RACE & CLASS

Volume XVII Spring 1976 Number 4

A. Sivanandan — Race, class and the state: the black experience in Britain

Godula Kosack — Migrant women: the move to Western Europe — a step towards emancipation?

E. Capizzi, H. Hill and D. Macey — FRETILIN and the struggle for independence in East Timor

L.K. Johnson — Jamaican rebel music

Notes and documents — Book reviews

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RACE & CLASS is published quarterly (in July, October, January and April) and subscriptions are payable in advance to any bookseller or to the Institute of Race Relations, 247-9 Pentonville Road, London N1. Subscriptions can be entered at any point in the volume. Current subscription rate £5.50 (US $15) per four issues. Single issues (Library edition) £1.50 (US $4). Special rates for booksellers are available on request. Back copies of Volumes 1-15 can be obtained from Wm. Dawson and Sons Limited, Cannon House, Folkestone, Kent. Volumes 1-4 available in reprint, at £2.50 per issue; Volumes 5-15 available in original, at current subscription and single copy prices (Volume 16 available at the IRR).

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Volume XVII Spring 1976 Number 4

Race, class and the state: the black experience
A. SIVANANDAN 347

Migrant women: the move to Western Europe — a step towards emancipation?
GODULA KOSACK 369

FRETILIN and the struggle for independence in East Timor
ELAINE CAPIZZI, HELEN HILL and DAVE MACEY 381

Jamaican rebel music
LINTON KWESI JOHNSON 397

Notes and documents 413
'Silence', 'Debt', and 'When the fighting is done' — poems by Wesley Dick (413)
Angola: the economic interests . . . — Jacques Bonaldi (416)
The trade in blood — Bettina Connor (424)

Book Reviews 428
Dependence and Transformation by Clive Thomas; *Class, Race, and Political Behaviour* by Carl Stone (Bill Branche) 428
Global Reach: the power of the multinational corporations by R. Barnet and R. Muller (Chris Farley) 432
With My Own Eyes: Israel and the Occupied Territories 1967-73 by Felicia Langer (Thomas Hodgkin) 434
Toward an Anthropology of Women edited by Rayna Reiter (Hermione Harris) 437
Imperial Britain in South-east Asia by Nicholas Tarling (Malcolm Caldwell) 438

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Racist and Sexist Images in Children's Books; How to Read Donald Duck: imperialist ideology in the Disney comic by A. Dorfman and A. Mattelart (Hazel Waters) 439
The Facts of Racial Discrimination: a national survey David J. Smith (A. Sivanandan) 441
East End Jewish Radicals 1875-1914 by William J. Fishman (Kenneth Leech) 442
Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution: an essay on American dominance and Caribbean resistance by Gordon K. Lewis (Miles) 444
The White Women's Protection Ordinance: Sexual Anxiety and Politics in Papua by Amirah Inglis (Hermione Harris) 446
The Somalian Revolution by Luigi Pestalozza (Chris Farley) 447
The Coloured Population of Great Britain: a comparative study by Gillian Lomas (Jenny Bourne) 448
The Aryan Myth: a history of racist and nationalist ideas in Europe by Leon Poliakov (Thomas Hodgkin) 449
The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860-1960 by Anton Blok Blok (Lynn Eden) 451
Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia edited by Malcolm Caldwell (C. Dean) 453
Books received 455

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ISSN 0306-3968

Photoset by Red Lion Setters
Holborn, London
Printed by Russell Press
Nottingham

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A. SIVANANDAN

Race, class and the state: the black experience in Britain

For Wesley Dick — poet and prisoner
In some answer to his questions

Within ten years Britain will have solved its 'black problem' — that is the message of the White Paper* — but 'solved' in the sense of having diverted revolutionary aspiration into nationalist achievement, reduced militancy to rhetoric, put protest to profit and, above all, kept a black under-class from bringing to the struggles of the white workers political dimensions peculiar to its own historic battle against capital. All these have been achieved in some considerable measure in the past decade and a half — through immigration control and social control — and the process has already thrown up the class of collaborators so essential to a solution of the next stage of the problem: the political control of a rebellious 'second generation'. And it is to this exercise that the White Paper addresses itself.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION

The laissez-faire era

But to understand the politics of the White Paper, to see what it tells us about state power in one particular aspect — black labour — but

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* The Government White Paper (September 1975) and not the Race Relations Bill is central to this discussion. The Bill is the instrument of legislation, the White Paper is its philosophy.

Race and Class, XVII, 4 (1976).

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an aspect which, like a barium meal, reveals the whole organism of the state and relates black experience to white struggle — one must first reappraise the Immigration Acts. Britain, after the war, like most Western European countries, was faced with a chronic shortage of labour. This shortage was in some measure alleviated by the half a million or so refugees, displaced persons and prisoners of war who were admitted to Britain between 1946 and 1951. But even so, the Ministry of Labour found it necessary to systematize the recruitment of workers from other parts of Europe. Between 1945 and 1957 there was a net immigration of more than 350,000 European nationals into the United Kingdom.[1]

Unlike most other European countries, however, Britain was in a position to turn to an alternative and comparatively uncompetitive source of labour in its colonies and ex-colonies in Asia and the Caribbean.* Colonialism had already under-developed these countries and thrown up a reserve army of labour which now waited in readiness to serve the needs of the metropolitan economy.** And it is to these vast and cheap resources of labour that Britain turned in the 1950s.

At first the supply of labour from these countries was governed by the demand for it in the metropolis. Except for a few thousand workers who were recruited directly into London Transport and the British Hotels and Restaurants Association from Barbados (from 1956), no effort was made to relate employment to vacancies. Instead it was left to the free market forces to determine the size of immigration. And this on the whole, as the excellent study by Ceri Peach shows, worked very well.[2] Thus periods of economic expansion led to a rise in immigration, periods of recession to a decline — and this sensitiveness of supply to demand characterized the whole 'stop-go' period of the 1950s.

But if the free market economy decided the numbers of immigrants, economic growth and the colonial legacy determined the nature of the work they were put to. It was inevitable that in a period of full employment the indigenous worker would move upwards into better paid jobs, skilled apprenticeships, training programmes, etc., leaving the dirty, hard, low-paid work to immigrant labour. Although, that is, the shortage of labour was general, the more dynamic and attractive sectors of industry were able to draw the best qualified labour from both the non-growth industries as well as the immigrant labour force. The non-growth sector (including the public services), on the other hand, had only

* Though France and Holland had similar sources, they were comparatively meagre.

** To put it more graphically, colonialism perverts the economy of the colonies to its own ends, drains their wealth into the coffers of the metropolitan country and leaves them at independence with a large labour force and no capital with which to make that labour productive. And since all the capital is now in the 'mother country' it is to her — and at her behest — that this labour is drawn.

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the new entrants to the labour market to turn to. (In practice, though, prejudice decreed that qualified immigrants were more available to the latter than to the former.) Thus the jobs which 'coloured immigrants' found themselves in were the largely unskilled and low status ones for which white labour was unavailable or which white workers were unwilling to fill — in the textile and clothing industries, engineering and foundry works, transport and communication, or as waiters, porters, kitchen hands.

And since the opportunities for such work obtained chiefly in the already overcrowded conurbations, immigrants came to occupy some of the worst housing in the country. The situation was further exacerbated by the exhorbitant rents charged by slum landlords. Attempts on the part of the newcomers to break the landlords' hold by buying their own homes were often frustrated either by the difficulties of obtaining loans from regular sources or by the prohibitive rates of interest charged by the irregular ones — or even by the refusal of owners to sell to 'wogs' and 'nig-nogs'. When immigrants eventually managed to buy their own property and were able to house their fellows, they were accused of overcrowding — sometimes sleeping five and ten to a room. (That there was excellent precedent for this in the dormitories of Eton and Harrow went unnoticed and unremarked.) In the course of time the 'immigrants' became ghetto-ized and locked into the decaying areas of the inner city. And a ghetto, in the words of Ceri Peach, 'is the geographical expression of complete social rejection'.[3]

Everyone made money on the immigrant worker — from the big-time capitalist to the slum landlord — from exploiting his labour, his colour, his customs, his culture. He himself had cost the country nothing. He had been paid for by the country of his origin — reared and raised, as capitalist under-development had willed it, for the labour markets of Europe. If anything, he represented a saving for Britain of all the expense involved in feeding and clothing and housing him till he had come of working age. For, as André Gorz has pointed out, 'the import of "ready-made" workers amounts to a saving, for the country of immigration, of between £8000 and £16000 per migrant worker, if the social cost of a man is estimated for Western European countries as between five and ten years of work'.[4] And the fact that in the early years of migration, the 'coloured' worker came to Britain as a single man — as a unit of labour — unaccompanied by his family meant an additional saving to the country in terms of social capital: schools, housing, hospitals, transport and other infra-structural facilities. A fraction of the saving made from the import of these ready-made workers — let alone their active contribution in labour and taxes — could have served to increase social stock and improve social conditions if the government had so willed. But capital and the state were concerned with the

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maximization of profit, not with the alleviation of social need.

By the late 1950s, however, the contradiction between the social and economic needs of Britain, *thrown up* — not caused — by immigration, became more defined. The shortage of workers, as Ceri Peach shows, made immigrants economically acceptable; the shortage of housing made them socially undesirable. 'The colour prejudice of landlords and landladies coupled with the shortage of houses made the crowding, and in some cases the overcrowding, of much of the accommodation available to the migrants inevitable and this, in turn increased their image of undesirability.' From being refused accommodation on the grounds that they were coloured, they were now refused houses on the grounds that they would overcrowd. 'It is surely an ideal system', concludes Peach, 'in which prediction produces its own justification.'[5]

Ideal, that is, for capital — for it gets labour without the overheads (so to speak), profit without pain, gain without cost. Having already deprived one section of the working class (the indigenous) of its basic needs, it now deprives it further in order to exploit another section (the blacks) even more — but, at the same time, prevents them both from coming to a common consciousness of class by intruding that other consciousness of race. It prevents, in other words, the horizontal conflict of classes through the vertical integration of race — and, in the process, exploits both race and class at once.

To put it differently, the profit from immigrant labour had not benefited the whole of society but only certain sections of it (including some sections of the white working class) whereas the infrastructural 'cost' of immigrant labour had been borne by those in greatest need. That is not to say that immigrants (qua immigrants) had caused social problems — Britain, after all, was a country of net emigration — but that the *forced* concentration of immigrants in the deprived and decaying areas of the big cities high-lighted (and reinforced) existing social deprivation; racism defined them as its cause. To put it crudely, the economic profit from immigration had gone to capital, the social cost had gone to labour, but the resulting conflict between the two had been mediated by a common 'ideology' of racism.

Prelude to control

That same 'ideology' detonated the race riots of 1958 — and revealed to the state that considerations of social need had now to be weighed against considerations of economic gain. Racism, though economically useful, was becoming socially counter-productive. And the state, which had hitherto acted in the economic interests of the ruling class, was now compelled to modify that role and assume its other function of appearing to act in the interests of society as a whole — in the 'national interest'. The first step was to slow down

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immigration, thin out the black presence, the second to manage racism, keep it within profitable proportions — relief for the depressed areas, urban aid, would follow. The economy in any case had, for the time being, absorbed all the unskilled labour it could *(though it still required skilled and professional workers). Additional* units of labour applied to existing (outworn, outmoded) plant would not yield the returns that would make such addition justifiable. On the other hand, automation and new technology — capital intensive production — would help Britain to compete with the rest of Europe in markets made more competitive by the loss of its colonies. That same 'loss', however, would make it possible for Britain to renege on its Commonwealth ties and look to the Common Market for the labour it required — when the time was ripe. The stage was set for immigration control.

To end immigration altogether would have been one answer. But given the periodic labour shortages characteristic of the capitalist countries of Western Europe, given the structural needs of late capitalism for the import of foreign workers, it was no answer at all. Migrant labour, precisely because it was migrant — seasonal and contractual, filling in the labour gaps in times of expansion and being fired in times of recession — served to absorb the shocks of alternating booms and depressions. And by virtue of the fact that it was foreign, migrant labour yielded extra profit to the employer.[6] Most of Western Europe had worked out a migratory mechanism combining both these functions. Labour, on short-term permits, on contract, ensured the buffer function; and the fact that it was foreign, recruited from the underdeveloped southern extremities of Europe, ensured that it would not — by virtue of nationality laws freely agreed to — have the same rights as the indigenous worker and could therefore be discriminated against. And to discriminate is to exploit, to derive a surplus value larger than that afforded by the exploitation of the native worker.[7] Together they, contract labour and nationality laws, fulfilled a third function — a political one: they prevented the integration of migrant labour into the indigenous proletariat and thereby mediated class conflict.

Britain, still outside the European community but periodically knocking at its door and gifted with a vast reserve of labour in the colonies and Commonwealth, was loth to let go of either and tried to hang on to both. Initially it recruited migrant workers from Europe on a permit basis. Between 1946 and 1951, 100,000 European workers had entered Britain. But the availability of labour in the colonies and ex-colonies and its sensitivity to demand made labour on contract unnecessary.* And as for a discriminatory mechanism, in place of

* '... The rate of immigrants into this country', said Gaitskell to the Commons in the debate on the 1962 Act, 'is closely related and, in my view at any rate, will always be closely related to the rate of economic absorption ... There has been over the years ...

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nationality laws there was the fact of race. Black labour was inherently 'discriminatable'. It was alien per se — and automatically excluded from integration into a racist white working class.

It had suited Britain, therefore, to import the workers it needed from its colonies and ex-colonies: it was the quickest way of getting the cheapest labour at minimum (infrastructural) cost — and without the fuss and bother of barriers. It worked, in effect, like any internal migratory movement: a movement of population from the periphery to the centre as and when the need arose. And in that sense it was unrestrained, laissez-faire. But to characterize the laissez-faire period of immigration as an essay in British absent-mindedness — the sort of aristocratic whimsy that gathers and loses empires on the spin of a wheel — or as a conscious 'open-door' policy designed to benefit the poor orphaned children of empire as befitted a once and only mother country — an aspect of British high-mindedness — is a load of bull-shit.* They were the sort of 'concepts' that led to a whole output of 'left' literature, not least by the Institute of Race Relations, which portrayed the Tories as die-hard immigration controllers and racists and Labour as the good guys who, despite themselves and Gaitskell, were compelled by *facts* — i.e. the presence of black people (if only the buggers were not so visible ...) — to abandon their 'traditional belief in the universal brotherhood of man' and go Tory. So ingrained were these views among radical analysts that when, over the 'Kenyan Asian' affair (in 1968), Labour went even more Tory than Tory, the 'experts' instead of abandoning their analysis, mourned instead the death of Labour idealism or, more concretely, the passing of 'the liberal hour' — and of Roy Jenkins, its finest flower.**

The fact of the matter was that laissez-faire immigration and laissez-faire discrimination had thrown up social problems which, after the riots of 1958 and the growing militancy of a black under-class, were taking on political proportions that the government — irrespective of party — could not ignore. It had to put an end to 'coloured immigration' and yet have recourse to a reserve pool of labour when required. The crux of the problem, therefore, was not migration, but settlement — and not discrimination but *racial* discrimination. For the purposes of exploitation, it was labour and not colour that had to be discriminated against — and that could be done on the basis of citizenship, of nationality, rather than of race.

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an almost precise correlation between the movement in the number of unfilled vacancies, that is to say employers wanting labour, and immigration figures' — House of Commons Official Report. (Vol 649, Col. 793, 16 November 1961).

* 'Through the 1950s Britain acquired a coloured population in, so to speak, a fit of absence of mind.' Dipak Nandy in the Foreword to *The Multi-Racial School*, by Julia McNeal and Margaret Rogers (Hardmonsworth, Penguin, 1971). For the high-minded school, see, for instance, the writings of P. Mason *et al*.

** See the writings of the Labour left but especially those of Anthony Lester, Nicholas Deakin *et al*.

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And since nationality laws by definition distinguished between citizen and alien, foreign or migrant labour would be automatically subject to discrimination. To change British nationality laws so as to put Commonwealth citizens on a par with aliens was the most obvious solution — and it had the added advantage of debarring settlement as a matter of right. But, on the other hand, it would spell the end of a historical relationship which ensured the continuing dependency of the colonial periphery on the centre. (No one, bar the tear-stained liberals, believed the sentimental bull about mother-country obligations.) The aim, therefore, was to move gradually towards the European model of contract labour (and a European configuration with the poor south as its periphery) without foregoing the 'Commonwealth' relationship.*

This meant, in concrete terms, that immigrants from the Commonwealth countries, though remaining British subjects under British nationality law, would be debarred from entering (and settling in) Britain except as and when required by the British economy. Thus the formal links with the Commonwealth would be maintained but the right of individual citizens to automatic entry would be denied. In terms of British nationality law, this would mean that a British citizen was not completely a British citizen when he was a black British citizen — somewhat on the lines of the American constitution which once decreed that a 'Negro' was three-fifths of a person. Nevertheless it would be a solution to black settler immigration: if it did not end settlement altogether it would at least reduce the numbers.

From status to contract

Accordingly the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 restricted the admission of Commonwealth immigrants for settlement to those who had been issued with employment vouchers.** The vouchers themselves were chiefly available to those who had jobs to come to (A vouchers) and to those with skills and qualifications 'likely to be useful in this country' (B vouchers). A third category, C vouchers, for unskilled workers gradually disappeared and became a dead letter by September 1964.† And, as though to compensate for the discrimination now institutionalized in the Immigrants Act, a Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council (CIAC) was set up to advise the Home Secretary on immigrant welfare and integration.

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* Eventually the Commonwealth relationship would *have to* be subordinated to the European relationship — *and* then the nationality laws would need to be tidied up — but for the time being a solution had to be found that did not require such a change.

** This article is concerned with immigrant workers admitted for settlement, not businessmen, students, dependants, etc.

† It is significant that at the time the Immigration Bill was being debated Britain was negotiating for entry into the Common Market.

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When the Labour government came to renew the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in the White Paper of August 1965, it made further restrictions on 'coloured' immigration — reducing the number of vouchers in the A and B categories to a ceiling of 8,500 per year and doing away with the unskilled category C altogether. It also reduced the categories of skill and qualifications required of B voucher applicants to doctors, dentists, nurses, teachers and graduates in science and technology. The policy was now firmly established that immigration from the black Commonwealth should be geared to the requirements of the British economy.* And since the manpower needs of this period were infrastructural — the schools (including medical schools), hospitals, houses, etc., that the state had decided not to invest in during an earlier period — it was to the skilled and the professional that employment vouchers were increasingly issued. Over 75 per cent of the vouchers issued in the first half of 1966 alone were to such personnel, whereas for the whole of 1965 the figure was 55 per cent. Or take another statistic: of the 3,976 B vouchers** (A vouchers accounted for 306) issued to India in 1966, 1,511 went to doctors, 922 to technology graduates, 667 to teachers and 469 to science graduates (and 407 to others).[8] Any lingering pretence that the employment of Commonwealth immigrants aided the Commonwealth was dispelled by a system which creamed off the most skilled and professional personnel from these countries while keeping out their unskilled.

It was also a system which took discrimination out of the market place and gave it the sanction of the state. It made racism respectable and clinical by institutionalizing it. But in so doing it also increased the social and political consequences of racism. And to counter these the state set out to develop a more coherent policy of integration. Thus the White Paper replaced the CIAC with the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI). In fact, the announcement of other legislation to deal with 'racial discrimination in public places and with the evil of incitement to racial hatred' preceded the White Paper. But an examination of the politics of integration (as opposed to the sociology of integration) belongs to the second half of this paper. Here it is intended to pursue the investigation into immigration policies to see how they effected

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* The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 had left no one in doubt as to which part of the Commonwealth (white or black) control was applicable.

** Already — by 1965 — 40 per cent of all junior hospital medical staff were from the New Commonwealth and nearly 15 per cent of all student nurses. Without that help some hospitals would have had to close just as without Commonwealth immigrants London Transport would be disrupted (See Lord Stonham, Lords *Hansard* 10 March 1965, Col. 96). And David Ennals told the Commons some days later that in 1963 'immigrant teachers, nurses, professional engineers and chemists numbered only half as many as their British counterparts who left for other parts of the world' (*Hansard* 23 March 1965, Col. 393).

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the transition of Commonwealth (and therefore British) citizens from the status of citizens to labourers on contract.

The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 is not essential to that investigation — except in that the circumstances which necessitated its enactment high-lighted yet more the contradiction between British nationality laws and the Immigrants Acts and once again pointed to the passage of the Commonwealth citizen from status to contract.

In 1967, following on the Africanization policies of the Kenyatta government, British Asians in Kenya, who had not opted for Kenyan citizenship at independence (1963) and had stayed loyal to the 'mother country', were granted only temporary residence. They were in effect asked to go home to Britain. Already in 1965 and 1966 six thousand Asians, possessing British citizenship, who were not subject to immigration control, had entered the UK. But after the Kenyan legislation of 1967, the numbers increased and the British (Labour) government, with an eye to all those other British Asians and British Chinese whom Britain had used and abandoned on the darker shores of the once empire, decided that they were not as British as their passports warranted. They were only as British as Commonwealth citizens. And since they were liable to the voucher system, the British Asians in Kenya would also be liable to the same procedure for admission — but would be allocated special vouchers as distinct from work vouchers.

Given the devaluation of British citizenship in 1962, the distinction between Commonwealth citizens and Kenyan British Asians was only a legal nuance* — except that, unlike the former, the Kenyan Asians had nowhere but Britain to go to: they were potentially stateless. And this aspect plus the fact that they were more middle-class and British than the normal run of immigrants particularly outraged British liberal opinion. But the blacks, post-1962, had seen the Act merely as the correction of an anomaly in the policy of reducing all black British citizens to the lowest common denominator of contract labour.

As usual, new anti-discriminatory legislation and integrationist policies went hand in hand with the new Immigrants Act — but these again will be dealt with in the next section.

The 1962 and 1965 Immigrants Acts had ensured the supply of skilled and professional workers from the black Commonwealth; for the seasonal unskilled jobs Britain turned to 'foreign workers'.** The

* The 1962 Act had applied to citizens of Commonwealth countries and colonies, not to UK citizens holding British passports issued by or on behalf of the UK government. The 1968 Act now extended the area of control to citizens of the UK and Colonies except where one of their parents or grandparents had been born, naturalized or adopted in the UK — which meant citizens of the white Commonwealth. Holding a British passport was no longer important.

** In an answer to a written question asked by Lord O'Hagan in Parliament in December 1970 — about the figures for the entry of alien workers — the government

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Kenyan Asian episode had temporarily swelled the number of settlers beyond immediate employment needs (the voucher system, in this case, was a device to phase-in the Kenyan 'exodus'). And the 1968 Act had in effect brought 'coloured' UK passport-holders within the provisions of the Immigration Acts. Black settler migration was firmly under control, but it was still settler and not migrant. Once in, the black 'immigrant' could remain in the UK indefinitely — and after five years he had the right to British citizenship. He was still not a fully-fledged *'gastarbeiter'*.

That situation was remedied by the Immigration Act of 1971 which put him, finally, on the same footing as the foreign worker: he could only come in on a permit to do a specific job in a specific place for an initial period of not longer than twelve months. He could not change his job without the permission of the government — which meant that he was dependent on his employer for recommendation: he had to be a good little wage-slave. He may, like any other alien, apply for UK citizenship at the end of four years, provided that he has been 'of good behaviour'. On the other hand, he could, if the Home Secretary so wished, be deported on the ground that it was 'conducive to the public good as being in the interest of national security or of the relations between the UK and any other country or for other reasons of a political nature'.

The immigrant was finally a migrant, the citizen an alien. There is no such thing as a 'Commonwealth immigrant' anymore. There are those who came from the Commonwealth before the 1971 Act came into force (January 1973) but these are not immigrants; they are settlers, black settlers. There are others who have come after the Act; they are neither settlers nor immigrants, they are simply migrant workers, black migrant workers. And the migratory mechanism — the combination of contract labour and discriminatory nationality laws — which ensures that the *gastarbeiters* of Europe are no more than second-class production factors yielding surplus surplus value as well as acting as a buffer, a shock absorber, between boom and depression now applied to migrant workers from the 'Commonwealth', except that time and distance and fares and race made them less accessible to the British labour market than their European counterpart. Then there are the workers, since Britain's entry into Europe in 1975, from the European *community* with free access to work in Britain. And there are aliens and colonials and patrials and non-patrials and white Commonwealth ... All of which makes a mess

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replied that 'in recent years the annual entry of foreign nationals for employment has been between 40,000 and 50,000, of whom about half came for seasonal employment' ('Some groups at risk' by Lord O'Hagan, *Race Today*, March 1971).

'In 1968, 62,267 work permits were issued to aliens. In 1969 this had increased to 67,788' (*The New Immigration Law* by Ian MacDonald, London, Butterworth, 1972). The work vouchers issued to Commonwealth citizens in these years were 4,353 and 3,512 respectively (*Facts and Figures 1972*, London, IRR and BCC, 1972).

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of nationality laws and discrimination less tidy — and for those reasons must claim the government's attention in the near future. But all of which also leaves the divisions and sub-divisions within the non-indigenous sector of the working-class — apart from the divisions between them, a sub-proletariat, and the native workers — looking something like this:



Britain now had two main reserve pools of labour: in the under-developed south of Europe and in the under-developed Third World — one for unskilled and /or seasonal labour, the other for skilled and professional — one, to put it crudely, to do the dirty work, the other to provide the infrastructural facilities (transport, hospitals, welfare) needed to keep the workers working — but neither exclusively so.[9] In a sense, Britain was now a neo-colonial power with two peripheries. And if migrant labour helped to perpetuate both these dependencies, the older was also anchored in that other history of colonialism.

THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION

From institutional racism ...

Thus the state had achieved for capital the best combination of factors for the exploitation of labour while appearing, at the same

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time, to have barricaded the nation against the intrusion of an 'alien wedge'. It had atomized the working class and created hierarchies within it based on race and nationality to make conflicting sectional interests assume greater significance than the interests of the class as a whole. It had combined with the trade union aristocracy to reduce the political struggle of the labour movement to its bare economic essentials — degraded the struggle to overthrow the system to the struggle to be well off within it — and in the process had weaned the trade unions from the concerns of the labour movement to the concerns of government. And when the black proletariat threatened to bring a political dimension, from out of their own historic struggle against capital, to the struggles of the working class, state policy had helped trade unions to institutionalize divisive racist practices within the labour movement itself.

But racism is not its own justification.* It is necessary only for the purpose of exploitation: you discriminate in order to exploit or, which is the same thing, you exploit by discriminating. So that any other system of discrimination, say on the basis of nationality, would — if available — do equally well. During the laissez-faire period of immigration, racism helped capital to make extra profit off black workers (extra in comparison to indigenous workers) — and the state, in the immediate economic interests of the ruling class, was content to leave well enough alone. But in the 1960s the state, in the long term and overall interests of capital (as against its temporary and/or sectional interests), entered into the task of converting immigrant settler labour to migrant contract labour. One of the benefits of such labour, as has been shown, is that it is automatically subject to discrimination on the basis of nationality laws and inter-state agreements. The British government, however, had — for reasons outlined earlier — no wish to change the nationality laws in order to stop 'coloured immigation' — some of the Caribbean countries were still colonies anyway.** Hence it resorted to a system of control which, in being specifically (though not overtly) directed against the 'coloured' Commonwealth, was essentially racist.

The basic intention of the government, one might say, was to anchor in legislation an institutionalized system of discrimination against foreign labour, but because that labour happened to be black, it ended up by institutionalizing racism instead. Instead of institutionalizing discrimination against labour it institutionalized discrimination against a whole people, irrespective of class. In trying to banish racism to the gates, it had confirmed it within the city walls.

* Psychologically it might be — but this is of no interest to capital unless there is profit in it. Socially, it is counter-productive.

** Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago achieved independence in August 1962, Guyana in May 1966, Barbados in November 1966. Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and other small islands became 'non dependent states' in 1967.

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The whole thing was particularly untoward because once immigration control had helped to minimize the number of blacks settling in Britain, the 'black problem' itself would have become more manageable. And the lessons of America had not been lost on Britain. Hence in order to counter-act the consequences of the Immigration Acts and to stop black militancy from infecting the body politic, the government embarked on a programme of 'integration'.

The Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council of 1962, however, was no more than a gesture towards integration: its function was to advise the Home Secretary on matters of immigrant welfare. But with the White Paper of 1965 integration began to assume the proportions of a philosophy. In fact the government had, in introducing further controls on immigration, pointed out that the purpose of reducing the numbers coming in was to improve matters for those already within — to improve race relations. 'Without integration', opined a future minister, 'limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible.'[10] Accordingly the government replaced the CIAC with the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI), with lots of money and staff and local liaison committees — and, to vest the effort with sanctity, set the Archbishop of Canterbury at its head. It was an independent body, however, free of government control, but linked to it through a minister in the Home Office with 'special resonsibility for immigrants'. The Committee's brief was 'to provide and coordinate on a national basis efforts directed towards the integration of Commonwealth immigrants into the community'.

The government also introduced the first piece of anti-discriminatory legislation in the form of the Race Relations Act of 1965, but this was a half-hearted affair which merely forbade discrimination in 'places of public resort' and, by default, encouraged discrimination in everything else: housing, employment, etc. The incorporation, in the Act, of a clause to 'penalise incitement to racial hatred' turned out to be more useful in imprisoning blacks (and right-wing extremists) than in arresting the exalted nativism of the Rt. Hon. Enoch Powell, Ronald Bell Q.C. and others of their ilk and silk. The discrimination provisions of the Race Relations Act were to be implemented by the Race Relations Board and its local conciliation committees.

But the concern of integration during this period related more to the Asians than to the West Indians. The latter, it was felt, had 'largely been brought up to regard themselves as British', whereas 'Pakistanis and Indians ... showed almost no interest in being integrated'.[11] The Asians, with their different cultures and customs and language and dress, their extended families and sense of community, and their peculiar preference to stay with their own kind, were a society apart. But they were also a people who were

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industrious and responsible, anxious to educate themselves, prepared to work hard and move up the social and economic ladder, honest, diligent, 'politic, cautious and meticulous' — all the WASP* virtues which shored up bourgeois society. Besides they too had their creeds and their castes and their classes. They may not be assimilable, but they were certainly made for integration — a parallel society to be accommodated in a pluralist set-up. All that was required was an acceptance of the principles of cultural pluralism on the part of the 'host' population. And it was not as though Britain had not had a tradition of accommodating other cultures and other peoples — only, this time, they happened to be a little more different and a lot more visible. Hence the precision with which the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, defined integration in May 1966: 'not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance'.[12]

The West Indians, on the other hand — it had been assumed — were a part of British culture, an aspect of it, a sub-culture. They spoke the same language, wore the same clothes, followed the same religions. They were not a society apart — only their colour was different. They could be assimilated (though the word used was 'integrated') into the mainstream of British society.** All that was necessary to make them acceptable to the 'host' society was to banish colour prejudice, outlaw racial discrimination.

The NCCI and Race Relations Board, however, did not succeed in even getting that programme off the ground. The Board was virtually a non-starter, so feeble and narrow were the provisions of the 1965 Act. The National Committee discovered discrimination everywhere it went but was frustrated into educating people out of their attitudes. 'Education in school and out of school, education of adults as well as children, education of newcomers as well as the indigenous population, education through conferences, through committee work, through social activities, through the Press ...' dragged on its first annual report in the tones of a forlorn manifesto. Hence in 1966 both bodies jointly commissioned the PEP (Political and Economic Planning) to investigate the extent of racial discrimination. Its report, published a year later, produced evidence to show what everybody knew: that racial discrimination varied in extent from 'the massive to the substantial.'

The profound effects of racism were already showing in the growing militancy of the West Indian community. At first it was only

* WASP = White Anglo-Saxon Protestant — an Americanism.

** In a speech supporting immigration control, Roy Hattersley MP (Labour) remarked that it was now 'necessary to impose a test which tries to analyse which immigrants, as well a having jobs or special skills are most likely to be assimilated into our national life'. This would, he added, favour the English-speaking West Indians as against the Pakistanis (See Sheila Patterson, *Immigration and Race Relations in Britain, 1960-67*, London, OUP for IRR, 1969).

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civil rights and Martin Luther King that had claimed their attention.* The Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD), set up in December 1964 after Martin Luther King's visit to London in transit to Sweden to receive the Nobel prize for peace, was composed of West Indians (militant and 'normal'), Asians (mostly 'normal') and whites (liberals and radicals). Its task was to fight discrimination by lobbying Whitehall, by asking the government — but in tones so strident as to pass for passion — to be nice to the blacks. But increasing police harassment, particularly of West Indians, mounting discrimination in employment and housing and the relegation of West Indian children to ESN (Educationally Sub-Normal) schools sparked off militant struggles in the Caribbean community. The black rebellion in America gave fillip to black nationalism. And Stokely Carmichael's visit in 1967 signalled the high water mark of revolutionary black politics. CARD, like the proverbial house of, folded under the impact, leaving it to the *Times* news team to conclude that 'the ominous lesson of CARD ... is that the mixture of pro-Chinese communism and American-style Black Power on the immigrant scene can be devastating'.[13]

The state was faced, against all its convictions, with an unassimilable black community. The West Indians were not a part of British society after all. They even proclaimed that they had a culture and a tradition and a history of their own. They rejected British values and British culture. And worse, especially for the educationalists who had suddenly come upon the discovery that the West Indian child could not/would not speak English English: they rejected the English language itself. Once, as slaves, when they had been forced to accept the white man's language, they had corrupted it so skilfully as to make it unintelligible to the slave-master. Now they sought to 'blacken the language, suffuse it with their own darkness and liberate it from the presence of the oppressor'.[14] And out of that assertion of themselves was springing an anti-capitalist ideology and a politics of revolution. They posed a problem from within British society — they posed the problems of it. They could not be assimilated and they could not, like the Asians, be integrated. They were a canker in the body politic. The body politic itself was threatened. The need for integration and for anti-discriminatory legislation had assumed a new urgency.

But as the government was contemplating fresh legislation, the 'Kenyan Asian' storm broke — and led to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of March 1968. In April Enoch Powell warned his people that 'their wives [were] unable to obtain hospital beds on childbirth, their children unable to obtain school-places, their homes

* Although the Racial Adjustment Action Society (RAAS), a militant all-black (allegedly black Muslim) group was set up about the same time as CARD, it did not come into prominence till later.

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and neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition'. In May the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, responded by promising an urban programme which would give substantial aid to local authorities 'in special need'. In October the Race Relations Act became law.

The 1968 Act extended the scope of the 1965 Act to include discrimination in employment (with some exceptions), housing (with some exceptions), credit and insurance facilities and places of public resort. But the breadth of its concerns was belied by the unenforceability of its provisions. The Board would have to rely almost entirely on conciliation to obtain redress. It had no powers of enforcement but could resort to the courts, in extreme cases, to obtain an injunction restraining the defendant from further discriminatory practices. It could order the payment of special damages and damages for the loss of opportunity.* All penny-pinching stuff. Basically the Act was not an act but an attitude.

But then it was never meant to be anything else. Anti-discriminatory legislation was not meant to chastise the wicked or to effect justice for the blacks. If it was, the government would have had no difficulty in making its intention felt in the administration of the law. Its sole purpose, however, was education — the education of the lesser capitalists in the ways of enlightened capital. Racial discrimination was a short-term expedient to exploit a section of the working class, and now that immigration laws were turning immigrants into migrants — and migrants from Europe would soon become available — it was necessary to count the social and political cost of racial friction.

... to domestic neocolonialism

The purpose of the Board as far as the state was concerned was to carry that lesson to employers and local officials. And it was a lesson to be taught not in anger or in punishment but in sorrow and conciliation. The very structure and personnel of the Board and its conciliation committees, marked by the presence of local firms and interests (and token blacks) and the absence of black workers from the factory-floor, bear witness to the point and purpose of the Act.

And yet there have been protestations that the Board has failed. Failed for the masses of the blacks, yes. But it succeeded in what the state meant it to do: to justify the ways of the state to local and sectional interests — and to create, in the process, a class of coloured collaborators who would in time justify the ways of the state to the blacks. One has only to look at the successful cases handled by the Board to see how much of it relates to the alleviation of marginal and often middle-class discrimination. In the year April 1969 to March

* In 1974 the median settlement was £23.50 (*White Paper on Racial Discrimination*, London, HMSO, September 1975).

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1970, for instance, the highest percentage of successes recorded related to discrimination in clubs: 50 per cent, the lowest to dismissals in employment: 4 per cent. Or take a look at the Board's journal, *Equals*, not just for the 'black' columnists who rage on the page they are paid for, but to see how the blacks are making it in the system. Sewa Singh Sodi can now play darts for his local against a club that once operated a colour bar. Mr Trevor MacDonald is 'the first black staff reporter to present news on British national T.V.', Mr Yunus Chowdry is the first black man to reach the National Executive of his union, the National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers, a veritable trade union aristocrat with his own little fiefdom. There is also a first black mayor somewhere in Wales, a first black woman deputy mayor in Camden, and of course there is the black black Lord, Lord Pitt — not the first, but close. And all within the last couple of years.

The 1968 Act also re-formed the existing organization, the NCCI, to create the Community Relations Commission — in order to complement the work of the Race Relations Board. The Commission's task as defined by the Act was to 'promote harmonious community relations', to co-ordinate national action to this end through its local community relations councils, to disseminate information about matters affecting minority groups and to advise the Home Secretary.

In theory, the Commission attempted to combat racial discrimination, the Board to penalize it. In practice, they were both educational and advisory and tended to overlap each other. In effect, they were to one degree or another both instruments of mediation — between sections of the ruling class, between the sectional interests and the blacks and, on the national level, between whites and blacks.

In its seven years of existence, the Commission has succeeded in saturating the key areas of society with information, advice and literature explaining West Indian and Asian peoples to white groups and individuals in positions of influence and power — employers, police, political parties, churches, local authorities, voluntary groups, educationalists, trade unions, the media. It has held conferences and seminars, often jointly (but in an elder capacity by virtue of its specialized and/or statutory position) with bodies such as the NUJ, ILEA, LA, DES* — to in-form the future holders of power: trainees in youth work, community work, teaching, policing, etc. Only in matters of employment and labour relations and the sophistry of statistics has it seemed to rely on the efforts of that 'independent' body, the Runnymede Trust.

In the structure of its local community relations councils, the Commission revealed the success of its local, grassroots effort. In the main appointed by the statutory body, the Commission, and paid by

* National Union of Journalists, Inner London Education Authority, Library Association and Department of Education and Science, respectively.

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the local authority, but always governed by Councils which are an exact replica of the local power structure (businessmen, police, political parties, trade unions, headmasters, clergy ...), the office of the Community Relations Officer defines, exactly, 'integration' as the absorption and negation of black discontent: the accommodation within the local status quo of factors that threaten the status quo, the expansion of the status quo itself to accommodate such factors.

But most important of all, the Commission took up the black cause and killed it. With the help of its 'black' staff and its 'black' experts, with the help of an old colonial elite and through the creation of a new one, it financed, assisted and helped to set up black self-help groups, youth clubs, supplementary schools, cultural centres, homes and hostels. It defined and ordained black studies; it investigated black curricula; it gave a name and a habitation to black rhetoric. And finally, almost in a last blaze of glory, the Commission, funded for this purpose by the Gulbenkian Foundation, brought together at a residential conference in an opulent hotel in January 1975 a cross-section of black activists, gave up the platform to the most militant blacks and itself sat in the aisles, servicing the black people.* Aptly, in view of the new dependent relationship that the black community was entering into, the Conference was named 'Black People: The Way Forward'. And out of that conference has emerged a new black committee one of whose functions will be to advise the Gulbenkian Foundation (shades of Ford) where to put its money** — in itself an indication that the black programmes can now be safely left to private enterprise.

The Commission's task is over. The Race Relations Bill (February 1976) sees that its work is good and that its work is done. It has taught the white power structure to accept the blacks and it has taught the blacks to accept the white power structure. It has successfully taken politics out of the black struggle and returned it to rhetoric and nationalism on the one hand and to the state on the other. It has, together with the Board, created a black bourgeoisie, especially West Indian (the Asian bourgeoisie was already in the wings), to which the state can now hand over control of black dissidents in general and black youth in particular. Britain has moved from institutional racism to domestic neo-colonialism.

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* At about the same time the Home Office announced the granting of Urban Aid to 'urban areas facing special social problems' to the tune of £7,000,000. Some of the black self-help groups to be aided were: Harambee Accommodation Project, London (£281,000). Southall Education and Community Project (£250,000), Pakistani Association Youth and Community Centre, Liverpool (£79,216), Leeds Asian Institute (£68,000), Brixton Neighbourhood Centre (£60,000), Melting Pot Accommodation Scheme, London (£51,000), George Jackson House Trust, Manchester (£32,000) (Home Office, *Urban Programme Circulars*, Nos 11 and 12, January 1975).

** Its other function is to set up a National Black People's Organization which will presumably represent black people on the new Race Relations Commission.

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In terms of the larger picture, what has been achieved in half a decade is the accommodation of West Indian militant politics within the framework of social democracy. The Asians had already settled into the cultural pluralist set-up ordained for them by the state as far back as a decade ago. They had their own TV and radio programmes, their mosques and their temples, their shops and cinemas and social centres. More importantly, they had thrown up leaders and spokesmen who spoke to and worked with the state. They had remained parallel in terms of culture, they had merged in terms of class. Only in regard to the Asian working class was there any trouble. Their strikes at Courtauld's and Woolf's and Mansfield Hosiery and Imperial Typewriters had threatened the system as few strikes did — for they were subsidized and supported by the community, united across divisions of labour and possessed of a genius for organization and obstinacy against all sorts of odds (including trade union ones). But these strikes were mostly one-off things that a combination of Asian leadership and trade union racism had prevented from growing into a movement.* In the outcome they fell prey to the system — or to the roseate politics of international socialism.

The strategy of the state in relation to the Asians had been to turn cultural antagonism into cultural pluralism — in relation to the West Indians, to turn political antagonism into political pluralism.** The process, in the case of the Asians, was first to free them from cultural oppression so as to help them 'modernize' their own class hierarchies and social structure — and then slot them into mainstream society. The West Indians, however, had to undergo a different process — for they were an aspect of British culture and society and yet outside it, even antithetical to it. Their similarities might have arisen from a master-slave history into which they had been locked in deathly embrace, but that same history had produced a culture and a politics that were mortally anti-white and anti-capital. The task, therefore, was to separate their antagonisms: to leave them anti-white but make them pro-capital. The task was to free them from the dishonour of racism so that they could honour the blandishments of capital. They had to be allowed to move upwards within the existing system so that they would not threaten to transform it into a different system.

But there was still 'the second generation'. All the other blacks had been found a place within the system, but the young blacks stood outside it. As though to confirm the dialectics of history they, the British born, carry the politics of their slave ancestry. And so it is to

* The British Asians from Uganda who fled to Britain in 1972 are, by and large, an entrepreneurial class — and have with their landlordism, super-markets and chain stores largely replaced the small-time grocer and landlord who were supportive of the strikes.

** Cultural pluralism and political pluralism are both accommodations made by the system in the superstructure so as to consolidate the economic base.

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them that the state now turns its attention in the Race Relations Bill of February 1976 and the White Paper that heralded it.

THE POLITICS OF THE WHITE PAPER

Listen to the voice, the anxieties of the state:

> the character of the coloured population resident in this country has changed dramatically over the decade. Ten years ago, less than a quarter of the coloured population had been born here: more than three out of every four coloured persons then were immigrants to this country ... About two out of every five of the coloured people in this country now were born here and the time is not far off when the majority of the coloured population will be British born.

Some of these the state has already mobilized by affording them places in universities and colleges of higher education, others it has taken care of — in borstals, mental homes and prisons. But some, in a completely unprecedented new phenomenon, have picked up the gun — not of course in the organized manner of a revolutionary political party or even as a movement (for as one small fragment of a very small minority, black youth qua black youth cannot have a mass base) but as self-ordained soldiers of the people.* That is not to romanticize their futile ambition to lay siege to the state but to acknowledge, even while acknowledging the romanticism of the act, the deep dark concern out of which their commitment springs. It is to acknowledge their gesture as a new language of resistance — and to refute the definition which the state through years of indoctrination has persuaded the black under-class to accept as the language of gangsterism. It is to refute that the ideas of the ruling class are the 'only rational, universally valid ones'.[15] It is to refute, in the particular, that other romanticism of anti-organization blacks which holds that unemployed black youth or, rather, anti-employment black youth are 'gunning for a wage'.[16] It is, in other words, to refute the 'ideology' of these political romanticists that if every dissident section of society did its own thing, capitalism would lie down and die — it is to refute the politics of spontaneism which Gramsci equates with opportunism. And it is to assert that 'the union of spontaneity and conscious leadership, or discipline *is* the real political action of subaltern classes, in so far as this is mass politics and not merely an adventure by groups claiming to represent the masses'.[17]

For, the anxiety of the state about rebellious black youth stems not from the rhetoric of professional black militants (whose dissidence it can accommodate and legitimize within the system) but from the

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* A significant case is pending and cannot be discussed here in the specific.

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fear of the mass politics that it may generate in the black under-class and in that other discriminated minority the migrant workers and perhaps in the working class as a whole — particularly in a time of massive unemployment and urban decay.

Almost a decade earlier the Home Secretary had warned the country against the future depredations of the second generation and argued for timely attempts at 'civilised living and social cohesion'. Now in the White Paper the same Home Secretary pointed out the 'politically grave consequences' of continued racism.

> If ... job opportunities, educational facilities, housing and environmental conditions are all poor, the next generation will grow up less well-equipped to deal with the difficulties facing them. The wheel then comes full circle, as the second generation find themselves trapped in poor jobs and poor housing. If, at each stage of this process an element of racial discrimination enters in, then an entire group of people are launched on a vicious downward spiral of deprivation.

Thus the Bill's intention is not just to outlaw discrimination but to carry the fight against discrimination into every area of society — housing, education, employment, trade unions, local government, vocational training bodies, etc. And more significantly, it means to *enforce* the law. The law is no longer an instrument of education; it is an instrument of compulsion. More, it will redress the balance of discrimination in some areas by discriminating in favour of the disadvantaged blacks; for it acknowledges at last that although 'they may share each of the disadvantages with some other deprived group in society ... few other groups in society display all their accumulated disadvantages'. 'It is no longer necessary to recite the immense danger, material as well as moral, which ensues when a minority loses faith in the capacity of social institutions to be impartial and fair.' And that is why the Government believes that 'it is vital to our well-being as a society to tap these reservoirs of resilience, initiative and vigour in the racial minority groups and not to allow them to lie unused or to be deflected into negative protest on account of arbitrary and unfair discriminatory practices'.

Hence the new Race Relations Commission which will replace both the Board and the Commission 'will have a major *strategic* role in *enforcing* the law in the *public interest*' (emphasis added).

However that interest is defined — as 'the public interest' or the national interest or, unashamedly, the ruling class interest — it is certainly the interest of capital. For capital requires racism not for racism's sake but for the sake of capital. Hence at a certain level of economic activity (witness the colonies) it finds it more profitable to abandon the idea of superiority of race in order to promote the idea of the superiority of capital. Racism dies in order that capital might survive.

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GODULA KOSACK

Migrant women: the move to Western Europe — a step towards emancipation?

Emigration is an economic necessity. No woman from Southern Europe, Asia or the West Indies emigrates in order to escape her fate as a second-class human being and in search of independence from father, husband or the repressive environment. And yet many a woman has discovered that being a wage earner allows her to take decisions of her own, to contradict her husband, in some cases even to separate from him. What process of development does she undergo to reach this new self-confidence?

Very generally speaking, there are two types of migrant women: those who go to Western Europe to join their husbands already working there, and those who go to take up work themselves. Although both share the inferior living conditions of the immigrant stratum of the working class, they have a different position within the production process, and their understanding of society and of their own position within it vary accordingly.

NON-WORKING MIGRANT WOMEN

The literature on migrant women is, with a few exceptions,[1] limited to the first category of migrant women, the non-working wives, although this group is, at least in the cases of Germany and Switzerland, smaller than that of working migrant women. Their problems are all too well known: they are virtually their husbands' servants. Their activities are limited to those typical in their home countries and indeed for all women in pre-capitalist societies — the kitchen, the children and the appropriate religious rituals. They live in almost complete isolation in a strange society where the different

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Race and Class, XVII, 4 (1976).

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values and norms become all the more a threat to them as their husbands become 'integrated' into the new surroundings. The large majority of them not only do not speak the national language sufficiently to find their way round the big cities, but even feel insecure when they go shopping. Thus they are dependent upon their husbands or children as interpreters and hardly dare leave the house alone. They try to keep their way of life as close as possible to that in their home countries and often enough lose touch with their children, who have to cope with the environment in a more active way. Such migrant women are sustained by the idea of returning home some day. They see the freer behaviour of Western European women as a threat to them. Even if they might like to be able to tell their husbands what they think of them or to go out in the evenings, they have no basis on which to demand this. They are not only emotionally but also economically completely dependent upon their husbands. An example may illustrate this.

Mrs L from a village in Calabria, Southern Italy, came to a small town in Switzerland, where her husband and her two adult sons had worked for twelve and four to five years respectively. She took her two daughters with her. The youngest was sent to school, while the 16-year-old was kept at home to help with the housework. Two attic rooms were rented for the three women, while the three men stayed in their firms' accommodation. Thus Mrs L did not even enjoy the family reunion she had hoped for. Her day consisted of keeping her rooms tidy and cooking for her three men, who usually came to fetch the food to eat at work during their lunch-break, only occasionally staying for a meal. They brought their clothes for washing and mending and continued the way of life which they had led as 'single' migrant workers, spending most of their time after work in bars and a substantial part of their money on drinks and the consumer goods, such as smart clothes, radios, motor-bikes, which they saw their better-paid Swiss colleagues enjoying.

Mrs L had to make ends meet, not even getting a regular sum for the housekeeping. The two sons, who wanted to enjoy the same life as the Swiss unmarried men, did not recognize any responsibility for keeping their mother and their two sisters, although they expected it of their father. The father, however, did not want to have more commitments than his sons, and thus there was a permanent quarrel about the amounts of money each one had to give to Mrs L. Her economic dependency meant a permanent humiliation, having always to beg for what she and her daughters needed. When, however, the 16-year-old daughter cautiously asked to be allowed to go to work in order to escape this dependence, not only were all three men against it, but also her mother. They argued that this was not necessary as long as three members of the family were working; moreover, it would diminish her chances of marriage, as everyone

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knows that an economically independent girl behaves much more freely than girls safe-guarded by the family. None of the three women learned enough German to be able to find their way around, and even the 12-year-old daughter stopped going to school, having missed classes for a while due to illness.

After a year the family crisis came to a climax: the women were threatened with eviction from their rooms due to rent arrears, and none of the men thought it his responsibility to pay the debts. So Mrs L and her two daughters went back to Italy, leaving their three men to cook and keep their clothes in order by themselves. They piously hoped to receive the necessary funds to be able to make a living at home, but at least life was cheaper there and there were no monthly rent bills for their small house.

Mrs L had hoped for a different type of return. She saw many a family where husbands and sons were paying a substantial part of their wages into a family savings account, which not only allowed the women to have a decent standard of living, but also nourished the hope of changing the economic status of the family through buying a piece of land or building a better house. Since then the recession has brought all three men back to Calabria. There they are faced with long-term unemployment, and even if they had saved part of their wages, they would have been used up by now.

But despite her sorrow about the men's inconsiderate and irresponsible behaviour towards herself and her daughters, Mrs L, 43 years old at the time of emigration, would never dream of demanding anything from her husband or sons. Marriage only meant exchanging her position as servant to her father and brothers for that of being a servant to her husband and later to her sons. She has never known a life of her own. For her it is enough when her men accept what she offers them, and life is all right when there is enough to eat and she is not beaten. Like her husband and her sons she expects the same fate for her two daughters.

However, M, her elder daughter, wanted to escape this fate. At 18 she turned down a couple of marriage offers, being determined not to follow in her mother's footsteps. She knew that the only way of becoming independent was to take this independence for herself. One day (while her father and brothers were still employed in Switzerland) she left Italy again in order to find work in Switzerland, without the permission of the family. Her mother did not have the power to hold her back, and her father, who at the time was off sick at home because of a work accident, was not informed of her intention to find work. He was persuaded to allow her to visit her brothers and stay with another relative in the same town. When she arrived there her brothers were taken by surprise and wanted to send her straight back to Italy, but she surprised them even more by finding a job in a bar without their help. When they realized how

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determined she was, they made the best they could out of the situation and found her a job in a factory, which they thought less compromising for her reputation, and a place in a women workers' hostel. But the recession sent her back to Italy even sooner than her father and brothers, and her prospects of finding a job in Italy and of emancipation from the repressive male-dominated family have become as remote as before her emigration.

MIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS

Women migrants form a substantial part of the immigrant labour force. In France there were 206,400 foreign women workers registered in 1968, making up 16.45 per cent of the total of immigrant workers at that time.[2] In Switzerland the female proportion of the foreign labour force is more than twice that in France: in 1974 there were 221,668 economically active foreign women — 33.7 per cent of all foreign workers.[3] The latest figures in Germany date from 1973, when there were 706,600 migrant women workers, accounting for 30.11 per cent of the total foreign labour force.[4]

These figures only give a rough idea of the number of foreign women workers in Western Europe today. Except for Switzerland the figures date back to before the main impact of the economic crisis was evident, and it may be assumed that 1974 and 1975 have brought about a change in the immigrant population structure. The generally low level of qualifications of women migrants, together with the short-term and fluctuating type of employment open to them, means that they are often the first category of workers to lose their jobs. In Germany they sometimes are not even registered as unemployed: labour office officials argue that if women with children cannot prove that they have kindergarten places, they are not available for the labour market. The fact that they have been working up to then is not adequate proof!

Many women, however, went originally to Germany, Switzerland or France without a work permit. Such women, if they want to improve the family budget, have to work illegally, and are subject to the worst forms of exploitation. Some work for less than half the normal wages for up to 12 and 14 hours a day without health or pension insurance. The number of illegal women migrant workers is likely to have increased during the recession, as no new labour permits are being issued and the fall in men's incomes necessitates additional earnings.[5]

It is important to stress that in Germany and Switzerland there are more working than non-working migrant women — their rate of activity being substantially higher than that for indigenous women. The rate of activity for Swiss women is 32.44 per cent, compared with

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46.6 per cent for foreign women in Switzerland. However, this latter figure includes women of all nationalities, and while Austrian, German and French women, for example, have an activity rate as low as that for the Swiss, 77 per cent of all Yugoslav, 64 per cent of all Spanish and 47 per cent of all Italian women are working.[6] In Germany, the rate of activity for foreign women is 50.9 per cent, compared with 30.1 per cent for the German female population. Again this rate varies according to nationality: it is lowest for Turkish women, 41 per cent, and highest for Yugoslav women, 72 per cent.[7] Only in France are foreign women less likely to be employed than French women. In 1968 the rate of activity for foreign women was 19.8 per cent, compared with 39.2 per cent for all women in France. This low proportion of migrant women workers in France is due to the large number of North Africans among the immigrant population, who hardly ever allow their wives or daughters to earn their living. Thus the rate of activity for Algerian women in France is only 4.8 per cent, whereas that for Yugoslav women is 48 per cent — higher than the average.[8]

THREEFOLD SUPPRESSION OF MIGRANT WOMEN

Migrant women are suppressed in three ways:

1. They are workers or workers' wives.[9] This means that they share the fate of their class, i.e., they are excluded from owning the means of production and live by selling their labour power, either directly as wage earners or indirectly through their husbands' labour power. In exchange for their keep, they care for the reproduction of the male labour power and that of the next generation. From their relationship to the means of production follows the alienated character of their work. They have no say in what is produced, how it is produced and for what it is produced, but have to submit to production in the interests of profit maximization. Because of educational barriers their children are as a rule doomed to the same fate.

2. They share the fate of women in all class societies.[10] Although women are actively involved in the production process in agriculture, industry and the services, the prevailing ideology states that woman's main domain is the household and the family. Neglecting the fact that for the majority of lower-class women it is an economic necessity to do productive work, sociologists like Parsons, Claessen, Koenig and many others state that women 'typically' do not earn their living but share their husbands' incomes and socio-economic status. This is taken as a justification for lower pay, for worse educational opportunities, and for largely excluding them from public offices.

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3. They are migrants and as such subjected to all the forms of discrimination typical to foreign workers. In comparison to indigenous workers they get the most strenuous, most dangerous, most monotonous, dirtiest and lowest-paid jobs; they have to pay more for lower quality housing; their mobility and political rights are severely restricted by discriminatory legislation, and their children have hardly any chances to advance socially.

These three forms of discrimination are not separate aspects of the migrant woman's existence. The basic problem, which conditions the other two, is the exploitation of workers in a class society. The underprivileged position of women and of migrants has the function of splitting the working class and of hindering emancipation. Migrant women have to fight harder than Western European women to be recognized as equals by their husbands. They have to overcome greater obstacles than their indigenous female colleagues to achieve promotion at work. But their chances of emancipation as workers is as close or as remote as that of the whole working class.

THE MIGRANT WOMEN'S REACTION

It is the extreme form of discrimination which makes migrant women fight. They get much lower pay than male workers, have to suffer authoritarian behaviour from the almost inevitably male foremen and, in addition, have a second day's work waiting for them at home — household and children — while their husbands consider it their right to relax after work. This obvious injustice mobilizes many migrant women against their previously unquestioned position as their husbands' servants. Many men try to counter this by not sending their wives to work (e.g., the North Africans in France), but for most the mere necessity to have additional family income brings about gradual changes in the relationship between men and women.

This becomes particularly clear in cases of labour struggles, when male workers often realize that they cannot win if the women in the factory are not actively involved. The number of migrant women in the labour force is so considerable that no working-class movement can do without them. Nor is this necessary. Where there have been struggles in factories employing immigrant women, the women have played an active part.

One of the best-known unofficial strikes of 1973 in Germany — the Pierburg strike — was initiated and led mainly by Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav women. This factory, which produces parts for the most important car plants in Germany, draws its vast profits mainly out of the extreme exploitation of migrants, especially women. In 1973 it employed 370 white-collar workers (almost exclusively Germans), as well as 900 Greek, 850 Turkish, 380 Yugoslav, 300 Spanish,

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200 Portuguese, 150 Italian and 850 German workers. Nearly two-thirds of all workers (65 per cent) were women, of whom 73 per cent, almost all of them foreigners, were paid according to wage category 2 (the second lowest) with a brutal hourly wage of DM 5,28. This low wage category is open discrimination. It is justified by the allegation that it is paid for 'light physical work', but in fact the women receiving it at Pierburg were exposed to dangerous chemicals (like petrol for cleaning metal parts) or had to do nerve-racking monotonous procedures at ever increasing speeds. The jobs for the somewhat better-paid German women workers and for the men were hardly different. Before the August 1973 strike, there had been two short strikes by the low-paid women. As a result, the trade union promised negotiations with the firm with the aim of abolishing wage category 2. Negotiations took place and an agreement was reached, but the firm did not implement it. Therefore, when the foreign women demanded the abolition of wage category 2 in August 1973, they were only asking for something that had already been agreed upon. Nevertheless, the trade union did not support the strike.

The strike was initiated in a department almost totally made up of foreign women. They not only demanded the abolition of wage category 2, but also an extra 1,—DM per hour for everybody, and wages comparable to those of men for all women doing hard physical work. The firm's reaction was to try and sack some of the 'ring leaders'. Then it attempted, unsuccessfully, to mobilize the well-paid skilled German workers (hourly wages of over 10DM) against the foreigners. Finally the employers got the police to intervene, and some violent arrests were made. The foreign women succeeded in getting the foreign men to join in the struggle at an early stage of the strike. On the fourth day the women, who by then were locked out, found a very unconventional way of winning the German men over to their cause. As they entered the factory premises at 6.30 in the morning, the women gave each of them a red rose with the words: 'We are expecting you at 9 o'clock.' And indeed, at the agreed time the German skilled workers came out in solidarity. This was a real blow to the management who had hoped to break the strike through the loyalty of the German workers. From that moment the strike was won. On the fifth day the firm made the offer: payment for four of the five days of strike, no sackings, 0.30 DM more per hour for each worker, 50,—DM more monthly for the white-collar workers, abolition of wage category 2, and a one-time 'inflation allowance' for all white- and blue-collar workers.

The way in which such a strike can change the consciousness of immigrant men and women is seen in the example of Anna Satolias and her husband. Anna had already been active in the strike of 1970, as a result of which the wage category 1 was abolished. She described

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her mobilization in an interview with a German paper:

> The work went from bad to worse, more production, more work, more workers, less working space. And the speed: faster and faster, the supervisor and the foreman shouting at us all the time — all that in the lowest wage category, which is called 'light'. [At that time Anna Satolias became active.] First I joined the trade union — like my husband — then we women started making demands. We wanted the abolition of wage category 1, because the work was and is heavy and not light — and because category 1 is supposed to be only for beginners, although we had been working five or six years in this category.

At first the women's demands were not taken seriously, then they were answered with empty promises, until 'we went on strike. We women simply stopped work — and after four days, wage category 1 was abolished. We were all in category 2 then.' That was in 1970. In the same year, Nikiforus Satolias was promoted to tool-setter, and placed with his wife and her colleagues in the machine room. 'Perhaps', says Anna, 'the firm thought we would be more docile then, because I would have to do what my husband said.' 'Perhaps', says Nikiforus, 'the firm thought that as a tool-setter I would earn so much that I could let my wife stay at home — and there were even colleagues who said such things aloud.'

But the appeals to male dominance as boss at work and at home did not bear fruit.

Anna Satolias feels that she has equal rights. She says this is a term that she has learned in Western Germany for the first time. At home, girls and women do not count. But here? Doesn't she work like her husband? Doesn't she earn her own money? The division between work and family does not exist for her. Both are important, both are part of her life. The family only has it good when there is work, when one can work well— that is her opinion. And she has been convinced of it — since 1970.[11]

Another example of a militant strike, where migrant women took the initiative, is that of the Eles stocking factory in Bleidenstadt, near Wiesbaden. The working conditions in this factory were medieval. Of 130 workers, 120 were foreigners. They did not receive hourly wages, but only piece work. For an 8-hour working day, a woman worker who folded and packed 1,500 pairs of stockings received only 500 to 600 DM net a month. They did not receive the Christmas bonus or holiday pay laid down in the collective agreement, their holidays were shorter and they did not get bonuses for overtime or Sunday work.

At the time I talked to the head of the Betriebsrat (workers' council), Gulay, a Turkish woman in her mid-twenties, married with one child. Gulay, who was in the strike leadership, said:

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> We have often tried to negotiate with the firm. But they have remained unmoved. For more than a year the trade union tried to get the boss to accept the collective agreement as it is valid for nearly all textile workers — in vain. One day we said: Now it's enough. And we decided to strike. The trade union found that all right and supported us. 100 of us came out on strike on the 29th of October. We were almost as many men as women. Those 30 to 40 who are still working are afraid to lose their jobs. We don't hate them. We talk to them every morning, but we can't prevent them from going inside the premises. At the beginning we tried to block the gates, but in no time 100 police were here, with dogs and everything, and one dog bit a Yugoslav woman. So we are just talking.
>
> But among us, who are striking, we have learnt a lot. When we came out on strike, we consisted of many different nationalities. We were Turks or Italians, or Greeks or Yugoslavs or Germans. But today we know that we all are just workers and that we have a common struggle to win. We are women and men, but even that does not make any difference. Before the strike, men and women did not chat with each other. But within the seven weeks of the strike we have come to know each other better than in years before. We also talk about personal things. And in matters of the strike, men accept what women say, and women respect the men without being afraid of them. We are all equals.

I asked whether such an experience also changed attitudes at home.

> O yes, my husband, who is not working in this firm, supports me. He comes to discuss matters with us in the evenings. And with regard to housework, he is doing just as much as I do. It's not like this everywhere, but in many families things are changing.

I wanted to know, why she was elected into the Betriebsrat. 'Well, you better ask the others.' Gulay herself had to act as an interpreter. She responded after a long vivid debate in Turkish:

> They say that I am more 'cheeky' than the others, and so they thought that I would represent our interests more aggressively than anyone else. You see, when there is something unjust, I just have to protest. And this is what qualifies me as a strike leader.

Had she always been like that, even before migration? 'A little bit perhaps, but now I have learnt a lot, and I can do much more than before.'

The strike ended after more than seven weeks with a bad compromise between the trade unions and the employer. The workers were disappointed and about half of them decided not to go back to work, risking getting the sack and having to find a new job — a nearly hopeless undertaking in a small town with little industry and

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in the middle of the crisis winter of 1975-76. Gulay was one of those who did not want to accept the offer.

CONCLUSIONS

Does migration to Western Europe mean a first step towards emancipation for migrant women? I would say: Coming to Western Europe does in itself not bring about emancipation. For Mrs L it meant greater suffering than in her home country. Not being able to participate in the production process she did just the same as she had always done at home, only without the warmth of a familiar neighbourhood.

Only when migrant women take up jobs and become economically independent do they realize the injustice of women's discrimination. They come to doubt their husbands' right to dominate them and demand certain participation in the housework. But this is a slow process and leads to many conflicts. Most of them reluctantly take up their double responsibility as workers and as wives and mothers and let their husbands enjoy their evenings in the bars, so as not to lose their support altogether. For even if they are working, migrant women's incomes are much lower than those of men, and alone they would not be able to make ends meet.

It is mainly in the process of labour and of political struggle that both men and women realize that it is not merely desirable but essential to change their relationships. When a strike can only be won if the women workers participate, they have to go to meetings and their opinions have to be taken seriously. At such times, men see themselves forced to look after the children in their own interest.

In other words: being actively involved in the production process, having the same power as all productive workers and getting involved in struggles are the preconditions for migrant women's emancipation.

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2 1968 Census of France
3 *Die Volkswirtschaft* (No 11, 1974), p. 690
4 'Ausländische Arbeitnehmer', *Bundesanstalt für Arbeit* (1972-3), p. 27
5 Official sources estimate far more than 200,000 foreign workers in Germany. See *Der Spiegel* (2 June 1975). The actual figure may well be higher.
6 Swiss Census 1970
7 'Repräsentativuntersuchung', *Bundesanstalt für Arbeit* (1972), p. 19
8 M. Morokvasic, op. cit., p. 10

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9 I am not concerned with the small minority of professional migrants.
10 This is not the place to prove my thesis that the suppression of women originates with the development of private property. For some arguments on this point, see F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*.
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

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

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ELAINE CAPIZZI, HELEN HILL and DAVE MACEY

FRETILIN and the struggle for independence in East Timor

With the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975, world attention was forcefully but briefly drawn to the situation in the former Portuguese colony. Most bourgeois commentators predicted the rapid fall of East Timor to the well-equipped Indonesian forces. From reports leaked from within the Australian establishment, it is clear that the Australian government and intelligence services were counting upon a swift and 'not too bloody' annexation of the country by Indonesia. It is apparent that most of the imperialist powers were also anxious and expectant that the Indonesian invasion would be effective: limited resistance by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), a short-lived flurry of international protest, and then the issue would be buried as Indonesia's annexation restored peace and security to the region of 'free states' (i.e., the various military dictatorships of South-east Asia).

On the other hand, FRETILIN supporters in Europe were guardedly optimistic, predicting the development of protracted guerrilla warfare. Australian activists, who were better informed about developments within East Timor and about FRETILIN'S organization, projects and effectiveness, appreciated the devastation that Indonesia would not hesitate to perpetrate, but were confident that FRETILIN would mount a full-scale and effective resistance.

By January the situation bore out the latter prediction. After two months of full-scale invasion, the use of up to 30,000 land troops, aerial bombing, naval blockades, etc., Indonesia had not managed to control even formally any territory beyond Dili, the capital, and various strips along the coast — less than one-third of the territory.

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Race and Class, XVII, 4 (1976).

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Without doubt, FRETILIN has the overwhelming support of the mass of the people of East Timor. The indiscriminate brutality of the Indonesian invaders has served to cement and extend the FRETILIN base of support rather than to cow the people into submission. The slogan adopted in March 1975 — 'Independence or Death' — has found its concrete realization in the organized resistance of the people.

This level of mobilization and the commitment of the mass of the East Timorese people is an incredible accomplishment. East Timor was the forgotten colony, never specifically mentioned in any of the UN declarations on the decolonization of Portuguese territories. While there have been, throughout East Timor's history, sporadic rebellions against Portuguese rule, by the time of the 25 April 1974 revolution in Portugal, there was no organized national liberation movement in East Timor. There existed only small and informal groupings of radical intellectuals whose activities were restricted by conditions in the colony to political discussion. Among the people there was some hostility to Portuguese rule, but there existed no means for mobilizing and developing this somewhat undefined discontent.

This means that the mobilization of the people has occurred within less than two years; that FRETILIN has established itself, worked out a coherent programme of economic, political and ideological independence in that time, and has raised mass support.

To understand this historical achievement, it is necessary to investigate the socio-historical development of East Timor, especially the effects of Portuguese colonialism, and the strategy adopted by FRETILIN.

Timor is part of that arc of islands, including Java and Celebes, that lies between Asia and Australia, separating the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Strategically placed on invasion and trade routes, it was populated by successive waves of immigrants from Papua and from what is now Indonesia, and long before the arrival of the Portuguese, was integrated into the flourishing trade between Java and China. The eastern half of the island, the former Portuguese colony, has a population of 650,000 and a surface area of 15,000 sq. kms. — roughly the size of Guiné-Bissau.

PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM

Portugal itself had never experienced intensive industrialization and, from the seventeenth century onwards, became increasingly subject to domination by British capital. As British manufactured goods

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flooded into the country, the small but dynamic merchant classes which had established the sea-borne empire became more and more subordinate to the conservative land-owning class. The persistence of feudalism in Portugal meant that Portuguese colonialism developed in a highly specific manner. In Timor, as in the African colonies, patterns usually associated with a transitional phase of accumulation became permanent features of the colonial economy.

Traditional Timorese society consisted of five classes: *Liurai*, the greater chiefs or kings, *dato*, the lesser chiefs or nobles, *ema-reino*, commoners, free but not of noble blood, *ata*, slaves and *lutun*, cattle keepers. These classes were fairly well defined before the coming of the Portuguese. Settlement took the form of scattered house clusters, *cnuas*, representing lineage groups organized into villages (*provacaos*) based on localized patricians or matricians. Six to ten of these villages go to make up a *suco* under a chief, the largest indigenous political unit surviving today. In the past shifting alliances between *sucos* threw up kingdoms whose rulers claimed authority over large tracts of territory. Changing patterns of trade were partly responsible for the growth and decline of these kingdoms. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the sandalwood trade was at its peak, and those chiefs who could organize labour to deliver cut wood to the coast gained a near-monopoly in the cloth, iron tools and guns brought to the island by Chinese, Arab and, later, Portuguese traders. The sandalwood trade declined in the eighteenth century and the Portuguese claimed a greater share of what business there was. The empires seem to have broken up into petty chiefdoms comprising no more than three to four thousand people each.

When the Portuguese succeeded in establishing control over East Timor, they tried to use the existing political system for their own ends rather than transform it. The first Portuguese governor, in an attempt to enlist Timorese support, appointed all *liurai* to the rank of colonel and gave lower ranks to the *dato*. Some of the *liurai* collaborated with the Portuguese whilst others raised armies to fight against them. One such *liurai*, Dom Boaventura, led a large-scale rebellion against Portuguese rule lasting two years, during which he actually established a seat of government which ruled for eighteen months and which was only brought down after the Portuguese brought out reinforcements from Lisbon. Today, Dom Boaventura is revered as an outstanding Timorese nationalist and is a hero of many young Timorese.

Following the crushing of the rebellion, the Portuguese instituted a more repressive rule in Timor. They attempted to reduce the power of the *liurai* by dividing their power amongst the *dato*, who ruled the *sucos*. Where the *liurai* are still found, they almost always represent a broken succession, the present chiefs being elected from groups who were faithful to the Portuguese during the rebellion. This disruption

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of the traditional framework of society has always been a source of resentment against colonial rule, but particularly strong resentment is directed against those who were given the position of *liurai* in the immediate post-war period, i.e., after the coming of fascist rule to Portugal.

The territory was divided into administrative regions reaching down to the village level. Administrators were Portuguese or, in later periods, *assimilados* from Timor or one of the other colonies. The infrastructure (roads and a fairly extensive telephone system), while being more developed than that on the Indonesian half of the island, was orientated to the needs of the administrators rather than to facilitating the distribution of food or meeting the other needs of the Timorese.

The coming of fascist rule to Portugal brought the secret police or PIDE to the colonies. Political activity was forbidden (apart from membership of the fascist party *Accão Nacional Popular*) and those who opposed the regime were brutally dealt with or deported to another of the colonies. The peasants, who accounted for 90 per cent of Timor's population, were the main victims of the compulsory tax imposed on all males over the age of 18. The tax was the same for all, regardless of income, and those who could not earn enough cash to pay were forced to work on the roads or other government projects. The extraction of surplus through this form of taxation and through forced labour also applied in Portugal's African territories. Although usually associated with a transitional phase of colonialism, it became a specific feature of the Portuguese system, replacing any extensive transformation of mercantilist relations.

Economic effects

The economic effects of 400 years of Portuguese colonialism can be summarized quite rapidly. Industrialization being actively discouraged by the Portuguese, Timor became heavily dependent upon imports from both the metropolis and the more affluent colonies, notably Mozambique and Macao. All consumer goods were imported, but their consumption was largely restricted to Dili. Coffee (introduced in the mid-nineteenth century) remained the largest export, providing 90 per cent of all exchange revenue. Forty per cent of all coffee was grown on a single Portuguese-owned plantation, with a further 20 per cent being produced by medium-sized Portuguese or Chinese plantations. Exclusive concentration upon cash crops for the export market meant that there was no diversification in agriculture and natural resources were not fully exploited. Indeed, in some areas there was a gross under-utilization of land, with many fertile areas remaining under-cultivated. The contradiction between town and countryside is greater in East Timor

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than is general in South-east Asia. Dili, with a population of 30,000, is by far the largest urban centre, Bacau, the second town, having only 5,000 inhabitants. With its sealed roads, European-style shops and hotels, Dili is far more developed than Kupang, the capital of Indonesian Timor, and presents a striking contrast with the poverty of the interior.

The Chinese minority in Timor, unlike its counterparts in other parts of South-east Asia, did not attempt to integrate itself into Timorese life. Originally arriving in Timor as traders, the Chinese continued to dominate the capitalist sector of the economy for four centuries and formed a fairly well-defined petty bourgeoisie. Less than half the 10,000-strong Chinese community were Portuguese citizens, most being citizens of Taiwan. The Taiwanese consul in Dili played an important role in the Chinese community, which maintained its own schools and spoke Mandarin. The biggest businesses in Timor were Chinese, including eighteen out of twenty import firms (the other two being Portuguese). Unlike the Chinese in Indonesia, their influence extended down to village level, each small village having a Chinese shop. The grain trade was controlled by the Chinese, who had a monopoly of the transport business.

Cultural colonization

The assimilation theory characteristic of Portuguese colonialism asserted that a Timorese could become the equal of a Portuguese, the proviso being that he or she 'became' Portuguese through the adoption of a Portuguese name, literacy in the Portuguese language and registration as a Catholic (only 25 per cent of the population are in fact registered Catholics). Assimilation into Portuguese culture also meant total divorce from the local culture and literacy in the Portuguese language. The colonial educational system was based firmly on this theory and education was uniquely Portuguese in content. Primary school children were faced with maps of Portugal on the walls of the classrooms and were obliged to study the history and geography of the 'mother country'. Almost none of the lessons had any connection with Timorese reality. Such total separation between education and reality produced an almost schizophrenic colonial mentality which manifested itself in a denigration of local culture, an absence of self-respect and a fanatical admiration for things Portuguese. It also resulted in a marked tendency on the part of the Timorese simply to forget everything taught at school — the Portuguese language, reading, writing — and a tendency to internalize colonial stereotypes and regard themselves as fools.

By the mid-sixties Portugal began to re-examine its colonial policies in the light of mounting international criticism and the success of liberation movements in the African colonies. A

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comprehensive primary school system was established, as were a high school and a technical school. Access to higher education in Lisbon at last became possible for a few Timorese and in 1975 there were thirty-nine students attending university courses in Portugal. Despite the new emphasis on education, the 1970 *Census of Population and Habitation* could report a 93 per cent illiteracy rate and a mere 53 per cent attendance rate amongst school children.

The aim of this new educational strategy was the creation of a new administrative elite to run the country on behalf of the Portuguese. But, as in Africa, the actual result was to create an educated stratum whose position in the lower ranks of the administration made them very open to nationalist ideologies.

The physical effects of Portuguese rule can be seen in a 50 per cent mortality rate among children under 5 and in the highest TB rate in the world. Malaria, leprosy and elephantiasis remain endemic. The only hospitals were in major towns and the health care available to the rural population through regional clinics was, to say the least, rudimentary.

After the April 25 events in Portugal, the secret police were disbanded and three main political groupings emerged in East Timor, each representing different classes and social groups. The first to develop was UDT (Timorese Democratic Union), which initially called, in Spinolist manner, for a close relationship with Portugal and the opening up of the country to foreign investment, so as to accelerate capitalist development. With the disappearance of Spinola, UDT entered a fragile coalition with FRETILIN and began to call for independence. The failure of the attempted UDT coup in August 1973 led to heavy fighting in East Timor. UDT forces were rapidly defeated by FRETILIN, which had the support of all the 3,000 Timorese serving in the Portuguese army. UDT broke into several fragments, with many of its leaders fleeing to Australia and others calling for integration with Indonesia.

Initially UDT appears to have had fairly widespread support. This can to some extent be explained by the seeming absence of any viable alternative and a general fear of change, but UDT also owed much of its support to the emotive use made by its leaders of the Portuguese flag, which had in some areas been integrated into traditional religions, taking on the character of a sacred object. UDT also found support among the pro-Portuguese elite in Dili and some of the chiefs, notably those who had been appointed by the Portuguese.

The smallest of the three parties, APODETI (Timorese Popular Democratic Association), called for the integration of East Timor into Indonesia, arguing that the colony was not economically viable as an independent nation and that there was, despite the absence of even a

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common language, a cultural unity between Timorese in the East and the West. The Party received some support from sections of the Catholic clergy who had connections with the church in Indonesian Timor and neighbouring islands and from sympathetic businessmen in Kupang. The latter also established Radio Kupang, which broadcast pro-Indonesian propaganda into East Timor. In an attempt to broaden its support base, APODETI began bribing chiefs to lead their followers across the border to Atambua where they could receive training in guerrilla warfare.

FRETILIN

FRETILIN developed out of the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) which was established early in May 1974. Its founders were drawn from a small group of urban, educated Timorese, mainly government clerks and high school students who had met regularly but informally prior to the Lisbon coup to discuss the future of their country. Its first major activity was the extension of a strike of a small group of workers into what became virtually a general strike in Dili. Forming the Committee for the Defence of Labour, the ASDT succeeded in securing a 100 per cent wage increase for public sector workers; this, the first strike in East Timor's history, was later followed by the creation of a Union of Workers, a Teachers' Union and associations of women and students.

On 22 May ASDT issued its first political manifesto, calling for independence and an end to colonialism; the immediate participation of 'worthy' Timorese in the administration; an end to racial discrimination and corruption, and friendly cooperation with neighbouring countries. Its guiding ideology was nationalism and its broadly social-democratic orientation took a particular form in the light of the Timor situation. Subsequent political experience and development of ASDT members led to a change in the conception of the form of political organization required. The need for the development of a national liberation front was formally recognized in the change of ASDT into FRETILIN. At the ASDT General Assembly on 12 September 1974 a new programme, discussed below, was adopted.

From the beginning ASDT/FRETILIN was the only political party consistently active in the villages, initiating and carrying out concrete projects as well as conducting general political propaganda for independence.

By January 1975 UDT and FRETILIN had hammered out a common platform calling for the transition to self-rule under a coalition of the two parties. The major basis for cooperation was a commitment to independence and democratic rights. Subsequent developments

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within East Timor, notably the rapid growth of FRETILIN support relative to the UDT, combined (it seems) with international pressure, led to the UDT unilaterally breaking the coalition in April.

Antagonisms between the two organizations grew and in the next months the UDT leadership extended its discussions with various business interests throughout the world (Japan, Macao, Hong Kong, Australia) and had increasing contact with the Indonesian government. This, together with its lack of contact with what was happening at the village level, probably contributed to an over-estimation by UDT of the support it had both within and outside the country. In any case, UDT decided to preempt the situation by attempting a coup on 10 August.

While the Portuguese government refused to take any action or put down the UDT after its coup, FRETILIN took effective action. The coup itself was soon crushed and peace was restored throughout the country within a month. The flight of the Portuguese Governor and officers and most of the UDT leadership meant that FRETILIN had to develop a de facto government and administration. Building upon programmes and projects already initiated, FRETILIN established its administration and functioned effectively for the months prior to the Indonesian invasion.

With the imminent threat of the Indonesian military dictatorship launching a full-scale invasion, FRETILIN declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28 November 1975.

Since the Indonesian invasion FRETILIN has been responsible for the maintenance of the government and economic structure in the areas it holds, whilst also organizing military resistance.

Following the April coup in Lisbon and the emergence of political parties in Timor, the Chinese knew that their days of fantastic wealth were coming to an end. They began to stockpile Australian dollars and send them out of the country, often investing in stock-markets in Australia, Singapore or Hong Kong. The wealthiest of Timor's Chinese had business contacts in Macao, and Johnny Ho, a millionaire casino-owner from Macao, had plans to open a casino in Timor which under FRETILIN would not be allowed. It is quite likely, then, that (as FRETILIN alleges) Macao interests heavily financed UDT and persuaded it to break the coalition with FRETILIN. Local Chinese tended not to join any of the political parties, but gave money to all three. Both FRETILIN and UDT were critical of the Chinese, not simply because they made so much money, but because they sent it out of the country and rarely, if ever, gave jobs to the Timorese.

FRETILIN: Ideology, leadership and mass support

In general, FRETILIN represents the interests of the urban workers, the peasantry and the small radical intelligentsia, who provided its

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initial cadres. Its basic unity rests upon the commitment to independent nationalist development and to what has been called *mauberism*. *Maubere* is a Tetum word signifying 'the common person, the poor, ignorant, oppressed Timorese under colonial rule'. *Mauberism* thus connotes a general struggle against poverty, illiteracy and economic and political oppression.

FRETILIN is a broad front nationalist alliance. There is a range of political perspectives within the leadership and a range of bases upon which support has been developed. Political positions vary in their coherence and concrete implications. In Western terms, one can recognize elements of social democracy, variants of Marxist positions and broad populist currents, but the implications for the development of these positions in the Timor situation are more important than the labels. Most of the leadership has been influenced to some extent by the ideas of Amilcar Cabral in Guiné Bissau and Samora Machel in Mozambique. While strategies for economic development differ, there is a basic unity in opposition to neo-colonial control.

Undoubtedly differences exist and will emerge; at this point, however, the basic unity on the issues of independence and *mauberism* is the determinant characteristic of relations within the Front and for the basis of support.

The Indonesian government's characterization of FRETILIN as 'communist' is simply another indication of the generals' use of 'communist' as a generic label for any group which they fear might weaken their position or which simply raises the issue of democratic rights and social reforms. It tells us nothing about FRETILIN.

As has been outlined, the basic point of unity is the commitment to independence and social change for the masses. In *What is FRETILIN? (A Popular Explanatory Statement)*, the basis for the Front is explained:

> It is called a Front because it calls for unity of all Timorese patriots ... It is necessary that all nationalists and patriots must unite without discrimination of race, religion, political ideology, sex and social background. It is necessary to disarm all those who are trying to divide the people ... At the moment East Timor is a colony and as a colony the immediate and only objective is the struggle for national independence and liberation of the people.

National independence requires an end to colonial rule, the active prevention of neo-colonialism and the adoption of a non-aligned position in international affairs:

1. At this moment the struggle against colonialism means:
   a. replace the foreign political power [Portugal] by another power to be exercised by the people of East Timor, with the

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consequent transformation of the present political and administrative structures.

b. modify, transform and revolutionize the social and economic structures of the colonial inspiration.

II. Active prevention of neo-colonialism. A neo-colonial situation in East Timor means that the people will not be free to run their own affairs, even though East Timor might be an independent state. Such a situation would happen through the introduction and implementation of foreign investments. When this doesn't serve the interests of the great majority of the people, then another form of dependency will emerge — an economic dependency.

The liberation of the masses further requires the establishment of broad democratic rights, economic development in the interests of the masses, popularly based democratic administration, 'cultural decolonization' and the mobilization of the masses for full social participation. These aspects of the programme, the strategies adopted and the actual operation of FRETILIN programmes are discussed below.

Political programme

FRETILIN's programme proclaims its commitment to the establishment of broad democratic rights and a popularly-based democratic administration.

The former includes the specific commitment to the establishment of racial, ethnic and sexual equality and the guarantee of religious freedom and freedom of political organization (except for those proposing annexation to a foreign power). The latter involves proposals for transitional administrative structures, at the local level, and elections for a Constitutional Assembly; the long-term establishment of universal suffrage for all over 15, elections with secret ballots and a relatively decentralized system of administration of locally-elected councils sending delegates to regional and thence to a national assembly.

From the beginning, the FRETILIN leadership has stressed the need for safeguards against the emergence of a new political elite amongst the leadership; safeguards include demands for modest living standards and the continuing integration of the leadership into village life through active participation in economic production.

Mobilization

The realization of democratic participation by the mass of the people is seen to be dependent upon the process of 'cultural decolonization' through concrete programmes to combat the effects of a 'colonial

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mentality' and give the people the means for self-determination; the establishment of mass organizations could also mobilize the people into effective action.

The programme calls specifically for the establishment of women's, students' and workers' associations and priority has been given to their development. Although these mass organizations are involved in all areas of political and economic life, the students' union (UNETIM) is particularly concerned with the development of the literacy campaigns and work in the democratization of the school system. Student organizations were also involved in the Revolutionary Brigades set up in April 1975.

The workers' association has been particularly involved in the organization of the agricultural cooperatives in the countryside and in the organization of urban workers.

The women's organization (OPM) has arranged activities for women, encouraged them to participate in the literacy and agricultural projects and, more generally, in all economic and political activities and discussion. OPM has been involved in setting up women's clubs and in the organization of creches. It helped develop a women's army unit of one hundred under a woman commander fighting at the front. It aims to counteract the subservient role which traditional Timorese society and Portuguese colonialism imposed upon women.

The establishment of the Revolutionary Brigades involved most of the FRETILIN leadership and urban students. The leadership gave up their jobs in Dili and Bacau and, together with virtually all the Timorese student population, went into the villages. There they lived in village huts, grew their own food and used the rest of their time to work in the literacy campaigns and other projects. This marked a vital step in the ideological development of FRETILIN and has significant implications for their future political organization. The idea, drawn from Amilcar Cabral, centres on the 'radical petty bourgeoisie' breaking with its privileges and origins and identifying fully with the poor villages. At this point FRETILIN adopted a policy that, after independence, political leaders would not have large salaries, big houses, cars, etc., and would be required to spend a major part of their time living and working in the villages.

After the UDT attempted coup, the work carried out by FRETILIN laid the foundation for the speedy establishment of local administration. The local councils are responsible for the coordination of the local militia, health and literacy schemes, and for the organization of agricultural production programmes and distribution through the people's shops. They comprise representatives of each of the three mass organizations (the women's organization, the workers' union and the student union), one locally- and one centrally-appointed FRETILIN cadre and two military

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representatives. The latters' presence is partly a result of the important role they played in crushing the UDT coup; there were, however, further long-term considerations involved. First, the almost inevitable Indonesian invasion required preparation, and secondly, the FRETILIN commitment to a 'people's army' necessitates the integration of the military into village life.

The administrative structures were operating effectively, political mobilization had begun to give a concrete basis for full democratic participation and the people had begun to organize themselves for effective military self-defence by the time the Indonesian military dictatorship launched its invasion.

In the areas of religious freedom and ethnic equality, FRETILIN has also fulfilled its commitments. Despite the extreme hostility and provocation of the Catholic hierarchy, FRETILIN has not conducted a campaign against Catholicism or the church and church property has not been seized. In local work, the development of local culture has been encouraged.

FRETILIN's policy on the Chinese is that they should have the same rights as other Timorese, but the economic policy of setting up distribution cooperatives is a deliberate attempt to undercut their economic power as a class.

Economic strategy

FRETILIN's economic strategy reflects both the priorities of its leaders and the particular situation of the Timorese economy after 400 years of Portuguese colonialism. Another consideration is that critics of Timorese independence often used the argument that an independent state of East Timor would be 'unviable'. FRETILIN thus stressed self-reliance in its economic programme and when it became an administration strove to put it into practice. The FRETILIN economic strategy is based firmly on each village or unit being able to produce food for its own needs as far as possible. One of the problems faced by FRETILIN in implementing land reform and collective working of the land has been that the land-ownership system varies from district to district. An extensive study of existing patterns of land ownership had been started and some experimental production cooperatives set up in Bazartete (near Dili) and Bucoli (near Bacau) when FRETILIN was pushed into war by the attempted UDT coup. FRETILIN Vice-President Nicolau Lobato was one of the leaders in the establishment of cooperatives and had been working on the establishment of one in his village since mid-1974.

Following FRETILIN's assumption of power in September 1975, it encouraged the Chinese to reopen their shops in Dili, but with the long-term aim of restricting them to selling non-essential imported goods. Distribution cooperatives were set up in the form of 'people's

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shops'. This was partly an emergency measure as FRETILIN was reponsible for feeding a large number of people who had no other means of support, but it is intended that the people's shops take over the the distribution of all essential goods at reasonable and fixed prices.

When FRETILIN became an administration it encouraged people to leave Dili and go to villages where they could join work brigades planting crops. This was partly dictated by necessity as all imports of foodstuffs had ceased, but it also fitted in with FRETILIN's principles of encouraging self-reliance. After self-sufficiency, the second aim for agriculture is the diversification of crops, improvement of techniques, such as using ploughs with buffaloes instead of the traditional digging stick, and then the cultivation of export crops. FRETILIN has plans for some industry based upon agriculture, e.g., flour-milling and sugar production, which could help cut down imports considerably. Many parts of Timor are highly suitable for the production of hydro-electricity and some projects have already been planned. As much of East Timor is under-populated compared with other parts of South-east Asia, there is no shortage of land, and with some improvement of technique and diversification of crops it could become self-sufficient in a short space of time. East Timor also has some oil. It has been used for centuries by the Timorese, but is now being developed by Timor Oil, an Australian company which has a farm-out arrangement with Woodside-Burmah. Because of the political uncertainties drilling has ceased, but enough oil could certainly be produced to meet Timor's own needs and also finance the imports necessary for the type of development envisaged by FRETILIN.

Cultural decolonization

One of the major obstacles to the development of an independent East Timor being the legacy of Portuguese colonialism in education and culture, FRETILIN places great emphasis on 'cultural decolonization'. UNETIM began to attack authoritarian methods in the schools and to demand more relevant curricula. But perhaps the most important element in the process of decolonization has been the mass literacy campaigns undertaken in the countryside. Literacy is seen as a basic political necessity, without which the economic and political reforms envisaged will be doomed to failure. Learning to read is therefore a political act, and the programmes have a very definite political content directly related to the lives and needs of the people. It cannot be separated mechanically from political education. Methods used are similar to those developed in North-east Brazil by Paolo Freire and the leading primers introduce the students to the history of Portuguese colonialism, encouraging them to ask why they are exploited by the landlord, the Chinese merchant, the

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colonial school teacher and the Portuguese administrator — and what can be done about it. Classes take place either in the open air or in huts built by the villagers and members of the Revolutionary Brigades, an arrangement which further emphasizes the need for self-reliance. The effect of the literacy campaigns is twofold. Firstly, it brings a vitally important new skill to the rural population and allows them to take part in political life in a more effective manner. Secondly, it is an important element in the political transformation and cultural decolonization of the students and FRETILIN cadres themselves. Teacher and pupil learn from one another, the peasant gaining a new skill and the intellectual or cadre becoming more firmly rooted in a culture that was repressed by colonialism. Working in the villages, growing their own food and working with the people, Brigade members begin to develop a new political consciousness and learn more about their own country than was possible in a Portuguese school. The contradiction between town and country, which has cultural as well as economic aspects, is being overcome.

The literacy campaigns have also had the effect of making Tetum into a written language for the first time. This will facilitate research into the language and will break down barriers caused by language difficulties in a country with many mutually incomprehensible dialects. Portuguese is, however, to be retained as the national language and will be taught to everybody once they can read and write in their own language. This will strengthen cultural links with Guiné Bissau and Mozambique. Portuguese also has the advantage of being an internationally-known language. The study of English will also be encouraged. Local music, songs, dances and handicrafts are being actively encouraged by FRETILIN, being seen as an important factor in the development of a national consciousness.

The literacy scheme goes hand in hand with a health scheme that gives priority to hygiene and preventive medicine. Great importance is placed on the need for health workers at the local level rather than for the creation of a medical corps of highly-trained specialists. Whilst this is obviously a pragmatic response to prevailing conditions, it does reflect a conscious choice. As in other areas, the emphasis falls upon self-reliance and on the breaking down of patterns of authority inherited from the colonial past. The FRETILIN programme's provisions for health care draw some inspiration from the Chinese barefoot doctors: health care is to be taken to the people; it must serve the people, and it must be available immediately. Above all, the health system must not contribute to the development of a new elite. FRETILIN had begun to train some hundred rural health workers at the time of the Indonesian invasion.



Initial resistance to the Indonesian invasion was much more effective

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than most observers predicted, so that Indonesian forces could control only the border area and the urban centres. Elsewhere, FRETILIN remained in control. Whilst this can in part be explained by the eminent suitability of the terrain for guerrilla warfare, the deciding factor must be the support of the people themselves. FRETILIN's ability to win the confidence of the rural population and to mobilize them against Indonesian aggression is a tribute to the work done in the countryside and to the rapid development of a political, cultural and economic programme. The struggle in East Timor will be prolonged and difficult, but early events showed that an Indonesian victory is far from certain.

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

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LINTON KWESI JOHNSON

Jamaican rebel music

> Sometimes I cry
> when I see my people
> and ooe
> pure pain and poverty
> we black people
> suffering so
> and yet I know
> history will show
> how long we suffer so ... [1]
> *Leroy Sibbles*

The popular music of Jamaica today is a music whose pulse is 'the ground-beat of survival itself'.[2] It is a 'music of the blood/black reared/pain rooted/heart geared', a music 'all tensed-up in the bubble and the bounce and the leap and the weight drop'.[3] It is a music that is at once violent and awesome, forceful and mighty, aggressive and cathartic. It is a music that beats heavily against the walls of babylon,* that the walls may come a-tumbling down; a music that chucks an heavy historical load that is pain that is hunger that is bitter that is blood, that is dread. Yes the popular music of Jamaica is full of dread for it is dread down Jamaica way this day; it is red down there I say.

Jamaica is red with the blood of innocents who are daily slaughtered by babylon; red with the blood of repression and rebellion that floods the streets of Kingston as the guns rage in the noon-day sun, as the guns bark throughout the troubled nights; red

---

LINTON KWESI JOHNSON is a black poet.

* Rastafarian word which means police, oppressor, land of oppression.

Race and Class, XVII, 4 (1976).

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with the fratricidal blood of the oppressed. And it is this tale that the musician, singer, and the dub-lyricist tells.* They tell of the burden of the history of oppression, rebellion, and repression; of the 'tribal wars', the political 'scank',** the despair and desperation. Not only does the poetry of Jamaican music lament the suffering of the 'sufferers', it also asserts their strength and their determination to struggle on relentlessly, and prophesies the coming Armageddon wherein 'only the fittest of the fittest shall survive' and 'no weak house shall prosper', because 'it dreads down a babylon/ dreaaaad'.[4]

Jamaican music embodies the historical experience of the Jamaican masses — it reflects, and in reflecting, reveals the contemporary situation of the nation. He who feels it knows it, the saying goes, and it is the sufferer from the urban ghettoes, the 'creation rebel' who has 'travelled up that old rough road' to find his bread who really has the say as to what is happening down Jamaica way today. So forward we now go with this musical exploration, the 'creation rebel' will guide us on our way.

I shall say it again: the popular music of Jamaica, the music of the people, is an essentially experiential music, not merely in the sense that the people *experience* the music, but also in the sense that the music is true to the historical experience of the people, that the music reflects the historical experience. It is the *spiritual expression* of the *historical experience* of the Afro-Jamaican. In making the music, the musicians themselves enter a common stream of consciousness, and what they create is an invitation to the listeners to be entered into that consciousness — which is also the consciousness of their people. The feel of the music is the feel of their common history, the burden of their history; their suffering and their woe; their endurance and their strength, their poverty and their pain. This is precisely what Leroy Sibbles of the Heptones means when he says of 'dub' or 'drum and bass music', the music of the sufferer of Jamaica today: 'well ... it signifies some kind of African feeling, the beat and the drum and the bass. We are all black and we have Africa deep within us. Yea we feel it. It's cultural and you just got to get with it because you feel it. Deep down inside from you hear it, you feel it.'[5] You feel it because the 'bad bass bounce' is your 'blood a leap an pulse a pounce'[6] you feel it because this 'rhythm of a tropical electrical storm',[7] 'rhythm cuttin sharp so' cuts at your hurt; you feel it for the 'bass history is a moving/is a hurting black story';[8] you feel it because it is your pain; you feel it because it is

* The 'dub-lyricist' is the dj turned poet. He intones his lyrics rather than sings them. Dub-lyricism is a new form of (oral) music-poetry, wherein the lyricist overdubs rhythmic phrases on to the rhythm background of a popular song. Dub-lyricists include poets like Big Youth, I Roy, U Roy, Dillinger, Shorty the President, Prince Jazzbo and others.

** Jamaican Creolism meaning 'to fool around, to fool someone or to play the fool for the purpose of deception'.

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your hunger, it is your sprout. 'Deep down inside, from you hear it, you feel it', for it is your heart-song and it touches your soul's senses. The youth sufferers who live in the ghettoes and shanty towns of Jamaica describe the music in terms of their own existence, which is basically a rebel existence: they call the music *rebel music*. According to Leroy Sibbles, 'they use the way they *feel* to describe the music', and this is so precisely because the music is expressive of how they 'feel'.

The musician, singer and dub-lyricist are mostly 'sufferers'. Through music, song and poetry, they give spiritual expression to their own inner beings, to their own experience. But in so doing, they are also giving spiritual expression to the collective experience of sufferation that is shared by all sufferers. Perhaps Toots and the Maytals 'Time Tough' will help us to explain the reciprocal relationship between the spiritual expression of experience by the artist on the one hand, and the *experiencing* of this spiritual expression by the people on the other hand. In this song, the lyricist is lamenting the hardships of life, the bitterness of life.

> I go to bed
> but sleep won't come
> get up in the night
> couldn't stand my *feeling*
> early in the morning
> it's the same situation
> then come the landlord
> just a knock knocking upon my door
> I've got four hundred month rent to pay
> and I can't find a dollar[9]

Here the lyrics are sung in the first person, so that it is the individual experience, the personal situation, that informs the song. But the individual experience is the experience of all;

> time tough
> everything is out of sight
> it is so hard so hard
> everything is going higher and higher[10]

every sufferer is experiencing the hardness of the time. 'Sister Lee cannot bear it/and brother Lee can hardly stand it/they're crying night and day/nobody to help them in their way.'[11] So when Toots with so much pain in his parched voice sings: 'from I was a little boy/I keep on feeling it feeling it now',[12] 'Sister Lee' feels it, and 'brother Lee' feels it too; immersed in music and song, everyone feels it for they immediately recognise the pain in this song as their own pain as the music takes them to the very depths of their being.

Music totally encompasses the lives of the oppressed in Jamaica

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this day. From the old and disillusioned to the young and rebellious, music is the 'food of love', their spiritual and cultural nourishment. For through music, their dreams are unveiled, their souls exorcized, their tensions canalized, their strength realized. In the Afro-Jamaican churches, men, women, and children gather together to rid themselves of their pain and their agony in a remorseful outpouring of the souls as they sing those mournful songs, bleeding on the cross, stretching forth their cupped hands, reaching, reaching out for the 'new Jerusalem'.

The dances which complement the popular music, the ska, the rock steady, the reggae, the scank, and the chucky, are at once erotic and sensual, violent, aggressive and cathartic. The music invokes what Fanon calls the 'emotional sensitivity' of the oppressed and gives vent to it through dance.[13] As Fanon puts it: 'The native's relaxation takes precisely the form of muscular orgy in which the most acute agressivity and the most impelling violence are transformed and conjured away'.[14] 'There are no limits — for in reality your purpose in coming together is to allow the accumulated libido, the hampered agressivity to dissolve as in a volcanic eruption. Symbolic killings, fantastic rites, imaginary mass murders — all must be brought out.'[15]

But it so happens that, at times, the catharsis does not come through dance, for the violence that the music carries is turned inwards and personalized, so that for no apparent reason, the dance halls and yards often explode into fratricidal violence and general pandemonium. Whenever two rival sound systems meet, violence often erupts between the rival supporters, so the dj is often both the musical pace setter and the musical peace keeper. He tells the dancers, 'those who deal in violence shall go down in silence'. Similarly, the dub-lyricist who has developed the dj talk into a form of music-poetry, tells his listeners that they are invited to a musical happening, but he warns them, 'when you come/I don't want you to bring your skeng/I want you to leave your skeng at home'.[16] Big youth tells his listener:

you should make a love not war
cause war is ugly love is lovely
cause if it's war then you'll be double double ugly
and if it's love then you'll be a double double lovely[17]

Jamaica, that 'Caribbean island paradise in the sun', is one of the most violent places under the sun. This is not surprising when we recall that Jamaican society, like all colonial societies, is one which was founded upon, and is maintained through, violence. Gordon Rohlehr, the West Indian literary critic, has commented on the fierceness of the 'forces of despair and erosion' that permeate Jamaican society and culture, and its relation to the music. 'Each new

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weight of pressure' in the society, says Rohlehr, 'has its corresponding effect on the music, and the revolution is usually felt first as a perceptible change in the bass, the basic rhythm, the inner pulse whose origin is in the confrontation between the despair which history and iniquitous politics inflict, and the rooted strength of the people.'[18] The music responds to changes in the society so that as the society becomes more violent, more dread, more tense, the beat becomes more dread and the rhythm more taut. The bass and the rhythm are the city's 'grounded heart beat' as Rohlehr puts it, and the beat of the music 'dominates the city'. So 'when the rhythm goes dread, the whole society *feels* the tension, and why not? After all it was the cruel tension which determined that the beat should go dread in the first place.'[19]

And every sufferer from the old to the young in Jamaica today wears the look of dread, a look of flame, a permanent grimace, a 'permanent screw'.[20] This look of dread testifies to the inner tension they feel, an agony that is real — testifies to the volcanic eruption inside their heads. I Roy's 'screw-face man'[21] is the 'mafiah', the 'dread', the man who has completely internalized the historical experience of violence and the violence of his existence, and acts out this violence through an existence of violence; for 'screw face carrying skeng/and a screw-face carrying bucky'.* Bob Marley's 'Talkin Blues' is here enlightening. Marley writes:

> I've been down on the rock for so long
> I seem to wear a permanent screw[22]

In this song, Marley is talking about a bitter existence in babylon which is 'blues'. He is 'saying talkin blues' because 'cold ground' was his bed last night 'and rock was my pillow too'.[23] The permanence of this blues experience and existence is the historical experience that is facially expressed in the 'permanent screw'. But along with this 'blues' feeling, this inner agony and outer look of dread, there is an urgent desire to tear down the walls of babylon:

> But I'm gonna stare in the sun
> let the rays shine in my eyes
> I'm gonna take just one step more
> for I feel like bombing a church.[24]

So that when Laxton Ford implores his listeners to: 'take some time and learn to smile/it's a better way to stay', we immediately understand the meaning of his musical say.[25]

The historical experience of the Jamaican masses, part of the wider Caribbean experience of colonialism and neocolonialism, is one that began with slavery. The barbarity of the slavemasters and slave

* 'Skeng' is a Jamaican Creolism meaning pistol, and 'bucky' means shotgun.

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drivers has been well documented and does not have to be repeated here. Neither do we have to recall the rapings, plunder and murders. Sam Clayton's words will suffice:

> Jamaica is an island in the Caribbean — they say Caribbean but if I remember clearly it has carried us beyond our borders, not by freewill but by force, force! Like in 1565 when John Hawkins was given a Royal Charter from Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth the first of England, and her personal ship, the SS Jesus of Lubek to transport slaves from Africa to the West Indies. As the history states, his methods were crude though effective. He just landed on the Guinea coast, seized three hundred Negroes and prepared for the Caribbean with his human cargo. They call us human cargo, but I say that is infra dig.[26]

It was a violent and bloody beginning, a brutal and traumatic beginning. Slavery was the name and capital accumulation the game. And although it is four hundred years hence, the violence of the people's existence persists like a naked light in a house full of dynamite. And the blood has not ceased to gush but continues to flow over. And the brutality is intensified under a different name. And the original trauma is the cause of the protracted drama that threatens the rule of a ruthless native bourgeoisie. For the wounds of history have not yet healed, but fester in the hot sun from day unto day so they multiply. So for the oppressed Jamaican, history is not a fleeting memory of the distant past, but the unbearable weight of the present. That as captives they came and as captives they remain is the veritable tale their history tells. And the people, O my people, they still feel the terrible sting of the whip of oppression, of poverty, of fruitless toil, and that is why the singerman sings:

> four hundred years
> we have been here as a slave
> now I an' I
> must find a way
> of not being enslaved
>
> no shackles on our feet
> no whip on our back
> Yet I an' I
> must realise
> we're still being enslaved[27]

Chattel slavery was finally abolished in 1838 in Jamaica, but already with the introduction of the system of apprenticeship in 1833 the slaves could sing: 'we free!/Lawd we free!'[28] But it did not take the people long to realize that 'the jangling chains', as Andrew Salkey puts it, were 'replaced by different noises'; it did not take the

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ex-slaves long to realize that they were still being enslaved and that 'freedom is as freedom does/and it did accomplish much'.[29] So it is no wonder that Winston Rodney should ask, 'do you remember/the days of slavery?' He implores us to try to remember the days of slavery when they 'beat us/when they use us/till they refuse us'[30] for it was then ... it was then that it all began. And ever since then, ever since that terrible day when 'they took us away from civilization' and 'brought us slave on this plantation',[31] they have been asking: 'how long must we wait for repatriation',[32] and the Afro-Jamaican has been praying: 'O father free us from/the chains of babylon/ and let us live to walk in zion/for we are pressurised just like the israelites'.[33] Ever since the days of slavery, my people have been singing this sad sad song:

took us away
in captivity
and brought us down here
where we can't be free
I wanna know how long
how long
how long shall evil rage
evil rage over my people[34]

The image of slavery persists in the mind of the Afro-Jamaican, and the conditions of slavery weigh down his existence. Though it was his sweat, blood and tears that built Jamaica, he shares no part of it. All he knows is 'pure pain and poverty' and all he sees around him is despair and sufferation and hopelessness. So the rastafarian refuses to accept this barren existence in a 'foreign land'. He has never renounced his African citizenship for he has never been given a citizenship and so he sings this song of despair, dreaming of the day when he will 'sail/on the *Black Star Line*/homeward bound'.[35]

I just can't take it no more
I just can't stand it no more
So let me go home to Ethiopia land[36]

The rastafarian's demand of repatriation back to Africa then is not unreasonable or unrealistic but quite legitimate. And it is the historical experience which legitimizes this demand. In fact it was the same hopelessness and despair which substantiates the rastafarians' demand that led to mass emigration since the turn of the century to places like Cuba, Panama, North America and the UK. As one lyricist explains:

the time is getting hard boy
we've got to travel on
the time is getting hard boy
we've got to leave this land

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a man can't stay where nothing goes right
and everything goes wrong
I've got to find somewhere else
where I can help myself[37]

From the days of slavery unto this day, the history of the Jamaican masses has been a tumultuous one. It has been a history of unrelenting struggle against slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism. It is a history characterised by slave uprisings and repression; riots and repression; betrayal, rebellion and repression. Between 1664, the year of the first civil administration, and 1838, the year of the abolition of chattel slavery, there were no less than twelve reported slave uprisings. There were also the maroon wars of 1729-39 and 1760-95 and 'the second maroon war' of 1795. In 1831, two years before the apprenticeship act, 'the signal was given for the launching of the greatest slave rebellion in all of the British Caribbean'.[38] The leaders of this 'Emancipation Rebellion', as Richard Hart calls the pro-emancipation revolts, were a group of black baptist church leaders: Burchell, George Taylor, Robert Dove, Robert Gardiner, Sam Sharpe, the main organizer, and others. A major riot was to occur thirty-four years later, nearly three decades after the abolition of chattel slavery, led again by a black baptist preacher named Paul Bogle, wherein a police station was attacked, a court house set on fire and several whites killed. This was the famous Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865 which was brutally put down by the establishment. After 1865 there were at least three reported riots, in the years 1902, 1912 and 1924, that led up to the spontaneous mobilization of the oppressed throughout the Caribbean in 1938, a year of rioting and labour disputes. It was out of the struggle of 1938 that Norman Washington Manley and the Peoples National Party, and Alexander Bustamante and the Jamaican Labour Party, who soon sought to betray the struggle of the oppressed, emerged. Between 1944 and 1962 Jamaica passed from what Dr Trevor Monroe calls 'constitutional apprenticeship' to political independence; colonialism stepped out and neocolonialism stepped in.[39]

The granting of independence in 1962, which marked a turning point in the history of decolonization in Jamaica, instead of bringing the long awaited change has brought the people from 'hope to hopelessness', lawlessness and despair. The truth is that, as Joseph Ruglass puts it:

400 years of colonial reign
Has brought the people misery
It has left them such pain
The talk is now of independence you see
Seems it wasn't meant for you or for me[40]

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The discontent of the disinherited Jamaican masses was to burst into revolutionary activity in 1968, only six years after the new dependence, by which time the fact that 'independence' would not bring the long awaited change had been well realized. The famous 'Rodney riots' was sparked off by the banning of Dr Walter Rodney, the Guyanese historian and scholar, by the repressive Shearer administration in October 1968. At least '50 buses were overturned and burnt. 14 major fires were started in different parts of the city; certain known enemies of the people were spat upon, dragged out of their cars and beaten, shop windows were wrecked.'[41] As Rodney himself has said, the riots had only 'marginal significance' as far as his ban was concerned, but were more fundamentally a 'part of a whole social malaise, that is revolutionary activity'.[42]

This brief sketch then provides the historical perspective which informs the music of Jamaica today. The people have come a long way since their historical journey was begun. It has been a long arduous journey, a long unending journey:

> journey journey journey
> journey journey journey journey
> journey journey journey
> journey journey journey
> journey
> journey
> journey journey journey journey
> long long journey[43]

Yes they have been 'travelling/for more than 2000 miles' up the old rocky road, through the gates of hell, down the valley of the shadow of death and they can't get no ... 'cant get no shady tree to res'/and the sun is red-hot/hotter than hot — red-hot', their own thought being 'we must, we will, go on'.[44]

In the same way as the musicians have responded to the changes in Jamaican society, incorporating the new pressures and tensions into the music, giving spiritual expression to the historical experience of oppression and rebellion, the singer and dub-lyricist likewise have given lyrical expression to this experience. The lyricism of Jamaican music, which is a part of as well as being informed by the wider Jamaican oral tradition, gives poetic or lyrical expression to what the music expresses. It is a lyricism which laments the human suffering, the terrible torments, the toil, a lyricism whose imagery is that of blood and fire, apocalyptic and dread — images that are really pictures of a brutal existence in the 'land of Sodom and Gomorrah'. Songs of hope in suffering, songs of utter despair, songs of praise, songs of defiance, dread dub-poetry, songs that speak of the historical endurance of the black Jamaican, songs that are as prophetic as they are true — such is the nature of the poetry of

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Jamaican music.

Burning Spear in a song called 'Ethiopians Live It Out' celebrate the endurance of the Afro-Jamaican from the days of slavery unto this day:

> O chinee men come
> they couldnt live it out
> coolie men come
> they couldnt live it out
> syrians come
> they couldnt live it out
> white men come
> they couldnt live it out
> ethiopians live it out
> how we do it
> ethiopians live it out[45]

Not only is this song a song that speaks of the historical endurance of the sufferer, it is also a song of strength. For if the black Jamaican has survived slavery and genocide then surely he shall live to see 'the wicked bow down and flee'.[46] It is a fact that of all the ethnic groups in Jamaica it was only the black Jamaican who could physically endure the brutality of the plantation system. When Burning Spear makes a comparison between the strength of and endurance of the Chinese, the Indians, the Syrians and the whites on the one hand, and the black Jamaican on the other, there is also the innuendo that the latter group will outlive the former one — because the Afro-Jamaican majority is at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Bob Marley's 'Soh Jah Seh', which may be described as a 'secular hymn', also expresses this strength and endurance and the determination to continue the historical struggle in the midst of so much desolation and sufferation. It is also a song of faith:

> soh jah seh
> not one of my seed
> shall sit on the street and beg bread[47]

Marley calls on the sufferers to 'I-nite oneself' and stop the fussing and fighting amongst each other. He then reaffirms the implacable will to continue to fight the fight of life, the struggle to survive:

> and down here in the ghetto
> and down here we suffer
> but I an I a hang on in there
> but I an I, I naw leggo[48]

It is man's faith in Jah that gives man the strength to carry on for Jah is man's shield and buckler, Jah is man's inner strength. Again Gregory Isaacs' 'Sweeter the Victory', another 'secular hymn', laments the

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plight of the sufferer and tells of his historical yearning for freedom: 'lord my people wanna be free/just like the blind would like to see'.[49] This is also a prayer asking for guidance and for faith 'that we will see a better day'.[50] But this song should not be dismissed as religious escapism, for this prayer for faith and guidance

> give us faith to face another day
> guide us in and out along the way
> that we will see a better day[51]

is really an inward search for the inner strength to endure — 'the whip, fantastic fines, Judge Dread and Judge Four Hundred Years, the rule of eunuchs, fops, thieves and ignoramuses who break the law themselves, the brutish stupidity of a demoralised police force making love to their guns'[52] — because deep down in his heart of hearts, he knows that:

> the hotter the battle
> the sweeter the victory[53]

That the language of the poetry of Jamaican music is rastafarian or biblical language cannot simply be put down to the colonizer and his satanic missionaries. The fact is that the historical experience of the black Jamaican is an experience of the most acute human suffering, desolation and despair in the cruel world that is the colonial world which brings about an inner-felt need for inner peace, an inner strength, for 'spiritual well being'[54] — in short, the historical experience of the Afro-Jamaican is a deeply spiritual experience, a religious experience in the wildest sense of the word. The quest for spiritual well-being, this impelling need to be free of the inner pain, the inner tension, the oscillation between the psychic states of despair and rebellion does not necessarily oppose the physical quest for liberation. The historical phenomenon called rastafarianism which is saturating the consciousness of the oppressed Jamaican — which represents a particular stage in the development of the consciousness of the oppressed — is in fact laying the spiritual and the cultural foundations from which to launch a struggle for liberation. Moreover, as Gordon Rohlehr has stated in his excellent *After Thoughts*, throughout the history of black Jamaica, 'culture has had a religious basis' and that is why in Jamaica today, 'it is difficult to separate religious music from the music of open rebellion'.[55]

There is a strong note of defiance running through the poetry of Jamaican music, and this defiance as we have seen has its roots in the historical experience. So Bob Marley and the Wailers wails:

> everytime I hear the crack of a whip
> my blood runs cold
> I remember on the slave ships

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how they brutalised our very souls
today they say we are free
only to be chained in poverty[56]

He tells the oppressor: 'slavedriver/the table is turned/catch a fire/you gonna get burned'.[57] In the 1960s, the era of 'ska' and 'rock steady' music, era of the rudie rebellion, the rudie in court tells Judge Dread that 'rudies dont fear for boy/rudies dont fear .../rougher than rough/tougher than tough' in fact dreader than the dreaded Judge Dread.[58] In the 1970s the rudie has been transformed through the cultural dynamism of rastafarianism into 'natty dread' but the tone of defiance is still present: 'natty dread will never run away'.[59]

In 'Only for a Time', the lyricist tells the oppressor

no matter what you try to do
you will never live to rule over me
what will you do when we rule over you[60]

Similarly, Burning Spear sings this song of defiance with so much dread and defiance in his voice that when we hear it we too are strengthened, we too are defiant:

is lucky thing I never get
swell headed
and started to run run run
I will never run away
do you hear![61]

The greater the level of repression, the more defiant and the more resolute the sufferers become and the more violent is their rebellion. The more this violent rebellion is directed against the establishment, property and capital, the more violent the repression, and the more violent the repression ... in a never-ending spiral of violence that will surely shatter the walls of babylon. 'If a man put forth coal in his bosom then shall he not be burned' is the opening question posed by a dub-lyricist in a grounding poem which is an open call to rebellion.

wi dread inna babylon
soh mi seh fire mek e bun dem
soh mek e bun mek e bun dem
a dee-dee-rum a dee-dee-rum deh
seh mek wi bun dung babylon
come mek wi bun dung babylon[62]

One of the many songs banned during the repressive rule of Hugh Shearer and the Jamaican Labour Party, was the much celebrated 'Beat Down Babylon', which immediately caught the imagination of sufferer in Jamaica and the brutalized black youth in Britain, for it was a song which sounded out their defiance and gave fire to their

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rebellious fervour

I an' I goin beat down babylon
I an' I goin beat down babylon
I an' I mus whip them wicked men

O what a wicked situation
I an' I starvin for salvation
this might cause a revolution
and a dangerous pollution.[63]

In fact, throughout the last decade or so the lyricist has been telling the sufferer to 'get up and fight for your rights/my brother/get up and fight for your rights/my sister'.[64] Today it is 'judgement' and 'the fulfillment of prophecy' the coming Armageddon, the coming revolution that the peoples' poets are singing about. They speak of Marcus Garvey's words coming to pass; they say 'swallow-field shall be the battlefield'; they say 'it a goh dread on yuh/not baddah ask a ska/he who have ears will hear/he who have eyes will see',[65] for prophecy a fulfil; 'judgement has come and mercy has gone'; and

... di blood goin flood
an di blood goin run
blood uptown and blood downtown
blood roun' town
blood in di woods
and di blood in the country ...[66]

declares Jah youth, for Marcus Garvey prophecy fulfil: 'cant get no food to eat/cant get no money to spend'.[67] We get the feeling from these songs that the oppressed Jamaican has decided that it is only a matter of time before armed struggle shall be launched and that they are prepared for it.

To my mind, the song which most adequately expresses the historical experience of the oppressed in Jamaica is a song called 'Fire Down Below' written by the *political culturalist*, Winston Rodney of the Burning Spear. The words are on the surface simple enough but they take us through a maze of metaphor to the historical experience and the contemporary situation and deserve to be quoted in full here:

fire
down below
ah said fire
fire now
down below
and the people dem a running around
and the people dem a running around

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all who now sleep
get a cup of tea
all who now sleep
get a cup of tea
have a little tea pay
short and stout
this is my hunger
this is my sprout
when I get my tea yea
then I will shout
you gots to tip, tip it over
people then you pour it out[68]

The historical experience of the Afro-Jamaican is here likened unto a journey through history, the sea of time, on the ship of life. But as the ship of life sails on the sea of history all is not well aboard. There is 'fire/down below'; there is repression, rebellion, poverty and despair. And the people are disorganized and disunited, 'and the people dem a running around/and the people dem a running around'. But all those who are struggling on in spite of all this and more, all those who are vigilant, 'all who now sleep' are strengthened and rewarded: 'get a cup of tea'. Their reward is spiritual nourishment, it flows from the wealth of experience of struggle and endurance, 'the rooted strength of the people', and it is this 'cup a tea' which keeps them going.

have a little tea pay
short and stout
this is my hunger
this is my sprout[69]

It is the lines 'have a little tea pay/short and stout' that suggest the 'rooted strength of the people'. In Jamaican creole, the word *talawah* translated into English means 'stalwart': stout, strong, sturdy. The context in which the word *talawah* is used invariably invokes some sort of remark about someone being short but stout and strong: 'him lickle but him talawah' (he is small but he is strong). In this song the lyricist uses the imagery of a teapot that is short and stout, the content of the teapot being the historical experience, and the cup of tea, short and stout, suggesting the rooted strength of the people. The last four lines of the song

when I get my tea yea
then I will shout
you gots to tip, tip it over
people then you pour it out[70]

suggest sobreness of struggle rather than spontaneous rebellion. 'You gots to *tip, tip it over*' — or else your passion may spill over and

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and you may get burnt — 'then you pour it out'.

Over the last decade, the main preoccupation of the lyricist has been the burning social, political and economic issues of the day. In commenting on these issues, the lyricist makes a vital contribution towards the oral documentation of the history of Jamaica and to the Jamaican oral tradition. Consciously setting out to transform the consciousness of the sufferer, to politicize him culturally through music, song and poetry, the lyricist contributes to the continuing struggle of the oppressed.

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Notes and documents

Three poems by Wesley Dick

Silence

Silence,
Sense dulling silence
Silence that is so noisy
That you beg the silence to be silent
Silence which cuts into your brain
So sharply that it overcomes your ability
    to even think
It deadens the faculty of rationalization
Silence that is so maddening
That it makes you scream
A loud frightening scream
That shatters the silence into millions
    of ultra-small pieces
And you're glad because you want noise
So you scream, and shout and bang
You throw a chair and kick a door
And jump up and down
You make as much noise as possible
Because noise is good
Noise is sane
So you shout and scream some more
You bang crash and thrash around
Yes you want noise.
Then, suddenly you stop, you think.
Hold on, you're cracking up.
If you carry on at this rate
You'll end up in a mental home,
The mad-house

Race and Class, XVII, 4 (1976).

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So you lie back down on your bed
And silence picks up its millions
    of ultra small pieces,
Envelopes itself around you
And laughs.

Debt

You call this the land of milk and honey
But you don't give me work to earn some money
You say this is the land of the free
But I don't have any liberty

You say "No one here is anti-Black"
But if I'm first in the queue you push me back
You claim that people start with an equal score
But you got a law for the rich, another for the poor.

And you make promises about a better life
But all I get is woe and strife
You announce promises big and bold
But you really mean "Do as you're told".

All your talk I have heard
But I know actions speak louder than words
I realise you're a hypocrite
And fool, you're words ain't worth shit.

So I've been checking out some history
And I realise you owe a whole lot to me
I was in Africa living free
Until you came over to me.

With weapons in your favour, you stole my wealth
Gave me disease, put me in bad health
You made me a slave, killed my family
And since then I have never been free.

The worse thing you done, so unkind,
You captured my body and enslaved my mind
You shipped me from Africa to oversea
Put me on your so called colonies

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So I was a slave, working for you
And you got fat, as there was nothing you would do
Later you claim you set me free
But you still had control of me

Still later, "Independence" You gave to me
"Independence"? not economically
And now I'm in your country
And still I am not free

You want me to work for you again
I'd sooner die in awful pain
Yes I've managed to trace out your past
The money you owe you'll pay at last

Of course it won't cover what I've lost
You'll never have enough to pay the cost
So don't call me thief or call me ponce
Taking from you is a justified response

You'll never pay what you owe
But I'll force you to have a dammed good go
Yes you are a colonial debtor
And me? I'm the Colonial Debt Collector.

When the fighting is done

When the fighting is done
And we have won
There will be a lot of work to do
We have to build a new society
A society founded on love and peace
A society that has a spirit common to everybody
So that we can be a strong people
With each others interest at heart
For to love others is to love life.

April 1975

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Angola: the economic interests . . .

Although the Angolan war is over we reprint Jacques Bonaldi's assessment of the imperial interests at stake. The article first appeared in Tricontinental (special issue on Angola, Vol. 10, 1975).

It is a well-known fact that when a colonial power finds itself forced to decolonize its possessions, the only way it can safeguard its political, economic, financial and cultural interests in that country, is by moving to a different form of domination: neocolonialism. Neocolonialism has been termed by one African leader as the highest stage of imperialism. But the establishment of neocolonialism requires the existence, in the former colonizing power, of a certain number of political-economic conditions, principally a sufficient level of capitalization, to be able to penetrate into the key economic sectors of the dominated country and thereby take over the essential wealth and the future of the former colony.

We also know that Portugal did not have a sufficient level of capitalist development to be able to implant neocolonialism in its colonies. When the liberation wars broke out at the beginning of the 1960s (in the case of Angola, in the year 1961 specifically), Portugal, faced with the impossibility of resorting to neocolonialism like other dominant European powers, had to keep three typically colonial wars going for more than ten years. But, despite its inability to take over the wealth of its colonies, it resorted to another measure: the intervention of intermediary foreign powers. The capital that established itself in Angola after 1961 was not Portuguese capital, but foreign capital. And thus, just as we are now witnessing the internationalization of the colonial war, we witnessed a parallel increase in the internationalization of the plunder.

Potentially, Angola was the richest Portuguese colony of Africa. Its resources — known or probable — place it among the richest countries of Africa. Thus it is one of the most coveted. The penetration of foreign capital has reached such an extreme that not one sector of Angola's economy is free of its intervention. This is the importance for imperialism — in addition to the political and geopolitical aspects — of ensuring that Angola is not separated from the 'free world' sphere of attraction. Within this brief space it is impossible to make an exhaustive analysis of the Angolan economy. So we will take a concrete, if very general, look at the most important sectors, with particular emphasis on the question of the intense penetration of foreign capital which explains why imperialism is always ready to go to any lengths to safeguard its interests. In this sense, the example of Chile is most eloquent. That country

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demonstrated how vicious a role the multinationals can play in the service of their respective governments. And the number of multinationals in Angola is not small but, on the contrary, very high.

Oil

Several years ago, oil became Angola's most important export sector. When one says oil in Angola, it is equivalent to saying 'Cabinda enclave', and to say 'Cabinda enclave' is to say Cabinda Gulf Oil. This company is a 100 per cent subsidiary of United States Gulf Oil, which has exclusive rights to the off-shore concessions. Gulf's production in Cabinda has developed to an extraordinary degree. In 1968, it produced a total of 749,514 tons of crude oil; by 1974 it was already producing 7.5 million tons. Cabinda's off-shore reserves amount to an estimated 300,000,000 tons. As for the benefits to Gulf, let's look at two examples: the total foreign exchange the Angolan government obtained from the oil of Cabinda (in taxes, royalties, etc.) during the first months of 1974 was equal to that of all other exports together and seven times greater than during the same period of 1973. Let's take another example:

According to the Portuguese daily *Expreso* (13 September 1975), Cabinda Gulf paid the national treasury approximately nine million contos (nearly $36 million), which was equivalent to 42.2 per cent of all ordinary income. During that year, Gulf exported 15 million contos worth which represented 48.8 per cent of total Angolan exports. In 1974, this provided a profit of three million contos, *which represents a fantastic profit: nearly 6,000 per cent.*

But Gulf is no longer alone in Cabinda, for two other companies have obtained concessions to prospect for oil in the subsoil. They are EXXON and Elf-Total (Compania Francesa del Petróleo).

There are two concessionaire companies in Angola: PETRANGOL (Compania de Petróleo de Angola), which is a group 85 per cent controlled by Petrofina of Belgium and in which the Portuguese banking group Espirito Santo has enormous interests, as well as the Federal Maybou Bank (South Africa). PETRANGOL exploits exclusively in Benefica, Luanda, Cacuaco, Galinda, Tobias and Puaca.

ANGOL (Sociedade Portuguese de Exploracao de Petróleos) is 40 per cent controlled by Sacor of Portugal. Then comes a tumult of interests which include Total (Compania Francesa del Petroleo), the Portuguese bank Borges e Irmao, General Mining and Finance Corp. (South Africa). In association with Total of France, ANGOL exploits in Ambriz and eastern Cuanza and with TEXACO in the exterior Congo. It is associated with PETRANGOL in western Cuanza and with PETRANGOL and TEXACO in the interior Congo.

Many other companies exploit Angola's oil or request concessions or make demands. Arco Petroleum Company (Los Angeles, United

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States) inherited from Gulf at the end of 1973, the monopoly of the entire territory of Cabinda. In 1974, EXXON received a concession of 7,700 square miles off-shore to the north of Angola (it paid $1.7 million to the firm). The US group Sun Oil Co., Amerada Hesse Corp. and Cities Service Co., received a concession of 3,861 square miles south of Luanda (the group paid $800,000 to the firm). On 25 February 1974, Seagull Exploration (London) presented a demand for an exclusive concession to Cabinda Ansa Petroleum (a group of South African companies controlled by General Mining which has a concession of 6,000 square kilometers off shore and 7,500 square kilometers on shore in Cuanda).

Challenger Oil and Gas Co. (subsidiary of Global Marine Inc., US) and American Pacific International, Inc. obtained licenses to look for gas and oil in an area of 2.7 million acres off shore to the west of Luanda. Esso (US) has a concession that covers 19,659 km². An international partnership composed of Tesoro Petroleum Corp. (Texas), General Exploitation (Los Angeles) and Geoterme (Paris) presented a demand to engage in prospecting. Kilroy (Houston, Texas) presented a demand for exclusive exploitation of hydrocarbon in two northern regions and on the border between Angola and Namibia.

As for the refineries, the only one that currently exists is owned by PETRANGOL in Luanda. It has a capacity of a million tons a year. But production of Angolan oil incites creation of new refineries. SACOR has received permission to construct a refinery in the South that will begin to function in 1975 (its projected capacity is two million tons a year). The Ambriz refinery will be completed in 1977 and its capacity will be 700,000 tons of oil at the end of 1978. This is a joint project of the Companhia dos Asfaltos de Angola (which has rights over bitumen and asphault deposits in the region) and the Riverwood Corporation (US). As for the refinery projected by Angola Energy Ltd. (London and US capital) in Moçamedes, it will be able to refine millions of tons a year in the first stage. An investment of $100 million is planned over three years.

To complete this section on oil, here is the summary the MPLA presents concerning the companies that are trying to establish themselves on Angolan territory (the figures in parenthesis indicate the number of concessions requested): Ashland (14); British Petroleum Development Ltd. (22); Compania Francesa del Petróleo (32); Compania de Investimenti no Sul Angola (13); Diversa Internacional de Exploracao de Petróleos Angola (24); Etosha Petroleum Company (15); Ferjoma Importacao Ltda. (17); Gibraltar Angola Minerals Co. (12); Mobil Oil Portuguesa (28); Occidental (30); Oceanic Exploration Co. (26); Place Gas Oil Co. (9); Rimalpi (13); Societa Planet Angola Oil Corp. (18); Sociedad Angol (27); Shell Portuguesa SARL (20); Standard Oil Co. (11); Tenneco Angola Inc. (23); Ultramar Co., Ltd. (10); Victor Manuel R. Velhen a Rebelo (21).

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Iron

Iron holds fourth place among exports from Angola (1973); with a value of $49 million. Just as to say oil is to say Cabinda, to speak of iron one simply mentions Cassinga, in the district of Huila, whose reserves amount to an estimated 350 million tons with a high percentage yield (60-64 per cent); and two billion with a medium percentage (40-50 per cent). The perimeter of land for explorations in Cassinga is an exclusive concession of the Companhia Minera do Lobito, controlled by the West German Krupp enterprise which includes Gregg-Europe (Belgian), Hojgaarde et Schultz (Denmark), Cantieri Navali di Venezia (Italy). It is therefore not so surprising that top officials of Lobito should have declared to the Luanda daily *Comercio* (6 June 1975) that the company was going bankrupt and that the high level reserves were practically exhausted. What sinister manoeuvre lies behind these declarations? Because the least that can be said is that the progression of iron extraction has been as phenomenal as that of oil in Cabinda. Judge for yourself: the company extracted 100,000 tons in 1965; a million in 1967; 3,200,000 in 1968; more than five million in 1969; six million in 1973; seven million in 1974. If the forecast was to extract 12 million in 1980, how is it possible that the mines are exhausted? A multinational firm does not invest $100 million (in 1967 this was the biggest investment made in Angola up to that time) without guaranteeing its rearguard, in other words without being certain of the profits it will receive from its exploitation. Nor do international financial groups authorize loans without being certain of their clients' solvency; however, in 1969 Lobito obtained a loan of 122,000,000 francs financed basically by two West German banking trusts (Deutsche Union Bank of Frankfurt and Hamburguische Landsbank) and by three other banks: the Bankers Trust (GB), Lavoro Bank AG (Switzerland), Monte dei Pashi (Siena, Italy). The chief clients for Cassinga iron are the Federal Republic of Germany (42 per cent), followed by the United States, France, Belgium, Portugal and Japan (11 per cent).

Other multinational companies work in iron extraction: the British Steel Corp. (GB), Sidelor (France) and Bethlehem Steel (US). In 1973, a group of South African, British, West German and French capitalists submitted a proposal to Portugal for enriching the iron; the Kunene dam would provide the increased energy the project required.

As for the only iron and steel mill that exists in Luanda, it is controlled by the Sotto Mayor Bank which belongs to the Champalimaud Portuguese group.

Diamonds

In 1973, diamonds were the third most important export product in Angola ($80 million). In this case also the picture is the same: to say

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diamonds is to say Diamang. Until 1971 Diamang (British and Belgian capital) had the monopoly on exploration and exploitation of diamonds in an area covering 81 per cent of Angolan territory! In 1968 it realized four million pounds sterling in profits. It was exempt from taxes and only paid a special tax that Portugal used directly in its colonial wars; it went even further by helping the Portuguese government construct its camps and maintained a mercenary army in its feudal territory. When its monopoly ended in 1971, it founded a new enterprise: this is controlled by the South African De Beers Company, subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corp. which provides 40 per cent of the capital; 44 per cent is provided by the Morgan Bank, Société Générale de Belgique, Guggenheim, Ryan (United States), Fourminiere, Guaranty Trust Bank; Angolan capital controls 11 per cent and Portuguese capital (Fonsecas e Burning, Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Banco Totta of the CUF) 5 per cent.

Diamond extraction takes place chiefly in the region of Luanda: in 1973 production reached 2,143,000 carats and extraction of three million more carats was projected from new veins located in the same region where there are currently more than sixty open mines.

Since 1971 other groups have joined Diamang: the Angola Exploration Company (South Africa), Diamond Distributors (United States) who act through the intermediary of Oestediam; Diamul (with US and South African capital); Diversa (United States) and the Anchor Diamond Corp. (South Africa).

Copper

The copper industry is controlled by the Portuguese group CUF (the most important in Portugal which alone holds more than 10 per cent of the total capital of all Portuguese companies), which extracts 20,000 tons a year of concentrate from the mines located in the Mavoio Tetabo region (Japanese capital is involved in this enterprise).

In Moçamedes, copper deposits have been discovered which will be exploited by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito and by Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (South Africa). In 1973, a French-Portuguese enterprise (the Cobre de Angola and Sociedad Anonima del Cobre enterprise) won concessions in the Mavoio Tetebo region where it made an initial investment of $15 million.

Bauxite

Angolan bauxite is controlled by the Dutch Company Billington Mastechapping and by Aluminio Portugués which is nothing more than a front for the French company Péchiney.

But the penetration of foreign capital in the prospecting of the

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subsoil does not end there. We cite other outstanding cases.

The Nuclear Energy Board of Portugal, the Companhia Mineira do Lobito and the General Mining and Finance Corporation (South Africa) established a private corporation to find and exploit existing minerals in two concessions owned by Lobito. The investment projected was 32,000 contos in three years.

Urangesellschaft (FRG), a group that includes Verba, Metallgesellschaft of Frankfurt and Steinholen-Eleltrimital of Essen signed a contract in March 1970 with the Portuguese Nuclear Agency to prospect for uranium in concessions covering 6,300 km^2 in Angola and Mozambique. In this same sector the Portuguese Nuclear Energy Agency and the Total-Compagnie Miniere et Nucleaire (Compania Francesa de Petróleos) signed a contract for exploration and exploitation of radioactive minerals.

The Chromalloy American Corporation took over control of the Sociedad Mineira de Huila in 1973 (which had concessions for gold and other minerals in the South), created Chromalloy Angola and invested $750,000 in a prospecting programme.

In Malanje there is a manganese deposit whose proven reserves amount to 65 million tons and which is controlled by the West German firm Luise A. Therese Bermann. The French-United States company Cefremet controls phosphates with reserves estimated at more than 100 million tons.

Other important deposits have been discovered: caolin in Sales; silicate in Negage; silicate and quartz in Viana; copper in Dundo-Guitola; alabaster in Dundo-Grande (Benguela). Southwest Angola has possibly the largest reserves of titanium in the world. It has been proved that there is gold, mica, marble, bituminous slate, coal, sulphur, gypsum, anhydride in Angola; apparently cobalt, chrome, tin and lead also exist.

To conclude this section on the subsoil, one single figure will demonstrate the interest the multinational companies have in Angola; between 1962 and 1972 the value of subsoil products increased six times over and the rate of growth in the amounts produced averaged 18.5 per cent annually.

Manufactured goods

Although the manufacturing sector is underdeveloped (in 1969 it only occupied 5.8 per cent of the economically active population and accounted for 11 per cent of the GNP) it is developing rapidly, always under the control of foreign capital. Between 1965 and 1972, according to the *Financial Times*, manufacturing production increased 18 per cent annually. Investments rose to $50 million in 1973, or more than double those of 1969.

We will content ourselves with a summary glance at this sector.

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Nestlé (Swiss) controls the enterprise Lactifinio de Angola; Italian capital controls Sinaldo (soft drinks); a match factory was opened in Nova Lisboa in January 1975; Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish capital is involved in it. The SEAT (Spanish FIAT), Leyland, Volvo (Swedish) and Ford (British) have proposed establishing assembly plants; Zuid-Afrikaansch Haldelshuia (Holland) is trying to establish a television factory in Luanda where there are already four factories: Standard Electric, Angotronics (Hitachi), Aliancia Comercial (Sony), ECREL (Sanyo). The Riverwood Corp. will set up a factory for synthetic products using the deposits from the asphault that has been granted to them north of Luanda. A British firm named Ward Ashcroft and Parckman has signed a contract for the creation of an industrial zone of 250 hectares in Nova Lisboa. Celangol (Celulosa de Angola), formed by a Portuguese economic group with British financing, will build a factory in Nova Lisboa; the projected investment is $140 million and its pulp production will be 300,000 tons a year. The Companhia de Celulosa de Ultramar (Banco Espirito Santo) is already working in this sector of paper pulp. As for the chemical sector, it is controlled by Angola African Oxygen (South Africa). Also involved are British American Tobacco, Coco-Cola, General Tire and Rubber (United States); in cement there is the Chamalimaud group (Portuguese), with French, Danish and Belgian capital; vegetable oils are controlled by CUF and Société Générale de Belgique; in the soft drinks sector, in addition to Coca-Cola, there is CUCA which depends on the Portugués de Atlántico Bank (Portugal), SINALCO (West German capital), NOCAL (Banco Espírito Santo). CUCA is associated with three United States companies (Arbor Acres Farm Inc., Crown Cork and Seal Co. and International Proteins Corp.), Passi Ltd. (Swiss) and Rhodesian capital in a trust that encompasses the most diverse sectors from animal food to fishing and hotels, including cattle, instant coffee and packaging materials.

Coffee

In 1973, coffee was the second export product, following oil, with a value of $206 million (the first four export products: oil, coffee, diamonds and iron accounted for 57 per cent of the value of exports this year). Angola has become the third largest producer, with a production of 220,000 tons in 1974.

Some 15 per cent of the production comes from small farmers while 85 per cent comes for three latifundist companies: the Companhia Angolana de Agricultura (CADA), the Companhia Agrícola de Angola and the Companía Africa de Cazengo, all three controlled by the Rallet bank (France). Exports go through the South African company Inexcafé.

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Cotton

Production is some 80,000 tons a year. This crop is controlled by Cotomang, monopoly of the Société Générale de Belgique, which also controls the other companies, Lagos e Irmao, Mota e Irmao. The Belga de Africa bank and the Compania Algodonera Congolena are also in this sector.

Sisal

With 80,000 tons a year, Angola is the third largest world producer. Control is in the hands of two British and West German groups, and of SIGA in which CUF has an interest.

Sugarcane (76,073 tons of sugar in 1973) is controlled by the Société Agricole de Cassequel and by Chivera (dependencies of Barton Mayhew, Great Britain), the latter of which is also in *cattle* raising, where we find as well CAPA and the Companhia de Moçamedes (controlled by the Portuguese bank Pinto e Sotta Mayor) and l'Uniao Comercial de Automovies with United States capital. In the timber industry, which is almost entirely devoted to exports, the Companhia de Cabinda, Jomar et Vitorano Malho, controlled by the CUF and the Banco de Angola, operate. As for fishing (500,000 tons in 1973) and the fishmeal industry, Uniao Comercial de Automoveis, Standard Oil and Banco Portugues do Atlántico are present.

Banking

The penetration of Portuguese capital in the banking sector is most notable for economic reasons that are easy to understand. The Banco de Angola, whose home office is in Lisbon, belongs to the Portuguese government in association with national capital (profits in 1973: $2 million). The Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial is a subsidiary of the Banco Borges Hermanos (profits in 1973: $1.4 million). The Banco Totta Standard is controlled by the Standard Bank (Great Britain and South Africa) and by Tota-Aliança (of the CUF group). The Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor, which has seventy offices in Angola, belongs to the Champalimaud group. The Banco Inter-Unido depends on the First National City Bank and the Grupo Espírito Santo. As for the Banco de Lisboa y Africa del Sur, it emerged recently out of the association of the Banco National Ultramarino, the Banco de Angola, the Banco Comercial de Angola and the South Africa Central Mining and Finance Corporation. The sector of insurance is controlled in large part by Portuguese capital. Mundial and Confiança are linked to the Champalimaud group, associated with Venhas and Cupertino. Imperio depends on the CUF. Atlas depends on the Borges Hermanos bank, the Banco de Créditos Marbos and Miguel Quina. Tranquilidad is controlled by Espirito Santo with the participation of the Banco Inter Unido y Cassequel.

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The trade in blood*

The brisk and profitable world trade in human blood bears some gruesome analogies to the colonial slave trade. Both involve the sale of living human tissue from the most impoverished sectors of Third World societies to wealthy, white First World societies; both involve moral as well as physical debilitation to the two societies; and in both cases, the only ultimate profiteers are the 'slave traders' themselves. In the case of the blood market, these traders are international pharmaceutical corporations and commercial blood banks.

The world market in human blood is estimated to be worth well over $1 billion a year to these corporate traders, as well as to hospitals, doctors, technicians and individual donors. This commercial blood costs recipients about 40 times more than the actual costs of extracting, transporting, processing, administering, researching and transfusing blood in volunteer, non-profit systems.

These high profit margins, coupled with a demand that is growing faster than supply in some wealthy countries, have created a strong market for blood from Third World nations.

Much of the rising blood demand is being filled by a relatively small number of the poorest people in developing countries. These people supply vastly disproportionate amounts of blood by submitting to plasmapheresis, a technique for extracting as much as five or more pints of blood a week from a single donor. (The human body contains an average of only 10-12 pints of blood.) Plasmapheresis involves taking whole blood from a donor, separating the plasma from the red cells, and reinjecting the donor with the red cells. According to the World Health Organization (WHO): 'In some centres single [one pint] or double [two pints] plasmapheresis may be repeated up to several times per week on the same donor.'

The long-term effects of plasmapheresis on donors is unknown. Some short-run dangers are obvious: anaemia, dehydration, malnutrition, protein deficiency and impairment of the body's natural defence mechanisms. Says the WHO: 'Poorer people who can, for health reasons, least afford to part with their blood, are encouraged to give blood for the benefit of the wealthier populations.' The same situation exists in US plasmapheresis banks, where donors come from the poorest segments of society, many of them Third World people. These US plasmapheresis centres, says Dr T.J. Greenwalt, are 'exploiting for its proteins a population which is least able to donate them — the poorly nourished skid row population'.

Plasmapheresis began ten years ago in South and Central America. Today it has spread to North America, Europe, Asia and Africa —

* Excerpts from 'The World Blood Trade' by Bettina Connor in *The Elements* (IPS/Transnational, January 1976).

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principally through the efforts of international pharmaceutical firms, who process much of this plasma to produce numerous high-priced drugs like immunoglobulin, albumin and fibrenogen. Latin America and Far Eastern countries have for years exported large amounts of blood to wealthier nations. In Japan the blood drain became so great that the government had to restrict its blood and placenta exports in 1966. When Haiti cancelled its profitable ten-year bleeding concession to Hemo-Caribbean Inc., the company urged Congress, the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank to suspend financial assistance to Haiti until the Haitian blood flow (which Hemo-Caribbean sold in the US for $3 million a year) was resumed.

Many plasmapheresis donors support themselves exclusively by selling their blood. In the US they receive from $5 to $25 a pint. (One plasmapheresis centre in Miami, Fla., advertises: 'Earn up to $200 a month in your spare time.') But drug companies and large commercial blood banks prefer to purchase blood in Third World countries, where donors are paid only one or two dollars a pint. In South India, where some 40,000 people maintain themselves by selling blood, regular plasmapheresis donors have formed a trade union in an attempt to minimize their health risks and maximize the payments they receive.

Last May the WHO urged its member states to stem 'the extensive and increasing activities of private firms in trying to establish commercial blood collection and plasmapheresis projects in developing countries', and 'to promote the development of national blood services based on voluntary non-remunerated donation of blood'. But corporate blood interests bitterly oppose moves toward voluntary systems. An all-volunteer system, says P. Carlinger of Pioneer Blood Services Inc., is a 'shiftless, socialistic approach' that would threaten the interests of 'great pharmaecutical companies'.

There are three basic systems of blood extraction in the world: commercial, volunteer, and 'inducement'. The commercial system, in which donors are paid for their blood, is by far the largest, and plasmapheresis is its fastest-growing sector. The all-volunteer system, where blood is donated as an anonymous gift, is both the least-used and the most successful. The second largest system for blood extraction involves a variety of 'inducements' — fringe benefits, replacement requirements, insurance programmes and workplace or institutional 'persuasion'.

For years, the greatest problem in the commercial system has been a high incidence of serum hepatitis in commercial blood. A debilitating and often lethal disease for which there is no vaccine or cure, serum hepatitis can be contracted from the whole blood or plasma of a donor who either has had the disease or has lived in a region where hepatitis is prevalent. Before 1970, tests to determine the presence of serum hepatitis in blood were too unreliable and

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sometimes not used. Commercial blood banks relied on donor information, which was frequently false. So countries which use commercial blood have had an extremely high incidence of serum hepatitis among transfused patients. In the US the rate of serum hepatitis from commercial blood was found to be 12 times higher than from volunteer blood. One study at a central hospital in Tokyo on the use of blood from paid donors showed that 65-95 per cent of transfused patients developed serum hepatitis. Japan and West Germany, where the serum hepatitis problem is particularly acute, rely almost exclusively on commercial blood.

'Inducement' programmes vary greatly among different countries. In the USSR 50 per cent of all donors are induced with generous fringe benefits such as free public transportation for a month, priority for medical care and housing and time off from work. In the US 'induced' donations are classified as 'voluntary' and constitute some 85 per cent of Red Cross donations and over 90 per cent of donations to voluntary hospital blood banks. Fringe benefits, such as time off from work, induce some US donors. But most induced donations in the US come from insurance and replacement programmes, under which donors give blood in order to get free or lower-cost blood themselves. However, high blood users, such as haemophiliacs and leukaemia patients, are not admitted to insurance programmes. The latest refinement on the US 'replacement inducement' is a request by many hospitals that patients who have scheduled an operation in advance donate one or two pints of their own blood, 'which can be transfused back if necessary'. The rationale for this inducement is that the patient will benefit from his own, 'safe' blood; but the fact is that one or two pints would be totally inadequate if a patient really needed a transfusion. The benefit accrues solely to the hospital's blood supply.

Workplace inducement is perhaps most dramatically practised in South Africa, where strong cultural taboos inhibit blood donations among Bantus. Bantu gold miners have admitted that they 'volunteer' to give blood only out of fear of losing their jobs.

There are strong arguments that an all-volunteer system is the only one that produces a safe, inexpensive and adequate supply of blood. Yet all-volunteer systems are practised in only a few countries — notably England, Wales, Holland and Sweden. The blood programmes in these countries are considered to be the best in the world. Similarly, in the US local all-volunteer blood programmes are the best in the country. In Connecticut, which has had an all-volunteer system for years, the incidence of serum hepatitis has been one-tenth the national rate. Seattle's Community Blood Bank, often cited as the best local programme in the country, produces an adequate supply of clean, inexpensive blood for all hospitals in the area.

A frequent complaint of volunteer programmes is that nearby

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commercial systems lure away volunteer donors. For example, West Germany's commercial blood banks on the Dutch frontier attract a large number of across-the-border donors from Holland. Similarly, international drug firms have been accused not only of luring donors from voluntary programmes, but also of transferring large amounts of blood from one region to another, better-paying region.

In most countries two or all three blood-extraction systems operate at the same time, frequently competing with and even hindering each other's activities. In the USSR half of all donors are paid for their blood. These payments are exceptionally high — 15 to 25 roubles (about $33) a pint, at a time when the minimum wage in the USSR was 40-45 roubles a month and a doctor's starting salary was 100 roubles a month.

About a half of the 3.75 million annual blood donations in the US are paid; one-third are contracted as repayment or pre-payment for blood use. The share of blood freely donated under voluntary programmes in the US has steadily diminished. And within the commercial system, the trend is towards larger blood banks, frequently owned by pharmaceutical firms, whose collections increased 242 per cent between 1961 and 1967.

These banks report blood-processing fees of between $2.50 and $35, and processing-plus-replacement charges as high as $100. Their charges to hospitals are usually four to five times above cost. Voluntary programmes in the US sell blood to hospitals for slightly less than commercial banks; Red Cross charges, for example, range from $7.50 to $20 a pint.

In the US, approximately 9,000 small volunteer banks — 3,000 of them in hospitals — provide under 50 per cent of domestic blood supplies; some 1,000 commercial banks, members of the American Association of Blood Banks, account for over half of all blood transfused in the US. Virtually every large pharmaceutical corporation in the world is engaged in the blood market.

Every year the demand for blood increases at a far greater rate than population growth in Western countries — a result of new blood-based drugs, larger numbers of violent accidents on the road and in workplaces, 'improvements' in warfare weaponry and new surgical techniques. Open heart surgery, for example, is an increasingly common operation requiring some 60 blood donations. It is argued that a commercial blood system is the only way to meet these growing blood needs. Yet, almost every country in which commercial programmes operate is experiencing acute blood shortages, while all-volunteer systems have been able to maintain an adequate supply.

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Book reviews

Dependence and Transformation

By CLIVE THOMAS (New York, Monthly Review, 1975). 288pp. £4.65

Class, Race, and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica

By CARL STONE (Kingston, University of the West Indies, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1973). 188pp. £2.00

Most discourses on world revolution have lacked a black dimension. This has led to an undertheorization of peripheral capitalist social formations; disastrous ignorance of the relation between class exploitation and racial oppression; underestimation of the potential African contribution to world liberation; and misunderstanding of the specificity of the African revolutions. Further, it has meant that not until the 6th Pan-African Congress in 1974 did there emerge a clearly principled theoretical line which included the revolutionary significance and relevance of the black diasporan masses in the USA and the Caribbean.

Perhaps the most neglected aspect of this black dimension has been the analysis of the Caribbean masses. This despite the existence of world famous names like Padmore, Fanon, Garvey, and Cesaire. For, in the main, these Caribbeans had an African vision for their black politics, and a defensiveness about the Caribbean islands as bases for radically transformed socio-economic formations. And if this all adds up to limited emphasis on macro-analysis of the Caribbean, it has meant even more an almost total failure to make micro-class and ideological analyses of the Caribbean.

Clive Thomas' book, *Dependence and Transformation*, investigates the problematic of relatively small peripheral capitalist social formations. And Carl Stone's book *Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica*, initiates a contribution to the specific

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political sociology of the Caribbean.

Both writers belong to a new generation of Caribbean 'grounded' scholars, and they are participants in a world renaissance of marxist political economic thought and analysis. The message of this renaissance is that economic theory and analysis of developed capitalist societies was never adequate for understanding or explaining the experience of underdeveloped capitalist societies. Different pre-capitalist histories; the brutal and de-humanizing aggressions of colonialism/imperialism; the dominance of political economy that derives from the workings of imperialism; intra-national structures of dependence that derive from international structures of dependence; dominated 'marginality' — all these parts contribute to the whole which is the political economy of underdeveloped societies. It can be demonstrated that not even a critical marxist political economy of imperialism is adequate for theorizing and analysing these peripheral capitalist social formations, in that they are seen as mere appendages to the central capitalist social formations. It can also be argued that a 'closed shop' on the socialist debate has meant that the formerly leading intellectual centres have become backward in their discussion of socialism in and for the vast majority of the societies in need of liberation — *the relatively small peripheral capitalist social formations*. And this is the major point of intervention of Clive Thomas' book.

Thomas' subject matter is small, underdeveloped, neo-colonial economies which have made the 'revolutionary break with capitalism and imperialism', and are therefore in 'transition to socialism'. And he lists as examples, Tanzania (debatable?), Cuba and North Vietnam.

The book is clearly set out and argued, starting with a discussion of the inadequacy of Western neo-classical economic theory; and of marxist economic theory during the 'freeze' period of the 1920s to the 1950s, with the Soviet 'model' dominating socialist debate. Of course, the marxist method of political economy remains relevant, and is at the heart of the 'new' theory emerging from what Thomas calls 'a generation of modern indigenous scholarship'. But he contends that this 'new' theory, although 'radical', has stressed the political and social, but not the economic. Hence the bias of his present work. It is unfortunate that in his contention he perpetuates the belief that good theory can be political *or* sociological *or* economic, as even in his own work he demonstrates the necessary unity of these dimensions to produce 'good' theory.

The main core of the book, apart from the descriptive analysis of the economics of peripheral capitalist formations, is a discussion of the strategy of transformation, for which Thomas discerns two 'iron laws'. First, there is the need to obtain 'convergence of domestic resource use and domestic consumption', as opposed to divergence

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which is fostered by continued reliance on traditional agricultural or raw material exports as a basis for transformation. And secondly there is the need to obtain 'convergence of the demand structure of the community with its needs', based in cultural specificities, requiring sociological analysis as well as economic structural analysis. The keeping of both these 'iron laws' predicates socialist planning in order to establish the integration of production, demand, indigenous technology, and community needs. Only on this basis, argues Thomas, can entry into world trade escape underdevelopment within an imperialist international division of labour.

Thomas is to be applauded for facing directly the intricacies and implications of transformation, for suggesting, indeed inventing, new tools of economic analysis, e.g., his 'import domestic export co-efficient', which promises to correct the notorious mistake of taking Gross National Product figures as an indicator of 'growth' and/or 'development'. He raises the thorny problem of pricing mechanisms in a planned socialist economy; the traps of the support role of the socialist bloc; the virtually moralistic debate amongst socialists about market and material incentives in transition to socialism, as against political motivation; the problems of choice and variety in a transitional economy; the role of the 'state' in socialization of ownership, and control, particularly the issue of juridical and formal control over means of production without regard to the *content* of such control, i.e., the masquerade of 'state capitalism'. These are all critical issues demanding debate, and in Thomas' handling of them we are witness to the renaissance of marxist scholarship. It is a thorough discussion even if too often conducted at too high a level of abstraction, for despite Thomas' intention it is basically a structuralist economic discussion.

But this is a common risk with the sort of grand theorizing of such writers as Thomas and Samir Amin. Amin's *Accumulation on a World Scale* (Monthly Review, 1975), for example, is a massive, impressive and fine work of analysis, but it leaves the reader with a sense of void between clear 'scientific' political economy and the actual making of revolutions for the transition to socialism. One major limitation is that the new theory is neither grounded in revolutionary party organizations, nor in any people's revolutionary movements. But perhaps more immediately the new theory fails to ground because it does not face up to a major problematic that it itself recognizes. All the 'new' theorists since Fanon have noted the implications of colonialism, racism and de-humanization for the populations of underdeveloped societies. And they note, Thomas included, that there is a consequent tendency for these populations to believe that their smallness and backwardness constitute total handicaps, and that their very location in a dominated society indicates their inability (psychological, sociological) to transform the relations of

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dominance. Marxism-Leninism was aimed at demystifying the 'handicaps' of the Western European oppressed and exploited classes, and organizing them on the basis of overcoming those 'handicaps'. Maoism has done the same in China. What these revolutionary theories had at core was a realization that the phenomena of oppression and exploitation cannot simply be analysed as descriptive or statistical accounts. They must include the way in which oppression and exploitation is experienced, i.e., the dialectic of the ideology of oppression and exploitation. The call is not for more theory but for more complete or complementary theory, and for 'grounded' theory, politically, economically and sociologically. And this is Carl Stone's problematic.

Carl Stone's book, as its blurb claims, is a landmark in Caribbean studies. Specifically, it focuses on 'the degree of mass support for the new political institutions, symbols and structure of power which have been introduced in Jamaica in the process of political decolonization . It accomplishes this easily. However, its field of theoretical and analytical application is much wider — 'to establish the linkages between social stratification and political attitudes and behaviour . This is a truly comprehensive ambition, and the book lives up to it. Stone pursues his objective and on the way sorts out the inadequacies of pluralist sociology, orthodox marxism, and positivistic empiricism with regard to social stratification analysis in the Caribbean. He fixes the relevance of pluralism as ideology manipulated mostly by the dominant Peoples National Party and the Jamaican Labour Party machines, with their tenuous, necessarily multi-class propaganda platforms. He reasserts the relevance of revolutionary class analysis, but insists that 'the question is really one of the relative emphasis between the Marxist dimension of labour-capital conflict and conflict that arises from the alienation of the materially dispossessed'. In the Jamaican social formation, the marxist dimension informs analysis of class conflict, while material dispossession is key to the understanding of race conflict. Of course the two dimensions overlap. The empirical problem is to discover when and how. Analysis is further complicated by the structural generation of a marginalized mass, what Stone describes as 'a large group of unemployed persons who have no organic relationship to the means of production'.

In Jamaica there is a rebellious politics that unites the exploited proletariat, the racially oppressed and materially dispossessed, and the marginalized. Stone notes that the shift from oppressed negative self-image to positive self-realizing revolutionary activity is a complex one, but the history of the emergence of these elements indicates that there is 'mass support for a third force, movement or organization, in the political arena of metropolitan Kingston and St. Andrew which is directed towards a radical solution of the economic

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problems of the poorer strata'. These research conclusions lead Stone to develop one of the most explicit academic statements of the concept *masses* as distinct from proletariat as a basis for revolutionary political action. Stone's analysis, although specific to Jamaica, is relevant to the experience of all peripheral capitalist social formations. His sensible and sensitive use of survey research statistics is a welcome intervention in an area normally dominated by broad descriptive and impressionistic, or theoretical, statements. He makes an invaluable contribution to grounding the good work of writers like Clive Thomas.

There are, however, some significant lapses, for example, Stone's preference for conceptualizing the peripheral capitalist social formation as 'dualistic' rather than *uneven*. And a major source of possible confusion is Stone's keen use of the concept 'lumpen' to analyse the structural definition and political potential of all or part of the marginalized mass. The predisposition of radical social scientists, and revolutionary organizations, to fall back on Marx's heavily moralistic and historically specific use of the concept 'lumpen' is often only too clearly an indictment of their failure to conceptualize correctly or to organize and include the revolutionary potential of these masses. Stone's discussion of what is to be done with these masses demonstrates this ambiguity of analysis and praxis. It is not a closed debate however, and will be returned to by many, not least because these marginalized masses will insist on making their contribution to revolutionary politics. See, as just one example, Trinidad and Tobago 1970 and since.

Carl Stone's is a brilliant statement of his problematic, and gives us a very clear idea of the specificity of Clive Thomas' own problematic. Together they add up to the question, what must we understand if we are to make and secure revolutions which will serve the masses in relatively small underdeveloped social formations? And they present rewarding contributions towards an answer.

Trinidad BILL BRANCHE

Global Reach: the Power of the Multinational Corporations

By RICHARD J. BARNET and RONALD E. MULLER (London, Jonathan Cape, 1975). 508pp. £6.00

The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation attempted to prevent the election of Salvador Allende to the presidency of Chile in 1970. Having failed, the Corporation then plotted economic and political chaos which could lead to a coup d'etat.[1] The United Fruit Company ran a banana fiefdom in Central America, policed by the CIA and the marines.[2] The unsafe character of General Motors'

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products was substantiated by Ralph Nader, who was hounded by the Corporation for his pains. Major military aircraft manufacturers have bribed their way into world-wide sales. In 1973 the former head of the CIA, Richard Helms, announced that he had difficulty estimating oil reserves because the major corporations were secretive.

Not many of such revelations are missing from the pages of Barnet and Muller's encyclopaedic volume on multinational corporations. The authors have little difficulty in documenting the villainy of the multinationals, notably towards the third world that they are 'developing' through impoverishment, but also in the wealthy nations where they are based. This is an enormous collection of information, underpinned by interviews and an excellent 89-page section of notes, which altogether represents a major organizational achievement. In the increasing literature on multinationals, it stands out as quite exceptional.[3]

It is the success of the authors in packaging such a wealth of data which obscures the limitations of the volume: it has much to say about corporations and their leading executives, but little at the theoretical level about the beneficiaries — the national ruling classes and their capitalist system.

International capital has been an important feature of the world economy since the classical age of imperialism, but only in the past 30 years has it been dominant. The response of labour is all-important. The authors sketch the obsolescence of US labour and explain why multinationals are so effective: 'capital, technology and marketplace ideology, the bases of corporate power, are mobile; workers, by and large, are not'. In the so-called peripheral countries, the multinationals have crippled emergent workers' organizations by takeovers and foreign capital penetration, and especially have smashed collective bargaining, labour militancy and union recognition by the use (or threat) of production switching and the imposition of different levels of bargaining. Resistance to multinationals requires an international labour response, which is why this has often been most effective where mounted by strongly established and less corrupted unions. The lessons of the joint actions by Dunlop-Pirelli workers, for example, are crucial, though sadly not of much interest to Barnet and Muller.

London CHRIS FARLEY

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1 For the internal memoranda of IT&T, see *ITT-CIA Subversion in Chile: A Case Study in U.S. Corporate Intrigue in the Third World* (Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1972).

2 Summaries appear in *inter alia* Richard J. Barnet: *Intervention and Revolution* (London, Palladin, 1972) and David Horowitz: *The Free World Colossus* (London,

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MacGibbon & Kee, 1965), later published as *From Yalta to Vietnam* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1967).

3 A mass of transitory or apologist ephemera may be ignored, but two British authors have produced important, original works — Michael Barratt Brown: *Essays on Imperialism* (Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1972) and *From Labourism to Socialism: The Political Economy of Labour in the 1970s* (Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1972), and Stuart Holland: *The Socialist Challenge* (London, Quartet Books, 1975).

With My Own Eyes: Israel and the Occupied Territories 1967-73

By FELICIA LANGER, foreword by ISRAEL SHAHAK (London, Ithaca Press, 1975). 166 pp. Paper £2.50

We, the British, must have a special sense of responsibility for Israeli imperialism since we invented it. My own personal feeling of responsibility — and shame — is particularly strong since forty years ago I was serving British imperialism in Palestine, and much that Felicia Langer describes in her moving and terrifying book is familiar, but much much worse. Consider these two passages:

> The Government ... has started a concentration camp with accommodation for a hundred Arab politicians at ... Auja el Hafir in the Beersheba desert... The Government has shown itself at its most brutal in the military raids against villages. These raids are described by the Government as 'searches', since their supposed purpose is to search for arms, which are actually almost never found... In two cases raids have been accompanied by the shooting and killing of innocent people. Others have been beaten. Cupboards are broken open, flour and oil upset, clothes and mattresses slashed and destroyed: money and jewellery has been looted by the soldiers. In the case of one tribe tanks rode over their tents; all their personal property was destroyed, and their animals ... killed.
>
> The frontier police patrolling the [Gaza] Strip carry, apart from their sidearms, clubs and some of them even whips... They thrash people as if they were cattle... Searches in refugee camps and poor neighbourhoods entail ill-treatment of the people and the destruction of their meagre belongings. The searches are carried out by the frontier police and by army patrols. They have the habit of undressing the women with the excuse of 'searching', and making them stand almost naked or even totally so for a long time in the cold... Watches and women's jewels are looted in broad daylight and their miserable belongings smashed to pieces. Thousands of people are arrested. Because of 'lack of space' in the usual prisons a gigantic temporary prison has been opened on the beach. Terrible cries

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> emanate most of the day from this place... A concentration camp for the families of 'wanted' people has been opened in the middle of Sinai...

The first passage comes from an article which I wrote for the *Labour Monthly* in July 1936 — the 'Government' referred to there was the Government of the Palestine Mandate. The second passage comes from a report on conditions in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip, prepared by the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights (of which Professor Shahak is chairman) in January 1971. Clearly there is continuity from the old imperialism to the new. Offspring resembles parent. But there are also important differences. The use of torture is much more systematic and general. The whole apparatus of repression and coercion is more highly developed, more elaborate. And the ideology — the idea that the subject people, the Arabs, are non-persons, some kind of excrescence, who ought not to be there at all, but being there must be banished, or 'thinned-out', or somehow eliminated — this is much more explicit.

What this idea means in practice is explained with particular clarity when Felicia Langer writes about the Golan Heights, very beautiful country where one used to go walking:

> Here is the Baniyas: the guide explains that it was an Arab village, inhabited mostly by Palestinians. They fled from the war in June 1967 and the village was totally destroyed. The neighbouring villages — Mirayr, Mahayli, Abbasiyya, Azma — are also derelict. It is even difficult to imagine that they were once full of life. A tank stands beside the road. It is in good condition; a Syrian tank, an interesting attraction for tourists, who agree happily to be photographed with it in the background. One of the people who live near by says that this tank has been photographed even more times than Golda Meir...
>
> Near to a hundred and fifty thousand people used to live in this region and fled during the war. Everything is intended to ensure that they won't have anywhere to return to, to prevent them from even recognising the place where their houses once stood... A resident still remains in this city [Kuneitra], one out of 45,000 people: an old man not altogether sane. His name is Naif Zahir Sidnawi Abu Hanna. He lost his reason during the war...

Nothing beside remains. (That is Shelley, not Felicia. They belong to the same good revolutionary tradition.)

However, what this important book is really about is not the desolation which imperialism has created but the men and women in Israel and the occupied territories, critics or merely victims of imperialism, whose lawyer and friend Felicia Langer has been, whom she has advised, battled for, helped in many cases to survive — a

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fraction only of all the people she has helped, of course (the original Hebrew version of the book, ignored in Israel, Professor Shashak tells us in his foreword, was much longer). One meets many remarkable, memorable, tragic people in these personal histories, covering the six years following the Six Day War. There is Ishaq Ali al-Ma'raji from East Jerusalem, 'young, intelligent, known for his readiness to help the destitute of East Jerusalem, especially the needy families of prisoners of the occupation', who told Felicia Langer 'You have come to see me too late', having been beaten for twenty-one days in the 'Moscovia' prison. There was al-Wahish, 'a poor illiterate peasant, arrested for the crime of harbouring his son, who had come back to his house as an armed infiltrator' and been sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment: al-Wahish had become mentally ill, could only say that it was the potato-planting season, tried to commit suicide in court, and was sentenced to ten years in the interest of 'public order'. There were the prisoners at Hebron ('This city haunts me, with its prison on the hill'), including Abd al-Jabir Abdallah Ahmad al-Suyuri, 52 years old with a respiratory disease, whose file was on a separate shelf in the prison office, meaning that he had been recently tortured and couldn't be seen, and Muhammad Abd al-Latif Qaraji, whose 'condition was the usual one after interrogation'. Later things changed somewhat at Hebron since, as Felicia Langer was told by one of the guards, 'our director refuses to accept them after the interrogation if they are half-dead'.

Essentially though, in spite of all the brutalities, the deportations, the destruction, the assaults on human liberty, this is a hopeful book, dealing with heroic situations as much as tragic situations, full of admirable people as well as confused and corrupted people — Giorah Neuman, who refused to serve in an army of occupation, stood up to the commander of the Reception and Classification Centre, Colonel Bucheister, and got eight months for it; Hanna Amira, who had studied literature at Beir Zeit, believed 'in a political solution to the Middle East crisis, for the good of all', had many Marxist texts found in his house and was sentenced to five years; Yusuf Abu Jabal ('a teacher by profession — his language is beautiful'), from Golan, whose father had been sentenced to thirty years, his brother killed by Israeli army — 'about ten people from the Abu Jabal family are in prison' — and had a twenty-year sentence himself. The basic fact which I discovered about Palestine forty years ago — that the best people are almost all in gaol — remains true today. Only now there are many more — more and better. And out of gaol, for the moment, are Felicia Langer and Israel Shahak, a Marxist and a Spinozist, taking part in the people's struggle.

THOMAS HODGKIN

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Toward an Anthropology of Women

Edited by RAYNA REITER (New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1975). 320pp. £6.60

Anthropology is at present a discredited discipline. Developed in the service of colonialism, it provided information on Third World peoples to their exploiters and rulers. As regards women, anthropologists, until recently, have tended either to ignore them, or to present them as mothers, wives and daughters (or other more complex kinship statuses) rather than as people in their own right.

But a discipline need not be bounded by its past. Insights into the interconnections between economy, power structures, ideology and consciousness can inform liberation struggles in the planning of their own forms of a socialist society. So women are now turning to the analysis of other societies to challenge the inevitability of accepted sex roles in their own cultures, and to understand the determinants of their own oppression in order to fight for change.

Toward an Anthropology of Women, a collection of articles by feminist anthropologists in America, 'has its roots in the women's movement'. There are individual studies of women's position in Europe and the Third World, plus theoretical essays, and all examine the male bias inherent in anthropology, and provoke some key questions: what is the connection between women's reproductive role, and the sexual division of labour? What is the relationship between their part in production and distribution and their relative status in the domestic and public spheres? What is the connection between these factors and their own consciousness of themselves and of their relationships with men?

Several of the articles deal with change. Pat Draper correlates settlement and the development of property relations with the declining position of women in the once-nomadic !Kung bushman society. Rayna Reiter, writing on the South of France, draws similar conclusions as to women's loss of power and their relegation to the domestic sphere with the growth of state and class. Articles on Colombia and Nigeria show how women's involvement in capitalist relations, either in the rural proletarianization of a peasant society, or in a move to urban areas, may reduce the position of women further, both absolutely, and in relation to men. Rights in property and independent roles in production are replaced by economic dependence on men, who monopolize the acquisition of new skills and dominate employment in the modern sector. Status in the extended household and ritual prestige, give way to isolation in the nuclear family, and the ideological justification for women's subservience by the world religions.

This kind of material helps to dismiss popular notions that 'westernization' (that is, capitalism) necessarily 'emancipates' women

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from their former 'slavery' in indigenous societies. Other myths are explicitly challenged, such as the value of making deductions on sex roles from primate studies, or, from the feminist side, on the past existence of a matriarchal societies. Norma Diamond's article on rural China shows how the persistence of the old male-dominated property relations in a new form perpetuates the patriarchy despite socialist ideology. 'The subjugation of women is a fact of our daily existence, yet it neither began with modern capitalism nor automatically disappears in socialist societies.'

The weakness of the book is that the articles are not drawn together to offer any overall conclusions; no significant theoretical advance has been made. Its strength is that it produces useful and interesting material to make general points in an accessible way. This, hopefully, will give the book a much wider readership than anthropologists alone.

London HERMIONE HARRIS

Imperial Britain in South-east Asia

By NICHOLAS TARLING (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1975). 299pp. Cloth £10 (illustrated)

To read this book is really a quite astonishing experience, because here we have, scrupulously preserved in some kind of academic aspic, colonial 'scholarship' unsullied by the vulgar intrusion of reality. I am, as a matter of strict fact, at a loss to know how to bridge the gulf between what one finds here and the world of today.

Still, it is worth making a few points. I deal with these as the author raises them, rather than in any methodical or systematic manner. First, he perceives South-east Asia's 'primary problem' as being 'the building of nations': not, be it noted, the expulsion of imperialism and neo-colonialism and the class struggle. Right from the outset this seems to me to be an indication of either naivety or perversity.

However, perhaps unconsciously, he does succeed in revealing how cunning and calculating Britain was in establishing and preserving her raj in South-east Asia. Note that he admits that London deliberately shored up the Dutch in Indonesia, because it was clearly realized that France (and Germany and America) would prove much more threatening regional rivals. Incidentally, he records how, from the very start, the United States treated Vietnam with contempt and contumely: in 1845 (sic), the USS *Constitution* put in at Tourane, demanded delivery of some French priests, and — on being refused (for good enough reasons) — casually opened fire, killing and wounding nearly a score of innocent Vietnamese and destroying several of their junks.

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When Tarling comes to the Bowring Treaty (1855), which opened Thailand to international trade, he waxes relatively eloquent, though, to be fair, he does appear to appreciate that Bangkok, at the time, felt itself to have little choice but to succumb to foreign blandishments. However, the discussion is on a low conceptual level, and ignores such germane analytical contributions as Anne Vimille's 'La Lutte de classes en Thailande' (*Critiques de l'economie politique*, September-December 1973), and David Elliott's recent thesis presented to the Institute of the Social Studies (The Hague). Both afford much deeper insights into the meaning and implications of the Bowring Treaty than Tarling even assays.

Finally, the author — while he cannot avoid mentioning (and to some extent discussing) the crucial importance of drugs (particularly Indian-grown opium) to the prosperity and viability of British and Western imperialism — avoids critical comment and certainly abstains from pointing out, as he would have been quite entitled to do, be it said, that the long Indochina war was *also* fought for control of the world heroin market (on the part of the successive US Presidents concerned), and that — today — the whole traffic is merely being re-routed through southern Thailand and Malaya. *Sic semper tyrannus* ...

London MALCOLM CALDWELL

Racist and Sexist Images in Children's Books

London, Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1976. 48pp. 35p. Paper.

How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic

By A. DORFMAN and A. MATTELART (New York, International General, 1975). 112pp. Paperback $3.25. £1.35

Racist and Sexist Images in Children's Books is a compilation of articles from the excellent (American) publication, *Bulletin of Interracial Books for Children*. The Writers and Readers Cooperative is to be congratulated on bringing this material to a UK audience — the *Bulletin* is not nearly as well known among teachers and librarians here as it ought to be. The pieces include evaluations of *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* by Roald Dahl, *Sounder* by W. Armstrong, and *The Cay* by Theodore Taylor (winner of a number of literary awards), as well as more general articles on books about gypsies, books about Puerto Ricans, and childrens books from China. One of the most interesting and substantial articles in the collection — I. Suhl on *Doctor Dolittle* (the Great White Father) — which examines the good doctor's extreme racism and jingoism, aroused furious protest when it

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first appeared. 'The London *Times*, considering the whole question to be heretical, dismissed the review as simply an unwarranted and malicious attack on a beloved author.' Dorfman and Mattelart, in their book shed some interesting light as to why children's books are held sacrosanct and beyond criticism:

> So the comics show the child as a miniature adult, enjoying an idealized, gilded infancy which is really nothing but the adult projection of some magic era beyond the reach of the harsh discord of daily life.... *the imagination of the child is conceived as the past and future utopia of the adult* (author's italics).

There is, of course, an inevitable US bias in the Cooperative's collection — but the fact that this type of analysis has had to be taken wholesale from America simply reflects the paucity of any critical work being done on children's literature in Britain. The simplicity and straightforwardness of the articles show in themselves that no esoteric knowledge is needed to apply the same kind of evaluation to a much wider range of children's material, an exercise that many more librarians and teachers in this country could usefully embark on.

If Dr Dolittle is one part of the mental equipment of well-read children in Britain and the US, Walt Disney is something else. 'Disney has been exalted as the inviolable common cultural heritage of contemporary man. His characters constitute little less than a social environment, inviting us all to join the great universal Disney family, which extends beyond all frontiers and ideologies...'

At first sight 112 pages, closely printed in double columns, on imperialist ideology in the Disney comic might seem to be stretching a good point too far. But the book, which came out of the 'popular Chilean cultural offensive, which accompanied the social and economic liberation' generated by the necessary accompanying process of 'criticising the "mass" cultural merchandise exported so profitably by the U.S. to the Third World', catches that excitement and sense of liberation and discovery. Disney comics are big business for the Disney Corporation in Third World countries, and particularly so in Latin America. In his useful and informative introduction, David Kunzle marks out some of the boundaries of the Disney empire: in 1962 the total monthly circulation of the comics throughout the world was given at 50 million; currently they appear in eighteen different languages.

There is no space here to outline the analysis in detail — of how the attitudes that inform the whole Disney world, while pretending at universality, in fact reflect the bias of a particular class — but it is subtle, thorough, illuminating and, in the process, revealing of the whole nature and function of mass entertainment media.

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> The value of their work lies in the light it throws not so much upon a particular group of comics, or even a particular cultural entrepreneur, but on the way in which capitalist and imperialist values are supported by its culture ... And the very simplicity of the comic has enabled the authors to make simply visible a very complicated process. (Kunzle)

And the fact that this is a study which has come out of a particular struggle — not an abstract academic exercise — roots it and gives it relevance:

> Underdeveloped peoples take the comics at second hand, as instruction in the way they are supposed to live and relate to the foreign power centre. There is nothing strange in this. In the same way Disney expels the productive and historical forces from his comics, imperialism thwarts real production and historical evolution in the underdeveloped world. The Disney dream is cast in the same mold which the capitalist system has created for the real world... This book did not emanate from the crazied mind of ivory tower individualism but arises from a struggle to defeat the class enemy on his and our common terrain.

Institute of Race Relations, London HAZEL WATERS

The Facts of Racial Disadvantage: a National Survey

By DAVID J. SMITH (London, Political & Economic Planning, 1976). 307pp £5.80

PEP surveys on race signal legislation as the crocus the spring — but there the resemblance ends. When the first of the present series of PEP reports appeared eighteen months ago, those who read signs (to change the metaphor) knew that the government was about to change the Race Relations Act of 1968 — whose coming (another change of metaphor), incidentally, was told by the PEP Report on Racial Discrimination (1967). Of course the House of Commons Select Committee has been sitting for several years hatching, not the Act, though, but consensus. Itself composed of a whole spectrum of opinion — from die-hard anti-immigrationists to reluctant paternalists — it has presented to the nation a national view of race relations. And on the whole that view was not against outlawing discrimination. (Equally, it was against settler-immigration.) But it was basically a prelude to the PEP survey.

The confused imagery in the previous paragraph reflects the confused picture the report itself presents. Not in fact — and it is crammed with facts (210 statistical tables), not in the meticulousness of its methodology or in the enterprise of its interviewing procedure

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(using Asian language speakers to interview Asians), or even in its conclusion that there is racial discrimination. But in its total un-understanding of black life and black values. For, it measures them by a colonial yardstick. Thus it portrays non-English speaking Asians (40 per cent) — meaning working-class Asians — as showing a natural tendency 'to live in areas containing a high proportion of other Asians' and to overcrowd. But this is not peculiar to Asians and West Indians but to the working class — or in some respects even to the middle-class. For, as Ceri Peach says, 'as for showing concentrations, the working class and middle class of any English town does as much without causing too much comment'.

The report also trots out hoary old theories of the push and pull factors of immigration, of Asians coming principally for work and of West Indians coming principally in search of the 'mother-country'. In brief, the report reinforces stereotypes almost despite itself — which shows not a failure of heart so much as an inability to undertake critical, holistic analysis.

And for that reason the report concludes that by and large the minorities are not 'preoccupied with the subject of racial discrimination. Instead they tend to think in terms of their access to jobs, housing and social welfare... They do not interpret their situation as that of an oppressed minority which must take political action on its own behalf...' On the other hand, 'the lower socio-economic groups are the least likely to believe that things have improved' and 'the growing generation of Asian and West Indian teen-agers will no doubt see things differently'.

If the older 'immigrants' have accepted discrimination as a fact of life it is because they have no option but to live with it. But 'lower socio-economic groups' and black youth see it as a fact against life. And it is to these that the forthcoming Race Relations Act addresses itself.

But for a critique of these concepts the reader is referred to the article, 'Race, class and the state', elsewhere in this issue.

Institute of Race Relations, London — A. SIVANANDAN

East End Jewish Radicals 1875-1914

By WILLIAM J. FISHMAN (London, Duckworth, 1975). 330pp. Cloth £6.50.

The concentration of the East European Jewish immigrants in Whitechapel reached its peak at the turn of the century. The immigrants were classified in the Census as 'Russians and Poles', and their poverty figured prominently in the polemic against them. Marx's comment in 1849 that 'the Jews of Poland are the smeariest of all

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races' was repeated throughout the literature on 'the alien problem'. The polemic which surrounded the aliens, a polemic which was associated particularly with such names as Major Evans Gordon and Arnold White, was at many points identical with that which has surrounded Commonwealth immigrants in recent years. 'There are some streets you may go through and hardly know that you are in England', complained a Conservative MP in 1893. It was out of the experience of oppression and injustice of the sweatshops that a Jewish political consciousness emerged in the East End, and it is with the beginnings of Jewish socialism that Dr Fishman's study is concerned.

Drawing on earlier works, the first chapters examine the background of the Jewish exodus from Eastern Europe and of the settlement in East London. All the familiar sources are utilized — the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, Booth, Zangwill and Arnold White, and the recent studies by J.A. Garrard and, particularly, L.P. Gartner, whose work on the Jewish immigrants has recently appeared in a revised form.

It is in the second part that the original and most valuable material appears. Here we are introduced to Aron Lieberman, and to the *Arbeter Fraint* group. It was Lieberman who set up the Hebrew Socialist Union in Spitalfields in 1876. Its manifesto claimed:

> Redemption for all mankind can only be attained by a universal political, social and economic upheaval which will destroy the status quo and replace it with a society based on socialist principles, which will end injustice with the domination of capital, together with parasitism and the system of 'mine' and 'thine'.

Then there is Morris Winchevsky who, with E. Rabbinowitz, published the *Poilishe Yidl*, the first socialist newspaper in Yiddish, in 1884. In the same year there was a fundamental ideological split between the two editors, and in July 1885 Winchevsky founded the Jewish socialist paper *Arbeter Fraint* (Worker's Friend). In 1886 this was taken over by the International Working Men's Educational Association, commonly known as the Berner Street Club, and in 1898 Rudolf Rocker became its editor. Berner Street by 1891 had become a predominantly anarchist group, and much of what Fishman tells us here is already available in Gartner's study and in Rocker's own book *The London Years*. Fishman documents the history of the club and its newspaper, the tailors' strikes of 1889 and 1911, and the gradual fragmentation of the movement. The final part of the book predictably deals with the siege of Sidney Street and the terrorism of 1911.

It is only at the end that Fishman tells us that 'in 1914 the Jewish labour movement, primarily under Anarchist direction, reached its peak of activity', and that 'by 1914 the Anarchists were the most

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dynamic element in the East End political life'. But a few years later Jewish anarchism seemed to be dead. The last few pages do not help much to answer the question: what became of Jewish anarchism? Fishman gives some reasons for failure, and it is, of course, possible that the Jewish anarchist movement was always smaller than would appear from Rocker's writings. The term 'anarchist', then as now, covered a wide range of political views. Probably many so-called anarchists became communists after 1917. Certainly the Jewish radical tradition in the East End did not become extinct, and the permanent contribution of the Jews to the political life of the East End has still to be written up. But Fishman does confirm what anarchist writers such as Albert Meltzer have also stressed: that the Jewish anarchist movement declined because it was a Yiddish-speaking movement. The 1870 Education Act began the process of Anglicization. The Yiddish speakers died out after one generation, and Jewish anarchism was a casualty of this process.

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KENNETH LEECH

Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution: an Essay on American Dominance and Caribbean Resistance.

By GORDON K. LEWIS (London & New York, Monthly Review Press, 1975). 272pp. £4.25

Gordon K. Lewis in this book combines a scholarly statistical study with a descriptive ability to convey the flavour and atmosphere of colonial oppression which is quite shattering. Puerto Rico, as a classical colony, constitutes for the United States a lucrative captive consumer audience for its exports as well as a vital strategic base for its imperialist policy in the Caribbean. Since the US invasion in 1898, Puerto Rico's agricultural base has been destroyed and its people used instead for high labour intensive industries such as sugar cane and (later) the garment and component assembly industries. In time, even with the no tax concessions, it became cheaper to transfer these industries elsewhere (e.g., the Far East), and the island came to be used instead for high capital intensive industries such as petroleum and pharmaceuticals, which are highly polluting and which environmental lobby groups will no longer tolerate in the US. These industries use little labour and have, consequently, worsened the already acute unemployment situation on the island so that since the 1940s, one-third of the Puerto Rican nation, close on two million people, have been forced to migrate to the metropolitan country in search of jobs.

The pollution is not just of the air and water. The island is

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culturally polluted by the Americans. The national language, Spanish, is under constant attack; the moronic shows and advertisements on television propagate US middle-class suburban values of consumerism, anti-social competitiveness and opportunism with their attendant spiritual emptiness, alienation and loss of identity. Many people, particularly the 35 per cent unemployed, are forced to live in terrible slums with the ever-present dangers of violence, rape, drug addiction, alcoholism and incest. Lewis shows how local politics are a sham, because the politicians have no power to change anything anyway (only Washington has that) and have become dominated by minor issues, with the resultant deterioration of political acumen.

After painting this grim but accurate picture, Lewis goes on to discuss resistance to colonialism. He deals with the historical independence movement (and here some of his Puerto Rican comrades disagree with him) and describes the growth of the present-day independence parties, dealing particularly with developments since his book *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean*, the standard English language work on Puerto Rico, published in 1963. In his opinion, after analysing recent US behaviour in Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Panama and the South-east Asian countries, Lewis concludes that there will be little alternative to armed struggle in order to free the island from US dominance. He feels that, unlike British colonialism which usually gave way at the eleventh hour, the US will fight till the end to preserve its privileges.

Lewis discusses how an independent Puerto Rico will, of necessity, have to be socialist, and outlines a programme that he would like to see obtain in the island. This constitutes a particularly Puerto Rican model and takes into account the many problems the independent country would have to face, not the least of which is the assimilation of returning Puerto Ricans from the US who may not even be able to speak Spanish and who would be traumatized by US big city ghetto-living.

This study of Puerto Rico is important for anyone who is concerned with the future of the Caribbean, for the US now regards all of the Caribbean as an 'internal problem'. To end with Lewis' own words:

> I have identified the North American presence as the single overriding factor that sets the terms of the contemporary Puerto Rican problem. As I study the Caribbean region, I am more and more convinced that its freedom and development are greatly endangered by the relentless penetration of the American capitalist spirit, now in its imperialist phase ... and that in the Caribbean, as in Latin America as a whole, its influence is, on balance, wholly pernicious.

Committee for Puerto Rican Independence MILES

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The White Women's Protection Ordinance: Sexual Anxiety and Politics in Papua.

By AMIRAH INGLIS (London, Sussex University Press, 1975). 166pp. £3.00

In 1926, the small white community in Port Moresby, Papua, finally obtained a savage piece of legislation for which they had been agitating. The 'White Women's Protection Ordinance', the subject of Amirah Inglis' study, introduced the death penalty for the rape or the attempted rape of any 'european woman or girl'. Assault was to be punished by imprisonment and flogging. In theory, this applied to men of all races. In practice, it was introduced to deal with the 'Black Peril', the fear of sexual assault on white women by Papuans, despite the fact that no such rape had yet occurred. Papuan women, however, were excluded by the terms of the Ordinance, so exempting those of the white settlers who used village women as they pleased.

This well-researched and readable study provides us with another example of the fear and hostility felt by members of a politically dominant group towards those they exploit being expressed in terms of sexual anxiety. Concentrating as she does on the manipulation of the issue in local politics, Inglis does not analyse this phenomenon itself in depth, nor does she look closely at the roots of the stereotypes intrinsic to this racism of sex. These affect both oppressor and oppressed, and from the Papuan side we might have wished for more on the motives behind the attacks that did take place, albeit rarely, during the 1920s and 1930s.

But here Inglis lacks the kind of historical evidence which she does have to illustrate contradictions familiar from other colonial situations. The mission to 'civilize the savages' justified exploitation, and indigenous labour was needed. Yet Papuans who acquired European habits were ridiculed, and fiercely resented as a threat to white superiority.

Apart from these insights into colonial racism, Inglis' book is also relevant to the present debates in Britain on rape. At first sight, a law which hangs a rapist seems quite different from the recent ruling which exonerates him — if he says that he believed that his victim consented, however unreasonable that belief might be. But both, in their contexts, represent a male view of rape, implying the sexually irresponsible and provocative nature of women. In the contemporary British case, where social and political power lie with men, a woman's supposedly ambivalent sexual behaviour excuses the crime. In Papua, where colour counted more than sex, women's waywardness was taken to excuse vicious legislation. For the common explanation for the Ordinance, both by settlers and historians, was that colonial wives provoked assault through their careless, familiar behaviour towards their servants. They thus had to be protected

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against the savage lust they aroused.

In fact, Inglis argues, there is no evidence for such provocation, nor for the myth that it was the women themselves who demanded protection. The Ordinance was a white male reaction to the potential weakening of a colonial order based on a rigid racial hierarchy, at a time of economic depression and internal political instability. It was expressed as a fear of black pollution of — in the words of a settler — 'God's greatest gift, a white woman.'

London HERMIONE HARRIS

The Somalian Revolution

By LUIGI PESTALOZZA. Translated from Italian by Peter Glendening (Paris, Editions Afrique Asie Amerique Latine, 1974). 352pp. No price published.

Luigi Pestalozza's substantial account of the early stages of the Somalian revolution has been translated into English and is clearly indispensable. His book covers approximately the three years from the bloodless coup d'etat of October 1969, whilst the fourth year is summarized for this edition in an introduction dated August 1973.

The legacy of colonialism in Somalia was typical, albeit even more harsh than usual: grinding poverty with hunger, disease, illiteracy and ignorance. On this apparently hopeless combination the neo-colonial ('parliamentary') phase of 1960-69 had managed to graft (*sic*) corruption, monumental incompetence and extended foreign economic domination. Add to this an economy so undeveloped that it consisted of little more than trade in bananas and animal hides, tribalism that barred any development of a nation, and a land of doubtful natural wealth. Such an inheritance is far more than the sum of its parts: all the circumstances are interlocking and mutually reinforcing. In such lands, a concern for parliamentary forms is a Eurocentric sublime irrelevance to the needs of the people, and as its practitioners in Somalia so fully demonstrated, is all too likely to prove a public charade behind which the serious work of corruption and advancement of the privileged elite may be conducted.

How President Siyad Barrah and his fellow generals and progressive civilians set out to transform this abyss of human misery is the author's theme. He is always informative, whether discussing state planning, Islam, *iska wah ugabso* (voluntary work), tribalism, nationalization or the shortage of cadres. Unfortunately his text closes soon after the revolutionary programme develops the organs of mass participation, so that already a companion volume is sorely needed. (Basil Davidson discussed some more recent events in 'Somalia: Towards Socialism', *Race & Class*, Volume XVII, no. 1.)

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Pestalozza has enjoyed ready access to the President and his closest colleagues, and his tone will be too dutiful for some readers. This becomes more disturbing because the author has very little indeed to say about the enemies of the revolution, such as former Premier Egal (who in fact was jailed for 30 years, but recently amnestied). How a revolution treats its opponents, who is in jail and why, who executed, is too important to gloss over. Piety is no essential ingredient in solidarity.

London CHRIS FARLEY

The Coloured Population of Great Britain: a Comparative Study of Coloured Households in Four County Boroughs based on the 1971 Census of Population

By GILLIAN LOMAS (London, Runnymede Trust, 1975). 91pp. £2.00

This study, of black and white households in wards of Bradford, Manchester, Leicester and Wolverhampton sets out to up-date and compare the situation with that described in *Colour and Citizenship* (1966 Census material), in order to inform the race relations debate and help policy-makers. Concentrating on housing type and conditions and 'dispersal' of black households, the author found that conditions for blacks are far worse than for white households, that 'dispersal' is slow and that black people do not have a wide choice of housing type. Familiar conclusions, perhaps, but this is not a trite study. The work on the data available has been extremely thorough from a statistical point of view, and each area is researched and related to its historical, economic and social development. Speculations to explain phenomena are just and intelligent.

Both Gillian Lomas and Dipak Nandy (author of the final overview section) are at pains to stress the small empirical nature of the research and the tentative nature of any conclusions: 'we must be content to assess the degree of disadvantage; we cannot from our evidence discover the reasons for it. Hence we cannot propose direct remedies.' In fact the authors have covered themselves from most of the criticism that similar research has been subject to in the past. There is just one point though — why is an independent body undertaking this sort of research (out of private funds) when the Community Relations Commission reference division was set up with public funds to do just this?

Institute of Race Relations, London JENNY BOURNE

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The Aryan Myth: a History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe

By LEON POLIAKOV (London, Chatto/Heinemann, for the Sussex University Press, 1975). 388pp. £5.

This is a very learned, semi-historical scrap-book — a compilation of absurd racist theories of many types, belonging to many periods — sometimes fascinating, often tedious, the essential purpose of which is not altogether clear. One is not much helped by the title either, since the Aryan theme does not really emerge until page 188 and becomes submerged in the last long chapter ('the Aryan Epoch') by a general discussion of a fairly familiar kind of the ideology of racism in general and anti-semitism in particular in our own time. As for the sub-title, Leon Poliakov does in his own wandering way chronicle the history of racist ideas in, mainly, Western Europe over the past four centuries, but nationalist ideas have little attention.

The book begins with an account of the various odd and conflicting ways in which European nations — their ruling and subject classes (the two are not always distinguished) — have handled the problems of their origins. Spaniards liked to think of themselves as Goths. The Russian nobility regarded themselves as Germans or Swedes or Byzantines until the Croat, George Krizhanich, taught them that they were Slavs — so that for Catherine the Great (herself of German origin) 'the first language of mankind was Slavonic' and 'King Alfred and others of the Anglo-Saxon race were Slavs'. The French were undecided whether they were Gauls or Franks. The Italians, for whom it might have seemed sufficient to be Romans, came to see themselves as Etruscans. For the British, of course, various options have been, and still are, open — to be Trojan-Celts, Israelites, Anglo-Saxons suffering under the Norman yoke, or, for really top people, Norman oppressors who came over with the Conqueror.

Poliakov goes on to consider the problems presented for theories of human origins by the new contacts with non-European peoples arising out of the first phase of European imperial expansion and aggression, from the late fifteenth century on, as well as by the rise of the new sciences and pseudo-sciences. This is much the most interesting part of the book. In general it was necessary to fit the new speculations into the traditional framework — the descent of all mankind from Adam, Noah and family (though, following on al-Mas'udi and Tomas Scotus, Paracelsus and Giordano Bruno had developed the heretical concept of 'other Adams'). This, however, was not necessarily a disadvantage, since the sixteenth-century Jesuit, Jose de Acosta, discussing the question — How did the first men reach the Indies? — argued that:

> It is not credible that there should have been another Noah's ark ... and even less so that the Angel should have borne aloft the men of

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> this new world, held and suspended by the hair, as he did with the prophet Habakkuk...

and 'concluded after a hundred pages of closely reasoned argument that the Indians must have arrived in America by a land route or by passing through some unknown straits. It would be true to say he discovered the existence of the Bering Straits by deduction ... The myth of Noah was here revealed as a pregnant working hypothesis...'

But whatever position theorizing Europeans took in relation to the controversies of their time — monogeneticists or polygeneticists — they naturally tended to presuppose the inherent intellectual and moral superiority of Europeans to the rest of mankind. I admit I was somewhat shocked to discover quite how badly the philosophers of 'the Age of Enlightenment' (which was also the Age of the Slave-trade) came out of it. According to Locke, 'the child certainly knows that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays with nor the Blackamoor it is afraid of'. Leibniz, while having harsh things to say of 'the American savages', was enough of a relativist to recognize that 'a wicked European is worse than a savage. He puts the finishing touches on evil.' Hume is awful — 'I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites.' Diderot's *Encyclopaedia* is worse. Even Kant, for all his belief in the unity of the human race, reveals an anti-semitic strain — 'The Palestinians who live among us have the well-merited reputation of being sharpers.' Condorcet and the Humboldt brothers ('we ... repel the depressing assumption of superior and inferior races of men') seem to come out best from this examination.

The Aryan component in European racist mythology intruded itself gradually, partly as a by-product of eighteenth-century imperialism, partly in the course of serious attempts at linguistic classification. William Jones, when a Justice of the High Court of Bengal in 1788, showed the relationship between Sanskrit and European languages. Schlegel, who had learned Sanskrit and lectured on universal history at Cologne from 1805 on, developed the romantic theory that 'everything, absolutely everything, is of Indian origin', and used the term 'Aryan' for the family of languages which others preferred to call 'Indo-European' or 'Indo-German' or 'Japhetic'. Thereafter 'the authentic and useful science of linguistics became absorbed in the crazy doctrine of "racial anthropology"'. Lassen, Renan, Michelet, Richard Wagner and many others, famous and obscure, helped to develop the myth of 'the Aryans' as 'the most highly organised, the most enterprising and the most creative among the peoples', 'the masters of the planet' — though it worried the British when Max Muller assured them that the same blood ran in the veins of English soldiers 'as in the veins of the dark Bengalese'. To complete the crazy

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structure it was necessary to include elements derived from 'craniology' — the superiority of the tall, blond dolichocephalics to the squat, retarded brachies (Lapps, Finno-Slavs and Bretons) — Social-Darwinism and bourgeois class-consciousness. Here is Georges Vacher de Lapouge (1854-1936):

> The brachycephalics gained power by the Revolution, and as a result of democratic development, this power tends to be concentrated in the lower classes, those which are most brachycephalic. The Aryan ... is something quite different ...

Racism as usual reinforces, and is reinforced by, sexism. Here is Karl Vogt:

> The difference between the sexes, so far as the cranial cavity is concerned, increases with the development of the race, so that the European male surpasses the female to a far greater extent than the Negro does the Negress.

So many cubic miles of drivel. But one has only to travel in a train, read a newspaper or listen to the BBC to be reminded at how little a distance below the surface these fantasies still live. The most serious weakness of Poliakov's book is that it is pure intellectual history — all superstructure, no base. He describes the fantasies, but does not try to explain them, or explains them only in a mystifying return-to-the-womb sort of language. The history of racist ideas in Europe is here cut off from the history of the European imperialism which bred them. There is a nice Blake engraving on the dust-cover.

Ilmington, Warwicks THOMAS HODGKIN

The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860-1960: a study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs

By ANTON BLOK (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1975). 293pp. $3.95

Anton Blok's book is an outstanding study of the origins of rural *mafia* in a small agricultural village in the interior of western Sicily. This *mafia* is not *the* Mafia as we know it but a particular stratum of the agrarian social structure of nineteenth and twentieth century Sicily. In the nineteenth century the social structure of the locale Blok studied consisted of three classes: an absentee estate-owning aristocracy, a declining peasantry and a group of armed and violent estate managers recruited from the peasantry: *mafiosi*.

Blok places this village microcosm in the historical macrocosm of changing world markets, crumbling feudalism and growing rural population. And in his excellent foreword Charles Tilly analyses the

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relationship between the phenomenon of *mafia* and the process of national state-formation.

It is only in this larger context that the development of *mafia* can be understood, for *mafiosi* were violent power brokers, protected by the landed aristocracy who needed them both to control the restive peasantry and to fend off the anti-feudal policies of the encroaching state. *Mafiosi* were distinguished by their private use of violence to control order in the public arena. The peasantry was unable to resist *mafia* effectively and the state, unable to monopolize the use of physical force in the Sicilian interior, had no choice but to rely on *mafiosi* to maintain public order. Blok traces the changing configurations of power between these groups, showing us in detail the development of rural *mafiosi* from their origins in the early nineteenth century to their peak of power in the early twentieth to their present demise.

The connections Blok draws between the social structure of his small village and the larger world are dazzling, but there are shadows in his analysis. The most serious omission is detailed discussion of the changing strategies of the Italian state. Why the Bourbons in the early nineteenth century tried to undermine the power of the landed aristocracy is almost adequately explained, but we are given no explanation of why a century later the Fascists reversed this policy and chose to ally with these old landed interests. This is a serious omission since the alliance was the kiss of death for the *mafiosi* who were no longer needed by the landlords and who, without landlord protection, were vulnerable to repression by the state.

One other point of criticism: the format of the book seems to result from the difficulties of merging anthropology and history and is at times very demanding of the reader. In the first half of the book Blok introduces us to the general features of agrarian social structure and at the same time very artfully shows us this structure in time, from the thirteenth century to the present. However, in the second part, the history is told again, in more detail and from a different point of view. This particular superimposing of history on history is difficult to synthesize and the task is not made any easier by Blok's choppy narrative in the second part of specific events involving *mafiosi*.

Still, there is no doubt the book is well worth the close reading it demands. Blok conveys a vivid panorama of the slowly changing routines and rhythms of agrarian life and the slow but dramatic crumbling of feudal structures. And the book as an extended discussion of power is superb. The theoretical discussion is excellent and the way in which Blok meshes theory with historical material produces a true illumination of the concept. The book would be worth reading for this alone. In addition, the scope of the analysis is inspiring, for anthropology should be historical, local studies should be done in a national context, and specific narrative should be

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informed by theory. Blok writes successfully on all these levels of analysis, leaving us with a rare sense of satisfaction and of wholeness in the work.

University of Michigan LYNN EDEN

Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia

Edited by MALCOLM CALDWELL (Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1975). 299pp. Cloth £7.00, Paper £3.00

> In the closing months of 1965 and on into the opening months of 1966, following the failure of a coup attempt on the first of October 1965, the right-wing Generals who as a result came to power in Indonesia proceeded to preside over one of the greatest organised slaughters in human history. Within the space of four months ... the Suharto regime murdered up to a million Indonesian citizens.

With these words Malcolm Caldwell opens the important collection of essays he commissioned to mark the tenth anniversary of the New Order in Indonesia. He describes his objects without the niceties of academic restraint:

> to draw attention to the atrocities that were committed in the seizing of power and to those which have accompanied the generals' rule from the first massacres of 1965-66 right down to the present; to expose the ruthless and reckless exploitation of the country and its people by giant corporations of the imperialist powers and by the regime working in harness with them; to document American complicity in bringing the present rulers to power and in sustaining and supporting them since; and to proclaim our solidarity with the Indonesian people and our abiding faith in the Indonesian Revolution which sooner or later will burst forth with irresistible force...

In much of this the essays succeed admirably. They are comprehensive, up-to-date and quickly published, well balanced between description and analysis and nearly all of them are published here for the first time. Together they form an indispensable critical assessment of the Suharto regime. The first group of essays covers the politics of repression, the role of the military, political imprisonment, racism and the destruction of all civil liberties. There follow four essays on the economy which confirm that even an oil-rich regime can be highly vulnerable through the scale of corruption the military elite enjoys. Finally there are contributions on the international context — Indonesia's changing place in US plans for South-east Asia

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during and after the Vietnam war, the world crisis of raw material and energy consumption, and the role of the multinational companies. This section includes the most remarkable essay by Peter Dale Scott, who documents in a little over 50 pages (and 139 footnotes) the secret role of the United States in the overthrow of Sukarno and its bloody aftermath. Building on earlier work by David Ransom,[1] he produces a model study of the CIA, phoney foundations, government-organized universities and key US personnel in the creation and sustenance of the machinery of slaughter.

Ironically, the minor shortcomings of the volume underline its excellence. There are some signs of hasty work, and an overall unevenness in contributions from journalists and academics. There are a few important gaps, notably concerning the fate of the trade union movement,[2] and the preparations for the invasion of independent East Timor; and the role of Japanese imperialism is understated. Moreover, both Caldwell and Ernst Utrecht offer optimistic forecasts of the role of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) which are not supported by adequate assessment of the role of the Party before the bloodbath or in the later period of armed struggle. All these objections, however, suggest the range of the achievement of the book in most areas.

Why has the Suharto regime and its organized mass executions received so little attention in the world? In 1966 Bertrand Russell complained that 'in four months, five times as many people died in Indonesia as in Vietnam in 12 years'. The contrast with the global movement to uphold the Vietnamese struggle is most striking. With the development by the US of Indonesia as a sub-imperial bastion on a level with Brazil and Iran, the need for study and agitation becomes even more necessary. Caldwell's book makes an invaluable contribution to this task.

London C. DEAN

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2 See Elaine Capizzi, 'Trade Unions under the New Order', in British Indonesia Committee (ed.), *Repression and Exploitation in Indonesia* (Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1974).

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