

RACE & CLASS

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ORLANDO LETELIER 1932-1976



MULTINATIONAL BANKS IN CHILE

by Isabel Letelier and Michael Moffitt

Letelier assassination conspiracy

Asian women in Britain

Racism in the National Front

Socialism and black nationalism, USA: 1917-41

Repression in Colombia and East Timor

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RACE & CLASS

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Volume XX

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Editorial	i
Supporting repression: multinational banks in Chile ISABEL LETELIER and MICHAEL MOFFITT	111
A burning fever: the isolation of Asian women in Britain AMRIT WILSON	129
A. Philip Randolph and the dilemmas of socialism and black nationalism in the United States, 1917-1941 JEFF HENDERSON	143
Patterns of racism: interviews with National Front members MICHAEL BILLIG	161
Notes and documents	181
Indictment for conspiracy to murder Orlando Letelier, with introduction by Eqbal Ahmad	184
Repression in Colombia: political persecution in Colombian universities	189
Repression in East Timor	191
Book reviews	
<i>Policing the Crisis: mugging, the state, and law and order</i> by S. Hall, C. Critcher, T. Jefferson, J. Clarke and B. Roberts (Lee Bridges)	193

- Beyond Orange and Green: the political economy of the Northern Ireland crisis* by Belinda Probert (Bill Rolston) 197
- The Declining Significance of Race: blacks and changing American institutions* by W.J. Wilson (Stuart Bentley) 200
- Biko* by Donald Woods (Norma B. Kitson) 202
- History of Black Americans: from Africa to the emergence of the cotton kingdom* by Philip S. Foner (Lee Bridges) 206
- Tobacco and the Third World: tomorrow's epidemic* by Michael Muller (Hazel Waters) 207
- The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* by Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons (Ken Jordaan) 209
- African Social Studies: a radical reader* selected by Peter C.W. Gutkind and Peter Waterman (Bill Freund) 210
- In Defence of Freedom* edited by Dr K. Watkins (Tony Bunyan) 212
- Retreat to the Ghetto* by Thomas Blair (Bill Branche) 213
- Mines, Masters and Migrants. Life in a Namibian compound* by Robert J. Gordon (Ken Jordaan) 215

Books received

217

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Editorial

This issue of *Race & Class* marks two of the major anniversaries of our times. On 11 September 1973 a military coup d'état overthrew the democratically-elected socialist government of Chile. On 21 September 1976 Orlando Letelier, former Chilean Ambassador to the United States and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Popular Unity Government of Allende, and his North American colleague Ronni Moffitt were assassinated in Washington, DC, when their car was blown up. The staff and editors of *Race & Class* were deeply affected by their deaths. Orlando was Director of the Transnational Institute and an editor of *Race & Class*, Ronni a research worker of the Institute for Policy Studies.

The coup snuffed out the hope of a peaceful transition to socialism under the aegis of a government which was increasing the support it enjoyed in Chile. The military junta which replaced it restored an extreme type of 'free' market economy, of which Professor Milton Friedman was the intellectual architect, and of which the multinational corporations are the mainstay — as Isabel Letelier and Michael Moffitt show in this issue of *Race & Class*. This was necessarily underpinned by a reign of terror which in its scale, barbarism and duration made the junta, even in an era of dictatorships, one of the foulest regimes on earth. The 'necessity' for terror to deprive the people of all their socialist gains and to destroy all opposition could not stop at Chile's borders. Beyond them, exiles and friends of Chile were organizing. Of these Orlando Letelier was in the front line. In the twisted 'logic' of the junta, he had to die.

The murders could have remained unsolved and brushed under the

carpet were it not for a handful of colleagues in the Transnational Institute and the Institute for Policy Studies, who immediately and with great energy began their own investigation and pressed the US authorities to apply themselves to the solution of the crime. Their efforts have been rewarded by the extradition from Chile of Michael Townley, a US citizen employed by DINA (Chilean Secret Service), and the identification of Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios of the Chilean army. The final legal indictment in the US includes several counter-revolutionary Cuban terrorists, Bay of Pigs veterans trained and formerly employed by the CIA, and General Manuel Contreras, Pinochet's right-hand man, who has been forced to resign as Chief of DINA. The disclosures, and the strains produced by the US prosecution team's request for access to material witnesses in Chile, have led to what Chileans are beginning to hope is Pinochet's Watergate. We reproduce that indictment in part in our 'Notes' section — alongside two other documents which draw attention to the nature of repression elsewhere in the Third World — and the involvement of the US in suppressing those struggles for freedom.

Through the work of Orlando's colleagues, we are once again reminded that a small body of determined spirits, fired by an unquenchable faith in their mission, can alter the course of history. They have done so, and their work deserves both wide recognition and high praise. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen only whether the head of the Chilean secret service could possibly have ordered the murder without the knowledge and approval of General Pinochet himself. Orlando Letelier continues to haunt the junta, and threatens its destruction from the grave. We salute his life and struggle.

Supporting repression: multinational banks in Chile

On 30 November 1977 the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to pass this resolution:

The Chilean people continue to be subjected to constant and flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, to lack adequate constitutional and judicial safeguards of their rights and liberties and to suffer assaults on the freedom and integrity of their persons, in particular by methods of systematic intimidation, including torture, disappearance of persons for political reasons, arbitrary arrest, detention, exile and deprivation of Chilean nationality.

Due to such international condemnation, Pinochet recently lifted the formal state of siege in Chile. Such an act signifies little substantive change in the continuing deterioration of human rights, however, because the international economic assistance that still pours into Chile sustains new forms of repression. This report illustrates the direct relationship between the foreign economic assistance that has flowed into Chile since the 1973 coup and the present state of human rights in that country.

Most governments have reduced or eliminated assistance to Chile because of the junta's human rights violations. Nevertheless, the

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Pinochet government has ignored these pressures because private multinational banks have been simultaneously funnelling loans to Chile at unprecedented rates. These private bank loans have now far surpassed public assistance as Chile's major source of external financing. Utilizing new and previously unpublished data, we have demonstrated that the enormous influx of private bank loans since 1976 has allowed the junta to thumb its nose at the international human rights campaign without fear that economic assistance from abroad will be completely cut off. *In 1977, when 'human rights' became the new catchword of US foreign policy, more US dollars flowed to the Chilean government than ever before.*

Not surprisingly, there has been remarkably little discussion of the conflicts between the US government's official policies on human rights and the policies of private US-based corporations and banks that allow the repressive government in Chile to survive. In addition, most discussions of human rights violations in Chile have underestimated the devastating social costs of the junta's economic policies. Chileans are not only denied traditional civil rights and liberties, but many are without work, adequate nutrition, housing, clothing and health care — conditions which are direct results of the policies of the military junta. The lack of concern demonstrated for the economic aspects of human rights violations reflects a profound bias which characterizes many discussions of human rights in western circles. Too often, focus on the relationship of the individual to the state is characterized primarily in political terms, while the economic and social aspects of this relationship remain ignored.

The repression and terror which has reigned in Chile since the coup in September 1973 has occurred because the social basis of the Pinochet dictatorship is so limited. In a moment of unusual candour, Pablo Barahona, who has held several high posts in the Pinochet regime, including President of the Central Bank, admitted, 'more than 90 per cent of the people are against our policies'. [1]

This situation contrasts starkly with previous governments in Chile. Since 1958 Chile has had four separate governments, all of which have had radically different philosophies and policies of economic development. Accordingly, each successive government — the conservative regime of Jorge Alessandri (1958-64); the Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei (1964-70); the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende (1970-73), and the military junta which has ruled Chile since 1973 — has attached differing significance to civil and constitutional liberties, the place of equity as a basic feature of society and the role of mass participation in the political process. Alessandri, Frei and Allende, however, all acted in the tradition of Chile's constitutional norms. Pinochet has either violated the constitution or abolished it.

It must be emphasized that the political situation in Chile is also

deeply affected by external forces. Each of the four recent governments of Chile has attached a high priority to friendly diplomatic relations with the United States — if for no other reason than Chile's dependence on external financial resources to sustain its domestic economy.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND CHILEAN POLITICS: FREI AND ALLENDE

During the administrations of presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, the Chilean Christian Democratic Party received considerable political and financial support from the United States. In the early 1960s Kennedy initiated the Alliance for Progress with the stated aim of stimulating industrial growth in Latin America and attacking the worst forms of mass poverty and deprivation, within the framework of western-style political democracy. As such, the 'Revolution in Liberty', which was the cornerstone of Eduardo Frei's 1964 presidential campaign, represented the prototype example of the Alliance for Progress approach to development in Latin America.

Once the Christian Democrats took office in late 1964, the Johnson administration responded with unprecedented bilateral assistance programmes and utilized its influence with multilateral lending institutions to increase Chile's borrowing capacity. The high levels of aid begun in 1964 were continued through Frei's first five years in office. From 1964 to 1969 Chile received a total of \$875 million in direct economic and military assistance from the United States Agency for International Development and other financial sources. Under Frei, Chile became the largest per capita US aid recipient in Latin America and one of the largest in the world. On average, from 1964 to 1969 Chile received \$125m annually through US bilateral programmes, another \$17.2m from the World Bank and \$29.8m from the InterAmerican Development Bank. Moreover, since the Alliance for Progress stressed the importance of supplementing foreign aid and local capital by private investment, Chile joined Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela as a large recipient of investment by US-based multinationals.

After 1969 the US curtailed its aid to Chile for two interrelated reasons. First, President Nixon was less favourably disposed towards the Christian Democratic Party and Eduardo Frei than were his Democratic predecessors. Secondly, US policy-makers were worried about the possible victory of Senator Salvador Allende in the 1970 presidential election. While Nixon and his National Security adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed, as did the Johnson administration, that the principal goal of US policy towards Chile should be to keep Allende out of power, they were also suspicious of Frei and Radomiro Tomic, the 1970 candidate of the Christian Democrats. Nixon and Kissinger

believed that Frei's promises had stirred the passions of Chileans for expanded political democracy and social reforms which had contributed to Allende's popularity.

The dramatic reductions of US aid in 1970 clearly indicated that the Nixon administration was abandoning the Christian Democrats and forging new alliances with a conservative business group, the *latifundistas* and the National Party led by former President Jorge Alessandri. Direct US bilateral aid was reduced by more than two-thirds between 1969 and 1970, as the United States plunged directly into a struggle to keep Allende out of power. As the election approached, Kissinger began to take direct responsibility for US anti-Allende operations. As one former member of Kissinger's staff later revealed to the *New York Times*, Kissinger 'thought that Allende might lead an anti-US movement in Latin America more effectively than Castro, just because it was the democratic path to power'. Kissinger also said publicly that the election of a socialist president by the Chilean people was a 'contagious' example, which might 'infect' the other pro-US regimes in Latin America and western Europe.[2]

Immediately after the Popular Unity coalition of President Allende began to govern Chile, the United States fomented an economic blockade in order to destabilize the country's economy and political situation. A cable from Ambassador Edward Korry to State Department official Charles Meyer and Henry Kissinger on 21 September 1970 aptly characterized US policy:

not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile ... Once Allende comes to power in Chile, we will do all in our power to condemn Chile and Chileans to the utmost deprivation and poverty; a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a communist society in Chile.

A vital element of this strategy was near-total suspension of economic aid to Chile. During the three years of the Popular Unity government, the total bilateral US economic assistance to Chile was only \$24.5m — less than Chile had received in any single year of Frei's term. Indeed, the only assistance which continued was that already 'in the pipeline' prior to Allende's election.

From 1971 to 1973, when the World Bank was in the process of doubling its lending operations around the world, Chile received no new loans or credit. Lending by the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) also fell to a record low. The anti-Allende stance of the United States government, coupled with apprehension over a fundamental change of property and social relations in Chile, kept private investment and loans at minimal levels, hence contributing to the decline of investment and productivity.

During the Allende years the only significant increase in the flow of

US assistance to Chile came in the form of military aid, which tripled from 1971 to 1973. The US was cementing its alliance with the top Chilean military officers, whom Nixon and Kissinger believed would ultimately turn against Allende. The political message here was far more significant than the money involved. The increased levels of military assistance, combined with the CIA's covert support of subversive activities, paved the way for the anti-constitutionalist officers in the military to proceed with the coup. Contrary to the Nixon administration's publicly-stated hands-off policy, the Central Intelligence Agency, operating under direct instructions from the 'Forty Committee' headed by Henry Kissinger, collaborated with anti-constitutionalist officers and right-wing paramilitary groups, like *Patria y Libertad*, to overthrow the Popular Unity government.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE 1973

Since 11 September 1973 the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet has been supported, politically and financially, by various agencies of the United States government, multilateral lending institutions and the private sector. Following the coup the Pinochet dictatorship killed, tortured, imprisoned and deported thousands of Chileans, and proceeded at once to dismantle the democratic institutions which Chileans had enjoyed for over 160 years. The Republican administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, while denying any role in the coup, quickly increased the flow of economic resources to the Chilean junta, asserting that the coup was in the 'best interests' of Chile and the United States.[3]

The sheer difference in the levels of aid during the Allende period and the early years of the military junta indicates that two United States administrations clearly preferred the 'stability' of a Pinochet dictatorship to the democratic and constitutionalist government which Chile had enjoyed for so long. After the 1973 coup the Nixon and Ford administrations quickly restored the Chilean aid programmes which had been halted under Allende. The multilateral lending institutions followed suit (see Table 1). The Chilean junta received commitments of roughly \$125m in bilateral US assistance during fiscal year 1974. Since 1973 the Chilean junta has received nearly \$350m in bilateral assistance from the United States* and roughly another \$400m from multilateral development banks, while Chile's IMF borrowing† represents an extraordinary sum, far in excess of its

* This figure does not include the \$27.5m which the junta rejected in fiscal year 1977.

† It should be kept in mind that approximately \$74m of Chile's 1975 IMF borrowing was withheld because of Chile's failure to meet budget targets specified in its stand-by arrangements.

Table 1 *US and multi-lateral economic assistance and private bank loans to Chile, 1974 - 8* (in US\$ millions)*

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Economic and military assistance (includes PL. 480 and AID)	25.7	96.2	83.4	27.5 ¹	—
Export-import bank credits and other US government loans	98.1	32.4	11.3	—	—
World Bank	13.5	20.0	33.0	60.0	— ³
Inter-American Development Bank	97.3	45.4	86.9	34.5	38.5
International Monetary Fund	98.6	199.8	82.8	— ²	NA
<i>Subtotal</i>	333.2	393.8	297.4	122.0	38.5
Private sources	—	99.8	520.2	858.5	977.0 ⁴
<i>Total</i>	333.2	493.6	817.6	980.5	1015.5

*Figures are categorized according to official US government fiscal year of 1 October to 30 September, adopted 1 October 1976, except for the IMF data and private bank loans, which are according to calendar year, and the US government assistance in fiscal year 1974 - 6 which are based on the previous fiscal year definition of 1 July to 30 June. The fiscal year 1976 figures for US economic and military assistance and export-import loans include 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1976 aid and loans. The data for fiscal year 1978 is current to 1978 March.

¹On 1 July 1977 US State Department officials confirmed that Chile rejected \$27.5m in bilateral US economic assistance that had been appropriated for fiscal year 1977 because the Carter administration had expressed disapproval of the junta's human rights violations. The State Department had announced that it was temporarily suspending \$9m of the aid package because of specific violations. No US military assistance was approved for fiscal year 1977.

²In fiscal year 1977 Chile had no net drawings of IMF resources while 'repurchasing' \$117m in currencies borrowed during 1974 and 1975. All IMF data is converted from SDRs (special drawing rights) at exchange rates prevailing at the time of transactions.

³A new World Bank loan to Chile totalling \$40m to finance repairs on the Pan American highway is currently scheduled to come before the Bank's Board of Executive Directors in July 1978.

⁴Projected.

Source: AID and other sources.

IMF quota.[4] It should be added that the data in Table 1 does not include private short-term suppliers' credits and government-to-government loans from countries such as Brazil or Argentina. Though the proportion of the latter is small in terms of Chile's overall borrowing, these loans had been increasing. In 1976 alone the Central Banks of Brazil and Argentina loaned the Chilean Central Bank approximately \$100m.

In addition to the balance of payments relief provided by the IMF, the United States and other major creditor countries also provided large-scale debt relief for the junta in early 1974, shortly after it came to power. During 1974 alone the debt rescheduling effectively amounted to another \$581m in foreign assistance. Without the debt rescheduling, many observers agree that Chile would have literally

defaulted on its huge foreign debt obligations. Chile's debts could not be renegotiated during the Popular Unity years because Chile's major creditors demanded changes in the government's economic policies that would have had devastating impacts on the majority of the Chilean population. To implement such changes would have meant abandoning the Popular Unity programme. The junta undertook these 'adjustments' willingly.

Since 1973 Chile has also received \$30m in military credits and grants from the United States and purchased a total of \$146m of US armaments, not only for external defence, but including equipment solely used for internal repression. As Michael Klare has pointed out: 'the delivery of repressive technology to authoritarian regimes abroad is a consistent and intentional product of our [US] foreign policy'.^[5] The United States government and private businesses have not only equipped Chile and other countries with the technology of political repression, including pistols, 'riot control' gear and computers which are used to monitor political dissidents, but has also trained leading members of the military junta in the ideology of anti-communism and the methodology of repression. In its military training schools, especially the Army School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone and Fort McNair in Washington, the US has trained nearly 7,000 Chilean military personnel since 1950, and 1,400 since 1973 alone. General Gustavo Leigh, Commander of the Chilean Air Force, and General Herman Brady, Minister of Defence, among others, are graduates of US military training programmes.

In the 1960s and 1970s US military training programmes placed a declining emphasis on national defence, and shifted towards training military officers in government administration and police techniques. This training has inevitably made repression in countries like Chile more effective. Much of this training was done under the auspices of the Office of Public Safety of AID, which was abolished by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, but its effects have nonetheless been felt in Chile since then.

CONGRESS CUTS AID TO CHILE

While the massive flow of foreign assistance from the United States and multilateral institutions continued virtually unabated until early 1977, it was becoming increasingly difficult to justify in view of the junta's abysmal human rights record and the desperate plight of the majority of Chileans. After repeated condemnations of the junta's human rights violations by the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, the Organization of American States, Amnesty International and individual US congressmen who visited Chile, the US Congress moved to reduce direct American assistance to Chile. By

mid-1976, despite the opposition of the Ford administration, the US Congress completely banned any further military assistance to the Chilean junta and limited economic assistance to a maximum of \$27.5m for fiscal year 1977. In June 1976, under the leadership of Representative Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), legislation was passed directing the United States' representative to the IDB to vote against further loans to Chile unless it could be demonstrated convincingly that the funds would directly benefit poor people in Chile.[6]

The pressures of international condemnation were cutting off the junta's sources of financial support. Feeling increasingly isolated and threatened, General Pinochet and Colonel Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, then director of DINA (Pinochet's personal secret police force), renewed crackdowns on dissenters internally and attacked Chilean exiles abroad. When public pressure became too great to ignore, the junta reduced the number of formal arrests. Instead, political activists, trade unionists and other dissidents simply began to 'disappear'. Abroad, the junta blamed its troubles on the activities of Chilean exiles and stepped up DINA's activities outside of Chile. In a memo dated 16 September 1975, Contreras requested increased funds from Pinochet to support 'neutralization of the principal enemies of the government junta in the exterior, especially in Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, the US, France and Italy'. Contreras also voiced particular apprehension over the political activities of exiled Popular Unity leader Orlando Letelier, former Ambassador to the United States and Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs under Allende. Specifically, Contreras was worried about the 'eventual victory of the Democrats in the US election' in 1976 because, he later wrote, of 'their support for Dr Letelier'. [7] In February 1976 Letelier, who lived in exile in Washington, visited the Netherlands, and shortly after Dutch private investors cancelled a \$60m loan to the junta. The cancellation enraged Pinochet and the other members of the junta. Most observers considered the success of Letelier in persuading the Dutch government to cancel the loan and the US government to apply human rights criteria to foreign aid programmes as significant factors which prompted Pinochet to retaliate. He did so by depriving Letelier of his Chilean citizenship in June 1976, and by ordering DINA to assassinate him.

While the US Congress was applying tougher human rights standards to its foreign aid programme, representatives of the Ford administration were busy drumming up support for the junta. In May 1976 Treasury Secretary and former Wall Street investment banker William Simon, on a well-publicized trip to Chile, publicly congratulated Pinochet for bringing 'economic freedom' to the country. Six months later, shortly before President Carter took office, the Ford administration backed two loans to Chile totalling \$60m which had come before the World Bank's Board of Governors. In early December,

over the objections of a number of US Congressmen, Bank President Robert McNamara urged passage of the two loans, and the US Treasury, under Simon's direction, supported him. McNamara also announced that the Chilean junta and the Bank staff were working on the preparation of several projects 'designed to stimulate export-oriented industries', but that approval of the projects would depend on the junta's willingness to pursue 'sound economic policies', strengthen economic growth and improve credit-worthiness.*

PRIVATE BANKS TO THE RESCUE

Beginning in mid-1976, an abrupt shift in the source of Chile's foreign borrowing occurred which had dramatic implications for international efforts to improve the human rights situation in Chile. Private multinational banks based in the United States, Canada and western Europe, which had not loaned significant sums to Chile in 1974 or 1975, began to lend hundreds of millions to the Chilean Central Bank, various other state agencies and the private sector.[8]

Between 1975 and 1976, when US bilateral aid was drying up and Chile's foreign debt obligations were falling due, private multinational bank lending to Chile increased 500 per cent and soared to over \$800m in 1977. As a percentage of Chile's total borrowing, private bank loans and suppliers' credits increased in 1974 from less than 25 per cent of Chile's total foreign borrowing, to over 50 per cent of the total in 1975, to 59 per cent in 1976 and to more than 80 per cent by 1977. Official estimates indicate that, by 1978, private sector loans will account for more than 90 per cent of Chile's total foreign borrowing.

Large consortia of multinational banks have provided the Chilean military government with the bulk of its total private borrowing. As Table 2 illustrates, six US-based banks (Citicorp, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., Bankers Trust Co., Wells Fargo, Chemical Bank of New York and First Chicago) have managed the consortia which account for most of the loans. Together, these banks have arranged more than \$800m in loans to the Chilean government in the last two years. The leader is Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., which has managed consortia which have provided the government with \$230m in loans; followed by Bankers Trust with \$180m; Wells Fargo with \$155m; Chemical Bank with \$125m; Citicorp with \$102m, and First Chicago with \$77m.

In 1977 private US-based multinational banks provided \$514m in loans and credits to Chile. Since the coup US banks have loaned \$927m to Chile, though banks based in Canada, West Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have also managed sizeable

*During the months preceding his assassination, Orlando Letelier had devoted much effort to block the Bank's renewed loans to Chile.

Table 2 Selected private multinational bank loans to Chilean government since 1974 (in \$US million)*

Date	Amount (\$)	Government agency	Leader of bank group
April 1975	53.4 (bonds)	CORFO (Development Corp)	Salomon Brothers (US)
May 1976	125.0	Central Bank	Bankers Trust Co. (US)
June 1976	5.0	Central Bank	First Wisconsin (US)
October 1976	25.0	ECA (agriculture)	Libra Bank (UK)
December 1976	21.0	Central Bank	Sudamerikanish (Federal Republic of Germany)
January 1977	10.0	CORFO	Morgan Guaranty Trust (US)
January 1977	2.5	—	Republic National Bank (US)
February 1977	10.0	Min. Obras Pub. (Transportation)	Banque Nationale de Paris (France)
March 1977	41.0	CORFO	Various sources
March 1977	10.0	CORFO	Morgan Guaranty Trust (US)
March 1977	10.0	CORFO	Bank of Nova Scotia (Canada)
April 1977	55.0	CAP (steel)	Bankers Trust Co. (US)
April 1977	21.0	Central Bank	Deutschbank (FRG)
April 1977	30.0	ECA	Citibank (US)
May 1977	10.0	CORFO	Bank of Nova Scotia (Canada)
May 1977	2.0	NA	Manufacturers Hanover Trust (US)
June 1977	75.0	Central Bank	First Chicago (US)
June 1977	30.0	ECA	Citibank (US)
June 1977	42.0	ENAP	Various sources
June 1977	2.5	CAP	First InterAmerican Corp.(US)
June 1977	12.0	D.G. Metro	Banque Nationale de Paris (France)
June 1977	100.0	CODELCO (copper)	Chemical Bank (US)
July 1977	5.0	CORFO	Marine Midland (US)
July 1977	2.7	CAP	McKee Financial Services (US)
August 1977	3.0	Lan Chile (airline)	Bank of America (US)
September 1977	2.5	CAP	First Inter-American Corp.(US)
September 1977	3.0	Lan Chile	Irving Trust Co. (US)
September 1977	42.0	ENAP (petroleum)	Citicorp. (US)
September 1977	5.0	CORFO	Marine Midland (US)
December 1977	12.0	Disputado de las Condes (copper)	Anthony Gibbs Bank (UK)
January 1978	125.0	Central Bank	Wells Fargo Bank (US)
April 1978	210.0	Central Bank	Morgan Guaranty Trust (US)
May 1978	90.0	CORFO	Chase Manhattan (US)

*Loans made in currencies other than US dollars were converted to dollars at exchange rates prevailing at the time of transactions.

loans to Chile. In 1977 Japanese firms also supplied hundreds of millions of dollars of suppliers' credits.

Clearly, private multinational bank loans and suppliers' credits have replaced official bilateral and multilateral loans as Chile's principal sources of external financing, and have far surpassed them in importance to the military junta. Repression in Chile can continue precisely because the military junta can rely on private sources of

financing rather than on governments who have attached human rights criteria to their foreign assistance programmes.

By mid-1977 Pinochet felt confident enough about Chile's future in private credit markets to refuse the final \$27.5m in economic assistance which had been appropriated by the US Congress. In other words, just when international public opinion was becoming most effective in reducing the flow of resources to the Chilean dictatorship, private banks felt confident enough in the future of the dictatorship to increase their total lending dramatically. No wonder former Chilean Ambassador to the US Jorge Cauas, speaking in New York on 16 February 1978, told a group of bankers and businessmen that 'the private sector is the key to the renaissance of relations between Chile and the United States'!

The flood of loans has been used for a variety of purposes. The most important use from the junta's perspective has been to refinance the debts owed by Chile to creditor governments. In effect, Chile has been borrowing from private banks to repay bilateral loans to the governments of western Europe and North America, the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank and the IMF. The loans have also injected added purchasing power into the depressed Chilean economy. Lifting of interest rates by the government in 1976 also attracted foreign capital to private markets. Finally, the loans are financing imports of intermediate industrial products and luxury goods consumed by the Chilean upper class.

For a variety of reasons, private loans to Chile were minimal until mid-1976. Even though private foreign investors welcomed the overthrow of Allende, they were by no means prepared to lend the junta large sums of money until they had the opportunity to assess its prospects for survival. In 1974 and 1975 the multinationals were obviously happy to see the US government and multilateral lending institutions make loans and grants to the junta in order to stabilize the Pinochet regime, but private investors were clearly reluctant to commit their own funds. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a US government agency which insures investment abroad from expropriation, was under fire in the US Congress and did not want to draw additional criticism by insuring new investments in Chile. Hence, despite the fact that the junta immediately began to court foreign investment, private investors have, until very recently, been unwilling to risk their money on the regime.

One major reason for the lack of private loans and investments until 1976 was Chile's serious economic crisis. According to a US Senate report, the Central Intelligence Agency helped economists and businessmen who were plotting the overthrow of Allende to prepare a 'blueprint' for the Chilean economy based upon the conservative 'monetarist' theories developed by Milton Friedman and others at the University of Chicago.[9] Following the coup, Pinochet selected the

'Chicago Boys' as his top economic policy-makers. Their economic policy's success depended upon two preconditions: in order to attract private and foreign capital, the public sector of the economy must be dismantled; to ensure it a high rate of profit ('capital formation'), the wages of the people must be kept down forcibly and a reverse economic distribution obtained. Almost immediately these economists began to dismantle the public sector, while the government began to lift price controls on most essential items, at the same time freezing wages. Most of the land distributed to peasants under the 1967 Land Reform Act was returned to the *latifundistas*; public spending on essential social services was eliminated or transferred to military and police expenditures, and government spending on productive investments was reduced in order to hold down the budget deficit. By way of explanation, Pinochet and his closest advisers stressed the need to eliminate politics from Chilean society in order to introduce a 'free market' system. 'Frankly,' said Central Bank President Alvaro Bardon, 'the success of the economic programme has been fantastic. Who would have ever thought you could do such a thing in Chile? We were always too political, we never wanted to make sacrifices.' [10]

The cumulative effect of the junta's economic policies was a dramatic redistribution of income, from workers and the poor to the propertied classes and foreign enterprises. In 1972, according to a confidential International Monetary Fund Staff Report, wage and salaried workers received 63 per cent of total income in Chile, whereas 37 per cent went to the propertied sectors in the form of profits, dividends and rents. By 1974 these shares of income had literally been reversed: 62 per cent of the total income was received by the propertied and only 38 per cent by the workers.

THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

These economic policies, however, sank the economy into a deepening stagnation coupled with runaway inflation. By 1975, with the dramatic drop in the international price of copper, Chile's ability to repay its foreign debts collapsed. The economy was in such dire straits that the junta literally faced a struggle for survival. That February, the United States appealed to the Paris Club of creditor nations on Chile's behalf. The US requested that they reschedule hundreds of millions of dollars of Chile's debts. Because of the growing international awareness of the junta's massive human rights violations, five European nations refused to participate in the rescheduling process. Under pressure from the United States, several other major creditors, among them Japan, West Germany, France and Spain, agreed to reschedule roughly \$250m of Chile's debts. However, the other nations made it

clear that if the junta's human rights record did not improve, this would be its last opportunity for debt relief.

In March 1975 Chile applied for new short-term balance of payments relief from the International Monetary Fund and received a stand-by agreement totalling 79m SDR (Special Drawing Rights) — on the condition that Chile would submit to a series of austerity measures designed to reduce the budget deficit. After the first instalment of 20m SDR had been made, however, the fall in world copper prices induced a decline in Chilean government revenues. When the IMF demanded a reduction in government expenditures which the junta failed to meet, the balance of the loan under the stand-by agreement was revoked.

Unable to return to the Paris Club, and with inflation still in excess of 300 per cent a year, top economic policy-maker Jorge Cauas chose the only available alternative, given the fact that the junta was unwilling to make concessions on human rights issues. In April 1975 Cauas deliberately threw the Chilean economy into a deep depression. In one year Cauas cut government spending by 20 per cent and government capital spending by over 50 per cent in order to free funds to meet Chile's debt obligations. Consequently, Chile's Gross Domestic Product fell by 15 per cent in 1975. Industrial production declined by 23 per cent and per capita income fell by 25 per cent, roughly to the level of 1962. This severe economic contraction was disastrous for the lower income groups, who were forced to bear the brunt of meeting Chile's debt repayments. By the end of 1975, according to the government's own statistics, unemployment in greater Santiago reached about 20 per cent of the labour force, and real wages had tumbled. To reduce the payments deficit, the junta also banned imports of subsistence foodstuffs, consumed mainly by the workers and the poor. Yet, in the interest of promoting 'free trade', the junta has lowered other import barriers. Now the tiny percentage of the Chilean population with large incomes can purchase all the amenities of the international consumer society (luxury cars, caviar and stereos), while the majority tries desperately to maintain decent living standards. The textile industry in Chile produces half of what it did five years ago. The car-assembly plants produce half of what they did in 1968 and one-fourth of what they did in 1972. When tariffs were recently lowered on machine tools, one executive told the *Wall Street Journal* that, 'we had to give up making an electric welding machine and begin selling an imported one'.

Coupled with the severe contraction in aggregate demand resulting from lower government expenditures, the decision to lower trade barriers has forced many small and medium businesses into bankruptcy and destroyed a good deal of Chile's industrial capacity. The industries which remain competitive with imports are monopolized by a few giant financial groups (*financieras*) with ties to the junta. The Cauas 'shock treatment' provoked outcries from many independent

businessmen and the middle class, historically represented by the Christian Democratic Party. When the Christian Democrats proposed alternative economic policies, which would have eased the burden on the workers and the middle class, the Party's economists and political leaders were suppressed. Finally, in March 1977, in response to its growing criticism of the junta's economic policies, the Christian Democratic Party was outlawed.

Today in Chile the official unemployment rate of 13 per cent is nearly twice that under the conservative Alessandri government (1958-64). Despite the junta's claim that the unemployment rate declined significantly in 1976, another 7 per cent of the labour force must participate in the minimum employment programme (PEM) just to stay alive. They earn less than US\$40 per month, while most prices have risen to US levels. Even the most basic public services have become almost non-existent. National expenditure on health care has fallen from 7 per cent of the national budget in 1972 to less than 3 per cent in 1977. Per capita health care expenditure declined from \$48 per person in 1971 to roughly \$13 in 1977. As Ernesto Medina, president of the Chilean Medical Association, explained, 'two-thirds of the Chilean population are not able to pay the very high cost of medical care in Chile at the present time'. Declining government expenditure for health services has left many recent medical school graduates unemployed, and political persecution, coupled with professional unemployment, has contributed to a migration of over 16 per cent of Chile's physicians since 1973. Government expenditure on housing has fallen from 9 per cent of the budget in 1965 to 4 per cent in 1977. Malnutrition is another serious problem arising from the government's policies of freeing prices, freezing wages and reducing government expenditures. Studies conducted by the Catholic Church's Vicariate of Solidarity in some working-class neighbourhoods have estimated that over 75 per cent of the children are malnourished, and, were it not for the church's soup kitchens, the figure would be higher. Per capita consumption of wheat, meat, vegetables, sugar, rice, oils and potatoes has declined markedly since 1973. It is not uncommon for workers and the poor to spend 80 to 90 per cent of their total income on food items.[11]

The junta conformed perfectly to the bankers' conception of 'sound economic policies'. They gave top priority to meeting their debt obligations, balancing their external payments, cutting the budget, holding down wages and allowing maximum freedom for private enterprise. Despite the tremendous internal costs of these policies, the banks began to lend the large sums needed to prop up the Chilean economy.

The junta's economic planners have found the new gush of credit extremely useful in financing Chile's \$500m current account deficit incurred in 1977 — largely due to the lowering of import barriers and the tremendous costs of paying off old debts. Despite paying out

billions in debt service payments, Chile still has a huge debt burden. The difference is that Chile is now indebted to private, not public, institutions. In 1977, while Chile's exports stagnated, the country still had to meet foreign debt payments of nearly \$1.2 billion. This left Chile with a ratio of debt service to exports of 54.2 per cent, an increase of 45 per cent since 1973, the highest debt service ratio in the world. In other words, for every \$1 of its export earnings, Chile must use 54 cents simply to pay off old debts.

Without a continual inflow of credit from the private banks, Chile will either be forced to return to the Paris Club to seek re-negotiation — where it will certainly be held accountable for its massive human rights violations — or to swallow a new dose of austerity like the one which Pinochet and Cauas introduced in April 1975. However, with the Pinochet regime under attack from both the centre and the left, and with augmented political divisions within the military junta (especially between Leigh and Pinochet), it would be political suicide for Pinochet to ask a country wracked by poverty and economic austerity to endure another severe depression.

The boom in private bank lending has continued in 1978. In January the Wells Fargo Bank headed a consortium which granted the Central Bank a new line of credit totalling \$125m. In early April a consortium of forty banks, led by Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., loaned the Central Bank \$210m, perhaps the largest single private loan in Chile's history. ENAP, the state-owned petroleum company, recently received a new \$14m line of credit from a consortium, headed by Citibank, to finance off-shore oil drilling operations at Tierra del Fuego. The World Bank is also currently considering a \$40m loan to offset the cost of repair work on the Chilean section of the Pan-American highway. Chile's largest private enterprise, the Papeles y Cartones paper monopoly, has just received the largest loan to a private enterprise without government guarantee of repayment in many years. The \$24.5m loan was provided by a consortium of eleven multinational banks, headed by the Chemical Bank of New York. A smaller loan of \$14.7m was granted to the firm by the Bank of Montreal and the Canadian government's Export Development Corporation.

Moreover, since the beginning of 1978, private multinational corporations, which have invested little in Chile since the coup, began to demonstrate renewed interest in Chilean investments. Still, many more private projects have been approved by the junta than have actually been undertaken. Exxon's \$107m purchase last January of the state-owned La Disputada copper mines was by far the largest investment in Chile since 1973, and certainly one of the largest in Chilean history. This investment came on the heels of Goodyear Tire's decision to purchase CORFO-INSA for \$36m. Like the influx of private bank loans, increasing investments by multinational corporations will surely be exploited by the regime in its attempt to gain

internal political legitimacy and diffuse international criticism of its human rights violations.

*HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVATE BANKS:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS*

During President Carter's recent visit to Brazil, a Brazilian journalist asked him how he would respond if the US Congress attempted to withhold US private bank loans from countries which violate human rights. Carter responded that:

it would be inconceivable to me that any act of Congress would try to restrict the lending of money by American private banks ... under any circumstances. This would violate the principles of our own free enterprise system. And if such an act was passed by Congress, I would not approve it.

Pursued on the potential conflict between private bank loans and the status of fundamental human rights, he continued:

I don't see any incompatibility between a belief in the free enterprise system where a government does not dominate the banks ... and a deep and consistent and permanent and strong belief in enhancing human rights around the world ... the American business community ... support[s] completely a commitment of our nation to human rights.

There is, he concluded, 'no conflict between human rights on the one hand and the free enterprise system on the other'. [12]

In March 1977, when the military junta outlawed even the Christian Democrats (formerly the US Democrats' favoured party in Chile) as well as all other remaining political parties, consortia of US and Canadian banks nonetheless lent the government over \$60m. In January 1978, shortly after the infamous 'referendum' in which citizens were asked to choose between the Pinochet government and 'international aggression' (the United Nations November 1977 resolution against Chile), Pinochet sent twelve Christian Democrats into exile for participating in unlawful political activities. Yet the same month, the bank consortium headed by Wells Fargo lent the government \$125m and Exxon purchased approximately \$100m worth of the shares of the La Disputada mines. Clearly, in the case of Chile there is a direct conflict between the freedom of private enterprise and the international efforts to restore human rights to a country which enjoyed them for so long. The lending operations of private multinational banks based in North America and western Europe have directly circumvented the stated official policies of Chile's major creditors.

While some defenders of the military junta have perceived some 'moderation' in the junta's policies in the past year, there is little evidence to support this view. To cite but one example: when the US Assistant Secretary of State Terrance Todman visited Chile in August 1977, Pinochet announced the dissolution of DINA; whereupon Todman publicly applauded Pinochet's actions. But, as Eugenio Velasco, former Dean of the School of Law of the University of Chile has pointed out, the dissolution of DINA is a 'farce'. DINA's functions as Pinochet's personal secret police were simply transferred to another agency with a different title, the National Information Centre (CNI). The new agency's legal mandate and mode of operation are essentially the same as those of DINA.

Others who have sought to discover some 'improvement' in the human rights situation in Chile have overlooked the fact that all of the essential freedoms which Chileans enjoyed for decades still do not exist — Pinochet still runs a fully-fledged police state. As Jose Zalaquette, a noted Chilean lawyer in exile, has pointed out:

The military junta has continued its suspension of union rights; it has added that the right to strike will never be reinstated and recently deprived three exiled trade union leaders of their nationality. Radio Balmaceda was closed and preventive censorship imposed on publication and/or circulation of all newly printed matter... Any dictatorship that could afford to use less direct means of coercion would prefer to do so. The cumulative effect of continued repression and the increased perfection of the state machinery for control and intimidation now allow the Chilean junta to turn gradually to less resounding forms of repression. To applaud this as progress is to praise a dictatorship for accomplishing its own goals.

What *has* clearly changed in Chile is the business climate. For nearly three years the junta was largely unable to attract private loans or investments. Now, however, private banks have lent Chile nearly \$2 billion, suppliers' credits have soared and multinational corporations have begun to return. According to US Commerce Department figures, rates of return on US investments in Chile have recovered from the low levels of 1974 and 1975 and now are comparable to rates of return in other Latin American countries.

The improvement in the climate for foreign investors, however, should not be confused with a return to the prosperity and freedom which Chileans once enjoyed. Some observers have asserted that the slight recovery in Gross Domestic Product which occurred in 1977 is a sign that the economy is recovering from the deflationary policies of 1975-6 and that the economic recovery will hasten a return to democratic rule. But the kinds of economic policies which are the hallmarks of the Pinochet regime in Chile can only lead to a more

rigid polarization of Chilean society. A small group of firms and individuals control Chile's entire productive apparatus, while the junta tries to auction the rest of the economy to foreign corporations. In order to establish its credit-worthiness with foreign banks, the junta has sacrificed both the health of Chile's industrial structure and the welfare of the Chilean people. That is the economic strategy which requires that the *de facto* state of siege introduced in September 1973 by the Pinochet regime continues to exist.

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Class and Power in a Punjabi Village

Saghir Ahmad

Introduction by
Kathleen Gough

This is a valuable and pioneering study of class, economy, power, and status in a West Pakistani village. Focusing particularly on changes resulting from the so-called Green Revolution and the institution of adult franchise, Ahmad finds that for most of the villagers, while caste relations may once have dominated their lives, now class relations are far more fundamental—for instance, the ways in which the villagers gain their livelihood, and the resulting landlord-peasant power relationships.

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A burning fever: the isolation of Asian women in Britain

INTRODUCTION

Being black in Britain one is constantly faced with an outside view of oneself, usually an overtly or unconsciously racist one. Being a woman, too, one has to contend with an outside view — a male view. Asian women are given a variety of images: by the health workers, who think of them as dirty and ignorant; by the liberals, who feel pity for their oppression and a sort of horror at the extremity of it; by conservative Asian men, who reserve their ideals of purity for them; and by sociologists, who observe 'objectively'. These images have their own importance, but they do not represent reality for Asian women. For women coming directly from the Indian sub-continent, Britain has meant being torn out of a semi-feudal peasant society and dumped at the bottom of a racist capitalist society. Before they came, from Punjab or Bangladesh or Gujerat, they lived within joint families in rural farming communities; now they are parts of newly-formed nuclear families in decaying inner cities of Britain.

The women I write about here are mainly from Sylhet in Bangladesh; they are among the Asian women who have most recently come to Britain as 'dependants', to join their husbands — men who came to fill the jobs, often very low-paid, thrown up by the post-war boom so as to support their families in the impoverished villages of Britain's ex-colonies. Ironically, many of the women have been brought here because of those very immigration laws which now seek

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to exclude them. Travel to and from Britain has been made so difficult for their husbands (who previously worked in Britain for short spells at a time, one brother replacing another) that they have been forced to settle here.

The women, unlike their husbands, have not come initially as workers, but increasingly, once here, economic pressures force them to take up work outside the home. It is not my purpose here to describe their struggles, as the lowest paid and most exploited section of the workforce, in strikes such as at Grunwick, Imperial Type-writers, Mansfield Hosiery — strikes which have changed, not only the lives of the women involved, but the horizons of working-class struggle in Britain. That I have documented elsewhere in my book.

The women in this extract, from orthodox muslim backgrounds and recently come to Britain, do not talk about this. They describe what is uppermost in their minds — the racism which they have experienced (from the health service, social workers and neighbours), their family life, and the past — feudal and colonial — which keeps intruding into the present.

It is a past where there is a strict sexual division of labour, where the woman's main economic role is to produce labour power and where the economic survival of the family depends on having sons. A man's role is to a certain extent within his control. He has to work hard in the fields. He may fail as a result of natural disasters but no one can blame him for that. But a woman's success or otherwise is not within her control. It is a matter of chance. In this past then, the most important, yet uncontrollable, factor occurs in the woman's body. As a result, religion and superstition centre attention on the womb in an effort to explain in terms of 'morality' what is unexplained and unacceptable in terms of fact. 'Morality', while opening the doors to oppression, by focusing so sharply on the woman's role, also makes her the central symbol of the culture. Women are the link between economic security and emotional security. Their role is at the heart, the core of the civilization. That is why they are kept in their place, if necessary by the most brutal oppression. If they rebel the society itself may be overturned. But in the harshness of their lives they have one consolation, the support and affection of other women — the warmth which sisters and sisters-in-law can show for one another.

In Britain all this is changed, capitalism means isolation for women who don't work outside the home and for Asian women it is an isolation which is intensified by racism. In Britain they face a new life — but, as Shahida, a woman from Lahore, told me: 'People come to a new country ... but the past they can't forget it. They bring it with them — memories, attitudes and relationships.'



I have been married now almost twenty five years. We lived in Gulabganj [in Sylhet]. My daughter married there. I have a little grandson. It was after the boy was born that I came to live in London. I came with my 13-year-old son to join my husband who had lived here for many, many years. It took some time to get entry, there were delays, long sessions of questioning and trouble with certificates but in the end it was sorted out and we got on a plane in April 1974. When we arrived... you ask me how I felt, sister... bad, I felt bad — to leave them all, everyone back in the village. My husband had come to collect us at the airport and we came back here in a minicar. Did I expect it to be like this? No, tell me how could I? After all I had never been here before, there was no means of knowing. I used to be sad. I used to cry, not knowing anyone or anything, missing my home... To live in one room after living in a country where houses are so open. It was hard, very hard.

Rezia Begum is 41. She lives in a street near Russell Square. There is no bell on the door. To get in I and the friend who is taking me hammer and hammer on the door, shout over and over again in Bengali, 'It's us, it's us, let us in.' These precautions are essential because of the danger of racial attacks. Finally Rezia throws the keys down from an upstairs window. Inside, the whole house slopes to the right, the stairs are unwashed, the walls are peeling, the door of a broken WC stands open. We go up several flights of stairs to the room where Rezia lives with her husband and son. It isn't large; two wide beds almost fill it. There is almost no other furniture. Clothes hang on a line at one side of the room. In one corner is a gas ring, in another a table with some school books on it. The room is tidy, a few pictures decorate the walls.

Rezia spends almost all her time in this room. She rarely goes out and has never been beyond the street she lives in on her own. She speaks no English and knows hardly anyone. In her first year in Britain no one visited her. Her husband is a restaurant worker. He is out all day from 11 am to midnight. Where does he work, I ask. 'I don't know the place. I have never been there. I don't know the name or address except that it is a club of some sort. He never really talks about his work. There isn't the time.'

The isolation and emptiness of Rezia's life is typical of what many Asian women in Britain face. Those who have come from a joint family in India, Pakistan or Bangladesh to live alone with their husbands in Britain suffer most. Zubeida, a woman in her thirties, described to me her experiences of twelve years ago.

I had a proxy marriage on the telephone. My husband was here and he was a great friend of my uncle, so my uncle arranged it all... We

stayed first in Colindale. My husband was an accountant. He was very handsome and he was very good to me. But one thing about our Asian men is that they think it a matter of pride that their women must not go out to work. But the problem for us is one of loneliness. At least if a woman goes out to work she can escape that — her mind is occupied, she does not long so much for her home in Pakistan. When I first came my husband did not want me to go out to work. It is true there was a lot of housework but I used to be very lonely. Everyday I used to cry. I missed my parents; I longed for my home and my sisters. In Pakistan they used to be my constant companions. I used to cry till my husband came home at five o'clock. Only on Saturdays and Sundays was I happy. I would make a really nice dinner, get ready and dress up. My husband would take me to a cinema. It was called the Scala. I was always waiting for Saturday.

In these lonely hours, sitting in Brick Lane in the East End or Lumb Lane in Bradford, vivid memories come flooding in from the past, from the life before this semi-existence.

Our house is open, as most houses in Sylhet are. It is made of earth and bamboo but it is beautiful. A straw thatch covers the main part, then there are verandahs and a courtyard. On moonlight nights, we, the women, used to sit there and talk or sing and prepare and eat *pan* [betel leaf]. The busiest time of the year is the rice harvest, if the crop is good that is. There used to be a lot of work. I and other girls and women, we'd work the *dhenki*, husking the rice, or sometimes we'd go to the fields carrying tobacco and food for my brothers-in-law and cousins who were working there. Occasionally we'd harvest the lighter crops, like sweet potatoes or chillis. Then the rainy season would come. When the rains come to my country the clusters of houses are like islands. Here and there a tall *tal* tree [a kind of palm] stands out, all else is submerged. When I was a young girl I and my sisters would get a boat and slip away, visiting friends from island to island. Of course the elders didn't like it, they thought we were tomboys, but we loved it — the sound of the water, the rocking and splashing ... Sometimes at night, the music of boatmen would come floating up, blown by the waves and wind, a flute playing the music of the river. Why, why did I ever leave my home?

In London it is 4 pm. Outside the evening is drawing in already. Rezia is waiting for her son to come home from school. She is worried about him. About a month ago he was severely beaten up by a gang of white boys on the way back from school.

They used to bully him and tease him; then one day on his way back from school they attacked him. The next day he and another

Bengali boy who lives nearby chose another way home, hoping to escape the attackers. But the gang found out and followed him here. Just as my son entered our room I could see them, seven or eight hefty white boys entering through the door downstairs. We could hear them coming up the stairs right to our door and then shouting and hammering on it. I got up and quietly bolted the door. We kept very still inside and in the end we could hear them slowly going down the stairs and going away. After that I did not want my son to go to school but in the end some Bengali men in the area took it up with the Headmaster and since then there has been no trouble.

A community worker who helped the family told me:

We took it up with the Education Officer who asked for information about the family. I told him I knew them well, their son is not the type who just gets in fights. When it was taken up with the Headmaster he said that the boy's name was not on the roll, they did not know of him. We felt he was trying to avoid the whole issue. Anyway in the end he and the Education Officer did take some action to control the bullies and since then there has been no trouble. But just think if the family had not been in touch with the Bengali Action Group or with any community workers, what sort of state of fear they'd live in. And there are many families like that. The police? — who would call them, these families don't have telephones. And even if they are called they hardly ever come in time.

Many other women I spoke to told me that for protection from racial attacks it was essential to have Asian neighbours. Calling the police had proved again and again to be useless. During the racial violence of summer 1976, a housewife from Newham told me:

It was just an ordinary evening. I had done all the cooking and was waiting for my husband to come home. Suddenly I heard a loud scream and rushed to the front door. Half a dozen white teenagers were beating someone up. There was blood on the pavement. I couldn't see who it was at first, then I realised it was my husband. He was unconscious on the ground. They were kicking and beating him. I screamed for help. The neighbours rushed out and we beat off the thugs with sticks and broom handles. We called the police and ambulance, but it was a long time before the police arrived. They went to see my husband in hospital and asked him to see them when he came out. But when he did they showed no interest at all, they just said the officer concerned was not there. They made no attempt to catch the thugs.

This family had Asian neighbours. Below is the story of a Bengali family in the East End who did not.

In Shadwell Gardens, by Cable Street, there is a large block of council flats. On the ground floor my interpreter from the Bengali Housing Association led the way into a small, bare flat inhabited by a Bengali widow with three children of six, eight and nine.

Last Saturday night they were watching television. They had just had the windows repaired from the last volley of stones. Fists started hammering on their windows. They turned the lights out and sat in fear.

They heard sounds in the kitchen: breaking glass, sounds of unknown things coming into their home. Peeking around the kitchen door, they saw rubbish being emptied from dustbins into their home. Then a stone came through the living-room window. The widow gathered her children and ran out of the front door seeking protection from another Bengali family thirty yards across the court.

There were about thirty people waiting for them as they left their home. The bruises on the neck and face and legs of the widow and her children were still livid on the brown skin as they recounted how they had run a gauntlet of fists and kicks and curses of their neighbours.

Yelling in Bengali for help, they reached the door of the other family. One of its sons came out and tried to help them inside. He was pulled into the court and beaten on the face. He stood beside the broken glass of his front door as he described how the white neighbours — assisted by two West Indian girls — hauled him into the court and beat him. The bruises and lumps were still fresh and unhealed on his face.

The police arrived three hours later, by which time the siege of the Bengali homes had ended ... Bengali families in the East End feel they have no protection and that they must begin to protect themselves. They say that the police could stop the violence overnight if the Special Patrol Group was assigned to patrol the area, or if the Home Office made it sufficiently clear that this kind of activity must stop. One of the fears of the Bengali community is that the new Conservative administration of the GLC [Greater London Council] will not honour a private agreement reached with the Labour GLC in 1976, for quick and emergency relocation of harassed Asian families. (*Guardian*, 6 June 1977)

If these fears prove justified, it won't be the first time Asian families are forced through deliberate government policies to live in terrifying isolation. Right from the early 1960s the attitude of local authorities and housing departments has been that 'ghettos' must be avoided at all costs, and even a handful of Asian families can make an area a ghetto. (Newham Councillor Harry Doran, reported in the *Newham Recorder*, May 1976 — 'The estate is becoming a ghetto. Only eight

floors [of a tower block] are without an immigrant family.')

When in 1972 the Ugandan Asians started coming to Britain, the government's Ugandan Resettlement Board operated a deliberate policy of dispersal. Refugee families in obvious distress were discouraged and often prevented from joining their relations and Asian friends in Britain by the Board's refusal of all aid if they settled in areas with significant Asian populations. This has led to situations like that described in *A Job Well Done?* (a report by Helene Middleweek and Michael Ward, prepared on behalf of the Co-ordination Committee for the Welfare of Evacuees from Uganda) when a family consisting of mother, father and 13-year-old son, where neither of the parents spoke any English and the father was almost paralysed, were settled in a remote area of Ross and Cromarty in Scotland, twenty miles from the nearest Asian family.

Isolation is seen from the outside as a result of women not speaking English, or of their being forced to stay at home for cultural reasons. But it is much more than this. It is a state of mind, one of shock and withdrawal. Weakened by the separation from their families, often suffering the loss of mother, sisters and close friends, these Asian women find themselves in a strange, unknown society. The realization that this is a racist society, a society which wishes them dead for the colour of their skin, accentuates their loneliness, and their isolation in turn makes it harder for them to fight against racism.

Living in the conditions I have described can cause the strongest personalities to sink into depression. For pregnant women, or those who have just had babies, the pressures are sometimes so great that they become mentally disturbed.

Post-natal depression is said to be common among immigrant women generally. Among Asians it particularly affects those separated from their families. Indigenous British women affected by post-natal depression are often single mothers or those whose husbands or boyfriends don't give them the care and affection or help they need in this new stage of their life. For Asian women, separation from their families can cause the same torment. Often these women, sometimes as young as 17 or 18, suffer alone; no one except their husband knows about them, or cares. Occasionally they are referred to hospitals, but the treatment they receive sometimes serves only to underline their isolation.

A London hospital allowed me to visit one of their patients, Manisha, a Muslim girl of 20 from Sylhet, who had just had her second child. I was told that she had been having fits of anger, and had been neglecting her children. She was being treated at home at that time. A community nurse was visiting her so that she wouldn't get too lonely and depressed. This nurse, I was surprised to discover, was a man. He seemed a very pleasant person but spoke no Bengali. In fact he said to me: 'You could be quite useful, you know, you

could help me get through to her '

We went to see Manisha one winter afternoon. The nurse had brought along a male friend. Manisha lived in a council flat on a decrepit estate. Garbage littered the outside; a very old white woman hobbled slowly on crutches into a downstairs flat. As we entered the building a white woman leaning from a balcony screamed a stream of abuse. We went up to the second floor and knocked at Manisha's flat. For a long time there was no sound inside, then the door opened. A Bengali girl, absurdly young, stood there holding a baby in her arms. She didn't look at us, didn't answer when I spoke in Bengali. Finally, still silent, she turned and led us into the main room. She left us there for a few minutes, then, coming to the door, beckoned me to the next room. There at last she began to speak. This is how I remember it.

My head aches all the time. I have a burning fever — feel me sister, feel me. Inside me sometimes is such anger, anger with my babies, with my husband, with the whole of my life. Then suddenly I am panic-stricken. My head feels as though it is on fire. It started when I got home from hospital after having my baby. My husband gave me the news that my father had died back in the village. Now, thinking of them, how do I feel ... Late, late at night my husband comes home. He loves the babies. He is a good husband, but what can he do? And what can I do? How can I live, sister, how can I live.

In the next room the nurse and his friend were playing with Manisha's older child.

What was it that Manisha was missing so desperately? Ranu, a Sylheti woman in her late twenties, told me of the enveloping love and care a woman with her first or second child can receive in Bangladesh.

If a girl is lucky and her parents are alive, she goes to her mother's house for the last few months of her pregnancy and about the first three months of the baby's life. There she gets a lot of love and care. She is asked 'What would you like to eat? What do you fancy?' All the time she is looked after. The whole matter of pregnancy is one of celebration. When the baby is born it is an occasion of joy for the whole family. The naming ceremony is so lovely. It is held when the baby is seven-days old. A new dress is bought for it and a new sari for the mother. There is feasting and singing till late at night. The women and young girls gather and sing songs. Garlands of turmeric and garlic are worn to ward off evil spirits. That's when the name is chosen. The *Maulvi* of course selects a formal Arabic name, but the celebration I am telling you about involves choosing a name to call the child by. Suggestions are asked for from the family and friends all over the village. Then

a new cane *kulo* [tray for dusting rice] is taken, a big one with pictures woven into it perhaps, and the names are written on it in ink. Candles are placed by each name. The name which burns the longest is chosen. The same ceremony is held for the birth of a boy or a girl. Of course it is considered better to have a boy, but the birth of a girl is celebrated with the same joy by the women in the family. We sit together eating *pan* and singing. Some of us might be young unmarried girls, others ladies of 40 or 50. There are so many jokes, so much laughter. People look so funny eating *pan* and singing. The men don't take much part. They may come and have a look at the baby, but the singing, the gathering together at night — it is all women. The songs are simple songs which are rarely written down. They are about the lives of women in Bengal.

Back in London, what is available to mentally-disturbed women who are treated in hospital? I cannot make generalizations without a far more detailed study. But it worth mentioning what a very experienced and established psychiatrist told me about his work when I interviewed him. When asked how he communicated with Bengali patients who spoke no English, he said: 'I have no trouble in communicating with them because I learned pidgin English in the army.' What were the main illnesses people suffered from? He replied:

Well, at certain times we have had a large number of Bengali patients. In fact at one time before the Pakistan-Bangladesh war there were so many that we called this form of depression Pakistani Syndrome. The symptoms were bleary eyes, pain in the head, loss of weight, sleeplessness, and for the men impotency. We gave electric treatment. Some had it twice. But if they came more than once their friends usually sent them home. After two bouts they go home; they don't recover. During the war it was better. There were very few patients. The war took people's minds off things. Now again there is less psychiatry because people are afraid of losing their jobs. Living conditions don't affect them. They do adapt, they are jolly and supportive.

As for the women, he said, they suffered from the same sort of things — depression and sometimes guilt. He told me of one case he had had of a woman in her early twenties. Her own family were in Bangladesh. Her husband, a restaurant owner, was almost twice her age and diabetic. She was acutely depressed and had a pain in the back of her neck. He had treated her for several months using her husband as an interpreter — as though her husband were an objective witness to her depression. He told me:

It took me time to find out what was wrong, but eventually I sorted it out. The patient had been living before she came to London on

the outskirts of a town in Bangladesh. She never wore the veil. One day an older woman who wore the veil cursed her and accused her of being loose. This curse resulted in guilt, because in a way you see it was true. She was loose. For example, everyday when she came to see me she wore a beautiful new sari.

I found this account sad but also rather revealing. It showed not only racism and sexist vanity on the part of the psychiatrist, but ignorance about the way of life of his patient. That young girl, hardly out of her teens, married to an ailing, elderly man, probably never went out of the house apart from these visits to the hospital. Being well-off (the wife of a restaurant owner), she had many beautiful saris. Wearing a different one every time she went out would be normal, particularly since a sari does not have to be washed as frequently as a dress because it is not worn next to the skin.

To get a more general view of how the Health Service departments treat their Asian women patients, I asked social workers in different parts of London what their experiences had been in dealing with hospitals, health visitors and Area Health Authorities. They told me that there were serious everyday problems which arose because the needs of Asian patients were being ignored. There is, for example, a general absence of interpreters in hospitals even in areas with high immigrant populations. Some terrifying situations occur as a result. There was the case, for example, of a 5-year-old boy who was taken to hospital vomiting violently and with a high temperature. It was two days before medical staff found out what his distraught parents were trying to tell them — that he had swallowed the contents of a tin of paint.

The hospital staff I spoke to were almost without exception complacent on the subject of interpreters. In one hospital, in an area with a large proportion of Bangladeshis, the hospital secretary told me: 'We rarely need interpreters but we have a list of members of staff who speak various foreign languages' — for Bengali there was a porter and a cook — both male.

In Wandsworth the attitude of the Area Health Authority and of health visitors was described to me by Geeta Amin, a social worker with Wandsworth Community Relations Council.

We wanted to do a research project on the reasons for the low take-up of health clinics and health services by Asian women. It seemed to be a very important project but the Area Health Authority felt it would be 'unethical'. There is a complete lack of understanding and that goes right the way through the Health Service ... I have been giving a series of seminars on nutrition and the Asian family to health visitors. I have been telling them about the different sensitivity which Asian women have to their babies and the fact that you can't just go up to an Asian woman with the diet leaflet and say

you should be giving your baby cod liver oil, because 90 per cent of Asians in Wandsworth are vegetarians. But one faces a continuous battle with these health visitors. You go to a seminar and say: 'Listen, they don't eat this kind of thing!' But their attitude remains the same — 'Well we treat them all the same whether they are Asian or English.' That is the fundamental policy of all social services — 'We treat them all the same. We don't see any difference. If we can tell an English mother to do that we'll tell an Asian mother to do that.'

Something which shows up the Area Health Authority policy is their refusal to have any special facilities for Asian women. They complain that Asian women don't attend clinics for mothers' groups and discussions. But they are not interested in the reasons for it, in the sort of alienation which Asian women feel at these groups. We suggested a special Asian mothers' group to discuss health problems. They said: 'We can't have anything of the sort, we don't run separate facilities for Asians, and not only that, we are not going to allow you to use the health clinic for anything that is solely for Asians.'

Hashmat Ara Haque, a community worker in the Borough of Camden, told me that she too had come across the most contemptuous attitudes among health visitors. She said that they seemed to regard Asian women as ignorant and stupid people who neglected their children. She explained why Bangladeshi women sometimes found it difficult to look after their children in Britain.

What young mothers suffer from more than almost anything else is having constant responsibility for their children. In Bangladesh children under the age of 5 or 6 are looked after by the whole family. All the children in the joint family are looked after together. They are taken to the pond for a bath perhaps by one daughter-in-law, and she baths them all. Then they all come in and sit down to eat. Perhaps the youngest daughter-in-law has cooked the meal. Another woman feeds them. As for playing, children play out of doors with natural objects. Here people say that Asian children don't play with toys. In Bangladesh they don't need toys. They make their own simple things — models and castles out of mud, dolls with red earth and leaves. Being out of doors means they are not always cooped up in one room with their mothers. In the afternoon or evening they love to hear *rupkotha* [fairy tales]. Maybe there is a favourite aunt, she tells them these stories. But at night when they get sleepy they always go to their mother and sleep in her embrace. But other women do help a lot, in fact they have such strong relationships with the child that it is not uncommon for them to be called Big Mother or Small Mother. Here, in Britain, the attitude of women is quite different; they may

say why should another woman look after my baby or even touch my baby.

Snatched from the security and love of their sisters in the joint family, Bengali women in Britain often find themselves forced into total emotional dependence on their husbands. For many it is a strange and difficult experience, one which people who have always lived in a nuclear family find hard to understand. In fact their feelings and the vast emotional adjustment they have to make are perhaps best explained to nuclear family dwellers by considering the reverse transplant, from nuclear to joint family. For Asian women coming to join their husbands in Britain the experience is if anything more bewildering: first, the change is permanent; then, often enough, there are also the problems of racism and poverty. But how do those western women feel, for example, who, having lived with their Indian husbands in Britain for years, are suddenly thrust into the bosom of the joint family, even temporarily. This is how Janet described her three-month visit to her husband's family in an Indian village in Bihar:

I found it really hard when I was left totally in the women's company ... One of the things I didn't like too much was the terrific hullabaloo the women made about menstruation, the way they would sit sighing in a corner and all the other women would make a fuss over them. As a feminist I wanted these women to stop having what seemed to me to be silly attitudes ... They were terribly puzzled by me. They often asked me if I had a baby in my tummy because they saw no evidence of my menstruation ... These women don't have a role of status or power in society. So when they are sick, especially women's things, they make the most of it. For example, during pregnancy and just after you are queen for ten or eleven months. When I was sick I experienced a great deal of love and consideration. But I found I could communicate better with men. One particular uncle, he showed such warmth that a western man would find it very hard to show. With the women it was less easy. They often stroked and embraced each other and me. I could sense their warmth and desire to please but I didn't know how to respond. A lot of the day they sat round the oven talking. I would attempt to do something like peeling potatoes with one of those footknives. This would be a source of pleasure to them. But often I hated spending time with them. It was frighteningly boring.

While it is true that village women in India have little power or status in society as a whole, Janet misunderstands what lies behind the caring and 'fussing'. It is not, as she thinks, a desire to 'make the most of it', to somehow claim importance, but rather a recognition that in

that oppressive society women need the care and emotional support of other women.

Often Asian women coming from joint families in the Indian subcontinent to join their husbands in Britain do succeed in making the necessary emotional adjustment, but for many it takes months if not years; and for some, coping with the total emotional dependence on the husband alone, is just not possible. Of course, I do not mean that there is no tradition of love in marriage. The oldest stories in Indian mythology are after all love stories, accounts of the relationships of lovers, and specifically of married couples. The same is true of Urdu poetry. In the villages of Bangladesh the folk-songs, even the tapestries women make, tell stories of love and romance. What I mean is that although most women hope for a happy and loving relationship with their husbands, the attainment of this is not the purpose of marriage. The role of marriage, which acts as a conservative force, is economic and childbearing, and the knowledge of this role hangs like a dark shadow over any possible relationships. For the girl, marriage does not symbolize a heightened or new relationship with a man. It means instead the end of childhood and freedom, the beginning of a new life as a slave and chattel at the bottom of a hierarchy in someone else's family. 'One day,' as one Pakistani girl in Bradford said, 'I was a child playing out of doors, the next I was a married woman with a life full of work.' To symbolize her new life, her new role, defined for her by the male rule-makers of society, a girl may even be given a new name on marriage.

For village women in Punjab, Bengal or Gujerat, there is usually only one source of comfort in their new life — the presence of other women — to love them, caress them, sing songs with them and soothe their sorrows. In Britain, for these women who live alone with their husbands, this comfort is lacking, the afternoon hour spent lying on a bed chatting with their sisters-in-law, combing and oiling each other's hair, is replaced by empty hours sitting by the heater in some grey suburb. Often their husbands are much older than them — not so much for traditional reasons but because men settled in Britain are considered of higher status and class and therefore, being more desirable as sons-in-law, can find young brides. As one Bengali girl bitterly commented: 'You may have wondered why among Sylheti families in this area [King's Cross] the man is often horribly old with a crooked face while his wife is a young girl of astonishing beauty. That's because parents in Sylhet seem to think it is a big deal, a real status symbol to get a *biliti bor* [a bridegroom from England].'

Another woman told me about how Sylheti men returned to their villages to find a bride: 'After years in England they suddenly decide to marry a village girl. They go, in their smart suits and ties, back to the village. The villagers hold them in awe and think of them as men

of the world. People don't know about London. Don't know what a rotten life their daughter will have.'

Often the men marry girls not only younger but of a higher social class than their own in Sylhet. Back in London in the Sylheti community, having a young, good-looking wife from a comparatively high class is in turn a status symbol. The next step, which only the most well-off men, such as restaurant owners, can afford, is keeping this wife in semi-purdah — in other words sentencing her to solitary confinement.

This greed for status reinforces the wife's role as a child-bearing domestic slave or chattel, and spoils for ever the chance of a real relationship. Any error on her part, however small, and her husband may remind her that he can go back to Bangladesh and marry again. Any gynaecological illness, even a Caesarian operation, and he may regard her as unfit for sex and therefore useless: and he will go back to Bangladesh and marry again. Two Bengali women in their twenties told me of many women they knew, or knew of, who were thus stranded. 'After that', said one of them, 'how can there be any love between husband and wife. The husband, loving him, looking after him is regarded by us as a duty. He may be like a banana tree or a coconut tree, half human in appearance, revolting in every way, but caring for him is still a woman's duty if he's her husband. At home [in Bangladesh] we can balance it out in our minds because of all the love and happiness we can get from the women in the family. Here, all that is in the past we yearn for.'

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A. Philip Randolph and the dilemmas of socialism and black nationalism in the United States, 1917-1941

The presence in the advanced capitalist countries of a substantial section of the population distinguishable by race and culture from the majority has, since the end of the nineteenth century, constituted a major problem for socialists seeking pathways to working-class unification, consciousness and, ultimately, socialist revolution. The problem has been, of course, that the black sections of the working class have been available as a focus for racist ideologies and attacks, and thus historically a smoke-screen has been constructed behind which the real enemies, capital and the state, in large measure, have been able to hide. Given institutional racism and the enormous penetration of racist ideologies, strategies for class unification in such situations have so far achieved, at best, limited success.

This is not to suggest that racism has been the only inhibitor of black and white class unification. Almost as important has been the theoretical and practico-political bankruptcy of socialists themselves — be they white or black — when confronted by the problems posed by class struggle in racially-divided advanced capitalist societies. Although there are now a few signs that the task of constructing a theory and practice adequate to such societies has at last begun,^[1] there seems much still to be learned from the earlier experiences of socialists engaged in race as well as class struggle. One such socialist provides the focus of this essay.

A. Philip Randolph was the most prominent black American socialist and labour leader of his generation. His career, until his

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resignation in 1968 from the Presidency of his great lasting monument, the all-black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, spanned over fifty years of race and class struggle in the United States. His political activity, particularly in the inter-war years, points up many of the classic dilemmas confronted by those who struggle for black liberation as part of the struggle for socialism. This is not to say, of course, that those dilemmas have appeared regularly in the same form throughout the history of the twentieth century. Not many socialists, after all, have had to cope on the one hand with the enigma of Garvey and the mobilizing power of his brand of black nationalism, and on the other with the theoretical myopia and political opportunism of the American Communist Party when under the sway of the Third International. But it was those two forces that constituted key features of the political context in which Randolph and other black socialists operated in the years prior to the Second World War. With the dilemmas of socialism and black nationalism in mind, it is by reviewing Randolph's political development in this period that we hope to make some contribution to the debate on the race/class dialectic in the United States.[2]

RANDOLPH'S EARLY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Asa Philip Randolph was born in Crescent City, Florida, in 1889. After high school graduation he, like many thousands of his race, drifted north in search of a job and a less racially-oppressed existence. The United States in the years immediately preceding its entrance into the First World War was already well advanced on its second, monopoly phase of capitalist industrialization, an industrialization based on steel and automobiles. Thanks to racist employers and trade unions, the unskilled and semi-skilled assembly-line jobs created by the expansion of these industries were largely reserved for immigrant labourers from Italy and Poland. Black migrants in contrast found themselves employed in the coal mines, on the waterfronts, but most importantly as domestics of various sorts.[3] It was in these latter occupations — in hotels — that Randolph came to be employed in New York City.

In 1911 Randolph joined the Socialist Party, and quickly came under the influence of one of its leading members, Eugene Debs. It was under Debs' tutelage that Randolph began to embrace Marxism and to perceive the connection between black liberation and the struggle for socialism. It was about this time that Randolph became recognized as one of a group of black socialist intellectuals in Harlem who, in rejecting on the one hand, the accommodationist tradition of Booker T. Washington, and on the other, the social democracy of W.E.B. Du Bois, became known as the 'New Negroes'.

In 1917 Randolph, together with a young black bourgeois renegade, Chandler Owen, founded the monthly journal, the *Messenger*, which projected itself as the journal of 'scientific radicalism', and in its pages Randolph and Owen, like their 'New Negro' contemporaries — Cyril Briggs of the *Crusader* and William Domingo of the *Emancipator* — developed a systematic socialist analysis of the black working-class predicament. As a consequence of its propagation of revolutionary socialism and its biting attacks on the American war effort and on the more moderate leaders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League (NUL), the *Messenger* rapidly became the most significant and infamous of black journals. In its 1919 report on subversive activities, the New York Department of Justice declared the *Messenger* to be the most dangerous of all black publications, and the white press dubbed Randolph 'the most dangerous Negro in America'. [4]

It is possible to speak of Randolph as a revolutionary socialist only between the years 1911 and 1920. During this period, particularly through the pages of the *Messenger*, Randolph argued consistently that only in the context of a socialist society was black emancipation possible. The way forward to socialism for him, as for the other 'New Negroes', was via the unification of the struggles of black and white workers in the context of trade union organization. While Randolph and the *Messenger* stressed the need for blacks to join unions, they recognized that such a development was fraught with difficulties. Many unions had explicit racial barriers to membership, and the largest amalgam of unions, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), was itself ultra-conservative, racist and in league with monopoly capital and the state via the auspices of the National Civic Federation. [5] The solution, according to Randolph, was for black workers to give up on the AFL and associate themselves with the syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World (the 'Wobblies'), which many black workers, particularly in mining and on the docks, did in these years. [6] As we shall see, Randolph's attitude to the AFL was to become distinctly more favourable over the next few years when his love-affair with revolutionary socialism was on the wane.

The crisis of political direction for Randolph occurred, as it did for other American socialists, with the strike wave of 1916-19, and particularly its high-point in 1919 when over four million workers went on strike, the highest number for any year in American history prior to 1941. [7] It seemed to many socialists in the United States, as it did for their comrades in Europe pursuing their own struggles, that socialism, at long last, was on the agenda. Yet at this high water-mark of working-class combativity — black as well as white — the Socialist Party seemed peripheral, a bystander rather than a central actor in the struggle. The marginalization of the Socialist Party was put down

by its critics to its moderate socialism and its electoral orientation to politics, though the vicious attacks by the state during the war had had a decimating effect on the Party.[8] For many American socialists, just as for their European comrades, the success of the Russian Revolution provided an object lesson of how socialism could be effected. For such socialists, America by 1919 was ripe for revolution. They did not bother to consider whether a revolutionary model lifted from a partially capitalist, barely industrial society was adequate when applied to an advanced industrial capitalist country. Those who were spurred on by the Russian Revolution inevitably split with the Socialist Party to form the Communist Party and the Communist Labor Party in 1919. Of the black socialists, it was Cyril Briggs and others of the African Blood Brotherhood (ABB) that joined the Communist Party, arguing that the Socialist Party's attempts to subsume politically considerations of race and nation under considerations of class had led to the irrelevance of the Party to black emancipatory struggles. Randolph, unlike his former comrades, however, remained in the Socialist Party, maintaining his membership until 1940 when he resigned over the Party's opposition to the Second World War.

In retrospect Randolph's commitment to the Socialist Party after 1919 seems a little peculiar. The black membership of the Party throughout the inter-war years remained substantially lower than black membership of the Communist Party, and the Socialist Party never had any substantial presence within black working-class struggles. Part of the reason for this was the irrelevance of the Party's theorization of American racism. For them racial oppression was simply a special case of class oppression. The Socialist Party in fact consistently sought to minimize the importance of racism in its programme, and rejected the idea that positive discrimination should operate towards blacks in the organization — preferring to follow Debs' dictum 'Freedom for all, special favours for none'.

RANDOLPH AND GARVEYISM

In the years prior to the founding of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters in 1925, Randolph's activities as socialist, journalist and orator can be seen certainly as an attempt to assist the formation of class consciousness amongst the black proletariat, but also partly as an attempt to create a mass working-class base for his own political aspirations. Throughout these years Randolph remained frustrated, as did other black socialists, in these attempts. It is hardly surprising, then, that the one person, Marcus Garvey, who did generate a mass working-class organization and measurably advance the consciousness of blacks, should become the object of black (and white) socialist ridicule and venom.

The development of a 'race first' consciousness amongst blacks, and attachment to Garvey's particular brand of black nationalism, was perhaps inevitable in circumstances where blacks had migrated north in search of emancipation, only to be confronted by the racism — albeit often in more subtle forms — that they had experienced in Dixie. For blacks arriving in New York, Cleveland or Chicago, whites, be they associated with labour or capital, seemed to be the enemy. Racist exclusion seemed all-pervasive — in employment, in housing, in education — and perhaps especially in the AFL trade unions. If justice was unobtainable from whites, what other reaction could be expected than immersion into the security of one's own race. With his 'race first' doctrines, Garvey was a natural leader. He offered blacks a vision of liberation when their only escape route had proved futile. Their liberation, he told them, lay in the very essence of their oppression, that is, in their race.

The solution was to see the problem of black America not simply as one of a racially-oppressed minority, but rather in terms of the universal and international oppression of the black race of which American blacks were an inherent part. The question of integration with white American society was therefore anathema to him; it was rather a question of building up cultural and economic bonds among the black race, both internally and internationally, in a way that would put them on an equal footing with other races in terms of political power. By belonging to a vast pan-African community, black people could rely on the forces of an overwhelming majority, even in areas such as the United States where they were a minority.

Although Garvey's attempts to give American blacks consciousness of their connections with Africa was crucial to the development of race-pride and a positive self-identity — themselves fundamental pre-conditions to the development of a black *class* consciousness — there were severe problems, from a socialist point of view, with Garveyism. Foremost among these was that the pan-Africanist, race-first orientation, whatever Garvey's intention, undervalued the extent to which Afro-Americans were culturally and psychologically not Africans, but Americans. Secondly, this orientation misunderstood the extent to which racism, though not originating from capitalist relations of production, was substantially deepened and extended as those relations were gradually realized.[9]

Whereas 'race first' led Garvey into ludicrous concerns with racial purity — and ultimately to praise for fascism and for the racist doctrines of the Ku Klux Klan,[10] the complement of pan-Africanism — the construction of a black economic base in America led to a pro-capitalist bias amongst blacks in Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). On both these scores — nationalism and black capitalism — Garvey incurred the wrath of black and white socialists alike.

At first, however, there was something of a 'love-affair' between Garvey and the socialists. Randolph, for instance, was initially favourable to Garvey's attempts to organize black people internationally for the struggle to throw off their colonial oppressors, and for a time they cooperated closely. In 1918 they joined to form the short-lived International League of Dark Peoples, which drew up a list of demands for the imperialist powers concerning their treatment of colonized peoples. After the war the UNIA chose Randolph to head a delegation of blacks to the Versailles Peace Conference, but he was refused a passport and was unable to attend. On a number of occasions Randolph shared a platform with Garvey and echoed his calls to organize for what they both saw as the imminent rebellion of oppressed peoples. For a while it seemed that the *enfant terrible* of black journalism and the black working-class Prometheus were in alliance.

But the alliance was short-lived. Inevitably the theoretical difference between the two became manifest in political practice and Randolph became increasingly critical of Garvey's nationalist philosophy. He saw the 'back to Africa' strands of Garveyism as diverting energies from the real struggles of black Americans that lay within the metropolitan homeland. He was particularly incensed by Garvey's attacks on organized labour and came to recognize that Garveyism could only perpetuate separation and thus inhibit the struggle of the black working class.

Randolph's Marxism, in common with that of other American socialists, was based on a crude economism, a theorization in which racial oppression was inextricably tied to the capitalist organization of production and hence was no different in origin from other forms of domination which capitalism perpetuated. Doctrines of separation were as destructive in Randolph's philosophy as integration was in Garvey's. The problem of blacks as a racially-oppressed minority could only be solved by theoretically and practically marginalizing the racial dimension, which would make possible the recognition that, as proletarians, blacks had a common cause with white labour and against (white) capital. Racism for Randolph, as for other socialists of the period, was simply a strategic weapon utilized by capital to divide and ultimately dissipate working-class struggle. The solution to both race and class oppression was the unification of black and white workers in labour organizations which aimed ultimately at the overthrow of capitalism. Under a new socialist order, with the economic imperatives of capitalism removed, racism would inevitably disappear.

Garvey's resistance to the injection of socialism into the UNIA incensed the black socialists, and they fell into implicit alliance with the state, which had become worried by the powerful working-class organization that Garvey was constructing in Harlem and other black

ghettoes across the country. In the *Messenger* Randolph began to denounce Garvey as a demagogue and charlatan. The traditional black American-West Indian animosity re-emerged in this attack. During 1922 and 1923 the *Messenger* consistently attacked Garvey as 'the supreme Negro Jamaican Jackass', 'clown and imperial buffoon', 'monumental monkey and unquestionable fool and ignoramus'. To black and white bourgeoisie, left and right alike, Garvey had become the Idi Amin of the 1920s.[11]

By 1922 Garveyism had become the common enemy that united all shades of black intellectual opinion. Briggs, who had become associated with Garvey in the hope that the ABB would become a paramilitary cadre within the UNIA, became disaffected in 1922. William Domingo, a comrade of Randolph's who had edited the Garveyite *Negro World*, also abandoned Garvey when he failed to convert him to a class line. In that year Randolph, Owen and Pickens (of the NAACP) made a nationwide tour speaking against Garvey, and, at the same time, the *Messenger* began to lead a fight to get Garvey deported. This was eventually successful in 1925, after a letter drafted by the *Messenger* group to the Attorney General led to Garvey's arrest on charges of fraud.

Although Randolph subsequently dissociated himself from the letter, his complicity in the events leading up to Garvey's arrest seems irrefutable. Whatever the political differences between the socialists and nationalists, it is hard to condone an act which in effect amounted to the socialists enlisting the support of the US government in overcoming their major rival.

RANDOLPH AND ORGANIZED LABOUR

Randolph's relationship with organized labour during the inter-war years provides a classic example of the outcomes of the contradictory tendencies to which a black, a trade unionist and a socialist is subject. Throughout his active life Randolph walked the tightrope of the uneasy dialectic between organizing workers across intra (racial) class divisions and organizing black workers autonomously. As we shall see in this section, Randolph never seemed able to resolve the tension between his theoretical orientation which pointed up the need to organize workers, be they black or white, within the same trade unions, and his practical activity which involved organizing black workers into all-black trade unions. As far as I am aware, the practice of autonomous black organization never found any expression in Randolph's — or indeed any other American socialist's — theorization of class and race relations during this period.

As has already been indicated, in the years after 1917 Randolph, in common with the other 'New Negroes', consistently advocated black

membership of the existing trade unions, be they the IWW or the unions of predominantly skilled craftsmen affiliated to the AFL. The unrelenting racism of AFL affiliates and the anti-socialist posture of the AFL itself, however, soon brought forward attack after attack in the pages of the *Messenger*. The May/June 1919 issue, for instance, contained the following invective:

The dissolution of the AFL would inure to the benefit of the labor movement in this country in particular, and the international labor movement in general. It is organised upon unsound principles. It holds that there can be a partnership between labour and capital ... It stands for pure and simple unionism as against industrial unionism ... The present AFL is the most wicked machine for the propagation of race prejudice in the country.[12]

In spite of the AFL's racism and conservatism, however, by the 1920s it remained the only real forum for workers' labour organizations in the country. In the years after 1917 the state had seen to it that the IWW had been nearly annihilated as an effective organizational force.[13] Under these circumstances, socialists were in a serious quandary. We will subsequently discover the Communist Party's response, but here some attention to Randolph's activity is required.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and indeed for the rest of his active life, Randolph clearly decided that black workers were not only better off within trade unions, but, at least until the formation of the Committee for Industrial Organisation (CIO) in 1935, that their interests would be better served by affiliation with the AFL. Randolph's strategy was three-pronged. First, he continued to encourage blacks to join the existing unions, even where this in effect meant membership of segregated 'auxiliary' local unions. A case in point here was his activities in the Friends of Negro Freedom (FNF), an inter-racial organization (though with black leadership) which had been founded in 1920 partly to recruit blacks into the segregated 'auxiliaries'. The second part of his strategy was to battle against racism within the councils of the AFL; and thirdly, where the racial composition of a trade suggested it, the formation of autonomous, all-black unions, affiliated to either the AFL or the CIO. Of the three, Randolph's commitment to black membership of unions, whatever the compromises necessary, was the most contentious, and as a consequence was subjected to slashing attacks by black and white Communists alike. The logic of his action, as far as I can decipher it, was that once blacks were within AFL-affiliated unions in substantial numbers, then they would be in a position to destroy the racism of those organizations from within. It was a logic, of course, which suffered from the flaws of most forms of entryism. The fact that Randolph up to his retirement from a vice-presidency of the AFL-CIO

in 1974 was still having to struggle against the racism within that organization, perhaps casts some critical light on the value of his AFL strategy.

Randolph's own efforts as a labour organizer were, at first, distinctly unsuccessful. In 1917 he and Chandler Owen had attempted to organize the black elevator and switchboard operators in New York, but the fledgling union collapsed, thanks largely to membership poaching by white AFL affiliates. Their second attempt was to organize the black waiters in New York, but apart from founding the *Hotel Messenger*, the paper out of which the *Messenger* developed, they had little success. Their third excursion into labour organizing came when a group of black workers (which included R. T. Sims of the IWW) formed the National Brotherhood Workers of America — which was an attempt to build an explicitly revolutionary black general union. The initial strength of the NBWA came from shipyard and dock workers at Newport News, Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia, and for a while the NBWA had considerable influence in the councils of the Virginia State Federation of Labor. Randolph and Owen became directors of the NBWA and the *Messenger* its official organ. As with the elevator operators, however, the NBWA was ultimately destroyed by the membership-poaching of another AFL affiliate, the International Longshoreman's Association.

Between 1921 (the collapse of the NBWA) and 1925 Randolph's isolation from the struggles of the black proletariat was almost total. During these years he ditched any remaining interest in the IWW, and by 1925 the *Messenger* had been purged of all vestiges of radicalism. Randolph was a rebel on the wane, whose only cause during these years had been the destruction of Carveyism. Fortunately for him, however, a new cause was about to appear on the horizon — a cause which for the first time was to provide him with a mass base, from which he was able to launch himself as a nationally-recognized union leader, and ultimately the pre-eminent race spokesman of his generation.

The cause which Randolph took up in 1925 was that of the most prestigious section of the black working class — the porters who worked in the Pullman Company's sleeping cars. Although the Pullman porters were the aristocracy of black labour, respected and envied by their fellow black workers (because of their secure employment, travel, relatively high wages, close association with the white bourgeoisie), they worked in an industry which exhibited some of the most reactionary elements of capital and some of the most racist labour unions. The Pullman porters had previously made four unsuccessful attempts to organize, each time being crushed by the Company on one side and white organized labour on the other. By August 1925 they were ready to try again, only this time they sought Randolph's assistance. He became general organizer and ultimately President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP).

Randolph's commitment to the BSCP gave the porters a possibility of success that had never before existed. Randolph brought with him to the BSCP four attributes that were to be invaluable. First, Randolph had influential friends, both in the black community and in white organized labour, who could provide the BSCP with both financial and moral assistance. The union was in fact launched on a \$10,000 grant from the Socialist Party. Secondly, Randolph was not and never had been employed by the Pullman Company, and hence was relatively immune from any Company attempts to intimidate him. Under the circumstances, Pullman could only resort to slander and character assassination, which it did frequently, charging that Randolph was a professional agitator and a Bolshevik. Thirdly, Randolph brought to the BSCP his experience as an organizer, and orator, as well as the prestige of a nationally known and rising race spokesman. Finally, Randolph brought with him the prestigious *Messenger*, which became the BSCP's official organ until it ceased publication in 1928.

Apart from these advantages of Randolph's leadership, there were structural factors which undoubtedly contributed to the BSCP's success. First, the union was organizing amongst a section of the working class that was entirely black; no whites were employed as porters, although a small number of Filipinos and Chicanos did operate on certain routes. Because the sector of the class was racially homogeneous, this minimized membership-poaching by white unions. Secondly, the BSCP was fighting a single company, as Pullman had virtual monopoly of sleeping car traffic.

In the teeth of opposition from Pullman, the black conservative leadership and much of the black press, the BSCP had a fairly speedy success in terms of enrolment. By 1928 the union had enrolled half of the 12,000 Pullman porters, and by 1940 its membership exceeded 10,000. The union, however, was frustrated in its attempts to gain recognition from the AFL. The racism of the AFL executive and its constituent unions was clearly the barrier to recognition, although the fact that the Hotel and Restaurant Employees claimed jurisdiction over the porters was used for a time to rationalize AFL intransigence.

Given the logic of Randolph's entryism, it is hardly surprising that a number of BSCP locals in 1929 accepted AFL 'federal' charters giving them 'auxiliary' status within the organization. It was not until 1936, however, that the BSCP became the first all-black union to be granted a full 'international' charter by the AFL.

Although the struggle for recognition by the AFL proved arduous enough, the struggle with the Pullman Company was even tougher. Pullman used every means at its command to try and smash the union. Its tactics ranged from the firing of union members and physical intimidation, to bribing black politicians and the black press to speak out against the BSCP in general, and Randolph in particular.

In 1928 BSCP threatened a strike to force the Pullman Company to recognize the union and to negotiate a wages and conditions contract. Randolph believed that Pullman was well prepared to last out the strike, and after pressure from AFL President William Green, by this time a close friend of Randolph's, the strike was called off, in spite of the fact that only a handful of the BSCP's membership had voted against it.[14]

In the end it was only as a consequence of that massive extension of the state-monopoly capital partnership, the 'New Deal', and in particular the NIRA and Wagner legislation, that forced the negotiations which in 1937 led to the BSCP becoming the first black union to obtain a contract from a white employer.

The success and national attention which the BSCP received in the years up to 1937 did much to reverse the stereotype of the shuffling, obedient porter in the eyes of American whites. With the exception of shoe-shine boys and those in hotel and catering work, the Pullman porters were probably viewed by northern whites as the archetypal black workers, and the BSCP had rendered them a militant section of the working class worthy of respect. The symbolic significance of the BSCP should not be underestimated, for it did much not only to elevate the image of black workers as a whole amongst whites, but to develop the racial pride amongst blacks so essential to the struggle for self-emancipation. It is hard, for instance, to conceive of the mobilization for the march on Washington that was to occur in 1941, without the organizational skills and prior success of the BSCP.

A perplexing feature of Randolph's labour-organizing activities in the years after 1935 is why he persisted in struggling for AFL affiliation of the BSCP, when the Committee for Industrial Organisation (later the Congress of Industrial Organisations) was consistently more egalitarian, more democratic, and, as Foner suggests, 'unquestionably the most important single development since the Civil War in the black worker's struggle for equality'.[15] The CIO unions, and the United Mine Workers in particular, were the most racially egalitarian of all American unions. No CIO union excluded blacks from membership, nor segregated them into white-officered 'auxiliary' locals. What is more, the other major black union — and a railroad union — Willard Townshend's United Transport Service Employees, secured a CIO charter in 1942.[16]

It is possible that it was because of Communist involvement that Randolph kept the BSCP out of the CIO. Certainly the AFL leadership did see the BSCP, given the respect which the black community had for it, as a way of stemming Communist Party advances amongst black workers. Yet Randolph on a number of occasions, and notably at the first conference of the National Negro Congress (NNC) in 1936, strongly advocated black membership of CIO unions. His own explanation was that it was precisely because the AFL was racist that

the BSCP needed to be inside it.[17] Given what we know of Randolph's animosity towards the Communist Party and his close association with members of the AFL executive, however, this suggestion would appear to be little more than a rationalization.

RANDOLPH AND THE COMMUNISTS

When the Socialist Party split in 1919 it had repercussions in the Party's Harlem section that were ethnic in character. Although I do not wish to speculate on any connection between Afro-American ethnic division and political consciousness, it was the case that whereas most of the West Indians — such as Briggs, Huiswood and others of the African Blood Brotherhood — adopted a Bolshevik route to socialism and joined the Communist Party, the indigenous blacks, Randolph included, remained within the Socialist Party. Of the West Indians, only Domingo opted for the Socialist Party's version of social democracy.

The animosity of Randolph to the black Communists developed throughout the 1920s, even though the Party's main black front organization in those years, the Negro Labor Congress, had some success in developing local labour committees designed to fight union racism and increase black membership. The *Messenger* at this time contained a number of scathing articles directed against black Communists, of which the following from a 1923 edition is representative:

Negro Communists are a menace ... [who] ... with irrational and romantic zeal break down the morals and confuse the aims and ideals of the New Negro Liberation Movement. So utterly senseless, unsound, unscientific, dangerous and ridiculous are their policies and tactics that we are driven to consider that they are either lunatics or agents provocateurs, stool pigeons of the United States Department of Justice ... Negro Communists seek to wreck all constructive, progressive, non-Communist programs.[18]

To some extent, Randolph's suspicion of the Communist Party was not without foundation. Even by the early 1920s the Party's opportunistic relation to black struggles had become apparent, though it was to reach its zenith with the development of the Third International's 'popular front' strategy of the 1930s. While being more committed to an analysis of black American struggles than the Socialist Party — to the extent of calling for an independent black republic in the south — the American CP in fact gave blacks little serious attention until they were instructed to by the International in 1930. It was not until their defence activities around the Scottsboro case in 1931 (a frame-up on rape charges of nine young blacks in Alabama) and their

organizing of unemployed councils through the Trade Union Unity League, that blacks began to join the Party in large numbers. By the late 1930s the Party had about 10,000 black members (more than 10 per cent of the total).[19]

The Party's theorization of the class position of Afro-Americans did not do much to assist the recruitment of black members. Disregarding the proletarianization of blacks that had been a consequence of their northerly migration and their increasing involvement in the new mass-production industries, the Party persisted in conceiving of blacks as rural peasants — this in spite of the fact that the largest black movement of the twentieth century, Garvey's UNIA, had been predominantly urban and proletarian in composition, and nationalist in character. For the CP, nationalism was a 'backward' ideology and hence must necessarily be connected theoretically with a politically-backward peasantry. As with so many of their positions on class structure and struggle in the United States, they were derived not from an analysis of the actualities of the American experience, but by analogy, usually from Russia. In the case of black Americans, their position — partly thanks to the dead-weight of Third International 'theory' — was drawn by analogy from Third World nations which were indeed pre-capitalist, peasant societies.

Having spent over a dozen years attacking the black bourgeoisie, and particularly those socialists amongst them, like Randolph, who had made successful attempts to organize black workers, by the mid-1930s the Communist Party, under the influence of Popular Front policy, had a change of heart and recognized that the black bourgeoisie may, after all, be a potential ally. The result was their participation in a united front 'embracing all Negro unions, together with religious, fraternal and civic groups'.[20]

The resulting National Negro Congress (NNC), to which Randolph was elected President, quickly forged an alliance with the CIO. The CIO was an organizational reflection of the changing class composition in the United States. No longer was the American working class composed of predominantly skilled workers, but rather of the 'deskilled' labourers that were the human product of the combined impact of Fordism and Taylorist 'scientific management'.[21] Many of these deskilled labourers were black, particularly in the steel industry (85,000 black workers by 1936) and at Ford's River Rouge plant in Detroit (14 per cent of the workforce).[22] From the beginning the CIO recognized that to organize this new section of the working class effectively, it must organize across race lines, and it was for this reason that it sought NNC assistance. The NNC's work was most effective in helping the CIO organize black steelworkers, and may have been partly to thank for the involvement of black workers in the automobile 'sit-down' strikes of the late 1930s.

The main aim of the Third International and its affiliated parties

during the 1930s was to protect Russia from fascist attack. This was the central reason for the formation of Popular Front organizations such as the NNC, for in such forums the Communist Party could develop strategic alliances with social democrats and liberals. Under such circumstances people like Randolph were tolerated, and the struggle for socialism in America, as in Europe, took a back seat. The Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939, however, produced a political about-face by the Stalinist Parties, the American Party notwithstanding. At all costs, a war with fascism must now be avoided, and the friends of yesterday, overnight, became the enemies of today. In the changed circumstances, Randolph, with his credibility in the black community and his pro-war sentiments, became a special target for Communist animosity.

Blacks at this time were generally anti-war in that they saw little reason to fight for a country that was not prepared to grant them even basic human rights. The Communist Party, for its part, sought within the NNC to shift the entire emphasis of the programme from domestic issues to foreign aid. Randolph had no truck with such an opportunistic approach to the concerns of black people. For him the domestic issues were important in their own right, and in any case he sought to mobilize black support, not only for American aid to the Allies, but indeed for American intervention in the war. In light of this, Randolph had to be dumped, and the party had to complete its take-over of the NNC. The crunch came at the 1940 conference, which the Party packed with its own delegates. The result was the resignation of Randolph and other prominent blacks.

Within a year of his resignation from the NNC Randolph was to tangle with the Communist Party once again. This came in his attempt to establish what became the second black working-class mass movement of the twentieth century — the March on Washington Movement.

Although Randolph had been a pacifist during the First World War, by 1939 his attitude had changed. While the spectre of the world's working class — black and white — dying for imperialist causes still presented problems for him, he considered that as far as the situation of American blacks was concerned, liberal democratic imperialism was preferable to Nazi imperialism. The problem for him was that the black population was experiencing low morale, fostered by the persistent discrimination, particularly within war industries and the military, that was becoming galvanized into a popular anti-war feeling. For Randolph the solution lay in the desegregation of the military and the outlawing of discrimination in war industries.

When in 1940 a White House conference failed to bring any progress towards this end, Randolph advocated more militant tactics. He took the unprecedented step of calling for a march on Washington of 50,000 blacks to demand that the federal government provide

them with jobs in the war industries. Thus the March on Washington Movement (MOWM) was formed, with branches across the country.

After twenty years' experience of the opportunistic and manipulative way that the CP related to black struggles, Randolph was determined that CP influence in the MOWM be minimized. It was partly this determination that led him, in the face of liberal black opposition, to insist that the MOWM be restricted to blacks. The second, and arguably the main reason for this insistence, was that his political experience had led him to recognize that, as much as anything, blacks had to be given the opportunity to fight for their own freedom without recourse to white assistance. Only in this way could they develop the pride, dignity and self-assurance that was a prerequisite for the liberation of their race.

The March on Washington was scheduled for 1 July 1941, when it was claimed that 100,000 blacks would be available for mobilization. This claim was never put to the test, for eventually 'the workers' friend', Franklin D. Roosevelt, with great reluctance issued executive order 8802 which forbade job discrimination in industries holding war material contracts from the federal government. To 'guarantee' integration the Fair Employment Practices Commission was established to take on a watch-dog role.

As might be expected after the NNC debacle, Randolph in his efforts to build the MOWM was not spared the wrath of the CP. Nowhere is the opportunism of the CP towards black struggles so clearly displayed. At its inception the CP attacked the MOWM as a key component of the Government's strategy to seduce blacks into the war effort, and, stripped of its conspiratorial overtones, this analysis does carry some weight. However, after Hitler's invasion of the USSR in June 1941, CP policy took another about-face. Now the Soviet Union must be defended at all costs and organizations such as the MOWM which might hinder the intervention of the United States must be denounced. Randolph and the MOWM were no longer seen as agents of the federal government, but rather as agents of the Nazis.[23]

RACE AND CLASS — THE CONTINUING DILEMMA

The MOWM was perhaps the high water-mark of Randolph's political career. From his base in the BSCP, he had been catapulted to the position of the country's most visible black spokesman and organizer, lauded by black working class and bourgeoisie alike, but perhaps more importantly, courted by white politicians and labour leaders. He remained the apple of the northern establishment's eye, until the rise of Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

In the inter-war years Randolph, like his comrades, both black and white, was caught in a cleft stick. On the one hand, he recognized that there could be no black liberation without socialism, and that socialism was only possible if it was based on class unification across race lines. On the other, however, he did not have available any means by which he could understand how the black experience was constructed not only out of class oppression, but also a race oppression which because of the colonial and slave legacies was formed with peculiarly ideological and cultural dimensions. The Marxism of the Second and Third Internationals was of no help here, and hence, when confronted with a philosophy and a movement — Garveyism — that did grasp racism in its ideological and cultural realities, his response was non-comprehension and hostility. Even when his own political activity, particularly with the BSCP, implied the need for theoretical re-appraisal, none was forthcoming. The vulgar class theory of American socialism remained supreme. The eventual co-optation of Randolph by conservative organized labour, capital and the state must be seen as part of the wider failure of American socialism.

If the American left was to utilize rather than dissipate the uncompromising radicalism that came from the experience of racial oppression, it had to develop a theoretical framework that was adequate to black political consciousness and practice. The second of these concerns could only have been fulfilled by some degree of autonomy in which the specific needs of blacks were not subsumed to the imperatives of white labour. For the former, it was essential for Marxism to be used not as a regressive dogma, but as a tool of analysis, which could incorporate the specificity and intensity of racial oppression, and thus encourage an understanding that the common denominator of capitalist exploitation was insufficient as a class-unificatory force.

The problem, then, was not simply one of the organizations within which blacks were forced to participate, but of the political theory with which they operated, with its restrictive pre-occupation with the economic dimension of capitalist exploitation, based on a crude application of the base/superstructure metaphor, and a consequent neglect of those non-economic factors that nevertheless acquire an independent significance and effectivity. In other words, as Sivanandan has emphasized, 'the racism inherent in white society is determined economically, but defined culturally'.^[24] A revolutionary theory, in other words, demands a revolutionary culture, and any revolutionary theory that is not to undervalue the significance of black struggle must grasp the total devastation that blacks experienced through slave and colonial exploitation, so that, although economic aspects of this exploitation may find analogy in white working-class history, the cultural and psychological dimensions of

black oppression are quite distinct and render their struggle, on one level, qualitatively different from class struggle.

It was to this area of black consciousness, totally ignored by American socialists, that Garveyite nationalism addressed itself and, as such, it was not the regressive diversion which Randolph and others assumed, but, by re-establishing black pride and heightening self-consciousness, was an essential step towards revolutionary consciousness, and class struggle. It is only when the various sections of the working class — black and white, male and female — are psychologically and politically strong, that class unification begins to make practical sense.

As a theoretical orientation, black nationalism is necessary to consciousness, but insufficient for practice. Not only is pan-Africanism or the notion of an independent black American state strategically unrealistic, but with virulent nationalism as its driving force, it cannot escape the danger of degenerating into chauvinism and imperialism — a new and oppressive black capitalism.

The problem then remains. The different experiences of class exploitation and racial oppression have as yet found no theoretical framework that is adequate to the necessity of a unified struggle. Sivanandan puts the problem this way:

Before an organic fusion of forces can take place, two requirements need to be fulfilled. The blacks must through the consciousness of their colour, through the consciousness that is of that in which they perceive their oppression, arrive at a consciousness of class; and the white working class must in recovering its class instinct, its sense of oppression ... arrive at a consciousness of racial oppression.[25]

Such a statement would have been as applicable to the American left of the 1920s and 1930s as it is to them today, or indeed to most of the British left. It is a statement of the problem. The theoretical and practical work, in large measure, has still to be done.

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I am grateful to A. Sivanandan for his comments on an earlier draft, and especially to Kate Adamson for her assistance with the final version.

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MICHAEL BILLIG

Patterns of racism: interviews with National Front members

We publish here an extract adapted from Michael Billig's forthcoming book, Fascists: a social psychological view of the National Front (Academic Press, Autumn 1978). This analysis is taken from a larger section, based on in-depth interviews with eleven NF members, all of whom were activists, nine having either held official positions in their local branches or stood as official election candidates. This is not claimed to be a representative sample; the indications suggest a bias towards the 'moderate' element.

The National Front is an openly racist party; its journal *Spearhead* proclaims: 'we are proud racials and we say so'. [1] The party's ideology is constructed from racist presuppositions. (According to one interviewee, D, 75 per cent of members joined because of the immigration issue.) Therefore, when examining the beliefs of the ordinary National Front member, it is necessary to enquire what meaning is given to the concept of 'race'.

In the first place it can be accepted that 'race' is 'a term which is borrowed from biology ... Race is a biological concept which helps us to bring order out of the otherwise meaningless range of human variation'. [2] Although the term has passed into everyday discourse, 'race' has not lost its biological origins. Non-specialists have implicit theories of race; it could be said that by using the concept to explain human affairs, the non-specialist becomes an amateur biologist. In this way an investigation of the contemporary meaning of 'race' involves looking at the naive theories of biology used by non-specialists.

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND RACE

Unfortunately this aspect of racial prejudice has been ignored by the bulk of social psychological research into racial attitudes. Instead racialism is often subsumed under the general heading of 'prejudice' and consequently is treated as an example of a more general phenomenon. This is reinforced by the tendency to define prejudice in terms of hostility. For instance, a recent and typical definition describes prejudice as 'interpersonal hostility which is directed against individuals based on their membership in a minority group'. [3] Leaving aside the 'minority' aspect of this definition, which could exclude white supporters of *apartheid* in South Africa, one can note that the emphasis is upon the individual and the hostility he is presumed to feel against others. Similarly, Rose, in his survey of attitudes in Britain, defined prejudice in terms of hostility, adding that the hostility derives from 'processes within the bearer of the hostile attitude'. [4] Again the implication is that racialism is a matter of individual hostility.

In the history of social psychology two of the principal methods used for measuring prejudiced attitudes have been questionnaires of social distance and stereotypes. The Social Distance Scale was designed to measure the degree of intimacy to which subjects would allow a member of another group. Stereotype research has examined the adjectives, or traits, which subjects associate with particular social groups. [5]

These two lines of research suggest that the prejudiced individual will use unfavourable descriptions of outgroups and will personally keep his distance, unless it is to act in a directly hostile manner to a member of the outgroup. A number of the interviewees' comments conformed to this conception of prejudice. For instance, all firmly rejected the notion of intermarriage between blacks and whites, advocating a measure of social distance between races. K, a young van driver, was typical when he declared, 'I wouldn't like my family, or anything to do with me, to marry a black person, because I'm totally against racial mixing.' According to H, 'you can't mix oil and water — they just don't mix'. When asked about intermarriage A declared, 'Absolutely not, absolutely not. Mixed marriages are just not on as far as I'm concerned.' None expressed any equivocation on the subject.

Whilst all rejected blacks with respect to the most intimate of social relations, a variety of reactions was shown with regard to less intimate relations. All the interviewees were at pains to present their views as being reasonable rather than as prejudiced bigotry. The upshot is that a number of the interviewees claimed to have normal social contacts with blacks. It is true that A and H showed reserve on this issue: A said, 'I'm a racist, yes. But at the same time I don't

believe because I don't like a man, I should go and push him around ... If I don't like a man and choose not to talk to him, then OK I just won't talk to him.'

However others were not so exclusive on a personal level. P, a shop steward at work, said that he would strive as hard for blacks as for whites: 'I'll fight for them coloured fellows when something's happened to them or they've got trouble, I'll fight for them as well. I'll fight for any bloke while he's here, while he's placed with me and I'm shop steward. I'll fight for that man's rights irrespective of what colour he is.' K, also a shop steward, claimed that blacks had voted for him, despite knowing his political convictions: 'politics doesn't come into it as long as they can see that I'm doing a job for them and protecting their livelihood'. Like a number of the other interviewees, K claimed to get on well with blacks on a personal level. He played football with blacks and would drink with them after the game: 'They're a good bunch of lads, they really are ... They're friends, whether they're black or white. But they'd be the first back home, just to show that I'm National Front and I do believe in repatriation.' T likewise claimed no personal animosity and said that he had upset his neighbours by inviting an Asian friend home.

This seems to be a real-life example of the old Jewish joke about the gentile who disclaims anti-semitism because 'some of my best friends are Jewish'. The traditional social psychological picture cannot explain the joke. The prejudiced person is assumed to stereotype all members of the group against which he feels hostility (stereotype research) and to keep his distance from individual members of that group (social distance research). From this it follows that the man who has black or Jewish 'best friends' cannot possibly be prejudiced. Perhaps it is no surprise that a social psychologist has recently in print objected to the 'unfairness' of the joke.[6] Certainly the traditions of the discipline do not equip one to understand the bitter irony of the joke.

This is because racism or anti-semitism is interpreted in terms of prejudice, which in turn is interpreted in terms of interpersonal hostility. Racism and anti-semitism as theories or ideologies become correspondingly neglected. In fact, the National Front officially advocates 'racialism' as a theory, not as interpersonal hostility — see, for instance, the distinction in *Spearhead* (92) between anti-semitism as an emotion and anti-semitism as a doctrine. Similarly, *Britain First* (41) tries to make a distinction between 'racialism' as recognition of racial differences and 'racism' which is defined accordingly as 'an irrational animosity towards other races'. With this in mind it becomes entirely understandable that individuals might express their prejudices theoretically rather than personally. Hence the joke's irony; it is based upon the knowledge that personal friendship is no guarantee that myths arising from the culture of prejudice are not

being entertained. Furthermore, the joke asserts that those who believe that personal friendship is the total refutation of the charge of prejudice only fool themselves.

Given this, a proper study of racist attitudes should concentrate upon the current mythology of race. Here, despite literally thousands of empirical studies of 'racial attitudes', social psychology seriously disappoints. There seems to have been virtually no systematic examination of racial attitudes *qua* racial attitudes. The traditional methodologies were not devised to measure racial attitudes specifically. Racial attitudes are typically measured by substituting the word 'negro' or 'black' for 'American', 'French' or 'homosexual', or whatever; even fictitious names will do, as was shown in one classic experiment.[7] Racism is inferred to occur if the stimulus words 'black' or 'negro' are rated by white subjects more unfavourably than are white outgroup stimulus words.

In this way 'racism' is treated as being merely one form of ethnocentrism; if it is distinguished from other forms it is by intensity not quality (for instance, that white Americans would be less willing to marry a black than they would a Scotsman). The topology of bigotry is flattened and the particularities of racism are ignored. An understanding of the role racism has played in modern society and the hold it continues to exert cannot be achieved by refusing to look directly at the meaning of 'race' itself.

If the above argument is valid, then it implies that social psychology, which has claimed to have studied race prejudice extensively, has in fact ignored the most central feature of racism, namely the meaning of race to the racist. One might speculate why this should be the case.

It is possible that a detailed examination of the meaning of race in this context might seriously conflict with social psychology's self-image of itself as a science. In this self-image science is equated with rationalism, as distinct from prejudice and irrationalism. Study after study of racial attitudes has confirmed this self-image by correlating bigotry with lack of education. Examination of the social origins of racist bigotry, however, would reveal that for the past three hundred years western science has been a consistent source of racist mythology.[8] Moreover, psychology, although primarily a discipline of the twentieth century, has not been slow to incorporate the mythology of nineteenth-century scientific racism. This again tends to be neglected in the discipline's self-image. Few textbooks today, while celebrating the memory of the discipline's great men such as Galton, Macdougall, Yerkes, etc., mention their consistent racism and, most importantly that such racism was based on their psychologies. It is left to a few heretics to present the discipline's history in a way which invalidates the assumption of an opposition between science and prejudice.[9] Nor is this merely a historical problem; it is

also necessary to examine the extent to which the contemporary ideas of Jensen, Eysenck, etc. have been diffused into the popular consciousness.

What is clear is that if a psychologist were to discover that racist psychology has permeated the thinking of ordinary racialsists, then it becomes difficult to champion the discipline unequivocally. It is easier to settle for the untruth that one's trade has been and always will be a force of enlightenment and that bigotry is the exclusive property of the uneducated and the poor.

RACIALISM AS MYTHOLOGY

One superficial difference between official NF ideology and the views of several of the interviewees can be mentioned first. B, K and T all denied being racialist. T said, 'I'm not a racialist. I would probably accept the term "race preservationist", but not a racialist.' The denial of the term 'racialist' was not accompanied by an ignorance of the official ideology, since all three adhered to a conspiracy theory of immigration.[10] Rather, it seems that an attempt was being made to distinguish between race theories and sentiments; all three definitely attached great importance to racial categories in their interpretation of global politics. For them, but not for the other interviewees, this was not sufficient to merit the title 'racialist', which they seemed to associate with personal hatred and brutality. Because such associations are ordinarily affixed to the term 'racialism', the NF faces an uphill battle if it wishes to promote 'racialism' as a theory — even its own supporters are shy of the term 'racialism'.

The NF policy to repatriate all black immigrants and their descendants who came to Britain after the 1948 Nationality Act does not of itself imply that blacks by definition cannot be British. It would still be logically possible for a long-settled black person to be British according to this policy. The question is whether the interviewees saw the categories of British and black as being mutually exclusive. Both T and P allowed the possibility of black Britons; T even went as far as allowing the possibility of black members of the National Front, but this was not mentioned by any other respondent. According to P, if one's grandparent's parents were born in Britain then this entitled a person to be British regardless of racial origin.

For the others racial characteristics were all important and led to the conclusion that blacks cannot be British. In A's opinion blacks must accept 'the heritage of their ancestors' country, be it grandfather, great-grandfather or whatever'. Similarly C asserted: 'If a negro is born in this country, he's not English he's West Indian.' This distinction did not apply to white immigrants to Britain (although T,

with his separation of citizenship from colour, said he would deport all post-1948 immigrants regardless of colour). The reasons for distinguishing citizenship on the basis of colour were not always in themselves racial, at least at first glance. For instance, R tried to justify the distinction on the grounds of cultural differences; he claimed that white immigrants were assimilable because their life-style was like that of the British. K advanced a similar argument about the ease with which Poles could be assimilated into British culture as opposed to black immigrants. C, despite several equivocations on the issue, mentioned a friend, a second-generation Pole, who C thought of as an English patriot: 'to all intents and purposes he's British through and through'. He was unsure whether his friend would be allowed to join the NF, thereby admitting the possibility that his own criteria of Britishness might not be quite in accord with official party policy. Moreover, he did not seem unduly perturbed that his friend might be excluded from the party — no doubt he would consider himself unprejudiced because some of his best friends were Polish.

The argument that a distinction between whites and blacks can be made on the basis of cultural similarities and dissimilarities seems a tenuous one, especially since most West Indian immigrants, as the respondents were well aware, are English-speaking Christians. The argument has a stronger appeal if the distinction between heredity and environment is blurred, or if it is assumed that cultural differences are ultimately derivable from racial differences. The latter perspective was adopted by J, who asserted that religions and cultures cannot mix, 'never in a million years, never mind two thousand years'. Acknowledging that Britain's early history had been one of cultural mixture ('the Danes and all this lot from the past'), he said that this had been possible because 'we are the same race, the only difference being the language barrier. The race is the same.' Comments by H showed that assumptions about the primacy of race need not be thought antithetical to theories of cultural differences. He maintained that the outlook of blacks 'is totally different'. When asked how much this was due to cultural differences, H replied: 'All of it, obviously.' And yet the criterion was racial. Blacks could not be assimilated because they 'stick out like a sore thumb'. The British, according to H, were a white race: 'You've got Angles, Jutes, Saxons, Celts and the lot... but we are white... so the mere fact that someone has lived in a place doesn't make them a British person or an Englishman.'

RACIALISM AS SCIENCE

It would be easy to dismiss the confusion between culture and

heredity as simply ignorance of scientific theory. But the ideological consequences of such confusion, as well as their conceptual sources, need to be examined in order to explore the theories of racial differences upheld by these middle-range ideologues of the NF. Their views are not just on the level of folklore emanating from a pre-scientific age, such as Banton, for instance, found. He recounts that in the 1950s there were still British people who believed that blacks had tails and were surprised to hear West Indians speak English:

When West Indians were first employed as bus conductors there were passengers who grabbed them and shouted to the rest of the bus that their hands were warm, passengers who would try to see if the blackness would rub off and others who would put their hands on the black man's hair for luck.[11]

It is possible that some of the older interviewees might once have entertained such myths, and it is even more probable that their parents did. Nevertheless, there was no indication of such myths in the interviews. In fact it would appear that a few years of familiarity with black people in Britain have been sufficient to eradicate these fantastic prejudices, or at least relegate them to the realm of jokes, metaphors and unconscious fantasies. Their place has been taken by a more scientifically-based form of racism. 'Scientifically-based' does not in any way imply 'reality-based' — the history of science is littered with erroneous detritus, especially in the field of race — but only that scientific authority is, or could be, cited to support the beliefs.

One example is the common belief of the interviewees that whites are, on average, more intelligent than blacks. This is constantly stressed in NF propaganda, buttressed by endless quotations from Jensen, Eysenck, Shockley, etc. The interviewees assumed that the belief was factually correct. For instance, C asserted that 'as a matter of fact the white man is superior'. B, whose general style of argument was to stress the factual and hence reasonable nature of NF policies, asserted that the facts of history showed that the white race has attained 'a level which now reflects itself higher than those civilizations which the coloured people enjoy', adding that: 'I'm compelled to observe from the facts, not necessarily from my innermost thoughts or fancies.' Two of the respondents specifically mentioned investigations into IQ scores, purporting to show a difference between blacks and whites, as back-up arguments to their general point, but expressed doubts about giving too much weight to such results. For instance, D mentioned that IQ scores are not very accurate and H agreed that, 'you can't prove that sort of thing'. However, the results lent confidence to the general proposition; as H said: 'you can only produce alleged facts or results and ... this has been born out to be

true'. The conclusion H drew was that 'the negro-type are in many ways inferior to the average white ... They've got more than their fair share of the nits, if you like, the slow-witted guys.'

In one aspect the older theories of race differ from the modern psychological theories of the hereditarians; the modern theories are essentially statistical and they refer to average differences, rather than implying that there is a systematic difference between every white and every black. This is reflected in the views of the interviewees. H specifically mentioned that exceptions are possible, giving the lie to the notion that racialisists must think in dogmatic stereotypes; in his view there were some blacks with first-class minds, as well as 'some right dumb whites knocking about ... It's one of those things you can't generalise too smartly about.' Similarly, P thought that three-quarters of blacks were not as intelligent as whites, but there were 'that few that are educated'.

Such views are to be expected, not because of the IQ findings, but because educated blacks have become evident in Britain in the last twenty or so years. It becomes hard for a man with limited education to maintain a view of utter differentiation between races if he knows that there is a strong possibility of being treated by a black doctor. Such sentiments become hard to reconcile with the official policy of repatriating all blacks (except those few who lived in Britain before 1948), unless a very rigid theory of race is believed. Certainly several of the interviewees expressed doubts about the official policy on this score.

The racist's recognition that there are educated and intelligent blacks has implications for his more general theories of racial differences. If once in racial mythology the black man was a primitive beast, hardly human and maybe even possessing a tail, then the mythology has itself evolved. This evolution can be seen as paralleling the contemporary racist's perception of the evolution of the black man. The recognition that there are intelligent blacks need not necessarily negate the previous mythology; it might imply improvement from the primitive state. In this way the contemporary racist need not disown past mythology.

The interviewees allowed for the possibility of black improvement; far from seeing this as a negation of their theories of racial differences, they returned to the biological origins of the concept of 'race'. The possibility of progress was interpreted in terms of the evolution of racial differences. The presupposition of the interviewees was that the alleged differences between blacks and whites, especially in intelligence, had not arisen by chance, but were the product of evolutionary processes. According to C's theory, whites living in the cold north-east of Europe 'had to very quickly develop a reasonable mentality' in order to clothe and heat themselves. On the other hand, the black man lived in Africa in very different climatic conditions. In

C's genealogy blacks only needed to develop their physical powers and 'never had the necessity to form any kind of culture'.

Taken at face value such a belief should imply that blacks are not capable of improvement, their limitations having been established by the processes of evolution. However, this was not generally true of the interviewees. According to C, blacks were a 'developing people' and, he added significantly, were 'gradually evolving'. P thought that in time the blacks might eventually catch up with whites, and R was prepared to date the difference between the races: in his opinion the blacks were three or four hundred years behind the whites. Where once the imperial British attitude might have been that Africans were biologically incapable of governing themselves in a civilized manner, the justification for continuing British rule in the latter stages of the Empire was that the colonies were being educated towards self-government. Whilst none of the interviewees thought that independence should have been withheld from the former colonies, they were generally of the opinion that most of the 'new' Commonwealth was better governed under colonial rule. Education thus had occurred, but was still held to be incomplete.

It was when the interviewees started discussing in detail their concept of black progress that they departed from the perspectives of contemporary science. Whereas most contemporary scientific racists recognize a balance between heredity and environment, albeit heavily weighted in favour of the former, there was a tendency amongst those interviewed to collapse the distinction between heredity and environment, interpreting both in terms of an anthropomorphic version of biology.

The idea that a race can genetically evolve under natural conditions in a predicted direction in the space of three or four hundred years is absurd from a scientific point of view. The time-scale of evolution has been collapsed; none of the interviewees entertained the idea of eugenic programmes designed to raise the genetic endowment of blacks, thereby quickening the pace of natural evolution.

C's remark that 'blacks are gradually evolving, they're learning', indicates that the collapsed time-scale might be related to a genetic interpretation of cultural factors. Evolution and learning are being considered as similar processes and the distinction between acquired and inherited knowledge is blurred. C did not mean cultural evolution when he spoke of 'evolution'; he believed that at the present time a black baby brought up by white parents would probably be less intelligent than a white baby brought up in similar circumstances, although this might change in the future. True to the paternalistic image of the later imperial era, the evolution/learning of blacks is presumed to depend on white teachers. According to C: 'They are learning from the white man ... Logically if we'd left them to it ...

they'd be swinging about the trees, eating coconuts and things and dancing around fires. Everything that the black man has got, he owes to the white man.' Thus the older images of black savagery and primitiveness are not rejected, but are incorporated into the modern racist system of thought, as signs of how far blacks have since progressed under white tutelage.

An implication, which is not always clearly expressed, is that acquired knowledge can be transmitted genetically. At times the naive biology of these NF members repeats the Lamarckian fallacy. Of all the interviewees, D expressed this style of thought the most succinctly, incorporating the themes of evolution, white superiority and the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

It would seem, on a historical basis, the white people are the most inventive of all, and I can't find a record anywhere of a negro ever inventing anything ... Intelligence of a kind is inherited, I would think, to some extent. You inherit some of the learning of your parents and their parents and so on backwards. I suppose some learning becomes part of one's instinct. The black people haven't a lot of that; there isn't this instinctive something with them. I suppose another thousand years of western-style civilization and there won't be much between us. I'm only guessing, I don't know, I'm no expert.

The fusion of the inherited and the acquired allows a sense of moral superiority to enter into the diagnosis of white intellectual superiority. If learning is a process under human control then evolution itself is no longer strictly deterministic. The racist is then able to defend his criticisms of multi-racialism with a tone of self-righteousness. In his mythology, not only does interbreeding between races spread diseases, a proposition entertained by several of the interviewees, but it weakens the white race both genetically and spiritually (the one implying the other). The white man is presumed to be the genetic heir to a worthier heritage and, similarly, the black genetically bears the sins of his fathers. This rather bizarre notion arises from the belief expressed by several of the interviewees, that the superior evolution of whites is a product of effort. The work ethic guides human evolution and rewards come to those who strive. In C's theory the black man did not evolve because 'life was easy ... he never needed to', unlike whites who had to work hard. It was R's opinion that blacks had less drive, 'whereas a lot of white people through their background are always pushing and I think that would come through the hereditary cycle'. In the same vein B thought that by 'a process over the years' the white race, 'by dint of sheer effort, had pulled themselves to a level which now reflects itself higher' than that of the black race. Hard work and sense of purpose had therefore resulted in a more advanced state of evolution.

In this way a traditional stereotype trait associated with blacks by white racialists, that of laziness, is given biological status. However, in doing this the racialist interviewees circumscribed biological science, making evolutionary change dependent in part on will-power. Accordingly, it is in the black man's power whether or not he evolves in the future without white tutelage: it is a matter of will-power, although the genetic history suggests that the drive for evolutionary betterment is absent, or nearly absent, in the black race. In this style of thought the laws of genetics are inextricably bound up with spirit or will; scientific distinctions are blurred into a conglomerate synthesis. This sort of fusion is not without precedent: a parallel can be made with the nazi philosophy of race. For instance, the Aryan race was considered a biological entity, created and maintained by will-power. Hitler, in describing how the Aryan race achieved pre-eminence in the world, ascribed 'the inner causes of the Aryan's importance' to the 'self-sacrificing will to give one's personal labour and if necessary one's own life'. [12] A similar jumble of pseudo-science and moralism is to be found in the writings of Rosenberg, amongst other nazi theorists.

The components of the interviewees' theories about evolution are in themselves compatible with orthodox scientific thought. The belief that the white race is intellectually superior to the black race can be supported with reference to the scientific racists within psychology. The statistical nature of this form of scientific racism, plus its allowed environmentalist effects (20 per cent is the figure permitted by some authorities), ensures that some concept of progress can be supported and also that the racialist does not have to deny the obvious reality of educated blacks. The desire to fit both genetic and environmental components within an encompassing evolutionary framework finds ready parallels with the works of biologists, especially with the new burgeoning discipline of socio-biology. It would be no surprise that evolutionary theory is selected to be the integrative theory and that once again it finds itself an accomplice of racism. The interviewees only depart from scientific orthodoxy in the ways in which they attempt to combine these various strands of thought.

IMMIGRATION AS INVASION

Although the implicit theories of evolution held by some of the interviewees can be compared to the nazi racial doctrines, there are of course many important differences. K stressed the difference between his views on race and nazism; his views had 'nothing to do with racial purity, blond blue-eyed British — no chance'. None talked of ideal racial types and none suggested anything like a programme

of eugenics. Nor was there any hint of the nazi concern with *Blut und Boden*. In the main the official propaganda avoids themes suggesting a mystical connection between soil and race. It is possible to speculate that this element of nazi propaganda is particularly unsuitable for Britain, even to the committed racialist, and that its absence might be expected for cultural reasons. It is hard to maintain that there is an age-old mystical connection with the land when the early history of Britain was one of invasion and settlement. I might deny that this early history makes Britain 'a mongrel race', but it does crucially relate the origins of Britain as a nation to the concept of immigration. Moreover, this is a feature of history well-known to all. P mentioned that it was by learning from the Romans and the Vikings that 'we gradually developed into a nation'. If many of the founders of the nation (for instance Romans, Anglo-Saxons, Vikings, Normans, etc) were themselves immigrants, it becomes inappropriate to claim a mystic relationship with the soil dating back to time immemorial. This is especially true in the light of the NF policy of realignment with the 'old' Commonwealth, supported whole-heartedly by all the interviewees. A's views were typical, except perhaps for the retrospective tone which coloured all his beliefs: 'I would love to see the time when we could be back together with ... the Old Commonwealth, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Rhodesia and Canada; get back with all these people again.' By 'these people', A meant the white immigrants and their descendants, not the original inhabitants. Again the theme of immigration precludes the *Blut und Boden* connection. The implication is that the countries of the 'white' Commonwealth belong by right to the immigrants.

Carrying this line of speculation further, one might assert that the twin images of immigration and conquest are amongst the most strongly-ingrained images in British history, or at least those parts of history which have had the greatest impact on the popular consciousness. Knowledge that the early history was one of invasion (no single date is as well-known as 1066) and awareness of Empire must be familiar to all: here again speculation is necessary because of a lack of systematic investigation into popular images of history. The result may well be a heritage which recognizes the basic legitimacy of immigration and the creation of national identity by denizens. Far from leading to a tolerant attitude towards immigration, it has linked the concept of immigration with conquest so that legitimate immigration is synonymous with successful conquest. Certainly, NF propaganda uses the images of conquest to describe contemporary immigration by West Indians and Asians. The immigration itself is frequently called an 'invasion'. The theme of 'blacks taking over the country' is reflected in the comments of the interviewees.

According to T, white people have second-class citizenship as compared to the blacks, who 'have certainly got the edge over the

white citizens'. A felt that in Britain 'the white race is certainly on the way to being overtaken, unless something is done about it'. Similarly, N thought that 'the people have always felt second-class citizens because foreigners have always been put in front of them'. K echoed the fear that the mere presence of black people in Britain was a threat:

it's frightening to think that these strange people should be massing all around you all the time, and doing things contrary to your culture ... and not conforming or anything, and not trying to live in peace with us in any way and just sticking in their own separate cliques. And that to me is frightening.

In this statement the opposition between the presence of foreign immigrants and 'not living in peace' is significant: their presence alone is perceived as tantamount to a declaration of war. A cultural bias is possible since the present wave of immigrants from the West Indies and Asia is not the first to have encountered this reaction in Britain.[13]

PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE

So far, in describing the racist thought of the interviewees, emphasis has been placed upon their stereotype of the Negro (or more properly of West Indians). In their comments this stereotype emerged most strongly. There seemed not to be such a readily available racist package for describing Asians. The overall generic term 'immigrants', equated with 'blacks' or 'coloureds', was commonly used, and the progression was then to talk of West Indians or Africans when talking of blacks. When distinctions between West Indians and Asians were made a different picture of the latter emerged.

In certain respects the stereotype of the Asians was more diffuse than that of the West Indians. K objected to Asian cooking smells and considered that Asians were aggressive amongst themselves. A was offended by the existence of mosques in England and thought that Asian children were contributing to a drop in educational standards in the schools because of their language difficulties. Such disparate objections do not suggest a composite image in the way that the racist stereotype of Africans and their descendants has crystallized into the Sambo/Brute images.[14]

At times interviewees seemed to doubt whether racial feeling was the cause of their objections to Asians; talk of race tended naturally to focus upon West Indians rather than Asians. Certainly, there were disagreements about the traits ascribed to Asians. C's comments about 'illiterate Pakistanis' not only contradicted, for instance, H's

view that Indians and Pakistanis were on average intelligent, but also some of C's own statements. At times he expressed admiration for Asians who had built up businesses in Britain 'by sheer bloody backbone'. As a small businessman himself he had great sympathy for them; he did not seem to regard them as illegitimate competition. He went on to praise Asian culture as being:

a damn sight older than ours and I'd be the last to decry it. The Asians were civilised when we were running about hitting people on the head with lumps of rock. And for that you've got to respect them and I respect them greatly. That is why their crime rate is so much lower ... they respect each other, and as a rule they respect their surroundings.

He claimed that his objections to Asians were not racial; in fact he did not consider that the Asians were black; properly speaking, he said, they were white. 'I don't think that they're that much different to us race-wise, other than a bit darker.' What he objected to was the possibility that Asians might gain a 'stranglehold on the economy'.

Through the disparate images invoked to describe Asians it is possible to discern an inchoate pattern resembling the images which have crystallized in anti-semitic mythology. Not all stereotype patterns of anti-semitism are identical. In nazi propaganda two separate images were combined: the Jew as vermin/dirt and the Jew as the powerful manipulator. Allport, following Bettelheim and Janowitz [15], refers to these respectively as 'id' and 'superego' stereotypes. He noted that in nazi Germany Jews were blamed for the sins of the id (e.g., lechery, filth, violence) as well as those of the superego (deceit, overambition, slyness). Allport commented that Americans, having the Negro to personify the sins of the id, 'do not need the Jew for this purpose. The American, therefore, can build up a more specialised stereotype for the Jew, embracing only the "superego" qualities of ambition, pride and adroitness'.

The possibility for a similar division of labour within bigoted thinking exists today in Britain, with the West Indian bearing the brunt of id accusations and the Asian being designated by superego traits. Although comments about Asian violence and cooking suggest id stereotypes, the main thrust of the interviewees comments point towards superego traits; it is these traits which resemble closely the superego ascribed to the Jew in the way Allport described. For instance, K criticized Asians for 'sticking in their own separate cliques', but then proceeded to fulminate against an Asian who had bought a small shop in a white area and had anglicized his name. This is reminiscent of the Jewish stereotype which depicted Jews as being conjointly clannish and intrusive — a contradiction which was claimed by Adorno *et al* to be a symptom of inner psychological

contradictions.[16] The parallel between Asians and Jews became striking in some of the comments and was even perceived by the interviewees themselves. For instance, K spontaneously described Asians like the Jews as 'a powerful financial race', and said that Jews stick together in the same way as Asians. When C made a comparison between Asians and Jews, not only did he invoke the traditional images of anti-semitism, but he also voiced negative feelings towards Asians. He talked of Asians in Africa controlling the economy:

they've got their tentacles wrapped so tightly round it that it's suffocating ... We're going to get exactly the same here. The Asians are a clever race. They're a business race and they're like the Jews — wherever they go they tend to make money and be successful. And they'll do exactly the same to this country if we let them. They'll get a stranglehold on it.

It should be remembered that although C here referred to the Asians as a 'race', he also spoke of them as being white (or almost white) and possessing an older culture than the British: the parallel with the Jews thus grows even closer.*

On the basis of these comments there are good reasons for thinking that under the blanket classification of 'immigrant' in contemporary Britain lies the possibility of demarcating two stereotypes which would be complementary from a psychological point of view. If psychological theories stressing the motivational functions of prejudice were correct, one would expect contemporary fascism to have replaced anti-semitism by anti-Asian propaganda, so updating the superego stereotype. However, the National Front's ideology has not replaced anti-semitism. That it retains anti-semitism at the centre of its ideology says much for the tenacity of prejudice; it also limits the role of individual psychology in explaining the politicization of bigotry.

RACE WAR

A number of studies have suggested that, because of psychological inadequacies, about 10 per cent of the population harbour extreme irrational hatreds against outgroups.[18] Marsh surmises that such persons are attracted to the National Front. But Weir's survey,[19] conducted in Hackney, indicates that not all NF supporters have

*It should be noted that the stereotype of Asians as small businessmen in Britain is at variance with the facts: Smith, in a comprehensive survey, has shown that only 8 per cent of Asian working men in Britain are self-employed, as compared to 12 per cent of the indigenous population.[17]

the extremes of hatred described by Marsh. Scott talks of 'pathological' NF members, some of whom had personally attacked black people.[20] However, the leadership of the branch he studied was not dominated by such pathological types. The moderate tone adopted by the interviewees in the present sample does not of itself indicate pathological hatred; nor, of course, was it intended to. Yet the interviewees gave indications that others were more extreme than themselves.

D appeared to follow the official line that the NF moderates hatred of blacks because it seeks to direct hatred away from the hapless immigrant onto the real villains behind the scenes. D mentioned that some people join the party and immediately start talking about their hatred for blacks:

whether they talk in this fashion because they think they ought to, because they think we're like that, I don't know. But we are very quick to put them right. My own personal view and that of my colleagues is that hatred is an emotion that blinds people to reality and hatred's no good. It gets in the way.

In an ideological sense such hatred does stand in the way: the official ideology does not identify blacks as the group behind the world's ills.

Even if the NF is held to play such a 'moderating' role, it hardly seems to have been completely satisfactory. A number of the interviewees, while assuring the interviewer that they had no personal hatred for blacks, said that others in the party did. For instance, P mentioned that 'there are people in the National Front that absolutely hate the sight of them'. Similarly, J said that there were 'probably people in the National Front who do hate the blacks — personally I don't'. K talked about those in the party who 'every time they see a black face it gets their back up ... They'd sort of move away if one [a black] sat at the table in the pub. They're the type to move away.' C, characteristically, was more outspoken about his colleagues, talking of the 'non-thinking, blind hatred of blacks' which some of the members have.

Significantly it was J, K and C who mentioned the hatred of blacks by other members; all these three had personal doubts about the policy of total repatriation. However, all three were prepared to go along with the party line. J said, after voicing his personal doubts, 'because we're so strong on our thing, the lot has to go back', thereby indicating the primacy of party opinion over personal preference. As if by way of explanation, he added: 'I ain't in the NF policy department you know.' C said that when he first expressed the belief that some blacks might be of benefit to Britain, 'this was, I found, totally unacceptable to the majority of our people. And it struck me that they were racist blindly ... I didn't accept this sort of blind hatred and I still don't accept blind hatred of blacks.' Nevertheless,

this young rebel, who was hoping to change the party from the inside, was in fact changing his views towards the official line. He was struggling to impose the rigid and unyielding categories upon his unruly thoughts. By the second interview he talked about the changes in his attitudes: 'I was quite willing at one point to allow those more useful members of the community to stay. And for various reasons, probably two or three dozen little reasons, I've come to the conclusion that perhaps that wouldn't be a good idea after all.' He did not specify what the reasons were, but on other matters too his beliefs were tending towards the official line.

If the remarks about other party members being active haters of blacks is taken at face value, then the policy of total repatriation is defended by two separate pressures within the party. First, the official ideology, with an elaborate racial doctrine at its core, demands a higher standard of racial purity than perhaps the interviewees would have demanded. Official policy itself carries a normative weight for the faithful follower — I was prepared to accommodate himself to the official line: 'let's face it, you don't write a policy in five minutes'. Secondly, grass-roots haters of blacks put pressure on from below. If this is the case then the present sample of middle-range ideologues would be under pressure from above and below to maintain the path towards extremism.

It is not only social pressures from party colleagues which determine the political development of party members. Attitudes themselves need not be considered as permanent. Just as party members may predict what the course of political events might be in the future, so they may also have ideas about the likely developments in their own beliefs. Most social psychological research into racial attitudes is firmly rooted in the here and now. It enquires typically into present attitudes, often neglecting that present attitudes might contain their future tendencies. For this reason not only should the present feelings of the interviewees be taken into consideration, but also their predictions for the future. Given that such predictions contain the ingredients of self-fulfilling prophecies, they should be paid special attention.

K, after distinguishing himself from the haters, expressed sympathy for them. He said he could understand why they felt that way and that if the political situation degenerated he himself would join the ranks of the haters: 'the more and more it goes on, the more and more they'll [the blacks] get my back up'. He predicted that, in a year's time, 'I'll probably be entirely different. I'll probably tear my hair out and say "no I hate all blacks, no matter where they come from, no matter how long they've been here. I just hate blacks and they've all got to go home." I don't feel that at the moment.'

The path however was mapped out. In common with all the other interviewees he foresaw with certainty future interracial violence and

a polarization between blacks and whites. According to J, '92 per cent of the National Front thinks that there is going to be violence at some stage'. This prediction of violence makes the distinction between the moderates and extremists with regard to racial attitudes largely cosmetic. All see the mere presence of West Indians and Asians in Britain as a major threat, leading possibly to civil war. Even P, claiming to like blacks on a personal basis, was preparing himself for the impending battle. C, another so-called moderate, was accommodating himself to the line dictated by the ideology and the haters; this was to be his side in the foreseen war. Stressing that his own personal views were in no way 'based on political brain-washing or mindless hatred', he perceived the connection between such views and violence, and, moreover, that the progression might lead to the ultimate form of racial violence — genocide. He did not flinch from the prospect: 'At the moment I know what I want. I know what I think is right and I'll fight for it. And if it means picking up a gun and destroying a group of people or a race of people, who I consider a threat, then I will do it.'

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"Two Deaths in the Morning," by Saul Landau; reprint from *Mother Jones*, December, 1976.

"Promise of Disarmament," by Richard Barnet; reprint from *The New York Times Magazine*, February 27, 1977.

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Notes and Documents

Indictment for conspiracy to murder Orlando Letelier

On 1 August 1978 the US Department of Justice announced the return by a Federal Grand Jury of a ten count indictment in the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt. Orlando Letelier, Director of the Transnational Institute, had been Chile's Ambassador to the US, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defence. Ronni Moffitt was a staff member of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington DC.

Those indicted are:

- 1 Juan Manuel Contreras, until recently director of the National Directorate of Intelligence of the Government of the Republic of Chile (DINA), a general in the Chilean army and top ranking member of the junta. He 'resigned' from government posts after his involvement in the murder had become known, and an indictment from the US was considered imminent.
- 2 Pedro Espinoza, former Director of Operations for DINA and a colonel in the Chilean army. He too 'resigned' from government due to the imminence of this indictment.
- 3 Armando Fernandez, an agent of DINA and an officer in the Chilean army.
- 4 Guillermo Novo
- 5 Alvin Ross
- 6 Virgilio Paz
- 7 Jose Dionisio Suarez
- 8 Ignacio Novo

The last five named defendants are members of the Cuban

Nationalist Movement. Previously they had been involved in the CIA-sponsored invasion of the Bay of Pigs and other anti-Castro activities.

The offences for which they have been indicted, with the maximum punishment provided by law, are:

All defendants except Ignacio Novo:

Count 1: 18 U.S. Code Sec. 1117, conspiracy to murder a foreign official

Maximum punishment: life imprisonment

Count 2: 18 U.S. Code Secs. 1111 and 1116, murder of a foreign official

Maximum punishment: life imprisonment

Count 3: 22 D.C. Code Sec. 2401, first degree murder (Letelier)

Maximum punishment: life imprisonment

Count 4: 22 D.C. Code Sec. 2401, first degree murder (Moffitt)

Maximum punishment: life imprisonment

Count 5: 18 U.S. Code Sec. 844 (i), murder by use of explosives

Maximum punishment: life imprisonment

Guillermo Novo and Ignacio Novo:

Counts 6-9: 18 U.S. Code Sec. 1623, false declaration before Grand Jury (two counts for each defendant)

Maximum punishment: five years' imprisonment, \$10,000 fine for each count

Ignacio Novo:

Count 10: 18 U.S. Code Sec. 4, misprision of a felony

Maximum punishment: three years' imprisonment and \$500 fine

This indictment should be viewed as only the beginning of the process necessary to bring to justice the perpetrators of these heinous crimes. The primary assassins of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt are not the Cuban operatives, whose pathological hatred of the socialist government in Cuba makes them in the 1970s as much the easy tools of Latin fascists as they had been of the CIA in the 1960s. The primary criminals are the leaders of the Chilean junta who have on their hands the blood of thousands of other martyrs killed in prisons and exile. We do not wish to presume or expose the nature of evidence available to the investigators of the US Justice Department. But we must affirm our belief that the decision to murder Orlando Letelier was not an expression of any personal animosity on the part of General Contreras and his operations commander, Colonel Spinoza. They acted on behalf of the Chilean military junta. Others,

including Pinochet, are implicated in this murder. The US indictment acknowledges this when it charges that:

Manuel Contreras, the Director of Dina, initiated the action which began the conspiracy and, either alone or with others unknown to the Grand Jury, ordered the assassination of Orlando Letelier.

Whether or not the whole truth will be made public and even partial justice will be done depends now on the extradition of the indicted Chilean officials and their trial in an open US court. We note with satisfaction that Earl J. Silbert, US Attorney for the District of Columbia, officially announced on 1 August 1978, that:

Pursuant to treaty between the United States and Chile, the United States will request the immediate arrest and detention of those Chilean citizens named in the indictment. A request for their extradition will follow.

Pinochet will undoubtedly resist this request, for the consequence of surrendering a member of the junta's inner circle to the rule of law may mean an end to its cohesion. In order to avoid extradition, the junta must make formal gestures and seek formulas designed to satisfy US opinion. The officially claimed 'arrest' of General Contreras, Colonel Spinoza and Captain Fernandez is an example of the gesture. An offer of simultaneous trials — you try the Cubans in the US; we try the Chileans here — is the likely formula. We fear that the junta's evasion of justice may find powerful support among the same institutions, corporations, and individuals in the US who had so heavily supported the destruction of Chile's constitutional regime and brought the fascist generals to power.

It will be yet another mockery of President Carter's professed concern for human rights if Washington fails to obtain the extradition of the indicted Chileans; and failing, it does not terminate all diplomatic and commercial relations with the Chilean police state. More importantly, it will be the first clear-cut example of the US government's willingness to surrender its obligations to protect citizens and uphold the rule of law at home in favour of serving vested interests abroad. We are sure, however, that the machinations of the junta and its American benefactors will be opposed by the American public, to some degree by the press, and by courageous employees within the US government. Some of these latter deserve our appreciation for having pursued the murder investigation with sincerity and vigour.

The following is excerpted from the indictment; we have reproduced in its entirety the first count of the Grand Jury's charges.

EQBAL AHMAD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Holding a Criminal Term

Grand Jury Sworn in on February 7, 1977

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JUAN MANUEL CONTRERAS SEPULVEDA
PEDRO ESPINOZA BRAVO
ARMANDO FERNANDEZ LARIOS
GUILLERMO NOVO SAMPOL
ALVIN ROSS DIAZ
VIRGILIO PAZ ROMERO
JOSE DIONISIO SUAREZ ESQUIVEL
IGNACIO NOVO SAMPOL

Violations: 18 U.S. Code §1117, §1111, §1116, §844(i), §1623, §4, §2

(Conspiracy to Murder a Foreign Official; Murder of a Foreign
Official; Murder by Use of Explosives; False Declarations;
Misprision of a Felony; Aiding and Abetting)

22 D.C. Code §2401, §105

(First Degree Murder; Aiding and Abetting)

The Grand Jury charges:

FIRST COUNT:

1 From on or about early July, 1976, the exact date being unknown to the Grand Jury, and continuing to on or about September 24, 1976, within the District of Columbia, the State of New Jersey, the State of New York, the State of Maryland, the Republic of Chile and elsewhere, *Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda*, hereinafter known as *Manuel Contreras*, *Pedro Espinoza Bravo*, hereinafter known as *Pedro Espinoza*, *Armando Fernandez Larios*, hereinafter known as *Armando Fernandez*, *Guillermo Novo Sampol*, hereinafter known as *Guillermo Novo*, *Alvin Ross Diaz*, hereinafter known as *Alvin Ross*, *Virgilio Paz Romero*, hereinafter known as *Virgilio Paz*, and *Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel*, hereinafter known as *Jose Dionisio Suarez*, defendants and co-conspirators herein, and Michael Townley, named herein as a co-conspirator but not a defendant, did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly conspire and agree together to kill Orlando Letelier, a foreign official, in violation of 18 U.S. Code §1116.

2(a) At all times during the period of the conspiracy, the National Directorate of Intelligence, hereinafter referred to as DINA, was the intelligence and secret police agency of the government of the Republic of Chile.

(b) At all times during the period of the conspiracy, *Manuel Contreras*, an officer in the Chilean Army, was the Director of DINA and responsible for its operations and activities.

(c) At all times during the period of the conspiracy, *Pedro Espinoza* was the Director of Operations for DINA and an officer in the Chilean Army.

(d) At all times during the period of the conspiracy, *Armando Fernandez* was an officer in the Chilean Army and an agent of DINA.

(e) At all times during the period of the conspiracy, *Michael Townley* was an agent of DINA.

(f) At all times during the period of the conspiracy, the Cuban Nationalist Movement, also known as CNM, CMN and MNC, was a Cuban exile group based in the United States.

(g) At all times during the period of the conspiracy, *Guillermo Novo*, *Alvin Ross*, *Virgilio Paz*, *Jose Dionisio Suarez* and *Ignacio Novo* were leaders of the Cuban Nationalist Movement and members of its governing council.

(h) At all times material hereto, *Orlando Letelier* was a former Ambassador to the United States from the Republic of Chile.

THE OBJECT OF THE CONSPIRACY

3 The object of the conspiracy was to assassinate *Orlando Letelier*.

THE MEANS USED BY THE DEFENDANTS TO FURTHER THE OBJECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY

4 It was a part of said conspiracy that members of the conspiracy would and did perform different functions and operate at different levels of responsibility. All the participants in the conspiracy were aware that the conspiracy would encompass and depend upon the combined, coordinated efforts of members of two organizations — DINA and the Cuban Nationalist Movement.

(a) *Manuel Contreras*, the Director of DINA, initiated the action which began the conspiracy and, either alone or with others unknown to the Grand Jury, ordered the assassination of *Orlando Letelier*.

(b) *Pedro Espinoza*, the Director of Operations for DINA, who was responsible directly to *Manuel Contreras*, conveyed the order to *Armando Fernandez* and *Michael Townley*, both agents of DINA, and instructed them on the operational details of the mission. *Manuel Contreras* and *Pedro Espinoza* used the resources, contacts, finances and intelligence apparatus of DINA to arrange international travel, false travel documentation, monetary disbursements and expenditures and intelligence contacts.

(c) *Armando Fernandez's* function in the conspiracy was to travel to the United States to follow *Orlando Letelier* to determine his habits

and schedule, the location of his home and office, his route to work and to give this information to Michael Townley.

(d) Michael Townley's function in the conspiracy was to travel to the United States to obtain the surveillance information on Orlando Letelier from *Armando Fernandez* and to arrange, together with Cuban exiles, to assassinate Orlando Letelier.

(e) *Guillermo Novo*, *Jose Dionisio Suarez*, *Alvin Ross* and *Virgilio Paz* performed the functions in the conspiracy of providing explosives, detonating devices and manpower to assist DINA in killing Orlando Letelier.

OVERT ACTS

5 In pursuance of the said conspiracy and to effect its object, to kill Orlando Letelier, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the District of Columbia and elsewhere:

1 On or about July 17, 1976, *Manuel Contreras*, the Director of DINA, contacted the Director of the Republic of Paraguay's Military Intelligence Service, to request that he authorize the issuance of Paraguayan passports for two DINA agents to be used on an unspecified secret DINA mission to the United States.

2 On or about July, 1976, within the Republic of Chile, *Manuel Contreras* ordered *Armando Fernandez* to travel to Paraguay on an official DINA mission to contact the Paraguayan Military Intelligence Service. *Contreras* also told *Fernandez* that it was a two man mission, that *Fernandez* would be in charge and that *Fernandez* should contact *Pedro Espinoza*, the Director of Operations for DINA, for details of the mission.

3 On or about July, 1976 ... within the Republic of Chile, *Armando Fernandez* had a meeting with *Pedro Espinoza*, who provided *Armando Fernandez* with a false identity card and ordered him to go to Paraguay to contact the Director of the Paraguayan Military Intelligence Service.

4 On or about July, 1976 ... within the Republic of Chile, *Armando Fernandez* telephoned Michael Townley to arrange a meeting between Townley and *Pedro Espinoza*.

5 On or about July, 1976, ... within the Republic of Chile, Michael Townley met with *Pedro Espinoza* who spoke to him about an unspecified mission outside Chile.

6 On or about July, 1976, ... *Armando Fernandez* contacted Michael Townley to arrange a second meeting with *Pedro Espinoza*.

7 On or about July, 1976, ... *Pedro Espinoza* told Michael Townley that Townley and *Fernandez* were being ordered to go to the United States on a DINA mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier.

8 On or about July, 1976, ... within the Republic of Chile, *Armando Fernandez* gave Michael Townley an airline ticket from

Chile to the Republic of Paraguay and a sum of United States currency.

9 On or about July 20, 1976, *Armando Fernandez* and Michael Townley arrived in the Republic of Paraguay, with false Chilean identities in the names of Alejandro Rivadeneira and Juan A. Wilson S.

10 On or about July 27, 1976, within the Republic of Paraguay, *Armando Fernandez* and Michael Townley obtained special Paraguayan passports in the names Alejandro Romeral and Juan Williams.

11 On or about July 28, 1976, *Armando Fernandez* and Michael Townley returned to Chile whereupon *Fernandez* gave the Romeral and Williams passports to *Pedro Espinoza*.

12 On or about late August, 1976, ... within the Republic of Chile, *Manuel Contreras* ordered *Armando Fernandez* to travel to the United States on a DINA mission and told him that he would use a false Chilean passport.

13 On or about late August, 1976, ... *Pedro Espinoza* summoned *Armando Fernandez* to a meeting where he handed *Fernandez* a false Chilean passport in the name of Armando Faundez Lyon and a round trip airline ticket from Santiago, Chile to Washington, D.C.

14 On or about August 26, 1976, *Armando Fernandez*, accompanied by another DINA agent Liliana Walker Martinez, arrived in the United States from Chile, using the false Chilean passport provided by DINA, to carry out surveillance activities on former Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Orlando Letelier.

15 On or about September 7, 1976, within the Republic of Chile, *Pedro Espinoza* telephoned Michael Townley and ordered him to travel to the United States to carry out the previously discussed mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier.

16 On or about September 9, 1976, Michael Townley entered the United States at Kennedy International Airport, using false identification provided by DINA in the name of Hans Petersen Silva.

17 On or about September 9, 1976, within the State of New York, *Armando Fernandez* met Michael Townley at Kennedy International Airport where *Fernandez* gave Townley the information he had obtained from his surveillance of Orlando Letelier.

18 On or about September 9, 1976, *Armando Fernandez* and Liliana Walker Martinez traveled from the State of New York to the Republic of Chile.

19 On or about September 9, 1976, within the State of New York, Michael Townley rented a car from Avis Rent-A-Car, using the name Hans Petersen.

20 On or about September 9, 1976, within the State of New Jersey, Michael Townley met with *Virgilio Paz* and asked *Paz* to set up a meeting with *Guillermo Novo*.

21 On or about September 10, 1976 ... Michael Townley met with

Guillermo Novo and *Jose Dionisio Suarez*, informed them of his orders from DINA to assassinate Orlando Letelier and requested their assistance in the mission.

22 On or about September 13, 1976, ... Michael Townley met at the Chateau Renaissance Motel with members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement and discussed with them the assassination of Orlando Letelier. Members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement present at this meeting included *Guillermo Novo*, *Jose Dionisio Suarez*, *Virgilio Paz* and *Alvin Ross*.

23 On or about September 15, 1976, ... *Guillermo Novo* and *Jose Dionisio Suarez* gave *Virgilio Paz* and Michael Townley explosives and a remote controlled detonating device to take to the District of Columbia, to be used in the assassination of Orlando Letelier.

24 On or about September 16, 1976, *Virgilio Paz* and Michael Townley drove from the State of New Jersey to the District of Columbia in *Paz's* car.

25 On or about September 16, 1976, within the District of Columbia, *Virgilio Paz* and Michael Townley checked into a Holiday Inn Motel.

26 On or about September 17, 1976, ... *Virgilio Paz* and Michael Townley purchased items to be used in the bomb at a Sears, Roebuck and Company store.

27 On or about September 18, 1976, *Guillermo Novo*, *Jose Dionisio Suarez* and *Alvin Ross* obtained parts to be used in the bomb.

28 On or about September 18, 1976, *Jose Dionisio Suarez* drove from the State of New Jersey to the District of Columbia where he joined *Virgilio Paz* and Michael Townley.

29 On or about September 18, 1976, ... *Jose Dionisio Suarez* registered at the Best Western Envoy Motel.

30 On or about September 18, 1976, within the District of Columbia, *Virgilio Paz*, *Jose Dionisio Suarez* and Michael Townley built a bomb to be used to assassinate Orlando Letelier.

31 On or about September 19, 1976, *Virgilio Paz*, *Jose Dionisio Suarez* and Michael Townley drove in *Virgilio Paz's* car from the District of Columbia to Orlando Letelier's home in Bethesda, Maryland, where Michael Townley placed the bomb on Orlando Letelier's car.

32 On or about September 19, 1976, Michael Townley telephoned Chile and told his wife, Mariana Ines Callejas de Townley, who was also an agent of DINA, to advise DINA that a bomb had been placed on Orlando Letelier's car, which she did.

33 On or about September 19, 1976, *Alvin Ross* met Michael Townley in Newark, New Jersey, where *Ross* inquired about the mission and Townley briefed him on it.

34 On or about September 19, 1976, within the State of New

Jersey, Alvin Ross drove Michael Townley to the residence of *Guillermo Novo* where the three discussed in detail what had transpired in the Washington, D.C. area.

35 On or about September 19, 1976, Michael Townley telephoned *Guillermo Novo*.

36 On or about September 19, 1976, Michael Townley flew from New York City to Miami, Florida.

37 On or about September 21, 1976, within the District of Columbia, the bomb was detonated, killing Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt.

38 On or about September 21, 1976, within the State of Florida, Michael Townley telephoned *Ignacio Novo*, whereupon *Novo* told him that something had happened in the District of Columbia.

39 On or about September 21, 1976, within the State of Florida, Michael Townley met with *Ignacio Novo* and briefed him about the mission in the Washington, D.C. area.

40 On or about September 23, 1976, Michael Townley flew from the State of Florida to the Republic of Chile.

41 On or about September 24, 1976, within the Republic of Chile, Michael Townley advised *Pedro Espinoza* that the DINA mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier had been carried out.

Repression in Colombia: political persecution in Colombian universities

Colombia is going through a period of intense military repression, political persecution and economic crisis. The US dominates the economy, using Colombia as a testing ground for repressive, maximum-profit generating policies, before applying them to the rest of Latin America. This has forced on the people massive inflation, grave labour instability and the suppression of labour and democratic rights. The rebellion against these policies has produced a wave of military mobilizations, incarcerations and confrontations. The recent 4th June presidential elections were conducted under martial law (for one month before and after).

The universities and high schools have been in the forefront of these struggles (since the early 1960s, students and teachers, inspired by the Cuban revolution have been organizing). To counter the threat, actual and potential, to US interests, plans have been elaborated to reform the educational system so as to prevent any mass revolutionary action. This need to reform the educational system coincided with the need for US investment (principally in the transformative industry) to be assured of a regular supply of

moderately-qualified technicians and engineers (something the old educational system did not provide).

These needs are both being met by the educational policies laid out in some detail in the government's Development Plans (themselves the product of a compromise between the government and supranational organizations such as UNESCO and Organization of American States). International financial cooperation is oriented towards medium-level education, with technical training receiving the highest priority. Priority has also been given to measures for 'rationalizing' university structure and control, removing the participation of students and faculty in the government of universities, and shifting the burden of financing education directly on to the students. Education itself has been reduced solely to the necessity to train labour power and administrative personnel as required by US economic interests. US mission, such as those of Currie and Rockefeller, have played a major part in defining this educational strategy.

On 23 May 1978, while the country was under martial law, the students and leftist faculty in the National University of Bogota, led by the Workers Independent Revolutionary Movement (MOIR), took to the streets and waged an all-day battle against the police and the military who had surrounded the University. The students were protesting recent bus tariff increases, the education policies and 'reforms' that had been forced upon the student body and the faculty, and the recent fencing in of the University — obviously to contain the students in a trap in times of battle. Several students were injured and arrested. The University was closed until after the elections.

On 29 May, after an assembly attended by over 3,500 students, workers and professors, a tremendous battle resulted between the police and the people. The students tore down 200 metres of the metal fence that had been erected around the University. The police entered the University firing indiscriminately and murdered a student. The students rescued the body of their comrade and took it to the Free University in the centre of the city near the President of the Republic's home. The army tried three times during the night to take the University and failed.

The next morning, several professors, including Jose Fernando Ocampo, a leader in FECODE (the Federation of Colombian Educators) and member of MOIR, went to the Free University to join the students. The army had surrounded the University for ten blocks all around, but the professors were able to obtain entry. Upon recognizing Professor Ocampo and the other professors, who have exercised leadership in past anti-imperialist democratic struggles and who have consistently defended the students in their struggles, the barricaded students allowed them in to assist in negotiating the entry of the coffin, the exit of the students and the preparations for the

funeral. The students were holding the President of the Free University as a hostage — hence they were able to obtain permission from the government to conduct the funeral.

As a result of his participation in this and past struggles Professor Jose Fernando Ocampo, who has been one of the most active opponents of the current reactionary educational policies, was summarily fired from his post in sociology at the National University without a single established procedure being observed. His destitution came directly from the University Administration and was signed by the Minister of Education. But, as we go to press already the unions have begun to campaign for his restitution.

For more information, contact Gilbert G. and Rosalinda M. Gonzalez, Program in Comparative Culture, University of California, Irvine.

July 1978

Repression in East Timor

Statement by Mr Jose Ramos-Horta, permanent representative of FRETILIN for the United Nations and international organizations

American military advisers, pilots and technicians, as well as mercenaries, are fighting alongside Indonesian troops in East Timor. US supplied OV-10 Bronco aircraft, tanks marked 'US Army', armoured cars and trucks have been used. It was admitted by a State Department spokesman during congressional hearings in Washington last year that 90 per cent of weapons used in East Timor by Indonesian forces are American-supplied.

The Minister of Information and National Security, Mr Alarico Fernandes, of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, said:

American military advisers and mercenaries fought alongside Indonesian soldiers against FRETILIN in two battles in Lekidoe area, 10 miles south of Dili, on June 13, and in the Remexio village, eight miles south-east of the capital, on June 21 and 22. In the meantime, American pilots are flying OV-10 Bronco aircraft for the Indonesian Air Force in bombing raids against the liberated areas under FRETILIN administration.

According to Mr Fernandes, two American military advisers have been in Dili since December last year and have been living at the Farol residential area west of the city. More American advisers arrived during the first three months of the year, some of whom moved to Aileu, 26 miles south of Dili.

This information has been carefully gathered during the past six

months and has been released only after overwhelming evidence of the American combat role on the Indonesian side. It has been also revealed by Mr Fernandes that military observers of an ASEAN country have been to East Timor during the month of December last year to watch Indonesian military operations against FRETILIN forces in the village of Ainaro.

American military intervention in East Timor comes at a time when the war in East Timor has become Indonesia's no. 1 problem and Indonesia's military adventure has proved to be a fiasco. After almost three years of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, some 85 per cent of the territory remains under FRETILIN administration and some 90 per cent of the population of 1,000,000 live in the liberated areas. Indonesia maintains an average of 25,000 to 45,000 troops in the territory. It has spent an estimated \$1 billion over the past three years at an average of half a million daily. Indonesian forces have suffered heavy casualties with thousands of dead and wounded. Hospitals in Jakarta and Jogjakarta are overflowing with war victims.

American intervention in East Timor runs against the Administration pronouncements on Human Rights and must be seen as a gross contradiction to say the least. It should be noted that besides carrying a war of aggression and expansion abroad, the current regime in Indonesia is regarded as one of the worst violators of Human Rights. Yet, since President Carter took office, he has requested that Congress increase military assistance to Indonesia by some 28 per cent. Early this year he authorized the sale of 12 F-5E jet fighters to Indonesia. One should then ask where is the consistency of the American Administration Human Rights policy — if there is any?

The Government of Indonesia has defied the international community by refusing to comply with five United Nations resolutions demanding the withdrawal of its troops from East Timor. It has barred foreign observers, including press correspondents and the ICRC, from visiting the territory. In view of this, we call upon the American Administration to cease its intervention in East Timor and all military assistance to the Government of Indonesia. Further, the American Administration should impress upon the Government of Indonesia that it comply with the United Nations resolutions and facilitate the entry into the territory of foreign observers, including press correspondents and relief organizations.

July 1978

Book reviews

Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order

By STUART HALL, CHAS CRITCHER, TONY JEFFERSON, JOHN CLARKE and BRIAN ROBERTS (London, MacMillan, 1978). 425pp. Paper £4.95

This is a challenging yet confusing book; stimulating yet grossly over-written. Ultimately, it is probably one of the most important books to be written on race relations in Britain, but one which must be read fully and carefully if it is not to be politically misleading.

These conflicting sentiments arise in part from the way the book has been constructed. It had its origins in a specific incident in 1973 when three Birmingham youths were given 'deterrent' sentences of 20, 10 and 10 years respectively for a 'mugging' offence. But, as the authors assert, the book is not about 'mugging' as such. They argue that 'mugging' was not a new crime — it was as old as urban poverty itself. What was new was the massive reaction to it among the press, the police, the judiciary, politicians and the public. This leads the authors into an analysis of the ways in which societal reactions to crime are constructed, both in general and in the specific details of the Birmingham case. The lines of this analysis will be familiar to those grounded in the sociology of deviance:

... the reaction to 'mugging' was out of all proportion to any level of actual threat which could be reconstructed through the unreliable statistics. And since it appeared to be a response, at least in part, not to the actual threat, it must have been a reaction by the control agencies and the media to the *perceived or symbolic* threat to society — what the 'mugging' label represented ... When such

discrepancies appear between threat and reaction, between what is perceived and what that is a perception of, we have good evidence to suggest we are in the presence of an ideological displacement. We call this displacement a *moral panic*. This is the critical transition point in the whole argument.

Yet, there is enough in the analysis presented here to indicate that this was no ordinary moral panic. The panic about 'mugging' did not begin with the Birmingham or any other specific incident; indeed, these incidents were themselves the products of an extended campaign in the media, as well as of police repression on the ground (and, in London, on the underground), against 'mugging'. Moreover, the 'mugging' label had been imported from the United States, with all its racial connotations, by the British media as far back as the late 1960s, and conflict between the police and the black community here had been endemic for years. In itself the moral panic thesis was incapable of encompassing these wider realities; having taken the analysis to one level of generality (crime control), it turns back in on itself, leading to a form of intellectual and political closure.

This takes us into the second stage of the book's analysis, where 'mugging' is seen as part of a more general revolt against authority in society and as one aspect of the 'crisis of hegemony' in Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This crisis had its source, of course, in the post-war, post-imperial weakness of British capitalism, but here the analysis is pitched deliberately at the ideological and political levels. In this section of the book we are presented with an exhaustive catalogue of everything and anything that went wrong (from a social control perspective) in Britain during this period — student revolts, youth culture and 'permissiveness', industrial strikes, women's liberation, etc. — all contributing to a more generalized moral panic and leading, particularly in the early years of the Heath regime, to the emergence of a 'law and order society', one marked by a swing away from managed consensus and towards increased repression, albeit through and by the law.

We have now moved from the specific ('mugging') to an all-embracing level of generality ('crisis of hegemony'), but still there is something vital missing from the analysis. Throughout this section of the book, the treatment of race is variable, irresolute. At times it is referred to in almost dismissive terms, as a mere 'play-thing of Party politics'. At others it is seemingly forgotten. Thus, the authors can talk of the abandonment of an economy of cheap labour' in the 1950s, as though there were no immigrant workers at the bottom propping this economy up, or later of the 'anti-immigrant lobby ... [taking] the field for the first time' over the Kenyan Asians issue in 1968, as though there had been no such lobby behind the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act or the 1965 White Paper. There are points, however, where the centrality of race, not just to 'mugging'

but to the crisis as a whole, is recognized:

The appearance of a renewed panic about race, in the very moment of this intense polarisation of the political scene and just when the shift from a managed to a more coercive variant of consensus is occurring, cannot be wholly fortuitous... Now, in 1968, as the floodgates of social dissent opened, race — not for the last time — becomes a salient theme: one capable of carrying intense but subterranean public emotions forward on a wave of reaction.

But — not for the first time — the analysis is deflected, back into its earlier sociology of deviance phase:

If the 'mugging' reaction grows out of the drift of the state, under the crisis of hegemony, into an exceptional stature, it is not, in a simple sense, the direct *product* of that evolution. The reaction to mugging has its own 'inner history', within the juridicial and ideological spheres: crime control, the police and courts, public opinion and the media.

It's as if the authors were 'willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike' — strike, that is, at the one factor, racism, which cuts through and encompasses both the 'moral panic' and 'crisis of hegemony' dimensions of the 'mugging' phenomenon.

That the authors do, in a superb final chapter, come to locate 'mugging' in the politics of the ghetto and the racism of British society and culture is the book's saving grace. Here we see how, in the period since the initial 1972-3 panic about 'mugging', the repression of the black community and of black youth in particular has intensified, while 'mugging' has come to be explicitly (it had always been implicit) identified with race on all fronts, not least the National Front. Here we have laid out before us the collective history of the black community in Britain — its economic role, its physical and social isolation in the 'colony' areas of the cities, its cultural and political resistance — and the particular history of the (potential) 'black mugger' — the experience of cultural genocide at school, the struggle for survival on the streets in the face of structural unemployment, the drift into a 'hustling' life, then into petty pilfering and, through confrontation with the police and other control agencies, its escalation into 'mugging'. Here we have the theory relating to the role of the lumpen proletariat, both in the metropolis and at the periphery, in the period of late capitalism, and to black consciousness, all brought to bear on the struggles of black youth in Britain today. Here we are shown the necessity of rejecting that politics which romanticizes black wagelessness, appropriating 'a limited form of economic struggle as if it were a full economic, political and ideological confrontation with capital', without at the same time

rejecting the black wageless themselves, condemning them to permanent criminalization. Here, finally, we have race as 'a critical structure of the social order of contemporary capitalism', that which constitutes and reproduces the black working classes at every level of their existence and makes class relations function as race relations. As the authors point out, 'this has consequences for the *whole class*':

Racism is ... not only a problem for blacks who are obliged to 'suffer' it. Nor is it a problem only for those sections of the white working class or those class organisations which are infected by its stain. Nor indeed can it be overcome, as a virus which can be treated by a heavy dose of liberal inoculation. Capital reproduces the class as a whole, structured by race. It dominates the divided class, in part, through those internal divisions which have 'racism' as one of their effects. It contains and disables the representative class organisations by confining them, in part, to strategies and struggles which are race-specific, which do not surmount its limits, its barriers. Through race, it continues to defeat the attempts to construct, at the political level, organisations which do in fact adequately represent the class as a *whole* — that is, which represent it *against capitalism, against racism*.

Yet, all this seems strangely unrelated to what has gone before, and it is the failure to read race, as a critical structural element, back into the earlier analysis that makes this book potentially misleading. Having once adopted the moral panic thesis as a tool of analysis, the authors have allowed themselves to get caught up in *its* logic and are therefore unable, through the greater part of the book, to break out of the crime/reaction to crime dialectic in which the whole sociology of deviance is grounded. But to relate 'mugging' to crime, even from this supposedly more radical perspective, is to misplace it, since it is not so much the crime of 'black mugging', but its racial component, that engenders the societal reaction to it. In other words, there is no displacement as such between the fact of 'mugging' and the reaction to it; on the contrary, the panic about 'mugging' represents a direct expression and amplification of the essential racism of contemporary British society. And it is this fact, rather than its coincidence with other moral panics of the 1968-73 period, which gives the reaction to 'mugging' a deeper, more long-term political (and not purely ideological) significance. Indeed, to locate the 'mugging' phenomenon within some generalized 'crisis of hegemony' is also to negate its specific basis in racism.

The importance of this has become all too evident now that, for the black community, legal repression is rapidly being overtaken by racist/fascist terror. At a time when blacks are being mugged and murdered in the streets of London and other cities, we might ask why there has been no moral panic about fascism. On the face of it, fascist

violence is just the stuff of which moral panics are made, and yet the response of the press, politicians, the judiciary and the police to the systematic and sustained harassment of the black community — rising to a fever pitch with the murder of an Asian workman, the battering to death of a Guyanese child and a shot-gun attack on West Indian youths, all in the space of three months — has been marked by a deliberate lack of either panic or morality. Equally, it is the successive panics about mugging, immigration, birth rates, culture swamping, etc. that have provided the racist *raison d'être* of fascism — and its breeding ground.

The answer to such 'paradoxes' must lie at a different level, beyond the bounds of the sociology of deviance, in the historic conjunction between racism and fascism — the point at which the defeat of a section of the class signals the defeat of the class as a whole.

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LEE BRIDGES

Beyond Orange and Green: the political economy of the Northern Ireland crisis

by BELINDA PROBERT (London, Zed Press, 1978). 174pp. £6.50 cloth, £2.95 paper

It is not difficult when viewing Ireland's history to analyse the link between Britain and Ireland as an imperialist one. Marx for one had no such difficulty, and writing as he did around the time of the Great Famine, which claimed at least one million lives in Ireland in the 1850s, he concluded that the British ruling class was creating in Ireland 'a system which wants to supplant the Irish by sheep, pigs and bullocks'. British imperialism for the south of Ireland meant underdevelopment and reliance on agriculture. It also created the industrialized north-east. The industrialization may have been built on a precariously narrow base, but it did provide Ireland with a new class, the proletariat. Part of that class in the north-east, the Protestants, had a stake in imperialism, whereas another part, the Catholics, had not. The Protestant workers established a position for themselves as a labour aristocracy. Their privileges were not massive, but they were real. And they were the reason for the Protestant working class to throw in its lot with the Protestant bourgeoisie.

It is from this starting point that Probert, attempting as she does to write a Marxist analysis of Irish history, begins. However, the crux of her argument is that while British imperialism may have been an explanation for Ireland's problems once, it is no longer so. Those who argue that it is, she writes, fall into three errors. First, they must see the present nationalist struggle as exactly the same as that of the revolutionary liberals of 1798, the United Irishmen. It is not; there is

no simple thread of anti-imperialism in Irish history, she concludes. Secondly, they must regard the Protestants in the north as usurpers, 'to be driven into the sea'. On the contrary, the Protestants are as much a part of Irish society as anyone else, she concludes. Thirdly, they must judge that the Protestant working class has had a false consciousness because it has been blinded by the machinations of drum-thumping industrialists and politicians. But, says Probert, ideology is not merely the result of ruling-class conspiracy; ideology has a 'relative autonomy'.

Probert's conclusions are perfectly valid ones, but her method of arriving at them is not. She arrives at them through rejecting three propositions. But these are the propositions of a straw man. No contemporary Marxist in Ireland has made these propositions as unequivocally as she claims. It is telling that to find quotations to back up her straw man she must go back some years to the writings of Desmond Greaves and T.A. Jackson. But there is no contemporary equivalent of these writers. Her claim that Michael Farrell (author of *Northern Ireland, the Orange State*, London, 1976) is in the same boat is an utterly specious one.

But, having set up her straw man, she can then reject his entire analysis. She does so without hesitation: 'the present conflict cannot be considered as a nationalist, anti-imperialist struggle for the liberation of Ireland' — so throwing out the baby with the bath water. Even if she could prove that there are some contemporary Irish Marxists proposing to drive one million Protestants into the sea, it does not necessarily negate an anti-imperialist analysis of the Irish struggle.

What can she put in place of an anti-imperialist analysis? She writes that because of the hegemony of the Protestant bourgeoisie, the Protestant working class never was able to articulate fully its interests. But things have changed, she says. The penetration of monopoly capital into Northern Ireland since the 1960s has meant the splintering of the Unionist bourgeoisie into those who opposed this penetration and those who supported it. The break-up of the unionist alliance has meant the release of the Protestant working class. Admittedly they do not quite know yet where their interests lie. And in these circumstances it is the relative autonomy of their Orange ideology which allows them still to act in a sectarian manner. Objectively speaking though, 'the central contradiction remains that between the bourgeoisie as a whole and the working class'. Hence, she concludes, the major objective of the Irish left 'must surely be to unite the working class in Northern Ireland'.

The problem with such a conclusion is that while it fits in with Marxism as *dogma*, it is not realistic. Why is the working class in Northern Ireland not united? Why has the left not succeeded in uniting it? Probert implies that it is because they have completely

tail-ended reactionary nationalists. But another answer is possible. The divisions exist because the 'national question' is unsolved. To presume that the left can organize solely on class issues is to judge that the national question will go away if we only ignore it. Or to presume that the working class in the north can forget about the national question and unite on social and economic issues only is voluntarism of the most crass kind. Working-class unity must surely be the wish of any Marxist. But the reasons for any lack of unity must be judged realistically and not dogmatically or romantically. For this reason many Irish Marxists have critically supported national liberation struggle. They have judged that while the national question in Ireland is outstanding there is no possibility of working-class unity. That is not the same as arguing that a nationalist success will guarantee socialism. On the contrary, it would only be the beginning of the struggle. But there is no beginning from the present situation.

So an anti-imperialist analysis does not merely rest on ethnocentrism or narrow nationalism, as Probert argues. It is an analysis deriving from the complete dependency of Ireland on British, American, German and other capital. (Only the British is considered by Probert.) It is an analysis that has a quite legitimate pedigree, beginning with James Connolly (whose *Labour in Irish History* and *The Reconquest of Ireland* are not mentioned), through authors such as Elinor Burns (whose 1931 pamphlet *British Imperialism in Ireland* is not mentioned) up to Stephen Parker's and Ciaran Driver's 'Capitalism in Ireland', in the *Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists*, 1975 (on whose economic facts Probert draws heavily without mentioning that they use these facts to propose an anti-imperialist analysis). And lastly, it is an analysis that completely opposes the 'two nations' position of Anders Boserup (*Socialist Register*, 1972), who proposed that the Irish left's task should be to make a 'tactical alliance' with British imperialism in order to destroy Orangeism! Probert rejects Boserup's naive conclusion, but sails remarkably close to an identical one herself. Writing of Northern Ireland under the now defunct unionist alliance she says: 'So reactionary and anachronistic a system could hold together only as long as Ulster remained isolated from the main currents of British politics.' By implication, then, all we needed to bring us into the twentieth century was a good dose of monopoly capital.

Probert denies any validity to the activity of many Marxists in Ireland, and offers the Irish working class a magnificent carrot — 'the establishment of a genuinely democratic assembly is a prerequisite of any settlement in which the working class may have a political voice.' Can this really be all that Marxists should be striving for as the end point of struggle?

Northern Ireland Polytechnic

BILL ROLSTON

The Declining Significance of Race: blacks and changing American institutions

By W.J. WILSON (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1978). 154pp. £8.75

On the face of it this book should be central to the concerns of a journal such as *Race & Class*. But essentially it is a confused and confusing work, balanced on the polarities of race or class. In the first two periods of American black-white history (and we will come to these periods à la Wilson in a moment) it was all race, in the last period all class.

'Black-white contact', says Wilson, can be divided into three stages, each structured by the changing economic and political institutions of the respective periods: first, a period of antebellum slavery (and its immediate aftermath) based on a plantation economy and characterized by racial-caste oppression; secondly, a period of industrial expansion — from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the New Deal — marked by class conflict and racial oppression, and finally, a period of progressive transition from racial inequalities to class inequalities in the 'modern industrial period' after the Second World War, but crystallizing in the 1960s and 1970s. Whereas in the first two periods — the 'pre-industrial' and 'industrial' — racial oppression was determined by the economy and reinforced by the 'laws and policies of the state', in the 'modern industrial period' the polity has acted relatively independently of the economy to promote racial equality through desegregation laws, affirmative action, etc., which explains why today not all blacks are an underclass,* but only one-third of them! And even those that are in the underclass are there not because they are black but because they were there already, deposited by a previous history of 'racial oppression'. And what keeps them there, alongside the poor whites, is class not race.

In effect, writes Wilson, the 'black class structure [has] started to take on some of the characteristics of the white class structure', with economic mobility for the 'talented and educated blacks' and 'economic subordination' for the black underclass. All of which should simply read 'black capitalism' — the strategy that the state devised to accommodate blacks within the system, lest their location outside it should threaten the system itself — a strategy in other words which integrated blacks into the class structure of mainstream American society and gave them a place in the capitalist sun.

But Wilson sees it differently: 'it was the intervention of the state (responding to the pressure of increased black political resources and to the racial protest movement) that removed any artificial discrimination barriers by municipal, state and federal civil rights legislation'

*Wilson's term for what is really a reserve army of labour.

and promoted 'occupational upgrading' for blacks. In the process, the 'traditional racial struggles for power and privilege' have 'shifted away from the economic sector and are concentrated in the socio-political order'. Accordingly: 'the immediate source of the tension has more to do with racial competition for public schools, municipal political systems, and residential areas than with the competition for jobs'.

In such a situation it is the state itself that can provide a solution by extending its efforts — from tackling race inequalities to tackling class inequalities. For:

in the final analysis ... the challenge of economic dislocation in modern industrial society calls for public policy programs to attack inequality on a broad class front, policy programs ... that go beyond the limits of ethnic and racial discrimination by directly confronting the pervasive and destructive features of class subordination.

For Wilson, then, the state itself has no economic bias, no class interest. It is an independent arbiter, an impartial judge — some souped up referee in a tournament of unequally matched teams bent on restoring equality. And class for Wilson is class à la Weber: a group of people sharing similar market positions in relation to goods and services or skills to offer in the job market.

In such a sociological tradition there is no recognizable proletariat nor bourgeoisie and it is thus entirely possible to conceive of the emergence of a post-industrial society composed almost entirely of a middle class based on a growing service sector exploding with riches, the good life and leisure for all. And it is only by locating Wilson in this tradition that one can account for his other fallacy — that because the forms of black-white conflict have shifted (from the struggle for jobs to struggles for the control of education, of residential areas, of amenities), this marks a structural shift — and improvement — in the position of blacks in American society. What remains unexplained in any systemic sense is that stubbornly resistant bloc of black people seemingly unheeding of these changes which have swept along the more educated, trained and skilled of their fellows in a process of upward mobility.

The book gathers together a great deal of previously published official data (particularly on employment and unemployment) and reviews the literature with a light touch which one does not expect in what I suspect will become a college textbook. But, in the final analysis, one is forced to the conclusion that the work is in the genre of American radical academe: by Weber out of Myrdal — and it's carrying a lot of weight.

Sheffield

STUART BENTLEY

Biko

By DONALD WOODS (London, Paddington Press, 1978). 288pp.
£5.95

Discard everything in this book except the words of Biko — as they come to us in his interviews, in his conversations and at court hearings. Listen:

The black man is subjected to two forces in this country. He is first of all oppressed by an external world through institutionalized machinery and through laws that restrict him from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, through poor pay, through difficult living conditions, through poor education, these are all external to him. Secondly, and this we regard as the most important, the black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation ... because of the ability of the white culture to solve so many problems ... You then tend to look at it as a superior culture to yours. You tend to despise the *worker culture*, and this inculcates in the black man a sense of *self-hatred* ... The urgency of the moment is that we have to liberate the mind of the black man ... to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth ... In the long run this will prove far more valuable than the sentimental and idealistic attitude of perpetually trying to 'bridge the gap' between the races.

That was on black consciousness. On the movement that sprang from it and its historical antecedents, Biko says:

In the 1960s the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress had been banned, so the main realities we were confronted with were the power of the police and the leftist noises of the white liberals ... In a sense, the Black People's Convention is the most powerful organization among blacks, but this is hard to determine exactly, since the ANC and PAC are banned as organizations, which means that they have a kind of generation-gap problem ... I do not want to give the impression that the relation between these organizations is one of competition. There will be *one* movement of revolt against the system of injustice ... To be sure there are the usual divisions due to background, but in terms of revolution, there is unity ... When we speak of leaders we refer to people like Mandela, we refer to people like Sobukwe, we refer to people like Govan Mbeki [ANC and PAC leaders].

Now hear what Woods has to say:

The idea behind Black Consciousness was to break away almost entirely from past black attitudes to the liberation struggle.

Biko on violence:

No matter how you look at it, armed struggle is difficult to discount as a possibility ... While the BPC is non violent, it should not be forgotten that we are part of a *movement* which will be confronted with new situations that may require different strategies ... We haven't debated violence so far. We are confined to operating peacefully precisely because we operate aboveground. That doesn't mean we preclude it. Eventually the crucial point will arrive where whites will decide whether our liberation is to be negotiated or forced. I think there will be a sufficiently conservative influence for them to opt for force, for a last-ditch struggle.

and on why restraint is necessary:

The frustrating difficulty is that the situation does not allow blacks to develop an organised vanguard. This is not only a result of the fact that many of our leaders are imprisoned or banned but also because of the fact that blacks are excluded from many of the essential disciplines needed for the formation of a vanguard ...

Yet Woods can say of Biko: 'And a champion of reconciliation, moderation and peace lies dead in detention.'

Biko on liberals:

We now come to the group that has longest enjoyed confidence from the black world — the liberal establishment ... The biggest mistake the black world ever made was to assume that whoever opposed apartheid was an ally. Any group seeking confrontation needs also to establish clear polarities, and the middle-of-the-road section needs to be eliminated in order to bring about the confrontation.

But Woods writes:

In the early days of our friendship with Steve there were many adjustments to make on both sides. He had to adjust to my capitalist assumptions and liberal approach, and I had to adjust to his radical sensitivities.

Biko on what is needed from the US and other nations:

What is needed in Washington and in other capitals of the Western world is an open acknowledgement of the blacks' legitimate struggle for freedom ... if the Carter administration is to know what spirit lives among the blacks, it will have to establish contacts with those persons who are the accepted leaders of the blacks, even if they are imprisoned on Robben Island ... In the second place, Washington can exert such economic pressures on South Africa

that it will become considerably less profitable to invest in South African industries. We blacks are perfectly willing to suffer the consequences. We are quite accustomed to suffering... Foreign investors come and exploit the wealth of the country with more advanced technological means than those we have in South Africa to siphon off profits which rightfully belong here, and these go to profit societies other than our own societies... the Andy Youngs must stop talking and start really getting tough with Vorster: sanctions, blockades if necessary, the lot.

Woods again:

In fact, I like to think to this day that Steve, who taught me so much, was genuinely influenced by me on at least two issues — the one mentioned above [the idea of a one-party state to a parliamentary democracy] and the adoption after much advocacy by me of a less cynical attitude toward the United States in particular and the Western democracies in general.

Why these glaring contradictions? How can Woods fail to see the evidence he himself presents? Who is he and what does he stand for?

Woods was a late developer. In 1952 he could say: 'Yes, shoot the niggers or send them back to the reserves!' Biko was the first banned person he met — in 1973, though he was the editor of a daily paper since 1965! In the 1970s he was referring to the Soweto uprising as 'riots' and to the 1952 Defiance Against Unjust Laws Campaign as 'one of the incidents of intermittent black urban violence'. He must have known of Sharpeville, of the Treason Trial, of the Rivonia Trial (which sentenced Nelson Mandela to life imprisonment) — to name but a few of the innumerable trials, shootings, detentions, tortures and deaths. Yet in 1977, after Biko's death, Woods could say:

The Nationalists were no longer simply disastrously misguided racists — they were now the mortal enemy who stopped at nothing, who had committed the ultimate outrage.

It is clear that Woods' development came from his relationship with Biko, Woods' account of which is full of boastful trivia about the 'great friendship' between the two. Often, though, such trivia are more revealing than Woods knows:

His [Biko's] big feet were invariably shod in sandals, and once I inadvertently stepped on his toe. He asked in a tone of scientific enquiry 'Donald, why is it that you persist in stamping on my feet all the time?' and *Umnqundu wahko!* (Your ass!) was all I could reply.

What is beyond doubt, however, is that Biko used Woods to good political ends. Biko had a voice to the outside world only through Woods. He was banned and could not be quoted in South Africa.

Woods states:

I wasn't clear as to why Biko would want to meet me — an orthodox, white liberal of the type his movement rejected. Biko said: 'Man, I wanted to find out if you're a terrific enough guy to start giving some decent coverage to the Black Consciousness movement, which means a lot more to the blacks than all the Bantustan stuff your reporters cover.'

Forty-five other 'Biko's' have been killed in detention, hundreds are in jail today — people who did not approach an editor to use him to put the majority viewpoint of the African people to the rest of the world. That is why we know so much about Biko and so little about so many others. I do not say this to belittle anything of the man Stephen Biko. It is necessary to put him into context. He never claimed to be a leader — he always said the leaders of his people were in jail on Robben Island.

The irony and danger is that Donald Woods chooses to act as Biko's interpreter — the white liberal as spokesman for the black man — the very issue around which the Black Consciousness movement was formed. And, as a self-styled and 'noisy' liberal, he misrepresents what Biko stood for with a naivety and wishfulness that needs investigation, because its outcome is to take the political man and water him down, as an acceptable package for middle-of-the-road liberals to approve — a nice, humorous, well-bred, westernized, Anglican, laid-back, anti-violent man, a moderate who mispronounced only one or two English words. Woods, and the other South African liberals — Pogrud, Oppenheimer, Suzman et al. — are, in rejecting the basic ideological struggle in favour of peace at any cost, playing a large part in obscuring the liberation struggle in South Africa. They have long assisted the West to believe that while they exist a form of democracy exists. Their fraternization with the Nationalists and their petty persecution at the hands of the government have given credence to this belief — and this in turn brings credibility to their 'cause'. And even as I write Hollywood is about to turn Woods into a hero on the back of Biko, with the intrepid Paul Newman for Woods and Sidney ('Guess Who's coming to Dinner') Poitier for Biko.

If the 'liberal' view holds in the West, it will defeat the liberation movement's intention of voicing the urgent case for action against the white racist regime, and Biko's voice will be muted. For Biko was a revolutionary working within the confines of a tightening oppression which finally killed him, as he forecast it would.

London

NORMA B. KITSON

History of Black Americans: From Africa to the Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom

By PHILIP S. FONER (London and Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1976). 680pp. £17.75

This is the first of an intended four-volume history of black Americans. Future volumes will cover the periods from the emergence of the cotton kingdom to the civil war, from reconstruction to the great migration, and from the great migration to the present. Foner's justification for this massive undertaking is two-fold: first, the inadequacies of single-volume histories, particularly their neglect of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and secondly, the vast amount of new material which has become available over the past two decades.

It is true that there has been a proliferation of studies of black history, especially in the United States, in recent years. Equally, a good deal of this material suffers from parochialism, both in its coverage and its intellectual concerns, often confining itself simply to the rediscovery of the role of blacks in American history. It is a mark of Foner's success in this first volume that he avoids these pitfalls. Not only has he assimilated the mass of recent studies with more established sources, but he has brought to this material a sense of history on a world scale. For example, the first third — and in some respects the best part — of this volume is devoted to early African society and culture, European expansion and the slave trade, and the development of the institution of slavery in various parts of the Americas. If anything, when he finally gets on to the United States in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries his account seems less original, but no less readable and comprehensive for that.

The book is obviously destined to become a standard academic reference work, and students will no doubt find the excellent, 60-odd page bibliography of great use. Although basically descriptive in tone, Foner presents concise summaries of the main theoretical debates concerning such issues as the interpretation of various forms of plantation slavery or the significance of the slave question in the formulation of the American constitution. On these issues, Foner takes an essentially Marxist line, seeing economic and political factors as predominant over religious and cultural ones, but what comes through above all else is a sense of horror at the ravages of slavery throughout the New World.

In the last analysis, to be really useful, history must be accessible, and despite Foner's considerable achievement in this respect, the very length of this book will inevitably put off many readers. This is a pity, for there are certain sections — particularly Foner's devastating account of the slave trade — which should be standard reading on school history courses throughout the United States and Europe

for what they will tell whites (let alone blacks) about their own history.

University of Birmingham

LEE BRIDGES

Tobacco and the Third World: Tomorrow's Epidemic?

By MICHAEL MULLER (London, War on Want, 467 Caledonian Rd, N7, 1978). 110pp. £1.20 paper

An excellent campaigning document from War on Want which analyses the role that tobacco — both its production and consumption — plays in Third World economies and societies — and of course who profits most from it. The world cigarette business is dominated by a few multinationals, foremost among them the British-based BAT (British American Tobacco), whose chairman, Sir Richard Dobson, recently hit the headlines over his after-dinner remarks about 'bribing wogs'.

BAT is a valuable dollar-earner for Britain, and neither the company nor Britain can afford to let go of that revenue — regardless of the cost to Third World countries in lives, health, raw materials — any more than in the last century Britain could afford to lose the scandalous opium trade. Not of course that the tobacco trade is not carried out with strict regard for international law and modern commercial practice, but still there are some unsavoury parallels — not least that the cigarettes marketed in the Third World are the most addictive and dangerous (in terms of extremely high tar content — usually associated with high nicotine levels), and that they are often sold by the most blatant and unrestricted advertising pressure with no warning or discussion of the health risks. The publisher of one Third World journal which carried a rather lightweight and humorous anti-smoking article was warned that a repetition would lose him the company's valuable advertising. Health campaigns in the west — despite the efforts of the tobacco companies to the contrary — are proving too effective: the market is stagnating, hence the drive to expand in the Third World.

But the costs are not only those of health. Tobacco crops take up valuable land which could be used for growing food (despite Sir Richard's assertion to the contrary: 'If tobacco were not grown in its turn, the land would normally lie fallow for a season'). They take much longer to reach maturity (in Malaysia farmers can grow and cure only one tobacco crop in the same length of time that they can sow and harvest most other crops twice). The curing process (which, like the growing process, needs the farmer's constant attention) demands high levels of heat, so valuable timber is burnt, forests are eroded and desertification hastened, or else expensive fuels have to

be imported. The jobs that the processing industry creates are few — cigarette-making is one of the most capital intensive operations, and only a few of these very expensive factories are needed to satisfy the demand. Otherwise the work (apart from the brief seasonal demands — which clash with the sowing and harvesting of other crops) is the extremely low paid, monotonous sorting and grading of the cured tobacco, leaf by leaf. And, where a small cartel dominates the market, even the finest quality leaf does not necessarily fetch its producers the best prices. Zambia, which has in some respects a model government-controlled scheme for tobacco production, attempted to gain a better deal for its producers: auction prices dropped and have stayed remarkably low for what is known to be excellent tobacco. Nor is tobacco leaf necessarily even a major export earner, except when it is under the firm control of a state agency as in Tanzania. It is one of BAT's policies that locally-produced tobacco should primarily be consumed domestically: there 'should be an expansion of the domestic base for tobacco', according to the spokesman for the 40 per cent BAT-owned ITC (Indian Tobacco Corporation), 'if exports are to be maintained ... and expanded'.

That tobacco appears (despite all the disadvantages) so attractive a crop to invest in, is due in very large measure to the skill with which it is promoted by the multinationals (with the eager support of the development agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization and Britain's own Overseas Development Ministry), to the excellent back-up and ancillary services they provide (the training in tobacco husbandry, the loans for fertilizer and equipment, the seedling plants), to the promptitude with which they make payments to the producers, and to the diligence with which they hand over tax revenues from the sale of cigarettes to the hard pressed and impoverished Third World states.

A review is too brief a space in which to explore all the ramifications of this issue, but one of the strongest points of this report is not only how well the facts and figures have been marshalled to support the arguments, but also the simplicity with which a highly-complex enterprise has been exposed. It is an excellent case study, and could well serve as a model not just for similar investigations, but for the campaigns that can flow from them — which is perhaps why one national newspaper (the *Daily Telegraph*) could devote a whole editorial (8 July 1978) to a campaign against the campaigners.

London

HAZEL WATERS

The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa

Edited by ROBIN PALMER and NEIL PARSONS (London, Heinemann, 1977). 430pp. £7.50. Paper £2.90.

This collection of essays examines the process of underdevelopment in Central and Southern Africa — 'the Africa of the labour reserves', as Samir Amin designates this important region. The contributors to this useful textbook use the 'dependency theory' — the development of underdevelopment — to analyse how western capitalism promoted the progressive impoverishment of this vast region, reducing it to dependency and appropriating its surplus.

The metropolitan or core areas dominate these peripheral regions. But within a given peripheral area there are certain regions — the rural districts — which are more underdeveloped than the industrial centres. This leads to the use of 'peripheral centres' and 'semi-peripheries' to describe the latter. South Africa, for example, is described as a sub-metropole, being subordinate to the metropolises of western capitalism, but dominant within the African sub-continent and holding sway over its own periphery.

The problem of rural poverty arose with the intrusion of the imperial powers, which set in train the process of peasantization and proletarianization. The migrant labour system created the African peasant-worker who, by working progressively longer in the colonial mining and industrial centres, generated wealth which imperialism creamed off. This, in turn, caused rural poverty: peasant crops were sold at low prices; the absence in the semi-peripheries of able-bodied migrants undermined the rural labour force and therefore agricultural production.

Migrancy froze peasant products and proletarian incomes at the lowest levels. Neither the urban sector nor the rural sector could, as a consequence, provide full subsistence and social security.

Essays in the book trace the impoverishment of peasant economies and their class stratification in Angola and Rhodesia, Zambia and Zaire, Lesotho and Swaziland, Namibia and the Transkei. The editors rightly say 'that the nature of the inherited colonial economies ... cannot be understood, and therefore be changed wittingly, without historical analysis of how and why contemporary social and economic distortions originated'.

London

KEN JORDAAN

African Social Studies: a radical reader

Selected by PETER C.W. GUTKIND and PETER WATERMAN (London, Heinemann, 1977). 481pp. Cloth £8.50, paper £2.90

Gutkind and Waterman have attempted in this volume to put together an anti-introduction to African studies. A worthwhile idea, but one that falls short of success in several ways. What the book most lacks is a tough, convincing framework that would give its critique of African studies structure and direction.

In Waterman's introductory essay on radicalism in African studies, he begins by defining radicalism negatively in contra-distinction to 'conventional wisdom'. What follows is a frequently unwieldy exposition which embraces a very broad definition indeed. Considerable space is given to discussing the radical quality of various (mainly British) writers such as Hodgkin and Davidson and the relationship of African studies to Communist Party history. These are interesting pages, but one misses a direct discussion between contributors of central issues posed in the form of a problematic.

As an example, take Coquery-Vitrovich's article which promotes the concept of an African mode of production, dependent in the last analysis on her emphasis upon long-distance trade. This is in sharp contrast to the analysis offered in Ken Post's article which accepts for Africa the application of Marx's analysis of an Asiatic mode of production. And yet Waterman is content simply to describe Coquery-Vitrovich's ideas as 'likely to stimulate lively and fruitful debate'. Surely the beginnings of the debate belong in this volume, in so far as it seeks to be radical and not merely describe radicalism.

There is a secondary definition with which Waterman presents us: radicalism as getting down to fundamentals. Here also a tighter point of view is needed. The great pre-war social anthropologists such as Evans-Pritchard or colonial administrators such as Lord Hailey, whatever their other faults, could not be accused of concentration on trivia. Waterman and Gutkind should have been bolder and decided themselves what are the fundamental issues and where is the cutting edge of radical debate. The closest they come to doing so is in the use of telling quotes from Amilcar Cabral which introduce each section. This is not, however, Cabral's book and using his ideas in an aphoristic way is tantamount to passing the buck.

Taking the different sections (methodology, history, economy, social structure, ideology, politics), some seem more successful than others, although all are too brief. Methodology and history profit from a broad systematic selection. The economy section is unsatisfyingly compartmentalized into case studies; it badly needs more articulated theoretical selections. The social structure section is informed by a general agreement among the authors to understand

African society in terms of class conflict and class alliance. This contrasts with the diffuse quality of the following section on ideology, a subject which requires deeper analysis of the political and societal culture articulated in a class system.

Some of the selections have been most fortunate in bringing to light essays of great merit not easily to hand. John Saul's analysis of nationalism in the development of Tanzanian historiography is impressive; so is Gavin Williams' elegant description of some basic features of the Nigerian political economy and Martin Legassick's wide-ranging critique of the use of 'pluralism' as a sociological concept in Africa. Hodgkin's hard to obtain essay on 'Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism' and Shivji's sharp exposition on the contradictions within Tanzanian socialism are also welcome choices. Leys and Clegg, back to back on Kenya and Algeria, present a stark but convincing picture of the repression and control of revolutionary impulses in two independent African states. A particular strength of the book lies in the inclusion of several selections by a new generation of Nigerian radicals (Onoge, Osoba, Nduka) which have a quality of emphasis and engagement that contrasts with other, more neutrally set contributions.

There are some major omissions. Perversely, despite the emphasis in Waterman's introduction, only one writer from a Communist state is included (Goncharov). Where is Szentes, Malowist, Olderogge? Similarly, French scholarship is strikingly underrepresented. The absolutely crucial group of Marxist economic anthropologists are mostly absent. These gaps and others are only in part made up by Chris Allen's useful descriptive bibliography.

Probably the most conspicuous omission of all is of southern Africa. To exclude it, as stated in the preface, because it has been 'under firm colonial-racist domination' seems odd; that would seem far more a reason for inclusion, especially given the use made of Cabral in the volume. In fact, there have been a number of important writings on southern Africa written in the last years which would have illuminated many of the themes here. It is true, though, that the focus on the already independent African states does provide a kind of unity in the book.

African Social Studies will deservedly find an audience among western students who have begun some study of Africa. In that it poses for them the possibility of a critical reading of many standard works, new questions and a new problematic, it makes a valuable contribution. The lack of a more positive and purposeful framework makes its value for African students less obvious. Its greatest weakness lies in the all too inclusive and generous tone of the introduction, which verges on chartering a cosy new establishment of Africanists, left-wing branch. The failure, in short, is that the funda-

mental question for such a volume is never even raised: what is the point of African studies and Africanists in the West?

Ahmadu Bello University

BILL FREUND

In Defence of Freedom

Edited by Dr K. WATKINS (London, Cassell, 1978). 180pp. £2.50

This book is a collection of essays by eleven authors — nine of whom are members of the Council of the National Association for Freedom (NAFF). It is an attempt to put some flesh on the crude free enterprise populism which has characterized NAFF's activities. As such it fails abysmally. The book only serves to put forward the banal idea that the individual, the family, free enterprise and the western way of life are not only the best but the only 'natural' way of organizing society (as opposed to 'unnatural' socialism). However, its publication does provide an opportunity to assess the prospects of NAFF as a right-wing pressure group based on the strength or otherwise of the ideas and policies put forward by its leaders.

The object of the authors, Dr Watkins writes in the Preface, is to make a contribution to the 'defence of freedom'. The concept of 'freedom' employed throughout the book (and by NAFF as an organization) is 'freedom' for the rich, for the right, and for obedient sections of the working class.

Winston Churchill, Conservative MP and opposition spokesman on defence, is one of several of the authors to take up this theme:

The free society, by according as much liberty to its enemies as to its defenders, places powerful weapons in the hands of any politically motivated minority — however tiny — who seek to abuse its freedoms in pursuit of their totalitarian aims.

Political freedoms should in effect be limited to those who unequivocally embrace capitalism and its social relations.

Of more interest is the chapter on 'Freedom and Race'. In the past NAFF have been noticeably silent on questions of immigration and racism, even to the point of being embarrassed by Mrs Thatcher's statements. This silence is prompted by their need to try and distance themselves in the right-wing spectrum from the fascism of the National Front. The chapter is written by Narindar Saroop, a company director, Conservative parliamentary candidate and chairman of the UK Anglo-Asian Conservative Society. 'Racialism', according to Saroop, springs from 'the fundamental factor of the real world which is that resources are always relatively scarce in relation to human desires and expectations'. He neglects to mention that, in dividing the cake, it is the capitalist who determines who gets what.

The implication of his argument is that in conditions of plenty racism will wither away, when the lessons of history show that the plight of the exploited and oppressed is an inherent and necessary characteristic of capitalism and imperialism.

The real enemies, Saroop says, who threaten to destroy that possibility — of overcoming the scarcity of resources — are the Marxists. Moreover, the Marxists and ‘vociferous’ immigrant leaders ‘and their fellow-travelling whites’ who regard ‘integration and assimilation as dirty words’ are merely using discontent with social conditions to achieve their ‘totalitarian’ ends.

While ‘immigrants have to adjust and acclimatise to the British way of life’, the Asian community has much to contribute: ‘the inherent characteristics such as individual enterprise, thrift, love and cohesion of the family unit provide the greatest potential in contributing to the maintenance of a free society in Britain’.

Having set out to write about race, Saroop ends up talking about class. Class from the perspective of someone at the top, divorced from working-class black people at the bottom of the pile.

Many of the essays are quite frankly pathetic. Lady Morrison of Lambeth opens her contribution with the statement that the ‘family structure of man, woman and their children is biologically inherent in *man’s nature*’ (my emphasis). And Professor Antony Flew writes: ‘It is not easy to define but one thing is certain, freedom is as indispensable to the life and fulfilment of the human spirit as is air to the human body.’

The book will not enhance NAFF’s prestige or its intellectual credibility, quite the reverse in fact. It highlights the paucity of its ideology. It seems after all that the prospects for NAFF are tied closely to Mrs Thatcher’s apron strings — if she comes to power several key NAFF figureheads are likely to be close confidants in her administration.

State Research, London

TONY BUNYAN

Retreat to the Ghetto

By THOMAS BLAIR (New York, Hill and Wang, 1977). 263 pp. Cloth \$8.95

This book purports to be a serious study of the ideological conflict between separatism and integration within the American black community as it developed during the decade up to the mid-1970s. In fact it consists of little more than potted, often ludicrous, portraits of certain black leaders and events of this period. Take, as just one example, the following on Malcolm X:

He was part hot-blooded, frustrated, alien Caribbean on his mother's side, and part puritan zealot on his father's. He hated the society that killed his father and filled his childhood home with tragedy; he was ashamed of the taint of white blood in his mother's family that bequeathed him a light skin with a reddish 'rhiny' cast. As Malcolm Little, the ghetto charity child, he was severely traumatized, and as 'Detroit Red', the parasitic criminal, he was alienated from black as well as white society. Malcolm the adolescent was a tragic victim of the ghetto slum, and in the prison of his mind, he was an exile in his own country.

Malcolm X was a prophet-rebel produced from the grieving womb of the black masses ... Though Malcolm spoke of revolution, and seemed the swaggering image of a hardened guerrilla leader — fierce, but charming and sexually attractive — he led no guerrilla campaigns. Malcolm was not, for example, the Che Guevara or Amilcar Cabral of black America, nor was his Organization of Afro-American Unity an Irish Republican Army, a German Baader-Meinhof group, or a Japanese Red Army. Malcolm's natural abode was the open city, not the pestilent swamps, shadowy forests, and craggy mountains. He was a media man, not a clandestine insurgent or maquisard.

It is as if the whole book were written as the script for some slick and totally unanalytical TV show. Indeed, the author's own acknowledgements reveal a type of 'research' more suited to a media man than a serious academic — a dinner with Ralph Abernathy here, a lunch with Julian Bond there, a talk somewhere else with Andrew Young. And, just to demonstrate one's grassroots credentials, 'rappin' in the streets with Panthers and Muslims, a garbage man, an auto mechanic, an elevator operator. In Blair's own words, 'hundreds of encounters ... [a]ll of them miniature cameos in sound, color, and feeling of people's lives'. A few libraries are mentioned in passing but there is little evidence in the book of any but the most cursory research being done in them.

One can just imagine how that garbage man or elevator operator might react to this book. 'Shit man, you were never here, in either body or soul. So what you writin' a book about it for!' On this showing Thomas Blair's natural habitat would appear to be the dinner table and the international conference hall, not the streets of the ghetto from which he retreated — physically, mentally, and spiritually — long ago.

London

BILL BRANCHE

Mines, Masters and Migrants. Life in a Namibian Compound

By ROBERT J. GORDON, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1977) pp. 276

The author, a white, was Personnel Officer, from 1973 to 1974, at a mining project near Windhoek, capital of Namibia. The book is a revised version of an academic dissertation, submitted at the University of Illinois, and relies on the writer's personal experience.

His purpose is to show how the mines are worked on the lines of contract and migrant labour, of compounds and pass laws, of colour bars and labour coercion. Though sympathetic to the plight of the Namibian workers, he takes these features of apartheid as static categories, making no attempt to show how they evolved and why they have become entrenched in the political economy. The capitalist system is treated as an immutable institution, colonialism as an aberration.

Robert Gordon discusses the low wage rates of the migrants at an empirical level: as a liberal he cannot explain how historical, social and political factors have shaped the starvation incomes of the Namibian workers. Nor can he analyse how migrancy itself was ushered in by the development of underdevelopment. The author does depict the bleak and regimented existence of the migrant worker, who is hermetically sealed off from urban life. But he does not go to the root of the structure: that compounds are a device to inhibit labour organization, to disrupt strikes and keep the workers divided.

At a time when events of great pith and moment are unfolding in Namibia, a work on the political economy of that country is badly needed. Recently, some pathfinding essays on Namibia's social structure have been published: they are based on the 'dependency theory', and throw far more light on the country than Gordon's jejune book.

London

KEN JORDAAN

The editorial collective of *Radical Philosophy* wish to invite contributions for a forthcoming special issue on racism and the analysis of racist ideologies.

Contributions and correspondence to Martin Barker,
7 Burghley Road, Bristol BS6 5BN.

NEWS FROM NEASDEN

A CATALOGUE OF NEW RADICAL PUBLICATIONS

NEWS FROM NEASDEN

'Books, pamphlets, reports etc are listed under various subject headings from sexual politics to theory and history. Each entry includes a short descriptive annotation with full bibliographic information. Mailed free to bookshops, and financed by radical publishers, the service is non-critical. Nevertheless, it is a help for any library collecting materials not likely to be found elsewhere.' Bill Katz, *Library Journal*.

News from Neasden started in August '75 and is now mailed to 870 bookshops (300 UK, 400 North America, 120 Australia and New Zealand, 50 Europe). Since February '77 we have included some 'real' reviews which have encouraged subscriptions and bookshop sales. We have increased our coverage of shops outside the UK and received more titles from publishers outside the UK and we hope this will continue.

LIBRARY SUBSCRIPTION

A grant from the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation has allowed us to mail a sample copy of the Spring '78 issue to major public and university libraries (2,000 on Bowker's list for the USA and 2,500 on the IBIS list outside the USA).

We are offering a subscription to run from June '78 to June '79. It will include a copy of our address list of bookshops and publishers to be published in June or soon after; three issues of *News from Neasden*, published in August '78, November '78 and February '79; an index by author and title to the three issues, together with a listing of titles by subject area, to be published soon after the February '79 issue. Libraries subscribing during the year will receive the back issues already published during that subscription year. Future subscriptions will also run from June to June. The subscription is £5 or \$10.

MICROFICHE/MICROFILM

The grant from the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation will allow us to offer a microfiche/microfilm of the first nine issues of *News from Neasden*, so that libraries subscribing now will have the complete run. It is published with an index by author and title, together with a listing of titles by subject area. The microfiche costs £5/\$10 a set, the microfilm £10/\$20 a set, post free. The microfilm is available in a VSMF cassette. Other cassettes and cartridges may be available but the price may vary.

We will send a sample copy to librarians reading this who have not already received one.

22 FLEET ROAD, LONDON, NW3 2QS

Books received

This listing does not preclude subsequent publication of reviews.

- Africa in Modern History: the search for a new society.* By Basil Davidson. London, Allen Lane, 1978. Cloth £7.95
- Asia in the Making of Europe: Volume 2: a century of wonder.* By Donald F. Lach. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1977. Cloth, 2 parts, £35.00
- Barbados: a history from the Amerindians to independence.* By F.A. Hoyos. London, Macmillan, 1978. Paper £5.00
- Black Over White.* By A. Holt. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1977. Cloth £7.50
- Beyond the Limits of the Law.* By Tom Bowden. London, Penguin Books, 1978. Paper £1.25
- Buying Time in South Africa.* London, Counter Information Services, 1978. Paper 95p
- The Candid Kibbutz Book.* London, Middle East Research and Action Group, 1978. Paper 30p
- Colour, Class and the Victorians.* By Douglas A. Lorimer. Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1978. Cloth £8.50
- Developing the Afro-American Economy.* By Richard F. America. Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1977. Cloth £8.75
- The Economics and Politics of Racial Accommodation: the Japanese of Los Angeles 1900-1942.* By John Modell. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1977
- Ethnicity and the media.* Paris, Unesco, 1977
- Ethos and Identity: three studies in ethnicity.* By A.L. Epstein. London, Tavistock Publications Ltd, 1978. Cloth £6.95. Paper £2.95
- Frantz Fanon: colonialism and alienation.* By Renate Zahar. New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1977. Paper \$3.45
- Frantz Fanon: Social and Political Thought.* By Emmanuel Hansen. Ohio, Ohio State University Press, 1977. Cloth \$15
- Human Variation: The Biopsychology of Age, Race, and Sex.* Edited by R. Travis Osborne, Clyde E. Noble and Nathaniel Weyl. New York, Academic Press, Inc., 1978. Cloth \$19.50.
- Khamsin: Journal of Revolutionary Socialists of the Middle East.* London, Pluto Press, 1978. Paper £2
- The Killing of the Imam.* By Barney Desai and Cardiff Marney. London, Quartet Books, 1978. Paper £1.95. Cloth £4.95
- Lessons from the Damned: Class Struggle in the Black Community.* By The Damned. Washington, Times Change Press, 1973. Paper \$2.75.
- In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process: The Colonial Period.* By A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. Oxford, Oxford

- Colonial Period.* By A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978. Cloth £8.50
- The Pakeha Papers.* By Jules Older. Dunedin New Zealand, John McIndoe Ltd, 1978. Paper \$2.95
- Pedagogy in Process: The Letters to Guinea-Bissau.* By Paulo Freire. London, Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1978. Cloth £5.95
- Plight of Malaysian Workers in Singapore.* Selangor Graduates Society, 127 Jln. 17/14, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia
- Political Repression in Thailand.* London, Ad Hoc Group for Democracy in Thailand. Paper 40p
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