GRENADA



Maurice Bishop on destabilisation

Diary of the invasion

Poetry of resistance

Racism and politics in West Germany
The Labour Party and racism
Iran and the US
South Africa

RACE & CLASS

CONTRIBUTIONS

Contributions, correspondence and books for review should be sent to the Editor at the Institute of Race Relations, 247-9 Pentonville Road, London N1, England. The Institute of Race Relations is precluded from expressing a corporate view: the opinions expressed are therefore those of the contributors.

While welcoming contributions, particularly on Third World problems and realities, we would like to remind our contributors that manuscripts should be short (ideally, 5,000 words), clear (as opposed to obscure) and free of jargon. Typescripts should be double-spaced.

We wish to acknowledge the assistance of the Transnational Institute in publishing this journal.

RACE & CLASS is published quarterly (in July, October, January and April) and subscriptions are payable in advance to any bookseller or to the Institute of Race Relations, 247-9 Pentonville Road, London N1 9NG. Subscriptions can be entered at any point in the volume. Current subscription rate £12/US$30 to institutions, £8/US$16 to individuals. Payment can be made in US or Canadian dollars drawn on US or Canadian banks respectively, or by international money order or sterling cheques drawn on a British bank. Special rates for booksellers are available on request. Back copies of Volumes 1-21 can be obtained from Wm Dawson and Sons Limited, Cannon House, Folkestone, Kent. Volumes 1-4 available in reprint at £4 per issue; Volumes 5-22 available in the original at £4 per single copy (Volumes 22-3 available at the IRR).

US Mailing Agent, Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd.,
527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York NY 10022, USA
2nd Class Postage Paid at New York, NY.
UK bookshop distribution Pluto Press, 105A Torriano Avenue, London NW5

RACE & CLASS

A JOURNAL FOR BLACK AND THIRD WORLD LIBERATION

Volume XXV Winter 1984 Number 3

ISSN 0306 3965

Cover design by Susan Hobbs
Typeset by Lithoprint Ltd (TU) 329 Upper Street, London N1
Printed by the Russell Press, Gamble Street, Nottingham

CHRIS SEARLE

Maurice Bishop on destabilisation: an interview

The following interview was first conducted in November 1982, then proof read by Cde Bishop in August 1983, just nine weeks before his death, when some additions and further points were made.

March 1984 is to be the fifth Anniversary of the Grenada Revolution, and it was to be celebrated by the opening of the international airport at Point Salines, the largest capital project that the Revolution had undertaken and its most impressive physical symbol. The Grenadian people and their government had struggled tenaciously throughout the previous four years to raise the money and resources to complete this most beautiful of airports, filling in bays of the sea and salt ponds, slicing hills in half, elevating valleys and rolling out their runway of freedom alongside Cuban construction workers and, for a period, American dredging workers from Miami. In August Cde Bishop was clear that the closer the opening of the airport came, the more intensive would be the energy of US imperialism to prevent its completion. The people's unity and vigilance and the Revolution's inner organisation would have to be sharper than ever, Cde Bishop emphasised.

Just five months before, in March 1983, the Revolution had faced yet another direct threat of a US invasion, coming on the heels of the 'Amber and the Amberines' manoeuvres of August 1981 on Vieques Island off Puerto Rico, which was a direct dress rehearsal for the eventual invasion, down to the very place where the US Marines landed – Amber, an area adjacent to the Point Salines airport. Cde Bishop had

Race & Class XXV, 3(1984)

warned his own people and the people of the world:

> Only a few days ago, on March 17th, to be precise, I revealed the analysis of our party that the war-mongering Reagan was becoming increasingly desperate and in that desperation, the possibility of military intervention against the revolutionary processes in the region, particularly Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada, seemed inevitable.
>
> This seemed the likely way out for the fascist clique in Washington because their arrogant designs for regional and world domination continue to fail. The continuing economic crisis in the US and its effects, the increasing successes of the popular liberation movements, particularly in El Salvador, the continued deepening and strengthening of the revolutionary processes in Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada, the total collapse of Reagan's so-called Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the growing popular opposition to his mad nuclear policy, has made imperialism more desperate and determined to halt revolutionary processes in this region.

A few weeks later, Cde Bishop spoke in London at Kensington Town Hall, and during his two-hour address he referred again to the designs of Reagan:

> Reagan's dream is that he can construct a new Pax Americana to destroy the socialist world, the non-aligned world. But why should we be dragged into his geo-political game? Reagan is the greatest disaster to hit mankind since Hitler.

While the Grenada Revolution preserved its imperative unity, it was unassailable. US imperialism had flailed out at it from every conceivable direction, using strategy after strategy of overt and covert destabilisation. This process I have attempted to chart and describe in the book from which this interview with Cde Bishop is taken, *Grenada: the struggle against destabilisation.** Yet the US always retained outright military invasion as an option to destroy the Revolution. It was always there, ready, prepared to strike when a pretext or a rift in the Revolution emerged, and since November 1979, a few months after the Revolution, there has been a Caribbean Task Force based in Miami eager for 'rapid deployment'. When the breach in that fundamental unity came in October 1983 it struck out immediately and mercilessly, as is the wont of imperialism, with all its machinery of death, terror, lies and regression.

Maurice Bishop lived to fight and organise against imperialism. He was a revolutionary patriot, a loving and brilliant human being, every

---

* London, Writers and Readers, forthcoming.

inch a Marxist-Leninist who never left the struggle and shoulder of his people. His fight lives on in the Grenadians who are still fighting in the hills and crests of their island, like the heroic army of Julien Fedon which built a revolution against British imperialism in 1795 and which is one of the great inspirations of the heroic Grenadian people. His fight lives on in the ideas of the Revolution which blazed across the region for the first time in the English language, and gave an alternative model of economic development and people's democracy to a people who had been bound in an economic stranglehold and institutional mimicry for centuries. It lives on in those words of repudiation, 'Four hundred years – we shall take no more! Forward ever, backward never!' painted across the walls of Grenada. It lives on in the vision of the *youth* who were taken up on the wings of the 'Revo' and who saw and lived the beginning of a future their parents and grandparents had only dreamed of, who realised that Grenada was also Cuba, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, El Salvador and Palestine, a part of the only future the world has.

Whatever tragedy happened in October in Grenada, whatever the part directly played in it by the intervention of imperialist destabilisation, the profound and continuing influence of the Grenada Revolution can never be minimised or erased. For the truth is as clear as the Caribbean Sea itself: that one jewel in that necklace of incomparable islands, *Grenada*, has made a revolution, with a minuscule population has successfully challenged the hugest and most demonic power of our century, has stood up head high with resolute courage with its bold, independent institutions and inspired the struggling people of the Caribbean towards the realisation of their magnificent and intractable destiny.

* * *

Chris Searle: Why do you think that imperialism is so obsessively afraid of the Grenada Revolution, an obsession out of all proportion to the size of the country?

Maurice Bishop: There are several reasons for this. The first is the fact that Grenada was the first country in the English-speaking Caribbean to have had a successful revolution, and different US administrations have always shown a mortal fear of any revolutionary process, of any attempt by any people by revolutionary means to overthrow different dictatorships or oligarchies that are oppressing them. These administrations have, of course, conveniently forgotten the history of their own country and their own revolution in 1776.

The second reason is even more fundamental and relates to the gains, successes and achievements of the Grenada Revolution. The fact

is that coming from a base that is no different and in many respects much worse than most other Caribbean territories of similar size and a similar type of economy, we have been able in three and a half years to reduce unemployment from the fantastically high figure of some 50 per cent of the total workforce – and among women 70 per cent – down to 14.7 per cent, which means a drop of over 35 per cent in the unemployment rate. And this at a time when other countries both inside and outside our region were continuing to have difficulties in finding jobs for their people, and this too as Grenada was being subjected to massive propaganda destabilisation, economic aggression, military threat and diplomatic isolation.

Third, there is the question of health, and the fact that we have been able to bring free health care to our people, to more than double the numbers of our doctors, quintuple the number of our dentists and increase by seven times the number of dental clinics in our country. All of this again is something that the people of the region are watching very closely. And there is education too. At this point in time, through the Centre for Popular Education programme, illiteracy has been virtually wiped out in the country and is estimated now at being something like 3 per cent of the population. A massive adult education programme has also started as Phase Two of the Centre for Popular Education, and at the same time we have been able to increase dramatically the number of places for students going to secondary schools. Before the Revolution only 11 per cent of all the eligible students were able to get into the secondary schools; now that figure has been increased to 36 per cent and we hope within the next two to three years to move to universal secondary education. The availability of free university scholarships abroad is also a part of that process. Moving from a situation of three in the last year of Gairy, we increased that paltry figure within the first six months of the Revolution to 109 students being able to go abroad on free university scholarships. Then there is free secondary education which we have introduced for all secondary schools in the country, and there is also a programme of subsidised school uniforms and school books for the poorest children.

Over the past three years in our economy we have been able to achieve an accumulated growth rate of some 10 per cent. The World Bank, in its last report of August 1982, spoke in very glowing terms about the strides which we have been able to make in the economy, in terms of economic management, planning, fiscal and budgetary controls – really in terms of all aspects of the development of our economy. That again is something that has certainly not gone unnoticed by the people of the region. Another significant point to made in relation to gains and benefits are the structures of revolutionary grassroots democracy that we are building in Grenada, away from the Westminster parliamentary system to a form which allows the people

themselves to participate on a regular basis, at least once a month, through the system of mass organisations that have been built very rapidly, and the organs of popular power – the Zonal Councils, Workers' Parish Councils and the Farmer, Women and Youth Councils.

In the critical area of housing, too, the Revolution has realised many advances. The Housing Repair Programme has been a major achievement. In 1980 this programme saw the renovation of the homes of 593 families; the figure rose to 981 in 1981 and will be about 1,300 by the end of 1982, constituting an overall total of 2,874. The money spent amounted to 2,243,415 Caribbean dollars. We have to remember that in Grenada the average size of the family in the low income bracket for which the programme is designed is seven persons. Thus, the number of persons benefiting from the Housing Repair Programme is in fact 20,118 – a figure which represents nearly 20 per cent of our population.

The Revolution has also witnessed the introduction of several housing schemes. These have been completed in Telescope and Grand Anse, while others are on stream in Corinth, Grand Anse, Telescope and Waltham. Construction here will receive a tremendous boost with the new Sandino Plant which has the capacity of producing some 500 houses per year.

Infrastructural development too has been a major achievement of our Revolution. The truth is that the face of Grenada is changing before our very eyes. By early 1984, we would have become the very first Caribbean country to have built an international airport after its independence – everyone else had theirs built during the colonial era. By the end of 1982, we would have built about fifty new miles of farm and feeder roads, which is an unprecedented rate of progress, and our new Eastern Main Road (being one of the three main roads in our country) should be nearly halfway completed. By August 1983 we should have direct dialling facilities to our sister islands of Carriacou and Petit Martinique for the first time in our history, and shortly after that we would have more than doubled the number of existing telephone lines in the country. Electricity output will go up by over 50 per cent in 1983 when we install our two recently purchased generators. We now deliver daily 50 per cent more pipe-borne water into the homes of our people than could have been done before the Revolution, and this process will be further enhanced in 1983 when construction of the new Mamma Cannes Reservoir in St David's is completed. Two new schools were built this year and at least one more will be constructed in 1983, while at the same time more community centres, day-care and pre-primary facilities and health centres will continue to be rehabilitated and built throughout the course of next year.

So, for reasons such as these concrete benefits, imperialism is doubly worried and concerned about our revolutionary process, because it

fears that the new socio-economic and political path of development which we have embarked upon may prove to be an example to the rest of the region, and therefore the people of the region may begin to press their own governments for a similar process to start in their countries. Additionally, there is the fact that since the Revolution, Grenada has pursued an independent and non-aligned path, and different US administrations over the years – but in particular this present administration of President Ronald Reagan – is deathly afraid of any independence, of non-aligned commitment in the world, particularly by countries of the Third World, which they feel they have a divine right to dominate and exploit. So, when we take firm positions that we are entitled to legal equality, to mutual respect for sovereignty, to non-interference in our internal affairs, to ideological pluralism and the right to develop our own process free from all outside interference and *diktat*, obviously it is seen as a mortal insult to this American administration. Equally, when we decide that as a part of our policy of non-alignment, that we are entitled to diversify and develop our relations with countries of the world, particularly the socialist countries, then this is seen as adding insult to injury. So the fact is that this firm and fundamental position of maintaining an independent and non-aligned path of development, and a non-aligned position in our international relations, is one that has caused us real problems with this American administration.

Finally, we have gleaned from their own security reports which they have put out – not publicly, but which we have nevertheless seen – other insights. In one of these reports the particular point was made that Grenada's process has two big differences to the other two revolutionary processes in the region, in Cuba and Nicaragua. For on the one hand, we speak the same language – English – as the people of the US, and on the other hand we have a largely black population. What they have pointed out from this is that the Grenada Revolution therefore has a facility of speaking directly to, and appealing directly in their own language to the people of the US overall, but more so to the exploited majority. Then in the case of black Americans, meaning something like twenty-seven million black people who are a part of the most rejected and oppressed section of the American population, US imperialism has a particular dread that they will develop an extra empathy and rapport with the Grenada Revolution, and from that point of view will pose a threat to its own continuing control and domination of the blacks inside the US.

CS: How did your experience of fascist terror under the Gairy regime serve as an efficient apprenticeship to organising against imperialist destabilisation since the Revolution?

MB: What we learned from our experiences in the struggle against the

dictator has proved to be very critical in many respects. Firstly, of course, it deepened our organisational skill and ability and gave us a tremendous experience in fighting in underground situations. We had to produce our newspaper, for example, in clandestine conditions, which meant that every single week we had to go to some new venue in order to print it, and thereafter our network of distributors had to sell the newspaper without being caught by the Gairy repressive apparatus. This was the invaluable kind of organisational ability we had to develop from underground in the building of our party. We had to hold meetings while the dictatorship was searching for us, and this served to force us to develop a strong sense of security and to build firm alliances with the people of our country coming from many different classes and strata. Very often we had to hold meetings in houses that would be unlikely to attract attention. That whole experience certainly helped us in our subsequent policy of building a concrete alliance to fight the 1976 elections, and it continues to help us today in pursuing a policy of alliances with sections of the upper petite-bourgeoisie in our country, and even with the bourgeoisie, as part of our overall policy of socialist orientation.

It also helped to steel our comrades, helped to make them much, much more disciplined, helped to ensure that once they were given tasks then they would carry them out, because in situations that we faced it was absolutely critical to be dead certain that everybody was actually doing what he or she had promised to do. And this was linked to the necessity of collective leadership. We found from our very hard experience that the repression was so constant and consistent, that at any given time any number of our people might be arrested or charged or jailed or sometimes, and this happened quite frequently, beaten, and therefore unavailable. So this made it necessary for us to build a strong collective leadership and rely very much upon each other, ensuring that each of us was responsible for specific critical tasks and areas. That also has stood us in very good stead in terms of ensuring that our principle of collective leadership, that we still follow, is fully maintained.

That period certainly helped us in making us much firmer. That quality of firmness has come out of the repression, out of the need repeatedly to show courage in the face of numerous difficulties, of having to come back from behind after temporary setbacks which we never accepted as defeats, and which also forced us to see things always in strategic terms and not just in tactical terms. We were always very certain that, no matter how many individual skirmishes Gairy and his forces might win, eventually our revolutionary forces would triumph.

Those years of fighting against the dictatorship also made us very aware of the international situation. Gairy's closest links and friendships were with dictatorships and fascist regimes in Chile, in South Korea and Haiti. Seeing those alliances at work, and seeing also in the

context of the Caribbean those reactionary regimes out here who gave him support – some of whom now are precisely the ones that are most opposed to our Revolution – really helped to teach us a lot about the international situation, about who our friends and enemies really were, and what we have subsequently seen as being the pillars of our foreign policy.

But, most crucially, the experiences of combating the Gairy dictatorship taught us the fundamental importance of having the firmest and most constant contacts with the people, working with the masses at all times, being totally honest with them at all times, in periods when we had to hide and in periods of relative lull, whether it was for the mass mobilisation activity which we did so well before the Revolution and which we have continued to stress since the Revolution, or whether it was creating democratic structures and the embryonic youth and women's organisations which have flourished so prosperously since our grasp of power on 13 March 1979. We have learned to develop a truly deep and abiding respect for the people of our country, particularly the working people, and have understood more and more their enormous creative power and ability to confront and solve all their problems.

CS: What precedents and new techniques has imperialism devised in its strategy of trying to destabilise the Grenada Revolution?

MB: In this present phase, imperialism has created a number of new strategies which themselves are different from its onslaughts over the last twenty-five years upon Guyana, Chile and Jamaica. Our Revolution has clearly forced imperialist destabilisation to find new approaches and become more and more wickedly original in its counter-revolutionary techniques. In Grenada there is no US Embassy, and this has clearly placed a powerful brake upon their potential to destabilise the Revolution internally, not having the permanent base for their mischief which they had in the three other countries mentioned. The US imperialists and their CIA are thus forced to rely upon local agents which they first have to recruit internally and then contact clandestinely from time to time, but in Grenada they do not have this fixed facility and infrastructure to operate, they do not have this ready-made system. The guise of normal diplomatic relations – which only hid on-the-spot organisational and recruitment centres – enabled them to reach their agents and gain information on a daily basis, as well as to provide guidance to those unpatriotic elements within the country who were prepared to carry out the dirty work of the CIA. This is a critical disadvantage for them in relation to Grenada.

Then our dismantling of the Westminster parliamentary system is also important in this context. Along with that dismantling has come an end to the traditional tribalism which continues in other Caribbean

countries. A part of the political tribalism, as used by the CIA, has been to get some of the parliamentarians to use the medium of parliament in such a way as to destabilise the country. Masterminded by their American puppeteers, they raise bogus concerns about the economy, they spread vicious propaganda from outside the country and seek to make the people lose faith and confidence in their revolutionary government, raising a million and one other such provocative matters through the medium of parliament – and thus claim to do it in that sense with a certain measure of legitimacy.

In relation to the media, we made it very clear at an early stage that we were not prepared to countenance counter-revolutionary literature in our country, or media that were being used for the purpose of inciting sections of the population to violence or disaffection. So within the first six months of the Revolution, one counter-revolutionary newspaper, *The Torchlight*, was closed down, and that too has meant that a powerful arm of their destabilisation machinery has been amputated in our situation.

Then there is the question of the armed forces, which in the Chile and Jamaica situations, for example, remained intact after progressive governments had taken power. For us it was very different. In the first hours of the Revolution the Green Beast army of Gairy was completely disbanded. That meant that thereafter a new army came into being, an army of patriotic youth, young farmers and sections of the unemployed. Right from the start it was possible to imbue this young army with a patriotic, anti-imperialist consciousness, and that has proved to be a decisive factor. The possibilities of infiltration or of coups d'etat are much more difficult in this army than in those countries where the armed forces of the previous regime remained intact. On top of that we have built a people's milita in addition to our regular armed forces, something that did not happen in the three countries that were mentioned before, where the progressive regimes did not move to arm the people in that way. The value of the people's militia is that the whole question of defence becomes the responsibility not just of a standing, full-time, professional army, but also of the whole people, who are ready to face any threat.

Within three years we have made greater attempts to disentangle our economy from the clutches of imperialism. The Marketing and National Importing Board which we established now has removed the opportunity for unpatriotic elements of the bourgeoisie to create artificial shortages of essential foods and supplies, a factor which was very prevalent in Jamaica in particular during the last years of the Manley government. Furthermore, we have attempted to involve our people in the planning and running of the economy, to get them to understand that the question of economic construction is not just an issue for the government, but is also the responsibility of the people. Therefore

there has been a great deal more voluntary involvement in the building of the economy in our situation than perhaps there was in either Chile or Jamaica. That too has been a major factor in terms of the room imperialism would have to manoeuvre in our situation.

Inside our country there are no media which they can use, so they have moved very powerfully into the regional media, the newspapers and the dozens of radio stations of the region daily beaming into our country, trying to spread lies and distortions about the Revolution. This has been a dramatic and unprecedented factor of huge intensity that we have had constantly to confront. We have seen the spectacle of five of these regional newspapers – the Jamaica *Gleaner*, the *Advocate* and *Nation* from Barbados and the *Express* and *Guardian* from Trinidad – coming out, as they did in November 1981, with the same headlines, the same front-page editorial attacking the Revolution and calling for our isolation. Again, this month, exactly one year later, we have seen almost an exact repetition, this time on the occasion of our presence at the CARICOM Heads of Government Conference in Jamaica, when all five newspapers carried the same back-page paid advertisement, prompted by its publication in the *Gleaner* on the first day of the Conference – another vulgar attack which had the effect of completely exposing who really runs the media in the region and what the so-called independent 'free press' really means. We saw again the same small minority tied to corporate interests speaking each time for their class and never for the interests, concerns and issues facing the masses of working people in the region. In fact, following the classic front-page fiasco of November 1981, journalists in the region, most notably the Trinidad and Tobago journalists, came out totally condemning the actions of their newspaper bosses, with one editor declaring that he had no idea that coordinated attacks on Grenada, such as his newspaper had been party to, were being waged right through the region, with newspapers such as the one he himself edited! This only showed once again who were the real controllers, the real bosses, the real dragons of big business.

This extraordinary level of coordinated vulgarity, not even known in the western European or American press, is highly significant, and says a lot about the deep penetration of imperialism into the regional press to force it to carry out its masters' dirty orders. Recently again the same newspapers all carried an article which alleged that in ten crates our government had received 'Russian Migs'. All of the forces behind these newspapers know well that Grenada does not have the capacity to operate 'Migs', in terms of what would be required in the way of hangars, maintenance facilities, trained pilots and technicians – it is a physical impossibility in Grenada, and all of them know that. They know, too, that if such planes came into our country, it could not be done secretly. Of course, the very way in which these articles were

written exposed that they knew all that. One article declared that one of our government officials had been contacted and had said that the story was impossible and must be a journalistic joke. But then the writer of the article continued: 'But in any case, *if it is true*, then it shows how dangerous this Grenada government is etc. etc.', and then went on to spend the rest of the page attacking us with a whole pile of lies. So it is quite clear that this was yet one more attempt at propaganda destabilisation, but this time using a higher and clearer form, because they were discovering that their lies about the economy or human rights violations did not convince the Caribbean masses, so now they try another grotesque tack to try to make us appear as if we are a military threat to our neighbours.

Another precedent set in the methodology of destabilisation was shown to us by the United States International Communications Agency (USICA) in May 1981. This propaganda limb of the US State Department summoned all the editors of the various Caribbean newspapers to Washington and showed them the best they could offer in facilities in the media and press, then held a number of seminars and workshops with them. One of the things that emerged was that an offer was made to these editors of assistance to develop their own facilities, but that it would only be forthcoming if they collaborated in helping to isolate Grenada through adverse propaganda. And sure enough, within a very short time from the return of these editors, a massive propaganda campaign started against us from their pages in the region. So the USICA Conference type of approach was certainly one new and creative destabilisation strategy developed by US imperialism to try to bring down our Revolution.

Then we have recently discovered yet another destabilisation phenomenon. Just prior to any major conference in the region that we go to, or any significant event in our own country, they will try to get reactionary trade union leaders or other individuals and backward institutions in the region to host conferences, sometimes conferences ostensibly dealing with conventional areas, maybe just normal trade union questions or questions of so-called democracy or human rights as interpreted by them. But these conferences will be set in the particular countries we are about to go to a few days before we are due to arrive. So that when we recently went off to Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States for a Heads of Government conference in St Lucia, we found that the week before a number of these reactionary trade union leaders were in St Lucia holding a conference. This conference was apparently dealing with regular worker issues like national insurance schemes, but what additionally happened was that a well-known Grenadian counter-revolutionary exile, called Stanley Cyrus, plus a Cuban counter-revolutionary exile arrived at the conference and steered it into vulgar attacks against Grenada in particular, but also

Cuba and Nicaragua. A number of documents were also distributed, obviously preparing the ground for when we arrived a few days later. Then something very similar happened in Jamaica a few days before we landed for the CARICOM Heads of Government meeting, when another conference was focusing upon issues like democracy and elections – and that was precisely one of the issues, Westminster parliamentary democracy, that Tom Adams and Edward Seaga, Prime Ministers of Barbados and Jamaica respectively, were attempting to push at the CARICOM meeting, hoping to secure an amendment to the CARICOM Treaty to institutionalise the Westminster approach to the question of democracy.

CS: How has the Revolution managed continually to beat back destabilising mischief, whilst other processes have failed?

MB: We have only done this through our relations of total honesty with our people. We start from the basis that destabilisation can only really work when it is covered up, when it is operating under darkness. Thus, from the earliest days of the Revolution, whenever we perceived any threat we always informed the people. The speech that I gave just one month after the Revolution, dealing with the threats made by US Ambassador Ortiz to us, was on national radio and television, and it exposed these threats to Grenada and the young Revolution to the people in the first few days. Then after three months, there was another speech, 'Organize to fight destabilisation', in which we exposed the CIA Pyramid Plan. Again, there was the national address given on the issue of the two Roman Catholic priests who were developing a whole strategy of destabilisation, and that again was a national address, when we dealt fully with the issues raised. Or there was the way in which we handled the 'Gang of twenty-six', who published the so-called *Grenadian Voice* as a cover for their counter-revolutionary activity, and they also were totally exposed at the rally of 19 June 1981.

So our first line of defence is complete openness and honesty: tell our people all the facts and call upon them for a response and involve them in what is happening. Linked to that is the necessity of the maximum preparation we can have through the involvement of our people, and here the militia is crucial, ensuring that at the level of national defence the people are always there and are always ready and able to defend the process, the Revolution and the country. We believe that the Revolution can only develop around three pillars: first, the people and their democratic organisations, second, the building of a strong national economy, and third, the building of a national defence capacity. We try at all times to integrate these three pillars because we feel that if any one of the three is missing at any particular time, then the Revolution will be in danger and will be weakened.

But we can also speak of a fourth pillar, the pillar of international

relations, and that too has been a major way of fighting destabilisation. Whenever there is any threat to our process, we immediately appeal to all our friends around the world for their support. This was very evident, for example, during the US 'Amber and the Amberines' manoeuvre, staged by the imperialist armed forces in August 1981 off the island of Vieques, near Puerto Rico. Our response was to go on a major international offensive around the issue and to call upon all friendly governments and international institutions, political parties and organisations we had contacts with, and ask them to come out with strong statements against the provocation which was a dress rehearsal for the invasion of our country. In the case of friendly governments, we asked them to summon the American ambassadors in their countries to demand explanations. That proved to be a very successful diplomatic offensive on our part, and we struggled in a similar way when we were having difficulties with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund after we had made an application for the Supplementary Fund facility, and it was rejected at the last minute as a result of the veto by the American director on the Board of Directors. Again we went on a worldwide offensive and mobilised all our friends to come to our support and intervene on our behalf on that question.

We have also seen – and there is much evidence of this in the account that precedes – the Revolution laying great emphasis upon the cultural awareness and educational developments of our people, through literacy programmes and rallies, mass events, councils and panel discussions, and through our growing and prospering organs of people's democracy, so that our people fully understand the extent of the imperialist penetration and the ways in which they can systematically and successfully fight against it.

Grenada: diary of an invasion

Grenada was preparing to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Revolution and the opening of the new International Airport at Point Salines. Tragically, disunity stemming from the highest ranks of the New Jewel Movement found its way on to the streets. The masses took to the town in support of Maurice Bishop, resulting in the Fort Rupert shooting on 19 October. A slogan of the Revolution was proved to be true: United we stand – divided we fall. Over the succeeding days the Revolutionary Military Council made desperate attempts, too late, to reunite the people. This was what the United States administration had been waiting for – an excuse to invade. Using its surrogates in the region (in particular, Barbados, Jamaica and Dominica), it carried out its well-prepared plan.

This document on the invasion takes the form of a diary supported by brief accounts of local, regional and international reactions. The diary is written from accounts given by four internationalist workers who were in Grenada during the period. They were living in different parts of the parish of St George.

The Limes is a heavily populated area close to the new International Airport at the southern tip of Grenada. A dry, fairly flat area, it is where most of the housing projects were being carried out. It was one of the main areas of resistance against the US troops advancing from their landing-point at Point Salines airport. One of the four workers was living in one of a group of houses mostly occupied by non-Grenadians – internationalist workers and American students at the St George's Medical School.

Race & Class, XXV, 3(1984)

Grand Anse is the main tourist area of Grenada, about half a mile from the Limes, towards the town of St George's. It is known for its beautiful beaches. This worker had only just arrived to work in Grenada. She was staying in a hotel (the Hibiscus Inn) opposite a row of cottages used for housing the Cuban doctors and teachers, and government workers. From the hotel she could see across to one of the campuses of the Medical School, situated on the Grand Anse beach. The radio station (Radio Free Grenada) was also in this area, a little way up the road from the hotel belt.

Belmont is a community on the narrow main road which runs between St George's and Grand Anse. It is heavily populated. The houses cluster above and below the road. In the hills behind are many colonial-type middle-class houses. There is a small beach, known as Panday beach, which is always crowded with local bathers and groups of all ages discussing the latest events and gossip. There is a community centre and public washing facilities close to the beach. Butler House, the office of the prime minister, was situated here on a projecting hillside overlooking the town of St George's. This large white building, which under the Gairy regime had been a hotel, was, under the Revolution, opened up to the people and many public meetings were held in its large halls. Belmont was always known for its street 'liming' and parties. This worker lived in a house overlooking Panday beach, near Butler House.

St George's is the capital of Grenada. It is a beautiful old harbour town. Inter-island schooners draw up in the Carenage to load up with produce for one of Grenada's sister islands, Carriacou, and Trinidad. From here you can look up the steep hill to where the Richmond Hill prison, the mental hospital, the children's home and the militia headquarters at Fort Frederick are situated.

The diary begins the day before the invasion.

* * *

Monday 24 October

News headlines on Radio Free Grenada

Grenada remains on military alert in the face of an invasion threat. The Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) has declared that any invasion is illegal and will be resisted. There has been widespread condemnation throughout the region at plans to invade Grenada ... The RMC called on all peace-loving countries throughout the world and all organisations throughout the region to condemn the invasion move.

Diary

Today is a normal working day. Curfew was lifted from 6am to 8pm.

Grand Anse was as normal. A road-repair team had begun work. Some workers were busy on a new building further down the road. The medical students were jogging as usual – curfew or no curfew. Reagan's task force of battleships and aircraft carriers with 1,900 marines was on its way to 'evacuate' them. In St George's everybody was talking about the invasion – it was clear that it was coming. The town was bustling, hot and wet, as one downpour followed another. Some people were trying to get flights out and others to get their money out of the banks. Scheduled flights from Pearls Airport were to have resumed today, but the Caricom/OECS economic and political sanctions had already taken effect. No flights leaving Grenada were allowed to land anywhere else in the region. There was also talk that the Eastern Caribbean dollar had collapsed.

Grand Anse beach was crowded with bathers in the afternoon. The People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), expecting a beach landing, had set up barbed wire on one section of the beach and had dug trenches. A small group of men was installed there. A group of rastas declared in heated debate: 'Them Caribbean politicians too wicked. They want us to starve now. We don't need no marines on our land.' The general feeling was that we had to look to the future and try to overcome our grief and pain.

In the evening another thunderstorm broke. There was a lot of activity on the road in front of our hotel as truckloads of PRA passed by. They sang: 'No, no, no Imperialism no. No backward reaction can stop the Revolution. No, no, no Imperialism no.' Cuban doctors and teachers were being evacuated from some of the Carifta cottages in front of us. The safety of the Cubans if the Americans invaded was always a major point of discussion at our hotel – where could they find safety? Everyone, Grenadians and visitors, were unanimous in their admiration of the Cuban workers. There was another group of people whose safety we also worried about. This was the delegation of fifteen engineers and planners from the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. They were in Grenada to help build a sports stadium, the newest project of the department of sports in the Ministry of Education.

Notes

- Over the weekend meetings had been held between members of the RMC and the staff and students of the St George's Medical School. Only 10 per cent of the students felt they wanted to be evacuated out of the country at this time, and then only temporarily.
- Five hundred parents of the American students at the Medical School met yesterday in New York and decided to send a telegram to President Reagan urging him not to move too quickly and not to take provocative action.

Tuesday 25th October

Grenada woke to the sound of two unlit US reconnaissance planes circling high above St George's.

Radio Free Grenada
Last night 800 regional forces were grouped in Barbados. During the night there has been movement of troops out from Barbados. At this moment a plane is circling over our island, in particular over the capital, and a boat has been sighted approximately four and a half miles from the south-west coast. Grenada is braced for a foreign attack which could come at any time.

5.40am US paratroopers have invaded Grenada with helicopter gunships. Grenadians, our country is now under attack. At 5.40 this morning foreign troops began invading our country. Our armed forces are engaging them in fierce battle. All Grenadians are asked to report immediately to our respective militia bases. All doctors, nurses and medics report to the hospital immediately. Grenadians, stand and fight. Now is the time when you have been called upon to come together. Unite and fight, to defend our country, our homeland, our Revolution. Grenadians block all roads and obstruct the enemy's progress.

Diary
As the reconnaissance plane came lower down, Grenadian forces opened fire with anti-aircraft guns. Broadcasts from Barbados claimed that by 6.15 Pearls Airport and Point Salines had been taken by the Americans. They also said that Radio Free Grenada had fallen. At 6.15 and for almost two hours after that Radio Free Grenada was still on the air, exhorting Grenadians to stand and fight.

The Limes: As fighting became heavy, we found the safest shelter we could in our house. The first jets swept over at 11am. Others followed, breaking the sound barrier all around us. I wept at the destruction and devastation of Grenada's hopes. The phones were still working. I contacted a friend who said that already two helicopters had been shot down and that there was fierce resistance in their area. Regional radio stations started giving estimates of the Cuban dead. No Grenadian figures. At 4pm heavy fighting began again. Black smoke rose from a destroyed helicopter that had crashed into a house.

Grand Anse: The first helicopter gunships flew over into the hills behind us to 'mop up' Grenadian positions. Resistance was fierce and defiant. After three hours of this heavy resistance the US decided to unleash the fighter jets. They screamed overhead. Bombing and strafing began. Strangely enough, nothing stirred at the campus of St

George's Medical School opposite our hotel. As evening came, the Korean delegation decided to leave the hotel and seek the safety of the Soviet Embassy up the road. Under cover of darkness, a small group of the People's Militia arrived at the hotel, leaving with us one wounded comrade. They also brought the news that the Richmond Hill institutions (the hospital for the mentally handicapped and the children's home) had been bombed in the attack on Fort Frederick. They said that the PRA were still holding Radio Free Grenada. They spoke of the strong comradeship that had developed between them over the last three days in the hills and of the extraordinary strength of the Militia sisters. The air attack continued throughout the night.

Belmont: The PRA around our house organised a runner to check on the safety of civilians. Their calmness, clarity and humanity will always remain a tribute to the best ideals of a People's Revolutionary Army. They remained in post on the beach and at the anti-aircraft gun barricade at the road.

Trevor, from St Andrews, the communications man of the unit, remained on our balcony keeping in contact with the command unit. He talked with us about the crisis and the invasion. For anyone who loved their country there was no choice but to stand up and fight.

Fighting continued heavily during that day and we remained under shelter, creeping out during lulls in the fighting to get food and drink. Later, helicopters began circling and machine-gunning directly around the house. Jets screamed overhead and bombed Butler House and other targets. Part of our house was hit in this attack. The PRA unit behind us put up a strong fight, bringing one helicopter down into the sea. Other helicopter gunships continued to circle trying to locate the anti-aircraft gun. We settled, all nine of us, into the tiny shelter for the rest of the night.

Notes

- The invading forces set up a transmitter and began their psychological propaganda campaign.
- Throughout the morning regional radio stations said that by noon US troops would have the situation firmly under their control. They also claimed that the fierce resistance to the invading forces came from the Cubans.
- International condemnation of the invasion begins. Thatcher expressed annoyance that Reagan had not listened to her advice. British MPs felt that the Queen, as head of the Commonwealth, had been snubbed and were worried about worsening Anglo-American relations.
- Nicaragua, supported by Guyana, Zimbabwe and the Soviet Union, called for an immediate emergency meeting of the UN Security Council.

● President Reagan and Eugenia Charles (Dominica's prime minister) hold a press conference in Washington. President Reagan said the purpose of the action in Grenada was 'to protect innocent lives, end chaos and restore law and order.'
● The advertisement for the *Nation* newspaper over Barbados radio was particularly vulgar: 'Don't go home without your Grenada invasion special.'

Wednesday, 26 October

Diary

The Limes: This morning was quieter in our area. We watched the jets flying into St George's, circling, then diving towards the town, bombing. One of the medical students came over to our house and said that they had been told to prepare for evacuation. All we could take with us was what we could carry. I had one small case and my baby to carry. The medical students seemed very disturbed that the fighting had continued into the second day. The invading forces had not made evacuation the purpose of their mission and now they found themselves in the middle of a war. As a result they were obviously frantic to get out as soon as possible.

Around midday another violent attack began. By 3.00pm we noticed US marines in the field behind us. All Grenadians were moving out of the area towards Point Salines, clutching babies, children and bags. We decided to stay and found a safer shelter in another house.

Less than half an hour later, the heaviest bombing and ground attack began. It continued solidly for five hours. I was very concerned for those people now out in the open.

Grand Anse: This morning a distraught Cuban staggered into the Hibiscus. He had escaped from an attack on the dormitories of the Cuban construction workers at Point Salines and reached the hotel by crawling through miles of bushland. Obviously from the rural areas of Cuba, he told us in Spanish of a massacre of Cuban construction workers at the airport. He said the men had been viciously gunned down in their dormitories. He said almost everyone in his dormitory had been killed and the few who escaped had got separated from each other in the bush. He took refuge in the Soviet Embassy.

The attack on Grand Anse began suddenly, shortly before 4.00pm. At the time, we were listening to a radio broadcast from Barbados announcing a complete American victory and repeating that all fighting had ceased on the 'Spice Isle'. This was shattered by the sound of low-flying jets directly overhead and of explosions very close by.

Looking over to the Carifta Cottages, helicopter gunships were

already at work. They hovered between the two rows of houses, firing directly into them. There was a flash of fire and the sound of burning and flying debris.

When it was over we saw two cottages which took direct hits razed to the ground. Three people – two badly and one fatally wounded – were driven to the hospital in St George's by one of the hotel workers. We never found out about others. Under attack we evacuated ourselves from the Hibiscus and made it to the Seascape Inn in St George's. From there we could see the battle of Grand Anse continuing.

Belmont: That morning, between bouts of fighting, people came out to inspect the damage done in their area. Dumped ammunition, later collected by the members of the armed forces, was examined and many people went up to Butler House to check the burnt out building. Looting began.

Early that afternoon, I ventured down to the beach below my house and sat watching the helicopters moving in droves towards Point Salines. I took up conversation with a man from my community. We talked at length about the situation. Two points remain clear in my mind. He talked about the struggle that Grenadians had gone through over the years. How under Gairy the people were denied education. He said I must remember that Gairyites never changed, that they would never want the people to know. He said that the most important thing that the Revolution had brought was education. The Revolution wanted people to learn, understand and grow. Now we would realise how important that is. Now we had a duty to continue the process in whatever way we are able. We sat on as the ships and helicopters continued their movements off the coast. The International Airport, he declared sadly, had proved to be useless. The troops would not have been able to land. He said he would stay, stay in his house. It was his home. He said that I, whose home was in England, should make sure that I tell the people of the achievements of the Revolution and of the Grenadian people.

At 6 that evening I watched six helicopter gunships strafing the Grand Anse area, in particular Radio Free Grenada, which went up in flames.

Notes

- Grenada's representatives, Caldwell Taylor and Ian Jacobs, manage to make strong representations at the UN.
- Chambers (prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago) stands by his view that non-military means should have been used. He calls for a peace-keeping force to be established at the earliest possible opportunity and for the withdrawal of US troops.
- Strong condemnation of the invasion comes in from the Caribbean Council of Churches.

- The implications for the future of regional organisations such as Caricom are becoming clear.
- The Surinamese government has asked the Cuban government to withdraw its ambassador. The US achieves its end in creating fear in the governments of small countries and in increasing the isolation of Cuba.

Thursday, 27 October

Diary

The Limes: Everybody had left the area except for our household and the medical students next door. A friend arrived, having walked from the north-east zone of the parish of St George, through town and through Grand Anse. Where he had stayed the previous night he had met with many Militia and PRA friends who told him of devastating attacks by the US. They themselves had been given civilian clothes and food by the people of the villages and shown safe paths to take through the bush. They told him that hundreds of Grenadians had been killed and many more wounded. He noticed that the gas station in the village had been bombed and that Queen's Park was a US military camp. Road blocks had been set up throughout the town. There was looting in the stores and supermarkets. Fighting in the hills around St George's was still continuing.

But this time, the marines were on three sides of us, carrying out house-to-house searches. They said they were looking for Cubans. The students were being evacuated and we were told to leave our house. We joined the students and were led on foot the two miles to Point Salines by well-armed marines. The Cuban ambassador's house situated on this road was destroyed. The thirty-five students with us were the last to be evacuated, but the war continued.

Belmont: During the day we got continual verbal reports of US ground troops moving slowly up from Grand Anse. This morning, people gathered to collect water from a tank near the house. Everybody exchanged stories. Some spoke out against the looting that was well under way. The need at this time, they said, was for people to work together and help one another. Some sisters of the National Women's Organisation were worried about the food situation, especially for those sisters with young children. Cars were beginning to move along Belmont Road, flying white flags from their aerials.

Later, heavy bombardment began, with jets and helicopter gunships moving in over the hills to the south-east.

At 6pm the marines reached our area. They were panicked and frightened by two truckloads of ammunition abandoned near Butler

House. That night they used bright, long-lasting flares to help in their search of the area. They were convinced that the PRA was going to ambush them.

Some marines came in to talk to us. They asked us to tell them about Grenada before the death of the Prime Minister.

St George's: Jets were attacking behind Morne Jaloux and into the Calivigny area. Amazingly, at 10am, *Gliding Star*, the inter-island schooner, came quietly into the Carenage harbour. A small heavily-armed US naval launch followed.

We realised that the town was now under US control as we watched large numbers of marines and trucks making their way from the town to outlying areas. They looked extremely edgy as they shouted meaningless commands to each other. The people in the streets looked on in silence. There were no welcoming cheers.

A jeep drove on to the Tanteen pasture below to inspect the burned-out remains of a US helicopter. The Grenadian flags on Fort Frederick were down.

That night we got news that the occupying army suspected that General Hudson Austin was holed up in a house in the Calivigny area. Flares lit up that area in the south of the island and were then followed by heavy bombardment.

Notes

- '610 Radio' in Trinidad announces that more US reinforcements are on their way to back up the 6,000 already on Grenadian soil.
- International condemnation continues, but Eugenia Charles and Tom Adams justify the invasion, alleging that there is a letter from Sir Paul Scoon, the governor general, authorising it. However, the existence and legality of such a letter are dubious.
- Only US casualty figures have been released so far; the last remaining prisoners on Richmond Hill are let out.
- 'Radio Antilles' broadcasts a message from Dessima Williams, Grenada's ambassador to the OAS, condemning the invasion.

Friday, 28 October

Diary

Belmont: Looting continued unchecked. Road blocks were set up and US troops began picking up supporters of the Revolution. Although fighting continued in the hills around and there was still sniping in town, most PRA were now in plain clothes. Two forces were operating. On the one hand, informers worked freely on the streets pointing out the 'enemy' to the troops. Meanwhile, others were aiding

fellow Grenadians, giving them food and shelter. Not everybody was cowed by the enormity of the invasion.

One young marine told us about his home town in the States. How the only way to survive was to get out, the only way to get out was to get a college degree, and the only way to get that was to join the marines. He said he did not understand why they were in this country – just something about the prime minister being shot, communism and that 'they had come to save the people'. He was amazed to hear that Grenada was a country of peace and stability until now. That it was safe to walk anywhere at night, that there had been free health and education, that there had been a national transport system, that the people, although poor, had food, electricity, water and housing, that the country had been run by Grenadians, not Cubans and Russians. He was stunned by the beauty of the country and shocked that so many women had stood up and fought in the defence of their country. The resistance of the Grenadians had made him think. He declared that he wished he could return to Grenada under different circumstances and talk to the people. The whole thing made no sense to him. The same, he said, was true in Beirut when he was there two years ago, and he expected it to be so when they reached Beirut this time.

St George's: In the morning, streams of people were making their way into town – all kinds of people, carrying what they could, the older people struggling to walk. They must have walked miles. One man told us that the Americans had dropped leaflets in the Morne Jaloux, Calivigny and Marian areas telling people to evacuate their homes. The previous day other leaflets had told them to stay indoors. These areas were fiercely attacked by jets and then helicopter gunships. The Cuban Embassy was in Morne Jaloux.

Marines had entered the Minister of Foreign Affairs and looted it for documents. Women and children collecting water near the Botanical Gardens were reported to have been physically and verbally abused by marines.

In the afternoon one of the hotel staff came back to the hotel. He was very shaken. The night before he had been picked up by the marines along with five other men and taken to the bombed-out shell of Butler House. There they were trussed up and interrogated all night as to the whereabouts of the PRA, the Militia, Cubans and arms. That morning he had been released with two others. His hands and feet were very swollen, he had rope burns on his wrists and ankles and bruises all over his body. He had been referred to by his captors as a prisoner of war.

This was also the day when we had trouble with informers. A man came up to the hotel and said he was going to tell the marines that there were Cubans here. Later, more people came to shelter with us and the hotel rooms became very crowded.

Notes

- Regional and international media continue to relay the lies that it was Cubans fighting in Grenada.
- Radio interview with Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs, Malmierca, stating that the number of Cubans in Grenada was less than 800, none of whom were combat soldiers. The construction workers had been given small arms by Maurice Bishop in case their dormitories at the airport should be attacked. There were only five military advisers. He repeated that the airport at Point Salines was not being built for military purposes.
- At this time the US had estimated the number of Cubans in Grenada as 1,100, claiming that they were combat troops.
- Condemnation of the invasion comes from the World Council of Churches.
- The Security Council at the UN voted on the resolution put by Nicaragua, eleven in favour, three abstentions (Britain, Togo and Zaire). The US, as one of the five major powers, vetoed it.

Saturday, 29 October

Diary

Belmont: In the morning, people crowd around the water tanks again. I get news whispered to me from one of the National Women's Organisation sisters that all the houses in the area have been searched and many people detained. There was some socialising with marines, but it was noticeable that most of the women simply went about their business, ignoring them as far as possible. While walking along the road with a friend, heavy fighting started again in the hill above us. It was extraordinary how our senses had become accustomed to the stress and noise and we simply continued to walk on.

White flags were flying from many houses and more cars were on the road. Strict searches were carried out at regular road checkpoints. Former prisoners were conspicuous on the roads.

Later, a friend drove me down to check on someone who lived in the housing scheme behind the Lime Gap. The area was deserted except for a few scattered people wandering through the houses clutching precious belongings. Some houses were burnt out and the walls showed showers of bullet holes.

A reporter, one of the first to be allowed in, was at a checkpoint asking for information.

In town, the streets were deserted except for a few Caribbean troops. The first I had seen.

St Georges: News had reached us that foreigners who wanted to leave

the country could do so from Point Salines, courtesy of the US State Department. The hotel workers who had stayed with us and supported us so magnificently throughout that period still had no idea what had happened to their families and they were anxious to find out. It was then decided that everyone had to leave the hotel. There was no time to say goodbye. We had to enlist the help of marines to get a lift to Point Salines.

We were stopped every few yards. Our luggage was checked for weapons. At one point we were asked about the PRA, the Militia and the Cubans.

Point Salines was swarming with US troops. The Stars and Stripes was raised.

We were loaded on to a C-130 military transport plane and taken to Barbados airport – a willing stepping-stone of imperialist aggression.

Notes

- Tom Adams, prime minister of Barbados, arrives in Grenada, Seaga, prime minister of Jamaica, arrives on Sunday – their first visit to Grenada.
- Bernard Coard, Phyllis Coard, Selwyn Strachan and Liam James are captured.
- Radio 'Spice Isle' starts broadcasting with an address by Sir Paul Scoon.

Grenada: tongues of the new dawn

After the imperialist enemy has murdered the body of the revolution, its message lives on in the ideas it created, and the words it found to express these those ideas. The fact that the Grenada Revolution was the first English-speaking revolution means that for the first time a revolution is sustained in the English language, and the extraordinary way the revolutionaries used it to bear their genius and their process. They took the English language, an alien and occupying institution in itself that had been the carrier of colonialism and slavery, and used it to carve a new reality that was indisputedly *theirs*, that scorned mimicry and dependence, the true vehicle of the creative originality that was the essence of their revolution.

This truth is vitally expressed in the poems that follow, written by the people who helped to build the Grenada Revolution. Some of them first appeared in a small book, *Tongues of the New Dawn*, that was published by the Ministry of Education, to celebrate the second anniversary of the Revolution and, in particular, the success of the First Phase of the Centre for Popular Education, which in a few hard-working months had almost eliminated the national blight of illiteracy. Others were written subsequently, and became the property of the Grenadian people through being read at parish councils, zonal councils and meetings of the mass organisations of women, youth, children and farmers throughout the nation. 'I Militia', for example, became nationally famous overnight when its author, a young primary school teacher and militiawoman, read her poem to the assembled mass of thousands of Militia members after the 'Heroes of the Homeland'

Race & Class, XXV, 3(1984)

national defence manoeuvre of August 1981. Poetry was coming straight out of the people through the skill and commitment of the poets and their integral connection to the masses, and through the new democratic organs was going directly back to them with a red-hot immediacy, striking the chords of dignity and struggle. Thus the poet became the conductor of revolutionary language and propagator of the process.

The five years of the Grenada Revolution have signalled the death of poetry as an elitist, rarefied and esoteric form in the Caribbean, as it had been fixed on to the region by the coloniser. It became at one with the popular consciousness, a natural and expected part of any democratic assembly or rally, being declaimed – often to the accompaniment of African drumming, as with the poetry of Michael 'Senator' Mitchell – with all the pride and love which the Grenada Revolution brought to the working people of Grenada and the Caribbean. Its only precedent in the English lanuage was the mass grasp of popular poetry that accompanied the first great working-class upsurge in Europe: the Chartist movement of the middle of last century.

These poems express the truths of the Revolution as they continue in the minds of the Grenadian people: the concrete benefits in housing, food, work, health and education: the growing understanding of concepts like 'imperialism' or 'destabilisation'; the internationalist consciousness that was sweeping the villages, telling the people that they were no longer small islanders but a part of the world: the pride in being a Grenadian woman who was at last contributing a full and recognised measure to her own process and her own development, truly 'equal in production and defence', the belief in 'education from the cradle to the grave': the sense of a history of struggle and a future of achievement through struggle: the dignity of being a part of '*one* Caribbean' and in nobody's, but nobody's backyard. None of these themes will now ever be lost to the Caribbean: the Grenada Revolution has put them all in a practical sense on to the agenda of the people of the region, and the fighting words of the Grenadian people have made sure that they will never be erased.

Babies will no longer perish

To the babies and pioneers of our revo

We fed
And nurtured
That simple fundamental wish
Until we were not able
To feel a happy coolness
In the heart
Of the mid-day sun.
We no longer feel
The dreadful pressure and pain
Of brutal blows
In lurking dangerous shadows.
We can now live
Under delightful rusty rainbows
And not merely exist
Burdened by hunger, thirst
And sadness –
The brilliantly blazing sun
Now shines for all.

All who were wretched,
Each and everyone.

It is you:
Old time fisherman
Old bend back farmers
Who love the land
It is you:
Worn out housewives
That now drink honey
From liberated bee hives
Little school boy
With your Education
You now enjoy
It is all of you
That the dawn smiles upon.

The basic flame of freedom
Is burning in this Grenada land
And would you believe it,
The poor simple folks
Are feeding and fanning it!
Forever we will cherish
The hope in our garden
With an intensity so feverish
The life in our dawn
Forever we will cherish
The red flower growing
In the rubbish
For in our hearts we know,
We are totally sure
That our babies will no longer
Perish.

Garvin Nantambu Stuart

A stone's throw

Swing me high, sah
Fling me hard, sah
Like I's stone
In di back yard
A' de monstah
Plant yuh foot like tree
in Cuba
An swing yuh han' like branch
Full a fruit
Scatter me far — Nicaragua!
Riding through storm — to Jamaica
Burning like sun — in Grenada

And El Salvador?
El Salvador!

Yes! I fly to fall like stone
Falling to break
(still red from the fireside a' retribution)
Dem million glass window
Da decorate di shame a'
Nations
Where
Size is no measure for struggle!

Swing me high, yes
Fling me hard, fren
Make me break that foot!
(Haiti squirms like a worm
Under the heel a' de monster)
(Chile still eatin she children)
(Puerto Rico pukin' from spikes in she guts)
(Trinidad starvin she people on oil)
Make me break an' burn
An' when I done
Use me, dis stone, to build!

Jacob Ross

The psalm of the oppressed

The imperialist is my exploiter
I shall always want,
He maketh me to lie down on fibre,
While he live and dress in his rich attire.
He leadeth me to always scrunt on the ground,
He weaken my soul,
He leadeth me unto the paths of unrighteousness,
Unto my prison cells.
Yea, though I struggle to walk through the streets of Injustice,
I shall always be in fear,
For thou art bombing, shooting and looting,
Which brings discomfort to me.
Though he prepareth a table of war to end humanity,
Though he shoot down my brethren in Africa,
Yea, South Africa,
Their blood runneth over like water,
Surely the day will come

When Justice shall be done,
And I shall dwell in the house of Freedom
For ever
And Ever
AMEN.

Michael 'Senator' Mitchell

Callaloo

Mix up
Like callaloo
Not no watery callaloo
But a hot
thick
Sweet callaloo
Burnin' you tongue
Wid dem
chunk
O' dumplin'
Goin' down
Nice
An' wid coconut
Wid
Or widdout deaders
As de case may be
As de taste may be
As de pocket may be
But sweet
An' hot

Dat is what
It feel like
To be part o' dis
Revolution reality
O' dis
wakin' up reality
O' dis
No more hidin' you passport
reality
no more
Hangin' you head
An' shufflin you foot
An' trying to hide
Behin' de person
in front o' you

Like little Janet
Behin' she mudder skirt

When de man ask

Way you from?

No more
Playin' you doh hear
Or sayin' some shit like
A ...
A ...
A island
Near by Trinidad
Or
A ...
A few mile
Off Venezuela
But out
Loud an' bole
Like you make de name
Grenada!

An
Wid you head in de air
Becus de world is yours
An' you know is yours
An' you not go be
meek
meek
meek
An' wait to see
If somebody
Go let you
Inherit de earth
Becus you know arready

Is yours
So you say
Loud
An' clear
An' proud
Grenada!

An' you silent scream
Which he mus' be hear
Becus he look up
Into your claimin' eyes
Says
Dat mean
Revolution
Dat mean
Progress
Dat mean
Forward!

Dat mean
Sharin'
An' carin'
An' believin'
An' livin'
An' lovin'
Dat mean
A country
In de Caribbean
In Latin America
In de Americas
In de struggle
In de world

Dat mean
Comrade
A people
Like de people
In Cuba
In Nicaragua
In Zimbabwe
In struggling South Africa
In all dem countries
Where de people know
Dat de donkey say
De world aint level
Even donkey heself
Mus' be does shake he head
To feel dem bumps
An know how ting
So hard for some toe
An so sof'
for others

All o' we
In all o' dis world
So mix up
Like callaloo
An' yet
So not like callaloo
An' dat is why
De change
An' de promise o' de change
Is sweet
An' strong
Like de soup
When Grannie
Cover it down dey
And let it
Consommé
Like dat
Hot
Sweet
Burnin'
Heavy
Heavy
Callaloo!

Merle Collins

The last cowboy

Ronald Reagan, the ageing cowboy bandit man
Cooked up a major bandit plan
This man pattern, this comic clown
Of movie fame and bushwacking fun
Announced that he was riding down
Through his backyard and islands in the sun
To put more notches on his gun.
For Ronald Reagan 'twas not strange
To go gun-shooting on his range
To shoot back all dese winds of change.

So paff-paff Reagan wid face like twine
And Caribbean Basin in he mind,
Was determined to keep everybody in line
And all yuh rebel is land slaves
Resisting just like Indian braves
Will end up dead in rebel graves,
And all yuh natives playing rude
Look out — I'm in a looting, tooting, shooting mood.

'Just like in de movies,' he said to himself
As he removed his six-shooters from up on de shelf,
'I'll fight for America, yes I will
For America I'll die — kill, kill, kill!
For de big boys and dem up on Capitol Hill,
America de land of de free and de bold
We give you de land and take all de gold.

America must direct the course of humanity
And he who resists we kill with impunity,
We make de plans, we pass out de orders
We empty wash basins just outside we borders,
We direct bombings, assassinations and murders
We preach it in our school to our sons and our daughters
These boys of the backyard are living in we waters.

So I'll attack like in days gone by,
Grenada go bawl and Cuba go cry,
And every other bugger is sure to die.
Like old McCarthy I'll go on a hunt
And mark up every piece a liberation front,
And Nicaragua must fall before end a mont' —
No matter who protest, don't bother who gripe
Dey all must bow down to de stars and stripes.'

And so this maniac, gunslinging clown
Stood ready to ride in and gun down the town,
Eventually to strike all humanity down —
A cowboy desperado with nuclear power
Threatening mankind hour after hour,
Trying vainly to stop the march of people's power.

Kojo de Riggs

I Militia

I Militia
I conscious militia
You Mr Exploiter
No way brother
Keeping down the worker
Saving your dollar
Making you richer
Ah say, is them labour
Not you sir

You spread propaganda
About Grenada
Through the media
And newspaper
saying how we doh ha
Human rights in Grenada
And how we mustn't frien with Cuba
Asking them passenger
When they coming to Grenada
'Where you going to, Grenada?
Don't go over there
Is guns cover the whole area!'
And how Grenada is a disaster
How we have a big boat load ah dead soldier
Stinking in the harbour
Just come out and fight war in Nicaragua
And how they owe La Qua so much a dollar
But you must tell the truth sir
You dirty liar
Did you tell them that benefits has come
To all man and their brother in Grenada?
No, you din tell them that, aha
But I Militia is a conscious fighter

But you doh know sir
That the gun is we defender
And we had a manoeuvre
Which we say will never over
But let me tell you further too, Mr Exploiter
That I Militia will never be a supporter
Of your exploiting bourgeois, vampire behaviour
Why? Because I Militia ah conscious Militia

I Militia say
You can't live forever
You days getting fewer
Every minute, every hour
You blood sucker
Killing we nature

I Militia
I conscious Militia, say
You can't leave us to suffer
Is the heavy roller for you, Mr Exploiter
Ah pick up me AK, oppressor
To fight you counter
To free the worker
To build Grenada
I Militia will never surrender!

Helena Joseph

From docility to creator

Deh tri to stitch me mout
Deh tri to tie me hans behin me back
    But I overs dem
    Yes I small islander
Mak history
Mak big Revolution in am small country.

Deh tri to rob me of me name
Deh tri to alienate me from me culture
School me in college of Drakes and King Henery
White-wash me brains me Europeanism
    But today I
    Yes I ... liberate meself
    From dem prison

Today I mak Caribbean culture
Stee ban
Kaiso
Rockers
I dubbing me message

Today I man speak with me own voice
In me own loud speaker
With me own volume
As loud as Lenin I demand
Bread and Peace

Today I beg the house of the United Nations
To change me name from U.F.O. to Human Existence
From Fascism to Socialism
Gone are the days of mystic-man
Gone are the days of visions and 'boots string'
Today my aspiration lies in the rising sun

Today
I elevate myself from exile to consciousness
From rags to velvet
From docility to creator

Allan Lowe

STEPHEN CASTLES

Racism and politics in West Germany*

The upsurge of hate

May Day 1982: I stand with a group of Germans and foreigners around the banner of the Initiative against Racism at the trade union rally in Frankfurt's central square. Suddenly we hear shouts of *'Sieg Heil'* and *'Ausländer raus'* (foreigners out). Several hundred young men with football scarves run across the road and smash into the crowd, attacking anyone who looks foreign with sticks, boots and tear gas. The Turkish workers break their flagpoles over their knees, and set about the young thugs, driving them off after a bitter fight. The police, with their riot gear and water cannon, only move in when it is all over. Later we discover that the attackers were fans of Nuremberg Football Club, in Frankfurt for a match, and that they had been led to the trade union rally by neo-nazis.

24 June 1982: A 26-year-old building worker called Helmut Oxner walks into a Nuremberg discotheque, pulls out a pistol and starts shooting at anyone who looks foreign. After killing three foreigners and wounding three more, he turns the pistol on himself. Oxner was a member of the youth section of the neo-nazi NPD *(National Democratic Party)* and police found stickers of the NSDAP-AO

Stephen Castles is Professor of Political Economy at the Fachhochschule (Polytechnic) of Frankfurt, and is active in the anti-racist movement.

* This article is abbreviated from a chapter in *Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities*, by S. Castles et al (London, Pluto Press, forthcoming).

Race & Class, XXV, 3(1984)

(Organisation for the Rebuilding of the Nazi Party) in his pockets. Although Oxner had repeatedly been charged with racist offences, police had not taken away his gun permits.[1]

June 1982: In a Frankfurt housing estate occupied by foreigners and by Germans at the bottom end of the poverty scale, a middle-aged German feels disturbed by the noisy games of the Turkish children. He grabs three-year old Aladin Cosgun and pushes him into the concrete box where the dustbins are, slamming the door shut. To a German woman who remonstrates with him, the man says 'they're just filth, they must get out of here'. A few weeks earlier, in a similar situation, a German had actually shot children with an air-gun, because he found them too noisy.[2]

October 1982: Gerhard Kromschröder, a reporter of the mass-circulation magazine *Stern* dyes his moustache black, dresses up in 'guest-worker style' – badly cut suit, white shirt, loud tie and cloth cap – and tries to get a drink in bars and cafés in Frankfurt. Again and again he is refused service and thrown out. Publication of his report leads to a flurry of letters and protests. When our action group goes to talk to the manager of one of the cafés concerned, we get ejected by the police, but the mayor does promise to take action to stop this type of discrimination.[3]

October 1982: A major insurance company announces its intention of charging Turkish customers 50 per cent extra on motor insurance policies; Yugoslavs and Greeks are to pay 25 per cent extra.[4]

November 1982: The new Federal Chancellor, Helmut Kohl (Christian Democratic Party (CDU)) states that there are too many foreigners in the Federal Republic, and that policies to stop immigration and encourage repatriation are one of his government's three principal tasks. The CDU distributes leaflets to all households in West Germany outlining this policy.

December 1982: A football match in West Berlin. Teenage fans wear jerkins with SS insignia and shout '*Sieg heil*' when their team appears. The chant changes to '*Jude, Jude*' (Jew, Jew) when the other side has the ball.[5]

January 1983: The papers are full of articles reminding us of the fiftieth anniversary of Hitler's rise to power. My twelve-year-old daughter comes home from school and tells me 'jokes' that are going round her class: 'How do you get eight Turks in a VW?' 'Four on the seats, the rest in the ashtray!'; 'What is the difference between the Jews and the Turks?' 'The first lot have already got it behind them!'

February 1983: Millions of Germans watch the live transmission of

the traditional Mainz Carnival. The audience in the vast hall includes celebrities and leading politicians in evening dress, adorned with fool's caps, who have paid DM150,00 to attend. On the stage two German men dressed up in something meant to look like traditional Greek costumes dance a *Sirtaki* and wave strings of garlic around, while singing about how much they stink. The tipsy dignitaries laugh and cheer.

Attitudes towards foreign workers

When West German capital decided to return to the strategy of labour import in the 1950s, there was some initial opposition from the trade unions but this was dropped once certain guarantees were given concerning recruitment by the state, wages, conditions and accommodation. All significant interest groups in West Germany accepted the guest-worker system between 1956 and 1973. This system was intrinsically racist, for it assigned foreigners to a permanently inferior position in society, denying them civil and political rights. Many of the laws and regulations made to administer the guest-worker system still apply, continuing discrimination even of children born to foreign parents within West Germany. Clearly a system of institutional discrimination is only possible if a sizeable proportion of the population is willing to accept the legitimacy of labelling foreigners as permanently inferior. The guest-worker system was thus a reflection of widespread racist attitudes.

The first foreign workers – mainly Italians – met with considerable hostility at their places of work, and in the neighbourhoods where they were housed. Spaich reports that they were often seen as 'the people who let us down in the war'.[6] Various opinion polls carried out in the early 1960s found that anything from 50 to 80 per cent of respondents had negative attitudes towards foreign workers and wanted to get rid of them. Such attitudes correlated with class, the highest incidence of the anti-foreign worker feeling being among manual workers.[7]

Attempts were soon made to exploit such attitudes for political ends. In May 1964, Federal Chancellor Erhard called on German workers to work longer hours in order to get rid of foreigners. The call was taken up by the employers' organisations and newspapers close to them. A neo-nazi party established in the mid-1960s, the NPD, concentrated its propaganda on anti-migrant themes, and managed to get between 2 and 10 per cent of the votes in *Länder* elections, actually getting into parliament in Hesse, Bavaria and Rheinland-Palatinate.

The shift to the left in West German politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s (marked by the German Social Democratic Party(SPD)-Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition in Bonn, and the left-wing student movement), seems to have been matched by a temporary decline in racism. The NPD lost electoral support, and failed to get into the

federal parliament. Immigration does not appear to have been a major political issue between 1968 and 1973 – the period of the most rapid growth in the foreign labour force. The prevailing view appears to have been that labour migration was a regrettable necessity for the maintenance of economic growth, while the foreign workers themselves were seen as 'not very clean, rather untidy', 'after German girls', 'angry and often aggressive', but, on the other hand, as 'hard-working and thrifty'.[8]

The crisis and the growth of popular racism

These patronising stereotypes of the useful, but somewhat primitive guest-workers did not last long, once the boom ground to a halt in the mid-1970s. The ban on labour migration in November 1973 labelled foreign workers as a cause of growing unemployment (the other being seen popularly as the 'oil sheikhs'). Many Germans supported the view that foreigners should be dismissed and deported to prevent German workers becoming unemployed.[9] Even prominent trade unionists called for such policies. The slogan *Ausländer raus* (foreigners out) began to appear on the walls. As temporary recession turned into long-term stagnation, and unemployment climbed to one and then two million, calls for mass repatriation became widespread. After all, it was 'common sense': if there were two million foreign workers and two million people out of work, repatriation appeared to provide an instant solution. By 1982, opinion polls were reporting that 82 per cent of Germans thought there were 'too many' foreigners in the country.[10]

However, the causes of increasing racism cannot simply be reduced to fears of unemployment. Rather, it is necessary to look at various factors arising from a process of settlement and restructuring of the foreign population which was taking place in a situation of economic, social and political crisis. The original migrant workers had been mainly young men, housed in out-of-the-way sheds on building sites and factory yards. They had only been visible to Germans at work, or on Sundays when they used the railway stations as meeting places. There had been enough complaints about that, but, after all, Germans did not have to spend much time at railway stations. Now, however, foreign families were seeking housing in the inner cities. Whole districts were turning into foreign communities, with their own shops, bars, churches, mosques and clubs. The foreign population did not grow dramatically in the late 1970s, but it became far more visible to Germans, as competition for housing and social facilities increased.

At the same time, the number of foreigners from southern Europe edged downwards, while the number from Turkey and other non-European countries grew. There was prejudice and discrimination against southern Europeans, but at least they were white and Christian,

and their languages and culture were not altogether alien. Germans seem to perceive Turks as alien and threatening. Differences in language, culture and appearance are much more marked, and anti-Turkish feeling has deep historical roots, connected with medieval struggles between Christianity and Islam, and Turkish expansion westwards up to the seventeenth century. The defeat of the Turks before Vienna in 1683 is a strong historical theme in Germany, especially in 1983, the anniversary year.

Above all, it is the presence of foreign youth that has brought home the reality of settlement to Germans. As more and more foreign children have entered inner-city schools, they have become a focus for conflict and racist agitation. The media and the politicians portray foreign youth as a 'social time-bomb': a long-term threat to social peace. Many young Germans have tried to keep foreigners out of youth clubs, sports clubs and bars. Fights and disputes often end with segregation: many clubs and bars are now used virtually only by foreign youth, while others are closed to them.

A further factor played a major role in the growth of racism in recent years: between 1979 and 1981 about a quarter of a million refugees entered West Germany in search of political asylum. Most came from Third World countries like Afghanistan, Eritrea, Argentina, Iran and Turkey. This represented a considerable increase over previous years, and led to an outcry by certain sections of the media, led by the mass-circulation *Bild-Zeitung* (the West German equivalent of the *Sun*). The refugees were portrayed as phonies, out to take advantage of social security benefits. The impression was given that West Germany was about to be swamped by millions of Africans and Asians, and the result would be Third World style poverty for the whole population. The neo-nazis circulated racist leaflets and slogans, and carried out bomb attacks on refugee hostels, killing several people. The CDU and CSU (Christian Social Union) campaigned for tighter rules to keep out 'economic refugees' and attacked the government for its lax immigration policies. The SPD-FDP coalition, indeed, changed the law to curtail entry of refugees in 1980 and again in 1981. The number of asylum-seekers entering West Germany has in the meantime declined substantially, mainly because of the introduction of entry visas for Turks and other Third World citizens. Around 80 per cent of applicants are denied asylum, even in cases where they are likely to be tortured or imprisoned if returned to their home countries.[11] The campaign against refugees did much to stimulate racism against all foreigners, and its impact may be compared with that of the campaign against the East African Asians in Britain in the mid-1970s.

Neo-nazism

The recent increase in neo-nazi activity in West Germany is closely linked with racism. Encouraging racism has been the main concern of neo-nazi groups, and their main way of attracting members. The government estimates that extreme right and neo-nazi organisations have about 20,000 members.[12] Membership declined in the 1970s and then started increasing in the early 1980s. In 1982, there were estimated to be seventy-four extreme right and neo-nazi organisations. The largest is the DVU (German People's Union), led by Gerhard Frey, with over 10,000 members. Its newspapers have a circulation of about 100,000 copies. The NPD has been declining since its hey-day in the late 1960s. Most of its 7,000 members are pensioners. It is not militant enough to attract young people, and its youth organisation is now down to 500 members.

In the 1980 and 1983 federal elections, agitation against foreigners was virtually the NPD's only theme. But voters are reluctant to support openly nazi parties: the NPD got less than half a per cent of votes cast, compared with 4.3 per cent in 1969. Both the NPD and the DVU have taken to setting up front organisations devoted entirely to racist campaigns. The NPD's *Bürgerinitiative Ausländerstopp* (Citizen's Initiative to Stop Foreigners) has collected thousands of signatures in petitions for compulsory repatriation, and for separate classes for German and foreign children. The DVU has set up a similar *Initiative für Ausländerbegrenzung* (Initiative for Restriction of Foreigners). Such fronts are able to mobilise more popular support than the parties themselves: for instance, the Kiel List for Restriction of Foreigners got 3.7 per cent of the poll in the May 1982 municipal elections. In inner-city working-class districts they got up to 9 per cent.

Many of the younger Germans attracted to neo-nazism by racist propaganda in recent years have joined the twenty or so militant organisations which reject electoral participation, and carry out campaigns of terrorism. Official estimates put membership of such groups at just over 1,000 in 1982,[13] but are unreliable, due to the clandestine nature of such organisations. The number of criminal offences attributed to the extreme right grew from 136 in 1974 to 2,047 in 1982.[14] The trend is towards systematic violence against foreigners, Jews, members of left and anti-racist organisations and – most recently – US soldiers. For instance, the *Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann* (Military Sport Group Hoffman) gave military training to its 400 members, many of whom have since been involved in crimes of violence. The most notorious of these was the bombing of the Munich October Festival, in which thirteen people were killed and 200 wounded. The *Wehrsportgruppe* was banned in 1980, and its members moved into other groups. The *Deutsche Aktionsgruppe* (German Action Group) carried out a campaign of

bombings and arson against foreign workers and refugees in 1981, killing two Vietnamese refugees. Other offences committed by the various nazi groups include molotov-cocktail attacks on homes and shops belonging to foreigners, demolition of Jewish cemeteries, the beating up of anti-racists and the theft and smuggling of weapons and explosives.

The most recent trend is the emergence of so-called 'national revolutionary' groups. These claim to be anti-capitalist in their aims and to represent the class interests of German workers. Their ideology is based on the Strasser-Röhm wing of the Nazi Party, and their actions and form of organisation are modelled on the SA (Hitler's Storm Troopers) which were recruited largely among workers. Such groups hope to attract working-class youth through their image of violence, toughness, comradeship and leadership. They recruit in football fan clubs, where racist violence is becoming increasingly accepted, and among male working-class youth sub-cultures such as rockers and skin-heads. In February 1983, five members of the *Volkssozialistische Bewegung Deutschlands* (German People's Socialist Movement) were arrested and charged with a series of bomb attacks on US vehicles and buildings. West German authorities, who tend to play down right-wing terrorism, had previously blamed these attacks on the left-wing 'revolutionary cells'. But in fact, attacks on the US 'forces of occupation' fit into the ideology of the 'national revolutionaries'.

The extreme right is also trying to gain a foothold in the ecology movement. The argument of groups like the Young Nationalists (NPD youth section) is that the destruction of the environment is due to rapacious capitalists, who want growth at any price, and therefore flood the country with foreign workers. In this way, foreigners can be blamed for the pollution of air and water, for the destruction of the forests, and for generally ruining the German homeland. Forced repatriation is therefore a way of safeguarding the environment and stopping over-industrialisation. Clearly, the aim of such slogans is to gain support among young people, who are very much involved in environmentalist politics.

Although the extreme right is anything but united, the difference between the various tendencies should not be over-emphasised. All the groups certainly concur on the issue of racism, and in their willingness to use violence against foreigners. Members tend to move from one group to another, and the more violent under-cover groups often have close links with the large legal organisations like the NPD and DVU. The German nazis also have strong bonds with similar groups in other countries, such as the British Movement and Column 88, FANE in France and NAR in Italy. There is frequent interchange of members for carrying out terrorist actions. German nazis are alleged to have been involved in attacks on synagogues in France and on the Bologna

railway station in Italy. Two of the members of the German People's Socialist Movement arrested in February 1983 were found in Britain, where they were in hiding at the home of ex-Major Souter-Clarence, a member of the neo-nazi League of St George.[15]

A number of surveys have attempted to assess the extent of extreme right views among young Germans. Without going into detail, it may be said that all the studies have found growing willingness to accept nazi slogans, and authoritarian solutions to social problems. For instance, 23 per cent of school students interviewed in Frankfurt thought that social problems could be solved by 'eliminating the lazy, the criminals, and the mentally ill from society'; 15 per cent thought that 'a man like Hitler could cope with the problems better than our present politicians'. The percentage of youth supporting such views varies in the different surveys, with a sizeable minority (perhaps 10-20 per cent) willing to go along with them, while a small group (perhaps 2-5 per cent) is actually ready to get involved in violent action.[16]

Making racism respectable

Nazism appeared as a viable political strategy to the German ruling class in the crisis of the 1930s. Neo-nazism is quite clearly not a valid option for the ruling class of West Germany in the crisis of the 1980s. Yet neo-nazi ideas do have an impact on politics: the growing acceptability of racist slogans encourages a shift of the major parties towards more openly nationalistic policies. This is happening because neo-nazi ideas are being taken up, transformed and made respectable by sections of the establishment.

One way this is taking place is through the resurrection of what is known as 'scientific' racism. Racist science is nothing new in Germany: the Nazis made great efforts to develop a branch of anthropology called *Rassenkunde* (race science), which set out to prove the superiority of the 'nordic' race, and to justify domination and exploitation of other nations. Although totally discredited, this older type of 'scientific' racism persists through a network of academics and journals throughout western Europe and the United States of America. 'Scientific' racism has received new impetus in recent years: first, through psychological studies purporting to show the innate superiority of whites over blacks;[17] and second, through the growing significance of 'socio-biological' theories, which set out to show that coherence of ethnic groups and exclusion of strangers are part of 'human nature'.[18]

'Scientific' racism went on the offensive for the first time in contemporary West Germany through the publication of the '*Heidelberger Manifest*' (Heidelberg Manifesto) in August 1981.[19] This document, signed by fifteen professors, warns that the German people is being undermined through the immigration of millions of foreigners, and

that German culture, language and national character (*Volkstum*) is being swamped. The Manifesto asserts the impossibility of integrating the foreigners, and says that the German people will be destroyed by the 'ethnic catastrophe' of a multi-cultural society. The fifteen professors insist that they are neither racist nor right wing. They regard it as in the best interests of foreigners to return to their countries of origin, so that they too can preserve their culture and national values. The Manifesto's aim is to 'preserve the German people' through immigration control, forced repatriation and measures to increase the birth rate of German women. Soon after publication of the Heidelberg Manifesto, a League for the Defence of the German People (*Schutzbund für das deutsche Volk*) was set up to implement its aims.

The group behind the Heidelberg Manifesto is not just part of a lunatic fringe, although it does have contacts and influence in neo-nazi organisations. More significant are links with the right wing of the CDU and the Bavarian CSU. Richard Stücklen, a leading member of the CSU and Speaker (*Präsident*) of the German federal parliament until March 1983, has stated that the central value of the West German constitution is the concept of the 'German people'. He called for measures to encourage love for home and father-land, for the German language, folk music and culture. Stücklen gave the League for the Defence of the German People permission to publish and distribute an article he had written stating this point of view.[20] Another CSU leader, Hans Stützle, has warned that the German people is on the verge of extinction due to its low birth rate, and has called for measures to strengthen the German family.

During the campaign for the federal elections in March 1983, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (West Germany's major serious conservative daily, comparable to the London *Daily Telegraph*) published a large advertisement for the League for the Defence of the German People. It started: 'The greatest danger which threatens our people today is the development of an alien population in Germany, while the German state people is rapidly shrinking.' After the usual allegations concerning high birth rates, sponging off social security, etc., the advertisement called on voters to support candidates opposed to foreign settlement in West Germany.[21]

Editorial comment in serious papers like the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt* has become increasingly racist in recent years. A leader in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in February 1982 was entitled 'The full boat' and called for a complete stop to immigration: 'The next million Turks must not come'. In December 1982, a leader with the headline '*Fremde und Allzufremde*' ('Aliens and too-much-aliens') clearly defined Turks as the target for racism:

> Apparently it is not permissible in this country to become conscious of the fact that there are various degrees of being alien, and that, for natural reasons (or more precisely cultural reasons), coexistence is most difficult with the particularly alien. Matters are reasonably good with the eastern, southern and south-eastern Europeans in the Federal Republic. Even a few Italian Mafiosi can be coped with. This is not surprising, for ever since the period of the historic migrations of peoples, the interchange between Slav, Romanic, Germanic and also Celtic peoples has become a habit. A tacit we-feeling has arisen in one and the same European culture. But excluded from this are the Turk-peoples, and also the Palestinians, North Africans and others from totally alien cultures. They, and only they, are the 'foreigner problem' in the Federal Republic.[22]

This editorial shows clearly the extent to which racist ideologies, evoking both older anthropological theories and newer ideas of cultural separateness, are becoming acceptable within the West German establishment. The trend indicates a shift in ruling-class attitudes towards foreigners. As long as West German industry needed additional labour, employers and politicians, who represented employers' interests, favoured recruitment of migrant labour. They supported measures to integrate foreign workers, in so far as this was necessary for efficient participation in the labour force. Now that additional labour is no longer required, conservatives are beginning to warn of the dangers to public order and national unity presented by foreign settlement. The German Employers' Federation recently stated that the 'foreigner question' is becoming the 'principal strain on our society'.[23] Employers' leaders assert that integration and naturalisation are unacceptable strategies, for Turks and Yugoslavs could hardly be expected to fight for the German Federal Republic in the event of a war. The influence of right-wing ideas is clearly visible in the Employers' Federation's current recommendation on foreigners policy: stopping immigration, restriction of family reunification, further curbs on civil and political rights, and increased use of deportation powers.

The political parties and the shift towards repatriation

By 1981, growing popular racism and the campaign against refugees had turned the situation of foreigners in West Germany into a major political issue. The language of the CDU was becoming increasingly nationalistic: 'The role of the German Federal Republic as a national unitary state and as part of a divided nation does not permit the commencement of an irreversible development to a multi-ethnic state', said a CDU resolution in the federal parliament in November 1981.[24] The

SPD-FDP cabinet hastened to state that 'the German Federal Republic is not a country of immigration and ought not to become one'.[25] Three weeks later, the government announced further restrictions on immigration of foreign workers' dependants.

In February 1982 there was a major debate on policy towards foreigners in the federal parliament. Alfred Dregger, leader of the CDU-CSU parliamentary group, took the opportunity to evoke fears of a new alien influx, pointing out that Turkey's Treaty of Association with the European Community would lead to free movement of labour from 1986:

> In Turkey, millions of people are waiting for this day. If this wave breaks over us, then our welfare state, which is in any case seriously endangered through financial exhaustion, will also break ... But Turks, with some exceptions, cannot be assimilated, indeed they can only be integrated with great difficulty. Since Turks are different from Germans in culture and mentality, and want to stay different, it is only natural that they seek the proximity of their fellows in Germany. That means that Turkish quarters, also known as ghettos, are developing in our cities. That could only be prevented by force, not by social security benefits or persuasion ... We have no reason to let critics at home and abroad accuse us of racism, when we insist that the German Federal Republic must not become a country of immigration. Anyone who disregards this natural and justified feeling of our fellow citizens is preparing the way for the extreme right ... The question of a reasonable and humane rotation must be reconsidered.[26]

Dregger's speech is worth quoting at length, because it evokes so many themes familiar to British readers from the speeches of Enoch Powell, or the writings of Alfred Sherman: the idea of being overwhelmed or swamped by aliens; the idea of cultural differences, which make integration impossible; the idea of 'natural feelings' of 'ordinary people', who will understandably move to the right, if the established parties do nothing. Only the call for repatriation takes a form unlike that in Britain: Dregger wants to return to 'rotation' of foreign workers, i.e., letting them in only temporarily and without dependants.

The SPD-FDP had no strategy to put against this. The government merely issued a statement reiterating its policy aims: maintaining the ban on labour immigration, encouraging voluntary return, and supporting the economic and social integration of foreigners who had already been in West Germany for a long time.[27] The CDU-CSU remained on the offensive, making deportation a major electoral theme. A CDU leaflet distributed during the state elections in Hesse in the autumn of 1982 bore the title 'Dealing with the foreigner problem',

and declared that the CDU would reduce the number of foreigners in West Germany by a million in the next five years. The demands of the leaflet can hardly be distinguished from those put out by neo-nazi organisations:

> Keeping the ban on entry of foreign workers.
> No further immigration of family members from outside the European Community.
> Stopping the fraudulent exploitation of the German social security system.
> Deportation of foreign criminals to their countries of origin.
> Strict measures against foreign political extremists.[28]

Racist policies with enforced repatriation as their final consequence have found wide acceptance in the CDU and CSU. Attitudes within the SPD are more complex: many members are strongly opposed to racism, and cooperate with foreigners in neighbourhood groups and anti-racist organisations. The leadership of the SPD calls for measures to integrate foreigners and improve their rights and demands measures to stop neo-nazi agitation. But the policies of the SPD while in power were discriminatory and restrictive. SPD leaders fear loss of popular support due to growing racism. Willy Brandt stated recently that 'we cannot cope with any further immigration'.[29] In a statement on the local elections in Kiel in 1982, Peter Glotz, general secretary of the SPD, said that his party was in danger of losing votes to right-wing 'populist' groups, and called for measures to stop further growth of the foreign population.[30] This trend in SPD thinking can be shown by comparing two statements made by Holger Börner, the SPD prime minister of Hesse. In 1978, Börner called for measures to integrate foreigners and improve their rights:

> We must learn that we are on the way to a multi-cultural and multi-racial society ... We should regard our foreign fellow citizens as European citizens. Many of them will stay in the Federal Republic forever. For them our country has in fact become a country of immigration.[31]

By 1982, Börner had changed his tune:

> The Federal Republic is not a country of immigration, the limits of our endurance have been reached ... The principle is that we must give them the opportunity of integration within the framework of our legal system. And, of course, they have a right to work and housing like German citizens. But to achieve this it is necessary to strictly close the frontiers against further immigration, for this problem will otherwise become insoluble ... I regard further immigration of Turks to the Federal Republic as impossible.[32]

The SPD formed the federal government (together with the smaller FDP) from 1969 to 1982. The SPD-FDP coalition collapsed in the autumn of 1982, and was replaced by a CDU-CSU-FDP government. The new coalition was quite clear about what was needed: policies to reduce wage and welfare costs in order to stimulate industrial investment, and a new emphasis on a strong state to guarantee 'law and order'. An offensive against the rights of foreign residents was seen as an integral part of this strategy. In his first statement as federal chancellor on 13 October 1982, Helmut Kohl announced that a new policy towards foreigners was one of the three main planks of his programme. Although lip service was still paid to integration, the emphasis was now on stopping immigration, drastically reducing family reunification, keeping out refugees, and encouraging repatriation. Kohl emphasised that repatriation was to be voluntary and 'humane', but the aim was explicit: the number of foreign residents was to be reduced by a million by the end of the decade.

The new minister of the interior, Zimmermann, set up a working group linking federal and *Länder* governments to map out the new policy. At the time of writing, it is not possible to say exactly what measures will be introduced, although the following are probable: a new Foreigners Law, restricting immigration and increasing deportation powers; reduction of the maximum age of entry of dependant children (probably to five years); introduction of residence permits for children under 16; deportation in the event of unemployment or inadequate housing; financial incentives for voluntary departure (already introduced for certain categories); and further restrictions on political rights.[33]

The principle underlying the new policy appears to be the division of the foreign population into two groups: those who are to be assimilated, and those who are to be repatriated. The ideological basis of this division has already been shown. The legal basis lies in the fact that the main European minority groups (except the Yugoslavs) are shielded from the effects of discriminatory legislation: Italians and Greeks through EEC membership, Spaniards and Portuguese through EEC association. Members of these national groups are going to be allowed to stay, under certain conditions: they must remain in employment, not claim social security benefits, and must conform to German expectations with regard to housing and life-style. Preservation of national cultures will only be permitted in the form of folklore; the establishment of separate communities will not be tolerated.[34] In the long run, the aim is naturalisation, and 'Germanisation'. The West German government speaks of 'integration', but its policies are shifting to assimilation.

The people to be repatriated are, first, all those unable to participate in the labour process: the unemployed, the elderly, the handicapped,

the chronically ill; second, the overwhelming majority of non-Europeans, above all the Turks. The CDU-CSU regards it as impossible to assimilate, or even integrate these groups, and sees them as a threat to the German nation. The pre-condition for carrying out this policy is the abrogation of the Treaty of Association between Turkey and the EEC, which provides for free movement of labour from 1986. The issue is delicate, for Turkey is a NATO-partner, and unilateral refusal to implement the treaty would smack of racism and illegality. The West German government is, therefore, at present doing everything possible to appease the military Junta, in the hope of persuading them to agree to the repeal of the free movement provisions. That is why the federal minister of the interior has promised to extradite the Junta's political opponents from West Germany. [35] That is why Cemal Kemal Altun* was hounded to his death in West Berlin on 30 August 1983.

References

1 *Frankfurter Rundschau* (26 February 1983).
2 *Frankfurter Rundschau* (26 June 1982, 9 September 1982).
3 *Stern* (10 October 1982).
4 *Frankfurter Rundschau* (28 October 1982).
5 *Tageszeitung* (13 December 1982).
6 Herbert Spaich, *Fremde in Deutschland* (Weinheim and Basel, 1981), pp. 7-8.
7 S. Castles and G. Kosack, *Immigrant workers and class structure in western Europe* (London, 1973), pp. 433-6.
8 Spaich, op. cit., p.218.
9 Ibid., p.220.
10 *Time Magazine* (30 August 1982).
11 See Victor Pfaff, 'Asylrecht in der BRD', in *Links* (Vol. 14, no.148/9, July/August 1982); and Terre des Hommes (ed.), *Zur situation in der Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Darmstadt, 1982).
12 Der Bundesminister des Innern (ed.), *Betrifft: Verfassungsschutz '82* (Bonn, 1983), p.113. This is the annual report of the West German political police, similar to the Special Branch in Britain.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p.153.
15 *Searchlight* (No. 93, March 1983).
16 GEW Berlin (ed.), *Wider das Vergessen — antifaschistische Erziehung in der Schule* (Frankfurt, 1981), p.92.
17 See Michael Billig, *Psychology, Racism and Fascism* (Birmingham,1979); and Michael Billig, *Die rassistische Internationale*, (Frankfurt, 1981).
18 Martin Barker, *The new racism* (London, 1981).

* Cemal Kemal Altun was the younger brother of an exiled left-wing Turkish MP. He faced imminent deportation despite the fact that his case had aroused nationwide protest. He died after throwing himself from the upper floor of the courtroom, where his case was to be heard.

19 The original version of the Heidelberg Manifesto, which drips with explicit racism, was leaked to the press in August 1981. Its authors published a new version in January 1982. Although the language is milder, there is no change in the ideology and aims. Both versions are reproduced in K. Staeck and I. Karst (eds), *Macht Ali deutsches Volk kaputt?* (Göttingen, 1982).
20 *Frankfurter Rundschau* (9 September 1982).
21 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (15 February 1983).
22 Ibid. (2 December 1982).
23 *Der Arbeitgeber* (No. 24, 1981).
24 Quoted from Initiativausschuss Ausländischer Mitbürger in Hessen, *Argumente gegen die Ausländerfeindlichkeit* (Hofheim, mimeo, 1982)
25 Cabinet decision of 11 November 1981.
26 Quoted from Staeck and Karst (eds.), op. cit., pp.178-81.
27 Cabinet decision of 3 February 1982.
28 Quoted from Staeck and Karst (eds.), op. cit., p.145.
29 Ibid., p.49.
30 *Frankfurter Rundschau* (24 May 1982).
31 Speech to the Synod of the Evangelical Church of Hesse, on 4 March 1978; see also Spaich, op. cit., p.234 and p.239.
32 Radio interview on 13 March 1982, quoted from *Links* (June 1982).
33 Der Bundesminister des Innern (ed.), *Bericht der Kommission 'Ausländerpolitik'* (Bonn 1983).
34 See Dregger, in Staeck and Karst (eds.), op. cit., p.181.
35 For evidence of collusion between the West German government and the Turkish Junta in the persecution of political opponents see *Frankfurter Rundschau* (31 August 1983 and 1 September 1983) and *Tageszeitung* (31 August 1983 and 1 September 1983).

GLC
Police Committee
Support Unit
Discussion Paper No. 2

POLICING BY COERCION

Louise Christian

£1.50 232 pages
SBN 7168 1336 X November 1983

Policing by Coercion is the first full-scale attempt to look at the issues behind the widely-criticised Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, first introduced in October 1982, and now back in an only slightly modified form. This book, by Louise Christian, a solicitor working in the GLC Police Committee Support Unit, analyses the view that new powers would not help to prevent crime or catch criminals, but would legitimise repressive policing.

To Greater London Council Publications, Room 82, The County Hall, London SE1 7PB

Please send me.....copy/ies of **Policing by Coercion** at £2.00 each (inc p+p)
I enclose cheque or postal order for £.....made out to The Greater London Council

Name .....

Address .....

.....Post code.....

Organisation (if any) .....

If you would like more information about the GLC campaign against the Police Bill or the work of the Police Committee Support Unit, please tick here ☐

Policing by Coercion
can also be ordered with other Pluto Press books from Pluto Press, 105a Torriano Avenue, London NW5 2RX.

Keep GLC Working for London

610

SHIRLEY JOSHI and BOB CARTER

The role of Labour in the creation of a racist Britain

A great deal of the discussion about racism on the left has invariably made one or other of the following assumptions: that the working class is spontaneously anti-racist; that anti-racist struggles are peripheral or diversionary; or that the working class is inherently racist. In contrast to these simple propositions, we want to suggest racism in Britain was not a belated Conservative response to popular pressures over immigration during the 1960s, but was evident in the late 1940s and 1950s and was, in fact, a submerged but powerful feature in British political cultures. Moreover, the response of labour institutions and organisations to racism was ambiguous, both in their frequently paternalistic and colonial attitudes to the black communities and in their relationships to black organisations. This resulted in black workers' struggles being relegated to the fringes of the labour movement. And, as no explanation was forthcoming from the moulders of working-class opinion for the black presence in Britain, this created an ideological vacuum which was increasingly filled by the Right from the 1960s onwards.

Racism, English nationalism and Labour reformism

Any discussion of racism necessarily involves a discussion of the state. Particularly pertinent here is Nairn's notion of the 'transitional' state.[1] He argues that the British state acquired certain peculiar features from

Shirley Joshi teaches at Birmingham Polytechnic; *Bob Carter* teaches at Newman College of Education, Birmingham.

Race & Class, XXV, 3(1984)

Britain's position as the first industrial imperial power. This was to impart a dominant patrician element to the state structure, which retained an archaic stamp and never produced a genuinely industrialised society. There was never a 'second bourgeois revolution' in Britain, 'that "modernising", socio-political upheaval that ought to have refashioned both society and state in logical conformity with the demands of the new age'. The external condition inhibiting this 'modernising' current was the development of a new imperialism centred around the City of London; the internal condition was the co-optive and cohesive authority of an intelligentsia which had a far more organic relationship to the state than in any other bourgeois society. Its strategy was the preservation of rule from above by constant adaptation and concession below, a strategy which concealed the real parameters of power under a spurious conservative unity.

The nationalism that formed the basis of this unity was not the revolutionary nationalism of the modern bourgeois state. British nationalism was not based, as in France, on middle-class cadres leading the masses in the overthrow of an *ancien regime*, but on depriving those masses of leadership. Without it, they were unable to break the system. The political defeat of Chartism, the accumulation of powerful social pressures from above, and the wealth of imperialism led to a negative reconciliation by the working class to elite hegemony, to a trade unionism that was deferential to state and constitution and that did not see political revolution as a means to social and economic betterment. Under the aegis of British labourism, the working class has subscribed to this vision, the idea that what a society enjoys in common is more important than its stratification. Hence, Nairn argues that the only effective version of nationalism here 'has been one which ignores class divisions against an "outside" enemy – at the same time implicitly reconsecrating them, as the tolerable features of a "way of life" basically worth defending against the world'.[2]

Seen from this perspective, Labour's victory in 1945 did not signify the major radical initiative that some assumed. This is not to suggest that the overwhelming vote for the Labour Party did not indicate a real impulse for change within the working class; merely that the Labour Party itself, committed to the version of nationalism outlined above through its notion of a pragmatic 'British socialism', and reinforced by its experiences within the war-time Coalition government, was unable to effect such radical change. Instead, it was concerned to demonstrate its 'Britishness' by presenting its programme as one designed to benefit the 'British people as a whole', of which the working class was only a part.

This perception of its task derived directly from the Labour Party's reformism, its commitment to a conservative nationalism that emphasised deference to state and constitution through a stress on their

uniquely 'English' character, and the severe defeats inflicted on the working class in the 1920s and 1930s. The Labour Party's participation in the patrician dominance of the British state was evident in the political leadership of labourism, dominated, by the 1940s, by the ideas and programmes of traditional elite figures like Keynes and Beveridge. The corollary of this was the passivity of working-class Labour Party members and the working-class electorate. The 'normal' political consequences of reformism – the discouragement of rank-and-file involvement, the reliance on elites through 'representative' institutions – were exacerbated by the Labour Party's enthusiasm for an 'English' parliamentary tradition.

The Labour Party's approach to de-colonisation illustrates these themes admirably. This combined pragmatism, an 'eye to the main chance', with paternalism. In no sense did the Labour Party commit itself to a thorough-going policy of de-colonisation;[3] indeed, the issue was not seen as one of political or moral principle, but political expediency. Thus, in India it was deemed desirable to grant independence; in Malaya it was deemed inappropriate until forces sympathetic to British interests were sure of victory. In the case of Africa, the issue was never raised.

In so far as there was discussion and debate on such issues within the Party, it was largely confined to the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF). This group, consisting mainly of middle-class intellectuals and overseas students, had links with the labour movement but was sealed off from rank-and-file concerns (for reasons that will become apparent). It was the MCF that first raised issues within the Labour Party of racial discrimination. Racism was viewed as the proper concern of those involved with colonial affairs; it was something external, not germane, to the mainstream of the labour movement.[4] Thus, when black workers began to arrive here in some numbers in the 1950s, there was no progressive, anti-racist political/ideological framework which would have enabled the working class to 'make sense' of a black presence in Britain. Before the working class could fashion a response from within its collective traditions and experiences of poverty and hardship, its reformist leadership had structured such a response around 'colour' as a 'problem'.

The Labour government and Commonwealth immigration 1945-51

The major factor determining the 1945-51 Labour government's attitude towards Commonwealth immigration was the massive labour shortage following the end of the war. The Cabinet Manpower Working Party estimated it to be 940,000 in June 1946; by the end of 1946, it was estimated to be 1,346,000.[5] A number of means of reducing the deficit were discussed: appeals to increase output; appeals to older

workers to remain in, or to return to, industry; and appeals to women to remain in industry (to which end the government considered removing barriers to the employment of married women, providing creches, flexible hours and part-time working). Initially, the use of foreign labour as a means of meeting the shortage was perceived by the Labour government as a sensitive issue. The Cabinet Foreign Labour Committee observed, 'The question of utilising foreign labour obviously raises many delicate social and political issues and these would have to be considered carefully.'[6]

Immediately after the war, the government tapped a number of sources of surplus labour, including ex-POW's, Polish ex-servicemen and eventually, in 1947, the European Voluntary Workers (EVM) scheme. However, reservations were already being expressed about the use of foreign labour, and these focused on four issues. Firstly, there was the question of directing such labour to those areas of the economy suffering most acutely from labour shortages. Hence, in February 1947, the Ministry of Labour suggested that 'suitable bodies of displaced persons' be held as pools of labour in dispersal camps and distributed without delay to particular jobs as vacancies arose.[7] Secondly, and seen as a crucial element in control, was the right to deport. The government's dilemma was illustrated clearly with the use of ex-POWs as reserve labour. In 1946 the Cabinet, after urging the need to increase POW labour, concluded by arguing that consideration 'may also have to be given to the use of foreign labour'.[8]

Thirdly, there was a strong preference for white European workers. The reasons for this are not entirely clear: partly, they reflected beliefs about the suitability of white workers or the sorts of jobs demanding labour; partly, they reflected ethnocentric and sometimes racialist assumptions about the alleged similarities of 'white' cultures and the difficulties of assimilating cultures other than those. In 1946 the Home Secretary, J. Chuter-Ede, commented to a meeting of the Cabinet Foreign Labour Committee that 'he would be much happier if the intake could be limited to entrants from the Western Countries, whose traditions and social background were more nearly equal to our own and in whose case it would be possible to apply the sanction of deportation'.[9]

Fourthly, there was the opposition to the employment of foreign workers raised by the trades unions. Aneurin Bevan had reported to the Cabinet in 1946 that unions objected to the employment of Italian labour in foundries on the grounds that they were unconvinced of its necessity. The National Union of Miners had expressed similar objections about the employment of Polish workers in the mines. Urging an immediate meeting with the unions, Bevan argued that there were no grounds for fearing that the employment of such foreign workers might lead to unemployment amongst the indigenous workforce

because the latter's position was adequately safeguarded by the conditions imposed on the entry of foreign labour, the principal one being that they would be returned when no longer needed.[10] The unions, though, continued to object.

Despite this concern, the need for labour proved so great that in 1946 the Cabinet set up a Foreign Labour Committee, whose terms of reference instructed it 'To examine, in the light of the existing manpower shortage, the possibility of making increased use of foreign labour, particularly in essential industries which are now finding special difficulty in recruiting labour'.[11] Within three months it was arguing that no emphasis should be placed on the political background of particular national groups who were suitable for work.

The discussion surrounding the employment of foreign labour constituted a formal attempt to construct a policy to overcome an acute labour shortage. Discussion about black immigration took place in an altogether different context, partly because there had been black communities in Britain since the sixteenth century; partly because they were not aliens, but British subjects and therefore able freely to enter the UK; and partly because of the resonance of their political and ideological definition as black colonial subjects in the period of Britain's transition from Empire to Commonwealth.

Thousands of Caribbeans came to Britain during the war, either as volunteers in the armed services or as technicians for Britain's war industry. A few of these remained; the rest returned home. They took with them images and experiences of Britain that were not unfavourable. These, together with poor employment prospects in the Caribbean, provided the impetus for what seems to have been an independent initiative by a number of Jamaicans to return to Britain early in 1948 aboard the *Empire Windrush*.

The government appears to have been entirely ignorant of this development. On 8 June 1948 Tom Driberg asked Geoffrey Isaacs, the Minister of Labour, whether he was aware that 'some hundreds of West Indians, many of them ex-Service men skilled in various trades, are now on their way to this country in search of work.' Isaacs replied that he was and that the men would be met and directed to local employment exchanges. He had, though, 'no knowledge of their qualifications or capacities, and can give no assurance that they can be found suitable work'. He went on to add, 'I hope no encouragement will be given to others to follow their example'.[12] Driberg then enquired whether the government would make special arrangements to deal with the men who were 'British citizens in a strange land'. Isaacs flatly rejected this and pointed out, 'If they suffer any inconvenience, the blame will be on those who sent them and not on those who receive them'. When questioned by Oliver Stanley about who was responsible for 'this extraordinary action', Isaacs confessed that he did not know.[13]

The government's diffidence, and desire to distance itself publicly from the issue of 'coloured immigration', was evident in several further parliamentary exchanges. Referring again to the imminent arrival of the *Windrush,* Driberg asked about arrangements for its passengers. Once more, the reply was that there were none. Isaacs complained that there were difficulties in transferring 'our own people' about the country and finding them accommodation. He was then asked about colour prejudice in the unions:

> I can assure the House that there is no colour prejudice at all with regard to their employment. The great difficulty is in getting these people into private billets. If our people will not take them, we are up against a real difficulty.

Earlier he had remarked that, 'Private billeting raises a matter of very great social consequence and embarrasses us very greatly indeed in placing these men'.[14]

On the 16 June, Oliver Stanley asked Creech-Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether the *Windrush* passengers had been 'carefully vetted before coming over here and their capabilities ascertained,' since otherwise 'the experiment would be a complete failure'. If such migration was going to continue, he went on, did the government intend setting up some organisation 'for the West Indians to ascertain beforehand if they are likely to be suitable for employment over here'. Assuring him that the government was very mindful of the point made, Creech-Jones replied that whilst recognising the need for some vetting, 'obviously we cannot interfere with the movement of British subjects'. After all, he added 'It is very unlikely that a similar event to this will occur again in the West Indies'.[15]

Two important considerations emerge from this public, parliamentary response to early Caribbean migration.[16] First, from the point of view of capital, Commonwealth workers were cheaper than aliens precisely because they were British citizens. Since they had come here 'individually and on their own initiative',[17] there was no need to provide any welfare or housing facilities. To do so, as government spokespersons self-righteously pointed out, would be to discriminate against the indigenous population. Beyond directing them to the local employment exchanges, nothing further need be done. Secondly, no provision was made, nor lead given, not because of complacency or inadvertence but because there was no intention to do so from the beginning. The arrival of the *Windrush* was fortuitous; but by the time of its arrival discussion was already under way behind the scenes about the use of black labour.

Correspondence between two prominent civil servants in March 1948 indicates that consideration was being given to a proposal by the Colonial Office that 'surplus colonial manpower' be used to meet the

UK's labour shortage. Sir Harold Wiles, in a letter to M.M. Bevan on 8 March 1948, suggested that a distinction needed to be made between types of labour: temporary importation and permanent importation of people from abroad with a view to their ultimate assimilation:

> Unlike ex-prisoners of war or other aliens, I assume there could be no authority for deporting coloured British subjects if they felt they wished to stay here and take their chance. If there were any assurance that these people could in fact be sent away when they had served their purpose, this proposition might be less unacceptable.

Even at this stage, the debate surrounding the use of black Commonwealth labour is structured around the notion of 'colour' as a 'problem'. As Sir Harold went on to say,:

> Whatever may be the policy about British citizenship, I do not think any scheme for the importation of coloured colonials for permanent settlement should be embarked upon without full understanding that this means that a coloured element will be brought in for permanent absorption into our own population.

On the other hand,

> With regard to the possible introduction of surplus workers from Malta and Cyprus the same difficulties do not arise and I should hope that any scheme for these two countries could well be worked in with our EVW arrangements without undue hostility from the trade unions.[18]

At a later point in this correspondence, another civil servant, M. Veysey, made a similar point equally explicitly:

> We must, I feel sure, rule out any question of a concerted plan to bring West Indian coloured workers here both for the reasons you give and for those which are pretty fully set out in the memorandum opposite. Their suitability for the kinds of employment for which we are importing foreign labour is open to the greatest possible doubt, but I think there is no possible doubt as to their unacceptability to trade unions. As regards Maltese, Cypriots or Gibraltarians, I am by no means sure that a scheme for bringing them here would be free of trade union difficulties or that we should find these Mediterranean people anything like as suitable for the kinds of employment we want to man up as the North Europeans we have been recruiting. Probably we should have to try and fit them into a variety of jobs of less importance.[19]

The remaining themes in this debate – the cheapness of Commonwealth labour always contrasted with its putative social and political cost, and the intense reluctance to encompass black workers

and the welfare and accommodation difficulties likely to accompany their arrival, within the provision of the welfare state – are unmistakably evident in Bevan's reply to Veysey of 10 August 1948:

> If colonial subjects come here on their own responsibility and initiative we do all we can to fit them into useful jobs, but they cannot complain if it is not all plain sailing. If, however, they are brought over under some organised scheme we have to accept responsibility not only for finding them work but for accommodating them and keeping them until they can be put into employment, for their general welfare and presumably for getting them home if they prove unsuitable or don't settle down or are willing to go back.
>
> I cannot help feeling that it all boils down to a question of whether it is politically desirable that we should make a gesture by offering employment at some expense to this country.[20]

This correspondence took place against a background of 'racial' incidents. In July 1948 a fight outside an Indian restaurant in Liverpool led to a 'race riot' that lasted two nights and resulted in scores of arrests. The following summer, in 1949, there was a series of fights between blacks and whites in Deptford which culminated in the siege of a black men's hostel by a white mob.[21] Frustrated by the police cordon around the place, the mob finally attacked the police. In Birmingham in August of the same year, Jamaican workers were attacked at the National Service Hostel, Causeway Green, by Polish workers who, 'alleged to have been armed with sticks, stones, razors and chairs, surrounded the Jamaican quarters and broke in, smashing windows, breaking up furniture and attacking the Jamaicans'. The following day, the *Birmingham Evening Mail* reported, all was 'very quiet' and 'the Jamaicans involved in Monday's disturbances were moving out slowly. It is expected that all 65 of the men will have left soon ... The Poles, who had been affected in the disturbance with the Jamaicans, gave an assurance to the police last night that they would cause no further trouble'.[22]

These sorts of incidents seemed to strengthen the view of some political commentators that black immigration inevitably brought 'difficulties'. The *Spectator* commented that 'there are bound to be difficulties – possibly with the trade unions, possibly with housewives prejudiced against West Indian lodgers'. But, it went on to add:

> They can probably be surmounted so far as the 500 are concerned [the *Empire Windrush* passengers]. If the 500 became 5,000 it would be a very different matter. The remedy, of course, lies in improving the shocking conditions at the other end. Meanwhile no one can prevent British citizens from travelling here at their own charges and staying here if they so desire.[23]

Difficulties were thus evident and discussed, but, in view of the pressing need for labour, were ignored by the Labour government as a political issue (although confidentially at Cabinet and senior civil service levels, they were used as an argument for immigration control). A decade later, in changed economic circumstances, politicians of both parties would be far less reticent to use 'trouble on the streets' in Nottingham, Notting Hill and other places to politicise the 'race issue' and justify immigration control.

Our point can be made more sharply by considering the debate surrounding the 1948 Nationality Bill, which did not appear to reflect the feelings and anxieties that found expression in the sorts of 'racial' incident outlined above. Here the participants took an altogether more elevated view of the British Empire, generally subscribing to the idea of the 'Mother of Parliaments' gently chiding her young flock along the thorny path to 'democracy' and 'self-government'. This was Herbert Morrison's 'jolly old Empire'. Consequently, discussion was influenced by wider concerns of economic alliances and interests, sharpened by the ending of Marshall aid. The major point of division between the Labour and Tory parties, in fact, centred around the Act's proposed abolition of British subjecthood status, which was to be replaced by a 'citizenship of the UK and Colonies'. The Tories, for whom Enoch Powell was a prominent speaker, objected to the proposal on the grounds that the 'essential loyalties of the Empire may be jeopardised without need'.[24]

Privately, however, the Labour government sufficiently sympathised with the view held by some civil servants, outlined earlier, that 'colour' was a 'problem', to arrange in June 1950 for 'a review to be made of the further means which might be adopted to check the immigration into this country of coloured people from the British Colonial Territories'.[25] The Committee began by considering 'the extent of the problems presented by the immigration into this country of coloured people from British Colonial Territories'. The 'taken-for-granted' nature of these 'problems' was already obvious, and the review adressed itself to the familiar litany of unemployment, illegal immigrants and 'welfare scroungers'. Having noted that, since 1945, 'at least 5,000 coloured immigrants from the Colonies' had arrived in the UK, the Committee quickly focused on the 'illegal' and 'threatening' aspects of the migration. 'Over the past 4 years', it warned,

> the stowaways have arrived – and continue to arrive – at the rate of about 400 a year. It is not known how many have come as seafarers, but at present about 500 coloured men who are unemployed call themselves 'seamen'; there is no doubt that in the past many 'one-trip seamen' have signed on in overseas ports for discharge in the United Kingdom in the vain hope of obtaining seafaring employment here.

No evidence whatsoever was offered in support of these speculations; their minatory effect, however, was undeniable and was reinforced in the same paragraph by the assertion: 'It is estimated [by whom? and how?] that since 1945 about 2,000 migrant workers have arrived from the West Indies, many of them in large parties travelling in troopships at cheap rates'. The overtones of invasion are unmistakable, and are sustained even when the Committee is forced to state that 'since 1949 there have been no large parties, but there is reason to believe that the total number of workers arriving has not fallen'. In concluding its opening section, the Review observed, 'Unemployment and destitution among the coloured people of all types are not so widespread as to have any noticeable effect on our economy'.

The Review then considered three possible methods of restricting the entry of black Commonwealth workers. The first of these, the application of aliens' control of British subjects from 'overseas', they rejected on the grounds that, 'If the control were applied to persons from the Colonies and the Independent Commonwealth countries, it would be difficult to justify the exemption of persons from the Irish Republic'. There were 30,000-40,000 persons coming to the UK each year from the Irish Republic and the extension of aliens' control to them would involve considerable administrative inconvenience and would, besides, 'be particularly unrewarding as there would be few, if any, Irish workers whom we should wish to exclude'.

The second approach was legislation to deport British subjects. Here the Committee returned to familiar themes.

> The main problem in relation to the immigration of British subjects from Colonial territories arises because they are tempted to come to the United Kingdom by better prospects of employment and in the knowledge that if they fail to find work they will be supported by the social services at a higher standard of living than many of them had in the Colonies.

A way round this, the Review noted, would be to leave the entry of British subjects into the UK unrestricted, but empower the Home Secretary to deport any overseas British subject who had been resident in the UK for not more than two years (or perhaps a longer period) and who had applied for National Assistance, been convicted of a serious offence, or attempted to create industrial unrest. This introduces a distinction, to be embodied in later immigration control legislation, between different categories of British subjects. Those from 'overseas' would, under the above scheme, have not been allowed to claim National Assistance or to defend their living standards or civil rights. British overseas citizens, furthermore, would be punished twice for any criminal offence – once by conviction and then by deportation. A minor difficulty with this procedure lay in deciding where to deport a citizen:

> In the case of independent Commonwealth countries this should not give rise to serious difficulties since it should be established that the person was a citizen of the country concerned. But Colonials are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, and it would be necessary to devise some means of determining to which Colony a particular person belonged; this would probably not be beyond solution in most cases.

The third possibility considered by the Review was 'to confine any measures taken to British subjects who came to the United Kingdom as stowaways'. This would deal with only part of the problem, 'but, nevertheless, a considerable improvement might be effected if powers were taken to deal with this particularly difficult class of person'. The 'stowaway' appears to have been the 1950 version of the 'illegal immigrant', prepared to use any, and all, possible means to gain entry to the UK. Thus, the Review urged that, in the case of the above measures being implemented, 'Corresponding powers would be necessary with regard to stowaways in aircraft'.

All three proposals, however, as the Committee observed, raised some embarrassing issues of policy. First, it was argued, 'The United Kingdom has a special status as the mother country, and freedom to enter and remain in the United Kingdom at will is one of the main practical benefits enjoyed by British subjects, as such'. The first two of the above proposals, certainly, would have infringed this benefit, although the Committee noted in justification, 'All colonies and independent Commonwealth countries ... impose restrictions on the entry into their territory of British subjects ...' The exception to this was India and Pakistan, migrants from which were to be a major target for restriction. Secondly, all three proposals presented the government with the serious dilemma of, on the one hand, keeping an 'open door' to 'Citizens of the UK and Colonies' and, on the other, of restricting the entry of black 'Citizens of the UK and Colonies'. The Committee realised that it would be difficult to justify restrictions on persons 'who are Citizens of the UK and Colonies, if no comparable restrictions were imposed on persons who are citizens of other Commonwealth countries, or even, as in the case of citizens of the Irish Republic, are citizens of a country outside the Commonwealth'.

The real point, then, was that 'Any solution depending on an apparent or concealed colour test would be so invidious as to make it impossible for adoption'. Having thus ruled out a colour bar, the Review continued helplessly, 'Nevertheless, the use of any powers taken to restrict the free entry of British subjects to this country would, as a general rule, be more or less confined to coloured persons'. Clearly overwhelmed by the difficulties of resolving this dilemma, the Review decided 'in favour of limiting any powers taken to the exclusion of

specific and well-defined categories of persons, such as those who become a charge on public funds or stowaways, whose continued presence here is clearly open to objection. Even so, coloured persons would be mainly concerned, and this might possibly give rise to resentment in India, Pakistan and Ceylon and in the more advanced Colonial territories'.

In conclusion, the Review felt that, 'In view of the comparatively small scale of immigration into this country of coloured people from British Colonial territories and the important and controversial issues of policy involved in legislation to control it, we consider that no such legislation should at present be introduced.' The Committee was careful not to rule out the possibility of future legislation, the purpose of which was unequivocal:

> We are aware, however, that, in the long term, social standards in the Colonies lower than those in the United Kingdom may well result in considerable migration to this country, and that the social services in the UK, particularly the rights of which any destitute person can avail himself under the National Assistance Act, must inevitably act as a considerable attraction. We recognise that a very large increase in such migration in the future might produce a situation in the UK rendering legislation for its control essential, despite the very strong opposing considerations which we have mentioned.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Review reassuringly concluded, 'has undertaken to advise his colleagues if, at any time there are indications of any large scale increase above the present scale of immigration from the Colonies'.

The beginnings of 'indigenous racism'

Up to the 1950s, 'race and immigration' had been protected from the public gaze. The secret Cabinet document discussed above gave a clear indication of the Labour government's views, and its feeling that the time was not opportune for pursuing the matter further. It is important to recognise that this was a question of expediency, rather than principle; control of black 'Commonwealth' immigration was not rejected, but laid aside until it was deemed politically appropriate.

This helps to explain why the Labour Party during much of the 1950s failed to respond to growing local murmurings on the issue. For example, in the Midlands, the local press had already begun to reinforce certain hostile images and stereotypes. The black communities were portrayed as hotbeds of vice, promiscuity and drug-taking which threatened the purity of white women. The *Birmingham Evening Mail* carried a report headed 'Police Found Girls With Coloured Men' that gave an account of late-night drinking and dancing parties organised by

'coloured men' at which white girls were present:

> Two sisters, 16 and 15, who were found by the police with coloured men at the house at 2.30 a.m., were ordered to be placed under supervision for two years. They were brought before the court by police on the grounds that they were exposed to moral danger and in need of care and protection. Chief Inspector Critchley described it as a disgusting case, 'particularly when one compared the behaviour of these girls with our own accepted standards of morals'.[26]

Another dominant theme was housing, where black people were described simultaneously as penniless aliens overburdening the housing market and crowding into confined accommodation and as greedy and corrupt landlords (sometimes with an exotic penchant for the violent settlement of disputes):

> 'City J.P. Warns Pakistanis: Binds Them Over For Assault'
> A Pakistani landlord and two of his fellow countrymen were found guilty at Birmingham today of assaulting white tenants they were trying to force out of a lodging house.[27]

The Pakistanis allegedly assaulted a white tenant in a lodging house owned by one of them. Remarks one of the defendants was alleged to have said to the complainant were quoted in full: 'Your life is no good after today. After next Wednesday you life no good. Me dangerous with knife. Countrymen very dangerous and me bring plenty.' Yet at a meeting at West Bromwich Town Hall in October 1955, called to form an Indian Welfare Council, Labour Alderman H.E. Lane referred to 'instances of as many as 60 Indians living in one house in Wolverhampton and being charged 22/- per week each for a bed.'[28]

This signifying of themes around 'colour' was accompanied by local political initiatives. In January 1956, Conservative Councillor Collett demanded that Birmingham City Council set up a committee to investigate and control the 'influx of Coloured immigrants'. The Labour group in the Council responded to this by having 'discussions with the government on the problems caused by uncontrolled immigrants'. On their return to Birmingham, they stated that they subscribed to the view 'that there should be free movement of peoples. To alter this policy would be disastrous to our reputation.'[29] 'Race' remained taboo at the formal political level.*

*Further illustration is provided by the experience of Sheila Wright, a member of the Birmingham district Labour Party from 1952 and MP for Handsworth from 1979 to 1983. She felt that there was little attempt to educate Party members and constituents on the question of racism. When she fought elections in Gravelly Hill in 1962 and Handsworth in 1964, she wished to include a 'fairly aggressive' question about racialism. The response from her Party colleagues was 'We agree with you but you make it worse by bringing it into the open.' She recalled that the Labour Party were 'sick with fright about the effect on the electorate.'[30]

By the end of the 1950s the recession in the car industry was becoming more severe and the hostile images of blacks as undesirable began to coalesce around the issue of unemployment. There was a shift from the presentation of blacks as a 'moral danger' (but where whites could remain 'civilised' and 'paternalistic') to the presentation of their putative threat to the material security of whites.* This marked the transition from the colonial legacy of the 'uncivilised', inferior 'races' to the 'indigenous racism' noted by Stuart Hall.[31]

Colonialism depended crucially on notions of racial inferiority. These provided a wealth of images about 'blackness' and black people which sustained Britain's colonial domination. These were absorbed and re-worked throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, so that when Britain's colonial position came to be challenged, they formed crucial 'filters' through which anti-colonial movements were perceived. By the mid-twentieth century, such images were no longer the product of a buoyant and successful imperialism, but one threatened and harried by its victims. Blacks were still seen as uncivilised and incapable of self-government, but largely gone was the 'liberal paternalism' of the nineteenth century with its overtones of the 'civilising mission'. In its place remained the conviction that black peoples were backward and violent and unable to grasp the basic principles of self-government so selflessly brought to them by the British. Such images provided the dominant means of interpreting colonial independence.

What we began to see during the 1950s is the further re-working of these notions, in which the cruder, historically specific ideas of inferiority and lack of civilisation are replaced by feelings of cultural difference, of 'Britishness', of 'whiteness', embodied in certain political and cultural traditions. White colonial and cultural supremacy was being threatened 'on the streets' in Britain as well as in former colonies. In response, the black person was defined as 'alien', a threat to 'Britishness', a person with no right to be here. It was the perception that black people threatened 'British culture' rather than simply British power overseas, that 'they' could take 'our' jobs and live in 'our' streets, that provided the impetus for 'indigenous racism' and its nascent obsession, towards the end of the 1950s, with the 'numbers game'.

This shift had its origins in the economic and political conditions that prevailed in post-war Britain. A rapid and marked rise in the standard of living of much of the working class was effected through a militant trade unionism based on a powerful shop stewards' movement. An expanding capitalism was able to concede to demands for higher

*It must be emphasised that this was a shift of imagery not a departure. The 'moral danger', 'cultural threat' theme is returned to in the 1970s (recognisably drawn from these older images, but distinct from them) as a crucial element in the 'common sense' of the 'new racism'.

wages without recourse to political intervention at the level of the state. It seemed that strength at the workplace was all the organised working class required to continue to improve its living standards indefinitely. The links between political organisation and rank-and-file activity became more attenuated. Politics became an irrelevant arena, confined to parliament and left to Labour politicians, whose own reformism accelerated working-class disinterest. A black presence in Britain was, therefore, much more likely to be interpreted in the context of economic competition rather than political solidarity – as rivals for jobs, housing and other welfare benefits, rather than as workers experiencing similar forms of class oppression.

The consequences of this for the working class were twofold. First, because increased wages and welfare statism did not threaten the interests of capital (indeed, these interests benefited in all sorts of ways from these developments), and were therefore conceded on the strength of shop-floor muscle, they gave an illusion of freedom and working-class advance. It deepened the division between the 'economic' and the 'political' fundamental to the elitist tradition of British labourism. In so doing, however, it undermined the ability of the working class to resist the attacks on the welfare state and its standards of living in the 1960s and 1970s, when economic crisis sharply curtailed capital's room for manoeuvre. The limits of trade union economism were reached but not extended by a recognition of the need to confront capitalism politically. With only the reformist traditions of labourism to draw upon, working-class responses were circumscribed; by the 1960s even the current of Bevanism had been extinguished. Thus, the space was created within which racist and nationalist ideas of the imperial epoch could be re-worked, ideas given a cutting edge by Britain's declining international prestige and the losses inflicted by desperate military rearguards in Aden, Cyprus, Kenya and Suez.

Second, there was the erosion of traditional working-class communities accompanying post-war expansion. This meant not only a physical displacement and relocation in New Towns and overspill housing estates, but also the displacement of jobs, a movement away from traditional manual work, the dirty, dangerous occupations with unsocial hours and low pay, into more congenial, higher status work. (A shift which left behind a stratum of jobs to be filled by black workers in the 1950s.) These social developments did not affect all sections of the working class. The elderly, the less skilled, the less adaptable were left behind, remnants of former working-class communities. They were the poor and the unorganised, trapped in the decaying 'inner-city' areas of declining capital investment. These were, to use Coates' term, the 'forgotten Englishmen', invisible to politicians, the intelligentsia and large sections of the labour movement. It was to these invisible communities that the first post-war black

migrants were driven, to disappear from political view in much the same way as their powerless, white working-class neighbours. The national silence on the 'race issue' in the 1950s was both furthered and reinforced by this invisibility. To the communities themselves, however, 'race' was a real issue.

For the white working class in the inner-city areas, a black presence brought a sharp awareness that things had changed, an awareness of the loss of community and their own sense of failure, of being left behind in the competitive struggle to live in the same streets as the people over whom 'they' had once ruled. Seabrook captures the essence of this with his argument that the improvements which welfare capitalism has bestowed on the working class have atomised traditional communal values structured around the experiences of class, stripping it of kinship ties and the social and political relations born out of the collective experience of poverty and deprivation.[32] Racism becomes a means of falsely reconstituting this sense of communal loss. It gives a hostile, meaningless world shape and form: an external threat replaces tangible, shared experience as the constituent of community. 'Once the market place renders redundant the determinants of family and kin, neighbourhood and work, there is nothing left but the appalling nudity of one's whiteness.'[33] A further consequence of this is that the violence and loneliness which many suffer in the inner cities is seen to have its causes in other people rather than social and political changes within British capitalism. It is not inequality, or lack of power, that is the problem, but other people – the rapists, the 'muggers', the 'terrorists', the young and, of course, the 'coloureds'.

Initially, these developments were confined largely to those inner-city areas where black people settled. There were racist incidents, which received fairly extensive coverage in the local papers, along with the reworking and elaboration of racist images from the colonial past, although these do not appear to be reflected in political debates within or between political parties, either at the local or national level. The political necessity for racialist politics was absent. Politicians could publicly indulge their moral distaste for racial prejudice on the basis of economic expansion, whilst privately wishing that the rights of black Commonwealth workers could be handily revoked. Until the end of the 1950s, when the constellation of political forces began to alter as a result of economic depression, politicians remained quiescent about 'race'. However, the continuity of racialist attitudes within the ruling class influenced the nature of their response when, in 1958, some sections of the white working class demonstrated their dislike of black workers with assaults and harassment on the streets of Notting Hill, Nottingham and Dudley.

'Race' had become a national issue, and racialism was again to be a key means of interpreting the class inequalities of English capitalism:

just as Ben Tillett had joined Tory MPs on the platform of 'anti-alien' meetings in the 1890s, so dockers and meat porters would rally in support of Enoch Powell in the 1960s. Several factors underlay this change. On an economic level, the usefulness of black migrant labour to British capitalism diminished. Compared to the 1940s, there had been a dramatic fall in demand for a 'reserve army of labour' (we are not suggesting here a 'general' fall, since the uneven development of capitalism meant that certain sections of capital would remain heavily dependent on the use of black labour, but these were not the most powerful sections). The relocation of the indigenous white workforce was slowing down, leaving fewer jobs at 'the bottom', which were the sorts of jobs for which black workers were recruited, and shifts in capital investment from recession-prone, labour-intensive industries to more safely-profitable, capital-intensive ones combined seriously to deplete the sorts of work that relied on black labour. Both these developments were influenced by the onset of recession towards the end of the 1950s. On a political level, these trends were accelerated by the growing organisation and militancy of black workers themselves. In the workplace, they showed clearly that they were not prepared to accept low wages or to scab, and more than this, they resisted racial abuse and discrimination on the shopfloor. Equally significant was the general struggle of black communities against racial discrimination in the wider society. At first the fight against racism was taken up through traditional cultural and welfare associations and groups, and in this way black self-organisation and self-reliance grew, developing into a resistance that came to embrace 'both shop floor and community, Asians and Afro-Caribbeans, sometimes in different areas of struggle, sometimes together'.[34]

Black workers thus offered the labour movement the opportunity to break the reformist distinction between the 'political' and the 'economic' precisely because, as a 'racialised' fraction of the working class, they could not improve their access to better jobs and housing through purely economistic action at the level of the shop floor. Political struggle was an essential element of any advance. Black workers, of course, realised this and, through their willingness to involve themselves in the labour movement on the basis of a rich experience of national liberation and labour struggles in their countries of origin, were in the vanguard of the working class. The Labour Party, however, steeped in traditions of colonialism and its accompanying racism, saw only 'problems' caused by the importation of numbers of 'uncivilised', culturally 'backward' 'coloured Colonials'. This left it little to draw upon to develop anti-racist responses to the clamour for immigration control, and encouraged that disillusionment that, by the end of the 1950s, black workers increasingly felt towards it.

Contrary to the commonly held view, then, 'race' as a 'problem' had

already been essentially structured by 1951. This was as apparent with the Labour Party as with the Conservatives. The Labour Party, in fact, was not merely a passive reactor to Conservative initiatives, but undertook policies and propounded ideas which significantly influenced the creation of a racist Britain.

References

1 T. Nairn, *The Break Up of Britain* 2nd edition (London, 1981). This and the following two paragraphs, draw heavily on Nairn's analysis.
2 *Ibid.*, p.44.
3 See, for example, William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: the United States and the decolonisation of the British Empire'* (Oxford, 1977).
4 R. Hinden, *Empire and After; a study of British imperial attitudes* (London, 1949), and Strachey *The End of the Empire* (London, 1959), are indicative of 'left' Labour Party attitudes.
5 Cabinet Man-Power Working Party Memo, 30 November 1945, CAB 134/510.
6 Cabinet Foreign Labour Committee Minutes (CFLC), CAB 134/301.
7 CFLC, 14 February 1947, CAB 134/301.
8 Cabinet Man-Power Committee Report, 31 January 1946, CAB.
9 CFLC, 14 March 1946, CAB 134/301.
10 CFLC, 23 May 1946, CAB 134/301.
11 CFLC, 14 February 1947, CAB 134/301.
12 *Hansard*, 8 June 1948, (451) 1851-3.
13 *Ibid.*
14 *Hansard*, 15 June 1948, (452) 224-6.
15 *Hansard*, 16 June 1948, (452) 421-2.
16 The numbers from the Caribbean during this period were given in the House of Commons in November 1948: December 1947-150; June 1948-500; October 1948-180. All came privately, at their own expense, and over half had friends in the UK.
17 *Hansard*, 24 June 1948, (451) 1555-6.
18 Letter from M.A. Wiles to M.M. Bevan (8 March 1948).
19 Letter from M. Veysey to Sir H. Wiles (undated).
20 Letter from M.M. Bevan to M. Veysey (10 August 1948).
21 See A. Richmond, *Colour Prejudice in Britain* (London, 1954), and R. Glass, *The Newcomers* (London, 1960).
22 *Birmingham Evening Mail* (9 August and 10 August 1949).
23 *Spectator* (25 June 1948).
24 Quoted in *The Times* (22 June 1948).
25 Secret Cabinet document, 'Immigration of British Subjects Into the United Kingdom', CAB 129/44.
26 *Birmingham Evening Mail* (6 March 1956).
27 *Birmingham Evening Mail* (1 March 1956).
28 Quoted in P. Foot, *Immigration and Race in British Politics* (London, 1965).
29 *Birmingham Evening Mail* (11 January 1956).
30 Personal interview with Sheila Wright (February 1983).
31 See S. Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis* (London, 1978), and S. Hall, 'Racism and reaction', in *Five Views of Multi-Racial Britain* (London, 1978).
32 J. Seabrook, *What Went Wrong: the working class and the ideals of the labour movement* (1978), and *Working-class Childhood: an oral history* (1982).
33 J. Seabrook (1978), op. cit., p. 95.
34 A. Sivanandan, 'From resistance to rebellion: Asian and Afro-Caribbean struggles in Britain', *Race & Class* (Vol. XXIII, Nos. 2/3, 1981/82).

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN

Washington autopsies of the Iranian Revolution: a review article*

Revolutions are, to borrow Saint-Just's simile, like volcanic explosions. They rarely occur, but when they do they explode suddenly – often unexpectedly – releasing vast amounts of hidden energy and altering permanently not only the shape of the mountain itself but also that of the surrounding countryside. What is more, their origins are inevitably far-reaching in both time and place – rooted in the distant past as well as in the bowels of the earth. The Iranian Revolution of 1977-9 is no exception. It erupted suddenly and for most observers unexpectedly, released years of pent-up mass anger, and in a brief but dramatic period transformed not only the top layers of its own society but also the whole political landscape of the surrounding region. Even more important, the origins of the Iranian Revolution were deep-seated, extending back into the distant past and far into the lowest layers of society.

In the short period since the fall of the Shah, over twenty books have appeared in English alone dealing with various aspects of the Iranian Revolution. Many more are on the way. Instead of discussing them all, I have chosen to review three well-publicised books written by

---

Ervand Abrahamian teaches history at Baruch College in the City University of New York and is the author of *Iran: between two revolutions* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982).

* William Sullivan, *Mission to Iran* (New York, Norton & Co, 1981); John Stemple, *Inside the Iranian Revolution* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1981); and Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, *Debacle: the American failure in Iran* (New York, Vintage Books, 1982).

Race & Class, XXV, 3 (1984)

members of the US foreign-policy establishment. William Sullivan, the author of *Mission to Iran*, was the US ambassador in Tehran during the critical period from June 1977 until April 1979. Before his assignment to Iran, Sullivan had headed the US embassies in Laos and the Philippines and enjoyed the reputation of knowing how to 'deal with authoritarian governments and with leaders who were forceful personalities'. John Stemple, the author of *Inside the Iranian Revolution*, is a career diplomat who led the political section of the American embassy in Iran during the last stages of the revolution. As the chief political officer, Stemple had the onerous responsibility of gathering information on political leaders, establishing contact with opposition groups, monitoring day-to-day events and, most important of all, interpreting them for the State Department back in Washington. Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, the co-authors of *Debacle: the American failure in Iran*, are also experienced foreign-policy analysts: the former is an editor of *Washington Quarterly*, the pro-Republican journal specialising in international affairs; the latter is a retired State Department analyst who used to specialise in the Middle East but now monitors the Far East from the well-known Sino-Soviet Institute at George Washington University. Never before have so many foreign-policy experts in Washington, DC turned their attention to Iran.

These three books reveal much about the mentality of the Washington foreign-policy establishment. They show – not surprisingly – that Washington was, and still is, obsessed with the dual question: Could the US have prevented the Iranian Revolution and can the US avoid the occurrence of such revolutions in other parts of the Third World? As Ledeen and Lewis admit, they wrote their book with the 'political purpose' of illustrating why American interests are in grave danger throughout the world. They end their book with the forthright declaration that if America learns from the Iranian experience – and presumably from their book – it will acquire 'the clarity of purpose and the resolution of mind and heart to lead the Western democracies out of their current predicament'. Similarly, Stemple writes that the Iranian Revolution poses a serious question on 'how America should handle its foreign affairs in the next half-century' and that 'from a theoretical perspective the most serious question is whether the Iranian Revolution could have been prevented, or at the very least channelled in the direction of less radical and destructive change'. These are not just histories of the Iranian Revolution; they purport to be handbooks on how America can prevent other Third World revolutions.

These three books also show – this time, more surprisingly – that Washington was sharply divided on how to deal with the Iranian crisis. In fact, Ledeen and Lewis, both of whom are Republicans, wrote their book precisely to raise the rhetorical question: 'Who lost Iran?' According to them, there would have been no revolution in Iran if President

Carter had not undermined right-wing regimes with the issue of human rights; if he had not suffered from a 'Pinochet' hangover; and if he had unleashed Zbigniew Brzezinski, his National Security Advisor, who, against the recommendations of the State Department, wanted to 'save' Iran through a military coup d'etat. It should also be mentioned that Sullivan and Stemple have written their books partly to pre-empt Brzezinski's memoirs and to argue that Iran could have been saved if the Carter administration had accepted the State Department conclusion that the Shah was lost and had promptly initiated negotiations with the opposition. Sullivan describes how, on the day the revolutionary forces were mopping up the remnants of the army, he was busy herding his embassy staff into shelters when Brzezinski phoned from Washington to inquire if the military could stage a coup. Sullivan writes that he gave an unprintable answer and asked if it needed to be translated into Polish.

In bolstering his own position, Sullivan leaves the reader with the distinct impression that he knew from the very moment he arrived in Tehran in June 1977 that something was amiss in Iran and that the Shah's days were numbered. In actual fact, the US documents released later by the students occupying the embassy reveal that Sullivan's confidence in the Shah was not shaken until late November 1978 – by which time the point of no return had long passed. Diplomats in retirement seem to have as little respect for the truth as diplomats in active service.

These three books further reveal that their authors, like much of the foreign policy establishment, cannot understand revolutions in general and the Iranian Revolution in particular. All three books fail to understand that revolutions are not just crises in the elite, but upheavals throughout the society; that the origins of such upheavals are to be found not in this or that person, in this or that accident, but in the historical development and the structural flaws of the specific country; and that such major upheavals have not only short-term causes, which one could call the sparks, the triggers, and the precipitants, but more importantly long-term causes, which one could categorise as the historical and the structural factors. Confusing the short-term causes with the long-term causes, these three books are obsessed with such questions as could the revolution have been prevented if Khomeini had been kept in Iraq, if the CIA in the 1970s had been given a free rein, if less money had been spent on AWACs and more on riot-control equipment, if the Shah in 1978 had used the right combination of carrot and stick ...? Marx once described conspirators who were convinced that they could destroy regimes with the right combination of gunpowder, rumour and heroism as revolutionary alchemists. One can very well describe these authors as the modern version of counterrevolutionary alchemists.

The Revolution as a social movement

The quarter century after the 1953 coup provided the Pahlevi regime with a rare opportunity to create a stable and prosperous society. In these years, the opposition – particularly the nationalists and communists – was in complete disarray. The religious leaders, together with their bazaar constituencies, gave the Shah political assistance and, to some extent, ideological legitimacy. The military – modernised by the United States – armed the regime with institutional might. And the ever-increasing oil revenues, which totalled over $53 billion in these twenty-five years, provided the regime with assets to develop the economy, alleviate social misery and diminish class tensions.

Despite the opportunities, the Shah pursued a host of political, social and economic policies that undermined the regime's institutional props, broke its links with society and eventually antagonised almost every sector of the population. These policies created new class conflicts without diminishing the old ones; widened the gap between the comprador bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, between the rich and the poor, between the court elite and the country masses, between the commercial farmers and the landless peasantry; further antagonised the intelligentsia and the urban proletariat who had opposed the regime since the 1930s; gradually alienated the petty bourgeoisie and the bazaar clergy who in the 1950s had been willing to cooperate with the authorities; and, most important of all, brought into existence both a mass of impoverished peasants who had been promised land but had received nothing and an under-class of shanty-town poor who had flocked from the villages into the cities in search of non-existent jobs. In short, the regime created a classic revolutionary situation in which the ruling elite was not only isolated from the rest of society but also was attacked by almost every stratum of the population. The Pahlevi collapse was as rapid and thorough as could be.

The three books under review all see the revolution as a crisis among the elite and not as an upheaval originating among the masses; consequently, they tend to exaggerate the role of the short-term causes at the expense of the long-term fundamental causes. According to Ledeen and Lewis, the entire responsibility for the 'debacle' lies squarely on the shoulders of the American officials who discouraged the Shah from using strong-arm tactics to silence the opposition. Most Iranian specialists, however, argue convincingly that whenever the Shah tried such tactics – as in the massacre of Black Friday at Jaleh Square – the bloodshed further inflamed public opinion, undermined any moderates willing to negotiate with the regime, and thereby hastened the revolution. To suppress the opposition the Shah would have had to use violence on a massive scale – maybe on a more massive scale than that used by Pinochet in Chile. But to have done that successfully, the Shah needed a disciplined and ideologically committed professional

army – something he sorely lacked. For even in early 1978 the Shah found himself having to use officers to fire into crowds, since rank-and-file soldiers, most of whom were workers and peasants in uniform, were not expected to shoot into demonstrations that contained their own friends and relatives. Thus, strong-arm tactics did not prevent the revolution; they merely added another short-term cause to the unravelling of the revolution.

While Ledeen and Lewis trace the main cause of the revolution to liberals in Washington, Sullivan and Stemple find it in the character deficiencies of the Shah, especially his 'psychological' inability either to compromise or use decisive force. Sullivan writes that the regime's negotiations with the moderate opposition, particularly with old-time politicians such as Ali Amini, came to naught because the Shah was psychologically incapable of giving up his position as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and of permitting the prime minister to determine the military budget. Stemple argues that the Shah fell mainly because he was 'weak', 'authoritarian', 'vain', 'lethargic', 'insecure', 'fatalistic', 'delusionary' and 'incapable of understanding the situation'. Stemple also claims – in contradiction to all the medical evidence – that the small doses of cancer chemotherapy the Shah was having in 1978 were enough to cause psychological 'disorientation' and 'debilitation'.

In lamenting the presumed weaknesses both of the Shah and of Washington, all three books tend to exaggerate the organisational strength of the revolutionaries and the amount of external support they received. According to Ledeen and Lewis, Syria and Libya gave substantial help to Khomeini; the PLO trained 'thousands' of Iranian guerrillas; 'the infamous Haddad' of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 'masterminded many of the most violent acts of the revolution'; and the Soviet KGB 'regularly' advised the revolutionary leaders in Paris. According to Stemple, the opposition groups, especially the fundamentalist clergy, the marxist Fedayin, and the Islamic Mujahedin, carefully coordinated their activities in Iran after a secret meeting in Europe – this meeting must have been so secret that no one else has ever heard of it. Also according to Stemple, the Mujahedin controlled the bazaars, took charge of what remained of the army, ruled the streets with their armed guards and – this will be especially surprising to Khomeini – helped create the fundamentalist Islamic Republican Party that now rules Iran. In a somewhat different vein, Sullivan argues that the fundamentalist clergy had well-organised structures not only in the bazaars and seminaries but also in the thousands of villages scattered throughout Iran. Ironically, Sullivan frequently complains that the 'paranoid' Iranian mind tends to see the 'hidden' foreign hand behind every crisis, yet he himself insinuates that it was Soviet money that helped the Iranian Student Association

disrupt the Shah's state visit to Washington in November 1977. Thus the revolution was caused in part because the Shah and Washington were weak, and in part because the opposition was well organised and well supported by sinister foreign forces.

These so-called explanations not only ignore the revolution's fundamental causes, but they also grossly distort reality. For example, the theory that the Shah's personality was weak runs counter to everything the unpublished sources, especially the confidential diplomatic dispatches, reveal about his thirty-eight year reign. From 1941 to 1945, the Shah successfully fought off an impressive array of veteran politicians, senior civil servants and ambitious generals who were determined to seize control of the military and thereby reduce him to a nominal commander-in-chief of the armed forces, as the constitutional laws had originally envisaged. In 1946, he ordered – against the advice of his premier and the threats of Stalin – the army into Azerbaijan and Kurdistan to crush the Soviet-backed provincial administrations. In February 1949, he took advantage of an attempt on his life to declare martial law, to arrest almost all the respected opposition leaders who criticised him and, convening a Constituent Assembly, to strengthen his royal prerogatives. In November 1949, when he paid a state visit to Washington, he so impressed the State Department with his determination to get modern military hardware, including newly manufactured jet planes, that White House advisers warned the President of the United States of America not to contradict in any way the Shah's military expertise. From 1953 to 1963, he again fought off veteran politicians and generals eager to wrest control of the armed forces. In 1963, he acted with determination to shoot down thousands of unarmed demonstrators and to exile religious opponents, notably Khomeini. And in 1963-4, he shrewdly launched with much fanfare the so-called White Revolution, which had been originally designed by an agricultural minister whom the Shah intensely distrusted. Thus, the Shah had a long career which can be described as 'devious', 'manipulative' and, of course, 'ruthless', but not 'weak', 'indecisive' and 'feeble'.

In fact, throughout his long reign the Shah always acted with determination and vigour as long as he had full confidence in the armed forces – his main pillar of support. The only times he wavered – from 1950 to 1952 against Mossadeq and from 1977 to 1979 against Khomeini – were times when he saw defections within the army rank-and-file and was realistic enough to know that if he put too many strains on military discipline the whole military establishment would crumble. This became clear in November 1978 when Ardasher Zahedi – his ambassador in Washington and fellow-conspirator of the 1953 coup – returned to Tehran to wax eloquent about the beauty of another coup. The Shah warned Sullivan that 1978 was not 1953 and that Zahedi's

fifteen-year absence had completely cut him off from the Iranian reality. The Shah in 1978 was realistic enough to know that if he had tried another coup he would have had in his hands not a silenced population but an armed nation supported by large segments of the military. In trying to explain the final collapse, the authors would have done better if they had avoided amateur psychology and instead had looked at the institutional weaknesses of the Iranian military.

The explanations focusing on the presumed organisational efficiency of the opposition also obscure reality. It is true that guilds organised bazaar protests, mosque mullahs led street demonstrations, and strike committees appeared in most work places. But it is not true that all these local protests, demonstrations and strikes were masterminded by a highly efficient central organisation. There was no central organisation until late January 1979. There was little coordination between the diverse and rival revolutionary groups. There was almost no clerical presence in the countryside, since most villages lack both mosques and resident mullahs. What is more, there is no evidence that the revolutionaries received substantial support from external forces: the number of guerrillas trained by the PLO run into the low hundreds, not into the thousands; foreign financial assistance would have been superfluous since many of the wealthiest bazaaris were helping the revolution; Haddad's feats in Iran are the figments of someone's vivid imagination in Washington; and Khomeini hardly needed Syrian, Libyan or Soviet advice on how to denounce the Shah. The misconceptions about the organisations are best illustrated by Stemple's eagerness to find a Mujahedin face behind every bearded youth carrying a gun or shouting an Islamic slogan. As later events proved to everyone – except perhaps to the American political analysts – the vast majority of armed fighters were not Mujahedin supporters but *pasdars* (guards) attached to local mosques, local bazaar guilds and local clerical leaders. And these local entities remained independent until after the regime's collapse, when they were gradually brought under the control of a central *Komiteh* (committee). Thus, the Iranian Revolution should be seen not as a well-organised and state-managed show, but as a disorganised and even haphazard happening.

The Revolution as an anti-imperialist movement

The Iranian Revolution had two major targets: the Pahlevi regime and the imperial powers, particularly the United States. Observers who at first failed to grasp the revolution's dual nature could not but admit the importance of the second target once the students overran the US embassy, once Khomeini stepped up his blasts against the 'Great Satan' and once the world discovered that these blasts struck the right chord among the Iranian populace. Into the streets poured years of

resentment against the United States – for organising the 1953 coup, for being a 'special friend' of the Shah for twenty-six years, for creating the detested SAVAK, for training the huge military establishment, for profiteering from the multi-million dollar arms trade, for encouraging multinational corporations to take over the country, and for undermining national culture by spreading the insidious germ of *gharbzadegi* ('Westernitis').

Despite the importance of these attitudes, all three books under review, even though they were written well after the embassy take-over, fail to mention even the existence of anti-American sentiments. This gross failure is due to the following three reasons. First, the authors, being members of the US foreign-policy establishment, cannot accept the fact that the US may be seen in some parts of the world as an expansionist imperial power. Second, the authors, like most Western writers on Iran, tend to exaggerate Iranian fears of the Soviet Union. For example, the Shah's eagerness since 1941 to build up the military is seen as proof of Iranian fears of its northern neighbour. In actual fact, this eagerness was motivated by the Shah's desire to bolster his own institutional position vis-à-vis all internal rivals such as Mossadeq. Third, the authors eagerly accept at face value any pro-American sentiments they find in Iran. For example, Stemple, repeating earlier misconceptions, claims that after the Second World War 'Persians became highly pro-American'. Similarly, Sullivan, after secret negotiations with Ayatollah Beheshti at the height of the revolution, claimed that the latter was 'highly distrustful' of the Soviet Union. Strangely enough, Sullivan, the hard-nosed diplomat, never harbours the suspicion that maybe Beheshti is singing this tune in order to lull the United States into a false sense of security, thereby isolating the Shah. Later events showed that the same Beheshti was willing to improve relations with the Soviet Union and exploit anti-American sentiments in order to undermine the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan. It seems that even the most tough-minded American officials become gullible when given an anti-Soviet line.

These three books are weak not only because they ignore anti-American sentiments and the structural causes of the revolution but also because they make claims that are either outright false or else so surprising that they need at least some explanation. For example, Ledeen and Lewis claim that for the majority of Iranians the Shah was 'a living legend, the embodiment of the nation'; that Mossadeq's opposition to the Shah was motivated by the former's family ties to the fallen Qajar dynasty; that none of the first eighteen majleses served a full term – in fact, all but four served full terms; that the Tudeh is led by a 'radical mullah'; that William Langer – not Crane Brinton – is the author of *The Anatomy of Revolution* and that Muslims hold memorial meetings for the dead on the sixtieth day – one wonders how

anyone detailing the course of the revolution could get such a crucial fact wrong. Sullivan claims that in the 1930s Reza Shah won over the peasantry by 'instituting sweeping land reforms'; that in 1964 Khomeini was belatedly elevated to the rank of ayatollah; and that in 1977 Shariati died of cancer – in fact, he died very suddenly, probably of a heart attack. Moreover, Stemple – one should not forget that he was the main American analyst of Iranian politics – claims that after the First World War the Bolsheviks successfully annexed 10,000 square miles of Iranian territory; that in February 1979 a 'mini-war' broke out between the Fedayin and the Mujahedin; that the Kurdish Democratic Party is headed by tribal leaders; that the US involvement in Iran began after 1946 as a result of Soviet aggression – not in 1942 when the United States signed military agreements with the Shah, nor in 1944 when American oil companies started negotiating for lucrative concessions; and that the Soviets in 1945 set up an Independent Republic in Iranian Azerbaijan – in fact, the autonomous provincial administration never used the label 'republic' and the whole secessionist-sounding term was coined by the Shah for American consumption. Finally, Stemple claims – this will come of special surprise to specialists of marxist ideas – that the Iranian revolution 'negates' the whole 'marxist theory' that rural populations determine the fate of revolutions. Tucked in between the falsities and banalities are a series of speculations on how the revolution could have been prevented if the Shah had done this or that, if Washington had or had not sent such a message ... It is as if these authors believed that they could prevent a volcanic explosion by shovelling snow from the mountain peak or by rearranging the rocks.

Thomas Sowell

"has once again effectively challenged cherished social science assumptions."

William Julius Wilson
University of Chicago

The outspoken author of *Ethnic America* now offers a provocative international perspective on the issues of immigration, ethnicity, and relations between minorities and dominant cultures. Separating economic reality from political myth, "Sowell gives us the facts and analytical tools with which to understand ethnic and racial experiences in *all* countries....No one has shown his skill at solving the ethnic and racial equivalents of Rubik's Cube."
—Edward Banfield, Harvard University



$15.95

William Morrow
105 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Notes and documents

South Africa: new constitution, old ideology*

The constitutional proposals: why?

Soweto's children strained against their educational system, police reaction shocked the world, Soweto burnt. A spate of bannings and detentions muzzled local black protests – and South Africa's western allies reeled in embarrassment and shock at Nationalist excesses. Something had to be done – the Urban Foundation came into existence, Soweto began to see electric lights, the principle of leasehold rights made a sluggish appearance in African townships and a number of commissions were appointed into such key areas as trade unions and labour. But basically the situation remains unchanged – the poverty of the people and the harassment of African job-seekers, of wives and children attempting to live with their husbands and parents near their places of work continues with unmitigated cruelty. While official reports indicate an improvement in the earnings of all race groups, and a shrinking in the economic gap between black and white, independent economists challenge the basis of their calculations and report an actual decline in the earnings and family incomes of black families. Professor Keenen of Wits finds that the boom in the South African economy has brought no material benefit to the bulk of the African

* This article was written shortly after *Professor Meer*, a sociologist at Natal University and former President of the now banned Black Women's Federation, was released, after 7 years, from banning.

population. Against this background it is hardly surprising that the constitutional proposals have aroused so much suspicion. Constitutional change can be expected when power shifts from one ideological group or class to another. The new group may see the old constitution as incompatible with its interests and in need of drastic overhauling or replacement.

When the Nationalists succeeded the United Party they found the existing level of segregation much too mild, and the entrenched clause safeguarding the Coloured and 'Native' franchise contradictory to its policy of racial segregation. They accordingly amended the constitution, but did not find it necessary to replace it, since it was wholly conducive to apartheid. The Act of Union was an act against the indigenous African people. It brought together sworn enemies as disparate as Boer and Briton because of their common fear of the African mass, their common interest in South Africa's wealth, their common dependence on African labour and their common belief that the simplest way of harnessing that labour and effecting their monopolistic hold over the country was by keeping the African disenfranchised and relatively landless. Why then the need for a new constitution now? The Nationalist hand has been forced by three sets of pressures. The first two were already apparent in 1960, with the banning of the Pan African Congress, the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, and aggravated in 1976 by the explosion in Soweto and its proliferations. They are inherent in rising black demands, both middle and working class, expressed in a range of rhetoric and in periodic eruptions of almost unmanageable violence, and are inherent in the demands for reform from South Africa's allies and business partners who recoil in apparent horror and embarrassment at what they consider to be Nationalist repression of legitimate black aspirations.

The West is not asking for any radical change – in fact, radical change does not serve its interests. The West seeks to preserve capitalism in South Africa, but fears that it is threatened by racism. It wants an eradication of existing race, but not of class. In other words, it wants an observable representation of blacks in the ranks of power and influence. The West believes that the underlying threat to white domination is the rising expectations of the black elite which, if not gratified, will lead to the fuelling of a revolution which may destroy their investments. To forestall that, the blacks need to be incorporated into the white bourgeoisie. The Afrikaner dilemma is that, in the process of implementing such racial miscegenation, it will lose its own hegemony and identity. How can they overcome the spectre of past ignominies and insecurities, the memory of poor whitism which only fifty years ago threatened to decimate the Afrikaner Volk into the black mass?

The third pressure comes from within Afrikanerdom itself. It emerged with the first signs that the Nationalist Party was making some concession to alien demands, that in its subscription to modernisation it was subordinating the interests of the Volk to those of international capitalism. It had happened before, when Smuts had renegaded to the mine bosses; the *verligtes* are seen as doing it again, and this has reaped a harvest of opposition within Afrikanerdom which is today threatened with a split.

While appearing to respond to these pressures, the Constitutional Bill in fact evades all of them and concentrates primarily on protecting the vested interest of the ruling party. It goes too far for the comfort of Afrikaner traditionalism, and not far enough to assuage the fears of its international partners; and there is nothing in it for the Africans, who are becoming increasingly aware that Indians and Coloureds are being used as pawns in a Nationalist attempt to gain a new lease on power. In the final analysis, the Bill appears to be far more concerned with the growing opposition of Afrikaner conservatism (which the Botha government rightly assesses to be obstructing progress and thereby threatening the survival of Afrikanerdom itself) than with reform, and the diminution of the traditional power of the legislature it contains is directed towards just such a purpose. It similarly provides for controlling all opposition to the ideology of apartheid, and any Indian or Coloured attempt to move the system away from that frame.

Managing conflict and restricting self-determination

If there is one basic desire that underlies the Constitution Bill, it is a desire to manage conflict, involving a dangerous plan to control, coerce and eliminate all opposition. The 'Guidelines for the Constitution' and the 'Explanatory Memorandum' emphasise both the need to 'move away from the current conflict style in parliament and establish procedures to promote unity' and that 'every organ in the new dispensation will have to concentrate on achieving consensus'. The constitution is geared to block opposition. The Guidelines state:

> clashes between the chambers will be the exception rather than the rule ... everyone will be expected not to stress the divisive factors in society, but rather to concentrate on common ground. Controversial issues should not be brought to a head in such a way that strong emotions are aroused. Instead, they should rather be addressed and resolved in a manner which will enhance the stability of the political order.

The Bill inflicts the legislatures with so much executive pressure to conform – from the Cabinet, the joint standing committee (an innovation in constitutional procedures) and, finally, the President's Council, whose decision is final – as to leave it with little or no self-

determination on contentious issues, which can also be expected to be the important issues. It is quite obvious that it will be the Indian and Coloured chambers that will suffer the most serious restriction in this respect. This attenuation of the function of the legislature makes a mockery of the electorate itself.

And what is this consensus that the Bill is so concerned about? Consensus has to be about predetermined standards or sets of principles. The parties coming together must submit to protecting that standard. Those who agree to the new constitution and concede to its principle of 'consensus' and 'co-operation' must of necessity agree to upholding the principle of Apartheid. The new dispensation does not allow any alternative in this respect. It categorically subjects all debate to existing law and policy.

Matters of common concern and own concern

While the constitution provides for three racially elected legislatures, House of Assembly (whites: 166), House of Representatives (Coloureds: 80), House of Deputies (Indians: 40) on the basis of separate adult suffrages, the agenda is closely monitored by the executive power and is, in fact, concentrated in the President who is responsible for appointing all ministers to the executive committees), the Cabinet (which deals with matters of general concern), the racial councils (which deal with matters of own concern), and 40 per cent of the members of the President's Council. No Bill can be introduced in any of the racial houses without first obtaining a certificate from the President clearing it for such discussion. His decision in these respects is final and beyond the intervention of a court of law. It is in making the distinction between 'own affairs' and 'common affairs' that the Bill wreaks its great mischief and cripples the 'self-determination' and 'co-responsibility' it proclaims to extend to Coloureds and Indians. Schedule 1 of the Bill lists subjects that constitute 'own affairs': social welfare, education, training of cadets, art, culture and recreation, health, community development, local government and agriculture. In every instance, the Bill stipulates that the discussion must remain within the 'general policy and general law' relating to the subject, and in conformity with the existing 'norms and standards' that regulate 'financial dispensation', 'running and capital costs', 'salaries and conditions of appointment of staff'. All 'general affairs' originate in the Cabinet, the racial composition of which is not defined in the Bill, and is the prerogative of the President. The function of the racial chambers is, by and large, to ratify such proposals, and when they fail to do so or are in conflict with one another, the President's Council intervenes and its decision is final. Such restrictions drain the legislatures of practically all self-determination and replace them with the obligation to become the lackey of the Nationalist government. It is a partnership in

the horrible acts of apartheid that is being offered to the Indian and Coloured people, and who worth his salt would accept that? The Bill is, in effect, the culmination of the 1950 Group Areas Act, which provided for self-government in the racial zones. Inter-race contact breeds conflict and to avoid that, there must be racial separation. Accordingly, there cannot be a common parliament. It is clear from the spirit of the Bill that joint sittings of the legislatures will be avoided for fear of the emotionalism and conflict that such 'mixing' may engender. Thus, thirty years later, the most 'radical' element of Nationalism remains morally bound to its former doctrine.

The only concession it makes is that on executive levels a small number of carefully selected Indians and Coloureds could be relied on to concur with white Cabinet ministers. The Guidelines are quite explicit about the kinds of Indians and Coloureds it wishes to have on its executive organs. 'Peaceloving and constructive' citizens who will not 'follow the simplistic approach of rejecting everything out of hand'; 'moderate leaders' who will arrive at an acceptable dispensation. One is left with the image of the elected legislatures relegated to concerns of implementing details of policies and legislations that originated elsewhere. The 'elsewhere' is the rarified atmosphere of the standing committee, the Cabinet and the Council, where men elected carefully for their back-slapping conviviality and their ability to get on with each other will get on with each other and slip into easy consensus. The danger is that if the Bill is implemented, apartheid will gain a new legitimacy and all extra-parliamentary opposition will be met with even greater repression than now.

Mrs Margaret Ballinger, the 'Native' representative (when such a thing was a fact of the South African parliament), once declared that all South African affairs are 'Native affairs'. The Nationalist enterprise, since its accession to power in 1948, has been primarily concerned with controlling and dominating 'Native affairs' through the homelands. Just as the homelands have brought no relief to the African people, the new constitution will bring no relief to Indians and Coloureds. Whatever improvements occur will do so despite the constitutional changes and will be dependent on an expanding economy creating new jobs and opportunities for blacks in a situation characterised by a shortage of white labour. But such economic expansion is subject to many historical accidents, the most crucial of these being those due to the shoring up of the legitimate aspirations of the people. If the country is to be spared tragic upheavals of violence before change can happen, then it is absolutely essential that a genuine process for a new non-racist constitution involving all the people of the country, including those in the Homelands, is instituted now. The existing constitution, which came into effect with the Act of Union in 1910, could just have by now, given another set of circumstances,

another group of legislators, moved in the direction of an integrated parliament. After all, when the Nats came to power in 1948, both 'Native' and Coloured representatives were facts in the South African parliament, and a new Act had been passed to bring in indirect Indian representation. But the pendulum moved with the Nats and thirty-four years later, we are presented with a shadowy substance for a new constitution. The Freedom Charter, ratified in Kliptown in June 1955 by 3,000 delegates, remains today the most widely canvassed guideline for a new order and the government, if truly concerned about this country and its people, would be well advised to study it for a positive beginning towards constitutional reform.

FATIMA MEER

Book reviews

Volkskapitalisme: class, capital and ideology in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, 1934-1948

By DAN O'MEARA (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983). 281 pp. £22.50.

Liberal and nationalist historiography has attributed to Afrikaner nationalism a role in South African history similar to that of original sin in theology. Not only are the Afrikaner rulers and their *volk* (people) regarded as the architects of those odious institutions associated with apartheid; all the current refractory problems that beset the country are traced by liberal and nationalist ideologues to the policies of the Afrikaner Nationalist government. In this perspective the rigid, reactionary and racist ideals of a monolithic Afrikanerdom have been imposed on an allegedly colour-blind capitalist economy, causing acute social dislocation and conflict.

Dan O'Meara has, in this scholarly work, broken with the traditional view that race is the prime mover in the evolution of Afrikaner nationalism. He assigns primacy, rather, to the social relations of production. More specifically, he locates the growth of Afrikaner nationalism in the imperatives of capital accumulation and the class contradictions in the South African social formation. Accordingly, the Afrikaners are perceived, not as a homogeneous, supra-class community, but as one composed of classes, often in conflict with one another and giving rise to distinct alliances, both within the framework of Afrikaner nationalism and with imperialism.

The goal of Afrikaner nationalism was national capitalism (*volkskapitalisme*) which, as a form of dependent capitalism, exhibits a Janus-like mode of operation, now cooperating with imperialism, now

coming into conflict with it. Consequently, schisms in the Afrikaner nationalist camp were inevitable and regular, one section succumbing to imperialist pressures, the other standing firm in upholding the 'national' interests of *die volk*, of the Afrikaner people.

The unification of the South African colonies in 1910, under a central government, was based on an alliance between the mining magnates, representing imperialism (foreign capital) and the incipient capitalist farmers, comprising Afrikaners. Both were represented in the ruling South African Party and shared a community of interest in the super-exploitation of coerced black labour. In 1914 the Party split on the issue of its relationship with imperialism. Those who remained in the Party supported the pro-British policies of the Afrikaner leaders, Louis Botha and General Smuts. The section that broke away under General Hertzog founded the Nationalist Party, which articulated the concerns of the Afrikaner capitalist farmers as well as those of the smaller farmers, who were feeling the pressures of proletarianisation.

In 1924 the Nationalist Party, in alliance with the Labour Party, representing both English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking white workers, came to power and formed the Pact government. Its policies reflected the alliance between the agricultural bourgeoisie and the white workers. Thus, the industrial colour bar was made more stringent to protect the white workers against competition from cheap black labour; tariff barriers were erected to promote local industry and protect the internal market for agricultural produce; and farmers were heavily subsidised by the state out of the taxes accruing from the profits of the gold mines. Although the Pact government was based on an unstable alliance of classes, three issues served to keep it united: the pursuit of sovereign independence from imperialism; the achievement of complete equality in the state between the English and Afrikaans languages; the economic nationalism of 'South Africa first'.

The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 paved the way for the collapse of the Pact government and the disintegration of the Nationalist Party. In the face of falling prices, the question of capital accumulation was raised in its most acute form. Neither the Pact government nor the South African Party had an answer to it. Britain had gone off the Gold Standard in 1931, and there was growing pressure that South Africa should follow suit. Yet General Hertzog, the Prime Minister, was determined not to follow Britain, if only to exhibit South Africa's independence in dealing with her problems. His resolve was stiffened by the Statute of Westminster (1931), which had granted the country full internal sovereignty.

For all that, the agricultural bourgeoisie, faced with bankruptcy, now deserted both the Nationalist and South African parties and demanded a coalition government to deal with the economic problems. Given the worsening economic crisis, South Africa left the Gold

Standard in 1932. In 1933 a coalition government was formed, and the following year fusion took place when the major parties formed the United Party. But a minority in the old Nationalist Party had baulked at fusion, arguing that the interests of the Afrikaner would be submerged in the United Party – 'a bulwark of imperialism and capitalism, and that, in the long run the farmer, worker, and the poor man would be unable to feel themselves safe in it'.

The minority in the Nationalist Party who had rejected fusion came together and set up the Purified Nationalist Party. It drew support from three classes: the big farmers of the Cape Province who, worried about their export outlets, had baulked at imperial trade preference; the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie – small rural traders, lawyers, teachers, civil servants, academics; and a stratum of poorer farmers in the Transvaal.

In an important chapter the author shows that it was the petty bourgeoisie, organised in the secret Afrikaner Broederbond, that became the class vanguard of Afrikaner nationalism. The Broederbond was dedicated to the proposition that Afrikaner capital should be amassed and used to build up Afrikaner business, commerce and industry. O'Meara shows that in 1938-9, while the Afrikaner farmers owned 87 per cent of all marketed agricultural and livestock produce, the Afrikaners as a whole owned only 8 per cent of commercial, 3 per cent of manufacturing and 5 per cent of financial undertakings.

The petty bourgeoisie, organised as the organic intellectuals of Afrikaner nationalism in the Broederbond, sought to collect the 'loose money' of the agricultural bourgeoisie and workers and use it to expand national capital. At the same time, the Afrikaners had to be organised and transformed ideologically for the attainment of these ends. Thus, under the slogan of *volkseenheid* (national unity), the Afrikaner workers were cut loose, politically and ideologically, from their class moorings and fitted into the Procrustean bed of cultural nationalism. Yet the book clearly shows how the interests of the Afrikaner workers were sacrificed on the altar of the very bourgeois aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie. By the late 1940s the Afrikaners had made appreciable progress in commerce, industry and finance, although imperialism still controlled the commanding heights of the economy.

When the Second World War broke out in 1939, the United Party split on the issue of participation in the war on the side of Britain. Prime Minister Hertzog, having lost the motion calling for neutrality, advised the Governor-General to dissolve parliament and hold elections. Instead, the Governor-General called upon General Smuts, who favoured participation, to form a new government. With thirty-seven MPs Hertzog withdrew from the United Party and set up the Volksparty. This schism gave the Afrikaner Broederbond the opportunity to

unite all Afrikaners against the war. In 1940 the Volksparty and the Purified Nationalist Party united and founded the Re-united Nationalist or People's Party.

The last two chapters of O'Meara's book deal with the circumstances leading to the assumption of power by the Re-united Nationalist Party in 1948 and the triumph of apartheid.

The war years witnessed a dramatic, and portentous, acceleration in the tempo of industrialisation. The Africans were 'pulled' to the cities by the labour requirements of expanding manufacturing, which offered higher wages than agriculture. They were also 'pushed' to the cities by the corrosion of their subsistence economies in the 'native reserves', which could no longer furnish them with food to supplement their starvation wages. A growing number of immigrant workers were indeed severing their ties with the reserves and settling permanently with their families in the 'white' cities. Given the imperious demand for labour, the pass laws, which controlled the influx of Africans into the industrial areas, were relaxed. On top of this, the concentration of African workers in the cities led to their organisation in trade unions, whose struggles served to improve wage rates. Moreover, since the industrial colour bar was relaxed during the war, owing to the acute shortage of white labour, many skilled and semi-skilled jobs – the traditional preserve of white workers – came to be filled by Africans. Concomitant with these developments came the recrudescence of the political struggle when the African National Congress and the Communist Party now demanded equal rights for the black population.

The Nationalist Party stitched together an alliance of the agricultural bourgeoisie, the white workers and the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie to oppose the 'liberalising' trends in the economy. It was a winning combination, and in the 1948 elections the Party was swept into power.

Dan O'Meara's materialist conception of Afrikaner nationalism is an important contribution to the understanding of South African history. Although his style is rather stilted, his arguments come out clearly. But he should avoid humour at which he does not excel. His attempts of that nature are among the more serious aspects of the book.

London KEN JORDAAN

National Liberation and Women's Liberation

Edited by MARIA MIES and RHODA REDDOCK (The Hague, Institute of Social Studies, 1982). 149 pp. Dfl.10.-

Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World

By KUMARI JAYAWARDENA (The Hague, Institute of Social Studies, 1982). 204 pp. Dfl.10.-

Third World – Second Sex: women's struggle and national liberation

Edited by MIRANDA DAVIES (London, Zed Press, 1983). 256 pp. £6.50 paper

'The situation of women is the most difficult of all the problems facing us and it's going to take the longest to solve.' The speaker is a woman who has seen some intractable problems in her time, a Palestinian who was put in charge of a military base in 1978 when she was in her early 20s. There can be no social transformation if only a few Palestinian women leave their homes and go as fighters to the bases. 'They must do it in their thousands, not as exceptional individuals. A vanguard that is too far in advance of the general experience will only delay the advance of the whole; the woman who goes to the bases now only builds a wall between herself and the others.' How to breach that wall, how to make of women's struggles against poverty, imperialism, racism and male domination a *mass* movement which aims to achieve not only women's liberation, but freedom for humanity: these are the themes so forcefully presented by Palestinians and other Third World women in *National Liberation and Women's Liberation* and *Third World – Second Sex*.

These are not academic studies carried out in social and political isolation. Both volumes attempt to transmit the immediacy of experience, and knowledge gained in struggle, in order to overcome the split between theory and activism. What emerges from personal testimony is an unforgettable picture of the courage and resilience of Chilean *companeras* who 'take a qualitative leap in their emancipation as women as well as in their revolutionary commitment' when tortured by fascist police, of South Korean women strikers who are imprisoned for days in a textile factory without food and water and are then beaten until fifty of them lose consciousness, and of women in Eritrea, Oman, Zimbabwe and Nicaragua who see their participation in armed struggle as 'a contribution to the struggle of women all over the world.' Eurocentric feminists inclined to impose their own version of sisterhood and the struggle on women elsewhere should find much to ponder in these pages.

National Liberation and Women's Liberation is the result of a two-week workshop held in June 1980 at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. In an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and practice, the organisers of the workshop extended invitations to women who had been active in national liberation struggles, trade unions, workers' cooperatives and peasant organisations, as well as women involved in research and specific feminist campaigns. Workshop papers reproduced here include a general discussion of national liberation, and post-liberation societies, and descriptions of the struggle for national liberation in China, India, Yugoslavia and Nicaragua. Participants in liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, Bangladesh and Azania

also gave their personal testimonies. At the end of her account of her childhood in colonial Ghana, political awakening under Nkrumah and involvement in the anti-colonial struggle in Zimbabwe, Sally Mugabe stated that there was no fundamental difference between Third World and western feminism. Other participants felt differently: 'Women throughout the world are united not only by their common experience of sexist oppression and subordination, but are also divided by imperialism, class and race.' For those at the receiving end of these multiple oppressions struggle must be permanent. Third World women cannot limit their activity to a fight for equality within traditional and capitalist structures. Neither can they retreat after national liberation has been achieved. Their struggle must be intensified after state power has been won, when divisions of class, race and sex re-emerge. There can be no emancipation for women without 'genuine social liberation' and the creation of new social and economic forms on the ruins of imperialism and capitalism.

Miranda Davies' book reinforces this message. This volume of extracts of interviews, journals, newspapers and feminist bulletins from twenty countries shows Third World women growing in their resourcefulness, determination to resist and organisational strategies and skills. The women who speak out here have not learned their feminism from western literature (as Ms Davies hints in her introduction) but from their own direct experience and concrete struggles for change going back decades. The 'debate about sexism, racism, imperialism and their relationship to patriarchy, which Ms Davies implies is a recent gift from First World women to Third, had in fact been fully explored by the women's movement in South Africa in the early 1950s; her omission of Azanian material seems curious. One also wonders why she chose 'Women's struggles and national liberation' as a subtitle for the volume. Several of the articles have little to do with national liberation in the general sense of the term, but concern trade union issues, the struggle for physical survival and personal integrity, and opposition to traditional and feudal structures in 'post-liberation' societies. Perhaps a more appropriate sub-title would have been 'Women's struggle and human liberation'. As Ms Davies herself writes in the introduction, the concern of most women in the book is 'to free not only women, but an entire oppressed people.'

That freedom must be fought for and won; it will never be 'given'. In the words of an Omani women's organisation, 'the liberation of women cannot be achieved through men making concessions to women, but through constant organisational struggle by women on the economic, social, and political levels'. This lesson is starkly illustrated by Kumari Jayawardena's *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, another volume from the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague. Ms Jayawardena sets out to challenge the view that feminism

was imposed on the Third World by the West and that Third World feminists have been merely imitative. She begins by making a distinction between feminism, which tackles 'basic issues of women's subordination in the family' and opposes the prevailing economic and political system, and the movement for emancipation, which seeks to end 'prevailing discrimination' against women and to promote equal rights. As she sees it, feminism is a 'revolutionary force', while the movement for emancipation remains reformist in tendency. This is, of course, a vitally important distinction, but one that is not sufficiently substantiated here. She claims, for example, that Third World women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 'advocating revolutionary political and social alternatives' to 'oppressive patriarchal structures', but she gives little evidence for this assertion – outside the case of revolutionary China.

Clearly, she had a problem getting source material, especially material about the struggles of working women. Most of the primary sources she quotes at length were written by men like Gandhi and Ataturk. Despite a formidable list of names of women who to some degree challenged patriarchy and foreign domination, and who cultivated working links with western feminists, the substance of the book consists of reformist reactions (largely male) to rapid social and economic change.

The women's movement depicted in these pages remains something of an abstraction. Ms Jayawardena claims that in Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Japan it was at its most militant in the years after the First World War, and then declined rapidly. She gives us little idea of why the movement should 'peter out' in all countries but China by the late 1920s, and why numerous reforms ending legal discriminations were so ineffective. Ms Jayawardena may not achieve all that she sets out to do, but her book does bring together an important body of material hitherto inaccessible to women in the west and Third World feminists. Judging from the other two volumes under review, Third World women have learned in the last fifty years that what is needed is the feminism that Ms Jayawardena calls a 'revolutionary force', and not the bourgeois laundry list.

London NANCY MURRAY

Sociological Theories: race and colonialism

(Paris, Unesco, 1981). 499 pp. £13.50.

It would be impossible in the space of a short review to comment fully on the lengthy introduction and sixteen essays in this collection. Nor is it necessary to do so, since very few of the pieces can be said to

contribute significantly to our understanding of racism and colonialism. Indeed, some of the authors openly admit to the irrelevance of particular sociological theories to these questions, while most of the rest simply restate the positions of classic theorists and familiar schools – Durkheim, Weber, Marxist-Leninism, functionalism, interactionism, pluralism – and use these as a basis for making highly generalised and largely descriptive remarks on race and colonialism. This mechanistic approach is itself probably a reflection of the narrow constituency from which the contributors to this volume are drawn, for, as the editor points out, 'without the participation of Africans, Asians [other than those from India] and Latin Americans in the elaboration and conscious testing of theories, many questions will remain.'

There are, however, two essays – significantly both by black scholars, one based in a metropolitan country (Britain) and the other from the Third World (India) – that do set out more creatively to test theory against the realities of racism and colonialism, and in the process to develop fresh insights into these issues. Stuart Hall's 'Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance' has already provided a platform for a body of new and liberating work on race in Britain and the Caribbean. In this essay he starts from the South African experience, as elaborated in the work of John Rex and Harold Wolpe, using it as a 'limit case' out of which to formulate a number of 'theoretical protocols' and general propositions concerning the 'articulation' of race and class at the economic, political and ideological levels of different social formations. This is not the place to provide a full account or critique of Hall's position, but readers should be warned that in moving here from the particular (South Africa) to the general (articulation of race and class) he does take a major detour by way of the marxist sociology of Gramsci, Althusser, Poulantzas and Laclau. One might question the relevance and necessity of this theoretical excursion to the statement of Hall's own position, and certainly in less skilled hands than his the work of these other writers, particularly Laclau, would seem to hold out the danger of a sterile sociology of ideas and politics of ideological manoeuvring.

The second important essay in this collection is Bipan Chandra's 'Karl Marx, his theories of Asian societies and colonial rule'. This is a piece of committed scholarship in which Marx's view, drawn primarily from his more journalistic writings, of India as a stagnant social formation, and therefore of colonialism as a positive 'destructive/regenerative' force in such a society, is placed against the detailed historical evidence of pre-colonial India and found to be entirely wrong. But Chandra is not here intent on debunking Marx or in any way abandoning the method of historical materialism, of which his own essay is a superb example. Indeed, he goes out of his way to

compare Marx's erroneous position on colonialism in India with the contrary view he developed, in the course of political involvement in the cause of Irish nationalism, on British rule in Ireland.[1] Nor does Chandra use the occasion to engage, as he so easily could have done, in elaborate theorisation around the marxist concept of an Asiatic mode of production. Rather, in the concluding section of his essay he provides a number of insights on the negative impact of colonialism as a destructive force entirely obstructive of any positive economic development. In this respect, Chandra's whole essay stands as a further powerful, historical and empirical refutation of those modern marxist theorists who, without any of the excuses available to explain Marx's own mistakes, have arrogantly reasserted the positive value of imperialism as a 'modernising' force in the Third World.[2]

University of Birmingham LEE BRIDGES

References

1 See John Newsinger, '"A great blow must be struck in Ireland": Karl Marx and the Fenians', *Race and Class* (Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1982).
2 See A. Sivanandan, 'Capitalism, the highest stage of imperialism? Warren and the Third World', *Race and Class* (Vol. XXIV, no.2, 1982).

British Intelligence and Covert Action: Africa, Middle East and Europe since 1945

By JONATHAN BLOCH and PATRICK FITZGERALD (London, Junction Books, 1983). 284pp. £5.95.

Throughout the 1970s, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was repeatedly embarrassed as former agents broke cover to tell the truth about their previous activities. The most important of these was undoubtedly Philip Agee's *Inside the Company: a CIA diary,* both because of its extensive account of CIA subversion in South America, and because it set an example which others would follow. But other accounts were no less embarrassing: Marks and Marchetti on 'the cult of intelligence', Marks' own account of the CIA's manipulation of individual human behaviour, Agee and Wolf's directory of CIA operatives in Europe, John Stockwell on CIA operations against the Angolan guerrillas, and Frank Snepp on Vietnam.[1] The authors' political viewpoints differed considerably, but their message was the same: the CIA was heavily engaged in secret 'dirty work' in support of officially defined American interests throughout the world.

In Britain, however, where the existence of the intelligence agencies is not even officially acknowledged, there was no such whistle blowing.

The only accounts of British intelligence operations abroad were those provided by official (or quasi-official) historians whose work carefully avoided criticism or controversy, and by writers of popular fiction. As far as the general public was concerned, British intelligence operations were a matter of 'ferrets', 'lamplighters', 'scalphunters' and 'Mothers', the 'Nursery', the 'reptile fund' and the 'Circus', all under the control of the decidedly un-nasty George Smiley.

Now, with the publication of this book, we can begin to see the truth about Britain's intelligence agencies and the part they have played in the previously hidden underside of British foreign and colonial policy. Bloch and Fitzgerald provide an excellent account of the structure of the various agencies involved in foreign intelligence work and covert operations, in particular Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which is responsible for electronic eavesdropping and most of whose work is illegal under international law; the Defence Intelligence Staff; M16, the foreign intelligence service; and the army's Special Air Service regiment. They show how these agencies operated to try and shore up the British empire in the period after 1945, as exemplified in the Malayan 'emergency' of 1948-60, which, the authors note, brought the British considerable prestige abroad and the development of a new 'British school' of counter-insurgency theory and practice. In each case, the methods used were much the same: infiltration of anti-colonial and opposition movements, harassment and arrest of prominent oppositionists, the spread of disinformation, the creation of front organisations, and the use of existing organisations, particularly in the student and trade union movements.

The end of the empire did not, however, mean an end to British covert operations. As the authors note, the Middle East continued to be the scene of 'some of the most aggressive and cavalier activity' by MI6 in its entire history. In Iran, MI6 along with the CIA, arranged the downfall of Prime Minister Mossadeq when he tried to nationalise British oil interests. In Egypt, MI6 ran a propaganda campaign against Nasser and his nationalisation of the Suez canal, thus preparing the way for the 1956 military invasion by Britain, France and Israel. In Jordan, British paratroops helped King Hussein put down popular uprisings, while in Lebanon, MI6 organised extreme right-wing guerrilla groups. Most recently, Britain has given extensive military and internal security assistance to the governments of Oman and South Yemen.

Similarly in Africa, covert action continued even after decolonisation. The British assisted the coup which brought Idi Amin to power in Uganda in 1969, and helped Numeiri regain control of the government of the Sudan in 1971. In what was then Rhodesia, MI6 failed either to provide accurate intelligence about the illegal Smith regime – reports suggested he could be brought down from within – or to show how

sanctions were routinely being broken.

As Philip Agee says in his introduction to the book, this account is 'a tale of terror, murder, bribery, cheating, lying and torture', but it should not go unnoticed (although the authors do not emphasise this sufficiently) that such actions were carried out not just by Conservative governments, but by Labour too. Indeed, it was under Labour that the Malayan 'emergency' was fought, and it was Labour which set up, in 1947, the anti-Communist propaganda unit, the Information Research Department, which was only wound up in 1977.

After all this, the final chapter, 'The empire – where to?', comes as something of a disappointment. There is some interesting material on Ireland and on commercial firms specialising in intelligence-gathering so as to advise clients about 'investment risks', but the authors fail to follow up a statement by the political editor of the *Sunday Times*, quoted approvingly, expressing concern about the change in MI6's role to that of an 'internal security arm'. Apart from the material on Ireland, we are given no indication of what this might involve, and the book peters out rather inconclusively.

Nevertheless, this is an important book, for it makes clear that the British state and its intelligence agencies, just as much as their American 'cousins', have been guilty of much 'dirty work' and, one presumes, continue to be so.

London PAUL GORDON

References

1 The books in question are John Marks and Victor Marchetti, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (London, 1974); John Marks, *The search for the 'Manchurian Candidate'* (London, 1980); Philip Agee and Louis Wolf (eds), *Dirty Work: the CIA in western Europe* (New Jersey, 1978); John Stockwell, *In search of enemies* (London, 1978); and Frank Snepp, *Decent interval: American debacle in Vietnam* (London, 1980).

Deadly Deceits: my 25 years in the CIA

By RALPH W. McGEHEE (New York, Sheridan Square Publications, 1983). 231pp. $7.95.

Ralph McGehee spent a quarter of a century in the CIA as an operative in the field and as an information analyst: in Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and at home in Langley, Virginia. He is not the first person to defect from the CIA, and much of what he tells us on its general activities since its establishment in 1947 is old ground. Nor are his motives so novel: for years he held his patience, hoping that suggestions for counter-insurgency work would

be listened to. They worked in Thailand, but were not implemented in Vietnam. So, his career blocked and his pride hurt, he left. No saint here.

Yet in one vital respect McGehee's is a novel and extremely timely book. For his argument is that the CIA is not an intelligence agency at all, but rather a covert action agency which shapes its intelligence to justify and win support for its dirty tricks. As McGehee reports it, the CIA has conducted its own military campaigns for years and has then provided policy-makers in Washington with the information needed to justify, or cover up, these activities in foreign countries.

He shows how the CIA faked information in Thailand and in Vietnam to justify itself, or to justify the whims of its political bosses. But he also gives a frightening picture of the degree of freelance paramilitary activity which the CIA carried out in Thailand in the 1960s under the guise of intelligence-gathering and civilian aid programmes. Exactly the same thing is, of course, now happening in Central America. From the information available so far, it seems that the CIA and its supporters are getting away with it again. Reagan has given the green light for precisely such a classic mixture, of covert action in the field and disinformation in Washington. One can only hope that if they have forgotten the lessons of Vietnam they will be taught them once again.

Transnational Institute FRED HALLIDAY

Seeds of Famine: ecological destruction and the development dilemma in the West African Sahel

By RICHARD W. FRANKE and BARBARA H. CHASIN (Montclair and New York, Allanheld, Osmun and Universe Books, 1981). 266 pp.

Famine in the Sahel is back in the news. An article in the *Observer* of 9 October 1983 reports that 'Famine is certain in the West African Sahel region this year ... ' The primary reason advanced for this likely catastrophe is that the cycle of drought which has characterised the region for at least a century is returning – earlier than expected. Meanwhile, an unpublished World Bank report calls the development trend of sub-Saharan Africa's poor countries 'almost a nightmare' and anticipates poverty of 'unimaginable dimensions' in rural regions and 'increased crime rates and misery' in urban areas. The solution – 'increased external assistance'.

But it has been precisely such external 'assistance' which has created the problem in the first place. For, as the authors of *Seeds of Famine* demonstrate, it was the penetration and conquest of the region by colonialism which undermined the ecological balance of the area –

thus making it increasingly vulnerable to droughts. Colonial cash-cropping based on a system of coerced labour created a 'below-subsistence standard of living, actual starvation on more than one occasion, and a disruption of patterns of social and family life because males were forced to seek work far from their native villages.' The ecological balance developed over hundreds of years between the farmers and herders – in the face of the depradations by local ruling elites – was fatally disrupted. The patterns of dependency created by the colonial system continued into the post-independence period with increasingly devastating consequences – a pattern which is apparent throughout the formerly colonised world.

It is the measure of the authors' achievement that they have demonstrated so irrefutably the chain of cause and effect between 'natural' phenomena such as drought and famine, and the aid and investment policies of the West. The endemic drought and famine of the Sahel can only be understood in a context that links ecological deterioration and food shortage with the region's structural relationship with international capitalism.

Having established with clarity and subtlety the causes of the famine of the 1968-74 period, the authors analyse the range of responses to the disaster. These were late and pitifully – not to say contemptibly – meagre. For example, the United States provided aid to the value of $5 per head – often in the form of grains originally intended as animal food. The next stage of the western governmental and multinational corporate strategy is analysed in great depth. The Sahel Development Program, based on an alliance between those forces and local elites, served to lock the Sahel nations even more closely into the international capitalist system. The latest expertise and assistance were made available to facilitate the growing of winter vegetables for Europe, to increase export-oriented livestock industries or for other similar enterprises. In each case, these plans and programmes – which have been so highly touted as 'new' approaches to development – have resulted in the further deterioration of the region's ecology. The authors predict that such programmes 'will end up by reproducing the vulnerability to drought that was so greatly increased in earlier decades by the colonial system' – a prediction which has proved all too accurate.

The choices facing the Sahel are strikingly clear. The World Bank report talks of forcing the Sahel nations to accept World Bank economic and technical direction as the price for receiving loans. Thus, the people of the Sahel would be subjected to more of the same in the name of reform. But André Gide's comments on development in French colonial Africa – quoted by the authors – are equally applicable to the latest phase of imperialist intervention: 'In the colonies, it is always the most beautiful ideals that are covering the most shameful practice'.

Franke and Chasin offer the beginnings of an alternative strategy, based on their understanding of the history and the ecology of the Sahel and on their commitment to the struggles of its peoples. They identify a number of small projects which have confronted the interconnected problems of the region and which point to an alternative strategy in which 'social balance, ecological protection and rehabilitation, and rational use of the region's productive resources will have a much greater likelihood of being achieved'. The key to such an alternative is political. The farmers and herders have to seize control of their resources and break the bonds of dependency – thus overcoming the local elites and their multinational allies. Only by doing this will the cycles of drought and famine be broken.

University of Manchester LOUIS KUSHNICK

How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America

By MANNING MARABLE (Boston, South End Press, 1983). 343 pp. $7.50

Each distinct stage of the Afro-American struggle has been marked by efforts to analyse the opposing currents within American society in order to work most efficiently for meaningful social change. Such an aim necessitates both the collection of high quality data, and the understanding of it through the use of theory. Theory in the absence of data becomes unreal dogma. Conversely, data devoid of a theoretical framework becomes mere empiricism.

How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America is an important contribution to the understanding of the US race-class conflict. Its thoroughly researched, well-documented array of statistics and historical data combined with powerful and well-reasoned arguments make it required reading for those concerned with the problems of achieving fundamental social change in America.

Unlike many academicians and cultural nationalists, Marable's materialism forces him consistently to consider the dialectic of class within the black community. For Marable the 'Black majority' are 'those who experienced and hated the lash; who labored in the cane field of the Carolina coast; who detested the daily exploitation of their parents, spouses and children; who dreamed or plotted their flight to freedom'. They stood in sharp contrast to the conditions which moulded the 'Black elite': 'A privileged social stratum, who were often distinguished by color and caste; who praised the master publicly if not privately ... who sought to accumulate petty amounts of capital at the expense of their Black brothers and sisters'.

Marable accurately describes the present crisis of the black working

class. Within the past decade, black workers, largely concentrated in the lowest paid, semi-skilled and unskilled sectors of the workforce, have lost ground due to a combination of cyclical capitalist downturns, 'recessions', the political swing to the right, run-away plants, automation and robotisation, the resurgence of racism, and the Reagan-led general offensive against the US working class. The official rate of permanently unemployed black people has increased dramatically from 8.1 per cent to 14.7 per cent in 1975, and will in all likelihood continue to rise.

Marable regards the black poor, the 'permanent reserve army of Black workers, subproletarians or the "underclass" ' resulting from the process of 'Black ghettoization', as representing 'the highest stage of Black underdevelopment, because it eliminates millions of Blacks from belonging to working class organizations'. Here it is obvious that the author has completely abandoned marxist class categories. Basing his analysis principally on census data, and apparently using income level as a yardstick, he includes under the rubric 'Black poor' the class categories of proletarians (wage workers), lumpen-proletarians, petty bourgeois and, in rare instances, the small capitalists. He also uses the term 'subproletarian', which includes 'both marginal elements of the working class as well as those whom Marxists have traditionally termed the lumpen-proletariat: pimps and prostitutes, small-time criminals, drug dealers and "numbers" runners'. The problem here is that the potentials for political organisation of the lower strata of the proletariat are quite a bit different from those of the lumpen-proletariat. Many black activists learned this distinction the hard way during the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Marable addresses, too, the special crisis of black working-class women, noting that black social history as it has been written to date has been profoundly patriarchal. In the process, he destroys the internally divisive myth of black women's economic superiority, again, in part, through a detailed analysis of census data. In 1979:

> 68,000 Black males and only 8,000 Black females earned salaries between $30,000 and $35,000. 46,000 Black men and 6,000 Black women collected annual wages between $35,000 to $50,000 in 1979 ... Within the highest income levels, in excess of $75,000, there were 548,000 white men and 4,000 Black men. Less than 500 Black women were in this category. The illusion that Black women, even within the so-called middle class, had achieved parity or had exceeded Black men's earnings was not simply false, but a gross reversal of reality. Black female unemployment rates were generally higher than those of Black men, especially for all blue collar workers, clerical workers and sales personnel.

The struggle against sexism in the black communities is not a mere

option that black people, specifically black men may, or may not, take up. To the contrary, Marable declares in order to emancipate ourselves we must destroy 'every vestige of sexual oppression within the black community'.

Despite these strengths, however, the work is theoretically flawed by its half-hearted and inconsistent effort to impose a 'dependency' framework upon the situation facing Afro-America. There are no consistent theoretical links from one chapter to another. Unlike Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1974), no effort is made to document historically this process of underdevelopment. Instead, the 'dependency' theory seems to have been appended to the empirical data almost in the manner of an afterthought. Certainly, if the application of dependency theory is more than a convenient analytical analogy to Marable, then it deserves at least a chapter.

Within the introductory chapter, 'Inequality and the burden of capitalist democracy: a point of view on black history', Marable using terminology similar to André Gunder Frank, writes:

> Capitalist development has occurred not in spite of the exclusion of Blacks, but because of the brutal exploitation of Blacks as workers and consumers. Blacks have never been equal partners in the American Social Contract, because the system exists not to develop, but to underdevelop Black people.

Yet Marable's conceptualisation of underdevelopment seems inconsistent with that of the dependency theorists. He asserts that:

> Development was, more than all other factors combined, the institutionalisation of the hegemony of capitalism as a world system. Underdevelopment was the direct consequence of this process: chattel slavery, share-cropping, peonage, industrial labor at low wages, and cultural chaos ...

Marable implies here that these forms of production relations are synonymous with underdevelopment. They are not. These relations of production have existed and continue to exist both in the 'developed' nations, such as the US, and the underdeveloped nations.

The most influential dependency theorists have maintained that the developed nations were never underdeveloped, perhaps 'undeveloped' as the US was, but not underdeveloped. Frank states:

> Yet even a modest acquaintance with history shows that underdevelopment is not original or traditional and that neither the past nor the present of the underdeveloped countries resembles in any important respect the past of the now developed countries. The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped ...[1]

Yet Marable refers to 'every stage of Western capitalist *underdevelopment*' (emphasis added).

The main problem with any serious attempt to apply a dependency framework to the Afro-American situation is the fact that Afro-Americans reside in the highly developed United States. The lack of geographic separation means that the white working class and the black working class have identical domestic class enemies, the US monopoly capitalist class. The overwhelming majority of black wage labourers toil for white-owned enterprises. This has always been the case and this relationship has quite different consequences for political direction than does the relationship between oppressed nations and imperialism.

It is obvious that the differences in the potentials as a class between the Afro-American bourgeoisie and a bourgeoisie of an underdeveloped nation are qualitatively different. While it is true that under imperialism this potential has never been realised, it is also clear that the US black bourgeoisie will never have the amount of relative power, politically, militarily and economically, that the bourgeois ruling class of, for example, Nigeria has.

Similarly, the relationship of the Nigerian working class to the English working class, for example, has very different laws of motion than that between the white and black segments of the working classes in America. Michael Hechter's *Internal Colonialism* used a dependency framework to explain the underdevelopment of the 'Celtic fringe' by the British. This process of underdevelopment, however, consisted of a situation in which pre-existing economies on separate contiguous land masses were subordinated by a foreign colonial power.[2] With the Afro-American situation today one is at pains to distinguish a separate 'black economy'. Out of some 7.42 million black men and women in the labour force a mere 164,177 were employed by black-owned firms (Bureau of the Census). Clearly blacks have little economy to distort or develop.

Even when applied to its 'proper' terrain, that of the 'Third World periphery', dependency theory has been demonstrated to contain serious flaws. In particular, it has tended to view the internal class relations of underdeveloped nations as being mechanically determined by their external relations, to downplay, therefore, the impact of internal class struggles, to underestimate the complexity of the 'periphery's' socio-economic formations, and to locate the locus of production of surplus value in the sphere of commerce rather than in production.

What is most puzzling about his imposition of the dependency framework upon the Afro-American situation is why no serious attempt was made by Marable to show how this perspective illuminates the dialectics of race and class in the US. As Gabriel Palma maintained, 'if particular features of dependency cannot be demonstrated to be

causally related to underdevelopment', then this is simply a 'catalogue of social, political, economic and cultural indicators'.[3]

How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America has in some respects set a standard of achievement for the current generation of Afro-American scholar-activists. Yet to follow the dead-end paths of dependency theorists is to sow the seeds of our continuing theoretical underdevelopment.

Washington CHRIS BOOKER

References

1 André Gunder Frank, 'The development of underdevelopment', *Monthly Review* (Vol. 18, no. 4, September 1966), pp. 17-31.
2 Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975).
3 Gabriel Palma, 'Dependency: a formal theory of underdevelopment or a methodology for the analysis of concrete situations of underdevelopment?', *World Development* (Vol. 6, 1978), pp. 881-924.

Hooligan: a history of respectable fears

By GEOFFREY PEARSON (London and Basingstoke , Macmillan, 1983). 283 pp. £15.00 cloth, £5.95 paper

'The inclination to invoke "racial" metaphors of social incohesion must be counted as a dominant theme within the British political culture – according to which violence and disorder have been repeatedly disowned as an alien intrusion into the peaceful ancestry of the "British way of life".' So argues Pearson in this provocative and timely book which sets out to dispel the myth that the Golden Age of a secure moral past has given way to a present of riot and street violence. That 'British way of life' is 'founded upon civility, reasonableness and an unquestioning respect for law and authority' with 'violence ... entirely foreign to the nation and its people'. Depending on where we are in history, street crime has been considered an importation from Naples (1862), Ireland (1898), Greece (1900), America (1917) and, of course, the Caribbean (1981). Its perpetrators have been variously labelled 'Arabs', 'Kaffirs', 'heathens' and 'Hottentots', as well as the eponymous 'hooligan'. This 'racial' thesis Pearson describes as

> revealing a long and dishonourable tradition of British belly-aching against the 'racial degeneration' of the common people and its supposed manifestation in 'unprecedented' violence and outrage. It is wonderfully convenient, of course, that this accusation can now be brought against an actual black presence in Britain's cities, thereby making it the more powerful.

What Pearson does is to destroy the rosy perspective that a nostalgic present always grants to its past. His critical inspection of two centuries of social history reveals that each age perceived itself in lurid colours, each society thought itself threatened with unprecedented levels of crime and decadence. And our own is no exception. Thus 1981 is found sadly recalling the tranquillity of the 1950s, which, plagued with Teddy boys and general moral deterioration, bemoaned the lost peace of the 1930s. When we get to the 1930s, of course, we find the 'voice of respectable fears' bewailing the rising crime wave, diminution of family and legal authority, and so on. Thus we travel back through the Edwardian era to the Victorian hooligans, their predecessors (the garotters) and the 'lawless' Chartists, the footpads, and the unruly apprentices of eighteenth-century Britain.

In the process Pearson draws out the true object of that attack of the respectable on the disreputable: hooligans are always working-class youth, with 'foreign' propensities to crime. Their activities – whether cycling, football, music hall, cinema, radio, or even going to libraries – are debilitating, destructive, rowdy and unwholesome. Working-class youth is too affluent for its own good (even when on the point of starvation), has too much freedom and is generally irresponsible. And, in every age, the 'voice of respectable fear', as Pearson characterises it, has always hit on the same solution for these miscreants – whatever was the contemporary version of the short-sharp-shock treatment. 'The idea that the past harbours a golden age of tranquillity also lends itself to the view that history might furnish us with effective methods of commonsense crime control.' Thus, at the Conservative Party conference in 1958 the cat-o'-nine tails and the stocks were being hailed as commendable crime preventatives. Their 1978 conference was still calling for the return of the birch and floggings. And, more recently, the 1983 conference rejoiced at the Home Secretary's announcement that minimum twenty-year sentences were to be introduced for certain categories of murder.

This is not to say that a strand of liberalism towards 'hooliganism' does not occasionally surface, which views delinquency as 'nothing more serious than the symptoms of healthy, vigorous, adventurous adolescence'. The official view has also not constantly maintained a hard line. Thus, in 1899, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner satisfactorily dismissed the increase in street crime as a trivial matter; 'at a time when a quarter of London's police were assaulted each year in the course of their duties, street "violence" was too much of an everyday occurrence to count as "real" crime'. And it is the *view* of crime which turns out to be the important feature, not the incidence. For some measure of lawlessness and disorder is a constant and abiding feature of the 'British way of life'. 'Respectable fear' claims that it is new, that unparalleled waves of crime are threatening the fabric of

society. Pearson documents that view with efficiency and much wit. And he does a good job on demolishing the method of measurement, the crime statistics which fuel that view. Crime waves are produced by changes in policing and not by changes in crime. 'Until the 1930s, for example, it was routine practice for the London police to record thefts reported to them by the public as "lost property".' The change in record-keeping produced a crime wave. The change from unregistered to formal cautions produced another. 'Among boys under 14 years of age ... the increased use of the formal caution is enough to account for the whole of the increase in recorded crime for this age-group during the 1970s.' When the distinction between major and minor damage was abandoned in 1977, 'all criminal damage incidents were recorded as "known crimes". In a single year, this simple administrative change produced the statistical illusion that vandalism had more than doubled, adding at a stroke *a sixth of a million* indictable offences to the criminal records.'

Although the police have always contributed their voice to that of 'respectable fear', they are now developing an autonomous political role in the arena. Pearson notes 'it seems almost impossible to go a single day without hearing ... a senior policeman hectoring us on the deteriorated conditions of public morals'. James Anderton, Kenneth Oxford, James Jardine, Robert Mark – they have almost achieved the status of household names with their variations on the 'crime-top-growth-industry' theme. No matter that, over the past five years, robbery and violence against the person have accounted for only 4 per cent of all serious crime,* they can still be trumpeted as a crime wave. The media, of course, loves a crime wave and cheerfully fuels the climate of fear which is currently shooting up to unprecedented levels. Their banner headlines proclaim the streets to be the territory of violent hordes of unemployed thugs (mostly black, of course), where the respectable newspaper reader dare not walk. They have been saying it for several hundred years, but the changing political climate is sharpening their clamours. The media publicises police opinion and legitimates their demands – demands to which Tory politicians willingly assent. This book is an excellent weapon with which to confound the lies and distortions of the 'law and order' lobby.

London ANGELA SHERLOCK

* Serious crime itself being a very dubious category which includes fixing your electricity meter, stealing a bicycle and murder.

Mozambique: the revolution and its origins

By BARRY MUNSLOW (London, Longman, 1983). 195 pp. £13.95 cloth, £5.95 paper

The particular importance of FRELIMO is that, in an African context, it transformed a national liberation struggle into revolution. When this achievement is summarised in one sentence, it is difficult to appreciate the enormity of it. Mozambican independence and the continuing struggle for socialism, however, are critical elements in the escalating southern Africa confrontation. Munslow's account of the experience is to be welcomed, not least because it is a valuable contribution to the continuing debate on the future of southern Africa.

FRELIMO was formed from three protonationalist groups. As such, it was a loose, cross-class alliance. Resistance to Portuguese colonialism was weak. Labour migration, largely to the South African mines, did not encourage a strong worker-peasant alliance within Mozambique and the use of forced labour within the colony prevented the emergence of a strong proletariat. The low level of technology and industrialisation, the significant racial divisions among the working class and the geographical isolation of much of the population worked against concerted action for national liberation. Yet, the First Congress (1962) established a basis for unity and struggle, while the Second Congress (1967) developed the strategy for struggle in a protracted people's war. Central to the successful strategy was the politicisation of areas before a military offensive was established and, when the areas were liberated, a concerted effort to establish development programmes. FRELIMO's leadership and leadership structure continue to reflect the growth of organic intellectuals who emerged from discussions of this strategy at the base.

The collapse of the Portuguese fascist regime, in 1974, brought a swift end to the fighting. Although FRELIMO was pursuing a revolutionary strategy in the north, it had little parallel experience in the south. Despite the antagonism of South Africa and the costs of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, FRELIMO moved beyond a simple nationalist context to develop a socialist trajectory. Dynamising groups continue to be an important focus for these efforts, carrying the lessons of people's war into the war against underdevelopment. The Third Congress (1977) marked the continued commitment to socialism, although the recent Fourth Congress (1983) has emphasised that such a commitment is difficult to achieve in the current war situation of southern Africa.

There are many attractive elements to FRELIMO's ideology. The history of the ideological struggle, like the history of the military struggle, is essential to an understanding of the present strength of FRELIMO. Ideological struggle had taken place from the beginning

and represented the different class positions of the leadership. As early as 1966, racism, tribalism and regionalism were declared enemies to be fought in the same way as colonialism. Even when these principles were enshrined in the constitution, debate raged, culminating in the unsuccessful bid to have the 'white' militants expelled from Tanzania during the 1968 crisis. These struggles continue as Machel attempts to focus attention on the current enemies, namely MNR backed by South Africa rather than internal ethnic differences. Yet, ten years after Independence, the list of development achievements is formidable, given the level of underdevelopment created by Portugal's 'civilising' mission and the impact of the undeclared war waged by South Africa.

Munslow's work is highly recommended. It provides an analysis of the strategy of FRELIMO and commentary on the development of Mondlane's and Machel's perceptive leadership. As such, it owes much to the pioneering efforts of Basil Davidson's work, particularly on the PAIGC and Cabral in Guiné. Most importantly, it chronicles a successful struggle that has critical lessons for the liberation of anglophone southern Africa. FRELIMO can, and does, teach us important lessons.

Nottingham PHIL O'KEEFE

Books received

This listing does not preclude subsequent publication of reviews

African islands and enclaves. Edited by Robin Cohen. London, Sage Publications, 1983. Cloth £19.50.

Amilcar Cabral: revolutionary leadership and people's war. By Patrick Chabal. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983. Cloth £22.50. Paper £9.95.

Ausländerfeindlichkeit: Tatsachen und Erklärungsversuche. By Georgios Tsiakalos. München, C.H. Beck, 1983.

Black marxism: the making of the black radical tradition. By Cedric J. Robinson. London, Zed Press, 1983. Cloth £22.00. Paper £7.95.

Black personalities in the era of the slave trade. By H. Edwards and J. Walvin. London, Macmillan, 1983. Cloth £25.00.

Black Southerners 1619-1869. By John B. Boles. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1983. Cloth £20.40.

Before colour prejudice: the ancient view of blacks. By Frank M. Snowden, Jr. London, Harvard University press, 1983. Cloth £14.80.

Class awareness in the United States. By Mary R. and Robert W. Jackman. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983. Cloth £24.75 ($37.65).

Close sesame. By Nuruddin Farah. London. Alison & Busby, 1983. Cloth £8.95.

Development literature and writers from underdeveloped countries: the case of Turkey. By Ayse Trak. Montreal, Centre for Developing-Area Studies, 1983. Paper $1.50.

Ethnic Pluralism and public policy: achieving equality in the United States and Britain. Edited by Nathan Glazer and Ken Young. London, Heinemann, 1983. Paper £6.50.

The family rice bowl: food and domestic economy in China. By Elizabeth Croll. London, Zed Press, 1983. Cloth £18.95. Paper £6.95.

Fellow Travellers of the right. By Richard Griffiths. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983. Paper £3.95.

Gender. By Ivan Illich. London, Marion Boyars, 1983. Cloth £8.95. Paper £4.95.

52%: getting women's power into politics. By Barbara Rogers. London, The Women's Press, 1983. Paper £4.50.

Greetings from Lappland: the Sami — Europe's forgotten people. By Nils-Aslak Valkeapää. London, Zed Press, 1983. Paper.

The Hongkong crisis. By Gregor Benton. London, Pluto Press, 1983. Paper £3.50.

Indonesia: law, propaganda and terror. By Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan. London, Zed Press, 1983. Cloth £12.95. Paper £5.95.

In the land of Israel. By Amos Oz. London, Chatto & Windus, 1983. Paper £8.95.

Inside the inner city: life under the cutting edge. By Paul Harrison. London, Penguin Books, 1983. Paper £3.95.

Introduction to race relations. By E. Cashmore and B. Troyna. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Paper £5.95.

Land and politics in New Caledonia. By Alan W. Ward. Canberra, Australian National University, 1982. Paper.

Listen, Companero: conversations with Central American revolutionary leaders. San Francisco, CENSA & Solidarity Publications, 1983. Paper $4.95.

Manichean aesthetics: the politics of literature in colonial Africa. By Abdul R. JanMohamed. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1983. Cloth $25.00.

Mines and independence: a future for Namibia 3. London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1983. Paper £2.95 ($5.00).

Mining capitalism and black labour in the early industrial period in South Africa. By Selim Gool. Lund, Sweden, Studentlitteratur, 1983. Paper $8.50.

Muslims in the West: the message and mission. By Syed Abdul Hasan Ali Nadwi. Leicester, the Islamic Foundation, 1983. Cloth £7.50. Paper £3.00.

Of common cloth: women in the global textile industry. Edited by Wendy Chapkis and Cynthia Enloe. Amsterdam, Transnational Institute, 1983. Paper £3.50.

One way ticket: migration and female labour. Edited by Annie Phizacklea. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Paper £4.95.

Pakistan: the roots of dictatorship: the political economy of a praetorian state. Edited by Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid. London, Zed Press, 1983.

Power, crime and mystification. By Steven Box. London, Tavistock Publications, 1983. Cloth £12.95. Paper £6.50.

Rainbows of the gutter. By Rukshana Smith. London, The Bodley Head, 1983. Paper £3.50.

Race, ethnicity and power ... a comparative study. By Donald G. Baker. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Cloth £14.95.

Race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status: a theoretical analysis of their interrelationship. By Charles V. Willie. New York, General Hall, 1983. Cloth $25.95. Paper $10.95.

Racial exclusionism and the city: the urban support of the National Front. By Christopher T. Husbands. London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983. Cloth £18.00.

Racism, school and the labour market. Edited by Barry Troyna and Douglas I. Smith. Leicester, National Youth Bureau, 1983. Paper £3.95.

The struggle for Africa. Edited by Mai Palmberg. London, Zed Press, 1983.

Talking about development. Edited by Altaf Gauhar. London, Third World Foundation, 1983. Paper £4.95 ($7.50).

The Soviet Union: socialist or social-imperialist? Part II. Raymond Lotta vs. Albert Szymanski. Chicago, RCP Publications, 1983.

Theresa and my people. By Desmond Johnson. London, Black Ink, 1983.

The valley of the orgy. By Julio Farrando. 1983. Paper £3.50.

Unmanageable revolutionaries: women and Irish nationalism. By Margaret Ward. London, Pluto Press, 1983. Paper £5.95.

White land, black labour: caste and class in late nineteenth-century Georgia. By Charles L. Flynn. London, Louisiana State University Press, 1983. Cloth £17.00.

Witness to genocide. London, Survival International, 1983. Paper.

We the people and others: duality and America's treatment of its racial minorities. By Benjamin B. Ringer. London, Tavistock Publications, 1983. Cloth £45.00.

Order the back issues you have missed

AUTUMN 1983 £2/$4

Special Issue: **British racism: the road to 1984**
Challenging racism: strategies for the '80s – *A. Sivanandan*
Capital, 'black youth' and crime – *Cecil Gutzmore*
Policing the urban wasteland – *Lee Bridges*
Psychiatry and the corporate state – *Black Health Workers and Patients Group*
A common language – *Chris Searle*

SUMMER 1983 £2/$4

Towards an anti-racist feminism – *Jenny Bourne*
Racism without colour: the Catholic ethic and ethnicity in Quebec – *Dipankar Gupta*
The people's commentator: calypso and the Grenada revolution: an interview with Cecil Belfon, The Flying Turkey – *Chris Searle*
Ethnicity and class in Cyprus – *Floya Anthias and Ron Ayres*

SPRING 1983 £3/$6

Special Double Issue: **The invasion of Lebanon**
Editors: *Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Eqbal Ahmad*
Introduction – *Eqbal Ahmad*
The meaning of Beirut, 1982 – *Ibrahim Abu-Lughod*
Despatches from the war – *Selim Nassib*
The defence of Beirut: report from the front line – *Sami Al-Banna*
Invasion of Lebanon: an American's view – *Don Wagner*
The medical impact of the siege of Beirut – *Ameen Ramzy, MD*

WINTER 1983 £2/$4

Special Issue: **Kenya: The Politics of Repression**
Race & Class publishes articles smuggled out of Kenya from those involved in the struggle:
Background to the coup; Events of 1 August; Politics of justice; Kenya's plundered economy; Foreign policy in American geopolitics; Mau Mau 30 years on; Popular theatre and popular struggle – Kamiriithu

Full details of all back issues in print available on request

£2.00/$4.00

Institute of Race Relations