

T.U.L.F. DEBACLE – THE CENTRE CRUMBLES

— Mervyn de Silva

LANKA

GUARDIAN

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T. V.
— in
defence
of the
medium

— Reggie Siriwardena

Gananath Obeyesekera on institutionalised violence

Kumari Jayawardena on the “silent revolution” of '56


Dayan Jayatilleka on Tamil issue and crisis in the South

M. Sinnathamby on plantation workers' new consciousness

● 2 ANNIVERSARIES — NICARAGUA, CUBA

● SRI LANKA AND INDIAN TRENDS

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POLICE POST

THE news report that the government plans to "re-locate" the Peradeniya police post may not accurately reflect official thinking but there obviously will be no return to the **status quo ante**. What is likely to happen is that a mobile unit of the Peradeniya police will move into the campus in the event of student disturbances. The Police will not wait for a summons from the University.

Actually, it is half a victory — first for common sense over the ill-advised recommendations of campus panjandrums and their patrons, and for one particular newspaper, the ISLAND. Resisting the temptation to take the tough law-and-order line so fashionable among some sections of the media or give expression to deep-laid middle class prejudices against the university community (sometimes, against university education itself), the ISLAND took an intelligent and brave stand when a student was shot dead by the police to set off unrest in almost all the other campuses.

Recalling its early warning about deteriorating conditions at Peradeniya and 'the regimentation of thought' within the universities, the ISLAND opened its editorial comment with the bold sentence:

"regimentation of thought, yes. But not a bullet in the back."

Meanwhile the judge inquiring into the incident awaits guidance from the A-G's department.

FOREIGN CONSULTANTS

TWO memoranda, actually muted protests, by the Sri Lanka Institute of Engineers and by the Institute of Architects on the extensive use of "foreign consultants" and the neglect of qualified Sri Lankan talent help expose the new conflicts of interest generated by the "open economy" policies. The Institute of engineers, President L. Sydney de Silva, states:

We regret to note that foreign consultants and contractors are advertising in their countries, for Engineers to work in Sri Lanka

on projects undertaken by them. Salaries offered are of the order of Rs. 50,000/- per month for even junior positions, in addition to free living accommodation, free transport and other fringe benefits. Where Engineers are provided by the consultants to the government (or the private sector) it costs the client country about Rs. 125,000/- to Rs. 150,000/- per month (a multiplier of 2.5 to 3 being generally used).

The Institute of Architects states: Our institute has been seriously concerned by the current trend in the engagement of Foreign Consultants in preference to Sri Lankan Consultants both by the Government Sector as well as the Private Sector. In some cases Sri Lankan consultants were previously engaged, but their services have been discontinued for reasons other than competency. They have been replaced by Foreign Consultants or by foreign contractors acting as consultants in turnkey type arrangements.

We wish to bring to your notice that the Foreign Consultants so engaged are from countries where activities of non-nationals as architects are subject to control and to regulations upon registration. Practice of architecture in their own home countries by non-nationals is forbidden without legal registration. We may cite the United Kingdom, the United States of America, all of the ECC Countries, all of the Middle East countries, India, ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

INDIAN OPPOSITION

The Sri Lanka issue is one of 31 items picked by 13 parties representing nearly all sections of the Indian opposition for a month-long discussion in the next sessions of the Indian parliament. The 13 parties include BJP-Lok Dal combine and the Communist parties. Earlier a co-ordination committee of four major Left parties (CPM, CPI RSP and FB) decided to "focus attention or and raise forcefully" the Sri Lankan issue in the Indian parliament. This is the sole foreign issue which the Committee which met in Delhi selected for special attention.

Citizenship Act

Kumari Jayawardena writes: 'On the first Citizenship Act in August 1948 C. Suntheralingam voted for but refrained from speaking in the debate; but (having) serious reservations about the question resigned from the government'. The exact opposite is what actually happened. Suntheralingam absented himself at voting time and was sacked from the cabinet by D.S. Senanayake on the advice of Sir Ivor Jennings.

As regards the Act of December 1948 it is perfectly correct that G.G.Ponnambalam, together with several other ACTC members of parliament (K. Kanagaratnem, T. Ramalinkam, and if

(Continued on page 3)

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Who buried the TULF?

Mervyn de Silva

Join the Club, Dr. Ananda-tissa de Alwis, Cabinet spokesman.

The lead article in the LANKA GUARDIAN of April 1st 84 was headlined.

End of Jaw-Jaw and — a Requiem for the TULF?

On July 25, after the collapse of the TULF sponsored 'satyagraha' campaign in the North and east, Dr. de Alwis says that it is the end of the road for the TULF. Another report (SUN) which cites unidentified government sources says that the government does not know whether TULF participation in the Roundtable Conference will serve any useful purpose. Whom do they represent? The question is real enough but the tone in which it is posed by pro-UNP groups clearly suggest that the government's supporters are enjoying the discomfiture and distress of the TULF. How very short-sighted and stupid!

The logic behind this thinking which so cheerfully welcomes the misfortunes of an increasingly isolated and illfated TULF is not difficult to divine. The TULF was the main opposition party; its leader was in fact the Leader of the Opposition, a post constitutionally recognised and therefore an essential part of the parliamentary system. This gave the Opposition leader and the TULF the right to speak on behalf of the Tamil people — certainly the Tamils of the north — and gave them access to the outside world, especially to those countries which have parliamentary forms of government. It is in these countries that large groups of Tamil expatriates live, and now conduct quite an effective propaganda campaign for EELAM. Moreover, it is these same countries which are Sri Lanka's principal aid givers. So, the TULF, a recognised political party, with a fair number of members in an elected assembly, was accorded a certain recognition by the governments of those nations. The Opposition leader, in person, had access

to the leaders and leading politicians of those countries.

The UNP and pro-UNP groups now believe that all this will collapse when it is clear that the TULF's electoral support-base, the northern constituency has rejected or has been seen as rejecting the TULF's leadership.

If all this is true, then the government does not need to negotiate with a party which speaks for nobody but itself. Further, "the boys" with the guns do not want anything less than EELAM and even the international community sympathises with the government's view that EELAM is non-negotiable. Diplomatic pressure on Colombo to negotiate a political settlement will thus ease. India, in particular, will have no moral basking for its diplomatic pressure moves. In other words, Colombo can de-recognise the TULF on the grounds that the TULF's constituency has demonstrably withdrawn its support.

With no pressure for a political settlement, the government can now adopt the attitude that all it has to do is grant some 'concessions' to the Tamils of Colombo and perhaps win over a few pliant politicians from the Jaffna Tamil community too. A Second Chamber could be the ideal mechanism to achieve precisely that. **Far from de-centralising, we could then have greater centralisation, with the Upper House serving a decorative function, an accommodation of the minority Tamils.**

Finally, this will allow a more open shift from jaw-jaw to war-war. How can one talk with a community which has obviously withdrawn support from those 'representatives' who were prepared to talk? The community seems to have shifted their loyalties to 'the boys'. But 'the boys' are only ready to talk with the gun. So we the govern-

ment, has no other option. We have to talk in the same fashion. On with the war.

This is the thinking behind those who have raised such a loud hurrah over the collapse of the TULF's satyagraha campaign and over the indignities and scorn poured on the TULF leadership.

This neat self-satisfying argument misses a fundamental point. If the TULF is ready for burial, then it was the Sinhala Political Establishment which dug its grave. But it is not the TULF alone which is being prepared for interment but the non-violent democratic option.

The process of polarisation is being completed. But to whose advantage? In line with whose strategy? History will provide the answer.

Letter . . .

(Continued from page 1)

my memory serves V. Kumaraswamy) voted for although the ACTC would now wish this fact to be forgotten. The voting on these two bills was not divided on ethnic lines but on right vs. left political lines. This is an important fact to remember as it contradicts the Vaddukoddal Resolution claim that two Acts were passed because the estate sector voters sent in 7 Tamils to parliament. It was not because they were Tamils but because they made common cause with the left that the Sinhalese and Tamil right voted for the bills and the Sinhalese and Tamil left voted against.

S. Wirasekera

Nugegoda

NEWS
BACKGROUND

Maitri's critical line

“The tamest opposition in the history of our parliament” was one comment heard at a recent seminar on current politics and the ethnic conflict. It came from a former parliamentarian. “Couldn't they have at least staged a token walk-out when the government closed any discussion on the student deaths?” was another observation.

While it is true that Messrs Dinesh Gunawardena, Lakshman Jayakody, and Sarath Muttetuwegama strive bravely to inject some spirit into parliamentary debate even UNP lower ranks are scornful of a tame Opposition. Even in Singapore, a one-man Opposition puts up a better fight, commented a politician who has served more than a decade in the legislature. Even in military regimes, he added, mentioning Bangladesh.

Opposition circles were thus happily surprised when ‘the gentle giant from Madawachchiya’ made a spirited speech on the emergency debate. He made the following points:

* You (the UNP) may think that the Muslim people have acquiesced in the induction of Israeli experts, under whose orders, we learn that our military and our police have to function. Well, I for one can discern the anger of the Muslim community, glowing like embers beneath the surface.

* Lift the ban of the JVP and the NSSP. We have said this repeatedly. If there is any evidence against these parties, then prosecute them legally.

* Table the agreement about the oceanographic survey being conducted with U. S. assistance, in our waters.

* Israeli advisors will create and extend an “intelligence gathering” system embracing every department and every village. This will only speed up this Govt.'s march towards dictatorship.

* A newspaper report says that Asia Foundation of officials attended a judges conference at which the Minister of Justice was present. The report said that the Asian Foundation official was advising the judiciary.

* The Peradeniya — Colombo students issue cannot be discussed because it is subjudice. But this much may be said: In '83 December, a police post on the campus without anyone (associations of the academic staff or student unions) requesting it. This was the root cause.

* When we take all these into account, plus the proposed pseudonym law, we can see that the general trend is one of the selling out of national independence and the setting up of a dictatorial state.

Withdraw Press Law

The READER-LISTNER-SPECTATOR ORGANIZATION is of the view that the law proposed by the government to prohibit publication of views and news without stating the author's name or such publications under Pseudonyms is a fatal blow to the already curtailed freedom of the press in Sri Lanka states H. A. Seneviratne secretary.

Freedom of the press is curtailed in this country in so many ways. The government in power controls two of the major newspaper organizations directly besides controlling the radio and the television. Emergency regulations that have become almost a permanent feature in the body politic of this country further curtails the freedom of the press. Besides, on specific matters censorship is imposed from time to time as is today in the case of news and comment on matters relating to the national question, the introduction of an Israeli Interests Section and the affairs of the University and other educational institutions.

We call upon all newspapers and other publications that are prepared to save the democratic rights of the people to open their columns without restrictions, other than those imposed by the existing law, for the freest possible expression of views regarding the proposed press law. It is only through such a process that the people can be called upon to safeguard and fight for the freedom of the press which is part and parcel of their democratic rights.

The Reader-Listner-Spectator Organisation also calls upon all genuine writers of this country to carry out a campaign within and outside Sri Lanka and oppose the proposed press law.

19 Unions Condemn

THE joint meeting of representatives of 19 trade union organisations held at Colombo on 21st June 1984 —

CONDEMNNS...

(1) The Police shooting of students at the Peradeniya University Campus on the night of 19th June 1984, resulting in the killing of one student and serious injury to another.

(2) The Police shooting at or opposite the Aquinas Hostel of students of the Colombo University this morning (21st June), resulting in the killing of one student and serious injury to another.

(3) The closure of all University Campuses and of various schools.

(4) The arrest and detention of elected student leaders and other student activists from various campuses.

(5) The imposition of general Press censorship under the state of Emergency, extended on 18th June 1984 for the 13th successive month since the imposition of the current State of Emergency, on 18th May 1983, and the censorship of all news relating to the attacks upon and repressing of students and student activities, since 19th June 1984, with the result that only the Government's version of those incidents and matters is made known to the public, and not the truth.

(6) The arrest and detention of political and trade union leaders or others.

DEMANDS...

(1) The immediate closure of the Police Station established inside the Peradeniya University Campus.

(2) The immediate removal of Police units from all University Campuses and the reopening of the Campuses without delay.

(3) The immediate release of all students and others held under detention.

(4) The immediate ending of the Press censorship.

CALLS UPON...

Other trade union and mass organisations to support the above demands in whatever manner possible.

HINDU sounds a warning

Whether one agrees with its line of reasoning or not, the two-column editorial in the *HINDU* deserves the serious attention and invites the most sober reflection of every student of the Sri Lankan crisis, particularly of its external dimension. And the crisis, far from showing signs of easing, gathers momentum not least of all because of fast-moving events in both Sri Lanka and India, and taken together, in the region.

The *HINDU*, a highly conservative paper based in Madras, appears to reflect opinion in official circles in Delhi. Besides, it is not just a critical analysis of events. This carefully crafted editorial also has a message.

"IF THE ASSUMPTION is valid that the crisis in Sri Lanka focused on the Tamil question is capable of being resolved through political negotiations aimed at finding a fair and democratic via media, the conservative government of Mr. J. R. Jayewardene seems to be going out of its way to undercut the process. No other reasonable construction can be placed on its handling of the situation in the Island since the genocidal state-backed program against the Tamils a year ago — which, on top of the large-scale loss of life, property and avocation, brought about an unprecedented uprooting of the minority population, physically as well as spiritually. From the standpoint of both the Tamils of Sri Lanka and India, whose good offices represent a major positive factor in the situation, Mr. Jayewardene has been chopping his position so much that an evaluation of his substantive approach or reliance on any conceivable goodwill element in it becomes especially difficult. It is clear that the "ideas" he pulled out of his latest travel kit in New Delhi do not add up to anything much from the point of

view of a serious political solution. What is needed is an equitable and democratic institutional structure, a meaningful alteration of the rules of the game in Sri Lanka, that will offer the alienated Tamil population a measure of autonomy, real self-administering and development opportunities. What Mr. Jayewardene and his Minister for National Security Mr. Lalith Athulathudali, have offered in the latest round is some new play upon the discredited (and now for the northern and eastern provinces, dissolved) local authority experiment known as the district development council. From the perspective of the minimum Tamil political demands, it is insultingly little, as the TULF leader, Mr. A. Amirthalingam, has made clear in his latest statement.

"Meanwhile, serious issue must be taken with two or three points made by Mr. Jayewardena in his public pronouncement in New Delhi, if only to ensure that no one nurses any illusions. The first concerns the posture that "the political resolution of this issue is an internal matter of Sri Lanka." In the sense it reads like an insinuation against the Indian role, it simply does not hold true. With respect to the crisis and its spillover effects, India is not just another country, not just Sri Lanka's closest neighbour. The forced transfer of a large Tamil population numbering very much over 30,000 to Indian soil, the possibility of an additional and perhaps larger transfer in the event of another bloody minded episode, the close bonds with the minority population (including large numbers of Indian-origin Tamils), and the major impact of the crisis on the regional geopolitical situation vest the nation with vital and urgent stakes that it does not lie in the mouth of the UNP leaders to make light of. Moreover, as Mr. Amirthalingam has pointed out, even while asserting it is an inter-

nal matter the Sri Lanka President has taken steps to internationalise it by seeking Western help, by inducting the notorious Israeli counter-revolutionary agency, Mossad, and British, mercenaries, and so on if then, as Colombo asserts, a sizeable portion of the targets (the so-called terrorists) are in Tamil Nadu, would not the logic of the dangerous new game mean using the external counter insurgency and to hit out here? What would be the bilateral and regional consequences of such moves? Or what would they not be? One trusts that Mr. Jayewardene has already entered these questions in his calculations.

"The second point concerns the bogey of "terrorism", which Colombo imagines it can use in a bid to place India on the defensive. Since the very use of the term "terrorist" tends to pre-empt the argument, it must be clarified that the phenomenon of militancy among the Tamil youth in Sri Lanka is primarily a political phenomenon, reflecting the maturing of the crisis. When progress along constitutional lines becomes blocked, when normal and legitimate political expectations are repeatedly frustrated, when it appears that there is no solution within the rules of the game, historical experience demonstrates it is a situation tailor-made for the development of militancy, including that part of it which takes recourse to non-peaceful methods. It is well known that India has offered its good offices in the spirit of making its contribution to a peaceful political settlement within the context of a sovereign and united Sri Lanka. It seems remarkably unwise not to take advantage of this."

The ethnic conflict and the crisis in the South

Dayan Jayatilleka

Our topic today is the "Ethnic Conflict and the Crisis in the South". Here I would like to focus on the national question as it exists in the North and East of the country, and its inter-action with the crisis in the predominantly Sinhala areas.

I would like first of all to say that today we are enveloped in a 'general national crisis' to use Lenin's term, or what Antonio Gramsci calls an 'organic crisis.' I would like to deal first of all with the key characteristics of this organic crisis as well as the various responses to the organic crisis. This latter aspect we can call the conjunctural aspect of the organic crisis.

The crisis in Sri Lanka is one of relatively long duration. One could go back to 1971, but then that too was only a symptom of a deep-seated malaise. You could really go back as far as 1963, with the rapid changes of Finance Ministers the formation of the United Left Front and the decision of the Left parties to join the SLFP government, which were all manifestations or responses to a crisis that was present in Sri Lankan society as far back as that time. So far the last two decades we have been "cooking in crisis" and it is against this backdrop that the ethnic question has manifested itself. We must understand that this crisis which is one of long duration is a structural crisis. This crisis derives from the crisis of the world capitalist system of which we are a peripheral part and also from the contradictions of our own dependent capitalism. The other characteristic of the crisis that I would like to remind you of that it is a **multi-level** crisis — it is not simply an economic crisis, nor a political or ethnic crisis as much. It operates at all these levels of the social formation — each level is distinct, you cannot reduce the political crisis to the economic crisis — but they are inter-related and inter-active. Then we have the responses to this crisis on the part

of the successive regimes and the masses. These responses themselves aggravate and change this or that aspect of the crisis.

Now what are the key characteristics of the organic crisis we find ourselves in? There are of course the economic and the political and military and the social aspects. I will dwell only very briefly on the economic aspect of the crisis as such: I have spoken twice within an year or so on the "World Capitalist Crisis and its Impact on the dependent capitalist economy of Sri Lanka". So I am deliberately avoiding dwelling at length on the economic crisis but you are welcome to ask questions in the course of the discussion.

I would just say that the economic crisis is a reflection of rapid dependent capitalist growth (particularly in the post-1977 Period) in the context of global crisis.

The examples of Iran, Philippines and Central America have brought home to us this social contradictions engendered by the rapid expansion of dependent capitalist relations. And this is all the more so when this takes place in the context of a global economic crisis and the burden of this crisis is transferred from the metropolitan centres to the periphery. So we see all these exacerbated social contradictions, increasing unemployment, which is expected to reach 1 million in 1985, and inflation running at 22% — it may remind you that in Nicaragua just two years before the revolution inflation was running at only 11%. We have declining real wages estimated by top economists as 30% during the last few years. We have a massive, and mounting debt, and factory closures — the Wellawatte Spinning and Weaving Mills — and flight of capital. However, as I said, I am not going to dwell on the economic crisis and would much rather dwell on the political and the military aspects of the organic crisis of the Sri Lanka social formation.

This article is based on a talk in the current Bishop Leo Nanayakkara Memorial Lecture Series.

I think the political crisis could be traced to what I would call the contradictions of maintaining a racist capitalism. Capitalism or the capitalist mode of production is supposed to have its own internal logic — the logic of capital accumulation. But what we have is not a pure capitalism — not that there can be such a thing but when what we have is not even a dependent capitalism with all its contradictions as in El Salvador, here we have a racist capitalism, where the need of the dominant sector is not just to preserve the bourgeois or class hegemony, but the hegemony of the Sinhala-Buddhist bourgeoisie. Therefore the political crisis I would reiterate is rooted in the contradictions of racist capitalism, and the need to preserve Sinhala bourgeois hegemony, and if one may be flippant, I would say that the political crisis would be summed up in two words — 'secession' and 'succession'. We have succession crisis atop the crisis faced by the state due to the secessionist struggle.

Let us dwell a little more on the political crisis and try to identify and enumerate the components of this political crisis. In the first place we have a historical situation in which the representatives of the old ruling classes cannot rule 'in the old way'. The old way is the bourgeois democratic way or the bourgeois liberal way, the way of representing social tensions and containing them within an institutional framework i.e. the Parliament. The Referendum, which I think is the culmination of a process beginning as far back as 1972 at the very least, was a watershed. It made it very clear that it was impossible for the dominant social groups to continue to maintain parliamentary democracy the way that we have known it. The student crisis of the past few weeks made it quite clear — the very low threshold of tolerance. The response to dissent in a very dissent in a very coercive fashion, I consider to be a sign of weakness.

If I remember right there were very few people killed — may be one or two — during the May 1968 upheaval in Paris. That was a sign of a system albeit in crisis which had a leadership which in turn still had considerable reserves. The leadership of course was of Gen. De Gaulle. But in Sri Lanka we have a situation in which the ruling classes have no other way of ruling than by firm domination. That is the first aspect I see of the political crisis. That, I reiterate, is a sign of weakness and not of strength.

Secondly, we have the phenomenon of internal fissures, factions, tendencies and divisions even nearing breaking point. This is a phenomenon everyone is quite well aware of. We observed two senior ministers of the government openly disagreeing on a fundamental principle of the foreign policy of our government — our relations with our biggest and closest neighbour. This is a clear sign of internal dissension. Another instance was when another minister albeit not of the UNP, took his place on the opposite side of a negotiating table from that of the government after leading a strike, as a representative of the estate workers. Several months ago Mr. Gamini Dissanayaka, had angry exchanges with Mr. Bill Devanayagam and Mr. S. Thondaman — this is yet another instance. So we have the inability of the regime to come up with a **concerted response** to the current crisis.

The third aspect of the current political crisis — this is one that impinges very directly on the ethnic conflict — is the inability to come up with the reform component of viable counter-insurgency strategy. Now I am deliberately not going to argue here on the rights and wrongs of Tamil self-determination.

I am taking, momentarily, the stand-point of the incumbent regime itself. What I would say is that if a guerilla threat is to be defeated, if a viable counter-insurgency strategy is to be implemented, it has to have, apart from the repressive component, a reformist component. This was most clear in one of the most successful counter-insur-

gency movement in the post-war period, that of Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines, Magsaysay managed to defeat the insurgency of the Hukbalahap in the fifties by eliminating the military abuse of power — (torture) — by having free general elections by declaring an amnesty, by stealing in fact some of the planks of the platform of the guerillas — that of land reform. He offered an attractive package to guerillas who surrendered. A plot of land plus amnesty and financial inducements were part of the package offered, while opening political negotiations. Benino Aquino the young Mayor of Tarue was Ramon Magsaysay's envoy to meet Luis Tarue, the guerilla leader in the mountains. But in Sri Lanka the regime has been unable to offer a strong reformist package that would win over the support base of the Tamil guerillas, at least neutralize the majority of Tamil people. In the absence of such a strategy the only strategy left would amount to nothing but genocide.

The dead-lock at the Round-Table Conference is another very, very clear indicator of the weakness of the regime. There is so much of shadow-boxing. It is not clear who they are afraid of. First we are told that the Sinhala people will not accept devolution. Who has asked the Sinhala people? A regime which has deprived the Sinhala people of everything they held dear, from the ration-book to the ballot, now seeks to make the Sinhala people a scape-goat for its inability or unwillingness to come up with a solution, which would marginalize the guerillas and make it easier for the security forces to deal with them from a security point of view! Because of the reasons I mentioned earlier, the factional infighting, and also the inability to accommodate dissent, the inability to be flexible, and because it is perceived that any devolution of power would be construed as a sign of weakness — it is impossible for the regime to come up with a reformed component of a counter-insurgency strategy. It has mistaken brittleness for firmness and strength!

Then we have another aspect of the crisis discontent has been focussed

at the apex. That is yet another sign of an unsuccessful political system. A successful system manages to deflect and diffuse discontent. Because we have a structure that intentionally concentrates all power at the apex, an apex that is "free from whims and fancies of the legislature", which is now rendered a rubber-stamp by the Referendum, we therefore have all discontent directed in a very unmediated fashion at the apex of power itself viz: the executive.

I would now like to bring into the picture, the institutional crisis. That means the crisis of the state apparatus — the **bourgeois** state apparatus. It is supposed to function according to a certain class logic. The logic is that of the extension and the maintenance of bourgeois relations of production. What we have is a bourgeois state apparatus **that is cross-cut with ethnic divisions**. Therefore its class logic does not function in the relentless fashion that it does, say, in India. And of course you have a legal crisis. The rather sordid manoeuvring to frustrated magisterial inquiries concerning the student issue, the criticisms levelled by the Chief Justice a few months ago, the resolutions passed by the Bar Association, also indicates that the crisis is not only at the level of politics but also at the level of the state apparatus and juridical and institutions.

Summing up the crisis of the regime, I would agree with a definition that was popular for about ten years, for all the wrong reasons. My friend Dr. Wickramabahu Karunaratne who is at the moment giving a lecture at the new Town Hall on the occasion of the 4th anniversary of his proscribed party, was one of those who incessantly describes President Jayewardene as 'Bonapartist'.

Five years before that from about 1971 upto 1976 he and others like Rohana Wijeweera were describing Mrs. Bandaranaike as Bonapartist: I found the characterisation most non-rigorous, because 'Bonapartism', according to Marx and Engels is a very unstable and temporary situation

(Continued on page 28)

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SINHALA CHAUVINISM IN THE FIFTIES

Kumari Jayawardena

By the time of the election held in 1956, both the UNP and the SLFP, as well as Philip Gunewardena's VLSSP (Viplavakari Sama Samaja Party) had opted for the declaration of Sinhala as the only official language. The LSSP and CP however continued to hold out for parity of Sinhala and Tamil and many of the meetings they organised in support of this policy were broken up by Sinhala chauvinists. At the elections in April 1956, the coalition led by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike — the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) — won 51 seats, out of 95 seats, obtaining an absolute majority, the Left winning 17 seats and the UNP being reduced to 8 seats. Since the election campaign had been based mainly on the language issue, the first legislation of the new government was the Bill to make Sinhala the sole official language.

In presenting the bill, Bandaranaike outlined the injustices that had arisen out of the continued use of English, and explained the basis for the change from parity to 'Sinhala only'; referring to Sir John Kotelawala's speech in Jaffna calling for parity, he described the reaction:

"Then everything exploded. People in the South saw this thing staring them in the face — parity of official language — and felt that it would be gravely detrimental to the continuance and progress of the Sinhala language; that it would almost imply the extinction of the Sinhalese language."
(Hansard 6 June 1926)

However Bandaranaike, who had earlier advocated parity, also made some interesting reservations; describing the 'Sinhala only' agitation,

he said 'The vast majority of the Sinhalese felt that way very strongly. That at least is a fact. *Whether you consider them to have been absolutely justified is another question*'.

The support that Philip Gunewardena of the VLSSP gave to the bill attracted attention, for he was the first Left leader to abandon a progressive position on the ethnic issue. One LSSP member taunted him by quoting from an earlier speech, in 1948, on the occasion of the Citizenship Bill when Gunewardena said 'The LSSP and other revolutionary parties will fight this communalism and will not in any circumstances succumb to racialism. We have... fought to obtain for every person who lives in this island... the same rights'. (Quoted by Anil Moonesinghe, Hansard 11 June 1956). By 1956, Philip Gunewardena's views had changed and he argued that the 'Sinhala Only' Bill was necessary to redress historic grievances.

"We are completing, by this Bill an important phase in our national struggle. The restoration of the Sinhalese language to the position it occupied before the occupation of this country by foreign powers; marks an important stage in the history of the development of this island".
(Hansard, 14 June 1956).

Left opposition

The main Left parties in Sri Lanka came out in favour of parity, despite certain currents of opinion within their parties which preferred to move with the 'Sinhala tide'. In 1955, in the midst of agitation for 'Sinhala Only' and three days after an LSSP rally at the Colombo

Town Hall had been broken up by Sinhala extremists, Dr. Perera proposed in Parliament that Sinhala and Tamil be made state languages on a basis of parity. He spoke with reference to the mounting chauvinism in the country.

It would have been easy for me and the members of my party to have sponsored the very popular idea, Sinhalese only, and we would have been acclaimed as heroes as a good many others have been.

But our party has taken up a consistent position. Ever since our party was launched we have never faltered or wavered from that position because we felt that was the correct line to take. That position we still adhere to. However unpopular that line of action might be, I am convinced myself of the correctness of that attitude. It might mean going into the political wilderness for some time, but still we the members of the LSSP are prepared to face that. Let there be no mistake about this. (Hansard 19, Oct 1955)

The Sinhala Only Bill of 1956 was bitterly contested by both the Tamil Congress and the Left members of parliament. The Marxists attempted to find reasons for the degeneration to racism that had occurred. A brief consideration of their views are revealing, especially in view of their own changes of policy only a few years later.

Forewarnings of Separatism

In the debate in parliament, Leslie Goonewardena attributed the lack of concern for minority opinion to the lack of a developed national consciousness in Sri Lanka:

"One of the reasons why the state language question has become so acute and apparently...incapable of solution is because of the low level of consciousness of a Ceylonese nationality that exists among the people...we did not have mass struggles against imperialism in order to win independence....If the Sinhalese as well as the Tamils had gone to jail in their thousands a consciousness, not of Sinhalese and Tamil nationality but of a Ceylonese nationality would have been built up in that struggle."

With great foresight he also warned that the consequences of forcing the Sinhala language on an unwilling minority, would be ethnic rioting and also added:

There is the graver danger of the country...if those people...feel that a grave and irreparable injustice is done to them, there is a possibility of their deciding even to break away from the rest of the country. (Hansard 8 June 1956).

Similarly **Colvin R. de Silva** argued forcefully that while the acceptance of parity of language was the road to 'freedom of our nation and the unity of its components', 'Sinhala Only' would lead to unforeseen consequences:

Two torn little bleeding states may yet arise out of one little state.... ready for the imperialists to mop up that which imperialism has only recently disgorged. (Hansard, 14 June 1956).

Several of the Left speakers in the debate referred to the government's cynical use of the language issue for gaining political power. **Anil Moonesinghe** contrasted the 1947 and 1952 elections, which had no slogans to 'save the Sinhala language', with that of 1956 in which it had become the main slogan. 'How can one account for this except by the fact that certain people made this an election issue because they wanted to come to power' he stated, further criticising the MEP concept of Socialism:

"For them Socialism is confined to one section of the people, to one community, I have never witnessed this type of Socialism, except the Socialism of Pilsudski, Hitler and Mussolini". (Hansard, 11 June 1956)

In the voting in June 1956, there were 66 votes for the Bill (MEP, UNP and VLSSP) with 29 votes (LSSP, CP and Tamil Congress) being cast against. Significantly, the two major parties of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, along with a breakaway from a working-class party had opted for a policy that went against minority interests, in the name of redressing historic grievances and catering to the needs of the Sinhala masses. As in earlier instances, once again a democratic demand had been transformed into an anti-democratic assault on minority rights, and the Sinhala leaders were able to delude the Sinhala public that a progressive step forward had been achieved. Instead, what happened was a quick descent into ethnic violence, which erupted even as the Bill was being discussed.

Ethnic violence and conflict 1956-1958

The agitation on the language issue led in 1956 to the first outburst of serious ethnic violence in fifty years. It began when the Federal Party members who had started a **satyagraha** on June 5th, (when the 'Sinhala Only' bill was introduced,) were assaulted by a crowd of Sinhalese; there were further violent incidents against Tamils in Colombo and in the colonisation schemes of the Gal Oya Valley (in the Eastern province). During this phase of violence, over 150 people were estimated to have been killed.

The ethnic problem was thereafter to escalate and dominate the politics of the country. In this period, the Federal Party organised active resistance to the government's language policy, and announced a further **satyagraha** campaign for this purpose, timed for August 1957. The Prime Minister tried to avert this by coming to an agreement with the leader of Federal Party. Under the **Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact**, the **satyagraha** was abandoned; Tamil was to be recognised as the language of a national minority and the language of administration in the Northern and Eastern provinces, with provision for regional councils with powers over education, and the selection of persons for colonisation schemes.

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Sections of the Sinhalese, including the militant bhikkus, declared the pact to be a betrayal of Sinhala interests and the UNP organised a march to Kandy to protest against the bill. The situation was further aggravated by the campaign in Jaffna in March 1958, to tar out the Sinhalese letter **sri** on vehicle license plates, which led to retaliation by Sinhalese crowds who began to tar every Tamil sign in Colombo. In addition there was continuous pressure on Bandaranaike by the bhikkus who surrounded his house, demanding the abrogation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact; he finally had to accede to these pressures.

This was the background to the rioting that broke out in many parts of the country on May 23rd 1958, being especially severe in Colombo, Batticaloa, Polonnaruwa, Badulla, Kurunegala, Panadura, Galle, and Matara. Shops were looted and set on fire. Tamils were attacked and killed, trains were derailed and unparalleled violence took place for 4 days before a state of emergency was declared. The riots resulted in 12,000 Tamils having to flee their houses and take shelter in refugee camps before being transported to Jaffna. The mood in Colombo during the riots can be seen from the government agent's reports which described the situation on 26th and 27th May:

Passing vehicles were stopped and their occupants mercilessly assaulted. Moving trains were halted at several places and the passengers ruthlessly attacked. There were many instances of arson and such brutal scenes as men being burnt alive. Looting was rampant. The Police were helpless against these marauding rioters.

(Quoted in Kearney, p. 87).

One particular feature of the 1958 outburst was the violence in the areas of the North Central and Eastern provinces in which there were Sinhala landless colonists settled from other areas and hired wage labour, working on the opening up of jungle areas.

* * * *

The success of the 'Sinhala Only' campaign and the events of the 1958 riots once again revealed the persistence and strength of the concepts that we have identified as forming the Sinhala Buddhist consciousness. The concepts of the primacy of the Sinhala people and their mission to protect Buddhism were brought into full play during this period and were strong enough to incite some Sinhala people to go on the rampage against Sri Lankan Tamils. In class terms, the particular economic interests that were being served were those of the Sinhala petty-bourgeoisie, consisting of the Sinhala intelligentsia, students clerks, teachers, monks, small traders and shop-keepers. To this group, the language issue had been one of critical importance, affecting their daily lives and giving them the illusory hope that 'Sinhala Only' would mean more employment prospects and chances of getting into the prestigious posts held by the English-speaking elite. However, the Sinhala Buddhist consciousness of which we have spoken, was strong enough to draw in the support of other sections of the Sinhalese like the urban poor, landless peasants, colonists and lumpen elements, for what was conceived as a common struggle of the Sinhalese against the Tamils; in addition, the chauvinism of the period also forced the bourgeois political leadership to support the demand for 'Sinhala Only' in order to succeed electorally.

The 1958 violence caused serious re-thinking in MEP circles and after the riots were over, a Tamil language Act providing for the 'reasonable use' of Tamil in the North and Eastern provinces was passed, but this was done in the absence of the Federal Party M.P.'s who were in detention. The forces of communalism that had been unleashed in the early 1950's and had instigated the violence, loot and arson of 1958 were to continue in their violent policies — the Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike being shot dead in September 1959, by a bhikkhu.

(To be continued)

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Ideology and institutionalised violence

Gananath Obeyesekera

Prior to the election of the present government in 1977, the J.S.S. was a minuscule working-class trade union (most unions being controlled by the Marxist parties of Sri Lanka). Today the J.S.S. is the single largest trade union in the country and has an effective say in the working of government offices and corporations.

How did the J.S.S. come into prominence? The answer is simple but one that has frightening implications. Traditionally the leftist unions provided a Trotskyite or Marxist ideology for the working classes. Whatever one may think of these ideologies they had the effect of filling the empty space in the conscience of people with a specifically working-class ideology. With the massive election victory of the UNP the J.S.S. came into prominence. Several political leaders emerged who had access to, and control over, the slums and anomic areas of the city, prominent among them being Mr. Premadasa, the Prime Minister and Minister for Housing, whose power base was Central Colombo (once the power base of the Communist party leader), one of most crowded areas in the city; and Mr. M. H. Mohammed, Minister of Transport, who was the Parliamentary member for Borella also contains one of the largest slums in the city). With the expansion of the economy, produced by the free enterprise policy of the government, jobs in

the working-class sector were increasingly given to members of this lumpen proletariat who swelled the ranks of the pro-UNP unions. Soon members of other unions were intimidated and forced to join it. The J.S.S. was without a working-class ideology; its leadership owed personal allegiances to party bosses. It is in a sense an exaggerated version of what I noted in the smaller marked towns where culturally dispossessed people serve as small bands of thugs for local merchants and politicians. However, before 1977 these bands of thugs served their masters but had no institutionalized authority. The J.S.S. phenomenon changed this. They were now organized and effectively controlled government offices and corporations and wielded enough power to transfer and intimidate even high officials unpopular with them. Further-more, the J.S.S. was provided with an ideology. The precarious identity of marginal people was thus given a new reality and meaning: a political and nationalist ideology. The nature of this ideology was spelled out by their president, Mathew, in a speech in Parliament on August 4, soon after the recent riots.

Mathew's thesis was that we should adopt the Malaysian example as set out by Mahathir Bin Mohamed in his book, *The Malay Dilemma*. In this book Mahathir states, says Mathew, that while the Malays are for a free enterprise system, they should not allow other racial groups to compete with Malays. Consequently, protection must be initially afforded the Malay community. Furthermore, Islam should be upheld and propagated. Malays have no place else to go whereas the Chinese can go to China and the Indians to

India. The Malays are the original or indigenous people of Malaya and the only people who can claim Malaya as their one and only country. In accordance with the practice all over the world (*sic*), this confers on the Malays certain inalienable rights over the forms and obligations of citizenship which can be imposed on citizens of nonindigenous origin.

This dubious thesis can be applied, says Mathew, even better to the Sri Lanka situation. Malaya has 53 percent Malays and 35 percent Chinese, Sri Lanka has 74 percent Sinhalese and 17 percent Tamils. In spite of this disproportion, Tamils dominate every aspect of professional and economic life. You do not have to go to Madras, he says, come to Colombo and you'll see the Pettah dominated by South Indians (No longer, since Pettah was burnt down.) The Sinhalese also have nowhere to go, but Tamils can go to India. The Sinhalese have been extraordinarily patient. In Malaya, there was a political rally by Chinese in May 1969 when they jeered at Malay policemen. The Malay government squashed it, "Killing all the Chinese who were there." We however, says Mathew, have been patient for ten years now "what had happened there has occurred in Sri Lanka also." Earlier in his speech Mathew quoted from another speech he made in Parliament: "By non-violent methods or violent ones the Sinhala people are ready" to prevent the division of the country. (The summary of Mathew's speech and preceding quotes are from Hansard (Parliamentary Debates), August 4, 1983, pp. 1308-1324.)

Such an ideology has a great deal of appeal to the Sinhalese, but it is also fostered by the Tamil elites

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who self-consciously identify with the Tamils of South India. The Sinhalese identity nowadays is predicated on the view that since they speak an Indo-European language, they are of North Indian origin whereas the Dravidian-speaking Tamils are from the South. The historical reality however is totally different. Except perhaps for the oldest stratum of settlers prior to 200 B.C., almost all subsequent settlers in Sri Lanka came from South India, mostly from Tamil Nadu, Orissa, and Kerala and quickly became Sinhalese. In fact, some of the most vociferously anti-Tamil castes among the Sinhalese were post-fifteenth-century migrants from South India. By contrast, the Tamils of Jaffna and the East Coast have been in Sri Lanka from at least the tenth to the fourteenth centuries A.D., if not earlier. They also came from diverse parts of South India though the Jaffna (Northern) Tamils now claim that they came from Tamil Nadu. As I stated earlier the only group of recent Tamil immigrants are the estate populations of the hill country brought over by the British in the middle and late nineteenth century. Both sides share antagonistic myths that are opposed to historical reality and like human beings everywhere act in terms of the former—with tragic consequences.

Mathew's ideology is doubtless shared by a vast number of Sinhalese, but the J.S.S. has given it an unprecedented militancy. Moreover, the union has spread its tentacles into other areas of the country. Thus today, the members of Parliament have created through other local groups in small market towns, a complex, powerful series of organizations that can be put to political use. At the same time there has occurred a remarkable change in the composition of political power brokers in the country, even in village areas. Traditionally the vote, and especially the village vote, was delivered or controlled by an educated village elite coming generally from "respectable" families. This was true of all parties but especially the UNP, the country's most important conservative party. Today this has

changed or is in fact changing; political power on the village level is in the hands of those who can control the unemployed and the discontented, primarily the youth.

It is against this context that one must examine specific examples of political violence in recent times. A large number of these events have been documented by the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) of Sri Lanka whose man is a highly regarded Anglican bishop, the Rt. Rev. Lakshman Wickremesinghe. Here are a few of these cases from the CRM files and my own notes.

1. A series of violent acts occurred in Jaffna in the end of May and early June 1981, of which the most serious was the burning of the Public Library by thugs from outside while security forces did nothing to stop the arson. The burning of the Public Library was a profoundly symbolic act: the library contained priceless manuscripts pertaining to the identity of the Tamils of Jaffna. On the Buddhist side it was an unparalleled act of barbarism, since rarely in Sri Lanka's recorded history (and perhaps even in the larger history of Buddhism) was there an example of book burning of this magnitude. The People of Jaffna identified the outsiders as the thugs of a prominent politician. The rumor in the Sinhalese areas was the same, yet no action was taken. Next year, the action was repeated in certain parts of the Saburagamuva Province where Tamil shops were destroyed and the homes of Tamil plantation workers pillaged. Again no action was taken against the political leaders involved in this affair.

2. A second event pertained to a gathering of artists and writers protesting their being refused work at the government-owned Broadcasting Corporation. A gang of thugs brandishing clubs and knives broke up this meeting, tore up the microphones, and chased away the participants. They shouted, "what kind of artists are you"! Even more disconcerting was a disruption of a meeting of a Sinhalese-Buddhist middle-class organization where Ediriweera Sarachchandra

Sri Lanka's best-known dramatist, was beaten up. Sarachchandra, had written a satirical book called **Dharmishta Samajaya** (A Just Society) where he highlighted the decay of cultural values brought about by the social and economic policies of the government. The thugs came in buses belonging to the state-owned bus corporation, and the Communist party paper even carried the license numbers of the buses. Sarachchandra himself made a complaint to the police. As in previous cases no police action was taken.

The following are a few examples from thirty-five cases of intimidation and assault documented by the Civil Rights Movement in a publication of October 12, 1981.

3. On July 4, 1980, teachers at Maharagama Teachers Training College were picketing peacefully when a Government Transport Board bus No. 23 Sri 2549 came through the college gates, carrying twenty-seven people including a stalwart of the J.S.S. Thugs got out and began to assault the teacher trainees with rubber belts, stones, bicycle chains, etc. women were thrown to the ground and waste oil was poured over their clothes and into their eyes and ears. They attempted to run over one girl with the bus. Police arrived about 4.00 p.m. and took a statement. Two hours later people were taken to Colombo South Hospital. Four female teachers were seriously injured.

4. On June 15, 1978, 9.30 a.m., about 400 thugs, members of the J.S.S., threatened six section heads at the **Thulhiriya Textile Mills** and drove them off the premises. They were forced to resign. The management was warned by the thugs not to allow the six people back. It appeared that only J.S.S. members and those who accepted their terms were allowed to stay in the Mills.

In February 1980 the personnel Manager of the **People's Bank** was, abused and assaulted in his office by J.S.S. men in the presence of several members of the staff. The police were informed and the four assailants were arrested. However,

they were shortly released on minimal bail of R.250/-each. The next day, a J.S.S. member threatened certain staff members near the head office entrance over this matter.

The management suspended four people from their jobs as a result of this incident. In September 1, 1980, a mob roamed the building, abusing and threatening officers. Eventually, the police were sent for and the Staff Department was put under a police guard. The mob then looted the canteen.

On November 1, 1930, the interdicted members were reinstated as a result of political pressure. The Personnel Manager was later transferred.

The pattern in these activities documented by CRM is clear: the gangs were organized, they came in government vehicles, they were sometimes accompanied by politicians and for the most part they belonged to the trade union arm of the party. This almost certainly accounts for police inaction. These activities received little public comment in the press largely owing to the fact that the newspapers were either directly owned by the government such as the Lake House group of newspapers, or supported by it. The exception was *Attha*, the Sinhalese newspaper of the communist party, but its circulation was limited and its offices closed and sealed by the government for various periods of time.

The greatest shock to public opinion, however, occurred as a result of two recent events whereby the Supreme Court decisions seemed to have been openly flouted by the government. In a public meeting held in 1982 by an interreligious organization, a police officer seized leaflets that were being distributed. A Buddhist clergyman filed suit against the police officer. The court held that the police officer had violated the fundamental rights of the petitioner and decreed that damages and costs be directly paid by him. The government however, promoted this police officer and ordered that the costs and damages be paid out of public funds. This was done the government stated so that "public officers should do their jobs with-

out fear of consequences from adverse court decisions."

The second event followed a similar pattern but received full publicity in all newspapers and outraged the middle-class conscience, which was until now generally favourable to a government that supported their class interests. In this case a senior left politician, Mrs. Vivienne Gunawardene, complained of assault and unlawful arrest by the Police during a march to the American embassy in Colombo in protest against the nuclearization of the military base at Diego Garcia. The Supreme Court presided over by three judges held that her arrest was unlawful and unconstitutional and ordered that the state pay her compensation. On the very day the judgement was issued, Cabinet promoted one police officer involved in the case. A few days later practically all newspapers headlined the sensational news that thugs in state-owned buses paraded outside the homes of the three judges and shouted obscenities at them. The police were conveniently not available when the judges tried to contact them. I was present in Sri Lanka at this time and it was commonplace for people gathered in bus stops and other public places to speculate whether it was "X" politician's thugs or "Y" politician's thugs that did it. Prime Minister Premadasa, however, made a strong statement saying that the government took a very serious view of the matter and that "appropriate action will be taken in consultation with the Attorney-General." Thus far nothing has come out of the police inquiries. It should be remembered however that this open scoffing at the judgement of the Supreme Court on these two occasions is part of a long conflict between the government and judiciary which commenced under the previous government of Mrs. Bandaranaike, particularly during the period 1970-1977. The present government with its political slogan of a "Just Society" promised to rectify these, but in the last few years the rift between the executive and the judiciary seems again to have widened.

Virtually every Tamil I met was of the opinion that the violence against them was organized especially by influential politicians. Given the

pattern of political intimidation and their extreme nationalist ideology, the view has considerable plausibility.

One of the most shameful events was the refusal of the minor staff of several hospitals to tend or care for the wounded. I know of an upper-class Tamil woman who broke her leg jumping from a balcony as her house was burning. She was removed to a hospital, but it refused to accept her because the minor staff (orderlies and labourers) threatened to strike if she was admitted. I know of another instance where a Tamil was actually stabbed to death in a hospital bed, allegedly by a minor employee. In these and many other instances, the party union can be held culpable since hospital system is almost totally controlled by it. Indeed, five months earlier the Government Medical Officers Association complained of indiscipline in the hospital system and appealed to the government to protect the medical profession from union thugs. In an editorial of January 4, 1983, the government-owned newspaper, *The Daily News*, commented on the situation thus: The issue brings into focus again the part of trade unions in the medical profession, no matter at what level... Union leaders, no matter where, must not be encouraged to get away through some show of force...

Sadly, the Government Medical Officers Association is not the only organization that has protested against the extension of political patronage to hoodlums. Sadly there is nothing new in this malady. Sadly enough, it is to be seen in other state-controlled organizations where again the management apparently lacks the strength to enforce discipline on favoured sections or individuals on their staff.

One thing is clear enough. No state, no government, no party that condemns Naxalite (leftist terrorist groups that operate in Bengal) methods can condone equally outrageous behaviour in any institution under its control.

It is futile to denounce thuggery on the one hand and resort to it or let it go unpunished on the other.

(To be continued)

MEDIA AND CRIME

Reggie Siriwardena

Moral reformers have often looked on media forms of entertainment as the root of social evils. The practice is very old. In England in Shakespear's time, the puritans blamed immorality on the theatre, and closed it down when they won political power. When I was a child, many middle — class parents regarded what they called the 'bioscope' as something inherently dangerous and sinful, and even thought that cinema going spoilt one's eyesight. It is usually the new and rising popular form which becomes the main target of moralist attack. At one time it was the theatre, then the novel, still later the film: now it is television which receives the brunt of the assault.

All this does not mean that we shouldn't be watchful in respect of the social influence of the media, whose potency, for good or ill, is undeniable. That the history of media and media criticism does suggest, however, is that we should be wary of making facile generalisations, of leaping to conclusions on the basis of random and impressionistic observations. These caveats are all the more important when the subject of discussion is one that is likely to arouse strong emotional reactions, as in the case of crime and violence. We must also remember that those who regard mass media with strong moral distaste are often ill-qualified to make informed judgements regarding them, since their bias prevents them from making any close acquaintance with the very subject of their criticism. Sitting on the Film Commission of 1962, I had the experience of listening to an old gentleman who demanded that all films should be banned, and the cinema industry closed down. When asked how many films he had seen, he replied in rather shocked tones that he had never watched one in his life. I should like this paper, therefore plea for caution, reasonableness and moderation in our approach to the subject of media and crime. I have no ready-made conclusions to offer because I think the uncertainties of

the terrain on which we are operating makes it impossible to adopt any dogmatic positions. That I should like to do is to raise the issues, to point to certain necessary lines of inquiry and convey some tentative and personal reflections on the subject of discussion. If that little, I should like to leave more ambitious judgements to those who are more assured of their certainty.

I wish to set out below under two heads the criticisms that have been most frequently made in respect of their treatment of crime and violence:

1. Media, crime and society

Media devote an undue proportion of their space/time to stories (factual or fictional) concerning crime. They give excessive prominence or emphasis to such stories. In their modes of reporting or depiction of them, they encourage identification on the part of readers/audiences with the criminal. Habituation to stories of crime desensitizes people to violence and makes them more ready to tolerate it or to participate in it. Particularly in the case of the visual media (film and TV) watching crimes being committed prompts people to imitate such behaviour.

2. Media, violence and children

(I list this aspect of the question separately because it is often given special emphasis by critics of the media.)

The dangers of media treatment of crime are all the greater in respect of children because children are more impressionable and more likely to respond to what they read or see in immature ways. Apart from those children who may imitate or adopt as a model criminal or violent behaviour that they watch, other children may be psychologically affected by the visual depiction of violence: It can be a source of phobias and nightmares.

I shall discuss the validity of these criticisms mainly in the Sri Lankan context, though I shall refer occasionally to parallels relating to media in other countries. But I should like to underline here one point that is, I think, very important for any discussion of the social effects of media. There are socialists and theorists of media who adopt what is virtually a technologically deterministic position in respect of the impact of the media on society. They tend to assume that media mould audiences all over the world in very similar ways. I don't think such an assumption is justified. We are still very far from being the 'global village' that theorists like Marshall McLuhan believe the world has become. The impact of a new technological medium like TV varies very much with the different social and cultural parameters of each society into which it is introduced. That is why we should beware of adopting mechanically as valid for our society conclusions that have been drawn from studies of media in Europe or America. In the first place, the reach of media is still limited in our country. There are masses of rural people, particularly, who are not yet reached even by radio, still less by press, film or television. Even in respect of the audiences for these media, we still lack scientifically structured studies of the influence of media on behaviour. I am not minimising the difficulties, even if such studies were to be done, of drawing definite conclusions regarding the possible correlations between exposure to particular media and criminal activity, or between such exposure and attitudes to crime and violence. There are so many variables which one has to take account of. However, at present we are in the realm of speculation, of discussion on the basis of reasonable probabilities, which will necessarily involve a large element of subjectivity.

Let us, with these limitations in mind, address ourselves to the first set of issues I listed. I should like

to make a distinction here between factual and fictional violence. The defence of the media reporter of real — life violence is likely to be that he is holding up the mirror to society: crime happens and he reports it. However, if one looks at the Sri Lankan media, one finds that the notion that in reporting of crime the media are simply a reflection of social reality cannot be defended. There are so many apparent differences between the practices of different media, and even between different institutions using the same medium. For instance, Sri Lankan radio and TV don't usually give time to the reporting of crime in their news bulletins unlike, say, their American counterparts. The departures from this practice have been in the case of crimes which have aroused special public concern as with the recent kidnapping and murder of a young boy. Even between newspapers, there is considerable difference in news reporting policies concerning crime. Some newspapers would make a lead story out of a particularly sensational murder or robbery; others wouldn't. It is clear, therefore, that the mirror-reflection theory of news reporting doesn't hold water. Judgments about what stories to report and how much prominence and emphasis to give them are necessarily value-judgements about what is important, and these in turn involve positions about what the function of a media institution in society is. I once knew an editor of a morning newspaper who, on a dull day when nothing much had happened, would rub his hands around 6 o'clock in the evening and say, 'What I really want now is a juicy murder.' He would have justified himself, if asked to, by saying: 'Well, that's what people want to read, isn't it?' But even that answer assumes certain positions about the social role of newspapers. Does a newspaper merely give the public what it wants, or in the choice of news display etc., does it promote reading habits and expectations that in the long run come to influence what people want to read? In the course of a recent analysis of news reporting some of my colleagues and I made, we found that a popular Sinhala paper gave several times more space to crime (including tri-

vial crime stories) than to foreign news. Not only does this involve certain questionable assumptions regarding its readers ('Sinhala readers aren't very interested in foreign affairs') but it imposes a continuing limitation on the range of readers' interests and knowledge.

There is no getting away then from the fact that media institutions have to make policy judgments regarding how much coverage they will give to crime in news reporting and what prominence and emphasis it is to receive. The question of such policy judgments arises even more sharply in respect of the attitudes and values projected in the reporting of crime. I would like to defer this question to my next section where I discuss the fictional treatment of crime, since the issues that have to be confronted in this respect are very much the same whether the crime is real or imaginary.

Turning then to the treatment of crime in imaginative forms — in film, television and theatre — one has to face the fact that violence and crime have been part of the permanent subject-matter of fiction, whether in its most elevated or most debased forms. *Macbeth* and *The Brothers Karamazov* are, at one level, crime stories, just as much as Mickey Spillane. How do we distinguish between them? The pulp-writer or hack film-maker exploits violence for the sensation as an end in itself, the artist illuminates it as a human or social phenomenon. But there is a large territory in between where other discriminations may be necessary. In Agatha Christie or Ellery Queen, say (whether in book or on screen), murder is just an ingredient in a mental puzzle.

I referred at the beginning of the fact that it is the newest and most popular forms of mass entertainment which tend to arouse the strongest reactions of moralist critics. As far as fictional violence is concerned, the visual forms also evoke the greatest hostility in these quarters because of the belief that these forms carry the greatest emotional charge

through their vividness and immediacy and lend themselves most readily to imitation. It is perhaps true that criticism of TV violence is even more frequent and articulate than that of film violence although the TV screen has a less dominating hold on the viewer's senses and mind than the big screen in a darkened theatre. However, the intensity of reactions to TV violence can be explained by the fact that it brings this phenomenon into the domestic living-room, especially into the presence of children.

That the sensationalist exploitation of violence in film or TV is socially undesirable is a proposition that does not need much argument. What it leaves unresolved is the way in which this principle is to be applied in practice in judging a particular TV programme or film. There are people who pin their faith on elaborate censorship codes to answer this question. This faith has not been borne out in practice. If you look at such documents as the BBC codes on violence in TV programmes, you will find that they are no more than guide-lines; their application in particular cases depends on the intelligence and good sense of the persons using it, and no code can go any further. The experience of some censorship boards in Sri Lanka who believed that a code could be used as a kind of litmus test showed what absurdities would follow. I remember one board which had drawn up an exhaustive set of rules in respect of the treatment of violence in films. One rule was that no murder in the pursuit of robbery could be permitted. A member of the Board told me about the hilarious discussions that would follow the screening of a film. 'Now that man who was shot at during the bank robbery, did he die?' 'No, he was only wounded.' 'Ah, then that's all right.' Similarly, no code can tell us whether the dramatic content of a story necessitates the depiction of violence: only critical intelligence can give the answer to that question.

Does a film or TV production, or for that matter, a newspaper story, induce identification on the part of its audience with the criminal, and is this always a bad thing? The

answer to this question may also involve delicate discriminations, varying with particular cases. Why is the Robin Hood-Sardiel figure a recurrent archetype of fiction, and why do most of us, at any rate, regard these stories as acceptable? Because they voice critical impulses against tyranny, oppression, inequality, and we believe therefore that they perform a socially reforming role. Similarly, I would say that the film treatments of the Maru Sira story did bring out the way in which social forces had propelled the character into a life of crime, and therefore illuminated the social phenomenon of crime in a way that could not have been achieved by the simple depiction of the character as a villain. On the other hand, there is, I think, nothing to be said in defence of the way in which the Sri Lankan press initially built up the character of the local hijacker of an Italian plane as a kind of popular hero, changing tune only when it was clear that he was going to be prosecuted.

The concern with the effects on children of media violence must be taken seriously because visually enacted violence, in particular, can have traumatic consequences for children who watch such scenes. I must add, however, that what is frightening to a child may not be identical with what an adult would identify as such. I have known very small children to be terrified of a piece of slapstick knockabout which sent adult audiences into fits of laughter. However, neither in film nor in TV should our sense of responsibility to child viewers lead us to reduce everything on the screen to the level of material that is fit for children to watch. That would emasculate cinema and TV and deprive it of much that is relevant and valuable to adult audiences. Public authorities can only help to safeguard child viewers by X certifies or late-night scheduling of particular TV programmes: beyond that, protection of the child must be the responsibility of the parent.

Finally, a work about the limits of discussion on media and crime. The great danger about simple minded moralist reactions to the treatment

of crime by the media is that they distract attention from the larger social causes of crime. It is generally agreed that in recent years in Sri Lanka there has been a considerable increase in the incidence of violence and lawlessness. This is not the place to go into a discussion of the total causes of this phenomenon. But it is all too easy to forget the wider social context in which it has taken place and blame it all on **Starsky and Hutch** and **Hawaii Five-O**. That would be both naive and unfortunate in its consequences. And much as I agree that children should be protected from disturbing violence on the TV or cinema screen, I should like to confront some of the people who talk on this subject with the much severer traumas experienced by children who went through July 1983.

THEY KILLED EVERYTHING

*"Forty leagues from paradise,
Peradeniya. Greatest place on
earth,"*

*Never tired telling us,
Or themselves, the dons.*

*Entombed
By the hills
They won't look out.
Stay busy feeding us shit.*

*We loved the grass too, if not
the green.
They tainted it corpse cold
crew cut khaki.
Then watched it warp, stained
the most callous kind of blood.
From a friend.*

*It was the don that died.
Inevitable suicide.
Safe, salaried and selfish,
Finally his silence ended.*

*No tears. No time
For trivialities now.
Not made for murder,
We will teach our selves.*

— Qadri Ismail

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A new awareness, consciousness and awakening

M. Sinnathamby

In January 1982 when the wages of plantation workers were consolidated no attempt was made to consolidate the basic wages and the allowances. Instead, the various special allowances were separately consolidated while the basic wages were untouched. The statutory allowances after consolidation were frozen at pre-1982 level. After the consolidation the wages of plantation workers comprised three components: a basic wage, allowances

and the PWS. The basic wage of the tea estate workers is Rs 4/51 for males and Rs 2/65 for rubber workers. This was brought upto Rs 18/30 for tea and Rs 19/76 for rubber workers by the addition of the various allowances and the PWS.

All these discriminations have meant a lower wage to plantation workers than what they would have been entitled to if there had

been no discriminations. The failure to pay the plantation workers the same rate of COL allowances given to workers in other sectors and the freezing of the PWS have resulted in the creation of anomalies and disparities between the plantation workers and the rest. Traditionally, the wages of plantation workers have remained lower than those of similar category of workers outside the plantations. For instance, in 1949 the daily wage of tea estate (male) worker was Rs 1/56 while Government Agricultural workers were paid Rs 2/50. Workers in non-agricultural trades were paid much higher rates.

This pattern has continued to survive to-date, notwithstanding, many changes that have taken place in the economy. In December 1983, male unskilled workers in the Tea Export and Rubber Export Trades received a monthly rate (on an incremental basis) with an initial of Rs 665/- per month. Assuming 26 working days per month this works out to Rs 25/58 per day. There are already moves to increase the monthly rate to Rs 765/- which would mean a daily wage of Rs 29/42. In the Government sector, unskilled workers were paid Rs 18/50 per day plus the making a total of Rs 30/21. In paddy farming, a male worker was paid Rs 30/66 in 1982 and this is likely to have risen in 1983. In comparison with all these other workers the plantation workers receive a lower wage. Often it is claimed that because of the fact that the plantation workers enjoy fringe benefits, that is not available to others, their real wages would be much more than the cash earnings referred to above. Of all the fringe benefits that they are claimed to

Table 1
Wages of Tea Estate Workers.
Col Index (1952=100) Real Wages in terms of

Year	Daily Wages (Rs/cts)	Col Index (1952=100)		Real Wages in terms of	
		All Items	Food Items	All Items (Rs/cts)	Food Items (Rs/cts)
1975	5.06	198.3	204.3	2.55	2.48
1976	5.92	200.7	202.1	2.95	2.93
1977	6.17	203.2	203.3	3.04	3.03
1978	8.61	227.8	237.5	3.78	3.63
1979	11.10	252.3	263.3	4.40	4.42
1980	12.87	318.2	339.7	4.04	3.79
1981	12.87	315.4	399.6	3.43	3.22
1982	14.95	416.1	450.4	3.83	3.32
1983	16.08	474.2	506.3	3.39	3.18
March 1984	16.69	542.2	553.2	3.08	2.91

1 December, 1983.

Table 2
Average Monthly Earnings of Tea Estate Workers.
Col Index (1952=100) Real Earnings (Rs/cts) in terms of

Year	Monthly Earnings (Rs/cts)	Col Index (1952=100)		Real Earnings (Rs/cts) in terms of	
		All Items	Food Items	All Items	Food Items
1975	100.45	198.3	204.3	50.43	49.17
1976	99.85	200.7	202.1	49.75	49.40
1977	132.11	203.2	203.3	65.01	64.98
1978	166.95	227.8	237.5	73.29	70.29
1979	218.9	252.3	263.3	86.48	82.86
1980	239.42	318.2	339.7	75.24	70.48
1981	229.63	375.4	399.6	61.17	57.46
1982	285.79	417.1	450.4	69.10	63.45

be enjoying only housing is substantial. Many of the other benefits such as free education and free health and medical facilities are also available to others and are in many respects superior to those available to the plantation workers. Housing conditions in the plantation are so deplorable that they cannot be considered to give any privileged position to these workers.

Since the present government came into operation in 1977 there were marked increases in their wages, at least in money terms, as indicated in Table 1. Money wages rose from Rs 6/17 per day in 1977 to Rs 16/69 in March, 1984. However, these were quickly offset by the alarmingly rapid rate of rise in the cost of living. As a result, real wages which rose from Rs 3.04 in 1977 to 4.40 in 1979 began to slide back. In 1982, they showed a marginal increase due to a Rs 2/- increase in basic wages, however, this increase was not sufficient to arrest the further decline in real wages and by March 1984, they reached a level that was almost the same as that prevailing in 1977.

For a realistic calculation of real wages of plantation workers, however, it is the COL Index relating to food items that is the most appropriate since they spend nearly 70% of their earnings on food. When this is done the fall in real wages after 1979 is very much sharper. In 1983 it stood at Rs 3/18 which was lower than the 1978 level. Similar trends are reflected in their monthly earnings too, as shown in Table 2.

Monthly earnings of tea estate workers like their daily wages began to show healthy improvement since 1977. They rose from Rs 132.11 in 1977 to Rs 285.79 in 1982. However, the sharp increases in the COL Index have eaten into their real earnings. They declined from Rs 65.01 in 1977 to Rs 61.17 in 1981. There was a marginal increase in 1982 due to the increase in basic wages but since the COL Index has further risen (at a much faster rate) since that year, there is no doubt that their real earnings would have suffered.

Furthermore in comparing the the real earnings of plantation workers before and after 1977, one should also take into account the issue of subsidised rice to all estate people before 1977 and its withdrawal from the bulk of them in the post-1977 period. The Tea Master Plan Study revealed that the percentage of families earning below Rs 300/- per month and receiving food subsidy varied between 16.6% and 28.1% in the three high elevation estates. The rest had forfeited their subsidised rice. A recent study in the Nuwara Eliya district revealed that nearly 25% of the estate families received an income that was lower than the official poverty line itself is an underestimation since the price level has gone up manifold over the years while the poverty line has remained stagnant. In view of the rapidly rising CoL, either the poverty line or the cash value of food coupons given to those who fall below the poverty line must be raised. The poverty line of Rs 300/- is unrealistic. The use of a figure of Rs 500/-, for instance, leaves as much as 40% of the estate families below this level.

The take-home of an estate worker after various deductions are made by the management is generally less than 50% of his gross pay. This balance pay is hardly sufficient to meet his other expenses. As a result, either he has to borrow to make ends meet and become permanently indebted as it happens very often or lower his standard of living which is already

at a precariously low level. According to a recent study, between 1973 and 1978/79, the increase in indebtedness is greater in the estate sectors. Indebtedness as a percent of income increased from 17% in 1973 to 40% in 1978/79 in the estate sector. The report also comments that this increased indebtedness was probably due to the increased short-term borrowings from boutiques brought about by the upward movement of prices. According to another survey on nutritional status chronic under-nutrition amongst pre-school children is highest in the Nuwara Eliya district while Badulla and Kandy ranked second and third. It should be noted that all these are districts with a large estate population. The prevalence of chronic under-nutrition is consistently higher in the estate sectors of the Nuwara Eliya, Kandy, Badulla, Ratnapura and Kegalle districts. A recent ILO study also states that ".....in 1969/70 malnutrition was virtually unknown on estates. Even the very lowest income group (0-100Rs) was 3% above the minimum caloric level and 11% above the minimum protein level. In 1980/81, 64% of the estate population has become caloric deficient and 62% protein deficient". The general health of the plantation population is much below the national level and the incidence of illness higher. The main reason for these is the general malnutrition among these workers. Infant death rate is as high as 68 per 1000 in some of the plantation districts compared to 44.7 and 24.6 in the urban and rural sectors respectively.

Table 3

Producer Margins (Rs/lb)

Year	Cost of Production	Nett Sale Average Price	Producer Margin
1975	3.05	3.14	0.09
1976	3.38	4.20	0.82
1977	3.54	6.10	2.56
1978	4.76	5.30	0.54
1979	5.77	5.06	-0.71
1980	7.04	8.06	1.02
1981	8.48	8.05	-0.43
1982	9.96	10.24	0.28

All these indicate to the bad living conditions and the abject poverty of these workers. They deserve a substantial wage increase in order to get out of this rut they are in. The question naturally arises as to whether the industry can afford to pay an enhanced wage to these workers. The number of workers involved is very large and in that the plantation sector is unique among the government corporations. However, it can be established that the industry has the capacity to increase wages.

Producer margins as worked out in Table III reveal that at the estate level, the margins have been fluctuating. In 1975, the margin was 9 cents per pound, in 1977 Rs 2.56 and in 1979 and 1981 there were negative margins of 71 cents and 43 cents respectively. This producer margin is, however, what accrues to the producer after the government takes away a large share of the profits by way of taxation. Table IV summarises revenue from tea exports. It can be seen that the total government revenue from tea exports has remained high through the years since 1977. Government revenue as a percent of total export earnings from tea has risen from 17.5% in 1975 to 53.5 in 1978. This percentage has fallen during the last three years.

Surplus extraction is a historical phenomenon. Almost every sector in the economy produces some surplus but the surplus produced by the plantation sector is the

one that is most easily identified and extracted. Very little of this surplus is ploughed back into the the industry. Investment is required not only to increase productivity of land but also to increase the productivity of labour through improved health and nutritional conditions of the workforce. Productivity increase itself can lead to an increase in wages but that can materialise in the medium to long-term. Workers can't wait until such an improvement takes place. They need immediate relief which can only be given by an increase in wages adequate to meet the rising and the minimum nutritional requirements.

Presently, the tea industry is enjoying boom conditions. A global shortage of aggravated by the Indian Government's ban on the export of CTC teas from India from December 1983, have been responsible for this boom. The average gross price of all teas at the Colombo Auctions reached a peak of Rs 71.30/kg. in January 1984. After a decline of 3% in February it has begun to rise again. Market analysts believe that there is a strong likelihood that this boom condition would continue through the year. A part of this windfall gain could perhaps be utilised to improve the the living conditions of the plantation workers without any undue strain on the industry.

The successful April strike of the plantation workers which involved over 500,000 of them is politically and economically a sig-

nificant event in their social and economic struggles. These workers who were brought here from South India over one hundred and fifty years ago have remained a relatively docile and submissive group in this country. They still remain a neglected section of the Sir Lankan population. For reasons not unknown to those who are familiar with the history of development of the plantations in Sri Lanka, the living conditions of these workers haven't improved over the years in comparison to those of the population. They have subjected to continuous exploitation both before and after independence. After independence they were deprived of their political rights and driven to a status of statelessness, a situation not experienced elsewhere in the world. Their trade union struggles in the past didn't aim at remedying these deprivations; they were centred on very narrow economic objectives. In recent years, the insecurity that affects those due to be repatriated to India (which is almost half of their number) and the general insecurity caused by the frequent anti-Tamil riots in the country in which many become victims of arson, murder and other forms of violence have fostered among them a feeling of helplessness. This attitude has led to inertia and indifference among them. But the April strike symbolizes a new awareness, consciousness and an awakening among them. Their determination to achieve their demands was unparalleled in the recent history of the trade union movement in this country. No amount of threats from official and other quarters was able to disengage them from their struggle to win their demands. They went all out against all odds and succeeded in achieving their objectives. This naturally has given them renewed hopes about a better future and the confidence necessary to achieve it. To what extent these will be taken to their logical ends will depend on an enlightened leadership, a sense of direction in their future struggles and an effort to cooperate and coordinate their struggles with those of the other sections of the working classes in this country.

Table 4

Year	Government Revenue from Tea (Rs/million)			Export Earnings	Govt. Revenue as a % of Export Earnings
	Export Duty	Sales Tax	Total Revenue		
1975	177.7	156.6	334.2	1931.6	17.5
1976	167.6	276.3	443.9	2099.7	23.5
1977	280.2	575.0	855.2	3502.5	26.2
1978	2781.0	510.4	3291.4	6400.9	53.5
1979	2495.2	223.4	2718.6	5722.2	50.1
1980	1920.3	101.7	2022.0	6170.1	35.5
1981	1878.5	86.4	1964.9	6444.0	30.5
1982	1443.9	149.7	1593.5	6340.2	25.1
1983	n.a.	n.a.	2246.0	829.60	27.1

n.a. — not available

(Concluded)

COUNTERING AMERICAN PROPAGANDA

FOREIGN NEWS

Sergio Ramirez Mercado

The grave error of the Sandinistas is that they are trying to export their revolution.

Throughout history, revolutions have always been exportable — if we wish to employ so mercantile a term when speaking of the dynamic with which ideas circulate across frontiers. There would never have been a French Revolution without the revolution of the thirteen North American colonies, nor would Jefferson's ideas have existed without the inspiration of the French Encyclopedists, nor would General Lafayette have gone from France to fight in the fields of Virginia had he not believed that revolutions have no frontiers, nor would Benjamin Franklin have spent so many years conspiring in European courts had he not believed that his American Revolution was exportable.

Thus it is that the revolution which gave birth to the United States as a nation has been the most exported revolution of contemporary history as well as the one which, at the same time, utilized the greatest number of imported ideological elements on which to base its thought, its war of liberation and its innovating laws.

Faced with the absolutism of the Spanish monarchs in Hispanic America — a colonialist absolutism identical to that which England exercised with respect to the future United States — our native liberators found that the most seductive and dazzling formulas for doing away with the colonial yoke came from the north,

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July 19th marked the 5th Anniversary of the Nicaraguan Revolution.

just as, later, all our calamities were to stem from that same source: the example of a bloody, implacable war carried out by men determined to substitute the colonialist regime for a new political and social order, the crystallization of the Utopian democratic ideas of the European Enlightenment, which for the first time would be proved in practice in the New World: the Promised Land of what, until then, had been extravagant philosophical dreams. Constitutional government and the separation of powers were extremist and subversive concepts for the monarchical order: concepts that were disseminated clandestinely in Hispanic American lands, provoked persecution, imprisonment and exile. To read James Madison in those days was a crime of *lese-majeste*, just as to read Marx these days can cost one's life in Guatemala or El Salvador.

The constitution of the new United States and the explosive ideas that inspired it, circulated on muleback through all Central America as a clandestine item, and that newborn republic, led by diabolical radicals, by extremist exporters of revolutions who believed only in their own model and rejected any other which opposed it, represented a menace to the internal security and the strategic interests of Spain in the New World: that great colonial empire that was beginning to disintegrate. In 1823, with Central American independence already achieved, the first federal constitution that was voted to provide a base for the ephemeral dream of a united, Morazan Central America, commenced with the identical invocation, copied

textually from the constitution drafted by Madison in 1787. The United States, then, was exporting a model, and it exported the bloody example that so profound a change, which signified the defeat of the British empire on American soil, could not be carried out without rifles, without crushing the enemy militarily and without emulating the 'Minutemen': guerilla combatants as fierce as those of the Salvadoran FMLN. Faced with the insurgency of a new order based on new, necessarily subversive, ideas, the war destroyed the old order and the old ideas, and hundreds of thousands of counter-revolutionary Tories left in a massive exodus to Canada, because revolutions always produce an exodus.

Thus it is that for the Sandinistas, who are repeating the revolutionary feat in the 20th century, it is impossible that their idea of revolution not be exported. We are exporting new ideas, ideas of change and renovation, the founding ideas of a new world that is being born. We export the proven possibility that a people in arms may, when they so propose, overthrow a tyranny and establish a new and dawning world on the debris of that tyranny; we export the news that in Nicaragua the revolution has brought with it literacy, agrarian reform, an end to poliomyelitis, the right to life and hope. How prevent a peasant from another Central American country from hearing, from knowing, from realizing, that in Nicaragua land is being given to other poor, barefoot peasants like himself? How prevent him from realizing that here children are being vaccinated who are not his, and that his children continue to die of gastroenteritis and polio?

Now, as then, the struggle is not between Nicaraguans and Hondurans, but between serfs and bosses, bet-

ween new men and specters from the past, between those who fight for a better order and those who try to uphold forever the worst order.

In this sense we do export our revolution.

What the Sandinistas have done is to copy a model of revolution that is a totalitarian model.

For us, the efficacy of a political model depends on its capacity to resolve the problem of democracy and the problem of justice. Effective democracy is what we attempt to practice in Nicaragua, with widespread popular participation, with a permanent dynamic of drawing the organic public in to multiple political and social tasks: people who offer their opinions and are listened to, people who contribute, who construct, who direct, who mobilize themselves, who attend to community and neighborhood problems as well as those of the nation; a people active in the exercise of sovereignty, ready to fight for its defence and ready to combat illiteracy, to teach, to vaccinate; an everyday democracy and not one that is expressed each four years; and if it should turn out that each four or five or six years we must have formal elections, a people that vote, not as a minority but in their totality, and that elect conscientiously and elect the best; not a candidate sold like a soap or a deodorant, but a conscientious leader; a vote freely emitted and not manipulated by a publicity agency, a vote to change and better a country and not a vote in favour of transnational financial interests or military-industrial trusts.

Probably, when Madison wrote his constitution, he was thinking of this sort of democracy, which no longer exists in the United States.

On the other hand, democracy for us is not merely a formal model, but a constant process capable of resolving the fundamental problems of development and capable of giving the public that elects and participates a real possibility of transforming its conditions of life, a democracy that establishes justice and puts an end to exploitation.

A political model springs from a concrete reality and the need imposed by this reality to change it. The Sandinista model, our own model, springs from the long domination of Nicaragua by the United States: a domination that was political, economic and even military and was also social, ideological and even cultural. Our model is a response to this domination, and it establishes as vital necessities — in order to be our own model — independence, and along with national independence, the recovery of our natural resources and the recovery of a will to develop an economic project that by transforming the country, gives us not only the possibility of generating wealth but also of distributing it justly.

The Sandinistas have betrayed the original project of their revolution.

Betrayal of the original project of the revolution in the United States commenced very early, to the point where James Madison, father of the American constitution, revealed his fear in 1829 that the perpetual expansion of the new nation, directed by manufacturers and merchants, would put an end to the experiment of republican government.

Madison's fear were realized a short time later in the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, and the America in revolution, the continent ablaze with the fires of change, was rapidly converted into the America of those below, the oppressors and the oppressed, the despoilers and the despoiled, the expansionists and the cornered. The sons of Washington and Jefferson not only expropriated the immense territories of Mexico in that first great conquering onslaught, but the very name of America itself, and it is since then that the dream of liberty and justice turned into a hegemonic nightmare. The United States of 1776 was not the same as the United States of 1898; it had left behind its original project of revolution and commenced the expansionist counter-revolution that swallowed Cuba and Puerto Rico and was preparing its assault on the entire Caribbean, including Nicaragua and Panama, no longer in the name of that old republican ideal for which so many soldiers of the War of Independence shed their

blood on the snowy battlefields, but in the name of that imperial ideological aberration known as Manifest Destiny, an aberration which at a later date would be shrouded by the veil of Panamericanism.

We know what the original project of the revolution was in the United States, but when they speak to us Sandinistas of the betrayal of our original project, to what project are they referring?

During Reagan's election campaign of 1980, the spokesmen of the New Right had already taken over the positions of ideological leadership in the Republican party, affirming that the United States would never again repeat the error of failing to fight to the finish for an ally such as Somoza, feeling guilty and ashamed for having abandoned him. Later, they affirmed that they prefer Somoza a thousand-fold to the Sandinistas. And even later they armed the former sustainers of the Somoza regime, none other than the National Guard itself, to destroy the Sandinista revolutionary project and to reconquer power with the arms of the counter-revolution.

Thus it is that the original project to which the U. S. government refers is not our project. Its permanent project, without changes or retouching, is that of the National Guard, which was created in 1927 by the United States itself, which replaced the Yankee occupation army in 1933 and sustained the Somoza dictatorship for nearly half a century.

It must not be forgotten that the fundamental promises of the Sandinistas were not made to the United States, to whom we have never made any sort of promises, nor to the privileged groups in Nicaragua. The fundamental promises were made to the poorest people of the country: the promises they defended with arms and with heroism. And the original promise continues, growing and multiplying itself for them in cooperatives, in schools, in health centers, in lands, in dignity and in sovereignty.

There was never any other project than this; this was the original project.

When one speaks of copying a model, it must be recalled that what Somocismo did during half a century was to copy in a servile manner the model imposed by the United States. Nicaragua was branded with the most radical capitalist model, a market economy that impoverished the country and alienated the possibilities of its real development; and together with this inexorable capitalist model, the inexorable dependency on markets, raw materials, capital resources; Nicaragua, a satellite of the United States; Nicaragua behind a real Iron Curtain with solid bars and triple lock. And of course, the Somoza family also imported the political model of elections every four years, which existed here, and a system of two political parties, which existed here, and a bicameral legislature and a Supreme Court and a constitution and laws. And it was all a bloody mockery.

And this imported, copied, imposed model failed historically, and now we are seeking our own model. We are no longer a satellite of the United States, we are not behind the Iron Curtain of the United States, and we are free, sovereign and independent: a condition that was always deceitfully inscribed in all the Somoza constitutions but which was not true until today, even though we have not yet written our constitution.

We are disposed to meet any challenge and to make any sacrifice in order to consolidate this national project, our own model of a sovereign revolution. In order to make possible this idea and to nourish it permanently, the people of Nicaragua are disposed to take up arms in defence of their project and their model of revolution. And they are disposed to achieve a definitive peace

that permits the flourishing of this model that we do not wish to impose on anybody. Because it has its real political frontiers which are those of Nicaragua. We are not a people chosen by God to accomplish any Manifest Destiny; we have no capital to export, nor any transnational enterprises to defend beyond our borders. Our dreams are not of dominion, nor of expansion nor of conquest, but they are the humble dreams of a humble people who aspire to full-fledged independence.

Because of this we want to live in peace and grow in peace and peacefully multiply the example of our sovereign people who never thought of asking anyone's permission to make their revolution and who will not ask anyone else to defend it.

(Courtesy: 'This Magazine', Toronto)

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GLIMPSES OF CUBAN LIFE

Fashion

Maria Helena Capote

● EMILIO PUCCI is an affable, elegant and precisely spoken man. An important figure in Italian fashions who has been in the business for almost 40 years, Pucci has the singular characteristic of Italian army pilot during World War II, marquis, deputy to the Italian Parliament and fashion designer.

Pucci was invited to Cubamoda 84 International Convention in Havana and had this to say about Cuban fashion :

"There can be no fashion if there is no culture, and Cuba has a wealth of culture. From 2000 years ago, from the Siboney Indians up until recent historical events, Cuba's singular situation has given it its own source of creation. There are enormous possibilities in the country for the service of fashion, because fashion is a service.

"Personally, I find it very moving to help others advance with one's mind and creativity. I may be the only one to have had shows in nearly the whole world and by far the best part is making new friends, making a human contribution to different cultures.

"I took from Cuba to Europe the color of the mamee fruit.

"Thirty years ago I came to Havana to do a fashion show in the Fin de Siglo department store and I was invited to spend a few days on a sugar plantation in the eastern part of the island, in Manati. I was attracted by the way agricultural workers dressed and learned that there was a tradition of women making the family's cloths, apart from working in the home or as domestics. The men only had work for a few months of the year. I was interested in putting together a collection with the ideas suggested to me by this experience I thought of calling it. Tropical Collection. I worked on this for three and a half years and tried to interest

Fashion has been defined as a social phenomenon of all epochs, classes and Societies. Ephemeral and changing, fashion has its 'dictates' coming from Paris, London, Madrid and Rome but the fashion capital for a week was HAVANA.

other people in Italy who could help me financially. I thought a whole clothing line could be created to sell abroad, not only in Cuba.

"Meantime, the Cuban Revolution started, something much more important than my idea at the time.

That's why I say its an old dream of mine, something I've planned for a long time. There's great energy in this country, a great culture and a great sense of human relations. These three elements shape up to a realistic picture of Cuban fashion

"There are highly positive elements in Cuban fashion but also, as in all beginnings, mistakes. Every time I present my collections I spend the two nights previous going over every detail, changing things. Everyone having something to do with such a thorny question as fashion has difficulty in visualizing the future. If there is no sense of reality, there can be no projecting instruments into visual elements. As to what little I can do, I am at the service of Cuba.

● PACO RABANNE has a rare gift for fashion, which grew, out of little more than watching his mother at work in Spain for the famous firm Balenciaga.

Today, after an interesting career he has become a world authority. His opinion of Cubamoda 84 has therefore, great weight.

"The Cuban fashions in this show are most interesting. Fantastic, I'd say. They have gone down well among all those present. I've talked

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CUBA made a grand entrance into the world of fashion at Cubamoda 84 International Convention held in Havana from May 28 through June 1. The event was attended by representatives of 30 countries and over 140 firms of world repute.

Organized by CONTEX the Cuban importing and exporting enterprise of general fashion articles, the fashion brought together over 200 business people executives, producers, designers and other artists and technicians involved in fashion promotion in Europe Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia, to discuss several papers in plenary sessions. Evenings were given over to fashion shows featuring collections from internationally known firms and the latest collections of typical Cuban fashions and their accessories.

At the Convention were outstanding figures of the fashion world, among them Paco Rabanne, Marquis Emilio Pucci and representatives of famous firms such as Puig, Revert, Lois, Loreal, Bogart, Rochas and Mister Mike. Significantly, fashion people from the United States, one of the fashion centers of the world, did not come. The world fashion press was also well represented.

The first to be held in Latin America, the Convention was opened by Caridad Abrantes, president of the organizing committee. The opening was attended by Cuban Minister of Culture Armando Hart and other government leaders, who toured the stands of Suchel, Ellus, Rabanne, Givenchy, Lancome, Balenciaga, Pavia Myrurgia, Nina Ricci and Ciudad del Cuero of Buenos Aires, among others.

The best Cuban chefs under Jose Smith, delighted guests with typical Cuban dishes. A meeting of hair-dressers was also held, with Charles Faubert of the firm Dessangue, and Spanish hair stylist Juanita Mateo.

The international event also helped establish work and trade relations and stronger ties among fashion designers and manufacturers.

The Cuban firm Suchel introduced its new line of perfume Alicia Alonso.

At the press conference held at the close of the Convention, CONTEX executives Caridad Abrantes and Guillermo Jimenez drew attention to the favorable impression made by the Cuban designs and lines among the visitors who had praised their quality creativity and prices. They also announced that some 40 concrete offers had been made by firms interested in selling CONTEX products on the international market.

Given how successful it had been Cubamoda the international fashion convention will be held every year from now on.

Can a Third World country cease to be a Third World country?

Kumar

For broad economic evaluation the countries of the world have been grouped into three — the First World consisting of rich industrial capitalist countries like the USA, UK, the Western European Countries, Australia, South Africa and Japan. It will be noticed that their one common feature is that they are all white. The only exception is Japan which has itself played an imperialistic role and occupied and exploited the resources of neighbouring countries. In the Second World are the Socialist Countries. All the remaining countries of the world are lumped together as the Third World.

More than two thirds of the world's population lives in the Third World, in Asia, Africa and the common feature binding them all is that the people are coloured and there is deep seated poverty in all of them. It is the endeavour of every Third World country to get out of the Third World group. With the rise of industrialisation also rose world poverty. In the last 200 years, since the age of industrialisation not one Third World country, all in a capitalist set up, has been able to join the First World countries. Is there no hope of a Third World country ever being able to cease being a Third World country.

We can take heart. There is one example where a Third World country has succeeded in getting out of Third World status. Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959 and for the last 25 years has survived in spite of every effort on the part of USA to crush his revolution and even kill him. In spite of economic sanctions organised by the USA, Cuba has been able to develop itself out of the Third World. On what basis can we make this startling claim? From an American source;

The American Magazine NEWSWEEK in its issue of 09.01.84 under the heading 'A Revolution that Lasted' refers to the achievements of Cuba after 25 years of revolution. The assessment is by no less a person than their UN Bureau chief. He reports talking of Castro: He could claim accurately that his revolution has brought significant advances to the country. Cuba now boasts a literacy rate of 96%, one of the highest in the world. The nation's first class free health service has virtually eradicated many of the infectious diseases that plague most of the Third World countries, tough anti-discrimination laws have clearly advanced the position of blacks and women in the country. And while the average wage is only about \$ 1000 annually, few, if any, Cubans are destitute. One Third World ambassador in Havana says "you simply will not find here the slums of Jakarta or Calcutta. The appalling difference between rich and poor doesn't exist. There are no beggars in the street".

Fidel Castro gave a rare exclusive interview to the NEWSWEEK UN Bureau chief in which he said among other things, "For the first time Cubans are master in their own country. No body can belittle them for being black or discriminate against them for being women. Their social status is not determined by their income. Our economy has grown at an approximate annual rate of 4.7% over the last 25 years, one of the highest growth rates in the continent, despite the USA blockade, and in Latin America we are the second country in food per capita consumption. In the field of health, education, culture and sports we rank first among Third World countries and better than many industrialised countries. I would surprise you if I tell you that with respect to

the total population there are more illiterate and semi-literate in the United States than in Cuba".

Cuba, while working for its own development, has not neglected to answer the call of other Third World countries for help. More than 70,000 Cubans have been sent to 35 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. They consist of doctors, teachers, construction workers and soldiers needed to defend themselves if and when attacked, have fought bravely and given their lives, when helping another poor country.

What is the secret of Cuba's success? When told during the interview that the revolution was on the verge of collapse, Castro replied, "If the Cuban people had not been deeply identified with their revolution we could have been crushed, since the powerful USA had used all possible forms of aggression against the Cuban revolution. It is our people who sustained it. This is not a blind non-critical adherence".

Can Cuba be said to have ceased to be a Third World country? Her economy has grown at a rate of 4.7% for the last 25 years, one of the highest rates in the continent. In Latin America Cuba is the second country in food per capita consumption, proved by its prowess in international sports. It has a literacy rate of 96%, one of the highest in the world. It has a first class health service which has virtually eradicated many of the infectious diseases that plague Third World Countries. There is no unemployment. Cuba has satisfied all its citizens with basic human needs — adequate food, schooling health care, clothing, shelter and employment. Of these adequate food is far and away the most important: It has been found that

80% of the human brain develop in the womb and in the first two years of life. If the human brain is not provided with the needed proteins during this short period, no amount of subsequent feeding can repair the damage already done and that human being is condemned to a life of mental retardation. This is one of the reasons why people in the Third World countries remain poor. Poverty causes malnutrition which causes mental retardation which causes poverty — a vicious cycle.

Cuba has broken the vicious cycle through its revolution and twenty five years of struggle against the mightiest enemy in the World. Clearly Cuba is a country which has moved from the Third World into the Second World. Can she move into the First World? The First World countries consist of rich industrialised countries who get their raw products at prices which make it profitable for the investor to venture forth. The motive is profit, not utility or need. Countries in the Second World also industrialise but their projects are centrally planned to fit into an over-all programme. There is no need for the frantic advertisement put out by the enterprises with a profit motive. This accounts for all the glamour seen in the First World.

This may be a suitable point at which to attempt to clear a question often thrown at me: Why are there defections from the Socialist countries to Capitalist countries but not the other way round. This seems to be a fair question and needs to be answered. When a country decides that the means of production and distribution of wealth should be publicly owned (socialism) hundred per cent of the citizens cannot be expected to be enthusiastically supporting it. There will be some people who will dislike the change, others who fall for the blandishments of the Western media. The media in Socialist countries does not attract vacillating minds. Socialism attracts the mature minds which cope with conditions in the capitalist set up and the urge to defect to Socialist countries does not arise in these mature minds.

It is my contention that Third World countries can progress into Second World but cannot enter the First World because they will lack the ability to exploit other Third World countries for cheap raw products, which keeps capitalist industrial countries flourishing. If Third World countries become First World countries the entire capitalist system will collapse. This the rich industrial countries will never permit and they will keep Third World countries where they are now. That is why they choose people, civilian or military, give them all support, financial and military, allow them all the pomp and show of riches — as long as the neo-colonial economy is allowed to remain.

The task of the Third World people is to break through the cordon round them and establish an economic system which ensures that the basic human needs are available to every man, woman and child born in the Third World to enable them to live in dignity.

This task only the people of the Third World can do for themselves. Others cannot do it for them. Once the people of a country have grasped this fundamental fact no power on earth can stop them. The people of Cuba have proved how right the British philosopher C. E. M. Joad was when he said:

There is one thing in this world stronger than force: And that is an idea whose time has come.

Glimpses of . . .

(Continued from page 24)

with the French designers and they all consider it a success. The most important thing about Cuban fashion is that it does not copy other countries. And that is a good path to be on."

"From what I have seen, Cuban textiles and clothing are of top quality and make. I was amazed at the CONTEX stand. Its designs do not fall within any European trend or that of any other continent. They stand out for their originality and beauty; they are typically Cuban. Cuba belongs to the civilization of the sun, the one most

in demand in the fashion world. Everybody wants new colorful designs for summer, relaxation and vacation. I have said that my summer 1985 collection will be influenced by Cuban women's dress. However, it's the Cuban designers who can really develop it; it's like Cuban music."

(Special for Granma weekly Review)

Mexican hair styling and make-up

● A DEMONSTRATION of hair styling and makeup was given by Mexican experts at Havana's International Conference Center as a preview to the Cuba 84 International Beauty Fair to be held in October under the aegis of the National Institute of Tourism. Some 1000 specialists from various countries are expected to attend the event.

The demonstrators were Maria de Jesus Valencia, Froylan Acosta, Sixto Santos (Tito of Mexico) and Rosa Elvira Noriega. They used Cuban models to present the latest styles of hair dressing and makeup.

The demonstration was attended by Francisco Martinez Rios, editor of stylist magazines Alto Peinado (founded 16 years ago, with a current run of 64 000) and Lord's (a magazine specializing in men's styles founded three years ago, with a current run of 55 000). Mario Perez, of the Viajes Optimo Travel Agency in Mexico, was also present.

The Beauty Fair will be attended by hair and makeup stylists of France, Britain, Italy, Venezuela, Mexico and other countries. The European stylists will bring their own models to demonstrate the styles currently in vogue and to give a preview of those planned for the next season.

At these events, which are planned to be held at regular intervals, Cuba will put on a show of typical hair styles and fashions. Cuban and visiting specialists will give technical demonstrations on models; and visitors, if they so request, can offer technical seminars.

(Special for Granma weekly Review)

Imperialism and the capitalist mode of production

Tara Coomaraswamy

To test the argument of the preceding sections a periodisation will be attempted of imperialism as a concept of world economy. As such it must show its reproduction as an inter-relation of economic forces and socio-political factors. No account of laws of development at an economic level alone can explain imperialist relations, which have a political as well as an economic nature. The influence of politics affects and conditions the reproduction of capital in the social formation of the "colonised" region. Each stage of capitalist expansion dictates different alliances between capital and classes within the new social formation, which must be treated as an articulation of different modes of production, capitalist and

non-capitalist, which coexist side by side. Frank's notion of the universality of the capitalist mode of production — based on the criterion of generalised commodity relations — is therefore rejected.

This periodisation would also attempt to indicate the manner in which the type of development — "capitalist" or otherwise — in less-developed regions has been affected by the needs of capitalism in the imperialist centres.

The simplest periodisation of the development of the world economy based on the expansion of capital beyond national boundaries, would be achieved by distinguishing between commodity capital (the period of "competitive capitalism") finance capital (the period of

"monopoly capitalism") and productive capital (the current period, whether labelled "neo-capitalism", "state monopoly capitalism", or "late capitalism" — (See TABLE)

(1) The first period indicated will not be dealt with, as falling outside the period usually defined as "imperialism." (Following Gallagher and Robinson, however, this period may also be seen as imperialist in the sense of an "imperialism of free trade.")

(2) The period of "New Imperialism" was characterised by irregular expansion of productive forces in the imperialist metropolitan centres, punctuated by recurring crises and cycles of boom and slump, the two biggest crises being

(Continued on page 28)

CAPITALISM AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

COMPETITIVE CAPITALISM	From Mid-16th Century to Mid-19th Century	MERCANTILE CAPITAL	TRPF/OCC	Periodic Cyclical Crises	— Export of Commodities
MONOPOLY CAPITALISM	From Mid-19th Century to World War II	FINANCE CAPITAL		Non-Capitalist Sectors in Western Economies gradually absorbed	— Export of capital in search of raw materials to cheapen constant capital (extractive industries etc.) — Export of capital to areas with higher rates of profit to counteract falling rates at home
LATE CAPITALISM	World War II to Mid-'60s	PRODUCTIVE CAPITAL	TRPF/RW	'Long Boom' Technological revolution in raw materials production Full employment in western economies	— Export of capital in search of labour (location of manufacturing units overseas — in LDCs/other MDCs)
	Late '60s to Present		TRPF/RW + under-consumption	'Stag Flation' Inability to expand without markets	— Export of commodities (aid, technological transfer, 'unequal exchange')

The ethnic. . .

(Continued from page 7)

characterized by an equilibrium between contending classes or contending factions of a single class. So by definition you cannot have a Bonapartism from 1972 to 1984. However, right now, at this point of time, I feel that description is valid. Right now the Executive Presidency is engaged in a balancing act not between contending classes but between contending factions of the regime. In fact President Jayewardene reminds me of a juggler under whom the ground is moving. Or a juggler trying to run up a downward moving escalator. This situation of Bonapartism — Antonio Gramsci had another word for it, 'Caesarism', is best described using another Gramsci term as one of **catastrophic equilibrium**. I think that is a very exact description of the state of affairs today. A situation of catastrophic equilibrium, by definition cannot last long.

Now this is the political crisis as manifested at the level of the regime. What of the alternatives? **I think that one of the chief defining characteristics of the present crisis is that it is not limited to the present regime. It is a total crisis. It is that which envelops the regime as well as the opposition.** So this is not something that you can call a UNP crisis. It is an all-enveloping total crisis. And this is very clearly manifested in that there is no viable alternative. Because if there was a viable alternative, the crisis would not be that deep: The depth of crisis rests also in that there is no viable opposition that is making its presence felt. I don't know but there may be somebody out there who may be thinking that he has the answer to the crisis. Nobody had heard of Rohana Wijeyeweera until 1970 but he had been working for a number of years by then. Certainly he or she has not made his or her presence felt as yet. But as far as the available political forces are concerned there is no viable **bourgeois** alternative. If you take the SLFP I think President Jayewardene was perfectly correct in saying as he did just before the Presidential Election that the SLFP has no alternative but to go along with the open economy. He

said 'I have made economic changes which are irreversible'. The crisis in the SLFP is exactly that. The interests of the class — the national bourgeoisie — born in the fifties and which had arrived in the seventies as a dependent bourgeoisie in the path of dependent state capitalism, has its economic interests fulfilled in the UNP's economic project. One of the characteristics of an organic crisis according to Gramsci is that class factions detach themselves from their earlier political representatives. The SLFP also cannot shift leftwards — Mr. Anura Bandaranaike's ideology makes this very clear. The SLFP simply does not have an alternative to offer.

As far as the new opposition block led by the Mahajana Party is concerned, it is demonstrated in the context of the student struggle, its inability to convert itself into a mass movement, using political or economic clout to wrest democratic concessions from the regime. What I am trying to say is that the opposition block led by the Mahajana Pakshaya has not been able to do what the opposition parties have been able to do in the Philippines. I am not talking of the New Peoples Army (i.e. the Communist movement) in the Philippines. I am talking of businessmen, professors, lawyers and beauty queens and film stars i.e. the liberal bourgeois opposition, who were able to take to the street and to trigger enough alarms in Washington to get Washington to put enough pressure on Marcos to hold an election. Neither the SLFP nor the four party bloc have been capable of this. As for the revolutionary anti-systemic alternative, if it exists, it has not made its presence felt on the terrain of mass politics.

So we have a situation of catastrophic equilibrium or Bonapartism, if you like, as far as the regime is concerned and inability of the opposition forces to present a coherent alternative. We had a deafening silence as far as the Allen affairs was concerned on the part of the regime, and we have had a more deafening silence on the part of the opposition parties as far as the ethnic conflict is concerned'.

(To be continued)

Imperialism . . .

(Continued from page 27)


in 1873-4 and 1893-4. Domestic rates of profit in Britain, the largest of the imperial powers, fell continuously for twenty years. This resulted in two types of capital outflow: (a) to countries with higher profit rates; (b) to areas supplying raw materials, both to secure them against rival imperialist powers as well as to rationalise and increase extraction to match growing needs of monopolies at home. Terms of trade had swung in favour of primary goods, but the influx of capital into extractive industries rectified this for a time.

However, by the mid-twentieth century, the need for raw materials rose once more, climaxing with the armaments boom of World War II and the Korean War.

(3)a. The technological revolution in raw materials (developments of synthetics) shifted their production to the industrialised centres, where costly capital-intensive technology involved made it safer and more rational to locate production at home. This and the development of MDC agriculture shifted the terms of trade against the Third World. MDC domestic policies, amongst other things, had resulted in fairly full employment. Capital export in this period was beginning to be in search of labour, rather than raw materials; a characteristic feature was location of manufacturing units overseas as foreign capital found it profitable to switch to manufacturing goods production at monopoly prices within developing countries themselves. This accorded both with the "import-substitution" fever which was sweeping the latter and the shift in MDCs towards concentration on export of capital goods, as it guaranteed MDC exports through purchases of machinery and other inputs for new installation. The technology involved was therefore only relatively labour-intensive, representing a balance between two objectives of MDCs.

(To be continued)

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