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Racism, fascism and the politics of the National Front

Next April 20 is the 89th anniversary of the birth of Adolf Hitler. Coincidentally, but perhaps more significantly, it will be ten years to the day since the Rt Hon J. Enoch Powell seemed, like the Roman, to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood.

During the decade since Powell's speech, against a background of the worst economic crisis since the War, there's been an Immigration Act and a brace of Race Relations Acts. Unemployment has risen to high levels for whites, higher for blacks. Police harassment of blacks has become systematic. And there's been the National Front.

There has also been anti-racist activity. Much of it (on the predominantly white left) has been directed against the NF and other racist organizations, as the embodiment, in its most blatant and brutal form, of the racist nature of society. Some black organizations have responded by arguing, with justice, that white socialists have tended to ignore institutional, state racism. Conversely, this has led to the view that the NF are significant only as a rabidly racist organization, as an awful warning of what excesses lie further along the continuum of immigration control, cessation and, finally, the deportation of Britain's black population.

Anti-fascists have, of course, pointed to other elements in the NF's stated and implied programme, and have identified the NF as fascist, a designation which has stuck, at least as a slogan. But in the public mind, and in the minds of not a few on the left, the NF has been seen, nonetheless, primarily as the organizational expression of anti-black

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prejudice in Britain, as a pressure-group for racist legislation and, insofar as their demands have not been met, as propagandists for even harsher legislation in the future. For those who accept the 'fascism' tag, the NF's anti-black racism has been regarded as equivalent to the German National-Socialists' scapegoating and persecution of the Jews.

It is possible, however, to interpret the history of the last ten years in a rather different way. It can be argued that the National Front's influence as an anti-immigration pressure group has been almost negligible; that their racial politics are fundamentally out of accord with those of the state; that their propaganda on immigration is not so central to their ideology as might appear; and that the direct identity of Jews in Germany in the 1930s with blacks in Britain now is incorrect and misleading.

THEORY

The Classic Model

'Fundamentally', Joachim Fest wrote, 'National Socialism represented a politically organised contempt for the mind'.[1] But because fascist ideology is irrational, that doesn't mean it's non-existent; the contradictions of its dogma do not make it arbitrary. Far from it: the very contradictions of the doctrine, and their irrational resolution, are at the core of its functional effectiveness as a mobilizer of support.

It's not the purpose of this paper to present a detailed definition of the function of fascism, partly because there is, and should be, much controversy about it, particularly on the nature of its relationship with the ruling class.[2] I hope, however, that the following is broad enough not to beg too many questions.

Fascism is the mobilization of a counter-revolutionary mass movement during a period of capitalist crisis in which the conventional forces of the state are seen to be incapable of resolving the contradictions of the system. The participants in this mass movement tend to be drawn from those sectors of society — notably the lower-middle-class, unorganized workers, the peasantry and backward sections of the ruling class — which are facing a relative and progressive worsening of their economic and social position, but who nonetheless see no future in an alliance with the organized proletariat. The role of fascism, both in power and on the road to it, is the destruction of the independent organizations of the working class, sometimes in collusion with and always in the broad interests of the employing classes.

The central problem of fascist ideology — the purpose of which is to mobilize the mass movement — is that the real interests of their various potential supporters are, in many cases, opposed. In

advanced capitalism, for example, it is often literally true that government policies to assist the small saver and businessman by reducing the inflation of the currency result directly in the increase in the number and the misery (by cutting expenditure on benefits) of the unemployed.

However, these groups do have two things in common: a profound disillusion with the present ordering of society, and nostalgia for a previous age in which their lot, relative to other sections of society, was supposedly better. Fascism seeks to exploit this by providing a programme which calls for radical, even revolutionary change, not towards a new future, but backwards, in the reactionary direction of the past. Thus fascist ideology opposes the more unpleasant symptoms of the development of capitalism — the development of joint-stock monopolies, speculation and the internationalization of the economy — while retaining a commitment to the private ownership of the means of production, a private ownership which, it's argued, monopolization and internationalization have destroyed. As Hitler wrote:

> A grave economic symptom of decay was the slow disappearance of the right of private property, and the gradual transference of the entire economy to the ownership of stock companies, thus robbing the enterprises of the foundations of a personal ownership.[3]

Elsewhere, Hitler referred to the 'difference between this pure capital as the end result of productive labour and a capital whose existence and essence rests exclusively on speculation'.[4] The political conclusions are clear:

> The sharp separation of stock exchange capital from the national economy offered the possibility of opposing the internationalisation of the German economy without at the same time menacing the foundation of an independent national self-maintenance by a struggle against all capital.[5]

This absurd division of capitalism into good (productive) and bad (financial, speculative) lies at the core of fascism's pseudo-radical posture, seen at its most blatant in the early programmes of the Fascist parties. The Italian Fascist Movement called for: 'Suppression of limited liability companies and shareholding companies, suppression of all forms of speculation, suppression of banks and stock exchanges.'[6] However, it saw no contradiction in also 'supporting every initiative of those minority groups of the proletariat who seek to harmonize the safeguarding of their class interests with the interests of the nation', these minority groups graphically defined as 'the bourgeoisie of labour'.[7] Even clearer is the first programme of the NSDAP,* whose 11th to 15th clauses state:

*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei, the Nazi Party.

> We demand therefore: Abolition of incomes unearned by work. Abolition of the thraldom of interest ... The ruthless confiscation of all war profits. We demand the nationalisation of all businesses which have been amalgamated. We demand that there shall be profit sharing in the great industries. We demand a generous development of provision for old age.[8]

The 16th clause, however, reads: 'We demand the creation and maintenance of a healthy middle class.'[9]

Fascist doctrine thus sets 'national' against 'international' capitalism. It also sets 'national' working-class activity against the internationalist aims of Marxism. Mussolini said: 'Socialist theories have been disproved; internationalist myths have crumbled. The class struggle is a fairy tale, mankind cannot be divided'.[10] And Hitler had this to say of workers' organizations:

> To call the trade-union movement in itself unpatriotic is nonsense and untrue to boot. ... The trade-union in the National-Socialist sense does not have the function of grouping certain people within a national body and thus gradually transforming them into a class, to take up the fight against other similarly organised formations. We can absolutely not impute this function to the trade-union as such; it became so only in the moment when the trade-unions became the instrument of Marxist struggle.[11]

Later in the same passage, Hitler hinted at his real plans for trade unions: 'The strike is an instrument which may and actually must be applied only so long as a National-Socialist folkish state does not exist.'

The ideological alternatives to the internationalized economy varied from country to country. For Mussolini, the national form was the state — 'Everything inside the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State'[12] — and the creation of the vertically-organized industrial corporations, a caricature of the medieval craft guilds. For the German National-Socialists,* the national idea was further developed, and the internationalization of both bourgeoisie and proletariat was seen in terms of a racial conspiracy theory, which served to combine in one theoretical model the wide varieties of enemy that faced the potential support-groups of the Nazi Party. This theory posited a conscious, covert alliance between the international banker and monopolist on the one hand, and the international Marxist on the other. It sought, further, to racialize the plotters, so that the foe could be more readily differentiated from the friend. The unemployed worker's oppressor could be thus identified as the 'finance

*From now on, we can use National-Socialism to mean the German version of Fascist ideology. This, unlike the Italian variety, is the ideological form that survived the Second World War, as will be argued below.

capitalist' rather than his own boss; the small businessman was threatened not by all workers but only by 'alien subversives'. There was only one racial candidate for the role of arch-conspirator. As Hitler said, 'Only an anti-semite is a true anti-communist', an equation completed by Goebbels in his statement that 'It is because we want socialism that we are anti-semitic'.[13]

The classic text on the Jewish conspiracy theory is, ironically, a supposed example of it. The *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* purport to be the minutes of a series of meetings of Jews, the purpose of which is to plan the take-over of the world. The actual document is a forgery, written by the Tsarist secret police in the early years of this century.[14] It is difficult to overestimate their impact throughout Europe between the wars, but, particularly, in confirming the Nazi weltanschauung.

In their schemes to destroy all that is good, true and noble in man, the Elders are nothing if not industrious. Through their control of money, and, particularly, gold, they have destroyed the aristocracy, led the French Revolution, gained control of the Press, provoked inflation, created the doctrine of liberalism, corrupted youth and undermined the family. Not content with that, however, they now plan for World Revolution:

> Nowadays, with the destruction of the aristocracy, the people have fallen into the grips of merciless money-grinding scoundrels who have laid a pitiless and cruel yoke upon the necks of the workers. We appear on the scene as the alleged saviours of the worker from this oppression and we suggest that he should enter the ranks of our fighting forces — socialists, anarchists, communists, to whom we always give support ... We shall create by all the secret and subterranean methods open to us and with the aid of gold, which is all in our hands, a universal economic crisis whereby we shall simultaneously throw upon the streets whole mobs of workers in all the countries of Europe.[15]

And, having created the final conflagration, the Elders will, they inform us, institute a world-wide dictatorship, 'distinguished by a despotism of ... magnificent proportions'.* Hitler put it more simply:

> While Moses Kohn sits in the director's meeting, advocating a policy of firmness ... his brother, Isaac Kohn, stands in the factory yard, stirring up the masses.[16]

*It is worth remembering that, despite the transparency of the fantasy, the Protocols were widely believed. A British government White Paper (Russia No. 1, 1919) described Bolshevism as being 'organised and worked by Jews ... whose object is to destroy for their own ends the existing order of things'; and Winston Churchill, writing in the *Illustrated Sunday Herald* (8 February 1920), referred to a 'world-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilisation' as a 'movement among the Jews'.

The National Front version

The most cursory glance through the pages of *Spearhead*, the National Front journal, or *National Front News*, their paper (or, indeed, the National Party equivalents), will reveal that the conspiracy theory runs through contemporary British fascist ideology like Blackpool runs through rock. In *Spearhead's* 100th edition, for instance, there are four articles on supposed sectors of the conspiracy — the Bilderberg Group, the Round Table, the Trilateral Commission and the Zionist Movement itself — and none, specifically, on race.[17] Much of the NF's booklet output is concerned with the exposure of the machinations of international financiers and the advocacy of economic protectionism. Of the seven books on *Spearhead's* present booklist,[18] four are concerned with supporting the conspiracy theory. And the only book actually written by a leading NF member — *The New Unhappy Lords* by A.K. Chesterton, first chairman of the Front — is wholly concerned with proving the existence of a world conspiracy, whose organs include the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and NATO, and whose aim is to destroy the white nations and impose a One-World dictatorship.

The theory does, however, suffer somewhat in translation. Often the word 'Jewish' appears in various coy disguises, such as 'Zionist', 'cosmopolitan', 'alien', 'international' or even 'ersatz'. At its most covert, the doctrine of a capitalist/communist axis appears thus in the NF Statement of Policy:

> The NF recognises that International Monopoly Capitalism is as great a menace to the freedom of the nations as International Communism, and that in fact the two represent different means to the same end: a world tyranny.[19]

Spearhead, the NF journal, is rather less euphemistic about defining this alliance (indeed, as a general rule, the lower the circulation of a piece of literature, the more specific does it become). For instance, Richard Verrall, now its editor, describes 'our principal enemy' thus:

> 1) International Finance, the parasite that feeds on nations and on free-enterprise industrial capitalism by the process of debt-creation, and which is predominantly Zionist in composition and Zionist in its global aims. 2) Marxism, a conspiracy fostered by the former.[20]

And Chesterton's *New Unhappy Lords*, referred to above, is brazenly specific:

> Are these master-manipulators and master-conspirators Jewish? Because of the power of the purse afforded by the control of credit and the preponderant participation in America's most powerful industries and commercial firms, and because of commercial

preponderance in the economies of the so-called 'free world', the answer must certainly be 'yes'.[21]

Not surprisingly, the division of 'finance' and 'productive' capital is as central to the NF version of the conspiracy theory as it was to Hitler's. It will be seen lurking behind Verrall's definition of 'international finance' quoted above. *The Money Manufacturers*, an NF booklet, openly states that 'capitalism' is 'a term which is loosely used to cover two very different systems and it is important not to confuse one with the other'. These two systems are 'Free Enterprise Capitalism' on the one hand, and, on the other, 'Loan Capitalism (Finance Capitalism, Monopoly Capitalism, International Finance)',[22] a list so comprehensive that no one can be forgiven for missing the point.

The same pamphlet contains an example of the way in which the NF have taken over a number of pre-War anti-semitic forgeries. One persistent myth is that Jewish Wall Street bankers financed the Russian Revolution: 'International bankers ... supplied the money, and then men for the Russian Revolution ... Jacob Schiff, a partner in the Wall St banking firm of Kuhn Loeb and Co., contributed $12 million.'[23] This particular story, often backed up by quotations from the actual forged document on which it was based, reappears time and again in NF and National Party literature.[24] The *Protocols of Zion* themselves tend to be cited more circumspectly (the Britons edition of the book has slithered in and out of their booklists over the years). However, the Front's continued commitment to them was made clear by the NF's chairman John Tyndall, in March 1976:

> So long as Jews are to the fore in promoting Communism and World Government, fuel is going to be given to those who maintain that there is a Jewish conspiracy for world power as outlined in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. If evidence of such a conspiracy is to be refuted ... there has got to be, I would maintain, a change of heart on the part of Jewry ...
>
> 'The Jewish Question' consists of the fact that Jewry hitherto has been unprepared to do this, and 'anti-semitism' as a doctrine is nothing more than a natural Gentile reaction to this fact.[25]

Its belief in the conspiracy theory allows the NF, like the Nazis, to indulge in much pseudo-radical demagogy. One extreme example is the journalism of the NF's erstwhile newspaper *Britain First* (before it, and its editorial staff, split from the Front to form the National Party in January 1976). The December 1974 edition, for instance, led with the following stirring call, beneath a picture of the Jarrow marchers and the headline 'Must the Slump Come?':

> As world-wide slump looms before us, the Labour, Tory and Liberal parties are asking the British people to tighten their belts by the imposition of either the so-called Social Contract, or some other

> 'prices and incomes' fraud. When did *we* ever cause inflation, and why should we suffer a drop in our standard of living?

These extremes of demagogic cynicism (a more recent example from the post-split *Britain First* is the headline of the March 1976 edition: 'Seize the Right to Work') are not reflected in the rest of NF literature. But even the staid old Statement of Policy 'upholds as a principle the right of all to work' and 'advocates stronger, not weaker trade unions'.[26]

Of course, like the German Nazis, the NF's real plans for the unions are very different. The Front is careful on this (after all, Hitler issued a proclamation guaranteeing the freedom of trade unions under his regime the day before he abolished them), but a hint is given in this quotation from Tyndall:

> We would apply government legislation which *compelled* all unions to adopt a secret ballot for all elections and all major union decisions. The same legislation would *establish* one union for one industry (my emphasis).[27]

And there is nothing too impenetrable about Tyndall's demand that 'water cannon, tear gas and rubber bullets' be used against trade union pickets.[28]

Racism and the conspiracy theory

A major dynamic of any racist theory of society is bound to be an obsessive fear of miscegenation.* One obvious example is the centrality of the Immorality Acts in the repressive apparatus of South African apartheid, and it is also present in the ideas of Hitler. In *Mein Kampf* he acknowledges specifically his debt to the ideas of Count Arthur de Gobineau, a nineteenth-century French aristocrat, who believed that: 'all civilisations derive from the white race, that none can exist without its help, and that a society is great and brilliant only so far as it preserves the blood of the noble group.'[29]

It will be obvious that this fear of 'racial pollution' cannot, if the ideology is applied strictly,** be a component of anti-semitism. Gobineau himself cites the Jews as an example of a race that has preserved its 'purity', and the National Front, too, express a grudging admiration for the Jews, though within a critical context: *Spearhead* writes that 'loyalty to kith and kin beyond territorial boundaries is something for which the Jews should be admired.'[30] The place of this 'admiration' in the conspiracy theory is clearly shown in this quotation from *Britain First*:

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*It's unfortunate, but significant, that there is no less pejorative word for inter-racial breeding.

**That it tends *not* to be applied strictly is a point made below.

> Zionists believe that while the gentile nations of the world will all become internationalised, the Jews will enjoy a national state based on Jerusalem which will be the seat of a World Government. This helps to explain the seeming contradiction prevalent in Zionist circles which simultaneously demands fanatical support for the survival of Israel, but race-mixing for everybody else.[31]

The argument is thus quite simple: among the dastardly schemes of the Elders of Zion is the destruction of the white races from within, by the encouragement of inter-breeding with 'inferior' groups. Hitler put it clearly when he spoke of the Jewish aim of

> breeding a general inferior human mishmash, by way of a chaotic bastardisation and which ultimately would no longer be able to do without the Jews as its only intellectual element ... His ultimate goal is the denationalisation, the promiscuous bastardisation of other peoples.[32]

That this kind of racism is bound up closely with imperialism is made clear by Hitler: 'Aryan races — often absurdly small numerically — subject foreign peoples ... In the end, however, the conquerors transgress against the principle of blood purity.'[33] For the German National-Socialists, the most immediate 'inferior' threat was the Slav races of Eastern Europe, though Hitler was also concerned with the presence of African soldiers of the French army on German soil:

> It was and is the Jews who bring the negroes into the Rhineland, always with the same secret thought of their own of ruining the hated white race by the necessarily resulting bastardization ... to deprive the white race of the foundations for a sovereign existence through infection from lower humanity.[34]

A direct comparison can be made between that passage and the following from *Spearhead*:

> It may well be that the masters of the campaign for world government know very well the truth concerning the cause of racial differences. If so, it would certainly explain why internationalist elements of all types are at the forefront of all attempts to encourage people of different races to interbreed and produce half-caste offspring. The reason for this is obvious. If separate races can be eradicated by the process of miscegenation and the whole of humanity submerged into a single slant-eyed khaki-coloured lumpen, then racial differences will have disappeared — along with any sense of national identity — and a world government system will be much more easy to impose.[35]

In earlier, less cautious days, *Spearhead* was able to put the same idea more simply: 'If Britain were to become Jew-clean she would have no nigger neighbours to worry about.'[36]

It's been the purpose of this section to show that the National Front's ideology is classically National-Socialist, and that, within this context, the slogan 'Hitler blamed the Jews, the Front blames the blacks' is an oversimplification, in that, strictly, the NF blames the Jews *for* the blacks. However, it would be grossly foolish to follow this abstract model through schematically, and to ignore the essential opportunism of the ideology in practice. First of all, it's demonstrably true that many if not most NF supporters *do* blame the blacks for bad housing, poor education and declining services. It's conversely true that many if not most of Hitler's stormtroops treated the Jewish proletariat as an 'inferior' racial group. Much Nazi-supporting propaganda concerned accusations of miscegenation against Jews, and it's arguable that the very lack of a substantial non-'Aryan' population in Germany, apart from the Jews, created the need to treat the Jewish working class as an 'inferior' group, while retaining the doctrine of a controlling, exclusive 'superior' caste of Jewish financiers.

Secondly, there are, of course, many objective differences between the two social situations which render anti-semitism less potent as an ideological weapon, notably the diminution of an independent petit-bourgeoisie (reduced in comparative size by the growth of monopolization and by the dramatic increase in white-collar unionization) who could be seen as directly threatened by Jewish monopoly capitalist institutions. This has created the need for the National-Socialists to penetrate much more deeply into the working class, and, consequently, for the concentration of their propaganda on an out-group which can be seen as directly threatening workers.

But against this must be set the fact that there is a limit to the level of responsibility for the national crisis that can be laid at the door of an almost exclusively working-class minority of the population; that if they are serious about achieving power the fascists have to provide a more comprehensive world-view; and that their own use of conspiratorial anti-semitism indicates that they at least think this is the case.

Finally, one needs to look closely at the influence on the National-Socialists' practice of the increased racism within the main political parties, and the consequent growth of harsh state controls on the very presence of the black population, an institutional racist apparatus that is not, in that form, paralleled at all in Weimar Germany.

PRACTICE

Since 1945, there have been fascists active in Britain, whose aim has been to revive Hitler's ideas and to create a National-Socialist state. They have faced the obvious problem that, after the War and particularly since the discovery of the death-camps, their ideology has been viewed by the vast majority with revulsion and horror. They have sought to resolve this problem in two ways. The more overt Nazis have tried to rehabilitate Hitler's regime, particularly by denying that many of the atrocities took place. But the mainstream has attempted to combine a denial of Nazi associations with a vigorous campaign on the one racial-populist issue that has gained support in this country: opposition to black Commonwealth immigration.

However, the level of support for anti-immigration measures has not been reflected in a corresponding commitment to the National-Socialist parties. There have been three main reasons for this: first, the alacrity with which the state has responded to racist demands;* secondly, the faith that racists felt able to place in the Conservative Party as an organizational forum for their ideas, at least until 1972; and, thirdly, the fascists' own use of the immigration issue not as an end in itself but as a means to attract people towards a National-Socialist ideology. This last, particularly, has prevented the Front and its predecessor parties from taking full advantage of popular racist opinion.

National-Socialists, state racism and the Conservatives

In the late 1950s, the British ultra-right was in a right old mess. Most of the people who were to dominate the movement in the years ahead — Colin Jordan, John Tyndall, Martin Webster, Andrew Fountaine, John Bean — had left A.K. Chesterton's League of Empire Loyalists (founded in 1954 to protest against decolonization, but also to propagate the conspiracy theory) and formed a variety of miniscule organizations, including the White Defence League (Jordan) and the National Labour Party (Fountaine and Bean). Years of economic boom, and the prospect of more to come, seemed to consign the National-Socialists to the most lunatic of lunatic fringes.

The Notting Hill and Nottingham 'race riots' of 1958 must have seemed a gift from the gods. Here, at last, was an indigenous racial-populist issue, on which the major parties seemed inclined to take no action,**

*The influence of public opinion on the development of the immigration laws was clearly considerable; though, certainly, from the Labour Party's commitment to the Common Market onwards, the shift from settler to contract-worker migration was also an economic decision.

**The then Conservative Home Secretary, R.A. Butler, said as late as July 1960: 'It is very unlikely that this country will turn away from her traditional policy of free entry.'

and which the National-Socialists could use as a wedge into the minds of millions.

The sorry saga of the next few years demonstrated, and not for the last time, the incapacity of the National-Socialists to take full advantage of racial conflict. In 1960 Jordan and Fountaine brought their organizations together to form the British National Party (other members included Tyndall and Webster), whose policies included the freeing of Britain from 'domination of the Jewish-controlled money-lending system'. In 1962 Jordan, Tyndall and Webster decided to take an even bolder step, and formed the overt National Socialist Movement, which hosted the even more grandiose founding conference of the World Union of National Socialists. Later that year Jordan, Tyndall and two others were jailed for organizing a paramilitary body. Apart from one successful electoral intervention — when the old BNP gained 9 per cent at Southall in 1964 — British National Socialism had shot its bolt and spent the next five years in a spate of internal dogfighting, creating ever-tinier splinter groups (each with their very own individual *fuehrer*) and, periodically, making the headlines by attacks on synagogues.

What, then, was happening in the loftier reaches of national politics, as the National-Socialist leaders split, reformed, failed and failed again? Despite Butler (and Gaitskell) the foundations of the racist state were being laid. As Tyndall faced jail in 1962, the Commonwealth Immigration Act was being passed. As Webster sat in prison for assaulting President Kenyatta, the country was voting in the 1964 general election, in which Peter Griffiths (with a little help from the fascists, but much more from local Tories) was to win Smethwick from Labour on an openly racist ticket. And as John Bean was being convicted of unlawful assembly in October 1965, the Labour Party conference was approving the government's August White Paper, which limited immigration to 8,500 new work vouchers a year. And in 1966 the extreme right gained more than 5 per cent in only two constituencies (Deptford and Leicester North-East), and the BNP, whose Southall vote fell to 4.9 per cent, received a derisory 1.5 per cent in Smethwick.

The lessons of the past had not been lost on the ultra-right, however. In 1967 the National Front was formed under the Chairmanship of A.K. Chesterton, with the specific aim of presenting a 'respectable' facade.* And after a year spent wallowing in gloomy obscurity, the new party was granted yet more manna from heaven, this time in the shape of one Enoch Powell.

*The component groups of the NF were, initially, the League of Empire Loyalists, the British National Party and bits of the Racial Preservation Society. Tyndall and Webster's Great Britain Movement — which, despite its less Teutonic image, still called for compulsory sterilization of 'all those who have hereditary defects, either racial, mental or physical' — joined a little later.

In fact, however, the only significant intervention by the ultra-right in the 1968 pro-Powell demonstrations was that of Mosleyite Danny Harmstone in Smithfield Market. The NF was outflanked by a combination of government action — the Kenyan Asians Bill had in fact just pre-dated Powell and in 1969 the government announced restrictions on the entry of dependants — and Powellite agitation within the Conservative Party itself. The Front as an organization gained little direct benefit, and its then stated policy of 'crashing our way into the headlines'[37] did not bash them into the polling booths. In 1970 they gained an average of 3.6 per cent of the vote in the ten constituencies they fought, their highest vote being 5.6 per cent in North Islington.

However, two years later, the situation changed radically. The Conservatives' 1971 Immigration Act was the final link in the chain of what was by then a bipartisan state strategy on race, which combined the ending of all new permanent black settlement with legislation to promote 'integration' of those already here.[38] There were only two remaining commitments — to dependants and East African British passport-holders. It was the latter commitment that created the Front's great breakthrough. The Tories' admittance of the Ugandan refugees in the autumn of 1972 demonstrated that the state had concluded — for economic rather than philanthropic reasons — its restriction of immigration, and the continuum had broken. Those racists who had hitherto placed faith in the Tories were rudely awakened. The National Front's own 1968-72 policy of infiltrating the Conservative Party, not to gain members so much as to influence grass-roots opinion,* was dropped in favour of an open policy of recruitment, particularly from the Monday Club, and the Front could claim, at last, leadership of the campaign against the entry of the refugees. The Front confirmed its success by saving its deposit in West Bromwich, with a 16 per cent by-election vote that bit hard into the Conservative share of the poll.

Events over the next two years followed the established pattern. The Front put up 54 candidates in the February 1974 election, and polled an average of 3.2 per cent. At the October election, their share of the vote had fallen to 3.1 per cent (although, with 94 candidates, their vote was obviously much higher),** despite the intervening Jenkins amnesty for those immigrants who had been retrospectively criminalized by the 1971 Immigration Act. Internally, too, the Front became engaged not in the consolidation of its new support, but in a

*For instance, O.C. Gilbert, a pre-war member of the Imperial Fascist League, wrote to *Spearhead* in December 1969: 'I believe that the Conservative Party can be made much more right-wing by the infiltration tactics now operated by men like myself who for years have been members of the Conservative Party.

**Butler and Kavanagh (*The British General Election of February 1974*, London, 1974) concluded that by now the NF was taking votes from all three parties more or less equally.

mighty internal dogfight about how far and how fast to move towards what sort of more overt National-Socialist programme.

The battle for the soul of the National Front — which lasted from October 1974 to January 1976 — can be interpreted in a number of ways. Some — notably Martin Walker in both the *Guardian* and his recent book[39] — have seen it as a struggle between the old-guard hard-line Nationalists (led by Tyndall and Webster) and ex-Conservative more 'moderate' populists. Under the latter's influence, 'the NF had moved not only to the left, but towards a coherent populist programme', and NF members 'had begun to wonder whether Tyndall and Webster were not a liability'.[40]

But, in fact, the NF leadership was faced with two opposing groups, attacking on two fronts. One group, certainly, was composed of men like Roy Painter, who had defected from the Conservative Party to stand for the NF in Tottenham. This group was indeed worried by the direct association of the leadership with overt National-Socialism and, particularly, anti-semitism. The other group, however, which controlled the NF's newspaper *Britain First*, had no objection to anti-semitism.* What they objected to was Tyndall's authoritarianism, both internally within the Front, and as an element of doctrine. We saw above an example of the wholesale hijack of left-wing rhetoric employed by *Britain First* in this period. This is their view of the NF:

> We believe that such compromises and betrayals as have been made by the traditional 'left' and 'right' have been the inevitable product of rule by an authoritarian oligarchy. For this reason we are irrevocably committed to a belief in *democratic* nationalism, and reject all forms of authoritarianism.[41]

The reference to betrayals of the right is interesting, and is explained: 'Hitler ... was backed by International Financiers and eventually liquidated those inside his Party whose radicalism he had earlier tolerated and used.'[42] For the doctrine that the pseudo-radicals were propagating, with its anti-authoritarian stance and 'left-wing' rhetoric, was more or less identical to that of the Strasserites in the German Nazi Party who, while remaining fervently anti-semitic and chauvinistic, expanded the Nazi's attack on 'international capitalism' to embrace capitalism as a whole. This historical analogy was not lost on the leadership faction of the NF. In an article in December 1975 Richard Verrall mounted a lengthy attack on the controlling group of *Britain First*:

> The emergence of these ideas within the National Front represents, in fact, the perennial heresy of Nationalist politics; it was preached

*The classic world-government conspiracy theory quote above (p.119) was printed as part of a series of anti-semitic articles by *Britain First* at the height of the internal dispute.

before by the National Bolsheviks and National Syndicalists, by the Strasser faction of the early Nazi party and by syndicalist groups on the Italian Right. It is Marxism in the guise of Nationalism.[43]

The end of the dispute in January 1976 (the two dissident groups broke off to form the National Party) was shortly followed by a series of events that gave the NF the chance to regroup its battle-weary forces. Tyndall's long knife was hardly back in its sheath when the Malawi Asians story broke, Robert Relf was jailed for defying the Race Relations Act, Enoch Powell leaked the Hawley Report and the BBC obligingly gave 30 minutes free air-time to Jim Merrick, a Bradford National Front candidate and Chairman of the British Campaign to Stop Immigration, in its 'Open Door' series.

Once again, the Front saw the consequent racial violence — in Southall and elsewhere[44] — as an opportunity to push out more overt propaganda. Tyndall's resurrection of the Protocols, referred to above, occurred in March. In June, at the height of the hot summer, *Spearhead* printed an article claiming that the Nazi death camps did not exist.

This article, in the form of a book review, claimed that 'the extermination charge' was 'manufactured from the persistent propaganda of the World Jewish Congress and its agencies' and that the exterminations of Auschwitz were 'a tissue of lies'. The article concluded by asking: 'Can anybody believe such a story?'[45]

The electoral performance of the Front in the 1976 and 1977 local elections revealed strong areas of support, but not a significant mass breakthrough. In 1976 the showcase was Leicester, in which the NF was supported by 15,340 voters. The following year, when London voted, the Front achieved percentages of 19 (Hackney South), 19.2 (Bethnal Green) and 16.4 (Stepney). The NF is presently seen as taking more votes from Labour than from the Conservatives, which, in a time of high unemployment, an unpopular Labour government and (then) relative control of the inflation rate, is what you'd expect.

However, there are indications that the NF's strategy is, once again, to move on from its proven bases of support. Tyndall told last year's NF Annual General Meeting:

> Let us remember that only certain areas are touched by immigration. Let us also remember that on the questions of the economy the British electorate does not consist of experts or specialists; it is difficult for them as ordinary men and women to sort out one economic argument from another. But there is one thing that the great majority of the electorate can immediately recognise — and they recognise it by instinct rather than by any form of intellectual understanding: that is a party which has the strength and the will to govern and to rule.[46]

An indication of the kind of rhetoric the NF may employ over the next months was given in June 1977 in an article by Tyndall in *Spearhead*. Here Tyndall, with his 119,000 largely working-class votes secure in his back pocket, deals out a running flush of monetarist demands, for 'the ruthless trimming down of labour forces in many industries' and 'proper control of the money supply'; for compulsory secret ballots in the unions and legislation to 'establish one union for one industry'; and 'for the Welfare State in a drastically revised form' in which 'for able-bodied people in the prime of life there should be the inducement to rely much less on the Welfare State and much more on personal initiative and hard work';[47] demands, in short, designed to undermine the interests and standard of life of those very people who, in the main, gave him their support in May.

I have tried to argue that, in practice, the NF's desire to exploit anti-black racism as part of a National-Socialist campaign has limited its effectiveness until recently. There has, however, been another way in which the National Front's racism has been fundamentally out of accord with the racial strategy pursued by the state and advocated, in a different way, by Enoch Powell.

The National Front and black militancy

One of the most remarkable facts about the 'rivers of blood' speech was how tardy Enoch Powell was about making it. 20 April 1968 post-dated the control of immigration by six years, and the Labour government's restriction of vouchers by three years. It even followed — by a month — the passing of the Kenyan Asians Bill. Part of the reason for Powell's extraordinary reticence was, no doubt, his own political opportunism.[48] Another reason, however, lies within the choice phrases and the pedantic rhetoric of the speech itself.

For, read as a whole, it is clear that although Powell's background, his context, is the presence of Britain's black population, his target is black militancy. Not for nothing does he refer to 'that tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic'.[49] And here is the kernel of his thesis:

> We are on the verge here of a change. Hitherto it has been force of circumstance and of background which has rendered the very idea of integration inaccessible to the greater part of the immigrant population ... Now we are seeing the growth of positive forces acting against integration, of vested interests in the preservation and sharpening of racial and religious differences, with a view to the exercise of actual domination, first over fellow-immigrants and then over the rest of the population ... For these dangerous and divisive elements the legislation proposed in the Race Relations Bill is the very pabulum they need to flouish. Here is the means of

showing that the immigrant communities can organise to consolidate their members, to agitate and campaign against their fellow-citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with the legal weapons which the ignorant and the ill-informed have provided. [50]

In short, the dynamic of Powell's protest was not against the feebleness of the immigration laws but the strength of the Race Relations Bill. In other words, it was not, primarily, an attack on the presence of a black sub-proletariat, conveniently situated in the 'Mother Country', and which Powell as Minister of Health had done so much to attract. It was the sub-proletariat resisting their status, demanding equal treatment in housing, education and jobs, that in fact aroused the ire of the then shadow Minister for Defence.

The American experience was not lost on the British government either, although they drew opposite conclusions from it. In July 1967 Roy Jenkins' commitment to the Race Relations Bill had been made at the height of the Detroit riots; and a speaker at the October 1967 Labour conference had pointed out that, were the Bill not enacted, 'the coloured population in this country will have no alternative but to take its remedy in the way it has been taken in some cities of America'.[51]

The difference between Powell and the state lay in the former's pessimism at the possibilities of containing the growth of black militancy. But Powell was not in government; the state could not indulge in luxurious fantasies about 'voluntary repatriation'. They had to preserve the existing sub-proletariat, to effect the delicate transfer from settler to contract-worker immigration, and to keep the blacks quiet. As Sivanandan writes, the state found it 'more profitable to abandon the idea of superiority of race in order to promote the idea of the superiority of capital'.[52] For the National-Socialists, however, the model has been fundamentally different from that of the state or Enoch Powell. Listen to these two homilies, the first from the NP's *Britain First*, the second from the NF's *Spearhead*:

> Many aspects of immigration are, to say the least, distasteful to the British population. Our anger, however, should not be directed towards immigrants but to the politicians who allowed or encouraged the problem. Race hatred is counter-productive and no sympathy can be extended to those who incite it.[53]

> Our magazine, though it believes in racial differences, opposes race-hatred. All those who oppose multi-racialism should attack the politicians who promote it, not the immigrants, who are merely its victims.[54]

Now on one level, of course, both these statements are nothing more than cynical hypocrisy. But there is a deeper, ideological truth

contained, nonetheless, in the casting of immigrants in the role of 'victim'. For another cursory glance, this time through the more popular NF and NP literature, reveals a vision of blacks not as actors but as essentially passive and objectified. Black people — overwhelmingly black men — are portrayed in a politically or socially inactive way: as the carriers of disease, as creatures of blind instinct (muggers and rapists) or as 'innocent' victims of forces of which they are unaware.

Evocative evidence of the limits of this stereotype and the Front's consequent incapacity to cope with conscious black self-activity is shown whenever they are forced to confront black industrial militancy. In its summary of the Imperial Typewriters dispute, for instance, *Spearhead* was concerned primarily (and obsessively) with the transference of responsibility for the dispute away from the strikers themselves and towards 'professional agitators', who were said to view the Asian workers as 'poor, misunderstood strikers' and who 'led week after week of Asian strike, picketing, violence, disturbance and disorder'.[55] But even this transference of impetus was not enough for *Spearhead*, which concluded its article by shifting the 'blame' away even from outside 'agitators' and towards the mysterious world of the super-conspirators:

> The industrial action by Britons at Imperial ... is the struggle of a united British people fighting to preserve their freedom and identity against the forces of Communism and International Capitalism which seek to destroy the British nation and which *use as their tool* the immigrant minorities *placed by them* in our midst (my emphasis).[56]

A further example is the inability of *Spearhead*, in its July 1977 issue, to take *any stand whatsoever* on the substantive issues of the Grunwick dispute, which is described as 'not in itself ... of great historical importance' precisely because it involves 'one gang of Asian Trotskyites trying to force another lot of Asian immigrants to stop working or join a trade union'.[57]

For the National Front, therefore, the whole panoply of state repression, immigration restriction, and race relations legislation is not merely too 'moderate' or, in the case of the latter, a threat to 'free speech'. It is irrelevant. Their view of black people as an essentially static and passive mass, incapable of the very self-activity which the state has expended so much energy and time attempting to control, is the direct practical consequence of their primary fear of black people as the consciously-directed agents of miscegenation and destruction of the race.

The Front's demand for the compulsory repatriation 'of those coloured immigrants already here, together with their descendants and dependants'[58] is not, therefore, a more extreme point on a

continuum of controls, each one harsher than the last in degree. It is the function of a racism in many ways different in kind to the bipartisan strategy of the state.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the differences between the Nazi's campaign against the Jews on the road to power, and the harrassment of the British black population by contemporary fascists, is, as stated above, the extent and character of British state racism. On the other hand, modern British fascists, unlike the Nazis, cast their most public victims in an ideologically symptomatic rather than causative role.

It's not my aim to draw any detailed political conclusions from this dual perspective. However, tentatively and generally, its consequences would seem to be two-fold. First, the fact that the fascist strategy on race is not a continuum but an alternative to the strategy of the state suggests that a defeat for state racism will not of itself represent the defeat of fascism; on the contrary, that the failure of the state's racist strategy will make the threat to blacks from the fascists themselves acute. Conversely, it is also clear that defeating National-Socialism will of itself hardly dent the racist apparatus of the state itself. An anti-racist strategy which concentrates solely or primarily on defeating the NF will thus have little practical or ideological effect on the racist attitudes of the population at large or the state apparatus that enshrines them.

In this context, it is possible to argue, for example, that the debate as to whether the primary or immediate enemy of black people is the forces of the state or the shocktroops of the National Front may be posing the wrong question. Paradoxically, the fact that defeating one does not necessarily undermine the other may mean that the united and contemporaneous struggle against both is made more and not less urgent by an understanding of the differences between them.

Finally that urgency itself should not be underestimated. Up till now, National-Socialism has been fettered by its own ideology. But there are signs that the distance that the NF has kept from the state may work to its advantage in the longer term. The crisis may well recede as the economy floats for a year or two on a sea of North Sea oil; but when the oil is gone the frustrations and despair of vast sections of British society will be exposed once again. The Nazis know that; so should we.

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BASIL DAVIDSON

Angola since independence

When the leaders of the MPLA could at last proclaim the independence of the People's Republic of Angola in the seething city of Luanda on 11 November 1975, this independence had still to be made complete. Foreign invaders and their local puppets still held much of the country. A force sent in from Zaire, but financed and armed by the USA, stood in aggressive occupation of north-western Angola, and threatened the very outskirts of the capital itself. This force consisted partly of European mercenaries, partly of troops detached from the army of the Zaire dictator, Mobutu Ssese-Seko, and partly of raw levies conscripted and assembled by Mobutu's Angolan instrument, Holden Roberto, from Angolan baKongo living in western Zaire. Other mixed forces, chiefly of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA bands (or bandits as they soon became), but consisting as to warlike capacity almost entirely of units of the South African army, held much of central Angola (the Alto Piano provinces of Huambo and Bié, and western Moxico) as well as much of the south-western provinces of Benguela and Huila.

Only a few months were required to change this menacing situation, thanks partly to a rapid improvement in the striking force of FAPLA (the army of the MPLA), and partly to the arrival in November of some thousands of Cuban volunteers responding to an appeal from the government of the new republic.[1] By the end of January 1976, with Cuban help, the FAPLA had unseated the northern invasion force from its positions north of Luanda, and driven this force

BASIL DAVIDSON began to study Angola in 1954, and his book of 1955 (*The African Awakening*) exposed conditions of near-slavery there. He is the author of *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's people* (London, Allen Lane, 1972; Penguin, 1975), a history of the national liberation struggle.

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pell-mell northwards to the frontier with Zaire, where, having retreated back across that frontier, it apparently disintegrated. The South Africans in the south proved somewhat harder to shift, having better discipline, morale and weapons. Here again the month of January was crucial, partly because of a further reinforcement of FAPLA-Cuban strike power, and partly because Pretoria, knowing now that it would receive no overt American support, decided that it could make no major reinforcement of its own troops. The commanders of these troops, who were now beginning to be badly mauled, saw that the game was up. Early in February they began to pull back in the face of FAPLA-Cuban offensives. By the end of March the last of their units were back across the frontier of Namibia.

This was not quite the end of that particular story. Savimbi's UNITA showed no capacity to fight any armed opponent. Their troops, commanders and politicians fled within days or even hours of the departure of their South African protectors, abandoning the towns they had boasted of controlling and leaving behind them an evil and sometimes terrible reputation for murder and corruption. But they took their weapons with them. Some fled southwards into Namibia; and from among these, since then, the South African army has continued to organize gangs for hit-and-run raids into southernmost Angola. Others fled into the hills and forests of this huge inland region of Huambo and Bié. Here they have continued, drawing on ammunition dumps left for them by the retreating South African army, to practise a guerrilla banditry, though on a declining scale. Raiding on a still smaller scale has similarly continued from Zaire into the border districts of northern Angola.

In reviewing Angola since independence, accordingly, one has to bear in mind that for a significant part of the country the period begins only in April 1976; and, secondly, that the new republic has been obliged to maintain a degree of military mobilization considerably higher than any level appropriate to the normal requirements of peacetime.

Reconstruction has had to absorb the impact of three other factors. Each of these calls for some mention here, while the first two of them must be seen as factors of a major historical importance. The first relates to the earliest period of active nationalism in Angola. Back in 1961-2, reacting with a wild violence to risings against the colonial system (but especially to murders of white men, women and children by the baKongo splinter movement UPA, afterwards FNLA, under Holden's leadership), Portuguese army and settlers jointly conducted a repression whose long-term consequences have still to be overcome. It appears likely that at least 20,000 literate Angolans were killed in those months, or a notable proportion of all those who, if they were alive today, would form the literate cadres of the new

state, as well as of the MPLA and its collateral organizations in the trade union and other fields.

Losses of this kind during the war of liberation itself were on a comparatively small scale, as appears to be the general rule in all successful wars of liberation. But corresponding losses during the 'second war' of 1975-6 were painfully high, mainly because of killings of civilians by the two puppet movements, FNLA and UNITA. Here again we lack detailed figures. But inquiries among survivors of the seven months occupation by UNITA of Huambo and Bié, the High Plateau provinces, tell a very sombre story. Long interviews with some of the survivors of that occupation, during June 1977, reported large massacres of MPLA militants and of other literates in these provinces, and even of many persons unable to speak Umbundu. Thus it appears that in the environs and city of Huambo alone (formerly Nova Lisboa) the total of MPLA civilian militants who were murdered by UNITA was somewhere between 1,000 and 1,300. For the environs and city of Bié, formerly Silva Porto, the evidence I was given this June suggests that the UNITA record there was even worse.

Secondly, there were the dislocations of Angolan society caused by Portuguese military policies between 1961 and 1974. There is no space here to review them, but one should at least note that about one-quarter of the whole rural population had been uprooted from its villages or homesteads by 1972 and forced into one or other kind of military 'resettlement'. Huge problems derived from this — and the 'second war' added others. Of the approximately 350,000 civilian Portuguese who were resident in Angola in 1974, all but a few thousand had quit the country by October 1975, fleeing for the most part at the order of their leaders (although a few of them, no doubt, were right in believing that they were also fleeing for their lives). The new republic had thus to face an almost total lack of trained managers, book-keepers, administrative clerks and skilled technicians of every kind.

Economic life was at a standstill almost everywhere by November 1975, the month of independence, and was often paralysed by crippling war damage or by the sabotage of departing Portuguese. The destruction of some 200 bridges obstructed rail and road traffic in a country where the regular and often long-range movement of goods, and above all of food, was important to daily life. None but the most elementary social structures had survived, and these, wherever they still existed outside the community of the MPLA, had little more than a purely local influence. Formally a nation, this society had to be assembled as it were from the bare ground, and endowed with a sense of unity which at that moment it altogether lacked.

Thirdly, and again as a necessary prelude to any measurement of achievements since independence, the MPLA came to power with a

latent schism within itself. Though limited to Luanda and its environs, this schism was powerful enough to hamper and retard the work of reconstruction all through 1976 and early 1977, until, as we know, it finally erupted in a futile but murderous *putsch* against the leadership on 27 May 1977. This again is not the place to review that affair in all its complex and instructive detail, most of which is now available. But a few words may be said about it, for its nature and origins can help to explain the problems of this tough initial period of independence.

Essentially, the Alves factionism derived from the history of Angola during the colonial period, but especially from that of the city of Luanda and its environs, and from the history of the liberation war itself. The Portuguese had always ruled by an acute if sometimes covert racism. It can even be said, without exaggeration, that 'colonial culture' (but the term is nothing if not pretentious) had imprinted very widely, at least in urban populations, the concept of 'five categories'. Four of these, consisting of less than 10 per cent of the whole population, were denominated as white, *mestiço cabrito* (mulatto × mulatto), *mestiço* (mulatto × white) and *mestiço cafuso* (mulatto × black); the fifth, consisting of the remaining 90 per cent of the population or more, was considered as black. The first category, white, was accepted as automatically endowed with citizenship, and had the mastery of the situation at all effective points. The next three categories, though with an ever increasing difficulty 'down the scale', could accede to citizenship (if, in practice, of a second-class order) by means of assimilation to Portuguese culture and ideas. So could a handful of the fifth or black category in so far as lucky individuals could win their way through to a secondary or, rarer still, a higher education. They were called *assimilados*.

But the vast majority of the black population, more than 99 per cent by the census of 1960, was held firmly in the legal and administrative clamps of 'native status' (*indígenato*). Subject to fully legal forced labour up to 1961 (and to less than fully legal forced labour after that), abused in countless ways by settler insolence, and always deprived of access to their own development as individuals or as collectivities, this overwhelming majority were the mere 'objects' of colonial exploitation. From this white racism, above all in the city of Luanda (with an eighth of the population), there derived a black counter-racism in peri-urban slums and *sanzalas*, though aimed above all at the three *mestiço* 'categories'. Individuals from these 'categories', as it happened, had played a key role and sometimes an heroic one in the long war of liberation; and several were now at the head of the MPLA on every good ground of talent and experience. Following his personal and counter-revolutionary ambitions, Alves saw these men as his particular enemies. He and his group called this Luanda racism to their aid, and did their best to inflame and exploit it.

This use of Luanda racism was supplemented by a Kimbundu regionalism. Once the 'core people' of the ancient kingdom of Ndongo, the Kimbundu live in the region of Luanda and its northern districts. Their regionalism ('tribalism') became the Luanda counterpart of the Umbundu 'tribalism' (regionalism) upon which Savimbi and his UNITA had counted in the provinces of the High Plateau. It derived largely from the circumstances of a long isolation of this Kimbundu region (known as the 'first region') of MPLA resistance from the main development of the MPLA in other regions of the country; and it became embodied in the central committee by Alves and two other members. Controlling key positions, such as that of the



Chief languages spoken in Angola: approximate boundaries
Most of the Angolan population lives in the western and central regions; the Lunda-Chokwe group is relatively small, the Mbunda-Luchazi-Luvale group smaller still. People who know Portuguese are found in every region, but especially in the west and centre. The whole Angolan population today is probably about six millions, or a little less.

ministry of the interior, this group was able to infiltrate its nominees into several decisively important departments of administration, as well as into sections of the army and security organization. As the evidence now abundantly shows, their plan drew heavily on the anti-Allende precedents of Chile. This plan included the sabotage of food supplies to Luanda, and other forms of sabotage, while blaming the government for the shortage of food and other necessities; and the making of a *coup d'état* during which the leaders of the main body of the MPLA were to be murdered. All this would be done in the name of 'saving the Revolution', and of getting rid of 'white and *mestiço* counter-revolutionaries'. It must be said that they had damaging success in both aspects of their plan. Their *putsch* failed miserably in Luanda, and no risings occurred elsewhere. But their previous sabotage had gone far to paralyse food supplies for Luanda; and their murder of MPLA leaders carried off seven of the best veterans of the war of liberation, five of whom, incidentally, were black.

All these factors and their varying consequences have formed part of the inheritance that the revolutionary regime, in starting on its work of reconstruction, has had to face and overcome. If its progress is nonetheless impressive, as I think it will be found to be, this needs to be considered from the standpoint of theory as well as of practice.

A THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT

The founders of the MPLA, back in 1956, were possessed of a clear idea of what their movement should achieve. Their earliest manifesto spoke to that with a remarkable foresight. Given the nature of the Portuguese system and its cultural, economic and other features, the revolutionary struggle which was necessary to liberate the potentials of Angola's people, said this manifesto, could succeed 'only by the building of a united front of all Angola's anti-imperialist forces, taking no account of colour, social situation, religious belief, or individual prejudice'.[2]

As with the similar programmes of the PAIGC in Guiné and of FRELIMO in Mozambique, this meant that the constructive and positive aspects of the rise of black consciousness in Angola — to be sharply distinguished from black racism — were to be developed within a resolution of race *and* class conflicts and contradictions. In other words, the aim was to end colonial rule in every form, whether direct or indirect, purely colonial or 'neo-colonial'. But the precise nature of the social structures which should then arise would depend on the progressive creation of a sense of national unity, of unity of aims and interests, as well as on a comparable perception of the needs and possibilities of a revolutionary programme of modernization.[3]

The leaders of the MPLA — or those who held firm till the end, there being no few defections and betrayals along the way — were marxist in their approach to reality. But they could afford no dogmatism. They had to apply their analysis in situations, and in face of realities, for which no detailed marxist prescriptions yet existed: or none, at least, of any workable value. One may search in vain, whether in the internal documents of the MPLA or in the declarations of Agostinho Neto and Lucio Lara, the MPLA's principal ideological thinkers, for 'textbook formulas'. They insisted from the first that the MPLA must struggle for 'a coalition government which will regroup all the forces which have fought through to the end' — again I am quoting from the manifesto of 1956 — and that 'the working class will form the leadership of this government of anti-imperialist forces'. But the precise forms in which these objectives could be won would be decided by the experience and content of the struggle for liberation itself.

The 'developmental model' which evolved in MPLA thinking has thus owed much of its historical necessity to the circumstances of the 1960s and early 1970s. The cultural and political development of the MPLA as a vanguard of liberation, evolving steadily in numbers from the few who led the way in 1956, and able to act increasingly as the pole of attraction for very much larger numbers ready to participate in the work of liberation, has had its decisive influence. So, too, in different ways, there was the influence of what was happening to the colonial economy and system. This system became ever more repressive. In doing so, it became ever more hateful and incapable of acceptance in any of its aspects, and had reached the point where mere reforms, even if they had been thinkable under the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship, could have satisfied none but a small fraction of *assimilados*. The colonial economy, at the same time, became ever more pointedly an economy of mere extraction, and, as such, perfectly unviable as a means of any kind of national development.

Largely unhindered in its central and western zones,[4] this colonial economy expanded rapidly after 1964, with mineral exports doubling between 1965-70, and with large increases in exports of coffee and other crops grown for sale abroad. This was largely thanks to an inflow of multinational investment which was now able to breach the hitherto closely-guarded barriers of Portuguese monopoly. Forced on the Salazarist regime by the latter's growing need for financial and military aid against the liberation movements in its colonies, these provisions for the 'liberalization of investment', to the advantage of American and other western investors, steadily reinforced the extractive character of the system. On one side, the natural resources of this potentially rich country were increasingly exploited for the benefit of foreign owners; on the other, the bulk of the population was increasingly reduced to the role of providing

cheap food and labour for the zones of export extraction. If the MPLA were to take over and conserve any part of this system, Angola's independence could be no more than nominal.

All 'personal preferences' aside, liberation had therefore to mean revolution.[5] And this revolution had to demand the dismantlement of all those structures which supplied or derived from a foreign capitalism, and their replacement with entirely new structures capable of yielding progress towards a society of self-development. What kind of new structures? They could obviously not be capitalist. Any attempt to build an indigenous capitalism — whether a private capitalism or a state capitalism — would lead straight back into a para-colonial or 'neo-colonial' system, as all the evidence in Africa in any case abundantly proved. So this revolution, if it were to succeed, would have to pass directly into a non-capitalist, or rather anti-capitalist, transition towards an eventual socialism. 'Personal preferences' might argue for that: more powerfully still, all the relevant circumstances demanded it.

That being the case, what were the immediately necessary tasks? They were rendered immensely more difficult by the nature of Portuguese withdrawal in 1975 and by the foreign invasions which followed that withdrawal; but they were never in doubt. The first was to continue with the building of unity around the concept of a nation-state: to realize, in short, the national destiny of Angola as a geographical entity — but to do this, and here lay the central problem, by means of a revolutionary nationalism whose front was turned, sharply and decisively, against the bourgeois-capitalist model which had dominated all concepts of the nation-state since 'modern history' began. The second task, flowing out of the first, was to produce the long-term structural foundations on which this revolutionary nationalism could stand firm, and, as the years passed, lead ever more confidently towards a society in full self-development within the world of modern science and technology: in other words, towards a non-capitalist society capable of becoming a socialist society.

One should enter here, in passing, a note that may be useful to an understanding of the 'inner dialectics' of this programme. That the tasks of this transition pose an equivocation between the aims of nationalism and the aims of socialism was always apparent. No serious thinker within the MPLA, for example, has ever proposed that Angola can hope to build 'socialism in a single country'. That may be a possible proposition in sub-continents, although history, even with them, can strongly suggest the contrary; it is manifestly impossible in any African country. Why, then, persist in forming a nation?

The answer is that within the realities of this independence, of this Africa, there can be no present alternative to nationalism as a unifying concept, as an organizing framework: but that, at the same time,

a revolutionary nationalism in the Angolan sense — cutting through all 'traditional' and colonial barriers of ethnic or other division — can lay the ground for a future situation in which national frontiers will lose their infrastructural significance. Unthinkable within the categories of 'neo-colonialist' (para-capitalist) thought and action, the organic federation of nation-states becomes, with this approach, as eventually possible as it is certainly desirable.[6] Meanwhile, one must 'solve one problem at a time'.

WINNING CONTROL

Victorious in its campaigns, and confirmed in these victories by the continued and vividly welcome presence of Cuba's military and civilian missions,[7] the MPLA began in 1976 with a major advantage, which was also of course a major problem. This was that 'everything', as practically everyone could plainly see, had to be rebuilt 'from the base'. Not only had nearly all Portuguese *colons* left the country, abandoning their managerial or other jobs in mines, plantations, small industrial enterprises and administration: beyond that, there was everywhere an obvious and pressing need for new structures in everyday life. An entirely new experience opened. Let us look at this experience from the somewhat artificially divided standpoints of (1) the socio-political field, and (2) the economic field. It will be more convenient to take the second before the first.

It must be said that no effective statistical measures can be applied, because no sufficient body of reliable statistics is yet to hand. 'When we came to power in Luanda,' in some recent words of the planning minister, Carlos Rocha Dilolwa,[8] 'we necessarily got here with no detailed knowledge of Angola's economic realities, save in general ways.' They had hoped to find the answers they needed in the Portuguese administrative files. They were disappointed.

> In relation to productive units, we found that the colonial administration made every year a sort of 'map' of the enterprises then in operation. They drew this up on a large sheet of paper in five copies. But such were the little bureaucratic wars they fought against each other that those who made this 'map' of productive units did not give it to those who compiled the coming year's productive 'plan'. So the planners did not even know how many productive units they were supposed to be planning for. Even these 'maps', we then discovered, were incomplete.

They had accordingly to compose an entirely new picture of the productive situation. 'Today, at least, we possess a sound knowledge of the conditions of about 85 per cent of existing enterprises, whether industrial or agricultural, and the rest are only small workshops and

handicraft units.' To this one may add the comment of one of Angola's very few trained statisticians, Cda. Colaço, who pointed out that there were no good statistics of overall economic reality for the reason that 'the colonial model of production had no need of any. What that model needed were the figures relating to individual companies in respect of costs, prices, and profits.'[9]

Existing enterprises at the time of independence were found to consist of two kinds. The first were enterprises abandoned by their owners, managers and skilled workers, but still in production, even at a low level, thanks to the initiative of their Angolan employees. The second, not so numerous but still depressingly many, were those that had been abandoned and were altogether out of production. A third but very small category consisted of a handful of multinational enterprises whose foreign personnel remained available. All the abandoned enterprises were taken under national control, formally at least, by Law 128 of the so-called transitional government of 1975, the 'tripartite' government in which the national movement was obliged to share power with the Zaire puppet FNLA and the South African puppet UNITA. 'We were able to achieve that law', remarked Dilolwa, 'because we controlled the ministry of finance through our comrade Saydi Mingas, its minister. And Mingas pushed it through because UNITA and FNLA attached no importance to financial administration and failed to "flank" Mingas with their secretaries of state.'

Secondly, in August 1975, by which time the national movement was gaining effective control of central government in Luanda, Mingas carried through a further decree taking control of the banks. Thirdly, by Law 3 of early 1976, a stiffening of the first Mingas decree provided for the confiscation of all abandoned enterprises, and their transfer to national ownership. Fourthly, a successful currency reform of early 1976 displaced the *escudo* by the *kwanza*, and greatly curtailed the monetary speculations of a large number of busy crooks in Luanda and elsewhere. With a large measure of economic control thus assured, the regime now has a position which needs considering under two heads: (a) the nationalized enterprises, and (b) those still in private hands.

So far as financial and fiduciary controls are concerned, the regime has nationalized the Banco Nacional de Angola, its central bank of issue, and launched a new credit institution, the Banco de Povo de Angola. Portuguese private banks are not yet nationalized, but their influence is small and their dealings subject to government control: they are no longer in any position to call the tune. Major foreign concessionaries are also still untouched as to ownership, and this on a variety of grounds. These include Gulf Oil, producing offshore crude from Cabinda; Diamang, the De Beers subsidiary in north-eastern Angola, and some others. Among the latter are the chiefly Krupp sub-

sidiary of Minieras de Benguela (which has not been nationalized largely because it is thought to be heavily in deficit), and the 90 per cent British-owned Benguela Railway, crossing the whole of middle Angola from Lobito on the Atlantic Coast to the Zaïre frontier at Teixiera da Sousa. The latter is now under Angolan management, but transfer of its ownership will apparently form part of a political balance yet to be struck with London. In this respect, as in others, the revolutionary government seems to have a shrewd grasp of how best to use its assets.

On major multinational enterprises such as Gulf Oil and Diamang, requiring high technology and complex marketing experience, the MPLA attitude was summarized by President Neto in a speech to the newly-formed União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola (UNTA) last October:

> We have as yet many tasks before we can achieve genuine economic independence. Can we say we are completely independent while Cabinda Gulf Oil exploits the petroleum of Cabinda? Obviously, not. We have achieved genuine political independence, but not yet genuine economic independence: that will be achieved only when there is in Angola, from Cabinda to the Cunene [that is, from far north to far south], not a single foreign monopoly exploiting our riches.
>
> Can this problem be solved by a decree? Can we solve it with an angry editorial proclaiming that the bosses shall not fatten on the sweat of the workers? Obviously, not. Cabinda oil is obtained through advanced technology. Do we possess this technology? No. Do the countries which are our friends and give us most help possess this technology? No again. Very well, what shall we do? What we are doing now: telling Gulf Oil that the People's Republic of Angola does not recognise the contracts which Gulf Oil made with the Portuguese colonialists; that these contracts were signed without the knowledge of the Angolan people; and that for the future we are drawing up new contracts which will be contracts between Gulf Oil and the Angolan people. According to these contracts, Gulf Oil agrees to produce the same as it produced before. So while Gulf Oil is there, will it be making profits in Angola? It will. Will it be fattening on the sweat of our workers and exploiting our riches? Yes, it will. Can we reject this situation. Obviously, not.
>
> These are unfavourable conditions for the Angolan people. But we cannot escape them without creating new difficulties for our workers and our people in general. If we were to stop the production of petroleum we should impose unnecessary hardships on our people. Is Gulf Oil going to exploit our riches for ever? No. We are not going to compromise our future. We are making a temporary, short-term agreement. There is no alternative ...

But, he went on,

> we do not want to deceive anyone. We do not want to deceive foreign capitalist monopolies by concealing the fact that we intend to follow the road of socialising our means of production, of finance, of trade, of services, of everything that can be socialised, and that we intend to do this as rapidly as possible ... [10]

WORKERS' CONTROL AND THE ABANDONED ENTERPRISES

Most of the Portuguese had left by October 1975. Many went from one day to the next. Almost none seem to have taken any thought for the future of the enterprises which they owned and managed or otherwise worked in: except, here and there, to sabotage their equipment or their buildings. There followed a strange interlude of months of confusion in which an elementary and *ad hoc* form of workers' control gradually emerged. A large number of these enterprises had employed ten to twenty Angolans who now found themselves with an idle plant on their hands; a few were bigger than this. These began to operate on a kind of 'Robinson Crusoe pattern', each little enterprise producing whatever it could and bartering its product — there being no reliable currency available — for whatever its producers could obtain, working as so many isolated islands of activity, paying no taxes and dividing up the profits (mostly in bartered goods) among their respective workers in lieu of wages. The national economy had practically ceased to exist as such.

This sometimes agreeable form of 'anarchy' could obviously not be allowed to persist, since it prevented any kind of national planning or investment, and deprived the state of much-required revenue in taxes. By October 1976 the government was able to begin appointing managements such as would enable these enterprises to be brought within a national economy. These managements mostly emerged from within the MPLA and were obliged, from the start, to work in harness with the new trade union organizations now taking shape in every enterprise. Out of this, incidentally, there came some of the anti-government support gained during 1976 by the Alves faction. Above all in Luanda, students of the lycée and university often provided the literate personnel of isolated enterprises operating in the way I have described above. Using a confused medley of slogans learned from young Portuguese 'leftists' — and I employ the term with reservations, since it is now clear that these particular 'leftists' were, directly, the conscious or unconscious tools of counter-revolution — these persons raised the cry of 'the Revolution in danger' as soon as isolated enterprises became subject to central planning and revenue control. This was the 'super-leftism' that Alves

and his group were able to exploit, demagogically, together with the other wings of their 'policy' — and notably with the anti-mulatto racism which they preached in Luanda to a purely African audience.

The position today, broadly, is that most of the isolated enterprises, and all those of any economic weight, are back within a national economy. Investigation of some of the larger of them, especially in Benguela, Lobito and Huambo city, indicated that they are on the way to recovery. The nationalized Cassequel sugar refinery at Catumbela, for example, is set to produce 24,000 tons this year, and 30,000 tons in 1978, against a 1973 'high' of 33,000 tons. The nationalized SOREFAME ship-repair yards at Lobito could handle only seventy-three ships in 1976, compared with 113 in 1973, but expects to handle more than 140 in 1977. The Cuca brewery in Huambo city produced 2,276,000 litres in three-shift working during 1973, but expects to produce 1,320,000 litres in two-shift working in 1977. Other enterprises have done better than these examples; others again have done worse.

All these results, in any case, have been achieved by Angolan workers who were merely the untrained 'assistants' of Portuguese skilled workers during the colonial period; and in this respect the results are continuously impressive. Of some 300 Portuguese technicians working at the central repair-shops in Huambo of the Benguela railway in 1974, for example, only two or three remained at the end of 1975; and yet these workshops, according to their trade union spokesmen (in a meeting which they called for me), 'can now repair anything that comes to us'. The story is much the same at the port of Lobito and elsewhere. Judged by my evidence from many plant meetings, the integration of new trade union branches with local management is now well advanced, with a corresponding improvement in conditions of work, and, above all, with a steady promotion of a national system of workers' control.

TOWARDS A SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY

There is manifestly a long way to go before this economy can really prosper. Just as clearly, the foundations of an evolving system of self-development are being laid. Among these one could note the launching of country-wide literacy campaigns, the mass inoculation of children against poliomyelitis, the founding of a network of clinics for preventive as well as curative medicine and the reorganization of the content of what is taught in schools.

You find a reflection of all this in the more purely political field. The foundations of a new state are there; the structures often remain to be built on them. What these structures should be, and how they should be built and operate, were central issues considered and

resolved in theory at the important third plenary of the central committee of the MPLA last October. This produced a document running to some ninety pages in which the present phase is defined as one of 'national reconstruction' — but the meaning, really, is 'national construction' — while its chief tasks were fixed as being the 'implantation and generalization of people's power' and, secondly, 'the creation of a party of the working-class' as the chief instrument of further transformation. These aims remain unchanged, and again one notes the emphasis on a step-by-step unfolding of structural innovation made in harmony with the development of a mass consciousness of the country's needs and possibilities. Thus a key definition runs:

> The eventual forms of our State, considered as a whole and not merely as an apparatus of government, will emerge from the representative institutions of our power, of the organs of People's Power, whereby the working class and working people [by the second of which the peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie are to be understood] participate institutionally in the mastery and government of society in all its activities and collectivities ... [11]

A national network of this 'People's Power' has still to take shape in terms of the generalization of representative committees and assemblies from the base to the top; but, again, the beginnings are already there. An outlying example from my own inquiries may be enough to demonstrate this.

The town and rural district of Cuma, lying within the shadow of the western rim of the High Plateau in Huambo province, is administered by a commissioner of *conselho* (district). But he works together, as he explained to me, with a *comité de zona*. This is a citizens' committee (each member, working pretty well fulltime, being provided with a small monthly stipend). It represents the *grupos d'acção* (action-groups) of Cuma town and district. There were, its members told me, forty such groups in the town and another 192 in the rural area. These form the elements of elective self-government, and embody the administrative aspect of the MPLA as a movement. No doubt they still often lack experience and self-confidence; as they acquire both, they will be expected to take a correspondingly larger responsibility for local affairs. Meanwhile, other aspects of this representative system are promoted by the trade union movement, by OMA (the Organization of Angolan Women) and by JMPLA (the MPLA youth organization), and all this, of course, on a country-wide basis. The object is to ensure that democratic centralism, as practised by the MPLA (and by the party organization still to be formed), incorporates a real and living influence 'from the base'.

The plenary of last October foresaw that the MPLA must continue to exist, for long into the future, as the broad front of unity within

which all trends of nationalist opinion have their place. But the transformation towards socialism called for more than that. What was now needed, it decided, was the formation of a revolutionary socialist party, a party in which all Angolans who accept the principles of marxism-leninism, and who are ready to give their lives to the cause of revolutionary change, can come together and form the vanguard of the MPLA, just as the MPLA, up to now, has formed the vanguard of Angolan nationalism. A congress scheduled for the end of 1977 will take these decisions further.

This bald and brief 'situation report' has allowed no place for the human dimensions of this experience; and perhaps those dimensions belong to a different kind of report. In conclusion here, though, it needs to be said that if Angola has known the depths of human cruelty and betrayal in these years, with fearful persecutions and grim disasters, this people has also brought forth great tolerance and generosity of spirit, courage and lucidity of mind, and, not seldom, an heroic grandeur among those who have fought through to the end and are fighting still. Here the contrasts have been very sharp: with the worst human horrors among the puppet movements and their assassins, and on the other side, among those who have stood and stand for a real independence, with the qualities that make mankind worthwhile. And this necessary statement leads me to two final points.

The first is that among the leadership here, whether up or down the ranks of command, one finds no easy optimism, no euphoria, no tendency to think the work more than begun. Who could be less demagogic than Agostinho Neto, less given to empty words than Lucio Lara, less inclined to illusions than those who stand beside them? Nothing is guaranteed: but these are men and women who know where they stand and where they mean to go. Secondly, the route they follow will be their own: a route to social revolution and the further liberation of Africa, but militarily non-aligned between the powers of the outside world, autonomous, specific, and pursued with a conviction that nothing less than a complete independence of decision can bring success.

The experience of others may be useful, may be indispensable. But only those policies which arise from the living reality of Angola, in all its diversity and complexity, will be able to achieve the further liberation of Angola's people.

> We are going to make a revolution, marxist, leninist, just like we say. And it is going to be our own revolution, because it has got to be if it is to succeed. It has got to move step by step with the unfolding of our own people's understanding of needs and

possibilities. Anyone who hasn't understood this hasn't yet decolonised his own mind. He will have to learn better.[12]

Angola, May-June 1977

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1 The story of the Cuban volunteers, whether military or civilian, is one that remains to be told. Even their transport across the seas was something of an epic. At first they seem to have possessed only two large aircraft able to make the distance non-stop. Afterwards, with smaller aircraft, stops en route were repeatedly difficult because of distance or diplomatic difficulties. They also came crowded into small ships under very tough conditions. They speak about all that now with a cheerful modesty which tells of high morale. But they do not speak about it at all unless you ask them.

2 In M. de Andrade and M. Ollivier, *La Guerre en Angola* (Paris, 1971). See also B. Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm, Angola's People* (London 1972), p. 332.

3 cf. Davidson, *loc. cit.*, for further discussion.

4 The chief reason why the Portuguese were largely unhindered in the western and central regions lay in the long-standing determination of the Zaire dictator, Mobutu, to obstruct the progress of the MPLA, and in Mobutu's promotion of Holden's FNLA.

5 cf. A. Cabral at various points, but especially in his Havana statement of 1966, in ibid. *Unité et Lutte* (Paris, 1975), vol I, *l'Arme de la Théorie*, pp. 282.

6 For extended discussion of this and connected points, see B. Davidson, *Africa in Modern History* (London, Allen Lane, forthcoming, February 1978).

7 In June 1977 there were some 300 Cuban doctors working in Angola; the chief of their medical mission told me that this number was expected to go to 500 and beyond.

8 Interview with B.D., 13 June 1977.

9 Interview with B.D., 9 June 1977.

10 Speech to UNTA, quoted from *Vitória Certa* (Luanda, 23 October 1976).

11 *Documentos da 3 Reunião Plenária do Comité Central do MPLA* (23-29 October 1976), Luanda (Secretariado do Bureau Político), p. 80.

12 Vice-President Lucio Lara, in interview with B.D., 28 June 1977.

EDMUNDO DESNOES

Translated by Francis Webber

The last summer: Cuba and Hemingway

> Today is the fifth anniversary of the death of Ernest Hemingway, one of the greatest North American writers of any age, considered unique master of a limpid, direct and muscular prose which has had a decisive influence on the new generation of writers of all countries ... Cuba has cause for particular devotion to the memory of Ernest Hemingway, who chose our country in which to live for many years, giving eloquent proofs of his love for our people and of his confidence in the rejuvenating air of our island until, oppressed by severe pain, he left in search of his lost health.
>
> With these brief lines, *El Mundo* [The World] warmly salutes the memory of a writer whose passage through life left the permanent mark of his artistic genius, who knew how to match words with action, like all who find the richest of adventures, and the firmest expression of a future built on love and purity, in the heart of man.
>
> *El Mundo* (2 June 1966)

Ernest Hemingway is Ernest Hemingway by virtue of a multitude of factors and frontiers. Fidel Castro was too generous when he declared, 'All Hemingway's work is a defence of human rights.' His passion for Spain, his defence of the Republican cause for the three years of the Civil War, drew him momentarily out of his thick American skin. But it was a case of juvenile love — although certainly it was a love to which he remained faithful to his death. We shall return to this theme later. But in Africa — part of our

EDMUNDO DESNOES is the author of the novel *Memories of Underdevelopment* (Penguin, 1971) and co-author of the screenplay for the Cuban film version. This essay, published for the first time in English, is taken from his book of essays *Punto de Vista*, published in Havana (1967).

underdeveloped world — he was a white hunter. A tourist on safari. We shall return to this theme later. And in Cuba he lived like a retired Englishman in one of his colonies — with sympathy for the Cuban people, but looking at them from above, from *La Vigia* (The Watchtower). To this, too, we shall return. Hemingway took part in both world wars, each time on the same side as his country, the USA. And this was no coincidence. Later, as an old man (1951), suffering pain and covered with bruises from an accident on board his yacht *Pilar*, Hemingway regretted not having been involved in an imperialist war. 'There's Korea', he said, in an irritated tone, to his intimate friend A.E. Hotchner, 'this is the first time my country ever fought that I wasn't there.' His human rights were, after all, the rights of North Americans. Although he lived outside the USA for many years, he was born in Illinois and committed suicide in Ohio — both states right in the centre of the country. He was a twentieth-century North American.

He led the life of a Roman, a citizen of a world power, who can move with ease through the world, always backed by an impressive green passport. It's a question of having both the economic means and the psychological assurance of feeling oneself a product and part of, and supported by, a huge and aggressive country. Hemingway spent his youth in its fields, fished trout in the tranquil depths of the Michigan rivers — a world of security (he saw there the inferiority imposed on the vestiges of another race: Indian women giving birth in suffering, Indian men killing themselves, but Nick Adams, with his father, the doctor, 'had the complete assurance that he would never die') — and from there he throws himself at Europe, with a handful of his contemporaries, to play an active part in the world's affairs. He strides over Europe aggressively: Paris, Venice, Madrid. He published in English, primarily for the US: *The Sun Also Rises, A Farewell to Arms, For Whom the Bell Tolls* ...

Hemingway writes in English, for publication in New York, because he does not change, become European, he doesn't gear himself to French, Italian, Spanish culture but remains firmly within North American culture. He doesn't let himself be dazzled or overawed by Europe, like so many Latin American writers, but rather masters, utilizes, expresses a stranger's vision of Europe. He is a direct descendant of Mark Twain (indeed, for him *Huckleberry Finn* is 'the best American book ever written'), who also has a very clear awareness of his cultural location, writing *A Yankee at the Court of King Arthur*. Hemingway is always a Yankee — in World War I (Lt Henry), in Paris (Jake), in the Spanish Civil War (Robert Jordan), and even in the bull-ring (*Death in the Afternoon*).

The USA is always quick to acclaim the work of any writer born in its vast and violent territory stolen from the Indians and Mexicans. After his difficult years of bohemian life in Paris, learning his craft,

Hemingway gradually begins to move with the ease and competence which alone attract international fame and wealth. He is offered $15,000 for a simple article on literature. For *The Snows of Kilimanjaro*, a short story which was screened, he receives $125,000, and something more for *The Old Man and The Sea*.*

Let us take a look at the way this man lives. Take any year — let's say 1949. For a few months he shuts down his estate, *La Vigia*, on the outskirts of Havana, his colonial residence in one of the outposts of Empire — and makes his way to New York. There he stays, according to custom, in a suite at the Hotel Sherry-Netherland, and before leaving for Europe, receives some friends, among them Marlene Dietrich. On the table, while they are chatting, are 'two silver ice buckets, each containing a bottle of Perrier-Jouet, a huge blue tin of béluga caviar, a salver of toast, a bowl of finely chopped onions, a bowl of lemon slices, a salver of smoked salmon and a thin vase containing yellow tea roses.'[1]

During his stay in New York, Hemingway suddenly gets the idea of going to the circus — Ringling Bros., in Madison Square Garden. He feels like saying hello to the animals. He knocks insistently at the side door until an attendant appears who tried to turn him away, whereupon Hemingway shows him a card signed by one of the circus owners, his friend John Ringling North, authorizing him to go in to the circus at any time of the day or night. He goes in, walks up to the gorilla and bear cages and begins an animated conversation; the animals end up by grunting and whimpering at him in friendship.

From there he sails on the *Ile de France* to Europe, to Paris. He spends a few days at the races; steeplechases at Auteuil. He studies the horses; Hemingway has supreme confidence in his ability to pick winners in the paddocks by their smell. He bets heavily; one day he and his friends place all the money they can get together on a horse running at 19:1, and win a mountain of francs. With the win, an orgy of present-giving begins. 'Never have so few bought so much' said Hemingway, paraphrasing Churchill — 'but I'm happy and proud to say that not one thing anybody gave to anybody is useful.'[2]

We stand before the splendid opulence of a great North American writer. I look at him with envy and rage. Envy, because it would be ingenuous to deny the richness of a life whose whims can be lived as concrete possibilities, where one can act individually without stagnating or approaching old age emptyhanded; and rage, through the knowledge that we are condemned for several more years (perhaps many) to a poor, distorted, limited, wasted world. Because one of the grave injustices of underdevelopment is that men under-use themselves, they do not live all their possibilities. Their corrupted dreams

*And the gap goes on increasing, the abyss between capitalism and underdevelopment. Truman Capote, for example, has already earned $4m for his 'non-fiction novel' *In Cold Blood*.

turn them mean, immoral. Or they flee from reality, with more or less success. Many writers of my generation — and I include myself — dreamed of living the bohemian life in Paris, of fighting for human dignity in Spain, while our obscure little countries were sinking in shit and corruption and pointlessness and were losing their chance of living in this century; we dreamed of having famous, eccentric friends in all the capital cities of the world; of having passionate love affairs while the world blazed; of receiving $100,000 for authorizing the technicolour filming of one of our more subtle and complete short stories; of hunting lions and buffaloes, antelope and rhino in Africa ... we dreamed dreams that did not belong to us, which humiliated us — like the romantic novels read by servant girls.

A Bolivian writer will never have a visit from his friend Marlene Dietrich in a suite at the Hotel Sherry-Netherland; the most he can do is masturbate with a foreign magazine pin-up of the blue angel with her dazzling and perfect legs that are insured for around $1m. All this we apprehended with sorrow, when we took up our true destiny. And I don't mean taking up arms, but simply seeing clearly.

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Hemingway's coming to Cuba was partly by chance and largely by coincidence. In 1927 he divorced his first wife, Hadley Richardson, and in the same year marries Pauline Pfeiffer, a fashion writer for *Vogue* magazine and a North American from St Louis like his first wife. He changes his lifestyle; he returns to the US and installs himself in its most southerly city: Key West for him, Cayo Hueso for us down here. He lives and fishes and writes there for ten years (1928-38), and crosses the Gulf Stream to visit us on numerous occasions.

With the Spanish Republic destroyed and Francisco Franco in power, Hemingway returns to the New World melancholy and a little disillusioned with social struggle. He writes a large part of *For Whom the Bell Tolls* in Havana, in a room at the *Ambos Mundos* hotel, probably because our customs, something of the architecture, the language, all remind him of Spain. There is a resemblance, but it isn't the same, and it must be admitted: Hemingway does not buy an estate in San Francisco de Paula and anchor his fishing boat in Cojimar simply because he likes Cuba, but because it reminds him of Spain, and because it is isolated enough, yet close enough to the States to escape to and to write in English without being disturbed by untimely visits; because he can go on spear fishing in the Caribbean. He settles here for convenience, and perhaps too for sentimental reasons, which have nothing directly to do with our collective personality. With time, of course, he develops some affection and sympathy for us, and even feels morally obliged, shortly before his

death, to display a kind of solidarity with us; we shall always be grateful.

When the Second World War broke out, his yacht *Pilar* was transformed into a submarine-hunter, and placed at the service of the US navy, with a crew of nine captained by Hemingway himself. The forty feet of yacht are transformed into a Q-boat, with radio equipment, machine-guns, bazookas and high explosives. It patrols the waters of the Caribbean, looking for Nazi submarines to destroy. The services it renders are of some importance, and the US ambassador in Cuba declares, 'Ernest's contribution was so important that I have strongly recommended him for a decoration.'[3]

Even before he bought his estate here, Hemingway had already published a portrait of our island. Cuba, and Cubans, are shown as sinister figures behind the destruction of lonely, unhappy Harry Morgan in *To Have and Have Not* (1937). It is an image which does not become us very well. From the very first pages it is clear how Hemingway sees us: a corrupted people whose men kill each other pointlessly in pursuit of power. In the very first chapter we have a gunfight in the docks between revolutionary bands. Later, Harry Morgan, who is involved in maritime smuggling between Cuba and Florida, is shot at near Mariel and remarks: 'Just like Cubans. One guy didn't pay another guy and we get shot at. Just like Cubans.' It is completely the opposite of what he says about Spaniards in *For Whom the Bell Tolls*: 'Those are the flowers of Spanish chivalry. What a people they have been. What sons of bitches from Cortes, Pizarro, Menendez, de Avila all down through Enrique Lister to Pablo. And what wonderful people. There is no finer and no worse people in the world. No kinder people and no crueller.'

Hemingway had a different opinion of the Cuban revolutionaries of the 1930s. (We cannot judge him, I know, from what one of his characters says or thinks. But it is not pure chance that the picture we get of Cuba comes from Harry Morgan — the protagonist, the eyes of the novel. And it accords with some of Hemingway's statements and attitudes.) A group of self-styled revolutionaries rob a bank in Cayo Hueso, kill a man and force Morgan to take them to the coast of Cuba in his boat — all for 'a revolutionary organization'. When Harry protests at the killing of his mate, one of the Cubans says to him, 'You see, this man Roberto is bad. He is a good revolutionary but a bad man. He kills so much in the time of Machado he gets to like it. He thinks it is funny to kill. He kills in a good cause, of course. The best cause.'

While they steer towards Cuba, the youngest and most idealistic of the gang outlines the social situation in Cuba: 'We want to do away with all the old politicians, with all the American imperialism that strangles us, with the tyranny of the army. We want to start clean and give every man a chance. We want to end the slavery of the *guajiros*,

you know, the peasants, and divide the big sugar estates among the people that work them.'

Harry, however, does not agree. 'What the hell do I care about his revolution. F— his revolution. To help the working man he robs a bank and kills that poor damned Albert that never did any harm. That's a working man he kills. He never thinks of that. With a family. It's the Cubans run Cuba. They all double-cross each other. They sell each other out. They get what they deserve. The hell with their revolutions.'

This is a caricature of revolutionary groups degenerating into gangsterism; a bleak, dead-end vision. At no time does Hemingway betray an understanding of the necessities and possibilities which lie, like his famous submerged icebergs, beneath all the political struggles of the country. And *To Have or Have Not* was written in 1937, the high-water period for North American radical literature, and is Hemingway's most *committed* work.

We should take care not to confuse a country with its people. Hemingway loved his life in Cuba; the peace of the countryside to write in, the sea where he regularly fished. The sea — nature — cleanses and washes away all human impurities; Hemingway sits and dreams and negates us, denies us any possibility of escape from our misery ... 'this Gulf Stream you are living with, knowing, learning about and loving, has moved, as it moves, since before man, and that it has gone by the shoreline of that long, beautiful, unhappy island since before Colombus sighted it, and that the things you find out about it, and those that have always lived in it, are permanent and of value because that stream will flow, as it has flowed, after the Indians, after the Spaniards, after the British, after the Americans and after all the Cubans and all the systems of governments, the richness, the poverty, the martyrdom, the sacrifice and the venality and cruelty are all gone as the high-piled scow of garbage, bright-coloured, white-flecked, ill-smelling ... and the palm fronds of our victories, the worn light bulbs of our discoveries and the empty condoms of our great loves float with no significance against one single, lasting thing — the stream.'

He wrote this in the *Green Hills of Africa* in 1935, and it illustrates one of the psychological mechanisms which Hemingway used to ward off the contemporary disease of alienation — specifically, the North American variety — nature became his refuge. Hemingway fished and hunted to free himself from his depressions, to get into the mainstream of life, to feel himself a rational animal among other, less fortunate, animals. 'I really spend a horrific amount of time killing animals and fish, so that I won't kill myself,' he said once to none other than the beautiful Ava Gardner, who had asked him if he had ever been to a psychiatrist.

Let us now go to his estate, *La Vigia*. If we enter with romantic

preconceptions, the extraordinary house of the extraordinary writer — we shall be sorely disappointed. At first sight it looks like the home of any North American sugar-estate manager — armchairs upholstered with English hunting scenes, his wife's bedroom with its pink dressing-table, the coffee table piled with the latest news and sport magazines. We may begin to revise our original impression when we see the books everywhere, but the bullfight posters reawaken our doubts — they look too much like exotic tourist souvenirs from a recent Spanish holiday. Then the stuffed, dead heads of African antelopes and buffaloes cause us a little sadness, in contrast with the pleasure at seeing the paintings of Juan Gris, Klee, and Miro's *Macia*. What is apparent at first glance, and remains true after an examination of the whole house, including the bathroom, is that Cuba has left not a trace. There is no sign of Cuba in the house — not a single picture by a Cuban artist, not even a little religious ornament or piece of handicraft. Nothing. The house might just as well be in Florida or Burma or the Philippines.

'I was the only person allowed in to his room while he was writing', so we were told, with pride, by René Villareal, Hemingway's right-hand man, as he showed us round the house (now converted into a museum). The famous North American writer had picked him up, a poor black waif, many years ago (I think it was on the streets of San Francisco de Paula), and had taken him in and moulded him to his personality and the needs of the house. While Hemingway wrote, René could enter the room because he made no noise; he moved stealthily like an African panther; silently; when Hemingway went away he would stay to look after the ranch. 'We all ate together at this table', René persisted, to show how Hemingway treated him as one of the family.

I believe the revolution has finally put an end to the possibility of such a relationship occurring again in Cuba. There is a kind of symbol here. We shall never again be servants of foreign masters, even though those masters help us to live in comfort, sit us at their table, keep us cushioned from the violent struggles of our time. No. A high price is paid for dignity.

On the intellectual plane something similar occurs. Seriously or in jest, in an article for *Look* magazine around 1950, Hemingway said, writing *from Cuba*: 'I was born (1889) in Cook County, Illinois, and from a very early age I ceded that territory as a writer to Carl Sandburg, who had already taken it anyway, and to James Farrell and Nelson Algren when they started writing. They've governed it well, and I have no complaints. Luckily it's always possible to stake claims in other territories, and I'm very glad that they haven't all been taken. One of these territories is here.'

How dare he claim and exploit a territory, the island of Cuba, which if it belongs to anyone in the literary sense, belongs to us, to

Cuban writers? It is a statement — and I repeat, whether seriously or in jest it matters not — which reveals the arrogance of a writer who belongs to a world capitalist power. He ignores us, he exploits us for local colour; we simply don't exist. It is vital that we rebel against situations like René's and statements like this from a famous exploiter of literary mines.

Hemingway knew very little about Cuban culture. He read Lino Novás Calvo and Nicolas Guillén and knew them personally. Probably the works of Montenegro and Serpa too. As to writing, I do not recall that he wrote anything on our literature. He discussed a Cuban artist, Gattorno, famous in the 1930s and today totally unimportant to Cuban painting; mediocre from any point of view. Hemingway, however, devoted an essay to him. But even his errors of judgment are of some value. In that essay, he referred to our island once more as 'a long, sad island of exuberant greenness'. And he compared Spain and Cuba: 'Spain is an open wound on the right arm which won't heal because dirt keeps getting in, while Cuba is a beautiful ulcer somewhere else.' (Where?) 'Of course he [Gattorno] couldn't speak Spanish either. He spoke Cuban. And Cubans feel apart from the Spanish.' Then he describes with real insight one of the many problems underdevelopment throws up: 'Cuba is more of a place to leave than a place to go back to. Why a place to leave? Because a painter can't make a living there, because he can never see a great painting which will cleanse his mind and cheer his heart; because if he becomes a great painter he'll never know it, nor will he sell enough of his paintings to feed himself. There's no-one there who can even photograph a painting properly, no-one who can reproduce it as it deserves to be reproduced. Why a place to go back to? Because he was born there, and every artist has to return to the place he knows best, either to destroy its image or to glorify it.'

That was, and still is, by and large, the cultural tragedy of Cuba, of our countries. For my part, I rebel against such an inhuman condition, against the cultural privilege of Hemingway, born in the US and travelling *conquistador* of all the world. Against that imbalance, that humiliation, the revolution also struggles.

The *Old Man and The Sea* (1952) is Hemingway's first completely Cuban novel in terms of characters and situations — but the action takes place in the sea, and it is more of a fable than a novel about Cuba. Again Hemingway finds refuge from men in nature, just as in his Michigan childhood.

Our narrative, of course, doesn't have the concentrated power, the literary rigour of Hemingway's work. We move more clumsily. It doesn't matter. We're different. We aren't satisfied with our underdeveloped reality, but neither are we ready to surrender ourselves to an aesthetic, a conception of the world which negates us; we don't want to be backward savages but neither do we want cultural

colonization. We want to express ourselves and reclaim our world with all the rigour demanded by modern culture; define our own destiny with its own voice, and place it firmly within the great adventure of the twentieth century.

The African writer is in the same situation, if not worse. He can never accept the image of the Dark Continent that Hemingway has circulated all round the world. If one has to dissect sharply and maliciously Hemingway's conduct and vision in order to expose his attitude towards Cuba, in the case of Africa one glance is enough to reveal his feeling of superiority, his white Anglo-Saxon colonizer attitude. Africa is, first of all, only the natural setting against which the drama of the North American bourgeoisie unfolds. The lives of a rich, delicate woman and her frustrated-writer husband are revealed in their true light in Africa, surrounded by wild animals, hyenas, vultures and the jungle (*The Snows of Kilimanjaro*). In the *Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber* we have a typical western triangle with an exotic twist — the rich, cowardly husband, the beautiful, possessive wife, the astute, efficient white hunter. When for the first time in his life Francis Macomber faces with coldblooded courage the charge of a wounded buffalo, 'the gun-bearer [black, African] shouted wildly and they saw him coming out of the bush sideways, fast as a crab, and the bull coming, nose out, mouth tight closed, blood dripping ...' The African runs in order to emphasize the valiant and daring action of the white man, his 'grace under pressure'. That is the black man in *The Short Happy Life* ...: a literary device, a counterpoint for the bravery of the white man.

I am not alone in this: I do not invent fantasies through a complex of underdevelopment. Edmund Wilson says exactly the same in his analysis of Hemingway's work. Referring to the *Green Hills of Africa*, he says, 'Almost the only thing we learn about the animals is that Hemingway wants to kill them. As regards the natives, although he includes a perceptive sketch of a tribe of marvellously agile runners, the main impression we receive is that they are simple, inferior people who all enormously admire Hemingway.'

And we shan't even talk about the struggle against colonialism, the political awakening of Africa. On one occasion Hemingway worked *against* a probable black insurrection. On one of his many safaris (returning from which he was nearly killed in a plane crash) he took it upon himself to act as the Queen of England's representative and chased a group of Africans discovered smuggling arms. He ended up capturing them.

In *The Story of the Antelopes* (1951) Hemingway begins by telling how two men suddenly appeared one summer's day at *La Vigia* while he was eating under the trees by the pool; they demanded 500 pesos 'to escape to a certain South American republic'. One of them was the friend of a friend of Hemingway's, who had been killed in an

attack, and who 'when they killed him, had 30 cents in his pocket, no money in the bank and was unarmed'. From this Hemingway proceeds to deliver a dissertation on the hunting of antelopes: 'And on the basis of this, I'm going to write two thousand words on the hunting of antelopes, where you shoot at an animal which can't return the shot.' Strange association of ideas; a man murdered in Cuba reminds him of an antelope hunt.

We make a very poor showing in Hemingway's work. Let us not deceive ourselves. He had first-hand knowledge of two continents of the Third World — Africa and Latin America — and didn't understand them too well. He knew them from close up — but was separated by the distance of his life, of his world, of his being — that of a North American writer dedicated to discovering 'grace under pressure' among men. Elegance and style are not for those of our world. We are not elegant, we have no style; we are coarse and ignorant because we are poor. And it is that industrialized world which glorifies Hemingway's life and work, that has kept us poor. Hemingway's studied glamour stands face to face with our unmanageable chaos. I take (at least I try all the time to take) from the industrial countries only what suits me: technology, tools — not what they would impose on us. For literature we must do what Che Guevara recommends for economies: 'We have to take technology where we find it, and we have to make a great technological leap to go on narrowing the gap between the more developed countries and ourselves.' Their technology, yes; their vision, no.

Yes, I know. The objections of Hemingway's uncritical devotees: 'Never in your whore's life will you be able to write one paragraph or even one piece of dialogue like Hemingway', they'll say. I know. But I have a greater responsibility; behind me, a world of shadows is suffering, at times struggling, in search of a life. What they have today, for men in Hemingway's world, doesn't deserve to be called, and is not, life. And to this still unformed world, ferocious in its anxiety to gain a place in today's civilization, I am now, in this essay, going to give up my old and just admiration for Hemingway's work. We are three-quarters of the world, and we scarcely have a coherent image. Hemingway has distorted us as much as the films of Tarzan do — their blacks are his blacks too — as much as those ads for Cuban rum which is sipped by the side of some dark-haired beauty on a sleek yacht on a tropical holiday. Forgive me Hemingway, but your world is not mine. Your work has limits: the limits of your society and your age, the first half of our century as seen from Europe and the USA. Now we have to shift that focus to our America, to Africa, and Asia.

Hemingway was an impeccable writer within the frontiers of his life and his age. He did enough. He taught us a few things. That piece in *A Farewell to Arms,* for example, on death, where Lt Henry discovers that nothing will ever happen to him which hasn't happened before

to someone else. One doesn't have to be afraid. Not to fear death nor enemies, no matter how well armed they are. I have thought about that many times and always as I read it in Hemingway. Later he repeats it, in the introduction to a selection of literature on war (*Men at War*): 'Anything that I would have to do, others had done before. If they had done it, then I could do it too, and the best thing was not to worry.'

But his reality ceased to exist for me a long time ago — centuries ago. The centuries represented by seven years of revolution. Hemingway asserted that every writer should experience war; a writer who hadn't lived through a war lacked something, and only a revolution is equivalent to this experience. It is equivalent, but it isn't the same. We are separated by the social and political revolution that Hemingway never lived through.

I would like to feel behind my voice (although the wretched of the earth themselves reject me) a leper in Bombay, a clumsy, foul-smelling, vermin-ridden Indian, a miserable poet of Cochabamba singing his idiotic but rhyming sonnets to the moon, a half-naked Vietnamese carrying a bazooka and a little bag of rice, a gleaming Congolese warding off with spells and repugnant potions the polished and deadly bullets of the West.

I want to make it quite clear: I loathe the backward, superficial style of Gallegos, Asturias, Icaza, Alegria or anyone of that ilk. I speak with hatred: there can be no admiration or glorification of the poor of the world; these poor must be taken from their backwardness, their simplistic world fought against; they must be lifted up, not left in the mud for progressive tourists interested in native customs to gape at.

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All this is a product of the revolution, its expression in ideas and feelings. And what was Hemingway's attitude to the Cuban revolution? His behaviour in Cuba from 1956 — from Fidel's landing — to his death in 1961, is a fair enough picture of Hemingway's limitations and his virtues.

In November 1959, on his return from Spain and the bulls, he kissed the Cuban flag at Havana airport. When the reporters asked him to kiss it again for a photo, he said, 'I'm very sorry ... that kiss came from the heart. Don't ask me to repeat it; forgive me, but I'm not an actor. I'm very happy to be back here, as I consider myself one more Cuban ... I haven't believed any of the stuff that's published against Cuba abroad. I sympathise with the Cuban government, and with all *our* difficulties. I don't want to be seen as a Yankee ...'

Let's see, on the other hand, what he said in private, on the phone to New York, to his friend Hotchner.[4] At the estate everything is

going well, 'but the Castro climate is something else. Not good. Not good at all. Can't tell what it will be when I come back to work in January [he was thinking of going to Ketchum in December], and what I want most is to get back to writing. I just hope to Christ the US doesn't cut the sugar quota. That would really tear it. It will make Cuba a gift to the Russians. You'd be amazed at the changes. Good and bad. A hell of a lot of good. After Batista any change would almost *have* to be an improvement. But the anti-US[thing] is building. All around. Spooks you. If they really turn it on, I'm sure they will put me out of business ... I'll just get one of those "Going Out of Business" signs and hang it around my neck: After 25 Years at This Location, Everything Must be Sold at a Sacrifice.'

I don't doubt the accuracy of such statements, but I do doubt the context in which these casual remarks of Hemingway's are placed by Hotchner. Hotchner is either indifferent to political problems, both in life and in Hemingway's work, or is simply reactionary; he emphasizes all those remarks Hemingway made that were unfavourable to the revolution, and omits all the favourable ones. Hemingway had private doubts about our revolution, but his public stance was almost always honourable.

In the middle of 1960 Hemingway began to plan his departure from Cuba. His private projects were rather sordid: in the middle of our revolution he was worrying about how to take out his paintings by Juan Gris and Joan Miro. He even took up the suggestion of going to Alfred Barr, director of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, to ask him to request the paintings on loan for an exhibition, to get them out of Cuba with no danger or difficulty. And they went. More than a million dollars' worth of paintings left the country; paintings of great cultural value, which I would never have allowed to leave. The revolution was too generous. Those paintings would have been better in the Hemingway Museum or the Fine Arts Museum in Havana. We are poor in good works of art too, and if we can nationalize banks we can surely nationalize pictures. After Hemingway's death Miss Mary promised to replace the original paintings which were taken with exact reproductions. So that everything would be the same, and the museum would be an exact replica of the house where Hemingway lived for so many years. Needless to say, the hunting trophies, the stuffed heads of buffaloes, antelopes and lions, the bullfight posters — none of these were taken. The reproductions still haven't arrived — they're probably still trying to achieve 100 per cent fidelity to the originals.

We mustn't forget Hemingway's opinion of revolutions, expressed in conversation with the greeen hills of Africa below him: 'They're beautiful. Really. For quite a time. Then they go off'.[5] Hemingway always watched all political planning with enormous reservations, intensified after his Spanish experience. His relationships with

nature, wild animals and fish and his friends, took the place of politics to a certain extent.

The Cuban revolution happened while he was writing *The Dangerous Summer*, on his return to Spain in 1953. It begins thus: 'I never hoped that I'd be allowed to return to this country, the one I love most after my own, and to which I thought I would never return while there was a single friend of mine in prison here.' Hemingway, we insist, was a man with a high sense of honour and friendship. His loyalty to Spain is proof enough. This passion, political during the war, on this occasion centred on his friends, and he wrote a sentimental and senile book about Ordonoz, son of the bullfighter who appears in *The Sun Also Rises*, and the Fiesta Brava (a bullfighting festival). However, he remains detached from Cuba, where the Spanish revolution was by and large being accomplished. He is a man defeated, although not conquered, by circumstances; he continues to defend the Cuban revolution in public: 'Miss Mary has just got back from Cuba and everything's going really well there', he declares in New York when reporters hound him with attacks on the Cuban situation — 'I prefer to believe my own correspondent. We men of honour believe in the Cuban revolution.'

He defended it, and at the same time he felt personally singled out by it, by its character of struggle against US imperialism, and he said in private (though it was later published in Hotchner's book): 'It doesn't bother me personally [Castro's regime]. I'm good publicity for them, so maybe they'd never bother me and let me live on here as always, but I am an American above everything else and I cannot stay here when other Americans are being kicked out and my country is being vilified. I guess I knew it was all over for me here the night they killed Black Dog. A Batista search party, looking for guns, came barrelling in here in the middle of the night and poor Black Dog, old and half-blind, tried to stand guard at the door of the *finca*,* but a soldier clubbed him to death with the butt of his rifle. Poor old Black Dog. I miss him ... as much as I miss any friend I ever lost. And now I lose the *finca* — there's no sense kidding myself — I know I must leave it all and go. But how can you measure that loss? Everything I have is here. My pictures, my books, my good workplace and good memories.'

It is a revealing paragraph — the sentimental thoughts of an old man, a prisoner of comfort, who has lived much and, moreover, resisted for years the conventional ways of his country, and despised material possessions — but who has finally succumbed. His death was timely.

His forthright declaration for Cuba, in spite of the doubts born of being a US citizen, reminds me of a perceptive observation by Tennessee Williams: 'What I most admire in Hemingway is his

*Estate.

consuming preoccupation with honour among men — there is no more hopeless quest than that.'

Hemingway has to be admired for that. In spite of the fact that he never really understood us. This, too: 'The task of a writer is to tell the truth. His fidelity to the truth must be so deep that his creations, based on his experience, give a picture of life more truthful than life itself.' Agreed. But my truth is different; it is based on my experience of the revolution, and of the world as it is now. The second half of the twentieth century belongs to us — we ought to seize by force our place in history.

In June 1960, while he was writing *The Dangerous Summer*, he was returning from the airport and saw the revolutionary posters everywhere, and the banners with 'CUBA SI! YANKEES NO!' He turned to Hotchner and said, 'You can see, this is the last summer.' So it was. So it had to be.

1966

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FRED HALLIDAY

British mercenaries and counter-insurgency

It was the Angolan war of 1975-6 and the subsequent trial of captured British citizens that re-focussed attention on the question of British mercenaries, and on the factors in British society that encourage people to volunteer to fight in this way. The trial of the mercenaries is now over. A British government commission on mercenaries has met and presented its report. But the matter is far from dead. Those who organized the Angola mercenaries have not been touched, or even properly identified. Some returned to business during the fighting in Zaire in April 1977. The majority of those who went out to kill have not been brought to justice. Moreover, we can only expect that as the fighting in southern Africa intensifies in the next months or years, so the demand for mercenaries will increase.

It is not, however, only in Africa that British mercenaries are used, nor is this probably the main area of their activity. In the Middle East, and specifically in the oil-rich states of the Arabian Peninsula, British mercenaries of various kinds have been used for a long time, and their continued use there is essential for maintaining the anti-democratic system that prevails in the region. This use of British mercenaries in Arabia was indeed mentioned at the time of the Angolan war. John Banks, one of the main recruiters of mercenaries in Britain, pointed out several times that it was inconsistent for people to criticize mercenaries going to Angola when the British government encouraged ex-servicemen to fight as mercenaries in Oman. And, in the recommendations of the Diplock Committee set

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up by the British government after the Angolan affair, it was explicitly recognized that the government should retain the right to decide which countries mercenaries could, and could not, go to fight in. The moral is evident enough: the British government is not opposed to mercenaries as such, only to people fighting in wars of which it disapproves.

The Middle East oil producers of the more conservative kind are probably the most obvious example of countries which are permitted to recruit British military personnel. This has been true for decades, but far from being a relic of the past it is something that has increased in scale in recent years in response to the new situation in these states. In the first place, British military personnel have been directly involved in helping the monarchs of the region to crush opposition forces that have arisen. Secondly, these rulers have become the largest purchasers of arms in the world since the rise in the price of oil in 1971-3, and the acquisition of these arms has gone together with an inflow of thousands of western military personnel into the area.

The interest of the British government here is clear. Britain was long the dominant colonial power in the Gulf region and wants to ensure that the pro-western regimes in the area, guarding two-thirds of the world's oil reserves, remain in power. A considerable British presence — military, political and economic — has remained, despite the formal withdrawal of British forces in 1971. At the same time the British government sees the increased oil revenues as an opportunity to sell more arms and to boost British exports, and with the arms go the personnel.

Since 1966 the main promoter of British arms exports has been the Ministry of Defence's Defence Sales Organization. Arms exports have risen from £150m in 1966 to £560m in the financial year 1975-6, and will possibly exceed £700m in 1976-7. Britain lags behind three other competitors in this field,[1] but the promotion of arms exports, especially to the Gulf region, has become a major part of this country's export drive. Among the most important arms contracts signed in recent years have been: a contract to sell 1,200 Chieftain tanks to Iran, and another 165 to Kuwait; contracts to sell Rapier anti-aircraft missiles to Iran, Abu Dhabi, Oman and Saudi Arabia, and a contract to sell 12 Jaguar jets to Oman. British salesmen have indeed hoped for much more: during the visit to Britain of Saudi Defence and Aviation Minister Prince Sultan in November 1976 there was much (officially-inspired) speculation in the press about him ordering arms worth £3,000m. As it turned out he was only prepared, at that stage, to renew the existing contract with the British Aircraft Corporation to service and maintain the Saudi air force. This was worth, however, some £760m over four years.

It cannot be stated often enough that all these monarchs — Iranian, Saudi, Kuwaiti, Omani and the rest — are extremely

conservative and repressive rulers. In none of these countries is any opposition allowed. The working class has no right to organize independently or to strike. Women are still subjected to sustained and degrading oppression. The arms being sent out, and the personnel that accompany them, are being used to consolidate regimes of this kind. We know too from recent revelations that the trade in arms has been accompanied by corruption on a hitherto undreamt of scale. Whilst most attention has focussed on the activities of US firms such as Lockheed and Northrop, British firms are also involved. A lieutenant-colonel in the Royal Corps of Signals, David Randel, was arrested in April 1976 on charges of corruption in connection with the sale of telecommunications equipment to the Oman. Earlier, in 1971, a British officer who had served in the Middle East brought an action against BAC salesman Geoffrey Edwards on the grounds that the latter had promised him commissions of 5 and 10 per cent on all BAC sales to Arab countries and had till then given him only £40,000.[2] These are almost certainly only the tip of the iceberg.

The sale of British arms overseas to boost counter-revolutionary governments is not, of course, confined to the Gulf. British sales to South Africa are on a par with those to Iran and the Arab monarchies, and have correspondingly increased in recent years as the situation in southern Africa has intensified. The 1976 report *Black South Africa Explodes*, published by Counter Information Services in London, details the activities of four such firms: Plessey, who manufacture in South Africa integrated circuits, a component of sophisticated weapons systems; Racal Electronics, the world's largest supplier of radio manpacks and tank radios, and one of the most profitable firms on the London Stock Exchange in 1976; Marconi, who are building an £8m 'tropospheric scatter system' as part of a computer-controlled communication system, and ICI, who through African Explosives and Chemical Industries Ltd., in which it has a 40 per cent interest, manufactures tear gas, nerve gas and defoliants. Marconi and Racal are both active in, for example, Oman where they have participated in building up the communications and air defence systems.

This trade in arms is not however the only way in which Britain is helping the monarchs of the Gulf to keep themselves in power. Part of the cooperation involves the provision by Britain of help in counter-insurgency and Special Branch work. Britain probably has the widest experience and expertise in this kind of repressive activity, and whilst to some extent based on colonial war, this expertise is still of relevance to many governments throughout the world. Within the past year alone it is possible to identify a number of countries that have put British policy to their own uses. In both Malaya and Rhodesia the local governments have faced growing armed popular resistance and have resorted to the traditional British techniques of

food control and population regroupment to try to separate the guerrilla forces from their popular base.[3] Moreover, the Portuguese in Mozambique and the Americans in Vietnam drew on this reserve of British experience.

The British army's continuing involvement in Northern Ireland is also providing relevant experience to many of Britain's allies. Belfast provides the most advanced and protracted case of urban armed conflict in an industrialized country that has ever been seen. Nothing in France (in the late 1950s) or, more recently, in West Germany or the USA compares with the past few years in Ulster. Nor has any counter-guerrilla campaign in any Latin American country reached the scale of that seen in Northern Ireland. It is not surprising therefore that other governments are quietly but carefully learning from this experience, just as the regional police forces in Britain are also ensuring that their senior officers have acquaintance with the kinds of operations undertaken by the Ulster force.

Two examples from 1976 will also illustrate how foreign governments are learning from Northern Ireland: following the upsurge of West Bank Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation in the spring of 1976, the Israeli government let it be known that 'the Army may adopt methods similar to those used by the British Army in Northern Ireland'.[4] After the suppression of the 'attempted leftist coup' in Portugal, in November 1975, NATO helped to rebuild the counter-revolutionary security forces. *The Times* reported that 'Officers in the new riot police, for example, have received advice from the police in London and from two British officers at Thiepval Barracks in Northern Ireland.'[5]

We do not have information on the numbers of British personnel involved in diffusing this kind of information, nor on the numbers of foreign personnel that have received training in British counter-insurgency techniques. However, we do have general figures on military cooperation between Britain and other states. In January 1976 military personnel from no less than sixty-six countries were training in Britain, whilst in the period 1971-5 British armed forces personnel served on loan and as instructors with thirty-three foreign armies. Not all of these personnel, probably not the majority, were involved in the diffusion of counter-insurgency information and techniques. But a significant number certainly were; and, just as control and repression techniques have come to play a more important part in courses for British officers in recent years (e.g. at Sandhurst), so one can expect that foreign interest in, and need for, these techniques has also grown.

In the Middle East arms sales, mercenaries and counter-insurgency have all gone together. Rich, repressive and vulnerable governments have turned to Britain, as well as to the USA and France, for the techniques they need. Within this general flow of arms and 'advice',

large numbers of service and ex-service personnel are involved. Most are in some way mercenaries — i.e. providing military skills for payment — and precisely because of the complex character of the current relationship it is important to distinguish between the different kinds of mercenary now active in the region. At least five distinct kinds can be identified.

1 The popular image of a mercenary is of the soldier who fights an undercover war for a high payment. This image is especially that of the mercenary in Africa — in Angola, and before that in the Congo. In Arabia mercenaries of this kind were active in the North Yemeni civil war in the 1960s. Britain and Saudi Arabia supported the royalist tribes fighting the Egyptian-backed republican forces. The dozens of British mercenaries sent in were used in three functions: training, specialized offensive operations and communications. The main British front man for the campaign was Colonel David Stirling, founder of the SAS regiment, and in 1975 notorious as the head of a right-wing private army, GB 75. However, the real point about this operation was that it was backed by the British government in order to counter Egyptian pressure on the British position in Aden.[6] It was a deliberate attempt to overthrow a government of which Britain disapproved, but where Britain did not want to be seen to intervene directly.

2 Closely related to these mercenaries are the soldiers who work with governments for the pay. Ex-British service personnel have served in the Arabian Peninsula for decades — in the army and air force, in defence administration, and in the police, Special Branch and intelligence divisions. In the small state of Qatar, for example, enormous power was held until 1972 by two legendary figures: one, an ex-Glasgow policeman named Ronald Cochrane, who had adopted the Muslim name of Mohammad Mahdi, headed the army; whilst the other, Ronald Lock, headed the police. In the neighbouring state of Bahrain the Special Branch is still run by a mysterious officer called Henderson. A similar pattern holds in the armies and police forces of the United Arab Amirates, where dozens of British mercenaries are employed. However, the most spectacular case of mercenary employment has been and remains the Sultanate of Oman. Here hundreds of mercenaries have manned the army, air force and navy, and in the decade after 1965 were involved in the counter-insurgency operation against guerrillas in the southern Dhofar province of the country. In an interview with ITV in 1972 the commander of the Dhofar gendarmerie, Major Ray Barker-Scofield praised Dhofar as 'the last place in the world where an Englishman is still called sahib', and explained his role as follows: 'I am a mercenary and a professional soldier and I've done twenty-five years abroad in

such places as India, Burma, South Africa, Egypt, Somalia, Mogadishu, Libya and Germany. This is my profession. Basically I am on the market.' Here, as in North Yemen, the mercenaries fight with the approval of the British government. They are indeed under the command of a serving British officer, since each branch of the Sultan's armed forces is commanded by such a regular soldier.

3 The officers seconded from the British services to the Middle East armed forces are also in essence mercenaries. Whilst they themselves may not see it this way, they are hired out by the British governmemt as part of the policy of getting money from oil states, and the Ministry of Defence makes a profit on the deal. According to one report London hires officers to the Sultan of Oman for *twice* the rate these officers are paid.[7] The provision of these soldiers is directly

related to arms sales and/or counter-insurgency operations: in the 1970s the two regions where most officers of this kind have gone are the Gulf and South-east Asia. In both areas guerrilla operations (Oman, Malaya, Brunei) or sustained repression (Iran, Kuwait, Amirates, Singapore) have been the norm. Recent figures for the Gulf indicate the continued role of British seconded personnel.

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Iran	21	48	36	62	71	74
Oman	92	121	154	170	235	216
Kuwait	106	112	112	118	118	118
Amirates	121	105	77	53	43	44

Source: Ministry of Defence

The presence has been especially strong in Oman, where regular British personnel have fallen into at least three categories. First, those who have commanded, officered and trained the local armed forces. These have been officers and technicians from the three services (the figures above are only for *this* group). Secondly, the Special Air Services regiment has had a detachment in Oman since 1971 — disguised as a British army training team, it has carried out offensive operations, whilst at the same time training local counter-guerrilla groups and organizing some 'hearts and minds' campaigns. Thirdly, several hundred British service personnel were deployed to guard and service the two RAF bases at Salala and Masirah, which were to be handed over to Oman at the end of March 1977.[8]

4 In addition to these three kinds of British personnel, there are thousands working on arms contracts in the region — training, installing and manning British-exported equipment. They are part of the growing local military establishments. Precise figures are not available, but the British Aircraft Corporation has had around 2,000 personnel in Saudi Arabia since 1965, and hundreds of other British technicians are now in Iran, Kuwait, Oman and the smaller Gulf states. Although not directly involved in fighting, they are performing a major military role: their very presence acts as a deterrent to other states, and some of the pilots supplied by BAC to Saudi Arabia in the mid-1960s did fly operational missions along the Saudi border with North Yemen. Given the dependence of these states on foreign technicians to install and operate the new arms for years to come, it would be quite unrealistic to rule out the possibility that some would be used, in the front line or in back-up roles, for military operations. The very pile-up of arms makes such conflicts more likely, and the number of foreign personnel is increasing. The most marked case of this is in Iran where by 1980 there will be 60,000 US expatriates and

their families, most of them working on defence-related contracts. But in Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states the British presence is substantial and will continue. Some idea of the diversity of the operations in which British personnel are engaged outside of the traditional British colonies can be gauged from studying the case of Iran. Whilst we do not have a full break-down of what is happening, the following distinct items can be identified:

(*a*) The British Aircraft Corporation is planning to help the Iranians build Rapier missiles in Iran, as part of a £400m oil-for-arms arrangement. An unknown number of British technicians will be involved in setting up and then maintaining the necessary installations.

(*b*) Britain is supplying the Iranian army with a special kind of tank armour, Chobham armour, to be used on the 1,200 Chieftain tanks the Shah had under order. The British army's own tanks in Germany will not receive this equipment for some time after the Iranian army has acquired it. Further personnel will be sent out to install and probably service these tanks.

(c) In an unpublicized arrangement, a unit of the counter-guerrilla SAS regiment has for some time been training Iranian soldiers. Since March 1974 two Cambridge University lecturers have been teaching groups of six SAS the Persian language, with special emphasis on military vocabulary. What the SAS are up to in Iran is not clear, but they are no doubt playing some role in the build-up of Iran's own counter-insurgency forces, for use both outside Iran (as in Oman and Pakistan) and inside, against the Shah's own people.

(*d*) British firms are helping the Iranian police to build up a new computerized information and communications system. In 1975 the Iranian police's communications division sent fifteen volumes of specification to the British government-run sales organization, Millbank Technical Services. Estimates of the contract's possible worth ran up to £100m. Firms involved in initial planning include Racal, Cable and Wireless, Laing and Wimpey. Although the final arrangements have not been made, Iranian police are already being trained in both Britain and Iran by British personnel.

None of these projects is, of course, designed to further the development of economic prosperity or freedom in Iran. They are designed to strengthen the repressive system on which the Shah relies, and, in the case of the armour and missiles, to threaten Iran's neighbours as well.

5 No discussion of mercenaries would be complete without focussing on the most numerous kind of mercenary in the region — the poor. These are not British or American, but impoverished peasants from the less fortunate countries of the region: peasants from North Yemen, nomads from some parts of Pakistani Baluchistan,

Pathans and Dhofaris. Historically many of the local rulers preferred to recruit via middlemen from outside their own area, and the expansion of local armed forces has continued this trend. Probably 40 per cent of the Sultan of Oman's 12,000-strong army is Baluchi. It is a sad feature of the situation in the Middle East that so many thousands of these men, without any ideological motive, have been driven by hunger to fight and suppress their class counterparts in other states.

The most extreme case of British counter-insurgency and of the use of mercenaries is undoubtedly Oman, where a regular British services presence, backed by mercenaries and British arms salesmen, has helped to crush the armed resistance of the people and keep the autocratic Sultan in power. The lessons of Oman are two-fold. First, that with the decline of old-style colonialism, wars of counter-revolution will tend to be fought by *coalitions* of powers, rather than by individual states. In Oman, Britain joined with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and several other countries. Similarly, Zaire, France, Morocco and Egypt all intervened. Secondly, as part of this internationalization, the lessons learnt by one nation, in this case Britain, will be learnt by other states who may be able to use them in situations that the British army no longer confronts. The British Empire may be all but gone, but the role of Britain — government, services and arms companies — in counter-revolution and counter-insurgency throughout the world is still a considerable one.[9] Indeed, the demand for assistance from Britain in these fields has probably grown. Socialists have therefore a continuing, if not increased, duty to reveal and oppose activities of this kind.

NOTES

1 US sales in 1974 were £4,200m, the Soviet Union's £2,250m and France's £1,500m (*Sunday Times*, 25 April 1976)
2 The *Observer* (10 October 1971). By his own reckoning the man involved, a Colonel Richard Lonsdale, was entitled to commission on eight deals totalling £313m.
3 Rhodesian use of these techniques is well documented in *Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia* (International Commission of Jurists and the Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1976)
4 *The Times* (19 May 1976)
5 *The Times* (28 May 1976)
6 For details see my *Arabia without Sultans* (London, 1974), pp.140, 149 n. 10, and David Smiley (one of the organizers) *Arabian Assignment* (London, 1975)
7 *Sunday Times* (16 July 1972)
8 The official British figures for personnel in Oman also included only the first category and excluded the others on the grounds that they were not officially seconded to the local armies — an artificial distinction.
9 On new developments in British counter-insurgency see *The Technology of Political Control* (Penguin, 1977) by Carol Ackroyd, Karen Margolis, Jonathan Rosenhead, Tim Shallice.

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PALESTINIAN SOCIOLOGY

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Notes and documents

A secret document from Zaire

Complete text of the agreement between Zaire and a West German company

The following secret 'treaty' breaks entirely new ground in the era of neo-colonialism: for the first time an 'independent' African state has in effect irrevocably ceded to a foreign company national sovereignty over a territory the size of Britain for the rest of the century. The implications for the entire Third World are enormous.

The company may make use of the territory 'without any restriction', to the extent of expelling all the inhabitants, plundering its natural wealth, inviting anyone else to enter and bearing no legal responsibility for the destruction of the environment. No doubt the company foresees many other ways of exploiting its new rights.

The territory in question is the eastern part of Shaba province, formerly Katanga, which is the world's largest producer of cobalt and industrial diamonds, and enjoys additional fabulous assets in copper, uranium, gold, zinc, tin, nickel, chrome and manganese.

The agreement was made in December 1975 and March 1976. At this time President Mobutu of Zaire was failing to halt the Angolan struggle for national liberation, and his economy was desperately weak. The German economy was strong and encouraging greater German ambitions in overseas investment. Under the agreement the Zaire government is to receive 25 million zaires (or US$50 million) per annum. The German company is to develop space technology, satellites and missiles. It will have unique opportunities for surveillance and overflights in southern Africa since the territory borders

both Tanzania and Zambia. The military implications of the agreement may be among the greatest in the remaining stages of the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa. Although it is not yet known what precise understandings the German company had with its government or other parties, no enterprise in space technology can be distant from all governments.

This agreement was first published in Afrique Asie *(Paris, no. 141, dated August 8-September 4 1977), and its authenticity has since been admitted by the German company. It was translated from the French for* Race & Class *by David Fernbach.*

Contract made between the Republic of Zaire and OTRAG (Orbital Transport and Missiles Ltd.) as to the full usage of a certain territory:

— Whereas the Republic of Zaire desires to strengthen its relations of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany, especially in the fields of technology, science and economics;
— Whereas the Republic of Zaire is concerned to promote the development of its country's infrastructure;
— Whereas OTRAG is a German company constructing and commercially exploiting carrier missiles designed for the transport of useful loads in space;
— Whereas OTRAG requires a very large area of operation suitable for the firing of carrier missiles into the atmosphere and into space, and for all activities of whatsoever kind that are directly or indirectly relevant to this,

the Republic of Zaire, henceforward, referred to as 'the State', as represented here by citizen Bokana W'ondangela, councillor to the Presidency of the Republic, on the one hand, and the OTRAG company (Orbital Transport and Missiles Ltd.) of Neu-Isenburg, represented by engineer Lutz T. Kayser, member of its board of directors and competent to represent the company, henceforward referred to as 'OTRAG', on the other hand,

have concluded the following agreement:

Article One

1. The State grants OTRAG the right of complete usage of the following territory:

Bounded on the north by the river Lukuga, and from longitude 26° 55′ east by a straight line running to the northern tip of the island of Kavala in Lake Tanganyika. From there in a straight line to the east until the frontier between Zaire and Tanzania. From there to the south along this frontier as far as the point separating Zaire, Tanzania and Zambia, then following the frontier dividing Zaire and Zambia as far as the 10th parallel south. The line then follows the 10th parallel until 26°50′ east, subsequently reverting in a straight line to the north to reach the river Zaire at the 8th parallel south. It

then follows the river Zaire downstream to its junction with the river Lukuga.

This territory is marked in red on the subjoined map, which constitutes an integral part of the present contract, and shall be referred to as the 'Territory' in all the following articles.

2. The right of usage comprises the right to make use of the Territory without any restriction for the purposes of sending projectiles into the atmosphere and into space, whatever kind and type they may be, particularly carrier missiles, as well as all measures which OTRAG deem to be directly, indirectly or otherwise pertinent to this.

3. Complete usage includes for example:

3.1 Every kind of alteration to the land, such as in particular the levelling or building up of high points (hills, high ground, etc.), the carrying out of underground excavations, the creation of artificial lakes of any kind, etc.;

3.2 the construction of aerodromes and all work connected with this;

3.3 the construction of surface and underground works of whatever kind (in particular launching ramps, power plants, observation and measurement posts, telecommunications and radar installations, and production of any kind);

3.4 the urban development of part of the Territory, in particular, that is, the construction of dwellings, buildings for commercial use, hospitals, hotels, leisure centres, etc.;

3.5 the construction of roads, and if necessary also of railways;

3.6 all measures designed to improve the infrastructure;

3.7 all measures designed to improve agriculture in agreement with Article One, paragraph 2 of the present contract (creation of agricultural enterprises, establishment of factories to produce chemical fertilizer and process feeding stuffs, etc.).

Article Two

1. The State grants OTRAG, specifically and without restriction, the right to take all measures that it deems necessary in the exercise of its complete usage of the Territory, provided that these do not impugn the country's security.

The State will supply OTRAG with all the authorization required to exercise the right of complete usage, and will take the necessary legislative measures to permit the exercise of the right of complete usage, especially the particular rights listed below.

2. In particular, the State grants OTRAG the following rights:

2.1 OTRAG, its agencies, members of its personnel and members of their families, as well as persons invited there by OTRAG, have the right to reach the Territory overland, by lake and river, and by air.

All persons mentioned above have the particular right of transporting goods needed by OTRAG to accomplish its projects by road, sea, river and air transport across the entire territory of the State and without special administrative authorization.

2.2 OTRAG is permitted to link up with power plants belonging to the State network for production and distribution of energy.

2.3 The Territory is a customs-free zone. This means that movable goods that are brought in or taken out by OTRAG are free from duty or taxation.

2.4 OTRAG, its agencies, the members of its personnel of non-Zairean nationality and the members of their families are exonerated from all state taxation of whatsoever kind.

By 'members of its personnel' are meant every person whom OTRAG designates as such.

By 'members of their families' are meant the spouse of a personnel member or a child living in the custody of a personnel member.

2.5 OTRAG, its agencies, the members of its personnel and the members of their families will enjoy immunity from any judicial prosecution by the State for acts committed by them in the exercise of the functions entrusted to them by OTRAG, both during their stay in the country and subsequently.

These persons will enjoy the same privileges and immunities in the State as the members of diplomatic missions.

OTRAG alone has disciplinary power over all those persons who comprise its agencies, its personnel or their families.

In the case of a member of the personnel or their families violating the laws of the State, OTRAG commits itself to expel the member of the personnel or family member in question from the State by the most rapid route, and never to employ him or her again in the Territory.

2.6 Vehicles designed for movement on land, means of sea, river and lake transport, aircraft and all machines (in particular carrier missiles) set in motion by OTRAG, its agencies, the members of its personnel and the members of their families, will be licensed and authorized to circulate by the State authorities on request from OTRAG — in agreement if necessary with international regulations and agreements that may be in force. The present stipulation refers in particular to the national emblems of the State, which may be carried by the machines in question in case of need.

Driving licences or other permits granted to OTRAG, its agencies, members of its personnel or members of their families by the authority of another State with regard to the driving or piloting of means of land, sea, river or lake and air transport will be valid for the driving or piloting of such means of transport within the State.

2.7 The State will permanently prohibit traffic from using the air space above the Territory (the regulated zone), in the sense that only

OTRAG, its agencies, the members of its personnel and the members of their families will be able to overfly the regulated zone, without any restriction. They will thus be able to take views of the Territory from aircraft. This clause does not apply to the Zairean armed forces.

2.8 OTRAG is granted the right of equipping aerodromes of its choosing at places in the Territory that it decides on, and using these with all the facilities that this usage involves. OTRAG disposes of all landing rights on the Territory.

2.9 OTRAG has the right to make use of telecommunications and radar equipment, and particularly to employ telecommunications satellites.

Article Three

1. The only persons who may stay on the Territory are those expressly authorized to this effect by OTRAG. It has the right to limit such authorization to specified zones.

2. The State undertakes, if OTRAG so demands, to evacuate all other persons from the Territory and keep them away from it. It is also up to the State to take and enforce all measures necessary to assure the security of the entire Territory, the installations located on it, and the persons admitted there by OTRAG. The measures to be taken and enforced will be agreed together with OTRAG, given that the operational needs of OTRAG require such measures.

3. At OTRAG's request, places and persons designated by it will be placed under special protection.

4. No records of any kind, whether by picture, sound or in writing, can be made on the Territory without OTRAG's authorization.

Article Four

1. OTRAG undertakes to carry out all the measures it will be called on to take in the Territory and which will contribute to improving the State's infrastructure, of such kind and character as meet international criteria, in as much as the particular situation of the territory allows.

2. OTRAG commits itself to training Zairean nationals as far as possible in the subjects of its activity.

3. It shall be up to OTRAG to see that when missiles are sent up into the atmosphere and into space, particularly carrier missiles, the necessary measures are taken to ensure the safety of persons and possible built-up areas on the Territory. For this purpose, OTRAG has the right to set up its own fire protection and fire-fighting services.

4. OTRAG bears no responsibility for harm caused to the environment by the manufacture and transport of missiles in the atmosphere

and in space. OTRAG undertakes to take out insurance for civil liability that will cover the possibility of damages that may be caused to human life and health, as well as any damage that may be caused to personal property.

Article Five

1. Until the end of the year during which the first firing of a carrier missile from the Territory has been made, and OTRAG has its full fee from a client in a currency other than that of the State, the rental for the usage will be

Z 25,000,000 (twenty-five million zaires) *

per annum, payable on the last day of each year to a bank that will be designated by the State.

2. In the year during which the first firing of a carrier missile from the Territory is made, and OTRAG has obtained its full fee from a client in a currency other than that of the State, the State and OTRAG will decide on a common agreement for a new rate of rental for the usage and its adjustment to changes that have taken place in the economic situation.

3. The State declares its willingness, for the present, to grant an interest-free delay in payment of the rental which will expire at the end of the year during which the first firing of a carrier missile from the Territory is made and OTRAG has obtained from a client its full remuneration in a currency other than that of the State.

OTRAG will make the State a written request for this delay in payment, and will do so four weeks before each instalment of the rental is due.

4. When this period of delayed payment has come to an end, the State and OTRAG will draw up a common agreement for planning the payment for the total sum of the rental that will be due by this date.

5. OTRAG undertakes to transport into space free of charge for the State, using its first operational carrier missile, an experimental observation satellite.

6. Furthermore, OTRAG undertakes to transport into space a telecommunications satellite by means of an operational carrier missile, if the State requests this, and on condition that the State delivers the satellite, at its own expense, to OTRAG on the Territory. The fee made for this launching will be equivalent to the fee that OTRAG would charge at the time to its other clients, reduced by 20 per cent. It will be paid in the State's currency.

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* The present official rate is 1 Zaire = $2

Article Six

1. OTRAG will enjoy the right of exclusive usage of the Territory until the end of the year 2000. It cannot be revoked by the State, on any legal grounds whatsoever, before this date. From this date onwards, the exclusive usage will be renewed every ten years, unless cancelled by one of the parties before the expiry of the usage. Such cancellation must be expressed in a written communication from one party to the other.

2. If the exclusive usage comes to an end following the established procedure, OTRAG will hand back to the State the Territory in the condition it is in at the expiry of the usage. OTRAG will not have to bear any responsibility for the condition of the Territory and the installations on it.

3. If the right of usage comes to an end for whatever reason, the State will compensate OTRAG for all the installations erected by it during its usage of the Territory, at their cash value. The value in question will be fixed by three experts designated by common agreement of the State and OTRAG.

4. If, when the right of usage terminates for any legal reason, OTRAG has not paid the State the totality of its rent for the usage which is due at this date, OTRAG will be entitled to set against the State's claim for such rental payments its own claim for compensation.

Article Seven

1. If one or more provisions of the present contract should be invalid, the validity of the contract would not be affected as regards the remainder. Any invalid or ambiguous provision must be replaced or interpreted in such a way that the economic result intended is still attained. The same shall apply if gaps in the contract have to be filled.

2. The legal relations between the parties shall be governed by Zairean legislation.

3. The Supreme Court of Justice of Zaire will be competent to decide on litigation resulting from the present contract or as a consequence of it.

Article Eight

1. The present contract will enter into force, with retroactive effect, on 6 December 1975 and will abrogate that signed on 6 December 1975, except for the subjoined map which shall become an integral part of the present contract.

2. The German and French versions of the present contract are both valid and have equal force in interpretation.

Signed at Kinshasa, March 26th, 1976

For the Republic of Zaire,
BOKANA W'ONDANGELA
Counsellor to the Presidency of the Republic,

For OTRAG
Representing the board of directors,
LUTZ T. KAYSER

OTRAG Orbital Transport — und Raketen — Gesellschaft
6078 Neu-Isenburg, Herzogstrasse 61

List of the administrative personnel in OTRAG's category I (management) who request a special visa:

Names and Forenames	*Function*
KAYSER Lutz T.	Chairman of OTRAG
Dr SCHREIBER Otto	Administrator, financial adviser
ZIEGLER Walter	Administrator and director of the programme on the ground
GOMPERTZ Richard	Administrator in charge of projects
PIEKATZ Klaus	Financial administrator and representative of OTRAG at Lumumbashi
LOEBERMANN Victor	Technical administrator
KLETT Rainer	Programmer
BRUNNER Gerhard	Assistant Administrator

The other members of the OTRAG personnel belonging to categories II and III will receive a normal visa.

Signed

Sendwe K. Ilunga — Dr O. Schreiber

Report from Sri Lanka, August 1977

It is the last week of July and in Colombo the Vel Festival is on. It is a Hindu festival, a Tamil festival marking the annual journey of Lord Muruga from one end of Colombo to the other as he changes abode. And in the wake of that journey he gathers to himself devotees from all the religions, and all the castes and all the classes and all the races of Sri Lanka. As the chariot in which he rides passes the house of the President of the Republic, the President himself, a Buddhist and a Singhalese, comes out to pay homage to the God.



In the temples there are fairs for the children, free concerts for the grown-ups given by famous musicians from India and in everyone's hand is a piece of sugar cane. Vel is the season of the sugar cane.

A week later I go north to the Jaffna peninsula and wherever I go — in towns and in villages, in shops and at bus stands, on the university campus and in the streets — I am constantly and relentlessly faced with a vision of a people who have suffered massive oppression and untold indignities at the hands of successive governments, reaching its zenith with the last. There is a bitterness towards the Sinhala state which has made the 'indigenous' Tamil* a third-class citizen in his own country and keeps him that way with an occupying force of police who are largely Singhalese. Strangely but not illogically there is absolutely no hatred of the Singhalese people. Not even the memories of 1958, when the Singhalese renaissance, begun by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike but perverted by his followers to reactionary and racist Sinhala nationalist ends, unleashed the type of racial hatred never known before, had served to drive a wedge between the

*The 'indigenous Tamils' are those who have been settled in the country for almost as long as the Singhalese; the 'Indian Tamils' were brought over by the British in the last century as cheap plantation labour. It is the latter who were disenfranchized by the United National Party government in 1948. Since then an Indo-Ceylon pact has agreed to repatriate half their number, while citizenizing the rest.

Tamil and the Singhalese peoples. Their customs were more or less the same, they worshipped each other's gods, they enjoyed each other's food. The less traditional among them married into each other's communities. Sri Lanka has always been a culturally pluralist society. But the dominance given to the Singhalese language as the official language and as the medium of instruction has denied social and economic mobility to the Tamils for the last two decades.[1] The last government went further in this direction by giving weightage to Sinhala students so that they had easier access to higher education than the Tamils, and by allowing Singhalese, under government edict, to colonize traditional Tamil land in the north. But whenever a government, whether of the United National Party (UNP) or of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), made an attempt to restore the Tamil language to its proper place and the Tamil peoples to equal status, the Opposition, irrespective of party, has viciously and violently demonstrated against that particular government.

The Tamil nationalist politicians for their part were initially more bourgeois than Tamil in protecting their class interests and privileges under cover of nationalism, but later, in response to the nationalism they had themselves served to unleash, became more Tamil than bourgeois. And today even the lower classes and castes of Jaffna see the Singhalese state and not the bourgeois high caste Tamil as their main enemy. When finally the last government enshrined discrimination against the Tamils in the constitution of 1972 (by failing to safeguard minority rights), the Tamil politicians, giving voice to the sentiments of their people, raised the cry of separatism and claimed for themselves a state in the Tamil north and the predominantly Tamil-speaking eastern seaboards of Trincomalee and Batticoloa.

But such a separate state, according to the theoretician of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF),* whom I spoke to some days later, should come into being without armed struggle or violence. The Singhalese are a peaceful people, he held — deeply Buddhist and given to *ahimsa*, non-violence, and once they saw the reasonableness of the Tamil claim for a separate state, they would hand it over.

Two weeks on, and it is the people of *ahimsa* — the Singhalese who but weeks ago had venerated the selfsame god as the Tamils — who have begun to burn Tamil houses, loot their shops, maim their children, terrorize their womenfolk. Bus conductors throw out passengers bodily who cannot speak Sinhala and must therefore be Tamil; Singhalese postal workers beat up their Tamil officers in the Central Telegraph Office; a Tamil doctor's car is burnt on the hospital premises. Intimidation and violence against Tamil public servants threatens to bring civil administration to a halt. In the six schools turned refugee camps in Colombo, 'housing' something like 35,000

*The TULF is a broad Tamil organization comprising the 'indigenous Tamils', the 'plantation Tamils' and the Tamil-speaking Muslims.

men, women and children, the conditions are appalling: bad sanitation, little food and less medical help. A request to the authorities that there should be an appeal on the radio for blood donors is turned down as impolitic: Sinhala blood cannot go to Tamil people. But a Singhalese bomb has just been lobbed into a Tamil refugee camp.

For the so-called Indian Tamils — the latrine cleaners and street sweepers of the city — driven from their shacks and their tenements and their hovels — the refuge at St Paul's School affords little asylum: there are few soldiers to guard them and even fewer organizations to help them, not even those of the 'indigenous' Tamils. The children queue up for anything and everything. And as some of my Singhalese compatriots and I enter the camp to give whatever help we can, we see little children wiping their faces with sanitary towels. But worse, these people have no homes in Jaffna to go to — the camps in Colombo are transit camps.

The violence against their fellows in the plantations has been even worse. For the Singhalese peasants hold them directly responsible for the loss of their traditional lands — a belief fostered and encouraged by Singhalese politicians. These Tamil workers, who form the backbone of the Sri Lankan tea economy, are the most exploited and oppressed class, with no possessions but a few trinkets and no homes but the infamous line-rooms — and even these they have been robbed of. And their refugee camps are even more wretched.

In the last few days of August vast numbers of Tamil refugees have been moved by train and ship and plane under heavy guard to Jaffna. And now the problems of the refugee camps have been merely shifted to the north because there is no food there and not everybody has a home to go to there. And what of the Tamils integrated into the Sinhala south who have never known Jaffna at all?

What has gone wrong?

The immediate event that precipitated communal violence was that some plain clothes policemen were prevented from gatecrashing the Jaffna Carnival. But this in itself would not have triggered off racial violence throughout the island. For it was basically a police-civilian clash — one of a series which had become endemic to the Tamil north. The police, according to the editor of the Sri Lanka *Tribune*, had, under cover of the Emergency Regulations through which the United Front (a coalition of the SLFP, the Trotskyites and the CP) and subsequently, the SLFP had governed the country 'for seven long years ... done very much what they liked in every part of the island. The civilians were too afraid to resist or oppose the police. In Jaffna, however, there was an element of resistance in that a predominantly Singhalese police force represented the occupying army of a discriminatory Sinhala state. In fact, as the *Tribune* points out, 'one of the basic causes for the frustrated cry for separation can be traced to the manner [in which] the police and the army had

conducted themselves in Jaffna and other Tamil areas'. So that when that cry was vindicated by the TULF in the elections of July 1977 (in which they won all the seats in the peninsula*), the police felt that they had suffered a set-back. Hence, when they were thrown out of the Carnival ground they felt that the Tamils had become uppity and had to be taught a lesson — and so they burned down the Old Jaffna Market in an act of overt and provocative communal violence.

As the rumour of the events spread south and it was alleged that a Singhalese policeman had been shot (which in fact was a much earlier incident), the train from Jaffna to Colombo was boarded at the first major Singhalese town of Anuradhapura by Singhalese thugs. While the police looked on, passengers were robbed, beaten and murdered. The Tamils in the north in retaliation set fire to Singhalese shops and the evicted shopkeepers carried stories to the south of how a Singhalese *vihara* had been burnt down and a Buddhist priest assassinated. It was only two days later that the priest himself made a broadcast from his *vihara* in Jaffna that all was well with him and his temple. Rumours such as these, however, fed fuel to the flames and Tamils all over the country came under attack.

Already there was a climate of violence in the country following the landslide victory of the UNP at the elections — as had happened in 1970 after the victory of the SLFP — only now the SLFP claimed to be the victims. But these were not communal clashes but clashes between rival party supporters — and had been brought under some sort of control when the clashes in Jaffna triggered them off again, translating them this time into communal violence. It was for this reason that the government alleged conspiracy on the part of the SLFP to embarrass the government and had in fact put some ex-MPs and a deputy minister of the former government under house arrest.

But such incitement to violence on the part of failed SLFP members is only one dimension of the problem. The other, particularly in Colombo and surrounding areas, was the abject poverty in which over half the urban population was living. Over 50 per cent of Colombo's inhabitants, noted a Central Bank report, live in shanties. In the past two years in particular the cost of living has sky-rocketed. And when, after the Emergency was lifted just before the elections, and the press was set free, it became increasingly apparent that foodstuffs had been hoarded by private racketeers and that some of it had even rotted in government warehouses because of bureaucratic neglect, the anger of the people knew no bounds. It first expressed itself in their vote against the SLFP, then in the violence against its followers and finally made communalism an excuse to rob and loot the Tamil population settled in their midst. The third dimension,

*The official opposition is composed of 19 TULF members and 8 SLFP; neither the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) nor the Communist Party (CP) got one seat.

particularly in the towns, was a paying off of old business scores between Tamil and Singhalese shopkeepers.

But not even the wide curfew which the government imposed from the very outset brought an immediate halt to the violence. And although the government was blamed for not clamping down an Emergency it became evident in the days that followed that it could not trust some sections of the police and the army to be impartial. This was particularly apparent in Jaffna where no curfew was imposed.

Nor did the Lanka Sama Samaja Party or the Communist Party mobilize trade union support to put a stop to the communal violence, as they had done in the riots of 1958. Or perhaps they were unable to, for their capitulationist politics had debased and demoralized the working class and left them without a base, as was evidenced by the elections. Their statements, when they finally emerged, were weak and ineffectual. Mrs Bandaranaike's statement on behalf of the SLFP was made some nine days after the principal events, and while blaming the Prime Minister for not enforcing law and order, the TULF for inciting racialism, and the mass media for everything else, appealed to her supporters for calm.

The Prime Minister, Mr J.R. Jayawardene, both in his party's manifesto and in his speech in the National State Assembly, has acknowledged the massive disabilities of the Tamils and has promised to find solutions to these in an all-party conference. But he has also warned the TULF against talks of separatism, going so far as to say, 'If you want to fight let there be a fight; if it is peace, let there be peace. That is what they will say. It is not what I'm saying. The people of Sri Lanka say that.' The mailed fist in the velvet glove.

Mr Jayawardene prides himself on being a modern statesman. Corruption, nepotism and racism for him are counter-productive; they foul up a modern capitalist economy. And it is possible that left to himself he would have attempted to 'heal the wounds of the nation', but he still has in his cabinet the old guard of the UNP and amongst the Buddhist clergy, a cross-section of influential racialists. Besides, the country is faced with a grave economic crisis — and racialism is always a useful distraction from the root causes of poverty. The recent communal violence will have once again unleashed generalized Sinhala chauvinism. Whether a UNP government will not again renege on its promises to the Tamils is in doubt. The signs are ominous.

August 1977 *A. Sivanandan*

This report will be followed by a more analytical article on Sri Lanka in the next issue of *Race & Class*

REFERENCE

1 See A. Sivanandan, 'Ceylon: the politics of language', *Race Today* (June 1970).

Book reviews

Révolutionnaires Vietnamiens et Pouvoir Colonial en Indochine: Communistes, Trotskystes, Nationalistes à Saigon de 1932 à 1937

By DANIEL HEMERY (Paris, Francois Maspero, 1975). 526pp. Fr. 70

Daniel Hémery's book, published in September 1975 but only just found and read by me, seems of much importance for readers of *Race & Class*. The subtitle gives a better idea than the title of what it is in fact about. The period 1932-5 was one of great difficulty for Vietnamese revolutionaries and what was then called the Indochinese Communist Party (since 1951 the Vietnam Workers' Party). The defeat of the Soviets which the peasants of the provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh had set up in the revolutionary situation of 1930-31 (the first instance of Soviet power in any colonial society) was followed by a phase of counter-revolutionary terror — colonial repression of a particularly brutal and bloody kind. For a time the Party's organization was almost destroyed and its cadres (apart from those who happened to be outside Vietnam) killed or imprisoned. In this crisis of the Party southern Vietnam, which the French oddly called *'Cochin Chine'* (now Nam Bo), where certain very restricted and precarious civil and political liberties existed, offered the best opportunity as a base for efforts to reconstruct the Party. The South had also an important tradition of anti-colonial resistance, going back to the time of the original French invasion of 1858 and the guerrilla struggle organized under Truong Cong Dinh. This tradition had been strengthened in the colonial period by land-alienation on a large scale and the formation of rice-growing latifundia, owned by both by French and Vietnamese, cultivated by *ta dien*, landless labourers. On

the French-owned rubber plantations, in the Saigon-Cholon urban complex and elsewhere the working class had through the 1920s been developing its own new forms of militant struggle.

In this situation a major part in the effort to rebuild the Party was played by a new generation of Vietnamese, then mostly in their twenties, who had studied and *milité* in French universities, and in some cases also continued their political education at the University of the Toiling People of the East (KUTB) in Moscow. One particularly important group of students was that of the nineteen expelled from France in May 1930 for their part in the demonstrations against the death sentences imposed on Vietnamese nationalists involved in the Yen Bay mutiny some months earlier. (Among them was my own friend and contemporary, Tran Van Giau, most distinguished and productive of Vietnamese historians, who until his imprisonment in 1935 worked tremendously hard rebuilding the Party's clandestine organization in Nam Bo.) This was the nucleus of the group which re-formed itself in Saigon in April 1933 to publish the journal, *La Lutte* (*The Struggle*). One particularly interesting characteristic of the group was that its dozen members included Trotskyists, as well as 'orthodox' Communists, in about equal numbers — one of the few examples of effective Communist-Trotskyist cooperation in the 1930s — while its leading figure was a radical nationalist, Nguyen An Ninh (the *anh*, elder brother, of the group).

One of the many merits of M. Hémery's excellent book is that he gives sharp detailed sketches of individual members of the *La Lutte* group — the *Lutteurs* as they were called. There is Nguyen An Ninh, son of an old Resistance scholar, imprisoned by the French for his work as a journalist, who acted on his principle — 'Philosophers remain in the ricefields — worthless people become bureaucrats' — dressed as a peasant and travelled round the countryside on a bicycle, selling *dau cu la*, a kind of Burmese ointment which he manufactured himself, at the same time selling his political writings and organizing the peasantry. Ta Thu Thau, leader of the least anti-Communist of the various Trotskyist factions, was another remarkable person, containing 'the stuff of the best kind of revolutionary leader — morally rigorous, calm and gentle, eloquent, respected by his enemies who recognised his fighting qualities'. Son of a poor village carpenter and an itinerant petty trader, as a student of mathematics at the University of Paris he kept himself for a time by working as a servant for a rich Englishman — in Saigon he lived in a small shop kept by his wife. Nguyen Van Tao came from a family of small landowners ruined by the 1930-32 crisis, went secretly to France at the age of 18, gave up his studies to work with the French Communist Party and was PCF delegate to the Sixth Comintern Conference in 1928 where he urged the establishment of a Vietnamese Communist Party. On his return to Saigon he combined editing the radical daily paper,

Trung Lap, with keeping a bar. All belonged to the Vietnamese scholars' tradition of rejection of oppressive authority, refusal of office and status, concern for moral principles and total commitment to the revolutionary life.

How did *La Lutte* — the journal and the collective that edited it — come into being? One factor was the precarious situation of the Indochinese Communist Party — almost the whole of whose Nam Bo leadership, reestablished with great difficulty, had been arrested at a clandestine conference in October 1932. With its extreme shortage of unimprisoned cadres, there was great advantage in having some kind of legal outlet behind which its reconstruction as a mass party could again be carried on. With that went the absence of pressure from national or international centres that might have blocked such united action: the Trotskyists did not have such centres, and an effective Central Committee of the ICP within Vietnam hardly existed until its Macao Conference in March 1935. It also helped, no doubt, that in its 1932 Programme of Action the ICP had moved in the direction of an ultra-Leftist 'class-against-class' strategy, in accordance with contemporary Comintern policy and not wholly in conflict with Trotskyist positions. But the most important factor stimulating the joint enterprise was certainly the existence of close ties between the participants, who had been pupils at, and expelled from, the same Cochon-China schools; who had been students together, had worked together in anti-colonial activities, had been tracked by the same police and had shared the same prisons, in France. 'The forming of the *La Lutte* group was thus a regrouping of former comrades and friends who were now directly confronting their common enemy, France.' When, at the time of the group's disintegration in the summer of 1937, all the other factors had changed this last remained a force, to check though not prevent it.

The immediate stimulus which brought *La Lutte* into being was the political opportunity presented by the elections to the Saigon municipal council in April-May 1933 and the decision to put up, for the first time in history, a *Liste Ouvrière*, consisting of two intellectuals — one Communist, one Trotskyist (or moving in that direction) — and five workers, with the journal in its first issue providing supporting propaganda. Two of the *Liste Ouvriére* — somewhat regrettably, though not surprisingly, the two intellectuals — were in fact elected, though later disqualified on technical grounds, after an election conducted with tremendous élan, with thousands of people attending the *Liste*'s meetings, in total contrast to the polite bourgeois-colonial politicking which had hitherto been the practice. After the election *La Lutte* stopped publication and was not revived again until October 1934, when it continued as a regular weekly until the final break-up in June 1937. The terms of the original compact between the members of the editorial collective have been variously stated, but the central

unifying ideas were: common struggle against the colonial power and its allies, and defence of the demands of workers and peasants without the need to choose between Communist and Trotskyist positions. Other points of agreement were — 'no calumny against the USSR', no hostile attitude to other Communist Parties (particularly the PCF), no public criticism by either group of the other and collective editing of articles.

The main body of M. Hémery's book consists of a very detailed analysis of the contents of *La Lutte* during the nearly three years of its existence, filled out by French police reports and some use of oral evidence from actors in the history of that time (but not, it would seem, from Vietnamese living in the DRVN at the time when his research was carried out). The real strength of *La Lutte*, he makes clear with constant illustrations, lay in its network of links with the masses. Though its circulation — rising gradually from 1,000 in 1934 to 3,000 in 1937 — was necessarily limited by the fact that in order to be published at all it had to be published in French (and had to have as editor a French citizen — M. Ganofsky, a drop-out from *Réunion*), its effective readership was far greater. It 'circulated from hand to hand, was translated at need, discussed in small groups'. In addition to its small editorial board *La Lutte* had an underground, or semi-underground, army of friends and supporters who worked under its influence — workers, clerks, village teachers, students, small gentry. This also provided a political outlet for those who were under too close police supervision to take part in clandestine Party work. It was their job to collect information and send it in to *La Lutte*, to look after the distribution and translation of the journal, to carry out propaganda at times of elections and strikes.

While *La Lutte* had an important, though patchy, rural base — much helped by Nguyen An Ninh, the closest of all the *Lutteurs* to the peasants — its ties with the working class were even stronger. According to M. Hémery, of nearly 600 articles published between October 1934 and July 1936 whose subjects were geographically definable, more than half were concerned with the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh complex. *La Lutte* excelled in exposing particular cases of oppression, injustice and brutality. 'We intervene', wrote an editorial, 'in class conflicts whenever a provisional solution is not impossible.' The *Lutteurs* took an active part also in the planning and organization of strikes, carrying out research, preparing documentation and securing legal aid. A major focus of their activities was the *bainlieu rouge*, the red suburb of Saigon, where 'many of the vital forces of the working class were concentrated'. They had strong roots among what M. Hémery calls 'the plebeian sections of the working class, with strong links with the peasantry' — the semi-proletariat of cab and pedicab drivers, potters and workers in small enterprises,

who at this period of history were showing particular militancy. Another vital field in which *La Lutte* was able to use its legal position to advance the anti-colonial struggle was the campaign for political prisoners — in Poulo-Condor and elsewhere. Its prison network paralleled its village and urban network. It described and analysed the various forms of torture, widely used from 1929-30 on. It collected and published accurate information about the rates of death and disease. It supported the great hunger-strikes of the prisoners and provided an essential channel of communication between them and the Paris-based Comité d'Amnistie aux Indochinois (including Langevin, Barbusse, Romain Rolland, etc.), which played a major part in winning the eventual partial amnesty of August 1936.

From one point of view M. Hémery's book is important because of the light which it throws on the early history of the ICP/Vietnam Workers' Party and the background to the August 1945 Revolution. While one does not want to exaggerate the role of *La Lutte* — a number of other, Vietnamese-language, papers and journals were involved in the struggle at this same period — it does illustrate with great richness of detail how a journal can influence the course of history — from 1933 to 1937 the French colonial administration was forced more and more onto the defensive in Vietnam. But, granted that the problems and possibilities of a revolutionary weekly in Vietnam in the 1930s were very different from those of a revolutionary quarterly in Britain in the 1970s — we can carry on the struggle against imperialism and racism under conditions of greater legality, less clandestinely, for the present at any rate, for one thing — none the less the history of *La Lutte* does seem to raise certain rather general questions. One is to do with the conditions that make co-operation possible between parties and factions of the left. How important are such factors as — a strong sense of commitment on the part of all concerned to the struggle against the common political enemy? A consciousness of relative weakness and need for reinforcement? Not too widely divergent political philosophies and strategies? Reasonable freedom of manoeuvre for those involved in making and executing the compact? Possibly most important of all, relations of confidence, respect and, as far as possible, friendship between them? Another question has to do with the relations between a journal and the movement with which it is linked, whose ideas it seeks to express. How can they help one another? What should be the relationship between the inner collective who put the journal together — largely write it perhaps — and the outer circle of supporters, who feed it with information and ideas, look after its distribution, use it for political education, etc? Should there in fact be no sharp distinction between them — so that the outer circle should also be, and feel, involved in

making the journal and the inner collective work closely with its supporters in the towns and villages, carrying it round on bicycles like precious Burmese ointment?

Ilmington THOMAS HODGKIN

Adam Kok's Griquas: a study in the development of stratification in South Africa

By ROBERT ROSS (London, Cambridge University Press, 1976). 194pp. £5.75

During the course of the nineteenth century a black and coloured peasantry emerged in South Africa. But soon after the unification of that country (1910), this class of small landholders was everywhere in a state of dissolution, before it could crystallize as a social force.

The discovery of diamonds and gold during the last third of the nineteenth century ushered in the first industrial revolution. Presently the rulers invented the *native question* as the ideological cloak to secure an abundant supply of fettered black labour. More to the point, the blacks had to be detached from the land and, as pass-bearers, manipulated to minister to the insatiable labour requirements of the mines, of the nascent capitalist farms, of the growing commercial sector. In a country with a large, permanent white population, who had already grabbed much of the land and imperiously demanded more labour for their domestic concerns, there was no place for a black peasantry.

Robert Ross's book is a micro-study, centring on a community of creole peasants. It is an attempt to show how race or colour finally became coterminous with class or economic stratification. Dutch pastoralists and Khoisan tribes, Bantu-speaking groups and slaves — these were the progenitors of the Griquas. Towards the end of the eighteenth century they had moved to the Cape colonial borders where they lived as pastoralists, hunters and traders. They had been partly driven to the periphery of the settlement by the expanding Dutch pastoralists; and partly attracted to the frontier zone by the prospects of gaining free land and access to abundant natural resources. They preened themselves on their white antecedents, treated the Africans as their inferiors, and strove for incorporation into white colonial society.

The colour line in the eighteenth century was ill-defined. Religious, economic and cultural considerations often obliterated it. The Griquas' claim to acceptance as members of the white community rested on two grounds: the first being that they had embraced christianity, which was the qualification for citizenship and land ownership; and the second being that they spoke Dutch as their

home language and practised the customs of the whites. Mixed people, who held property and had been baptized, were frequently incorporated into white-christian society in the early days. Not so as the nineteenth century got under way and race attitudes began to harden.

It became increasingly more difficult for the Griquas to own registered farms in the Cape Colony. Consequently, they established themselves as a christian community beyond the northern borders and, with the assistance of the missionaries, maintained cultural and commercial links with colonial society. North of the Orange River the Griquas tried, without success, to hold sway, as an aristocracy, over the Tswana tribes.

In the 1830s the Voortrekkers, who had left the Cape Colony, encroached on their land. The Griquas appealed for British protection. Ross is surely wrong when he says that this mixed community of peasants used the London Missionary Society, but not vice versa. Thus the missionaries were to a fair, if not a large, extent responsible for the Griquas' abiding faith in British justice; for their repeated appeals to be taken under British protection — as a counterweight to Boer expansionism. In particular, the Griquas readily gave Britain military assistance against the Boers and certain African tribes. In so doing they did not pause to consider that they were making enemies of whites and blacks alike. The upshot was that they had to pin all their hopes for survival on British support which, over time, palpably became less reliable. Still, the Griquas rejected out of hand an offer of an alliance which the Voortrekkers made in 1844, so great was their trust in the imperial connection.

But the British approach to race questions was essentially instrumentalist and pragmatic. From having supported the Griquas and other 'non-whites' against the Boers, she moved to a rapprochement, in the mid-nineteenth century, with the Voortrekkers — a reversal of policy prompted by larger imperial concerns. In 1854 she gave the Boers of the Orange Free State their independence — with the tacit approval that they may handle all land disputes with the Griquas, who owned farms in that territory. With the withdrawal of the British umbrella, the Griquas found themselves all alone. They now viewed with trepidation the prospect of annexation by the Boer Republic.

They finally resolved to sell their farms, and made an epic trek, in 1861, to Nomansland, later Griqualand East, in the Transkei, where Britain had allowed them to resettle. There, they reestablished the Griqua polity and — their racial pride still intact — exercised hegemony over such African tribes as chose to settle in their territory.

By the 1870s a loose body of colour phobias, of blood pride, of racialist practices, had been systematized into an ideology of racism. An analysis of the steps in its evolution is a complicated task to which historians have yet to address themselves. All the same, it is clear that

British imperialism, representing the mining magnates, was the prime mover in the incubation of this ideology. Racism hastened, hothouse fashion, the mass expropriation of the 'non-whites', shackled them as a labour force, and thereby maximized the extraction of surplus value.

Given the relatively large white population, strong enough to hold its own against the black masses, the rulers saw no need to create, as they did in Brazil, an intermediate mixed group of small proprietors, who could serve as allies of the whites. For the Griquas these developments betokened their imminent demise as an organized community.

A clamour arose among the British settlers of Natal and the Eastern Cape that the 'effete aristocracy', as the Griquas were called, had no right to an independent state existence. The whites wanted their land and their labour and saw in the Griqua military a menace to 'white civilization'.

In 1874 the Cape government, ably supported by the Cape Liberals, representing the trading class of the Eastern Province, annexed Griqualand East. Certain sections of the Griquas, angered that they had not been consulted on the take-over, raised the standard of revolt in 1878, but were quickly suppressed. The Griquas gradually parted with their farms and drifted to the towns to join the ranks of the labourers. This process brought their economic status into line with that of the blacks generally.

Ross's thesis, that the Griquas disintegrated as a community on account of hardening race attitudes, is too general an explanation and needs elaboration. He empathizes with his subject, tells a good story and has revived the lost art of the historical narrative.

London KEN JORDAAN

African Studies since 1945: a tribute to Basil Davidson

Edited by CHRISTOPHER FYFE (London, Longman, 1976). 255pp. £3.50

Earlier this year an *Observer* correspondent crept through the dark streets of Asmara to a meeting of the Eritrean Liberation Front. On the table there, beside the marxist magazines, he noticed one book — Basil Davidson's *The Liberation of Guinea, Aspects of an African Revolution*. This is where Davidson's journalism and scholarship belong. As once he influenced a generation of African nationalists, now he informs contemporary revolutionary movements. It is sad that a collection of essays written in honour of his sixtieth birthday should reflect so little of the combination of thinking and doing which has shaped his own life.

The brief given to the nineteen contributors to *African Studies since 1945* is avowedly an academic one: to chart the development of their different disciplines or areas of study since the war. Some have responded by producing what are in effect annotated bibliographies of their specific fields — Muslim Africa, African archeology, Meoritic studies — which presumably will be of interest to specialists. Luckily there are a number of more general articles which analyse theoretical developments in the light of political and intellectual change. Seidman explains the recent emphasis on the role of international capital in African underdevelopment in terms of the evident failure of post-independence economies. Hopkins, however, warns that going overboard with dependency theory means neglecting the specific internal dynamics of each state, which are now becoming the focus for studies in political economy.

A few contributors show how academia reflects the political context of the researchers as well as the researched. Shula Marks' excellent piece on South African studies relates intellectual to political stagnation; African history in Germany, argues Geiss, has been used in the service of German imperialism; and Bender and Isaacman, on the historiography of Angola and Mozambique, provide a good study on the legitimation of racism and colonialism in Portugal. But others, especially those writing from their practical experience in administration and education, show less self-reflection. They crack a few jokes about the 'jungle and juju' style of early district officers, and the irrelevance of Keats to Ghanaian youth, but leave colonial structures unquestioned.

But what is lacking, overall, is any confrontation with the enterprise of African studies itself. Any academic discipline which bases itself on the study of one group of people by another does not merely reflect, or document, the power relations between the two; it is an intrinsic part of them. Surely a collection dedicated to Basil Davidson of all people should include some general discussion of cultural imperialism; some thought on how knowledge produced by the powerful not only informs them about the weak, but enables them to impose their own version of the other's past and present as the universal truth? Terence Ranger, in 'Toward a Usable African Past', concludes that African historiography has not been usable enough in the practical business of independent government or revolutionary struggle. But that's not quite the same thing.

This isn't a call for more liberal breast-beating (which we are mercifully spared), or for abandoning African studies — in which Africans themselves are now far more involved than this collection would suggest. But at least the problem must be recognized. The worst example of academic ostrich-ism is Godfrey Lienhardt's lamentable piece on the social anthropology of Africa, which amounts to a cursory, uncritical, bibliography of British anthropology classics. He

seems unaware of the relationship between his discipline and colonialism, which has poisoned African tolerance of it. He also ignores contemporary work which challenges past anthropological assumptions.

All this is a far cry from Davidson's own work which is hardly mentioned in the book. The only glimpse we get of the man — his personality, preoccupations and politics — is from his longstanding friend and colleague, Thomas Hodgkin. Most others make only a token gesture in his direction in what is, overall, a disappointing tribute to a committed scholar.

London

HERMIONE HARRIS

A History of the Philippines

By RENATO CONSTANTINO (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1976). 459pp. $21.50/£12.00

It always used to surprise me that there were so few good books in English on the history of the Philippines, considering the long connection with the United States (which moved in at the behest of the Sugar Trust in 1898, taking astute advantage of the defeat of the Spanish colonialists by Filipino revolutionaries). Of course, it was sensitive territory; any scholar of integrity would have quickly found himself in a quagmire of American 'counter-insurgency' atrocities, all-pervasive corruption and horrifying impoverishment and oppression of the Filipino masses. The Vietnam war, and with it the birth of a radical tradition in American Asia scholarship, has begun to put this right. Meanwhile, the US-condoned Marcos *coup* of 1972 has spurred an indigenous re-assessment of Philippine history. Accordingly, the bibliographies are looking much healthier.

Renato Constantino is the doyen of Filipino radical scholars. In books, learned articles and popular journalism he has sought for many years to arouse a consciousness in his fellow citizens of the quintessence and destiny of the Filipino people. Dictator Marcos sought to muzzle him, but international vigilance has ensured him at least some freedom of movement and activity. He has repaid this concern with a steady stream of excellent writings, culminating for the time being with a fully-fledged two-volume history of his homeland, of which this is the first part. No praise is high enough for what he has accomplished here in the way of broad coverage, readability, clarity, organization, compassion and fierce intelligence in the service of unapologetic revolutionary purpose.

In terms of population, the Philippines is the seventeenth largest country in the world (immediately after the UK, Italy, France and Vietnam in that descending order). It is of more than passing interest

and relevance because, with nearly 80 years experience as a US colony and neo-colony, it ought to be studied as a test case of the efficacy of conventional or 'bourgeois' economic 'development' wisdom. Thus judged, it offers embarrassingly unequivocal testimony. Illiteracy rates are high, calorie and protein consumption low (among the lowest recorded in Asia). Unemployment in the rural sector runs at some 32 per cent, according to ILO estimates.

> Between 1957 and 1971, the income share of the poorest 20% of rural families declined from 7% to an abysmally low 4.4% ... In 1971, about half of all rural families had incomes below that required to provide adequate nutrition and other essentials of life ... Per capita consumption of rice, the Filipino peoples' staple food went down from 89.5 kilograms in 1965 to 70.8 kilograms in 1973.* ... The caloric intake of the poorest families is estimated at only 88% adequacy ...**

Per capita GNP in 1973 was estimated at US $280, one of the lowest in the world outside Africa, and in any case rendered meaningless by the gross maldistribution of income prevailing — North Korea, struggling to build from the rubble of a US bombardment that had left virtually nothing intact by 1953, had yet achieved an evenly distributed US $375 per capita at a comparable point in the 1970s, without benefit of US 'aid' and 'advice' and of international investment.

What Renato Constantino has done is to demonstrate how first Spanish and then American colonialism constructed a local class structure amenable to alien manipulation; at the same time, however, the constantly erupting popular risings sparked off by poverty and oppression were giving way in the latter part of the Spanish period to genuinely national social revolution. That the Philippine revolution — the first of its kind in Asia — eventually failed (through a combination of middle- and upper-class treachery and vacillation and ferocious American repression in the course of which hundreds of thousands of Filipinos died) did not mean the end of revolutionary endeavour in the Philippines, as the present heroic struggles of the New People's Army and of the peoples of Mindanao show.

Renato Constantino sums up the philosophy which informs his work as follows:

> The history of the people's movements through the centuries has been characterized by a groping for consciousness ... When there is an attempt to understand society not in terms of myths and

*Professor Ingram calculates in his standard work *Economic Change in Thailand* that a 'normal' South-east Asian rice requirement is about 320 lbs per capita per annum — 145 kilograms.

**Data from an IBRD — World Bank survey, *The Philippines: priorities and prospects for development* (Washington D.C., 1976), cited in W. Bello and S. Rivera (eds.), *The Logistics of Repression* (Washington D.C., Friends of the Filipino People, 1977).

theories but in terms of the concrete experience and sufferings of the people, history acquires practical significance. For only if they are armed with a concrete understanding of Philippine reality can the Filipino people act correctly to change that reality. And this understanding can come about by a systematic and patriotic effort to synthesize the experience of the past in order to obtain a concrete vision of the future. History, then, should serve the purpose of integrating seemingly isolated facts and events into a coherent historical process so that a view of the totality of social reality may be achieved. Only then can facts be really understood and not be merely known; only then can this understanding of facts become an understanding of society; only then can history be perceived as a unified process. Only then can history have a goal. And when history has a goal, the past ceases to dominate the present and to hold back the future. Then history can be consciously made.

School of Oriental and African Studies
London

MALCOLM CALDWELL

Imperial Brain Trust: the Council on Foreign Relations and US foreign policy

By LAURENCE H. SHOUP and WILLIAM MINTER (New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1977). 334pp. $17.50/£9.85

> The last systematic, overall examination of the international system — its structure, key relationships, rules, processes and institutions — took place during the Second World War and in the early years of the cold war. Since then there have been some adjustments, but no thoroughgoing attempts to re-examine the pattern as a whole ... The time is ripe for an attempt to analyze the characteristics of the kind of international system that would be suited to deal with the conditions and problems of the upcoming decade. Systematic intellectual effort is required to identify the changes in policies, institutions, and attitudes that such an international system would imply and to suggest ways to bring about those changes. The Council's 1980's Project will undertake that effort.

With these words, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) president Bayless Manning encapsulates the role of the CFR in the maintenance of the American imperial system. Shoup and Minter trace the development of the CFR, its class characteristics and its role in the achievement of its ambitious goal — in their words, 'no less than to prescribe a course of world leadership for American foreign policy'.

The CFR functions as the hub of a network of political decision-makers, corporate executives — mainly from the largest multi-nationals — investment bankers, corporate lawyers and academics such as Kissinger and Brzezinski. From 1945 to 1972, 45 per cent of top foreign policy officials were CFR members who have functioned as recruiters of other members for governmental positions. The authors describe in great detail and with sensitivity the network, the links with foundations, financial groupings (particularly New York based), other foreign policy oriented organizations and the media. The book's importance, however, comes primarily from the careful, well-researched case studies which illustrate how the imperatives of monopoly capitalism are translated into concrete state policies.

The 'overall examination of the international system' referred to by CFR president Manning was the product of the War and Peace Studies Project carried out under CFR State Department auspices and primarily by CFR members before and during US entry into the Second World War. These studies were based on an imperialist conception of United States national interest, and developed the structures to implement that conception. 'Major readjustments' in the economy of the United States had to be prevented, and that imperative was at the base of all planning. This necessitated the search for sufficient 'elbow room' in which to operate, or, in the words of Henry Luce (CFR member and publisher), 'Tyrannies may require a large amount of living space. But Freedom requires and will require far greater living space than Tyranny.' The minimum American living space sufficient to avoid economic dislocation or readjustment was called the 'Grand Area' and included the western hemisphere, South-east Asia and Great Britain. Once the United States entered the war the goal expanded to the creation of a world system. One week after American entry, Council director and Territorial Group leader Isaiah Bowman wrote that the Council and the American government now had to:

> think of world-organization in a fresh way. To the degree that the United States is the arsenal of the Democracies it will be the final arsenal away. *It must accept world responsibility* ... The measure of our victory will be the measure of our domination after victory.

Council president Norman Davis asserted in early May 1942 that it was probable 'the British Empire as it existed in the past will never reappear and that the United States may have to take its place'.

The IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations, Land-Lease and its cold war equivalent, the Marshall Plan, all emerged out of CFR activities, out of the effort to create the world system necessary for the continuation and advancement of American monopoly capitalism. The Council's 1980's Project and the Trilateral Commission, with which the CFR has many links, are important attempts by the

corporate elite to create a new international order in the face of the changed situation following American defeat in Vietnam, the impact of competition within the advanced capitalist world, the success of the oil cartel and the possible implications for other underdeveloped nations, the problems of inflation and unemployment in the developed capitalist nations and shifts in global power. The CFR 1980's Project must, in the words of a Council memorandum:

> come to grips with strategies for *modifying the behaviour of all the relevant actors in international community* — individuals, governments, agencies within governments, elite groups, industrial firms, interest groups, mass societies, and other groups and organizations at the subnational and transnational level [Shoup and Minter's emphasis added].

The bases of this new world order involve collective management by the United States, western Europe and Japan, far-reaching coordination of domestic and foreign policy among the advanced capitalist nations, a strengthening of the international division of labour so as to preserve as much as possible of the existing structure of western power and predominance by making minimal concessions to Third World countries and by preventing the development of unity among the latter. There is also an attempt to structure politics in the advanced capitalist countries so as to militate against what Harold Brown, Secretary of Defence in the Carter administration and member of the Trilateral Commission, warned against when he declared, 'unfortunately, in my view, there is an increasing tendency toward egalitarianism in the United States'. There is a desire to limit democracy and 'depoliticize' key issues such as inflation, unemployment and intergovernmental relationships.

The policies of the Carter administration, made up as it is by leading members of both the Trilateral Commission and the Council's 1980's Project, must be seen in the light of this attempt to create a new international order. Shoup and Minter enable us to understand the genesis of these programmes, and their goals. They have performed a valuable service in exposing the underlying political realities of the 'world system' with such clarity, precision and concreteness.

University of Manchester LOUIS KUSHNICK

Racism and Empire: white settlers and colored immigrants in the British self-governing colonies 1830-1910

By ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK (London, Cornell University Press, 1976). 359pp. £14.00

Professor Huttenback's latest book is an extremely valuable addition to the literature on the development of racist legislation within the British Empire. His subject is the growth of anti-'non-white' immigration law and policy in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. Crucial to this process was the gradual emergence of the so-called 'Natal formula' as a means employed throughout the self-governing colonies for preventing non-European immigration. It imposed literacy tests on would-be immigrants in order to stop free non-Europeans from entering, while at the same time preserving a legal veneer of equal treatment. In the parallel process of legislating away the legal equality of resident non-Europeans, the initiative — eagerly taken up by the other colonies — also came from Natal.

As a reference book for colonial legislation of this kind, Huttenback's book can hardly be faulted. One gets a very strong picture of the legislators' crude racism and the social Darwinism so important to its obtaining intellectual respectability — for instance that of Younghusband: 'Our superiority over them is not due to mere sharpness of intellect, but to the higher moral nature we have attained in the development of the human race.' The deviousness (as in the Natal formula) and the thoroughgoing discrimination to which they resorted stand out clearly. For instance, the British government did not interfere when, in 1895, the Cape legislature passed the East London Municipal Corporation Act, which established segregated dwelling areas and allowed the passage of bye-laws 'fixing the hours within which it shall not be lawful for natives and Asiatics to be in the streets, public places or thoroughfares without a written pass or certificate and for fixing such parts of streets, open spaces or pavements of the same on which natives and Asiatics may not walk or be'.

The book's weakness is that its sources are almost exclusively governmental. There is very little feeling of the social and political tensions underlying the legislative process. Too little attention is given to the role of the poorer white immigrant communities in demanding racist protective laws. This is a subject which urgently requires more research, particularly as it would help to clarify many of the problems facing the historians of British emigration movements in the nineteenth century — not to mention the light which it would throw on the racist policies followed to this day in all four countries by their descendants.

The growth of an almost total ideology of white supremacy among British emigrants of the nineteenth century towards other races is a

phenomenon of great significance, particularly because the emigrants had so often themselves been the victims and enemies of British capitalism at home. The process began early. A man like William Howitt, a Chartist sympathiser and widely-read radical writer, could say in 1838:

> In these colonies, no idea of any right of the natives to the soil, or any consideration of their claims, comforts or improvements, seem to have been entertained. Colonies were settled, and lands appropriated, just as they were needed; and if the natives did not like it they were shot at.

But even Howitt, one of the strongest critics of British colonial rule, could not keep it up. When he visited Australia in 1854, he found himself writing that:

> with all my feeling of justice towards the aboriginal tribes, and all that I have written of their treatment by the whites, I really could not help asking myself, on seeing this miserable spectacle of humanity, in the midst of a race full of activity and progress, whether such a race could be intended by providence to ramble over, without possessing, much less improving, large regions of the earth?

Possession of the earth was the driving force. In Canada, New Zealand and Australia the whites had secured it by 1850; in southern Africa perhaps not fully until 1900. But once in possession, the Saxon who had regained his land would only allow other races to be his agents — preferably unpaid — in the 'improvement' of it. From this came the restrictive and discriminatory legislation which Professor Huttenback has chronicled. For all its positive value to the historian, his book is in no way the last word on a subject of such importance.

London MARTIN KETTLE

The Vision of the Vanquished

By NATHAN WACHTEL (Sussex, Harvester Press, 1977). 328pp. £12.50

In 1519 a group of 500 Spanish soldiers 'conquered' the Aztec empire of central Mexico and killed its ruler. Thirteen years later an even smaller group of 150 'conquered' the vast Inca empire of the Andes, whose territory stretched from the south of present-day Colombia in the north to the centre of what is now Chile in the south, and from the Pacific coast to the Amazon basin and northern Argentina. These extraordinary events are usually presented as the triumphant beginnings of European expansion: the conquest of the 'New

World', whose apparently unlimited supplies of precious metals made Spain rich for a century.

But how did the inhabitants of the so-called 'New World' view this cataclysmic turn of events? In most other parts of the world, full-scale colonization was preceded by the establishment of trading connections, of small outposts of Europe, so that while the effects were similar, the process was more gradual. In Central and South America, the Europeans found themselves in control of vast and elaborate empires within a few years of their first 'discovery', so they present an exceptional opportunity to learn about the nature of civilizations which owed nothing to European contact or trade.

The sixteenth-century Spaniards left a wealth of histories and administrative documents, full of admiration for the achievements of their new subjects, but it is only recently that this material is beginning to be used to full effect. As long as 'history' consisted of what the Europeans did, Aztec chronicles or Inca tribute lists were irrelevant. Now, the welcome translation of Nathan Wachtel's book into English provides an important addition to *ethno*history — a new way of approaching history which seeks to recover the experience of the majority of the world's population, who were at the *receiving* end of colonial expansion.

Wachtel's book starts from what he calls the trauma of the Spanish conquest — the 'discovery of the Old World' by the inhabitants of the New. He uses Indian literature, poetry and chronicles of the events, to express in their own terms the sense of horror and shock at the Spaniards' rude entry into their history. 'To castrate the Sun! That is what the strangers have come to do', wrote a Mayan poet. An Andean elegy on the murder of one of the Incas speaks clearly:

> All things hide, all vanishes
> in suffering ...
> With the martyrdom of infinite separation
> the heart breaks.

Wachtel recreates from different angles a 'vision of the vanquished'. He turns from sixteenth-century writings to the way the Spanish conquest is expressed in contemporary Indian folklore. Then he describes the Inca state before the arrival of the Europeans, and how it was dismembered both by the systematic violence of the invaders and by massive epidemics to which the Indian population had no resistance. He looks at the effects of forced conversion to Christianity, and the ways the Spanish administration was able to use the indigenous organization to extract ever greater wealth from the declining population.

The Indian lords were, under the Inca system, the 'fathers of their people', leaders bound up in a system of rights and duties. Under the Spanish they became intermediaries of the colonial administration,

and the significance of the same rights and duties completely changed in a world where precious metals were no longer gifts for the gods, but formed the basis of profit and expanding value.

While the book is very dense in parts, and uses a structuralist model that is mannered at times, its great merit is to help us think in a new way about the meaning of the European conquest of the globe, at a time before it had become the Third World. Wachtel manages to create a picture which is both vivid and complex, and while he carefully guards against idealizing the great American civilizations, he pays great attention to the subjective element. He enables us to begin to imagine the mental universe of the Indians, as well as documenting the objective facts of disaster. We begin to question many of our preconceptions about the state, about ideas of efficiency and well-being. The book is an illuminating combination of the study of history, of ideology and of anthropology. May there be more like it.

London OLIVIA HARRIS

The Collapse of Democracy

By ROBERT MOSS (London, Abacus, 1977). 256pp. £1.50 Paper

This is an ideological primer for the National Association for Freedom of which Moss is the Director. As such, the book is more significant for its status than its content. It consists largely of half-baked notions which would earn an undergraduate grudging approval for the breadth of his reading but not the depth of his understanding. Moss has described himself as a political warfare expert, and clearly considers himself to be at war. In 1976 he was able to tell an audience that the principal dangers faced by society were inflation, subversion and excessive trade union power. The audience, who no doubt listened intently, were Argentinian military officers, presiding then as now over a regime which Amnesty International regards as marginally worse than Chile.

Moss's other books include *Urban Guerillas* and *Chile's Marxist Experiment*. The latter was published in Britain with the aid of Forum World Features, a news service which was a CIA front. *Chile's Marxist Experiment* was written before, but published after, the military coup which overthrew Salvador Allende in 1973. It presents so uncomplimentary a picture of Chile under Allende that twice as many copies were bought for free distribution by the new Chilean military regime as were sold on the commercial market.

The Collapse of Democracy is a conglomerate of British constitutional 'theory', poujadism and anti-communism, designed to appeal to academic liberals, the petty bourgeois who feels threatened by creeping 'state socialism' and the most reactionary sectors of the

British ruling class who have modified, but not moderated, their opposition to international Bolshevism since they sponsored the intervention against the Russian Revolution in 1917-18.

The ultimate beneficiaries of this anti-communism are monopoly capitalism and the transnational corporations. Since the Second World War, those corporations have accepted trade unions, and have apparently, moved away from the confrontation of pre-war years. Moss's thesis is that this corporatism has allowed communists, their supporters and dupes to take key positions within the trade unions, social democratic' political parties, academia and the media. Moss seeks to turn back this tide.

The shock troops for this battle are the smaller employers, who cannot easily afford to make those concessions to the organized working class which have been made by the transnational firms. It is not surprising that NAFF found and drew its battle lines round Grunwicks, a factory in north London which uses badly-paid immigrant labour to process holiday snaps.

The dispute is far from being settled at the time of writing and has been exacerbated by NAFF to discredit the Labour government and the trade unions. At each stage, NAFF has used legal action against the struggle to unionize the factory — such legal action being central to NAFF strategy. The recommendation from the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration service, that the union concerned should be recognized, is being fought in the courts. Legal action has been taken against postal workers who have refused to deliver Grunwick's mail. The intentions of the Labour government's Trade Union and Labour Relations Act have thus been thwarted.

Moss extols freedom, but freedom under law — that is the body of custom and practice which has been acquired by society over centuries. Elected Parliaments can be allowed to alter it only within certain limits, which Moss maintains can be deduced from the custom and practice itself. In claiming that political action within Parliament and trade union activity within the law provide organized workers with too great an influence on society, Moss has made an important break for a bourgeois writer, one designed to administer a sharp warning to the 'liberal' capitalists.

There have always been sections of the old ruling class in Britain which have never accepted the legitimacy of an elected Labour government. But the question of the future of parliamentary forms rests not with those politically extreme elements, but with the capitalist class as a whole. So it is alarming to see that NAFF's membership is not fringe. Its council includes Sir Frederick Bennett, a Conservative MP and Chairman of Kleinwort Benson Europe, and Sir Raymond Brookes, Chairman of the engineering firm GKN, which has a large South African subsidiary and gives more money to the Conservative Party and related right-wing organizations than any

other British firm. Brookes is also a member of the CBI council, and of the UK-South Africa Trade Association. Others include Sir Paul Chambers of ICI, Frank Taylor of the construction firm Taylor Woodrow, Lord de L'Isle of Phoenix Assurance, and the ex-Chairman of British Metal Corporation, Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templar, who fought for queen, country, and British metal's tin mines against the communist insurgency in Malaya in the 1950s. Other Conservative MPs, including Rhodes Boyson and Winston Churchill, are also prominent in the NAFF leadership.

So it would seem that ruling-class figures are prepared seriously to consider the end of class collaboration. Moss accepts that fascism or a military dictatorship in an advanced capitalist society would probably be counter-productive. The alternatives he offers are either a 'totalitarian' system, which he defines as one where the state interferes with all aspects of life, from production to the family, or an 'authoritarian' system, which he opts for. Production will be restored to its 'proper' private status, people freed to live their economic lives, but politics is to become the province of an elite, fulfilling the function of expressing grievances, but prevented from functioning as an avenue for increasing working-class power. A ban on socialists holding public employment would be introduced, which Moss would model explicitly on the West German 'berufsverbot'. Socialism would cease to be treated even as one of the ideologies competing within a plural society.

Moss is also Margaret Thatcher's speech-writer and adviser. When the present Labour government crashes to ignominious defeat at the next general election, he and his allies in the new right of the Conservative Party will be well placed to use their extra-parliamentary base to tip the political balance in their direction.

London PHIL KELLY

The Minority Report: an introduction to racial, ethnic and gender relations

By ANTHONY GARY DWORKIN and ROSALIND J. DWORKIN (New York, Praeger, 1976). 410pp.

Pyramid writing lives! Give the Dworkins, senior and junior (to use their own quaint self-description), a job lot of 'facts' and, before your very eyes, they will conjure up a 'book ... focused towards the undergraduate who is taking a first race relations or minority-group relations course'. Yet another offering at the tomb of the Unknown Undergraduate, I'm afraid: this time he/she is expected to have had 'little previous exposure to sociology', a lack which the present volume will fill past satiety.

I know that undergraduates need to learn about sociology and about race. I just do not think this is the way to teach them, that's all. The Dworkins define their 'two chief themes: (1) that race, ethnicity, and gender relations are social variables subject to social definition and consequences; and that (2) sociology can provide several heuristic orientations toward such social data, definitions, and consequences'. They then take 130 pages to give us the theoretical groundwork of their subject: not a theory or a paradigm fails to make its appearance on cue, not one single way of viewing minorities as objects of rivetting social scientific concern escapes the roving Dworkin eye.

But this — all of it — is mere introduction to the rest: page 133 launches us on to a 'diversity of perspective made possible by people of different minority groups with different experiences (*sic*), all interpreting the minority scene'. And off we go through the different experiences of Afro-Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Rican Americans, Indians (they mean native), Japanese, Chinese, Jewish and Irish Americans, and American women.

That is one of the major faults of the book. Obviously it's a neat idea to produce a spotter's guide to minorities — complete with checklists of identifiability, power, discrimination and group awareness ('*I* know he belongs to a minority, but *he* doesn't, so he must be Irish') — but it ends up seeming too neat by half. The various minorities chosen do not have so much in common that any particularly useful parallels emerge from the twenty or thirty pages which each is allotted. In that sense, too, the Dworkins and their contributors — for each minority is described by one of its own members — offer their readers some vertiginous pyramid writing. They have put down as many facts as they could think of about as many minorities as they could find. I don't know what it does to the undergraduates, but by God it terrifies me.

The other fault stems from the same source. Everyone seems so eager to say everything there is to be said about whichever minority happens to be under the microscope, that the relentless barrage of reportage effectively drowns the occasional insight as soon as it is heard, and analysis is never allowed to develop. The 'problems faced by Mexican Americans are generally similar to those faced by other minority groups', laments their chronicler. 'The origin of these problems is not found in the nature of the minority groups themselves, but in the values, attitudes, behaviours, and structures of the American majority society.' Quite. But there are few enough references to that society. What matter, so long as we know our minorities?

London ALEXANDER KIRBY

Education and the Indian plantation worker in Sri Lanka

By G.A. GNANAMUTTU (published by the author, 4 Chelsea Gardens, Colombo 3, 1977). xi + 138pp. Rs.12.50

Reports emerging from New York based organizations monitoring violations of human rights, repressions of political freedom and the 'physical quality of life' around the globe have listed Sri Lanka among the proud ranks of 61 'free' countries, and as the 'only "free" country in S.E. Asia' (*sic*). According to a new index measuring indicators of cultural and physical well-being, and how efficiently a state attends to the educational, health and other social needs of its people, Sri Lanka actually takes fifth place, not far behind well-known affluent nations. Such statistics, however, reveal what may be significant, but hide, more often, what is truly vital. All Ceylonese may theoretically be equal, but many are more equal than others quite unabashedly, and the least equal are little noticed and seldom figure in national statistics. It is the purpose of George A. Gnanamuttu's valuable and timely exposition to throw a revealing spotlight on one very old skeleton in the welfare cupboard of our society.

The Indian plantation worker was introduced to Ceylon by the British coffee planter almost a century and a half ago, and, over the years, the estate Tamil population has contributed by its specialized and back-breaking labours to the wealth and gross national product of this island. The tea industry, in whose service they are largely concentrated, remains the major source of our foreign exchange earnings. As a result of the Sirima-Sastri Pact of 1964 about 400,000 persons of Indian origin will ultimately become Ceylon citizens, along with their natural increase (the number of children will amount to about 150,000). A much larger number will be repatriated to become Indian citizens. But the problems and deprivations affecting both groups are similar, and need equal care and attention. In comparison with conditions and progress in other areas of the country, health services are minimal, educational facilities primitive, cultural amenities practically non-existent and unemployment most acute, while political representation since 1952 has been limited to a single nominated member in Parliament. The living and housing conditions of many of them are appalling, while undernourishment wreaks havoc among child-bearing mothers and infants. Nearly a *lakh** of children of school-age on estates receive no schooling and, where rudimentary facilities exist, attendance seldom reaches 50 per cent. The literacy rates among adults and children are lowest in the Tamil estate population, and only a handful have had the benefits of a higher education up to university level. Despite many proclamations and pledges of intent to remedy these sad and cruel deficiencies, successive governments since independence have done little to

*Lakh = 100,000

alter the stark dimensions of inhuman neglect reaching back into the middle of the nineteenth century.

But the recent bold and sweeping legislation affecting land reform and the nationalization of estates, in particular, *appear* to hold out promise of a brighter future. Planned programmes of development, agricultural diversification on tea and rubber estates and cooperative schemes of cultivation offer economic hope, while the vesting in the state of over two hundred estate schools, the extension of national health services to these forgotten areas and, even more important, the delimitation of electorates enabling the estate Tamil population registered as voters to send at least three elected representatives to Parliament, might portend a less unjust morrow. But however fine these reforms may appear on paper, certain serious flaws and restrictive practices affecting existing rights and hard-won privileges have become apparent in their implementation. Even prevailing facilities in the area of Tamil medium education are in serious danger of being further crimped and even taken away through absorption into the national (Sinhala) network. But we must return to the proper focus of this important book.

Mr Gnanamuttu's total concern is with the denial of a conventional education to, and the enforced cultural backwardness of, the children of a class of immigrant workers who make up nearly a tenth of the population of Sri Lanka. The underprivileged conditions of their existence on the periphery of the Sinhalese-Buddhist core of the island and the ambiguous nature of their political and civic status have together combined to thwart nearly every impetus towards an advancement of their educational and social aspirations up to now. The author brings to his research and investigation of a greatly neglected field a painstaking turn of mind and many years of experience, both as a teacher in plantation district schools and later as an official in the Department of Labour. He has seen it all from both sides of the sombre curtain, which few Ceylonese travelling carefree amidst the resplendently verdant slopes of the island's tea-gardens or the serried ranks of rubber groves elsewhere have thought it worth their while to penetrate. Behind the emerald aroma lie 150 years of blatant discrimination and segregated ignorance, which not all the sessional papers, committee reports, commission recommendations and legislation, nor the strenuous work of conscience-stricken agencies (both spiritual and secular), and dedicated individuals have succeeded in eradicating to any significant degree. The author lays bare in unheated, though unsparing, prose a grim record of a society which has permitted a grave and continuing waste of potential human resources, thereby inhibiting through the creation of permanent grievances and tensions, the harmonious development of its economy. Strong winds of change have however begun to blow, and in this necessary re-education for self-reliant development,

Gnanamuttu's work is required reading, for information, encounter and dialogue.

He deals with the dismal vicissitudes of the education of the children of plantation workers of Indian origin, from about 1870 to 1976. The work of the various agencies, religious and secular, private and state, is reviewed with detachment and a wealth of statistics. Their achievements and failures are evaluated, and the causes for failure are analysed and remedies suggested. Since education cannot be viewed apart from within the total context of the Indian estate workers' life, the presentation is made against a historical background of the sequestered plantation communities' living and working conditions, and the unsettled political and social environment, which have influenced their thinking and attitudes no less than the attitudes of others towards them. To quote the author:

> In Sri Lanka the 'estate school' has not changed very much from what it was nearly a century ago, and no serious attempts have been made by the State to enforce even the minimum requirements that the law prescribes. The children attending these schools have not been brought within the scope of the reforms that have been devised from time to time for the benefit of the other children in the country. What is, perhaps, not sufficiently known to many is that even the facilities for education that were available to these children some years ago have of late been reduced or completely removed. It is also a matter for regret that training in vocational skills is denied to a sector that is likely to take to such training more readily than any other.

The author has marshalled his facts with diligence and understanding, assembled the data with impressive accuracy, and assessed their significance with exemplary sympathy. This highly purposive study points an unerring and accusing finger at the citadels of official apathy, administrative neglect and political indifference, and must stir the social conscience of every citizen. Mr Gnanamuttu has written a brave, challenging and instructive book which cries aloud to be read at a crucial juncture in the affairs of this land, when the amelioration of social disadvantages, the elimination of economic distress and the integration of minorities are high on the list of national priorities.

University of Ceylon, Peradeniya H.A.I. GOONETILEKE

Immigration and Social Policy in Britain

By CATHERINE JONES (London, Tavistock Publications, 1977). 291pp. £7.85

This book purports to compare the inter-relationship between immigration and British 'social policy' across three periods: that of initial large-scale Irish immigration in the mid-nineteenth century, that of Jewish immigration in the late nineteenth century and that of Commonwealth immigration in the post-Second World War era. Given the wide disparities between these periods, as regards both the nature of immigration and the stage of development of social policy, it is not surprising that the comparisons drawn are artificial in the extreme. Indeed, the impression one gains is that the two historical case studies were added, almost as an afterthought, to bump up what is, in effect, a rather insubstantial survey of the impact of Commonwealth immigration on the statutory social services.

This survey involved 113 administrators in various services — local authority health, housing, social services and youth employment departments (in addition, data from another survey of education departments is used); supplementary benefit offices and employment exchanges; health service executive councils and hospital management committees. The results of the survey amount to little more than a catalogue of administrative anxieties about such matters as the keeping of special ethnic records, language training, recruitment of immigrant staff, etc. These may be the type of questions to exercise the minds of petty bureaucrats, but they are hardly the real stuff of which 'social policy' is made.

More fundamentally, the whole conception on which the book is based is misguided. With constant references to the 'host/stranger' dichotomy, immigration is treated throughout as something incidental, almost accidental, to the on-going processes of social policy. On the contrary, immigration has constituted one of the main pillars of British socio-economic policy in the post-war era, and the reactions of the established social services, as well as the new found race relations machinery, have been determined at virtually every step by the need to control and manage an immigrant population of second-class production factors. Thus we have the ESN schools for West Indian children, the myth of 'unrealistic aspirations' as a rationalization for the employment services' slotting immigrants into low wage jobs, the discriminatory policies of local authority housing and public health departments, let alone the direct 'social control' exercised by the police. All of these issues have been well documented elsewhere, and it is a mark of the pedestrian level of this book's analysis that none of them is even mentioned.

In view of the sorry state of social administration as an academic discipline in British universities, this book might be just passable as

an undergraduate dissertation. As an attempt to understand the impact of immigration on the social services and, more to the point, the all too often disastrous effects of those services on the immigrants themselves, it cannot be taken at all seriously.

University of Birmingham LEE BRIDGES

Fascism as a Mass Movement

By MIHALY VAJDA (London, Allison and Busby, 1976). 132pp. Hardback £5.25, Paper £2.95

Mihaly Vajda, a Hungarian philosopher, was expelled from his country's Communist Party in 1973. He has written a fascinating and challenging essay on fascism, which should be read backwards.

Vajda's thesis concludes with the courageous argument that, from 1936, the alliance of the German Nazi elite and the big bourgeoisie was much shakier than has been commonly supposed; that, having destroyed the bargaining power of the working class, Hitler kept living standards counter-productively low for political reasons; and that, paradoxically, the direction of surplus value into arms rather than consumption laid the foundations for West Germany's post-war miracle.

One of Vajda's purposes in this argument is to counter the crude identity of fascism and the big bourgeoisie (a thesis that reached its nadir with the Third International's literally suicidal theory that social-democracy and fascism were 'twin brothers'). As Vajda says, fascism 'cannot be regarded as a movement which is actually launched by the ruling class, and ... moreover, it openly contradicts the interests of the ruling class in certain cases'.

However, Vajda allows his conclusions on the essentially petty-bourgeois nature of fascism in power to cloud his view of the much more complex relations of class forces within the fascist masses on the road to victory. In the early part of the book, he does indeed acknowledge, briefly, the tensions between the 'anti-capitalist' Nazi Brownshirts and the leadership; however, his description of the defeat of the radicals underestimates the importance of the albeit reluctant concordat between Hitler and the big bourgeoisie in 1933.

The point is that this error is not necessary to Vajda's thesis: fascism is, precisely because its class-base and class-function are so often in contradiction, a constantly mutating animal. Its role in power, when the plebeian shocktroops are disbanded, is vastly different from its role during the seizure, and its role then must be distinguished from its terrorist function during the period of its growth. Vajda's claim, for instance, that 'only in Italy and Germany did it [fascism] become a decisive political factor', ignores the

specific function of the fascist masses in France, Norway and Austria, although the indigenous fascists did not achieve power in these countries. There is, in fact, little contradiction between Vajda's thesis of a semi-autonomous fascist state and a close identity of fascism and big business during the seizure; little conflict, either, between that identity of interests and the 'anti-capitalist' dynamic of the fascist masses in the period of growth. As economic and political circumstances change, so does the beast mutate.

That said, Vajda's essay contains many illuminating points, particularly on the world-view of the petty-bourgeoisie itself. Its concluding chapters are an important contribution to the continuing debate on the nature of fascism, a debate which may prove a great deal more than academic.

Birmingham DAVID EDGAR

Human (and anti-human) values in children's books

By COUNCIL ON INTERRACIAL BOOKS FOR CHILDREN (New York, Racism and Sexism Resource Center for Educators, 1976). 279pp. $7.95

Stereotypes, distortions and omissions in US history textbooks

By COUNCIL ON INTERRACIAL BOOKS FOR CHILDREN (New York, Racism and Sexism Resource Center for Educators, 1977). 144pp. $7.95

Many people combatting the increasingly overt racism and sexism in our society, particularly in the education system, appreciate the importance of children's books. Unfortunately,

> in any given society, children's books generally reflect the needs of those who dominate that society. A major need is to maintain and fortify the structure of relations between dominators and dominated. The prevailing values are supportive of the existing structure; they are the dominators' values ... children's books play an active part in maintaining that structure by molding future adults who will accept it.

Both these books, from the Council on Interracial Books for Children, a New York based organization that monitors and assesses children's books published in the USA, set out to challenge that status quo. The Council has built up a reputation for thorough research and commands the respect of individuals and organizations both in the USA and in Britain. Members of the Council 'are advocates of a society which will be free of racism, sexism, ageism, classism, materialism, elitism, and other negative values', and these

VALUES CHECKLIST

	ART	WORDS		ART	WORDS		ART	WORDS	N.A.
anti-Racist			non-Racist			Racist: omission / commission			
anti-Sexist			non-Sexist			Sexist			
anti-Elitist			non-Elitist			Elitist			
anti-Materialist			non-Materialist			Materialist			
anti-Individualist			non-Individualist			Individualist			
anti-Ageist			non-Ageist			Ageist			
anti-Conformist			non-Conformist			Conformist			
anti-Escapist			non-Escapist			Escapist			
Builds positive image of females/ minorities			Builds negative image of females/ minorities				Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
Inspires action vs. oppression			Culturally authentic			Literary quality				
						Art quality				

'Racist by omission' means that third world people could logically have been included but were not.

'Racist by commission' means that the words or the art were openly racist in some way which the book's analysis will detail.

'Non' before a negative value means that the book's impact was neutral in that regard.

'Anti' before a negative value means that the book made some positive impact.

'Inspires action against oppression' means that the book not only describes injustice but in some way encourages readers to act against injustice.

Note: The Checklist will always *follow* the analysis of the book.

books provide guidelines in evaluating children's reading materials from that perspective.

The first looks at children's fiction. A values checklist was devised and used by each reviewer, always a member of the community featured in the book. 235 children's books, published in 1975, dealing with minority, feminist and social-issue themes, were selected and graded on the values checklist. The books were selected in the belief that they would reflect a conscious effort towards positive value content.

The second looks at history textbooks and examines the treatment in thirteen books (all but one published after 1970) of six groups — African Americans, Asian Americans, Chicanos, native Americans, Puerto Ricans and women. Although they are treated separately, the Council recognizes that many factors link these groups together.

Each section begins by highlighting those aspects or experiences which are too often distorted or omitted. Each of the major points is used as a criterion against which the sample books are measured. There are quotations to show how the information was treated in the

book, a commentary on the treatment (especially on the language used, and the assumptions which that language reveals) and a list of 'alternative' sources. The method has the tremendous advantage of making omissions obvious (and a very similar method was used by McDiarmid and Pratt's *Teaching Prejudice* for precisely the same reason), but it has the disadvantage for the non-specialist that it cannot be applied unless you already know the history that is left out of conventional texts.

The results of both surveys were depressing. Only fourteen of the fiction titles received high ratings, although another twenty were considered noteworthy. Only fifty-seven of the 235 received any positive ratings, eighty-five were neutral and ninety-three were negative, and this in a country where 15-20 per cent of the population are of minority group origin, and where organizations have been raising the consciousness of teachers, authors and others for many years.

The survey of history books showed that women and Third World peoples are more commonly included in textbooks, and this is of course a welcome improvement; but they are still too frequently presented from the same old perspective, which does nothing to shake the underlying assumptions of conventional texts: American society is still the only 'true democracy'; discrimination, sexism and racism are seen as aberrations of the past, and are not connected in any way with the imperialism of the USA, the economic system on which the society is based, and the exploitation of groups within that society.

We are convinced that similar analyses of our own children's books would reveal the same sorts of omissions, distortions and anti-human values. With comprehensive criteria similar to those set out in these two books we could do more to impress upon authors, publishers, teachers and librarians that the majority of books for children are biased and insulting, and in this way force them to re-examine their own perspectives. It is only by selecting books which challenge the racist and sexist institutions of our society that we will give all our children a better chance to determine for themselves the role they intend to play in changing our society.

London ANN HEDGE and ANN MARIE DAVIES

On the Political Economy of Women
Conference of Socialist Economists Pamphlet no. 2 (London, Stage 1, 1977). 37pp. 70p.

Much work has been done in the last few years on the analysis of woman's role in the advanced capitalist economy: housework and childcare are now seen to be intimately bound up in the economic system, and within Marxist theory concepts such as the reproduction

of labour power can no longer be dismissed as unproblematic. One of the groups that has been active in forcing us to look at the nature of women's work is the Political Economy of Women Group, affiliated to the Conference of Socialist Economists, and the publication of two of their major articles within this pamphlet is especially welcome.

The pamphlet seems to me an example of collective work at its best. Each of the two articles was researched and written by a small group of women, and then read and discussed by a wider group. Even where the ideas being discussed are complex, the language is clear and the direction of the argument explicit. At the end a glossary provides definitions and examples of the main Marxist concepts used in the text.

The first article — 'Women's Domestic Labour' — focusses on how to analyse housework within the framework of Marxist theory. Since the main interest of political economy has been commodity production, and thus the relation between capitalists and workers, the work done by women *outside* the commodity sector in maintaining and reproducing the labour force has been largely ignored. Since ideology conditions us to see as 'natural' the work done by women in the home, it is easy to think of it as unchanging, and therefore not worthy of attention.

Through a discussion of the different ways of analysing the role of housework under capitalism we are shown how the requirements of capital have differed at different historical periods, so that the demands made of women's labour have correspondingly changed. It suggests that while in the past women's labour has always been cheaper than men's because of their domestic role, today serious contradictions are arising as much domestic work is increasingly mechanised, yet women's wage labour becomes more and more indispensable.

This theme is taken up in the second article, 'Women, the State and reproduction since the 1930's', and illustrated by the changes that have taken place in Britain in the last few decades. It discusses how and why the role of housework has altered with changes in fertility patterns, increased state intervention and the growing employment of women in wage work. The message is clear: the ideology that conditions us to see the home as a private sphere, free from the constraints of the outside world, conceals the degree to which what goes on inside the home is harnessed to changes in broad social and economic processes.

While both articles concentrate on economic aspects, they recognize the crucial importance of political and ideological factors for an understanding of the specific nature of women's oppression under capitalism and the contradictions around which the women's movement can organize. While the pamphlet is directly concerned with advanced capitalist society, it is highly suggestive for a more general

theory of women's subordination. While the privatization of domestic work occurs only under certain historical conditions, all societies must organize the reproduction of their labour force, and it is by trying to understand the way the needs of reproduction are articulated with those of production that we shall have the basis for understanding the changing forms of women's subordination.

London OLIVIA HARRIS

The Technology of Political Control

By C. ACKROYD, K. MARGOLIS, J. ROSENHEAD and T. SHALLICE (London, Pelican, 1977). 320pp. £1.25

'Subversion' at home, the enemy within, has become a major preoccupation for bourgeois politicians and state planners as the economic recession extends into yet another year. For whatever external challenges it faces capital must always make sure its base at the centre is secure. This book looks at the response of the British state to this situation.

In the nineteenth century the ruling class covered the country with a network of army garrisons. However, the ruthless suppression of the working class that followed then is no longer on the agenda except as a last resort. Now the emphasis is on pre-empting working-class initiatives and shifting the boundaries of what are held to be 'legitimate' political freedoms (the right of workers to picket is currently under attack).

Informed by the experience of its colonial wars and the eight-year-old war in Northern Ireland, Britain has developed some of the most sophisticated means available for controlling political action. Riot control equipment, interrogation methods, surveillance technology, ways of coping with political prisoners and computerized intelligence on a whole population are among the areas dealt with. Moreover, Britain has turned this expertise to good advantage by becoming one of the leading exporters of low-level policing technology.

These new techniques have been designed not to kill but to control, without the apparent use of force. The wooden bullet (reinforced with a metal core) developed for use in Hong Kong became the rubber bullet in Northern Ireland. But people have been killed and blinded by rubber bullets. So alongside the technology comes 'news management' ('psychological operations' in military jargon) to suppress, deny or excuse such 'accidents'.

Counter-insurgency techniques for urban situations not only inform the military in the six counties; they are part of standard training for the British army to plan for a widespread confrontation on the mainland. Joint police-military operations and the surveillance of all

political and trade union activity is now routine in Britain.

The most thought-provoking section of the book sets out the possible futures for Britain (and other advanced capitalist countries) in the face of a prolonged crisis. The authors suggest that fascism is unlikely to arise in Britain because the National Front (the only overtly fascist party) does not have mass support. Nor, more importantly, does it have the backing of any significant section of capital. Similarly, a military coup is ruled out because for many years the British military establishment has recognized the need to be seen to be acting under formal political direction.

The authors see the 'strong state' as the most likely direction for this country. They suggest that although the formal front of liberal democracy will be maintained, the real power will increasingly rest with the state agencies. While it is possible to agree that a military dictatorship is unlikely and that a 'strong state' is on the cards, the authors' analysis is weak on the political ideology that would legitimate such a state. The book's analysis of fascism looks for exact parallels between the historical form of German fascism and political developments in Britain today. But racism, the rise of the National Association for Freedom and the shift to the right of all the main political parties indicates that a 'strong state' with a fascist ideology could be quite compatible. The form and content of fascism can vary more than the authors allow for. The fascism of Germany of the 1930s may come to look very primitive besides the fascistic ideology of late capitalism — one that will be more subtle and long lasting precisely because it will not overtly raise the flag of fascism.

London TONY BUNYAN

Books received

This listing does not preclude subsequent publication of reviews

Afro Americans and Africa: black nationalism at the crossroads. Compiled by W.B. Helmreich. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1977. Cloth

Black Art: an international quarterly. Issues of Fall 1976 and Winter 1976. New York, Black Art, 1976. Paper $3.00

Black Women in Nineteenth-Century American Life. Edited by B.J. Loewenberg and R. Bogin. London, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977. Paper £6.00

Black Workers in White Unions: job discrimination in the United States. By W.B. Gould. London, Cornell University Press, 1977. Cloth £15.00

Capitalism in Crisis and Everyday Life. By M. Bosquet. Hassocks, Sussex, Harvester Press, 1977. Cloth £8.95. Paper £2.95

A Chance to Learn: the history of race and education in the United States. By M. Weinberg. London, Cambridge University Press, 1977. Cloth £14.00

China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy. By J.G. Gurley. New York, Monthly Review, 1976. Cloth $15.00

Crisis in Korea. Edited by G. McCormack and J. Gittings. Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1977. Paper £2.95

The Economics of European Imperialism. By Alan Hodgart. London, Edward Arnold, 1977. Paper £2.25

False Messiah: the story of Michael X. By D. Humphry and D. Tindall. London, Hart-Davis Macgibbon, 1977. Cloth £6.95

Fascist Movements in Austria: from Schönerer to Hitler. By F.L. Carsten. London, Sage, 1977. Paper £4.50

Frederick Douglass on Women's Rights. Edited by P.S. Foner. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1977. Cloth

'Good Time Coming?' Black Nevadans in the nineteenth century. By E.R. Rusco. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1976. Cloth $13.95

History Workshop: a journal of socialist historians. Issue of Autumn 1976. Oxford, History Workshop Journal, 1976. Paper £3.45

How Long Will South Africa Survive? By R.W. Johnson. London, Macmillan, 1977. Paper £3.95

Identities: the impact of ethnicity on Canadian society. Edited by W. Isajiw. Toronto, Peter Martin Associates, 1977. Paper $8.95

Ideology and Utopia in the US, 1956-1976. By I.L. Horowitz. London, Oxford University Press, 1977. Cloth £10.95

An Introduction to Anthropology. Fifth edition. Edited by A.R. and R.L. Beals and H. Hoijer. London, Collier Macmillan, 1977. Paper £10.50

The Labour Process and Class Strategies. By Conference of Socialist Economists. London, Stage 1, 1976. Paper £1.80

No Problems Here? Management and the multi-racial workforce. By K. Carby and M. Thakur. London, Institute of Personnel Management, 1977. Paper

Plight of Muslims in India. By S. Harman. London, D.L. Publications, 1977. Paper £4.50

A Political History of Japanese Capitalism. By Jon Halliday. New York, Pantheon Books, 1975. Cloth.

The Political Socialization of Black Americans: a critical evaluation of research on efficacy and trust. By Paul R. Abramson. London, Collier Macmillan, 1977. Cloth £9.75

The Politics of Literacy. Edited by M. Hoyles. London, Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1977. Paper £1.50

Population Target: the political economy of population control in Latin America. By B. Mass. Toronto, Latin America Working Group, 1977, Paper

Race and Races. By R.A. Goldsby. London, Collier Macmillan, 1977. Paper £4.15

Racial Disadvantage in Britain. By D.J. Smith. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977. Paper £1.25

Social Security for Migrant Workers. Geneva, I.L.O., 1977. Paper Swiss Fr. 22.50

Teaching in a Multicultural Society: perspectives and professional strategies. Edited by D.E. Cross, G.C. Baker and L.J. Stiles, London, Collier Macmillan, 1977. Cloth £9.00

A Worker's Guide to the Employment Protection Act. By I. Clemitson. Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1977. Paper £0.95

The World Council of Churches and Bank Loans to Apartheid. Geneva, WCC, 1977. Paper Swiss Fr. 6.50

The World in a Classroom. Compiled by C. Searle. London, Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1977. Paper £1.95

Writing in Cuba since the Revolution. Edited by A. Salkey. London, Bogle l'Ouverture, 1977. Paper £1.95

The following recent back issues of *Race & Class* are available from the Institute of Race Relations, 247 Pentonville Road, London N1.

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