

**EXCLUSIVE**

● THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT — an Indian policy paper (2) ●

**LANKA**

# **GUARDIAN**

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Gandhi takes charge

## **THAT WAS THE WEEK THAT WAS**

— *Mervyn de Silva*

- MASSACRE OF THE MONKS
- THE ARMADA RETREATS
- RAJIV REACHES FOR THE SKY
- THE ISOLATION OF SRI LANKA
- PRAISE BE TO ZIA AND SAARC
- THE TIGER SPRINGS BACK !

**Beyond Hysteria** — *Reggie Siriwardena*  
*R. Coomaraswamy*

**The battle for hearts, minds and stomachs**  
— *John Elliott*

**Peasant Agriculture** — *N. Shanmugaratnam*

**AFGHANISTAN: Does Reagan really want the Russians out ?**  
— *Arnaldo Musa*

**Also:** Solarz, E.E.C. on the crisis,  
An army infiltrated? **and**  
The foreign aid scene

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GARADS

# TRENDS

## MILITARISATION AND THE STATE

Sri Lanka's 'war effort', enthusiastically supported by a media blitz for a rapid military build-up, resulted inevitably in what this journal has a long while ago described as an ominous 'militarisation process'. The implied danger was the militarising of a society where crime and violence, though widespread, was not frightening because the weapons used were not sophisticated and were not easily available anyway even to the best organised 'gangs'. Militarisation not only means a social and psychological change but ready access to deadly modern weaponry.

Now 'militarisation', the policy of the State confronted by an insurgency, is not only a threat to society but to the State itself. A list of 50 names, all recent recruits to the services, has been recovered by the police, according to a frontpage story in the ISLAND (10/6). This number is in addition to the 37 servicemen already drummed out of the army. 200 others are being re-screened by the intelligence agencies. (One newspaper put the figure as high as 1,000). Besides, the personnel arrested or thrown out are NOT all from the army, by far the largest of the services. After the recent attack on the Katunayake air base, which is only a few more miles away from Colombo than the Kotelawela Defence Academy, the other target, Air Force personnel have also been taken into custody.

The military build-up meant indiscriminate recruitment. Just a chit from some highly placed politico — not in anyway different from getting your name into the Job Bank!

## THE SPORTING LIFE

Relief at last. Not seaborne nor airdropped! On horse back. The Daily News reported, with almost a full throated shout of unalloyed joy, that racing will start once more in Nuwara Eliya, the old colonial Englishman's seasonal pleasure resort, and of course of the upper class Sri Lankan. "Going to the races in Sri Lanka" was the frontpage headline for the story by the paper's upcountry correspondent. On the same page, the paper's lobby correspondent reported the previous day's proceedings in parliament, "Racing Bill canters thru" was the equally cheerful headline for the welcome news that 'the

Ban on Racing News publication Act' had been revoked.

## NORWEGIAN AID

With only ten days more for the Sri Lanka Aid Group meeting, Norway has decided to stop commodity assistance to this country. The Norwegian Aid Agency (NORAD) corrected a report broadcast by All-India Radio which said that Norway would cease all aid operations here. In a clarification, a Norwegian spokesman said that his country will continue its support for specific projects. The Integrated Rural Development scheme was named.

"Norway" said the official "is deeply concerned with the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, and follows the situation closely. Our aid has been subject to much discussions during the last couple of years in the light of violence and the human rights situation".

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# CROSSING THE THRESHOLD

NEWS  
BACKGROUND

Mervyn de Silva

The Indian airforce planes which intruded into Sri Lankan airspace crossed more than Sri Lanka's borders. The aircraft, symbolising the Indian state, not the state of Tamilnadu, signalled that India's Sri Lanka's policy had crossed a critical threshold, a threshold of tolerance.

The mission had other messages, multiple messages for different audiences.

(a) It was primarily a signal to Colombo that Delhi was ready to pay a price, mainly diplomatic prestige, in order to demonstrate that its patience had run out. It would be a demonstration of superior force.

(b) The force-projection was a message to neighbours (and to the world) that it was prepared to violate international law, which of course is always arguable, to assert its regional paramountcy, if India's 'national and security interests' were imperilled and its regional status questioned or challenged.

(c) It was a message of appeasement, loud and clear, to Tamilnadu. While all these signals have been received and correctly understood, one particular message has not.

(d) It was a message to the Tamil people of the north that in the last analysis, their protector was NOT the LTTE, nor even Tamilnadu, but the Indian government.

Thus the "greenlight" story which appeared in the state-owned *SUNDAY OBSERVER* was neither true nor false. India did not give Colombo the 'greenlight' to go ahead with "Operation Liberation". It stuck to its basic position that a 'military solution' would prove short-lived

and illusory. (In other words a "Mirage", a mirage it proved, only of French-make!). What Delhi did tell Colombo was 'scooped' by the South Asia editor of the *Financial Times* reporting from Colombo. He wrote (FT 8/6) "Sri Lanka has been told by India that it should not conduct any more air strikes and bombing raids on the northern peninsula against Tamil extremists... This is the explicit message given by India following its assertion of military supremacy over its tiny island neighbour last week..."

In fact, message was only 'more explicit', but not new. From late May, when it looked as if 'Operation Liberation One' may move into Phase 2, Delhi has repeated its warnings — stop air-strikes; do not make any attempt to recapture Jaffna town, for the civilian casualties would be such that Tamilnadu situation may become uncontrollable, putting in turn too much pressure on Delhi.

The fact that Delhi chose the least harmful way of asserting its military supremacy — dropping food parcels rather than anything lethal — was the clearest indication that the operation had been carefully calibrated, to achieve the best balance considerations, the goal of all policy-makers in conditions that are not ideal, and in fact involve some risks and sacrifices. In this case, the sacrifices was India's image (and Mr. Gandhi's) of nonaligned leader, SAARC chairman, consistent critic of the use of military force against small nations apostle of panchasila etc.

The demonstration of regional pre-eminence had a regional audience too, especially to those neighbours which had actively got involved in the armed conflict here. Mr. Gandhi has been persistently denouncing the active participation of 'foreign' military and security advisers etc. And the Indian press, especially the *HINDU*, has been strident and shrill in its allegations that the military offensives have been

## LALITH IN PAKISTAN

*The National Security Minister, Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali, who was reported to be visiting the U. S. on a lecture tour-cum-official meetings has left for Pakistan, according to the SUN (15/6). The paper which called it a 'mission' said he was carrying an "important message" from President J R to General Zia ul Huq. His visit follows, the SUN added, last week's meeting with president Zia of Education and Youth Affairs Minister, Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe, who is also in charge of 'the manpower mobilisation scheme' under which para-military training is given to hundreds of young men.*

*Before his departure, Mr. Athulathmudali told the SUNDAY TIMES that if peace talks are not resumed 'the government will have no choice but to resume the military option and gradually gain control of the entire Jaffna peninsula'.*

“planned” with their help. It was also a signal to the patron of these foreign advisers that India, though pressed recently on both strategic borders and disputed boundaries, China and Pakistan could act. So, the demonstration was in many senses a demonstration only — the lowest rung in the ladder of escalation.

Foreign correspondents who came along for the ride in the Atononov transport planes observed how the French Mirage jet fighters zoomed several times menacingly over Palaly airport. If Palaly become unserviceable, as one western correspondent, pointed out, the Sri Lanka armed forces would be denied air support, the critical plus factor on the side of the armed forces.

There was no shot fired, no blood split. But that has not stopped Tamilnadu (and the *HINDU*) from demanding “harder options” — like air strikes on all vital bases, air and naval, in the north and Trincō. Delhi has ignored these war-mongers.

## FIST IN THE KID'S GLOVE

The *New York Times* has made a disenchanting discovery. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is beginning to behave like his “testy and authoritarian mother, but without her cunning”. Surprised and visibly pained by the personality change, the usually imperturbable NYK Times asks: “Where is the calm, good-natured Rajiv Gandhi who so impressed the world a year ago?”.

Regular readers of the L.G., which has noticed and patiently traced the gradual transformations, will note that Mr. Gandhi finally ended up by holding nation-wide rallies on the “De-Stabilisation Theme” where the prime minister’s accusing finger was pointed aimed at ‘foreign elements’, both in the region and outside it. In politics, it is more common for the role to take over the individual than the individual to create his own singular role.

The air-drop may not win any votes in Haryana. So, Tamilnadu pressures notwithstanding, the domestic compulsions and the need for a morale-boosting action for Gandhi more than his Congress, must not be emphasised to the point of excluding other considerations. By this

mildest of interventions (the *SUN* said the Goa operation of 1961 was the model) India has confirmed a prediction of Prof. Neil McFarlane in his I.I.S.S. study on ‘Intervention and Regional Security’.

(Continued on page 5)

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## DIPLOMATIC FRONT

## Sri Lanka's Moment of Truth

General Zia stood up and was counted, confirming Prime Minister Premadasa's description of Pakistan as a firm friend and close ally. 'Deplorable violation' of Sri Lanka's sovereignty, said Pakistan of the Indian intrusion into the island's airspace. China stood up too, but its criticism was more subdued. It censured India for 'interference'.

But serious diplomatic embarrassment for India came through the choric cry of S.A.A.R.C., the South Asian body of which India is the current chairman. Bangladesh which has a running dispute with India, over Chakma tribal insurgency and cross-border raids from both countries, issued a highly critical statement, Bangladesh's Ziaur Rahman was the author of the SAARC idea. Recently Indo-Bangladesh talks on bilateral issues proved abortive. Nepal which has whole crop of unsettled problems with India was also forthright. So was Maldives.

But these internal frictions, the direct outcome of the Indian airforce 'airdrop' of relief supplies, finally left Sri Lanka and SAARC with a problem. Should Sri Lanka attend the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Delhi? Colombo was in two minds. South Block then made a smart move. If Sri Lanka decided not to attend, Delhi would postpone the Foreign Ministers' meeting and many others, at official level, which were to follow. Promptly, the rest of the SAARC members were converted from hostile critics of India into friendly persuaders of Sri Lanka. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Maldives urged Sri Lanka to participate in the Delhi conference. The ball was clearly in Colombo's court.

With the exception of Pakistan and China, both arms suppliers to Sri Lanka (Pakistan also provides military training facilities

and military expertise) and to a lesser extent the SAARC quartet, Sri Lanka, although the victim, suffered near-total diplomatic isolation in the international community, a stinging indictment of the UNP's foreign policy. In past decades, Sri Lanka's sturdy non-alignment had been its first line of defence.

In 1971, a popularly elected U. F. government received prompt military assistance, including the active participation of foreign personnel, from the two major regional powers (no great friends!) India and Pakistan, from the two superpowers, from Yugoslavia and Egypt, two founder-members of the nonaligned movement. Of course, there are many salient differences between the two conflicts. Yet those differences, however important, do not diminish the significance of the immediate and sympathetic responses from the outside world, and the varied sources of direct and active support received by the Sri Lankan government of the day.

How did the international community respond this time? Apart from SAARC, the current was plainly against us. To the intense discomfiture and dismay, UNP's three biggest backers, political and economic, the US, Japan and U.K. preferred to stay silent (Japan's was the most marked) or make statements that were far from pro-Sri Lankan. It fact, the U. S. position was presented by the State Dept. spokesman. He regretted that talks between Sri Lanka and India had been abortive and India had "felt is necessary" to send the supplies in the manner which it chose. The EEC is the world's most powerful economic organisation. The EEC expressed the 'firm hope' that Indo-Sri Lankan relations will improve, 'failing which no solution to the central problem... will be possible' (See EEC statement and Solarz).

The other superpower spoke through the authoritative voice of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev himself. "We have a perfect understanding of the Indian view on Sri Lanka" he told Foreign Minister Tiwari.

As for the UN, it was no less a person than the UNP's first appointee to New York, Mr. B. J. Fernando who advised his old party on the "futility" of going to the Security Council. Such a step, he warned, would 'internationalise' the issue — something we can ill afford, especially after the roasting we got at the Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva 3 months ago.

M. de S.

## CROSSING. . .

(Continued from page 4)

"Intervention has for many years been primarily a Third World phenomenon in terms of targets. To an increasing degree, it is likely to become so in terms of actors as well."

Examining the 'target environment', the same writer notes: "Societies which ultimately experience military intervention are generally lacking in political integration and chronically unstable, and their populations have little if any commitment to central political authority. This lack of integration reflects deep-seated ethnic and class conflicts between groups comprising the society in question. It sets the scene for the armed conflict within the population that in turn provokes military intervention. Moreover intervention is usually a new stage in a long-standing involvement on the part of an external actor in an internal conflict on the side of one party to that conflict".

# Solarz on South Asia's Ulster

Aziz Haniffa

WASHINGTON, D. C.

**W**hile wishing that New Delhi's decision to provide relief supplies to the Jaffna Peninsula could have been worked out in co-operation with Sri Lanka, a leading American Congressman said yesterday that "to the extent that India decided however to proceed with the airlift unilaterally, I can only say that it is better to drop relief supplies than bombs."

Brooklyn Democrat Stephen J. Solarz, who chairs the House Sub-committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, acknowledged that "obviously to some extent, India was acting out of its own domestic compulsions."

He said that his main interest as chairman of a committee that has jurisdiction over both India and Sri Lanka, was to "facilitate a solution for the problems to the region and I don't think that is served by either denouncing or condoning these actions."

"I think," he said, "it is served by encouraging negotiations in a peaceful resolution of differences."

He asserted that he did not have "all of the information I would need in order to make a definite judgement of this."

"If in fact," Solarz said, thousands and thousands of people were starving, if in fact, lots of people were otherwise innocent, I might come to one conclusion, if not, I might come to another conclusion."

He reiterated that "at the moment, I simply do not know what the facts were on the ground."

They are as different as the night is from the day in terms of values, in terms of their record, and the like." He said that "what I was simply trying to do was to give some illustrations of situations where other countries did intervene."

Solarz agreed that Sri Lanka was "a democracy and as a democracy I certainly believe it is entitled to the sympathy of the United States."

Speaking to the Sri Lankan situation in general, Solarz said that any long-term solution to the problem was a "political one, which would be compatible with the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, but also with the very legitimate concerns of the Tamil minority with respect to their own security and their right to play a greater role in the conduct of their own affairs."

He said that "at some point if it should become clear that a negotiated settlement is simply not possible, I think it would be difficult to deny or to deprive the government of Sri Lanka of the right to take such actions as may be necessary in order to establish their control over the entirety of their country."

However, he asserted that this should not be "interpreted as acquiescing in the systematic violation of the human rights of the Sri Lankan people or the Tamil minority."

He said that one of the "real problems of the Sri Lankans is that in past the security forces have acted in utterly unacceptable ways with respect to the Tamil minority."

Solarz acknowledged that the problem, of course is compounded by the absolutely outrageous attacks against Sinhalese civilians, presumably by Tamil terrorists and that has clearly further inflamed the situation."

"A country," he said, "which was once the envy of the Third World, relatively peaceful and tranquil experiencing sustained economic growth with an equitable distribution of income, is now on the verge of becoming the Ulster of South Asia."

— Sun

## EEC on Indo - Sri Lanka relations

**T**he twelve state members of the European Community, have followed with serious concern the evolution of relations between India and Sri Lanka these last few days. They consider that, whatever the reasons behind the actions undertaken by either side, parties involved must avoid any escalation of tension in the region. They express the firm hope that the relations between India and Sri Lanka will ease, failing which no solution to this central problem, i.e. the ethnic conflict which is dividing Sri Lanka, will be possible.

Referring to their common declarations dated 25 February

1986, 14 July 1986 and 27 April 1987, the Twelve regret that it has not been possible so far to implement a peaceable settlement of this internal conflict. They condemn again the terrorist actions which have caused the death of so many civilians. They have been deeply shocked by the recent brutal massacre of Buddhist monks.

The Twelve acknowledge that the Sri Lanka Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and share with it the firm belief that a negotiated settlement is the only way to find a lasting solution which is acceptable to all the parties involved.



## MILITARY FRONT

## A hostile population

The landmine that killed three soldiers also killed ten released Tamil detainees returning home. The cruel ironies of war should not divert our attention from what that incident really meant. It took place in an area where the army have dislodged the LTTE, after destroying its bunkers etc, is now 'consolidating'. It was the first glimpse of the next stage of this war if, especially if Jaffna town is recaptured and the forces become an army of occupation.

Mr. Lalith Athulathmidali seems to have sensed this when he told

an ECONOMIST correspondent a month ago "We will face a hostile population of 850,000 people".

In other words, a military victory will in fact transform the nature of the armed conflict thrusting it into a new and perhaps even more trying and demanding stage. The situation may revert to the late 70's when the policeman was the symbol of law and order. In the new stage the soldier, especially soldiers on patrol in small units, will become the target.

The LTTE like the PLO and its fighters may be thrown out of Jaffna, the way the PLO was ejected physically from Lebanon by the mighty Israeli army, which also created its own pro-Israeli Christian militia in South Lebanon. Now Yasser Arafat is back, as Chairman, of a more united, more radical PLO that has denounced Egypt, Israeli partner to the US sponsored Camp David.

The Christian militia is under attack, and the Israel army has to rush help. What is more the Israeli Cabinet is sharply divided on the question of war and peace.

M.

## THE MADRAS FRONT

## Forerunner to firm actions

MADRAS, June 6.

The DMK President, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, today said that the next sorties by the Indian Air Force planes over Sri Lanka should be to rain bombs and not to drop relief supplies.

He was addressing his party-men at the end of a silent procession organised to condole the victims of State terrorism in Sri Lanka and to condemn the genocide of Tamils in the island.

The Governments of India, he said, had failed to take effective steps in the last four years to save the Tamils subjected to untold sufferings in the island. The air dropping of relief supplies had come as a sequel to the refusal to let the Indian boats carrying food and other articles reach the shores of Sri Lanka. To a limited extent this mission of providing humanitarian assistance was welcome. But what

next? Would this be a forerunner to firm actions which India might take to force the Sri Lanka Government stop its genocide of Tamils?

## Centre urged to continue relief supplies to Tamils

MADRAS, June 6.

Mr. A. Nallasivan, State Secretary of the CPI (M) today urged the Centre to continue the provision of relief to Tamils in Sri Lanka suffering without essential commodities and life-saving medicines due to the economic blockade.

In a statement, he also appealed to the centre to mobilise world opinion to help find a solution to the ethnic crisis in the island and ensure relief to the Tamils.

## TULF appeal to world leaders

MADRAS, June 6.

The TULF has appealed to the Heads of Government in the world to come to the rescue of the Tamils in Sri Lanka in this hour of crisis by extending all support to the efforts of the Government of India and channeling generous material aid to the destitute Tamil people through the Government of India.

In a telex message, the TULF Secretary-General, Mr. A. Amirthalingam and its president, Mr. M. Sivasithamparam, said the attacks on innocent Tamil civilians had been intensified since January, resulting in the death of thousands of men, women and children and also the colossal destruction of property. The economic blockade imposed by Colombo, strafing and bombing from the air and shelling from the sea had reduced the Tamil people to a state of starvation. — Hindu

## JAFFNA FRONT

John Elliott in Sri Lanka reports from amid the rubble of the Tigers' guerrilla stronghold

# Battle for Tamil hearts, minds and stomachs

Mr Lalith Athulathmudali, Sri Lanka's National Security Minister, stood yesterday in the coastal Jaffna town of Velvedditurai captured from Tamil extremists a week ago and announced "We want to win the hearts and minds of the people. We are one people and one country and we want non-violence".

Accompanied by four other ministers, two generals, civil servants, and a crowd of local and foreign journalists, including two from India, Mr Athulathmudali chose this battered and sensitive town to launch a "hearts, minds and stomachs" campaign aimed at preventing the area falling back into the hands of the Tamil Tigers.

For four years this had been the Tamil extremists' main base. It was seized by the armed forces after heavy bombing and fighting, which claimed perhaps more than 100 civilian lives and demolished many homes and other buildings.

In the last few days 4,000 Tamil men aged 15 to 35 have been arrested in the surrounding area and taken to a controversial and feared interrogation centre called Boosa in the south of the island.

Smiling and talking with the urbane style of a 50-year-old former president of the Oxford Union and a successful lawyer, Mr Athulathmudali, who wants to be president of Sri Lanka, walked into the dusty courtyard of an ornate Hindu temple where several hundred Tamil women, watched by their husbands and children, queued for relief aid of rice and flour.

He gently held the hand of the first distraught father who rushed to him and said: "I have put my wife (Shrimani) in charge of all the welfare of the boys who have gone to Boosa. She and her colleagues in the

Seva Vinythia welfare organisation are writing to all the parents and will look after their welfare."

At a meeting with local organisations, he promised to use defence budget money to buy the local crop of onions, and also promised to help ship coconuts to Colombo, to provide grants for agricultural seeds and fertiliser, to set up a telephone link with the rest of the island, and to try to reopen schools and restart fishing.

This is the first such community programme launched by Mr Athulathmudali, who believes that military victories against the Tigers must precede a possibly distant peace settlement. That he has done it is recognition of the depths to which Sri Lanka's ethnic strife has sunk in the past four years as Tamil claims for some form of independence or devolution in Jaffna and the east of the island had become increasingly violent.

The main street and coastal roads of Velvedditurai are testimony to the havoc that has been wrought. Three years ago the first damage was done to buildings when the Tigers planted landmines and the navy shelled the town which is the home of Mr V Prabhakaran, the Tiger's leader, who escaped after last week's defeat.

The battle smashed line after line of buildings beyond repair. Roofs are caved in and brick and concrete walls are a mass of rubble. There are access tunnels under roads and large bunkers built by the Tigers which have been demolished. I was warned not to walk off the street or into houses because they could still be booby-trapped.

A three-mile long bunker called Canada, and regarded by the Tigers as their main defence, took two days to capture and is now a mass of rubble. "The Tigers always said Eelam (their

name for an independent homeland) would fall when Canada fell," said Brigadier Gerry de Silva.

"There was no warning at all last Tuesday week. The planes came in at 5.45 am and they bombed and bombed till 6 pm," said Mr J. Nathan, a quantity surveyor who was standing with other husbands and children in the temple ground.

"Seven helicopters came in and shot along the streets. Three Avro transport planes dropped incendiary bombs on houses and there were five other bombers as well," said Mr Sinha, a lorry driver.

He was referring, almost certainly with some exaggeration, to part of Sri Lanka's limited air force of 25 Bell 212, 412, and 206 civilian helicopters, converted with machine guns and rocket launchers, six new SIAI-Machetti two-seat turbo prop trainers which have been converted with guns and rocket pods and were doing the bombing, and some antique Avro 748 transports.

There is no sign of the "carpet bombing" alleged by India, nor the massive civilian casualties and starvation which India used as justification for its violation of Sri Lankan airspace to drop relief supplies on Thursday.

"We did have bombing on concrete bunkers where there was heavy resistance. They were destroyed by air when the infantry asked for help," said General N. Seneviratne, the army commander, who claimed the locals' reports were exaggerated.

People in the temple were divided about whether they wanted India to intervene. Most wanted arms sent to them or the Tamils to help them defend themselves, but few wanted India

(Continued on page 11)

## JAFFNA FRONT

John Elliott assesses the importance of Mr Gandhi's flotilla of relief boats

# Sri Lanka finally exhausts India's patience

India's plan to send relief boats into Sri Lankan territory, has finally made clear, after years of frustration, that it intends to have a more direct say in the fate of the island's 2m Tamils in an increasingly violent ethnic crisis.

Irrespective of how events unfold in the next few days, the relationship between these two neighbouring but vastly different countries will never be the same again. To the people of Sri Lanka's majority Sinhalese race, India seems to have confirmed their worst fears that one day it would try to invade their small island. "Will Indian troops follow?" was a question often asked here yesterday.

"The relief boats are the basis of a message we want to send to Sri Lanka that they cannot continue generating tensions, killing Tamil civilians and not solving their basic ethnic problems," Mr J. N. Dixit, India's influential High Commissioner in Colombo, said in an interview yesterday.

"We want their military offensive to stop. They have a systematically escalating pogrom against the Tamils. My prime minister has said he cannot accept genocide, Mr Dixit added, referring to the military operations which Sri Lankan armed forces have waged against Tamil extremists on the northern Jaffna peninsula in the past eight days.

For the first time Mr Rajiv Gandhi, Indian Prime Minister, has taken an aggressive step towards one of India's smaller neighbours which is more reminiscent of the policies of his mother, the late Mrs Indira Gandhi, than his own earlier professed desire to improve regional relationships.

There will be some suspicions that Mr Gandhi has adopted

his aggressive stance partly to bolster his own dwindling public image in India and to help his Congress I Party's chances in a key regional election which takes place in the northern Indian state of Haryana later this month.

Mr Gandhi has also been under pressure from India's southern state of Tamil Nadu, where there are 50m Indian Tamils closely linked with those in Sri Lanka.

For the first time, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, Indian Prime Minister, has taken an aggressive step towards one of India's smaller neighbours which is more reminiscent of the policies of his mother, the late Mrs Indira Gandhi, than his own earliest professed desire to improve regional relationships.

India has, however, also become increasingly uneasy about links between Sri Lanka and two of its more interventionist neighbours, Pakistan on its western border and China to the north. Pakistan, which yesterday offered the country relief aid, has trained hundreds of Sri Lankan soldiers to fight the Tamil extremists, and China has been supplying defence equipment on what are believed to be very soft terms. This help has contributed to a dramatic improvement in the Sri Lankan armed forces' effectiveness in the past two years.

For over three years, Mr Gandhi has tried to conciliate on the Tamils' claims for some form of devolution between the Sri Lankan Government of Mr Junius Jayawardene, and representatives of the Tamils based in the southern Indian city of Madras.

Although the extremists have frequently walked away from possible settlement, India believes that it is the intransigence of

Sri Lanka's Sinhalese dominated Government, backed by Buddhist priests, which is most to blame for continual conciliation failures.

Sri Lanka argues that India could end the crisis, if it closed down extremists' safe havens in Tamil Nadu. It is especially angry at cheques for over \$3m, recently given to Tamil organisations by the state government of Tamil Nadu.

In the past few months it has decided to concentrate primarily on achieving military victories rather than a negotiated settlement, and the campaign launched in Jaffna last Tuesday marked the start of the major push against Tamil strongholds.

While privately understanding Sri Lanka's wish to eliminate leading Tamil extremists, India fears that these battles would involve widespread killing of innocent Tamil civilians, perhaps as many as 10,000 if a full attack was launched in Jaffna city. Sri Lanka, however, puts civilian deaths so far at no higher than 40 and has given the impression it would wait for Jaffna city to be evacuated before launching any final attack.

But India accuses the Sri Lankan Government of discriminating against the Tamil minority for many years and now believes that Sinhalese soldiers would have no compunction about mass Tamil civilian deaths.

The flotilla of boats due to sail this morning is a message that, after 40 years of the two countries' independence from British rule, India's patience with Sri Lanka's policies on the Tamils is exhausted. What India might do next is not known, but Sri Lanka is supposed to understand that, the 20 boats carrying food, kerosene and journalists are merely the first step of a new era, from which there is no going back.

**JAFFNA FRONT**

**The push on Jaffna**

After a week of feints and probes, the Sri Lankan army on May 26th started a new offensive aimed at winning back the island's northern peninsula of Jaffna from the Tamil guerrillas who have controlled it for two years. Since more than 100 people were killed by a terrorist bomb in the capital, Colombo, on April 21st, peace talks have been forgotten. The government needs to regain the support of the country's Sinhalese majority; it hopes to do so by inflicting serious and visible damage on the guerrillas who want a separate state for the Tamil minority.

It is a year since the government last tried seriously to retake Jaffna. Then the army moved up through Elephant pass, the land route on to the peninsula, and tried a pincer attack on the town. The guerrillas beat the

soldiers back. This time the troops are moving in by land, sea and air. Most observers reckon the balance of military power has swung in their favour in the past year. The army has recruited plenty of new men. The 8,000 or so soldiers in the peninsula are better trained, armed and equipped than before.

The Tamil Tigers, who are the main guerrilla group, have suffered serious reverses. They tried at the beginning of the year to set up an independent administration in Jaffna but failed to take account of the peninsula's dependence on the south for fuel, electricity, money and much of its food. The government partly blockaded the peninsula in January and followed up with a pretty successful offensive in February in the Tamil-speaking Northern province, which lies just south of the peninsula.

The Tigers have lost too many of their leaders. Some were killed in that offensive, some in February in a disastrous attempt to blow up an army base. Their second-in-command, Mr Sadasivam Krishnakumar (known as Kittu), was seriously wounded two months ago when three rival Tamil groups tried to assassinate him.

Sri Lanka's national security minister, Mr Lalith Athulathmudali, recently estimated the Tiger's total strength at 3,000 men. Other people doubt whether there are even half that number of hard-core guerrillas in the whole island. For most of this year they have had problems getting weapons, which normally come in through Indian's southern state of Tamil Nadu; the Indian government, trying to force the

*(Continued on page 11)*

**Bullying not legacy of Gandhi and Nehru**

**— President**

"In the long history of relations between India and the Indian states, we have been invaded 16 times from Indian soil and four times by powers from the Far East and the West". President J. R. Jayewardene told yesterday's government parliament group meeting.

He said "The Indian invasion of June 4 was the 21st. We were occupied for 715 years, the whole island or a portion of it, in a history of 2500 years. This has added a few hours to this total.

"Was this necessary? The Sri Lanka government had informed India that the government would receive aid and distribute it in accordance with the wishes of the donors and in association with them.

"The Sri Lanka government had no means of resisting India's unilateral action physically, nor

will it be able to do so in the future. Moreover, the government did not wish that a single person, Indian or Lankan, should be harmed.

"I have instructed my people not to retaliate in any way and that they should by non-violence and truth seek to persuade the Indian government and those who agree with them. that the path of violence, of bullying, is not the political endowment India has inherited from Mahatma Gandhi and Jawarhalal Nehru.

"In September 1967, when there was a time of great famine and drought in India, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) with the consent of the Indian government, directed two ships carrying 18,000 tons of rice to aid the starving people, though we were importing rice ourselves. Mrs. Gandhi, on her visit to Sri Lanka that year, publicly thanked the government

and people of Sri Lanka for this gesture — and also for sending technical experts to advise the local king of Kashmir on irrigation projects. over 1500 years ago.

"My intention is to see that we behave following the tenets of Lord Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi, the greatest sons of India, though their reachings are not respected any longer by the Indian and Tamil Nadu governments.

"Non-violence and satyagraha seek to persuade and not to confront, to convert and not to defeat.

"Let the whole nation wish that the members of the government of India and Tamil Nadu turn away from the path of violence in thought and action".

*— Daily New, 10/6*

# Sri Lanka aid likely to remain stagnant

John Elliott

NEW DELHI

**S**ri Lanka is expected to be given pledges of development aid of about \$ 550 m for the coming year, when donor nations hold their annual consortium meeting, organised by the World Bank, in Paris on June 25.

This will continue the recent trend of Sri Lanka's level of aid stagnating in real terms, despite the total last year having pushed up to about \$ 700 m by extra funding for new hydro-electric and other development projects.

Sri Lanka has been warned by countries involved not to try to impress the consortium by setting up special peace talks on the country's ethnic crisis, so as to mitigate the impact of the sort of offensive now under way in the Jaffna peninsula.

For the past three years, peace initiatives have been started just before each annual meeting, and have foundered shortly after. Each time they have diverted most of the countries involved from cutting their aid or openly criticising Sri Lanka's ethnic policies and army violence.

## Battle for . . .

(Continued from page 8)

to invade. They knew little about Thursday's drop of relief aid.

Mr Athulathmudali was more caustic. With a glance to foreign journalists to ensure we were listening, he said: "Indian food be careful, diarrhoea, you know." He appeared to acknowledge an implied threat by India to intervene again if government forces renewed their attacks on the Tigers, but laughed: "It's like a big brother trying to bully a small brother — the small brother goes between the legs of big brother."

— *Financial Times*, 6/6

Last year, though, Mr. Ronnie de Mel, Sri Lanka's Finance Minister was warned not to let this happen again, if he wanted to avoid a serious loss of international credibility. This message has been repeated again in recent months.

Mr de Mel says that, but for the current Tamil guerrilla war, his country could have absorbed up to \$ 1 bn a year by now, given its earlier development plans. He has been promised an immediate \$ 200 m extra by various countries for rehabilitation work, if and when the crisis is settled.

But, despite the line on peace talks, Sri Lanka could well be criticised at the talks over the current military offensive against Tamil extremists' positions in the northern peninsula of Jaffna. Forecasts of casualties rise as high as 11,000, mostly civilians, if a bid were made to capture Jaffna city, which has been occupied by the extremists for more than two years. So Sri Lanka is unlikely to want to be in the middle of such a battle on June 25

Two of the countries at the aid talks — Canada and Norway — jointly sponsored a recent resolution condemning Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Commission. Norway is cutting its aid this year, in protest against the government's policies, being the first country to do so.

Meanwhile, an International Monetary Fund team is in Colombo negotiating details of fiscal and industrial policy reforms, which the government is to introduce in return for obtaining Rs 6.5 bn (\$ 230 m) in structural adjustment and other loans from the IMF and the World Bank. These will be in addition to the Paris consortium pledges, and are aimed to provide urgently needed balance of payments support.

The country's debt service ratio rose by 5.7 per cent to 26

per cent in 1986, according to the annual report of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, published this month, despite the balance of payments having improved slightly. The current account deficit declined from SDR 410 m in 1985 to SDR 357 m, partly, helped by lower oil prices.

The country's main economic problem however, remains the rapidly increasing defence budget.

— *Financial Times*

## The push . . .

(Continued from page 10)

guerillas into negotiations, confiscated the weapons and stopped supplies of other things. Recent ructions between the Indian and Sri Lankan governments, however, are said to have resulted in new shipments.

India has criticised the latest offensive, but its influence is limited. The Indian government's repeated attempts to mediate between the two sides have got nowhere. The Indian and Sri Lankan governments have engaged in a slanging match this year over the economic blockade and subsequent bombing of Jaffna. Earlier this month, the Indians damned themselves in the Sri Lankan's eyes when the chief minister of Tamil Nadu handed over \$ 2.5m, supposedly humanitarian aid, to organisations of Sri Lankan Tamils which have set up bases in his state.

By ignoring Indian objections and attacking the peninsula, the Sri Lankan government looks tough and pleases its own people. But some of its members wonder what would happen if it recaptured Jaffna. As Mr Athulathmudali asked earlier this year, "What do we do with a hostile population of 850,000 Tamils?"

— *The Economist*, 30/5

# Beyond Hysteria

— Committee for Rational Development

## When sanity is unpopular

After the barbaric and cruel murders which took place on the Habarana Trincomalee road, the inhuman bombing at the Pettah bus stand, the punitive raids on the Jaffna Peninsula, and the unique type of foreign aid being now offered to us Tamil Nadu style, most concerned citizens of Sri Lanka can feel nothing but despair about the prevailing situation in the country. The dominant feeling especially after the bomb incident has been one of anger, vengeance and a desire for military victory. So much so that many of our leaders within government and in the opposition have said that there is little necessity now to speak of a political solution.

While the hysteria continues there is nothing much that anyone can do. The government claims that it has to respond to Sinhala feelings even if this means that it must alienate our large neighbour and the regional power in South Asia. The Indian government feels that it has to respond to Tamil sentiment even though (perhaps especially if) this will embarrass and challenge its small defiant neighbour to the South. As a result, the vicious cycle of destruction continues apace. In this context, at the risk of becoming even more unpopular, the CRD would like to pose three hard questions which we feel are imperative at this juncture. We do so in the belief that sanity instead of adhoc posturing should guide our policy on the ethnic front.

## Some hard questions

1. Given the geo-political context especially at this time, can there really be a military solution to this ethnic conflict, or even a partial military solution. When are we going to give up our confrontational attitude to our target neighbour and respond

*This statement was written in April 1987. It was distributed among members of Cabinet and Leaders of Opposition Parties. Given the events of the last few days, we are releasing it to the press.*

Sgd: Joint Secretaries  
R. Siriwardena  
R. Coomaraswamy

realistically to regional power and politics.

2. Given the nature of the guerrilla war can there really be a military taking of Jaffna? if so at what cost? and if Jaffna can be taken can it be held? and if so at what cost?

3. Given the fact that the government wants a united country and the Tigers not, a fundamental difference in objectives, can there be any solution if the government continues to react in a tribal, militaristic manner, meeting terror with counter-terror? Every cycle of violence makes reconciliation that much harder.

## Missed Opportunity

The road to peace is a hard one but it appeared to have some hope in July 1986, and these sentiments for peace reached their climax in December when five significant events took place.

— Vijay Kumaranatunge went to Jaffna and held important discussions about the release of prisoners with Tiger representatives. The first time that a Sinhalese politician has visited the north since July 1983

— Mr. Kumaranatunge returned to Jaffna again with relatives of the soldiers and 30 Buddhist priests to visit the LTTE camp and continue with the negotiations. For the first time pirith was chanted in an LTTE camp and the leader of the LTTE in Jaffna even took part in the ceremony.

— Captain Jayantha Kotelawala, in consultation with the Minister

of National Security met the Tiger leaders of Jaffna and negotiated an exchange of prisoners.

— A government delegation led by Vincent Perera M. P. for Yatiyantota went to Jaffna and met with the LTTE leaders. The talks were very cordial as is evidenced by the pictures taken during that occasion. There was hope that this would be the first in a series of visits to be made by government officials.

— The Sri Lankan government and the Indian government had reached near agreement on a solution along the lines of what is termed the December 19th proposals.

At that time, though enormous political problems still existed, the atmosphere was conducive to political negotiations. Though many people were skeptical, there was little fear and perhaps a genuine belief that we were on the road to peace. But, within three weeks the climate had changed drastically. The LTTE began to set up certain aspects of civil administration in the peninsula. The government responded with an economic blockade which still continues. It also cut off all direct telecommunications to the peninsula. Neither of these has proven to be truly effective. Prabhakaran returned to Jaffna and military activity on both sides began to accelerate, culminating in the terrible tragedies of Kokadaicholai and Amparai. The government immediately reopened its military option, commencing a massive military offensive and marching to the boundaries of the Jaffna peninsula unhindered and in full

command claiming that Trincomalee, Mannar and Vavuniya had become liberated areas. Television crews, tourists and civilians were encouraged to move back and forth. After the offensive, Indian "peace" efforts began afresh with the visit of Mr. Dinesh Singh and there were conflicting reports about the nature of the progress made with militant groups. At New Year, the government declared a unilateral ceasefire with a specific time-limit. Since The New Year it appears that the LTTE and EROS have struck brutally and inhumanly in areas the government says it has secured, Mannar, Vavuniya Trincomalee and also the heart of Colombo. The government responded by bombing targets in Jaffna. But, according to the Minister of National Security, the LTTE had anticipated the reaction and had moved much of their military equipment. The Tamil Nadu government reacted to these bombings by offering aid of over 3 million rupees to Sri Lankan Tamils. The Indian government rejected the Sri Lankan governments protests and supported the Tamil Nadu governments claiming that the assistance is a natural response to the economic blockade. And so the vicious cycle of fear, distrust and destruction continues unabated leaving everyone with a dreaded sense of *deja vu*.

### Back to the corner

In reviewing the chronicle of events which have taken place since it is very evident that the government of Sri Lanka has again managed to work itself into a tight corner. They have maximised tension and minimised their options. The Sinhalese leaders are sounding more aggressive and militaristic. The Tamil militants appear more intransigent and have begun after a period of six months to speak of Ealam. Tamil Nadu appears to be backing the militants openly, and the Sri Lankan government and the Indian government are again at loggerheads, exchanging diplomatic affronts. The government has forsaken its political and diplomatic options and the military

one is not paying the dividends because of the very nature of the war and our geo-political location. Meanwhile, thousands of lives have been lost; hate, fear, tension are reaching feverish heights. In this context and looking back at the experience of the last few years it is obvious to members of the CRD that there are certain hometruths which have been apparent since 1983 and which have appeared again and again in the course of this conflict. However, for political and perhaps emotional reasons neither the government nor the opposition is ready to come to terms with these truths. And yet, these truths or principles have to form the basis of any lasting solution to the ethnic conflict. A resolution based on any other set of premises has in the past and will in the future lead us further down the road of self destruction.

### The self evident truths

1. There can be no military solution to this conflict and every so called military victory spins off all types of regional repercussions which we can neither anticipate nor determine because the conflict has a regional and international dimension, which is beyond our control.

2. There can be no political solution to the conflict unless we act in collaboration with the Indian government and the Tamil Nadu government and work out an acceptable political formula to the conflict. The experience in November after SAARC is to date our only case in point. The alliance may be slow in the making especially since we have insisted on constantly burning the bridges. We cannot persist with what outside commentators have called our "mighty mouse" syndrome. Unfriendly relations with India take a far greater toll on us than it does on India. The intractable nature of this conflict is evidence enough of that. And yet we still persist in the self-delusion that we can defy, confront and outwit India and not pay the obvious costs. For a government which has been ruthlessly realistic about its politics in the south of this country, the self-righteous cry from the heart

against India not only wrings hollow but has proven time and again to be counterproductive. We need not remind ourselves of our relative weakness to India, in terms of size, population, economic market and military strength. Why do we insist on taking every issue to crisis point?

3. There can be no peace unless the LTTE, the main Tamil group also consents to negotiate and enter into a political arrangement. They appear to be the only Tamil party in control who are capable of delivering peace. Whatever we may feel about the ideology of the LTTE (and the CRD has deep and fundamental reservations about the nature of its political programme and military strategy), we also realize that only peace and the resumption of free political activity in the North and the East will stimulate different political responses to the situation of the Tamil people in those areas. The longer the military offensive, the stronger will be the military wing of Tamil politics, and the more indispensable the military aspects of the LTTE. Rajiv Gandhi in a recent speech expressed his government's belief that the Tamil organisations can be persuaded to come to the table under certain conditions. Every opportunity, all contacts and every network should be tapped to make that promise into a reality.

4. There will be no solution to any conflict in this country unless there is also a commitment to democracy in the South; the holding of general elections at the correct time, non-interference with the franchise and the strengthening of democratic institutions at all levels. One thing that this prolonged conflict must have taught us is that there are no shortcuts to democratic participation. The arbitrariness of the State will always be challenged, if not in parliament, then in the courts, if not in the courts, then in the streets and if not in the streets, then in the jungles. We hope all our political leaders have learnt these hard lessons for it is only with a twin commitment to devolution and democracy that we can even begin to overcome this crisis.

# An urgent appeal for Peace

**T**he Commission for Justice and Peace of the National Christian Council of Sri Lanka together with the Diocesan Committee for Social Study and Action of the Anglican Church of Ceylon and the Advisory Council for Church and Nation of the Methodist Conference expresses grave concern over the critical situation our country has been placed.

As Church bodies concerned with matters of justice and peace in the country, we call for an immediate end to all military action both by the State as well as by the armed Tamil Militants as a pre-requisite for political negotiations. It is only in an atmosphere devoid of violence and hostilities that negotiations for a solution to the ethnic conflict could succeed.

We support the Government in its efforts towards a political solution to be followed by concrete legislative and administrative measures to resolve the national crisis and we look forward to the Government as the primarily responsible institution for law and order in the country to implement such proposals. We believe that such action will build mutual trust and provide the assurance to the other concerned parties that negotiations leading to an acceptable solution are feasible.

We strongly urge the armed Tamil Militant groups to end all hostile action which will disturb the environment required for sober negotiations. At the same time, we look to the State to persist in its efforts for a

negotiated settlement and to resist any attempts by irresponsible elements to provoke hostilities.

We express our fullest support for the recent statement made by the heads of Christian denominations in association with the National Christian Council. The tragedy of increasing death and destruction in our land is too great for any of us to delay in or desist from promoting the paths of peace.

The NCC Commission for Justice and Peace.

The Colombo Diocesan Committee for Social Study and Action.

The Advisory Council for Church and Nation of the Methodist Conference.

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## AFGHANISTAN

# Reconciliation vs Washington's policy

FOREIGN  
NEWS

Arnaldo Musa

Reading the scores of dispatches on the Afghan situation, we can only conclude that the United States has a major interest in preventing the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

Herbert Hagerty, assistant secretary of state for Middle East and South Asian affairs, described the unilateral cease-fire announced on January 15 by the Kabul government as a "propaganda gesture." The measure is intended to stop further bloodshed and find a political solution to the Afghan problem.

Coinciding with the Islamic new year in Afghanistan, President Reagan, on March 21, announced that the terrorist groups would be given 630 million dollars and 300 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, of the sort that have already shot down Afghan passenger planes. This will notably increase the firepower of these organizations, not to mention the fact that last year the CIA spent a billion dollars to aid the bandits who also received 30 million dollars in "humanitarian aid" in autumn. Part of the money from the U. S. arms sale to Iran — Irangate — reportedly went to the counter revolutionaries in Afghanistan.

The money Reagan allocated directly to increase the conflict was approved by Congress, where there is an anti-Afghan lobby and a bipartisan group set up to control "secret" U. S. aid to counter revolutionary organizations.

And so Washington has created a vicious circle: insisting that a political agreement can only come after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, but at the same time it obstructs this, by trying to torpedo UN-mediated talks between

Pakistan and Afghanistan and increasing military and economic aid to counter revolutionary bands.

Through Pakistan, the latter have been receiving an endless flow of modern U. S. weapons, including missiles, mines, recoilless rifles, etc. Thousands of civilians have already been killed as a result of the use of such weapons. Large sums are also being spent for psychological warfare against Afghanistan and in keeping up anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet hysteria.

The Soviet people sincerely want to see the roar of arms give way to the voice of reason in Afghanistan, because that would mean bringing the troops home, and Soviet diplomacy has centered its efforts on convincing other countries, chiefly Pakistan, to support the Afghan proposal.

## New Mentality

The Afghan government's enactment of the cease-fire was an indication of the possibility of peaceful coexistence among differing political forces in the process of socio-economic change approved by the great majority of society. This is the first point in the policy of national reconciliation. Another is to form a national unity government which includes political forces. Najib, the general secretary of the Popular Democratic party of Afghanistan, has stressed that his organization is willing to consider specific proposals as to the composition of a coalition government in talks held in Afghanistan or in any neutral country with representatives of opposition groups and to hold elections to form such a coalition government if all the interested parties agree.

Basically, this reflects a willingness to share political and state power to achieve national reconciliation.

The Afghan government is giving a push to the process of internal transformation, seeking to make it more humane, and taking into account the specific interests and conditions of this multi-ethnic agrarian country and the complexity of inter tribal relations.

As a result of outside pressure, there are those who reject the cease-fire, thereby sacrificing the lives of thousands of Afghans, not to mention the precarious fate of millions of refugees in 240 camps in Pakistan and 45 in Iran who hope to return home as soon as possible.

They reject it at the bidding of the enemies of Afghanistan, of those responsible for crimes such as the shooting down of passenger planes with U. S. Stinger missiles or U. S. made Pakistani fighter planes.

Last but by no means least, there is the daily false propaganda, bribery of those who would vacillate, and terror against those who wish to return home.

After the Afghan government announced the reconciliation policy, the salary of the counter revolutionary leaders reached new heights. Also there are informers reporting on all who express the desire to return home.

Although more than 40,000 Afghans have already returned, and the flow continues the main obstacle to the peace process remains: U. S. interference, using counter revolution, Stinger missiles and the CIA to bring death and suffering to the Afghan family and prevent any lasting peace in the country.

— Granma (Havana)



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# The Sri Lankan conflict — an Indian perception

## RECENT EVENTS AND DECEMBER 19 PROPOSALS

When Minister of State Shri Natwar Singh and Shri P. Chidambaram visited Colombo again in mid-December, a new package of proposals was evolved (which has come to be known as the "December 19 Proposals").

The proposals essentially involve formation of a new Eastern Province by excising Sinhalese majority areas (Amparai Electoral District) from the existing Eastern Province, and creation of two Tamil Provincial Councils in the Northern and the reconstituted Eastern Province. The two Councils would have institutional linkages for coordination between the two so as to make them acceptable to all concerned. The Sri Lankan government also agreed to consider a proposal for a Second Stage of constitutional development providing for the Northern Province and new Eastern Province coming together subject to the wishes of the people in the two Provinces being ascertained separately after a period of time. The proposals had the support of the Sri Lankan President.

However, soon after the return of the Ministers, the Sri Lankan Government expressed reservations and resiled from December 19 position. The Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE also entered into direct negotiations without informing the Government of India. As a result, India could not discuss any proposals with the Tamil groups in the absence of firm commitment by the Sri Lankan Government.

In January 1987, the situation in Sri Lanka took a turn for the worse after the Sri Lankan Govern-

ment imposed an economic blockade on the Jaffna peninsula causing considerable hardship to the civilian population. The Sri Lankan authorities claimed that these measures followed a virtual setting up of a parallel administration in the Northern Province by the LTTE. The President also took the view that India could discuss the December 19 proposals with the Tamils, and if the latter accepted these proposals, he would try to persuade his party, the Muslims and Sinhala public opinion to accept them as the basis for resolving the ethnic problem. Dilatory tactics continued throughout January and early February while the Sri Lankan Government conducted large-scale military operations and made preparations for a possible assault on militant strongholds in Jaffna. On 10th February, a message from Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was conveyed to President Jayewardene that India was not in a position to resume discussions as long as the military operations against the Tamils continued, and the economic blockade was not lifted; the Sri Lankan Government was asked to clearly affirm its commitment to the December 19 proposals for any further negotiations.

Even after the suspension of its good offices role caused by Sri Lankan actions, India has remained in close contact with both sides. It has expressed its grave concern at the developments affecting civilians and has called for caution and restraint on the part of Sri Lanka Government.

Starting from February, 1987 the position of Tamil militants has weakened greatly due to a number of factors. The Sri Lankan forces gained effective control over the Eastern provinces in February March 1987 and in the first week of March 1987, a

final offensive on Jaffna seemed imminent. On 4th March speaking in the Parliament, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made an indirect reference to India's options. Contact was also maintained with the Sri Lanka Government. Since the situation in Jaffna continued to deteriorate with serious hardship being caused to the civilian population, and since there was imminent possibility of large scale casualties. Shri Rajiv Gandhi sent Shri Dinesh Singh as his personal emissary on March 13, 1987 to meet President Jayewardene and express India's grave concern. These steps led to some de-escalation in mid-March, 1987, Sri Lanka did not embark on a military offensive on Jaffna. It reaffirmed its commitment to December 19th proposals. The fuel ban was also partially lifted. In this phase intense efforts were made to create conditions for resumption of negotiations on the basis of December 19th proposals. On 19th April, 1987, Sri Lanka announced a Unilateral Ceasefire for 10 days. The situation appeared hopeful. However, with the brutal massacre of over 200 people on 17,18th April, 1987, the Colombo Bomb Outrage on April 21, and retaliatory and indiscriminate bombing and attacks by Sri Lanka forces from 20th April, the fragile and temporary lull was shattered and full-scale hostilities resumed. This brings us once again to a stage when the situation on the ground appears ominous.

In an atmosphere of escalating violence, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mr. Premadasa announced on April 24 that in the light of provocative violence by the Tamil militants the Sri Lankan Government would be carrying out military attacks on militants' stronghold adding "Now on we will talk of a political solution

only after we are able to protect and preserve the country. What ever proposals (for resolving the problem) were discussed, I say emphatically we will consider them only after peace is restored." President Jayewardene, however, declared on April 26 that his Government was "pro-peace" and "pro-political settlement." He also said that the Government of Sri Lanka was extending a "Hand of peace and friendship" to the "terrorists" adding "it does not look as if our efforts and the efforts of India (to settle the ethnic problem) have been of any use to them (militants). President Jayewardene's statement followed a strong condemnation by the Government of India of aerial attacks and other military operations by the Sri Lankan armed forces.

### ASSESSMENT

#### India's Principled Position: Framework of a solution

From the very beginning, the Government of India made it abundantly clear that its efforts were at narrowing the differences between the two sides and at assisting them in reaching a solution which was within the framework of the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. It was recognised that the Tamils had legitimate demands and grievances and had faced discrimination for over 30 years. It was considered necessary and also possible to meet their legitimate aspirations through constitutional and structural changes. The problem of ethnic minorities has been faced by other countries such as Canada, Belgium, UK, Switzerland, not to speak of India itself. Different countries have found different solutions arising from their unique characteristics and based on the genius of their people. It was felt that Sri Lanka too should and could find a model of provincial autonomy. It was clear that any lasting settlement will have to be acceptable to all sides and would involve compromises.

Indian leaders at the highest level have reiterated India's commitment and support to a solution

which meets Tamil demands and aspirations within the framework of Sri Lankan unity and territorial integrity. Speaking in the Indian Parliament on August 12, 1983, Smt. Gandhi had said "I took the opportunity to reassure Mr. Jayewardene (H. W. Jayewardene) that India stands for the independence, unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. India does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. However, because of the historical, cultural and such other close ties between the peoples of the two countries, particularly between the Tamil community of Sri Lanka and us, India cannot remain unaffected by such events there". On 6 April, 84 speaking in the Indian Parliament, the then External Affairs Minister, Shri P. V. Narasimha Rao said 'It is not merely a policy for Sri Lanka. We stand for peaceful settlements of disputes wherever and whenever they arise in whatever manner. These are some of the parameters of our policy. We do not want any secession. We are against secessionist trends in any country. So, these are the parameters subject to which our policy is made and pursued and, therefore, there is no question of my having compromises on this.'

In 1985 speaking in the Parliament on 3rd May Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said "our concern is for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The concern is not only of people in the South but it is the concern of everyone in India. We have to see that the refugees go back, go back in honour, go back in safety, go back with the security of expecting and getting full freedom to express themselves, to work, to live within the integrity of Sri Lanka. We have made our position clear many times on this". Within this framework India has consistently supported the Tamil demands and has deplored firmly and unequivocally the injustice done to them. The civilian death and destruction caused by violence, the atrocities against the Tamils, and the resort to a military option caused deep anguish and distress in India. These have been severely condemned and

the solidarity with the victims of State oppression, expressed in both word and deed. India has also continued to shelter and provide basic amenities to over 1,30,000 Tamil refugees.

#### Double track policy of Sri Lanka Government

The lack of firm political commitment, the vacillation, at times withdrawal from accepted position and the two-track policy of undertaking military operations even while professing faith in negotiations, on the part of Sri Lanka Government have contributed greatly to the failures in the mediation efforts. With a history of betrayals in the past there is a deep-seated distrust of Sinhala politicians among the Tamil people. They therefore are disinclined to accept that the Sri Lanka Government is committed to a fair and long lasting political settlement. Sri Lanka Government has compounded their distrust and alienation by resort to military measures at crucial phases of negotiations (in mid-August 1985 after Thimpu talks, in early 1986 and in January 1987 after December 19th proposals).

#### Position of Tamil Groups/ Militants

While it is true that the Tamil population in Sri Lanka do have legitimate grievances which have already been outlined in this booklet and their cause has received international sympathy and support, recent developments like the massacre of innocent civilians on the Trincomalee-Habarana Road and the Colombo Bomb Outrage have created an adverse impact on international public opinion. The quest for a political solution which would meet the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people would require vision, statesmanship, realism and a readiness to negotiate with sincerity and on a realistic basis with the Sri Lankan authorities on the part of the leadership of the Tamil groups.

## PROGRESS MADE IN NEGOTIATIONS SINCE 1983

If the aim is to secure a peaceful settlement through negotiations, it will be seen that a considerable forward movement has been made in the position arrived at in the December 19th proposals and related discussions as compared to the position of the Sri Lanka Government in 1983. To highlight some important aspects:

The Sri Lanka Government has agreed in the December 19th proposals to create two Provincial Councils through a constitutional amendment and without a referendum. Thus it is envisaged that there will be two Tamil majority Provinces in the North and in the East which are the areas of Tamil concentration. It should be possible for Tamil political parties to come to power in democratic elections in both these Provinces. (The fear of not enjoying a clear majority in the Eastern province has been taken care of by excising Sinhala majority Amparai electoral district in that Province). Further, the desire of the Tamils to have linkages between the two provinces has also been addressed to. The December 19th proposals provide for institutional linkages through an inter-Ministerial Provincial Council, a common High Court, a common university etc. The Sri Lanka Government was also prepared to consider a second stage of constitutional development wherein the two Provinces could come together through a process wherein the wishes of the people of the two Provinces are ascertained separately.

The proposals arrived at on December 19th and in earlier discussions in 1986 also provide for meaningful devolution of power. Detailed lists have been drawn up defining Provincial and Central powers which are akin to the Indian system. In key areas of concern to Tamils such as law and order, land settlement, education and culture, substantial concessions have been made by the Sri Lanka Government though in some of these

matters, final agreement was yet to be reached. If the negotiations had continued, after the December 19th and Agreement reached, effective devolution of power akin to a Federal system could have been achieved even within the framework of the unitary constitution of Sri Lanka.

It will be noted from the following analysis that on major issues of concern to the Tamil minority, considerable progress has been made in the last three years (between the Annexure "C" proposals and December 19, 1986 proposals) in evolving a constitutional framework which would meet the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people. This has been possible only because of the persistent diplomatic efforts of the Government through its good offices.

- (a) **Unity of Devolution:** In 1983, the Sri Lankan Government stated that the District Development Council would be the Unit of Devolution though the Annexure "C" proposals did provide for the District Development Councils coming together to form a "Regional Council", after a Referendum. The December 1986 proposals provided for Provincial Councils to be formed automatically by a constitutional amendment. The Provincial Council, as a Unit of Devolution, is large enough to provide for meaningful devolution of power.
- (b) **Provinces:** In 1983, the Sri Lankan Government was willing to agree to the devolution of power to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as per existing boundaries. In the December 1986 proposals, the Eastern Province is to be reconstituted by excising Amparai Electoral District from the present Eastern Province. This will leave a near Tamil majority in the Eastern Province. Thus two Provinces would be created where Tamils could form Provincial Governments.

- (c) **Merger of the Eastern & Northern Provinces:** In 1983, the Sri Lankan Government did not accept the merger of the Eastern and Northern Provinces. While there is no acceptance of the merger of the two Provinces in the December '86 proposals, these proposals do provide that the Sri Lankan Government would be willing to consider a second stage of constitutional development providing for the Northern and the new Eastern Province coming together, subject to modalities being agreed upon for ascertaining the wishes of the people in the Northern Province and the Eastern Province separately.
- (d) **Institutional Linkages:** Institutional linkages were not discussed in 1983. The December 86 proposals provided for institutional linkages between the two provinces by Inter-Provincial Ministerial Council. Common Institutions like a common Governor, a common High Court, a common educational system are provided for.
- (e) **Devolution of Power:** Annexure "C" of 1983 provides, in principle, for devolution of power by drawing up of lists of subjects to be allocated to the Regions. In the proposals which emerged in 1986, a Provincial List, Reserved (Central) List and Concurrent List were drawn up in discussions and a large measure of agreement reached.
- (f) **Powers of the Centre to Legislate on Subjects under the Provincial List:** There was no mention of this subject in the Annexure "C" proposals of 1983. In 1986, constitutional guarantees to define and limit Centre's powers were discussed.
- (g) **Law & Order:** The Annexure "C" proposals provided, in principle, that law & order would be a devolved subject.

(Continued on page 22)



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# Peasant Agrarian System

S. Sathanathan

(a) Agrarian systems and structures of underdevelopment

The final essay in the volume is an exhaustive study of 'Peasant Agrarian Systems and Structural Transformation in Sri Lanka', authored by Newton Gunasinghe. He recognised that the dominant mode is a CMP (b227) and that, within this mode, agriculture displayed a great diversity of combinations of forces and relations of production; and that, therefore, it would be futile to conceptualise a monolithic Chayanovian 'peasant economy' (p.195).

Consequently, Gunasinghe commenced his analysis with reference to Balibar's invariant and variant forces and relations of production and constructed four different constellations of forces and relations of production, each of which was defined as an 'agrarian system'. He examined the interaction between forces and relations of production in each system and concluded that each followed a different path of agrarian transformation: the first was characterised by a 'tendency towards dissolution'; the second, by a 'strong potential for growth'; the third was handicapped by 'internal inhibitions to growth'; and the fourth agrarian system was an example of one which has been 'transformed and frozen'.

The concept of 'agrarian system' was preferred instead of mode of production because the latter is an abstract formulation (p.227). This is of course true and it is also true that an interpretation based predominantly on mode of production often unnecessarily elevates residual elements or survivals, which continued to persist largely in form, to the level of a mode of production.

The point to be stressed, however, is that analyses should, as far as possible, precede from the general to the particular: an analysis of specific aspects being preceded by a definition

This is the sixth part of a review essay on "Peasant Agriculture" a publication of the Social Scientists' Association, edited by Charles Abesekera.

of the general trajectory of motion of the mode of production. has been underdeveloped in the direction of a capitalist mode, the specific systems selected for analysis would have to be viewed as products as well as component elements of under-development of capitalist production.

But, it is unclear from the essay whether the four agrarian systems are historically constituted structures of underdevelopment. Instead, it appears as if each agrarian system was identified in an *ad hoc* manner by a tendency or potential, which was observed at the time of study and was interpreted as given by the selected forces and relations of production, without reference to the process of underdevelopment at work. Although the need for 'linking up the concept to the agrarian system with the concept of the mode of production and the social formation' was recognised by Gunasinghe (p.227), his methodology of conceptualising agrarian systems in terms of ahistorical categories tends to preclude precisely this integration.

Consequently, each case study stands by itself; and because each agrarian system was not located within underdevelopment of capitalist production, none of them throw light on the dynamics of underdevelopment of capitalism in agriculture. For example, Kele Tirappane, the first agrarian system was described in non-dialectical terms as a system undergoing dissolution and disintegration without simultaneous qualitative transformation (p.201): in other words, as a process not unlike that of pauperization.

The second case, a village called Pathamany, was conceived as an agrarian system in which

class differentiation reached the point of 'take off' into capitalist production; yet it fell victim to the 'scissor crisis', which aborted 'take off'. But, the 'scissor crisis' merely describes the fact that for entrepreneurial farmers, the rate of profit with respect to the cultivation of some commercial crops has fallen below the average rate of profit and continues to fall.

The principal characteristic of a class structure which is typical of capitalist underdevelopment was recorded by Gunasinghe in his third case study, of the Kohowala village. He noted that class differentiation produced 'entrepreneurs, who are basically engaged in collecting and trading in...minor exports, a sizeable stratum of affluent middle peasants, a stratum of poor peasants and an expanding group of landless rural workers' (p.220). In other words, there has come into being 'capitalism without capitalists'.

The dialectics of this process of underdevelopment of capitalism has yet to be examined. However, tautological claims such as for example, capitalist farmers did not emerge because there were insufficient avenues for capital investment (p.220), do not explain the causes of underdevelopment of capitalist productions; instead, they merely identify associated conditions.

A tendency for the development of 'capitalism without capitalists' was also observed in the fourth and final case study, of the Udawatta village. Under the economically hegemonic position of a tobacco TNC, simple commodity producers in the village have undergone social differentiation to produce a hierarchy of strata, composed of the TNC at the top, followed by barn owners, simple commodity producers and wage labourers.

A similar differentiation was observed by Abeysekera and it is important to note that in such instances, barn owners and wage labourers are not categories which necessarily possess mutually antagonistic interests, i.e. they are not products of a dialectical process of class differentiation and, therefore, cannot constitute a dialectical unity. Instead, they

were created by the TNC as gradational client strata which relate to each other by virtue of their positions in the hierarchy relatively primarily to the TNC.

In Sri Lanka, this type of underdevelopment of capitalist production had been evident during the Dutch colonial period. The Dutch East India Company used its monopoly position to create a similar agrarian system by engineering the emergence of an intermediate social stratum in the cultivation of cinnamon and tobacco: Governor Van der Graff, for example, encouraged Ceylonese farmers to cultivate cinnamon and rewarded the more successful ones with honorary titles and grants of land; and the resulting intermediate client stratum was denied the domestic conditions necessary for its expanded reproduction. This process of underdevelopment continues to be

*(Continued on page 24)*

### **The Sri Lankan. . .**

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In the 1986 proposals, it had been agreed that law and order at Provincial level will devolve upon the Provincial Council. The division of the Sri Lankan Police into a National and Provincial Division is also provided for.

- (h) **Land Settlement:** Annexure "C" provided for a national policy on Land Settlement to be worked out. While no final agreement has been reached in the 1986 proposals, it has been accepted that the Land Policy will be a devolved subject. A National Land Commission has been accepted by the Sri Lankan Government.
- (i) **Vice-President:** There was no mention of this in the Annexure "C" proposals. In accordance with the December 86 proposals, Sri Lankan Government has expressed its willingness to consider creation of an Office of Vice-President, with the understanding being that the Vice-President would be from a minority community in Sri Lanka.

## **To a Tamil Friend — 1987**

*It was wonderful  
meeting once again  
though you  
bewildered by the rush of traffic on Colombo's streets  
(we hardly see vehicles in Jaffna these days!)  
the glib lies spouted through Colombo's media  
the averted faces of once trusted friends  
mirrored depths of sadness  
in your eyes*

*Our common base  
no longer gentle memories  
but harsh realizations  
of impenetrable politicians and suicidal militants  
of insensitive ideals and base prejudices  
of bombs raining over Jaffna  
the deathly stillness of Aranthalawa  
of raped sisters, limbless brothers  
of mothers — throats slit open  
and blank faced children  
in refugee camps  
waking night after night  
in a fear clotted sweat*

*I don't care  
whether you cook the best poriel and payasam  
or that some Sinhalese still relish Tamil dishes  
I despair  
that your world is no longer  
my world*

*Tell me friend  
should I set aflame  
my hands  
in retribution  
for my inaction?  
or can we still unite  
not with tears  
or soft sighs for  
Peace  
but through our  
soaring  
flaming  
spirit  
of womanhood.*

— Malathi de Alwis



# Capital and Peasant Production Revisited

## A reply

N. Shanmugaratnam\*

I read Sathanathan's review of Capital and Peasant Production (CAPP) with interest. As a contributor to the volume I wish to return to some of the basic concepts adopted by me particularly in my paper on Colonial Agrarian Changes and under development through a critical examination of Sathanathan's theoretical premises.

Sathanathan begins his critique of "how the central theme of these essays has been treated" with a major charge against those authors of CAPP who have adopted an explicit Marxist perspective. He brands them "neo-classical". One gets the impression that the reviewer's notion of "neo-classical" is rather strange. By labelling the views of the left-wing authors of CAPP "neo-classical" Sathanathan has given not only undue credit to the "neo-classical" school but also a new meaning to that term! Following Sathanathan's method one may label the flaws in his own arguments "neo-classical" if one is only concerned to score debating points. But one does not qualify to be a better Marxist analyst by calling another neo-classical — whatever it means.

A Marxist is not committing any sin if he/she is able to refute a certain false interpretation at an empirical level. (Didn't Marx himself do it on many occasions?) It would, of course, be wrong to claim that such refutations is Marxist. And, for a Marxist it is not enough to refute reactionary interpretations on empirical grounds alone. Their theoretical roots must be attacked. However, there are certain issues

which have engaged the animated attention of Marxists for a long time and divided them into different schools. The agrarian question is one such issue.

When we get rid of the 'neo-classical' red herring from Sathanathan's review there remain some fundamental theoretical matters to be discussed in a constructive way. In this response I am concerned to address the questions of proletarianization, capitalist development and underdevelopment at a basic level.

Generalised commodity production, a term Sathanathan uses, may be a good starting point. He says: "The CMP begins to unfold with the coming into being of a commodity economy and, under conditions of generalised commodity production, the development of capitalist production in agriculture proceeds through proletarianization". In this rather complicated formulation the author has collapsed the prehistory and the history of capitalist development into one.

Commodity economy predates capitalist-commodity economy by centuries. Capitalist-commodity production is the essence of generalised commodity production and presupposes proletarianization. The *differentia specifica* of the capitalist mode of production is the antagonistic, and, with time, reified class relation between the owners of two unique types of commodities: **Labour power** and **Capital**. The capitalist purchases labour power with the sole motive of appropriating surplus value for the formation of more capital i. e. accumulation. The labourer has no choice other than selling his labour power to capital because he has been expropriated from his conditions of labour in an irreversible manner. Capitalist production reproduces this

antagonistic social relation in reified forms.

This radical commoditization of the production process itself is a precondition for the evolution of a generalised commodity economy. As capitalist relations of production become more and more pervasive a generalised capital market comes into being with merchant capital losing its pre-capitalist autonomy. The major forms of capital, finance capital (a special variant of money lending capital characteristic of the imperialist phase), industrial capital and, merchant capital become integrated into a general capital market through the banking and credit systems. Usurer capital is relegated to marginal activities like pawn shops etc. Non-capitalist commodity production, for example modern family farming, is subordinated to the conditions of the capital market through its dependence on the credit system. Such are the conditions characterising generalised commodity production. The commodity economy of a precapitalist society operates outside the realm of production and in the sphere of circulation. The historical expropriation of the producer from his conditions of labour is the process that concerns us here. This concern should take us to the immediate prehistory of, or, prelude to, capitalist development. In Marxian political economy this pertains to the theory of primitive accumulation. Although the most radical end result of primitive (or primary) accumulation is the irreversible separation of the producers from their means of production and their ejection into a capitalist labour market, i. e. proletarianization, the complexity and the trajectories of this process vary according to given historical conditions.

(To be continued)

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# The Name of the Rose

A Discussion of the Novel & the Film

Radhika Coomaraswamy

## The Power of Interpretation

Another powerful theme which comes out of the novel is the central importance given by society and the State to the power of interpretations. It is a well known dictum among lawyers that he who interprets the law, makes the law. The power to decide the correct interpretations of a social order is often the power over life and death in a society. This is another important theme of the modern schools of structuralism which includes such diverse thinkers as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. In the novel the concern of structuralists comes out in the debate over orthodoxy and heresy — not only in connection with laughter but also over the discussion of Christ's approach to poverty. The debate on poverty in the pages of the book is underscored by the fact that Monk William, who is now seen as a free thinker, was once a priest of the Inquisition and had infact condemned many innocent people to death. This guilt continues to make him humble and his venture into free thinking is a direct result of this subjective experience as an Inquisitor. Having had the power to decide what is heresy and what is orthodoxy he understands the compulsions behind the need for the dichotomy.

The novel is full of descriptions of the various heretical Christian movements and their doctrines which actually existed during the period. The Waldensians, Catharsists, the Joschimites Fra Dolcino etc., Monk William, whose spirit is closer to the pledge of the Franciscan monks, who serve the poor and the outcast, but whose past has been conditioned by his experience as an Inquisitor, narrates a detached and sober account about the interaction between orthodoxy

and heresy. In the long term he speaks of a very broad vision — a vision very akin to Hegel's dialectics. Like Hegel, he sees history as a river overflowing, parting and re-emerging. He tells Adso "Imagine a river wide and majestic which flows for miles and miles between strong embankments where the land is firm. At a certain point, the river out of weariness, because its flow has taken up too much time and too much space, because it is approaching the sea which annihilates all rivers in itself, no longer knows what it is, loses its identity and becomes its own delta. After a while you cannot tell what begets what and you cannot tell what is river and what is sea" William's dialectical vision of history views the debates between truth and falsity, orthodoxy and heresy as part of one historical process which accentuates under threat, but which after a period of conflict settles into a pattern where the earlier lines of intensity and debate lose all meaning.

This larger vision of social process is supplemented by an understanding of the role of orthodoxy and heresy in the immediate world — the world of the 14th century. Heresy to Monk William is the cry of the outcast or the excluded against those in authority use the term "heresy" to apply to anyone whom they wish to exclude from a share of power and position in society. But nothing is final. Today's heretic may become tomorrow's inquisitor and today's tyrant may become tomorrow's heretic. Heresy then is a term of control, the exercise of power by the establishment against the voices on the margins of society and the voices of dissent. It is aimed at those who have a different vision of the world and a different interpretation of the social order. Those who glori-

fied Christ's poverty used it to challenge the authority of the established Church. Those who glorified the Church as an Institution and protector of Christian Theology, saw such a challenge as heretical a fundamental assault on Christianity itself. To them the Church and Christ were one. These debates and the arguments are never ending. The Franciscans monks who began as heretics became acceptable to the orthodox 14th century priests even though they continued to maintain their separate identity. However it is very evident in the pages of the novel that acceptance into the fold of orthodoxy required that the Franciscans compromise on certain fundamental principles. This transformation from being, once heretical also led to perpetual insecurity and a constant fear that they would be relabelled "heretics" and persecuted on the slightest excuse. The power to call groups heretical is therefore the power to control dissent. It is an integral part of a state's repressive arm. None of this is irrelevant to the social processes which exist today in any of our societies.

(To be continued)

## Peasant . . .

(Continued from page 22)

reproduced today under the hegemony of the TNC; thus, the barn owners face serious obstacles to their expanded reproduction (p.224) due to the monopsony position of the TNC.

Consequently, the primary contradiction is between the TNC, on the one hand, and barn owners, simple commodity producers and wage labourers, on the other; or, to quote Gunasinghe, 'the contradiction between the Company and rural society as a whole appears to the villagers as the most important contradiction' (p.225) This internal condition of political unity, which permits sufficient political space for the barn owners to lead a 'progressive' or 'radical' opposition to the TNC, is a micro-level example of the objective conditions at the level of the nation which allow the national bourgeoisie as a whole to ally with working classes and adopt an anti-imperialist posture.



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