

# THE PORTUGUESE IN CEYLON 1617 - 1638



JPL



C10418

In a period of decline in their fortunes throughout the world, the Portuguese achieved considerable accretions of power and wealth in Ceylon. The intriguing story of how this was achieved forms the main theme in this in-depth study of twenty one years of Portuguese rule in Ceylon.


This work is the result of three years intense study of both Portuguese and Sinhala documents to which the author had direct access in the archives of Portugal and Spain, England and Ceylon. It explores Portuguese relations with the inland kingdom of Kandy; economic conditions and land tenure in Portuguese territory, the treatment of inhabitants under their rule the Catholic missionary effort and the growth of the Portuguese administrative structure.

The author reveals many new facets of seventeenth century Ceylon history and convincingly argues that the Portuguese impact on the society and economy of Ceylon had hitherto been underestimated.

The book closes a gap in the existing literature on the history of Ceylon. Both as a chapter in Ceylon history and as a study of the colonial policy of the Portuguese it is bound to be of substantial and lasting value.

UR/-

w,  
1







THE PORTUGUESE IN CEYLON 1617-1638



Digitized by Noolaham Foundation.

CEYLON  
1617-1638

SCALE  
0 12 24  
MILES

AREA UNDER DIRECT RULE OF THE KING OF KANDY.  
AREA UNDER DIRECT RULE OF THE KING OF JAFFNA UP TO 1621.  
AREA UNDER DIRECT RULE OF THE KING OF JAFFNA UP TO 1621.  
AREA UNDER DIRECT RULE OF THE KING OF JAFFNA UP TO 1621.

in Ceylon 1617-1638



CHANDRA RICHARD DE SILVA

SEVEN

KORALESSA  
MATALE

KANDY  
UVA

W. CAVE & COMPANY






BARANA


VALA

BARAGAMUWA

# CEYLON 1617-1638

SCALE 24 12 0 24 MILES

-  KNOWN FRONTIER
-  APPROXIMATE FRONTIER
-  AREA UNDER DIRECT RULE OF KINGS OF JAFFNA UP TO 1621.
-  AREA UNDER DIRECT RULE OF THE KING OF KANDY.
-  DISTRICT BOUNDARY







# The Portuguese in Ceylon 1617-1638

CHANDRA RICHARD DE SILVA



10418 c.c

**PUBLIC LIBRARY**  
JAFFNA  
**SPECIAL COLLECTION**

H. W. CAVE & COMPANY Colombo

229227

229227 c.c

c.c

DEDICATED TO  
MY WIFE

R  
954-93

Copyright 1972  
Chandra Richard De Silva

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NO PART OF THIS BOOK MAY  
BE REPRODUCED BY ANY MEANS WITHOUT THE PRIOR  
WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE PUBLISHER.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY H. W. CAVE & COMPANY  
LTD. P. O. BOX 25, SIR BARON JAYATILAKA MAWATHA,  
COLOMBO 1, CEYLON.

## PREFACE

This work is primarily an inquiry into the nature and effects of Portuguese rule in Ceylon. The period under survey is remarkable in that more than for any other period of Portuguese activity in the island, their political and military history as related by the chroniclers of the seventeenth century, can be checked by reference to contemporary documents. The story that emerges is one in which the major Portuguese effort directed towards the conquest of the whole island was arrested in its stride partly by the lack of sufficient man-power, partly by stubborn resistance from the highland region and also partly by the failure of the Portuguese to win the loyalty of the inhabitants of the lowlands. In the socio-economic sphere the picture though less complete, is hardly less fascinating. The administrative and revenue measures of the Portuguese aimed at consolidating their power made deep inroads into the indigenous way of life. The spread of Christianity with its accompanying social values was hardly less significant.

There is however, another aspect of this work which should be of interest to students of Portuguese colonial history. The period covered by this book generally accepted as one of decline in Portuguese fortunes throughout the world saw substantial accretions of Portuguese power in Ceylon. It was also an age when the Portuguese, threatened by their European rivals seem to have evolved more efficient methods of maximising their revenue. Thus this work, while illustrating instances of Portuguese misrule and religious intolerance, also demonstrates the resilience of their empire in the east.

This is a revised version of a thesis presented for a degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of London in 1968. It evolved in its present form largely owing to the guidance provided by my supervisor Major J. B. Harrison of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. I also owe a great debt of gratitude to Professor C. R. Boxer for his ready advice and encouragement and to Mr. Luis de Rebello of King's College, University of London for initiating me into the intricacies of the Portuguese language. Many of the members of the Departments of History of the Universities in Colombo and Peradeniya, Ceylon were also of assistance to me in one way or another. My thanks are due to the University of London whose award of a Postgraduate Studentship in History enabled me to complete the research necessary, to the Institute of High Culture, Lisbon for providing me with an opportunity to attend a course in Portuguese at the Univer-

sity of Lisbon and to the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon for the grant of a subsidy for travelling and microfilm expenses. I would also like to record my gratitude to Mr George Rupesinghe, Manager of H. W. Cave & Co. Colombo for the personal interest he took in the publication of this work.

C. R. DE SILVA

Dept. of History  
University of Ceylon  
Peradeniya  
December 1971

## PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS

- AHU : Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon
- AHU Caixa : Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon. India caixa
- Ajuda : Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon
- APO : *Arquivo Portugues-Oriental*, ed. by J. H. Cunha Rivara
- Assentos : *Assentos do Conselho da India* ed. by P. S. S. Pissurlencar
- BM Add. Mss : British Museum, London. Additional Manuscripts
- BM.Or. : British Museum, London. Oriental Manuscripts
- BNL.FG : Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Fundo Geral
- CALR : *Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register*
- CLR 3 ser. : *Ceylon Literary Register*. Third series
- Coimbra : Biblioteca da Universidade de Coimbra
- DR : *Documentos Remittidos da India*
- Evora : *Biblioteca Publica Eborensis*, Evora
- F. de Souza : Faria de Souza
- Goa C Pe As : Archives of Goa—Cartas Patentes e Alvares
- Goa A e CR : Archives of Goa—Assentos e Cartas Regias
- JCBRAS : *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society—Ceylon Branch*

- JCBRAS (NS) : *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society—Ceylon Branch, New Series*
- Reimers : *Constantino de Saa's Maps and Plans of Ceylon, 1624-28, ed. E.Reimers*
- Rego : *Documentacao para a Historia das Missoes do Padroado Portugues do Oriente, ed. by A. de Silva Rego*
- Simancas SP : Arquivo Geral de Simancas, Secretarias Provinciales
- TT : Arquivo Nacional de Torre do Tombo, Lisbon
- TT.LM. : Arquivo Nacional de Torre do Tombo, Lisbon. Livros das Moncoes
- TT.Mss da Liv. : Arquivo Nacional de Torre do Tombo, Lisbon. Manuscritos da Livraria

As special types were not available the Portuguese names have been printed throughout in English characters.

## CONTENTS

Preface	v
Principal Abbreviations	vii
1 Introduction	1
2 Crisis and Recovery	22
3 The Rule of Constantino de Sa de Noronha	63
4 From Randeniwela to Gannoruwa	111
5 The Administrative Structure	156
6 Revenue and Expenditure	190
7 Religion	236
8 Conclusion	247
Bibliography	253
Index	259





## CHAPTER I

### THE PORTUGUESE IN CEYLON<sup>1</sup>

In the early years of the sixteenth century when the Portuguese first visited Ceylon the island was divided into three major political units and a number of lesser principalities. The first Portuguese contacts were with the kingdom of Kotte<sup>2</sup> which at that time covered the whole of the populous and fertile south-western lowlands. Kotte had, in the previous century exercised effective suzerainty over the rest of the island but since the days of Parakramabahu VI (1411-1466) its ruler had been gradually losing control over various parts of the island. Nevertheless even in the early sixteenth century it remained the strongest kingdom in Ceylon and the king of Kotte still claimed to be the overlord of the whole island.

The Kotte economy was basically one of subsistence agriculture. However there was a limited external trade in few valuable commodities—cinnamon, precious stones, arecanut and elephants—handled at the ports of Puttalam, Kalpitiya, Chilaw, Colombo, Negombo, Beruwala, Galle and Weligama. This trade was largely in the hands of a small Muslim community concentrated in the port towns of Kotte, and of the other kingdoms of Ceylon.

The central highlands of Ceylon were under the rule of a separate monarch. Sometime after the arrival of the Portuguese, the capital of this kingdom on the hills (*Kande Uda Rata*) was transferred from Gampola to the more centrally situated Senkadagala or Kandy. Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the primary political objective of the king of Kandy was to secure his independence from the ruler of Kotte. Kandy, protected by geographical factors such as its mountainous terrain, forest tracts and rivers, was a country difficult to keep under subjugation. On the other hand, as it was less populous and poorer than Kotte, the king of Kandy had often to seek a foreign alliance or the aid of rebels within Kotte to maintain his position. Kandyan foreign trade was even more limited than that of Kotte, though elephants

1. Except as otherwise stated the sources for this section of the introductory chapter are Fr. S. G. Perera—*A history of Ceylon for schools*, (1505-1796), Fr. Fernao de Queyroz—*The temporal and spiritual conquest of Ceylon* and T. Abeyasinghe—*Portuguese rule in Ceylon*, 1594-1612.
2. In the history of Ceylon, kingdoms are usually known after their capitals. Kotte therefore will be generally used to indicate the kingdom of which the city of Kotte was the capital. The sole exception in the period under survey is the kingdom of Jaffna whose capital remained at Nallur until 1621.

and arecanut were exported through the east coast ports of Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Kottiyar, and also by way of Kotte and Jaffna.

The kingdom of Jaffna was in many ways distinct from the two other major kingdoms of the island. It was peopled by Tamils, a race distinct in language and culture from the Sinhalese who inhabited Kotte and Kandy. Moreover the people of Jaffna were Hindus while the Sinhalese of the south were adherents of Buddhism. The position of Jaffna in the northern extremity of the island made it a link (and sometimes a buffer) between the two Sinhalese states in the south and the powers of south India. Jaffna itself had special ties of culture and commerce with the south Indian empire of Vijayanagara and its successor states of Tanjore and Madura, but since it was also exposed to attacks from them, independence for Jaffna meant warding off threats from across the Palk straits as well as from the south. Jaffna too was based on a subsistence economy but the relative infertility of the soil in this area had stimulated crafts such as the production of cloth.

Lesser principalities extended from the western coastal region south of Mannar across north-central Ceylon and then southwards along the eastern seaboard up to the boundaries of Kotte. These principalities often of no more than a few dozen square miles in extent, were ruled by petty chieftains called the *Vanniyars*. During the sixteenth century most of the *Vanniyars* of the eastern coast came under the overlordship of Kandy while those in north-central Ceylon yielded allegiance to Kotte, Jaffna or Kandy, as circumstances dictated.

The Portuguese, as their envoy explained to the king of Kotte on their first visit, came to the East mainly to trade. Having established their headquarters at Goa in 1510, they seized strategic positions like Malacca and Ormuz in the Indian ocean and attempted to exclude their traditional rivals—the Muslims—from the trade in spices and cloth.<sup>3</sup> However in Kotte, for a dozen years after their arrival, the Portuguese traded on equal terms with the Muslims who had hitherto monopolized the external trade of the kingdom. It was after they had built a fort in Colombo in 1518 that they secured a more favourable position by means of a treaty of alliance with the king of Kotte.

3. Their success in this respect was rather limited (see Jan Kieniewicz, *The Portuguese Factory and Trade in Pepper in Malabar during the 16th Century in The Indian Economic and Social History Review* Vol. VI No. 1 March 1969)

Three years later occurred the partition of the Kingdom of Kotte resulting from a revolt of the three sons of King Vijayabahu, against their own father. The three princes who feared that their father was planning to disinherit them, had him killed and divided the kingdom amongst themselves. The eldest, Bhuvanekabahu ruled most of the kingdom of Kotte from the capital while the other two, Rayigam Bandara and Mayadunne were allocated small portions of territory around Rayigama and Sitawaka. As in earlier times, the area within Kotte known as the Seven Korales, continued to be governed by a semi-independent princeling.

Mayadunne, who had played a leading part in the events of 1521 was by no means content with his position. Bhuvanekabahu for his part, while he lacked the ability to oppose his brother, showed no inclination to give him greater recognition. To counter the ambitions of Mayadunne he began to identify himself with the Portuguese interests and began to rely on their assistance. The Portuguese were quite willing to supply this, for they knew that military protection was the first step to political dominance over the valuable domains of Kotte. Mayadunne thereupon turned for assistance to the well-known enemy of the Portuguese on the Malabar coast, the *zamorin* of Calicut.

The first attempt of Mayadunne to gain supreme power in Kotte occurred in 1526. In this and other attempts during the next twenty five years, Bhuvanekabahu was saved only by the arrival of Portuguese expeditionary forces from Goa. His dependence on the Portuguese became even more complete when he sought to exclude Mayadunne from the succession,<sup>4</sup> in favour of his grandson Dharmapala. Bhuvanekabahu himself seems to have realised the weakness of his position as a client of the Portuguese and this was probably why he never agreed to the complete destruction of his brother's power, or to give up Buddhism, the faith of his people, in order to accept Christianity. On the other hand the limitations of his power are apparent from the fact that he had to appeal to the king of Portugal to order the Portuguese and the converted Christians in his own kingdom to obey the laws of the land.<sup>5</sup>

4. The normal rule of succession in Kotte was from brother to brother and then to the eldest son of the eldest brother. Exceptional cases of son succeeding instead of brother are found, but grandsons clearly had a weaker claim than brothers.

5. Fr. G. Schurhammer and E. A. Voretzch—*Ceylon zur zeit des konigs Bhuvanekabahu und Franz Xaviers, 1539-1552*. Vol. I (Leipzig 1928) 107-128 Ribeiro 27-28

Even this limited power, in time, became irksome to the Portuguese who had Bhuvanekabahu assassinated,<sup>6</sup> and then drove out his powerful son-in-law Vidiya Bandara who had shown open hostility towards both Christianity and the Portuguese. The young prince Dharmapala, who was proclaimed king by the Portuguese on his grandfather's death in 1551 was induced to accept Christianity six years later and the Portuguese took upon themselves the task of reducing his kingdom to obedience.

This proved to be no easy task. Mayadunne claimed to be the true heir of Bhuvanekabahu and posed as the champion of the Sinhalese and of Buddhism against foreign and Christian influences. This factor, as well as the lawless behaviour of the Portuguese, induced many of the leading men of Kotte to take his side. Friendly relations between Sitawaka and Jaffna facilitated the flow of south Indian mercenaries to Ceylon. Furthermore the military prowess of Mayadunne's son, Rajasinha enabled him to confine the Portuguese to a small coastal area around Colombo. Attempts to capture Colombo itself however, were foiled by the timely arrival of aid to the besieged from India.

Nevertheless for forty years from 1550, the rulers of Sitawaka confined Portuguese power, exercised in the name of Dharmapala, to the environs of Colombo. The missionary activity of the Franciscans was likewise confined to the same area. However, though the coastal villages of Kotte which had given their allegiance to Mayadunne suffered heavily from Portuguese raids, the Sinhalese inhabitants of the lowlands seem to have continued trade relations with the Portuguese except during the two great sieges of Colombo in 1579 and 1587-88.<sup>7</sup>

The power of Sitawaka then at its zenith, was also signalized by the conquest of Kandy. Since 1521 the rulers of Kandy had been left undisturbed while Mayadunne and Bhuvanekabahu were engaged in a struggle for supremacy. One of them, Jayaweera Bandara by name, being anxious to gain sovereign status had asked for Portuguese aid in the 1540's. The Portuguese were quite willing to grant such assistance, despite their promises to defend the realms and rights of Bhuvanekabahu but unfortunately for the Kandyan king, this assistance was forthcoming only at a time when Bhuvanekabahu and Mayadunne had temporarily united and the first bid for Kandyan independence ended in failure.

6. P. E. Pieris and M. A. H. Fitzler—*Ceylon and Portugal: Part I Kings & Christians 1539-1552* (Leipzig 1927) 12-13. 257-260. 282-285; *Rajavaliya* (ed. by B. Gunasekera) 79, 81.

7. DR IV, 239-243.

When Rajasinha succeeded to the throne of Sitawaka in 1581 he found that Karaliyadde Bandara, Jayaweera Bandara's successor, not only had a force of Portuguese soldiers to aid him but had allied himself with the Portuguese and had given his daughter in marriage to Dharmapala. This convinced Rajasinha that the conquest of Kandy was necessary to safeguard his own flank while attacking Colombo. Some of the Kandyan chiefs, alienated by Karaliyadde Bandara's pro-Portuguese policy also gave valuable aid to Rajasinha in his campaign against the king of Kandy. Finding his supporters too few and his Portuguese contingent too small to offer much resistance, Karaliyadde Bandara fled to Trincomalee, where he died. His children baptised as Dom Filipe, Dom Joao and Dona Catherina respectively were later taken with a Portuguese escort to Mannar.<sup>8</sup>

In the period up to 1590, while the Portuguese were foiled in their ambitions in Kotte and Kandy due to the power of Sitawaka, in Jaffna they were held at bay by a succession of rulers who clearly saw that it was in their interest to resist Portuguese encroachment. The best known amongst them, Sankili (1519-1561) pursued a consistent anti-Portuguese and anti-Catholic policy. He knew that the heir of the former king whom he had deposed, had gained friends among the Portuguese. He also quickly realised that the Christian converts of the Fishery Coast would acknowledge no temporal sovereign other than the king of Portugal. Thus to him the Portuguese represented the enemy from without and Christianity, subversion from within. This was why he aided Mayadunne against the Portuguese and later offered refuge and assistance to Vidiya Bandara. The Portuguese military efforts against Sankili had little effect.<sup>9</sup> Even the elaborately prepared expedition of 1560 which was led by the Viceroy Dom Constantino de Braganca himself was eventually forced to sail away without dethroning him. De Braganca's expedition however achieved one important gain. The island of Mannar was seized and a fort was built on it. A number of Christians from the Fishery Coast<sup>10</sup> were settled in the island which henceforth became a base for intrigues against hostile monarchs in Jaffna and a source of support

8. P. da Trindade—*Conquista espiritual do Oriente*, III. 65-68

9. Fr. S. G. Perera holds that in 1543 Martim Affonso de Souza forced Sankili to promise tribute but the very next year Sankili killed all Christians in Mannar who refused to give up their faith. The Portuguese were unable to make him reverse this policy despite another expedition in 1545.

10. The Tinneveli coast of south India between Cape Camorin and the island of Rameswaram.

to those who favoured the Portuguese. However, even when in the 1560's the captain of Mannar eventually found himself able to play the king-maker in Jaffna it was not long before the new ruler found himself obliged to oppose the Portuguese to protect his own interests and to maintain the loyalty of the Hindu subjects. For instance Periyapulle Chegarajasekaram installed in 1570 attacked Mannar with aid of forces from Tanjore.<sup>11</sup>

Eighty five years after their first visit to Ceylon, the Portuguese still had little real power in Ceylon. They and their Christian converts were confined to the areas surrounding the forts of Colombo and Mannar. Even these forts were frequently besieged by the kings of Sitawaka and Jaffna<sup>12</sup> who acted in concert against the foreign danger. Portuguese efforts to set up puppet rulers who would be amenable to their wishes had so far failed. Correspondingly, missionary activity and the social impact of Christianity was reduced to a minimum.

During the next few years, however, a series of striking victories enabled the Portuguese to become the rulers of Kotte and the dominant power in Ceylon. This sudden reversal of fortune was to a large extent a result of the decline of the power of the Sitawaka. Rajasinha's exactions, especially those made during his preparations for his last seige of Colombo, alienated many. His conversion to Hinduism and the favours he granted to Hindus could not have endeared him to those who had turned to his father as a defender of Buddhism. Moreover, his ruthless elimination of all potential rebels ensured that there would be no strong successor at his death.

After his failure to capture Colombo in 1588, Rajasinha faced revolts in his own dominions. The Portuguese profited by these disturbances to capture some of the lands of Kotte. Furthermore, they sent a force to the hill country under Konnappu Bandara<sup>13</sup> to enthrone Dom Filipe, son of Karaliyadde Bandara, as the new king of Kandy. Konnappu Bandara, joining hands with the rebellious Kandyan nobility defeated Rajasinha's forces at Ganetenna and then successfully defended Balane pass against Rajasinha himself. Having failed in his final attempt to recover Kandy, Rajasinha retired towards Sitawaka in 1593 and died on the way. After his death dissension within Sitawaka enabled the Portuguese to gain the support of a large section of the Sinhalese

11. Vriddhagirison—*The Nayaks of Tanjore*. (Annamalainagar 1942) 78

12. Mannar for instance was attacked five times in thirty one years. (Queyroz 418-419 ; Vriddhagirison 78)

13. Son of Virasundara Bandara who had helped Rajasinha to seize Kandy. Virasundara Bandara was later killed by Rajasinha on suspicion of treachery and his son fled to the Portuguese.

army led by Manamperuma Mohottala<sup>14</sup> and with his aid Sitawaka itself was captured and the whole of south-western Ceylon reduced to obedience.

In Jaffna too the Portuguese gained ground. The king Puviraja Pandaram Pararajasingham<sup>15</sup> had already launched an unsuccessful attack against Mannar. Realising the need for a naval power to cut off Portuguese sea-borne aid he appealed to the Kunjalis, the admirals of the *zamorin* of Calicut to aid him. This proved to be his undoing, for in wake of the Calicut fleet came the Portuguese fleet of Andre Furtado de Mendonca which had been especially organised to put an end to Kunjali raids on Portuguese ships. De Mendonca not only destroyed the fleet but having relieved Mannar, invaded Jaffna. The king of Jaffna was defeated and killed together with his son and the commander-in-chief of the Jaffna forces. Ethirimanne Sinham, son of Periyapulle whom the Portuguese had set up in 1570 and son-in-law of Puviraja Pandaram, was then placed on the throne. The new king agreed to accept the king of Portugal as sovereign and to pay tribute.<sup>16</sup>

In Kandy, however, the initial Portuguese success was soon followed by a humiliating reverse. The Sinhalese forces of Dom Filipe having proved themselves well able to defend Kandy, the Portuguese contingent returned to Mannar leaving a small garrison at Gannoruwa. Konnappu Bandara however was not satisfied with his position as commander-in-chief, and made use of the growing unpopularity of the Franciscan missionaries and the Portuguese to form a group loyal to himself. Thus when the king Dom Filipe died suddenly,<sup>17</sup> Konnappu Bandara seized the opportunity to rise against Dom Filipe's infant son and to expel him and the Portuguese from the highland kingdom. Konnappu Bandara himself renounced Christianity and taking the name of Vimaladharmasuriya proclaimed himself ruler of Kandy.

In an effort to avenge this defeat and restore Portuguese power, the viceroy at Goa nominated Pero Lopez de Souza to lead an ex-

14. Manamperuma Mohottala was a south Indian recruit to Rajasinha's army. His original name was Aritthakeevendu Perumal. After Rajasinha's death he won a skirmish against the Portuguese and taking the name of Jayaweera Bandara, made an attempt to gain kingship for himself, before destroying the Portuguese.

15. The successor of Periyapulle Chegarajasekeram.

16. C. R. Boxer and F. de Vasconcelos—*Andre Furtado de Mendonca 1538-1610*, (Lisbon MSS) 13-17 ; A. Botelho de Souza—*Subsidios para a historia militar maritima da India I.* 32 ; BM Add. Mss. 28432.f.124v ; BNL.FG 482.f.54 ; BNL Illuminados 139.f.82

On the question of tribute see Chapter VI footnote 200

17. The Portuguese suspected that Konnappu Bandara was responsible for the death of Dom Filipe. There is however, no definite evidence to prove this.

pedition to Kandy. De Souza arrived with a large force of Portuguese and prepared to invade Kandy, and to enthrone Dona Catharina (Kusumasana Devi) the sole surviving child of Karaliyadde Bandara. De Souza was aided by the former Sitawaka commander-in-chief, Jayaweera Bandara and many of the leaders of Kandy who were glad to see their royal family back on the throne. After only slight resistance Dona Catherina was installed in Kandy and Vimaladharmasuriya was driven off.

From his rather desperate position Vimaladharmasuriya extricated himself by exploiting the political weaknesses of the Portuguese. Since the time of Karaliyadde Bandara, if not earlier, a large section of the nobility had been mistrustful of Portuguese interference. Vimaladharmasuriya obiligingly circulated rumours that the heavily-guarded princess was to marry a Portuguese who would then be the actual ruler.

Further, the Portuguese wished to avoid a repetition of what had happened in the previous expedition to Kandy. They entertained suspicions of the ambitions of Jayaweera Bandara. Vimaladharmasuriya, knowing this, contrived to let a compromising message from him to the Sinhalese commander fall into the hands of the Portuguese. The resultant execution of Jayaweera Bandara led to the desertion of the Sinhalese troops and the defeat of de Souza. The capture of Kusumasana Devi by Vimaladharmasuriya which followed, was perhaps an even more important result of de Souza's expedition, for the Kandyan monarch who promptly married her was thereby provided with the best of claims to be the legitimate sovereign of the highlands. When Kotte passed into Portuguese hands at the death of King Dharmapala without issue, Vimaladharmasuriya as the sole surviving Sinhalese monarch was considered even by many of the people of Kotte as their protector.

Hitherto, the Portuguese had sought to establish their influence in Ceylon by the support or installation of client rulers, first in Kotte and then in Jaffna and Kandy. There is little evidence of a change of policy from that pursued in Kotte from the early years of Bhuvanekabahu's reign until the defeat of Pero Lopez de Souza. Andre Furtado de Mendonca having defeated the opposing forces in Jaffna did not annex the kingdom. He merely set up a tributary ruler who, it was expected would remain loyal to the Portuguese. Similarly the two expeditions to Kandy in the early 1590's both aimed at establishing Sinhalese rulers under Portuguese protection. The document by which King Dharmapala of Kotte in 1580 bequeathed his kingdom to the king of Portugal in case he died without issue seems on the face of it to tell against this proposition.



However in 1580 when Dharmapala's near relatives were all in the opposite camp this was the only possible solution. The Portuguese had nothing to lose by maintaining a figurehead ruler. It was merely that at this time they could not find a successor to Dharmapala.

Under Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo (1594-1612), Portuguese policy changed from one of favouring the establishment of protectorates to a policy of direct conquest. Some of the factors which influenced this change were developments within Ceylon. The political events of the early 1590's seemed to indicate to the Portuguese that the conquest of the whole island was well within their reach. The rapid collapse of the kingdom of Sitawaka not only removed a major obstacle to Portuguese expansion but enabled them to seize most of the lands of Kotte and supplement their own forces by large numbers of Sinhalese militiamen. In this changed context those who favoured conquest gained a valuable advocate in de Azevedo who by determined and vigouring measures soon brought all Kotte to heel. Moreover in the case of Kandy the Portuguese ran out of claimants to set up on the throne, while the experience of Jaffna showed that vassal rulers did not always remain amenable to Portuguese wishes.

While de Azevedo in Ceylon urged direct conquest, developments elsewhere in the East convinced the king of Portugal that this was indeed the best policy. The Deccan campaign of Akbar between 1593 and 1600 awoke the fear of a Mughul threat to Portuguese India. In the event of a Mughul conquest of the Deccan sultanates it was considered that Ceylon would provide a valuable base from which possible losses in India might be recovered. More important was the arrival of the Dutch in the East in 1595. The early Dutch expeditions followed the Portuguese route along the eastern coast of Africa and then sailed across the Indian ocean to the East Indies. Their fleets in the first twenty years therefore sailed just south of Ceylon. Ceylon thus acquired a strategic value it had not had in the earlier period and the Portuguese realised that the existence of an unsubjected kingdom occupying a long stretch of coast was an open invitation to the Dutch.

While political events dictated a warlike policy, economic inducements too pulled their weight in the same direction. The control of Ceylon would have secured a plentiful supply of elephants, arecanut, pearls and precious stones as well as a monopoly of the supply of cinnamon. Moreover the climate of the island was thought extremely suitable for fostering a Portuguese colony. Advocates of the conquest of Kandy could point to economic

rewards as well as political necessity especially as the elimination of inland frontiers was expected to result in reduced defence costs.<sup>18</sup> There thus seemed a variety of good reasons why Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo should have pursued a policy of direct conquest of Kandy.

To meet this new and more determined Portuguese threat Vimaladharmasuriya had only the resources of the kingdom of Kandy, though this also included some control over the *Vanniyars* of the eastern coast. His lands however were poorer and more sparsely populated than the fertile south-western plains which were now under Portuguese control. It is thus no surprise that he was forced on the defensive for most of his reign.

Vimaladharmasuriya however had two sources of strength. Firstly the people of Kandy remained loyal to him,<sup>19</sup> and those of the low country, especially after the death of King Dharmapala in 1597, regarded him as their lawful sovereign. The harsh measures of de Azevedo<sup>20</sup> further alienated the people from the Portuguese and thus enabled Vimaladharmasuriya to divert the Portuguese attack by encouragement of revolts in the lowlands. The Portuguese were thus occupied with a series of revolts which culminated in the risings of Kangara Aratchi and Kuruwita Rala<sup>21</sup> in 1601.

Secondly Vimaladharmasuriya had access to supplies of men, munitions and provisions from abroad. Fortunately for the Portuguese his negotiations for Dutch assistance bore no fruit, but the lack of Portuguese power on the east coast enabled the Muslim traders to supply Kandy with much of what was needed, chiefly through the ports of Trincomalee, Kottiyar and Batticaloa.<sup>22</sup> Soon after 1594 moreover Jaffna had become an important source of supply.

18. T. Abeyasinghe (189) estimates that costs would have been reduced by over ten thousand *xerafims* a year. This was of course in time of war. But in time of peace the saving could not have been much less as Portuguese troops remained on a war footing even from 1621 to 1628. However, against this must be set the expenses of garrisoning Kandy, though this might conceivably have been financed by Kandyan revenues.
19. Vimaladharmasuriya's patronage of Buddhism was a factor which ensured this loyalty. P. M. P. Abeyasinghe—*Udarata Vitti* (2nd ed. 1960) 140
20. A letter of the *camara* of Colombo to the viceroy dated 21 November 1617 described how de Azevedo ordered the massacre of every living person from the youngest child to the oldest inhabitant in Attanagalla, for the killing of a Portuguese soldier in the village. AHU Caixa V. 21.11.1617
21. Kuruwita Rala was also known as Antonio Baretto. He later fled to Kandy and gained high office under Vimaladharmasuriya and became the ruler of Uva and commander of the army under Senerat.
22. Puttalam was also a source of supply but not between 1601 and 1603 and after 1612.

Ethirimanne Sinham, the king set up in Jaffna by Andre Furtado de Mendonca in 1591, was for a time loyal to the Portuguese. By 1595 however the Portuguese had found reason to suspect his loyalty.<sup>23</sup> His change in attitude was perhaps due to a desire to gain greater real power and perhaps also due to irritation with the overbearing attitude of the Portuguese officials<sup>24</sup> and the demands of the Catholic priests.<sup>25</sup> Whatever the cause, there seems to be little doubt that he aided Kandy in the procuring of essential supplies.<sup>26</sup> By 1614 the Portuguese king had sent definite instructions to depose him and only the lack of means prevented the captain-general in Ceylon from carrying out this order.<sup>27</sup> However, Ethirimanne Sinham never dared to come out openly either against the Portuguese or against Christianity.<sup>28</sup> The tribute was paid regularly. In fact he was even forced to allow the construction of a number of churches in the islands near Jaffna. These churches also served as defensible positions round which were gathered a number of Tamil converts. The grant of permission to build a church at Urkavalturai and the grant of its revenue to the church for instance led to the loss of political control over the island.<sup>29</sup> These developments while they provided a basis of support for any Portuguese intervention, inevitably roused hostility among the Jaffna Hindu nobility.

During the twenty three years after 1594 the main interest of the Portuguese lay in the maintainance of their hold on Kotte and in the subjugation of Kandy. In the first eighteen years of this period they were led by Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo. De Azevedo left his mark on Ceylon in more ways than one. In the religious field the monopoly of the Franciscans was broken, first by the Jesuits and then by the Augustinians and Dominicans with his active encouragement, so that the total missionary effort could be enlarged. It was he who established the Portuguese headquarters at Malwana, an inland capital.

23. APO III.504 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon, the Portuguese era II*, 118

24. P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon, the Portuguese era II*.119

25. *Ibid* 150-152

26. *Ibid* 119-120

27. *Ibid* 119-120 ; DR II. 308, 402 ; A. Bocarro—*Decada XIII da historia da India*. 277

28. P. da Trindade (III.204-206) mentions an expedition led by Manoel Baretto da Silva, captain of Mannar who with three hundred Portuguese and seven hundred Christians of Mannar sailed to Jaffna to force the king to prohibit trade with Kandy. The expedition failed in its purpose for the king stood firm and Baretto had to rest content with a promise of continued religious freedom for Christians in Jaffna. The Christians of Jaffna apparently set little store by this undertaking for a majority of them, about eight hundred in number migrated to the island of Tanadiva or Kayts which became a Christian stronghold.

29. P. da Trindade III. 205

In matters of civil administration, de Azevedo's impact was no less important. The provincial administrative structure in the time of the Sinhalese kings had been a very complex one. The most important territorial unit then was the *korale* or district and Kotte in the sixteenth century included forty *korales*.<sup>30</sup> These *korales* were generally grouped into larger units which could be termed provinces. Some of these latter like the Seven Korales were traditionally placed under princes of the blood. Others like the *disavas* (or provinces) of Matara and Weligama were generally administered by Sinhalese noblemen who were also called *disavas*. However there were also much smaller units which were independent of the provincial chieftains and were directly under the king. A good example of this was Madampe which only formed a part of a *korale*.<sup>31</sup> The relationship between the local ruler and the king depended on a variety of factors like the status of the chieftain, the wealth and strategic value of the area held, and the personalities involved. Such a system depended for its smooth working on an understanding of the traditions of the land and this was a factor that the Portuguese lacked. Under de Azevedo therefore the provincial administration was reorganized and rationalized to suit the convenience of the conqueror.

Kotte was divided into four *disavas* radiating from Colombo, Matara, Sabaragamuwa, Four Korales and Seven Korales. Each area was ruled by a *disava*, who had administrative, judicial and military powers. Another significant development in de Azevedo's time was the separation of revenue collection from other branches of civil administration. The revenue collection duties of the *disavas* were delegated to the *korale vidanes* or district revenue collectors, whose activities were co-ordinated by a superintendent of revenue called the *vedor da fazenda*. Apart from these changes however, the traditional Sinhalese system of administration was generally retained. The *korales* were retained as subdivisions of the *disavas* and the *korale vidanes* continued to be aided in the exercise of their duties by *atukorales*, *mohottalas*, *kanakapulles* and various grades of headmen as of old. De Azevedo's innovations also did not extend to the *baddas* which were organizations (often of caste groups) for purposes of revenue and services to the state.<sup>32</sup> The Sinhalese armed forces too remained organized under their own *mudaliyars* or commanders and *aratchis*

30 The picture of the Sinhalese system of administration is largely derived from the *tombo* or land register of 1599.

31. For further details see C. R. de Silva—*Lancarote de Seixas and Madampe*. (Ceylon Studies Seminar 69/70 series No. 1)

32. A good example of a *badda* is the *mahabadda* which included most of the *chaleas* or cinnamon peelers.

or captains. As in the days of Kotte they remained an untrained militia. Nevertheless, though the Sinhalese administrative framework was retained, the increasing substitution of Portuguese for Sinhalese officials and Portuguese ignorance of Sinhalese custom upon which the administration was based, did lead to change which bore heavily upon the subject Sinhalese.

It was however in the military sphere that de Azevedo excelled and it was to this that he devoted most of his time and energy. He was an uncompromising opponent of Kandy, particularly of Vimaladharmasuriya. He had however, to first pacify the lands of Kotte that had risen in revolt on the news of the defeat of de Souza. By 1603 this task was completed and a number of forts and stockades had been constructed both to prevent rebellion within Portuguese territory and to ward off Kandyan attacks. In January 1603 de Azevedo led his troops against the forts guarding the mountain approaches to Kandy, took them and found his way to the capital.

De Azevedo's attempt to invade and conquer Kandy in one decisive campaign failed however due to the revolt of the *lascarins* or Sinhalese militiamen who formed the bulk of his forces. The tough campaign that followed, the revolts in Kotte itself and the increasing difficulties of the Portuguese in the East created by the coming of the Dutch and English, apparently convinced de Azevedo of the need to weaken his enemy before further attempts at conquest. Thus he began a policy of destructive raids on Kandy. Twice a year, normally at harvest time, a lightly armed and highly mobile group of Portuguese and *lascarins* entered Kandyan territory and laid the lands waste. This policy was reinforced by a blockade of Kandyan trade enforced by a fleet of light vessels which cruised off the eastern coast of Ceylon. This policy was pursued with considerable success for the next decade. It was nevertheless only a makeshift attempt to keep Kandy weak till the Portuguese had gained sufficient strength for a final decisive campaign.

The change to a defensive policy by the Portuguese coincided with a change of ruler in Kandy. The death of Vimaladharmasuriya in 1604 led to a crisis in Kandy. His only son Rajjuru Maha Adhasin<sup>33</sup> was still a child and the queen Kusumasana Devi proved

33. The *Culavamsa* and some versions of *Rajavaliya* hold that kusumasane Devi had at least three sons by Vimaladharmasuriya. (BM Add. Mss. 22012 ; MB Or. 2702 ; MB Or. 5307 ; BM Or. 8219 ; *Rajavaliya* 98 ; *Culavamsa* II. 233) Nevertheless Portuguese sources supported by other versions of *Rajavaliya* appear to prove that Kumarasinha and Vijayapala as well as Maha Astana were sons of Senerat. (Biker I. 205-207 ; II. 40 ; Assentos I. 573 ; CALR III. 49-50 ; 3 CLR ser. III. 155-293 ; *Diario de conde de Linhares* 66 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40. ff. 216, 220v)

This leaves us with the conclusion that Rajjuru Maha Adhasin was Vimaladharmasuriya's sole son.

to be too weak to rule over the Kandyan nobility. Vimaladharmasuriya himself had tried to secure an undisturbed succession by appointing his cousin Senerat to the key position of commander-in-chief.<sup>34</sup> Senerat soon found that other princes, chiefly Mayadunne of Uva and Vidiya Bandara of the Seven and Four Korales wished to marry Kusumasana Devi and become king. He promptly forestalled them and marrying Kusumasana Devi himself was acclaimed king after a period of turmoil lasting several months.<sup>35</sup>

The dispute regarding the succession in Kandy enabled de Azevedo to regain control over much of Kotte. The significance of the death of Vimaladharmasuriya and accession of Senerat has however been exaggerated. It is true that Senerat had at one time been a *bhikku*<sup>36</sup> and was very much less warlike than his cousin. Yet he had years of experience in leading troops<sup>37</sup> and had proved astute enough to overcome his rivals in 1604. Moreover he had the assistance of two of the rebels who had risen against de Azevedo in 1603—Kuruwita Rala and Kangara Aratchi. He did face more opposition within Kandy than Vimaladharmasuriya, but the real decline in Senerat's position, popularity and authority occurred only after 1612 with the death of Rajjuru Maha Adhasin and Kusumasana Devi.<sup>38</sup>

During the period 1604-1612 the Kandyans were in no position to attempt to expel the Portuguese. The latter were likewise too weak to make another attempt on the scale of 1603. On the whole

34. There is little doubt that Senerat was entrusted with the protection of Kusumasana Devi and the prince by Vimaladharmasuriya, (*Rajavaliya* 100 ; *Jornada* 34 ; Queyroz 606 ; *Mandarampurapuvata* stanza 177) but it is doubtful whether Vimaladharmasuriya wished him to be his successor as asserted by Queyroz and some Sinhalese authorities. (P. M. P. Abeyasinghe 132-138)
35. The allegation is made by Queyroz (606-609) that Senerat put to death three hundred Portuguese prisoners including sixty blind men after they had aided him to become king. A contemporary Portuguese document (*Ajuda* 51-V-34.f.101 a report on India 1605) gives the same story but puts the number of Portuguese killed at two hundred. Senerat's character and his treatment of captured Portuguese on other occasions makes this report improbable.
36. A Buddhist monk.
37. *Jornada* 34 ; Baldaeus *A true and exact description of the Great Island of Ceylon* 37 ; In fact an old Sinhalese poem published in P. M. P. Abeyasinghe's *Udaratavitti* 132-133 even suggests that he was chosen as Vimaladharmasuriya's successor due to his military skill.
38. Senerat was suspected of being responsible for the death of Vimaladharmasuriya's son. (*Jornada* 34 ; Baldaeus 58 ; Queyroz 610 ; Biker I.78) The mode of killing is given only by Baldaeus and the *Rajavaliya*. The former asserts that the prince was poisoned and the latter that he was drowned. Kusumasana Devi herself, married Senerat against her wishes. (Baldaeus 42 ; *Jornada* 34)

however the Portuguese retained the military initiative. They were relatively free from revolts in Kotte for constant risings and harsh reprisals had exhausted and cowed the lowland Sinhalese. The Portuguese army was thus free to launch periodic punitive raids on Kandyan territory. These raids aimed at undermining the economic basis of Kandyan power—the village settlement. The systematic devastation of villages and crops did make the Kandyans retire further and further into the forested areas rather than risk captivity or death in Portuguese hands.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless Kandy survived, for the paucity of troops limited the effectiveness of the Portuguese raids. Moreover despite the official embargo on the trade of Kandy and efforts to deprive her of essential goods, the lure of high profits from trade in Kandyan pepper and ginger, elephants, ivory and arecanut proved to be too strong for some Portuguese as well as Muslim traders. Thus in Ceylon as in contemporary Europe, political and military struggles did not involve the cessation of economic relations.

De Azevedo left Ceylon in December 1612 to take up the post of viceroy of India. As viceroy he sent detailed instructions to his successors to guide them in the administration of Kotte as well as the conduct of the war against Kandy.<sup>40</sup> Consequently for four years after his departure Portuguese policy in Ceylon remained essentially that of de Azevedo.

The most important development in Kotte during these years was the making of a *tombo* or a register of lands and revenues by Antao Vaz Freire, an official sent from Lisbon for this task. Freire who occupied the post of *vedor da fazenda* or controller of revenue was not the first Portuguese to record the sources of royal revenue, for this had been done in 1599 by Jorge Frolim de Almeida.<sup>41</sup> However Freire's work, in addition to being in much greater detail than that of de Almeida also included a register of all the lands. The *foral* or register of revenue prepared by Freire certainly achieved one of its objectives, the increase of revenue ; for while the actual revenue in the days of de Azevedo did not exceed 30,000 *xerafims*<sup>42</sup> Antao Vaz Freire's estimate was as high as 73,740 *xerafims*. Freire's

39. Filmoteca LM. 12. 19/1-2 Dr. T. Abeyasinghe blames the ills that befell Kandy on the personal incompetence of Senerat. Yet at this time the Kandyan forces were led by Kuruwita Rala, an opponent justly feared by the Portuguese. Senerat also had a number of respected vassals, notably Yalagoda Manthri, Senerat Mudaliyar, Kuruppu, Temekoon of Unambuwe, Chandrasekera of Walagama, Wijeykoon of Walalagama, Wanigasekera of Aluvihare, Molagoda Manthri and Mahatmatota Manthri (*Rajasiha Hatana stangas* 13-17)

40. AHU Caixa 23.4.1614 ; Bocarro 275-276 ; AHU Caixa 5. 9.10.1615

41. TT. Manuscritos do Convento da Graça, tomo 6D pg. 325-411

42. AHU Codice 222.f.172v ; Balthazar Marinho, the *escrivão da fazenda* or

achievement must have come as welcome news to the king of Portugal who was no doubt aware that in de Azevedo's days the Ceylon budget had an annual deficit of 25,000 *xerafims*. In the years that followed the revenue assessed according to the new registers proved to be the financial basis of Portuguese power in Ceylon. For the time being however, the conversion of all customary dues and gifts into compulsory payments did not endear Portuguese rule to the Sinhalese peasantry.

But if the years after 1612 were years of hope for the Portuguese, for Senerat they were years of trouble. After the death of Kusumasana Devi who had legitimized his rule, as it were, his position in Kandy became so insecure that he forced her eldest daughter to marry him to preserve his legal claims to the throne.<sup>43</sup> For a time he hoped for foreign assistance. The honour and high position he bestowed on Marcellus de Boschouwer, the Dutch envoy in Kandy (1612-1615) was an index as much of his need for Dutch aid as of his personal regard for Boschouwer. Despite Boschouwer's representations, however, his superiors in Masulipatam and Batavia were not keen on fighting Senerat's battles and no aid materialized.<sup>44</sup> Meanwhile after a brief respite in the time of de Azevedo's successor Dom Francisco de Menezes Roxo (1612-1614),<sup>45</sup> the Portuguese attacks became even more frequent in the

secretary of the treasury estimated the revenue to be 15,000 *xerafims* a year, apart from some customary dues and the revenues from elephants. On Portuguese currency see Chapter VI

43. Baldaeus 80-81 ; Biker I 224 ; S. G. Perera—*Historical sketches* 152 ; DR II.402

Vimaladharmasuriya and Kusumasana Devi had two daughters—Soriya Adhasin and Hantana Adhasin. The elder Soriya married Senerat in 1613 and became his chief queen. They had one daughter Lankadhasin or Hamiadhasin before the queen died in 1617. From then on her sister Hantana Adhasin became his chief queen. Hamiadhasin was later married to Maha Astana, Kusumasana Devi's third son by Senerat.

44. CLR 3 ser I. 26-27, 216-219, 330,332,415-418 ; P. E. Pieris—*The Portuguese era* I. 418-429; Baldaeus 82; T. Rayachaudhuri *Jan Company in Coromandel 1605-1690—A Study in the inter actions of European Commerce and traditional economics* (The Hague 1962) 86

Boschouwer left Ceylon on 9 May 1615 to try to convince his superiors of the advantages of giving military aid to Senerat in return for a trade monopoly and other rights. He was eventually sent to Holland to present his proposals before the XVII.

45. Dom Francisco de Menezes Roxo was the son of Diogo de Menezes, count of Ericeyra. He came to Ceylon in 1596 and served as a captain of a company of Portuguese soldiers. Later he became the captain of a galleon and was the captain-major of the annual fleet sent to Ceylon. In the last days of de Azevedo's captain-generalship he was the captain-major of the fleet. Like de Azevedo, de Menezes had no qualms about diverting royal revenues to his own use, but he had neither the ability nor the military skill that de Azevedo possessed. In his term of eighteen months (December 1612-May 1614) he made only one raid on Kandyan territory.



time of Manoel Mascarenhas Homem (1614-1616),<sup>46</sup> as viceroy de Azevedo kept Ceylon adequately supplied with men and munitions to continue the pressure against Kandy.<sup>47</sup> The arrival of a new captain-general Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira<sup>48</sup> (1616-1618) on 28 February 1616 led to a further intensification of Portuguese hostilities. Pereira himself led two expeditions to Kandy in April and August of the same year. Senerat and his generals however, were by no means powerless. Although they seldom risked open battle, they constantly harassed Portuguese raiding parties.<sup>49</sup> The Portuguese therefore while they subjugated the south-western lowlands failed to succeed in conquering any sizeable tract of Kandyan territory. On the other hand Senerat proved strong enough to exercise control over the south-eastern coast of Ceylon, west of Walawe Ganga which had been a part of Kotte in the sixteenth century. He is also known to have been able to take strong action against feudatory chieftains who contemplated joining the Portuguese side.<sup>50</sup>

Moreover there were factors which though unknown to Senerat were working in his favour. The most important of these was the gradual deterioration of the Portuguese position in the Indian ocean. Such Portuguese dominance over trade in the Indian ocean as existed, had depended not on any special trading ability of the

- F. de Souza VI. 14-15 ; Baldaeus 65,77-81 ; Bocarro 45-47 ; DR IV 26, 206 ; TT.LM. 16.f.754 ; Simancas SP 1473.f.278 ; AHU Caixa 6. 2.11.1618
46. Homem had served in Malacca before his appointment as captain-general of Ceylon. Bocarro gives two dates of his arrival in Ceylon—May 1614 (Bocarro 278) and November 1614 (Bocarro 405,410). Contemporary documents in the AHU indicate that the former is the correct date. Homem seems to have been equally effective in war and internal administration and was removed from office only because Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira, the king's nominee for the post, arrived in Goa in 1615. Homem served till the arrival of Pereira in Ceylon in February 1616. Bocarro 272-279, 405-411 ; AHU Caixa 3. 30.6.1613 ; AHU Caixa 3. 22.10.1615 ; F. de Souza VI. 77-78 ; CLR 3 ser. I 507-508 ; Baldaeus 81
47. The Portuguese forces in Ceylon in the four years 1613-1616 ranged between 500 and 700 soldiers. Bocarro 405-410, 496-497 ; Filmoteca LM. 12 76/3 ; LM.12 99/1-3 ; CLR 3 ser I 507-508, 513 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.172
48. Pereira, brother of the count of Feyra was the person chosen by the king in February 1613 to succeed de Azevedo in Ceylon. He left Lisbon in 1614 in the ship 'Remedios' which arrived in Goa only in May the following year. He set out for Ceylon in October 1615 but was forced to put into Cochim due to bad weather and remained there till February 1616. Though a man of mediocre talents he was ambitious. In the 1620's on his return to Goa after serving in Mocambique he came to be regarded as the 'Ceylon expert' in the viceroy's council. Bocarro 480-481 ; DR V. 37-38,42,45 ; AHU codice 501.f.6v Filmoteca LM. 12 76/3 ;—Ribeiro—*Registo da casa da India* (Lisbon 1954) 440-441
49. F. de Souza VI.78 ; Bocarro 407,409
50. Baldaeus 60-64 ; *Mandarampura Puvata* stanzas 182-187 ; *TT.Manuscritos do convento da Graca* tomo 6D

Portuguese but on their supremacy at sea. The discovery of the Cape route by the English and the Dutch in the late sixteenth century although it destroyed the Portuguese monopoly of the sea route to Europe did not immediately present a threat to Portuguese political and economic power in India. The northern European powers were at first content to keep away from the centres of Portuguese power. Moreover the Portuguese in their alarm at the arrival of their European enemies, had in the last years of the sixteenth century maintained a steady stream of soldiers and supplies to the East. In the years 1595-1601, thirty three ships set out from Lisbon for India as against the forty eight Dutch ships that left for the East in the same period,<sup>51</sup> and the Portuguese ships being generally larger carried more men and supplies than Dutch ones.<sup>52</sup>

This situation began to change after both the English and the Dutch set up permanent trading stations in the East. In 1617 there were eleven English and thirty nine Dutch ships sailing in the Indian ocean.<sup>53</sup> Portuguese command of the seas was being increasingly challenged. Moreover, although the Portuguese empire in the East remained as strong as it had been during most of the sixteenth century, the European preoccupations of the Iberian monarch prevented it from being further strengthened to meet the rapidly growing challenge of the two Protestant powers. In the period 1613-1617 fifty one ships left Holland for the East and twenty nine left England for the same destination. From Lisbon departures numbered only twenty three.<sup>54</sup> Clearly the Portuguese would before long have had to face heavy odds in the East. Even a worse portent for the future, for the Portuguese was the effort by the English and the Dutch to end their conflicts in the East and to pool their resources for a common struggle against the Portuguese. Discussions on these lines were begun in 1613 and again in 1615 much to the alarm of the authorities in Lisbon.

However, despite the difficulties both actual and potential, in the Portuguese position in the East, the general situation in

51. Meilink-Roelofs—*Asian trade and European influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and 1630*, 373

52. It is generally accepted however that Dutch ships were lighter better constructed, better armed and above all, had better trained crews than the Portuguese ones (Meilink Roelofs 175) but Prof. Boxer points out that some of the larger northern European ships were as big as the smaller carracks and galleons of the Portuguese. (C. R. Boxer—Admiral Joao Pereira Corte Real and the construction of Portuguese East Indiamen in the early seventeenth century in *The Mariners Mirror XXVI*. 1940.

53. Meilink-Roelofs 378

54. *Ibid* 194 ; F. de Souza 509-510

Ceylon when Dom Nono Alvares Pereira arrived in Ceylon in 1616, appeared one of hope for the Portuguese. The Kandyan king seemed to be becoming weaker year by year while Kotte seemed more firmly in the grasp of the Portuguese than ever before. The missionary work of the Franciscans and the other orders appeared steadily progressing in Kotte and Mannar.

Before turning to the events in Ceylon in the period 1617-1638 however it is best to consider in some detail the Portuguese administrative structure in the East so far as it is known for its nature and its degree of efficiency did, on occasion, influence the course of these events.

All Portuguese trading posts, factories and colonies, east of the Cape of Good Hope were placed in charge of the Portuguese governor of India. Some Portuguese governors were honoured with the title of viceroy but this did not involve the grant of any extra powers to them. The governors were however not conceived as policy-making officials. The formulation of colonial policy was supposed to be done in Europe. In theory all important policy decisions had to obtain the approval of the king of Portugal. In the period 1580-1640 the situation was further complicated by the fact that the king of Portugal also happened to be the king of Spain and moreover usually resided in Spain, Portugal itself being governed either by a viceroy or a board of three governors.<sup>55</sup> To avoid delay inherent in this situation it was decided that all normal and routine administrative policy decisions relating to Portuguese Asia were to be made in Lisbon by a body known as the *conselho da fazenda*<sup>56</sup> which worked in conjunction with and generally included the viceroy of Portugal. Matters of unusual interest or importance were however merely discussed in the *conselho da fazenda* and sent up with recommendations to a superior body known as the *conselho de Portugal*. This latter body apparently moved with the king to keep in close touch with him and dealt with all important matters relating to Portugal and her empire. Co-ordination in policy matters was supposed to be achieved by means of routine correspondence between the two bodies. The same objective was furthered by the occasional appointment of an influential and trusted councillor to both councils. This would involve for the councillor

55. A list of viceroys and governors of Portugal is found in Joao Pedro Ribeiro's *Dissertacoes chronologicas e criticas sobre a historia e jurisprudencia e ecclesiastica e civil de Portugal II*. Lisbon, 1857.

56. The *conselho da fazenda* was delegated this task only in the period 1614-1644. In the early years of the seventeenth century up to 1614 a separate body known as the *conselho da India* performed this task. After 1644 the overseas empire was dealt with by the *Conselho Ultramarino*.

so chosen about three months residence in Lisbon (January to March) when despatches of the Lisbon council to the East were being prepared and residence at the court in Madrid, Salamanca, Valladolid or Seville for the rest of the year. The Duque de Villa Hermoza who dealt with some of the correspondence of the *conselho da fazenda* intermittantly for sixteen years was one such trusted councillor. There is however some reason to think that these measures proved ineffective by the 1620's, with the result that on occasion contradictory instructions were issued to the viceroy by these councils.<sup>57</sup>

The governor of India too had some hand in the formulation of policy. It often happened that the governor appointed, was a man of some standing and his opinions were therefore generally respected. In fact few important policy decisions were taken in Europe without consulting the governor. Moreover often only the broad outlines of policy were indicated and the governor allowed to determine the details of its execution. On the other hand the high turnover in the number of governors often meant that the governor was, as likely as not, out of office by the time his recommendation was accepted especially as the return voyage from Goa to Lisbon took almost two years.<sup>58</sup> Moreover the *conselho da fazenda* once it decided on a policy sent persistent orders for its execution until definite news arrived that this was done, thus often reducing the governor's powers to those of delay.

The other persons who could be expected to some influence in policy formulation for Ceylon were the captain-general and the *vedcr da fazenda* or the superintendent of revenue of the island. Both had the right of direct correspondence with Lisbon. The *conselho da fazenda* also did receive special reports from the *camara* or municipal council of Colombo and from other important lay and ecclesiastical dignitaries.<sup>59</sup> Thus it can be broadly asserted that Portuguese policy was generally formulated in Lisbon by the *conselho da fazenda* in the name of the king on the recommendations of Portuguese officials in the East. For the sake of convenience decisions so made shall henceforth be referred to as decisions of the king.

On receipt of these decisions the governor of India executed them with the aid of two advisory councils—the *conselho do Estado* or Council of State and the *conselho da fazenda* or the Council of

57. See footnote 135 of Chapter III

58. Sixteen governors served in India in the period 1600-1640.

59. See the reports of the Bishop of Cochim in TT.LM.16.ff.106,108-109; AHU 33.ff.11-23

Finance. The former dealt with political and religious affairs and its membership normally included the chancellor of state, the captain of Goa, the *vedor da fazenda* and the archbishop of Goa. The latter council consisted chiefly of treasury officials. The governor could nominate any *fidalgo* he wished to the councils and was not bound by their advice but being often less experienced in the affairs of the East than his advisors he sometimes bowed to the decision of the majority even when he was opposed to it.<sup>60</sup>

The Portuguese administrative system embodied two principles which were expected to restrain an excessive accumulation of power in the governor of India. In the first place the superintendent of revenue was theoretically made independent of the governor. The archbishop too was generally supposed to be beyond his control. The Portuguese governor's powers were in the main concentrated on the political, administrative and military spheres. Secondly subordinate officials were allowed to send independent reports criticising their superiors. These practices however, proved ineffective in preventing both extension of the governor's powers and in the growth of corruption and nepotism at all levels. The powers of office and the efficiency of the administration was still to a large extent determined by the personality of the holder, and in no case was this dictum truer than in the post of the captain-general of Ceylon.

60. C. R. Boxer—'A glimpse of the Goan archives' in the *Bulletin of the school of Oriental & African Studies XIV*. London, 1952. 320

## CHAPTER 2

### CRISIS AND RECOVERY

When Dom Nono Alvares Pereira took up the captain-generalship in Ceylon in early 1616 the position of the Portuguese seemed most satisfactory, with the lands of Kotte quiet and the enemy in Kandy forced on the defensive. Indeed, a few years earlier de Azevedo, now the viceroy of Portuguese India had written back hopefully to his king that a high proportion of the people of Kandy had already been killed in battle or by hunger.<sup>1</sup> Yet within a year all was to be in turmoil, peace in Kotte shattered by major rebellions and even more unexpected, the Portuguese forced to accept a positive alliance with Senerat, the king of Kandy.

The origins of this radical change in the political situation are to be found in two revolts, which drew upon widespread if latent discontent. The establishment of Portuguese rule in the low-country had entailed new economic burdens on the subjected Sinhalese peasantry. It was also accompanied by undisguised violations of traditional practices. The destruction and desecration of temples, both Buddhist and Hindu evoked feelings of deep resentment, especially in inland areas as yet untouched by Catholic missionaries. The public humiliation of two Buddhist monks who had dared to preach in Portuguese territory had inflamed the Seven Korales shortly before the disturbances broke out.<sup>2</sup> The rebellions therefore were perhaps not surprising. That they took the Portuguese rulers so completely by surprise is an interesting commentary on their alienation from the Sinhalese people.

The first rising occurred in Sabaragamuwa in September 1616 and Filipe de Oliveira, *disava* of the Seven Korales had to be sent there to restore order.<sup>2</sup> While de Oliveira was occupied in the south, a second and far more formidable rebellion broke out in December 1616 in the Seven Korales under a man who called himself Nikapitiya Bandara.<sup>3</sup>

1. Filmoteca LM12/19/1-2

2. C. A. L. R. 2 78; Queyroz 1023-1035;

3. The real Nikapitiya Bandara was a prince of Sitawaka who was proclaimed king on the death of Rajasinha in 1592 and captured by the Portuguese soon after. He was later educated at Colombo and Coimbra and died in 1611 in Coimbra. The rebel was a pretender, son of a measurer of grain and a priestess of the Rayigam Korale. He was educated by Fr. Manoel de Trindade and married the daughter of Pulasinha Aratchi of Waskaduwa, Potupitiya. He served the Portuguese in various capacities after 1616 and gained the valued post of *vidane* of *chaleas* and palanquin bearer of the captain-general in the time of de Menezes and Homem. While at Malwana he learnt much about the Sitawaka royal family from ladies of the Sitawaka court who resided at Walgama. His career how-

The success of Nikapitiya, who in the absence of de Oliveira became master of the eastern half of the Seven Korales within a few weeks, was the signal for Kandyan intervention. For the first time since his succession Senerat saw a chance of carrying the war into Portuguese territory. Kangara Aratchi, a former rebel leader who had considerable support in the Seven Korales<sup>4</sup> led two thousand well-armed Kandyan militiamen to reinforce Nikapitiya's peasant army in the north while Kuruwita Rala, governor of Uva descended with his forces on his homeland, the Two Korales, where he could always rely on finding support.<sup>5</sup>

The Portuguese were thus confronted with attacks on two fronts by Sinhalese forces which in both cases amounted to several thousand men. To meet these the Portuguese had some seven hundred regular Portuguese troops who could be reinforced by detachments of *casados* and *topazes*.<sup>6</sup> The timely arrival of a fleet from Malacca in December 1616 placed an extra force of a hundred Portuguese and their followers at the disposal of the captain-general.<sup>7</sup> A proportion of these forces was of course occupied in garrison duty but at the outbreak of the revolt the captain-general Pereira certainly possessed a Portuguese force twice as strong as that at the disposal of de Azevedo in the latter half of his regime in Ceylon.<sup>8</sup>

The key to the position however, was held by the *lascarin* forces. If they deserted *en masse* the Portuguese forces would have had little option but to withdraw from most of the Seven Korales and Sabaragamuwa. As it was, many of them did desert to join the leader they believed to be the grandson of Rajasinha of Sitawaka,<sup>9</sup>

ever, was sharply interrupted and he seems to have been dismissed from his posts. Bocarro suggests that the reason for his disgrace was the abandonment of his wife and consequent disputes with the clergy. In 1615 he accompanied Antonio Batalha who was taking some elephants to Jaffna and disappeared into the jungles of Nuwarakalawiya whence he emerged an year later. Bocarro 497 ; DR I.10,106 ; CLR 3 ser.II. 530 ; F. de Souza VI.92 ;

DR II,230-239 ; W. L. A. Don Peter—*Studies in Ceylon church history*, Colombo, 1963. p. 113

4. T. Abeyasinghe 50 ; Bocarro 498 identifies him as Gancara Rache.

5. Bocarro 498,508 ; F. de Souza VI.92

6. *Casados* are married Portuguese settlers. *Topazes* 'dark skinned or half-caste claimants of Portuguese descent and Christian profession' according to H. Yule and A. L. Burnell—*Hobson-Jobson—A glossary of colloquial Anglo-Indian words and phrases* (new ed. by W. Cooks) London 1903

7. This fleet of eight vessels continued on its way to Goa in January 1617 leaving many of the soldiers behind. Bocarro 496-497, 685 ; F. de Souza VI.91 ; CALR II.131 ; Filmoteca LM.12 99/1-3 Filmoteca LM.12 76/3

8. T. Abeyasinghe 64

9. CALR II.130 ; Bocarro 499,504

but Dom Constantino, a converted prince of the Kotte dynasty who commanded the *lascarins* forces<sup>10</sup> was able to keep the majority loyal.

The first use made of these forces by the captain-general was against Nikapitiya whose success in the Seven Korales continued threateningly. Portuguese reinforcements were pushed up the Kelani-ganga to the forward base at Menikkadawara with orders to Manoel Cezar who commanded the Portuguese forces there to put a speedy end to the rising. Cezar marched northwards with a force of two hundred and twenty Portuguese and a thousand Sinhalese *lascarins* and was met by Nikapitiya's forces about four thousand strong who had crossed the Maha Oya into the Four Korales. The two armies met on a stretch of level ground at Gandolaha on 18 December 1616.<sup>11</sup> Despite the desertion of half of Cezar's *lascarins* Nikapitiya was forced back into the Seven Korales after a hard fought battle. This dearly earned victory proved to be of little use to the Portuguese however, for when Manoel Cezar advanced into the Seven Korales he found himself in a hostile land. No intelligence of the rebels could be had and the Portuguese forces were harassed by the guerilla tactics of Nikapitiya's men. His force was soon reduced to eighty Portuguese and a handful of *lascarins*. Indeed it was only the arrival of de Oliveira from the Two Korales with a hundred and twenty Portuguese and eight hundred *lascarins* that saved Cezar from annihilation. Even these joint forces were placed in danger when de Oliveira's *lascarins* absconded one night with all their arms and at this stage the two commanders decided to abandon the struggle for the Seven Korales, to retreat twenty miles south-east to Attanagalla and there to fortify themselves.

Relieved of the pressure on the centre of his power, Nikapitiya once more took the offensive, moving into the western reaches of the Seven Korales and raiding on occasion to within a few miles of Colombo fort.<sup>12</sup> These successes emboldened Kuruwita Rala operating in the south in the Two Korales. He attacked and captured the fort of Sabaragamuwa,<sup>13</sup> the main stronghold of the *disava*

10. Bocarro 498

11. Bocarro 498 says that Gandolaha was located on the river Loao. The site was probably located somewhere in the present Gandolaha Pattuwa. It was evidently a place of strategic value as P. da Trindade (III.118) mentions that the Portuguese had a garrison at Gandolaha (Gandole) in 1632.

12. Bocarro 499-506 ; F. de Souza VI.92-96 ; AHU Caixa 5. 21.11.1617 CALR II.130-131 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.230v

13. Located at or near the modern town of Ratnapura. In 1616 the fort was garrisoned by sixty Portuguese under its captain Manoel Matoso and the *lascarins* of Sabaragamuwa under *disava* Estavao da Faria.



of Sabaragamuwa, by a strategem and turned to the Matara *disava*, particularly the rich Rayigam Korale.<sup>14</sup>

It was at this time when things were going so well for both Nikapitiya and Kandy that a 'Diplomatic Revolution' occurred in Ceylon. Senerat who had so far led the Kandyan in war against the Portuguese suddenly turned to his erstwhile enemies for friendship and alliance. Kuruwita Rala, the general who had served the Kandyan kings so loyally since 1603 not only turned against his master and raised a revolt in the hill country itself but also invited a rival prince of the Sitawaka dynasty to assume the throne of Kandy. Abeyasinghe seeks to explain this phenomena by stating that the revolt in Kotte '...became a struggle against the foreigner in the low country and a revolt against incompetent monarchy in the country on the hills. The two powers threatened by the revolt therefore drew together and the first Kandyan-Portuguese treaty of 1617 was the result.'<sup>15</sup> The Luso-Kandyan *entente* was no doubt a product of common interest but the above explanation is a reversal of the order of events, for the revolt against Senerat was a result and not the cause of the Kandyan alliance with the Portuguese.<sup>16</sup>

The true explanation of this unusual sequence of events must be sought for in the character and aims of three of the main protagonists, Nikapitiya Bandara, Senerat and Kuruwita Rala. The tragedy of Nikapitiya was that in claiming to be the grandson of Rajasinha, he also inherited all of the Rajasinha legend. Elated by the success of his first campaign he began to think of the ruler of Kandy as a vassal and demanded from him one of the daughters of Kusumāsana Devi as wife.<sup>17</sup> Senerat had so far thought of himself as Nikapitiya's patron and protector. On receipt of this message he swiftly realised that his protegee could become a dangerous rival. He therefore immediately withdrew the contingent he had sent to aid Nikapitiya and instructed Kuruwita Rala to withdraw from his campaign. Furthermore, he began to make efforts to reach an understanding with the Portuguese.

The cause of the rift between Senerat and Kuruwita Rala lay in this decision. Senerat's primary interest was to safeguard his own dynasty and protect his own position. For this he was willing to sacrifice all hopes of expelling the Portuguese from the island. Born and bred in Kandy he was content to rule in his kingdom if left unmolested by the Portuguese. In this respect he was a true

14. Bocarro 508.685 ; F. de Souza VI.98

15. T. Abeyasinghe 68

16. Queyroz 710 ; P. da Trinidad III.78

17. Bocarro 506 ; F. de Souza VI.96

successor of Vimaladharmasuriya. The Sitawaka dynasty had no tradition of friendship with that of Kandy, and Nikapitiya's pretensions alarmed him all the more as he had achieved in a few weeks what Senerat had failed to do in years of fighting—he had forced the Portuguese to give up most of the Four and Seven Korales and had placed them on the defensive in Kotte. Thus, to the king the prudent course seemed to be to ally himself with the hard-pressed Portuguese against the more dangerous Nikapitiya.

Kuruwita Rala viewed the conflict from an entirely different point of view. As a native of Kotte he could not regard the fate of the people of the lowlands with the same indifference as Senerat. To him the Portuguese were always the main enemy and he no doubt considered that the differences between Senerat and Nikapitiya could be sorted out after the Portuguese had been expelled from the island. Already his own homeland, the Two Korales, was in his hands. Kuruwita Rala therefore refused to turn his back on the most favourable opportunity to liberate Kotte that he had ever known. Thus when Senerat persisted in his policy of seeking peace with the Portuguese, Kuruwita Rala revolted against him and soon became master of much of southern Ceylon including Batticaloa, Wellassa, Panama and Uva and part of Sabaragamuwa and Matara.<sup>18</sup> In a sense Kuruwita Rala rather than Senerat was the true Sinhalese patriot for it was he who placed national above dynastic interests.

There is little doubt that Senerat, like the Portuguese, had formed an exaggerated opinion of the strength of Nikapitiya,<sup>19</sup> but for sometime he failed to convince the Portuguese of his desire for peace. The messenger he sent to Balana to seek for an escort for his ambassador was put to death by the garrison. Senerat however did not lose hope. He next sent Domingos Rodriguez and Balthazar Ribeiro, two of the Portuguese captured at Sabaragamuwa to convey his wishes. Finally, as even this would not convince Manoel Falcao, the captain of the fort he brought all the forces he could spare and laid siege to the fort. After some resistance the Portuguese who had no hope of relief surrendered. It was only then that Senerat succeeded in convincing Falcao that his desire for peace and an alliance was genuine. However due to

18. *Kustantinu Hatana stanzas* 14-19 ; CLR 3 ser I.151 P. da Trindade II 78 remarks in passing ".....alevantando-se contra o rei alguns vassalos seus, descontentes de ter ele feito pazes com os Portugueses....."

19. Nikapitiya's base and source of strength was the Seven Korales which had suffered much devastation in the time of de Azevedo. Apart from the two thousand men he could raise in this area many *lascarins* who deserted the Portuguese forces of the Four Korales and Matara joined him.

these delays it was only on 15 March 1617 that two of his envoys reached Malwana to offer a treaty of peace to the captain general.<sup>20</sup> Even then, though Pereira was pleased to gain an ally at such a difficult time, Senerat was asked to release some Portuguese prisoners and to send envoys of greater standing as an earnest of good faith. It was only when these further envoys with an escort of a hundred *lascarins* together with thirty of the Portuguese held captive in Kandy arrived at Malwana on 6 May 1617 that all doubts about Senerat's intentions were set at rest. The question was how the Portuguese should react to the Kandyan offer.

De Azevedo's policy had been one of uncompromising hostility to Kandy and though direct assault had had to be abandoned in favour of containment and a wearing down process, the absorption of Kandy remained the ultimate goal. One argument in favour of this policy had always been the need to deny to Portugal's European rivals in the East any trade or military alliance in Ceylon. In early years while the Dutch and the English were seeking to avoid a full scale clash with established Portuguese centres of power and instead were pushing their trade in the Indonesian archipelago, the Coromandel coast and Bengal, it seemed a justifiable policy to devote Portuguese energy to consolidation in Ceylon by the elimination of Kandy. But as Dutch and English pressure intensified and their need to break into the 'country' or port to port trade of Asia drove them westwards, the right course for the Portuguese in Ceylon became less clear. Complete mastery of the island was more desirable than ever, but whether resources could properly be spared for a war in Kandy when so many other points in the *Estado da India* were threatened seemed increasingly doubtful. In the second decade of the seventeenth century doubt grew as the English by their naval victories in Gujerat broke into the trade with Mughul India, the Dutch consolidated their hold on the Coromandel cloth trade and as both European and Achinese attack put Malacca in peril. With the failure in 1616 of Portuguese plans for a counter-blow in Indonesia by a joint Luso-spanish naval expedition doubt turned to certainty; the pursuit of victory in Ceylon must be set aside. In Europe the king instructed the new viceroy Dom Joao Coutinho, conde de Redondo to 'dissimulate' with the kings of Ceylon and to concentrate on opposing the European enemies. The news of the revolt in Ceylon made Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo

20. F. de Souza VI.99-100 ; CALR II.131,135 ; Bocarro 509-510 CRL 3 ser. II.530-533

serving as viceroy in India admit that the peace proposals from Kandy must be accepted.<sup>21</sup>

Meanwhile, in Ceylon, events both in Kotte and Kandy were drawing Senerat and the captain-general even closer together, for after consulting those who supported him<sup>22</sup> Kuruwita Rala decided to invite Mayadunne of Denawaka, descendant of his namesake who founded the kingdom of Sitawaka,<sup>23</sup> to return from India and accept the title of king of Ceylon. The exact reason for this invitation is unknown, for there is no reason to believe that Kuruwita Rala suspected Nikapitiya to be an imposter. It is more likely that this was an act to safeguard his own position. Having renounced his allegiance to Senerat, he had to provide his followers with another king. He himself was inhibited from assuming the title due to his caste.<sup>24</sup> Thus he needed a figure-head prince who would be amenable to his control. Nikapitiya's recent conduct hardly recommended him for this post. Mayadunne on the other hand was an ideal candidate, for even Nikapitiya could hardly dispute the claims of this well-known prince. On Mayadunne's arrival the two claimants agreed to a compromise. Nikapitiya was to be king of Kotte and Mayadunne, king of Kandy.<sup>25</sup>

During the first six months of 1617 Mayadunne, Kuruwita Rala and Nikapitiya more than held their own. Nikapitiya on 12 January 1617 tried and failed at Kaleliya to defeat the Portuguese in open battle.<sup>26</sup> But Kaleliya like Gandolaha proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Portuguese for Nikapitiya realized that without the trained troops of Kandy, his ill-armed levies had little chance of winning pitched battles. He therefore began following Kuruwita Rala's policy of avoiding battle, harassing the Portuguese forces on the move and attacking isolated Portuguese outposts. Captain-general Pereira was unable to formulate an effective

21. H. W. Livermore (ed), *Portugal and Brazil—An introduction* (Oxford 1953) 227 Botelho de Souza III.7

22. The chief among these were Kangara Aratchi and Vellappu Aratchi. The latter had rebelled in the Hewagam Korale in the days of de Azevedo and had since been in Kandyan service. T. Abeyasinghe 64 ; Jornada 10,35 ; BM.Add.Ms 19866 ; BM.Or.2012 ; BM.Or.2702 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.220v ; *Rajavaliya* 99

23. Biker I.224 ; CLR 3 ser .I.151

24. Kuruwita Rala was of the Karawa caste which was not held in high esteem in the seventeenth century Ceylon. (Queyroz 591 ; Jornada 35 ; F. de Souza VI.78 ; T. Abeyasinghe 64 ; Bocarro 508 ; Ajuda 51-IV-32.f.16v) This was not enough to bar him from high office, for Senerat had made him ruler of Uva. To assume the title of king was another matter and Kuruwita Rala was shrewed enough to realize that this was no time to risk disputes over loyalties.

25. TT.LM.12.f.454

26. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.230v ; Bocarro 507-508 ; F. de Souza VI.97

plan of military action against the rebels. This may have been partly due to the lack of troops. In the first half of 1617 Portuguese forces were at no time strong enough to launch an offensive against both Nikapitiya and the forces of Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala at the same time. This enabled the rebels to launch diversionary attacks on the depleted Portuguese forces in one sector while the main Portuguese force was fighting in the other. Thus the apparently successful campaign of Manoel Cezar against Nikapitiya in January 1617 had to be halted due to Kuruwita's offensive against Rayigam Korale following his capture of Sabaragamuwa fort.<sup>27</sup> Similarly an attack on Kuruwita Rala in February of the same year could not be pursued partly due to renewed activity by Nikapitiya. Nevertheless it is difficult to disagree with Faria de Souza's criticism that the Portuguese forces could have achieved more had they been better utilized.<sup>28</sup> Pereira let the rebels dictate the campaign, switching his main forces against one or the other according to the success they temporarily achieved. Throughout this period therefore the Portuguese forces achieved little save devastation of land which only tended to attract more support for their enemies. Their control of Kotte remained limited to the Kelani valley and the coast-line from Negombo to Matara.<sup>29</sup>

By June however the situation began to favour the Portuguese once more. The rebels received no new accessions of strength. The Portuguese on the other hand received a flow of men and supplies which began to alter the balance of power. In early February the China fleet on its way to Goa called at Colombo and besides providing a much needed supply of money left a number of Portuguese sailors, soldiers and merchants who were on board, to serve in the defence of the island.<sup>30</sup> When favourable winds set in in March, a stream of reinforcements poured in from Goa. First to arrive was Lourenco Pires de Carvalho with a force of sixty or seventy men and a consignment of rice.<sup>31</sup> He was soon followed by Pedro Alvares Cabral who led a force of a hundred and fifty Portuguese.<sup>32</sup> Another force of eighty men was sent from Goa to Galle in April to ensure that the cinnamon producing villages in the southern regions of Kotte remained under Portuguese control.<sup>33</sup>

27. Bocarro 507-508, 684-685

28. F. de Souza VI.130

29. Bocarro 686-690, 703-711 ; CALR II.132 ; F. de Souza VI.130

30. Pereira obtained about seven hundred *xerafims* in money from state and private funds on board the fleet. TT.*Corpo Chronologico* Part I. Maco 116.Doc. 101, and Doc.87 ; TT.LM.13.f.123

31. CALR II.f.132 ; F. de Souza VI.130 ; Bocarro 702-703

32. Simancas SP.1468.f.182

33. Bocarro 693

While the forces of the Portuguese were thus being built up, the aid in men and supplies which the rebels had expected from Jaffna was largely denied because of a political upheaval in that kingdom. The death of Ethirimanne Sinham at the end of 1615 had been followed by the installation of his three year old son<sup>34</sup> under the regency of Arsakesari, Ethirimanne's brother. This arrangement was confirmed by the viceroy in May 1616 but before his letter could reach Jaffna a rival faction headed by Sankili,<sup>35</sup> a nephew of Ethirimanne Sinham had seized power and put to death all princes of the blood save the heir and Sankili's own brother-in-law, Luku Kumaran. Periyapulle Aratchi, one of the chief supporters of Arasakesari was also put to death. His son Sinna Migapillai Aratchi thereupon fled to the Portuguese with two princesses and requested support to oust Sankili.<sup>36</sup> Sankili himself also applied for confirmation of his position as Regent. The Portuguese were thus placed in a strong position and in return for his recognition as regent they forced Sankili not only to refuse aid and assistance to Nikapitiya but also to close the frontiers against him and deny him a refuge.<sup>37</sup> Since the rebels had also lost any hope of aid from Senerat who was busy negotiating an alliance with the Portuguese, their position became increasingly desperate. The majority of soldiers in their armies were peasant recruits, armed only with swords, bows and spears who could not be expected to be absent from their villages, for long.<sup>38</sup> Promises of lavish grants of land might bring them in for a while but the immediate need to sow or harvest the family fields soon overshadowed all hopes of future

34. The age of the prince stated above is that given in Queyros 463. P. da Trindade says the prince was seven or eight years old. (III.207)

35. Queyroz (462) calls Sankili 'a perfect heathen and a traitor' but evidence from the work of P. da Trindade (III.189) indicates that he was by no means anti-Christian throughout. While still a nobleman he granted the villages of Visivil and Ilavr to Fr. Pedro Betancor.

36. Sinna Migapillai Aratchi was baptised under the name of D. Luis. He returned to Jaffna when the Portuguese recognized Sankili and later led a rising against him.

37. Vriddagirison 80 ; Bocarro 698-699 ; F. de Souza VI.132133,216 ; Queyroz 463-467 ; P. da Trindade III.207-208

The persistent Portuguese charges that Sankili aided both Kuruwita Rala and Nikapitiya may throw some doubt as to how far Sankili kept to his promise but there is little doubt that Sankili did not join Nikapitiya and Kuruwita Rala in an attempt to get rid of Portuguese overlordship as asserted by Alfredo Botelho de Souza. His position in Jaffna itself at this time was too dependent on Portuguese support for this. Nevertheless, it is possible that he followed Ethirimanne Sinham's policy of allowing contacts between the Sinhalese and south India through the traditional routes across Jaffna.

38. Evidence in Bocarro (499,707) and in contemporary Jesuit letters (CALR II.130) indicate that Nikapitiya's army fluctuated in number from about four thousand to under one thousand men.

gain. Moreover though Kuruwita Rala could draw on his base in Uva for supplies and new recruits, for his long tenure of power in that province had won him loyalty there, Nikapitiya had not the same facilities in the Seven Korales and his supplies and recruits were forthcoming only while he was attended by success in the field.

These factors explain why the campaign of Luis Gomes Pinto and Dom Constantino against Nikapitiya in May-July 1617 was such a success. Nikapitiya, who was forced to withdraw northwards, escaped the Portuguese only because of the imperfect control that Senerat had over the *Vanniyars* of Nuwarakalawiya. From July 1617 Nikapitiya ceased to be a force to be reckoned with. Though he made a final incursion into Portuguese territory in September 1617, he found the people of the Seven Korales reluctant to support him. He therefore speedily withdrew to the forests of north-central Ceylon and was never heard of again.<sup>39</sup>

The revolt left its mark on the Seven Korales. This province had been a valuable source of revenue and had provided the seat for one of the sub-kings of Kotte at the end of the fifteenth century. Its prosperity, however, had suffered a check after the systematic devastation of the area by de Azevedo in his attempt to regain control of it in 1596-1601 and again in 1603-1612.<sup>40</sup> After five years of relative peace the Seven Korales once more became a battleground in 1616-1617. It is unlikely that the Portuguese estimate of seven thousand Sinhalese killed and over a thousand crippled by injury in war in the eight months of revolt was an exaggeration.<sup>41</sup> In the long run the Portuguese themselves lost by their own scorched earth policy for the Seven Korales which had mustered four thousand *lascarins* in the time of Rajasinha yielded less than half that number in 1618.<sup>42</sup>

The peace treaty of 1617 between the king of Kandy and the Portuguese was in many ways the most significant result of the activities of Nikapitiya. As might have been expected so complete a reversal of past policies as the treaty represented was not easily achieved. Over three months elapsed between the arrival of king's accredited ambassadors in Malwana and the eventual signing of

39. Bocarro 714

40. T. Abeyasinghe 32

41. AHU 501. ff. 68v, 287

Eight years later Francisco Barbosa de Andrade estimated that at least two thousand *lascarins* died in the revolt of Nikapitiya. (Ajuda 51-VIII-40, f. 220v) The Portuguese loss probably exceeded two hundred dead. On many occasions the Portuguese killed all their captives to instill terror and to subjugate the land. (Bocarro ff. 686-687)

42. Ajuda 51-VIII-40 f. 266

the peace.<sup>43</sup> Part of the delay arose from matters of procedure, though this did not include delay in contacting and getting the approval of the viceroy as Faria de Souza would have us believe.<sup>44</sup> In fact the whole process of negotiation from the Portuguese side was done by the captain-general Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira himself, though he was always careful to obtain approval of the steps he took from a council he had formed for the purpose. This council normally consisted of the captain-major himself, the *vedor* or the controller of revenue, the captain of Colombo, the heads of the four religious orders, the four *disavas* (if available), the officials of the *camara* or the municipal council of Colombo and a few senior Portuguese soldiers. The council held its meetings in Colombo.<sup>45</sup> The delay arose chiefly from the fact that the Kandyan envoys were allowed little power to negotiate. Often they could merely indicate the king's wishes to the captain-general and convey the Portuguese proposals to the king and his advisers in Kandy. Thus after the first meeting of the captain-general's council when it approved of the decision to negotiate peace on 13 May 1617, it met again on 27 July 1617 to consider the draft proposals of the general and twice more in the same month to discuss amendments proposed by the king of Kandy.<sup>46</sup>

The delay was also due to the differences between the two parties as to the terms of the treaty. Senerat was willing to pay tribute and release all prisoners seized in war in return for recognition as king of Kandy and an alliance with the Portuguese. On the other hand he did not agree completely to the Portuguese proposals regarding the amount of tribute, the delimitation of the frontier, missionary activity in Kandy, treatment of refugees from Portuguese lands and the question of the fort of Balane.

Senerat's conception of tribute proved to be a token gift offered 'to do honour to the king of Portugal for the king of Portugal had no need of money but only honour'<sup>47</sup> The Portuguese on the other hand demanded a substantial tribute; namely four elephants (each five cubits in height) together with one thousand *amunas* of

43. The peace treaty and negotiations which preceded it are found in Biker I 203-217, Evora VI / 2-2-ff.246-253 and TT.LM.51. ff.364-369v ; Articles written by Fr. S. G. Perera on the subject (CALR II.132-135, III 49-52 ; CLR 3 ser.II. 536-538 157-166) are mainly based on Jesuit records.

44. F. de Souza VI.132

45. CLR 3 ser.III.158,160,162 ; CLR 3 ser.II.533,536 ; Biker I. 208,211,213 ; Evora CVI/2-2 ff.246v-247,249-249v ; 250v,251,253

46. On 18 and 30 of July.

47. CLR 3 ser.III 155 ; CALR III 50



## SPECIAL COLLECTION

arecanut and two hundred *bahars* of cinnamon.<sup>48</sup> Eventually Senerat's offer of one elephant a year led to a compromise settlement of a tribute of two elephants a year being accepted by the Portuguese on 18 July.

The differences over Balane fort were as wide. The Portuguese originally wanted the fort to be rebuilt by Senerat, stocked with provisions for a whole year and handed over to the Portuguese with all the men, arms and amunitions captured there in February. Senerat was not prepared to concede this. The fort at Balane had been constructed by de Azevedo for the express purpose of attacking Kandy and one of Senerat's chief objectives since his accession had been the dismantling of the fort. Thus he offered merely to restore all men and weapons captured from the fort and the Portuguese had to rest content with this. On the question of the return of the men captured at Sabaragamuwa, Senerat offered to return the Portuguese who were in his power but made it clear that their weapons were with the men of the area who were now followers of Kuruwita Rala.

Then there was the question of the repatriation of the rebels. Pereira like all the generals since de Azevedo, was concerned with the depopulation of Kotte and wanted Senerat to send back all those rebels who had fled to the hill country. Senerat agreed on condition that the captain-general would pardon them and restore their lands to them.

At the outset the Portuguese also insisted that all Muslims and Europeans should be excluded from any contact with Kandy. This was a clause which Kandy would have found difficult to honour on practice, for much of the Kandyan trade was in the hands of the Muslims. Senerat found an ingenious way out here. Omitting all specific mention of nationalities he proposed that Kandy 'would be a friend of our friends and an enemy of our enemies.'<sup>49</sup> This preserved Kandyan trade against interference, for Indian Muslims supplied many goods to Kotte too and therefore could not be regarded as enemies of the Portuguese. The

48. The Portuguese proposals mentioned above are those of the draft treaty prepared by Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira on 30 June 1617 and approved by his council on 2 July 1617. The compromise settlements mentioned, unless otherwise indicated were reached by 18 July. For the proposals of the Portuguese and the counter-proposals of the king see, CLR 3 ser. II.536-537, 156-157; Biker I.205-08; CALR III.49-52; Evora CVI/2-2.ff.246-250v

*amuna* = a measure of capacity. An *amuna* of arecanut contained 24,000-26,000 nuts.

*bahar* = a measure of weight. The Portuguese *bahar* was approximately 420 avoirdupois pounds (Goonewardena 191)

49. CALR III.50; CLR 3 ser.III.155; Evora CVI/2-2 f.248; Biker I.207

Portuguese fears of a Kandyan alliance with other European nations were also assuaged by this clause.

The Portuguese proposals regarding the propagation of Christianity also raised problems. The captain-general had stipulated not only that Senerat should provide a site for a church in Kandy but that 'he should favour and help'<sup>50</sup> the spread of Christianity.<sup>51</sup> Senerat was a tolerant king for he had allowed Franciscan friars free access to Kusumasana Devi and had even entrusted the education of his sons to them. Yet he could not have failed to realize that the support of his people was to a great extent dependent on his patronage of Buddhism. This was perhaps why the eventual treaty merely contained a clause establishing the right of Kandyans to become Christians if they chose to do so.<sup>52</sup>

The captain-general in his draft treaty of 30 January 1617 requested that one of Senerat's three sons be handed over as a hostage, and as the princes were young that four of the Kandyan nobles should also be handed over to the Portuguese. This demand reflects the distrust that the Portuguese had of Kandyan intentions even at this late stage. Senerat predictably refused to part with one of his sons and pointed that his royal word was more valuable than two hundred hostages. However, to calm Portuguese apprehensions he agreed to the sending of some nobles as hostages on condition that they could take turns so that none be separated from his family for long.<sup>53</sup>

All these issues having been settled by 18 July, only the question of the delimitation of the boundaries remained. Once negotiations had begun, Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira had sent a delegation of five trusted persons to Kandy to determine the limits of each kingdom. This did not prove difficult as the traditional boundaries of Kotte and Kandy were well known. The difficulties arose from

50. CLR 3 ser.III.538 ; Biker I.206 ; CALR III.50

51. This demand should also be viewed in the context of the Portuguese intolerance of Buddhism and Hinduism in their territory.

52. There is no reason to believe that freedom of conscience did not exist in Kandy before this. The only difficulty Senerat raised was in the case of slaves who on conversion became free, since this led to dispute between their masters and the priests. The Portuguese who doubtless had experience of the difficulty in Kotte agreed to exclude slaves from the freedom to accept Christianity. The final treaty also specifically granted Senerat the right to name the Franciscan friar in Kandy. The extent to which Senerat exercised this right is unknown. He certainly did nominate the first-Fr. Jose de Madre de Deus. Other Franciscans who served in Kandy in the 1620's and 30's include Fr. Francisco Negrao, Fr. Bernado de Cruz and Fr. Pedro dos Anjos. (P. da Trinidade III. 79,85)

53. Senerat himself asked for no hostage save the Franciscan friar in Kandy. This clause of the treaty on hostages does not appear to have been enforced at any time.

the Portuguese efforts to obtain some kind of control over the eastern sea board of Ceylon.<sup>54</sup> The captain-general in his original proposals asked the king of Kandy to promise to aid the Portuguese in building forts on the sea-coast. Senerat refused to agree to this as such a measure would isolate Kandy and place Kandyan trade at the mercy of the Portuguese. The Portuguese thereupon laid claims to Batticaloa. Senerat once more refused to give in, despite a Portuguese compromise offer in early August by which Batticaloa was to be included in Kandyan territory on condition that Senerat would aid the Portuguese to build a fort there. Eventually it was agreed that all rights over Batticaloa belonged to Senerat and his heirs.<sup>55</sup>

Thus the delay in signing the formal treaty was due partly to the process of negotiation itself and partly to the differences between the two parties. Senerat appears to have had an edge over the Portuguese in negotiations for he yielded far less often than the Portuguese on points at dispute. It should however be recalled that Senerat had conceded much to make the Portuguese commence negotiations.<sup>56</sup> Moreover Senerat unlike the Portuguese was compelled to stand firm on several issues. The very policy of making peace with the Portuguese had raised revolts in his domains. Senerat knew only too well that too many concessions might lose him his throne. On the other hand the Portuguese captain-general feared a further deterioration of the military situation due to fresh revolts and also feared Dutch intervention, especially after rumours of the sighting of three Dutch ships off Batticaloa.<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, Faria de Souza's charge that Senerat at first offered favourable terms and then changed them after the defeat of Nikapitiya is refuted by contemporary documents. Senerat's objections to the original Portuguese proposals and the acceptance of the eventual compromise solutions by the Portuguese (except in the case of Batticaloa) all came before the final defeat of Nikapitiya.<sup>58</sup>

54. The fortification of Trincomalee and Batticaloa, two ports on the eastern seaboard of Ceylon had been urged on the captain-general of Ceylon from the time of de Azevedo. (see DR IV.137 ; AHU 282.f.62 ; DR II.478 ; DR III.202,397)

55. Evora CVI/2-2 ff.249v-250v ; Biker I.210-211 ; CLR 3 ser.III.159-160

56. He agreed to be a vassal and to release some of the prisoners-of-war.

57. The new *disava* of the Seven Korales Luis Teixeira de Macedo also warned of another rising being planned with the aid of the king of Jaffna in the Seven Korales.

Evora CVI/2-2ff.250v-251v ; Biker I.212-213 ; CLR 3 ser.III.161-162

58. F. de Souza VI.132 appears to confuse the terms proposed by the captain-general with those offered by Senerat. Bocarro 709-710 gives the original proposals of the Portuguese as the actual contents of the treaty.

The treaty was ultimately signed by the captain-general on 17 August 1617 and by the king seven days later. The treaty was then sent to Goa for the viceroy's approval and finally to Lisbon for confirmation by the king. The Luso-Kandyan alliance however brought no immediate peace to Ceylon for the swift Portuguese success against Nikapitiya was not repeated against Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne.

The ability of Kuruwita Rala to resist the combined power of Senerat and the Portuguese was partly due to his skill and experience in war and partly due to the extent of his resources. Throughout 1617 and most of 1618 Kuruwita Rala commanded much of the *disavas* of Sabaragamuwa and Matara as well as the southern half of the Kandyan kingdom. The forces he could raise in these areas were superior to any that Senerat could muster, in number and as well as in armament.<sup>59</sup> That was why Kuruwita Rala could raid Kandy and drive Senerat out of his own capital.<sup>60</sup> In Kotte, when confronted by the better armed Portuguese forces Kuruwita Rala always withdrew and used his superior mobility and better information service to surprise isolated bodies of *lascarin* auxiliaries serving the Portuguese or to attack relatively undefended settlements. Thus by the end of 1617 Kuruwita Rala had not merely avoided defeat and kept control over the areas he subjugated but he had forced the Portuguese to abandon the newly built fort at Sabaragamuwa,<sup>61</sup> had raided Beruwala, had attacked two detachments of *lascarins* and had even persuaded some more of the *lascarins* of Matara to desert to him.<sup>62</sup>

The success of Kuruwita Rala however, owed much to a factor outside his control; misgovernment in Kotte itself. Pereira's mediocrity as a soldier had been partially disguised by the fortuitous treaty of peace with Kandy. His work as an administrator had no such saving grace. Here his principal faults lay in his inability to discipline his subordinates and an urge to reward loyal supporters at the expense of others. The former limited the effectiveness of

59. Most of the foundry workers who had served the Portuguese had joined Kuruwita Rala, partly as a protest against their increased burdens under Portuguese rule. (T. Abeyasinghe 83 ; T.T. Collecao de S. Vicente. livro 19.doc.276) The king of Kandy at this time could hardly raise three thousand men. (JCBRAS XXXVII 75)

60. *Kustantinu Hatana* stanzas 20-26

61. Sabaragamuwa had been re-captured and re-fortified by the Portuguese in March-April 1617 in an attempt to regain control over the district.

62. Bocarro does not mention a single military victory against Kuruwita Rala during the last six months of 1617. Thus the mention of a victory in which twelve *aratchis* and eight *mudaliyars* of Kuruwita Rala were killed, in a petition of a Portuguese soldier should be treated with some caution. (Bocarro 711-713 ; AHU 501 f.287)

his forces in war, while the latter earned him the enmity of the *camara* of Colombo, the stronghold of Portuguese settler interests. The problem of discipline arose partly from the fact that the Portuguese *fidalgo* or nobleman could be punished only by the viceroy and the High Court (*Relacao*) of Goa for any crime he committed. The captain-general had only the power to order his arrest. The arrest itself would have to be done by the *ouvidor* or judge who would then send the accused to Goa for trial. Pereira however took no steps against the chief offenders who happened to be two of his nephews.<sup>63</sup> The *ouvidor* Francisco Gomes dos Santos displayed no wish to alienate the captain-general, his superior in rank, by proceeding against his favourites. After a time, therefore, even the outward forms of justice ceased to be observed and general and subordinates alike displayed no scruples about making money at the expense of the royal treasury. The consequent oppression of the Sinhalese only tended to increase support for Kuruwita Rala.

Moreover Pereira's actions in this period were also governed by a suspicion of all Sinhalese leaders. At one stage he even suspected that Dom Constantino Barreto might lead a new rebellion in Matara.<sup>64</sup> Distrustful of the Sinhalese and disliked by the Portuguese Pereira grew increasingly ineffective as a general. This is why the arrival of a competent captain-general in the person of Constantino de Sa de Noronha in September 1618 was such a significant event.<sup>65</sup>

The revolt of Nikapitiya, the peace with Kandy and the appointment of de Sa as captain-general were three key events in a period which saw the end of de Azevedo era in Portuguese Ceylon. The first clearly showed the Portuguese that they had by no means won the loyalty of the Sinhalese inhabitants of Kotte even after two decades of rule. The second gave them—for the first

63. Queyroz 622 ; JCBRAS XI.495 ; TT.*Corpo Chronologico* part I.maco 116.doc.87 ; AHU Caixa V. 21.11.1617 ; AHU Caixa VI. 2.11.1618

The two nephews of the general, Manoel Cezar and Dom Francisco Pereira became well-known for their lawless and high-handed acts.

Pereira kidnapped a young Portuguese girl and kept her in her house for one and a half months. Cezar did not scruple to use force against the officials of the *camara* and even against priests. The *camara* in a letter dated 21 November 1617 complained to the king as follows '*queixasse mais este povo e cidade dos criados do geral actuilarem e matarem mto homes e cometerem adulterios porque se matare molheres cazados e entrarem em cazas de viuvas honrades e fazerem mtos forcas.*'

64. DR V.239 ; Botelho de Souza III.57

65. The need for a successor to Pereira did not arise out of any doubts in Lisbon as to his ability. On the contrary the king had decided in March 1617 that he was best fitted by experience and standing to take up the captain-generalship of Mocambique. (DR V.37-38,45)

time since they claimed Kotte in their own right—a chance to re-organize the administration of the kingdom, provide for its defence and try to win over the people, without the distraction of a war against Kandy. The third gave the Portuguese in Ceylon, a gifted leader for the tasks which lay ahead.

Constantino de Sa de Noronha was undoubtedly a natural leader of men. As Queyroz puts it 'has gallant disposition and manly frame and stature, tall and robust along with great strength, firmness and perfect health won him respect.'<sup>66</sup> De Sa came from a family with a tradition of service overseas. His own father, Martim Lourenco de Sa de Menezes had served as the warden of Ceuta. Brought up in Belem, the settlement along the river Tagus from which almost all the famous Portuguese explorers set sail, he was from early days exposed to the lure of the Portuguese overseas empire. However de Sa's departure to the east was not a product of his yearning for adventure. It was an event prompted by economic necessity. He had inherited little. His marriage in 1607 to Dona Luiza da Silva de Medonca was merely a union between two impoverished noble households. De Sa therefore had to recourse to the only occupation thought honourable to the Portuguese *fidalgo* of the seventeenth century—a career in the armed services. He served in the navy for a year and then for two and a half years more in the north African fort of Mazagao. These years of service however brought him little fortune while the birth of five children to his wife certainly increased the economic pressure on him.<sup>67</sup>

De Sa left Lisbon for the East in 1614. Four years later he had established a reputation for himself as a leader of men and occupied the important position of the captain-major of the fleet of Cape Comorin (1617-1618). In his rise he was undoubtedly assisted by his kinsmen but his exploits had already won him so much recognition that when on 8 October 1618 the new viceroy, Dom Joao Coutinho, conde de Redondo summoned a meeting of his council to choose a new captain-general for Ceylon (until the king made a fresh appointment) de Sa was the unanimous choice.<sup>68</sup>

66. Queyroz 780

67. De Sa's five children included two daughters—

Dona Joana and Dona Francisca. His eldest son was Joao Rodriguez de Sa de Menezes. For further details of de Sa's family and personal life see—JCBRAS XI. 480-494 ; Bocarro 325,446,469,645-648 ; AHU 501.ff.167,350 ; Simancas SP.1505.ff.10,44 C. R. Boxer (ed.) *Commentaries of Ruy Freire da Andrade* (London 1929) 315 ; TT. *livros do ordem do Christo* XXI.ff.35,58v

68. Queyroz 759-760 holds that Constantino de Sa did not seek to enrich himself when he was captain-general of Ceylon. De Sa de Menezes

De Sa left Goa on 15 October of the same year with a small force of twenty seven men. A month later he arrived at Colombo.<sup>69</sup> His first task was the reorganization of the armed forces, for Portuguese power in the island in the last analysis depended on the army. He moved cautiously at first consulting the *disavas* and the Portuguese captains of the *estancias*.<sup>70</sup> He appointed Filipe de Oliveira as captain-major of the Portuguese forces and entrusted him with the regrouping of six hundred Portuguese soldiers available for duty. The *disavas* were requested to muster the *lascarins* forces. To counter Kuruwita Rala's excellent system of obtaining news of the movements of Portuguese troops, de Sa established an espionage corps of his own. Finally, he exchanged envoys with Kandy recognising that peace with Kandy was essential to secure the defeat of the rebel forces.<sup>71</sup>

Having completed his preparations de Sa resolved, on the advice of more experienced Portuguese captains to construct a stockade at Sabaragamuwa. The stockade was to act as a base for the campaign planned against Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala. De Sa determined to avoid any risk of a revolt in the subjugated areas while he was away in the Two Korales. Thus sizeable garrisons were left in all Portuguese forts.<sup>72</sup> The new stockade at Sabaragamuwa was left in charge of two companies of Portuguese soldiers aided by a force of *lascarins*. A thousand Sinhalese under Luis Cabral de Faria guarded the Four Korales. The defensive deployment of these forces left de Sa with little more than three hundred soldiers to spare. With this force and a detachment of *lascarins* he set out in late 1618 to eliminate the power of Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala.<sup>73</sup>

(JCBRAS XI.566-567) also makes this contention pointing out that he spent eighteen thousand *xerafims* of his own money in works of fortification while refusing huge bribes offered by the king of Kandy. Contemporary documents however indicate that de Sa did not neglect opportunities to make money. Although his salary was fixed at four thousand *xerafims* a year the bishop of Cochim in 1619 calculated his annual income to be twenty thousand *xerafims*. (AHU 33.f.21) His mansion at Rossapana near Malwana was kept in such style that the king ordered an investigation be made as to whether such luxury was in accordance with royal instructions.

(TT.LM.15.f.16. TT.LM.13.f.243 ; TT.Ms da Convento da Graca tomo 3F ff.41,46,30 ; BNL Caxia 199.doc.78)

69. DR V.242 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.247

70. About thirty soldiers formed one *estancia* or company.

71. Queyroz 623 ; *Kustantinu Hatana* stanzas 65-70 ; JCBRAS XI. 495-496,498,500 ; Botelho de Souza III.59 relying on a single document states that Senerat made a new peace with de Sa giving up Batticaloa to the Portuguese.

72. Colombo, Malwana, Menikkadawara and Galle. (*Kustantinu Hatana* stanzas 83-87)

73. Queyroz 624 ; JCBRAS XI.500-503 ; F. de Souza VI.185-186

The two rebel leaders, having no wish to meet the general and his well-armed troops in open battle, retired to their mountain stronghold of Meddegama, just inside the borders of Kandy. The distance from Sabaragamuwa fort to Meddegama as the crow flies was hardly twenty miles. To make it on foot however was no easy proposition. The shortest route lay along the valley of Bambarabotuwa Oya.<sup>74</sup> Kuruwita Rala had however made considerable defensive preparations along the valley which being thickly forested and replete with rivulets was the ideal scene for guerrilla warfare. De Sa had no wish to risk his forces in a frontal attack, but being determined to attack Meddegama he made a wide detour to the south, thus avoiding the difficult country that protected the rebel stronghold and advanced on Meddegama from the rear along the Walawe Ganga. Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne promptly retired further inland hoping to entice de Sa further but de Sa decided to return to Sabaragamuwa partly owing to an outbreak of small-pox among the *lascarins*. Hampered by many sick soldiers de Sa decided to take a shorter route on the return journey, though he once more avoided the route along the Bambarabotuwa Oya but Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne realizing the difficulties of the Portuguese were soon on their heels. For over twenty-five miles from Imbulpe to Lellopitiya they pursued the Portuguese, cutting off stragglers and doing all they could to impede their march. At length at Lellopitiya, within four miles of the Portuguese fort at Sabaragamuwa, the captain-general decided to counter-attack. He feigned to retire in disorder and laid an ambush. The Sinhalese, elated by their success rushed into the trap and were routed by the Portuguese forces.<sup>75</sup>

The encounter at Lellopitiya has been hailed as a great victory for de Sa by both Sinhalese and Portuguese writers of the seventeenth century. The greatest Sinhalese poet of the age, Alagiyawanna,<sup>76</sup> wrote a poem *Kustantinu Hatana* (or the battle of Constantino) depicting it as a great triumph. De Sa de Menezes (and Queyroz following him) claim that eight thousand Sinhalese were killed in the struggle without the loss of a single Portuguese and that Kangara Aratchi, a renowned Sinhalese rebel leader was captured. Queyroz in addition states that forty *mudaliyars* of the rebels were killed in

74. Across the present Meda Pattuwa Korale of the province of Sabaragamuwa.

75. *Kustantinu Hatana stanzas* 97-180; Queyroz 625; JCBRAS XI. 504 505; F. de Souza VI.186

76. Baptised as Dom Jeronimo Alagiyawanna in the time of de Azevedo.



battle. Alagiyawanna maintained that thirty two *mudaliyars* were captured and mentions the names of four of them.<sup>77</sup>

Of the three writers only Alagiyawanna was a resident in Ceylon at the time of the battle. However his poem is obviously an eulogistic account of the activities of the general and allowance must be made for poetic licence. Alagiyawanna moreover was a Christian convert and had been in Portuguese service for many years. De Sa de Menezes when he wrote his father's biography would have been influenced not merely by filial affection but also by the expectation of material reward for his father's services. Moreover, when he composed his work, over twenty years had elapsed since the battle of Lellopitiya. De Sa de Menezes had not yet visited the East. Of these writers therefore, only Queyroz can be expected to take a reasonably detached view. But Queyroz does not seem to have relied on contemporary documents. His account of the battle is taken from de Sa de Menezes's '*Rebellion de Ceylan*' and a certificate of Francisco Barbosa da Andrade dated 3 June 1634.<sup>78</sup>

Internal evidence in these three accounts and their comparison with that of Faria de Souza suggests that the Portuguese victory has been considerably exaggerated. Even on the face of it the estimate of Sinhalese losses given in Queyroz and de Sa de Menezes is suspect in view of the low casualty figure quoted for the Portuguese. Faria de Souza claims that the force trapped numbered only five hundred men. A contemporary Jesuit report scales down the battle still further by asserting that only thirty three of the enemy were killed during the whole campaign. The account of the capture of Kangara Aratchi given by de Sa de Menezes and repeated by Queyroz is open to doubt, especially as Alagiyawanna fails to mention him among the leaders seized. Queyroz himself gives another account of how Kangara Aratchi was captured.<sup>79</sup>

The events following Lellopitiya moreover support the view that it was merely a minor ambush. The Portuguese army continued to retreat towards Sabaragamuwa even after the encounter. The only tangible result was therefore the safe return of the Portuguese force.<sup>80</sup> In fact the months which followed the battle saw an extension of the area under rebel control and continued attacks

77. *Kustantinu Hatana* stanza 180 ; JCBRAS XI.505 ; Queyroz 625 ; F. de Souza claims that thirty five *mudaliyars* were captured.

78. *Jornada* 9

79. Queyroz 729 ; *Kustantinu Hatana* stanza 177 ; BM.Add.Mss, 9858.f.158

80. Queyroz 627 ; JCBRAS XI,565,508

by Mayadunne on the lands of Kotte. But, for this, the chief reason probably lay in important developments in Jaffna.

The ruler of Jaffna had faced an unenviable task since 1591. He was pledged to favour Christianity and oppose all enemies of the Portuguese. On the other hand he had to conciliate the mass of his subjects who remained Hindu in faith. The ruler's difficulties were increased by the rise in power of the nobility during the last half of the sixteenth century. The nobility however were by no means united and while some of them were involved in trade relations with Kandy and south India, others who were converted to Christianity looked to the Portuguese for advancement. The whole situation complicated by the attitude of the missionary priests some of whom like Fr. Pedro Betancor, relying on the support of the Portuguese in Mannar, behaved in an arrogant fashion.<sup>81</sup> Sankili who had been confirmed governor by the Portuguese in 1617 was by no means able to deal with the delicate situation. He was as Queyroz described him 'proud, ambitious and weak.' His difficulties were further aggravated by his unpopularity. Many in Jaffna resented the killing of some of the princes of the royal family in the coup by which he came into power. He also lost popular esteem by his open association with a woman dancer. The suspicion that Sankili intended to do away with the heir and make his own son-in-law king added greatly to the unrest in the country. Profiting by the general discontent two Christian *mudaliyars* Dom Pedro and Dom Luis with the support of the Portuguese *casados* resident in Jaffna raised a revolt against Sankili and drove him to Kayts in August-September 1618. Sankili immediately applied to the captain of Mannar for help against the rebels. The captain who provided a refuge for Sankili in a Franciscan monastery proved unwilling to give Sankili military assistance against a rising led by Portuguese and Christians. Sankili therefore turned to the Nayak of Tanjore for help. The powerful Rangunatha Nayak (1600-1634) was only too glad to aid a neighbouring Hindu ruler against what he thought to be a Christian revolt supported by the Portuguese. A force of five thousand men was sent from Tanjore under Varuna Kulattan. Meanwhile the efforts of the rebels to provide an alternative to Sankili by inviting the nephew of Pararajasingham who was living in Rameswaran met with little success and the rebellion swiftly crushed.<sup>82</sup>

81. Queyroz 665-666

82. Vriddagirison 76-77, 80-81, 91; DR. V.195; Queyroz 467-468; Assentos I. 11-13; Pala Trividade III 208-209

The subsequent policy of Sankili was determined by his own weakness in Jaffna. Henceforth his power rested largely on a contingent of troops from Tanjore. This force remained under the command of Varuna Kulattan who stayed in Jaffna and received high honours.<sup>83</sup> Being dependent on a foreign contingent to maintain power in his own kingdom, Sankili could neither hope to take effective action against those who rebelled against him nor break with the Portuguese. Thus the *casados* and priests, who did not forgive him for his alliance with Tanjore, were allowed to remain unmolested though they formed a potential fifth column. These were not slow to point out to the captain of Mannar that Sankili had violated his agreement with the Portuguese by bringing *Vadugai* troops into the country.<sup>84</sup> Sankili seemed to have hoped that the Portuguese would ignore this infringement in the same way as they had tolerated Ethirimanne Sinham's policy of aiding Kandy.

Portuguese policy towards Jaffna during this period was simple. Ever since the news had reached Lisbon that Jaffna was a route of supply to the Kandyan enemy, the king of Portugal had requested that Jaffna be conquered and incorporated into the Portuguese *estado da India*.<sup>85</sup> The viceroy de Azevedo (1612-1617) however had found that the execution of this order required troops which he could not spare. Thus though he passed on the king's orders to Ceylon he also maintained normal relations with Jaffna and exercised the right of the suzerain in confirming the regencies of Arasakesari and Sankili.<sup>86</sup> The new viceroy Dom Joao Coutinho at first held that de Azevedo's letter of appointment to Sankili precluded the Portuguese from any hostilities against him.<sup>87</sup> By the end of August 1618 he had changed his mind and had accepted the wisdom of conquering Jaffna as soon as forces were available. By the end of that month, reports from the captain of Mannar, the Commissioner of the Franciscans and the *ouvidor* or crown judge of Mannar had convinced the viceroy and his council that the time was ripe for the conquest of Jaffna. Instructions were therefore sent to Francisco de Miranda Henriques, captain-major of the Malabar fleet to accomplish this task.<sup>88</sup> Before Henriques could arrive in Jaffna, another expedition had been sent from Kotte against Sankili by Constantino de Sa.

83. Queyroz 631. Varuna Kulata or Varuna Kulattan is the name given in Queyroz 468. F.de Souza VI. 214 calls him Chem Nayak, the king of *careas*.

84. The *Vadugai* or *Bagadas* as the Portuguese of the seventeenth century termed them were Telugu speaking people of the Madura area.

85. DR II.465 ; TT.LM.13.f.115

86. F. de Souza VI. 216 ; Bocarro 699 ; Queyroz 466 ; Vriddagirison 80

87. TT. *Corpo Chronologico* part I,maco 116 doc.87

De Sa's expedition was not aimed at overthrowing Sankili to gain possession of Jaffna, as was the viceroy's, but was rather preventive in intent. Its military objective was to check any movement of south Indian mercenaries through Jaffna into rebel-held territory and to deal with rumoured attempts by Sankili to win over Senerat to renewed opposition, in alliance with Mayadunne, against the Portuguese. De Sa also apparently placed some weight on the story that Sankili had sought aid from the Dutch at Pulicat.<sup>89</sup> Further in March 1619 the captain-general received news from Mannar that Dom Pedro Rodriguez,<sup>90</sup> a cousin of the last Kunjali admiral of Calicut had appeared off Jaffna with five armed vessels, presumably at the request of Sankili and was plundering all Portuguese shipping.

In addition to dealing with these problems and strengthening the Portuguese position in Jaffna de Sa's expedition was intended to ensure the prompt payment of certain dues which were in arrears<sup>91</sup> and to put an end to the competition of Jaffna elephant sales with those made by the Portuguese. The export of elephants from Kotte formed an important source of revenue for the Portuguese. These elephants were usually transported overland to Mannar or Jaffna for sale. Here they had to face competition from elephants sold by the ruler of Jaffna himself.<sup>92</sup> Any move into Jaffna would

88. DR II. 195 ; Assentos I. 11-13

89. Assentos I.52,59

90. Born in 1578, he was taken prisoner in 1591 by Andre Furtado de Mendonca in his victory over the Kunjali fleet. He became a Christian and was henceforth called Dom Pedro Rodriguez. Soon after he married a Portuguese orphan but was still not granted complete liberty. One night he escaped with his family and gathering a band of Malabari followers began attacking Portuguese shipping.

91. Queyroz's (631) statement that Sankili owed the Portuguese three years tribute is improbable as this question did not arise when Sankili asked for aid in August-September 1618. The *regimento* of Constantino de Sa given to Filipe de Oliveira requires the latter to collect 'money of the elephants'. It is known that according to the treaty of 1591 the king of Jaffna was forced to pay annually ten elephants or thirteen thousand *fanams* a year. It is possible that the disturbances of 1618 made Sankili fail behind in his payment of tribute but in that case the tribute would have been owing only for 1618-1619. Another possible explanation of this demand for the '*dinheiro dos elefantes*' is that it may refer to the elephants sent to Jaffna for sale in 1615 by the then captain-general Manoel Mascarenhas Homem and the *vedor* Antao Vaz Friere. Due to the viceroy's prohibition on the sale of elephants that year, these animals were left unsold in the care of the king of Jaffna. In any case this issue gained even greater importance due to the shortage of funds among the Portuguese as de Sa explained in his orders to de Oliveira, 'there is no money to pay the soldiers, nor for their food allowance, nor to buy rice for the winter save that obtained from (the sale of) elephants.'

Assentos I.55-56, 59 ; *Regimentos das fortalezas da India*, (ed. by Panduronga S.S. Pissurlencar) (Goa 1951) 359-360

92. Goa. C. Pc As. IV. f. 233

not only secure the control of the trading ground but also give the Portuguese greater control over the selling price.

Of the various reasons for action, the fear that Sankili, with the aid of the Dutch and of Dom Pedro's fleet might attack Mannar and thus endanger the Portuguese position in Ceylon was doubtless the strongest and the most urgent. This explains why de Sa did not rest content with the appealing to Goa for aid. Despite the presence of rebels in Kotte itself, he prepared a strong expeditionary force of about two hundred and thirty Portuguese and three thousand *lascarins*.<sup>93</sup> This force was sent to Mannar in two detachments. The first consisting of about a hundred Portuguese with many *lascarins* sailed from Colombo in two gallions under Joao da Silva and Joao Madeira and six boats under Vitorio de Abreu.<sup>94</sup> The second led by Filipe de Oliveira consisted of a hundred and thirty Portuguese and the rest of the *lascarins*. This force marched overland across the Seven Korales to Pooneryn. The two forces were to safeguard Mannar, defeat the Malabar force of Dom Pedro and obtain immediate payment of arrears of dues from Jaffna. If Sankili refused to pay dues or was proved to have had treasonable dealings with Dom Pedro, de Oliveira was empowered to conquer the kingdom.<sup>95</sup>

The seaborne force reached Mannar first. The captain of Mannar strengthened the fleet with twelve small crafts of his own. Wishing to gain all the credit for the expulsion of the Malabari forces he decided that his combined squadron should attack Dom Pedro without waiting for Filipe de Oliveira. However the incompetent handling of the attack resulted in the loss of the twelve of the eighteen boats and over three hundred men. The Portuguese thereupon retired to Jaffna. De Oliveira meanwhile arrived at Pooneryn after an exhausting march across arid lands separating Kotte from the northern kingdom.<sup>96</sup> From Pooneryn he sent a message to Sankili asking for a ferry-boat to cross the lagoon to the Jaffna peninsula. Sankili complied. The *casados* of Jaffna also sent a vessel to help in the transport but the crossing took eight days to complete.<sup>97</sup> After consultations with the captain

93. BM.AddMass.9853.f.158 ; F. de Souza VI.189 ; Queyroz 629

94. Assentos I.52 ; F. de Souza VI.187-188 ; Queyroz 629 ; JCBRAS. XI.507 ; K. Nambiar—*The Kunjalis, admirals of Calicut*. (London 1963) 142-143

95. Assentos I.52-54,59 ; F. de Souza VI.189 ; Queyroz 629

96. De Oliveira's march was slow due to sickness contracted on the way Assentos I.54 ; Queyroz 629

97. Queyroz 629 ; F. de Souza VI.187-188 ; Assentos I.55 The lagoon crossing was four miles wide and the boats could take only a few at a time. De Oliveira in a letter to the viceroy dated 8.6.1619 later complained that

of Mannar, de Oliveira decided to appeal for naval assistance from Negapatam as he did not feel that the two galleons alone could safely attack the fleet of Dom Pedro. On news of Portuguese preparations however, Dom Pedro thought it best to sail away and thus one of de Oliveira's problems disappeared.<sup>98</sup>

Sankili's conduct during the whole of the Dom Pedro episode had been impeccable. He had not only refrained from allying himself with this powerful enemy of the Portuguese but had given valuable assistance to the Portuguese themselves. To the Portuguese fleet defeated by the Malabaris, Jaffna was made available as a port of refuge, while the advancing de Oliveira was furnished with ferry-boats to cross the lagoon. His conduct therefore suggests that Sankili still viewed the Portuguese as his allies and protectors.<sup>99</sup>

De Oliveira's conduct during the next few days undeceived him. De Oliveira demanded the immediate payment of the monies due and the surrender of the commander of Sankili's south Indian mercenary troops. Compliance with the second demand would have meant the crippling of Sankili's power. He therefore declined to give up Varuna Kulattan and pointed out that some of the dues demanded had already been paid. Sankili however was aware of the weakness of his position. The total force at his disposal did not exceed four thousand men. He therefore chose to negotiate and requested de Oliveira to withdraw to Pooneryn upon an immediate payment of five thousand *pardaos* and the payment of similar sum within the next three months. He also offered to send his *Vadugai* troops back to South India. De Oliveira accepted the first payment as he was short of money to buy provisions for the troops, but instead of moving his troops across the lagoon he advanced to Vannarponnai. This led to a clash between the Sinhalese *lascarins* of the Portuguese force and the Jaffna army. The ensuing battle resulted in the total defeat of the latter after it had gained some early success. On this news Sankili and his family fled in a boat towards the south Indian coast but were blown back to Point Pedro. In his second attempt to flee Jaffna in a larger boat he was overtaken and captured by his Portuguese pursuers.<sup>100</sup> Varuna Kulattan had better fortune and escaped to Tanjore.

Sankili impeded the crossing by scaring away the sailors who would have helped to man the boat.

98. Queyroz 630 ; Assentos I.55

99. If Sankili had been contemplating an anti Portuguese alliance he would scarcely have missed the chance to attack de Oliveira's Portuguese forces while the Sinhalese *lascarins* were still in Pooneryn.

100. Assentos I.55-57 ; Queyroz 631 ; F. de Souza VI.188-190 ; P. da

De Oliveira occupied the capital, Nallur, and established his headquarters at the great Hindu temple there. A part of the Portuguese force was left at the Franciscan church in Jaffna under Francisco Pereira Velho. With the capture of Sankili, all resistance ceased. De Oliveira thereupon annexed the kingdom to the Portuguese empire in the name of the king. As the land appeared quiet de Oliveira sent Antonio da Motta Galvao with one hundred Portuguese and most of the *lascarins* back to Kotte as he knew the general was in need of troops.<sup>101</sup> De Motta was also instructed to escort Sankili to Colombo from where he was sent to Goa for trial.<sup>102</sup>

The ease of the Portuguese conquest of Jaffna contrasts with their failure to conquer Kandy. The reasons for this could be seen partly in the differing location and size, population and racial composition of the two kingdoms. Kandy situated in the central regions of Ceylon was far more difficult of access than Jaffna, whose capital was less than a day's march from the sea. The Kandyan kingdom moreover, being larger in size and rugged, afforded the defeated monarch many places of refuge. In fact in Ceylon history Kandy has traditionally being the 'home of the lost causes' and the northern plains of Ceylon 'the first prey of the invader.' Furthermore the ruler of Kandy apart from his ability to rely on a larger population could always hope as a last resort to subvert the fellow-Sinhalese *lascarin* soldiers of the Portuguese. In Jaffna on the other hand the Portuguese could use the Sinhalese *lascarins* with confidence against the Tamil population.<sup>103</sup> Another major reason for the Portuguese success seems to have been a lack of Tamil leadership and unity in Jaffna. Sankili as a leader compares unfavourably with any of the Kandyan kings who fought the Portuguese. He lacked the foresight to envisage the eventual clash between his loyalties to the Portuguese and those to Tanjore. Finally, note should be taken of a growth of pro-Portuguese Christian minority within Jaffna. The Christians had been strong enough to make Sankili seek aid from Tanjore. During and after the conquest they provided a source of strength in Jaffna that the Portuguese never possessed in Kandy.

101. Queyroz 631 ; BM. Add Mss. 9853.f.158 ; Assentos I.58

102. Sankili was tried in the *Relacao* or High Court of Goa for treason and found guilty. He became a Christian before he was executed. The two nephews of Sankili were sent with him to Colombo for as de Oliveira put it '*todo o q cheirar a principe he bom estar longe daqui.*' TT.LM 15.f.62 ; *Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos* 34/4-5, 37/1-2

103. The original invasion force contained three thousand Sinhalese *lascarins*, one thousand five hundred Sinhalese coolies and only two hundred and thirty Portuguese soldiers.

The conquest of Jaffna meant a great accession of strength to the Portuguese in India as well as in Ceylon. With Jaffna in their hands, Portuguese communications between the Malabar and the Coromandel coasts became much safer and the Dutch settlement at Pulicat began to look even more isolated.<sup>104</sup> The flow of south Indian mercenaries to Ceylon was checked to some degree. The lands of Jaffna itself, though not as rich as those of Kotte became a useful means of rewarding the services of Portuguese soldiers. The possession of Jaffna moreover enabled the Portuguese to gain a greater measure of control over the supply of elephants from the Vanni and over the pearl fishery off Mannar.

It took some time however before the Portuguese hold in Jaffna became a secure one. The danger to Portuguese rule in the area was twofold. Firstly there was a risk of a revolt, by the anti-Portuguese Tamil element in Jaffna. Secondly there was the threat of invasion by the forces of Raghunatha Nayak of Tanjore. During the period June 1619 to February 1621 the Portuguese had to face the opposition of both these elements. The Portuguese forces in Jaffna ranged from one hundred to one hundred and fifty *soldados* plus some twenty *casados* and about a thousand *lascarins*.<sup>105</sup> This force was sometimes hard pressed by Tamil armies of up to five thousand men but the Portuguese had three great advantages; the support of the Christian Tamils of Jaffna, the possibility of obtaining reinforcements from Kotte and the information regarding Tanjore preparations provided by the Portuguese at Negapatam. These factors enabled them eventually to wear down the Hindu Tamils of Jaffna and the Nayak of Tanjore.

The first real challenge to Portuguese authority came in March 1620. By the end of 1619 Dom Luis, who had hitherto been one of the foremost supporters of the Portuguese in Jaffna was disillusioned by the role assigned to him in the Portuguese regime. He therefore fled to Tanjore taking with him two Tamil princesses who had been in his charge since 1616. In Tanjore he appealed to Raghunatha for aid to expel the Portuguese and to enthrone the only member of the Jaffna royal family outside Portuguese control, the prince of Rameswaram. Raghunatha was only too willing to

104. The Dutch had set up a factory at Pulicat in 1610. The Portuguese destroyed it in 1612 and the Dutch promptly replaced it with a fort in the following year. The attempt of the Portuguese to seize the fort in 1615 failed but since that time its destruction had remained a cherished objective. The Dutch wish to maintain their hold on Pulicat rose from the desire to gain a supply of Coromandel cloth with which they traded in the East Indies.

105. Ajuda 51-V-51.f.163, Reimers 56, P. da Trindade III.215



seize a chance to re-establish the position he had enjoyed in Jaffna while Varuna Kulattan commanded Sankili's *Vadugai* troops. He promptly organised a new expedition to Jaffna. The prince of Rameswaram reassured by Raghunatha's assistance organized his army to take possession of Jaffna.<sup>106</sup> The arrival of the first Danish ship in the East with the news of further forces to follow gave Dom Luis and the prince hopes of a new ally against the Portuguese.<sup>107</sup>

The force organized by the Nayak was the first to land. It was only a thousand strong but Dom Luis who commanded it counted on the support of the Hindus of Jaffna. He was not disappointed, for, from the time the invading force landed at Talaimannar in March 1620 it grew daily in size and strength. De Oliveira was for once caught unprepared. The bulk of his forces had been sent back to Kotte. De Oliveira decided to make a stand at his headquarters at the Hindu temple at Nallur with about thirty Portuguese and a force of Sinhalese auxiliaries. In the settlement of Jaffna Francisco Velho organized the defence of the well-built Franciscan church of *Nossa Senhora dos Milagres* with the aid of twenty *casados* and a number of Tamil Christians. A further detachment of Portuguese was detailed to defend Kayts. The combined Tamil and *Vadugai* force which now amounted to over three thousand men attacked both the church at Jaffna and the pagoda at Nallur. For almost a month the Portuguese were thus confined to these garrison posts.

It was sea-power which saved the meagre Portuguese forces in Jaffna. It enabled supply of munitions sent by the *casados* of Negapatam to reach Jaffna safely. As important was the safe arrival of a force of two hundred Sinhalese under Antonio da Motta Galvao by sea. This force (probably sent to relieve a part of the Sinhalese detachment on garrison duty in Jaffna) proved to be of immense use. Moreover command of the sea enabled the Portuguese to send a request for aid to Constantino de Sa who promptly

106. Queyroz 634 holds that the attempt of the prince of Rameswaram to expel the Portuguese was distinct from and prior to the first attempt made by Dom Luis. However evidence in P. da Trindade III.214-216 and F. de Souza VI 212-214 make it clear that the *mudaliyar* 'das Maminhas' who invited the prince to Jaffna was none other than Dom Luis himself. What P. da Trindade III.214-218 and F. de Souza VI.212-214 depict as one great attempt by Varuna Kulattan, the prince of Rameswaram and Dom Luis to seize control of Jaffna, Queyroz 633-638 presents as three separate attempts. Contemporary documents support the Trindade-F. de Souza version. (TT.LM.15.ff.59,67,190,193 ; *Filmoteca Reiz Vizinhos* I. 48/2-3)

107. P. da Trindade III.217-218

sent a relieving force of one hundred and twenty Portuguese and one thousand five hundred Sinhalese *lascarins* under Luis Teixeira de Macedo by land and a fleet of six vessels under Andre Coelho by sea. The cruel, ruthless measures of de Macedo<sup>108</sup> cowed the inhabitants of Jaffna while the combined relief forces defeated Dom Luis and forced him to flee to Tanjore, leaving his own family in Portuguese hands.

Meanwhile the prince of Rameswaram unaware of the defeat of his allies had landed in the Jaffna Peninsula with a contingent of one thousand fighting men. At this stage the Christian Tamils of Jaffna gave news of the new invasion to de Oliveira who being determined to check the revolt before it could spread, sent de Macedo with a strong force against the prince. The prince was defeated and captured a few miles north of Nallur and the land returned to obedience once more. De Macedo and de Motta thereupon returned to Kotte with their troops and the captive prince was sent with them to Colombo.<sup>109</sup>

The failure of his first attempt by no means discouraged Dom Luis. On his return to Tanjore he appealed once more to Raghunatha. Raghunatha thereupon prepared a second and stronger expeditionary force. The new enterprise was put under the overall command of Varuna Kulattan, a veteran of the Jaffna campaign of 1618-1619.<sup>110</sup>

The Portuguese at Negapatam kept de Oliveira informed of these developments. He in turn reported the matter to de Sa. De Sa's problem was that with the continuing revolt in Kotte he could not afford to leave forces strong enough to defend Jaffna without assistance. Nor was the Portuguese command of the sea complete enough to prevent the landing of hostile forces from Tanjore. The best de Sa could do was to promise speedy assistance in case of attack. De Oliveira meanwhile did not stay idle. On the fifteenth of August 1620 he began to build a small

108. P. da Trindade III. 216 and F. de Souza VI 215 accuse de Macedo of cruelty—that he cut children in two, severed breasts of women and cut open the abdomen of women and pushed their babies inside. These accusations seem confirmed by contemporary documents. CALR III.25

109. AHU 501.f.185v ; AHU Caixa 22. 4.8.1654 ; P. da Trindade III.214-216 ; F. de Souza VI.212-213 ; Queyroz 635-638 ; Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos I. 45/5, 45-46/5-1, 46/1-2, 48/2-3

110. P. da Trindade III.219 states that the command of the enterprise was given to Cheni (Chem Nayak) the chief of the Tanjore nobility while the general of the expeditionary force was Bornagolate (Varuna Kulattan). However evidence in F. de Souza VI.214 and Queyroz 468 show that Chem Nayak, king of the *Careas* and Varuna Kulattan were the same person. Contemporary letters refer to only one leader—the king of the *Careas*.

fort enclosing the Franciscan church in Jaffna. The Portuguese forces at Nallur were withdrawn to this fort. In November the *casados* of Negapatam sent munitions to Jaffna with a warning that invasion was imminent. Eventually, on 5 December two thousand men from Tanjore landed at Tondaimannar. Once more the Hindus of Jaffna joined the invaders.

De Oliveira advanced to meet the invading forces. The result was a drawn battle at Nallur. As the Tamil forces proved stronger than expected de Oliveira retired to Jaffna to await reinforcements. The Tamils in their turn sent requests for further forces from Tanjore. Fortunately for de Oliveira the Portuguese relief forces under Antao da Motta Galvao arrived first. This force of ninety Portuguese and a thousand Sinhalese *lasacarins* arrived on 14 January 1621. De Oliveira attacked the enemy encampments at Nallur soon after and defeated the Tamils after heavy fighting. However it needed a further battle at Kopay in early February 1621 before the invading force was completely destroyed and its commander killed.<sup>111</sup>

The challenge to Portuguese rule however was not yet over, for the Nayak of Tanjore despatched a fresh force prepared in response to Varuna Kulattan's call for aid in December 1620. By the time these forces arrived however de Oliveira was in control of most of Jaffna. The new force was ambushed at Achchuveli by da Motta on 11 February 1621 before it could gain any support in Jaffna. The Tanjore dead included the new governor of Jaffna sent by the Nayak. With this defeat ended the second and final attempt of Raghunatha to conquer Jaffna. For the next six years therefore, peace returned to Jaffna. These years were used by de Oliveira to build up and consolidate the Portuguese power in the kingdom.<sup>112</sup>

It will be recalled that when de Sa sent his first expedition to Jaffna in 1619, he was also still engaged in the struggle in Kotte against both Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala. These latter naturally profited by the diversion of Portuguese attention. Kuruwita Rala promptly advanced into the Seven Korales while Mayadunne tried to establish himself in the Two Korales. To meet this new challenge de Sa himself led a strong Portuguese force to the Seven Korales and forced Kuruwita Rala to retire to Uva, while *disava* Dom Constantino defeated Mayadunne. The forces of the rebels were quickly driven out of Portuguese territory.<sup>113</sup>

111. P. da Trindade III.219-221 ; F. de Souza VI.214 ; Queyroz 638-641 ; TT.LM.15.ff.59.190,193

112. Queyroz 642-645 ; P. de Trindade III.221-223 ; F. de Souza VI.215

113. Queyroz 627 ; JCBRAS XI,510 ; BM.Add.Ms.9853.f.158

However, the defeat of Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala did not restore peace in Kotte. It merely changed the nature of the conflict. Small bands of Sinhalese guerrillas basing themselves on forested areas impeded Portuguese control of near-by villages. As each group numbered only about a hundred men their elimination proved a difficult task. Therefore for most of 1619 a large portion of the Seven Korales remained free of Portuguese control. The Portuguese task was made even more difficult by a new rising led by *mudaliyar* Ekanayake in Matara. Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala too had their own problems for they had to carry on another campaign against Senerat in Kandy.

By the end of 1619 with the return of a part of the expeditionary force sent to Jaffna and the arrival of reinforcements from Goa, the Portuguese were able to take the offensive. *Disava* Dom Constantino of Matara attacked and set fire to Mayadunne's mountain capital at Maddegama Nuwara. Military cooperation with Senerat also continued. On one occasion *disava* Dom Constantino led a hundred Portuguese and over one thousand *lascarins* up to Alutnuwara and joining with Senerat's forces penetrated south-east to Panama.<sup>114</sup> In another expedition *disava* Dom Constantino captured Kangara Aratchi who was executed for treason in Colombo.<sup>115</sup>

In March 1620 with the weakening of the Portuguese forces on the departure of Luis Teixeira for Jaffna, Mayadunne appeared once more in the Seven Korales. De Sa, with his captain-major Constantino de Sa de Miranda and the *disava* of the four Korales Francisco Brito de Almeida, forced Mayadunne to retire from Talampitiya but was unable to dislodge him from Moratanne until Teixeira returned from Jaffna. With the return of Teixeira, de Sa began a determined campaign to eliminate the power of Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne.<sup>116</sup>

Action against the rebels was made more urgent by a change in attitude on the part of Senerat. For Senerat, as for the Portuguese, the peace of 1617 was a rather unsatisfactory compromise, agreed on chiefly to gain time to deal with a more dangerous enemy. Senerat's main enemy Nikapitiya had lost all power by now. The Portuguese conquest of Jaffna in 1619 and the defeat of Mayadunne in the same year roused Senerat's fears of the Portuguese once again. By this time he had also received news that European aid was

114. BM.Add.Ms 9853.ff.157v-158 ; AHU Caixa 22, 4.8.1654

115. Queyroz 729

116. Queyroz 730 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.227v

on its way to him. So, early in 1620, he made an informal truce with Mayadunne. Mayadunne was to become the king of Kotte while Senerat remained master of Kandy.<sup>117</sup>

The fleet Senerat based his hopes upon was the first Danish squadron to come to the East. Boschouwer, having failed to convince the directors of the Dutch V.O.C. of the advantages to be gained in aiding Senerat, had proceeded to Denmark. There in March 1618 he made a treaty with King Christian IV and his newly formed Danish East India Company. Consequently in August 1618 the 'Oeresund' under Roelant Crape set out for Ceylon, followed in December of the same year by four more vessels under the commander of Ove Giedde. The arrival of Crape in Ceylon at the end of 1619 provided Senerat with the first inkling of what had happened. The main fleet under Giedde sighted Ceylon in May 1620.<sup>118</sup>

The projected Kandyan-Danish alliance was beset with problems from the very start. Boschouwer in order to make sure of Danish assistance had not only exaggerated the resources of Senerat, but had even used forged credentials to make promises he was not empowered to do. Thus Giedde arrived in 1620 expecting and immediate payment of ninety five thousand dollars as Senerat's share of the expenses of the fleet.<sup>119</sup> The death of Boschouwer on the way to Ceylon made matters worse, for Giedde was no diplomat. Moreover by the time Giedde arrived in Ceylon Senerat was officially at peace with the Portuguese and the cautious monarch wished for tangible proof that the Danes were actually willing and able to drive the Portuguese out of Ceylon before he abandoned the treaty which had cost him so much to gain.<sup>120</sup>

The eventual failure to establish a Kandyan-Danish alliance as a working concern however was not due either to the deceit of Boschouwer or to Senerat's reluctance to go to the war, for Senerat eventually accepted the obligation to pay the sum demanded and signed a new treaty of alliance with Denmark on 21 August 1620.<sup>121</sup> The real cause of failure lay in the weakness of the Danish fleet and the differences in the objectives of the two parties.

Giedde had set out with a force of three hundred soldiers from Denmark on 29 December 1618.<sup>122</sup> One and a half years later

117. Queyroz 730 ; JCBRAS XXXVII.62,73-77

118. TT.LM.12.f.5 ; JCBRAS XXXVII 51-62 ; Vriddagirison 96-97

119. TT.LM.12.f.65 ; JCBRAS XXXVII 51-62 ; Vriddegirison 96-97

120. The *Yalpana Vaipawa Malai* (trans C. Brito. Colombo 1879) 50 hints as much.

121. JCBRAS XXXVII 63

122. J. H. Schlegei gives the date as 25 August 1620 but Ove Gieddes diary proves otherwise. JCBRAS XXXVII.80-86

this number had been much reduced by death and desertion, while many of the survivors were sick. Senerat would no doubt have also heard that Roelant Crape had been forced to abandon ship by a Portuguese fleet under Andre Coelho, and had taken refuge in Tanjore. These factors explain why Senerat at first suggested that the Danes ally themselves with Mayadunne who was already at war with the Portuguese.<sup>123</sup>

Even after Senerat had agreed to a formal treaty of alliance, differences in aims between the two parties prevented effective co-operation. Senerat was interested in forestalling the Portuguese by building a fort at Trincomalee, and offered aid for the task to the Danes. Giedde on the other hand was more interested in procuring a cargo for his ship and left for the Coromandel coast two weeks after the treaty was signed. Despite the sending of a body of sixty men by Senerat to help in the construction work, the Danes who had occupied the Hindu temple at Trincomalee and made it their headquarters remained inactive and eventually evacuated it. Senerat therefore, decided to give up his plans against the Portuguese unless the Danes arrived with a much larger force.<sup>124</sup>

Meanwhile de Sa's new campaign against Mayadunne had gained a striking success. By June 1620 the rebel leaders were once more expelled from Portuguese territory. Mayadunne himself was so hotly pursued that he was forced to take temporary refuge aboard a Danish ship at Kottiyar on 2 July 1620.<sup>125</sup> About a month later his chief general Kuruwita Rala was surprised and killed at Panama by *disava* Dom Constantino of Matara.<sup>126</sup> The death of Kuruwita Rala marked the end of effective opposition to the Portuguese in the lowlands. Mayadunne having failed to gain Danish aid for his final bid in March 1621 left Ceylon soon after.<sup>127</sup> Thus from about 1620 until the great rising of 1630 Kotte enjoyed a period of relative tranquility.

123. JCBRAS XXXVII 62, 63, 66, 74, 77 ; BNL FG. 7160.f.97 ; Queyroz 731 ; TT.LM.12.f.5 ; TT.LM.15.f.67 ; Filmoteca *Reis Vizinhos* I. 22/2

124. TT.Mss da Liv. 1699 f.260 ; TT.LM.18.f.44 ; JCBRAS XXXVII 77-79

125. JCBRAS XXXVII 68-70, 86-87 ; TT.LM.15.f.44 ; TT.LM.18.f.135

126. De Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI.510) gives another version of the death of Kuruwita Rala. Queyroz (626) seems to accept this. However the version given above is also present in Queyroz (731) and is supported by contemporary Jesuit letters (CALR II. 26, 29), the diary of Ove Giedde (JCBRAS XXXVII 78) and Fr. Manoel de Assumpcao's work (TT.Ms. da Liv. 1699.f.247). The only document which may lend support to de Sa de Menezes's version is a letter from the viceroy to the king dated 6 February 1620 which states that de Sa '*matou hum alevantado nosso que para elle se foi, capitao-mor e cabeça da mor parte da sua gente*'. (DR V. 262) This of course may refer to Kangara Aratchi.

127. TT.LM.18.f.44 ; JCBRAS XXXVII 87

For Kandy too, the early 1620's were a period of peace. Up to 1627 the legal basis of relationship between Kandy and the Portuguese remained the treaty of 1617. Though the relationship was not always a cordial one, no open conflict developed during this period. Peace, however shortlived, was welcome to Kandy after thirty five years of war. Senerat used it to consolidate his hold on the kingdom. He toured his lands, encouraged settlers from abroad to colonise the abandoned and uncultivated land and was active in the repair of tanks and canals, the main-stay of rice cultivation. 128 Senerat also tried to make provision for a peaceful succession. As early as 1621 the kingdom was divided into three principalities, Uva, Matale and Kandy and these were allocated to the three princes.<sup>129</sup> The princes remained with Senerat even after this as they were still minors but by 1625 Kumarasinha was exercising personal rule over Uva and was the commander of the forces of that region.<sup>130</sup> With peace, Kandy prospered and trade increased not only with the Portuguese but also with Indian merchants.<sup>131</sup>

After the last of the invaders from Tanjore had been dispersed in 1621 Jaffna enjoyed a period of peace which lasted till 1628. For most of this time Jaffna was dominated by the commanding figure of Filipe de Oliveira. He was responsible for the organisation of administration of the newly conquered kingdom in accordance with instructions sent from Goa.<sup>132</sup> His encouragement of the missionaries was one of the principal reasons for their success in Jaffna. De Oliveira was also responsible for the transfer of Jaffna's capital from the ancient city of Nallur to the Portuguese settlement of Patanam or Jaffna in 1621.<sup>133</sup> Jaffna being a port could be

128. *Mandaram pura puvata*, stanzas 198-201

129. *TT.Colleccao de S. Vicente*, livro 19.doc.110 ; Biker I.224 ; *Parangi Hatana*, stanzas 66-71

130. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.220v,222v Kumarasinha was hardly twenty years of age at this time. Contemporary evidence contradicts the assertion of Pieris (II.178) that the partition of Kandy occurred in 1628. It is possible however, that Maha Astana, the youngest son was set up as the prince of Kandy only at that date, for this would be in keeping with evidence in the *Culavamsa*. The mode of allocation in the three principalities may have been by lot as suggested in *Culavamsa*, II.231 and Knox 53, but Knox's story that Senerat craftily made sure that Kandy would go to Maha Astana is more dubious specially as Uva which fell as Kumarasinha's share was probably the strongest of the three principalities. The practice of dividing the kingdom among the sons of the king was not new. It is noteworthy that even in 1630 Maha Astana had no precedence over the other two princes.

131. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.216v,219,222,223,225

132. Assentos I.50 The assertion of de Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI.516-517) that de Sa visited Jaffna and reorganized its administration during his first term of office is inaccurate.

133. The reason for the abandonment of Nallur seem curiously akin to those which led to the abandonment of Kotte in 1565. P.E. Pieris (*Ceylon*

more easily defended and reinforced by sea while the maintenance of the Portuguese headquarters at Nallur necessitated the division of Portuguese forces to protect the township and to secure communications. The division of a limited force in a newly conquered land had proved to be unwise. De Oliveira, supported by de Sa, even suggested the transfer of the Portuguese headquarters to the island of Kayts.<sup>134</sup> This suggestion made in 1624, reflects the insecurity felt by the Portuguese even five years after the conquest. The viceroy agreed that a fort be constructed on the island but referred the decision on the transfer of the capital to Lisbon.<sup>135</sup> Eventually however it was realized that the island of Kayts being ten miles in length would be as difficult to defend as a fort on the mainland. Moreover the *casado* settler community in Jaffna seemed quite content there. Thus even after Miguel Pereira built a fort at Kayts<sup>136</sup> Jaffna remained the capital of the kingdom. The fortification of Jaffna itself was begun in 1624 but work progressed slowly.<sup>137</sup> The work done in de Oliveira's time however suffered as a result of the great tempest of 1627 and despite the efforts of Lancarote de Seixas, de Oliveira's successor, work on the fort was not completed till 1632.<sup>138</sup>

Though de Oliveira's term of office in Jaffna was a successful one from the Portuguese point of view, it was one of hardship for the people of Jaffna. The wars which raged until 1621 were followed by an epidemic of small-pox and a fever. Famine was a natural result.<sup>139</sup> The making of the *tombo* of the lands of Jaffna by Ambrosio da Freitas da Camara in 1623 and its completion and revision by de Oliveira himself in 1623-1627 resulted in the increase of dues to be paid to the crown.<sup>140</sup> The Portuguese gained large tracts of lands confiscated from the supporters of Sankili. The Hindu Tamils of course found life more difficult

II.137) incorrectly assume that Queyroz's statement (642) 'Filipe de Oliveira moved to Nallur on 2nd of February and ordered the large pagoda to be razed' means that de Oliveira transferred his headquarters to Nallur on 2 February 1621. In fact the temple at Nallur had been his headquarters since the conquest up to August-September 1620 when he moved to Jaffna. Queyroz here is referring to an incident in the campaign against the forces of the Nayak of Tanjore.

134. TT.LM.19.f.40v

135. BNL.FG 1982.f.51

136. Reimers 56

137. *Yalpana Vaipawa Malai*, 50 ; TT.Colleccao de S. Vicente, 19.doc.2 ; TT.LM.15.f.20 ; TT.LM.16.f.561

138. Queyroz 647-648 ; Baldeaus 86

139. The wars resulted in over six thousand deaths. Jornada 35 ; Queyroz 646-647

140. Queyroz 646 ; AHU Caixa 2. 246 ; AHU Caixa 9. 20.11.1626



than their Christian counterparts for all offices were reserved for the favoured converts.<sup>141</sup>

With the return of peace de Sa was able to pay greater attention to the problems of external defence. This aspect had been badly neglected by de Azevedo who, being convinced that the conquest of Kandy alone would bring security to the Portuguese within Ceylon, had spent most of his eighteen years in the island in an attempt to wear down Kandyan resistance. When de Azevedo left Ceylon in 1612 the only Portuguese fort in the island capable of offering worthwhile resistance to an attack by a well-armed European force was that of Colombo, but even this fort was in need of repair.<sup>142</sup> The viceroy, de Azevedo doubtless passed on the king's orders to fortify Colombo to his successors—Dom Francisco de Menezes and Manoel Mascarenhas Homem—for they rebuilt the walls of Colombo fort on the landward side.<sup>143</sup> Nevertheless there is little doubt that the policy directives from de Azevedo compelled the captain-generals of Ceylon to consider Kandy as the prime enemy.<sup>144</sup>

By the 1620's however the Dutch and English were too powerful in the East to be safely ignored. The English challenge to the Portuguese command of the trade of the Arabian sea and the Persian Gulf had led to several encounters in which the Portuguese could claim little success. The Dutch under the able leadership of Jan Pieterzoon Coen were by now firmly established in the Indonesian Archipelago and were threatening the Portuguese strongholds of Malacca and Macao as well as their Far Eastern trade. The Luso-Spanish alliance in the East Indies had failed to check the Dutch advance and already rumours of an impending Anglo-Dutch alliance against the Portuguese had appeared in the East.<sup>145</sup> De Sa who had served as the captain-major of the fleet of Cape Camorin for about three years knew these dangers as well as any

141. Queyroz 645-646

142. The king had urged the strengthening of the Colombo fort in 1605, 1607, 1608 and twice in 1610—but little was done till 1613. A report on Ceylon about this time states that '*Colombo nao tem muros e os que tinha todos estao na chao abertos que entram os gados por elles e nao ha baluartes.*' (DR II.85)

143. AHU Caixa 4. 18.12.1616 ; Filmoteca LM.12. 86/1 ; TT.LM.13.f.147 (144) Bocarro 273-278 ; AHU Caixa 3. 23.4.1614 ; AHU Caixa 4. 9.10.1615

144. The comprehensive *regimentos* sent by de Azevedo to de Menezes and Homem reflect this policy. A greater part of these *regimentos* is devoted to the Kandyan war while the fortification of forts is not even mentioned.

145. Filmoteca *Reis Vizinhos* I. 52/3/4 ; Botelho de Souza III.99-100 ; *The Cambridge History of India*, V.32,78-83 The agreement was actually concluded in July 1619. Definite news regarding the conclusion of the pact arrived in the East in early 1620.

other man. That was perhaps why he began work on fortifying the coastal ports of Kotte even before the rebellion in his lands was over.

The first port he turned to was Galle. Next to Trincomalee, Galle possessed the best natural harbour in Ceylon. Its position on the south-west coast of the island taken in conjunction with the winds and ocean currents which prevailed, gave its possessor a command over the sea-routes from Arabia to Malacca and from the west to the east coast of India. The first proposal to fortify Galle had been made even before the death of Rajasinha of Sitawaka. By 1597 the Portuguese had constructed a small fort on a hillock, a short distance from the harbour. The king, realizing the strategic value of Galle, repeatedly urged the strengthening of the fort in the early seventeenth century.<sup>146</sup> In 1619 de Sa began to give his attention to the task.<sup>147</sup>

The existing fort had been built of mud and reinforced by wooden palisades. Intended primarily as a base against the rebellious Sinhalese, it had been neglected when the adjoining lands were subjugated and pacified. The fort, moreover, though located on elevated ground was so placed that its guns did not command the entrance to the harbour. As Antonio Martim, a Portuguese *fidalgo* remarked in 1613-1614, the fort of Galle would have fallen to any single enemy ship that dared to attack it.

De Sa realized that the existing fort even if strengthened would be of little use against European enemies. He knew that the value of a fort in Galle to the Portuguese in the context of the Anglo-Dutch threat depended partly on whether Portuguese vessels could safely ride at anchor under the protection of the guns of the fort. He therefore proposed the demolition of the existing structure and the building of an entirely new fort on the promontory on the western side of the harbour.

De Sa reasoned that the rocky coast of the promontory itself was sufficient protection on the side facing the sea. The side facing the bay was to be guarded by a wall of beams and earth. On the southernmost point of the promontory de Sa planned to build a bastion to command the entrance to the harbour. Another bastion at the quayside was to protect the anchorage. The landward defence of the fort was to be secured by building a wall across the promontory at its isthmus.

146. DR I.8,53,60-61, 387-388 ; DR V.133

147. Queyroz 627 ; JCBRAS XI.511 ; *TT. Colleccas de S. Vicente*. 19.doc. 271

The initial stages of the construction of the new fort was supervised by Fernao Pinhao, captain of Galle, 1620-1623. Financial difficulties slowed construction work which was however continued without interval till 1623.<sup>148</sup>

De Sa however realized that the defence of Ceylon should be considered as a whole and that the coastal defences in Kotte itself would not suffice while the whole of the eastern coast remained unprotected. De Sa's predecessors had had repeated orders to fortify the two important ports on the eastern coast—Trincomalee and Batticaloa, but had failed to take any action.<sup>149</sup> With the conquest of Jaffna, the maintenance of these proposed forts became a much easier proposition, for Trincomalee and Batticaloa when cut off from Kotte by monsoon winds were accesible from Jaffna and vice versa. The peace treaty of 1617 however placed both these ports in the territory of the king of Kandy. De Sa was not deterred by this. He evidently considered that the king of Kandy was too weak to break with the Portuguese while contending with a revolt in his own lands and he decided to proceed with the construction of the two forts. However the difficulties faced by the Portuguese in other parts of Asia as well as the death of the viceroy Dom Joao Coutinho, conde de Redondo prevented the sending of sufficient money and artillery for the purpose and the project had to be postponed.<sup>150</sup>

De Sa also tried to win the favour of the Sinhalese inhabitants of Kotte. He realized that their assistance was invaluable in the prevention and suppression of rebellions in Kotte as well as in the war against Kandy. De Sa believed that kind and just treatment would reconcile the Sinhalese to Portuguese rule. He therefore tried to ensure justice for all. De Sa also encouraged a renewal of missionary activity in the areas which had been under rebel control, for conversion to Christianity was one of the means of ensuring loyalty to the Portuguese.

By 1621 de Sa had secured peace within Kotte. Jaffna was by now firmly in the grasp of de Oliveira. The peace with Kandy was maintained, though much of the goodwill that had existed between the two sides had disappeared with the defeat of the rebels. The Danish threat was proving to be an empty one. Perhaps

148. Queyroz 828 ; Ribeiro 129 ; TT.LM.21.f.139 ; TT.LM.24.f.458

149. DR II.465,478 ; DR III.397,399 ; DR V.260-264 ; TT.LM.7.f.1 ; TT.LM.15.f.20 ; AHU 33.f.20 ; AHU 282.f.62. The first order to fortify Trincomalee was made as early as 1602 ; The first request for a fort at Batticaloa was in 1613.

150. TT.LM.12.f.50 ; DR V.263 ; Filmoteca *Reis Vizinhos* 52/3-4

most important, the Portuguese possessions were for the first time beginning to pay their way and were soon to be a valuable source of supply.

De Sa's activities were, however, suddenly cut short when in February 1621 the new Portuguese governor of India Fernao de Albuquerque decided to recall him to Goa and to appoint his own son Jorge as the captain-general of the island. Jorge de Albuquerque already held the post of captain of Colombo.<sup>151</sup> His father pointed out to the king that de Albuquerque was willing to serve as both captain of Colombo and captain-general of Ceylon for only the salary of the former post.<sup>152</sup> Saving money for the treasury, however, was far from being the true motive of the father and son, for with his letter of appointment Jorge de Albuquerque obtained decrees enabling him to receive an extra allowance of 1000 *xerafims* a year to cover expenses connected with his duties as captain-general and also to export fifty *bahars* of cinnamon on his own account in violation of the royal monopoly of the product. The new captain-general was also authorized to draw a year's salary in advance and to export privately a ship full of goods after paying the customary dues.<sup>153</sup> Evidence in Queyroz seems to indicate that the father made the appointment on his own initiative.<sup>154</sup> However contemporary documents show that this was not so. Fernao de Albuquerque had ruled the Portuguese in the East for over a year before he made this appointment. Three months before he recalled de Sa, he wrote to the king stating that he had decided not to change the captain-general in Ceylon.<sup>155</sup> Obviously it was the personal appeal of his son who visited Goa in early 1621 which caused him to change his mind.<sup>156</sup>

Jorge de Albuquerque left Goa on the 10 February 1621 with Gomez da Silva da Cunha who had been appointed as the new captain-major of the field. Arriving in Ceylon with one hundred and fifty men on 12 March he took over from de Sa and ruled

151. In virtue of his marriage to Dona Isabel de Souza, the daughter of Pero Lopez de Souza who died in Kandy in 1594. Goa C.Pe.As VI.f.345

152. TT.LM.15.f.67 ; TT.LM.16.f.45 ; TT.Mss da Convento da Graca 2E pg.557

153. Goa C Pe As.ff.345-352 ; TT.LM.21.f.277 ; TT.LM.18.f.247

154. Queyroz 732

155. TT.LM.15.f.44

156. This of course does not absolve Fernao de Albuquerque. It merely explains the reason for his action. Lancarote de Seixas who was serving as the *vedor* of Ceylon at this time claimed in a letter to the king dated 20 November 1621 that the appointment of Jorge de Albuquerque was made against the advice of the viceroy's councillors, (AHU 35.f.24) but de Seixas was a hostile critic and no confirmatory evidence is available.

Portuguese Ceylon for just over two years.<sup>157</sup>

De Albuquerque continued de Sa's policy of fortifying the ports of Kotte. The work on the fort at Galle was continued. De Albuquerque also built a quadrangular fort at Kalutara,<sup>158</sup> twenty seven miles south of Colombo.<sup>159</sup> In other respects however his rule was a complete failure. He destroyed what little good will de Sa's conciliatory measures had gained among the Sinhalese. This was chiefly due to his arbitrary arrest of a prominent Sinhalese leader, Naide Appu. Naide Appu, or Manoel Mascarenhas Homem as he was called after his conversion to Christianity, had served the Portuguese loyally for many years and had amassed a considerable fortune. Under de Sa he had served as the chief of the *lascarins* of the Seven Korales. De Albuquerque had Naide Appu seized and confiscated all his property and expelled him from the island on the charge that he had plotted to rebel. On the way to Goa by ship Naide Appu was thrown overboard and drowned.<sup>160</sup>

De Albuquerque, moreover, could not resist making use of his position to enrich himself. In fact it was widely rumoured that Naide Appu died because of his wealth rather than because of any treachery. De Albuquerque certainly used his position to secure from his father the grant of an island off Jaffna despite a royal directive that lands in Jaffna should be given only to those who actually served there.<sup>161</sup> He also obtained the revenues of several villages in Kotte itself. The chief sources of his unauthorized income however were arecanut and cinnamon. He bought both these products at low prices and made considerable profits.<sup>162</sup>

De Albuquerque's tendency to reward only those whom he favoured led to discontent among both soldiers and settlers. The soldiers rose in mutiny against their captain-major Gomez da Silva da Cunha and set up a council of twelve to represent their grievances to the general. Eventually de Albuquerque was forced to give way and appoint a new captain-major for the army. The *casados* of the *camara* of Colombo complained to the king mainly of the misuse of royal funds by the general.<sup>163</sup>

157. Queyroz 732 ; TT.Ms da Livraria 1699.f.247v ; AHU Caixa 17. 9.5.1645

158. With two bastions defended by three pieces of artillery.

159. TT.LM.18.f.44 ; Ribeiro 129-130 ; Reimers 56 ; JCBRAS XI.526 ; It was built on the ruins of an earlier fort built by de Azevedo in the 1590's. Ten *casados* were settled in nearby villages.

160. P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon the Portuguese era* II.167 ; JCBRAS XI.526 ; Queyroz 733 ; TT.LM.18.ff.44,171,219 ; TT.LM.19.ff.17,23 TT. LM.23.f.435

161. AHU Caixa 8. 26.1.1625 ; TT.LM.17.ff.23,57

162. TT.LM.18.ff.243-244,147 ; TT.LM.21.f.277

163. Queyroz 734 ; TT.LM.18.ff.239-240 ;

While the general fell into disfavour among the Sinhalese and the Portuguese alike, the work of administration was thrown into confusion by disagreements between the captain-general, the *vedor* and the *ouvidor*. The lack of able government was reflected in the elections to the *misericordia* which resulted in open fighting and the death of a soldier.<sup>164</sup>

Early in 1623 however, Jorge de Albuquerque received news of the arrival of the new viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama with orders to reinstate Constantino de Sa in Ceylon.<sup>165</sup> In April, before de Sa could return to Ceylon de Albuquerque commandeered a vessel which had come to Ceylon to take some cinnamon to the Persian Gulf and took his family in it to Goa.<sup>166</sup> De Sa set out from Goa to Ceylon in the same month.<sup>167</sup>

The significance of the rule of Jorge de Albuquerque lay in what he failed to achieve. Having the strongest ties of personal relationship with the Portuguese governor in Goa he was much better placed than de Sa to obtain the resources necessary to execute royal orders. He chose however to use his period of office for the pursuit of personal gain. The Kandyan monarch thus received a further period of time to re-establish his authority over his kingdom, and to regain the confidence of his people. Moreover de Albuquerque's tactless measures made deep inroads in the support among Sinhalese chieftains which de Sa had built up during his first period of office.

P.da Trindade III.129

164. TT.LLM.15.f.191 ; TT.LM.18.f.240 ; *Biblioteca de Sociedade de Geografia, Restante D.Maco* 4. doc.52

An unsigned contemporary document (TT.LM.18.f.71) suggests that many of Jorge de Albuquerque's troubles might have arisen from opposition to him by the *vedor*, Lancarote de Seixas who was a friend and kinsman of Constantino de Sa. De Seixas apparently had considerable influence both in the army and among the *casados* of Colombo. De Seixas was certainly no friend of Jorge de Albuquerque. On 20 November 1621 he wrote to the king making many specific charges of corruption against the new general (AHU 35.ff.24-24v) but no conclusive evidence can be found to connect de Seixas with either the mutiny in the army or the protests of the *camara* of Colombo.

165. The king had never agreed to the appointment of Jorge de Albuquerque, and he even ordered an inquiry to be held as to why de Sa was dismissed. TT.LM.16.f.45 ; TT.LM.18.ff.233,326 ; TT.Colleccao de S. Vicente 19.doc.340

166. Incidentally this deprived Ruy Freire de Andrade of much needed funds which would have been gained by the sale of this cinnamon.

167. De Sa after he left Ceylon had resided in Goa until appointed commander of the squadron sent to relieve Ormuz. De Sa displayed little eagerness to reach Ormuz in time and his fleet was too late to save the fort. On his return to Goa his conduct of the expedition was investigated by the *Relacao* where de Sa was cleared of all responsibility for the loss.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE RULE OF CONSTANTINO DE SA DE NORONHA

From May 1623 to August 1630 the Portuguese territories in Ceylon were governed by Constantino de Sa de Noronha. Until 1628 de Sa governed the country in peace, but even in these years war never appeared far off. With the *estado da India* hard pressed by European and local enemies in many sectors from East Africa to China, peace in Ceylon, if it could be combined with security was obviously desirable to the Portuguese. From the point of view of Kandy too, as the weaker of the two protagonists, peace was much to be sought after. Senerat after 1621 was ready to postpone, if not give up completely, his plan for a fresh war against the Portuguese, for he realized that Kandy needed a spell of peace to recover from the effects of foreign invasion and civil war. Therefore, although determined to resist any further diminution of his power, Senerat was prepared to acquiesce in the increase in Portuguese power in Ceylon which had occurred between 1617 and 1621.

To the Portuguese, on the other hand, the very existence of Kandy presented a three fold threat to their security. Firstly, it increased the risk of foreign intervention in Ceylon. A kingdom outside Portuguese control, within Ceylon, was an encouragement for other European nations to try their fortunes in the island. Secondly, a strong Kandyan monarch was likely to exploit any Portuguese weakness to attempt to expel them from the island. Finally, the prospect of support from or at least a refuge, in the hill country could in many ways be regarded as an inducement for low-country Sinhalese to rebel. Consequent Portuguese hostility towards Kandy however, only served to arouse Kandyan suspicions as to Portuguese objectives.

Portuguese policy was, however, to a great extent also a reflection of the Portuguese political, military and economic position in Europe as well as in Asia and therefore it is necessary to keep the broader prospect constantly in view. The resumption of the war with the Dutch at the end of the twelve year truce in 1621 imposed a considerable burden on Portuguese resources. The Dutch attacks on the valuable Portuguese colonies of Bahia and Angola and the consequent struggle for the reconquest of these areas absorbed much of the Portuguese war effort in the 1620's.<sup>1</sup> In the Indian ocean the situation was not much better. By 1617 the spice trade

1. H.W. Livermore—*History of Portugal*. Cambridge, 1947.pg.277 ; C.R. Boxer—*Salvador de Sa and the struggle for Brazil and Angola 1602-1686. passim*

at Ormuz had fallen to one sixth of its former value.<sup>2</sup> The Anglo-Dutch accord signed in Europe in June 1619 had provided for close co-operation, political and economic, between these powers in Asia and though the expectations of the parent companies in Europe were never matched by the actual cooperation between their officials in the East, the years which followed were marked by considerable Anglo-Dutch successes against the Portuguese. In 1622 an allied fleet attacked the Portuguese squadron bringing out the viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de Vidiguerra, off Mocambique and destroyed three of the four galleons in the Portuguese fleet. The victorious Anglo-Dutch fleet later blockaded Goa for four months between December 1622 and March 1623 to prevent the departure of the annual Portuguese fleet to Lisbon.<sup>3</sup> Though the Dutch attack on Macao failed in 1622, they established themselves in Formosa two years later.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile a Persian force supported by an English fleet had in 1622 seized Ormuz. This last event was a tremendous psychological blow to the Portuguese and their main efforts in the East during the next few years were directed to regaining command of the Persian Gulf and the restoration of their prestige there.<sup>5</sup>

These factors naturally led to a restriction of the amount of Portuguese resources in men, arms and equipment that could be diverted to Ceylon. The viceroy at Goa, as the head of a hard pressed and far flung empire, had to allocate resources to each area according to its needs, and in comparison with others those of Ceylon did not look pressing. This explains why the figure of eight hundred *soldados* in the field, attained in the early years of de Azevedo's regime was not reached again in Ceylon till the island was in danger of being completely lost in 1630-1631.<sup>6</sup>

The problem of what was to be done with the little that could be spared for Ceylon was a question that gave rise to controversy both within and outside the island. After 1617, two alternative uses appeared possible. The Portuguese could either preserve peace with Kandy and concentrate on the fortification of the ports of the island to prevent any other European power from getting a foothold or renew the struggle against Kandy in the hope of conquering the kingdom, thus rendering secure their hold on the island. Both

2. Meilink—Roelosfz, 190

3. *The Cambridge History of India V*, 83-84 ; F.de Souza VI, 258-260

4. *The New Cambridge Modern History V*. 417

5. *The Cambridge History of India V*. 83-84

6. T. Abeyasinghe, 43



policies aimed at objectives desirable from the Portuguese point of view. They were viewed as alternatives simply because, with the resources at hand, at best only one of these objectives could be aimed at.

However, as the Portuguese found out in the 1620's these two policies were not true alternatives. The treaty of 1617 had granted the king of Kandy the whole of the eastern seaboard of Ceylon including the ports of Trincomalee and Batticaloa.<sup>7</sup> Thus any attempt to fortify all the ports of the island was likely to involve a conflict with the Kandyan kingdom. Similarly any further attempts to subjugate Kandy could well lead Senerat to appeal to the Dutch for aid by way of the east coast.

The authorities in Lisbon did not realize this problem for the letters of the king to the viceroy in both 1619 and 1620 contained requests that Trincomalee and Batticaloa be fortified,<sup>8</sup> while another dated 26 March 1620 instructed the viceroy to confirm the treaty of 1617.<sup>9</sup> However the Portuguese governor of India, Fernao de Albuquerque who had earlier served as the captain of Colombo was under no such delusion. When he received these instructions he at once replied on 20 February 1621 that the peace treaty in question handed over to Kandy, the lands of Batticaloa where the king of Portugal had asked for a fort to be built.<sup>10</sup> Confronted by the alternatives of confirming the peace treaty of 1617 or of constructing forts at Trincomalee and Batticaloa with the risk of renewed conflicts, the king of Portugal unhesitatingly chose the latter. A letter of the king to the viceroy dated 8 February 1622 decreed that peace be made only on condition that Batticaloa be left in Portuguese hands.<sup>11</sup> When Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de Vidi-guerra, de Albuquerque's successor as viceroy, pointed out in the following year that even Trincomalee was in Kandyan territory according to the peace,<sup>12</sup> the king rejoined that such a treaty so harmful to his interests, should not be confirmed at all.<sup>13</sup>

The king's decision to continue the struggle with Kandy involved a change from the policy laid down in the instructions of 1617 to the outgoing viceroy Dom Joao Coutinho, conde de Redondo. Three reasons seem to have been responsible for this. By 1622 the king had received news that the rebellions in Portuguese

7. CLR 3 ser.III.164

8. DR V. 26-261 ; TT.LM.16.f.561

9. TT.LM.13.f.133

10. TT.LM.15.f.21

11. TT.LM.16.f.79

12. TT.LM.17.f.8v

13. TT.LM.20.f.1

territory were almost extinguished. Thus it could be safely presumed that renewed war with Kandy would not place too great a burden on the Portuguese forces in Ceylon. Secondly, by this time news of the conquest and annexation of Jaffna had also been received in Lisbon. This accession of territory, the first in Ceylon for over twenty years, would have once more roused hopes of the subjugation of Kandy. Finally, by 1622 letters from the viceroy had informed the king that a Danish fleet had arrived off Ceylon in 1620 with the object of assisting the king of Kandy to drive out the Portuguese. These factors prompted the king to formulate a new course of action. Kandy was to be henceforth completely isolated from foreign contacts. This purpose was to be achieved by the construction of forts round the coast of Ceylon at Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Weligama, Galle, Kalutara, Negombo and Kayts. As the forts had to be strong enough to resist hostile Europeans as well as the Sinhalese army the king also requested that the viceroy send a qualified engineer to advise on their construction.<sup>14</sup>

However, the king's decision to tear up the 1617 treaty did not result in armed conflict as the new viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de Vidiguerra embarked on a policy venture of his own. After consultations with Constantino de Sa, the viceroy realized that if the seizure of Trincomalee were done with tact and speed no overt conflict need necessarily result. The king of Kandy, weakened by the rebellion in his own domains which had lasted from 1617 to 1620, was as yet in no position to renew war. He was keen on a period of peace to bring up his three sons, the eldest of whom was hardly eighteen years of age. Moreover having refused the offer of Danish aid in 1620-1621 he knew that he might well be without allies in a new war against the Portuguese.

In view of these factors, the viceroy ordered de Sa to proceed directly to Trincomalee and start work on building a fort there.<sup>15</sup> At the same time he despatched a Franciscan, Fr. Eleuterio de Santiago to Kandy to explain to Senerat that this was merely an attempt to forestall the enemies of the Portuguese who had planned to seize Trincomalee for themselves.<sup>16</sup>

De Sa set out from Goa in the first week of April 1623 with four galliots and two pinnaces, together with men, munitions and eight pieces of artillery.<sup>17</sup> He was also accompanied by Francisco

14. TT.LM.16.f.156

15. TT.LM.16.f.16v ; TT.LM.17.f.66 ; TT.LM.19.f.6v ; *TT. Collecção de S. Vicente* XIX Doc.154

16. Queyroz 698 ; *P.da Trindade* III.79

17. *TT.Colleccao de S. Vicente* XIX Doc. 154 ; *TT.Mss da Convento da Graca*, tomo 2E pg.1557-558 ; *TT.LM.19f.6v*.

Pinto Pimenta who was well versed in matters regarding fortifications.<sup>18</sup> De Sa had been delayed in Goa partly by the Anglo-Dutch blockade of the port which lasted till 19 March and partly by the inquiry into the conduct of the expedition led by him for the relief of Ormuz.<sup>19</sup> Consequently he met with adverse winds and was forced to put into Tuticorim. Thence he crossed over to Jaffna on 16 May 1623. After spending a few weeks regrouping his forces and taking in some fresh supplies and *lascarin* troops from Jaffna, de Sa sailed for Trincomalee which he reached in July 1623.<sup>20</sup>

The port and the area surrounding Trincomalee bay was under the rule of the *Vanniyar* of Trincomalee and Kottiyar who was a tributary of the king of Kandy. This ruler seems to have offered no resistance. The ruler of Kandy, Senerat was by no means deceived by Portuguese professions of friendship but being unprepared for war contented himself with protests to the captain-general and the *camara* of Colombo reminding them of the peace treaty of 1617.<sup>21</sup>

The spot chosen for the fort at Trincomalee was the site of the famous Konesar temple. This temple had been one of the best known and most frequented Hindu temples in this region in the sixteenth century, and had made Trincomalee a pilgrim as well as a trade centre. It had been built on the isthmus of a promontory which protected Trincomalee harbour.<sup>22</sup> The Danes, recognising its natural strength, had entrenched themselves in it in 1620. However they had left the original structure more or less intact even when they finally evacuated it in 1621.<sup>23</sup> De Sa was not content with such a makeshift stronghold. He proceeded to demolish the old temple building and to use the material for the construction of a triangular fort with three bastions. The eight pieces of artillery brought from Goa were supplemented by the salvage of eleven guns from the Danish ship *Copenhagen* which had sunk off Kottiyar in

18. Pimenta had come to the East with Antonio Pinto da Fonseca, the military engineer sent by Philip II of Portugal (and III of Spain) to strengthen the Portuguese fortifications of the East. TT.LM.17.f.88v; TT.LM.16.f.16v; TT.LM.22.f.84

19. TT.LM.17.f.4v: *TT.Colleccao de S.Vicente* XIX.Doc.271

20. TT.Ms da Liv.1699.ff.248,260. It is possible that the reference in Queyroz (696) to a visit by de Sa to Jaffna in which he reorganized the administration of the area may well refer to this stay. Queyroz however seems to have been confused on this subject as he later makes out (Queyroz 757) that no captain-general had set foot set in Jaffna up to 1627.

21. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.248; Baldaeus 86; TT.LM.17.f.88 v; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.222.

22. JCBRAS XXX 362; Queyroz 236

23. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.248

1620. Of the three bastions the southernmost, Santa Cruz, was built on the site of the highest buildings of the former temple. It was provided with six of the largest guns to defend the harbour. From this key bastion one wall ran north-westwards for about fifty paces across the isthmus to the bastion of S.Iago, cutting off the promontory from the mainland. Another wall extended northwards from Santa Cruz for one hundred paces and terminated in the sea at the bastion of S.Antonio. The stretch between S. Iago and S.Antonio was difficult of access from without, due to the rocky nature of the coast but the Portuguese built a wall on the topmost rocks to eliminate all danger of attack from the narrow sea beach.<sup>24</sup>

The building of the fort necessitated the transport of stone and lime from Jaffna and other parts of the coast to the top of the rock.<sup>25</sup> Much of the labour force used for this work appears to have been brought from Jaffna. In fact, the assistance of de Oliveira, the captain-major of Jaffna, in the procuring of supplies of food and munitions as well as a *lascarin* contingent for the expeditionary force proved invaluable.<sup>26</sup> After four months of work had placed the fort in a fairly defensible position, de Sa departed for Kotte leaving Francisco Pinto Pimenta as captain of Trincomalee with a force of eighty Portuguese and a hundred *lascarins* to defend the fort.<sup>27</sup> De Sa evidently considered it too dangerous to leave Kotte longer without a captain-general. Further delay would have made sailing even more difficult due to the onset of the north-east monsoon. He set from Trincomalee in a pinnace and reached Colombo in October 1623.<sup>28</sup>

Pimenta went ahead with the construction of the fort but met with several difficulties. In the first place the resources left were far smaller than those de Sa had enjoyed. The comparatively large fleet of four galliots and two pinnaces had been allocated to de Sa's expedition only because it was considered that the gallions could proceed in early 1624 to join the Coromandel fleet led by

24. APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Vol.2.Part I.412 ; JCBRAS X.124 ; Reimers 57 ; Ribeiro 130 ; Filmoteca, *Plantas Rola* III.
25. AHU Caixa 26. 31.1.1664
26. AHU 501.f.36 ; TT.LM.22.f.114 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.228 ; TT.LM. 19.f.40v ; A.Botelho de Souza III. 328
27. The estimate given above is that of Queyroz 737. Other estimates are : De Sa de M 529—eighty Portuguese and five hundred *lascarins*. A. Botelho de Souza—sixty Portuguese and one hundred and fifty *lascarins*. In January 1624 the viceroy wrote to the king that the force expected to be left in Trincomalee was seventy Portuguese and one hundred and fifty *lascarins*. These figures of course do not include the labour force brought from Jaffna for construction work.
28. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.248

Diogo de Mello de Castro,<sup>29</sup> and this the galliots proceeded to do. Thus Pimenta was reduced to the manpower of the garrison and such aid as had arrived from Jaffna. Secondly, Senerat realising the weakness of the Portuguese force at Trincomalee began to take measures to impede the construction of the fort and generally to discourage the Portuguese. Late in 1624, Sinhalese guerrilla bands began to raid the villages around the fort which the Portuguese had also brought under their control. This development certainly disconcerted the Portuguese who had hoped to obtain much of their supply of rice from neighbouring villages like Tambalagama.<sup>30</sup>

De Sa having heard of the problems faced by Pimenta decided in 1624 to venture once more to Trincomalee, taking with him a force of Portuguese strengthened by some detachments of Sinhalese *lascarins*. The whole force was under the overall command of the new captain-major-of-the-field, Constantino de Sa de Miranda.<sup>31</sup> The *disava* of the Four Korales, Francisco de Brito de Almeida also made ready to accompany the captain-general with the men of his province. Senerat fearing de Sa's moves acted to forestall him. Kandyan agents began to foment disturbances in the Four Korales in the hope that de Sa would be deterred from leaving Kotte. Unfortunately for Senerat, de Sa decided merely to send back de Almeida to pacify the Four Korales and himself continued on his way to Trincomalee where he spent another four months completing the fort.<sup>32</sup> He also supervised the establishment of the new township where several *casados* sent from Goa were settled as residents.<sup>33</sup>

29. TT.LM.19.f.9

30. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.248 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.228v ; Baldaeus 85 ; Filmoteca LM. 15. 38/1-5. This incidentally disproves the view advanced in Queyroz 698 and Ribeiro 221 that Senerat was soothed into acquiescence in the Portuguese seizure of Trincomalee.

31. AHU 501.f.292 ; Simancas S.P. 1530.f.30

32. TT.LM.19.f.40v ; Reimers 57 ; Filmoteca LM.20.9/10 4-2 ; AHU Caixa 16 ant. 18.1.1644

33. The normal garrison in Trincomalee was about seventy five Portuguese. During the years 1623-1627 about thirty *casados* were settled in the township. Consequently the *soldados* in the garrison were reduced in number to thirty or forty men. It is noteworthy that three of the best known writers of the seventeenth century who described the construction of the fort at Trincomalee—Fernaõ de Queyroz, (734-736) Joao Rodriguez de Sa de Menezes (527-529) and Joao Ribeiro (221) all maintain that the fort was begun only in 1624. They all assume that in 1623 de Sa went directly from Goa to Colombo where according to de Sa de Menezes the captain-general was opposed by his councillors regarding the plan to fortify Trincomalee on the grounds that the area around was too poor and uninhabited to support a large garrison. Authorities on Ceylon history have so far generally accepted the version given by these chroniclers. (eg. Fr. S. G. Perera—*A history of Ceylon for schools* 88 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon the Portuguese era* II.168). However, contemporary documents clearly indicate that there were two separate expeditions—one from Goa in 1623 and one from Kotte in 1624.

De Sa had instructions from the viceroy to strengthen the forts of Kotte itself, once Trincomalee was fortified. This explains his visit to Galle in November 1623 soon after he arrived from Trincomalee. The fortalice planned by de Sa to command Galle harbour had been completed by Fernao Pinhao, captain of Galle in time of Jorge de Albuquerque.<sup>34</sup> The defence structure in Galle however was far from complete. The wall intended to cut off the promontory (on which the fortalice was built) from the mainland was not yet complete, while the seaward bastion of Santa Cruz, intended to command the entrance to the bay, still lacked the long range artillery necessary for this task. Nevertheless de Sa considered the situation at Galle sufficiently satisfactory to leave it alone until more urgent task had been attended to.<sup>35</sup>

Up to the end of 1624, de Sa followed the policy outlined by the viceroy. Peace was maintained with Kandy, while the Portuguese in Ceylon endeavoured to strengthen their position against external attack. However at the end of this year de Sa requested the viceroy for permission to resume open war against Kandy. In support of his view he attached a letter from Joao Cardoso da Pina, *disava* of Matara, an experienced Portuguese *fidalgo*, giving reasons for advocating this course.<sup>36</sup> As neither letter survives it is not possible to say with certainty why de Sa became convinced that open war was preferable to working under the guise of peace. Apart from the Sinhalese guerrilla attacks on the villages surrounding Trincomalee, several possible reasons may be advanced by way of explanation. Firstly, the pretence of keeping the peace made it impossible for the captain-general to act against the trading activities of the Indian merchants at Batticaloa. De Sa must have realized that an open port at Batticaloa gave Senerat unimpeded access to foreign powers in his search for allies. War alone could check this. Secondly, about this time came Senerat's request for the daughter of Sankili, the late ruler of Jaffna, as consort for his eldest son.<sup>37</sup> On Portuguese rejection of this plan Senerat procured from Tanjore two of Sankili's nieces (who had been taken to that principality by D. Luis when he broke with the Portuguese) as consorts for his two elder sons, Kumarasinha and Vijayapala.<sup>38</sup> These activities probably roused de Sa's fears regarding Senerat's intentions towards Jaffna. Thirdly, it is apparent from the records of

34. TT.LM.18.ff.44,57 ; TT.LM.24.f.458

35. TT.LM.19.ff.4,18,40v ; JCBRAS XI.537

36. BNL.FG 1982.f.59

37. P. da Trindade III.233 ; Queyroz 692

38. Biker I.224 ; JCBRAS XI.517, 529-530 ; CLR 3 ser.I./152 ; *Jornada* 36

the discussions of the viceroy's council that one of the reasons put forward by de Sa for the advocacy of war was the growing strength of the Kandyan king. During his first term, de Sa had seen Senerat at his weakest, when the risings within his kingdom had confined his power to the Kandy-Matale region. Now on his arrival in Ceylon a few years later, de Sa saw how useful the period of peace had been for the Kandyan monarch. He therefore wished for war to arrest the growth of Senerat's power.<sup>39</sup>

The viceroy was apparently unimpressed by the arguments put forward by de Sa and da Pina. By this time he had found a staunch supporter for his policy of peace with Kandy within his own council in Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira. Pereira, a former captain-general of Ceylon, had returned from Mocambique to take a seat in the viceroy's council in 1624. As the only member in the council with first-hand experience of the island, his views on Ceylon were listened to with respect. Pereira doubtless from conviction born of his own experience in Ceylon (which was perhaps reinforced by an urge to defend his own handiwork—the treaty of 1617) held the view that the best policy for the Portuguese at the moment was to preserve peace with Kandy.<sup>40</sup> It was therefore decided on 2 January 1625 to refuse de Sa permission to go to war.

The viceroy however considered that a matter as weighty as this could not be finally resolved without further evidence. He therefore requested the captain-general to summon twelve men named by the viceroy and to discuss with them the question of how to curb the growing power of Kandy and assure the security of the Portuguese possessions in the island.<sup>41</sup> Undoubtedly one of the aims of the viceroy in making this request was to gauge what element of support existed within Ceylon for his policy of peace. His letter of 7 January 1625 therefore contained elaborate instructions designed to ensure that these twelve men would voice their views without fear. After a full scale discussion, each was to go back to his own house and put his views in writing and then hand over this document to the *vedor da fazenda* who would seal it and despatch it to the viceroy. However, if the viceroy hoped to receive a vote for peace he was also open-minded in his search for information,

39. BNL.FG 1982.f.59

40. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.216

41. BNL.FG 1982.f.59. The twelve nominated by the viceroy were Luis Gomes Pinto, Filipe de Oliveira, Domingos Carvalho Cao, Lancarote de Seixas, Luis Cabral de Faria, Francisco Barbosa de Andrade, Luis Teixeira de Macedo, Joano Roiz Homem, Diogo da Souza da Cunha, Jeronimo Taveira, Fr. Bernadino da Fonseca and the *vedor* Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara.

suggestions and opinions. Thus each man was requested to state not only whether he was in favour of war or not, but if in favour of war, how many Portuguese soldiers, how much money and what supplies would be necessary, or if against war, what other measures could be taken to prevent Kandy from getting stronger. The twelve were also enjoined to give their opinions as to where the Portuguese army should be based and what other measures were necessary to ensure the security of the Portuguese Ceylon.<sup>42</sup>

The result of this inquiry provided a demonstration of overwhelming support for the captain-general's view that war was the best course of action. Of the eleven Portuguese consulted (the twelfth Filipe de Oliveira, serving in Jaffna was unable to attend) nine unhesitatingly came out in favour of open war, one was non-committal and only one opposed the immediate declaration of war.<sup>43</sup> Apart from the two arguments in favour of war mentioned above—that peace allowed Kandy to contact the enemies of the Portuguese and that it enabled the king of Kandy to grow stronger daily, four other reasons were advanced by those who wanted war. Firstly, it was held that it was the existence of Kandy that made the Portuguese hold on the lowlands insecure, for rebellions in Kotte owed much to the encouragement given by Kandy.<sup>44</sup> As Lancarote de Seixas, the former *vedor* of Ceylon argued,<sup>45</sup> 'no man is safe with an enemy in his own house.'<sup>46</sup> The war against Kandy was thus advocated as preventive measure. 'If we do not conquer Kandy' wrote Luis Teixeira de Macedo 'all the Portuguese will one day be killed in their sleep.'<sup>47</sup> Secondly, it was held that the time was ripe to strike. The Portuguese now had an able captain-general, a *lascarin* force in Ceylon and strong forces in India.<sup>48</sup> Thirdly, it was contended that unless they made the attempt now, the Portuguese would soon be forced to do so under less favourable circumstances for the number of *lascarins* in Portuguese forces was gradually diminishing, for many were fleeing to Kandy to take service under Senerat.<sup>49</sup> Finally, attention was drawn to the econo-

42. BNL.FG 1982.f.59 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.223v ; De Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI.560,566) mentions this 'meeting of captains' but represents it as a council summoned by the captain-general to urge the viceroy to action. This story, repeated in P. E. Pieris's *Ceylon* II. 173, needless to say, is inaccurate.

43. Ajuda 51-VIII-50.ff.216-230

44. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.216,217,225,227,227v

45. De Seixas had just returned to Ceylon after serving a year as the *Provedor mor dos contos* at Goa.

46. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.225

47. Ibid f.216v

48. Ibid. ff.216,225

49. Ibid. ff.217,221,222,223,225



mic advantages which would result from the conquest, in greater revenue, customs dues and the like. Luis Teixeira de Macedo even argued that if Kandy was seized Ceylon could after a few years provide money and material to support other wars in the East.<sup>50</sup>

The viceroy of India, Dom Francisco da Gama remained unconvinced. The Portuguese in India at this time were engaged in one contest against the English for the Mughal-Persian trade, and another against the Dutch for the spice trade in the East Indies.<sup>51</sup> The viceroy did not wish to shoulder additional commitments if he could avoid it. Moreover Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira in the viceroy's council offered cogent reasons why he should not go to war with Kandy. Pereira pointed out that there was no guarantee that de Sa would succeed where others had failed—in completing the conquest of Kandy. Moreover he held that war normally involved a fall in revenue and a great rise in expenditure. Thus Ceylon, far from financing other wars in the East would need considerable aid for a long time to come. Finally, he pointed out that conflict with Kandy would only encourage enemies of the Portuguese, whether Dutch, English or South Indian to open a new front in Ceylon and this was something the Portuguese could not afford.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the king of Portugal meanwhile had agreed in principle to the viceroy's advice to preserve peace and had begun to exchange friendly letters with the king of Kandy.<sup>53</sup> The viceroy's wider view of the Portuguese position in Asia prevailed and de Sa therefore had to give up his aggressive plans for the time being.<sup>54</sup>

Since an attempt to conquer Kandy had been ruled out de Sa had to return to the second route to security by way of command of the littoral. During the next few years his main efforts were directed to the fortification of the ports and the reorganization of the administration of Kotte. Moreover, in 1624 the king had twice requested the viceroy to send him plans of all the ports of the island and to let him know what other fortifications were necessary and what action was being taken to deal with these gaps in Ceylon's defences.<sup>55</sup> In 1625 therefore de Sa turned his attention to Colombo fort. This was easily the largest fort in Portuguese Ceylon. It

50. Ibid. f.216

51. Of course there were the English in the East Indies and the Dutch in western India. In fact the first Dutch ship to leave India directly from Europe sailed in 1624. But the contest was generally in the lines indicated above.

52. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.229.

53. Ajuda 51-IV-32.f.5v

54. TT.LM.23.ff.53,141

55. TT.LM.20.ff.1,39

PUBLIC LIBRARY

JAFFNA 10418cc  
SPECIAL COLLECTION

had been strong enough to withstand the attacks of the warlike Rajasinha of Sitawaka in the 1580's but had been neglected since. Thus the sixteenth century mud ramparts connecting the stone bastions had collapsed in places. The *camara* of Colombo had requested the king to ensure that Colombo was adequately defended,<sup>56</sup> and the authorities in Lisbon, having recognised the justice of this demand, had sent corresponding instructions to the viceroy of India.<sup>57</sup> The problem was, as it always had been, one of finance. In the time of Mathias de Albuquerque (1591-1597) the king had granted the money realized from the sale of an annual voyage to China for this work but none of the 24,300 *xerafims* realized from this sale was ever spent on Colombo.<sup>58</sup> By 1613 however, repeated instructions from home, the extension of English and Dutch activities in the western seaboard of India and the worsened state of the walls of Colombo had forced de Azevedo's successor, Dom Francisco de Menezes, to take action. He and his successor, Manoel Mascarenhas Homem rebuilt the walls on the landward side for more than half their circuit.<sup>59</sup> The lack of funds however, prevented the general from using stone. Thus once the building and repair work ceased, as it did in 1616 due to the revolt of Nikapitiya, the torrential rains of the south-west monsoon took their toll and by 1618 the walls had once again collapsed in many-places.<sup>60</sup>

De Sa however, did not pay attention to the problem of repairing the walls on the landward side. He evidently considered the prospects of a landward attack rather remote. He concentrated on the defence of the harbour against attack by sea, which had become more likely due to Dutch attempts to capture the trade in the Arabian sea in the 1620's. The headland which had formed the site for the original fortalice at Colombo, called the point of S.Lourenco was fortified to form a new bastion called S.Cruz and provided with eleven pieces of artillery to defend the whole harbour.<sup>61</sup> The *casados* of Colombo gave the captain substantial aid in this project which occupied most of 1625.

The viceroy had also instructed de Sa to fortify Puttalam. A stockade had been established there in the second decade of the seventeenth century to prevent the Kandyans from using the port.

56. DR.I. 182

57. DR.I.8,58-61,182,332,388 ; DR IV.138

58. TT.LM.15.ff.23,111 ; TT.LM.16.f.552

59. TT.LM.13.f.147 ; AHU Caixa 4, 18.12.1616 ; DR III.394-395 ; Filmoteca LM 12 86/3

60. AHU Caixa 6, 21.11.1618

61. Queyroz 740 ; JCBRAS XI. 537-538 Reimers 52

De Sa however, was against the dispersal of Portuguese soldiers at too many fortified posts and wrote back to the viceroy that Puttalam was situated in a barren area unfrequented by Europeans and that he had abandoned the project.<sup>62</sup> De Sa could justifiably argue here that although Puttalam was undefended and although the fort of Chilaw established in the time of de Azevedo had been abandoned,<sup>63</sup> the fort of Negombo built by Lourenco Teixeira de Macedo in the 1590's was adequate to defend the cinnamon rich areas of the Pitigal, Beligal and Alutkuru Korales. De Macedo who had been granted the captaincy of Negombo for life, kept the fort in repair and maintained a small *lascarin* force for its defence from the revenues of the port and the villages attached to it. Apart from this force there were usually fifteen or twenty Portuguese soldiers plus another five officials. These were assisted in times of war by half-a-dozen married settlers who lived within easy reach of the fort. Negombo fort itself was triangular in shape and small in size with three well-built bulwarks—Nossa Senhora da Vitoria, Espirito Santo and S.Lourenco—furnished with a few small pieces of artillery.<sup>64</sup>

By 1625 therefore the coastal belt of Kotte was defended by the four forts of Negombo, Colombo, Kalutara and Galle. In this year arrived a letter from the king to the viceroy requesting that an inquiry be made as to whether Weligama, eighteen miles south of Galle, should also be fortified.<sup>65</sup> This inquiry was the result of a petition submitted by Diogo Vaz Freire, a Portuguese *fidalgo* who had seen many years of services in Ceylon. Freire pointed out that a fort at Weligama would be of great use to the Portuguese within Ceylon as well as in their conflict with the Dutch. The construction of a fort there, he argued, would enable the Portuguese to gain a greater hold over the southern part of Matara *disava*. Furthermore he argued that such a fort would be of immense value to Portuguese shipping. At this time the Dutch were attacking Portuguese shipping sailing to Goa from the Far East and Malacca at a point just to the south of Ceylon. Freire pointed out that a loss of a ship in 1619 and two more in 1620 could have been avoided had a fort at Weligama enabled the Portuguese to use Weligama bay as a refuge. Freire also contended that only the fortification of all such bays and inlets could eventually

62. Reimers 54 ; BM Add. Ms.9853.f.157v

63. T. Abeyasinghe 28

64. Filmoteca—*Plantas Rola* III ; Ribeiro 130 ; Reimers 53 ; TT.LM 31.ff.42-43 ; APO (new ed.) Tomo IV, Vol.2 part I.369-370

65. TT.LM.20.f.365

enable the Portuguese to control the trade of the island and ensure the conquest of the Kandyan kingdom. To clinch the issue he offered to spend between eighteen and twenty thousand *cruzados* for the fort if given the *disavaship* of Matara and later the command of the *lascarin* troops of the island as well as a grant of Weligama for life.<sup>66</sup>

The king was obviously impressed with the offer, for, although he left the decision whether to construct the fort to the discretion of the viceroy, he asked that a hundred Christians be settled in the vicinity of Weligama to give added strength to the projected stronghold.<sup>67</sup> The viceroy and captain-general however were both opposed to the scheme on the grounds that the fortification of Galle rendered that of Weligama unnecessary, that the rewards asked for by Diogo Vaz Freire were excessive and that the port and village of Weligama were already granted to another who could not be dispossessed of them save in a general reallocation of land in Ceylon.<sup>68</sup>

In the period 1626-1627 de Sa continued the work of strengthening the defences of Kotte. In 1626 he concentrated on the two inland centres of Malwana and Menikkadawara. Malwana, the residence of the captain-general since the time of de Azevedo was provided with a square shaped fort named S.Helena. The garrison required for this fort had been estimated at seventy soldiers though in actual fact, very often the force left to guard the fort was much smaller.<sup>69</sup>

The fort built at Menikkadawara was much larger in scale. It was intended partly as a base from which the Portuguese army could be supplied for any offensive or defensive campaign in the

66. TT.LM.20.f.366-368

67. TM.LM.20.f.365

68. BNL.FG.1982.ff.121v-122 ; TT.LM.22.ff.113v-114 ; TT.LM.24.ff.6v, 117. From a letter written by the king to the viceroy on 19 March 1623 it would appear that Gaspar de Mello Sampayo held Weligama during this period. (TT.LM.18.f.207) Despite the advice given by de Sa and the viceroy, conde de Vidigueira against the fortification of Weligama in 1626 the king continued to urge that the matter be investigated further. Action was delayed by the outbreak of war against Kandy. Eventually, in 1634 the captain-general of the day Dom Jorge de Almeida reported that Weligama could be fortified without detriment to the interest of the Christian converts of the area. By this time the viceroy conde de Linhares was also in favour of the project. Definite orders to fortify Weligama issued both by the viceroy and the king in 1636 were not carried out only due to the lack of funds. Coimbra 459.ff.250,280 ; Botelho de Souza III. 436 ; Filmoteca LM.13a 4/2 ; TT.LM.25.f.118 ; TT.LM.26.f.86 ; TT.LM.27.f.130 ; TT.LM.28.f.128 ; TT.LM.31.f.115 ; TT.LM.36.f.131 ; TT.LM.37.f.83.

69. Reimers 61 ; Ribeiro 130 ; JCBRAS XI, 566 ; Queyroz 751 ; TT. Ms da Liv. 1699.f.248v

Four Korales, and partly as a secure place of refuge to which a Portuguese force could retire after a tiring campaign. Construction work on the fort was started in October 1626.<sup>70</sup> The fort itself, named the fort of Santa Fe, was rectangular with four bastions.<sup>71</sup> The walls and the breast work were made of stone and mortar and a well within the fort secured the supply of water. The construction of a moat was begun but later abandoned. In the centre of the fort was the citadel called Forte Cruz. The work on the fort continued till about May 1628. For much of the time the captain-general himself supervised the work but during his absence Francisco de Brito de Almeida, captain-major-of-the-field was left in charge.<sup>72</sup>

One such period of absence was due to de Sa's departure in 1627 to finish the work on the fort of Galle which had been left incomplete in 1623. In 1627 de Sa attended to the task of constructing the defences of Galle on the landward side. The wall separating the settlement from the mainland was strengthened by three bastions, one at each end and the third at the centre. These were provided with seven small pieces of artillery.<sup>73</sup> De Sa's intention to strengthen the defences with a moat was given up due to lack of funds.<sup>74</sup>

The years of peace (1623-1628) were thus used by de Sa to strengthen the Portuguese position in Ceylon. He had been forbidden to attempt a solution through a renewal of war with Kandy but he had done what he could to isolate the mountain kingdom and to prevent any Kandyan contact with the European enemies of the Portuguese by his programme of coastal fortification. However, he did not stop there, for he realized that there could be a threat to the Portuguese territories from within. The fortification of Malwana and Menikkadawara served to counter threats within the lowlands as well as from Kandy. He also built a gunpowder factory, designed to turn out about one hundred and sixty pounds of powder daily.<sup>75</sup>

70. AHU 501.f.51v

71. Called S.Iago, S. Boa Ventura, S. Jorge and S. Pedro.

72. Simancas 1530 f. 130 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.248v ; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644 ; AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655 ; P. E. Peiris's (*Ceylon* II.173) assertion that the fort of Menikkadawara was built in a few days is an inaccuracy derived from Queyroz 751.

73. AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644 ; AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655 ; Simancas SP. 1530.f.30 ; APO (new ed) Tomo IV.vol.2 Part I. 406 Incidentally, contemporary documents disprove the contention of de Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI.537) that de Sa, his father completed the fortification of Galle in 1625.

74. Queyroz 627

75. Queyroz 740 reports that the saltpetre was obtained from Madura. This made little difference from the military point of view as no provision was made for the storage of ingredients essential for the making of gun

But most important of all he sought to ensure the loyalty of the *lascarins* by the establishment of two fortified settlements for them near Colombo. One of these settlements was at Peliyagoda within three miles of the Portuguese fort of Colombo.<sup>76</sup> The other was probably located at Mulleriyawa, about six miles due west of Colombo.<sup>77</sup> This policy of settling *lascarins* and their families within fortified settlements had been urged by the king as early as 1607.<sup>78</sup> It was realized that as long as the families of *lascarins* remained in areas within Portuguese control, the Sinhalese were unlikely to desert. However, despite repeated orders by the king no steps had been taken to put the recommendations into effect up to 1625.<sup>79</sup> The primary obstacle to the execution of this policy was the problem of land allocation. Such fortified village settlements as proposed, if they were to serve their intended purpose, had to be located near a major Portuguese fort, for otherwise in time of war the control of these settlements could easily be lost. The *lascarins* who were paid by land grants would naturally have to be allocated land near their settlements. Difficulties arose chiefly because all lands had already been allocated and much of the land near Colombo was in the hands of the Portuguese *casados* who were reluctant to give it up.<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, it was clear that even if the *lascarins* were favourably disposed towards the Portuguese they had little choice if their families were exposed to retaliation by the rebels. The Portuguese settlers of Colombo had already propounded their own solution to the problem. In a letter of the *camara* of Colombo to the king dated 20 November 1615 they proposed that the *casados* be given the task of maintaining the *lascarins*. For every *lascarin* maintained, the *casado* responsible was to be granted lands worth one hundred *pardaos* a year in revenue. The *camara*, the stronghold of Portuguese settler interests, argued that this solution would ensure the obedience of the *lascarins* who would be thus deprived of their leaders and placed in a position of dependence upon the Portuguese.<sup>81</sup> However, the

powder. It may be noted that in the 1640's Ribeiro observed a gun powder factory on the same site as that established by de Sa. However he gave it a capacity double that mentioned by de Sa de Menezes. (JCB RAS XI 538 ; Ribeiro 128)

76. 'Deste lugar de matual para onde nace o sol, espacio de tiro de esfera esta a cidade Nova que fez Constantino de Sa, sendo geral, povoada da mulheres dos aratches, lascarins e mais gente de guerra e das sete corales para seguranca desta conquista.' P. da Trindade III. 136. See also Queyroz 715 and Boudens—*The Catholic church in Ceylon under Dutch rule*—35

77. This was also called *Tranqueira Grande*—the great stockade.

78. T. Abeyasinghe 59,61

79. TT.LM.16.ff.101, 240 ; DR IV. 46-47

80. TT.LM.26.f.313

81. AHU Caixa 6, 21

Portuguese governor of India, Fernao de Albuquerque to whom the suggestion was referred, decided against it on the grounds that it was intended to serve the private interests of the *casados* who would retain and even add to their lands as well as obtain bands of retainers who might be used in personal quarrels as well as in times of war.<sup>82</sup>

By the 1620's the opinion of senior Portuguese soldiers within Ceylon had swung strongly in favour of the scheme for fortified settlements. Of the eleven Portuguese who in 1625 sent secret reports on Ceylon to Goa at the viceroy's request<sup>83</sup> five dealt with this problem. All these five were in favour of the fortified settlement scheme and three of them specifically stated that *lascarins* should be granted lands near Colombo taken from the Portuguese who could be compensated with lands further afield.<sup>84</sup> However it was apparent that such a step would meet with bitter opposition from the Portuguese settlers of Colombo and charges of favouritism and discrimination were sure to arise from those who lost by the changes. De Sa foresaw this. As early as 1 December 1623 he proposed to the king that a new *tombo* or register of lands be made. Once this was done, all villages save those whose grant was confirmed by the king could be resumed and then allocated according to royal instructions, leaving sufficient lands in the neighbourhood of Colombo and along the strategic Kelani valley for the settlement of *lascarin* forces.<sup>85</sup> The plan envisaged the eventual settlement of about two thousand *lascarins*.<sup>86</sup> Taking into account all their dependents it meant the resettlement of about ten thousand men, women and children. During de Sa's time only a small fraction of this number were settled in the two fortified settlements set up.<sup>87</sup> mainly because the work of the new *tombo* and the redistribution of land never got under way.<sup>88</sup> One essential difference between the scheme urged by the king and that put into practice by de Sa should be noted. The king had originally urged that these

82. TT.LM.16.f.561

83. See page 133.


84. These three were Jeronimo Taveira, Francisco Barbosa da Andrade and Luis Cabral da Faria. The other two Luis Gomes Pinto and Domingos Carvalho Cao did not deal with the problem of how to obtain lands for the *lascarins* though the latter remarked that '*no accomodar desta gente bem veio ha dever dificuldades*'. Luis Gomes Pinto advocated the establishment of such settlements near Galle, Negombo as well as Colombo but the other four advocated settlements near Colombo only. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.217,218v-219,220-221v

85. TT.Collecao de S. Vicente 19.doc.276

86. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.217,220-221v

87. In Peliyagoda for instance on 23 November 1628 there were only two hundred Christian converts. (P.da Trindade III.136)

88. TT.LM.24.f.335



fortified settlements be places of residence not only for the *lascarins* and their chiefs but also for the Portuguese settlers and Indian Christian colonists.<sup>89</sup> After the risings of 1616-1618 in Kotte the authorities in Goa apparently lost some of their optimism about Portuguese settlers living with security among the Sinhalese,<sup>90</sup> but there is no evidence of a change of policy in Lisbon regarding the fortified towns. De Sa had however no illusions regarding the salutary effects of mixing Portuguese settlers with *lascarin* forces. His object was to let the Sinhalese live in their settlements with the minimum interference from the Portuguese.<sup>91</sup>

De Sa and many of his contemporaries both within Ceylon and in Goa and Lisbon realized the value of ensuring the loyalty of the *lascarins* in the event of any rebellion or war. This accounts for the efforts made in the 1620's to assure economic as well as military security for the families of the *lascarins*. Hitherto land grants made to those other than the Portuguese could be withdrawn at any time. In the early 1620's this was changed when the king, on the recommendation of de Sa, decreed that lands should be granted to native inhabitants for life.<sup>92</sup> However, this measure did not affect the right of the captain-general and the *disavas* to resume lands whose grant had not been confirmed by the king. This explains why the viceroy had to ask the captain-general in January 1625 to forbid the *disavas* to seize lands from the Sinhalese and the Tamils.<sup>93</sup> The captain-general de Sa and the *vedor* Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara were both convinced that the concessions granted to the *lascarins* did not go far enough. Both held the view that if the *lascarins* were given security and assurance of the continued well-being of their families, they would be less likely to revolt. They doubtless realised that the grants of lands for life did not assure the Sinhalese or Tamil soldier that his family, even if it provided someone to take his place after his death, would continue to hold the lands he now held. They therefore recommended in late 1625 that land grants should be made to the *lascarins* either for a period of three lives or in perpetuity. Such lands would

89. T. Abeyasinghe 59-61

90. In a letter dated 20 March 1620 the king instructed the viceroy to consider the proposal that a wall of stone be built within the mud walls of the fort of Colombo and the *lascarins* and their families settled in the space between the walls. The Portuguese were to reside within the inner walls.

91. '*Convinha he repartir se aquelle Ilha de Novo, dando aos naturaes quatro corlas vizinhas a suas cidades sem mistura dos Portugueses.*' TT.LM. 22.f.88

92. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.225

93. Ibid.f.223v



return to royal hands only in case of absence of a male to perform the military service attached to the grant. In case of lack of children the *lascarins* was entitled to nominate a relative to succeed him.<sup>94</sup> This policy, which envisaged the grant of lands to the Sinhalese and Tamils on equal terms with the Portuguese did not fail to rouse opposition among the settler elements in Ceylon. Lancarote de Seixas, probably the wealthiest *casado* in Ceylon, specifically recommended to the viceroy that in no case should a land grant be made to a native for more than two lives.<sup>95</sup> However, the viceroy-in-council decided to accept the joint recommendations of the captain-general and the *vedor*. It was decided at a council meeting on 26 January 1626 that henceforth all land grants to natives in Ceylon should be for three lives. Records were to be kept of the exact area granted and the revenue it was expected to yield to the holder. Moreover, it was specifically decreed that neither the *disavas* nor the captain-general himself had the power to resume these grants.<sup>96</sup>

Apart from trying to better the general lot of the *lascarins* de Sa tried to win the loyalty of their commanders by lavish patronage and by fostering a feeling that they too played a useful and vital role in the Portuguese regime in Ceylon. Four Sinhalese leaders gained de Sa's favour and prospered in his time—*Mudaliyar* Kulatunga Wickremasinghe or Dom Cosmo, Amarakoon Mantri or Dom Aleixo, Siyane Korale Bandara or Dom Balthazar and Kattota Mantri or Dom Theodosio Barreto.<sup>97</sup> Dom Cosmo and Dom Balthazar as well as Dom Theodosio<sup>98</sup> were representatives of the Sinhalese nobility. Dom Cosmo was the son of Weerasekera *Mudaliyar*,<sup>99</sup> a very rich Sinhalese nobleman who lived at the end of the sixteenth century. The son gained favour among the Portuguese for his services in the revolt of Nikapitiya and was appointed head of the *lascarins* of the Four Korales. This enabled Dom Cosmo to build a large residence for himself at Peliyagoda, while

94. BNL.FG 1983.ff.88-89 ; TT.LM.22.f.87v

95. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.225

96. BNL.FG.1983.ff.88-89. The viceroy's decision on land tenure was probably influenced by the consideration that longer tenure might induce the *lascarins* to agree to pay the quit rents for their lands. For a discussion of the question of the payment of dues for lands held by *lascarins* see chapter VI.

97. The precise identification of these four leaders was first made by P.E. Pieris, (Ribeiro 252-253) from whose work much of the next paragraph is extracted.

98. Le Grand holds that Dom Theodosio was a descendant of a Moor of Cannanore who had commanded one of the four ships that brought aid to Rajasinha of Sitawaka. (Le Grand 88) A seventeenth century manuscript however described Dom Theodosio as '*Chingala de nacao parente dos reis daquelles reinos.*' TT.Mss da Liv. 31.f.145

99. Virasequara—Pieris render this as Wijayasekera. (Ribeiro 252 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 175)

his eldest son Dom Antonio was married to the daughter of Dom Manoel, the standard-bearer of the captain-general.<sup>100</sup> Dom Balthazar's power and influence was centred in the Siyane Korale, the area of the Four Korales nearest to Colombo. He was connected to Dom Theodosio's family by ties of marriage.<sup>101</sup> Dom Theodosio, the leader of the *lascarins* of Matara was probably the most powerful amongst them. He was made a *mudaliyar* by de Sa. In contrast to the other three, Dom Aleixo rose from the ranks, his skill in war winning the patronage of Luis Gomes Pinto, an experienced Portuguese commander. Apart from these four leaders there were also Sinhalese leaders of lesser account favoured by de Sa, notably Dom Simao, leader of the *lascarins* of Sabaragamuwa and Rajapakse or Dom Jeronimo who led the *lascarins* of the Seven Korales.<sup>102</sup>

The efforts of de Sa to reconcile the Sinhalese in Kotte to Portuguese rule and to win their loyalty eventually ended in failure. The reasons for this lay partly in his inability to carry out the reforms he had advocated. The delay in the making of the second *tombo*, frustrated his plans for a more equitable reallocation of lands. Moreover, despite his zeal for justice de Sa could not check all those petty acts of oppression which aroused anger against the Portuguese soldiers and settlers.<sup>103</sup> However, Sinhalese and *lascarin* discontent with de Sa's rule arose from acts of commission rather than of omission. De Sa's extensive programme of fort construction and the making of palisades of wood and *taipa* around the *lascarin* settlements involved a great deal of labour, the major part of which fell on the shoulders of the subject Sinhalese and Tamils. Moreover, de Sa a devout Catholic himself, looked on conversion to Christianity as an index of loyalty to the Portuguese. The period 1623-1628 saw a great extension in church building and missionary activity. This naturally led to resentment in the hearts of those who believed and revered the teachings of Buddhism and Hinduism.<sup>104</sup> While for such reasons discontent grew among the rank and file, resentment also found its way to the Sinhalese leaders. De Sa, though he consulted the Sinhalese commanders in matters of importance, never appointed a Sinhalese to the coveted

100. JCBRAS XI. 582. Le Grand's version of Ribeiro holds that Dom Cosmo give his daughter in marriage to Dom Manoel. (Le Grand 88)
101. His uncle Amancota Aratchi married Dom Theodosio's aunt. P. E. Pieris *Ceylon* II. 176 ; Le Grand 88
102. TT.Mss da Liv. 1699.ff.276-277
103. Queyroz 1053 ; TT.LM.30.f.253 ; TT.LM.37.f.83 ; Coimbra 459.f. 360v
104. TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.306 ; TT.LM.30.f.253 ; TT.LM.31.f.42v

post of *disava*.<sup>105</sup> This post had been last held by a Sinhalese in 1620 when Dom Constantino, a Sinhalese prince was *disava* of Matara and this rank was what the *lascarin* leaders hoped to obtain when they eventually deserted to Senerat.<sup>106</sup>

The colonization policy of the Portuguese had been devised in the context of the uncertain loyalty of the *lascarins* in the early seventeenth century. By the 1620's the earlier hopes of attracting large numbers of Portuguese colonists by means of land grants had disappeared. Though small numbers of Portuguese colonists continued to arrive,<sup>107</sup> the hopes of the king of Portugal now rested in the planned migration of Indian Christians. Three reasons lay behind the king's policy of advocating the settlement in Ceylon of Christians from Goa, Salsete and Bardes as well as the Coromandel coast. Firstly, it was held that these settlers could be used to cultivate the areas depopulated by war and migration of the inhabitants to Kandy. This, it was considered would result in increased revenue and a supply of food stuffs much of which was currently imported from abroad.<sup>108</sup> Secondly, it was thought that the settlement of Paravar inhabitants of the so called Fishery coast off Coromandel would strengthen the Portuguese hold over the pearl fishery.<sup>109</sup> Finally, it was considered that these migrants would be more reliable allies than the Sinhalese themselves and would be of great use in the conquest of the island.<sup>110</sup>

Constantine de Sa, however, had no illusions in respect of this last point. The conquest of Ceylon, he held, could be accomplished

105. P. E. Pieris is in error when he says (P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 175) that Dom Theodosio was the *disava* of Matara. As he himself states a few lines later the *disava* was Joao Cardoso da Pina, a Portuguese.

106. It is by no means implied that the Sinhalese leaders went over to Senerat for the sake of material gains alone but it is certain that these played an important part at least in the case of Dom Theodosio who returned to the Portuguese later on after a disagreement with the Kandyan princes.

107. T. Abeyasinghe (62) correctly points out that the number of Portuguese colonists was very small. However, the estimate of three hundred and fifty Portuguese civilian males in Colombo in 1634 (given in the *Arquivo Portugues Oriental*, nova ed. Tomo. IV.Vol.2.part I.371) must not be taken as indicative of this situation in the 1620's. By 1634 six years of war had caused a decline in the number of Portuguese *casados* through death, disease and possible emigration, while the influx of settlers ceased almost completely. Though the estimate in Reimers (52) of four hundred *casados* within the fort and three hundred out side may be somewhat too high, it is certain that the *casado* population in Colombo in 1628 must have exceeded that of 1634. Apart from these, there were in Ceylon, one hundred and twenty settlers in Jaffna, twenty to thirty in Trincomalee and fifty in Galle, ten in Kalutara and small numbers in other coastal towns. APO (new ed) Tomo IV.Vol.2 Part 1. 371-379; Reimers 52-60

108. TT.LM.25.f.106; TT.LM.23.f.57; TT.LM.20.f.39; TT.LM.27.f.78; A. Botelho de Souza III.102

109. The Paravar were fishermen of the Tinnevelly coast of South India.

110. A. Botelho de Souza III.102

only with the aid of substantial Portuguese reinforcements. Thus though he was in favour of the plan for the settlement of Christians from the Fishery coast he held that it would be of benefit only in so far as cultivation of the land and organization of the pearl fishery was concerned. As for their military value he commented that 'in this respect your Majesty has been given inaccurate information for this conquest cannot be concluded without the (help of) the same natives with whom it was begun, and all other forces are of no use for this task as has been shown in the case of aid in the form of the Christians of S.Thome who were destroyed without achieving anything.'<sup>111</sup> However the efforts of the viceroy and the captain-general led to no result either good or bad, economic or military, for the inhabitants of Goa, Salsete and Bardes proved as reluctant to leave their homeland as the people of the Fishery coast.<sup>112</sup>

During the period of peace de Sa also turned to the problem of the Muslims in Ceylon. Here again can be seen the perpetual search for security, both internal and external that the Portuguese were engaged upon in Ceylon. The Muslims in Ceylon were few in number and chiefly engaged in trading. Unlike in India where Mughul power was always a factor to be reckoned with, the Muslims in Ceylon presented no political threat to the Portuguese. The Muslims of course had been the traditional enemies of the Portuguese. However the Portuguese officials in Ceylon were as a rule not inclined to act against Muslims on religious grounds alone. In fact in the 1630's Diogo de Mello de Castro advocated trade with the Muslim Nawab of Bengal in preference to trade with the Hindu Nayak of Madura on economic grounds. The view

- 111. TT.LM.21.f.147 ; *'E neste particular nao foi VMge bem informado porque esta conquista nao se ha de concluir senao com os mesmos naturais com que se principiou e toda a outra gente para a conquista nao ha de nenhu effeito com ja o tempo tem mostrado nos soccorros que a elle vierao dos Christaos de Sao Thome que sem fazerem nenha effeito acabarao.'* TT. Collecao de S. Vicente XIX Doc.276, Constantino de Sa to the king 1.12.1623

112. TT.LM.30.f.128. The only recorded instance when large number of Indian Christians declared themselves ready to settle in Ceylon occurred in 1631 when famine conditions affected most of North India. This occurred at a time when the viceroy-in-council, reacting strongly to what the Portuguese considered to be treachery on the part of the Sinhalese, was in favour of replacing the Sinhalese inhabitants in the lowlands not only by the Indian Christians but also by Negroes from Mocambique. The plan to send five hundred Negroes a year direct from Mocambique was never put into effect. However over one thousand one hundred Canarese and three hundred Negroes were sent from Goa to Ceylon in October 1631. These men were expected to settle in Ceylon. Many of the Africans died. Others deserted to Kandy. Of the Canarese many eventually returned to their former homes upon news of improved conditions there. TT.LM.30.f.128 ; TT.LM.36.f.89 ; Assentos I.360

in Europe however was normally a more dogmatic one. As heretics as well as rivals in trade the Muslims were regarded as 'enemies of king and God.' Since the end of the sixteenth century the Portuguese had made efforts to formulate a policy regarding the Muslims in Ceylon. De Azevedo in a viceregal decree of 22 April 1613 had confined the right to reside in Colombo to those Muslims who had lived there since the days of Rajasinha of Sitawaka. Further immigration of Muslims into Kotte was also forbidden by this decree.<sup>113</sup> However this regulation was never strictly enforced. Gradually the authorities in Lisbon became firm exponents of the idea that the Muslims in Ceylon, being a danger to Portuguese power and the Catholic Church, should be expelled. Orders to this effect were sent in 1622, 1623 and 1624.<sup>114</sup> Eventually de Sa in consultation with the viceroy Conde de Vidi guerra decided to proclaim their expulsion in early 1626.<sup>115</sup> It may be assumed that the old Muslim residents of Colombo were excluded from this decree of expulsion. Moreover it involved no ban on the trading activity of those Muslims who handled the export trade of the island but lived in areas outside Portuguese Ceylon.

Lack of evidence makes it impossible to estimate the economic impact of this expulsion of a peaceful, industrious community. It involved the emigration of those who had lived many generations in settlements such as Beruwala.<sup>116</sup> Nor is it certain what proportion of the Muslims accepted conversion as a means of circumventing the order for expulsion. It is known however that at last four thousand of them fled to Kandy where they were well received by Senerat and accommodated in the fertile lands around Batticaloa where their descendants still form a significant proportion of the population.<sup>117</sup>

The opinion among the Portuguese in Ceylon as to the question of the Muslims appears to have been less rigid than that in Lisbon. Queyroz mentions the case of one Fernao Duarte who thought them dangerous and petitioned de Sa to make a list of them but even this was to ensure that any strangers were expelled rather than to oust the long settled.<sup>118</sup> On the other hand it is known that

113. APO VI.950-951

114. TT.LM.18.f.221 ; TT.LM.23.f.45

115. JCBRAS XI.543 ; Queyroz 745 ; Jornada 10

116. P. E. Pieris—*The Ceylon littoral*, 41 A Sinhalese manuscript in the British Museum Library entitled (BM or.6611,52) *Rabel Varnanava* seems to indicate that the gaps left by the departure of Muslims peddlers, might to some extent have been filled by the Sinhalese.

117. Queyroz 745 ; JCBRAS XI. 543 ; TT.LM. 24.f.4v

118. Queyroz 744

people from Galle, Alutgama and Negombo petitioned de Sa declaring that Muslims enriched the area and should not be expelled.<sup>119</sup> This factor probably explains why despite the order for expulsion some Muslims did remain in Portuguese Kotte.<sup>120</sup>

It appears that during the period 1623-1628 while de Sa succeeded in strengthening the Portuguese military position by building a number of forts and stockades and keeping order and discipline among the Portuguese soldiers, he had less success in winning the confidence of the Sinhalese in Kotte. His action in expelling the Muslims, though it won the favour of his superiors did little to strengthen the Portuguese or reconcile the other elements in Ceylon to Portuguese rule. Moreover his disputes with the *vedor da fazenda*, Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara prevented the smooth running of the administration.<sup>121</sup> However, by 1628 his rule appeared to be having unprecedented success. There was no sign of *lascarin* discontent and de Sa had every confidence in the Sinhalese chieftains he had patronized. The Portuguese missionary effort was more successful and Portuguese Ceylon had enjoyed a longer period of peace than ever before.

The maintenance of peace, however, owed little to de Sa who from an early date was of the opinion that it was best to fight and destroy the power of Kandy. The war faction in Ceylon almost succeeded in precipitating a conflict with the highland kingdom over the death of a Portuguese called Damiao Correa. Correa was killed while within Kandyan territory. It was contended that the killing of a Portuguese in Kandy was an insult to Portuguese prestige and an act of hostility by the Kandyans but, as Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira pointed out in Goa that the death of Correa was a result of private vengeance and not a hostile act provoked by the king of Kandy, the viceroy refused to sanction a war against Senerat.<sup>122</sup>

Despite the mutual suspicion that coloured Luso-Kandyan attitudes in this period normal trading relations continued between the two powers. This policy did not lack critics. Kandy imported most of the salt and cloth she needed and many Portuguese were of the view that an economic blockade was the best way of reducing

119. *Ibid.* 745

120. P. da Trindade III.167. S. Arasaratnam—*Dutch power in Ceylon, 1638-1688*, 204-205 says that investigation in the 1650's revealed that Muslims had been in Galle for generations and had valid legal titles to the property they held there.

121. See chapter v for the underlying cases of this dispute.

122. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.229v ; BNL.FG 1982.f.122v. It is known what Correa was doing in Kandyan territory. Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira held that he had killed a Kandyan *mudaliyar* and was killed in turn by the dead man's relatives.

Kandy. At one stage the *vedor* Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara advocated the establishment of a monopoly of salt mainly to control the supply to Kandy.<sup>123</sup> Perhaps the strongest proponent of this policy was Diogo Vaz Freire, who put forward his views in a petition addressed to the king in 1623.<sup>124</sup> When Freire was appointed captain of Trincomalee in 1625 he tried to put this policy into effect by seizing some vessels of the king of Kandy, but was apparently restrained by de Sa.<sup>125</sup> De Sa himself was no advocate of this policy. He was, it is true in a difficult position, as he had been instructed by the viceroy to maintain peace and a general trade embargo would certainly have meant war. Nevertheless, it is possible that de Sa's opposition to economic warfare was not based solely on reasons of state, for despite assertions by his son and biographer Joao Rodrigues de Sa de Menezes that de Sa stamped out private trade among Portuguese officials in Ceylon, contemporary documents show that he and most of his *disavos* were involved in trading relations with the Kandyans up to the outbreak of war.<sup>126</sup>

During the period 1626-1628 the main issue in dispute as far as Portuguese policy towards Kandy was concerned, was whether to fortify Batticaloa and if so, when to do it. The view taken by the *conselho da fazenda* in Portugal as reflected in the letters of the king to the viceroy during this period shows no change from earlier attitudes. Batticaloa was to be seized and fortified even at the risk of war. In fact instructions to this effect became even more urgent than before for it was rumoured that the Dutch intended to seize Batticaloa and use it as a base to attack the annual Portuguese China fleet.<sup>127</sup> The captain-general, Constantino de Sa was also keen on the seizure of Batticaloa, for he considered that it would either lead to war which would enable him to conquer Kandy or at least would enable him to deny Senerat the use of his last remaining major port. The opposition came from the viceroy Conde de Vidiguerra or rather, from his council.

The viceroy's opposition stemmed largely from the fear of a renewed conflict with Kandy. He stated as much in a letter to

123. TT.LM.23.f.235

124. TT.LM.20.f.366

125. TT.LM.22.f.113

126. JCBRAS XI.539-540 ; Queyroz 740 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.248v Evora CXVI 2-3 116-672 Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.221,222v,223,BML *Pombalina*, 490 f 196.

127. BNL.FG.1982.f.140 ; There was some basis for this fear for in January 1625 the Dutch sent five ships to intercept Portuguese vessels sailing from Macao and Malacca to Goa. The Dutch ships were instructed to lay in waiting off the point of Galle. (See De Vos's translation of the Dagh Registers of Batavia in JCBRAS XXX.94)

the king on 15 January 1626.<sup>128</sup> However, as he could not reject royal instructions off hand,<sup>129</sup> he sought to give good reasons why the fortification of Batticaloa was not advisable. In this he was ably seconded by his councillors led by Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira. In response to the king's warning of a Dutch plan to seize Batticaloa, these councillors rejoined that this was very unlikely as there were a number of unfortified bays and inlets in Ceylon which would suit the Dutch purposes much better.<sup>130</sup> In fact, the viceroy's opposition to the fortification of Batticaloa was less determined and less rigid than that of his councillors. This was clearly shown by certain developments in 1626-1627.

In 1626, following their expulsion from Portuguese territory, the Muslims of Kotte fled to Kandy. Senerat, who saw in them a reliable ally against the Portuguese, settled some four thousand of them in the lands around Batticaloa. This was intended to discourage the Portuguese from making a fort in this area. The immediate effect, however, was exactly the opposite. De Sa sent word to the viceroy rousing fears of a Muslim trading centre in Batticaloa developing outside Portuguese control. This in turn prompted the viceroy to write back to the captain-general in September 1626 requesting him to prepare for the fortification of Batticaloa and promising substantial aid for the project.<sup>131</sup> A few months later the viceroy changed his mind and countermanded his former instructions. The reason for this was the influence his councillors, particularly Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira, exerted on him. In a crucial meeting in early February these councillors persuaded the viceroy that the construction of a fort at Batticaloa was inadvisable on two grounds—first, that Batticaloa did not have a harbour which allowed large ocean going vessels to enter it,<sup>132</sup> and second that a fleet of six light vessels operating from Trincomalee could control trade in this area as effectively as a fort at a much smaller cost and with much less danger of a conflict with Kandy. This decision taken by the viceroy-in-council in February 1627 was upheld once more when the question came up before the same body in September 1627.<sup>133</sup>

128. TT.LM.22.f.84

129. TT.LM.21.f.137

130. Filmoteca LM.14. 119/1-3

131. TT.LM.24.f.5 ; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644. De Sa's personal emissary Francisco de Brito de Almeida left Ceylon on 8 June 1626. He however reached Goa only on 5 September 1626. Having discussed the question of military assistance with the viceroy he set out on 27 September and reached Ceylon with the viceroy's instructions at the end of October 1626.

132. '...*Batticaloa nao tem bahia para entrarem naos nem navios grandes sendo assi qui ha em Ceilam outras partes capazes disso...*' TT.LM. 24.f.1

133. TT.LM.24.f.1 ;



Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira however, had not cleared all the doubts in the viceroy's mind, for at the end of 1627 when fresh instructions to fortify Batticaloa arrived from Lisbon, the conde de Vidiguerra decided to instruct the captain-general to prepare to fortify Batticaloa.<sup>134</sup> If the viceroy had been convinced that the fortification of this fort was not advisable he could at least have postponed action on the grounds that the objections to this course of action contained in his letter of 20 February 1627 had not yet been considered by the king.<sup>135</sup>

De Sa made careful preparation for the long awaited execution of the plan to seize Batticaloa. As early as March 1628 three ships were sent to the eastern coast of Ceylon to reconnoitre the area and strengthen the force at Trincomalee.<sup>136</sup> On 2 July 1628 de Sa himself set sail for Trincomalee with over a hundred Portuguese and two thousand *lascarins*.<sup>137</sup> From Trincomalee he marched southwards along the coast towards the Batticaloa lagoon,<sup>138</sup> There, on the island of Puliyantivu, some three miles inside the lagoon, de Sa laid the foundations of the Batticaloa fort.

The Portuguese seizure of Batticaloa resulted in the immediate outbreak of war with Kandy. Senerat was by now ready for war and was unwilling to see his last major port lost without a struggle. When de Sa arrived at Puliyantivu in July 1628 the king sent him a message asking him to desist and de Sa made a conciliatory but evasive reply.<sup>139</sup>

134. Neither the letter of king to the viceroy giving this order nor the viceroy's instructions to the captain-general have survived. However both Queyroz (751) and de Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI.566) hold that the captain-general was asked to fortify Batticaloa by the viceroy.

135. It is interesting to note that had he thus waited, he (or rather his successor) would have received two contradictory orders on this question. One dated 20 March 1628 from the *conselho da fazenda* instructed the viceroy to build a fort as soon as possible. Another dated 10 April 1628 signed at Madrid and presumably from *conselho de Portugal* gave him permission to abandon the project. Neither letter arrived in time to affect the developments in Ceylon. The repetition of both orders in the following year on 26 February and 24 January respectively sheds some light on the lack of co-ordination between the two councils in these years. TT.LM. 25.ff.126,148 ; TT.LM.26.ff.82,78

136. AHU Caixa 22, 4.8.1654

137. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.249

138. Fr. Manual de Assumpcao writing in 1630 (TT.Ms da Liv.1699.f.249) says that de Sa crossed the island to reach Batticaloa and then proceeded to Trincomalee, but the journey by sea to Trincomalee and the subsequent march overland to Batticaloa are mentioned by de Sa himself in a certificate dated 8 November 1628 granted to a soldier who accompanied him. AHU Caixa 22, 4.8.1654.

139. Biker II.48 ; BNL.FG.257.ff.27-28 ; CALR III. 351 ; Queyroz 752 TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.260 ; JCBRAS XI.567. This is the Sinhalese version as given in a letter of Senerat to the viceroy dated 5 December 1632. De Sa de Menezes and Queyroz on the other hand maintain that Senerat was trying to maintain peace and even offered de Sa a bribe of eighty thousand *xerafims* to do so.

Senerat having realized that the Portuguese were determined to seize Batticaloa decided on action. Wijayakoon Bandara,<sup>140</sup> a trusted commander of royal blood was sent with two thousand men to Batticaloa to impede the making of the fort. On news of this attack a Portuguese force under Jacinto Rebelo, *disava* of Sabaragamuwa and Domingos Carvalho Cao, *disava* of Matara set out from Kotte and marched overland towards Batticaloa. The king of Kandy thereupon requested his eldest son, Kumarasinha to check the Portuguese relieving forces moving towards Batticaloa and profiting by the division of the Portuguese forces he himself launched an attack on the Four Korales. Unfortunately for Senerat in these initial stages, the fortunes of war went against him. The two Portuguese *disavas* making their way along the south-eastern coastal plain proved to be more than a match for the forces sent against them by Kumarasinha. Even before their arrival de Sa had attacked and defeated the troops under Wijayakoon Bandara. Finally, Senerat's offensive in the Four Korales was repulsed by the Portuguese army based at Menikkadawara led by the captain-major-of-the-field, Diogo Mendes de Brito.<sup>141</sup>

These successes enabled de Sa to continue work at Batticaloa, till early October. During this period he built one bastion and raised the walls all round to a height of about three feet. Then he left for Kotte leaving Damiao Botado as captain of the fort of Nossa Senhora da Penha da Franca at Batticaloa. Botado was allotted a detachment of *lascarins*, fifty Portuguese and thirty *topazes* to aid in defence and construction work. De Sa himself reached Kotte on 12 October 1628.<sup>142</sup>

Work on Batticaloa fort continued for the next two years despite continued war. As in the case of Trincomalee, Jaffna proved to be an invaluable source of supplies. The fort, when eventually completed was a rectangular structure with three bastions. The main bastion, that of S.Cruz commanded the port and was provided with six pieces of artillery including three large cannon.

140. He may have been *mudaliyar* Wijayakoon of Tumpane or *Mudaliyar* Wijayakoon of Walalgama. Both later distinguished themselves at the battle of Randeniwela in 1630. (Ribeiro 255) Queyroz (755) refers to a Wijayakoon who was a noble in the Kandyan court and who had been at the Sitawaka court in the early 1590's.

141. AHU Caixa 22, 4.8.1654 ; AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655 ; AHU 501.f. 379 ; Evora CV/2/7.f.70 ; *The Expedition to Uva made in 1630 together with an account of the siege laid to Colombo by the king of Kandy* (trans. S. G. Perera) 4-5. The work will be thenceforth referred to as *Jornada*.

142. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.i.249v

The other two bastions had three pieces each.<sup>143</sup>

The fort was undoubtedly badly sited. As it had no supply of water within the circuit of the walls, stockades had to be built from the walls to the lagoon to protect those who went to fetch water. Access to the sea could only be gained by sailing for three miles along a narrow channel. Moreover although de Sa planned to settle twenty or thirty families on the island, it soon became clear that the channel separating Puliyantivu from the mainland was too narrow to prevent the passage of Sinhalese from the mainland. Thus in time of war the safety of the settlers could not be guaranteed outside the walls of the fort.<sup>144</sup>

Although the responsibility for the war could be laid squarely on the shoulders of the Portuguese who provoked it by the seizure of Batticaloa, in 1628 they would have preferred Senerat not to have opened hostilities, for their preoccupation with the fortification of Batticaloa hampered them in both 1628 and 1629. Once war commenced, however, opinion both in Ceylon and Goa hardened against a settlement with Kandy and it was resolved by both captain-general and viceroy that this opportunity should be used to finally subjugate Kandy.<sup>145</sup>

The Portuguese forces in Ceylon in the 1620's amounted to over seven hundred and fifty soldiers.<sup>146</sup> Of these however a large proportion were occupied in garrison duty. The defence of the kingdom of Jaffna occupied a hundred and fifty Portuguese *soldados* while a further hundred men were tied up in the forts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa.<sup>147</sup> The seven forts in Kotte required at least another two hundred men.<sup>148</sup> This left a mobile force of only three hundred men. However the captain-general could call on the services of over three hundred *casados* or married Portuguese settlers and a similar number of *topazes* or men of mixed

143. Four of the twelve pieces of artillery provided for Batticaloa were sent from Goa for this purpose. TT.LM.27.f.22

144. AHU Caixa 22, 4.8.1654 ; AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1656 ; Queyroz 1150-1151 ; APO (new ed) Tomo IV.Vol. 2 Part I. 408-409 ; Ribeiro 130

The bad siting of the fort led to many proposals in the 1630's to dismantle it and rebuild it on a better site. Nevertheless in view of the expenditure of forty thousand *xerafims* already incurred on the fort, it was decided to leave the fort as it stood until a large sum of money became available for this purpose. This eventuality never occurred and the fort as it stood fell to the Dutch in 1638. AHU Caixa 11, 7.12.1634 ; Filmoteca LM.14. 119/1-3 ; Filmoteca LM.13a 32/3-5 ; TT.LM.36.f. 214 ; Filmoteca LM 13a. 34/1-4 ; JCBRAS XXXI. 368

145. TT.LM.27.f.88 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1115.f.48v

146. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.221

147. Reimers 56,57

148. Negombo, Colombo, Galle, Kalutara, Malwana, Menikkadawara and Sabaragamuwa.

descent.<sup>149</sup> These men, though they rarely served in the mobile army could be of great use to free Portuguese soldiers from garrison duty. The Portuguese forces in the army were reinforced by about four or five thousand Sinhalese *lascarins* and a few hundred Tamils.<sup>150</sup>

Throughout the 1620's, de Sa by repeated appeals for assistance to Goa tried to increase the number of troops available.<sup>151</sup> From about 1626 both the viceroy and the king began to realise that the danger of war did exist in Ceylon.<sup>152</sup> However due to the small number of men available, the need to equip the high seas fleet of Nuno Alvares Botelho and to repel the the threat to Malacca from Achinese and Dutch forces, little could be spared for Ceylon. Statistical data of the number of Portuguese troops sent to Ceylon in this period is incomplete but it is apparent from a comparison of the strength of the Portuguese army in 1625-1626 with that in 1630 that the losses through death and departure were hardly compensated for by the new arrivals.<sup>153</sup> However, the Portuguese forces in the first two years of the war were far stronger than those which had successfully and systematically devastated Kandy in the decade preceding 1617. Not only was the numerical strength of the Portuguese element almost doubled.<sup>154</sup> but the routes through which Kandy had obtained aid in the earlier period were to a large extent closed by the conquest of Jaffna and the seizure of the ports of Batticaloa and Trincomalee. This alone would explain the optimism of the veterans of the Kandyan war, that given a reinforcement of a further three or four hundred soldiers Kandy would be within their grasp.<sup>155</sup>

The war faction in Ceylon failed however to make sufficient allowance for three factors. Firstly, the efforts of the Portuguese to encircle Kandy and cut off her contacts with other powers had resulted in a dispersal of their forces. In the days of de Azevedo it was the Portuguese operating from their main fort in Colombo, who had the advantage of internal lines of communication. In

149. T. Abeyasinghe 188

150. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.262-263 ; APO (New ed) II.Tomo II. Vol.2.416

151. Filmoteca LM.13a 67/68/3-1 ; F. de Souza VI. 293 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51, f.41. In November 1627 de Sa made a special journey to Mannar to meet Frei Luis de Brito, then bishop of Cochim, who soon became archbishop of Goa and in March 1628 viceroy of India. In his discussions de Sa would no doubt have explained his views and objectives in Ceylon.

152. Ajuda 51-VI-32.f.5v ; BNL.FG 1982.f.122v

153. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.221 ; Assentos I,525 ; TT.LM.27.f.222. Filmoteca LM.19D 23/4 ; Evora CR.Arm. V-VI. 14-5.f.166

154. T. Abeyasinghe 64

155. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.216v,217,218,221,221v,222v,224,225v,226

1628 this advantage lay with Kandy. Secondly, almost ten years of peace had undone much of the damage wrought by the Portuguese in the first twenty years of the seventeenth century. The problem of depopulation in Kandy had been solved to a large extent by settling Sinhalese and Muslim refugees from Portuguese territory in abandoned lands. Small bands of colonists from South India as well as Bengal came in to fill what gaps were left. Kandy was once more a relatively prosperous kingdom.<sup>156</sup> Finally, the complete defeat of his rivals and the achievement of Senerat in securing peace for his people had gradually enabled Senerat to win back the allegiance of all Kandyans. The lowest point of his power and prestige had been reached in 1617-1618 when Senerat found half his kingdom in rebellion against him. From that time onwards he had patiently rebuilt the foundations of his power. In the early 1620's his two elder sons had been appointed rulers of the provinces of Uva and Matale. In 1628, at the age of sixteen, his youngest son Maha Astana was acclaimed the prince of Kandy the last of the three principalities into which the kingdom of Kandy, was divided.

It is therefore no surprise that throughout 1628 it was Senerat who took the offensive. After the failure of his attempt to check the fortification of Batticaloa in July-September 1628, he re-organized his forces and attacked the Portuguese on three fronts—Batticaloa, Jaffna and Kotte. In late 1628, a Sinhalese commander<sup>157</sup> with a strong force was sent to besiege Batticaloa and impede all construction work. This force successfully cut off the garrison from all outside contact but the defenders continued to resist even after reinforcements led by the king of Kandy arrived to strengthen the besieging force.<sup>158</sup> Senerat's second expedition was aimed at shattering the Portuguese hold on Jaffna. He realized that the Portuguese position at Trincomalee<sup>159</sup> and Batticaloa would be much less strong if the base from which they were supplied—Jaffna—could be seized. Moreover through their marriages to the nieces of Sankili, the two elder sons of Senerat had some sort of claim

156. *Mandarampura Puvata*, stanzas 179-209

157. 'Visiapu' was the Portuguese version of his name.

158. Evora CV/2-7.f.70

159. It was a tribute to the natural strength of Trincomalee that the Sinhalese did not attempt to capture it as they did Batticaloa. The Portuguese sources do not speak of any armed conflict at Trincomalee until the late stages of 1630 but it is clear from these sources as well as the Sinhalese manuscript *Matale Maha Disava Kadayim Pota* that a blockade was maintained on Trincomalee fort on the landward side from 1628 and that the fort received its provisions from Jaffna. AHU 501.f.379 ; AHU Caixa 22, 4.8.1654 ; BM Or.6606 (144)

to the throne of Jaffna. Senerat however realized that he might need allies to conquer Jaffna and hold it against the Portuguese. He therefore sent ambassadors to the Nayak of Tanjore proposing an alliance between Kandy, Tanjore and the Dutch. Unfortunately for him however, de Sa had foreseen this move and forestalled any such development by sending his own emissary to the Nayak's court as early as March 1628. This envoy, Fr. Antonio de Sao Raimundo was persuasive enough to keep the Nayak neutral.<sup>160</sup> Senerat however did not abandon his plans. In 1628 he despatched a small force to rouse the Tamils of Jaffna against their Portuguese rulers. Jaffna was ripe for rebellion. The years following the conquest had seen the expropriation of large amounts of land by the Portuguese. The new *tombo* begun by Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara in 1624 and completed in a revised form by Filipe de Oliveira in 1626 had meant a considerable increase in taxes and dues. The widespread destruction of Hindu temples in the days of de Oliveira had aroused great resentment, while the death of de Oliveria in 1627 had removed from the scene the man most feared by the Tamils. Thus with the arrival of the Sinhalese forces there was a general rising in all parts of Jaffna. Two Jesuits were killed on 16 September 1628.<sup>161</sup> Thirty churches erected in various parts of Jaffna were destroyed.<sup>162</sup> The Hindus in their anger burnt all the crosses, Christian symbols and sacred ornaments they could lay their hands on. The factor of Trincomalee and a Portuguese *adigar* (or headman) who could not reach the safety of Jaffna fort in time lost their lives.<sup>163</sup> The captain-major of Jaffna, Lancarote de Seixas who had a force of sixty Portuguese soldiers, eighty loyal *lascarins* and some *casados* cautiously withdrew his forces within the fort of Jaffna, which was promptly beseiged by the combined Sinhalese and Tamil forces. The siege lasted for thirteen days during which the combined Sinhalese and Tamil army, a little over a thousand strong made one general assault on the fort. On the repulse of this attack after a conflict lasting the whole day the beseigers constructed a stockade behind the shelter of which they fired into the fort. By this time de Seixas had realized how ill-armed and ill-organized his opponents were. He therefore suddenly attacked the stockade and catching his opponents by surprise completely defeated them. The remnants of the Sinhalese force and some of

160. AHU Caixa 10, 10.9.1633

161. Fr. Bernadino da Isena (Pecci) and Fr. Mathew Fernandez. D. Ferroli—*The Jesuits in Malabar I.* (Bangalore 1939) 443-445 ; Boudens 53 ; CALR III. 124 ; IV.97-99

162. Simancas S. P. 1523 f.5 : AHU Caixa 10, 10.9.1633

163. Evora CV/2/7 f.70

the Tamils fled from the peninsula.<sup>164</sup> Meanwhile Senerat's attempt to rouse the people of Kotte by sending forces to the frontier districts was even less effective for the Portuguese army led by de Sa successfully defended the frontiers.<sup>165</sup>

With his forces meeting with reverse for the second time within a year, Senerat decided to request a settlement of peace to avoid the devastation of his country. De Sa and his officers interpreted this as a sign of weakness and decided to refuse the offer and appeal to Goa for reinforcements to complete the conquest of the island.<sup>166</sup>

If in 1628 the military initiative lay with Senerat, in 1629 it was the Portuguese who took the offensive. Senerat's aim in the blockade of Trincomalee, the siege of Batticaloa, and the rousing of the people of Jaffna to rebellion had been not merely the seizure of these places but the diversion of the captain-general's attention from an invasion of Kandy. De Sa however had resolved to carry the war into Kandyan territory. In March 1629 after the dry month of February had transformed many of the Kandyan rivers into fordable streams, he attacked the Kandyan kingdom. An invasion of the highland kingdom was not a task to be undertaken lightly. The normal Portuguese invasion route lay through Ganetenna and Balane. The difficulty of advancing over the rising ground that lay before Balane was accentuated by the thick forests which covered the whole area. The snakes, the mosquitoes and the leeches that abounded in this tropical jungle provided their own problems. De Sa however, planned a raid rather than an invasion. His contingent of lightly armed men rapidly advanced on Balane and seized this strategic position with little resistance. Senerat withdrew further inland, but de Sa was not to be tempted and after the burning the fortifications of Balane, swiftly withdrew to Kotte.<sup>167</sup>

164. CALR IV.97 ; III.124 ; AHU 501.f.37v ; Evora CV 2/7.f.70

165. Evora C-V 2/7.f.70 ; AHU Caixa 14, ant.18.1.1644 ; JCBRAS XI.572

It is interesting to note that da Sa's activities in late 1628, shown clearly as a defensive operation in contemporary documents (AHU Caixa 14, ant. 18.1.1644) has been exaggerated into an attack in which he with fifty soldiers ravaged a greater part of Kandy in de Sa Menezes 572 and Queyroz 757. By the time Ribeiro heard the story de Sa was reported to have marched with five hundred soldiers and burnt the king Senerat's palace in Kandy ! (Ribeiro 222). Baldaeus further elaborated the story. P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II.176 and Fr. S. G. Perera—*History of Ceylon for schools* (Colombo 1955) 91 relying on de Sa de Menezes' and Queyroz mention this mythical campaign and ascribe it to 1627 on which year hostilities had not even commenced.

166. Evora C-V 2/7.f.70

167. *Mandaramapura Puvata*, stanza 212 ; AHU 501.f.13. Contemporary documents make it clear that it was in early 1629 and not in 1628 as

De Sa decided to try his fortune once more in late June 1629,<sup>168</sup> taking the whole of the mobile army with him. On this occasion however he ran into greater difficulties as his forces were exposed to the incessant rain of the south-west monsoon. Many of his soldiers were soon sick. They were scarcely able to defend themselves in the stagnant morasses and rivers over which they waded up to their necks with the greatest difficulty and fatigue marching barefoot and almost naked, they came out with their feet torn and lacerated, bitten by leeches and reptiles which breed and swarm in these waters.<sup>169</sup> It is not clear why de Sa, a veteran campaigner, decided to inaugurate a new campaign in such inclement weather, though he may have been trying to forestall a Kandyan counter-attack on the Four Korales. De Sa entered the capital city of Kandy and burnt it, but when he began his return journey Senerat decided to follow him with all the forces he could muster. After some preliminary manoeuvring the two armies met at Ambatenna. After a battle which raged from dawn till noon the Portuguese forced the Sinhalese forces to retire across the river. The Portuguese themselves were so badly shaken however, that de Sa continued his retreat to Menikkadawara *via* Bokkawala. Both sides claimed victory.<sup>170</sup> The Sinhalese army failed to cut off the Portuguese from their base. But Ambatenna like Lellopitiya marked no gains for the Portuguese: it merely ensured their safe return to Menikkadawara. In this sense it could be described as a drawn battle.<sup>171</sup>

On his return the captain-general was greeted with grave news. Batticaloa was still besieged and the fort in danger of being lost. Batticaloa, unlike the other Portuguese coastal forts was three miles from the open sea. In the absence of a large Portuguese vessel the Sinhalese could use their fishing boats to blockade the

Ribeiro (221-222) makes out, that de Sa made his first invasion of Kandy. De Sa returned from Batticaloa on 12 October 1628. On 8 November he was still at Menikkadawara preparing for the next year's campaign. (AHU Caixa 22, 4.8.1654; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.249v) Even by March 1629, the reinforcements he expected from Goa had not arrived. (Queyroz 758)

168. TT.Ms da Liv. 731.f.386. A certificate of de Sa himself dated 23 November 1629 dates the beginning of the campaign as 23 June 1629.

169. JCBRAS XI.574

170. Jornada 18 asserts that the forces of Uva did not flee but retired to a side of the river in close formation, 'about which they afterwards mocked those of Candea and Matale.' Baldaeus states that on the other hand that 'encountering them (i.e. the Portuguese) near Ambatenna we forced them to retreat with considerable loss.' The *Parangi Hatana* (stanzas 76-85) and the *Rajasiha Hatana* also give (stanzas 68-75) the impression of a Sinhalese victory.

171. JCBRAS XVIII. 169; Ribeiro 249; Jornada 18, 36; AHU 501.ff. 13.357; AHU 445.f.45v; TT.Ms da Liv. 751.f.386; P. da Trinidad III.85; *Rajasiha Hatana* stanza 73



narrow channel through which ships had to pass into the Batticaloa lagoon. This was what the Sinhalese under two of the sons of Senerat had done.

De Sa decided to relieve Batticaloa immediately. With a force of two hundred Portuguese and a thousand *lascarins* he marched eighty five miles to Galle. Though the monsoon winds had hardly abated, de Sa himself embarked with some of his men in a pinnace and three *champanas* and made for Batticaloa by sea.<sup>172</sup> The rest of the forces under Domingos Carvalho Cao, *disava* of Matara proceeded overland along the coast through Matara. The captain-general also sent a message to Jaffna requesting that Miguel Pereira Borralho, captain-major of the fleet of Camorin who had arrived with five ships in Jaffna to leave the vessels there and march overland with all his forces to Batticaloa.<sup>173</sup> The captain-major-of-the-field Diogo Mendes de Brito, who was left in charge of Kotte was instructed to keep the pressure of Kandy by a policy of raids on that kindgom.

De Sa had taken a chance in dividing his forces. However fortune favoured the Portuguese once more. The Portuguese left behind at Kotte kept Senerat occupied by continuous incursions. Luis Gomes Pinto, a veteran Portuguese commander led the first incursion in August 1629. In September, Diogo Mendes de Brito drove away a Kandyan detachment which had entered the Seven Korales and made a counter-attack on Kandyan territory.<sup>174</sup> Meanwhile de Sa had sucessfully relieved Batticaloa and supervised the continuation of fort construction.<sup>175</sup>

It was when he was at Batticaloa that de Sa received the word of a second Sinhalese attempt to seize Jaffna. This time Senerat had sent a strong force of nearly four thousand men under one of his kinsmen. The Sinhalese planned to rouse the Tamils against the Portuguese and with the help of a few *Vadugai* troops from Tanjore to drive the Portuguese out of Jaffna. Very soon most of Jaffna passed under their control.<sup>176</sup>

To counter this threat, de Sa despatched a force under Do-

172. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.250. *Champana*—a boat of up to forty tons capable of carrying twenty five or thirty men.

173. Filmoteca LM.13B. 5/63-2. Borralho was on a routine visit to Jaffna. De Sa probably felt he needed all the forces that could be spared. Due to the south-west monsoon winds Borralho could not sail southwards to Batticaloa. Leaving the ships behind was the only solution.

174. TT.Ms da Liv. 731.ff.375, 392

175. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.250

176. Queyroz 654 ; Jornada 5 ; Ribeiro 222. Queyroz estimated that Sinhalese force at ten thousand. Ribeiro gives the figure of five thousand. The above estimate is given in the *Jornada*, 5.

mingos Carvalho Cao, who shortly before this had arrived in Batticaloa from Kotte with a seaborne expeditionary force.<sup>177</sup> He was now instructed to proceed to Jaffna. Making his way northwards along the coast Cao landed his forces at the isthmus of the Jaffna peninsula, his object being to cut off the paths of retreat left to the Sinhalese. The Sinhalese army was encamped in the plains of Pachchilappalai. The Sinhalese had found the Tamils after their failure of their revolt of 1628 reluctant to join them. Cao decided it was time to attack them. Leaving half of his force under Lourenco Teixeira de Macedo to advance north-westwards along the Jaffna peninsula, Cao marched along the southern shores of the Jaffna lagoon and crossed into the peninsula by Elephant Pass. He also sent a message to the captain-major of Jaffna, Lancarote de Seixas to join in the assault on the Sinhalese. Before de Seixas could arrive however the two Portuguese detachments attacked and defeated the Sinhalese forces, whose commander was executed. The *Vadugai* troops sent to assist the Kandyans were also defeated on their belated arrival near Mannar.<sup>178</sup> The people of Jaffna escaped reprisals of the type seen in 1620, because of their reluctance to join the Sinhalese, but they were forced to take a fresh oath of allegiance. Jaffna made secure once more, the Portuguese soldiers returned to Kotte along the western coast.<sup>179</sup>

At the end of 1629 Senerat again offered to negotiate for peace. Although his kingdom had not suffered greatly by war he saw how difficult it was to dislodge the Portuguese from the lands they held. He therefore offered a peace probably on the basis of a return to the *status quo ante*. The Portuguese both in Goa and Ceylon however had not yet lost all hopes of conquering Kandy and refused to agree.<sup>180</sup>

177. Queyroz's figure of two hundred Portuguese and seven thousand *lascarins* is obviously too high. Ribeiro too gives a high estimate of two hundred and ten Portuguese and six thousand *lascarins*. The expeditionary force could not have been much greater than the one brought by de Sa to Batticaloa.

178. AHU 501.f.9

179. Queyroz 654-656 ; Jornada 5, 36 ; Ribeiro 223. All these three sources refer to only one Sinhalese attack on Jaffna during the war. Contemporary documents however indicate that there were two separate attacks. A certificate of Lancarote de Seixas to Francisco Henriques mentions the first siege of Jaffna implying that there was a second. (AHU 501.f.37v) This view is also supported by other documents. Filmoteca LM. 13A 64-65/4-3 ; Simancas SP 1523 f.5

Ribeiro holds that seven thousand of the Sinhalese died in this battle. The estimate of one thousand six hundred given in the Jornada appears nearer to the truth for it also repeated in a contemporary document. (AHU 501.f.13)

P.da Trindade III. 85 gives a much higher estimate of three thousand Sinhalese killed.

180. JCBRAS XI.576

De Sa returned from Batticaloa afflicted with a fever. His sickness at times grew so bad that he made a codicil to his will, recommending that in case of his death peace be concluded with Kandy.<sup>181</sup> By this time he had despaired of obtaining reinforcements from Goa and it was apparent to him that the conquest of Kandy was a more difficult project than he had anticipated. Meanwhile de Sa's quarrel with the *vedor* Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara had reached such an acrimonious pitch that the new viceroy Dom Miguel de Noronha, conde de Linhares who had taken up office in October 1629 was compelled to direct Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara to Jaffna to work on a new *tombo* while the captain-major of Jaffna, Lancarote de Seixas was ordered to proceed to Colombo and take up duties as the new *vedor da fazenda*. For the vacant post of captain-major of Jaffna was appointed Miguel Pereira Borralho who knew the area well. All these changes were completed by June 1630.<sup>182</sup>

The first campaign of 1630 proved to be an indecisive one. Senerat advanced with his forces up to Attapitiya on the frontier of Kotte. The captain-major of the Portuguese forces at Menik-kadawara advanced with his forces to meet the Kandyans but finding the king strongly entrenched awaited reinforcements which were brought up by de Sa. Senerat seeing the strength of the Portuguese forces retired. De Sa followed the Kandyan forces across the frontier but after a fortnight's campaign returned to Kotte.<sup>183</sup>

De Sa's sickness at the end of 1629 had taken much of his zest out of him. The meagre reinforcements sent from Goa further discouraged him. He had asked for four hundred Portuguese soldiers. A ship which arrived in early May brought him only fifty.<sup>184</sup> The dispirited captain-general remained in Colombo in April, May and June, recuperating and hoping for more aid and better fortune.<sup>185</sup> Senerat on the other hand, proved as active as ever. In March-April 1630 a Kandyan force began to blockade Batticaloa once again.<sup>186</sup> The war of conquest was slipping out of Portuguese control.

181. This was 22 January 1630. Queyroz 759-760 ; JCBRAS XI.577-579

182. Assentos I.266 ; AHU Caixa 16, ant. 18.1.1644

183. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.252v-257 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.47,156 ; Jornada 21-22

184. Filmoteca LM. 19D 23/4 ; Filmoteca LM.13A 67/68/3-1 ; AHU Caixa 14, 18.1.1644 ; Evora CR Arm.V-Vi. 14-5.f.166 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51. ff. 41,52,62,67,74,95

185. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.257

186. Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.78

The Portuguese position was however much worse than de Sa ever imagined. By early 1626 the *lascarin* commanders of Kotte had become disillusioned with the Portuguese regime despite the efforts of de Sa to ensure a fairer deal for them. The allowance paid by the state to the *lascarins* and their chiefs had been discontinued early in the seventeenth century due to financial exigencies. Nevertheless the Portuguese had insisted that they should continue to pay quit rents for all lands they held.<sup>187</sup> The Sinhalese felt that this was unfair and maintained that if payment for service in war were discontinued, they should at least be allowed to enjoy the fruits of their land without payment of quit rent. While the rank and file were discontented for financial reasons the leadership was more alarmed by the general lines of Portuguese policy. The expulsion of the Muslims coupled with the encouragement of Portuguese and Indian Christian colonists roused fears in their minds as to the ultimate intentions of the Portuguese regarding the Sinhalese people.<sup>188</sup> They were therefore in a mood receptive to any proposals to overthrow the Portuguese.

The exact date when the Sinhalese *Mudaliyars* decided to attempt to overthrow Portuguese power in Kotte is uncertain. Queyroz holds that their conspiracy originated in March 1626.<sup>189</sup> It is more likely that the conspiracy was worked out much later even if discontent had existed as early as 1626. The *Mudaliyars* must have gradually realized that their efforts would have little chance of success unless they enlisted the support of the king of Kandy. Here the role played by Domingos Fernandes proved vital.

Domingos Fernandes was a sword smith living in Colombo.<sup>190</sup> Fernandes sent a letter to Senerat that he was really the son of Rajasinha of Sitawaka and asked for aid to gain the throne of Kotte. Senerat who was preparing for war at this time, knew quite well that Fernandes was an impostor, for in his very court he had two nobles who had themselves witnessed the death of

187. T. Abeyasinghe 126

188. Queyroz 762-763. Queyroz attributes the following words to D. Cosmo, . . . nor do you reflect on the unhappy fate of your children for if by our weakness and irresolution we are reduced to slavery, they will have either a certain death or banishment before them ; because if today they will let you enjoy our property (in order to have men to accompany them for ruin) tomorrow they will become their owners; either with the death and extinction of the Chingala names or at least with the banishment and transmigration of all your families. . . .'

189. Queyroz 755

190. Queyroz 753. Queyroz relates the story that he was a native of Tanjore and that he was the son of a Moor and a Parava woman. The sword smith was a bachelor

Rajasinha's son. However, he decided to use Fernandes to contact the *Mudaliyars* of Kotte. Fernandes thereupon contacted Dom Theodosio, Dom Aleixo, Dom Balthazar and Dom Cosmo who decided to accept him as their leader.

Having achieved his objective of opening communications with the Sinhalese commanders of Kotte, Senerat decided to remove the possibility of Fernandes becoming a second Nikapitiya. Therefore in 1629 he persuaded Fernandes to flee to Kandy. On his arrival in court the pretender at length discovered that Senerat had known him to be an imposter all along. However the the king of Kandy did not prove ungrateful to one who had, though inadvertently, done him a great service. On condition that he gave up all claims to kingship, Fernandes was granted lands in Wellassa.<sup>191</sup>

Meanwhile the four Sinhalese leaders had won others to their cause. Among them were Dom Andre, the *mohottiyar* or secretary of the captain-general and Dom Manoel, who was a Sinhalese so trusted by de Sa that he had been awarded the post of shield-bearer of the captain-general himself. Dom Simao, leader of the *lascarins* of Sabaragamuwa was another recruit. The first two played a vital role in supplying the conspirators with information as to de Sa's intentions and policies while the adherence of Dom Simao completed the alienation of all the prominent *lascarin* leaders from the Portuguese cause. A negro Muslim who had nominally accepted Christianity to avoid expulsion also joined in when offered leadership of the Muslim community in Kotte.<sup>192</sup>

After the the departure of Fernandes, the conspirators continued to correspond with Senerat and apparently decided to accept him as their leader when it became known that Fernandes was an impostor. Early in 1630 they planned means by which a final overthrow of Portuguese power in Kotte could be achieved with minimum risk to themselves. It was decided to wait until the next large invasion of Kandy took place. At a favourable opportunity the Sinhalese were to desert to the Kandyans and destroy the Portuguese forces thus isolated. It was however realised that

191. Queyroz 753-756 ; Jornada 43-48 ; AHU 501.f.379. Fernandes was joined in Wellassa by his brother who was later killed in a skirmish in 1631. Queyroz states that Fernandes becoming disappointed at the end of his hopes to become king, fled to Wellassa and became an anchorite, thus drawing a moral that traitors never prosper. Contemporary documents cast doubts on Queyroz's version of the fate of Fernandes.

192. Queyroz 762 ; JCBRAS 581-582, 584

This Muslim is described as an armourer and was probably the same person who served as the *kanakapulle* of Antonio de Souza Coutinho in 1630. See page 111

while the Portuguese held Colombo any Sinhalese victory would have but a temporary effect. Moreover, their forces in Colombo would be able to seize the *lascarins* families left behind at Peliyagoda and Mulleriyawa. Therefore the plan was extended to include the seizure of Colombo. Two of the key figures, Dom Andre and Dom Manoel were to be left behind in the city. They, together with the Muslim negro and two other men<sup>193</sup> were to remain in Colombo with their followers. The *Mudaliyars* promised to send them news of the desertion as soon as possible, and on the night that they received the news they were to set fire to all the houses of the *casados*, within and outside the walls of the city. It was estimated that, in the confusion, profiting by the element of surprise, the six hundred Sinhalese and Muslims who were at the disposal of the plotters could seize Colombo fort and hold it till the others arrived.<sup>194</sup>

The plan so carefully arranged almost went awry. In March 1630 just before the captain-general set off towards Kandy an *aratchi* of the *paduwa* caste<sup>195</sup> who had taken a message from the *mudaliyars* of Kotte to Kandy gave word of the plot to Fr. Paulino da Madre de Deus, an Augustinian serving in Kalutara. Fr. Madre de Deus, was not himself fully convinced<sup>196</sup> but sent the *aratchi* to the captain-general, who refused to listen to these charges thinking that it was merely a Kandyan move to create dissension within Kotte. The *aratchi* therefore sought the aid of a Franciscan Fr. Antonio de Peixoto, who served at Matara.<sup>197</sup> Fr. Peixoto was clearly convinced but his open charges against Dom Theodosio only roused that Sinhalese noble to make things so difficult for the *aratchi*, that he fled from Kotte. The flight of the *aratchi* and Dom Theodosio's marriage to a lady of mixed descent in Colombo increased de Sa's trust in this leader especially as Dom Theodosio wore European dress for his marriage ceremony.<sup>198</sup>

During the short campaign of 1630 the Sinhalese apparently had no opportunity of putting their plans into effect. By this

- 193 Chuti Naide (Cuti Naide) and Chavan (Xaban) according to Jornada 38.  
 194. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.251v-253v  
 195. 'Pache'-P. E. Pieris (Ribeiro 144) identifies *pachas* with the *paduwa* caste. According to B. Ryan—*Caste in modern Ceylon*, 67 *paduwas* were palanquin bearers, *lascarins* and coolies.  
 196. For he merely sent the man with a note of introduction saying that he had some important news to impart.  
 197. P. E. Pieris—(*Ceylon*) II.178) incorrectly assumes that the Franciscan referred to in Faria de Souza was Fr. Negrao.  
 198. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.254-256v ; F. de Souza VI.370 ; P. da Trindade III. 108-109 ; Jornada 19, 20.

time however they were convinced that delay would be dangerous in view of the chances that the plot might be discovered. They therefore requested Senerat to make a provocative attack from Uva in the hope of persuading de Sa to lead a retaliatory raid into Uva, thus providing an opportunity to destroy the main Portuguese army. In response to this call, Kumarasinha, prince of Uva crossed the frontier and with the aid of *mudaliyar* Abhayasinha<sup>199</sup> who had deserted the Portuguese forces, ravaged much of the Two Korales for a month.<sup>200</sup> The garrison of Sabaragamuwa fort made up of sixty Portuguese and a hundred and fifty *lascarins* was too small to take effective measures against the invaders.<sup>201</sup>

De Sa thereupon decided to make a retaliatory raid on Uva. Joao Rodriguez de Sa de Menezes maintains that this was partly in response to the appeals of the Sinhalese *lascarin* commanders who pretended to be zealous in the defence of Kotte to ensure the captain-general. This could well have been a significant factor especially as the senior Portuguese soldiers were divided on the advisability of the campaign.<sup>202</sup> However, there is little doubt that the crucial factor which influenced de Sa's decision was the letter received from the viceroy, the conde de Linhares.

The conde de Linhares, since his arrival in India in October 1629 had received many letters from both de Sa and the *vedor*, Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara complaining about each other. The viceroy who had no doubt heard of de Sa's achievements in Ceylon, considered him the man best fitted to deal with Portuguese problems in the island. This was why on finding that de Freitas and de Sa did not get along well together, he decided to remove de Freitas. Nevertheless, he was also convinced that the greater blame in the dispute should really be apportioned to de Sa. The viceroy was also convinced that de Sa's involvement in trade was prejudicial to Portuguese interests as it distracted the captain-

199. Abhayasinha was one of the *lascarin* leaders of Sabaragamuwa. It is uncertain as to when he deserted from the Portuguese.

200. Queyroz 765 ; JCBRAS XI. 585 ; Ribeiro 226 ; Ajuda 51-IV-32.f.6

201. Jornada 9, 17

202. Those who opposed the expedition included Francisco de Brito de Almeida and Lancarote de Seixas. (TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.259) De Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI.587-88) says there was a diversity of opinions. Lourenco Teixeira de Macedo, captain of Negombo in letter to the king dated 4.12.1630 stated that de Sa's expedition was undertaken against the advice of all, but Francisco Barbosa da Andrade in a document dated 3 August 1634 maintained that all four *disavas* agreed to the expedition. (TT.LM.31.f.43 ; Jornada 9) Jornada, 21 states that Luis Gomes Pinto, who had offered to lend money to finance the expedition, changed his mind after he met the people of the Four Korales and Sabaragamuwa and advocated a small scale raid by the captain-major while de Sa remained at Malwana. Queyroz 765 ; 769 ; JCBRAS XI. 585-590

general from the war. Thus his letters included injunctions in strong terms that an effort should be made to conquer Kandy and also contained remarks to the effect that the true function of the captain-general was war and not commerce.<sup>203</sup> De Sa was deeply hurt by these reprimands made by his superior and kinsman and decided to risk no further taunts as to his inactivity. In July 1630 he assembled his forces at Menikkadawara for an invasion of Uva.<sup>201</sup>

De Sa's expedition to Uva is easily the best documented of the Portuguese invasions of Kandy.<sup>205</sup> De Sa set out with the forces he had assembled at Menikkadawara on 3 August 1630 and marching by leisurely stages arrived at Sabaragamuwa about forty miles away on the seventh of the month. There the army rested for two days until Luis Gomez Pinto arrived with further men. The combined forces now amounted to five hundred and eight Portuguese soldiers, one hundred and twenty *casados* and *topazes* and almost four thousand five hundred *lascarins*. On 9 August 1630 this army left Sabaragamuwa and began to make its way towards Kandyan territory.<sup>206</sup>

203. Queyroz 769 ; JCBRAS XI. 590 ; Jornada 21 ; Assentos I. 265-266 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.259v ; BNL.Pombalina 490.f.195 ; Filmoteca LM.13B ; 13/14 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.270. The viceroy had probably no doubt as to the honesty of the captain-general. He simply wished to prod him to action. This explains why when on 14 September 1630 the viceroy-in-council decided to recall the *vedor* Lancarote de Seixas to Goa to answer charges of manslaughter, it was decided to leave the control of finance as well as war with de Sa.

204. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.257v

205. Three distinct accounts of the campaign written within ten years of it are available to us, (*viz.*, Jornada ; Ms. da Liv. 1699.ff.257-269 ; JCBRAS XI. 593-605) besides many contemporary letters and a chronicle of a later date. The Sinhalese war poems also give useful accounts of the campaign. Particularly lengthy and informative is the account in *Rajasiha Hatana* stanzas 89-204.

206. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.261v,263 ; Jornada 22 ; Assentos I.525 ; P. da Trindade III. 110 ; Queyroz 770 ; Ribeiro 226 ; JCBRAS XI. 592-593. The diverse estimates of de Sa's forces are tabulated below.

Sources and date of *soldados casados and topazes lascarins*,  
source.

TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.

263 Dec.1630	350	40	4300+
Assentos I. 515 3.1.1631	508	120	5000
Jornada 21-24 1.4.1635	450	( <i>soldados and casados</i> )	5000
JCBRAS XI.592-593 1630's	500	—	13,000
P.da Trindade III. 100 1630's	400	—	—
Jornada 88-90 1630's	400	80	3,000
F.de Souza VI. 370 1675	400	—	—
Queyroz 770 1680's	500	200	13,000
Ribeiro 226 1685	400	100	20,000
Baldaeus 88 1680's	1300	1700	8,000

The estimates in Assentos I are accepted here as they represent the official



The southern route to Uva across the Idalgashinna pass was perhaps even more difficult than the well-known invasion route to Kandy proper through Balane. The Portuguese army had to take a circuitous route through the Pelmadulla gap to avoid the mountainous terrain of the Rakwana hills. After sixty miles of marching through forested lands, criss-crossed by numerous streams the invading army would arrive at Haldumulla, three thousand feet above sea-level. From here lay the difficult part of the journey, a climb of two thousand five hundred feet within two miles, through tropical jungle up to the frontier post at Idalgashinna. This was the ideal country for guerrilla warfare as any army marching through the sparsely populated land had also to carry provisions with it. From Idalgashinna onwards however, the obstacles were few. The invader marching northwards came into more open country and had the advantage of descending from the mountains to a country with gently undulating hills covered with grass and small trees. In the centre of this Uva basin was Badulla, the capital city of the province.

De Sa's army however, had an unexpectedly easy journey up to the frontier and even beyond it. As the Kandyan intention was to draw the Portuguese as far as possible into their territory, little effort was made to impede the Portuguese army which reached Idalgashinna on 15 August 1630. Three days after crossing the frontier Portuguese were at Badulla. Badulla, though the provincial capital was little more than a village, for apart from the residence of the prince and the temples, little had been built after the settlement was sacked by the Portuguese in 1615.<sup>207</sup>

The invading army set fire to the settlement. The majority of houses having roofs thatched with straw caught fire easily. Thereupon the Portuguese set up their headquarters at Muthiyangana Vihara which was protected by the Belihul Oya on one side and a stone wall and a ditch on the other. From this base they sent out foraging parties on the 18 and 19 of August to collect provisions and burn the ripening rice crop in the areas around Badulla.<sup>208</sup> Meanwhile the Kandyans had completed their prepa-

figures quoted by the viceroy to the king within six months of the campaign. The figures quoted by Fr. Assumpacao (TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f. 263) for the Portuguese are considered too low, as the number of Portuguese who fell into Sinhalese hands numbered over two hundred and fifty.

207. *Jornada* 22-23,88 ; *TT.Ms da Liv.*1699.f.263. Bocarro 406-407 ; F. de Souza VI.78 ; *Parangi Hatana* stanzas 85-94 (in Ribeiro 250 ; ) *Maha Hatana* stanzas 41-45 ; *Mandarampura Puvata* stanzas 212-218

208. JCBRAS XI.594 ; Queyroz 771 ; *Jornada*-89 ; Baldaeus 88 ; F.de Souza VI. 360 ; *Maha Hatana* stanza 55

rations. The king and the princes having raised the largest army they could muster, gradually advanced up the Belihul Oya and took up positions around Badulla on 20 August 1630. The total Kandyan force numbered about twelve thousand men,<sup>209</sup> of whom at least a thousand had muskets while the others were armed with swords, pikes and bows and arrows.<sup>210</sup>

On the very day that the Kandyan army appeared a series of events at length convinced de Sa that the *lascarins* commanders were at the point of revolt and that the Portuguese army, being so far away from their nearest fort and having no hope of relief, was in great danger. Early in the morning a loyal *lascarin* found a message from the Kandyans to the *mudaliyars* revealing the plot. Still the general was unconvinced, fearing that this was merely a Kandyan strategem to sow mistrust. Soon after however a Sinhalese *aratchi* named Dom Jeronimo (or Dharmasuriya)<sup>211</sup> who had fallen out with the conspirators on a question of leadership came over to de Sa and gave all the information he had about the plot. The *aratchi* advised that the best course of action would be to arrest the leaders of the plot for the mass of *lascarins* who as yet know nothing about it might remain loyal. De Sa however was reluctant to risk a battle within his own camp while the Kandyans remained close at hand. He therefore summoned the *mudaliyars* and asked for their advice for the course of action to be taken against the Kandyans. The *mudaliyars* advised retreat as the purpose of the retaliatory raid was now achieved. De Sa thereupon feigning friendship, praised them for their services, restored to them the posts of *vidana* of the foundry workers which the *vedor* had taken from them and swore an oath to retain them in their posts as long as he remained captain-general. All surplus stores and spoils accumulated in the campaign were collected and burnt and the army prepared for the retreat planned for the following day keeping supplies sufficient only for a two day march.<sup>212</sup>

209. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.267. The Portuguese normally exaggerate the number of their opponents involved and frequently fail to mention the numbers of the auxilliary troops that supported them. In this respect Fr. Assumpcao is better than the most and the above estimate is the one given by him. Other estimates are : De Sa de M. 596—20,000 ; Queyroz 771—40,000 ; Jornada 26—30,000 ; Baldaeus 88—23,000. The *Rajasiha Hatana* (stanzas 89-104) describes the gradual progress of this Sinhalese army from Kandy across Hanguranketa, Paranagama, Tupitiya and Kandegedera to Badulla.

210. *Parangi Hatana* stanzas 94-114 (In Ribeiro 250-251)

211. 'Adamanasuri' according to Jornada 23 and 'Idrumaraturi' according to JCBRAS XI. 594

212. Queyroz 771-772 ; JCBRAS XI. 594 ; Ribeiro 226-227 ; Jornada 24 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.263v

This sudden display of generosity did not divert the *lascarins* commanders from the course they had planned for so long. At day break on 21 August before the retreat began they asked to be placed in the van of the Portuguese forces. De Sa agreed to place some of them there but by keeping the *lascarins* both in the van and in the rear he hoped to create a conflict between them and the Kandyans before the leaders could act. Moreover, by this disposition he kept the Portuguese forces unbroken in the centre.<sup>213</sup>

As the Portuguese emerged from Badulla at nine in the morning they found the troops of Kandy led by Kumarasinha and Vijayapala blocking the route of retreat. Before battle could be joined Dom Jeronimo Rajapakse, deserted with the men of the Seven Korales leaving the Portuguese flanks unprotected. At the same time Dom Cosmo, killing the Portuguese nearest to him, deserted with his forces followed by Dom Aleixo, Dom Theodosio and Dom Balthazar.<sup>214</sup>

De Sa re-organized his forces. His position was now a desperate one. It is true that many of the *lascarins*, who were unaware of the plot were taken by surprise, remained for the moment, with the Portuguese forces.<sup>215</sup> However it was clear that only a minority of these men could be relied on to stay with them especially if conditions became difficult. Those who deserted exhorted the *lascarins* who remained to follow suit and join them in the expulsion of the hated foreigner. Moreover the route through which de Sa had come up to Uva, through the Idalgashinna pass, was so well obstructed that the captain-general in retreat was forced to move south-eastwards instead of south-westwards thus reducing even further his chance of survival as he had now a much longer distance to traverse before he could reach friendly territory.

On 21 August the Portuguese made considerable progress towards the frontier. By determined efforts they cut through the Kandyan forces and advanced up to the Lunugala hills which separated the Uva basin from the south-eastern lowlands. On the other hand they suffered considerable losses. Many of the *lascarins* made away when the opportunity arose and late in the

213. Queyroz 774 ; JCBRAS XI. 598 ; Jornada 24-25

214. *Rajasiha Hatana* stanza 123, Jornada 25

215. Ribeiro 227 holds that only a hundred and fifty *lascarins* remained with the Portuguese. Fr. Assumpcao's account (TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.267) however asserts that two hundred loyal *lascarins* were killed on the first day of the battle. Queyroz 775 indicates that at least five hundred remained with the Portuguese to the last. Therefore the evidence in Jornada 25,27 that at least half the *lascarins* troops remained with the Portuguese at the outset appears accurate. This could explain how six hundred Portuguese and *topazes* resisted fifteen thousand men for two days.

day the Sinhalese cut off the rear guard led by *disava* Luis Teixeira Macedo and took twenty two Portuguese prisoners.<sup>216</sup> On the following day, Tuesday 22 August 1630, the Portuguese army was completely surrounded in an open field at Randeniwela near Wellawaya and annihilated by the Sinhalese forces led by the king and the three princes.<sup>217</sup> The battle raged from morning until mid-afternoon. At two in the afternoon, after two hundred Portuguese had fallen, the captain-general himself was killed.<sup>218</sup> The Portuguese continued to struggle for another hour under Luis Gomes Pinto but on his death they eventually surrendered.<sup>219</sup> The Sinhalese losses must have amounted to well over two thousand men.<sup>220</sup> It was a victory hard earned.<sup>221</sup>

The significance of Randeniwela lay in the complete destruction of the Portuguese army. At Lellopitiya and Ambatenna de Sa had managed to preserve his army intact and had retreated to a position of safety. At Randeniwela he failed to do so. His defeat in 1630 marked the greatest Sinhalese victory against the Portuguese since the annihilation of the expeditionary force of

216. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.267-268 ; Ribeiro 227-228 ; Jornada 24-28 ; 89-91 ; Queyroz 774-775 ; JCBRAS XI. 599-604 ; *Parangi Hatana* stanzas 115-134 (In Ribeiro 251-253) *Mandarampura puvata* stanzas 220-229 ; *Rajasiha Hatana* stanza 117-126. Queyroz basing his account on Jornada states that the Portuguese struggled for four days. All other accounts (except Jornada-Lomba) agree that the Portuguese army was defeated on the second day. Ribeiro maintains that a shower of rain which fell on the night before the final battle prevented the use of fire-arms by the Portuguese. Other Portuguese accounts however mention the use of fire-arms by the Portuguese in the last day of fighting.
217. Queyroz 771,780 asserts that Senerat who had caught a fever was not on the battle field. Sinhalese sources however indicate that he was present and that he returned to Senkadagala only after the battle. *Rajavaliya* 101 ; *Mandarampura puvata* stanzas 214-241 ; *Rajasiha Hatana* stanza 201
218. The captain-general himself is said to have killed many Sinhalese before his death. (TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.305 ; Queyroz 777). This may have been due to Senerat's orders to seize him alive. There are many versions as to how de Sa actually died. Knox's version, that he stabbed himself with a knife of a Kaffir servant appears unlikely in view of the accounts of the battle available to us. Queyroz 778 (following Jornada 30) states that de Sa was accidentally shot by a Portuguese Joao da Fonseca. It is more likely however that he was killed by the Sinhalese as stated by his son. (JCBRAS XI. 604) Fr. Assumpcao (TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f. 306), F. de Souza (VI.372) and in the diary of the conde de Linhares. (Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.399)
219. One hundred and thirty Portuguese and a hundred *lascarins* formed the main Portuguese force which eventually surrendered. CLR/ser. 352 ; Queyroz 774 ; JCBRAS XVIII. 169-171 ; Baldaeus 96 ; Assentos I. 525
220. Queyroz claims that the Sinhalese lost nearly four thousand men.
221. Queyroz 775-778 ; De Sa de M. 599-604 ; Jornada-Lomba 91 ; Jornada 28-30 ; *Maha Hatana* stanzas 56-66 ; *Parangi Hatana* stanzas 135-209 ; (In Ribeiro 253-256) ; *Mandarampura puvata* stanza 230 ; Ribeiro 228 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.268-269v

Pero Lopes de Souza at Danture in 1594.<sup>222</sup> Though perhaps less politically decisive than the battle of Danture, Randeniwela really left the Portuguese in Ceylon in a worse military position. In 1594 the Portuguese defeat did not involve any risk of a Kandyan attack on the lowlands. The captain in charge of the Portuguese forces in Kotte had not participated in the campaign and was able to organize resistance.<sup>223</sup> The army which had been destroyed had consisted chiefly of soldiers who had arrived in Ceylon a short while before for the specific task of invading Kandy and thus the regular Portuguese forces were more or less intact.<sup>224</sup> In 1630 on the other hand the captain-general lay dead on the field of battle and his chief officers were either killed or taken prisoner. Except for a mobile force in Jaffna which was hardly adequate to defend even that kingdom, the Portuguese now had only the garrisons of their forts. In Kotte itself the Portuguese had hardly five hundred able-bodied *casados* and *soldados* with two or three thousand *lascarins* of a rather dubious loyalty. Even these forces were scattered throughout the land, though mainly in and around the seven forts of Colombo, Negombo, Kalutara, Galle, Sabaragamuwa, Menikkadawara, and Malwana<sup>225</sup>. The fortunes of war had at last swung on to the Kandyan side.

The campaigns of 1628-1630 demonstrated the great recovery Kandy had made after the peace treaty of 1617. While in the first two decades of the seventeenth century the Portuguese in Kotte invaded and ravaged Kandy almost at will, stronger forces under de Sa, who was as good a leader as any, failed to get the upper hand in the 1620's. A large share of the credit for this change in position must be allotted to the refugees—Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims—who fled from Portuguese territory and revived the cultivation of the areas abandoned during the wars of the earlier period. A part of the credit can also be claimed by Senerat whose wise policy of encouragement of settlers from abroad was a factor in the growth of the Kandyan population during this period.<sup>226</sup>

De Sa's military defeat was in a sense a reflection of his failure to gain the confidence and loyalty of the conquered Sinhalese. De Sa wished to win their support and adherence and there is little doubt that he won the genuine affection and respect from many of

222. Queyroz 483-488 ; Fr. S. G. Perera—*A history of Ceylon for schools*, 80-82

223. Queyroz 494

224. *Ibid.*, 479

225. Queyroz 771 ; Jornada-91 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.303 ; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.274v,275v,279,313

226. *Mandarampura puvata* stanzas 179-209.

the Sinhalese who came to know him. However by birth, upbringing and position he was firmly committed to certain policies which were clearly unpopular with the majority of the people of Kotte. His activity in the destruction of temples<sup>227</sup> and in the propagation of the Christian faith in a land where Buddhism had deep roots, his usage of the custom of *Rajakariya* or compulsory labour service to build forts for the Portuguese by Sinhalese labour, his war-like policy towards Kandy and his expulsion of the peaceful Muslim community, were factors which more than counteracted a kindly nature and a passion for justice and fair play. De Sa forgot that no conqueror could afford to be liberal to the conquered and depend on their support unless he completely identified his interests with theirs, and eventually paid the price for this.

## CHAPTER 4

### FROM RANDENIWELA TO GANNORUWA

The destruction of the Portuguese army at Randeniwela was merely the first step of a programme devised to expel the Portuguese from the island. The next step was to be the seizure of Colombo fort from within by a band of *lascarins* organised by Dom Manoel and the *kanakapulle* of Antonio de Souza Coutinho. The success of this stage of the plot depended a great deal on the timing of the revolt within the army under de Sa and it was here that the weakness of the whole plan lay. The four *lascarin* commanders who planned to desert could not give their confederates in Colombo a definite date on which the rising would take place. Their plan was to strike whenever an opportunity presented itself and then to send a swift message to their compatriots in Colombo. Thus everything depended on whether Dom Manoel received the news before the Portuguese did, for he had only some six hundred men with him in Colombo and therefore needed the element of surprise to succeed. The rebel leaders were all the more conscious of this because the families of Dom Cosmo, Dom Balthazar and Dom Aleixo lived within a few miles of the fort of Colombo and would be in great danger if the Portuguese got word of the plot. This was why they despatched Dom Aleixo with a force of two hundred men to Colombo as soon as victory was secured.<sup>1</sup>

Dom Aleixo's task was thus two fold—to remove the families of the rebel leaders to places of safety and to instruct and aid Dom Manoel in the rising which was planned to take within the fort. Marching swiftly across the country, Dom Aleixo reached the environs of Colombo on the night of Monday 26 August 1630 having covered over a hundred and twenty miles in four days. On his arrival Dom Aleixo found that he could not send a message into the fort because it was late and the gates of the fort were closed. He therefore decided to use his time to take the families of the *lascarins* to places of safety in the interior.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile Antonio Gomes, a *lascarin* loyal to the Portuguese, had made his escape from Uva to the fort of Malwana. There he related to its captain, Francisco de Brito de Almeida what he had found out about the conspiracy to defeat de Sa and seize the fort of Colombo from

1. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.270 ; P. da Trindade III. 111, 167

2. Fr. Assumpcao suggests that immediate attack was ruled out because Dom Aleixo preferred to save his own family before attacking the Portuguese but the other Sinhalese leaders apparently did not hold him responsible for the failure to seize Colombo, for Dom Aleixo continued to hold high posts in later years.

within.<sup>3</sup> News was at once sent to Colombo and was in the hands of the *vedor* Lancarote de Seixas early, on the twenty seventh before the Sinhalese could set the plot in motion.

De Seixas acted promptly, organizing two mobile forces—one to raid the residences of the rebels outside Colombo, to try to seize their families and goods, and the other to round up the plotters within the city. A strong guard was placed at the city gates.<sup>4</sup> Dom Manoel was immediately arrested. When questioned he confessed the complicity of the *kanakapulle* of Dom Antonio de Souza Coutinho who was arrested after a sharp struggle in which one Portuguese and six Sinhalese were killed. In all about one hundred and eighty conspirators were arrested but more than twice that number who could not be identified, later escaped to join the Sinhalese forces.<sup>5</sup> Colombo had escaped capture from within; its fate was now to be decided by the seige from without.<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, in Uva, Senerat had decided to return to Kandy to celebrate his triumph<sup>7</sup> and perhaps also to recruit further forces and organise supplies. The Portuguese prisoners followed under strong guard, while the princes reorganized their forces for the march on Colombo across the Two Korales.<sup>8</sup> However, even before the troops could be set in motion, news of the defeat of the Portuguese had spread and the lands of Kotte had risen. Isolated Portuguese in the villages, whether soldiers, *casados* or priests were attacked and killed.<sup>9</sup> When the Sinhalese forces led by the princes arrived, they found the lowlands except for the Portuguese forts already in Sinhalese hands. In the absence of any strong supporting Portuguese field army, the inland forts, too, soon proved vulnerable. Many of the forts had been badly garrisoned and what garrison there was, consisted of old, sick, injured or convalescent soldiers who had not been able to make the journey to Uva.<sup>10</sup> Only the coastal forts were safe, thanks to the inability of the Sinhalese to threaten Portuguese supremacy at sea.

The first of the inland forts to go was the base at Malwana, where the garrison had included only seventeen Portuguese. Fran-

3. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.270-271 ; AHU Caixa 16 ant 18.1.1644

4. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.270-271v

5. *Ibid.* ff.271v-272v ; Jornada-92

6. Perhaps the Sinhalese might have fared better had the rebels sent an urgent message to Dom Manoel immediately after their defection on 20 August instead of waiting for victory.

7. *Manadarampura puvata* stanzas 241-242

8. Jornada 53 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.269v

9. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.273-273v, 295v ; Jornada-93

10. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.274v ; TT.LM.31.f.42v ; AHU Caixa 16 ant 18.1.1644



cisco de Brito de Almeida reported from here that six thousand Sinhalese were expected shortly and that even if he had the support of loyal *lascarins*, he would not be able to hold out for long due to the lack of a regular water supply inside the fort. Because there was a great shortage of men in Colombo, de Seixas, after consulting a hastily summoned council of advisers, instructed de Almeida to withdraw. Already the countryside had risen against the Portuguese and de Almeida could get to Colombo only under the cover of night after jettisoning all his surplus powder and shot in the Kelani river. He did succeed however in bringing with him two small cannon, some small arms, and a little rice. The morning after he left, a Sinhalese force arrived and occupied the fort.<sup>11</sup>

Shortly afterwards the fort of Santa Cruz at Sabaragamuwa, the key to the whole *disava*, fell but this time with the loss of the whole garrison. The fort here was in good condition. It was equipped with three pieces of artillery and had fifty Portuguese and some *lascarins* to defend it. However, though the captain Joao de Seixas had two days notice of the approach of the Sinhalese, instead of preparing to resist or withdraw, he fled from the fort alone, lost his way and was eventually killed by the Sinhalese.<sup>12</sup> His successor offered to surrender the fort to Dom Theodosio and the prince of Uva on condition that the lives of the garrison were spared. This being agreed to, the Portuguese were sent to Kandy under escort and the Sinhalese occupied the fort.<sup>13</sup>

In strong contrast to the cowardice displayed at Sabaragamuwa was the tenacity of the garrison of the fort of Santa Fe at Menikkadawara. This fort commanded the upper reaches of the Kelani valley and had often served as a base for incursions against Kandy. The fort itself was strong, having been built in 1627 by de Sa. It was amply provisioned and had a regular supply of water within the walls. The captain, Manoel Mendes de Motta, with his garrison of seventy Portuguese hung on determinedly from August to mid November though there seemed no possibility of relief from Colombo which was by then closely invested. However when Maha Astana and Senerat<sup>14</sup> appeared before the fort on their way

11. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.274-275 ; Jornada-93. Queyroz 782 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II.189 ; AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646 AHU Caixa 16 ant 18.1.1644

12. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.273 ; Jornada 39,92 ;

13. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.dd.273-274 ; Jornada 39 ; JCBRAS XVIII.170, 226 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 190 ; *Rajasiha Hatana* stanza 204

14. P. E. Pieris (*Ceylon* II. 190) probably basing his account on Rajasinha's letter to the Dutch (JCBRAS XVIII.170,226) says that it was Rajasinha (or it was Maha Astana as he was called before he became king) who captured Menikkadawara but the accounts of the *Rajasiha Hatana* stanzas

back from Colombo to Kandy further resistance seemed hopeless. Nine soldiers had already deserted. Therefore, Mendes de Motta offered to surrender on condition that each Portuguese would be allowed to take his arms and all the property that he himself and his servants could carry. This being agreed to, the Portuguese marched out and the Sinhalese took possession of the fort.<sup>15</sup>

With the fall of Menikkadawara the last vestiges of Portuguese control over the lowlands of Kotte were swept away and for the time being they were reduced to their strongholds upon the coast. Even these had not been preserved intact for Manoel Correa de Brito, the captain of Kalutara retired with all his men northwards to Colombo as soon as he heard of the defeat of de Sa and the imminent Kandyan invasion.<sup>16</sup> De Brito maintained that of the twenty two Portuguese in his garrison, some were sick and that in any case there were no munitions or provisions in the fort. Unlike de Almeida however, he had not obtained permission to abandon his post. Moreover he had left three pieces of artillery behind.<sup>17</sup> De Seixas later argued that de Brito should have defended Kalutara until he was reinforced or ordered to withdraw from the fort.<sup>18</sup> The disapproval de Brito had to face in Colombo was by no means lessened when the Sinhalese used the artillery he had left behind to fire against the Colombo fort.<sup>19</sup> However, the loss or retention of a minor post like Kalutara was unimportant. The key to the Portuguese-Sinhalese struggle was now in Colombo. That this was so must have been clear to the Sinhalese and Portuguese alike, and it is necessary therefore to consider how effectively the Sinhalese pushed their advantage after Randeniwela. Queyroz maintains that the princes delayed so long in their march from Uva to Colombo that they gave the city twenty six days to prepare. He argues that this was one of the chief reasons for the successful defence of the city. The princes, he writes, 'marched to Sofragao in ten days and resting a day, they spent four (days) on the one day's march to Colombo.' The *Jornada* even enlarges on this

208-209, the *Jornada* and Fr. Assumpcao make it clear that the Portuguese negotiated with Senerat though Rajasinha was with him.

*Jornada* 49-50; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.299-299v; Assentos I. 526

15. *Jornada* 49-50,93. Queyroz 787; Assentos I.529; JCBRAS XVIII. 170; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 190; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.299-299v

16. P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II.189; Queyroz 782

17. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.275-276; *Jornada*- 92

18. TT.LM.30.f.158; Filmoteca LM.13A 21/3; Queyroz 782. Queyroz is wrong when he says that de Seixas ordered the garrison of Kalutara to withdraw.

19. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.291. De Brito was eventually tried for this offence. See Filmoteca LM.19B. 56-75/1-4

account by asserting that the princes, after taking the fort at Sabaragamuwa, spent eight days 'regaling themselves with dancing girls.'<sup>20</sup>

For this period the only evidence available is Portuguese; nevertheless it is easy to show that the picture of Sinhalese ineptitude and folly given above is wrong both in detail and probably in general. Note has already been taken of the speed with which the preparations for an insurrection within Colombo was set on foot after de Sa's final defeat and death. Dom Aleixo, marching light with his small force was under the walls of the city by the evening of the twenty sixth of August, just four days after the final victory at Randeniwela. Eleven days later the princes with the main Sinhalese army had reached Colombo and begun its seige.<sup>21</sup> To have reorganized their troops and supply and baggage trains after victory and then to have marched some one hundred and twenty miles through jungle-covered hills in the tail of the monsoon, securing the surrender of the fort Santa Cruz on the way, so as to reach Colombo on 7 September does not seem to leave much room for a supposed eight days dalliance with dancing girls. It may be that even more speed could have been achieved and that as Faria de Souza argues the princes relied too confidently on the success of the rising within Colombo by Dom Manoel and the *kanakapulle*. Again the illness of the king at this moment may have distracted the attention of the princes Kumarasinha and Vijayapala, who were by no means content with the size of the principalities awarded to them or with the special favours shown to their brother Maha Astana. It may be, as Portuguese sources say, that the princes delayed so as to let the king come from Kandy and take command of the assault on Colombo. But there is little need to call on these explanations for there are more obvious military reasons for some delay in setting off. No army was likely to be able to move off directly from a major battle to a distant seige, quite certainly not a Sinhalese one, for the peasant levies were not obliged to serve in offensive wars beyond the frontiers of their land. On this occasion it is known that the forces of Uva refused to participate in a campaign against the Portuguese in the kingdom of Kotte, despite an offer of four fifths of the plunder to be taken. The princes must therefore have had to recruit fresh troops, in part at least, for their advance on Sabaragamuwa and thence to Colombo. Under such circumstances their advance from Randeni-

20. Queyroz 780-781 ; Jornada 38-39

21. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.276

wela to Colombo in sixteen days—not twenty six as Queyroz states represents a very vigorous effort to follow up victory.<sup>22</sup>

The Portuguese in Colombo did not even have sixteen days warning, for as has been seen the first news of the disaster did not arrive from Malwana until the morning of 27 August. They therefore had just eleven days to prepare for the forthcoming struggle. It must be admitted that even this short space of time was of immense value to the Portuguese. Their first task was to install a new leader to replace de Sa. This was soon done, for the day after the plot of Dom Aleixo had been crushed, the members of the *camara* and other important officials gathered in the council chamber and opened the letter of succession left by the captain-general when he marched for Uva. This named Lancarote de Seixas, the *vedor*, who was at once accepted as the new captain-general until further orders could arrive from Goa.<sup>23</sup>

The next task was to strengthen the defences of the city. The fort at Colombo was the strongest held by the Portuguese and well protected by nature. However, the last repairs to the fort had been made five years earlier and even then, attention had been concentrated on the bulwarks protecting the harbour.<sup>23</sup> Most of the walls were in a poor state and had fallen down in parts while some of the lake front of Colombo was entirely unprotected. During the limited time he had at his disposal de Seixas had the walls rebuilt, repaired or supported by coconut and arecanut trunks. Repair of specific parts of the walls was allocated to certain *fidalgos*. Some of the trees that had been allowed to grow up near the walls of the city were also cut down so that Portuguese artillery could have the maximum effect. Finally, when the repairs were completed twenty nine new watch towers (*guaritas*) and stockades were constructed on the walls to supplement the eleven bastions which defended the fort.<sup>25</sup>

To arm the new defences was the next task and in this the garrison had one piece of great good fortune in the earlier arrival in Colombo of a galley taken from the Achinese by Nuno Alvares Botelho, the admiral of the high sea fleet. This was on its way from Malacca to Goa under the command of Antonio de Souza Coutinho who had undertaken to deliver it to the *camara* of Goa

22. F. de Souza VI. 372-373 ; Queyroz 69-70, 781

23. Jornada 76 ; F. de Souza VI.373 ; Assentos I. 298,307 ; TT.LM.31.f. 143v ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.271v,311v ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.291 ; Fílmoteca LM.14,115/1-2

24. JCBRAS XI. 537-538 ; Queyroz 740 ; Reimers 52

25. Jornada 39-40,92 ; P. da Trindade III. 111-112 ; TT.Ms. da Liv. 1699.f. 278,312 ; Assentos I. 308,525 ; AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646 ; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644

as a gift from the admiral. Besides its own armament this galley also contained six pieces of artillery being sent to the *vedor* at Goa to be set against the expenses of Botelho's fleet, as well as two more pieces for the city of Cochim. When the galley arrived the *vedor* and the officials of the Colombo *camara* had begged Coutinho to remain with his crew for some time since the departure of so many *casados* with the captain-general had left the city defenceless. Fortunately for the Portuguese, Coutinho had agreed, so that when news of Randeniwela arrived and the defences of Colombo were hurriedly set in order much needed men and guns were available from the galley. When de Sa left Colombo the fort had only sixteen pieces of artillery but by the time the main Sinhalese forces arrived before its gates, it had forty. Except for two from Malwana all these extra cannon, as well as many smaller weapons and much ammunition were procured from the galley.<sup>26</sup>

Having repaired and strengthened the walls and provided them with additional artillery, Lancarote de Seixas set about apportioning soldiers to their defences. To the south-west the rocky sea coast was so inaccessible that apart from the bastion of Santa Cruz which protected the harbour, a dozen *lascarins* were considered sufficient to patrol the whole area. The bastion itself which was not expected to be threatened was defended by the factor and the customs officials with the aid of the Jesuits. Ten other Portuguese and their servants were posted to keep a look out towards the sea, both to give the alarm in case of a surprise attack and to prevent any attempt at desertion by sea.<sup>27</sup> The eastern side of the fort which was protected by the lagoon, was the most neglected. In many areas the walls had collapsed completely. To prevent the Sinhalese from making use of this opportunity to enter the city sixteen stockades and guard towers were built in this stretch which was placed under the overall command of Antonio de Souza Coutinho.<sup>28</sup>

However, the areas most exposed to attack were the north, north-west and south. In these sectors the walls of the fort were further protected by deep moats connecting the lake with the sea.<sup>29</sup>

26. Queyroz 782 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 189-190 ; Jornada 39 ; Assentos I. 308, 520-521, 529 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.281v, 285v ; F. de Souza VI.374 ; TT.LM.29.f.6v ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.303, 306 ; Filmoteca LM.14, 114/3-5 ; 115/1-2 ; 115/2-4 ; Filmoteca LM.16, 13/5

27. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.284-284v ; Queyroz 782 ; P.E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 190

28. P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 189-190 ; Jornada 39 ; Queyroz 782 ; TT. Ms da Liv. 1699.f.285

29. Fr. S. G. Perera—*The city of Colombo 1505-1656*, (Ceylon Historical Association Paper 6, Colombo 1926) 13

The southern wall, from the sea to the lake, was divided into two sectors by the captain-general and the captain of Colombo, Diogo Boto Machado, was entrusted with the defence of one of them while Francisco de Brito de Almeida, the newly appointed captain-major-of-the-field, was entrusted with the other. The former commanded the area from the sea coast to a point almost halfway between the bastions of Mapane and St. Jeronimo. He was aided by Manuel Vaz Barreto, who was in charge of Mapane, and by Pero de Abrew de Caza who now held the post of *Wickremasinghe* or commander of the *lascarins*. This sector was strengthened by four new stockades and guard towers. The area commanded by de Almeida included three guard towers manned by Franciscans, Augustinians and *lascarins* respectively.<sup>30</sup>

In the north the key bastion of S.Joao was placed in charge of Jorge Coelho de Castro. The north-western coast up to the harbour was protected by three newly built stockades, two of them being manned by the Jesuits and Dominicans respectively. The north-eastern sector up to the lake was well protected by the three bastions of S.Estevao, S.Sebestiao and Madre de Deus.<sup>31</sup>

Lancarote de Seixas, having thus organized the static defence of the city, also created two reserve companies of soldiers who were to aid any point which was hard-pressed. These men were also to patrol the walls of the fort regularly. The lack of shot was made good by using the material available in the galley brought by Antonio de Souza Coutinho but the need for powder was even more urgent, for the gunpowder mill constructed by de Sa was no longer functioning. The making of powder was entrusted to Manuel Barros, Jeronimo de Azevedo and Balthazar Monis who together made about four barrels a day. The storage and distribution of the powder and shot was entrusted to Domingos Pereira da Araujo and Antonio Rebelo, *casados* of Colombo.<sup>32</sup>

Altogether, de Seixas had no more than three hundred and fifty Portuguese in his force, for most of the *casados* had either gone with de Sa or were posted at Menikkadawara and Sabaragamuwa. He could also count upon some two thousand slaves and a thousand servants of the resident Portuguese, and less certainly upon the one thousand three hundred *lascarins* still in the city.<sup>33</sup>


30. P. E. Pieris — *Ceylon* II. 189 ; Simancas SP 1530.f.130 ; AHU Caixa 16 ant 18.1.1644 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.283-284,312 ; TT.LM.31.ff. 31,35 ; Queyroz 782

31. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.279v-280v ; AHU 501.f.36

32. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.286-287

33. Estimates of Portuguese forces within the fort in August 1630 are : — 400 Portuguese including priests F. de Souza VI.373


## THE SIEGE OF COLOMBO, SEPT-OCT 1630



### KEY

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Factor + 4 cannon                         | 7. Antonio Segredo +<br>20 Portuguese + 3 cannon        |
| 2. Manual Vaz Barretto +<br><i>lascarins</i> | 8. Jorge Coelho de Castro +<br>16 Portuguese + 4 cannon |
| 3. <i>Ouvidor</i> + 15 Portuguese            | 9. Balthazar Moniz +<br>100 <i>lascarins</i>            |
| 4. 12 Portuguese + 7 cannon                  | 10. 10 Portuguese +<br>servants                         |
| 5. Joao Gomes da Lima<br>+ 2 Portuguese      |   |
| 6. Goncalo Alvares +<br>6 clerics + 3 cannon |   |

The southern wall, from the sea to the lake, was divided into two parts by the captain-general and the captain of the fort. Diego de Melo, Major of the fort, was entrusted with the eastern part.



PUBLIC LIBRARY  
JAFFNA 10418 CC  
SPECIAL COLLECTION



With these five thousand men he had to hold the whole circuit of the walls. Two great advantages however, were his—he possessed an effective artillery whereas the enemy lacked any guns capable of battering the walls, and he had the sea behind him, of which his countrymen were the masters.

The Sinhalese who appeared before Colombo were organized into four divisions consisting chiefly of the men of Matara, Sabaragamuwa, Four Korales and the Seven Korales. Each division was strengthened by a detachment of Kandyan troops. The men of Matara led by the prince of Uva and Dom Theodosio entrenched themselves in the plains of Mapane, to the south of the bastion of that name. The forces of Sabaragamuwa under Dom Simao were stationed near the bastion of S. Sebastiao and Queen's Gate. The king and Maha Astana had their headquarters in the house of Luis Gomes Pinto and were with the men of the Four Korales led by Dom Cosmo, Dom Balthazar and Dom Aleixo. Finally, Vijayapala of Matale and Dom Jeronimo Rajapakse led the men of the Seven Korales to positions near the bastion of S. Joao and the sea.<sup>34</sup>

Though the rebel *lascarins* commanders were allowed to lead their men, there is no doubt that the overall command of operations rested with the king and in his absence with the princes. The king himself and Maha Astana seem to have organized supplies and reinforcements for the besieging force, for they made journeys to Kandy twice within the first three months of the struggle.<sup>35</sup>

The numerical strength of the besieging force has been variously estimated but it could not have exceeded fifteen thousand men. A small proportion of the men had muskets but a majority were armed with swords, bows and spears. Save for a few small pieces brought up from Sabaragamuwa and Kalutara, the Sinhalese had no artillery. Neither did they possess war elephants in sufficient numbers to try to batter down the gates of the fort. The odds were therefore more even than the Portuguese chroniclers would have us believe.<sup>36</sup>

Jornada 40

Jornada-Lomba 91

TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.279v, 301

— 200 Portuguese including priests

— less than 300 Portuguese

— 240 Portuguese 60 priests and 20 clerics apart from the garrisons of Kalutara and Malwana.

34. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.276-277 ; JCBRAS XVIII. 226 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 190 ; Queyroz 782

35. JCBRAS XVIII. 170,227 ; Queyroz 781 ; F. de Souza VI. 421 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 189 ; Assentos I. 526 ; AHU Caixa 16 ant 18.1.1644

36. Apart from omitting to mention the Sinhalese levies on the side of the defence most of Portuguese sources exaggerate the numbers of the besie-

The first move of the Sinhalese once they had entrenched themselves was to send a captured Dominican priest on 9 September with a message from the king to Lancarote de Seixas offering permission for the Portuguese to live peacefully in the island in return for the surrender of the fort. The proposition was predictably rejected by de Seixas and the Sinhalese, who had occupied houses within a hundred paces of the walls, began to exchange fire with the Portuguese. Realising however, that their muskets and small arms had little effect on the Portuguese within the fort while the Portuguese artillery inflicted some loss on them, the Sinhalese decided to use their superiority in numbers in a general assault. Accordingly, on 16 September a general attack was delivered on the fort both from the north and the south. The men of the Four and Seven Korales under the direction of Dom Jeronimo and Dom Balthazar delivered the major attack on the north against the bastion of S.Joao. Against the southern walls came the men under Dom Theodosio, reinforced by detachments under *mudaliyar* Abeyasingha Dom Aleixo and Maha Astana himself. The fighting was fierce but the Sinhalese being exposed to Portuguese fire suffered heavy losses and were eventually forced to withdraw.<sup>37</sup>

Having failed to gain the fort by direct assault the Sinhalese now began to construct stockades of wood around northern and north-eastern walls of the fort. These were built up to an elevation higher than the walls of the fort so that they not merely enabled the Sinhalese to protect themselves but also gave them an opportunity to fire at the defenders within the bastions and the walls of the city. Similar use was made of the taller coconut trees which remained within gun-shot of the city's walls, as snipers' posts.

gers. *eg.*,

Queyroz, 782	60,000 men
Jornada 40	60,000 men
F. de Souza VI. 421	50,000 men
AHU 501.f.180	40,000 men
Ajuda 51-V-31.f.76	20,000 men
TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.276v	30,000 men

Queyroz (640) estimates the number of *lascarins* in Kotte in the 1590's at 12,000. By the 1640's the number had fallen to under 5000. (Queyroz 33, Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.266). It is also known that de Sa's attempts to avert the decline had only limited success. Thus despite the high estimate of 13,000 given in Queyroz (770) the number of *lascarins* in de Sa's expeditionary force must have been short of 10,000. Fr. Assumpcao (TT.MS da Liv. 1699.f.276v) says that Senerat brought 7000 Kandyans with him. Even so the total besieging force could not have been over 15,000 men especially as detachments had been sent against Negombo, Galle and Menikkadawara. On exaggeration of enemy forces by Portuguese writers *see* also Goonewardene 54

37. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.287-289 ; Evora CXVI 2-3 ; Queyroz 782 ; Jornada-92 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 190 : AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646 ; AHU Caixa 16 ant 18.1.1644

De Seixas now began to fear that the Sinhalese would mine the city walls. As the fire from the stockades was also restricting movement within the walls, on the 22 September he organized a force of forty Portuguese led by Francisco de Brito and four hundred *lascarins* led by Joao de Abrew and Balthazar Moniz and ordered them to sally from Queen's Gate and destroy the stockade in the north-east. The party took the Sinhalese guards by surprise and successfully executed the mission. The other stockade was also destroyed, but this time by means of a strategem. By the end of September the shortage of food within the fort had become acute and the Portuguese periodically drove numbers of Sinhalese who could not bear arms out of the main gates. The besiegers received their fellow countrymen into their lines. Jorge Coelho de Castro decided to send three loyal *lascarins* with the next batch of people pushed out of the city from the Gate of S.Joao. They were instructed to carry with them three bags of inflammable material, fix them to the stockade and set them on fire. This was successfully executed, for the dry wooden stockade caught fire easily.<sup>38</sup>

The Sinhalese however reconstructed the stockades and began firing into the city once again and the defenders were facing a difficult period when five Portuguese vessels appeared off Colombo on 9 October. The Sinhalese fearing that substantial reinforcements had arrived, gave up their positions and retired a few miles inland. The vessels were only the regular fleet sent to take away the annual consignment of cinnamon, and the captain-major of the squadron, Gaspar Gomez, had no intimation of the siege until he came to Colombo. His arrival, however, marked the end of the first stage of the siege of Colombo, for the Sinhalese having retired from their positions did not henceforth try to invest the city closely. From then on they aimed at restricting the Portuguese to Colombo fort and denying them all supplies, hoping thus to make their stay in Ceylon worthless to them. On the other hand they did not give up hopes of siezing Colombo but merely decided to await more favourable circumstances for a further attack.<sup>39</sup>

The first stage of the siege of Colombo thus ended without a clear victory to either party. The Portuguese could claim some

38. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.289-291 ; Jornada-92-93 ; JCBRAS XVIII. 227 ; AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646 ; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644

39. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.291-291v ; F. de Souza VI. 421 ; Assentos I. 526 ; AHU 510,f,180 ; Jornada-93 ; Queyroz 783 ; R. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 190 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.282,305,379 ; Ajuda 51-V-36.f. 76v ; Fimoteca LM.14.115/2-4 ; AHU Caixa 16 ant, 18.1.1644

measure of success in that they had survived the most dangerous period of initial assaults and had eventually forced the Sinhalese to withdraw some miles inland. Moreover their war casualties were light, amounting to a little more than a dozen Portuguese and a few dozen Sinhalese, while the Sinhalese had lost Dom Simao, the leader of the men of Sabaragamuwa and a much larger number of men. On the other hand the Sinhalese had merely retired to defensible fortified posts within six miles of the city walls and bands of armed men sent from these posts, ambushed any Portuguese foraging parties which ventured beyond the walls. The siege having begun before the harvesting season and moreover having caught the Portuguese by surprise, there soon arose a shortage of food stuffs in the city. Within a month prices had risen five-fold. The poor within the fort began to die in increasing numbers from starvation and disease. The welcome that the Sinhalese gave to those pushed out of the gates had cooled noticeably after the burning of the stockades.<sup>40</sup> Thus the struggle for Colombo was by no means over.

The arrival of one hundred and fifty Portuguese in the cinnamon fleet<sup>41</sup> greatly encouraged de Seixas and the defenders of Colombo, especially as they had hopes of receiving further supplies of men, munitions and provisions from India. When the Sinhalese appeared before Colombo, the Portuguese realising the urgency of summoning aid had sent Manoel Pacheco for this purpose. Pacheco set out from Colombo in a fishing boat on 11 September 1630 and reached Negapatam on the east coast of India by the 16th. He sent a message to the viceroy at Goa, to Dom Filipe Mascarenhas at Cochim and to Dom Bras de Castro, captain-major of the Portuguese fleet of the Coromandel coast. Pacheco himself remained at Negapatam collecting provisions and munitions to aid forts still held by the Portuguese.

On 14 September de Seixas sent a second messenger, Fr. Francisco de Santa Apollonia, a Franciscan, in case Pacheco had been lost on the way. Fr. Santa Apollonia reached Negapatam by the end of the month and left overland for Goa on 8 October to explain matters personally to the viceroy.<sup>42</sup>

40. *Jornada*-88 ; *Queyroz* 783 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II 190 F. de Souza VI.372,421 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.313v, 315

41. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.291-291v ; *Ajuda* 51-VIII-51.ff.282,305,379 ; *Ajuda* 51-V-36.f.76v ; AHU 501.f.180 ; AHU Caixa 16, ant. 18.1. 1644 ; *Assentos* I. 526 ; *Filmoteca* LM.14.115/2-4 ; F. de Souza VI.421 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 190 ; *Queyroz* 783 ; *Jornada*-93

42. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.293-294v ; *Ajuda* 51-VIII-51.f.322

The quickest response to the appeal for aid came from Dom Filipe Mascarenhas, captain of Cochin. He heard the news of the siege on 3 October and immediately prepared to embark on a vessel belonging to one Manoel de Costa, a *casado* of Cochin. His relief force included about seventy *casados* and *soldados* of Cochin and their servants. The ship set out in 9 October and reached Colombo on 16 October. The arrival of Dom Filipe was doubly welcome as he brought six hundred *candils* of rice and three barrels of gunpowder (both of which were in short supply) as well as a quantity of saltpetre.<sup>43</sup>

Meanwhile the viceroy had made great efforts to send a ship with men and supplies to relieve Colombo. As no suitable vessel was available in Goa the viceroy gave orders to unload a *pataxo* belonging to one Ruy Dias de Coutinho which had just arrived from Mocambique and to prepare it for the journey. With some difficulty eighty Portuguese soldiers and twenty sailors were collected and the *pataxo* was loaded with one thousand and two hundred *fardos*<sup>44</sup> of rice, one hundred and twenty barrels of gunpowder, sixty *candils* of wheat, ten barrels of cheese, six barrels of olive oil and five hundred muskets. Having set off from Goa on 17 October, the ship, the *Nossa Senhora da Penha da Franca* under Francisco Ribeiro, the chief pilot of Goa, sailed into Colombo harbour at noon on 1 November. The men abroad were immediately disembarked with their personal belongings but little else was done that day. The Portuguese were to regret this inactivity for during the night a storm broke out which increased in intensity on the following day to such an extent that the cable which held the ship snapped, and the vessel was lost with all supplies on board. This was a great blow. Had the rice been got ashore much of the civilian loss due to hunger and disease, which in the first three months of the siege alone carried off over two thousand five hundred persons, might have been avoided.<sup>45</sup> Soon after this however

43. Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.322 ; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.77 ; Queyroz 783 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.307,312,286v ; TT.LM.29.f.6v ; TT.LM.31.f.44 ; Filmoteca LM.14, 115/116/5-1 ; F. de Souza VI. 374, 421 ; Assentos I. 308,526. Estimates of the size of the reinforcements brought by Dom Filipe range from thirty (Queyroz) to hundred and thirty (Assentos I. 308, Ajuda 51-VIII-51) but Fr. Assumpcao and Assentos I. 526 state the figure of seventy men. *Candil*—500 lbs or 14 bushels

44. *Fardo* is a bale normally 100-125 pounds in weight.

45. AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646 ; AHU Caixa 16 ant, 18.1.1644 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.307v-308v, 313v-316 ; Evora GR.Arm. V-VI. 14-5.f.166 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.290,292,293,294,297,305 ; Filmoteca LM.14. 114/3-5 ; Filmoteca LM.19D. 29/4 ; Queyroz 783 ; Assentos I.298,302, 308,527,529 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II.191 ; Queyroz and the AHU Caixa mention that eighty men arrived from Goa. Fr. Assumpcao

Dom Antonio Mascarenhas arrived with two pinnaces from Malacca bringing two hundred men.<sup>46</sup>

More substantial aid had been expected from the fleet of the Coromandel coast. Dom Bras had left Goa with twelve ships in February 1630 but by September his fleet had been reduced to seven vessels. On receiving the appeal from Ceylon he set out on 19 September but was delayed first by a conflict with a Dutch ship and then by a great storm; on each occasion losing one more ship. When he eventually arrived in Jaffna he sent one of his five remaining vessels with supplies and men to Batticaloa. He himself sailed southwards with the four other ships, and appeared off Negombo on 26 November 1630.<sup>47</sup>

From 9 October 1630 up to 4 January 1632 the Portuguese were more or less continuously confined by the Sinhalese forces to a small area around Colombo. The Sinhalese concentrated on preventing the Portuguese from gaining any supplies from the country. Thus all the land, from the walls of Colombo, to the Sinhalese encampments a few miles away was devastated. On the three main highways to Colombo were posted three groups of *lascarins*—the men of the Four Korales at Nakalagama, Abhayasinha and the men of Sabaragamuwa at S. Sebastiao and Dom Theodosio Barreto on the road to the south. As these men set upon any small group of Portuguese who ventured beyond the walls, the captain-general forbade anyone to leave the city without his permission. However over sixty of the *casados* of Colombo at that time had houses in the area which had become a no man's land, and being anxious to save what articles they could, they sent out their slaves and servants to bring back anything that remained. Moreover, food being increasingly scarce, the Portuguese could hardly resist sending out their servants to look for coconuts and fruits. The Sinhalese sometimes provided bait by allowing cattle to stray within sight of the walls, and then attacked anyone who ventured out to try and seize them.<sup>48</sup>

The Portuguese made several sallies, the most successful being that made on 11 November 1630. On that day de Seixas marched to Nakalagama and defeated the Sinhalese forces on the south bank of the Kelani and forced them to retire across the

estimates one hundred. Filmoteca, Ajuda, Evora, and Assentos estimate between a hundred and hundred and fifty besides thirty sailors.

46. Queyroz 783 ; Ribeiro 94 ; TT.LM.29.f.7

47. Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.305 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.309-309v ; Assentos I. 308,521-523,529 ; Filmoteca LM.14. 62/1-5 ; TT.LM.29.ff.6-6v ; F. de Souza VI. 374 ; Queyroz 783

48. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.300-303v, 292v-293,308v

river. Even on this occasion, however, the Portuguese made no attempt to seize the ferry or pursue the Sinhalese beyond the river.<sup>49</sup> In fact an attack made on 29 November just after the arrival of the fleet of Dom Bras revealed once more the weakness of the Portuguese forces and the uncertain loyalty of the *lascarins* levies. While returning from a successful raid on Sinhalese positions, a group of *lascarins* suddenly jumped into the jungle and opened fire upon the Portuguese, killing two and wounding several others. The Portuguese force did not feel strong enough to do other than beat a hasty retreat.<sup>50</sup>

Meanwhile the viceroy, the conde de Linhares had decided to appoint Dom Filipe Mascarenhas as captain-general of Ceylon, despite the difference of opinion that had existed between them since the viceroy had arrived in India.<sup>51</sup> The viceroy had been looking for a successor from the time that he had heard of the fate of de Sa; the appointment of Lancarote de Seixas as captain-general was obviously meant as a stop-gap, for the viceroy before he had heard of de Sa's valedictory nomination of de Seixas had requested him to take only the title of captain-major.<sup>52</sup> Mascarenhas took over as captain-general in December 1630 and de Seixas continued to serve under him as *vedor*.<sup>53</sup>

When he handed over the captain-generalship to Mascarenhas Lancarote de Seixas had held that office for some three months. All this time had been spent in war with the Sinhalese forces investing Colombo, and though the enemy had been compelled to draw back a few miles, there had been little opportunity for constructive action. The main task of de Seixas had been to ensure the survival of the Portuguese coastal strongholds. He had also exercised the functions of the *vedor*, but here too there was little he could do except by way of retrenchment and economy, notably

49. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.300-303 ; 292v-293, 308v

50. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.303v-306v ; Assentos I. 526 ; Queyroz 783 ; Jornada-93 ; AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646 ; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1646

51. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.310v-311v

52. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.192-194 ; Assentos I. 308. Mascarenhas considered this new appointment an attempt to deprive him of a better post to which he felt he was entitled to.

52. Assentos I. 299,307,526

53. Assentos I.308 ; Queyroz 784 suggests that the citizens of Colombo who did not like Lancarote de Seixas removed him and elected Dom Filipe Mascarenhas and that the viceroy's approval was granted subsequently. There is no evidence to support such a proposition. The viceroy had decided to appoint Dom Filipe as early as 23 October 1630 and even a week earlier de Seixas himself had offered the post to Dom Filipe, who had refused. Assentos I.308,527 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.307v

by reducing the number of *disavas* to two. Jorge Coelho de Castro was appointed *disava* of the Four and Seven Korales. Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo, the nephew of the former viceroy of that name, and de Seixas's own son-in-law, was appointed *disava* of Sabaragamuwa and Matara.<sup>54</sup>

Dom Filipe Mascarenhas had no wish to be captain-general of Ceylon as at this stage he was hoping to gain the captainship of Mocambique as soon as it fell vacant. He therefore wrote immediately to the viceroy asking him to name someone else for the post in Ceylon. Mascarenhas also found that the forces available in Colombo were inadequate for the task they had to perform. The inflow of reinforcements did not improve the situation very much as some of the defenders of Colombo who had come in time of acute danger left that city, now that the Sinhalese had pulled back. The cinnamon fleet and their crew sailed for Goa on 28 November and some of the *casados* whom Dom Filipe himself had brought over from Cochin set off for their homes. The viceroy on the other hand being displeased with Mascarenhas's refusal to serve in Ceylon, thought his requests for reinforcements and supplies inordinately large.<sup>55</sup>

To replace Dom Filipe the viceroy chose Dom Jorge de Almeida who though in his late fifties was willing enough to accept a post which was by no means sought for in Goa. With great difficulty he collected a hundred and sixty nine men including eighty Portuguese and set out on 29 February 1631 in the same Achinese galley that Antonio de Souza Coutinho had brought to Colombo from Malacca in 1630.<sup>56</sup> The galley though large and well armed had been somewhat bettered by long service and war and the viceroy, foreseeing the dangers of a shipwreck, asked the captain of another ship taking provisions to Ceylon to sail within sight of the galley. As it turned out, however, the two vessels were separated in a storm and the galley was lost with all on board save Dom Jorge de Almeida himself and twenty eight others who managed to get into the ship's boat and reached the Maldives. After remaining in the

54. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.313

55. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.193v,396 ; BNL FG. 93).ff.13a,39a ; Assentos I. 528. Dom Filipe had seven hundred and thirty Portuguese troops in 1630. By the end of the year he asked for a further two thousand Portuguese and two thousand others. Until the continuing stalemate forced his hand, the viceroy was prepared to send only two hundred Portuguese and two hundred others.

56. F. de Souza VI. 422 and P. da Trindade III.124 give the date as 23.2.1631 and Queyroz 785 and Ajuda 51-V-36.f.79 say he left Goa on 19.12.1631, but the diary of Conde de Linhares makes it clear that he was still in Goa up to the twenty eighth of February. BNL.FG 939.ff.1a,3a,4a,5a



islands for about a month de Almeida and his companions made their way to Cochin but soon after arrival there, de Almeida fell sick and took several months to recover. It was not until 17 October that de Almeida was able to recruit new troops, collect provisions and begin his second attempt to reach Ceylon. Thus for the major part of 1631 Dom Filipe Mascarenhas remained captain-general of Ceylon.<sup>57</sup>

During this period Mascarenhas had great difficulty in obtaining funds to pay the troops, being driven eventually to borrow money from the *misericordia* of Colombo for the purpose.<sup>58</sup> He was also put to great straits to find sufficient food for the city, for all north India, both on the east and west coasts was at this time in the grip of famine. He was active militarily, often venturing out of the fort to skirmish with the Sinhalese, but though he once penetrated as far as Panadura, sixteen miles south of Colombo, he was unable to dislodge the Sinhalese from the two great stockades they had built six miles east of Colombo on either side of the Kelani river.<sup>59</sup>

The Sinhalese on their part had not yet abandoned the hope of seizing Colombo. What they had failed to obtain through force, they attempted to gain through guile. They negotiated with Vicente da Silva, a captain of the *lascarins* to let the king's forces into the fort at Queen's Gate. The reasons which impelled da Silva to agree to the plan are not clear for he was one of those who fled from Wellawaya and brought the news of the defeat of de Sa. He is said to have been the first *lascarin* of the army of de Sa to reach Colombo. According to Queyroz, he was moved by the promise of the *disavaship* of Matara or alternatively the governorship of Jaffna. In any case, the plan came to nought for a *mudaliyar* called Ekanayake revealed the plot to Francisco de Brito de Almeida who had da Silva shot from the mouth of a cannon to instil terror into would-be deserters.<sup>60</sup>

The viceroy was by this time getting increasingly concerned regarding the situation in Ceylon. Eight months had passed by since the defeat of de Sa and forces amounting to over nine hundred men and provisions and munitions had been sent to Ceylon at a cost of over eighty five thousand Goa *xerafims*. Yet the Portuguese

57. Queyroz 785 ; F. de Souza VI. ff. 422-425 ; P. da Trindade III. 123-126 ; Ajuda 51-V-36. ff. 76-9- ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51. f. 419 ; BNL. FG. 939. ff. 1a, 3a, 23a, 28a, 29a, 39a ; Botelho de Souza III. 488 ; TT. LM. 29. ff. 6v, 37, 197

58. The *Santa casa da misericordia* or the Holy house of mercy was an institution assigned to relieve the suffering of the poor and the needy.

59. Queyroz 783 ; Jornada 77 ; BNL. FG. 939. f. 13a ; BNL. FG. 7640. f. 7v ; V. A. Smith—*Oxford history of India*, (Oxford 1961) 377-378

60. Queyroz 784 ; Jornada 77 ; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644

in Kotte were still restricted to the three forts of Colombo, Galle and Negombo and no prospect of a victory seemed in sight. There was as yet no news from Dom Jorge de Almeida and his galley and it was feared that he and his men were all lost. Disputes had arisen between the *vedor* Lancarote de Seixas and the captain-general Dom Filipe Mascarenhas. Hardly any cinnamon had arrived from Ceylon since the cinnamon fleet of 1629 and this represented a loss of seventy thousand *xerafims* a year, if not more. Therefore on 14 May 1631 the viceroy suggested in council that he himself should go to Ceylon with a force of one thousand and two hundred Portuguese and two thousand other troops as soon as the annual fleet arrived from Lisbon. The galleons of the fleet themselves were to be used for the transport of the forces. The viceroy intended this expedition to have a twofold purpose. The first most important was to recover the lands of Kotte and to conquer the kingdom of Kandy, thus completing the conquest of the island. A subsidiary objective was the expulsion of the Dutch from Pulicat for which a force was to be sent to join Diogo de Mello, captain of the Coromandel coast, after the subjugation of Ceylon. The plan was a bold one and if successfully executed could have dealt a heavy blow to the expansion of Dutch power on the Coromandel coast. The loss of Pulicat would also have hurt the cloth trade of the Dutch which was so vital to their economic relations with the East Indies. From the Kandyan point of view the arrival of such a large Portuguese force would have presented that kingdom with a challenge it might well have found difficult to overcome.

The scheme however depended on the safe and early arrival of the fleet from Portugal. As the galleons were expected to start their return journey to Portugal by December-January, time became a very important factor, for unless the galleons left Goa for Ceylon before the end of September they would not have time to return safely before the north-east monsoon set in. During the five months from May to September the viceroy made elaborate preparations for the expedition, recruiting over one thousand two hundred Canarese from Bardes, Salsete and Goa as well as about five hundred Kaffirs. One thousand Parava Christians were expected from the Fishery Coast. By the end of August 1631 the viceroy's advisers had convinced him that it was better not to risk the galleons in the north-east monsoon winds and that his expedition should sail from Goa in the faster *pataxos* which could more easily avoid an attack by a Dutch fleet. Eventually, the reinforcements which the viceroy expected from Portugal in the annual

fleet failed to arrive even by the first week of October, and the viceroy reluctantly gave up his grandiose plan. As an alternative he decided to send all possible aid to de Almeida to help him to recover the lost territories. It was with this objective that on 6 October two *pataxos* were sent from Goa with three hundred and thirty seven Canarese and a hundred Kaffirs to join Dom Jorge de Almeida at Cochin with instructions to proceed to Ceylon. On 13 October four other ships with supplies of food, money and munitions as well as eighty Portuguese, eight hundred Canarese and two hundred Kaffirs sailed directly from Goa to Colombo.<sup>61</sup> A few days later the viceroy-in-council decided to send the fleet of Dom Alvaro de Castro to serve in Ceylon. This fleet of ten ships with almost two thousand men was originally intended for Malacca but the viceroy apparently decided that it was more urgently needed in Ceylon. With the arrival of Dom Alvaro on 17 October and Dom Jorge de Almeida on 21 October, the Portuguese after a year's defensive activity were once more on a position to attack.<sup>62</sup>

The landward blockade of Colombo, only broken in January 1632 when the Portuguese advanced up the Kelani valley, had lasted sixteen months. During that time the Sinhalese had lost a few hundred men in battle, the Portuguese perhaps rather less. The Portuguese *casados* lost their villages and possessions. But the real sufferers were the Sinhalese Christians who had remained within the fort. Without any form of equitable rationing or adequate medical service over four thousand of them died of disease and starvation.<sup>63</sup>

Meanwhile the forts of Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Negombo and Galle had continued to be held by Portuguese troops against the attacks of the Sinhalese forces. Trincomalee fort itself was not frontally attacked, though its captain Francisco de Mello de Noronha and his seventy men were ready to face an assault. The chief aspect of the conflict here was the naval one, for the king of Kandy, being the master of most of Ceylon, tried to export its produce to obtain valued munitions of war in return. The dozen

61. Ajuda 51-V-36.ff.90v,210 ; JCBRAS XXX.95-96 ; Assentos I. 347-350,353,359,366-376,379-381,354-355 ; TT.LM 29.ff.37v-38,91,103,127,133,141 ; Filmoteca LM.17.13/2-2,14/4 ; BNL.FG 939.ff.25a, 26a,27a, 29a,31a,38a,39a,43a,45a,48a,49a,54a,59a,64a,65a,71a,73a,77a,81a

62. Ajuda 51-V-36.f.90v ; BNL.FG 7640.f.117 ; Queyroz 791. Queyroz implies that Dom Alvaro de Castro arrived in Ceylon after de Almeida but in fact Dom Alvaro arrived earlier and served under Dom Filipe Mascarenhas for a few days. Dom Jorge de Almeida took over his post only on 24 October 1631. Simancas SP.1530.f.59v

63. Jornada-88 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 190 ; Queyroz 783 ; F. de Souza VI. 373,421 ; TT Ms da Liv 1699.f.315

Portuguese ships based on Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Jaffna made it their task not merely to supply the besieged forts with provisions but also to impede the commercial ventures of the Kandyans and their Muslim allies.<sup>64</sup> The captain of Batticaloa, Manoel Pessoa de Carvalho, did have to face a Kandyan attack, but by January 1631 he had received enough reinforcements to raid the nearby villages on the mainland. In August 1631 his successor Theodosio Affonso da Gama made a raid further inland.<sup>65</sup>

Galle and Negombo faced heavier onslaughts. In early September a part of the rebel forces numbering about five hundred men was placed under Andre Godinho, a native of Colombo and directed to attack Galle. The captain of the fort Joao Teixeira Meireles had about sixty Portuguese including *soldados*, *casados* and priests, besides a few hundred *lascarins* under his command and these, with the artillery of the fort, proved to be sufficient to keep the Sinhalese at bay. However, realising that the force they saw might be merely the vanguard of a stronger force, the Portuguese prepared for a longer siege. As Meireles was old and unable to direct the forces actively, he was replaced by common consent by a *casado*, Antonio da Cunha till a new captain was named from Colombo. Da Cunha appealed to Colombo for aid and de Seixas sent him twenty men with powder, shot and saltpetre in three fishing boats. In October after the arrival of Dom Filipe Mascarenhas in Colombo, de Seixas sent a further reinforcement of ten men with provisions and some time later twenty more in a ship under Dom Lourenco Sotomayor.

While the Portuguese garrison was thus being strengthened the Sinhalese forces outside had increased in number. As communications with Colombo were being carried on by means of *tones* or fishing boats the Sinhalese tried to prevent these boats from leaving the port. The Portuguese could not allow this threat to their communications, especially as it would have also meant the end of the valuable supply of fresh fish that the fishermen brought in. So they sent armed guards with their fishing boats and beat off the Sinhalese vessels. Failing in this venture the besiegers tried to persuade the *lascarins* to deliver the fort to them. The plot was well advanced when the accidental death of a *lascarin* revealed the existence of the scheme.<sup>66</sup> The ring leaders were promptly

64. AHU 445.f.55 ; AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655 ; Simancas SP. 1530.f.11v. Filmoteca LM. 20.9-10/4-2 ; AHU 501.f.124

65. Simancas SP.1530.f.11v ; Queyroz 785 ; Ahu 501.f.379

66. Fr. Assumpcao relates how a Portuguese let off his gun accidentally and killed a *lascarin*. While the *lascarin* was being carried away a palm

executed.<sup>67</sup>

By April 1631, Galle had gained many reinforcements and the garrison was organised under Dom Antonio Mascarenhas, the captain-major of the forces at Galle, who organised attacks on the villages near the fort. In this he was assisted by the new captain of Galle, Manoel Pinto and the two leaders attacked Kathaluwa, Welitota and Weligama. They also made raids on other coastal towns up to Devinuwara. Despite these efforts however, the Portuguese in Galle, like those in Colombo, remained more or less confined to the fort up to early 1632.<sup>68</sup>

Negombo had a stronger force than the other outlying Portuguese forts chiefly because the captain, Lourenco Teixeira de Macedo had acted swiftly on hearing the news of the defeat of the Portuguese army in 1630. He had immediately recruited five hundred men of the Seven Korales to aid the forty Portuguese in the fort and was thus able to keep control of the surrounding villages and obtain provisions from them long after the commencement of the siege of Colombo. In October 1630 a force of one thousand five hundred Sinhalese led by Dom Jeronimo Rajapaksa and the prince of Matale was sent to attack Negombo but this force was beaten off by the *lascarins* led by Manoel Gil, a *casado* of Colombo who was at the time serving in Negombo. As the Sinhalese continued to attack across the river as well as on the landward side of the fort and laid siege to it, Lourenco Teixeira appealed for help from Colombo and was sent twenty men under Jorge Fernandes de Abreu.

De Seixas had also meanwhile devised a stratagem. He told Lourenco that when Dom Bras de Castro appeared with his fleet he was to ask that all the men be landed secretly and arrange that the ship should sail away the following day. Then with all his forces together with those of Dom Bras he was to attack the Sinhalese who were entrenched before the fort, hoping to catch them by surprise. However when Dom Bras appeared on 26 November the plan fell through as neither he nor Lourenco Teixeira was willing to take charge of the operation as both feared to take responsibility for the task. The Sinhalese profiting by the Portuguese delay brought in reinforcements and Dom Bras de Castro eventually left without accomplishing anything. Negombo remained besieged

letter hidden in his clothes fell out. This revealed a plot to betray the fort.

67. TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.296v-298v ; 312v ; Filmoteca LM.14,115/1-2 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.303

68. Simancas SP.1530.f.11v ; P. da Trindade III. 115

by five hundred men up to the end of 1631 during which period the Sinhalese made several attacks on the fort without success.<sup>69</sup>

In the north the feared Kandyan invasion of Jaffna with the aid of south Indian troops did not materialize and the Jaffna peninsula itself remained securely in Portuguese hands. The rumours of an attack were however sufficiently strong to make all the priests take refuge in the fort of Jaffna. The Kandyans did attack Mannar whose captain Francisco Telles de Menezes beat off their assaults, but apart from this, all that the captain-major of Jaffna Miguel Pereira Borralho (1630-1633) had to contend with were a few skirmishes in the Vanni region. However, the work of conversion, always a good index of Portuguese authority, was not resumed till 1632.<sup>70</sup>

Everywhere the Portuguese held their ground through 1631, beating off attacks and in some places counter-raiding with gradually increasing freedom. With their command of the sea they were able to deny to the king of Kandy any great extension of his trade with the outside world which would have enabled him to arm his troops effectively. They were also able to bring in troops in increasing numbers in preparation for a struggle for the domains of Kotte. With the crossing of the Kelani river by the Portuguese army on 5 January 1632, that struggle was begun. Contrary to what Queyroz states,<sup>71</sup> de Almeida did not delay for two months in Colombo awaiting the outcome of negotiations for peace. Such negotiations did not in fact commence till August 1632. The delay is better explained by the cautious disposition of de Almeida himself. The heavy rains which fell in November and December had made the countryside marshy and de Almeida favoured waiting for better weather and making use of the time thus made available for the reorganization of the armed forces and the collection of supplies and munitions. Miguel Fernao de Castelbranco was appointed the captain-major-of-the-field and Dom Antonio Mascarenhas, Jorge Coelho de Castro, Antonio da Motta da Galvao and Antonio Barbosa were made *disavas* of the Seven Korales, Four Korales, Matara and Sabaragamuwa respectively.<sup>72</sup>

De Almeida's major problem was that of supply, for there was

69. BNL.FG 939.f.1a ; 7940.f.7 ; AHU 501.ff.9.379 ; Assentos I.529 ; TT.LM.31.ff.42-43 ; AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699. ff.296v,298v-299,309-310v ; TT.LM.29.f.125v ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f. 309

70. Assentos I. 529 ; BNL.FG 7640.ff.7-8

71. Queyroz 791

72. Ajuda 51-V-36.ff.91v-95 ; BNL FG. 7640.f.17 ; Queyroz 791-792 TT.LM.29.f.219 ; F. de Souza VI. 425-426

a great lack of coolies. As his first target was the Kelani valley he hoped to circumvent this problem by using ships sailing up-river as transports of food and munitions. He therefore asked Andre Coelho for six of his smaller vessels to be made ready for the task. This was the first time the Portuguese had used sea-going vessels on a river in Ceylon for military purposes. The success of the experiment itself was a limited one, for one of the six caught fire, another ran aground and two more failed to proceed beyond a few miles from the river mouth.<sup>73</sup>

To understand de Almeida's military plans it is essential to review the defence plans of the Sinhalese. The Kelani valley was not merely a fertile agricultural region but the main route from Colombo to the highlands. The king of Kandy was therefore determined to hold it and for this purpose had built stockades to form two lines of defence. About six miles to the east of Colombo were two large stockades of wood and mud on either side of the river. These were fortified by several pieces of artillery captured from the Portuguese. The second line of defence was a fort at Kaduwala to the south of Kelani and another at Malwana to the north. A few miles west of Malwana yet another stockade had been built to strengthen this system. The forces of the Four and the Seven Korales reinforced by a strong contingent of Kandyans under Maha Astana and Vijayapala were ready to defend these places. De Almeida's plan—somewhat conditioned by his supply problem—was to advance eastwards along the northern bank up to Malwana and then to cross the river and return along the southern bank destroying all the forts on the way.

Leaving a strong force to garrison Colombo, de Almeida took with him four thousand men, one third of them Portuguese, one third *lascarins* and the rest Kaffirs and Canarese. He marched eastwards along the northern bank with great caution. The two stockades on the northern bank were taken after heavy fighting on 7 and 8 January 1632 and de Almeida reached Malwana, twelve miles from Colombo on the ninth, four days after he had set out. The Sinhalese recognising the strength of his force did not offer open battle and at Malwana, Maha Astana abandoned the fort, doubtless hoping to draw de Almeida further away from his base. The old soldier, however, stuck to his plans and having successfully attacked and demolished the stockades on the southern bank stationed himself with his forces a few miles outside Colombo where he sent his sick and wounded. Having thus secured fourteen

73. Ajuda 51-V-36. ff. 95-96v; Queyroz 792; F. de Souza VI-426—427

villages within a dozen miles of Colombo de Almeida turned to the Rayigam, Salpiti and Pasdun Korales.<sup>74</sup>

During this period de Almeida took great pains to ensure the loyalty of the *lascarins* for he realised that this was the key to the conquest of the lands of Ceylon. Those who brought back heads of the Sinhalese killed in battle were given liberal rewards on the spot.<sup>75</sup> With the seizure of the stockades a special bonus of ten *xerafims* was presented to each of the *lascarins*. One of the newly conquered villages was ceremoniously handed over to a *lascarin*. Those who returned to obedience were given red berets as a sign of approval.<sup>76</sup> On the other hand the rebels once captured, were treated roughly. Many were distributed as slaves and servants to the captains and *mudaliyars* and one was even handed over to the cannibal Kaffirs who killed and devoured him in front of his own family.<sup>77</sup>

By now the Sinhalese were organized into two main mobile units—the army of the west and the army of the south. The first consisted of the men of the Four and Seven Korales aided by forces of Maha Astana and Vijayapala. The second was led by Kumarsinghe and Dom Theodosio and was made up of men from Matara, Sabaragamuwa and Uva. After posting a garrison to protect Colombo from sudden attack, de Almeida attempted to subjugate the Four and Seven Korales. The Sinhalese army of the west led by the two princes was defeated at Daladagamwela and Methiangane, and in the latter conflict Vijayapala narrowly avoided capture. It was to contain this advance that the two princes called in the forces of the south. To meet this combined force de Almeida advanced at Vadaruwa, sixteen miles west of Methiangane where he fortified his position with a stockade. Once more, however, fortune favoured the Portuguese, for Dom Theodosio fell out with the princes and retired to Kalutara pursued by a force of Kandyans led by Kumarasinghe.<sup>78</sup>

The reasons for the estrangement between Dom Theodosio and the princes are not clear. Dom Theodosio during the past two years had emerged as the strongest of the rebel leaders. Senerat had made him *disava* of Matara and Dom Theodosio set up his

74. BNL.FG. 7640.ff.17-18 ; Ajuda 51-V-36.ff.97-108 ; Queyroz 792 Jornada 79 ; F. de Souza VI.427-429 ; AHU 501.ff.4.38

75. Ajuda 51-V-36.f.97 ; F. de Souza VI. 427

76. Ajuda 51-V-36.ff.100v-101v

77. Ibid. f.102 ; F. de Souza VI.428 ; Queyroz 792

78. Queyroz 794-785 ; Jornada 80 ; BNL FG. 7640.f.118 ; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.107v ; AHU 501.ff.16v,47 ; M. D. Raghavan—*The Karava of Ceylon ; society and culture* (Colombo 1961) 27



headquarters at Devinuwara where he rebuilt the ancient temple. It may well have been that he resented the authority of Kumarasinghe who had been designated king of Matara by his father. The loyalty of the men of Matara were to Dom Theodosio and not to Kumarasinghe, the nominal king, and this may have made cooperation between the two difficult. It may also have been that Dom Theodosio disagreed with the strategy of the princes who wanted to concentrate all his forces on the Kelani for that left his own principality open to Portuguese attacks.<sup>79</sup>

The results of the break were decisive. Dom Theodosio's troops amounted to nearly four thousand men-about a third of the forces the Sinhalese had on the field. Finding himself besieged in Kalutara by the Kandyans under the prince of Uva, Dom Theodosio offered to submit to the Portuguese. De Almeida accepted the offer and sent Antonio da Motta Galvao with troops to aid him, whereupon Kumarasinghe withdrew to Uva. Thus the whole *disava* of Matara passed into Portuguese hands with little difficulty.<sup>80</sup>

At sea too, the Portuguese soon began to reassert their power. Shortly after raising the blockade of Colombo, de Almeida appointed Francisco Tenreiro as captain-major of the coasts of Ceylon with instructions to disrupt the trade the Kandyans had started with south Indian merchants. By this time Chilaw had become a centre of exchange for arecanut, cinnamon and elephants for rice, saltpetre and cloth from south India. The Portuguese raided Chilaw twice. On the first occasion the traders received a warning which enabled them to escape but on the second one hundred and thirty vessels fell into the hands of the Portuguese. The three ports of Matara, Devinuwara and Alutgama were also attacked and put to the flames.<sup>81</sup>

During the second half of 1632 de Almeida took measures for the collection of revenue from the areas recovered. Captains were appointed to the ports of Kalutara, Alutgama and Weligama.<sup>82</sup> De Almeida also attempted to organise the cinnamon peelers for the collection of this spice. It was this step which brought him into conflict with the Franciscans. The Franciscans claimed that all the properties of those who had abjured Christianity and died

79. F. de Souza VI. 431 ; Queyroz 794-795 ; AHU 501.ff.236v ; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.107v

80. F. de Souza VI. 430 ; Queyroz 795 ; Jornada 80 ; AHU 445.f.55

81. AHU 501.ff.16v,38,47v,199,236v ; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.108 ; Queyroz 795 ; BNL.FG.7640.f.17 ; TT.LM.32.f.270 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.309,402 ; BNL.FG 939.f.59a

82. Filmoteca LM.15, 20-21/2-5

in the war should be confiscated while Dom Jorge de Almeida refused to enforce this measure due to the need to attract men back to the lowlands. The dispute soon degenerated into a personal one between one of the Franciscans and the captain-general.<sup>83</sup>

It was not that de Almeida had hitherto lacked enemies. He was old and infirm,<sup>84</sup> and in the campaigns over the marshy Kelani valley he had to be carried in a palanquin.<sup>85</sup> For this he was subjected to criticism by the soldiers as unwarlike in conduct. The soldiers had little appreciation of the engineering skill he displayed in the construction of the bastion of Mapane,<sup>86</sup> while he lost respect also due to his extreme caution in the field. He was charged for rewarding his friends liberally while those who served in the army were forgotten.<sup>87</sup> The unpopularity of his associates certainly reflected on him. He was seen as an old man surrounding himself with other old men, unaware of the needs of the army and of the *casados*.<sup>88</sup> Perhaps his greatest fault was that he was moved to anger easily.<sup>89</sup> It was this that led him into altercations with his subordinates, in one of which a *casado* was killed, while the general himself was twice injured.<sup>90</sup>

To add to de Almeida's difficulties a violent tempest on 29 November 1632 damaged many buildings and brought down some of the walls of the fort of Colombo. The lake overflowed and the rains continued until only the Franciscan monastery and a small church remained undamaged. The annual fleet sent out to Ceylon to take cinnamon to Goa was lost with many other vessels that were in the harbour.<sup>91</sup> Moreover the Portuguese forces having been weakened by the departure of the fleets of Andre Coelho, Dom Alvaro de Castro and Dom Bras da Castro during the course of 1632,<sup>92</sup> were checked after they had recovered Matara, a part of

83. TT.LM.31.ff.595-597 ; TT.LM.30.ff.253, 264v ; TT.LM.36.f.443 ; TT.LM.37.f.375 ; Fimoteca LM.20. 36/2 ; Evora GR Arm.V-VI. 14-5.f. 108-109

84. TT.LM.35.f.37 ; TT.LM.36.f.13 ; Queyroz 797

85. Ajuda 51-V-36.f.96v

86. Queyroz 797

87. *Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India*, 63

88. At least two of his officers Lancarote de Seixas (*vedor*) and Manoel Freire de Andrade (captain of Colombo) were very old and very corrupt.

89. TT.LM.35.f.37. De Almeida himself was above corruption, but the suggestion in Queyroz 797 that efforts to check corruption may have caused his unpopularity had no further evidence to support it.

90. Queyroz 797 ; F. de Souza VI.431 ; Jornada 78-79 ; TT.LM.30.ff. 158, 253 ; Ajuda 50-V-38.f.184v

91. BNL.FG 7640.f.66 ; Fimoteca LM 19a 22/2-3 ; TT.LM.31.f.199 ; TT.LM.30.f.264v ; AHU 501.f.326 ; JCBRAS XXX 97

92. The viceroy did send reinforcements when the annual fleet arrived in 1632 (Fimoteca LM 19a.17/1) but these were too few. Evora GR.Arm. V-VI.14-5.ff.84-85

Sabaragamuwa, the coastal sector of the Seven Korales and the Kelani valley up to Pitigaldeniya.<sup>93</sup> Though de Almeida recruited many *lascarins* to compensate for the decline in the number of Portuguese, by 1633 he had lost the confidence of the clergy, the *casados* and the army.<sup>94</sup> On the receipt of this news and on the complaints of the *casados* of Colombo the viceroy decided to recall Dom Jorge de Almeida and replace him with Diogo de Mello de Castro, captain of the Coromandel coast.<sup>95</sup>

Meanwhile negotiations for peace had started between the Portuguese and the king of Kandy. The Portuguese successes on land and sea in 1632 had made Senerat willing to consider peace. He and his people were weary after five years of continuous warfare. Though the Portuguese blockade of Kandyan trade was by no means complete, supplies of food were irregular and sometimes salt was in short supply. Senerat himself was ageing and saw divisions arising within the Sinhalese ranks. Dom Theodosio had already rejoined the Portuguese. The prince of Matale was becoming increasingly discontented with the favours shown to Maha Astana. In fact Vijayapala had already attempted to desert to the Portuguese by marching to Batticaloa with some of his men and twenty two prisoners. It was only the opposition of his own men that had stopped him from doing so. Finally, the Kandyan efforts to seize Mannar and Jaffna had been effectively checked by Miguel Pereira Borralho, captain-major of Jaffna (1630-1633). In fact by 1631 Borralho had begun raids into the Kandyan controlled Vanni districts.<sup>96</sup>

By August 1632 the viceroy too had realized the advisability of a peaceful settlement. The past two years had been difficult ones for the Portuguese in the east. In 1630 the loss of Nuno Alvares Botelho with his high seas fleet in the straits of Malacca had been added to the defeat of Constantino de Sa in Ceylon. In 1631 came disorders on the Zambesi with over three hundred Portuguese deaths and the loss of Mombaca to the rebellious forces of Dom Jeronimo Chingulia. No aid arrived from Portugal in 1631,<sup>97</sup> and in Bengal the Portuguese were heading for direct

93. P. da Trindade III. 118

94. *Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India*, 21-65 ; Queyroz 796

95. BNL.FG 7640.f.61 ; Evora CXVI/2-3.f.114 ; Ajuda 50-V-38.f.182v

96. AHU 501.ff.38,379 ; Filmoteca LM. 15. 20/21/2-5 ; AHU Caixa 22, 4.8.1634. P. E. Peiris—*Prince Vijayapala of Matale 1634-1654* (Colombo 1927) 25.

97. E. Axelson—*The Portuguese in South Africa, 1600-1700*, (Johannesburg 1960) 76-77, 86-87 ; C. R. Boxer (ed) *Commentaries of Ruy Freire de Andrade* (London 1929) 315

conflict with Mughal authorities. In such circumstances a peace treaty was obviously desirable. It would release the two hundred Portuguese prisoners held by the king of Kandy and free other troops tied up in Ceylon for services elsewhere. Peace would also bring to an end the outpouring of men and material to Ceylon which had cost over two hundred thousand *xerafims* in the last two years, and would permit the exportation once again of such lucrative commodities as cinnamon and arecanut.<sup>98</sup> Within Ceylon the *casados* represented by the *camara* of Colombo were strongly in favour of peace. Two years of campaigns in Kotte had deprived them of their major source of income—the revenue from the villages. The rising cost of foodstuffs was an added blow. To the *casados* of Ceylon therefore peace represented their chance to return to normalcy and prosperity.<sup>99</sup>

While willingness to suspend war existed on both sides, difficulties arose regarding the terms of peace. The two main issues in dispute were the possession of Batticaloa and the payment of tribute. After preliminary soundings through Fr. Antonio Peixoto, de Almeida sent an ambassador<sup>100</sup> to offer Senerat peace on the terms of 1617 on condition he agreed to Batticaloa remaining in Portuguese hands. Senerat on the other hand held that Batticaloa was a part of his kingdom and refused to pay any tribute in the future.

As the Portuguese envoy would not agree, Senerat dismissed him and decided to send an embassy to Goa. The decision to send envoys to Goa was also influenced by another factor. Senerat considered that a treaty made directly with the viceroy would not be set aside with impunity by a subsequent captain-general. De Sa's disregard of the treaty of 1617 apparently disillusioned him on treaties made with the captain-general. Jayasundara Mudaliyar, *disava* of Udunuwara and Kuruppu Rala were chosen as the king's envoys. Domingos Carvalho Cao, Gaspar da Costa and Miguel de Fonseca accompanied them as the king's procurators while Dom Diogo was the official interpreter.<sup>101</sup>

Cao, a veteran soldier of Ceylon tried to persuade the viceroy

98. BNL.FG 939.f.139a ; TT.LM.29.f.197 ; TT.LM.30.ff.108,264v ; BNL.FG 7640.f.7 ; Filmoteca LM.16.43-44/4-1 ; Queyroz 786 ; F. de Souza VI. 425

99. Evora CXVI 2-3 f.114

100. Jornada 72 and Queyroz 790 name the ambassador as Jeronimo Taveira. Biker II. 49 and 3CLR ser.III.352 name him as Jeronimo Oliveira da Cunha.

101. CLR 3 ser.III.291-293 ; P. da Trindade III. 118-120 ; Biker II. 38-40, 47 ; Evora CXVI/2-3 f.114 ; Assentos I.573 Assentos I. names the interpreter as Dom Rodrigo. So does Biker II.38, but Biker II.47 names him as Dom Diogo.

that leniency was the best guarantee of a stable peace with Kandy. The former sergeant-major, Miguel de Fonseca opposed this view arguing that leniency would be taken for weakness. Ambrosio da Freitas da Camara who had had differences with Cao while serving in Ceylon was also an advocate of the policy of hard negotiation. As Ambrosio de Freitas was the only person in the viceroy's council with a first hand knowledge of Ceylon his influence must have been decisive in the council meeting of 11.3.1633 which resolved that neither Batticaloa nor the tribute could be dispensed with for the sake of peace.<sup>102</sup> As the Portuguese stood firm the Sinhalese envoys were compelled to yield and on 3 April 1633 they signed a treaty involving both payment of tribute and the cession of Batticaloa. Senerat was to pay two elephants a year to the Portuguese apart from the arrears of tribute for the past seven years. However for the first six years after the signing of the treaty this payment was limited to one elephant a year.<sup>103</sup> The fort of Batticaloa and all land within two thousand paces or an artillery shot from the walls was to belong to the Portuguese. The revenue from the customs duties was to be shared.<sup>104</sup>

The viceroy also refused to agree *in toto* to two other proposals of Senerat. Senerat had suggested that those who fled from the Portuguese to Kandy or *vice versa* should be allowed to live in the land they wished to. The viceroy, probably realising the problems this would create in time of a rising in Kotte, included the proviso that this would apply only to persons who had not committed treason.<sup>105</sup> Senerat had also requested letters of authority for his ships to trade on the high seas, with the protection of the Portuguese but here the viceroy inserted a clause which meant that control of the trade in arms and ammunition remained in Portuguese hands.<sup>106</sup>

Thus the draft treaty of 1633 while it ceded Batticaloa to the Portuguese, awarded Senerat little more than what he had obtained in 1617. He still remained a vassal of Portugal. It is true that he now had specific permission to trade in goods other than arms. Moreover at his insistence a clause had been inserted stipulating that no captain-general could make war without pre-

102. Assentos I. 467-468 ; CLR 3 ser.III.291 ; Queyroz 790-791 ; Ajuda 50-V-38.f.181

103. Clause 9. Records of the treaty negotiations are available in Portuguese in Assentos I.573-577 and Biker II. 42-47 and in English translation in CLR 3 ser III. 291-295,350-354,402-405.

104. Clauses 7 and 8

105. Clause 3

106. Clause 7

sending good reasons for doing so to the viceroy.<sup>107</sup> But these were small comforts after six years of war. It is not surprising therefore, that Senerat rejected the terms agreed to by the envoys at Goa.

There was considerable speculation in the Portuguese camp as to what reasons prompted Senerat to take this step. One of them was probably the sudden arrest of Dom Theodosio by the Portuguese at the end of 1632. The Portuguese probably never forgave Dom Theodosio for his role at Randeniwela. His opponents within the Portuguese camp were led by Fr. Antonio Peixoto who had suspected Dom Theodosio's fidelity even in the days of de Sa. Antonio de Motta da Galvao with whom Dom Theodosio had never been on good terms was now appointed as his superior. When Senerat offered to negotiate for peace and his envoys set out for Goa, Dom Theodosio's value to the Portuguese diminished greatly. On the first rumour of treachery therefore he was arrested and sent to Goa for trial. To Senerat, Dom Theodosio's fall was a relief. It ensured at least for the time being the loyalty of the other rebels and weakened the Portuguese hold over the *lascarins* of Matara who no doubt resented the arrest of their respected leader.<sup>108</sup> Another factor which may have swayed Senerat was the paucity of the Portuguese reinforcements. As the considerable Portuguese forces sent from Goa in late 1631 to recover Ceylon and Mombaca had not been made up by the arrival of fresh troops from Lisbon there was not much the viceroy could have done to make up the deficiency. The year 1632 had not seen many Portuguese successes in the east, save in Ceylon. The Mughal siege of the Portuguese fort at Hugli (June to September 1632) had ended with the abandonment of their position by the Portuguese after three hundred of their number as well as seven hundred native Christians had been killed. In both 1632 and 1633 the Dutch were active in the Arabian sea and in the latter year alone five of the Portuguese ships trading between Ceylon and Goa fell into their hands.<sup>109</sup> But the weakness of the Portuguese forces was at most a contributory factor to Senerat's decision. The chief reason was, without doubt, the insistence of the Portuguese on the retention of

107. Clause 6. If the captain-general did not observe this clause the king of Kandy was expected to inform the viceroy through the *camara* of Colombo.

108. Queyroz 796 ; CLR 3 ser.III.291 ; P. da Trindade III.117 ; The other rebel leaders never returned to the Portuguese side. Dom Balthazar became a trusted counsellor of Rajasinha, and died in battle in 1640. (see Goonewardena 26,40.)

109. Jornada 75 ; Queyroz 798 ; Ajuda 51-V-38.f.183v ; JCBRAS XXX. 97 ; V. Smith—*Oxford history of India*, (Oxford 1961) 379-380

Batticaloa. From the Kandyan point of view the main reason for the outbreak of war in 1628 was the unauthorised construction of a Portuguese fort on Kandyan soil in Batticaloa. Furthermore it was apparent that this fort was built to control and restrict Kandyan trade and foreign relations.

Thus when Diogo de Mello arrived at Colombo on 22 November 1633 to take up his appointment as captain-general he was faced with the prospect of continued war. With great efforts he was able to muster four hundred Portuguese, a thousand Kaffirs, Canarese and five thousand *lascarins* for his mobile army.<sup>110</sup> The Sinhalese at this time were organized into two armies : that of Maha Astana and Vijayapala defending the upper regions of the Four Korales and that of Kumarasinghe which fought in Matara. Maha Astana fortified himself at Attapitiya and Vijayapala at Moratenna while the king himself was reported to be at Ganetenna on the Kandyan frontier.<sup>111</sup> The military situation had not apparently changed very greatly for de Mello had no more troops than de Almeida had but de Mello was able to unite all elements behind him and though perhaps less gifted as a tactician he probably inspired the troops with his greater aggressiveness. He seized the stockade at Moratenna and marching up to Attapitiya made ready to attack the positions held by Maha Astana who had been joined by the king and the two other princes. The Kandyans had sixteen thousand men ready for battle but de Mello's venture was a success, for Maha Astana after vain efforts to extract better terms agreed without fighting to ratify the draft treaty drawn up in Goa.<sup>112</sup>

If the war was a drawn battle, the peace was a Portuguese victory. The Kandyans had to give up fourteen *korales* which they had held since 1630. Two hundred and twelve Portuguese prisoners held in Kandy for three years returned once more to take their places in the Portuguese army.<sup>113</sup> But when the peace was signed on 14 January 1634 at Attapitiya<sup>114</sup> Senerat secured one advantage. It was Maha Astana, now calling himself Rajasinha, king of Kandy who signed the peace treaty. To Senerat, this was

110. Jornada 75 ; Queyroz 798 ; Ajuda 50-V-38.f.183v

111. Queyroz 798 states that there were seven hundred Portuguese. The statement in a letter of de Mello that he had only one hundred and fifty Portuguese soldiers when he took up office is certainly a misrepresentation (*Diario* 62) but his final figure of seven hundred Portuguese in all (*Diario* 65) tallies with that of Queyroz. Jornada 84 gives the figure of four hundred Portuguese and five thousand *lascarins*.

112. Queyroz 798 ; Jornada 84 ; AHU 501.f.38 ; *Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India*, 65

113. Queyroz 798-799 ; *Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India*, 65 ; P. da Trindade III. 121

114. CLR 3 ser. III. 405 ; Biker II 46 ; Jornada 13

the culmination of a long effort to have his dynasty securely established on the Kandyan throne.<sup>115</sup>

The way in which Rajasinha and Senerat agreed to terms they had rejected before, after a mere show of force, was to leave an unfortunate impression in the mind of de Mello. He was convinced that the king of Kandy had merely postponed the day of reckoning and would make war on the Portuguese again, once he thought the opportunity favourable. Having served fourteen years on the Coromandel and the Malabar coasts he knew how interested the Dutch were in gaining the cinnamon trade of Ceylon. He considered that the only way to secure the island was to conquer the kingdom of Kandy. Thus just three and a half months after signing the peace treaty he wrote to the king of Portugal warning that peace would not be kept for long and that the Portuguese should make war against the king who had defeated de Sa and brought discredit on them. He attempted to convince the king of Portugal that the peace was of greater advantage to Kandy than to the Portuguese by pointing out that under its protection the king of Kandy used Portuguese ports to sell his elephants to the Nayak of Tanjore.<sup>116</sup>

These views of the captain-general received no support from the viceroy, conde de Linhares, who being hard-pressed to meet the existing commitments in Aisa had no wish to undertake new ones.<sup>117</sup> The viceroy was glad enough that the costly war had ended. He considered that other projects, notably the defence of Malacca gravely threatened by the Dutch, were questions of higher priority. He thus looked forward to a considerable reduction in the expenses in Ceylon. This fundamental divergence of views led to a clash between the captain-general and the viceroy on almost all aspects of policy.

The expenses of Ceylon had far exceeded its revenue in the past few years. The viceroy now aimed at readjusting the balance. Until the 1620's the Ceylon authorities had received the proceeds of the land revenue and money from the sale of crown commodities, most notably cinnamon, and in the years before 1628 and the outbreak of war, these revenues had generally been sufficient to cover the total Portuguese expenditure. War obviously quite

115. *Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India*, 68; Filmoteca LM 19D 34/1-2. Maha Astana had been administering Kandy on behalf of Senerat for many years but before this had not taken himself the title of king of Kandy or the name Rajasinha.

116. TT.LM.36.f.116

117. P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon II*. 200



upset that balance, but the cinnamon monopoly was thereafter so handled by the conde de Linhares as to produce a considerable surplus over the peace-time costs of the Ceylon government. The viceroy in 1634 proposed that while quit rents and revenues from the sale of government products should go as before to the *vedor* of Ceylon, virtually the whole of the cinnamon revenues should go to the central government at Goa. He also concluded an agreement in 1634 with the Nayak of Madura by which he agreed to exchange the elephants caught in Ceylon for saltpetre. To make good part of the loss to the Ceylon exchequer caused by these two changes, he also provided for a subvention from Goa. This he fixed in 1634 at the low figure of thirty thousand *xerafims* of Goa—which was to be the maximum grant per year. Not content with this quite drastic change in the handling of Ceylon revenues, the viceroy, in consultation with de Almeida and Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara, the ex-captain-general and the ex-*vedor* of Ceylon, drew up a new *regimento* for Ceylon which among other instructions, proposed further economies by cutting the rice ration to troops in Ceylon.<sup>118</sup>

The policy of stringent economy laid down by the viceroy made inroads on the military strength of the Portuguese in Ceylon. It seriously affected the repair and rebuilding of the forts, which were now certainly in a bad state. De Almeida had repaired some of the damage done to Colombo by the tempest of 1632, and during the time of de Mello, the captain of Colombo was busy repairing the stretch of wall from the bastion of S.Iago to the sea and in constructing a new bulwark—that of S.Augustino.<sup>119</sup> But besides the repair work on the fort of Colombo, de Mello envisaged a vast scheme to refortify all the old Portuguese strong points. The defences at Kalutara, Malwana and Sabaragamuwa had been almost completely destroyed by the Sinhalese during the war, the fort at Menikkadawara needed extensive repairs, while Mannar, Batticaloa and Galle also needed attention. De Mello considered that Chilaw too should be fortified to prevent the Kandyans from using it to obtain supplies during any further conflict.<sup>120</sup> He also pointed out that forts, especially those situated far away from Colombo should be provided with supplies for at least a year to enable them to stand a long siege.<sup>121</sup>

118. TT.LM.36.ff.4, 15-15v

119. AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644

120. TT.LM.36.f.24

121. *Ibid.*f.15v

The viceroy himself appreciated the need for the repair of forts, and in 1634 he conceded to Colombo the revenue from the forty *bahars* of cinnamon allowed to the city for five years in advance, as well as a further grant of twelve thousand Goa *xerafims* all of which was to be used to repair the fort. However; though he agreed with the policy of repairing the forts on the coast, he did not see any urgency in the reconstruction of inland forts as the Portuguese were at peace with Kandy. For the same reason the viceroy considered that the size of the standing army could safely be reduced.<sup>122</sup>

Diogo de Mello having failed to convince the viceroy appealed to Lisbon. He complained that the viceroy's policy was unrealistic for when cinnamon and elephants were taken by the Goa government the other revenues were insufficient to meet the expenses of the island.<sup>123</sup> The viceroy's agreement with Madura, he claimed, was disadvantageous, for the price stipulated for elephants was low while that fixed for saltpetre was very high.<sup>124</sup> Moreover even this sacrifice did not secure for the Portuguese a monopoly of saltpetre which the Nayak of Madura was also selling to the Dutch.<sup>125</sup> To circumvent the authority of the viceroy over the supply of soldiers he requested that three hundred soldiers be sent direct from Lisbon to Colombo, assuring the king that he would not lose financially as the ship that was used to transport them to Colombo could return with a cargo of saltpetre, pepper, cloth, cinnamon and precious stones.<sup>126</sup>

Diogo de Mello did not rest content with complaining to the king. It would have taken at least two years for him to receive a royal order reversing the decisions of the viceroy, and de Mello had not the patience to wait that long. Moreover his problems were immediate. By June 1634 the payments to soldiers were already one year in arrears,<sup>127</sup> and early in 1634 the captain-major-of-the-field Antonio da Motta da Galvao had complained of the lack of coolies and provisions. He had also recommended that the reduction of the rice ration, one of the economy measures in the viceroy's new *regimento*, be done away with.<sup>128</sup> In October

122. Fimoteca LM 19a, 2-3,22 ; Coimbra 459.f.360v

123. TT.LM.36.f.15

124. *Ibid.* f.17

125. *Ibid.*f.16. The motives of de Mello in opposing the agreement with Madura may not have been entirely disinterested, especially in view of his interest in trade. (Ribeiro 97-98)

126. BM Ad. Mss.42056.ff.2,4

127. TT.LM.36.f.15 ; *Diario do 3° conde de Linhares vice-rei da India*, 145.

128. Assentos II, 52-53 says that de Mello after consulting the captain of Colombo, the *vedor* and the guardian of the Franciscans decided not to enforce the cut in the ration till his representations to the viceroy were answered.

1634, nine captains of the army sent a representative to Colombo to voice their grievances.<sup>129</sup> Thus Diogo de Mello had a choice between violating the orders of the viceroy and facing a mutiny in the troops. He chose the former.

With the concurrence of the new *vedor*, Amaro Roiz, de Mello prevented the despatch of elephants to Madura and used the proceeds of their sale for the expenses of the island.<sup>130</sup> When this proved insufficient he sent some of the cinnamon for sale to Negapatam in defiance of royal and viceregal orders regarding the cinnamon monopoly. To keep the forces contented he and the *vedor* assumed the possession of villages which had been granted to private individuals and used their revenues and services for the army. De Mello also granted villages on his own authority without consulting the *junta* that had been set up for land allocation.<sup>131</sup>

These acts incensed the viceroy who earlier had viewed De Mello with favour.<sup>132</sup> In particular he resented the sabotaging of his arrangements to sell elephants. The Portuguese envoy had promised the Nayak of Madura the first consignment of elephants by August 1634 and then by November or December at the latest. By January 1635 no elephants had yet been delivered and consequently no saltpetre could be obtained.<sup>133</sup> The viceroy also heard that some of the cinnamon sold by de Mello had found its way into the hands of the Dutch at Masulipatam<sup>134</sup> and it was also about this time that he found that the captain-general had written letters against his policy to Lisbon.<sup>135</sup>

By the end of 1634 the viceroy had decided to remove both the captain-general and the *vedor* from office. The judicial inquiry which had investigated the disturbances in the time of Dom Jorge de Almeida had completely exonerated him and it was considered necessary to send him back to Ceylon as captain-general to satisfy his honour. In place of Amaro Roiz who had aided de Mello

The cut was even more resented because of the general scarcity of rice at that time. P. da Trindade (III. 121) asserts that the fields had not been cultivated for three years due to war. This assertion however, may have been true only for parts of Kotte.

129. TT.LM.36.ff.10,20 ; TT.LM.35.f.37

130. For this he had a good excuse for the drought of 1634-1635 made the taking of elephants across the one hundred and twenty miles of dry land from Colombo to Mannar a very difficult and risky task.

131. TT.LM.36.f.7 ; Filmoteca LM.19B.26/3-5

132. Evora GR.Arm. V-VI. 14-5.f.164

133. *Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da Índia*, 260

134. TT.LM.39.f.31 ; TT.LM.40.f.40 ; TT.LM.34.f.9 ; TT.LM.37.f.1 ; Filmoteca LM.19B 26/3-5

135. *Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da Índia*, 260

to defy him, the viceroy appointed Antonio Pinho da Costa.<sup>136</sup> Antonio da Motta da Galvao whom de Mello had dismissed from his post was reappointed as captain-major-of-the-field.<sup>137</sup> These moves seem to have been made to secure a complete change of all the principal officers of Ceylon, for at the same time the viceroy also removed Balthazar de Camara da Noronha, captain-major of Jaffna, (1633-1635) and appointed in his place Lopo Gomez de Abreu, the son-in-law of Antonio Pinho da Costa.<sup>138</sup> Amaro Roiz was directed to continue the making of the *tombo* of Jaffna.<sup>139</sup>

De Almeida set sail from Goa on 1 April 1635 with a force of sixty nine men. The timing of his appointment was hardly a fortunate one. Hardly a year had passed since he had aided in the drafting of a new *regimento* for Ceylon<sup>140</sup> which among other things, had ordered a reduction in the allowance of rice allotted to each soldier, from two to one and a quarter Goa measures a day.<sup>141</sup> Great unrest in the army had followed and de Mello had himself found trouble in keeping order. The arrival of one of the very men who had drafted the *regimento*, to fill the post of captain-general, was a signal for further unrest. Unrest developed into open mutiny when de Almeida insisted on the army accepting Galvao as their captain-major. The soldiers selected Luis Teixeira, who had served as their captain-major since the dismissal of Galvao, to speak for them. Teixeira conveyed the soldiers' demands that the old rice ration be restored and someone other than the unpopular Galvao be appointed as captain-major. When de Almeida refused to yield the soldiers marched on Colombo and forced him to accept their terms.<sup>142</sup>

De Almeida thereupon tried to win the support of the ecclesiastics by a vigorous policy of aid in their mission work. He granted many villages to them. He expelled all Buddhist monks and Hindu priests from Portuguese lands and forbade them to return on pain of death.<sup>143</sup> His rule nevertheless remained as unpopular in

136. TT.LM.34.ff.9-9v,11. Da Costa did not take up his post, offering to work in Jaffna with his son-in-law, the captain-major of Jaffna. Roiz therefore continued as *vedor*.

137. Queyroz 799

138. TT.LM.34.f.11 ; TT.LM.40.f.33 ; TT.LM.42.f.66v ; AHU 501.ff.293.379, 24,102v ; Filmoteca LM.19D. 41-43/115, 35/1

139. TT.LM.35.f.5 ; TT.LM.34.f.9

140. TT.LM.34.f.9 ; TT.LM.35.f.37 : Coimbra 459.f.361 . .

141. T. Abeyasinghe 190 ; TT.LM. 36.ff.20,10,; Assentos II.52. From evidence available it appears that thirty eight to forty two Goa measures was the equivalent of twenty five Ceylon measures. The actual reduction in the ration to be made in Ceylon was from one and a half to one Ceylon measure.

142. TT.LM.31.f.251 ; TT.LM.35.f.29 ; Assentos II.52

143. TT.LM.45.f.303

1635 as it had been in 1633.<sup>144</sup> The *casados* of Colombo alleged that de Almeida seized villages which they had held to give them to his personal followers.<sup>145</sup> The viceroy-in-council heard renewed complaints about de Almeida and eventually decided to recall him. When this news reached Ceylon, a group of soldiers set out from Menikkadawara to settle accounts with him before he left the island.<sup>146</sup> De Almeida therefore had to embark hurriedly even before his successor arrived but having escaped his enemies he died apparently from age and exhaustion at Mangalore on his way to Goa.<sup>147</sup>

Before he left Ceylon de Almeida alleged that the mutiny of the soldiers against him had been organized with the encouragement of Diogo de Mello. At the enquiry which followed de Mello was cleared of all responsibility.<sup>148</sup> De Mello's movements during this period however gave rise to suspicion that he did not expect de Almeida to last long in his post. He did not leave Colombo until September 1635 and then went on to Mannar where he stayed till early 1636.<sup>149</sup> It was there that he heard of his re-appointment by the new viceroy, Pero da Silva who had brought orders to this effect from Lisbon.<sup>150</sup>

The mutiny itself showed the rising indiscipline in the Portuguese forces in Ceylon and the inability of the authorities to deal with this problem. The army was immobilised for twenty three days. The mutineers were led by the most experienced soldiers in Ceylon—those who had been prisoners in Kandy for three years. The viceroy confessed that due to lack of troops these men could not be punished as they could not be replaced. One of them, Thome Gomez was arrested as an example to others but even he was eventually released for service in other parts of India.<sup>151</sup> The old ration of rice was restored. To replace Galvao the new viceroy appointed Constantino de Sa de Miranda, a soldier who had held the post of captain-major once before in Ceylon.<sup>152</sup> Such a policy

144. TT.LM.33.f.266 ; TT.LM.35.f.43v ; TT.LM.37.f.423

145. TT.LM.39.f.31 ; TT.LM.40.f.31

146. TT.LM.37.ff.1.423 ; TT.LM.38.f.396

147. Queyroz 799 ; F. de Souza VI. 432 ; TT.LM.37.ff.1.423 ; BM.Add Ms. 41996.f.64

148. TT.LM.42.f.66 ; TT.LM.40.f.31

149. Queyroz 799 ; TT.LM.35.f.5 ; AHU Caixa 16 ant, 17.1.1644

150. De Mello may, of course, have delayed in order to avoid meeting the conde de Linhares who was due to be recalled. De Mello's connivance in the mutiny cannot be proved.

151. TT.LM.40.f.31 ; TT.LM.39.f.31 ; TT.LM.37.f.423 ; TT.LM.42.ff.66-66v. Assentos II. 52

152. TT.LM.39.f.31 ; TT.LM.40.f.31 ; TT.LM.31.f.251 ; TT.LM.35.f.29. Assentos II. 54

of dealing with an army mutiny would have been unthinkable in the time of de Azevedo or de Sa.

Perhaps one of the reasons for the leniency was the worsening of relations with Kandy. After the conclusion of peace there had appeared dissensions within Kandy. Kumarasinha and Vijayapala united to check the growing power of their youngest brother, Rajasinha.<sup>153</sup> Before they could take any action, however Kumarasinha died in mid 1634. While the prince of Matale stood irresolute, Rajasinha seized Kumarasinha's principality of Uva.<sup>154</sup> Some of the men of Uva apparently preferred Vijayapala for they killed the *disava* sent by Rajasinha and fled to Batticaloa. The captain of Batticaloa, Pero Soares de Brito promptly gave them refuge.<sup>155</sup> The Portuguese had, in fact, even earlier, been encouraging dissension within Kandy and Rajasinha was aware of the exchange of friendly correspondence between Vijayapala and the Portuguese even before this overt action of de Brito.<sup>156</sup> These factors led Rajasinha to seek foreign aid to expel the Portuguese from the island. A policy of encouraging dissension within Kandy had proved incompatible with a policy of peace with that kingdom. The Portuguese noticed that the king of Kandy had become hostile. He omitted to send the customary messenger to welcome the new captain-general, Dom Jorge de Almeida in April 1635.<sup>157</sup> Nevertheless, due to the death of king Senerat in mid 1635 Rajasinha was in no position to interfere with the affairs of the Portuguese.<sup>158</sup>

When de Mello arrived in early 1636 he determined to take vigorous measures to strengthen Portuguese power in Ceylon. Realising that discontent among Sinhalese subjects could be a dangerous threat to the security of Portuguese possessions he encouraged them to put forward their grievances. The result was a giant petition presented in December 1636.<sup>159</sup> The remedial measures taken by de Mello after consultation with the *junta* and proclaimed on 28 March 1637 removed some of the worst elements of oppression. For instance a Sinhalese could no longer be forced to pay for arecanut dues according to the *tombo* if the total produce of his garden fell short of this amount. After paying dues the Sinhalese were allowed to sell their surplus products freely. Portuguese

153. *Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India*, 145

154. P. E. Pieris—*Prince Vijayapala of Matale*, 1634-1654 (Colombo 1927) 17

155. JCBRAS XVIII.170 ; Baldaeus 97 ; TT.LM.34.f.9 ; Filmoteca LM.19D 41-43/1-5

156. P. E. Pieris—*Prince Vijayapala of Matale*, 29-33 ; Assentos II. 52 ; TT.LM.31.f.251 ; TT.LM.35.f.29 ; Goonewardena 13.

157. TT.LM.34.f.9

158. TT.LM.31.f.251 ; TT.LM.35.f.29

159. TT.LM.31.f.251 ; TT.LM.35.f.29

and Sinhalese land-holders were forbidden to live in the villages they held, for this compelled the inhabitants to feed them.<sup>160</sup> Yet de Mello's reforms fell far short of his own ideal—that the conquest of Ceylon must be founded on justice and reason.<sup>161</sup> The reason for this is not difficult to see. Portuguese power in Ceylon ultimately depended on the army and the *casados*. They were the two elements no general could afford to alienate. Thus natives were forbidden to travel in palanquins but not the Portuguese.<sup>162</sup> Similarly, reforms which could hurt the exchequer were not considered. Thus, though the price at which arecanut had to be supplied to the *vedor* was raised to five *xerafims* an *amuna*, the compulsory purchase of arecanut was retained as government policy.<sup>163</sup>

De Mello also continued the work of repairing and rebuilding the forts. Repairs to the walls of Colombo went on. The work of rebuilding Malwana begun by de Almeida was continued under de Mello. The new viceroy, Pero da Silva encouraged him in the policy and also instructed him to see to repairing the fort of Mannar. In Jaffna Lopo Gomes de Abreu was entrusted with the rebuilding of a part of the walls of Jaffna fort.<sup>164</sup>

Diogo de Mello had been instructed by the viceroy to take no steps which might precipitate war. Pero da Silva agreed with the policy followed by the conde de Linhares in as much as he considered the Dutch to be the primary enemy and the refortification of the coastal ports the first priority.<sup>165</sup> Diogo de Mello adhered to these instructions for a time. In fact when he received a letter in March 1637 from the queens of Kandy<sup>166</sup> offering to come over to the Portuguese side, he replied in a noncommittal fashion and referred the whole matter to Goa.<sup>167</sup>

Eight months later the whole picture had changed. In the

160. Queyroz 1020-1022. Queyroz is our only source on this petition which he states was put forward by the *lascarins* and by headman and other local leaders. He provided a long list of grievances voiced, for which the reader is referred to Queyroz. The measures adopted regarding arecanut had already been advocated in the viceroy's *regimento* to Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro on his appointment as *vedor* on 13 September 1636.

161. *Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India*, 66

162. Queyroz 1022

163. *Goa regimentos e instruccoes*, III. ff. 2-8. An *amuna* was equivalent to 24,000-25,000 arecanut in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese demanded up to 33% more nuts for an *amuna* in the the 1630's.

164. TT.LM.37.f.410. The finances for these works were available is the king in response to de Mello's letters of 1634 had instructed that all revenues from cinnamon and elephants be used to provision and supply the forts of Ceylon.

165. TT.LM.37.f.423

166. The widowed queen of Senerat and the queen of Rajasinha.

167. TT.LM.40. ff. 31v, 94v, 285; Assentos-II, 174-175

first place a personal dispute had arisen between Rajasinha and de Mello. According to Ribeiro this followed from the seizure of an elephant gifted by Rajasinha to a Portuguese and consequent retaliation by the king, who confiscated two horses belonging to the captain-general.<sup>168</sup> Queyroz states that the dispute arose because of the seizure of some jewellery which de Mello had sent for sale to Kandy.<sup>169</sup> Both maintain that this was the immediate cause of the invasion of Kandy in 1638.

This personal motive however could not have been as important as has hitherto been made out.<sup>170</sup> The letters of the *camara* of Colombo to Diogo de Mello before his invasion of Kandy and to the viceroy after it, make no mention of de Mello's individual animosity towards Rajasinha.<sup>171</sup> From Rajasinha's point of view he did not need personal enmity to be hostile to de Mello for de Mello's action in giving continued protection to the rebels who fled to Batticaloa, was reason enough for that.<sup>172</sup>

About this time there was also a change of policy in Goa. In March 1637, even before the news of the offer of the queens of Kandy reached Goa, despite opposition from some members of his council, the viceroy swung around to the view expressed by de Mello since 1634—that despite the peace treaty the Portuguese should be ready for war at any time and should seize any favourable opportunity to conquer Kandy.<sup>173</sup>

More significantly, in 1637 for the first time, de Mello obtained permission to use the enormous revenue that cinnamon now annually provided, to strengthen the defences of Ceylon. De Mello's argument against the policy of conde de Linhares in reducing the the defence expenses to a minimum as expressed in letters written during 1634 in his first term of office in Ceylon, had won the day in Lisbon. The king in a letter dated 28 January 1636 ordered that Ceylon's revenues should be used to provide Ceylon's needs. The revenues could be used for other areas only if a surplus occurred. This reversal of the policy of the conde de Linhares was discussed and approved in the *conselho do estado* at Goa on 4 March 1637.<sup>174</sup>

168. Ribeiro 231-235. It is possible that behind the seizure of this single elephant was an attempt to control the Kandyan trade in elephants and that Rajasinha recognised this. See also Goonewardena 14

169. Queyroz 801

170. P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 203-204. Prof. K. W. Goonewardane correctly points out that the dispute must have occurred before 21 November 1637 and not after as Pieris makes it to be.

171. TT.LM.43.ff.105-108

172. Baldaeus 97

173. TT.LM.43.ff.94v,285

174. Assentos II. 161-162 ; Coimbra 460.ff.228-230. The letter written on behalf of the king embodied the recommendations made by the *conselho da fazenda* on 24 November 1635.



Nevertheless even if none of these events had occurred it is quite likely that war would still have broken out in late 1637 for on 27 October 1637 a Dutch ship appeared off Batticaloa. This was in response to an appeal for aid by Rajasinha in September 1636.<sup>175</sup> The Dutch envoys landed at Kalmunai and sent messages to the king. Eventually they were led to Pangaragama, a village near the Mahaveli where they negotiated with Rajasinha and his ministers from 19 to 26 November. After this they departed for their ships accompanied by three Sinhalese officials to discuss the final terms with the Dutch commander.<sup>176</sup>

Diogo de Mello heard of the arrival of the Dutch on 18 November. The following day he proposed to the captain of Colombo and the officials of the *camara* that the Portuguese should declare war and invade Kandy. He was advised to await more definite news of the king's activities.<sup>177</sup> De Mello complied, partly because his forces were inadequate and partly because the weather was inclement. Confirmations of the negotiations of the king of Kandy with the Dutch was not long in coming. Fr. Frei Christavao de Madre de Deus, a priest resident in Kandy sent an urgent message that a combined Kandyan-Dutch attack on Colombo should be expected shortly. A trader-spy Chettynagar swore to the captain-general that the Maravas of south India led by the Nayak of Madura were also being invited to join the alliance. Their adherence seemed more than likely for they had attacked Mannar unsuccessfully in March 1636.<sup>178</sup> De Mello also received letters from Baerent Pessaert, president of the Danes in the east warning him of a Dutch attack.<sup>179</sup>

175. TT.LM.43.ff.176-178 ; P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 201-202 ; *Mahahatana*, stanza 116. Valentyn merely states that the messenger was a brahmin (Orientalist IV 53). *The Matale Maha Disave Kadaim Potha* (ed by H. D. L. W. Gunatilleke. Moratuwa 1932) names the envoys as Galtombuwe Mantri, Jayasundara Mudiyanse and Narangamuwe Kalu Adappaya. The name of the first also appears in *Maha hatana*. The statement of Manoel Pinto, captain of Batticaloa that the Dutch came at the request of Acidappa Chetiar may well refer to Kalu Adappaya. *Itihasaya* vol 3 No. 1. 46-48 ; D. D. Ranasinghe (ed) *Purawirtha; A collection of historical notes on Ceylon* (Colombo 1928). See also K. W. Goonewardene 14-16
176. P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II. 202-203 ; Baldaeus 92-93 ; Goonewardena 15-16
177. TT.LM.43.ff.188-189
178. TT.LM.43.ff.179-180 ; AHU 501.f.155
179. F. C. Danvers—*Report to the Secretary of State for India in Council on the Portuguese records relating to the East Indies contained in the Archivo da Terre do Tombo and the Public Libraries of Lisbon and Evra* (London 1892) 134,152. In 1637 the Danes offered to aid the Portuguese in exchange for trading rights in cinnamon, arecanut and elephants. This offer was rejected by the Portuguese but renewed again by the Danes in 1638. Pessaert, a former VOC employee was bitterly hostile towards the Dutch. (JCBRAS XVIII. 253)

De Mello sent Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo as a personal emissary to the viceroy asking for aid. In the meantime he opened hostilities by sending his nephew Fernao de Mendonca with fifty Portuguese and five hundred *lascarins* to attack a Kandyan supply depot at Mahagama. De Mello had his own problems with the army. The indiscipline which had grown in the time of de Almeida had not yet been suppressed. There were reports of a mutiny in Mannar, where the garrison encouraged by two priests, drove the captain Miguel de Almeida de Sampayo out of the fort.<sup>180</sup> The garrison of Batticaloa refused to accept Manoel Pessoa de Carvalho as their new captain in 1637, as he had not brought forces to relieve those Portuguese who had completed their service in the fort.<sup>181</sup> De Mello himself had disagreements with Constantino de Sa de Miranda, his new captain-major-of-the-field. By the end of 1637 however, this last problem had been settled by the return of de Miranda to Goa and the appointment of Damiao Botado in his place.<sup>182</sup>

By early 1638 reinforcements had arrived from Goa. Two ships under Gaspar de Araujo and four more under Miguel Rangel de Castelbranco arrived, bringing two hundred men in all. Further aid was expected from Cochin. In February 1638 six ships led by Goncalo de Souza Chichorro together with two more under Antonio Soares da Guerra and two other merchant ships called at Colombo on their way from Malacca to Goa.<sup>183</sup> On 18 February de Mello invited the leaders of the squadrons to the house of Francisco Barbosa da Andrade, the captain of Colombo, and in the presence of the new *vedor*, Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro<sup>184</sup> and the *ouvidor*, Joao Nogueira Coelho and many other *fidalgos*, asked them to remain in Ceylon that winter and help to defend it. He also pointed out that if the ships proceeded to India they might well encounter the Dutch fleet returning from the blockade of Goa. It was decided that the information as to the state of Malacca which was brought by Chichorro should be sent by a messenger to Goa. The Dutch prisoners aboard the fleet were to be sent in the cinnamon vessels.<sup>185</sup>

At this stage there arose two views among the Portuguese as to what course of action would best serve the interests of the

180. The two priests were a Franciscan Fr. Jeronimo Nossa Senhora and a Dominica Fr. Domingos Beltrao.

181. TT.LM.43.f.176v ; TT.LM.40.f.94

182. TT.LM.40.f.95 ; Assentos II. 198-201,228

183. TT.LM.41.ff.7v-8 ; TT.LM.43.ff.17-18

184. Ozouro was sent as *vedor* in 1637 to replace Amaro Roiz who was recalled to Goa.

185. TT.LM.45.ff.181-181v

state. The *vedor, ouvidor*, captain of Colombo and the members of the *camara* considered it best to remain on the defensive. They argued that the Sinhalese of Kotte could rebel at any moment and that if they did so, the supply line to any force attacking Kandy would be cut off. Moreover, many of the troops newly arrived were still too inexperienced for use in a full scale campaign in Ceylon. Finally, they argued that while the invading army was in Kandy the Dutch might well attack Colombo. They therefore recommended that the captain-general should merely make a demonstration of force by marching up to Menikkadawara. This view would have been strongly supported by the *casados* who feared to lose all in one attack, and had the backing of men of experience such as Francisco de Brito de Almeida.<sup>186</sup>

Diogo de Mello and his captain-major advocated the bolder though riskier policy of invading Kandy. They argued that the best chance of victory lay in fighting and defeating the king of Kandy before the Dutch aid reached him. De Mello pointed out that the Dutch would not attack Colombo without support on the landward side. He assured the *camara* that the city was safe.<sup>187</sup> De Mello's resolve to strike soon must have been strengthened by the fact that he knew the men from Malacca could leave in a few months' time. In Goa, the viceroy's council was also divided, into those who advocated defensive measures against the Dutch in Colombo and Galle and those who urged the fortification of Balane and the conquest of Kandy. The viceroy urged the fortification of Colombo and Galle and asked de Mello to consult others on the advisability of fortifying Balane. His views however had little effect as his instructions of 5 March 1638 and 6 May 1638 arrived only after de Mello had left for Kandy.<sup>188</sup>

Learning of the Portuguese preparations to invade Kandy, Rajasinha sent envoys to the captain-general and the *camara* of Colombo admitting his dealings with the Dutch but laying blame for his action on the Portuguese themselves and asking for peace. It is impossible to determine whether this was merely a delaying tactic but it is likely that it was so. De Mello, however, determined to go through with the invasion and was undeterred when the king sent an Augustinian to request peace once more. De Mello also had hopes of enticing Vijayapala to the Portuguese side.<sup>189</sup>

186. TT.LM.43.ff.17-18v ; 187 TT.LM.41.f.7v

187. TT.LM.43.f.188

188. TT.LM.41.f.8v ; TT.LM.43.f.18 ; Assentos II.230-232

189. Queyroz 802-803

In fact the whole campaign turned on the attitude of Vijayapala. Whatever de Mello may have hoped to achieve, he could not really have expected to conquer Kandy with a force of only seven hundred Portuguese, three hundred Kaffirs, two hundred Canarese and five thousand *lascarins* aided by a regiment of *topazes*.<sup>190</sup> None of his four *disavas* had previously served in an active campaign in Ceylon. Moreover having called up all the available Portuguese soldiers, he had to leave the defence of the inland forts to the sailors of the fleets. He knew that he had no reserve left.

De Mello left Attapitiya on 26 March 1638 and reached Kandy next day without meeting with any resistance. The city was burnt and the Portuguese began to withdraw. At this moment Rajasinha struck. The way back to Balane was obstructed and the Portuguese were forced to camp for the night near the banks of Mahaveli. Having first prevented them from crossing the river, the Sinhalese then moved in at night-fall and beat off all detachments sent out to bring supplies of water. The following day, 28 March 1638, Rajasinha, ignoring a plea for peace<sup>191</sup>, brought in forces amounting to fifteen thousand Sinhalese<sup>192</sup> reinforced by a thousand men of Madura. Vijayapala remained loyal to him and the Portuguese were surrounded. A shower of rain just before battle reduce the effectiveness of their firearms. The Sinhalese by a well directed attack seized the Portuguese baggage train and cut their army in two. The Portuguese attempted to reform but the *lascarins* who had by now lost all hope, deserted. The Portuguese were then completely defeated and de Mello and Botado were killed.<sup>193</sup>

Militarily the battle of Gannoruwa was a greater disaster to the Portuguese than even the battle of Randeniwela. It weakened them at a moment when they needed all their strength. Moreover, unlike in 1630 when the Portuguese army had to be lured a long distance away from their bases, in 1638 they were annihilated within thirty miles of their army headquarters. A further contrast

190. Queyroz 802-803 ; TT.LM.41.f.8v ; TT.LM.43.f.18 ; BM. Add Ms. 41966.f.66. Queyroz mentions nine hundred Portuguese, all other sources mention seven hundred. *Rajavaliya*, 102 estimates de Mello's forces at nine thousand men in all.

191. Ribeiro 236-237 says that de Mello sent de Mendonca with an offer of peace on the basis of a return to the *status quo* if allowed to return to Colombo and that Rajasinha handed him over to Vijayapala. Baldaeus 94 says that de Mello sent two priests to offer terms. The former account is unlikely to be true as each brother kept his own captives and Queyroz 805 states that de Mendonca was wounded and escaped death with the aid of Vijayapala.

192. JCBRAS (New series) V.163

193. Queyroz 804-805 ; Baldaeus 94-95 ; Ribeiro 236-237 ; *Rajavaliya* 101-102 ; TT.LM.43.f.185 ; *Rajasinha Hatana* stanzas 232-404. Of the expeditionary force over two thousand and five hundred were killed.

between the two battles stands out clearly. In 1630, Senerat was intent on capturing alive as many Portuguese as possible with a view to a future settlement. In 1638, Rajasinha had already burnt his boats, and so while there were two hundred Portuguese prisoners at Randeniwela, only thirty three Portuguese were spared at Gannoruwa.<sup>194</sup> This meant that the Portuguese losses at the latter engagement was almost double those at the former.

The significance of Gannoruwa could be exaggerated. P.E. Pieris implies that the battle saved Kandy and its people from the Portuguese.<sup>195</sup> This was hardly the case for though the campaign of 1638 was fought on Kandyan soil, the battle itself was forced by Rajasinha in an attempt to destroy the Portuguese army. Even if de Mello had won he would merely have saved the Portuguese army. Nevertheless the Kandyan victory showed that the balance of power in Ceylon had altered somewhat since the days of de Azevedo and de Sa. For the first time since the days of Rajasinha of Sitawaka, a Portuguese army had been defeated in the field before the desertion of the *lascarins*. In the wider context of the Kandyan-Dutch alliance Gannoruwa thus meant the beginning of the end of the Portuguese dominance in Ceylon.

194. Ribeiro 237 ; estimates the number of prisoners as thirty three ; Baldaeus 95 as seventy and Queyroz 805 as one hundred.

195. P. E. Pieris—*Ceylon* II, 212

## CHAPTER 5

### THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

During the twenty one years from 1617 to 1638, the administrative structure of Kotte remained, in the main, that which had crystallized under the direction of Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo in the early years of the seventeenth century. The basis of this structure was the old Sinhalese administrative organization modified and altered to suit the needs of the conquerors.

The system thus evolved has been adequately discussed elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> However a short account of this system seems a necessary prelude to a discussion of what further changes it underwent during the period under consideration. The Portuguese domains in Kotte were divided into four *disavas* or provinces, each administered by an official also known as the *disava*. The province of *disava* was in turn divided into smaller territorial units called *korales*. Each *korale* was placed in charge of an officer named the *korale vidane* who had a number of officers to aid him. Some of these officials like the *mohottalas* and the *kanakapulle* were concerned with the keeping of accounts and records, others like the headmen were executive officials who carried out the orders of their *korale vidane* or *disava*. The *disava* himself had immense power. He appointed all subordinate officials within the province.<sup>2</sup> Up to 1614 much of the land allotment was done by the *disava*. He also led the provincial *lascarins* in war and had judicial powers within his province. The *korale vidane* besides, having a more restricted authority over a smaller area had become primarily a revenue collector and had no military powers.

In addition to the territorial divisions under officials whose functions were political or military, there were other departments concerned with the collection of revenues or utilization of labour services. These departments were not divided geographically<sup>3</sup> but by function, covering as they did the relations of the state with members of particular castes or crafts throughout the island. These departments necessarily interpenetrated the territorial administration. They were usually organized under *vidanes*, assisted by *mohottalas* and *kanakapulles*.

1. T. Abeyasinghe 69-74. The contents of the next three paragraphs unless otherwise indicated are drawn from Dr. Abeyasinghe's work.
2. S. G. Perera (trans.,) *The tombo of the Two Korales*, 30 records the appointment of a *gamea* (*gamaya* in Sinhalese) or headman by *disava* Dom Constantino Barreto.
3. The organization for the administration of Bulatgama was an exception.

Under the captain-generalship of Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo there had occurred several important changes in the Sinhalese system. Some of these have been already noted in the first chapter. Two further modifications are dealt with here.

Firstly the Sinhalese in the higher posts tended to be replaced by Portuguese. Secondly there was a relaxation of central control over the *disavas* resulting in a substantial increase in their power.

During the quarter century that followed de Azevedo's departure from Ceylon the trend regarding the change of personnel in the higher reaches of the administrative system continued unabated. The last Sinhalese to hold the post of *disava* was Dom Constantino Barretto in 1621. Thenceforth it became a matter of policy to appoint only Portuguese to this key post.<sup>4</sup> The other notable change, the increase in the power of the higher administrative officials was recognised as an evil and efforts were made to curtail it. One of the powers gained by the *disavas* in the early years of Portuguese rule was that of granting lands within their province. During the time of de Azevedo, apart from a few grants by the captain-general himself all grants of service lands to the Ceylonese were made by these *disavas*.<sup>5</sup> The establishment of a *junta* made up of the captain-general, the *vedor* and the captain of Colombo or the bishop of Cochin, in 1614 could in a sense be viewed as an attempt to curtail this power of the *disavas* for the *junta* was expected to be the sole source of land grants in the years to come. However, it is clear that the *disavas* did not lose all rights to grant land. When Miguel Pinheiro Ravasco made the *tombo* of the Two Korales in 1622 he recorded fifteen of the twenty eight villages of the Ihala Pattu of the Meda Korale as having been granted by the *disava*, only one by the captain-general and none by the *junta*. The Two Korales however may have been exceptional in that it was a land recently subjugated and not included in Vaz Freire's *tombo*, for it is known that the *junta* was active in making and or confirming land grants as early as 1614. Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the *disavas* continued to have a hand in land grants especially as Vaz Freire's *tombo* had inadvertently omitted a number of smaller villages and thus deprived the *junta* of information regarding them.<sup>6</sup>

4. Dom Constantino Barretto was succeeded as *disava* of Matara by Joao de Freitas. Evora CXVI/2-3f.67-67v ; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635 ; Filmoteca LM.15.38/2-3 ; S. G. Perera (trans.,) *The tombo of the Two Korales*, 5

5. T. Abeyasinghe 110-111

6. S. G. Perera (trans.,) *The tombo of the Two Korales*, 4-32 ; AHU Caixa 4, 18.1.1615

The *disavas* had also increased their judicial powers during the early years of Portuguese rule. For instance they acquired the right to sentence people to death. In his first term of office, Constantino de Sa attempted to reserve this trend by transferring the judicial powers of the *disavas* to Portuguese judges each of whom was to be in charge of about ten *korales*. The scheme was abandoned due to opposition from the king who, probably influenced by reports of the disturbances of 1616-1620, forbade any radical alteration in the existing administrative system.<sup>7</sup> Despite this, the extensive powers of the *disavas* induced the Portuguese to look for further means of reducing their power. The plan advanced by Lancarote de Seixas in 1625 was perhaps the most radical of these. De Seixas proposed that the post of *disava* be abolished altogether and the four *disavas* replaced by ten or twelve other officials, each in charge of two or three *korales*. Whereas the *disavas* had been granted lands for their subsistence, these new officials were to be paid servants of the state receiving cash salaries, and were to be entrusted with judicial and administrative duties as well as those of revenue collection.<sup>8</sup> This plan never bore fruit, owing to the reluctance of the Portuguese in Lisbon and Goa to risk rebellion by innovations.

In one respect however the power and authority of the *disavas* did suffer a decline in the first four decades of the seventeenth century. This was a direct corollary of the replacement of Sinhalese by Portuguese officers. The Sinhalese *disavas* of Kotte like Constantino Barretto and Simao Correa had inspired feelings of personal loyalty among the *lascarins* troops of their provinces. By the 1620's and 1630's however the policy of appointing Portuguese alone to these posts led to *lascarins* loyalty being transferred to the most senior Sinhalese official remaining, the *mudaliyar*. Thus in 1630 the *lascarins* of Matara preferred to follow Dom Theodosio or Kattota Rala rather than their *disava* Domingos Carvalho Cao. When Dom Theodosio returned to Portuguese allegiance, his *lascarins* followed suit. Nevertheless, it was only on rare occasions that the Sinhalese *mudaliyars* dared to challenge the authority of the Portuguese *disavas* and on the whole in 1638 the *disavas* had little less power than in 1617.<sup>9</sup> However, the exclusive appointment of Portuguese to this post reduced the political dangers likely to arise from the existence of over-mighty subjects.

7. TT.LM.16.f.802

8. Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.225-226

9. TT LM.45.f.304



To assure themselves of political control over Kotte, the Portuguese conquerors had created new posts which were incorporated into the Kotte administration. The most important of these were those of captain-general of Ceylon, of *vedor da fazenda* or controller of revenue, of *ouvidor* or crown judge and of factor. Of the occupants of these posts the captain-general was undoubtedly the most powerful. In theory his appointment and dismissal was a prerogative of the king of Portugal.<sup>10</sup> In practice, the slow communications between Goa and Lisbon often allowed and sometimes forced the viceroy to take the task on himself. Only one of the six captains-general of the period under review was directly appointed by the king. However the authorities in Lisbon kept a strict supervision over the viceroy's actions, for whenever a captain-general was removed from office without convincing reasons, prompt orders were sent for his reinstatement.<sup>11</sup>

The captain-general once appointed was subordinate to the viceroy of India and had to obey his orders. However, he had the right of direct communication with the king of Portugal, though the fact that the *vedor da fazenda* or the controller of revenue, the captain-major of Jaffna and the *camara* or the municipal council of Colombo also had the same privilege somewhat reduced its value. The relationship between the captain-general and the viceroy depended largely on the personality of the individuals who occupied the respective posts but generally the captain-general's opinion, if not always accepted, was held in high regard, if only for the fact that he was the man on the spot.

Within the island, the captain-general had wide powers and was not obliged to consult anyone in wielding them.<sup>12</sup> On occasion however, he consulted a council chosen by himself to advise him on an urgent problem. This step is known to have been taken in 1617 and again in 1638. As the name of his office indicates, he was the supreme commander of all the armed forces

10. Such appointments were to be made by the king on the recommendations of the *conselho da fazenda*, a body which dealt with political and economic affairs relating to Portuguese colonies. The appointment of Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira in 1615 and the need to delegate authority to choose his successor in 1618 shows clearly that the appointment was one to which the viceroy had no claim of right.

11. Two such instances occur in this period. The dismissal of Constantino de Sa in 1621 and that of Diogo de Mello de Castro in 1635. (see above chapters II and IV) In the case of the removal of Francisco de Menezes Roxo in 1614 however the *conselho da fazenda* apparently accepted that it was a desirable measure.

12. Evora CXVI/2-3 f.67

in the kingdom. He could declare war and make peace.<sup>13</sup> He was also the head of the civil administration and till 1630 had the power to mint coins. The captains of the Portuguese forts as well as the *disavas* or rulers of provinces in Kotte, were all responsible to him. The missionary clergy looked to him for support and patronage. Although revenue matters were considered outside his purview, until such time as the island was fully subjugated, the captain-general had the right to incur extraordinary expenses on condition that he requisitioned the money from the factor alone, showed the requisitions to the *vedor* and sent a statement of expenditure to the viceroy.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the captain-general had judicial powers and could investigate all crimes, including cases of suspected murder and manslaughter. Though in cases of crimes committed by captains or *fidalgos* he could only arrest them and send them to the viceroy at Goa for sentence,<sup>15</sup> he was empowered to pass the sentence of death upon other Portuguese and Sinhalese.<sup>16</sup> The captain-general could authorize the confiscation of all the property of those who plotted or rose against the Portuguese<sup>17</sup> while he himself was immune from arrest by the judicial officers in the island.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, with the conquest of Jaffna the area under the captain-general's jurisdiction was greatly extended.

Nevertheless, the powers envisaged for the captain-general by the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon fell far short of the powers formerly wielded by the local rulers whose grandeur he inherited.<sup>19</sup> The captains of the principal forts of Kotte were all nominated by the king of Portugal.<sup>20</sup> Though the *disavas* or provincial rulers were generally appointed by the captain-general even this office was occasionally granted by the king to *fidalgos* of merit.<sup>21</sup> The

13. The king on 2 January 1607 held that the generals of Ceylon had no right to declare war—only to act in self-defence. However, as events proved the distinction was difficult to draw. TT.LM.2.f.45
14. T. Abeyasinghe 85-86 ; Goa C.Pe AS VI.f.345-352
15. TT.LM.16.f.13v
16. This power was also possessed by the *disavas*. T. Abeyasinghe, 82
17. TT.LM.16.f.571 ; AHU 33.f.21
18. Goa C.Pe AS VI.ff.345v-346v
19. T. Abeyasinghe 76
20. As there was always a waiting list for each post, the captain-general rarely had a chance of making his own nomination. BNL FG. 1982.ff. 125v-126 ; TT.Chancellarias, Filipe II. (Doacaes) livro I.f.105v ; Filipe III.livro 32.f.232v. The forts in Ceylon to which appointments were made in Lisbon included Colombo, Weligama, Jaffna, Mannar, Galle, Kalutara and Batticaloa.
21. BNL FG. 1982.f.150 records the grant of the *disava* of the Seven Korales to Jacinto Rebelo by the king. Queyroz 1044 mentions another instance. However the conde de Linhares, viceroy of India held that the appointment of the *disavas* was best left to the judgement of the captain-general and that appointments should not be made without consulting him and Jorge de Albuquerque received, on his appointment, the right to fill,

highest revenue official, the *vedor da fazenda* owed no allegiance to the captain-general who moreover had no authority over the appointment and dismissal of even the lesser revenue officials.<sup>22</sup> The grant of land and the consideration of other financial matters was entrusted to the *junta* of which the captain-general was but one member.<sup>23</sup> Finally in the sphere of justice the civil jurisdiction of the captain-general had an upper limit of cases involving one hundred *mil-reis* or thirty three and one third *xerafims* while the maximum fine he could impose was fixed at five hundred *mil-reis*.<sup>24</sup>

By 1617 however, the captain-general had already found ways and means to circumvent some of these restrictions. This was done partly by reviving institutions that had formed part of the Kotte administration in the sixteenth century and had since fallen into abeyance. One such body was the Sinhalese *mahanaduwa* or high court. The revival of this court enabled Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo and his successors to acquire civil jurisdiction beyond the limits allowed to them by the king's ordinances.<sup>25</sup> The captain-general also resorted to extra-legal acts to extend their power. This is best illustrated in the case of land grants. In the *regimento* issued on 27 February 1608 by the king to Antao Vaz Freire, newly appointed *vedor* of Ceylon, it was specified that once the *tombo* or land register was completed a *junta* consisting of the captain-general, the *vedor da fazenda* and the bishop of Cochin was to be set up. In the absence of any one of these three persons the captain of Colombo was to deputise. The *junta* was to fix the quit rents for the villages and grant lands according to the king's instructions. All such grants were subject to confirmation by the king of Portugal.<sup>26</sup> As few village grants were actually confirmed by the king of Portugal, the captains-general throughout this period took advantage of this loophole in the law to resume grants made by the *junta* and grant them provisionally to those whom they wished. The position of the captain-general was further strengthened by an order of the viceroy Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo authorizing the captain-general

all vacant posts save those relating to justice. (Goa C.Pe AS ff. 345-350)  
TT.LM.27.f.116 ; Filmoteca LM.14.6/2

22. T. Abeyasinghe 86 ; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635 ; AHU Caixa 8,17.1.1624
23. APO VI.804 ; Simancas SP 1437.f.278 also see pages 302-303 and 312-314
24. TT.LM.13.f.13v
25. T. Abeyasinghe 77. Some Sinhalese institutions were also revived to serve the personal requirements of the captain-general. One such was the post of *bhandagarika rala* (*bandigarrala* according to TT.LM.45.f.360v) or treasurer whose function now became the collection of the personal income of the captain-general.
26. APO VI. 804-805

to resume any lands needed to sustain or reward the armed forces. Repeated royal instructions forbidding the generals to deprive village holders of their lands apparently had no effect.<sup>27</sup>

During the period 1614-1638 the most important limiting factor on the powers of the captain-general was the presence of the *vedor da fazenda*. Though the post of *vedor da fazenda* of Ceylon existed since 1597, the holder of this post had been allowed to exercise little power by the captains-general Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo and Dom Francisco de Menezes Roxo.<sup>28</sup> The basis of the authority of the *vedor* was the *regimento* of Antao Vaz Freire. The functions of this officer could be conveniently divided into five categories. First, he was expected to secure the efficient working of the machinery of revenue collection. It was his duty to seek to maximise royal revenue and to submit proposals to this end to the viceroy and the king. Accordingly he was given the power to appoint and dismiss all minor revenue officials.<sup>29</sup> In 1615 the *vedor* also received the authority to fine persons up to five hundred *cruzados* in matters dealing solely with revenue.<sup>30</sup> Secondly, it was his duty to compile a *tombo* or land register. This aspect of the *vedor's* functions was clearly connected with revenue collection for the *tombo* was intended to be a record of all the services due and the taxable produce of each village. Thirdly, all normal government expenditure was under the control of the *vedor* while he had the right to be notified of all extraordinary expenses requisitioned for by the captain-general. Fourthly, as one of the three members of the *junta* he had a share in the allocation of the villages and lands to those who had petitioned for them. Finally, he was also instructed to fortify the important ports of Kotte.<sup>31</sup> The conquest of Jaffna in 1619 added further responsibilities to the *vedor* who was thenceforth expected to supervise the work of the factors of Jaffna and Mannar and also to complete the land register of Jaffna.

27. TT.LM.12.ff.374,423 ; TT.LM.16.ff.500,580 ; TT.LM.45.f.305 ; TT.LM.35.f.5v ; TT.LM.44.f.63 ; TT.LM.18.f.240v ; AHU Caixa 7,4,3, 1622. As late as 1622 Jorge de Albuquerque, captain-general of Ceylon granted the village of Panane to a Sinhalese *mudaliyar*. S. G. Perera *trans.*, *The tombo of the Two Korales*, 28

28. T. Abeyasinghe assumes that Antao Vaz Freire, appointed in 1607 was the first *vedor* of Ceylon. However it is clear from the *tombo* of Kotte compiled by Jorge Frolim de Almeida in 1597 that de Almeida himself was appointed as *vedor da fazenda* of the conquest of Ceylon though he may have been allowed less power than Vaz Freire. It is however unlikely that de Almeida remained in Kotte until the arrival of Antao Vaz Freire. T. Abeyasinghe, 89,129 ; TT.*Manuscritos do Convento da Graca, tombo* 6D.ff.325,323

29. AHU Caixa 6, 2.11.1618

30. AHU Caixa 4, 24.11.1615

31. T Abeyasinghe 84-85 ; APO VI.802-808 ; Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos I. 40/2-4

In the execution of these functions the *vedor* was responsible only to the viceroy of India. Indeed Dr. Abeyasinghe had pointed out that the *regimento* of Antao Vaz Freire did not require him even to subordinate himself to the viceroy.<sup>32</sup> However in practice the *vedores* including Vaz Freire received and obeyed orders from the viceroy. Although in the early stages the post of *vedor* was usually filled by persons directly nominated by the king in the 1620's and the 1630's the appointment of the *vedor* became almost exclusively the task of the viceroy.<sup>33</sup> The viceroy also certainly acquired the right to dismiss any *vedor* who refused to carry out his orders.<sup>34</sup> Complaints against the *vedor* were investigated in the *conselho da fazenda* or treasury council at Goa, just as those against the captain-general were discussed in the viceroy's *conselho do estado* or council of state.<sup>35</sup>

Indeed the need for a supervisory authority over both the captain-general and the *vedor* was enhanced by the continued conflicts that occurred between the two officials. These conflicts were partly the result of the lack of precision in the differentiation of their functions and respective spheres of jurisdiction. For example it was directed that the *vedor* should be in charge of all normal expenditure and accordingly submit annual accounts of

32. T. Abeyasinghe 86

33. Antao Vaz Freire was the first *vedor* appointed by the king of Portugal. On receipt of news that Vaz Freire wished to return to Portugal, the king on 8 January 1617 appointed Paulo de Serra de Moraes to succeed him. De Moraes was unable to come to the east due to sickness and the king thereupon requested the viceroy-in-council to make a choice between Lancarote de Seixas and Pedro de Almeida da Cabral. After de Seixas had been chosen and had served for sometime, in 1623 the king nominated Joao Pereira Borracho to succeed him. Borracho died before the orders reached India. (DR IV.221, DR V.106 ; TT.LM.17.f.83 ; TT.LM.20.f.269 ; TT.LM.37.f.425 ; TT.LM.40.f.94 ; TT.LM.41.f.253 ; AHU 501.f.286v ; AHU Caixa 5,1.2.1618 ; AHU Caixa 4,6.1.1618)

The *vedores da fazenda* of Ceylon 1597-1639 were : Jorge Frolim de Almeida (1597- ). Antao Vaz Freire (1608-1616). Manoel de Oliveira de Azevedo (1616-1618). Lancarote de Seixas (1618-1622). Miguel Pinheiro Ravasco (1622-1623). Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara (1623-1626). Constantino de Sa de Noronha (1626-1627). Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara (1628-1630). Lancarote de Seixas (1630-1631). Andre Simoes (1631). Jorge de Almeida (1631-1633). Amaro Roiz (1633-1636). Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro (1636-1638). Gaspar da Araujo (1638-1639). Diogo Mendes de Brito (1639-16...).

34. Late in 1634 the viceroy Conde de Linhares decided to remove the *vedor* Amaro Roiz from office for precisely this reason. Amaro Roiz was able to continue in office only because the successor nominated by the viceroy, Antonio Pinho da Costa was reluctant to sacrifice his business and trading interests to take up residence in Colombo and because the viceroy himself was replaced by a successor who partially reversed his policies. The Conde de Linhares also removed Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara from the post of *vedor* in 1630. (See chapters III and IV)

35. On the Viceroy's advisory councils see above page 20

revenue and expenses to the viceroy.<sup>36</sup> However, the right of the captain-general to requisition funds from the factor for extraordinary expenses made the *vedor's* control over expenditure a farce.<sup>37</sup> The situation, perhaps difficult to avoid in time of war, continued even in times of peace for since the term 'extraordinary expenses' was not defined, despite the protests of the *vedor*, the captain-general continued to use this loophole in the law to obtain funds for diverse purposes.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, the *vedor* could sabotage or at least delay the schemes of the captain-general by pleading lack of funds. This was what Ambrosio de Freitas did in respect of the fortification of Batticaloa and Menikkadawara. In these circumstances the only resource open to the captain-general was to spend his own money and later reclaim it from the royal treasury.

The instructions given to Vaz Freire by the king clearly show that the fortification of the ports of Kotte was considered to be a part of the *vedor's* functions. The captain-general naturally resisted this intrusion into the politico-military sphere which he regarded as exclusively his own concern. At no time during the two decades under review did the *vedor* succeed in asserting his control over the building of forts. On the other hand he established the right to advise the viceroy on political and military affairs and came to be regarded as a valuable source of critical comment on the policies of the captain-general. This was to prove an irritant to the captain-general especially when, as in the case of Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara, the *vedor* had views distinctly opposed to those of the captain-general. However the captain-general's protests were of no avail. The *regimento* issued to Diogo Mendes de Brito on 8 February 1639 not only requested him to give his opinion on the advisability of fortifying Kalutara and on the state of the fort at Negombo but even instructed him to keep a close check on the work of fortifying Colombo.<sup>39</sup> Yet another instance of overlapping authority may be found in the divided responsibility for the *lascarin* forces. The *lascarins* as soldiers were subject

36. APO VI.1219 ; TT.LM.13.f.193 ; TT.LM.17.f.85 ; TT.LM.16.f.355 ; TT.LM.38.f3296v

37. Luis de Seixas in a report to the *conselho da fazenda* in Lisbon argued that the *vedor* could not fulfil his functions as the captain-general held the factor in subservience. The factor he states is a person *que esta tremendo quando falacem o geral.*' AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635

38. AHU Caixa 6, 7.11.1618 ; AHU 210.f.124v. Both Lancarote de Seixas and Antonio de Fonseca Ozouro are known to have protested against this practice. They suggested controls such as, a maximum limit on extraordinary expenses, the enforcement of the general's liability to submit accounts to the viceroy which had hitherto been ignored and a definition of what constituted 'extraordinary expenses.'

39. APO VI.805 ; TT.LM.45.ff.363-363v ; Filmoteca LM.14.119/1-3

to the captain-general and his subordinates. Yet they were rewarded for their services by land grants. As landholders they were also under the jurisdiction of the *vedor*.

Defects in delimitation of authority alone however would not explain all the clashes between those two important officials. The problem lay partly in the fact that the Portuguese attempted to take over the institutions of Kotte and make only piecemeal changes to suit their immediate objectives. Such a policy inevitably led to unforeseen problems which affected the smooth working of the administration. Under the king of Kotte only the king had the authority to make proclamations. The Portuguese took the powers over revenue that belonged to the king and invested them in the *vedor* but the captain-general insisted on retaining the sole power to make proclamations by issuing the document in *ola* or palm leaf. The persistent efforts of Amaro Roiz (*vedor* 1633-1636) failed to convince the viceroy-in-council of the need for any change in procedure and throughout this period the *vedor* had to depend on the co-operation of the captain-general in issuing new orders regarding revenue.<sup>40</sup>

As in many other instances in the seventeenth century, in Portuguese Ceylon individual and personal attitudes mattered a great deal. In 1630 Constantino de Sa de Noronha declared that he was willing to work with anyone except Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara. Lancarote de Seixas, twice *vedor* of Ceylon worked amicably with Constantino de Sa on both occasions but had disputes with both Jorge de Albuquerque and Dom Filipe Mascarenhas.<sup>41</sup> However, it was often argued that an administrative structure which left so much room for dispute was clearly in need of reform.<sup>42</sup> The disputes between the two premier officials in Ceylon threatened to bring the administration to a standstill and this was something the Portuguese could ill-afford.<sup>43</sup>

The solution advocated by two of the ablest captains-general of this period—Constantino de Sa and Diogo de Mello was simple

40. TT.LM.36.ff.11,28,30,32

41. Filmoteca LM.13B. 11/3-5 ; Assentos I.265,53,352 ; TT.LM.18.f.240v

42. Constantino de Sa who turned so bitter against Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara in later years had written a letter to the king on 1 December 1623 warmly praising him for good work as *vedor*. Thus the animosity he later acquired was a product of their relationship in 1624-1625.

Although it is possible to accept John Lynch's statement (in *Spanish Colonial Administration 1782-1810 ; The Intendant System in the viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata*. London 1958, page 195) that in any administrative system there are margins of uncertain territory over which jealous officials can dispute, if disputes are sought, "there margins seem to have been unusually wide in the Portuguese administrative structure in Ceylon.

43. TT.LM.24.f.21v ; Filmoteca LM.21.26/2-4

though drastic. They proposed the abolition of the post of *vedor da fazenda*. The captain-general was to take over the duty of general supervision of the collection of revenue and the preparation of accounts of revenue and expenditure. The routine administration of financial affairs was to be delegated to the factor. Many arguments could be advanced in favour of this solution which had been advocated by the bishop of Cochin as early as 1619. Diogo de Mello pointed out that to have both a *vedor* and a captain-general was like having two heads to one body. The concentration of power in the hands of the captain-general, would lead to greater efficiency. Moreover this measure would save the substantial emoluments paid by the treasury to the *vedor*. These were the arguments that induced the conde de Linhares, viceroy of India to accept Constantino de Sa's offer to perform the task of *vedor* as well as captain-general.<sup>44</sup>

The authorities in Lisbon did not agree. The *vedor da fazenda* was considered not merely as a revenue official but also as a useful check on the powers of the captain-general. The whole of the Portuguese administrative system in the east had been based on this system of 'checks and balances.' The factor, a minor official could not be expected to fulfil this aspect of the *vedor's* functions. This was why the king refused to agree to proposals to dispense with the *vedor*.<sup>45</sup>

However, it was soon realised that greater co-operation between the *vedor* and the captain-general was an urgent need. Apart from the viceroy's authority the main instrument used to ensure this co-ordination was the *junta*. The *junta* as defined in the instructions of Antao Vaz Freire and as set up in 1614 was a council consisting of the captain-general, the *vedor*, and the bishop of Cochin or in the absence of any one of these the captain of Colombo. Its original objective was to define the quit rents to be fixed after the completion of the land register of Kotte and to distribute the villages to persons of merit.<sup>46</sup> In a sense it could be viewed as an attempt to gain for the *vedor* a hand in the grant of lands which had

44. TT.LM.24.ff.61v-62 ; BNL. FG 1982. ff.123-123v,147 ; AHU 33. f.22 ; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.ff.216v,217,221, 227 ; TT.LM.22.f.91v

45. TT.LM.26.ff.319.319,335 ; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635 ; AHU Caixa 16, 28.1.1644

46. APO VI.804 ; T. Abeyasinghe 122. The *junta* set up in 22 May 1614 was suspended in May 1615 by the viceroy Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo on the grounds that it did not adhere to the king's instructions. Following protests by Antao Vaz Freire it was reinstated on the king's orders a few years later. AHU Caixa 4, 19.11.1615 ; AHU Caixa 4, 7.9.1615 ; TT.LM.12.f.175



hitherto been dealt with mainly by the captain-general and his *disavas*. However, by the second decade of the seventeenth century the king of Portugal had already begun considering this body as one which should have much wider functions. Thus on 23 February 1615 for example, he wrote to the viceroy requesting that the *junta* be asked to make inquiries as to how *chaleas* resident in villages held by private persons could be regained for the king's service.<sup>47</sup> Accordingly by the 1620's the *junta* had become a council of finance as well as a *mesa da reparticao* or a board of (land) allocation. With the completion of the *tombo* and the allocation of land, all that remained of the *junta's* original functions was to review petitions for lands that had fallen vacant. It was therefore viewed also as a body where the *vedor* and the captain-general would exchange views on problems of finance. In 1619 the king recommended that the council be enlarged to accommodate a Franciscan. The *junta* continued to function throughout the 1620's and the 1630's during which period it sometimes acted as a judicial body. During the brief periods when the general took over the *vedor*, as in 1626-1627 and 1631-1633, the *vedor's* was filled first by an Augustinian Frey Jacinto de Jesus and then by the veteran soldier, Lourenco Teixeira de Macedo.<sup>48</sup> However, continued disputes between the *vedor* and the captain-general show that the *junta* too failed to cope with the problem of interdepartmental conflict.

In comparison with those already discussed the post of factor was a minor one. The primary responsibility of the factor lay in the collection of revenue under the overall supervision of the *vedor*. The factor's functions were confined to the day to day administration of revenue matters and the keeping of records as to the amounts received from each local collector while the *vedor* determined policy decisions relating to revenue. The factor was entrusted with the recording of all regulations sent by the king and the viceroy and those proclaimed by the captain-general. He also had minor judicial powers. Each factor served for a three year term. There were two factors in Kotte during this period—the factor of Colombo and the factor of Galle. There had also been a factor in Mannar since the sixteenth century and with the conquest of the Jaffna kingdom another such office was created to deal with

47. APO VI 1078 ; T. Abeyasinghe 110

48. DR V.358 ; AHU Caixa 8,27.1.1625 ; APO VI. 1185-1186 : BNL FG.1983.f.136 ; TT.LM. 30.f.284v ; TT.LM.24.f.349 ; TT.LM.12.ff. 113,175-176 ; TT.LM.22.f.13v ; TT.LM.16.f.409 ; TT.LM.20.f.225 ; TT.LM.45.f.355v

revenue collection in Jaffna. Each factor had a writer to assist him.<sup>49</sup>

The only Portuguese official whose functions were exclusively judicial, was the *ouvidor* or judge. The evidence available does not precisely indicate the extent of his jurisdiction but the *regimento* issued to the *vedor* Diogo Mendes de Brito in 1639 indicates that the *ouvidor* could not sentence in case of major crimes except with the concurrence of the captain-general. In other settlements of the Portuguese colonial empire the *ouvidor's* powers were usually restricted to the imposing of fines, corporal punishment and imprisonment for minor officials. However, during this period the *ouvidor* was responsible for the preliminary investigations into all charges after which the major cases were tried by the captain-general and the *ouvidor* together or sent up to the *junta* in Ceylon or the *relacao* or high court in Goa. The *ouvidor* also certified all affidavits, grants and copies of these documents. In 1618 there were two *ouvidors* in Kotte—the *ouvidor* of Colombo and the *ouvidor* of the conquest of Ceylon. On the recommendations of Jeronimo de Brito, a judicial officer (*desembargador*) sent from Goa to investigate complaints in Ceylon, the king in 1620 ordered these two posts to be amalgamated.<sup>50</sup> This was done in 1621.<sup>51</sup> In 1617 there was also an *ouvidor* in Mannar and another such official was appointed to Jaffna after the conquest of the kingdom in 1618. By 1638 there was a separate Portuguese magistrate (*juiz*) in Galle.<sup>52</sup>

49. P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 1645-2,37 ; Assentos I,50 ; Panduronga S. S. Pissurlencar—*Regimentos das fortalezas da India*, 511 ; AHU Caixa 5,29.1.1618 ; T. Abeyasinghe, 89 ; T. Abeyasinghe points out that the factor of Colombo served as the chief police officer (*alcaide mor*) and superintendent of works (*vedor das obras*) and sometimes also as trustee for the property of the dead (*provedor dos defunctos*). He also served as *Juiz de alfendega* or chief customs officer. The following are known to have served as factors of Colombo—Dom Bras Viera de Moraes 1614-1616. Francisco Quizante 1.11.1619-31.3.1622. Joao da Costa 1.4.1622-31.1.1633. Jorge de Abreu 1.2.1623-31.5.1626. Francisco Tristao 1.1.1626-31.3.1629. Thome de Gouvea 1636-1639. The factors of Jaffna included—Antonio Toneles 10.1619-4.1634. Manoel de Barros 4.1624-4.1625. Francisco de Mello de Silva early 1630's.
50. From 1612-1616 the two officers had been held by the same person but the two posts were regarded as distinct ones. The bishop of Cochin also recommended the amalgamation but the authorities in Lisbon had decided on it before the bishop's report reached there. (TT.LM.13.d 253 ; TT.LM.16.f.571)
51. The *ouvidor* of Colombo also held the office of magistrate of the provinces (*corregedor da comarca*) and the judge of the native people (*juiz de jurisdicao da gente da terra*). In case of the absence of the *ouvidor* the most senior alderman of the *camara* (*vereador mais velho*) of Colombo took his place. Goa C. Pe As VII.ff.34-36 . .
52. TT.LM.45.f.355v ; AHU Caixa 15, 29.12.1643 ; AHU Caixa 22, 4.8.1654 ; TT.LM.16.f.794 ; C. R. Boxer and C. de Azevedo—*Fort Jesus and the Portuguese in Mombaca*, 1593-1729 4-44. The *foral* of Jaffna

The *ouvidor* was accountable for his judicial functions only to the high court at Goa. However, due to the need for a close working relationship with the captain-general, the *ouvidor* of Colombo often tended to be subservient to him. This must have placed him in a rather awkward position due to the conflict between the *vedor* and the captain-general, for the *ouvidor* was expected to render accounts of fines imposed and collected by him to the *vedor* and he also received his pay from him. In fact direct conflicts between the *vedor* and the *ouvidor* are known to have occurred in the early 1620's.<sup>53</sup>

The administration of the newly acquired territories in the north was kept separate from that of Kotte, partly of course due to geographical reasons but partly also as a matter of policy, for the Portuguese had learnt in Kotte that the existing administrative structure when suitably modified could often be made to serve their purposes more or less satisfactorily. The chief Portuguese officer in Jaffna was the captain-major. He was responsible for the defence of the areas under direct Portuguese rule, namely the Jaffna Peninsula itself, the adjacent islands and the island of Mannar. In the 1620's the newly constructed forts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa, more accessible from Jaffna than from Kotte, were also placed under his overall supervision. The captain-major of Jaffna was theoretically under the command of the captain-general of Ceylon but, with the exception of Constantino de Sa, no captain-general ever visited Jaffna while in office during the twenty one years from 1617 to 1638. Moreover, the captain-major had the right to communicate directly with the viceroy,<sup>54</sup> and was solely responsible for the grant of villages.<sup>55</sup>

Like the captain-general in Kotte, the captain-major in Jaffna tended to use local traditions connected with the royalty to enhance his prestige and position. He moved about the country surrounded by a guard of eighty *lascarins* and ten Portuguese. The beating of tom-toms announced his approach and like the king of Jaffna he had the service of two shield-bearers (*rodeleiros*). However, the powers of the captain-major, like those of the captain-

(1645) indicates that there was a fixed scale of judicial fees (eg. *one fanam* to register a patent, two *fanams* to make entry in the *tombo* and to issue a certificate etc.) and that the *ouvidor* in Jaffna had no power to act against revenue collectors (*recebedores*) except in charges of assault. P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 1645-2,38

53. TT.LM.15.f.191 ; TT.LM.17.f.59 ; TT.LM.13.f.253. TT.LM.18.f.240v ; *Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos* I. 11/2

54. P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 1645,1 ; Assentos I.50 ; APO (new ed.) IV.Tomo II.Part A.417

55. TT.LM.26.f.291v

general were restricted in the sphere of revenue. It is true that the first captain-major of Jaffna, Filipe de Oliveira, not merely had the right to appoint revenue officials but was even authorised to complete the land register begun by the *vedor* Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara. However, from the outset the collection of revenue and the disbursement of expenditure was made the responsibility of the factor in Jaffna who worked under the supervision of the *vedor* of Ceylon. By the early 1630's the administration of Jaffna had been brought completely into line with that of Kotte by the separation of revenue from other aspects of administration. The conde de Linhares, viceroy of India (1629-1635) decreed that revenue officials (*recebedores*) could henceforth be appointed only by the viceroy of India or the *vedor da fazenda* of Ceylon and forbade the captain-major to interfere in their work.<sup>56</sup>

Of the working of the lower reaches of the administration in Jaffna little evidence is available. Civil administration continued to be in the hands of the *mudaliyars* as in the days of the Tamil kings. However the *mudaliyars* having lost their best lands to the Portuguese were never the power they had been in the late sixteenth century. For revenue purposes the traditional four fold territorial divisions of Valikamam, Vadamarachchi, Tenmarachchi and Pachchlaippalai remained. The islands off the coast were attached to the proximate revenue division on the mainland. The revenue collection itself was done by means of *recebedores* or collectors who had *adigars* to aid them. In the 1640's the two provinces of Vadamarachchi and Pachchilaippalai were placed under a single *recebedor*. The other provinces had one each. These posts were usually held by Tamil *mudaliyars*. The land rents of the Portuguese were collected by a separate official called *recebedor dos foros*. The collectors were paid one percent of the collection they made. They were appointed for life in the early years of Portuguese rule but abuses of office soon compelled the Portuguese to limit their tenure to three years. Like the *vidanes* of Kotte, the *adigars* of Jaffna were revenue collectors, not only of territorial areas, but of caste groups. They themselves were sometimes assisted by caste headmen called *talaiyars* and *pattangutties*.<sup>57</sup>

56. P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 1645. 1 ; Assentos I.50. TT. LM.45.ff.362-363

57. P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 1645 19 ; TT.LM.45.ff.362-363 ; C. S. Navaratnam—*Tamils and Ceylon* (Jaffna 1958), 167-168 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 731.f.359v ; *Yalpana Vaipava Malai*, (trans., C. Brito. Colombo 1879) 48.

The mainland to the south of the Jaffna peninsula too had some revenue officials but except along the coast the Portuguese never exercised any real authority in the area and were content with collecting tribute from the local chieftains.

As in the decade preceding 1617, in the two decades that followed that year, the main constructive work of the Portuguese administrative system was the making of the *tombo*s or land registers. The urge to make a detailed survey of Ceylon's lands and resources was primarily economic. The Portuguese wished to obtain the maximum revenue from the lands they had subjugated. The best way to ensure this seemed to be to build up a detailed knowledge of the resources of the country. However it is difficult to resist the conclusion that *tombo*-making had political overtones too. Their view of the Sinhalese and the Tamils as '*traidores por natureza*' made the Portuguese reluctant to rely on native officials for information. They were aware that this dependence had enabled the *disavas* of Kotte and the *mudaliyars* of Jaffna to increase their powers and influence in the early years of Portuguese rule. The *tombo* was thus regarded as a means of checking and even reversing this trend.

By the beginning of our period, the techniques of *tombo* making had already advanced considerably beyond the early efforts of Jorge Frolim de Almeida. De Almeida's work, though called a *tombo* by the compiler himself, was more a *foral* or register of revenue.<sup>58</sup> Apart from some twenty ports and coastal settlements, the only villages mentioned in de Almeida's work were the royal villages or *gabadagam*.<sup>59</sup>

A little over thirteen years later the second *vedor da fazenda* of Ceylon had begun a new attempt at a land register. This was a more ambitious venture and aimed at recording not merely the number and names of villages, the extent of cultivable and cultivated land, and the type of crop, but even the average yield per acre, the number of craftsmen in each village and all customary-dues owed to the king. The task was a monumental one, for existing Sinhalese records had to be translated and the Sinhalese officials of each area consulted. However despite various difficulties Antao Vaz Freire and his assistant Balthazar Marinho completed the *tombo* in twenty two months. The *foral* or register of royal

58. TT.Mss da Livraria Tombo 6D pages 325-411

59. De Almeida's work covered the sea-ports and their environs as well as thirty nine korales consisting of 5004 villages. Details of revenue are recorded for some 430 *gabada* villages which made up about half the total number of *gabadagam* in Kotte.

revenue based on the *tombo* was completed six months later on 6 July 1615.<sup>60</sup>

Thus at the commencement of the period under consideration there was already a fairly comprehensive account of the available resources of the former kingdom of Kotte. However, before long, suggestions arose to supplement, revise and even re-make the *tombo*. One of the disadvantages of the Portuguese *tombo* was that it became out of date soon after it was recorded. The *tombo* merely recorded the situation existing at a particular time. There was no way in which changes in land ownership or in the extent of cultivated land could be inserted and the *tombo* revised periodically. Moreover, in Kotte, the rebellion of Nikapitiya (1616-1617) and the campaigns of Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala (1616-1620) had caused devastation in the inland areas. Thus by the early 1620's the dues fixed for many of the villages had begun to be unrealistic. On the other hand other villages had grown in size and population but the income derived from them by the state had remained static.<sup>61</sup>

Moreover, the Portuguese were now getting to know the country better. Vaz Freire's *tombo*, after all, had been in many ways a pioneer effort. With the passage of time it was discovered that many of the small settlements had been overlooked by the compilers of the *tombo* and it was soon evident that the revenues of some villages had been greatly underestimated. This was not remarkable as Vaz Freire had not the time to visit each of the small villages scattered all over Kotte. In fact much of the *tombo* was made in Colombo at the *vedor's* residence with the help of local Sinhalese officials summoned before the *vedor*. These officials had much to gain by not disclosing all sources of revenue and the Portuguese often had no means of checking their accounts as the old Sinhalese records had in many cases been destroyed. With the restoration of peace in Kotte in 1620 came an increasing awareness of what had happened and a desire to remedy it by revising the *tombo*.<sup>62</sup>

Two further reasons for the making of a new *tombo* were advanced by Constantino de Sa in a letter to the king dated 1 December 1623. The first of these was primarily economic. The *foral* of Kotte was made by Antao Vaz Friere estimated the *foros*

60. T. Abeyasinghe 127-134; AHU Caixa 4, 28.10.1615; & 20.11.1615 In November 1615 Vaz Freire wrote to the king that the *tombo* completed on 26 January 1615 covered thirty five *korales* and 4,640 villages as well as eleven ports. It was inscribed in four books containing 1,834 folios.

61. TT.LM.21.f.171; TT.Colleccao de S. Vicente XIX, Doc. 276

62. TT.LM.16.ff.238,717; TT.LM.22.f.88. P. E. Pieris—*The Ceylon littoral* 1593, pp, 6,22,47

or quitrents due from land at 22,000 *xerafims*. Of this sum 4,700 *xerafims* were due from Portuguese village holders, and the rest from Sinhalese, many of whom were *lascarins*.

By the 1620's these *lascarins* were refusing to pay quit rents for the villages they held and they had grounds for doing so. In the days of the kings of Kotte the local militia had been rewarded for their services by tax-free grants of lands and villages. In the second half of the sixteenth century the success of the warlike Rajasinha of Sitawaka had deprived the *lascarins* who remained loyal to the Portuguese-sponsored king of Kotte, of all their lands. These *lascarins*, moreover, being occupied with continuous fighting in defence of coastal forts had little time to tend land even if it was available. Therefore the Portuguese adopted the practice of paying *lascarins* a maintenance allowance. When in the 1590's the lands of Kotte fell into Portuguese hands, these *lascarins* were rewarded with villages but in view of the maintenance allowance<sup>62a</sup> they received, their villages were, like those of the Portuguese *casados* assessed for quitrent. In the second decade of the seventeenth century the Portuguese government ceased the payment of this allowance due to financial problems. The *lascarins* thereupon demanded that their villages be free of quit rent and ceased to pay their dues. The Portuguese authorities were unwilling to lose this source of revenue and de Sa held that the only solution was to make a new *tombo*, resume all lands and regrant some of them to the *lascarins* on more favourable conditions.<sup>63</sup>

The other reason for advocating a new *tombo* was primarily military. De Sa believed that in view of the likelihood of renewed warfare with Kandy, the *lascarins* could be used to best advantage by settling them in areas of the Four Korales near Colombo. This, it was felt, would not merely enable the Portuguese to provide security for the families of the *lascarins* within fortified posts near Colombo but would also secure the communications between Colombo and Malwana along the Kelani valley. This plan could also have provided the Portuguese with a strong force, based centrally and capable of being mobilized easily when necessary. The problem was that lands near Colombo which could have been allocated to the *lascarins* were already granted to others. De Sa seems to have felt that a new *tombo* and a general redistribution of lands was the only way to overcome this difficulty without

62a Studia IV 266 ; AHU Caixa 500. ff. 51.54 ; Ajuda 51-VIII.58, ff. 291-291v ; BM Add. Mss. 28443 ff. 141, 143-144

63. T. Abeyasinghe 125-126 ; TT. *Collecao de S. Vicente* XIX Doc. 276. AHU Caixa 6. 13. 11. 1619

undue bitterness among those who would be forced to exchange villages in the Four Korales for those further afield.<sup>64</sup>

De Sa's request for a new *tombo* in Kotte did not receive sanction from Lisbon. The authorities in Lisbon who had not as yet seen Vaz Freire's work were reluctant to embark on the expensive task of remaking the whole *tombo*.<sup>65</sup> So the work of the next two decades in Kotte was one of supplementing Vaz Freire's work by the addition of separate volumes covering areas newly subjugated and villages newly discovered. Thus in 1622 the *vedor* Miguel Pinheiro Ravasco made a *tombo* and a *foral* of the Two Korales covering a hundred and fifty three villages. He was aided by three of the Sinhalese officials who had assisted in Vaz Freire's work—Dom Jeronimo Basnayake, Dom Jeronimo Alagiya-wanna and Dom Jeronimo Samaradiwakara.<sup>66</sup> A few years later another *vedor*, Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara made a *tombo* of villages in Kotte discovered since the days of Vaz Freire. This register covered another hundred villages. Finally, Amaro Roiz (*vedor da fazenda*, 1633-36) added another supplement covering villages omitted from all former *tombo*s. The *regimento* issued to the *vedor* in 1639 requested him to continue this work.<sup>67</sup> Apart from these supplementary *tombo*s it is known that Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara made a *foral* or list of revenue of all the *pagoda* villages.<sup>68</sup> All these works were however, much smaller in scale than the monumental labours of Vaz Freire.<sup>69</sup>

With the conquest of Jaffna, the need for a *tombo* in that kingdom became apparent. In this area there were two Portuguese officials responsible for revenue collection—the factor of Mannar and the factor of Jaffna. The factor of Mannar was responsible for the collection of revenue from the pearl fishery, the island of Mannar itself and the tributary payments from the area of the

64. TT.Colleccao de S. Vicente XIX Doc. 726 ; TT.LM.22.f.88

65. AHU Caixa 8, 23.1.1625

66. The *tombo* of the Two Korales is preserved as manuscript FG 2637 at the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon and has been translated into English and published by Fr. S. G. Perera. The *tombo* covers the whole of the Meda Korale and that part of Kadawata Korale that belonged to the Portuguese. It also includes the villages of the Kandavel Pattu of the Atakalan Korale that were not included in the *tombo* of Vaz Freire.

67. TT.LM.45.f.304v ; TT.LM.45.f.355

68. TT.LM.21.f.175. Pagoda villages or *viharagam* and *devalagam* as they are known in Sinhalese were lands gifted by the local king and other persons to the Buddhist and Hindu temples. The king of Portugal had ordered these to be separated from other villages and used for the maintenance of the Catholic missionary effort. TT.Ms da Convento da Graca tomo 6D.f.332

69. The *tombo* of the Two Korales for instance covered only seventy folio leaves.



mainland of Ceylon immediately opposite the island. The factor in Jaffna was in charge of collecting the revenue from the Jaffna peninsula and receiving the tribute from the Vanni area. There is no evidence that the factor in Mannar was in any sense subordinate to the factor in Jaffna. In fact the former had the right (or perhaps the duty) to send reports directly to the viceroy regarding the condition of the local inhabitants and local matters. Both were equally subordinate to the *vedor da fazenda* of Ceylon. This perhaps explains why the Portuguese sought to make two separate *tombos*—one for Mannar and Mantota and the other for the Jaffna peninsula proper.<sup>70</sup>

The making of a *tombo* of the lands of Mannar and Mantota had been advocated as early as 1590's by Matias de Albuquerque, viceroy of India.<sup>71</sup> The work on the *tombo*, however, never actually got under way. In June 1620 Lancarote de Seixas, *vedor* of Ceylon visited Mannar and reorganized the collection of revenue but the lands remained unregistered.<sup>72</sup> Seven years later, when Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara was ordered to take up the task, he asked for the power to confiscate lands from those who had usurped possession and also the right to grant such lands to others, arguing that this was the best means of discovering hidden sources of revenue.<sup>73</sup> Amaro Roiz is known to have visited Mannar twice—in March 1635 and August 1636 but on neither occasion did he have time to do much more than issue a series of regulations on the collection of revenue and the disbursement of expenses.<sup>74</sup>

Probably because its revenues were larger, the Jaffna peninsula attracted more attention than Mannar from the Portuguese revenue officers. Barely a few months after the conquest of Jaffna the viceroy's council in Goa agreed that a responsible person should be sent to the area to ascertain its revenues.<sup>75</sup> Accordingly in June 1620 the *vedor* of Ceylon, de Seixas visited Jaffna, remained there for a few weeks and made a *foral* or list of dues based on the information given by the local *mudaliyars*.<sup>76</sup> However due to the disturbed state of the kingdom at the time and the short period of stay, the *vedor's* list could not have been either detailed or complete.

The primary objective of the Portuguese in Jaffna in the early

70. P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645, 2,37

71. Panduronga S. S. Pissurlencar—*Regimentos das fortalezas da India*, 481

72. AHU 35.f.24

73. TT.LM.26.f.292v

74. TT.LM.41.ff.253-254

75. Assentos I. 113

76. AHU 35.f.24 ; TT.LM.18.f.284

1620's was to provide for its defence. For this purpose sufficient revenue to pay the *soldados* and sufficient land to attract Portuguese *casados* were the primary requirements. It is therefore no surprise that the authorities in Goa decided that a *tombo* and a *foral* were urgent requirements in Jaffna.<sup>77</sup> The king of Portugal had urged the same measure in a letter dated March 1622.<sup>78</sup> It was however not until 1623 that the first positive steps in this direction were taken. In that year the viceroy, Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de Vidigueira requested the then *vedor* of Ceylon, Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara to visit Jaffna, make a *tombo* of its lands and ascertain whether the expenses of the garrison, the officials and the missionary priests in Jaffna could be met from the revenues of the province.

Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara arrived in Jaffna in April 1623. His work however suffered greatly due to disputes which sprang up between him and Filipe de Oliveria, captain-major of Jaffna. De Oliveira who by mid 1623 had had almost four years experience in governing Jaffna seems to have offered much advice that de Freitas was slow to appreciate. Moreover, de Oliveira being by far the most powerful and feared Portuguese official in Jaffna seems to have expected de Freitas to report to him on progress made with the *tombo*. De Freitas, on the other hand held that his obligation was only to report to the viceroy. As *vedor* he insisted on a guard of *lascarins* and Portuguese in his travels in the peninsula. Two issues strained the relations between the two officials almost to a breaking point. One was the desire of de Freitas to obtain complete control over the revenue aspects of the administration. This could hardly be achieved while de Oliveira had the right to appoint revenue officials and had the sole power to allocate lands. De Freitas however tried his best. He protested to the viceroy about this matter and sent orders to the factor of Jaffna without consulting the captain-major. The other issue was the resentment of de Oliveira at the powers given to de Freitas to report on military questions, the number of troops required, the number, size, position and strength of forts necessary and the like. The eventual outcome was that while de Oliveira argued that the revenue estimates of the *vedor* were greatly exaggerated, the *vedor* claimed that de Oliveira had expropriated customary payments due to the king instead of paying them to the treasury.<sup>79</sup>

77. TT.LM.15.f.45

78. TT.LM.26.f.291v

79. TT.LM.26.f.293v

The viceroy tried to induce a more amicable relationship and on his instructions, de Freitas, who had returned to Colombo after a few months in Jaffna, made a second visit to the peninsula. However as both de Oliveira and de Freitas remained unyielding, the effort ended with each writing to the viceroy refusing to work with the other. Despite these disputes however, de Freitas completed a *tombo* and a *foral* of Jaffna.<sup>80</sup> Almost inevitably there came critical comments from de Oliveira. De Oliveira's chief objection was that de Freitas with a total stay of less than eight months in Jaffna had no understanding of the revenue collection in the area. He argued that the Tamil documents could not always be relied upon, for the warfare of the past decade had caused considerable destruction. In support of this contention he pointed out that during the past few years there had often been a short-fall in revenue by two to three thousand *cruzados*. De Oliveira also held that the commutation of customary payments in goods for fixed payments in cash would lead to hardship among the poorer classes. Finally he claimed that the distribution of burdens done on the advice of the *mudaliyars* was unjust.<sup>81</sup>

The viceroy recognised the weight of the arguments of one who had ruled Jaffna for five years and decided in view of de Oliveira's excellent record that he himself should be entrusted with the task of revising the *tombo*. By 20 November 1626 de Oliveira was able to report that the chief province (Valikamam) was already dealt with but it is not known how much more work was done before de Oliveira himself died on 22 March 1627.<sup>82</sup> That the revision of the *tombo* remained incomplete is evident from the fact that on 1 September 1627, just five months after the death of de Oliveira, the viceroy's council at Goa discussed whether to send de Freitas back to Jaffna to work on it. Ambrosio de Freitas, however, was at this time engaged in a dispute with the captain-general, de Sa and had little time to spare. Being reluctant to leave the finances of Kotte in the hands of the factor Francisco Tristao who was proving to be a partisan of de Sa's, de Freitas suggested that instead of the *vedor* making a journey to Jaffna, the *mudaliyars* of the northern kingdom be requested to journey to Colombo and Malwana to aid the *vedor* in the making of the *tombo*. He also suggested the appointment of Portuguese officials to fill the posts of *vidana* or *adigar* as a means of finding out more about the revenues

80. AHU Caixa 8, 26.1.1625 ; TT.LM.23.f.93

81. TT.LM.23.f.213

82. BNL FG.1983.ff.45,85-85b ; TT.LM.22.ff.11v,114,132 ; TT.LM.25.f.267 ; TT.LM.26.f.335

of the area. Lancarote de Seixas, the new captain-major of Jaffna, agreed to these suggestions but due to the bitter personal dispute that developed between de Sa and de Freitas as well as the outbreak of war with Kandy and the consequent disturbed conditions in Jaffna, the work of registering lands and revising the *tombo* was further postponed. In June 1630, de Freitas, finally removed from office because of his disputes with de Sa, was requested to proceed to Jaffna and complete the *tombo*, but as he did not remain very long in Jaffna itself, it is unlikely that he completed the process of revising the *tombo* during this third and final visit of his to the area.<sup>83</sup>

Hardly three years after de Freitas had left the island the newly appointed *vedor* of Ceylon, Amaro Roiz was requested by the viceroy to make a *tombo* of Jaffna. Certainly by this time there were very strong reasons for making a new land register. After fifteen years of Portuguese rule much of the land had passed into the hands of the conquerors. The Kandyan invasion of 1628 and the rising of the Tamils that followed had accelerated this development. Moreover, the need for detailed information about Jaffna was greater than ever, for with the death of Filipe de Oliveira and Lancarote de Seixas there were few Portuguese left with a thorough knowledge of the Jaffna kingdom.

Nevertheless, it is possible that one of the reasons for the viceroy's desire to register the lands of Jaffna may have been the destruction of the old *tombo*, by accident or design. No seventeenth century document dated later than 1630 refers to the *tombo* made by de Freitas. Amaro Roiz in a report dated 30 November 1637 declared that the sources for his land register were the old Tamil *ola* documents, information received from the local officers and opinion given by Portuguese who knew the area. The report made no reference at all to any previous *tombo*.<sup>84</sup>

The work on this new *tombo* was organized methodically by Roiz. Roiz spent the whole of his first visit to Jaffna, lasting seven months from March to October 1635, collecting information for his land register. During his second visit from August 1636 to January 1637, he enlisted the aid of Lopo Gomes de Abreu, the captain-major of Jaffna, in the actual making of the register itself.

To Amaro Roiz, the *tombo* was not merely a record that would ensure an accurate estimate of revenue due. It was, by reason of its stating exactly what was due and expected from the village

83. TT.Ms da Liv. 731.f.359v ; BNL FG.1982.ff.147,154v ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.40 ; Simancas SP 1522 f.20 ; TT.LM.40.f.345. TT.LM.26.f.290

84. TT.LM.41.ff.253-255

holder, a safeguard against excessive demands upon the subject. Thus his *tombo* specified not merely the names of the holders of lands, the nature and extent of these lands and the dues owed to the king but the regulations passed by Portuguese authorities on matters relating to revenue<sup>85</sup>. Roiz intended that this *tombo* should eventually be translated into Tamil, to be used as a guide by the local revenue collectors.

The *tombo* itself was made up of six volumes, two of which covered Valikamam. Each of the other three provinces, Tenmarachchi, Vadamarachchi, and Pachchilaippalai was registered in a separate volume. The sixth volume contained a register of lands of all the islands off the Jaffna peninsula. The lands of the Vanni and of Mannar and Mantota were not registered. A *foral* based on this *tombo* was also begun by Roiz but was left incomplete. The outbreak of war with Kandy in 1638 and Dutch intervention in Ceylon in the same year delayed the completion of this task till 1645 when the *foral* of Jaffna was completed under the direction of Dom Filipe Mascarenhas. By this time it had become the duty of the *vedor* of Ceylon and the factor of Jaffna to keep the *tombo* up to date.<sup>86</sup>

To conclude the survey of Portuguese administration in Ceylon two more institutions have to be considered : the *camara* or municipal council of Colombo and the Portuguese armed forces. Although the earliest reference to a municipal council of Colombo occurs in 1580 there are reasons to believe that the *camara* of Colombo was organized as an effective body even earlier. In fact it is possible that the Portuguese in Colombo formed such an organization not long after the abandonment of Kotte in 1565.<sup>87</sup> In the last two decades of the sixteenth century not only the local monarch Dom Joao Dharmapala but even officials of the king of Portugal recognised the existence of such a body.<sup>88</sup> However, it was not until the direct annexation of Kotte that the Portuguese in Colombo applied for a charter of privileges. Portuguese colonial settlements in the seventeenth century received two types of charters. Larger and more important settlements like Goa obtained the privileges of Lisbon. Smaller settlements like Macao and Cochin

85. For instance the regulations regarding the monopoly of elephants were all recorded.

86. TT.LM.41.ff.253-255 ; TT.LM.45.f.361v ; TT.LM.43.f.91 ; TT.LM.40.f.31,95 ; TT.LM.39.f.31 ; TT.LM.44.f.230v. The *foral* of Jaffna is preserved as codice 222 of the *Archivo Historico Ultramarino*, Lisbon. It has been summarized and translated into English by P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 1645.

87. T. Abeyasinghe 93 ; Evora C-V/2-2 ff.216-221

88. T. Abeyasinghe 94 ; AHU Caixa 6, 10.11.1618

were awarded the more limited privileges of Evora.<sup>89</sup> The Portuguese in Colombo aspired only to gain the latter. The provisional grant of these privileges by the viceroys Ayres de Saldanha and Affonso de Castro apparently lapsed due to lack of confirmation by the king. The petitions of the *camara* in the 1620's also had no appreciable effect. However, in the early 1630's the conde de Linhares, viceroy of India, probably influenced by the sacrifices made by the Portuguese *casados* in the war against Kandy once more granted the privileges of Evora to Colombo. This grant was finally confirmed by the king in 1641.<sup>90</sup>

No direct evidence exists on the composition of the senate of the council (*senado da camara*). However, from the signatures in the petitions forwarded by the council it appears that there were six regular members apart from the *escrivao* or writer. It seems reasonable to assume that in Colombo as in Macao these six officials consisted of three *vereadores* or aldermen elected by the citizens, two *juizes ordinarios* or magistrates and the *procurador* or procurator. Elections to the *camara* were annual and involved a complicated system of ballot and lot.<sup>91</sup> The writer of the *camara* of Colombo was appointed for life.<sup>92</sup>

Disputes between the *camara* and the chief administrative officials were by no means rare. They were usually the result of the attempt of a *vedor* to impose some dues on the *casados* of Colombo or the attempt of the *camara* itself to spearhead opposition to an unpopular general.<sup>93</sup> However the lack of a charter of privileges crippled the *camara*. Thus when Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira arrested the officials of the *camara* and sent them to Goa in 1617 for trial they could only plead for a pardon as they had no legal status and therefore no judicial immunity.<sup>94</sup> Nevertheless the lack of a formal charter did not prevent the *camara* of Colombo from exercising many of the rights it claimed. The *officiais da camara* could and did correspond directly with the king. They collected revenues due from municipal lands and provided public

89. C. R. Boxer—*Portuguese society in the tropics—The Municipal councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia and Luanda 1570-1800.* (Wisconsin 1965) 5-14,45

90. AHU 210.ff.257v-258 ; AHU 211.f.130 ; TT.LM.18.f.241v ; TT.LM.55.f.23

91. AHU Caixa 10,7.12.1632 ; AHU Caixa 5, 22.10.1617 ; AHU Caixa 6, 21.11.1618 ; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644 ; TT.LM.43.f.186v ; Filmoteca LM 14, 115/1-2 ; C. R. Boxer—*Portuguese society in the tropics*, 5-7,45

92. Filmoteca LM 14.6/2

93. These factors explain the council's clashes with the *vedor* Vaz Freire and captains-general Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira and Jorge de Albuquerque. There were no recorded disputes in the time of de Azevedo and de Sa. DR III.398 ; DR IV.46-47,355 ; APO VI.1147,1218,1220-1221 ; TT.LM.16.f.582

94. TT.*Corpo chronologico Part I.* maco 116 doc. 87

facilities with the funds thus obtained.<sup>95</sup>

During the 1620's and 1630's there was little change in the council's power and influence. Already in 1618 the council had obtained an order from the king specifically forbidding the captain-general to interfere with the administration of the city. In 1623 following representations by Fernao de Albuquerque and his son Jorge de Albuquerque, the governor of India and the captain-general of Ceylon respectively, the king forbade the *camara* to issue testimonials of merit for services rendered to the crown. However in practice this prohibition seems to have had little effect for such testimonials were issued even as late as 1630. The *camara* had no statutory duty to advise the captain-general on matters of policy but in times crisis such as 1617 and 1638 the captain-general invariably consulted the *camara* to obtain advice and support.<sup>96</sup>

The revenue of the *camara* was obtained partly by renting some of the ferries across the Kelani river within a few miles of Colombo. In January 1620 de Azevedo had granted to the council the revenues from all ferries within the limits of the city.<sup>97</sup> Up to the late 1620's however, only three of the four ferries so granted were handed over to the council, as a Portuguese settler Fernao Sanches had successfully asserted his rights to the ferry at Wattala.<sup>98</sup> Apart from this revenue it is possible that the *camara* of Colombo, like the Portuguese municipal councils gained some income from the rents of municipal property, taxes on non-staple foods and fines imposed on those who violated municipal regulations.<sup>99</sup> However the bulk of its income must have been derived from the right to export forty *bahars* of cinnamon.

This 'liberty' was one which the Portuguese *casados* had obtained from the last Sinhalese king of Kotte, Dom Joao Dharmapala. The original purpose of the grant was that money derived from the sale of cinnamon should be distributed among the poorer settlers.<sup>100</sup> This privilege continued undisturbed under Portuguese

95. TT.LM.18.ff.240v-241v ; TT.LM.19.f.24v ; TT.LM.12.f.134 ; Simancas SP 1473.f.539. The necessities given priority were the making of a store house for provisions, a slaughter house for the supply of meat, a new building for the *camara* and a jail.

96. T. Abeyasinghe 98 ; DR IV.355 ; APO VI.1147 ; TT.LM.16.ff.118, 582 ; TT.LM.17.f.12. From the correspondence and records of the membership of the *camara* it appears that it was a body representing the Portuguese settler interests.

97. T. Abeyasinghe 95-96

98. TT.LM.21.f.133 ; Filmoteca LM.12.1/2-3 ; TT.LM.24.f.450 ; AHU Caixa 4, 2.1.1616

99. C. R. Boxer—*Portuguese society in the tropics*, 10

100. T. Abeyasinghe 94 ; AHU Caixa 6.10.11.1618

rule till 1614. The establishment of the monopoly of the production and sale of cinnamon in that year struck at this lucrative source of revenue for the *camara*. It was effectively argued that the city's 'liberty' should be abolished as any relaxation of the monopoly of cinnamon would defeat the very purpose of the monopoly—the maximization of royal revenue. In response to the petitions of the *camara*, the king on 14 February 1615 requested that this question be examined by the *junta* in Ceylon.<sup>101</sup> The recommendations of the *junta* are not known, but it is clear that despite the monopoly, the *camara* continued to collect and sell forty *bahars* of cinnamon annually till 1619. In 1619 Lancarote de Seixas, the *vedor*, forbade this practice on the grounds that it was contrary to the viceregal order enforcing the monopoly of cinnamon and moreover reduced royal revenue.<sup>102</sup> At this stage the city council brought in a new issue. It was pointed out that the settlement in Colombo was growing rapidly and was still without many basic public facilities. As the revenues of the *camara* apart from those derived from cinnamon were very small it was held that only the restoration of the permission to export forty *bahars* of the product would provide the necessary funds. Fernao de Albuquerque, the Portuguese governor at Goa still did not favour the request of the *camara*<sup>103</sup> and it was only after the *camara* obtained the support of his successor, the conde de Vidigueira that the king agreed in January 1624 to restore this 'liberty'.<sup>104</sup> A year later however, he qualified this grant. On 26 March 1625 he ordered that all revenue from this source should in future be used for the fortification of Colombo.<sup>105</sup> This requirement was adhered throughout the next fifteen years, the cinnamon revenue being used to rebuild walls, cast artillery and buy arms.<sup>106</sup> In the 1640's in view of the Dutch threat the grant was increased to one hundred *bahars* of cinnamon a year.<sup>107</sup>

The *camara* in the 1620's and 1630's appeared to champion the interests of the married Portuguese settlers in the island. This is best seen in the dispute over the payment of customs dues. On

101. DR II.224 ; TT.LM.15.f.182 ; AHU Caixa 7, 11.2.1622 ; TT.*Collecao de S.Vicente* XIX doc. 144

102. *Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos* I.40/5 ; TT.LM.18.ff.240-241

103. The governor's opposition to the grant was perhaps influenced by the *camara's* vociferous opposition to his son's rule in Ceylon. AHU Caixa 7,11.2.1622

104. TT.LM.18.ff.240-241v ; TT.LM.19.f.24v

105. TT.LM.21.ff.131,159 ; Simancas SP 1519.f.25v ; AHU Caixa 8, 15.12.1625

106. *Filmoteca* LM 19A.22/2-3

107. TT.LM.57.f.145



3 October 1584 king Dom Joao Dharmapala had granted the Portuguese *casados* and their descendants freedom from the payment of customs dues at Colombo. In 1597 following a request by the *casados* to confirm this grant, the viceroy, Dom Francisco da Gama agreed to respect this privilege. However when the *camara* asked that this privilege be confirmed by the king in 1612, the authorities in Lisbon decided against it. Nevertheless, for some unknown reason royal orders were not executed.<sup>108</sup> In the 1620's when the growth of the number of Portuguese settlers began to have increasingly harmful effects on customs revenues in Colombo the issue was revived again. By the end of 1624 the conde de Vidiueria, viceroy of India had instructed the *vedor* of Ceylon to apply the exemption from customs dues only in the case of *casados* who had actually helped king Dharmapala. The descendants of these *casados* were also entitled to this privilege but only if they continued to reside in Colombo. All new settlers thus lost the privilege of exemption from customs dues. This decision was confirmed in an *assento* or resolution of the *conselho da fazenda* at Goa on 17 March 1625.<sup>109</sup> When this matter was raised once more in Lisbon in 1627 two principles that were to guide a fresh settlement of the issue were enunciated. Firstly, no one was to have complete exemption from customs dues. Secondly, some concession in the form of payment of lower duties might be allowed to those who had hitherto benefited by king Dharmapala's grant.<sup>110</sup> However, no such settlement seems to have been arrived at. During the viceroyalty of the conde de Linhares (1629-1635), the guiding principle remained the *assento* of 17 March 1625. Meanwhile the *camara* continued its efforts to secure the grant of this privilege to all Portuguese settlers of Colombo. The council eventually achieved success in the early 1640's. With the arrival of the Dutch in Ceylon it was realised that the Portuguese strength in the island had to be maintained at all cost and for this a greater inducement to potential settlers was one necessity. This was all the more so in an age when warfare limited revenue from land. Thus on 5 March 1643 the *conselho da fazenda* decided that all settlers in Colombo should be allowed exemption from customs dues.<sup>111</sup>

108. DR II.224 ; AHU Caixa 4,2.1.1616 ; AHU Caixa 3,20.10.1613 ; Filmoteca LM.12.1/2-3

109. Panduronga S. S. Pissurlencar—*Regimentos das fortalezas da India*, 510 ; TT.*Ms da Convento da Graca*, tomo 6D.328-329 ; BNL FG 1983.ff. 62v-63 ; Filmoteca LM 19D.101/3-4

110. AHU 285.f.70 ; TT.LM.24.f.375

111. AHU 210.f.257v ; TT.LM.52.f.73

The *camara* achieved a swifter victory in its efforts to obtain favoured rights for the *casados* who held garden lands in the environs of Colombo. The rights of the settlers to these lands dated from the days of de Azevedo, who, when captain-general, ordered the settlers to take possession of and cultivate the waste land around the city. By the time Vaz Freire began making his *tombo* the settlers had held these lands for years without paying any dues. Vaz Freire wished to impose the standard quit rent of 12% of the revenue on these lands or failing that at least the tax on coconut palms (*pol aya*). As a result of representations made by the council which also held some of these lands in its corporate capacity, orders were sent from Lisbon in the 1620's granting these lands in perpetuity free of all dues.<sup>112</sup> By the 1630's however, this order seems to have been revoked for Bocarro records, that the gardens of Colombo paid 1/10 of their produce to the state in 1634.<sup>113</sup>

The last branch of the administration which has to be discussed, the mainstay of Portuguese rule in Ceylon, is the military. Of the armed forces the naval arm is the less well-known, but its role was vital and it will be treated first. While the army secured effective possession of the lands and revenues of Kotte and Jaffna, the Portuguese naval forces ensured that the communications and supply routes to Goa and other parts of the *estado da India* remained open. At least once within our period—in 1630—Portuguese naval strength saved them after their army had been disastrously defeated. The role of the navy in Ceylon however, was not confined to conveying supplies and reinforcements and protecting Portuguese trade, important though these functions were. Naval power gave the Portuguese army in Ceylon greater mobility and enabled it to take the enemy unawares. This was best seen in 1630-1631 when the Portuguese were confined to a few coastal ports in Kotte. Surprise attacks by sea on unfortified ports and villages held by the Sinhalese not only enabled them to deliver telling blows upon their opponents, but also secured quantities of much needed provisions.<sup>114</sup> De Sa's relief of Batticaloa in 1628 provided another instance of the use of sea power in campaigns in Ceylon. Finally, naval power enabled the Portuguese to blockade Kandy during years of war and cut off her trade and communications with powers outside the island. Even during years of peace the kings of Kandy did not find communications with the Dutch

112. T. Abeyasinghe 96-97 ; AHU 31.ff.197v-198 ; DR V.366 ; Simancas SP 1473.f.539

113. See foot-note 159 of Chapter VI

114. AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655

an easy task due to Portuguese control of the sea around Ceylon.

The only regular naval force stationed in Ceylon in the first four decades of the seventeenth century was the one used to guard the pearl fishery and blockade the eastern coast in time of war. This fleet was originally stationed at Mannar and numbered only three vessels in the early seventeenth century.<sup>115</sup> Soon after 1605 however, when the Portuguese decided on an intensified blockade of Kandy, the number of vessels was increased to six of which three were to remain at Mannar.<sup>116</sup> The two duties of guarding the pearl fishery and of blockading the eastern coast did not clash with each other for the normal period of trading activity in the eastern coast of Ceylon was from March to November, while the pearl fishery was usually held in February-March. In any event the pearl fishery was not held between 1604 and 1634. In the 1620's this fleet was made more effective by the availability of two more bases at Trincomalee and Batticaloa. The only other state owned vessel which was based on Ceylon was a rivercraft on the Kelani which was used to transport supplies from Colombo to Malwana.<sup>117</sup>

The potential strength of Portuguese naval power in Ceylon however, was by no means limited to this fleet.<sup>118</sup> Many of the *casados* in Ceylon owned armed vessels ranging from forty to a hundred tons which were used in coastal trade. These vessels were sometimes requisitioned by the Portuguese authorities for use in military expeditions. The expedition to Jaffna in 1619 saw the requisition of two such vessels. De Sa in 1628 no doubt resorted to the same expedient when he arrived at Galle on his way to relieve Batticaloa. One cannot be certain whether the vessels based on Ceylon, state or private owned, used for military or commercial purposes, were actually built in the island or not. Shipbuilding had been carried out in the ports of Kotte in the sixteenth century. In 1614 however, the king of Portugal had decreed that owing to the shortage of wood necessary for the construction of dwellings and the like, the making of vessels of over one hundred tons burden

115. DR I.10 ; In 1571 however there were ten vessels guarding the pearl fishery. By 1574 the number had fallen to eight. Ajuda 51-V-36.f.37; -Studia Vol.IV.264

116. DR I.58-59,113,138

117. APO (new ed) Tomo IV.Vol.II.Part I.385

118. The contention that no large ships were based in Ceylon is supported by a letter of the viceroy to the king dated 5 October 1631 which gives the location of the *navios do reino*. Muscat 22, Diu 11, Armada of the north 24, Goa 10, pepper fleet to Cochin (Malabar fleet) 7, Canara coast (fleet of the Cape Camorin) 15, Malacca 10, Ceylon 16, Total 115. The figure of sixteen ships in Ceylon is explained as ten ships of the Malacca fleet and six of the Coromandel which were temporarily in the island helping in the war. TTLM 29 f 38

should be forbidden. The construction of smaller vessels however undoubtedly continued, for in the 1620's the viceroy gave serious attention to the possibilities of transferring the shipyards of Goa to Ceylon in the interests of economy and of increased output.<sup>119</sup>

The ships based on Ceylon were supplemented at various periods by visiting fleets. The most regular of these was the cinnamon fleet. In the early years of the seventeenth century a single large vessel seems to have conveyed the cinnamon of Ceylon to Goa. By the 1620's the increasing threat of a Dutch attack had forced the Portuguese to resort to five or six smaller but swifter vessels. The fleet of 1632 consisted of eleven vessels—eight galleys and three pinnaces.<sup>120</sup> The cinnamon fleet arrived in early October and usually left by the end of the month after unloading supplies and loading the cinnamon. The three Portuguese fleets off south India—the Malabar fleet, the Coromandel fleet and the fleet of the Cape Camorin occasionally called at Jaffna for repairs.<sup>121</sup> The annual China fleet also on occasion called at one of the ports of Kotte on its return journey to Goa.<sup>122</sup>

Though in the twenty one years under consideration Portuguese Ceylon was hardly even in danger of being completely cut off from the rest of Portuguese Asia, challenges to Portuguese supremacy at sea came often. It was a challenge of this kind—by Dom Pedro, a Kunjali corsair—which precipitated the expedition to Jaffna in 1619. The arrival of the Danish fleet in 1620 provoked another crisis. Once more however, the Portuguese resources proved adequate to deal with a small isolated squadron. The Dutch threat, though slower to develop was more difficult to resist, for by 1617 the Dutch like the Portuguese were a well established power in Asia. In 1619 the Portuguese captain Andre Coelho barely escaped with his life after his ship was sunk in an encounter with the Dutch in the Gulf of Mannar.<sup>123</sup> By the 1620's with increasing English and Dutch pressure on the Portuguese in the Arabian Sea, the coasts around Ceylon were becoming unsafe for Portuguese shipping,<sup>124</sup> and the viceroy at Goa was beginning to breath a sigh of relief every time a Portuguese fleet returned safely home. The loss of the high seas fleet of Nuno

119. Evora CV/2-7.ff.58-69v ; DR III.51,61 ; TT.LM.45.ff.358. Evora CXVI" 2-3.f.68

120. *Goa regimentose instruccoes*, Vol.III.f.9 ; TT.Ms da Liv.816ff.257v,260

121. P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 1645, 11

122. See chapter II. Page 29

123. BM Add Ms. 28432.f.97

124. The Dutch factory at Pulicat formed an adequate base for trading and privateering expeditions.

Alvares Botelho in 1630 made the position even worse. When the Dutch fleet under Westerwoldt arrived off Ceylon in May 1638 no Portuguese fleet strong enough to challenge it was available.

The army, the Portuguese relied on to defend their possessions and even conquer Kandy was a heterogenous one made up of Sinhalese, Tamils, Canarese and Kaffirs besides the Portuguese themselves. The core of the armed forces however was a body of seven or eight hundred Portuguese *soldados* or unmarried soldiers.<sup>125</sup> These were organized in companies (*estancias*) of thirty to thirty eight soldiers each under captains, ensigns (*alferes*) and sergeants (*sargentos*). Three hundred and fifty to four hundred of these soldiers were stationed under the captain-major-of-the-field at Menikkadawara as a large mobile force.<sup>126</sup> Another one hundred soldiers were stationed at Jaffna fort to repel any attack upon that kingdom.<sup>127</sup> The rest were distributed in the forts of Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Kayts, Mannar, Negombo, Colombo, Kalutara Galle, Menikkadawara, Malwana and Sabaragamuwa. Though the Portuguese dispensed with the use of armour due to the climate and the terrain, they were well armed with muskets and swords. Perhaps due to the difficulty of transport however, they did not take any artillery with them while on the march. The heavy munitions and the food supplies of the Portuguese were carried by native coolies. In camp too, the tasks of cooking and cleaning were performed by Sinhalese and Tamil servicemen.

The Portuguese *casados* or married settlers and the *topazes* or descendants of Portuguese-native marriages were not members of the regular army. Being retired soldiers however, the *casados* often voluntarily enlisted for a particular campaign. They could not be compelled to take up arms except in defence of their homes or in a grave emergency.<sup>128</sup> The *casado* contingent in the Portuguese army never exceeded a hundred in any mobile campaign but as each settler often took his servant or slave with him to carry a spare musket, to help him in loading it and to transport his food rations, they often formed a very useful acquisition in the field. When the news of the loss of a large number of *casados* in de Sa's ill-fated expedition of 1630 reached Lisbon, it was decided that to ensure the security of Colombo, the *casados* should not be used on offensive campaigns in the future. This directive however,

125. Evora CV 2-7.f.80

126. APO (new ed) Tomo IV.Part I.378-379 ; Ribeiro 132

127. P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 1645, 3

128. TT.LM.15.f.19

was violated in the very next invasion of Kandy led by Diogo de Mello de Castro in 1638.<sup>129</sup>

The *lascarins* formed a vital part of the Portuguese army. In Jaffna, where the Tamil army had for long been mainly a mercenary force only a small contingent of a few hundred Tamil *lascarins* was retained.<sup>130</sup> In Kotte, where the land tenure system provided a *lascarin* force at little actual expense, Sinhalese *lascarins* formed a much more numerous force. The *lascarins* attached to the Portuguese army appears to have declined steadily in numbers throughout the seventeenth century due to appropriation of land by the Portuguese,<sup>131</sup> emigration to Kandy and death in war.<sup>132</sup> Contemporary estimates in the 1630's as to the actual size of the *lascarin* contingent ranged between four thousand and seven thousand men.<sup>133</sup> In view of the overwhelming evidence of the gradual decline in their numbers, the total in the 1620's must have been a few thousand more. The *lascarins* fought with their traditional arms—bows, swords, spears and daggers but a small proportion of these militiamen were also provided with muskets.

Finally, there were the Canarese and the Kaffirs. The Canarese were mercenary troops from the west coast of India. The Kaffirs were Portuguese negro slaves trained in war.<sup>134</sup> Both these elements appeared in sizeable numbers in the Portuguese army only in late 1631. By 1634 all the Canarese had returned to their homes and only two hundred and eighty Kaffirs were left.<sup>135</sup> The Kaffirs introduced a new weapon to Ceylon—the *assagai*—a short wooden spear with a metal point.<sup>136</sup>

The Portuguese soldiers were paid twenty *xerafims* a year as salary. They also received a monthly payment of one *xerafim* a month as curry allowance (*conduto*) together with two measures of rice a day. These two last items however, were handed over to

129. TT.LM.36.f.49 ; TT.LM.37.f.11

130. Ajuda 50-V-51.f.163

131. T. Abeyasinghe 117-118

132. P. da Trindade III.9 ; *Diario de conde de Linhares*, 145.  
In the rebellions of 1617-1618 alone over seven thousand men are estimated to have died.

133. Coimbra 459.f.361 ; Evora CXVI 2-3.f.68

134. BNL FG.939.f.54a

135. APO (new ed) Tomo IV.Vol.II.Part I. 383

136. BNL FG.939.f.85a

the captains, each of whom provided his company with food.<sup>137</sup> The captains themselves were paid two hundred *xerafims* a year, together with ten *larims* a month as curry allowance and five measures of rice a day. The soldiers were provided with arms and ammunition by the state and when wounded were given medical attention at the hospitals at Colombo, Mannar and Jaffna. The *casados* were paid on the same terms but only during periods of active service. The *lascarins* were usually paid by land grants and were expected to bring their own provisions during campaigns. When on continuous duty the *lascarins* were paid an allowance ranging from three hundred and thirty to four hundred and fifty *reis* (1 1/10 to 1½ *xerafims*) a month. They too were provided with arms by the state. There is no information available on rates of pay for the Canarese but the Kaffirs were allowed a rice ration of two measures a day, a payment of eighteen *xerafims* a year and were also allowed a certain amount of cloth for their use.<sup>138</sup>

137. Ribeiro (134) states that the captain's pay was only fifty *pardaos* a year. The above estimate is based on Queyroz 1036.
138. Ribeiro 130 ; APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Vol.II Part I.380,383, 386-387. The lands granted to the *lascarins* varied in extent and value so that their annual income ranged between twenty five and fifty five *xerafims* a year (JCBRAS XXXVI.181).

## CHAPTER 6

### REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE

This study of the revenue and expenditure of the Portuguese administration in Ceylon falls into two parts. The first is concerned with sources of revenue. The chief sources of income to the crown—cinnamon, elephants, arecanuts, the pearl fishery and land rents are examined in that order. This is by no means an exhaustive list but the items omitted are either very minor ones or those adequately discussed in other works.<sup>1</sup>

The second part is an examination of the budgetary problems of the Portuguese in Ceylon and is mainly concerned with whether the Portuguese crown did make a profit out of its possessions in Ceylon. In this respect a note on the currency used appears relevant. All figures mentioned in this chapter, and indeed in this whole study, unless otherwise specified are given in Kotte *pardao-xerafims*.<sup>2</sup> For the purpose of converting other currencies to this unit the following table has been used.<sup>3</sup>

4½	Goa reis	=	one Kotte <i>fanam</i>
90	Goa reis	=	one Ceylon <i>larim</i>
270	Goa reis	=	one Kotte <i>pardao</i> or one Kotte <i>xerafim</i>
54	Goa reis	=	one Jaffna <i>fanam</i>
270	Goa reis	=	one Jaffna <i>xerafim</i>
450	Goa reis	=	one Jaffna <i>pataca</i>
540	Goa reis	=	one Jaffna <i>pardao</i>
300	Goa reis	=	one Goa <i>pardao</i> or one Goa <i>xerafim</i>

#### SOURCES OF REVENUE

##### CINNAMON

Cinnamon was undoubtedly the greatest single source of revenue the Portuguese possessed in seventeenth century Ceylon. Cinnamon grew wild in the Kelani valley and in a broad coastal stretch of Kotte from Chilaw to the Walawe Ganga. When

1. T. Abeyasinghe 164-183 ; P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 1645,6-22
2. Coins were minted in Ceylon during the captain-generalships of de Azevedo and de Sa (H. W. Codrington—*Ceylon coins and currency—Memoirs of the Ceylon Museum Series A No. 3* (Colombo 1924). 99, 101-102). An indication of the purchasing power of a Ceylon *xerafim* is given by Fr. Manoel de Assumpcao who reports that it could buy in Colombo in 1630 two hundred and forty coconuts or twelve to fifteen fowls or three large loaves of bread or thirty to thirty six measures of rice.
3. The sources used to formulate the table include—Codrington—*Ceylon coins and currency*, 92 ; P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 1645 59 ; APO (New ed) IV-II-I. 379-403. K. W. Goonewardena (191) maintains that a *xerafim* was worth about one and a half *florins* in Dutch currency and that a *florin* was worth approximately one shilling and ten pence.



fully grown, the cinnamon tree (*cinnamomum zeylanicum*) was twenty five to forty feet in height. The inner bark of the tree, when peeled and dried, was extensively used in south Asia and Europe as a condiment. The Sinhalese also used cinnamon oil, extracted from the fruit of the tree, for medicinal purposes but unlike the bark, the oil was not produced in substantial quantities for sale abroad during the period of Portuguese rule.<sup>4</sup>

In the sixteenth century, the production of cinnamon had become accepted as the main occupation of a group of people known as the *chaleas*. The *chaleas* are said to have been a group of immigrants from south India and it is probable that the Sinhalese kings of Kotte assigned the task of peeling cinnamon to them, sometime after their arrival in the island. By the beginning of the seventeenth century the collection of cinnamon had become well regulated. The *chaleas* themselves were organized into three departments or *baddas*—the *mahabadda*, the *sulubadda* and the *kunambadda*. Those *chaleas* who belonged to the first two departments were obliged to peel cinnamon under the overall superintendence of their *vidanas*. The men of *kunambadda* were exempt from this duty as they acted as palanquin bearers to the captain-general. Within each *badda* there were a number of *durayas* or *chalea* headmen who supervised the peelers. The *durayas* were responsible to the *vidana* who was in turn responsible to the *vedor da fazenda*.<sup>5</sup> Once the cinnamon was collected and dried, it was made into bundles (*fardos*) wrapped in mats (*esteiras*) and tied with rope (*cairo*). In the sixteenth century some officials who supervised the collection of cinnamon as well as those who bundled the produce were paid wages in cash by the Portuguese. In the seventeenth century these payments were commuted for land grants.<sup>6</sup>

The obligations of the *chaleas* in the sixteenth century were apparently related to the tribute the king of Kotte agreed to pay the Portuguese. In the early sixteenth century this tribute was fixed at three hundred *bahars* of cinnamon a year and this amount

4. Ribeiro 161-162.

5. A mid-sixteenth century Dutch source however makes it clear that all *chaleas* did not peel cinnamon. One category served as *lascarins*; another group as coolies and messengers and a third had as their duty the bundling of cinnamon. It was only the fourth group—the *corondahaliyas* who peeled cinnamon. (See *Instructions from the Governor-General and Council of India to the Governor of Ceylon, 1656-1665*, (trans. Sophia Pieters) Colombo, 1908. 46-48.

6. Diogo Velho—*Orcamento do estado da India* (ed A de Oliveira Lisbon 1960), 130; Queyroz 1028; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.38; Ajuda 51-VIII-58. f.291v; Studia IV.266

had to be provided free by the *chaleas* of the *mahabadda* in return for the lands they held. Cinnamon produced in excess of this amount was bought by the Portuguese at a price of three *pardaos* a *bahar*. During the second half of the sixteenth century, the peelers had imposed upon them, the additional obligation of providing a further one hundred *bahars* free of charge to the king of Kotte. With the death of King Dharmapala in 1597, the *chaleas* were thus obliged to supply four hundred *bahars* a year to the Portuguese, the new rulers of Kotte.<sup>7</sup>

During the next half century the demands of the state on the *chaleas* grew inexorably. In the time of de Azevedo, the introduction of a larger measure increased the burden on the peelers by a third. By 1615 they were required to supply a thousand *bahars* annually to the state.<sup>8</sup> In 1632-1633 captain-general Dom Jorge de Almeida increased this amount by a further three hundred and fifty *bahars*.<sup>9</sup> In the 1640's Dom Filipe Mascarenhas, serving as captain-general reported that one thousand five hundred to two thousand *bahars* of cinnamon were produced per year for the government without charge.<sup>10</sup> While the government demand rose, the quantity produced by the *chaleas* to satisfy individual requirements of the Portuguese did not fall. At least until the 1630's it seems clear that a further one thousand five hundred to two thousand *bahars* were produced by the peelers for private individuals.<sup>11</sup>

This increase in output was achieved with the aid of two significant developments in the organization of cinnamon production. Firstly there was a general increase in individual burdens. The highest quantity any peeler was expected to provide as reported in the extant parts of Vaz Freire's *tombo* was about four hundred and twenty avoirdupois pounds. Some peelers in the early seventeenth century delivered only a sixth of that amount.<sup>12</sup> By the end of the Portuguese regime in Ceylon however, the average obligation per peeler had risen to about five hundred

7. Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho—*Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial*, II. 39-40; *Studia* IV.265; Diogo Velho, 129; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.38; AHU Caixa 6,10.11.1618
8. T. Abeyasinghe 142,150
9. Evora CXVI/2-2.f.115v; APO (New ed) IV-II-I.392
10. BM.Add Ms.41996.f.7
11. P. da Trindade III.20; TT.*Ms da Convento da Graca* tomo 6D.336. TT.LM.12.f.599; BM Add.Ms.20893.ff.9-10; Filmoteca LM.13 B11/3-5; Queyroz 34
12. P.E.Pieris—*The Ceylon Littoral* 1593, 64. In Madampe, however, twenty cinnamon peelers produced twenty *bahars* of cinnamon for Lancarote de Seixas. This average of approximately 420 pounds per peeler was exceptionally high.

pounds.<sup>13</sup> Secondly the obligation of peeling cinnamon was extended to cover people of castes other than the *chaleas*. This process was begun by de Azevedo when he required the woodcutters and the *pannayas* (or those who supplied fodder for elephants) of the Seven Korales to supply cinnamon instead of providing their traditional services.<sup>14</sup> This policy of replacing outmoded or unnecessary services with useful ones, no doubt met with some opposition, though in seventeenth century Kotte the caste system had not yet developed into a rigid and inflexible form. After all, the *chaleas* themselves when they settled in Kotte were originally weavers. Thus in the first half of the seventeenth century increasing numbers of non-*chalea* Sinhalese were recruited for cinnamon peeling. By 1650 these included people of the *Hunu*, *Paduwa* and *Karawa* castes, lime burners, palanquin bearers and fisher folk respectively. The change of occupation did not enhance or detract from their status *vis-a-vis* the *chaleas*.<sup>15</sup> However, once the obligation of peeling of cinnamon had been foisted on a group of people there was little likelihood of their getting rid of it.<sup>16</sup>

During the first half of the seventeenth century there occurred a fundamental change in the basis of the obligation of the peelers. When Vaz Freire made his *tombo* the *chaleas* were obliged to peel cinnamon for the land they held and the obligation of each depended on the extent and quality of land held. By the end of the Portuguese period however, the obligation had become associated with the person rather than the land. The basis for this development was the growth of the theory advanced by the Portuguese to serve their needs, that the *chaleas* were slaves of the king and were therefore obliged to serve the state free of charge. By the middle of the century the obligation of every male *chalea* over twelve years of age to supply a minimum fixed quantity of cinnamon irrespective of land held had become accepted practice.<sup>17</sup>

When the Portuguese obtained *de facto* control of the cinnamon lands of Kotte in the early 1590's they also inherited the system of open trade in cinnamon that had prevailed in the previous decade. Production of cinnamon was under no restriction. Export of the spice, other than the quantity specifically made for the state, was done by private individuals who had obtained licences to do

13. Queyroz 1028 ; S. Arasaratnam, 185-186

14. TT.Mss.da Convento da Graca, tomo 6D.333

15. TT.LM.60.f.287

16. When the Dutch conquered the Wallallawiti Korale in the 1640's they found there one or two villages inhabited by *pannayas* who were bound by custom to peel cinnamon. K. W. Goonewardene, 142-143.

17. T. Abeyasinghe 139-140 ; S. Arasaratnam, 185-186 ; TT.LM. 60.f.287. Efforts to restrain the cinnamon peelers from leaving their lands and occupation led to a restriction of their rights. See fn 138, Chapter VI.

so. Almost from the outset Portuguese officials urged that a closer control of the cinnamon trade was desirable from an economic as well as a political point of view. Stricter control, it was argued, would avoid the loss of revenue caused by the export of cinnamon from ports outside Portuguese control in Ceylon while the same measure would effectively deny revenue from cinnamon to the political opponents of the Portuguese, principally the rulers of Kandy and the Dutch.<sup>18</sup>

Several measures designed to promote greater control over the cinnamon trade were promulgated in the 1590's. Colombo was designated as the only port from which the export of cinnamon was legally permitted, while cinnamon could be disembarked only at an Indian port. More important, in 1595 the export of cinnamon was declared a private monopoly of the captain of Colombo who was required to sell a fixed proportion of his exports at cost price to the state.<sup>19</sup>

These measures though they ensured a greater degree of control over the trade in cinnamon, failed to check the fall in cinnamon prices that was causing great concern among the Portuguese. In the three decades preceding 1590 cinnamon prices remained at a relatively high level due to interruptions in supply caused by warfare. In the 1590's with the subjugation of the whole of the old kingdom of Kotte and increased production by the *chaleas*, price fell to a lower level. This trend continued in the first decade of the seventeenth century when the death of Vimaladharmasuriya

18. T. Abeyasinghe 142-143

19. The first contract between the state and the captain of Colombo was made in 1588. By the 1590 agreement the captain promised to sell a third of the cinnamon he collected to the state at cost price. It is not known whether in return he obtained the position of sole private exporter, though this appears likely. In 1595 this definitely did occur. The contract made between Thome de Souza Ronches captain of Colombo and Diogo Caiado, *juiz* and *disembargador* who acted as representative of the king on 7 November 1595 specified that '*.... o q fizere canela forados este contrato a perdera a metade pa que accuzare co sinco (annos) mais de degredo pa Maluquo....*' (AHU Caixa 6,10.11.1618). In return the captain of Colombo had to sell a fifth of the first five hundred *bahars* he exported from Colombo at cost price to the state. The monopoly was however modified by the right of several persons and institutions to export fixed quantities of cinnamon. These exceptions were as follows—captain-general Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo, 150 *bahars*; other Portuguese captains in Ceylon, 100 *bahars*; *camara* of Colombo, 40 *bahars*; factor, 12 *bahars*; *escrivao*, 6 *bahars*. After the arrival of Jorge Frolim de Almeida (*vedor* of Ceylon 1597 —) this agreement was amended to oblige de Souza Ronches to sell to the state at cost price, 15% of all cinnamon exported by him in excess of five hundred *bahars*.

removed the immediate threat to the Portuguese hold on the lowlands. The only means of reversing this trend was a restriction of supply and this was a measure which any individual contractor was unlikely to welcome.<sup>20</sup>

Thus after experimenting with other forms of contracts with persons other than the captain of Colombo,<sup>21</sup> it was decided in 1614 to make trade in cinnamon a royal monopoly. Cinnamon could be exported only on behalf of the state and the annual exports were fixed at a thousand *bahars*. Production in villages privately held by the Portuguese was not forbidden but the sale of cinnamon so produced to any person other than the *vedor* or his officials representative was liable to be punished by a sentence of five years service in the Far-Eastern fleet.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, as the authorities in Ceylon made arrangements to have the whole of the thousand *bahars* made in state held villages any production by individuals appeared superfluous.<sup>23</sup>

The cinnamon trade under royal monopoly in the period 1614-1638 falls into two distinct phases. During the first phase, extending from 1615 to 1628, the monopoly was largely an ineffective one. The main purpose in establishing a royal monopoly, namely the raising of cinnamon prices and of revenue was not achieved. In 1628 the price of cinnamon remained on the average what it had been in 1614-1615. Four possible reasons may be advanced for this. The first was the vice-rega decree de Azevedo himself issued on 3 October 1614. The *casados* of Colombo on receiving news of the establishment of a royal monopoly by the viceroy's decree of 22 April 1614, protested that they had already, at considerable expense to themselves collected quantities of cinnamon for export and appealed to the viceroy to postpone the date of enforcement. The viceroy thereupon decided on 30 October 1614 that cinnamon produced before the publication of the decree of 12 April 1614 could be sold freely until 1 January 1615. This was just the leeway speculators were hoping for. In the months of November and December a record quantity of cinnamon was exported from the island. The *vedor* Antao Vaz Freire estimated the amount exported at about two thousand *bahars*. It was reported that five ships loaded with cinnamon from Ceylon arrived at Cochin alone

20. T. Abeyasinghe 151-153 ; DR IV.241-244

21. In 1607, for instance Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo was awarded the sole right of export of cinnamon for three years in return for a payment of twelve thousand *pardaos*.

22. T. Abeyasinghe 149 ; AHU Caixa 3, 22.4.1614 ; AHU Caixa 3,3.10.1614

23. T. Abeyasinghe 150

during the last few days of December 1614. Prices therefore fell even further in the first year of the monopoly.<sup>24</sup> The effect of this development, however, were short-lived.

Secondly the royal monopoly like the private monopolies that had preceded it, was breached by special privileges awarded by both king and viceroy to private individuals. Some of these privileges were grants of long standing. For example the right of the family of the conde de Vidigueira, descendants of the famous Vasco da Gama, to import a fixed quantity of cinnamon had been granted to them in the days of Dom Manoel (1495-1521). This privilege had been reaffirmed and amplified on 4 November 1593 when the king granted Dom Francisco da Gama the right to send sixty *bahars* of cinnamon without any payment to the crown save a small sum to the Order of Christ.<sup>25</sup> A similar privilege had been granted to Dona Catherina, a relative of the king.<sup>26</sup> The *camara* of Colombo maintained its right to export forty *bahars* on behalf of the *casados* of the city.<sup>27</sup> The captain of Colombo in recompense for the loss of his income was allowed a further sixty six *bahars*.<sup>28</sup> The viceroy, de Azevedo, is also said to have conceded licences to collect and export cinnamon to many of his friends and companions.<sup>29</sup> His successors continued this practice. The bishop of Cochin in a report on Ceylon in 1619 estimated that these licences allowed the export of three thousand *bahars* of cinnamon.<sup>30</sup> This may have been an exaggeration, but one should note that important recipients of such licences appear to have included the captain-general and the *vedor da fazenda*, the two officials responsible for the protection of the king's monopoly.<sup>31</sup>

The third factor causing the continued low price for cinnamon was the deliberate and persistent disregard of the regulations that governed the monopoly itself, by many officials in Ceylon and India. Once more the lead was provided by superior officers.

24. AHU Caixa 4, 3.2.1616. The fall in prices was so sharp that the viceroy felt constrained to send a judicial official to Colombo to investigate its cause.
25. AHU Caixa 13. 20.12.1639 ; *Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda II.* ff.71-72
26. AHU Caixa 5. 15.7.1617
27. See above pages 181-182
28. AHU 33.f.12
29. BM Ad.Mss 20893.f.9 ; Goa Ac CR I.f.161
30. TT.LM.12.f.599. In a letter to the king dated 19. Nov. 1615 Antao Vaz Freire protested that de Azevedo had already granted permission to individuals to export a total of 160 *bahars*. AHU Caixa 4,19.11.1615)
31. Filmoteca LM 13A.26/27-2/2 ; AHU 33.f.11 ; AHU Caixa 6,11.12. 1619

Jorge de Albuquerque, captain-general of Ceylon (1621-1623) and Lancarote de Seixas, *vedor* (1618-1622) are but two examples of men who used their position as the king's servants to defraud the king. It was little wonder that the *camara* of Colombo complained that the royal monopoly was a monopoly only for the poor. However, a good deal of smuggling appears to have been carried on by lesser officials from Colombo too. Suspicion of this arose in Europe when it was reported that three Portuguese, Antonio de Pinho da Costa, Cosmo Cardoso and Dom Diogo Coutinho had petitioned for permission to collect quantities of cinnamon equal to what they had lost when a ship carrying the spice sank, soon after leaving Colombo port. During the investigations it was found that the original receipts for the sale of this cinnamon were not to be found in the accounts of the factor Jorge Fernandes de Abreu. Although a thorough investigation by two officials from Goa subsequently cleared the three traders and the factor, it showed that unauthorized export of cinnamon from Colombo was not such a difficult proposition.<sup>32</sup> Finally, as always, the cinnamon from Ceylon had to compete in the market with the coarser and less fragrant but cheaper *cassia* of the Malabar coast.<sup>33</sup>

There is insufficient evidence to detect any definite trends in the price movement during the first fifteen years of the royal monopoly. It is clear that the price paid to the peelers remained constant throughout this period and indeed in the decades after it, at two *xerafims* a *bahar*.<sup>34</sup> This was the price at which the govern-

32. Simancas SP 1522.f.20 ; Filmoteca LM 13A.27/4,26-27/2-2 ; Filmoteca LM.14.118/3-4 ; Filmoteca LM.15 67/4,67-68/6-1 ; TT.LM.26.f.244 ; TT.LM.28.f.360 ; AHU 33.ff.16-16v Another instance that aroused suspicion of malpractices occurred in 1629. Domingos Ferreira the *vidana* of the *chaleas* bought one hundred and seven *bahars* of cinnamon from the crown and paid the money this amount to the factor, Francisco Tristao. However his name failed to appear in the list of people who had obtained permission to export cinnamon and to Ferreira's surprise the proceeds of these hundred and seven *bahars* were not credited to him. (Goa CP e AS X f.193). The *regimento* issued on 13 September 1636 to the outgoing *vedor* Antonio de Fonseca Ozouro makes it clear that smuggling had occurred from the ports of Galle, Kalutara, Jaffna and Mannar whence cinnamon was taken to Masulipatam for sale. (*Goa regimentos e instruccoes* III.ff.2-8)

33. *Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda* IV.f.197

34. Queyroz 1028 ; Evora CXVI/2-3.f.115 ; TT.LM.45.f.352v. P. da Trindade III.20 ; Filmoteca LM.19D.78/1-4. The assertion by T. Abeyasinghe (150-151) that the actual price paid to the peeler declined in the first forty years of Portuguese rule is difficult to prove. It is true that cinnamon cost the Portuguese three *xerafims* a *bahar* in the 1570's and two *xerafims* in 1639. But there is no proof that Portuguese dealings in the 1570's were directly with the peelers as they were in later times. There is evidence that the price paid to the peeler rose after the arrival of the Dutch. While in 1639 the state obtained a *bahar* of five *fardos* (actually  $1\frac{1}{4}$  *bahars* of 3 *quintals* each) for two *xerafims*, Dom Filipe

ment bought from peelers in state-held villages. The cost of cinnamon to the government and to licence holders from privately held villages tended to be higher ranging from four to five *xerafims* per *bahar*.<sup>35</sup>

The cinnamon produced by peelers was bound into bales of about one hundred and twenty pounds each and stored in warehouses at Mutwal. The bulk of this produce was loaded on to the cinnamon fleet which arrived from Goa annually in October. From 1621 about two hundred *bahars* were also sent direct to Basra for sale in the Persian Gulf region. Occasionally, dealers in Ceylon were sold small quantities of cinnamon for export to other areas. These dealers were not allowed to buy directly from the peelers or village holders. They had to buy from the *vedor* with the approval of the *junta*. The quantities sold to each trader seems to have been in the region of fifty to a hundred *bahars*, but the total quantity so exported was often considerable. For example in 1622 five hundred and two *bahars* of cinnamon were sold to individual traders for a total sum of thirteen thousand six hundred and eighty four *xerafims*. Complete statistics of cinnamon prices at Colombo in the later 1620's are not available but it is clear that in the early 1620's the price per *bahar* remained at or about twenty *xerafims*.<sup>36</sup>

From the revenue point of view, the most important factor in deciding the profit to the crown was the level of prices at Goa and Cochin for it was at these ports that the bulk of the Ceylon cinnamon was disposed of. The price level at Goa was normally at least ten *xerafims* a *bahar* above that at Colombo, partly due to freight costs. The prices at Cochin, a port much closer to Colombo, were expected to be somewhat lower than at Goa.<sup>37</sup> From the evidence available it appears that prices at Goa did rise from the low level of twenty two and a half *xerafims* that prevailed in 1615 to somewhat over thirty *xerafims* a *bahar* in 1620. This rise was no doubt the result of the interruptions of supply due to the rebellions of 1616-1620. With the return of peace and continued violation of the royal monopoly, prices at Goa returned to the

Mascarenhas reported in the 1640's that two *xerafims* or more had to be paid for a *bahar* of three *quintals*. On the other hand K. W. Goonewardena's estimate (based on Dutch source) of 15 *xerafims* per *bahar* paid to the peeler seems to be on the high side (Goonewardena 54)

35. Evora CXVI/2-3.f.115 ; Filmoteca LM 19D.78/1-4 ; AHU 210.f.250v

36. Filmoteca LM 19D 78/1-4 ; Filmoteca LM 13A 26-17/2-1 ; TT.LM.16.f.258 ; Assentos I. 53 ; Goa C. Pe As VI.f.357 ; Goa *provisoes dos vizoreis* III. 218-220

37. Cochin was less than four hundred miles by sea from Colombo. Goa was a further three hundred and fifty miles away.



1615 levels by the mid 1620's. The cinnamon sold at Basra yielded even less, for the selling prices there ranged from fifteen to eighteen *xerafims a bahar*.<sup>38</sup> In 1628 however with the outbreak of war with Kandy cinnamon prices showed a slight upward trend registering twenty five *xerafims a bahar* at Cochin.<sup>39</sup>

The revenue derived from cinnamon during the period 1615-1628 obviously varied with the price and the quantity sold. In 1615 with the prevailing low prices the total cinnamon revenue could not have been much more than twenty thousand *xerafims*. By 1619 according to the figures of the factor, Joao da Costa Perestello, the yield had risen to 39,060 *xerafims*. During the period 1621-1627 the increase in the quantity exported by the state compensated for the gradual fall in prices keeping the annual revenue between 20,000 and 30,000 *xerafims*. The revenue in 1628 was 45,000 *xerafims*. The amount of cinnamon exported by the state reached one thousand five hundred and sixty *bahars* in 1626 and one thousand eight hundred and fifty one *bahars* in 1628.<sup>40</sup>

The year 1629 marked a turning point in the cinnamon trade during the period under survey. In February that year Dom Miguel de Noronha, conde de Linhares assumed office as viceroy. He determined to enforce the monopoly in a way never done before. The authorities in Ceylon were forbidden to sell any cinnamon whatsoever within the island. On 2 October 1629 it was decreed that with the exception of small quantities sent on the king's account to Mannar and the Persian Gulf, all cinnamon was to be taken direct to Goa and sold there on the orders of the viceroy. The export of cinnamon was strictly restricted to Colombo. The effect was immediate. The price at Goa shot up to eighty to ninety *xerafims a bahar*. Controlled selling at one centre enabled the Portuguese to obtain a sum of 71,157 *xerafims* from the produce of 1629.<sup>41</sup> The cutting off of the cinnamon supply in 1630-1632 caused<sup>42</sup> a further rise in the price in cinnamon. In the 1630's the price at Goa remained at around a hundred *xerafims a bahar*. To ensure that prices remained at this level the export of inferior

38. Filmoteca LM 19D. 78/1-4 ; TT.LM.16.f.258

39. The price at Basra however remained at eighteen *xerafims*.

40. Filmoteca LM 19D.78/1-4 ; TT.LM.16.f.258 ; Ajuda 51-V-44.f.23v

41. *Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda*, III..ff.84-85104 ; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.ff.256,405 ; AHU Caixa 12.6.12.1635 ; Filmoteca LM 13B.13-14/4-5 ; Evora CXV/2-8.f.184. J. I. Abranches Garcia (ed) *Arquivo da Relacao de Goa 1601-1640*, (Nova Goa 1872) 498.

42. The total exported in 1630 was hundred *bahars*. No cinnamon was exported in 1631. A storm at Colombo sank all eleven ships of the cinnamon fleet of 1632 after they were loaded. TT.Ms da Liv. 816.ff.ff.257v, 260 ; Filmoteca LM 14. 114/3-4 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f.313

cinnamon from the Malabar coast was forbidden.<sup>43</sup> With exports in peace time averaging well over two thousand *bahars* a year, this meant a total revenue of 200,000 *xerafims*.<sup>44</sup>

Every year about half the cinnamon produced in Ceylon was shipped from Goa to Lisbon in the annual fleet.<sup>45</sup> A small proportion of this was made up of the cinnamon privately imported by persons and institutions granted special permission by the king. A much larger quantity was taken by sailors in their 'liberty chests,' the privilege of bringing back a certain quantity of spices being one of the inducements for recruitment for the *carreira da India*.<sup>46</sup> Both these categories of imports were liable to a duty of 26% of the Goa value at the *casa da India* at Lisbon, but as the price in Europe was about five to ten times that in Goa, this

43. *Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda* IV.f.199

44. In this context Antonio Boccarro's estimate of revenue of one hundred thousand *xerafims* from cinnamon in the 1630's appears to be an underestimate. A contemporary document at Evora supports the estimate given in the text. In the 1640's the price at Goa was around hundred and twenty *xerafims* a *bahar* but the quantity sold there declined with the loss of some of the cinnamon lands to the Dutch. The known exports figures in the 1630's are :

1632 — 2100 *bahars* 1633 — 2624 *bahars* 1636 — 2080 *bahars*  
1637 — 2400 *bahars*

APO (new ed) IV-II-I,299 ; AHU 211.f.127 ; Queyroz 1193 ; Evora CXVI/2-3.f.115v ; *Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda* IV.f.123 ; V.ff.5-6

45. No precise figures are available to us but in 1629 the viceroy proposed to sell 1500 *bahars* of cinnamon for transport to Lisbon to the newly formed *companhia da India*, a body formed in 1628 in imitation of the English and Dutch joint stock companies, to take over the trade between Europe and the East. The *companhia* at the same time applied to the *conselho da India* at Lisbon for permission to import 2000 *bahars*.. The *companhia* however never traded in cinnamon though it did trade in other spices, for when permission to transport cinnamon to Europe was given, the supply had been cut off due to wars in Ceylon. By this time supplies were resumed in 1633, the *companhia* had become defunct. (University of London, King's College Library—Portuguese department, manuscript entitled *Companhia das Indias*' D.S.4987 At.2 ; BNL FG.7640.f.60 ; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635 ; Assentos I.527 ; TT.LM.27.f.365 ; AHU 476.f.45)

46. The '*liberdade da canella*' as defined in 1615, allowed each sailor one man's load of cinnamon (*que hua pessoa os possa levantar*). This was originally understood to mean a bundle of ninety six pounds or at most hundred and thirty pounds. However in time the size of the bundle of so defined grew in size so that its weight rose to 250-300 pounds. By 1625 it was contended that each sailor had the right to take up two *quintals* (or nearly 200 pounds). Less than two decades later the sailors claimed that the right to take up to twelve large bundles. The privilege, claimed by captains and other officers rose proportionately. Moreover another abuse crept into the system. The customs dues were sometimes evaded by landing the cinnamon direct and by-passing the *casa da India*. Merchants began to buy up sailors' rights and participate in the trade which was supposed to be a government monopoly. Ships overloaded with spice were often wrecked on the voyage to Lisbon. Finally the arrival in 1644 of a ship *Nossa Senhora da Livramente* with 4300 *quintals* (or 1433 *bahars* approximately) of cinnamon in 'liberty chests' alone provoked an inquiry which led to the limitation of this liberty to one *quintal* or

duty by no means discouraged the trade in spice.<sup>47</sup> Cinnamon was also taken to Lisbon on behalf of the king to be sold at a profit.

In the early years of the monopoly there was little opposition to the end of open trade. The critics of the system were chiefly those who wished the monopoly tightened.<sup>48</sup> The reason for this is not far to seek. Up to 1629 these officials could violate the monopoly with impunity and had nothing to lose by its nominal presence. After 1629 however with the tightening of controls opposition did emerge. It was led by Diogo de Mello de Castro, the energetic, if impetuous captain-general of Ceylon. De Mello's opposition to the monopoly seems to have been based on political as well as economic grounds. The operation of the monopoly as envisaged by the conde de Linhares removed the control of all cinnamon revenues from the captain-general to the viceroy and this loss seriously undermined the general's capacity to put his own policies into effect. However, the captain-general had also an effective economic argument. He pointed out that the loss of cinnamon as a article of trade was hampering the role Ceylon had to play as a part of the trading complex of south India. Unfortunately for de Mello his contentions were put forward during the years when the royal monopoly of cinnamon was for the first time yielding a substantial revenue. As the viceroy commented, for revenue reasons alone it was unthinkable at the moment to abolish the monopoly. The king and his councillors could not but agree.<sup>49</sup>

#### ELEPHANTS

In the first half of the seventeenth century herds of wild elephants sometimes numbering up to two or three hundred animals, wandered in the forests of the south-western and north-central plains of Ceylon.<sup>50</sup> They were in demand in many parts of India for use in war and transport as well as for ceremonial purposes.

The Portuguese regime in Ceylon had three main sources of supply of elephants. Firstly as rulers of Kotte they received a fixed number of elephants. In the time of the Sinhalese kings

94-96 pounds per sailor. (TT,LM.19.f.54v ; AHU Caixa 17, 6.9.1644 ; AHU Caixa 16, 28.1.1644 ; AHU Caixa 16, 25.2.1644 ; AHU Caixa 10, 9.2.1626 ; AHU Caixa 18, 26.6.1625 ; AHU 210.ff.143v-144 ; *Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda* IV.f.123

47. AHU 31.ff.151v-153v ; AHU Caixa 8, 26.6.1625 ; N. W. Posthumus—*Inquiry into the history of prices in Holland* I. (Leiden 1946) 147

48. AHU 33.ff.11-12 ; *Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda* I.ff.126-127

49. AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635 ; TT.LM.37.f.1

50. Queyroz 73-74,1069 ; P. E. Pieris—*The Ceylon littoral*, 1593 2-3

there had been an elaborate organization to ensure that the king received a certain number of elephants annually. According to the system the capture, the taming and the feeding of elephants were the responsibility of three groups of people—the *panikkayas*, the *kuruwe* people and the *pannayas* respectively. These groups held land in return for their services.<sup>51</sup> This system was continued after the Portuguese became masters of Kotte. In 1615 the number of elephants due according to this system was thirty seven, of which thirty were from the Dolosdas Korale of the Matara *disava* and seven from the Mangul Korale in the Seven Korales. The number of elephants actually received by the Portuguese however, varied from year to year. In 1634 only sixteen elephants are recorded as having been sold from Kotte.<sup>52</sup> However, due to the lack of statistics it is difficult to determine whether the rebellions of 1616-1618 and the war of 1628-1633 had any permanent effect on the supply of elephants. The difficulty is greater because the Portuguese occasionally organized elephant hunts in areas other than those in which such hunts were due to take place according to the *tombo* of Vaz Freire.<sup>53</sup>

The second major source of supply was the Vanni. The Portuguese obtained a regular supply from this region long before they obtained control of Jaffna itself. As early as the 1580's the Portuguese in Mannar received two elephants a year from the king of Jaffna as a result of an accord between the two parties.<sup>54</sup> In 1591 Ethirimanne Sinham, made king of Jaffna by a Portuguese expeditionary force under Andre Furtado de Medonao, agreed to pay twelve elephants a year as part of his tribute to the Portuguese.<sup>55</sup> After the conquest of Jaffna in 1619, the Portuguese took over the dues in elephants the Vanniyars had hitherto paid to the king of Jaffna. These dues as recorded in the *foral* of Jaffna in 1645 amounted to twenty seven tuskless elephants or half that number of tuskers.<sup>56</sup> This supply was even less dependable than that from Kotte owing to the slender political control the Portuguese had over the Vanni chieftains.<sup>57</sup>

The third source of supply was Kandy. During the eleven years 1617-1627 the king of Kandy delivered two elephants a year to the Portuguese as a mark of vassalage. According to the

51. For a description of this system see T. Abeyasinghe, 160-162

52. Filmoteca LM 19D 33/2-5 ; TT.LM.45.f.173 ;

53. P. da Trindade III. 18-19

54. Panduronga S. S. Pissurlencar—*Regimentos das fortalezas da India*, 360

55. *Ibid.*, 485

56. AHU 220.ff.16-16v ; P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645.18

57. TT.Ms da Liv. 731 f.359v

treaty of 1634 which ended the war with Kandy, the Kandyans agreed to pay all arrears of tribute and continue tribute at the rate of one elephant a year for the next six years. Thus during the twenty one years 1617-1638 the Portuguese received thirty eight elephants as tribute from Kandy.<sup>58</sup> The Portuguese also attempted to buy elephants from Kandy, though the Kandyans naturally preferred to make greater profits by selling to south Indian traders or to their Indian customers directly.<sup>59</sup> With the seizure of Trincomalee in 1623, the inhabitants of the neighbouring village of Tambalagama were required to deliver a fixed number of elephants to the captain of the fort.<sup>60</sup>

In Kotte the right to hunt and trade in elephants had traditionally been a royal monopoly. Although the king of Jaffna had participated in the elephant trade in the sixteenth century, it seems unlikely that the trade in elephants was a monopoly in that kingdom especially as the areas of the elephant hunt were not under the direct political control of the Tamil kings. However, once the Portuguese obtained control of the northern kingdom they attempted to extend their monopoly to Jaffna. As a provisional measure the *vedor* Lancarote de Seixas introduced a tax on elephant exports during his first term of office. On 8 April 1630, the Conde de Linhares issued a viceregal decree declaring that elephant hunting in the Vanni was to be undertaken only for the state.

The instructions given to the *vedor* Diogo Mendes de Brito in 1639 as well as evidence in the *foral* of Jaffna (1645) indicate that the Portuguese maintained a monopoly over the sale of elephants in Jaffna at least after 1630. The infringement of this monopoly was punishable by five years service in the fleet of Malacca.<sup>61</sup>

The Portuguese monopoly of the Ceylon elephant trade however had several gaps. In the first place, they had little real control over the supply from Kandy. The Kandyans by the treaty of 1617 had the right to sell elephants abroad and they often used the ports of Kotte and Jaffna for this purpose.<sup>62</sup> Secondly, in the 1620's the Portuguese monopoly was restricted to trade within Ceylon. Once the elephants had been caught and tamed they were taken to Colombo, Mannar or Jaffna and sold by public auction.<sup>63</sup> At

58. See chapters II and IV.

59. AHU 210.ff.106,124

60. TT.LM.45.f.363

61. AHU 220.f.44 ; AHU Caixa 2, doc.246 ; P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645,30

62. AHU 210.ff.106,124 ; TT.LM.43.f.175 ; Coimbra 460.ff.228-230

63. AHU 210.f.124 ; P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645, 31. It seems likely that the elephants caught in Matara were sold at Colombo

these auctions they were bought by private merchants who paid customs dues of seven and a half percent.<sup>64</sup> Thus trade in elephants outside Ceylon was free. Two captains-general of Ceylon are known to have exported elephants on their own account.<sup>65</sup>

Elephants were taken by private traders to various parts of India. In the early sixteenth century Ceylon's chief market seems to have been Tanjore.<sup>66</sup> In our period there is evidence that elephants were sold to Vijayanagara, Bijapur, Golconda, Tanjore, Madura and the Mughal empire.<sup>67</sup> Ceylon elephants were sometimes presented by the Portuguese state to Indian rulers as tokens of friendship and esteem.<sup>68</sup> In the 1630's Ceylon elephants were also sent to work in the shipyards of Goa.<sup>69</sup> The king of Portugal himself sent a request for Ceylon elephants to be sent to Europe.<sup>70</sup> On the Coromandel and the Malabar coasts, the chief competition to the Ceylon elephants came from the elephants exported from the Arakan region.<sup>71</sup>

In the 1630's the open trade in Ceylon elephants outside the island was disrupted by a measure of the conde de Linhares of viceroy India (1629-1635). The viceroy who had already insisted on a monopoly in elephant hunting in 1630 ordered that auctions should cease and that the Ceylon administration should take over the sale of elephants. The sale of elephants abroad by Portuguese officials had been tried in de Azevedo's day and abandoned for financial reasons. The motive of the conde de Linhares in returning to this policy was however not one of increasing the revenue obtained by the Ceylon government. In fact his plans envisaged the loss of all elephant revenue to Ceylon. It was dictated by a need to obtain a reliable supply of saltpetre and to deny it to the Dutch.<sup>72</sup>

while those caught in the Seven Korales were escorted overland to Mannar and sometimes thence to Jaffna via Elephant Pass. During the second and third decades of the seventeenth century many elephants were taken overland across arid country to Jaffna probably because of the higher prices that could be obtained there. TT.LM.12.f.344 ; TT.LM.16.f.294

64. AHU 220.f.45. Of these dues, seven percent went to the state. The half percent was divided among customs officials as follows  
16/30 to the *recebedor* or receiver, 8/30 to the *escrivao* or secretary,  
6/30 to the *kanakapulle* or native official.
65. TT.LM.16.ff.585,738
66. T. Abeyasinghe 162 ; Vriddagirison, 172
67. Filmoteca LM 13B.5-6/3-2 ; P. da Trindade III.6 ; *Goa regimentos e instruccoes*, III.ff.2-8
68. Ajuda 51-VIII-51.f.198,207
69. *Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda* IV.f.65
70. TT.LM.31.f.153. The request originally sent in October 1631 was repeated in April 1632 and January 1634. It is unknown whether the request was eventually complied with.
71. TT.LM.36.f.5
72. TT.LM.40.f.69 ; T. Abeyasinghe 162

The Portuguese in the east needed quantities of saltpetre for the manufacture of gunpowder for their own use. As urgent, however, was the need to supply the mother country. In Europe at the beginning of our period, the demand for and the price of, saltpetre rose steeply due largely to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War.<sup>73</sup> The viceroy in India was therefore instructed to secure a supply of saltpetre and to deny it to all enemies of Portugal. The chief exporters of saltpetre in Asia at this time were Madura and Bengal. In 1633 the conde de Linhares sent Sebastiao Pessanha to Madura to negotiate a trade agreement to exchange saltpetre for Ceylon elephants. The agreement eventually concluded laid down that the Nayak would sell saltpetre to the Portuguese at a price of twenty seven and a half *xerafims* a *bahar* in exchange for elephants delivered at Tuticorin at prices averaging six hundred and sixty six *xerafims* each. It was understood that the Nayak was to sell saltpetre only to the Portuguese and the Portuguese in return were to regard the Nayak as the sole purchaser of elephants.<sup>74</sup>

The return to direct sale by the Portuguese officials to the customer in India aroused opposition in Ceylon. Portuguese officials led by captain-general, Diogo de Mello de Castro argued against this practice on two counts. Firstly it was contended that the agreement caused a financial loss as the price fixed for saltpetre was too high and that for the elephants was too low. They held that better terms could be obtained from merchants from Bengal. Secondly, it was argued that the end of auctions at Jaffna and Mannar would also lead to the end of the supply of food stuffs brought by merchants from Bengal.<sup>75</sup> Eventually a compromise settlement was reached. Some elephants continued to be auctioned in Ceylon while others were sent to Madura in exchange for saltpetre.<sup>76</sup>

Estimates of the price of Ceylon elephants as found in seventeenth century books and documents vary a great deal. However two principles seem clear. The price of an elephant varied with its size, or more accurately, its height as measured in *covados* or

73. T. Rayachaudhuri *Jan Company in Coromandel 1605-1690* (the Hague 1962 168 ; G. N. Clerk—*War and society in the seventeenth century*, (Cambridge 1958) 62

74. TT.LM.30.f.59 ; TT.LM.31.f.227 ; Coimbra 645.f.7 ; Coimbra 459.f.182 ; Evora CR Arm. V-VI.14-5.f.165

75. AHU 210.ff.106-106v ; TT.LM.37.f.1 ; *Diario do conde de Linhares*, 157

76. TT.LM.43.f.175v ; TT.LM.40.f.95 ; TT.LM.37.f.155 ; Assentos II. 162 ; Filmoteca LM 20, 19/2

cubits. Secondly, a tusker was worth double the price of a tuskless elephant.<sup>77</sup> Apart from these factors the place of sale itself must have had an important relation to the price. Elephants were expensive to feed and difficult to transport. Unless well cared for, they could sicken and die. This could probably explain why prices at Jaffna, a port nearer the customer, seem to have been higher than those at Colombo. The *foral* of Jaffna of 1645 gives a list of prices paid to the *Vanniyars* for the delivery of extra tuskers. For an elephant of 5 covados—60 *xerafims* ;  $4\frac{1}{2}$  covados—50 *xerafims* ; 4 covados—40 *xerafims* ;  $3\frac{1}{2}$  covados—32 *xerafims*. Female or tuskless elephants fetched much lower prices. The *foral* gives the following details.

For one of  $5-4\frac{1}{2}$  covados—16 *xerafims* ;  $4\frac{1}{2}-3$  covados—12 *xerafims* ; Under 3 covados—8 *xerafims*<sup>78</sup>

These prices however by no means represented the value that could be obtained in the open market for they were the amounts fixed by a monopolistic buyer. More realistic perhaps were the penalties imposed in the case of non-delivery of fixed tribute. This amounted to one hundred *pardaos* per tusker and fifty *pardaos* for any other elephant.<sup>79</sup> The actual selling price of elephants in Ceylon was much higher due to costs of transport to the place of sale and of feeding. In Kotte it probably averaged between two hundred and three hundred *xerafims* per elephant.<sup>80</sup> In Jaffna the price was around five hundred *xerafims* each. There is little information on the price of elephants in India but the Nayak of Madura agreed to buy elephants at the rate of two hundred and twenty two *xerafims* a covado.<sup>81</sup> Queyroz's estimate of about thousand *pardaos* per Kotte elephant may well have been based on the price level in India, though instances of even higher prices being paid are known.<sup>82</sup>

The revenue obtained by the Ceylon administration from the sale of elephants is difficult to estimate, as the price and the number

77. T. Abeyasinghe 163 ; P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645 18,24,31. A covado measured thirty inches. (Ribeiro 138).

78. P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645 31

79. *Ibid.*, 18

80. Queyroz 729,1194 ; T. Abeyasinghe 163-164 ;

81. Coimbra 645.f.7. The Dutch on the average obtained over 1000 *xerafims* per elephant sold in Jaffna in the 1660's (Instructions 109)

82. Queyroz 1193. Ribeiro (149) who lived for many years in Ceylon gave eight thousand *pardaos* as lowest price of a Ceylon elephant. Ribeiro's figures however are not always reliable. In 1633 the Goa administration contracted with Francisco Telles, captain of Mannar to take delivery of three elephants at Cochin for a total payment of six thousand five hundred *xerafims*—over two thousand one hundred and sixty *xerafims* per animal. *Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda* IV.f.65



of elephants varied greatly. A list of the revenues of Kotte in the 1620's estimates the income from elephants at five thousand *xerafims*.<sup>83</sup> The lowest recorded income for Kotte was that of 1634—sixteen elephants were sold for three thousand nine hundred and ninety *xerafims*.<sup>84</sup> The only complete figures for elephants obtained from the whole of Portuguese Ceylon occur in 1637 when sixty six of them were captured.<sup>85</sup> Sold at an average price of three hundred *xerafims* each in Ceylon they would have yielded 19,800 *xerafims*.

#### ARECANUT

The nut of the areca palm (*areca catechu*) had been an article of commercial value long before the arrival of the Portuguese in the east. The chewing of arecanut with betel leaves was a social custom among the people of Ceylon and south India. The palm itself could be cultivated in most parts of the south-western plains of Ceylon and in many parts of Kotte, the nut had become the mainstay of local trade, for the Kotte peasants had become accustomed to pay for their requirements of cloth and salt in areca.<sup>86</sup>

When the Portuguese obtained possession of Kotte, the only arecanut the government was entitled to, was the produce paid as dues in kind by those who lived in royal villages (*gabadagam*). With the increasing alienation of state-held villages this amount fell to three hundred and seventy six *amunas* of twenty four thousand to twenty five thousand nuts each in the last days of de Azevedo's captain-generalship. During the 1620's and 1630's this amount seems to have fallen further to three hundred and five *amunas*.<sup>87</sup>

Soon after taking over the administration of Kotte however, the Portuguese found another means of obtaining revenue from the arecanut trade, by the imposition of enhanced customs dues. When the *vedor* Jorge Frolim de Almeida arrived in Ceylon he found that there was a considerable difference in the sale prices between Colombo and Galle. While an *amuna* of arecanut could be sold for ten *larins* in Colombo, the sale price of the same quantity at Galle was only four *larins*. The duty at both ports was fixed at four *fanams* per *amuna*. The higher price at Colombo was no doubt due to the greater demand for the product for export from the metropolis. De Almeida was determined to gain some benefit

83. Ajuda 51-V-44.f.23v

84. APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Part I.401-402

85. TT.LM.43.f.175v

86. S. Arasaratnam, 146.

87. T. Abeyasinghe 154 ; Filmoteca LM 19D.29/30-5/1, 33/2-5

PUBLIC LIBRARY  
JAFNA 10418cc

for the crown from this variation in prices. By his order the customs dues at Colombo were fixed at one *larin* an *amuna* while those at Galle were raised to the high level of ten *larins* an *amuna*. Modification were made at other ports too. An *amuna* of arecanut exported from Kalutara paid only six *fanams* while the same quantity if exported from Chilaw or Negombo paid approximately one and a half *larins*. These dues were all in addition to the traditional octroi duty of ten per cent on areca that was paid at the entry to every port from the landward side. This variation of customs dues must have resulted in some dislocation of the traditional pattern of trade. In particular it would have dealt a heavy blow to the arecanut trade in Galle which in 1599 had amounted to some 1600 *amunas*. It also might have stimulated increased export of arecanut from Colombo, for the dues charged at that port were the lowest in all Kotte, save Kalutara. However de Almeida's scheme did not last long. By 1614 customs dues on arecanut exported from most ports of Kotte had been standardized at around one *larin* per *amuna*.<sup>88</sup> This was not necessarily due to the failure of de Almeida's scheme as a revenue measure. It was more that the whole scheme was made somewhat superfluous by another innovation—that of compulsory purchase of all arecanut produced in Kotte.

The compulsory purchase of arecanut itself was no innovation at all. The Portuguese *tombo* made by Vaz Freire records that the inhabitants of Alutgama had to supply sixty *amunas* of arecanut a year in exchange for goods worth two hundred and forty *larins* to Rajasinha of Sitawaka in the sixteenth century.<sup>89</sup> However this practice was by no means widespread in Kotte under the Sinhalese kings. The *tombo* of Jorge Frolim de Almeida makes it clear that, at least, at the end of the sixteenth century, there was open trade in arecanut. It was the widespread application of a practice hitherto confined to a small area that was new.

The regulations governing compulsory purchase were framed so as to obtain for the crown the total quantity of arecanut produced in Kotte at a fixed price of four *larins* an *amuna*.<sup>90</sup> The total sum of four thousand one hundred and eleven *amunas* recorded in

88. TT.Ms da Convento da Graca 6D 341-342. P. E. Pieris—*The Ceylon littoral*, 1593 6-7, 26, 38. The exception was Puttalam where one and a half *larins* was charged as export duty.

*Fanam*—a Sinhalese coin which fell in value in relation to the *larin* and the *xerafim* in the late sixteenth century. In the 1570's and 1580's a *larin* was equivalent to seven *fanams*. By 1599 a *larin* was worth fifteen to twenty *fanams*.

89. P. E. Pieris—*The Ceylon littoral* 1593 50

90. TT.LM.18.f.240v

Vaz Freire's *tombo* thus represented an estimate made of the arecanut production of Kotte in the early years of the seventeenth century. The figure was a great underestimate and the second decade of the seventeenth century, many officers of the administration, ranging from the captain-general himself to captains of the army, and the *vidanes* of the *baddas* or departments, had acquired the right to obtain quantities of arecanut at the price paid by the government.<sup>91</sup> The impact of the extension of compulsory purchase was worsened when in the 1620's the villager was compelled to deliver all the arecanut so purchased, to Colombo with an additional thousand nuts per *amuna* to cover possible losses in transport and storage.<sup>92</sup>

The reason given for originally enforcing the practice of compulsory purchase was the need for money to finance the war against Kandy.<sup>93</sup> However, the practice proved so profitable that it was retained even when the Portuguese financial resources improved considerably in later times. This new obligation bore increasingly on the peasants of Kotte with the passage of time for three reasons. Firstly, the purchase price had been fixed at a time when arecanut prices were beginning to rise—the fixing of the rate forced them to forego a source of revenue they badly needed. Secondly, the obligation to produce a set quantity each year was rigidly enforced. Although warfare and natural disasters often caused the loss of arecanut trees in a locality, the amount originally fixed had to be delivered to Colombo. This sometimes forced villagers to buy arecanut at three or four times the fixed price to fulfill their obligations. Thirdly, at least in the 1630's the peasant often did not receive even the four *larins* per *amuna* they were entitled to according to the *tombo* of Vaz Freire. The payment to the producer was usually made in lengths of cloth worth four *larins*. The Portuguese made the peasant accept cloth worth only two or three *larins* in exchange for each *amuna*. Moreover, the amount of nuts per *amuna*, which had been traditionally fixed at twenty four to twenty five thousand, was gradually increased to thirty two thousand. This latter development effectively nullified the rise in price from four to five *larins* per *amuna* decreed by the viceroy Pero da Silva in his *regimento* to the *vedor* Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro on 13 September 1637.<sup>94</sup>

91. AHU 222.ff.171-171v ; *Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda* II.ff.211-212 ; T. Abeyasinghe 155-157

92. AHU 35.f.79 ; TT.*Collecao de S.Vicente* XIX doc.144

93. TT.LM.18.f.240v ; T. Abeyasinghe 155

94. TT.LM.18.f.240v ; *Goa regimentos e instruccoes* III.2-8 ; Queyroz 1017,1027

Opposition to compulsory purchase of arecanut by the state came from two sources. In 1617 and again in 1621 the *camara* of Colombo petitioned to the king that this system be ended. The abolition of compulsory purchase would have freed the village holding *casados* from the obligation of supplying a fixed quantity of arecanut to the state. The petition however made it clear that the *casados* had nothing against the principle of compulsory purchase itself. When the state requirement was abolished they planned to take over the whole system and apply it for their own benefit. The petition of the *camara* was considered in the *conselho da fazenda* at Lisbon which recommended the abolition of compulsory purchase of areca on condition that the quit rents of the villages were raised proportionately. No further steps are known to have been taken in this respect. The second element to oppose this practice consisted of the Sinhalese themselves. When in 1636 they made representations to the captain-general in a lengthy petition, compulsory purchase of arecanut was one of the items singled out for bitter attack. The Sinhalese unlike the *casados* wanted the whole system abolished. Their hopes however, had far smaller chances of realization than those of the *casados*.<sup>95</sup>

The evidence available however suggests that despite the rigid insistence on the quantities recorded in the *tombo*, the actual amount of arecanut received by the government in our period never reached the four thousand one hundred and eleven *amunas* obtained in 1615. A document in the 1620's estimates the total receipts from arecanut obtained by compulsory purchase at six thousand *xerafims* of three *larins* each.<sup>96</sup> If this estimate was even approximately true it would indicate that purchases had fallen to twenty five percent of the 1615 level for the selling price of arecanut in 1622 was twelve to sixteen *larins* per *amuna*. It was probably in an attempt to counter this fall in supply that the Governor Fernao de Albuquerque sought in 1622 to lower the price of cloth which was usually exchanged for arecanut. Nevertheless even in 1634 the amount purchased by the government was substantially less than the figure of 1615. In that year the arecanut purchased by the government totalled one thousand nine hundred and fifty two and a half *amunas*. It was made up as follows:

95. Queyroz 1017,1027 ; AHU Caixa 5, 21.11.1617 ; TT.LM.18.f.240v ; AHU 33.f.12 ; TT.Colleccao de S.Vicente XIX doc. 144. The only Portuguese known to have opposed the compulsory purchase *in toto* was Lancarote de Seixas but even he argued that it was perhaps justified in the case of Sinhalese *lascarins* for unlike the Portuguese they did not pay quit rents to the state.

96. AHU 35.f.79

From Bulatgama	—	1195	<i>amunas</i>
the <i>vidane</i> of the <i>mahabadda</i>	—	200	<i>amunas</i>
the <i>vidane</i> of the gem mining villages of Denawaka	—	200	<i>amunas</i>
the Alutkuru <i>Korale</i>	—	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>amunas</i>
the Pasdun <i>Korale</i>	—	86 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>amunas</i>
the Sabaragamuwa <i>disava</i>	—	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>amunas</i>
the Matara <i>disava</i>	—	140	<i>amunas</i>
the Four <i>Korales</i>	—	152	<i>amunas</i>
the bullock-men of the Seven <i>Korales</i>	—	20	<i>amunas</i>
the <i>vidane</i> of the Pannayas	—	25	<i>amunas</i>
		<hr/>	
		1952 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>amunas</i>

These figures can be assumed as representative of the situation in the 1630's.<sup>97</sup>

Though much of the arecanut was exported to south India directly from Colombo, some also found its way to the Jaffna peninsula from which area it was transported to the Coromandel coast. In fact though arecanut was produced only in negligible quantities in Jaffna itself, trade between the peninsula and south India depended largely on its sale. For this reason Lancarote de Seixas when captain-major of Jaffna (1627-1630) proposed that the export of arecanut by local merchants be forbidden so that foreign merchants would be forced to Jaffna and thereby increase its customs revenues. This measure however proved to be ill-advised for the customers in south India continued to be supplied from other parts of Ceylon and this policy was eventually abandoned before any lasting harm was done to the trade in Jaffna.<sup>98</sup>

The annual revenue derived from arecanut in our period is difficult to estimate. In 1634 the gross revenue was eleven thousand two hundred and sixty two and a half *xerafims*. When the price paid to the producer is deducted this leaves a net revenue of approximately eight thousand six hundred *xerafims*. The factor, Joao da Costa Perestello, estimated the revenue from arecanut in 1618-1619 to be between eight and nine thousand *xerafims*.<sup>99</sup> This could well have been the average revenue from arecanut in the 1620's and 1630's.

97. AHU 35.f.79 ; TT.LM.45.f.353 ; TT.LM.15.f.181 ; Queyroz 1034 ; Filmoteca LM 19D 33/2-5 ; P. da Trindade III.20 ; AHU Caixa 7, 11.2.1622 ; TT.Collecao de S.Vicente XIX doc. 144

98. Filmoteca LM15 28/2-3 ; TT.LM.28.f.274 ; AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635

99. Filmoteca LM19D.33/2-5. This view is further supported by an estimate

## THE PEARL FISHERY

Pearl oysters were to be found along both the Indian and the Ceylon coasts of the Gulf of Mannar. They were found in concentrations sufficient to make a large scale fishery profitable only during certain years. Even in these years the fishing had to be engaged in during the months of February, March and April to obtain the best results. Although fishing for pearls was periodic and seasonal the divers were kept occupied by fishing for chanks, a task which could be done throughout the year. Chanks were large shells used for making ornaments and drinking vessels. While the income derived by the administration from chank fishing was very minute, that from the pearl fishery, if and when one was held could be considerable.<sup>100</sup>

The Portuguese interest in the pearl fishery dated from the 1540's when the Jesuits converted large numbers of fishermen and divers on the Tirunaveli coast of India. With the establishment of base at Mannar, interest changed to control. The Portuguese with their command over the seas and their influence over the divers were well placed to take over the fishing rights from the Nayak of Madura who had hitherto held them. In the sixteenth century the Portuguese who needed the co-operation of the Nayak apparently came to an arrangement with him by which the Nayak obtained all the pearls brought up by a fixed number of divers.<sup>101</sup> With the conquest of Jaffna, however, the Portuguese became by far the most powerful force in the region. By the 1630's the Portuguese held that the Nayak had no right at all to fish for pearls. This contention however was much more difficult to enforce off the Indian coast than that off Mannar, especially as the Portuguese officials could not always trust the Jesuits not to conspire with the divers and the Nayak of Madura to hoodwink the captain of Mannar. In 1634 and again in 1637 the Portuguese used armed vessels to patrol the coasts and prevent the Nayak from fishing for pearls.<sup>102</sup>

of an annual revenue of nine thousand *xerafims* a year in the 1620's given in another contemporary document. (Ajuda 51-V-44.f.23v ; TT.LM. 16.f.258).

100. S. Arasaratnam 146 ; S. Arunachalam—*The history of the pearl fishery of the Tamil coast* (Annamalainagar 1952) 99 ; Ribeiro 71 ; Ajuda 51-V-34.f.126 ; Coimbra 459.ff.188,201. The reasons for the seasonal nature of the pearl fishing were probably the prevalence of monsoon winds during other parts of the year. The viceroy on 8 February 1635 wrote to the king stating that fishing for pearls was possible only in February-March or November, both inter-monsoonal periods.
101. S. Arunachalam, 99,113-114
102. Filmoteca LM 19B 27/2-4 ; Simancas S.P.1469.f.194 ; Coimbra 645.f.7 ; Coimbra 459.ff.184,188,201 ; TT.LM.40.f.69 ; AHU Caixa 6, 1.12.1619

During the thirty years 1604-1634 no pearl fishery was held. It is not known whether this interval was in part due to the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Fishery Coast in 1618 and their absence from the area for the next twelve years, but the absence of a fishery even after their return indicates that the main reason may have been the lack of a sufficient concentration of oysters.<sup>103</sup> From 1634 to at least 1639 pearl fishing on a greater or lesser scale was carried on annually.<sup>104</sup>

When held, the pearl fishery was a highly complicated venture. The decision whether or not to hold a fishery was made on the basis of a pilot survey carried out in September of the previous year. On the shores off Ceylon, the pilot survey was arranged by the factor of Mannar who sent out boats with half a dozen divers in each to check on likely locations. The oysters collected by these divers were taken back to Mannar to be examined for pearls and the result notified to the viceroy with an appropriate recommendation. On the Indian coast similar surveys were made by the Portuguese captain at Tuticorin. The real decision about holding the fishery was made on the spot, for the viceroy at Goa had not the expertise to analyse the reasons that lay behind the recommendations sent to him.<sup>105</sup>

Once the decision to hold the fishery was confirmed at Goa however, the viceroy appointed an official to administer the fishery. In the sixteenth century the captain of Mannar was often chosen for this task but this arrangement did not always prove satisfactory as many of the captains proved more interested in their own incomes than the king's.<sup>106</sup> In 1636 the viceroy nominated Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro, already named as *vedor* of Ceylon to be in charge of the fishery and the supervision of the fishery thenceforth became an *ex-officio* task of the *vedor*. By the *regimentos* of 1636 and 1639 issued by viceroy Pero da Silva it was decreed that the *vedor* should journey personally to Mannar every year to perform this task. In case he was unable to do this he was required

103. Reimers 55 ; DR I.342 ; DR II.145 ; TT.LM.18.f.41. There is however no doubt that the prospect of renewed income from the pearl fishery was a factor that facilitated the return of the Jesuits. For an account of the expulsion and the return of the Jesuits see—D.Ferrolli—*The Jesuits in the Malabar*, I. (Bangalore 1939) 312-334
104. Coimbra 459.ff.188,201 ; TT.LM.37.f.425 ; 1636 was a possible exception
105. TT.LM.40.f.311v ; TT.LM.37.f.410 ; Assentos II.97-98 ; P.E.Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam*, 39
106. S. Botelho—*O tombo do estado da India*, (ed Rodrigo Jose de Lima; Felmer in *Subsidios para a Historia India Portuguesa* (Lisbon 1868) 245 AHU 282.ff.25

to send a personal nominee to act as his representative.<sup>107</sup>

In the month before the fishery at a place on the seashore near the oyster-bed, a whole series of temporary buildings were built under the general supervision of the captain of Mannar. These buildings were designed to serve as residences, shops and storehouses. The *vedor* arrived just before the fishery started and registered the number of vessels and divers which were to take part. The fishing itself lasted for about two months after which the whole makeshift settlement was dismantled. For the duration of the fishery, a few Portuguese armed vessels stood by to prevent a raid by pirates or adventurers. Soldiers from the garrison of Jaffna provided a guard on shore.<sup>108</sup>

Throughout this specific period the pearl fishery was essentially based on private enterprise, organized, directed and supervised by government officials. The fishing boats were privately owned and the divers paid by the owners of the boats with a share of the catch. However, the Portuguese administration derived a large revenue from each pearl fishery. The first and most important source of revenue was the tax on the divers. According the *foral* of Jaffna each individual Christian diver, paid two and a half *patacas* or four and one sixth *xerafims* for the right to participate in the fishery. Non-Christians paid double this amount.<sup>109</sup> The income from this source had been around five thousand *pardaos* in the 1570's.<sup>110</sup> By the 1580's it had risen to six thousand four hundred *pardaos*.<sup>111</sup> Towards the end of our period it amounted to over seven thousand two hundred *pardaos*.<sup>112</sup> Next in importance was the *bolca* or dues paid by merchants for the right to buy and sell at the site of the temporary settlement during the duration of the fishery. The income from this source is difficult to estimate. In the 1590's it was reported to have yielded one thousand three hundred and

107. Assentos II.94 ; TT.LM.42.f.9 ; TT.LM.45.f.361 ; *Goa regimentos e instruccoes* III.ff.2-8. The decision to leave the *vedor* permanently in charge of the fishery was taken in 1638 and the instructions to the effect were drafted in early 1639.

108. S. Arunachalam, 99 ; P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645 5, 39-40, Ribeiro 163-167 ; *Instructions from the Governor General and council of India to the Governor of Ceylon 1656-1665* (trans. Sophia Pieters. Colombo 1908) 100. Ribeiro's estimate of three to five thousand vessels engaged in the fishery is an exaggeration. The actual number must have been around three hundred with about two thousand five hundred divers.

109. P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645 42

110. Studia IV.263-264 ; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.37 ; D. Velho—*Orcamento do estado da India*, (Lisbon 1960) 125

111. Panduronga S. S. Pissurlencar—*Regimentos das fortalezas da India*, 485

112. Queyroz 1194



seventy five *pardaos*. Queyroz estimates that it yielded two hundred and seventy three *pardaos* in the 1640's.<sup>113</sup> A less important source was the rents of the shops built by the Portuguese at the settlement and the stamp duty on all goods sold in the area. The right of searching the beaches after the fishery for pearls, lost or forgotten, was also sold for a small sum.<sup>114</sup> Besides these revenues, which were all farmed out,<sup>115</sup> at the start of the fishery, the *vedor* collected other customary dues. For example the people of Kilarai had to supply two pearls of five carats each and two others of of two carats each.<sup>116</sup> The total revenue derived from the fishery varied from year to year but the average income which had hardly reached ten thousand *xerafims* in the sixteenth century<sup>117</sup> had risen to about twelve thousand by the 1630's.

If revenue was high, so were the expenses. The captain of Mannar successfully claimed a sum of three hundred *pardaos* for his pains. The *vedor* was paid an extra two hundred *pardaos*. This lavish payment of bonuses continued down to the payment of a sum of four *xerafims* to every soldier of the Jaffna garrison who served in guarding the fishery. The expenses rose so high that in the 1640's it became hardly worthwhile to the government to hold a fishery at all.<sup>118</sup>

#### LAND REVENUE

Until the establishment of direct Portuguese rule in Kotte, the land tenure system of the region was governed by traditional Sinhalese custom. The king was the source of all land grants. Land grants were of two types—grants of *pangus* or portions of land and grants of villages. The king could grant to any person a portion of the abandoned or vacant land in any village. The holder of such an extent was called the *pangukaraya*. Every *pangukaraya* was expected to perform some services in lieu of land held, the nature of the service depending on the caste of the landholder. Thus a man of the *berava* caste would beat tom-toms when called upon to do so. These service-tenure land holders could bequeath land to their heirs on condition that the traditional services also continued.

113. Panduronga S.S. Pissurlencar—*Regimentos das fortalezas da India*, 485 ; Queyroz 1194

114. The revenues estimated from these sources in the 1590's were 300,200 and 300 *pardaos* respectively. According to Queyroz these amounts had fallen to 70, 40 and 20 *pardaos* by 1645-46. Queyroz 1194; Pissurlencar 480-485

115. S. Arundachalam, 104

116. Pissurlencar 371 ; P.E.Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645 42

117. Evora CV/2-7.f.57v ; AHU 500 f.57 ; Studia IV.263-264 ; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.37

118. P.E.Pieris—*The Kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645 43

The second type of land grant was the grant of a village. This did not mean that the *gam ladda* or village holder was entitled to all the land in the village. He was in fact in possession of only a limited tract of paddy and/or garden land which was called the *muttettu* (or *lord's demesne*). This portion had to be gratuitously cultivated by the *pangukarayas*. The income of the village holder was often supplemented by dues from land given out on lease. *Otu* and *ande* were two forms of such lease holds.<sup>119</sup> In sixteenth century Kotte, the king himself was the principal villageholder for he retained 1/6 to 1/8 of the total number of villages in Kotte as villages of the royal store house or *gabada*.<sup>120</sup> Some villages were granted to Hindu and Buddhist temples in perpetuity. These were termed *devalagam* and *viharagam* respectively. However, by far the largest number of villages were those granted to individuals as rewards for past services or as remuneration for services being currently performed. These villages known as *nindagam* were granted at pleasure. In Jaffna, the land tenure system was much simpler. Land was generally granted as freehold but was subject to a land tax and a grain tax.

The first twenty years of Portuguese rule in Ceylon saw several modifications of the traditional system. Three of these have been highlighted by T. Abeyasinghe in his study of Kotte under de Azevedo,<sup>121</sup> namely the introduction of Portuguese settlers in the village holding class, the supplanting of service tenure at the village holder's level by the payment of quit rents and the gradual alienation of royal villages to both missionaries and the Portuguese *casados*. These developments continued during the period 1617-

119. These were disadvantageous (in comparison with outright grants) to the peasants, for while as a *pangukaraya* he gained the whole of the produce of his plot, as an *ande* or *otu* cultivator he gained only a part. Thus cultivation would be undertaken by the peasant only if he did not hold a *pangu* or if the *ande* or *otu* lands were so situated in relation to his *pangu* that he could cultivate them with little extra effort. In times of labour scarcity, as the Kotte peasant was not tied to the soil, *ande* or *otu* land would be of little value. Much depended however on the fertility of the plot and the share due to the holder of the land. Even in the early seventeenth century when many lands were abandoned due to lack of cultivators in some areas in other parts considerable tracts were cultivated under the *otu* contracts. (see P. E. Pieris—*The Ceylon littoral* 1593 3-5, 12,14,19,35). *Ande* involved equal division of the crop after certain dues were separated (Queyroz 1017). *Otu* in Kotte involved the payment by the cultivator to the landholder, the amount sown in the field. (See also H. W. Codrington—*Ancient land tenure and revenue in Ceylon* (Colombo 1938) 9 ; H. C. P. Bell—*Report on the Kegalle district of the Province of Sabaragamuwa* (Ceylon sessional papers XIX 1892) Colombo 1892) 116

120. TT. *Manuscritos do convento da Graca*, Tomo 6D 350-411

121. T. Abeyasinghe 103-127

1638 and their combined effects determined the amount of revenue obtained from land by the Portuguese government.

The sources for the two decades under survey provide little evidence as to the number of villages held by the Portuguese and still less on their territorial extent and monetary value. The *tombo* of Vaz Freire indicates that in 1614 the Portuguese village holdings extended along the coastal belt from Colombo to Matara and a few fertile areas inland.<sup>122</sup> Revenue figures from the same decade indicate that the Portuguese-held villages covered something like 1/5 of the area of Kotte.<sup>123</sup> There is considerable evidence that the trend towards a greater number of villages falling into Portuguese hands continued. The Kadawatu and Meda Korales came under Portuguese control only in 1618. By 1622 ten villages in the area had been granted to two Portuguese *disavas*.<sup>124</sup> This trend was even more evident in Jaffna. In 1618 the principal village holders were all Tamils. By 1645 Portuguese settlers had become the chief village holders in Jaffna.<sup>125</sup> This change bore hard on the native peasantry for the Portuguese both misunderstood and misused the customary practices of the land.<sup>126</sup> In fact the change must have been more oppressive for the Sinhalese of Kotte than for the Tamils of Jaffna for the Sinhalese land tenure system was both less easy to understand and more easy to abuse. The change was also significant from a revenue point of view, for a Portuguese village holder was much better placed than a native one, to secure lower quit rent for the village he held,<sup>127</sup> but the second development that of paying cash instead of performing services was even more important in this respect.

Portuguese land policy in Kotte as evolved in the first two decades of the seventeenth century envisaged one principal type of village holding. Villages were to be granted with the obligation of paying 12% of their income to the state as *foro* or quit rent. The village holders were also expected to assume the task of maintaining a fixed number of militiamen, the obligation of each village holder in this respect varying with the income derived from the villages held. Two exceptions to this rule were to be permitted. Firstly, the land formerly allocated to Buddhist or Hindu temples—

122. T. Abeyasinghe 114-115

123. AHU Caixa 6, 13.11.1619

124. S. G. Perera—*The tombo of the Two Korales*, pgs. 5,8,14,20,28,29,30.; The *disavas* were Joao de Freitas of Marata and Bartolameu de Lemos of Sabaragamuwa.

125. IOL Conselho Ultramarino I

126. T. Abeyasinghe 121; Queyroz 1008,1015-1016, 1025-1026

127. The instance of Madampe is noted in C. R. de Silva—*Lancarote de Seixas and Madampe* (Ceylon Studies Seminar 69/70 No. 1. University of Ceylon)

*viharagam* and *devalagam*—when held by missionaries made no payment in cash or service.<sup>128</sup> Secondly, the service tenure was retained in a few cases when it was thought to be profitable or convenient. Thus the cinnamon peelers and those who served in the elephant hunt held villages in return for these services. The service tenure villages thus preserved amounted to approximately 9% of the total number of villages in Kotte.<sup>129</sup>

This system encountered several difficulties in the period under consideration. The principal village-holders, mostly Portuguese though willing to pay the *foros* for the lands they held proved reluctant to maintain the militiamen as they were required by the terms of their land grants. Moreover, the Sinhalese *lascarins* whose pay had been discontinued in the early seventeenth century, refused to pay *foro* for their lands until these payments were resumed.<sup>130</sup> Thus up to about 1626 while the Portuguese settlers paid their quit rents and evaded the military obligations the Sinhalese *lascarins* served in war but refused to pay land rents.<sup>131</sup>

Despite specific orders by the king, the Portuguese administration never succeeded in forcing the *casados* to maintain militiamen.<sup>132</sup> In the case of the *lascarins* however a compromise settlement was reached in the time of de Sa. Up to 1626, though the Portuguese held land grants for three lives,<sup>133</sup> the Sinhalese had held villages at pleasure. In that year both the captain-general de Sa and the *vedor* Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara recommended to the viceroy that land grants to Sinhalese should be made on the same terms as to the Portuguese. This meant that the native holder was thenceforth able to nominate his child, brother, nephew or indeed any relative to hold the land on the same terms as he had done.<sup>134</sup> In return for this security of tenure the *lascarins* were called upon to pay quit rents for the lands they held. This recommendation was accepted by the viceroy-in-council and an effort was made to

128. Other lands when held by missionaries paid quitrents. AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632

129. T. Abeyasinghe 121-126 ; AHU Caixa 4, 20.11.1615

130. See above pages.

131. TT.LM.16.f.294 ; TT.LM.21.f.167 ; AHU Caixa 4. 15.11.1615 ; AHU Caixa 6, 13.11.1619 ; AHU Caixa 4, 2.1.1616 ; AHU Caixa 4. 20.11.1615 ; T. Abeyasinghe 125-126

132. TT.LM.16.f.237

133. In the early years of Portuguese rule grants were sometimes made for two lives but after the first decade of the seventeenth century grants were always made for three. TT.LM.26.f.658 ; TT.LM.21.f.351 ; AHU Caixa 4, 28.9.1615. DR I. 384-385

134. The right to raise the *foro* at the end of each life was reserved by the administration but it was seldom exercised.

implement them in Ceylon.<sup>135</sup> There is no direct evidence on the reactions of the lascarins themselves. However, as the advantages they acquired were of rather dubious value (for the security of their holdings ultimately depended on the inclinations of the *disavas* and the captain-general) they may well have resented the change.<sup>136</sup> In fact data on land dues available for the 1630's and 1640's indicate that considerable evasion for the payment of quit rents continued.<sup>137</sup>

Land revenue accruing to the Portuguese administration in Kotte was however not confined to the quit rent collections alone. The receipts from royal villages formed a valuable source of revenue. The first few decades of Portuguese rule were nevertheless characterised by a steady decline in the number of villages reserved for the state and a corresponding decline in the revenue derived from this source.

The alienation of *gabadagam* to missionaries stemmed in part from a short-sighted policy relating to the temple lands—*viharagam* and *devalagam*. The Portuguese made no distinction between these two categories and termed them both—*pagoda* villages. The *tombo* of 1599 records the existence of about one hundred and twenty *pagoda* villages in twelve of the twenty seven inland territorial divisions of olden Kotte.<sup>138</sup> On this basis it is possible to hazard a guess that there must have been well over two hundred *pagoda* villages in all Kotte.

Portuguese policy since the conversion of the puppet Kotte king Dom Joao Dharmapala in 1557 had been the confiscation of all temple property and handing it over to the missionaries. In fact the lands of the well-known Kelaniya temple were specifically handed over by King Dharmapala to the Franciscans who also obtained from the king a blanket grant of all *pagoda* villages in

135. BNL FG.1983.ff.88-89 ; AHU Caixa 9, 6.2.1626 ; TT.LM.24.f.385 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.216v

136. TT.LM.45.f.304v ; TT.LM.16.f.580

137. The Portuguese officials had calculated that on the basis of the *tombo* of 1614 that all land in Kotte would yield 21,022 *xerafims* as *foros*, 4700 *xerafims* from Portuguese *casados* and 17,300 *xerafims* from Sinhalese village holders. This was an over estimate by at least 10%, for royal villages and temple villages granted to missionaries, which two categories did not pay *foros* were both included in the estimates. In contrast the total quit rents actually collected in 1634 was only 5538 *xerafims* though this might have been a reflection of the unsettled conditions of the period 1630-1634.

138. The twelve divisions for which figures are available are the following Korales—Pasdun, Walallawiti, Kukulu, Siyane, Hewagam, Udapola, Navadum, Atakalan and Handapandunu Korales, Five Korales, Four Korales and Seven Korales.

Kotte.<sup>139</sup> This latter grant, of course, had no effect as long as the Portuguese were hemmed in within a few coastal forts. With the Portuguese conquest of Kotte 1593-1595, the situation changed suddenly. Plenty of temple lands became available to sustain the missionary effort but the number of Franciscans which had fallen to four in 1585 failed to expand sufficiently.<sup>140</sup> They were therefore unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain monopoly possession of the temple lands though they did succeed in obtaining some twenty of them including Kelaniya, Dompe, Pepiliyana and Batu-wantudawa.<sup>141</sup>

The Portuguese captain-general would have greatly enhanced the land revenue if he had retained the confiscated villages for the exchequer but he chose to reward his loyal supporters. The state still continued to obtain some revenue for lay holders of *pagoda* lands unlike missionaries had to pay quit rents. However, this overhasty distribution of *pagoda* lands to laymen resulted in a situation where the expansion of the missionary effort would no longer be financed from *pagoda* lands alone.

The authorities in Lisbon had anticipated this situation, for in the instructions of the king to the outgoing *vedor da fazenda* Antao Vaz Freire in 1608, it was clearly stated that the *pagoda* villages should be granted only to missionaries and even to them at royal pleasure. This, it was explained, would facilitate the reallocation of resources during the anticipated expansion in the missionary effort. The *vedor* was also instructed to make a separate *tombo* of *pagoda* villages and to collect the revenue of those villages not already granted. It was specifically pointed out that keeping these villages for the Crown was financially more advantageous than giving them out for quit rents.<sup>142</sup>

But it was already too late. Even before the Jesuits first arrived in Kotte in 1602, most of the *pagoda* lands had already been granted. The Jesuits did indeed secure the sixty four villages of the Hindu temple at Munneswaram but by 1605 de Azevedo had been compelled to grant royal villages to finance the Jesuits.<sup>143</sup>

139. Queyroz 330, 0156 ; Coimbra 459.f.33

140. P.da Trindade III 41.

141. T. Abeyasinghe (112) maintains that most of the temple lands were taken over '... for the maintenance of the Catholic religious orders and therefore only a few were available for the allotment to private individuals...' though he does maintain that there were exceptions in areas inland. It would perhaps be as fair to state that except on the coast most temple villages were granted to private individuals.

142. APO VI 804

143. *Gabada* villages granted to Jesuits in 1605 included Kolonnawa, Angoda and Moratuwa (including Laxapatiya and Ratmalana). The Augustiniana obtained Panadura about this time.

The lesson, however, was not well learnt. When in 1618-1619 the Meda Korale was subjugated all the *viharagam* in that region were distributed to *lascarins*.<sup>144</sup> This continued violation of royal instructions resulted in a further drain on the number of royal villages. By 1631 the Jesuits alone possessed at least ten *gabada-gam* including the well-known villages of Rilaula, Bambarenda, Weligampitiya and Udugampola.

The number of *gabada-gam* fell also because many of them were given out on quit rent to individuals and thus lost their character as villages reserved for the king. This transformation was partly the result of land-grabbing in the chaotic conditions of the last decades of the sixteenth century. Jorge Frolim de Almeida records the instance of Manoel Dias da Lomba who held a royal village in the Alutkuru Korale in 1599 merely on the grounds that his father had been the *vidane* of the village earlier.<sup>145</sup> Most grants of *gabada-gam* were however made as a matter of policy. The clamour for rewards was difficult to resist and it was not easy to find suitable villages to reward the numerous loyal supporters without recourse to granting state-held villages. The income subsequently arriving to the state by means of quit rent payment was but a fraction of what it would have gained by retaining the *gabada-gam*.<sup>146</sup> Of course some royal village were set aside to supply specified forts. For instance in the 1620's and the 1630's the revenue of Balangoda was used for the fort of Sabaragamuwa.<sup>147</sup> Royal villages were also granted in lieu of pay to certain officials. For example the *disava* of Sabaragamuwa held Opanayaka, Uggalkaltota, Morahela and Galpaya.<sup>148</sup> Less defensible was the grant of royal villages to Portuguese officials who were paid *ordenado*. The captain-major-of-the-field is known to have enjoyed the village of Dorawaka.<sup>149</sup>

The result of this policy was that the Portuguese government in Ceylon was financially in great difficulty in the first two decades of the seventeenth century and forced to adopt unpopular and oppressive revenue measures such as the compulsory purchase of arecanut. It would be no exaggeration to claim that had the Portuguese left the *gabada-gam* in state hands, the administration

144. S. G. Perera—*The tombo of the Two Korales*, 28-29. The villages involved were Kubuddana, Panane, Dorawela, Wikiliya Panguwa and Alutwela Panguwa.

145. *TT.Mss da Convento da Graca*, tomo 6D. 376

146. T. Abeyasinghe 119

147. S. G. Perera—*The tombo of the Two Korales*, 8

148. *Ibid*, 5,20,28 ; C. R. de Silva—*Lancarote de Seixas and Madampe*, 11

149. He also held Ulapane and Mandamaravita.

would have had few financial worries. The paddy derived by the king of Kotte from *gabadagam* in the Galu Korale alone would have yielded well over 5000 *xerafims* a year at the prices of 1600.<sup>150</sup> When it is considered that the total revenue from the compulsory purchase of arecanut was below 10,000 *xerafims* a year, it is clear that the Portuguese officials, by their lavish grant of *gabadagam* had sabotaged the economic base of thier own attempts to conquer the island.

By the second decade of the seventeenth century the Portuguese had realised their folly. In an attempt to repair some of the damage the king of Portugal requested the *vedor da fazenda* of Ceylon to resume twelve of the most lucrative villages and to set aside their revenue for the maintainence of the Portuguese army. On his visit to Ceylon, 1617-1619, the bishop of Cochin noted that the only sizable area left to the crown was Bulatgama and he sent up to Lisbon a list of eighteen villages from which twelve might be chosen.<sup>151</sup> Both the bishop and the authorities in Lisbon however greatly underestimated the powers of resistance of those already in possession. The king's instructions on the question, framed on the advice of the bishop and first issued on 11th February 1622 remained unimplemented for over a decade despite repeated reminders.<sup>152</sup> The village holders convinced captain-general, de Sa that it was best not to dispossess them. They even managed to convince Conde de Vidigueira, viceroy of India. Their arguments were clearly reflected in a letter of the viceroy to the king dated 15th March 1625.<sup>153</sup> It was contended that villages of Dorawaka, Ulapane and Mandamaravita held by the captain-major-of-the-field were providing the king's army with many *lascarins* and therefore their resumption would mean a loss, militarily. It was argued that it was unfair to deprive the *disavas* of the villages granted to them for their maintainence for they were paid no salary. This reasoning was aimed at preserving Talampitiya for the *disava* of the Seven Korales and Kottapitiya and Opanayake for the *disava* of Sabaragamuwa. If the villages of Munneswaram held by the Jesuits were resumed, the Government would have to provide for the seven priests at the Jesuit College

150, *TT.Mss Convento de Graca, tomo 6D. 359-363.* The *gabadagam* of the Galu Korale yielded in addition considerable arecanut, some pepper and a small revenue in cash.

151. *TT.LM.16.ff.210-211*

152. *TT.LM.16.f.208 ; TT.LM.20.f.205 ; TT.LM.23.f.237 ; BNL 1983,ffl-119-121 ; Filmoteca LM 13A 11/5 ; AHU Caixa 8. 26.2.1624 ; Evora G. R. Arm. V VI 14-5.f.139*

153. *TT.LM.24.f.21*



and thus would gain no financial advantage.<sup>154</sup> Similar arguments were advanced against the resumption of other villages. Little wonder that the king testily wrote back that with 4640 villages in Kotte and many more in Jaffna there must be enough available to compensate the holders of the twelve villages for their loss.<sup>155</sup> The persistent efforts of the authorities in Lisbon and the opportunity afforded by the dislocation of the village-holding pattern by the Kandyan invasion of 1630-1633, eventually led to the implementation of the king's recommendations. Twelve villages whose total income was approximately 13,300 *xerafims* were set aside to serve the needs of the army.

Another development which had little effect on land revenue receipts but was important as far as the rights of the village-holders and the position of the peasants were concerned, is known to have occurred in this period. This was the acquisition by the village-holder of the right to buy and sell the village. It is clear that this right did not exist in the second decade of the seventeenth century. Indeed the sale of villages was prohibited by royal decree. However when on 3rd December 1611 the king decreed that all those who held land in Ceylon should reside in the island, he allowed a period four months within which those who did not wish to reside in Ceylon could sell their lands.<sup>156</sup> Nine years later the bishop of Cochin complained that the king's prohibition on the sale of villages was being violated both with and without the viceroy's consent.<sup>157</sup> By 1629 this practice had become so commonplace that the authorities both at Goa and Lisbon had accepted it. The king in a letter to the viceroy dated 25 March 1629 merely laid down the condition that sales must be made only to persons living in the island.<sup>158</sup>

154. This was a good instance of the use of false statistics to try to change royal policy. According to the *tombo* of 1614 Munneswaram yielded a revenue of 770 *pardaos*. The Jesuits later claimed that the improvements they made after 1614 further enhanced its revenues. But in the viceroy's letter it is maintained that Munneswaram yielded a mere 500 *xerafims* a year. (TT.LM. 24.f.21 ; AHU Caixa 10. 7.12.1632)

155. '...me pareceo dizer vos q sendo quatro mil seis centas e quarenta aldeas os q estam Lancadas no tombo q fez o veador da faza Antam Vaz Freire e estando-confir madas por my muy poucas das repartidas como que os possuidores nam tem adquirido direito fixo in re, se nam depois da confirmacao, E estandosse ainda repartindo as aldeas do Rno Jaffnapatam aonde se podia dar satisfacao aos providos das doze q se ham de separar E e dura cousa q a ja inconvenientes e duvidas com q se dilate tanto tempo darsse a execucao q nisto tenho mandado sendo em benef° da conservacao da mesma ilha.... (TT.LM.26 f.333)

156. A. Garcia—*Arquivo da relacao da Goa 1601-1640* (Nova Goa 1872)

157. TT.LM.16.f.239 ; AHU Caixa 3, 31.3.1615 ; AHU Caixa 4, 7.9.1615 ; AHU 33.f. 19

158. TT.LM.26.f.298

As long as the unit bought and sold was the village, the peasant or the *pangukaraya* was not directly affected.<sup>159</sup> By the late 1620's however buying and selling of *pangus* themselves registered a sharp increase. The right to buy and sell *pangus* had existed in Ceylon since very early times. However, in the disturbed years of the early seventeenth century such sales were few.<sup>160</sup> With the return of peace the demand for land apparently increased, perhaps due to the influx of refugees from the Kandyan highlands. Portuguese *casados* now found it profitable to buy *pangus* from existing holders and convert them into *ande* or *otu* lands.

By the 1630's therefore the Portuguese administration was faced with the results of its own policy in converting a system of land tenure based on service to one in which a cash payment was the nexus between the landholder and the government. There had been created not merely a market for land but also a small but growing class of landless peasants. The administration also found that even those aspects of service tenure which they wished to preserve—the service of the cinnamon peelers, elephant hunters and feeders, woodcutters (*cortadores*) and the bullockcart men were all affected as these men had begun selling their lands. The reaction of the Ceylon authorities was decisive. Dom Jorge de Almeida in 1634 ordered that all lands purchased from the above categories of service landholders be immediately restored to them. The process of breaking up the economy of Kotte was proving economically disadvantageous to the Portuguese.<sup>161</sup> By the mid-seventeenth century the *chaleas* were forbidden to sell their lands.<sup>162</sup>

There is much less evidence as to land tenure and land revenues in Jaffna than in respect of Kotte. However, it seems clear that the changes in Kotte in the first twenty years of Portuguese rule were to some extent duplicated in Jaffna. Portuguese settlers entered the ranks of the landholding class and the old system of land tenure was supplanted in many areas by the holding of land

159. However there is little doubt that during the period of Portuguese rule landholders, Portuguese and Sinhalese alike, began to extract more from the peasants, in violation of customary practice. De Sa acknowledged this as the principal reason for rebellions and discontentment. (*TT. Colleccion de S. Vicente XIX doc. 274*)

160. At least two instances are recorded in the *tombo* of Vaz Freire. P. E. Pieris—*The Ceylon littoral*, 34,82

161. Queyroz 1034 ; Evora CXVI/2-3.f.115v. The *cortadores* or woodcutters performed the important task of cutting a way through the jungle and of carrying munitions for the army.

162. . . . 'the *chaleas* have not the right, like other natives of Ceylon, to sell or alienate the lands granted to them. Their heirs may inherit but they may not sell.' (Instructions, 46)

on payment of quit rents to the Crown.<sup>163</sup> This latter development occurred chiefly in areas where the Portuguese settled and at the end of Portuguese occupation it was the old grain tax and not the new system of quitrents the survived.<sup>164</sup> In one respect however, the Portuguese revenue authorities in Jaffna set out to reap the benefits of their experience in Kotte. The *foro* or quit rents for the lands of Kotte was only twelve per cent of the assessed revenue. This left eighty eight per cent for the landholder. This *foro* had been considered too low by the authorities in Lisbon but little could be done without arousing discontent once the lands had been granted and the quitrents fixed. In 1630 Lancarote de Seixas captain-major of Jaffna suggested that henceforth the *foro* for lands in Jaffna should be fixed at from two thirds to three quarters of the total revenue. The viceroy, the conde de Linhares, always on the alert for fresh sources of revenue, recommended the change to the king. Wiser counsels however prevailed in Lisbon. It was perhaps felt that the burden of the higher *foro* might be passed on to the peasant. Also perhaps it was felt that discontent in Jaffna might well provoke a rising akin to that of 1627, and this was a real danger with the Portuguese at war with Kandy. On 15 March 1634 the king wrote back requesting that no innovations be made in matters of land policy.

The land revenues of Jaffna in the period seems to have risen very rapidly. On conquest these could not have been more than three thousand five hundred *pardaos*<sup>165</sup> a year. With the new *tombo* of Antao Vaz Freire increased assessments made the land revenue rise to seven thousand five hundred *pardaos*.<sup>166</sup> The labours of Amaro Roiz raised the figures still further. By 1646 the figure had come up to 10,720 *pardaos*.<sup>167</sup> In Kotte due to the refusal of the *lascarins* to pay *foro* the land revenue at the commencement of this period remained at about four thousand seven hundred *pardaos*. This target however was probably never reached. In the 1620's the land revenue from *foros* remained at around six thousand *xerafims* and the estimates of land revenue given by Antonio Bocarro suggests that this amount had not been substantially increased even by 1634. Nevertheless if the estimates of revenue from land rents given in Queyroz for the 1640's is even

163. I.O.L. Conselho Ultramarino I.

164. Filmoteca LM 15. 38/2-3 ; TT.LM.31.f.430 ; S. Arasaratnam—*Trade and agricultural economy of the Tamils in Jaffna during the latter half of the seventeenth century*, in *Tamil Culture*, IX. (Annamalainagar 1952) 371-373

165. AHU Caixa 2, 246

166. AHU Caixa 10, 5.12.1627

167. AHU 220.f.24v

approximately correct the revenue from quit rents must have almost doubled in the later 1630's.<sup>168</sup> Even if the yield of the twelve villages specifically reserved to meet the expenses of the army of conquest is taken into account the total land revenue in Kotte in the 1630's must have been under twenty five thousand *pardaos*.<sup>169</sup>

#### REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE

During the period, 1617-1638 the accounts of the revenue and expenditure of Kotte were kept separate from those of Jaffna. In 1640 the king approved of a suggestion made by the viceroy that the revenues of Portuguese Ceylon should be considered as a whole,<sup>170</sup> but apparently no steps were taken to implement this measure for Fr. Fernao de Queyroz writing four decades later about the revenues of Portuguese Ceylon in 1645 gave separate estimates for Jaffna and Kotte.<sup>171</sup>

Portuguese sources so far traced give us estimates of the revenue of Kotte only at three points in our period—1619, 1620 and 1634.<sup>172</sup> These represent the accounts of the factor of Ceylon, an estimate by an unknown author and the figures of Antonio Bocarro, respectively. However, for purposes of obtaining a balanced view, estimates for the years 1615 and 1645, which fall outside the scope of this work have been used here.<sup>173</sup> Unfortunately none of the annual reports of revenue and expenditure which the *vedor* of Ceylon was required to send to the king has ever come to light.<sup>174</sup> These would have been extremely useful in showing the annual variations in revenue and expenditure which we can only guess at now. Estimates of expenditure are available only for the year 1634.<sup>175</sup> However with the assistance of isolated scraps of information from various documents it is possible to build up a coherent, if not complete picture of the finances of the Portuguese administration in Kotte.

The average annual revenue the Portuguese obtained from Kotte in years of peace during the period 1618-1628 was:

168. Ajuda 51-V-44.f.23v ; Queyroz 1192
169. Filmoteca LM 19D 33/2-5 ; APO (New ed.) tomo IV.vol.I, Part 2. 401-402 ; Queyroz 729
170. Filmoteca LM21 8/2
171. Queyroz 1192-1194
172. TT.LM.16.f.258 ; Ajuda 51-V-44.f.23v ; APO (new ed) Tomo IV.vol. II.Part 1.400-403
173. TT.LM.16.f.257 ; Queyroz 1192-1193
174. A. Botelho de Souza I.31 ; TT.LM.38.f.396v ; TT.LM.16.f.355 ; TT.LM 20.f.67 ; TT.LM.17.f.85 ; TT.LM.13.f.193 ; TT.LM.26.f.256 ; TT.LM 22.f.88 ; APO VI.1219-1220
175. APO (New ed) Tomo IV Part 1 379-399

from the sale of 1000 <i>bahars</i> of cinnamon	30,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the sale of 2250 <i>amunas</i> of areca	9,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the sale of 37 elephants at 250 <i>xerafims</i> each	9,250 <i>xerafims</i>
the sale of gems mined in the Two Korales	1,000 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>176</sup>
port dues	12,000 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>177</sup>
quit rents on land	4,700 <i>xerafims</i>
the coconut tax, fines and customary dues	3,000 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>178</sup>

---

68,950 *xerafims*

less the price paid for the 1900 *amunas* of areca 2,533 *xerafims*

---

66,417 *xerafims*

less the cost of freight of 1000 *bahars* of cinnamon—2000 *xerafims* + the cost of mats and cord used to bundle cinnamon etc., 400 *xerafims* 2,400 *xerafims*<sup>179</sup>

---

64,017 *xerafims*

---

The revenue obtained in times of peace in the next decade was much greater.

From the sale of 2000 <i>bahars</i> of cinnamon	200,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the sale of 2250 <i>amunas</i> of arecanut	9,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the sale of 37 elephants at 250 <i>xerafims</i> each	9,250 <i>xerafims</i>

176. In 1615 Vaz Freire estimated the revenue from gems at 2850 *xerafims*. (T. Abeyasinghe 166). The actual proceeds of that year amounted to 2300 *xerafims*. (AHU Caixa 4, 15.11.1615). In 1616 basing their forecast on the actual revenues of 1614 and 1615 Vaz Freire and Balthazar Marinho estimated the yield to be 2500 *xerafims* annually. (TT.LM.16.f.258). These hopes however were not fulfilled in subsequent years. In the 1620's the annual revenue was about 100 *xerafims* (Ajuda 51-V-44 f.23v). In 1625 the *vedor* reported to the king that the income from gems was 440-600 *xerafims*. (TT.LM.23.f.253) but here the *vedor* was arguing a case for the sale of gems within Ceylon and may have underestimated the revenue.

177. This estimate is from the accounts of the factor Joao da Costa Perestello in 1618-1619.

178. Queyroz 729

179. APO (New ed) Tomo IV Part 1.391 ; TT.LM.16.f.258. The freight costs have been estimated at the rate of two *xerafims* a *bahar*. According to estimates presented to the viceroy's council at Goa on 4 March 1637 the freight costs from Colombo to Goa of a *bahar* of cinnamon was estimated at twelve *xerafims* (Assentos II.162). Similar estimates were placed before the *conselho da India* in Lisbon on 16 March 1635. (Coimbra 645.f.68v). Another document estimates the cost at six *xerafims* a *bahar*. Both these estimates seem exaggerated for the cost of transporting a sack of rice from Goa to Colombo is known to have been one *larim*. (Goa C. Pe As VIII.f.152)

the sale of gems mined in the Two Korales	500 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>180</sup>
port dues	8,500 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>181</sup>
quit rents on land and revenues of garden land held by crown	6,000 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>182</sup>
the twelve villages separated to supply the army of conquest	13,333 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>183</sup>
the coconut tax, fines and customary dues	3,000 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>184</sup>
	<hr/>
	249,583 <i>xerafims</i>
less the price paid for 1,900 <i>amunas</i> of areca	2,533 <i>xerafims</i>
	<hr/>
	247,750 <i>xerafims</i>
less the cost of freight and packing 2000 <i>bahars</i> of cinnamon	4,800 <i>xerafims</i>
	<hr/>
	242,250 <i>xerafims</i>

The contrast in revenue between the 1620's and the 1630's however must be kept in perspective. The figures above represent merely the average receipts during a year of peace. The actual revenue in 1617 probably did not exceed 45,000 *xerafims*: that in 1628 was about 75,000 *xerafims* and that in 1629 over 100,000 *xerafims*.

Moreover, while the 1620's were mainly years in which peaceful conditions prevailed in Kotte, the early 1630's saw most of Kotte wrested from Portuguese control. Thus while the actual revenue collected in the period 1617-1629 probably averaged 60,000 *xerafims* the average for the period 1630-1638 could not have been much over 150,000 *xerafims* a year. Even this increase, however, did not immediately result in increased means for the captain-general

180. In 1634 according to Antonio Bocarro the revenue from gems was 300 *xerafim*.. This seems an unusually low figure and may have been due to the disorganized state of the mining villages after the risings of 1630-1633. In 1644 the viceroy reported to the king that the revenues from gems was 1000-1300 *xerafims* a year.

181. Bocarro's estimate of the port dues of Colombo, Negombo, Chilaw and Puttlam was 8,250 *xerafims*.

182. Bocarro's estimate of *foros* in 1634 (APO New ed. Tomo IV. Part 1. Vol. II.401-402) was 5,528 *xerafims*. To this must be added the 1/10 charged from the gardens and properties of Colombo 101 *xerafims*; the revenue of two gardens held by the government 203 *xerafims* the revenue of the *gabada* villages of the Two Koarles 150 *xerafims*. In the late 1630's this revenue apparently rose considerably for Queyroz (1192) estimates it at 11,264 *xerafims* annually

183. The actual practice was that these villages supplied the rice for the army directly. The above estimate is that given by Bocarro.

184. The *dekum* or customary annual gift and the *marala* or death duty both yielded 2336 *xerafims* in 1634. For further information on these sources of revenue see T. Abeyasinghe 171-180.

of Ceylon, for, from the early 1630's the conde de Linhares appropriated the total revenue from cinnamon giving the Ceylon government 30,000 *xerafims* in exchange. The local administration benefited from the extra revenue only after 1636 when the king in response to the protests of Diogo de Mello de Castro, captain-general of Ceylon, decreed that revenue from Ceylon sources could be used for the needs of other parts of the *estado* only after the needs of the island had been satisfied.<sup>185</sup>

The fixed annual expenditure of Kotte 1617-1638 was:<sup>186</sup>

To the salary of the captain-general	4,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the interpreter ( <i>lingua</i> ) and the treasurer ( <i>banaca</i> ) of the captain-general	90 <i>xerafims</i>
the subsistence allowance of thirty <i>lascarins</i> forming the captain-general's bodyguard	480 <i>xerafims</i>
the captain of the captain-general's bodyguard—4 measures of rice a day and 2 <i>xerafims</i> a month	66 <i>xerafims</i>
4 torch bearers for the captain-general—2 measures of rice a day + 1 <i>xerafims</i> a month as pay + 5 <i>xerafims</i> a year for oil to each	115 <i>xerafims</i>
the rice supplied to the captain-general's residence at Malwana—sixty <i>candils</i>	420 <i>xerafims</i>
the salary of <i>vedor da fazenda</i> <sup>187</sup>	4,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the writer of the <i>fazenda</i> or revenue department	740 <i>xerafims</i>
the salaries of the attendants of the <i>vedor</i> including a torch bearer, washerman and a parasol bearer	380 <i>xerafims</i>
the purchase of paper for records—14	

185. TT.LM.36.f.15v

186. Figures have been reduced to the nearest *xerafim*. The cost of the rice allowance has been calculated on the basis of seven Ceylon *xerafims* a *candil*. This estimate is closer to the price levels in 1620's than in the 1630's. On 6 November 1634 the writer of the *fazenda* reported the cost of rice at 10-12½ *xerafims* a *candil*. The items of expenditure unless otherwise indicated have been taken from Antonio Bocarro's account of the *Estado da India*, 1634. (APO New ed. Tomo IV. Part 2 Vol. I 380-399)

187. Bocarro gives the *vedor's* salary as 2666 *xerafims* of Goa which is about 2960 *xerafims* of Ceylon. Queyroz is not certain on the issue for he states on one occasion that the *vedor's* pay was over 3,000 *xerafims* and on another that it was over 4,000 *xerafims*. Queyroz 1040,1073) However two contemporary estimates made by persons in Ceylon agree that his salary was 4,000 *xerafims*. (Ajuda 51-VIII-40.f.216 ; TT.LM.16.f.571). The *vedor* was also paid a subsistence allowance of 3 *xerafims* 3 *tangas* and 20 *reis* in Goa currency per day when travelling on duty. (*Goa conselho da fazenda Assentos* II. ff.108-109)

reams at 8 <i>xerafims</i> each	112 <i>xerafims</i>
the <i>aratchi</i> and 20 <i>lascarins</i> who formed the <i>vedor's</i> bodyguard—at 4½ <i>larims</i> a month per <i>lascarin</i> and 9 <i>larims</i> a month for the <i>aratchi</i>	396 <i>xerafims</i>
the captain of Colombo <sup>188</sup>	2,222 <i>xerafims</i>
the subsistence allowance of 30 <i>lascarins</i> and an <i>aratchi</i> in the captain's bodyguard <sup>189</sup>	512 <i>xerafims</i>
the factor	400 <i>xerafims</i>
the writer to the factory	100 <i>xerafims</i>
bailiff of the customs office at Colombo ( <i>Meirinho da fazenda e alfandega</i> )	100 <i>xerafims</i>
the subsistence allowance ( <i>mantimento</i> ) and the curry allowance ( <i>conduto</i> ) of the bailiff and the writer to the factory	70 <i>xerafims</i>
the purchase of paper for the customs house	50 <i>xerafims</i>
the customs officer ( <i>contador da alfandega</i> )	60 <i>xerafims</i>
7 assistants at the customs office	150 <i>xerafims</i>
pilot	70 <i>xerafims</i>
constable	100 <i>xerafims</i>
the captain of Galle <sup>190</sup>	2,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the writer to the factory at Galle, the bailiff and his men	280 <i>xerafims</i>
the captain of Chilaw	200 <i>xerafims</i>
10 <i>lascarins</i> at Chilaw at the rate of one Goa <i>xerafim</i> a month	132 <i>xerafims</i>
the bailiff ( <i>merinho</i> ) and writer ( <i>escrivao</i> ) of Chilaw	98 <i>xerafims</i>
the <i>kanakapulle</i> at Chilaw	20 <i>xerafims</i>
the captain of Negombo	440 <i>xerafims</i>
the captain of Puttalam	200 <i>xerafims</i>
the judge ( <i>ouvidor</i> ) <sup>191</sup>	400 <i>xerafims</i>
4 men who assisted the <i>ouvidor</i> <sup>192</sup>	71 <i>xerafims</i>

188. TT.LM.19.f.6 ; TT.LM.21.f.103 ; Simancas SP 1530.f.130

189. The ten Portuguese retainers mentioned in a list of expenses in 1607 seem to have been discontinued. (T. Abeyasinghe 186)

190. Given in estimates of 1607 quoted by T. Abeyasinghe 187. Absent from Bocarro's list.

191. Bocarro gives the *ouvidor's* salary as 333 *xerafims*, 1 *tanga* and 40 *reis* which is about 370 *xerafims* of Ceylon. However in 1607 his salary was already 400 *xerafims* and the *ouvidor* received additional functions in 1621. His salary therefore could hardly have fallen.

192. A document dated 1607 states that there were six such assistants and they



the jail guard <sup>193</sup>	48 <i>xerafims</i>
the bailiff ( <i>merinho</i> ) of the conquest	58 <i>xerafims</i>
the expenses of the hospital	4,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the cost of mats and ropes used to bundle 1350 <i>bahars</i> of cinnamon and for clothes of the Kaffirs	700 <i>xerafims</i>
the rent of eight storehouses <sup>194</sup>	384 <i>xerafims</i>
the manufacture of gunpowder at Malwana <sup>195</sup>	200 <i>xerafims</i>
the manufacture and repair of arms at the iron works at Malwana	1,620 <i>xerafims</i>
the receiver ( <i>recebedor</i> ) of Negombo	70 <i>xerafims</i>
the <i>kanakapulles</i> of Negombo and four assistants	60 <i>xerafims</i>
the subsistence allowance of the receivers ( <i>recebedores</i> ) of Chilaw and Puttalam	70 <i>xerafims</i>
the two <i>kanakapulles</i> who assisted the receivers of Chilaw and Puttalam	48 <i>xerafims</i>
the sailors who man the vessels which transport supplies up to Malwana	380 <i>xerafims</i>
the captain-major-of-the-field <sup>196</sup>	1,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the rice supplied to the captain-major-of- the-field to feed his staff	365 <i>xerafims</i>
the 18 captains at 200 <i>xerafims</i> each <sup>197</sup>	3,600 <i>xerafims</i>
the two quarterages ( <i>quarteis</i> ) for 600 soldiers at 10 <i>xerafims</i> each a quar- terage <sup>197</sup>	12,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the curry allowance ( <i>conduto</i> ) for 600 soldiers at 1 Goa <i>xerafim</i> a month	7,920 <i>xerafims</i>
the rice supplied to the 600 soldiers at 2 measures a day	12,000 <i>xerafims</i>
the rice supplied 20 captains at 5 measures a day	427 <i>xerafims</i>

cost 250 *xerafims*. (T. Abeyasinghe 187). In 1634 the *ouvidor's* retinue were paid 4 *larims* a month each. The letter of appointment of Antonio d'Alvares Toscano dated 30 December 1620 makes provision for two Portuguese attendants for him. (Goa C. Pe As. VI. ff. 322-323)

193. T. Abeyasinghe 187

194. This item appears to indicate the destruction of storehouses built by the *vedor* Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara in the 1620's.

195. The absence of any estimate of the expenses of the gunpowder factory established by de Sa at Colombo is striking.

196. Bocarro's estimate is confirmed by the letter of appointment of Francisco Brito de Almeida appointed captain-major-of-the-field on 27 September 1626 and three other sources. (JCBRAS XI.471 ; Simancas SP 1530.f. 30v ; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644 ; Queyroz 104)

197. Also in Queyroz 1036

the curry allowance for 20 captains at 3 <i>xerafims</i> of Goa a month	792 <i>xerafims</i>
the salary of 280 Kaffirs at a <i>fanam</i> a day <sup>198</sup>	1,708 <i>xerafims</i>
the rice allowance for 280 Kaffirs at 2 measures a day <sup>199</sup>	2,800 <i>xerafims</i>
the five gunners at Colombo, Menikkadawara, Malwana and Sabaragamuwa	250 <i>xerafims</i>
the allowance paid to the factor for special journeys made to pay the troops	272 <i>xerafims</i>
the 3 <i>kanakapulles</i> and 2 measurers at Malwana, Menikkadawara and Sabaragamuwa	173 <i>xerafims</i>
the two surgeons at Menikkadawara and Sabaragamuwa	190 <i>xerafims</i>
the allowances paid to the missionaries	3,970 <i>xerafims</i>
	73,146 <i>xerafims</i>

The lack of integration that characterized the accounting system in Portuguese Ceylon as seen in the separation of the estimates of Kotte from those of Jaffna, could also be noticed within Jaffna itself. During the period 1618-1638 the estimates of revenue and expenditure of the kingdom of Jaffna proper were kept separate from those of the Mannar-Mantota area. This practice was one which reflected the development of Portuguese power in the area. The Portuguese who had held the island of Mannar since 1560, had by 1618 already organized a machinery under the factor of Mannar for purposes of collection of revenue and the disbursement of expenses. When Jaffna was conquered in 1619 a new factor was appointed to that kingdom but the old system at Mannar was allowed to continue. For our purposes however the figures for the whole of the kingdom of Jaffna will be considered together.

Information on the revenues of Jaffna can be obtained at three points of time—at the time of conquest, in 1627 and finally in 1634. Filipe de Oliveira estimated that the revenue of Jaffna excluding Mannar and Mantota in the days of the kings of Jaffna had been:<sup>200</sup>

198. Each Portuguese soldiers was paid in two instalments of ten *xerafims* each year. (*i.e.* 18 *xerafims* of Goa or 20 *xerafims* of Kotte in all) Queyroz 104; JCBRAS XI.471

199. The Kaffir contingent in the Portuguese army appeared after 1631.

200. The whole of the revenue listed in the text did not accrue to the king of Jaffna. Even as early as the 1580's the king of Jaffna appears to have paid the Portuguese two elephants a year. By the terms of the settlements of 1591 the Portuguese obtained twelve elephants as well as the revenues of the provinces of Malikaman and Vadamarachchi. The latter was

18,665 *xerafims* in cash

851 $\frac{1}{4}$  *candils* of grain of which 178 $\frac{1}{2}$  were rice

Oil, betel, butter and milk

Customary gifts of bananas twice a year

Elephants

The revenue collected at Mannar in 1619 probably amounted to one thousand or one thousand five hundred *xerafims*.

The revenue actually obtained in the years 1619-1624 fell somewhat short of de Oliveira's figures. In the first year of conquest the total revenue collected was hardly 7,360 *xerafims*. In 1620 however the *vedor*, Lancarote de Seixas visited Jaffna and made a list of revenues to be collected. This list provided for an annual income of 16,400 *xerafims* in cash, together with ten elephants a year as well as small quantities of cloth and grain. The 7% duty fixed for certain exports and imports brought in an extra sum of three hundred and thirty six *xerafims* a year.<sup>201</sup> These figures exclude the revenues of Mannar and Mantota.

The visit of the *vedor* Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara in 1624 brought further changes in the revenue structure. Firstly, he commuted many of the traditional services for payments in cash.<sup>202</sup> Secondly, he imposed new taxes like the stamp duty on cloth.<sup>203</sup> De Freitas also imposed on certain groups of people such as the slaves of the Hindu temples and some of the elephant hunters, the obligation to pay a fixed sum to the state. Finally, the sum paid to the state by two of the privileged sections of the kingdom, the Portuguese settlers and missionaries, were greatly augmented by a close examination of their claims.<sup>204</sup> The cash revenues of Jaffna was thus raised to a sum exceeding 25,000 *xerafims* a year.<sup>205</sup> They remained around this level till 1634.<sup>206</sup> In the

worth over 3,000 *xerafims*. Between 1591 and 1618 the rulers of Jaffna also granted villages and islands to Portuguese soldiers and missionaries who did not pay any dues.

201. These figures are based on the accounts of Antonio Teneles, the first factor of Jaffna for the period 1 October 1619 to 25 April 1624. (AHU Caixa 10, 25.2.1627)

202. The increase in cash revenue by this means was almost 2,000 *xerafims*.

203. This duty was expected to yield only some 166 *xerafims* at the outset. It may have been imposed as a substitute for the payment of dues in cloth made in the times of Tamil kings.

204. These groups probably still retained the right to hold without payment of dues, the land obtained from the Tamil kings on these terms. This may well account for the absence of the Jesuits from the list of those who paid dues. The payment of 800 *xerafims* by the Franciscans and 605 *xerafims* by the *casados* as *foro* indicates the extent of the dispossession of the Tamil landholders in the six years of Portuguese rule in Jaffna.

205. The list made by de Freitas gave an estimated revenue of about 26,415 *xerafims*. The actual collected between 25 April 1624 and 22 April 1625 was only 23,050 *xerafims* according to the factor of Jaffna, Manoel de Bairos.

206. APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Part 2.vol.I.418,420

next few years the holding of the pearl fishery raised revenue by about fifty per cent.

Estimates of expenditure of Jaffna and Mannar are available within this period only for the year 1634. According to Antonio Bocarro the expenses of Jaffna in that year was 14,572 *xerafims* made up as follows:

To the salaries of missionaries	3,600 <i>xerafims</i>
the expenses of Trincomalee	1,876 <i>xerafims</i>
the cost of the garrison of Jaffna	6,932 <i>xerafims</i>
the salaries of the captain-major and other officials	2,164 <i>xerafims</i>

---

14,572 *xerafims*<sup>207</sup>

The expenses of Mannar in this time amounted to a further 12,000 *xerafims* the principal items of expenditure being:<sup>208</sup>

To the captain of the fort	1,333 <i>xerafims</i>
the factor	333 <i>xerafims</i>
the writer	133 <i>xerafims</i>
other officials	400 <i>xerafims</i>
the hospital	360 <i>xerafims</i>
the 30 <i>lascarins</i> of the captain's guard	360 <i>xerafims</i>
doctor and official in charge of hospital	168 <i>xerafims</i>
20 soldiers of the garrison at 9 <i>pardaos</i> a <i>quartel</i> and 2 <i>pardaos</i> a month as <i>manti-</i> <i>mento</i>	800 <i>xerafims</i>
180 sailors to man the six ships that guard the east coast at 9 <i>pardaos</i> a <i>quartel</i> and 2 <i>pardaos</i> a month as <i>mantimento</i>	7,200 <i>xerafims</i>
the priests and the five churches at Man- tota	500 <i>xerafims</i>

---

11,587 *xerafims*

Thus after about 1625 the revenues of Jaffna alone were sufficient to cover the expenses of both Mannar and Jaffna. In the 1630's, as in Kotte, the financial situation improved dramatically. With the pearl fishery yielding a regular revenue and the revenues of Jaffna further raised by the efforts of Amaro Roiz and the new

207. Ibid. 420-424. When first appointed, the captain-major of Jaffna had an annual salary of 200 *mil reis* (approximately 740 *xerafims*) and an allowance of 100 *xerafims* for ten attendants. By 1634 his salary had risen to 1111 *xerafims*. (P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam 1645* 1; APO (New ed) Tomo IV Part 2 vol.I.417; Assentos II.50)

208. APO (New ed) Tomo IV Part 2 vol.I 363-365

*foral* of 1645, Dom Filipe Mascarenhas estimated a combined surplus of 77,698 *xerafims* from Jaffna and Mannar.<sup>209</sup>

In the 1620's for the first time in over a half a century Ceylon ceased to be a financial burden on the *estado da India*.<sup>210</sup> During the years 1621-1628 the Portuguese administration in Ceylon both in Kotte and Jaffna was able to cover all expenses with the revenue received from local sources.<sup>211</sup> The war with Kandy did lead to a deficit in the next six years but after the peace treaty of 1634 the Portuguese financial position improved considerably owing to the high cinnamon prices which prevailed. Ceylon's incomes began to be used for Portuguese projects elsewhere in Asia. The Portuguese had at length solved the problem of the budgetary deficit that had hampered their war effort against Kandy for so long. But even in the late 1630's it was already too late, for the king of Kandy, despairing of any lasting settlement with the Portuguese, had by then, called in the Dutch.

210. AHU 500.ff.53-54v ; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.38 ; Ajuda 51-VIII-58.f.291v  
T. Abeyasinghe 182-183.191

211. *Filmoteca Reis vizinhos* I.7-8/5-1 ; TT.LM.24.f.24 ; TT.LM.26.f.272

## CHAPTER 7

### RELIGION

If in 1616 the prospects of the temporal conquest of Ceylon seemed promising, those for the spiritual conquest seemed even more so. In Kotte, the Franciscan missionary activity which had slowly got under way after 1543, had spread more widely and rapidly after the lowlands came under the Portuguese control in the 1590's and was by now firmly established. The Jesuits who had entered the missionary field in 1602, though less numerous, were as active. Two other religious orders, the Augustinians and the Dominicans had also established footholds at Colombo. In the northern kingdom of Jaffna, missionary activity, though less extensive than in Kotte, had achieved comparable success. Most of the inhabitants of the island of Mannar, which had been controlled by the Portuguese since 1560, had already been converted to Catholicism before 1616 by the Jesuit missionaries. Missionary outposts had also been established in the mainland around Mantota. A church had existed in the Jaffna settlement itself since the expedition of Andre Furtado de Mendonca in 1591. Though the rate of conversion in northern Ceylon may have been checked in the early seventeenth century by the dispute between Dom Frey Andreas da Santa Maria, bishop of Cochin and the Jesuits, which eventually resulted in the expulsion of the latter from the Fishery Coast in 1608, the efforts of a volatile Franciscan friar Pedro Betancor ensured the continued propagation of Christianity in Jaffna and Mannar.<sup>1</sup> Even in Kandy, at that time at war with the Portuguese, the pro-Catholic inclinations of the children of Kusumasana Devi ensured that Catholic priests were provided with a courteous welcome within the palace though they won few converts among the nobility or the people.<sup>2</sup>

In both Kotte and Jaffna, the religious developments of the years 1617-1619 proved critical. They set the pattern of missionary enterprise, success and failure for the decade to come. In Kotte, the year 1617 initially saw a set back for the missionary effort. The rebellion of Nikapitiya Bandara had distinct religious overtones. The rebels sent a special detachment for the purpose of killing the Catholic priests at Methiangana to whom, had been assigned

1. T. Abeyasinghe 192-203; P.da Trinite III.158-160 193-194; TT.LM.12.f. 454 Queyroz 242-243,663-686; CALR V. 32-40
2. P.da Trinite III.146 claims that there was a church in Kandy called Bom Jesus. Unfortunately there is no available contemporary estimate of the number of Catholics in Ceylon in 1616. In 1606 there were 30,000 converts in Kotte. T. Abeyasinghe 202

as servants, two of the Buddhist monks apprehended by the captain-general for preaching in public against the Portuguese and Christianity.<sup>3</sup> Rebel forces had likewise made a point of destroying all churches and missionary stations established in the Jaffna interior, Jesuit and Franciscan alike. But the Buddhist religion in Ceylon was not very strongly structured and in so far as it had frequently leant upon the support of the ruler it was at this period betrayed, first by the Hindu zeal of Rajasinha and then by the political weakness of Kandy. For Christianity far more important than the short term losses inflicted by Nikapitiya was the accord in 1617 by the king of Kandy with the Portuguese. This ensured that once the rebellions were over, the missionaries in Portuguese territory would be free from the fear of Kandyan incursions against outlying stations.

The sixteen twenties marked perhaps the most successful decade for the Catholic missionary effort in Kotte. Since the inception of Portuguese rule there had been several factors favouring the growth of Catholicism within the kingdom. Embracing the new religion brought with it preferential judicial treatment, for the penalties imposed on Catholics were less heavy than those imposed on others.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, Christianity brought with it tangible economic advantages. Christians were exempt from the *marala* or levy on the movable effects of each person on his death. More important, conversion to Catholicism was increasingly being regarded as a precondition of appointment to office and a recommendation from the local priest an essential requisite for the award of positions of trust.<sup>5</sup> In the 1620's these factors were strengthened by three major considerations. The Buddhists and Hindus of the land had been denied the facilities of public worship and of access to their monks and religious leaders. By the third decade of the seventeenth century a new generation which knew little about their forefathers' religion had grown up. Moreover, long periods of residence in Kotte had given some of the missionaries a better understanding of the customs, beliefs and attitudes of the local people and perhaps a better command of the local language and idiom. These certainly were an aid in making

3. CALR II 78

4. T. Abeyasinghe 208. Some of the broader aspects of the Catholic missionary policy have not been examined here as they are well dealt with by T. Abeyasinghe (206-214) and by C. R. Boxer (*Ceylon Historical Journal* vol X Nos. 1-4 1960-1961)

5. T. Abeyasinghe 208; DR II.136; Filmoteca—*Livro dos provisoes e alvares a favor de Christandade*, ff.27-39v; Evora GR Arm. V-VI.14-5. ff.108-109

more effective, the explanation of the new doctrine. Finally, in the 1620's the missionary bodies had the vigorous support of the captain-general Constantino de Sa de Noronha, who like most Portuguese of the time regarded conversion to Christianity as an index of loyalty to the Portuguese regime.<sup>6</sup>

During this decade the Fransiscans maintained the lead they had always held, both in the number of missionaries working in Kotte and in the number of converts made. By 1621 they had established forty five parish churches, most of them in the *disava* of Matara. Seven years later this number had increased to fifty four. The total number of Franciscans working in Kotte varied between forty five and forty seven friars. Normally ten of these resided at their headquarters in the convent of Santa Antonio at Colombo, while the rest served in the parishes. The Fransiscans, like the other missionaries in Ceylon solved the problem of the shortage of parish priests by placing several parishes in the same neighbourhood under the same priest. In 1628 the Franciscans had over sixty thousand converts in their charge.<sup>7</sup> The Jesuit mission too, maintained a steady if gradual growth, once the Seven Korales, the centre of their activity, was pacified in 1619. In that year there were only fifteen Jesuits in Kotte. A year later the number has risen to seventeen. In 1627 there were eighteen Jesuits in the field. About half the number usually remained in the Jesuit College of Colombo while the rest served in outlying parishes. In 1620 the Jesuits made two hundred and fifty adult converts and the years that followed were marked with increasing success. By the late 1620's the total number of Christians in their charge must have been around ten thousand.<sup>8</sup> This period also marked a great expansion in the work of the other orders which had been introduced into Ceylon in the early seventeenth century—the Augustinians and the Dominicans. By the end of 1623 the former had established five parish churches at Bentota, Horana, Rambukkana, Dungaha and Attanagalla. Under the energetic direction of two successive priors of the Convent of Our Lady of Grace (*Convento da Nossa Senhora da Graca*), Agostinho da Graca and Jose Madre de Deus, the Augustinians greatly extended their missionary activity, chiefly in the Four Korales. In 1628 the Augustinians claimed eight

6. TT.LM.45.f.303 ; CALR IV.151

7. P.da Trinite III.111,115 ; Boudens 34-38 basing his estimate on P.da Trinite III.135-146 and Queyroz 714-719 estimates over 70,000 converts by November 1628. But Fr. Simao de Nazareth, provincial of the Franciscans estimated the number to be around 50,000 on 13 December 1629. Filmoteca LM 13A. 21-22/4-2

8. CALR II. 225-229, 233-234 ; CALR III.29-30



parish churches outside the walls of Colombo fort. By 1630 this number had increased to twelve. The number of Augustinians at work in Kotte in the early 1620's was only eight but in 1630 there were at least twelve Augustinians under the new prior of the new convent, Fr. Manoel de Assumpcao. The number of converts made by these Augustinians is difficult to estimate. They themselves claimed a total of six hundred and fifty converts in 1628 alone. Their total flock could not have been amounted to more than a few thousands.<sup>9</sup> The Dominicans, the last of the four religious orders to officially gain entry into Kotte, were hampered by the lack of resources and personnel. In August 1625 the conde de Vidigueira granted them permission to take charge of three parishes in Sabaragamuwa and the Two Korales. Six months later, the viceroy entrusted a further three parishes in the same area to them. These grants were followed by another from Frey Luis de Brito, bishop of Cochin which awarded the Dominicans permission to establish a further six parishes in Sabaragamuwa. The Dominicans however had only six or seven missionaries in Ceylon in this period and constructed only six of the twelve parish churches they were expected to build.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless by 1630 there were eighty two churches and almost 80,000 Catholics in Kotte.

In Jaffna, the subjugation of the kingdom in 1619-1620 led to a rapid extension in the field of missionary activity. Hitherto, though missionaries preached within the lands of the Tamil Hindu kings, their activities were largely confined to the islands off Jaffna and the port and the settlement of Jaffna itself. Moreover, though they had obtained considerable grants of land before 1619, these were sufficient to sustain only a handful of priests. In addition, Christianity had up to 1619 to compete on more or less equal terms with Hinduism which was the religion of the Tamil king and the majority of his subjects.<sup>11</sup> With the conquest of Jaffna came the destruction of Hindu temples and the confiscation of temple lands. While Hinduism lost its secular support a large state missionary effort was organized with the active support and encouragement of the first captain-major of Jaffna. The first to take advantage of this situation were the Franciscans, who since the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Fishery Coast had been in

9. Queyroz 720,1056 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 731.ff.404v,373-400,496 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.ff.245,381 ; BNF FG.59.f.34 ; AHU Caixa 8, 15.1.1624 AHU Caixa 16.f.18.1.1644

10. Boudens 55-56 ; AHU 210.f.27v ; AHU Caixa 10, 10.9.1633 ; BNL FG 177.ff.356-357 ; Filmoteca LM 16B.17/2 ; Evora C/V 2-6.ff.518-519

11. See chapter I. pages 2, 22

charge of the Christians in Jaffna. The Franciscans available for the task of conversion were, however, deemed insufficient by Filipe Oliveira, the captain-major, who appealed through the provincial of the Jesuits on the Malabar coast for missionaries. The response was immediate. In 1622 Fr. Pero Rebello, a professor of theology at the College of Cochin was sent over and three other missionaries followed soon after.<sup>12</sup> The reaction of the Franciscans to the decision to call in the Jesuits is unknown but it is evident that once the Jesuits moved into Jaffna disputes did arise between them and the Franciscan friars.<sup>13</sup> In 1627 there were twenty four Franciscans and sixteen Jesuits working within the Jaffna peninsula. In 1629 the number of Franciscans had risen to thirty. Apart from this, there were seven Franciscans in charge of over ten thousand Christians in Mannar and Mantota.<sup>14</sup> The total number of converts made in the 1620's in the Jaffna peninsula is not easy to determine. A contemporary Jesuit letter claims that in 1627 there were some forty one thousand Christians under Jesuit pastoral care in Jaffna.<sup>15</sup> The Franciscans claimed to have made fifty two thousand converts between 1624 and 1626 alone.<sup>16</sup> The latter claim at least is probably an exaggeration for in a letter to the king on 13 December 1629, Fr. Simao de Nazareth, provincial of the Franciscans, estimated the number of converts made by his order in Jaffna at a total of thirty thousand.<sup>17</sup> The missionary field in Jaffna in this period continued to be monopolized by these two orders with the exception of a lone Dominican who established a convent in Jaffna in the early 1620's<sup>18</sup>.

Missionary success however, was largely bound up with political power and the Portuguese fortunes in the war against Kandy 1628-1634 had a close and direct relationship with the spread of Catholicism in both Kotte and Jaffna. In both areas, for short periods, the success of Sinhalese arms served to end the run of Catholic triumphs. The first blow to the missionary effort came in Jaffna. In 1628 a Sinhalese army aided by many of the inhabitants of Jaffna forced the Portuguese to retire into Jaffna fort where they were hemmed in for two weeks. During this

12. CALR III.118-120

13. TT.LM.22.f.19

14. TT.LM.23.f.93 ; Filmoteca LM 13A 21-22/4-2 ; AHU Caixa 12, 4.2.1637

15. Queyroz 659 ; Boudens 49 ; P.da Trindade III.193 ; CALR III.129-130 ; CALR IV.95-96

16. Boudens 43 ; Coimbra 459.f.116

17. Filmoteca LM 13A 21-22/4-2

18. By the 1640's the number of Dominicans had risen to two. Fr. Luicacegas *Historia de S.Domingos IV.270* ; P. E. Pieris—*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam* 1645 28-29

short period thirteen churches were burnt to the ground and much church property was destroyed.<sup>19</sup> The Sinhalese invasion of Jaffna in 1629 resulted in further uncertainty and insecurity. Though Jaffna remained quiet for the next three years and priests made tours of their parishes from their central base at Jaffna fort, missionary activity in the scale of the early 1620's does not seem to have been resumed till 1632.<sup>20</sup>

If disaster struck the missionary effort in Kotte later than it did in Jaffna, it struck with greater effect. In 1630-1631 for sixteen months Portuguese power was virtually confined to their forts on the coast. All external vestiges of Christianity, churches, crosses and the like were destroyed by the triumphant Sinhalese forces. Many of the recent converts returned to the faith of their forefathers.<sup>21</sup> The gains of the past century seemed wiped out in a few days. With the return of peace with Kandy and of order in Portuguese territory, however, the missionaries returned to the fray with undiminished vigour. In Kotte, sixty Franciscans were mobilised for work in the parishes and by 1638 fifty six new churches had been built.<sup>22</sup> The Jesuits did not lag behind. In 1632 there were twenty three Jesuits in Kotte, nineteen of them engaged in work in the parishes.<sup>23</sup> The Dominicans not only reconstructed the six churches of their order that had been destroyed but built a further six in the period 1634-1638. The figure of twelve missionaries the Dominicans had in the field<sup>24</sup> was easily surpassed by the Augustinians who had up to eighteen churches.<sup>25</sup> By 1638 the number of Catholics in Kotte would have neared the one hundred thousand mark. In Jaffna too, missionary activity returned to full strength after 1632. In 1632 twenty five Franciscans and fifteen Jesuits were working in the parishes in the Jaffna peninsula while a further ten Franciscans attended to the spiritual needs of the Christians of Mannar and Mantota.<sup>26</sup> In 1634, the Franciscans alone claimed to have seventy one thousand native Christians in their charge in the Jaffna peninsula and the adjoining islands.<sup>27</sup> The Jesuits had well over thirty thousand converts in

19. Simancas SP 1523 f.5

20. See chapter IV. page 132

21. P.da Trindade III.111 ; CALR II.230

22. APO (New ed) Tomo IV. Part 2 vol.II.57 ; TT.LM.45.f.304

23. CALR III.34-35

34. Queyroz 720 ; Boudens 56 ; TT.LM.45.f.304 ; Coimbra 460.ff.86-87v ; TT.Ms da Liv. 674.f.288v ; AHU Caixa 10, 10.9.1633

25. APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Part 1.vol.II.59 : Boudens 4 ; TT.LM.35.f.178 ; Don Peter—*Studies in Ceylon church history*, 117-126

26. CALR III. 34-35

27. Boudens 43

their hands in the 1630's while the inhabitants of Mannar under Franciscan guidance formed another sizeable group of Christians,<sup>28</sup>

In terms of their original objective, the conversion of the whole island, the Portuguese missionaries failed. Most of the inhabitants of the Jaffna peninsula and the island of Mannar had been baptised by 1638. About half the inhabitants of Kotte were likewise converted, but Buddhism and Hinduism remained strongly entrenched in the Vanni, the kingdom of Kandy and in some of the frontier districts of Kotte itself.<sup>29</sup> Even taking into account the difficulties the missionaries encountered as aliens dependent on an alien power, in view of the amount of state support they enjoyed, the failure of the missionaries is a striking testimony to the strength of Buddhism and Hinduism in Kotte and Jaffna.

Throughout the 1620's and 1630's all missionaries were under the overall supervision of the bishop of Cochin. With the growth of the number of missionaries and of Christians in Ceylon there gradually arose a realisation that the bishop of Cochin could not effectively exercise his duties in respect of the island without making regular visits to Ceylon. This, the bishop of Cochin found difficult to do, owing to his duties in Cochin itself and the dangers of crossing the Gulf of Mannar at certain times of the year. The solution proposed was the establishment of a new bishopric in Ceylon. A bishop of Ceylon, besides ensuring greater ecclesiastical discipline might also provide a salutary check to the great powers of the captain-general, and a useful source of reliable information on events in Ceylon. The proposal for a new bishopric in Ceylon was originally made as early as 1622 but was given little serious consideration till 1630 when the conde de Linhares viceroy of India renewed the suggestion. He proposed that the bishop of Ceylon should also be in charge of the former see of Meliapor which the viceroy contended was within easy reach of Jaffna. This suggestion, having been considered in the council at Lisbon, was referred to the conde de Vidigueira, the former viceroy, for his opinion. The conde de Vidigueira, not merely approved of the suggestion but amplified the proposal suggesting that the new bishop should take with him sufficient secular clergy to take over all churches within twenty miles of Colombo, thus

28. APO (New ed) Tomo IV Part 2 vol.II.57 estimates that there were ten Franciscans in the Mannar-Mantota area. CALR IV.155-156 ; TT.LM. 38.f.97

29. Even of those converted, the majority were Christians only in name. (TT. LM.30.f.253). By the end of Portuguese rule there were 200,000—250,000 Catholics in Ceylon. Queyroz 1059 ; Arasaratnam 217

releasing the monastic orders for the more urgent task of converting the frontier areas. Eventually however it was decided in Lisbon that the Christians of S. Thome had their individual problems which might not be adequately served by a bishop in Ceylon and the king therefore petitioned the Pope for an entirely new bishopric. As this step would reduce the area of jurisdiction of the Cochin bishopric under which Ceylon had hitherto been placed it was decided to include the archbishopric of Cranganore in the new bishopric of Cochin. These suggestions however were not approved in time by the Pope to have any effect while the Portuguese held Ceylon.<sup>30</sup>

One of the questions the new bishop was expected to resolve when appointed was that of the demarcation of parish boundaries and the delimiting of districts allocated to the four monastic orders. When the Jesuits entered Kotte, the bishop of Cochin had decreed that they were to concentrate on the Seven Korales.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, in the 1620's, the Augustinians were allocated the Four Korales and the Dominicans, Sabaragamuwa while the Franciscans retained the largest and most populous *disava*, that of Matara.<sup>32</sup> These divisions however, were not rigidly enforced and each order sought to gain special privileges to encroach upon areas allocated to others. The issue was further complicated by the allocation of temple lands, regardless of their location, for the sustenance of various religious orders. Thus, Jesuits and Augustinians as well as Franciscans held land in Matara. The acquisition of new territory by the Portuguese in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa led to even greater disputes among the clergy.<sup>33</sup> At length in 1628 the king ordered the viceroy to appoint responsible persons authorized to make a summary settlement of all such disputes.<sup>34</sup>

The missionaries throughout the period 1618-1638 were materially supported by the state. They were awarded, for each member working in a parish either an annual grant termed *ordinaria* amounting to a hundred *xerafims* a year or lands yielding approximately the same revenue. The Franciscans in Kotte for instance received

30. Boudens 58 ; Evora GR Arm.V-VI 14-5 pp. 66 ; Filmoteca LM 17 22/4-5 ; Filmoteca LM 20. 36/2 ; TT.LM.16.f.114 ; Filmoteca LM 19B,20/1 ; Filmoteca LM 14. 18/19-4/3 ; TT.*Ms da Convento da Graca*, Tomo 2E ff.387-391 ; Coimbra 460.f.34

31. AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632 ; AHU Caixa 16, 12.1.1644 ; Boudens 46 ; Queyroz 1055 ; T. Abeyasinghe 199 ; D. Ferrolí—*The Jesuits in Malabar coast* vol.I. (Bangalore 1939) 312

32. Queyroz 1083 ; TT.*Ms da Liv.* 731.ff.204,206v ; Boudens 54 ; Reimers 52

33. Filmoteca LM 13A 4/1 ; P.da Trindade III.230

34. TT.LM.26.f.406 ; TT.LM.27.f.82

in 1629 an allowance in money amounting to five hundred *xerafims* a year. They also held lands which were worth 2050 *xerafims* a year according to the *tombo* of Vaz Freire. In addition they, like the other three orders received four *candils* of rice per year for their convent. The last grant was estimated as worth forty eight *xerafims* a year.<sup>35</sup> The missionaries as a rule preferred to hold land rather than receive a payment in money. The value of land tended to rise gradually with rising prices, while grants in money remained fixed. For instance the Franciscans received an actual revenue of 2677 *xerafims* from their villages in 1621. Moreover possession of villages ensured a ready supply of unpaid labour for the construction of churches and similar functions. These advantages however were gained partly at the expense of the state which lost prospects of increased revenue and labour services. Perhaps this was why the king in 1615 ordered that all the land granted to religious bodies in Ceylon should be resumed and the missionaries paid a fixed salary.<sup>36</sup> Attempts to enforce this order by the the bishop of Cochin in 1619, the conde de Linhares in 1630 and viceroy Pero da Silva in 1638 were all checked by the effective lobbies these religious orders, particularly the Jesuits, maintained both at Goa and Lisbon.<sup>37</sup> In Jaffna however, the policy of annual payments in money which had prevailed since its conquest continued till 1638.

The amounts disbursed by the state in the maintenance of missionaries may be roughly calculated as follows:

		In cash	In land grants
Jaffna	— 25 Franciscans	2500 <i>xerafims</i>	—
	16 Jesuits	1600 <i>xerafims</i>	—
	1 Dominican	100 <i>xerafims</i>	—
Mannar	— 7 Franciscans	700 <i>xerafims</i>	—
Trincomalee		100 <i>xerafims</i>	—
Batticaloa		100 <i>xerafims</i>	—
Kotte	— Franciscans	500 <i>xerafims</i>	2050 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>38</sup>
	Jesuits	300 <i>xerafims</i>	1445 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>39</sup>

35. AHU Caixa 7, 3.2.1621. See fn 41 of Chapter VII in page 295

36. Simancas SP 1474 f. 238v

37. TT.LM.12.f.404 ; TT.LM.16.f.734 ; AHU 35.f.40v ; Queyroz 1054 ; AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632 ; AHU Caixa 8, 24.2.1625 ; BM Add Mss. 9853.f.157v ; Simancas SP 1522.f.12v

38. This was the value of the villages according to Vaz Freire's *tombo*. In 1621 they were actually worth 2677 *xerafims* (AHU Caixa 7, 3.2.1621) or if we accept Queyroz (1054) 3364 *xerafims*. A decade later according to Queyroz their value had risen to 4,200 *xerafims* and by 1638 to 5,010 *xerafims*

39. This represented the income of the villages held by the Jesuits in 1632 as given in the *tombo*. As the largest village held by them, Munneswaram (revenue—770 *xerafims*) did not pay *foro* as it was a temple village\*the

Dominicans	600 <i>xerafims</i>	150 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>40</sup>
Augustinians	500 <i>xerafims</i>	140 <i>xerafims</i>
Sixteen <i>candils</i> of rice supplied to the four convents at 12 <i>xerafims a candil</i>	192 <i>xerafims</i> <sup>41</sup>	
	7,192 <i>xerafims</i>	3795 <i>xerafims</i>

The spiritual conquest of Ceylon had thus been allocated about eleven thousand *xerafims* a year, a little over ten percent of the total Portuguese expenditure in Ceylon.

The Portuguese of the seventeenth century never discussed the expenditure on the propagation of religion solely in terms of political advantages. To them the temporal and spiritual conquests of the island were but two essential aspects of the same enterprise.<sup>42</sup> In the twentieth century, however, the question as to whether this expenditure could be justified even from a purely politico-military point of view appears relevant.

It is evident that Sinhalese and Tamil opposition to Portuguese rule stemmed in part from the policy of conversion. Apart from the desire to protect their traditional religious beliefs the Sinhalese had specific complaints against Catholic priests. A Christian burial cost three to four *xerafims*, a payment which many could ill-afford. The missionaries paid only half price for all the provisions they bought from the peasants. The children who were forced to attend church school were sometimes compelled to cultivate the church garden. The peasants were compelled to labour to build new churches and residences for priests with little or no payment. It is no surprise that the first targets for attack in case of a rebellion were the missionaries and the churches.<sup>43</sup>

Jesuits paid only eight *xerafims* as land rents. The actual revenue of the lands held by Jesuits was much greater than the estimate given above. On 30 October 1632 the *junta* resumed Munneswaram to be used as a source of rice to supply the army and gave the Jesuits twelve villages worth 878 *xerafims* a year in exchange. After payment of *foro* of one hundred and five *xerafims* for the new villages this left the Jesuits theoretically in the same financial position. Throughout the 1620's and 1630's the Jesuits were clamouring for increased grants to support a greater number of missionaries in the Seven Korales. Sometimes before 1638 the fixed cash payment was raised to four hundred *xerafims*. TT.LM.38.f.101 ; TT.LM.45.f.304v ; TT.LM.15.ff.361,368-369 ; AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632 ; AHU Caixa 7, 3.2.1621 ; TT.LM.61.f.76 ; TT.Ms da Liv. 674.f.293v

40. The Dominicans held Athuraliya, the Augustinians the three villages of Horana, Dunagaha and Rambukkana.

41. If price is any indication, the rice supplied seems to have been of the best quality.

42. This however did not prevent secular officials from delaying or even withholding the payment due to the missionaries in times when money was scarce. Filmoteca LM 20. 36/2-3 ; TT.LM.36.f.15v ; TT.LM.21.f.223

43. JCBRAS XIX 129 ; Evora GR Arm. V-VI 14-5 ff.129-130 ; APO (New ed) Tomo IV Part 2 vol.II.377 ; Queyroz 1050-1052 ; Coimbra 460.ff.

In our period this disadvantage was partly counteracted by the political success of the proselytising campaign itself. By 1618 substantial numbers of converts had been made in both Kotte and Jaffna. Though missionary activity continued to evoke opposition, the Sinhalese and Tamils were now generally divided into those who embraced the new faith and those who did not. Though many of the converts accepted Catholicism under political or economic pressure, the missionaries could henceforth rely on an increasing number of loyal Catholics, especially those of the second and third generations, particularly as these looked to priests for protection against the more rapacious village holders.<sup>44</sup> It was this element which greatly facilitated the conquest of Jaffna and played a vital part in alerting the Portuguese at Colombo after the battle of Randeniwela as well as in the defence of the city. We could also perhaps surmise that the few hundred Sinhalese *lascarins* who remained fighting for de Sa after his defeat were pretty certainly those who preferred their new religion to the old. Furthermore, the missionaries also served as army chaplains and apart from keeping up the morale of the soldiers often proved to be effective fighting men themselves.

From a secular point of view the missionaries proved their worth in other spheres. They were generally concerned with works of charity and played an important role in this respect together with the *Santa casa da misericordia* or the Holy house of mercy, branches of which were established in Colombo and Jaffna.<sup>45</sup> They cared for the sick and ran the hospitals of Colombo and Mannar.<sup>46</sup> Finally, they established schools to teach the local people both at the parish level and at Colombo. At parish schools the students were taught only reading, writing and religion but Latin and theology were taught at the Jesuit College of Colombo.<sup>47</sup>

But if the missionaries were an asset to Portuguese political power, they derived even greater benefits from it. In Ceylon Catholicism established itself and survived in the first half of the seventeenth century only where Portuguese power could give it assistance and protection.

94-94v ; TT.LM.31.f.627 ; TT.LM.36.f.423. Filmoteca LM 13A 60/1

44. TT.LM.27.f.114 ; TT.LM.28.f.274 ; P.da Trindade III.163-165 ; Filmoteca LM 13A 19/4-5

45. TT.LM.46.f.33

46. Queyroz 1041-1042 ; T. Abeyasinghe 217 ; Ajuda 51\*V-36.f.37

47. Detailed information on the Jesuit educational system is provided by Rev. W. L. A. Don Peter's thesis *The educational work of the Jesuits in Ceylon* University of London, 1955. Useful information on the educational activities of all four orders is given by Fr. S. G. Perera in *Historical sketches*, 76-82. The Franciscans prodded to action by Jesuit success planned three colleges of higher education in Ceylon in 1615 but little eventually came of it (AHO Caixa 4, 26.11.1615)



## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION

The period 1617-1638 forms a natural unit in the history of Ceylon. In the two preceding decades the Portuguese had established a seemingly secure hold over the lowlands of Kotte. During all this time they had also been continuously at war with the Sinhalese ruler of Kandy in an attempt to conquer that highland kingdom. The years 1616-1619 heralded the beginning of a new era. A formidable rebellion in Portuguese territory compelled them to revise their policy of relentless hostility to Kandy and concluded a treaty of peace with its king. The arrival of an enterprising captain-general enabled them to make use of this respite and conquer Jaffna, which had so far remained virtually independent. With the lowlands of the west, south-west and north in their hands, with revenue for the first time exceeding expenditure and with missionary activity more flourishing than ever, the Portuguese had now only one major problem—the conquest of or the establishment of a lasting accord with Kandy. The year 1638 marks an even more decisive break than 1617. It saw not merely the unsuccessful end of the last Portuguese attempt to conquer Kandy but also the arrival of a new European power—the Dutch—in Ceylon. The coming of the Dutch meant a revolution in the balance of power in Ceylon. The days of Portuguese dominance were ended and then from then on for the most part the Portuguese were on the defensive.

Luso-Kandyan relations remained the key factor in the political history of Ceylon throughout the period of 1617-1638. The Portuguese had fully established themselves as rulers of Kotte and in 1619 they brought the protectorate of Jaffna under direct rule. Kandy alone remained outside Portuguese control. The advantage to the Portuguese, of the conquest of Kandy were undeniable for it would have given them complete control over the whole island simplifying both internal administration and defence against outside enemies. Nevertheless the numerous difficulties involved in a policy of conquest convinced many responsible officials that an accord with Kandy was the best way to surmount this problem.

A peaceful solution to the Kandyan problem depended on the grant to Kandy, of a number of concessions. Kandyans had to be allowed to export their products freely, a step which ran counter to Portuguese efforts to obtain a monopoly control over the lucrative trade in cinnamon and elephants. Further a policy of conciliation

would have involved a toning down of the harsh anti-Buddhist, anti-Hindu and anti-Muslim attitude of the Portuguese missionaries. The success of such a policy also rested upon certain political concessions. In the 1620's these included the abandonment of the project of fortifying Batticaloa and Trincomalee. In the 1630's it involved at least a policy of rigid nonintervention in Kandyan internal affairs. As the Portuguese during this period never really abandoned hope of conquering Kandy, they were unwilling to fulfil these conditions, so that despite the treaties made to meet political and military exigencies, they did not come to any lasting settlement.

A military solution was likewise incapable of achievement. The Portuguese at Goa, who found it difficult to meet existing commitments could find little money, men or arms to aid the captain-general to prosecute a policy of conquest. Though from the 1620's the Portuguese Ceylon yielded sufficient revenues to pay its way in years of peace, until after 1633 there was little surplus to spend on warlike preparations. Moreover the captain-general in Ceylon had the difficult task of reconciling the various elements within Ceylon on whom he depended for military service and this he failed to do. The policy of resettlement of the *lascarins* which was designed to give them security and ensure their loyalty was foiled by *casado* opposition. Conflicts of interests also arose among the Portuguese themselves—between *soldados* and *casados*.<sup>1</sup> Finally the Portuguese had their attention and energies increasingly diverted by the Dutch threat, both with regard to sea borne communications with Goa and the defence of the Portuguese possessions in the island itself. Within Ceylon, for example, the replacement of de Azevedo's ring of mud forts on the Kandyan frontier by an outer ring of forts of stone and mortar on the coast, represents a notable diversion of effort from the Kandyan enterprise caused by the prospect of Dutch intervention.

However, if the Portuguese were distracted both by external problems and by divisions within their ranks so were their opponents, both Sinhalese and Tamils. The Portuguese recovered so quickly from a perilous situation in 1617 only because of Senerat's willingness to make common cause with them against Nikapitiya Bandara who was seen as a rival for Sinhalese loyalty. In the 1630's one of Senerat's own sons, Vijayapala, prince of Matale was engaged in secret correspondence with the Portuguese for an

1. TT.L.M.13.f.27 ; TT.LM.15.f.7; TT.LM.31.f.41

alliance against his own brother Rajasinha.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the cultural and linguistic divide that separated the Sinhalese and the Tamils enabled the Portuguese to use the Sinhalese *lascarins* in Jaffna and to make use of Tamil troops in the garrisons of Trincomalee and Batticaloa.

The official Kandyan reaction to the permutations of Portuguese policy was largely determined by the character of the monarch. The gentle, scholarly Senerat sought peace whenever possible. The youthful, energetic Rajasinha was more warlike. He too, tried to secure a peaceful solution at first but when after 1634 it became that the Portuguese would let slip no opportunity of conquering Kandy, he determined to invite the Dutch to aid him in an all-out effort against the Portuguese. With the arrival of the Dutch the Portuguese conflict against the two allies became the dominant theme of the day.<sup>3</sup>

Portuguese reactions to Kandyan moves were likewise strongly influenced by the personal attitude of leading figures. In the first instance this meant the attitudes of the captain-general and perhaps of the *vedor*. But it is also clear from evidence that a considerable measure of detailed supervisory control over policies in Ceylon was exercised by the viceroy and council in Goa, whether in political, economic or religious matters. This is scarcely surprising when it is recalled that the governor Fernao de Albuquerque had himself served as captain of Colombo and that his son acted as captain-general, that the bishop of Cochin had spent two years in Ceylon reorganising the ecclesiastical system in Ceylon, a decade before he became viceroy or that in the days of the conde de Linhares his council contained the forceful and experienced ex-*vedor* Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara. There was some control from Portugal and Spain, but the officials there, handicapped in the main by lack of personal experience of the island problems, could exercise only a rather general supervision.

Within Ceylon, the efficient working of the administrative system was marred by conflicts of jurisdiction between various officials, particularly between the *vedor* and the captain-general. Moreover, the personality of the men who occupied these posts was often as important as the powers attached to the posts themselves. Of the captains-general of the time Constantino de Sa de Noronha stands out as the most interesting. As an able and energetic administrator, and a good commander in the field he

2. P.E.Pieris—*Prince Vijayapala of Matale*, 3-6

3. K.W. Goonewardane, XVIII

was respected by all. His understanding of some of the problems faced by the Sinhalese won him a regard that no Portuguese general had ever gained. However, it is clear that he was by no means as upright as his son and biographer Joao Rodrigues de Sa de Menezes tries to make him out to be. He was perfectly capable of deception and subterfuge<sup>4</sup> and of placing private profit before the interests of the state.<sup>5</sup> Of the other captains-general Diogo do Mello was the most effective, both in the military and administrative spheres. De Mello had many of the qualities of de Sa but was much less willing to listen to advice and was certainly more impetuous. Of the rest, the mediocre and weak Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira, the self-centred Jorge de Albuquerque and the tactless Jorge de Almeida should never have been appointed to the post. On the other hand, in Filipe de Oliveira, the able but ruthless and bigoted captain-major of Jaffna, the Portuguese found the ideal instrument for the execution of their policy in Jaffna.

The post of *vedor* too attracted men with ability, notably Lancarote de Seixas, Miguel Pinheiro Ravasco, Ambrosio de Freitas da Camara and Amaro Roiz. These and others continued the work of the first two *vedores* of Ceylon, Jorge Frolim de Almeida and Antao Vaz Freire. However, it was particularly in the revenue sphere that the Portuguese failed to make the best of their resources. Partly due to improvident grants of royal villages and partly by the laxity in the enforcement of the cinnamon monopoly, the Portuguese failed to secure the economic resources to back their attempts to conquer Ceylon in the period when conquest was at least feasible.

The impact of Portuguese rule in Ceylon has been often underestimated especially in the socio-economic sphere. For instance Arasaratnam in a study based mainly on Dutch sources and published in 1958 makes the following remarks: '*...Direct Portuguese rule had been exercised over the maritime areas of Ceylon for just over half a century. This period was not long enough for any radical alterations to be made in the economic and social organization of the land. This was further reinforced by the fact that, on assuming the administration of the land they had summoned the native chiefs to a convention at Malwana in 1597 and promised to maintain and uphold the traditional customs and usages of the country. The organization of the land and the relationship between the cultivator and the lord of the land was maintained by the Portuguese, as it had been under native kings.....In the actual operation of the*

4. One clear instance was his attempt to deceive Senerat as to the real purpose of the construction of the fort at Trincomalee.

5. See fn 68 of Chapter II.

*system however certain differences did appear, arising from the different nature of Portuguese aims...But these changes were only made within the basic framework of the existing structure...'*<sup>6</sup>

Much of the above quotation needs to be revised in the light of material presented in this work as well as that of Dr. Abeyasinghe. The Portuguese admittedly held the position of the dominant power in Ceylon only for a bare half century and even in this period their hegemony was challenged from time to time. Nevertheless, even during this short period, the Portuguese introduced changes which were both radical and long lasting.

In the social sphere, the bonds of traditional society were dealt a severe blow by the movement of refugees from the southwestern coast to the highland region. They were further weakened in the lowland areas by the Portuguese policy of intolerance towards Buddhism and Hinduism, which deprived the local villages of its traditional spiritual mentors. The Catholic missionaries did not provide an adequate replacement save in certain coastal areas, partly because of their small numbers but even more because many of them took long to learn the unfamiliar local languages.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand the conversion of a large proportion of the people in Portuguese areas opened the door to new social concepts—notably the sanctity of marriage and monogamy.<sup>8</sup>

The changes in the economic sphere were as vital. Up to the end of the sixteenth century dues from land formed the chief source of revenue for the rulers of the land.<sup>9</sup> With Portuguese hegemony began an era in which the principal revenue of state was derived from the sale of a commercial product, namely cinnamon. Although in the end it was the traditional system of land tenure—much the worse for the suffering it received—that survived, the Portuguese land policy had certainly not been one of preserving the organization of land '*as it had been under the native kings.*' Moreover, it was the Portuguese who first established the state monopoly of overseas trade in cinnamon. They anticipated the Dutch in efforts to profit from the trade in arecanut for which product they introduced a system of compulsory purchase. The cumulative effect of these changes distorted the economic structure

6. S. Arasaratnam 120. For a new view on the Convention at Malwana see, T. Abeyasinghe—*The myth of the Malwana Convention in The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, vol. VII No. 1, 1965, 67-72.

7. Some eventually obtained great proficiency—see Boudens, 43

8. On Sinhalese marriage customs see—R. Pieris—*The Sinhalese social organization*, 195-211. The Portuguese impact on the caste system on the other hand was somewhat incidental for they generally accepted the prevailing social structure and tried to make use of it for their own ends.

9. *TT. Manuscritos do convento da Graca, tomo 6D. 325-411*

of the south-western lowlands long before the arrival of the Dutch. The changes in the Jaffna peninsula though perhaps less important were still noteworthy.<sup>10</sup>

The strength of the Portuguese impact is seen by the fact that Portuguese influence on female dress was preserved in the lowlands till the nineteenth century and a Portuguese dialect was spoken in Ceylon until well into the twentieth century.<sup>11</sup> Many Portuguese words have been absorbed into both Sinhalese and Tamil and Roman Catholics (some of them descendants of converts in Portuguese times) remain the largest Christian element in Ceylon.

10. For example the bringing of elephant trade under state control.

11. Even today there exists an isolated pocket of people speaking corrupted Portuguese in the Batticaloa district.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

## PRIMARY AUTHORITIES — Manuscripts

The richest sources of manuscript material relating to Portuguese Ceylon are predictably found in the archives of Portugal. A valuable guide to this material is found in Mrs. D. De Silva's 'A bibliography of manuscripts relating to Ceylon in the archives and libraries of Portugal in *Boletim International Bibliographia Lyso-Brasileira* volumes VIII and IX 1967—1968.

1. *Arquivo Nacional da Torre de Tombo*, Lisbon

As far as the history of Ceylon and of Portuguese Asia is concerned, the most useful collection here is a sixty-two volume series covering the seventeenth century called the *Livros dos Moncoes* or the Books of the Monsoons. Fairly accurate manuscript copies of this series are found in the British Museum, London. The more recent transcripts of the series found in the India Office Library are less reliable. The documents dated on or before 7 March 1619 (with few exceptions) have been published in the *Documentos Remettidos da India*, Vol. I-V. The *Torre de Tombo* collection however is incomplete for certain periods—notably 1629-1638 and needs to be supplemented by the Goa collection bearing the same name.

*Tomo 6D* and *Tomo 2E* of the collection *Manuscritos do Convento da Graca* also contain valuable information. The former is particularly useful in that it contains the *tombo* of Kotte of 1599. *Livro XIX* of the *Collecao de S. Vicente* contains some correspondence between the captain-general of Ceylon and the Council at Lisbon as well as communications from the king in Spain to the authorities in Portugal about Ceylon.

Volume 1699 of the *Manuscritos da Livraria* contains a '*Recapilacao breve das guerras da ilha de Ceilao e da Rebeliam dos Levantados, morte do geral Constantino de Sa de Noronha e perda de todo arrayal co outras covsas q succederao*' by Fr. Manoel de Assumpcao. Fr. Assumpcao or Manoel Borges da Costa as he was christened, entered the Augustinians order at the age of nineteen or twenty in 1613. He arrived in Ceylon in 1620 and soon after became the first vicar of the Augustinian mission at Rambukkana. He worked at Bentota in 1628 and was appointed Prior of the Convent of Colombo on 1 December 1628. He left Ceylon in 1630 soon after completing the above manuscript. His account was extremely useful in tracing the events of the year 1630 but is rather unreliable for the period prior to his arrival in Ceylon.

*Manuscritos da Livraria*, 62, 674, 731 and 115 and *Corpo Chronologico*, Part I, Maco 116 were also utilized.

2. *Arquivo Historico Ultramarino*, Lisbon

The codices in this archive have been inventorised by M. A. Hedwig Fitzler, *A seccao Ultramarina da Biblioteca Nacional*, Lisbon, 1928. The most useful of these were the volumes containing the extent parts of the *tombo* and *foral* of Kotte, 1614, (*codices* 221, 222, 280 and 484) and the *foral* of Jaffn a 1645 (*codice* 220). Other *codices* utilized were 31-33, 35, 36, 40, 210, 211, 219, 278, 285, 295, 435-6, 437, 476, 500, 501.

The unbound collections of the archive are stored in metal cabinets (*caixas*) and roughly classified by area and then by date. All the documents relating to Ceylon are found in the *India caixas*. The *caixas* are not indexed and documents have been placed in the various *caixas* according to the latest date on the document, not according to the period they cover. Thus documents in *India caixa* 26 (1664-1665) contain references to events in Ceylon in 1622. Documents in *India caixas* 1-28 and 37A have been used in this work.

3. *Biblioteca Nacional*, Lisbon

Several of the bound volumes in the *Fundo Geral* of this archive contained valuable source material for this work. Of great value were the parts of the diary of the Conde de Linhares, viceroy of India (1629-1635) found in *codice* 939. The unpublished portion of the diary available here covers the period 10 February 1631 to the end of October 1631. *Codices* 1982 and 1983 contain proceedings of the *conselho do estado* in Goa in the years 1625-1627. *Codice* 140 of the *Iluminados* section contains Antonio Bocarro's well known account of the

Portuguese Empire in the East, copies of which are available in the *Biblioteca da Academia de Ciencias* (serie azul 267,268) and the British Museum Library (Sloane Manuscript 197). Other documents used in the *Biblioteca Nacional* were *Fundo Geral*—59,177,257,482,518,581,723,1540,1783,1814,1815,1816,1987, 4947,7140,7640,9913, *Iluminados* 139, *Pombalina* 490 and *caixas* 199 doc. 78.

4. *Biblioteca da Ajuda*, Lisbon

Here is found in *codice* 51-V-36 a long account of the services of Dom Jorge de Almeida, captain-general of Ceylon during his first term of office written by his brother Francisco de Almeida in early 1634. *Codice* 51-VIII-57 contains the diary of the conde de Linhares from March 1630 to January 1631. Large portions of the *codice* 51-VIII-40 also relate to Ceylon. Also utilized were the *codices* 46-X-8, 49-V-8, 50-V-34, 50-V-37, 50-V-38, 51-IV-32, 41-V-34 51-V-44, 51-VIII-21, 51-VIII-58.

5. *Biblioteca da Sociedade Geografia*, Lisbon  
*Restante Prat. D.Maco. 4. Doc. 52*

6. *Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa*, Lisbon

*Provisoes e alvares a favor da Christandade* (1624) ; *Livros das Moncoes*, 12,13A,13B,14,15,16A,16B,17,18,19A,19B,19C,19D,20,21,26B ; *Livros dos Segredos* I and *Reis Vizinhos* I.

7. *Biblioteca Publica Eborensis*, Evora, Portugal

CV/2-7, CXVI/2-3, CXV/1-13, CXV/2-8 ; G. R. Arm. V-VI Nos.14-15

8. *Biblioteca da Universidade de Coimbra*, Portugal

*Codices* 459 and 460 which contain proceedings of the *Mesa de Consien- cia* and *codice* 645 which contains reports of the *Conselho da Fazenda*, Lisbon were particularly useful.

9. State Archives of Goa, India (formerly *Arquivo Historico do Estado da India*)

*Assentos do conselho da fazenda I-V* ; *Cartas, Patentes e Alvaras XI-X Regimentos e Intruccoes III* ; *Assentos e cartas Regias I* ; *Provisoes dos Viso reis III*

Transcripts and summaries of these collections were kindly made available to me by Major J. B. Harrison, Reader in South Asia History of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

10. *Arquivo General de Simancas*, Valladolid, Spain

The only collection having material relating to Ceylon was the *Secretarias Provinciales* and of that the following volumes were used—1468,1469,1473, 1474,1504,1505,1508,5109,1515,1516,1519,1520,1522,1523,1530,1535

11. British Museum Library, London

Department of Manuscripts—Sloane Manuscript 197 ; Egerton Manuscript 1824 ; Additional Manuscripts 9853 ; 19,281 ; 20,866-20,875 ; 20,891-20900 ; 28,163, 28,164 ; 42,056

Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts—Sinhalese Palm Leaf Manuscripts Or 2702, Or 6606, (64) Or 6606(126), Or 6606(141), Or 6611(52), Or 6611(55), Or 6219

Additional Manuscripts 19,866 ; 22,012

12. India Office Library, London

Portuguese transcript in the records section—*Documentos Remettidos da India* (1616-1643) 71-74 ; *Corpo Chronologico* (1535-1630) 77 ; *Conselho Ultramarino I* (1614-1768) 80

13. King's College Library, University of London

Portuguese Department—D.S. 4987,At.2—*Companhia das Indias*. This manuscript contains information on the activities of the Portuguese East India Company which operated between 1628 and 1633.



## PRIMARY AUTHORITIES — Published documents

*Arquivo Portugues Oriental (Nova Edicao) Tomo IV* vol. II Parts I and II edited (somewhat badly) by A. B. Branganca Pereira. Bastora, 1937. *Arquivo Portuguez-Oriental* edited by J. H. Cunha Rivara. Nova Goa, 1857-1877.

*Assentos do Conselho do Estado da India* vols I and II. Bastora, 1953. The editor, Panduronga S. S. Pissurlencar has usefully supplemented the council proceedings with copies of correspondence between Goa and Lisbon extracted from *Livros das Moncoes* found in the Goan archives.

*The Ceylon littoral, 1593* edited by P. E. Pieris, Colombo, 1949 is a summarised translation of *codice* 484 of the *Arquivo Historico Ultramarino* or the Third Book of the Tombo of Kotte by Antao Vaz Freire in 1614. Certain portions of the original manuscript have been omitted and several inaccuracies have unfortunately crept in even in the parts summarised.

*Collecao de Tratados e concertos de pazes que o Estado da India Portugueza fez com on Reis e Senhores com quem teve relacoes nas partes da Asia e Africa Oriental desde o principio da Conquista ate o fim do seculo XVIII, tomos I and II* edited by J. F. Judice Biker. Lisbon, 1881-1882 gives information on the treaties of peace with Kandy 1617 and 1634.

*Documentacao para a Historia das Missoes do Padraodo Portuguez do Oriente Vol. XI (1569-1572)*; edited by Fr. Antonio da Silva Rego. Lisbon, 1955. Despite the dates indicated in the title most of the volume is made up of a history of the Augustinians written in 1817.

*Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros da Moncoes* vols. I-V. Lisbon, 1880-1935.

'The First Treaty of peace between the Portuguese and the King of Kandy, 1617 trans. by Fr. S. G. Perera in *CLR* 3 ser II,III. Colombo, 1932-1934.

'The Jesuits in Ceylon in the 16th and 17th centuries trans. by Fr. S. G. Perera in *CALR* I-VI. Colombo, 1915-1921.

'Historical Records of the Society of Jesus trans. and ed. by Fr. S. G. Perera in *CALR* II,III,VI. Colombo, 1916-1921.

*The kingdom of Jaffnapatam, 1645* edited by P. E. Pieris. Colombo, 1920 is a summarised translation of the *foral* of Jaffna as recorded in *codice* 220 of the *Arquivo Historico Ultramarino*.

*Lanka Puravrtha* edited by V. D. de Lanerolle. Colombo, 1960 is a collection of Sinhalese folklore and tradition.

*Portuguese maps and plans of Ceylon* edited by P. E. Pieris. Colombo, 1926.

'*Rajasinha : His Military and other Resources—a Report by Disava Tennekoon in 1676* trans. by H. O. Paulusz in *JCBRAS* (NS), V. Colombo, 1958.

*Regimentos das fortalezas da India* edited by Panduronga S. S. Pissurlencar. Goa, 1951.

'The *tombo* of the Kiraveli Pattu by P. E. Pieris in *JCBRAS* XXXVI. Colombo, 1930 is a translation of part of the *tombo* of Kotte of 1614.

*The tombo of the Two Korales* translated and edited by Fr. S. G. Perera. Colombo, 1938 was originally compiled in 1622 by Miguel Pinheiro Ravasco.

'The Transactions between the king of Kandy and the Dutch 1609-1617' translated by D. W. Ferguson in *CLR* 3 ser I-III. Colombo, 1931-1934.

*Tri Simhala Kadaim saha Vitti—A Collection of ten ola works dealing with the geography and history of Ceylon* compiled by A. J. W. Marambe. Kandy, 1926.

'Some Sinhalese Royal Families, A memorandum compiled in 1676 by Gov. Ryckloff van Goens the Younger edited by J. H. O. Paulusz in *JCBRAS* (NS) II. Colombo, 1952.

*Velho, Diogo Orcamento do Estado da India* edited by A. de Oliveira. Lisbon, 1960.

Contemporary and near contemporary works and chronicles

*Alagiyawanna Kustantinu Hatana* edited by Fr. S. G. Perera and M. E. Fernando. Colombo, 1932.

- Baldaeus, P *A true and Exact description of the Great Island of Ceylon* translated by P. Brohier. vol. III Nos. 1-4 of (Ceylon Historical Journal) Dehiwala, 1960.
- Bocarro, A *Decada XIII da Historia da India*. Lisbon, 1876.
- Constantino de Sa's maps and plans of Ceylon 1624-1628 edited by E. Reimers (Ceylon Government—Selections from Dutch Records—No. 2)—Colombo, 1929.
- Culavamsa being the more recent part of the Mahavamsa II. translated into German by W. Geiger and from German into English by Mrs. C. R. Rickmers. Colombo, 1953. This work is of very little value to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
- Diario do 3º conde de Linhares vice-rei da India I and II. Lisbon, 1937-1943. Professor C. R. Boxer points out that the title should read 4º and not 3º.
- The Expedition to Uva made in 1630 together with an account of the siege laid to Colombo by the king of Kandy translated by Fr. S. G. Perera. Colombo, 1930.
- Faria de Souza, M *Asia Portuguesa* translated to Portuguese by M. V. Garcia Sanchos Ferreira. Lisbon, 1947. The abridged English translation by Captain John Stevens entitled *The Portuguese Asia*, London, 1695 leaves out some material used in this study.
- Kirimatiyawe Methindu Maha Hatana edited by T. S. Kumar. Colombo, 1964. This work together with the prose work Rajavaliya and two other war poems (*hatan kavya*)—*Parangi Hatana* (see Joao Ribeiro) and *Rajasiha Hatana* effectively present Sinhalese point of view.
- Knox, Robert *An Historical Relation of Ceylon* vol. VI Nos. I-IV of (Ceylon Historical Journal) Dehiwala, 1958. Knox gives a picture of Kandy in the late seventeenth century. On the reliability of Knox see K. W. Goonewardena 'Some comments on Robert Knox and writings on Ceylon' University of Ceylon Review, vol. XVI. 1958.
- Mandarampura Puvata edited by Labugama Lankananda. Colombo, 1948. A poem giving useful information on Kandy.
- Menezes, Joao Rodriguez de Sa de *Rebellion de Ceylan y los progressos de su conquista en el gobierno de Constantino de Saa Y Noronha*. Lisbon, 1681.
- 'The Rebellion of Ceylon and the progress of its conquest under the government of Constantino de Sa Y Noronha' translated by H. H. St. George in *JCBRAS II*. Colombo, 1890. D. W. Ferguson in *JCBRAS XI* 427 claimed that de Sa de Menezes wrote his book almost fifty years after his father's death but Professor C. R. Boxer was kind enough to draw my attention to the fact that evidence within the book itself indicates that it is likely that it was completed before 1640. (See pages 214-215 of the Spanish edition where de Menezes refers to his friendship with the conde de Linhares.)
- Queyroz, Fr. Fernao de *Conquista Temporal e Espiritual de Ceilao*. Colombo, 1916.
- The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon I-III*. Translated by Fr. S. G. Perera. Colombo, 1930. Queyroz's narrative forms the framework on which the political history of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century Ceylon is built. It is a tribute to his skill in assimilating evidence that an examination of contemporary records leaves his narrative more or less intact. His work is however lengthy, badly organized and somewhat uneven in depth and treatment. The whole period 1612-1618 for instance is dismissed in two pages.
- Rajasiha Hatana* edited by H. M. Somaratna. Kandy, 1966.
- Rajavaliya* edited and translated by B. Gunasekera. Colombo, 1954.
- Ribeiro, Joao *History o Ceilao with a summary of de Barros do Couto Antonio Bocarro and the Documentos Remettidos with Parangi Hatana and Kustantinu Hatana*, translated by P. E. Pieris. 2nd edition. Colombo, 1909. Ribeiro served as a soldier in Ceylon for eighteen years but his statistics are often unreliable. For further information on Ribeiro see C. R. Boxer 'An introduction to Joao Ribeiro's Historical Tragedy of the island of Ceylon 1685' in *Ceylon Historical Journal III*. Nos. 3 and 4. Dehiwala, 1954.
- History of Ceylon presented by captain John Ribeyro to the king of*

- Portugal in 1685* translated to French by Abbe Le Grand and from French to English by George Lee. Colombo, 1847. An evaluation of the Le Grand version is made by D. W. Ferguson in JCBRAS X. Colombo, 1888.
- Saar, J. J. 'Account of Ceylon 1647-1657' translated by P. Freudenberg in, JCBRAS XI. Colombo, 1890.
- Schlegel, J. H. 'A selection from Danish History, Numismatology, Economics and Language, Kopenhagen, 1771.' Extracts translated by M. Mackenzie in JCBRAS XXXVII. Colombo, 1931. Relevant sections of Ove Giedde's diary are given in English translation.
- Soledade, F. de *Historia Serafica Chronologica da Ordem da S. Francisco na Provincia de Portugal III*. Lisbon, 1705.
- Trinidad, Paulo de *Conquista Espiritual do Oriente III* edited by Fr. Lopez. Lisbon, 1968. This proved to be an extremely useful contemporary account.
- Yalpana Vaipava Malai* translated by C. Brito. Colombo, 1879 is a Tamil Chronicle which gives a rather confused and incoherent account of events as far as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are concerned.
- GUIDE TO FURTHER READING** A select list of books and periodical articles
- Abeyasinghe, T. B. H. *Portuguese rule in Ceylon, 1594-1612*. Colombo, 1966.
- Arasaratnam S. *Dutch power in Ceylon 1658-1687*. Amsterdam, 1958.
- Botelho de Souza, A. *Subsidios para a Historia Militar Maritima da India, II and III*. Lisbon, 1948-1953.
- Boudens, Rev. R. *The Catholic Church in Ceylon under Dutch rule*. Rome, 1957.
- Boxer, C. R. 'European rivalry in the Indian seas 1600-1700' in *The Mariner's Mirror* XIV. London, 1928.
- 'The Anglo-Portuguese rivalry in the Persian Gulf 1615-1635 in *Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations* edited by Edgar Prestage. Watford, 1935.
- Fidalgos in the Far East 1550-1770*. The Hague, 1948.
- Salvador de Sa and the struggle for Brazil and Angola (1602-1686)*. London, 1952.
- The Dutch in Brazil 1624-1654*. Oxford, 1957.
- The Portuguese seaborne Empire*. London, 1969.
- A note on Portuguese missionary methods in the East in *Ceylon Historical Journal*, Vol.10.Nos.1-4,1960-1961.
- Portuguese society in the Tropics—The Municipal councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia and Luanda 1510-1800*. Wisconsin, 1965.
- The Cambridge history of India* vols IV and V. Cambridge, 1929-1973.
- Cacegas, Fr. L. *Historia de S. Domingos Part IV*. Lisbon, 1767.
- Codrington, H. W. *Ancient land tenure and revenue in Ceylon*. Colombo, 1938.
- Ceylon Coins and Currency* (Memoirs of the Colombo Museum Series A. No. 3). Colombo, 1924.
- Don Peter, Rev. W. L. A. *Studies in Ceylon Church history*. Colombo, 1963.
- Ferguson, D. W. 'The Earliest Dutch Visits to Ceylon' in JCBRAS XXX. Colombo, 1929.
- 'Correspondence between Rajasinha II and the Dutch' in JCBRAS VII, Colombo, 1904.
- Godinho, Vitorino Magalhaes *Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial* vols. I and II Lisbon, 1971.
- Goonewardane, K. W. *The Foundations of Dutch power in Ceylon*. Amsterdam, 1958.
- Leach, E. R. *Pul Eliya, a village in Ceylon : a study of land tenure and kinship*. Cambridge, 1961.
- Lynch, J. *Spain under the Hapsburgs*. vol. I-II, Oxford, 1964-1969.
- Meilink-Roelofs, M. A. P. *Asian trade and European influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630*. The Hague, 1962.
- Mendes da Luz, F. P. *O Conselho da India : contributo ao estudo da historia da administracao e do commercio do Ultramar Portugues nos Principios do seculo XVII*. Lisbon, 1952.
- Nanavimala, Rev. K. *Saparagamuwe Parani Liyavilli*. Colombo, 1946.
- Obeyasekera, G. *Land tenure in village Ceylon—A sociological and historical survey*. Cambridge, 1967.

- Panikkar, K. M. *Malabar and the Portuguese being a history of the relations of the Portuguese with Malabar from 1550-1663.* Bombay, 1929.  
*Malabar and the Dutch being a history of the fall of the Nayak power in Malabar.* Bombay, 1931.
- Perera, S. G. *Historical sketches—Ceylon Church History.* Jaffna, 1938.  
*The Jesuits in Ceylon in the XVI and XVII centuries.* Madura, 1941.  
*A history of Ceylon—the Portuguese and Dutch periods 1505-1796,* revised by Fr. V. Perniola. 6th edition. Colombo, 1955.  
*Portuguese missionary methods or the myth of forced conversion.* Galle, 1956.
- Pieris, P. E. *Ceylon : The Portuguese era being a history of the island for the period 1505-1658. vols. I and II.* Colombo, 1913-1914.
- Ryan, B. *Caste in modern Ceylon.* New Jersey, 1953.
- Sathyanatha Aiyar, R. *History of the Nayaks of Madura.* Madras, 1924.
- Vriddhagirison, V. *The Nayaks of Tanjore.* Annamalainagar. 1942.

## INDEX

- Abhayasinha *mudaliyar*, 103, 120, 124  
 Abreu, Jorge Fernandes de, 131, 197  
 Abreu, Lopo Gomez de, 146, 149, 178  
 Abrew de Caza, Pero de, 118  
 Abrew, Joao de, 121  
 Achchuvveli, 51  
 Achinese, attacks on Malacca, 27, 92;  
     galley seized from the, 116, 126  
*Adigar*, 94, 170, 177  
 Akbar, 9  
 Alagiyawanne, Dom Jeronimo, 174  
 Albuquerque, Fernao de, 60, 65, 79,  
     181, 182, 210, 249  
 Albuquerque, Jorge de, 60-62, 70, 165,  
     181, 197, 250  
 Albuquerque, Mathias de, 74, 175  
 Aldermen *see vereadores*  
 Aleixo, Dom, 81, 82, 101, 107, 111, 115  
     116, 119, 129  
 Almeida de Sampayo, Miguel de, 152  
 Almeida, Dom Jorge de, captain-general  
     of Ceylon (1631-1634), 129, 132-  
     137, 138, 192, 225; captain-general  
     of Ceylon (1635-1636), 145-147, 148,  
     250; attempt to reach Ceylon, 121-  
     127, 128; and the new *regimento*.  
     143  
 Almeida, Jorge Frolim de, 15, 171,  
     207, 208, 221, 250,  
 Alutgama, 86, 135, 208  
 Alutnuwara, 52  
 Alutkuru *korale*, 75, 211, 221  
 Amarakoon Mantri *see* Aleixo, Dom  
 Ambatenna, 96, 108  
*Ande*, 216, 224  
 Andrade, Francisco Barbosa da, 152  
 Andre, Dom, 101, 102  
 Angola, 63  
 Antonio, Dom, 82  
 Arabia, 58  
 Arabian sea, 57, 74, 140, 186  
 Araujo, Domingos Pereira de, 118  
 Araujo, Gaspar de, 152  
 Arakan, 204  
*Aratchis*, 12, 15, 230  
 Arecanut, supply of, 9, 33, 207; export  
     of, 2, 135, 138, 207-211, 251; private  
     trade in, 61; revenue from, 190, 207,  
     211, 227; compulsory purchase of,  
     148, 149, 208-211, 221, 222, 251;  
     customs dues on, 207-208; price of,  
     208-211, 227, 228  
 Arsakesari, 30, 43  
*Assagai*, 188  
 Assumpcao, Fr, Manoel de, 239  
 Attanagalla, 24, 238  
 Attapitiya, 99, 141, 154,  
*Atukorales*, 12  
 Augustinians, the coming of, 11; in  
     the siege of Colombo, 1630, 118;  
     in the *junta*, 167, missionary activity,  
     236-241, 243; revenues of the, 245  
 Azevedo, Dom Jeronimo de, captain-  
     general (1594-1612), 9-17, 22, 23, 27,  
     31, 33, 37, 57, 64, 74, 75, 76, 85, 92,  
     148, 155, 156, 157, 161, 162, 181, 184,  
     192, 195, 196, 204, 207, 216, 220,  
     248; viceroy of India, (1612-1617),  
     43; nephew of, 126, 152  
 Azevedo, Jeronimo de, 118  
*Baddas*, 12, 209  
 Badulla, 105, 106  
 Bahia, 63  
 Balana, 26, 32, 33, 95, 104, 153, 154  
 Balangoda, 221  
 Balthazar, Dom, 81, 82, 101, 107, 111,  
     119, 120  
 Bambarabotuwa oya, 40  
 Bambarenda, 221  
 Bananas, 233  
 Barbosa, Antonio, 132  
 Bardes, 83, 84, 128  
 Barreto, Dom Constantino, 37, 157,  
     158  
 Barreto, Dom Theodosio, 81, 82, 101,  
     102, 107, 113, 119, 120, 124, 134,  
     135, 137, 140, 158  
 Barros, Manual, 118  
 Basnayake, Dom Jeronimo, 174  
 Basra, 198, 199  
 Batavia, 16  
 Batticaloa, fortification of, 59, 66, 87-  
     91, 164, 248; fort of, 90, 129, 141,  
     143, 187, 249; attacks on, 89, 90-91,  
     93, 95, 96, 184; Dutch at, 151;  
     captain of, 130, 148, 152; port of, 2,  
     10, 35, 92, 97, 185; lands of, 26, 65,  
     85; Indian merchants at, 70;  
     missionary activity in, 244; in the  
     treaty of 1617, 138, 139  
 Batuwantudawa, 220  
 Belihul oya, 105, 106  
 Belem, 38  
 Beligal *korale*, 75  
 Bengal, 27, 93, 137, 205; Nawab of,  
     84  
 Bentota, 238  
*Berava* caste, 215  
 Beruwala, 1, 36, 85  
 Betal, 233  
 Betancor, Fr, Pedro, 42, 236  
 Bhuvanekabahu VII, 3, 4, 8  
 Bijapur, 204  
 Bokkawala, 96  
 Borralho, Miguel Pereira, 55, 97, 99,  
     132, 137  
 Boschouwer, Marcellus de, 16, 53  
 Botado, Damiao, 90, 152, 154  
 Botelho, Nuno Alvares, 92, 116, 117,  
     137, 187  
 Braganca, Dom Constantino de, 5  
 Brito de Almeida, Francisco de, 52, 69,  
     77, 111, 113, 118, 121, 127, 153  
 Brito, Diogo Mendes de, 90, 97, 164,  
     168, 203  
 Brito, Frey Luiz de, 239  
 Brito, Jeronimo de, 168

- Brito, Manoel Correa de, 114  
 Brito, Pero Soares de, 148  
 Buddhism, 2, 3, 4, 22, 34, 82, 237, 242, 251  
 Buddhist monks, 146, 236  
 Buddhist temples, 110, 216, 217  
 Buddhists, 237  
 Bulatgama, 222  
 Bullock-cart men, 211, 224  
 Butter, 233
- Cabral, Pedro Alvares, 29  
 Camara da Noronha, Balthazar de, 146  
 Canarese, 128, 129, 133, 141, 154, 187, 188, 189  
 Cao, Domingos Carvalho, 90, 97-98, 138, 139, 158  
 Cape Camorin, 38, 57 ; fleet of 97, 186  
 Captain-general, role in policy formulation, 20; appointment of, 159; powers of, 159-162, 167, 168, 181, 219; council of, 32, 152-153, 159, 196; in the *junta*, 157; torch bearers of, 229; interpreter to, 229; relations with *vedor*, 62, 86, 103, 128, 161, 162-167, 169, 178, 249; relations with *ouvidor*, 169; private trade carried on by, 204, 209; salary of, 229, treasurer of, 229  
 Captain-major-of-the-field, 187, 221, 222, 231, 234  
 Cardoso, Cosmo, 197  
*Carreira da India*, 200  
 Carvalho, Lourenco, Pires de, 29  
 Carvalho, Manoel Pessoa de, 130, 152  
*Casados*, of Galle, 130; of Negapatam, 51; of Trincomalee, 69; of Cochin, 126; in Jaffna, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 56, 94, 176; in the army, 23, 48, 104, 187; of Colombo, 61, 74, 117, 118, 124, 129, 147, 180-184, 195, 196, 248; and *lascarins*, 78-79, 81; houses of the, 102, 109; making of gunpowder by the, 118; in Kotte, 91, 149; and Jorge de Almeida, 136, 137, 147; land holding by, 210, 216, 218, 224; privileges of, 181-184; owning ships, 185; views on Kandy, 138, 153  
*Cassia*, 197  
 Caste, 156, 193  
 Castelbranco, Miguel Fernao de, 132  
 Castelbranco, Miguel Rangel de, 152  
 Castro, Affonso de, 180  
 Castro, Dom Alvaro de, 129, 136  
 Castro, Dom Bras de, 122, 124, 125, 131, 136  
 Castro, Jorge Coelho de, 118, 121, 126, 132  
 Catherina, Dona, 5, 8, 13, 14, 16, 33, 196, 236; daughter of, 25  
 Ceuta, 38  
 Cezar, Manoel, 24, 29
- Chaleas* see cinnamon peelers  
 Chanks, 212  
 Cheese, 123  
 Chettynagar, 151  
 Chiefs, of Jaffna, 11, 42; of Kandy, 5, 14; of Kotte, 62, 81, 86  
 Chilaw, 1, 75, 135, 143, 190, 208, 230, 231  
 China, 63, 74  
 China fleet, 29, 87, 186  
 Chingulia, Dom Jeronimo, 137  
 Christian converts, in Kotte, 3, 59, 76; in the Fishery Coast, 5, 84, 214; in Colombo, 6; in Mannar, 6; in Jaffna, 48, 57; Indian, 83, 140; number of, 238  
 Christian IV, king of Denmark, 53  
 Christianity, inducements to accept, 237; conversion to, 3, 101, 238, 246, 252; hostility to, 4, 11, 237, 245; social impact of, 6, 251; in Kandy, 34, 236; in Jaffna, 42, 236-246; in Kotte, 82, 94, 236-246; and the Muslims, 85; those who abjured, 135  
 Cinnamon, export of, 1, 62, 135, 138, 142, 145, 186, 193-201, 227, 228, 231; supply of, 9; privilege of exporting given to *camara* of Colombo, 181; as tribute, 33; producing areas, 29, 75, 190; private trade in, 60-61, 195, 200; fleet, 121, 122, 126, 128, 136, 152, 186, 198, 200; peelers, 135, 167, 191-193, 194, 197, 198, 218, 224; monopoly of, 143, 145, 182, 195-201, 247, 250, 251; revenue from, 142, 144, 150, 190, 199, 201, 227, 251; oil, 191; price of, 197-201  
 Cloth, given in exchange for arecanut, 209, 210; in Jaffna, 2, 233; trade in the Coromandel, 27; imported by Kandy, 86, 135; transported to Lisbon, 144; exchanged at Chilaw, 135; granted to Kaffirs, 189, 231  
 Cochin, bishop of, 157, 161, 166, 196, 222, 223, 236, 239, 242, 243, 244, 249; captain of, 123; *casados* of, 123  
 Coconuts, 120, 124  
 Coelho, Andre, 50, 54, 133, 136, 186  
 Coelho, Joao Nogueira, 152  
 Coen, Jan Pieterzoon, 57  
 Coins, minting of, 160  
 Colombo, port of, 1, 123, 194, 197; fort of, 2, 6, 24, 57, 73, 75, 92, 102, 109, 111, 116-119, 120-121, 124, 127, 128, 130, 136, 143, 149, 153, 187, 232; siege of 1579-80, 4; siege of 1588-89, 4, 5, 6; siege of 1630-1632, 116-125, 126, 129; fortification of, 2, 74, 153, 164, 182; *misericordia* of, 62, 127; captain of, 32, 60, 65, 118, 143, 151, 152, 153, 157, 161,

- 166, 195, 196, 230; *camara* of, 20, 32, 37, 61, 67, 74, 78, 116, 117, 138, 144, 150, 151, 153, 159, 179-184, 196, 197, 210; settlements near, 78-79, 173; Muslims in, 85; execution of Kangara Aratchi in, 52; garden lands of, 184; hospital of, 189; cinnamon prices at, 198; sale of elephants at, 203; arecanut prices at 207; customs dues at, 208
- Colonists, Indian, 80, 83, 93, 100; Portuguese, 83
- Conselho de Portugal*, 19
- Constantino, Dom, 24, 31, 51, 52, 54, 83
- Coromandel coast, 27, 48, 54, 83, 122, 124, 128, 142, 204, 211; fleet, 68, 186
- Correa, Damiao, 86
- Correa, Simao, 158
- Cosmo, Dom, 81, 101, 107, 111, 119
- Costa, Gaspar da, 138
- Costa, Manoel de, 123
- Costa Perestello, Joao da, 199
- Coutinho, Dom Diogo, 197
- Coutinho, Dom Joao, Conde de Redondo, 27, 38, 43, 59, 65
- Coutinho, Ruy Dias de, 123
- Cranganore, archbishopric of, 243
- Crape, Roelant, 53, 54
- Cunha, Antonio da, 130
- Customs duties, 139, 182-183, 203, 204, 207, 208, 227, 228
- Customs officer, 230
- Daladagamwela, 134
- Danes, 49, 53, 54, 59, 66, 67, 151, 186
- Danture, 109
- Deccan sultanates, 9
- Denawaka, 211
- Desembargador*, 168
- Deus, Fr, Christavao Madre de, 151
- Deus, Fr, Jose Madre de, 238
- Deus, Fr Paulino de Madre de, 102
- Devalagam see pagoda* villages
- Devinuwara, 131, 135
- Dharmapala, Dom Joao, 3-5, 8-10, 179, 181, 183, 192, 219
- Dharmasuriya, Dom Jeronimo, 106
- Diogo, Dom, 138
- Disava* (post of), of Kandy, 138; of Sinhalese Kotte, 12; of Portuguese Kotte, 12, 90, 108, 126, 132, 154, 156, 157, 158, 160, 171, 217, 218; as members of the council, 39; appointment of Sinhalese to the post of, 83; and private trade, 87; power of land grants, 80-81
- Disava* (province), 12, 90, 156
- Dolosdas *korale*, 202
- Dominicans, missionary work of the, 11, 236-241, 243; in war, 118; used as envoys, 120
- Dompe, 220
- Dorawaka, 221, 222
- Dress, 252
- Duarte, Fernao, 85
- Durayas*, 191
- Dutch, Anglo-Dutch accord, 64; arrival of, 183, 247, 249, 252; assistance to Kandy by the, 10, 16, 65, 94, 151, 153, 155, 184, 235; conflict with the Portuguese, 63, 73, 75, 92, 124, 149, 179, 182, 186, 187, 194, 248; in the Indian ocean, 27, 44, 67, 74, 128, 140; in the East Indies, 9, 13, 18, 57; ships off Batticaloa, 35, 87, 88; rumours of aid to Sankili by the, 45; trade, 142, 144, 145, 204; V.O.C., 53
- East Indies, 9
- Ekanayake *mudaliyar*, 52, 127
- Elephant Pass, 98
- Elephants, trade in, 1, 15, 44, 135, 142, 143, 203-204, 247; supply of, 9, 48, 201, 202; tribute in, 32, 139, 201, 202, 203; revenues from, 144, 145, 190, 206-207, 227; in war, 119; gifted by Rajasinha, 150; in transport, 201; used for ceremonial purposes, 201; monopoly of, 203-204; hunting of, 202, 203, 224, 233; price of, 205-206
- English, in the East, 13, 18; trade in Asia, 27, 57, 67, 74; Anglo-Dutch accord, 64; conflict with the Portuguese, 73, 186
- Escrivao* see writer
- Ethirimanne Sinham, 7, 11, 30, 43, 202
- Evora, 180
- Factor, of Ceylon, 159, 160, 164, 167, 197, 199, 230; of Jaffna, 162, 170, 174, 175, 176, 179; of Mannar, 162, 167, 174, 175; of Galle, 167
- Falcao, Manoel, 26
- Faria, Luiz Cabral de, 39
- Fernandes, Domingos, 100-101
- Fidalgos*, 21, 37, 38, 58, 70, 75, 116, 152, 160
- Filipe, Dom, 5, 6, 7
- Fishermen, 212
- Fishery coast, 5, 83, 84, 128, 213, 236, 239
- Fishing, 130
- Fonseca, Miguel de, 138, 139
- Fonseca Ozouro, Antonio da, 152, 209, 213
- Foral*, 15, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 203, 206, 214, 235
- Formosa, 64
- Four Korales, *disava* (province) of, 12, 82; *disava* (post) of, 52, 69, 126, 132; missionary activity, 238, 243; defences of the, 39, 77; *lascarin* commander of the 81; *lascarin* settlements in, 173-174; forces of the,

- 119, 120, 124, 133, 134; campaigns in the, 24, 26, 90, 96, 141; arecanut from, 211
- Franciscans, missionary activity of, 4, 11, 19, 135-136, 236-246; in war, 118; commissioner of, 43; unpopularity of, 7; in Kandy, 34; in the *junta*, 167; in Jaffna, 42, 47, 51; grants of temple lands to, 219; number of, 220, 238; convent of S Antonio of, 238
- Freitas da Camara, Ambrosio da, as *vedor*, 250; making of *tombo* by, 56, 94, 170, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 233; views on *lascarins*, 80, 218; disputes with captain-general, 87, 99, 103, 164, 165, 177, 178, in viceroy's council, 139, 249; drawing up of *regimento* by, 143
- Gabadagam*, 171, 207, 216, 219, 221, 222
- Galle, port of, 1, 58; captain of, 59, 70, 230; fortification of, 58, 61, 66, 70, 77, 143, 153; fort of, 75, 109, 128, 187; attacks on, 129-131; factor of, 167; magistrate of, 168; arecanut prices at, 207; customs dues at, 208
- Galpaya, 221
- Galu *Korale*, 222
- Gama, Dom Francisco da, Conde de Vidiguerra, 62, 64, 65, 66, 73, 85, 87, 89, 176, 182, 183, 196, 201, 222, 239, 242
- Gama, Dom Theodosio Affonso da, 130
- Gama, Vasco da, 196
- Gam-ladda*, 216
- Gampola, 1
- Gandolaha, 24, 28
- Ganetenna, 6, 95, 141
- Gannoruwa, 7, 154, 155
- Giedde, Ove, 53, 54
- Gil, Manoel, 131
- Ginger, 15
- Goa, captain of, 21; archbishop of 21; High Court of, 37; *camara* of, 116; shipyards of, 204; *conselho da fazenda* at, 20, 163, 183; *conselho do estado* (or viceroy's council), 20, 71, 73, 81, 88, 128, 129, 138, 150, 153, 163, 165, 175, 177
- Godinho, Andre, 130
- Golconda, 204
- Gomes, Antonio, 111
- Gomes, Gaspar, 121
- Gomes, Thome, 147
- Graca, Fr, Agostinho da, 238
- Grain tax, 216, 225
- Guerilla tactics, 24, 40, 52, 69, 70, 104
- Guerra, Antonio Soares de, 152
- Gujerat, 27
- Gunpowder, 77, 113, 118, 123, 130, 205, 231
- Haldumulla, 104
- Headmen, 156
- Hinduism, 22, 82, 239, 242, 251
- Hindu priests, 146
- Hindus, 2, 6, 11, 42, 48, 49, 51, 56, 94
- Hindu temples, 67, 94, 110, 216, 217, 220, 223, 239
- Horana, 238
- Horses, 150
- Hughli, river, 140
- Hunu* caste, 193
- Idalgashinna, 104, 105, 107
- Ihala Pattu, 157
- Imbulpe, 40
- Indonesian Archipelago, 27, 57
- Iron, 231
- Ivqry, 15
- Jaffna, fort and settlement of, 46, 47, 49, 55-56, 94, 97, 149, 187, 241; hospital of, 189; elephant sales at, 203, 205; peninsula of, 45, 50, 98, 171, 175, 176, 179, 211, 240, 251; captain-major of, 51, 159, 169-170, 176, 178, 239
- Jayasundara *mudaliyar*, 138
- Jayaweera Bandara, 4, 5, 7, 8,
- Jesuits, 11, 41, 94, 117, 118, 212, 213, 220, 221, 222, 236-246
- Jesuit College of Colombo, 222, 238, 246
- Jesus, Frei Jacinto de, 167
- Jewellery, 150
- Joao, Dom, 5
- Juiz*, 168, 180
- Junta*, 145, 148, 157, 161, 162, 166, 167, 168, 182, 198
- Kadawatu *korale*, 217
- Kaduwela, 133
- Kaffirs, 128, 129, 133, 134, 141, 154, 187, 188, 189, 232
- Kaleliya, 28
- Kalpitiya, 1
- Kalutara, captain of 114; customs dues at, 208; port and fort of, 61, 66, 75, 102, 109, 119, 134, 135, 143, 164, 187
- Kanakapulles*, 12, 111, 112, 115, 156, 230, 231, 232
- Kande Uda Rata*, 1
- Kandy, settlement of, 1, 8, 96, 114, 115,
- Kangara Aratchi, 10, 14, 23, 40, 41, 52
- Karaliyadde Bandara, 5, 6, 8
- Karawa* caste, 193
- Kathaluwa, 131
- Kattota Mantri *see* Barreto, Dom Theodosio
- Kayts, island of, 42, 49, 56; fort of, 56, 66, 187,
- Kelani river, 24, 113, 127, 132, 135, 181, 185



- Kelani valley, 29, 79, 124, 129, 133, 136, 137, 173, 190  
 Kelaniya, 220  
 Kelaniya temple, 219  
 Kilakarai, 215  
 Konesar temple, 67  
 Kopay, 51  
 Konnappu Bandara *see* Vimaladharmasuriya  
 Korales (districts), 12, 141, 156, 158  
 Korale vidanes, 12, 156  
 Kottapitya, 222  
 Kottiyar, 2, 10, 54, 67  
 Kulatunga Wickremasinghe, *see* Cosmo, Dom  
 Kumarasinha, named ruler of Uva, 55; marriage of, 70; campaigns against the Portuguese, 90, 103, 107, 115, 134, 135, 141; death of, 148  
 Kunambadda, 191  
 Kunjalis, 7, 44, 186  
 Kuruppu Rala, 138  
 Kuruwe, 202  
 Kuruwita Rala, campaigns against the Portuguese by, 10, 14, 23, 29, 31, 36, 39, 40, 51, 52, 172, rising against Senerat, 25-26, 33; and Mayadunne, 28; death of, 54  
 Kusumasanadevi *see* Catherina, Dona  
  
 Land grants, 145, 157, 161, 165, 166, 167, 191, 218  
 Land revenue, 142, 190, 215-226,  
 Land tax, 216  
 Land tenure, 215-226, 251  
 Lascarins, in war, 13, 36, 39, 45-46, 50, 51, 52, 69, 89, 92, 94, 97, 104, 109, 118, 121, 124, 125, 133, 137, 141, 152, 154, 156, 158, 188; disloyalty of, 23-24, 36, 47, 72, 83, 86, 100, 106, 109, 125, 127, 134, 140, 155; land grants to, 80-81, 173, 189, 218, 219, 225; commander of the, 76, 82, 83, 100, 101, 103, 107, 111, 119; settlements of the, 78-80, 173, 248; disease among the, 40; escort of, 27, 229, 230; in Jaffna, 48, 67, 68, 94, 169, 176, 188; at Trincomalee, 68; at Negombo, 75; at Sabaragamuwa, 113; at Batticaloa, 90; at Mannar, 234; at Chilaw, 230; at Galle, 130; in the Seven Korales, 31; of Matara, 158: number of, 188; in villages of the captain-major-of-the-field, 222; authority of the *vedor* and captain-general over, 164-165; religion of, 246  
 Lellopitiya, 40, 41, 96, 108  
 Liberty chests, 200  
 Lisbon, *conselho de fazenda* at, 19, 20, 87, 210; customs dues at, 200; *casa da India* at, 200  
 Lomba, Manoel Dias da, 221  
 Luis, Dom, 42, 48, 49, 50, 70  
 Luku Kumaran, 30  
 Lunugala hills, 107  
 Macao, 57, 64, 179, 180  
 Macedo, Lourenco Teixeira de, 75, 98, 131, 167  
 Macedo, Luis Teixeira de, 50, 52, 72, 73, 108, 146  
 Machado, Diogo Boto, 118  
 Madampe, 12  
 Madeira, Joao, 45  
 Maddegama Nuwara, 40, 52  
 Madrid, 20  
 Madura, 2, 144, 145, 204, 205; Nayak of, 84, 143, 144, 145, 151, 205, 206, 212; forces from, 154  
 Maha Astana *see* Rajasinha II  
 Mahabadda, 191, 192, 211  
 Mahagama, 152  
 Mahanaduwa, 161  
 Maha oya, 24  
 Mahaweli river, 151, 154  
 Magistrate, *see* *juiz*  
 Malabar coast, 3, 48, 142, 197, 200, 204, 240; fleet, 43, 45, 46, 186  
 Malacca, Portuguese capture of, 2; fleet from, 23; attacks on, 27, 57, 92; fleet of, 203  
 Maldives, 126  
 Malwana, 11: 27, 31, 76, 173, 177, 185, 231; fort of, 76, 77, 109, 111, 112-113, 116, 117, 133, 143, 149, 187, 232; convention of, 250  
 Manamperuma mohottala, *see* Jayaweera Bandara  
 Mandamaravita, 222  
 Mangalore, 147  
 Mangul korale, 202  
 Mannar, island of, 5, 174, 175, 179, 185, 232, 236; attacks on, 6, 7, 45, 132, 137, 151; missionary work in, 19; capture of, 6, 42, 43, 214, 215, 232, 234; Portuguese in, 42, 202; expedition to Jaffna *via*, 45; pearl fishery off, 48; battle near, 98; captain of, 6, 43, 44, 45, 46, 132, 212; fort of, 143, 149, 187; mutiny at, 152; factor of, 162, 168, 213, 234; Gulf of, 186, 212, 242; hospital of, 189; elephant sales at, 203, 205; Christians in, 240-242; cinnamon sent to, 199  
 Manoel, Dom, 82, 101, 102, 111, 112, 115  
 Manoel, Dom, king of Portugal, 196  
 Mantota, 179, 233, 234, 236, 240, 241  
 Marala, 237  
 Maravas, 151  
 Marinho, Balthazar, 171  
 Martim, Antonio, 58  
 Mascarenhas, Dom Antonio, 124, 131, 132  
 Mascarenhas, Dom Filipe, arrival in Ceylon 130; captain of Cochin, 122, 123; captain-general, 125-128,

- 165, 192, 235; making of *foral* of Jaffna, 179
- Mascarenhas Homem, Manoel, captain-general, 17, 57, 74
- Mascarenhas Homem, Manoel, *see* Naide Appu
- Masulipatam, 16, 145
- Matale, 55, 71, 93
- Matara, *disava* (post) of 52, 70, 76, 83, 90, 97, 126, 127, 132, 134; *disava* (province) of, 12, 25, 75, 97, 136, 202; campaigns in, 25, 26, 141,; port of, 29, 97, 217; king of, 135; missionary activity in, 243; *lascarins* of, 36, 82, 119, 134, 135, 140, 158; fear of rebellion in, 37; settlement of, 102; arecanut from, 211
- Mats, 191, 227, 231
- Mayadunne of Denawaka, 28, 29, 36, 39, 40, 42, 44, 51, 52, 53, 54, 172
- Mayadunne of Sitawaka, 3, 4, 5,
- Mayadunne of Uva, 14
- Mazagao, 38
- Meda *korale*, 157, 217, 221
- Mello de Castro, Diogo de, captain-general (1633-1635), 141-146, 201; captain-general (1636-1638), 147-154, 188, 201, 205, 229; captain of the Coromandel coast, 68-69, 128, 137; views on trade, 84; views on *vedor's* post, 166; evaluation of, 250
- Mello de Noronha, Francisco de, 129
- Mendonca, Andre Furtado de, 7, 8, 11, 202, 236
- Mendonca, Fernao de, 152
- Menezes Roxo, Dom Francisco de, 16, 57, 74, 162
- Menikkadawara, fort of, 24 76, 77, 90, 96, 99, 104, 109, 113, 114, 118, 143, 147, 153, 164, 187, 232
- Methiangane, 134, 236
- Miereles, Joao Teixeira, 130
- Milk, 233
- Miranda Henriques, Francisco de, 43
- Misericordia*, 62, 127, 246
- Missionary activity, 6, 11, 19, 22, 32, 42, 55, 59, 82, 86, 132, 160, 176, 212, 216, 218, 219, 220, 232, 233, 234, 236-246, 251
- Mocambique, 64, 71, 123, 126
- Mohottalas*, 12, 101, 156
- Mombaca, 137, 140
- Monis, Balthazar, 118, 121
- Morahela, 221
- Moratanne, 52, 141
- Motta Galvao, Antonio da, 47, 49, 50, 51, 132, 135, 140, 144, 146
- Motta, Manoel Mendes de, 113, 114
- Mudaliyars*, 12, 40, 41, 81, 82, 100, 102, 106, 134, 158, 170, 171, 175, 177
- Mughuls, 9, 27, 84, 138, 140, 204
- Mulleriyawa, 78, 102
- Munneswaram, 220, 222
- Muslims, community of, 1, 101; as traders, 2, 10, 15, 33, 130; expulsion of the, 84-86, 100, 110; emigration to Kandy of, 83, 93, 109
- Muthiyangana *vihara*, 105
- Muttettu*, 216
- Mutwal, 198
- Naide Appu, 61
- Nakalagama, 124
- Nallur, 47, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56
- Nazareth, Fr, Simao de, 240
- Negapatam, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 122, 145
- Negombo, port of, 1, 29, 36, 124; fort of, 66, 75, 109, 128, 129, 130, 131, 164, 187; captain of, 75, 230; customs dues at, 208; bastions of, 75
- Nikapitiya Bandara, 22-28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 52, 74, 81, 101, 172, 236, 237, 248
- Nindagama*, 216
- Noronha, Dom Miguel de, conde de Linhares, 99, 103, 125, 142, 143, 150, 166, 170, 180, 183, 199, 203, 204, 205, 225, 229, 242, 244, 249
- Nossa Senhora dos Milagres, church of, 49
- Nuwarakalawiya, 31
- Octroi duty, 208
- Oil, 229, 233
- Oliveira, Filipe de, *disava* of Seven Korales, 22, 23, 24; captain-major of the Portuguese forces, 39; expedition to and rule of Jaffna by, 45-51, 59, 72, 170, 176, 177, 232, 233, 240, 250; transfer of Jaffna's capital by, 55-56; assistance in fortification of Trincomalee and Batticaloa by, 68; death of, 94, 177, 178,
- Olive oil, 123
- Opanayake, 221, 222
- Order of Christ, 196
- Ormuz, 2, 64, 67
- Otu*, 216, 224
- Ouvidor*, of Ceylon, 37, 62, 152, 153, 159, 168-169; of Mannar, 43
- Pachchilappalai, 99, 170, 179
- Pacheco, Manoel, 122
- Paddy land, 216
- Paduwa* caste, 102, 193
- Pagoda* villages, 174, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221
- Palanquins, 136, 149
- Palk straits, 2
- Panadura, 127
- Panama, 26, 52, 54
- Pangaragama, 151
- Pangukarayas*, 215, 216, 224
- Pangus*, 215, 224
- Panikayas*, 202
- Pannayas*, 193, 202, 211, 224

- Paper, 229-230  
 Parakramabahu VI, 1  
 Pararajasingham, 42  
*Paravars*, 83, 128  
 Partition of Kotte, 3  
*Pasdun Korale*, 134, 211  
 Patanam, 55  
*Pattangutties*, 170  
 Pearls, 9  
 Pearl fishery, 48, 83, 84, 174, 185, 190, 212-215, 234  
 Peasantry, 16, 22, 30, 209, 224, 245  
 Pedro, Dom, 42  
 Peliyagoda, 78, 81, 102  
 Peixoto, Fr, Antonio de, 102, 138, 140  
 Pelmadulla gap, 104  
 Pepiliyana, 220  
 Pepper, 15, 144  
 Pereira, Dom Nuno Alvares, captain-general, 17, 19, 22-37, 180, 250; member of viceroy's council, 71, 73, 86, 88-89  
 Periyapulle Aratchi, 30  
 Periyapulle Chegarajasekeram, 6, 7  
 Persian Gulf, 57, 62, 64, 198, 199  
 Pessaert, Baerent, 151  
 Pessanha, Sebastiao, 205  
 Petition of 1636, 148, 210  
 Pimenta, Francisco Pinto, 66-67, 68, 69  
 Pina, Joao Cardoso da, 70, 71  
 Pinhao, Fernao, 59, 70  
 Pinho da Costa, Antonio de, 146, 197  
 Pinto, Luis Gomes, 31, 82, 97, 104, 108, 119  
 Pinto, Manoel, 131  
*Pitigal korale*, 75  
 Pitigaldeniya, 137  
 Point Pedro, 46  
*Pol aya*, 184, 227, 228  
 Pooneryn, 45, 46  
 Precious stones, 1, 9, 144, 211, 227, 228  
*Procurador*, 180  
 Pulicat, 44, 48, 128  
 Puliyantivu, 89, 91  
 Puttalam, 1, 74, 75, 230, 231  
 Puviraja Pandaram Pararajasingham, 7  
  
 Quit rents, 100, 143, 173, 210, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 225, 226, 227, 228  
  
 Ragunatha Nayak, 42, 48, 49, 50, 51  
*Rajakariya*, 110  
 Rajapaksha, Dom Jeronimo, 82, 107, 119, 120, 131  
 Rajasinha I, 4, 5, 6, 31, 58, 74, 85, 100, 101, 155, 173, 208, 237  
 Rajasinha II, prince of Kandy, 93; campaigns against the Portuguese, 113, 115, 119, 120, 130, 134, 141, 154-155; relations with Vijayapala, 137, 148, 249; relations with de Mello, 142, 148, 150, 153; treaty of 1634, 141; and the Dutch 151, 153  
 Rajjuru Maha Adhasin, 13, 14  
 Rakwana hills, 104  
 Rambukkana, 238  
 Rameswaram, 42; prince of, 48, 49, 50  
 Randeniwala, 108, 109, 111, 114, 115, 117, 140, 154, 155, 246  
 Ravasco, Miguel Pinheiro, 157, 174, 250  
 Rayigam Bandara, 3  
*Rayigam Korale*, 25, 29, 134,  
 Rebello, Fr, Pero, 240  
 Rebelo, Antonio, 118  
 Rebelo, Jacinto, 90  
*Recebedores*, 170, 231  
*Regimento*, 143, 144, 161, 162, 163  
*Relacao*, 168  
 Revenue collection, 158, 162, 165, 170, 176  
 Ribeiro, Balthazar, 26  
 Ribeiro, Francisco, 123  
 Rice, supply to Trincomalee, 69; cultivation of, 55; import of, 29, 123, 135; ration, 143, 144, 146, 188, 229, 231, 244, 245; destruction of crop of, 105; from *gabadagam*, 222; due to king of Jaffna, 233  
 Rilaula, 221  
 Rodriguez, Domingos, 26  
 Rodriguez, Dom Pedro, 44, 45, 46, 186  
 Roiz, Amaro, 145, 165, 174, 175, 178, 179, 225, 234, 250  
 Ropes, 191, 231  
  
 Sabaragamuwa, *disava* (province) of, 12, 36, 137; *disava* (post of), 90, 132, 221, 222; *lascarins* of, 101, 119, 122, 124, 134; arecanut from, 211; fort of, 24, 29, 36, 39, 40, 103, 104, 109, 113, 114, 115, 118, 143, 187, 221, 232; campaigns in, 22, 23, 24-25, 26, 39-417, capture of the fort of, 24-25, 33; missionary activity in, 239, 243  
 Sa de Menezes, Martimhovrenco de, 38  
 Sa de Miranda, Constantino de, 52, 69, 147, 152  
 Sa de Noronha, Constantino de, arrival of, 37; career of, 38-39; captain-generalship of, (1618-1621) 39-60, 158, 238; captain-generalship of (1623-1630), 62-110, 148, 155, 165, 166, 169, 172, 185, 187, 218, 222; evaluation as captain-general, 249-250  
 Salamanca, 20  
 Saldanha, Ayres de, 180  
*Salpiti korale*, 134  
 Salsete, 83, 84, 128  
 Salt, 86, 137; monopoly of, 87  
 Saltpetre, 123, 130, 135, 143, 144, 204-205  
 Samaradiwakara, Dom Jeronimo, 174  
 Sanches, Fernao, 181  
 Sankili (1519-1561), 5;

- Sankili (1616-1619), 30, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 56, 70, 93  
 Santa Apollonia, Fr, Francisco de, 122  
 Santa Maria, Dom Frey Andreas de, 236  
 Santiago, Fr, Eleutrio de, 66  
 Santos, Francisco Gomes dos, 37  
 Sao, Raimundo, Antonio de, 94  
 S.Thome, 84, 243; captain of, 137  
 Seixas, Joao de, 113  
 Seixas, Lancarote de, captain-major of Jaffna, 56, 94, 98, 177, 211, 225; views on Kandy, 72; wealth of, 81; appointment of as *vedor*, 99; as *vedor da fazenda*, 112, 113, 114, 125, 126, 128, 165, 175, 182, 197, 203, 233, 250; as captain-general, 116, 117, 118, 120-122, 124, 130; views on *disavas*, 158; death of, 178  
 Senkadagala, *see* Kandy, town of  
 Senerat, accession to throne, 14; and Nikapitiya, 23, 25-26, 30; and Kuruwita Rala, 23, 25-26, 27; and the Danes, 53, 54; and Sankili, 44; domestic policy of, 55, 109; envoys to, 66; and the Muslims, 85; negotiations with the Dutch, 16, 65; growth of power of, 71; request for daughter of Sankili by, 70; and the Portuguese, 22, 23, 26, 27, 31-36, 52, 63, 69, 72, 83, 86-101, 103, 137-140, 142, 248, 249  
 Service-tenure, 215, 216, 218  
 Seven Korales, *disava* (province) of, 3, 12, 202; *disava* (post) of, 22, 126, 132, 222; campaigns in the, 23, 24, 26, 45, 51, 52, 97, 137; impact of Nikapitiye's rebellion on, 31; *lascarins* of the, 31, 82, 107, 119, 120, 126, 131, 133, 134; traditional services of, 193, 211; missionary activity, 243  
 Seville, 20  
 Shipbuilding, 186  
 Silva da Cunha, Gomez da, 60, 61  
 Silva de Medonca, Dona Luiza da, 38  
 Silva, Joao da, 45  
 Silva, Pero da, 147, 149, 209, 213, 244  
 Silva, Vicente da, 127  
 Simao, Dom, 82, 101, 119, 122  
 Sinna Migapillai Aratchi, 30  
 Sitawaka, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 28, 74, 85  
 Siyane *Korale*, 82  
 Siyane *Korale* Bandara, *see* Balthazar, Dom  
 Slaves, 118, 124, 134, 193  
 Small-pox, 40, 56  
 Souza Chichorro, Goncalo de, 152  
 Souza Coutinho, Dom Antonio de, 111, 112, 116, 117, 118, 126  
 Souza, Pero Lopez de, 7, 8, 13, 109  
 South Indian mercenaries, 4, 46, 48  
 South Indian traders, 203  
 Sulubadda, 191  
 Tagus, river, 38  
 Talaimannar, 49  
*Talaiyars*, 170  
 Talampitiya, 52, 222  
 Tambalagama, 69, 203  
 Tanjore, 2, 6, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 70, 94, 204; Nayak of, 42, 48, 49, 51, 94, 142  
 Tenmarachchi, 170, 179  
 Tenreiro, Francisco, 135  
 Thirty year's war, 205  
 Tirunaveli coast, 212  
*Tombo*, of Kotte, 15, 79, 82, 94, 148, 157, 161, 166, 171-174, 184, 192, 193, 202, 208, 209, 217, 244; of Mannar and Mantota, 175; of Jaffna, 56, 99, 146, 162, 170, 175-179, 225; of *pagoda* villages, 220; of Two Korales, 157, 174  
 Tondaimannar, 51  
*Topazes*, 23, 90, 91, 104, 154, 187  
 Trade, Kandyan, 1-2, 14, 15, 35, 42, 55, 70, 88, 139, 150, 184; of Kotte, 1; Mughul-Persian, 73; Muslims in, 33, 84, 85; in the Indian Ocean, 17, 27, 42, 55, 74, 84; Far-Eastern, 57; private, 103, 150; in spices, 63, 73  
 Treaty of 1617, 31-36, 52, 55, 59, 65, 66, 67, 71, 138, 203, 237  
 Treaty of 1634, 139, 141, 203  
 Trincomalee, port of, 2, 10, 67, 92, 185, 203; Hindu temple at, 54, 67; access to, 59, 90, 93; fortification of, 65, 66-70, 248; garrison of, 68, 89, 91, 187, 249; captain of, 68, 87, 203; factor of, 94; fleet based at, 88, 130; attacks on, 95, 129; expenses of, 234; missionary activity in, 244  
 Tristao, Francisco, 177  
 Tuticorin, 67, 205; captain of, 213  
 Two Korales, 23, 24, 26, 39, 51, 103, 112, 157, 174, 239  
 Udugampola, 221  
 Udunuwara, 138  
 Uggalkaltota, 221  
 Ulapane, 222  
 Urkavalturai, 11  
 Uva, 26, 31, 51, 55, 93, 103, 104, 105, 107, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 134, 135, 148; governor of, 23; prince of, 103, 113, 119  
 Vadamarachchi, 170, 179  
*Vadugai* troops, 43, 46, 49, 97, 98  
 Valikamam, 170, 177, 179  
 Valladolid, 20  
 Vannarponnai, 46  
 Vanni, 48, 132, 137, 175, 179, 202, 203, 242  
 Vanniyars, 2, 10, 31, 67, 202, 206  
 Varuna Kulattan, 42, 43, 46, 49, 50, 51  
 Vaz, Barreto, Manoel, 118  
 Vaz Freire, Antao, 15, 157, 161, 162,

- 163, 166, 171, 172, 174, 184, 192, 193, 195, 202, 208, 209, 217, 220, 225, 244
- Vaz Freire, Diogo, 75, 76, 87
- Vedor da fazenda*, appointment of the, 99, 163; relations with the captain-general, 62, 86, 103, 128, 161, 162, 167, 169, 178, 249; views on Kandy, 72, 87; views on the *lascarins*, 80-81; in the captain-general's council, 32, 152, 153; powers and functions of the, 12, 15, 20, 71, 106, 112, 117, 143, 145, 157, 159, 160, 162-165, 167, 170, 175, 176, 179, 183, 191, 194, 196, 198, 213, 226; relations with the *ouvidor*, 169; residence of, 172; salary of, 229; attendants of, 229, 230
- Vedor da fazenda* of India, 21, 117
- Velho, Francisco Pereira, 47, 49
- Vereadores*, 180
- Vidana*, 106, 170, 191, 209, 211, 221
- Vidiya Bandara, 4, 5,
- Vidiya Bandara of the Seven and Four Korales, 14
- Viharagam*, *see pagoda* villages
- Vijayabahu, 3
- Vijayanagara, 2, 204
- Vijayapala, marriage of, 70; campaigns against the Portuguese by, 107, 115, 119, 133, 134, 141, 154, attempts to join the Portuguese by, 137, 248; relations with Rajasinha, 115, 148, 153, 154
- Villa Hermoza, Duque de, 20
- Vimaladharmasuriya, campaigns against Rajasinha I, 6; accession to the throne, 7; relations with the Portuguese, 6, 7-8, 10; and the Dutch, 10; and Muslim traders, 10; death of, 13, 194; successor of, 14, 26
- Walawe ganga, 17, 40, 190
- Wattala, 181
- Weavers, 193
- Weerasekera *Mudaliyar*, 81
- Weligama, 1, 66, 75, 76, 131, 135; *disava* of, 12
- Weligampitiya, 221
- Welitota, 131
- Wellassa, 26, 101
- Wellawaya, 127
- Westerwoldt, 187
- Wheat, 123
- Wickremasinghe, post of, 118
- Wijayakoon Bandara, 90
- Woodcutter, 193, 224
- Writer, 168, 180, 229, 230
- Zambesi, river, 137
- Zamorin of Calicut, 3, 7

229227



Chandra Richard de Silva - born 19th July 1940 - educated at St Peter's College, Colombo and the University of Ceylon, Peradeniya (1958-1962) - had a successful academic record winning many awards including the University Entrance Scholarship in 1957 and the Mabel Jayasuriya Prize for Ceylon History, (1962) soon after Completing the B. A. (History) Hons., Examination, (1962) was recruited to the Dept. of History, University of Ceylon, Peradeniya. He obtained in 1964 a postgraduate studentship for South-East Asia offered by the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and read for a Ph. D. (London) which he obtained in 1968. In 1970 he was awarded a Research Fellowship of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon. Publications include articles and booklets both in English and Sinhala - but this is his first major work.

# Some Women of the Mahavamsa

By MAUREEN SENEVIRATNE

Here are stories of some of the most remarkable women of former times. Ceylon's history as recorded in the Mahavamsa and Chulavamsa provide only a fleeting glimpse of her ancient heroines. Maureen Seneviratne has attempted to breathe more life into them. Basing her stories on the old texts, she recreates the drama, the passions, the triumphs and tragedies, the conflicts and adventures of their eventful lives against the vast fabric of history. Besides appealing to the general reader this book will be very useful to school children. It is bound to create a keener interest in ancient Ceylon history.

H. W. CAVE & COMPANY