

US: THE BLACK POOR AND THE POLITICS OF EXPENDABILITY

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NINE THESES ON OUR EPOCH

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US: the Black poor and the politics of expendability

In this presidential election year, as rhetoric about international terrorism heightens, the two major US political parties have united in a campaign of terror against poor and working-class people, especially poor Black and brown people – a campaign consistent with the shifting economic needs of American capitalism. At a time when unemployment and underemployment are at epidemic proportions, we are witnessing a callous erosion of the welfare state as we have known it for nearly two generations. The system was never ideal, but even the most basic services are now being eradicated. Government aid to the unemployed and working poor is being cut to a point where many more families will literally be living on the street without the most basic resources of food, shelter and clothing. This elimination of a basic commitment to those in need corresponds to an economic shift which has virtually eliminated any real possibility for employment for millions of these very same out-of-work Americans. A number of economists and analysts, most notably Jeremy Rifkin and Stanley Aronowitz, have described the devastating impact of the new technological revolution. Downsizing and the introduction of labour-replacing technology (i.e., computer technology, automation and biotechnology) have created a situation in which millions of jobs and prospective jobs in manufacturing and service industries are being rapidly erased. The impact of this retrenchment, which began at the low-skill job levels, has hit Black and Latino workers hardest. Thirty per cent of the manufacturing jobs eliminated by downsizing in 1990

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and 1991 were jobs held by Blacks. This economic trend, which has persisted for more than a decade with little abatement, means that there now exists a class of permanently unemployed men and women who are essentially surplus labourers in an increasingly 'streamlined' economy.[1] These are the men and women whom social scientists condescendingly refer to as the 'Black underclass'.

So, then, what do the Democrats and Republicans propose to do with these excess proletarians? The solutions being advocated are alarming and raise serious challenges for left and progressive forces as we attempt to construct a response tailored to the realities we are confronted with. A three pronged legislative agenda graphically illustrates the virtual convergence of Democratic and Republican ideologies: the passage of a Welfare Bill which blames the poor for their own poverty and denies them basic resources for survival; a willingness to cut taxes and give additional resources to corporate elites; and, finally, the 1994 Crime Bill and the law and order campaign that inspired it. In essence, a major element of the solutions being proposed to address this economic reality – although discussed in euphemistic terms by those in power – involves a redistribution of resources in favour of the wealthy, and containment, coerced labour and imprisonment for large sectors of the Black and Latino urban poor. Clearly, the conditions for slave labour are returning.

Economic terrorism against the poor

The Welfare Bill that has just passed into law signals an unprecedented assault on the well-being and survival of millions of poor Americans. One feature of the bill is its imposition of rigid time limits on how long poor people can receive assistance (five years for an entire lifetime), and its elimination of the social obligation of state governments to try to meet the needs of their impoverished citizens. That is, the Bill eradicates the notion that citizens are 'entitled' to basic subsistence resources, despite the fact that they live in one of the richest countries in the world, and that most of them have paid taxes to the same federal government which will now deny them much-needed benefits. There will also be economic penalties for women who have additional children while receiving welfare. And the doors of colleges and universities will be closed even tighter to exclude the poor, as well. The reduction of funds for job training and the elimination of programmes that now enable welfare recipients to attend school in preparation for employment will deny them even the most remote chance to obtain the skills necessary to compete in the shrinking job market. The denial of food stamps and other basic benefits to legal immigrants is another harsh feature of the Bill, which policy analysts estimate will result in an additional 2.6 million people, including 1.1 million children, sinking below the poverty threshold by the year 2000.[2]

The crux of the problem with the so-called welfare reform programmes is the underlying assumption that the problem lies with the culture, behaviour and morality of the poor, rather than with poverty itself. The mandatory work requirement for welfare recipients after two years ignores the absence of real jobs for unskilled and undereducated workers and, instead, blames unemployed people for not being resourceful enough to find non-existent jobs. In other words, it is poor people who are defective, and not the economy. The alleged moral agenda of the current welfare reform crusade – to reduce out-of-wedlock births and instil a greater work ethic in the poor – applies higher moral standards to poor people than those adhered to by many of our public officials themselves. Moreover, the elitist assumption that poor people are lazy and irresponsible ignores the fact that most of these people have to work harder than most rich people just to survive. Daily life demands a certain resourcefulness, discipline and stamina that is wholly ignored and discounted by the behaviourist arguments against the poor.

The US economy

The promise by both major political parties of substantial tax cuts to the middle class – more like tax breaks for the wealthy – is the selling point of the social spending cuts we are currently witnessing. Despite the rhetoric of uplifting the poor by 'cutting their dependency on government', the underlying economic objectives of the recent social policy initiatives are clear. And what are some of the economic motives at play? A book written nearly twenty-five years ago by Sidney Wilhelm, entitled *Who Needs the Negro?*, offers a hint.[3] In it, Wilhelm outlines the growing marginalisation of Black workers to the American economy, foreshadowing the even more pronounced developments two decades later. During the colonial and early American periods, Black labour was, of course, the unpaid labour upon which the wealth and profit of the slave south and, by extension, much of the north, rested. Later, Blacks were instrumental as exploited farm labour under the sharecropping system and most recently as indispensable factory workers in the industrial marketplace after the second world war. Wilhelm wrote in 1970: 'White America, by a more perfect application of mechanization and a vigorous reliance upon automation, disposes of the Negro: consequently, the Negro transforms from an exploited labour force to an outcast.'[4]

Jeremy Rifkin in the US and A. Sivanandan in Britain, among others, argue persuasively that the scientific revolution we are experiencing today is bringing about even more dramatic changes – and is changing the very nature of labour and work as we know it.[5] Rifkin argues, as the title of his book, *The End of Work*, suggests, that the

direction we are going in will ultimately render a certain section of the population permanently unemployed and wholly superfluous to the economy. The obvious social consequences of such a scenario are profound. He paints the following picture:

> Unemployment is rising (sharply) as transnational companies build state of the art high-tech production facilities all over the world, letting go millions of laborers who can no longer compete with the cost efficiency, quality control and speed of delivery achieved by automated manufacturing. In more and more countries the news is filled with talk about lean production, re-engineering, total quality engineering, post-Fordism, decruiting and downsizing. Everywhere men and women are worried about their future.[6]

And, in response to the suggestion that this economic crisis is cyclical or temporary, Rifkin and his colleagues insist:

> In the past, when new technologies have replaced workers in a given sector, new sectors have always emerged to absorb the displaced laborers. Today all three of the traditional sectors of the economy – agriculture, manufacturing, and service – are experiencing technological displacement. The only new sector emerging is the knowledge sector, made up of a small elite of entrepreneurs, scientists, technicians, computer programmers, educators and consultants.[7]

Abdul Alkalimat and others have written and spoken eloquently on the ways in which this scientific revolution and its economic reverberations have and will continue, directly and ominously, to shape social policy. The bottom line is that, if certain sectors of the workforce and potential work force are no longer needed by an economy increasingly reliant on highly skilled computer experts, what becomes of those left behind by these changes? Even service sector jobs, flipping hamburgers at local fast food chains, or changing bed-pans at hospitals and nursing homes are becoming harder to come by. Union busting, which began with the Reagan administration in the early 1980s, has made decent paying union jobs a thing of the past for all but the lucky few. My mother and father's generation could count on certain hard, gruelling, back-breaking work as a ticket to a reliable income and a relatively decent life. No more. Government economic interventions over the past decade and a half have been increasingly and unabashedly geared towards the interests of the rich and upper middle class, offering more tax loopholes and tax breaks to those at the top of the economic pyramid, and ushering in what some economists have labelled a 'jobless recovery'. In other words, economic improvements for corporate elites and nothing for unemployed workers.

These policies are fattening up elite strata already quite pampered by the state. While welfare for the poor is being slashed, corporate perks

are growing. Even Clinton's secretary of labor, Robert Reich, has spoken out critically of the undue benefits enjoyed by corporate elites as a result of government policy. In the 1950s, corporate taxes accounted for one third of all federal revenues. That figure had been reduced to a mere 10 per cent in 1995. Corporate agricultural businesses are heavily subsidised by the state, and many companies claim tax exemptions for a whole variety of things, including advertising their own products abroad. The 'supply side' economic policies now being espoused by the Republican candidate for president promise to shift the economic policy debate even more to the right and more in favour of big business interests. The net result of all this is that the top 10 per cent of the US population now own nearly two-thirds of all the private wealth, and the top 1 per cent own and control 40 per cent.[8]

Of course, forcing the working class and poor to bear the brunt of economic down turns is nothing new, but the widening and unmediated gulf between rich and poor, with less and less of a buffer in between, coupled with the growing insecurity of a certain stratum of professionals victimised by cuts in corporate bureaucracies, all represent significant shifts in the political and economic landscape. Historically, the notion of American exceptionalism has meant that most US workers embraced an illusory 'middle-class' identity and felt privileged and distinct from workers in other parts of the world. The economic and technological changes we are experiencing threaten to redefine that self-concept, offering both hopeful and frightening prospects for future political mobilizations. Mid-managers who played by the rules, and personified the American dream, are being booted out of their jobs by downsizing. Many of them feel betrayed by a system they once believed in. However, that resentment can go in one of two political directions. These excessed bureaucrats can either become more sympathetic to left critiques of the social order, or join the right-wing militia movement, the conservative Christian Coalition, or endorse the thinly- veiled fascism of Ross Perot.

While surplus managers and professionals can look forward to loss of mortgages and eclipsed career ambitions, the prospects for the poor are much grimmer. At the same time that social service expenditures are being cut and, in the case of some programmes, eliminated outright, prison construction is flourishing. In the state of Michigan, which led the way in spending cuts for services to the poor, a $200 million prison building project is under way. In Missouri, a $94 million prison is being constructed. And a $50 million bond campaign has been launched in Maryland to expand the state's prison system to accommodate overcrowding.[9] With this pattern of funding re-allocation throughout the country, it seems clear where most politicians and bureaucrats plan to deposit the excess workforce.

Criminalisation and elimination schemes for poor Black people

In 1994, Bill Clinton, with Republican support, passed a repressive Crime Bill that moved the nation closer to a police state than ever before. Last year, an alarming study by the Washington DC-based Sentencing Project reported that there were more Black men in US prisons than white men, 43 per cent and 42 per cent respectively, despite the fact that Blacks comprise a mere 13 per cent of the entire population. This means that the percentage of Black men imprisoned is more than three times their representation in the population at large. Today 5,000 of every 100,000 Black men are in prison, as opposed to 500 out of every 100,000 in the general population. Even more striking, one in every three Black men between the ages of 20 and 29 is either in prison, or on probation or parole, in contrast to a mere 7 per cent of their white counterparts. More Black men are under the supervision of the criminal justice system in the United States today than were imprisoned in South Africa under the racist apartheid regime. And Black women are not exempt from what prisoner rights activist Angela Davis calls 'the punishment industry'. Incarceration rates for Black women have risen 20 per cent in the last decade.[10]

One response to these statistics might be that Blacks are simply committing more crimes. The answer is not that simple. Although crime rates have gone down over the past twenty years, the incarceration rate has more than quadrupled, from 200,000 prisoners in 1975 to 1.6 million in 1996. This has largely been a result of stiffer and mandatory sentencing laws, more reluctance to release prisoners on parole, the creation of new crime statutes, and the deinstitutionalisation of mental patients, many of whom end up homeless and eventually incarcerated for one infraction or another. The US now leads the world in imprisoning its citizens.

Much of this 'get tough on crime' and law and order hysteria has been carried out under the guise of the so-called war on drugs. And this is where racism comes into play most clearly. Black urban neighbourhoods have been vilified as drug infested jungles, inhabited by bloodthirsty savages who lack morals, civility or conscience. This is not to deny the fact that crime is a real problem in poor inner-city communities. It is. Kids without jobs or education often turn to the ruthless business of drug trafficking, thereby mimicking the entrepreneurial spirit of capitalism. Like their legal counterparts, they kill, maim and destroy people's lives in the process of making a profit. This grim fact notwithstanding, predatory crimes are still committed by a minute fraction of the Black community, and the racism embedded in the anti-drug laws and enforcement practices is still undeniable.

Particularly ominous, and quite telling, is the blanket criminalisation of entire communities for crimes committed by a few, which

suggests that the elimination of drugs is not the objective at all. Rather, containment and control of a potentially rebellious population seems a more plausible explanation. Parenthetically, this type of community-wide punishment is reminiscent of the treatment meted out to Palestinian communities during the *intifada* in which whole neighbourhoods were razed as retribution against rock-throwing youths. Some examples of this type of group punishment in the US context can be seen in public housing projects where large numbers of the urban poor live. In many of these projects, quasi-military conditions now prevail. Residents have to walk through metal detectors and provide identification on demand. Housing police are often allowed to carry out what are termed 'lock downs' and 'sweeps' which means locking residents in their buildings at night and conducting random searches of apartments to identify 'outsiders'. More often than not, outsiders are individuals staying with public housing residents but are not officially on the lease for that dwelling. This might be a homeless relative, a domestic partner not legally married to the resident, or a child or sibling evicted from their own housing. Having an unlisted occupant in the apartment at the time of the sweep could result in the termination of a lease and the eviction of an entire family. Such practices not only deny poor people basic civil rights, but build tensions within extended families, deter people from helping one another in a crisis, and literally break down survival mechanisms employed by poor people as an adaptation to increasingly adverse conditions. It is important to note that, contrary to the notion that increased policing and repression apply solely to Black men, Black women and children are the primary residents of public housing in most major cities and these housing projects increasingly resemble minimum security prisons – at best. The criminalisation of youth, with the emphasis on trying teenagers as adults, and the economically punitive measures against poor single mothers, are additional facets of this larger trend of criminalising the Black urban poor.

Another component of the so-called war on drugs, the battle cry of the Crime Bill proponents, is the racially biased practice of imposing harsher sentences on those forms of drug use and sales most common in the Black community, while handing out lighter sentences for comparable offences committed most commonly by whites. Even though drug use among whites and Blacks is estimated at relatively the same rate, Blacks get arrested five times as often. And another widely cited discrepancy is the fact that crack cocaine possession is met with much harsher sentencing than the possession and sale of powder cocaine.[11] Crack is more common in the Black community and powder cocaine is more popular among wealthy whites. In fact, between 83 and 90 per cent of those convicted of crack possession and sales are Black.[12] There is a hundred to one disparity between powder cocaine and crack

cocaine sentences as established under the 1986 Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act.[13] So, for very similar offences, whites either get a shorter sentence or avoid jail altogether. The net result of biased sentencing, increased mandatory sentencing and general increased repression of poor and working-class Black communities is that the entire Black community is placed under surveillance and subjected to greater police harassment. Ultimately, of course, poor Blacks are much more likely to end up in prison.

Another often ignored by-product of the trend of increased Black imprisonment constitutes a reversal of many of the voting rights gains won by the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Prisoners, now mostly Black, are essentially deemed non-citizens. Poor Blacks, therefore, are being systematically disenfranchised and reduced to a non-citizen status reminiscent of slavery. Under slavery, every one of us was deemed three-fifths of a person by the US constitution; today, thousands of Black prisoners and ex-prisoners are not seen as persons at all. Nearly all states deny prisoners the right to vote, over half deny voting rights to individuals on probation, and nearly a third of states deny even ex-offenders the ballot. Today, this racially biased disenfranchisement affects 14 million Americans, disproportionately Black.[14] So, in essence, conviction for a single crime can, in many instances, mean lifelong exclusion from the body politic. Once you have 'a record', the authorities have information on you and a right to monitor you and restrict you in ways that they do not vis à vis other fully-fledged citizens. Ex-offenders are frequently hauled into police line-ups or designated as suspects because they fit the description of some alleged lawbreaker. All of these factors help to strengthen the state's ability to control a population which has growing reasons to feel angry and rebellious.

Finally, there is the issue of the death penalty. Perhaps the most serious by-product of the current crime fighting crusade is a push to make the death penalty more common, to 'streamline' the appeals process, to deny death row inmates the right of multiple appeals, and to implement quicker, more cost-efficient methods of execution. Capital punishment has always constituted a form of special treatment reserved for the poor and, disproportionately, the Black poor. So, it is not surprising that, even as we see policies that view poor Black people as expendable, we also hear increased demands for the more liberal use of capital punishment. Of the 3,000 inmates awaiting execution, 40 per cent are African American, again a figure far exceeding Black representation in the population. After decades of decreased popularity, the death penalty has risen as a part of the battle cry of the new campaign for law and order at any cost. More people were executed by the state in 1995 than in any year since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976. One of the most well-known inmates on death row is political prisoner

Mumia Abu-Jamal, whose case has helped to bring attention to the injustice of capital punishment, but this unfortunately has not won Mumia's freedom or that of dozens of other Black political prisoners, like Geronimo Pratt, who have been languishing in US prisons since the 1960s and early '70s.[15]

So the current political climate in the US is one in which repression and criminalisation of the poor are quite compatible with economic shifts that have created a superfluous class of workers. But how are such fascistic policies being carried out, seemingly with popular tolerance, if not support? Let me indicate, as an aside, that the current conservative Congress, led by right-wing icon Newt Gingrich, was not elected by a majority of Americans. The majority of Americans either voted for candidates that lost, or, even more tellingly, did not bother to vote at all. Nevertheless, some of the harshest social policies we have seen in generations are being carried out in the name of the American people. This policy agenda, which hinges on the denial of basic resources to, and mass imprisonment of, poor Black people, is fundamentally racist in its nature. And it is racism and its propagation in the mainstream media that allows such a programme to be carried out, by politicians and bureaucrats of varied skin tones, and by both major political parties.

Of course, I in no way subscribe to the ahistorical notion that, the worse things get, the better the climate for radical social movements to develop. If this were the case, we would never have witnessed the development of fully-fledged fascism in Europe or the emergence of Third World dictatorships today. But the sobering political and economic reality we are confronted with has led to a resurgence of organising efforts among American leftists, especially Black and Latin activists. Student and youth activism on American college campuses never died out completely, despite rumours to the contrary. But recent years have witnessed a renewed phase of campus organising which, perhaps, has even greater promise of making links with off-campus struggles. The union campaign by Yale University graduate students this year garnered national attention and support from left intellectuals and trade unionists alike. Columbia University students led a militant campaign for an ethnic studies programme last spring, taking over university buildings and forcing the administration to bring New York City police on campus for the first time in over a decade. The Columbia students also lent support to the clerical workers' strike at adjacent Barnard College, which occurred around the same time. And California students have led the fight back against the state's reversal of affirmative action and its attacks on largely Latino immigrants, in the form of Proposition 187, which has become a national model for denying all public services, including health care and access to schools to undocumented workers.[16]

Not all youth organising is confined to the campuses. Hundreds of young people, most of them students, participated in a union organising drive this summer which was labelled Union Summer, reminiscent of the civil rights movement's historic Freedom Summer campaign of 1964. Some former student organisers have also made a priority of doing community level youth organising with high-school-age young people. The Southwest Youth Collaborative in Chicago is one example of this effort. Led by an African American organiser, Jonathan Peck, and a Palestinian activist, Jeremy Lahoud, the project does mass political education of youth and offers workshops on political organising. One of the key issues on which they have done an impressive amount is the criminalisation of youth.

On a national level, despite two decades of largely single issue organising campaigns, Black left forces are once again attempting to organise on a national level, some in interracial formations and some exclusively in the Black community. A contingent of veteran Black organisers and intellectuals have involved themselves in, and influenced the formation of, such groups as the New Party; the Labor Party, which just had a highly promising founding conference this summer, and Committees of Correspondence, a group that grew out of the break-up of the Communist Party but has reached out to include other sectors of the progressive and left communities.[17] Black left intellectuals and organisers are talking to each other more these days as well, across organisational and ideological boundaries. The number of national dialogues, conferences and summits which have taken place, or are being planned, include a national gathering of Black radical activists in 1997; a National Black Leadership Summit, which involved some radicals, but many mainstream leaders as well; and a number of Black feminist initiatives such as the New York based, Agenda 2000 – A Black Feminist Network (formerly African American Agenda 2000), and the Washington DC- based Black Women for Justice. Finally, a series of conferences, involving a core of African American workers and academics, resulted in the publication of a book, *Jobs? and Technology: the impact of technology on society*, which is serving as a basis for ongoing national discussions and course outlines for teachers.

The political situation is serious, but not hopeless. The real challenge in this country at this juncture seems to be threefold. The first challenge is to build a national network, if not organisation, to coordinate local and overlapping national efforts but to insist on anti-racism and leadership by people of colour as a priority to avoid the elitism and isolation that has plagued such efforts in the past. Second, we seriously need to create a constructive and inclusive conversation about the internal weaknesses of our own movement, historically and today. Paramount in the list of discussion items has to be the persistence of sexism and homophobia; the need to ally across the boundaries of the

academy and the community, and the need to combat egocentrism and hold even our most eloquent spokespersons accountable for what they say. Finally, we need to build upon, and take more seriously, efforts at creating a sustained international alliance. The demise of socialist experiments and the socialist movement worldwide, and the globalisation and increased cross-national operation of capitalism, demands that we take this task to heart. The challenges of the twenty-first century are formidable, but the potential is tremendous.

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WILLIAM I. ROBINSON

Globalisation: nine theses on our epoch

The left and progressives around the world are struggling to come to terms with the fundamental dynamic of our epoch: capitalist globalisation. The globalisation of capitalism, and the transnationalisation of social, political and cultural processes it entails, is the world-historic context of developments on the eve of the twenty-first century. The debate on globalisation is being played out in the academy, and more importantly, among diverse social and political movements worldwide. These movements have run up against globalising processes that are reshaping the very terrain of social action, including the deep constraints, as well as real opportunities, that the new global environment presents for popular change. In my view, however, activists and scholars alike have tended to understate the *systemic* nature of the changes involved in globalisation, which is redefining all the fundamental reference points of human society and social analysis, and requires a modification of all existing paradigms.[1]

Capitalist globalisation denotes a world war. This war has been brewing for four decades following the second world war, concealed behind a whole set of secondary contradictions tied up with the cold war and the East-West conflict. It was incubated with the development of new technologies and the changing face of production and of labour in the capitalist world, and the hatching of transnational capital out of

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former national capitals in the North. The opening salvos date back to the early 1980s, when, as I argue below, class fractions representing transnational capital gained effective control of state apparatuses in the North and set about to capture these apparatuses in the South. This war has proceeded with transnational capital being liberated from any constraint on its global activity, given the demise of the former Soviet bloc and capital's increasing achievement of total mobility and access to every corner of the world. It is a war of a global rich and powerful minority against the global poor, dispossessed and outcast majority. Casualties already number hundreds of millions, and threaten to mount into the billions. I refer to this as a world war figuratively, in that the level of social conflict and human destruction is reaching bellicose proportions. But I also mean so literally, in that the conflict bound up with capitalist globalisation is truly *world* war: it involves all peoples around the world, and none can escape involvement.

Calling the current state of affairs a world war is a dramatic statement, intended to underscore the extent to which I believe humanity is entering a period that could well rival the colonial depredations of past centuries. However, I do not mean to be apocalyptic or to disarm. Capitalist globalisation is a process, not so much consummated as in motion. It confronts major contradictions that present possibilities for altering its course. A more precise reading of globalisation is therefore required as a guide to our social inquiry and action. What follows, far from a claim to resolve the debate on globalisation, is a modest attempt to take stock of the principal contours of our epoch. It is intended to present a holistic snapshot of the globalisation 'forest' by identifying its most imperious trees and how they intermesh, in accord with what I believe should be key theoretical and practical concerns of intellectuals and activists. It should be stressed that, given space limitations, the following theses should not be seen as full explanations of the issues. Each is an open-ended summary statement that presents complex phenomena in simplified form and requires further exploration.

First, the essence of the process is the replacement for the first time in the history of the modern world system, of all residual pre(or non)-capitalist production relations with capitalist ones in every part of the globe.

Activists and scholars have noted that globalisation involves the hastened internationalisation of capital and technology, a new international division of labour, economic integration processes, a decline in the importance of the nation-state, and so on. The world has been moving in the past few decades to a situation in which nations have been linked, via capital flows and exchange, in an integrated international market, to the globalisation of the process of production itself. In turn, economic globalisation is bringing with it the material

basis for the transnationalisation of political processes and systems, of civil societies, and the global integration of social life. Globalisation has increasingly eroded national boundaries, and made it structurally impossible for individual nations to sustain independent, or even autonomous, economies, polities and social structures. Nation-states are no longer appropriate units of analysis.

These are all important features. But the core of globalisation, theoretically conceived, is the near culmination of a process that began with the dawn of European colonial expansion and the modern world system 500 years ago: the gradual spread of capitalist production around the world and its displacement of all pre-capitalist relations. From a world in which capitalism was the dominant mode within a system of 'articulated modes of production', globalisation is bringing about a world integrated into a single capitalist mode (thus capitalist globalisation).[2] This involves all the changes associated with capitalism, but changes which are *transnational* rather than national or international in character. It includes the transnationalisation of classes and the accelerated division of all humanity into just two single classes, global capital and global labour (although both remain embedded in segmented structures and 'hierarchies', as discussed below).

Global capitalism is tearing down all non-market structures that, in the past, placed limits on the accumulation – and the dictatorship – of capital. Every corner of the globe, every nook and cranny of social life, is becoming commodified. This involves breaking up and commodifying non-market spheres of human activity, namely public spheres managed by states, and private spheres linked to community and family units, local and household economies. This complete commodification of social life is undermining what remains of democratic control by people over the conditions of their daily existence, above and beyond that involved with private ownership of the principal means of production. As James O'Connor has noted, we are seeing the maturation of the capitalist *economy* into capitalist society, with the penetration of capitalist relations into all spheres of life.[3]

Commodification involves the transfer to capital both of former public spheres and of former private, non-capitalist spheres, such as family and cultural realms. All around the world, the public sphere, ranging from educational and health systems, police forces, prisons, utilities, infrastructure and transportation systems, is being privatised and commodified. The juggernaut of exchange value is also invading the intimate private spheres of community, family, and culture. None of the old pre-commodity spheres provide a protective shield from the alienation of capitalism. In every aspect of our social existence, we increasingly interact with our fellow human beings through dehumanised and competitive commodity relationships.

Second, a new 'social structure of accumulation' is emerging which, for the first time in history, is global.

A social structure of accumulation refers to a set of mutually-reinforcing social, economic, and political institutions and cultural and ideological norms which fuse with, and facilitate a successful pattern of capital accumulation over specific historic periods.[4] A new global social structure of accumulation is being superimposed on, and transforming, existing national social structures of accumulation. Integration into the global system is the causal structural dynamic that underlies the events we have witnessed in nations and regions all around the world over the past few decades. The breakup of national economic, political and social structures is reciprocal to the gradual breakup, starting thirty years ago, of a pre-globalisation nation-state based world order. New economic, political and social structures emerge as each nation and region becomes integrated into developing transnational structures and processes.

The agent of the global economy is transnational capital, organised institutionally in global corporations and in supranational economic planning agencies and political forums, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Trilateral Commission, and the G7 forum, and managed by a class-conscious transnational elite based in the centres of world capitalism. This transnational elite has an integrated global agenda of mutually-reinforcing economic, political, and cultural components that, taken together, comprise a new global social structure of accumulation.[5]

The economic component is hyper-liberalism, which seeks to achieve the conditions for the total mobility and unfettered world-wide activity of capital.[6] Hyper-liberalism includes the elimination of state intervention in the economy and also of the regulation by individual nation states over the activity of transnational capital in their territories. It is putting an end to the state's earlier ability to interfere with profit-making by capturing and redistributing surpluses. In the North, hyper-liberalism, first launched by the Reagan and Thatcher governments, takes the form of deregulation and the dismantling of Keynesian welfare states. In the South, it involves 'neo-liberal structural adjustment' programmes. These programmes seek macroeconomic stability (price and exchange rate stability, etc.) as an essential requisite for the activity of transnational capital, which must harmonise a wide range of fiscal, monetary and industrial policies among multiple nations if it is to be able to function simultaneously, and often instantaneously, within numerous national borders. [7]

The political component is the development of political systems that operate through consensual, rather than through direct, coercive domination. Consensual mechanisms of social control tend to replace the dictatorships, authoritarianism and repressive colonial systems that characterised much of the world's formal political authority structures

right up to the post-cold war period. These political systems are referred to as 'democracy' by the transnational elite, although they have little or no authentic democratic content. The 'democratic consensus' in the new world order is a consensus among an increasingly cohesive global elite on the type of political system most propitious to the reproduction of social order in the new global environment. This component is discussed in more detail below.

The cultural/ideological component is consumerism and cut-throat individualism. Consumerism proclaims that well-being, peace of mind, and purpose in life are achieved through the acquisition of commodities.[8] Competitive individualism legitimises personal survival, and whatever is required to achieve it, over collective well-being. Consumerism and individualism imbue mass consciousness at the global level. They channel mass aspirations into individual consumer desires, even though induced wants will never be met for the vast majority of humanity. The culture and ideology of global capitalism thus work to depoliticise social behaviour and preempt collective action aimed at social change by channelling people's activities into a fixation with the search for individual consumption and survival.

Globalisation, therefore, has profound consequences for each nation of the world system. Productive structures in each nation are reorganised reciprocal to a new international division of labour, characterised by the concentration of finances, services, technology and knowledge in the North, and the labour-intensive phases of globalised production in the South. As each national economy is restructured and subordinated to the global economy, new activities linked to globalisation come to dominate. Pre-globalisation classes such as national peasantries, small-scale artisans and domestic bourgeoisies linked to national capital and internal markets, are weakened and are threatened with disintegration. New groups linked to the global economy emerge and become dominant, both economically and politically. States are externalised. Political systems are shaken and reorganised. The dominant global culture penetrates, perverts, and reshapes cultural institutions, group identities, and mass consciousness.

Third, this transnational agenda has germinated in every country of the world under the guidance of hegemonic transnationalised fractions of national bourgeoisies.

Global capitalism is represented in each nation-state by in-country representatives, who constitute transnationalised fractions of dominant groups. The international class alliance of national bourgeoisies of the post-war period mutated into a transnationalised bourgeoisie in the post-cold war period, and had become, by the 1990s, the hegemonic class fraction globally. This denationalised bourgeoisie is class conscious, and conscious of its transnationality. At its apex is a

managerial elite which controls the levers of global policy-making, and which responds to transnational finance capital as the hegemonic fraction of capital on a world scale.

In the 1970s and 1980s, incipient transnationalised fractions set out to eclipse national fractions in the core capitalist countries of the North and to capture the 'commanding heights' of state policy-making. From the 1980s into the 1990s, these fractions ascended in the South and began to vie for and, in many countries, to capture, state apparatuses.[9] The transnational agenda is embryonic in some countries and regions (eg, much of sub-Saharan Africa). It has incubated and is now ascendant in others (eg, the Philippines, India, major portions of Asia). It has become fully consolidated elsewhere (eg, in Chile, Mexico, and much of Latin America). Given the structures of North-South asymmetry, transnationalised fractions in the Third World are 'junior' partners. They oversee at the local level, and under the tutelage of their 'senior' counterparts in the North, the sweeping economic, political, social and cultural changes involved in globalisation, including free-market reform, the fomenting of 'democratic' systems in place of dictatorships, and the dissemination of the culture/ideology of consumerism and individualism.

Fourth, observers search for a new global 'hegemon' and posit a tri-polar world of European, American, and Asian economic blocs. But the old nation-state phase of capitalism has been superseded by the transnational phase of capitalism.

In his master study, *The Great Transformation*, Karl Polanyi summed up the previous historic change in the relationship between the state and capital, and society and market forces, that took place with the maturation of national capitalism in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century.[10] We are now witness to another 'great transformation', the maturation of transnational capitalism.

But activists and scholars still cling on to an outdated nation-state framework of analysis that reifies the state, with a consequent misreading of events and the danger of misdirected social action. The momentary fluxes, conflicts and contradictions bound up with the transition from national to transnational capitalism should not be confused with the historic tendency itself. Globalisation changes the relationship between capitalism and territoriality and, with it, the relationship between classes and the nation-state.[11] The 'commanding heights' of state decision-making are shifting to supranational institutions.[12] The structural power of fully mobile transnational capital is superimposed on the direct power of nation-states.[13] The historic relation between nation-states and formerly nation-based classes, and between class power and state power, has been modified and requires redefinition.

The transnational bourgeoisie exercises its class power through two

channels. One is a dense network of supranational institutions and relationships that increasingly bypass formal states, and that should be conceived as an emergent transnational state that has not acquired any centralised institutional form. The other is the utilisation of national governments as territorially-bound juridical units (the inter-state system), which are transformed into transmission belts and filtering devices for the imposition of the transnational agenda. Transnational capital requires nation-states to perform three functions: 1) adopt fiscal and monetary policies which assure macro-economic stability; 2) provide the basic infrastructure necessary for global economic activity, and; 3) provide social control, order and stability (the transnational elite has assessed 'democracy' as better able than dictatorship to perform this social order function). In a nutshell, we are not witnessing 'the death of the nation-state', but its transformation into a neo-liberal state.

It is true, therefore, as many scholars and activists have pointed out, that capital still needs state power.[14] However, state power and the nation-state are not co-equivalent, and the interests of transnational capital do not correspond to any 'national' interest or any nation-state. The confusion is in equating capital's need for the services provided by neo-liberal states, and the use it makes of the lingering inter-state system, with some type of organic affinity between transnational capital and specific nation-states, as existed in the national stage of capitalism. If major concentrations of transnational capital are no longer associated with any particular nation-state, on what material and class basis should inter-state conflict be interpreted? What theoretical rationale exists for predicting rivalry and competition between nation states as an expression of the competition of national capitals?

The spatial decentralisation of the power of transnational capital is confused with the growing 'strength' and 'independence' of 'US rivals', and with geo-political shifts in power conceived in terms of nation-states.[15] In fact, transnational capital and its principal institutional agent, the global corporation, is able to exploit an antiquated nation-state/inter-state system to wring further concessions from global labour. The continued separation of the world into nation-states creates a central condition for the power of transnational capital.

An outdated nation-state framework can lead to a misreading of events. By way of example, some have interpreted the 'Contract with America' (and before it, Reaganism) as a retrenchant right-wing project opposed to a more 'liberal' programme. The 'Contract with America', in fact, is a programme representing the quintessential interests of transnational capital. The differences between Gingrich's and Clinton's programmes do not represent a fundamental clash between distinct capitalist fractions or projects, but differences over the pace, timing and secondary aspects (eg, social policy) of advancing the transnational agenda in the United States. The fundamental

restructuring of social policies that began under Reaganism and Thatcherism in the North, the adjustment programmes in the South, the 'Contract with America', and so forth, are not the product of conservative movements and right-wing political inclinations, per se, despite appearances. Rather, they represent the logical concrete policy and ideological adjuncts of globalisation as it applies to the particular conditions of each country.

Similarly, tactical differences between national governments of core countries over how to advance transnational interests – tactical differences often originating in the particulars of local and regional histories and conditions – take on the appearance of fundamental contradictions between rival 'national capitals' and 'national interests'. Events may appear as contradictions between nation-states when, in essence, they are contradictions internal to global capitalism. The need for neo-liberal states to secure legitimacy as part of their social order function often entails a discourse of 'national interests', 'foreign competition', and so on, at the ideological and the mass public levels. Space constraints limit discussion. Suffice it to recall that the hallmark of good social analysis is to distinguish appearance from essence.

Fifth, the 'brave new world' of global capitalism is profoundly anti-democratic.

Global capitalism is predatory and parasitic. In today's global economy, capitalism is less benign, less responsive to the interests of broad majorities around the world, and less accountable to society than ever before. Some 400 transnational corporations own two-thirds of the planet's fixed assets and control 70 per cent of world trade. With the world's resources controlled by a few hundred global corporations, the life blood and the very fate of humanity is in the hands of transnational capital, which holds the power to make life and death decisions for millions of human beings. Such tremendous concentrations of economic power lead to tremendous concentrations of political power globally. Any discussion of 'democracy' under such conditions becomes meaningless.

The paradox of the demise of dictatorships, 'democratic transitions' and the spread of 'democracy' around the world is explained by new forms of social control, and the misuse of the concept of democracy, the original meaning of which, the power (cratos) of the people (demos), has been disconfigured beyond recognition. What the transnational elite calls democracy is more accurately termed *polyarchy*, to borrow a concept from academia. Polyarchy is neither dictatorship nor democracy.[16] It refers to a system in which a small group actually rules, on behalf of capital, and participation in decision-making by the majority is confined to choosing among competing elites

in tightly controlled electoral processes. This 'low-intensity democracy' is a form of consensual domination. Social control and domination is hegemonic, in the sense meant by Antonio Gramsci, rather than coercive. It is based less on outright repression than on diverse forms of ideological cooptation and political disempowerment made possible by the structural domination and 'veto power' of global capital.

Polyarchy is being promoted ('democracy promotion') by the transnational elite in the South as part and parcel of its agenda, as distinct from the earlier global network of civilian-military regimes and outright dictatorships (eg, the Somozas, the Duvaliers, the Marcos, the Pinochets, white minority regimes, etc.), or, before them, the repressive colonial states that northern capitalist countries promoted and sustained for much of modern world history. Authoritarian systems tend to unravel as globalising pressures break up embedded forms of coercive political authority, dislocate traditional communities and social patterns, and stir masses of people to demand the democratisation of social life. Disorganised masses push for a deeper popular democratisation, while organised elites push for tightly controlled transitions from authoritarianism and dictatorships to elite polyarchies.

This issue is crucial, because much of the left worldwide has not been democratic in the twentieth century, both within its own organisations and in state practices in those countries where it has come to power. The left's historic democratic failings have made some hesitant to denounce polyarchy for what it is – a mockery of democracy. The left must be committed to democracy in society and in its own institutions – a popular, participatory democracy from the grassroots up that empowers popular classes at the local level, subordinates states to civil society, holds leaders accountable, and so on. But polyarchy has as little to do with democracy as did the Stalinist political system in the former Soviet bloc. The trappings of democratic procedure in a polyarchy do not mean that the lives of the mass of people become filled with authentic or meaningful popular democratic content, much less that social justice or greater economic equality is achieved. The new polyarchies ('the new democracies') of emergent global society do not, and are not intended to, meet the authentic aspirations of repressed and marginalised majorities for political participation, for greater socio-economic justice and for cultural realisation.[17]

Sixth, 'poverty amidst plenty', the dramatic growth under globalisation of socioeconomic inequalities and of human misery, a consequence of the unbridled operation of transnational capital, is worldwide and generalised.

The dual tendency is for wealth to be concentrated among a privileged stratum encompassing some 20 per cent of humanity, with the gap between rich and poor widening within each country, North and

South alike, and, simultaneously, a sharp increase in the inequalities between the North and the South. The worldwide inequality in the distribution of wealth and power is a form of permanent structural violence against the world's majority. This is a widely noted phenomenon, but it needs to be linked more explicitly to globalisation.

In Latin America alone, the number of people living in poverty increased from 183 million in 1990, to 230 million in 1995, according to figures recently released by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Taking into account population growth, the percentage of the population living in poverty, according to the ECLAC, increased from 40 per cent of the total population in 1980, to 44 per cent in 1980, and 48 per cent in 1995. This rise in poverty is thus more exponential than arithmetical. The UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) adds that, among the Latin American poor, 59 million people suffer from chronic hunger.[18] According to the most recent of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) annual reports, *Human Development 1994*, 1.3 billion people live in absolute poverty – literally on the verge of life and death. A third of the South's population 'lives in state of abject poverty', states the report, 'at such a margin of human existence that words simply fail to describe it'. One billion are without access to health services, 1.3 billion have no access to safe water, and 1.9 billion are without access to sanitation.[19]

These annual UNDP reports have become widely disseminated. A comparison of recent reports reveals the frightening tendency for the chasm between a shrinking minority of haves and a vast majority of have-nots to widen ever further. The 1992 report indicated that the wealthiest 20 per cent of humanity received 82.7 per cent of the world's wealth. Its 1994 report places that figure at 84.7 per cent. The comparison also reveals that the abyss between rich and poor nations continues to widen. In 1960, the wealthiest 20 per cent of the world's nations was thirty times richer than the poorest 20 per cent. Thirty years later, in 1990, it was sixty times richer. Just one year later, in 1991, the latest year for which figures were available, it was 61:1, according to the 1994 report.

However, the report noted: 'these figures conceal the true scale of injustice since they are based on comparisons of the average per capita incomes of rich and poor *countries*. In reality, of course, there are wide disparities within each country between rich and poor *people*' (emphasis in original). Adding the maldistribution within countries, the richest 20 per cent of the world's people got at least 150 times more than the poorest 20 per cent. In other words, the ratio of inequality between the global rich and the global poor, seen as social groups in a highly stratified world system, was 1:150.

The outward drainage of surplus from the South to the North

continues unabated under globalisation. The 1994 UNDP report noted that, in 1992, the outflow in debt service charges alone (a figure which therefore does not include profit repatriation and other forms of surplus transfer from South to North) on the Third World's combined debt of $1.5 trillion was two and one-half times the amount of northern development aid, and $60 billion more than total private flows to developing countries. These 'open veins', through which wealth continues to flow from South to North, suggest that transnational capital operates in such a way that it still requires strategic rearguards in the core of world capitalism, where global management, the store of capital, and the centres of technology and finances are concentrated, within the new international division of labour and what A. Sivanandan has referred to as 'new circuits of imperialism'.[20]

But the perpetuation of the centre-periphery divide does not translate into continued prosperity for majorities in the North. Alongside the widening North-South divide, has come a widening gap between rich and poor in the United States and the other developed countries, together with heightened social polarisation and political tensions. Between 1973 and 1990, real wages dropped uniformly for 80 per cent of the US population and rose for the remaining 20 per cent.[21] The top quintile in the United States increased its share of income from 41.1 per cent in 1973 to 44.21 per cent in 1991. The concentration of wealth (which includes income and wealth) was even more pronounced. By 1991, the top .05 per cent of the population owned 45.4 per cent of all assets, excluding homes. The top 1 per cent owned 53.2 per cent of all assets, and the top 10 per cent owned 83.2 per cent. The United States *belonged* to a tiny minority.

In 1991, those living either below the government-established poverty line or below 125 per cent of the poverty line represented 34.2 per cent of the population of the United States. In other words, 34.2 per cent of the US population was 'poor' or 'very poor'. In more sociologically precise terms, over one-third of the US population lived in absolute or relative poverty. The pattern is similar in other developed countries of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

The North-South divide is growing and should not be understated. However, humanity is increasingly stratified along transnational class lines. Given the accelerated creation under globalisation of lakes of wealth in Third World countries and seas of poverty in First World countries, it makes more sense to see the world as increasingly divided along class, rather than national, lines. Space constraints limit discussion, but there are important empirical processes such as downward 'global leveling', and the theoretical issues that these processes raise, which require further exploration.

Seventh, there are deep and interwoven racial, ethnic and gender dimensions to this escalating global poverty and inequality.

As global capital concentrates, it disproportionately locks out women and racially and ethnically oppressed groups. As transnational capital moves to the South of the world, it does not leave behind in the North, or encounter in the South, homogenous working classes, but ones which are historically stratified and segmented along racial, ethnic and gender lines. In the North, for instance, labour of colour, drawn originally, and often by force, from the periphery to the core as menial labour, is disproportionately excluded from strategic economic sectors. Relegated to the ranks of the growing army of 'supernumeraries', made the most vulnerable sector in a racially-segmented labour market which is becoming more, not less, rigid under globalisation, it is subject to a rising tide of racism which includes the dismantling of affirmative action programmes and the implementation of repressive state measures against immigrant labour pools.[22] Although globalising processes undermine the existence of pre-capitalist classes, they also intensify stratification within labour, often along racial/ethnic lines, in both North and South. However, I suggest that 'hierarchies of labour' are becoming spatially organised across the North-South axis, given global integration processes, new migration patterns, and increased concentrations of Third World labour in the First World, as well as the increasing impoverishment of the once-privileged 'labour aristocracies' of European origin. This issue and its theoretical implications, too, require further exploration.

The root cause of the subordination of women – unequal participation in a sexual division of labour on the basis of the female reproductive function – is exacerbated by globalisation, which increasingly turns women from reproducers of labour power required by capital into reproducers of supernumeraries for which capital has no use. Female labour is further devalued, and women denigrated, as the function of the domestic (household) economy moves from rearing labour for incorporation into capitalist production to rearing supernumeraries. This is one important structural underpinning of the global 'feminisation of poverty' and is reciprocal to, and mutually reinforces, the racial/ethnic dimensions of inequality. It helps explain the movement among northern elites to dismantle Keynesian welfare benefits in a manner which disproportionately affects women and racially oppressed groups, and the impetuousness with which the neoliberal model calls for the elimination of even minimal social spending and safety nets that often mean, literally, the difference between life and death.

Eighth, there are deep contradictions in emergent world society that make uncertain the very survival of our species – much less the mid- to long-term

stabilisation and viability of global capitalism – and portend prolonged global social conflict.

The structure of global production, distribution and consumption increasingly reflects the skewed income pattern. For instance, under the new global social apartheid, tourism is the fastest growing economic activity and even the mainstay of many Third World economies. This does not mean that more people are actually enjoying the fruits of leisure and international travel; it means that 20 per cent of humanity has more and more disposable income, even as the consumption of the remaining 80 per cent contracts. This 80 per cent is forced to provide ever more frivolous services to, and orient its productive activity towards, meeting the needs and satisfying the sumptuous desires of that 20 per cent.[23] Private security forces and prisons are now the number one growth sector in the United States and the other northern countries.[24] Social apartheid spawns decadence. Militarised 'fortress cities' and 'spatial apartheid' are necessary for social control in a situation in which an ever-smaller portion of humanity can consume even the essentials of life, let alone luxury goods.[25]

As national capitalism matured in the late nineteenth century in the North, the tendency inherent in capital accumulation towards a concentration of income and productive resources, and the social polarity and political conflict this generates, was offset by two factors. The first was the intervention of states to regulate the operation of the free market, to guide accumulation, and to capture and redistribute surpluses. The second was the emergence of modern imperialism to offset the polarising tendencies inherent in the process of capital accumulation in the North, so that global social conflict was generally transferred to the South. Both these factors therefore fettered, in the core of the world system, the social polarity generated by capitalism. But, by reducing or eliminating the ability of individual states to regulate capital accumulation and capture surpluses, globalisation is now bringing – at a worldwide level – precisely the polarisation between a rich minority and a poor majority that Karl Marx predicted. Yet this time there are no 'new frontiers', no virgin lands for capitalist colonisation that could offset the social and political consequences of global polarisation.

Endemic to unfettered global capitalism, therefore, is intensified social conflict, which in turn engenders constant political crises and ongoing instability, both within countries and between countries. In the post-war period, the North was able to shift much social conflict to the South as a combined result of an imperialist transfer of wealth from South to North and the redistribution of this wealth in the North through Keynesian state intervention. No less than 160 wars were fought in the Third World from 1945 to 1990. However, globalisation involves a distinct shift in global strife from inter-state conflict

(reflecting a certain correspondence between classes and nations in the stage of national capitalism) to global class conflict. The UNDP's 1994 report underscores a shift from 'a pattern of wars between states to wars within states'. Of the eighty-two armed conflicts between 1989 and 1992, only three were between states. 'Although often cast in ethnic divisions, many have a political or economic character,' states the report. Meanwhile, global military spending in 1992 was $815 billion ($725 billion, of which corresponded to the rich northern countries), a figure equal to the combined income of 49 per cent of the world's people in that same year.[26] The period of worldwide political instability we face ranges from civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and in numerous African countries, to simmering social conflict in Latin America and Asia, endemic civil disturbances, sometimes low-key and sometimes high profile, in Los Angeles, Paris, Bonn and most metropoles of the northern countries. Uncertain survival and insecurities posed by global capitalism induce diverse forms of fundamentalism, localism, nationalism and racial and ethnic conflict.

As the worldwide ruling class, the transnational bourgeoisie has thrust humanity into a crisis of civilisation. Social life under global capitalism is increasingly dehumanising and devoid of any ethical content. But our crisis is deeper: we face a *species crisis*. Well-known structural contradictions analysed a century ago by Marx, such as over-accumulation, under-consumption, and the tendency towards stagnation, are exacerbated by globalisation, as many analysts have pointed out. However, while these 'classic' contradictions cause social crisis and cultural decadence, new contradictions associated with late twentieth century capitalism – namely, the incompatibility of the reproduction of both capital *and* of nature – is leading to an ecological holocaust that threatens the survival of our species and of life itself on our planet.[27]

Ninth, stated in highly simplified terms, much of the left world-wide is split between two camps.

One group is so overwhelmed by the power of global capitalism that it does not see any alternative to participation through trying to negotiate the best deal possible. This camp searches for some new variant of social democracy and redistributive justice that could become operant in the new world order. It therefore proposes diverse sorts of a global Keynesianism that do not challenge the logic of capitalism itself, and tend towards a political pragmatism. The other views global capitalism and its costs – including its tendency towards the destruction of our species – as unacceptably high, so much so that it must be resisted and rejected. However, it has not worked out a coherent socialist alternative to the transnational phase of capitalism.

We see this strategic dividing line in the Latin American, African

and Asian left, as well as in the North and among left and socialist groups attempting a renewal in the former Soviet-bloc countries. For instance, this was the fundamental underlying issue that ultimately led to formal splits in the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, and the recent fracturing of the Philippine left, and that is generating deep tensions within the Workers Party (PT) of Brazil and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa (although care must be taken neither to simplify complex issues nor to draw broad generalisations from specific experiences).

My own view is that we should harbour no illusions that global capitalism can be tamed or democratised. This does not mean that we should not struggle for reform within capitalism, but that all such struggle should be encapsulated in a broader strategy and programme for revolution against capitalism. Globalisation places enormous constraints on popular struggles and social change in any one country or region. The most urgent task is to develop solutions to the plight of humanity under a savage capitalism liberated from the constraints that could earlier be imposed on it through the nation state. An alternative to global capitalism must therefore be a *transnational* popular project. The transnational bourgeoisie is conscious of its transnationality, is organised transnationally, and operates globally. Many have argued that the nation-state is still the fulcrum of political activity for the foreseeable future. But it is not the fulcrum of the political activity of this global elite. The popular mass of humanity must develop a transnational class consciousness and a concomitant global political protagonism and strategies that link the local to the national and the national to the global.

A transnational counter-hegemonic project requires the development of concrete and viable programmatic alternatives. The South African Communist Party (SACP), for instance, has made important programmatic advances in its strategy of 'rolling back' the market through the decommodification of key areas of South African society, not as an end in itself but as part of a broader struggle for socialism.[28] The contradictions of global capitalism open up new possibilities, as well as enormous challenges, for a popular alternative. Without its own viable socioeconomic model, popular sectors run the risk of political stagnation under the hegemony of the transnational elite, or, even worse, being reduced, if they come to occupy governments, to administering the crises of neo-liberalism, with a consequent loss of legitimacy. Under such a scenario, the hegemonic view that there is no popular alternative to global capitalism becomes reinforced, leading to resignation among popular sectors and betrayal of obligations among intellectuals and leaders.

The 'race to the bottom' – the worldwide downward levelling of

living conditions and the gradual equalisation of life conditions in North and South – creates fertile objective conditions for the development of transnational social movements and political projects. The communications revolution has facilitated global elite communications, but it can also assist global coordination among popular classes, as demonstrated by the creative use that the Zapatistas (EZLN) in Mexico have made of the internet. There were encouraging signs in the mid-1990s of such transnational popular coordination, such as the Sao Paulo Forum in Latin America, and the Peoples Plan for the Twenty First Century (PP21) in Asia.[29]

A transnational counter-hegemonic project would not entail resisting globalisation – alas, we cannot simply demand that historic processes be halted to conform to our wishes, and would do better to understand how we may influence and redirect those processes – but trying to convert it into a 'globalisation from below'. Such a process from the bottom up would have to address the deep racial/ethnic dimensions of global inequality, starting from the premise that, although racism and ethnic and religious conflicts rest on real material fears among groups that survival is under threat, they take on cultural, ideological and political dynamics of their own which must be challenged and countered in the programmes and the practice of counter-hegemony. A counter-hegemonic project will have to be thoroughly imbued with a gender equality approach, in practice and in content. It will also require alternative forms of democratic practice within popular organisations (trade unions, the 'new social movements', etc.), within political parties, and – wherever the formal state apparatus is captured, through elections or other means – within state institutions.

New egalitarian practices must eschew traditional hierarchical and authoritarian forms of social intercourse, bureaucratic authority relations, and overcome personality cults, centralised decision-making, and other such traditional practices. The flow of authority and decision-making in new social and political practices within any counter-hegemonic bloc must be from the bottom up, not from the top down. Transnational political protagonism among popular classes means developing a transnational protagonism at the mass, grassroots level – a transnationalised participatory democracy – well beyond the old 'internationalism' of political leaders and bureaucrats, and also beyond the paternalistic forms of northern 'solidarity' with the South.

More than prolonged mass misery and social conflict is at stake: at stake is the very survival of our species. A democratic socialism founded on a popular democracy may be humanity's 'last best,' and perhaps only, hope.

References

I would like to thank Kent Norsworthy for his critical comments on several earlier drafts of this article.

1 There is an enormous and growing body of literature on globalisation, too vast to reference here. Summaries of the literature may be found, among other places, in William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: globalisation, US intervention, and hegemony* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996); Leslie Sklair, *Sociology of the Global System* (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1991); Malcolm Waters, *Globalisation* (London, Routledge, 1995). For specific points of debate among left scholars and activists, see, eg, diverse contributions in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch (eds), *Socialist Register 1992*, 'New World Order?'), and *1994*, 'Between globalism and nationalism' (London, Merlin Press).

2 Thus my definition of globalisation goes beyond most conceptions that see the process as a *quantitative* one involving an acceleration in the pace of global interconnections and interdependencies (the objective dimension) along with our awareness of such interconnections (the subjective dimension). See Ronald Robertson, *Globalisation: social theory and global culture* (Newbury Park, Sage, 1992) for such a quantitative conceptualisation. The *qualitative* definition advanced here incorporates these objective and subjective dimensions but sees quantitative change as giving way to qualitative change. My argument is that the modern world system has gone through successive waves of global interconnections, each of which has deepened webs of relations and further broken down autonomies, but that the current epoch is a *qualitatively* new phase. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York, Academic Press, 1974), and world system and dependency literature in general for the notion that, in this quantitative conception, there is nothing new in globalisation as worldwide interconnections, and see Eric Wolf's brilliant study, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982), on how such webs of interconnections span back centuries, if not millennia.

3 James O'Connor, 'A Red-Green politics in the United States?', *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* (Vol.5, No.1, March 1994), pp.1-19.

4 On social structures of accumulation, see David M. Kotz, Terrence McDonough and Michael Reich, *Social Structures of Accumulation: the political economy of growth and crisis* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994).

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6 As far as I know, the term hyper-liberalism was first used by Robert W. Cox, in 'Global Perestroika', *Socialist Register 1992*, op. cit.

7 For more extended discussion and case studies on neo-liberalism, see Henk Overbeek (ed.), *Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: the rise of transnational neo-liberalism in the 1980s* (London, Routledge, 1993), and Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, op. cit.

8 On this point, see Sklair, op. cit.

9 Regarding these transnational fractions in the North, see, among several important works, Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); Robert W. Cox, *Power, Production, and World Order: social forces in the making of history* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1987). On these fractions in the South, see Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, op. cit.

10 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York, Rinehart, 1944).

11 On capitalism and territoriality, see John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond:

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12 See, eg, David C. Ranney, *The Evolving Supra-National Policy Arena* (Chicago, University of Illinois at Chicago, Center for Urban Economic Development, 1993).

13 See, eg, Stephen Gill and David Law, 'Global hegemony and the structural power of capital', *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 33, no. 4, December 1989), pp.475-99.

14 See, eg, Michael Tanzer, 'Globalising the economy', *Monthly Review* (Vol. 47, no. 4, September 1995), pp.1-15; Samir Amin, 'Fifty years is enough!,' *Monthly Review* (Vol. 46, no. 11, April 1995), pp.8-50.

15 These views are widespread. See, eg, Harry Magdoff, 'Globalisation – to what end?' in *Socialist Register 1992*, op. cit.; Alejandro Bendana, *Hegemonia y Nuevo Orden Mundial* (Managua, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1992); Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987).

16 Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: participation and opposition* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971).

17 The issues in this 'thesis' are discussed at great length in Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, op. cit. See also Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson (eds), *Low Intensity Democracy: political power and the New World Order* (Boulder, Westview, 1993).

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26 UNDP 1994 report.

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28 See the SACP's 'Strategy and tactics document' adopted at its ninth congress in April 1995, in particular the section 'Socialism is the future: build it now', reprinted in *Crossroads* (No. 55, October 1995).

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JOHN NEWSINGER

'Pox Britannica': Orwell and the empire

Eric Blair was born on 25 June 1903 at Motihari in Bengal, the son of an official in the government of India's Opium Department. His father, Richard Blair, was involved in the opium trade the whole of his adult life, from 1875 until his retirement as a sub-deputy opium agent in 1912. He was employed in supervising the production of the drug that was then exported to China, intimately involved in what one historian has described as 'the most long-continued and systematic international crime in modern time'.[1] This imperial background was not new: young Eric's great-grandfather had been a substantial slave owner in Jamaica, while, on his mother's side, his grandfather had been a prosperous teak merchant in Burma, at one time employing thirty domestic servants. Eric, however, was very much the product of the imperial administrative middle class, brought up and educated to take his place in its ranks. He attended preparatory school in Sussex before going on to Eton and then, in 1922, joined the Indian Police as an officer cadet, giving Burma as his preferred posting. This was the rather unpromising background of the man who was to become George Orwell.

Although he was to die comparatively young, aged only forty-six, George Orwell can, nevertheless, claim to be the most important literary figure on the left in Britain this century. While he is perhaps best known for his time on the tramp in Paris and London, his 1930s exploration of the depressed north of England, his participation in the Spanish civil war, his revolutionary patriotism during the second world war and his determined opposition to Soviet communism, Orwell was

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also an enemy of the British empire. This article will explore the development of his anti-imperialism and consider its importance for both his political ideas and his political activity.

Colonial policeman

Blair joined the Indian Police at a time of considerable turmoil. Only three years earlier, in April 1919, Gurkha troops under British command had carried out an exemplary massacre at Amritsar. Acting on the orders of General Dyer, the soldiers had fired into a peaceful crowd for ten minutes, killing nearly 400 people, including women and children, and injuring another 1,200. While it was most unlikely that anyone with anti-imperialist sympathies would ever have joined the Indian Police, it is altogether inconceivable that they would have joined in 1922. Clearly, young Blair set out for Burma as, at the very best, a naive supporter of British imperialism.

While unrest in Burma in the 1920s never led to resistance and repression on the scale that was to take place in India, there was enough conflict for one historian to describe the period as 'a decade of repression'.[2] In the early 1920s, nationalism emerged as a popular movement in the towns and cities, spearheaded by the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA). In December 1920, students at Rangoon University went on strike and their protest was quickly joined by school students throughout much of the country. The resulting boycott of the British-controlled education system saw an abortive attempt to establish a rival National School Movement. This had collapsed by 1923. Nevertheless, the fact was that British rule was openly challenged and that its agents, among them young Eric, found themselves governing an increasingly hostile population. In his own words, written many years later, he was to admit that this was the only time he had ever been important enough to be 'hated by large numbers of people'.[3]

It was during his five years in Burma that Blair's political awakening began, transforming him from colonial policeman into the determined opponent of authority and supporter of the downtrodden who was to finally emerge as the socialist writer, George Orwell. Looking back on this period of his life in *The Road To Wigan Pier*, he described how it came about that he 'hated the imperialism I was serving with a bitterness which I probably cannot make clear'. He argues, somewhat optimistically one might think, that nearly all the British in India were 'haunted by a sense of guilt', but managed to suppress or conceal it. For him, the problem was particularly acute, because he 'was part of the actual machinery of despotism'. In the police, you saw 'the dirty work of Empire at close quarters' and it came to appal him. He came to have 'an indescribable loathing of the whole machinery of so-called justice'

and he recalled very vividly

> the wretched prisoners squatting in the reeking cages of the lock-ups, the grey cowed faces of the long-term convicts, the scarred buttocks of the men who had been flogged with bamboos, the women and children howling when their menfolk were led away under arrest – things like these are beyond bearing when you are in any way directly responsible for them.

As far as he was concerned, he was taking part in a 'double oppression': not only enforcing the so-called law, but enforcing it as a 'foreign conqueror' on people 'who never really recognised our jurisdiction'. The prisoners he locked up, even when guilty, still regarded him as a foreign oppressor inflicting 'wanton meaningless cruelty'. He could see it in their faces and 'unfortunately I had not trained myself to be indifferent to the expression in a human face'. Even common criminals had the moral advantage over the colonial policeman, as far as Blair was concerned.

In a celebrated passage in *The Road To Wigan Pier*, he describes how he eventually came to decide that he was no longer prepared 'to be part of that evil despotism':

> For five years I had been part of an oppressive system, and it had left me with a bad conscience. Innumerable remembered faces – faces of prisoners in the dock, of men waiting in the condemned cells, of subordinates I had bullied and aged peasants I had snubbed, of servants and coolies I had hit with my fist in moments of rage (nearly everyone does these things in the East, at any rate occasionally: Orientals can be very provoking) – haunted me intolerably. I was conscious of an immense weight of guilt that I had got to expiate.[4]

He was to return to Britain opposed not only to imperialism, but to 'every form of man's dominion over man. I wanted to submerge myself, to get right down among the oppressed, to be one of them and on their side against their tyrants.' It was this determination that was to lead him to socialism.

What of Blair's time in Burma? The evidence we have suggests that he began his service very much committed to the role of colonial policeman, living the part of a reactionary pukka sahib, although remaining bookish and unclubbable. When Christopher Hollis, a fellow old Etonian and future Conservative MP, visited him in the summer of 1925, he found that Blair had 'no trace of liberal opinions', was very much 'at pains to be the imperial policeman' and had an 'especial hatred of Buddhist monks'. Blair believed that freedom and liberty were all very well in theory but that they 'don't agree with Niggers'.[5] Certainly, he continued to give vent to a detestation of Buddhist monks even after his embrace of socialism. As late as 1936, he could still write with considerable feeling of how they

'were the worst of all'. They seemed to have nothing 'to do except stand on street corners and jeer at Europeans'. Even once he had become an opponent of empire, he could still not altogether shake off the 'thought that the greatest joy in the world would be to drive a bayonet in a Buddhist priest's guts.'[6]

Blair later admitted to striking Burmese as routine ('everyone does these things in the East') and we have independent testimony of this from Maung Htin Aung, a former rector of Rangoon University. He describes the Blair he saw in Moulmein when he was a young student as 'a typical young ex-public school Englishman'. He was certainly not an 'incongruous' or 'tragic-comic figure', but was instead 'an efficient police officer', 'wore his uniform well' and 'killed an elephant with a clean and precise shot'. He goes on to describe an incident that took place in November 1924, when he was one of a number of young Burmese who bumped into Blair, in plain clothes at the time, knocking him over. Blair struck the young man responsible across the back with his cane and was pursued by protesting students, complaining of his behaviour. Despite this incident, Maung Htin Aung considers Blair's eventual rejection of imperialism as 'plausible, significant and impressive', making the point that he gave up a police career of 'rich promise when he decided to resign'.[7]

Blair's own testimony was that, even after he had turned against the empire, he still felt obliged to hide his opinions and maintain the appearance of a 'pukka sahib'. Once again in *The Road To Wigan Pier*, he describes how in India there was 'no freedom of speech' and for someone 'merely to be overheard making a seditious remark may damage his career'. He describes how on one occasion he shared a railway carriage with an Englishman from the educational service and how, after carefully testing each other out, they admitted to each other their loathing of imperialism. They spent the night sitting up in their bunks, drinking beer and damning the British empire. 'It did us both good', he recalled, but they had nevertheless 'been speaking forbidden things ... we parted as guiltily as any adulterous couple'.[8]

While Blair came to detest imperialism and any dominion of man over man, this radicalisation did not extend to gender relations. While in Burma, Blair took advantage of the availability of Burmese women, as colonial subjects, for sexual relations, keeping mistresses and visiting brothels. While he was to display considerable evidence of guilt about this in his novel, *Burmese Days*, he never developed an understanding of the relation between empire and sexuality.[9] Indeed, more than a decade later, when convalescing in Morocco with his wife, Eileen, he procured a young Arab woman for sex, apparently with his wife's agreement.[10] Only towards the end of his life does he seem to have been coming to an understanding of the significance of gender inequalities and to a rejection of the double standard.[11]

'Burmese Days'

By the time Eric Blair published his first novel, *Burmese Days*, he had become George Orwell, no longer the colonial policeman but already on the road to becoming an important socialist writer and novelist. The book was first published in the United States because of fear of the libel laws, but eventually came out in Britain in 1935. It is one of the most important anti-imperialist novels written by a British author this century.

Burmese Days tells the story of Flory, the man Orwell might have become if he had remained in Burma. Flory hates British imperialism with a burning passion, but is nevertheless trapped inside it, too scared to say what he really thinks, even lacking the courage to take a stand in support of his only real friend, the Indian, Dr Veraswami. He fails to help the doctor in his conflict with the corrupt Burmese magistrate, U Po Kyin, a rapist and extortioner of the most monstrous kind, and eventually falls victim to this man's machinations himself. Throughout the novel, Flory is haunted by guilt at his sexual exploitation of Ma Hla May, a young Burmese woman whom he had bought from her parents for three hundred rupees and installed as his mistress.

Appalled by the racism, philistinism and bigoted narrow-mindedness of his fellow Europeans, Flory experiences a brief revival when the young Elizabeth Lackersteen arrives in Kyauktada, looking for a husband. He mistakes her for a soul fellow who might bring him salvation, rescue him from an existence that is eating him up with bitterness and self-hatred. It is not to be. Elizabeth is, in fact, just another 'burra memsahib', while Flory himself is too far gone, too compromised, beyond salvation. He is destroyed by a public scene staged by his cast-off mistress, Ma Hla May (not the first woman he has treated this way). Suicide is all that remains.

This imperial tragedy contains a savage indictment of the British empire. According to Flory, 'Pox Britannica is its proper name.' He argues with his friend, Dr Veraswami, a great admirer of the British:

> My dear doctor ... how can you make out that we are in this country for any purpose except to steal? It's so simple. The official holds the Burman down while the businessman goes through his pockets. Do you suppose my firm, for instance, could get its timber contracts if the country weren't in the hands of the British? Or the other timber firms, or the oil companies, or the miners and planters and traders?

Flory goes on:

> We've even crushed various industries. Where are the Indian muslins now? Back in the 'forties or thereabouts they were building sea-going ships in India, and manning them as well. Now you couldn't build a seaworthy fishing boat there. In the eighteenth century the

> Indians cast guns that were at any rate up to the European standard. Now after we've been in India a hundred and fifty years, you can't make so much as a brass cartridge case in the whole continent. The only Eastern races that have developed at all quickly are the independent ones.

This indictment is given explicit authorial endorsement in the text.

At one point in the novel, Orwell discusses Flory's plight with very obvious autobiographical overtones: this could easily have been his fate. Flory had only discovered 'the truth about the English and their Empire', that it was 'a despotism with theft as its final object', too late. He was already committed to being 'a cog in the wheels of despotism', living a lie but unable to speak out. The pukka sahibs' code compels him to remain silent 'while Colonel Bodger develops his theory that these bloody Nationalists should be boiled in oil', while his Oriental friends are called 'greasy babus' and while young men fresh from school kick 'grey haired servants'. The time comes 'when you burn with hatred of your own countrymen, when you long for a native rising to drown their Empire in blood'. But even this feeling is dishonest and disreputable.

As well as condemning imperialism in general terms, Orwell paints a grim picture of the British in Burma: Lackersteen, the drunken lecher, Ellis, the pathological racist, Verrall, the polo-obsessed army snob, MacGregor, the self-important official and so on. They are a collection of inadequates living on the backs of the Burmese whom they both fear and despise. Most of these people are, he insists, fools, with the real work being left in the main to native subordinates. Few of them work as hard 'as the postmaster of a provincial town in England'.[12]

Two influential critiques of *Burmese Days* are worth considering here. First, Daphne Patai's discussion in her *The Orwell Mystique*, subtitled *A study in male ideology*. This is one of the most interesting recent accounts of Orwell's work. Her exploration of the masculine discourse that informs his writing is most valuable, but the argument is pushed too far, becomes unbalanced and too often topples over into a 'get Orwell' exercise. Writing of *Burmese Days*, she argues that the key to understanding the novel is that, for Orwell, Flory's failure to act on his beliefs 'makes him ... less than a man'. According to Patai, 'manhood is the basic issue' of the novel. This is fundamentally wrong-headed. Anti-imperialism is, it has to be insisted, 'the basic issue' of *Burmese Days*. This is not to deny Orwell's concern with masculinity, but rather to recognise that this was something that he shared with the great majority of male writers of his day. What distinguishes him is his anti-imperialism. More than that, Orwell does not make Patai's mistake of seeing the world only in terms of ideology, of discourse. It is not only the fact that Flory only reluctantly comes to stand up for his

beliefs that poisons him but that he actually is a cog in the wheel of an exploitative despotism, that he is part of the imperialist machine. His suicide derives not from his failure as a man, but from his recognition that there is no way out of his predicament.

Patai's discussion is similarly misleading when discussing Orwell's portrayal of his women characters. While it is true that Orwell never recognised the nature of women's oppression and undoubtedly on occasions felt threatened by feminism, she once again pushes her argument too far. She accuses him, for example, of 'muting' his female characters in *Burmese Days*, but the fact is that he does exactly the same to all of his male characters, with the exception of Flory. Moreover, when she proceeds to accuse him of failing to recognise that both Ma Hla May and Elizabeth Lackersteen 'are colonised people, and the colony they belong to is the female', not only does she overstate his insensitivity to the plight of his women characters, but, more seriously, is guilty of creating an 'ideological' solidarity between these two women that has no basis in reality.[13] Ma Hla May, the despised cast-off of an English sahib, ends up in a brothel in Mandalay ('her clients pay her only four annas and sometimes kick her and beat her'), while Elizabeth Lackersteen marries MacGregor and becomes, as nature intended, a 'burra memsahib', the terror of her servants, 'though she speaks no Burmese', with an exhaustive knowledge of the Civil List that enables her 'to put the wives of subordinate officials in their places'. Patai's prioritising of 'manhood' over Empire has led her to neglect Orwell's recognition of the place of English women, like Elizabeth Lackersteen, in the imperial machine.[14]

Another critical study worth considering is Shamsul Islam's *Chronicles of the Raj*. Here he warns that readers should not allow themselves 'to be carried away by Orwell's anti-imperial or anti-Kipling stance' and asserts that 'this is not the whole story'. While Orwell's anti-imperialism was 'not a total hoax', he never really hated the Raj the way he hated fascism and Stalinism. He was compromised by a 'Kiplingesque side to his personality', although he was never 'to love the natives as Kipling did'. Indeed, according to Islam, if one considers Orwell's views 'taken as a whole', he shows 'a remarkable tolerance and even admiration of the Raj. He is not as big an enemy of the Raj as he is generally supposed to be. In fact, he is pretty close to Kipling in many ways.' This is a complete travesty. Not only is *Burmese Days* a savage indictment of British imperialism, but for the rest of his life Orwell remained a committed supporter of the cause of Indian independence. During the second world war, as we shall see, he came to regard Nazism as the greater evil, but this did not prevent him being dismayed at the reactionary nature of British policy in India. Moreover, this public opposition to British imperialism continued after the war.

Where Islam is perhaps on stronger ground is with regard to

Orwell's lack of sympathy for nationalist movements in Britain's colonies. While he supported independence, he never had a high opinion of the movements that looked set to inherit it. These were not socialist movements, as far as he was concerned, and so offered no hope of creating just, egalitarian societies. Indeed, a good case can be made that U Po Kyin, his monstrous Burmese magistrate, is the first portrait of the neo-colonial politician, fattening off his own people in alliance with the western powers.[15]

Spain and after

While his experience of imperialism in Burma had been the first decisive turning point in Orwell's life, his participation in the Spanish civil war was the second. He went to Spain just before Christmas 1936 and enlisted in the POUM militia in Barcelona, joining a contingent from the Independent Labour Party (ILP). Here, he saw a city where 'the working class was in the saddle' and he 'recognised it immediately as a state of affairs worth fighting for'.[16]

The POUM, with whom he had thrown in his lot, was an independent revolutionary party that argued that the revolutionary process precipitated in Spain by the generals' coup of July 1936 had to be completed if the civil war was to be won. Only a workers' state could defeat Franco. Initially, Orwell was extremely sceptical with regard to this and was much more sympathetic to the communist line that completing the revolution had to be postponed and everything had to be subordinated to the need to win the war. He was actually in the process of transferring to the International Brigades when fighting broke out in Barcelona in May 1937 between the communists and the anarchists who were supported by the POUM. As far as Orwell was concerned, what now became clear was that, far from postponing the revolution to win the war, the communists were in fact liquidating the revolutionary advances already made in the interests of Russian foreign policy. His alienation from communism was completed by the suppression of the POUM, the torture and murder of its leader, Andres Nin, by communist secret police and the barrage of propaganda denouncing the organisation as Trotskyist-Fascist. He only narrowly escaped from Spain with his own life.[17]

These developments were to push Orwell sharply to the left. He embraced revolutionary politics, beginning a dialogue with Trotskyism that was to continue until his death, as well as becoming a determined opponent of Soviet communism. What were the implications of this for his anti-imperialism? Orwell roundly condemned the politics of the Popular Front, which he regarded as a betrayal of the struggle for socialism and as a Russian-sponsored accommodation with western imperialism. With regard to Spain, he saw the Republican govern-

ment's refusal to proclaim Morocco independent as a decisive failure of nerve that only served to strengthen Franco who, at least initially, was dependent on Moroccan troops. In *Homage To Catalonia*, he makes clear that it was 'the case of Morocco' that in the end clinched his view of communist policy:

> Why was there no rising in Morocco? Franco was trying to set up an infamous dictatorship, and the Moors actually preferred him to the Popular Front government! The palpable truth is that no attempt was made to foment a rising in Morocco, because to do so would have meant putting a revolutionary construction on the war. The first necessity, to convince the Moors of the government's good faith, would have been to proclaim Morocco liberated. And we can imagine how pleased the French would have been by that! The best strategic opportunity of the war was flung away in the vain hope of placating French and British capitalism.

To have declared Morocco independent would have compromised Russian hopes for an alliance with Britain and France and so the communists opposed such an initiative.[18]

After his return to Britain, Orwell not only attempted, without much success, to expose what was going on in Spain, but also argued strongly against Popular Front politics at home. He saw the Popular Front as preparing the way for another world war, for a second imperialist war, that would only result in the strengthening of the European empires. He made his views clear in an article, 'Not counting Niggers', that appeared in the left-wing journal, *Adelphi*, in July 1939. Here he attacked a book, *Union Now*, by Clarence Streit, that argued for the formation of a 'peace bloc' uniting the western powers against the menace of Nazism. As Orwell remarks, Streit's identification of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and imperial Japan as goats was acceptable, but were Britain and France really sheep? 'Mr Streit', he wrote, 'has coolly lumped the huge British and French empires – in essence nothing but mechanisms for exploiting cheap coloured labour – under the heading of democracies.' What a peace bloc would actually do was prop up these empires, strengthening British and French rule 'over six hundred million disenfranchised human beings'. He goes on:

> What we always forget is that the overwhelming bulk of the British proletariat does not live in Britain, but in Asia and Africa. It is not in Hitler's power, for instance, to make a penny an hour a normal industrial wage; it is perfectly normal in India, and we are at great pains to keep it so. One gets some idea of the real relationship of England and India when one reflects that the per capita annual income in England is something over £80 and in India about £7. It is quite common for an Indian coolie's leg to be thinner than the

> average Englishman's arm. And there is nothing racial in this, for well-fed members of the same races are of normal physique; it is due simply to starvation. This is the system that we all live on and which we denounce when there seems to be no danger of its being altered. Of late, however, it has become the first duty of a 'good anti-Fascist' to lie about it and help to keep it in being.

Of course, he was proven wrong about Hitler's ability to drive down the living standards of the millions of people held captive in the empire he was to carve out of eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the fact remains that one of his most telling criticisms of the politics of the Popular Front was that it involved the abandonment of anti-imperialism.

As far as Orwell was concerned the Popular Front line-up – 'Quakers shouting for a bigger army, Communists waving Union Jacks, Winston Churchill posing as a democrat' – was all very predictable. In an imperialist country, left-wing politics was 'always partly humbug' because of the extent to which living standards, including working-class living standards, were kept up by the exploitation of cheap labour in the empire. A socialist government would put a stop to this so that living standards would have to fall at least temporarily. From this point of view, socialist politics in countries like Britain and France always had an element of bluff, with politicians demanding things they did not really want to come to pass. The 'red-hot revolutionaries' reveal that they are shamming in every 'real emergency'.[19] The trouble is, of course, that with the outbreak of war with Nazi Germany in September 1939, only a couple of months after the publication of 'Not counting Niggers', Orwell was to proclaim himself a revolutionary patriot, argue that the British empire was the lesser evil and support the war effort.

Revolutionary patriotism

Orwell's decision to support his country, 'right or left', in the war with Nazi Germany involved a recognition on his part that he was 'patriotic at heart, would not sabotage or act against my own side, would support the war, would fight in it if possible'. England was in 'a serious jam' and his middle-class upbringing made it impossible for him to resist the call to arms. Nevertheless, he went on to insist that patriotism 'has nothing to do with Conservatism'. Indeed, he argued that to oppose the war would 'make nonsense of the Republican resistance in Spain, the Chinese resistance to Japan, etc. etc.' While his support for the war had an undeniable emotional basis, he nevertheless developed the notion of a 'revolutionary patriotism'. This derived from his understanding of the POUM position during the Spanish civil war. 'Only revolution can save England,' he proclaimed, and that 'revolution has started and it

may proceed quite quickly if only we can keep Hitler out'. The London gutters might well have to run with blood, but so be it. Even when the red militia were billeted in the Ritz, England would still be the country he had been taught to love as a boy, but a fairer, more just country. It was possible, he insisted, to build 'a socialist on the bones of a Blimp'.[20]

Orwell's hopes for a socialist revolution in Britain in 1940–41 and his belief that such a transformation was essential for victory over Nazi Germany are well documented.[21] But what consequences did this revolutionary patriotism have for his anti-imperialism? Orwell's main contribution to what he believed was a developing revolutionary situation was the 'Searchlight' series of books that he edited with Tosco Fyvel and Frederic Warburg. His own contribution, *The Lion and the Unicorn*, was published in February 1941. Here he attempted to argue for an alternative to the reform or revolution polarity, to find a third way between the compromised reformism of the Labour Party and the outdated Marxism-Leninism of the Communist Party. He called for a new mass socialist movement that would be 'both revolutionary and realistic' and 'which can swing the mass of the people behind it, drive the pro-Fascists out of positions of control, wipe out the grosser injustices and let the working class see that they have something to fight for, win over the middle classes instead of antagonising them, produce a workable imperial policy ...' What was this 'workable imperial policy'? Orwell proposed a six-point programme for the new socialist movement, three internal and three external. The domestic proposals were for the nationalisation of land, mines, railways, banks and major industries, an egalitarian incomes policy and democratic reform of the education system. This was considerably more far-reaching than the Labour Party ever contemplated: he was proposing the expropriation of the capitalist class (there would be no generous compensation), the effective elimination of the rich and the abolition of the public schools. The external proposals were for immediate dominion status for India, with the right to secede from the empire once the war was over, the establishment of an Imperial General Council 'in which the coloured peoples are to be represented' and a formal alliance 'with China, Abyssinia and all other victims of the Fascist powers'. With regard to his last proposal, it is worth remembering that he was advocating an alliance with China nine months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.

It is immediately clear how far Orwell's ideas had developed since the 1930s. In *The Lion and the Unicorn*, he argues that independence for Britain's colonies 'was nonsense', that in 'the age of the tank and the bombing plane, backward agricultural countries like India and the African colonies can no more be independent than can a cat or a dog'. The harsh reality was that if India had become independent in the 1930s, then the country 'would simply have been absorbed by Japan, or divided between Japan and Russia'. What India had to be offered was

not independence, 'but alliance, partnership – in a word equality'. This would only be possible if Britain had a socialist revolution. A socialist Britain would offer India 'its military protection and technical advice', but, and he emphasised this point, it would also have to make absolutely clear that if the Indian people wanted complete separation and independence, then their wishes would be respected. The unconditional right to secede was the only way 'of proving that we mean what we say'. And this must apply not only to India, but 'to Burma, Malaya and most of our African possessions as well'.[22]

A choice of evils

Orwell's hopes for a revolutionary transformation of British society in 1940-41 failed to materialise as Churchill's coalition government rode out the crisis with the support of the Labour Party. His own response to what he perceived as the ebb of revolutionary sentiment was to take up a post as talks producer in the Indian section of the BBC's Eastern Service in August 1941. His hopes for a decisive shift to the left were to revive with the succession of military defeats at the start of 1942, so that, by May of that year, he could actually write that 'we are back to the "revolutionary situation" which existed but was not utilised after Dunkirk'.[23] Meanwhile, at the BBC, Orwell was involved in attempting to rally Indian support for the British war effort, not for the socialist Britain he hoped for, but for the imperialist Britain he had so bitterly opposed in the 1930s. Indeed, he was attacked in the pages of *Partisan Review* by the anarchist-pacifist, George Woodcock, who accused him of having returned to 'his old imperialist allegiances ... conducting propaganda to fox the Indian masses'. Orwell, obviously stung, defended himself and his broadcasts, arguing that most of his broadcasters were 'Indian left-wing intellectuals, from Liberals to Trotskyists, some of them bitterly anti-British. They don't do it to "fox the Indian masses" but because they know what a Fascist victory would mean to the chances of India's independence.'[24]

The Quit India Revolt of August 1942 seems to have been a turning point as far as Orwell was concerned. He recorded in his diary on 10 August:

> Nehru, Gandhi, Azad and many others in jail. Rioting over most of India, a number of deaths, countless arrests. Ghastly speech of Amery, speaking of Nehru and Co as 'wicked men', 'saboteurs' etc. ... Terrible feeling of depression among the Indians and everyone sympathetic to India. Even Bokhari, a Muslim League man, almost in tears and talking about resigning from the BBC. It is strange, but quite truly the way the British government is now behaving in India upsets me more than a military defeat.

Two days later he wrote in his diary once again: 'Appalling policy hand-out this morning about affairs in India ... Almost everyone utterly disgusted.' He was afraid that the success of repression in India would have political repercussions in Britain. 'All seems set', he complained, 'for a big come-back by the reactionaries.'[25]

Later that month, in his 'London letter' to *Partisan Review*, he argued that developments in Britain were definitely moving 'in a reactionary direction'. There was 'an all-round increase in blimpishness, a drive against giving the war an anti-Fascist colour, a general shedding of the phony radicalism of the past two years'. In a telling phrase, he observed that the 'Indian business twitched the mask off many faces'.[26] The situation at the BBC became increasingly difficult in this changed climate. Whereas in 1941 he could get away with broadcasting 'off-the-cuff, near-revolutionary talks', now he found his freedom seriously curtailed.[27]

Among the talks that Orwell commissioned was a series entitled 'The history of Fascism'. This all went well until it came to the script on Spain written by his friend, the novelist and socialist, Mulk Raj Anand. Here the attempt to give the war 'an anti-Fascist colour' went a step too far. Franco was not to be maligned over the airwaves and the censor refused the script. Orwell tried to get Anand a full-time post at the BBC. When this failed to materialise, he was pressed as to the reason and eventually showed Anand a file. According to Anand, this 'had a list of every meeting I had attended, every communist colleague I knew and so on'. All became clear.[28] Soon after the banning of the Spanish broadcast (2 December 1942), Orwell wrote to George Woodcock, by now a firm friend despite their public disagreement, pondering 'the ethics of broadcasting and in general letting oneself be used by the British governing class'. He refused to believe that he had been used and instead argued that by working at the BBC he had helped 'deodorise it to some small extent ... I consider I have kept our little corner of it fairly clean'.[29]

Orwell eventually left the BBC in November 1943 to take up the post of literary editor on the left-wing weekly newspaper, *Tribune*. By now, he had come to accept that there was not going to be a revolution in Britain, but he still supported the war effort. 'It is a choice of evils,' he wrote in a private letter of 18 May 1944,

> I fancy nearly every war is that. I know enough of British imperialism not to like it, but I would support it against Nazism or Japanese imperialism as the lesser evil ... our cause is the better, but we have to keep on making it the better, which involves constant criticism.[30]

This was a long way from his revolutionary stance of the late 1930s, but he still remained an anti-imperialist.

In the shadow of the cold war

Orwell's hostility to Stalinism came to dominate his thinking from the end of 1943 onwards. Both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, his two most popular books, were intended as literary assaults on the 'Soviet myth' from a democratic socialist standpoint, although they were, of course, to be successfully confiscated by the political right. Orwell's early death prevented him from taking the necessary steps to counter this. Even while he was preoccupied with Stalinism, he still continued his support for anti-imperialism in general and Indian independence in particular. In an important article that he wrote soon after the Labour Party's July 1945 general election victory, Orwell argued that 'the hardest problem for a Labour government ... is India'. He went on:

> Immersed in their struggle with the Tories, the Labour leaders have never made clear to their followers the extent to which British prosperity depends on the exploitation of the coloured peoples. It has always been tacitly pretended that we could 'set India free' and raise our own wages simultaneously. The first task of the Labour government is to make people realise that Britain is not self-contained, but is part of a world-wide network. Even the problem of introducing Socialism into Britain is secondary to that. For Britain cannot become a genuinely Socialist country while continuing to plunder Asia and Africa ...

He was not sure if Labour would 'make a genuine effort to introduce Socialism', but if it did, 'the period of reconstruction will probably be a very uncomfortable one'. Once again, Orwell believed that living standards in Britain would have to fall, at least temporarily, once the exploitation of the empire was stopped. People had to be prepared for this, won over to accept that it was a necessary part of building a just, egalitarian, socialist society. Whatever one thinks of his arguments, they still show a clear commitment to anti-imperialism.[31]

The importance he continued to assign to anti-imperialism was also shown by the attitude he took to Conservative opponents of Russian policy in eastern Europe. He was not prepared to associate himself with people who were not opposed to British imperialism as well. On 15 November 1945, for example, he wrote to the Duchess of Athol refusing an invitation to speak on the platform of the League of European Freedom, an organisation opposed to Russian policy in eastern Europe. The letter makes his position crystal clear:

> I cannot associate myself with an essentially Conservative body which claims to defend democracy in Europe but has nothing to say about British imperialism. It seems to me that one can only denounce the crimes now being committed in Poland, Jugoslavia etc.

> if one is equally insistent on ending Britain's unwanted role in India. I belong to the Left and must work inside it, much as I hate Russian totalitarianism and its poisonous influence in this country.[32]

He made exactly the same point with regard to British intervention against the communist-led resistance in Greece in December 1944. How could one possibly oppose Russian intervention in Poland and not oppose the British presence in Athens? Indeed, he went so far as to actually support the Greek resistance in the fighting with the British. British troops had been killed by the resistance: 'But what of it?' In the circumstances, he was not prepared to 'disapprove of their action' and, in the event of any attempt being made to put the resistance leaders on trial, 'we should rightly protest'.[33] Interestingly enough, Orwell went out of his way to condemn the objection by some on the left to the use of 'coloured' troops in Greece, making the point that this seemed to suggest that it was 'somehow worse to be shot up by Indians or Negroes than by Europeans'. It was, he argued, an insult to suggest that the presence of Indian troops in Athens was any more offensive than the presence of British troops.[34] Quite clearly, Orwell's anti-imperialism was neither submerged nor supplanted by his anti-Stalinism.

Orwell was still concerned with developments in Burma. On 16 February 1945, he used his *Tribune* column to make a passionate declaration in favour of Burmese independence and, by implication, for Britain's other far-eastern colonies. He warned that, with eyes fixed on Europe, it was very easy to forget that 'at the other end of the world there is a whole string of countries awaiting liberation and in nearly every case hoping for something better than a mere change of conquerors'. Burma was likely to be the first colony to come back under British control and the Burmese will 'be looking to us, the Labour movement to see whether our talk about democracy, self-determination, racial equality ... has any truth in it'. In the event of the Churchill government imposing a 'reactionary settlement ... we shall harm ourselves irreparably if we do not make at least as much row about it as we did in the case of Greece'.[35]

Conclusion

Orwell's premature death on 21 January 1950 left his legacy to be hotly contested by left and right. Conservatives claimed that his anti-Stalinism clearly identified him as one of them or at least as someone who was already moving in their direction. The communist-influenced left has generally endorsed this interpretation, while the non-communist left, which has become increasingly important since the 1960s, has tended to emphasise Orwell's own death-bed insistence that

he remained a socialist. This controversy has been recently revitalised by the revelation in the *Guardian* newspaper that in March 1949 Orwell had 'offered to provide a secret Foreign Office propaganda unit linked to the intelligence services' with a list of communists and fellow travellers that he had compiled. The implication was that Orwell knowingly collaborated with the secret state against the left both in Britain and abroad. This was not the case. The propaganda unit in question, the Information Research Department (IRD), was set up by the Labour government in 1948. Initially, it purported to be advocating a third way between Soviet communism and American capitalism and this is almost certainly how it was sold to Orwell. Moreover, he was, at the time, a very sick man, less than a year from his death. This does not excuse what he did, but it was a mistake of a different order from that implied in the *Guardian*.[36]

It is, of course, impossible to say how his politics would have developed if he had lived. Would he have been reconciled to western capitalism by the post-war boom and the cold war, or would he have remained a socialist, condemning the consensus politics of the 1950s, opposing the Suez invasion and supporting nuclear disarmament? He would certainly have supported the Hungarian revolution of 1956. Nevertheless, commentators' views very much reflect their own political trajectory. All we can really say categorically is that the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that, right up to his death, Orwell remained a committed socialist, combining both anti-Stalinism and anti-imperialism.

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2 U. Maung Maung, *From Sangha To Laity* (New Delhi , 1980) p. 44.
3 *CEJL* 1, p. 265.
4 George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier* (London, 1986) pp. 127-30.
5 Christopher Hollis, *A Study of George Orwell* (London, 1956) pp. 27-8. In retrospect, Hollis accepted that he might only have seen one side of Orwell in Burma and that there was probably 'a struggle within him of two minds – the policeman who hated the rudeness and insubordination of the native and the new man who was coming to see imperialism as an evil thing'. Hollis was a Conservative MP, while his brother became head of MI5.
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PHIL VASILI

Walter Daniel Tull, 1888–1918: soldier, footballer, Black

Walter Daniel Tull's body, like thousands of others, decomposed on a battlefield near Favreuil, France, during the second battle of the Somme, March–April 1918. He was an officer in the 23rd Battalion (2nd Football) of the Middlesex Regiment and the first black man to be commissioned in the British army.[1] Private T. Billingham, club colleague with Tull at Northampton Town, and another soldier attempted to carry the second lieutenant back to their lines for burial – but they had to leave him.[2] He had been shot through the head. He was 29. He has no known grave, only an inscription on the memorial wall, bay 7 at the Fauborg-Amiens war cemetery and memorial, Arras, France. The National Army Museum, which holds the records of the Middlesex Regiment, knows nothing of Tull.

His obituary in the *Rushden Echo*, entitled 'Famous Footballer Killed', which included a photograph of Walter smiling in military clothing, recalled his transfer to Northampton from Spurs for 'a heavy transfer fee' (undisclosed at the time of signing), his 'fine physique', his commission and the mentioning of his name in dispatches. It ended: 'The deceased sportsman was an officer and a gentleman every inch of him, and the news of his death will come as a great shock to his many Rushden friends.'[3] Edward, his brother, was devastated: 'the worst moment of my life'.[4] His death carried significance beyond locality and kinship by virtue of his accomplishments and was reported in other local and national sporting and football newspapers from Manchester to Folkestone.[5]

Phil Vasili, who lives in Cambridge, is currently writing a book on Arthur Wharton, the first black professional footballer.

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Tull's achievements travelled along two vocational trajectories, sporting and military. (He was also a trained printer, though he did not earn a living from the trade on completion of his apprenticeship.) His accomplishments need to be evaluated within the context of a society where skin colour was changing its political complexion: many influential Victorians believed in the concept of a pigmentocracy, a physiologically determined hierarchy of 'races'. The hardships of coping with an increasingly colour conscious socio-political environment were compounded by the death of both his parents before his tenth birthday. The argument in this paper is that his colour, while attracting negative comment and action, also served – because of the attached symbolic value – both as a galvanising force in the subjective pursuit of his goals and as an objective refutation of racist ideology. His achievements, therefore, were despite and because of his colour.

From Barbados to the East End

Walter's father, Daniel, was from St Michael's parish, Barbados. Educated by Moravian missionaries, he became a carpenter. He was the son of Anna and William Tull, themselves born into plantation slavery. His mother may have been literate,[6] and her cousin, Henry Mimms, had a BA.[7] Daniel had one brother and one sister.[8] Daniel left for St Lucia around 1873. This was not an uncommon practice. Wages were often higher on other islands such as Trinidad, British Guiana and St Lucia – as much as four times the average Barbadian day rate.[9] A law passed by the Barbados legislature in 1676 criminalised the introduction of Christianity to blacks for fear of spreading ideas about collective equality and self improvement that were seen as subversive of the status quo. It was left to the non-conformist sects – Quakers, Methodists and Moravians – to actively proselytise among and educate the black and coloured population. Although the island had more schools per square mile in 1834 than any other British colony, only five accepted blacks. Class and ethnic conflict over education in Barbados mirrored other struggles over other resources. Having portable skills, Daniel emigrated like 16,000 other Barbadians who left the island between 1838 (abolition of slavery) and 1870. His third island destination brought him to Folkestone in England, during the summer of 1876, a time of bitter class conflict and revolt in Barbados. He had earned his passage, possibly as a ship's carpenter. Within five years he had married Alice Palmer, a Kent woman whose family were agricultural labourers. Despite his lack of cultural capital, caused by social attitudes to his ethnicity, his vocational skills, literacy and non-conformist religion may have represented upward social mobility for Alice. Both attended the newly built Grace Hill Wesleyan Chapel in the seaside town.

The 1891 census lists the Tulls as living at 51 Walton Road, a working-class neighbourhood in what was considered a fashionable resort. On 14 April 1895, Alice died from cancer, aged 42, and Daniel was left with five surviving children.[10] Alice's cousin, Clara, became his second wife shortly afterwards, 'largely to mother the children'.[11] It was the Methodist community upon which Clara was forced to rely when Daniel died two and a half years later from heart disease. The birth of Miriam in September 1897, three months before her husband's death, meant Clara now had responsibility for six children. In desperation, she turned to Grace Hill Wesleyan chapel for help. Its financial and spiritual links with the Children's Home and Orphanage, run by the Methodist preacher, the Revd Dr Stephenson, in east London (Bethnal Green), played a role in the family fortunes. The resident minister, the Revd George Adcock, recommended Walter and his elder brother, Edward, to the Home.[12] Adcock knew Stephenson and reminded him, when advocating the boys' case, of the financial assistance the Folkestone Methodist circuit had consistently provided for the Home.[13] The Folkestone Poor Law Guardians eventually agreed to subsidise the living expenses of the boys at the rate of four shillings each per week – more than double that paid to Clara – plus an outfit on maturity. In one letter dated 22 January 1898, Lonergan, registrar of the local Poor Law Union, pointed out to Stephenson that 'the father of these children was a Negro and they are consequently coloured children. I do not know if you are aware of this or whether it will in any way affect the application?' Stephenson replied that, to him, it made no difference.[14]

Edward and Walter were accepted into the Home on 24 February 1898. Letters in 'Epitome' from Clara, William, and Cecilia (Cissie), requesting to see the boys, show a family concerned for their welfare and development and determined not to let the seismic emotional upheavals break them. However, under the legal 'agreement' signed between Clara and the Home, there was to be no 'interference in any way' by the guardian while the children were in the Home and the Home had the right to send the children abroad – and many were so sent. If a child was taken back by the guardian, a sum equivalent to eight shillings for every week of their stay in the Home would have to be repaid. This was twice the sum the Poor Law Guardians allocated and was no doubt meant to be prohibitive, in the sense that de facto rights over the child were determined by economic circumstances. These conditions had to be agreed before the case for acceptance in the Home could be considered by the committee.

Stephenson had three aims for children placed in his care: to inculcate in them a moral code based upon Wesleyan Methodist principles (a more egalitarian version of orthodox Christian morality); to educate them to at least elementary standard, and to provide vocational skills (which in Walter's case meant an apprenticeship in the

Home's print shop). In pursuing these aims, the Home played its role in the empire by providing human resources for use domestically or in the colonies. By 1909, the National Children's Home (as it was now called) had sent 2,000 children to Canada alone.[15]

Football 1908-18

Walter spent seven years at Bethnal Green. His brother, Edward – who was adopted from the Home by a Glasgow dentist and his wife* – described the environment as 'harsh and disciplined'.[16] Walter played for the orphanage football team at left back. Then, in 1908, a friend, recognising his talents, suggested he write to Clapton, a successful local amateur club. Ten weeks later, in October, he was, at the age of 20, in the first team. That first season was a wonderful introduction to senior competitive football: Clapton won the Amateur Cup, the London Senior Cup and the London County Amateur Cup.[18] He was described as Clapton's 'catch of the season'. Playing at inside left, 'our dusky friend' was soon noticed by Tottenham Hotspur for 'his clever footwork'.[19] He was invited to play for their 'A' and Reserve teams and to join the first team on their close season tour to Argentina and Uruguay – four months after playing his first game for Clapton's first team.

According to a letter written while en route to Argentina, Walter had mixed feelings towards turning professional.[20] He'd joined Clapton, an amateur club in an area of London that was extremely fertile hunting ground for professional clubs in the production of both in players and supporters. He had considered an offer to play – for money – from an amateur club in the Midlands. The ethical difficulties of accepting such an offer led to him to join Spurs on 20 July for a £10 signing-on fee (the maximum allowed), after he'd completed his time as apprentice printer.[21] While travelling to the Argentine, it was still in his mind to 'get a place on one of the newspapers'.[22] There may have been peer, institutional and wider social pressure on Tull to remain an amateur. Friends and colleagues at Clapton, a club with 'faithful followers and a fine esprit de corps',[23] would, like any successful team, wanted to have remained intact. Furthermore, the ethos of muscular Christianity could have been the cultural bond linking Home and Club. To such believers, being paid would have missed the point.

Social developments such as urbanisation, rises in real incomes and a curtailment in industrial working hours, facilitated the use of

* Edward, who also graduated as a dentist in 1910, later took over the Glasgow practice. On Walter's death, he took on responsibility for the rest of the family. A keen amateur footballer, he was to be instrumental in securing Walter for Rangers FC. A socialist and admirer of Paul Robeson, he was also renowned for his 'rendering of Negro spirituals'. He deserves more than a passing reference, but space does not permit.[17]

recreational pursuits. A realisation that football was a marketable commodity was swiftly exploited. New, bigger stadia able to hold more paying spectators were opened, such as Tottenham Hotspur's at White Hart Lane and Everton's at Goodison Park.

During the middle part of the Edwardian decade, concern over the fiscal probity of clubs became an issue. Concern about the evasion by the game's ruling authorities of their own regulations (the imposition of the £4 maximum wage), led, among the more politically aware players, to a wider debate about workers' rights. Some footballers such as Tull agonised over the morality of taking wages, while others fought for the right to form a union.[24]

But though Tull was under pressure to uphold the moral sanctity of 'games' and remain unpaid, economic and social realities overrode such influence. The decision to turn professional with the capital's leading club, contextualised and compounded as it was by class and ethnicity, was a rational one. Quite simply, Tull knew that, as a black man, the offer to enter a world where respect and fame among one's peers and community was almost guaranteed, was too good to refuse, whatever the doubts raised and restrictions presented by a moral code designed by those unlikely to face such dilemmas.

With the benefit of hindsight, most historians of sport recognise that the concern with the separation between amateur and professional was a semantic masking of class divisions. Such segregation served the objective of retaining power over the control and allocation of resources through the exclusion of the majority. The formation of the Amateur Football Association in 1907 – initially called the Amateur Football Defence Federation – over the issue of admittance of professionals to county football associations, was essentially a southern-based, public school reaction to the growing economic might of northern, working-class professional clubs.

Given that the discourse of the amateur/professional debate used language that betrayed a political agenda, the double standards and selective application of the rules used to define status were breathtaking in their hypocrisy. The elitist, amateur Corinthians often charged more in expenses to play than the weekly wage bill of their professional opponents; amateur cricketers could receive unlimited income from benefit matches. And, most importantly, generally amateurs didn't need or want to earn a living from sport. Thus their performance didn't carry the same practical or symbolic value. If they played badly the disadvantages were metaphysical – a loss to pride, not to the pocket. Loss of form was not the demon-with-material-consequences that shadowed the exploits of the working-class professional. Shamateur clubs like the one in the Midlands that wanted Tull's services were snobs: they wanted to compete, to use the same devices as professional clubs to build a successful team, but at the same time remain unsullied

by the grubby practice of *openly* paying hirelings to beat opponents.

Tull was not well for part of the trip to Argentina, suffering from 'sunstroke and [feeling] very queer for a few days'.[25] He and another forward, J. Curtis from Gainsborough Trinity, were new signings to a 'young' team that had been promoted to the first division in their inaugural season in the Football League. The transition in football culture that Walter would have undergone by going on tour with 'the first truly great professional side in southern England'[26] would have been profound. Sadly, the next six months represented the zenith of his footballing achievements, despite his gold medals with Clapton, a side which could not compare with the north Londoners.

The tour had been arranged by the FA and the committee of the *Sociedad Sportiva*. Along with Everton, Spurs were to play the top club sides and representative teams of the Argentine and Uruguayan football associations, a total of twelve games in all. To accommodate the visit, the first round of the Argentine FA Cup had been post-poned.[27] It does not seem to have been very enjoyable, apart from the games when neither team lost to indigenous opposition. The players complained about the quality of their accommodation on arrival in the Argentine capital: 'none of the waiters spoke English ... the aspect of the bedrooms was anything but cheerful.' It was also cold and there were no fires or easy chairs.[28] Perhaps more worrying was the greater chasm between cultural attitudes to the way the game should be played, even though British influence in founding and developing the game was paramount. The first representative match between the Liga Argentina and Spurs had been ill-tempered and violent. The visitors' forward, Minter, had been sent off, quite unfairly according to the sports correspondent of the *Buenos Aires Herald*. A foul on another forward, D. Clarke, off the ball was 'the filthiest charge in the back it is possible to imagine'. After protests by the Spurs team and the intervention of the chairman and other club officials, who came down to the pitch from the stands, Minter was reinstated. Play had been held up for three minutes. The *Buenos Aires Herald*, never slow to assert the cultural superiority of its Anglo-Saxon heritage, continued indignantly, 'it shows one what kind of a sporting spirit the native has, when I say that they laughed and clapped their hands with joy when they saw Clarke reel.'[29] These 'fine chaps from London' had been 'treated very badly'.[30]

Action by players over wage capping and unionisation meant the tourists had left behind a highly charged political environment in England and, ironically, had come to one equally intense.[31] The first match of the tour between Everton and Tottenham – the first time two Football League clubs had played each other in Argentina – was attended by president, Figueron Alcarta. At half time, he met the teams. The visit of the clubs held national importance for the develop-ment of the game in that country. And it provided an opportunity for

the president to cultivate a symbolic relationship with the people, linking his popularity to that of the game.[32] The success of Argentinian football against foreign opposition gave a boost both to the president's standing and to the status of the Argentinian sporting establishment, the *Sociedad Sportiva*, which had arranged the tour.

The *Buenos Aires Herald* had a different objective: the diffusion of Anglo-Saxon, bourgeois values through the playing of sport according to rules, written and unwritten, which included playing the game in a 'gentlemanly' fashion; not striving to win for winning's sake (no material disadvantage would accrue to the amateur loser); not seeking unfair advantage. Such informal, abstract principles were, however, open to varied cultural interpretations and masked a range of practices designed to subvert and negate their stated ethical basis.

The editorial message broadcast by the *Buenos Aires Herald* left no room for ambiguity. Game playing and nation building were symbiotic activities. To indulge in the former was preparation for the latter. Its vision was encapsulated in its 'Mission of the athlete' address welcoming the tourists and is worth quoting from here for the way it typifies the thinking of the period. It began by positing a racial hierarchy and ended by leaving the reader in no doubt as to which 'race' headed it.

> A little while ago we saw an illustration of a football match somewhere near the Bight of Benin. The sable Africans were there shown kicking, with bare feet, the sun bleached skulls of their slaughtered enemies ... a mere replica of the game played when the noble savage first found grim solace in his piping intervals of peace.
>
> From kicking empty craniums to scoring a sensitive shin is, after all, a mere transition but the step is one of considerable extent...
>
> We look upon [the footballers] as men with a mission ... Every unit in a football team, is a missionary who teaches the gospel of sport by strenuous example ... The people who do not love field sports will not take kindly to field campaigns. War is best waged by those nations who have learned the absolute truth of the saying unity is strength...
>
> Our 'missionaries' ... are here ... because in Argentina there is a growing willingness to learn the game in order that the Argentines of the rising generations may, in their turn, play the game. The youth of Argentina are finding out that the sensuous life, the life of the sybarite, is not conducive to glory, or even commercial pre-eminence. Politics and cigarettes may round off a feast, but they will not extend a territory, or keep the flag flying proudly.[33]

Such an arrogance of motives and objectives, cultural and political, militated against the tour's success – however this goal was defined. The teams left after playing in some tempestuous matches which

resulted in a lively correspondence on the letters page of the *Herald*. The latter thought it would be 'some time' before other British clubs visited.

Tull had had mixed fortunes in his football 'rite of passage' to Argentina. It was both a stern and harsh, yet exotic and unique, introduction to the game at elite level. His travel sickness and the discomforts of the hotel seem not to have affected his enthusiasm to play. In his first game, he'd 'installed himself as favourite with the crowd'.[34] When chosen, he played at centre or inside forward. Spurs were attempting to find the right front-line combination after the departure of England international centre forward V.J. Woodward, an amateur player who was also to join the Football Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment. Unfortunately, the Spurs management was not similarly impressed. Tull was left out of the next game. The sum total of his performances, however, did earn him selection for Tottenham's first ever game in division one in September 1909.

His Football League debut was also the club's initiation into first division football (Spurs had won the FA Cup in 1901). They lost 3-1 away to Sunderland, followed by a 4-2 defeat to fellow Argentine sojourners Everton, in front of a 20,000-strong crowd. Over 32,000 paid to watch the first home match against the FA Cup holders and vanguard Players' Union strikers – the self-proclaimed 'Outcasts' – Manchester United. They shared the points in a 2-2 draw, Tull having been brought down for a penalty.[35] He seems to have relished his home debut.

> We have been told much of the ineffectiveness of Tull that the forward's display on Saturday must have astounded everyone who saw it. Such perfect coolness, such judicious waiting for a fraction of a second in order to get a pass in not before a defender has worked to a false position, and such accuracy of strength in passing, I have not seen for a long time. During the first half, Tull just compelled Curtis to play a good game, for the outside right was plied with a series of passes that made it almost impossible for him to do anything other than well.
>
> Tull has been charged with being slow, but there never was a footballer yet who was really great and always appeared to be in a hurry. Tull did not get the ball and rush on into trouble. He let his opponents do the rushing, and defeated them by side touches and side-steps worthy of a professional boxer. Tull is very good indeed...[36]

He scored his first goal against Bradford City a week later and continued to receive more praise than criticism for his performances, although this never matched the eulogy described above. Despite being 'a class superior to that shown by most of his colleagues',[37] Tull was

relegated to the reserves (the 'Stiffs') by the end of October, having played just seven first team games. He played sixteen games for the 'Stiffs' during the remainder of the season.[38] Quite why Tull was never given another chance in the first team that season remains open to speculation. All that is certain is that he was good enough, when on form, to have merited selection. And there is nothing in the contemporary reports to suggest a prolonged loss of confidence or form. Wider social pressures may have played a role, especially if the racial abuse Tull received in a game at Bristol unnerved ambitious directors.[39] The exact reason for his demotion remains open to speculation.

The 1910–11 season was worse for Tull. He played only three first team games, scoring one goal against Manchester City. His third game against Arsenal in April was to be his last. His outings with the reserves totalled twenty-seven, with ten goals scored. They won the South Eastern League, Tull playing for the League representative team against Chelsea at the end of the season. He may have gone to Heanor Town for a period on loan, although this cannot be confirmed.[40] His career with Spurs, begun so promisingly, ended unsatisfactorily. By October 1911, Tull had signed for Southern League Northampton Town – winners of the competition in 1909 – 'for a heavy transfer fee'. The deal included the exchange of R.C. Brittain to Spurs. The 'Cobblers' manager was Herbert Chapman – a former Spurs player – who was later to become uniquely successful with Huddersfield Town and Arsenal. It seems Tull caught Chapman's eye while playing against the reserves the previous season. He had to compete with Aston Villa, Leicester Fosse and Clapton Orient for Tull's signature.[41]

Tull's opening games for Northampton did not show the form displayed in his first season at Spurs. His debut against Watford made no great impression. By the end of November, he was in the reserves. A conversion to wing half from centre forward led to a revival in form. He went on to play 110 first team games, scoring nine goals, including four in one match.[42] On 21 December 1914, he became the first Northampton Town player to join the 17th (1st Football) Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment.[43] It was commanded by Major Frank Buckley,[44] Boer War veteran, ex-Manchester United and Aston Villa, a legendary disciplinarian who later became famous as manager of Wolverhampton Wanderers.

'Race', sport and society

Tull's mercurial rise from orphanage team to first division carried with it the inevitable consequence of fame contextualised by colour. Tull grew up in Britain during a time of great self-assurance among its rulers. Huge areas of Africa had only recently been added to imperial possessions. In his first year in the Home, the Boer War broke out. The

press was awash with stories about the brutish Boer and why it was in the 'natives' interest not to side with the Dutch speaking settlers. In London, at Earls Court Olympia an exhibition opened entitled 'Savage South Africa'. A review in the *Illustrated Sporting and Dramatic News* headed 'Briton, Boer and the Black' stated the purpose of the enterprise was to show 'life, chase and warfare from the Cape to Cairo ... The most striking episodes in the wild life of Savage South Africa ... [illustrate] "the pride, pomp and circumstance of glorious war".'[45]

The review spoke of the 'magnificent black men from the Zulu country' (because of their proven martial status?). However, London County Council officials forced the 'native kraals' to be sectioned off so that the public couldn't fraternise with the 'heathen warriors' and their 'ebony babies'. The short-term agenda of not antagonising the Zulus did not extend to according them unrestricted access. The contradiction embodied above encapsulates the sort of battles Tull had to fight: for recognition as an equal within a society whose rulers held differentiation whether by class, gender or colour to be the natural order of things. It is telling, in this respect, that even as Tull entered first division football, he became known in press and commentary as 'Darkie Tull'.

Indeed, such contradictions came to the fore in the field of sport. Those who sought to popularise a more egalitarian view of humanity could argue that in sport the scientific assertion of 'racial' superiority was demonstrably disproven. Only applied ability, trained to the optimum degree, counted. But, while blacks had excelled in football, rugby, running, boxing, cricket and other sports in Britain, such a claim to equality was met with the counter argument of animalism. A boxing contest between the African-American world champion Jack Johnson and 'Bombardier Billy' Wells in London ventilated the 'scientific' stereotype about the atavistic black from the Reverend Frederick Meyer, who campaigned to stop the fight.

> The present conflict is not wholly one of skill, because on the one side there is added the instinctive passion of the Negro race, which is so differently constituted to our own, and in the present instance will be aroused to do the utmost that immense animal development can do to retain the championship, together with all the financial gain that would follow.[46]

Thus winning through sport for black Britons like Tull could be seen as, ultimately, a pyrrhic victory. Their achievements were defined in such a way as to confirm the scientific taxonomies of 'race': it was their 'animalism', a sub-human characteristic, that allowed them their physical prowess, possession of which necessarily excluded ownership of civilised, cultured traits such as a highly evolved intellect or refined sensitivities.

Such prejudices manifested themselves against Tull at a League

game away to Bristol City on 9 October 1909. Tull was racially taunted by 'a section of the spectators [who] made a cowardly attack upon him in language lower than Billingsgate'. The reporter was clearly upset by the abuse of Spurs' 'most brainy forward' whose 'tactics were absolutely beyond reproach'.

> Let me tell these Bristol hooligans (there were but few of them in a crowd of nearly twenty thousand) that Tull is so clean in mind and method as to be a model for all white men who play football whether they be amateur or professional. In point of ability, if not in actual achievement, Tull was the best forward on the field.[47]

What the report seems to suggest is that a heightened awareness of 'race' difference was beginning to manifest itself at football grounds. Perhaps the political geography of Bristol, as a port whose wealth and growth owed much to the slave trade, may have explained, in part, this prejudice. A further factor, the downward dissemination of scientific ideas about 'race', should also be included in the equation. That contemporary repository of received wisdom, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (published the same year that Tull transferred to Northampton) expatiated in great detail on the characteristics of the 'Negro', finally concluding that 'mentally the Negro is inferior to the white ... The mental constitution ... is very similar to that of a child.' However, because of their 'dog-like fidelity ... given suitable training, the Negro is capable of becoming a craftsman of considerable skill'. While these ideas were voiced by only a few, the practical realities of such sentiments were all around, not least in the laws governing black recruitment into the British army.

The relationship between sport as preparation for war was consistently remarked upon by apologists of empire. By personally fusing these two pursuits, Tull burnt the straw house of scientific racism. His achievements as a sportsman were equalled by his exploits as a soldier in a war he came to hate.[48]

'An officer and a gentleman, every inch of him'

According to the logic of scientific racism, Tull could not, as a black man, hope to achieve the status and manner of a gentleman. The 1914 *Manual of Military Law*, echoing this school of thought, stated that no black soldier could issue orders that would be accepted by his white comrades. The military chiefs of staff, with government approval, did not want black soldiers. The government line, as mouthed by the War Office in 1870, was that the army should be racially homogeneous, despite the fact that blacks had served in the army since at least the seventeenth century.[49] Lord Wolseley at the War Office argued, 'let us keep our British regiments strictly British ... If ever we begin to fill our

ranks with alien races our downfall will most surely follow.'[50] By the outbreak of the first world war, the vision of black officers with the ability to issue orders was officially forbidden.[51] White troops just would not serve with men of colour, the chiefs argued. Black soldiers in British regiments would be bad for discipline. But they did enlist. Tull's brother, William, joined. Nigerians Eugene and John Brown* signed up for the 5th North Staffordshire Regiment while attending college in Britain. Eugene was killed in action, while John ended his war days in hospital.[52] Numerous others broke the colour bar. It was not until 1918, a time of severe manpower shortage, that the Army Council officially allowed British and colonial blacks to join up.[53]

Football and war

The British Expeditionary Force fought nine principal battles between August and October 1914. At the end of October, secretary of state for war Lord Kitchener issued another call for volunteers to replace those killed and enlarge the British Expeditionary Force. Pressure to suspend League and Cup professional football began to gather momentum among the powerful, vociferous and jingoistic elements of society.

> Football is an excellent thing, even in time of war. Armies and navies can only be maintained so long as the community fulfills its function of producing means for their support; and healthy recreation is essential for efficient production. A man may be doing his duty in other fields than the front. But there is no excuse in diverting from the front thousands of athletes in order to feast the eyes of crowds of inactive spectators, who are either unfit to fight or else unfit to be fought for ... Every club who employs a professional player is bribing a needed recruit to refrain from enlistment, and every spectator who pays his gate money is contributing so much towards a German victory.[54]

The FA took up the call. They urged all those involved in football who were single to enlist. War propagandists were given permission to proselytise at half-time. Military bands would provide stirring patriotic airs. The exercise proved a disaster. Very few recruits were obtained. The Manchester based *Athletic News* (7 December 1914) was outraged by the crude attempts to portray football, and those civilian workers that had anything to do with it, as pro-German conspirators:

> The whole agitation is nothing less than an attempt by the classes to stop the recreation on one day in the week of the masses ... What do they care for the poor man's sport?
>
> The poor are giving their lives for this country in thousands. In

* They were, respectively, father and uncle of Roy Brown, another black professional footballer and a club colleague of Stanley Matthews at Stoke City in the late 1930s.

> many cases they have nothing else ... There are those who could bear arms, but who have to stay at home and work for the Army's requirements, and the country's needs. These should, according to a small clique of virulent snobs, be deprived of the one distraction that they have had for over thirty years.[55]

In fact, 2,000 professionals out of a total of 5,000 had signed for military service. Tull, young, single, gifted with his feet, and black, joined the 17th (1st Football) Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment. A practical feature of military recruiting was corporate recruitment. Getting workmates, friends, relatives, neighbours to join up together had two roles: it generated peer group pressure to conform to the will of the majority; and it delivered a ready-made esprit de corps. This, in turn, engendered a collective discipline that would have to withstand and hold firm against an extraordinary physical, emotional and psychological bombardment.

A member of an infantry battalion, Tull arrived in France from Salisbury Plain, as part of the 33rd division, 100th Brigade, on 18 November 1915. They were initially billeted at Les Ciseaux, sixteen miles from the front line. Their accommodation in December was the 'College des jeune filles' (sic) in Bethune. By 9 December, half the battalion was on the front line. Away from the front line, the battalion played football match after football match, interspersed with tug-of-war and other athletic competitions. (The first year of war, spent in preparation in England, gave Tull the opportunity to guest for Fulham in three games in September 1915.) A reading of the war diaries of the regiment leaves the impression of intense trench warfare punctuated by intense football activity.[56]

On 20 January, A company (of which Tull was a member), together with B company, were sent back to the front at Festubert, 'a pestilential part of the line'.[57] Two days later, Woodward was wounded. Front line duty often lasted a month or more. A letter Tull wrote from France early in 1916 spoke of the boredom of waiting to be sent up the line. 'For the last three weeks my Battalion has been resting some miles distant from the firing line but we are now going up to the trenches for a month or so. Afterwards we shall begin to think about coming home on leave. It is a very monotonous life out here when one is supposed to be resting and most of the boys prefer the excitement of the trenches.'[58] By now, he had been made sergeant.

He came later to detest the war. This changed attitude of mind was probably produced by the unique scale of mass carnage and destruction wrought by a combination of fighting the first 'technical' war and being led by military leaders who still believed in the nobility of hand to hand combat.

The 1st Football fought in the battle of the Somme, July–November

1916. There were over 60,000 killed on the first day, the worst day ever in British military history. At the end in mid-November, the total death toll for all combatants stood at 1,115,000.[59] In one of the last major actions by the 17th, they were ordered to capture the German Z-Z trench. The attack began at 5.15am on 13 November. 'All ranks were extremely cheerful and success seemed inevitable.' They 'went over in waves', B and D Companies 'playing mouth organs'. By 7.20am, a report reached the commanding officer saying 'a certain amount of confusion existed ... various units were all mixed up in "No Man's Land" ... [and] the machine guns were causing a lot of trouble ... The enemy killed heavily various parts of our line.'[60] Only seventy-nine men returned from over 400. In his report, the commanding officer of the 17th put the decimation down to 'fog', 'uncut wire' and the added disorientation caused by the movements of the Royal Scots and West Yorkshire regiments, which confused and disorganised his men. Men of the battalion who were killed may even have been shot by their own machine-gunners. Such an apocalyptic scenario may have also been compounded by gas, first used in 1915. The gross ineptitude of the commanding officers (who had planned this specific operation and the battle of the Somme as a whole), to which the recruits bore impotent witness, led to widespread disillusionment and anger among the ranks.

Tull was invalided out of France with trench fever some time in 1916. One of the military hospitals was at Sandgate, Folkestone, although it is not known if he was sent back to his home town. On recovery, he entered the officer cadet training school at Gailes in Scotland, the first person of colour ever to do so. His official military records give no indication as to why Walter was chosen for Gailes. Killingray argues that the recruitment of blacks into the army was a matter of luck and gradation of colour. Some recruiting officers were not so pernickety, while others followed the rules to the letter.[61] The question still remains as to how he got accepted for Gailes and was gazetted at a time when officers had to be of 'pure' European descent. Perhaps the answer can be found in the nature of the battalion, which was made up of footballers, many of whom would have known or known of each other, creating an environment of self- and mutual respect. That military recruiting objective of transferring peer group bonds from civilian to khaki life through the formation of geographical and vocational regiments had worked in Tull's favour. The field of play is a great leveller. Strengths and weaknesses are exposed to view to be exploited. It is a place where cultural myths can be exorcised.[62] Among footballers, Tull had nothing to prove. He was as good as they, and the thousands of others who played and watched, knew. Whatever his colour signified culturally, if Walter could give of his best on the sportsfield, and take the worst the players and fans could throw, he could do it as an equal in this other field, of battle.

While he was training, the 17th were involved in the battle of Arleux, receiving over 462 casualties. These proved to be irreplaceable losses. New recruits were getting younger. (Most of the seventy that arrived at the end of January 1918 'had just turned 19 years old'.)[63] The 1st Football Battalion – the first ever made up of professional footballers in the British army – was eventually disbanded. The remnants were 'divvied out' to other battalions on 10 February. Tull was commissioned as second lieutenant on 30 May 1917 to the 23rd (2nd Football) Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment. He was posted to Italy with the 41st division and at the first battle of Piave he was mentioned in dispatches by major general Sydney Lawford for his 'gallantry and coolness'. 'You were one of the first to cross the river Piave prior to the raid on January 1–2, 1918, and during the raid you took the covering party of the main body across and brought them without a casualty in spite of heavy fire.'[64]

Tull returned to France to fight in the second battle of the Somme, his last campaign.

Conclusion

As an orphan from early childhood, as a footballer and as a soldier, Tull's life exemplified extremes of achievement, tragedy and heroism. But the day-to-day simplicities of life also held extra burdens for him. As the Bristol reporter said of his dignity in the face of racist hostility, his behaviour was a lesson to the white men on the pitch – in fact, to people of any colour. He did not suffer passively, ensconced in the muffled discourse of victimology. His death in battle was poignantly poetic in the sense that it encapsulated the entwined essences of heroism and tragedy: 'killed [on the battlefield] instantaneously with a bullet through the head'.[65] He had served the duration of the war, almost from the beginning, in numerous campaigns; was awarded the British War and Victory medal and was recommended for a Military Cross.[66]

From a late twentieth-century perspective, it could be argued that Tull was politically naive. A man in an army that didn't want him,[67] where he was officially a threat to discipline; an army that accepted the findings of science that he and his kind were intellectually and morally backward. As evidence of the futility and paradox of his time in the killing fields, we can point to the reimposition of the the colour bar on black officers once the war had ended, a barrier that lasted until the 1940s. And to the 'race' riots in Liverpool, Cardiff, Newport and London immediately after the war – to which the government response was, among other things, to set up repatriation committees in Hull, South Shields, Glasgow, Cardiff, Liverpool, London and Salford. And black people who had fought in the war *were* repatriated.[68]

There is some evidence to suggest that Tull was cognisant of his

pioneering role. He had a desire for a posting to the West Indies, a region that had been radicalised by its experiences of the conflict. The mutinies, strikes, demonstrations and riots that swelled in the wake of peace were a forthright testament to the growing self-confidence of Caribbean workers, veterans and anti-colonialists. As with so many others, the horror and the camaraderie would have produced a changed person. The year 1919 in Britain has been described by some as the closest Britain has come to revolution.[69] Whether the war created the mood of rebellion among workers – this sometimes taking a horribly distorted and misguided form as we saw with the 'race' riots above – or merely speeded up a process that had been years fermenting cannot be debated here. People were changed by the conflict. Tull was changed: his eagerness to enlist souring to a hatred for the carnage.

Perhaps the foremost evidence that Tull was aware of the wider social significance of his achievements is the continuity of the achievements themselves. His career as a footballer must have entailed going beyond the normal effort required to prove equality with his peers, as the reading of his days at Tottenham seems to suggest. As a soldier, he was the only black officer in the British army until the second world war. (The colour bar has only recently been raised in the elite Guards Regiment, which, in the 1990s, had its first black recruit.) His life, recalled so fragmentarily here – for of lives like his so much goes unrecorded or is lost – reveals not only a cool, intelligent courage, but a dogged persistence in surmounting the barriers of class and colour.

References

1 This claim was first made by Edward Tull, Walter's brother in response to Harold Moody that his son Arundel was the first. (Edward and Harold were friends). See *Glasgow Evening Times*, 12 February 1940; League of Coloured Peoples Newsnotes, no 6 March 1940.

2 *Sporting Chronicle* (Manchester), 24 April 1918.

3 12 April 1918.

4 Interview with Revd Duncan Finlayson (son-in-law of Edward), 22 February 1995.

5 *Sporting Chronicle*, op.cit.; *Sheffield Sports Special* (*The Green 'Un*) (15 May 1918); *Folkestone, Hythe, Sandgate and Cheriton Herald* (13 April 1918); *Northampton Mercury* (12 April 1918); *Northampton Daily Chronicle* (12 April 1918); *Tottenham Weekly Herald* (26 April 1918). This list is not exhaustive.

6 She sent letters to Daniel, although the same hand writes for different members of the family. See letter dated 25 March 1883, Finlayson Collection.

7 Daniel Tull, *A Short Journal*. An unfinished autobiography held by Jean and Revd Duncan Finlayson (Finlayson Collection).

8 My thanks to Jean and the Revd Duncan Finlayson and the Humphrey and Hopkins' families for this information. Jean is the niece of Walter Tull, the latter families descendants of William, Walter's eldest brother.

9 This, and other information on Barbados, from Hilary Beckles *A History of Barbados* (Cambridge 1990).

10 Liverpool University: The National Children's Home – Action for Children Archive. Cause of death listed in Application for Walter and Edward to enter 'The Children's

Home and Orphanage'. My thanks to Brian Parnell of the NCH – Action for Children for assisting my access to the Tull file.

11 Application, ibid.

12 William, the eldest boy, was working and contributing seven shillings per week to the family. It was thought Elsie, 7, could look after Miriam while Clara took in washing to supplement the (Poor Law) parish relief administered by the Elham Union. Cecilia the eldest girl was soon to get work as a domestic. See 'application', ibid.

13 The NCH Archive, Tull file 'Epitome of correspondence' (hereafter Epitome). Letters between Adcock and Stephenson, January–February 1898.

14 29 January 1898, 'Epitome', ibid.

15 'Forty years work , 1869-1909 for the children of sorrow', *Highways and Hedges* (July and August 1909), p.108.

16 Interview with Jean and the Revd Duncan Finlayson, op.cit.; Reg Ferm, *Ice Cold Charity* (Sussex, 1990), an autobiography of orphanage life in the 1920s, describes a cold, compassionless, austere environment.

17 Edward graduated from the Royal Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons, Glasgow in 1910, registering as a practising dentist in 1912 (information from the General Dental Council, London). His first interview after graduation was in Birmingham. On opening the door his interviewer greeted him with the words, 'my God you're coloured'. The next day he caught the train home to Glasgow. A Methodist connection placed him at a practice in Aberdeen, where he met his wife Elizabeth, daughter of the Bailey of Aberdeen. Information from author's interview with Jean and Duncan Finlayson, op.cit. See also his obituary, *Ayrshire Post* (15 December 1950), p.8.

18 My thanks to Andy Porter, Tottenham Hotspur FC historian, for this information.

19 *Football Star* (20 March 1909). Up to the date of the report, Tull had not played in a losing Clapton side.

20 26 May 1909 to Morgan at the NCO London. Written while on board RMSP *Araguaya* in 'Epitome'.

21 Andy Porter, phone call with the author, 12 March 1995. The amateur club in the Midlands may have been Heanor Town, for whom he later played on loan.

22 Letter, 26 May 1909, to Morgan, op.cit.

23 *Illustrated Sporting and Dramatic News* (17 April 1909), p.234.

24 A number of players attempted to resuscitate the union during 1908–9 but they failed to activate mass support form other players, mainly due to a campaign of intimidation by the FA and club chairmen. A meeting of Spurs players addressed by club director T.A. Deacock decided to resign from the union and not rejoin under its present constitution. *Tottenham and Edmonton Wednesday Herald* (1 September 1909), p.4. By 1910, only 7 per cent of professionals registered with the FA had joined. For a history of the Professional Footballers Association see John Harding, *For the Good of the Game* (London, 1991).

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27 *Buenos Aires Herald* (hereafter *BAH*) (20 May 1909).

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29 *BAH* (17 June 1909), p.9.

30 Ibid.

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33 *BAH* (6 June 1909), p.3.

34 Ibid. (8 June 1909).

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36 *Daily Chronicle* (13 September 1909), p.8.
37 Ibid. (4 October 1909).
38 Andy Porter, op.cit.
39 A member of that group, Deacock, had already warned players off seeking collective responses to their problems with his threats over unionisation.
40 Phone call with Nick Ansell, Northampton Town FC, 7 March 1995.
41 *Northampton Mercury* (20 October 1911); *Rushden Echo* (12 April 1918); *Northampton Daily Chronicle (NDC)* (18 October 1911).
42 Nick Ansell, op.cit.
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49 David Killingray, 'All the King's Men? Blacks in the British Army in the First World War, 1914-1918' in *Under the Imperial Carpet: Essays in Black History 1780-1950* (Crawley, 1986) p.166.
50 Ibid., pp.167-9, minute 'Enlistment of Eurasians into British Regiments', 29 December 1886, P.R.O. Kew, W.O.32/6889.
51 Ibid., pp.167-71. See p.168 in particular, extract from the *Manual of Military Law*, p.471. This states that 'aliens' (including 'Negroes') can be commissioned in an honorary rank but must not 'exercise any actual command or power'.
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54 A.F. Pollard in a letter to *The Times* (7 November 1914) in Mason, op.cit., p.251.
55 Mason, op.cit., p.254. The material on war, football and enlistment relies heavily on Mason's work.
56 P.R.O., Kew, War Diaries of the 17th (1st Football) Middlesex Regiment. W.O.95/1361.
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61 Op.cit, pp.172-75.
62 I recognise that social processes, such as ethnic stereotyping, that filter professional sports participation, can act to perpetuate cultural myths: Why are there no Asian footballers at Football League and Premiership level?
63 War Diaries, op.cit., 26 January 1918.
64 Original letter in Finlayson Collection, op.cit. See also *Glasgow Evening Times* (12 Februay 1940).

65 Letter from Major B.S. Poole, Middlesex Regiment, to Edward Tull, 12 April 1918, in Finlayson Collection, op.cit.

66 P.R.O. (Kew) W.O..329/2239, p.105. Major Poole, 23rd Battalion Middlesex Regiment to Edward Finlayson, 12 April 1918, in Finlayson Collection..

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JAN CAREW

Caribbean culture and development*

> 'When a Westerner looks at the jungle, he sees green – herbs, vines, shrubs, trees. When an Indian looks at the jungle, he sees the basics of life – food, medicines, and raw materials.'
>
> – *M. Plotkin*

Unless we, the people of the Caribbean Basin, view culture, history, national identity and development as parts of an organic whole, we will constantly be driven to seek ad hoc, irrelevant solutions to our problems. After winning our independence from colonial rule, we have become adept at the politics and economics of chasing market-oriented mirages. A line from a poem by Robert Burns about 'the borealis race that flits ere you can point its place' somehow describes our attempts at post-independence development very accurately.

It is, therefore, not all that extraordinary that our seminal historical research has never really begun with the unequivocal acknowledgement that, in 1492, our Caribbean archipelago sustained large and healthy populations – numbered in millions – in a wholesome and friendly environment. For, in doing this, we would be forced to admit that today, after more than five centuries, it is certainly not the case. What, therefore, went wrong with the much-touted colonial civilising mission?

Let us try briefly to estimate what was lost in that historic encounter, that apocalyptic invasion, when Christopher Columbus, a Genoese

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* Based on a lecture to the annual meeting of the Barbados National Trust, 6 July 1994.

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adventurer, had set sail from Palos on 2 September 1492 and was discovered by the Tainos, just over a month later, on their Guanahani shores. It is important to note at this stage that when Columbus set sail he did not know where he was going; when he made his landfall at Guanahani, he did not know where he was; and when he returned to Spain he did not know where he had been. This geographical confusion led to his misguided belief that the Caribbean was somewhere in the Bay of Bengal and part of the Indies.

For a long time afterwards, it was assumed that the population of these islands could not have been more than two or three hundred thousand. When Bartolomé de las Casas, that exemplary Dominican priest, said that the population of Española was three million, this was dismissed as the reckless exaggeration of an 'Indian lover'. But recently, some very sober historical demographers have, after a thorough examination of records that had always been available to the diligent researcher, come up with a count that most historians of the early Columbian era had either chosen to ignore or to misinterpret. Let us, therefore, take Española, the island in question, since it was by far the most heavily populated. In 1496, Bartolomé Colon, acting as ruler while his brother was in Spain, authorised the first census of the Columbian era. In order to keep better track of the monstrous tribute system he and his brother had imposed, he ordered a head count of Indian adults. He came up with a figure of 1.1 million.[1] This did not include children under 14, aged Kaseeks and others estimated to be 40 per cent of the population. Besides, it only included that half of the island which was under Spanish control. So Las Casas' figure of three million is, in fact, a reasonably accurate one. This census was taken four years after the devastating contact with European pathogens, and two years after the imposition of a genocidal Spanish rule. Two of the leading historical demographers in the field, Sherburne Cook and Woodrow Borah of the University of California at Berkeley, have been able to calculate the rate of population decline in the decades immediately after 1492. They extrapolated from that a curve going back to 1492 and, in so doing, came up with an estimate of the original island population at just under eight million. This is not far from the combined population of Haiti and Santo Domingo today. That makes the next figures truly appalling. Spanish surveys in 1508, 1510, 1514 and 1518 all show a population of under 100,000 and declining catastrophically. The most detailed census, the *repartimiento* of 1514, listed 22,000 adults. Cook and Borah's figures put it at 27,800.[2] It went from eight million to 28,000 in just over twenty years! That makes a rate of decline of more than 99 per cent. If that was not genocide, then the word has lost its meaning. Las Casas tells us that, by 1542, there were 200 Tainos in Española, perhaps the last of that gentle, non-violent and immensely gifted people. In short shrift after that, over a

period of at most two decades, the Tainos ceased to exist as a people. Of course, simultaneous with the extermination of the Tainos, their Arawakian relatives and the Caribs, was the wanton destruction of the environment that had sustained those vanished people for millennia. The human and environmental losses were catastrophic, and yet it was in the midst of this unacknowledged catastrophe that the modern Caribbean came into being as a settler, plantation and slave society.

* * *

Two decades after the rule of Governor Colon in 1518, Alonzo de Zuaso wrote to a friend in the Spanish Court, 'If I were to tell you all the damage I should never make an end ... Although these islands had been, since God made the earth, prosperous and full of people lacking nothing they needed, yet ... they were laid waste, inhabited only by wild animals and birds, and useless indeed for the service of either God or of their Highnesses.' Las Casas stated later, in a footnote, 'It was the first to be destroyed and made into a desert.'[3] This statement, well intentioned as it was, was far from accurate, since the misnamed Cape Verde Islands and the Canaries had also been depopulated and made into deserts, the former much earlier and the latter by 1496.

Las Casas, our original liberation theologian, who sought to create a synthesis of all that was finest and best in the Indian and Christian cultures, described the holocaust against the Tainos as 'cruelty never before seen, nor heard of, nor read of'. And Fernandez de Oviedo, one of the earliest historians of the Columbian era and a passionate defender of the Spanish 'civilising mission', nevertheless confirmed that the conquistadors had rained down an apocalypse 'of various and innumerable cruel deaths ... as uncountable as the stars'.[4]

The story of that holocaust should be compulsory reading in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the diaspora, even though it is painful, spiritually bruising and fills us with anger and anguish. Then, having read it, we should reach deep into the wellsprings of our humanity to reconstruct a future that resurrects the finest qualities of those vanished people – their non-violence and their ability to maintain unbelievable harmonies in a complex social order. Columbus himself had said of them that they 'loved their neighbours as they loved themselves'. We should also study very seriously their advanced agricultural systems and their environmental sciences. We should do this, not for esoteric reasons, but for our own survival in the twenty-first century. For, if we are to take the business of culture and development seriously, we must adopt their belief that agriculture is a culture that ties people and nature together with a Gordian knot and, if you cut it, both will perish. The two are linked to the rhythms of life, of survival, of the essences of production, of creative labour, of collective and individual dreams of a

people, of art and music, of concepts of how the world was created and of the basic tenets of mathematics, astronomy and cosmology.

The Caribbean is part of a geographical and geopolitical ellipse. On the northeastern and eastern curve of this ellipse are islands like stepping stones between the northern and southern continents – while the western curve arches around the littorals of North, Central and South America. The archipelago was never one of islands unto themselves. The original inhabitants moved freely inside the ellipse and beyond its outer edges. There are Mayan ball courts in Puerto Rico. A German archaeologist found pre-Columbian Carib burial mounds in the Canary islands. Columbus told us, almost as an aside, that he found a tented vessel with ninety oarsmen anchored in a harbour on the Jamaican north coast, and some of the passengers, he declared, wore splendidly ornate robes. Did they, too, come from 'heaven'? Aurelio Tio, a Puerto Rican scholar, while poring over research materials in archives in Madrid, stumbled upon documents which showed that Spanish explorers like Ponce de Leon had to rely on Carib and Taino pilots who taught them to navigate those treacherous waters between the Yucatan, the Bahama current and the southern sweep of the Gulf Stream. The Spaniards found these pilots' expertise in astronomy, oceanography, navigation, and in the accurate measurement of nautical distances, truly astonishing.

Astronomy also goes hand in glove with basic agricultural sciences. It enables people to study the material universe outside of the earth's atmosphere, to codify seasons and to live in tune with the movements of the sun and moon. I deliberately use the word 'sciences' because, as Professor Maurice Bazin of the Exploratorium in San Francisco wrote,

> We need to overcome the ongoing belief that science is reserved for those who belong to the culture which supposedly constructed it and called it 'modern' science. There is science in every culture and civilisation ... We must recover from the abyss of disrespect and lost opportunities of 1492 by furthering, from now onwards, the onerous work of learning from the total wealth of human experience and problem solving capacities.[5]

* * *

I began by recalling the melancholy events of a holocaust because, in its ashes, we must search for, and discover, the seeds of our regeneration. Colon's contribution to Caribbean agriculture was the introduction of chickpeas, wheat, olive trees and, of course, sugar-cane from the Canary islands. The chickpeas, which the Moors had brought to Spain from Africa, survived. The wheat grew seven inches tall and wilted. The olive trees never took root, and sugar-cane became the bane of our

lives. It produced the most merciless and sustained exploitation of slave labour in modern history. Colon, with a conspicuous lack of imagination, also introduced the *ranchero* system from Castile and, with this borrowed system, did immense environmental damage. He and his men, Alfred Crosby, a noted environmental scientist, tells us, were blind to the 'obviously spectacular biogeographical phenomenon going on right under their noses'.[6] What they failed to see – and little has changed in five centuries – is that inside of that Caribbean/Central and South American ellipse, was one of the greatest reservoirs of health foods on our planet. The fruits, vegetables, nuts and vegetable by-products taken from our region would, in the wake of Columbus's voyages, transform concepts of agriculture and nutrition in Europe and the rest of the world. The priceless gifts that this region gave to the world included avocados, corn, pineapple, cocoa, chocolate, cassava, cashews, Jerusalem artichokes, pumpkins, squash, peanuts, pomegranates, passion fruit, papayas, sunflowers, sweet potatoes, tomatoes – the list goes on and on. Alas, those who appropriated these riches, by exterminating the original people who gave them to the world, never steeped themselves in the knowledge of how these agricultural products could be produced in harmony with the environment for millennia.

Our problem today, as we contemplate the challenge of culture and development, is, first of all, a conceptual one. We are the victims of a fragmented vision. The Indians saw the countries of the Caribbean Basin as an organic whole. They viewed it then as an integral part of an island and mainland environment in which the living world wore an eternal green mantle, and their shamans taught each new generation that, if you removed the green skin of the living world, the earth would become a graveyard.

If this region was once the greatest reservoir of health foods in the world, why don't we make it so once more for the next century and beyond? We can turn the region into a vast reservoir of organically grown fruits, vegetables, nuts and flowers. We can rely on wind, solar and other non-polluting energy sources for our principal energy supplies. Dominica, with its geothermal capacities, for example, should be using thermal energy to meet all of its needs, and then exporting electricity to neighbouring islands. In this way, we can achieve the benefits that have eluded us for five centuries – maintain a healthy and prosperous population, produce significant surpluses for export and develop a new, different and attractive tourism. Thus, we can preserve our past heritage for the future.

Albert Cowdrey described the Indian horticultural practices as 'the most energy-efficient of all economic systems'.[7] There was the corn-beans-squash triad and also the sweet potato-pumpkin-cassava triad. The Taino system of mound planting, as distinct from row planting,

prevented wind and water erosion for centuries in spite of hurricanes and occasional cycles of drought and flood. Then there was the 'three sister' farming with corn or cassava stalks as a trellis on which beans would grow, and then squash, pumpkin or other plants would provide a moisture retentive ground cover, ensuring both balanced soil nutrients and a balanced diet.

For our farmers today, as an ancillary activity to the production of a variety of health foods, we could, for both commercial and aesthetic reasons, produce flowers – heliconias, orchids, anthuriums and a vast variety of rare and exquisite flowers that grow on trees or on the ground under the rain forest canopy. These latter make very good house plants, since they are accustomed to a limited supply of light. Then there are, of course, herbs, herbal medicines and pharmaceutical products that would bring added commercial and health benefits to our region as well as to countries outside of it. The greening of the Caribbean will be its salvation. A rich, vital, fecund and enduring human culture has never developed in an unwholesome environment.

Postscript

> 'A missionary once asked Prof. Schultes, "Why do we want to know all the plants on the earth? When the final trumpet is sounded, we'll know everything anyway." That may or may not be true, but until then we cannot sit still. If we are to safeguard the rights of the indigenous peoples, protect endangered species, find new food to feed the hungry and new medicines to cure the sick, now is the time to act. We must develop a proactive, holistic approach to the environmental problems we face, realising that previously overlooked or even ridiculed worldviews like shamanic wisdom can help us find answers to some of the questions we face. If we don't, our children and grandchildren will inherit a world infinitely less diverse biologically and culturally than the one into which we were born.'
>
> – *M. Plotkin*[8]

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Commentary

Europe

From refugee to terrorist

> 'A common culture of Euro-racism – which defines all Third World peoples as immigrants and all immigrants and refugees as terrorists and drug runners – cannot tell a citizen from an immigrant or an immigrant from a refugee, let alone one black from another.'
>
> – *A. Sivanandan*[1]

In April 1996, a huge police operation, with marksmen and helicopters, was launched to raid a Kurdish community centre in Haringey, north London. Inside, embarrassed police found a Kurdish group rehearsing a Harold Pinter play about the repression of Kurds.[2] Someone had seen hooded armed men going into the community centre and the police, forgetting the advance notification they had been given of the rehearsal, assumed the Kurds were engaged in terrorist violence. Fortunately for the Kurds, on this occasion at least, the police didn't shoot first and ask questions later.

When the IRA announced a ceasefire on 31 August 1994, there was a general expectation that the emergency and anti-terrorist laws allowing the police to cordon off whole areas and stop and search vehicles, to detain people incommunicado for up to a week and to banish them into internal exile, would not be renewed. After all, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act had to be renewed annually. But it was not to be. The draconian powers were kept intact and used on different targets; no longer just 'Irish', but 'international' terrorism was the justification for retaining powers which the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly condemned for infringing fundamental rights to freedom. And the police

stop and search powers under the PTA were extended in April 1996 to pedestrians within designated areas, who can now be stopped and searched at random.

Why did the leaders of the major British parties agree not just to continue but to expand these repressive measures? Because to the politicians and the racist opinion-formers, immigrants and asylum-seekers are a threat of the same order as terrorists, and merit the same response: extreme powers of prevention, detection and apprehension, with no regard to democratic or human rights.

UK

Different communities come in for special targeting in different European countries. In the UK, the tendency is for Middle Eastern people, from Palestine, Lebanon or the Gulf states, as well as Sikhs from the Punjab, to be given the full anti-terrorist treatment (although recently, under pressure from France and Germany, Kurds and north Africans have come under scrutiny too). Karamjit Singh Chahal, a Sikh community leader, is treated as a terrorist suspect, despite his acquittal on criminal charges, and has been in prison for over five years awaiting deportation to India (where he is likely to be tortured to death) on evidence he is not allowed to know, let alone challenge.[3] Raghbir Singh, held at Winson Green prison in Birmingham for over a year, is another Sikh 'terrorist' who has yet to hear what he is alleged to have done to merit deportation on national security grounds. Such processes are the equivalent of the PTA's exclusion orders, with the same absence of real appeal rights.

France

In France, the main suspect community is the Algerian. In the clamp-down on suspected Islamists in 1993, 2,000 were rounded up and deported to Algeria, where some were never heard of again. Others were put on a charter flight to Burkina Faso, where they remain stranded, unable to return to France or to Algeria. Others still were placed under house arrest.[4] Over a million young North Africans were stopped and searched in the wake of the metro bomb in August 1995. What particularly enraged the Algerian community in France was the issue of three fake photofit pictures of north Africans even before the identity or nationality of the bombers was known, in a police public relations exercise designed 'to reassure the public'. When the Swedish authorities refused to extradite a suspect with an unbreakable alibi, the French did not conceal their fury. (France has also been leaning on Britain to clamp down on Islamist activists.) Up to 800 Algerians remain detained in France without charge, their children taken by social services and their houses repossessed. An unknown number have been deported to Algeria, where they have been put in the notorious concentration camps in the

Sahara desert or simply killed. Now, the UK government is arguing that French expertise in dealing with Islamist extremists should be used in the creation of counter-terrorism 'centres of excellence'.[5]

Algerian exiles accuse the French authorities of open collusion with the junta, which has retained power in Algeria despite the FIS election victory in 1991, for the sake of the huge reserves of oil and natural gas in the country. They refer to the banning of a book describing the excesses of the Algerian junta since 1991, the *White Book* on repression in Algeria, censored by interior minister Debré earlier this year on public order grounds. This collusion between governments makes a terrorist out of every dissident, out of every gang leader. Even Khalid Kelkal, a young French Arab killed by police in a gun battle in September 1995 near Lille, was posthumously elevated from 'gang leader' to 'terrorist', to justify his extrajudicial execution.

Germany

In Germany, it is the Kurds who are singled out as a suspect community. Germany, with France, banned the PKK and ERNK, the main Kurdish groups, in 1993 at the request of the then Turkish prime minister, Tansu Ciller, who had vowed to crush the Kurdish rebels within a year, and followed up the bans with vicious repression of Kurdish protests.[6] Banned demonstrations are labelled a threat to public order in Germany, and 'ringleaders' are dealt with harshly. President Roman Herzog said in March 1996, referring to participation in banned demonstrations, that foreigners engaged in 'violence and terror' have forfeited the right to stay in the country;[7] and a Bill going through the German Bundestag makes deportation of those breaching the peace at banned demonstrations easier. Germany is also seeking the extradition of European Kurdish leader Kani Yilmaz from the UK, where he has been in top-security Belmarsh prison for twenty-one months, ever since coming from Germany (where he had political asylum) to a House of Commons meeting in October 1994.[8]

Once more, Germany's interests in cooperation with Turkey against Kurdish dissidents are obvious: German arms sales and trade links to Turkey. Germany is currently cultivating trade links with Iran, and is simultaneously clamping down on Iranian opposition activity in Germany. This is worrying Iranian refugees there, who fear an attempt to declare Iran safe, followed by attempted deportations. It is particularly frightening as the German internal security police enjoy close links with their Iranian counterparts.

Silencing dissent

Within the suspect communities, it is political activists who are the prime targets, and the true aim is often to silence them. Kani Yilmaz's extradition is sought, not because he is alleged to have committed any

acts of terrorism, but for the leadership he gives to the Kurdish community in exile. In France, too, it is leading Islamists rather than terrorists who find themselves in detention, under house arrest or deported. A leading activist of FAF (an Algerian solidarity group in France), Moussa Kraouche, is still under house arrest two years after it was disclosed that the evidence linking him with terrorism was false and probably planted by police.[9] Mohammed Al-Masari was threatened with deportation from the UK to Dominica because of his peaceful but noisy dissident activities against the Saudi regime.[10] In the wake of the Al-Masari affair, the British government has announced plans for a new conspiracy law to prevent foreigners seeking asylum in the UK if their activities are considered detrimental to 'national interests'. Such a move would contravene the Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees. But the government has anticipated that. At a meeting of the foreign and interior ministers of the G7 industrial nations in July, the UK proposed that a new convention, refusing asylum to anyone planning or funding terrorism, be adopted. Such plans amount to a public declaration that commercial, diplomatic and arms links with refugee-producing countries take precedence over refugees' rights to life and freedom.

Emergency

But the safeguarding of commercial and diplomatic ties with repressive regimes by targeting refugee communities and activists is only part of the story. For the vote-mongering politicians of western Europe, it is equally important to present the 'invasion' of immigrants and asylum-seekers as a threat of the same magnitude as that from terrorism, and one which justifies the same sort of emergency measures. We have become used to the imprisonment without trial of immigrants and asylum-seekers, to their routine fingerprinting, to the illegal immigrant intelligence units exchanging information: in short, to measures germane to serious and urgent criminal investigations being used on immigrants and asylum-seekers. An automated fingerprint-matching system to match the prints of all asylum-seekers anywhere in the EU and access personal data on them all, agreed by EU ministers in 1992, is well on the way to completion. EU ministers are planning a European Information System to collect, collate and exchange information on all immigrants or foreigners travelling or staying in any EU country. In the Netherlands, traditionally one of Europe's more open societies, the government plans a central register which would make information on all foreigners available to all police and immigration officers. Such an internal scheme has been recommended for all EU countries by the European Council of Ministers.

In Italy, groups helping immigrants and asylum-seekers in the fields of health and welfare have called for an end to the 'emergency and

public order approach to immigration'.[11] But the opposite approach is currently rampant, and those groups helping immigrants and campaigning against racist immigration laws are finding themselves increasingly treated as if they were aiding and abetting dangerous criminals and terrorists. In Belgium, on 23 March 1996, police in Geel raided the homes of members of the political organisation 'Truth'. The organisation, set up to tell the truth about imperialism and exploitation in Africa and to help refugees, has been accused of aiding illegal immigration to Belgium. Those arrested had their identity papers confiscated and were taken to the police station in windowless vans, like terrorist suspects.[12]

And in Germany, the same law which is being invoked against Kani Yilmaz is being used in a show trial against the anti-fascist group, Autonome Antifa (M), whose members are charged with 'building and being members of a criminal organisation'. A five-year investigation of 143 suspected members of the organisation, during which almost 14,000 phone calls were tapped in eight months, culminated in a massive police raid on 5 and 6 July 1994. The law, s129 of the Law of Assembly, was introduced over a century ago by Bismarck and does not require specific criminal offences to be proved. Historically, it has been used against organised workers, communists and opponents of German rearmament – in other words, perceived 'enemies of the state'.[13]

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to retain arms contracts worth £20 billion with the Saudi regime.
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13 Ibid.

Africa

Babu of Africa: Pan-African patriot, radical and democrat, 1924–1996

Abdulrahman Muhammad has joined his political ancestors, the illustrious as well as the unheralded men and women who fought to end colonialism, destroy white minority rule and develop a strong African polity and economy. He was known from Cairo to Cape Town and in political circles in the Americas, Asia and Europe simply as Babu, a Swahili word for grandfather, a childhood nickname acquired from an Indian merchant in the Stone Town area of Zanzibar. His death on 5 August in London removes one of the last living links with the radical Pan-Africanism of the late 1950s and early 1960s, exemplified by individuals like Kwame Nkrumah, Abdel Gamal Nasser, Mehdi Ben Barka, Pio Gama Pinto, Dr Felix Moumie and Amilcar Cabral. These visionary individuals saw early on that mere flag independence would result in resource-rich Africa continuing to be poor, weak and dependent.

Babu began a process of political radicalisation when, in 1950, he left Zanzibar for the metropole – in his case London – like other intellectuals from colonial countries. He went to study accounting, but abandoned it for political philosophy and literature. His politics evolved leftward, through a phase as an anarchist, towards marxist socialism.

London was a hotbed of African anti-colonial politics during this period. George Padmore was in residence, working with a network of organisations and individuals plotting the demise of British colonialism in Africa. Kwame Nkrumah had left London three years before Babu's arrival and, within a decade, led his country to independence as Ghana.

Babu worked with the Movement for Colonial Freedom, led by Fenner Brockway. He learned the nuts and bolts of political organisation at this time in a way that would stand him in good stead when he returned to Zanzibar in 1957 as the secretary general of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP). The young Pan-Africanist also began building a network of continent-wide and global contacts.

The ZNP was in disarray when Babu arrived back in Zanzibar after a

seven-year absence. It had suffered a devastating defeat in the 1957 elections for the colonial legislature. However, the party's fortunes changed, with Babu as chief organiser, and it won a majority on the Legislative Council, in a coalition with a smaller party, in the June 1961 election.

Babu was in an increasingly untenable position in the ZNP, despite his key role in its political strengthening and electoral success. Sharp differences developed rapidly over a three-year period between the radical secretary general and Ali Muhsin, the leader of the party's moderate wing. They revolved around ideological differences, the ZNP's commitment to multiracialism and its contemporary links to the party's origins as an African peasant movement. Babu left the ZNP in mid-1963 and formed the Umma (masses) Party, as a self-proclaimed vanguard grouping.

The Umma Party, despite its small numbers, played the role of organisational catalyst for the events leading up to the Zanzibar revolution in January 1964. Michael Lofchie, a leading scholar of the social upheaval, wrote, 'Umma drew its support from the full range of anti-government elements ... [and] functioned as an organisational meeting ground for all these groups between the election and the revolution.' Umma also played a prominent role in unifying the two trade union centres and the opposition press under the auspices of the All Zanzibar Journalist Organisation. It could play this role because of Babu's organisational ability and the high quality of the young Umma Party cadres he trained.

The January 1964 revolution deposed the sultan and established a Revolutionary Council with substantial participation by the Umma Party. Babu was appointed the minister of foreign affairs. These events sent shock-waves through the region, where a civil war was raging in Congo-Leopoldville and nationalists in Mozambique were preparing to launch an armed struggle.

The American and British governments were concerned about Babu's high profile and the presence of highly disciplined Umma cadres in the revolutionary government. This was viewed as a clear and present danger that Zanzibar would become the Cuba of Africa and export revolution to the continent. The Tanzanian president, Julius K. Nyerere, was also apprehensive. Babu was, in addition, feared by Abeid Karume, the chairman of the Revolutionary Council and leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party, the senior party in the coalition government.

Karume and Nyerere, with the urging of the Americans and British, moved to dilute Babu's influence in Zanzibar. They effected a hurried union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form Tanzania in April 1964 while he was on a mission to Pakistan. On his return, he was delegated to go to Tanzania, where he was joined by other Umma Party cadres, as minister of economic planning.

Babu and many of the young Umma Party contingent were

manoeuvred out of Zanzibar to prevent them from moving the country further to the left. This move was successful and Karume imposed his own one-man authoritarian rule. However, Babu and his associates played a critical role in moving Tanzania and Nyerere leftward. This is clearly seen in the adoption of the Arusha declaration and Mwongozo, the leadership code.

The home of the Zanzibar revolutionary on Luthuli Road in Dar es Salaam received visitors from throughout the Pan-African world and beyond. Babu served as an unofficial liaison for revolutionary groups fighting white minority rule and reactionary governments, in addition to his ministerial duties. He opened government doors and provided contacts for sources of support for their struggles. Many of the leaders, who assumed power after the fall of Portuguese colonialism and the demise of the white settler colonies, had gathered in his home for political discussion, advice and good food.

African Americans were encompassed within Babu's definition of the Pan-African world. He was a steadfast friend of Malcolm X and attended an Organisation of African Unity meeting at the Audubon Ballroom. Babu was supportive of the black Americans who lived in Tanzania during the 1960s and 1970s. He also maintained contact with progressive African American academicians and movement figures, including Amiri Baraka, whom he had known for more than thirty years.

Nyerere dropped Babu from his cabinet, where he had held a number of ministerial posts, in 1971. The decision was taken while he was travelling outside the country. Babu remained, however, a parliamentary backbencher.

Karume was assassinated in April 1972. Nyerere arrested Babu and detained him without trial for six years, but refused to return him to Zanzibar. An international campaign for his release was organised and Babu was adopted as a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International.

Babu left Tanzania after his release. He worked as a lecturer at colleges in the United States and Britain, including Amherst College and Birkbeck College at London University. His focus on African affairs remained consistent and he worked to foster democracy in Africa. Babu was involved in organising the seventh Pan-African Congress and was actively sought out by the younger generation of African leaders for his counsel.

Africa-based politics called out to Babu again in 1995. He returned to Tanzania to run as the vice-presidential candidate of the opposition National Convention for Construction and Reform. The government short-circuited his electoral bid by disqualifying him on the grounds of his six-year detention without trial from 1972-78.

Silver Spring, MD MALIK M. CHAKA

Book reviews

Photocopies

By JOHN BERGER (London, Bloomsbury, 1996). 180pp. £13.99

'Only the utterly essential is communicated' – that beautiful, understated phrase could stand as the epigram of this collection of portraits and recollections. It is taken from what, on the surface, is one of the more unlikely subjects for Berger's passionate evocations – of the final stages of the motorcycle World Endurance Championships. And of an accident on track that leaves one rider with his leg severed. That is a clumsy description, for it does nothing to convey the essence or shape of Berger's writing here or elsewhere in *Photocopies*. For, above all else, these are moments caught from an intensely lived life. Not a life that is lived to itself, but one that reaches through the experience of others, just some of them recreated here. And it is the sharp, immediate feel of that intensity, the experience of it now, that Berger has created. So the portrait is twofold, of the individual at a fragment of time, caught out of time and held before us, and the author whose power of feeling and depth of creative self-effacement enable these recreations to take place.

For these are recreations, not just vignettes (horrible word) or descriptions – I used the term 'portraits' in the attempt to place them, but that is too imprecise, florid and static a word also. How different, this attempt to convey my reader's experience by addition, stockpiling one adjective on another, from Berger's prose, clear as water and thin as glass. 'Only the utterly essential is communicated' – listen to it, feel it, its delicate, precise sound, its falling rhythm. All the writing is like that, spare, direct, born out of an unflinching, intense looking and with the simplicity of profound depth. Of a cabin in the mountains, now a friend, its occupant has died: 'Sometimes the pine trees seem as if they've just stopped walking. There are nights when the Milky Way looks as close as a mosquito net.' That made me catch my breath when

I read it. I have seen the Milky Way maybe three or four times in my life, here in England. The Milky Way, that has inspired poets for centuries – was it Troilus who fled there and hid his face 'amid a crowd of stars'? – is now scarcely visible, covered by thick, atmospheric and visual pollution. So how right that the writer whose seeing is a gift that gives others to see should lift, for me, that obscuring veil.

Photocopies – so modest and unexpected a title – the transmission of the originals to us, the readers, so that we may share, without limitation or exclusivity, in the immediacy of the moment, created paradoxically by the author's power of reflection. There are no hierarchies in this most human of writings – whether Cartier-Bresson, an unnamed painter, a homeless blind man – only the attempt to reconnect what modern life, self-absorption, getting and spending in a free market world, shatters and sunders. Berger sees a newspaper picture of a young, wounded Russian woman, attempting to defend the Russian parliament in 1993 against the onslaught of free market reactionaries, and evokes a compelling picture of her struggle in that world.

> Everything once lived has lost its value. Everything has become junk for sale. Each day in the streets you have seen people selling treasures, once close to their hearts, in order to buy sugar or a pair of boots for the winter. All the sacrifices of three generations are now being sacrificed on the altar of the Free Market. And, once sacrificed, instantly spent so that nothing remains. Nothing.
>
> With your delicacy you came to protect against that nothing.

Only a writer who cleaves, like Berger, to the holiness of the heart's affections and the truth of the imagination could conjure such depth out of a newspaper image.

Part of Berger's process of reconnection is also a historical awareness, reaching into the recent past or further back to the stories and legends of the ancient world, as informing still an imaginative understanding of today. 'At historic moments, two, three, even four generations are sometimes compressed and co-exist within the lived experience of a single hour.' That wholeness – of seeing, feeling, apprehending, reflecting in all their intensity, without extravagance or exaggeration – is what Berger has set unsparingly down on the page. It is a writing born of giving, it is Berger's gift to us.

HAZEL WATERS

Illicit Union: scientific racism in modern South Africa

By SAUL DUBOW (Johannesburg and Cambridge, Witwatersrand University Press and Cambridge University Press, 1995). 315pp. £15.95.

Saul Dubow has produced a fascinating, readable and extensively researched study of the intellectual discourse on 'race' in South Africa between the early years of the nineteenth century and the middle years of the twentieth (marked approximately by the UNESCO statement on race in 1952). The principal chapters cover the investigations of physical anthropologists and comparative anatomists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; debate over 'Bantu' origins and cultural diffusion, and the significance of eugenics in South African debate between the wars; mental testing, IQs and 'the native mind'; and, finally, the relation between Christian-national ideology and the emergence of apartheid. Although the principal developments in most of these areas occurred elsewhere, South Africa during this period was of paramount importance in the history of scientific racism, not only because of the way in which it infused the political worlds of segregation and apartheid, but also because of the role played by this part of Africa as a laboratory in the early western scientific searches for the origins of 'man' (to use the language of the time). It is with the way in which the emerging scientific community of South Africa is drawn into this latter process that the book begins.

Although the book is written primarily as a historical account, Dubow, by connecting the various 'scientific' investigations to their authors' preconceptions of the African 'Other', provides a classic case study in the social construction of knowledge. Debate around the origins of the 'Bushmen' in the early years of the present century, for instance, involved attempts to distinguish them from 'Hottentots' and 'Strandlopers' – classifications which had their origins in sub-scientific discourse – through extensive comparative anatomical studies. From the self-evidently superior vantage point of white civilisation, these researches inevitably attempted to place indigenous South Africans at a lower level on the evolutionary scale, linking them with finds from excavated older settlements. Thus, in the 1920s, M.R. Drennan, Professor of Anatomy at the University of Cape Town from 1919 to 1956, considered the 'Bushmen' as a failed evolutionary branch, while his more internationally renowned colleague at Witwatersrand, Raymond Dart, was able to write in 1936 of their 'child-like characteristics' – making a quite unconscious transfer from measured physical differences to cultural and psychological attributes based purely upon casual observation and popular stereotype.

Similar implicit biases are evident in the attempts to classify the 'Southern African Negro' or the 'Bantu', for many years regarded as

'superior', and therefore of a different 'race', to Africans elsewhere on the continent. Thought to be less black or 'negroid' than West and Central Africans, the scientific community of South Africa for many years believed this to be due to Hamitic influence from North-East Africa, which, naturally enough, derived in its turn from some distant mix with Europe. Hence the more 'civilised' nature of the Southern African 'Negro'! The influence of this school of thought was pervasive, for example through Charles Seligman's influential text on *The Races of Africa* which was widely used between 1930 and the 1960s. Again, the leap between a supposedly objective comparative anatomical study and ideological preconceptions, made easier by notions of cultural diffusionism, emerges uncritically. How this then comes across to the political world is illustrated in Jan Smuts' 1929 Oxford lecture in which he declared that 'the negroid Bantu ... has largely remained a child-type, with a child psychology and outlook', a view which underlay his approach to white 'trusteeship' of Africans through segregation and separate development. On the other hand, this period was also marked by debate among anthropologists respecting the relative merits of physical versus cultural (and linguistic) anthropology, though again influenced by diffusionist perspectives.

The two chapters covering the influence of eugenics bring out the specificity of South Africa in the paradoxes associated with the so-called 'poor whites' problem. The irony here was that 'poor whiteism' tended to be identified with environmental disadvantage, while the poverty of black people was taken as evidence of their genetic inferiority. Likewise, the Afrikaners were regarded as particularly adaptable to life in Africa because of their descent from a particularly beneficial mixture of European 'races' – at the same time as cross-breeding between white and black was defined as 'miscegenation' leading to a weakened species. Similar ironies were present in the development and interpretation of IQ tests.

Chapter 7, on Christian-national ideology, Afrikaner identity and the central role of the *volk*, at first seems to fit uneasily with the rest of the book, though reproducing interesting themes which the author has developed elsewhere. The key point here is the ambivalent attitude of the Dutch Reformed Church towards the evolutionary, and hence anti-creationist, background of the scientific world. This, however, is mentioned only briefly by Dubow and could perhaps have been developed further. In the second half of the book, in fact, there is a tendency to let the details of different viewpoints on, for instance, IQ testing, overwhelm the more contextual themes of the impact of the scientific establishment on popular perceptions and political parties.

Yet, in other ways, the author's précis of historical detail is impressive. He ranges through the work of Dart, Drennan, Smuts, Broom, Gardner, P.J. Coertze among the anthropologists, through

Pim, Bell, Fantham, Duerden and others on eugenics, to Kidd, Levy-Bruhl, Fick and Biesheuvel on intelligence testing, and Kuyper and Du Toit on scriptural rationale, all among many others, in a most comprehensive and highly readable fashion. Such wide coverage, combined with an essentially narrative approach, does, however, limit the author's scope for interpretation and, although he does refer to a 'discourse of psychological domination' in the summary of Chapter 6 and to the 'naive faith in the dispassionate virtue ... of positivist science' in his introductory chapter, the potential for a more thorough textual deconstruction of South African variants of scientific racism is only tentatively indicated.

Finally, to imply that scientific racism died with the appearance of the UNESCO statement (as is also evident in Elazar Barkan's *The Retreat of Scientific Racism*) is, to this reviewer, unduly optimistic and as misleading as Dubow's reference to a 'post-war colour blind consensus'. Debate over IQ testing has continued to rumble on, with its latest manifestation in the notorious *Bell Curve* by Murray and Herrnstein; the scope for genetic engineering has raised eugenicist arguments in new guises; while psychiatric treatment and diagnosis of black people continues to be influenced by the racist preconceptions of practitioners. In South Africa itself, where apartheid 'racial' categories continue to pervade political discourse, when Nelson Mandela has been shouted down by a Cape Flats audience as a 'kaffir', and when the present reviewer has been told in all seriousness by a Free State farmer in 1996 that 'the Blacks ... don't have the genes' for civilisation, there is still clearly much to be done in examining the continuing impact of 'scientific' racism in its various forms.

Saul Dubow has shown effectively how the ideology of racism permeates even those sections of society that both regard themselves as 'objective' and are so regarded by others. He has produced an excellent periodised study, but the phenomenon itself cannot be so readily confined.

Sheffield ROY LOVE

Imperial Leather: race, gender and sexuality in the colonial contest

By ANNE MCCLINTOCK (London and New York, Routledge, 1995). 449pp. £13.99.

Imperial Leather is another intervention in the debates on the culture of imperialism that have become increasingly prevalent in the academic disciplines of postcolonial studies and cultural studies since the publication in 1978 of Edward Said's *Orientalism*. Beginning from the premise that imperialism and the invention of race were fundamental

aspects of western, industrial modernity, but that imperialism cannot be fully understood without a theory of gender power, McClintock sets out to explore the ways in which the social categories of race, class, gender and sexuality have intersected and played themselves out in imperial culture.

The book is organised in three sections, themselves sandwiched between the two parts of a familiar but still pertinent essay of hers, 'The angel of progress'. Here she analyses the pitfalls of the pervasive and uncritical deployment of the term 'postcolonialism' to generalise about vastly differing contemporary situations such that their historical and geo-political distinctions are rendered into (Eurocentric) invisibility. The essay concludes with an apposite critique of the proliferation of 'post'-words in academic and cultural life over the last few years.

The main body of the text is sweeping in its scope: spanning the past century and a half and moving from Victorian, metropolitan space through to the colonies and in particular Africa, it draws on a diversity of genres and cultural forms for its analyses including photography, diaries, ethnography, performance poetry, advertisements and the imperialist fiction of Rider Haggard. Opposed at a methodological level to the separation of psychoanalysis and what she misleadingly terms 'material history' (in referring to political economics/history), McClintock proposes that explorations of imperial and anti-imperial narratives should draw on both. In the first section of her book, she presents various illustrations of her argument that, in the Victorian era, 'the invention of race in the urban metropoles ... became central not only to the self-definition of the middle class but also to the policing of the "dangerous classes": the working class, the Irish, Jews, prostitutes, feminists, gays and lesbians, criminals, the militant crowd and so on.' Particularly fascinating is her discussion of the curious and fetishistic relationship between the barrister and man of letters, Arthur Munby, and the maidservant, Hannah Cullwick, whom he secretly marries, a case study which enables McClintock to demonstrate the bourgeois management of labour – and in particular women's domestic labour – through an exploration of the attendant ideologies which both 'naturalised' and 'racialised' this labour. In the chapters that follow, she continues to pursue her claim that 'the mass-marketing of empire as a global system was intimately wedded to the Western reinvention of domesticity' by examining how the colonies themselves 'became a theatre for exhibiting ... the cult of domesticity' and 'the reinvention of patriarchy' (which was under threat in the metropole). Of special interest in this respect is the chapter which surveys the way in which advertising, a cultural form which began to flourish in the Victorian era, took explicit shape around the reinvention of racial difference. Domestic commodities (of which the case of soap was exemplary) were mass marketed through their appeal to 'imperial jingoism'. By the turn

of the century, soap ads, inscribing African culture as unclean and undomesticated, embodied the promise that the commodity alone could convert other cultures to 'civilisation'. McClintock contends – in what I believe to be a distinctive argument – that, parallel to the pseudo-scientific racism that saturated anthropological, scientific and medical journals, travel writing and novels, there developed what she terms a 'commodity racism' which was unique in its capacity to expand, market and distribute ideologies of evolutionary racism well beyond the literate and propertied elite to a mass audience.

Her final section, containing chapters on cultural resistance in apartheid South Africa, holds for me, however, her most insightful work. Her chapter on the autobiographical narrative of a black woman, Poppy Nongena, the result of her collaboration with a white Afrikaner, Elsa Joubert, leads to a compelling argument against the practice of divorcing literary texts from their social and political contexts, and an exploration of the resistant, collectivist and dynamic politics that the narrative reveals. Another chapter on 'cultural resistance in the desperate decades' charts the evolution of black writing in English, from the writers of the 1950s whose work aspired to the 'universal' literary conventions of the traditional canon, through the increasing radicalisation of their aesthetic values, to the emergence in the 1970s of the Soweto poets whose work, '"unliterary", incendiary ... formally inelegant and politically indiscreet', marked the transition to a cultural nationalist politics.

But, like so much of the recent work on imperialism by cultural critics, *Imperial Leather* is unable in the main to demonstrate the broader socio-economic and political significance of the cultural themes that it explores. This is in part due to the historical and conceptual imprecision of McClintock's use of the term imperialism. She fails to differentiate, for example, between colonialism and imperialism; she neglects also to situate imperialism vis à vis capitalist development (discussion of commodities and their fetishisation substitutes for this), and there seems to be no awareness of the causes of change in the configuration of imperialism during the vast period she scans. One consequence of this is that she fails to engage adequately with the vastly differing modes and effects of imperialism in different parts of the globe, so that, in the total absence of a rationale for her particular concentration on the case of South Africa, one can only assume that she supposes it to be representative of imperialist and anti-imperialist culture as a whole. Her imprecision curiously effects, in fact, a similar homogenisation of cultures to that of the peddlers of the term 'postcolonialism' whom she herself so succinctly critiques.

There may well be an argument to be made for linking the methodology of psychoanalysis to a materialist analysis of imperial culture, but McClintock fails to convince that the examples she surveys

have much to do with the central mechanics of imperialist domination or that her documentation of individual instances of women's social and political agency and cultural resistance – offered to counter 'the historical definition of family and female as outside politics proper' – amounts to a theory of collective, anti-imperial resistance or socio-economic power. In addition, the style and organisation of her work serve merely to increase a conviction that there is no cumulative thrust, no sustained, structuring argument across the book as a whole. Irritatingly overwritten and repetitive – her chapters are cumbersome, divided into numerous subtitled sections with little attempt to link either sections or chapters to each other or the argument she constantly proposes that she will make – she is at times guilty of overstatement and rhetorical grandstanding, as in her repeated use of adjectives such as 'violently' (male), 'deadly' (labour of the female) or 'murderously' (violent change) to dramatise quite trivial points. Ultimately, alas, the text remains a series of loosely-connected essays that offer local and sometimes interesting insights into the culture and counter-culture of imperialism: it goes no further than to 'tell a series of overlapping and contradictory stories' drawn from 'genres [that] are diverse'.

Middlesex University TAMARA JAKUBOWSKA

The Diary of Anne Frank: the critical edition

Edited by D. BARNOUW and G. VAN DER STROOM (London, Viking, 1995). 736pp. £30.

It is fifty years since Anne Frank died of typhus in the Nazi concentration camp of Bergen-Belsen, two weeks before it was liberated by British soldiers. If she had survived the war and lived on, she would now be 66. But one of six million, her grave and those of her mother, Edith, and sister, Margot, remain untraced. When her father, Otto Frank, the only member of the family to live through the processes of extermination, returned to Amsterdam after the war, one of the family's helpers during their time in hiding, presented him with Anne's diary. She had salvaged it after the Nazis had ransacked its hiding place – the diary kept during Anne's two years in the 'secret annexe' in Otto's office premises on the Prinsengracht, a beautiful tree-lined and canal-lined street in the heart of the city.

The *Diary*, first published in Dutch in 1947, has since become the most celebrated and widely-read work of young people's literature ever written. The 'Anne Frank House' is now a museum visited by half a million people from all over the world each year. They climb up its steep and narrow staircase to enter the 'hidden annexe' through the concealing bookcase and explore the small, secreted rooms lived in by

the Frank and van Daan families and the irritable dentist, Mr Dussel, see the lines on the wall made by Otto Frank to check the height of his daughters, or the film magazine cuttings on Anne's bedroom walls of Greta Garbo, Ginger Rogers and Ray Milland. Like Anne, they look out towards the chestnut tree in the backyard, 'on whose branches little raindrops glisten like silver, and at the seagulls and other birds as they glide in the wind'. And, in the house, there is now a glass case with editions of the *Diary* that span the languages and publishing houses of the world. Rooms which marked a fearful and vulnerable refuge surrounded by Nazi oppression and racist death are now a teaching place, a house of precious knowledge and internationalism.

To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary, a full critical edition was published of Anne's work. Over 700 pages long and prepared by the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, the edition contains variants of the original manuscript, deletions, additions, a summary of the findings of a handwriting identification process and background chapters on the betrayal, arrest, imprisonment and deportation of the Frank family, as well as responses to fascist attacks on the *Diary*'s authenticity – in short, a full scholarly text. From the tartan notebook used by Anne, through popular editions like the slim Pan paperback I remember as a boy, to monumental critical tome has been a long journey for Anne's words, but a necessary and respectful one. For every young people's library in schools, colleges and communities should have this book for close reference and study, so that school students in particular can see clearly and know that one of their own has produced a classic work which is for always in its truth and humanity, and its documentation of hope over cruelty.

Anne Frank's testimony is doubtless one of the most vital writings of our century, expressed as it is with a burning generosity and an optimism which seems astonishing, given the terrible fatality of the situation that the Frank family, and those hiding with them, found themselves in. When you visit the house you think – this hiding place, so obvious, so conspicuous, was really no refuge at all from eventual capture. Discovery must have been inevitable. Anne knew this in her heart as she wrote that 'a deadly close silence hangs everywhere, catching hold of me as if it will drag me down deep into an underworld'. Or again:

> The round, clearly defined spot where we stand is still safe, but the clouds gather more closely about us and the circle which separates us from the approaching danger closes more and more tightly. Now we are surrounded by danger and darkness that we bump against each other, as we search desperately for a means of escape.

And yet the *Diary* radiates a luminous hope. In the midst of the quarrels with her mother in that congested space, her annoyance at the pettinesses

of Mrs van Daan and the confusion of feelings inside her for her son, Peter van Daan, the intolerance of Mr Dussel and her tiredness at the daily round of communal tasks and arguments in the sharing out of the tiny portions of butter – in all of this, the immediate world inside the wider orbit of fascist occupation outside the hiding place, there is optimism about ordinary people and their motives. It reaches its final expression in the entry written shortly before the betrayal and invasion of the refuge:

> That's the difficulty in these times: ideals, dreams and cherished hopes rise within us, only to meet the horrible truth and be shattered.
>
> It's really a wonder that I haven't dropped all my ideals because they seem so absurd and impossible to carry out. Yet, I keep them, because in spite of everything I still believe that people are really good at heart. I simply can't build up my hopes on a foundation consisting of confusion, misery and death. I see the world being gradually turned into a wilderness, hear the ever-approaching thunder which will destroy us too, I can feel the suffering of millions, and yet if I look up into the heavens, I think that it will all come right, that this cruelty too will end, and that peace and tranquillity will return again.

This is not a loose, groundless hope. For the *Diary* shows Anne and her fourteen years of life to have a sharp and ever-deepening insight about events in the world. When she declares that she can 'feel the sufferings of millions', she reveals an empathy which enabled her to understand much about the brutality of the world's systems as they weighed upon her own life, and would have enabled her to understand them now. Think of the now-times relevance of her musings and questionings of the barbarism that organised itself around her and those she loved:

> Why do some people have to starve while there are surpluses rotting in other parts of the world? Oh why are people so crazy? Why should millions be spent daily on the war and yet there is not a penny available for medical services, artists or for poor people?

Thus she used her diary and its daily commentaries as a means of political education as well as confession and therapy, with herself as her own teacher, living, as she put it, 'a great adventure', as with every act of writing she found her 'courage reborn'. Thus her diary becomes her instrument of self-criticism and self-knowledge in her determination 'to grow into a real young woman'.

But her writing is there also to help her understand the force that drives the centre of her being – the quest for justice. 'My feeling for justice is immovable,' she wrote; she simply couldn't 'swallow ... rage at some injustice'. It is this theme, so unequivocally expressed throughout the *Diary*, that makes it such an invaluable text for the political education and democratic development of young people. It shows that

childhood and adolescence are not barriers to understanding the world. Indeed, Anne Frank shows them to be ages of perception and the catalyst years of building intellectual confidence and insight:

> Although I'm only 14, I know quite well what I want, I know who is right and who is wrong. I have my opinions, my own ideas and principles, and although it may sound pretty mad from an adolescent, I feel more of a person than a child, I feel quite independent of anyone.

And that independence of thought and political acuity is expressed repeatedly in the *Diary*, particularly in Anne's internationalist vision, her way of following events in the war from Italy and the collapse of fascism to the landings in Sicily, anti-Hitler sabotage in Germany, the fall of Algiers and Casablanca and her expectations of the same in Tunis. 'Everyday', she writes, 'thousands are killed in Russia and Africa': this is no parochial schoolgirl writing, but a young person who, from the cell of her secret bedroom, is envisioning the world and its peoples.

When she asserts that she has 'been through things that hardly anyone of my age has undergone', my mind as a schoolteacher goes towards my former students in Sheffield and thousands of other inner-city young people in Britain and elsewhere, whose life experiences and those of their families could be described in the same words. There are many adults who, upon reading Anne's *Diary*, marvel at how a 14-year-old girl could write about her life with so much beauty, maturity and power, describing the best and worst of human thought and action. The truth is that there are Anne Franks writing in their classrooms, bedrooms and at their kitchen tables all over the world, young people wrestling and moving with the world through written words, seeking the rational through creative language as with Anne's determination: 'I think I shall succeed because I want to write.' It was not simply her ambition to become a professional journalist speaking, but her belief in language and its transforming power – for everything went into her relationship with the words that she wrote, and the meanings that she rendered to every day as it passed.

For young Dutch women, Anne Franks of today, writing in their classrooms or their own secret places in the evenings – are they thinking about the Turkish asylum-seeker threatened with deportation, who was found hanged in Hengalo police station, or the Vietnamese refugee shot dead by the Dutch police in Pumerend? They might also be reflecting upon the racist words written by the mayor of Amsterdam to a group of Romany travellers camping on a site in the city's western port district, perhaps writing about the attempt of Dutch and German neo-nazis to stage their annual commemoration of Rudolf Hess's death – or the forty-two racist attacks, including arson, carried out by a group in Nijmegen, for which five people were jailed. All these events happened

not in 1944, but half a century later, which is why Anne Frank's struggle has never stood still, and never will.

Sheffield CHRIS SEARLE

Winning Hearts and Minds: British governments, the media and colonial counter-insurgency 1944-1960

By SUSAN CARRUTHERS (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1995). 320pp. £16.99.

Susan Carruthers rightly criticises the existing literature on British counter-insurgency campaigning for neglecting the importance to the government of winning domestic and international opinion as well as the 'hearts and minds' of local people in contested territories. Discussing British counter-insurgency campaigns in Palestine (1944-47), Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60) and Cyprus (1955-59), Carruthers documents some of the propaganda efforts of the government in these wider areas as well as in the more immediate arena of conflict. While valuable in broadening out the study of counter-insurgency and propaganda in this way, *Winning Hearts and Minds* unfortunately rests on unsound analytical foundations and is restricted in the scope of its concerns.

Carruthers defines the critical term 'propaganda' as a 'neutral' concept equivalent to 'information' or 'publicity'. This is to side-step the central issue. Propaganda is not simply the provision of 'information'; it is the selection and presentation of particular pieces of 'information', sometimes it involves the suppression or distortion of 'information', sometimes even the outright fabrication of 'information' – all for political purposes. Any serious analysis of propaganda must address these issues. Carruthers repeatedly shies away from such problems.

Similarly, 'terrorism' is defined *a priori* as sub-state terrorism. Others have sometimes referred to this category as 'retail terrorism' as opposed to state or 'wholesale terrorism'. By excluding the latter from consideration as 'terrorism', Carruthers again avoids a central question: whether 'counter-insurgency campaigning' is not itself a form of terrorism – the use or threatened use of violence for political ends.

On these unreliable foundations, Carruthers constructs a modest analysis which is perhaps over-dependent on the internal record and therefore more concerned with the staffing, organisation and policies of government propaganda agencies than the realities which these agencies were grappling with. Carruthers quite rightly takes earlier writers to task for not paying 'due attention to what "winning hearts and minds" actually meant'. However, her own study could be said to suffer from precisely this failure.

In the colonial arena, 'winning hearts and minds' meant (speaking euphemistically) changing local people's beliefs and attitudes by a combination of civil and military policies. While colonial strategists generally recognised that these changes could not be obtained merely by propaganda alone, Carruthers pays very little attention to these issues of policy. In Britain itself, and internationally, British propagandists had to battle with often unfavourable popular and elite attitudes. The larger narratives of these social forces and the challenges they posed for British propaganda are not discussed in *Winning Hearts and Minds*, nor are they alluded to.

It is, by now, commonplace that, beneath the pose of 'objectivity' and 'neutrality', historians and social scientists often obscure commitments that affect their work. This study is no exception. In fact, it could almost be argued that *Winning Hearts and Minds* is, in many ways, an unconscious testimony to the power of the British propaganda system. One of the most powerful techniques of modern western propaganda is to exclude certain questions from discussion – it is not that a particular thought or concern is wrong or inappropriate or unfounded, it is just not expressed. In fact, it is *unthinkable*. It is 'not thinkable', for example, that counter-insurgency campaigning in, say, Malaya was itself a form of state terrorism. From another point of view, it is 'unthinkable' that the mass media were supportive of state power and of colonial war, and that the friction between media and military turned for the most part on tactics. To her credit, Carruthers approaches the point of considering this as a possibility, but draws back from the brink. She is clearly aware of the work of Noam Chomsky and his colleagues (as her bibliography indicates), but she does not even raise the possibility that the 'propaganda model' they have developed may be relevant to the intersection of propaganda and counter-insurgency that she is examining (as her index indicates).

It is also 'not thinkable' that systematic brutality was used by British forces as a matter of policy in the course of these counter-insurgency campaigns. When she does discuss this topic, Carruthers focuses on the perennial need for British propagandists to produce 'defensive propaganda', defending the British forces against charges of brutality. The validity of the charges themselves is rarely examined, and the focus is very much on the propagandists, not on the alleged perpetrators – or the alleged victims.

Beyond the issues of 'means', there is, of course, the question of 'ends': imperial control as opposed to national independence. The legitimacy of and conflict between these two claims to sovereignty is also glossed over in Carruthers' discussion, despite its centrality to the debate around counter-insurgency and decolonisation. In the final analysis, as an addition to the literatures on counter-insurgency and

propaganda, the value of *Winning Hearts and Minds* lies more in the questions that it raises than in the answers it provides.

Oxford MILAN RAI

The Myth of Political Correctness

By JOHN K. WILSON (London and Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1996). 205pp. £13.95.

There is no doubt that John K. Wilson is on the side of the angels. As 'a first hand witness to what had been happening on college campuses for the past eight years' (having taken 150 classes in dozens of departments) he was so disturbed by discrepancies between what he read of Political Correctness (PC) and the reality before his eyes, that he set out to put the record straight.

The four core chapters of the book examine and refute in great detail the main tenets of the anti-PC brigade: the decline in the teaching of western culture and the enforcement of speech codes, sexual correctness and reverse discrimination on US campuses. What Wilson shows in his minute dissection of supposed curriculum changes, lecturers' remarks and policy decisions is that anecdotes which 'have become more important than the reality ... unravel under the strain of exaggeration, deceptive omission of key facts, and occasional outright invention'.

Unfortunately, much of his detailed refutation does not travel well. Few outside the US academy will really care about exactly what happened to whom at Stanford, Brown or the University of Texas at Austin. The stronger chapters are those in which Wilson situates the PC myth and its makers. He repeatedly points to the irony that 'conservative correctness' – whether silencing an anti-Gulf war rally or the harassment of gay students – is systematically ignored. He observes, 'when someone on the Left was censored – often with the approval of the same conservatives who complained about the PC police – nobody called it political correctness.' He also examines exactly how the conservatives had, in their attack on civil rights and creation of organisations like the Accuracy in Academia (AIA) and the National Association of Scholars during the 1980s, primed the campuses for PC. Only the tactic changed, he says. Instead of getting students to spy on left academics as AIA did, conservatives now can just present themselves as victims of reverse discrimination. And Wilson provides valuable data on the funding by right-wing think tanks of conservative student papers and pop academics such as D'Souza who really turned PC into a target through the mass media.

If there is a problem with the book, it is that it provides some startling insights which tantalise, but never quite satisfy, the reader.

For example, on the final page Wilson explains that the real threat is not PC but FC – fiscal correctness, i.e. massive cutbacks in educational funding. 'The main flaw with American higher education', he writes, 'is not that colleges and universities are too egalitarian, but that they remain places of privilege'. A similar insight – that the tide turned in the culture war for the conservatives because they won over the liberals and moderates who had begun to distrust the left – is also left hanging in the air. How does the ideological onslaught from the right connect to market economics, one wants to know. Why did the left alienate the liberals?

It is, in fact, in his treatment of the left that Wilson appears to be at his weakest. Whilst he accepts that there are some instances in which political correctness does exist and that it 'should be condemned', he does not incorporate this into his analysis or suggest that these instances might have served to give hostages to the enemy and even have pulled those liberals over to the conservative side. He just castigates the left for allowing 'PC to become a public relations fiasco through its inability or lack of interest to tell the other side of the story'. But, as this journal has demonstrated, the issue is more complex than that. It is because the US campus is divorced from street politics and the larger struggles over social justice which once infected and politicised the student body, that college 'politics' have become distorted and prey to PC attack (see the issue of *Race & Class* on Black America, July 1993). Inward-looking issues of identity and accompanying gesture politics have taken the place of commitment to larger social movements. And 'telling the other side of the story' by playing D'Souza at his own game, which Wilson does magnificently, won't actually solve that fundamental problem.

Institute of Race Relations JENNY BOURNE

Edge of the Knife: police violence in the Americas

By PAUL CHEVIGNY (New York, New Press, 1995). 319pp. $25.

This is a study of the roots and consequences of police violence in six cities: Los Angeles, New York City, Kingston Jamaica, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires and Mexico City. Chevigny asks what are the essential characteristics of the political and social systems within which the police operate which determine the levels of violence used, and argues that to control that violence is the essential civil rights issue concerning ordinary police work.

He identifies the role of the police as not only 'keeping order' but as 'reproducing order'. When police stop an expensive car because it is out of place in a particular area, or the driver is a member of a 'pariah'

group, effectively they are putting these groups 'in their place'. Again, to force an individual to lie on the ground, be searched in public or suffer verbal abuse, is also to put that person 'in their place'. Chevigny sees all violence used by officials against the relatively defenceless as expressions of hierarchy and the imposition of subordination. And those attitudes and actions of the subordinated which are interpreted by the police as 'defiance' are met, in turn, with even more abusive violence by police.

Such abusive violence can result in the ultimate abuse – killing. But whether, or to what degree, this takes place is largely determined by the wider political system, how far police are controlled within it, and by the fears and values of the public. Thus, the level of police killings varies sharply between Los Angeles and New York City – the police are organised differently in the two cities, the political power of racial minorities is not the same, nor is the relationship of local government to police.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, clientelism and corruption play a central role in allowing police misconduct to go unpunished. At the same time, there is widespread public fear of crime and an impatience with the criminal justice system which, in the context of the much touted 'war on crime' makes for 'an explosive brew of state power and vigilantism .. In the most uncontrolled situations, the police may use violence, including deadly force, against the merest petty criminals and those who are poorest, in an effort ... to create a semblance of order in an increasingly miserable population'.

Although torture and the use of deadly force are more controlled in US cities than in Latin America and the Caribbean, the use of violence continues to be a central characteristic of an increasingly unequal society. Here, the principal problem of police violence is non-deadly force – the beatings of civilians in the streets. Such violence is difficult to isolate and easy to conceal; criminal charges are often levelled against the victims who, in the face of a police wall of silence, find it difficult to prove their allegations. Look what happened to Rodney King, even given the videotape of his beating.

Chevigny's discussion has striking resonances for Britain – here, too, is the language of order and place, the presumed characteristics of pariah groups, their subjection to much higher levels of deadly and non-deadly force. For instance, when a police officer, giving evidence to the Christopher Commission (investigating the Los Angeles Police Department) states that 'aggression and force are the only things these people [blacks] respond to, is this much different from Sir Kenneth Newman stating, before he became Metropolitan Commissioner of Police, that Jamaicans were congenitally anti-authority? When British police operate stop and search policies that routinely stop a disproportionate number of black people, are they not 'putting them in

their place'? Fundamental failures of internal discipline and of prosecutions to control police brutality meant that the city of Los Angeles paid out more than $20 million in compensation between 1986 and 1990. And in Britain? The Metropolitan Police has paid out £20 million over the past ten years.

Nor is the 'war on crime' which Chevigny identifies in Latin America and the Caribbean as contributing to an increased use of deadly violence in fact restricted to those areas. Both in the US and Britain, we find police, politicians and right-wing press engaged in a similar scapegoating enterprise. The 'war on crime' has undoubtedly facilitated the judicial murder of an increasing number of people in the US. By the end of 1995, over 3,000 US prisoners were under sentence of death; fifty-six were executed in 1995 alone. The 'war on crime' is used by both Democrats and Republicans in the US and by Conservatives and Labour in Britain to justify ever more draconian policies and practices at every stage of the criminal justice system. Now, there is even a British version of 'three strikes and out'. Clearly, the temptations to an increasingly punitive system that Chevigny identifies in Latin America and the Caribbean are not confined to those regions.

Today, in the face of economic restructuring and increasing economic inequality, there are growing pressures for 'wars' on crime and demands for order. But, order without justice requires, as Chevigny shows, increasing levels of police violence. *Edge of the Knife* is a sober analysis of an issue that is of the gravest importance to civil rights in democratic states.

University of Manchester LOUIS KUSHNICK

The Queen's Daughters: an anthology of Victorian feminist writings on India, 1857-1900

Edited by PENELOPE TUSON (Reading, Ithaca Press, 1995). 341pp. £20.

The Queen's Daughters reflects a growing interest among feminist historians in women's imperial role and in the relationship between their activity in territories under British rule, on the one hand, and their political positions on colonial and gender issues, on the other. More specifically, the collection stems from the British Library's 1989 Colloquium on Resources for Women's Studies. Its editor is a curator in the Library's Oriental and India Office collections, and her instincts as an organiser of source materials have prompted her to supplement her chosen texts with short contextual introductions, bio-bibliographical notes on their authors, and a bibliography of manuscript and archival sources, primary and secondary publications.

The texts selected date from the Rebellion of 1857 to the end of the nineteenth century, the majority being written between 1880 and 1900. Two of the authors, Pandita Ramabai and Cornelia Sorabji, are Indian, while four of the best known – Harriet Martineau, Florence Nightingale, Josephine Butler and Millicent Garrett Fawcett – never visited the subcontinent. Others, like Flora Annie Steel and Annette Ackroyd Beveridge, lived there for extended periods, or made visits for the purpose of investigating and reporting, motivated either by philanthropic visions of 'reform', in the case of Mary Carpenter, in the 1860s, or by a desire to counter the views of 'tinkering meddlers' (read 'do-gooders'), on the part of Mary Billington, in the 1890s.

In addition to those texts in which the author speaks in her own voice, three show how the work of women who involved themselves in Indian affairs was received and commented on. They are a review by Mrs Bayle Bernard of Mary Carpenter's *Six Months in India* (1868), Dorothea Beale's summary of the report by Lady Dufferin, the vicereine, on medical aid to Indian women in 1885-1888, and an extract from *The Queen's Daughters in India* (1899), a report by American feminists Elizabeth Andrew and Kate Bushnell in response to Josephine Butler's campaign against state-controlled prostitution for the benefit of British soldiers in India. Such texts convey a sense of the mutual encouragement, stimulus and critique engaged in by these energetic and influential women.

The Queen's Daughters is arranged in five sections, dealing with 'The Rebellion of 1857 and the dilemma of imperial rule', 'Philanthropists, social reformers and missionaries', Sex, morality and medicine', Nationalism, culture and Indian womanhood' and 'Anti-feminists', where challenges to 'imperial sisterhood' are represented by Mary Billington, with reference to the similar views of Eliza Lynn Linton. Billington's inclusion as a dissenting voice (though a 'progressive' woman and a career journalist who helped to advance the interests of women in that occupation) indicates the variety of positions and perspectives represented.

The Rebellion and the reassertion of British power in its aftermath transformed public attitudes towards India and also confirmed the presence there of British women, many of whom had been casualties of the uprising. This fact became a symbolic marker of their place in debates about its future and, as feminist campaigns on education, access to the professions, marriage and property, and the vote evolved, Indian issues were a frequent reference point.

As Antoinette Burton has suggested in *Burdens of History: British feminists, Indian women and imperial culture* (1994), British women were often the 'intended subject' of texts ostensibly dealing with the emancipation of 'oriental' (that is, domestically confined and excluded) women. She also makes the point that, when opponents of women's

suffrage argued that their incapacity to administer the empire, or to defend it militarily, barred them from parliamentary representation, it was important for feminists to show that they had a role in imperial affairs which would carry equal weight with that of men. It was inevitable that philanthropic activity would present itself as this legitimate role. It is, therefore, interesting to detect in *The Queen's Daughters* the echoes of conflict between respect for Indian institutions and identification with India, on the one hand, and the impulse to correct, to criticise and to improve, on the other. In education, particularly, the converting motive had often to be restrained and goals were proposed which conflicted as little as possible with patriarchal structures that mirrored the 'separate sphere' model at home.

Similarly, theoretical and analytical work by the contemporary scholar, Barbara Ramusack, on the paradigms for western women's engagement with Indian women, is also fleshed out in the texts presented in *The Queen's Daughters*. From Isabella Blagden's earnest verse, in 'Englishwomen in the Rebellion', to Annie Besant's exhilarating appeal to Indian men to revive the more egalitarian gender relations of ancient India, in Martineau's magisterial and Nightingale's bureaucratically powerful prose, women writing on schooling and higher education, religion, women workers and prisoners, child marriage, health, and the status of widows, offer a variety of arguments about Victorian India, refracted through their widely different perceptions of feminism.

University of Greenwich IMOGEN FORSTER

Writing Across Worlds: literature and migration

Edited by RUSSELL KING, JOHN CONNELL and PAUL WHITE (London, Routledge, 1995). 284pp. £14.99.

This is an ambitious attempt to show the important links between literary interpretations of migration and the analysis of its wider economic and social aspects. The aim is to go beyond accounts of the broad economic, social and political contexts of migration to uncover the migrant voice in literature that tells us what it is like 'to live simultaneously inside and outside one's immediate situation ... to traverse borders like the Rio Grande or "Fortress Europe", and by doing so suddenly become an illegal person'.

The collection succeeds in providing sixteen interesting accounts of a wide range of literature reflecting many diverse migratory experiences. Some contributions are concerned with full bodies of literature on a societal scale and some with individual works. It was Joyce who once said that the route to Tara was through Holyhead – that the

understanding of the Irish experience requires understanding of Irish migration. Patrick Duffy's chapter outlines this prevailing influence on Irish literature over the last two centuries. In a similar vein, Federica Scarpa provides a fascinating account of the work of minor writers from the emigrant region of north-east Italy. Others focus on the work of a group of writers from within particular communities such as Alec Hargreaves, whose chapter is on writers of Algerian origin in France, or Stanley Waterman and Marlena Schmool who write on the literary perspectives of Jewish authors in Britain in the early twentieth century. Another two chapters concentrate on the work of individual authors – the Caribbean migration novels of George Lamming and the South Pacific literature of Albert Wendt.

The editors are to be commended for including work on many unknown – even unpublished – writers. Also to be welcomed is the recognition of letters, diaries and oral histories as important influences on literature. However, to relegate these purely to a category of 'pre-literature' and thus fail to accord them importance in their own right smacks of elitism. And, while the collection is not intended to be representative, the lack of consideration of rural-to-urban migration is surprising given the rich seam of literature that exists on the subject (Steinbeck is the most obvious example) and the millions undergoing such migration today in the Third World.

Thankfully, this collection is largely free from the pretentious postmodern theorising that has tended to characterise the recent engagement in the social sciences with literature. Above all, it is very readable and accessible. It also succeeds in going beyond the pre-occupation within geography with *place* to emphasise *movement*. But there is little consideration of how capitalist processes cause such movement. This is partly because the book intends to be as much illustrative as analytical. Yet some contributions do suffer from a preoccupation with the formation of an individual's identity *per se* in relation to their location – 'here' or 'there' or 'in-between' – as if the migration experience and politics of the migrant were entirely constituted of this.

The contributions that work best are those that adopt a critical stance: Jonathan Crush, for example, criticises the literary accounts of South African gold mining for failing to recognise the exploitation caused by capitalist production. Others succeed in powerfully contextualising the literary sources within the wider economic and social forces that impel migration. In this respect, this collection is useful for illustrating how literature can help us understand the human experience of migration and subjection under capitalism.

Bristol TOM BRIDGES

The Ambiguities of Power: British foreign policy since 1945

By MARK CURTIS (London, Zed Press, 1995). 250pp. £12.95.

On the very first page of this outstanding book, Mark Curtis makes the point that there are two ways of looking at British foreign policy since 1945. First, one can assume that Britain 'promotes certain grand principles – peace, democracy, human rights and economic development in the Third World', that British policy has been 'essentially benign'. This is the view advanced by both the media and the academy, with very few exceptions. Or, second, 'one can consider the facts of the real world'. Curtis adopts the second approach and goes on to provide a relentless indictment of British action towards the Third World that is solidly based on original research. The men responsible for British policy in Malaya, Iran, British Guiana, Oman and elsewhere are allowed to condemn themselves out of their own mouths.

Curtis starts by discussing the 1945-51 Labour government's attempts to maintain Britain as a great power. Under Ernest Bevin, the Labour foreign secretary, foreign policy was designed to bolster Britain's position as an independent world power, controlling vast material resources in a far-flung empire. To this end, the colonies were brought under tighter control and economic exploitation was actually intensified. This stance could not be sustained, however. The second world war had left Britain too weak and financially dependent on the United States. Instead of preserving its position as an independent great power, Britain had to come to terms with being a junior partner in America's world hegemony instead.

The conventional view that British and American foreign policies were essentially a response to Soviet aggression is convincingly demolished. This is the rhetoric, not the reality: 'the documents tell a different story'. The actions of the Soviet Union were often of minor, even of no, importance as far as western policy was concerned. If we strip aside the propaganda and look at the real world, we can see that 'the primary threats to Anglo-American interests in the Third World have arisen from independent nationalist movements'. 'The documents', as Curtis points out, 'are often explicit.'

Western actions have, of course, had nothing to do with democracy. In 1954 in Vietnam, for example, the Americans were well aware that, in the event of free elections, Ho Chi Minh would certainly win. Indeed, Winston Churchill himself actually wrote to Eisenhower lamenting the fact. This was not allowed to stand in the way of the pursuit of western interests. Democracy has never been a question of principle as far as either Britain or North America is concerned. It has always been a matter of expediency and on numerous occasions has been something to be discarded as inconvenient. Curtis's discussion of British relations with the Chilean dictatorship is ample testimony to this.

He looks at the process of decolonisation, in particular in Malaya, Kenya and British Guiana. In Malaya, the British waged a twelve-year war against Communist insurgents. When the country finally became independent in 1957, it was firmly 'set upon a course of political and economic development in which Britain's substantial economic interests were substantially preserved'. In Kenya, there was an even more brutal counter-insurgency campaign, one of the great scandals of post-war British history. Over a thousand rebels were hanged, only 297 for murder, the rest for possessing arms or ammunition or administering illegal oaths. Torture was used routinely and large numbers of Mau Mau suspects were shot out of hand. All this is still virtually unknown in Britain. Lastly, Curtis looks at the British overthrow of Cheddi Jagan's democratically elected government in British Guiana in 1953.

His discussion of British policy in the Middle East, from the overthrow of Mussadiq in Iran, through the Suez invasion and the little-known wars in Oman and on to the Gulf war is also of considerable value.

Today, of course, the British state's room for independent action is strictly limited. Even as far as Northern Ireland is concerned, ostensibly still part of the United Kingdom, US sensibilities have to be taken into account. Once again, Curtis relentlessly explores British subordination to the United States. From the deportation of the inhabitants of Diego Garcia to SAS support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Curtis tells a shameful story.

Clearly, this is a book that we have been waiting for and we are very much in Curtis's debt. His painstaking research has exposed to the light of day much that our masters would rather have kept hidden. What is vital is that his efforts are followed up by others, that his absolutely compelling view of British policy towards the Third World is deepened and extended. Curtis has dealt the establishment view a serious blow, but there is still a great deal to be done.

Bath College of Higher Education JOHN NEWSINGER

Turning the Page Without Closing the Book: the right to truth in the Irish context

By BILL ROLSTON (Dublin, Irish Reporter Publications, 1996). 58pp. £3.95.

The eighteen-month-long IRA ceasefire raised, for the first time in twenty-five years, the prospect of an imminent 'negotiated settlement'. Despite the ending of the ceasefire in February 1996 and the belligerent reassertion of loyalist dominance in 'Northern Ireland' during the

summer of 1996, such a settlement remains – just – on the political agenda.

This booklet argues that crucial to any settlement is the unearthing of the truth about systematic human rights abuses by the authorities and the search for justice for those who have suffered as a consequence of them. In particular, the role of 'truth commissions' is considered as part of the transition process from repression to a more just society. In the past twenty years, some fifteen such official commissions have been set up in various countries – along with a number of unofficial ones – to investigate the repressive record of former regimes. Many have lessons to offer.

The experience of the Chilean and Argentinian commissions highlights the vexed issue of whether to link prosecutions to investigations into such matters as summary execution, abduction, torture, etc. In Chile, no such link was made. Not only were no military or state officials charged, but the 'truth commission' led to no erosion of the social, economic and military status quo established by the Pinochet regime. In Argentina, the military reaction to the prospect of large-scale prosecution led to a drastic reduction in the number of planned prosecutions and weakened the effectiveness of the whole investigation/prosecution process. Nonetheless, the threat of prosecution still served to subdue, if it did not purge, an anti-democratic military. As the author notes, 'the chances of truth and justice are intricately tied up in the balance of political forces within a society at the point of transition.'

What about Ireland? Clearly this is not in transition from a dictatorship involving state mass murder on the Chile/Argentina scale. Yet the 'shoot-to-kill' policy of the 1980s, Bloody Sunday 1972, torture in Castlereagh, collusion between the British forces and Loyalist paramilitaries, miscarriages of justice, the use of rubber bullets, etc., all add up to a systematic abuse of human rights. Bill Rolston argues that not only must Britain be made to acknowledge these crimes but, as the experience of other countries shows, such an acknowledgement should be linked to prosecutions – 'the state cannot pardon itself'. 'To seek truth without justice is to risk achieving neither.' The author does not expect the establishment of a full-scale 'truth commission' during a period of fluid settlement negotiations. Rather, he sees an unofficial commission, which would establish its own legitimacy through its involvement with as wide a range of indigenous groups as possible, as a necessary part of the settlement process in a society beginning 'to come to terms with the past and look forward to the future'.

London DANNY REILLY

Books received

This listing does not preclude subsequent publication of reviews

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