

TOWARDS AN ANTI-RACIST FEMINISIN

Racism without colour — Quebec Calypso and the Grenada revolution Cyprus: class and ethnicity SAS and popular fiction

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JENNY BOURNE

Towards an anti-racist feminism

When the Women's Movement (WM) as we know it today, took off in the latter part of the 1960s, the debt of inspiration it owed to the black movement was obvious and acknowledged. 'Black' slogans became 'feminist' slogans, the new perspectives thrown up by the anti-war, civil rights and black power movements harnessed by the WM served to show up their potential for all oppressed groups. The debt found its way without apology into feminist writings.1 But since then the bonds have become fraved, the roots discarded, the lessons unlearnt, not least because of the changes in political direction within the WM itself. Today the relationship of the WM to black people is once again on the agenda. What is of concern, though, is the way the subject is being formulated and the uncritical way in which recent women's anti-racist practice is being assessed - not least in Britain. And as racism in Britain becomes more structured and pervasive, the task of setting our sights right becomes that much more imperative and our fight against it that much more urgent. The role of women in that fight should and does have its own particularity. But in its origins and development and in its particular understanding of oppression and exploitation, it has much in common with the struggles of black people.

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Feminism's anti-racist potential

Feminism locates the oppression of women not merely in the individualised actions of men but in a system – of patriarchy. Such a system in its turn is conceived of as incorporating more than just exploitative capitalist relations. So that oppression comes to 'reflect the hierarchial relations of the sexual and racial division of labor and society'. Or, as Eisenstein continues, 'exploitation speaks to the economic reality of capitalist class relations for men and women, whereas oppression refers to women and minorities defined within patriarchal, racist and capitalist relations'.²

And the way that white women and black people come to an understanding of their oppressions is not through an abstract analysis of exploitation, but through their every day personal perception. 'By calling attention to life rather than theory, the women's movement has called attention to cultural domination as a whole – has begun a political analysis that does not take place in isolation from practical activity.'³ Whereas the politics of orthodox class struggle does not necessarily demand that those involved 'question their very individuality', feminist (and black) struggle cannot be undertaken without questioning both the values, ideas, images imposed on women and black people and the relationship these have to the overall exploitative system. Thus the integration of both personal and political change is of the essence. According to Nancy Hartock:

By working out the links between the personal and the political, and by working out the links between daily life and social institutions, we have begun to understand existence as a social process, the product of human activity ... changed consciousness and changed definition of the self can only occur in conjunction with a restructuring of the social (both societal and personal) relation in which each of us is involved. Thus feminism leads us to oppose the institutions of capitalism, and white supremacy as well as patriarchy. By calling attention to the specific experiences of individuals, feminism calls attention to the totality of social relations, to the social formation as a whole.⁴

The same idea is echoed in Sheila Rowbotham's argument that 'the liberation of women necessitates the liberation of all human beings',⁵ and is picked up and amplified by Marlene Dixon: 'As women we must fight all injustice because ours is the universal, the fundamental image and reality of inequality and exploitation – to end ours, all inequality and exploitation must be abolished'.⁶

Feminism at root provides a new way of seeing things, a new series of questions to ask, a new way of conceiving of political struggle. It

necessitates a reordering of priorities, particularly the question of consciousness in relation to the conditions of society. Questions of consciousness become a part of the discussion of social reality. Reality itself comes to encompass the relations of class and sex and race ... the dialectic will be self-consciously extended to the relations between consciousness, ideology and social reality.⁷

For Hartock, feminists have 'reinvented Marx's method' to provide 'a model for the rest of the left'.⁸

In Britain the struggles of feminists and black people have held up a mirror to the left revealing its inadequacies - its reliance on arid dogma, on economistic formulations, and on its own little hierarchies. Both women and black people have stressed the nature of their oppressions and the need to fight them on their own terms without subsuming their struggles to the class struggle or indeed of deferring them till 'after the revolution'. They have emphasised the importance of not viewing racism and sexism purely in terms of their economic function. And implicit in these demands to organise autonomously around their own oppressions and redefine the content of political struggle is the redefinition by both groups of where that struggle takes place. For the orthodox left, the factory floor has been the site of struggle, with the traditional political fight defined as that between the owners of the means of production and the sellers of labour power. But for both white women and black people, fighting an oppression which goes beyond (or is disconnected from) direct economic exploitation. the focus of the struggle has moved to the community. Women and black people have since the 1970s been at the forefront of community-based fights. The black uprisings of 1981 and the demonstrations of the women of Greenham Common are simply the dramatic examples of that trend.

The role of women outside mainstream factory production has been variously viewed by the WM. Analysts have mainly concentrated on women's isolation and powerlessness in the home or on their role in reproduction. A few commentators have turned the issue on its head to show that because women have been less directly incorporated into capitalist relations, they actually bear the seeds of a more revolutionary consciousness than men do. Samir Amin, for instance, argues that women's household tasks and relationships retain an element of usevalue in a society where all other relations are dominated by exchangevalues.⁹ Alain Touraine takes up the same theme more explicitly.

Of all social movements, the women's movement is the one most able to oppose the growing hold exercised by giant corporations over our daily lives. Only women have preserved those personal qualities which male domination has crushed out of men. Since they have been completely excluded from political and military power, women have succeeded in maintaining a capacity for affective relations from which men have been estranged by the structures of power.¹⁰

A. Sivanandan contends that capitalism has over the years not only divided and separated 'the economic and cultural aspects of struggle – the standard of living and the quality of life', but has concealed them from each other and therefore divided the struggles. And because of the traditional labour movement's concentration on the standard of living, it has been left to black people and white women to struggle over the quality of life and restore that dimension to class struggle generally.¹¹ If we accept that women in the home are not merely reproducing labour power but social relations and ideology too, and that they, probably far more than their husbands, have a hand in fashioning the ideas and values of the next generation, then the concern of women over the 'quality of life' and their capacity for 'affective relations' carry within them the potential for anti-racist values and commitment.

It is against this promise that women hold out and in terms of the principles of feminism itself that I examine the nature of racism (or the limitations of anti-racism) in the white British WM. The purpose is not to suggest that we women are more or less racist than other groups or that there is a moral reason to bring us to book, but to show that antiracist practice is closely allied to the way that feminist principles have been applied, betrayed or distorted. Essentially, I see anti-racism not as something outside of the WM but as intrinsic to the best principles of feminism itself. The extent to which the WM has failed its own principles is the extent to which it is racist. Conversely, and this is the direction I am writing from, to analyse our 'lapses' from anti-racism is to analyse flaws in the contemporary practice of feminism itself.

Borrowing from the left

To understand how we can fight racism as women, it is important to evaluate critically our past practice and learn from our past mistakes. And for that reason I want to look back at the main strands of feminist activity (or lack of activity) on race over the last few years. This falls into two broad phases: 1977-9, when anti-fascist anti-racist activity had a relatively high profile on the left generally, and 1980 to the present.

The British WM, probably unlike any other, does have a distinct though short-lived campaign against racism (and fascism) to its credit: that carried out by the Women Against Racism and Fascism (WARF). It arose out of a major mobilisation against a fascist march in North London in April 1977 when a number of women not affiliated to any political party took part and out of that experience felt the need to organise more systematically to protect women in street confrontations and to raise the issues of racism and fascism with other women. A few months later, the first WARF group was launched in London – followed by others throughout the country. Women attracted to WARF activities were almost all white and already active on the left of the WM. WARF groups were usually composed of a hard core of women who gave primacy to fighting racism and fascism and acted as a caucus within the WM proper – raising the issues through debates, conferences and articles and mobilising and organising women for large public events. WARF groups were an exciting development and had a huge potential. But this potential was never fully realised and after two years the movement sank almost without trace.* Women looking back on that era bemoan the passing of anti-racist concerns from the movement,¹² but without really examining what it was about WARF that made it so transitory.

Any notion that WARF was the prototype for women's anti-racism is based on a fallacy. The WM at that time was not anti-racist at all. It was, for a short period, like much of the left, anti-fascist and only incidentally anti-racist. This distinction between racism and fascism and the relationship between them has an important bearing on how struggle should be conducted, and therefore needed to be examined more closely. But the WM, in borrowing uncritically the left's analysis and approach to fascism and racism, replicated its failure to develop a coherent integrated anti-racist practice or strategy. So that when, after the general election to which it was geared, the anti-fascist movement wound down, women too, packed up their 'anti-fascist' bags and went home.

The chief error of the anti-fascist movement was and is to confound the explicit ideology of fascism with its organisational tactics and practice on the streets, and in so doing to concentrate the attack on fascist ideology and its outpourings to the exclusion of everything else. Where that ideology is not sufficiently explicated in current fascist analysis and writings, it looks to the 1930s for a fleshed-out picture of what fascism is really about. Jews, gays, trade unionists, women are all under threat from fascism in terms of its ideology - all have a reason for fighting it. White women can see that fascists do not believe in abortion (for white women), that fascism would relegate them to the home under the thumb of the white patriarch, that fascism is the incarnation of sexism in extremis.13 But to concentrate in this way purely on the fascists' structure of ideas and ideology and their promulgation of them is to lose sight of the organisational basis of contemporary fascism - which is racism, anti-black racism. It is to leave out of the reckoning the breeding ground of fascism today - the fact that it has its roots in and derives sustenance from vast areas of ordinary workingclass racism. (But then, the left has always had difficulty in facing up to

^{*} The campaign against the use of Depo-Provera on black and Third World women was an important off-shoot — and is largely responsible for focusing national attention on the issue.

the entrenched nature of British working-class racism – as though it were a sacrilege to acknowledge that the agents of revolution were not entirely without sin.) It is no sophisticated ideology that wins recruits for fascist parties today, but a quite simple belief that groups like the National Front and the British Movement are going to rid Britain of the 'coloured immigrants' who have taken working people's jobs, homes, schools, daughters, breed like rabbits, revel in crime, and so on. It may not be the working class who have created these ideas; that has been done by the British culture of racism and the policies of both Tory and Labour governments,¹⁴ but fascists have capitalised on these beliefs in the working class to win recruits and build their organisations.*

The inability of the left to make these distinctions, to understand the nature of contemporary fascism stemmed from the flaws in its own anti-racist practice. Seeing black struggle as part of orthodox class struggle, the white left would only take up the cause of black workers qua workers. It would support them in industrial action because that was the sort of 'legitimate' activity that unifies the working class. Any demand not related to legitimate white-defined struggle, however, was written off as black nationalism. And the black activities of the early 1970s directed to fighting racism in the community - against the police, the courts, the education system, the attempts to build a black infrastructure through organising supplementary schools, youth projects, community organisations - went unsupported and unacknowledged. The left had no conception of state racism or of black oppression and was unable to comprehend, let alone applaud, any black 'self-activity' or any black analysis of society which stressed aspects other than those of class exploitation. It viewed these as 'splitist' (at best) or as racism in reverse (at worst).

When gradually through the 1970s the white left was forced by black struggle to acknowledge racism, it was still unable to define it in terms other than immigration law – and the 1971 Act in particular. And then the arguments it brought to bear against the Act were based on moral precept rather than political analysis. Lacking a theoretical grasp of the economics of immigration and the politics of state racism, the left was enticed into the liberal lobbyist orientation of groups like the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants and the National Council for Civil Liberties. When, subsequently, it was to take up other issues such

^{*} If the inability of the white left to accept this analysis made it irrelevant to the black struggle, the inclination of the women to follow the left in moving the terrain of battle to the purely ideological plane led them to compete with blacks for first place in the oppression stakes. It did not matter that, on the ground, it was black people more than (white) women who were under threat; fascist ideology gave them both an equal status! Hence, an anti-fascist front had to be equally an anti-sexist front as an anti-racist one.

as racial violence, police harassment and racist court decisions, it did so in the main as a result of pressure from blacks within its ranks and the fear of losing its black members. Even today, the left's response continues to be ad hoc, piecemeal and lacking a genuine comprehension of state racism.

But if the left parties failed to address themselves in a coherent organised way to the questions of racism and fascism, there were still individuals on the left who, feeling the impact of racist and fascist thugs on the ground, came together from 1976 onwards to form local anti-racist anti-fascist groups. The composition of these local committees differed from area to area, as did the issues that were taken up. Sometimes the committees were seen as little more than adjuncts to the state's Community Relations Committee network, sometimes they simply embraced a 'tea-party philosophy' of racial harmony, to be achieved through cultural and social events. But on all committees sat members of the left parties – the SWP, the IMG, the CP, the Labour left – and they were all primarily interested in fighting fascism. There was as yet no British tradition of fighting racism.* The liberal view reduced the issue to one of interpersonal relations – educating prejudice away – the militant view reduced anti-racism to anti-fascism.

Fighting racism would have involved seeing racism as a white problem which it was the responsibility of white people to deal with. It would have necessitated slow unrewarding educative and campaigning work in those areas where working people were already involved – such as tenants associations, trades councils, etc. Though most groups postured at doing local work, they rarely undertook much practical activity. Their excuse was that black people did not join and tell them what to do – thus they neatly absolved themselves of serious responsibility. In fact, if they had taken up local campaigns against racism, based on local issues, in earnest, black people might well have joined them – as was demonstrated in the support that the paper CARF (Campaign Against Racism and Fascism) got (and still gets) from black groups. (CARF is still the only political anti-racist forum in the UK.)

Because there were no strong guiding anti-racist principles, and little orientation towards truly local work, it was inevitable that fighting the fascists, either at elections or in street confrontations, would become the most popular and most publicised aspect of the work. Many local committees were dormant 'paper' organisations fired into reluctant activity by a fascist march or a fascist meeting on their patch and, lacking a local mobilising capacity, had to turn to the left parties for organisation and numbers.

^{*} Some of us based at the Institute of Race Relations were responsible for bringing together twenty-six local broad fronts into an All London Anti-racist Anti-fascist Coordinating Committee (1977-9) which also published a newspaper, CARF.

And it was this basic weakness of the anti-racist anti-fascist groups to draw out a clear anti-racist perspective grounded in local activity that made it possible for a powerful anti-fascist movement like the Anti Nazi League (ANL) to take over and submerge them. Whatever local anti-racist potential there had been was diverted even more readily into a movement against fascism, albeit popular and national – and temporary. The ANL, whose aim was to defeat the fascist threat at the polls, organised around slogans and definitions which were simply throw-backs to the 1930s. It made no pretence at analysing contemporary fascism or its relationship to racism and black people. (To be fair, it must be stressed that WARF aways opposed the ANL's attempts to take over and subvert the chief concerns of the movement. But this resistance probably owes more to a reflex distrust of male left organisations, which backed the ANL, than a commitment to antiracism.)

Since the ANL, we have seen a downturn in activity against fascism and racism – not because either has diminished, on the contrary they have increased, but because left groups generally have turned their attention to other issues – unemployment, social and welfare cuts, nuclear disarmament. And left-wing Labour-controlled councils prefer to fund ethnic culturalist programmes rather than support antiracist political activities.¹⁵

Women Against Racism and Fascism: form and content of struggle

Where does WARF fit into this scenario?* WARF was a broad front of women opposed to racism and fascism who for the first time could organise together outside the confines of the left parties. The group brought large contingents of women to its public activities. WARF women prided themselves on their impressive turn-outs and organised ranks, adopting slogans and songs to events: 'The women united will never be defeated' and 'Oh sisters don't you weep don't you moan ... the women's army is marching ...' But what were we mobilising for?

Essentially, we followed the lead of the white left parties into two key areas – both firmly within the traditional purview of left politics – industrial disputes and mobilising in counter-demonstration against fascist marches. In the Grunwick strike, for instance, white women took to the picket line, not when the black women had stood alone for months outside the gate and desperately looked for allies, but when the left had changed the underlying issue from one of racial discrimination to one of unionisation and made the dispute an 'official' left concern.¹⁶

^{*} This account is based on my experiences in North London WARF and that group's relationship with other WARF groups and the All London Anti-racist Anti-fascist Coordinating Committee.

Similarly, the women remained bound to the white male left's ordering of priorities in the anti-fascist fight, re-acting to fascism rather than acting against it – stomping it out on the ground, in its chrysalis stage of racism. Our activities as women did not mark a feminist departure from but a feminist involvement in activities defined and sanctioned, if not ordained, by the left.

And in supporting the left, we were actually supporting a political line which ran counter to feminist principles. For what the left was doing in fighting fascism rather than racism was subsuming the race question to the class question. And, in the Grunwick case, the left actually inveigled black people into giving up their right to autonomous organisation. Ironically, we feminists, who had fought for the right to *our* autonomy against the male left, were not prepared to extend the same principle to black people in their struggle. Instead, when it came to anti-racist practice, we succumbed, if only by default, to white male left politics – and betrayed in the process one of the fundamental tenets of feminism itself.

WARF raised the issue of racism and fascism mainly within the WM, speaking and writing for women similar to ourselves - middleclass and left inclined. WARF (like the left) did not speak to workingclass women - it neither had the commitment nor the opportunity to do so (except for a minority of women who were engaged professionally on social and welfare issues). The majority of WARF (like the left) was without a community base and, inevitably, its work became abstract and theoretical. Not working in the community meant not reaching the very women likely to be attracted to racist or fascist ideas. And without that area in which practice could have informed theory and vice versa. it became even harder to develop an anti-racist feminism. Instead. WARF fell back on dogma and sloganeering. As we marched through Hackney on an anti-racist demo chanting, 'The women united will never be defeated', the heckling of fascist women on the pavements brought home to us the falseness of the proposition. WARF, like the left, had fallen prey to romanticising its constituency.

The influence of the left tradition was even more obvious in our internal meetings. For the majority of white women, WARF provided the first opportunity for anti-racist activity as women: the WM had none and the left was alienating. But they brought with them a whole baggage of ideas and concepts from both. To a group of us coming in as anti-racist women, who had not travelled via the white male left either to find our anti-racism or to consolidate our feminism, the different strands of feminist and left politics were real impediments to thrashing out a common anti-racist position. Leaving aside debates that WARF did manage to transcend (for example, about racism being male or all men being fascists), it was the way that women coming from the white left had been trained into thinking, organising and

approaching problems that prevented the formation of a specifically feminist broad front. Having thrown off male forms of organising (and continuing to do so in the fight with the ANL), the male political legacy was surreptitiously present at every turn. Instead of examining the reality of a situation, weighing up the contradictions, formulating a strategy, WARF tried to fit every event into a pre-set mould, deriving practice from dogma. If one did not accept one dogma, one was automatically branded another type of dogmatist. It was as though in rejecting a male left approach to politics as inappropriate for women, only half the lesson had been learned: the rejection of male organisational forms and the adoption of female forms instead.

And it was this concentration on forms of struggle to the exclusion of their context (in terms of race, class and sex) that led to the disintegration of WARF and stifled the anti-racist development within the WM. Conversely, because women did not have a feminist view of fighting racism, they concentrated on reformulating and reorganising struggle along feminist lines as a political end in itself. When women were confronted with forms of struggle reminiscent of those they had rejected or with which they were out of sympathy, they branded them as 'male' and fought them as though they, rather than racism or fascism, were the enemy. In one WARF group, for example, women suggested that the whole political practice of confronting fascists on the streets was male not female, implying that men liked violence and women did not.17 This completely missed the point that as anti-fascists we were actually being given no choice in our tactics - none of us had chosen violence. And it was largely the organisational form of the first national anti-racist anti-fascist conference in 1978 - its adoption of rigid TUC rules, its concentration on plenary sessions and guest speakers - that caused the WARF (and gay) groups to disrupt the whole conference. It was their insistence that the conference break up into workshops - because workshops are a feminist way of doing things - that halted a plenary session aimed at locating racism in the fight against fascism - one of the conference's principle tasks. And in imposing their priority over and above the concerns of the conference, they were actually imposing on other groups a line that they did not accept - in particular, negating and overriding the political priorities of the black groups present.

It was a unique conference, in that it had brought together from all over the country rank-and-file trade unionists, black groups, local and women's anti-fascist groups. And there was a unique opportunity there to work out the politics of class, race and gender in a common fight against fascism. It could even have been a dry run for the bigger struggles to come. The tendency to supervene form over the content of struggle is not entirely absent, even in the best of socialist feminist writings - such as Beyond the fragments.¹⁸ Here, three white feminists who have all worked both in left parties and in the WM explain how and why women had to fight against and outside the male left. For the first time in British feminist writings the issue has been tackled as one of politics - the problem, that is, is located not in the sexism of individual men but in the basis on which (male) left politics is organised. As such, the authors have provided some very exciting and influential ideas for the WM. But when they extend that analysis to how (as one of the contributors put it) 'new forms of organising within the women's movement' could become 'part of a larger recovery of a libertarian socialist tradition', they splutter and stop, their promise unfulfilled. It escapes them completely that black people were having to wage a similar struggle to women's against the left and under identical circumstances. Mukti, Samaj, Black Socialist Alliance, Flame, Awaz, OWAAD and so many other organisations bear witness to the battles black people (male and female) were waging in the 1970s against a white left which relegated their struggle and tried to sidetrack their fight. In this book, as in women's politics generally, there has been no genuine recognition that it is the same left which is male towards women's politics that is white towards black politics.

The betraval of the black cause, however, does not rest here; it has been extended into what amounts to a denial of the inspiration that 'women's liberation' owes to the 1960s black movement. As David Edgar put it, 'The struggle for black rights in America was the first and defining political struggle of the 1960s ... Without Black Brotherhood. there would have been no Sisterhood; without Black Power and Black Pride, there would have been no Gay Power and Gay Pride.'19 In a recently published collection of personal narratives from those involved in the struggles around the Vietnam war, civil rights and women's liberation in the USA in the 1960s - They should have served that cup of coffee - American feminists recall this history. 'We were aided in our recognition of cultural domination by the black movement's pointing to the power of the (white) Man's ideology in forming black selfperception. The black movement countered this domination in part with the slogan "Black is Beautiful". Could women together, make a similar affirmation about ourselves?'20 'The fact that the Civil Rights Movement had torn apart assumptions about equality and freedom in America allowed us the space to question the reality of our own freedom as women.'21

Compare this with the history recalled by the authors of Sweet Freedom.²² For them, post-war feminism owed its inspiration to the pill, the ideas of Betty Friedan and the experience of sexism in political movements. It simply 'adapted the terminology of black liberation and

anti-imperialism'. Hilary Wainwright in her introduction to Beyond the fragments goes a step further and actually denies the legacy of the black struggle. For her, no left organisation 'had any real understanding of the subjectivity of oppression, of the connections between personal relations and public political organisation, or of the emotional components of consciousness, until the Women's Movement had brought these issues to the surface and made them part of political thought and action.' But long before the WM, the protagonists of the black movement (and the Chinese and Cuban revolutionaries before them) had insisted that there could be no dichotomy between one's personal life-style, behaviour, beliefs and the pursuit of liberationist politics, that who you are and what you do belong to the same continuum. The difference in emphasis between the two types of histories is not solely because one is British and the other American, for earlier British feminists did own to the influence of black power.23 Contemporary British feminist history, however, is shifting the debate about the genesis of the WM from its inspirational origins to its organisational formation and, in so doing, is expurgating history - to create a revisionist 'white' history.

Women and the state

But even if white women fail to understand the parallel struggles for autonomy by black people, even if they fail to acknowledge the inspirational debt owed to the black power movement, one could still expect them to find common ground with black people through their common experience of the state. The WM, though, finds it difficult, like the left, to grasp the idea of state racism - not because it is hung up on the orthodoxies of capitalist exploitation, but because it finds it hard to distinguish between the individualised sexism of particular men and the systematic or institutionalised nature of state oppression of women. And there is even now a tendency in the WM to see men (en masse) rather than a system as primarily responsible for the oppression of women. Loosely stated, the extent to which the WM has viewed a system (of patriarchy or whatever) as responsible for oppression is the extent to which it has adhered to socialist-feminist ideas as opposed to radical feminist ones. A class analysis necessarily underlies an understanding of the state. Where marxist women have analysed the state, it has often been in a very abstract way, bearing little reality to actual or potential struggle. Consciously fighting state power rather than male power has hitherto been alien to the WM. Very often, where women have fought the state, it has been over 'local state' issues around welfare demands such as more nursery provision. Where women have tackled the national state, it has been around strictly feminist demands such as abortion. One can perceive in the WM an

ambivalence towards the state. Is it an instrument of oppression or is it a welfare state whence concessions can be won? Often the strong 'reformist' wing of the movement, having confused parliament for the state, has implied that lobbying against laws constitutes the whole fight against the state.

In their failure to understand the state, the women fail to side with the blacks; in failing to side with the blacks, they play into the hands of the state. Take, for example, one aspect of state racism in Britain today. In order to justify police harassment of the black community and the demand for increased police powers, the state is, through the media, highlighting 'mugging' - a term used to criminalise the black community: black youth are all muggers, their victims all white women. If we keep silent, appearing to concur with this view, we become in effect a party to state racism. Furthermore, because as feminists we have been campaigning against male violence on the streets, we can, if we do not consistently attack this type of stereotyping, even as we fight male violence actually give racism credibility. Unfortunately, there are examples to show that women have fallen into the trap of reinforcing racist stereotypes of male violence - their views being promulgated on the women's pages of the national press. Gillian Widdicombe, in the Observer's 'Living Page' (1.2.81), wrote on street theft: 'A black skin must be regarded as an advantage for the professional mugger: far more difficult to see in the dark, or describe and identify afterwards.' Jane Kelly, writing on 'The rape of the liberal conscience' in the Guardian's 'Women's Page' (5.8.81) during the summer 'riots', analysed her feelings after a rape attempt on her.

My attitude towards black people had received a massive jolt ... I could no longer accept an unselfcritical approach from the black community and felt vastly irritated by the idea of people making vociferous demands on society while continually putting themselves above and beyond that society's laws ... to my mind it is no part of feminist struggle to put black men above the law.

An aggrieved black woman writing in reply pointed out that though many black women had been attacked by white men, they 'did not make the mistake of thinking that all white men are rapists and therefore that all white people see themselves as above the law'. Jane Kelly, after attaching importance to the race of her attacker, had then generalised her individual experience to the whole black community.

Even when not engaged in this type of stereotyping, women, by failing to understand the parallels between their experience and that of black people, can fall into the trap of supporting the state's racism; by default they allow a wedge to be driven between women's struggle and the black struggle. For example, following closely in the wake of a national exposé of how callously the police treat women rape victims, a

rapist of twenty-three women in North London was convicted. Immediately, a number of his victims came forward in defence of the police and praised them for their sympathy and support. The fact that in this particular case the rapist was black had no doubt put the police on the side of the women. But in failing to distinguish – however poignant the task – between a rapist who happens to be black and the stereotype (often police) view that all blacks are rapists, the women had inadvertently reinforced the hierarchies of police oppression.

A similar lack of understanding of the state was illustrated recently in the magazine *Outwrite*, when a lead article in issue 13 calling for women's support for black community worker Dorothy Gbebikan and her family, brutally beaten up by police in their home, was headlined, 'Say NO to all male violence'. Would it have been all right if the police were all female? If more women were recruited into the police force, would black Dorothy be safer? It is like saying that if you had more blacks in the police force, the police would behave better towards black people.

What feminists should be doing is showing that the state is responsible both for the oppression of black people and of women. It is the same police force that does not protect women from male violence, that does not protect black people from racialist attack. It is the same media that exaggerates black crimes that portrays women as sex objects. It is the same legal system that humilates rape victims that sides against black defendants. It is only when we have a clear understanding of the role of the system in our oppression that we can clearly see at what point we have to fight male oppression and at what point the state. And, as anti-racist women, we have to find a way of fighting the violence from men on the streets without at the same time enhancing state racism against black people.

In America, where the question of rape has played a crucial role in the enslavement, lynching and oppression of black people and continues with all its emotive connotations to be used as a method of criminalising black men, feminists have advanced positions from which we could learn. For example, in the January 1981 issue of *Off our backs*, Aimée Sands asks which side she should be on when a white woman is pressing rape charges against a black man who says he has been framed. She concludes: 'We have to create a ''new side'': an independent feminist presence which offers support to the man *and* the woman in these cases, while maintaining steady and accurate criticisms of the police and courts.'

Taking race personally

But the likelihood of building the 'new side' now seems more remote than ever. Even the question that is being posed for women has

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undergone change, from 'how do we fight racism as women' to 'why is the women's movement so white'. Of course, feminists have to question why their own movement is white - it is the area that they have direct experience of and have the power to change. But in the way that they tackle the question, feminists are moving from examining the basis of racism in society, and their complicity in it, to examining an organisational problem in the movement. The line of argument followed - to explain that whiteness - neither takes the WM outward to examine state racism, nor takes it deeper into itself to examine feminist principles. Instead, it treats racism as a moral problem, a defect in sisterhood, and reduces it to an interpersonal issue. To understand how to treat one's black sister, one has to understand one's own prejudiced behaviour. To understand one's own prejudices, one has to become conscious of what they are and where they came from. Hence, consciousness raising (CR) and racial awareness training are being advocated (and taken up) in the WM today.23

Advocates of CR on race for women argue that racism dehumanises women (just as sexism dehumanises men). True feminists cannot oppress the black women that they work with. And they cannot expect black women to keep clarifying their racism for them – they must take on the burden of recognising it themselves. CR is a female form of thrashing out an issue; it 'encourages the ''personal'' change that makes political transformation and action possible'.²⁴

Firstly, the argument for combating racism the CR way is a moral rather than a political one - it is about rescuing white humanity from itself. Second, it suggests that one can parallel the sexism visited by men on women with the 'racism' visited by white people on black. But this does not in fact hold true. Women feel their oppression by men directly and personally in the relationships of the home. Men's sexual oppression of women does not merely reflect society's inbuilt discrimination against women, for men directly benefit from women's oppression and subjugation and individual men hold physical and economic power over individual women in the home. This is not to say that the individual sexism of the man is not derived from the structural sexism of society, but it is to say that what most women feel most poignantly and are first conscious of is the power relationship between the man and the woman in the home. The same is not true of relations between black people and white people. Though most white people hold racialist attitudes, they are not engaged with black individuals in a relationship where they act out those feelings, nor do white individuals benefit in a direct personal sense from the oppression and subjugation of black individuals. But white people do benefit indirectly from the fact that a whole system exercises power over black people via institutionalised racism.

CR may be an ideal and tested female form for coming to

consciousness of one's own oppression as a woman, but that does not mean it can be extrapolated as a method of dealing with other issues such as racism. (Women have, in fact, told me that it often serves as a way of exonerating racialist attitudes - to acknowledge them and discover that others share them has confirmed some women in their racialist views.) In fact, CR on race is neither a female innovation nor a subversive technique. It has become a popular programme with race relations professionals in the US and in Britain. Feminism is borrowing a practice which belongs squarely within the conservative integrationist wing of race relations practice. Its underlying tenet is that bad race relations are caused not by state racism and discrimination but by misunderstandings between people. White people need only to be educated out of their prejudices - black people need only to be allowed their cultural identity. What is essentially a question of power and economics becomes transformed into a personal and cultural question. CR takes us away from a position where we can work with other groups (including black people) on racism and into a discussion about our attitudes, prejudice, etc (racialism). Working against racism means tackling political issues. Working on racialism means tackling ideas about black people.

Some feminist advocates of CR have argued that one needs both a political/historical understanding of racism and a personal/political understanding of how it affects one's daily life.²⁵ But, in allowing that there are two separate understandings and by implying that the first is 'orthodox', the second, 'feminist', they encourage feminists to tackle attitudes without tracing them to their material cause. Rather than integrating the 'personal' understanding with the 'political' understanding, CR divorces ideas from their acting out in a social context, so that it becomes a sort of special therapy through which one mechanistically learns how to relate to people not as normal as oneself. (Are we to have courses on how to deal with the elderly, the disabled and so on?) Instead of relating to black people through practice, CR tries to relate through ideas about them. The world, says CR, is in your head, not out there.

Seeing race as a personal problem rather than a 'structural' one is part of a more general trend within the WM against intellectualising and abstracting issues. The WM has quite rightly stressed that 'the personal is the political' in opposition to the white male left's dogmatic reductionism. But the tendency now, and the WM's attitude to race is only one example of the trend, is to go so far along that road as to reduce the political to the personal. Thus, the personal transformation becomes the be-all and end-all. Sexual politics has come to re-define 'the personal is the political, reducing politics to inter-personal relationships, political power to personal power. CR's route into anti-racism, for instance, is through the instilling of guilt into women for being white – and leads to a kind of confessional situation, with black people (irrespective of class or values) in the position of arbiters of our racialism dealing out the mea culpae. It absolves us from the responsibility of making our own judgements or shaping our own course of action and it actually suggests that white women are incapable of developing a practice that is anti-racist. Accepting anything black, promoting the black experience, a sort of cultural pluralism, passes as surrogate for a white feminist anti-racist practice.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the recent 'cult' that has been made of the black female experience. Feminist magazines and bookshops have suddenly 'discovered' the writings of black women. There has been in the last few years evidence of a very strong desire in the WM to include black women within sisterhood – to include black feminist experience in 'their' experience, black history in 'their' history. It is a conscious 'taking account of', reminiscent of the way the white male left 'tags on' race or gender.

The challenge of the black experience

The irony is that very often the black experience availed of by white feminists in Britain is from American literature and not from the events transpiring before their eyes. From the early 1970s, black women began to 'defect' from the British WM to address themselves to the issues of race and gender. Black women's groups sprang up all over Britain, with an umbrella organisation, OWAAD, a paper FOWAAD, annual conferences for black women, black women's centres and refuges, black women's marches and demonstrations - a black women's movement. But the WM, so self-conscious about 'hierarchy' and its own disassociation with a male left which had systematically exluded its interests, was conspicuously unmoved by the disaffection and flight of black women. And instead of examining how their sisterhood had in practice been antithetical to black interests and exclusive of black women - instead, that is, of examining the nature of 'sisterhood' itself on the touchstone of 'blackness' - the white WM has resorted to a policy of CR on the one hand and of cultural pluralism on the other. The 'blackness' of the feminist experience is seperated off, either for mindless celebration or as an 'odd' experience (like being disabled or an older woman) which ought to be learnt about. But, as Hazel Carby has pointed out, what black women are asking white feminists is not to render them 'visible' but to 'challenge the use of some of the central categories and assumptions of recent mainstream feminist thought',26

Some concession to this view has been made in recent years. The call for 'abortion on demand', for instance, was changed to 'a woman's

right to choose' when black and working-class women pointed out that *they* were having to fight not for the right not to bear children, but for the right to keep their fertility against enforced terminations, sterilisations and the use of dangerous drugs such as Depo-Provera. Some feminists have refused to take part in protests against male violence in red-light districts, where many black people happen to live, because they feel that the WM marches there give credence to the racist stereotype promulgated by the police and the state that all blacks are muggers and assaulters.

But even so, there is a reluctance in the WM to really question what underlies such 'errors of judgement'. 'We did not mean to be racist, so we weren't really being so', the argument runs. Adrienne Rich has used the term 'tunnel vision' – literally the physical inability to see beyond a certain narrow range – to explain this inadvertant racism and this has gained currency as a way of letting white feminists off the hook.²⁷ 'Explanations' such as these, however, pass off the act for the intent, they suggest no anti-racist yardstick to measure feminist practice.

Black feminists have pointed out that behind the WM's 'tunnel visions' lies the inability of the WM to provide policies or programmes which speak to the oppression of the majority of women – which would mean working-class women including black women – or the differential oppression of women according to race, class or history (social formation). What it has done is to universalise the middle-class woman's experience of oppression and her demands which have centred around her sexuality.

That the movement originated in and is still dominated by middleclass women is hardly contentious. But that middle-class and workingclass women may perceive their oppression differently and have different ways of fighting it has hardly been examined. Ann Foreman hinted at it when she wrote that 'though the growing contradictions for women in the feminine stereotype together with a structural crisis in the position of women in society' affected both working-class and middleclass women, it was the latter who experienced it as a conflict between 'the traditions of femininity and their aspirations and abilities', and it was they (and not their working-class sisters tied by material necessity to their families) who were free to explore such contradictions. Ann Foreman goes on to point out that working-class women have organised at a different level - struggling over pay and job discrimination.28 But, as Eleanor Leacock succinctly wrote some ten years ago, there is a very strong tendency in the WM not to deem the struggles of workingclass women as fights for women's liberation at all.²⁹ This tendency to exclude as 'non-feminist' perspectives too closely bound up with black or working-class struggle is clearly revealed in a recent review of black feminist literature. Ellen Willis attacked Angela Davis as an 'antifeminist' on the basis that in Women, Race and Class Davis states that

'black and white working-class women have been the leaders of the *real* feminist struggle'.³¹ Even if this is what Angela Davis says (and she does not), she would only be giving primacy to the activities of the majority of women. Her book is actually one of the first to connect the hitherto disconnected struggles of women and of black people and to analyse them through an understanding of class formation and class struggle.

The movement appears to find it divisive to acknowledge material and historically specific differences between women and relentlessly asserts the commonality of women qua women. In an eagerness to promote the idea of sisterhood, it has ignored the complexities of experience. While claiming to liberate women from biological determinism, it has denied women an existence outside that determined by their sex. And behind the idea that every woman is equally oppressed biologically is the idea that gender per se, rather than a particular system or set of relations, is the primary enemy of women.

And because the Western WM is the most developed in the battle of the genders, it seems to think that it holds the key to women's liberation everywhere. There is, even in the writings of avowedly 'socialist' feminists, a sense that western feminism is more liberated and liberating. Maxine Molyneux, writing on Third World 'socialist' countries, for example, attributes the low level of debate on feminism in these countries' women's organisations to the fact that western WM literature has often not been allowed to penetrate there.³² Sue O'Sullivan, writing on 'How Cuba doesn't cope with sexuality',33 manages, despite her expressions of solidarity with the Cuban revolution, to judge Cuba's socialism on western feminism's sexuality scale. She tries to balance her assertion that 'as feminists, we believe that sexuality, the possibility and struggle for choice around sexual preference and questions about sexual practice, are completely relevant to any questions of revolution', with the view that few feminists 'would deny the crucial importance of class, race, imperialism'. But instead of integrating the two approaches, she categorically throws out the notion that 'the complexity of women's different situations worldwide' should modify our conception of women's oppression which was 'recognised through the emergence of autonomous women's movements during the last 15 years' - in other words, via the recent western WM. And, throughout, her article is permeated with the view that lesbianism (which is forbidden in Cuba) is the highest stage of feminism.

There is nowhere in western feminist writing (save that coming from the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague) a sense that Third World women actually have an indigenous history and tradition of struggle from which western feminists could learn. This is the more significant since, in many ways, western feminists often try artificially to recreate the relationships and feelings between women which exist in the nonnuclear, non-capitalist households of most Third World social formations.

But the object here is not so much to point out the cultural imperialism of the WM – though that there is – as to show the absurdity and inappropriateness of the universalist tenets of western feminism and its preoccupation with sexual freedom for women in the Third World. In countries locked in feudal relations, for instance, feminists have concentrated on exposing and attacking one aspect of a complex social and economic relationship, the custom of clitoridectomy; in newly industrialising countries which superexploit all female labour, they have concentrated on prostitution. But this is to isolate and judge sexual oppression outside of its social and economic context and outside the context of imperialism. The increase in prostitution in South Asia for instance is a product of poverty, of tourism and the absolute (as opposed to relative) exploitation of women by multinational corporations in Free Trade Zones, which renders them unemployable by the age of 25.³⁴

By taking a practice out of its socio-economic context, by attributing it to a country or culture, rather than to a historical stage, feminists are well on the way to racial stereotyping. Instead of seeing that arranged marriages, circumcision, dowries and so on have been part of all our histories, they attribute the customs not to an epoch or to a social formation but to a racial group. And by taking customs out of their context, they not only fail to learn about parallels in their history, but also distort the very struggles of Third World women whom they claim to want to help. In the metropolis, the inability to relate customs to their social and economic relations is to range feminists alongside reactionary 'ethnic' sociologists at best,³⁵ or the Powellite lobby at worst, Such a view omits from consideration the facts of colonialism, the fact that Britain cajoled black labour here after destroying colonial economies, and that black 'customs' appertain to the peasant societies from which black people were wrenched, and that the social relations imported from another economy and society tend to get (defensively) frozen in an alien racist capitalist society.

By examining the position of Third World women from the vantage point of western feminist priorities, feminists often fail to see the role that racial and imperial domination play in the lives of Third World women. At the NGO Women's Conference in Copenhagen in July 1980, Nawal El Saadawi lamented that western feminists were sensationalising marginal issues. She asked how women in Beirut subjected to daily bombardment by Israeli planes could be expected to worry about their orgasms.³⁶

The western WM has concentrated on extending individual sexual freedoms as part of liberal democracy rather than on fundamentally

changing society. What Third World, black and working-class women pose is a much more profound and total reorganisation of society itself and the relations within it. The idea of individualism is alien to Third World countries where familial, caste, tribal or national interests are often dominant. And in these countries the separation of women's freedom from other freedoms becomes impossible. Freedom from hunger, from dictatorship, from foreign domination – struggles which by necessity challenge fundamental power structures and benefit whole classes or nations – define *their* priorities. But they in turn should tell us about our own and shape our feminism – and point us, once again, towards the holism of which we are the legatees and to which we aspire.

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DIPANKAR GUPTA

Racism without colour: the Catholic ethic and ethnicity in Quebec

It has always been the fate of vanguished people all over the world to have been considered inherently incapable of progress and development. In India, the backwardness of the Indians was attributed to the supposed caste ridden (Hindu) consciousness. In Africa, the underdevelopment of the native population was explained in terms of the inability of Africans to think beyond their tribal and ethnic affiliations. In Quebec, the inferior position of the French Quebecois vis-àvis the English Canadian was, according to the British myth, attributable to the innate religiosity of the Quebecois which prevented him from shaking off the teachings of the Catholic Church.¹ It is this popular British-engendered view of the Quebecois that is specifically addressed in this article. It will be shown that the supposed Catholic ethic of the Ouebecois soon attained ethnic proportions as it was closely intercalated with the notion of 'race'. Had this been a point of view prevalent only among the Anglophone Canadians, it may not have merited this rather lengthy rejoinder. But, as it is also subscribed to by many Francophone Quebecois scholars, writers, thinkers and nationalists, an examination of the basis of the popular argument needs to be made.

The relationship that is made out to exist between Catholicism and the lack of a secular capitalist and industrial spirit among the Quebecois, for at least two centuries, also draws sustenance, albeit

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indirectly, from Weber's thesis on the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit* of Capitalism. However, Weber himself cannot be entirely absolved of the responsibility for encouraging a 'spiritualistic one-sided explanation' for the rise of capitalism and the capitalist ethic. His studies on *The Religion of China* and *The Religion of India* leave no doubt as to his preference for this kind of explanation of social phenomena. Talcott Parsons, in this sense, is Weber's true heir. All those who believe that Weber was a disguised marxist, or that he was not nearly as bad or as crude as any panegyric by Parsons would lead us to think, should perhaps recollect Weber's fulsome support of racism.*

It is not, however, the intention to show that the Catholic Church had no authority or influence whatsoever over the Quebecois. The religious beliefs and values of the rural Quebecois were very much influenced by the Church and many facets of their daily lives revolved around it. This is not uncommon in a rural community. The Protestant clergy fulfilled a similar role in pre-capitalist societies. One can argue, for instance, that the Dutch Reformed Church was as influential among the rural Afrikaaners in South Africa as was the Catholic Church among the Quebecois.

But what is sociologically untenable is the argument that the social, political and economic life of a people is so totally dominated by religious beliefs that they are incapable of refuting or circumventing traditional values and religious authority, even when their own interests and well-being are threatened by them. In other words, to consider that a body of religious values can have an existence autonomous of the social conditions of its milieu; and that it can perennially exert its pristine influence from outside, to dictate every aspect of the economic and political life of a people, would be an outcome of prejudice and not of historical and sociological enquiry.

Unlike the usual situation, wherein one finds the domination of the 'natives' by the white colonisers, in Quebec, there is the unusual spectacle of a 'racist' ideological discourse being activated in a situation where both the communities concerned, the dominated and the dominating, are European and *white*. If the arguments of this paper are then to have some validity, they are to be seen as a further reiteration of the great 'truth' that racism is the most comprehensive ideological weapon of domination and that it does not always obey the protocol of colour.

^{*} Weber said, 'Only Master Races have a vocation to climb the ladder of world development. If peoples, who do not possess this profound quality try to do it, not only the sure instinct of other nations will oppose them, but they will also come internally to grief'.²

The popular argument: the myth itself

Briefly, the myth about the Ouebecois goes like this. The Ouebecois as a 'race' are seen as having been unable to break away from the Catholic Church, or disobey the injunctions of its clergy. The 'bishop's opinion', according to Trudeau, 'was equivalent to an order.'3 And the Catholic Church, guided as it was by a pre-capitalist ethic. discouraged the Ouebecois from engaging in scientific, technical and secular pursuits, encouraging them instead to engage in antiquated forms of farming. This tied them rather irrationally to land and prevented them from becoming urbanised or industrialised. The Church concomitantly also successfully discouraged any attempt towards secular education and controlled, as part of its total domination, the political attitudes and responses of the Ouebecois. For instance, Jean-Charles Falardeau writes: 'French Canadian society since its early days, has been surrounded, restrained, and dominated by the clergy and ecclesiastical leaders to such an extent that its history is completely inter-mingled with the history of the Canadian Church' (emphasis added). He then goes on to quote appreciatively the American historian Parkman, who held that the Church of Rome '[more] than even the Royal power ... shaped the character and destinies of the colony. She was its nurse and almost its mother.'4 The conclusion guite naturally, therefore, is that it was the English Canadians who took up the challenge of capitalist development and industrial progress, free as they were from the religious and mental constraints that inhibited the Quebecois. It is this factor, the myth concludes, which has determined the economic superiority of the English Canadians over the Ouebecois.

As is obvious, this myth draws sustenance from the alleged unique character of the Quebecois who cannot help but genuflect to every dictate of the Catholic hierarchy. Not surprisingly, this has assumed a racial overtone. It is common place today to be treated to the argument that the Quebecois are economically backward because they do not have what it takes to get ahead. One would have assumed that under such a direct racist attack, Quebecois nationalists and intellectuals would have strenuously resisted any attempt to brand the Quebecois as a unique racial type. Many of them, by virtue of their training as historians and sociologists, should have been scientifically able to accomplish this. Instead, paradoxically, they too seem to have fallen prey to this racial shibboleth.

As an instance of the above, we have the following observation of Marcel Rioux, a prominent sociologist and, ironically, a Quebecois nationalist. Rioux writes:

the people of New France begin to distinguish itself from the metropolis; they draw in on themselves to create, here on American soil, another French-speaking people. French institutions are

modified, habits change and another *mentality* is born – A new kind of human being will appear, the French Canadian habitant. This man lives within an institution as unique as himself (emphasis added).⁵

The clerical nationalists of the 1920s and 1930s, significantly enough, propounded a similar opinion. Abbé Groulx, the most notable clerical nationalist of that period, wrote in the 1930s:

How much more then would life in the new world ... by the quality of spirit and will which it demanded, not modify profoundly the early colonists of New France? The transformation was rapid from the first generation on. From hereditary traits so rapidly translated and accumulated could there spring a new race? When this *heritage* is no longer isolated or restrained to a few families but has spread to a great number of the same species, it constitutes a *race* (emphasis added).⁶

Quebec before the British

The province of Quebec is the oldest province of Canada. It was first colonised by the French and remained a colony of France till the British conquest of Quebec in 1760. Eighty per cent of its population is French-speaking or Quebecois, but it is the 20 per cent of Anglophone Canadians who are more prosperous and economically more powerful – and have been so since the early days of the British conquest of 1760.

The early Frenchmen who came to Quebec were not, as has often been held, mainly farmers, but hunters, traders and explorers, who roamed and searched this vast new stretch of land, primarily for the purpose of promoting the fur trade. The Quebecois became *habitants*, or settlers on land, and Quebec became an agricultural economy only after the British conquest of 1760.

The authority structure in Quebec did not possess the rigidity of old France. Though there was an attempt to establish *seigneuries*, or a feudal system, it differed vastly from the *seigneuries* in France and from feudalism elsewhere. The so-called *seigneur* (manor lord) in Quebec did not command the overwhelming authority that his counterpart in France did. The *seigneurs* of Quebec were not supposed to administer the manor so much as find people to fill it – their job was to settle *habitants* on lands granted them by the state. That only 170,000 acres were under cultivation a few years before the British conquest in 1760 reveals that the drive towards establishing an agricultural society under the French regime was not very successful.

As for the Church, Mgr de Laval was the first Catholic Bishop to lay the foundations of latter-day clerical pretensions in Quebec. Between 1659 and 1684, he tried to do in Quebec what was beyond him or any other cleric in France. Being an ultramontane zealot, he took strong exception to gallicanism in France and eventually managed to have the Bishop of Quebec nominated directly by the Pope in Rome. But this fact did not automatically elevate the Church above the state. Ultimate authority still reposed in the French governor, and there is ample evidence to show the Church's displeasure at this, as well as the constant friction that existed between the Catholic clergy and the civil authorities.

One of the primary reasons for the tolerance by the civil authorities in Quebec and the royal court in France of clerical pretensions in Quebec was that the Catholic priests (like the ancient Brahmans of Vedic India) made peace with the natives and won them over through religious conversions. This facilitated French expansion in Quebec and promoted the fur trade. There is a tendency among several authors to imply that because the Bishop of Quebec was directly subordinate to the Holy See, ultramontanism had triumphed in Quebec. But, as Samuel de Champlaign, the true founder of French Canada, wrote, the purpose of establishing New France was 'first trade, then geographical curiosity, and finally missionary activity'.⁷ The fact that this order is often reversed, indicates the dominance of idealist clerics in the writing of Canadian history.

Consequences of the conquest

The British conquest of 1760 resulted in several significant mutations in the then existing social order of Quebec. The consequences of the conquest can be dealt with, for our purpose, under two categories – political and economic.

The political consequences were many. The earlier authority structure completely collapsed. This deprived French soldiers, officials, and the colonial *noblesse*, of their old opportunities for soldiering, and they were forced to emigrate. Some went back to France, others emigrated to Louisiana and to the Antilles. The withdrawal of the French administrators to France resulted in the decapitation of Quebec society, and the British, anxious to mediate their rule through local native authorities, were quick to seize upon the *seigneurs* and clergymen as their intermediaries. Not only were their positions protected by the British, but their authority over the people was also significantly extended.

The seigneurs were nominated to the British-controlled Assembly, and were given, for the first time, the prestige (so vainly longed for under the French regime) that comes with proximity to the centre of power. The seigneurs were generally grateful to the British for freeing them from the capricious French regime. They were, however, particularly happy because the new rulers forced the French commoner,

who had stayed on in Quebec, on to the land. This was accomplished by confiscating the French Canadian's right to trade in fur, thereby converting him, out of necessity, into a *habitant*, or farmer, in the *seigneurial* demesne.

But in spite of all this, the *seigneurial* economy did not really get off the ground. The *seigneurs* cared little for the development of their *seigneuries*, and indulged in activities, such as land speculation and hoarding, that lowered their esteem in the eyes of the people.⁸ Significantly also, from around the turn of the eighteenth century, the *seigneurs* quit the Assembly, to sit sedately in the Council, secluded from popular political sentiments and pressures. They ceased, therefore, to be in the true sense active agents of the British.

With regard to the Catholic clergy, however, the situation differed in several respects. Unlike the *seigneurs*, they were better educated and more single-minded in their determination to control the spiritual and temporal lives of the laity. Unlike the *seigneurs*, they did not have to overcome the slight of the French defeat at the hands of the British; nor did they discredit themselves, as did the *seigneurs*, by dabbling in dubious economic practices. It was, therefore, on the Catholic Church that the British increasingly relied to ensure the loyalty of the populace.

The British administrators also quickly realised the identity of interests that existed between them and the Catholic Church. Both feared the popular political participation of the Quebecois. For this reason the British were at first reluctant to grant an elected Assembly in Quebec, and when, after the Constitutional Act of 1791, it was finally formed, and was dominated, as expected, by the Quebecois, the British steadfastly refused to entertain the demand of the elected representatives, that the Assembly, like the British parliament, be allowed to wield supreme power. The Church, for its part, also opposed popular democratic politics, for it feared the spread of liberal and republican ideas among the masses – a development that might bring about militant anti-clericalism, as had happened in France after the French Revolution.

Another cause for concern, for both the British and the Catholic clergy, was the influence and spill-over effect of the American War of Independence of 1776. While the British feared the overtures made by the Americans to the people of Quebec to join their confederation, the Church feared the anti-clerical and radical views of the *Bostonnais*. Both the Church and the British were, therefore, equally interested in keeping the Americans outside the boundaries of Quebec. This further solidified the alliance between the British and the Catholic clergy, and consolidated the basis for future cooperation and collaboration between them.

So the clergy, with good reason, lost no time in singing paeans to the British and preached among the Catholics the virtues of obeying the new rulers. Bishop Briand eulogised the British rule thus: 'Do not these noble conquerors succeed in forgetting that they have been our enemies, and concern themselves only with our needs and how to meet them.'⁹ The British rulers also saw that it was to their advantage not to alienate the affections of such a valuable and trustworthy ally as the Church, and refrained from enforcing any measure that might undermine the influence of the clergy. They allowed the church to continue to collect tithes from the Catholics, and permitted it to exploit the natural resources of Canada, with the minor proviso that this should not clash with British economic interests (in 1839 even this restriction was removed).

The economic consequences of the conquest were similarly wide ranging. The fur trade – the primary trade at that time in Canada – was taken over by the British from the French. The North West Company was soon set up by the British to take up the trade and promote other exports and under Mctavish, McGill, Todd, Frobisher and Patterson, it amassed huge profits. Initially, after the conquest, according to Brunet, several small Quebecois merchants thought that with the departure of the more established French traders, they would have all the opportunites to expand and that the new rulers would look after their interests. They were to be greatly disillusioned. French merchants, large and small alike, were disallowed by the British from carrying on with their business, as the latter did not want any competition in the lucrative trade of fur and other exportable commodities.

The British move to monopolise trade snatched away from the French Canadians their primary source of livelihood. Thereafter, they became *habitants* or tillers of the soil out of compulsion.

But the British also profited from the government's preferential treatment to them in the agricultural sector. While the Quebecois were herded in *seigneuries*, the British were given land in free tenure. These lands were not available to the French. The British American Land Company had rights over the choicest lands in Quebec, especially in the Eastern Townships. The monopolistic control over free tenurial land by the British American Land Company made it impossible for the mass of impoverished Quebecois *habitants* to move out of the *seigneuries* and prosper agriculturally. After 1820, many Quebecois had, therefore, no other alternative but to emigrate from their farms in Quebec. In the 1840s, the rate of emigration from rural Quebec increased tremendously. Between 1844 and 1861 nearly 400,000 farms were abandoned.¹⁰

The clergy viewed this outmigration with alarm, for fear that its ideal of rural life was in jeopardy, and more so perhaps because the majority of the migrants from Quebec were leaving for New England, a Protestant territory notorious for its republican, liberal and anticlerical persuasions. Some clerics in the mid-ninteenth century, like

Curé Laselle, reacted to this huge outflow of Quebecois by putting in a massive effort to settle the Laurentian foothills north of Montreal. But even this failed to curb the ceaseless migration that took place down the years from rural Quebec, first to New England, then to Ontario, and, with the turn of the present century, to Montreal and other urban centres in Quebec – defying all along the injunctions and the sermons of the clergy.

The backwardness of the Quebecois

The Napoleonic Wars of 1801 provided the English merchants in Canada with further opportunities for reaping enormous advantage from Britain's demand for Quebec-built ships and Canadian lumber (located largely in Quebec). This helped consolidate the English mercantile class, and mercantilism took strong roots in Canada. However, the demand for Quebec-built ships and Quebec lumber did not substantially better the lot of the Quebecois. Deprived of a strong commercial class, they entered this sphere of economic activity only as carpenters and artisans.

After around 1860, however, there was a slump in economic activity in Quebec, due to the shift from mercantilism to industrialism. The construction of railroads was the decisive factor in transferring the centre of economic activity from Quebec to Ontario. Quebec was deprived of its 'prior importance as a land of lumbering and shipbuilding ... Without coal and without technological know-how in the iron works, the hardy race of carpenters were confronted with a lay off.'¹¹

It was only in the twentieth century that industrialisation came to Quebec, primarily because its natural resources were found necessary for the 'new era of industrialisation' in the North American continent. This 'new era' was basically a twentieth century phenomenon and was characterised by two major developments. Firstly, though steel was still important, it lost its place of eminence to other metals that were being developed as a substitute for it in several fields – notably aluminium for the aircraft industry. Secondly, coal lost its predominance as a source of energy as hydro-electric power became a cheaper substitute. Quebec contained rich mineral deposits, as well as tremendous hydro-electric potential and it was natural that industrial investment and activity should spread to this province, integrating Quebec into the economic system of North America.

The spread of industrialisation in Quebec displeased the Catholic clergy, which now not only discouraged emigration, as it had done for nearly a century, but also vociferously campaigned against industrialisation and industrial employment. In a sermon delivered in 1902, Mgr Paquet declared:

Our mission is not so much to manipulate capital, as to handle ideas; not so much to light the fires of factories, as to maintain the luminous hearth of religion and of thought, making it to radiate afar. While our rivals are laying claim to the hegemony of industry and finance, we shall strive above all for the honour of doctrine and the palm of apostleship.¹²

But here again, objective factors proved to be stronger than the injunctions of the clergy. According to Keyfitz,¹³ one also gets a clue to the movement from agriculture to industry from the fact that the number of persons in 'non-agricultural industry rose by 748,000, while in agriculture it dropped by 17,000 between 1891 and 1951'. During the years of the Second World War alone 'the population in agriculture in the province of Quebec dropped from 252,000 to 188,000, a decline of 64,000'.

But, in spite of industrialisation and a greater release of productive forces, the division between the haves and the have-nots, with its ethnic connotations, continued to exist, since in areas where industrialisation spreads (like Quebec), in contrast to areas where it originates, the work force is drawn upon from the native population, while the managers and entrepreneurs are foreign, coming from the already industrially developed areas.¹⁴ There were also, as Brazeau points out, cultural factors involved that inhibited an immediate large-scale absorption of the French into the techno-managerial sectors of Quebec industry. With the growth of corporate enterprise, the scope of communication changed 'from a regional to a national and even a continental basis'.¹⁵ The corporate organisations hence developed an English-language character, which naturally served as an impediment for those who did not speak or write it.

However, industrialisation, besides increasing the demand for workers, also increased that for skilled labourers and supervisors. This gave an impetus, in the early twentieth century, to technical and secular education, which previously had been kept under wraps in Ouebec by the Church and the state. In any case, the earlier lack of industrialisation in Quebec had not created the incentive to acquire professional or technical skills, especially since education was the preserve of the Catholic Church. Even the so-called 'inferior art' of book-keeping and accounting was not taught in Quebec. In Ontario, or Upper Canada, on the other hand, which was dominated by Anglo-Canadian merchants, Protestant educational institutions were required to teach such business skills to their students, even though the Protestant clergy also thought this extremely gross. In Quebec, such pressures did not exist, and hence Latin and scripture reigned supreme. The Church and the state, it seems, supported this, and urged the Quebecois, even in the twentieth century, to develop their 'inborn characteristics', through

religion, philosophy and Latin, and complement the secular training of the English.

This leads to yet another aspect of the myth – that the Quebecois were strongly opposed to non-sectarian education, and were inclined by temperament to submit to clerical instruction. What are the facts?

Education and the Church

As early as 1789, a committee on education, appointed by Governor General Dorchester, proposed non-sectarian education in Quebec. This proposal was unanimously accepted by the Council, which included French Canadians, but was opposed by the Church. The 'establishment of a non-sectarian university was supported by a petition on October 31, 1790, which bore the signature of 60 French Canadians ... Meanwhile the Montreal lawyer, Simon Sanguinet, left property worth four or five hundred pounds for the endowment of such a university.'¹⁶ But no decision was taken and the proposal was finally shelved.

But it did apparently generate a good deal of enthusiasm among the Quebecois, and the fact that it was shelved was, in all likelihood, not so much the result of resistance (if any) from the Quebecois laity as the result of the sensitivity of the British state to the well-being of the Catholic Church. This again manifested itself a few years later when the decision to take action on the Act of 1801, which set out to establish Royal institutions, was postponed and finally given up in Quebec. Inspired by Anglican Bishop Mountain and supported by Governor General Craig, it was specifically aimed at anglicising (not secularising) education and placing all educational institutions under the control of the Protestant Church.

After some initial pressure applied by Craig to implement the 1801 Act in Quebec (which led to the phrase 'Craig's Reign of Terror'), the British belatedly realised that it would not do any good to undermine the Catholic clergy's control over education in the province. In addition, the American war of 1812 was looming and the British state realised that it would need all the help it could get from the Church to bolster its war effort among the Quebecois. The decision to set up Royal institutions in Quebec was, therefore, dropped by the British. The clergy subsequently lived up to British expectations, and performed a sterling job in promoting the British cause during the American war. In recognition of the clergy's services, the British even raised the salary of the Bishop to £1,000 per annum.

The policy of the British thereafter was not to tamper with clerical control over education in Lower Canada, or Quebec – as can be seen from the Buller report into the state of education in Lower Canada. After noting that education in Quebec left much to be desired, Buller nevertheless advocated that it should remain in the hands of the clergy.¹⁷ The Schools Act of 1846 went further. By formally separating

schools on a religious basis, it sanctioned the control of the Catholic Church over the education of Catholics. All of which undermines statements, such as that of Phillips: 'When proposals were made to reestablish schools and educational institutions for all without religious schools bias, leaders of the French Catholic majority refused to cooperate.'¹⁸

It would also be incorrect to counterpose the Protestant Church to the Catholic Church in respect of the desire to impart religious sectarian education. From Buller's report of 1839, it appears that the desire of the Protestant Church to dominate education matched that of the Catholic Church: the Protestant clergy demanded 'the unrestricted use of Holy Scriptures' and was as hostile as the Catholic Church to the establishment of common schools. Therefore, the blame for the sectarian nature of education in Quebec and its inferior quality cannot be placed on the influence of Catholicism or on the Catholic Church as such, without taking into account the socio-economic conditions that prevailed at that time in this province.

It was after industrialisation spread to Quebec in the 1920s, that the Quebecois became restive and demanded compulsory schooling and technical education to further their prospects in the growing technomanagerial sectors. The Church viewed this demand for secular education with distaste and came down heavily against compulsory schooling. Cardinal Villeneuve said: 'People are demanding the compulsory school, the public school, the national school, as if this were not tantamount to violating the family, and thereby enfeebling society.'¹⁹ But such sermons did not succeed in preventing an ever growing number of Quebecois from seeking secular and technical instruction. By 1943, the Catholic Church recognised its impotence in this matter, and thought it best to rescind its objection to compulsory schools and to government control over schooling.

The demand for architects, engineers, metallurgists, chemists, managers and accountants saw the expansion of departments in these fields in universities in Quebec. Fewer students were now enrolling for religious or traditional education. This effectively diminished the importance of the clergy in university affairs, and in 1960 its control over these institutions was formally terminated.

People vs. the Church

Since the conquest of 1760, Quebec's history has been punctuated by several political crises. And, not surprisingly, on these occasions, the Church and the state have always closed their ranks. Contrary to popular opinion, that the Quebecois 'readily accepted the Church hierarchy as their legitimate interpreter', it is clear that they more willingly followed the laymen who articulated their material and political aspirations, rather than the clergy, whose role was often correctly perceived by both the lay leaders and the masses to be that of hand-maiden to the state.²⁰

The deep suspicions of the Ouebecois about the seigneurs and the clergy were soon manifest in the tumultuous years leading to the American War of Independence. The seigneurs and the clergy, deeply grateful to the British for reinforcing their positions, pledged total support to the new rulers during the American invasion of Quebec in 1775-6. But the Ouebecois habitants were 'willing to listen' to the calls of revolt against the British made by the Americans. Bishop Briand tried to force the Quebecois on religious grounds to oppose the Americans. He appealed to them to aid the British by taking up arms against the Americans, as England had granted 'the practice of our laws, the free exercise of our religion'.²¹ But the Quebecois were not very enthusiastic about the Bishop's point of view and were not anxious to assist in the preservation of Ouebec as a British colony. It was remarked with bitterness by the Quebecois that 'Bishop Briand's proper role was making priests rather than militia men'.22 When the Americans did finally enter Ouebec, they were easily able to recruit two Quebecois regiments. On the other hand, British Governor Carleton, who managed to recruit 1,000 Quebecois, found, when the time had come, that they had all deserted him and gone home for the autumn harvest.23

The Quebecois' ability to distance themselves from the clergy and their general scepticism regarding the pretensions of the Catholic hierarchy is also clearly seen in a motion introduced in the Assembly by Boudarges in 1832. This sought to place the temporal possessions of the clergy and the Church under democratic parish councils – 'in effect, miniature local parliaments'. It was carried in the Assembly, but quashed in the English-dominated Council at the instance of Sewell, who remarked: 'In destroying the discipline of the Church, one strikes at religion itself.' Thus, as Wade has noted, 'a militant anti-French Protestant gratified the Catholic clergy by opposing a bill supported by French Canadian majority'.²⁴

Later, in 1837-8, when the popular *Patriote* rebellion broke out in Quebec, the Church again opposed the popular will of the Quebecois. The *Patriotes* essentially demanded control over the purse strings of the state, and an end to the Land Tenure Act which favoured the British and promoted land speculation. The *Patriote* movement, anticipating the reactions of the clergy, was from the beginning openly anti-clerical. Its leader, the legendary Louis Joseph Papineau, remained to the last an unrelenting critic of the clergy.

The Church, as the *Patriotes* expected, came out strongly against them, and Bishops Bourget and Lartigue especially distinguished themselves in heaping abuse on Papineau and on other leaders of the movement. But the *Patriotes* had the people on their side, and the Quebecois came out in perhaps what was, up to then, their most militant offensive against the Church. At Montreal, sympathisers of the *Patriotes* protested outside St James Cathedral. In Chambly, Bishop Bourget was booed by the people after Mass with cries of 'A Bas le Mandemant', and 'Vive Papineau'. The state, however, was able to contain and finally suppress this popular though ill-organised revolt.

The gloom which followed in the wake of the Patriotes' defeat, and desertion of many of its leaders (notably Papineau, who fled to America) was seized upon by the Church to drive home the futility of opposing the authority of God on earth. The years 1840-65 were subsequently the heyday of the Church. It was also in this period that the church sponsored a romantic history of the early Quebecois, depicting them as peaceful farmers and devout Catholics. The historical writings of Garneau and the works of Lejoie are especially notable in this connection. But the Church failed to establish a complete hegemony. By 1850, many of the Patriotes had returned to Quebec. They formed a radical group, the Rouges and established the Institut Canadien, which provided a free forum for discussion. Its library housed anti-clerical literature as well as the works of Voltaire, Montesquieu and other thinkers of the French Enlightenment. By 1857 the Institut had 700 members, and it was also able to publish two journals. But the Rouges were as yet few in number, and the Church was able to attack the Institut and burn its 'heretical' books.

The Rouges, however, kept themselves going. Their opposition to the Canadian Confederation in 1867 enabled them to stage a comeback, for there was a growing public sentiment in Quebec against the Confederation. This alarmed the clergy, who supported the Confederation, and prompted one ultramontane sympathiser, F-X. Trudel to form in 1871 a Catholic bloc within the Conservative party to counteract the increasing sympathy for the Rouges. It was called the Catholic Programme.

By 1871, the *Rouges* had disbanded as a group, but their ideological fervour and spirit inspired the formation of a new opposition party, the Liberty Party, which challenged the Conservatives at the hustings in 1871. The Church castigated the Liberals, calumniated them 'as being contaminated with revolutionary principles', and fully backed the Conservatives. When the results of the elections were declared, it was found that only one member of the Catholic Programme, namely its founder, Trudel, had been elected. The rest were trounced. The Liberals made some progress. Their most spectacular success was the defeat of the powerful Conservative, G.E. Cartier, at the hands of a relatively unknown Liberal, Louis Jetté. Later, in the 1874 elections, however, the Liberals convincingly defeated the Conservatives, in spite of the fact that the latter were again fully backed by the Catholic Church. It is in 1885, with the climax of the *Métis* rebellion in the west, that we find again a sharply focused attack on the Catholic hierarchy by the Quebecois. The *Métis*, who inhabited the area west of the province of Ontario (later to become the province of Saskatchewan in the Canadian Confederation), resented the manner in which their land was being brought under the Canadian Confederation, and took up arms to oppose this. The *Métis* were French Indians, and Catholic, though their leader, Louis Riel, may not have had any Indian blood.

In spite of the fact that the Métis were Catholics, the Church felt no compunction in condemning them, for the clerics, under Bishop Bourget, had after all blessed the initiative taken by the Anglo-Canadians to forge the Confederation. The Church called Riel a 'miserable mad man and a fanatic'. The ferocity with which the Catholic clergy attacked the rebellion prompted Riel in turn openly to denounce the clerics. In spite of the Church's opposition to Riel, the Quebecois rallied behind the Métis, and came out in spontaneous protest against Riel's execution on 12 November 1885. In Champs des Mars in Montreal, 40,000 to 50,000 people assembled to voice their anger over Riel's death. The crowd sang the revolutionary 'Marseillaise', which was condemned by the clergy. Wilfred Laurier, who was later to become the first French Canadian Prime Minister of Canada, and leader of the Liberal Party, won much support in this period, and the backlash of Riel's death propelled both him and the Liberals to prominence in Quebec.

However, the clergy did not give up. In the elections of 1896, Mgr Laflèche declared that 'no Catholic could, without committing a serious *sin*, vote for a party leader like Laurier' (emphasis added).²⁵ This spiritual blackmail yet again failed to intimidate the people, and the Liberal Party won a thumping victory in the province of Quebec and in the Dominion as a whole. The defeated clergy immediately prepared for a reconciliation with the victor, and retreated into semiabstention from politics for some years.

But this did not last long. The call of Anglo-Canadian interests again moved the clergy to action and, predictably, to oppose the people of Quebec. The next major crisis – the first in the twentieth century – came with the First World War. The clergy supported the demand put forward by the Canadian state to help Britain with troops during the war. The Quebecois, under the leadership of Henri Bourassa, a protégé of Laurier, opposed this move, and supported the proposition that Canadian soldiers should not be forced to go abroad to defend the territorial possessions of any other country. Archbishop Bruchési, in the meantime, had set his shoulder to the task of recruiting Quebecois under the National Service Scheme for overseas service. Bourassa and the other nationalists campaigned against this in the columns of *Le Devoir* and through speeches and public meetings. The confrontations between the clergy and Bourassa became increasingly acrimonious. Bourassa's lieutenant, Olivier Asselin, accused them of unjust interference in the political life of the citizens and condemned the 'avalanche of "cretino-theological" bad prose', which advanced imperialist policy.²⁶

The popularity of Bourassa and the nationalists continued to increase over the issue. Particularly notable was one incident that occurred at a National Service meeting held in Montreal in January 1917. The meeting had been organised by both Catholic and Protestant clergymen to recharge and revamp their drive for recruitment for overseas service and was attended by Prime Minister Bennet. But it was disturbed at several points by the people, and when the Catholic clerics rose to speak, they were howled down by cries of, 'We want Bourassa and Lavergne.' Conscription was eventually enforced in May 1917 and led to riots in Quebec. The great mission of the French Canadians to service abroad, as chalked out by Bishop Bruchési, evidently fell on deaf ears. When riots broke out in Quebec city on Easter Weekend 1918, the crowds sang the 'Marseillaise'.

Numerous instances of revolt against clerical injunctions can be cited. But in the following pages I should like to draw attention to a view on which there is almost universal consensus, and which is accepted even by such critical scholars as Dumont and Rocher, who were never very impressed by the popular notion of clerical hegemony over the Quebecois. This view suggests that the domination of the clergy over the masses in Quebec was clearly evident in the period of rapid industrial transformation, i.e., between 1920 and 1950. Among other things, the growth of nationalist sentiment and the emergence of Catholic trade unions are especially cited. Dumont and Rocher noted that the anti-clerical and republican spirit which stirred the greatest lay leaders of the nineteenth century provided no inspiration to twentieth century writers and intellectuals. The authors, therefore, discovered a 'discontinuity' in the ideological structure of the Quebecois literati and leaders of the present century (especially in the years between the termination of the world wars) from that of the tradition in the nineteenth century.27

Nationalism and the clergy

To what extent can we say that Quebecois nationalism between 1920 and 1950 developed predominantly under clerical inspiration and tutelage? More importantly, to what extent did this nationalism reflect the popular sentiments of the masses? To understand these issues, it is necessary to recall the profound changes wrought on Quebec society by industrialisation in the twentieth century.

Industrialisation altered Quebec society in many significant ways.

But the most important change was in the social composition of the Quebecois. From the time of the British conquest of 1760 to the beginning of the twentieth century, the Quebecois were primarily *habitants*. The educated few, such as the doctors, the lawyers and even the political thinkers, came from this class of *habitants*, and essentially voiced the *habitants*' interests. These professionals, and members of the literati, had not as such formed a separate class, like the petit bourgeoisie or the middle class, with interests different from and contradictory to the interests of the common masses. As Lord Durham very perceptively noted, the educated Quebecois was:

separated by no barrier of manners or pride or *distinct interests*, from the singularly ignorant peasantry by which he is surrounded. He combines, therefore, the influences of superior knowledge and social equality and wields a power over the mass, which I do not believe that the educated class of any other portion of the world possess ... The most uninstructed population ... is thus placed in the hands of a small body of instructed persons, in whom it reposes confidence, *which nothing but domestic connections and such community of interests* could generate (emphasis added).²⁸

This explains to a great degree the influence that leaders like Papineau had on the masses. It also makes nonsense of any attempts to consider the educated and instructed few of those days to be members of the Quebecois bourgeois class, as Rioux often does.²⁹

Industrialisation, however, brought about the development of a Quebecois middle class which formed a distinct category between the capitalists and the working class and peasantry. Quebec also had by then a large number of native proletarians working in factories. These classes crystallised around 1920, i.e., after the First World War. It is also from this period on that a certain collaboration developed between the clergymen and some members of the newly formed Quebecois middle class or petit bourgeoisie, which can to some extent explain the 'discontinuity' in the intellectual currents between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The growing stratification and differentiation among the Quebecois, in particular, the growth of a middle class with interests opposed to the working class, led to a good deal of dislocation in the once near homogeneous outlook of the Quebecois.

As noted earlier, after the defeat of the *Patriotes*, around the midnineteenth century, the Church began energetically to articulate its ideal of a good, pure and religious rural life. For, according to the clerics, 'Commerce and industry ... are material occupations. We French Canadians are made for something more noble; let us leave material gain to more vulgar natures.'³⁰ But, strangely enough, though these views were highly conducive to cultural isolationism, they did not show any trend towards separatism. The Church did not point to the English as its foe, but rather to ' "the Liberals", namely those bent on converting institutions and society to a broader view of world affairs'.³¹

This, however, ostensibly changed in the 1920s. The Church, still relying on 'agriculturalism', now felt that its ideal of a rural society was incompatible with the growth of industrialisation in Quebec, which it identified as an Anglo-Canadian intrusion. The writings of Abbé Groulx, the most prominent of the clerical nationalists of the twentieth century, reveal an obvious nostalgia for a return to the 'idyllic state' of a nation of farmers, and flaunt an arcadian revulsion to industrialisation and its ethos. Therefore, in order to preserve what it considered to be the basis of French Canadian society and culture and in order also not to vitiate what it believed was the providential mission of the Catholics, the Quebecois were encouraged by the ecclesiastical leaders to seek the separation of Quebec from the Candian Confederation.

This renewed ideological activity of the Church and of individual clerics to concoct an unreal past, under the garb of nationalism, was born of an increasing fear of the rise of radicalism among the Quebecois working class. It was, likewise, primarily intended to counteract the influence of militant labour unions by preaching the so-called 'Catholic virtues' of conformity to tradition and obedience to the Catholic Church. But this variety of nationalism with ecclesiastical moorings only managed to enthuse a section of middle-class intellectuals and never really became a mass phenomenon. L'action Française, founded by Abbé Groulx in 1917, could only boast a very small membership even after several years. It failed to live up to its expectations and did not succeed in generating a broad-based nationalist movement.

The fact that L'action Française failed to extend its hold over the masses led to a considerable overhauling of its ideology and leadership in the 1930s, and non-clerics began to take over the organisation. Oliver describes this event as presaging a left-wing shift in the ideological position of the organisation. (By 'left-wing' Oliver means the acceptance of the ideas of equality and liberty.)³² The ousting of the clerics from a position of pre-eminence in L'action Française made it possible for a new genre of thinkers, like André Laurendeau, to become leading figures of the organisation and give it a 'left-wing' posture. In 1935 L'action Française was renamed L'action Nationale. André Laurendeau continued to attack right-wing clerical interpretations of nationalism and, in particular, criticised the clerical nationalists for their support of Mussolini's imperialist policies, and of France during the Spanish Civil War.

The growth of nationalism, left wing or right wing, was a typical middle-class phenomenon, and the middle-class intellectuals engaged in it with all the sophistry and acrimony that was their forte. Even so-called 'left-wing' nationalism, which created quite a ripple in middle-class circles, never really seeped down to the people. It was never able to articulate a systematic doctrine, nor could it rise above schisms and factions. For example, apart from the anti-conscription movement spearheaded by the *Bloc Populaire* (itself a breakaway organisation of *L'action Nationale*) during the Second World War, no nationalist organisation was able to trigger off a popular upheaval between 1918 and 1945. Elections were fought primarily on economic issues and were decided on the basis of the economic performances and programmes of the various political parties. The *Union Nationale*, for instance, which is often considered to have been *the* nationalist party of Quebec in that period, and which also had the blessing of the Church, was voted out in the elections of 1939 because of its dismal economic performance and its attacks on organised Labour.³³

The belief, therefore, that the growth of nationalist fervour among the lay intellectuals in the first half of the twentieth century was solely orchestrated by the Church does not square with the facts. This becomes evident during the 1930s and after, when nationalism made some headway. Firstly, there was no one nationalist organisation or ideology. The clerical nationalists represented one among several strands of nationalism. Second, the most popular nationalist organisations, like *L'action Nationale* and *Bloc Populaire*, modified several doctrines of the Church, and were also sometimes openly critical of the positions the Church took on several issues. This is especially true of the *Bloc Populaire*, which was by far the most popular nationalist organisation in those years. Thus, the Church and the Catholic priests, even in this restricted sphere – which mainly involved middle-class intellectuals – played a secondary role which does not deserve top billing.

Trade unions and the Church

In spite of the admonitions of the clergy, the Quebecois began deserting their farms as Quebec became an urban industrialised society. This forced the Church to reconsider its position on several issues, like urbanisation and trade unions, in order not to estrange itself completely from the Quebecois who were being drawn irrevocably into the vortex of industrialisation.

Although Pope Leo XIII in his 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, had sanctioned the workers' right to join unions, the Archbishop of Montreal did not allow them to do so till as late as 1903. Even this was a half-hearted concession on his part, made in the hope of reaching a compromise under inexorable social pressure, and was not accompanied by any tempering of his prejudice against trade unions, nor of his abhorrence of working-class demands for better living conditions. In the same pastoral letter which supported the right to form unions, Bishop Bruchési also wrote:

It would be chimerical to try to banish this inequality from the earth or to revolt against it ... To the end of time, God's creatures will be divided into two great classes, the class of the rich and the class of the poor ... You cannot reasonably demand that the wages of labour be continually increased ... Think of heaven, there thou shalt receive thy eternal reward.³⁴

Naturally, clerical sermons on the divine order and the hierarchy's condemnation of trade unions cut very little ice with the Quebecois workers. They readily joined American unions and the CCF. As a Quebecois worker reported to Mgr Lapointe:

Abbé ... for many years we have suffered, toiled, laboured for starvation wages ... when we complained of our poverty, and were greeted with rifle shots as rebels and revolutionaries, what were you doing? You counselled patience, pointing to heaven, and you read us some fine little sermons on respect for social order. Abbé, you offered us no solution. Then organised labour from the States opened its arms to us, and we rushed to them. Today you say that's no good.³⁵

The Catholic Church could not conceivably allow this rising disaffection, worse, apathy, of the masses towards it to continue, and in 1921 it formally organised the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour (CCCL) and attempted to update its ideological and spiritual apparatus in keeping with the objective conditions of its milieu.

The fact that the Church organised trade unions does not mean that Catholic workers rushed to join them. The CCCL was first inaugurated in Thetford and Asbestos in the 1920s. It did not succeed in enrolling many members, and over the years many left it to join other unions. After nearly twenty years of existence it was still marking time – probably because the Church had not played a particularly edifying role in the eyes of the workers in union disputes elsewhere. Especially remembered was the way the Church had refused to help 1,200 Thetford miners who found themselves unemployed in 1929, and the manner in which Cardinal Villeneuve and Mgr Gauthier had intervened in the textile strike of 1937 and imposed an unfavourable agreement on the workers.

At the time of the formation of the CCCL, it was made clear that the clergy would hold all the important offices in the union and would also have the final say in any decision taken by it. This state of affairs substantially altered in the early 1940s. The CCCl acquired new militant leadership in the form of Marchand and Picard, and in the 1943 convention at Granby went so far as to deprive the Chaplain of the right to veto any resolution. Further, as Boisvert says, the Church's

doctrine of social conservation, the essence of a certain kind of nationalism, had not been able to achieve results. The CCCL was able to do so by developing a dynamic doctrine which ignored neither the changing pattern of our lives nor the economic and social characteristics of our society (emphasis added).³⁶

The CCCL, therefore, became a dynamic reality, able to attract large numbers, only after it had ideologically and organisationally cleansed itself of clerical influence. According to the *Labour Gazette* and *Labour Organisations in Canada*, in 1940 the CCCL had as members approximately 35 per cent of all unionised workers in Quebec – an increase of as much as 15 per cent from its membership figures in the 1930s. This development, however, alarmed the management of several companies. For example, Canadian John Manville Co (Protestant through and through), against whom the historic strike at Asbestos was directed, were upset by the anti-clerical turn taken by the CCCL and deplored the fact that its Asbestos branch had even dropped the word 'Catholique' from its name.³⁷

Though, as the CCCL grew, the clerics lost control over it, and were out of all leading positions by the time it led the strike at Asbestos, many members of the lower clergy began to join as rank-and-file members. The majority of these were now reconciled to a more pluralistic era – and for many of them it was an *about face* from the attitudes they had held even as recently as at the CCCL's formation. In 1950, in their collective pastoral letter, the Quebec bishops officially conceded that the urban worker could lead a life as spiritually sublime as the tiller of the soil. Therefore, rather than the workers being dominated by the clergy in the unions, it was the clergy that strove from 1949 onwards to fall in line and concur with the sentiments of the Quebecois working class.

Conclusion

It is not as if the facts mentioned in this article are little known or obscure. But it appears that the influence of the clergy is most marked in the minds of historians and sociologists, and not, as it is made out to be, in the minds of the Quebecois people.

Religious values and beliefs have no absolute ethical directives which are unyielding and incapable of modification and reinterpretation to suit different social situations. The Catholic religion, as such, is no barrier to individualism, and can be easily reinterpreted, as Angers shows, to fall in line with the modern industrial spirit.³⁸

Catholic religious values can also become, as contemporary events in Quebec demonstrate, compartmentalised and segregated, and have no perceptible bearing on the secular lives of the people.

As noted earlier, the attempt to denigrate the Quebecois by the

economically superior British community, by putting the responsibility for their economic backwardness on their mental make up and on their religious inclinations, is not unique to Quebec. Nor is the fact that the imperialists, or the superior community, paradoxically seem to buttress the very institutions supposedly responsible, according to them, for the backwardness of the subaltern community.

Unfortunately, a comprehensive history of Quebecois resistance to the Church has yet to be written. Nor has the marginal impact of clerical opinion on the political and economic lives of the Quebecois people been adequately and consistently emphasised. We hope, therefore, that this article goes some way in correcting the popular myth of clerical hegemony exercised by the Catholic hierarchy over the Quebecois, and provides some ammunition to counter the racist interpretations given for the economic backwardness of the Quebecois.

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The people's commentator: calypso and the Grenada revolution

An interview with Cecil Belfon, The Flying Turkey

Cecil Belfon, The Flying Turkey, is the most celebrated calypsonian in Grenada. He is also a soldier in the People's Revolutionary Army. As he says: 'In the context of our society now, I have been able to combine the two functions, soldier and calypsonian, because the objectives of both roles have come together and make one and the same thing.'

Belfon was a bank clerk in the Royal Bank of Canada until 13 March 1979, the morning of the Grenada Revolution. When he heard of the uprising, he left his bank counter and immediately went to help defend the radio station, which the revolutionaries had stormed and taken. He has been a soldier ever since then.

His songs and records, in particular 'Innocent Blood' (written shortly after the June 1980 bomb attack on the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Government at a public rally, causing the death of three teenage girls), are very popular in Grenada, and show the clear and dynamic link between calypso and the revolutionary movement in the Caribbean.

Belfon is now Manager of Television Free Grenada.

Chris Searle: The form of calypso was normally associated with Trinidad, but it is also clearly deep in the roots of the people of Grenada. Could you give some history of its development in Grenada

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Chris Searle is a teacher, poet and author. He recently worked in Grenada in the National In-service Teacher Education Programme. This interview comes from Words Unchained: Language and Revolution in Grenada, to be published by Zed Press in 1984.

and how you think it arose from the lives of the people?

Cecil Belfon: The history of calypso's development in Trinidad cannot be seen in isolation from its history in Grenada. The most important historic reason is that the islands have much in common from the period of colonisation and the coming of the slaves. It was out of this era that calypso itself began to emerge. The slaves introduced this lament as their consolation while working on the plantations. Throughout the generations there have been different interpretations and modernisations.

Then, in Trinidad there is a peculiar situation. Most of the leading calypsonians there are either Grenadians or have Grenadian parentage, Sparrow being the most outstanding, of course. So it is far from accurate to speak of calypso as being something which is simply Trinidadian. I prefer to speak of calypso-Caribbean, particularly in the context of the present integration movement within the Caribbean. We must stress that the colonialist and imperialist forces have always tried to tell us and teach us that the Caribbean is divided, and we know that it *should not* be divided. Even presently, there are attempts to recolonise the region by imperialism. So it is important that our culture makes the evidence clear that the Caribbean is not divided. The calypso of Trinidad is the calypso of Grenada; it has the same feel right through the islands.

But in the context of Grenada, calypso has gone through a tremendous struggle. It began to emerge strongly around the early days of Attila the Hun and Roaring Lion in Trinidad, but at that time the concept of calypso in Grenada was always a second-place kind of thing. We were always supposed to be the imitators of the man in Trinidad, and that was the result of the concept that was thrown down our throats throughout our history: that we were second, even within the islands! That you had the larger islands and the smaller islands and the smaller islands were supposed to wait upon the larger islands to produce these things. Therefore, what you had in the beginning in Grenada was that the locals would wait upon the Trinidadians to produce their songs, and then take a Trinidad calypso and change around some of the lyrics. When the song said 'Trinidad', they would change it to 'Grenada', and since the next word after 'Trinidad' might be 'bad', they'd find a next word to rhyme with 'Grenada'. Or where he use a minor chord, they use a flat chord!

Again, at that time there was not much scope, because the people only associated calypso with the *lumpen*. Calypso was never sophisticated at that point of time, or associated with ambitious youths or educated people. If you were a calypsonian, it was most likely your parents were drunkards or very poor, or you never had an opportunity to get yourself an education. And the calypsonians themselves contributed to

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this belief, even without them realising it because there was no opportunity to perform in any professional way – so they used to go from rum shop to rum shop with their straw hats and guitars. The whole thing was *comicry*, and as a result people could not conceive of *serious* calypso of social commentary, constructive satire or anything like that. Calypsonians used smut and ex-tempore, there was no previous preparation. A fellow known as a calypsonian was supposed to be an idiot, dress comical, go around the place waiting for things to happen and do ex-tempore rhymes on the spot – to walk in a rum shop and a fellow would play the guitar and another fellow say, 'Make a tune on that girl there!' And he was supposed to make a tune there and then and sing it. Of course, this was to prove important because it *did* challenge the ability of the artiste and it is a skill that has become a rare ability now. If a fellow can do it these days, he is the tops.

Then the calypso competitions at that time was that two calypsonians would meet in a square and the people gather round. And every time I sing a verse on this one, he sing a verse back on me! And the people throwing coins in the middle and some rum would pass. To be successful and popular as a calypsonian you had to be able to ridicule each other. It was a contest. You pick up a guitar and sing, 'Look how you face big and long/And you hand long to be touching the ground', and just ridicule the other man. Then you had the groups – the Jab-jab, the Maypole, the Short Knee, the Viequo – just waiting on the calypsonian, and he was supposed to make himself available to all of these. There was never the formal competition and the recording that happens now.

But we should call some historic names of those who developed calypso in Grenada. Men like Caruso, who is dead now. He played a 'political' role around the 1972 period here in Grenada. He would come on stage and threaten the masses on behalf of the Gairy government, but it was done in such a way as it was very popular. He didn't *mean* what he said and sang it all with a kind of irony. He had a tune when he asked Gairy to make him the prime minister and he going to show him what to do with people who oppose the regime! There was another when he asked Gairy to bring everyone to the Market Square and hang them! He was very peculiar, but a very good artiste.

Other calypsonians like Unlucky and Dictator, who have emigrated, began to introduce a kind of seriousness and professionalism into their tunes. Unlucky started to make his own songs, totally independent of the Trinidad form, and Dictator was responsible for the then national motto which came from one of his calypsoes – 'Bright out of darkness'. And this takes us on to the kind of names calypsonians used to choose for themselves during the historical development of calypso. Every calypsonian had to be 'Lord', 'Mighty' or 'King' because of the carbon copying of Trinidad – and what happened in Trinidad was a carbon copy attitude, itself coming from the experience of colonialism. Kitchener in Trinidad took his name from Lord Kitchener in British history – and also Baron, Duke and many others. In Grenada you *had* to be 'Lord' or 'Mighty', and there was a particular breed of calypsonians who searched for aggressive names in order to dominate. But amongst the artistes here there were all kinds of names – you had Melody, Darkie, Pirate, Papitette, Manicou, Eagle, Chain, Slim, Teller, Kaunda, Stingray and Gold Dust, these were the types of names that the artistes chose in those times.

When they came under pressure, the calypsonians started to join together to form 'tents'. Then each one had his own village support that he used to move in. Then there came another need, the need for musicians. Now the artistes wanted a whole band, so in Grenada that gave rise to one or two remarkable and popular bands, like 'Wakax', also known as 'Solid Senders'. These tents were originally just that galvanize and straw – not like the modern structures with electricity that we might have now. And in them days, the tents just bring all the bacchanal in off the streets and put in a building, there was no programme or master of ceremonies like today, when people actually listen to the lyrics and clap. But it was the first stage of organisation, even though it had the same old smut and picong - the gossip and old talk. And when the calypsonians entered the tent, there would be both unity and division. They only united at that level to save their own necks. They had found that they were isolated and redundant ouside, and also found that there was no room for progress. Outside of the tent, it was just take a drink, sing a calypso and go home and sleep. The people around you didn't hear you, and the upper class people never bothered with calypso. For in the context of class, they always saw calypso as being aimed at them, a part of the culture of the poor and oppressed that had helped to ease them through slavery, and therefore there was a hostility between them and calypso.

So inside the tents the calypsonians had to pull together, but the divisions still existed. There was the old urge for competition, for each one to be better than the next. And there was still a serious narrowness of scope. A local calypsonian was not interested in singing about the struggles of Africa or in any other part of the world. He was only interested in what went on in his village and in cussing the other man. He was still very parochial. Each artiste would bring in his own crowd, so it was a war of artiste versus artiste, crowd versus crowd. This is really still with us today, except that the terms are modernised and the behaviour of the crowds more discreet. Today you call them 'fans' and say that they are coming to 'back you up'. But there is still that rivalry, and on any day of a competition you could meet people placing bets.

From time to time in Grenada, as young blood came into calypso, there was a certain shift, a particular nudge at revolutionising the

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concept of calypso. The older heads never did change until very late. For some of them the thing became futile and they dropped out, and others who remained have only now started to change. For example, Lord Melody has been writing calypsoes so long and only now is starting to realise a change has to be made. Then there was Darkie, who got fed up and went to Trinidad, and Chain, Pirate and Defender, who also pulled out. They couldn't cope with the changes, the modernising – for now we had begun to sever the navel string with Trinidad, we had begun truly to make our own calypsoes, and that called for more imagination, more research, more creativeness. And our calypsonians had one great advantage. In Trinidad, there is a great deal of specialisation. A fellow who's an excellent singer gets his lyrics from someone else, then an arranger does everything for him and all he has to do is to sing it. In Grenada, the singer is the writer is the arranger is the performer. The same man does everything and it calls for real versatility.

CS: Calypso played an important part in both the cultural and political struggle against the Gairy dictatorship. Could you describe something of that, and your own involvement in it?

CB: After reaching a certain level of development, the calvpsonian had begun to be recognised by a large section of the public as the people's commentator. As far as the calypsonians were concerned, they had won a victory because they had struggled and they were at last gaining respect. The masses too had gained a victory, for now they had somebody who could take up their cry, interpret it professionally and could get other people to hear it. The dictatorship began to worry about this. It was always Gairy's aim to subdue the voice of the people. and calypso was really rising. So he tried many things. He tried to boost 'culture' with strings attached. At a particular period, for you to go into the savannah and be successful, you had to sing in favour of the dictatorship. The judges were carefully chosen and some artistes were favoured. So some calvosonians sang 'Grenada is nice. Grenada is beautiful, we have no problems, we are a comfortable people, everything is nice'. That was the dictatorship's method of calming the artistes - 'Thiefing the artist's head' was the local expression - and keeping them from expressing negatives and protest, getting them to paint a false image and then turning around and convincing followers that since you are saying that the voice of the calypsonian is the voice of the people, the calypsonian is saying that things are good, then what more do vou want?

That went on for quite a while, and the reward for those calypsonians was more air-play than for the other artistes. Many of the progressive artistes had little or no air-play, never made it on the charts and were never selected to leave the country or to sing at any national events. Then, in 1975, there was a calypsonian called Slim – who is doing well in New York now. He sang a calypso with lyrics like, 'If this is the land in which we were born, then to Grenadians I'll ask a simple question. If this is our land, why is it that some people have and some people have not?' It was his interpretation of the oppression that was going on. The song was extremely good and the only thing that saved Slim that year was that it was *so* well done and he was *so* popular that beyond death no one could stop him. They *had* to play his tune on the radio, he *had* to go in the savannah and he *had* to win.

In 1976 we started a tent in St Paul's. It was always side-by-side with the political activities of the country. Some of the other tents had names like 'Old Firesticks' or 'All Stars Roving Brigade' and so on. The artistes approached firms for donations, or, at some stage, some politicians came into the picture. We approached the MP for our area in 1976, and discussed with him about making a tent – giving the line all along that we want a tent because the people want a tent, and no strings attached. Sooner or later the strings began to appear.

Then, by 1976, we had a lot of new blood in the tent, and after the elections of that year there was an automatic split in the forces in the tent. By 1977 the more progressive calypsonians, whom I led, had chosen to break away and form what we called 'We Tent'. The name signified the masses, and our unity with them. 'We Tent' then started to play a particular role. It was after the election, and Maurice* had won the local seat in parliament. We had a great mass base, and on any tent night to every ten people that went to the other tent, we had 150! I remember one particular night when we had 500 people, and the other tent had thirty.

Then the dictator started turning on the pressure. We had to go down to the radio station personally, had to plead, protest, cuss to get our tunes on the radio, and when I wasn't hearing them, I would go back down there. Our tapes were lost, mis-filed, 'accidentally' rubbed off, burst. Those tapes unfortunately couldn't be repaired in time for Carnival! But apart from that, during this whole period of repression, the dictatorship used its Public Order Act, or the Loud Speaker Act. So every time we had to advertise a show, we had to go to Fort George – which is now called Fort Rupert after Rupert Bishop, whom Gairy's henchmen killed in 1974. I had to go and knock and wait sometimes for two hours for a policeman to come and sign his authority giving us two hours in the town to advertise our show, and another to use the loudspeaker at night! It was a hard period for us, but we took it firmly as a challenge, and it was precisely because of that, combined with the type of songs we used to sing, that gave us the sympathy of the masses.

In 1977 I had a tune called 'Prophecy', and another called 'Come

^{*} Maurice Bishop was elected MP for the St Paul's area in December 1976.

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Back to Roots'. The second was aimed at West Indians, Grenadians in particular, who had gone abroad and neglected their own culture. What it was saying was that this is where your grounding is, where you belong, this is where your roots are, and you could never really go out there and belong. And out there, where you going, the people finding interest in our thing now! 'Prophecy' had a certain level of idealism in the lyrics, as I was to admit to myself later, but that was my level at the time. It spoke of the coming of bitter days, and rising out of these bitter days the coming of peace and equality. Idealistic only in the sense of the concept, the approach, in that the lyrics made it all seem automatic, as if you could actually sit down and see it all passing through. What I was to learn later, through practical experience and also a grasp of theory, was that the essence of *struggle* had to be introduced.

As a matter of fact, just before 13 March 1979, I was writing a song the actual lyrics of which prophesied the inevitable conflict and change that was to come, about 'the attitudes now of man to fellow man/Spreading condemnation throughout the land,/And some people trying to reach higher heights/Oppressors exploit we just to show their might,/But one day, I know, my people will be free,/We shall reach our destiny.' Then came 13 March, and the Revolution. When I heard that the comrades had taken over the radio station, I left my job and went right down there to pick up a gun and defend it. This time I wasn't pleading for any air-play!

In other calypsoes I tried different approaches, and the biblical approach was often quite deliberate – like in one of my best tunes, 'Black Child', which won the crown in 1978. It was aimed at championing the cause of the black woman, and was fully supporting her cry. The last two lines went like this:

Black woman, you are the gem of my heart Let us come together and make a fresh start.

But after the Revolution I took this same verse and applied some different lyrics. I was invited to sing at the International Women's Day Rally in 1981, so I sang these. I started with 'Woman' – I left out the 'black' now, it was a different period. I had moved from the nationalist struggle to the internationalist revolutionary struggle, so it was not correct to focus upon the 'black' in that nationalist kind of way because the struggle is much wider.

Woman, you are the gem of my heart, Let us come together and make a fresh start. Consolidate now your position, And take up your role in the Revolution. Set up party groups and N.W.O.,*

^{*} N.W.O.: National Women's Organisation.

People's Militia and the N.Y.O.,* I know you fought many battles Some of which you lost, But high is the price of freedom And we must pay the cost. While together, forward ever we go, Your spirit and example now will show. So cast all mistaken ideals away And programme yourself for the brighter day – Scothilda** died for your salvation and for all women, even yet unborn. 'A luta continua!' I cry, Woman, fight on till the day you die!

It showed me that from time to time it is important to review your lyrics. There are different historical periods and a man can only write as far as his development permits at the time, and he must realise and admit his deficiencies. For example, an artiste in Trinidad made an excellent calypso this year which says:

While presidents and kings do their own thing The people are the ones that suffering, While presidents and kings have their own way The children suffer from their power play.

And then he goes on to say what the world needs now is love. I draw a parallel with that and my 'Prophecy'. It's the same idealism. We have to understand the contradiction that we have to struggle to get that peace, it don't come easy. For outside of the context of 13 March, we wouldn't even be here, we couldn't even be holding this discussion.

CS: What were the experiences of those calypsonians who used their songs as a means of struggle?

CB: In some cases artistes suffered a lot of licks and repression, but in my particular case I was able to make my way through. I'll tell you why. Most of the calypsonians who identified with progress were from the working people and some did not have much of an academic education due to the deficiencies of the system then, and through no fault of their own. Then, when I went into calypso, I was able to draw a particular type of person to listen to my songs, including middle strata and young intellectuals. Before then, they had shied away from calypso, now they were moving closer in that they would pay to come in, listen and applaud – and support. I was working at the Royal Bank, and

^{*} N.Y.O .: National Youth Organisation.

^{**} Scothilda Noel: A pioneer woman militant of the New Jewel Movement, who died in 1979.

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understanding the smallness of the society then, you would know what that meant! Here was this fellow – me – working in a bank and singing calypso. It didn't really go, calypso with 'O' levels and 'A' levels, and it was partly responsible for me winning automatic popularity among these middle strata groups. I had managed to penetrate all circles of society. So it was not easy for the dictatorship to treat me like some of the other calypsonians – you beat up a lumpen artiste and all you say is that he smoking ganja and it end there! What I often used to do was mask my lyrics. I used to deal with a high level of prose and thing, and inject a little satire, so by the time the dictatorship realise that some licks falling is because they fall already! Some of the other calypsonians who were not so able to juggle with their words just had to come out raw and say the system stinks and so they get two licks. Quite a few artistes had a bitter experience, some getting bad licks and having microphones torn away from their hands.

A lot of the calypsonians used to evade the struggle too, just sing about the pretty flowers outside and you get through the season! You sing about Grenada so beautiful, lovely waterfall, come Mr Tourist for a whole season and evade the struggle! What they realised though, sooner or later, was that the masses began to pull away from them, they did not associate with them any longer. But I was finding that the masses were drawing closer to my lyrics. In 1976 I actually printed them up on a sheet and distributed them for twenty five cents a copy. I shifted a few hundred, for at that time I had no records out. The response was always positive.

CS: What has been the impact of the Revolution in Grenada upon the calypso form?

CB: Tremendous! Let us look at what the Revolution has done for artistes who were there before, and then for new artistes. For the former, it brought new hope and a new sense of direction. A lot of them had begun to become redundant. They didn't know what was next, they had reached an artificial ceiling which they knew was not the top. They had become muzzled under the dictatorship, not just in the present, but also in a future plan – they could not look down the road and see what was in store for them. Compare all that to *now*, when we are speaking of bringing a *Caribbean* Calypso Festival to Grenada, of bringing top artistes – like we have done already – Sparrow, Arrow, Valentino, Explainer, Gypsy, Poser, Merchant – all these names have thus become much closer and more meaningful to the people. Before the Revolution, our calypsonians had never met such professional artistes. They had only heard them on the radio.

Then, after the Revolution you had the Cuban Carifesta – and if that had happened in Gairy time a team would never have been allowed to go up. A lot of our artistes gained confidence and experience up there,

and gained more exposure in the Barbados Carifesta and during their Cuban and Nicaraguan tours, as well as tours to New York and the one in England. Then our calypsonians have been performing at rallies, conferences and concerts and all the other events we are constantly having in Grenada since the Revolution. For calypso it is really the dawn of a new day.

And for the artistes who were stifled or timid under the dictatorship, they now have the chance to come out. And the quality and standard are really rising all the time. Right now, over fifty per cent of our present calypso faces have come out since 13 March, and included among them are several women. Back under the dictatorship 'We Tent' had been instrumental in bringing out three of these sisters. Angie, for example, way back in 1974 was singing out for the rights of women, and Lady Beginner, who has been consistent in calypso for many years, has always shown a firm line in calling upon other women to come into calypso. Now we have Valiant V, who is now singing with 'We Tent' and is showing great prospects. She has an intellectual approach towards her composing and she's clear on the progressive path.

Another significant change since the Revolution is the way in which some of the words and lines have really been taken up by the people, and have even become slogans of the Revolution. We can see that in 'No backward reaction can stop our Revolution!' But it works the other way too, and we have been taking some of the people's slogans into our calypsoes. It's an indication of the whole process and integration of the propaganda of the struggle. It's closely enmeshed – whether you print it in books or make it in songs, it could still come out along the same lines. Culture and politics are one. Before the Revolution, the dictatorship used to project that culture must stay out of politics, and yet they had used politics to try to stifle culture! But that's impossible! If you say culture should stay out of politics, you are saying that culture should stay out of the people, and then you don't have culture.

One of the problems that we faced before the Revolution, which has erased itself in a big way and is rapidly fading altogether, is the problem of sectarianism. In Grenada, this has been traditional between the St George's artistes and those coming from Grenville. The comrades from Grenville have had genuine disadvantages during Carnival in the past, having to come down to St George's for rehearsals and shows, and there was a lot of mismanagement. This ended up with a war of artistes, even though the problem was one of administration. But it stemmed out of the whole attitude of the old regime and the town versus country politics which just made more artificial divisions among the people.

Then we had 'sidewalk wars', particularly around the time of competitions. Each artiste had his band or group or village backing him, and these people would meet in the towns or wherever the functions were held, and there would be some serious and bitter debates and conflict around who should win and why, and they used to take it on as a personal war. You still have a little of that, but with a different flavour. It's not a 'diehard, cut-throat' thing. People look at it more objectively, more scientifically - people are beginning to study the lyrics. They have become more realistic right across the society, they're analysing now. They're now going to their Zonal Councils and Workers' Parish Councils with notebooks and pencils, and such a thing could never have happened in the past. In Gairy days, when you talking about going to a meeting, you talking about going with your 'eights' bottle of rum in your back pocket, you take two drinks in the middle of the meeting, and when you done you find two 'JEWEL' to bust they head with the same bottle, or you have a two stone nearby so if a 'JEWEL' pass you pelt it behind him. Now our culture and that includes our calypso, gives us a more responsible approach and a feeling of unity.

You see, people are becoming a lot more analytical and critical here in Grenada. When they hear calypso, they listen again and they wait. and they extract the good and bad. They listening to the lyrics closely, and they are telling you if them lyrics deficient or so. Immediately they could detect if the calypsonian is trying to fill the thing with too much music. People used to take a dogmatic approach - once they like the artiste, they backing him to the end, no matter what he singing. Now, any new calypsonian who comes up with an act that is good, if the lyrics, content and composition are worth attention, then he gets recognition right away, he wouldn't have to be a big name. And that kind of objective approach is a reflection of the attitude running through the whole society in Grenada - not like in Trinidad, where a lot of the artistes get away year after year with long-service medals. Here, people are listening close, and they're more interested in the relevance of a calypsonian's theme and its content to the struggle. They're seeking for antiimperialist lyrics, but at the same time they're looking for beauty, like in Scorpion's 'Love' or Timpo's 'Soft Head Preacher'. The people are extremely critical in these times, and it confirms that calypso is aiding the education of the masses. In the past, if a new record came to Grenada, Grenadians would say, 'It comes from Trinidad, it's on wax - come le' we buy it!' and they accepted it, lock, stock and barrel, they just took it. Now it's different, and that is what the Revolution has brought us.

CS: What is there about the language of calypso that makes it such an important vehicle for the working people?

CB: One, the grassroots nature of calypso. Although different artistes have different interpretations of bringing it across and some fellows go for the niceness of the poetry, ultimately it is its grassroots expression

as a people's language. People readily associate with calypso, it's instinctive, it's in with them, it's automatic! People understand the *history* of calypso, the context in which it has been sung. Even though one individual might make a backward calypso, generally people understand without doubt that calypso is *their* thing and that the mission of calypso is to bring out the ideas and the cry of the workers.

There is a certain amount of simplicity in the langauge of calypso which the people like, even though some of the words may be at a level of sophistication or be ironic. You need to penetrate different fora with your calypsoes and it is often a question of strategy – how do you penetrate this or that area? At what point in time do you expose the whole thing? At what point do you push your line open? Then again, calypso has sometimes been able to penetrate the bourgeois circles through its *musical* style, and then slide in the message. In the early days it didn't have that advantage, the music wasn't so developed and it was a straight case of the lyrics. It is very important to be able to *flex* calypso, and that is why the *soca* is so important, with its bass and drum foundation it appeals to the urge to music inside man, the *soul* of calypso.

CS: Why do you call yourself The Flying Turkey?

CB: The history of that name goes right back to school days, and this story.

There was this game we used to play with a map. You open a map and you ask a fellow to show you a place on the map. You say a place like Greece and he have to find it while you start counting '1 2 3 4 5 6 7 etc', until he finds Greece, then you stop count and whatever the count is, that becomes your points. We were very young in school, we didn't know those places – that was how we were learning the map. Then one day I went to school, sit down, call some fellows and say, 'Find Turkey!' And they start laughing and say, 'It ent have a place name so!' I say, 'Yes man, it have a place name so, I see it last night. Find it now.' And I start counting. I count till I tired and they get fed up. And so they started calling me 'Turkey', and that was my name throughout school.

Now, when I entered calypso, I had a choice either to fall into that line of the 'Lords' and 'Mighties' that I spoke about before – which I immediately developed a hostility against and decided not to get into. Therefore, the 'Flying' was deliberate: one, to be unique, two, because no other local turkey could fly, and three, because it was supposed to symbolise my aspirations. It took me two months to find that name. Everytime I go to give myself that name, I thinking 'Lord Turkey ... Mighty Turkey ... King Turkey ... it just can't go with it!' so for the first few months I left it out and just called myself 'Turkey' and nothing else, and then I say, 'It got to be Flying!' CS: You combine various strands of Caribbean music in your compositions. It is clearly calypso based, but other forms are there too. What is your intention in doing this?

CB: Jamaica is projecting her reggae, Trinidad is projecting her calypso, and in a geographical sense we are in between. What I am trying to say in my music is that it don't just belong to them, it's all ours, it's *Caribbean*. I want to bring them together and synthesise them with cadenz and soca. 'Innocent Blood' combines soca, calypso and reggae, so it's Caribbean music. When you combine them things you have a super-music, you could do anything with it! We can't afford to be splitting up that music, we have to be bringing it together – it has the strength of the Caribbean, and that's what we're building here in Grenada.

CS: Another remarkable aspect to your songs is the way the lyrics spread across the world. You've gone so far away from the idea of calypso being merely parochial. 'Innocent Blood' goes from Grenada to Vietnam to El Salvador to Angola to Cuba to South Africa to Guatemala, right across the world. Is that kind of internationalist vision new to calypso?

CB: Not only myself, but other artistes have recognised the importance of this, like Sparrow, of course, and also Gypsy in, for example, 'Kit of Survival'. Some other calypsonians, however, although they have started to go international, still don't appreciate the world political situation. A lot of them tend to jump on Africa. You have at least a hundred calvpsoes on Africa! Once they have moved out of their Trinidad period, they go into a Caribbean thing and then an African thing. That was the mother country and the cultural nationalism coming out. Then, when they become more democratic in their views, they are still hooked on to the African scene. Now, in the Caribbean it is a question of the political development of the people and the calypsonian coming from the people. For example, if a professional calypsonian wanted to make a song boosting socialism, then he could do it, if he has the ability, he could make an excellent calypso. But these fellows thinking in the back of their head that they don't want to be behind the masses, but they don't want to move too far ahead of them either. or they would become alienated just the same. If they came out with a real heavy calypso on socialism in the context of their society not being into that, then they would soon become alienated and they feel their role and importance would be lost, the people wouldn't listen to them anymore, it would be a kind of leftism in that sense, for the people might well abandon them.

That is why the calypsonian, particularly in our context, has to be aware of the development of the politics of the people. For example,

Melody last year, when he sang for Carnival. He sang a tune commenting on some trivial problems and the people listening, the masses, were extremely hostile. They wouldn't accept a calypso like that in this time. When you speak about the masses have achieved material benefits in health, education, house repair and all the other social benefits, and you coming up here in front of thousands of people quarrelling about two holes in the road, then you're not understanding the development of the consciousness of the people. Because in the days of Gairy you find any damn thing to comment and guarrel about - that was your role, as a part of the struggle you had to undermine the regime. Therefore, every hole in the road you meet, every time the electricity black out, every time the radio station blank off the air the artiste had to make it a political issue. You had to reflect in your tunes the inefficiency of the regime, you had to push it in that way. It would have been correct in those times for a fellow to come up and sing 'Look the roads not good, and I pack up my car two months now!' But in the context of now times, because that artiste was not up to date with the politics of the masses, he got a lot of hostility and he had to learn a lesson. It is illogical to come out now and sing about two holes in the road! People want to hear you come out in defence of the Revolution, people want to hear you come out and rage hostility upon imperialism, rage hostility upon Reagan and American interventionist attitudes. That was the secret of the success of 'The Lion', from Carriacou who won the Third Anniversary Festival of the Revolution competition last month [March 1982]. He came out and he blaze imperialism! Or the fellow from Gouyave, Awful, and his 'No Dictator, No Way'! So Melody find he have to change, but he learned the lesson and is writing revolutionary calypso now and getting back his popularity.

But if you look back to the time of the dictatorship, what caused an artiste to change then? He changed his line either because of the threats or the deprivation of his rights to get his song out. What is causing the artiste to change now? It's the masses! The calypsonian has to go with the masses, so calypso itself is becoming a part of the people's democracy of the Revolution. A calypsonian once said: 'If the people ent doing nothing, then calypso have no work to do.' For the masses themselves have to create the basis for calypso, they have to create the material. So if the people make the Revolution, then the Revolution is going to make the subject of their songs.

A selection of Flying Turkey's lyrics is published in the Notes and documents section of this issue.

FLOYA ANTHIAS and RON AYRES

Ethnicity and class in Cyprus

The Cyprus conflict is a pertinent reminder of the complexities of nationalist phenomena and the intractable territorial and political problems often implicated in them. A dominant feature of the conflict internally has been a different claim to territory by the two main ethnic groups on the island, the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot. Such claims have taken different forms in different periods, ranging from the desire for Enosis, or union with Greece, from Greek-Cypriots, to Taksim, or partition, desired by the Turkish-Cypriots. These have been articulated most forcefully by right-wing and chauvinist political and social groupings. Conflicting territorial claims have been 'resolved' through the military invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, the aftermath of a coup led by the fascist EOKA B and the Greek junta. Such a 'resolution' can only be a temporary one, but negotiations over the last eight years between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot political leaders have been more or less abortive in finding a 'political' solution (some form of federation) which is acceptable to both sides.

Cyprus is a classic case of a small island with no intrinsic interest for colonialism but which has suffered continuous colonialism. A determining factor has been its geographical position in the Eastern Mediterranean which has made it a strategically desirable possession. In 1571 the Ottomans captured Cyprus from the Venetians and

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introduced a Turkish-Cypriot presence. Sultan Selim granted fiefs to about 20,000 Turkish soldiers, whose numbers were added to by the Ottoman practice of shifting populations. The Byzantine period (AD300–1192) had established very strong bonds between mainland Greece and the Cyprus periphery. The subsequent insertion of European feudalism and Ottoman rule failed to nullify the Greek cultural presence, partly because the Ottoman *millet* (nation in Arabic) system gave a degree of internal autonomy to separate religious communities. Britain was leased the island in 1878 and formally annexed it at the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, finally to be made 'independent' in 1960. The constitutional arrangements of 1960 failed to overcome interethnic conflict and, subsequently, a series of political events led to the Turkish invasion of 1974, after which 40 per cent of the island was declared a separate Turkish Republic of Cyprus.

Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot relations in historical perspective

According to available records. Orthodox Christians have always outnumbered the Muslims in Cyprus, although the ratio between them has not remained constant. By the time Britain took over administration of the island in 1878, the Muslims accounted for about 25 per cent of the population, which was then to decline to about 18 per cent by 1974. It has been argued that some of the population shifted by the Ottomans to Cyprus were Christians originally and may have been Greek. In addition, it has been demonstrated that neither the ethnic and religious composition of the population which was shifted to Cyprus, nor the size, can fully account for the numbers who comprised the Muslim community from the sixteenth century onwards. During the early years of Ottoman rule, conversions from Christianity to Islam appear to have been fairly common, since those who converted were then treated as full Ottoman citizens, and thus were able to avoid the exorbitant and discriminatory tax rates that Christians were subjected to and the social and economic disadvantages they suffered. Papadopoulos has presented specific evidence for this, ' and additional evidence is the existence of whole Muslim villages where inhabitants spoke only Greek, and the sect of Linobambakoi (Linen-Cotton) who were crypto-Christians and as time went by reverted to Christianity. Even in 1881, three years after British rule had been established, there were 2,454 Muslims (about 1.3 per cent of the total population and 5.8 per cent of the Muslim population) who regarded Greek as the mother-tongue. In addition to the demographic fluctuations and the 'interchangeability' of Christians and Muslims, the number of mixed villages in Cyprus until the 1963 intercommunal riots testify to what has been termed 'traditional coexistence'

There are other elements which appear to give some validity to the view that certain solidary bonds developed between Muslims and Christians, partly related to those families including both through the conversion process, but mainly structured by the common economic conditions of peasants. This is shown by a number of peasant revolts, under Christian or Muslim leaders, which included members from each faith. According to Beckingham,² Muslims and Christians often shared religious shrines. They also shared customs and traditions such as celebrating religious feasts and marriages. A Greek-Cypriot dialect evolved that incorporated many Turkish words and was spoken by Christians and many Muslims, although 'within' the two communities the separate mother-tongues were dominant.

Extremely important within this pattern of co-existence are economic processes and structures. The merchant-intermediary relation to the peasant producer was crucial. For what tied both Christian and Muslim together was their relation to merchant middlemen who supplied credit and provided marketing outlets.³ Yet commerce, both before and after 1878, was monopolised by the Orthodox Christians. This was to give rise to accusations of exploitation of Turks in later years. Peasant producers relied on credit to tide them over in times of poor yield or until the crop was harvested and sold. Interest rates were high, corruption was widespread and merchants often claimed repayment by seizing part of the peasants' crop on which they set the price. Through the existence of a 'patronage' power relation, political control of peasants was also established. Another economic link was through the 'feudal' sharecropping system, whereby landless labour worked plots provided by the landowner and shared the crop.

It would be wholly wrong, however, to assume that the commercial intercourse that took place between Christians and Muslims created horizontal or local alliances strong enough to overcome the ethnic and religious differences. Prior to 1878, the Ottoman Muslims were the colonial power and the Orthodox population was denied the freedom that its leaders, at least, desired. The two populations had different religious beliefs and practices, their own language, largely separate familial and social life and a low degree of intermarriage. Moreover, one significant effect of Ottoman rule was the establishment of the Greek-Orthodox Church to a position of leadership within the Christian community through the millet system. This granted the autocephalous Archbishop of Cyprus ecclesiastical and lay jurisdiction over the Orthodox population and reinforced the communal nature of group relatedness along religious lines in opposition to Islam, which further resulted in a desire on the part of Orthodox leaders for union with Greece, particularly after the Greek War of Independence of 1821. Beckingham claims that there was no serious rebellion or even dangerous conspiracy against Ottoman rule in over 300 years.⁴

Nevertheless, in 1821 the Muhassil Kuçuk Mehmed Silahsor had several Orthodox leaders executed, including the Archbishop, the Metropolitans and the Abbot of Kykko, even though there is no evidence that any of the victims were deeply implicated in the revolt in the Balkans. This indicates that the Ottoman rulers regarded the Orthodox Church as a potential threat to their power and were intent on keeping the Christians firmly under control.

The development of nationalism

In 1878 Cyprus was ceded to Britain under the Cyprus convention, and this provided the necessary, although not sufficient, conditions for the emergence of Greek Cypriot nationalism. When Britain took over the administration of Cyprus, it began with the assumption (as it did for its other multi-ethnic and multi-religious colonies) that each of the Cypriot communities had diverse interests and aspired to separate development. This was reinforced by the quick representation made by Church leaders for union with Greece. The first British High Commissioner (Sir Garnet Wolseley) was met in 1878 by the Bishop of Citium with the words: 'We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected.'⁵

Already then, before the onset of British rule, we find the desire for Enosis (union with Greece). This was predicated on the *Megali Idea*, the panhellenic ideology which involved the dream that the Byzantine Empire would again be recreated, and which included Cyprus in its irredentist claim.

Since 1830, when Greece was freed from the Ottoman yoke, Greek-Cypriot leaders had wanted to become merged with the 'motherland'. Though not of itself chauvinist, the nationalist form that the desire for union took was chauvinistic, romantic-idealist, thrived on the mythology of a glorious Hellenic past, and was aimed at the aggrandisement of the Hellenic world. It was also largely conservative and, significantly, its most forceful purveyors were the Church; and after the 1940s (with the growth of left syndicalism and communism in Cyprus), it had an explicitly anti-communist character.

The development of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and the ideology of Enosis were given freedom to flourish under British colonial rule. The political system that Britain introduced under the 1882 constitution gave the Orthodox community participation in the administration of the island, but, in doing so, formalised ethnic divisions and gave an impetus to bi-national consciousness. The relations that had developed between Muslims and Christians during Ottoman rule became transformed under British rule. Each of the communities was endowed with certain 'national' attributes and regarded as a 'natural extension' of Greece and the Ottoman Turks respectively – and this was reflected in (and reinforced by) the constitution itself. In the Legislative Council each ethnic group was given proportional representation, with Britain maintaining ultimate control. There were nine Greek-Cypriot, three Turkish-Cypriot and six British members, which gave Britain the deciding say in any ethnic conflict.

In addition to writing in inter-communal divisions at the level of political representation, the constitution also gave the Greek community the right to fly the Greek flag in opposition to the Ottoman flag. In education, Britain encouraged a rapid expansion of schools organised on religious lines (with separate schools for Muslims, Orthodox, Catholics, Armenians and Maronites), forcing the two main communities to become dependent for personnel and literature on mainland Greece and Turkey. This, in turn, exacerbated existing group differences and fostered national political elites concerned with protecting the political interests of their own communities.

Enosis - the form of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and its constituents

Enosis, the form that Greek-Cypriot nationalism took under British rule, was expressed in mass political action for the first time in the 'great October events' of 1931, when the Governor's house in Nicosia was burnt down. This led to the instigation of direct rule and the abandonment of the constitution. The main disturbances were triggered by the resignation of the Bishop of Kitium from the Legislative Council on 17 October over the imposition of crippling taxes. They were led by the Church, which was clearly nationalist and opportunist, although the young Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK formed in 1926) was also implicated, some of its leading members indeed being outlawed or exiled.

Although Enosis was a social movement which was founded on chauvinist ideological constituents and aimed at the enlargement and greater glory of the Hellenic world, the movement also represented a struggle against colonialism, and it was partly through this struggle that the Orthodox Church was able to transform Enosis into a mass movement.

The material conditions for this transformation must be located in the extreme economic exploitation and oppression of the Cypriot peasantry and the discrimination against indigenous capital. The bourgeois elements, the merchants and intermediaries, had an interest in fighting colonial rule, because the British colonialists clearly privileged British capital at the expense of local capital.⁶ The Greek Legislative Council members were, of course, drawn from this class. In 1926 Sir Ronald Storr, noted that eight of the Greek members were advocates (three of them moneylenders, one landowner/moneylender),

one was a merchant, one was a farmer and one was a Bishop – the Bishop of Kitium, who was the most politically active member and the effective leader of the Orthodox contingent.

Since the Archbishop was regarded as the leader of the Orthodox community and the Church played a dominant role in the Legislative Council, it became the agency for the pursuit of Greek interests and there was thus an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the Church leaders. In addition, the bourgeoisie could readily take to an ideology based on elitist and reactionary elements, specially since Enosis would facilitate its growth as a bourgeois class unhampered by a colonial power which disadvantaged it. It is interesting that British capital in this instance did not seek for the cooperation of local capital. The failure to begin to develop a true comprador bourgeoisie was related to the limited extent to which colonialism found a truly 'economic' expression, for it was political domination that the British sought to maintain and military power was sufficient for this.

The peasantry, on the other hand, was at the mercy of the merchant/intermediary class and to articulate its opposition to this class, the British sought to appeal to the peasantry through the encouragement of credit cooperative societies. However, Britain's failure to ease the crippling colonial taxation prevented an alliance with the peasantry, which was also being hit by the economic crisis of the 1930s. Economic discontent found, in part, its expression in anti-colonialist and 'nationalist' sentiments in the 1931 riots. Thus, anti-colonialism and nationalism were firmly married in the consciousness and political action of the Greek-Cypriot peasant and working class. Enosis, despite the nature of its specific formulation by the powerful leaders of the Church and the bourgeoisie, also contained within itself national-liberationist and anti-colonialist tendencies which were to achieve expression within the national-liberation struggle of 1955-60.

After 1931 Enosis was not only the official ideology of the Church but also of the Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie and large sections of the peasantry and working class, thus setting it up as the dominant form of Greek-Cypriot ethnic consciousness. Its constituent elements were the following:

(a) A resurrection and amplification of a Hellenistic Megali Idea tradition – which was originally forged in Greece in opposition to Ottoman rule. Thus, it was an affirmation of 'Greekness', as opposed to 'Turkishness' or 'heathenism'. Religious and linguistic ingredients were present; it was a unification of all Greek-speaking and Greek Orthodox lands that was posited – a Graikos (Greek) was Greekspeaking and Christian Orthodox.

(b) Enosis was also formulated as a political ideal of national liberation from the colonial rule of the British. What Greek-Cypriots opposed was the 'enforced' and 'illegitimate' rule and economic exploitation of a 'foreign' bourgeoisie and 'foreign' capital – this was indeed also to find expression in the socialist movement. However, although it was national-liberationist, in as much as it sought freedom from British colonial rule, it nevertheless sought incorporation into another nation-state which was seen to be its legitimate ruler – Greece. The conception of national 'freedom' thus differs from that of most secessionist nationalist movements.

(c) Ethnic consciousness in Cyprus was able, at the popular level, to articulate class elements. This occurred through the development of the progressive movement in Cyprus, which was able to see national liberation as a first stage in the struggle against the international bourgeoisie. But nationalist ideas came to be over-represented in the class struggle in a way which prevented the complete development of horizontal class interests in the struggle for independence.

The development of class ideology

The Cypriot Communist Party (KKK – known as AKEL since 1941) was formed officially in Limassol on 15 August 1926. Its slogan from its inception was 'A united anti-British front of Greek and Turks'. The events of October 1931 led to the outlawing of KKK and many of its leading members were imprisoned or exiled. An authoritarian and oppressive exercise of colonial rule under the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Richard Palmer, ensued. In the period 1931-41 communism was channelled into the syndicalist movement (known as PSE until 1946 and then PEO, the Pancyprian Federation of Labour). It re-emerged as AKEL (the Progressive Party of Cyprus) in 1941, which by 1946 had become the strongest single political party in Cyprus, winning the majority of seats in local elections in five major cities.

The social basis of KKK and AKEL is to be located within the peasant and industrial working class and has always been local or village based. The roots of this village-based support are found under colonialism when conditions were poor, and there was poverty, squalor, primitive housing and complete dependence on the merchant broker and debt-collector. In the 1920s a small group of individuals with a left ideology created clubs in certain villages which educated villagers into 'socialist' developments and fostered political ties, utilising preexisting family and village social networks. These individuals were actively involved in local struggles.

The development of KKK is linked to the growth of syndicalism, which took off in the 1930s. The economic crisis of 1929-34 was instrumental in the development of class consciousness, for thousands of peasants were transformed into proletarians and came to the towns from rural areas. There was a rapid growth of PSE, with membership rising from 2,544 in 1935 to 12,961 in 1945.⁷ With PEO, formed in 1946, there was common struggle with Turkish Cypriots. In the famous mining strike at Maurovouni, against the American Mining Corporation, 700 of the 2,100 on strike were Muslims.

According to British government sources, KKK took only an indirect and belated part in the 1931 uprising, using the event to launch its own campaign for national liberation. Certainly, after 1931 KKK and later AKEL, stressed the national issue almost exclusively, for the questions of socialism and national liberation were theorised in terms of the Leninist position – the national liberation struggle being the first stage in the struggle for socialism. There is no doubt that this implied, although it did not formally specify, union with Greece. There were various theorisations possible for supporting Enosis. First, there was the strategic question of building socialism with Greece, rather than on the small island of Cyprus, and the joining of the struggles of Greek workers and Cypriot workers. The communist uprisings in Greece in 1937 and 1947 favoured this argument. Secondly, there was the 'realistic' political ground that Greek-Cypriots would choose to join forces with what was by now regarded by Greek-Cypriots as the Greek 'Motherland'. AKEL's explicit position on Enosis was shifting, and unsympathetic observers have seen its sporadic support for Enosis as opportunist - for example, in 1950, when it supported the Church plebiscite which showed almost universal Greek-Cypriot support for Enosis.

As Crouzet has shown,⁹ both the right and left were drawn into the Enosis movement, for no group could denounce the form in which nationalism/anti-colonialism was articulated – since to be opposed to one was to oppose the other. It was the theoretical and necessary link established between these two analytically different positions that was responsible for this. AKEL's mass support, which was partly an effect of its local participation in economic and class struggle, was also bounded by the traditional authority of the Church and its linkages with the 'national' or 'internal' bourgeoisie. The educational system, dominated by the Church and by Greek mainland texts and ideas, is involved here, as is the role of the village priest in local affairs and in gaining peasants' allegiance.

The support, then, for AKEL was always at best an economic/ local/practical based support, rather than expressing a level of socialist political consciousness that could allow for a recognition of the chauvinist element in the Enosis ideology. What AKEL was unable to provide was the ideological leadership necessary – in particular, it failed to develop a positive practice in relation to the Turkish-Cypriot population, for whom Enosis would have meant political subjugation. Greek national and Turkish national conflicts served as a reminder to Turkish-Cypriots of the possibilities of such subjugation - as, for example, the fate of the Turkish population in Rhodes and Kos appeared to testify.

AKEL's policy on Enosis was effectively to support it as the pragmatic outcome of self-determination. Such a policy has to be judged in terms of its political effects and in terms of unifying the working class and should be voluntary for that class. But Enosis, as it was formulated, could only be voluntary for a section of the population and was increasingly unpalatable to the Turkish-Cypriot minority. During the 1940s and 1950s the anti-communist taint also grew – the Church and Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie using it to cut across horizontal class allegiances. Enosis was a reactionary form of nationalism, since it joined the proletariat and bourgeoisie of each community and kept the proletarians of those communities apart.

More and more, Enosis came to express spiritual, religious and anti-Turkish sentiments. AKEL's failure, despite its avowed proletarian internationalism, was its inability effectively to neutralise these sentiments and to incorporate Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot workers fully into the anti-colonial and 'socialist' or 'class' struggle. This was due to its 'pragmatic' support for self-determination, which was known to imply Enosis, and its practical failure to oppose Hellenistic chauvinism. It was also a result of certain developments within the Turkish-Cypriot community itself, which we now turn to.

Turkish-Cypriot nationalism

In terms of political practice, there can be no doubt concerning the disastrous effects of the Enosis movement in the development of ethnic conflict and the growth of a polarised bi-nationalism in Cyprus. Turkish-Cypriot anti-Enosists had existed in the early part of this century, but these came mainly from the Turkish-Cypriot urban elite who favoured the continuation of British rule. Even after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism remained dormant. In 1924, Headlam Morlay, the official British historian could write: 'The Mahometan population, being as they were a minority, regarded British rule as a safeguard and accepted the new situation [annexation], showing no tendency to identify themselves with the Turks.'¹⁰

However, in the 1930s, and particularly in the 1940s, as the Enosis movement gained in strength, there grew a concomitant Turkish-Cypriot nationalism fostered by Turkish extremist elements, which was primarily a response to the form that Enosis was taking. Developments in Turkey also had an impact. Turkey's reputation as the strongest power in the Middle East was enhanced during the 1930s, and the conclusion of the Montreux Convention in 1936 testified to her international status. It was inevitable that the Turkish nationalist movement in Cyprus would be boosted by the success of Ataturk's revolution. In addition, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism was purveyed by the educational system, which was staffed and organised through Turkey.

The 1940s also witnessed the growth of separate Turkish-Cypriot political parties and trade unions. Although many Turkish-Cypriots belonged to AKEL, the pro-Islamic Turkish National Party in Cyprus gained in strength, partly due to the equivocation of AKEL over Enosis. The first Turkish-Cypriot trade union was formed in 1943 with the Nicosia Turkish Carpenters' Trade Union, which had a membership of forty-three. By 1945 there were thirteen Turkish trade unions, with a membership of 843, although this was considerably less than the number of Turkish workers in PEO; and even in 1955, while there were still about 3,000 Turkish workers in PEO.¹¹

By 1948, Turkish-Cypriot leaders were demanding the return of Cyprus to Turkey, 'its previous suzerain and nearest neighbour, who is in a better position than any other neighbouring state to defend it'.¹²

In December 1949, 15,000 Turkish-Cypriots marched through the Turkish quarter of Nicosia in opposition to Enosis. It was not, however, until 1955 that the Turkish national cry for partition or Taksim took off as a main Turkish-Cypriot demand. The notion of partition was the full expression of Turkish-Cypriot ethnicity, but had in fact been raised formally in 1955 by the British.¹³ Britain encouraged Turkey's claim to Cyprus (renounced in 1923 at the Lausanne Conference) in order to contain Greek and Greek-Cypriot pressures and by emphasising the important strategic needs of the western alliances.

The growth of ethnic conflict

On 1 April 1955, EOKA (Union of Cypriot Fighters), the Greek-Cypriot rightist guerrilla movement, launched its attack on British rule under the leadership of Dhigenis (General Grivas), and it is important to consider the implications of this for ethnic conflict.

For one thing, the activities of the British during the 1955-9 EOKA struggle helped to cement even further inter-communal divisions. As well as encouraging the idea of partition, Britain used large numbers of Turkish-Cypriots as auxiliary policemen and specially trained commandoes during this 'Emergency Period'. More significantly, by 1958, Turkish-Cypriot nationalists, possibly under the direction and pay of the colonial government, began military activities with their organisation TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation). According to Kyrris,¹⁴ a considerable number of Turkish-Cypriot auxiliary policemen were members and collaborated with the local agents of the British intelligence service. The British in 1955 had allowed the formation of

Kuçuk's party – 'The Cyprus is Turkish Party' – which began to emphasise the Turkish claim to Cyprus. In the ensuing conflict between the two communities, the activities of EOKA and TMT finally split the tenuous horizontal links between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, as the two military organisations took up a distinctly anti-communist position so that Turkish-Cypriot workers were forced to leave PEO and AKEL. The failure of AKEL, the self-avowed revolutionary party, to emerge as the leader of the independence struggle removed the only possibility that Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots could be integrated in a common fight.

Yet it is doubtful if AKEL was in a position to integrate Turkish-Cypriot workers and peasants into the national struggle. This was partly due to its implicit assent with Enosis, and also to its theorisation of Turkish-Cypriots not as a political representational group but as a 'minority' with common interests to Greek-Cypriots. They were thus to be left to the mercy, politically, of a possible Greek nation state that could not yet be proletarian internationalist.* Partly, though, it was due to AKEL's inability to enter into Turkish-Cypriot communities and, after Independence, its inability to attempt at the local level to break down the inter-communal divisions, which had been legitimised through the Independence agreements - or indeed prevent them from being further amplified. AKEL has always been extremely careful not to alienate popular nationalist feelings, justifying this theoretically by the need to maintain 'democratic' support. In addition, it failed to take up effectively and consistently the issue of economic conditions in the Turkish-Cypriot sector, which were, on the whole, less developed. Nor did it struggle for an integrated educational system or for the breaking of religious-based and dominated ideas and their divisive effects. Of course, it is clear that there were practical constraints, such as the TMT and EOKA terrorism and also the facts of religious and educational practices. However, the 'class' element was too bound to the 'ethnic' category at the level of political practice for a socialist organisation to act effectively.

Ethnic divisions and conflicts were thus structured by the growth of the Enosis movement, the utilisation of Turkish-Cypriots to counter Greek-Cypriot demands by the British, the increasing involvement of Ankara and the interests of Turkey in the dispute and the development of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism and claims for Taksim. Enosis and Taksim stood in opposition as the representation of Greek-Cypriot

^{*}This is partly a problem of marxist theories, of the failure to consider the full import of ethnic and national divisions and *how* they should be used strategically to further the cause of 'socialism'. To write them away by effectively arguing that divisions are reactionary and should not exist does not advance the common struggle.

and Turkish-Cypriot ethnicity. Ethnic divisions were further to be exacerbated by the Independence agreements of 1959-60 which made up the Zurich Agreement.

The Zurich Agreement established the form of the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and set up three treaties allowing the retention of colonial rule, albeit in a different form.¹⁵ The Treaty of Establishment defined the territory of the Republic and gave Britain two major military bases on the south shore of the island and thirty-two other points all over Cyprus, in total representing 3 per cent of the island.

The Treaty of Alliance provided for a permanent presence of Greek and Turkish troops on the island, initially comprising 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers, and set up a tripartite headquarters (with Cyprus) to control military contingents on the island.

The Treaty of Guarantee prohibited either union or partition and states:

In the event of a breach of the provision of the present treaty, Greece, Turkey and the UK undertake to consult together with respect to the representation or measures necessary to ensure observance of these provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

This was to allow Turkey in 1974 to invade Cyprus on just such a pretext. The Treaty of Guarantee especially linked constitutional developments in Cyprus to the interests of the guarantor powers, for they could intervene *if they believed* that the state of affairs created by the Treaty had been changed. In addition, the development of a Cypriot national consciousness was made almost impossible by the legitimation of separate Greek and Turkish ethnicity through their military presence. This Treaty also had the significant effect of establishing Greek rights in Cyprus and formally re-establishing Turkish rights in Cyprus ceded in 1923.

Thus, while formal internal state power was passed to indigenous hands, the three treaties curtailed the autonomy of local developments and gave right of interference to three foreign powers – so extending colonial domination from one state to three. Colonialism in Cyprus has always taken a 'political' form. As Sir Ronald Storrs, ex-Governor of Cyprus, says in his autobiography: 'England occupied Cyprus for strategic and imperial purposes.'

The constitution of 1960 established thoroughgoing bicommunalism in all spheres and all levels of government. For example, the Turkish-Cypriots (18 per cent of the population) were given 30 per cent parliamentary representation, with fifteen out of fifty seats. The president was always to be 'Greek' and the vice-president a 'Turk'. each elected by his own community, deriving authority from each and responsible and accountable to them. Bi-communalism was also written into the Civil Service and security forces (70:30 Greek/Turkish) and in the army (60:40) and at every level of government and administration.

Clearly such constitutional provisions required a great deal of collaboration and agreement between the communal representatives to work. Within three years these had broken down, the Turkish-Cypriots withdrawing from government and forming Turkish enclaves. One of the problems was that Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders conceptualised the constitution in different ways. The Turkish-Cypriots endowed it with a federal character and saw it as protecting their rights – they thus argued for its rigid implementation. Greek-Cypriots saw it as representing the interests of Turkey and other foreign nations and giving unfair representation to Turkish-Cypriots. They indeed desired an integrated unitary state. In fact, Makarios, the first President of the Republic, still publicly expressed support for the Hellenic ideal, which was hardly conducive to ethnic cooperation. The Turkish-Cypriots clung to their constitutional rights tenaciously and the crunch came when President Makarios issued constitutional proposals to amend them, which led to inter-communal fighting, the entry of Turkish troops and the de facto withdrawal in 1963 of Turkish-Cypriots.

Ethnic politics

Given the role of the constitution in the amplification of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, it is important to consider how the political parties within the two communities reacted. After the first presidential elections, when Archbishop Makarios won a decisive victory, largely through the public acclaim of his EOKA involvement, a 'patriotic front' was formed which united all Greek-Cypriot political groupings, including AKEL. Makarios sought AKEL's support in the interests of the overall unity of Greek-Cypriots, irrespective of ideological differences, with the aim of building Greek-Cypriot strength to fight the constitutional structure decided at Zurich. Makarios's 'patriotic front' was thus premised on ethnic unity. The practical activities of the 'patriotic front' centred around the constitution and this could hardly appeal to the Turkish-Cypriots. The constitutional amendments proposed by Makarios in 1963, with the full support of the 'patriotic front', could not guarantee the positive discrimination in favour of Turkish-Cypriots that they required.

The Cypriot bourgeoisie was mainly Greek and there were always more wealthy individuals within the Greek-Christian population than the Muslim. In 1963 only 15 per cent of all car-owners were Turkish-Cypriot. In 1961 the average per capita income of Turkish-

Cypriots was 20 per cent lower than for Greek-Cypriots – indicating the higher number of Greek commercial and professional workers. Turkish-Cypriots also remained disproportionately concentrated in government employment, and were more urban than Greek-Cypriots – a result of their position under Ottoman rule as administrators and their subsequent orientation towards this. Under British colonialism, Greek-Cypriots developed commercially, whereas Turkish-Cypriots remained mainly peasants or administrators.

The 'popular unity' that all Greek-Cypriot political parties participated in until 1974 was an ethnically constructed one. From 1960 to 1974 the 'class' element also submerged itself in Makarios' party, which made political cooperation between the two communities even more difficult.

The rejection of Makarios' constitutional amendments by the Turkish-Cypriots in later 1963 was followed by violent clashes between the two communities which led to the withdrawal of Turkish-Cypriots into separate enclaves. During the next three years there was a gradual settling down of the two communities to their respective and separate lives, only for the violence to emerge once again in 1967. Turkish threats of invasion in support of the Turkish-Cypriot minority were effectively removed by the force of international opinion in 1964 and 1967; on the latter occasion, it was also a condition that Athens withdraw illegal mainland troops. In this period US and NATO plans to partition the island were also consistently rejected by the Greek-Cypriots. After 1967 inter-communal clashes effectively ceased until 1974 (inter-communal talks had begun in 1968).

From the time of the two communities' separation - in effect partition - the economic position of Turkish-Cypriots worsened in relation to that of the entrepreneurial Greek-Cypriot community. Behind the barricaded Turkish sector the activities of TMT and the pressure from Ankara ensured that the Turkish-Cypriots were effectively united in their opposition to the constitutional arrangements envisaged by Makarios. Yet there were political divisions within the Turkish-Cypriot community which had their origins in pre-independence Cyprus and which eventually emerged in the early 1970s with the more or less simultaneous formation of the National Unity Party (NUP) and the Republican Turkish Party (RTP). NUP, the right-wing party of Rauf Denktash, was pro-Turkish and favoured an independent Turkish state of Cyprus. RTP, a left-wing party with informal links with EDEK (The Socialist Party) and AKEL on the Greek side, favoured a united Cyprus, albeit with strong safeguards for the security and rights of the Turkish minority.

It has been argued that during the boom period of the 1960s Makarios began to take a long-term view of the Cyprus problem, namely, that in the end the Turkish-Cypriots would be drawn back into mainstream Cypriot life for economic reasons. Ironically, this view could never be tested because of political developments within the Greek-Cypriot community. After the 1967 inter-communal clashes, General Grivas, the former leader of EOKA, was forced to leave the island, but he returned in 1971 to campaign for Enosis once again through the formation of EOKA B. This period was marked by violent clashes within the Greek-Cypriot community and several attempts on the life of Makarios by the ultra-right pro-Enosis EOKA B. The death of Grivas in early 1974 did not diminish the aims or tactics of EOKA B, which probably had the support of officers within the Greek National Guard. In July 1974. after Makarios had publicly accused the Colonels in Athens of being in league with EOKA B. he demanded that the mainland officers (650) and half the National Guard of 10,000 be withdrawn. A few days later, on 15 July, the Junta-dominated National Guard attacked the Archbishop's palace and took control of the island. Makarios once again survived and escaped to Akrotiri, from where he was airlifted to safety. After the coup, Sampson, with the support of the Athens' Junta, became President. Turkey, already in dispute with Greece over the Aegean, used the coup as the pretext for intervention and subsequent territorial expansion.

Recent developments

Events since 1974 have led to a stalemate on the Cyprus problem. Attempts to mediate by the then UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, with proposals for inter-communal discussion repeatedly failed to produce any agreement. Whenever the two sides have got together for peace talks the same stumbling blocks have emerged time and again. The Greek-Cypriots want a federal solution to the constitutional form of the state, while the Turkish Cypriots, led by Denktash and under the influence of Ankara, have favoured a tenuous confederation of two separate states.

It was not until August 1981 that the Turkish side finally came forward with firm proposals for a settlement to the Cyprus problem. It was proposed that about 4 per cent of the territory occupied by the Turks should be returned to the Greeks, which would allow about 40,000 refugees (out of perhaps 180,000) to return home. On the constitutional issue, the Turks proposed that there should be equality between the two communities in the Central Cabinet and in the administration of a united Cyprus, with the post of President alternating between a Turk and a Greek. These proposals were totally unacceptable to the Greek side and were firmly rejected.

There can be no simple solution to the Cyprus problem, largely because the dispute is manifested at several levels, but also because the years of conflict and violence have left the two communities in a state

of mistrust. Yet there are signs of a genuine desire to resolve the Cyprus problem by members of both communities on the island and this is reflected in recent political developments. On the Greek side, in the months immediately following the invasion there was an attempt to recreate a united popular front to negotiate with the Turks. The first elections after the invasion took place in 1976 and an alliance of AKEL (the Communist Party), EDEK (the Socialist Party of Lysarides) and the Democratic Party of Kyprianou took all the seats, depriving Clerides and his right-wing Rally Party of any parliamentary representation. Any possibility that a solution to the Cyprus problem could be achieved at this time, which would have required the Greek-Cypriots to make concessions to the Turks who were negotiating from a position of strength, was set back by the death of Makarios in 1977. The new President, Kyprianou, could not claim the same widespread popular support as his predecessor and was in no position to concede the safeguards that the Turks demanded and that Makarios may have been able to make.

The elections of 1981 revealed the extent to which Greek-Cypriot politics had become fragmented. AKEL had 32.8 per cent of the vote (12 seats), Rally Party 31.9 per cent (12), Democratic Party 19.5 per cent (8) and EDEK 8.2 per cent (3). The alliance between AKEL and Kyprianou's Democratic Party has survived the 1981 elections, but EDEK has begun to take a more independent line. Furthermore, in the presidential elections of February 1983 there was a three-way contest between Kyprianou, who got 56.5 per cent of the vote, Clerides, with 33.9 per cent and Lysarides, with 9.5 per cent. They each represent a different view on the Cyprus problem. Lysarides adopts a somewhat uncompromising position and is in favour of a solution based on the UN resolution, with refugee rights fully safeguarded and the right to settlement, property and free movement guaranteed. Kyprianou, the re-elected President, in alliance with AKEL, stresses the need to find a negotiated, federal solution through the inter-communal talks. Clerides takes a similar line to Kyprianou on the federal issue, but favours a more 'western' position on foreign policy. These obvious divisions within the Greek-Cypriot community represent an important change since the days of almost total support for Enosis, but the overwhelming support for Kyprianou may indicate a gradual willingness, other interested parties permitting, to find an acceptable long-term solution to the problem.

There are similar signs of a softening of the Turkish-Cypriot position on the problem. In the early days of the self-declared Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, there was a widespread belief among Turks that perhaps the Cyprus problem had been resolved once and for all. Developments within the Turkish sector, however, have shown these views to be too simplistic. There is discontent in the Turkish sector with the lack of economic progress, the high levels of unemployment, the uncertainty of refugees from the south living in occupied areas and the continuous interference of Ankara in domestic issues. In the elections of June 1981,16 Denktash's NUP, which in the past has taken a pro-Turkish position and stressed the need for an independent Turkish state of Cyprus, obtained less than 50 per cent of the vote. It is, perhaps, significant that even Denktash and his party no longer openly state the pro-Turkish position, recognising that it is unrealistic. The main opposition, the Communal Liberation Party (CLP) obtained 28.5 per cent of the vote in 1981, coming some way behind NUP, while advocating a negotiated solution. Nevertheless, there are fundamental differences even between CLP and the various Greek positions, since they argue for a weak central government or confederation, which no one in the south of the island is willing to concede at the moment. Moreover, even if a confederation is agreed, there remains the issue of who will secure the boundaries and how far freedom of movement will be permitted.

There is, however, another crucial level of involvement in the Cyprus problem that constrains the Cypriots themselves - namely that created by the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 and the de facto occupation of the north by Turkey in 1974. Turkey has been arguing for the past thirty years that its national security would be threatened if Cyprus became part of Greece and the approaches to the southern ports of Antalya, Mersin and Iskenerun were therefore dominated by Greece. For this reason, many Greek-Cypriots fear that Turkey's long-run objective is to take over the whole of the island, and her treatment of eight million Kurds within Turkey, who are denied even the freedom to speak their own language, shows clearly that Ankara would be willing to carry out mass oppression under the excuse of the national interest. Any action by Turkey on Cyprus, however, has to take account of Greece, one of the other Guarantor Powers. Relations between Greece and Greek-Cypriots have improved considerably since the election of Papandreou in 1981, who has emphasised the priority of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. At this level of Turkish-Greek relations it is difficult to envisage any agreement over the Cyprus problem without some progress being made over Aegean rights, which itself may depend on the extent of oil and other mineral deposits to be found there. There is also the vital question of political developments in Turkey itself, and until the restoration of civilian democratic government one cannot anticipate any concessions being made on Cyprus.

Finally, there are the interests of NATO to be taken into account. At the moment these are protected by the Treaty of Establishment, which gives Britain two major military bases on this strategically vital island. But in the long-run the existence of the bases is uncertain as both AKEL and the Democratic Party are committed to dismantling them. An independent Cyprus might establish links with the USSR. This

possible outcome is given credence in US circles because of the continued widespread electoral support achieved by AKEL. Furthermore, long-term US interests require that Greece and Turkey co-exist peacefully within NATO. This scenario would seem to suggest that the US and Britain would be opposed to any solution to the Cyprus problem that would not guarantee NATO strategic interests, and that this might best be achieved by a permanent Turkish and/or Greek presence on the island.

The prospects for an agreement between the two communities in Cyprus, which is arrived at without coercion and within the spirit of the UN resolution, seem to be daunting, but not hopeless. It is impossible to go back to the situation as it was prior to 1974 and means have to be established to provide the Turkish minority with the rights and safeguards they need, whilst giving Greek-Cypriots the freedom to return to the homes and land they have occupied for centuries.

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- 15 For details, see *Cyprus* (Cmnd 1093, HMSO, July 1960). For a fuller discussion of the effects of the constitution on internal political developments, see F. Anthias and R. Ayres, 'Constitutional struggle in Cypriot left politics', paper presented to the BSA Conference, 1979.
- 16 For details, see Friends of Cyprus, Report (No. 23, Winter 1981-2).

Notes and documents

Lyrics by The Flying Turkey

Freedom Day

Revolution, Revolution they cry, Everybody fighting, don't know who go die. Tuesday March 13th, 1979 Is a day every West Indian will bear in mind, When a people driven with their backs to the wall Responded in answer to their leaders' call, Smooth and efficient, spontaneous was their cry, No one was afraid then to die. The people from the ghetto, Lord, The people from the town, The country areas everywhere The people moved like one Forging towards their destiny And the dawn of a new day, Our new and bright dimension Is really here to stay.

Chorus:

The people call it FREEDOM DAY Old people say FREEDOM DAY Young people say FREEDOM DAY I and I say FREEDOM DAY

The N.J.M. say FREEDOM DAY¹ The Rastaman say FREEDOM DAY The P.R.A. say FREEDOM DAY² We going with FREEDOM DAY For Justice, Equality, Equal opportunity For evermore Grenadians say FREEDOM DAY!

The soldiers of justice all ready to fight, Worked smooth and efficiently all through the night. While thousands were home sleeping deep in their bed Freedom fighters rendered their blood to be shed. With the grace of the masses and the cry of the poor The guns of the downpressed we saw victory's door. Prophecy fulfilled when at our leaders' call Once more did a dictator fall, And a joyful sound of freedom rose from a land made to suffer, The people rose in unity and placed hands together, A consciousness rose deep within their hearts and very souls, Motivated their actions and made them move so bold.

Liberation, liberation at last! Long live the struggles of the working class! With patriotism and dedication We rise every morning to meet the morning sun. 'Forward ever, backward never!' is our cry If we can't be free now then we'd rather die, The struggle is long, hard and we'll feel the pain, But we'll labour and hold the reins! And let the children of Revolution rise In a land that's free from fear, To learn to live in unity, to learn to work and share. And even while our enemies try to divide and pull us down We'll defend to the end, we'll make no compromise, Our process is too sound.

Innocent Blood

In a revolution some people are weak While others are strong, Listen to my song.

^{1.} N.J.M.: New Jewel Movement

^{2.} P.R.A.: People's Revolutionary Army

The weak turn to counter-revolution Subversion and destabilisation. It's the strong ones to stand firm and make things right, Show to the weak why we must unite. The weak, them they don't know Who they fighting for, Moving aimlessly, in a senseless war, Murdering their people Innocent along the way But we are go whip them So listen when I say.

They don't care about the children In this here time, They don't care about the children, oh no. I say they preaching war. Say what they kill them for? Bernadette, Laurice and Laureen.¹

In a revolution some people are right While others are wrong Listen to my song. The wrong always feel that they have it right, That they are correct, so they want to fight. It's the right ones to lead them and show them the way, They get more confused each and every day. Their opportunism and reaction too, Show these our brothers, their dirty works to do Turn them into robots, puppets on a string, They kill their own sisters And they don't care a thing.

In a revolution there will be progress Pain, sorrow and fun, Listen to my song. The joy of the years will be mixed with tears Bitter and sweet, as we move along. The genuine ones stand firm to the end, We understand that we must defend. But in 1980, the 19th. of June.

^{1.} Bernadette, Laurice, Laureen: three teenage girls killed by counter-revolutionary bomb blast, 19 June 1980.

Imperialism on that afternoon Raised their cruel hands And innocent blood get shed And now Bernadette, Laurice and Laureen are all dead.

Look what they do to Alister² Tell me, what they do that for? Alister blood was innocent blood Rupert Bishop, he was innocent too. I say, innocent blood spill in Angola Innocent blood spill in Jamaica Innocent blood spill in Havana Innocent blood spill in Grenada Innocent blood in Guatemala Innocent blood in Nicaragua Innocent blood in El Salvador Innocent blood spill in Vietnam

Stop the tribal war I tell you say, a war leaves scars, The four people were going in a car They pick up them gun and they open fire I tell you say a murder on the land! Black people you should never, never fight Sometimes, you know, you got to defend your rights I say to go there with your tribal war. You keep on shooting everybody down I say you wouldn't see the rising sun.

Harold Strachan blood was innocent blood Stanislaus blood was innocent blood³ Walter Rodney blood was innocent blood Steve Biko blood was innocent blood Romero blood was innocent blood Lalsee blood was innocent blood Courtney blood was innocent blood Evon Charles blood was innocent blood.

^{2.} Alister Strachan, Rupert Bishop, Harold Strachan: victims of Gairy's terror in the 1970s.

^{3.} Stanislaus, Lalsee, Courtney, Evon Charles: victims of counter-revolutionary violence, November 1980.

Africa

I heard my brothers' voices calling me from afar I heard the big drums rolling way back in Africa, I heard my people crying 'invasion in our land!' And then colonialism put in its ugly hand. They tortured, they raped, stole our identity And since then our people are fighting to be free.

Chorus:

We shall struggle on and on TO LIBERATE AFRICA Every day fighters are born TO LIBERATE AFRICA Now in the name of N'krumah TO LIBERATE AFRICA My people say Forward Ever TO LIBERATE AFRICA

The diamonds of Namibia, the gold of Zimbabwe, The freedom of my people these robbers took away, Racism and Apartheid they brought to our land, Frustration and division foreign to Africans. But my people resisted right from the very start And the great Mau Mau rebellion they felt in their heart.

My people still remember the Sharpeville Massacre The exile to Bantustan, the rapist John Vorster, The murder in Salisbury, the murder in Soweto, The murder in Namibia, the death of Steve Biko. With the rise of Socialism my people know for sure That soon, very soon, we'll walk through freedom's door.

Right here in Grenada there's one thing we can do, To ensure that the struggle in Africa is true. Let's build our Revolution, let's build it night and day, Show Imperialism that progress is here to stay. Forward on our feet, never on our knees, We'll work and build and they will feel the squeeze.

The SAS and popular fiction

Since the siege of the Iranian Embassy in May 1980 the Special Air Service (SAS) has come to occupy an important place in popular consciousness, playing the part of both protector and avenger. Before the siege, the SAS was already renowned for its exploits behind the

German frontline in the Second World War, but its shadowy involvement in Britain's dirty colonial wars had generally been played down. The Regiment very deliberately adopted a low profile because it was considered that the nature of its activities were too politically sensitive. Now, with the storming of the Embassy and the ruthless execution of a number of terrorists who had already clearly given up the fight (they were shot 'as they half-sat, half-lay against a wall'), the Regiment's counter-revolutionary prowess was put on public display for all to see.¹ The siege became a television spectacular that demonstrated, to any who might have doubted it, that the British state was equipped to meet any challenge, to master any 'panic'.

The popular response to the storming of the Embassy prefigured the wave of nationalism and chauvinism that swept over much of the country with the despatch of the South Atlantic Task Force to the Falklands two years later. Certainly, Prime Minister Thatcher's eagerness to share in the glory of the Embassy siege made perfectly clear that her advocacy of military might was not empty rhetoric and suggests that she was well aware that in the political climate of the 1980s military success was a way to rally support for her government. She spent the evening after the storming of the Embassy sitting contentedly on the floor watching the whole affair on television in the company of the SAS Counter-Revolutionary Warfare team.² What was once kept hidden was now put proudly on display. The SAS and the myths that surround it had become an essential element of Thatcherism, a testimony to the government's 'resolute and determined approach' to political problems, to its refusal not to flinch from whatever was necessary to make Britain 'Great' again.

As one of the more detached and sceptical accounts of the Falklands War has observed, in the aftermath of the Embassy siege the SAS became 'a metaphor for efficient violence, in which Britain, rather short of heroes, took an inordinate pride'.³ Inevitably, this compelling metaphor has been taken up in popular fiction and at this moment there are available in bookshops a number of novels about the SAS, with more on the way. It is with the politics of these novels that we are concerned.

Marxists, whenever they have been concerned to examine the field of literature, have generally focused their attention on the classics, on Conrad and Eliot, on the Brontes and Lawrence. They have accepted the bourgeois classification and evaluation of fiction and have been content to fit their own particular analytical methods into an already given framework. This has led to marxists sharing in the critical neglect of popular fiction, of the books read by the majority of the reading public, and has given much marxist literary criticism a drawing-room quality, distancing it from practical considerations. At the present time this is not a luxury we can afford and the criticism of popular fiction must become an area within which marxists are prepared to intervene.

The range of SAS novels extends from the blood and guts, shoot anything that moves volumes of James Albany's Second World War series, 'The Fighting Saga of the SAS' (Pan), through to the more sophisticated thrillers of Gavin Lyall (Pan), whose SAS Major, Harry Maxim, appears to have been given his SAS affiliation almost as an afterthought, as a ritual genuflection in the direction of a popular shibboleth. Albany's novels fall more handily into the category of Second World War fiction and develop the themes and concerns of that particular field, rather than being concerned with the SAS as such. Similarly, Lyall's Maxim novels are in reality thrillers, which pay passing tribute to the power of the SAS metaphor, but do not really develop it. Much more central are Terence Strong's Whisper Who Dares (Coronet) and James Follett's The Tiptoe Boys (Corgi). Both deal with the SAS confronting and defeating terrorism today, in the former in the shape of the Provisional IRA and in the latter in the shape of a Libyan-financed terrorist wing of a CND-style peace movement (I kid you not)! These two books usefully expand and develop the SAS metaphor and provide the basis for an investigation of its working out in fiction.

Follett's The Tiptoe Boys is a study in Thatcherite political paranoia that makes not the slightest effort to hide or moderate its prejudices. The SAS is portrayed as the thin red line confronting a whole array of enemies of the Crown who are out to bring the country down. The actual terrorists are only the most extreme members of this far more widespread conspiracy. The object of Follett's hatred is an anti-nuclear weapons campaign, the People's Lobby, led by Horace Wilberforce Crick, the Anglican Bishop of Camden Town. This organisation involves, we are told, 'all the familar faces': the revolutionary actress, the Troops Out MP, the Trotskyist journalist, the pro-PLO TV commentator ... and three trade union leaders who had called over a million workers out on strike in support of a man sacked for breaking his foreman's nose. Their leader. Crick, is a charlatan and a hypocrite. condemning the Chilean government but not the Polish, being always photographed walking or riding a bike, when in reality he is the owner of a chauffeur-driven limousine. The author's prejudices extend predictably enough to include homosexuals and social workers. especially homosexual social workers. All in all, Follett provides a fairly exhaustive round-up of Daily Telegraph prejudices which he adds up to find the counry deep in the grip of social decay. Festering within this decay is a small group of terrorists who have decided that political violence is the only effective way to bring home to the masses the full horror of nuclear weapons. They intend to capture and hold hostage the British Foreign Secretary, the US Ambassador and the visiting Presidential Strategic Analysis Committee. Their sole demand is that a cruise missile be fired at the Holy Loch submarine base. Only the SAS stands in their way.

The terrorists are highly trained and extremely competent, equipped with modern weapons and advanced technology. They are totally ruthless and kill and mutilate without any qualms whatsoever in order to achieve their aims: when they execute an American Senator, they first of all shoot his testicles off. The terrorists are shown as cruel heartless fanatics, almost as automatons, callously murdering a number of individuals, whereas the Presidential Strategic Analysis Committee, who are happily planning the deaths of hundreds of millions, are perfectly normal decent people with whom it is intended the reader should identify. The novel's caricature of the terrorist does not advance our understanding of terrorism as a political phenomenon, but, of course, it is not intended to. Its purpose is rather to justify the treatment of terrorists as mad dogs. The patent ridiculousness of Follett's particular right-wing fantasy, whereby CND serves as a breeding ground for terrorism, should not lead us to underestimate its potency. It is a reworking of the far more common right-wing characterisation of CND as an ally, unwitting or otherwise, of Soviet imperialism.

Women play an important part in Follett's terrorist organisation: one of the leaders, Frankie, is the daughter of a multi-millionaire, a young, beautiful liberated woman who has been completely drained of conscience and pity by her devotion to the revolutionary cause. She is a sexually-liberated Lady Macbeth. Such an abomination cannot be allowed to live, and at the end of the novel she is executed in cold blood by the SAS hero, Skellen. Another woman terrorist is Helga, a lesbian who delights in killing, and who holds Skellen's family hostage for part of the book. Clearly, as far as Follett is concerned the involvement of women in terrorism is the most unnatural political perversion that he can think of and almost seems to threaten the basis of society on its own. He goes out of his way to try to shock his readers with his account of their part in terrorist operations. The effect of this goes far beyond being a comment on terrorism. In effect, he makes their part in terrorist activities serve as a comment on women's liberation and lesbianism, and of the way in which they can twist and distort even a lovely young woman with everything to live for like Frankie. By means of sleight of hand Follett has managed to move from condemning terrorism to using terrorism as a means of condemning women's liberation and lesbianism. This is really the most pernicious aspect of the novel, because it is not so obvious as the rest of Follett's politics.

John Sutherland in a general discussion of contemporary war novels, has noted the extent to which many of them are 'encrusted ... with a surplus of authenticating detail'.⁴ Follett is no exception and adorns his novel with detailed accounts of modern military hardware and intelligence methods. Prospective revolutionaries will learn from his pages that in the case of high priority targets Special Branch tap not just their target's own personal phone, but every public telephone within a kilometre radius. They use computers programmed to recognise up to a hundred keywords such as 'Bomb', 'Gun', 'National Front', etc., that can simultaneously monitor 10,000 lines. His gripping account of the rescue of Skellen's family from the clutches of the lesbian Helga should be enough to deter even the most foolhardy terrorist from holding hostages: the SAS Counter-Revolutionary Warfare team burn away the brickwork of the house with heavy electrospark machining equipment without alerting Helga, and then burst through the plaster, guns blazing. The actual climax of the novel is an altogether more bloody reworking of the storming of the Iranian Embassy that established the SAS as once again veritable supermen. This striving after pseudo-authenticity seems to have become a compulsory part of this type of novel ever since Frederick Forsyth's The Day of the Jackal.

With Terence Strong's *Whisper Who Dares*, the scene shifts to Ulster and we are confronted with a novel that works on a different level from Follett's. Whereas Follett indulges his political prejudices quite openly, Strong successfully blends his into the narrative and has written a much darker and more powerful novel that can perhaps best be described as an exercise in the pornography of violence.

Strong deals with the herculean efforts of a four-man SAS team. commanded by Captain Jack Ducane, at preventing the Provisional IRA from establishing an elite unit modelled on the SAS and trained and equipped by ex-Green Beret mercenaries. The Irish are incapable of handling the SAS themselves, and with defeat staring them in the face they call in professional help in the form of an American psychopath, McClatcher. The IRA are portrayed as third-rate gangsters, good enough to murder defenceless women and children. but no match for the hardmen of the SAS. The Provo Army Council is shown as a bunch of self-important incompetents, small-minded bigots dealing out death and destruction for their own self-aggrandisement and petty gratification. Moreoever, the book strives after authenticity by giving the Council members the names of actual people, known or suspected members of the real Army Council, for example, Joe Cahill, Seamus Twomey, Billy McKee, Martin McGuiness and, of course, Gerry Adams. McClatcher, however, threatens to change all this and to turn the rather pathetic IRA Volunteers into real fighting men. He has to be stopped, no matter how.

To do this Ducane and his three men raid an IRA training camp deep in the Republic and, after various setbacks, succeed in wiping out the new elite unit before it can go into action. Ducane's men slaughter some forty-five handpicked IRA men and suffer only one fatality themselves (predictably inflicted by McClatcher). They daub the scene of battle with UVF slogans and then slip away. Mrs Thatcher would have been proud of them.

All of the IRA's best efforts are brought to nothing by what Strong calls the 'Paddy Factor', that is the supposed congenital stupidity of the Irish, their inability to get anything right. This causes problems, because if the IRA are to be portrayed as a gang of incompetents with no real support, how can one account for the failure of the British army to defeat them and the need for SAS involvement? Strong overcomes this by showing the army as a well-meaning but blundering military machine neither trained nor equipped to combat a guerrilla force like the IRA. The SAS, however, turn the IRA's own methods against them, only more so. This is just not good enough. In South Armagh, where the novel opens, before SAS deployment, the IRA had killed forty-nine British soldiers without suffering a single fatality themselves. No matter how ill-prepared the British army supposedly was for guerrilla warfare, this was obviously not the work of the sort of organisation Strong describes. Indeed, the British army itself has acknowledged as much. None of Strong's Volunteers show a trace of the idealism that could lead men like Frank Stagg and Bobby Sands to go on hunger strike to the death. He just cannot bear to endow the enemy with any worthy qualities whatsoever. Having diminished the IRA in the eyes of his readers. Strong now introduces McClatcher, whose task it is to convert chosen volunteers into serious opponents. This racist caricature of the IRA informs the whole book.

Whisper Who Dares draws its strength from its powerful graphic descriptions of acts of violence. Early on in the book Ducane's men ambush a carload of Provos and in the shooting, one of them has his head literally shot off. The man's last few heartbeats project a fountain of blood up inside the roof of the car. Later on a young woman, Roisin McGuire, is knee-capped by the IRA and Strong provides a graphic description of the drill biting into her and spewing up blood and gristle flecked with chips of bone. He gives this particular assault the appearance of a rape as the unfortunate victim thrusts her pelvis forward in a grotesque imitation of orgasm. Of course, this can be justified on the grounds of being realistic, as being no more than the truth; after all, two high velocity bullets in the neck would tear someone's head off and blood would spray all over the place, and kneecapping is a bloody brutal affair and a violation, but Strong's writing has the effect not so much of horrifying his readers at the nature of the wounds inflicted, as of thrilling and exciting them. He has written a work of pornography, a novel that is far more insidious than Follett's, by comparison, rather tame effort.

What place is there for women in this world of ambushes, gunfire and smouldering corpses? They are the fighting man's Achilles' heel. Ducane himself is betrayed by his wife, Trish, and another British officer, working undercover, Lieutenant Harrington, is betrayed by the Irish girl, Roisin McGuire. Both women are in the course of the story the victims of rape, Trish by McClatcher and Roisin by a member of the Provisional Army Council, but the frailty of women is such that they enjoy the experience and participate in it. Strong plumbs the murky depths of masculine insecurity, but retribution is at hand. Both women are punished for their betrayals: Trish is murdered and Roisin, as we have seen, is crippled. Follett's attitude towards women seems almost progressive in comparison.

Whereas Follett deals in the politics of the *Daily Telegraph*, Strong's universe is a much more libidinous affair, a universe where killing, torture and bloodshed seem to be the only reality. The book ends unfinished, with McClatcher at large in London and the hunt for him just getting underway. The killing will go on. Violence is what is extolled above all, and, compared to this, Follett's Toryism is a tepid oldfashioned affair. In Strong's charnel house of a universe we can only sleep easy in our beds because the SAS is out there to protect us.

JOHN NEWSINGER

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BULLETIN

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Book reviews

Changing South Africa: political considerations

By SAM C. NOLUTSHUNGU (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1982). 219pp. £6.50 paperback.

'Give us six months and you will be surprised at where the country will stand in six to twelve months' time', declared Vorster towards the end of his career as Prime Minister of South Africa. That he made clear his words did not imply political change did not stop them from feeding much of the talk about change in South Africa. Much of the talk is, of course, a political tactic to buy time, but beneath the talk lie factors which do make change imperative. At least four recent studies have considered these factors as constituting, in a Gramscian sense, an organic crisis and the talk itself as representing the response of the ruling classes to that crisis. This book by Sam Nolutshungu, a black South African, is of the same genre. But it addresses itself not so much to the crisis as to the

attempts to define the place of politics in the general problem of change in South Africa, to indicate how the objective, material inequalities between Blacks and Whites create formidable political problems for any partial resolution of the conflict that is based on elite incorporation, and to illustrate the political and ideological resistances that have been established among Blacks by tradition and the nature of the political terrain.

And it is into these subject areas that each of the three sections of the book falls. This review focuses upon the first section ('Politics and change') because it is there, I believe, the book makes its most important contribution.

Any serious discussion of change in South Africa is influenced by either a liberal democratic or marxist perspective. Thus, it is these two schools of thought which are given attention in the first part of the book. Nolutshungu makes no facile dismissal of liberal democracy, but thinks that its concerns of freedom and democracy are 'selfcommending'; their shortcomings, as indeed there are, can if necessary be overcome by a 'plausible and realistic account of transcendence'. This appears in a footnote early in the book, but it is a sufficiently good warning that he considers the couples freedom/repression and democracy/domination 'central to the idea of politics'. Freedom and democracy, in the context of political change, are in fact his major themes throughout.

Yet Nolutshungu rejects the liberal democratic thesis that democracy is a concomitant of capitalism. This he does by picking up one theme after another from within this school of thought. Discussing 'at the level of empirical common sense' he shows how untenable their positions are. For example, the connection between capitalism and liberal democracy is not inevitable and does not repeat itself everywhere. In the Third World countries primitive accumulation gives rise to a capitalism that is 'red in tooth and claw'. But, above all, liberal democratic thought simply cannot account for change, in particular, large-scale political change. With regard to South Africa, it may concede the failure of capitalism to democratise, but does not consider capitalism as the primary obstacle to democratisation - it conceives apartheid as an unwarranted incumbrance which, when once removed, will allow capitalism free reign to develop democracy. Nolutshungu advisedly uses the word democratisation in contrast to democracy; liberal democratic thought is much preoccupied with the latter as an end-point and not with the process of constructing democracy, a process which in the model countries of liberal democracy has involved struggles, rebellions and revolutions. Liberal democratic thought is silent about class conflict.

It is to a marxist perspective that he turns because marxism is preeminently concerned with large-scale change. But what of the traditionally received notions of economic instrumentalism or determinism associated with marxism? As he puts the concerns of freedom and selfgovernment, concerns which are specifically political, at the heart of the problem of political change, Nolutshungu asks 'how can the marxist view of social change accommodate [these] concerns and, with them, that problem of political change that seems so important for South Africa now?'

A fair representation of Nolutshungu's argument is difficult to make in a summary review. But he sees at issue the definitions of the structure, classes and class struggle. Marx's notion of relations of production does not carry with it a narrow economic sense. It is a legal and political relation as well; the ideological and political superstructures are not only predicated upon the structure of production, they are also conditions of its existence: 'there is a necessary simultaneity between domination and exploitation'. If politics, then, is a condition of existence (and reproduction) of an economic structure, it must also be distinct from the economic aspect of that structure. It is in this respect that Nolutshungu makes a persuasive plea for a recognition of a distinctive and autonomous place for politics, and the implications this has for the problem of political change in South Africa.

He accepts Poulantzas' conception of social classes as determined not only economically by their positions at the point of production but also through ideological and political practices. 'It is simply impossible', he asserts:

to make sense of the ideological and political effectiveness of class divisions, or to understand the real boundaries of classes outside the immediate site of production, unless one recognises that politics and ideology (which are not simple reflections of the economic) also have their important effects on the total meaning of class.

This is a conception of class which is particularly pertinent and, I daresay, deeply subversive of conventional wisdom on the left in South Africa, where class membership and relations of production and of domination are qualified by racial criteria.

To return to politics: if political domination is a condition of existence of exploitative relations, it also requires a 'very definite form of state with a wide range of distinctive political and ideological relations as its supports or corollaries'. This is effected in a variety of forms, but under the particular conditions of settler-colonialism it has always meant a differential co-optation of colonists and the indigenous into the economic system, with the result that the relation of domination is assimilated into the very structure of productive relations 'in a way that defines a distinctive social division of labour'. Conceived in this way, the distinctive and autonomous place of politics in colonial countries becomes 'compellingly evident': 'It is principally in relation to political domination and its very particular effects that nativist and nationalist political resistances arise. These are struggles that, first and foremost, reject the political relations of dominance.'

The importance of Nolutshungu's book is that it provides some basis upon which to theorise our interventions in struggles which, in the words of Sivanandan, are 'not necessarily class, socialist revolutions ... but always against the repressive political state and its imperial backers'. It is, indeed, an answer to his own question as to how the marxist view of social change can – and must – accommodate these specifically political concerns.

London

ROSEINNES PHAHLE

Policing the Riots

Edited by DAVID COWELL, TREVOR JONES and JOCK YOUNG (London, Junction Books, 1982). 172pp. £5.95.

Police Powers and Politics

By ROBERT BALDWIN and RICHARD KINSEY (London, Quartet Books, 1982). 310pp. £9.95.

Policing by Multi-racial Consent: the Handsworth experience

By JOHN BROWN (London, Bedford Square Press, 1982). 174pp. £5.95.

In the wake of the 1981 'riots', community policing is fast becoming the focus for an unholy alliance of 'left' academics, conservative sociologists and voluntary organisations. Differences of opinion notwithstanding, this alliance has its roots in the writings of John Alderson, former Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, and its exegesis in Lord Scarman's inadequate and superficial analysis of inner-city policing.

The first of these three books is a fine piece of British left opportunism in that it consists of an incoherent hotch-potch of papers given at a conference called 'Policing Now', few of which actually deal with the policing of the riots of 1981. The book does contain some contributions of current relevance. Steve Bundred, vice-chair of the Greater London Council's Police Commitee, provides an irrefutable case on economic, political and historical grounds as to why the Metropolitan Police should be made accountable to the London public. Tony Jefferson and Roger Grimshaw deal authoritatively with accountability at a more general, but heavily theoretical, level. Phil Scraton's account of institutionalised racism in the policing of Merseyside serves as a necessary reminder that accountability and policing were issues among working people, white and black, for years, long before the academics got round to talking about them.

As for the other pieces in this volume, they range from the mundane and the banal to the downright dangerous. The former can be safely ignored; the latter must be contested. Jock Young and John Lea attempt to 'take crime seriously' from a left perspective, but do so in a way which not only offers a highly deterministic view of black crime, but accepts without question the police definition of 'the problem'. Not surprisingly, police racism does not figure in their account of the origins of the riots, just as it did not figure in Scarman's. For Young and Lea, repressive policing of inner-city areas is simply a response to rapidly increasing crime.

Even when Young, in another contribution with Richard Kinsey, acknowledges the existence of racism, he tells us that the notion of its

being institutionalised in the police involves a 'quite fundamental mistake'. Police racism, we are told, is a 'cultural rather than an institutional phenomenon' and the police are racist because the working class from which they come is racist.

But even this racism is seen as an aspect of a conflict between 'the respectable working class and what has been traditionally referred to as the lumpen proletariat'. And, whatever that means, its effect is that racism vanishes, and in its place, hey-presto, stands intra-class conflict. This formulation ignores the extent to which British racism has a separate basis in the history of colonialism and imperialism and, more importantly, in the state racism institutionalised in immigration controls and management of the 'black problem' already here.

Baldwin and Kinsey's own book is in much the same mould as the worst of *Policing the Riots*. Despite its title, it lacks any political analysis and, as a result, can only offer a rather sterile account of recent developments in police powers and accountability. Thus, for example, racism – surely a key aspect in the development of contemporary policing – is all but absent, being mentioned only in the introduction (where the Metropolitan Police's use of criminal statistics is quickly passed over) and in the account of the Scarman report. Given such a lack of analysis, it is not surprising that the authors end up, like Scarman, opting for a type of community policing as an alternative to the kind of policing now increasingly used in Britain's urban areas.

Baldwin and Kinsey disagree with John Alderson that the police should have a central and leading role in initiating community action and, correctly, reject any notion that the police have a special role as definers of the social good. But their plea for 'community-based policing' is based on wishful thinking rather than sound analysis. It avoids the fact that, increasingly, the police act as agents of social discipline; it ignores police racism, and misses the point that the police, by virtue of their professionalisation and internal organisation, are most unlikely to play a secondary role in cooperation with other agencies. This is particularly surprising because it also contradicts the lessons of the authors' own research into policing in a major city – that community policing and intelligence gathering are inextricably linked. Take, for example, the job specification for an 'area constable':

He/she should:

a) Secure the services of at least one observer in every street, not a paid professional informant, but someone who knows the inhabitants and is inquisitive enough to find out what is going on and who is willing to pass on such information gained ...

c) cultivate shopkeepers, tradesmen and garage proprietors who are a good source of information;

d) keep observations in parks, playing fields, schools and other places where children congregate.

A major experiment in community policing has, in fact, been carried out in Handsworth, Birmingham. Instrumental in its development was the report of a sociologist with a long and close relationship with the police – John Brown's *Shades of Grey*. That it failed to answer the many allegations of police racism which led to it being commissioned went almost unnoticed. Brown even managed to blame all the area's problems on a couple of hundred Rastas who made life difficult for the police. The first part of this book is, in fact, *Shades of Grey* republished, and it is interesting to note that even the secretary of the charitable trust which commissioned the report has strongly criticised this republication.

The second part of the book is Brown's account of the Handsworth experiment itself. The account is superficial, banal and, above all, uncritical, but it does provide some information about what community policing means in practice: police liaison with schools, involvement with social services departments, running youth clubs, involvement in tenants' associations and other community activities. In short, it shows the reality of what John Alderson has called 'the penetration of the community in a multitude of ways'.

What is more important, perhaps, than the content of the book, is the fact of its publication by the Bedford Square Press, the publishing arm of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, an umbrella group and servicing body for most of Britain's voluntary organisations and charities. At a time when such organisations are increasingly under attack for engaging in 'political' and non-charitable activities, and are increasingly required to make up for the deficiencies of the welfare state, it is particularly invidious that NCVO, far from strengthening the independence of the voluntary sector from government, should be encouraging its further cooption by the police and the state.

London

PAUL GORDON

Black Sportsmen

By ERNEST CASHMORE (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). 212pp. £5.95

'Half the England football team black by 1990?' asks the publicity blurb on the back cover of this book. This apparently innocent question has slotted easily into the racist commonsense about the numbers of blacks in the country and their predilection for sport rather than 'real' work or intellectual pursuits. It has also guaranteed the attentions of the media which has been interested precisely in the scale of the 'infiltration'. Where Thatcher once said the blacks are 'swamping our culture', Cashmore paints a picture of their children swarming all over England's playing fields. Yet he has not enquired seriously into the racist practices in football that will probably prevent his vision being fulfilled; has failed to explain adequately why black champions in British boxing get little recognition and earn below average purses; and because he doesn't take women seriously in any case, is absolutely silent about the all-white complexion of the England netball team.

'Black sportsmen', he says, are indeed better than their white counterparts, not because they have 'natural ability', but because knowing that they have to be at least twice as good to succeed, they work harder. This is one consequence of racism and, contrary to the view Cashmore tries to propound, is true not just of sport but generally. In Cashmore's double-think, however, racism becomes a force for good; acting as a bizarre form of 'natural selection' in which the 'weak' (those who are not twice as good) go to the wall, leaving the 'strong' to emerge as 'super' sports personalities. Sagely, Cashmore reveals that reality is 'complex' and in his desire to reflect this, kindly provides room for the 'weak' to select themselves. Here he draws upon the racist commonsense of the coaches and trainers, who tell him that blacks 'lack bottle'.

Cashmore obligingly constructs this into sociological theory. Although he concedes that the operation of racism in the labour market puts black youth 'at a disadvantage', he argues that this is not the important point. The problem is that Afro-Caribbean youth, at any rate, 'also perceive sharply that this is so'. Apparently oblivious to the high rate of unemployment amongst Asian youth, Cashmore tells us that they view the avenues to success as 'to a large extent unrestricted'. Not only do Afro-Caribbean youth perceive the restrictions, but actually discuss it in their 'peer-group gangs', and in a 'self-fulfilling way it [achievement] does become difficult'. It is not racism that is the problem then, but the knowledge of it! Cashmore goes on. The youth, he explains, merely *perceiving* other avenues to be closed and brooking 'no arguments in favour of deferred gratification', crave success in sport, and if it is not instantaneous their 'bottle goes'; they 'give up and drift away'.

Predictably, he links all of this to the 'crisis of identity' which the recognition of racism supposedly brings. Those who respond to the 'crisis' by playing down their blackness; 'constructing new identities' for themselves as sportsmen and women; and 'trying harder' to pull themselves up by the laces of their running shoes, Cashmore refers to sympathetically as 'well-balanced', 'good mixers with whites' who don't use 'colour as an excuse'. Those who tackle it head on 'with no apology' are referred to as 'bitter' and 'rancorous' people who have withdrawn from (white) society, thereby 'reinforcing the sense of antipathy'. At times he comes close to saying that racism *is* all in the mind.

He saves his most righteous ire, however, for the Afro-Caribbean family, which he caricatures as unstable, disorganised and brutalising, In his view, Afro-Caribbean family life, rather than racism, is the principal source of the youths' problems. By way of contrast, the school is portrayed as a haven of 'reasonableness'. In another piece of Cashmorean double-think, the well-documented miseducation of Afro-Caribbean children is transformed into a philanthropic act, in which 'well-meaning' teachers are doing the kids a favour by 'innocently' channelling them into sport and thereby 'improving the sportsman's life chances generally'. Suggesting that Afro-Caribbean parents do not encourage this involvement in sport, Cashmore condemns them for being 'apathetic' and 'unable to give positive guidance'. Because they do encourage their children to do well in the academic aspects of schooling, he condemns them again for 'doing it in the wrong way'. All the hoary old imagery is here. Either the parents set 'unattainable objectives' for their children, reinforcing these with harsh 'Victorian' punishments; or else, being 'illiterate' they are 'ignorant of educational considerations'. But this is only if the youths are lucky. In the 'many broken-homes' with single working mothers, the children receive only 'neglect' and lack an 'adequate father-figure' to boot.

Cashmore wants to have his cake and eat it too. The cases he uses to justify his caricature of the Afro-Caribbean family are, he admits, not typical. Some of his respondents spoke favourably about the influence of their parents. Back comes Cashmore again, these cases too are 'irregular', he says. In fact, the 'typical' family is 'neglecting or overburdening' after all. Confused? Don't be. This hedging of bets is Cashmore's way of trying to ward off criticism, and is a constant feature of the book. Reality *is* complex, remember. Again, Cashmore talks throughout the book about the youths' 'crisis of identity'; yet on the last but one page, he tells us that in fact 'there is no satisfactory evidence to suggest that black kids do have inadequate self-concepts'.

Pride of place, however, must go to his comment on the last page where, having consistently dodged questions about the structural inequalities that make British capitalism work, he belatedly bucks up against some 'seemingly immoveable obstacles'. Like large-scale structural unemployment; where the simple equation between good qualifications and a good job is no longer appropriate (if it ever was); where for many who have jobs, work is 'dull and monotonous'; and the role of the school in all this. Like the fact that racism will indeed continue to affect the lives of black kids. Ah well! says Cashmore, 'these are the questions that will inevitably undermine my conclusions'. Is reality just too complex for him, or is he disappearing up his own 'bottle'?

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ERROL LAWRENCE

Contemporary Caribbean: a sociological reader

Edited by SUSAN CRAIG (Maracas, Trinidad and Tobago, Volume 1, 1981, Volume 2, 1982). Volume 1, 404pp. Volume 2, 463pp.

External factors, both political and economic, based on rival ideologies, feature generally in the analyses of social structure collected here under Susan Craig's editorship. Such external factors are seen to influence and to give direction to the internal social dynamics of Caribbean societies by and large. The authors collectively cover a wide field: population, migration and immigration, urbanisation, employment and underemployment, race, class, and other generic structural features of society, whether mobile or in stagnation.

Such a complex variety of facets as the Caribbean presents, defying a uniform and comprehensive rationalisation, might baffle the sociologist in search of a methodological tool. Anna Gomez (Introduction, part 6) suggests that Caribbean sociologists might be tempted to choose from any one of the existing variants, such as the 'plural society' approach, the structuralist school, or the unresolved categorisation of race on an analogy with class in terms of classical marxism. However, she advocates that 'the only methodologically feasible tenet' open to Caribbean sociologists would be 'rooting their explanations in the problem structure which they seek to analyse'.

The most important single external factor in relation to these Caribbean territories is the historical link with the great imperialist powers who still form a vast entrepreneurial capitalist class. It is significant, therefore, that across the dominant Caribbean cultures, whether in the English, French, Dutch or Spanish languages, the essays, in dealing with problems of social structure in post-war Caribbean society, see the newly independent territories as 'neo-colonial', Cuba and Grenada being notable exceptions. It is an emotive issue. Therefore, it is all the more commendable that, in tracing the emergence of the 'Puerto Rican model', a writer such as Angel Quintero Rivera refuses to take a simplistic view of the historical relationship of capital to the colonial economy.

Occasionally a writer, in pursuit of an ideology, is defeated by his own doctrinaire excesses. Such a case is Fitzroy Ambursley's paper, 'Whither Grenada', in which a revolutionary programme for the island is imposed as a set piece, rather than adapted to contemporary circumstances inherent in the world capitalist system. By way of contrast, the reader might go to the careful analytical scholarship displayed in Frank T. Fitzgerald's examination of the Sovietisation thesis in his paper on 'The direction of Cuban socialism'.

As unemployment in the Caribbean remains one of the most pressing problems within the region, a number of readers might find a significant socio-economic focus in the papers by Jack Harewood and Humphrey Lamur. These researchers survey respectively 'Unemployment and under-employment in the Commonwealth Caribbean' and 'Demographic aspects of Suriname's employment'. In an area that might otherwise prove dull and unexciting, creative use is made here of statistics in defining and quantifying unemployment. Harewood, sensitive to local variation and difference, provides a critical analysis and assessment of the labour force across national Caribbean boundaries. Lamur, on the other hand, from a historical perspective, explains labour surplus in relation to class interest in Suriname today.

A minor difficulty encountered in the Sociological Reader is in the plan of the book. The overall structure, somewhat fragmented, would have been helped if a starting-point had been made with an introductory review of sociological theorising in the Caribbean as a whole – although Susan Craig's excellent paper on the application of methodology within the English-speaking region does go some way to meet this objection.

As an alternative, Craig has chosen a form that allows the veteran marxist historian C.L.R. James the right of overview in a paper where scholarship is tempered with sentiment. James, with much passion, calls for the formation and consolidation of a Caribbean nation, a projection consistent with the deterministic logic inherent in this writer's view of the historical process in his other works.

Was Craig merely looking for sociologists whose methods would conform to the marxist lead given by C.L.R. James? This does not appear to be so. Maurice St Pierre's paper, 'The 1962-1964 disturbances in Guyana', argues its case from the populist standpoint. This might be contrasted with the method used by Nelson P. Valdes in the paper, 'Ideological roots of the Cuban revolutionary movement'. Here, populism is seen as belonging to a historical phase only. Valdes' verdict is that the *Partido Revolucionario Cubano* with its populist structure, accommodating to 'consensus politics' and oblivious of class antagonisms, was inadequate to provide a revolutionary directive. He is emphatic, however, that the revolutionary nationalist politics that evolved in Cuba under Fidel Castro had little to do with marxist ideas in the first place, but 'worked with the concepts and premises already existing within the society', a general view also held by Fitzpatrick in his critique of the Sovietisation process, already referred to.

It would take a lengthy review to do justice to the range and scope of these papers. Recommended for essential reading are Richard Hart's 'Trade unionism in the English-speaking Caribbean: the formative years and the Caribbean Labour Congress', Peter Fraser's 'The fictive peasantry: Caribbean rural groups in the nineteenth century', and Bill Riviere's 'Contemporary class struggles and the revolutionary potential of social classes in Dominica'. One looks in vain among these papers, however, for some definitive nexus with the wider African and Asian post-War revolutionary movements. Such a contribution, using this as its subject, might have been made by a Caribbean researcher with knowledge of proletarian struggles within these vital regions of the Third World.

University of London

ANGUS RICHMOND

The Empire Strikes Back: race and racism in 70s' Britain

By CENTRE FOR CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL STUDIES (London, Hutchinson, 1982). 324pp. £5.95 paper.

On the face of it, this is a book we ought to be able to celebrate unreservedly. Unlike its direct predecessor from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies,¹ which chose to come at racism tangentially by way of a moral panic about 'mugging' and the sociology of deviance, this book sets out self-consciously to 'take race seriously' and to tackle racism head on. This the authors do by asserting right from the outset the pivotal position of racism during the 1970s and into the 1980s in the construction of a popular authoritarianism in Britain and in the transformation of state policies towards greater and more explicit repression and control.

In support of this argument the various authors present, in their separate contributions, a wide-ranging analysis of racism in British history and society - from the highly elaborated theories of the New Right, with their bio-cultural ideas of 'nation' and of the threat posed to it by 'alien' black cultures and the resultant 'social pathological' conditions of black communities, through the more academic racism of race relations sociology and 'ethnicity' studies, to the everyday and 'commonsense' racism of the white working class. They also deal with racism as it inheres and is contested within a number of policy areas. including the family, education and youth training, crime and policing, women's struggles and popular youth culture, and along the way they challenge both the marxist left and white women's liberation movement for their failures to deal with the 'specifity' of race or the racism of their own theories. And finally, this is a book of considerable scholarship, which for its mass of footnotes and excellent bibliography will need to be referred to by the generation of black students who follow the authors into the higher reaches of British education.

Yet for all the promise it holds out - and it is a promise that desperately needs to be fulfilled, by black people writing for black people - the book does not quite deliver. For one thing, a good deal of it is written in a highly abstract and impenetrable language. But this in itself is symptomatic of a more basic failure of the authors to ground their critique of various racist ideas and theories more firmly in the experiences of the black community and their struggles against racism. There are, of course, numerous references to black struggle scattered throughout the book, but these are often made in passing or confined to footnotes as a form of empirical ammunition with which to 'shoot down' whichever set of ideas or writer is under attack.

Occasionally, some of the authors do set abstract argumentation aside long enough to enable the black experience to speak for itself as by far the most effective means of exposing both the distortions of racist ideologies and the effects of racism in practice. Thus, Errol Lawrence's critique of sociological theories of black social pathology is at its best when he sets them beside an extended account of the historical development of the black family in resistance to racism. Similarly, Hazel Carby uses the experiences of Third World women in struggles against imperialism and racism to demonstrate the narrowness of white feminist thinking on this subject; while Pratibha Parmar's detailed exposition of the struggles of Asian women against racism in Britain totally belies theories of their supposed 'dependency' and cultural 'passivity'.

It is also unclear what forms of political practice this book is intended to inform. At one point, Hazel Carby correctly attacks multiculturalism for reacting to racism 'as if it were limited to a struggle over forms of representation – a struggle over images'. Unfortunately, the authors leave themselves open to the same criticism, and despite their claims to the contrary, the impression they frequently convey is one of racism not as a set of systematic practices aligned with deeper economic and political structures but as an outcome of constantly shifting 'articulations' and 'conjunctures' of racist ideas. Such an idealist conception produces, at least implicitly, an anti-racism that is equally confined to intellectual activity, as if the actual practices of community policing and multiculturalism can be defeated by exposing the narrow ideological nature of the theories that lay behind them.

At a time when the mass of black youth face educational genocide in British schools and criminalisation and control outside, the black community can ill afford that those who do escape should allow their intellects to be hijacked in this way.

University of Birmingham

LEE BRIDGES

1 S. Hall et al, Policing the crisis ... (London, 1978).

Troublesome Business: The Labour Party and the Irish question By GEOFFREY BELL (London, Pluto Press, 1982). 168pp.

A major consequence of the partition of Ireland in 1921, rarely emphasised by standard historians, is that one of the most divisive issues in British politics in the forty years before was at a stroke removed. The fact that such a 'solution' of the 'Irish question' rested on what James Connolly termed a 'carnival of reaction' in Ireland, South as well as North, was irrelevant to British politicians. They had much to gain by removing Ireland from the discourse of politics. Thus, in the partition of Ireland was born a lasting bipartisan agreement to isolate Ireland, or to be more precise Northern Ireland, from British politics. As Jim Callaghan said in 1967: 'I had no occasion to seek more work or to go out and look at the problems of Northern Ireland unless they forced themselves upon me.' For the most part, they did not, or were not allowed to; Northern Ireland was relegated to the furthest recesses of parliamentary business. For both Labour and the Tories it was, as Geoffrey Bell unequivocally shows, 'troublesome business'.

Refusing to follow the lead of standard historians, Bell sets out to show what Labour had to gain by the partition settlement. Simultaneously, he reveals how it actively involved itself in maintaining that settlement. Labour's position on Ireland, he argues, has been that of seeking the middle way, when 'there is little evidence that there is a navigable middle way in Ireland, or that there ever has been'. Using published sources, parliamentary debates and internal Labour Party documents, he meticulously uncovers a record that could at best be described as culpable negligence, at worst as the active participation by the political wing of the British labour movement in the imperialist domination of Ireland.

For brevity's sake, it can be said that that participation has gone through three stages (although Bell does not identify these stages as such). Firstly, there was a period when the Party had no policy on Ireland, that is, from the foundation of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 until 1918. Ramsay MacDonald, in the pursuit of fence-sitting, stated that his was a 'detached party', yet paradoxically one that was in favour of Home Rule! Perhaps J.E. Sutton provided the solution to this riddle when he argued that the Party had to get the question of Home Rule out of the way in order to discuss social and economic matters of more importance to the (*British*) workers.

The second phase began in 1918, when Labour finally produced a policy position on Ireland. However, it was by then anachronistic. At a point where the Irish struggle had moved far beyond Home Rule, the Labour Party found itself unable to support the call for 'selfdetermination' for Ireland to be made one year later in Berne by the Second International.

Instead, in the face of all evidence to the contrary, it called for limited Home Rule for Ireland. As the war in Ireland escalated, that policy was challenged from within the Party by numerous MPs and the National Council of Action, to the point where the 1920 Party Conference narrowly passed a resolution favouring 'absolute freedom' for Ireland. But, far from being the Party leaders' finest hour, it was a case

of them leading from behind. When the initial wave of working-class militancy that followed the First World War ebbed, those leaders were left to support in practice the arrangements for Ireland that the Tories had imposed through the Treaty.

The third phase began after the Second World War, when the right wing in the Labour cabinet succeeded in moving the government to a position of support for the Unionist Party in Northern Ireland. When the government in the South declared in 1949 that the Free State was now a Republic, Attlee responded by announcing: 'The view of his Majesty's government of the United Kingdom has always been that no change should be made in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without Northern Ireland's free agreement.' Thus, despite the claim of tradition, was born the constitutional guarantee to the Unionists which has enabled them since to veto any political moves that were not to their liking. Partition was cemented, and has remained so to this day, despite the upheavals of the last fourteen years.

For those already aware of the Labour Party's acquiescence in the continuation of Unionist hegemony and the repression of vast numbers of anti-Unionists during those years (remember, it was the Labour Party in power which enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1974), the earlier history presented in this book will be both interesting and eerily familiar. Throughout, there is a strong sense of deja vu. Roy Mason, Labour Secretary of State, for example, who in his arrogance and commitment to repression out-Toried the Tories, had his predecessors. Listen to J.H. Thomas, Labour Minister in the 1932 Coalition cabinet with responsibility for conducting the economic war against DeValera: 'I am the first Minister that ever stood up to the Irish, and remember that I am doing it quite determined to maintain British rights and interests.' Similarly, bipartisanship may be a recent term, but it is a phenomenon as old as the partition 'solution' itself. Thus, those Labour backbenchers who oppose the use of plastic bullets in Northern Ireland today are, like the members of the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster in the 1960s, or the dissidents who opposed the granting of a veto to the Unionists in 1949, in the position of salmon fighting a very strong current. Finally, the most recent policy decision of the Party's Study Group on Ireland in 1981 to support the long-term 'unity between the two parts of Ireland', while at the same time (as Jim Callaghan stated in a subsequent radio interview) in no way diminishing the guarantee to the Unionists, is akin to Ramsay Mac-Donald's 'detached party in support of Home Rule'.

This most recent example of fence-sitting raises a crucial political question: has the Labour Party finally moved, even if only marginally, away from bipartisanship? Bell – whom, we are told, is a member of the Labour Party – would seem to believe it has. In fact, the political purpose of his book is to contribute towards the strategy of moving

the Labour Party from within. Yet, the historical content of the same book would seem to encourage doubt about the success of such a strategy. Labour was not moved away from its pro-imperialist position in 1918, 1922 or 1949; why should it be now? In short, the optimist hears the words of the Study Group in support of long-term unity, while the pessimist concentrates on Jim Callaghan's assurances to the loyalists immediately afterwards.

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BILL ROLSTON

The Idea of Race in Science

By NANCY STEPAN. (London, Macmillan, 1982). 230pp. £20.00 cloth.

Scientific racism utilises the language, concepts, methods and authority of science to support the belief that certain human groups are intrinsically inferior to others as measured by some socially defined criterion such as intelligence or 'civilised' behaviour. Nancy Stepan's book is a history of the extraordinary persistence of scientific racist mythology, mainly in Britain from 1800 to 1960. She shows how virtually all branches of biology, from neuroanatomy to evolutionary theory, were brought into play as the nineteenth century wore on to justify the claims for the innate superiority of Europeans over all other peoples.

From phrenology at the beginning of the century to the sophisticated craniometric measurements at the end, whatever the bumps deemed to be indicative of desirable qualities. Europeans were claimed to have more and bigger ones. (Stephen Jay Gould, in The Mismeasure of recently re-evaluated some of the craniometric Man. has measurements made by Broca and Morton, and shown the alleged differences to be the product of systematic bias.) Evolutionists like Darwin, as much as his anti-evolutionary opponents, called their science into play to bolster their prejudices. Theorists of human origins debated endlessly the question of monogenesis (a single origin for humans) versus polygenesis (multiple sites of origin). Yet monogenesists and polygenesists alike were convinced that, for whatever reason, the dark-skinned races had lagged behind in some sort of evolutionary competition. There was an almost universal assumption that socially defined racial groups must be biologically different - even to the extent at one point of claiming that 'crosses' between races were 'less fertile' or 'less fit' than 'pure bred races'. By the 1920s scientific racism had become intertwined with eugenic programmes for collective improvement of the human 'stock' by controlled breeding.

It wasn't, as Nancy Stepan shows, until the 'modern synthesis' of genetics and evolutionary theory in the 1930s that typological thinking about races ('... it is on the degree of curliness or twist in the hair that Distinged by Noolaham Foundation.

the most fundamental divisions of the human race are based', as W.J. Soller put it in 1912) began to give way to more sophisticated understanding of population biology. Even then, it was a long hard road. Although most human population biologists today would agree that the term 'race' as applied to human groups is devoid of *biological* significance, and that the overwhelming majority of genetic variance amongst humans lies *within* groups rather than between them, scientific racism is an unconscionable long time a-dying.

A generation of 1930s' biologists in Britain – men like Haldane, Hogben and Levy – spoke out against it as the Nazi cloud progressively darkened the horizon. After the 1939-45 war, and in revulsion against Nazi race science with its final, eugenic solution, others, like Montagu and Penrose, endeavoured to lay a new base for the study of human anthropology and genetic differences. Stepan's view is optimistic – by the 1960s, she claims, scientific racism was on the way out, though she points to the publicity surrounding the views of Jensen, Eysenck and E.O. Wilson to show how far it still had to go. Stepan's optimism about the demise of scientific racism may be less than well-founded. It is not just that many of the words of nineteenth and early twentiethcentury scientific racism can still be found quoted with approval in the publications of the National Front and its multifarious offshoots, but that similar views pervade popular culture in Britain at all levels.

Why has scientific racism been so persistent? Despite her detailed history of the phenomenon, Stepan offers few clues. She catalogues the sorry tale effectively enough, but as to its causes, she offers merely the thought that 'at heart the British by the nineteenth century were not universalistic and cosmopolitan in outlook but insular and narrow. Their commitment to the theory of racial types and racial inequality was, it appears, deeper than any commitment to a theory of biological change.' This is not merely just a polite way of putting it; it itself embraces, it would appear, some type of theory of 'national character' which unless firmly grounded in an analysis of material conditions comes close to the typological thinking Stepan rightly deplores.

The challenge for any materialist historian of science is not merely to describe but to explain the origins, persistence or rejection of scientific ideas – an attempt which the new 'sociological' school of historians of science has embraced. A book like Mackenzie's recent history of the eugenics movement in Britain, with its links to statistics and genetical theory, struggles to relate the ideas of scientists like Bateson, Pearson or Galton to their social origins and class position, albeit sometimes a trifle naively. All these characters reappear in Stepan's account, as representative of various forms of scientific racist thinking, yet without 'grounding' them in the material world in any way, their agreements and disagreements become merely part of an abstract history of ideas. Stepan, I suspect, knows this, but avoids entering this crucial terrain. What stands out from her account is that racism was not added on to scientific theorising, or derived from it, but was the bedrock on which it was based. Where the sociologists of science might expect to find all racist scientists embracing a similar set of theories, as compatible with their 'interests', Stepan's account makes clear that any old set of theories could, at a pinch, be made to serve the racist interest. Despite its methodological silences, *The Idea of Race in Science* must stand as a necessary book, fittingly complementary to Gould's *The Mismeasure* of Man.

Open University

STEVEN ROSE

Southern Black Leaders of the Reconstruction Era

Edited by HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ. (Urbana, Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 1982). 402pp. £6.00, paper.

When Southern blacks were emancipated at the close of the Civil War, it did not seem unreasonable to hope that the end of slavery would be followed by some attempt to introduce equality for blacks within the constraints of the Southern class system. Whatever hope existed was to be dashed by the close of Reconstruction in 1877. It became clear as early as 1865 that President Andrew Johnson had no intention of aiding blacks in any significant way. When Congress took control of a recalcitrant South in 1867, it seemed possible that some fundamental changes might be introduced as part of Radical Reconstruction. It was even suggested that some of the land held by the wealthiest of white Southerners might be reallocated to black families. This suggestion was dismissed as far too radical for an essentially moderate movement. The only major concession that emerged from Radical Reconstruction was political. Many black men were given the vote and allowed to hold office. As a result, twenty-two black men were sent to Congress between 1870 and 1901, and a more sizeable number served as state legislators and officials throughout the South. It was no accident that this one concession simultaneously strengthened a weak Republican party and that the Republicans withdrew their support for the black franchise as soon as their party had acquired sufficient votes in the new western states.

Whether or not political change that does not rest upon any foundation of economic power can be anything more than cosmetic, this restructuring of the political level of Southern society did seem startling in the mid-nineteenth century. For the first time, black men in America were given the opportunity to show that their political acumen, ability and ambitions were in no way inferior to those of their white compatriots. This book demonstrates very clearly that these men

were extremely capable, well-educated and responsible, and that wherever they were given any real power, they used it wisely and well. That this power was very limited is undeniable. Not for several generations have historians talked of 'black Reconstruction': that has long been dismissed as a figment of white racist imagination. Only in South Carolina did blacks exercise even the most transitory political domination and there was never a black governor of any Southern state. Despite this lack of control, there is no doubt that individual blacks did wield unprecedented influence. In South Carolina, moreover, the range of black political potential was not only explored but found to be extraordinarily promising. That this potential has never yet been fully realised makes this brief experiment all the more important.

Informed and scholarly studies of these pioneer black spokesmen have been remarkably few. The essays in this book meet a long felt need and, for the most part, they meet it in impressive style. They are, inevitably, brief but rarely are they superficial. They effectively explore the scope of skills demonstrated by political figures of very varied talents and inclinations. Genuine insights are given into politicians such as Blanche K. Bruce, the United States senator for Mississippi, who managed to be both honest and extraordinarily diplomatic. This chapter, by William Harris, and one on John Lynch, a Mississippi member of the United States House of Representatives, by John Hope Franklin, manage to illuminate both the complexity of Mississippi politics and the evolution of an educational system for blacks in the state. Thomas Holt reinforces the impression given by other recent work that the black ex-slaves of South Carolina were possessed of unusual political maturity, restraint and responsibility. Eric Anderson, on the other hand, shows that the contradictory images projected by some historical evidence and some historians result in sheer absurdity. James O'Hara, for instance, the North Carolina Congressman, has been depicted as 'a politely foul-mouthed incendiary conservative who is both reckless and accommodating'.

In all seriousness, perhaps the greatest criticism that can be levelled at the black politicians of the Reconstruction era is that they were too accommodating. Few pushed for land reform or any reallocation of land to blacks, and yet that is what their black constituents wanted and needed most. When men such as James Rapier of Alabama or George Ruby of Texas did seek land, it was under uncontentious homesteading laws. Aaron Bradley, a South Carolinian who became a Georgia Senator, did support the retention of war-reallocated land by seaisland blacks, but his was one of the few voices raised in the cause dearest to black hearts. Far more energy was poured into acquiring education for the freedmen. It was in this area that the small gains made by blacks were to last longest. In contrast, the existence of a black political elite was, by the end of the century, to sink without trace into the morass of Southern discrimination.

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MARY ELLISON

British Prisons

By MIKE FITZGERALD and JOE SIM (Oxford, Blackwell, 1982).

182pp. Cloth: £12.00 Paper £4.95

For far too long any reading list of books on British prisons has been dominated by the Home Office, either directly through official publications or, more dangerously because of their apparent independence, through academic works which have relied for the most part, and often exclusively, on Home Office statistics for their source material.

Now, in 1982, there is a welcome new look about the bookshelves. Prisoners' evidence, often channelled through their own organisations, is no longer excluded or at best referred to with patronising qualifications as to its inherent unreliability and bias. Instead, we have three or four books, with others coming up behind, which start from the premise that events of the past few years have demonstrated that grassroots pressure groups have a considerably better record for trustworthy information than does the Home Office's prison department. Likewise, on an individual basis, any prisoner or ex-prisoner, even if picked out with a pin, can start from a basis of at least as much credibility as people like Merlyn Rees, Shirley Summerskill or William Whitelaw. A great many prisoners, of course, have much better records than that and are recognised as such.

The book that started this new wave was British Prisons by Mike Fitzgerald and Joe Sim, published in 1979 by Blackwell and almost immediately withdrawn as a result of a succession of libel actions which dragged on for a year. One revised version was cancelled for the same reasons and this second revision, just published, has been greatly delayed for precautionary checking. Comparison with the original makes it clear that the offending material all concerned the prison medical service - always the most difficult to write freely about because of the interlinking secrecy of the Home Office and the medical profession, and the touchiness of both to charges that prison doctors are using drugs for disciplinary rather than medical purposes. The litigious reaction of prison doctors could indicate that they have much to hide. Despite the long drawn out attempts to muzzle the authors, however, their condemnation of the prison medical service remains unambiguous and readers are left in no doubt as to the fundamental dishonesty of the Home Office's statements on these matters.

There are unfortunate gaps in the book, brought about by the length of time between acceptance of the final manuscript and eventual appearance in the bookshops. Thus, matters which have come to a head over the last two years are inadequately dealt with - for example, the mounting concern over deaths in custody, the harassment of young

black prisoners and the disproportionate scale of their imprisonment, the prison officers' dispute of 1980/81.

What is interesting, though, and an admirable test of any book, is that none of these developments contradict or in any way invalidate what the authors have to say. It is precisely because they ground their analysis of the prison system firmly in the context of society that developments within the political framework are unlikely to catch them, or their readers, unawares.

For example, no reader of this book will have been the least surprised to learn that the Government, for all its talk of reducing the prison population, is actually working on forecasts that it will rise from its present 44,100 to 48,000 in 1984/5 – almost directly in line with the prison building programme. The same thing, of course, happened over the past ten years, which is why the overcrowding in 1981 was the same as in 1971, despite the provision of nearly 5,000 new prison places, which had been initially presented as a means to eradicating some of the overcrowding and squalor.

The next few years will doubtless validate much else that is in this book. It can be confidently recommended as the best general account of the British prison system and its jargon-free style deserves a wide readership.

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