RACE & CLASS

A JOURNAL FOR BLACK AND THIRD WORLD LIBERATION

VOLUME XXI
AUTUMN 1979
NUMBER 2.





People's power – Mozambique '79

Emergence of European radicalism

Grenada's revolution

IMPERIALISM IN THE SILICON AGE



Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

EDITORIAL WORKING COMMITTEE
Eqbal Ahmad
Lee Bridges
Tony Bunyan
Basil Davidson
Chris Farley
Hermione Harris
Thomas Hodgkin
Ken Jordaan
Colin Prescod
Basker Vashee

EDITOR
A. Sivanandan

EDITORIAL STAFF
Hilary Arnott
Jenny Bourne
Hazel Waters

CONTRIBUTIONS

Contributions, correspondence and books for review should be sent to the Editor at the Institute of Race Relations, 247-9 Pentonville Road, London N1, England. The Institute of Race Relations and the Transnational Institute are precluded from expressing a corporate view: the opinions expressed are therefore those of the contributors.

While welcoming contributions, particularly on Third World problems and realities, we would like to remind our contributors that manuscripts should be short (ideally, 5,000 words), clear (as opposed to obscure) and free of jargon. Typescripts should be double-spaced.

Race & Class is published quarterly (in July, October, January and April) and subscriptions are payable in advance to any bookseller or to the Institute of Race Relations, 247-9 Pentonville Road, London N1 9NG. Subscriptions can be entered at any point in the volume. Current subscription rate £7.00/US $20.00/DM 50 to institutions, £5.50/ US $12.00/DM 20 to individuals. Subscribers from West Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands please pay in DM or the equivalent in local currency. Single issues £2.50/ $6.00/DM 13 to institutions, £1.50/$ 3.00/DM 5 to individuals. Special rates for booksellers on request. Back copies of Volumes 1-19 can be obtained from Wm Dawson and Sons Limited, Cannon House, Folkestone, Kent. Volumes 1-4 available in reprint at £2.50 per issue: Volumes 5-19 available in the original at current subscription and single copy prices (Volume 20 available at the IRR).

US Mailing Agent, Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd.,
527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York, NY10022, USA
2nd Class Postage Paid at New York, NY.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

RACE & CLASS

THE JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS
AND THE TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE

Volume XXI Autumn 1979 Number 2

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

© Institute of Race Relations 1979
ISSN 0306 3965

Cover design by M
Cover photographs courtesy of *Pacific Research* and *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*
Typeset by Red Lion Setters, 22 Brownlow Mews, London WC1N 2LA
Printed by The Russell Press Ltd., Gamble Street, Nottingham

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

A. SIVANANDAN

Imperialism and disorganic development in the silicon age*

One epoch does not lead tidily into another. Each epoch carries with it a burden of the past — an idea perhaps, a set of values, even bits and pieces of an outmoded economic and political system. And the longer and more durable the previous epoch the more halting is the emergence of the new.

The classic centre-periphery relationship as represented by British colonialism — and the inter-imperialist rivalries of that period — had come to an end with the Second World War. A new colonialism was emerging with its centre of gravity in the United States of America; a new economic order was being fashioned at Bretton Woods. Capital, labour, trade were to be unshackled of their past inhibitions — and the world opened up to accumulation on a scale more massive than ever before. The instruments of that expansion — the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank — were ready to go into operation.**Even so, it took the capitalist nations of western Europe, Japan and the United States some twenty-five years to rid themselves of the old notions of national boundaries and 'lift the siege against multinational enterprises so that they might be permitted to get on with the unfinished business of developing the world economy' (Rockefeller). The Trilateral Commission was its acknowledgement.

Britain, hung up in its colonial past, was to lag further behind.

A. SIVANANDAN is Director of the Institute of Race Relations.

*This is a development and reformulation of a paper originally given at the 'Three Worlds or One?' Conference, Berlin, June 1979.

**GATT was set up to regulate trade between nations, the IMF to help nations adjust to free trade by providing balance-of-payments financial assistance, the World Bank to facilitate the movement of capital to war-torn Europe and aid to developing countries.

Race & Class, XXI, 2(1979)

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

It continued, long after the war, to seek fresh profit from an old relationship — most notably through the continued exploitation of colonial labour, but this time at the centre. So that when the rest of Europe, particularly Germany, was reconstructing its industries and infrastructure with a judicious mix of capital and labour (importing labour as and when required), Britain, with easy access to cheap black labour and easy profit from racial exploitation, resorted to labour-intensive production. And it was in the nature of that colonial relationship that the immigrants should have come as settlers and not as labourers on contract.

The history of British immigration legislation including the present calls for repatriation is the history of Britain's attempt to reverse the colonial trend and to catch up with Europe and the new world order.[1]

That order, having gone through a number of overlapping phases since the war, now begins to emerge with distinctive features. These, on the one hand, reflect changes in the international division of labour and of production, involving the movement of capital to labour (from centre to periphery) which in turn involves the movement of labour as between the differing peripheries. On the other hand, they foreshadow a new industrial revolution based on micro-electronics — and a new imperialism, accelerating the 'disorganic' development of the periphery. And it is to these new developments in capitalist imperialism that I want to address myself, moving between centre and periphery — and between peripheries — as the investigation takes me, bearing in mind that these are merely notes for further study.

The early post-war phase of this development need not detain us here, except to note that the industrialisation undertaken by the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa (Latin America had begun to industrialise between the wars) put them further in hock to foreign capital, impoverished their agriculture and gave rise to a new bourgeoisie and a bureaucratic elite.[2] The name of the game was import substitution, its end the favourable balance of trade, its economic expression state capitalism, its political raison d'être bourgeois nationalism. Not fortuitously, this period coincided with the export of labour to the centre.

CAPITAL AND LABOUR MIGRATION

By the 1960s, however, the tendency of labour to move to capital was beginning to be reversed. The post-war reconstruction of Europe was over, manufacturing industries showed declining profit margins and capital was looking outside for expansion. The increasing subordination of Third World economies to multinational corporations made

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

accessible a cheap and plentiful supply of labour in the periphery, in Asia in particular. Advances in technology — in transport, communications, information and data processing and organisation — rendered geographical distances irrelevant and made possible the movement of plant to labour, while ensuring centralised control of production. More importantly, technological development had further fragmented the labour process, so that the most unskilled worker could now perform the most complex operations.

For its part, the periphery, having failed to take off into independent and self sustained growth through import substitution,* turned to embrace export-oriented industrialisation — the manufacture of textiles, transistors, leather goods, household appliances and numerous consumer items. But capital had first to be assured that it could avail itself of tax incentives, repatriate its profits, obtain low-priced factory sites and, not least, be provided with a labour force that was as docile and undemanding as it was cheap and plentiful. Authoritarian regimes, often set up by American intervention, provided those assurances — and Free Trade Zones provided their viability.**

The pattern of imperialist exploitation was changing — and with it, the international division of production and of labour. The centre no longer supplied the manufactured goods and the periphery the raw materials. Instead the former provided the plant and the know-how while the latter supplied primary products and manufactures. Or, as the Japanese Ministry of Trade in its 'Long Term Vision of Industrial Structure' expressed it, Japan would retain 'high-technology and knowledge-intensive industries' which yielded 'high added value' while industries 'such as textiles which involve a low degree of processing and generate low added value [would] be moved to developing countries where labour costs are low'.

Or, as Samir Amin put it in *Imperialism and Unequal Development*, 'the centre of gravity of the exploitation of labour by capital (and in the first place, by monopoly capital which dominates the system as a whole) had been displaced from the centre of the system to the periphery'.

---

*Even in the period of import-substitution — more succinctly described by the Japanese as 'export-substitution investment' — the multinational corporations were able to move in 'behind tariff barriers to produce locally what they had hitherto imported'. (Ampo, Special Issue, *Free Trade Zones and industrialisation of Asia*, 1977.)

**The first Free Trade Zone was established at Shannon airport in Ireland in 1958 and was followed by Taiwan in 1965. In 1967 the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation was set up to promote industrialisation in developing countries and soon embarked on the internationalisation of Free Trade Zones into a global system. South Korea established a Free Trade Zone in 1970, the Philippines in 1972 and Malaysia in the same year. By 1974, Egypt, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Liberia, Syria, Trinidad & Tobago and Sudan were asking UNIDO to draw up plans for Free Trade Zones. (Ampo,op.cit.) Sri Lanka set up its Free Trade Zone last year soon after a right-wing government had taken power, albeit through the ballot box.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

The parameters of that new economic order are best expressed in the purpose and philosophy of the Trilateral Commission. Founded in 1973, under the sponsorship of David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank, the Commission brought together representatives of the world's most powerful banks, corporations, communications conglomerates, and international organisations plus top politicians and a few 'free' trade unions and trade union federations (from North America, Europe and Japan) to reconcile the contradictions of transnational capital, while at the same time checking 'the efforts of national governments to seize for their own countries a disproportionate share of the benefits generated by foreign direct investment'.[3] As Richard Falk puts it: 'The vistas of the Trilateral Commission can be understood as the ideological perspective representing the transnational outlook of the multinational corporation' which 'seeks to subordinate territorial politics to non-territorial economic goals'.[4]

And for the purposes of that subordination, it was necessary to distinguish between the differing peripheries: the oil-producing countries and the 'newly-industrialising' countries, and the underdeveloped countries proper (which the Commission terms the 'Fourth World').

The implications of this new imperial ordinance for labour migration — not, as before, between centre and periphery but as between the peripheries themselves — are profound, the consequences for these countries devastating. The oil-rich Gulf states, for instance, have sucked in whole sections of the working population, skilled and semi-skilled, of South Asia, leaving vast holes in the labour structure of these countries. Moratuwa, a coastal town in Sri Lanka, once boasted some of the finest carpenters in the world. Today there are none — they are all in Kuwait or in Muscat or Abu Dhabi. And there are no welders, masons, electricians, plumbers, mechanics — all gone. And the doctors, teachers, engineers — they have been long gone — in the first wave of post-war migration to Britain, Canada, USA, Australia, in the second to Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana. Today Sri Lanka, which had the first free health service in the Third World and some of the finest physicians and surgeons, imports its doctors from Marcos' Philippines. What that must do to the Filipino people is another matter, but all that we are left with in Sri Lanka is a plentiful supply of unemployed labour, which is now being herded into the colony within the neo-colony, the Free Trade Zone.

Or take the case of Pakistan, which shows a similar pattern of emigration, except that being a Muslim country the pull of the Gulf is even stronger. Besides, the export of manpower — as a foreign exchange earner — is official policy, a Bureau of Emigration having been set up in 1969 to facilitate employment overseas. Consequently Pakistan 'is being progressively converted into a factory producing

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

skilled manpower for its rich neighbours'.[5]

But the export of skilled workers is not the only drain on Pakistan's resources. Apart from its traditional export of primary products, its physical proximity to the oil-rich countries has meant also the smuggling out of fresh vegetables, the sale of fish in mid-seas and the export, often illegal, of beef and goat meat. (The Gulf states raise no cattle.) 'The adverse effects of this trade', laments Feroz Ahmed, 'can be judged from the fact that Pakistan has one of the lowest per capita daily consumptions of animal protein in the world: less than 10 grammes.'[6]

The Middle East countries in turn have only invested in those enterprises which are geared to their own needs (textiles, cement, fertilizer, livestock) and rendered Pakistan's economy subservient to their interests. And to make this 'development of underdevelopment' palatable they harked back to a common culture. Iranian cultural centres sprouted in every major town in Pakistan, outdoing the Americans, and the teaching of Arabic and Persian was fostered by official policy. 'We the Pakistanis and our brethren living in Iran', wrote a Pakistani paper, 'are the two Asiatic branches of the Aryan Tree who originally lived in a common country, spoke the same language, followed the same religion, worshipped the same gods and observed the same rites ... Culturally we were and are a single people.'[7]

But if Pakistan has been relegated, in the pecking order of imperialism, 'to the status of a slave substratum upon which the imperialist master and their privileged clients play out their game of plunder and oppression',[8] the privileged clients themselves exhibit a distorted 'development'. Take Kuwait for instance. In the pre-oil era Kuwait's economy was based on fishing, pearling, pasturing, trade and a little agriculture. Today all these activities, with the exception of fishing, have virtually ceased — and fishing has been taken over by a company run by the ruling family. The oil industry, while providing the government with 99 per cent of its income, affords employment only to a few thousand. Almost three-fourths of the native work force is in the service sector, with little or nothing to do. (A UN survey estimated that the Kuwaiti civil servant works 17 minutes a day.)[9] But more than 70 per cent of the total work force and over half the total population consists of non-Kuwaiti immigrant labour. And they are subjected to harsh conditions of work, low wages, no trade union rights, wretched housing and arbitrary deportation. Kuwait is, in effect, two societies, but even within the first 'the ruling elite lives in a swamp of consumer commodities and luxuries, while those at the bottom of the Kuwaiti social pyramid are being uprooted from their traditional productive activities and thrown on the market of unproductiveness'.[10]

The pattern of labour migration in South-east Asia is a variation on

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

the same imperial theme, and its consequences no less devastating. The first countries to industrialise in this region were Taiwan in the 1950s and, in the 1960s, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong. Taiwan and South Korea were basically offshore operations of the USA and Japan — and, by virtue of their strategic importance to America, were able to develop heavy industry (ship building, steel, vehicles) and chemicals in addition to the usual manufacture of textiles, shoes, electrical goods, etc. And by the middle of the 1970s, these two countries had gone over from being producers of primary products to producers of manufactured goods. Singapore's industrialisation includes ship repair (Singapore is the fourth largest port in the world) and the construction industry. Hong Kong, the closest thing to a 'free economy', is shaped by the world market.

What all these countries could offer multinational capital, apart from a 'favourable climate of investment' (repatriation of profit, tax holidays, etc.), was authoritarian regimes (Hong Kong is a colony) with a tough line on dissidence in the work force and a basic infrastructure of power and communications. What they did not have was a great pool of unemployed workers. That was provided by the neighbouring countries.

Hong Kong uses all the migrant labour available in the region, including workers from mainland China, and is currently negotiating with the Philippines government for the import of Filipino labour. South Korea's shortage of labour, by the very nature of its development, has been in the area of skilled workers. (Not illogically South Korea has been priced out of its own skilled workers, some 70,000 of them, by the developing oil-rich countries of the Middle East.) But it is Singapore which is the major employer of contract labour — from Malaysia mostly (40 per cent of the industrial work force) but also from Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand — and that under the most horrendous conditions. For apart from the usual strictures on gastarbeiters that we are familiar with in Europe, such as no right of settlement, no right to change jobs without permission and deportation if jobless, Singapore also forbids these workers to marry, except after five years, on the showing of a 'clean record', and then with the permission of the government — and that on signing a bond that both partners will agree to be sterilised after the second child is born. Lee Kuan Yew, with a nod to Hitler, justifies the policy on the ground that 'a multiple replacement rate right at the bottom' leads to 'a gradual lowering of the general quality of the population'.[11] Their working conditions too are insanitary and dangerous and makeshift shacks on worksites (like the bidonvilles) provide their only housing.

And yet the plight of the indigenous workers of these countries is not much better. The economic miracle is not for them. Their lives contrast glaringly with the luxury apartments, automobiles and swinging discos of the rich. To buy a coffee and sandwich on a

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

thoroughfare of Singapore costs a day's wage, in South Korea 12- and 13-year-old girls work 18 hours a day, 7 days a week, for £12 a month, and Hong Kong is notorious for its exploitation of child labour.[12]

How long the repressive regimes of these countries can hold down their work force on behalf of international capital is a moot point — but multinationals do not wait to find out. They do not stay in one place. They gather their surplus while they may and move on to new pastures their miracles to perform.

The candidates for the new expropriation were Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines whose economies were primarily based on agriculture and on extractive industries such as mining and timber. Like the first group of countries they too could boast of authoritarian regimes — ordained by the White House, fashioned by the Pentagon and installed by the CIA — which could pave the way for international capital. Additionally, they were able to provide the cheap indigenous labour which the other group had lacked — and the Free Trade Zones to go with it. What they did not have, though, was a developed infrastructure.

Multinationals had already moved into these countries by the 1970s and some industrialisation was already under way. What accelerated that movement, however, was the tilt to cheap labour, as against a developed infrastructure, brought about by revolutionary changes in the production process.

To that revolution, variously described as the new industrial revolution, the third industrial revolution and the post-industrial age. I must now turn — not so much to look at labour migration as labour polarisation — between the periphery and the centre, and within the centre itself, and its social and political implications in both.

CAPITAL AND LABOUR IN THE SILICON AGE

What has caused the new industrial revolution and brought about a qualitative leap in the level of the productive forces is the silicon chip or, more accurately, the computer-on-a-chip, known as the microprocessor. (You have already seen them at work in your digital watch and your pocket calculator.)

The ancestry of the microprocessor need not concern us here, except to note that it derives from the electronic transistor, invented by American scientists in 1947 — which in turn led to the semiconductor industry in 1952-3 and in 1963, to the integrated circuit industry. Integrated circuits meant that various electronic elements such as transistors, resistors, diodes, etc. could all be combined on a tiny chip of semi-conductor silicon, 'which in the form of sand is the world's most common element next to oxygen'.[13] But if industrially the new technology has been in existence for sixteen years, it is only

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

in the last five that it has really taken off. The periodisation of its development is important because it is not unconnected with the postwar changes in the international division of production and of labour and the corresponding movements and operations of the multinational corporations.

The microprocessor is to the new industrial revolution what steam and electricity was to the old — except that where steam and electric power replaced human muscle, microelectronics replaces the brain. That, quite simply, is the measure of its achievement. Consequently, there is virtually no field in manufacturing, the utilities, the service industries or commerce that is not affected by the new technology. Microprocessors are already in use in the control of power stations, textile mills, telephone-switching systems, office-heating and typesetting as well as in repetitive and mechanical tasks such as spraying, welding, etc. in the car industry. Fiat, for instance, has a television commercial which boasts that its cars are 'designed by computers, silenced by lasers and hand-built by robots' — to the strains of Figaro's aria (from Rossini). Volkswagen designs and sells its own robots for spot welding and handling body panels between presses. Robots, besides, can be re-programmed for different tasks more easily than personnel can be re-trained. And because microprocessors can be re-programmed, automated assembly techniques could be introduced into areas hitherto immune to automation, such as batch production (which incidentally constitutes 70 per cent of the production in British manufacturing). From this has grown the idea of linking together a group of machines to form an unmanned manufacturing system, which could produce anything from diesel engines to machine tools and even aeroengines. And 'once the design of the unmanned factory has been standardised, entire factories could be produced on a production line based on a standard design'.[14] The Japanese are close to achieving the 'universal factory'.

A few examples from other areas of life will give you some idea of the pervasiveness of microelectronics. In the retail trade, for instance, the electronic cash register, in addition to performing its normal chores, monitors the stock level by keeping tabs on what has been sold at all the terminals and relays that information to computers in the warehouse which then automatically move the necessary stocks to the shop. A further line-up between computerised check-outs at stores and computerised bank accounts will soon do away with cash transactions, directly debiting the customer's account and crediting the store's. Other refinements such as keeping a check on the speed and efficiency of employees have also grown out of such computerisation — in Denmark, for instance (but it has been resisted by the workers).

There are chips in everything you buy — cookers, washing machines, toasters, vacuum cleaners, clocks, toys, sewing machines,

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

motor vehicles — replacing standard parts and facilitating repair: you take out one chip and put in another. One silicon chip in an electronic sewing machine for example replaces 350 standard parts.

But it is in the service sector, particularly in the matter of producing, handling, storing and transmitting information, that silicon technology has had its greatest impact. Up to now automation has not seriously affected office work which, while accounting for 75 per cent of the costs in this sector (and about half the operating costs of corporations), is also the least productive, thereby depressing the overall rate of productivity. One of the chief reasons for this is that office work is divided into several tasks (typing, filing, processing, retrieving, transmitting and so forth) which are really inter-connected. The new technology not only automates these tasks but integrates them. For example, the word processor, consisting of a keyboard, a visual display unit, a storage memory unit and a print-out, enables one typist to do the work of four while at the same time reducing the skill she needs. Different visual display units (VDUs) can then be linked to the company's mainframe computer, to other computers within the country (via computer network systems) and even to those in other countries through satellite communication — all of which makes possible the electronic mail and the electronic funds transfer (EFT) which would dispense with cash completely.

What this link-up between the office, the computer and telecommunications means is the 'convergence' of previously separate industries. 'Convergence' is defined by the Butler Cox Foundation as 'the process by which these three industries are coming to depend on a single technology. They are becoming, to all intents and purposes, three branches of a single industry'.[15] But 'convergence' to you and me spells the convergence of corporations, horizontal (and vertical) integration, monopoly. A 'convergence' of Bell Telephones and IBM computers would take over the world's communication facilities. (Whether the anti-trust laws in America have already been bent to enable such a development I do not know, but it is only a matter of time.)

Underscoring the attributes and applications of the microprocessor is the speed of its advance and the continuing reduction in its costs. Sir Ieuan Maddock, Secretary of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, estimates that 'in terms of the gates it can contain, the performance of a single chip has increased ten thousandfold in a period of 15 years'. And of its falling cost, he says, 'the price of each unit of performance has reduced one hundred thousandfold since the early 1960s'.[16]

'These are not just marginal effects', continues Sir Ieuan, 'to be absorbed in a few per cent change in the economic indicators — they are deep and widespread and collectively signal a fundamental and irreversible change in the way the industrialised societies will live ...

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Changes of such magnitude and speed have never been experienced before.'[17]

The scope of these changes have been dealt with in the growing literature on the subject.[18] But they have mostly been concerned with the prospects of increasing and permanent unemployment, particularly in the service industries and in the field of unskilled manual employment — in both of which blacks and women predominate.* A study by Siemens estimates that 40 per cent of all office work in Germany is suitable for automation — which, viewed from the other side, means a 40 per cent lay off of office workers in the next ten years. The Nora report warns that French banking and insurance industries, which are particularly labour intensive, will lose 30 per cent of their work force by 1990. Unemployment in Britain is expected to rise by about 3 million in that time.[19] Other writers have pointed to a polarisation in the work force itself — as between a small technological elite on the one hand and a large number of unskilled, unemployable workers, counting among their number those whose craft has become outmoded. Or, as the Chairman of the British Oil Corporation, Lord Kearton, puts it: 'we have an elite now of a very special kind at the top on which most of mankind depends for its future development and the rest of us are more or less taken along in the direct stream of these elite personnel'.[20]

All the remedies that the British Trades Union Congress has been able to suggest are 'new technology agreements' between government and union, 'continuing payments to redundant workers related to their past earnings' and 'opportunities for linking technological change with a reduction in the working week, working year and working life time'.[21] The Association of Scientific Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS), whose members are more immediately affected by automation, elevates these remedies into a philosophy which encompasses a changed attitude towards work that would 'promote a better balance between working life and personal life', 'recurrent education throughout adult life' and a new system of income distribution which in effect will 'pay people not to work'.[22]

But, in the performance, these are precisely the palliatives that enlightened capitalism (i.e. multinational capitalism as opposed to the archaic private enterprise capitalism of Margaret Thatcher and her mercantile minions) offers the working class in the silicon age. Translated into the system's terms, 'new technology agreements' mean a continuing social contract between the unions and the government wherein the workers abjure their only power, collective bargaining (and thereby take the politics out of the struggle) and a

*Of course there are those (guess who) who suggest that automation will not only release people from dirty, boring jobs and into more interesting work, but even enhance job prospects.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

new culture which divorces work from income (under the guise of life-long education, part-time work, early retirement, etc.) and provides the raison d'être for unemployment. Already the protagonists of the establishment have declared that the Protestant work ethic is outdated (what has work got to do with income?), that leisure should become a major occupation (university departments are already investigating its 'potential'), that schooling is not for now but for ever.

I am not arguing here against technology or a life of creative leisure. Anything that improves the lot of man is to be welcomed. But in capitalist society such improvement redounds to the few at cost to the many. That cost has been heavy for the working class in the centre and heavier for the masses in the periphery. What the new industrial revolution predicates is the further degradation of work where, as Braverman so brilliantly predicted, thought itself is eliminated from the labour process,[23] the centralised ownership of the means of production, a culture of reified leisure to mediate discontent and a political system incorporating the state, the multinationals, the trade unions, the bureaucracy and the media, backed by the forces of 'law and order' with microelectronic surveillance at their command. For in as much as liberal democracy was the political expression of the old industrial revolution, the corporate state is the necessary expression of the new. The qualitative leap in the productive forces, ensnared in capitalist economics, demands such an expression. Or, to put it differently, the contradiction between the heightened centralisation in the ownership of the means of production — made possible not only by the enormous increase in the level of productivity but also by the technological nature of that increase — and the social nature of production (however attenuated) can no longer be mediated by liberal democracy but by corporativism, with an accompanying corporate culture, and state surveillance to go with it.

But nowhere, in all the chip literature, is there a suggestion of any of this. Nor is there in British writings on the subject,* with the exception of the CIS report,[24] any hint of a suggestion that the new industrial revolution, like the old, has taken off on the backs of the workers in the peripheries — that it is they who will provide the 'living dole' for the unemployed of the West. For, the chip, produced in the pleasant environs of 'Silicon Valley' in California, has its circuitry assembled in the toxic factories of Asia. Or, as a Conservative Political Centre publication puts it, 'while the manufacture of the chips requires expensive equipment in a dust-free, air-conditioned environment little capital is necessary to assemble them profitably

*American writers, however, have done better in this regard. See in particular the articles of Jon Stewart and John Markoff in the *Pacific News Service* and Rachael Grossman et al in the Special issue of *Southeast Asia Chronicle*.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

into saleable devices. And it is the assembly that creates both the wealth and the jobs.'[25]

Initially the industry went to Mexico, but Asia was soon considered the cheaper. (Besides 'Santa Clara was only a telex away'.) And even within Asia the moves were to cheaper and cheaper areas: from Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore in the 1960s, to Malaysia in 1972, Thailand in 1973, the Philippines and Indonesia in 1974 and soon to Sri Lanka. 'The manager of a plant in Malaysia explained how profitable these moves had been: "one worker working one hour produces enough to pay the wages of 10 workers working one shift plus all the costs of materials and transport".'[26]

But the moves the industry makes are not just from country to country but from one batch of workers to another within the country itself. For, the nature of the work — the bonding under a microscope of tiny hair-thin wires to circuit boards on wafers of silicon chip half the size of a fingernail — shortens working life. 'After 3 or 4 years of peering through a microscope', reports Rachael Grossman, 'a worker's vision begins to blur so that she can no longer meet the production quota'.[27] But if the microscope does not get her ('grandma where are your glasses' is how electronic workers over 25 are greeted in Hong Kong), the bonding chemicals do.* And why 'her'? Because they are invariably women. For, as a Malaysian brochure has it, 'the manual dexterity of the oriental female is famous the world over. Her hands are small and she works fast with extreme care. Who, therefore, could be better qualified by nature and inheritance to contribute to the efficiency of a bench assembly production line than the oriental girl?'[28]

To make such intense exploitation palatable, however, the multinationals offer the women a global culture — beauty contests, fashion shows, cosmetic displays and disco dancing — which in turn enhances the market for consumer goods and western beauty products. Tourism reinforces the culture and reinforces prostitution (with packaged sex tours for Japanese businessmen), drug selling, child labour. For the woman thrown out of work on the assembly line at an early age, the wage earner for the whole extended family, prostitution is often the only form of livelihood left.[29]

A global culture then, to go with a global economy, serviced by a global office the size of a walkie-talkie held in your hand** — a global assembly line run by global corporations that move from one pool of labour to another, discarding them when done — high

*'Workers who must dip components in acids and rub them with solvents frequently experience serious burns, dizziness, nausea, sometimes even losing their fingers in accidents ... It will be 10 or 15 years before the possible carcinogenic effects begin to show up in the women who work with them now.' (*Southeast Asia Chronicle*, no 66, January-February 1979.)

**See 'The Day After Tomorrow', by Peter Large, *Guardian*(17 February 1979)

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

technology in the centre, low technology in the peripheries — and a polarisation of the workforce within the centre itself (as between the highly skilled and unskilled or de-skilled) and as between the centre and the peripheries, with qualitatively different rates of exploitation that allow the one to feed off the other — a corporate state maintained by surveillance for the developed countries, authoritarian regimes and gun law for the developing. That is the size of the new world order.

DISORGANIC DEVELOPMENT

But it is not without its contradictions. Where those contradictions are sharpest, however, are where they exist in the raw — in the peripheries.* For what capitalist development has meant to the masses of these countries is increased poverty, the corruption of their cultures, repressive regimes — and all at once. All the GNP they amass for their country through their incessant labour leaves them poorer than before. They produce what is of no real use to them and yet cannot buy what they produce — neither use value nor exchange value — neither the old system nor the new.

And how they produce has no relation to how they used to produce. They have not grown into the one from the other. They have not emerged into capitalist production but been flung into it — into technologies and labour processes that reify them and into social relations that violate their customs and their codes. They work, in the factories, in town, to support their families, their extended families, in the village — to contribute to the building of the village temple, to help get a teacher for the school, to sink a well. But the way of their working socialises them into individualism, nuclear families, consumer priorities, artefacts of capitalist culture. They are caught between two modes, two sets, of social relations, characterised by exchange value in the one and use value in the other — and the contradiction disorients them and removes them from the centre of their being.

And not just the workers, but the peasants too — they have not escaped the capitalist mode. And all it has done is to wrench them from their social relations and their relationship with the land. Within a single life-time, they have had to exchange sons for tractors and tractors for petrochemicals. And these things too have taken them from themselves in space and in time.

And what happens to all this production, from the land and from the factories? Where does all the GNP go — except to faceless foreign

*For the purposes of the general analysis presented here, I make no distinction between periphery and developing periphery.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

exploiters in another country and a handful of rich in their own? And who the agents but their own rulers?

In sum, what capitalist development has meant to the masses of these countries is production without purpose, except to stay alive; massive immiseration accompanied by a wholesale attack on the values, relationships, gods that made such immiseration bearable; rulers who rule not for their own people but for someone else — a development that makes no sense, has no bearing on their lives, is disorganic.

To state it at another level. The economic development that capital has super-imposed on the peripheries has been unaccompanied by capitalist culture or capitalist democracy. Whereas, in the centre, the different aspects of capitalism (economic, cultural, political) have evolved gradually, organically, out of the centre's own history, in the periphery the capitalist mode of production has been grafted on to the existing cultural and political order. Peripheral capitalism is not an organised body of connected, interdependent parts sharing a common life — it is not an organism. What these countries exhibit, therefore, is not just 'distorted' or 'disarticulated' development (Samir Amin), but disorganic development: an economic system (itself 'extraverted') at odds with the cultural and political institutions of the people it exploits. The economic system, that is, is not mediated by culture or legitimated by politics, as in the centre. The base and the superstructure do not complement and reinforce each other. (That is not to say that they are in perfect harmony at the centre.) They are in fundamental conflict — and exploitation is naked, crude, unmediated — although softened by artefacts of capitalist culture and capitalist homilies on human rights. And that contradiction is not only general to the social formation but, because of capitalist penetration, runs right through the various modes of production comprising the social formation. At some point, therefore, the political system has to be extrapolated from the superstructure and made to serve as a cohesive — and coercive — force to maintain the economic order of things. The contradiction between superstructure and base now resolves into one between the political regime and the people, with culture as the expression of their resistance. And it is cultural resistance which, in Cabral's magnificent phrase, takes on 'new forms (political, economic, armed) in order fully to contest foreign domination'.[30]

But culture in the periphery is not equally developed in all sectors of society. It differs as between the different modes of production but, again as Cabral says, it does have 'a mass character'. Similarly at the economic level, the different exploitations in the different modes confuse the formal lines of class struggle but the common denominators of political oppression make for a mass movement.

Hence the revolutions in these countries are not necessarily class,

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

socialist, revolutions — they do not begin as such anyway. They are not even nationalist revolutions as we know them. They are mass movements with national and revolutionary components — sometimes religious, sometimes secular, often both, but always against the repressive political state and its imperial backers.

REFERENCES

1 See A. Sivanandan, *Race, class and the state: the black experience in Britain*, Race & Class Pamphlet No. 1, (London, 1976). Also see A. Sivanandan, *From immigration control to 'induced repatriation'*, Race & Class Pamphlet No. 5 (London, 1978).
2 See *Ampo*, Special issue, 'Free Trade Zones and industrialisation of Asia' (Vol.8, no. 4 and Vol. 9, nos. 1-2, 1977).
3 Jeff Frieden, 'The Trilateral Commission: economics and politics in the 1970s', *Monthly Review* (Vol. 29, no. 7, December 1977).
4 Richard Falk, 'A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies', *The Yale Law Journal* (Vol. 84, no. 5, April 1975).
5 Feroz Ahmed, 'Pakistan: the new dependence', *Race & Class*, (Vol. XVIII, no. 1, Summer 1976).
6 Ibid.
7 *Dawn* (13 May 1973), cited in ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Cited in 'Oil for underdevelopment and discrimination: the case of Kuwait', *Monthly Review* (Vol. 30, no. 6, November 1978).
10 Ibid.
11 Selangor Graduates Society, *Plight of the Malaysian workers in Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur, 1978).
12 Walter Easey, 'Notes on child labour in Hong Kong', *Race & Class* (Vol. XVIII, no. 4, Spring 1977).
13 Jon Stewart and John Markoff, 'The Microprocessor Revolution', *Pacific News Service*, Global Factory (Part II of VI).
14 Association of Scientific Technical and Managerial Staffs, *Technological Change and Collective Bargaining* (London, 1978).
15 D. Butler, abstract, *The Convergence of Technologies*, Report Series no. 5, Butler Cox Foundation, quoted in ASTMS, op. cit.
16 Ieuan Maddock, 'Beyond the Protestant ethic', *New Scientist* (23 November, 1978).
17 Ibid.
18 See, for instance, I. Barron and R. Curnow, *The Future with Microelectronics* (London, 1979); C. Jenkins and B. Sherman, *The Collapse of Work* (London, 1979); Trades Union Congress, *Employment and Technology* (London, 1979); ASTMS, op. cit.; Colin Hines, *The 'Chips' are down* (London, 1978); Chris Harman *Is a machine after your job?* (London, 1979).
19 Cambridge Economic Policy Group, *Economic Policy Review*, (March 1978).
20 Introductory address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science Symposium, Automation Friend or Foe?
21 Trades Union Congress, *Employment and Technology* (London, 1979).
22 ASTMS, op. cit.
23 Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (New York, 1974).
24 Counter Information Services, *The New Technology*, Anti-Report no. 23 (London, 1979).

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

25 Philip Virgo, *Cashing in on the Chips* (London, 1979).
26 Cited in Rachael Grossman, 'Women's Place in the Integrated Circuit', *Southeast Asia Chronicle* (no. 66, Jan-Feb 1979).
27 Ibid.
28 Cited in ibid.
29 See A. Lin Neumann, '"Hospitality Girls" in the Philippines', *Southeast Asia Chronicle* (no. 66, Jan-Feb 1979).
30 Amilcar Cabral, *Return to the Source* (New York, 1973).

". . . the most impressive journal of intellectual opinion to have appeared on the scene in years."

William Styron

Subscribe Now!

Marxist Perspectives

Forthcoming Articles:

Christopher Hill, Religion & Revolution; *Carlos Fuentes*, Styron's Sophie; *Owen Lattimore*, Mongolian Collectivization; *Ann Lane*, Linda Gordon's Marxism-Feminism; *Ernest Mandell*, Eurocommunism; *Carl Marzani*, The Bishop Of Ivrea & Berlinguer: An Exchange; *Bertell Ollman*, Review Of Works On Marxist Theory Of History; *Joann Magdoff*, The Mass & The Mid-day Meal; *Herbert Aptheker*, Review Of Genovese On Slave Revolts; *Gertrud Lenzer*, Auguste Comte; *Jane Slaughter*, Feminism & Socialism; *C.H. George*, Wallerstein & The Transition To Capitalism; *Lucia Chiavola Birnbaum*, Sicilian American Women; *James Livingston*, Romeo And Juliet; *Sidney Mintz*, Food, Time, & Sugar; *Elizabeth Fox-Genovese*, Radical Feminism; *Jacob Neusner*, Jewish Law & Women; *Michel Melot*, Camille Pissarro, Anarchistic Artist; *Susan Fox*, Poetry; A.G. Quintero-Rivera, On Puerto Rico; *Ann Lauterbach*, Poetry; *Samuel Zelnick*, Melville's Bartleby The Scrivener; *Theodore Brown*, Kuhn's Paradigm; *Louis Menashe*, The Russian Old Believers; *Steven Hahn*, The Southern Yoemanry.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

BASIL DAVIDSON

The revolution of people's power: notes on Mozambique 1979

It is four years since Mozambique was fully freed from the colonial system by the political and military struggle of its movement of national liberation, FRELIMO. So it's reasonable to begin asking questions about experience and progress since then. What trends develop there? What strengths appear, what weaknesses? What does the road travelled since 1975 look like, what the road ahead? The theory and practice of FRELIMO, and now of its structured party, FRELIMO-Partido, are defined as marxist-leninist: what, in practice, does this mean?

Five weeks of discussion and travel during May-June 1979 gave an opportunity for seeking answers: thanks, above all, to the always frank and direct approach and help of FRELIMO comrades at many levels — from those 'at the base' right through this evolving society to those 'leading at the top'. Enough material was assembled to make a fairly thick book; what follows here, obviously, is no more than a selective sketch. Even so, given the daily outpouring in our 'mass media' of fantasies and worse — whenever, that is, our 'media' can bring itself to mention Mozambique — a sketch may still be useful.

To begin with, a few essential points for readers new to the subject. Mozambique is important for three reasons. It is important in itself: for its twelve million people, for their history before and during colonialism and now after colonialism: a people terribly abused and exploited by foreign rule for decades, even for centuries: a people

BASIL DAVIDSON is an anti-imperialist scholar and writer who has campaigned for African liberation for many years. His most recent book is *Africa in Modern History* (Penguin, 1979).

Race & Class, XXI, 2 (1979)

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

that now ends one long chapter in their history and begins another, building for themselves a new society of peaceful and self-generated development. Secondly, Mozambique is important because its new regime, setting out to enable this new society to be built, represents in Africa a trend of practice and theory that is directly opposed to the neo-colonial miseries and horrors which have overtaken many of the countries freed from foreign political rule during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

This trend, which we may confidently define as one of revolutionary nationalism in contrast with reformist or neo-colonial nationalism, is still weak in Africa, but it grows stronger: as the evidence combines to show, it is the trend on whose side stands all real hope of democratic growth, of diminishing poverty, of lessening strife, and, as the trend goes further, of unified action between neighbouring African peoples. Then Mozambique has a third importance. Mozambique stands today as a powerful bulwark of defence against the spread of racist rule in the southern African subcontinent, and as a strong base for the eventual defeat of that racism. Whatever happens in Mozambique has a meaning, even an urgent meaning, for the world as well as for its own people and their immediate neighbours.

The struggle for liberation began in 1962 with the forming of a loosely organised front of nationalist elements; but in 1964 it became an armed struggle because there could be no prospect of any peaceful advance against Portugese fascism. This armed struggle, continuing until 1975 (though largely over by 1974), had to overcome a long-sustained and massive colonial army and airforce, far superior in numbers, equipment, armament or transport, and always able to rely on military and financial and diplomatic aid from the major partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This fascist army was invariably brutal in its methods of warfare, and indifferent to the sufferings it imposed on the people whom it claimed to 'have in trust'. The Africans of Mozambique had to pay a heavy price for the victory they gained, and for the full independence of July 1975 which followed that victory. But there was a compensation for their losses that was even larger than these two gains. They learned a practice and theory of liberation which goes far beyond 'the waving of a national flag and the singing of an anthem'.

This 'politics of liberation' was not easily learned. Up to 1968 FRELIMO was sorely divided within itself. On one side was a minority, though an influential one, that saw the armed struggle merely as a bargaining counter, as a lever to make the colonial power give way and compromise, so that some kind of neo-colonial solution would become possible, and this minority — as its members thought — would then take over the same colonial system and run it with 'black faces'. On the other side there was a majority (including all the

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

fighting leaders and most of the political leaders, notably the late Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO's founding president) that saw any such compromise and solution as a betrayal of their struggle. This majority was determined to fight on to the end so that independence, when eventually it came, would be complete, and would be able to displace the colonial system by a new and democratic one. Things came to a head at a famous congress of FRELIMO held in the woodlands of Niassa Province during July 1968. The revolutionary line of Mondlane and his comrades prevailed. Yet the minority could still manoeuvre, and it was not until late in 1969 that unity was completely forged in favour of the revolutionary line: after Mondlane's murder by enemy agents early in that year, under the veteran leader of its fighting units, Samora Moisés Machel, who is the president of Mozambique today.

With this unity and forceful leadership, the armed struggle rapidly expanded, won new successes, opened new fighting zones, and carried the war to victory. So that, when FRELIMO assumed national power in July 1975, the way was indeed open for a revolutionary alternative to the colonial system and its culture. The colonialists were disarmed or driven out or expropriated; all public services (such as health and education) were nationalised, as were the 'commanding heights' of the economy in finance and other sectors. Some of this could be done neither quickly nor easily, because the colonialists left a wrecked country behind them, fewer than seventy medical practitioners for twelve million people, a ratio of schoolteachers to children still desperately small, practically no road transport, very few skilled workers, managers, book-keepers and the rest: and, above all, no political institutions capable of serving a free people. For all that, the transfer of power was sufficiently complete by early 1976, even if physical and organisational problems remained immense.

★ ★ ★

One should have no illusions about the difficulty of building a genuinely post-colonial society. Here the difficulty was great and all-pervasive. Not only was the economy wrecked, production at a catastrophic level, and disorganisation practically total: but the very situation of Mozambique in Southern Africa presented other problems. For about the last forty years of the colonial period (in some respects, much longer), the Portuguese had run Mozambique as little more than a 'branch' of the economy of racist South Africa. Mozambique was placed in heavy dependence to South Africa in several ways. Employment for a large force of Mozambican workers — over 100,000 a year for many years and even more in 1975 — was dependent on the South African gold mines. The principal port of Lourenço Marques (Maputo today) was dependent on South African in-out traffic. Much

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

of the electric-power grid in southern Mozambique could operate only with South African consent. Time must pass before this dependency is overcome; meanwhile Mozambique has to live in an uneasy 'peace' with a racist South Africa whose hostility can never be in doubt.

This hostility might have lessened if FRELIMO, once in power, had turned away from its human and political commitments to neighbouring peoples not yet free: above all, to the liberation movements of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front, and to the African National Congress of South Africa. But FRELIMO did and has since done no such thing. FRELIMO has stayed true to its commitments. Fighting cooperation was extended to Zimbabwean combatants early in the 1970s; sanctions against Rhodesia were applied after independence and the frontier with Rhodesia was closed. A strong rear-base was made available to the fighters of the Patriotic Front. The African National Congress of South Africa has likewise found that it can count on firm friends in Mozambique. All this has meant that a correspondingly large and expensive effort has had to be made by FRELIMO in building up Mozambican defences against the countless aggressions and raids that continue to be launched by the racists. Building its new society, Mozambique has to defend itself at the same time from powerful enemies who have still more powerful partners in the 'developed' world of 'the West'.

★ ★ ★

This is the background against which FRELIMO has set out to fill the greatest 'colonial void' of all: the absence of any useful or usable institutions of self-government. There were no such institutions in existence because the colonialists had no use for any institutions of self-government: they had governed by a rigid dictatorship and an autocratic bureaucracy. Their Mozambique had been, very exactly, a police state. FRELIMO completed the destruction of that state and dictatorship in 1974-5. This brought FRELIMO, but intentionally, right against their second objective: having got rid of the Portuguese system, the task now was to build an altogether different one. That task called for a new 'set of ideas' about how to do this. But thanks to the experience of their armed struggle, the men and women of FRELIMO possessed these ideas.

Why was this so: how did they come to possess them? The answer can be briefly summarised. Listen to Samora in a recent conversation:

> Ideas come from practice. When we set out, all those years ago, we wanted to liberate our people; and we found that people have to liberate themselves if the thing is to be real. We found that people could not liberate themselves unless they were active participants

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

in the process of liberation. And so, little by little, we applied a revolutionary practice — in the wartime zones that we controlled and protected from colonial power — which enabled this indispensable participation, this mass participation — political and social, cultural and military — to begin and grow and develop itself.

We acquired a lot of experience. We learned much. We made mistakes and saw how to correct them. We made successes and saw how to improve on them. In doing this, we evolved a theory out of our practice: and then we found that this theory of ours, evolving out of our practice, had already acquired a theorisation under different circumstances, elsewhere, in different times and places. This theory or theorisation is marxism-leninism.

The theory has its specific application in each case: it must have, because it can be legitimised in practice only by the specific circumstances and possibilities of each case. So the marxism-leninism of FRELIMO, while taking much from world revolutionary experience and still in full development, remains specific to Mozambique. It is no kind of import; if it were, it would fail through incapacity of application. On the other hand, it has nothing to do with fake theories of 'African socialism' and the like. It is a theory of class struggle: the real thing, but a Mozambican real thing.

'What we are saying', Samora has explained on another and public occasion,

> is that our movement's revolutionary ideology was forged in each of the political battles which it was necessary to wage, in each of the options it was necessary to choose.
>
> The struggle against racism, the struggle against tribalism, were not waged in the name of vague principles of unity or of idealist assertions about the equality of man. This struggle was and is a class option, made clear by the need to struggle against those with economic ambitions and against the political opportunists whose final aim was to substitute themselves for the colonialists, while they safeguarded the continuation of capitalism in Mozambique.
>
> The struggle for the emancipation of women, the definition of a policy of clemency [towards former enemies], the fight against elitism, the construction of collective living — these were some of the class confrontations which took place within our organisation, and which brought reactionary actions, sometimes bloody ones ...
>
> This is why, for us, marxism-leninism is not something we chose out of a book. It was in the process of the struggle that the people's interests asserted themselves and became more and more clearly demarcated from the interests of the colonialist exploiter and the would-be national [Mozambican] exploiter. It was in the

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

process of struggle that we synthesised the lessons of each experience, forging our ideology, constructing the theoretical instruments of our struggle ...[1]

★ ★ ★

What is this specific line of thought and action, 'not chosen out of any book' but developed and refined in the heat and challenge of a long fight for freedom on every level, whether cultural or political, moral or economic, violent or peaceful? It is defined, in sum, in the making and the use of *Poder Popular*, of People's Power. The whole meaning and potential of the Mozambican revolutionary movement is contained in that definition. We have to take it very seriously.

First of all, what *Poder Popular* is not. It is not a slogan, a label, a ready-made 'answer to all problems'. Whether in theory or in practice, it is not the reproduction of some other experience in some other country. It is not a copy of any foreign model: even though (a) its development has been sharpened, clarified and extended by further marxist-leninist analysis, and (b) some of its basic ideas and assumptions can certainly be found in books such as Lenin's *State and Revolution* of 1917. Above all, it is not the making and using of a power which appears overnight and, as it were, fully clothed in competent strength. Lastly, *Poder Popular* owes nothing to an African chauvinism, to a Mozambican cultural provincialism, or to any 'theory' which supposes (as *per* Senghor, Ahidjo, Mobutu and company) that the laws of socio-political development are somehow 'different' in Africa from other continents. It is a synthesis deriving from people's struggle (in Mozambique in this case) and from world revolutionary experience as well.

Poder Popular is a process. It began to be developed in its earliest forms in the wartime liberated zones of Delgado and Niassa Provinces. There, by 1966, FRELIMO fighting units had driven colonial power from fairly large areas. The need now was a dual one: to continue with the political and social work of transforming mass support, of mass sympathy with FRELIMO, into mass participation, 'so that people could liberate themselves', while beginning, at the same time, to build new and post-colonial, anti-colonial, institutions of self-government. Clearly, the way to secure both objectives was to draw the people of the liberated zones into this work of building new institutions. Thus the first 'people's committees', the earliest forms of autonomous self-government, took shape inside the 'institutional void' brought about by FRELIMO when they drove out colonial power and destroyed its institutions. These committees were weak at first, limping from lack of understanding, experience, and practical skill. But they were sufficiently successful to show that the right solution had been found.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

With time, these new institutions of *Poder Popular* were able to transform the liberated zones into powerful bases of mass participation. So the liberated zones provided the 'laboratories' of FRELIMO policy. What was tried and applied there, and gradually achieved after much revision and modification, gave FRELIMO two big advantages over all its enemies, whether colonial or otherwise; and these advantages are bigger today even than they were before. The first advantage was to endow FRELIMO with a practical guide to action in all those regions of the country that could be liberated only at the end of the war. The second advantage was to endow FRELIMO with a numerous core of men and women who well understood what needed to be done and how to do it. When FRELIMO took over the whole country in 1975, it thus possessed a leadership, 'up and down the line' as well as 'at the top', who knew what their society ought to aim for, and had a fairly clear idea about the next steps to getting there. They did not have to think up some sudden answer, discovered overnight, to the problems of power. They had this answer working in everyday practice in their 'old' liberated areas of the war, even if now they had to apply it in the different and often much more difficult circumstances of the areas occupied by the Portuguese colonialism till 1975.

This is not to say that they had worked out every aspect of the application of *Poder Popular* and its implications; nor that their practice had yet reached the point (necessarily some way in the future) where they would have to work out practical solutions to new problems of the mediation of power between party and state, between bureaucracy and *Poder Popular*; nor that they were men and women who never blundered, never lost their way, and never failed to meet a challenge. No such claims were made, and it is a measure of the superiority of this leadership that no such claims have been made since. Everyone is fallible, and the test of practice is what counts. A statement of 1974 gives the keynote. Speaking in that July of FRELIMO's ideas on a new post-colonial education system, Samora remarked with a customary lack of flannel that

> The truth is that we know very well what we do not want: oppression, exploitation, humiliation. But as to what we do want and how to get it, our ideas are necessarily still vague. They are born of practice, corrected by practice. Our experience about forming a new mankind, how to define this mankind, how to go about forging it, is new and recent: our practice is still a limited one. We are bound to run into setbacks. But it's from these setbacks that we will learn ... [2]

And if one stands aside for a moment from the immediate scene and speculates on a more or less distant future, this is probably the only realistic approach to other problems — problems, essentially, of

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

democracy — which may arise in the future (in my opinion, at least, are bound to arise) in respect of the mediation of power between party and people, between bureaucracy and *Poder Popular*. That kind of problem may be 'inherent to human nature': in any case, it is certainly inherent to all institutional history up to the present time, above all in periods of social revolution. Such problems of democracy were inherent to the building of capitalism in its democratic potential for the bourgeoisie, and they have remained inherent to capitalism, as the western European history of the last fifty years can demonstrate most crushingly. In a different but nonetheless comparable context, they have just as certainly remained inherent to the building of post-capitalist systems, of socialist systems.

Such problems concerning the mediation of power and the advance (or regression) of modes of democracy are certainly perceived by this leadership in Mozambique. They are problems which have in fact always formed a threatening aspect of the whole problematic of self-transformation, if only because every armed struggle for liberation contains within itself not only the fruits of liberation but also the weeds of military 'commandism' and elitism — in a word, of dictatorship. Can the leadership and movement progressively eliminate the weeds and reap the fruits? It has always been the proof of success or failure. FRELIMO can confidently claim to have succeeded: 'by practice, corrected by practice', but it would be naive to suppose that this success was easy, much less automatic. On the contrary, it has been a success long struggled for *within* the movement as well as against the colonialist enemy. Given that success during the armed struggle (and the clearest test came in 1968-9 in the circumstances I have mentioned above), FRELIMO has again set itself since 1975 to struggle in other circumstances against new forms of 'commandism' or elitism, and the process obviously continues and will continue.

This concept of democratic enlargement, of applying policies to that end and then correcting and improving these policies, of setting objectives and then re-setting them, extending them, reinforcing their persuasive and instructional power: all this is reflected in another concept, in the concept of 'cultural revolution'. They are very much in agreement with Amilcar Cabral when he said in 1972 that 'the struggle for liberation is not only a cultural fact, it is also a *determinant of culture*',[3]: of a people's culture that is, once this people has identified itself, actively, individually, collectively, with the tasks of self-liberation. 'A people's revolutionary war', Samora observed in January 1979, 'produces a people's revolutionary culture. It produces a cultural revolution ...'[4] A cultural revolution, we should note, not only against 'colonial values' which spell subjection, exploitation, indifference, demoralisation, a fear that 'nothing can be done': but also, and no less, against a whole quantity of 'pre-colonial values' — of 'values surviving from the past which are negative and

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

hang a dead weight on our progress: old attitudes, traditionalist, tribalist, regionalist, racist...'[5]

In other words, a dual revolution: against the attitudes and structure of the colonial system in all its aspects, and, at the same time, against all those 'past values' — the oppression of women, destructive customs, divisive loyalties, distrust of modern science — which, in surviving from another age, clog the wheels of liberation and, if they can, bring those wheels to a stop.[6].

All this is the ongoing process of *Poder Popular*.

By 1979, the institutions of the wartime liberated zones — the institutions of self-rule, self-reliance, individual responsibility within collective responsibility: in short, the institutions of mass participation — were extended widely across Mozambique. Often in new forms in new types of organisation, in new structures of power, and with a firmer grip upon what should be done and how it should be done. There is space to summarise only a few of the essentials to perceiving this process and the various ways in which it works.

★ ★ ★

The basic principle is that every community should organise itself to analyse its own problems and possibilities, find appropriate solutions and policies, and act to bring these solutions and policies into force. People living or working together are asked to meet, discuss, decide, and act. Perhaps needless to insist, this is not any kind of invitation to destructive rivalry or conflict. On the contrary. Just as the good of the individual, in this evolving system, can be realised only as part of the good of his or her local community, so also can the good of that community come to fruition only in the measure that it contributes to the good of the wider community: regional, provincial, national. This is the meaning of FRELIMO's centralism: misery and exploitation can really end for some only in the measure that they end for all; and the militants of FRELIMO, whether as state, government or party in their various fields of responsibility and action, are there to ensure this. The new structures are institutions of democracy: just because of this, they are institutions set hard against all forms of divisive influence, whether regionalist, opportunist, elitist, which could subvert the unity of this evolving society.

How does it work? By self-government: yes, but how? As matters stood in 1979, three chief forms of democratic structure had taken shape, were in place, were going through their teething troubles, or, already, were broadly effective.

The first form is an assembly-delegate structure applied to communities defined by place of residence (a village, a group of hamlets, a city 'quarter' (*bairro*), and so on), or by place of work (a factory, a co-operative, a communal village (*aldeia comunal*: see

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

below), and so on again). Each community is expected to meet in public session, and regularly, there being present all who can be persuaded to attend (as many as possible: all if possible). This public session is defined as a 'people's assembly', and it has powers. These powers vary with type of community and other circumstances, as well as with the degree of experience in self-government that people have acquired, and, of course, that people continue to acquire as the process unfolds. The assembly elects an executive committee from among its members. Subject to assembly control and re-election, this executive governs.

It governs according to the laws of the land and the objectives of the revolution: within these limits, it governs above all by local initiative. The watchword is self-reliance. Each community should have a school, a clinic, other services. The state will help it to acquire these benefits with the provision of materials (roofing materials, for instance, and medical supplies); but there will be no school and no clinic (for example) unless the community sets to and builds those facilities, pays the teacher or the 'barefoot doctor' or the motor-mechanic, houses that cadre, makes sure that these cadres can do their work. The point is that 'they' are not doing things for 'us': 'they' are only helping 'us' to do things for ourselves.

The lesson is not easily learned. Colonial habits of mind stand often in the way. There is the case of the communal villages (*aldeias comunais*). FRELIMO called to peasants living in isolated homesteads and tiny hamlets, to individual families 'lost in the bush', that they should come together in communal villages capable of being supplied and supplying themselves with modern facilities, of producing more and better, of living with less daily difficulty, of carrying domestic water for shorter distances, of opening for themselves and their children the perspectives of a real mental and material progress. This call had been widely answered by 1978. Large numbers of such peasants responded to it. More than a thousand communal villages had been formed, and the number was growing rapidly in 1979.

Yet very few of these villages deserved the name. Most were the fruit of unplanned moves by peasants who, forming new communities (or at least the basis for such communities), then sat back and waited for the state — for the government, in a word for FRELIMO — to 'take it on from there' and bring them the good things they needed. Many such villages, in consequence, were badly sited for production and the marketing of produce. Some were far too big; others were pitifully small. Profoundly believing in their movement, thinking it capable of miracles, peasants waited for 'the magic' to begin. An administrator in Nampula Province explained to me one morning that he had just received a delegation of peasants who said they had formed a new communal village, and who now asked for a school and a clinic. They totalled exactly four families, and were

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

much set back on hearing that nothing could be done for them. Here one sees how the old traditions of behaviour, colonial rather than pre-colonial, had led these families into thinking that all power to change reality rested not with them but with 'authority'.

Yet the lesson has to be learned: *Poder Popular* depends on that. In this respect, too, 1978-9 introduced a period of analysis and discussion concerned with the shortcomings of existing *aldeias comunais* and the means to remove such weaknesses. Ths has led to three chief conclusions. The first is that the policy of building communal villages for scattered homesteads and hamlets is the right policy. Secondly, the wide response to this policy has proved that the peasants want these villages. But, thirdly, a lack of cadres, of militants trained in the work and competent to carry it out, has proved a large obstacle to success. 'In two or three years', a FRELIMO leader remarked on this point, 'we think that we'll have enough cadres to handle this situation.' Meanwhile, the work of correction and improvement goes on with the cadres now to hand.

What work? Essentially, the work of patient explanation and practical advice. Another FRELIMO leader, Oscar Monteiro, told me an instructive story about what this work has to mean.

Along with his or her other duties, each senior militant is expected to act as a member of a 'brigade', a group of tried and trained militants, whose duty is to 'dynamise' (persuade, encourage, 'get moving') this or that community. Oscar's brigade is concerned with the 15,000 inhabitants of a certain *bairro* in the *caniço* (the mud-road and thatched-house suburbs) of Maputo. These suburbs came into existence during the final years of colonial crisis when destitute countryfolk were crowding to the cities in the hope of finding some minimal means of livelihood: they are huge, still growing rapidly, and for the most part without any modern facility or public service, other than those now beginning to be installed.

In this *bairro* of 15,000 people there was no single telephone: no public telephone and, of course, no private telephone. Bad: so a public telephone should be installed? The *bairro* assembly thought so, and agreed where to put it: in a central position near the *bairro* market and a dispensary now in prospect. The assembly also agreed that the phone should have an electric light, now that the *bairro* is linked to the Maputo grid, and even that a guard should be placed on the phone in case some vandal lunatic should take it for a target. (There isn't much vandalism in Maputo now, but there is still some left over from the colonial crisis.) That would cost a little more, but people agreed to pay.

Good: but who is to do the necessary work of preparing to instal the phone? That's technically not difficult, nor expensive either; all the same, who is going to do it?

A meeting is called with Oscar and the other members of his

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

brigade in attendance. A man stands up and says to Oscar: 'All right, you're the government. We elected you to get things done. So it's up to you to do the necessary work.'

Oscar: 'But our brigade is responsible for a lot of things. If we undertake to do this work, as well as helping you to consider and decide this sort of question for yourselves, do you think we'd possibly have the time?'

Man: 'Well, it's obviously your job. We don't know how to put in telephones.'

Oscar: 'Then you can learn. And what changes things, anyway?' (Now this refers to a well-known FRELIMO teaching slogan, and it gets its immediate response.)

Many voices, in chorus: 'Practice changes things.'

Oscar: 'But whose practice, yours or ours in the brigade? If we instal the phone, and you merely use it, what's changed in your minds, in your attitudes? No: it's for you to go and find the poles for the cable — the government will pay for them — and work out where to plant them, and plant them, and do the other work that needs to be done before the telephone technicians come with the cable and the phone. Then it'll be your telephone, something you've helped to create for yourselves — '

Another man gets up at this point and interrupts him. 'I'm smiling, you'll see that', says this man, 'and you'll be asking why. I'll tell you. It's because I've listened to you and I've understood, I've understood at last just what this thing really is, this *poder popular* ... ' Even in the small matter of installing a telephone, the great lesson that has to be learned could indeed be learned, for what this second man said carried the meeting. The people of this *bairro* did indeed collect the necessary cable poles, and decide where best to plant them, and plant them, and do the other preparatory work of preparation. They got their telephone. But more than that, they scored a larger collective gain. They carried their community another small step forward to coherence, self-reliance, self-confidence in tackling common problems, out of the makeshift chaos and disunity in which their *bairro*, their urban slum as it at once became, had somehow shambled into existence around 1972.

★ ★ ★

One may see in this, no doubt, the true 'workings', the 'intimate machinery', of revolutionary process. There is nothing sentimental about it, and no idealism has much to add. It is a hardheaded process among hardheaded people such as the people of that *bairro*: hard to persuade, and hard to lead even when persuaded, if only because (but not only because) no leadership in living memory has ever before proposed to help them and set out to prove that it can do this.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

On the other hand, it is also the process which, once in movement, gathers quickly to itself the kind of popular confidence and enthusiasm which the sceptics from afar find so difficult to believe. But the confidence and enthusiasm, all the same, are as real when they arrive as the initial reluctance and suspicion. That is another thing 'inherent to human nature', it would seem, and above all in times of social revolution. The problem is to get people thinking together and working together and moving together, and, once they are in movement, to help on the momentum. Presiding over this movement of great masses of people never before united in their history, FRELIMO has other aids for 'pushing and steering'.

Among these, three mass organisations stand out in their importance: devoted, respectively, to the promotion of the specific interests of women, youth, and the new workers' unions which have displaced the corporative-fascist fakes of colonial times. Women's liberation, for example: what does it mean in Mozambique? It is indispensable to further progress. That's generally (and, at least in theory, easily) agreed. And it's an old theme of this struggle. FRELIMO created OMM, the Organisation of Mozambican Women (*Organisação da Mulher Mozambicana*), many years ago. Its militants worked in the wartime liberated zones, promoting there, among other things, a women's fighting detachment.

After 1975, OMM began to work in the rest of the country as well. But it failed to work well. Once again, there was the very general assumption (among women, this time) that 'they' would do good things for 'us', rather than that 'we' should do these things for ourselves. But 'they', of course, would not do these things, and even could not do them. For the concept of women's liberation here is in line with *Poder Popular*: it holds accordingly that individuals in their communities can only liberate themselves — no one else can do it for them — and only if they act together. The government will respond with progressive laws and administrative attitudes; but nothing will happen unless there is collective action 'at the base'. Given the traditional (and pre-colonial) subjection of women in Mozambique, and the long influence of colonialism in deepening this subjection (since colonialism found it always convenient, here, to treat African men as chattels and African women as the chattels of men), this collective action 'at the base' was and remains hard to achieve. Yet in 1979 it was undoubtedly beginning to appear.

At a communal village (and cooperative) out in the northern bush a lengthy discussion with members of the village executive came round at last to the woman question. Two women's delegates were present. One of them, in this situation characteristically the younger of them, replied to my questions. 'Look,' she said, 'I am sitting alongside you on this bench, and I am telling you what we women want and mean to get. Which of us women could have done that before? I could not

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

even have sat alongside you, I couldn't have sat down at all, I'd have been chased out, beaten even...' and she went into current demands: polygamy has to stop, female initiation rites (preparing young women for subjection to husbands) have to stop, using women as sex objects has to stop (she used blunter words), unequal treatment at work has to stop.

Now this communal village and cooperative is relatively advanced, it is far better organised than the majority of such villages and producer cooperatives, and one should not think that what this peasant woman said is what most peasant women say openly as yet. All the same, these things were said without fear or hesitation by a peasant woman under 30 who can barely read or write, and who, quite certainly, belongs to the first of many generations (and how many!) ever to talk like this in public: or to know that, in talking like this, she has the party and the government and the state on her side, even if she still has most men and many women on the other side.

Another central factor in the process is the new party, FRELIMO-Partido, which has crystallised since 1977 out of the liberation movement. It is the most important of all the instruments of persuasion, supervision, action-by-example, and education-in-practice that FRELIMO has given birth to. It deserves a detailed study: here again it can receive only a sketch. It rests on two principles. First, that no social revolution can be carried to success without a revolutionary party to launch and lead and steer. Secondly, that the party itself has to be another emanation of the processes of *Poder Popular*, of self-transformation, and, beyond any possible doubt, has to be *seen* to be that.

As such, FRELIMO-Partido has no legislative, administrative, or other coercive power. It has no coercive power. It is not the state and it is not the government, even if neither can be imagined without its formative influence and controlling presence. Its members, numbering many thousands by the middle of 1979, have not appointed themselves, nor has the government appointed them, nor does their membership depend in any way upon the state. How then did they become members, or how are new members selected, given that the process of selection must continue across the years? In 1977 the liberation-movement-in-power, FRELIMO, decided at a congress to form this party and proceeded to ask for candidates. Many proposed themselves, or were proposed by others. But they were not therefore selected, for who could be sure that they were the right sort of persons to carry out the duties and obligations of membership? Who could be sure that they were the sort of persons who deserved public confidence, who had a record clean of bad compromise with colonialism, whom people would trust because people knew they could be trusted?

The answer, clearly, had to be sought in the communities from

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

which these candidates came. Each candidate, accordingly, was asked to attend a public meeting of his or her community. 'Here,' said FRELIMO at this meeting, 'is a candidate for party membership. Shall we select him (or her)?' There was no need, apparently, to ask twice; and what happened next, in countless such meetings of selection across the country, would again merit telling at length.

Given that party members would have influence, if only because they would have access to administrative power (and some of them, of course, would share that administrative power, though not in their status as party-members), it was grasped at once that good and reliable persons should be selected. None should be accepted, FRELIMO added, who was known to have sold out to colonial power in the past, served the political police (PIDE), betrayed the cause of liberation ... But, at the same time, FRELIMO said, there should be a sensible tolerance and forgiveness, no spirit of revenge: so that men and women who had merely served the colonial power without abetting crimes of oppression could still be accepted if they were otherwise good and reliable persons. Long and intimate discussions followed at these public meetings, and much came out that had never come out before.

In extreme cases, where really bad persons had presented themselves, there were tumultuous and even violent scenes. This happened whenever former colonial agents, spies or persecutors had somehow managed to smuggle themselves into positions of confidence in 1975 and after. Of the records of such meetings that I saw, none was more instructive than the initial selection meeting for candidates belonging to a cashew-shelling factory in Maputo. This factory employs some 2,160 women and they were angry. They were asked to give opinions on certain persons who happened to be men who had long kicked them around in colonial times, blackmailed them for sexual favours ('do it with me or it's your job'), beaten them and in one case even killed a woman worker. All the same, these men had managed to survive the colonial clean-out and maintain a hold on the factory. The reckoning came now, and in the end, so angry were these women, the FRELIMO militant in charge of the meeting had to ask for help from the police. Not many selection meetings reached that point of fury against unworthy candidates, but quite a few seem to have been long and arduous, and often painful for the would-be party members in question. But at the end of this process of selection FRELIMO could feel sure that the new party was being founded with good and trusted members. They might not all be perfect human beings; but it was quite unlikely that more than a few could possibly be rogues or layabouts.

★ ★ ★

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

These notes have concentrated, even if still very sketchily, on the processes of *Poder Popular* because they are decisive in Mozambique today, and because they will decide the future. Many interesting things have been omitted. Nothing has been said on steps being taken to get production levels back to pre-war levels within the near future; to reduce inefficiency, muddle and confusion; to lay foundations for a planned economy capable of exploring and exploiting all the material resources of this potentially very rich country (new initiatives, for example, include large-scale digging of coal in Tete and planting of coffee in Zambésia); to track and define the human possibilities by the getting of necessary information — by a national census of population now being prepared, by ecological surveys, by the recovery and analysis of Mozambican history, and much else besides. But I hope these notes will have told something useful about the greatest effort of all, the installation of revolutionary organs of self-transformation.

★ ★ ★

One other aspect must be touched on. This is the danger to Mozambique (as to Angola, and as to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe and Namibia and South Africa) which threatens all the time from racist and imperialist bases, most nearly and dangerously in the South African regime. This is a very living danger in Mozambique today. Repeated raids and aggressions, many bombings, the infiltration of sabotage teams and other forms of 'destabilisation', make sure that no one can forget it. We should not forget it either. The very clear objective of racist South Africa and its international partners is to undermine and isolate Mozambique and Angola. To strangle these democratic regimes while they are still young and comparatively weak. To kill the processes of revolution. To sweep these obstructions out of the path of a racist and imperialist hegemony and exploitation in the whole of the southern subcontinent. The solidarity of all progressive people everywhere is needed here. And needed now.

That being so, let me conclude with a recent FRELIMO statement on the subject. Drawing attention to these dangers, FRELIMO warns that

> It is imperialism which is attacking us. It attacks us hidden behind the mask of the Rhodesian racist regime. It attacks us because in our country the schools are ours, the health sector serves the people, exploitation of man by man is being eliminated. It attacks us because the people exercise power and want to develop their economy to improve their lives. In short, they are attacking socialism at birth ...

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

The revolution of people's power will win. Meanwhile, in its time of danger, it has the right to demand our support. To demand every support that we can give.

July 1979

REFERENCES

1 From report of Standing Political Committee of 4th Session of Central Committee of FRELIMO presented by Samora Machel: Agência de Informacao de Mocambique, Maputo (7-16 August 1978). Translated by Agency.
2 Samora Machel, *A Nossa Luta*, collected speeches and writings (Maputo, 1975). Translated by B.D.
3 Amilcar Cabral, 'The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence' (Paris, 1972). Original in French, translated by B.D.
4 Samora Machel, interview in *Tempo*, Maputo (7 January 1979). Translated by B.D.
5 *Loc cit.*
6 Cf. Agostinho Neto, president of MPLA and of the people's Republic of Angola, quoted in B. Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People* (London, 1975). Corresponding formulations will be found in the writings of Amilcar Cabral at various points.

To FRELIMO and the people of Mozambique

Congratulations!

– 4th anniversary of the People's Republic

– 17th anniversary of FRELIMO

Race & Class

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Socialist Review

Socialist Review is a bi-monthly journal of American politics and culture in their international setting. Issues feature a wide range of articles on politics, social movements, and important theoretical questions.

Articles from recent and forthcoming issues:

Nuclear Power and the Anti-Nuclear Movement *Pector*

The Labor Movement and the Left in the U. S. *Aronowitz*

Violence in the Family *McGrath*

Black America in the 1970's *Marable*

Debate on Zionism, Anti-Semitism, and the U. S. Left

Women and Trade Unions *Milkman*

Theory, Practice, and Communication *Gintis*

The Welfare State Today *Gough*

Subscribe to SR now — and don't miss any of our future issues. For only $15, you'll receive six issues — they would cost $18 if purchased at bookstores. And if you send this form in with your check, and save both of us the trouble of a billing process, your subscription is only $14.

SOCIALIST REVIEW
New Fronts Publishing Company
4228 Telegraph Avenue
Oakland, CA 94609

Name _____

Address _____

City State/Zip _____

Total Enclosed _____

Please Bill Me:

____$15 for one year subscription (six issues)

____$16 outside the U. S.

____$26 for two year subscription

____$28 outside the U. S.

____$12 for a gift subscription, if you already subscribe

Back issues $3 each _____

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

CEDRIC ROBINSON

The emergence and limitations of European radicalism

The historical development of world capitalism was influenced in a most fundamental way by the particularistic forces of racism and nationalism. This could only be true if the social, psychological and cultural origins of racism and nationalism both anticipated capitalism in time and formed a piece with those events which contributed directly to its organisation of production and exchange. Feudal society is the key. More particularly, the antagonistic commitments, structures and ambitions which feudal society encompassed are better conceptualised as those of a developing civilization than as elements of a unified tradition. The processes through which the world system emerged contained an opposition between the rationalistic thrusts of an economistic world-view and the political momenta of collectivist logic. A primary consequence of the conflict between those two social tendencies was that capitalists, as the architects of this system, never achieved the coherence of structure and organisation which had been the promise of capitalism as an objective system.[1] On the contrary, the history of capitalism has in no way distinguished itself from earlier eras with respect to wars, material crises and social conflicts. A secondary consequence is that the critique of capitalism, to the extent that its protagonists have based their analyses upon the presumption of a determinant economic rationality in the development and expansion of capitalism, has been characterised by an incapacity to come to terms with the world

CEDRIC ROBINSON is Director of the Center for Black Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara. This article forms part of the introductory chapter to his book, *Black Marxism* (in progress).

Race & Class, XXI, 2(1979)

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

system's direction of development. Marxism, the dominant form that the critique of capitalism has assumed in western thought, incorporated theoretical and ideological weaknesses which stemmed from the same social forces which provided the bases of capitalist formation.

The creation of capitalism was much more than a matter of the displacement of feudal modes and relations of production by capitalist ones.[2] Certainly, the transformation of the economic structures of non-capitalist Europe (specifically the Mediterranean and western European market, trade and production systems) into capitalist forms of production and exchange was a major part of this process. Still, the first appearance of capitalism in the fifteenth century[3] involved other dynamics as well. The social, cultural, political and ideological complexes of European feudalisms contributed more to capitalism than the social 'fetters'[4] which precipitated the bougeoisie into social and political revolutions. No class was its own creation. Indeed, capitalism was less a catastrophic revolution (negation) of feudalist social orders than the extension of these social relations into the larger tapestry of the modern world's political and economic relations. Historically, the civilisation evolving in the western extremities of the Asian/European continent, and whose first signification is medieval Europe,[5] passed with few disjunctions from feudalism as the dominant mode of production to capitalism as the dominant mode of production. And from its very beginnings, this European civilisation, containing racial, tribal, linguistic and regional particularities, was constructed on antagonistic differences.

Europe's formation

The social basis of European civilisation was 'among those whom the Romans called the "barbarians"'.[6] Prior to the eleventh or the twelfth centuries the use of the collective sense of the term barbarian was primarily a function of exclusion rather than a reflection of any significant consolidation among those peoples. The term signified that the 'barbarians' had their historical origins beyond the civilising reach of Roman law and the old Roman imperial social order. The 'Europe' of the ninth century for which the Carolingian family and its minions claimed paternity was rather limited geopolitically[7] and had a rather short and unhappy existence. Interestingly, for several centuries following the deaths of Charlemagne and his immediate heirs (the last being Arnulf, d.899), both the Emperor and Europe were more the stuff of popular legend and clerical rhetoric than manifestations of social reality.[8] The idea of Europe, no longer a realistic project, was transferred from one of a terrestrial social order to that of a spiritual kingdom: Christendom.

In fact, those peoples to whom the Greeks and the Romans referred collectively as barbarians were of diverse races with widely differing

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

cultures.[9] The diversity of their languages is, perhaps, one measure of their differences. But in using this measure, we must be cautious of the schemes of classification of those languages which reduce the reality of their numbers to simple groupings like the Celtic, the Italic, the Germanic, the Balto-Slavonic and Albanian languages.[10]

Direct and indirect evidence indicates that a more authentic mapping of the languages of the proto-Europeans would be much more complex. For instance, H. Munro Chadwick, as late as 1945, could locate extant descendants of those several languages among the Gaelic, Welsh and Breton languages of Great Britain and France; the Portuguese, Spanish, Catalan, Provencal, French, Italian, Sardinian, Alpine and Rumanian languages and dialects of southern and western Europe; the English, Frisian, Dutch, German, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian and Icelandic languages of England, Scotland, the Netherlands, Germany and Scandinavia; the Russian, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, Slovenian, Slovak, Czech, Polish and Lusitian languages and dialects of central and eastern Europe; and the Latvian and Lithuanian languages of northern Europe.[11] But even Chadwick's list was of merely those languages which had survived 'the millenium of Europe'. The list would lengthen considerably if one were to consider the languages which existed in this area at the beginning of this era and are no longer spoken (for example, Latin, Cornish, Prusai), along with those languages of peoples who preceded the migrations from the north and east of Rome's barbarians (for example, Basque, Etruscan, Oscan, Umbrian).[12]

The Ostrogoth, Visigoth, Vandal, Suevi, Burgundi, Alamanni and Frank peoples (that is the barbarians), whose impact on the fortunes of the Late Roman Empire from the fifth century was quick and dramatic,[13] were in fact a small minority of thousands among the millions of the decaying state. Henri Pirenne, relying on the estimates of Emile-Felix Gautier and L. Schmidt, reports that the Ostrogoths and Visigoths may have numbered 100,000 each, the Vandals 80,000 and the Burgundi 25,000.[14] Moreover, the warrior strata of each kingdom is consistently estimated at about 20 per cent of their populations. On the other hand, the Empire which they invaded contained as many as 50-70 million persons.[15] Pirenne cautiously concludes:

> All this is conjecture. Our estimate would doubtless be in excess of the truth if, for the Western provinces beyond the *limes*, we reckoned the Germanic element as constituting 5 percent of the population.[16]

More importantly, the vast majority of the barbarians 'came not as conquerors, but exactly as, in our own day, North Africans, Italians, Poles cross into Metropolitan France to look for work'.[17] In a relatively short time, in the southern-most European lands which

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

were bounded by the western Roman Empire, these peoples were entirely assimilated by the indigenous peoples as a primarily slave labour force.[18] The pattern was already a familiar one within the dying civilisation of the Mediterranean[19] with which they desired and desperately needed to join.[20]

It is also important to realize that, with respect to the emerging European civilisation whose beginnings coincide with the arrivals of these same barbarians, slave labour as a critical basis of production would continue without any significant interruption into the twentieth century.[21] From the *familia rustica* which characterised Roman and even earlier Greek (*doulos*) rural production within vast estates, through the *manucipia* of the *colonicae* and *mansi* land-holdings of Merovingian (481-752) and Carolingian eras, the feudal villeins of western medieval Europe and England, and the *sclavi* of the Genoese and Venetian merchants who dominated commerical trade in the Mediterranean from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, slave labour persisted as an aspect of European agrarian production up to the modern era.[22] Neither feudal serfdom, nor capitalism had as their result the elimination or curtailment of slavery.[23] At the very most (it is argued by some), their organisation served to relocate it.[24]

Despite the 'Romanisation' of the southern Goths, or (seen differently) because of it, the Germanic tribes did establish the general administrative boundaries which were to mark the nations of modern western Europe. The kingdoms which they established, mainly under the rules of Roman *hospitalitas* and in accordance with Roman administration,[25] were in large measure the predecessors of France, Germany, Spain and Italy.

Still, we must not forget that in historical reconstruction, a medieval age is to be intervened between these two ages. Medieval Europe, though still agricultural in economy was a much cruder existence for slave, peasant, farmer, artisan, land-owner, cleric and nobility alike than had been the circumstance for their predecessors in the Empire. Urban life declined, leaving the old cities in ruins,[26] long-distance trade, especially by sea routes, decayed dramatically.[27] Latouche summarises:

> The balance-sheet of the Merovingian economy is singularly disappointing. The now fashionable, if unpleasant, word 'rot' describes it to perfection. Whether in the sphere of town life, commerce, barter, currency, public works, shipping, we find everywhere the same policy of neglect, the same selfish refusal to initiate reform. From this disastrous, drifting *laissez-faire* which left men and things as they had always been, pursuing unchanged their traditional way of life, there sprang the illusion that the ancient world still lingered on; it was, in fact, no more than a facade.[28]

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

The Carolingian Empire did little to repair the 'rot' which anticipated the restructuring of Europe in feudal terms. The Muslim conquests of the Mediterranean in the seventh and eighth centuries had deprived the European economies of the urban commercial, productive and cultural vitality they required for their reconstruction. Pirenne put it boldly:

> The ports and the cities were deserted. The link with the Orient was severed, and there was no communication with the Saracen coasts. There was nothing but death. The Carolingian Empire presented the most striking contrast with the Byzantine. It was purely an inland power, for it had no outlets. The Mediterranean territories, formerly the most active portions of the Empire, which supported the life of the whole, were now the poorest, the most desolate, the most constantly menaced. For the first time in history the axis of Occidental civilization was displaced towards the North, and for many centuries it remained between the Seine and the Rhine. And the Germanic peoples, which had hitherto played only the negative part of destroyers, were now called upon to play a positive part in the reconstruction of European civilization.[29]

Latouche, though he differed with Pirenne on many of the particulars of the Carolingian response to the loss of the Mediterranean, finally concurred:

> ... the Empire broke up less than half a century after its creation, and Charlemargne did nothing to prevent, and did not even attempt to delay, the development of feudal institutions, so heavy with menace for the future ... a world in which there were no great business concerns, no industries, and in which agricultural activity was predominant.[30]

Urban life, trade and market systems incorporating the goods of long-distance trade did not return to Europe until the end of the eleventh century at the earliest, and most probably during the twelfth century.[31] By then, the depth to which the degradation of European life had fallen is perhaps best expressed by the appearance of commercialised cannibalism.[32]

The first bourgeoisie

Into this depressed land, where few were free of the authority of an intellectually backward and commercially unimaginative ruling class, where famine and epidemics were the natural order of things, and where the sciences of the ancient world had long been displaced as the basis of intellectual development by theogony and demonology[33], appeared the figure to which European social theorists, liberal and marxist, attribute the generation of western civilisation:

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

the bourgeoisie. The merchant was as alien to feudal society as the barbarian invaders had been to the Empire. Unlike the Mediterranean tradesmen,[34] the origins of the western European bourgeoisie is obscured. No doubt this is largely due to the fact that historical documentation is inevitably sparse where civilisation in the formal sense of urban culture has largely disappeared and where life is recorded by an elite of land and Church largely preoccupied with its own experience while being hostile to commerce.[35] Nevertheless, it is clear that the western European merchant class — 'a class of deracinés'[36] — crystallised within a social order for which it was an extrinsic phenomenon.

The economic organisation of demesne production was characterised by Pirenne as a 'closed domestic economy, one which we might call, with more exactitude, the economy of no markets'.[37] In fact, there were markets, local ones, but their function and existence had no part in the development of the markets of long-distance trades which were the basis of the merchant class's development. The *mercati* whose existence predates the bourgeoisie dealt not in trade but foodstuffs at the retail level.[38] The one factor 'internal' to the feudal order which did contribute to the rise of the bourgeoisie was the eleventh century's population growth. This increase had ultimately placed significant strains on feudal production:

> It had as a result the detaching from the land of an increasingly important number of individuals and committing them to that roving and hazardous existence which, in every agricultural civilisation, is the lot of those who no longer find themselves with their roots in the soil. It multiplied the crowd of vagabonds ... Energetic characters, tempered by the experience of a life full of the unexpected, must have abounded among them. Many knew foreign languages and were conversant with the customs and needs of divers lands. Let a lucky chance present itself ... they were remarkably well equipped to profit thereby ... Famines were multiplied throughout Europe, sometimes in one province and sometimes in another, by that inadequate system of communications, and increased still more the opportunities, for those who knew how to make use of them, of getting rich. A few timely sacks of wheat, transported to the right spot, sufficed for the realizing of huge profits ... It was certainly not long before nouveaux riches made their appearance in the midst of this miserable crowd of impoverished, bare-foot wanderers in the world.[39]

In the beginning, before they could properly be described as bourgeoisie, these merchants travelled from region to region, their survival a matter of their mobility and their ability to capitalise on the frequent ruptures and breakdowns of the reproduction of populations sunk into the manorial soil. Their mobility may have also been

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

occasioned by the fact that many of them were not free-born and thus sought respite from their social condition by flight from their lords: 'By virtue of the wandering existence they led, they were everywhere regarded as foreigners.'[40] For security they often travelled in small bands — a habit which would continue into their more sedentary period. It was not long before they began to establish *porti* (storehouses or transfer points for merchandise) outside the *burgs* (the fortresses of the Germanic nobles), bishoprics and towns which straddled the main routes of war, communications and, later, international trade. It was these *porti*, or merchant colonies, which founded, in the main, the medieval cities of Europe's hinterland. It was at this point that the merchants of Europe became bourgeoisies (*burgenses*). By the beginnings of the twelfth century, these bourgeoises had already begun the transformation of European life so necessary for the emergence of capitalism as the dominant organisation of European production.

The western European bougeoisie re-established the urban centres by basing them upon exchange between the Mediterranean, the East and northern Europe:

> [in the tenth century] there appears in Anglo-Saxon texts the word 'port', employed as a synonym for the Latin words *urbs* and *civitas*, and even at the present day the term 'port' is commonly met with in the names of cities of every land of English speech.
>
> Nothing shows more clearly the close connection that existed between the economic revival of the Middle Ages and the beginnings of city life. They were so intimately related that the same word which designated a commercial settlement served in one of the great idioms of Europe to designate the town itself.[41]

Elsewhere, Pirenne puts it more succinctly: 'Europe "colonized" herself, thanks to the increase of her inhabitants.'[42] Flanders, geographically situated to service the commerce of the northern seas and economically critical because of the Flemish cloth industry, was the first of the major European merchant centres. Close behind Flanders came Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, Lille, Douai, Arras, Tournai, Cambrai, Valenciennes, Liege, Huy, Dinant, Cologne, Mainz, Rouen, Bordeaux and Bayonne.[43] Cloth, which both Pirenne[44] and Karl Polanyi[45] identify as the basis of European trade, originally a rural industry, was transformed by the bourgeoisie in Flanders into an urban manufacture 'organised on the capitalistic basis of wage labor'.[46] The urban concentration of industry was thus initiated:

> The increase of the population naturally favored industrial concentration. Numbers of the poor poured into the towns where cloth-making, the activity of which trade grew proportionately with the development of commerce, guaranteed them their daily bread ...

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

> The old rural industry very quickly disappeared. It could not compete with that of the town, abundantly supplied with the raw material of commerce, operating at lower prices, and enjoying more advanced methods ...
>
> ... whatever might be the nature of industry in other respects, everywhere it obeyed that law of concentration which was operative at such an early date in Flanders. Everywhere the city groups, thanks to commerce, drew rural industry to them.[47]

It is also true that the bourgeoisie, in so doing, came to free some portions of the serfs,[48] only to re-enslave them through wage labour. For with urban industry came the successful attack on feudal and seigniorial servitude:

> Freedom, of old, used to be the monopoly of a privileged class. By means of the cities it again took its place in society as a natural attribute of the citizen. Hereafter it was enough to reside on city soil to acquire it. Every serf who had lived for a year and a day within the city limits had it by definite right: the statute of limitations abolished all rights which his lord exercised over his person and chattels. Birth meant little. Whatever might be the mark with which it had stigmatized the infant in his cradle, it vanished in the atmosphere of the city.[49]

With the flourishing of long-distance trade and the development of urban centres in western Europe came some specialisations in rural production. Though open-field agriculture dominated Europe as a whole in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, specialised grain production could be found in Prussia (corn), Tuscany and Lombardy (cereals), England (wheat) and north Germany (rye). By the late fifteenth century, viticulture had appeared in Italy, Spain, France and southwest Germany. In the Baltic and North Seas, fishing and salt made up a significant part of the cargoes of Hanseatic shippers. And in England and Spain, meat production for export had begun to emerge.[50]

In northern Europe, these exports joined wool and woollen cloth as the major bases of international trade. In southern Europe, that is more precisely the Mediterranean, the long-distance trade in cloth (wool, silk and later cotton), grains and wines came to complement a significant trade in luxury goods:

> The precious stuffs from the east found their way into every rich household, and so did the specialities of various European regions: amber and furs from the countries bordering on the Baltic; *objets d'art* such as paintings from Flanders, embroidery from England, enamels from Limoges; manuscript books for church, boudoir or library; fine armour and weapons from Milan and glass from Venice.[51]

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Still, according to Iris Origo, the most precious cargo of the Mediterranean tradesmen was slaves:

> ... European and Levantine traders sold Grecian wines and Ligurian figs, and the linen and woollen stuffs of Champagne and Lombardy, and purchased precious silks from China, carpets from Bokhara and Samarkand, furs from the Ural Mountains and Indian spices, as well as the produce of the rich black fields and forests of the Crimea. But the most flourishing trade of all was that in slaves — for Caffa was the chief slave-market of the Levant.[52]

Tartar, Greek, Armenian, Russian, Bulgarian, Turk, Circassian, Slav, Cretan, Arab, African (*Mori*) and occasionally Chinese (Cathay) slaves[53] (two-thirds of whom were female[54]) were to be found in the households of wealthy and 'even relatively modest Catalan and Italian families'.[55]

From the thirteenth century to the beginnings of the fifteenth century, the primary function of these predominantly European slaves in the economics of southern Europe was domestic service.[56] Nevertheless, in Spain (Catalan and Castile) and in the Italian colonies on Cyprus, Crete, and in Asia Minor (Phocaea) and Palestine, Genoese and Venetian masters used both European and African slaves in agriculture on sugar plantations, in industry, and for work in mines:

> This variety of uses to which slaves were put illustrates clearly the degree to which medieval colonial slavery served as a model for Atlantic colonial slavery. Slave man-power had been employed in the Italian colonies in the Mediterranean for all the kinds of work it would be burdened with in the Atlantic colonies. The only important change was that the white victims of slavery were replaced by a much greater number of African Negroes, captured in raids or bought by traders.[57]

The destruction of the first bourgeoisie

However, it was the fate of this nascent bourgeoisie not to thrive. Indeed, for one historical moment, even the further development of capitalism might be said to have been in question. The events of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries intervened in the processes through which feudalism was ultimately displaced by the several forms of capitalism.[58] The consequences of those events were to determine the species of the modern world: the identities of the bourgeoisies which transformed cpaitalism into a world system; the sequences of this development; the relative vitalities of the several European economies; and the sources of labour from which each economy would draw.

The momentous events of which we speak were: the periodic

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

famines which struck Europe in this period, the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century and subsequent years, the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) and the rebellions of peasants and artisans.[59] Together they had a devastating impact on western Europe and the Mediterranean — decimating the populations of cities and countryside alike, disrupting trade, collapsing industry and agricultural production — levelling, as it were, the bulk of the most developed regions of western European bourgeois activity. Denys Hay has summed it up quite well:

> The result of prolonged scarcity, endemic and pandemic plague, the intermittent but catastrophic invasions of ruthless armies, and the constant threat in many areas from well-organized robber bands, was seen not only in a dwindling population but in roads abandoned to brambles and briars, in arable land out of cultivation and in deserted villages. Contraction in the area of cultivation in its turn made dearth the more likely. There was in every sense a vicious circle. A sober estimate suggests that 'in 1470 the number of households was halved in most European villages compared with the start of the fourteenth century'; the reconquest of forest and waste of the arable is 'an episode equal in importance to the drama of the earlier clearings'.[60].

This general economic decline in Europe of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was marked in a final and visible way by social disorders much more profound than the territorial wars. Such wars, after all had been in character with feudal society. The appearance of peasant movements was not:

> In the boom condition of the thirteenth century there had been in rural areas a degree of over-population which made many peasants — day labourers, poor serfs — very vulnerable. Now the countryside was more sparsely occupied and a better living was possible for those who remained ... What was new in the slump conditions of the fourteenth century was a bitterness in the lord's relations with the villagers.[61]

As Hay indicates, the most intense of the peasant rebellions occurred in Flanders (1325-8), northern France (the Jacquerie of 1358) and England (1381). But such movements erupted over much of western Europe during the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In France, and especially Normandy (precipitated surely by the final savaging of the peasants by the forces of the Hundred Years War), in Catalonia (1409-13 and later), in Jutland (1411), in Finland (1438) and in Germany (1524), peasants arose, seizing land, executing lords, clergy and even lawyers, demanding an end to manorial dues, petitioning for the establishment of wage-labour, and insisting on the dissolution of restrictions on free buying and selling.[62]

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Within the vortex of these disturbances, long-distance trade declined drastically. In England, the export of wool and cloth, and subsequently their production, fell well below thirteenth-century levels.[63] In France (Gascony), the export of wine showed similar misfortune.[64] Hay remarks that 'Florentine bankruptcies in the first half of the fourteenth century are paralleled by similar troubles in Florence at the end of the fifteenth century',[65] while P. Ramsey notes the precipitous fall of 'the great merchant bankers of southern Germany'.[66] Further north, the Hansa League disintegrated,[67] while to the west, the Flemish cloth industry collapsed.[68] Finally, even the northern Italian city states found their bourgeoisie in decline. The foundations of the European civilisation still figuratively embryonic appeared to be crumbling.

The modern world bourgeoisie

Henri Pirenne, however, provided a key to one of the mysteries of the emergence of the modern era in the sixteenth century from the chaos and desperation of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: the 'survival' of the bourgeoisie. Pirenne also anticipated the somewhat rehetorical question put by K.G. Davies in the heat of the debate revolving around the historical authenticity of the phrase: the rise of the middle class. Davies queries:

> What, after all, is wrong with the suggestion that the *bourgeoisie*, not steadily but by fits and starts, improved its status over many centuries, a process that began with the appearance of towns and has not yet been finally consummated?[69]

Forty years earlier, Pirenne had already replied:

> I believe that, for each period into which our economic history may be divided, there is a distinct and separate class of capitalists. In other words, the group of capitalists of a given epoch does not spring from the capitalist group of the preceding epoch. At every change in economic organization we find a breach of continuity. It is as if the capitalists who have up to then been active recognize that they are incapable of adapting themselves to conditions which are evoked by needs hitherto unknown and which call for methods hitherto unemployed.[70]

Both Pirenne and Davies understood that the biological metaphor of a bourgeoisie emerging out of the Middle Ages, nurturing itself on the 'mercantilisms' and administrations of the absolute monarchies of the traditional period between feudalism and the capitalism and on the lands and titles of impoverished nobilities then finally achieving political and economic maturity and thus constituting industrial capitalism, is a shadow play. The imagery is largely unsupported by

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

historical evidence. Rather it is an historical *impression*, a phantom representation largely constructed from the late eighteenth century to the present by the notional activity of a bourgeoisie as a dominant class. This history of 'the rise of the middle class' is an amalgam of bourgeois political and economic power, the self-serving ideology of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class and thus an intellectual and political preoccupation — mediated through the constructs of evolutionary theory:

> From Darwin has descended the language of error, a language that has locked up historical thinking and imposed slovenly and imprecise conclusions even upon scholarly and sensible researchers. Words like 'growth', 'decline', 'development', 'evolution', 'decay', may have started as servants but they have ended as masters: they have brought us to the edge of historical inevitability.[71]

Hegel's dialectic of *Aufhebung*, Marx's dialectic of class struggle and the contradictions between the mode and relations of production, Darwin's evolution of the species and Spencer's survival of the fittest are all forged in the same kiln of metaphysical conventions. The declining European bourgeoisies of the fourteen and fifteenth centuries were not, for the most part, the lineal antecedents of those which appeared in the sixteenth century. The universality of capitalism is less an historical reality than a construct of this 'language of error'.[72] Not only did different western European bourgeoisies appear in the sixteenth century, but these new bourgeoisies were implicated in structures, institutions and organisations which were substantively undeveloped in the Middle Ages.

For one, the focus of long-distance trade in Europe gravitated from the Mediterranean and Scania areas to the Atlantic. The most familiar forms of this extension of trade to the south and west of the European peninsula were merchant voyages and colonisation. Secondly, 'expanded bureaucratic state structures'[73] became the major conduits of capitalist expansion: determining the direction of investment, establishing political security for such investments, encouraging certain commercial networks and relations while discouraging others:

> In these conditions, in fact, may be seen the matrix of modern capitalism: like nationalism, less the creator than the creation of the modern State. It had many antecedents, but its full emergence required a conjunction of political and moral as well as strictly economic factors. This emergence could take place within the intricate framework of one type of western State then evolving; it may be doubted whether it could have done so under any other circumstances that we know of in history; at any rate it never did.[74]

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

The city, the point of departure for the earlier bourgeoisies and their networks of long-distance trade and productive organisation, proved to be incapable of sustaining the economic recovery of those bourgeoisies situated where the merchant town had reached its highest development: northern Italy, western Germany, the Netherlands and the Baltic.[75] The absolutist state, under the hegemony of western European aristocracies, brought forth a new bourgeoisie. The territories of Castile (Spain), the Ile de France, the home counties and London (England), the expansionist and colonial ambitions and policies of their administrations, and the structures of their political economies organised for repression and exploitation, these constituted the basis of this bourgeoisie's formation.

The state and the new bourgeoisie

The bourgeoisies of the sixteenth century accumulated in the interstices of the state. And as the state acquired the machinery of rule — bureaucracies of administrative, regulatory and extractive concerns, and armies of wars of colonial pacification, international competition, and domestic repression[76] — those who would soon constitute a class settled into the proliferating roles of political, economic and juridical agents for the state. And as the state necessarily expanded its fiscal and economic activities,[77] a new merchant and banking class parasitised its host: state loans, state monopolies, state business became the vital centres of its construction.

It is still debatable whether this was a result of what Adam Smith and Eli Heckscher after him termed the 'system' of *mercantilism*,[78] or the consequence of what other historians describe as the ideology of *statism*.[79] Nevertheless, it is clear that by the seventeenth century the new bourgeoisies were identified with political attitudes and a trend in economic thought which was pure mercantilism:

> ... implicit in the 'tragedy of mercantilism' was the belief that what was one man's or country's gain was another's loss ... It was, after all, a world in which population remained remarkably static; in which trade and production usually grew only very gradually; in which the limits of the known world were expanded slowly and with great difficulty; in which economic horizons were narrowly limited; and in which man approximated more closely than today to Hobbes' vision of his natural state: for most men most of the time, life was 'poor, nasty, brutish and short'.[80]

The parochialism of the town which had so much characterised the perspective of the bourgeoisie of the Middle Ages was matched in this second era of western civilisation by a parochialism of the state. Heckscher commented that:

> The collective entity [to peoples of the sixteenth and seventeenth

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

> centuries] was not a nation unified by common race, speech, and customs: the only decisive factor for them was *the state*... Mercantilism was the exponent of the prevailing conception of the relationship between the state and nation in the period before the advent of romanticism. It was the state and not the nation which absorbed its attention.[81]

Again, the particularistic character of the formations of these bourgeoisies[82] withheld, from what would be called capitalism, a systemic structure. The class which is so consistently identified with the appearance of industrial capitalism was inextricably associated with specific 'national' structures — a relationship which profoundly influenced bourgeois imaginations and realisations. Political economies,[83] that is national economies, enclosed them and thus the bourgeoisie perceived what later analysis argues in retrospect is the beginnings of a world system as something quite different: an international system.[84] The bourgeoisies of early modern capitalism were attempting to destroy or dominate each other.

The lower orders

Just as the western European middle classes were suspended in webs of state parochialisms, so too was that vast majority of European peoples: the lower orders. The class that rules, the nobility, by its orchestration of the instrumentalities of the state, imprinted its character on the whole of European society. And since much of that character had to do with violence,[85] the lower orders were woven into the tapestry of a violent social order. By the nature of hierarchical societies, the integration of the lower classes (wage labourers, peasants, serfs, slaves, vagabonds and beggars) into the social, political and economic orders of the absolute state was on the terms of the clients of the latter. The function of the labouring classes was to provide the state and its privileged classes with the material and human resources needed for their maintenance and further accumulations of power and wealth. This was not, however, a simple question of the dominance of a ruling class over the masses.

The masses did not exist as such. As earlier, Greek and Roman thinkers had created the totalising construct of the barbarians, the feudal nobilities of western Europe had inspired and authored a similar myth: the masses. Friedrich Hertz has reported that:

> In the Middle Ages and later the nobility, as a rule, considered themselves of better blood than the common people, whom they utterly despised. The peasants were supposed to be descended from Ham, who, for lack of filial piety, was known to have been condemned by Noah to slavery. The knightly classes of many lands, on the other hand, believed themselves to be the descendants

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

> of the Trojan heroes, who after the fall of Troy were said to have settled in England, France, and Germany. This theory was seriously maintained not only in numerous songs and tales of knightly deeds, but also in many scholarly works.[86]

It was a form of this notion that Count Gobineau revived in the mid-nineteenth century, extending its conceptualisation of superiority so as to include elements of the bourgeoisie.[87] The nobilities of the sixteenth century, however, proved to be more circumspect about 'the masses' than their genealogical legends might imply. They did not become victims of their own mythic creations. When it came to the structures of the state, their knowledge of the social, cultural and historical compositions of the masses was exquisitely refined. Perhaps this is no more clearly demonstated than in one of the most critical areas of state activity: the monopolisation of force.

As we have already seen, the absolutist state was a cause and effect of war. Its economy was a war economy, its foreign trade was combative,[88] its bureaucracy administered the preparations and prosecutions of war.[89] Such a state required standing armies (and, eventually, navies). But for certainly political and sometimes economic reasons, soldiers could not be recruited easily from, in V.G. Kiernan's phrase, 'the mass of ordinary peasants and burghers'. Kiernan puts the situation most simply for France though it was the same all over Europe: 'Frenchmen were seldom eager to serve their king, and their king was not eager to employ Frenchmen.'[90] Loyalty to the state of the monarchy from the exploited ranks of the lower classes was an infrequent sentiment. In any case, not one state of the sixteenth or seventeenth century was reliant on such an identification between the masses and their rulers. The soldiers of the armies of France, Spain, England, Holland, Prussia, Poland, Sweden and at first Russia, were either alien to the states for which they fought and policed or very marginal to them:

> European governments ... relied very largely on foreign mercenaries. One of the employments for which they were particularly well suited was the suppression of rebellious subjects, and in the sixteenth century, that age of endemic revolution, they were often called upon for this purpose.
>
> ... Governments ... had to look either to backward areas for honest, simple-minded fellows untainted by political ideas ... or to foreigners.[91]

Depending then on changing fortunes, the identities of the combatants, the geo-politics of wars, and the mission, mercenaries were drawn from among the Swiss, the Scots, Picardians, Bretons, Flemings, Welsh, Basques, Mavarrese, Gallowayians, Dalmations,

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Corsicans, Burgundians, Gueldrians, the Irish, Czechs, Croatians, Magyars, and from Gascony, Allgaeu, Norway and Albania. Since one function and result of the work of these mercenaries was the suppression of subject peoples, the degree of their success is directly indicated by their own absence for the most part from the political geography of modern Europe. The absolute state (or its direct successors), the instrument which propelled them into prominence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (for France, into the late eighteenth century), ultimately absorbed the autonomous sectors from which the mercenaries originated.

In the armies of the sixteenth century, native recruits distributed among the foreign mercenaries, were also chosen with an eye for minimising the political social risks of the monarchy and its allied nobility. In France, the army 'drew it volunteers from the least "national", most nondescript types, the dregs of the poorest classes', Kiernan informs us.[92] In Spain, the hills of Aragon and the Basque provinces served a similar function. In Scotland, until the mid-eighteenth century, the Highlands were the most frequent site of recruitment; and in England, the Welsh soldier's skills became legendary.[93]

As important as the formation of these armies were for the construction of the states which dominated Europe for more than two hundred years, we must not be diverted by the romantic richness of the social and political drama to which they contributed from their more historical importance. The innovation of Louis XI, in 1474, of organising a 'French infantry without Frenchmen'[94] was revolutionary in scale, not in character.[95] The tactic of composing armies from mercenaries and from marginal peoples and social strata extended back into the Middle Ages and earlier. Imperial armies, republican armies, bandit armies, invading armies and defending armies, the armies of rebellious slaves, of nobles and even of the chauvinist medieval cities, all laid claim to or incorporated to some extent souls for whom they had, at best, few considerations in less intense times. More significantly, the point, in reviewing this phenomenon for the sixteenth and later centuries, is not that mercenaries were recruited from the outside and from among those least secure internally. This is simply the best documented form of a more generalised pattern of structural formation and social integration.

The important meaning is that this form of enlisting human reserves was not peculiar to military apparatus but extended throughout Europe to domestic service, handicrafts, industrial labour, the ship and dock workers of merchant capitalism, and the field labourers of agrarian capitalism. There has never been a moment in modern European history (if before) that migratory and/or immigrant labour was not a significant aspect of European economies.[96] That this is

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

not more widely understood seems to be a consequence of conceptualisation and analysis: the mistaken use of the *nation* as a social, historical and economic category; a resultant and persistent reference to national labour 'pools' (e.g. 'the English working class'); and a subsequent failure of historical investigation. Wallerstein, in his otherwise, quite detailed study of the origins of the capitalist world system, can devote a mere page to this phenomenon, incuding a single paragraph on the ethnic divisions of sixteenth-century immigrant labour. And, though compelled to acknowledge that 'not much research seems to have been done on the ethnic distribution of the urban working class of early modern Europe', he goes on to speculate that Kazimiery Tymimecki's description of systematic ethnic distinctions of rank within the working class 'in the towns of sixteenth century East Elba (is) typical of the whole of the world economy'.[97] Despite the paucity of studies there are historical records which tend to confirm this view. We discover in them Flemish cloth workers in early sixteenth-century London; and later in the sixteenth century and in the seventeenth century Hugenot refugees (40-80,000 of them), many of them handloom weavers, fleeing France and settling in Spitalfields in London's East End and thus establishing England's silk industry.[98] In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Irish workers 'formed the core of the floating armies of labourers who built canals, the docks, the railways and transformed the face of England'.[99] And again on the continent, as German farm workers and peasants were drawn to urban and industrial sectors of central and western Germany, Polish labour was used to fill the vacuum in eastern Germany.[100] France and Switzerland also recruited heavily from Poland, Italy and Spain.[101] And of course, the formation of industrial cores in the US before the Civil War located immigrant workers from northern Italy, Germany, Scotland and Ireland; and after the Civil War from southern Italy, and the lands of eastern, northern and central Europe: Russia, Finland, Poland, Greece and the Balkans.[102] (Perhaps the only unique aspect of north American industrial recruitment was the appearance of Asian workers, beginning in the late nineteenth century, from China, Japan and the Philippines.)[103]

We begin to perceive that the nation is not a unit of analysis for the social history of Europe. The state is a bureaucratic structure, and the 'nation' for which it administers is more a convenient construct than the historical, racial, cultural and linguistic entity that the term nation signifies.[104] The truer character of European history resides beneath the phenomenology of nation and state. With respect to the construction of modern capitalism, one must not forget the particular identities, the particular social movements and societal structures which have persisted and/or have profoundly influenced European life:

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

> Altogether western Europe had acquired a greater richness of forms of corporate life, a greater crystallization of habits into institutions, than any known elsewhere. It had a remarkable ability to forge societal ties, more tenacious than almost any others apart from those of the family and its extensions, clan or caste; ties that could survive from one epoch to another, and be built into more elaborate combinations. But along with fixity of particular relationships went a no less radical instability of the system as a whole.[105]

European civilisation is not the product of capitalism. On the contrary, the character of capitalism can only be understood in the social and historical context of its appearance.

The effects of civilisation on capitalism

The development of capitalism can thus be seen as having been determined in form by the social and ideological composition of a civilisation which had assumed its fundamental perspectives during feudalism. The bourgeoisie which led the development of capitalism were drawn from particular ethnic and cultural groups; the European proletariats and the mercenaries of the leading states from others; its peasants from still other cultures; and its slaves from entirely different worlds. The tendency of European civilisation through capitalism was thus not to homogenise but to differentiate — to exaggerate regional, subcultural, dialectical differences into 'racial' ones. As the Slavs became the natural slaves, the racially inferior stock for domination and exploitation during the early Middle Ages, as the Tartars came to occupy a similar position in the Italian cities of the late Middle Ages, so at the systemic interlocking of capitalism in the sixteenth century, the peoples of the Third World began to fill this expanding category of a civilisation reproduced by capitalism.[106]

As a civilisation of free and equal beings, Europe was as much a fiction in the nineteenth century (and later) as its very unity had been during the Merovingian and Carolingian eras. Both the Church and the more powerful nobilities of the Holy Roman Empire and its predecessor had been the source of the illusion in those earlier periods. From the twelfth century forward, it was the bourgeoisie and the administrators of state power who initiated and nurtured myths of egalitarianism while seizing every occasion to divide peoples for the purpose of their domination.[107] The carnage of wars and revolutions precipitated by the bourgeoisies of Europe to sanctify their masques was enormous. The delusion of citizenship which persisted for five centuries in western Europe as the single great levelling principle was ultimately supplanted by race and *Herrenvolk* in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[108] The functions of these

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

latter ideological constructions were related but different.

Race became largely the rationalisation for the domination, exploitation and/or extermination of non-'Europeans' (including Slavs and Jews). *Herrenvolk* explained the inevitability and the naturalness of the domination of some 'Europeans' by other 'Europeans'.

> Racialists, not satisfied with merely proclaiming the superiority of the white over the colored race, also felt it necessary to erect a hierarchy within the white race itself. To meet this need they developed the myth of the Aryan, or Nordic, superiority. The Aryan myth in turn became the source of other secondary myths such as Teutonism (Germany), Anglo-Saxonism (England and the United States), and Celticism (France).[109]

Then, in the nineteenth century modern nationalism appeared.

The emergence of nationalism[110] was again neither accidental or unrelated to the character that European capitalism had assumed historically. Again, the bourgeoisie of particular cultures and political structures refused to acknowledge their logical and systemic identity as a class. Instead, international capitalism persisted in competitive anarchy — each national bourgeoisie opposing the others as 'natural' enemies. But as powerful as the bourgoisie and its allies in the aristocracy and bureaucracy might be in some ways, they still required the cooptation of their 'national' proletariat in order to destroy their competitors. Nationalism mobilised the armed might they required either to destroy the productive capacities of those whom they opposed, or to secure new markets, new labour and productive resources.[111] Ultimately, the uneven developments of national capitalisms would have horrifying consequences for both Europe and the peoples under European dominations.

In Germany and Italy, where national bourgeoisies were relatively late in their formation, the marshalling of national social forces (peasants, farmers, workers, clerics, professional classes, the aristocracy and the state) was accomplished by the ideological phantasmagora of race, *Herrenvolk* and nationalism. This compost of violence in its time became known under the name of fascism.[112] With the creation of fascism, the bourgeoisie retained the full range of its social, political and economic prerogatives. It had the cake of the total control of its national society, an efficient instrument for expanding its domination and expropriation to the Third World, and the ultimate means for redressing the injuries and humiliations of the past. Again, not unexpectedly, slavery as a form of labour would reappear in Europe.[113]

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

REFERENCES

1 One of the most extraordinary expressions of the expectations associated with the appearance of capitalism, was Marx's caustic appraisal of the bourgeoisie's world-historical significance: 'The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment" ...

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured ...

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil ...

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society ...

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.' Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in Robert Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York, 1972), pp. 337-8. A more recent version of this vision of capitalism (reflecting both its authors' views and those of directors of multi-national (or global) corporations) is much less poetic but still as certain: 'The power of the global corporation derives from its unique capacity to use finance, technology, and advanced marketing skills to integrate production on a worldwide scale and thus to realize the ancient capitalist dream of One Great Market.' Richard Barnet and Ronald Muller, *Global Reach* (New York, 1974), p. 18.

2 Paul Sweezy, et al, *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (London, 1976) and Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (New York, 1965).

3 Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800* (New York, 1973), pp. xiii-xv.

4 Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, in Robert Tucker op.cit., pp. 158-61.

5 Robert Latouche, *The Birth of Western Economy* (New York, 1961), p. 309.

6 Petr Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid* (Extending Horizon Books, Boston undated), pp. 117-8; Henri Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne* (London, 1968), pp. 17-19, pp. 184-5; and William C. Bark, *Origins of the Medieval World* (Stanford, 1958), pp. 26-7.

7 Oscar Halecki, *The Millenium of Europe* (Notre Dame University Press, 1963), p. 50.

8 Denis de Rougemont, *The Idea of Europe* (New York, 1966), pp. 47-9 and p. 53; and Duncan McMillan, 'Charlemagne Legends', *Encyclopedia Brittanica*, Vol. 5 (Chicago, 1965), pp. 291-2.

9 H. Monro Chadwick, *The Nationalities of Europe and the Growth of National Ideologies* (Cambridge, 1945), pp. 50-75.

10 Along with the Italic, the Hellenic, the Indian, the Iranian and Armenian, these are said sometimes to constitute the Indo-European languages; see G.L. Brook, *A History of the English Language* (New York, 1958), pp. 30-60.

11 Chadwick, op.cit., pp. 14-49.

12 According to Chadwick, Basque presumably 'represents the language, or one of the languages, of the ancient Iberians', ibid., p. 49. Brook argues that there is evidence going back to the sixth century BC of Etruscan, Oscan and Umbrian being spoken in Italy; Brook, op. cit., pp. 36-7.

13 Henri Pirenne, op. cit., pp. 17-71.

14 Ibid., pp. 36-37.

15 Ibid., pp. 28 and 32.

16 Ibid., p. 37. Pirenne reports that Gautier put the number of Roman Africans at 7-8 millions in the fifth century and that Doren, for the same century, estimates that Italy's population ranged between 5-6 millions, ibid.

17 Latouche, op. cit., p. 70.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

18 Ibid., pp. 59-60, 71; Pirenne, op. cit., pp. 75-9.
19 Frank Snowden, *Blacks in Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 170-1.
20 Both Pirenne and Latouche argue that long before the mounting of political pressures on the Germanic tribes by subsequent 'barbarian' peoples (the Iranians, Mongols, Slavs and Hungarians) the Goths were motivated by essentially economic reasons to integrate with the more productive peoples of the Empire. Pirenne, op. cit., pp. 37-9; Latouche, op. cit., pp. 42-5.
21 David Brion Davis, *The Problems of Slavery in Western Civilization* (Ithaca, 1966), pp. 29-61.
22 For Greek and Roman slavery, see William L. Westermann, *The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Philadelphia, 1955), and Snowden, op. cit.; for the feudal period, see R. Welldon Finn, *An Introduction to Domesday Book* (London, 1963), pp. 118-21 as cited by Davis, op. cit., pp. 38-9, and Iris Origo, 'The Domestic Enemy: the Eastern Slaves in Tuscany in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries', *Speculum*, XXX, no. 3 (July, 1955), pp. 321-66, and Latouche, op. cit., pp. 123-5; for Genoese and Venetian trades, see Henri Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe* (New York, 1937), pp. 16-20, Davis, op. cit., pp. 43 and 52, and Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York, 1976), Vol. I, pp. 290-3 and Vol. II, pp. 754-5 — both Davis and Braudel are largely based upon the work of Charles Verlinden, *L'esclavage dans l'Europe medievale*, Vol. I (Brugge, France, 1955); and for the modern era see Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (New York, 1966).
23 Davis, op. cit., pp. 33 and 37.
24 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York, 1974), pp. 86-90. Wallerstein wishes to distinguish between the economic and legal-political conditions of New World slavery and a capitalist 'serfdom' ('coerced cash-crop labor') in Eastern Europe and among 'natives' of the New World (the *encomienda*) of the sixteenth century. His definition of 'coerced cash-crop labor' ('a system of agricultural labor control wherein peasants are required by some legal process enforced by the state to labor at least part of the time on a large domain producing some product for sale on the world market', p. 91) would appear to serve as well as a description of slavery. The point is that alone it does not distinguish the presumably distinct forms of forced labour. David Brion Davis observes that, for at least the medieval era, the distinctions were not as clear-cut in daily life as modern scholars would suggest. Davis, op. cit., p. 33.
25 Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, op. cit., p. 140. In a note to the text, Pirenne observes: 'These things were retained: the language, the currency, writing (papyrus), weights and measures, the kinds of foodstuffs in common use, the social classes, the religion — the role of Arianism has been exaggerated — art, the law, the administration, the taxes, the economic organization.' Ibid.
26 Latouche, op. cit., pp. 97-116; Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
27 Dirk Jellema, 'Frisian Trade in the Dark Ages', *Speculum*, XXX, no. 1 (January, 1955), pp. 15-36; and Latouche, op. cit., pp. 120-3. The decline of trade in Merovingian Europe is an important aspect of the attempt to challenge Henri Pirenne's 'thesis' that the Muslim invasion of Europe by ending the European-Mediterranean trade with its social and cultural concomitants precipitated the beginnings of a 'new' European civilization inaugurated by Charlemagne's empire. See Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, op. cit., pp. 162-85; Latouche, op. cit., pp. 117-88; Bark, op. cit., pp. 6-28; and Alfred Havighurst (ed.), *The Pirenne Thesis* (Boston, 1958).
28 Latouche, op. cit., p. 139.
29 Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, op. cit., pp. 184-5; Braudel, op. cit., p. 222.
30 Latouche, op. cit., pp. 173-4.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

31 Ibid., pp. 297-8. Even by the late sixteenth century, the contrast in urban life was still great between the European hinterland and the Mediterranean. Braudel writes: '... the Mediterranean region in the sixteenth century (and it must be extended to its maximum when we are talking of towns) was unique in its immensity. In the sixteenth century no other region in the world had such a developed urban network. Paris and London were just on threshold of their modern careers. The towns of the Low Countries and southern Germany (the latter bathing in the reflected glory of the Mediterranean, the former stimulated economically by merchants and sailors from the south), further north the industrious but small towns of the Hanseatic League, all of these towns, thriving and beautiful though they might be, did not make up a network as closely knit and complex as that of the Mediterranean, where town followed town in endless strings, punctuated by great cities: Venice, Genoa, Florence, Milan, Barcelona, Seville, Algiers, Naples, Constantinople, Cairo.' Braudel, *The Mediterranean* ..., op. cit., pp. 277-8.

32 'Raoul Glaber has described with an insistence verging on sadism the appalling famine which preceded the year 1033. He notes for instance that at the fair at Tournus in Burgundy, a man was offering human flesh for sale, ready cooked on a butcher's stall.' Latouche, op. cit., p. 298.

33 Bark, op. cit., pp. 70-82.

34 Pirenne, *The Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, op. cit., pp. 44-9.

35 Pirenne, *Medieval Cities, Their Origins and the Revival of Trade* (Princeton, 1948), p. 140.

36 Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, op. cit., p. 44.

37 Pirenne, *Medieval Cities* ..., op. cit., p. 46.

38 Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, op. cit., p. 40.

39 Pirenne, *Medieval Cities* ..., op. cit., pp. 114-5. Denis Hay, though in disagreement with Pirenne's interpretation of the origins of these merchants, does not specifically cite the evidentiary basis of his view, *Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (London, 1966), p. 71.

40 Ibid., p. 126. Elsewhere Pirenne has explained: '... it is incontestable that commerce and industry were originally recruited from among landless men, who lived, so to speak, on the margin of a society where land alone was the basis of existence.' *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, op. cit., p. 45.

41 Pirenne, *Medieval Cities* ..., op. cit., pp. 143-4. In eastern Europe, it was a quite different story since the political and economic powers of the towns were quixotic and short-lived: '... the towns were compelled to surrender their ancient rights of harbouring serfs; they were compelled to abandon leagues with other towns; and the lords were even able to avoid using the towns as markets for their grain by selling it direct to exporters.' Hay, op. cit., p. 41.

42 Ibid., p. 81.

43 Ibid., pp. 100-1.

44 Ibid., p. 155, and Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, op. cit., pp. 35-6.

45 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1957), p. 64.

46 Ibid.; and Pirenne, *The Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, op. cit., pp. 160-6.

47 Pirenne, *Medieval Cities* ..., op. cit., pp. 154-6.

48 Pirenne, *The Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, op. cit., pp. 57-8; and Hay, op. cit., p. 77.

49 Pirenne, *Medieval Cities* ..., op. cit., p. 193. See also Michael Tigar and Madeleine Levy, *Law and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York, 1977), pp. 80-96; elsewhere, Tigar and Levy summarise their review of the earliest thrusts of the bourgeoisie against the feudal order: 'The great achievement of the bourgeoisie in this period (1000 to 1200) was to wrest from seigneurs in hundreds of separate localities the recognition of an independent status within the feudal hierarchy.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

The urban movement ... demanded one major concession from the seigneur: a charter ... the status of *bourgeois, burgher*, or burgess ...' (p. 111).

50 Hay, op. cit., pp. 39 and 370.
51 Ibid., pp. 373-4.
52 Origo, op. cit., p. 326.
53 Origo, op. cit., pp. 328 and 336; Davis, op. cit., p. 43; and Hay, op. cit.
54 Origo, op. cit., p. 336.
55 Hay, op. cit., p. 76. Hay observes that: 'In these slave-owning communities of the Christian Mediterranean there is not much evidence that slaves were used in agriculture.' (Ibid.) Charles Verlinden does not agree: 'In Spain female slaves were generally cheaper than males, although the opposite was true in most of Italy. This was because much of the slave manpower in Spain was used in agriculture and in industry, whereas in Italy the domestic slave predominated in the cities and therefore more female workers were required.' Charles Verlinden, 'The Transfer of Colonial Techniques from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic', in *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization* (Ithaca, 1970), p. 29.
56 Charles Verlinden notes: 'The Latin word *sclavus*, the common source of the words *esclave, esclavo, escravo, schiavo, Sklave*, and *slave*, did not take root during that initial period (pre-Middle Ages) when slavery was common to the whole of Europe ... It was only when slaves were recruited from entirely new sources that other terms appeared to indicate the nonfree, and among these were *sclavus*, derived from the ethnic name of the Slave people and popularized. It appeared first in its Latin form in tenth-century Germany.' 'Medieval Slavery in Europe and Colonial Slavery in America', Verlinden, op. cit., pp. 35-6.
57 Charles Verlinden, 'The Transfer of Colonial Techniques ...,' op. cit., pp. 31-2.
58 R.H. Tawney has commented on the several forms of capitalism in European history. The occasion for his remarks was the review of Maurice Dobb's *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (London, 1946]: 'Mr. Dobb's limitation of the term capitalism to a particular system of production, under which labor is employed on the basis of a wage-contract to produce surplus value for the owner of capital, might seem, at first sight, to escape some of the ambiguities inherent in less restricted interpretations; but it raises problems of its own. It is not merely that, as he would agree, financial and commercial capitalism have been highly developed in circumstances when the institution, as interpreted by him, has been a feeble plant, and that to exclude these varieties on the ground that they do not fall within the four corners of the nineteenth-century definition is to beg the question. It is that, as his work shows, the origins and growth of the industrial species require for their elucidation to be considered in relation to the history of other members of the family, some of which have been among its progenitors. Obviously the capitalism of our day rests predominantly on a wage-system, and the latter is so familar that it is tempting to treat it as historically a constant.' Tawney, 'A History of Capitalism,' *The Economic History Review*, Second Series, Vol. II, no. 3 (1950), pp. 310-11.
59 Marian Malowist, 'The Economic and Social Development of the Baltic Countries From the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries', *The Economic History Review*, Second Series, Vol. XII, no. 2 (1959), pp. 177-8, and Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 21-6.
60 Hay, op. cit., p. 34.
61 Ibid., pp. 34-5.
62 Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (New York, 1970), pp. 198-9; and Hay, op. cit., pp. 35-7.
63 E.M. Carus-Wilson and Olive Coleman, *England's Export Trade, 1275-1547* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 201-7.
64 Hay, op. cit., p. 387.
65 Ibid., p. 389.
66 P. Ramsey, 'The European Economy in the Sixteenth Century', *The Economic*

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

History Review, Second Series, Vol. XII, no. 3 (April 1960), p. 458.

67 Hay, op. cit., p. 389.

68 Ibid.; and Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 148.

69 K.G. Davies, 'The Mess of the Middle Class', *Past and Present*, No. 22, (July 1962), p. 82.

70 As quoted by Immanuel Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 124 note.

71 Davies, op. cit., p. 79.

72 In his important but flawed study of mercentilism, Eli Heckscher made a point on the conceptualisation of capitalism related to that of Davies quoted above in the text. Heckscher commented 'that the method of treating all sorts of disconnected tendencies, paving the way to modern economic conditions, under the common name of 'modern capitalism' appears to me confusing and a thing to be shunned ...' *Mercantilism*, Vol. 1 (London, 1955), p. 14.

73 The phrase is Immanuel Wallerstein's, op. cit., p. 133; see also Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolute State* (London, 1974), pp. 40-1.

74 V.G. Kiernan, 'State and Nation in Western Europe,' *Past and Present*, No. 31 (July 1965), p.34.

75 Ibid., pp. 25-6.

76 'War for (the monarchy) was not an optional policy, but an organic need ... The whole State apparatus that rulers were putting together piecemeal was largely a by-product of war. During its adolescence, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, fighting was almost continuous; later on it grew rather more intermittent.' Ibid., p. 31.

77 Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 136-9. For an extensive discussion of the state-merchant associations see Heckscher, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 340-455.

78 See D.C. Coleman, 'Eli Heckscher and the Idea of Mercantilism,' *The Scandinavian Economic History Review*, Vol. V, no. 1 (1957), pp. 3-4.

79 Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 146-7.

80 Coleman, op. cit., pp. 18-19; see also Carl Bücher, *Industrial Evolution* (New York, 1968), (Orio, 1901), pp. 136-9.

81 Heckscher, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 14-15. Wallerstein apparently has some problems with this particular attribution to sixteenth-century bourgeoisie. While relying on Kiernan for his own characterisation — rather loosely — Wallerstein presents an interpretation which is inconsistent with respect to the distinctions to be made between statism and nationalism: 'It was only in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries within the framework of mercantilism that nationalism would find its first real advocates amongst the bourgeoisies. But in the sixteenth century, the interests of the bourgeoisie were not yet surely fixed on the state. Too large a number were more interested in open than in closed economies. And for state builders, premature nationalism risked its crystallization around too small an ethno-territorial entity. At an early point, statism could amost be said to be anti-nationalist, since the boundaries of "nationalist" sentiment were often narrower than the bounds of the monarch's state.' Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 146; also see Kiernan, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

82 See Coleman, op. cit., p. 21.

83 Heckscher, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 18.

84 Ibid., pp. 18-23; see also Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 196-7.

85 Fernand Braudel: 'Beginning in the sixteenth century and with more eclat in this century of renewal, the States — at least those who would live, prosper, and resist the exhausting expenses of land and sea warfare — the States dominate, deform economic life, subject it to a network of constraints; they capture it in their net ... the part of economic life that was at that point most modern, that which we would readily designate as operating within the framework of large-scale merchant capitalism was linked to these financial ups and downs of the State ...' Quoted by Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 138 note.

86 Friedrich Hertz, *Race and Civilization*, KTAV (no place, 1970), p. 4; see also Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Cleveland, 1958), pp. 161-5; and

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Henri Peyre, *Historical and Critical Essays* (University of Nebraska, 1968), pp. 29-30 (Peyre acknowledges his debt to Jacques Barzun, see *The French Race* (New York, 1966, Oris. 1432), and *Race* (New York, 1932)). One should also mention that with respect to the Ham legend and its origins as a rationalisation for African slavery in North America, Winthrop Jordan in his highly regarded study *White Over Black* (Chapel Hill, 1968), in company with most American scholars, has virtually ignored the phenomenon of racist attitudes among Europeans toward other Europeans — this despite his claim to be familiar with the relevant literature (see his appendix, 'Essay on Sources').

87 Hertz, op. cit., p. 6.

88 Heckscher, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 18.

89 V.G. Kiernan, 'Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy,' *Past and Present*, No. 11 (April 1957), pp. 76-7.

90 Ibid., p. 68; see also Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 739-43.

91 Ibid., p. 74.

92 Ibid., p. 78.

93 Ibid., p. 69.

94 Ibid., p. 72.

95 That there were several other sides to the relation of the state to mercenaries is attested to by Braudel (*The Mediterranean*, op. cit., Vol.II): 'Sea-pirates were aided and abetted by powerful towns and cities. Pirates on land, bandits, received regular backing from nobles. Robber bands were often led, or more or less closely directed, by some genuine nobleman ...' (p. 749); '... banditry had other origins besides the crisis in noble fortunes; it issued from peasantry and populace alike. This was a ground-swell — "a flood tide" as an eighteenth-century historian called it, which stirred up a variety of waters. As a political and social (though not religious) reaction, it had both aristocratic and popular components (the "mountain kings" in the Roman Campagna and around Naples were more often than not peasants and humble folk).' (p. 751).

96 Bücher, op. cit., p. 346; Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 117; see also Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (London, 1973), pp. 15-25; Braudel says it best: 'These indispensable immigrants were not always unskilled labourers or men of little aptitude. They often brought with them new techniques that were as indispensable as their persons to urban life. The Jews, driven out by their religious beliefs not their poverty, played an exceptional role in these transfers of technology ... There were other valuable immigrants, itinerant artists for instance attracted by expanding towns which were extending their public buildings; or merchants, particularly the Italian merchants and bankers, who activated and indeed created such cities as Lisbon, Seville, Medina del Campo, Lyons and Antwerp. An urban community needs all sorts and conditions of men, not least rich men. Towns attracted the wealthy just as they attracted the proletariat, though for very different reasons.' *The Mediterranean*, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 336-7.

97 Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 118-9; Bücher makes a similar comment, op. cit., p. 353.

98 Chaim Bermant, *London's East End* (New York, 1975), pp. 30-1.

99 Ibid., p. 43; see also E.P. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 469-85; and Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

100 See Paul Lazarsfeld and Anthony Oberschall, 'Max Weber and Empirical Social Research,' *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30, no. 2 (April 1965), pp. 185-8.

101 See Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, 'The Function of Labour Immigration in Western European Capitalism', *New Left Review*, No. 73, (May-June 1972), p. 6; and Bücher, op. cit., pp. 367-8.

102 See David Brody, *Steelworkers in America* (New York, 1969), pp. 96-9.

103 See Howard Brett Melendy, *The Oriental Americans* (New York, 1972); Mary R. Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration* (New York, 1969, orig. 1909); and Stuart Miller,

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

The Unwelcome Immigrant (Berkeley, 1969).

104 'A "nation" is etymologically a "birth", or a "being born", and hence a race, a kin or kind having a common origin or, more loosely, a common language and other institutions ... There is not only an original and individual birth for each system but a continual birth of new institutions within it, a continual transformation of old institutions, and even a rebirth of the nation after death', Max Fisch's introduction to *The New Science of Giambattista Vico* (Ithaca, 1970), p. xxiii; see also Friedrich Hertz for an example of the length to which the monarchy was willing to go to produce the appropriate illusion; 'The theory already put forward by Bodin that the Franks were a people of Gallic stock who had wandered into Germany, and from there had returned later as deliverers of their brothers from the Roman yoke, came into favour under Louis XIV. Within the French people there was, therefore, no racial difference, but national unity of the kind so much desired by the absolute monarchy. This theory very conveniently lent support to the desire for the annexation of the Rhine, the restoration of which, as old Frankish territory, he affected to demand', op. cit., p. 5.

105 Kiernan, op. cit., *Past and Present*, No. 31, p. 27.

106 See Charles Verlinden, op. cit.; Eric Williams, op. cit., and David Brion Davis, op. cit.

107 See Karl Mannhein, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1936), pp. 121-4; and Hertz, op. cit., pp. 6 and 10.

108 See Arendt, op. cit., pp. 165-7; and Hertz, op. cit., pp. 1-19.

109 Louis Snyder, *The Idea of Racialism* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 39-40 (also see pp. 20-3, and 39-53); see also Snyder's *Race* (New York, 1939), pp. 93-5; Magnus Hirschfield, *Racism* (London, 1938). (Hirschfield, interestingly, traces the usage of the term race from its introduction in scientific literature by Comte de Buffon in 1749, to its appearance in the prolegomena of Immanuel Kant's summer course in 1775 at Konigsberg in the form of White Race, Negro Race, Hunnish Race, Hindu Race, and mongrel races, pp. 51-4.)

110 See Eric Hobsbawm, 'Some Reflections on Nationalism', in T.J. Nossiter, A.H. Hanson, Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences* (London, 1972), pp. 385-406.

111 See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in Robert Rucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* op. cit., pp. 342-3.

112 See Louis Snyder, *The Idea of Racialism*, op. cit., pp. 155-65 for excerpts from various National Socialist thinkers in Germany including Adolf Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg, Ernst Hauer, Felix Fischer-Dodeleben, Wilhelm Klesserow, Ernst Krieck, Walter Darre, Herman Gauch, and, as well, appropriate selections from the Nuremberg Laws (1935); see also Mannheim, op. cit., pp. 134-46; M.N. Roy, *Fascism* (Jijnasa, 1976), pp. 33-43; and Renzo De Felice, *Interpretations of Fascism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 176-8.

113 See William Styron, 'Hell Reconsidered', *New York Review of Books*, Vol. XXV, no. 11, 29 June 1978), pp. 10-12 and 14; Edward Homze, *Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany* (Princeton 1967), pp. 297-8.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

CHRIS SEARLE

Grenada's revolution: an interview with Bernard Coard

Chris Searle: There is clearly a new, revolutionary wind blowing through the Caribbean. We have seen a revolution in Grenada, the election of a new, radical government in St Lucia, a general strike and the ousting of Prime Minister Patrick John in Dominica, the development of the Yulimo party in St Vincent, and also events in neighbouring Latin-american countries like Nicaragua. How do you account for this process, and where do you think it is leading?

Bernard Coard: I'm not sure that there's a simple answer to the question 'how do you account for it?'. I would say that the phenomena that we're witnessing in the Caribbean now can perhaps be best compared to what happened in the Caribbean, in the English-speaking Caribbean certainly, in the 1930s, and particularly in the 1937-8 period, when you also had these mass, popular social-political upheavals throughout the region, from Trinidad right through to Jamaica.

But I think it has to be seen in a much broader context this time around. I think that struggles worldwide are becoming more interlinked and peoples in different areas are following these struggles more closely and are being influenced by them. So that, for example,

---

BERNARD COARD is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Trade and Industry and Planning in the People's Republic of Grenada. He is author of *How the West Indian child is made educationally sub-normal in the British school system*, (New Beacon Books, 1971).
CHRIS SEARLE is a teacher, and author of *The Forsaken Lover* (1972), *Classrooms of Resistance* (1975) and *The World in a Classroom* (1977).

Race & Class, XXI, 2(1979)

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

I see that what is happening in Grenada, St Lucia, Dominica and Nicaragua as also being linked in people's minds with what's happened in Iran with the ousting of the Shah, with the ousting of the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, with the overthrow of Amin in Uganda and so on. In fact, Grenadian people are very conscious of this and they have been counting dictators as they fall this year, one by one. We've had seven fall in seven months, which is a one per month ratio. Pol Pot went first, then you had the Shah, then you had Gairy third, you had Amin fourth, after Amin you had Patrick John in Dominica fifth, you had John Compton in St Lucia, then you had Somoza, seventh, in Nicaragua. The fact that Grenadians are counting them worldwide is also significant. They are not just looking at the fall of dictators within the region. Indeed, a number of working people have made the point that this year is shaping up now not so much as the International Year of the Child as the International Year of the Fall of Dictators!

So there is that phenomenon. I can also say this, that the people of Grenada were deeply influenced, firstly, by the struggles of the Jamaican people over the last seven years under the leadership of Michael Manley, *very* influenced by those struggles, by the attempt to build a genuinely independent economic base, by the attempt to transform Jamaica from being not only politically and constitutionally independent but also to being economically independent. Influenced by the attempt to spend the resources of the country on the poor people through the Jamal Programme for adult literacy; through the different Impact programmes to help unmarried mothers receive jobs and hence incomes; through the Youth Pioneer groups providing skills for the youth and putting them on the land and forming cooperatives, through the landlease programmes which gave something like 40,000 landless peasants in Jamaica land for the first time in history; through the attempt to expand agriculture on the basis of the peasantry, and through the purchasing of the land of the big estates to give it over to the sugar workers in the form of sugar workers' cooperatives and hence the building of the Sugar Workers' Cooperative Council. All these phenomena in Jamaica have had a profound influence, not just on our leadership, but also on the man in the street in Grenada. And the attempt to de-stabilise Jamaica in the 1974-6 period was also something of great concern to the people of Grenada and of the eastern Caribbean generally. We have followed with great interest, blow by blow, the struggles of the Jamaican people to liberate themselves, despite the fact that Jamaica is a thousand miles away from the eastern Caribbean — that in itself tells you something. And, conversely, the man in the street in Jamaica has been following the struggles in the eastern Caribbean in a way that has never happened before historically.

Moving beyond that, what is also very significant is the extent to

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

which the people of Grenada, in every village of the island, were listening to their BBC news and World News from this and that source as the struggle in Iran unfolded — particularly the mass demonstrations in the streets. People were comparing that with our mass demonstrations through the streets against Gairy in 1973-4 when we had our first mass upheaval of the recent period. And so they could identify with the people of Iran as they were demonstrating through the streets and building to a crescendo to oust the Shah. When we, the New Jewel Movement, spoke on platforms around the country, whenever we talked about Iran, you could hear a pin drop — people were all ears because they were following it so closely.

Another sign of the influence of Iran on our struggle was the fact that in one of the restaurants in the heart of St George's, the twenty workers there decided to tape-record the speeches of our Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, who at the time was leader of the opposition, and also to tape-record the main news stories from our party newspaper which was an underground publication, *The New Jewel*. Then they would broadcast them through loud speakers which they set up, blaring from inside and outside the restaurant. Nearly all of them got fired by the employer, but they did this and the crowds would gather to listen in the streets. Now, if you remember, the Ayatollah Khomeini was using this technique from Paris. His phone calls would be recorded and many tapes would be made and would spread all over the villages and played so that the people would hear them on the streets all over the land. Now to me it could not have been totally accidental, that after this was happening in Iran and had become highly organised, suddenly you have a group of workers here, completely independent of any leadership from the New Jewel Movement, doing their own type of tape recorded system of reaching the masses and getting our underground publication to the people.

CS: So Grenadians don't see themselves just as islanders any more, they see themselves as a part of the world's people, the revolutionary force of the world?

BC: Definitely. It's a worldwide struggle. When you've experienced revolution, when you've experienced the struggle to liberate yourself, it makes it very easy to identify with other people, wherever they be, regardless of their race, religion or whatever their cultural background. After all, until recently Grenadians didn't know about Nicaragua, they'd never heard of Nicaragua — Nicaragua could have been a million miles away as far as Grenadians were concerned. And it really is far away, 1,500 miles away, which in Grenadian terms is a lot. Hardly anybody from Grenada, if anyone, has ever visited Nicaragua. They have no connections there, no relatives, the people speak a different language, they have a completely different cultural background. And yet, I can tell you, every Grenadian has been

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

following with intense interest the Nicaraguan struggle over the last few months, and is jubilant at the victory of the people over the Somoza dynasty — because we have been through that process right here in Grenada, we can identify.

CS: Could you briefly relate a little of the history of the New Jewel Movement, and how it grew out of the history of popular struggle in Grenada?

BC: The New Jewel Movement came out of two organisations which merged in March 1973. The first of these organisations was formed in March 1972. That organisation was called JEWEL, Joint Endeavour for the Welfare, Education and Liberation of the People. This was based in the south-eastern part of the country, in the parish of St David's and was comprised of a few teachers, an ex-policeman, a few peasants and a number of youths. They had a farming cooperative as well as a news-sheet which they started. The other organisation was formed six months after that in September 1972, and that was called MAP, Movement for Assemblies of the People. It was based in the capital parish of St George's, and was composed of a mixture of professional types like lawyers and teachers, but also one or two workers, and one or two youths. What they all had in common was that they were young, they had come out of a black power tradition of the late 1960s and early 70s, many had lived in Britain, America and Canada and had studied and worked in those countries. They were all linked with young people struggling for similar broad goals, objectives and ideals in the neighbouring islands. Many were influenced by the 1970 uprising in Trinidad. All were deeply committed to the development of the country.

And so these two organisations very quickly saw themselves as one, since they had common goals and objectives, and six months after the formation of MAP and a year after the formation of JEWEL, they held a joint congress in which they decided to formally merge and form one body called the New Jewel Movement.

Now it is significant that this whole process started one month after the 1972 general elections. Because up until those elections, held in February (one month before JEWEL was formed), you had a two-party system of Gairy on the one hand and the Grenada National Party led by Herbert Blaize on the other. In other words, you had a kind of Tweedledee and Tweedledum situation, two parties which were two sides of the same coin. Now, while I don't want to give the impression in any way that Blaize and the GNP were fascist, or brutal and terrorist like Gairy was, because they were not, what I mean is that, in a sense, Gairy would be in there forever, so long as the kind of opposition he had was the GNP. They were so ineffectual, so bumbling, so lacking in any initiative, so cowardly that if Gairy breathed too hard they would all go hiding under a rockstone. With

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

that kind of opposition, Gairy was going to be in there for the next thousand years once science was able to discover a way of keeping him alive!

The people had become thoroughly fed up with that type of politics and they had become fed up too with a type of politics which meant that you came to the people two weeks before an election, having not at all come to them for the preceding five years, and then asked them once more to vote for you. So you had what we call 'five seconds democracy'. You go into a polling booth and you vote, having been given enough rum and corned beef for the two weeks preceding — and maybe a little temporary work on the roads. Then you vote, and for the next five years you are ignored until two weeks before the next elections. We rejected this totally, and throughout the six years of struggle we maintained the principle that you had to be meeting with the people regularly, discussing all the issues with them, involving them in all the major decisions that the country faced, and having their total mass participation — which in our view is the essence of democracy.

So this is what we preached up and down the country on the platform, and we have kept to our principles. In four months of the revolution we have held meetings in every single village of Grenada. In some cases, in many villages, we have gone in half an hour or an hour before the meeting started and discussed all kinds of questions with the villagers, including what they want us to talk about. At the end of the meeting we would stay on for another hour or two for further discussions with the villagers, with individuals and groups. And so we have that kind of contact with the people. This is really the essence and spirit of the revolution and the building of a revolutionary democracy.

This was one of the fundamental differences between ourselves and the two existing Tweedledee and Tweedledum parties. And then, of course, you had the youth — a powerful force numerically, in terms of energy and in terms of *wanting* to do something for the country. They were completely unorganised and could not be reached by those old politicians.

So this is the kind of picture of how things stood in 1972. The New Jewel Movement emerged one month after the February 1972 elections, out of that context. It was also a context of a worsening economic situation because of the way that Gairy was managing the economy. You had greater and greater hardship and suffering on the part of the poor people. Water, roads, electricity, housing, health, jobs, you name it, all were extremely bad and were getting worse. Between 1970 and 1972 agricultural production had dropped by twenty per cent — a massive drop in two years. In this kind of situation the masses had reached a stage where they could take no more. It was significant, therefore, that the first outburst, the first

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

upsurge of the people, took place only a matter of four weeks after the formation of the NJM, with the killing of Jeremiah Richardson in April 1973, only 20 years of age, in the town of Grenville by one of Gairy's police. It was a typical and classic incident. Here is a poor youth, whose entire family, ironically, were Gairyite, not supporters of the NJM or the opposition. He was on the sidewalk, rapping and chatting and 'liming', as we say, with his friends. A policeman came up to him and said 'move on', and without even giving him five seconds to move on, put a gun to his temple and blew his brains out, literally.

That so angered the people that, led by NJM, 5,000 people in the parish of St Andrew's (including many who up until that day were Gairyites) marched down to the police station in Grenville. The policemen, seeing that massive crowd, barricaded themselves inside and fled through the back door. The people then marched from Grenville to the airport, three miles away, and closed it down for three days. That brought international attention for the first time onto the Grenada situation, only four weeks after the formation of the NJM.

From there it led from one struggle to another struggle. All of the same kind. There was a struggle which NJM led a few weeks before it formally became NJM with the same leaders who were in the process of putting the First Congress together. This was the La Sagesse struggle as it's called. In the parish of St David's, an Englishman by the name of Lord Brownlow (a member of your House of Lords) bought an estate in Grenada, assisted by Gairy. Then he decided that the only beach in the entire parish of St David's would no longer be accessible to the people. Now, under Grenadian Law, there are no such things as private beaches, all beaches must be accessible to the public. There was a road running through the estate which for over a hundred years had been an access road, what the law calls an 'allowed road'. Lord Brownlow built a gate, an iron fence and gate, and blocked it off, getting Gairy's police to enforce it with guns. NJM led the people, over 800 people from that parish, to march on the spot. We held a 'People's Trial', as we called it, of Lord Brownlow and the court found him guilty. The sentence was that he was declared 'persona non grata', that he would no longer be welcome in Grenada, and secondly, that the gate be removed immediately and the people have their beach returned to them. Fifty police were rushed up by Gairy, armed with all sorts of weapons (303s, shotguns and so on), threatening to shoot. The people ignored them, removed the gate, and ever since then the beach has been liberated and once more available to the people. Lord Brownlow, fortunately for him, saw fit not to return to Grenada, which was quite frankly to the delight of the people!

The character of our struggles throughout the years was always to

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

fight for the common man, the poor man, the nutmeg farmers, the cocoa farmers, the banana farmers, the youths who were brutalised and beaten and in some places shot and killed by the police, people who were being denied use of the local beach in their area, people who suffered from merchants who were charging 300 and 400 per cent mark-up on the price of sugar, flour, rice and other basic necessities. These were the kinds of struggles, broad, democratic, economic, social and political struggles — this is the background to the New Jewel Movement.

CS: How would you summarise and illustrate the main characteristics of Gairyism?

BC: Gairyism? Massive corruption, violence — the naked use of violence and terror as an instrument of rule — in that sense, fascism.

Gairy had very strong links with the South Korean and Chilean regimes. Two of his military men were trained in Chile, including the second-in-command of his army, Abrahams, and another leading officer, La Crette. There were plans to train more. He received ten crates of arms from Chile, marked 'medical supplies', which turned out to be guns and uniforms — which the revolution has since seized, and put to good use, I may add. One of the ironies of our history is that the first set of uniforms that the People's Revolutionary Army got were sent to Gairy thanks to Pinochet. And there were also plans, announced by the Chileans themselves, to train some of his police. So there was a close connection. We had a visit from a Chilean naval training vessel, *The Esmeralda*, which the UN Commissioner of Human Rights described in 1974 as a 'torture chamber' to house and torture many of the supporters of Allende. Chileans were constantly visiting the country and Grenadians going over there. One of the documents we found in the barracks of Trueblue that we burned to the ground when we took over on 13 March was written in Spanish and dealt with the methods of torture. This was the same building which housed the Chilean-trained officers.

Then we were really shocked and shaken up more recently when we discovered eight cells at Richmond Hill Prison that were four feet underground, specially designed and built for torture. Just simply being put in a cell like that is a form of torture, because you couldn't last very long in such a place. Gairy built only eight and there were just eight leaders of the New Jewel Movement. We were told later by prison officers that they were specifically designed, built and intended for us — that is where we were going to be placed.

CS: Is it true that he used obscurantist practices to deceive the people?

BC: He used and mobilised superstition, black magic, obeah — all kinds of foolishness, trying to play on the ignorance of the masses,

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

trying to play on their lack of education. And he deliberately denied the people education. Do you know that the last time a new government secondary school was built in Grenada was in 1885? In thirty years of Gairyism not a single secondary school was built. The few private schools that have been built in that time have not been built by the Grenadian Government. The goal was very clear — no education. In other words, a 'Papa Doc' Duvalier situation as existed in Haiti, and using superstition in all its manifestations to create an aura of fear and magic, an aura of mysticism, an environment and ambiance in which he could rule ruthlessly and autocratically, and subjugate the people at his whim and fancy.

CS: You have declared your objective of building socialism in Grenada. With such a small population and little or no working class, how will you set about doing this?

BC: I think that one has to have a very clear objective and a realistic appraisal of what is possible, and over what period of time and in what way. I think that the first thing that has to be said is that we do not subscribe to nor do we take a dogmatic approach to this question. We have to try to develop a socialist society, a society of genuine equality, a society that genuinely serves the interests of the broad masses of the country, based on our objective conditions — our size, the kind of natural resources we have, the kind of skill levels we have to deal with, the type of organisational capacity we have at any given moment and so on. Our primary objective at this point of time, therefore, is not the building of socialism, quite frankly, but simply trying to get the economy, which has been totally shattered by Gairy, back on its feet. What we have witnessed over the past thirty years of Gairy and Gairyism is really what the people call 'Hurricane Gairy'. But unlike a hurricane that comes and might last for a few hours, destroy a lot and go away, and then you can start building, we've had thirty years of Hurricane Gairy.

Can you imagine a constant hurricane-force wind for thirty years? That's the situation we've inherited, in the financial aspect, in terms of the infrastructure — and there are people who have not seen water in their pipes for five years. That is how bad the water situation is. Roads? Terrible! Medical facilities? Non-existent, non-existent! No sheets or pillow cases on the hospital beds, no medicines, not even aspirins; no qualified nurses, hardly any qualified doctors, virtually no ambulances — just two or three and they don't work and yet they're supposed to cover the entire country! I could go on and on, all the different areas of infrastructure. We've had school buildings collapsing and falling down, no school books or uniforms. The people are poor, very poor, with half the population out of work and 40 per cent of the country illiterate. Never mind the official figures, which were glowing, but the reality is half of our people cannot read or write.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

So we have inherited an unbelievable mess — financially, unbelievable! Millions upon millions of dollars of taxpayers' money raped from the treasury — disappeared! Can't be found anywhere! So we are trying to repair the damage of Hurricane Gairy. That is our number one task, to get agricultural production going again, develop a fishing industry, develop a lumber industry with our limited forestry — in conjunction with a reafforestation programme. We must get tourism going, because tourism is important in our context. We need to get our agro-industries going, based on food processing of our cocoa, nutmegs and bananas, our fruits, vegetables, coconuts sugar cane and so on. There's an enormous range of agro-industries that are possible, but it will take time and will require financial resources.

So fundamentally, at this time, we see our task not as one of building socialism. It is one of re-structuring and re-building the economy, of getting production going and trying to develop genuine grassroots democracy, trying to involve the people in every village and every workplace in the process of the reconstruction of the country. In that sense we are in a national democratic revolution involving the broad masses and many strata of the population.

CS: You have inherited an economy based on a narrow reliance on certain export cash crops and tourism. How much of this economy do you see as a liability and how much as an advantage? And how do you set about reconstructing and diversifying your economy?

BC: For us the most important aspect of building an economically-independent country (which is the only way in which you can truly eventually say that you are politically independent) is by the method of diversification — in all ways and in all aspects. First, diversification of agricultural production, secondly, diversification of the markets that we sell these products to, thirdly, diversification of the sources of our tourism, the variety of countries from which our tourists come. The maximum of diversification, the minimum of reliance upon one country or a handful of countries means the greater your independence, the less able certain people are to squeeze you, pressurise you and blackmail you. So the principle of diversification is important in terms of the political objective of political and economic independence. But it's also important in its own right as a means of expanding employment opportunities, preventing all reliance on one or two commodities or one of two markets. Then if you have a crisis or recession in a particular advanced industrial economy or in a group of such economies, you do not have a situation whereby your Grenadian economy collapses because something has gone wrong in the USA or Canada. You would have so many different sources for your imports and tourism that a recession in one or two economies would not collapse your own economy totally. You would feel it, but

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

you wouldn't have this type of disastrous collapse which is a phenomenon of Caribbean societies right now.

Concretely, it means that apart from our cocoa, nutmeg and bananas, our three agricultural commodities through which we earn all our visible foreign exchange earnings, we also want to move into the minor spices area where we have a great deal of potential, possibly into horticulture for export, certainly into fruits and vegetables for export. So that, instead of three, we would have six or seven basic food items to export. And fish as well, lobster, possibly shrimp. We need to develop a fishing industry. We are surrounded by sea, we're an island and we haven't been making use of that. Right now, the fishing technology that we use is the technology of the Old Testament — a little rowing boat, a fishing rod, line and a little hook at the bottom, and if the guy is really technologically advanced he might have three hooks at the bottom of the line instead of one. And then there is the other type of fishing where they pull the nets up on the sand — anything more advanced and sophisticated we don't know about. We have to move into the twentieth century rapidly with respect to fishing. Half of the fish we eat now we import. We need to supply that locally, and still export more fish to the outside world.

Secondly, we want to process these foodstuffs. We want to make our own jams, jellies, wines, liqueurs, our own tins of sardines and mackerel. There is the canning, bottling and preserving of our fruits. We can do this ourselves with our own juices and nectars. And we have already begun this in the four months since the revolution, using our produce laboratory for experimentation and perfection of the products. We want to be able to make our own Milo and Ovaltine — not necessarily with those brand names, but using the same basic principles. We see no reason why we should be the ones who import this kind of thing.

So this is the diversification picture, basic agricultural production and food processing which would also be for the local market, as an import substitute phenomenon to cut down on what we're importing and make it locally. Instead of importing the tins and bottles of this and that, *we* shall produce them for ourselves and also export them to a variety of countries throughout the world, by seeking markets all over. Thus we shall diversify the markets where these goods we produce are going, so again we are able to protect ourselves against economic as well as political buffeting worldwide.

CS: How will the New Jewel Movement politically educate your youth, and indeed, your entire people, towards socialism?

BC: In the first place, I don't think that the immediate task facing us is to educate them towards socialism. As a goal, as an objective — yes, and that has already started over the years. Right now, the most

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

critical area of education is education for dealing with the immediate situation that we face: the threat from imperialism, the threat to bully us, the threat to invade us, the threat to determine our lives for us.

The people have to have a deep grasp of what imperialism is in concrete terms — worldwide, in the Caribbean and specifically as it affects Grenada. What are the mechanisms by which it seeks to control our economy and determine our lives? That is one level. Secondly, there is education dealing with the fundamentals of democracy — not in the 'five second democracy' we spoke about, five seconds in a polling booth every five years — but genuine democracy which involves ongoing participation by the people, the whole question of the organisation of society, of economic and social transformation and the steps which need to be taken immediately along that path — the immediate tasks that are necessary in order to get further on with the objectives. In other words, we are dealing with a crisis situation, a situation in which we have inherited an infrastructural crisis, a financial crisis, a crisis in production, an unemployment crisis, an inflationary crisis — a crisis in just about every aspect of the economy and society. We have to educate and prepare our people to deal with that immediate situation, while at the same time educating and preparing them for the broader objectives of building socialism further down the road.

CS: What is the New Jewel Movement doing to fully integrate the Grenadian woman into the revolutionary process?

BC: The upsurge of activity by women in Grenada is one of the most remarkable features of the revolution. Their participation and involvement at so many levels, particularly at the grassroots level of the villages, is truly extraordinary. Right now, quite frankly, the men must be embarrassed, because the initiative has been entirely seized by the women. It's no longer a question of equality of activity, but of the women being in front in the different villages, and it shows itself in many different ways.

One of the very first steps that the revolution took was to decree equal pay for men and women. 'Equal pay for equal work' is a fundamental slogan. Another was the abolition of sexual exploitation through practices which were taking place in both government and private sectors. Gairy and his ministers promoted these practices which went down as far as many senior civil servants in some cases, who engaged in the practice of hiring women only on the basis of sexual favours — and people who were already employed were losing their jobs if they did not provide these favours. A number of businessmen and managers in the private sector were also doing the same thing. We quite frankly consider this as rape, and we have made it clear that such activities would not only result in immediate dismissal, but in penalties much more serious than that. We would

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

jail anybody involved in that kind of activity. The sexual exploitation of women is something we will simply not tolerate — we have made this clear in radio broadcasts, mass rallies, public meetings, newspaper articles and so on. Everyone has got the message and no one is in any doubt. Any woman who is approached in this kind of way can report it immediately and we would take drastic measures.

This is one of the most popular measures among our women because it was an area of massive abuse by the Gairy dictatorship. It was one of the features of Gairyism. So the question of equal pay and the question of the abolition of sexual exploitation and severe penalties for anyone engaging in this are two of the positive gains for women in the revolution in just the opening four months.

Apart from this we're taking other steps which benefit women along with other people. For example, the various workers' rights which women identify with fully. The Trade Union Recognition Act we never had on the books before. This compels the employers to recognise the trade union of the workers' choice once a secret ballot shows that over 50 per cent of the workers have voted for that union. This has resulted in the unionisation of nearly the entire working class in four months in Grenada. This is important because a lot of the working class here are women, especially in the garment factories, offices, commercial houses, banks and so on. Women predominate in these industries and therefore the Act is of direct significance to them. A lot of the people who have been fired for trying to engage in trade union activity have been women. Apart from this, all the anti-worker laws which were on the books have been abolished. That too benefits women workers along with the men.

The NJM has had a women's arm for many years, and this has grown from strength to strength before the revolution, and even more so since. This has been in the vanguard of the struggle for women's rights on many fronts. Since the revolution, a National Conference has been held to deal with the burning questions and issues facing women in particular and working people in general in all the villages in Grenada, with the women identifying the problems themselves. And this was presented in a formal report to the cabinet from the women's arm of the party, which has been studied — and many sections of it implemented.

We are examining now the bringing up to what we would consider civilised standards of maternity leave with full pay, because we don't have that in Grenada right now. We want to do something about this soon. We're looking into the absence of pipe-borne water in houses and the strain this puts on women, particularly pregnant women. Then there is the question of medical attention for women, particularly as regards childbirth and the care of young children.

CS: What is the New Jewel Movement's policy with regard to family planning and control of the birth rate?

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

BC: While it is good to educate people and provide them with the material basis of family planning, such as contraceptives, at the same time we do not see the solution to our problems as laying in just this. For fundamentally, what history shows across many countries, is that when you have a higher standard of living, when you have an income sufficient to care for your family, you tend to have fewer children. This sounds ironic, but it is true that the poorer the country is, the more children per family there are. Even within a country, the middle and upper classes who have more wealth at their disposal tend to have smaller families. If you are poor and have ten or twelve children, then they are a form of insurance. It means you are going to have several more breadwinners in the family once they start working. It also means that the half dozen out of your twelve who go abroad as migrants in search of work will be sending money back in the form of remittances, and that is a type of pension in old age in a society where there are no pensions — except for civil servants. Ninety per cent of our working people have no pensions to look forward to when they reach an age when they can no longer work.

In Grenada, 15 per cent of the entire gross domestic product of the country comes in the form of remittances from relatives abroad. It is as fantastic as that. So, many poor people see large families as an insurance against unemployment, sickness and old age. So until you solve the economic problem you will not really fundamentally reduce family sizes. That is our perspective. We have no quarrel with educating people about smaller family sizes and providing them with the means of doing it, but we don't see that in a vacuum divorced from economic development and putting real incomes into the pockets of the people as a solution to the problem of population growth.

CS: What do you see as the political and military role of the People's Revolutionary Army in Grenada?

BC: This is our army, comprised almost entirely of young people who seized power on 13 March, and who have been in the process of consolidating that power ever since. They are the young people who patrol the beaches at night and ensure that any mercenary attempt at invasion will be resoundingly defeated. So that their role is defence and consolidation of the revolution, and making sure that any mercenary invasion by Gairy and any imperialist forces that may seek to back him will be crushed.

A revolutionary army does not see itself as some kind of standing army divorced from the people. The PRA is made up of young people who have come from all the villages in Grenada. They are a part of the people and see themselves as such. As a result of this, they are engaged through many hours each day, in literacy programmes, adult education programmes, mechanical work — particularly in getting government vehicles repaired. There's a PRA garage engaged

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

in bringing back onto the roads literally hundreds of old vehicles of all sorts which were used by the different ministries and abandoned as impossible to fix. Other young soldiers are into the area of refrigeration, going around fixing government refrigeration equipment. Quite a large number are engaged in direct agricultural production, and more and more will be.

The army is also renovating roads all over the country and improving their services, and a lot of feeder roads are being built into new agricultural areas. In fact, the Commander of our Armed Forces is a civil engineer. He has been building roads all his life and has whole military teams doing this, which is a great advantage to the farmers. Also we have had heavy rainstorms and the roads have become blocked by landslides — and one of the things which the people have commented upon is that within an hour or two the PRA appears on the scene and the whole place is cleaned and fixed up. Also, within the PRA are teachers, bankworkers, agriculturalists — all kinds of people with skills, and all these skills are being put to use.

So while we have people who are there to defend the country against external aggression, at the same time every single one of them has to be engaged on a daily basis in directly productive work. We can't afford a standing army in the traditional sense of a bunch of people just gobbling up food and expense and not being productive. So we must have an army which is more than an army.

CS: In the recent 'Caribbean Solidarity Summit' here between the governments of Grenada, St Lucia and Dominica, the New Jewel Movement used the slogan, 'One Caribbean'. Do you see any possibility of a federated socialist Caribbean community emerging in the future?

BC: Well, I think that's going to be far, far down the road. But what I think can happen and is beginning to happen is the coming together of the people of the Caribbean regardless of the language barriers — Spanish speaking, Dutch speaking, English speaking, French speaking. Our view, which we have expressed publicly on many occasions, is that these language barriers are artificial barriers put there by the colonialists in much the same way as they chopped up Africa. We refuse to respect them and are determined to break them down, and to see people in Aruba, Curação, Bonaire, Saba, St Eustacious, St Maarten, Surinam, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, as well as the English-speaking islands, *all* as Caribbean people. Our goal is, through cultural and sporting exchanges, discussions at the political leadership level, greater inter-Caribbean tourism, through all sorts of people-exchanges to bring our people closer together, to learn each other's languages and bust down those barriers.

We have no illusions, we know it's going to take many years, but a

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

start has got to be made. It's an important goal, it's a principled question, and our goal must be, sighted far down the road, the building of one Caribbean nation.

CS: How have you so far dealt with the campaigns of destabilisation launched by imperialism against your young revolution?

BC: We believe fundamentally that one has to understand historically the significance and place in historical perspective the phenomenon and imperialist tactics of destabilisation.

In the old days, the method of rule was direct rule. You had your imperialist governors, governor-generals and the other colonial officials. Imperialism took the form of direct colonialism, and the army and colonial police force was stationed on the spot in the country to quell any disturbances or riots. We moved from that to a neo-colonial model, and anybody who tried to step outside that neo-colonial framework — then the gunboat would appear on the horizon and the marines would land and deal with the problem: Dominican Republic, 1965, Guatemala, 1954.

Then there is a slightly more sophisticated model of the same thing. You use reactionary exiles from the country under attack, combined with some mercenaries or marines pretending to be other-than-regular troops, and you launch invasions like the Bay of Pigs, 1961. These methods of direct and not-so-direct military intervention have become extremely unpopular worldwide — including inside the very countries themselves, following Vietnam in particular. So there has been a tendency to move away from these tactics, and world opinion is solidly against this kind of vulgar imperialism.

So now you move to more subtle methods, the methods of putting a squeeze on a country's export crops, on a country's tourism, by spreading the most vicious lies in newspapers around the world to frighten tourists and dissuade them from coming to the country. Thus you can collapse the economy by removing the foreign exchange earnings. You can plant articles, not only internationally, but in the local and regional press, that would tend to undermine the confidence of the people in their government and sow the seeds of doubt with lies and innuendoes. You can engage in a tremendous volume of anti-communist propaganda so as to frighten people and give them the impression that there are people around who are going to take their cow and sheep and goat, their shop or piece of land or everything — which is totally untrue. The idea is to frighten people, to scare the hell out of them so that they lose confidence in themselves and in their government and therefore are easy prey now to any kind of reactionary position that is presented to them.

Then if these tactics don't work, you move a stage further to acts of violence within the society, deliberately stirring up acts of violence.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

You hire two or three criminal elements to shoot a couple of tourists — preferably white tourists, so you have a big scandal in the world's press and that mashes up the tourist industry. Then you start picking off and shooting some of the leaders of the ruling party at the grass roots level. This was done in Jamaica in 1975-6, in that period of destabilisation. Hundreds of the ruling party PNP cadres and youth leaders around the country were gunned down in the streets and shot in their beds by criminal elements hired by imperialism. So that the deliberate stirring-up of violence, unrest and an aura of instability in a society, is one method of destabilising. And then there is the planting of a handful of agents within the country with bankrolls — to bankroll these activities by the same criminal elements.

And if these methods don't succeed, you try assassination of the leadership: Kamal Jumblatt in the Lebanon, Marien N'gouabi in the Congo Republic, you had Lumumba in the early 60s, a number of people in the leadership of both Nkomo and Mugabe's liberation movements — and there were seventeen attempts to kill Fidel Castro. Let us not forget Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique and Amilcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau. All were outstanding fighters for their countries' liberation. This weapon of assassination of leaders is very much a current tactic of destabilisation.

All of these methods — propaganda destabilisation, economic destabilisation, violent, terrorist destabilisation are a part of the package of the modern gunboat diplomacy. It is no longer the gunboat coming, but you plant agents within the country to undertake these activities and to destroy the economy and fabric of the society, and to create political instability to lay the basis for the emergence of reaction — even fascism.

CS: Have you any observations from Grenada to young West Indians and their families in Britain, and to British working people, black and white in general?

BC: I have this overall and general comment. I'm not advocating anything to anybody to do anything, because it would be out of place for me to do so. It is simply an observation from a distance as to what I see as the only way forward. Whether it happens or not is really a question for history and for the people themselves to determine.

I would say, as someone who lived in England for many years, who studied there, worked there, and struggled there for the black working people experiencing racism, that something I feel very deeply about, having had some time to be away from Britain and to reflect from a distance, is this. A population of black people comprising about 2 per cent of the total population, has no hope whatsoever of ever achieving its just rights, of being treated equally, unless there is forged an alliance of all working people regardless of race. I feel very strongly about this. I think the lessons of history

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

teach this, my own experiences in Britain confirm this, and my experiences since leaving Britain doubly confirm this.

Therefore, the task of the white working-class and the black working-class leaders who are genuine and committed, must be to forge an alliance of the working people, so that those ruling-class elements who are deliberately trying to divide the working class, black and white, by spreading racism and hatred, by trying to get the white working class to hate the black working class, are defeated. Poor people cussing poor people, poor people discriminating against poor people, poor people fighting against poor people is just self-defeating and has the imperialist and ruling class laughing. They are deliberately stirring this up and there's no way that anything can change in terms of improving the living and working conditions of the working people, white and black — including the elimination of racism and the elimination of discrimination against women — unless there's that unity of the working class and of the working people to struggle against the ruling class and this kind of exploitation and 'divide and rule'.

St George's, Grenada
28 July, 1979

subscribe to

News from Oman

In depth coverage of the Liberation Struggle in Oman, seen within the framework of regional and international economic and political development.

Also substantial coverage of the events in Yemen.

With a valuable bibliographic section.

The newsletter is published app. 6 times a year. Published since 1975.

WRITE FOR FREE SAMPLE COPIES AND SUBSCRIPTION DETAILS

KROAG, Box 86, DK-1003 Copenhagen K, Denmark.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

THE SHAH WAS ONLY ONE.



Last year the U.S. exported $71 billion in arms. 37% of these sales went to ten governments considered the worst violators of human rights in the world. The Shah was the biggest buyer—but he was only one.

SUPPLYING REPRESSION: US SUPPORT FOR AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES ABROAD by Michael T. Klare documents it all.

"Very important, fully documented indictment of U.S. role in supplying rightists Third World governments with weaponry and know-how of repression." The Nation

$2.50 plus .75 postage/handling per order

Also available from the Institute:

THE COUNTERFORCE SYNDROME: A Guide to U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Doctrine—*Robert C. Aldridge,* $2.50

DUBIOUS SPECTER: A Second Look at the 'Soviet Threat'—*Fred Kaplan,* $2.50

CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT: An Unfulfilled Promise—*Michael T. Klare and Max Holland,* $1.00

TOWARD WORLD SECURITY: A Program for Disarmament—*Earl C. Ravenal,* $2.00

RESURGENT MILITARISM—*Michael T. Klare and the Bay Area Chapter of the Inter-University Committee,* $1.50

AFTER THE SHAH—*Fred Halliday,* $1.50

Please send me the following titles:

_____

_____

_____

☐ Payment Enclosed
☐ Charge this order to my
☐ Visa
☐ Master Charge

_____
Account No.

_____
Bank No.

_____
Expiration Date

A-002

_____
Signature Required for Charge

_____
Name

_____
Street

_____
City State Zip

Send to Institute for Policy Studies, 1901 Q Street, N.W., Dept. BD, Washington, D.C. 20009

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Notes and documents

Repression in the Philippines: the case of José-Maria Sison

José-Maria Sison is a political prisoner in the Philippines. He was arrested on 10 November 1977, together with his wife and three comrades, and since then has been kept in solitary confinement. President Marcos has threatened to execute Sison as a warning to the mounting people's resistance in the Philippines.

Throughout the 1960s, Sison spearheaded the movement to expose and oppose US domination of the Philippines, and the subservience of the Marcos regime to US interests. A noted historian and poet (the youngest professor ever to be appointed in his country) he became an ardent nationalist. He founded several progressive organisations — among them the Kabataang Makabayan, a patriotic youth association, which aimed to unite with workers and peasants in the struggle against the existing social system.

The crime of which Sison stands accused is that he is alleged to be the chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) whose writings, under the pen-name of Amado Guerrero, constitute the main theoretical guidelines for the Philippine resistance (among these are *Philippine Society and Revolution* (1969) and *Specific Characteristics of Our People's War* (1974)).

The CPP has grown out of 39 years of communist history in the country. It was re-established in 1968, after the old party had degenerated. Over the last ten years it has expanded its membership from some 20 at its founding to several thousands at present. Despite strong repression and the arrest of many leaders, the CPP continues unabated to lead the revolutionary movement. Its military wing, the New People's Army (NPA) has gained strong ground among the peasantry, whose organisation and politicisation is regarded as a precondition for effective military resistance. Increasingly, there are

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

signs of a 'rapprochement' with the Moro National Liberation Front.

For ten years Sison has led the Philippine resistance from underground. Since his arrest, he has been kept in isolation. *Race & Class* recently received a copy of his statement, smuggled out of the country, in which he details the torture he has been subjected to and the inhuman conditions he has been kept in since his arrest — conditions common to many political prisoners since the proclamation of martial law in 1972, but the length and severity of his solitary confinement at the maximum security unit of Fort Bonifacio are unprecedented. He ends his statement thus:

> Upon the good counsel of my lawyer, I insist on certain constitutional rights in this statement. But in another statement, [not available] as I have already said, I make a comprehensive and fundamental criticism and condemnation of the antinational and antidemocratic reign of terror and greed. By actively participating in my legal defence, I try not only to expose, delay or stay the hand of injustice about to smite me but also to continue doing my bit in the people's democratic cause.
>
> I am aware that my ordeal in the hands of the fascists is so slight in comparison to the torture suffered by several of my co-accused. It is also as nothing in comparison to the torture and murder as well as massacre of thousands of revolutionary martyrs. With this awareness, I am determined to keep on fighting and I am prepared to undergo further fascist brutality until my tormentors decide to finally kill me. The broad masses of the people will eventually put the whole lot of their oppressors in their proper places. Right now the organised democratic revolutionary forces are steadily growing in strength and advancing. US imperialism and the local exploiting classes will utterly regret that the fascist regime has only served to accelerate the rise of the revolutionary forces and the doom of the already outmoded system.

To spearhead protests against the treatment inflicted on Sison, an international committee has been formed: Committee to Save the Life of José-Maria Sison, PO Box 24737, Oakland, California, 94623, USA.

Repression in Guyana: The Working People's Alliance*

On Wednesday, 11 July 1979, in Georgetown, Guyana, the headquarters of Burnham's ruling People's National Congress Party, the

*Based on a statement received from the Los Angeles Committee for Academics in Peril.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Ministry of National Mobilisation and the headquarters of the Guyana Sugar Company were burnt down. One man, a watchman, died.

A number of internationally-known scholars were subsequently arrested and detained: Maurice Odle, Director of the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Guyana, Dr Omawale, former lecturer at the University of Guyana and FAO consultant, Walter Rodney, Africanist, lecturer and author, and Rupert Roopnarine, lecturer in English at the University of Guyana and filmmaker. Also arrested were Kwame Apata, lecturer in education, and Karen De Souza, civil servant. Walter Rodney (subsequently released on $5,000 bail) and the other academics were leading members of the Working People's Alliance (WPA) and had previously published *Dayclean*,* the WPA organ, which had been silenced through government seizure of typewriters and printing equipment. The fire-raising occurred a day after the WPA had organised a demonstration commemorating the first anniversary of the bogus referendum which Burnham had used to amend the Constitution to prolong the life of his administration, and about a week after the WPA had announced it would enter candidates in the forthcoming general election.

Rodney, Roopnarine, Omawale and Apata were formally charged with arson on 14 July. Following the court hearing, a WPA demonstration was met with violence by a pro-PNC group, the House of Israel, one of several cults which, like Jones' People's Temple, found a haven in Guyana because of its readiness to contribute to PNC funds and to commit armed violence against the opposition. (The House of Israel has also been implicated in other acts of violence against the WPA at rallies and demonstrations.) Guyanese Defence Force soldiers used bayonets against the WPA demonstrators. Father Bernard Drake, journalist for the *Catholic Standard* and author of several articles critical of the government, was shot and later died. Eleven others were injured, including another *Catholic Standard* journalist whose hand was cut off.

Burnham's ruling PNC is, in reality, a minority party representing the Afro-Guyanese segment of the population. The East Indians, the numerical majority, have traditionally voted for Jagan's People's Progressive Party(PPP). Burnham, backed by Britain and the US, defeated Jagan in the 1964 election through his manipulation of proportional representation, an electoral strategy introduced by Britain. In itself it could be fully justified as a legitimate means of bringing about greater parity between the number of votes cast and seats won — the plurality voting system had, in the past, consistently assured disproportionately high majorities to the PPP. In practice, however, it has been used illegitimately, opening up the way for

*See his interview with Colin Prescod, 'Guyana's Socialism' in *Race & Class* (Vol. 18 no. 2, Autumn 1976).

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

more and more electoral manipulation, increasingly necessary for Burnham to retain power. Frauds, documented by British and other international observers, included the stuffing of ballot boxes, the permitting of non-Guyanese to vote in national elections, the granting of overseas votes to infants and children. An Independent Television documentary presented substantial evidence, as did a 1968 survey of overseas voter registration carried out by the Opinion Research Centre (UK). To sustain his power while in office, Burnham has limited the means of expression of the opposition party and of dissidents more generally. Newsprint is government controlled, the movements of his opponents carefully monitored, premises searched.

The WPA, originally an alliance of progressive groups, was founded in 1974, and comprises the Indian Political Revolutionary Association, RATOON (a group of school and university teachers), African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa. It became an integrated organisation in 1978. It works closely with the Working People's Vanguard Party, and the Organisation of Working People, three of whose members were arrested on 17 July. After questioning they were released.

There is in Guyana at this time a wholesale onslaught against the WPA — all the individuals detained have been closely associated with its establishment and organisation. Such repression is, however, by no means a new phenomenon. In 1972 Joshua Ramsammy, a biology lecturer and member of the RATOON group, was shot; despite witnesses the culprits were never apprehended. An attempt was also made around the same time to kidnap Dr Clive Thomas, an internationally known development economist and leading member of RATOON. He is now a prominent member of the WPA. In 1974 Walter Rodney was illegally banned, under government pressure, from taking up a teaching post at the University of Guyana. The ban is still in force.

It is hardly plausible to suppose that the WPA, in becoming an electoral party and launching a peaceful campaign against the current regime, would have resorted to spontaneous terrorist action as the government alleges. There is great fear, not only for the safety of the individuals involved, but also that detainees will be coerced into making false and incriminating confessions. As we go to press, the trial of Walter Rodney, Rupert Roopnarine, Dr Omawale, Kwame Apata and Karen De Souza is scheduled to begin.

Telegrams and letters of concern should be sent to the Guyanese Ambassador to the US,Lawrence E. Mann, 2490 Tracy Place N.W., Washington DC 20008; the High Commission for Guyana, 3 Palace Court, London W2; the Prime Minister of Guyana, Georgetown, Guyana. A defence committee has been formed: Guyana Alliance Legal Defence Fund, c/o Joseph Woolcock, School of Education, Stanford University, California 94305, USA.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Book reviews

The Capitalist World Economy

By IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN (Cambridge University Press and Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1979). 305pp. £15.00

It appears as one of the odder features of the contemporary American academic scene that Immanuel Wallerstein is so often heralded as an eminent radical, progressive or marxist. An entire industry of 'world-system analysis' seems to be in development there. The man actually inhabiting this book of essays and collected articles comes across most often as an enthused if confused onlooker in a timeless, otherworldly cocktail party to which all the Big Guns have been invited. To the left, Fernand Braudel comes to a surprising agreement with Antonio Gramsci. To the right, Joseph Schumpeter scores a conversational point against Mao Tse-Tung. In the centre, Frantz Fanon passes on an aphorism to Immanuel.

Underneath the chatter lies an assumption, never overtly articulated but surfacing repeatedly, that intellectuals occupy the main ring in history, ultimately a tiresome and conservative approach to understanding society. In the address aimed at the American Sociological Association, 'Modernisation: requiescat in pace', this assumption comes out particularly sharply as Wallerstein explains away the history of American sociologists' views of the Third World as an entirely internal process, virtually without reference to concrete historical forces or the sociologists' relationship to those forces. Wallerstein indeed characterises himself as a paternalistic and rather self-satisfied onlooker:

> I shall end on the note of an ethical question: how can we view our own situation in light of this world-system? Suppose I am a strong

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

swimmer at an ocean beach and the sea is choppy. Suppose some motorboats engaged in a race come closer to shore than they should and cause already high waves to become suddenly higher. Suppose a weak swimmer nearby begins to drown.

In analyzing the causes of the dilemma, I could point to the short-term fact that the weak swimmer had failed to get in shape in prior weeks and had thus become exhausted easily. Or I could offer a middle-term explanation that the motorboats recklessly caused already high waves to become even higher. Or I could look at the long-term social roots. The community, though warned, had failed to build breakers to reduce the waves. Or the community had failed to ban motorboat races, or at least police them so that they were less dangerous.

The drowning man would prefer I save his life than analyze the roots of his dilemma. It is thus that the food crisis is often presented to us. There is drought in Ethiopia or earthquake in Brazil: send food, or medicine, or tents, and send them instantly. Who dares say no? Suppose I change the 'givens' slightly. Perhaps I am not in the water myself but on the beach and hence the drowning man is further away. Suppose not one man is drowning but one thousand, but for all the same reasons. Then my ethical dilemma might conceivably be posed as a choice between four courses of action:

(1) I could swim out to save people. I could probably save one or several. What would happen to the rest is uncertain.

(2) I could spend a little time locating a nearby lifeline and toss it into the water. This might save fifty. But the one I might have saved in plan (1) will probably drown in the meantime. What happens to the other 950 is in doubt.

(3) I could do something to stop the speedboats. This might take even more time than locating the lifeline. I probably could save 950, but perhaps the 50 that would have been saved by plan (2) might have drowned in the meantime.

(4) I could seek to change the laws and/or attitudes of the community. Powerful groups would oppose me. I would have to prepare for an organised struggle. Nonetheless, this might save all future swimmers. Meanwhile however, it is conceivable that the present thousand might go under.

It is not easy to decide what to do. You will want more details. You will prefer to do all simultaneously, which is not possible. You may get angry and deny the dilemma, saying no one will drown if they will only swim. Or you may find the moral choice too difficult for mere humans, and leave it to the will of God. My own penchant is to do (3) in the immediate and then move on to (4).(pp.130-1)

Wallerstein is to be counted among those writers where a radical

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

façade masks an idealist outlook in combination with a heavy-handed, dehumanised structuralism. He claims to present a dialectical understanding of capitalist development in contrast with bourgeois ('developmentalist') social scientists:

> To put it in Hegelian terms, the developmentalist perspective is mechanical, whereas the world-system perspective is dialectical. I mean by the latter term that at every point in the analysis, one asks not what is the formal structure but what is the consequence for both the whole and the parts of maintaining or changing a certain structure at that particular point in time, given the totality of particular positions of that moment in time.(p.54)

What literally could be a more mechanical description? Why put 'it' in 'Hegelian terms'?

Wallerstein borrows ideas from Marx and marxist thinkers, but his own conception of the world excises the labour theory of value and the centrality of human production and reproduction which for Marx lay at the heart of social relationships. As a result, Wallerstein's 'world-system' is one determined entirely by relations of exchange, much as in pre-Ricardian political economy, albeit with some historical perceptions thrown in.

> We take the defining characteristic of a social system to be the existence within it of a division of labour, such that the various sectors or areas within are dependent upon economic exchange with others for the smooth and continuous provisioning of the needs of the area.(p.5)

According to Wallerstein, the capitalist world system rests on two 'basic dichotomies' or 'poles' (poles?) of contradiction, one of class conflict and one of periphery-core states. On class, Wallerstein has little new to relate: the development of classes is ascribed largely to market relationships. Within the 'core' countries, classes are essentially 'groups', quarrelling over control of the 'ambiguous and ambivalent role of the state'(p.200), an opinion not a thousand miles away from conventional American interest group political science analysis.

It is in the second area where Wallerstein sees himself as an innovator. In developing his international division of labour, he has absorbed the work of dependency theorists such as André Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, but he has ossified their analyses and shorn them of revolutionary content. There are genuine difficulties in radical development theory as Ernesto Laclau (dismissed lightly by Wallerstein) and, more recently, Dan Nabudere in a sharp polemic, have pointed out. It is precisely the weakest side of development theory, its over-emphasis on exchange relations and 'unequal exchange' which Wallerstein seizes upon and stresses. At the political level Wallerstein must be distinguished sharply from Amin, Frank,

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Furtado, etc. Few militants from Third World countries reading Wallerstein will learn much from his notion that all that they are fighting for is to turn their peripheral countries into semi-peripheries:

> Take a struggle like that of Vietnam, of Algeria, or Angola. They were wars of national liberation. They united peoples in these areas. Ultimately, the forces of national liberation won or are winning political change. How may we evaluate its effect? On the one hand, these colonial wars fundamentally weakened the internal supports of the regimes of the USA, France, and Portugal. They sapped the dominant forces of world capitalism. These wars made many changes possible in the countries of struggle, the metropolises, and in third [*sic*] countries. And yet, and yet — one can ask if the net result has not been in part further to integrate these countries, even their regimes, into the capitalist world-economy. It did both of course. (p.64)

One of Wallerstein's main arguments against liberal mainstream thought is that it lacks historical dimension in comprehending economic development. Yet his notions of historical development are so crude as to defy usefulness. He recognises only three stages in history — several less than Joe Stalin! — mini-systems, world empires and world economies. Even with this narrow mould into which all human experience is squeezed, the latter two turn out to be mere sub-sets of the category, world-system. Capitalism is apparently only a sub-variant of the sub-category, world economy, but Wallerstein does not spell out what or who the other 'world-economies' were. (For the schema see esp. pp.156-60.)

Once this capitalist sub-variant gets on the move in the fifteenth century, it seems to change little.[1] Then as now there were/are cores, peripheries and semi-peripheries. Semi-peripheries are a curious category, defined basically as the middling countries in a country by country analysis of capitalist world surplus, much as if we were to take the middling teams in a football league as an analytical unit. The current list includes Canada, South Africa, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Chile, Cuba and China.(p.100) Thanks to Wallerstein's 'historical' framework, we can begin to understand what the People's Republic of China fundamentally has in common with the Venetian Republic in the seventeenth century!

Through the means of this lugubrious chess game with only three types of pieces and two or three moves, Wallerstein purports to explain such epochal events as the American Civil War or the Russian Revolution. In the Wallersteinian system, the Russian Revolution was 'a classic technique of mercantilist semiwithdrawal from the world-economy. In the process of doing this, the now [*sic*] USSR mobilised considerable popular support, especially in the urban sector. At the end of the Second World War, Russia ... could begin to seek full core

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

status'. As for Fascism, the Third Reich was fundamentally a struggle on the part of Germany to 'recoup lost ground', albeit 'noxious and unsuccessful'.(p.31) It is difficult in Wallerstein's constructions to distinguish between Willy Brandt and Gamal Abdel Nasser:

> Essentially, social democrats in core countries of the capitalist world-economy and populist-nationalists of the peripheral countries represented the same interest groups, espoused the same underlying Weltanschauung, and promoted the same genre of reforms, mutatis mutandis.(p.237)

Apart from this type of absurd reductionism, Wallerstein is also wont to indulge himself in bizarre Herman Kahn-like futurology, suggesting an anti-American alliance of Eastern and Western Europe with the Arab states or the use of Central Asians as the Soviet Union's German-style *Gastarbeiter*. At times, Wallerstein assures his readers that we must discard our old-fashioned notions of the nation-state as a crucial unit, but it is upon the state, the fundamental atom in his molecule, that all hinges. Underneath the verbiage about semi-peripheries, there is little but a very old-fashioned geopolitical world carve-up scenario in his 'world-system' approach.

There is nothing left, in this approach, of class analysis apart from the strife of groups distorting the world-economy in their interests while class struggle is largely reduced to the 'daily bread and butter of local politics'.(p.25) This places Wallerstein in considerable difficulty with the central issues this journal addresses. Race becomes an 'international status group category', replacing religion, which had assumed this interesting structural position in the eighth century. What are status groups? 'Blurred collective representation of classes', naturally! Third World workers in Europe are 'subproletarian ethnic strata'. 'Class' and 'ethno-nation' 'are two sets of clothing for the same basic reality'.(see pp.180ff. for these categorisations) It is difficult to see how Wallerstein's bewildering, stilted and occasionally if unintentionally quite funny linguistic world-system will assist serious students of this problem.

This review is perhaps guilty of repaying Wallerstein in kind for his over-arching fault — his work is almost entirely a package of assertions. These assertions succeed in being at once glib and heavy-handed but they are little substitute for real analysis. Again and again, instead of concepts, Wallerstein hands out impromptu and arbitrary definitions. Shopping about through the works of great thinkers to paste together a concoction such as this is no service to them or to us. Wallerstein is undoubtedly a scholar of impressive learning. A couple of his essays on restricted themes, one on Fanon and another reviewing recent books about American slavery, are perceptive and interesting. And Wallerstein's insistence on understanding capitalism in global, rather

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

than national, terms is a very important point. However, his attempt to put together this understanding on the cheap, and robbed of political and historical content, is much more likely to frustrate and anger, rather than stimulate, readers.

Centre for the Study of Social History
University of Warwick

BILL FREUND

1 For a thorough study of Wallerstein's interpretation of the origin of capitalism, see Robert Brenner's lengthy critique in *New Left Review* (July-August 1977, no. 104).

Colonial Immigrants in a British City: a class analysis

By JOHN REX and SALLY TOMLINSON with the assistance of DAVID HEARNDEN and PETER RATCLIFFE (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979). 357pp. £10.50

Black people have not migrated to and settled in Britain in order to relate with people of other races. It is time that we were done with discussing the experience of black workers and their families in Britain, as a race relations sociological problematic. It is time that we were done with tolerating the ramblings of sociologists who persist in writing about race relations, when they should be writing about racism. At the risk of repeating some things that others have already stated more elegantly, let us take, for example, the story of Caribbean industrial workers in Britain since the Second World War — a story which actually starts in the 1930s, before the war. It is a story of economic and political crisis as it struck in the ever worsening situation of Britain's exploited, underdeveloped colonies. The late-1930s saw massive popular unrest in the English-speaking Caribbean, in Jamaica and Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, and so on. Royal Commissions of Enquiry were set up, and they reported on the dire economic condition of his majesty's subjects in that corner of the empire. There was then no denying that the British ruling class was responsible for this state of affairs. The British government sat on the most damaging information in the reports, but they promised the colonials that something would be done. Then came the war, and all Commonwealth citizens were told that the most urgent priority was to serve and die for king and mother country. Caribbeans served and died, many travelling to Britain for these purposes. When the war was over, the promissory notes issued before and during the war were called in. Constitutional reform for self-government began to be considered. But the material economic bases of livelihood in the Caribbean were not being improved in the main — unemployment and material scarcity were great. And now there was a new coincidence of interests — Britain needed quick, cheap labour to reflate her home

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

economy, and new leadership elements in the Caribbean were happy to shift sections of their 'surplus' of labour to the metropole. (During the 1950s Caribbeans had gone in large numbers to North America, where there were jobs and wages, and they continue to do so.) This is how it came to be that Caribbeans were recruited or encouraged to come to work hard, long and poorly paid hours in Britain from the late 1940s, and with gathering momentum into the 1960s. The details for the Asian migrant workers are different, but structurally it is essentially the same story.

It must have become clear, quite early on, to the British ruling class and its chief executive servants, that not enough thinking and preparation had been done concerning this labour recruitment strategy for boosting the economy. Other European capitalist countries were using the strategy but (a) along with a more thorough attempt at reshaping their technological and industrial structure, and (b) with a much less embarrassing mechanism for taking the labour but not the labourer — a guest-worker mechanism. (This has not always worked out as planned for these economies.) In addition, the inner cities, to which Britain's new workers came, were already in advanced stages of decay. Britain's stored-up troubles came to a head simultaneously — an economy going into deeper crisis, hundreds of thousands of black settler workers in a society of individuals reared on snow-white fairy tale versions of history and of their place in the world, and cities stretched to the limit, not so much physically as financially and culturally. Such was the state of the nation that many black workers were now committed to settling in.

The executive of British capitalism debated over the years, and decided to go European: to rethink economic strategies in line with their powerful European neighbours; to treat black workers less as loyal subjects of the crown, and more as disposable objects of capital; to establish the necessary legislative, administrative and repressive machinery in order to contain the immediate unrest thrown up by the desperate situation in the inner cities. Britain joined the EEC. Immigration Acts were passed restricting the rights of black workers to enter and settle here. Community control legislation was passed: a Community Relations Commission was established, urban programmes were set up, and the police were given expanded powers formally and informally. We can see that this is not a story about good or bad race relations. Who seriously attempts to understand the relations of modern slavery, or of the British Raj, as exercises in race relations? Let us make it sharper. No one but an apologist for racist Southern African capitalism would characterise the difficulties currently encountered by the majority of blacks in Zimbabwe and Azania as a hitch in good race relations. This is not a point about emphasis. It is a point about distortion. But, the ideological mode which was employed, from the start, to make sense, for the common

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

man and woman, of the presence of black people in Britain, was culture conflict, racialism. And among the leading ideologists were sociologists. To steal a metaphor — in the beginning race relations was a laissez-faire enterprise. The images used in early social science writings were dramatic and simple, and some of those ways of seeing the black presence have stuck. Black workers were 'dark strangers', 'immigrants', new ingredients for the 'melting pot', problems for 'integration' and 'assimilation'. But as things became more serious and regularised, race relations became a highly structured industry. And where hard and scarce cash had to be used to sort out the mess of those early ill-considered decisions to import hundreds of thousand of black workers, hard social policy research and directives came to be of importance. Some sociologists hired themselves out to the great race relations industry and when, at the end of the 1960s, the old IRR began to fold up, they even set up their own academic niches in universities. Others, like John Rex, avoided the blandishments, were even for a while opposed to the race relations industry. But that very radical-ness was to establish them as the policy researchers par excellence in the period of black militancy.*

In 1967, nearly ten years after the Notting Hill street battles of black resistance to harassment and racist attacks, John Rex published his first major book on black people in Britain, with Robert Moore. His stated object was to make a contribution to the sociology of race relations, and the sociology of the city. He was then a liberal optimist on these matters. Since then the predicament of many black workers and their families has worsened. Now, in 1979, Rex with a new co-writer has produced his second major book about black people in Britain. He is still making contributions to the sociology of race relations, but he is now a liberal pessimist. What was signalled on the streets in 1958, and has since become everyday knowledge throughout the land, is announced by John Rex and Sally Tomlinson as a new finding in the sociology of race relations. They now talk about 'conflict triumphing over community' —yesterday's banner headlines for yesterday's news.

Rex and Tomlinson are at their best in this book as empiricist sociologists, never mind their claims to the contrary. They've researched in Handsworth, Birmingham, using over 1,000 interviews, and they've amassed evidence which reinforces already existing, more general statistical and critical findings of, for example, David Smith's PEP research (1977); the Department of Employment's *The Role of Immigrants in the Labour Market* (1977); the Redhill report on education (1976). In passing, they denounce the 'sheer viciousness' of John Brown's report on Handsworth, *Shades of Grey*. They reconstruct an interesting chronology of significant events and

*See 'The New Radicals' in a forthcoming issue of *Race & Class*.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

practices in the race relations industry, although there is a conspicuous absence of reference to state and other aggressions against blacks, e.g the creation and practices of the police Special Patrol Group and the Illegal Immigrants Intelligence Unit, and the expanded practice of 'sus' and conspiracy prosecutions against black young people. They present a full acount of the unfolding of the debate and legislation on race. Perhaps most innovatively they present a reasonably comprehensive listing, with some attempt at assessment, of what they call 'associational activity' in Handsworth — from the community relations council, through the Indian Workers' Association and Harambee black self-help, to Rastafarianism.

But beyond this empiricist research aspect, the book is pretentious. It is uneven, incoherent, and even at points self-contradictory. In adopting 'a certain degree of movement between perspectives', the authors obtain not a theory but a 'background' against which they approach an analysis of the black condition in Britain. They continue to work with notions like 'immigrant assimilation'. They misrepresent the rigour of marxist class analysis, and replace it with what they call a 'quasi marxist' conception. When they get around to doing their analysis of their research findings, they write about West Indians as 'descendants of slaves deprived of a culture' of Asians with a Jewish-option, and of how these complicate the assimilation prospects of the 'immigrants'. Then, taking the reader through a mess of unconvincing diagrammatic sociology (where the text carefully explains the inadequacy of the diagrams), the authors produce their prize analytical intervention.

By piecing together aspects of the sketches of the organisations and some of the leading personnel in the Handsworth community associations, Rex and Tomlinson claim to find evidence that there exists a black 'underclass-for-itself'. Note the quasi-marxism! This 'revolutionary underclass of black workers' has a political position which is apparently the same as that advocated by the authors. This position holds that, 'the structural transformation of capitalist and colonial society which is going on in the Third World' is 'more fundamental than the revolution of the working class in the advanced countries'. Now if the politics of this black 'underclass' is colonially focussed, in the context of Britain, it is evidently not so much an 'underclass' as an outclass!

How are we to apprehend the intention of a book that starts with a scientific race relations project, and finishes with an emotional third worldist programme? There is something almost racist about the implication that it is necessary to inform social change in the metropole with some kind of science, whereas mere revolutionary rhetoric will do for the Third World periphery. Except that this perception of modes of political action is consistently of a piece with the authors' extraordinarily odd conception of world capitalism and its class formations.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Quite apart from the disastrous venture into interpreting Third World and revolutionary black politics, we might expect this book, for which the blurb claims the accolade of '*the* text on race and community relations in Britain', to provide us with a convincing account or analysis of the development of racism in Britain during the 1960s and the 1970s. No joy here either. The wisdom of the authors is contained in an aphorism — 'racism flows, it never ebbs' — unlike the trade cycle. So that there can be no significant determining relation between business (capital) and racism. It is argued that escalating racism in Britain is most significantly influenced by the electoral pragmatism of the leading parliamentary parties. And even an Archbishop of Canterbury, the 'highest moral authority', was shown to have sanctioned 'hostile attitudes and beliefs' of the 'frustrated working class'. And we are left with the distinct possibility that the British white working class has a mysterious power to make the policy of the executive of the capitalist ruling class. On the basis of this wisdom, the authors finish their book with suggestions of essential tasks for whites concerned 'to arrest the vicious cumulative spiral of escalating racism'. They get the general tone right, but their suggestions are yesterday's liberals' programme — stop the political parties competing for the popular vote on racist platforms, work for a multi-cultural society, do political work at every point of injustice, decide whose side you're on and support the self-help and independent projects of black people, don't be paternalistic to blacks. And, if all else fails, sit back and let black people fight their own independent race battles.

In spite of all their erudition, the authors do not appear to know of the dialectical relation between racism and capitalism. They have taken the point that black workers' interests have not been adequately pursued under the auspices of traditional working class representational forms in Britain. But they have misunderstood the implication of this realisation. The point is not simply to show how 'minority problems' are not to be subsumed under 'the general problems of the disadvantaged', thereby marking out blacks as separate problems of race relations sociology.

In post-Second World War Britain, black has come to be not merely the colour of a specific experience of oppression and exploitation, but also the colour of a particular array of struggles against deprivation and inequality. These struggles are emphatically not struggles for better race relations. They are struggles against racism and its task master capitalism, struggles about economic exploitation, material deprivation, physical repression, and ideological obfuscation in a racist capitalist society. Now this is decidedly not the emphasis of this new book by Rex and Tomlinson. But no matter since, in spite of their good intentions, their soulful dedications, and their impeccable academic credentials, race relations sociologists

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

exemplify a latter day case of the emperor's new clothes syndrome. Any child — any youth, any black youth, can see right through their cover.

North London Polytechnic COLIN PRESCOD

Steve Biko: I Write What I Like: A selection of his writings. Edited with a personal memoir by A. STUBBS C.R. (London, Bowerdean Press, 1978). 216pp. £4.95.

South Africa after Soweto has settled back into its customary, but deceptive, political and social calm. Once again the period of respite marks the denouement of yet another upsurge of political struggle, when the state police unleashed unprecedented violence on school students peacefully demonstrating. Thus 16 June 1976 signalled the beginning of the end to that era of resistance in South Africa which, spanning the previous decade, was effectively brought to a halt by an Act outlawing the activities of all Black Consciousness organisations in September 1977. Only recently another tradition (50 years old), of civil disobedience against successive settler minority regimes, was brought to its abrupt end. When in 1961 the political activities of South Africa's erstwhile black intelligentsia were also terminated (banning orders were imposed on the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, March 1961), effective resistance against the South African state was reduced to nil. What followed was a period of ruthless and total repression (instigated by the security police), ironically dubbed the lull by the new young black intellectuals who emerged from it.

There is little doubt that the new wave of political activity inside South Africa following the 'lull' was spearheaded by student activities, notably those of the South African Student Organisation (SASO), which later proliferated into several organs, known collectively as the Black Consciousness Movement. The prime catalyst in this rekindled bid for state power was Steve Biko who in 1968 had led black students out of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), a multi-racial but white English-speaking dominated student body. SASO was formed, and in July 1969 Steve Biko was elected its first President. But it was as SASO's publicity secretary (he was appointed in July 1970) that he finally emerged as a strategist, organiser and chief exponent of the Black Consciousness philosophy.

I Write What I Like, a selection of Steve Biko's writings,memoranda and speeches, captures the essence of his political career and his invaluable contribution to a very difficult and complex struggle. Thanks go to Aelred Stubbs CR for his effort in compiling, editing and making available to the rest of us this important piece of history.

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Having read the book, however, I could not help feeling that Father Stubbs' personal memoir detracts more than it adds to the political passion and urgency which underlie Biko's work. Stubbs overemphasises his own spiritual patronage of Biko, which had nothing to do with Steve's struggle for the seizure of state power — clearly his ultimate goal. I also fail to see why Steve's physical attributes, with an allusion to his sexual prowess, surely completely extraneous to the central theme of the book, warranted inclusion.

What does the book tell us about Steve Biko as a revolutionary? The question of whether or not the political sagacity revealed in his varied analyses of the South African social structure was matched by an equal grasp of the nature of international political forces and their influence on South Africa itself, is purely academic. Even if we assume that such an understanding was missing from his theoretical position, there is no doubt that, given his acumen and further revolutionary practice, he would have developed it, and become one of the foremost thinkers on the continent. To espouse the idea of black communalism (i.e. primitive communism) as he did, was to ignore or to be unaware of the dominance of world capitalism which is the basis of the exploitation of black people in South Africa today. So that, if we agree with Amilcar Cabral, that the motive force of history is the mode of production, to advocate communalism as Steve Biko did and eschew socialism, would be to seek to revert to a mode of production which is at many removes from the present dominant mode. Clearly this is historically not possible, unless we undertook to destroy capitalism, its technology and its culture, as we find it in South Africa.

Steve Biko's political philosophy, as outlined in these selections, derives precisely from a thorough knowledge and understanding of the nature of the South African regime's neo-fascist repression against the black community. Therefore, for Steve Biko it is not an abstraction to see the major contradiction there as white racism, a racism which breeds 'a fear that erodes the souls of Black people in South Africa — a fear obviously built up deliberately by the system through a myriad of civil agents, be they post office attendants, police, CID officials, army men in uniform, security police or even the occasional trigger-happy white farmer or store owner ...'

Thus grew in Steve Biko a passionate determination to rid himself and his compatriots of this paralysis: blacks, 'in spite of their obvious contempt for the values cherished by Whites, and the price at which White comfort and security is purchased ... seem to me to have been successfully cowed down by the type of brutality that emanates from this section of the community'. It is within this context that the formation of SASO and the subsequent creation of its supportive organisations, especially the Black Community projects, should be seen. The latter, as part of an insurrectionary strategy, were to

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

constitute the preparatory stage for 'resistance against their [the people's] overall oppression' and to bring to an end their economic exploitation, which in Biko's words is '... the claim by Whites of monopoly on comfort and security which has always been so exclusive that Blacks see Whites as the major obstacle in the progress towards peace, prosperity and a sane society'. Since the South African state does not as a rule provide adequate welfare amenities for the Blacks, the founding of such projects as, for example, Zanempilo Community Health Clinic, became the most important aspect of practical politics, attempting as they did to meet the ideal of self-reliance. Zimele was another project of major importance, which was established to help ex-political prisoners (most of whom are invariably banished to remote rural areas where employment opportunity is slim) through loans and grants 'to stand on their own feet again', preferably in collectives.

But even more crucial for South Africa, as a result of Steve Biko's work and the BCM 'conscientisation' programme, is the substantial success that has been attained in inspiring a new breed of revolutionaries to align themselves with the people against the minority regime in the struggle for state power.

Middlesex Polytechnic MOJI MOKONE

Ethnic Minorities in the Inner City

By CRISPIN CROSS (London, Commission for Racial Equality, 1978). 183pp. £1.80 paper.

Racism and Political Action in Britain

Edited by ROBERT MILES and ANNIE PHIZACKLEA (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). 246pp. £3.75 paper.

If these two publications are a sign that the race relations industry lives, in its bureaucratic and academic guises, they also show just how stagnant and insular it has become, seemingly impervious to all that is happening around it in the community, in black thinking, within the state itself. Both publications represent gestures toward relevance — one in the direction of official policy on the inner city, the other to the advent of fascism — but each is ultimately betrayed by its contents.

The Commission for Racial Equality booklet supposedly reports on a survey of local authority 'decision-makers' and professional workers, and a sample of 'lay persons' as well, concerning attitudes toward the social needs of ethnic minorities. In fact, for the greater part the booklet presents little more than a summary of evidence drawn from other sources (the old Institute of Race Relations' survey of British

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

race relations and the various PEP reports), all to show that black people do indeed have special social problems, even if the local authority officials interviewed were loth to admit it for fear of being accused of 'reverse' discrimination. What all this amounts to is a pathetic plea to these same officials not to forget black people, especially now that the state's strategy on inner cities has shifted to a higher plane and, perhaps more to the point for the CRE, control over the distribution of the deprivation goodies has been taken out of the hands of mother Home Office. But this report is so badly written and presented that it is unlikely to carry conviction, except possibly to demonstrate the CRE's own need for compensatory education in the ways of bureaucracy.

Miles and Phizacklea's book presents various papers first given at a conference held by the SSRC Ethnic Relations Unit in 1977. Some of the papers have a familiar ring. John Rex, for instance, in the only paper dealing directly with black politics, argues that because of the class nature of British politics (as opposed to the ethnic politics of the United States), and racial discrimination, blacks have not found the Labour Party and the trade unions to be suitable vehicles for channelling their specific demands in such fields as employment, housing and education. Nor have the paternalistic structures created by the state, in the form of the CRE and its predecessors, been any more successful in accommodating black politics. As a result, Rex contends that young blacks in particular are moving toward a community-based politics of 'defensive confrontation'. But in labelling black politics in this way, or indeed in accepting such developments as inevitable and essential to black people's ultimate entry, on non-paternalistic grounds, into the working class, it is not at all clear where this analysis leads. Certainly, Rex seems not to recognize that the Labour Party and trade unions have increasingly abandoned their own communal instincts and lost their ability to defend even white working-class interests, factors which go some way towards explaining the rise of working-class racism and the National Front.

Such an extension of his argument would have at least enabled Rex's paper to fit in better with the others presented here. Most of these papers are concerned, directly or indirectly, with the National Front, as if the academic branch of the race relations industry had suddenly discovered a whole new product line. The Front is analysed from virtually every angle — its historical antecedents, the underlying working-class racism on which it builds, its scapegoating tactics and ideology, its membership and structure, its electoral impact (or lack of it). Everything, that is, except for that aspect of National Front activity which most directly affects black people — its actions on the streets, in their communities. Fascist violence, like that other racism of the state and its party political organs, does get the odd passing mention, but usually in such a way as to assign them to the periphery

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

of the analyses presented here. Only Caroline Knowles, in her careful study of the conflicts between the 'established' and 'radical' wings of the Labour movement over strategies for combating anti-Semitism in the 1930s, has attempted in any way to draw out practical lessons in terms of the current situation. Moreover, she has done so in full recognition of the fact that 'contemporary hostility towards black people in Britain should not be seen as part of a continuum, stretching from "Jew-baiting" through to "Paki-bashing"' and that racism today 'exists against a background of increasingly restrictive immigration acts which aim to prevent black people from settling in Britain' and a race relations industry and policy 'which has the effect of sanctioning and legitimizing white, English hostility.' Her fellow contributors would do well to consider their own part in this — how far in the very act of subjecting racism and fascism to such sterile, academic analysis they actually serve to explain them away.

University of Birmingham LEE BRIDGES

Organising the Farmers: cocoa politics and national development in Chana

By BJÖRN BECKMAN (Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976), 299pp., n.p.

With the possible exception of Nyerere's Tanzania, no other African regime has been so much at the centre of the development debate as has been Ghana during the period in which it was ruled by Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party. Björn Beckman has made an important contribution to this debate through his detailed study of the operation of the United Gold Coast Farmers' Council, the farmers' wing of the CPP, and in doing so he has provided us with perhaps the best insight to date into the failure of Nkrumahism and the socialism of the CPP.

It is a cliché to say that cocoa is the basis of Ghanaian politics, but a true one. As Beckman notes, one-third of all Ghanaians could be classed as cocoa farmers in the early 1960s and cocoa was responsible for about sixty per cent of Ghana's export earnings. Thus, it was crucial for the CPP development strategy to gain control of cocoa marketing and the surplus generated by cocoa production and the Farmers' Council was the vehicle chosen by Nkrumah and the CPP to exercise that control.

Nkrumah's 'Dawn Broadcast' of 8 April 1961 established the Farmers' Council as the sole legal buyer of cocoa and, in doing so, launched an attack on the entire structure of the Ghanaian economy. The major foreign buyers simply left the field. The United Africa Company diversified into other areas of commerce, while the cocoa

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

manufacturers such as Fry and Cadbury merely retreated to the position of ultimate buyers. No attempt was made to alter the relations of cocoa production, rather, as Beckman perceptively notes, CPP policy was rooted 'in the international relations of exchange rather than the social organisation of production'. By attacking the control of the foreign firms the CPP also attacked the position of the indigenous cocoa brokers and large farmers, many of whom had depended on their links with the expatriate firms for their economic position. In the past this group had been an important source of support of the CPP, now they were faced with the appropriation of their economic position by the bureaucracy of the CPP.

This attack on the indigenous petty-bourgeoisie of cocoa created a fatal split in the Ghanaian body politic. Local brokers were not opposed to the attack on foreign domination of the economy. Quite the opposite. the unity of the independence struggle was rooted in the understanding of both CPP bureaucrats and the broker/large farmers alike that it was necessary 'to use the nationalist state as an instrument for advancing their own position'. Here, however, the two groups parted company. For while the bureaucracy of the CPP saw state control as its objective, the broker/farmer group saw the 'opening up' of the Ghanaian economy 'in such a way as to permit their own economic expansion' as the ultimate goal.

The clash of these two positions and the ultimate failure of the CPP to retain power was accelerated by existing regional differences and by the collapse of world cocoa prices in the early 1960s. Yet it is too easy to ascribe the CPP's failure to these causes alone and happily Beckman does not. Beckman argues that the failure of the CPP must be seen as the failure of the party bureaucracy as well. Little attempt was ever made to mobilise those allies who might have proved crucial to the CPP's survival — smaller cocoa farmers, share croppers and migrant labourers. Moreover, as Beckman so closely details, the corruption, arrogance and heavy-handedness of the functionaries of the Farmers' Council bureaucrats went far in pushing just these potential allies into the hands of their traditional patrons, the large farmer/brokers.

In several important respects Beckman's work parallels the analysis of Tanzanian socialism set forth by Issa Shivji in his *Silent Class Struggle*, yet Beckman's work lacks the forcefulness of Shivji's presentation. Its scholarly tone may unfortunately limit its audience, but *Organising the Farmers* is likely to remain for some time the best corrective to the 'illusions' of Ghana under Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples' Party.

University of Toronto BOB SHENTON

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Let Me Speak! Testimony of Domitila, a woman of the Bolivian mines
By DOMITILA BARRIOS DE CHUNGARA with MOEMA VIEZZER (London, Stage 1, 1978). 235pp. £2.95.

> I want to testify about all the experience we have acquired over so many years of struggle in Bolivia and contribute a little grain of sand with the hope that our experience may serve in some way for the new generation — for the new people.

Let Me Speak is a unique and important book. It is the personal story of Domitila, a woman of the Bolivian mines, the history of working-class struggle in Bolivia between 1964 and 1976, and a simple analysis of imperialist exploitation and control. These subjects are not treated consecutively but permeate one another, because the story of Domitila's life is the story of her people's struggle. Her understanding and analysis come out of experience. In her testimony theory and practice are inseparable, as in her reality.

In the mines of Siglo XX (Domitila's home town) the average life expectancy of a miner is 35 years, a worker cannot even stop his eight-hour shift in order to eat, most men die of silicosis and their wives and children are then thrown out of their homes with no source of livelihood. In trying to change that reality Domitila and the miners discovered what really lay behind it. Domitila recounts the explanation given by a miners leader

> He took a sheet of paper and said: 'This represents what we produce this whole sheet ... How is this distributed?' Then he tore the sheet of paper into five equal parts. 'Of these five parts', he said, 'four go to the foreign capitalist. That is his profits. Bolivia only keeps one part. Now this fifth is also distributed according to the system in which we live, right? So from this the government takes almost half for transportation, customs and export expenses which is another way to make the capitalist earn a profit, no? ... they take and they keep on taking ... so that we end up with almost nothing, see?'

The miners' unions in Bolivia are strong and well organised. They remain undaunted despite the massacres of hundreds of workers and their families by the Bolivian army, and independent despite the efforts of the Organizacion Regional Interamericana del Trabajo (ORIT) to incorporate them into the US-controlled unions of Latin America. However women's organised involvement in politics is comparatively recent. In Siglo XX it centres on the Housewives' Committee which was formed in 1961 by miners' wives fighting to free their imprisoned husbands. Domitila describes a number of battles which the women of the committee were involved in over the years. They held US diplomats hostage for exchange with imprisoned

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

miners' leaders, they worked with women who had no source of livelihood and helped them find jobs and organise, they held demonstrations about price rises and so on

Periodically they had to face the hostility of their men. After one demonstration;

> when they went back home lots of men beat their wives and said that they were housewives and had nothing to do with politics and that their obligation was to be at home. Until finally we said that we were going to criticise them on the radio [the miners had their own radio station] which we did. We said: 'Those compañeros who beat their wives must be government agents. That is the only thing that can explain the fact that they are opposed to their compañeras demanding what in all justice is ours.'

Domitila became increasingly involved in the Housewives' Committee and the miners' struggles as successive governments further increased the exploitation of the workers. In 1967 she and her family were exiled from their own village and dumped in another town, Oruro.

> I swallowed my tears watching my children cry. In our own country thrown out of our own village ... where would we go? ... They say that the land is for those who work it. That land in the mine that our fathers have worked was the only thing we had to live from. And yet they had thrown us off it. We were foreigners in our own country.

In trying to keep her family together in these circumstances Domitila was arrested. Eight months pregnant she was battered and kicked in the stomach and, because she dared resist to save her unborn child, she was knocked unconscious. Later, after more threats, she began to go into labour. But such was her worry about what would happen to the child that she became petrified. 'And I said to myself "If it is born let it be born dead. I don't want the colonel to kill it!" Really I lived through a terrible odyssey. The head was about to come out and I pushed it back in.'

Finally Domitila was released, but only on condition she remained in exile in the rural area of Los Yungas. With her body rotting with unhealed wounds, her mind full of agonising memories of torture, she almost gave up hope: 'at moments I questioned almost everything I had done. I almost gave in'. To save herself, as it were, she began to work in the fields. And there the indomitable Domitila, working till her hands bled, brutalising herself with work to earn a few pennies, began to see that the oppression of the miners and of the peasants complemented each other, and that their struggle was one. It was during this period too that she started reading marxist theory, and saw in it an articulation of her perceptions and feelings, her

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

experience, and a guide to future actions. 'I've dreamed about this since I was little and now I have to work and begin to uphold this doctrine, base myself on this doctrine in order to go on, no?'

Let Me Speak! has political lessons for us all but it is moving rather than moralistic. Domitila herself sees her book as a weapon in the struggle. 'It does not matter what kind of paper it is put down on, but it does matter that it be useful to the working class, not only for intellectual people or for people who make a business of this kind of thing.'

London ISOBEL REID

Race, Education and Identity

By G.K. VERMA and C. BAGLEY, *editors* (London, Macmillan, 1979). 268pp. £10.00

These studies are concerned in general with the adjustment of black children to various aspects of life in Britain. The authors also set out to refute empirically certain myths they consider detrimental to the overall aim that emerges from the book: the promotion of multiracial harmony, whatever that means. Undoubtedly the book's underlying rationale is based on the assumption that painstaking empirical research, presented in a careful scholarly manner (which for them seems to involve a long, and to the general reader, somewhat obtuse discussion on methodology), will produce an accumulating body of evidence which will acquire the status of accepted fact. While this may indeed be the case in academic circles (although, if it is, why is it necessary to go on refuting Jensen?) one wonders how much influence such studies will have on social policy or public behaviour. Would, for example, the facts presented here stop race being used as an election issue? To ask this, however, is to question the general applicability of a social-psychological approach to racism (which is an institutionalised phenomenon occurring in a specific political and economic context) and therefore to dismiss the book altogether. The alternative, which I shall take here, is to pull from this fat collection of essays those sections where the book does, in fact, confront some of the major problems of racism. Some interesting points do emerge from these studies which focus mainly on four problem areas: first, the refutation of 'scientific' racism; secondly, the possibility of changing racist attitudes through education; thirdly, identity problems faced by black children in a white racist society; and finally, the desirability of transracial adoption.

The underachievement of black children in education in both the United States and Britain has been a fact easily distorted for the purposes of racist propaganda. The more so if the evidence is

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

explained by psychologists like Jensen in terms of supposedly scientific arguments about genetic inferiority. Stones' article, 'The colour of conceptual learning', is important because it demonstrates Jensen's inadequate grasp of the nature of human learning, and therefore the theoretical weakness of his tests. Stones argues that whereas Jensen's work assesses the mastery of rote learning *tasks*, which he considers equally available to everyone, when it came to concept learning he merely administered *tests* which simply measured the conceptual equipment children had already developed before taking the test. He did not test how well they could learn to apply a concept in a novel situation. This error, Stones claims, allowed Jensen to make the damaging assumption that some children, particularly black low SES (social economic status) children, were not capable of conceptual learning. When Stones included the learning of concepts in his own test situation he found no significant difference in the performance scores of West Indian, Pakistani and English children.

Stones' conclusions are supported by the results of Bagley's study designed to discover the factors leading to academic success among West Indian 10-year olds in London schools. He found that black children who enjoyed adequate material standards, and who had non-authoritarian parents who were radically disaffected with English society, performed at a level comparable with middle-class English children. In contrast, children of Jamaican parents (more than those from any other island), who tended to be authoritarian, to speak Creole at home and adopt a passive accepting attitude towards English society, performed badly. In Bagley's opinion the crucial differentiating variable was the parents' critical attitude. He suggests that 'any major movement in the educational advancement of young blacks lies along a broad front of radical activity involving schools and other institutions'.

Racism, and the conditions it perpetuates, not only influences both the assessment and educational performance of black children it may also affect their personalities. Whereas many black children in Britain seek to avoid racial hostility by remaining within a black world, Peter Weinreich found others tried to solve the problem by identifying with white rather than black people, finally rejecting their own skin colour. This might be expected to occur particularly in black or mixed-race children who had been adopted by white families. However, Bagley and Young found the cognitive progress and emotional adjustment of such children to be excellent in comparison with white classmates and white adopted children, and substantially superior to that of other mixed-race or black children remaining in institutions or returned to a single parent. They argue against black American opinion, which holds that only black parents can teach black children to cope with racism, that trans-racial adoption still offers a better solution for black children, at least until an adequate number of black adoptive families

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

can be found. While admitting that the children in their sample were not yet teenagers, and had therefore not yet faced the critical period of identity crisis, they felt optimistic that the experience of childhood in a warm and caring family would give them the stability and confidence to overcome such problems, should they arise.

Teaching programmes designed to reduce prejudice are regarded with similar optimism, even though some research seems to indicate they work best among those who are well educated and least racially prejudiced to begin with. However, the difficulties of finding out how well these programmes work are not underestimated. In perhaps the most thoughtful and theoretically probing essay in the book, 'Racism and educational evaluation', the authors face the problems that evaluation poses in a politically sensitive area like race. But while they insist that all opinions about issues which are necessarily controversial and political must be heard fairly, they nevertheless still reflect the traditional liberal split between research and policy. This seems a curious position to take when they also admit that the treatment of black people in Britain 'makes the goodness of our society problematic'.

The book has an appealing optimism, however, and is full of good intention, but by treating racism primarily as a phenomenon to be understood at the level of social interaction it leaves us bereft of tools for analysis or weapons to overcome it as an intrinsic part of the institutionalised fabric of British society. It is not enough to prove that black children are just as capable as white children of taking advantage of good socio-economic conditions, what has to be explained is why in every area of deprivation black people are over-represented.

North London Polytechnic JENNY MELLOR

The Land of Promise: a critique of political Zionism

By ABDELWAHAB M. ELMESSIRI (New Brunswick, North American, 1977). 256pp. $7.95.

Books about the Arab-Israel conflict have a disturbing tendency to become pigeonholed into either 'pro-Israel' or 'pro-Arab' categories, even when they intend otherwise. The Zionists, certainly, will not like Mr. Elmessiri's work. He is an Egyptian scholar who has spent several years studying his subject. Its indictment of political Zionism on a charge of wilful blindness towards the very existence of the Palestinian Arab identity is no new discovery, but it is thoroughly researched and meticulously documented. Several points are well put: the uniqueness of Zionism as an ideology that created a society rather than the other way around; the complexity of the Zionist infrastructures of East

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

European ghetto, present day diaspora Jewry and the Jewish state itself. His chapter on the early 'gentile Zionists' has some revealing details (British Governor Sir Ronald Storrs who declared the Zionist settlement would be a blessing for Britain 'by forming for England "a little loyal Jewish Ulster" in a sea of hostile Arabism'). Some aspects of the book, however, are caught in a number of problematic pitfalls.

Elmessiri, as an Egyptian, has obviously never been in Israel (one hopes he will remedy this now that the dove of peace flutters awkwardly over the Nile). This does not invalidate his research, but it does give it a kind of artificial tinge, a dryness that often fails to distinguish neat facts put on paper with the rather more messy social reality. For his chapters on Jewish religion and Zionism he relies far too heavily on 'our gang', the familiar clique of Rabbi Berger, Menuhin and the ultra-orthodox Netorei Karta, dissident Jews whose particular thrust does not go unchallenged in anti-Zionist circles. Anti-Zionism can make strange bedfellows, and one must, I think, be wary of groups whose opinions one agrees with on one issue but totally disagrees with on others. The question I would ask in this context is: 'Is their anti-Zionism socially progressive?' I can respect the integrity of Netorei Karta in rejecting what they see as un-Jewish injustice in the Zionist state, but I would certainly not want to live under their form of fundamentalism. In this case I would be wary of accepting their authority on anti-Zionism.

The assumption by Elmessiri of mere malicious intent behind every Zionist move is too simplistic: he fails to examine the question of motivation. It is clear that to its Arab victims Zionism was and is one undifferentiated lump, its internal ideological squabbles apparently irrelevant in the context of its results in practice. The Palestinian whose house is bulldozed is not concerned whether the bulldozer's driver is a fanatic Beginist rightist or a Zionist-Socialist Mapamnik whose conscience is in constant anxiety. The victim judges his oppressor by his acts, one cannot demand of him otherwise. But Elmessiri appears to consign motivation to a minor role. This, in a book about Zionism, is an error, perhaps made inevitable by the author's distance from his subject. Facts, dates, documents, all play their part in helping us comprehend history, but they cannot in themselves convey the living culture of a socio-political movement. By confining himself to denunciatory research, the author has diminished the book's potential impact.

In conclusion, Elmessiri cites the Israeli minority attitude that sees Zionism as a closed historical process that terminated with the founding of the Israeli state in 1948. He hopes this view will prevail in Israel, leaving the historical argument to the academics. In my opinion too many wars have been fought over differing views of history to warrant such a pious hope. There is no reason to believe that the new *Israeli* nationalism, as distinct from Zionism, will be any

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

less rapacious towards the Palestinian Arab. 'Peace' as recent events have shown, can be brought to Palestine in two ways: by manipulations of the ruling classes on either side to end strife that no longer serves their interest (and who would pay the price of this 'peace' but the usual dispossessed?), or from the bottom upward, by the dispossessed of both sides working side by side to replace currently evil social systems with better ones. One has one's choice of 'utopian' hopes, but the assumption that class conflict, poverty and exploitation can be brought to an end by mutual goodwill is a liberal dream.

London SIMON LOUVISH

Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the destruction of Cambodia

By WILLIAM SHAWCROSS (London, Andre Deutsch, 1979) 467pp. £6.95

With an anaesthetised electorate and an imperial consensus, the function of the successful 'peace' candidate can be to implement much of the policies of the avowed hawk. Lyndon Johnson saved the US from Goldwater and enormously escalated the secret war in Vietnam which he inherited from Kennedy. Nixon, likewise, was elected President in November 1968 on a promise to extricate the nation from the Vietnam war. He promptly appointed Kissinger his National Security Assistant, and within a month of inauguration they had received favourably a request from the commander in Vietnam to authorise the bombing of neutral Cambodia. On 18 March, 1969 such bombing began in conditions of utmost secrecy explicitly imposed by Nixon. The Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force were not informed, nor were any of the Congressional committees which constitutionally enable Congress to authorise and fund warfare. The official computerised military record-keeping system, recording bombing raids, targets, destruction and flying times, was beaten with an elaborate system of false 'dual reporting'. All military personnel involved violated Article 107 of the Military Code of Justice, which provides court martial for signing false records.

When the conspiracy was not immediately detected, the bombing continued, under the codename operation MENU, after the breakfast briefing which launched it. The Joint Chiefs informed the White House in April that many of the target areas for saturation bombing were populated by Cambodians, mostly peasants. By June 1969, 3,630 B52 raids had flown into Cambodia all along the 500-mile South Vietnam border.

Thus began the destruction of Cambodia, later completed by

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

invasion and, after the Paris agreements in early 1973 to end the Vietnam war, some of the heaviest carpet bombing in history. The invasion in April 1970 totally ignored Congress, although the US constitution reserves to it the power to declare war, in order (as Abraham Lincoln put it) that 'no man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us'. Nobody knows the casualty figures. Already by February 1972 a Senate sub-committee found that two million Cambodians had been made homeless by the war, in a population of only seven millions.

There are many lessons from this important book. The substantial but incomplete record it represents was made possible by the release under the Freedom of Information Act of thousands of documents by the Department of Defence, State Department, CIA, National Security Council and Agency for International Development. But several of the documents were still censored, and the author did not pursue his applications to the limits.

Moreover Shawcross does not pursue the implications of the records of the war. US Special Forces had in fact been entering Cambodia secretly since May 1967 under President Johnson. In the black 'pyjamas' of the National Liberation Front, and carrying Chinese-made weapons, they entered with up to three times as many local mercenaries recruited by the CIA. The release they had to sign subjected them to a $10,000 fine and up to 10 years' imprisonment for disclosing details of the raids.

Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia was in fact soon reported briefly in the May 9, 1969 issue of the *New York Times*, but this provoked no great public outcry. Kissinger immediately asked FBI director Hoover to find the source of the leak and promised to 'destroy whoever did this'. That day the FBI illegally violated Fourth Amendment rights by putting a wiretap on the home of Kissinger's assistant on the National Security Council staff. This attempted cover-up of *foreign* policy crimes marked the beginning of the domestic abuses of power later known as Watergate.

In July 1974, just before Nixon's enforced resignation, the House of Representatives' Judiciary Committee approved sections on the Watergate cover-up and on wiretaps in the impeachment of Nixon, but rejected the accusation of Nixon waging secret illegal war in Cambodia. It is clear that both Congress and the large sections of the American public eventually disturbed by the Watergate revelations were unwilling to insist on Executive legality and accountability in the field of the greatest potential crimes of the state, namely war. Shawcross sings the praises of 'the world's most vital democracy', but refuses to look at the implications of this blindness. Instead he retreats into the untenable thesis that the 'sideshow' of Cambodia merely revealed the responsibility of the madman and his ambitious henchman, whereas it was part of an Indochina and global strategy

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

which involved many other accomplices and many other major war crimes.

Nixon's reputation was irretrievably destroyed, but Kissinger's was elevated. He was confirmed as Secretary of State in September 1973. All those who seek legality and accountability in public life, not to say that honour so beloved of public scoundrels, will study with reward Kissinger's response to this devastating book, which if facts alone mattered would mark his permanent disgrace. They will do well also to note how quickly the 'main show' of Vietnam has been transformed by the US political establishment and media from a crime into a regrettable mistake.

London CHRIS FARLEY

Neocolonial Identity and Counter Consciousness: essays on cultural decolonisation.

By RENATO CONSTANTINO (London, Merlin Press, 1978). 307pp.

Colonialism and neocolonialism are frequently referred to as the economic subjugation of countries by imperialism. But for those who, like Constantino, speak from the midst of the battle against imperialism, it is more: it involves too the colonial stranglehold on the consciousness of the oppressed, the colonisation of the mind.

Thus to struggle for liberation, the fetters of colonial consciousness, forged through centuries of class domination, have to be broken, 'melted and recast' so that the pride and dignity of the oppressed can be asserted in a newly-formed consciousness. But what is consciousness? For Constantino it 'is the manner by which a society in its development explains the world and views itself. But more than that, it is the recognition of the changing nature of social forms, therefore it is an awareness of the necessity for basic and hence revolutionary change.' The journey to consciousness, however, is a long and cumulative process beginning in 'counter consciousness ... the reaction against the prevailing consciousness'. But consciousness, for Constantino, is not just an abstract or metaphysical thing; it is a material force. 'Consciousness as impediment in the realm of the spirit is compounded by consciousness as a material force.' And as such, 'changes in the material base are delayed by the weight of consciousness itself as consciousness is imprisoned by the relatively unchanging base'. Thus consciousness is an operative, dynamic force for change, and is to be distinguished from identity which of itself is static and apolitical. It is his concern for 'retrieving' the consciousness (and therefore the revolutionary potential) of his people that has led Constantino to devote the greater part of his life to a re-examination of his country's history 'from the

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

vantage point of the people' for:

> the only way a history of the Philippines can be truly Filipino is to write on the basis of the struggles of the Filipino people ... Such a task can be sustained only by a scholarship that is as partisan as it is dedicated.

The legacy of Spanish and American rule in the Philippines was a legacy of carefully nurtured ignorance. Under Spanish rule, the church nurtured the virtues of resignation and passivity, virtues that made for 'a good colonial as well as a docile parishioner'. But the material hardships the people suffered and the social repression they underwent, generated an instinctive reaction against the coloniser, and laid the foundations of an incipient counter consciousness which, in the course of the battles to survive, was 'transmuted into a national consciousness the culminating expression of which was the national revolution of 1896 when identity and consciousness became a unity', and the Filipino nation was born. But hardly had this new consciousness taken shape than a new colonialism, the American, replaced it, brutally crushing all revolt.

Education had been one of the demands of the people under the Spaniards; granted by the Americans, 'it gave the new conquerors an image of altruism' thereby facilitating the Americanisation of the Filipinos and the destruction of their identity. Through the 'alchemy of miseducation', through the distortion of the history of the early American occupation together with the glorification of the American way of life, its heroes and institutions, the Filipino was converted into a consumer of American goods, a reproducer of American values. Today, mourns Constantino:

> the Filipino is a creature of immense talent for cultural acquisition. He has shown his discriminating taste by being receptive only to American culture, selecting for avid consumption such outstanding contributions as cowboy movies, horror pictures, comics, rock and roll ... The typical Filipino is ambitious. The male aspires to be a junior executive in a large American firm and later to head a subsidiary of some big American corporation ... The female, both married and unmarried, aspires to be a fashion model and cover girl.

Nationalism is the key to Constantino's thinking: yet it is not a narrow nationalism. At all times he is anxious to define the class basis of the movement, never ignoring the potential of sections of the indigenous classes to submit to the colonial master. Moreover, this nationalism embodies a deep conviction in social change, involving a far-reaching restructuring of society. But, reciprocally, 'social change ... can only be real if buttressed by the nationalist premise'. The search for a new society is thus a search also for a new identity, a new consciousness and the fusion of identity with consciousness.

London

FIROZ HAJI

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Books received

This listing does not preclude subsequent publication of reviews.

The adoption of black children: counteracting institutional discrimination. By Dawn Day. Toronto, Lexington Books, 1979. Cloth £10.50

Arise ye starvelings: the Jamaican labour rebellion of 1938 and its aftermath. By Ken Post. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1978. Paper 80 guilders

Bangladesh: the unfinished revolution. By Lawrence Lifschultz. London, Zed Press, 1979. Paper £3.50

Birds of passage: migrant labor and industrial societies. By Michael J. Piore. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979. Cloth £8.95

Black Macho and the myth of the superwoman. By Michele Wallace. London, John Calder, 1979. Cloth £5.95 — Paper £2.50

Britain and Latin America: an annual review of British-Latin American relations. London, The Latin American Bureau, 1979. Paper £2.50

Caste and family in the politics of the Sinhalese 1947-76. By J. Jiggins. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979. Cloth £9.50

Choice, class and conflict: a study of Southern Nigerian factory workers. By Adrian Peace. Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1979. Cloth £14.95

The collapse of work. By Clive Jenkins and Barrie Sherman. London, Eyre Methuen, 1979, Cloth £7.50

Coloured minorities in Great Britain. Edited by Raj Madan. London, Aldwych Press, 1979. Cloth

Contested Terrain: the transformation of the workplace in the twentieth century. By Richard Edwards. New York, Basic Books, 1979. Cloth $12.95

Critical perspectives on imperialism and social class in the Third World. By James Petras. New York, Monthly Review, 1978. Cloth $15.00

Emperor Shaka the great. By Mazisi Kunene. London, Heinemann Educational Books, 1979. Paper £1.90

Forced labour in colonial Africa. Edited by Robin Cohen. London, Zed Press, 1979. Paper £2.95

Frogs in a well: Indian women in Purdah. By Patricia Jeffery. London, Zed Press, 1979. Paper £2.95

The future with microelectronics. By Iann Barron and Ray Curnow. London, Frances Pinter, 1979. Cloth £7.95

From genesis to genocide: the meaning of human nature and the power of behavior control. By Stephen L. Chorover. London, M.I.T. Press, 1979. Cloth £9.75

Malcolm yucca seed. By Lynne Gessner. New York and London,

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

Harvey House, 1977. Cloth £3.25

Immigrant labour and racial conflict in industrial societies: the French and British experience, 1945-1975. By Gary P. Freeman. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1979. Cloth £12.50

Media, politics and culture: a socialist view. Edited by Carl Gardner. London, MacMillan, 1979. Paper £3.95

The myth of return: Pakistanis in Britain. By Muhammad Anwar. London, Heinemann Educational Books, 1979. Cloth £8.50

Nicaragua: Dictatorship and revolution. London, Latin American Bureau, 1979. Paper 75p

One Azania, one nation: the national question in South Africa. By No Sizwe. London, Zed Press, 1979. Paper £2.95

Out of the ghetto: a path to socialist rewards. By Mike Prior and Dave Purdy. Nottingham, Spokesman, 1979. Paper £2.50

Poverty and power: the case for political approach to development and its implications for action in the west. By Rachel Heatley. London, Zed Press, 1979. Paper £1

Quebec and the parti Quebecois. Edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas. San Francisco, Synthesis Productions, 1978. Paper $3.00

Race, class and rebellion in the South Pacific. Edited by Colin Bell. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1979. Cloth £10.95

The road to Alto. By Robin Jenkins. London, Pluto Press, 1979. Paper £3.95

Scholars, saints, and sufis: Muslim religious institutions since 1500. Edited by Nikki R. Keddie. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. Paper $5.95

School desegration policy: compliance, avoidance and the Metropolitan remedy. By E.F. Caldo, M.W. Giles, and D.S. Gatlin. Toronto, Lexington Books, 1979. Cloth £9.50

A short history of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam. By Cornelisch Goslinga. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1979. Paper 37.50 guilders

Slaves, peasants and capitalists in Southern Angola 1840-1926. By W.G. Smith. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979. Cloth £8.50

South Africa: the method in the madness. By John Kane-Berman. London, Pluto Press, 1979. Paper £2.95

The urban American Indian. By Alan L. Sorkin. Toronto, Lexington Books, 1979. Cloth £11.00

Using the media: how to deal with the press, television and radio. By Denis MacShane. London, Pluto Press, 1979. Paper £2.50

West Indies. By Zaidee Lindsay. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1979. Cloth £2.50

White teacher. By Vivian G. Paley. Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1979. Cloth £5.85

Year of fire, year of ash: the Soweto revolt: roots of a revolution? By Baruch Hirson. London, Zed Press, 1979. Paper $8.50

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

The following recent back issues of *Race & Class* are available from The Institute of Race Relations, 247 Pentonville Road, London N1

AUTUMN 1978 VOLUME XX No 2

Isabel Letelier and Michael Moffitt	*Supporting repression: multinational banks in Chile*
Amrit Wilson	*A burning fever: the isolation of Asian women in Britain*
Jeff Henderson	*A. Philip Randolph and the dilemmas of socialism and black nationalism in the US*
Michael Billig	*Patterns of racism: interviews with National Front members*

WINTER 1979 VOLUME XX No 3

E.P. Thompson	*The secret state*
Hussein A. Bulhan	*Black psyches in captivity and crises*
Atilio Boron	*New forms of capitalist state in Latin America: an exploration*
Steven Rose	*'It's only human nature': the socio-biologist's fairyland*

SPRING 1979 VOLUME XX No 4

Malcolm Caldwell	*The South-east Asian kaleidoscope: background to the conflict in Indo-China*
John S. Saul	*The dialectic of class and tribe*
Fred Halliday	*The arc of revolutions: Iran, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia*
Ken Jordaan	*Iberian and Anglo-Saxon racism: a study of Portuguese Angola and South Africa*

SUMMER 1979 VOLUME XXI No 1

The Iranian Revolution Guest editor: Eqbal Ahmad

Eqbal Ahmad	*The Iranian revolution*
Nikki Keddie	*Oil, economic policy and social conflict in Iran*
Mansour Farhang	*Resisting the Pharaohs: Ali Shariati on oppression*
Richard Falk	*Iran and American geopolitics in the Gulf*
William A. Dorman	*Iranian people vs. US news media*
Stuart Schaar	*Orientalism at the service of imperialism*
Fred Halliday	*Theses on the Iranian revolution*

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org

VOLUME XXI NUMBER 2 RACE & CLASS AUTUMN 1979

Institute of Race Relations
Transnational Institute

Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.
noolaham.org | aavanaham.org