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THE FOUNDATION OF DUTCH POWER
IN CEYLON

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DUTCH POWER
IN CEYLON

1638 - 1658

BY

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K. W. GOONEWARDENA

FOREWORD

There are authors who have tried to characterize the colonisation of the Portuguese, the British and the Dutch by the titles, which they gave to their employees. Those of the Lusitanians have a military character: capitao, alfreres; those of the British are administrative: secretary; but those of the Dutch are of a mercantile nature: merchant, bookkeeper. And indeed, while the Portuguese may have excelled in the use of the sword, the Dutch were, without doubt, more proficient in the use of the pen. A simple comparison between the 'Livros das Monções' in the Arquivo Nacional de Torre do Tombo at Lisbon and the bulky volumes of the 'Overgekomen Brieven' from Batavia in the Colonial Archives (Koloniaal Archief) at The Hague will easily convince us. The many visitors from the East and West, who are admitted to study these documents (stored on shelves of a length of 1800 metres) know what treasures of knowledge are hidden there for the historical research on Africa, America and Asia.

Not in vain, therefore, after having acquired a working knowledge of the Dutch language, did the author of this book, Dr. Goonawardena, make his way to the Public Record Office (Algemeen Rijksarchief) at The Hague and painstakingly consult and copy documents there for months, for the sake of his native country's history. This way, he obtained data which enabled him to rewrite a chapter of Ceylon's history, often written before, to wit the establishment of Dutch authority in the island. Contrary to all of his predecessors, except perhaps one - the Netherlander W. van Geer - he made use of much unpublished material, belonging to the rich records of the Dutch East India Company. May this praiseworthy example find many followers, especially with regards to the facts of the XVIIIth century, which for the greater part are still hidden in profound darkness.

Dr. Goonewardena did not confine himself to giving us new information only, but he also wished to take an own stand, for

which nobody will blame him. He wants to consider the struggle of the Dutch and the Portuguese for the cinnamon monopoly with the sovereign of Kandy as a third party. He also wishes to survey the course of events from the point of view of this ruler, the famous Raja Sinha, as well as from the point of view of the Company. It is understandable that not everybody is willing to follow him on this path full of traps and pitfalls. The author of this foreword has his objections too.

However, bearing the old adage in mind: 'audite et alteram partem', the Netherlands Institute for International Cultural Relations (Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Culturele Betrekkingen), did not hesitate to call upon this party too, after so many of the other groups have already raised their voices. This way we hope, that the truth will one day emerge from this 'choc des opinions'.

The historical problems with which Dr. Goonewardena was confronted are extremely complicated. It was no easy task to describe the trilateral relation between the Portuguese and their enemies, the Dutch, on the one hand, and the prince, for whose friendship they both competed, on the other hand. It puts a great strain on the discipline and self-control of the research worker, not to be carried away by his sympathies and antipathies. It is also particularly difficult to measure against each other the exact degree of guilt and responsibility of each of the three parties. We may be grateful, that Dr. Goonewardena has made a praiseworthy effort in this direction. If the result of his exertion does not come up to everybody's expectations, we may recall the words of our once admired poet, with which the travel story of some of our most daring navigators ends "Do not consider the result but look at the purpose only."

But there is more than only an effort here. Dr. Goonewardena has allowed us to peep behind the scenes of the political stage, on which these three parties have played their parts. As the result of his research, many considerations and discussions of the Dutch, which


were secret till now, have come to light. The material, that was brought out from the volumes in parchment bindings of the Colonial Archives was not always equally elevating. Let it be so! We Dutch are not accustomed to fight shy of the truth and we were often the first to criticize the behaviour of our colonizers severely, sometimes even too severely. May the work of Dr. Goonewardena stimulate others to follow his example. When that happens, it is only natural that the standard of criticism will also be applied to his work. Only by continuous critical work may we perhaps in the far future possess a history of the East of the same value as that of the West, at which so many generations have already unremittingly toiled and are toiling still.

Wassenaar, July 1958

DR. H. J. DE GRAAF

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Map of Colombo dating from the 17th century, probably from the Portuguese period (Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, Foreign Maps No. 941).

INTRODUCTION

The present work is chiefly based on the documents concerning Ceylon which are preserved in the *Koloniaal Archief* section of the *Algemeen Rijksarchief* at The Hague. They consist, in the main, of three series - 1. *Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren*, 2. *Bataviaesch Uitgaende Briefboek* and 3. *Brieven van de Vergaderingh van Seventhienen naer Indien*.

Of these, the first-mentioned is by far the most voluminous and the most important - at least so far as this study is concerned. This series consists of documents, which the Governor-General and Council sent to their superiors along with the *Generale Missive* or annual report. In the *Generale Missive*, the Batavian authorities review (among other things) the events and developments which have taken place in Ceylon since their previous *Generale Missive*. This review is often quite detailed, but sometimes sketchy. Nevertheless, whether detailed or sketchy, it is almost invariably an indispensable source for the history of the period covered by it. Generally, of greater importance than this review of Ceylon affairs are the originals or copies of letters, reports etc. sent from Ceylon to Batavia and thence, along with the *Generale Missive*, to the Netherlands. Although, unfortunately, all the documents sent from Ceylon have not been dispatched to the Netherlands, yet, those sent are in sufficient number to give a fuller and truer picture of happenings in Ceylon than is given in the *Generale Missive*.

The second series of documents, the *Bataviaesch Uitgaende Briefboek*, contains (among other things) letters and instructions etc. from the Governor-General and Council to Ceylon, and to their subordinates proceeding to that island on various missions. This series though less voluminous and not so important as the first, is nevertheless invaluable and indispensable. Sometimes the letters and instructions contained in this series are so wide in their scope and ramifications that with their aid many gaps in matters connected with Ceylon can be filled up. Moreover, for a study of Dutch policy, this series is probably the most important of all.

The third series, the *Brieven van de Vergaderingh van Seventhienen naer Indien*, contains, as its name indicates, letters from the Heeren XVII to Batavia. These letters are chiefly important for a study of Dutch policy; they often serve to remind the reader that profit

and commercial advantages were always meant to be the real touchstones of any policy in the island (or elsewhere).

All these documents contain various shortcomings which have to be carefully noted if wrong and hasty conclusions are to be avoided. For instance, letters written on the same subject either to one and the same person or to different persons, sometimes contain contradictory instructions. One explanation for this was given by the Governor-General and Council to the Directors,¹ thus:

‘That in our local letters we write to the Directors and merchants of the Company and, sometimes, to native princes ideas which are far removed from our resolutions, such as, that Muscat is going to be conquered, and coming victorious from there we shall attack Diu, Daman and other Portuguese forts; that . . . we shall assist Bantam against Mataram, and Mataram against Bantam etc. - we request Your Honours to accept such ideas and projects in our letters . . . which do not agree with our resolutions as being inventions made in order to throw our enemy into confusion.’

Another reason for these contradictory statements appears, however, to have been due to a desire on the part of the writers to safeguard themselves in the event of matters turning out contrary to expectation. In fact, in their desire to safeguard themselves from criticism and reproach, the Governor-General and Council, in particular, are at times found to be making absolutely false denials and statements; but these are, generally speaking, so cleverly framed that only a thorough study of all the available materials can get at the truth.

The most notable shortcoming - and the one most to be guarded against - in the reporting of the Dutch Company is the fact that the ‘other fellow’ - whether Raja Sinha or the Portuguese or the ‘Engelsche vrunden’ - is almost invariably said to be a rascal and a cheat, whose actions are thoroughly Machiavellian. This manner of reporting, it must be noted, is seldom absent, to a lesser or greater extent, in the official correspondence of all countries at all times; if the Sinhalese archives had survived I doubt not that it would have been in fitting company when placed beside the Dutch East India Company’s archives. The unfortunate fact, however, is that this characteristic of the Dutch Company’s reporting

has been too often overlooked. In a way, this is not surprising, because the charges of Machiavellianism made against the 'other fellow' are often accompanied by solemn (though on close analysis, false) protestations and explanations of the Company's own uprightness, and the difficulty for the 'open-hearted Netherlander' to act contrary to his conscience.²

Nevertheless, despite these drawbacks, the Company's records at The Hague still remain, on the whole, the most copious and the best material for a study of the period surveyed in this book. There can, perhaps, be no better testimony to their value than that it is possible, after all, to get a fair picture of the 'other fellow's' ideas and actions, even if this has to be obtained by the most exhaustive research.

As far as I know only three writers have hitherto made any considerable use of these records for a study of even a part of the subject dealt with in this thesis. Of these, the first in point of time and, indeed, of importance, has been W. van Geer, who utilised the documents for the years 1638-45 for his doctoral thesis, *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag over Ceilon* (Leiden, 1895). Van Geer's thesis suffered from certain defects, which were due to no fault of his, but were merely the result of its being a pioneer work. For instance, his only Portuguese source was Ribeiro, and he naturally had not access to Raja Sinha's correspondence preserved in the Ceylon archives and published by Donald Ferguson in 1904; nor had he at his disposal the works of scholars such as Dr. P. E. Pieris and H. W. Codrington who dealt with the Portuguese side of the story. There are, however, other defects in Van Geer's work which must be ascribed to the writer's own shortcomings. He has often overlooked vital facts and documents; sometimes he contradicts what is stated in the documents (even where the relevant document is given among his appendixes); sometimes he supplies details by mere guess-work, which, unfortunately, has proved wrong; moreover, he sometimes accepted at their face-value, the tendentious or false statements of the Dutch Company's officials.³ When all this is said and done, however, the fact remains that Van Geer's work is still the best available on his subject; no other writer has a fuller account or a more impartial one.⁴

In his well-known work *De Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azië*, Rijswijk (Z.H.) 1927, N. MacLeod has devoted some

attention to a study of matters connected with Ceylon in the years 1638-50. He is the second writer, in point of importance, who has used a considerable number of the Company's records at the *Rijksarchief* for a study of part at least of the subject covered in this book. As he was primarily interested in the V.O.C. as a sea-power, and was able to devote only some thirty pages for what he says regarding Ceylon, it is to be expected that his work should be very much less comprehensive and satisfactory than that of Van Geer. There are also other factors, which detract from the value of his work. He has sometimes misunderstood or misrepresented what is contained in the documents. To a greater extent than Van Geer he seems to have accepted the tendentious or false statements of the Company's officials at their face-value. On the other hand it must be said that with regard to certain matters he has a fuller account than Van Geer, and, sometimes, where the earlier writer is hopelessly incorrect, MacLeod has not missed the truth.⁵ Moreover, considering the aims and the scope of his work - he covers some forty to fifty places with which the Company had relations of some form or another, and that too, often over a period of three or four decades - the surprising thing perhaps is that the degree of accuracy of what he says is as considerable as it actually is.

The third writer who has made a considerable use of the Company's records preserved at The Hague, for a work dealing with part at least of the subject covered in the present study, is J. Aalbers. In his book *Rijcklof Van Goens, Commissaris . . . , en zijn Arbeidsveld, 1653/54 en 1657/58*, Groningen, 1916, his main concern is with the activities of Rijcklof Van Goens during four specified years. To describe these activities and to indicate the necessary background to them, Aalbers appears certainly to have made much less use of the V.O.C. records at The Hague than either Van Geer or MacLeod in their respective studies. Except for a few documents connected with the activities of Van Goens in 1657-58, he appears to have consulted only the *Generale Missiven*, from the *Missive* of 24 December 1652 to that of 14 December 1658. As far as it concerns the military exploits of Van Goens, his account of matters dealing with Ceylon is well-nigh excellent, but, as regards events prior to 1657, and the relations between Raja Sinha and the Dutch, what he says is faulty; mainly because he utilised (from the Hague records) only the *Generale Missiven*, and sometimes accepted with-

out qualification the false or tendentious statements therein of the Governor-General and Council.⁶

There is a fourth writer, who, while he has not himself consulted any of the V.O.C. records at The Hague, has yet had access to the translations - at the India Office - of a few of these records. This writer, Dr. P. E. Pieris, has incorporated précis, extracts, or entire reproductions of these translations in a book entitled: *Some Documents Relating to the Rise of the Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1602-1670, from the Translations at the India Office*, Colombo 1929. It is, I believe, fairly well-known that these translations have been rather ineptly done; nevertheless it is probably not out of place to indicate here a concrete example of the gross errors committed in them;

<i>Original words</i>	<i>India Office Trans. (in Dr. Pieris' book)</i>	<i>Trans. as it should be</i>
„want boven in 't hoff alles schier aen sijn eijgen zinnelijc- heijt hangt, daer onse Hren Mrs in dese gelegentheijt immers seer veel aengelegen is.” ⁷	‘Whilst quietly at Court he is enslaved to his sensual appe- tites, and the interests of the Company demands the actual display of this allegiance to us.’	‘For, up there in the Court, almost everything depends on his own humour, upon which our Lords Principals are really very much dependent in the present cir- cumstances.’

The defects in Dr. Pieris' book cannot, however, be all ascribed to the shortcomings of the translators. A good deal of the defects in it arise from the fact that it is neither a book of documents nor a history; trying to be both it falls between two stools.

Apart from the V.O.C. records at The Hague, there are known to be many at Batavia; but I have not been able to consult any of them. The only unpublished V.O.C. records in Ceylon which are relevant to the present work are the ‘Council Minutes’ of Galle, Colombo and Negombo.⁸ With many gaps, they cover the period from July 1640 to the end of 1658. Unfortunately, I have yet been unable to consult any of these ‘Council Minutes’ except those of Galle from July 1640 to March 1644 which have been available to me from the translations published by R.G. Anthonisz in the *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1902) XVII. Nevertheless, I feel certain that what is contained in the available

Ceylon records will not in any way alter the main conclusions arrived at in this study.

Of the published V.O.C. records of Ceylon, by far the most important for the period under consideration is the *Memoir of Joan Maetsuijcker, 1650*, edited (with the Dutch text and an English translation) by E. Reimers, Colombo, 1927. This *Memoir* furnishes some important information, which is not available from other sources. The *Instructions from the Governor-General and Council of India to the Governor of Ceylon 1656⁹ to 1665*, translated by Sophia Pieters, Colombo, 1908 and the *Memoirs of Ryckloff van Goens, 1663-1675*, edited (with the Dutch text and an English translation) by E. Reimers, Colombo, 1932, also contain data which are somewhat relevant to the subject-matter of this study.

The Dutch records, which have been, next to the Hague documents, the most useful and important for the purposes of this book are those embodied in the *Dagh-Register gehouden in 't Casteel Batavia*, the relevant volumes of which, covering the years 1636-1659, were printed serially at Batavia in 1887-1904. These volumes are of unequal value, some containing transcripts of original documents in full, others omitting them altogether or confining themselves to brief digests. (The available volumes from 1646 to 1658, inclusive, are of very little use for matters dealing with Ceylon). Where the documents are printed *in extenso* (as for example Raja Sinha's letter on pp. 407-18 of the 1641 volume) then, however, this series is of great value, although non-Dutch names are often badly mutilated, and the information given is sometimes incorrect, and, occasionally, deliberately distorted.¹⁰ Generally speaking, however, the *Dagh-Register* is a reliable and invaluable source.

Of contemporary printed Dutch works, the most important is the work of Philippus Baldaeus: *Nauwkeurige Beschryvinge van Malabar en Choromandel . . . en het machtige Eyland Ceylon* (Amsterdam, 1672). In his capacity of Predikant or Preacher, Baldaeus spent some years in Ceylon himself (1656-1663) and took much trouble in amassing material for his book, which includes copious extracts from contemporary state-papers and correspondence. He was been severely criticised for plagiarising and making unscrupulous use of his Portuguese predecessor's materials, nor can it be denied that he has been convicted on this point.¹¹ Moreover, occasionally he seems to present a garbled version of a treaty or other document,

with quite a happy face and he is even found deliberately denying the truth.¹² But the standards of the 17th century in these respects were not those of the 20th, and although Baldaeus' book must be used (like all others) with due caution, the fact remains that it is an indispensable and generally reliable work.

A work compiled (though not published) next to Baldaeus in point of time is that of Pieter Van Dam, the 'Advocate' of the V.O.C. His *Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie*, Bk. II part II (edited by Dr. F. W. Stapel, The Hague, 1932) contains (on pp. 247ff) an account of Dutch relations with Ceylon from 1602 onwards. Although it appears certain that his work is of greater value for the period after 1658, the fact is that for the period prior to that date; Baldaeus has a fuller and better account than Van Dam. Whereas Baldaeus appears to have consulted many and a varied number of the Company's documents for his work dealing with this period, Van Dam appears to have confined himself for the most part to the *Generale Missiven*.¹³

In François Valentyn's well-known work, *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien*, Dordrecht-Amsterdam, 1724-26, volume five contains his *Beschryving van het Eyland Ceylon*. The same adverse comments which have been made on the work of Baldaeus apply also to that of Valentyn. While the importance of Valentyn's work for the period up to 1658 is somewhat overshadowed by the fact that Baldaeus has already covered much of the ground, nevertheless Valentyn's work is also indispensable for a study of this period. Apart from certain letters of Maetsuijcker, Van Kittenstein etc. which are available only in his work, the invaluable and extremely accurate glossary of Sinhalese terms and the almost equally useful and accurate description of the various castes which he gives at the beginning of his work are still indispensable.¹⁴

Lastly, there is the *Beknopte Historie van de voornaamste gebeurtenissen op Ceijlon . . . tot den jare 1757* compiled in 1760 by W. van Damast Limberger and published in translation by F. H. de Vos in *J. C. R. A. S.*, (1889) XI 1-147. For the purposes of this book Limberger's compilation has been useful only for the purpose of collation with the works of Baldaeus and Valentyn. It is apparent that the compiler has almost entirely derived his account from these two authors.

Two memoirs of German mercenary soldiers who served the

Dutch Company against the Portuguese in Ceylon, contain interesting 'background material', and occasionally indicate the way in which those in the ranks viewed the actions of their superiors. J. J. Saar's *Ost-Indianische Funfzehen-Jahriges Kriegs-Dienste* (Nurnberg, 1662) is better known than the *Ost-Indisches Tage-Buch* of J. van der Behr (Leipzig, 1668). Saar was first in Ceylon in October 1647 and last there in the latter half of 1658; Von der Behr first arrived in the island in December 1644 and was last there in October 1649. Von der Behr's account of events is extremely accurate as regards dates (and is therefore a useful check on the official records of his superiors) and is generally less fanciful than that of Saar, whose account is, however, more interesting.¹⁵

The Portuguese archives at Lisbon and Goa are known to contain much 17th century material on Ceylon, but I have not consulted them, and comparatively little of this material has been published. There is nothing printed in Portuguese to compare with the *Dagh-Register Gehouden In 't Casteel Batavia*, or with the *English Factories in India* for the period under review, since the corresponding Portuguese series, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das Monções*, has only reached the year 1619 in print.

Reliance has therefore chiefly been placed on the *Conquista Temporal e Espiritual de Ceylão*, of Fr. Fernão de Queyroz and the *Fatalidade Historica da Ilha de Ceilão*, by Captain João Ribeiro. These works were completed in 1686/87 and 1685 respectively, but were first printed in 1916 and 1836 in their original form. Queyroz was never in Ceylon but a lifetime spent in Goa brought him into close and continual contact with many of his compatriots who had lived there, and he had access to the Indo-Portuguese archives. His work is diffuse, badly co-ordinated and unmethodical. Moreover - and this appears to have been hitherto unnoticed - he twists his material sometimes to suit his purposes.¹⁶ Nevertheless, his work contains a great mass of useful and interesting material, and is essential for the Portuguese side of the story. Ribeiro spent some nineteen years as a soldier in Ceylon (1640-1658) and his work though very much shorter than that of Queyroz, remains invaluable for the viewpoint of the man in the ranks. His dates and figures are seldom reliable, but his description of Sinhalese life and customs, though inevitably marred by the prejudices of his age and nation, remains of lasting value.

Owing to my insufficient knowledge of Portuguese, I have had to depend on English translations of Queyroz and Ribeiro; but these versions are preferable in many respects to the printed Portuguese editions which have no annotation worth mentioning, whereas the English translations are competently edited by Sinhalese scholars.¹⁷ Inadequate knowledge of Portuguese has also prevented me from making use of the documents concerning the truce negotiations (in Europe) over Ceylon published by E. Prestage and P. de Azavedo in the *Correspondência Diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a sua embaixada em Hollanda, 1643-1648* (2 vols. Coimbra, 1920-26) or proper use of the narratives of the last days of Portuguese rule in Ceylon printed by M. A. H. Fitzler in *O Cérco de Columbo. Últimos dias do dominio Português em Ceilão. Rompimento das hostilidades pelos Holandeses até a rendição de Columbo 1652-1656*, Coimbra, 1928. To some extent this is compensated for by my use of the translations from the unpublished *Livros das Monções* for the years 1637-1656, which are in the India Office Library; although these must be used with caution since the translations (and even the transcripts) often leave a good deal to be desired.¹⁸

Twenty-four letters, which Raja Sinha wrote to the Dutch during this period and, which are preserved at the Ceylon Archives, were translated from the original Portuguese and published by Donald Ferguson in *J.C.R.A.S.*, XVIII 185-245, *passim* and XXI 260-66. These letters of Raja Sinha, together with a considerable number available at the *Rijksarchief* at The Hague, in the *Dagh-Register* of Batavia, and in the works of Baldaeus and Valentyn (some of which missives are only in summary form) constitute the only important documents known to be extant from the Sinhalese side. The Kandyan archives appear to have been completely lost. There is the Sinhalese chronicle the *Rajavaliya* in a confused variety of versions; but what it says is so confused and little, that it is almost of no use for the subject of the present work. In passing, it may also be noted that the work of Robert Knox, *An Historical Relation of the Island Ceylon* (London, 1681), while invaluable for its description of various aspects of the political, economic and social life within the Kandyan Kingdom, is not of direct use for the subject-matter of this study. As for Knox's picture of Raja Sinha as an unmitigated tyrant - it really does not belong to this period, although a streak of tyranny ran through some of his actions even at this time.

After the study of the above documents, I have come to certain conclusions, which in many respects revise completely, or in part, many of the views, hitherto generally accepted, on the topics dealt with in this study. Of these conclusions, the most important are those which concern the mutual relations between the King of Kandy, Raja Sinha, and the Dutch.

It has been generally accepted, that although Raja Sinha called in the Dutch to drive out the Portuguese, he gave his allies little or no assistance in their task, because he wished to see them do all the fighting, and himself reap any benefits resulting therefrom. In actual fact, however, it is apparent that, generally speaking, he gave his allies all possible help against the enemy; indeed, during a critical period, one Dutch Governor went so far as to declare to his superiors that the King's help had been only second to that of God.

It has also been generally believed that Raja Sinha's policy was to play off the Dutch against the Portuguese and *vice versa*. But in reality, the King steadily supported the Dutch against the common enemy except during a brief period, when his allies began to act as enemies; even then, he did not proceed further than to observe a friendly neutrality towards the Portuguese.

Finally, it has been generally held that, because he did not repay, according to promise, the huge expenses which they had incurred in his service, the Dutch were forced to take over territorial control in order, thereby, to obtain satisfaction of their debts. The truth, however, is that not only did the Dutch grossly exaggerate the extent of the King's debts, but they also ensured, in the most ingenious manner, that however hard he might try, he would never be able to clear up his debts; for, they wished to use his indebtedness as a pretext for establishing their power in Ceylon.

The well-known historian of Ceylon, H. W. Codrington¹⁹ says of Raja Sinha:

'He was a master in craft and double dealing, but met his equal in diplomacy in the Dutch, who found it impossible to act otherwise with so shifty an ally.'

Even if this statement were completely inverted the truth is still not well expressed; for, Raja Sinha was not quite the equal of the Dutch in diplomacy.

1. 9 Dec. 1637, in Koloniaal Archief No. 1034 pp. 35-36.
2. Cf. for illustrations of some of these points 48 n. 22, 49 n. 28, 51 n. 42, 101 n. 6, 134 n. 18, 137 n. 57, 138 n. 62, 188 n. 2 etc. of the present work.
3. Cf. on the above points 48 n. 21, 50 ns. 32 & 33, 54 n. 67, 77 n. 15, 78 n. 39 etc. of the present work.
4. The fact that none of the three Ceylon writers, who avowedly utilised his work, were able to maintain the degree of impartiality shown by him, is a good testimony to the merits of Van Geer's work. (cf. Donald Ferguson, 'Raja Sinha II and the Dutch', *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XVIII 166-275; R. G. Anthonisz, *The Dutch in Ceylon*, Colombo, 1929; H. W. Codrington, *A Short History of Ceylon*, London, 1929.) In fact, only two writers (Prof. P. Geyl in *Camb. Hist. of India*, v. ch. ii and Dr. F. W. Stapel, *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië*, iii, 251 ff.) appear to have made rather detailed and fair use of Van Geer's work. Dr. Stapel's work, however, has many inaccuracies.
5. cf. on the above points 22 n. 29, 48 ns. 20 & 21, 50 n. 35, 78 n. 26, 106 n. 65, 134 n. 18, 138 n. 70 etc. of the present work.
6. cf. on the above points 182 ns. 1 & 3 & 9, 184 n. 24, 185 n. 43, 188 n. 71 etc. of the present work.
7. A. van der Meijden and Council to Governor-General & C., 14 May 1655, Kol. Arch. 1100 fo. 418. The India Office translation is on p. 178 of Dr. Pieris' work.
8. cf. M. W. Jurriaanse, *Catalogue of the Archives of the Dutch Central Government of Coastal Ceylon*, Colombo, 1943.
9. There is really nothing in these 'Instructions' which could be said to apply definitely to the period before 1659.
10. cf. 34, 80 ns. 53 & 59, 133 n. 10, 134 n. 11 of the present work.
11. cf. the articles of J. Charpentier in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, ii (1923) 731-54 and *ibid.*, iii (1924) 413-20.
12. cf. 11 n. 16, 21 ns. 19, 22 & 25, 187 n. 70. of the present work.
13. e.g. pp. 255-62 consist almost entirely of transcripts from the *Generale Missiven* of 1 Feb. 1656 (Kol. Arch. 1102 fos. 63-72) and of 4 Dec. 1656 (Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 52-59). Needless to say, Van Dam's entire work is generally useful for anyone studying almost any matter connected with the V.O.C. in the 17th century.
14. For a general estimate of Valentyn's works cf. Stapel, *Geschiedenis*, iii, 487-91.
15. cf. the collected edition of these German soldiers' narratives by S.P. L'Honoré Naber, *Reisebeschreibungen von Deutschen Beamten und Kriegsleuten im Dienst der Niederländischen West- und Ost-Indischen Compagnie, 1602-1797* (Hague, 1931-32) of which Von der Behr's account is Vol. IV and that of Saar, Vol. VI.
16. cp. e.g. his attitude towards the Portuguese General, Diogo de Melo de Castro on pp. 800-01 of his work (for which, see next note, below) with that on p. 1095. For an estimate of Queyroz as historian of Ceylon see G. Schurhammer, S.J. and E.A. Voretzsch, *Ceylon zur Zeit des Königs Bhuvaneka Bâhu und Franz Xavers 1539-1552* (Leipzig, 1928) 40-49 and Fr. G. Schurhammer's article in *B.S.O.A.S.*, V (1929) pp. 209-27.

17. *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon*, translated by S. G. Perera, S. J. (3 vols., Colombo, 1930); *The Historic Tragedy of the Island of Ceylon*, translated and edited by Dr. P. E. Pieris. I have used the 1925 edition (Colombo).
18. For the original *Livros das Monções* at Goa and Lisbon cf. C. R. Boxer 'A glimpse of the Goa Archives' in *B.S.O.A.S.* XIV (1952) pp. 299-324.
19. *Short History*, 136.

CEYLON: FROM THE ARRIVAL OF THE PORTUGUESE UP TO THE ACCESSION OF RAJA SINHA II

‘The island of Ceylon is said to be one of the finest islands that have been discovered up to our times, and, the most fruitful under the sun.’¹

When these words of Linschoten were being eagerly read by the adventurous merchants of the Netherlands, their Portuguese enemies had been enjoying most of the fruits of this island, for more than half a century. The Portuguese were appraising the value of Ceylon at least as highly as Linschoten himself; for, after all, he was only repeating information about Ceylon which he had obtained, for the most part, from the Portuguese themselves.

When recounting the riches of this ‘terrestrial paradise’,² as some of them called the island, the Portuguese named cinnamon as the first in importance. Speaking of its value and uses, Garcia da Orta says in 1563:

‘... for Portugal, it is certainly a very good article of commerce. It is sent there in sufficient quantity, for besides being a good medicine, it is useful in seasoning dishes, as is the practice in India.’³

The quality of the Ceylon cinnamon was such that Ribeiro dismissed the inferior varieties found elsewhere as being practically worthless, when he declared: ‘We know that this spice is found nowhere but in Ceylon.’⁴ In addition to the cinnamon, the island possessed a number of other products such as pearls and precious stones, elephants, arecanut and pepper, all of which were highly valued on account of the great profits which they yielded.

All the products enumerated above, were from ancient times royal monopolies. By means of the prevalent system of land tenure, the King was able to exploit them without any expense to his treasury. For instance, the work of peeling and gathering the cinnamon was done by men of the Chalea caste for no other payment than the lands, which they were assigned for use as long as they did this work. If anyone was unable to perform this work, his lands were given over to another, who was prepared to do so.

This system of land tenure was so extensive in its application that even military service had to be rendered by certain classes of people, not in return for any cash payments, but for usufructuary rights over certain specified lands. Thus, as Ribeiro enthusiastically explains, 'the King was not put to the expense of a single *real*' in maintaining his soldiers, who would otherwise cost more than a vast treasure.⁵

From all this, it might appear as if the Portuguese would find, when they came to rule over a rich portion of this 'terrestrial paradise', that they had almost every requisite for the successful exploitation of its riches. But they lacked at least one absolutely essential requisite; namely the continued co-operation and allegiance of a sufficient number of the inhabitants of the country. In the words of the well-known Portuguese historian of Ceylon, Fernão de Queyroz,⁶ his countrymen were opposed by:

'the disloyalty and desperation of the Chingalaz, a subtle, proud, treacherous and fickle race, by no means inferior in courage to the bravest in India; who bear their own native yoke so ill that it is impossible they should not decline a foreign one, as may well be seen by the pertinacity with which for more than a century they obliged us to turn that island into a pool of their own and foreign blood.'

When the Portuguese first came to the island at the beginning of the sixteenth century there were three kingdoms of varying economic and political importance. In the north was the Kingdom of Jaffna, inhabited by the Tamils, a people differing very much in race, language, customs and religion, from the Sinhalese who inhabited the rest of Ceylon. In comparison with the rest of the country, Jaffna was a poor area; at least, not a stick of the much-sought-after cinnamon grew in that country. Then, there was the Kingdom of Kandy, occupying the central highlands of Ceylon. At the time the Portuguese arrived, it was becoming an important factor in the politics of Ceylon. Finally, there was the Kingdom of Kotte, occupying the western and south-western areas of the country. It was the richest and the most powerful of the three kingdoms, and had been exercising varying degrees of overlordship over the other two. Most of the cinnamon of the country was to be found in the Kotte Kingdom; the rest was in the Kingdom of Kandy.⁷

The Portuguese had their first contacts with the ruler of Kotte, who, overawed by their military might, allowed them to build a fort at Colombo, in 1518; furthermore, he promised to pay tribute to the King of Portugal. Nevertheless, he could not be persuaded to exclude the Muslims (or Moors, as they were usually called by the Portuguese) from the trade which they had conducted for so long in cinnamon and other articles. In fact, the populace and many of the nobles, whose sympathies were with the peaceful Muslim traders, felt that the King had gone too far in permitting the construction of a fort. The consequent attacks made on the unpopular foreigner proved a failure. When in 1520 a new Sinhalese King gave in to the popular clamour against the Portuguese, his attempts to destroy the fort ended in a fiasco.

In the following year, an event took place which considerably weakened the power of the Sinhalese to resist Portuguese ambitions in Ceylon. The three sons of the King of Kotte did away with their father, and partitioned the Kingdom amongst themselves. The mutual rivalries of two of these sons - the third died within a few years of the partition - gave the Portuguese a splendid opportunity of strengthening their own position. Bhuwanekabahu, the elder of these sons, although he had obtained the capital city of Kotte and a major share at the partition, was very much of a weakling and became increasingly dependent on the Portuguese for maintaining his position against his ambitious and abler brother, Mayadunne, who had obtained the subordinate principality of Sitawaka. While Bhuwanekabahu called in the aid of the Portuguese, Mayadunne obtained help from the Samorin of Calicut who had his own quarrels with the Portuguese.

The successor of Bhuwanekabahu, his grandson, Dharmapala, was even more of a weakling than his grandfather, consequently, he soon came to rule only in name, his indispensable allies and protectors, the Portuguese, exercising all effective power. His conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1557, made Dharmapala only too happy to see the Portuguese so powerful in his state. In August 1580 he appointed the King of Portugal as heir to his kingdom, by a testament to that effect. When, therefore, Dharmapala died in 1597, the Portuguese became the rulers of the Kingdom of Kotte, in fact and in name.

Nevertheless, although they inherited a kingdom, they also inherited, on account of the barbarism and religious bigotry⁸

displayed by them almost from the beginning, the implacable hostility of the vast majority of the Sinhalese. When Dharmapala had become a Catholic, many of his courtiers and some of his other subjects had followed his example. Though the Portuguese had a somewhat loyal element from amongst these Catholics, the majority of their subjects obeyed them through fear and necessity and by no means through love and affection.⁹

To all these Sinhalese who were hostile to Portuguese domination, Mayadunne of Sitawaka had been the champion of Buddhism and of Sinhalese culture, till his death in 1581. In fact, he and his son, Raja Sinha, had driven Dharmapala and the Portuguese to such straits that long before Dharmapala donated his Kingdom, the Kotte King and his Portuguese friends had little more than the city of Colombo in their possession. Raja Sinha, although he was considered a godless King by many of his subjects, was certainly no Catholic; nor was his hatred for the Portuguese less than that of his father; his military genius and his successes against them were much greater. He all but drove them into the sea. But the Portuguese who were in full command of the seas, always obtained relief from Goa in the nick of time.

Various circumstances, not the least of which was his ill-judged and ill-timed conquest of the Kandyan Kingdom, brought about the downfall of Raja Sinha and the Kingdom of Sitawaka (1593). Before that happened, however, there appeared on the scene a new figure, which, while contributing in a large measure to the downfall of Raja Sinha, at the same time came to fill the vacant position of the Sitawaka King as a rallying point for the Sinhalese against the Portuguese tyranny.

It happened that in 1591 the Portuguese had decided to set up on their behalf on the throne of Kandy one of the heirs of the King, whom Raja Sinha had driven out from that Kingdom. To head the movement in favour of their protégé, they sent a valiant Kandyan Sinhalese named Konappu Bandara, who had taken service under Dharmapala but, was himself the son of a nobleman, who had once aspired to the throne of Kandy. The Portuguese plans seemed on the point of realisation because the whole country flocked to the standard of Dom Philip,¹⁰ their protégé, against the tyrannous usurpation of Raja Sinha. But when Dom Philip died suddenly under suspicious signs of having been poisoned, Konappu Bandara utilised the popular suspicion and

resentment in order to oust the Portuguese, and become King.

Thus, at about the same time that Raja Sinha and the Kingdom of Sitawaka came to be no more, Wimaladharma Surya (as Konappu Bandara now came to be known) and the Kandyan Kingdom, came to the fore as the champions of the Sinhalese in the struggle against Portuguese domination.

If, in the eyes of any Sinhalese, Wimaladharma lacked a perfect title to the throne of Kandy, the Portuguese, quite unwittingly though, provided him with one. Determined to obtain control of the Kandyan Kingdom, the General Pero Lopez de Souza set out on an expedition to Kandy taking with him Dona Catherina,¹⁰ the sole remaining heir of the late dynasty of Kandy. At first, he carried all before him, being very much assisted in the enterprise by an able and respected Sinhalese commander; but when he did away with this commander, and when it appeared that de Souza intended to marry Dona Catherina to a Portuguese, almost all the Sinhalese troops deserted him. Soon after this, Wimaladharma surrounded the Portuguese and killed or captured all of them on the 8th October 1594. Among the booty which fell into his hands was Dona Catherina herself. He made her his queen and thereby obtained a perfect title to the Kingdom.

In the years succeeding, the Portuguese and the Sinhalese waged a fierce warfare, but neither side was able to conquer the other. The Portuguese maintained a hold over a vast area. The internal dissensions which followed in Sitawaka at the death of Raja Sinha, had enabled the Portuguese not only to regain the original kingdom of Bhuwanekabahu, but also to capture most of the Sitawaka territory. Wimaladharma ruled the remainder of Sitawaka, and his own Kingdom of Kandy. Roughly, this was the territorial position of the two powers. The Portuguese, however, could at no time enjoy the perfect submission of their territory, because of the antagonism of their subjects towards them. A letter which the inhabitants of the Four and Seven Korales addressed to Wimaladharma in 1599 is a testimony to this irreconcilability of the people to Portuguese rule:

‘The inhabitants of the frontiers of the Portuguese make known to you, the Universal King and Victorious Lord of this Lancab,¹¹ how on all sides the robbers of cattle, the shedders of blood, the Enemies of Life, the causers of captivity, have come upon us, which makes it necessary for us either to abandon our possessions

to them, or to obey them against our will. Wherefore you, who are the guardian and refuge of this orphaned and afflicted people, succour the miserable, who are in this condition, if you do not wish to see altogether extinguished the Nation of which you are the Restorer, Guardian, Relief and firm protector.'¹²

Nevertheless, despite all the hostility of their subjects, the experience of Raja Sinha had shown that without the support of sea-power to prevent relief being sent to them from outside the island, the Portuguese could not be driven from Ceylon.

This was the situation in the island, when the first Netherlanders appeared on it. Of the early expeditions which the compatriots of Linschoten sent out to the East in order to break into the Portuguese monopoly of the valuable spice trade, the first to touch at Ceylon was the expedition sent under Joris Van Spilbergen. Acting on the express instructions of the promoters of the voyage, Spilbergen journeyed to Kandy to meet the King, in July 1602. Although trade was the real object of their expedition, he artfully passed himself off before the King more as a diplomat than as a trader, because he realised that the King looked upon matters of trade with contempt. He declared that he had been sent to Ceylon to offer the friendship and the help of Prince Maurice of Nassau against the Portuguese. The overjoyed Wimaladharmapala presented Spilbergen with all the cinnamon and pepper which he had at the moment; and, finally, he sent him back with rich presents and letters for Prince Maurice.¹³

Hardly three months after the departure of Spilbergen from Ceylon, there arrived another Netherlander. This was Sebald de Weert who had been instructed to proceed first to Ceylon and thence to Achin. He was received warmly by Wimaladharmapala when the latter heard that the newcomer belonged to the same nation as Spilbergen. On account of the very favourable conditions which the King offered in return for Dutch help against the Portuguese, de Weert decided to give the required help. To strengthen his forces for the agreed attack on the Portuguese, he sailed to Achin and fetched additional men and ships from the Dutch vessels which were at the moment at that port. The King though pleased at his return with a large force, soon found reason to suspect the Dutchman's good faith. His suspicions soon changed

into wrath when the drunken de Weert made a lewd and insulting remark. He ordered his men to bind de Weert; when the latter prepared to resist, he was cut down, together with some forty-seven of his men, by the Sinhalese. Although the remaining Dutch tarried at the port of Batticaloa for nearly a month after this event, and even sent an envoy to the King, from whom they received some cinnamon and pepper, they were unwilling to assist him against the Portuguese. Thus, Wimaladharma never obtained the naval support which he knew was essential for driving out the Portuguese.

The ex-monk Senarat who succeeded his step-brother Wimaladharma Surya in 1604, was most anxious to obtain Dutch assistance against the Portuguese, who had become bolder since the death of Wimaladharma, whom they had feared. Although in 1610 he succeeded in concluding a treaty with the commander of a Dutch ship which touched at a port on the east-coast of the island, nothing further came of this treaty.¹⁴ Except the successful attempt of various Dutch officials on the Coromandel Coast to obtain elephants from Senarat by holding out false promises of armed assistance, nothing of importance occurred until February 1612. In that month an envoy named Marcelis Boschouwer arrived with letters from the States General and Prince Maurice to Senarat.

These two letters¹⁵ were part of the many similar letters addressed to Eastern princes by the States-General and Prince Maurice in 1609. They were all to the effect that a twelve-year truce had been concluded with the King of Spain and Portugal, and that each of the rulers to whom these letters were addressed, could rely on the armed support of the States-General and the Prince, if the Portuguese violated the truce which expressly stipulated that these rulers were also included in its terms.

It is certain that neither the States-General nor Prince Maurice had any intentions of giving armed help to all these rulers if the Portuguese continued the wars against them. It was, however, expected that on the strength of these promises of help, the Dutch could obtain great commercial and other privileges from these rulers. Senarat, of course, knew nothing of all this when on the 11th March 1612 he agreed to the terms of a treaty proposed by Boschouwer.¹⁶ By this he granted the Dutch vast commercial privileges, amounting in effect to a monopoly of all the trade of the country. In addition, he ceded to them the harbour and the

land of Kottiyar in full sovereignty. All this was in return for the 5th article of the treaty by which the Dutch promised to give armed assistance against the Portuguese, if the latter were directly or indirectly the aggressors.

Although Boschouwer pointed out to them the great advantages to be derived from the concluded treaty, his immediate superiors on the Coromandel Coast were unable to send any assistance to Senarat, to whom, however, they held out promises of sending help within a short time. At length, in March 1615, Boschouwer left Ceylon promising to return with the necessary help. Failing to obtain assistance from Bantam, the then headquarters of the Dutch Company in the East, Boschouwer decided to press the matter before the Directors in the Netherlands. The Directors too were not prepared to give the required assistance, and he turned to Denmark, where he found a willing ally.

Meanwhile, however, the situation had changed in Ceylon. King Senarat despairing of obtaining assistance from the Dutch, concluded peace with the Portuguese in August 1617. When, therefore, the Danish expedition arrived in Ceylon in May 1620, he could not accept its help without violation of the sworn peace. This, much more than the absence of Boschouwer, who had died on the voyage, explains why he refused the proffered assistance of the Danes.

War was resumed between the Sinhalese and the Portuguese when the latter flagrantly violated the peace by fortifying Trincomalee and Batticaloa, two ports belonging to the King. Although the King made preparations for the war, the Portuguese General Constantine de Sa de Noronha was able to make a practically unopposed raid into Kandyan territory in 1627. He followed this up with a less successful expedition in 1629 and the grand expedition of 1630. In the early part of this expedition, he captured and burnt the city of Badulla in the principality of Uva, the King and his three sons avoiding an engagement. But, suddenly, the Sinhalese army appeared in force, and in the battle of Randeniwela (25 August 1630), de Sa with most of his men were killed and over 200 Portuguese remained prisoner. This expedition showed the Portuguese, more clearly than ever before, that in the last resort 'the blacks are all our enemies.' Almost all the important Sinhalese commanders, great favourites of de Sa, and many of them allied through marriage and a common religion to the Portuguese,

went over with their men to the Kandyans, at the beginning of the engagement.

Although, as a result of this defeat, Portuguese power in Ceylon reached a very low ebb, yet the Kandyans were unable to make an effective siege of Colombo, as they lacked the necessary naval support to cut off all relief from the city. To remedy this defect the Kandyan King requested help from the Dutch Governor of Pulicat.¹⁷ But the Dutch, apparently did not feel strong enough to give any assistance. Finally, after well over a year's siege of Galle and Colombo, the Sinhalese were forced to give up their hopes of capturing these places. Thereafter, an indecisive warfare was waged by the two parties until about 1634 when peace was concluded between them.

At the end of this year, or early in the following, King Senarat died, and his youngest son,¹⁸ the Prince Maha Asthana, who seems to have been actually administering the state since about 1629, became King of Kandy under the name of Raja Sinha II. His eldest brother had died some time earlier; his elder brother, Wijayapala, became ruler of the principality of Matale, but remained subordinate to him. Raja Sinha was thus the acknowledged overlord of all the territories outside Portuguese control.

1. H. Kern (Ed.) *Itinerario-Voyage ofte Schipvaert van Jan Huygen van Linschoten naer Oost-ofte Portugaels Indien, 1579-1592.* (*Werken der Linschoten Vereeniging ii* The Hague, 1910) Pt. i. p. 55.

2. P. E. Pieris (Transl.) Captain João Ribeiro, *The Historic Tragedy of the Island of Ceilão*, 3rd Edition, Colombo, 1925 p. 264. This work will be hereafter referred to as: Ribeiro.

3. Sir Clements Markham (Trans.) Garcia da Orta, *Colloquies on the Simples & Drugs of India* (New Edition, Lisbon, 1895, Edited and Annotated by the Conde de Ficalho,) London, 1913, p. 131.

4. Ribeiro, 159.

João Ribeiro: Born at Lisbon 1622 of humble parentage, came out to the East in 1640 and served in Ceylon until the capture of Jaffna in 1658. After his return to Europe he fought in the campaigns against the Spaniards in Alemtejo 1661-65; in 1667-80 Garrison Commander at Funchal (Madeira) where he married, returned to Lisbon in 1680, where he wrote his *Fatalidade Historica* (dedication dated Jan. 1685) and died in 1693.

5. Ribeiro, 29.

For the system of land tenure see (among others): Ribeiro, 28ff; Robert Knox, *An Historical Relation of the Island of Ceylon*, London, 1681, p. 43.

Sir John D'Oyly, *A Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom*, Colombo

- 1929; H. W. Codrington, *Ancient Land Tenure and Revenue in Ceylon*, Colombo, 1938.
6. S. G. Perera, (Trans.) Fernão de Queyroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon*, Colombo, 1930, p. 806. This work will be hereafter referred to as: Queyroz.
Queyroz: Born 1617; entered orders of Society of Jesus; arrived in India, Nov. 1635; occupied various posts such as Professor of Theology, Parish Priest of Salsette, until in 1677 he became Provincial of the Order. After laying down this office in 1680, he continued at Goa where he died in April 1688, after a continuous residence of 53 years in India. He composed various works of which, apart from his book on Ceylon, the '*Life of the Venerable Brother Pedro de Basto.....*' is best known.
 7. For the history of the so-called 'Portuguese Period' see (among others): Queyroz and Ribeiro.
P. E. Pieris, *Ceylon: The Portuguese Era*, 2 vols.
Fr. S. G. Perera, *A History of Ceylon for Schools* (1943) pt. 1.
H. W. Codrington, *A Short History of Ceylon* (1929). There are various editions of the last two works. I have indicated the editions used by me.
For the territorial boundaries during the 16th C. see the last-mentioned work, Map VI, p. 131.
 8. 'It was the day of the festival of the Pagode of Alugão and the concourse of Pilgrims was large; and to turn their tears into blood, the arrayal (i.e. the Portuguese army) marched to that Pagode.' These words of Queyroz (427) indicate the behaviour of the Portuguese rather well. It is true that the idea of religious tolerance had not been properly developed in Europe at that time; but this fact could not be understood by the Buddhist Sinhalese, who had always respected other people's opinions and had at first extended a friendly welcome to the Portuguese missionaries.
 9. Most of the Sinhalese Catholics were so only in name. The Portuguese could not be assured of the continued loyalty and co-operation of even the few practising Catholics, because of the excesses committed against them by Portuguese of all classes. Roughly, however, it could be said that Portuguese power depended, to some extent, on the not very steady loyalty of the practising Catholics, the dangerous, but often happily effective assistance of ambitious and self-seeking Sinhalese noblemen and the divisions among the subjects of the Sinhalese ruler; but, overwhelmingly, their power depended on their own military strength.
 10. A baptismal name given by the Portuguese.
 11. *Sic.* for 'Lankawa', a Sinhalese name for Ceylon.
 12. Queyroz, 540.
 13. For the history of Dutch contacts with Ceylon up to about 1638, see in particular:
Philippus Baldaeus, *Beschrijvinge van het machtige Eyland Ceylon*, in (*Naauwkeurige beschrijvinge van Malabar en Choromandel... en het Machtige Eyland Ceylon*, Amsterdam 1672) 20ff; Francois Valentyn, *Beschryvinge van het Eyland Ceylon*, in (*Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien*, Dordrecht-Amsterdam, 1724-26, V) p. 101ff.
Willem van Geer, *De opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag over Ceilon*, Leyden, 1895, pp. 11-26.

N. MacLeod, *De Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azië*, Rijswijk (Z.H.) 1927, i. 13ff.

14. J. E. Heeres, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, The Hague, 1907, i 81-83.

15. India Office Library, *Dutch Records* (Transcripts) (B 1), V 3.

16. *Ibid.*

In the *Corpus Dip.* (i. 95-99) Heeres gives the version of this treaty as given by Baldaeus. Baldaeus' version, however, is hopelessly confused and misleading. For instance, he gives the date of the Treaty as 11th May; but the actual date is 11th March. (There was a slight modification of the terms on 5 April of the same year). Moreover, the treaty consisted of 45 articles, of which Baldaeus gives only 33.

17. Marten Ysbrants to (Governor-General & Council) 4 December 1630, in I.O.L. (i.e: India Office Library) Dutch Recs. IX; Viceroy to King (of Portugal & Spain) 2 April 1632, in I.O.L., *Portuguese Records* (Trans). VII. It is interesting also to note that the Governor-General, Hendrik Brouwer had (some time before June 1634) ordered a ship to be sent in order to offer assistance to the King. (cf. on this point, Philip Lucas to Directors, 20 June 1634, I.O.L., *Dutch Recs. X*) Whether this order was carried out is not known.

18. Whether Raja Sinha was Senerat's youngest son or only son, is still an unsolved problem. But I incline to believe that the other Princes were both sons of Wimaladharma. The Sinhalese chronicle the *Rajawaliya* (or, at least, the versions of it at the British Museum) indicate clearly that Raja Sinha was Senerat's only son. (cf. B.M., *Sinhalese MSS.*, OR 5307, OR 2702, Add. 220 12). This seems to be further substantiated by the details, regarding the ages of Raja Sinha and Wijayapala, given in W. J. Coster to Governor-General, 31 December 1638, in *Koloniaal Archief* 1039, fo. 388.

THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN RAJA SINHA
AND THE DUTCH

Raja Sinha was an astute, able and ambitious king, much unlike his late father, who had been too mildmannered and weak for the turbulent times ushered in by the Portuguese. In many ways, the new king recalled the memory of his great namesake of Sitawaka. Like the King of Sitawaka, he had distinguished himself at quite an early age as a military commander and an administrator; consequently, he too had been entrusted with the government of the country even during the life-time of his father, just as Mayadunne long before his death had entrusted his son with the administration of his kingdom.

Raja Sinha himself was aware of this similarity; what was more he consciously set out to emulate, and even surpass the achievements of his illustrious namesake of Sitawaka.¹ Whether he would succeed in these ambitions, or not was still a matter for the future to decide; but he had already made a good beginning, by putting order into his kingdom, and bringing his subjects firmly under control. All the princelings and hereditary chieftains who had enjoyed semi-independent powers in previous reigns were brought down to the level of royal officials, holding office at the King's pleasure. His subjects were made to recognise that there was only one master in the Kingdom.²

Outside his Kingdom, however, he was faced with the unpleasant fact that the Portuguese were dominating over rich and extensive areas of Ceylon, and had ringed him round with a number of strongholds, from which they effectively controlled his trade and communications with the outside world. In addition to possessing a vast extent of inland territory in the West, South-West and North of the island, they were masters of practically the whole coast of Ceylon. Although they did not actually occupy the entire littoral they yet exercised effective domination over it from six great strongholds³ which they had at various points on it. Of these strongholds, three were on the west coast - at Colombo, Negombo and Galle; one was in the north - at Jaffna; the other two were on the east coast - at Batticaloa and Trincomalee. Portu-

guese domination over the east coast was not such a thoroughgoing affair as that over the western and northern littorals. In these two latter areas they were in full occupation of the territories; but on the eastern littoral they occupied only the forts at Batticaloa and Trincomalee. And although Raja Sinha had a few roadsteads like Yale and Hambantota which were rather far removed from these two forts, nevertheless, by means of cruisers based at Batticaloa and Trincomalee, they could control his trade and contacts with the outside world as effectively as they wished.

What made this sorry situation altogether unbearable to the King, was the repeated violation by the Portuguese of the sworn peace. For instance, the Viceroy at Goa and the Captain-General of Colombo were carrying on a secret correspondence with his brother, the Prince of Matale, with the intention of stirring the Prince to turn against him.⁴ Some of his rebellious subjects had been assisted against him by the Captain of Batticaloa.⁵ Shortly afterwards, the Portuguese had plundered a vessel bringing goods for him.⁶ To add to these injuries, he was insulted by the Captain-General, Diogo de Melo de Castro, when the latter seized a tusker and other valuables, which he had presented to a certain Portuguese trader.⁷

Finding this situation intolerable, Raja Sinha resolved to set all his energies to the task of driving out the Portuguese completely from Ceylon. Since the time of his great namesake, experience had shown that this could not be accomplished without the aid of a Naval Power superior to the Portuguese.

It was natural, therefore, that the King should call in the aid of the Dutch, the one such Power, which was known all over the East as the successful enemy of the Portuguese, and whose aid his predecessors had attempted to obtain. On the 9th September 1636,⁸ Raja Sinha wrote to Carel Reijniersz, the Governor of Pulicat, requesting Dutch help. Owing to various reasons, the chief of which was the effectiveness of the watch kept on the Ceylon coasts by the Portuguese, it was not much less than a year afterwards, when this letter was delivered to Reijniersz.⁹

Before they heard of Raja Sinha's request, the Dutch authorities at Batavia had already decided to offer their help to the King.¹⁰ They were very anxious to obtain at least a share of the Ceylon cinnamon, the one important spice, which they had hitherto neither monopolised nor even shared. As late as August 1633,

they had been writing ruefully to the Directors of the Company, thus: 'We still see little prospect of obtaining cinnamon from Ceylon, because the Portuguese have somewhat strengthened their fallen position there.'¹¹ But within less than four years afterwards they had decided to make a bid for the cinnamon by allying themselves with the King of Kandy.

There were at least two important factors which led to this decision. They knew from intercepted letters¹² that the Portuguese were in a very bad state in Ceylon. For instance, in two of these letters the Captain-General, Diogo de Melo himself was found complaining to the Viceroy that there was such a dearth of men, money and materials, in order to embark upon a war, that he dared not violate the peace with Raja Sinha by interfering with the latter's trade in elephants, although the Viceroy himself was urging this course of action upon him. But the second, and indeed the most important, factor behind this decision, was undoubtedly the bold leadership of the able and resourceful Governor-General, Anthonio Van Diemen. From 1636, the first year of his rule, the Batavian authorities began to send an annual fleet to blockade Goa, the centre of Portuguese power in Asia.¹³

An attack on the Portuguese position in Ceylon now appeared feasible. During the seven or eight months in the year when Goa could be kept blockaded, no assistance could be sent by the Viceroy to his countrymen in Ceylon. At least during these months, the Dutch would have a good opportunity of achieving something in the island. Moreover, Van Diemen and his Council believed that an attack in Ceylon, would force the Portuguese to divide their comparatively meagre resources between that island and Malacca, which the Dutch had been seriously thinking of capturing ever since 1633 when they had begun an annual blockade of that stronghold.¹⁴ In addition, to all these considerations however, was the fact that the lure of the cinnamon had become irresistible to the Dutch.

Thus it was, that on 31st July 1637 the Batavian authorities wrote to Carel Reijniersz, instructing him to offer Dutch assistance against the Portuguese to the 'Kings of Kandy and Colombo.'¹⁵ If the 'Kings' promised to withhold the cinnamon from the Portuguese and to give it to the Dutch, he was to offer them not only assistance and arms and ammunition, but also 50% more for the cinnamon than the Portuguese had paid; payment would

be made in cash or merchandise or in munitions of war, whichever the Kings preferred.

Shortly after the despatch of this letter the Governor-General and Council heard from Reijniersz how the King of Kandy himself was requesting their assistance, under conditions which appeared to be very advantageous to them. If the required assistance was given, he promised to give them all necessary material for the building of a fort at Trincomalee or at Batticaloa; moreover, he would pay all the expenses which might be incurred by five ships (which he considered to be an adequate navel force for a successful attack on some of the Portuguese strongholds.)

When they saw that the King himself was very eager to obtain help from them, and that he was offering them very advantageous terms, the Batavian authorities lowered their offer regarding the cinnamon. Instead of offering to pay for it 50% more than the Portuguese had paid, he was now to be merely told that they would pay more than the Portuguese; but they were not going to commit themselves by saying how much more. Accordingly, this was one item of the instructions given to Adam Westerwolt, who left Batavia at the end of August as Commander of the fleet sent to blockade Goa. On his return from the blockade of Goa, he was to proceed to Ceylon, with seven ships and the 250 soldiers in the fleet and effect whatever was possible against the Portuguese there. As a member of the Batavian Council, he undoubtedly did not need very detailed instructions from it; he was therefore reminded in general terms that he should 'direct affairs in such a way that we may obtain from the King of Kandy a good, profitable and binding contract and a great quantity of cinnamon'. To impress upon him all the more the importance of his task, he was reminded of the fact that the Portuguese attached greater importance to Ceylon than to any of their other possessions in the East. Finally, Westerwolt was warned not to agree to attack any place around which no cinnamon was to be found - even though the King should request it, and promise to bear all the expenses connected with it.¹⁶

Meanwhile Reijnierz had made preparations to send envoys to the King, in order to discuss preliminary terms. Towards the close of October he sent two envoys, Jan Thijssen¹⁷ and Adriaen Helmont, with a letter to the King. In the latter half of November the envoys presented themselves before Raja Sinha and handed

over the Governor's letter. This letter and the further declarations of the envoys were, in brief, to the effect that the Dutch were prepared to assist him if he would grant them the cinnamon trade; they promised to pay more for the cinnamon than the Portuguese had paid; finally, to transport cinnamon and other merchandise, and in order to assist him, the commander of the fleet before Goa would send some ships towards April next.¹⁸

Raja Sinha was overjoyed when he heard that the Dutch were prepared to assist him. As the envoys had no authority to conclude any precise agreement, he decided to send with them a letter and ambassadors to the Commander of the fleet at Goa. In this letter¹⁹ he extended his previous favourable terms by explicitly stating that he would sell the cinnamon, pepper and wax to the Dutch only.

The Dutch envoys and the King's ambassadors appeared before Westerwolt, the commander of the fleet, on the 23rd December 1637. Following the advice of the King and his ambassadors, Westerwolt decided to attack Batticaloa first. For this purpose he sent his Vice-Commander Willem Jacobsz Coster²⁰ ahead with three ships; the King's ambassadors accompanied Coster.

In the meantime, differences between Raja Sinha and the Portuguese had come to a head. Despite the differences which seem to have existed from shortly after the peace of 1634, war had not been declared by either party, because neither felt strong enough to do so. When, however, the Captain-General, Diogo de Melo heard that Raja Sinha had begun negotiations with the dreaded enemy, he decided to act before these negotiations should contrive the utter ruin of the Portuguese in the island.

Early in 1638 he received considerable reinforcements. Thereupon spurred on by certain humiliations²¹ he had suffered at the King's hands, and determined to prevent the impending combination between Sinhalese and Hollander, he invaded Kandy in force. Raja Sinha felt himself unprepared for the war, and wished to talk of peace; but the Captain-General would not listen to his suggestion. He marched on Kandy and burned the city to the ground. Immediately after that, however, he realised his mistake. The armies of Raja Sinha and Prince Wijayapala appeared on the scene, and when he began a hasty retreat, he was harassed on all sides and finally brought to bay at Gannoruwa, where apart from the Kaffirs, Kanarese and Sinhalese who had accompanied

him, all his Portuguese troops (about 900 in number) were killed or captured. Diogo de Melo and most of his officers were among those slain in this battle, which took place on the 23rd and 24th March 1638.

This was the welcome news which Coster heard on the 4th April at Kalmunai, near Batticaloa. He also heard that the King had sent an army to lay siege to Colombo. Thus it appeared certain that the garrison of Batticaloa would obtain no help from the Portuguese headquarters in Colombo. On the 9th April,²² Coster arrived before Batticaloa, and soon after that he began to erect batteries with the help of the men supplied by the local governors of the King. He received news on the 25th of the month from Raja Sinha to the effect that he himself would soon be coming to Batticaloa.²³

Meantime, Westerwolt, who had left Goa for Ceylon with five ships, arrived at Batticaloa on the 10th May. Four days later the King himself arrived with some 15,000²⁴ soldiers and pioneers. It was then decided to storm the fort after a preliminary bombardment. The attack was to be made from two sides; on one side, Coster with the Dutch soldiers were drawn up, and on the other, Raja Sinha's troops. But it did not come to a storm, because the Portuguese hoisted the white flag. The cannon had so battered the fort, and the enemies were in such numbers that the Portuguese realised that resistance would be useless. On the 18th May the fort was surrendered on condition that the Portuguese and half-castes should be transported to Negapatam. The 'blacks'²⁵ who were with the Portuguese were handed over to the King.

As Westerwolt reported²⁶ afterwards to the Directors of the Company, the King's joy at this victory was unbounded. He related with wonder to Westerwolt and Coster that the fort which their artillery had forced to surrender by a battering of only a few hours, had at one time withstood a mighty force which he had sent against it.

Before Raja Sinha's ecstasies at this victory could abate, Westerwolt offered him the terms of a draft treaty. The King deliberated over them with his chiefs for a few days, and finally agreed to the terms put forward by the Dutch. On the 23rd May 1638 two copies of the Treaty written out in Portuguese,²⁷ were signed by Raja Sinha on the one hand, and Westerwolt and Coster on the other. Each party kept one of these original copies.²⁸

Neither of these originals are now extant. But from the Dutch translations, which are available, it appears that this treaty was a most advantageous one for the Dutch. They obtained a monopoly of all the most important articles of trade except elephants. Even with regard to elephants, the King was bound to sell at least the same number of beasts, which he sold to outsiders, to the Company. As regards the expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by the Dutch in assisting the King, the latter was bound to repay them in cinnamon, pepper, wax and other merchandise.

This monopoly of trade and the repayment of the expenses incurred in his service, had both been previously promised by Raja Sinha. What is startlingly new about this treaty is contained in Articles 3 and 4.

Article 3²⁹ was to the effect that all the captured forts would be garrisoned by the Dutch; moreover, if they considered that these forts were not properly fortified, the King was bound to get them fortified in the manner indicated by them.

Article 4, which is closely related to the previous one, dictated that in case any captured forts were garrisoned by the Dutch, the King would be bound to provide the garrison-personnel with the necessary rations and pay their wages.

That Raja Sinha ever conceded these two articles (particularly Article 3), is incredible. He must have known that when the 3rd Article was put into effect he would have merely substituted Dutch garrisons for the existing Portuguese ones. According to the treaty, not only would he have nothing to say against this, but, on the contrary, he would also be bound to pay all the expenses incurred by the Dutch in capturing the forts, and also continue to provide the monthly rations and wages of all the garrison-personnel, and, finally, see that the forts were fortified at his own cost, and in the manner desired by the Dutch.

When Raja Sinha's burning ambition was to rid his country of a hated foreign domination, it is hard to believe that he could have merely wished to substitute a new foreigner for the old one. It is also difficult to believe that the concession of the 3rd Article was due to an oversight; because he had deliberated over the terms of the treaty, for several days with his chiefs. It is, however, just possible that there is in all this some error or mistake which time might perhaps indicate;³⁰ otherwise, the King had committed an act of unbelievable stupidity.

From the Dutch point of view, however, the treaty fully conforms to their declared policy. On the 9th of December 1637,³¹ the Batavian authorities had written to the Directors of the Company:

‘We shall regulate our further assistance to the Persian and Achinese King, as well as to other Indian princes, in such a way as to occasion the least expense and to bring the greatest profit to the Company’.

After the signing of this treaty, Raja Sinha requested³² Westerwolt to leave for its protection 100 Dutch as garrison in Batticaloa. Westerwolt accordingly left his Vice-Commander, Coster, in charge of the fort with a hundred men as its garrison. Of his eight ships, he sent one of Coromandel with a sample lading of cinnamon, from the merchandise which Raja Sinha had already given; with one ship he decided to go ahead to Batavia with a further lading of this spice, leaving the other six behind to take in further quantities of merchandise and then to return to Batavia. Accordingly, he left for Batavia on 4th June 1638. With him went two Sinhalese ambassadors to obtain ratification of the treaty.

Raja Sinha himself had left Batticaloa for the hill-country some time before Westerwolt's departure. The relations between the Dutch and the King had been excellent, and Westerwolt and Coster had had reason to be thankful for the munificence of the King not only towards the Company but also to them personally.³³

1. cf. Raja Sinha to Adriaen van der Meijden, 23 Oct. 1656, Kol. Arch (i.e: Koloniaal Archief) 1105 fo. 957. Except for a few words which are missing because the MS. is torn, this letter is found translated from the original in *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XVIII 242-43.
2. See the interesting evidence of Raja's strong rule in: W. J. Coster to G. G., 31 Dec. 1638, Kol. Arch. 1039 fo. 388. Even in the principality of Matale his brother acknowledged him as the overlord. For all practical purposes the principality of Matale could be considered as being under Raja Sinha's control. cf. P. E. Pieris, *The Prince Vijaya Pala of Ceylon, 1634-1654*, documents 1-7, 12.
3. Apart from the great strongholds, there were two lesser forts on the West Coast at Kalutara and Manar.
4. Pieris, *Prince Vijaya*, docs. 1-7, 12.
5. Raja to Gov. of Pulicat, 9 Sept. 1636, in Baldaeus, 45.
6. Ibid.

7. Ribeiro, 103-05; Queyroz, 801, 945, 1095. De Castro: came from Lisbon to Goa in 1620 as Captain of a carrack; Captain-General of São Tomé (Meliapur) & the Coromandel Coast, 1625-31; Captain-General of Ceylon from Nov. 1633 (with a short interruption in 1635-36) until his defeat and death in March 1638.
8. Letter in Baldaeus, 45.
9. So said the later Governor of Ceylon, Adriaen van der Meijden, who had accompanied Thyssen and Helmont to Kandy in 1637. For the mission to Kandy, see below pp. 15-16.
For the statement of Van der Meijden, see Kol. Arch. 1105 fo. 907; also Valentyn, 162, where an extract is given from a report made by van der Meijden.
10. In their letters to the Directors, on 9 Dec. 1637 (Kol. Arch. 1034, pp. 35-36) the Batavian authorities say that they had received Raja's letter by 16 July 1637. This would mean that when they wrote to Reijniersz on 31 July 1637 (See, below, p 14), asking him to offer help to the Kings of Ceylon, they knew the contents of Raja's letter. But strangely enough, there is *absolutely no mention* of Raja's letter (or his request for assistance) in this letter of 31 July. Moreover, the terms which Reijniersz was instructed to offer the *Kings of Candy and Colombo* (note the vagueness and inaccuracy in this respect, throughout the letter), were so very favourable to the Sinhalese, and so completely ignore the incorporation of all the most favourable terms offered in Raja's letter, that it appears certain that G. G. & C. had not yet received Raja's letter, when they wrote to Reijniersz. Fortunately, there is further evidence, which convincingly proves this point. In their instructions of 21 Aug. 1637 to Westerwolt (Kol. Arch. 762, p. 659), G. G. & C. actually say that they had received a copy of Raja's letter only *after* they had written to Reijniersz. Thus the view hitherto held by Van Geer (33-35) and all the other writers, that G. G. & C. thought of offering help to Raja Sinha only when the latter requested it, is mistaken.
11. Mac Leod, ii. 108.
12. *Dagh-Register gehouden in 't Casteel Batavia, 1637*, p. 83. The letters of de Melo are dated 21 Oct. and 13 Nov. 1636. cf. G. G. & C. to Reijniersz, 31 July 1637, Kol. Arch. 762 fo. 577.
13. For Van Diemen and his policy, see: Dr. F. W. Stapel, *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië*, (Amsterdam, 1939) iii 241ff.
14. See these ideas expressed in: G. G. & C. to Reijniersz, 31 July, 1637, Kol. Arch. 762 fo. 577; Instructions for Westerwolt, 21 Aug. 1637, Kol. Arch. 762, p. 659.
15. cf. n. 10 above.
For letter to Reijniersz, see previous note.
16. Instructions, 21 Aug. 1637, Kol. Arch. 762, p. 659.
17. Had been a prisoner of the Portuguese in Ceylon, some time previously. In 1639 in charge of Batticaloa; 1640, succeeded Coster as President of Ceylon; 1645 Governor; 1646 removed from office and later in same year sent as Governor of Malacca, where he remained till 1662 when appointed Vice-Pres. of Council of Justice at Batavia. Had been Councillor Extraordinary of India since 1648. Returned to Holland in 1668-69.

18. Diary of Helmont, Kol. Arch. 1037 fos. 175-79. Reijniersz's letter of 20 Oct., in Baldaeus, 48.
19. 22 Nov. 1637, Kol. Arch. 1037 fo. 179.
Baldaeus (49) does not give a faithful copy of this letter. Even the date he gives for it is wrong. There is a translation of this letter in: P. E. Pieris, *Some Documents Relating to the Rise of the Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1602-1670, from the Translations at the India Office*, (Colombo 1929) 55-56. Regarding the inaccuracy of these translations see below, p. 25 n. 11, and Introduction p. XI.
20. In Company's service from before 1634 with the rank of merchant; in 1638 was Chief at Batticaloa; 1639, served as Vice-Commander of Antonio Caen, with whom he returned to Batavia (at the request of G. G. & C.) in order to report on Ceylon affairs; returned to Ceylon as Vice-Commander of fleet under Lucas, after whose departure, he became Commander; in this capacity captured Galle (March 1640) where he became the first President; five months later, returning from a mission to Kandy, he was murdered by the King's men, on account of his arrogant and unseemly behaviour.
21. The King had retaliated for the seizure by de Melo of the tusker and other presents (See p. 13 above) by seizing two horses belonging to de Melo. Ribeiro, 105.
Dr. Pieris (*Port Era* ii 203-04) places the private quarrel between de Melo and Raja Sinha as having arisen after the visit of Thijssen and Helmont. But de Melo's letter of 21 Nov. 1637 in Pieris, *Prince Vijaya*, 22-23), indicates that the quarrel had arisen much earlier.
22. Not the 18th as given by Van Geer, 38; Stapel, *Geschiedenis...* iii 252; Pieris, *Some Docs.* 56; etc.
23. Coster to G. G. & C., 4 June 1638, Kol. Arch. 1037 fos. 165-166; Note that Baldaeus (53, 55) conjures up a meeting between Coster and Raja before the arrival of Westerwolt.
24. Coster to G. G. & C., 4 June 1638, *Ibid.* Westerwolt to Dircs., 24 Sept. 1638, Kol. Arch. 1036 fos. 305-22. Van Geer (38) says 1500. This is probably a printer's error.
The assistance which Raja gave, and was prepared to give, at the capture of Batticaloa, does not in itself deserve special notice. But in order to test the validity of the later charge, that his policy was to let the Dutch do all the fighting, and to reap for himself all the consequent advantages, it is necessary to note what assistance was given by the King at the various attacks on the Portuguese. Regarding Raja Sinha's assistance at Batticaloa, MacLeod (ii 114-15) is the only writer who gives a fair and full account. On the other hand, cf. Donald Ferguson, 'Correspondence between Raja Sinha II and the Dutch', *J.C.R.A.S.* XVIII. 179; S. G. Perera, *History of Ceylon*, p. 114.
25. Where the word 'Swarten' seems to refer to several races, I have used the word 'blacks'.
Among the Sinhalese who fell into Raja's hands by the capture of the fort, were some seven or eight men who had been concerned in the murder of one of his governors (cf. p. 13 above). He caused these men to be impaled at the corners of the fort. (Westerwolt to Dircs. 24 Sept. 1638, Kol. Arch. 1036 fo. 325). The interesting fact is that Baldaeus (55) adds some 42 more to the number impaled.

26. 24 Sept. 1638, Kol. Arch. 1036 fos. 305-22.
27. All writers on the subject have made the strange error of believing that while the original copy of the treaty which Raja retained was written out in Portuguese, that kept by the Dutch was made out in the Dutch language. This would mean that when he signed the Dutch copy, Raja was signing a sort of blank cheque, for, everyone agree that the King knew no Dutch. Even the available copies of the Treaty leave no doubt regarding the fact that *both original copies were drawn up in Portuguese*. The Dutch translation of this treaty available at the Ceylon Archives indicates this in the most obvious manner possible, for it says by way of introduction to the actual treaty, thus: 'Translaat uit de Portuguese tale van 't Contract van Alliantie en anders gemaact tusschen Syn Majest van Ceylon, ter eenre ende 'd doorl: Compe: ter andere zeyde..... den 23 May Ao. 1638..' (Text given in: E. Reimers, *Memoir of Joan Maetsuyker, 1650*, Colombo, 1927, p. 47. Appendix A.) Moreover, in their letter of 26 Sept. 1640 to Coster, G. G. & C. explicitly admit that the originals of the treaty were both in Portuguese (Kol. Arch. 767 p. 623). See further, below, p. 32.
- For copy of treaty in Heeres, *Corp. Dip.* i, see pp. 308-16.
28. Westerwolt to Dirs., 24 Sept. 1638, Kol. Arch. 1036 fos. 333-34.
29. MacLeod, i 115 gives a quite inaccurate summary of this Article.
30. Indeed, it will appear later on that there is something more serious than an error or mistake regarding this matter. See below pp. 32ff.
31. Kol. Arch. 1034, fos. 35-36.
32. So says Westerwolt (24 Sept. 1638, Kol. Arch. 1036 p. 324). But according to the 3rd Art. which we have been considering, he could have placed a garrison, even on his own authority.
33. Coster values the gifts given to Westerwolt by the King at about 1000 reals (i.e: about 2500 florins). He does not say how much the gifts he received would amount to (Coster to G. G., 4 June 1638, Kol. Arch. 1037 fo. 166.)

THE POLICY OF THE DUTCH

On the departure of Westerwolt, Coster set about the task of obtaining from the King's officials loadings of cinnamon, pepper, pepper, wax, and other merchandise for the ships left behind at Batticaloa. Het obtained a considerable quantity of these articles; but not as much as he desired. He was more or less given to understand by the Kandyans, that enough merchandise had already been given to cover all the expenses so far incurred in the King's service by the Dutch. Coster, however, maintained that the value of the merchandise received did not by any means meet the expenses incurred by the Company.

This was a rather serious difference of opinion; it is, therefore, worth attempting to find out which was the correct opinion.¹ According to Coster's own statement,² the Dutch had received 143 bahars*³ 269 pounds of cinnamon, 21 bahars 421 pounds of wax, and 6 bahars 179 pounds of pepper. The revealing fact is, that the cinnamon alone fetched well over the 100,000 florins in Holland,⁴ while the Dutch claim (later on sent from Batavia) for expenses did not amount to more than 53,750 florins.⁵ Even allowing for the costs of transport⁶ and other incidental expenses, it appears certain that the Dutch must not only have covered their expenses incurred in the King's service, but also have made a profit out of the cinnamon alone. Thus, it appears that Coster was either highly exaggerating the Company's expenses or else highly minimising the value of the merchandise received.

However that may be, the fact was that he decided to journey to the court in order to indicate to the King that the merchandise so far received was totally inadequate to meet the Dutch expenses. He made a written 'Request'⁷ to this effect on the 28th August (1638). In the same document he requested that the cinnamon and other articles should be priced moderately.

On the 8th September, Raja Sinha gave his reply. He asked for an account of the Dutch expenses pointing out that he had made this same request earlier to Westerwolt. Regarding the price of the cinnamon, he said that the Governor of Pulicat and Westerwolt had both promised to pay him a higher price than the Portu-

guese; but, despite this, he would, in consideration of the loyal service of the Dutch, price the bahar of cinnamon at 110 *xerafims** which was twenty xerafims less than the price paid by the Portuguese in Colombo. He explained that the wax and the pepper were also being moderately priced by him. Finally, he placed his good will in this matter beyond all doubt by declaring that if the Dutch could not agree to the prices which he had stated, then he would pay their expenses fully in cash.

Coster replied to all this by saying that he would refer to Batavia what the King had said and await the orders of his superiors. He was perhaps a little relieved when, on the 15th September he obtained leave to depart; because his activities at the Court seem to have aroused the King's suspicions. The King had commanded that no one should see Coster without the royal permission; despite this order, the Dutchman had managed to meet all types of people from whom he obtained information on the trade and the political situation in the Kingdom.⁸

Shortly after his return to Batticaloa, he received a letter⁹ of instructions from Batavia. The authorities there had been very much impressed by news which he had sent early in July¹⁰ regarding a big Portuguese defeat at the hands of the Kandyans. This news had apparently given them hopes of achieving great success; for, they now explained to Coster that they had instructed Antonio Caen, the commander of the fleet sent to blockade Goa for the third year in succession, to proceed to Ceylon early in 1639 and capture some of the enemy strongholds there. Coster was asked to join Caen at Goa as soon as possible and give him all necessary advice. If he thought that any further delay at Goa might jeopardise the chances of success in Ceylon, he was to advise Caen to leave immediately for Ceylon; in concrete terms they explained that they would rather see Galle captured than the rich Portuguese vessels prevented from going to Lisbon.

As they considered that Galle had a better harbour, and was in every way more secure, and profitable for them than Colombo, they instructed him to conduct matters in such a way that the King would be induced to agree to the capture of Galle before that of Colombo. In addition, he was also given the following rather strange instructions:

‘You shall also thoroughly sound the King’s humour and inclination towards (the idea of) our undertaking along by our-

selves something against the Portuguese forts; since it is not advisable to have his men and his assistance'.

With these instructions, Coster left once again for the King's Court. Having arrived there on the 15th November, he handed over a letter,¹¹ which had been sent from Batavia for Raja Sinha. The letter informed the king that a Dutch fleet would soon come to his assistance. He was requested to prepare to support it with his forces, and to have cinnamon and other merchandise ready for loading into the ships. As for the request which he had made through Westerwolt, that the expenses should be assessed in a reasonable manner, they should deal so very reasonably that he would be content; although the expenses would undoubtedly run to a high figure.

The King was pleased with the letter; but when Coster had audience on the 20th November, he found the King averse to discussing anything of importance on that day, because it was considered to be an unlucky day¹². A few days later, however, he was able to broach the subject of making an attack on Galle before any attack on Colombo. But to Raja Sinha, Colombo was 'the mother of all the evil'¹³ that had befallen his dynasty and his people; therefore, his determination to capture that centre of Portuguese power could not be shaken. It would also seem that Coster found the King unwilling to entertain the idea of the Dutch attacking any forts without his assistance. In fact, he impressed on Coster the fact that he would hurry towards Colombo as soon as the fleet appeared. To facilitate matters he said that he would send two ambassadors, an interpreter, and a pilot, who know the ins and outs of all the Ceylon harbours, to accompany Coster to the fleet at Goa.¹⁴

Following these arrangements, Coster went back to Batticaloa, where he left the Merchant Jacob Compostel in charge of the fort.¹⁵ Then he proceeded to the rendezvous of Walawe in the south where he was to meet the King's ambassadors and their retinue. Embarking for Goa with these men, he joined the fleet of Antonio Caen on the 23rd January 1639.

Fortunately, Raja Sinha's insistence on an attack on Colombo did not create a very difficult problem for Caen, because by their letter of 9th November 1638,¹⁶ the Batavian authorities had left him some latitude in this matter. While emphasising their prefe-

rence for an attack on Galle first, they instructed him to give in to the King's wishes, if the latter insisted that Colombo should be first attacked. The Governor-General and Council gave two reasons for this modification of their previous attitude. Firstly they had heard recently that the area around Colombo was really the richest in cinnamon and the most opulent in trade. Secondly, they had come to the conclusion that it was not advisable to undertake any enterprise without the King's advice and assistance.

After raising the blockade of Goa, Caen sailed for Ceylon, where, on the 9th March 1639, he touched at a place some thirty odd miles north of Colombo. There, at the request of the King's ambassadors, he dispatched two Sinhalese with a letter, informing the King of the arrival of the fleet. Immediately after this, he left with his fleet for Colombo, and on the 12th of the month anchored within cannon-shot of the city.¹⁷

In the meantime, the Kandyans had not been idle. After the defeat of de Melo in March 1638, they had forced the Portuguese to abandon most of the inland territories and concentrate their forces at Colombo, Galle and Negombo. Towards the close of that year, however, the Portuguese had recovered some of the inland territories, and in particular the fort of Malwana, which was captured without loss owing to the treachery of some of the King's men.¹⁸ But now, once again, the Kandyans resumed the offensive, and the Portuguese retreated on Colombo, regarding the safety of which place they had become much concerned after the arrival of the Dutch fleet.

On the 19th, Caen received a letter from the Kandyans informing him that Dom Balthazar,¹⁹ one of the principal councillors of the King, would soon arrive with an army before the city. Four days later he had a letter from Dom Balthazar himself giving news of his arrival within nine or ten miles of Colombo, and informing him that he was awaiting orders from the King to march upon the city. Caen, however, concluded that this letter was very probably a fabrication of the Portuguese and decided to sail away from Colombo. The reasons given for this conclusion are not really convincing; one was, that he had found the talk of the two Sinhalese letters-bearers to be variable; another reason was, that no mention of Caen's name was made in the letter; the third was, that Raja Sinha's ambassadors did not know the two messengers personally. The actual reason, however, for the Dutch Com-

mander's decision to leave Colombo, appears to have been his fear of the south-west monsoon winds and currents, regarding which he had become apprehensive within four days of his arrival before Colombo.²⁰

After leaving Colombo,²¹ he sailed south to Galle; but finding that place to be too strongly defended, he sailed on to Batticaloa. There, on the 4th April, he dispatched Jacob Compostel with a letter to Raja Sinha. In it (among other things) he complained that the King's delay in bringing his army before Colombo, had been the only reason why that city had not been captured. Compostel was also instructed to explain the good intentions of the Dutch, and to find out what the King's wishes were. On the same day, Caen proposed in Council that an attack should be made on Trincomalee or Jaffna by the Dutch alone, without the King's help. This was turned down by the Council, because orders from Batavia had stressed that no enterprise should be undertaken without the King's request and help, and also because the Dutch forces were considered to be too weak to attempt anything successfully, without the King's help. It was, however, decided that a combined attack should be made on Trincomalee.²²

In the meantime, the Kandyan governor of Sammanture had been providing the Dutch fleet with necessary provisions. When he was informed of the intended attack on Trincomalee, he sent word to Kottiyar (near Trincomalee) asking that storming-ladders, gabions, sufficient provisions and other necessary items should be got ready against the arrival of the fleet. On the 12th he himself left for Kottiyar to see that everything was properly attended to.

Caen continued at Batticaloa until the 17th of the month. During this period he busied himself in putting some order into the place. Compostel had been found unsuitable for his post and Jan Thijssen was placed instead as Chief at Batticaloa. Having attended to these and other matters, he set sail with his fleet and arrived in the Bay of Kottiyar on the 18th.

He was visited on board ship by the Governor of Sammanture and the Wanniya* or hereditary Chief, of Kottiyar. The latter know the lay of the land well and indicated a suitable place near Trincomalee where a landing could be made just beyond range of the artillery in the Portuguese fort. He volunteered to hold this landing place with his 900 men while the Dutch troops were disembarking there. Following this plan, the troops were landed.

Immediately after that the Dutch and the Sinhalese set about erecting batteries and entrenchments.²³

On the 28th of the month, Compostel returned from his mission to Raja Sinha. He reported that the King had resolved to continue in the lowlands around Colombo, because, if he departed, the inhabitants who had flocked to him would again return to the Portuguese. He had, however, decided to send a few of his principal mudaliyars* with some 4,000 men to assist the Dutch in the capture of Trincomalee and Jaffna. Compostel had brought a letter for Caen, from the King himself; but, strangely enough, its meaning could not be understood.²⁴

Meantime, everything had been made ready for the attack on the fort. On the 1st of May it was heavily bombarded and a breach was soon made. The Portuguese, however, refused to treat for surrender. But, when on the following day Caen prepared to make an assault, they agreed to accept terms offered them. These were rather more favourable than those granted to the garrison of Batticaloa. Unlike at Batticaloa, the Trincomalee garrison was permitted to take away with it all movable personal property. But the request that the *Careas** or fishermen should be allowed to accompany the Portuguese was refused. Caen declaring that these fishermen must remain to serve the Dutch.

Within a few hours of the capture of the fort, two Kandyan mudaliyars arrived with some 3000 men. The mudaliyars requested Caen to hand over the fort to them. The latter replied by asking them whether they could protect the fort without Dutch assistance. The Sinhalese answered, that they did not think so; but since the King had clearly stated, even in the letter which they had brought for Caen, that the fort should be handed over to them, they wished to see the King's orders put into effect. When he found that he could not refuse the request of the mudaliyars merely by pointing out their inability to defend the fort, Caen produced a copy of the Treaty of 1638. He caused the 3rd Article to be translated, and solemnly pointed out to the Sinhalese that the treaty expressly stated that all the captured forts would be garrisoned by the Dutch.²⁵ The mudaliyars were effectively silenced. They next proposed a joint attack on Jaffna. Caen excused himself pleading lack of time, insufficiency of his forces and other difficulties.²⁶

Caen left the fiscal Gerrit Herbers in charge of Trincomalee. In accordance with the instructions from the Governor-General and

Council, Coster was to accompany him to Batavia to report on the situation in Ceylon. On the 19th May three ambassadors arrived at Trincomalee from Kandy, in order to leave for Batavia in Caen's fleet. A few days later, the Dutch Commander set sail accompanied by Coster and the Sinhalese ambassadors and taking with him a cargo of merchandise, which the King had sent to him for delivery at Batavia.

When he had heard that Caen had refused to hand over Trincomalee to his officers, Raja Sinha had written several strong letters²⁷ to the Dutch Commander before the latter's departure from Ceylon; but in vain. He had therefore sent his ambassadors with letters to the Governor General to complain of Caen's actions. He complained that just when his forces had appeared near Colombo, Caen had sailed away; also that the Dutch commander had refused to attack Jaffna despite his requests. Most important of all, he complained that Caen had refused to hand over Trincomalee to his mudaliyars. He made it clear that on account of all these reasons, Caen was unacceptable to him and should not be sent on any further expedition to Ceylon.²⁸

These complaints were, however, only one aspect of Raja Sinha's letter; a more pleasing aspect for the Batavian authorities, was his earnest request for further assistance against the Portuguese. Apart from the forces which were to attack Colombo from the sea-side, the King requested a force of 500 Hollanders to accompany his army overland against that city.

Governor-General and Council deliberated long over the King's complaints and his request. They heard the reports on the situation in Ceylon given by Caen and Coster. They next considered whether the available force of about 1300 men could be most profitably used against Malacca or Macao, or to suppress once and for all the opposition in the Moluccas, or to attack the Portuguese in Ceylon. Finally, they decided that nothing was so important as their objectives in Ceylon. So great was the importance attached to the conduct of affairs in Ceylon, that Van Diemen himself volunteered²⁹ to lead the projected expedition to Ceylon. But since that would violate the recent orders of the Directors of the Company prohibiting the Governor-General from leaving Batavia, it was decided that the Director-General, Philips Lucas, who was next in rank, should lead the expedition.

The conduct of military operation against the Portuguese was only one of the tasks entrusted to Lucas; there were others, as important, if not more so. In 1638, Caen had been told:

‘As the accorded conditions (i.e. in the Treaty of 1638) are extremely advantageous for this Company, it will be in no way advisable, on our part, to enter into further communication with His Majesty regarding this matter, or to make any suggestion regarding it.’³⁰

But now, in 1639, the Batavian authorities have completely changed their former opinion. Lucas is asked to stipulate ‘further and more binding’ conditions with the King. The reason for this change appears undoubtedly to be closely connected with the King’s demand for the handing over of Trincomalee and the suspicions, which he had shown regarding Dutch actions. In fact, Van Diemen and his Council were so disturbed regarding Raja Sinha’s suspicions, that they authorised Lucas to withdraw (if he thought it necessary) all the Dutch forces from Ceylon; ‘since we find the Ceylonese (i.e. the King) to be very variable in his actions, and is suspicious even of us’.³¹

Although a comparatively large force of 1500 men was placed at the disposal of Lucas, yet it was realised that without the assistance of Raja Sinha’s army, Colombo could not be attacked with advantage. Therefore, to give the King sufficient time to have his forces ready to support Lucas immediately on the latter’s arrival in Ceylon, two ships, the *Oudewater* and the *Santvoort* were sent ahead with letters of advice to Raja Sinha and to Thijssen, the Chief at Batticaloa. By the same ships 200 Dutch soldiers were sent in response to Raja Sinha’s request for 500 Dutchmen to accompany him overland to Colombo. These ships arrived in Ceylon at the end of September 1639. Following the instructions contained in the letter which he then received, Thijssen proceeded on a mission to Raja Sinha, in order to present van Diemen’s letter to the King, and to say that a force of 300 Hollanders had arrived at Batticaloa to join the King’s army.

On the 24th September, a month after the departure of the *Oudewater* and *Santvoort*, Lucas himself left for Ceylon with the rest of the fleet. Delayed very much by extremely bad weather, he was able to sight the coast of Ceylon only on the 2nd of December. Shortly after that, he met the *Oudewater* and *Santvoort*

from which he learnt that the King had at first forbidden the Wanniya of Kottiyar to supply any provisions to Trincomalee, on the ground that Caen had garrisoned it against his wishes;³³ but, that after the news brought from Batavia by the two ships, he had issued fresh orders, as a result of which Trincomalee was being supplied with provisions. The King's displeasure and his suspicions regarding the Dutch had, apparently, not quite abated; because he had strictly prohibited his subjects from having any communications, without his orders, with the Dutch garrisons. Of more immediate use to Lucas than all this information was what he learnt from the officers of the *Oudewater* regarding the places where drinking water, cattle and other provisions were being supplied on the King's behalf. Following this information, he proceeded to Yale and Walawe from where he obtained the necessary provisions. Sailing on to Galle, he made ready on the 18th December, to attack this place; but heavy rain and a strong wind soon made him give up this design. He then proceeded towards Colombo, but found no sign of the King's troops, nor of the 200 Hollanders who were to have accompanied them. Judging it inexpedient to attack Colombo without assistance from the King's army, Lucas decided to make a surprise attack on Negombo, which, it was heard, had diverted its main forces for the defence of Colombo. The idea of a surprise attack had, however, to be given up, because of the confusion caused in the fleet when one of the ships was wrecked off Negombo and some of the others were in danger of suffering the same fate.

In the meantime all had not been going well with Lucas. For many weeks he had been very ill, and towards the close of December he had decided to leave for Batavia handing over the command to his vice-commander, Coster. Among the documents, which he handed over to the latter, Lucas laid particular stress on the draft articles of a treaty which he had drawn up for presentation before Raja Sinha.³⁴ To Coster and the other members of the secret Council he explained how the negotiations with Raja Sinha, and other connected matters were to be conducted. But at the last moment, his illness took a favourable turn and he decided to continue in charge.

Towards the close of January³⁵ 1640, he was forced by lack of drinking water in the fleet, to put into Kammala, a village a few miles to the north of Negombo. On hearing of this, the Portuguese

Captain-General ordered his forces, which were at Arandora to retire upon Kammala and, if possible, to dislodge the Dutch from their entrenchments. Now, these forces at Arandora had up to that time been successfully preventing the King's army from descending on the lowlands in support of Lucas. When, therefore, the Portuguese forces following the orders of the Captain-General turned back and rushed upon Kammala, the King's army followed in their wake.

The Portuguese are said to have rushed down from Arandora in such haste that during the three-days' march to Kammala, no halt was made for cooking food. Headless of their exhausted state, they made a disorderly but impetuous charge on the Hollanders, who were strongly entrenched at Kammala. But though they were forced back for a while, their superiority in numbers, the strength of their entrenchments and the exhaustion of the enemy, enabled the Dutch to turn the Portuguese attack into an utter rout. On the 29th January, Raja Sinha's army joined the forces of Lucas. With the King's army there was also the Dutch force which had accompanied it; but through illness and other causes, this force now numbered only 150 men. On the 6th February, the combined Dutch-Sinhalese forces arrived before Negombo. Three days later a joint assault was made on the fortifications, which were carried with little loss. The Portuguese, who took to flight were pursued by the Sinhalese; the Dutch, it would appear, being only concerned with occupying the fort and repairing its damaged walls.³⁶

As soon as Raja Sinha (who was in person with his army) saw the Dutch repairing the damaged walls of Negombo, he immediately asked Lucas to stop all repairs and hand over the fort to him as he wished to raze it to the ground. Lucas did not agree to this. It would appear that, then, not only did Lucas base his refusal, of the King's request, on the strength of the 3rd Article of the Treaty of 1638, but, strangely enough, Raja Sinha also based his demand for Negombo on the strength of the same article of the treaty. Out of this difference of opinion there ultimately emerged the remarkable fact, that the 3rd Article of the Treaty of 1638 substantiated Raja Sinha's contention, and not that of Lucas.³⁷

The explanation of this is not very complicated. In both the original copies of the treaty, it had been clearly stated that forts captured from the Portuguese would be garrisoned by the Dutch,

only *if His Majesty thought it fit*. As observed in the previous chapter, these two original documents were in Portuguese, and had been signed by the King on the one hand and Westerwolt and Coster on the other. Each party had taken one of the original copies. But the Dutch, it is clear, put aside this original copy, and for all practical purposes made use of a Dutch translation. This would not have mattered, if only the translation had not omitted the vital clause: *if His Majesty thought it fit*.³⁸

What excuse or explanation Lucas gave Raja Sinha for the omission of this clause in the Dutch translation or for having relied at all, so heavily, on a translation, and not on the original, is not really known. But, having given some explanation or excuse, Lucas placed before the King the draft³⁹ of a new treaty to replace that of 1638, which, in Lucas' opinion, was unsatisfactory in many ways. In the course of a very long preamble to this proposed treaty, he stated:

'Therefore, we declare on our part by these (presents) in all fidelity, that we do not aspire after the least sovereign or absolute authority, title or powers, in Your Majesty's lands . . . But in case Your Imperial Majesty, your nobles or vassals, have conceived the least distrust of our good and upright intentions . . . , we declare sincerely by these (presents) that (we would) rather abandon the work begun in Ceylon (despite the conquest of the forts of Batticaloa and Trincomalee which has been made for the service of Your Imperial Majesty) and hand over the aforesaid forts to Your Imperial Majesty, remove our men and munitions from there, and remain with Your Imperial Majesty in the former character of allies'.

The King really saw no need for a new treaty; yet he consented to consider Lucas's proposals. As he read through them, however, Raja Sinha quickly realised - if he had not done so already - that the Dutch were only out to deceive him and to step into the shoes of the Portuguese.

Article 4, it is true, explicitly conceded the right of deciding whether captured strongholds should be garrisoned or dismantled, to the King; but the reservation stipulated in that same article made this concession worthless. The reservation was to the effect that the Dutch should be permitted to fortify themselves in such places, and with such facilities placed at their disposal, that they

would be able to defend themselves not only against open enemies, but also against 'pretended friends'. Moreover, the provisions of many of the other articles⁴⁰ gave the Dutch further opportunities of establishing their power in the island.

When he perceived what the Dutch were attempting to encompass, Raja Sinha was full of indignation. He refused to listen any longer to Lucas⁴¹ and broke off all relations with the Dutch. He then moved away with his army some miles into the interior. Although the King had shown in word and deed that he had more than 'the least distrust of our good and upright intentions', Lucas (as is to be expected from what has been seen above), did not, of course, hand over the forts and remove his men and munitions from Ceylon.

To return, for a moment, to the draft treaty of Lucas. It is remarkable not only for its contents, but also for the date by which it was ready. It was ready by the 9th January 1640, on which date Lucas dispatched copies of it to the Directors of the Company. But the 9th of January (1640) is one month before Raja Sinha first indicated the vital conditional clause in the 3rd Article of the original copy of the 1638 treaty. But, then, on the 9th of January, before he even set foot on Ceylon - let alone met the King - Lucas had anticipated this clause by the provisions of the 4th Article of his own draft treaty. If Lucas and the Council at Batavia had been all along, really unaware of the vital clause, which gave the King full power to deal with captured forts as he liked, how then did Lucas contrive to anticipate that clause, by the 9th January 1640? There can be only one reasonable answer: Lucas and the Council at Batavia, had been all the time perfectly aware of the *full* provisions of Article 3 of the original copies of the Treaty of 1638.

Referring to the omission (in the Dutch translation which they had used) of the vital clause - *if His Majesty though it fit* - the Governor-General and Council told Coster in September 1640, that they did not know how this had happened. Eight months later, the *Dagh Register* of Batavia contained something more precise; the 'assistant' (or clerk) Nicolaes Holsteijn had either by error or wantonly, left out the clause in question. In a letter of September 1641 to Jan Thijssen, this explanation was repeated by the authorities at Batavia.⁴²

Commenting on this explanation, the Dutch historian Willem van Geer said nearly sixty years ago:

'It cannot be decided with certainty whether the alteration made in the copy presented to the Maharaja, has been caused by an error, or deliberately, in order to deceive him.....

..... it is, however, hardly credible that an unconscious, yet so glaring, error of a subordinate should not have been immediately perceived. The nature of the alteration and the obvious objective that was aimed at by the alteration, make us rather believe that there is no question here of an error, but that really, this has been done according to a fixed plan and that the translator has only been the tool of people in higher positions'.⁴³

Even the slight hesitation, which he had, would have disappeared completely if Van Geer had noted some of the facts indicated in the preceding pages, and had realised that the 'error' occurred, not in the copy of the treaty which had been given to the King, but in a translation, which the Dutch had made out of the original copies of the treaty.

It may be argued that the plan for deceiving Raja Sinha was conceived only after Westerwolt's return to Batavia in July 1638.

One important consideration, however, proves beyond reasonable doubt that the plan had already been decided upon when Westerwolt first placed the draft treaty before Raja Sinha. This important consideration relates to the offer of a fort in Ceylon which Raja Sinha had made to the Dutch by his letters to Reijniersz in 1636 and Westerwolt in 1637. The fact that Westerwolt did not incorporate this most advantageous offer in the articles which he presented to Raja Sinha, indicates that he expected to obtain the substance of this offer - or rather, more than the substance - by other means already decided upon.

Once the Dutch plan is understood, then most of their actions or ideas (relating to Ceylon) which appear puzzling or singular or contradictory, explain themselves. For instance, the caveat to Caen not to bring up any discussion of the treaty; the instructions asking him to place garrisons in any newly-captured forts, but to manage everything so discreetly that no dispute arose with the King on this matter;⁴⁴ the instructions to Lucas asking him to conclude a new and more binding treaty, when only a few months previously Caen had been enjoined not to bring up any discussion

of the existing treaty because it was so very advantageous for the Company - all these things become intelligible now.

The deceit practised on Raja Sinha by the Dutch had a profound and permanent effect on the relations between the two parties. The King could never afterwards have much trust in the words or the actions of his allies. He continued to co-operate with the Dutch only because of his fervent conviction that no enemy could be as bad as the Portuguese; and to achieve his life's ambition of driving them out, the assistance of the Dutch was indispensable. He, therefore, dissembled with them, and attempted to frustrate their ambitions, as far as possible by covert methods. The Dutch, for their part, attempted to justify their conduct, by bringing various charges against the King, the main charge being, as they said, the non-payment of the great expenses which they had incurred in his service. Moreover, they consistently distrusted the King, because - quite apart from any cause which the King himself might have given them for such distrust - they felt that the latter could never behave honestly towards them after what they themselves had done to him.

Feeling himself utterly deceived and rebuffed, Raja Sinha had broken off all relations with the Dutch. But it was only a week or two after this event, that he sought⁴⁵ out the Dutch in order to effect a compromise with them. This 'come-down' of the, otherwise exceedingly haughty, monarch and the big concessions which he soon made to the Dutch, illustrate quite clearly, that no other consideration was so important to him as the burning ambition which he had cherished all his life; namely, to drive the hated Portuguese completely from the island. The Dutch had given more than sufficient indication that they were attempting to fill the vacuum, which would be caused by the expulsion of the Portuguese. But to Raja Sinha no danger seems to have been so fearful as the danger from the presence of the Portuguese in Ceylon.⁴⁶ Thus he reopened negotiations, with the Dutch by sending a summons to Coster to appear before him.

Coster had been left in charge of the further conduct of affairs in Ceylon, with the title of 'President',⁴⁷ by Lucas, who left for Batavia on the 21st of February. When he received the summons, Coster was too apprehensive to go himself and, therefore, sent one Herports to hear the King's proposals.

Out of the ensuing discussions between the Dutch and the King, an agreement resulted which was very advantageous to the Dutch. Its terms were: Trincomalee was to be handed over to the King as soon as he gave the Dutch ten elephants to meet the cost of capturing that fort; after its capture, Colombo was to be razed to the ground; all other forts would be garrisoned by the Dutch till the King paid all the expenses incurred by them in his service; when all expenses were paid, then, the King would assign the Dutch one fort in possession.

After the conclusion of this agreement, it was next decided that a joint attack should be made on Galle. But Coster's intention was to make a surprise attack on the place, with or without the assistance of the Sinhalese.⁴⁹ On the 9th March (within six days of leaving Negombo) Coster was able to land his troops just beyond cannon-shot of the fort of Galle. But on that same day, a Portuguese force, which had been rushed from Colombo immediately the Dutch intentions on Galle were understood, made in fierce attack. By a pre-concerted arrangement, the garrison of Galle made a sally at the same time. The Dutch, however, had been forewarned by spies, and they were ultimately able to beat back the enemy with heavy loss. Coster himself had suffered considerable losses; but, being strengthened by the chance arrival of three ships returning from the blockade of Goa, he felt himself strong enough to attempt a storm on the fortress. This he did on the 15th of March. Both sides fought gallantly; but the fort was finally in the hands of the Hollanders. Although the King's Dissawe of Matara appears to have joined the Dutch forces before the storm, the main body of the Kandyans arrived only in time to take part in the plunder.⁵⁰

To the Dutch, there could not have been a more important victory in Ceylon than the capture of Galle. In comparison with Galle they had always attached a second-rate value to Colombo, the centre of Portuguese power. They believed that from Galle the whole of Ceylon could be kept under their control. Moreover, Galle and Negombo were, as the Batavian authorities phrased it, 'The keys to the most fruitful cinnamon lands of the islands of Ceylon'.⁵¹ They naturally expected great profits through the two important conquests made in the first months of 1640.

Whether they would obtain the expected profits, would depend very much on the King, in whose name they had captured the

forts, and whose Officials had taken possession of the territories surrounding these forts. And, indeed, it appeared that the Dutch could expect much profit, because they soon heard that the King had sent 2000 Chaloas or cinnamon-peelers into the newly occupied territories to harvest the cinnamon. Moreover, the King informed them that he did not wish for any further assistance until he had paid off all the expenses which they had hitherto incurred in his service. That the King was concentrating on this task was also shown by the delivery of ten elephants in payment of Dutch expenses incurred in the capture of Trincomalee. (On receipt of these elephants the Dutch handed over the fort to the King's officials, who demolished it.)⁵²

Coster, however, was not quite pleased with this situation. He wanted the King to continue active military operations with Dutch assistance against the Portuguese. At the same time, he wanted large quantities of cinnamon and other merchandise. Furthermore, he felt that Galle was being inadequately provisioned by the King.⁵³ To lay these and other matters⁵⁴ before the King, he left for Kandy and arrived there on the 15th July.

Although he was at first welcomed with great friendliness, he soon brought the King's wrath upon himself on account of his actions. Within two days of his arrival at Kandy, his interpreter was caught having secret communication with Prince Wijayapala,⁵⁵ who was being kept at Kandy as a prisoner on account of his intrigues against the King, his brother. A few days later, Coster submitted a memorandum in which he used the tactless and impudent argument, that the Dutch should be given some villages and estates in the environs of Galle, 'since the right of war permits us to enjoy the aforesaid prerogative as far as our cannonshots can reach'. On the 16th of August, he infringed all court etiquette, when he turned his back on the King and began to leave the audience-hall without saying a word to him or obtaining his leave; merely, because he had seen within the hall four chiefs, whom he considered to have insulted him earlier. When he was called back by the King's officials, he returned; but immediately began a torrent of abuse against the four chiefs. Stifling his anger, the King calmed the Dutchman and gave him permission to return to Galle on the following day. But during his return journey Coster committed a final insult to the King when, in a fit of wrath, he removed from his neck the golden chain, which

the King had presented to him some time earlier, and threw it at the feet of a Kandyan official.⁵⁶ Thereby, Coster's fate appears to have been sealed, for, a few days later he was murdered by some Sinhalese at a village named Nilgale in the King's territory.⁵⁷

Immediately on hearing of this murder, the King wrote to Jan Thijssen, the Chief at Batticaloa, to the effect that the murder had been committed quite without his knowledge, and had been really committed by the Sinhalese concerned, over a question of a private nature. The Dutch, however, were probably correct in believing that it had been committed on the King's orders, but they were wrong in surmising that it had been largely the result of instigation by foreigners and Sinhalese, who were attached to the Portuguese and hostile to the Dutch. Any instigation must have been superfluous; because Coster's actions were in themselves more than sufficient to decide his fate.⁵⁸

To return to the narrative of events. As soon as Thijssen heard of the death of Coster, he hurried to Galle from Batticaloa, accompanied by the Senior Merchant Marten Vinck.⁵⁹ They arrived none too soon; for the Captain Walraven de St. Amant,⁶⁰ who had been left in charge of Galle by Coster, had deserted on the 10th October to the Portuguese, along with two Netherlanders and nine 'blacks'. As a result, the garrison of Galle was in a disturbed state, and the arrival of Vinck and Thijssen was most opportune.

St. Amant was to become in a very short time one of the most trusted and energetic officers among the Portuguese. The first-hand information, which he was able to give them regarding the Dutch position in Ceylon, made the Captain-General, Don Antonio Mascaranhas resolve to attack Negombo at the first opportunity. But while he was making preparations for the projected attack, there arrived from Goa his elder brother Dom Philipo Mascarenhas,⁶¹ with a force of 360 soldiers and with munitions and other provisions. Don Philippe had been sent as Captain-General of Ceylon, by the newly-arrived Viceroy, the Conde d'Aveiras.⁶² The new Captain-General acted with great diligence. Taking advantage of the preparations which had already been made, Dom Philippe proceeded to besiege Negombo. He disguised his actions so effectively that, at first, the Dutch garrison did not realise that a siege was being undertaken.

Although a messenger from the Kandyan forces made his way into the fort and informed the Dutch that a force of 3000 men

would soon be arriving to support them, the Dutch Commander decided to surrender the fort, after only eight days' siege. The Sinhalese messenger was captured leaving the fort at the time the Dutch surrendered. Hearing of the expected Kandyan army, Don Philipe dispatched some companies of Portuguese troops and 2000 lascarins* to attack it. In the meantime, the Kandyan commander, Don Balthazar, had marched rapidly to relieve Negombo. Mistaking the salvo, which the Portuguese fired to greet the hoisting of their flag at Negombo for the sound of the actual assault on the fort, Don Balthazar hurried the pace of his army all the more. Thus it was, that the Kandyan Commander, and his 3000 men were taken quite unaware by the Portuguese force. The Kandyan force was routed; Don Balthazar and four of his arcahchis* were among the slain.⁶⁴

Don Philipe estimated this latter success to be no less important than the re-capture of Negombo itself - and the re-capture of the fort was important enough. Quite apart from the rich cinnamon districts, which could thereby be brought under the control of the Portuguese, this capture had a great effect upon the morale and the prestige of the Portuguese, for, it was the first stronghold which they had captured from the Dutch in Asia.⁶⁵

The Captain-General, however, did not rest on his laurels. He sent detachments to the Four and Seven Korales* and to Matara and Sabaragamuwa, with orders to bring these territories once again under Portuguese control and to capture the large stooks of cinnamon, which he knew had been collected for the Hollanders by the King's men.⁶⁶ The Portuguese forces did not meet with great success in their attempts at subjugating the lands in the interior. On the other hand, not only were most of the coastal areas soon reduced, but also large quantities of cinnamon which had been collected by the King's men, fell into Portuguese hands. At Alutgama alone, out of nearly 1150 bahars, 800 fell into their hands, the remainder having been already transported to Galle by the Sinhalese.⁶⁷ From Alutgama the Portuguese moved south into the Dissawani of Metara, cutting off pretty effectively the assistance of the King from the Dutch in Galle. The King himself was hard put to it to maintain his hold over the low-country, where success seems to have swayed to and fro for a considerable time after the loss of Negombo to the Portuguese.

Thus, with the loss of Negombo the tables were turned on the

allies - Raja Sinha and the Dutch. From the offensive they were forced on to the defensive.

In the meantime, matters had so developed between the allies, that it was not certain whether they could present a united front against the progress of Portuguese arms.

It was been seen earlier how the Dutch had practiced a piece of deceit (over the 3rd Article of the Treaty of 1638) in order to be able to occupy the forts captured from the Portuguese. To exercise sufficient control over the King and the country and, thereby, 'have our way in this island'⁶⁸ (as they praised it), the possession and occupation of forts was a *sine qua non*. But the deceit had been soon discovered and they had to seek some other justification or excuse for the continued occupation of the forts. This was not a difficult task because they had amply provided for it in the Treaty of 1638 itself.

By Article 8 it had been stipulated that the King should pay in cinnamon, pepper and other wares, all the expenses, which the Dutch might incur in assisting him against the Portuguese. But during the period when the Dutch were relying on the 'error' in the translation of the 3rd Article, no connection was drawn between their garrisoning of forts and the provisions of Article 8. During this period, however, the theme of the 'great expenses'⁶⁹ which were being incurred in his service was dinned continually into the King's ears, both by Van Diemen (in his letters) and by the visiting commanders and the officers in Ceylon, in accordance with repeated orders from Batavia. And the King was earnestly requested to make good these expenses by delivering large quantities of merchandise.⁷⁰

But the moment the 'error' in the 3rd Article proved to be no longer serviceable, then the theme of the 'great expenses' acquired a new significance. Article 8 now came to be the justification for holding on to the forts. Coster was told by the Batavian authorities that the maxim should now be: 'We shall not occupy any place longer than till satisfaction of our expenses is made'.⁷¹ Coster, who was thoroughly versed in the plans of his superiors, had already followed this maxim. As seen earlier, under the new agreement entered into with the King, it had been stipulated that the captured forts (with certain exceptions) were to be garrisoned by the Dutch until all the expenses incurred by them in the King's ser-

vice were paid for; when these expenses were paid, the Dutch would be permitted to possess one fort, which would be assigned to them by the King.

Raja Sinha was very anxious to clear up his debt without any delay, because he was keenly aware of the consequences which would result if the Hollanders were allowed to fortify themselves wherever they pleased. His idea was to drive the Portuguese completely out of the island with the help of the Dutch, and then to assign one fort in possession to his allies; in return for the valuable monopoly of the cinnamon and other trade of the island, he expected that his merchant-allies would be eager to prevent the Portuguese from staging a comeback, and would keep the island free from all foreign invasion.⁷² Although he was keenly alive to the fact that his allies had much greater ambitions in Ceylon than he liked, he yet had great hopes of being able to check them. Therefore, to recover his freedom of action in dealing with the Dutch, he set all his energies to the task of clearing up his debt. And immediately after the capture of Galle and Negombo he sent large numbers of Chaleas to peel cinnamon for delivery to the Dutch.

With the military successes of the Portuguese and their capture of almost all the cinnamon collected by his men, the King saw his hopes of paying off the debt vanish for the time being. Hardly two months later, however, when he saw the amount of the debt, as it was in the statement presented to him, in January 1641, he must have felt that it might never be possible to gather sufficient merchandise to pay off the debt.

In January 1641, the Senior Merchant, Marten Vinck arrived at the court, bringing with him a letter, dated 26th September 1640 from Van Diemen, together with a statement of the Dutch expenses.⁷³ Van Diemen laid much emphasis on the expenses which the Company had undergone for three years in the King's service. If the King had promptly repaid their expenses, then, argued Van Diemen, the Dutch would have violated the 3rd Article of the treaty, by their garrisoning of the forts against the King's wishes; but since he had not paid their expenses, they were justified in their actions; only when the expenses were paid, could the forts be handed over to him. Little pleased as he was, with the honesty of Van Diemen's arguments, Raja Sinha was perhaps even less pleased with the statement of expenses which Van Diemen had sent along with this letter.

The King particularly objected to,⁷⁴ and refused to pay for, two items in this statement of expenses. Firstly, he refused to pay for the monthly salaries of the men, who had been left in garrison in Trincomalee, because this fort had been garrisoned directly against his wishes. Secondly he refused to pay for the loss of the cargo-ship, the *Rarob*, which had been wrecked off Negombo in January 1640. According to Article 18⁷⁵ of the Treaty of 1638, the Dutch would have to bear this loss by themselves. Quite apart from these two points of objection, he suspected that all the items of expenditure had been rated inordinately high; but beyond making a general criticism to that effect he could do nothing else.

As a matter of fact, the King's suspicions were correct; the actual expenses must have been only a fraction of the 317,983 *xerafims* or 776,975 florins claimed by the Dutch. Fortunately, there is enough evidence to show that the statement of the King's debt is very much of a concoction, turned out by the commission, which was specially appointed for the purpose.⁷⁶ For instance, the claim in respect of the loss of the *Rarob* and part of its goods, was made out to be 87,000 florins. But in the Galle 'trade-books', the actual loss is given as 41,135 florins. Then again, in the calculation of the king's debt, the average salary and ration-allowance per man per month, is fixed at twenty-five florins; but from a calculation made by the later Dutch Governor of Ceylon, Jacob van Kittensteijn, it is apparent that the correct average figure should be ten florins less.⁷⁸ Since about three-quarters of the King's total debt is made up of salaries and allowances, the significance of the above calculation can be estimated. Finally, apart from the 87,000 florins claimed in respect of the loss of the *Rarob*, a sum of 433,600 florins was claimed as expenses incurred during the expedition sent under Lucas. The huge exaggeration involved in this claim can be realised when it is noted that even for the bigger expedition sent to Ceylon in 1644 under Francois Caren, only 25,368 florins were put down as expenses, in the 'trade-books' at Batavia.⁷⁹

Although Raja Sinha did not know these and certain other similar details concerning his debt, he certainly knew what he had contributed towards its payment. His surprise and indignation can, therefore, be imagined when he saw that some of the most important articles, which he had given to the Dutch towards the payment of the debt, were not included in the list of articles, acknowledged as having been received. For instance, the 143

bahars and 269 pounds of cinnamon, and the pepper and wax which he had given the Dutch after the capture of Batticaloa, were not included in this list. Van Diemen maintained that these items had been given as presents to Commander Westerwolt and himself, and not as contributions towards the debt. But, like so many of the other bold-faced statements of Van Diemen, this also was not true, for, in 1638, Coster, who had shipped most of these articles, had shown no doubts about this matter, and referred to these as articles given in payment of the debt.⁸⁰

The price which the Dutch were prepared to offer for the cinnamon and other merchandise, was another important factor bearing on the question of the King's debt. The Batavian authorities had progressively lowered the price which they offered for cinnamon. At the very beginning, in July 1637, they had wanted the Governor of Pulicat to offer for it 50% more than the Portuguese had paid. But soon realising that the King was as keen as they were to enter into an alliance they instructed Westerwolt only to offer to pay more than the Portuguese, without saying how much more. Following these instructions, Reijniersz offered by letter to pay the King 'to satisfaction' for the cinnamon; Reijniersz's envoys offered to pay more than the Portuguese had paid; and almost certainly Westerwolt did the same.⁸¹ All Dutch offers, however drastically changed immediately after Raja Sinha granted them, by the Treaty of 1638, a monopoly of the cinnamon, along with many other articles. They now wanted the King to sell them the cinnamon at a price much less than paid by the Portuguese.⁸²

The King, on his part, stated that despite Dutch promises of paying more for it, he would price the cinnamon even lower than the Portuguese price, because he took into consideration the services which the Dutch were rendering him. He pointed out that the Portuguese paid 130 *xerafims* the bahar, but that he would charge only 110 *xerafims* for the bahar.⁸³

The most that the Dutch were prepared to pay was, however, only 80 *xerafims* or 120 florins, although at this time, they were making in Europe over 1000 florins for a bahar of the lowest quality cinnamon.⁸⁴

The explanation for the Dutch attitude since the signing of the Treaty of 1638, is quite obvious. By this treaty, the King bound himself to sell the cinnamon (along with certain other specified wares) to the Dutch alone. Thereafter, the Dutch being the only

legal buyers, the King had to sell the cinnamon at whatever price the Dutch were pleased to offer. By lowering the price as they thought fit the Dutch could not only get the cinnamon (and other merchandise) for a mere song, but they could also keep the King in their debt as long as they wanted to. However much cinnamon was delivered by Raja Sinha, it would be of little avail, if the value of the cinnamon could be lowered as much as the Dutch wanted to.

Thus, they ensured their hold on the forts on the island and on Raja Sinha, not only by utterly exaggerating their expenses and by excluding from the account some of the merchandise delivered by the King, but also by under-valuing, as they pleased, what they did admit having received.

But there is more to this extremely ingenious scheme. When Raja Sinha realised that the Dutch wanted the cinnamon for a mere nothing, and that, in any case, considering the extent of the debt it would be a difficult task to pay it off with merchandise, since little could be gathered in the disturbed state of the lands, he offered to pay the full debt in cash. Coster's reply⁸⁵ to this offer had already indicated to Raja Sinha, that the Dutch did not wish to see him ever pay up his debt; Van Diemen merely confirmed this, when he replied to Raja Sinha's offer, in the following words,⁸⁶ unmistakeable in their import:

'The contract speaks of merchandise and not of cash; furthermore (the contract says) that all the wares of Ceylon, may be sold to no other nation than the Netherlands; excepting the elephants, of which not more, than half is due to us. Therefore, we request you to maintain inviolate the concluded contract.'

Thus, it is apparent that his creditors had fully ensured that Raja Sinha's indebtedness was going to be eternal.⁸⁷

Nevertheless, though the Dutch had acquired a hold over the King by means of the debt, it would be of little avail, if he disowned his debt and became openly hostile. This, Van Diemen and his Council, were anxious to avoid; because, if, the King became hostile and joined the Portuguese, their position in the island would be in grave danger.⁸⁸ They, therefore, instructed Coster (and their other officers in Ceylon) to do everything possible to dull the King's suspicions. He was to make no mention of matters touching the sovereignty of the lands since the King was very touchy on this point, and he was to make the King believe that the forts were of no use

to them, being only kept as securities for the payment of their debt.⁸⁹

This, however, was an impossible task, Not only had the Dutch given the King more than enough reasons to have the worst suspicions regarding their intentions and actions, but they also could not refrain from giving him further cause to suspect them. For instance, they could not help suggesting to the King that even when the Portuguese were completely driven from the island he should have four forts garrisoned by the Dutch for the better protection of his Kingdom. Then again, they could not refrain from attempting to take the levying of tolls at the King's into their hands.⁹⁰ Most notable of all, they revealed that they covered the rich Matara Dissawani; in the same letter instructing Coster to refrain from making any mention of matters touching the sovereignty of the lands, Van Diemen and his Council asked him to try to induce the King to grant them this Dissawani in recognition of their services to him. In fact, Van Diemen himself wrote to the King requesting that the benefits which the Portuguese had enjoyed from the Dissawani should be granted to the Dutch.⁹¹

All these things only served to strengthen the King's suspicions. Regarding the suggested four fortresses, he made it clear that beyond one fort which he would assign to the Dutch he needed no others. As for the levying of tolls, he put a stop to it by sharply ordering the Dutch to desist from doing so. To van Diemen's request he replied by pointing out that the Portuguese had enjoyed the profits from the lands by coercing the inhabitants, and he concluded by saying:⁹²

'But today, now that the lands are mine, and I am the lawful King of these same lands, through the mercy of God, you have no reason to make any mention of the profits enjoyed by the Portuguese.'

It thus repeatedly appeared to Van Diemen and his Council, that the King would neither brook any infringement of his sovereign rights nor make any concessions which would curtail these rights. They were quite certain that once the Portuguese were driven out they could obtain what they wanted from the island; but they were impatient at the delay this might involve, for, the re-capture of Negombo had shown that the Portuguese could not be easily ousted from Ceylon. Taking everything into consideration, there-

fore, they decided, early in 1641, that if a favourable opportunity arose they would take over direct control of as many of the cinnamon lands as possible - no matter what the King's reactions might be.⁹³


1. Particularly since the question of the King's debt to the Company was one of the most important questions which arose between Raja Sinha and the Dutch; it runs right through (and even beyond) the period surveyed in this study.
2. Kol. Arch. 1039, p. 396.
3. For words marked with an asterisk see Glossary.
4. From the 'Petitie' of the Directors for various articles (22 Oct. 1639). Kol. Arch. 454.
5. Kol. Arch. 765. pp. 643-48. It will be seen later on (cf. p. 43) that in this claim also there is a gross exaggeration.
6. For some idea regarding the costs of transport see: Dr. F. W. Stapel (Ed.), Pieter van Dam, *Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie* (The Hague, 1932) Bk. i. Pt. ii, 5, 52. Also, MacLeod, ii. 434.
7. This 'Request' and the King's reply to it are in Kol. Arch. 1039 pp. 393-401.
8. Coster to CC., 31 Dec. 1638, Kol. Arch. 1039 pp. 382-92.
9. 11 Aug. 1638, Kol. Arch. 764 pp. 375-76.
10. 2 July 1638, Kol. Arch. 1037 fo. 164. None of the available Portuguese sources mention this defeat. But whether this event was fictitious or not, the fact remains that to the Batavian authorities, this must have been a perfectly true event, and the effect on their policy must have been real.
11. 11 Aug. 1638, Kol. Arch. 764 pp. 378-79. Translations or translated extracts (from the translations made for the India Office Library) of this letter and the one to Coster, are given in Pieris, *Some Docs.* But these translations have to be used with great caution, because they are very often faulty, cf., e.g. the relevant part of the extract from the letter to Coster (given on pp. 64-65) with the sentence quoted above from that letter.
12. This belief in astrology, etc., was an important element governing Raja's actions. See further, pp. 120, 129.
13. *Dagh-Register 1641*, p. 413.
14. Coster to G. G., 31 Dec. 1638, Kol. Arch. 1039 pp. 382-92.
15. One item in the instructions (Kol. Arch. 1039 p. 377) which Coster gave Compostel, shows unmistakably what ambitions the Dutch were having: Article 9, 'The 'blacks' who are in the fort should be at first treated softly until such time as our position is somewhat better grounded.' Further evidence on this point is revealed in his letter of 31 Dec. 1638 (*Ibid.*): „Maer mijns bedunckens, en zalt voor ons, voor eerst met de coopmanschappen niet vele hebben te beduijen, tot dat wat vaster zijn gezeten rontom het Eijilandt.”
16. Kol. Arch. 764 pp. 547-52.
17. The main sources for the narrative of the events connected with Caen's operation in Ceylon, are:

- (1) 'Journal' of the fleet under Caen, 27 July 1638 - 19 July 1639, Kol. Arch. 1039, pp. 108-233.
- (2) 'Resolutions' of Caen and his Council, Kol. Arch. 1039 pp. 261-325. Van Geer appears to have used the first document, but overlooked some important information in it; a few of these oversights will be indicated in this study. He has, apparently, not consulted the second doc., where some relevant and important information is to be found.
18. *v. Coster* to G. G., 31 Dec. 1638, Kol. Arch. 1039, 383. Queyroz (813-15) refers to the capture of Malwana by the Portuguese, but does not mention its later re-capture by the Kandyans. This latter event is established without doubt from Kol. Arch. 1039, pp. 187-200 ('Journal of Caen').
19. This was his baptismal name, given when he was a subject of the Portuguese. He was one of the principal Sinhalese who went over to the Kandyans during the expedition of de Sa in 1630. His military abilities had no equal recognition among the Kandyans as among the Portuguese. His Sinhalese name was Siyane Korale Rala.
20. For the information regarding the letters from the Kandyans, see: Resolution of 21 March. Kol. Arch. 1039, pp. 311-12; 'Journal of Caen' under date 23 March, Kol. Arch. 1039 pp. 160 ff. For Caen's fear of the monsoon and his hurry to leave Colombo, see Resolutions of 17 and 23 March pp. 300 ff. Van Geer (47) and MacLeod (ii. 121) have completely ignored the contact established with Caen's fleet by the Kandyans.
21. Caen left Colombo on 23 or 24 March. Van Geer (47) gives an utterly wrong picture of Caen's actions between 24 March and the end of April. The period in which Caen was putting order into Batticaloa, and was making arrangements for the projected attack on Trincomalee, etc. is conceived by Van Geer as a period of desultory cruising before Colombo. MacLeod (iii. 121) has, however, a somewhat accurate picture of this period.
22. As seen earlier, G.G. & C. had recommended to Coster to see whether he could persuade the King to agree to the Dutch attacking any forts without his assistance; but in the letter of 9 Nov. (1638) Caen had been enjoined not to undertake anything in Ceylon without the King's advice and help. That, despite this, Caen should have proposed in Council, something quite contrary to his written instructions, suggests two things: Either, Caen was a careless and insubordinate commander (although a member of the Council of India) or else, he knew better than the others that his colleagues at Batavia would rather see, in this matter, the instructions to Coster followed than the (written) instructions given to him. The second of these two alternatives seems to be the more probable.
23. The assistance given by the Sinhalese has been completely ignored by Van Geer (47). MacLeod (ii. 121) also makes no mention of it. But, c.f., Pieris, *Some Docs.*, 70.
24. So it is said in the 'Journal of Caen'. As a short while before another letter sent from the King is also reported (in the 'Journal') to have been unintelligible, the idea suggests itself that these letters contained some information which Caen did not wish to divulge to the others.
25. Note that Caen took his stand on the treaty, only as a last resort, for, he had been told by G. G. & C. (9 Nov. 1638, Kol. Arch. 764 pp. 551-52): 'ende

alsoo de geaccordeerde conditien voor dese Compe Seer voirderl. zijn, zall geensints geraaden wesen onsent wegen met zijn Mayt. in naerder communicatie op die materie comen, off eenige motie desen aengaende te doen'. And strangely enough the Batavian authorities seem to have anticipated difficulties with the King, over the garrisoning of forts, for they say (in the same letter): 'Gelijck zijn Mayt. ons guarnisoen in Batacaloa, van cost ende dranck onderhoudt, zoo zall dienen geleth bij veroveringh van meerder en andere fortressen, dat d'onse op den selven voeth gesustenteert,.....edoch alles dient soo discreetlijck gemenagieerdt dat dierhalven met de Mayt niet in contentie geraecken. Uijt disordre, zal den tijt ordre voortbrengen.'

26. On account of an exceedingly faulty and misleading translation of a portion of Caen's 'Journal', it has been believed that it was the Sinhalese who were unwilling to proceed to the attack on Jaffna. For the trans., see: *JCRAS*. 123-40. A more accurate and extensive extract from Caen's Journal is given in, Pieris: *Some Docs.*, 65-71; but here too much important information has been cut out.
27. No reference is made to these letters either in the 'Journal' of the 'Resolutions' of Caen. They are referred to in the letter of Lucas of 9 Jan. 1640 to the Directors (Kol. Arch. 1039 p. 20) and in the 'Resolutions' of G. G. & C., of 20 Aug., and 23 Sept. 1639. (Kol. Arch. 564). The references to these letters have been overlooked by Van Geer, MacLeod and all others.
28. Note how these complaints were reported by Lucas and the Council of Batavia to the Directors. Whereas the King had clearly indicated that he was displeased with Caen's refusal to hand over Trincolamee, both Lucas and the Council reported that the King was displeased merely because Trincomalee had been *captured* (cf. 'Resolutions' of G. G. & C., 20 Aug. 1639, Kol. Arch. 564 with Lucas to Dirs., 9 Jan. 1640, Kol. Arch. 1039 p. 20, and G. G. & C., to Dirs., 18 Dec. 1639, Kol. Arch. 1039 fo. 64 ff.). Similarly, no attack was made on Jaffna because Caen was not prepared to do so; but G. G. & C., reported that it was the King's co-operation which had been lacking and not that of Caen (cf. 'Journal' of Caen, Kol. Arch. 1039, p. 213 with G. G. & C., to Dirs., 18 Dec. 1639, *Ibid.*).
29. *Realia. Register op de Generale Resolutiën van het Kasteel Batavia 1632-1805*. The Hague - Batavia, 1882-85; i. 227; G. G. & C., to Dirs., 18 Dec. 1639, Kol. Arch. 1039 fo. 64 ff.
30. See note 25 above.
31. G. G. & C., to Dirs., 18 Dec. 1639, Kol. Arch. 1039 fo. 64 ff; 'Commissie' for Lucas, 28 Sep. 1659, Kol. Arch. 765 p. 581. It is not possible to say whether this idea of withdrawing from Ceylon (if matters turned out contrary to expectation) was seriously entertained by the Dutch. Considering the great importance which they attached to the cinnamon of Ceylon, it is certain that only insurmountable obstacles would make them withdraw from Ceylon. The prevailing view regarding the attitude of G. G. & C. to Raja, is well-expressed by Codrington (*Short Hist.*, 118) thus: 'The Council at Batavia, in spite of their unfavourable opinion of Raja Sinha's trustworthiness, decided to comply with his wishes, but held it necessary to enter into a more binding agreement...'

32. Although Van Geer refers to the letter of G. G. & C. to the Directors, of 18 Dec. 1639, he seems to have overlooked and also misinterpreted some of the important statements in that letter. For instance, the 200 soldiers were sent at Raja's request to accompany him to Colombo; they were not sent, as Van Geer (51-52) implies, in order to make a lone march across the island from the east coast to Colombo in case Raja's assistance was not forthcoming.
33. Van Geer believed that G. G. & C., did not know why Raja had withheld provisions from Trincomalee; but see 'Resolutions' of G. G. & C. of 20 Aug. 1639, Kol. Arch. 564. He also says that Lucas first went to Trincomalee. The fact is, Lucas never saw that place. He says Lucas found the garrison of Trincomalee in a miserable state on account of the King's withholding of supplies, and that the provisions which Lucas had brought freed the garrison from starvation; it was not Lucas' fleet but the *Oudewater* and *Santvoort* which had found the fort in sore straits and had provisioned it. Van Geer further says that finding Trincomalee so badly treated, Lucas sent a pressing request to the King asking him to fulfill his obligations better; Lucas sent no such letter. The only letter which he sent to the King was dated 11 Nov., and was sent from the Nicobar Islands, long before he saw Ceylon. (This type of inaccuracy in Van Geer could be noted *ad nauseam*) On the above points cf. Van Geer, 49,42 with G. G. & C., to Dirs. 18 Dec. 1639, Kol. Arch. 1039 fo. 64 ff; Lucas to Dirs., 9 Jan 1640, Kol. Arch. 1039 pp. 14-22.
34. See the letter of Lucas to the Dirs. (9 Jan. 1640, Kol. Arch. 1039, pp. 14-30) for the great importance which he attached to these articles, and the impending negotiations with Raja.
35. MacLeod's account of the expedition is substantially correct up to about 9 Jan.; thereafter, it is extremely erroneous.
See MacLeod, ii. 127-28.
36. Thijssen to Cardenijs, 11 April 1640, Kol. Arch. 1043 fo. 214; G. G. & C. to Coster, 26 Sept. 1640, Kol. Arch. 765 pp. 620-21; G. G. to Raja, 26 Sept. 1640, Kol. Arch. 765 pp. 638 ff.; Raja's reply (no date) to above letter of G. G., *Dagh. Reg. 1641*, 408-18; G. G. & C. to Dirs. 30 Nov. 1640, Kol. Arch. 1042 fo. 10 ff; Same to same, 9 Sept. 1640, Kol. Arch. 1043, fos. 242-44. Extracts from the last two documents and from the letter of 26 Sep. to Coster are given in Van Geer, Appendix v, vi, vii. Appendix vi and, more particularly, vii, are inadequate. (The Dutch documents at the Hague Archives for the years 1640-41 are unusually few, because most of the Ceylon documents seem to have been lost).
From the account of Queyroz (819-26) it appears clearly that the Sinhalese played as large a part as the Dutch at the capture of Negombo. But the available Dutch documents make no mention of this beyond saying that the King's forces joined theirs shortly after the battle at Kammala.
37. For the reconstruction of this dispute and other connected matters see the documents cited in the previous note.
38. Note how G. G. & C., while admitting the truth - or rather, part of the truth - attempt to blur it: Raeckende het derde articul t'zelve hebben geconfronteert met t'origineel in Portugese Tale ges. twelck eenighsints schijnt te differeren, dicteerende t'Nederlandts, dat alle fortten, die vande Portugesen op Ceylon comen te veroveren, tot laste vande Maijt., met Nederlandts



crijgsvolck zullen worden beseth, ende int origineel staeth, alsulcke fortent te besetten die de Maijt. dienstich oordeelt.'

39. Kol. Arch. 1039, pp. 32-65.
40. e.g. part of Art. 7 ran as follows:
'Alle heijdense Sanguleesen nu onder de Jurisdictione der portugiesen resor-terende, sullen met haere persoonen landerijen, t'huijnen, plantagien, huijsen, haven, wesen ter believen... vande keijser lijcke maijt, uijtgesondert Christen wesende, welcke zijn Maijt uijt goeder gratie vrijheijt van consciencie ende onder de Nederlanderen jurisdictione toestonde te resideren. Jegens welcke sullen de Nederlanders toegevoecht ende onder subjectie gestelt werden alle Caria Celia, lijfeijgene, slaven der portugiesen toebehoorende, van wat natie ofte religie d'selve wesen ofte professie doen mochten, mitsgaders hare goederen...'
41. Lucas had, therefore, been mistaken when he thought that he had made a clever job of this draft treaty for he had written to the Directors (9 Jan 1640, Kol. Arch. 1039, p. 22) thus:
'Desen prince is seer laetdunckende, moedich ende niet al te fijdeel, redenen waerom met het instellen van de capitulatiën bijzonder geleth, ende oock soo circumspect bepaelt hebben, als geoordeelt sij, dat eenichsints met goede redenen, soude mogen gedifferendeert.'
42. G. G. & C., to Coster, 26 Sep. 1640, Kol. Arch. 767 p. 623; *Dagh Register 1841*, 335; G. G. & C., to Thijs., 20 Sept. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 p. 440. This attempt to make it appear that the fault lay with Holsteijn was carried to great lengths. For instance, on 18 Oct. 1641 (Kol. Arch. 768 p. 516) G. G. & C., wrote to Holsteijn (who was at Kandy at the time) saying that they believed that he had made this wrong translation not through malice but through an error. The letter had the effect, which was apparently desired. Holsteijn wrote back a letter full of apologies for his 'error' (*Dagh-Reg. 1642*, 255). That G. G. & C.'s letter was really sent for Raja's information is apparent from the fact that they wrote to Thijssen at the same time (Kol. Arch. 768 fos. 503-08) asking him to send the letter for Holsteijn, only if he thought it prudent; for, after all, they could not be sure what Raja might do to Holsteijn on the strength of that letter! That Holsteijn was one of the most trusted of the Company's servants in Ceylon, is apparent from the fact that in their letter to Coster (26 Sep. 1640) G. G. & C., expressly say that if any of the G. G.'s letters to Raja require any alteration it should be entrusted to Holsteijn.
43. Van Geer, 422. The unfortunate fact is that many writers who avowedly followed Van Geer, have left this question much more undecided than Van Geer, See e.g., H. T. Colenbrander, *Koloniale Geschiedenis*, The Hague 1925-26, ii. 144-45; Codrington, *Short Hist.* 118; D. W. Ferguson, 'Raja Sinha ii and the Dutch', *JCRAS. XVIII* 174. This last writer in fact says (167) also: 'Raja Sinha's duplicity in his dealings with the Dutch is forcibly set forth by Mr. W. Van Geer in his....., a work of the utmost value, which badly needs translating into English'.
44. See note 25 above.
45. Apparently following Van Geer (57-58) it has been hitherto accepted that it was Coster who made the first advances. But G. G. & C.'s letter of 26 Sept. 1640 to Coster (Kol. Arch. 767. p. 622) proves the contrary.

46. Queyroz (836) was aware that Raja had made a definite choice in favour of the Dutch; but he considered the choice to have been made rather later than 1640. . .
47. Hot 'Governor' as Van Geer has said; thereby, he has contradicted what is stated in Appendix V p. 10 of his work. Although MacLeod (ii. 189) correctly points out that Coster was dead by the time he was appointed Governor, this seems to have been ignored by other writers. See e.g. W. Wijnaendts van Resandt, *De Gezaghebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie op hare Buiten-Comptoiren in Azië*, Amsterdam 1944; 55.
48. G. G. & C., to Coster, 26 Sept. 1640, Kol. Arch. 762 p. 622; G. G. & C., to Dirs., 9 Sept. 1640, Kol. Arch. 1043 fo. 240 ff. See for this last document, also Van Geer, Appendix V. pp 8-10. It seems almost certain that the agreement, so far as it affected Negombo, was rather different to what these documents imply. It appears possible from G. G.'s letter of 26 Sept. 1640 to Raja (Kol. Arch. 767, p. 638 ff) and almost certain from the reply of Raja (*Dagh-Reg. 1641*, 411-13) that Negombo was to be handed over to the King immediately he paid the Dutch the expenses which they had incurred in the capture of that fort. The fact that when the King later on demanded the handing over of Negombo, the Dutch did not base their refusal on this agreement strengthens the above idea further.
49. G. G. & C., to Cardenijs, 14 April 1640, Kol. Arch. 767, p. 422.
50. Queyroz (828-48) has the fullest account of the capture of Galle. It is he who mentions that the King's Dissawe had joined the Dutch before the storm. The main Kandyan force, however, arrived too late, for, Raja accused Coster of having attacked Galle before the time agreed upon for it. (*Dagh-Reg. 1640* p. 409).
51. G. G. & C., to Dirs., 30 Nov. 1640, Kol. Arch. 1043 fo. 10.
52. G. G. & C., to Coster, 26 Sept. 1640, Kol. Arch. 787 pp. 620-30.
53. In this matter, as in so many others, Coster was only taking up attitudes which G. G. & C., wished him to take, for in their letter of 26 Sept. (Kol. Arch. 767 p. 625) they wrote: 'gestadich moeten de Modeljaers (wiens last is onse besettingen te versorgen) hert aengesproocken worden, ten eijnde de rantsoenen verschaffen, ende noch de fortten van rijs ende sout provideren, omme in tijt van noode niet verlegen te vallen.'
54. Van Geer (64) says that Coster had heard that merchandise was being sold to outsiders in violation of the treaty by the King; and that having several times written in vain to the King, he had decided to go to Kandy and make direct representations. In the representations which Coster is known to have made, there is really no mention of the above charge. Van Geer also says that although the King had sent a large number of cinnamon-peelers into the lowlands, hardly any cinnamon had been received at Galle; he implies that Coster was displeased over this matter also. In actual fact, however, Coster's own statements show that he did not expect any cinnamon at the moment, because it was only peeling and gathering time. (Cinnamon peeled from about May to August was usually brought from the woods only from Sept. onwards). See on above points, *Dagh-Reg. 1640*, 92-101. Note that Van Geer's implication regarding the alleged selling of cinnamon to outsiders was taken up by other writers, who made the allegations more explicit.

See e.g., *Cambridge History of India*, V. ch. ii (by P. Geyl) 44; Colenbrander, *Kol. Gesch.*, ii. 471; Stapel, *Geschiedenis*, iii. 255.

55. Ever since Nov. 1638 (see *Kol. Arch.* 1039 p. 385) Coster seems to have carried on a secret correspondence with Wijayapala. G. G. & Co. feared that some misfortune might result from this and on 26 Sept. 1640 (*Kol. Arch.* 767 pp. 620-30) they wrote: 'In allen gevalle verbieden U. E. wel strictelijck geen correspondentie met conings broeder te houden. U. E. doen niet wel de saecke te voeden ende brieven buijten kennisse van Radja Singa t'ontfangen. T'is qual twee heeren te dienen, daeromme circumspect ende met communicatie van de Maijt in dese sake gaen sult.' This salutary advice was given much too late.
56. *Dagh-Reg.* 1640, 92-101. Van Geer (65) underestimates very much the offense given to the King by Coster's insulting behaviour. Ferguson (*JCRAS.* XVIII 179-80) considered not Raja but Coster to have been the insulted and aggrieved party. However, in a note (n. 89) on p. 255, Ferguson modified his attitude somewhat. Dr. Stapel was incorrect when he said (Van Dam, ii. Pt. ii, 250, n. 9) that Coster had behaved very courteously. The *Dagh-Reg.* account to which he refers for full details, indicates just the opposite.
57. Dr. Pieris seems to believe (sec. *Port. Era.* ii. 303; *Some Docs.*, 83) that the King had no hand in this murder. But the available evidence seems to indicate the contrary.
58. What G. G. & C., themselves say regarding Coster's conduct, shows, once again, that the principal cause of his death was his own behaviour. In their letter of 30 Nov. 1640 (*Kol. Arch.* 1042 fo. 77; also in Van Geer, Appendix VI. p. 16.) they told the Dirs.: 'Coster sal^r. is seer rude van humeur geweest, hebbende vrij groote impertinentie, omtrent dese diffidente race gepleecht.' To this the Dirs. added (5 Sep. 1641, *Kol. Arch.* 454): 'hoewel de voornoemde Coster all eenig oorsaecke daer toe schijnt gegeven te hebben door sijn gedebauscheert leven met vrouwen en andere meer, genoeghsaem uijt alle omstandigheden blijcken.'
59. Had been for seven years at Kandy during time of Senarat, and had acquired a good knowledge of Sinhalese. Apparently after a return to Europe, he came out to the East once again in May 1639 with rank of Senior Merchant, in the following year he was ordered to proceed from Pulicat to Ceylon; where he was to be used as a spy in Kandy, and in the low-country as an instrument for drawing the affections of the inhabitants towards the Dutch; until 1645, he continued as second in rank to Thijssen at Galle. In that year he was made Chief at Negombo; but in 1646 he was replaced by Overschie because he was *persona non grata* with the Portuguese Captain-General - he died that very year.
60. A French mercenary soldier who came out to the East in the Company's service, with the rank of Sergeant; after his desertion to the Portuguese he became the favourite and confidant of Don Philippe de Mascarenhas, who took him to Goa when he accused the Viceroyalty in 1645. According to Tavernier, St. Amant was Chief-Engineer and Master ginner of Portuguese India in 1648; he was later killed in an encounter at Buscat.
61. First came out to India in 1623; Captain-General of Cochin, 1631-34, and of Ceylon, 1640-45; Governor of Portuguese India, 1645-51; died on his

- homeward voyage to Portugal in 1652. He was notorious for his great personal wealth, and Queyroz says the Dutch and Sinhalese called him the 'King of Gold'. Ribeiro speaks very highly of him, but other contemporaries criticised the way in which he amassed his wealth; his administration in Ceylon was marked by ability as well as by unscrupulousness.
62. Viceroy of Portuguese India, 1640-45, reappointed in 1650, but died on the outward voyage; despite his equivocal attitude in accepting at Goa João IV as King, he was much trusted by that monarch. His enemies, among whom was the celebrated Jesuit Antonio Vieira, accused him of having amassed great wealth through illicit means during his term as Viceroy.
 63. Philippe Mascarenhas to Viceroy, 12 Nov. 1640, Bk. 47 fo. 86 (of Bks. of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port Recs.*. (Trans.) 13. This fact has hitherto escaped notice. That the Dutch garrison surrendered despite this message adds still greater weight to the opinion of G. G. & C., that the garrison had not made a proper resistance. (to Dirs., 12 Dec. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1044 fo. 50ff). Mascarenhas mentions the Kandyan force to have been about 3000 men. Compare this figure with the figure of 20,000 given by Ribeiro (120) and 'that large host of Chingalas' mentioned by Queyroz (860). This illustrates clearly the characteristic exaggeration of these two authors. Ribeiro's exaggeration is all the more significant because he was in Ceylon, and almost certainly at Negombo, at the time.
 64. Mascarenhas to Viceroy, 12 Nov. 1640 (see previous note); *Dagh-Reg. 1641*, 410.
Not only did the Dutch (whether in Ceylon or in Batavia) make no mention of the Sinhalese assistance, but on the contrary they also accused Raja of having been aloof and even hostile towards them during the siege of Negombo and before. (e.g. see G. G. & C. to Thijs; 13 April 1641, Kol. Arch. 768, p. 100; G. G. & C., to Dirs. 12 Dec. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1044 fo. 50ff, also in Van Geer, Appendix VIII pp. 18-10). As has been, and will be, often noted this misrepresentation or total contradiction of facts is by no means an unusual feature in the Dutch correspondence, and must be guarded against, if wrong conclusions are to be avoided.
 65. As D'Aveiras triumphantly wrote to his King, 10 Jan. 1641, Bk. 47 fo. 85 (of Bks of Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port. Recs.* (Trans) 13.
 66. Mascarenhas specifically says so in his letter of 12 Nov. 1640 to the Viceroy, Bk. 47 fo. 86.
 67. G. G. & C. to Dirs., 12 Dec. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1044 fo. 45; *Dagh-Reg. 1641*, 238-39; G. G. & C. to Thijs., 15 Apr. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768, p. 100. Although G. G. & C. knew the contrary, they represented the delivery of the cinnamon to them, as being the result of Raja's trepidation at the success of Portuguese arms in the capture of Negombo (See letter of 12 Dec. 1641 to Dirs. In truth, however, as they and the Portuguese (see page 40 above) both knew, cinnamon had been collected for the Dutch before the sudden success of the Portuguese. 345 bahars had already been delivered at Galle by the King's men, before the capture of the rest by the Portuguese. Van Geer was misled by the statements of G. G. & C., and he echoed their assertion that Raja showed himself disposed to support them once again,

only after the success of Portuguese arms; according to him (71) the delivery of the cinnamon was a sign of this new disposition.

68. G. G. & C., to Gardenijs, 22 May 1641, Kol. Arch. 768, p. 178.
69. 'groote onkosten' or 'groote gasten' etc. This is a constant formula in the Dutch correspondence relating to Raja Sinha and Ceylon affairs. See below p. 43 for an estimate of how great these 'great expenses' were.
70. e.g. Instructions for Gardenijs, 11 Aug. 1658, Kol. Arch. 764 pp. 364-65; Van Diemen to Raja, 11 Aug. 1638, Kol. Arch. 764 pp. 378-79; G. G. & C. to Caen, No. 1638, Kol. Arch. 784 p. 551.
71. G. G. & C. to Coster, 26 Sept. 1640, Kol. Arch. 767 p. 623. This same instruction is given to Thijssen in an even more interesting and revealing manner in their letter of 20 Sep. 1641 (Kol. Arch. 768, pp. 438-441): 't' derde artijckel is disputabel, ende schijnt den assistent Holsteijn int translateren na behooren niet gedaen te hebben, echter t'can gesont worden uijtgeleijt, namentlijk dat geen geconquesteerde fortressen, als met des Maijts consent, sullen besetten, te weten wanneer Ceijlen van de Portuguesen sul gesuijvert, ende de Maijt ons cententemt. gedaen heeft.'
72. From G. G. & C.'s statements at this stage the implication is clear that they little doubted (G. G. & C. to Dirs. 30 Nov. 1640, Kol. Arch. 1042, fo. 10ff) Raja's sincerity in wishing to execute this plan of his. But they of course were not satisfied with it, and Raja was over-rating his own abilities far too much when he thought that he could order the affairs of Ceylon as he wished. It is interesting to note that when Raja conceived the above plan he was thinking of the way in which his great namesake of Sitawaka had controlled Ceylon (see *Dagh-Reg. 1641.* 415).
73. For the embassy of Vinck see: *Dagh-Reg. 1641,* 237, 534; G. G. & C. to Dirs. 12 Dec. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1044 ff. 45ff. The letter of Van Diemen and the King's account are to be found in: Kol. Arch. 765 p. 638 ff.
74. For the King's objections, see: *Dagh. Reg. 1641,* 535, 400-01.
75. See Heeres, *Corp. Dip.*, i. 315. Although Raja was *perfectly* correct in his objection, G. G. & C. (in characteristic fashion) informed the Dirs. (12 Dec. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1044 fo. 45ff) that Raja's objection was 'geheel ongefondeert.'
76. *Realia*, i. 228 (Resoln. of 17 Sep. 1640).
77. 'Extract from the Trade Books of. Galle', Kol. Arch. 1116 fo. 884.
78. Kitt to G. G. & C. 6 Nov. 1650, Kol. Arch. 1070 (Bis.) fo. 670, Kittensteijn is here calculating the average salary and ration-allowance of 1500 men (soldiers, sailors, artisans and various officials).
79. J. E. Heeres (Ed.) *De opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indië* (2nd series) iii. 200-203; cf. Van Dam, ii. pt. ii Appendix iv. 435. It is, however, likely that in this figure, the portions of the salaries which were to be paid in the Netherlands are not included. But even allowing for this, it is certain that the total amount of 433,600 florins claimed as expenses for Lucas's expedition, is a gross exaggeration. Regarding the portions of salaries paid in the Netherlands see: J. Aalbers, *Rijcklof van Goans. en zijn Arbeijdsveld*, Groningen, 1916, 18.
80. See pp. 23 above.
81. See 14-16 above.

82. G. G. & C., however, at times said or implied that the price which they offered was the same as or even more than what the Portuguese had paid. The explanation of this lies partly in what they chose to consider as the Portuguese price, and partly, of course, in their characteristic of asserting as true something which was not. When they stated (Kol. Arch. 1042 fo. 10 ff) that the King of Spain did not pay to the peasants more than 15 *xerafims* for the bahar of 384 lbs., then they were referring to the 'Portuguese price', more than which they were offering to pay. But this 15 *xerafims* was, of course, nothing more than a sort of gratuitous payment which was made to the semi-servile chaleas.
83. See pp. 23-24 above.
When Raja spoke of the 'Portuguese price' he referred to the price at which the cinnamon collected in Ceylon was valued by the Portuguese before dispatch to Goa. It appears that he was not exaggerating when he said that the price in Colombo was 150 *xerafims*. See on this point Queyroz, 1192-95, remembering that a Portuguese bahar was only 384 Dutch pounds. The Dutch were themselves not unaware that Raja's figure was correct. See on this point, G. G. & C., to Dirs., 20 Nov. 1640, Kol. Arch. 1042 fo. 10ff. The most that they were prepared to pay was, however, only 80 *xerafims*.
84. Although in the first sale of Ceylon cinnamon, a pound did not fetch more than 32 stivers, in subsequent sales it fetched more than 42 stivers. For instance, even the cinnamon, which G. G. & C. told Raja was worthless on account of its low quality, fetched 42.2/3 stivers in the Netherlands. See on these points 'Resolutions of the Heeren Seventeen', Kol. Arch. 185 and G. G. & C. to Thijs. 20 Sep. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768, p. 441.
85. See on this point, 'Diary' of Pieter Boreel, Kol. Arch. 1056, fc. 398 ff.
86. 18 Oct. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 pp. 510-11.
87. Hitherto, no writer has even suspected that the Dutch account of the King's debt was very much of a concoction, devised to maintain their hold on the forts and to justify their actions. On the contrary almost every writer on the history of the period has seen a justification or at least a valid excuse for Dutch actions in the 'fact' that the King had not paid the huge debt which he was supposed to owe to the Company. See e.g. Van Geer, 138; Colenbrander, ii. 145; MacLeod, ii. 148; Codrington, *Short History*, 118-19, 121; Perera, *Hist. of Ceylon*, i. 116, 121; etc. Dr. Pieris is probably the only writer who did not ascribe any justification or excuse for Dutch actions on the grounds of the King's non-payment of his debt, although he too accepted the 'fact' of a huge debt.
88. They were never fully aware of the fact that Raja would not turn to the Portuguese under almost any circumstances.
89. G. G. & C., to Coster, 26 Sept. 1640, Kol. Arch. 707, pp. 619-37 Van Geer gives only a very small extract from this extremely important letter. See Van Geer, Appendix vii pp. 17-18.
90. It seems to have been the common practice of the Dutch to get the rulers who had fallen into their debt to deliver into their hands the levying of tolls in the territories of these rulers (see e.g.: *Dagh-Reg. 1641* 394-95; Heeres, *De Opkomst.....* 2nd Series, ii. 370). A number of the ideas and methods, which

appear in Cutch relations with the Sultan of Ternate appear also in their relations with Raja Sinha. For instance, in Ternate too they attempted to get the income from the tolls into their hands; but, whereas they were able to coerce Sultan Hamza to grant this income to them, (see Heeres, *De Opkomst*, *loc. cit.*) they failed in their attempt to coerce Raja Sinha. See also next note.

91. 26 Spt. 1640, Kol. Arch. 767 p. 625. In order to make the King grant their desires all the better, G. G. & C., toyed with the idea (for a brief moment) of keeping the Portuguese a little longer in the island (G. G. & C., to Dirs., 30 Nov. 1640, Kol. Arch. 1642 fo. 10ff.) But they gave up the idea almost immediately, probably because they felt that Raja Sinha was a tougher customer than the Sultans of Ternate.

The policy which was being successfully followed in Ternate is best expressed in the following words of G. G. & C., in which they are summarising the views of the Directors on this subject:

'...dat... om de Tarnatanen altijt werck te geven, niet geraden sij, den Tidorees ende Spangiaert door onse adsistentie off eijgen macht geheel uijtte Molucces te verdrijven..... ende dat de Tarnatanen..... van haer verlost sijnde, wel licht op iets anders.... dencken ende voornomen mocht, compes, staet in die quartieren prejudiciaebel ende schadelijck sijnde, ende om daer van geen perijckel te loopen, altijt in actie van oorlogh blijven moet.' (G. G. & C. to Dirs., 18 Jan. 1649, in Heeres, *De Opkomst*.... 2nd Series, iii. 359). For an earlier expression of these ideas see: *Dagh-Reg. 1640*, 20, 27.

It is really no wonder that the Dutch often explained Raja's policy to be none other than that of keeping them and the Portuguese balanced against each other, so that he could take advantage of the situation. See p. 157 below.

92. *Dagh-Reg. 1641*, 408-18, *passim*.

93. See e.g. C. G. & C. to Gardenijs, 3 April 1641, Kol. Arch. 768, p. 68; G. G. & C. to Thijs., 13 April 1641, Kol. Arch. 768, p. 99; *Dagh-Reg. 1641*, 239.

The idea of taking control over the cinnamon lands was latent in the minds of the Dutch from the very beginning. They had at first decided to proceed very slowly in this matter; but they soon became impatient at the delay in realising their aims; the Directors in Holland, in particular, became most impatient for quick results. (See Dirs. to G. G. & C., 11 Sept. 1640, Kol. Arch. 454).

A PERIOD OF STALEMATE. THE MISSION OF BOREEL

Early in 1641 Raja Sinha was seriously threatened with the prospect of having to fight a war on two fronts. To the west and south of his Kingdom he was menaced by the Portuguese, who, flushed with their recent successes were in an aggressive mood. To the south-east he was faced with the revolt of Prince Wijayapala, who had escaped from Kandy in the latter half of 1640 and had established himself in the Kingdom of Uva.¹ Wijayapala was notorious for his Portuguese sympathics, and in December 1640, Don Philipe Mascarenhas had sent an insulting letter to Raja Sinha, threatening to place the 'King of Uva' on the throne of Kandy.² On the instructions of the Conde de Aveiras, Viceroy of Goa, Mascarenhas had previously offered certain terms of peace to Raja Sinha through the agency of Antonio da Mota Galivão, the Portuguese Captain-Major of the Field; but the King had rejected these with scorn.³

This was the situation when Marten Vinck had arrived at Kandy with Van Diemen's letter of the 26th September 1640, and the account of the Dutch expenditure incurred in the King's service. As explained previously, Raja Sinha was quite convinced of the duplicity of the Dutch, but he realised that an open breach with them would only make matters worse for himself. He could not hope to drive the Dutch, who were more powerful than the Portuguese, from their coastal forts; and still less could he hope to cope successfully with both Dutch and Portuguese simultaneously even if the two foreigners remained at variance with each other. Wijayapala's rebellion gave him an additional reason for keeping on good terms with the Dutch; so when Marten Vinck returned to Galle in April 1641, he was accompanied by four Sinhalese ambassadors who proceeded thence to Batavia, where they arrived on 24th August.

Raja Sinha did not send his envoys empty-handed. He had sent some 10,000 pounds of wax and about half that quantity of pepper towards the payment of his debt to the Company, while his personal gifts for Van Diemen, his wife and councillors included six elephants and various gold and jewelled ornaments.⁴

The ambassadors had their first audience on the 26th August

when they handed over Raja Sinha's letter to Van Diemen, who read them with rather mixed feelings. In these missives Raja Sinha reiterated his affection for the Dutch, his desire to co-operate wholeheartedly with them against the Portuguese, and his intention of liquidating his debt in due time. But he likewise made it plain that he did not accept their statement of his debt, and that he had been justified in calling the Dutch 'faithless' and 'covenant-breakers'.

'I have room to presume such, for it is not written in the articles of the treaty, that when any fortress was captured it should be kept as a security untill I should have paid the expenses; nor that I should immediately pay the same, nor do you desire the payment in cash, but only in merchandise . . . And if you desired the repayment in cash whenever any fortress is conquered, or if we had agreed in the articles of the treaty to make repayment in cash then I would admit the reasonableness of your demand. But since neither the one nor the other has been agreed on, I may well term, those who do the contrary, 'faithless', and 'covenant breakers', since they have done that which has not been agreed in the treaty'.

The King added that despite all this he would abide by the concession which he had made to Coster concerning the captured forts.⁵

Van Diemen and his councillors were annoyed at Raja Sinha's candid criticisms of their policy, but they decided to send him further assistance against the Portuguese since their own interests demanded it. Not only must Galle be relieved from this stringent blockade by land, but also they could not hope to draw large profits from the cinnamon districts so long as these were liable to be periodically overrun by the Portuguese forces based on Colombo⁶. The Portuguese had to be driven out from Colombo as well as from Negombo. Most important of all, they had recently received news of the truce negotiations between Portugal and the United Provinces, and this made Van Diemen and his advisors anxious to secure as much as possible of the cinnamon lands before orders for the cessation of hostilities could be received from Europe.⁷

On the 19th October 1641, Commander Dominicus Bouwens sailed for Ceylon with six ships and 455 men. At the same time, orders were sent to the Commander of the fleet blockading Goa,

to detach part of his fleet early in 1642 to join that of Bouwens off Ceylon. The combined force was then to attempt the capture of Colombo, if this would seem an easy task without the co-operation of Raja Sinha. If Colombo seemed too tough a nut to crack, then the expedition should endeavour to recapture Negombo.⁸

Through Raja Sinha's ambassadors who left for Ceylon with Bouwens, Van Diemen dispatched to the King a letter dated 18th October 1641.⁹ Thinking, perhaps, that the strong tone which the King had adopted in his letter was partly a result of his contempt for the trading activities of the Dutch, Van Diemen assured the King that the Dutch should in no way be considered as merchants. He himself adopted a strong tone towards the King, particularly when accusing him of the murder of Coster.

This tone was no doubt partly evoked by that adopted by Raja Sinha himself in his letters; partly, however, it seems to have been the result of Van Diemen's conviction that at last the favourable time had approached for assuming territorial control in Ceylon, in open defiance of the King. The idea of the contemplated breach with Raja Sinha is clearly indicated thus, in the letter sent to Thijssen on the 18th October.¹⁰

'On account of the great likelihood of a peace with Portugal, it would not be a strange thing if, after this, everything remained in a *status quo*, and if we break off with Raja, each of us would remain in possession of the territory under his jurisdiction as his own. Then, the cinnamon in the territory of Galle, being lawfully appertaining to us . . .'

Pursuing this idea of a contemplated breach with the King, Thijssen was given the permission (which he had previously asked) to enlist as many Sinhalese as possible in the Dutch service, even if he had to engage some of them on a regular pay.

By the time these advices and the fleet of Bouwens arrived in Ceylon, many important events had taken place there.

Realising that the defences of Galle were too strong for an assault and that a successful siege was also out of the question since relief by sea was available at the will of the Dutch, Don Philippe Mascarenhas attempted to corrupt the garrison of the fort and thereby obtain its surrender. He offered lavish rewards to those who deserted and fabulous sums to those who would hand over the fort to him. To President Jan Thijssen himself he offered a fortune and

the hand of a Portuguese woman, towards whom he thought the Dutchman had a fancy. In this work of corrupting the garrison Don Philipe was ably supported by Miguel de Santaman (as Walraven de St. Amant was now known). But Thijssen was not to be bought, nor was the vast majority of the garrison. Nevertheless, desertions were not so rare as to cause no anxiety to Thijssen and his officers.¹¹

Much more serious in its effects was the way in which the Portuguese kept Galle virtually hemmed-on on the land-side. Occasionally, the situation was improved when some of the Portuguese forces were withdrawn into the interior either to obtain supplies or to meet a diversion or a serious attack from the Kandyan forces. On such occasions, parties of Dutch, guided by the 150 or 200 King's troops who were in Galle, ventured out of the fort in order to obtain supplies. Sometimes the King succeeded in sending supplies into Galle.¹² But these were by no means sufficient and could not be depended upon, because the Portuguese usually kept a thorough watch around the place. It is true that Galle was relieved by sea from Pulicat and Batavia not only with men and munitions, but also with rice and other food-provisions. But this relief was inadequate and could be obtained only at certain periods when Galle was navigable from these two places.

As a result of this situation, it became sometimes imperative for the Dutch to send out foraging expeditions somewhat into the interior as the Portuguese had laid waste all the land in the immediate vicinity of the fort. On one of these expeditions the Dutch suffered a severe defeat. On the 9th August a party of some ninety men was sent out under Captain Walraven de Riviere, who had been recently sent from Batavia. At Wakwella, a few miles outside Galle, the party was attacked by a Portuguese force. The Dutch officers were not properly supported by the ordinary soldiers, and Captain Riviere and most of the officers were among the thirty dead on the Dutch side.¹³

Death by battle was not the only cause of mortality in Galle. Very many died of the dropsy, *beri beri* and other diseases, as many as thirty dying through illness within a period of three months; and at times of the garrison of less than 400 men, about eighty were on the sick list. To strengthen the weakened garrison, the King offered a further 500 men in addition to the Kandyans already in the fort. But Thijssen was afraid to trust so many Sinhalese in the fort and accordingly declined the offer.¹⁴

While his allies were undergoing great hardships at Galle, Raja Sinha himself was having a very difficult time with a war against the Portuguese on the one hand and against Wijayapala on the other. On the 18th April he had left for Uva with an army against Wijayapala, but had to retire with loss. With this success, Wijayapala extended his power northwards of Uva. Up to near Trincomalee, and in the north-east, up to Sammanture, Raja Sinha had sent word to Laurens de Maerschalk, the Dutch Chief at Batticaloa requesting a Dutch force to assist him. Although Maerschalk did not comply with this request, he later on sent fifty men to help the King's governor of Sammanture against Wijayapala. But by the time these fifty men arrived near Sammanture by sea, they found no sign of the King's governor, as the province had apparently submitted to Prince Wijayapala.

Some time after these early reverses, Raja Sinha sent a large force to attack Wijayapala's dissawe of Wellassa. This force drove the dissawe in flight, killing many of his men. Thereupon, Wijayapala in turn began to ask for assistance from Maerschalk promising great benefits and honours to the Dutchman. But Maerschalk replied by declaring his recognition of and loyalty to Raja Sinha as being the lawful King. Moreover, he sent to Kandy by an express messenger all the communications received from Wijayapala. The King was so pleased at this action that he immediately sent the Dutchman a golden chain as a present.

Pressing home the victory obtained in Wellassa, Raja Sinha's forces moved on the province of Bintenna. There, on the 1st August, the King's forces gained a decisive victory over the men of Uva. Most of Wijayapala's chief officers were amongst the 600 men who were captured at this battle. Uva quickly submitted to Raja Sinha and Wijayapala became a fugitive.¹⁵

For some time there was a talk of a possible reconciliation between the two brothers. But Wijayapala ultimately chose another path. In October, he passed over to the Portuguese with a considerable retinue of attendants and lascarins. This decision was a natural one, for he had had increasingly strong pro-Portuguese sympathies which had brought about most of the differences of opinion with his brother.¹⁶ He was, however, soon disillusioned in his belief that he would have happier dealings with the Portuguese than he had with his brother. They were not prepared to give him the assistance which he asked. They feared a possible reconciliation

between the brothers.¹⁷ Perhaps they had other reasons also for their decision not to assist him. However that may be, they soon kept him as a virtual prisoner in Colombo. His consequent attempts at communicating with his brother and the Dutch only led to harsher treatment at the Portuguese hands.¹⁸ Finally, early in 1643, he was removed to Goa, where he remained till his death in 1654.

Immediately after the crushing defeat which his forces had inflicted on Wijayapala (in August), Raja Sinha took the offensive against the Portuguese. These latter were forced to abandon Ruwanwella, which they appear to have held perhaps for more than a year previously.

In the south, the King's forces appeared at Hakmana, and the Portuguese in the vicinity of Galle were for the most part withdrawn to meet this threat.¹⁹ But nothing decisive seems to have been achieved on either side; if anything, the Portuguese seem to have checked the further progress of the King's men, and Galle continued to be beleaguered by land.

This was roughly the situation in Ceylon, when on the 16th December, Bouwens, appeared at Galle with his fleet. It was then decided by Thijssen and Bouwens that the fleet should blockade Colombo and Negombo till the arrival of the Dutch fleet from Goa. Accordingly throughout the whole of January, and early part of February 1642 the fleet continued to cruise before Colombo and Negombo.²⁰

On the 10th February, Commander Cornelis Leendertsz Blaeuw arrived with four ships from Goa. After some discussion on points of precedence, the President Jan Thijssen was accorded the command over the combined fleet, which now comprised twelve ships and about 1100 men. This force was considered much too weak for an attack on Colombo. Accordingly, Thijssen and his Council decided that they should, for the moment, proceed to Alutgama to meet the King's dissawe, who was there with a considerable force.

On arrival at Alutgama, Thijssen was earnestly requested by the dissawe to land his forces and make an attack on the Portuguese in combination with the King's men.²¹ This did not suit Thijssen's plans. He had already decided that if the Portuguese had followed his movements, and come near Alutgama, he would attempt to sail to Negombo, unobserved by the enemy by keeping the fleet out of sight from the land. He would then be in a position to capture Negombo before its garrison received any relief. As he had expected,

the Portuguese had indeed followed his movements and approached Alutgama. Therefore he decided to put his plans into effect. To the dissawe Thijssen explained that his plans were to move far out to sea and then to make a landing at Panadura, a few miles to the south of Colombo, as soon as the King's forces drew near to the city.

Having pleased the unsuspecting dissawe with this story, Thijssen put out to sea with his fleet. But adverse winds forced the fleet to hug close to the coast, and thereby the Portuguese were able to follow the movements of the Dutch. Thus, at about the same time that the Dutch arrived before Negombo, that fort obtained all necessary reinforcements. In these circumstances, the Dutch had to abandon the idea of an attack on Negombo.

A few days later, on the 27th February, Thijssen received a letter from Raja Sinha. In this letter the King explained that his dissawes were near Kalutara with 1500 men. He, therefore, wished the Dutch to make a landing and prepare to attack Colombo along with his men. If this was done, he himself would hurry to their support within seven or eight days.

But the Dutch decided to abide by a resolution taken five days earlier, of not undertaking any land operations even against Negambo, mainly on account of the weakness of their forces. The additional strength which they would now obtain from the support of the King's forces, was considered a very doubtful quantity by them. They argued that the King might perhaps not turn up at all or that even if he did so he might not keep his ground. There were, however, two very important reasons (not mentioned in the Council's resolutions) which must certainly have influenced Thijssen and his Council in their decision not to agree to the King's request. Firstly, in their letter of 18 October 1641,²² the Batavian authorities had instructed Thijssen not to combine his forces with the King's. If the King's forces were at all engaged in an attack on Colombo, then the Dutch should attack the fort by sea, leaving the land-attack to the Kandyans. Secondly, the authorities had strongly impressed on him the desirability of capturing Colombo before the arrival of the King's forces, the implication undoubtedly being that in such a case the Dutch could garrison Colombo, if they thought it necessary, without any let or hindrance from the King's troops. These instructions, taken into consideration with the weakness of the available Dutch forces, are sufficient to explain why Thijssen did

not agree to the King's request for a combined attack on Colombo.

When they realised that the Dutch were not prepared to attack Colombo, the King's envoys to Batavia who were still aboard the fleet, requested that Dutch forces should be set on land in order to combine with the royal forces and attack the Portuguese in the field. This too Thijssen politely refused to do. A few days later, on the 3rd March, the envoys requested that the fleet at least should cruise for some time longer before Colombo, so that the Chaleas, who were harvesting the cinnamon might be unmolested by the Portuguese, who would not leave Colombo so long as the Dutch fleet was before it. This request was readily granted, and Commander Bouwens was instructed to cruise before Colombo until the 20th of the month with all the vessels except three, which were to sail to Galle with President Thijssen and Commander Blaeuw.²³

Accordingly, having cruised before Colombo till the appointed date, Bouwens arrived with his fleet on the 23rd March at Galle. A few days later, both the Commanders, Blaeuw and Bouwens, left for Coromandel and Batavia with their fleets. On the way they touched at Batticaloa in order to hand over this fortress to the King. The Dutch believed that it was too weak to withstand a Portuguese attack; therefore, they felt that they should hand it over to the King, although he had not yet delivered the full 1000 bahars of cinnamon, promised for it.²⁴ As soon as the fort was handed over, the King's men began to dismantle it on their master's order. Before they left Batticaloa, Blaeuw and Bouwens loaded their ships with considerable quantities of merchandise, which had been delivered on behalf of the King. They also took with them two of Raja Sinha's envoys, who were being sent to Batavia to ask for more substantial assistance than had been given recently.

The Batavian authorities were bitterly disappointed when they heard that neither Negombo nor Colombo had been captured by the fleets which they had sent for the purpose. Before the anticipated truce should come into operation, they had hoped to secure both these fortresses or at least one of them; they hoped thereby to control all, or at least a major share of the Ceylon cinnamon, which was, in their expressive phrase, „the bride round whom we dance in that quarter”.²⁵

Disappointed though they were in their hopes, they must have realised that neither Colombo nor Negombo had been captured, only because the Dutch forces had been utterly inadequate for the

purpose. When, however, they reported matters to the Directors, they laid most of the blame for the failure to capture either of these places, at Raja Sinha's door. Ignoring the facts, they stated that during the expedition, the Dutch had heard nothing from the King, who had remained at Kandy without coming to their assistance, apparently - as they said - in order to be on the side of the strongest party, the Portuguese.²⁶ This, of course, was a total distortion of the facts. But this is not surprising when it is noted that even President Jan Thijssen made more or less the same allegation²⁷ against the King, when he wrote to Batavia on the 16th March (1642). However, the Batavian authorities need not have been misled by this allegation, because, curiously enough, this same letter of Thijssen's contained sufficient evidence to contradict the allegation.

Moreover, irrespective of the fact that the charge made against the King was false, it was also inconsistent with the previous instructions and statements made by the Batavian authorities. For instance, in their letter of 12 December 1641,²⁸ they had written to the Directors that they did not expect any assistance from the King in the operations which were being undertaken, at the time, and that they had clearly forbidden their commanders to combine with the King's forces, if the latter made an appearance. It is apparent from all this, that the King was merely made the scape-goat²⁹ for the almost futile³⁰ operations in Ceylon.

On the 30th November 1640³¹, Van Diemen and his councillors had written to the Directors of the Company, assuring them that the Portuguese could be totally expelled from the East, if only the Company would send a force of 4000 men immediately. Moreover, all European nations could be forced to abandon the East, immediately after the expulsion of the Portuguese. The only requisites which they considered necessary for the attainment of these projects, were the force of 4000 men asked for, and, of course, God's blessings.

Fired as they were, with such a fervent belief in their ability to obtain perfect dominion over the Orient in the very near future, they reacted bitterly to the news of the impending truce. They gave vent to their bitterness by saying that they heartily wished that Portugal had never separated itself from Spain.³²

However it was seldom, if ever, a characteristic of Van Diemen and his Council, to accept unpleasant situations as being inevitable or irreparable. With characteristic skill and resourcefulness they

immediately set about - thinking of ways and means by which they could continue their successful and profitable warfare against the Portuguese, unhindered by a truce. Some of the ways and means by which they hoped to achieve their object, are expressed clearly in the following extract from their letter of 12th December 1641,³³ to the Directors:

‘If it comes to a peace, we shall maintain the same religiously. But we are bound by contract to the King of Ceylon to assist him to drive the Portuguese from his land; that must be accomplished or else he will remain unable to pay the expenses incurred by the Company in his service. Likewise, if the Bijapurese king has the right and the opportunity of driving his enemy from Goa, what shall forbid us to offer the helping hand for a work so useful for our position and to accommodate him in his lawful right with Netherlands soldiers? and so forth in other, further opportunities?’

While the Dutch approached the idea of a truce in this manner, the Portuguese considered the prospect of one to be a god-send. The loss of Batticaloa in 1638, and of Trincomalee in 1639, of Negombo and Galle in 1640, and of Malacca in 1641, had convinced the Portuguese that if the war continued much longer, they would have nothing left out of their *estado da India*. Therefore, they grasped eagerly at the idea, the more so since they realised that King João (IV) could spare little or nothing out of his meagre forces, which were needed for the defence of the mother country against Spain.³⁴

Thus it was that immediately he received news of the impending truce between Portugal and the United Provinces, the Viceroy sent two envoys to negotiate with Van Diemen over the conclusion of a truce. These two envoys, Diogo Mendes de Brito and Fr. Gonçalo Veloso, arrived at Batavia in January 1642, but they were unable to achieve anything. Van Diemen was able to point out that according to the treaty³⁵ (a copy of which had reached Batavia after their arrival) a truce was to take effect in the East only after the news of its ratification by João IV should have been sent there officially from the Hague.

On the 6th August, since no news of the ratification had yet arrived, the Batavian authorities despatched seven ships under Jan Dircksz Galen to blockade Goa (for the seventh year in succes-

sion). On the 2nd October, however, the *Salamander* arrived at Batavia with the official news of the ratification and with an order from the States-General for an immediate notification and observance of the truce. Accordingly, on the 7th of the month the truce was proclaimed at Batavia. On the 21st, the Councillor Extraordinary, Pieter Boreel³⁶ was sent to proclaim an agreement with the Viceroy over the delimitation of boundaries in Ceylon.

This question of the delimitation of boundaries was based upon Article 12 of the treaty of truce. By this article it was stipulated that which it occupied at the time of the proclamation of the truce, and that the lands, situated between fortresses belonging to the two parties, should be divided between them according to the dependance of those lands on the respective fortresses. Now, the significant point is that Article 12 was meant to apply only to the West Indies;³⁷ but Van Diemen and his councillors, conscious of their own military strength, had determined to make the Portuguese see otherwise.

Thus, fictiously basing their demands on the strength of this article, they attempted to obtain all the cinnamon lands around Galle which they had been thinking of possessing ever since the capture of that fort. The Directors too considered the possession of the cinnamon districts as a *sine qua non*, and on the 5th September 1641,³⁸ they had clearly instructed Van Diemen and his Council to conduct matters in such a way that on the proclamation of the truce in the East, the Company would be assured of the cinnamon around its forts in the island; as it was much too expensive and prejudicial to the Company to possess fortresses, which gave no economic advantages. This desirable aim was to be promoted according to the circumstances of the time. They regretted that they could not give more detailed advice until they had heard the opinion of the Batavian authorities themselves, on this subject. Thus Van Diemen and his Councillors were only attempting to carry out the orders of their superiors and their own long-contemplated designs, when they instructed³⁹ Pieter Boreel to claim the Dissawanies of Matara and Sabaragamuwa by virtue of the 12th Article.

Quite apart from the fact that this article was not valid for the East, the Dutch could not claim with justice that the Dissawanies of Matara and Sabaragamuwa fell within the jurisdiction of Galle. The Dissawani of Matara had always been administered by the dissawe, who had his head-quarters at the town of Matara, some

thirty miles away from Galle; the Dissawani of Sabaragamuwa was likewise administered by its own dissawe from the town of Sabaragamuwa, situated some seventy miles from Galle.⁶⁰ Even in a military sense, the Dutch could not rightly claim that they commanded the Dissawanies from Galle.⁴¹ Except for an occasional foraging party sent from Galle, the Dutch had not even frequented the Matara Dissawani, let alone been in command of it. As for the Dissawani of Sabaragamuwa, it is certain that no Dutchman had even seen a part of it, except perhaps a stray envoy or messenger on his way to Raja Sinha's court. From first to last, these two Dissawanies had been partly or wholly in the hands of the King or of the Portuguese.

The Dutch would, however, have some substance in their claims on the Dissawanies if they could claim them in the name of the King and not on any fictitious jurisdiction of Galle. At least for about eight months in 1640, the King had been in possession of the Matara Dissawani and since that year, he seems to have continued in occupation of a good deal of Sabaragamuwa.⁴² These facts were not overlooked by the Dutch, and indeed, in addition to their other arguments, in support of their claims, they also used the King's name. Thus, Boreel was also instructed to maintain that these Dissawanies belonged to Raja Sinha; but that the King had mortgaged them to the Company as security for the debt which he owed it.⁴³

The authorities at Batavia knew fully well that these arguments were rather weak and that their validity would certainly be denied by the Portuguese. But this did not perturb them. They instructed Boreel to tell the Portuguese that if their claims were not granted, the war would be continued not only in Ceylon, but also in the rest of the East. This ultimatum, they were convinced, would speedily make the enemy grant all the Dutch claims. As they told Boreel: 'And as the situation of the Portuguese in Europe as also here (in Asia) is not suited for a continuation of hostilities with us, we believe that they will concede rather more than they themselves imagine. You must take note of that.'

The policy, which Boreel was instructed to follow towards Raja Sinha, was to depend on the success or failure of the negotiations with the Portuguese. If the Portuguese conceded the Dutch claims, then a bold and confident policy was to be followed against him.

If necessary, Boreel was to conclude an alliance with the Portuguese against Raja Sinha.⁴⁵ In any case, he was to be kept out of the Dissawanies of Matara and Sabaragamuwa, which were to become in effect Dutch territory. Boreel was told that 'many pretexts and well-founded reasons' could be brought forward to justify this action. The King was to be told that everything was being done in order to obtain payment of their debt as speedily as possible; and every item of income from these lands would be carefully noted, and the moment the debt was covered, all the lands would be handed over to the King. But, of course, an actual transfer of these lands to the King was never contemplated by the authorities, because, as they explained to Boreel, it would not be long before they would be at enmity with the King.⁴⁶

If, however, the Portuguese refused to grant the Dutch claims, then Boreel was to pay more attention to the King and attempts were to be made to conserve his friendship.

There was, however, one thing which it was desirable to attend to, before or during the time of the negotiations with the Portuguese; Raja Sinha must be persuaded to accede to the truce. There were at least two reasons, which made it desirable (if not essential) to see that the King entered the truce, along with the Dutch. The first was that it would be rather an inconvenient matter, if he continued the war with the Portuguese, and called upon the Dutch to assist him in accordance with the Treaty of 1638. To get over this difficulty, Van Diemen wrote⁴⁷ to Raja Sinha, declining to assist him unless he paid the debt, which was now brought to 473,589 *reals* or well over one million florins. 'But', as the authorities explained to their subordinates, 'we know that this is impossible for Raja to do.'⁴⁸ Boreel was instructed to use the same argument of Van Diemen's in order to decline any assistance. The second, and more important reason, which made the Dutch authorities wish to get the King to accede to the treaty, was their realization that it would be difficult to claim lands from the Portuguese in the King's name, if the King himself chose to continue the war, and did not enter the treaty. Therefore, in his letter to the King, Van Diemen used various arguments, to induce him to accede to the treaty. In particular, he pointed out that the Portuguese, being at peace with the Company, would use all their forces against him and thereby present a grave threat to his position. These, and other reasons, Boreel was also to use in order to persuade the King to accede to the truce.

With these comprehensive instructions, Boreel left for Ceylon on the 21st October 1642. Stopping at Malacca on the way in order to proclaim the truce there, he arrived at Batticaloa on the 28th of January 1643. Here he set ashore the two ambassadors, whom Raja Sinha had sent to Batavia the previous year to request a powerful force to attack the Portuguese. The ambassadors took with them Van Diemen's letter to the King. On the 1st February, Boreel arrived at Galle, which he found as closely beleaguered as ever by the Portuguese.

For three months, from January to March 1642, the Portuguese had left the garrison of Galle in comparative peace. This had been because they had withdrawn their forces around Galle for the defence of Colombo, which appeared threatened by the fleets of Blaeuw and Bouwens. But immediately these fleets gave up the blockade of Colombo, the Portuguese came once more in force into the lands around the fortress. They removed to Colombo all the inhabitants living around Galle whom they were able to capture, and devastated the lands in such a way that they themselves had to get most of their provisions from Colombo.

During this land-blockade, the Dutch ventured occasionally to send a foraging-party with the greatest circumspection. Although the fleets of Blaeuw and Bouwens had brought the strength of the garrison up to 450 with men transferred from the ships, yet the memory of the disaster at Wakwella seems to have made Thijssen and his men rather fearful of encountering the Portuguese.

The King had sent large quantities of paddy and other provisions, as also had Batavia and Pulicat. But since these supplies were not steady, the garrison had at times to undergo great privations, sometimes having to forego the meat rations. On such occasions, however, a double ration of arrack was distributed as a not unwelcome substitute.⁴⁹

It was, in these circumstances, a great relief to the garrison when Pieter Boreel arrived; particularly since he brought from Batavia a force of 200 soldiers to strengthen the garrison still further. But, for the moment, this added strength was not of great significance because Boreel proclaimed a provisional truce, while negotiations with the Portuguese were conducted.

On the 3rd February, he sent a copy⁵⁶ of the ratification of the truce in Europe to the Portuguese Captain-Major, Antonio da Mota Galvão, and requested him to evacuate the Dissawanies of

Matara and Sabaragamuwa since these fell within the jurisdiction of Galle. The Captain-Major refused the request declaring that the Dissawanies belonged to the King of Portugal, both by virtue of the donation of Dharmapala, and actual possession up to the present.⁵¹

As a result of this refusal, Marten Vinck was sent on the 5th to Don Philippe Mascarenhas in Colombo, in order to ask for the withdrawal of the Portuguese forces from the dissawanies. But Vinck met with the same refusal from Mascarenhas that Boreel had received from da Mota.

Mascarenhas pointed out that no land beyond the range of the guns in the fort was appertaining to Galle. Vinck protested that it was customary in Europe for a fort to have jurisdiction over all the adjacent territory, and that according to this custom, Galle possessed jurisdiction over the adjacent Dissawanies. The Captain-General denied the validity of this argument, pointing out the complete control, which the Portuguese maintained over these Dissawanies, and reaffirming the legal rights of the Portuguese King to those territories. As for Galle itself, he offered to buy it, if a suitable price could be agreed upon. Vinck replied that the Dutch had never made such a sale before this and never would, and that since their lawful claims were not granted, it was not possible to proclaim the truce in Ceylon. This threat, however, made little impression on Masacrenhas, who declared that he was not prepared to yield any territory, and that in any case he had no authority to do so, even if he had wished it. Before Vinck left him, however, Mascarenhas expressed a hope which foreshadows a later development, and indicates quite clearly that the Dutch attitude to Raja Sinha was no secret. He expressed the hope that matters might so turn out that the Dutch and the Portuguese could jointly make war on Raja Sinha. Since Vinck had carefully left out⁵² from the 'Procuration' of Boreel which he showed the Captain-General, the section which authorised Boreel to conclude an alliance against Raja Sinha, and since the negotiations had proved fruitless, it was only to be expected that Vinck should fail to take up the suggestion made by Mascarenhas.

On the return of Vinck, Boreel decided to leave for Goa as soon as possible to see whether he could persuade the Viceroy to grant the Company's claims. Before he left Ceylon, Boreel and Mascarenhas had an exchange of protests and counter-protests, each defending his actions and blaming the other for all the evil consequences

that might result from the dispute regarding the Dissawanies. Nevertheless, until Boreel or the Viceroy should send further orders from Goa, it was agreed that a provisional truce should be observed.

The Dutch Commissioner left Galle on the 26th February. On the 3rd March, Colomba Naide and Curipuli Naide, two envoys from the King, arrived at Galle with letters and presents for the Dutch Commissioners.⁵⁸ As they insisted on handing these personally to Boreel, Thijssen decided to send the envoys per the *Romerswael* to catch up with Boreel; which they did on the 5th March. They handed over two letters and some gifts from the King to Boreel.

One of these letters, dated 21st February, dealt almost exclusively with Van Diemen's letter of the 20th October 1642. He expressed his intense displeasure at the news of the contemplated peace with the enemy, and recalled the fact that any peace made with the Portuguese in former times had never been firm or certain. However, if the lands which he now possessed were assured to him at the truce, he would also enter it. As for the proposition of the Governor-General that the tolls of Batticaloa and other places should be granted to the Dutch as part payment of the debt, he wished to point out that the tolls did not constitute merchandise but cash. According to the treaty with Westerwolt, payment of the debt had to be made in cash, and Commander Coster had referred very often to this fact. Therefore, he would see that payment was made in merchandise.⁵⁴

In the other letter, dated 23rd February, the King expressed his profuse thanks for the naval escort, which had been given by Boreel to his ambassadors, who were bringing as his brides two princesses from the Carnatic. In gratitude for this service, he promised not only to make a handsome present to Boreel, but also to fix price of the cinnamon at a figure, which would make the Company satisfied.

On the 8th March Boreel sent back the two envoys, and proceeded on his way to Goa, where he arrived on the 1st April. Although he was received and entertained right royally, he soon found that the Viceroy was not prepared to cede any of the lands, which the Portuguese had been occupying for so long and which the Dutch had never occupied.

As Marcarenhas had already done at Colombo, and for the same reasons, the Viceroy's deputies, who carried on the negotiations with Boreel, maintained that the Dutch in Galle could not lawfully claim

any jurisdiction beyond the territory which was within range of the cannon of the fortress.⁵⁵ In addition, they pointed out (though in vain) that the 12th Article did not apply to the East but only to the West Indies. They offered to buy Galle for a reasonable price; needless to say, the offer was refused. Boreel's claim on the Dissawanies by virtue of the mortgage, which he said the King had made, was met by the deputies by denying that Raja Sinha had any authority to mortgage those Dissawanies since he had no rights over them. They furthermore alleged that Raja Sinha could not be entered into the treaty of truce since he was an upstart and a heathen ruler, and the 3rd Article of the treaty by virtue of which Asian rulers allied to either side could be included in the truce, applied only to such rulers as were not heathen. It is easy to see why the Portuguese distorted the meaning of the 3rd Article and refused to recognise Raja Sinha as a lawful ruler; there was no better way of meeting the Dutch argument that the King had mortgaged the Dissawanies to them, and that, therefore, these were appertaining to them.

In a last effort to secure at least half of the Dissawanies, Boreel made, on his own authority - at least, it was not in conformity with his written instructions - the following proposal: Until a decision should arrive on this subject from the Sovereign authorities in Europe, the Dissawanies were to be divided equally between the two parties; the total of the income from both parts of the Dissawanies would be divided equally between the two parties; but careful and separate notes would be made of the incomes derived from each korale or district, so that when the decision arrived from Europe, each party could restore to the other any incomes which it had already enjoyed from districts assigned to the other party by the sovereigns.

The deputies of the Viceroy replied that they were prepared to grant the substance of this proposal but not its form. They were prepared to keep in deposit the incomes from these Dissawanies until a decision should arrive from the sovereigns in Europe. Then, if any of these lands were assigned to the Dutch, the Portuguese would hand over, from the deposited incomes, what appertained to the Dutch. Till a decision should arrive, however, the Portuguese must remain in occupation of the Dissawanies in the same manner in which they were occupying them at the present moment.⁵⁶

This counter-proposal, Boreel was not prepared to accept.

There then followed an exchange of protests and counter-protests between the two parties. Finally, Pieter Boreel left the bar of Goa on the 26th April, after having proclaimed the resumption of the war not only in Ceylon but also over the whole of the East.

Thus, by refusing the claims of the enemy, the Portuguese were once more embarked upon a war, from which they could expect nothing but loss. But this refusal was not merely, or even principally, the result of a new confidence inspired by their recent successes in Ceylon, as Professor Geyl has implied,⁵⁷ but rather, the result of their conviction that the Dutch were making unjust demands, taking advantage of their own strength and the weakness of the Portuguese. The Count de Aveiras expressed the feeling of his whole council when he proposed to it that:

‘it would not be creditable to yield . . . what they so unjustly demanded . . . , even if by so doing we should have to suffer, as in effect we shall have to suffer, what we have experienced up to the present.’⁵⁸

After leaving Goa, Boreel made straight for Ceylon. He himself, however, did not touch at Galle, but proceeded on to Batticaloa, sending Marten Vinck with letters of instructions for Thijssen. In these letters, (received at Galle on the 25th May) Boreel informed Thijssen that the war had been resumed, and instructed him to signify this to the Portuguese, towards whom he was, thereafter to do all possible injury and loss.

On the 8th May, Boreel arrived at Batticaloa, expecting fulfillment of what the King had promised by the letter of 23rd February. But although the King fulfilled his promise of rewarding Boreel himself, he did not⁵⁹ fulfill his promise of rewarding the Company by lowering the price fixed on the cinnamon. He had apparently re-considered the matter and decided that any reduction of the price would not get him any further towards paying off the debt, because he knew that the Dutch were determined to keep him debt always. A reduction of the price would only mean a further concession on his part without any compensating advantages. Whatever the reason for this action, the fact was that he had broken his promise. And this fact was not altered by the extraordinarily large number of elephants - twenty - which he ordered to be handed over to Boreel⁶⁰ for the Company’s benefit.

1. Dr. P. E. Pieris (*Port. Era*, ii. 313) and those who follow him place this event in April 1641. But from Philippe Mascarenhas' letter to Raja of 21 Dec. 1640 (*Dagh-Reg.*, 1641, 237) it is obvious that by then Wijayapala was already well established in Uva.
2. Mascarenhas to Raja, 21 Dec. 1640 (*Dagh-Reg.* 1641, 237). 'I was born with a strong predilection for the Portuguese nation' confessed Wijayapala himself (Pieris, *Prince Vijaya*, 31) cf. also the description of this Prince by Ribeiro (130 ff.) who knew him personally.
3. Summary of intercepted Portuguese letters in G. G. & C., to Gardenijs, 3 April 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 p. 69; Mascarenhas to Raja, 21 Dec. 1640; in *Dagh-Reg.* 1641, 237; Vinck to G. G. & C., 25 June 1643, Kol. Arch. 1052 fos. 53-54. Dr. Pieris gives erroneous dates for Mota's embassy in *Some Docs.*, 84-85.
4. For details regarding this embassy see *Dagh-Reg.* 1641, 400-444; G. G. & C., to Dirs., 12 Dec. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1044 fo. 45 ff.
5. *Dagh-Reg.* 1641, 413.
6. G. G. & C., to Thijs., 13 April 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 pp. 97-103; same to same, 20 Sep. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 pp. 438-41. cf. also *Dagh-Reg.* 1641, 239, 336.
7. G. G. & C. to Dirs., 14 Sept. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1046 (no pagination) G. G. & C. to Thijs., 20 Sep. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 fo. 438ff. cf. also Van Geer, Appendix XI, p. 26.
8. Instructions for Bouwens, 18 Oct. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 pp. 469-72; G. G. & C. to Comdr. Quast, 18 Oct. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 pp. 496-501; G. G. & C. to Dirs., 12 Dec. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1044 fo. 45 ff.
9. Kol. Arch. 768, pp. 509-14.
10. Kol. Arch. 768, pp. 503-08.
11. Thijs. to Gardenijs, 14 Sep. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1046 fos. 96-99. Thijs. to Quast,... Nov. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1046, fos. 102-05. Queyroz, 865.
12. The King seems to have made all possible efforts to provision Galle, the loss of which would have meant the complete triumph of his arch-enemy. When the close watch kept by the enemy prevented his sending supplies by land, he began to send them by sea (See on this Thijs. to G. G. & C., 18 Nov. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1047 p. 694; etc.). But even this was hazardous because the Portuguese cruised in light vessels at several places between Batticaloa and Galle. (See R. G. Anthonisz, 'Resolutions and Sentences... of Galle, 1640-44', *JCRAS XVII*. 440, 449). The statements of the Dutch that the King did not wish to provision Galle or that what he sent was negligible, are proved to be false by other statements of their own (See eg. *Dagh-Reg.* 1641, 120; Thijs to Quast,... Nov. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1046, fos. 102-05; Thijs., to G. G. & C., 18 Nov. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1047 fo. 694: 'Resolutions of Galle', *JCRAS XVII*, 264, 265, 431, etc.) However, it appears that all the writers on the subject have believed that the King was unwilling to, or at least, not keen on provisioning Galle. (See eg. Van Geer, 136; Pieris, *Port. Era*, ii. 317; Codrington, *Short Hist.*, 120).
13. Estimates of the casualties vary widely, but the Dutch themselves termed this action a 'disaster'. (Thijs. to Gardenijs, 14 Sep. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1046, fos. 96-99; 'Resolutions of Galle' *JCRAS XVII*, 259-60, 272, 364-68; Queyroz,

- 863-64; Ribeiro, 121). Van Geer (70) is wrong in thinking that only the Dutch vanguard was concerned.
14. Thijs. to Gardenijs, 14 Sep. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1046 fos. 96-99; *Dagh-Reg. 1641*, 335.
 15. For the struggle between the two brothers, see: *Dagh-Reg. 1641*, 482-83; *Dagh-Reg. 1641-42*, 219-21. The account given in the *Dagh-Register* is particularly valuable, because it is derived from letters sent by Holsteijn, who was at Kandy during this period, and by Maerschalk, who was at Batticaloa. The accounts of Queyroz (781, 804, 862, 863) and Ribeiro (123-41) seem to be hazy and inaccurate for the period before Wijayapala joined the Portuguese, cf. also Pieris, *Prince Vijaya*, particularly documents 12 and 19. Van Geer has completely overlooked the struggle between the brothers.
 16. *Dagh-Reg. 1641-42*, 221; Ribeiro, 123ff.
 17. Curiously enough Raja Sinha retained a lasting affection for Wijayapala despite the break between them. The Dutch, who knew this, attempted, later on, to make the King more embittered against the Portuguese by telling him that Wijayapala was being increasingly ill-treated at Goa. See eg. Diary of Pieter Kieft, April 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 pp. 504-16.
 18. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 22 May 1642, Kol. Arch. 1047 fo. 678; *Dagh-Reg. 1641-42*, 254; undated letter of Wijayapala to the Dutch, Kol. Arch. 1052 fos. 47-48; Wijayapala to Vinck, 29 April 1643, Kol. Arch. 1056 (Bis) fo. 674.
 19. Thijs. to Gardenijs, 14 Sep. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1046 fos. 96-99. Even during the period when he had the war with Wijayapala on his hands, Raja Sinha did all he could to relieve the pressure of the Portuguese blockade of Galle. For instance, on the 28th of May, Thijssen had written to Gardenijs that the Portuguese had left the environs of Galle to deal with a force of 9000 Kandyans (G. G. & C., to Quast, 18 Oct. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 p. 498.).
 20. For the operations of the fleets of Blaeuw and Bouwens (under the supreme command of Thijssen) see: Thijs. to G. G. & C., March 1642, Kol. Arch. 1047 fos. 682-82; same to same, 16 March 1642, Kol. Arch. 1047 fos. 682-90; 90; G. G. & C., to Dirs., 12 Dec. 1642, Kol. Arch. 1047 fo. 12 ff. (Extract from last-mentioned in Van Geer, Appendix XIV pp. 29-30) 'Resolutions of Galle', *JCRAS XVII*. 283-319.
Ribeiro, 142.
 21. The co-operation and help given during this expedition by the Kandyans has been completely overlooked by Van Geer, who says (85-86) that Raja gave no assistance.
 22. Kol. Arch. 768 pp. 503-04, cf. also G. G. & C. to Quast, 18 Oct. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 p. 498.
 23. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 16 March 1642, Kol. Arch. 1047 fos. 628-90; 'Resolutions of Galle', *JCRAS XVII*. 311-12.
 24. G. G. & C. to Thijs., 13 April 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 p. 101. Note, incidentally, that the Dutch handed over Trincomalee and Batticaloa, mainly because they expected little profit from the territories around these forts. On 12 Dec. 1641 G. G. & C. wrote to the Dirs. (Kol. Arch. 1044 fo. 45 ff.): 'Wij weten wel dat Batacaloa ende Trinquenemale van cleene importantie voor de comp. sijn.'

25. G. G. & C. to Quast, 16 Nov. 1641, Kol. Arch. 768 p. 542.
26. G. G. & C., to Dirs. 12 Dec. 1642, Kol. Arch. 1047 fo. 12ff. Mac Leod (ii 132) has taken these statements at their full face value and says: 'Radja Singa draaide als de wind, naarmate de Portugueezen of de Nederlanders hem sterker toeschenen.'
27. See relevant extract given by Van Geer, 89.
28. Kol. Arch. 1044 fo. 45 ff. cf. extract in Van Geer, Appendix VIII p. 22.
29. Although Van Geer completely overlooked the fact that the King had sent forces to support the Dutch, he however, did not fail to see from other facts that the King was made the scape-goat for the failure of the expedition. He illustrated this quite clearly on pp. 88-90.
30. Not wholly futile because during the presence of the fleet before Colombo, the Portuguese withdrew most of their forces from outside Colombo. As a result, the pressure on Galle was relieved for about three months.
31. Kol. Arch. 1042 fo. 58 ff.
32. G. G. & C. to Dirs., 12 Dec. 1641, Kol. Arch. 1044 fo. 93ff.
33. Kol. Arch. 1044 fo. 93ff. It seems certain that if the Portuguese had been in the position of the Dutch, they would have acted similarly to the latter. See on this point, Queyroz, 866.
34. When the first news of a possible truce reached him D'Aveiras wrote to the King of Portugal (27 Sep. 1641, I.O.L. *Port Recs.* (Trans.) 14): 'I am compelled to declare to Your Majesty, prostrated at your royal feet, that, in any case, it behooves to make peace or effect a truce at once with the Dutch in these parts.'
35. Full text in: L. van Aitzema, *Historie of Verhael van Saken van Staet en Oorlogh*, (Hague 1660) v. 203-10. For the conclusion of the truce in Europe, etc., see: Edgar Prestage, *The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England and Holland from 1640 to 1668* (Watford 1925) 173 ff.
36. A Doctor of Laws, was taken into the service of the Company on 14 March 1641, as a Councillor Extraordinary. He was soon despatched to Batavia, from where he was sent to conduct negotiations for a truce with the Portuguese. From all circumstances it would appear that Boreel had been sent to Batavia with secret instructions from the Directors.
37. Heeres (*Corp. Diplomaticum*, i. 442. n.) corrects Van Geer (82, 92) on this point. Even more convincing proof than that which Heeres cites is to be found in Dirs. to G. G. & C., 11 April 1642, Kol. Arch. 454.
38. Kol. Arch. 454.
39. Instructions for Boreel, 20 Oct. 1642, Kol. Arch. 769 pp. 650-65. Van Geer (95 ns 1 and 2) refers to the 'Commissie' for Boreel as being also his 'Instructie'. This is incorrect. The instructions form a separate document of sixteen pages and contain much more valuable information than is in the 'Commissie', which runs to only three pages (pp. 647-649).
40. See Ribeiro, 42-43. Apart from anything else, the names 'Matara Dissawani' and 'Sabaragamuwa Dissawani' themselves suggest where the centres of these Dissawanies were.
41. The Dutch were quite conscious of this. For instance Thijssen wrote to Batavia on 22 May 1642 (Kol. Arch. 1047 fo. 677): 'want soo maer bij U.Ed. conde te wegen gebracht werden, dat eenige macht van volck tot 6 à 700

- man toe, conde herwaerts gesonden werden ende de selvige met de grootste partije uijt Gales guarnisoen geconjungeert naer Colombo, soude sich den viandt sonder omsien daatelijck in sijn eijgen grensen om die te behouden vervoegen, als wanneer al het land voornoemd sonder slach offte stoot onder ons gehoorsaemheijt te brengen waare, ende daerop dan de vrede volgende, soudē weinigh contestatij over t'deelen des lands met den Portugees behoeven te hebben.'
42. Boreel claimed that Raja Sinha had 5¹/₂ Korales or districts of Sabaragamuwa, while the Portuguese had only 1¹/₂. (Reply of Boreel to D'Aveiras, 9 April 1643, Kol. Arch. 1056 fo. 432).
 43. The fact that Raja Sinha had never even thought of mortgaging these lands did not worry the Dutch. They apparently expected that Raja Sinha would be satisfied if they told him that this story of the mortgage was necessary in order to obtain these lands for His Majesty from the Portuguese.
 44. This idea was again repeated in the instructions, thus: 'hare swacke constitutie ende onse macht geconsidereert, des oock te resoluter int pretendēren moeten wesen.'
 45. 'Procuratie op den E. Pieter Boreel', 20 Oct. 1642, Kol. Arch. 769 p. 651. Thus the idea of an armed alliance with the Portuguese against the King, appears much earlier than 1645, in which year such an alliance was actually concluded. Incidentally, neither the above instruction to Boreel, nor most of his other instructions on the policy to be followed towards Raja Sinha have been noticed hitherto.
 46. This idea was expressed even more clearly in the letter of 20 Oct. 1642 (Kol. Arch. 769 p. 678) which they sent to Thijssen: "'T is buijten bedencken bevoren ons achterstel hebben ingetrocken, off den Singless sal ons overvloedig stoffe geven, omme haer int Candise geberghte te confineren, ende van dien trouwlose race t'ontledigen, soo maer met den Portugees connen verdragen.'
 47. 20 Oct. 1642, Kol. Arch. 769 p. 678 ff.
 48. G. G. & C. to Thijs., 20 Oct. 1641, Kol. Arch. 769 p. 678.
 49. See (in particular) on the above points: Thijs. to G. G. & C., 22 May 1642, Kol. Arch. 1047 fos. 675-79; same to same 1 Sep. 1642, Kol. Arch. 1052 fos. 59-61; 'Resolutions of Galle', *JCRAS XVII*, 319-38, 374-84 *passim*.
 50. As early as 4 Oct. 1642, Don Philipe had sent to Thijssen a copy of the ratification of the truce, but on the ground that the ratification and formal assent of the States-General was lacking, Thijssen had refused to recognise it. 'Resolutions of Galle', *JCRAS XVII*. 388.
 51. The main sources utilised for what took place in Ceylon and Goa during the mission of Boreel are: Diary of Boreel, 21 Oct. 1642-26 April 1643, Kol. Arch. 1056 fos. 367-410; Boreel to G. G. & C., 29 April 1643, Kol. Arch. 1052 fos. 199-203; Letters, protests, and counter-protests during negotiations at Goa, Kol. Arch. 1056 fos. 411-42; Thijs. to G. G. & C., 17 March 1643, Kol. Arch. 1052 fos. 99-108; Same to same, 29 March 1643, Kol. Arch. 1052 fos. 56-58; *Dagh-Reg. 1643-44*, 203 ff. and 301 ff: 'Resolutions of Galle', *JCRAS XVII* 385-414.
Viceroy to King 1 May 1643, Bk. 48 fo. 151 (Bks. of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port. Recs.* (Trans) 14; Ribeiro, 143-44.
 52. Referring to the papers, which he showed Mascarenhas, Vinck says: 'de

- missive van de E. Heer, alsoock de copie van de notificatie en ratificatie tractaet ende prozuratie, uitgenomen de sake aengaende Radja-Sinha, overhandigde.' Diary of Vinck, contained in Diary of Boreel, Kol. Arch. 1056 fos. 367-410. Mascarenhas's suggestion regarding a joint-war and other details on the negotiations between Vinck and Mascarenhas are contained in this Diary of Vinck. cf. Van Geer, Appendix XX pp. 39-41.
53. Van Geer (100) is incorrect in saying that these envoys arrived before Boreel left Galle. He has also noted the contents of only one out of the two letters sent to Boreel. It is also very doubtful whether Raja Sinha referred to the Dissawanies of Matara and Sabaragamuwa - as Van Geer (100) believes) -, when he asked Boreel to see that 'de landen vanden rivier Caltura herwaerts aen mij blijven'. (cf. Diary of Boreel, Kol. Arch. 1056 fo. 398 ff for Raja's letters). How misleading the *Dagh-Reg.* can be at times, is shown by the fact that it reported the King as having requested the Dutch to obtain for him Jaffna, the Seven and Four Korales, etc. (*Dagh-Reg.* 1643-44, 212). In actual fact, in his letter of 23 Feb., Raja had referred to all these places; but only to say that from Jaffna southwards, he was in occupation of certain territories in the Four and the Seven Korales, etc.
 54. The Dutch were deftly quoted to their own disadvantage. It was this sort of thing, which had soon convinced Van Diemen and his councillors that they had to deal with a tough customer.
 55. The Viceroy's deputies pertinently pointed out that if the theory was accepted that by the mere possession of the fort of Galle alone, the Dissawanies of Matara and Sabaragamuwa could be justly claimed, then, on that same theory, it would be easy to conquer great kingdoms by capturing a part and demanding the whole. (*Dagh-Reg.* 1643-44, 301).
 56. *Dagh-Reg.* 1643-44, 216. Van Geer has over-looked this counter-proposal, which indicates that the Portuguese were not reluctant to effect a fair compromise. He therefore believed (104) that D'Aveiras was too obstinate in the matter.
 57. 'It must be said that the Dutch interpretation (of Article 12) seems the correct one, and that the Portuguese Viceroy's attitude was most unyielding. The successes of the last two years in Ceylon had inspired the Portuguese with a new confidence.' *Cambridge History of India*, v. 45. As already pointed out (p. 120 above) the Dutch interpretation of Article 12 was not the correct one.
 58. Viceroy to King (of Portugal) 1 May 1643, Bk .48 fo. 151 (Bks. of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port Recs.* (Trans.) 14.
 59. At least, so it appears from the available Dutch accounts, which say that the King's correspondence with Boreel during this period, is hardly worth mentioning. To conclude from this that the King did not lower the price of the cinnamon, is, perhaps, to give the Dutch too much benefit of the doubt, especially because of what has previously been seen of their manner of reporting. Incidentally, note once again how misleading the *Dagh-Reg.* can be. It refers to the wax and pepper, which the King gave to Boreel, as having been purchased by the Dutch. (*Dagh-Reg.* 1643-44, 223). Other accounts indicate clearly that this merchandise had been given free by the King towards meeting his debts. (See eg. G. G. & C. to Dirs. 22 Dec. 1643 fo. 25 ff.)
 60. Boreel, incidentally, did not reach Batavia, as he died at Pulicat on 3 July (1643).

THE DUTCH BECOME A TERRITORIAL POWER
THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRUCE

Van Diemen and his Council were surprised at the Portuguese rejection of their claims in Ceylon. As they explained to Thijssen, they could not understand why the Portuguese should contemplate a resumption of the war when their own situation was so desperate, both in Asia and in Europe. The only explanation they could suggest, was that the Portuguese imagined that the Dutch at Batavia had no authority to renew the war in the East without reference to their superiors in the Netherlands.¹ If the Portuguese really imagined this, they were soon disillusioned, for when the Governor-General and Council instructed Boreel to proclaim the resumption of the war throughout the East, they acted with the knowledge that what they did would be supported by the Directors of the Company.²

The Batavian authorities had decided not to limit the war to Ceylon because they realised that the Portuguese position was much weaker elsewhere. Ceylon could be reinforced comparatively easily from the Portuguese possessions on the neighbouring Malabar coast, and if the war was limited to that island the Portuguese could have concentrated all their available forces there. As it was, they had to defend all their scattered settlements from Macao to Mozambique, while Dutch command of the sea enabled the Hollanders not only to harry the outlying possessions but also to blockade Goa itself. The blockade of Goa not only made it difficult for the Portuguese adequately to reinforce Ceylon, but also prevented them from shipping spices to Europe and thus from competing with the Dutch in the home market. Thanks to the 13 ships and 4,500 men recently sent by the Directors to Batavia in expectation of a renewal of the war,³ the Dutch were able to send a fleet of 8 sail under Cornelisz Blocq to blockade Goa, and to dispatch the largest expedition which had yet been sent to Ceylon - 13 sail with 1700 men - under the command of Councillor Francois Caron.⁴

Caron's orders envisaged the capture of both Colombo and Negombo if possible, since their fall would seal the fate of the Portu-

guese in Ceylon, their other settlements being of little or no account. Even if the Portuguese unexpectedly showed a desire to negotiate, Caron was informed that the war could still be continued in Raja Sinha's name, since 'we are bound by solemn contract to the Ceylonese King to assist him against the Portuguese at his expense, until they shall have been driven from his lands'. Only if Raja Sinha did not wish to continue the war, but wished to enter the truce, Caron need negotiate with the Portuguese. If this last (and admittedly unlikely) contingency occurred, then Caron was instructed to pitch his demands so high, that the Portuguese would be quite unable to fulfill them even if they had been willing to do so; for, apart from the Dutch territorial claims round Galle, he was to insist on a cash indemnity of over a million florins and the surrender of Negombo as security until this sum was paid.⁵

As regards Raja Sinha, Caron was told that there was no need to conclude any agreement with him as long as the Dutch had sufficient forces in Ceylon, for then he would remain 'well within the limits of reasonableness'. Although the Sinhalese monarch would be sure to insist on the demolition of Negombo and Colombo (which, incidentally was within his treaty rights) Caron was told to pay no attention to him, but to garrison both places on their capture. Raja Sinha was merely to be told in general terms that this great expedition was being sent at his request, and that he should fulfill his obligations and pay his debt.⁶

While Caron's expedition was being mobilised at Batavia, Thijssen had been chafing at Galle under the temporary truce proclaimed by Boreel. Despite the truce, and the fact that Portuguese and Dutch paid frequent visits to each other's encampments, the Portuguese still prevented the Sinhalese from provisioning Galle by savagely punishing any they caught doing so. Thijssen knew that his own forces were superior in number to these of the Portuguese which comprised some 12 *estansias*⁷ or about 360 men, and he wrote to Batavia in March 1643, 'it is lamentable that there must be a truce, for now we know their situation better'.⁸

No sooner had Thijssen received Boreel's letter notifying him of the renewal of the war (6 May 1643) then he sent a column of 300 men, commanded by Captains Paulus Doncq and Jan van der Laen,⁹ to tell the Portuguese at Weligama to evacuate the territory around Galle. The Portuguese found themselves too weak

to fight the Dutch at Weligama, since they had detached part of their forces to repel incursions by Kandyan troops in the interiors. They therefore withdrew to Akuressa, where they were attacked by the Dutch on the 10th May; but the latter sustained a severe reverse with the loss of nearly 100 men in killed alone. The Portuguese were now masters of the country surrounding Galle again, while Dutch prestige sank to a low ebb in the eyes of the Sinhalese.¹⁰

The King's men had also not fared too well against the enemy. They had kept up an unwearied, though perhaps not a very bloody struggle for some time, until early in 1643 they suffered a loss when two of their commanders were ambushed and slain in the Matara Dissawani.¹¹ Nevertheless, the Kandyans continued to trouble the Portuguese in this Dissawani and in Sabaragamuwa. In June they took the offensive in the Four Korales; but had to retire when the Portuguese rushed all available forces there. The rest of the year appears to have passed with nothing of note happening in the struggle between the Kandyans and the Portuguese.¹²

Meanwhile, Francois Caron, who had left Batavia on the 30th September 1643 arrived in the Ceylon waters towards the middle of December. After a secret conference with Thijssen and Vinck at a rendez-vous near Walawe, he decided to make an attempt to surround and annihilate the Portuguese force which was at Akminana near Galle. It was felt that once these 540 men, the flower of the enemy's troops, were put out of the way, the capture of Colombo would not be a difficult task.¹³

Accordingly, on 20th December a force of 1400 men was set on land. Accompanied by the King's Dissawe (who was in Galle) and his lascarins, the Dutch forces marched near the Gin-Ganga.¹⁴ There they took up various positions commanding the escape-routes of the enemy, who was at Akmimana. Little attempt was made to close in on the enemy, as the latter was in an almost inaccessible position, surrounded by deep morasses; consequently the Portuguese were able to pass on, unobserved to Mapalagama on the upper reaches of the Gin-Ganga where they took up an even better position than at Akmimana.

Frustrated in their aim of wiping out the enemy force, Caron and his men returned to Galle on the 28th. There, it was decided to set sail for Colombo as soon as possible. On the 2nd January 1644 the fleet arrived near Panadura, and until the 6th of the

month, Thijssen and a few other officers reconnoitred the coast between Colombo and Negombo. Except near Panadura itself, they found no suitable place for landing the army, the artillery and other equipment. But as the terrain from Panadura to Colombo was considered too unsuitable for the transport of the heavy cannon, Caron decided to attack and capture Negombo first, and thence to march on Colombo.

The Portuguese realised in time that the Dutch intended attacking Negombo. Don Philipe, therefore, placed a force of 600 Portuguese and some Lascarijs at the disposal of his brother, Don Antonio Mascarenhas, who was placed in charge of the defense of Negombo.

Owing to the misplaced over-confidence of Don Antonio, the Dutch were allowed to execute undisturbed the difficult operation of disembarking some 1500 men by night, and when battle was joined in the morning (of the 9th January 1644) their superior numbers and discipline soon told. Within two hours the Portuguese had been completely defeated with the loss of about 300 dead including Don Antonio himself, and Negombo was again in Dutch hands.¹⁵

Immediately after the capture of Negombo, Caron set about repairing the damaged walls of the fort, and attending to such matters as burying the dead, mustering the troops and appointing new officers in place of the dead or badly wounded. When all these things had been attended to, he placed 100 men in garrison in Negombo and with a further 1000 men, marched on Colombo on the 20th January. The Dissawes of Matale and of the Seven Korales (whom Raja Sinha had sent immediately he heard of the arrival of the Dutch fleet) marched along with the Dutch, with 2000 of their own men.¹⁶

In the meantime, Don Philipe Mascarenhas, who had been on the way to relieve Negombo when he heard of the loss of that fort, returned to Colombo and took vigorous and resolute measures for the defence of that city. As a result, when the Dutch and Kandyan force approached Colombo, they were effectively stopped at Mutwal near the crossing of the Kelani-Ganga.

For six days, the combined armies continued near Mutwal. During that period, Caron attempted to dislodge the Portuguese from their positions by a heavy cannonading, but in vain. The Portuguese continued in their positions, fortifying themselves

more and more daily, and returning the fire of the Dutch. Finally, realising that there was no chance of successfully crossing the river, the combined Dutch and Kandyan armies returned to Negombo. It was further decided by Caron and his Council that there was no hope of successfully attacking Colombo even from the side of Panadura, because not only were the fortifications of Colombo strong, but the forces in the city were also stronger than expected. As against a thousand men, whom he calculated he could lead against the city, there were, in his opinion, about 1400 to 1500 Portuguese, 2000 Sinhalese and half-castes and about 400 Kaffirs for its defence.

Immediately after returning to Negombo he set about the task of constructing new fortifications according to the plan submitted by the Senior Merchant Pieter Vinckbooms, who had great talent as an engineer. The officers as well as the ordinary men worked hard and unceasingly at the task of building the new fortifications. They were helped in this work by the 150 slaves¹⁷, whom the King's Dissawes sent them; when the work was complete, Caron placed in Negombo 500 men in garrison, under the charge of Vinckbooms.

When the King had heard that the Dutch forces had turned back from Colombo, he tried his best to persuade the Dutch to march once more against Colombo. Caron replied to his letters by indicating the difficulties of attacking Colombo. But the Dutch Commander was not able to answer very effectively some of the further letters complaining that Negombo was being garrisoned against his wishes, that the Dutch took too long a time to drive out the Portuguese and that they were thereby increasing his debt. And, to use Caron's phraseology, the King wrote 'more such-like Sinhalese tittle-tattle'.¹⁸

On the 22nd February, a former Dissawe of Galle, named Udapalathe Mudaliyar, and two other envoys were sent by the King to make further complaints. The surprised Caron was asked by these envoys whether he knew that the Sinhalese Kings were descended from the sun. In any case, protested the envoys, a King and a General were not of the same status; therefore, it was presumptuous of the Governor General¹⁹ to have addressed himself as 'Your affectionate friend'. To this Caron replied as best as he could. But when the envoys complained further that the words 'Your' and 'Yours' had been used in that same letter instead of

'Your Imperial Majesty' etc., Caron was quick to put the blame on the Dutch translator or copyist.²⁰ The envoys finally complained that the murder of Coster was being persistently laid at the King's door. Caron replied that if the murder had been committed without the knowledge and wish of the King, he should have seen proper justice done. When they heard this reply, the envoys rose from their seats in anger and prepared to go away, one of them addressing to Caron these last words: 'Is it then so? your people are not to be moved away from your opinion? In that case, there is nothing more for us to say, and it will be better if we go away'. Caron was upset by this attitude. He feared that open hostilities with the King might result, and at the moment the Dutch were not prepared for it. Therefore, with soothing words he calmed the Kandyan envoys and sent them back in a pleasant mood.²¹

Caron, for his part, did not neglect to make the representations, which every Commander sent from Batavia had been instructed to make, and which Van Diemen had always made; namely, to represent to the King the 'huge expenses', which the Company had incurred 'on the King's service', and to request cinnamon and other merchandise in repayment of these services. The replies²² which Caron got on his repeated representations, were not what he wished for. However, in a final letter the King said he would be sending to Batticaloa some of the elephants for which Boreel had not waited, and in addition, as a personal gift to Caron, an elephant of great stature.

On the 5th March, leaving behind in Negombo Vinckbooms and the 500 men referred to above, Caron sailed with his fleet for Galle. On the way, he tarried before Colombo for a while, hoping to obtain in exchange for some of the Portuguese prisoners, the Dutch who had been captured at Akuressa. But he learnt that all of them had taken service under the Portuguese. Therefore, he sailed on to Galle, where he arrived on the 11th March. He raised the garrison of that fortress up to about 900 men, with soldiers taken from his fleet, and finally he left for Batavia on the 19th March 1644.

Caron's expedition marks a turning-point in the history of the Dutch in Ceylon, not because of the recapture of Negombo *per se*, but because with the strengthening of the garrison of Galle and the effective control thereafter acquired over some of the adjacent cinnamon districts, the Dutch became a territorial power in Ceylon.

We have seen earlier that Van Diemen and his Council had determined to get a grip on the cinnamon districts as soon as a truce was concluded with the Portuguese.²³ The policy to be then followed towards Raja Sinha was clearly explained to Thijssen in their letter of 20th October 1642 sent through Boreel. The King was to be told that the Dutch were assuming territorial control in order to liquidate his debt quickly by obtaining the incomes from the lands; as soon as sufficient income to meet the debt had been obtained, the lands would be immediately handed back to him. The King's officers, who would attempt to prevent them from taking possession of the territories, were to be repelled by force, under the pretext that these were 'robbers' and 'disturbers of the peace', who were acting without Raja Sinha's knowledge. In other words, war was to be carried on against the King's men in the King's own name.²⁴ This policy could not be carried out in 1643 because the truce negotiations of Boreel failed, and the lands around Galle remained under Portuguese control. With Caron's expedition and the substantial reinforcements which he left behind the situation was altered. The Dutch now felt strong enough to contend simultaneously with the Portuguese and with Raja Sinha, if the latter should risk an open breach in an effort to prevent them from becoming a territorial power at his expense.²⁵

However, the Dutch authorities fully realised that the co-operation of the local inhabitants was essential if they were to derive full benefit from their possession of these lands. Thijssen, for instance, had once declared that even the Portuguese after so many years' experience of the island, still could not obtain a single stick of cinnamon without the co-operation of the Sinhalese.²⁶ As early as September 1640, the government at Batavia had stressed the importance of treating the Sinhalese as considerately as possible, using 'affable persons to deal with them', and in particular Marten Vinck, who knew their language well. They even suggested that the Sinhalese might be converted to the 'true Christianity',²⁷ in order to attach them to the Dutch. In accordance with these instructions, Marten Vinck was used as an agent in dealing with the Sinhalese, who were, in fact well treated. Severe penalties were imposed on any Dutch soldier who mistreated any of the inhabitants. Moreover, early in 1642, Thijssen enlisted in the Dutch service some 200 lascarins and some coolies and Chaleas who had fled from the Portuguese to Galle.²⁸

Despite all these preparatory measures, Thijsen found to his chagrin that a contemplated expedition (in March 1644) to some of the lands around Galle had to be abandoned because he found that most of the lascarins and coolies had suddenly left Galle on the orders of Raja Sinha.²⁹ It appears, that immediately after the recapture of Negombo by the Dutch, the King had sensed that his allies intended to occupy quite soon the lands outside the fort of Galle.³⁰ In an attempt to frustrate this, he had ordered the Sinhalese to leave the fort and take up their residence at a considerable distance from it. He had summoned before him certain of the principal Sinhalese who had shown themselves too friendly towards the Dutch. Thus it was that most of the Sinhalese had soon left Galle. The same orders had apparently been sent to the Negombo area, for there too, the inhabitants including even the fishermen, whose means of livelihood lay on the sea-coast, had moved into the interior.³¹

How worried the King had become over the actions of the Dutch, is clearly shown by the letters which he wrote at this time to them. He had heard that they had disembarked at Kalutara or Alutgama for the purpose of fortifying themselves, and so, on the 23rd March, he wrote to Thijssen:

‘If it is true . . . even if it were for my service, or it were found to be useful by your Council, or in order to do harm to our enemies - do not disembark in order to fortify in any part of this island of Ceylon, without my licence.’³²

Twelve days later he wrote once again to Thijssen, this time giving him a clear hint that he should remain within the fortress of Galle, without extending his activities outside.³³ On the 11th April, he wrote to Van Diemen:

‘Should they (i.e. the Dutch) make themselves master of the fortresses of the island of Ceylon against my wish, then they place themselves in danger of losing their credit and the money that I owe to the Company - without enjoying any profit from the land.’³⁴

In the meantime the Dissawes of Matara and Sabaragamuwa had been busy seeing that the inhabitants were obeying the royal orders. After all the principal inhabitants within a nine or ten-mile radius of Galle had been removed into the interior, the Dissawe of Matara,

Ekanayaka Mudaliyar, appeared at the fort itself on the 16th of April. His intention was to remove all those Sinhalese who still remained at Galle. But he was effectively foiled by Thijssen, who arrested one of the Dissawe's lascarins, who was found driving out some of the Sinhalese. Thereupon, Ekanayaka went back without accomplishing his object.³⁵

Although Thijssen had thus safeguarded the Sinhalese, who still remained in Galle, he was unable to achieve much more. The King's Dissawes remained in practical occupation of most of the lands around Galle, and he did not, or could not, drive them away.

When Van Diemen and his Council heard of this situation they wrote to him on the 26th July,³⁶ upbraiding him for what they implied was his pusillanimity. They then went on to explain what he should have done:

'You know well that we help Raja for no other purpose than to help ourselves . . . consequently, you must not allow the coolies and cinnamon-peelers and others to be removed from the jurisdiction of Galle . . . If you read carefully, the letters sent through the Commissioner Boreel, you will find yourself fully authorised to do what the service of the Company requires . . . We do not ask you to break formally with Raja, and to declare war against him - that is not our meaning - but that you shall carry on war in his name against those who try to hinder the Majesty's forts' [sic] 'and people in Ceylon from obtaining proper sustenance from His lands'³⁷
... But we would be glad to see that they [i.e. the few Dutchmen who were at Batticaloa] continue there, even if it were only one or two persons, in order not to create greater suspicions in the mind of the faithless Raja, that we wish to break formally with him; although it, apparently, must come to that.'

Despite these incitements to a bolder policy, Thijssen found himself unable to do more than take over some of the lands in the immediate vicinity of Galle. It was only later on in the year that he extended the Company's sway over a larger area. But before taking more particular note of that, it is necessary to see the reactions of the Portuguese to the loss of Negombo.

As soon as the Conde d'Aveiras heard of this disaster, he dispatched to Ceylon on the 9th February a force of 280 men.³⁸ He had great difficulty in gathering further reinforcements, because almost

everyone was found reluctant to go to Ceylon. But the Conde, who always considered that island to be the most important possession under his charge,³⁹ spared no pains to gather relief for it. And he, therefore, succeeded in sending a goodly force of about 500 men under Fernão de Mendonça Furtado. In April he sent further men and materials in seven vessels.

On receipt of all these reinforcements Don Philipe Mascarenhas was able to muster a force of about 1300 Portuguese for the recapture of Negombo which he had sworn to effect. As a preliminary measure, however, he sent an embassy to Raja Sinha. The ambassadors took with them a letter (dated the 14th May) to the King from the Viceroy, who had doubtless recommended Mascarenhas to seek peace with the King. In his letter, the Viceroy assured the King that whatever was concluded with Mascarenhas would be held inviolate.⁴⁰

Raja Sinha, who had become thoroughly alarmed at the attempts, which the Dutch were making to gain possession of the lands around Galle, gave a more favourable reception to the embassy than he would otherwise have done. But he made it clear to the ambassadors that there could be no question of a peace between him and the Portuguese. The most that he could do for them was to refrain from helping the Dutch in Negombo. In return for this favour he, it appears, wanted the restitution of his brother Wijayapla,⁴¹ to ensure which he detained one ambassador, Diogo de Sousa da Cunha.

Don Philipe now moved with his army for the recapture of Negombo. For nearly two months (from the close of May to the close of July) he kept up a close siege of the fort. But at the instance of the Captain-Major, Fernão de Mendonça Furtado, who was impatient at this slow siege, it was decided to make an assault. On the 23rd July about a thousand Portuguese made a general assault on the fort in three waves. Within two hours they were routed, and retired with the loss of more than half their number, among the dead being the Captain-Major himself. The attempt to recapture Negombo had proved a sad failure.⁴²

The Conde d'Aveiras, although he had applied all diligence to send relief to Ceylon, for the purpose of recovering Negombo and improving the position of the Portuguese there, yet had no illusions as to the strength of the enemy, and the losses which the Portuguese

would thereby sustain, in the long run. For instance, he wrote at this time, to the King of Portugal, thus:⁴³

‘Should there be a delay in the coming of relief, which she [Portuguese Asia] begs for today, it might so happen (which may God not permit) that when it arrives, it will be of little use, because there will not be anything to relieve.’

D’Aveiras, therefore, attempted to reach a settlement with the Dutch, before the situation became worse.

On the 8th April he wrote to Van Diemen offering to come to a settlement on the terms proposed by Boreel, promising to release the rich merchandise in the *Pauw* together with the ship itself (which had fallen into Portuguese hand the previous year). In return he wished Van Diemen to agree to a restitution of all conquests made since the time when news of the ratification of the truce had been received in the East.⁴⁴

The Batavian authorities were, however, not prepared to agree to such restitution, which would mean the handing over of Negombo to the Portuguese. On the other hand, they were now not averse to concluding a truce, provided, of course, their rights to Negombo were granted. Till the truce was over, they felt they could remain satisfied with the major share in the Ceylon cinnamon which they could claim through the possession of Galle and Negombo, (which latter place was supposed to lie in the richest cinnamon area in the island). Moreover, by a continuation of the war, they could not hope to capture Colombo either easily or soon. But, above all, what made the authorities think of effecting a settlement, was the fear that owing to Portuguese diplomatic pressure in Europe, the States-General might impose a truce in the East, whether the Company liked it or not. Van Diemen and his Council rightly felt that it would in every way be better if they made a truce, on their own terms, with the Portuguese.⁴⁵

Thus it was, that in August 1644, they despatched a member of their Council to conclude a truce with the Portuguese. The member chosen, Jean Maetsuijcker, had, in addition to his great talents as a jurist, a thorough grasp of matters connected with the truce and with Ceylon, for it was he who had kept the Batavia ‘diary’ of the earlier negotiations regarding the truce and it was he who had drawn up the instructions for Francois Caron, the previous year.⁴⁶

Maetsuijcker was instructed⁴⁷ not to carry on any negotiations

with the Viceroy if he heard that the Portuguese had re-captured Negombo. In that case, he was to use the 12 ships and the 2045 men who were placed at his disposal, for the re-capture of Negombo.

With Negombo and Galle safely in the hands of the Dutch, he was to demand from the Viceroy the exact half of the lands between Negombo and Colombo and between Galle and Colombo, at least provisionally until a decision on the matter should arrive from the sovereigns in Europe.

If the Viceroy was unwilling to concede these terms, and proposed that the war should be continued only in Ceylon, Maetsuijcker was to agree to this as a last resort.⁴⁸

As Boreel had been instructed previously so Maetsuijcker was now told that the policy towards Raja Sinha was to depend on the success or failure of the negotiations with the Portuguese. If the Viceroy agreed to the Dutch terms and peace was concluded with the Portuguese, then Maetsuijcker was to confer with Marten Vinck (who was to accompany him from Galle) as to whether it would be necessary to declare war on Raja Sinha. If this was considered necessary, then he was to sound the Viceroy's mind in a discreet manner in order to find out what his attitude regarding the King was. If the Viceroy's disposition was suitable for the purpose, then an armed alliance against Raja Sinha was to be concluded with d'Aveiras.⁴⁹

However, no open hostilities were to be begun against Raja Sinha, if the war with the Portuguese had to be continued. This advice was given for two reasons: firstly, in order to prevent a combination between Raja Sinha and the Portuguese; secondly in order to retain the excuse of warring on the Portuguese on behalf of the King in fulfilment of treaty obligations. But Maetsuijcker was told that even if the war was continued with the Portuguese, the policy of taking possession of the territories around Galle must be continued, in the name of the King, although in defiance of him.

Leaving Batavia with these instructions on the 10th August, Maetsuijcker reached Ceylon early the following month. There he found that Negombo was safely in the hands of the Company. Therefore, he left for Goa, where he arrived at the end of September. After the lapse of about two weeks, spent in an exchange of letters with the Viceroy and in various formalities, Maetsuijcker was at length able to set foot on land on the 13th October.⁵⁰

But the negotiations did not in any way run smoothly. The

Viceroy's deputies for the negotiations were not prepared to recognize the Dutch conquest of Negombo. On the contrary, as having been captured after the date when the truce should have been proclaimed, they wanted it restored along with the vessels and goods which the Dutch had captured since that date. But when Maetsuijcker, defending the acquisition of Negombo as having been made on behalf of Raja Sinha, pointed out that the Dutch were determined to carry on the war till their claims to Negombo were recognized, the Portuguese had no alternative but to bow down to the might of Dutch arms. But before doing so, the Portuguese made a last effort to get back Negombo. The Archbishop Primate of Goa was specially deputed by d'Aveiros to offer a huge price for the restitution of Negombo; but Maetsuijcker declared that the Dutch had no intention of selling Negombo for any price. On one point, however, the Viceroy was adamant: he could only agree to a provisional division of lands; the final division must be left to the sovereign authorities in Europe. The reason which he gave for this stand was, that from the earliest times, the Viceroys have been expressly forbidden to alienate any immovable property of the Crown, in any manner, or under any circumstances, without the orders of the Crown. As D'Aveiras declared that even if the war was resumed as a result of it, he could not agree to anything more than a provisional division of the lands, Maetsuijcker agreed that: while the lands between Galle and Colombo, and between Colombo and Negombo, were to be divided equally between the two parties, it was to be a provisional arrangement only, until a final division was made by the sovereign authorities in Europe; the produce, which the Dutch enjoyed from the lands provisionally assigned to them, was to be kept in deposit⁵¹ until the final division was made in Europe; if, according to this final division, the Dutch had to return any lands to the Portuguese then the relevant incomes held in deposit must also go to the Portuguese.

Some of the other important provisions of the agreement, which was signed at Goa on the 10th November 1644,⁵² were the following. The owners and long-lease holders of property, which was situated in the lands provisionally under the Dutch, could resume possession of their property, provided they or their renters reported themselves within six months, and provided they paid the accustomed dues to the Dutch; they were to enjoy freedom of worship and their priests were to be permitted to visit them everywhere, except in the Dutch

fortresses. The Chaleas were to be made available for the service of both parties. No difference or dispute between the two parties was to upset the agreement; on the contrary it was to be maintained fully and religiously; while the settlement of any dispute was pending, the object of the dispute was to remain in the possession of the defendant party. Finally, both sides declared that the present agreement must not cause any prejudice to the decision which their respective sovereigns might arrive at.

As regards Raja Sinha, the Viceroy agreed by Article 5 of the treaty to make peace with him if the King wished it. Maetsuijcker did not broach the subject of an armed alliance against the King, because he had heard from Thijssen that the King had almost certainly made peace with the Portuguese. But the Viceroy seems to have guessed correctly the Dutch intentions regarding the King, for he tried his best to induce Maetsuijcker to agree not to war on the King without the consent of the Portuguese.⁵³ But Maetsuijcker was not to be persuaded on this matter.

Within four days of the signing of the Treaty, Maetsuijcker sent the greater part of the Dutch fleet to Ceylon under the Commander Blocq, with a copy of the treaty signed at Goa. Immediately on hearing from Blocq of the concluded peace, Jan Thijssen went with the copy of the treaty, to meet the Portuguese Captain-General. Mascarenhas, who, incidentally, had only recently heard news of his appointment as the new Viceroy, caused the truce to be published, with a happy face. But regarding the division of the territories which, according to the 4th Article of the Treaty, had to be made by the respective Governors in Ceylon, he had rather unexpected ideas. According to him the division should take place in the following manner: From the most landward point of, say Negombo fort, a straight line should be drawn to the most landward point of the Portuguese fort, Colombo. The territory enclosed within this line and the sea-coast was to be divided equally between the two parties; but everything to the interior of that line was to belong to the Portuguese. In the same manner, should the territory between Gallo and Kalutara, so said Mascarenhas, be divided. In his opinion, Kalutara, and not Colombo was the Portuguese fort nearest to Gallo.⁵⁴ Despite all his attempts, Thijssen failed to alter these opinions of Mascarenhas.

When Maetsuijcker himself finally arrived in Ceylon at the end of December and conferred with Don Philipe, the latter maintained

the position which he had taken against Thijssen. But with Maetsuijcker, had arrived a special envoy, Gonçalo Veloso, sent by d'Aveiras to inform Don Philipe of matters pertaining to the truce. This envoy it was who finally induced Don Philipe to agree, although under protest, to a division of lands in the manner understood between the two parties at Goa.

Finally, on 10 January 1645 an agreement⁵⁵ was signed at Colombo, delimiting the boundaries of the two parties. Towards noon of the same day, Mascarenhas had this agreement proclaimed throughout the city.

The division of the territories between Galle and Colombo was determined by the Bentota-Ganga. The territory to the south of this river was to belong to the Dutch, and that to the north, to the Portuguese.

Regarding the lands between Colombo and Negombo, however, it was decided that although an equal division of the total territory was to be made, entire Korales or districts were, as far as possible, to be assigned without mutations, to each party; the reason given for this decision was, that confusion and conflicts regarding jurisdiction could be thereby avoided.⁵⁶

It was further stated that to the north of Negombo, Puttla and Kalpitiya were to remain in Portuguese hands.

While it was agreed that this division of the lands was to be observed until a final decision on their ownership should come from Europe, a proviso was added, at Maetsuijcker's instance, to the following effect: since the Dutch did not have a very precise knowledge regarding the lands, they reserved the right to claim redress, if within a year they found that in the above division they had been considerably deceived. Nevertheless, it was also agreed that if the parties could not agree over the claims of the Dutch, no recourse was to be had to arms; but the truce was to be maintained inviolate.

The agreement between Maetsuijcker and Mascarenhas, also contained a stipulation regarding the Chaleas: every year, at a fixed time, the Dutch were to place at the disposal of the Portuguese, half the Chaleas of Welitara and Kosgoda; the cinnamon peeled by these Chaleas was to be divided equally between the two parties, who undertook to share the costs incurred in the peeling.

With the signing of this agreement, matters had at last been rather satisfactorily settled between the Dutch and the Portuguese. But the relations between the Dutch and the Sinhalese King, at this

time, were, perhaps more unsatisfactory than they had ever been before.

It was seen earlier how Thijssen's efforts at taking possession of the territories around Galle and drawing their incomes, had been countered by the King's policy of removing far into the interior almost all the inhabitants, living in the vicinity of the fort. On the King's orders, even many of the Sinhalese living within the fort had moved inland. Mere land, without inhabitants, was valueless; therefore, as a result of the King's measures, Thijssen had made little headway in his policy.

But urged on by the sharp orders from Batavia, and encouraged by the fact that the King showed himself unwilling to take any military measures against the Dutch, Thijssen (towards the latter half of 1644) began to act more vigorously than before. In spite of the King's Dissawes, he managed to secure about fifty Chaleas, whom he immediately employed in peeling cinnamon. He took good care to see that these men took up residence at places within easy control of Galle. He sent detachments of troops to various parts of the Matara Dissawani, and called upon the inhabitants, in the King's name and in his own, to deliver the customary dues to the Dutch.⁵⁷

The King himself, thereupon wrote, on the 5th October, to Thijssen ordering him to desist from the policy, which he was following. If the Sinhalese, whom the Dutch had won over to their side by money, were not immediately handed over to his Dissawe, so wrote Raja Sinha, he would not have any faith in the treaty concluded with Westerwolt. And he further ordered Thijssen to withdraw with his armies into the fort, immediately on receipt of his letter, alleging that the inhabitants had become frightened by the presence of the Dutch armies.⁵⁸

But Thijssen paid little heed to these orders because it was abundantly clear both from the King's letters and from his actions that he did not wish to proceed to extremities. Therefore, when the Dissawe demanded, in the King's name, the handing over of all the lascarins and Chaleas in Dutch service, Thijssen refused the demand, and the Dissawe went back empty-handed.

However, the results, which he achieved by this more vigorous policy, fell far below expectations. The King's Dissawe of Matara, whom Thijssen was afraid to drive out, sabotaged his efforts at obtaining the produce of the lands, by secretly forbidding the in-

habitants to deliver anything to the Dutch. And, except in a gradually increasing ring of territory immediately around Galle, the inhabitants listened to the Dissawe's orders and not to those of Thijssen.

Matters were in this state, when at the end of the year, Maetsuycker had arrived in Ceylon. It will be remembered, that Maetsuycker had not broached to the Viceroy the subject of an armed alliance against Raja Sinha, because he had heard from Thijssen that the King was in alliance with the Portuguese. But when he came to Ceylon, Maetsuycker soon found that no such alliance had been concluded. He was, therefore, free to conclude the projected armed alliance against the King. But before doing so he decided to sound the King's intentions.

Accordingly, on 4 February 1645, he sent to the King two letters together with copies of the agreements made at Goa and Colombo. One letter, he sent in his own name, and the other in that of Van Diemen, although both had been composed by him, in accordance with instructions given to him at Batavia.⁵⁹ The letter, purporting to be from Van Diemen, skilfully explained the objectives of the expedition, sent under Maetsuijcker, as having been none other than the realisation of what was most to the service of the King. In the letter sent in his own name, Maetsuijcker tried to explain the partition of the lands made between him and Mascarenhas, in the most pleasing manner to Raja Sinha. For instance, the lands assigned by that partition to the Dutch, were always referred to as lands assigned 'to Your Majesty'. In this same letter, Maetsuycker explained that he had sent soldiers to kill all the 'robbers', who he had heard, were justifying their actions by falsely saying that they had been sent by His Majesty.

Raja Sinha replied to these letters, by letter of the 16th February.⁶⁰ He pointed out that in the agreement regarding the partition of the territories, instead of his name that of the Dutch was given; although he knew that the Portuguese had done this, on account of their great hatred for him, yet he wished this rectified in the Dutch copies of the treaty. He further pointed out that the Portuguese had deceived Maetsuycker over the division of the lands by assigning to themselves territories which he was occupying. But if the Portuguese were not prepared to grant his just claims, he was going to wage war on them. As regards the armies which the Dutch had in the field, the King told Maetsuycker: 'Since your people⁶¹ are at

peace with the Portuguese, and there is also peace between me and the Hollanders, we do not have any other enemy, who will disturb the same [i.e. the lands.] Therefore will you please order the aforesaid garrison to retire to my fortress of Negombo.' Finally, he asked Maetsuijcker to send him a trustworthy envoy, with whom he could discuss certain matters of importance.

Maetsuijcker replied to the King by letter of the 1st March.⁶² He put all the blame on the Portuguese for those features of the agreement with Mascarenhas regarding which the King had expressed his displeasure. He excused himself from withdrawing the armies from the field by saying that on account of the late war, the lands were full of 'highwaymen' and 'riff-raff' who had to be first eliminated before the armies could leave the field; unless this was done it would not be possible to draw from the land the incomes which alone could help to clear up His Majesty's debt. As regards the request for an envoy, he expressed his sorrow at being unable to send one owing to his immediate departure for Batavia; but he suggested that the King should send ambassadors to Batavia to decide all matters, which he wished attended to.

Immediately after the despatch of this letter to the King, Maetsuijcker discussed with Thijssen and Vinck the idea of concluding with the Portuguese an alliance against Raja Sinha. It had been the wish of the Batavian Council that such an alliance should be concluded, if Maetsuijcker thought that war with Raja Sinha was a necessary matter. Maetsuijcker, Vinck and Thijssen certainly seem to have thought this to be a necessary matter. They were most perturbed by the fact that the King had not declared his intention of entering the concluded truce, but had, on the contrary, shown an inclination to continue the war with the Portuguese. Besides, he showed too much of a 'happy face'⁶³ in the not very happy situation in which he found himself. This made the Dutch suspect that he was only dissimulating and waiting for a suitable opportunity for revenge. There was a further consideration which made the Dutch decide to conclude an alliance against the King: such an alliance would give the Dutch and the Portuguese greater reliance in each other and a greater sense of security.⁶⁴

An alliance with the Portuguese had become not only desirable but also feasible to the Dutch because their relations with the Portuguese had become very friendly since the signing of the Agreement of the 10th January. It is true that the Padre Gonçalo Veloso

had made two requests from Maetsuijcker and both had been refused. Veloso had requested that Negombo should be handed over to the Portuguese promising in return to give the Dutch the annual incomes from the lands around Negombo. But Maetsuijcker refused this politely, suggesting that he should make this request from the Council at Batavia. The Padre had also requested that the Dutch should give authority to the Portuguese priests (in the Dutch territory) to continue their old practice of coercing the Sinhalese Christians to attend their churches and to bring them their food;⁶⁵ if this authority was not given, Christianity in Ceylon, so said the padre, would be reduced to ashes. But Maetsuijcker refused to grant this request too, saying that it was not the custom of the Dutch to coerce anyone in matters of religion. But although these requests had been thus refused, the relations with the Portuguese appeared very friendly. In fact, Maetsuijcker reported that he and Don Philipe had become great friends and that the new Portuguese Viceroy had declared his intention of establishing the friendliest relations with the Dutch Governor-General.⁶⁶ On account of this friendly attitude of the Portuguese, Maetsuijcker was all the more encouraged to conclude an armed alliance against the King.

On the 9th March, Maetsuijcker on the one hand, and Gonçalo Veloso on the other, signed the alliance,⁶⁷ at Galle. In a long preamble to the terms of this treaty it was stated, that since the people, who dwell in the mountains of Ceylon - (meaning thereby, of course Raja Sinha and the Kandyans) - are always accustomed to devastate and depopulate the lowlands, it was necessary to take measures against them in order to enjoy the fruits of the lowlands. Therefore, said this preamble, the following terms had been agreed upon between the Portuguese and Dutch ambassadors. The Portuguese and Netherlanders bound themselves to protect, according to ability and the necessities of the case, each other's lands and peoples against the invasions and devastations 'of the aforesaid peoples, whoever the same may be, or by whomever they may be sent'. But in case either of the parties wished to completely destroy the above people and thought it necessary to declare war and pursue them beyond the territorial boundaries of that party, then the other party was not bound to assist in this work unless it had been undertaken with common agreement. The two parties also promised to assist each other in quelling any rebellions, which might arise in their respective territories. Finally, each party bound itself

to refrain from negotiating with the King of Kandy - here he was explicitly referred to - anything which might be prejudicial to the other party. For the better observance of this agreement, which, incidentally, was to last till a final decision regarding the lands was notified from Europe, the governors of both parties were to swear on oath that they would fully maintain the above terms.

Immediately after the conclusion of this alliance, Maetsuijcker wished to proclaim it in Galle. But Veloso wished this to be postponed until the Portuguese ambassador, Diogo de Sousa da Cunha, was released from Kandy (where he was still detained by the King) or until the Captain-General of Colombo should request the proclamation to be made. Maetsuijcker agreed to Veloso's suggestion, and no proclamation of the alliance was made.⁶⁸

Before he left Ceylon, Maetsuijcker attended to several details of administration. For instance, in Negombo, he appointed Marten Vinck as Chief; in Galle, he effected various changes in the composition of the Council. He raised Jan Thijssen's salary and status, appointing him Governor of the Company's possessions in Ceylon, on a salary of 200 florins a month.⁶⁹

Finally, accompanied by Gonçalo Veloso, he left Ceylon on the 12th March for Batavia, where he arrived on the 11th of the following month - eight days before the death of Antonio Van Diemen.

1. G. G. & C. to Thijssen, 24 July 1643, Kol. Arch. 770 p. 511.
2. Van Geer (110, 123-24) alleges that the Directors were more peaceably inclined, but he has overlooked their vital private letter of 10 Sep. 1643 (Kol. Arch. 454) to Van Diemen, which explicitly authorised G. G. & C. to continue the war 'not only there [i.e. in Ceylon] but also before Goa, and anywhere else where you think the most advantage over the Portuguese can be obtained, until further orders and as long as they have not ceded the places under the aforesaid jurisdiction of Galle - for we, over here, think that it is better that they, rather than we, should complain'. cf. also next note (below).
3. cf. Dirs. to G. G. & C., 25 Sept. 1642 (Kol. Arch. 454) and MacLeod, ii. 142,
4. G. G. & C. to Dirs., 23 Dec. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fos. 1-30 *passim* Thijs. to Arnold Heussen, 22 March 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fo. 589. cf. also Van Geer, App. XXIV, pp. 52-60. For Caron's career in the East Indies cf. C. R. Boxer [Ed.] *A true description of the mighty Kingdoms of Japan and Siam by Fr. Caron and J. Schouten* (London 1935) XV-CXXIX.
5. Instructions for Caron, 29 Sep. 1643, Kol. Arch. 770 pp. 714-24 cf. also Van Geer, App. XXIII pp. 46-52, and p. 109 n. 2.



Peeling of the cinnamon bark (engraving by Nonalab Foundation, See page 37).
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DE JANGH

- De Belegering van
belegde van*
1. t'Logement vanden Ed: vanden Ende Ed: Govern vanden
 2. De Kerck Agas de liep mont vande H: Ma: Jan
 3. Luyt: de Mof en Merd
 4. Bateria van 4 fack
 5. Noffo Senhora de Lib
 6. Luytenant Kind
 7. Luyt. Christoffel
 8. S. Sebastiaen
 9. Luytenant Alhier
 10. Papp Nays
 11. Mortieren
 12. Quartier vande Iovann
 13. Luyt: de Wit
 14. Bateria van 2 fack
 15. S. Thomas
 16. Bateria van 6 fack
 17. Capit: Cuylenburgh



van de voornaeme Stadt Columbo, onder het
 de vanden Ed. Heer Geeraerd Kuyft.
 18. Luyt: Ketelaers Huis
 19. quartier van Luyt: Gerrit
 20. Luyt: Aerts Reduyt
 21. Luyt: Schert
 22. Cap. Hendrick Gerritsz
 23. Brugh over de Tangh
 24. quart; van Luyt; Poukes met sijn
 Approche
 25. Onse Galderie, waer in de Heer
 Kuyft is doot geschoten
 26. Des Vyants Beer
 27. Buyten Reduyt
 28. Afsendingh van ons Volck buy
 ten de Poort Mopane
 29. Een droge Gracht



Church and parochy (engraving from Baldaeus. See page 147).

6. Although the garrisoning of Colombo against the wishes of the King would have been a clear breach not only of the agreement with Coster (pp. 36-37 above) but also of Van Diemen's own written promises (Van Diemen to Raja Sinha, 26 Sep. 1640, Kol. Arch 767 p. 638 ff. *Dagh-Reg.* 1641, 414) yet G. G. & C. informed Caron that Raja Sinha 'sich aen gene beloften zal binden, al waren die met Eede bevestight. Tot gouverno'.
7. ~~or Companies~~. A Portuguese company (in Ceylon) comprised about 36-38 men according to Ribeiro (46) or about 30 according to Queyroz (813-825).
8. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 29 March 1643 (Kol. Arch. 1052 fos. 56-58) cf. also Same to Same, 17 March 1643 (Kol. Arch. 1052 fos. 100-07).
9. The leading soldier on the Dutch side in their campaigns against the Portuguese in Ceylon, and the one most dreaded by them as can be seen from the accounts of Ribeiro, Queyroz, Baldaeus etc. He subsequently served in the abortive expedition to Formosa and Macae in 1660-61, and repatriated as *Schout-bij-Nacht* or Rear Admiral of the homeward-bound East India fleet in 1661-62. He returned to the East later, and served as Sergt. Major (garrison commander) in Ceylon, finally repatriating as commander of the homeward bound fleet of 1668.
10. Although the Dutch records make no mention of Sinhalese auxiliaries on their side, the Portuguese accounts do so. For different accounts of the battle of Akuressa and its repercussions cf. Thijssen to G. G. & C., 21 May 1643, Kol. Arch. 1052 fos. 77-80; Same to Boreel, 19 May 1643, Kol. Arch. 1052 fos. 63-66; 'Resolutions of Galle', *JCRAS* XVII 412-14, 420, 421, 440, 441-45; Viceroy to King, 4 Dec. 1643, Bk. 48. fo. 266 (Bks of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port. Recs.* (Trans) 14; Ribeiro, 145-47; Queyroz, 870-75.
11. Dr. Pieris (*Port. Era*, ii. 324) mistakenly places this event in 1642.
12. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 25 June 1643, Kol. Arch. 1052 fo. 49. Queyroz 869, 874-75; Ribeiro 147.
13. The main sources for what took place in Ceylon during the expedition under Caron are: Report of Caron, 17 April 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fos. 616-70; Caron to Paulus Croocq, 31 Jan. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fos. 545-46; G. G. & C. to Dirs., 23 Dec. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fos. 68-72; *Dagh-Reg.* 1643-44, 232-35; 'Resolutions of Galle', *JCRAS* XVII. 456-506. Viceroy to King, 15 Feb. 1644, Bk. 48 fo. 290 (Bks of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port. Recs.* (Trans) 15; Queyroz, 875-89; Ribeiro, 147-52.
14. Ganga = (Sinhalese) river.
15. For a full account of the battle cf. C. R. Boxer, *A True Description of the mighty Kingdoms etc.* LXXVI-LXXXIV
16. Van Geer (118) quite wrongly says that during the entire expedition there had been no support at alle from Raja Sinha and that the King had sent 2000 men only for the purpose of garrisoning Negombo. The Report of Caron, which he himself has consulted (cf. 113 n.) clearly indicates the contrary. Ferguson's statement (in 'Raja Sinha II and the Dutch' *JCRAS* XVIII 254 n. 75) that Raja Sinha himself had been lying in *perdus* until the fighting at Negombo was over, is entirely unfounded; for, Caron himself decided on attacking Negombo only on 6 Jan. ('Resolutions of Galle', *JCRAS* XVII 469).

17. It is a surprising thing, that the King should have sent any men at all to help construct the fortifications, since he was bitterly opposed to the garrisoning of Negombo. Further, Caron admits in his Report that he had received some food and other provisions from the King's men. These actions seem to be explained, to a large extent at least, by the fact that although Raja Sinha was bitterly opposed to the Dutch garrisoning the fort, he always (at least, up to this time) thought it preferable to see a Dutch rather than a Portuguese garrison there; although he would have preferred still more to see neither.
18. 'diergelijcke Singalesche praetjens meer' Report of Caron (17 April 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fo. 648).
19. It was not Caron, as Dr. Pieris (*Some Docs.*, 94) says, but Van Diemen, who had addressed the King in that manner.
20. 'daer van gaven wij den schrijver off Translateur de schult.' (Report of Caron 17 April 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fo. 649). Thus the practice of getting out of a difficult situation or a false position by putting the blame on the translator seems to have been a ready expedient of the Company's officials.
21. Regarding this incident Thijssen wrote to Batavia (18 March 1644, Kol. Arch. 1059 fo. 321) that 'if the commander-in-chief Caron had not shown greater discretion than was shown by Udapalath and his companions, the affair would probably have burst out into open war with the King of Kandy'.
22. No details given by Caron.
23. cf. pp. 60-61 above.
24. G. G. & C., to Thijs. 20 Oct. 1642, Kol. Arch. 769 pp. 674-83. This was similar to the policy adopted by the Dutch towards the Sultan of Ternate in their occupation of Amboina and other places belonging to that ruler, cf. documents printed in Heeres [Ed.] *De Opkomst etc.* 2nd Series, ii. 194-95, 387-88; *Ibid.* iii. 205, 209 ns.
25. Thijssen to G. G. & C., 18 March 1644, Kol. Arch. 1059 fo. 322. G. G. & C. to Dirs., 23 Dec. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fos. 71-72. See below, pp. 156-57 for further details. Van Geer (138-40) was mistaken in his assertion that this policy was only envisaged in the event of a peace being concluded with the Portuguese.
26. Thijssen to Quast,.. Nov. 1641, Kol. Arch 1046 fos. 102-05. cf. also *Dagh-Reg. 1642*, 228.
27. G. G. & C. to Coster, 26 Sept. 1640, Kol. Arch. 767 pp. 619-37.
28. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 22 May 1642, Kol. Arch. 1047 fo. 677; *Dagh-Reg. 1642* 254; 'Resolutions of Galle', *JCRAS XVII*, 319-20, 341, 354, 398.
29. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 18 March 1644 (Kol. Arch. 1059 fos. 321-26) From the date of this letter it appears that the policy of taking possession of the lands was begun while Caron was still in Ceylon.
30. Thijssen reported to Batavia in the letter of 18 March 1644 (*Ibid*) that everything that was done by the Hollanders was suspect to the King. This same letter contains a most interesting testimony to the fact that even the ordinary Sinhalese of the time had realised how the Dutch had set about achieving their aims: 'Seer seltsaem wert hier onder den gemeijnen man van ons luijden gediscoursert, geven voor d' Hollandrs. hare coninghs schulden van jare tot jare soodanich creseren dat hem van nu voortaan niet mogelijk is, met sijn gantsche coninckrijck t'selve te voldoen, waer uijt dan bij hun lieden besloo-

ten wert onsen aenliech niet anders te sijn, als maer den Portugees uijt Ceijlon hebben verdreven, 't landt te assurpeeren ende hun tot slaven maecken, ais noch andere diergel. allegatien meer.'

31. Thijs. to G. G. & C. 17 March 1644, *ibid.* Thijs. to Arnold Heussen, 28 March 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fos. 561-62. *Dagh-Reg. 1643-44*, 234-35.
32. *Dagh-Reg. 1643-44*, 307-08. Note how the King has tried to anticipate, and ~~safeguard~~ himself against the stock-pretexts used by the Dutch to justify their actions.
33. *Ibid.*, 310-11.
34. Extract quoted in G. G. & C. to Thijs. 26 July 1644, Kol. Arch. 771 p. 468. Van Geer (137) is quite misleading when he says that the King had practically all along preferred to destroy the produce of his lands rather than to hand it over to the Dutch. The documents, which he cites (137 n. 1) to support his statement, refer only to lands which were devastated because they were on the point of falling into Portuguese hands. Note that Van Geer himself had earlier (89) drawn the correct conclusion from these documents.
35. Thijs. to Arnold Heussen, 28 March 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fos. 561-62; Thijs. to G. G. & C., 24 April 1644, Kol. Arch. 1654 fos. 606-09.
36. Kol. Arch. 771 pp. 462-74.
37. See above note 25.
38. It is interesting to note that at about the same time that Thijssen believed that the King was about to conclude peace with the Portuguese, the Viceroy was fearing that Raja Sinha would soon lay siege to Colombo in combination with the Hollanders: cf. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 18 March 1644, Kol. Arch. 1059, fos. 321-26; Viceroy to King (of Portugal) 15 Feb. 1644, Bk. 48. fo. 290 (Bks of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port. Recs.* (Trans.). 15.
39. cf. eg. Viceroy to King. 1 May 1643, Bk. 48 fo. 151 and same to same, 5 March 1643, Bk. 48 fo. 149 in (Bks of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port Recs.* (Trans) 14.
40. cf. Thijs. to Maetsuijcker, 5 Oct. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1055 fos. 510-11; *Dagh-Register 1645*, 280 ff Ribeiro, 153-54.
41. This was what Thijs. had heard (Thijs. to Maet., 5 Oct. 1644, *ibid.*) Indeed, this seems to be the most likely explanation for the detention of da Cunha, Except for what Ribeiro (153-54) says, the published Portuguese sources give, as far as I know, no information regarding this embassy.
42. For details regarding the siege and assault see: Diary of Negombo fort, 27 May to 31 Aug. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1055 fos. 445-508. Lengthy extracts from this document are given in Pieris, *Some Docs.*, 96-118; Viceroy to King, 23 Dec. 1644, Bk. 48 fo. 187 (Bks of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port. Recs.* (Trans) 14; Queyroz, 890-92; Ribeiro, 154-57.
43. 15 Feb. 1644, Bk. 48 fo. 290 (Bks. of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port. Recs.* (Trans) 15.
44. cf. G. G. & C., to Dirs., 23 Dec. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fo. 70 ff. A relevant extract in Van Geer, App. XXIV, p. 54.
45. G. G. & C., to Thijs., 26 July 1644, Kol. Arch. 771 p. 462; Instructions for Maetsuijcker, Kol. Arch. 771, p. 489. cf. Van Geer, App. XXV p. 61.
46. cf. G. G. & C., to Dirs. 12 Dec. 1642 Kol. Arch. 1047 fo. 10; *Realia*, ii. 33. Meester Joan Maetsuijcker had been sent out to the East in 1636 as a 'Pen-

sionary' of the Council of Justice at Batavia. Although he was suspected of being at best but a poor Calvinist, his able services had won recognition and he was a 'Councillor of India' when he was sent to conduct negotiations for a truce. After the successful performance of this mission he returned to Batavia. But in 1646 he was back in Ceylon, where he continued as Governor until Feb. 1650. Within three years of his return to Batavia he became Governor-General, a post which he continued to hold till his death, nearly twenty-five years later.

47. Instructions for Maetsuijcker, 9 Aug. 1644, Kol. Arch. 771 pp. 483-95. Part of these instructions are summarised in G. G. & C. to Dirs., 23 Dec. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1054 fos. 79-80. Van Geer (App. XXV pp. 60-61) gives only a very short extract from the instructions for Maet.; he has (in App. XXIV p. 60) also a relevant extract from the letter of 23 Dec.
48. The reason for this order was not, as Van Geer (128-24) says, because the Dirs. had clearly ordered G. G. & C. to continue the war only in Ceylon; it was rather because the Dirs. had expressed their doubts as to whether they could successfully defend the action of continuing the war everywhere on account of a dispute in Ceylon. Therefore, what was feared was the intervention of the States-General at the instance of the Portuguese and other interested parties (cf. on these points, Instructions for Maet, 9 Aug. 1644, *ibid.*, Dirs. to G. G. & C. 31 Aug. 1643 and 10 Sept. 1643 in Kol. Arch. 454), In fact, the true reason for this order is clearly indicated in Van Geer's own App. XXVI, p. 62.
49. '...sal U.E. met advijs van den Commissaris Vinck... over den toestant van onse gelegentheijt op gemelte Eijland overleggen, off nodich sal sijn met Raija Singa breecken..... welck nodich geacht wordende sal U.E. geduchte Grave Vice Roij discretelijck sonderen, hoe ontrent die sake gehumeurt zij, ende des geraden oordelende,..... met sijn Extic. contracteren, ende besluyten soodanigen alliantie ende verbont van wapenen jegens Raja Singa en tot onse gerechticheijt te geraecken, als onsen staet nodich ende voordelijc sal achten.' Thus it is clear that an armed alliance was to be concluded only if a declaration of war on the King was considered necessary. Van Geer (140, 144) has completely missed this vital fact.
50. The main sources for matters connected with Maetsuijcker's mission (both in Goa and Ceylon) are: Diary of Maetsuijcker, Kol. Arch 1060 fos. 401-76; Report of Maet., 11 April 1645, Kol. Arch. 1060 fos. 390-400 (This very important document has been overlooked by Van Geer, cf. Van Geer, 130 n. 1); Maet. to G. G. & C., 15 Nov. 1644, Kol. Arch 1059 bis fos. 466-74; Maet to Dirs., 30 Nov. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1055 fos. 29-39; Same to Same, 7 Dec. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1057 fos. 141-55; Thijs. to G. G. & C., 5 March 1645, Kol. Arch. 1059 (Bis) fos. 436-51; *Dagh. Reg. 1645*, 283 ff; Viceroy to King, 23 Dec. 1644, Bk. 48 fo. 187 (Bks. of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port. Recs.* (Trans) 14. This last document is fragmentary.
51. Maetsuijcker while agreeing to it, made a special protest in the agreement itself, declaring that this concession (made in order to avoid further shedding of 'Christian blood') was not to prejudice in any way the rights or the possessions of the States-General.

52. Dutch translation of the Treaty, (which was drawn up in Latin and Portuguese) in: Kol. Arch. 1055 (Bis) fos. 603-07. cf. *Dagh-Reg. 1645*, 266 ff and Heeres, *Corpus. Dip.* 1, 430-37 for printed versions.
It is interesting to note that shortly after swearing on the Holy Bible to maintain the agreement without any direct or indirect violation of it, Maetsuijcker wrote (on 30 Nov. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1055 fos. 29-39) to the Dirs.: 'In any case, if it is decided in Europe, and the States General requested, that Negombo should be handed back, we can always excuse ourselves by saying that there are Raja Sinha's forts and lands, the Company having only the mortgage of them.'
53. Maet. to G. G. & C. 15 Nov. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1059 bis. fos. 466-74. cf. Van Geer, App. XXVIII p. 67.
54. This second argument of Mascarenhas had a good deal of substance in it, as the Dutch admitted in their correspondence amongst themselves (cf. e.g. G. G. & C., to Dirs. 9 July 1645, Kol. Arch. 1057 fos. 18-23).
55. Kol. Arch. 1059 bis. fo. 796 ff; *Dagh-Reg. 1645*, 292 ff; Heeres, *Corpus. Dip.* i 443 ff.
56. Even where the division is said to be of territory situated *between* Colombo and Negombo, it is found that, in reality, the division is of all the land *around* Negombo to the North, South and East of the fort. The decision to divide by Korales and the actual division itself, indicate quite clearly that Raja Sinha was correct when he told Maetsuijcker that the Portuguese had deceived the Dutch 'like the rogues that they are' (Letter of 16 Feb. 1645, *Dagh-Reg. 1645*, 299 ff).
57. Thijs. to Maet., 5 Oct. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1055 fos. 510 ff; Thijs. to G. G. & C. 8 Dec. 1644, Kol. Arch. 1059 fos. 420-28; Same to same, 10 Sep. 1644 (summary in *Dagh-Reg. 1645* 280 ff).
58. Summary of letter in *Dagh-Reg. 1645* 280 ff.
59. The letters dated 27 Jan. 1645 and 9 Aug. 1644 are to be found in the Diary of Maetsuijcker, Kol. Arch. 1060 fos. 401-76. Translations appear in Pieris, *Some Docs.* 121-26. In the instructions drawn up for him Maet. had been told (Kol. Arch. 771 p. 494) that since the Batavian Council could not foretell how the situation in Ceylon would be when he arrived there, they were not writing to the King. But he was asked to compose a letter to suit the circumstances, in Van Diemen's name; for this purpose he was given a blank paper with the G. G.'s signature.
60. In Diary of Maet., (Kol. Arch. 1060 fos. 401-76); cf. also *Dagh-Reg. 1645*, 299-301; *JCRAS XVIII.* 185-87 (a translation made from the original, by Donald Ferguson).
61. Ferguson translates 'V.M.' (Vossa Merce) in the original by 'Your Honour'. The Diary of Maet. and the *Dagh-Reg. 1645* has 'UL' (= U lieden) which I have rendered as 'Your People'. 'You' and 'Your People' seem to render more accurately than 'Your Honour' the tone adopted by the King towards Maetsuijcker. Incidentally, Ferguson rightly points out that Van Geer had been mistaken when he had said that the King had remained silent throughout the whole of 1645 (cf. *JCRAS XVIII.* 258 n. 128).
62. In Diary of Maet., (Kol. Arch. 1060 fos. 401-76), *Dagh-Reg. 1645* 301-02. cf. translations in Pieris, *Some Docs.*, 126-28 and *JCRAS XVIII* 187-89. The second translation is much less faulty than the first.

63. This is the phrase used by Thijssen himself (to G. G. & C., 5 March 1645 Kol. Arch. 1059 Bis. fo. 441).
64. Diary of Maet. (Kol. Arch. 1060 fos. 401-76).
65. On Veloso's requests and Maetsuijcker's replies see (among others): Report of Maet., 11 April 1645, Kol. Arch. 1060 fos. 392-99; G. G. & C. to Dirs. 9 July 1645, Kol. Arch. 1057 fos. 18-23. MacLeod (ii. 147) misunderstood the meaning of part of the relevant extract from the second of these documents. He mistakenly concluded that the Portuguese clergy had been accustomed to keep the Sinhalese devoted to their church by providing these latter with food for their bellies. A still more erroneous translation of the relevant extract is given in Dr. Pieris', *Some Docs.* 129. The many sins of omission and commission in this latter translation, illustrate very clearly how unreliably the documents contained in this work have been translated.
66. Report of Maet., 11 April 1645 (Kol. Arch. 1060 fos. 392-99).
67. Terms in *Dagh-Reg. 1645*, 303-04; Heeres, *Corpus Dip.* i. 448-50, Van Geer, App. XXXIII pp. 87-89.
68. 'Explanation by Governor Joan Thijssen (of reasons) for declaring war against Raja Sinha', 23 Oct. 1646, Kol. Arch. 1061 fo. 575.
69. Report of Maet., 11 April, 1645 (Kol. Arch. 1060, fos. 392-99).

THE PERIOD OF THE TRUCE

Thijssen's efforts at taking possession of the cinnamon lands around Galle had not met with great success up to about the end of 1644. But with the proclamation of the truce in Ceylon, and the division of lands agreed upon with Mascarenhas, the territorial power of the Dutch rapidly expanded.

Since there was nothing to fear from the Portuguese, Thijssen was able to employ all his field-forces for the purpose of driving out the King's men from the territories obtained by the Dutch at the partition of 10th January 1645. Many of these territories were in the possession of the King at the time of the partition.¹ When Thijssen began to occupy them, he was thus actually waging war against the King in the King's own name.

In the Galle area, almost the entire Matara Dissawani was brought under Dutch rule by means of armies stationed at Matara, Gintota, Mapalagama and Bentota. The Sinhalese chiefs of the Weligam, Dolosdas and Morawak Korales came to offer their submission and promised to obey the Dutch in the same manner as they had previously obeyed the Portuguese. But the people of Kolonna Korale remained refractory until Thijssen sent a force of 200 Dutch and 100 lascarins under Captain Van der Laen to Hakmana to bring that Korale to subjection. Lack of sufficient troops prevented Thijssen from occupying the half of Sabaragamuwa Dissawani which had been assigned to the Dutch at the partition.

Following the example of the Portuguese administration of these territories, a Dutchman, Captain Lambert Camholt, was appointed Dissawe of Matara. Subject to the superior jurisdiction of the Governor and Council at Galle, the Dissawe was in charge of the civil, judicial and military administration of the Dissawani. The *Mahabadda* or cinnamon, department was likewise placed under a Dutchman, subordinate to Thijssen and his council at Galle.

The allegiance of the inhabitants who submitted, was further strengthened by the parcelling out to them of 300 villages. But Thijssen was disappointed to find that almost all the inhabitants who were in his territories were men of little importance, most of the chiefs being still detained in the hills. Moreover, in vast areas,

even the common folk were missing and the lands were desolate. On account of almost famine conditions prevailing at the moment, in Dutch territory, it was not likely that the men who had been removed by the Kandyan would be very anxious to escape from detention and return to their old homes.

In the Negombo area the lands were in a much worse state because the King's men had combed most of the villages clean of inhabitants. Consequently, the fieldforces were hard put to it even to find any provisions from the villages and for that reason almost all their provisions had to be brought from Negombo. Nevertheless, the Dutch moved their forces far into the interior, both in order to protect the inhabitants, who remained and in order to encourage others to return and resume possession of their lands. But a wave of sickness which swept over the Dutch camp at Hiwalgedera in Dewamedi Korale, forced the troops to retire on Katugampola Korale.

Even the relations with the Portuguese were more unsatisfactory in the area of Negombo than in that of Galle. For one thing, the Chief at Negombo, Marten Vinck had become *persona non grata* to the new Captain General, Manoel Mascarenhas Homem² who had succeeded Don Philipe Mascarenhas, in March, when the latter left for Goa to take up his duties as Viceroy. More serious than these differences of a personal nature, was the dispute over the villages of Alauwa and Wisinawaya. The Dutch claimed these villages as appertaining to them according to the Agreement of 10 January, but the Portuguese did not recognise this claim and occupied these villages.³

The Portuguese, on their part, complained that not only in Negombo, but also in Galle, many Portuguese owners of property, lease-holders and renters, had been unlawfully denied the lands, which should have been handed back to them in accordance with the 6th Article of the Treaty of 10 November 1644.⁴

Thus, with these complaints and counter-complaints, it appeared that relations between the Dutch and the Portuguese were not running smoothly. In fact, on the 17th April 1645,⁵ Thijssen wrote regarding the Portuguese to Batavia:

'It looks as if we shall not be able to keep any good-neighbourly relations with this evil brood. But time will teach us what we must do.'

But although the relations with their new allies were not satis-

factory yet the Dutch had no fear of a resort to arms by them. Conscious of their own might and of the weakness of the Portuguese, they were convinced that their erstwhile enemies would not dare to resume hostilities. There was all the less reason to fear the Portuguese because there appeared to be no prospect of an alliance between Raja Sinha and his old enemies.

On the contrary, these two parties were fighting, probably, as bitterly as ever before. Shortly after the partition of territories with the Dutch, the Portuguese invaded the districts in Sabaragamuwa and the Four Korales which were occupied by the King; but they were beaten back by the King's Dissawes. Returning to the attack, the Portuguese were so successful that they were able to encamp within sight of the Balana range, which commanded the gateway into Kandy; But this was not for long; sickness and the opposition of the Kandyans, forced them to retire, disconsolately, to Menikkawadara. Hostilities were, however, continued with, and the continued detention of da Cunha at Kandy was a sign of the continuance of hostilities⁶.

Meanwhile, no open hostilities took place between Raja Sinha and the Dutch. By writing to Thijssen and to Maetsuijcker, the King had attempted, in vain, to obtain the withdrawal of the Dutch armies from his territories. But seeing the failure of these efforts, he did not take any strong or desperate measures against the Hollanders. On the contrary, he scrupulously, avoided any encounter with them. When the Dutch armies advanced against his Dissawe of Matara, the latter retreated into the hills, abandoning the lands.

But although the King's policy was to avoid open warfare with the Hollanders, he did not intend to let them enjoy, undisturbed, the full benefits from their new possessions. Particularly in the Negombo area, his troops were active in driving the inhabitants from the Dutch-occupied territories. On one occasion his men had moved to within five or six miles of Negombo fort and carried off an Augustinian monk living within Dutch territory. Regarding this incident, Thijssen remarked that although the Portuguese were displeased at the inability of the Dutch to prevent its happening, yet, in their own territories the Portuguese themselves were unable to prevent such incidents.⁷

This remark indicates that the King's attempts at depopulating the lands (and thereby making them useless to the Dutch) were meeting with much success. A pointer in the same direction was

Thijssen's confession that he could not hope to obtain more than 300 bahars of cinnamon that year, through lack of sufficient Chaleas, although he had earlier given hopes of obtaining a much larger quantity.

It was doubtless in an attempt at drastically improving the situation that Thijssen decided to declare war on Raja Sinha. If the King was humbled by means of open warfare, then not only would the Chaleas and other inhabitants be secure from him thereafter, but he could also be forced to release those inhabitants, whom he kept detained in the hills and without whom the Dutch could not obtain the large profits, which they expected from their territories.

Thijssen had little difficulty in coming to this decision because he knew full well that his superiors at Batavia had for long been contemplating the idea of declaring war on the King, once the truce was concluded with the Portuguese⁸. Moreover, the actions of the King's Dissawes, in avoiding any encounter with Dutch forces, had strengthened Thijssen's conviction that it was quite an easy matter to humble the Kandyan King.⁹ The Dutch Governor had no fear (for reasons seen earlier) that the Portuguese Captain-General would assist Raja Sinha against him.

Thus it was, that when in May 1645 Manoel Mascarenhas Homem requested him to make public the Armed Alliance of 9th March, Thijssen did much more than requested; he added a special proclamation of his own, explicitly declaring war on Raja Sinha.¹⁰

The quick success, which, very probably, Thijssen had expected to obtain over the King, did not, however, follow. Beyond his claim of having subjected a fourth of Sabaragamuwa, Thijssen appears to have achieved little of note during the months following the declaration of war which had been made on the 25th May.

In part, the failure to achieve anything noteworthy was due to the difficulties caused by the famine, which was raging in various parts of the low-country; in part, it was due to the epidemic of fevers which had caused terrible mortality among the troops, especially in Negombo, where over a hundred men had died within a period of three months. For a large part, however, the failure seems to have been due to the greater activity, which the Kandyans had shown since the declaration of war. In the Kolonna Korale, a Kandyan force under a Dissawe had made its appearance, and the Dutch were not in a position to drive him out. In the area of Negombo, particularly in the rich cinnamon-yielding Seven Korales,

the King's troops were operating almost at will, driving out from the villages the inhabitants, who still remained in them. Although Thijssen sent a reinforcement of seventy-five men to strengthen the forces in Negombo, yet the situation continued to deteriorate in that area.¹¹

Shortly after war had been declared on him by Thijssen, the King had released the Portuguese ambassador, da Cunha, and offered to conclude a truce with them if they were prepared to hand over certain territories, previously in his possession and now in theirs.¹² This made Thijssen rather apprehensive, because the King would become a more formidable enemy, than he was at the moment, if he concluded a truce with the Portuguese.

To add to his difficulties, Thijssen found the relations with his Portuguese allies none too satisfactory. It was true that in two important matters, Homem had shown himself very accommodating. On Thijssen's request, he had loaned the Dutch four decoy elephants to enable them to catch elephants in their territories¹³; he had also permitted them to copy out the *foral* (or register of the dues) of the villages of the Matara Dissawani. But, on the other hand, the Portuguese continued to do as they liked with the lands of Alauwa and Wisinawaya, and it also appears that they had not proclaimed the Treaty of Armed Alliance with the Dutch.

For one reason or another, therefore, Thijssen had already begun to have serious misgivings about the probable future consequences of his declaration of war, when he received the letter of 31st July 1645, from his superiors at Batavia. If he had needed it, this letter gave covering sanction for Thijssen's declaration of war, for, in explicit terms, he was asked to declare war on the King, if that was thought necessary. It was further suggested that the capture of Trincomalee and Batticaloa would be good of bringing the King under better control.¹⁴

But Thijssen had already begun to retrace his steps somewhat; therefore, he replied that, unless the King continued to disturb and depopulate the Dutch territories, he should be left in peace, despite the fact that war had been proclaimed on him.¹⁵

On hearing this unexpected reply, and the further unfavourable reports of the situation in Ceylon, the Batavian authorities must have become very perturbed. But their perturbation turned into dismay, when, at the close of the year, they received peremptory orders from the Prince of Orange and the States-General, asking

them to hand over Negombo to the Portuguese, in accordance with the agreement arrived at in Europe.¹⁶

The only pretext under which this order could be disobeyed, was that of maintaining that Negombo had been captured and was being occupied on the King's behalf and that since it lawfully belonged to the King, the Company had no power to restore it to the Portuguese. But, obviously, it was impossible to make this pretext appear even plausible, at a time when the Company had declared war on that very King.¹⁷

Under these circumstances, the Batavian authorities decided on a *volte-face*. They decided to disown completely Thijssen's action in declaring war. His action, they now pretended, was completely against their intentions and against their express orders; therefore, they were sending a Special Commissioner to undo the harm done by Thijssen and to make peace with the King.¹⁸

The Special Commissioner chosen was Joan Maetsuijcker, the man who had previously conducted negotiations so ably with the Portuguese. Maetsuijcker was instructed to remove Thijssen from office and send him with his family to Batavia. The King was to be told that Thijssen was being sent as a prisoner to Batavia to be punished there for the criminal offence which he had committed in declaring war against His Majesty in flagrant violation of the orders and advices from Batavia.

Furthermore, Maetsuijcker was to use all politic means in order to have peace and, at least, a simulated friendship with the King.¹⁹

Among the other instructions, which Maetsuijcker was given, was a very important one relating to the future policy towards the Portuguese. He was to feign friendship towards them until he should see an opportunity of making a successful attack on them. For instance, if they were engaged in battle with the King or they were found off their guard, then Colombo was to be captured by surprise. Thereby, the Company would become virtual masters of Ceylon. Before making the attack, Maetsuijcker was to have at hand some plausible *casus belli*; but if meanwhile the King had been reconciled, no other pretexts would be necessary because the aggression could be justified in the King's name.²⁰

On the 2nd February, 1646, Maetsuijcker left Batavia, but on account of adverse sailing conditions, he was able to reach Ceylon only on the 27th April. When he arrived there he found that the war with the King had taken a serious turn.

It appears that by January 1646, the Dutch position in Negombo had so far improved, that the main field-force had moved its camp once more to Hiwalgedera. And the appointment of a Dutch Dissawe for the Seven Korales, was an indication that at last the Company had effective control over that rich cinnamon-yielding area.

On 12th January, this Dissawe, Jan Meerman, made a bold incursion into a part of Hiriyaale Korale which was occupied by the King's men. Defeating and driving away a Kandyan force, which opposed him, Meerman captured four of the King's decoy elephants and returned with them into Dutch territory.²¹

When Nicholaes Jacobsz Overschie (who had replaced Vinck as Chief at Negombo) reported this exploit to Thijssen, the latter was highly pleased, declaring that the Portuguese had never been able to achieve such a great victory over the King. But his pleasure gave way to anxiety when he heard of the later consequences of this victory.

As has been noted previously, the King had always been anxious to avoid an armed clash with the Dutch, even after the latter had declared war on him. But by the capture of four of the royal elephants, the Dutch had offered him an insult, which he could not ignore. Therefore, in order to drive out the Dutch from the field he sent a force of 800 men which force was soon reinforced and brought up to 2000 men.²²

The Kandyan force moved on the Dutch camp at Hiwalgedere, but two days after the appearance of the Kandyans the Dutch struck camp and retreated to Pannara, situated near the Maha Oya and about fifteen miles from Negombo. The Sinhalese followed them to Pannara, and prepared to attack them in their entrenchments.

As soon as Thijssen heard of these events, he hastily sent a mission to Colombo to request assistance from the Portuguese Captain-General. But Manoel Mascarenhas Homem refused to give any assistance, for he was glad to see the Dutch continue in their difficulties.²³

This was the situation in Ceylon, when Maetsuijcker arrived there on the 27th of April. Three days later, he wrote to the King, promising to restore the captured elephants, and saying that Overschie and Thijssen had been dismissed for their insolent and unauthorised actions.²⁴ At the same time, Maetsuijcker sent Adriaen Van der Stel (a one-time Commander of Mauritius) with reinforcements for Negombo.

Meanwhile, the King himself had decided to join his army at Pannara. But, before doing so, he wrote on the 1st May to the Commander of the Dutch forces at Pannara asking him to retire to Negombo, so that matters could be settled peaceably. Having joined his army, the King wrote again on 9 May, expressing his great desire to avoid blood-shed and hostilities. And, indeed, his actions and the letters, which he wrote at this time, indicate clearly how much he wished to settle the differences with the Dutch in a peaceful manner.²⁵

But although the Dutch had themselves decided to withdraw their army into Negombo, they did not wish to let the withdrawal appear as an act of submission to the King. Therefore, it was decided to send the Commander Van der Stel with 143 men and two field-pieces to join the army at Pannara and thereafter, to retreat in a body to Negombo in an orderly manner.

Van der Stel's expedition was a humiliating fiasco. On the 25th May, his relief column was intercepted and cut to pieces by the Kandyan forces not far from Pannara, the Dutch commander being among those slain; three or four men remained as prisoners and only one escaped to Negombo. Van der Stel's head was sent on a silver tray to the Dutch commandant at Pannara who promptly surrendered on the 16th May with his garrison of 280 men; the surrender of another 60 men at Chilaw was obtained in the same way. This triple reverse cost the Dutch a total of about 140 killed and 340 prisoners, apart from the great loss of prestige.²⁶

Two or three days after these successes, Raja Sinha wrote to Maetsuijcker offering to make peace, provided that the Dutch handed over Negombo to him, for he wished to raze it to the ground; also, he required all the territories outside the fort of Galle to be placed in the hands of his Dissawes, who, he promised, would collect all the cinnamon and other merchandise and deliver them to the Dutch towards payment of the debt.²⁷ When he did not receive a satisfactory reply, he wrote again to Maetsuijcker on the 10th June.

The latter, however, only made vague and conditional promises, attempting by a combination of threats and cajolery to obtain the release of the prisoners.²⁸ Therefore, the King broke off all communications with Maetsuijcker, whose letters he began to ignore.

Early in July, the King was forced to withdraw with the bulk

of his army and the prisoners to the highlands, on account of the great mortality among his men through sickness. Moreover, the famine-conditions of the low-country made it impossible to find provisions for this troops, despite the fact that the Portuguese had ordered their subjects to give all available provisions to the Kandians.

Although the King left with the bulk of his army, his Dissawe of the Seven Korales continued in control of all the territories around Negombo fort, preventing the Dutch from obtaining anything from the lands outside. The lands in the vicinity of the fort were utterly laid waste and all the inhabitants removed to the interior. And although the Dutch were expecting to remedy this situation, by again re-occupying these lands, some day, the fact was that with the defeat at Pannara, they lost the bulk of the Seven Korales for all time to come.

The victories of the King had a profound effect even on the inhabitants in the Matara Dissawani. When the King sent a Dissawe to occupy some of the outlying districts, these submitted to him quite readily. Many of the inhabitants of territories nearer Galle, fled into the forests and hid themselves, fearing that they would be kidnapped into the interior. For, although almost all the low-country Sinhalese had their sympathies with the King, yet they did not wish to lose their homes and possessions and live in a miserable detention in the hills, where they could not hope to find new homes. But, among a few, sentiment was greater than self-interest. A notable example among this latter class of people was one Kata-pitiya Appuhami,* who went over to the King and subsequently wrote to his friends in Matara, explaining that the only reason for his action was his desire 'to serve the gods of his forefathers, and his lawful king.'²⁹

With most of the inhabitants flying to the forests and some going over to the king, the situation in the Galle area might have become very serious for the Dutch, but for Maetsuijcker's prompt measures. Immediately, he had heard of the disaster at Negombo, he had promptly brought within the fort of Galle the families of the Chaleas and the lascarins (which he maintained at the Company's expense). By this well-tried expedient of the Portuguese, he assured himself of the loyalty of the two classes of people, most useful for drawing the desired profits from the lands.³⁰ In order to overawe the disaffected and the waverers and to reassure those who wished to re-

turn to their homes, he removed the sailors from passing ships, and made them march into the interior along with the available Dutch and Sinhalese troops. Thus, when he had thereby created the impression that the Dutch had huge forces at their disposal, he withdrew the sailors and embarked them once more on their ships, which then proceeded on their way. This policy had much success and many of the fugitives were emboldened to return to their homes. Finally, in order to prevent the people from abandoning their homes, he published a *placcaet* forbidding them to do so and threatening severe penalties on any who did.³¹

Meanwhile, he was confronted with a difficult problem by the Portuguese. Shortly after his arrival in Ceylon, the Portuguese Captain-General had written to him, requesting the restitution of Negombo, in accordance with the terms of the Provisional Treaty³² of the 27th March 1645, concluded between the Portuguese and the Dutch in Europe. This request could not be refused on the pretext that Negombo belonged to Raja Sinha, because the Dutch were at war with the King. Therefore, Maetsuijcker decided to play for time, until he should succeed in making peace with the King.

He replied to Homem pointing out, that Article 9 of this Treaty of 27 March stipulated that if a provisional agreement had already been reached between the two parties in the East, then that agreement was to remain valid; therefore the Provisional Treaty of the 10th November 1644, and not that of the 27th March, should apply regarding Negombo. Thereupon, Homem pointed out that the Viceroy had agreed to the Provisional Treaty of November 1644, only under express protest and until the decision of the sovereign in Europe was made known; in the circumstances, Negombo must be handed over to him according to the terms of the decision made in Europe.

As Maetsuijcker continued to insist on the validity of the Treaty of November 1644 and refused to restore Negombo, the Viceroy, Dom Philippe Mascarenhas, sent Fr. Gonçalo Veloso to demand it from Maetsuijcker. When Veloso arrived at Galle in the latter part of October 1646, Maetsuijcker had still failed to obtain peace from Raja Sinha. But he had recently received certain news of the violation of the truce by the Portuguese in Brazil. This news he now used to good purposes. To Veloso's demand for the restitution of Negombo, he replied that even if the Portuguese claims were

wellfounded, he would still refuse to hand over Negombo, on account of the violation of the truce in Brazil. With this reply, Veloso left on the 5th November empty-handed for Goa.³³

It was at about this time that Maetsuijcker received from Batavia rather noteworthy instructions regarding negotiations with the King. By letter of 30th August 1646,³⁴ he was told that if the King proved irreconcilable, then (as previously suggested by Maetsuijcker) the harbours of Batticaloa and Trincomalee should be blockaded in order to prevent him from obtaining salt and other necessaries from outside. But it was very much to be wished that peace could be obtained from him, even by promising to yield what he had demanded - Negombo and the Matara Dissawani. But the proper fulfillment of those promises was another matter. The Matara Dissawani was to be re-occupied as soon as the situation improved. Negombo, was not to be handed over, even temporarily; with one excuse or another, its surrender was to be postponed until the situation improved so far that it could be boldly refused.

On his own, Maetsuijcker had already thought of a policy similar to that suggested by the Batavian authorities. For instance, in his letter of 11 September ³⁵ (1646) he had suggested to the King that the Dutch should be allowed to occupy Negombo for another six or seven months, implying thereby that they would hand it over at the expiry of that period.

Maetsuijcker's difficulty, however, was to make the King listen to his proposals. Before his letter of 11th September, he had written to the King on 21st June and 12th August,³⁶ but to none of these letters had he obtained a reply.

While he was considering what he should do next, he heard at the close of December, that the Portuguese had recently sent ambassadors with rich presents to the King. The ambassadors, Sebastião de Fonçeca, Rector of the Jesuit College, and Dom Jeronimo de Azavedo, were considered to be the two most important Portuguese next to the Captain-General in Ceylon. The news of this distinguished embassy revived and strengthened all Maetsuijcker's fears of a possible peace and alliance between the King and the Portuguese. Therefore, he decided to make another effort at coming to an understanding with the King.³⁷

On the 8th January 1647,³⁸ he wrote to Raja Sinha offering to send on an embassy, the merchant Laurens de Maerschalk (who

was known to be *persona grata* to the King). He requested a safe-conduct for Maerschalk, if the King was pleased to give audience to the latter.

For well over six months, Maetsuijcker waited in vain for a reply. But at last, on the 27th of July, two Kandyan envoys arrived at Galle, bringing with them a letter³⁹ (dated the 12th July) from the King. Raja Sinha pointed out that the arisen differences were due to the evil conduct of the Dutch officers; but that since he had not called the Hollanders to the island in order to quarrel with them, he desired nothing but peace. Therefore, he would be glad to receive the ambassador, who could come with perfect assurance of safety.

On 11th August,⁴⁰ Maetsuijcker replied to the King's letter saying that the ambassador would be sent at an early date. As he was at the moment expecting new orders from Batavia, he did not, in fact, wish to dispatch Maerschalk in a hurry. But when he received a hint through one of the King's Dissawes that Raja Sinha was impatient at the delay, he decided not to wait for the advices from Batavia. He dispatched Maerschalk on the 22nd of August, via Batticaloa, with a letter⁴¹ informing the King that when terms were agreed upon with this ambassador he would send a more distinguished embassy to swear to the new agreement.

In the meantime, The King had grown impatient at the delay and wrote on the 29 August⁴² asking Maetsuijcker why the ambassador had delayed to come. He also pointed out that the Portuguese ambassadors were importunating him for peace; but since he had an alliance with the Dutch nation he did not wish to give an answer without consulting the Hollanders.

On the 10th September,⁴³ three days after the receipt of the King's letter, Maetsuijcker sent a reply. He cleverly excused the delay in sending Maerschalk as having been due to the fact that the vessel which was to take the latter to Batticaloa, had needed more repairs to make it sea-worthy than originally expected. As regards the Portuguese request for peace, he said that war between the Dutch and the Portuguese was imminent and that if the King made peace with the latter, the only result would be, that the Dutch would fight them on their own account and not on that of the King; in that case, when Colombo was captured, the King would have no claims on it.

Meanwhile, on the 11th of September, Maerschalk reached

Kandy, where he was received ceremoniously and in the most friendly manner by the King's officers. On the 23rd, he was summoned to Court. After he had greeted the King and handed over Maetsuijcker's letter (of the 21st August), he put forward various excuses and propositions in the manner instructed by Maetsuijcker.⁴⁴ The differences, which had arisen between the Dutch and the King, had only been caused by the wicked calumnies of the Portuguese, who had even gone so far as to say that the Dutch were trying to take possession of the King's fortresses and lands - 'which, God Almighty knows, has never been in our thoughts'. The fort of Negombo and the cinnamon lands will be handed over within a short time; the fulfilment of this will be promised with the most awesome and sacred oaths, which the King might stipulate.

After he had listened to these fair promises, Raja Sinha dismissed Maerschalk for the nonce, without, however, giving any reply to the Dutchman's proposals. He then left with his court for his country-palace at Kundasale, where he seems to have deliberated with his councillors over the proposals of Maerschalk. Returning to Kandy on the 2nd October, he summoned Maerschalk for an audience three days later. When the latter appeared before him, he indicated certain articles of the Treaty of 1638 which he wished altered in a manner proposed by him. As Maerschalk had no authority to agree to the proposed alterations, he promised to inform Maetsuijcker, and await his superior's instructions.

On the following day, the Portuguese ambassadors received audience and according to Maerschalk, the Padre ambassador importunated the King thus: 'Your Majesty please think of our utter misery and conclude peace with us, or else we are lost'. But no favourable reply could be elicited from the King, who wanted the Portuguese to first fulfil their promise of restoring Wijayapala to him. The Portuguese, on the other hand, were unwilling to release the Prince unless the King was prepared - which he was not - to sign a perpetual peace with them.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, on the 14th September,⁴⁶ Governor-General Cornelis Van der Lijn and his Councillors wrote to Maetsuijcker that it would be best for the Company to bring the King to terms by means of open war, to commence which, they were awaiting orders from Holland. In their opinion, the King was too embittered by the loss of the cinnamon lands to think of making peace with them.

But the reports, which he received from his ambassador, convinced Maetsuijcker that the King was inclined towards peace. As regards the suggested alterations in the existing treaty, he was willing to consent to all except one. According to the proposed revision of Article 10, the King would acquire the right to sell cinnamon and other products to nations which were at peace with the Dutch. But the legal monopoly of the cinnamon was too big a privilege to be given up. Therefore, he instructed Maerschalk to reply to the King, that provided the monopoly of the cinnamon, was safeguarded for the Company the revision of Article 10 would be agreed to.⁴⁷

The removal of the Dutch monopoly of cinnamon was the most important element in the revisions proposed. Therefore, the reply entrusted to Maerschalk was going to be most unsatisfactory to the King. It was doubtless in order to soften this expected sense of dissatisfaction that Maetsuijcker sent a number of presents, which he knew would be pleasing to the King. Raja Sinha's craze for strange and rare birds and beasts was well known, and so among the presents were a cassowary, a Dutch bear, and a Persian greyhound. In an attempt to please the King further, Maetsuijcker instructed his ambassador to say that as soon as peace was concluded the Dutch would place His Majesty's coat-of-arms over the fort-gates of Galle and Negombo and at other public places, so that all the world could know to whom these places belonged.

Negotiations at Kandy, however, did not go very smoothly. Probably, the King realised that the Dutch promises of handing over Negombo and the Matara Dissawani were much too vague and evasive; the reply regarding his proposal for the revision of Article 10 of the 1638 Treaty was also unsatisfactory. Therefore, till he obtained satisfactory conditions, he refused to release the prisoners or conclude peace. Moreover, it appears that for several months, from the close of 1647 onwards, he was passing through what was considered to be an inauspicious period. During that time, he shut himself up at Bintenna and would give audience to no one.⁴⁸

Maerschalk was unable to send any letters to Galle as he could not obtain permission for it during the King's absence from Kandy. Meanwhile, Maetsuijcker, who found himself without news from his ambassador, decided on a ruse in order to get some news from Kandy. On the 28th December 1647 he wrote to Maerschalk asking him to offer the services of the Dutch in case His Majesty wished

to send any letter to his brother Wijayapala or wished to find out about the Prince's health.⁴⁹ This offer, Maetsuijcker expected, would be eagerly grasped by the King, who would then write to Galle or ask Maerschalk to do so. Unfortunately for Maetsuijcker, his ruse for obtaining information from Kandy failed because it appears the King was keeping himself in seclusion. A further letter written on 25th March 1648⁵⁰ also elicited no reply. Finally, on the 10th September⁵¹, he wrote to the King requesting the release of Maerschalk, if it were true that His Majesty has concluded an offensive alliance with the Portuguese against the Dutch.

It was, therefore, a pleasant surprise for him when on the 15th October two envoys arrived at Galle bringing with them a letter (dated 3rd October) from the King. By this letter Raja Sinha informed him that he intended sending Maerschalk and the captives with all their weapons, in a short time. Ten days later he heard from Maerschalk himself that an 'eternal alliance' had been concluded and that he would be returning soon with all the captive Netherlanders.⁵²

When Maetsuijcker heard of these good tidings, he wrote to the King, on the 27th October,⁵³ expressing his pleasure at the news, and promising to send another ambassador in place of Maerschalk. It was this letter, according to Maerschalk which made the King change his intentions. At the time the letter was received, Maerschalk and the Dutch prisoners were due to leave for Galle in three days' time. But after he had read this letter, Raja Sinha immediately gave orders that the prisoners were to be detained until he gave further instructions.⁵⁴

There now took place a long correspondence between Maetsuijcker and the King. Raja Sinha wished to pin the Dutch down to definite promises regarding the handing over of Negombo and the Matara Dissawani; the Dutch on the other hand made evasive and equivocal promises on this matter. In order to soften the King's attitude, Maetsuijcker sent him some rich presents, in particular, a fine Persian horse. But the King was not to be cajoled and Maetsuijcker had to promise the immediate restitution of Negombo and the Matara Dissawani. As regards the Dissawani, however, he requested the King to appoint a Dutchman as his Dissawe, in the same manner in which he had a Portuguese as his Dissawe of Walawe.⁵⁵

Finally, when he found his demands satisfactorily met, Raja

Sinha sent to Galle Maerschalk and two of his envoys with a letter dated the 27th of June 1649.⁵⁶ He wished Maetsuijcker to sign the revised terms of the Treaty of 1638 which he was sending along with this letter. When these terms were duly signed, the new Dutch ambassador was to bring the document to Kandy and swear on behalf of the Prince of Orange and the Company, to observe the revised Treaty faithfully and sincerely. Then he (the King) would himself sign the Treaty, and order the release of the prisoners. Just as in 1640, Coster and sent him a Dutch officer authorised to remove the garrison of Trincomalee and hand over the fort, in the same manner, Maetsuijcker should send in company of the new ambassador an officer authorised to hand over Negombo to him. He was pleased to appoint a Dutchman as his Dissawe for Matara, provided this Dissawe took up his residence at the royal court in like manner as all his other Dissawes; otherwise, he would appoint one of his own chieftains as Dissawe.

These were some of the main contents of the letter, which Maetsuijcker received on the 15th July, when Maerschall and the King's envoys arrived at Galle. On the 6th August he signed the revised terms of the Treaty of 1638. By the new Article 10, the Company did not lose its monopoly of the cinnamon in the drastic manner first proposed by Raja Sinha. The King, however, acquired the right to sell cinnamon and other merchandise to nations at peace with the Company, from the moment that he should succeed in squaring his debt. Maetsuijcker agreed to this article with the perfect conviction that the King would never be able to pay his debt; if this ever appeared possible, a new treaty could be imposed on him by force of arms.⁵⁷

On the 12th August, Maetsuijcker dispatched Captain Burchard Cox as the ambassador for swearing to the treaty. With him went the Junior Merchant Pieter Kieft, who was to be at the court as the permanent Dutch ambassador (the King's having consented to Maetsuijcker's request⁵⁸ for appointing such an ambassador). By a letter⁵⁹ which he sent through Cox, the King was informed that the ambassadors would beg permission to retain Negombo in Dutch hands till Colombo was captured. As regards the capture of Colombo, the King was informed, an armada was expected soon from Batavia to effect it.

The Dutch ambassadors were received with extraordinary honours at Kandy, and on the 2nd of November the new treaty was

sworn to by Cox and Kieft. They further swore to hand over the Matara Dissawani; they likewise swore that when Laurens de Maerschalk (or someone in his stead) returned from Batavia, the fort of Negombo would be handed over. Thereupon, with a joyful countenance, Raja Sinha signed the treaty.

Shortly after this, he gave Cox leave to depart with the prisoners. As Cox was forced to admit that no Dutch Dissawe could fulfil the duties required by him, he sent along with the Dutch ambassador, one of his own chiefs as Dissawe of Matara. The chief chosen, Rampoth Adigar, was, next to the King, the second most important personage in the Kingdom. Before Cox left Kandy, the Portuguese ambassadors were also given leave to depart; but their departure was made so humiliating that when he heard of it Maetsuijcker suspected for a moment that the humiliation was a pretence to cover up some dark plot agreed upon between Raja Sinha and the Portuguese.⁶⁰

On the 13th December, Burchard Cox arrived at Galle with 126 prisoners. 14 others, who had been too ill to march, were expected to come from Kandy some time later. (Thus, of some 340 prisoners the Dutch got back only 140; a few had taken service with the King; the rest had all died). Along with Cox, there also arrived the new Dissawe of Matara, Rampoth, with 300 lascarins.

The Dissawe handed over to Maetsuijcker a letter, dated 16th November,⁶¹ from Raja Sinha. In the letter the King asked (among other things) that all the territories and people of the Matara Dissawani should be immediately handed over to his Dissawe. He stated that he was waiting for the return of Maerschalk from Batavia and the consequent handing over of Negombo. He also wished to know when exactly the fleet for the capture of Colombo would arrive.

After the King's letter had been read and mutual courtesies had been exchanged between Maetsuijcker and Rampoth, the question of handing over the Matara Dissawani was taken up. The Dutchman expressed his sincere desire to hand over the Dissawani immediately, provided the King cleared up certain doubts, which had arisen in his mind regarding this matter. Was the Galu Korale, which had for many years past been administered by a separate chief, a part of the Matara Dissawani? Was the *Mahabadda* or cinnamon department also a part of it? He did not think so, although the Dissawe was of the contrary opinion. Moreover, without His Majesty's special orders, he could not hand over the villages, which

had been rented by the Company. From those villages came annual incomes, which greatly helped to liquidate His Majesty's debt.

As Maetsuijcker proceeded to make these 'subterfuges and pretexts,'⁶² the Dissawe quickly realised that his royal master had been sadly deceived and that he himself would gain nothing by arguing any longer with the Dutchman. Therefore, he soon informed Maetsuijcker that he had decided to go back to Kandy and represent matters to the King.

Although he did not think that the King would go to war on account of the deceit practiced on him, Maetsuijcker yet considered it necessary to appease his wrath. Therefore, he sent several presents, in particular two cannon, to the King through the Dissawe. More important, perhaps, was the cleverly phrased letter, which also he sent through Rampoth. He expressed his regret that as yet he had received no answer from Batavia regarding the handing over of Negombo and the commencement of the war with the Portuguese. He was hoping to return to Batavia within about three weeks, but he would not leave His Majesty's service without once more 'kissing His feet with a short letter'. As regards the doubts which had arisen in his mind over the claims and representations of the Dissawe, it was all the result of his concern for His Majesty's service. At the mere appearance of the Dissawe several people had fled from their homes in terror and others were in a panic lest their lands should be taken from them and given to favourites of the Dissawe. Therefore, unless changes were made slowly, it would be harmful for His Majesty's lands, for the inhabitants would fly to the Portuguese through fear. Having made these and other pretexts for his actions, Maetsuijcker proceeded to discredit Rampoth by damning him with faint praise. Finally, with the aid of two post-scripts to his letter he made it appear that Rampoth was saying one thing on one day, and the contrary on another, and as such behaviour was unbecoming in a Dissawe, he requested that the King should appoint a Dutchman as Dissawe of Matara. Along with this letter Maetsuijcker sent another to Kieft instructing him in what manner he should explain Dutch actions and placate the King.⁶³ With these letters and the presents Rampoth left Galle on the 31st of December 1649. But he did not go to Kandy; sending on to the King Maetsuijcker's letters and presents and his own report on the Dutchman's actions, he remained at Katuwana in Dolosdas Korale. From there he sent orders to various parts of

Dutch territory, asking the inhabitants not to obey the Dutch, and indeed in the villages in his immediate vicinity, the people came to submit to him.

On receiving news of Rampoth's activities, Maetsuijcker sent against him a force under the Dutch Dissawe, Marcus Cassel. The Kandyan Dissawe, however, did not wait for the Dutch force. He retreated further into the interior from where he sent several insulting messages to the Dutch, calling them traitors and asking them to leave His Majesty's lands and amuse themselves in their element, the sea. On the withdrawal of the Dutch force, he came once again to Katuwana. Thereupon, Maetsuijcker himself marched with his forces against the Kandyan. On the 28th January he sent an ultimatum to him in the King's name, asking him to withdraw within twenty-one hours unless he wished to be attacked and driven out. But nothing was achieved because Rampoth evaded the Dutch forces.⁶⁴

Meanwhile Raja Sinha had received Maetsuijcker's letter and the report of his Dissawe. As soon as he realised what had happened he was bitterly angry at the deceit practiced on him. As he had decided not to write any letters to Maetsuijcker, he wrote to Kieft on the 12th January,⁶⁵ complaining of the deceitfulness of the 'casta Hollandesa' (as he throughout this letter referred to the Dutch):

'And if I had thought that the casta Hollandesa would not fulfill that which they had said and sworn at the peace, I would not have allowed them to swear in my royal presence.'

Before he left Ceylon, Maetsuijcker 'kissed the King's feet' with two further letters,⁶⁶ written on the 11th January and the 23rd of February. In both these letters he maintained an attitude of righteous indignation at what he considered to be a breach of the peace on the King's side, and urged the recall of Rampoth in order to redress this grievance. In the letter of 23rd February, he took strong exception to the insult of being called 'casta Hollandesa'; he further explained to the King that the Dutch were not accustomed to deal in a deceitful manner, and that therefore, all the arisen differences were due to the 'deceitful lies of Rampoth and other Portuguese creatures.' But the King deigned no reply.

At the close of February, Maetsuijcker left for Batavia, leaving for his successor, Jacob van Kittensteijn⁶⁷ written instructions,⁶⁸

in which it was particularly stressed that under no circumstances should the Matara Dissawani (or any other territories in the Company's hands) be handed over to the King. Since the 13th December, when he landed at Galle, Van Kittensteijn had been following every step of Maetsuijcker's diplomacy and so he found no difficulty in continuing the policy hitherto followed.

The Dutch had been daily expecting Rampoth to go back to Kandy as he had not more than fifty or sixty men with him, the rest of his 300 men having gone back to their homes through sickness. But although all his men had advised him to leave the lowlands he had refused to do so, declaring that even if everyone left him, he would not go back but rather die in the low-country. Moreover, not content with harassing the Dutch from Katuwana he moved further south near Hakwana, taking into his hands the dues hitherto paid to the Dutch.

When he found that Rampoth was determined to harass the Dutch as long as he could, Kittensteijn decided to drive him away before further harm was done. Before undertaking the enterprise he wished to assure himself of the loyalty of the chiefs and lascarins who would be used for the attack on the King's Dissawe. Therefore, he made them bring their families within the fort of Matara (which had been begun by Maetsuijcker and was now nearly complete). Having taken this essential precaution, Kittensteijn sent his Dissawe, Marcus Cassel along with the Sinhalese chiefs and lascarins, against Rampoth.

On the 23rd March, Marcus Cassel proposed to the chiefs, the plan of attack on the King's Dissawe. He was astounded at the audacious reply of the chiefs.⁶⁹ Among other things they told him that the Portuguese too had sworn a lasting peace with the King, on three occasions. On each occasion they had broken the peace and each time earned their just retribution from God. The Dutch too should remember that having sworn a peace with the King before God and the world, they would earn similar retribution for breaking it.

As soon as he heard that the Sinhalese chiefs were unwilling to attack the King's Dissawe, Kittensteijn ordered the withdrawal to Matara of all forces from the Weligam, Dolosdas and Morawak Korales, leaving behind only two outposts at Walasmulla and Kirama. The chiefs were now aghast at the result of their own audacity. With the lands virtually abandoned to the King's Dissawe, they stood to lose the incomes and the profits, which they had hither-

to enjoyed. Therefore, turning from sentiment to self-interest, they promised the Dutch to help in the attack on Rampoth.

Although he had hardly fifty men with him, the King's Dissawe was acting as boldly as before. Early in April he drove the Dutch outpost from Kirama and placed his own men there and at Katuwana. But, shortly after this, the Dutch effectively got rid of him.

On the 15th April, Kittensteijn sent large bodies of Dutch and Sinhalese troops by diverse paths to fall upon Rampoth. One of these detachments commanded by one Wijesundera Mudaliyar came unawares upon Rampoth and his men; who were able to escape by flight as the Mudaliyar did not fire a single shot or order a pursuit. A short while later, however, Marcus Cassel sent a detachment of more loyal Sinhalese and these returned with three captives. Although Rampoth escaped, he did not return to trouble the Dutch any more.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, the King was following a rather curious policy. While he had railed at the Dutch and contemptuously ignored Maetsuijcker's letters, he had refrained from reinforcing Rampoth or ordering any acts of hostility. Moreover, through his Dissawe of the Seven Korales he had delivered to the Dutch in March, over a hundred bahars of fine cinnamon. And, finally, despite the deceit practised on him, he kept to his word regarding the sick prisoners, and released them.

It thus appeared that the King's anger had probably subsided and that he wished to avoid hostilities. But when he heard that his Dissawe had been driven out of the Matara Dissawani, Raja Sinha sent a rather sharp letter to Van Kittensteijn on the 3rd of May.⁷¹ He wrote: 'But if on account of the cupidity, which they have for the lands of Matara, the Hollanders wish to break the terms of peace and desire war, I shall be glad to know it.' As Maetsuijcker and Kittensteijn, had continually harped on the theme of the King's debt, he asked for a full statement of what he still owed the Company, pointing out that he had made this same demand many times before. He wrote once again, on the 11th⁷² of the same month, demanding to know whether the Dutch were prepared to fulfill their promises or not.

Van Kittensteijn was convinced that his reply would not be agreeable to the King; he, therefore, decided to delay it as long as possible. Meanwhile, in order to please the King, he released the three lascarins, who had been captured from Rampoth.

Soon, however, alarming rumours reached Van Kittensteijn. It was said that the King was gathering his forces to come down on the Dutch territory, and that he had also asked for assistance from the Portuguese. Van Kittensteijn's spies were unable to find out whether the rumours had substance or not, because the Kandyans were closely guarding all approaches to their kingdom. And Pieter Kieft, who had sent much secret information at the beginning of the year, had sent no news thereafter.

While Van Kittensteijn was contemplating what he should do in the circumstances, he heard that the renegade Portuguese, who was serving as Raja Sinha's Vidana of Panama, had sent a message to the Sinhalese chiefs of Matara. In this message, the Vidana advised the chiefs to make their immediate submission to the King before the latter marched into the Matara Dissawani.

Van Kittensteijn was now certain that the King was furious with the Dutch and was planning to attack them. He, therefore, withdrew into Matara, all the Dutch forces from the field, because he feared that if the King himself came down the episode of Pannara might be repeated. At Akuressa and Hakmana, he left some lascarins and eight Hollanders to serve as outposts.

In order to placate the King, he wrote on the 23rd July,⁷³ saying that he had asked for advice from Batavia regarding the differences which had arisen over the Matara Dissawani. He further assured him that the reply from Batavia would be sure to meet His Majesty's wishes. But Van Kittensteijn deliberately avoided any answer to Raja Sinha's demand for a statement of the debt. He knew that his superiors at Batavia did not wish to present the bill until a more favourable opportunity.⁷⁴

The King's reply⁷⁵ to Van Kittensteijn was so friendly in tone that it appeared as if he was reconciled to what had happened. But it was just possible that the friendly tone was just a pretence, and therefore, Van Kittensteijn decided not to risk his forces outside the Matara fort for yet some time more.

At the close of April 1651, Van Kittensteijn learned from secret information sent by Kieft, that the King was equipping a great expedition, the purpose of which the Dutch ambassador did not quite know. In July and in August, Kieft sent further secret information to say that the King was preparing to attack the Dutch territory. Indeed, in August the King himself informed Kittensteijn that he intended visiting the lowlands in order to discuss the disputes

which had arisen previously. But although the King's preparations for war caused alarm the Dutch territories were left undisturbed.⁷⁶

In September, Kieft was caught holding a secret correspondence with a captive Portuguese priest. At about the same time, one of Kieft's Dutch attendants had, in a fit of drunkenness wounded one of the King's hunting buffaloes. Van Kittensteijn was quick to offer his apologies over these incidents, and the King was prepared to overlook them. In the following month, however, he was once again displeased with the Dutch. The excessive vanity, which had sometimes been revealed in his letters, appears to have developed into something like megalomania, and he now required the Dutch to address him as 'God our Lord'. But this the latter were not prepared to do, despite his pointing out that not only his own subjects but even foreign princes and the Portuguese gave him that title or others similar to it, when addressing him.⁷⁷

Throughout 1652 the Dutch continued on friendly terms with the King. On September 5th, Raja Sinha wrote to Van Kittensteijn, asking the latter to inform him before commencing war with the Portuguese. On October 26th Van Kittensteijn informed the King of the resumption of war, which was then earnestly taken in hand by Raja Sinha.⁷⁸

At this point, it may be well to consider why Raja Sinha did not go to war with the Dutch over the deceit practiced on him by Maetsuijcker. One of the most important reasons, which prevented him from taking to the sword was his belief that he was under unlucky stars during this period. In fact, somewhere about the beginning of 1650 or earlier he had been even warned by his astrologers to stay out of his capital-city of Kandy for two years in order to mitigate the evil planetary influences.⁷⁹ Another reason for the King's peaceful policy, was the trouble, which he had with some of his subjects, who tried to do away with him.⁸⁰ (Undoubtedly he must have drawn a strong connection between his evil planets and the disaffection of his subjects). Then again, the bitter hatred, which he always bore towards the Portuguese, was continually overshadowing his bitterness towards the Dutch. Moreover, he knew that the Portuguese fully returned the compliment, and he was, therefore, afraid that his old enemy might make a sudden flank-attack on him, while he was engaged with the Dutch. Besides, he was too aware of the fact that, whatever success he might obtain, he could not drive the Dutch from their fortresses; a limited

success would not alter the situation permanently in his favour.

In addition to all these reasons, certain measures taken by the Dutch also influenced the King towards a peaceful policy. Van Kittensteijn seems to have correctly guessed that Raja Sinha wished to capture a sufficient number of Dutch prisoners, so that he could once more be in a position to dictate terms. Therefore, by withdrawing the Dutch forces into the fort of Matara, he had effectively frustrated the King's intentions. The way, however, by which the Dutch most inclined the King towards a peaceful and indeed, a friendly disposition, was by the succession of presents and the constant flattery, which they bestowed on him. It was Maetsuijcker, who had first suggested⁸¹ that not only Raja Sinha's craze for the strange and the rare, but also his vainglorious nature should be satisfied as much as possible, in order thereby to cajole and to placate him. This suggestion was put into effect by Maetsuijcker himself and continued even more thoroughly by Van Kittensteijn. Even when he was unable to send a present along with his letters, Van Kittensteijn found that an extra amount of flattery could more than make up for the absence of one. For instance, on the 17th September 1650⁸², he wrote to the King:

'We much regret that we have nothing of any value to offer His Majesty; but before long, we hope to send His Majesty, something that will be worthy of presentation before so great a Potentate as His Majesty.'

Apart from greatly helping to ensure peace, these flatteries and presents had the added advantage for the Dutch that Raja Sinha sometimes sent return-presents, which were many times the value of what had been sent to him.⁸³

Ever since the military disasters of 1646 the Dutch had been anxious to be on peaceful terms with the King, and at last they had achieved their aim. But regarding the Portuguese, the Dutch had been anxious for nothing so much as for a resumption of hostilities.

It will be remembered that Maetsuijcker had been sent from Batavia with secret orders for a surprise attack on the Portuguese. But on account of the hostile relations with the King and the losses sustained at his hands, Maetsuijcker found it inadvisable to attack them until the situation improved somewhat. He was, however, convinced that on account of their weak situation they would not take up arms, unless the gravest provocation was given to them. Therefore, he had no apprehension in refusing to place the Chaleas

of Welitara and Kosgoda, at their disposal, although, he, thereby, violated the agreement of 10th January 1645. By the end of 1646 he felt confident enough to decide to expel all the Portuguese from Dutch territory and to confiscate their lands, But when he heard, early in 1647, that the Portuguese had recently obtained considerable reinforcements from Goa, and that they were carrying on secret negotiations with Raja Sinha, he decided to carry out his intentions at a more favourable opportunity. But he expelled two Portuguese priests; who had continued their activities in Dutch territory, and also one Francisco Antunes, whom he considered to be a very harmful influence amongst the Company's subjects.⁸⁴

Meanwhile, on 15th January 1647,⁸⁵ Cornelis van der Lijn and his Councillors wrote to the Directors of the Company asking for permission to resume the war with the Portuguese. By letter of 26 January,⁸⁶ Maetsuijcker too suggested the same idea to the Directors, Two years later⁸⁷ the Batavian authorities wrote once again on the subject, pointing out that as the Portuguese were carefully refraining from affording them any excuse for commencing hostilities, there was no way of breaking the truce unless they received positive orders to do so.

The idea of commencing war with the Portuguese, was an attractive one for the Directors, who saw in it the only means of preventing the Portuguese from competing with the Company in the European spice-market and thereby reducing its profits. Therefore, in their letter of 4th October 1647, they asked the Governor-General and Council to begin the war if there was a defensible excuse for it. But they must confine themselves to only defensive warfare in Ceylon, where the number of soldiers must be greatly reduced in order to diminish the burdensome expenses of a huge garrison. The blockade of Goa, however, was to be taken up in earnest. But in their letter of the 9th of the following month, they thought it advisable that all available forces should be used in Ceylon in order to drive out the Portuguese, completely from that island. This idea was even more clearly expressed in their letter of 28 March 1648. But in September of that year, they were once more enjoining Batavia to reduce the garrison in Ceylon, and to think of being on the defensive there. And on 23rd September 1649, they sharply ordered the Batavian authorities to follow instructions and reduce the forces in Ceylon.⁸⁸

From all these instructions, it is apparent that the Directors were

in two minds regarding the war question. Realising this Van der Lijn and his colleagues acted warily, and the result was, that, until after the expiry of the Ten Year's Truce, war was not resumed.

Meanwhile, throughout the period of the Truce, the Portuguese were well on their guard because they knew that the Dutch would not neglect any good opportunity of attacking them. For the same reason, they took care not to give the Dutch reason for a *casus belli*.

They were not so fearful, however, as to let the Dutch have their own way in the disputes, which arose during the period of truce. Wherever possible, they either held their own or took retaliatory measures. For instance, despite all threats, they refused to budge from the lands of Alauwa and Wisinaway. And when early in 1649 Maetsuijcker made bold to expel all Portuguese property-holders from Dutch jurisdiction, Homem retaliated by refusing passage through Portuguese territory to the Chaleas, who were sent from Galle to peel cinnamon in Negombo. (As a result, the Dutch had to undergo much expense and inconvenience in transporting the Chaleas and the cinnamon by sea.)

The Portuguese did not content themselves with merely defensive or retaliatory measures. Where they saw an opportunity of harming the Dutch, without running the risk of thereby precipitating a war, they took it. For instance, when in 1646 Raja Sinha came down on the Dutch in Negombo, Homem secretly ordered the inhabitants to take supplies to the King's army. Then again, by threats and other unscrupulous means, he prevented many Indian merchants from trading with the Dutch ports. The Viceroy himself caused much harm to the Dutch by successfully inciting the Nayaka of Madura to expel them from Kayalpatanam.⁸⁹

Despite their friendly neutrality towards Raja Sinha during the latter's campaign against the Dutch, the Portuguese, as we have seen earlier, were unable to obtain peace from the King. And although there seemed to have been long lulls to the fighting, the fact was that during the years of the Truce with the Dutch, the Portuguese lost a large amount of territory to the King, particularly in the Four and Seven Korales.

With Raja Sinha continuing at enmity with them, and the Dutch awaiting orders for a resumption of war, the Portuguese applied themselves to strengthening and improving the fortifications of Colombo,⁹⁰ on the strength of which lay their hopes of survival in Ceylon.

1. cf. Raja Sinha to Maetsuijcker, 16 Feb. 1645, in Diary of Maetsuijcker, Kol. Arch. 1060 fos. 401-76. (cf. also *Dagh-Reg. 1645*, 299-301; *JCRAS XVIII*. 185-87.); Instructions for Maet., 1 Feb. 1646, Kol. Arch. 773 p. 41.
2. Had been Captain-Major of the Field in Ceylon for a brief period in 1623; Captain-General of São Tomé (Meliapur) in 1634; Captain-General of Ceylon, 1645-53; interim Governor of Portuguese India, 1656-57; died at Goa, Sep. 1657; an irresolute and unpopular character among his compatriots.
3. For the above, see in particular: Thijs. to G. G. & C., 17 April 1645, Kol. Arch. 1059 (Bis.) fos. 430-34; Same to same 26 May 1645, Kol. Arch. 1059 fos. 259-62; Thijs. to Arnold Heussen, 20 March 1645, Kol. Arch. 1059 fos. 311-14; Diary of Negombo, 20 March to 28 April 1645, Kol. Arch. 1059 fos. 396-407.
4. cf. p. 166 above and Heeres, *Corpus Dip.*, i. 434. Fr. Gonçalo Veloso, who made these and other complains at Batavia was told by G. G. & C. that they would write to Thijssen ordering him to make amends. Thereupon, Veloso asked for an extract from this letter. The letter was written and the extract was supplied. But below the portion of the letter which was given in the extract there was a sentence, which asked Thijssen to act 'sonder aenschouw van het gene boven gesecht is, meer ter contemplatie van den ambassadeur als dat onse meijninge juijst sodanich soude zijn.' ('Councillors of India' to Thijs., 31 July 1645, Kol. Arch. 772 pp. 394-407).
5. Kol. Arch. 1059 (Bis) fos. 430-34.
6. Raja to Maet. 16 Feb. 1645, in Diary of Maet., Kol. Arch. 1060 fos. 401-76; Thijs. to G. G. & C., 26 May 1645, Kol. Arch. 1059 fos. 259-62. Queyroz (894) and more particularly Ribeiro (159-60) are wrong in depicting the period from 1645-1652 as being one of peace between Raja Sinha and the Portuguese. Queyroz (910-11) and Ribeiro (174) themselves have evidence, which contradicts their earlier assertions. cf. also Maet. to G. G. & C., 13 April 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 79-87.
7. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 26 May 1645, Kol. Arch. 1059 fos. 259-62. In Batticaloa where the merchant Laurens de Maerschalk was stationed primarily for the purpose of receiving merchandise from the King, the displeasure against the Dutch showed itself in many ways. For instance, he was deprived of food-provisions for a long time, and all the illicit trade, which he had been stealthily carrying on up to that time, was suddenly stopped. As an exemple to others, two Veddahs who had secretly supplied him with wax-not food as Aalbers (*Rijcklof Van Goens*, 41) wrongly stated- were put to death on the King's orders. (Maerschalk to Thijs. 18 Feb. 1645 and 9 April 1645, Kol. Arch. 1059 fos. 315, 435).
8. cf. p. 125 n. 1; pp. 157, 162 and p. 163 n. 1. above.
9. In his letter of 18 March 1644 to G. G. & C (Kol. Arch. 1059 fo. 322) Thijs. had said: 'If the Portuguese had the daring to fight both the King and us, we could also maintain our own against Raja and the Portuguese.'
10. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 26 May 1645, Kol. Arch. 1059 fos. 311-14 Thijssen's proclamation is also given in: Van Geer, App. XXXIV pp. 89-90; Heeres, *Corpus Dip.* i. 450-51; *Dagh-Reg. 1645*, 311-12. The last mentioned work also has a version of Thijssen's letter of 26 May, but there are several inaccuracies in this version, even the date being given as 28 May.

11. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 20 Aug. 1645, Kol. Arch. 1058 (Bis) fos. 660-70; cf. also *Dagh-Reg. 1645*, 313ff. (The copy of the letter at the *Rijksarchief* is more detailed than the *Dagh-Reg.* version, which has sometimes left out important facts.
12. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 20 Aug. 1645, *Ibid.* Raja Sinha to Thijs., 13 June 1645, quoted in Instructions for Maet., 1 Feb. 1646, Kol. Arch. 773 pp. 31-59.
13. Van Geer (142) mistakenly considers this loan to have taken place *before* 26 May 1645.
14. 'Councillors of India' to Thijs., 31 July 1645, Kol. Arch. 772 pp. 394-407. This letter was sent before the receipt of Thijssen's letter of 26 May (cf. *Dagh-Reg. 1645*, 308). Among other things the Councillors said: 'wij onsen voordesen gegeven ordre, als noch blijven confirmeren, dat U.E. gelijk wel heeft beginnen te doen, sich niet ontsien sal desselfs quade gangen met force tegen te gaen, het zij dan op sijn eigen name, gelick U.E. voordesen hebben aengeschreven, of wel opentlijck des nodich sijnde, sonder simulatie, also ons nu dewijl met den portugees in vrede en alliantie sijn daer zoo veel niet aengelegen laten.' Among those who signed these significant instructions, were Maetsuijcker and Cornelis van der Lijn, who was President of the Council until he became G. G. in Oct. 1646.
See further note 25 below.
15. Thijs. to G. G. & C., 17 Sep. 1645, in *Dagh-Reg. 1645*, 317.
16. cf. 'Councillors of India' to Dirs., 17 Dec. 1645, Kol. Arch. 1058 fos. 55-67. A lengthy though not adequate extract from this letter is given by Van Geer (App. XXXI pp. 78-85). He (145, 153) was quite wrong in saying that no orders for the restitution of Negombo were ever received at Batavia. He has overlooked clear evidence to the contrary in pp. 80, 84 and 85 of his App. XXXI.
17. The Batavian authorities, nevertheless decided to use this pretext and disobey the orders of the Prince and of the States-General. They were confident that the King could soon be reconciled and that thereby their pretext could be made rather plausible. cf. their letter of 17 Dec. 1645 to the Directors referred to in the previous note.
18. 'Councillors of India' to Dirs., 17 Dec. 1645, Kol. Arch. 1058 fos. 55-67. The Councillors now feigned such surprise and righteous indignation at Thijssen's declaration of war, that the Directors believed Thijssen to have acted quite contrary to the intentions and the orders of the Batavian authorities. (Dirs. to G. G. & C., 16 Aug. 1646, Kol. Arch. 455, fos. 63-64). In fact, Van Geer and all the other writers on the subject have been hitherto misled in the same manner, cf. (among others): Van Geer, 143-47; MacLeod, ii. 148; Stapel, *Geschiedenis.*, iii 259; Pieris, *Some Docs.* 129-30.
19. Instructions for Maet., 1 Feb. 1616, Kol. Arch. 773, pp. 31-59. The Councillors also sent a letter of the same date to Raja Sinha (Kol. Arch. 773 pp. 60-63). The main theme of the letter was an emphasis of their peaceful intentions and their goodwill towards him. They also apologised for the delay in sending a commissioner to undo the harm done by Thyssen.
Note that although Maetsuijcker was sent as a Special Commissioner, for a short period, he ultimately had to continue as Governor of Ceylon until Feb. 1650.

20. 'wij altoos 't gevolch van onse hostile aggressen op sijnen naem, gelijk U.E. kennelijcq is justificeren cunnen.'
21. Thijs. to W. Geleijnsen de Jonge, 25 Jan. 1646, Kol. Arch. 1059 (Bis) fos. 722-23; Thijs. to Arnold Heussen, 1 May 1646, Kol. Arch. 1063 fos. 90-92. Van Geer (146) is wrong in placing this event in April. He is equally wrong as to the nature of the event.
22. So I interpret 'acht: C' and '20: C' (in 'Councillors of India', to Maet., 30 Aug. 1646, Kol. Arch. 773 p. 297). But in their letter of 15 Jan. 1647 to the Dirs. (Kol. Arch. 1062 fos. 2-7) G. G. & C., estimate the entire forces, after the arrival of the King himself at 8000 men.
23. cf. Resolution of Maetsuijcker and his Council, 31 Dec. 1646, Kol. Arch. 1065 (Bis.) fo. 758.
24. Valentyn, 121. Maetsuijcker followed up this letter with one on 4 May and another on the 10th June. On the 10th he wrote: 'Ook namen wij God tot Getuyge, dat noit de intentie geweest zij na eenig bezit in deze Landen te tragten maer alleen om Zijn Majesteyt Assistentie te doen' (Valentyn, 121-22).
- Despite what Maet. wrote to Raja, Overschie continued at Negombo. But in 1649 he was convicted of gross irregularities and removed, from his post. His sentence was enhanced in appeal at Batavia and he was ordered to be repatriated.
- As regards Thijssen, shortly after his arrival at Batavia he was sent as Governor of Malacca. The Directors were displeased that he was again appointed to a responsible post (Cf. Dirs. to G. G. & C., 4 Oct. 1647, Kol. Arch. 455 fos. 84-85). But G. G. & C. had to show their gratitude for the fact that in his written defence (Kol. Arch. 1061 fos. 574-77) he did not even allude to their incriminatory letter of 31 July, but merely contented himself with making lame excuses.
25. For the King's letters, see *JCRAS* XVIII. 189-91. It is very interesting to find Saar emphasising that the King was most anxious for peace, while the Hollanders were bent on war. (Johann Jacob Saar, *Ost-Indianische Funfzehnjährige Kriegs-Dienste*, Edited by S. P. L'Honore Naber, as Volume VI of the *Reisebeschreibungen*, etc., Hague, 1930, p. 99; cf. translation of portions of Saar's work dealing with Ceylon in *JCRAS*. XI. 270. Saar first arrived in Ceylon on 4 Oct. 1647.
26. The narrative of the above events has been based on: Maet. to G. G. & C., 23 May 1646, Kol. Arch. 1061 fos. 518-24; G. G. & C., to Maet., 30 Aug. 1646, Kol. Arch. 773 pp. 297-320; G. G. & C., to Dirs., 15 Jan. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1062 fos. 2-7. There are different versions of these events in Saar (*Reisebeschreibungen* etc., VI. 99-104) and in Johann Von der Behr (*Reisebeschreibungen* etc., IV. 87-89). Both these soldiers outdo Ribeiro's characteristic of conjuring up Kandyan forces of mythical proportions. But, on the whole, Von der Behr's account is a much more sober one than that of Saar, who has much that is fanciful (Von der Behr was in Ceylon during the events of 1646). The accounts of Van Geer (146) MacLeod (ii. 148-49) Pieris (*Port. Era.*, ii 348-51); etc. suffer from various inaccuracies.
27. This letter itself is not forthcoming. But its main contents can be gathered from Raja Sinha's letters of 21 May and 11 June to the commander of Ne-

gombo (*JCRAS* XVIII. 192, 195) and from G. G. & C. to Maet., 30 Aug. 1646, Kol. Arch. 773), pp. 297-320.

28. Many of Maetsuijcker's letters are given either in summary form or *in extenso* by Valentyn (121-27). Of these only a few are available at the Rijksarchief at The Hague or (as far as I know) anywhere else. On account of this, Valentyn's extracts and summaries are invaluable. But they must be used with caution, as comparison with copies of some letters available at the Hague, shows that he has not stuck close enough to the original letters (cf. p. 207 n. 4 and p. 208 n. 3 etc). Donald Ferguson has referred to all and translated some of these letters given by Valentyn. (cf. *JCRAS* XVIII. 189-204 *passim*.)
The *Beknopte Historie van de voornaamste gebeurtenissen op Ceilon* etc., (Trans. in *JCRAS* XI. 1ff) also contains summaries and extracts from some of these letters; but they seem to be mostly derived from Valentyn.
29. Quoted by Maet. in his letter of 13 April 1647 to Batavia, Kol. Arch. 1065 fo. 82.
30. Without Chaleas we cannot get the fruits of the land, and the lands have to be protected and kept in peace by means of the lascarins, without whom warfare cannot be properly conducted in this island.' Maet. to G. G. & C., 13 April 1647 cf. E. Reimers (Ed.) *Memoir of Joan Maetsuijcker, 1650*, p. 40.
31. For the above, see in particular: Maet. to Heussen, 27 June 1646, Kol. Arch. 1063 fos. 101-102; Maet. to P. Sterthemius, 19 Aug. 1646, Kol. Arch. 1063 fo. 102; Maet. to G. G. & C., 13 April 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 79-87; Same to same, 18 Nov. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065, fos. 303-18; G. G. & C., to Maet., 14 Sep. 1647, Kol. Arch. 774 pp. 487-504.
32. Terms of Treaty in Aitzema, *Historie of Verhael* etc., VI. 62-65.
33. Protest of Homem to Maet., 15 June 1646, Kol. Arch. 1063, no pagination; Reply of Maet. to Homem, 13 Aug. 1646, Kol. Arch. 1061 fos. 562-73; Maet. to Dirs., 9 Nov. 1646, Kol. Arch. 1063 fos. 263-64; Maet. to G. G. & C., 13 April 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065, fos. 79-87.
34. Kol. Arch. 773 pp. 297-320. Re Negombo, they said: ende staet daerom te overwegen off dan tot reconciliatoir humeur bij uijtstellingh van een jaer off anderhalff niet te bewegen soude zijn, om hem eeniger maeten in hoope te stellen van restitutie te sullen krijgen, waermede op gevolchde acceptatie sijn tegenstrevigheijt wat ingetoomt, ende tijt gewonnen, veel gewonnen soude sijn, excuserende den geconditioneerde uijtstel, dat suicx ten principalen geschiet int regard van den portugaleesch, wanneer jegens d'expiratie van den geprefigeerde tijt het niet mancqueren sal aen politycque consideratien ende impulsive motijven tot verder dilaj . . .'
35. Valentyn, 124, Summary contents of this letter are found in Maet. to G. G. & C., 13 April 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065, fos. 79-87.
36. The letter of 12 August is not mentioned by Valentyn but is referred to in Maet's letter of 13 April 1647 referred to in previous note. The letter of 21 June is found in Valentyn, 123.
37. cf. Resolution of Maet. & Council, 31 Dec. 1646, Kol. Arch. 1065 (Bis) fo. 758.
38. Valentyn, 124.
39. Kol. Arch. 1065 fo. 321.

40. Kol. Arch. 1065 fo. 322. Valentyn, 124. By comparing Valentyn's version of this letter with that at the *Rijksarchief*, I find that Valentyn has considerably condensed this letter.
41. dated 21 Aug. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fo. 324; Valentyn (125) has again a considerably condensed version. Ferguson (*JCRAS* XVIII. 198) wrongly translates 'een aanzienelyker Ambassadeur' by 'a regular ambassador'.
42. Kol. Arch. 1065 fo. 321.
43. Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 324-26. Valentyn (125) has left out some important details of this letter.
44. Instructions for Maerschalk, 22 Aug. 1647. Kol. Arch. 1065 (Bis). fos. 775-79.
45. For what took place at Kandy during this period see in particular: Maerschalk to Maet., 24 Sep. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 334-35; Same to same, 10 Oct. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 335-37; Revisions of Treaty proposed by Raja, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 338-39; Maet. to Maerschalk, 18 Oct. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 328-29.
46. Kol. Arch. 774 pp. 487-504. The expected orders for a war with Raja Sinha did not, however, come from the Dirs.
47. Maet. to Maerschalk, 5 Nov. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 330-32.
48. Maet. to G. G. & C., 7 Feb. 1648, Kol. Arch. 1067 fos. 202-04; Same to same, 17 May 1748, Kol. Arch. 1067 fos. 154-59.
49. cf. Maet. to G. G. & C., 7 Feb. 1648, *Ibid*.
50. Referred to by Valentyn (125); but no details given.
51. Summary contents of letter in Maet. to G. G. & C., 31 Oct. 1648, Kol. Arch. 1066 (Bis). fos. 115-22; Extract from letter, in Valentyn, 125.
52. Maet. to G. G. & C., 31 Oct. 1648, *Ibid*.
53. Valentyn, 125.
54. cf. G. G. & C. to Maet., 7 Oct. 1649, Kol. Arch. 776 fos. 139-44. It is not possible to say why the King changed his mind, because full details of Maet's letters are not available; nor is Maerschalk's diary (referred to by G. G. & C., in their letter) forthcoming.
55. Incidentally, in his letter of 27 June 1649 (see next note, below) Raja pointed out that this Portuguese was only Vidana of Paname.
For the correspondence mentioned at the beginning of the para. See Valentyn, 125-26.
56. Trans. from original by Ferguson in *JCRAS* XVIII. 200-02.
57. In their letter of 7 Oct. 1649 (Kol. Arch. 776 fos. 139-44) G. G. & C. told Maet. that as they were Christians and therefore bound to keep their promises, they could not agree with his ideas on this matter. But the Directors in their letter of 10 Sep. 1650 (Kol. Arch. 455 fo. 195) entirely agreed with Maet's views, and regarding the King's debt they said: 'die alrede soo groot is, ende noch wijders soo geextendeert can werden, dat hij deselve nimmermeer sal connen voldoen.' And they continued: invougen wij met d'E Maetsuijcker mede souden besluyten, dat duijsende saecken tusschen beijden voorvallen sullen, ende dat den Radja tsijner tijt met de macht van de Compagnie tot reden gebracht sal moeten werden.'
58. cf. Valentyn, 126.
59. Valentyn, 126. Valentyn gives the date as 8 Aug. But in Raja's letter of 16 Nov. 1649 (Kol. Arch. 1069 Bis. fos. 844-45) the date is given as 12 Aug.

Incidentally, the summary contents of Maet's letter can be gathered from Raja's letter, which serves as a useful check on Valentyn.

60. Raja to Maet., 16 Nov. 1649, Kol. Arch. 1069 (bis) fos. 844-45; Maet. to Dirs., 3 Jan 1650, Kol. Arch. 1069 (Bis) fos. 848-49. For the new treaty (which was considered by Raja as a renewal of the Treaty of 1638) see: E. Reimers, *Memoir of Joan Maetsuijcker*, Bijlage C. pp. 59-64; Heeres in *Corpus. Dip.* i. 515-19 gives only some of the Articles.
61. *Ibid.*
62. Maet. wrote to the Dirs. on 3 Jan. 1650 (Kol. Arch. 1069, Bis. fos. 848-49) explaining his policy thus: . . . met vast gestelden resolutie van onse sijde hem de landen niet in te willigen, maer hetselve met alle practicabile uijtvluchten en tergiversatien te excuseren.'
Although Van der Lijn and his councillors had themselves suggested a policy of deceit regarding the King's demand for Neogombo and the Matara Dissawani (See p. 117 and note 34 above) they now expressed great indignation at Maet's policy. In their letter of 18 Sep. 1650 (Kol. Arch. 777 pp. 371-89) they told Kittensteijn: Wij prijsen het goet ende geluckigh success, de verlossinge onser arme gevangenen, waer over ons oock met haer verblijden, maer het beleidt, ende de middelen daer toe gebruijckt, en connen wij niet vrij van opspraeck, noch sonder reprochje houden . . . , al en contra moeten wij oock wel wachten, van iets, te belooven, ende dat niet naer te comen . . . , in 't gehouden dagh-register der commissarissen Burchart Cox ende Pieter Kieft, bij den coninck in Candia sijnde, sien wij, dat hij op Radja Singas versoeck, om Negombo in sijn gewelt te mogen obtineren, hem tot antwoordt geven, sij vertrouwen dat d'Ed. Heer Generael Sijne Majt sulcx niet soude refuseren; dat misslagen ende ijdele toeseggingen sijn, die daer naer niet anders als quade vruchten geven.'
63. Maet. to Raja, 27 Dec. 1649 (with P. S. of 28 and of 29 Dec.) Kol. Arch. 1069 (Bis) fos. 850-51; Maet. to Kieft, 29 Dec. 1649, Kol. Arch. 1069 (Bis) fos. 429-30.
64. On the above, cf. Maet. to Kieft, 11 Jan. 1650, Kol. Arch. 1071 fo. 431; Same to same, 15 Jan. 1650 Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 431-33; Maet. to Thijssen, 10 Jan. 1650, Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 402-03; Ultimatum of Maet. to Rampoth, 28 Jan. 1650, Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 391-92.
65. Kol. Arch. 1071 fo. 403.
66. Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 443-44 and 445-47 respectively.
67. Had served for 14 years in various factories of the Company in North-India, and in 1649 was on the point of repatriating, when Van der Lijn persuaded him to take up the Government of Ceylon in succession to Maetsuijcker. In Nov. 1651 he was promoted from the rank of President to that of Governor. In Oct. 1653 he was relieved of his charge at his earnest request. But on 26 Dec. 1653 he died at Batavia before he could undertake his long-desired voyage to the Netherlands.
68. Reimers (Ed.) *Memoir of Joan Maetsuijcker*.
69. cf. Marcus Cassel to Kittensteijn, 24 March 1650, Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 341-42.
70. For the *affaire Rampoth* and certain other connected matters, since the departure of Maet. see (in particular) Kittensteijn to Thijssen, 21 March 1650,

- Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 393-94; Kitt. to G. G. & C., 23 March 1650, Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 375; Kitt. to Heussen, 1 April 1650, Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 451-52; Resolutions of Kitt. & C., 19 March and 26 March 1650, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 495-98; Kitt. to G. G. & C., 10 May 1650 Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 324-33. To my knowledge, MacLeod is the only writer hitherto who has consulted the documents at the *Rijksarchief* for a study of the negotiations between Maet. and Raja and for the *affaire Ramboth*. But Mac Leod's account (ii. 370-74) of these matters is quite faulty, as he has missed many of the salient facts.
71. Kol. Arch. 1070 (Bis) fos. 646-48, cf. also a translation from the original, by Ferguson in *JCRAS XVIII* 204-06; also in Pieris, *Some Docs.*, 155-57. A comparison of the translation in *Some Docs.* with that of Ferguson, will indicate, once again, the inaccuracies of the translations in the former work. (The Dutch copy of this letter at the Hague agrees in content with Ferguson's translation).
72. Kol. Arch. 1070 (Bis) fos. 648-49; also in *Some Docs.* 158-59. Kitt. had written to Raja on 1 April (Kol. Arch. 1071 fo. 357) and on 25 April (Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 358-59). The second of these letters is given in *Some Docs.* 154-55.
73. Kol. Arch. 1070 (Bis) fos. 651-52; cf. also *Some Docs.*, 159-60.
74. Kitt. wrote to G. G. & C., on 20 Jan. 1651 (Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 377-87) saying that the King had asked for the account and offered to pay the debt within one year, and that he could give no other reply to this than: 'dat sulcx sijne Majjt. te swaer, en ons te nadelich soude vallen, mitsgaders sijne Mts. Reecq.^e van d'gesupporteerde ongelden in sijnen dienst van Bat.^a sijn verwachtende, t welck hij ontwijfel. voor frivole excusen soude aennemem.'
75. 25 Aug. 1650, Kol. Arch. 1070 (Bis) fo. 650, cf. also Pieris, *Some Docs.*, 160, This translation is as inaccurate as most of the others in this book. From the translation of Kitt.'s letter of 6 Nov. 1650, Dr. Pieris (*Some Docs.* 162) concludes that the communications of the Dutch with their outposts at Hakmana and Akuressa were cut off. In Kitts'. letter there is no evidence at all to that effect.
76. cf. on above Diary of Kieft, March-April 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 504-16; Kieft to Kitt. 3, 4, 8 Aug. 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 517-21; Raja to Kieft, 1 Aug. 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fo. 523; Raja to Kitt, 23 July 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fo. 526; Same to same, 10 Aug. 1651, *JCRAS XVIII*-209; Kitt. to G. G. & C., 5 April 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 411-17; Kitt. to G. G. & C., 30 Aug. 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fo. 474.
77. Kitt & C. to G. G. & C., 23 Sep. 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 476-86; Same to same, 9 Nov. 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 489-90; G. G. & C., to Kitt., 22 Nov. 1651, Kol. Arch. 778-p. 401. G. G. & C., to Dirs., 24 Jan. 1652, Kol. Arch. 1074 fos. 28-29.
78. Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 29 Feb. 1652, Kol. Arch. 1086 fos. 570-78. Same to same, 21 April and 16 May 1652, Kol. Arch. 1086 fos. 581-90; Same to same, 7 July 1652, Kol. Arch. 1086 fos. 594-606; Raja to Kitt., 5 Sept. 1652 *JCRAS XXI*. 260-66; Raja to Kieft, 10 Jan. 1652, *JCRAS XVIII*. 210.
79. Diary of Kieft, March-April 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos., 504-16; Raja to Kieft, 10 Jan. 1652, *JCRAS XVIII*. 210 ff.

80. cf. Adriaen van der Meijden to Kitt. 26 Feb. 1650, Kol. Arch., 1071 fos. 417-18.
81. Maet. to G. G. & C., 18 Nov. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 303-18.
82. Kol. Arch. 1070 (Bis) fos. 652-53.
83. cf. G. G. & C., to Dirs. 24 Dec. 1652, Kol. Arch. 1080 fos. 154-66.
84. cf. on the above: G. G. & C. to Maet., 30 Aug. 1646, Kol. Arch. 773, pp. 297-320; Resolution of Maet. & C., 31 Dec. 1646, Kol. Arch. 1065 (Bis) fo. 759; Maet. to Dirs., 26 Jan. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1063 fos. 265-72; Maet. to G. G. & C., 13 April 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 79-87.
85. Kol. Arch. 1062 fos. 2-7.
86. Kol. Arch. 1063 fos. 266-72.
87. 18 Jan. 1649, Kol. Arch. 1066 fos. 75-83.
88. The letters referred to in this para are found in: Kol. Arch. 455, fos. 73-85, fos. 97-98, fo. 104, fo. 116 and fos. 145-46 respectively cf. also MacLeod ii. 371.
89. For the attitude of the Portuguese and the measures taken by them, see, in particular: Instructions for Maet., 1 Feb. 1646, Kol. Arch. 773 pp. 31-59; Resolution of Maet. & C., 31 Dec. 1646, Kol. Arch. 1065 (Bis) fo. 759; Maet. to G. G. & C., 18 Nov. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 303-18; Same to same, 17 March 1649, Kol. Arch. 1069 fos. 452-67; Arent Baerentsen to G. G. & C., 22 May 1649, Kol. Arch. 1069 fos. 487-89; Viceroy to King (of Portugal, 14 Jan. 1649, Bk. 59. fo. 50 (Bks of the Monsoons) I.O.L. *Port. Recs.* (Trans) 16.
- In retaliation for the expulsion of the Dutch from Kayalpatanam, Maet. led an expedition to the Coast of Madura early in 1649. In the course of this expedition the Portuguese at Tutucorin had to pay for the sins of their Viceroy. cf. MacLeod, ii. 376-82; M. A. P. Roelofs., *De Vestiging der Nederlanders ter Kuste Malabar* (Vol. 4 of the *Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut*, etc., The Hague 1943). 125-28.
90. Although the Portuguese have accused Homem of having completely neglected to attend to the fortifications of the city, the Dutch always refer to the fact that Colombo was being 'incessantly' fortified during the truce years, cf. eg. Instructions for Maet., 1 Feb. 1646, Kol. Arch. 773 pp. 31-59; Kitt. to G. G. & C., 5 April 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 411-17; Same to same, 29 Feb. 1652, Kol. 1086 fos. 570-78.

AIMS AND METHODS OF DUTCH ADMINISTRATION 1644 - 1652

By 1652, the Dutch East India Company was *de facto*¹ ruler over a considerable extent of territory in Ceylon. In the South-West portion of the island, its territory stretched along the coast from the Bentota-Ganga to the Walawe-Ganga. At certain points of this coastal strip its sway extended up to some thirty or forty miles inland; but at certain others, its authority did not extend so far. In terms of the Korale or Provincial divisions of the country, this territory comprised the Dolosdas, Morawak, Weligam and Galu Korales and small portions of the Walallawiti and Pasdum Korales. For a brief period in 1645, Governor Jan Thijssen seems to have controlled the Kolonna Korale, but during the war with the King, it was lost for good. As a result of this same war, the Company lost the rich and extensive Seven Korales, in the area of Negombo, where it was left with only a small territory in the vicinity of the fort.

The Company's lands were ruled by a President or a Governor (as the case may be) assisted by a Council. The Governor (or President) and Council were under the supreme authority of the Governor-General and Council, without whose previous consent no major decisions were generally taken, and, to whom regular reports on all important matters had to be sent.

Apart from the Governor and the Secretary, the officers usually represented on the Council were the Senior Merchant, the Fiscal, the Receiver of the Lands' Incomes, the Chief Captain of the Armed Forces, the Captain of the Mahabadde and the Captain of the Galu Korale. These last two officers were not necessarily, or even often, military men, as their functions were more civil than military. In the Council, the person next in rank to the Governor was the Senior Merchant, who was in charge of matters connected with trade and finances.²

In theory, the Governor was expected to decide important matters only in consultation with the Council; in practice, however, he did not fully adhere to this principle. But when in 1651 the Batavian authorities received secret information that Van Kitten-

steijn had taken certain important decisions without the consent of the Council they sent the following explicit orders to him:

‘We require that in future you will not undertake or decide any matters of importance, except with previous consent and common decision of the Council - as happens here and everywhere, where good order is maintained. And, so that the Councillors may have the fuller knowledge of all matters concerning the affairs of government, they will, in future, sign the letters (to Batavia, apparently) along with you.’³

These orders seem to have had much effect, because thereafter - at least up to 1658 - the Batavian authorities heard of no instance where the Governor had acted in any matter of importance, without the consent of the Council.

The Dutch territory in Negombo was administered by an *Opperhooft* or Chief, who was subordinate to the Governor and Council in Galle. Nevertheless, he exercised a considerable measure of independence, because the authorities in Galle had no opportunity of directly supervising his actions, except during a rare visit, which the Governor might make to Negombo.

The day to day administration of the lands in the Galle area was divided up among four officers, whose actions were more or less effectively supervised by the Governor and Council. They exercised administrative, judicial and military authority in the territories under their charge. But this authority was limited, because they had to submit all matters of importance, to the Governor and Council for advice and decision.⁴

Of these four officers, the least in importance, was the officer-in-charge of the outposts along the Bentota-Ganga. In addition to his military duties, he administered the portions of the Pasdum and Walallawiti Korales belonging to the Dutch. The lands and the number of inhabitants under his authority were of comparatively small proportions. In his work, he was assisted by the Sinhalese Adigar of Bentota.

The Captain of the *Mahabadda* or cinnamon Department was another officer (from among these four) who administered a comparatively small area. The Chalea villages of Kosgoda, Welitara, Madampe, Akurala, Ratgama, Dadalla, Magalla and Lanumodera were under this Captain; so also were one or two villages of the Walallawiti Korale, in which lived the caste called

the Panneas, who also were bound by ancient custom to peel cinnamon. The Captain of the *Mahabadda* was assisted by four Sinhalese Vidanas, in the task of administering the Chaleas (and Panneas) and in seeing that the prescribed quota of cinnamon was obtained annually. As cinnamon was by far the most profitable source of income from the island, for the Company, the Captaincy of the *Mahabadda* was one of the most important posts in the Dutch Government in Ceylon.

The Captaincy of the extensive and populous Galu Korale⁵ was another important post. In administering the lands, the Captain was assisted by a Sinhalese Mudaliyar. The Captains of Galu Corale Mahabadda were members of the Governor's Council, and they had their usual residence within the fort.

In charge of a much larger area than the Captain of the Galu Korale, was the Dissawe of Matara, who administered the Weligam, Dolosdas and Morawak Korales. Although the Dutch Dissawe did not have more than a small fraction of the powers, which the Portuguese⁶ had allowed their Dissawes to assume, yet he still enjoyed much respect and prestige among the Sinhalese inhabitants. As he administered the Dissawani from Matara, which was about thirty miles from Galle, the Governor and Council were not able to supervise his actions, constantly. This gave him a greater measure of independence that either the Captain of the Mahabadda or the Captain of the Galu Korale could hope to have. But he (as also the three other officers mentioned above) had to submit frequent reports of his actions and refer all important matters to the decision of the Governor and Council. Moreover, the Governor himself paid occasional visits to Matara to find out things for himself. By these means a tolerable check on the Dissawe's actions was assured. The Dissawe was assisted in the work of administration by the Adigar of Matara, the foremost Sinhalese chief in Dutch territory.⁷

The principal source of revenue from this territory was, as earlier remarked, the cinnamon. On an average, about 800 bahars of 480 (Dutch) pounds the bahar were annually sent to Batavia and thence to the Netherlands. Pricing it at the very low figure⁸ of one florin per pound the Dutch could obtain at least 384,000 florins annually from this cinnamon.

The second important item of revenue was derived from the sale of elephants. The inhabitants assigned to the hunt, had, from

ancient times, to deliver thirty-four elephants annually to the lord of the land. For various reasons, such as the lack of sufficient decoy-elephants,⁹ the full quota was never supplied during the period under review. From the full quota, the Dutch could hope to obtain at least sixty or seventy thousand florins yearly.

The customary dues paid by the inhabitants, the rents and leases and the tolls, together constituted another important item of revenue. Annually some twenty to thirty thousand florins were realised from this item, from which the Dutch were expecting to obtain more revenue in the future, by such measures as raising the tolls.

The trade in arecanuts which were found in great quantity in the Dutch territory, also promised fair profits. If the cloth, which was brought from Coromandel in exchange for the arecanut, could be sold at their own prices, the Dutch stood to obtain a larger profit. But the Moors, who had long been doing this exchange trade, were such keen competitors that the Dutch had to be content with small profits.¹⁰

It is apparent from all that has been said above, that the profits from the cinnamon were about three or four times the total profits from all the other items of revenue in the Dutch territory in Ceylon. But the interesting fact was, that in calculating the Revenue and Expenditure Account of Ceylon, the Dutch did not include the cinnamon as part of the Islands revenue. The Directors of the Company and the Batavian authorities wished the Island to balance its budget without its most important item of revenue.¹¹

There was one big difficulty, which obstructed the realisation of this desirable aim; namely, the expenses involved in maintaining the comparatively huge forces stationed in the Island. To get over this difficulty and, at the same time, to consolidate the Company's position, the idea of founding a large Dutch colony in Ceylon was taken up. It was felt that the military forces could be reduced to very inexpensive proportion by following the practice of the Portuguese and entrusting the defence of the fortresses to the colonists.¹²

It was Maetsuijcker, who first put this idea into practice in Ceylon. He was convinced that the Company possessed no place more suitable than Ceylon for founding a large Dutch colony.¹³ When he was in Ceylon in 1645 in connection with the truce negotiations, he permitted several soldiers to leave the Company's

service and set themselves up as colonists. When he returned to Ceylon in 1646, he continued this policy; so that at his departure for Batavia in 1650, there were nearly seventy colonists.

Most of these men were provided with villages and estates for their maintenance, and all were given every possible help, short of anything that might be considered prejudicial to the Company's interests. For instance, whereas tolls were imposed on all other private merchants, the colonists could import rice without paying any tolls. Then again from the time of Van Kittensteijn even cinnamon (though of the coarser varieties) was sold to the colonists, who were permitted to re-sell it in various parts of India.¹⁴

Nevertheless, despite all efforts, the project of colonisation did not progress satisfactorily. With but few exceptions, the colonists showed little or no enterprise and energy. They were content with merely drawing the incomes from the villages allotted to them. There were some, in fact, who were too lazy to look after their villages and estates and rented these out for half their value. Those who had not been given sufficient lands, rapidly went to ruin through poverty. And as the Company had no more lands available for allotment, Van Kittensteijn stated that there was little or no prospect of an increase in the size of the Colony. In fact, many colonists were importunating him to take them back into the service of the Company.¹⁵

Apart from the colonists' lack of enterprise and disinclination for hard work, the character of the native women, whom most of them married, had much to do with their failure. The Directors had expressed their desire to see the colonists married to native women of the best castes.¹⁶ But, in reality, that desire was hardly ever realised. Few, except those who had nothing to lose and everything to gain, had the courage to marry the Dutch soldiers (for almost all the colonists were soldiers). And these women, either through their unfaithfulness, or their extravagant habits or both, dragged many of the colonists to ruin.¹⁷

Thus, through one reason or another, the prospects of improving and consolidating the Company's position in Ceylon by means of a large colony, seemed doomed to failure. But there were other ways in which the Dutch were attempting to strengthen their hold on the country; for instance, by converting the Sinhalese subjects to the Dutch Church.

As early as 1640,¹⁸ the Batavian authorities had been thinking of

ways and means of converting the Sinhalese in order to make them loyal to the Dutch interests. But until 1644 and after, when they became a territorial power in the Island, they had no opportunity of carrying out their intentions.

When, finally, they began the task of converting the Sinhalese, they had to contend with - among others - the Portuguese priests and the Roman Catholicism of many of the Sinhalese. By virtue of Article 6 of the Treaty of 10 November 1644,¹⁹ (made at Goa) the Portuguese priests had been permitted to return to their churches in territory assigned to the Dutch, by that Treaty.

These priests were badly hit by Maetsuijcker's refusal to authorise them to coerce their flock to attend church and supply them with food. Their position was further harmed by the Vidanas and other headmen, who were secretly ordered by the Dutch to prevent the inhabitants from attending church and to create all possible difficulties, for the priests. As a result of this, many of the priests were soon forced to give up their activities in Dutch territory. Those who still zealously persevered at their ministrations, were finally expelled by Maetsuijcker in 1647.²⁰

Concerned as the Dutch were over the influence of Roman Catholicism, they were much more apprehensive regarding 'the heathendom' or Buddhism, which was the religion of the majority of their subjects. The fact was, they soon found that many of those who had been most open to Portuguese cultural and religious influences, were the men who were most loyal and attached to the new rulers.²¹ But the 'weak Christians', as the Dutch termed them, and the Buddhists, often revealed their sympathies, and affections for the King of Kandy, whom they considered as the defender of their ancient faith and traditions.

But while the Dutch had expelled the Portuguese priests and forbidden the practice of the Roman Catholic religion, they did not dare to go so far with regard to Buddhism. This was because they feared the possible reactions of their own subjects, and of Raja Sinha himself. Nevertheless, they were prepared to go as far as possible and at least to prevent an extension of Buddhist activities. For instance, in 1647 they stopped the construction of a new temple begun by the chiefs of Matara.²² But at least in the period under review (and indeed even up to 1658) the Dutch appear not to have interfered with existing temples or religious practices of the Buddhists.

The measures against Roman Catholicism and Buddhism were, however, only the negative aspects of their religious policy. On the positive side lay their attempts at converting the Sinhalese to the 'Reformed Religion'.

The main work of conversion was conducted through the religious schools, established at most of the populous villages along the coast, and at one or two places in the interior. At first, a few 'black' schoolmasters were sent from Batavia; but very soon teaching in these schools was done by Sinhalese, who had previously taught in the Portuguese religious schools. What had to be taught was prescribed by the Predikant or Preacher, who gave certain formularies drawn up in Portuguese for the purpose.²³ The work of the schoolmasters was supervised by the *Krankbesoekers*,²⁴ or visitors of the sick. Both these were supervised by the Predikant during his rounds through the villages, once in two or three months. At such times, he also did some preaching to the inhabitants, with the aid of an interpreter. Furthermore, he baptised children, and solemnised the marriage of those who appeared before him for the purpose.

During this period, no direct compulsion seems to have been used in effecting conversions. The Sinhalese chiefs, who had been Roman Catholics, seem to have been insinuated into becoming Calvinists. The lure of bestowing various offices was also held out to converts. To get children to attend school various agreeable inducements, such as the present of small sums of money, were made.²⁵

The policy of conversion did not, however, meet with great success. Except in the towns of Galle and Negombo, the number of converts seems to have been small, and of the converts, many (if not most) were so only in name.

There were several reasons for these poor results. For one thing, the Predikants and *Krankbesoekers* were too few to undertake the work of conversion properly. At first there was only one Predikant in Ceylon, but by 1650 there were three of whom one was at Negombo. As regards *Krankbesoekers*, there were not more than six or seven. Ministrations to the Dutch militia at Galle and Matara and at the outposts, left these religious workers little time to devote to conversion. Then again, their ignorance of Sinhalese and imperfect knowledge of Portuguese severely limited their proselytizing activities. Much depended, therefore, on the schoolmasters, on

whose zeal no great reliance could be placed on account of their ready apostasy from Roman Catholicism. Indeed, on one occasion, the schoolmasters of Dondra had all to be dismissed 'on account of their scandalous living and committed idolatries'.²⁶ Finally many of the Dutch religions themselves were found unsuitable for their vocation. For instance, the Predikants Lentsius and Hilarius had to be transported to Batavia, and thence to the Netherlands, on account of their improper behaviour. The Predikant Anthonius Stamperius was reported to have died at Negombo, in a bout of drunkenness.²⁷

Fortunately, the Dutch did not depend too heavily on their religious policy, in their bid to win the loyalty of the Sinhalese to the Company's rule. Another line which they took in order to attain this objective, is indicated by the following words of Van der Lijn and his Council to Van Kittensteijn.²⁸

'This matter is clear and certain; namely, that we cannot obtain the fruits of the lands without the help of those people [the Sinhalese]; it is on account of this that they must be attached to us by means of all polite, friendly and mild treatment - and not because they merit such treatment or are worthy of it'.

This was, indeed, the policy, which had already been put into practice, particularly during the Governorship of Maetsuijcker; it was persevered in by Van Kittensteijn. In their attempt to rule with a mild and beneficent hand, these Governors were at times prepared to intervene actively on behalf of the inhabitants, even against their own compatriots. For instance, in 1647 Maetsuijcker found that during the famine 'foul profiteers, among whom, were several prominent servants of the Company', were fleecing the poorer inhabitants by selling rice at exorbitant prices.²⁹ He, therefore, instituted a price-control and, to make the control more effective, began to sell rice on behalf of the Company at the controlled rate. The Dutch Governors also took strong measures against those among their compatriots, who ill-treated the inhabitants, through a sense of power and racial superiority. For example, a Dutch Sergeant who had beaten a Sinhalese Arachchi, with a cane was immediately removed from office and deported to Batavia.³⁰

It was also thought to be a necessary and good policy to govern the Sinhalese, in the main, according to their ancient laws and customs.³¹ Thus the village administrations and the settlement of

most judicial matters were left in the hands of the Sinhalese chiefs. Only the important administrative and judicial matters were taken up by the Dutch - and even then, generally, in consultation with the chiefs. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that among the Commissioners of Daily and Civil Matters³² in Galle, were three Sinhalese chiefs, the rest of the Commissioners being three high officials of the Company, and two colonists. Regarding the powers of the Adigar of Matara, it was declared that 'the administration (of the Matara lands) belongs to him in addition to the Dissawe.'³³

The Dutch were particularly anxious to uphold the chiefs in most of their ancient privileges and positions. By such a policy they hoped to win over this class, which, they believed, could preserve or destroy the company's power, in case of war with the King of Kandy. It was no secret to the Dutch, that the chiefs of the Weligam, Dolosdas and Morawak Korales, had very strong sympathies for that King. As they were almost all Buddhists or only nominal Christians, they looked up to Raja Sinha as the patron and defender of their faith. The Dutch hoped to counteract this sentiment attachment to the King, by giving the chiefs such material advantages under their rule that none of the chiefs would wish for a change of government. 'The richer they are, the trustier they must become, as their wealth is like a security of their loyalty.' said the Batavian authorities.³⁴ Therefore, in addition to maintaining the chiefs in their old positions and privileges, they were given liberal grants of land particularly out of the confiscated Portuguese properties.³⁵

All these measures must have made Dutch rule more palatable to the chiefs. Nevertheless, they were yet far from being fully reconciled to it. On 23rd September 1651, Van Kittensteijn is found writing³⁶ thus to Batavia, regarding the chiefs of the Matara area:

'From our daily experiences we judge that they imagine that so long as they have to submit to our rule (although in peace and quiet) they consider themselves to be in slavery'.

In these circumstances, the loyalty of the chiefs was mainly assured, through the military power of the Dutch. The fort of Galle had always stood like a pistol pointed at the head of the chiefs of Galu Korale; the construction of a new fort at Matara similarly overawed the chiefs of the Korales around Matara. (The fact was, that a

fort on the coast was something which the Sinhalese kings had never succeeded in capturing.) Their freedom of independent action was still further limited, when Maetsuijcker induced them to take up residence in Matara. Unlike when they were spread out all over the land, their actions could now be closely watched by the Dutch, and as their families had always to be in Matara, they could not easily rebel against the rulers, without risking the loss of their families. In this manner, the Dutch maintained a strong hold on the loyalty of their subjects in Ceylon.


1. But they kept up the fiction of holding the lands only until they should have paid themselves, from the produce of these lands, the 'enormous debt' which was owing to them from the King. In their correspondence with the King, all the Governors (and Presidents, etc.) signed themselves as 'His Majesty's humble servant' and the forts and territories were referred to as 'His Majesty's forts' etc. The legal position regarding the lands was thus given by Maetsuijcker: '...dewijl de landen op's conincs name besitten, ende deselve oock inderdaet de sijnen moeten blijven, bij aldien den inhoude des contracts voldoet.' Maet. to G. G. & C., 18 Nov., 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 303-18. cf. also *Memoirs of Joan Maetsuijcker*, 25-26.
2. It has been wrongly maintained that 'the Dutch Government of Ceylon remained primarily of a military character and composition' up to 1658 and that a regular civil administration was set up only from that date (cf. M. W. Jurriaanse, *Catalogue of the Archives of the Dutch Central Government of Coastal Ceylon, 1640-1796*, 5, and R. L. Brohier, *Land, Maps & Surveys*, Colombo 1950, i .11) What is said earlier and in the following pages (of this study) is sufficient evidence to prove the contrary. How anxious the Dutch were to maintain the predominantly civilian character of the administration is further indicated by their great reluctance to place a military officer in charge of Negombo, although at this time the importance of Negombo was more military than economic (cf. Arent Baerentsen to G. G. & C., 22 May 1649, Kol. Arch. 1069 fos. 487-89).
3. G. G. & C., to Kitt. 4 April 1651, Kol. Arch. 778 pp. 126-32.
4. The limited powers given to the subordinate officers and the relatively strict supervision, which was maintained over these officers, were features, which were very much - if not entirely - lacking under the administration of the Portuguese. For the administration of the Portuguese see: Queyroz, 1005 ff.; Ribeiro, 25ff, *passim*. Pieris, *Port. Era.*, ii. 33-93; Codrington, *Short Hist.*, 124-32.
5. Note that the Chalea villages fell within the Galu Korale, but they were under the authority of the Captain of the Mahabadda.
6. For the powers of the Portuguese Dissawes and their abuse of those powers, see: Queyroz, 97, 1033-1035; Ribeiro, 43.
7. See table at end of Chapter.

8. Even during the period of strongest Portuguese competition, the average price seems to have been about 1¹/₂ florins (cf. G. G. & C. to Kitt., 17 Aug. 1652, Kol. Arch. 779 fos. 528-39).
9. One other important reason was that Manamperi Arachchi the man in charge of the hunt, was secretly hindering it. But in 1653 he was caught going too far, when in the hearing of the Dissawe he boldly ordered his men to release a magnificent elephant, saying it was too good for the Hollanders. He was, therefore, soon put into prison, where he died (Kitt. to G. G. & C., 3 Dec. 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 523-45.)
10. No figures for arecanut sales during this period are available. But it is unlikely that more than a few thousand florins were realised annually. For some details regarding the other items of revenue mentioned see: Extract from the Trade Books of Galle, Kol. Arch. 1116 fos. 884ff. In order to oust the Moors from the arecanut and cloth trade the authorities in Ceylon made various suggestions, the most notable of which were (a) to buy up all arecanut for the Company, thus creating a monopoly and (b) to hold up the Moor's cloth in the customs house until the Company had sold all its cloth. These suggestions were considered too premature and extreme by G. G. & C., (cf. Kitt. to G. G. & C., 6 Nov. 1650, Kol. Arch. 1070 Bis. fos. 654-77; Same to same, 5 April 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 415-17; G. G. & C., to Kitt., 4 April 1651 and 19 July 1651, Kol. Arch. 778, pp. 126-32 and 271-72).
11. Hence the constant references to deficits in the Ceylon Accounts (eg. G. G. & C. to Dirs., 20 Jan. 1651, Kol. Arch. 1070 fo. 7; Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* etc. Bk. 2. pt. 2, pp. 393, 434-35; MacLeod, ii. 148, 149). But Van Kittensteijn clearly proved that if the returns from the cinnamon were taken into the account, the Company would annually have (on an average) a nett profit of at least 200,000 florins (Kitt. to G. G. & C., 6 Nov. 1650, Kol. Arch. 1070 Bis. fos. 654-77). cf. also *Camb. Hist. of India*, v. 57.
12. The project of colonisation in Ceylon was part of a larger scheme intended for all the Dutch possessions in the East. At least from the time of Coen, the project of founding Dutch colonies in order thereby to consolidate the Company's power and greatly reduce its expenses, was entertained. Van Diemen considered this project desirable; but it was Maetsuijcker who expressed the greatest enthusiasm for it. cf. on these points; Colenbrander, *Kol. Gesch.*, ii. 120-22; G. G. & C., to Dirs., 30 Nov. 1640, in J. K. J. de Jonge, *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag* etc., (Amsterdam 1862-75) v. 242-45; 'Advice given to the Heeren 17... regarding the Netherlands colonies in India', by Joan Maetsuijcker Kol. Arch. 4464.v
13. Maet. to Dirs., 26 Jan. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1063 fos. 266-72.
14. Kitt. to G. G. & C., 6 Nov. 1650, Kol. Arch. 1070 (Bis) fos. 654-77.
15. Kitt. to G. G. & C., 6 Nov. 1650, *Ibid.*
Same to same, 20 Jan. 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 377-87; Same to same, 29 April 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 426-29. MacLeod (ii. 376) is, however, incorrect in saying that the Council in Galle prevented marriages with native women.
16. Dirs. to G. G. & C., 5 Sep. 1641, Kol. Arch. 454, no pagination. The Dirs. were very enthusiastic about the idea of colonization, because they could be

- rid of heavy expenses if, instead of mercenary soldiers, the colonists undertook the defence of the Company's possessions. They were even prepared to pay a 'moderate premium' for soldiers who married native women and settled down as colonists (cf. Dirs. to G. G. & C., 26 April 1650, Kol. Arch. 455 fos. 159-60; MacLeod, ii. 434). The emphasis on the colonists' marrying native women, was because it was more expensive to send Dutch families from the Netherlands and it was not possible to prevent these families from returning home. But in the case of those who married native women, their permanent stay in the East, could be assured by prohibiting their return to Europe, unless their wives and children were all dead. (cf. *Realia*, iii. 127).
17. To prevent the unfaithfulness of these women, Maetsuijcker made the interesting (and amusing) suggestion that they should be kept indoors in 'an honourable confinement' ('eelijke opsluitinge'). Maet. to Dirs., 26 Jan. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1063 fos. 266-72.
 18. cf. p. 87 above.
 19. cf. p. 93 above.
 20. 'Councillors of India' to Thijs., 31 July 1645, Kol. Arch. 772, pp. 394-407; Thijs. to G. G. & C., 20 Aug. 1645, Kol. Arch. 1058 Bis. fos. 660-70; 'Councillors of India' to Maet., 30 Aug. 1646, Kol. Arch. 773 pp. 297-320.
 21. It was no mere accident that almost all the chiefs, on whose loyalty the Dutch were able to place most reliance, had names such as Dom Joan da Costa, Anthonio Rebello, Bras Rodrigo and Antonio Mendes.
 22. Maet. to G. G. & C., 16 Nov. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 303-18.
In the period under review (and indeed up to 1658) the above is the only example (in the Hague records) of interference with Buddhist activities. But without taking any strong measures, the Dutch must have attempted to incommode Buddhist activities by various indirect measures. The declared policy regarding Buddhism was: 'de affgoderije onder de inwoonderen, soo veer als ons gebiedt strect, en willen niet gedoogen, maer moet de selve met sachtigheijt, ende de bequaemste middelen, van dat onbesnoeijde volckje, werden affgeweert.' (G. G. & C., to Maet. 16 Sep. 1648, Kol. Arch. 775, pp. 300-01).
 23. Maet. to G. G. & C., 17 May 1648, Kol. Arch. 1067, fos. 154-159.
Although the formularies were drawn up in Portuguese, they were probably translated into Sinhalese by the schoolmasters, because the teaching was in that language. Incidentally, since none of the Dutch religious workers knew enough Sinhalese the task of supervising the work of the schoolmasters must have been quite imperfectly done.
 24. Also called *ziekentroosters* (lit. 'sick-comforters'). They held an ill-defined position midway between a licensed preacher (Predikant) and a male nurse. Their duties consisted chiefly in visiting the sick, reading the daily prayers and singing a verse or two of the psalms for the garrison (or ship's crew, as the case may be). They were not allowed to preach *extempore* sermons, but could only read extracts from duly authorised printed collections. They also sometimes gave elementary school lessons to soldiers, sailors and others. Contemporary narratives are very critical of their educational attainments and way of life; it being commonly alleged that they were better termed *drankbesoekers* than *krankbesoekers*. cf. C. A. L. Van Troostenburg de Bruyn,

- De Hervormde Kerk in Nederlandsch Oost-Indië onder de Oost-Indische Compagnie, 1602-1795* (Arnhem, 1884) pp. 342 ff; A. S. Carpentier Alting, 'Predikanten en Ziekentroosters op de Vloot', in *Verslagen der Marine-Vereeniging*, No. 2 (Den Helder, 1907-08) pp. 139-74; *Oost-Indische Spiegel*, in J. C. M. Warnsinck (Ed), *Reisen van Nicolaus de Graaff* (*Werken Uitgegeven door de Linschoten-Vereeniging*, XXXIII), Pt. II. 28-29, 51.
25. 'Councillors of India' to Thijs., 31 July 1645, Kol. Arch. 772, pp. 394-407; Maet. to G. G. & C., 13 April 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 79-87; Albert Hooghland to Kitt., 28 April 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 446-47.
 26. Kitt. to G. G. & C., 10 May 1650, Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 325-33.
 27. Maet. to G. G. & C., 31 Oct. 1648, Kol. Arch. 1067 fos. 115-22; Kitt. to G. G. & C., 6 Nov. 1650, Kol. Arch. 1070 (Bis) fos. 654-77.
 28. 18 Sep. 1650, Kol. Arch. 777 pp. 371-88.
 29. Maet. to G. G. & C., 13 April 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 79-87.
 30. Maet. to G. G. & C., 18 Nov. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 303-18.
 31. At the Convention of Malwana in 1597, the Portuguese had sworn to govern the Sinhalese according to their ancient laws and customs. But mainly because the Portuguese Government allowed its subordinate officers (both Portuguese and Sinhalese) to rule almost according to their desire, the spirit of these laws and customs was seldom kept, even though the form was generally retained. cf., Queyroz, 1008, 1010, 1019; Ribeiro, 25-26; Pieris, *Port. Era*, ii. 84; Codrington, *Short History*, 129.
 32. *Commissarissen der dagelijcksen en civile saken*,. Kol. Arch. 1077 fo. 492. No details regarding the powers and functions of this body are known. The functions, apparently, were judicial and quasi-administrative. As the third-ranking person in the Dutch Government and the Fiscal, were members of this council, it must have had considerable powers.
 33. G. G. & C., to Kitt. 3 July 1651, Kol. Arch. 778 pp. 233-38. Cf. *Memoir of Joan Maetsuijcker*, 30.
 34. G. G. & C., to Kitt., 3 July 1651, *Ibid*.
 35. For Dutch policy towards their Sinhalese subjects, cf.: Maet. to G. G. & C., 17 May 1648, Kol. Arch. 1067 fos. 154-59; same to same, 20 June 1649, Kol. Arch. 1069 fos. 480-82; Kitt. to G. G. & C., 10 May 1650, Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 325-33; same to same, 5 April 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 415-17; G. G. & C., to Kitt., 18 Sep. 1650, Kol. Arch. 777 pp. 371-88. Same to same, 3 July, 1651, Kol. Arch. 778 pp. 233-38, etc.: *Memoirs of Joan Maet.*, 28-34. Valentyn (128-35) has a lengthy though often inaccurate extract from this invaluable *Memoir* (cf. eg. Valentyn, 130 with relevant sentences on p. 27 of the *Memoir*, Aalbers (62-65) has utilised parts of the extract in Valentyn.
 36. Kitt. to G. G. & C., 23 Sep. 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 476-86.

TABLE SHOWING ORGANISATION OF DUTCH ADMINISTRATION



EXPULSION OF THE PORTUGUESE DUTCH POWER PREDOMINANT

The long-awaited orders for a resumption of the war with the Portuguese, reached Van Kittensteijn and his Council on the 20th June 1652.¹ Along with these orders, they had been sent only twenty Javanese as reinforcements. They decided, therefore, to postpone a declaration of war, until they should have received more reinforcements from Batavia. They were all the more induced to make this decision, because elephant-hunting and cinnamon-peeling were on at the moment; any military set-backs might not only derange these activities but also result in the loss of the cinnamon, and the cinnamon-peelers.²

In September, 150 soldiers and three warships were received as reinforcements from Batavia. Before the end of that month, the cinnamon-harvest had been gathered, and elephant-hunting concluded. Van Kittensteijn and his Council, therefore, considered the moment appropriate and sent the Merchant Sijbrandt Croes to inform Mascarenhas Homem that the war would be resumed immediately.

Mascarenhas Homem plainly showed his disappointment and vexation at the news which was brought to him. In any case, he refused Groes permission to proceed to Negombo in order to inform the garrison of that place, that the war had been resumed. Fortunately, the Chief at Negombo had been warned same months earlier by Van Kittensteijn, that the war would soon be resumed;³ Hence he was on the alert. Moreover, as soon as Groes informed the Governor and Council of what had happened, they sent news of the resumption of the war, by sea to Negombo.

The news of the war caused terror and alarm among the inhabitants in Portuguese territory, bordering on the Dutch frontiers. As soon as the envoy Groes had crossed on to Dutch territory, many subjects of the Portuguese followed in his wake. That very night the Moor Mudaliyar in charge of the forces around Alutgama, deserted to the Dutch with many Moor lascarins and nearly a hundred cinnamon-peelers. On account of his abilities and extraordinarily faithful services, this man had been one of the most trusted native

officers under the Portuguese. His desertion therefore, greatly disheartened the Portuguese and increased the confidence of the Dutch, to whom he was able to give much valuable information.⁴

The Mudaliyar advised the Dutch to take advantage of the low spirits of the enemy, and to occupy the lands up to Kalutara, before which place alone, he assured them, the Portuguese would dare to offer resistance. Following this advice, Van Kittensteijn ordered the lascarins to cross the Bentota-Canga against the Portuguese, on the 15th October.⁵ Three days later, 350 Dutch and Javans under Van Kittensteijn himself, crossed this river and marched up, to find that the lascarins had already taken the fort of Kalutara which the enemy had abandoned without a fight. The Portuguese, about 150 in number (apart from lascarins) were, however, entrenching themselves on the other side of the Kalu-Ganga, with the intention of preventing the crossing of this river.

While the two parties were exchanging shots⁶ across the Kalu-Ganga, the Mudaliyar advised the Dutch to occupy the pass of Anguruwatota (situated higher up the river) in order to safeguard the possession of the newly-conquered territories. Accordingly, fifty Dutch and 200 lascarins were sent to occupy this pass. This was accomplished without difficulty as the Portuguese had already retired to the other bank, where they were preparing to oppose a crossing. The lascarins were, however, unwilling to continue at Anguruwatota. It appears that they were annoyed and disturbed at the fact, that in their march on Kalutara, the Dutch forces had joined them only after three days. While the Dutch seem to have had no casualties, they had already had some wounded, among whom was the Vidana of the Mahabadda, Anthonio Mendes.

When the Dutch army at Kalutara heard that the lascarins were unwilling to continue at Anguruwatota, it despatched the Lieutenant Jan Van Westrenen with a good number of Dutch soldiers, to strengthen the forces at Angurumatota, and thereby give greater courage to the lascarins. On the way, seeing a body of men coming from the direction of Anguruwatota, the Lieutenant, followed by all his men, jumped in a panic into the woods. It was soon found that the party, which had been mistaken to be the enemy, was only a band of coolies returning from the Anguruwatota camp. Nevertheless, the Lieutenant and his men were reluctant to proceed any further and returned to Kalutara. Consequently, the forces at Angurumatota were not strengthened and their commander,

Ensign Brouwer, was forced to yield to the clamour of the lascarins for a withdrawal. When the Portuguese noticed this, they began a heavy cannonading, at which the Dutch and the lascarins all took to their heels, even though the enemy had not crossed the river in pursuit.⁷

On the 1st November, the Dutch re-occupied Anguruwatota with a larger force than previously. Five days later their army at Kalutara made preparations for crossing the Kalu-Ganga. As a preliminary measure, they sent by sea, four vessels to bombard the Portuguese entrenchments at the mouth of the river. But on the mere sight of these vessels the enemy fled in great disorder, leaving behind much ammunition and food-provisions. They finally halted at a place about six miles from Colombo. At about the same time the Portuguese forces near Anguruwatota, abandoned their positions and joined the army which had fled from Kalutara.

The Dutch were now in full occupation of the Walallawiti and Pasdum Korales, and considerable parts of Raygam Korale. Among the inhabitants who thereby came under Dutch rule, were 250 lascarins and 150 Chaleas. To devastate the lands which they were unable to occupy, they frequently sent parties of lascarins right up to Panadura, some sixteen miles from Colombo.

Although Van Kittensteijn had declared war during the first week of October, it was only on the 26th of that month, that he wrote to the King giving this news and requesting assistance against the Portuguese.⁸ But he did not expect any help from the King, because he fully agreed with the view of the Batavian authorities, that the King had no wish to see the Portuguese driven from Colombo. His policy was to keep the two European nations balanced against each other; therefore, as the Portuguese appeared to be too weak, he was sure to assist them, if not openly, at least secretly.⁹ He must be knowing that 'if we could drive the Portuguese once and for all from Colombo . . . we shall make him dance to our tunes.'¹⁰

As so often before this, the Dutch failed to understand the extent of Raja Sinha's hatred for the Portuguese and his passionate desire to see them driven from Colombo, 'the Mother of all evil'. He was speaking from his heart when he declared later on:

'When my imperial person summoned the said Dutch nation to this my Empire, the principal reason was that they might help me, and likewise capture the city of Colombo: since the most

serene and famous Raja who was King of Ceitavaca laid several sieges to it and could not take it, for this reason I took into my imperial heart to capture it'.¹¹

Raja Sinha knew fully well that once the Portuguese were completely driven out from Ceylon, the Dutch would attempt to make him dance to their tunes. But, to him the establishment of Dutch power seems to have been undoubtedly preferable to the continuance of Portuguese rule in the island. Moreover, he seems to have had full confidence in his ability to contain Dutch power within rather narrow territorial limits; the expulsion of the Dutch from the Kolonna and the Seven Korales must have increased his confidence.

Quite naturally, therefore, he entered with heart and soul into the war with the Portuguese. He sent his Dissawe of the Four Korales against the Portuguese at Menikkadawara; his Dissawe of the Seven Korales was ordered to cut across Portuguese territory, via Deraniyagala and move upon the Portuguese-occupied parts of Sabaragamuwa, where he would be supported by the Dissawe of Sabaragamuwa.¹²

The movements of the King's men forced the Portuguese Dissawes of the Four and the Seven Korales to retire towards Colombo. Shortly afterwards, the army at Sabaragamuwa retired on Colombo, it is said,¹³ on the orders of Mascarenhas Homem, who wished to prevent it from joining the Menikkadawara army, which had mutinied. But it is likely that Kandyan troop-movements had more to do with this withdrawal than the orders of the Captain-General; for, the retreat was made in such disorder that large stocks of provisions and merchandise were left behind.

At Menikkadawara, where the main Portuguese army was stationed, the men mutinied against their Captain-Major, Lopo Barriga, primarily because they were dissatisfied with the incapable leadership of his father-in-law, Mascarenhas Homem, to whom they attributed treacherous designs. The retreat of the Portuguese forces from Kalutara and Anguruwatota, from the Four and Seven Korales and Sabaragamuwa, were all considered to be part of a treacherous plan to sell Colombo to the Dutch.¹⁴ Having deposed Barriga, the army elected the valiant and resourceful Gaspar Figueira as their Captain-Major. Despite the attacks of the Kandyan forces, Figueira withdrew the army safely near Colombo. The

declared intention of Figueira and his men, was to depose Manuel Mascarenhas Homem. This the latter tried to oppose; but finding few to support him, he was ignominiously forced to submit to the inevitable.¹⁵

On the 30th November the army took over control of the Government. The General was deposed and three *Eleitos* were elected to form the Government; but the real power remained in Figueira's hands. By their actions the new rulers demonstrated beyond doubt that what the Portuguese had hitherto lacked, was not an army, but proper leadership.

Having despatched two detachments to the Four and Seven Korales, Figueira himself marched towards Negombo with nearly 700 Portuguese. His attempt to lay an ambush for a party of thirty-three Hollanders, was foiled through the incompetence of one of his officers, and although he was able to capture a considerable amount of baggage and ammunition, all but three of the enemy succeeded in escaping. He next approached the fort of Negombo; but found the garrison strong and ably commanded by the well-known Dutch Captain, Jan van der Laen. Finding it impossible to effect anything against Negombo, Figueira marched south with over 500 Portuguese and many lascarins, with the intention of capturing Anguruwatota.

For nine days the garrison of Anguruwatota held out in the hope of being succoured by the main Dutch army which was hardly a day's march away, at Kalutara.¹⁶ Finally, on the 8th January 1653, the stockade was surrendered with one hundred Dutch and twenty-four Javanese soldiers and a hundred-and-forty lascarins, together with a good quantity of arms and ammunition and provisions.

Figueira was, however, unable to hold Anguruwatota for even a day after its capture, because the Kandyans had begun to attack his line of communication with Colombo, and to cut off supplies.¹⁷ At about the same time, a Kandyan force attacked the Portuguese Dissawe of the Four Korales at Tihariya. The Portuguese were saved from an utter rout, only by the death of the Kandyan Dissawe. Finding, that the King's men were on the offensive everywhere, Figueira marched with about 800 Portuguese and a larger number of lascarins, against the Kandyan forces on the upper reaches of the Kelani-Ganga. At a village near Arandora he won a considerable victory. He then followed this up with an other vic-

tory in this region.¹⁸ Further south, however, the King's men continued to have the upper hand. In fact, at one stage a Kandyan Dissawe pushed up to Gurubewila, which was situated less than twenty miles from Colombo. But he was forced back by the Portuguese, who took the offensive and proceeded as far as Kendangomuwa. Here, the Portuguese were halted and driven back once again to Gurubewila; for, the Kandyans were in great strength on this front, because Raja Sinha himself had arrived with his forces (estimated at 18000 by Queyroz)¹⁹ somewhere about the end of March 1653.

Raja Sinha's arrival in the lowlands, with the avowed object of attacking Colombo was unwelcome news for Van Kittensteijn. From the very beginning, he had tried to dissuade and to divert the King from coming down into the lowlands or thinking of attacking Colombo.²⁰ He had suggested that while the Dutch concentrated their attention on Colombo the King should attack and occupy Kalpitiya, Manar and Jaffna. When the King expressed his intention of proceeding to attack Colombo, Van Kittensteijn gave the singular reply that this was not advisable because that city could not be won without blood-shed.

There were at least two reasons why the Dutch wished to keep Raja Sinha away from the lowlands. Firstly, they were afraid that he might attempt to pay off old scores, by suddenly making a treacherous attack on them. Secondly - this was the main reason, - they feared that he might capture Colombo by himself, and do as he pleased with it; even if he captured the city in conjunction with them he would still have too much of a say on account of the strength of his forces.²¹

Raja Sinha seems to have easily guessed from Van Kittensteijn's letters, that the Dutch were very probably thinking of occupying Colombo after its capture, in the same manner as they had occupied Negombo. He, therefore, repeatedly demanded reassurances that the agreement with Coster and the later promises of the Dutch regarding Colombo (and also Negombo) would be fulfilled.

Van Kittensteijn had little hesitation in giving the required assurances and promises, because he felt that their fulfillment was quite another matter.²² He was, however, very apprehensive that the King would capture Colombo, by himself. A Dutch corporal, who had been present at some of the recent engagements between the Portuguese and the Kandyans had informed Van Kittensteijn

that owing to very severe discipline imposed by the King, Kandyan troops had fought 'excellently'; two Portuguese deserters had confirmed this information. With Colombo blockaded by sea, and the King having large forces at his disposal, there was little doubt, that if the Kandyans continued to fight so well, the city would soon be in the King's hands. These thoughts made Van Kittensteijn express the fervent hope that his ally would 'knock his head well against the enemy and, thereby, be forced to keep still for some time'.²³

While distrustful of the King, and secretly wishing him ill, the Dutch yet considered it necessary to feign friendship, and keep him well-disposed towards them. Therefore, promises, flatteries and presents were continually showered upon him. When a drunken Lieutenant killed one of the King's messengers, Van Kittensteijn was so fearful of giving any offence to Raja Sinha, that he ordered the Dutchman to be executed, even though the King had ignored the incident. In his persistent efforts to please the King, the Governor had gone so far as to send, at Raja Sinha's request, a company of Hollanders under an Ensign to serve in his body-guard. The fact was, that despite his apprehensions that the King might capture Colombo, Van Kittensteijn was also rather thankful to him for having prevented the Portuguese from following up the success at Angutuwatota. In a letter of 30 April 1653²⁴ the Governor and Council wrote thus to Batavia:

'It is certain that (next to God) His Majesty is the only cause, that has enabled us to keep things going in this form, for so long; therefore we ought to be rather obliged to him'.

They also added that the King's enmity towards the Portuguese and friendship towards the Dutch, could not be doubted any longer.

On receipt of this letter, Governor-General Maetsuijcker and his Council were rather perturbed at what they considered was a lack of understanding in their subordinates at Galle. They, therefore, replied:

'He hates the Portuguese, because they are occupying his lands; and that is what we are also doing. He will hate us all the more, because he will observe that we are more powerful than the Portuguese. Therefore, we must never let ourselves be so far misled, as to imagine, that he will mean rightly by us.'²⁵

In the event of the capture of Colombo, they advised the following line of conduct:

‘But regarding Colombo, you must regulate yourself according to circumstances and the strength of our available forces. If we could capture that city, without the King being present we should gladly see, that it was held until our further deliberation and order in case this could happen without great danger . . . But if this cannot happen without danger and great calamity, then you will let this city be demolished for the contemplation and desire of the King.’

Meanwhile, the Portuguese had obtained considerable reinforcements and a new Captain-General sent from Goa to succeed the deposed Mascarenhas Homem. On the 15th May, hardly a week after the Dutch vessels blockading Colombo had been forced to sail to Galle on account of inclement weather, Francisco de Melo de Castro put into Colombo with 250 soldiers and fourteen vessels. With him came a new Captain-Major of the Field, Dom Alvaro de Ataide, who replaced Gasper Figueira.

The Portuguese continued to have most of their forces arrayed against the Kandyans, who, the Dutch reported, were in great straits through lack of sufficient provisions. A wave of sickness had spread through Raja Sinha's army at Batugedera. Finally, at the course of August, the King was forced to move his camp. Through one of his Dissawes he asked the Portuguese for a free passage for his stores. This was agreed to, and the King himself moved on to Kendangomuwa where only a river separated him from the Portuguese. But nothing happened until the end of September, when he wrote to the Dutch asking them to create a diversion in Raygam Korale, as he was preparing to attack the enemy. The Dutch, however, were not prepared to do this. But on the 20th of the following month, the Portuguese suddenly retired to Malwana. The reason for this withdrawal appears certainly to have been the anxiety caused by the arrival at Negombo of the Commisioner Rijcklof Van Goens, with four vessels.²⁶

Van Goens, who was on his way to Surat and Wingurla on a tour of inspection;²⁷ had neither the time nor the necessary forces to undertake an attack on the Portuguese. After a short inspection of the Administration in Ceylon, he left the island on the 15th November. As for the new Governor, Adriaen van der Meijden,²⁸ who

had succeeded Van Kittensteijn on the 11th October, he too did not dare to take the field against the Portuguese. Thus, throughout the whole of 1653, the Dutch seemed to be under the cloud of the defeat at Anguruwatota. The lascarins, however, had been sent out on ravaging expeditions, from both Negombo and Kalutara. The inhabitants living between this latter fortress and the outskirts of Colombo, were summoned to come over to the Dutch; many of those who failed to do so were captured and sold as slaves, the lascarins who effected the captures, being rewarded with a third of the proceeds. In March, the Negombo lascarins had made successful ravaging expeditions against Kalpitiya and Manar, which had been much devastated by the Kandyans a short while before. These lascarins were once more active in November, when they killed the Portuguese guards at Mutwal. Beyond these isolated raids and the naval blockade of Colombo, the Dutch had attempted in 1653 little or nothing against the enemy.

Although his men were suffering great privations, Raja Sinha had continued in the lowlands with his army, because he expected that the Hollanders would be reinforced from Batavia and would, thereafter, attack Colombo. He apparently considered it wisest to move on that city, only when his allies were prepared to do the same. When at length it appeared that the Dutch did not intend attacking Colombo for quite a while, he decided early in November to return to the highlands. By this time provisions were so scarce in his army, that even the Chiefs were feeling the want. He had ordered his Dutch bodyguard to be well-provided; but they obtained little because the stores were so empty and, consequently, 'to fetch something from nothing, is magic', reported the Ensign in command of the body-guard.²⁹

When they heard that the King had retired to Kandy, the Portuguese attempted to re-occupy some of the territories, which had been lost to him. They met with only moderate success, because they encountered strong opposition from the King's Dissawes. They had most success in the Seven Korales, where they were able to proceed as far as Alauwa; but further south, they were halted at Gurubewila.³⁰

Against the Dutch too, they took the offensive, and by-passing Kalutara made frequent raids as far as Maggona. At length, on account of the harm which they were causing through these raids, the Hollanders sought them out at Tebuwana, where a fierce

battle was fought on the 26th March 1654. After several hours of fighting, both sides eagerly separated themselves from each other on account of the losses sustained.³¹

The Dutch retired to Kalutara; but did not tarry a moment there when they heard that five galleons had put into Colombo after having defeated the three ships blockading that harbour. This news caused such fear that the Dutch did not stop their flight until they were at Welitara.

The news of this flight caused a great stir amongst the subjects of the Dutch. Six Appuhamis fled from Dutch territory with a good number of their lascarins. One of them was trapped and shot dead; but the other five fled to the King's territory and caused much harm by their frequent marauding expeditions into the lands near Matara. Even more significant than the desertion of these Appuhamis, was that of the Mudaliyar, Kulatunga, one of the foremost chiefs of Matara. The old man was, however, overtaken and soon died under torture.³²

The disaffection of these chiefs, as the Appuhamis themselves explained, was mainly the result of the disrespectful way in which the Dutch officers treated them. While Maetsuijcker and Van Kittensteijn had always been particular to see that their subordinates gave the chiefs no cause of offence, Van der Meijden was less concerned about this matter. Moreover, his aim was to transfer most of the important offices from the Sinhalese to his Dutch officers; he had already made a beginning in this direction, for example, by appointing a Dutchman to fill the place of the Moor Mudaliyar, at the latter's death.³³ Maetsuijcker and his Council, however, decided that the time was not yet ripe for such changes, and that the Chiefs should be treated in the most winning manner possible for yet some time more;³⁴ the desertion of the Appuhamis had confirmed them in this opinion.

Meanwhile, the apprehension caused among the Dutch, by the coming of the galleons, passed off when it was found that hardly any soldiers had been brought to Colombo by these vessels. The subsequent news of the total destruction of these galleons by Rijckloff van Coens very much raised the fallen prestige of the Dutch. Nevertheless, Kalutara and the lands so precipitately abandoned, continued in the hands of the enemy.

On the Kandyan front, the Portuguese were having a difficult time. Towards the middle of the year, they were twice defeated;

once in the Seven Korales and later on in Raygam Korale. They, therefore, attempted to treat with the King for peace. Some time previously the Captain-General had written to Raja Sinha, but had received no reply. Now once again, on the 15th and 19th July, the Dissawe Manoel Gil and the Captain-Major, Caspar de Araujo Pereyra wrote to the King suggesting a peace.³⁵ But Raja Sinha was not prepared to talk of peace, although it was said that he was faced with internal dissensions, as a result of which he had already ordered several Chiefs to be executed. In September, it was rumoured that his nephew, the young Prince of Matale had rebelled against him, but that his Dissawes had soon suppressed the rebellion.³⁶ The Portuguese had doubtless taken advantage of the King's difficulties; for, towards the close of the year, they had pitched their camp at Pitigaldeniya, about thirty miles from Kandy. In December, the King sent against the Portuguese, a new Dissawe who was so successful as to drive them not only from Pitigaldeniya but also from the entire Four and Seven Korales. He devastated the lands up to Malwana, and removed many of the adherents of the Portuguese as prisoners. For the moment the enemy could do little but guard the approaches to the city.

In the meantime, the Hollanders had not been inactive. Following up the victory of a successful ambush, they determined to attack the Portuguese entrenchment at Bentota. On the 16th of December, 790 Dutch and Javans and 700 lascarins attacked the enemy, whose strength was hardly 350 Portuguese and 600 lascarins. After some severe fighting, the Portuguese left their entrenchments and retired towards Kalutara, pursued by the Dutch. Within a short time, however, the pursuit was given up on account of the strong resistance of the enemy, who inflicted on the Dutch greater losses than they themselves sustained. Nevertheless, this engagement had an advantageous result for the Hollanders in that, thereafter, the enemy did not venture far from Kalutara.³⁷

While the Portuguese went onto the defensive against the Hollanders, they took the offensive against the King's men. In view of the recent astonishing success of the Kandyans, it was felt that Caspar Figueira was the only man, who could deal successfully with the enemy. Early in January Figueira was appointed Captain-Major, and sent against the Kandyans with some 300 or more Portuguese and many lascarins. He encountered little opposition at first; but did not proceed far until the receipt of further rein-

forcements. These were soon sent when on the 30th of January 1655, a fleet of nineteen vessels had brought to Colombo (among other items) a force of 200 soldiers.³⁸ As soon as he had received these reinforcements, Figueira marched against the King's Dissawes at Arambepola in the Seven Korales. With the loss of only nine Portuguese, he drove the Dissawes right into the Kandyan territories. Early in April, he won a still greater victory at Kotikapola. He had heard that the King himself had decided to take the field, and had ordered two of his Dissawes to prepare accommodation for him at Kotikapola. With the skill characteristic of him, Figueira surprised the Dissawes, and utterly routed them killing one Dissawe and about 200 men and capturing about a hundred.³⁹ Shortly afterwards the King's troops defeated⁴⁰ a Portuguese detachment and followed it up with several less successful engagements; but it made little difference to Figueira's position. He not only re-occupied some of the territories, which had been lost for the last ten or fifteen years, but even made daring raids into the King's lands. Nevertheless, the Kandyan front was such an extensive one that Figueira could control only part of it; Raja Sinha's Dissawes more than held their own in other parts of this front.⁴¹

Before sending his Dissawes to Kotikapola, the King had informed the Dutch of his plan to attack the Portuguese, and had asked them to create a diversion for the enemy, by attacking Kalutara. Accordingly, they made a show of force from the 3rd to the 12th of April before that fort; but with their available forces, they did not consider it advisable to attack it.

In the following month the Dutch obtained a victory, which they considered to be nothing but a God-send. On the 18th May, Antonio de Sousa Coutinho,⁴² who was sent from Coa as the new Captain-General of Ceylon, was (through the incompetence of his pilot, and the force of the currents) driven with his fleet near Galle. On seeing this fleet the Dutch immediately sent two warships against it, and soon had the satisfaction of seeing half the fleet captured or destroyed. Coutinho himself made good his escape via Batticaloa to Jaffna, with four of his vessels and only about 230 out of the 400 soldiers, whom he had brought from Goa. Marching overland from Jaffna, the new Captain-General reached Colombo, towards the middle of August.

In this same month of August, the Governor-General and his

Council at last found themselves in a position to send a force, which would be strong enough to attack Colombo. Hitherto, on account of the troubles in the Moluccas and the war with England,⁴³ and, more particularly, because the Directors had sent insufficient troops and ships, they had been able to send only very meagre relief to Ceylon. In fact, in May 1655, Van der Meijden had been constrained to point out that the total strength of the army had fallen to 980 men; whereas in time of peace there had ordinarily been 1300 - 1500 men.⁴⁴ But, with the large reinforcements, which they had received in 1654 and 1655 from Europe, the Batavian authorities were finally able to more than remedy this situation.

On the 14th August (1655) they dispatched to Ceylon the Director-General, Gerard Hulft,⁴⁵ with a force of 1200 soldiers and 14 ships. He was instructed to effect the capture of Colombo before undertaking any other exploit; although the Directors had repeatedly recommended the blockade of Goa as being of paramount importance. As a result of the capture of Colombo, the Company could not only become 'sole masters of the cinnamon', but it could also cut down expenses in Ceylon, because, with the Portuguese virtually driven from the island, less garrison-forces would be required.

Whether the city (after its capture) should be garrisoned or handed over to Raja Sinha, they were not decided. They, however, felt that at least until the serious difficulties in Amboyna were overcome, it might be safer to hand over the city to the King 'in fulfillment from our side, of the aforesaid Contract [Treaty of 1649] and with the hope that in that case he will acquire more confidence in our good intentions and will try from his side also to fulfill the same (contract)'. Although this was their opinion at the moment, a final decision on this matter was left to Hulft, who, in consultation with Van der Meijden and his Council, had to consider what was best according to the situation in Ceylon.⁴⁶

One and a half months before the departure of Hulft from Batavia, Van der Meijden and his Council were sent news of the intended expedition. In the general letter⁴⁷ to the Governor and Council, it was stated that the expedition would first undertake certain exploits against the Portuguese on the West Coast of India, and thereafter arrive in Ceylon; but in a secret letter to Van der Meijden alone, the true objectives of the expedition were explained. Van der Meijden was instructed to send secret advices regarding

the best course of military action to Hulft, to a rendez-vous near Cape Comorin.

When Hulft arrived at the appointed place, on the 12th September, he did not find the expected advices (which, incidentally, had been held up by adverse sailing conditions). On the following day he decided to proceed to Negombo and march overland from there to Colombo with the idea of cutting off the Portuguese field-forces from the city. But during the march from Negombo there was such heavy rain, that he and his Council decided to retire; because the men were feeling unfit, and the matches and gunpowder had gone wet.

It was then decided to re-embark and make a landing to the south of Colombo. The ships were, however, driven too far south, and ultimately Hulft landed at Maggona (to the south of Kalutara) on the 28th September. There he was joined by the forces under Van der Meijden. The combined forces immediately marched upon Kalutara, which it laid under siege. After having resisted for two weeks, the garrison of 255 men surrendered through lack of provisions to hold out longer.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese in Colombo had decided to relieve Kalutara. For this purpose, they re-called Gaspar Figueira from the Kandyan frontiers and entrusted him with a force of 450 men. Just before Figueira was about to start for Kalutara, some vessels from Goa, after eluding the Dutch cruisers, put into Colombo with 200 soldiers. These men were also placed under Figueira, who then started with 650 men and a thousand lascarins for Kalutara.

On the night of the 16th October the Dutch had a sharp skirmish near Panadura with the advance guard of Figueira's troops. The Portuguese retired leaving behind some prisoners, and fifteen to sixteen dead; but the Dutch losses were negligible. From the prisoners they learnt that Figueira would make his appearance the next day; therefore, they took up a favourable position on the beach and awaited his coming. Although the Dutch force had all the advantages of numbers and a favourable position Figueira attacked it with confidence; but after a short contest, he and his men took to head-long flight. Hardly 200 of the 650 Portuguese succeeded in reaching Colombo; the rest were killed in the battle or slain or captured in the pursuit by the lascarins of the Dutch.

Moving up to Colombo on the 18th, the Dutch occupied, after overcoming some resistance, the outer positions at Mutwal and São

Sebastião and ringed the city on all sides. The historic siege of Colombo had begun.

At this juncture Hulft received a letter, written at Raja Sinha's command, by the Ensign, Joris Hervendonck, to the effect that despite his illness, the King intended arriving near Colombo before long. In reply, on the 20th, a note was despatched to the King, informing him of the recent victories, and attempting with various covert arguments to dissuade him from coming down upon Colombo⁴⁸. Two days later, the Dissawe of Sabaragamuwa appeared before Colombo with his forces. After making solicitous enquiries from him regarding the King's health, Hulft informed the Dissawe that he had arrived in the island for no other purpose than to capture the towns of Colombo, Manar and Jaffna and hand them over to His Majesty.⁴⁹

When his Dissawe reported what Hulft had said, Raja Sinha was over-joyed. It appeared to him that at last he could have much confidence in the promises of the Dutch. This was reflected in the very next letter to Hulft, not only in its contents but even in its superscription, in which the Hollander was addressed as: 'Director-General of the Naval Squadron of the *upright, faithful* Netherlands nation.'⁵⁰

Meanwhile, Hulft had begun a heavy fire on the bastions of the city. After two weeks of such battering it appeared that the defences were sufficiently crumbled to make a storm feasible; besides, the return-fire of the Portuguese had latterly become so unsteady, that little opposition could be expected from them. Therefore, on the 9th November, he sent a courteous note to the Captain-General, calling upon him in Raja Sinha's name and in that of the Company, to surrender the city.⁵¹ On the following day he received a valiant reply, in which de Sousa Coutinho expressed his determination to defend the city to the last. Hulft, thereupon, determined to carry the city by storm on the 12th.

On the land side, the attack was concentrated on four bastions, and an ill-defended point near the house of one de Azavedo.. It was only at this last position that a penetration was made; but owing to the valour of the defenders and the ill discipline of the attackers, many of those who entered within were killed, and the rest forced to surrender. At the four bastions the attackers courageously rushed towards the walls; but at the critical moment the ladders were not forthcoming, because when many of those carrying them were

mowed down by the fire of the enemy, the others abandoned their ladders and fled. Although Hulft himself tried to set an example by laying hold of a ladder and rushing up, he was forced to turn back when he saw his officers and men all retiring in confusion. On the sea-side, two ships were ordered to attack the bastion of Santa Cruz which commanded the bay, under cover of this attack a large number of soldiers and sailors were to make a landing from some smaller vessels and capture the bastion. Unfortunately, only one of the ships reached its appointed place in time. As a result, the attack by sea also failed.

As the Dutch declared in bewilderment, the resistance of the city had been unexpectedly strong and courageous. Apart from seventy-four taken captive, they had lost at least 300 in dead, and about an equal number or more were wounded. The losses of the enemy seem to have been hardly a third of the Dutch losses.⁵²

In view of the heavy losses sustained, it was debated in Council whether the attempt to capture Colombo should be given up or not. Finally, it was decided that the losses could be made good by reinforcements from Batavia, and that for the sake of the Company's prestige, it was necessary to continue the enterprise against the city, which could never be captured if the attempt was given up now.

A few hours after the ill-fated storm, Hulft received a letter, dated the 5th of the month, from Raja Sinha. At the same time, the King had also sent a copy of the letter which the Captain-General had written to him on the 27th October. In this letter, de Sousa Continho had begged for the King's friendship and assistance against the Dutch, and in return had promised to hand over to him the lands around Colombo. He had further warned the King that the Dutch would never hand over the city to him, if they captured it.⁵³ Although Raja Sinha ignored the rest of Continho's letter, the warning regarding the policy of the Dutch seems to have revived his suspicions of the good faith of his allies; for, in his letter to Hulft he considered it necessary to express his confidence that according to treaty, and repeated promises, Colombo would be handed over to him by the Director-General.

For a moment Hulft was somewhat apprehensive, thinking that the King might change his attitude towards the Portuguese, when he heard the outcome of the storm. His doubts were set at rest when on the 19th, the Dissawes showed him a letter, which they had just received from the Chiefs at the Court; written at his orders, this

letter indicated the King's grief at the loss suffered by the Dutch, and expressed his determination to hurry to their assistance; until his arrival, he wished that no further assault should be undertaken.⁵⁴

Hulft himself had already decided that beyond maintaining a close siege of the city, he could do little else, at least, until reinforcements should arrive from Batavia. At the moment, the besieging forces were not more than 1200 men, apart from the 3000 Kandyans, who were guarding the approaches on the south side of the city. As the city was over four miles in circuit, Hulft believed that, without the help of the King's Dissawes, he could not besiege it adequately enough.⁵⁵ But for the pioneers, whom the King supplied, he could not proceed with the siege-works;⁵⁶ nor could he continue with his forces before Colombo for long, if the Kandyans discontinued the provisioning of his army.⁵⁷ Moreover, apart from the great advantage resulting from the King's favour, Hulft was keenly aware of the grave danger that would follow, if Raja Sinha became hostile, and combined with the Portuguese. He believed that the Dutch could not withstand such a combination.⁵⁸

On account of all these considerations, he deemed it imperative to refrain from giving the King the slightest cause of offence. Doubtless on the advice of Van der Meijden, he had at first ventured to accept the submission of some of the villages near Colombo, and to place Vidanas over them; but when the Dissawes complained to Raja Sinha over this action, Hulft realised his mistake and forthwith left the villages entirely to the Dissawes.⁵⁹

To remove any suspicions, which his action might have aroused, Hulft wrote to the King a series of letters, in which he repeatedly asserted that he had been expressly sent from Holland to capture the remaining Portuguese strongholds and, to hand them over together with Negombo to His Majesty. He made the same assurances through the King's Dissawes and through the Lieutenant of his guard, Joannes Hartman, whom he sent on two occasions to present his greetings and letters before the King. Finally, when the King himself appeared in the lowlands, Hulft wrote to him on the 8th February 1656, expressing his eagerness for permission to appear before the royal presence, and to explain 'the true friendship and affection with which the Honourable Company strives to persevere to the end' in the imperial service.⁶⁰

The promises and assurances of Hulft, seem to have rung true to the King's ears. 'I received all as perfect truth into my imperial

heart'.⁶¹ Convinced of the Dutchman's sincerity, Raja Sinha came to have a certain amount of genuine regard and affection for him. When, therefore, the Portuguese Captain-General and the citizens of Colombo separately wrote to him making a last desperate appeal for assistance, he entrusted the replies to Hulft.⁶² The good relations between the King and Hulft reached their climax on the 8th April, when the letter had audience of the King, and in the name of the Prince of Orange and the Company solemnly repeated the earlier promises to hand over the fortresses, after their capture.⁶³ Raja Sinha had nothing more to wish. Three days later, however, Raja Sinha was weeping bitterly;⁶⁴ for, on that day, the Dutch interpreter Jurgen Bloem brought him the news, that Hulft was dead (When inspecting the siege-works, the Director-General had exposed himself too much and a chance bullet had mortally wounded him).

Now that 'the most faithful servant that he had ever known' was dead, Raja Sinha had to deal once more with the Governor, Adriaen van der Meijden, regarding whose 'faithfulness' he did not have very great confidence. When, on the 18 April, he wrote to the Governor saying that he wished to be previously informed of any intended attack, the latter ventured to suggest that His Majesty need arrive before Colombo only after its capture. This aroused the King's suspicions, and he thought it necessary to remind Van der Meijden that according to treaty, and repeated promises, Colombo must be handed over to him immediately after its capture. His feelings towards the Governor were not improved when shortly afterwards, the latter, sent him a letter written on half a sheet of paper.⁶⁵

Meanwhile, the Portuguese had been defending their capital-city with the most astonishing bravery and steadfastness. With their artillery, the Hollanders battered much of the fortifications into ruins; but under the heaviest fire the Portuguese were busy repairing the damage done and, strengthening the walls with fascines. The Dutch assiduously attempted to mine the bastions; but they were each time frustrated by effective counter-mining of the enemy. Moreover, the Portuguese did not confine themselves to merely defensive measures; small but resolute bands repeatedly made bold sallies, from which they almost invariably returned with great success. Civilians and priests defended the city with as much bravery as the soldiers; in fact, one of the most conspicuously daring fighters,

was the Jesuit, Father Damião Vieyra. What with one thing and another, the defence was such that Hulft had exclaimed with admiration: 'The gallant opposition of the defenders does not seem to acknowledge a superior force.'⁶⁶

Time and circumstances were, however, against the Portuguese. After about two or three months of the siege, the scarcity of provisions caused a famine. In an attempt to remedy the situation somewhat, thousands of non-Portuguese men, women and children were driven out of the city, and left to die outside the walls (because the Hollanders, wishing to encumber the enemy with the maintenance of these unfortunates drove them back towards the city, which would not receive them).⁶⁷ Even this inhuman measure could not save the Portuguese; as the days passed by, the famine became more severe. To add to the misery, there came a plague, which together with the famine daily carried off so many that the corpses lay unburied. Some Portuguese, unable to bear the intolerable conditions any longer, fled to the enemy; but the majority held on, fanatically. Two desperate appeals to Raja Sinha, had been in vain. The only hope lay in the arrival of the long-awaited reinforcements - which, however, never came.⁶⁸

The Dutch had summoned the city on the 18th April, and had received a brave reply from the Captain-General. But the difficulties within the city and the weakness of the defenders, was no secret because deserters daily brought information regarding these things. Van der Meijden and his Council, therefore, thought it advisable to undertake an assault before the Portuguese should be relieved from Goa. On the morning of Sunday, the 7th May, at a time when almost all the Portuguese were attending Mass, the Hollanders swarmed into the bastion of San João and captured it with ease. When, however, they attempted to penetrate further they were thrown back with heavy losses by the enemy, who had hastily rushed to arms. Nevertheless, despite two desperate assaults the Dutch could not be dislodged from the bastion. For two days they suffered heavily from the fire of the enemy from the other bastions; but when they in turn were able to sweep the city from cannon placed on this point, the enemy hoisted the white flag on the 10th. On the following day, three deputies came from the Captain-General, to the Dutch camp, to negotiate for terms.⁶⁹

Under very honourable terms, the Portuguese surrendered the city on the 12th May after withstanding a siege of nearly seven

months. Among these terms were the following: All Portuguese officers, both civil and military, as well as the citizens, were permitted (with certain reservations) to remove with them all their movable goods. The unmarried soldiers, who were born in Europe, alone were to be transported to Europa; all other soldiers, officers and civilians were to be transported to the Coast of India at the earliest opportunity. As long as they were under the charge of the Dutch, everyone was promised freedom from all injury either to persons or to goods.⁷⁰ The natives were to be at the discretion of the Governor, who would favour all Mudaliyars, arachchis and lascarins and treat them 'like his own men'.

Immediately after the surrender, the Dutch manned the bastions. The terms of surrender had been granted 'in the name of the Imperial Majesty of Ceylon, the High and Mighty States-General' etc. Nevertheless one of the first steps of the Dutch Governor was to shut out the Imperial Majesty's troops, from the city.

Raja Sinha received the first news of the terms of surrender from his chiefs, on the 11th. On the following day he was sent a copy of the terms by Van der Meijden, who wrote at the same time, urgently requesting the King's Standard, in order to place it over the city. The King replied, expressing his sorrow at the deceit practiced on him, and warning the Governor that no good would result from it. On the 14th May, and on the 20th, Van der Meijden wrote assuring the King of the good intentions of the Dutch. On the 21st the King reminded the Dutchman of the solemn promises, which had been made regarding the handing over of Colombo and Negombo.⁷¹ To this the latter replied that Hulft had several times expressed his conviction, that His Majesty himself would desire the retention of a small portion of the city and the destruction of the rest. He therefore wished the King to send men to demolish a portion of the city and the entire fort of Negombo.⁷² Eight days later the King replied that if the Governor wished to see the peace maintained he should fulfill the terms of the agreements, which had been sworn to previously, and should refrain from soothsaying. To this, Van der Meijden replied on the 31st May, in the following fashion:

'... especially since we observe therein [i.e. in the King's letter] how well our meagre [thoughts] agree with Your Imperial Majesty's excellent thoughts, in order to raze the largest part of this, Your Imperial Majesty's captured city, and to fortify again

only the smallest part; besides, [since we see in that letter] that Your Imperial Majesty conducts himself according to the confirmed and sworn articles of peace with the Hollander nation which we also are fulfilling perfectly; thereby the peace shall endure'.⁷³

The King was powerless against the chicanery of Van der Meijden. He had no means of enforcing the fulfillment of the concluded treaties, and the repeated promises of his allies. The Dutch feared that he would ally himself with the Portuguese, in an attempt to remedy the situation. Raja Sinha, however, hated and distrusted the Portuguese so much that he could not think of allying with them; besides, he must have realised that with their poor naval power, they would never prevail against the Dutch, even if he assisted them. Unaided, he did not dare to try conclusions against the Hollanders, whose strength he did not underestimate, and, whose power was now strongly established in the island.

Nevertheless, without setting any armies in the field against them, he caused great loss and injury to the Hollanders from the moment he heard of the garrisoning of Colombo. The provisions from the interior which had up to that time maintained the Dutch forces, were immediately cut off. Soon famine raged once more in the unfortunate city, and in every letter to the King Van der Meijden was forced to appeal for provisions, although in vain. Of the inhabitants of Colombo, very many, both Sinhalese and Portuguese, being instigated by the Dissawes, went over to the King.⁷⁴

To make the occupation of lands unprofitable to the Dutch, there was no better means than to remove the inhabitants and devastate the lands. This was done thoroughly in all the lands around Colombo, and even in parts of the Galle and Matara lands. Almost the entire Morawak Korale was denuded of inhabitants. In other areas too, guerillas were active in kidnapping, and in killing adherents of the Dutch. Sometimes, Dutch soldiers themselves were the victims, and on one occasion four soldiers and their wives were kidnapped. Despite Dutch outposts in the Galle and Matara lands, the guerillas were at times able to operate even a mile or two from the coast, because most of the chiefs were in secret sympathy with the King. In fact, several chiefs went over to him with their lascarins. Not the least harmful consequence of the hostility of the Kandyans, was that elephant-hunting and the gathering of cinnamon, which had

both been regularly conducted throughout the war with the Portuguese, were now brought to a standstill.⁷⁵

It appeared to Van der Meijden and his Council that the situation could only be improved by driving the King's army from the lowlands. They were very apprehensive that the King would ally himself with the Portuguese; therefore it was in every way best to deal with him before such a combination could take place. On the 31st May they wrote to the Governor-General and Council asking for authority to attack Raja Sinha.

Maetsuijcker and his Council did not wish to take any responsibility in this matter. They even posed the question, whether Colombo should be garrisoned at all;⁷⁶ but left the decision entirely to Van der Meijden and his Council. They only stated that in case of a successful war, no attempt should be made to extend the territories beyond the lands, where cinnamon was to be found; unless strategic reasons required otherwise.

On receipt of these advices in October the Governor and his Council decided to attack Raja Sinha. Through scarcity of provisions, as well as through various sicknesses many of the King's men had died or else had gone back to the hills, with or without the permission of their officers. With him, therefore, there were less than 3000 men. In July, he had made preparations to go back to Ruwanwella, and had sent a Dissawe ahead, to prepare accommodation for him.⁷⁷ But he had altered his plans, and continued at Raygamwatte. Perhaps he was hoping that some favourable circumstance might turn up by which he could obtain some advantage over the Dutch. In June and July, Van der Meijden had written some letters with appeals as well as threats. But he ignored them till September, when on the 9th he wrote upbraiding the Dutch by saying that they had behaved 'like a barbarous people, who have neither King, nor faith, nor laws'.⁷⁸ At the same time he showed a vestige of friendliness, by informing the Governor that a Dutch ship had been wrecked near Batticaloa and that the salvaged goods could be recovered when desired. The latter replied on the 10th October,⁷⁹ insinuating that the breach of faith was on the King's side and that if the Dutch were not left in peaceful possession of their lands, war might result; he further explained how sorry the Governor-General himself was over His Majesty's attitude. Raja Sinha replied on the 23rd of the month: 'if the Governor-General and the Company are persons, who keep their word, they have reason to be sorry; and

if this shall go on after this manner there will follow more and more sorrows.⁸⁰

On receipt of this letter, Van der Meijden and his Council decided on war. On 27th October he sent an ultimatum to the King; after a lengthy statement, to the effect that over since 1638 the Dutch had faithfully fulfilled the treaty-obligations, while the King had not, the Governor demanded the cessation of all acts of hostility and the return of all the kidnapped persons within ten days; otherwise there would be war.

As the King did not deign a reply. Van der Meijden and the Sergeant-Major Van der Laen marched against him on the 10th November, with a force of 950 Dutch, all the available Indonesian troops, most of the lascarins and a party of Topass.⁸¹ About a mile from the city they encountered some opposition from the Kandyan outposts; but thereafter, the march up to the royal camp at Raygamwatte, was virtually unhindered. Nevertheless, as the Dutch had taken one-and-a-half days to march the seven or eight miles to that camp, the King had had ample time to set fire to his encampments and retire to Kandy. From Raygamwatte the Dutch marched further along the Kelani Ganga expecting that some of the local inhabitants would appear to offer submission. But no one appeared; because all the inhabitants had been carried away with their cattle and goods, by the Kandyans. Thereupon, the Dutch returned to Colombo.⁸²

The activities of the marauding guerillas did not, however, cease with the retreat of the Kandyans. Van der Meijden complained to Batavia that the guerillas were active even up to the town-limits of Matara. Moreover, he soon heard rumours that the King was mustering his forces to come down in strength against the Dutch; also, that Gaspar Figueira had been sent to him from Jaffna, apparently to command his troops.

Nevertheless, despite these rumours, and the depredations of the Kandyan guerillas, the Dutch decided to refrain from hostilities, unless the King sent any armies to attack them or allied himself with the Portuguese. If he did so, they intended (among other things) to put a stop to his trade at Batticaloa and Trincomalee by a naval blockade of those ports. But they anxiously hoped that they would have no war with the King until they had expelled the Portuguese completely from Ceylon.

The Dutch did not feel secure in the island, so long as the Portu-

guese continued to have a footing on it through the possession of Manar and Jaffna. For still greater security they considered it also essential to capture Tuticorin and Negapatam on the neighbouring coasts of India, so that the Portuguese would be unable to menace this island from these bases.

The value attached to Manar, Jaffna and Tuticorin and Negapatam was, however, not merely strategic; but also economic. Manar and Tuticorin were particularly important for their famous pearl-banks. Tuticorin, furthermore, produced coarse cloths, which were manufactured in Negapatam and, to a lesser extent, in Jaffna as well. The entire Peninsula of Jaffna was known to be a very rich territory with elephants and chayaroot as the main commercial products.⁸³

To capture these places, as well as to undertake certain other exploits, the Batavian authorities sent the Councillor Extraordinary, Rijcklof Van Goens, with seven ships and nearly 700 soldiers, on 6 September 1657. His instructions⁸⁴ were that he should first sail to Goa and obtain further reinforcements from the fleet of nine ships under Commander Roothaes which were blockading that harbour. He was then to attempt the capture of Diu, if that task did not appear too hazardous; thereafter, he was to sail down to Ceylon and attempt the capture of Jaffna and the other Portuguese strongholds in its vicinity. He was authorised to modify these instructions according to circumstances.

The attitude to be adopted towards Raja Sinha, was also to be regulated according to circumstances. If the power of the Portuguese appeared to be so weak that there was nothing to fear from a combination between them and Raja Sinha, then, Van Goens should not pay any attention to him; but if the situation was otherwise, 'he should be complimented, the sooner the better, and be sent a valuable present, with the excuse that the troubles and misunderstandings, arisen between His Majesty and our people, gave us the greatest sorrow, but that, nevertheless, we remained unalterably inclined to maintain sacredly the contract made with His Majesty - in order, by that means, to divert him, if possible, from the plans, which he might be able to resolve upon with the enemy'.

After a difficult voyage, Van Goens reached Goa in November. There he learnt that the Portuguese fleet in the harbour was much stronger than had been calculated in Batavia. Instead of obtaining reinforcements from the fleet of Roothaes, he had now to reinforce

that fleet from his own forces. It was decided that a successful attack on Diu was not possible on account of the weakness of his forces; he, therefore, sailed for Ceylon, where he arrived on the 1st January 1658.

In view of the strength of the Portuguese both at Goa and in Ceylon (where at Manar alone, there was said to be a thousand men) it was decided that a friendly letter should be dispatched to Raja Sinha in the manner advised by Maetsuijcker and his Council. Such a letter was sent on the 8th January 1658.⁸⁵ Van Goens feared that if the King wished to do so he could greatly hinder his enterprises against the Portuguese; therefore he instructed Van der Meijden: 'If he [i.e. the King] replies, . . . and if a speedy answer is to our advantage, compose an answer in my name and send it to him, in order to keep him well-disposed, until we shall have settled our affairs in Manar and Jaffna, when we shall be able to reply to the Imperial Majesty, better than now.'⁸⁶

It was, however, rather doubtful that the King would show a friendly disposition, because only a few weeks earlier his Dissawe of Sabaragamuwa had threatened to march upon the Matara territories, thereby forcing the Dutch to withdraw their forces from Katuwana to Hakmana.⁸⁷

Having reinforced his forces with 350 Dutch soldiers and 300 Sinhalese, Van Goens sailed for Tuticorin, which he captured on the 25th January, without meeting much opposition. On the 19th of the following month, he was before Manar, where he found the Portuguese resolutely prepared to oppose him. For two days their vessels prevented him from effecting a landing; but on the third day, despite stout opposition, he gained the beach. The Portuguese were soon driven in flight leaving behind seventy captives and many more dead, among whom was the Captain-General of Ceylon, Antonio de Amaral de Menezes. On the 24th February, the fort of Manar surrendered without a fight. With the 124 captives from the fort, the Portuguese had lost in Manar nearly 300 men in dead or captured; about 400 had, however, succeeded in escaping to Jaffna.

Leaving a garrison of sixty men on Manar, Van Goens marched overland to Jaffna. From the 7th to the 18th of March, he encountered considerable opposition from the enemy, who kept up a house-to-house resistance. At length, they were driven to take refuge within the citadel, 'which', Van Goens wrote to Batavia,

‘deserves that name better than any other that I have seen in India.’⁸⁸ In view of its strength he decided not to risk a storm, but to lay siege to it. He determined, however, to capture a smaller fort on the island of Kayts which was preventing the Dutch vessels from approaching close to the shore. After a few days’ resistance the garrison of a hundred men was forced to surrender as it had run short of drinking-water.

For over three months the fort of Jaffna held out in the expectation of relief - which never came, because the Commander Roothaes kept Goa closely blockaded. From the cannonading of the enemy, the beleaguered suffered some casualties, but ‘the greatest battle was with famine and pestilence.’⁸⁹ On account of these miseries there appeared signs of a mutiny brewing amongst some of the Portuguese. When the outlook appeared so desperate, the Commander surrendered on the 23rd June.

The terms⁹⁰ of the capitulation were much harder than those granted at the surrender of Colombo. Moreover, they were dishonourably kept by Van Goens. By Article 4 it had been stipulated that all civil and military officers of the rank of Captain, and above, should be transported to Goa at the earliest opportunity. He, however, decided to send them to Batavia instead. By this means he hoped to prevent these officers, for a long time, from serving against him in his further enterprises on the mainland of India; for, he even requested the Batavian authorities to detain the most valiant of these officers somewhat longer than the others, as he considered them to be ‘cattle with the most dangerous horns.’⁹¹

A few weeks after the capture of Jaffna, Van Goens sent the Sergeant-Major, Van der Laen with 700 soldiers in eleven ships to blockade Negapatam until his own arrival later on with more forces; when an attack could be made on the town. Immediately on arrival at Negapatam, Van der Laen, however, decided to summon it to surrender on very favourable terms. With the examples of the defeats at Manar and Jaffna before them, the Portuguese had no hesitation, and accepted the offer with celerity. On the 23rd July Negapatam passed into Dutch hands; thereby, the Portuguese were driven from the last stronghold from which the Hollanders feared their position in Ceylon could be seriously threatened.⁹²

Meanwhile, throughout all the military operations of Van Goens, Raja Sinha had kept still. There had been disturbing rumours, that

he would send assistance to the enemy; but they all proved to be false. It was true that the Portuguese had sent ambassadors to request help; but they had not even obtained an audience from him. At the same time, however, he had shown no friendliness towards the Dutch. Van Goens had written to him once again on the 18th May; but neither to this letter, nor to that of 8th January, had he deigned a reply. Moreover, he had allowed his guerillas to continue sporadic depredations.⁹³

With the fall of Jaffna to the Dutch and the complete expulsion thereby of the Portuguese from the island, Raja Sinha witnessed that he had exchanged one foreigner for another, or, as his subjects caustically put it: 'He gave pepper and took ginger'. The fact, however, was that he had realised quite early that such an exchange would take place and had become more or less reconciled to it; because he preferred to have the Dutch as neighbours rather than the Portuguese - if he could not be rid of both.

The situation in 1658, when compared with that at the beginning of 1638, indicated that the exchange, had been an advantageous one. In 1638, he was hemmed in by a ring of coastal fortresses, and the Portuguese territories sprawled up to within fifteen or twenty miles west of his capital. In 1658 almost the entire east coast and a considerable portion of the west coast were his; and, to the west of his Capital, all the territories within a sixty-to-seventy-mile radius were under his authority. In 1638 he had had to deal with 'His Highness, the King of Malwane'⁹⁴ at Colombo; but in 1658, there was in 'His Majesty's city of Colombo', 'His Majesty's humble servant', the Dutch Governor. Whether the favourable situation of 1658 would continue, was, however, another question.

As for the Dutch, Maetsuijcker triumphantly explained to the Directors the position which they had won in the island, thus:

'And thus is the Company, through God's merciful blessing, become master of the renowned Kingdom of Jaffananpatnam . . .

.....
we have thereby become complete masters of the whole island of Ceylon, as far as it has been occupied by the Portuguese.⁹⁵ . . . and now the King Raja Sinha can also be kept under better allegiance, just as the Portuguese, before our arrival, have always known very well how to coerce him.'

The establishment of Dutch power in Ceylon, was complete.

1. Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 7 July 1652, Kol. Arch. 1086 fos. 594-606. Batavia itself had received orders for the resumption of the war, on 5 April, by letter of 14 Oct. 1651 from the Dirs. (Kol. Arch. 455 fos. 231-53).
2. Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 7 July 1652, *Ibid.* Aalbers (44) gives only one reason for the postponement; he omits the more important one regarding the lack of sufficient forces.
3. Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 7 July 1652, *Ibid.* Nevertheless, it was certainly a blunder, not to have informed Negombo before informing Colombo of the actual resumption of the war. Aalbers (44) quotes approvingly the words of G. G. & C. to the Dirs., to the effect that, in any case, it was not at all necessary to have informed the Portuguese, because the latter should have known that the truce had not been prolonged in Europe. (24 Dec. 1652, Kol. Arch. 1080 fos. 154-66). But Aalbers did not know that the same authorities had earlier written to Kitt. & C. that before resuming the war they should see that 'het bestant het sij aende Revier van Alican, ofte in Colombo opgeseijt werde op dat geen oorsaeck en nemen te clagen van ons verraet, ofte verrader te wesen.' (21 May 1652, Kol. Arch. 779 pp. 265-78).
4. Galle Councillors to G. G. & C., 20 Oct. 1652, Kol. Arch. 1086, fos. 609-11; Kitt & C. to G. G. & C., 6 Nov. 1652, Kol. Arch. 1086 fos. 612-24 Queyroz (896) is wrong in saying that the Mudaliyar deserted only after repeatedly appealing in vain for reinforcements from Homem.
5. Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 6 Nov. 1652, *Ibid.* Under the Portuguese (and as it appears here, under the Dutch also) the lascarins seem to have been usually placed in the vanguard, not merely in field encounters, but even in attacks on fortifications. See on this point: Queyroz, 452, 475, 941. Ribeiro, 351-53. On p. 98 Ribeiro asserts that it was the custom for the lascarins to be in the vanguard.
6. Queyroz (896) wrongly asserts that because of Homem's orders the Portuguese were not permitted to fire a single shot in reply to the Dutch.
7. Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 6 Nov. 1652, Kol. Arch. 1086, fos. 612-24; Same to same, 19 Nov. 1652, Kol. Arch. 1086, fos. 629-34.
8. Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 6 Nov. 1652, *Ibid.* Valentyn, 137. In the above letter to Batavia, Kitt. says that the Portuguese had already sent an ambassador with a rich present to the King. As far as I know, none of the Portuguese sources make any mention of this embassy.
9. For the views of G. G. & C.: G. G. & C., to Kitt. & C., 21 May 1652, Kol. Arch. 779 pp. 265-78; Same to same, 17 Aug. 52, Kol. Arch. 779 pp. 528-39. For Kitt's agreement: Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 7 July 1652, Kol. Arch. 1086 fos. 594-606. Aalbers (46) readily accepts the above views of G. G. & C. as expressed in the '*Generale Missive*' [i.e. G. G. & C. to Dirs.] of 24 Dec. 1652, because he did not know that the Dutch officials generally misunderstood or misrepresented the King's policy. Note for instance the new theory which was put forward to explain away the King's all-out war against the Portuguese. On 6 Nov. 1652, Kitt. asserted (Kol. Arch. 1086 fos. 612-24) that the King would continue in friendship with the Dutch as long as they appear to be the *strongest*.
10. G. G. & C., to Dirs. 31 Jan. 1653, Kol. Arch. 1080 fos. 221-54.
11. Raja to Van der Meijden, 23 Oct. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1105 fo. 957; a trans-

- lation from original of this letter, in *JCRAS* XVIII. 242-43. The Dutch themselves were not unaware of his hatred for the Portuguese, and his passionate desire to capture Colombo. Regarding the latter, see the foll. words of G. G. & C., to Kitt., 17 Feb. 1653 (Kol. Arch. 780 fos. 12-21): '... dat hij haer (ie. Portuguese) eijndelijck als de noodt aende man sal gaen trachten te adsisteren of wel dat deel inde victorie ofte overwinninge sal willen hebben van die stadt die hem ende sijne voorouderen soo veel quaets beroochend heeft, ende daer hij soo opgebeten is.'
12. Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 6 Nov. 1652, Kol. Arch. 1086 fos. 612-24. The mutiny of the Portuguese (see text, below) undoubtedly took place some time after Raja's entry into the war. Kitt's successor, Van der Meijden, falsely declared in 1660 that Raja had been very much induced to enter upon the war, on account of this mutiny. cf. Valentyn, 141 (In pp. 141-48, Valentyn gives an extract from a Report of Van der Meijden made in 1660. Although no acknowledgement is made by Baldaeus, pp. 142-47 of his work on Ceylon is almost a transcript from this Report.)
 13. by Ribeiro (167), Queyroz (898) however, indicates some doubt on this point.
 14. who expressed their surprise, when they heard of this accusation (cf. G. G. & C. to Dirs., 19 Jan. 1654, Kol. Arch. 1087 fos. 264-81).
 15. It was a sad irony of fate that in 1623, the soldiers who had mutinied against their Captain-Major, Gomes da Silva, should have 'accepted as Captain-Major, Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, who knew how to punish them thenceforth in the proper way' (Queyroz. 733-34).
 16. Kitt. & C. gave the curious explanation that Anguruwatota could not be relieved in time, because the Kalutara army had summoned eighty men from Negombo and that until these arrived the march had to be delayed. (G. G. & C., to Dirs. 19 Jan. 1654, Kol. Arch. 1087 fos. 264-81) Reinforcements could have been sooner obtained from Galle. From Valentyn (137) it appaers that the Dutch considered the King at fault for not having informed them in time of the movements of the Portuguese.
 17. Kitt. to G. G. & C., 3 Dec. 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 523-45.
 18. It is difficult to give much credence to the accounts of Ribeiro and Queyroz regarding the details of these encounters. In the first encounter near Arandora (which Queyroz, unlike Ribeiro, rightly places after the battle of Tihariya) Ribeiro (171) gives the Kandyan casualties at more than 3000 dead, and the Portuguese, at 13; Queyroz (910) gives the Kandyan losses at over 100, and those of the Portuguese at 7. Regarding the second encounter Queyroz (911) says that after a nine-hour battle more than 300 Kandyans were killed, without any loss to the Portuguese.
 19. Queyroz (911). This figure, cannot, however, be relied upon as the proportions of the Kandyan forces seem to be, generally, magnified very much by both Queyroz and Ribeiro (see above, p. 54 n. 63 for a concrete proof regarding such exaggeration. Kittensteijn mentions the interesting fact that when Raja Sinha appeared in the lowlands, the subjects of the Dutch went in crowds to pay their respects to the King. Kitt & C. to G. G. & C., 30 April, 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 488-511.
 20. See, for an explicit reference to his continual efforts in this direction, his letter cited in the previous note.

21. These ideas are expressed in most of the letters (of this period) between Batavia and Galle. See eg.: Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 30 April 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 488-511; G. G. & C., to Kitt. 17 Aug. 1652, Kol. Arch. 779 pp. 528-39. Maetsuijcker (and his Council) believed that if the King was allowed to come near the Dutch army, they would be unable even to trust their own Christian lascarins, whom he described as: 'a faithless people, always more attached to their own rule than to ours or to that of the Portuguese; which has become apparent as often as they had a chance of ridding themselves of them [i.e. the Portuguese] G. G. & C. to Dirs. 31 Jan. 1653, Kol. Arch. 1080 fos. 221-54.
22. 'Hij hout op vorige beloften om Negombo aen, als Colombo sal gewonnen wezen, het welcke wij hem ten dezen tijde niet hebben derven ontseggen, gedenkende als het eens soo verde is, die sake neffens veel andere daer over ten dien sal gekibbelt, wel sal gereddet worden.' Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 30 April 1653 Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 488-511.
From his previous experience, the King must have realised how little reliance could be placed on the promises of the Dutch. But there was nothing he could do to ensure that the forts would be handed over to him; he had to depend entirely on the sincerity of the Dutch.
23. Kitt. & C. to G. G. & C., 30 April 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 488-511.
24. *Ibid.* Later on, Kitt's successor Van der Meijden said more or less the same thing, though in less enthusiastic language. (V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 4 Dec. 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 559-65. Needless to say, Aalbers (47) is quite wrong when he says that up to 1655 (at least) the King had remained peacefully in Kandy without taking an active part in the war with the Portuguese either in person or through his commanders).
25. G. G. & C. to Kitt., 13 Aug. 1653, Kol. Arch. 780 pp. 309-23. The real reason why the Dutch mistrusted and misrepresented the King's actions is thus apparent. Incidentally, this letter appears to be the first sent to Ceylon, after Maetsuijcker became Governor-General, Carel Reijniersz who had succeeded Van der Lijn in 1650, died on 19 May 1653 and Maet. was chosen to fill his place.
26. Kitt. to G. G. & C., 3 Dec. 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 523-45; V. der M. & C., to G. G. & C., 4 Dec. 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 559-65. Van Goens to G. G. & C., 14 Nov. 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 568-75. Queyroz (914) mistakenly attributes the retreat to Malwana as having been made immediately after the King had been promised a free passage for his stores.
27. For his activities in this connection see Aalbers, 68 ff. He had risen rapidly in the ranks of the Company, and was hardly 35 years old at this time. He was again in Ceylon in 1658 when he captured the last Portuguese strongholds in the island. In 1662-63 and 1665-75, he was Governor of Ceylon and from 1676-80 he was Governor-General at Batavia.
28. He had been to Kandy with Helmond and Thijssen in 1637; thereafter, he had served in various capacities on the Coromandel Coast. From 1649-50 he was Chief at Negombo. Finally, in April 1652 he was once more sent to Ceylon, to serve as the second person in the administration until the departure of Van Kittensteijn for Batavia. When the latter left, he succeeded as Governor. In 1657, he became a Councillor Extraordinary and in the follow-

- ing year, a full-fledged Councillor of India. He served as Governor till 1662.
29. Raja to 'those who are in the Government of my Imperial fortress Galle' 2 Nov. 1653. Kol. Arch. 1092 fo. 593. Letter and Diary of Joris Hervendonck, 3 Nov. 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 591-92. The 'sober-treatment' which Aalbers points out was meted out by the King to this body-guard, was merely the result of the scarcity of provisions. See on this point: V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 14 Nov. 1654, Kol. Arch. 1094 fos. 685-704.
 30. V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 25 Aug. 1654, Kol. Arch. 1094 fos. 679-84.
 31. G. G. & C. to Dirs. 7 Nov. 1654, Kol. Arch. 1099 fos. 75-79, Queyroz, 916-17; Ribeiro, 180. Ribeiro is perfectly correct as to the date, and his figure for the Portuguese casualties appears to be more reliable than that of Queyroz (It looks as if Ribeiro himself was present at this encounter). He is, however, mistaken as regards the reason for the flight of the Dutch from Kalutara. Dr. Pieris (*Port. Era*, ii. 381-82) incorrectly places this battle in 1653.
 32. G. G. & C. to Dirs. 7 Nov. 1654, *Ibid.* V. der M. & C., to G. G. & C. 25 Aug. 1654, Kol. Arch. 1094 fos. 679-84. Dr. Pieris (*Some Docs.* 169) is incorrect in saying that the Appuhamis deserted to the Portuguese.
 33. Kitt. to G. G. & C., 3 Dec. 1653, Kol. Arch. 1092 fos. 523-45.
 34. G. G. & C., to V. der M. & C. 30 June 1655, Kol. Arch. 782 pp. 305-15.
 35. The originals of these letters together with copies of his replies were sent by the King to V. der M. who refers summarily to their contents in V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C. 14 Nov. 1654, Kol. Arch. 1094 fos. 685-704. See also Queyroz 925.
 36. Regarding these internal troubles, see: V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 25 Aug. 1654, Kol. Arch. 1094 fos. 679-84; Same to same, 14 Nov. 1654, Kol. Arch. 1094 fos. 685-704.
 37. V. der M. & C., to G. G. & C. 14 Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1100 fos. 406-19; G. G. & C. to Dirs., 24 Dec. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1100 fos. 93-100. 'Narrative of the Events which have taken place in East India during the monsoon of 1655' Library of Evora, Collec. of MSS. Cod. C.V. (2-15) fo. 46 (I.O.L. Trans.) Queyroz, 932-24; Ribeiro, 184-85.
 38. V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 14 May 1655, Kol. Arch. 1100 fos. 406-19. The naval blockade of Colombo was not effective enough to prevent the Portuguese from receiving considerable reinforcements from time to time.
 39. V. der M. & C., G. G. & C., 14 May 1655, *Ibid.* 'Narrative of the Events..... during the Monsoon of 1655'. (I.O.L. Trans); Queyroz, 927-28; Ribeiro, 190. While Queyroz exaggerates the Kandyan losses by about 3 or 4 times the actual amount, Ribeiro magnifies the losses 50 to 60 times.
 40. V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 14 May 1655, *Ibid.* Note, incidentally, that Ribeiro (191) is quite incorrect in saying that after Kotikapola, he forbade his men to attack Portuguese territory.
 41. cf. Raja to V. der M., 16 Aug. 1655 (Trans in *JCRAS* XVIII. 221-22).
 42. After valiantly conducting the defence of Colombo till its surrender he returned to Goa, where he became interim Governor (1656-58) of Portuguese India along with Francisco de Melo de Castro, his predecessor in Ceylon.
 43. The war with England was not hailed with 'great joy' by the Batavian authorities, although Aalbers (32) says it was. They were very sorry that it would

interfere with the proper prosecution of their enterprises against the Portuguese (cf. G. G. & C., to Dirs., 19 Jan. 1654, Kol. Arch. 1087 fo. 6; G. G. & C. to V. der M. & C., 19 Oct. 1654, Kol. Arch. 781, pp. 482-83; etc.).

44. V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 14 May 1655, Kol. Arch. 1100 fos. 406-19.
45. A man equally at home with the pen as with the sword; had served, in the war against England, at the head of a company of 24 men maintained at his own expense; had been Secretary of the city of Amsterdam, when he was taken into the V.O.C. service; in Jan. 1654 sent to Batavia to take up duties as Director-General; during the expedition to Ceylon, conducted affairs with great ability and resourcefulness until his death on 10 April 1656.
46. Instructions for Hulft, 14 Aug. 1655, Kol. Arch. 782, pp. 475-95. Following the story from the 'Generale Missiven' Aalbers (53 n. 4) was misled into believing that Hulft had been categorically instructed to demolish the fortifications and to hand over the city to the King. The instructions to Hulft explain the true views of G. G. & C.:
'...maer laten het selve U.E. ende des Gouver^{nr}. ende Raets voorsigtig oordeel bevoelen, naa dat de saecken ende gelegentheeden ter plaetse sullen bevonden worden te vereijschen, het sij dan dat U.E. met malcander goetvind alle beijde voorz. fortificatien [i.e. Negombo and Colombo] te abandonneeren ofte wel een van beijde, of soo wel d'een als d'ander in te houden.' cf. also p. 162 above, and note 76 below.
47. 30 June 1655, Kol. Arch. 782, pp. 205-15. The secret letter to V. der M. of same date in, Kol. Arch. 782, pp. 316-17.
48. cf. Hulft to G. G., 14 Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1102 fos. 226-31.
49. cf. Raja to Hulft, 29 Oct. 1655, in Baldaeus, 68-69. The work of Baldaeus is invaluable for a study of matters connected with the years 1655-56, because he gives information and documents which are not available from other sources. But as noted earlier (e.g. p. 11 n. 16, p. 21 n. 25 above) his work has to be used very carefully.
50. Raja to Hulft, 29 Oct. 1655 (*Ibid*) cf. the superscriptions in the previous letters (in *JCRAS XVIII*. 169-222, *passim*.).
51. For this letter and the reply, cf. Baldaeus, 69-70; Queyroz, 949.
52. For a full account of the storm and events preceding it cf: Hulft to G. G. & C., 24 Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1100^A fos. 878-84. cf. also V. der M. to G. G. & C., 14 Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1102 fo. 232; Baldaeus, 61-74; Saar (*Reisebeschreibungen*, VI. 132-40); Queyroz, 934-54; Ribeiro, 193-201; Pieris, *Port. Era*, ii. 397-413.
53. For the contents of Raja's letter and that of Coutinho cf. Hulft to G. G. & C., 24 Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1100^A fos. 878-84; also Baldaeus, 74.
54. cf. Hulft to G. G. & C., 24 Nov. 1655 (*Ibid*); V. der M. to G. G. & C., 24 Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1102 fos. 241-49.
55. Hulft to Dirs., 5 Feb. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1100^A fos. 861-77. cp. Aalbers (51-52). Even G. G. & C. felt that now that a siege had to be undertaken, the King's assistance was more necessary than ever; but, as they explained, there was one big difficulty in this matter: 'als men den Coninck maer vertrouwen mocht, dat sijn bedencken grootelijcx heeft, gelijk U.Ed. bekent is om den quaden achterdocht die hij heeft dat wij hem soo de Portugesen

- eens meester connen werden niet een hair beter sullen tracteren dan deselve hebben gedaen, tot welcke gedachten wij hem veel oorsaeck gegeven hebben' (G. G. & C., to Dirs., 1 Feb. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1102 fos. 64-72). Seldom were G. G. & C. so frank,
56. cf. Baldaeus, 66, 78, 92; Saer (*Reisebeschreibungen*, VI. 138); Queyroz, 944, 965.
 57. cf. G. G. & C. to Dirs., 31 July 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 105-06.
 58. Hulft to G. G. & C., 24 Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1100^A fos. 373-84.
 59. cf. *Ibid.*, Baldaeus, 95.
 60. cf. Letter in Baldaeus, 85-86 (cf. also trans. in *JCRAS* XVIII. 228) cf. on Hulft's policy towards Raja: V. der M. to G. G. & C., 24 Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1102 fos. 241-49; Hulft to G. G. & C., 24 Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1100^A fos. 878-84; Hulft to Dirs., 5 Feb. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1100^A fos. 861-77; Baldaeus, 66, 78, 79, 95, 104-06. In the above-mentioned letter to the Dirs. Hulft explained: 'Telckens hebbe ick hem met de beste inckt geantwoort.' Aalbers (53) appears to have believed that Hulft was only imitating the 'Eastern rhetoric' and 'flattering courteousness' of Raja Sinha.
 61. Raja to Hulft, 20 Jan. 1656, in *JCRAS*, XVIII. 225-26. Hulft could make his assurances ring true all the more because he had almost decided to hand over the city to Raja, once it was captured (cf. Hulft to Dirs., 5 Feb., 1656, Kol. Arch. 1100^A fos. 861-77).
 62. cf. Baldaeus, 92-94, 96; Queyroz, 967.
 63. cf. Raja to V. der M., 21 May 1656, in *JCRAS*, VXIII. 239, cf. also Baldaeus 104-06.
 64. cf. 'Extract from the diary of Jan Volckertsz' in *JCRAS*, XI, 148. Aalbers (52-53) suggests unjustifiably that the hyperbolic epithets of affection used by the King towards Hulft were entirely hypocritical and made in order to induce the Dutchman to hand over Colombo to him. Incidentally, it is curious to note that Raja soon came to believe that Hulft had been done away with by the Dutch themselves (cf. Raja to Van Goens, 6 July 1658, Kol. Arch. 1121 fo. 253).
 65. cf. on the above: Baldaeus, 95, 111-18, *passim*.
 66. Hulft to Dirs. 5 Feb. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1100^A fos. 861-77.
 67. According to the Report of Godskens (as given in Baldaeus, 95) the King approved of this action of the Dutch.
 68. Throughout the war between the Dutch and the Portuguese, a vital factor which always told heavily in favour of the Dutch was their overwhelmingly superior naval power. This was never more significantly apparent than during the siege of Colombo; for although reinforcements were at length sent from Goa, the Dutch warships effectively prevented them from reaching Colombo. (cf. G. G. & C., to Dirs., 4 Dec. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 52-59.)
 69. V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 31 May 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 455-63. Baldaeus (121-22) mentions that the Kandyans had joined in at the beginning of the assault, on 7th May; but that they were of little or no use. For the siege and capture of Colombo, see (in addition to the letters of Hulft and V. der M. cited earlier): Baldaeus, 75-122, 205-32 (wrongly paginated 105-32); Saer (in *Reisebeschreibungen*, VI. 141-146); Queyroz, 955-84; Ribeiro, 201-17.
 70. On the admission of the Governor Van der Meijden himself (to G. G. & C.

- 31 May 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 455-63) this undertaking was badly violated by the Dutch. The fact that Baldaeus hotly denies this (230, wrongly paginated 130) and adduces specious evidence to support his denial, indicates how untrustworthy his statements can at times be. (It must be remembered that he was in Ceylon within a few months of the capitulation of Colombo. cf. on this point, G. G. & C. to Dirs. 4 Dec. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 52-59) For terms of surrender cf. Heeres, *Corpus Dip.* ii. 85-92. The terms as given by Baldaeus and Queyroz are accurate, but those given by Saar are almost entirely fictitious (cf. previous note).
71. Aalbers (51) says that the payment of the King's debt to the Company was a necessary pre-condition for the handing over of Colombo. The truth, however, was, as we have seen already, (cf. p. 143 n. 2 above) that the Dutch had agreed to surrender Colombo to him under all circumstances whether he had paid his debt or not. Nevertheless, G. G. & C. maintained (after the capture of the city) that they were not bound to hand over Colombo, since the King had not paid his debt. (cf. G. G. & C. to Dirs., 31 July 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 105-06 and Aalbers, 57 n. 1) Note the significant fact that in addition to all this, G. G. & C. falsely reported on 4 Dec. 1656 to their superiors (Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 52-59) that Raja had had secret intelligence with the Portuguese during the siege of Colombo.
 72. The offer to hand over Negombo for demolition was a false one. By letter of 29 May 1656 (Kol. Arch. 1105 fos. 954-55) the King informed V. der M. that he was sending a Dissawe to take over the fort; but it did not take him long to find that he was being fooled by the Governor. Note, however, that G. G. & C. made the Directors understand that the offer of handing over Negombo was a genuine one (4 Dec. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 52-59).
 73. 31 May 1656, Kol. Arch. 1105, fo. 943. V. der M.'s letters to Raja at this period were dated: 12, 14, 20, 24, 30, 31 May; 10, 15 June and 5 July. (Kol. Arch. 1105 fos. 938-45) Raja's letters were dated: 11, 12, 21, 29 May (Kol. Arch. 1105 fos. 946-55). There was also a letter of 13 June (cf. *JCRAS*, XVIII, 241-42) and one of 1 July (Kol. Arch. 1105) fos. 955-56) the latter being written on Raja's orders by the Dutch interpreter George Blume. These two letters are interesting because they show that in the midst of all his troubles, he was passionately interested in one of his favourite pastimes - falconry.
 74. V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 31 May 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 455-63. Ribeiro (274-75) correctly points out that Raja Sinha's hatred was towards the Portuguese as a nation, and not as separate individuals.
 75. For the harm caused by the hostility of the Kandyans etc. cf. V. der M. & C., to G. G. & C., 31 May 1656 (*Ibid*); Councillors at Galle to G. G. & C., 27 June 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 470-72; V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 5 Aug. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 475-76; Councillors at Galle to G. G. & C., 15 Aug. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 478-79; Baldaeus, 132-39, *passim*.; Saar (in *Reisebeschreibungen*, VI. 148-49).
 76. 7 Sep. 1656, Kol. Arch. 783, pp. 357-64. In their letters of 31 July (Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 105-06) and 4 Dec. (Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 52-59) 1656, they wrote to the Dirs. that, in order to have good relations with the King, and in view of the difficult circumstances of the time etc. they were seriously con-

sidering the question of handing over Colombo, which undoubtedly would have been given to the King if the Hon. Hulft had lived to fulfil the instructions they had given to him on the subject. These statements of G. G. & C. are a good example of the way in which they often played for safety. Fearing that a warpolicy towards the King might bring about disasters similar to those of 1646, they did not declare definitely either approval or disapproval of V. der M.'s action in occupying Colombo. But when they heard of the successful outcome of affairs, they wrote: 'soo word wij te meer in onse gevoelens geconfirmeert ende bevesticht, dat het een geheel dienstige sake voor de Compagnie sal wesen, dat se Colombo inhout.' (31 Jan. 1657, Kol. Arch. 1107, fos. 54-56).

77. For the above, cf. V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 5 Aug. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos. 475-76.
78. Kol. Arch. 1105 fos. 956-57.
79. Kol. Arch. 1105 fo. 946.
80. Kol. Arch. 1105 fo. 957. At the same time he sent a copy of a letter which the new Captain-General, Antonio de Amaral de Menezes had written to him. De Menezes was humbly requesting the King's assistance against the Dutch. By sending this letter to V. der M. the King, apparently, wished to indicate that despite the wrong done to him by the Dutch, he remained steadfastly hostile to the Portuguese.
81. This force has been described as a *little* army (cf. Geyl, *Camb. Hist. of Ind.* v. 47; Stapel, *Geschiedenis*, III. 314). In actual fact, it was the largest field-force which the Dutch had employed up to that time (in Ceylon); besides, its numerical strength does not appear to have been much less than that of the Kandyan forces.
82. cf. on the above, V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C. 19 Nov. 1656. Kol. Arch. 1105 fos. 927-33.
83. cf. on these points; Instructions for Van Goens, 5 Sep. 1657, Kol. Arch. 784, pp. 415-25.
84. *Ibid.*
85. Kol. Arch. 1116 fo. 921. Aalbers (Appendix II, pp. 215-16) reproduces this letter in full.
86. *Memorio* for V. der M. from Van Goens, 14 Jan. (not 19 Jan., as Aalbers, 141 n., gives it) 1658, Kol. Arch. 1116 fos. 918-20.
87. cf. V. der M. to G. G. & C., 30 April 1658, Kol. Arch. 1117 fos. 253-62.
88. V. Goens to G. G. & C., 17 March 1658, Kol. Arch. 1117 fo. 244.
89. Queyroz, 998.
90. cf. Heeres, *Corpus Dip.* ii. 124-27.
91. V. Goens to G. G. & C., 6 July 1658, Kol. Arch. 1117 fos. 277-87. Aalbers (166-68 and 167 n. 3) attempts to explain away the conduct of Van Goens, but G. G. & C. had the correct view of the matter when they wrote to him (30 Sep. 1658, Kol. Arch. 785, fos. 506-20): '... en behoort men zijn woort niet te verbreken dat men aen gevangens gegeven heeft sonder dat hiertegen in consideratie can comen dat eenige van de selve getracht hebben contrarie het accordt.... eenich goudt ende juwelen uijtte brengen.... om dat daertegen voorsien conde werden door naeuw recherche als andere middel, nocte can ons oock excuseren dat vele onder de selve cloeke soldaten sijn, die ons in

- onse vordere desseijns boven andere sullen connen hinderl. wezen alsoo wij dat te vooren soudē hebben moeten bedacht al eer onse woort te geven....'
92. For the capture of Tuticorin, Manar, Jaffna and Negapatam cf. V. Goens to G. G. & C., 17 March 1658, Kol. Arch. 1117 fos. 238-49; Same to same, 6 July 1658, Kol. Arch. 1117 fos. 277-87; Baldaeus, 147-58, *passim*; Saar (in *Reisebeschreibungen*, VI. 154-65, *passim*); Queyroz, 993-99; Ribeiro, 219-24. Saar's account contains much that is fanciful and can bear no comparison with that of Ribeiro. Aalbers (135-70) gives a well-nigh excellent account of these events.
93. For the above, cf. V. der M. to G. G. & C., 30 April 1658, Kol. Arch. 1117 fos. 253-62; Councillors at Galle to G. G. & C., 8 May 1658, Kol. Arch. 1117 fos. 264-65; V. der M. & C. to G. G. & C., 15 June 1658, Kol. Arch. 1117 fos. 268-69. Raja Sinha did reply to Van Goens before the year was out; but I consider his reply to belong to a new chapter in the relations between him and the Dutch.
2. cf. Queyroz, 1074; Ribeiro, 132.
94. Note, incidentally that Colombo became the capital of the Dutch Government in Ceylon only in 1658 (cf. G. G. & C. to Van Goens, 30 Sep. 1658, Kol. Arch. 785 pp. 506-20) and not in 1656, as hitherto believed (cf. e.g. Van Resandt, *De Gezaghebbers*, 58).
95. This was not strictly true, because many of the old Portuguese territories in the west and south-west of the island, were now in the King's hands. This letter of Maetsuijcker (and his Council) was dated 14 Dec. 1658 (Kol. Arch. 1115, fos. 49-50).

GLOSSARY

ADIGAR

the two chief Ministers in the Kandyan Kingdom were called Adigars; of these the *Pallegampaha* Adigar ranked as the First, and the *Udagampaha* Adigar ranked as the Second Adigar. In the Portuguese territories, however, Adigars are with as officials subordinate to the Dissawes. The Portuguese practice was continued by the Dutch.

APPUHAMI

an honorific applied to men of good descent.

ARACHCHI

a military officer in command of a *ranchuwa* or company of about twenty-five lascarins.

BAHAR

a measure of weight equated at 480 Dutch pounds; a Portuguese Bahar was equated at 384 Dutch pounds, a Dutch pound being 9% more than the avoirdupois pound.

CAREAS

a caste of Tamil fishermen who seem to have been found not only in the Jaffna area, but also at various points on the East Coast, such as at Batticaloa and Trincomalee.

DISSAWE

Governor of a Dissawani or Province.

DISSAWANI

largest territorial unit within a Sinhalese Kingdom. The division into Dissawanies was continued by the Portuguese and the Dutch.

KORALE

a territorial sub-division of a Dissawani.

LASCARIN

a term applied by the Portuguese (and continued by the Dutch) for the Sinhalese soldiers whose proper (Sinhalese) name was *Hewayo*.

MUDALIYAR

chief military officer commanding the lascarins.

TOPASS

a name used 'for dark-skinned or half-caste claimants of Portuguese descent, and Christian profession.'¹

VIDANA

a supervising officer with degrees of importance varying according to the nature of the charge entrusted.

WANNIYA

a hereditary chief. The territories of the Wanniyas were all located on the eastern and northern borders of the Kandyan Kingdom.

XERAFIM

a coin worth about $1\frac{1}{2}$ florins (a florin being equal to about 1 sh. 10d.).

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

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CEYLON

MAP A



Boundaries of Dutch territory during the truce-years
 Boundaries of Dutch territory in 1658



Boundaries of Portuguese territory in 1638
 Boundaries of Portuguese territory during the truce-years

MATARA Dissawanies
KOLONNA Korales
 For Mannar, Jaffna and the East-coast, see Map B

CEYLON

MAP B

0 10 20 30 40 Miles

-  Boundary of Portuguese Territory in 1638
-  Boundary of Dutch Territory in 1658

