கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Economic Review 1982.12

Page 1


Page 2
VOTING PATTERNS AT PRESIDENTHAE, ELE
O
U. N. H.
S. E. F. P
OTHERS
 
 

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dے
CTAT
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ON
At the Presidential Elections in OCto cer the ruling party's candidate received the highest majority of the Votes in 21 of the 22 districts, the exception being Jaffna. In four of the districts, namely, Jaffna, Trinccimalee, Baticaloa and Wanni the demarcation is thin between the votes of the UNP and SLFP and the picture is further distorted by the high number of abstentions and also the influence of the TULF in these districts.
In the Other 18 districts there appears to be a pattern where the UNP obtained convincing majorities in half the number (the 9 denoted by stripes). in the Cther half (the 9 den Oted by dots) also the UNP obtained a majority, but the SLFP minority victa wa s not as low in these as in 9 districts denced by stripes. (Kurunegala which received almost a 56 percent UNIP vote is a borderline case, but since the SLFP vote Was 40 percent here it falls into the latter category).
Percentage of votes in 9 of the 18 di Strict,S Where the UNP fared be St.
District UNP SLFP 1. N, u wara. Eliya 63.1 33.1 2. Kandy 59.8 36.9 3. Puttalam 59.1 36 7 4. Badulla 58.7 368 5. Matale 58.1 36.7 6. Colombo 57.7 36.6 7. Kegalle 57.0 369 8. Digamadulla 56.4 33.0 9. FJ'OnnaruWa 56.3 35.3
Percentage of votes in 9 of the 18 districts. Where the SLFP fared best.
District SLFP UNIP 1. Ratnapura, 44.1 51.0 2. Kalutara, 44.1 502 3 Anura dhapura 43.5 49.9 4. Gampaha, 43.3 52.5 5. Matara, 43.3 49.3 6. Galle 430 50.2 7. MOnaragala 42.5 494 8. Kurunegala 401 55.8 9, Hambant Ota, 38.7 46.0
In the nine districtS den Oted by Stripes the UNP's candidate received ver 56 percent of the votes, going up from 56.7 percent in Polonnaruwa to 63.1 percent in Nuwara Eliya. In all these nie district.S. the SLFP'S candidate recei, ed less than 37 percent of the vote, ranging from 32.9 percent in Digamad'Ulla to 36.9 percent in Kandy. The majorities in these nine districts Were clear and the differences in voting strength very marked.
In the other nine districts, denoted by dots, the UNP once again received a majority of the votes, but the gap betWeen the UNP Vote and SLFP is not aS in arked. In these 9 di Stricts the SLFP vote has varied between 38.7 percent at Hambantota to 44.1 percent at Ratnapura Leaving out the 4 districts of the Northern and Eastern provinces, generally there is a clear pottern. Where the UNP received its largest number Of V Ctes the VOte for the SLFP WaS COnsiderably low. On the other hand, Where the SLFP faired best (even though it did not receive majorities) the UNP vote was not as overwhelming, as in the case of the 9 where it received large majorities.

Page 3
Économia (REVEV
Published by the People's Bank Research Department
Head Office, sirchittampalam A. Gardin Colombo 2. Sri Lanka
THE Economic REVIEW is intended to promote knowledge òf and intérest in th, economy and economic development process by a many sided presentation of views & reportage, facts and debate. THE ECONOMIC REVIEW is a community service project of the People's Bank. its contents, however, are the result of editoria considerations only and do not necessarily reflect Bank policies or the official viewpoint. Signed feature articles also are the persona views of te authors and do not represent the institutions to which they are attached Similar contributions as we as comments and viewpoints areas welcome. THE ECONOMIC REVIEW is published nonthly and is available both on subscription and on direct sale
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瑟
Nię 3 December 1982
CONTENTATS
FEATURES
basena Rasaputrain 14 The current World economic Scene and its impact on developing countries K. N. Raj 18 The Global Slump and "Rules of
the Game”
Siri Gamage i 24 The marriage pattern of Sri Lanka W. J. G. Mendis 27 Small and medium towns in Sri
Lanka: a situational analysis and their planning significance
SPECIAL REPORT
3 NATIONAL ELECTIONS
G. S. Waidyanatha 6 The shift towards the UN P:
a district-wise analysis
H. L. Hemachandra 11. The vote in the Nothern and
Eastern Provinces
COLUMNS
Diary of Events 2 October - November 1982
icides—how necessary and evil; 食 comprehensive survey of
uses and impact in Sri Lanka with and expansion of multinational banking in Singapore sibilities in inland fisheries for developing the peasant nomy of the dry zone ' ' '
palika Fernando and Palitha Kannangara
: Readers please note that from the January 1983 issue there will 1 change in the price of the Economic Review. The new price is copy and Rs. 40/- for an annual subscription.

Page 4
11
14
18
28
29
30
Oct.
DARY O
An International Agreement on Jute Products was adopted in Geneva by the 50-nation UN Conference convened under UNCTAD auspices within the Integrated Programme for Commodities. The Agreement will come into force on 1 July 1983 if by that date three governments accounting for at least 85 per cent of net world exports and 20 governments representing at least 65 per cent of net world imports have signed the Agreement, declaring themselves to be bound by it, or have ratified it.
TurnOver talv levied On the busineSS Of an architect or a consultant in respect of construction work was reduced from 10 per cent to 5 per cent, according to an announcement in the Gazette Extraordinary.
The risk of the banking crisis plunging the World Înto real depreSSion is “Undoubtedly higher tham for many years past” stated the IMF's former Managing Director Witteveen, according to the EcOmOmisti,
Experts from tea-producing and tea-consuming
countries Who met in Gene:Va tO COnsider minimum
export standards for black tea decided that they would need to convene again to continue their work.
An agreement was signed with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for a loan of US Dollars $ 16.1 million (Rs. 336.5 million approximately). The proceeds of the loan will be utilised for a Technical Education Project.
Four agreements were signed with the Government of Canada, for a total grant of Canadian Dollars 15.6 million (Rs. 226 million approximately) The proceeds of these grants are to be utilised in the Maduru Oya Project, Technical Assistance (C$ 1.8 min) ; Water resources management project in the Mahaweli Development Area (CS 2.8 min); Establishment of a planning and survey unit in the Mahaweli Authority (C$ 1.0 min); and the supply of wheat grain as food aid during the period of 1982/1983 (Cs 100 mm).
The Government announced a downward revision in the retail prices of wheat flour and bread in view of the declining prices of wheat grain in the world market. Flour was reduced from R.S. 6/55 to RS. 5/95 per kg. and bread from Rs. 2/70 to Rs. 2/50 per 450 gms. -
An agreement was signed with the US Government for a loan of US Dollars 15 million (R.S. 313.5 million approximately) to be utilised for the purchase of about 90,000 metric tonnes of wheat grain under the PL 480 Title I Programme for the fiscal year 1983. -
Brazil can finance its $14 bm. current account deficit until the end of the year, Planning Minister Netto promised western bankers, reported the Economist. Meanwhile, Argentina, agreed with the IMF for a $1.5 bn. stand-by facility; while Chile was likely to get $900 min... from the IMF.

EVENTS
Nov.
2 The Vote on Account for 1983 intended to provide parliamentary approval for a certain amount of expenditure and advances out of the Consolidated Fund during the period commencing list January 1983, was approved by Parliament. The first vote on account presented in the country was in 1931; this was the fifth. The Government raised the authorised limit on Treasury Bills from Rs. 18,000 million to Rs. 23,000 million. The previous increase in the limit from Rs. 13,000 million to Rs. 18,000 million was in No| vember, 1981. 3. The Stamp Duty Act No. 43 of 1982 was enacted by Parliament. The Act provides for the imposition of Stamp Duty on instruments such as deeds, share certificates, etc. and documents such as affidavits, summons etc. Two major features incorporated in the new Act are: firstly, the increased role of the Notary Public in the payment of stamp duty and the facility to accept cash in lieu of Stamp duties in the court proceedings; secondly, the banks to pay stamp duties in cash, and enterprises with a large number of employees to pay stamp duties on salary receipts in cash. 4. The Food Commissioner announced reduction in the imported raw and pair boiled rice from Rs. 6/00 to Rs. 5/60 per kg. The price of local par boiled rice was reduced four days later from Rs. 5/70 to Rs. 5/60 per kg. The government withdrew the export duty on ground cinnamon in bulk or packed and cinnamon quills in cut pieces. This measure was intended to compensate for relatively higher expenses involved in processing, packing and marketing of such products for export. 6 Poland's Western Bankers agreed to the rescheduling of $2.3 bin. of debts due this year, reported the Economist. O The Central Bank announced that its foreign exchange transactions with commercial banks operating in Sri Lanka will be done exclusively in United States Dollars. Under the new arrangements the Central Bank will buy and sell US Dollars for spot delivery at rates to be announced in the morning of every working day. 12 An Agreement was signed between the Government of Sri Lanka, and K.C.P. Ltd., of India, for the construction of a factory for the Sevanagala Sugar Development Project. The annual capacity of the new factory is expected to be around 27,000 tons of Sugar. The estimated cost of the factory is US $ 29.8 million including a foreign exchange cost of US $ 21.3 million which will be funded by a loan from the Asian Development Bank. Letters were exchanged between the Governments of Italy and Sri Lanka providing for a grant of US Dollars 1.1 million (approximately Rs. 23 million). The proceeds of this grant will be utilized for the import of 5,000 metric tons of soft wheat flour during 1983. 2 Construction work on the Randenigala Project, the final and the largest of the major reservoirs under the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Programme, was inaugurated.
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982

Page 5
%
NATIONAL
The statistical analysis of elec
tion results in this issue is a Straightforward matter. Yet the Statistical trends, that emerge and have been analysed, depend O actual human actions and motivations. These actions of voters have been influenced to a large extent by the social perceptions of the groups from which they come. It is these groups whose votes 3.e canvassed in the electioneering process and are consciously or unconsciously Wooed by political parties. In Our two issues on the election of 1977 (May 1977 and July 1977) we Sketched what the groupS Were. We Outline here S.One of these groupings together With the new social elements that have been introduced into the country since 1977 and which we believe have played a significant part in the 1982 electiOnS.
The Sri Lankan Social Structure has been influenced in turn by its pre-colonial 'feudal' past, a colonial economy and the post
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982
ELECT
colonial situation. S the Social Strata, c. these stages still from the feudal pa pockets of a clas With life styles ren feudal past. The sion brought with eCOn Omy and a Kle together with a di local peasantry in try and the introdu India of a large e The 19th century emergence Of neurs providing fu to the main Coloni ther, the introduc mercial ecCthomy roads into areas in ture untouched by and transformed tih ter.
In the post in With the initial em substitution there arising associated
 

|ONS
Some remnants of orresponding to Survive. Thus, st, there are still SSical peasantry niniscent of the 2 colonial in Curit a plantation w ruling strata. sruption of the the hill counLction from South state proletariat. also saw the local entrepreinctions ancilliary all presence. Furtion of a conmade deep, inthe social structhe plantations
eir entire chara.C-.
dependence era phasis on import WeΙΘ ηeν gΙΟι 19S | With the im
ELECTORAL PREFERENCES
A major part of the country's electorate has always been with one of the two leading political parties, as seen in this diagram. With the exception of 1956, the ruling UNEP appears to have enjoyed considerable popularity throughout and its upward Swing is most marked in the recent elections of 1977 and 1982.
port substitution process. This new class rapidly rose to challenge the dominance of the old plantation class and began to compete with it, particularly around the 1970's in the economic sphere.
A significant aspect of the socioeconomic changes in Sri Lanka from independence in 1948 upto the 1977 changes and after was the gradual erosion of the predominant position of the plantation elite. The latter Were Successfully challenged through the medium of the electoral process and associated patrOImage politics) by the rural lower middle classes, SOme of whose members had risen to occupy as a group a predominant position. This new class reached market and other limits within the country and was actively engaged in a process of forming new linkages economically countries in the 'centre'. It also bes gan to forge strong links with the remnants of the earlier plantation elite (the plantations themselves were largely nationalised in the mid 70's, with compensation) which had now diversified into new activities,
A national election symptomatic of the new changes in the country was that of 1977. Here the United National Party, the old plantation allied party at Independence, with a new refurbished image, W.On 魏 resounding victory which was in many ways as significant an event as that of the 1956 election. As a Watershed it signified in a sense the completion over a twenty-year period-1956 to 1977-of significant changes, and the partial amelioration of the strong cultural and social contradictions between the rural lower middle class and the Colombo based upper strata that existed at Independence. Taking these
This Special Report on “National Elections' was prepared immediately after the Presidential Elections in October 1982, but eventually held over for publication till after the Referendum in Decemher. The analysis is therefore restricted to the October Elections.

Page 6
changes to a 'logical' conclusion the Government since 1977 has attempt2d a determined relinking of the economy with the world economy. It has invited transnational investment and liberalised imports, provided strong incentives to private entrepreneurs, combined with a curtailment of subsidies, and economic management of the COuntry has been carried on under IMF and World Barak advice,
Since 1977 new social groups have energed Corresponding to the dramatic new changes in the economy. The economy has exerienced an im Ort led growth in the trade sector, based on liberalised imports (with at present a resulting massive trade gap). Apart from the trading, the other main Sector Of expanSiOn, Was COinStruction. A SigInificant area of economic activity was the Mahaveli Development Programme, with its massive construction efforts, together with the housing construction programme. Further, the Free Trade ZAOle (though on some key criteria the
FTZ, has yet to prove itself) has had an impact on the country.
These new economic activities
Occurred without a related increase in export earnings or any dramatic increase in the Sphere of local industrial production. The new dynamic sectors of the economy, however, gave rise to new powerful Strata. Such as contractors and agents for foreign firms (who earned very high incomes), and those large commercial houses involved in imports. The corresponding spread of these activities which centred around these strata, gave rise in the trading sector, for example, to a proliferation of shops throughout
the country, as well as Of SUoContractors throughout large Sections of the country. The spread
effects of these has resulted in a certain aneliroation of unenoloyment, as well as a partial trickle down effect on in COrnes,
These then were among the social groups that were the hidden actors in the electoral drama. These social strata, are largely the horizontal strata, but in addition there are also vertical Strata, that play a part in the consciousness of the people. These include “racial” g'OUIJOS Such as Sinhalese, Tamils or MuSlims, religious ones Such as Budidhist, Hindu or Christian, caste groupings etc.
It is on this tapestry of vertical 3.And horizontal divisions of society that the electOrate articulates its will. It is in the manner that these groups perceive political reality that produces a particular election result. However, perceptions of reality are not autonomous willed acts of groups. The groups themselves are subject to pressures
4.
and COnditi Gini through the mec consciousness in their “true’ objec COnSCiOuSneSS COU perceive quite tives from thei
A Significant change over the the removal of st Cultural di Spar: and country and ombo based Eng. Stratum and the Speaking COuntry minant process penetration of which resulted i In short, the sh; a Cultural natur prime motive fac of 1956 vanished The country was rally colonised', now led to ai COintry. COinSE no sharp cultur ween those in cles and those with regard to hero figures and values. A writer Research Depart On the role of mechanics of SOC Lanka, in 1980, Ceylon Studies : War Economic
of Vrye Were rospect the no protest and its Independence Sr. tural protest Occ 50’s When the II class gained part acted against tr ombo groupS, T culture of the l itself included O culture transmitt tury and Since The overt dema tatives of the obtaining State phasise a return ed vaS g traditiC years later with tion of the urba of the ecOnOnmy the annelioration and cultural cle2 town and count by Some element. class reaching u the overt; cultul minimised. In it formation, with upper classes for the world eco O. direct entry of into the whole c. is now re-linked World economic Sociall and Cultur

g for example dia, So that their ay not represent tive situations. False ld make groups different perspec
Objective needs.
I trend of social last 25 years was he large social and ity between town between the COlish Speaking upper Sinhala, and Tamil ySide. The predowas the commercial the rural Sectos in this amelioration. arp dichotomies of e which were the tors of the election by the late 1970's. still being “cultubut the conduits Corners of the 2duently there was al cleavage bettColombo upper ciroutside, particularly their aspirations, even perhaps core from the Bank's ment commenting culture in the cial changes in Sri pointed out (at a Seminar on Post
Development).
to examine in revement of cultural aftermath in post
i Lanka.: the Culsurred in the late ural lower middle
ial state power and
he anglicised ColChe ideology and Ower middle class
ockets of colonial ed in the 19th centhen internalised. ad of the represenural lower class in power was to emto what it imaginna culture. Twenty a deeper integrain and rural sectOrS of Sri Lanka and of the gross social avage between the ryside, exemplified s of the rural middle pper class status, a conflicts Were S place a new social
the
ny, provides today a
Cultural influenCeS ountry. The country not only to the system but also the a One.'
contemporary ging new links with
"Although the Cultural aspirations between town and countryside have got lessened over the last few decades, yet with the recent rising Cost of living and widening income gaps, a new social strata, having very high purchasing power has emerged. The ability to Consume the new cultural symbols are today however not necessarily uniform. CulGuiral aspirations across the nation may be largely uniform but the ability to acquire the cultural symbols are limited to only a few. Whether this widening social and economic scheme would lead to a new straturn uSing culture as a tool of protest is at this stage too premature to predict’.
Clearly the election results indicate strongly that the schisms or their perceptions had not been sufficiently wide to create a different consciousness. Wide access to aspects of the import led boom - although with different strata having different access-meant that a strong subjectively felt differentiation had not emerged. This was true even though SOne Studies have indicated that access to some basic items, such as food, anOng certain Sections of the population, had very probably decreased (See for example Economic Review, March 1982, special issue on Food and Society).
Economic Background to the Election
The policy reforms since late 1977 were designed to move the economy away from the existing goverment intervention and COintrol S. In keeping with this policy the exchange rate was unified and allowed to float, most import payment restrictions were relaxed and price controlS di Smantled. This resulted in a liberalization of the economy and marked changes in relative prices Which were expected to boost prOduction and stimulate exports. A significant result, however, WES the import led trade boom which in turn led to a soaring import bill and a comparatively slower growth in export earnings and has resulted in a widening trade gap. While imports expanded by over 150 per cent exports have expanded by less than 40 per cent during this period. It is an unfortunate fact that this growth strategy had to be tried and tested in an entirely hostile international economic environment.
Further, the attention of the Government had to be engaged in Cushioning the public from the elffects of global and domestic inflation. There was a high rate of inflation, which was Serious in the 1980/81 period. And when the exchange depreciation occurred against the background of this inflationary situation the entire position was
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982

Page 7
aggravated. In the Economic Review of February 1982 We drew attention to this situation. When we stated that “the high inflation in the country (caused by factors other than exchange depreciation) leads to exchange depreciation which in turn becomes a further contributory factor to the inflation. The exchange depreciation is at Once an adjustment to the already existing inflation in the country as well as a contributory factor to the inflation. Inflation and exchange rate depreciation has begun to Operate in a cycle. One leading to the other'.
After 1980 inflation accellerated sharply, the budgetary position began to grow un manageable, and the increase in the current account deficit quickly outpaced the growth in available concessional aid and investment flows. The result was that for the first time since 1975 net foreign exchange reserves began to decline and Sri Lanka was forced to undertake short-term and COmmercial borrowings on a significant to finance the payments de盘Cit,
Furthermore, government revenues did not come upto expectations While the impOrt cOsts Of eSsential commodities and inflationary pressures upset government's expenditure programme. The weakening in the government expenditure mechanisms also resulted in heavy bank borrowings in order to finance persistent budget deficits. All these factors posed a threat to the government's development strategy and its liberalised economy policy. In Order to bring the situation under control major cuts were introduced in the public investment, programme and attempts were made to redesign this programme in line with the new reSource realities. A concorted effort Was therefore made to stabilize domestic prices, reduce the externa resource imbalance and switch composition of investment towards (3ick-gestation and leSS capital-intensive and energy-intenSive projectS.
The increase in the cost of living
Was also reaching dangerous levels. The government was left helpleSS to do anything except create employment opportunities to permit the people to earn adequate wages to meet these costs.
There were significant growth
areas over the 1977/81 period, des
pite the problems of the economy. The period from 1982, however, appeared to be one of greater stability particularly for the price level. The deflationary measures adopted by the Government, aided by the world recession, helped to hold back the inflationary process which had caused considerable concern to the people and the government. Moreover, the paddy farming sector had
EconoMIC REviEw, DECEMBER 1982
Pistrict Colombo Gampaha Kalutara Kandy
Matale Nuwara Eliya Galle - Matara Hamba infota jafna
Wanni Batticaloa Digamadulla Trincomalee Kurunegala . Pitalam Anura dihapura ... Polioninaruwa Bądu łą Monera gala Ratnapura Kegalle
B* Bonus Seats
contributed to Size production during from 1977 and th though having to inputs, had reaped the increasing pric erS earned HOre more money than fore. In the
liberalised econom goods in plenty fo had more money in tendency towards large Sections of t rated by the 'open and the desire to situation, was a chological factor
ti vya S in Such an the ecOmOmic iSSule the election; alth iSSueS did not C since the persona evidently more sig
Extraipeolating til Results to a C
The issies, peri
parties present at
Election were not
in a general elect
dential electi On it Often a Clash ult two personalities. election showed,
noinic factors We very much in det local issues at th di SCUSSed. It is the to extra 2C late the sidential election 1 tion and then in about What the re election WOuld ha held during the
Sidential electio arties such as
Party which supp and the TULE the election, woul

lo. of seats B* U.N. P. B. S.L.F. P. B. S. L.T.C. P. B. J. V.P
2彗 13 7 量器 ! 8 5 5 2 7 4. 莺 2 2. 6 3 2. 11 1 5 5 9 ! 4 4 7 2
0 2 4. 4. 5 2 4. 6 3 2 4 2 鲁 9 6.
亨 4. 7 3 3. 李 2 器 !,4 4. 2 {} 5 4. 5 4.
96 2 95 - 72 6
116
able increases in the five years is sector in turn, pay more for its the benefits Of e level. The farmand handled far they ever did bemeantime the y made available )r those Who now n their hands. The consumerism by ;he people, geneeconomy' policies maintain this significant Syfor the electorate. environment that is were faced in ouh the economic Ome to the fOre lity factor WaS Inificant.
he Presidential legaera Election
sonalities and the the Presidential identical to those ton. In the Presibecame quite imately between And, as this the major eCOce not discussed ail, neither were e electoral level refore, not correct results of a Preo a general elecLake predictions sults of a general We been Were time Of the Prel. Furthern Ore, the Communist orted the SLFP, which boycotted d also probably
contest a general election so that the end result would be different.
However, taking into account these reservations, we have attempted in the table above to see what the major parties would have Scored if a general election followed the pattern of the Presidential election. We have applied the provisions in the Constitution which define the process of elections according to Proportional Representation and have arrived at the figures. The figures indicate that on a popular vote the UNP would have won 95 seats and the SLFP 72 seats, the Tamil Congress 6 seats and JVP 1 seat. However, the conStitution aliOWS also for an extra Seat for the party that has a majority in each particular district. The UNP won 21 of the districts and the Tamil Congress the remainder. On this basis, the UNP gets 21 bonus seats and the Tamil Congress One. This gives a final tally of UNP 116 seats, SLFP 72, TC 7 and JVP 1.
The October Presidential Election was held two years before it was finally due. There were many reasons given for the advancement of this date. It was accepted that the ruling party had a positive advaritage in its well-knit organisation and astute leadership; though the Fresident himself listed (in a postelection interview with foreign COrrespondents) the Search for political advantage when the Opposiion was in disarray as one of the main reasons for the advancement of the date. The significance of the ultimate result of the election can now be seen in a more clear perSpective. President J. R. Jayewardene was given a fresh mandate to carry on till 1989, thus indicating the direction of the political situation till the end of the decade.
<

Page 8
THE SHIFT TOWARDS THE UNP: A DSTR
W. G. S. Waidyanatha
In the 1982 Presidential pol 194G K the United National Party gained sq-T majorities in 21 out of the 22 districts of the island. An attempt is made here to examine the percent- 1. age-wise change and pattern of votes polled by the UNP in each district 卧 in 1982 in relation to its performance in 1977. At times, however, în order to clarify the analysis, it is necessary حجم ಫ್ಲಿಕ್ಜೆ to the number of WOTES O e Sri Lanka. Freedom Party polled in this election. It == should also be noted that at the Presidential Election the United National Party was supported by the pses Ceylon Workers Congress; while, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party was the Mahajana. Eksath Peramuna, a ைைஆஇ section of the Lanka. Sama Samaja Party and a few other left splinter ജം *"°"H** 197f th t ded i
In 197 e
y party Succeeded in 36
--
鳄
s
obtaining over 50 percent of the votes cast in 16 out of 22 districts. In 9 of these 16 districts namely Colombo, Kurunegala, Matara, Ba- Ο dulla, Puttalam Hambantota, Matale and Polonnaruwa the UNP won over 55 percent of the total votes. This position was not reflected in the re- O sults of the 1982 Presidential Elec- い) tion when the number of districts in which the UNP obtained over 50 percent of the vote was reduced अ+== to 14. The districts where this majority was gained also changed somewhat from the 1977 position, پچیسینڑل Thus the Mataifa Hambantota, 霞 Anuradhapura and Moneragala districts where the UNP received over 50 percent of the vote in 1977 registered majorities of below 50 per- R cent in 1982. On the other hand, (り
he UNP's share of the votes cast
--
in Colombo, Kurunegala, Kandy, 3g Badulla, Kegalle, Puttalam, Digama -T-
dulla, Nuwara-Eiiya. Matale and Polonnaruwa districts even exceed- 369Hمیس ed the 55 percent mark in 1982. Moreover, the share of the UNP votes cast in the Nuwara-Eliya. District increased by 20.14 percent Over its 1977 position.
Compared with the 1977 Situation, in 1982 the UNP increased its vote in 10 districts, while it poled less than in 1977 in 12 districts (See table On Page 9). However, with the exception of the Jaffna 36 جس District the UNP had clear maj9 rities in all other districts in 1982, »። 9 The graphs on the following pages سسسسسسسسسسسلسسسسسسضسا indicate the extent of change and behaviour patterns of the UNP vote over each preceding general இ& election in each district. In order to gauge the tendencies in the ݂ ݂ ඌ GNB vote this year, it would ; ट्रĪ=→ be useful to examine the movement 玄
i5
بیخی
or change from the 1977 position to 疹邯= that of 1982.
This may be ascertained through a comparison of the votes cast in 3كـل سسسسبنسله 6

CT-W-SE ANALYSS
೫2 1956 ಕ್ಲಿಂ ಕ್ಲಿಂ 1965 19Tಂ 1977 1982 一 Γ 事 T
لس. -
f
کس سے
ECONOMIC REVIEw, DECEMBER 1982

Page 9
favour of the UNP in each district in 1977 and in 1932. In the graphs reproduced on these pages the line indirating zero could be identified as the total of votes polled in the previOus election year. The increaSe OI decrease in tile amount of votes
received in a particular year WaS therefore measured with the Zer0 line denoting the base year. Thus,
the percentage change at any elec
|94င္ |952 |95e . [ငါ့ခိဉ
tion is the point line. On this ba toral districts th gains in 1982 is
trictS Cf Kand Vanni, Batticaloa. madulla..
The increase in the Kandy dis ably related to a larity of the Sri
{ c» 96.O. 1985 197O
T ش236
O
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3o
ECONOMIC Review, DECEMBER 1982

away from this Sis of all 22 elechighest rate of vident in the dis, Nuwara-Eliya, Jaffna and Diga
in the UNP votes 3rict is also probdrop in the popu
Lanka Freedom
9 ፖ7 !Q82
•
-
لسسسسسسسسسسسسلسسسسسسسسسسسلس
Party tinat prevailled in 1977; (in 1981. 38.9%, in 1977 32.7%) a heavier vote from the Estate Tamil Labour in the district in its favour; (Percentage of eState Indian Tamil Votes in Kandy was 1981) and the progovernnant vote of the business minded Muslim community who have benefited from the liberalized economic policy of the government in Such areas as Akurana, Uudunuwara and GaminOola.
A notewortly feature of the poll in the Jaffna District is that the UNP vote at the Presidential election had gone up by 17.05 percent Over 1977 figure, whilst SLFP gained 33.94% and Tamil Congress received 44% of the votes. The ellement Of distOirtion due to the nonparticipation of the TULF is also to be noted. One interpretation of the heavy non TULF vote may be interpreted as a vote against vioence. Inspite of the TULF boycott part of this vote was cast and could possibly have switched to the UNP though most of it went in favour of the Tamil Congress candidate. HOWever, this UNP vote was much less than the votes received by the other rival party candidates from the All Ceylon Tamil Congress and Sri Tankā, FreedOin Party.
Comparing the number of VOtes polled in 1977 and 1982 it is observed that the number of votes polled by the UNP's Presidential candiate in the Nuwara-Eliya district was the highest polled by this party in the entire island. It amounted to 63.10 percent of the total votes polled in the district. Even though the UNP was generally strong in this district at the last Parliamentary elections, the UNP vote in 1977 was less than that of i970. 1977 3.2% less than 1970}) The te are Several reaSOMS why the UNP was able to increase its share of the poll by so large a margin in 1982 over the 1977 figure.
A fair percentage of the population and of the voters in this district (the Iridian Tamil population in the Nuwara-Eliya, district was 47.5% of its population in 1981, though all do not enjoy the franchise) are mainly estate workers of Indian origin. In the 1977 General Elections, they registered their vote in favour of the Ceylon Workers Congress andi Succeeded in electing an MP from One annong them. Since 1946 this M.P., who opted to support the UNP which came to power in 1977, was also elevated to Cabinet rank and estate workers were probably able to Cbtain facilities earlier denied to them. Further, the process Of enfranchi Sement Of the estate population of Indian origin on the basis of the Sirima-Shastri Pact was accelerated. Tnis M.P. who represented them canvassed their vote in Support of the UNP's candidate in 1982, which was very probably the principal factor that influenced the 7

Page 10
vote so heavily in favour of the UNP in the Nuwara-Eliya district.
In the case Of the Battical Oa district, the UNP polled 14.59 percent more votes than in 1977. In this district, the number of votes polled by the UNP since 1960 July election had increased steadily till 1970; but in 1977 it dropped by 10.9 percent. Tine principal reason for the drop in 1977, was the presence of the TULF. Thus, the increase in the UNP vote in 1982 by 14.59 percent over the figure for 1977 surpassed even the majority it held in 1970. Here the UF joycott was not as effective and the turnout, was 71 percent as against a turnout of 46 percent in the Jaffna district. Besides, it also possibly shows that a Section of the Tamil population had apparently rejected tie terrCrist activities resorted to in the Jaffna district. Also in this di Stric, it appears tha the Muslim communiy (where welthier elements have always been traders) Weich had berlefited from the liberalised trade policy of the present governient had largely supported the UNP.
On the basis of an all-island percentage of votes polled by the UNP, it appears that the party was more popular in the central region than in the imaritime provinces. Thus in the districts of the Southern prOvince in particular the UNP's popularity appeared to drop somewhat from the position it held in 1977. For example, the UNP vote dropped by 4.26 percent in the Galle district, by 5.97 percent in the Matara district and by 9.72 per Cent in the Hambantota district. The presence of the Janatha, Virukthi Peramuna (a new political party in the contest) which depended for the support on the young voter, could be one of the causes for this drop in the UNP vote. In 1977 a large part of the anti-SLFP youth vOte, was cast in favour of the UNP. Part of this yote may have been diverted to the JV- in 982. On the other hand, if Galle and Matara, districts the other traditional left party in the contest polled considerably less votes in 1982 than in 1977; while the SLFP with Communist Party support polled more votes in 1982 than in 1977; one interpretation being that the left vote had significantly shifted to the SLFP in 1982. Also, though it appears that the drop in popularity of the UNP in the Southern Province may have been the result Of was mainly in Matara, and Galle districts that the SLFP increaSed an increase in the SLFP vote; it ifS vOte in the South. The COmmunist Party received 16 percent of the votes in the Matara district and 6 percent, in the Galle district in 1977 and a large part of this vote could have gone to boost the SLFP vote.
While (INP popularity in the Hambantsia district too has dropped
8
1946
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『ア) |952 |95ဓ |ာ်ခိÓ |်ခိ6 |9ဓ5 197ာ၊ |977, 1982
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ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982

Page 11
9ses
اني
●李●言9é2。
s 9
g |豊g○
3, so
12
1965
| =
홍 is YO፰)
~ ܢܠ リ_ ܐܠ
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assa དེ་ - } V S.
, كامير 意 \ 江 いイ Y~~
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శాస్త్ర 量 量
foy, 9.72 per cerat, the increase in the SLEF's popularity in that District ai been marginal. On the Whole, the other candidates together have increased their total vote here from 7.58 percent in 1977 to 15.37 percent
percentage of the in this di Striç t nn tät fhe dissident royed over to the Matale is 310 Which the UNIF ha Gercentage Of VO
ARGES EN THE UNEP’S WOTE FFORVEI 19?? "TO
in 1982. The comparatively high
gistrict
!. Īvā iya, 2. Jaffna 3. VFanni 4. Batticalga 5. Gilgama di Ulla 6. Kandy i. E2ätt33. 8. Kegalle 9. Tiflih Cormatee O. Cuombo 11. Ganapaha 12. Ku'legia 13. Badulla 14.- Ք.31:)titia: : Wa 15. Retilag:Ara 16. Klutara, 17. Ant113 αίμaυιira, 18. Mioneragala
9. Cale 20. Matale 21. Matar, 22. Haban tota
Econorific REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982
% of votes pesj Ped
1977 }g
42.96 63.G 2.58 19.64 30.82 46.42 2546 垒{}鲁多 44.48 56.39. 532 59.80 55.63 59.12 55.19 3.02 47.0 48.64 57.15 57.亨茎 54.56 53.90 56.81, $5,77 59.89 58.67 57.80 56.26 52.88 50.9S 53.53 0.5 53.29 49.84 53.36 49.38 54.09 49.83 62.84 58.11
55.29 932 蚤562 45.9G

件 וך9ן 星9芭芝
!--
poll for the JVP akes One believe
voter could have 2 JVP. ther district in is polled a lower tes in 1982 (ie
重982
Charge
壹重玺
2G.重连 1705 5.80 且尘59 191. 608 3.49 183 1.54 0.56 0.66 04 122 其。54 1.98 338 3.45 3.98 4.26 473 5.97 9、72
4.73 %) tilain in 1977. The UNEP haS Conting Osly is Creased its popularity in this district from 1965, showing an improvenient of 5.4 percent in
| 1970 over 1965, and an improve
ment of 9.6 percent in 1977 over that of 1970 Cugh at the 1982 poll it recorded a drop
In the MOne ragala district too the UNP's popularity dipped by about 4 percentage points compared to its 1977 position. Once again it appears that the di SSeint Wote mOVed mOre to the JVP whiC se candiate obtained 6.9 percent of the votes in this district. The SLFP had a marginal increase of 1.5 percent over that of its 1977 position.
In the Aiuradhapura district too the UNP's popularity showed a drop of 3.45 percent over its 1977 position in this district and it was almost this saille percentage (3.48%) that the SLEP gained here. However, the JWP too obtained a significant 5.9 percent of the votes in this district, which was polled by the two Traditional left parties (CP and LSSP) in 1977.
Polonnaruwa was another district where the UNP recorded a drop from its 1977 pe)sition, in this case, however, the diop was a mariginal 1.5 percent. Here too the JVP had gained comparatively much ground obtaining 7.7 percent of the votes in tĚe diiStrict; though it probably gained in Gre at the expense of the SLFP (whose vote dropped 3.8 percent) tin the UNEP. The Other five istricts in Which the UNEP VOte showed a drop Wee Gampaha, Kalutara, Kurilegala, Badulla, and Ratnapura and in all these districts there were gains by the SLFP and also the JWR. (Gampaha SLFP 5%, JVP 3.4%. Kalutara. SLEP 20%, JVP 4%, Radulla SLFP .7%, JVP 3.2%, Kirunegala SLFP 5.9%. JVP 35%, and Ratna piva, SLFP 14.5%, JVP
3.2%),
However, i the island is taken as a whole (despite possible distortions due to the lower poll in the KhOirthern Fanf eastern provinces) popularity of the UNP in October 1982 shows an Overall gain over its 1977 position; Statistically, an improvement from 50.6 percent in 1977 to 529 percent in 1982. The secOnd largest political party the SLFP also improved its popularity from 29.7 percent in 1977 to 38.6 percent in 1982. The most significant trend in the entire O. ocess, considering all previous electio2S, is that in 1982 for the first time an electorate did not move away from a party which it had voted in overwhelmingly in a previous (1977) election.
Moreover, the number of votes cast in favour of this party has increased continuously since 956 with each one of the last six general elections, whilst its main contender jina S ShOWjn tipos and dOWNS with t, he, latter ili Creasing its share at this poll. (See graph on page 3).
9

Page 12

NG PATTERNS AT THE REFERENDUM
ern can be compared with the voting pattern at the sidential Election. See maps on front covers.)
صبح 須 Majorities for Lamp in 100% of the
electorates ހަހަ
1 100% Majorities for Lamp, though not in ޙަހކަ
of the electorates ރ
Ο o Majorities for Pot, though not in 100% of
the electorates s
Majorities for Pot in 100% of the electorates
C
s Q
c
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懿 co,
e c
o ○ o

Page 13
The Vote is the Norther and
H. L. Hemachadra
A number of Significant features may be observed in the results of the Presidential Elections held in 1982 October, in respect of the Northern and Eastern provinces. The number of voters who turned out in these two provinces was considerably low at this election, while a substantial number of the votes polled had been rejected. The two prominent national parties, namely, the UNP and the SLFP have both obtained a greater number of votes in these Provinces than they did in the 1977 general electiCinS.
Before attempting to discuss these special features, it is necessary to analyse the composition of popu
Časée"m Provi šé
foiled Wanni ( (which comprises ministrative distri Mullaitivu and War lation of Tarini is of the total pop Cent Sri Lanka per cent Indian "
The percenta population in the which is 42.1 per ably low comparec entire Northern comprises 40.9 pe Lanka, Tamils an Of Indian Tanhills. tricts of the East Battical Oa di Sri Ct,
lation of these two provinces and Tamil population, the various political parties that of the total p contested this election. According to Tamils, (70.8 per the Census of 1981, 86.4 per cent TamilS and 1.2
of the total population of the Northern Province comprises Sri Lanka. Tamils and 5.7 per cent are Tamilis of Indian origin, with the total
Tamils). The perce the TrincOmale e di cent of the total
comprises 33.8 per
Tamil population in this province be- Tamils and 2.6 ing 92.1 per cent. In the Jaffna dis- Tamils. While in t trict, which comes within the North- trict the rᎾSigᎾᏩ ern province, these percentages are fOr Sri Lanka,
95.3 per cent for Sri Lanka, Tamils and 2.4 per cent for Indian Tamils, with the total percentage of Tamils being 97.7 per cent. In the newly
per cent and Indi cent oringing the
lation in this dis cent. (See tables I
LLL0S S SS SSSSLLLLYZLJLLLGLLLLSLLLLLYSSGLGL S LLLYLLL LLLLa LLzY S LaLLLLLLLLGLL SLLLLSS SLLSz PROVINCES IN 1981, NUMBER OF WOTES POLLED AND REJ PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF OCTOBER 1982 ON A DES
Sigri Province District Lankan Indian Total Tafil Tamil famili
Nothern Province 86.4 5.7 92.1 Jaffna District 95.3 2.4 97.7 Vanni District 59.8 5.5 75.7 Eastern Province 40.9 1.2 42.1
Batticaloa Dist. 70.8 1.2 72.O Trinconalee Dist. - - - 33.8 2.6 36.4 Digamadulla Dist. (Amparai) 20.1 0.4 20.5
Table 2 PERCENTAGE OF TAMELS IN SRI LANKA IN 1981, THE ELECTIONS OF OCTOBER 1982. NO. OF VOTES POLLED, PERC AND SLFP-ACCORONG TO PROVINCES
Sri Indian Lankan Taj77il Pro kritice Tamil
% % Nothern 86.4 5.7 Eastern 40.9 1.2 Westerin 5.6 1.6 Central 7.3 18.8 Southern 0.6 1.3 North Western 2.7 0.5 North Centra 1.5 0.1 Uva 4.5 15.7 Sabaragamuwa 2.2 8.9 Total 2.6 5.6
EconoMIC REVIEw, DECEMBER 1982

lectoral district the former ad3ts of Mannar, fu niya) the popuS 75.3 per cent lation (59.8 per
Tamils and 15.5 Camils). ge of the Tamil
Eastern province cent, is consider
to that of the province. This r cent Of Siri di 1.2 per cent
Of the three disern province, the has the largest with 72.0 per cent }pulation being cent Sri Lanka, per cent Indian. ntage Of Tamils in istrict is 36.4 per population, which cent Sri Lanka, per cent Indian he Amparai distive percentages Tamils is 20.1 an Tamils 0.4 per total Tamil poputrict to 30.5 per
and III).
E EASTERNA ECTED AT THE TRICT BASIS
Votes Votes Polled Rejected
% 49.3 4.3 46.3 4.6 61.5 3.3 74.7 1.8 71.3 2.3 71.4 1.9 79.8 1.3
It is therefore clear that the majority of the population inhabiting the Northern Province are Tamils. The distribution pattern Of the various nationalities ShOWs a difference in he Eastern province where, except for the Battical Oa, District, the majority of the population does not constitute Tamils. It is also evident that the percentage of Tamils of Indian Origin in these two provinces is comparatively low and that there is a greater weightage of Tamils of Sri Lankan origin. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that of the total Tamili population of Sri Lanka 37.9 per cent live in the Northern province whereas in the Eastern province this percentage is only 15.3 per cent. Considering only the Sri Lanka Tamil population it may be observed that 51.3 per cent inhabit the NCrthern province while 21.3 per cent of the Siri Lanka. Tamil population is in the Eastern province. Coinsidering the Indian Tamil population in Sri Lanka. it is seen that 7.7 per cent live in the Northern province, whereas only 1.5 per cent live in the Eastern province. Ore evident feature from this population distribution is that the majority of Tamils of Sri Lankan origin (almost three-fourth) inhabit these two provinces, mainly the Northern, whereas the majority of the Indian Tamils live outside these two province's; the majority of them, nearly 90.8 per cent living mainly in the plantation areas. It must be noted that while all Sri Lanka) Tamils enjoy the right to vote, only a section of the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka enjoy this privilege.
At the General Elections of 1977 the two major national parties, that is, the UNP aid the SLFP, and also the TULF (Which participated only on a reginal basis), entered the contest. At the Presidential Election of 1982, nowever, the TULF withdrew completely from the contest though a representative of the Tamil Congress (which had allied with the TULF in the 1977 General Election) did contest.
In attempting to analyse the significant features of the October
NUMBER OF REGISTERED WOTERS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL ENTAGE REJECTED, AND PERCENTAGE GAINED BY THE UNP
Total No. of Taril J/OteS
Registered
92.1 612,798 42.1 510,394 7.2 2,306,676 26.1 953.921 1.9 1,154,342 3.2 985,180 1.6 406.218 20.2 406,745 11.1 808,750 18.2 8.145,024
Votes Ζοίes Ψοίes Votes Polled Rejected Polled Polled
by by UNIP SLFP % % % % 49.3 4.3 26.9 54.8 74.7 1.8 49.2 28.4 82.1 1.0 54.1 40.8 86.7 1.0 60.2 36.0 83.4 1.1 - 49.0 42.2 85.8 0.9 56.6 39.1 85.1 1.0 51.8 41.2 85.8 1.3 55.9 38.5 86.1 1. 54.0 40.5 81.1 1.2 52.9 39.1
1

Page 14
Presidential Election, in respect of the Northern and Eastern provinces illy, it is necessary to consider Specially the pattern of population distribution and the participation of particular political parties at this election,
becline in Number of Wotes Polled
The turnout of Voters at the Presidential Eiection particularly in the Northern province was very low, while in the Eastern province too it was considerably low, the respective percentage turnout being 49.3 per cent and 74.7 per cent compared to 81.1 per cent for the whole island. This Situation COntra Sts Strongly with the percentage of votes polled in the other seven provinces of the island where tie turnout varied between 32.1 per cent and 86.7 per cent (See table 2), he average percentage of votes púGillied for these 7 provinces is a higi 84.3 per cent. (This is further interpreted from table 3). It is apparent that the low percentage of votes poiled in these two particular provinces, namely the Northera and the Eastern, resulted in a general decline in the average national percentage as well.
Considered district-wise, it appears that (with the exception of the COlOmb O Cistrict) in all other Districts in the Island the percentages of the votes poiled have exceeded those of all districts in the Northern and the Eastern province. Another evident feature is that a strong corelation appears to exist between the percentage of votes polled in the five electoral districts in the Northern and Eastern provinces and the strength of the Tamil population in these respective districts. (See Table 1). Coinsidered percentage wise, it is observed that the lowest percentage of the votes polled (46.3%) Vyas in the di Strict Where the highest percentage of Tamil population exist, namely the Jaffna district; and the highest percentage of votes polled (79.8%) was in the Amparai district which is inhabited by the lowest percentage of the Tamil population among these five districts.
According to this pattern the rion-participation of the TULF in the Presidential Election of 1982, appears to have been the major realson for the decline in the number of votes polled in the Northern and Eastern provinces at this election; it has been an important factor in Election as much as 69.0 per cent Of the valid votes in the Northern province and 32.9 per cent of votes of the Easten procvince were won by the TULF adds support to this Contention.
Rejected Votes
At the 1982 Fresidential Election 4.3 percent and 1.8 percent of the total votes pollied were rejected in Northern and Eastern Provinces res
12
pectively. The pei ted votes in Otner from 0.9 per Cent the average per Cer rejected in these
being 1.) per cent. centage of rejecte prOVinces was 1.2 1 that the ni inb 6 o C the Northern andi had gone up. (A down of the figure five districts in N erin provinces ha\ higher percentage than all Other diis tWO, namely MiOn galle). It is evider there has been a the percentage of tion and the per rejected as weli of votes not pollec
It jS difficult tor, other thari : which has brough precedented inci votes. There is no gest that th stand the people of these any influence in t increase iin 1'ejeCte to the 981 Census acy almOng the pe district eCOrdieci centage, being Seco the Colora OO and tricts. But, the J. gistered the highe rejected votes. Th a large Illumber of spoilt delibe atel, lipheld. It is pt voters in lay have tended to expreSS { towards the Presid feeling of dismay ing political System
Performance
National
At the end O. dential Election the obtain 26.9 pel ce cent of the Ottai in the Northern provinces, respectiv hand, the SLFP of cent and 28.4 per in these two poroviji not be realistic to On these percental ed by these two parties. It is al SC ir der two Cther factO Which is the leadi cal party, did not election; and the voter absteration a
To assess the at this poll by th SLFP, actors. Such Of VOt,9'S Who voting under Spec What political par Supported, and als actually contested

2entages of rejecprovinces ranged to 1.3 per cent, tage of total votes ther 7 provinces (The average pervotes of all 9. er cent). It sh0WS f votes rejected in Eastern provinces listrict-wise break s shows that the orthern and Easte registered 3. of rejected votes tricts except for ragala, and Keit therefore, that 2lose link between the Tamil populatentage of v Ottes S the percentage ... (See Table 1).
to trace any facpolitical One, t about this Ulmease of rejected evidence to SUgair of education of two districts had his unprecedented di votS. AccOrding the rate of literOple of the Jaffna a very high perind only to that Of Gampaha disaffna district rest percentage of e conclusion that these votes were y is thus strongly ossible that such by this action inbither their dislike ential poll. Or a owards the existof the country.
if Two Major
Parties
the 1982 PreSi2 UNEP WaS a ble tO nt andi 49.2 per valid votes polled and the Eastern ely. On the other otained 34.8 per cent respectively, nces. But it vould base our analysis ges alone, Obtainmajor national ecessary to COinSirs: that the TULF. ng regional politicontest at this high rate Of t this election.
level of succeSS e UNEP and the as the number abstained frOm all circumstances, lies these voters O if the TULE the attitude they
WOUid have a di Opted at this election must also be considered. However, We attempt to analyse this situation on the assumption that these voters,
who abstained from voting under special circumstances, were mainly TULF Stapporters and if the TULF contested these votes would have
gone to this party, the picture would e BS follOWS : the UNEP obtained 15.5 er cent and 43.6 per cent of the
valid votes poiled in the Northern and the Eastern provinces, respectively; while, the SLFP obtain
ed 20.1 per cent and 25,2 per cent Of the valid votes in these tWO provinges. At the 1977 General Election when all three parties contested the UNP gained Only 7.7 per cent in the Northern province and 38.0 per cent in the Eastern province. The apparent trend is that this party has registered a clear percentage increase in votes in ooth these provinces compared to 1977. In the case of the SIFP it obtained 1.4 per cent and 26.8 per cent, respectively from these two provinces in 1977. In 1982 this party showed 2 marked improvement in its performance in respect of the Northern province at the Presidential Election; but in the Eastern province although the votes gained by the SLFP were 12,000 more thaa in 1977 General Election, it seems that they have shown a. slight decrease percentage wise. The number of votes obtained by the two major national parties could well have been lOWei if One Were tO CO11Sider a Situation Where the TULF actually contested the Presidential election. In Such a situation SOme Of the votes gained by these two parties could possibly have been received by the TULF.
One assumption that may be mią die is 3. Situation where the TULF contested the residential elections of 1982, instead of the TC and the voters who agstained from voting in these two provinces as well as the votes pollad by the TC were obtained by TULF. In such a situation the TULF could have registered 62.1 per cent and 26.9 per cent of the valid votes polled, in the Northern and the Ea Ste112 prOVinceS, respectively. At the 1977 General Election the corresponding percentages registered by this party was 69.0 per cent from the Northern and 32.9 per cent from the Eastern prOvinces. Therefore On the abOiVie a Ssumption the performance of the TULF Cn a percentage basis, would have been COmparatively lower than in 1977, if this party in fact COntested the 982 Presidential Election. (This would have been the situation only if the TULF did not receive any of the votes obtain ed by the UNP and the SLFP).
On the other hand, if the TULF
did contest the Presidential Election of 1982, and if this induced the voters (who abstained under
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982

Page 15
special circumstances) in the Northern and the Eastern provinces to vote for the TULF, the number Of total valid votes polled at the Pre
sidential election WOuld have increased by another 261,000 votes. Thus the total valid votes polled
could have increased from 6,5222,000 to 6,783,000. In these circumstances the percentage of the total valid votes polled by the two major national parties could have declined and the 52.9 per cent registered by the UNP at this election may have been reduced to 50.9 per cent; while the SLFP's percentage may have been 37.6 per cent instead Of the 39.1 per cent, that was registered by this party in October 1982. FOOT NOTE
At the December
once again the IOWest
Referendum number of
votes polled in th corded in the NC particularly in th Jaffna and Wan. of a lower poll t Viln CeS, SG en In Ol’€ maintained here. F 1977 General. Ele total registered vc entire iSiland a Vel the figure for the Vince was 82.2 p. When the nati On at the October per cent the figur province was 60.1 contrary at the D. dum the poll for Vince Was compara the three district IDigama, dulla, a,n CI,
Table 3 NUMBER OF REGISTERED WOTERS, VOTES POLLE EASTERN PROVINCES AT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF OCT AND ASSUMPTONS ON ABSTENTIONS AND LIKELY VOTE O
(1) (2 (3)
No. of No. of Registered Votes ναίες Polled
Provinces Districts
Nothern Province 612,798 4.25
Jaffna Dist. 493.705 46.31
Wanni Dist. 19.093 台重.45
Eastern Province 510,394 74.73
Batticaloa Dist. 172,480 71.29
Trincomalee Dist. 133,646 71.38
Digamadulla Dist. 204.268 79.83 (Amparai)
All Island Position 8.06
8, 145,024
(4) (5) * Percent- No. of Af age of Votes E4C Voters abstained (as
assumed (assumed) tea to have under of abstain- special tal ed under Circuinsi- voi special (171C35 lHill CECH2S hal tail CeS abs litt Cir [(፲Í 35.05 214,780 2
37.99 187,569 1
22.85 7.220
9.57 48,840
13.01. 22.440
2.92 17,270
4.47 9, 130
3.24* 263.620* 26
** The assumptions for abstentions; (4)under special circumstances, and ( Eastern Provinces, are based on the national average poll at the Presid must be noted, however, that generally in the Northern province the
Table 4 COMPARATIVE POSITION OF VOTES POLLED AND R
THE DECEMBER REFERENDUM
No. of Votes ܡ Provice Registered
Northern 612,798 Eastern 510,398 Western 2,306,676 Central 953,921 Souther 1,154,342 South Western 985,180 North Centrā 406.218 Uva 406,745 Sabaragamuwa 808,750 Total 8, 145.024
EconoMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982
%. Votes Polled
Presidential Referendum
Election (Dec)
(Oct.)
49.3 60. 74.7 72.1 82.1 67.4 86.7 77.6 834 69.2 85.8 74.4 85.1 72.5 85.8 75.9 86.1 74.6 81.1 70.8

e Island was rerthern Province a two districts of i. Also, the trend han in Other prOvious eections, was or instance at the tions when the tes polled for the age 86.1 per cent
gistering an average poll of 70.3 per cent, 75.7 per cent and 68.7 per cent, respectivciy. Considered beside the national average poll at the December Referendum Of 70.8 per cent, the level of voting in this province has not shown a significant decline at the Referendum. It must be noted that in December the national average poll dropped sig
: Northern pro- nificantly from the October figure er cent. Again, of 81.1 per cent to 70.8 per cent. all average polled A significant factor was that Referendum 70.8 a large number of voters in the
2 for the Northern per cent. On the ecember Referenthe Eastern protively high, with S. of Batticaloa,
Jaffna district who abstained from voting at the Presidential Election exercised their franchise at the Referendum with the percentage of turnout going up to 60.1 per cent in December from only 49.3 per Cent in October.
Trincomalee "e عقد
D., ABSTENTIONS AND REJECTIONS IN NORTHERN AND OBER 1982. VALID VOTES RECEIVED BY MAJOR PARTES, N OTHER CIRCUMISTANCES
6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) ter red. No. of No. of No. of 64-9 No. of The ing 1 % Valid Willial Walid Vaglia Total
rejec- votes /otes Votes Vo fe:S no. of ! potes received receihed received receioed vo fe:S fhe to- by the that all No. of ܗܘ parties ers da SS- UNP SLFP TC 1'ould ed to other have "e parties obtai:- failed der special (7十8十 C፱፱፱፻፪8– 10-1-11
፲Cé8 12,590 77,614 100,521 98,784 31 1,374 11,817 501,326 (15.48) (20.05) (19.70) (62.11) (2.36) (100.00) 85,650 44,780 77.300 87,263 272,913 8,654 403,647 (11.09) (19.15) (21.62) (67.61) (2.14) (10.000) 26,940 32,834 23,221 11,521 38,461 3,163 97,679 (33.61) (23.77) (11.79) (39.37) (3.24) (100.00) 48,340 184,388 106,484 65,242 13,582 18,529 422,983 43.59) (25.18) (15.42) (26.85) (4.38) (100.00) 22.210 48,094 21,688 47,095 69,305 3,200 142,287 (33.80) (14.24) (33.10) (48.71) (2.25) (100.00) 27,090 45,522 31,700 10,068 27,158 6,306 110,686 (41.13) (28.64) (10.00) (24.54) (5.70) (100.00) 9,040 90.772 53,096 8,079 17,119 9,023 170,010 (53.39) (31.23) (4.75) (10.07) (5.31) (100.0) 0,930: 3,450,811 2,548,438 173,934 434,864 348,9656,783,078 (50.87) (37.57) (2.56) (6.41) (5.14) (100.00)
12) total valid votes all parties could have received in the Northern and ential Election of 84.3 per cent for the seven other provinces. It boll has been slightly lower than the national average.
E.JECTED AT THE OCTOBER PRESIDENTAL ELECTIONS AND
%. Votes Polled '% of Votes Polled for
% of Votes Rejected
Lamp. Other Parties Pot
Presidential Referendun UNP
Election (Dec) Pl.Elec Ref.: P. Elec. ef.
(Oct.) (Oct.) (Dec.) (Oct.) (Dec.) 4.3 0.6 26.9 量4.G 73.1 86.0 1.8 0.5 49.2 48.7 50.8 51.3 O 0.3 54. 53.9 45.4 46. 1.0 0.4 60.2 60.3 38.8 33.0 1.1 0.3 490 48.1 51.0 52.0 0.9 0.3 56.6 61.7 43.4 38.3 1.0 Q.4 5.8 65.5 48.2 34.5 1.3 0.6 55.9 68.6 44.1 31.4 1.1 0.3 54.0 57.4 46.0 42.6 1.2 Q.4 52.9 54.7 47.1 45.3
13

Page 16
sy
drop in tha Eastern province,
In the Eastern province when comparing the Overall average turnout for all Cistricts in this province with the October situation, the nuinber of votes polled at the December Referendum appears to have registered a decline; although when CCIn pared with the percentage Of Other provinces this decline seems negligible. There was a 2.6 per Cent, from 74.7 per cent iii. October to 72.1 per cent in December.
At the Referendum, however it is apparent that there was a strong vote against the proposal in both the Northern and Eastern Provinces; particulaily in the Northern province Which averaged only 14 per cent in favour of the proposal (Jaffna. 8.7 per cent and Wanni 34.5 per cent). This low percentage for the proposal at the Referendum in the Jaffna district no doubt contribited to a Substantial declien in the Overall overage percentage in respect of the WhGle island.
The percentage of votes received in favour of the proposal for the whole Islarid was 54.7 per cent. 'ihis figure when worked Out for the the 21 districts (with the excep
ticil of the Jaffna district) would have amourited to 57.1 per cent. It, Was in the 3 attical Oa. di Strict
Weire the lowest percentage of votes for the Oosal recorded in the Eastern province. In this district the percent2ge of votes received for the Referendium was only 39.1 per cent. However, in the other tν Ο districts which comprise of the Eastern province, Ilamely Trincomalee and Digamadilia, the percentage of v OtES receiyyed for the Refereldum does not show a similar decline where the respective percentages re corded were 43.0 per cent and 58.9
per cent. As shown in the analysis of the Presidential election results the vote against the government
wy2s strong est in the districts of theSe two provinces where the concentration of the Tamil population was
heaviest.
Spoilit Votes
A notable feature in the results at both the Presidential Election and the Referendum is that the number of spoilt or rejected votes in the Northern province was the highest for any province. In October it was as high as 4.3 per cent against a national average of 1.2 per cent; while at the Referendum it was 0.6 per cent against a national average of 0,4 per cent. At the 1977 General Elections, however, the number of spoilt votes was far below that of the national average, which has therefore given rise to the view that the high proportion of spoilt votes in the Northern province at the two 1982 polls was not due to negligence (or ignorance aS appeared to be the case in the UV a. province in December 1982) but a deliberate course of action.
14
FEATURE
The Current Developing C
Warnasena Rasaputr
The impact country, though CuSS its effects p
Dr. Warna Se: analyses the Sitt Scene in this pa nated effort by the day, so tha He maintains th any attempt to This paper Was Lumpur, at the
The World e not Only continué also indicates th; early recovery a There is an eco most every spher vity. Growth countries are no likely to remain o convincing sig age output rise improve signifi year. The per c: developing world trade Was advers flation, exchange rate volatility, slo art demand. S. trade may enter year. Deflation ces posed a seriOl bility of incomes tries. Demand fo COintiralue:S tO rei levels of unempl courage the buil of protectionism. a decline in the by the developed 2 percent each threa years.
The present is plagued by tw employment and countries have people or 8 perce unemployed. In the unemployme) Of WOrk force ré While in France i percent. There ver lining arOun The inflation ra In the advanced of inflation has to single digit f tion ariSes Whet] is merely a prod Or Something mC

S
World Economic Scene and its impact on
Blagnéries
蠱
if the recession in the Western world is being felt by every in varying degrees. This paper and the following one disarticularly on the developing countries. na, Rasaputram, Governor of the Central Bank of Ceylon, ation in a wide ranging discussion of the world economic per. What is required, he states: is a concerted and co-ordiall countries, by harmonising the conflicting objectives of developing countries can work as partners in development. at the adjustment process itself has to be a global one and go alone by any sinle country will only confuse the issues.
resented by him at the Regent School of
2nd of November 1982.
Economics, Kuala
conOnic SituatiOn. es to be gloomy but at the prospects for e getting bleaker. homic crisis in ale of economic acti
ates of developed t only low but are low. There are
gns that their aveof 1 percent will cantly in the next apita output of the declined. World gely affected by in
rate and interest w growth and stagtagnation in world a third SucceSSiWe of commodity prils threat to the staof developing counr primary products main Weak. High oyment tend to ending up of a wall In fact there was volume of imports countries by nearly year for the last
economic situation to big problems-ulinflation. OECD nearly 28 million nt of the work force the United States int, rate as a percent bached 13 percent it reached nearly 153 is however, one sild these dark clouds. te has Slowed dOWm. countries the rate been brought down gure. But the quesher this deceleration luct of the recession
re lasting.
The developing countries particularly of South East Asia showed satisfactory rates of growth despite Stubborn economic difficulties. Their terms of trade however, deteriorated further by nearly 11 percent and a few countries experienced declines Of aS much as 30 percent in three years. Unemployment remains high, according to an estimate made by the UNCTAD. Growth rate of GDP must rise joy more than 6 percent if the unemployment situation is not allowed to deteriorate from its current Situation. Acute foreign exchange shortages continued to reduce the availability of goods and Services cal Sig Seyere hardship to all sectOFS of the economy. Projections of economic growth for developing econoFries for the next 3 years show a disnal Picture. Sharp increases in Oil prices coupled with recession in the developed countries had resulted in severe balance of payments difficulties for the Third World countries. In fact the high oil prices together with a weak demand for their exports and higher imports of capital goods particularly those connected with raising energy supplies caused a balance of deficit of nearly $100 billion in each of the years since 1979. The current account deficits of most non Oil developing countries are in the region of 11-13 percent of GDP. As we are aware, anything more than 5 percent Of GDP will undoubtedly cause severe financing problems and debt service burdens. The debt burden of SOme countries had skyrocketed to levels tinat are un precedented. The rising linterest rates added a further burden. It is estimated that 1 percent rise in interest rates of Euro dollars would raise the debt servicing burden by $2 billion. Take the case of MexicO. In 1981 it had a debt service ratio
ECONOMIC REVIEw, DECEMBER 1982,

Page 17
of 60 percent followed closely by Brazil with 58 percent. Of the ASEAN countries the debt service ratio is highest for Philippines with 24 percent, followed by Thailand 17 percent, Indonesia 12 percent and Ma|laysia, 5 percent. There was an lurgent need to have more investments to raise supplies and reduce the heavy dependence on imported energy which ranged between 30 and 72 percent of exports in a few countries. There can, therefore, be a continuation of the deficits into 1984 while possibilities of financing these deficits over a long period within the context of the current economic scene appears to be limited.
The Socialist countries have had their share of trouble. China moved to modernise its economy. Certain Structural problems cau Sed a reduction in the planned rate of increase in national income of the East European socialist block.
There was however, a determined effort by all the countries concerned to meet the current challenge in the context of ever changing needs and priorities. There is an awareness not confined to Third World countries alone, that the existing configuration of economic forces is unjust, inequitous and inefficient. The developing countries have only been able to let off their steam in international fora about the inertia and inactivity of the developed countries to make concerted efforts to reach a solution to the existing problems despite their being aware of them. The disappointment about the inability to solve pressing economic issues now gone beyond the stage of showing impatience.
Before I come to a discussion Of world recovery through international economic co-operatin, let me point out some of the effects that the current economic issues have on developing countries.
Despite bold attempts made by developing countries to adjust their economies they are obstructed by imported inflation. The control of inflation is given the highest priorities by most countries Of the world. However, the solutions attempted by them may not be well balanced. It is accepted that inflation cannot be tackled except through action over a broad range Of ecOínomic policies includiing mOnetary policy, fiscal policy, balance of payments policies and other economic policies that will raise Supplies. Under the influence of monetarism the developed countries have given too much of emphasis to monetary issues. Another reason that may have allowed an excessive burden to fall on monetary policy may be the fact that it is a vital instrument in the hands of the Central Bank alone which had taken timely corrective action but not fully
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982
kna S .
supported by fisc: Government. The an increase in inte a higher debt Ser the developing ec Cognised that larg low savings and ill management have fOrtS made by re monetary policies. Of most developed gansionary. Fiscal loped countries in 4 percent of GDP. that reductions ir Will reduce domeS to deter Gover cepting bold pOliC thinking is found WOrld. A tempora economic activity pressures on infla Of payments are t stead they react guard existing i. maintaining the le in import COIΩ). Thus the protect in the developed ci on the increase.
During World veloping countrie, tO - Substitute: a fe due to Supply Sho. these indulStries W inefficienti COnditiC Stand the flood O veloped countries War. However, wi
“There is an aw existing configu inefficient. The
onic issues has in
Of the World ecOn ergence of an inte Viith independent manage their eCO veloped a trend tC tion of their expO. of multinationals,
COuntries have mai diversifying thei: this diversification significant. They
break into a small goition of the m. dustrial World. Th get alarmed with
gOrtS into develOp the cry has been
uncontrolled impo Stile of the indust giO31S Of these COu has arisen mainly ing countries hav their manufacture developed countri rate of nearly 25 num. But When Ot tries coroeted on
a cry was not rai hand much of t World trade jih tih
 

policies of the
rest rates causing ricing burden to nomies. It is re2 budget deficits, efficient financial nullified the elfSolute restrictive The fiscal policies countries are exdeficit Of deve1981 was nearly The general fear budget deficits sic activity Seems ments from a Cies. This type Of in all parts of the ry slow down of in unavoidable if tion and balan Ce o be reduced. Inby trying to safeindustries Whilst vel of employment reting industries. onist tendencies Ountries had been
War III, the des were compelled W imported items tages. Some Of rere started under ns and COUld MOt f goods from desoon after the th the breakdown
among industrialised countries and such trade was mostly in competitive goods. According to estimates made by the Overseas Development Council barriers to exports Of manulfactured gOOdS from developing countries are removed, they alone can raise export-earnings by as much as $25 billion. But there is a significant rise in protectionism in recent years. Motivated by short term political considerations, the developed countries move towards increasing protectionism has had serious adverse effects on the eCO
alonies of the developing countries. . - -
A rise in protectionism Con
pounds the difficulty of finding long term solutions. Protectionist measures get entrenched and vested interests grow around them and prewent their removal thus causing higher costs to the economy. Though
imports from developing countries are insignificant and seemingly minor, the developed countries
make a fuss about its influence due to regional and political factors. The developing countries, on the other hand, which still specialise over a narrow range of products, find their export incomes heavily eroded. This will naturally have a serious adverse effect on econom1C growth at home and on the budget through lower revenues. They are unable to expand their exports and export production. In an inter
areness, not confined to Third World countries, that the
tration of economic forces
disappointment about the inability to solve pressing econow gone beyond the stage of showing impatience."
is unjust, inequitous and
Omy and the emrnational ecOnOmy states trying to nomies, there deWards diversificarts. With the help Some developing de great strides in r exports, though is still not very have been able to 1 and insignificant arkets of the inlere is n0 Calu Se t0
increasing imed countries, but raised that such its would ruin
ries in certain reintries. The fear because develope been extending d exports to the es at a very rapid percent per anher western counequal terms, such sed. On the other he increase in e past had been
dependent world their heavy dependence on exports has thus reSulted in a lowering of real income as a consequence of direct action taken by the developed countries. Obviously exports of these products will not have the same growth momentum Once they have been cienied a CCeSS Or granted limited access to their products. They have to make further efforts in looking for new markets. But export promotion is an expensive item in the budgets of these countries. Some countries have even entered into long term debt based on export projections. Once the markets are closed the reopening of integrated markets like those in the United States, will be most difficult and ΘΚΟeInSIVe.
Monopolistic practices can Often depress prices of third World exports; the efficient functioning of a, free market mechaniSnm. fOr Third World Commodities is Often challenged. The importation of essential commodities is dependent On export incomes. Serious disruption of export incomes will compel the
5

Page 18
Third World countries to move their resources away from export products, a decision that may lead to the maldistribution. Of reSOUTCeS. The countries that import Third World Commodities have a responsibility to assist in the stabilisation of export incomes of the developing world, either individually, regionally or through multilateral institutions. Regional schemes such as STABEX for compensatory export Shortfalls of developing countries are working well, but are inadequate. The
** Today the financial world is : disarray. Monetary crises have not been overco#ine, financial relationShips are at a point of disruption and money in general has run into a
Himnaelst f'offin... ”
need to compensate such export shortfalls is well recognised by the IMF and its facility is widely used. What is required is a more liberal'ised Compensatory Financing Facility to take into account real export losses, the condition of the most seriously affected countries, the size and nature of the loss due to protectionism and the need to compensate for the permanent loss of Imarkets. Discussions on this subject at various forums such as the North South Dialogue had been inconclusive, but the Third World countries would expect some lead from a country like the United States towards the adoption of a more positive approach to assist the developing countries.
Lowering of real incomes both due to protectionism and recession has given rise to a huge debt probiem for the developing countries, Interest rates, it was mentioned had gone up mainly because of the inability of the developed countries to control inflation. It is only now We see a breakthrough in the fight against inflation. However, inflationary expectations have not been reduced by the Same degree. Whatever the Outcome on economic activity this may have, it is necessary for the developed countries to pursue more restrictive budgetary policies. So that the interest rates may decline to satisfactory levels without relaxing the tight monetary policies that are being pursued. This will not only help the developed countries themselves to come out of the present economic morass but also the developing countries to forge ahead with their development plans and a reduction in their debt servicing burden. The debt of the non oil developing countries can be further divided into debt of the middle income countries and debt of the low income countries. In 1974 the debt of the low income countries was nearly half that of middle income countries. It was earlier believed
16
that since the tries have the ting and mai economic growt. ien WaS In Ot lik COI). Cern. But Otherwise. The pIULS funds by t little too well.
1979 the medium of all developin. 25 percent per y and 1981 growth percent. But th grOW further ar. be in the regio i886. The debt
however, expecte percent in 1982 t Even though th growth in the income countrie; position to accel and help the ad. ance of paymen outside help. Th Qxglerienced ball: deficits in the
lion per year í years. To rest Or whilst achieving of growth, these receive COncessio ger term S. Of mai ternational forul have demanded debt relief measl Of the moraSS Of Cielot Situati On. A Dialogue and Su TAD, low income tries demanded lief measures ir cellation of that ari Sing frOm Of 2SSistance, reschi and the establis) tative mechanisn in Ore Or less to a rescheduling. r income countries drastic action fO reaction from i market, the prest the debt resched bankers and t these suggestion greater attentior loped countries.
Today the fi di Sarray. MOneta been overconne; ships are at th tion and money int0 a maelstrOH development, hav ted that they from being solv gap instead of seen to be wider Ween the rich Will in CreaSe frO $6540 in 1985 and 2000. However, a tiatives that hav past, encourageS these eCOmOmic e ed by collective

middle income COunpotential for generaintaining continued l, their debt probely to cause serious vents have proved recycling Of surhe banks WaS di One Between 1976 and
countries rose by 'ear. Between 1979 has been around 15 e total debt will d it is projected to in of $954 billion in service burden is d to decline from 24 O 20 percent in 1986. ere is a SOWer Otal debt, the low Will not be in a
i u Stment Of the balES pOSition WithOut ese countries have Lnce Of paymentS region of $100 bilor the last three e ecOnOmic health a satisfactory rate countries must nary aid. With lonurity. In several inms these countries implementation Of res to get them. Out an ever deepening it the North South bsequently at UNC: developing counLimmediate debt recluding the Callportion of the debt cal eduling of all debts nment Of a conSuln, that would lead utomaticity in debt hough the middle do not favour such r fear Of adverse he private capital ent situation (where iuling will help the he WOrld eCOmOmy ) s should receive frOm the deve
nancial World is in ry crises have not financial relatione point of disrupin general has run 1. Some problems of e been SO aggravaare further a Way ed. The income narrowing down is ning. The gap betand poor countries m $4070 in 1965 to to $8812 in the year series of bold ini2 taken place in the us to believe that vents deeply markmalai Se in e CONNOmic
development .
relationships can be ΟνθYOOIΥιθ through collective efforts.
It is well accepted that the growth rates Of indstrialised countries will have an impact. On trade, income, output and the balance of payments of developing countries. However, there are certain disadvantages arising When high growth oriented developing countries are heavily dependent on developed · ecOmOmies. "The demand for oil and capital goods by the developing countries will put them in the red with regard to balance Of paymentS. If there is stagnation in growth of developed economies, this will cause balance of payrinents to deteriorate further and will be accompanied by a worsening Of terms of trade. The expected aid flows will be adversely affected because of Slow growth in industrialised countries. Obviously the financing requirements cannot be fully met and Will pose Severe problems in the context of imperfect capital markets that are heavily loaded again St prO'Or developing COԱ11tries.
Thus, there does not seem to be any long term solution that is in sight except to increase intra
''...... there does not seem to be any long term solution that is in sight
except to increase intra - regional
trade on the basis of collective self.
reliance.'
regional trade on the basis of collective Self-reliance.
In the Short run there is AlO escape from being dependant on aid flows, capital flows and high growth rates of developed countries as it is not possible to reduce the propensity to import in the short run, On the other hand it is possible to effect substantial reduction in the collective import propensity of developing countries, in respect to developed country imports in the long run by a well designed scheme of trading among themselves.
Since the objective of achieving collective Self reliance cannot be realised in the near term, there is a strong case for international assistance not only to help the developing countries but also to assist the developed countries. Apart from the reverse flow arising from aid to developing countries the industrial countries would increase the efficiency in the use of resources and in the allocation of resources on a global scale. The allocation of world capital stock will not only improve efficiency mut also work towards minimising the effects and possibllities of World recession and Or inflation. An UNCTAD study has indicated that if the Third World countries increase their growth rate
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982

Page 19
by 3 percentage points, it will lead to an increase in the growth rate of the developed economies by 1. percentage point. We are quite aware of the current global imbalance which if allowed to grow, will cause further imbalances of a Serious Structural nature. For the Sake of efficiency and equity, there is an urgent need to encourage the transfer of resources to stimulate a more balanced and sustainable growth. Any recovery of the industrial countries and acceleration of their growth without an equal stimulus to the growth of the Third World countries would rekindle inflation and Cause Serious imbalances. Continuing deterioration of the inequitous distribution of income will one day result in a situation where developed COuntries will be Surrounded by a massive population of undernourished, underdeveloped peoples of the Third World just the same Way South Africa is Surrounded by Black Africa. It is therefore essential to take the initiative to transfer resources in a Well meaning manner, to reduce the existing inequalities, by raising the efficiency in the use of resources of the 'rhird World. Structural bottlenecks that hamper the achievement of a higher level of economic activity will have to be removed by a well designed and timely programme of action. The . Arusha. Declaration of the Group of 77 is important and relevant in the context of today's economic scene. This declaration of 1979 Observed that “the extent and persistence of considerable underutiliSation of IreSOurces leading to unemployment in the developed world should no longer be seen as an exceptionally prolonged through to the business cycle with a more or less automatic recovery to follow. This situation inhibits an effective international adjustment process. What would be required to restore full employment is a new impulse on a historic scale comparable for example with the transfer of reSourCes tO Europe for post-War recOnStruction'. The Pearson Committee emphasised this need and this was re-emphasised by the Brandt Committee. Despite these declarations and recommendations, the developed countries are hesistant to Support a massive transfer of resources even in the short term. Except for the front runners like Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, the ratio of Official development assistance (ODA) aS percent Of Gross National Product (GNP) has increased only slightly from .35 percent in 1979 to 0.037 percent in 1981. There was, how
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982
ever, a decline in t flow from 1.17 pel 1979 to 1.04 perce reluctance on the loped countries, p2 time of recession. lack of political Wi tance on their part further assistance rating inflation. T ment has been u fresh allocation of been a decline in SIDERS in interna, tiO recent years. The ir CannOt be naintai a declining ratio. " dence to Suggest th pansion in de Vel prompted by expan demand is lesS infl transfer of resourc countries either thr tion or development arguments are n0t but lead to misallo ces and building The growth of un the developed count unprecedented level create un certainty
* The only way the their own product, particularly in the for them."
come generation future. Labour, in security and a per could push costs would enhance inf
SeS
All these mere) of concerted effort veloped countries a political leadership pressures of various countries and effect the call of the Thi forts they have ta Only based On Self on enlightened self the North. So far that the needs of have a major role economic health of tries?
The industriali gan to take an int nomic developme) World countires on munist countries be threat to the econo the North. The em as a Superpower in Korean War, made

he total resource cent of GNP in ht in 1980. The art Of the Clevearticularly at a is a result of a Il and the relucto increase any for fear of genemis same arguSed against 3, SDRS. There has the share Of nal liquidity in flation argument ned under Such here is no eviat ecOnOmic exOped countries sion of domestic ationary than a es to developing ough SDR creaassistance. Such only misleading cation of resourup of rigidities. employment in Fries had reached S and would about the in
scious of the need to protect their interests. If One looks at the record of multi-lateral institutions elgaged purely in reconstruction and development, one notes that during the first few years of the World Bank's existence, it loaned only to industrialised countries. It diverted its attention to the developing countries after the Korean bOOIn but mainly to develop the infrastructure that would normally help the export Oriented agricultural and mineral sectors. It is only very recently that it began to get interested in the development of rural areas and raising of the Standard. Of living of the poorest of the poor. Assistance both from the World E3ank and the IMF had risen Substantially between 1979 and 1981. But projections of World Bank lending indicate that it will not grow as fast as in the past. It is most unfortunate that at this time there is an unwillingness by the developed countries to raise the resources of multilateral Organisations. This has not only restricted their flexibility of operations, but also reduced the
鹤
| Thirál VVorld Čáři hope for a greater share of the gains of ion and trade is by widening their spheres of influence, decision making process, rather than have decisions made
aspect in the heir concern for manent inCOme to a point that lationary pres
y indicate lack
among the dend even a StrOng to surmount the s lobbies of these ively respond to rd World. The elfken. So far are interest and not interest. Why did accept the fact the Third World to play to restore all the coun
ed COuntries beerest in the econt of the Third ly after the comcame an effective mic dominance of hergence of China, in Asia, and the the NOrth COn
ability of the developing countries to make both short term and structural adjustments. The widening Of the gap between developed and developing countries will ultimately lead to social and economic injustices that will threaten the security of the world. Revolutionary changes in the policies of the world are required to change the fortunes of the developing countries to levels that can be considered as tolerable, let alOne to be Satisfactory.
The phrase “time for action' has been often repeated at various international forum.S. But actiOn taken So far has been insignificant compared to the magnitude of the problem. In a World of conflicting objectives, political factors must necessarily take precedence. HOWever, care should be taken not to give rise to further complexities Or to by-pass the deep rooted problems, or else the harmonisation of development policies towards the attainment of the desired goals not only becomes difficult and imperfect but also unattainable in the context of the existing political environment.
We are now looking for better instruments and better ways and means of overcoming the misery of
17

Page 20
the poor countries. Collective self reliance alone cannot be considered a rapid way of developing the e cOnOmiies in an. interdependant world. They have to be supported and assisted by the developed countries. We have seen the collapse of the mercantilist era and Of the World economic Order which existed since Bretton Woods. What is ᎢᎾquired now is the establishment of a new international economic order. Third WOrld countries are demanding a comprehensive reform Of the international monetary system. They are demanding a greater share in the decision making process. They feel frustrated when the decisions Of development lending institutions like the World Bank are On a v Otte heavily weighted against the Third World. Similarly IMF is considered a rich mans club primarily to develop monetary relationships to give Security and stability to developed COuntries. The IMF haS nOt only hardened its conditionality clauses, but refused to increase the conditional liauidity position (SDR). The institutions that have been bOrne
Out Of One set of circumstances are
seldom capable of adapting themselves to a new set of attitudes and needs. The only way the Third World can hope for a greater share of the gains of their own production and trade is by widening their spheres of influence, particularly in the decision making process, rather than have decisions made for them.
The Non-alignment move arose from a desire for self-preservation and self-advancement. In recent years it has veered away from political issues into economic issues especially after the Lusaka meeting. Consistently economic declarations emphasised the need for collective self-reliance for the attainment and distribution of benefits arising Out of economic deve lopment. The general disSatisfaction with the policies pursued by the developed countries in regulating the international monetary system, with only a scant respect for the ideas and aspirations of the developing countries, would make them nove away into finding solutions in their own way. What is required is a concerted and co-ordinated effort by all countries, by harmonising the conflicting objectives of the day, so that developing countries can work as partners in development.
A Solution must have a lasting impact on the attitudes and psychology of the people. It has to be worked not only within existing political and social conditions and the value System but alSO taken into the possible changes that can be foreseen. This ᎢᎾ-- quires a new approach and a new scenario towards global economic development. The ideals and aspi
18
HE GLOB
K. N. Raj
In this p Studies in Tir and discusses this situation perspective o larly, in a cc other partner, factors under near future. some kind o. action. EK. N. nections with the late 1940 rial Lecture dian banker BankerS.
rations of the vill have to bi Weightage. Econ fect the youth contrieS, nan OSt loped countries a different set O all cases the yo establish peace that may be di not tolerate extr poverty and oper against the have tribution of incC abjectives throug increa Sing effC raising dignity O unfair competitic all types of pri frustrated as en inities are limited required is a ni strategies of de ???, gwyf fi) Ck at the ving the ultimat hibition in the few clothes’ will the younger gen) Ang ke them lOSe methods. Apart timely corrective world economic there should be a urgent need to system. On a tim of action.
Let nine concl saying that the malaise may be year cycle but th ble for COrrecti plied successfully context of 8 wyard. The adius has to be a glob tempt to go alo. country will only Concerted efforts agement policies ply policies need luated, identified ted and impleme eCOn OnniG futlle be solved by re expressions of po) Semantics. -
 
 
 

EL SLUMP AND 66 RULES OF THE GAME”
per K. N. Raj, Director of the Centre for Development "andrum looks at the background to the current recession what he regards as crucial international relationships in Raj sees its implications for India, viewing it from the a dominant force in the global economy; more particulflict of interests within the US and outside it with itS of the developed market economies. He maintains that the ring the global slump seen unlikely to fade away in the Concluding that it is in the interests of all nations to find resolution to these issues he suggests a broad line of Raj, a respected India in economist who had close conSri Lanka, when worked with the Ceylon Daily News in read this paper in early December 1982, at the Memo1) honour of Sir PurShothamdas ThakurdaS (the late Inand Statesman), under auspices of the Indian Institute of
-ജ
ounger generations
given adequate Dmic problems af)f the developing While in the devehey are faced with f problems. But in rth are seeking to through methods fferent. YOuth d'OeS emes of Wealth and ly favour have-nots S. Equity in the di Sme is one of the in which they aim at iency of Workers, f labour, preventing on, exploitation and ivileges. Youth are mployment opportu... What is therefore eW look at the velopment, and a methods of achiee goal. Any exform of "emperors 1 not only alienate erations but will confidence in the from pressing for action to restore health and stability, in acceptance of the eform the existing bound programme
Lude my remarks by
World θCOIιΟΥΥ110 on a kondraties 50 instruments availg this can be aponly within the interdependent ment process itself ul one and any atle by any single confuse the issueS. On demand maNtogether with Supo be defined, evadiscussed, accepinted. The ble ak before us cannot Orting to abstract tical and economic
Whether we call it a recession, a disorder or a slump does not really matter very much; what is important, and beyond dispute now, is that it is global in its reach and has a SSumed Serious proportions. I propose to address myself therefore to tyVO questions: first, what does this slump signify? and second, what are therefore the "rules of the game in interational economic relationS today and the implications for the policies we follow in India?
If we go by the recorded trends in growth rates, the socialist countries have been evidently affected no less than the Capitalist. According to a recent United Nations estimate, the average rate of growth of output in the middle of the 1960's was nearly 73 per cent per annum in the former (i.e. in the so-called “centrally planned economies') and 5. per cent per annum in the latter (i.e. in both the 'developed market economies' and the “developing econ0mies”). By the latter half of the 1970's these rates had fallen in both to around 4 per cent per annum; in 1981 the increase in output was below 2 per cent in the socialist countries, less than 1 per cent in the advanced capitalist countries, and just over per cent in the developing countries.
The sharp decline in growth rates in Socialist countries is certainly significant, and needs to be investigated and Studied very carefully. It would however be a mistake to infer, from the more or less parallel movement in the growth rates observed, that the reasons for the deceleration have been the Same as those that have brought it about in the capitalist market ecOnOnmieS. The available literature on the Soviet Union points to some of the possible reasons for deceleration such as shortage of manpower, obsolescent technology, shortfalls in agriculture, and insufficient motivation for raising labour productivity; but we do not still know enough to be able to offer any firm hypotheses with adequate empirical foundation,
ECONOMIC REVIEw, DECEMBER 1982

Page 21
The economic response to such ieceleration in growth rates could also be very different in socialist Countries. For instance, while standards of consumption may be allowed to suffer, it is highly unlikely that either the levels of employment or rates of investment are cut down. In an effort to raise growth rates, the rates of investment may even be raised and imports increased to the extent necessary to Sustain them. What repercussions all these Will have on countries like ours is therefore by no means Cie2.1:
For these reasons I shall leave out of account the slow-down in the socialist countries and confine the rest of my observations largely to the slump in the capitalist world. Here We are on more familiar territory, though the characteristics of this slump are in some important respects very different from those associated with slumps earlier.
Characteristics of the Sun)
A broad historical interpretation of the slump in capitalist countries is that it marks the end of a period of unprecedented growth in productivity made possible by a spe
cial set of circumstances following the Second World War. ESSentially this was a period during
which the technological and Organisational advances made earlier in the United States, and the patterns of consumption so fostered, got transmitted to and widely spread in about 10 to 15 countries.
These countries, mostly in Western Europe but including Others Such as Japan and Australia, were already developed industrially and had most of the pre-requisites for a chieving high levels of prOductivity: but their further progress had been retarded by the two World Wars and the political and economic upheavels in between. After 1945 they were brought together in a variety of political, economic and military arrangements under the leadership of the United States, and this provided the framework in which rapid gains could be made, spurred forward by high rates of investment and phenomenal growth in inter-country trading opportunities. The high tide of this great post-war boom was in the first half of the 1960's.
We have some broad dimensional estimates of the productivity gains achieved by these countries in this way in the course of tWO decades. In 1950 the average output per Worker in ten of them (including Japan), valued at the relative prices prevailing in the United States, was only about half aS much as in that country. In the following period productivity rose as fast as ever in the United States, but the rate of increase was
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982
SO much faster in that by 1970 their Worker Was 70 per Actually in some O in France, West Japan, where exte gical upgrading a Were undertaken a rebuilding of indu War, the difference Weite 3 IrCWed eWe Other hand, the gi na rowed very mulC) of Britain, which c rate of investment eruired and lived the good times of f, 3 find itself handi increasingly ObSOl Structure.
But this is on of the story. We a what brought this boom to an end, a the reasons for the in soon afterwards, stagnation and dec activity, and the a of the leading coun talist, world to act reverse these trend
Many explanat Course been put f them blame the tr these countries for unreasonably and t fiscal authorities f cies; that Inną die it, ces and tyages to 1y. A.ninoing them, believe that the O in letting the st money Supply incre rate than output, thing will be all r is a chieved Over t able. Some hold tries responsible waves of price air through sharp and in the price of O take the view that phenomena on the uncontrolled acti listic enterprises ( nationals) seeking margins regardless to prices, output O.
However, not 3 een InO = COISenSUS professio1aal econ different diagnoses but even practical who are credited v tive understanding show much cohere tency in their pro has been the CaS{ the United States What is one to n. of President Reaga year with the larg in the history of after proclaiming elimination Of Suc. centrepiece of his programme? Or hC

these countries nean Output per cent as high. then, such as Germany and nsive techinOlOld modernization long with the stry after the s in productivity more. On the ap was evidently less in the case id not raise its to the extent joyfully through the boom, only capped with an escent industrial
ly the beginning re interested in great post-war ld above all with inflation that set
the continuing line in economic pparent inability tries in the capi
in concert and S.
ions have of orward. Some of ade unions in
hiking up Wages he monetary and )r foiloWing polipossible for pririse cumulativethe monetarists' riginal sin Wa:S ock of primary base at a faster and that everyight Once control nis crucial Varithe OPEC coulfor unleashing di cost increaSeS Successive hikes il. Some others below all these surface, are the vities of oligoOOincluding multig higher profit of what happens
employment.
only has there of opinion among omists on these ; of the malaise men of affairs, with greater intuihave failed to ince and consisnouncements. This e particularly in in recent years. Lake, for instance, in coming out this ţest budget deficit the United States that the total h deficits was the anti-inflationary w is one to inter
Reserve on money supply and interChairman Wolcker of the Federal Reserve on money supply and inter est rates in the United States?
There are several other mystifying features in the global Scene today which seem to defy any logically consistent explanation. For instance, why has the exchange value of the dollar remained SO high in the last two years when the United States has had large deficits in its external trade įr COIMlmodities and the probability of a downward drift in its value has been not inconsiderable? If this was On account of the very high interest rates maintained in the United States during this period, stimulating large inflows of capital from abroad, Why did not its value drop when these interest rates were recently allowed to fall quite sharply? What can explain the considerable decline in the value of the yen precisely at this point, even though Japan has been piling up an enormous trade Surplus? And What meaning is one to see in the political crisis in Japan over apparently nothing more than the continuing deficit in the government budget (absorbing hardly one sixth of the country's gross saving, which itself is as high as ՕՈeof its gross national product)
A simple interpretation of all this could be of course that they reflect the magnitude and conplexity of the crisis now afflicting the capitalist world. And no doubt such an observation is not unwarranted. However, it would be an explanation of only the current differences in perception, and of the confusions and un certainties surrounding them, not of the underlying trends in the capitalist ecCnomies which have given rise to these phenomena. And certainly it offers no clue to what the future holds and what its possible implications are.
A Working Hypothesis
Only fools rush in where angels fear to tread, so the saying goes. One has to be therefore very circumspect in offering any alternative explanation. Certainly we are toto near the events to be able tO comprehend them fully and understand their meaning and significance in proper historical perspective. At the same time it is essential to have some kind of a WOrking hypothesis, COnsistent with whatever we know; and it is therefore in this spirit, with all the due qualifications and reservations, that
I shall present such a hypothesis here.
This hypothesis is simply that, for a variety of reasons, there has developed a basic incompatibility in the United States, the leading coun
19

Page 22
try in the capitalist WOrld, between the policies it needs to follow for maintaining and improving its competitive position as an industrial power and the policies it finds compelled to follow for strengthening its financial hegemony and its investment activities abroad. t rests essentially on the following propositions for which considerable empirical evidence is available:
(i) the industrial dynamism of the United States, hitherto resting heavily on steel and cheap sources of energy, has been seriously undermined by both the obsolesence of the earlier steel technology (1) and by the more recent rise in enrgy costs; (ii) in the absence of a compensating technological break-through, not only has industrial productivity ceased to grow at the Sale rate as before, but the trend of rising wages, set moving in the period of rapidly increasing productivity, has raised unit labour costs and cut quite significantly into the relative share of profits in US industry; (iii) since the newer industrial structures of countries like Japan have incorporated the more efficient steel technology (2) and are moreover better designed to save energy and other input costs, American industry has also suffered serious setbacks its competitive strength, and has heen therefore unable to maintain its position without the Sulpport of extraneous measures such aS devaluation of the dollar and various forms of preference and protection: (iv) at the same time, the decline in the profitability of industry within the United States, together with the prospect of earning higher returns abroad opened up by American multi-nationals, have stimulated a considerable outflow of capital, particularly after the middle of the 1960-s; and this process has been enormously helped by the unquestioned position of the dolar as reserve currency after the liquidation of the Bretton Woods regime in 1971, the rapid growth of the Euro-currency markets in the following years, and above aid by the a bility of the United States with its political, military and financial power to attract and recycle through American banks a very high proportion of the dollars paid out to OPEC countries; (v) consequently, while gross corporate profits from domestic manufacture in the United States amounted to less than $75 billion in 1980 (just about 5 per cent of its gross national product), the gross profits of finani cia companies (excluding Fede
20
(vi)
ra. A Reserve $19 billion to over S31 profits ear added up t as two-third (while they One-fifth reflecting one-quarter growth in i cial and ey terests relat facturing Country dur and a haf; a
in the light ments, ther erged in the ly sharp coi Ween those COincerne
within the much deprec interest rate to improve t tion and pro quired incr: and those primarily Iii remacy of
financial ima for which it that it retai externa valu
This interpret velopments in th Over the last de rather esoteric 2 they are basically in character and developments in agO When the i had propelled its tion got exhauste rate of net inves" British economy : higher than 5 per income in the las 19th century) dip
While
Savings beg
in growing dimen Of foreign investin
(1)
ལོ་ (2)
In popular
very clearly embodied i Nothing was tures, and tures three
(which was COSt and ef. hot melted
Over long d. COst of steel a technologi Peter Druck
Since Japan late, it has aS Peter ID mechanical 'COntinuous stitutes grav for the exp vidual batche located near and unloade

Banks) were nearly and the corporate billion; the last two ed abroad amountedi herefore to as much s of the first in 1980 amounted to only In 1950 and about the considerable even as late as 1965), Importance of finanternal business intve to that of manUinterests within the ng the last decade ld lastly,
of these develope has evidently emUnited States a fairflict of interests betwho are primarily with manufacturing ountry, for whom a iated dollar and lower s would help greatly heir competitive posimote the urgently reeases in investment, whose concerns are nked with the supthe dolar in the rkets of the world , is highly desirable as a high and stable 1Ꮎ.
lation of recent de
le United States 2ade may appear and strange; but
not very different direction from the
Britain a century nin Ovations which industrial revolu
d. The already low ment. Within the at that time (no cent of its national it quarter of the ped still further, an to flow abroad sions till the rate lent rose to nearly
83 per cent of the national income in the years immediately preceding the First World War.
It was against this background that the Bank of England, with its close association with the financial interests in the City of London, was inclined to keep changing its Bank Rate in quick response to gold movements without much concern for the consequences on the domestic economy. It was also on account Of this earlier tradition, and external Orientation, that Britain was SO anxious to restore the old par value Of the pound sterling in terms Of gold after the First World War, despite all the serious deflationary consequences in the 1920's Keynes had Warned against.
There are of course some important difference.S betWeen the Situation then and now, and these differences are perhaps crucial for understanding the COmplexities and COInfusions that are so obvious now. The United States commands in the first place a much wider range of natural and Scientific resources than Britain ever had, and therefore, even though the problems it faces in rebuilding afresh the earlier industries like steel appear to be formidable, the prospects of a new generation of industries emerging, based on new technology and new Sources of energy, and providing large and highly profitable investment outlets within the economy are very much greater. It still retains leadership in several industries such as in the
chemical, machine-manufacturing, electronic and aero-space industries.
For these reasons, the possibility Of investment in domestic manufa Cturing industry declining in the United States and a high proportion of savings seeking foreign investment is rather rem Ote. The role of Ame rican foreign investment, through its multi-nationals, will be essentially to provide a complementary
literature, Peter Drucker was perhaps the first to point Out
towards the end of the 1960's that the steel-making processes the existing industry had become grossly uneconomical. s more expensive, he observed, than creating high temperayet these processes involved such creation of high temperatimes over, only to quench them immediately thereafter just as expensive as heating). No less expensive in terms of fort was moving of heavy weights, and yet in steel-making steel in highly corrosive form had to be moved again istances. To regain its growth dynamics, he added, the would have to b, lowered by at least one-third, and such cal revolution in steel making had only just begun, cf. er, The Age of Discontinuity (1968).
began the phenomenal expansion of its steel industry rather
been able to adopt the new oxygen process (a major step, rucker pointed out, towards converting steel-making from a to a chemical industry) as well as the new technique Of casting (which climinates wastes of temperature and subity flow of raw steel to and through the finishing equipment )ensive and dangerous lifting, hauling, and moving of indiS”). Moreover the new gigantic steel plants of Japan are deep-water ports where iron ore can be transported to di at relatively loW COst.
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982

Page 23
and Supporting role to the manufacturing industries within (though, in the case of Some of the industries that are not being restructured, renovated or otherwise reviewed, there could well be conflicts of interest). On the other hand, with the dethronement of gold from the international monetary System, and the Considerable economic, military and financial power of the United States, the prospects of its gaining cornmand over the entire world ecorigmy through the dominance of the digliar are now greater than they ever were for Britain. In fact, in - the case of Britain, it was so rigidly tied to the gold standard, and the system was operated with such Sinall gold reserves of its ΟΥΝΙΩ (no more than about £12 million in the last quarter of the 19th century), that it enjoyed very little flexibility.
'Ries of the Garae' The so-called 'rules Of the game'. Of the international gold standard trapped the dominant power at that time almost as much as those Who were being dominated; Britain reaized it much too late, in 1931, by when its position as an industrial power had been so totally eroded that it was not able to regain its SUIG fel £23. Cy.
The United States has learnt this lesson quite Well and, When President Nixon became a convert to Keynesianism and completely delinked the dollar from gold in 1971, what he was declaring in effect was its determination to make its own rules and change them as and When it suited its national interestS. Gold was dethroned and in its place was enthroned the dollar which by then, rather like President Nixon himself, had developed ambitious imperial interests. It is not perhas an accident that this was the year when he also called on Chairman Mao and started forging a new political alliance that was to have falo-rea Ching COInsequences On the balance of power in the world.
All this gave the United States a high degree of maneouvrability in economic and political affairs. It is not therefore surprising that after agreeing in the late 1960's to the creation of SDRs (as a major reserve asset that countries could hold alternatively to the dollar) - thiS vaS perhaps only a tactical concession, in response to the strong French advocacy of an international monetary system based on gold - the United States has since then show no great enthusiasm for building up an alternative internatiOnal mOnetary regime based largely on SDRs. The International Monetary Fund could become a serious embarassment if given an oportunity to turn the tables and enforce “conditionali ties' on the United States; SO it. was better to keep it in an eSSentially subservient position, only
EconoMIC REVIEw, DECEMBER 1982
enforcing the cha Ing game as required States.
The United Sta PE’OWedi man Oeul Vrab. the dethronement C devalue the dollar : to launch. Such a f external value that it was further deval per cent in relation
Mark. This impro titiveness Of Ame. turing industry s
that, along with t Stres taken at that increased governn there was a phei both in the export; ted States and in corporate profits Franufacturing.
ThaUS, the valui Inerchandise export exceeded 4 per cent tional product all th rose steadily from nearly 8 per cent ( national product by l.970's. Corporate pri facturing, which around $40 billion Ween 1965 and 19, thereafter to nearl 1979. The conseque the American econo. its imports and ther vive e COITIOmic a Cti over in the Second
1970's.
The contributic valuation of the do sharp inflationary developed during t not been however is lighted in the lite Subject (except in Professor Robert external payments and capital acc0 un' made in dollars ( On Outflow Of Capit in 1974), and such d Canne the basis of t growth in euro-Cu. QVeĩ? which rio CO exercised by anyOI. beei a major fac and supporting wav in the commodity the world. To the increased the foreig Serves Of Other COU been secondary eff dimention accelerat movement of price
In fact, it is rise in prices so i. the line that neutr tial part of the ga countries from the price and provoked for another sharp 1979. It needs to b that since imports countries were alim C voiced in dollars,

ging rules of the by the United
.tes used its ilmility, gained by of gold, first to a little and then ree flOat Of itS within two years ued by nearly 40 to the Deutsche Ved the COImperican manufa Cso considerably he Other meatime (Such as lent spending), Omeila increase S frOm. the Unithe quantum of
earned from
e Of American S, which never ; Of its gross nahrough the 1960's, 1972 and touched Df the grOSS the end of the OfitS from manuhadi fluctuated per annun bet74, rose sharply y $90 billion by }nt upsWing in my increased also *eby helped to revity the world half Of the
in that the dellar made to the
ᎤᎵᎾSSulfᎾS that his period has ufficiently highrature. On this
the writings of Triffin). Since on both current t could be freely with all controls ial removed early Ollar OutflOWS behe phenomenal rrency markets Introl could be le, they have tor Stimulating res of speculation markets al OVer extent they also gn exchange reIntries there have ects Of enorm0US ing the upward S. the very large induced all along alized a Substanins Of the OPEC first hike in oil them to go in hike in price in e mentioned here of oil by other st universally inand the dollar
prices were raised as the dollar got depreciated, the devaluation of the dollar brought really no relief to the oil-importing countries. In due course this method of pricing was adopted by exporters of many other commodities. The belief that a system of floating exchange rates would insulate countries with appreciating currencies from the inpact of inflation elsewhere has therefore been disproved in practice to a very considerable degree.
Similarly, for the same reasons, it is not true that it is the unreaSonable Wage demands of labour that have been the main force behind the inflationary movement in prices either within the United States or elsewhere. In general even the organised labour in the adVanced capitalist countries have sought no more than rise in wages to compensate for rise in consumer prices, and still not quite succeeded in maintaining their real wages. What has basically created the problem is that productivity has ceased to grow in a wide range Of industries; and under Such COnditions wage increases (whatever the underlying reasons) do tend to affect profits adversely even after part of the in Crea, Ses in cost are passed on through rise in product prices. Naturally, in countries like Germany and Japan, where there have been continuing productivity increases, these problems have been very much under control.
Doubts about the Dollar It is the cumulative inflationary novement caused by all these factoS within the United States and Outside, and above all the doubts that began to develop the world over about the stability and reliabiity of the dollar as a reserve asset (as its external value continued to drift downwards), that caused 3. sharp reversal of policies in the United States around 1980. t was all right to let the external value of the dollar drop as long as it helped to improve the competitive position of American manufacturing industry at practically no cost to the United States. But when the external value of the dollar slid so low as it had by the end of the 1970's (reflected, for instance, in the deutsche mark dollar exchange rate falling to 18 in 1979 from its earlier level of 3.5 in 1971), and moreover the price of gold suddenly shot up to over $800 per ounce (reflecting the apparently growing preference of holders of financial assets for gold) the signals were clear and unmistakeable... Unless something very dirastic Was dOne to restOre confidence in its stability and integrity there was a real danger of the dollar getting dethroned in favour of either gold, the monarch deposed earlier still waiting in the wings (like some other deposed monarchs), or a
21

Page 24
democratic and republican candidate in the form of SDRs within a fullblooded and truly international monetary system. This was obvious
ly too terrible a prospect for any patriotic American to view with equanimity, particularly since it
would have struck a body blow to the financial and political pOWer wielded by the United States.
The only way of preventing such a catastrophe Was to make it clear by any means whatever that the dollar Was at least as stable as, if not more than, any other financial asset including gold. This required getting price rises within the United States under control, regardless of the impact that the measures taken for the purpose might have on either manufacturing industry or employment within the country. Naturally, at this stage, the monetaristo prescriptions had great appeal, for what could be a more obvious solution than the traditional one of raising interest rates sharply as the Bank of England would have done if it had been forced into a similar predicament in the late 19th century? Somehow the very simplicity of “monetarism” makes it politically very saleable, despite its totally fallacious premiSeS. (3).
With the sharp upward adiustment of interest rates in the United States the movement of funds a Way from the dollar did get reversed, and not only was there a Cuick drop in gold prices but the external value of the dollar rose perceptibly (with the deutsche mark-dollar rate going up to nearly 2.3 by the end of 1981). Since high interest rates checked speculative holdings of commodi
ties the inflation: prices was also ch tent. However, at high interest rat of precipitating th ness enterprises a ring the required manufacturing in the riSe in the ex| dollar adversely a titive position of American indu Stri If therefore h and a much appre ClOliaf beCOrne a, 1 ture of U.S. e{20} could lead to a dustrializatiOn” in over a period, mu where this proces, widespread closure terprises and drast dustrial employm million in 1966 to lion by the middle Well before Such a powerful interests the policy may w
reversal in the
There is muc be said and develo but I shall refrain lack of time. All I a few observations of the apparnet policies that are b the United States, matters most to
Contra, dicto In the first p) clearly rather naiv the policy pronour dent Reagan Or a: he seeks to raise ( cut taxas while away with big
(3) Henry Kaufman, who is supposed to be the Guru
Stock Exchange,
Was content to go along with mone!
covered recently a conceptual problem and made the
conceptual
Vations: *Perhaps the most significant “monetarismo is the continuously changing nature O as IY1ΟΙΩey.
Financial innovation, which is primarily
these changes has been encouraged by the monetarist monetarism has raised the opportunity costs of rema:
confines of regulation. Money, Federal Reserve Well after central bank, ber 1978, the definition of the original ly redefined entity continues to
GNP”. This little bit of economic who was closely associated with ago. As an active participant in time he had explained this
moreover, any financial innovation consequently, is always
money has been altered
concept expanded by $90 billion. Neverthe
be a declining Cf. “Danger: Too Much Turbulence',
Wisdom. Was in fact knoWn
the City of London r the monetary very clearly in a famous
is always 1.
playing catch
fra, Challeng
cont
in 1802: “...if bank paper were abolished, a substit be likely to be found, to a certain degree, in bills (
bills and bank notes were extinguished, other
Substi
would unquestionably be found.... Banks would be instit description which now exist, but of the kind and numbe. best to spare both the trouble of gold, and the expense i of interest upon the quantity of it in possession..... Credi
credit in books, credit depending mere verbal
on the testimony of promise of parties'. cf. An Enquiry
into
Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain. Unfortunate replaced by faith cures, such lessons have to be lea again at the expense of millions of innocent people.
22

ry movement Of ecked to SOme exthe same time, is had the effect e collapse of busiOver and deterinvestment in ustry; moreover, ernal value of the fected the COmpemany traditional e.S. igh interest rates 2iated value of the more lasting feaomic policy it. rocess of “de-inthe United States ch as in Britain has resulted in of industrial enic reduction in inent from nearly 12 Well bellOW 8 millof 1981. Of course, development, the that are hurt by ell bring about its United States. h more that can ped on this theme, from doing so for need to add are about the future ly contradictory eing followed by since that is what us at Oresent. y Policies ace, it would be ye to take literally lcements Of Presissume that. When efence outlay and talking of doing government and
of the New York jari Sm till he di Sfollowing obser
problem with f what we regard
responsible fO approach. That is, ning within the edefined by the has occurred. The up. Since Novemfour times, and less, this constanttion of nominal e, May-June 1982. o Henry Thornton, early two centuries oversies of that treatise published
te for it Would f exchange ... if jutes than gold
Luted, not of the
which would serve ncurred by the loSS would still exist; witnesses, or the
the Nature and y, when reason is nt over and OVer
budget deficits, he does so out of ignorance or stupidity. He must know that, when total government expenditure is as high as one-third of the gross national product of the United States, it is not going to be easy doing any of these things. He must also know that such spending is now essential to keep alive a large part of American industry (which is vital for continuing political suppoit in the COuntry) and to build up some of the new generation of industries with the R & D and other funds provided through the defence budget (since they are vital for the iuture). All he is attempting to do therefore is probably to reassure some of the concerned Sections of American big busineSS, iii language they understand, that they need nOt WOrry, this may Seem COltradictory to others, but it has its Own internal political logic.
Similar CONSiderations are perhaps also valid in the case of the pronouncements of Chairman Volcker of the Federal Reserve. If high interest rates in the United States are striking at the root of American financial interests (as they were beginning to recently in Mexico) they will of course be brought down, irrespective of what it costs and what rules and conventions have to be changed. But please do not let us say that too loud, in case others think that inflation will soon be out of control in the United States and the confidence in the future of the dollar is thereby shaken.
This confidence is a very fragile thing that depends largely on what the big business and financial interests in the world think of it and does not always have necessarily any other objective or rational basis to it. This is so particularly because they in turn depend for their guidance on all kinds of barometers in highly sensitive and essentially speculative markets (including the stock exchanges); and here New York is particularly notorious for its propensities. AS Keynes pointed out long ago, “even outside the field of finance, Americans are apt to be unduly interested in discovering what average opinion believes average opinion to be; and this national weakness finds its nemesis in the stock market. Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is SeriOuS when enterprise becomes the bubble on a Whirl -pooi of speculation”. Unfortunately for the United States, from time to time Keynes like Marx
turns out to have been perfectly right.
Pragmatic Outlook What I am trying to suggest
therefore is that the political and economic leadership in the United States is now walking on tight rope trying to reconcile powerful conflict ing interests within the country and outside; that in spite of the dOC
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982

Page 25
trinaire cloak they wear they ae perhaps, like the leadership now in socialist countries, essentially pragnatic in outlook; that they understand very well that the confidence in the dollar is essentially a matter of providing the right psychological and political appeal to those with large financial interests; and that they Will change the rules of the game or bend any rule (as they have done many times over and now again in the aftermaith Of the Mexican Cirisis) in support of their national and international objectives.
At the Same time, the game that is being played is a very risky One. It is not Only that in the present maze of international finance, based on an enormous and Over-bloated Structure of debts something untOward can always happen. That may appear now to be the most Serious threat; but the United States has perhaps enough reSOurces at its command to be able to SCroape through such crisis. A much more serious cause for alarm is that the game includes also playing With armaments of all kinds, setting people against each other, and profiting from that too. Armaments are indeed the biggest business now.
We know at our own cost the implication of this game in South Asia, and we continue to pay a high price for it. The pressures now being applied on Japan to devote a larger proportion of its reSources for armaments and defence, and not to protect its farm products so heavily (so that 3 apan becomes Very much more dependent on imports from the United States), are also part of this game; and this is no doubt a major factor in the emerging political realignments in Japan. In fact, since the stakes of the game are very high, there could even be Strong tempation to start an open global conflict in which the United States and the dollar can be symbolized as the defenders of “democracy' and 'freedom’.
There are of conflicts of interest United States and even its partners for them to see this game and frustrate its realization to the extent that it suits them. The manner in which countries of Western Europe have defied the United States in the matter of thier agreement with the Soviet Union on natural gas pipe-lines is ample evidence of such in-built correctives within the existing frame of international political relations. Japan could also prove to be a tougher nut to crack than some in the United States now imagine, particularly if at an opportune time the Soviet Union were to make some political and economic moves attractive to Japan (which it is in fact well placed to do).
Above all, the moves the Soviet Union and China have made re
EcoΝοMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982
course sufficient between the closest through
cently to come ClO full of possibilities On tine present tors underlying the Seem unlikely to f: near future. The ( est betWeen the Structures of Unite tain and of the efficient structures many and Japan only Over a fairly time, particularly S. do not believe in ned investment p] could have Other Wis lerate the process. Y WOrk of relations are now Operating. except the United extent enjoys the tial for following : cies. President M discovering this a major changes in much more agreem than their interests process of fundame ing of the kind re their eCOmOmides in ner is liikely to ta period, with many lasting at least a probably the rest o
The internal c estis within the Unit perhaps easier to cause there are v monality of interes flected in the trad finance-capitalism', time to get sorted this depends On var cesses that would derably by what ha both in the United the rest Of the W.
Need to Conflicts of It is certainly of the rest of the us in India, to various conflicts of United States and kind of resolution fectively stop the the various contine dence, and create time a new interna in which all count those belonging to can develop rapidl Suffocated and Su towards this end t haS to be made mO
The New Inter Order, which the Third World have b mote Over the las little success), is its conception to the near future. I slogan for mobilizi nion at the global however other poss more realistic recC

Ser tOgether are
for the future. Outl0Ok, the facglobal Slump ide away in the onflicts of interOlder industrial i States and BrileWer allC mOre of France, Gercan get reSolved long period of Ince most Of them he kind af plan*Ogrammes that se helped to acceWithin the frame
in Which they nO One of them States to Some flexibility essen
Independent poliitterand is now his cost. Since policy require ent betWeen them ; now permit, the ntal restructurquired to revive a SuStalined manke a fairly long ups and downs, decade but more f this century.
onflicts of inter5ed States, though be resolved betery strong comtS as well (as relitional notion of ), may also take out. In any case
ious political pro
be affected consitippens meanwhile States and in orld.
Resolve
Interests din the interestS world, including See that these interests in the Outside find SOme that Would ef.-- drift to war in ints now in eviover a period of jtional frameWyOrk ries, particularly the Third World, y without being ppressed. It is hat every effort
W.
lational EcOnOmic countries of the een trying to prot decade (with Oo romantic in be realizable in is at best a ng political opilevel. There are bilities, based on gnition of the
elements of power, self-interest and ideology in the world at its present stage of development. Some hints of these possibilities have been already given, but they need to be carefully thought out in more concrete detail and above all made into an acceptable political and economic agenda for a large number of countries, including not only those in the Third World who are able to stand up to the United States but also the Soviet Union, China and Other Socialist countries, and hopefully also some countries in Western Europe such as France, Sweden, Norway and Italy. (West Germany and Japan are perhaps still too closely tied up with the United States to contemplate a serious break with it.
Perhaps a first step in this direction could be mobilization of political support in favour of a new Cooperative Organisation of NOnAligned and Allied Countries (on the lines of the earlier Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development set up in Europe after the Second World War). India, Can play a major role in such a cooperative endeavour; and this could give a new and very relevant economic dimension to our traditional policy of Non-alignment.
The fact that we are now getting heavily indebted to the International Monetary Fund (which has taken the place of the Bank of England in the old British Empire) need not really matter all that much, provided we know how to play the game according to our interests and, to the extent possible, get the rules changed through collective action. However that way does not lie in Splendrous waste of resources on the Asiad or in being taken in by the promise of the Wonders of modern technology and marketing that multi-nationals can bring (whether in the form of television Sets and low-cost baby cars or through the large foreign markets they will open up for us). These are the kind of games that the present rulers of the United States would love to see us get lost in, and they can Only lead to our ruin as heavy debtors pulled by our nose.
To avoid this, we shall have to have a close look at some of Our policies to cut out all the frills and frivolities (not to mention the pOlltical and economic corruptions) through which a high proportion of Our Scarce resources is now being frittered away; and concentrate very much more on self-reliant development based mainly on Our Own Capabilities in science, technology and organisation. In other words, We need to have a more mature underStanding Of Our weaknesses and strength. The choice is there for us to make and act upon if we have the political understanding and foresight to do so.
23

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Page 27
Sri Lanka females stand near the East level on the Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) - Several years above the South Asian level
(Smith, Peter; 1978).
In comparison to Thailand, which is also a Theravada Eddhist country like Sri Lanka, it is evident that Sri Lankan men and vAYOInnen narry later than Thais. The percentage single at the end of marriageable ages (e.g. 45-49) in Sri Lanka is higher than the percentage single at the corresponding ages of males and jeniales in Thailand.
Several attempts have bee lĩìạde to understand the possible causes of the cihanges occurring in Sri Lanka's marriage pattern. Among then Dixon's study may be regarded as the major demographic study dealing with the nuptiality pattern in Sri Lanka utilizing national level data. She uses the Census data from the 1940s to 1963. Describing the nature of marriage timing, Dixon illdicates that in 1963, 41 percent of the females aged 20-25 and 85 percent of the hales were still single. Also 10 percent of the men, aged 40-44, were bachelors. Looking at the reasons for the delay in timing of narriage, Dixon concludes that it is not the non-availability of mates (sex ratio), or non-desirability, but the non-feasibility of marrying at proper ages which explains the delay in the timing of marriage. The dificulties in accumulating a dowry and finding a suitable bridegroom lave become increasingly severe due to the following two reasons, accordi3g to her:
(2) Land fragmentation and landlessness caused by the nature of inheritance laws and the acquisition of land for plantations (pp. 287-88, 263, 310). (b) High natural increase in the
population. "Economic conditions in rural
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) excluding the estates, are not favourable for nuptiality, males of marriageable age are increasingly less likely to have inherited any land, Or to be able to purchase ary, if they do have an inheritance, their portion is likely to be too small to Support a family. Females are increasingly less likely to bring land With them as a dowry. At the same time the rural economy is not expanding enough to provide wage paying jobs to supplement the meagre incomes from village garderas. Thus marriage for both men and women must be continuously postponed if not foregone altogether (p.256) ..... That marital postponements, and in SOme cases permanent celibacy, have been increasingly necessary throughout the country, because of pressures on scarce land and employment is without doubt. Both men and women must wait
EconoMIC REVIEw, DECEMBER 1982
longer to accumulat l'eSOurCes tO Set Up b) Ou Sehold. Thus 1 feasible for both th: (Dixon, R, 1970 pp.
Though Guna. Singl a national level St it, utilised the San proach in a micro-l village in the Kand Lanka. His interes look at the relations dei development an( lity. However, it t nuptiality in so fa to fertility. Gunasi ral reasons as to h in DeliU III agO dia, the V became p0or Over ti acquisition of vill plantations has res available to villager cialisation of agric paddy cultivation, n lagers to sell the Sl the market which have gone to the V. traditional social C ed the poor Was Wage labour came place of old forms like Share CrO3ing change. According per cent of the hea diO rn Ot OvÄyra altiy 1O‘a gent do nOt OWh
(defined as land ex garden) and 19 pe: have legal title to Only 21 per cent are employed on a the nin Odern SectOr a Salaries.
One of the draw
Singhe's study is th
define the 'real pO Delung Oda, e.g. he percentage of house not, own high land houses o hold em modern sector ea, Salary. No idea is
many of these fami the four categories. gories are not in the point here is th not have land at employment. If ( fined the real poor ) which is denied an of wealth or emplo an arital status and уOUld have been i tion to conclude layed marriages wer of resources or not. henti On the numbé get a reasonable i land, farming or
pation like carpent the number Of un Seems to be little e ever, it should be ( InfOrmati On he prO to identify the el society of Sri Lan Though there may

the neceSSary an independent uptiality is less In it once Was' 287-88). e's work was not dy like Dixon’s kind. Of apvel study of a district of Sri was rather to hip between unmarital fertihrows light On r as it relates nghe cites SeVeow the peasants llage he studied, me. The colonial agers” land for ricted the land ... The connerulture, specially otivated the vil(rplus paddy in would otherwise
llage poor. The rder which helpdisrupted, and
into being in of employment and labour exto his data, 55.7 ds of households ddy land 69 per any high land cept house and r cent do not their houseS. of householders regular basis in ind earn monthly
ybacks in Gunaat he does not or segment' in talks about the holds that does !, paddy land, loyement in the rning a. monthly given as to how lies belong to all Since these cateutually exclusive hat those who do all may have Sumasinghe depeasant category y of these forms yment, and their timing, then he a better posiwhether the de'e a result of lack Since he did not er of people who income through any other Occury, or masOnary, employed also xaggerated. HOWobserved that the vides is valuable ements of rural ka in the 70S.
be doubt
Guinasinghe's statistical reasoning as to whether it supports his argument, and the statistics themselves are insufficient to identify the category of 'real poor' peasants in Delungoda, his arguments and conclusions are important for our task. In his conclusion he states "I demonstrated the casual relationship between the high proportions Of un married Women and the underdeveloped economy, which is incapable Of generating sufficient employment Opportunities” (GunaSinghe; 1977, p. 151).
The higher age at marriage, coupled with a relatively higher percentage of those who never marry, conforms with the two majOr characteristics of what demographers call a 'non-traditional nuptiality pattern'. In Dixon's words Ceylon (Sri Lanka) is the purest example of "a non-traditional nuptiality pattern in Asia that cannot be attributed to a larger immigrant population. Or a. highly urban environment' (Dixon, 1970, p. 258). The question at issue here then is why should a nuptiality pattern, usually found in Societies with a higher level of development, be found in a country like Sri Lanka which is at a differeint leyel Of development. This issue needs more investigation by researchers before any firm answer Could be found. However, DixOn's and Gunasinghe's studies confirm that the conditions of under-developrent in Sri Lanka have in the timiing contributed to the upward changes in the timing of marriage.
This kind of conclusion is in complete contradiction to the assumptions of the “demographic transition theory (DTT) which summarises the European and lately Some of the non-European experience in relation to nuptiality and fertility trends. The DTT postulates that the increase in the age at marriage and reductions in fertility are consequences of an economically developed State of a Society with a higher level Of urbanisation etc.
The differentials in age at marriage and the proportion single reveal some interesting facts as to how the delay in timing of marriage has been operating among different social groups. "f we look at the 1975 World Fertility Survey, Sri Lanka (WFSS) data, it can be seen that the overall mean age at marriage was 18.2 years for the Women interviewed during the survey. The mean for women living in estates is 17.3; which is about a year and a half earlier than for women living in urban areas for whom the mean is 18.8. FOI" W Omen from rural areas the mean age at marriage was intermediate. As for ethnic differentials, the Sri Lankan Moors had a mean of 16.5 which is two years younger than the mean for Sinhalese (18.6).
25

Page 28
The Indian Tamils had a mean of 17.2 and Sri Lanka. Tamils 17.5. Religious differentials more or less follow the same pattern as the ethnic differentials, according to the survey results. The rise in the mean age at marriage is greatest among Sinhalese Buddhists and for Women With lower levels of education. Age at marriage by zone, according to
Paranagamage, shows that the females in the dry zone married nearly 3 years earlier than the females in the wet zone, and the
urban rural difference in age at marriage within the zones seems less Significant than Zonal differences (Paranagamage, 1978). However, the general finding in the demographic research is that the women living in urban areas enter marriage later than their counterparts living in rural areas. The early age at marriage reported for the dry zone may be a reflection of this pattern.
Regarding the stability of the institution of marriage in Sri Lanka. we could state that marriage in Sri Lanka is a relatively stable institution, with very low levels of widowhood, divorce or separation as means of marital dissolution. The WFSS results show that Widowhood and divorce or separation stood at 6 percent each for all Women who entered marriage. Out of all married Women interviewed during this survey, 96 percent had been marriac only once and 88 percent were still in their first marriage (WFS, Summary 1978). Here we should not forget however, that many marriage dissolutions occur in Sri Lanka, specially in the rural sector Without necessarily reporting them to the authorities and the rates usually Worked out on the basis of data reported to the Registrar General of Births, Marriages and Deaths have to be used with enough attention to this fact. In fact, traditionally the Customary marriage was never registered and even today some of the old couples live together without registering their marriages. Legally, both males and females can COntract a marriage on their own at the minimum age of 21 years. Beow this age parental consent has to be obtained for marriage. At present spouse selection is made on
the basis of two major lines. (a) Arrangement by parents, relatives Or friends. (b) Contracting by the
partners. Whichever manner one folllows, the spouse selection is made on the basis of certain criteria. Ryan (1953) identified that the spouse selection is made on the basis of five fundamental rigid criteria and three balancing factors. The five criteria, are ethnicity, caste, age differentials, bride's virginity and horoscope matching. The balancing factors include girl's family dowry power, the security and Occupation of the groom, and the status of family lines. These factors are more look
26
ed into When n ged rather than There is ver group marriage Lanka. For exa marriages cons 3 percent of th year during the (Fernando, 1980 ethnic groups i] de Occur in cont and their occur be on the incre: tions of educa in COme alld lift caste boundaries ever, caste endog Within each CaS who can afford true in arrangil their children than in the c. “Although selec the same religic departures from mot un COmmOn embra Ces the fa where difference are compatible v ever, the extent marriages canno since the Regis nOt maintain Sl Such marriages In Ore numerous ween ethnic rou] O.434),
Apart from ted factors, ther Such as educati influence the ag. Lanka. School both men and " n2rriage market ing period and t ges brought abou could further po to marriage.
BBLOGRAPHY
Dixon, Ruth B
The Social and
minants of Ma and Celibacy: A Ph. D. thesis, I Of California (U
Fernando, Dallas,
“Changing nuptia
Lanka. 1901-19 Studies 29 (2) Ju
1980
Ethnic and re
marriage in Sri Of bźO-SOCidil Scie
Gamage, S. 1983
*Kinship, Famil Caste System in organization ar arOund Maha We paper Written in coming).

arriages are arranwhen contracted.
little interethnic taking place in Sri imple inter-ethnic ituted only about Se registered each period 1960-1975 Within various ter-caste marriageS emporary Sri Lanka 2nce now seems to Se. The COnsideraSion, employment, Style cut aCOSS very often. Howamy is still practiced e group by those to. This is more g marriages fΟΥ у parents rather Se of contracting. Ding a partner from us group is usual, this practice are where one partner ith Of the Other Or S in religious faiths rith marriage. Howof inter-religious
t be ascertained rar General doeS lch statistics. But
are believed to be than marriages betDs” (Fernando, 1980:
the tradition-Oriene are also factors on which seem to e of marriage in Sri attendance keeps Women out of the during their schoolhe attitudinal Chanit during this period stpone the entrance
90
Demographic Deterrital Postponement
Comparative Study. Berkeley: University
npublished) -
F. S. 1975
lity Patterns in Sri 71 in Population y pp. 179-190.
ligious factors in
Lanka. In Journal nces 12, 429-436.
y, Marriage and he context of Social d administration i river basin'. A Sinhalese (forth
Formal education in Sri Lanka is relatively free and open, compared to other societies in the South Asian region. As a source of to seek employment in the present context; and to be more competitive in the job market, women seek more education which eventually delays their marriage.
Finally it could be stated that the marriage pattern in Sri Lanka. is characterised by a rleatively late timing of marriage both for males and females and a relatively high percentage of Spinsterhood or celibacy. (Though spinsterhood or Celibacy (Permanent non-marriage) stood at relatively higher levels, most recent findings show that the level has declined (Census; 1981). The proportions getting married has also declined among the younger age groupS, conforming to this same trend. Standard indices of marriage timing such as SMAM, Mean Age at Marriage, and even the components Of the marriage pattern Such as a K.C. prove the same. The educCational, employment and income factor's coupled with traditionoriented considerations of caste, ethnicity, religion dowry etc. seem to be major influences in the Observed delay in the timing of marriage. In more general terms, the socio-economic and cultural conditions prevailing, in the context of Sri Lanka's relative economic underdevelopment contributes towards the creation of certain attitudinal and behavioural consequences as may be seen in the case of marriage in Sri Lanka. However, Once a marriage is arranged or contracted, it seems to be stable; since the level. Of marriage dissolution prevalent here is low.
Gumasinghe, Newton 1977
Under-development and declining fertility in a Kandyan village' chapter 7 in - T. Scarlett Epstein and Darrel Jackson (eds) The Feasibility Of Fertility planning, Micro Perspectives. PergamOn PreSS.
Leach, E. R. 1961
Lanka. 1901-1971 in Population pectives. Pergamon Press. PulBliya, A village in Ceylon, A.
Studal of land tenure and kinship,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Obeysekera, G. 1967
Land tenure in village Ceylon. Cambridge University Press, Cam
bridge.
Pieris, Ralph 1956
Sinhalese social organization. The Ceylon University Press Board. Colombo.
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982

Page 29
Small and Mediun Towns in Sri Lanka:
A Situational Analysis and their Planning Signif
M. W. J. G. Mendis
There is an urgent need to formulate a national urban development policy which would include a component connected with the Small and medium towns. Today these towns perform a key role in providing urban support in the predominantly rural regions and as Suburbs in the predominantly urban regions. But since there is no explicit national urban growth strategy they lack spatial structuring which can enable them to secure more effective urban-rural complementarities, states Professor Willie Mendis, Head of the Town and Country Planning Department, University of Moratuwa, in this paper. In a previous paper, published in the Economic Review of April 1982, he dealt with the "large" towns and a national urban growth strategy.
Background and Purpose of Paper
In Sri Lanka, one out of every five persons lives in urban areas. In the latter, only nine of its towns exceed 50,000 population in size, of which six have populations of over 100,000 persons. Of the latter too, only one exceeds half a million while the rest are well below 200,000 population in size. In such a context, the small and medium towns can be regarded as those with populations below 50,000 persons in each. Such towns in the Sri Lankan urban perspective have become significant as suburbs and also as “service centres' to the rural hinterland and as “market towns' for rural producers.
In the above circumstances, a study of their pattern of prevalence by location and structure, of their rates of growth, and an analysis of their relevance in development, all become useful areas for enhancing the fund of knowledge needed in planning of the Urban Sector in Sri Lanka. In particular, at this juncture when urban areas are being consciously promoted as contributors to economic growth, specific attention on the small and medium size towns will be most appropriate to achieve three objectives, as folloWS:
(a) to determine the framework oi c national urban development strategy which will incorporate them in a hierarachical manner that would simultneously €SUlrè complementarity with rural development.
to ascertain how they could act as foci of urban needs of rural people and as centres capable of accommodating the rural surplus of those persons electing to live in them.
(b)
EconoMIC REVIEw, DECEMBER 1982
(c) to determine a Structure of 1 which in turn Securing of eco through the the location of
This Paper is h to study and analy, ly stated factors medium towns With mulating recomme would permit the ri above mentioned th Aethodology of Stu
This study has Inition of “urban' s the national Ce11S1 Only those towns Municipal Councils, and Town Councils sidered. Further, f noted previously, th fined those urban air population - size, medilm tOWnS in th text. In this conn towns below 10,000 be regarded as Sma Others between 1 population as medit (See Figure 1) .
The format of firstly included a c the Small and mec number and size. rates have next Thereafter their loc tial structuring hav The conclusions an tions for developme) sing Out of the Stut final Section.
Table POPULATO
Census Year
Population in Small &
Towns
Share of Total Urban
Share of Total Popula
Sources: Urbanizatio and Census Note: Percentage fig
Tabie 2 SHARE (
Censitis Year
1946 1953 1963 1971 1981
Source: Urbanizatio

ᎦᏟ8aᎥBC£
suitable spatial (rban settlements will facilitate the
homic objectives 'ationalisation of investments.
ince an attempt se the previous
of Small and a view to forndations that
alisation of the ree objectives. ly utiliSed the defiis employed in ls. Accordingly, designated aS Urban Councils, have been COInor the reaSOInS is study has deeas below 50,000 aS small and e Sri Lanka COin
ection, those population will towns and
0,000 and 50,000 lm Size tOWInS.
the study has lassification Of ilium towns by
Their growth been discussed. ations and Spae been analysed. i recommendant planning, aridy, comprise its
ج۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔سی۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔یہیے۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
sceratic ASSIFICATION OF TOWNS BY. Paul Afon size, sat Alexa
13 gENSUS
Figure
Classification of Small and Medium Towns by Number and Size
In the post-independence period (ie. 1946-1981) the magnitude of the urban population living in small and medium towns has increased by 1.34 million or at an average of 384,000 persons per decade (See Table 1). Further in that same period, one Out of every two urban persons in Sri Lanka has been living in small and medium towns. Presently (1981), 1.8 million persons live in such towns.
In addition, the number of small and medium towns in the post independence period have always been greater than 85% of all towns in the country. (See Table 2). Accordingly, they have performed, and continue
N OF SMALL AND MEDIUM TOWNS IN POST-INDEPENDENT
SRI LANKA 1946-1981
1946 1953 1963 1971 198
Medium
439,582 429,968 1,014,442 1,612, 197 1,782,971 Population (%). 43 35 50 57 56 tion (%) 7 5 10 13 12
in in Sri Lanka, Mendis (1981) p.3.. Statistical Abstract (1979) p. 30/31
of Population (1981) p. 3. res have been rounded.
DF SMALL AND MEDIUM TOWNS IN TOTAL NUMBER OF
TOWNS IN SRI LANKA 1946-1981
Total Number of Number of Small & Share of Small &
Towns Medium Towns Medium Towns in all
Towns 9,
42 37 88 43 36 85 99 92 93 35 130 96 134 125 93
in Sri Lanka. Mendis (1981) p. 31.
27

Page 30
Census Year
946
Populatio in %of Təfa Urban Number of Towns Population %of Total Urban Number of Towns Population %of Tota į Urban Number of Towns Population %of Total Urban Number of Towns Population % of Total Jrban
1953
1963
97
98.
Number of Towns
DISTRIBUTE ON OF POPULATION
BY SIZE AND NUMB
S#; 2004
ία 499.
9 283: 2.8
Belo 2000
3.
O.
2
5
3.
i.2
7
4
68
s
3
7
5
19 4 3.
73 O.2
Source: Urbanization in Sri Lanka. Mendis (1981) ρ. 31.
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 \ ಘ್ವಿ; 三 盏 \S ڈبہ بنikخچP جاتی ہیں جو دنیا میں بن! ordi 念、 ? స్క్రీస్తే . ܢ ܢܝ ဖိူ\ * s ဒ........ ဟီးရိုးဖြိုဖွံ့ဖြုံပွဲ మిక్కెళ్ల કિર્તિrge ******:్క ******-{33 ziren. 蕊
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* కీపర్త్క్కి * కలిగిఉూఖ్య gala
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یا مدیریت وی اتفاق افت. به Pe;:;િ "نتيجة تعنيزة
" fathe్క్క * Rékagena
6-קליני" -- TMashຍ.
Ar( ±- ̄
*{E}^${}e్క
مع "كمية نتي ، حي و raقنغ:A#f1{dخت> هيسمبنميسستة سسسسسسسيستينسسسسسسسست مس. *#e t:ఉచిత్తe ***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

IN SMALL AND MEDIUM TOWNS, SRI LANKA
ER OF TOWNS 1946-98Sg
Size of town " in fermis of" Popilatioin
iail foi piis
550 ές, 99.99 7 ܡ 36 55874. 5.5 ܠܝ
੬ 鹦8 2969
All Sicill Toys its
リ_リ
2 *(?్య్య్న Α xxt:్న ఫ్రీఫిFrఇ
i f-sta, kelia
ችድኦ፰x
፳፭,
ফুi స్త్ర
S ઇંદ્ગિ.િన్యీషి
assissix “းမွှားဒူးఫ్రసిగొణి: عہدہ
3.jපඤ
&nkudi
RšEERSigg
|s tడికోడ్డg togre
قریب ia می نتا2یک ایالات نیز
محی
t
y
di Saggi Largeters å fëdit4FYn siže forvens
® ຂຶai Tsuyາຣ
Mediann Size Toons
10,000 20,000
έα έΟ All Mieditan 19,999 49,999. Size Toynis
13 5 8 74598 7723 351721
7. 17.3 3奎。4 15 6 2. 23150 54.727 367876 7.2 2.5 29.7 2. 重墨 39 27853 487986 776139 3.8 24.2 38.0 34. 25 59 499.561 78量874 28.8095
7.5 27.5 40 35 3. 66 $重重量3器 967957 483(95
Í 6.0; 30.5 4鑫5
to play a significant role in the national urban scenario. It is thus contended that they have acted in concert to avoid large-scale migra
tion to the large cities.
In terms of population living in the post-independence period it is revealed that a large share of them have always lived in the medium size towns. (See Table 3) .Thus, as Seen in Table 3, the population living in the medium size towns with between 10,000 - 19,999 people, alone have always been greater than the cumulative total of all classes of the Saall tOWnS.
Within its own categories (as shown in Table 3) the largest share {}f the Ogulation of Small towns is in its 5000-9999 class. In the case of the medium size towns, the largest share of its population is in the 20,000 - 49,999 class. Hence in both iypes of towns their biggest classes have always held the largest share of their separate populations.
In terms of actual numbers, the Small towns have been nearly equal or greater than the numbers of medium size towns in the post independence period. On the other hand it is noteworthy that while the number of medium size towns have been continuously increasing since 1946, the corresponding situation in the Shall towns has been a decrease in the Census years 1946-1953 and 19711981,
By a classification of small and medium towns in terms of major administrative units, which i comprise District Capitals and Municipalities, the numbers of medium size towns which consist of the latter, far exceeded the corresponding numpers of small towns in each of the Census years 1971 and 1981. (See Table 4). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in overall terms, a greater proportion of all District Capitals and Municipalities comprise Small and mediurn towns.
gonomic REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982.

Page 31
S LLLL SYS S S LL YzLLLLLYLLLLLLL S0LLLS S LLLLLLLLYS S LLLSS LLL0LLLLLLaLLLLSS SS LLLL BY A/AJ OR ADMINISTRATIVE UNTS: SRI LAN Ceft:35 *ear
District Capitals --- - - - Small Towns (Total: 24) Medium Towns Municipalities - - - - Small Towns (Total: 12) Medium Towns
Table 5 DISTRIBUTION OF SMALL AND MEDUVT BY AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH 97
Average Annual Rates Belovy Zero Zero 1.00 2 of Growth (%) in the Zero fé? tô? 鑫 fitter-Cessal Period 0.99 1.99 2. 1971-1981
Numbers of Towns Small Towns 3 23 4. (in 1981) Medium Size Towns 7 O 5 26
Note: The Medium size town of Amparai was not included in the 1971
it's growth rate has not been computed. Accordingly the total r size towns in the above Table is 65 and not 66 as reflected in Ta.
Pattern of Growth of Small and
Mediam Towns جتنییہ میری مییہ ** CSR -
The average annual growth rates 羧 of the small and medium towns CF POPUA
during the last inter-censal period (1971-1981), provides interesting data for study. They reveal that 30
or about half the total number [二[ of Small towns are presently growing at rates higher than the na- 7"གས་ཚོང་ N tional urban growth rate of 1.2% .ليختنخفض S
per annum. However, as shown in Q Table 5, twenty-seven of their number (ie, nearly half their total), are 1|AFNA. also growing at rates of less than :ே 1.0% per annum; with three of them even growing at negative rates. Thuis in Overall terms, the data in Table 5 suggests that, at present, the population in a majority of the Small towns are increa Sing very rapidly.
On the other hand as shown in Table 5 in the case of medium size towns, 39 or more than half its total number, are presently growing at rates higher than the national urban growth rate. Further, Only twenty-two medium size towns, (ie One third Of its total), are growing at rates less than 1.0% per annum, Hence in overall terrns the data in Table 5 suggests that at present, a greater number of the medium size towns are growing at rates faster than those of Small towns. In this connection, the growth rates which provide greater propensity in the medium soize to Wins are those between 1.0 % to 1.99%, and 2.0 per cent to 2.99 per cent.
However, a comparative observation of the data in Table 5, for small and medium towns, indicates that there were more medium size towns with negative growth rates and also less of them at the other end. Of the spectrum with rapid growth rates.
Table 6 shows the complete list of Small and medium towns and their individual average annual growth rates.
Lgcation and Spatia Structure of the Small and Medium Towns
In terms of location, at present, 31 Of the 59 Small towns and 28 Of the 66 medium size towns are located
ECONOMIC REVIEw, DECEMBER 1982
 

DWNS
KA
1971 量罗忍妻
4. 3 16 7 O O 6 6 OWNS 型二重劈器重
„G0 3.00 4 bá2}že Ο if (9
99 4.99 5.00
6 9 3 3. 3 1.
Census and hence number of medium
ole 3.
is the Dry ZOI nie. (See Table 7 and Map 1) The remainder are located in the Wet ZOne.
Table 7 also shows the distribution of small and medium towns by Districts in 1981. It indicates that Gampaha District had the largest number of medium size towns, with Jaffna, Kalutara, Colombo and Galle Districts following thereafter with five or more such towns in each. It further indicates that Badula District had the largest number of Small towns, with Kegalle, Puttalam, and Hambantota, Districts following thereafter with five such towns in each.
WSE DISTRBUTION OF THE EN LARGEST SHARES TORN IN SMALL ANO MEDIUM TOWNS, SRI LANKA, 1981
SqSSSS S LSSS S SSSS qqSSSS SSS SS SSqqS SMMSMS S District Boundary
SSTLTTLTLkSkSkLSSSLLLSLLLLLSLLLTTL C LLLLLLLMMMMSLLSLLeeS 0L LMSMS South Westerñ Qadrant
III High Shares of Sinat Towns High Shares of Mediurn Size towns سE
H High Shares of Both Small and Medin Town
奪
JNYA ?
-SMÅ TOMAANS KNM کیمرے سے
Horianstoka 102% Garpaha ?0 3%፡ s Kegalla 83% Color:3t 35% > Gampola 79% Katutara 酚7竺 路 Puttatar 6/ 9,0% }HAPURA RNCOMALEF affns 65%) - Battisgatio:
*「 ーーーフマー Galle 6,2% fringTaee - 5 2 % f 息A Badla 63% fate 擂 Kaufără 60% ຫຼິ 3 8ዓሯ POLONNARUWA Kurunagaka 5-9% Ampara 3.6%
-- C- N-Kwara-Etyä 56%. Ratnapura 3.2%
ܟ݂ .“ 2 ܐ
نوم- عنه*
f t با سه عبر ح
MORARAGALA
()
mitas 10 S 9 10 20 30

Page 32
Table 6-AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF SMALL Al
SMALL TOWNS
Namie Ave. Annual
Growth Rate (%)
District
COLOMBO
KALUTARA
KANDY
MATALE
NUWARA-ELIYA
GALLE
MATARA
HAMIBANTOTA
JAFFNA
MANNAR VAVUNYA BATTICALOA AMPARAI TRINCOMALEE KURUNEGALA
PUTTALAM
ANURADHAPURA POLONNARUWA
BADULLA
MONERAGALA
RATNAPURA
KEGALLE
GAMPAHA
MULAITIVU
30
Piliyandala
Horaina Alutgama Agalawatta
Kadugannawa Wattegama PuSSellawa Teldeniya
Galewela Dambulla Rattota Talawakelle Pundalu-Oya. Hatton-Dickoya
Ahangama Dodanduwa Hiikkaduwa
Devinuwara Akuressa Tangalle Hambantota Beliatta Walasmula Tissamaharama
Chen kanai Manipay Kayts None None None None
Kantale Kuliyapitiya Polgahawela Alawwa Narammalla Madampe Wennappuwa Dankotuwa Nattandiya Kalpitiya Kekirawa Hingurakgoda
Bandarawela Haputale Hali-Eia PaSSara Lunugala Welinhada
Moneragala
Kahawatte Pel madulla Rakvana Rambukkana Yatiyantota Warakapola RuWainwella Delhiowita Minuwangoda Veyangoda Kochchikade Mirigama Mulaitivu
1.27
}
m
8
2

ND MEDIUM SIZE TOWNS IN SRI LANKA, 1981
MEDIUM SIZE TOWNS
District
COLOMBO
KALUTARA
KANDY
MATALE NUWARA-ELIYA
GALLE
MATARA
HAMIBANTOTA JAFFNA
MANNAR VAVUNIYA
BATTICALOA
AMPARAI
TRINCOMALEE
KURUNEGALA PUTTALAM
ANURADHAPURA
POLONNARUWA
BADULLA MONERAGALA RATNAPURA
KEGALLE
GAMPAHA
MULLAITIVU
Najne Ave. Annual
Growth Rate (%) AvisSawella 1.53 Kolonnawa 1.1 Mulleriyawa 0.22 Kotikawatta 1.09 Homagama 2.76 Maharagama 2.38 Beruwala 2.23 Panadura 25 Kalutara 0.96 Wadduwa 0.96 Matugama 1.52 Keselwatta i.62 Dharga-town 1.89 Gampola 040.-۔ Nawalapitiya 0.3 Matale -03 Nuwara-Eliya 3.04. Ambalangoda 0.87 Elpitiya 1.47 Bentota 2.01 Balapitiya 0.43 Wagedera 0.18 Matara 0.69 Welligama 0.84 Ambalantota 3.49 Chawakachcheri 1.02 Point Pedro 0.98 Valvettitura 1.46 Killinochchi 9.75 Nelliady 0.25 Kankasanthurai 2.59 Chunnakam 39 Pandatheruppu 1.93 Urumpirai 1.95 Mannar 2.97 Vavuniya 1.84 Batticaloa 1.68 Kattankudy 1.40 Era Vir 0.21 Amparai --- Sammanturai 1.06 Kalimunai 1.90 Trincomalee 0.75 Mfutur 3.48 Kinniya -0.8 Kurunegala 0.53 Puttalam 1.94 Chilaw 1.83 Anuradhapura 0.41 Polonnaruwa 2.35 Badulla -0.49 None ܚ Ratnapura 283 Balangoda 1.86 Kegalle 1.26 Malwanella 2.72 Ja-ela 1.23 Wattala-Ma bole 1.06 Peliyagoda 0.19 Gampaha 0.60 Seed uwaKatunayake 2.20 Hendala 2.62 Dalugama 1.56 Kelaniya 0.59 Kandana 1.49 Ragama 2.69 WelliSara 2.44
None ܢܝܝܝܝܢ
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982

Page 33
It is also seen from Table that there are no small towns in four of the Districts and no medium size towns in two of the Districts; all such Districts being situated in the Dry Zone.
In terms of the shares of population, Table 7 indicates a wider spread of the shares in the medium size towns and less so in the Small towns. Thus Map 2 shows the district-wise distribution of the ten largest shares of population in the Small and medium towns. It indicates a high concentration in the South-West and in the Northern tip of the country. A lesser concentration is evident on the Eastern coastline.
Map 3 shows the location of small and medium towns which have high rates of population growth. It indicates three distinct high growth rate zones in the south, South-west and the east.
The combined considerations of Map 2 and Map 3 suggests (as follows) a spatial structure of four segments; the development of which can be influenced by small and medium towns.
i. South-west segment
Districts of Gampaha, Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matara, Ratnapura. and Kegalle
il Central segment. : District of Nuwara-Eliya
fil. Eastern segment : District of Trincomalee
iv. Northern Segment : District of Jaffna.
Planning Issues Connected with the Small and Medium Towns
The prevalence of a large share of the urban population in the small and medium towns which make up more than three fourths of all towns, is an indication of the high reliance on them in the urban Scenario in Sri Lanka. Accordingly, they comprise an important factOr for consi
Distribution of small
-—ni
s
s
Kafunayak
yleis: Hgត្ត
A
ο ο 2ο 30 , ,
Table 7–-DSTRICT-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF SMALL AND M
District Colombo Kalutara Kandy Matale Nuwara Eliya Galle Matara Hambantota Jafna Mannar Vavuniya Batticaloa Amparai Trincomalee Kurunegala Puttalam Anuradhapura Polonnaruwa Badulla Moneragala Ratnapura Kegalle Gampaha Mulaitivu All Districts
EconoMIC REVIEw, DECEMBER 1982

& Inedium towns with high rates of population growth ↑ᏎAᏢ Ꮌ
$çಸ್ತೇs
Average Annua Grath Rate Above 3.0%
《དཔལ་ ༽ O Aerage Armat ክ‛ ཞེa༽ Befween
· እ ኑ . ' , } 2-0% ‹and 3:öኃሬ --- Zones of High Growth rate
IEDIUM TOWNS IN SRI LANKA 1981
Sinaill Torvinis Medium Size Towns one No. Population % No. Population %, 1. 6508 2.2 6 201621 13.5 W 3 17668 6.0 7 159317 10.7 W 4 13266 4.5 2 32889 2.2 D 3. 9063 3. 1. 29745 2.0 W 3 16547 5.6 1. 21,319 1.4 W 3 18874 6.4 5 72063 4.8 AV 2. 14513 4.9 2 57034 3.8 D 5 30340 10.2 11076 0.7 D 3 1915.9 6.5 9 133227 9.0 D N O O 1. 14469 O D NIL O O 1851 1.2 D NIL O O 3 795.65 5.4 D NIL D 1. 7293 2.5 3. 75969 5.2 D 4 17379 5.9 26519 1.8 D 5 19481. 2 42293 2.8 D 1. 5427 1.8 36248 2.4 D 1. 8966 3.0 1. 1793 0.8 D 6 18524 6.3 3.2954 2.3 D 6048 2.0 NIL O O 3 11582 3.9 2 47617 3.2 5 24676 8.3 2 28826 19 4. 23244 7.9 11 3.01437 20.43 D 4. 7202 2.4 NL O
59 294,880 100.0 66 1480,095 100.0
31

Page 34
deration in development planning at all spatial levels.
In the above connection, the lOcation of nearly half the number of small and medium towns, and also of more than one third each of their populations in the Dry Zone, indicates the useful role they are performing in the process Of deveopment in the predominantly rural
3,l'ES. They comprise a vital link for Supp-Orting rural prOducers and accommodating the
Surplus rural labour. By such means they thus demonstrate urban-rural complementarity which is necessary for effective rural development.
t, vas also noted, in the preceding sections, that a large proportion of District capitals and Municipali
产 MANKULAM سے رہے، سے ،
*
f
p WAWUNYA f f
ཅན་སྣ་
༣.
། MEÐÂw&{H{H}YA
) f లో ÁNURADHAPUBA NOCHCHAYAGA
* *žœAÄ¥iÄ
PPA * )Λ (Ε بلندن ፲AMቒህኾ 4
సోష్టి བཞིར་
T’I VIGAKA
حنه
GAÈKIRIYAGAŃ, V
ܐ
KŘEGÅtÅ
*、 \' 2 ಡಿಸಿಟ್ತA
\బ్రషUA مريح
ties comprise Sm towns. This is a tion of the functio Leeded in the dev and hOW SUChi Serv ded even in Smal tOWIS.
In the above c ever necessary th: rationali See the OC: ments and services and medium town integrated with ea, higher Order towns ed spatial structur can be secured tih growth strategy instrumental in pr ate economic deve at both national :
is vels.
URBAN SE LMENS
SYSTEMS A,B,C,D OF THE MAHAWELL PR
i
ూలో سمصنسیسیح
32
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

all and medium further confirmanal specialisation 'elopment process ices can be provil and medium
ontext, it is how
at in Order O ation of invest3, that these Small S be consciously
ch other and with s within a desighe. Such a feature rough an urban Which can bec, Orne omoting approprilopment Strategie:S and sub-national
-}ھ تما%/NA N 巽
DjECT
NEW TOWNSHIP Towns TO BE IMPROVED EXISTING TOWNS
RRGATION SYSTEM
›ህ፷A
RUMA
翡萄A
F##{es
A nati Onal urbain gr'OWith strategy is in fact necessary to complement the economic strategies. Such a link is vital for whatever economic philosophy being followed by a Government in power. It is thus equally relevant for “free market economies' as well as for "centrally plained economies'.
In both, it will provide public and private investors with a choice of locations carefully selected according to various levels of potential for growth and equity. In such a COntext, it does not interfere. With “free market' conditions, but grants it credibility and also acts as a stimulant to it. Accordingly, a well conceived urban growth strategy will enable investors to gain confidence in the fact that overall analysis for location of investments has already been done for them by the planners in terms of both private and public benefit. In addition such a strategy Will particularly assist public investments in prioritisation and choice Of location for productive as well as infra-structure projects. In this way, the overall process of development will take place in a desirable manner aind in the appropriate places.
However, presently there is no explicitly stated urban hierarchy nor is there an urban growth strategy in the development prOceSS. ACcordingly, the stimulus needed by the Small and medium towns in certain Districts which have the potential for securing economic develonment obiectives also do not exist. Thus, the small and medium towns in the southern and eastern Districts in particular appear tO hang isolated in the absence of integrated regional development plans for them. In these circunstances it is now opportune to construct Development Plans for a 'TrincomaleePolonnaruwa-Batticaloa. region' and a “Galle-Matara regi On”.
In large contiguous urban settlements, the Small and medium towns play a vital role either as suburbal commercial centres Or as nore important sub-regional centres. In such a context they act as urban economic entities. Thus, the small and medium towns in the iroan regions of Colombo and Jaffna. possess the potential for such roles. In planning these Urban regions, these towns can be fashioned to achieve a stated development Strategy.
On a national scale too, the absence of a stated urban growth Strategy indicates that the small and Medium towns are not being pronoted to suit a desired pattern and direction of urban growth. Presentlly, the analysis of the distribution and rates of growth of the Small and medium towns, when considered together with the distribution of the large towns too, Suggests that the
ECONOMIC REVIEw, DECEMBER 1982

Page 35
national urban spatial structure Straddles a South West - East axis through the central and north-central land mass: The Only urban area located outside this axis is that in the Jaffna District. Hence taking into account the settlements in the Accelerated Mahaveli Programme (see Map 4), and the desirability Of promoting future pOpulati Ons tO Settle Outside the dense South-West, a die Sirable natiOnal urban Strategy could be fashioned. On a broad urban ('Orridor between the South-Western Seaboard (focusing On Colombo), and the eastern Seaboard (fOcu Sing on Trincomalee). Within Such a corridor the Small and medium towns could perform a significant role in Structuring different hierarchichal Services and production units.
Thus, taking into account the analysis of the data in Map 2 and in Map 3, together with the location Of the country's large urban centres and Of the towns in the Mahaveli Project areas, a corridor of about 50 miles width may need to be examined further for determining it's final dimensions that will be utilised in 2. planning strategy. This COrri d'Or needs to be supplemented with two Cther designated urban regi OinS; One in the SOuth (around Galle) and anOther in the north (around Jaffna). The former may be an area. Of aľOUnd 10-15 mile:S radiUS frOm Galle and the latter an edual size radiuS from Jaffna. It Would then include the cluster Of Small and medium iOwns in them with its larger counterpartS.
The promotion of the integratinn. Of Small and medium towns within a Stated urban hierarchy
and also a designated urban growth Strategy must be ba Sed On a nati Ona spatial planning framework. The 12 titer is rerilired to fa cilitate both plan formulatinn and also plan im– plementation. In this connection, it may therefore be timely to design a suitable network of macro “planning reginns' in the n°tional snatial fabric. Within this the Small, medium and large towns and their OWIl ur han regions can be consciously develinped. Such regions will also provide the linkage of urban-rural comrlement arities so that, the continued enrohasis. On agricultural developnent Can be steered to Secure COnprehensive rural development.
The dOminatiOn Of the rural Sector ijn national eCOnomic de Ve100
ment Stratt gies is a pointer to the
importance and reliance that Will Continue to lie On Small ar d medillilim towns. Accordingly, as stated earlier the latter will, even in the future,
* The author reoards large towns in the Sri Lankan context as thОSe above 100,000 persons in each. They are presently (1981), Colombo City, Moratuwa, Dehiwela-Mt. Lavinia, Kotte, Kandy and Jaffna.
ECONOMIC REVIEW, DECEMBER 1982
comprise a large tOWS and Of the
CNT clusi DTS and
The m2 in Conc of the analysis ir
tat, :
(i)
(lì }
(ii)
(1v )
(v)
. (Vi)
(vii)
(Viii)
The Small ar.
consisting of and 50,000 po ways compris of all towns include a larg trict Capitals cipalities in {
Presentlv (198 two urban pe and mediTunn such populati Si 7é tOWnS (ie lation). jS gr the Sinn 911 tC, V, population).
Presently, the
maiority of t not increasing reVerse is trill towns Wherei provided bv rates between all’UI.
Seven out of negative grow medium size
The distribut Small and n cate that, bv efall v divire and dry ZOnes th eV are cluS° western quad found in grO e Stern and : the country. The small ang form a key urban Suonor nantlv rural
urbs in the ]
regions. However, th national urb
Hence the Sm to Wins lack SY SecurinՉ mOr
rural comple
The current t gran hic chara Small and in cate that the dominate the nario in Sri seeable future
The reconner are as follows:
(a)
It is recon explicit nat lopment po urgently, a COm OOne1: the Small a
In the abo also recomir

proportion of the urban population.
Recommendations
'lusions arising out this paper are
ld medium towns, those between 10,000 pulation S. have faled more than 7/8ths in Sri Lanka. They ge proportion of Disand half the Munithe country.
1). One out of every eorole live in Small towns. The share of on in the medium
10.000 - 50,000 popueater than that in Wns (ie below 10,000
poinulation in る。 he Small tOW von S are 2 ranidly; while the e Of the medium size in the prooensity is those growing at 1.5% and 3.0% per
the ten to Wins With h rates are however towns.
inn pattern of the edium towns indil
number they are d het Wean fin a Wet, s By concentrations, tered in the southrant and are also urs in the rentral, northern districts of
medium towns ner
role in providing t in the pre-domiretions, and as subpre-dominant urban
ere is no evnlicit ban growth strategy. lo 11 and medium Datin 1 Structurinor in e efferti v ve urban ErmentaritieS.
Irends in the demoarteristics of the edilum tOWnS indiby will continue to
national urban SceLanka in the fore
dati Ons for action
lmended that an ional urban develicy be formulated including therein it connected with ind medium to WinS. we context, it is mended that the
(c)
(d)
BBEL
1.
5.
role and function of the Small and medium towns in both urban and rural sectors be consciously recognised and their economic base accordingly strengthened by integrating them in the plans for the development of the corresponding urban and rural regions. The latter should be specifically incorporated in the Settlement Planning pOlicies of the Accelerated Mahaveli Development PrOgraÎnnle.
It is further that the presently existing urban statial Structure be incorporated in an appropriate national urban growth strategy. In this connection, the urban corridor between Colombo and Trincomalee and the urban regi Ons 2r Ound Galle and Jaffna should be further studied for refineindent Of their trritorial dime”SiOns which need to be included in such a strategy.
rec Ommended
It is also recommended that the national urban growth strategy be a component Of an overall e cOnOmic de Velopment strategy and be based upon a macro-econCmic ranning fra mework for the effective realisation Of ec)n Omlc de Velopment ob
fectives.
EOGRAPHY
Urbanisation and the Growth of Small Towns in Sri Lanka, 1901 - 71, Dayalal Abevsekera, Paper No: 67 of the East-West Population Institute, USA, April 1980.
Sinn all TOWrns in Rural Development, M. D. Ellerpola, M.Sc. (Town and Country Planning) Degree Dissertation, University of Moratu Wa, March 1982.
Large Towns in Sri Lanka, MWJG Mendis, in “Economic Review’ Vol. 8 No. 1, A People's Bank Research Deoartment Publication Colombo, April 1982.
Urbanisation in Sri Lanka. MWJG Mendis, in “Progress' Vol. 1 No. 4, Ministry of Plan Implementation, Publication, Colombo, December 1981.
Statistical Abstract Of Sri Lanka - 1979, Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo, August 1981.
Census of Population and HousingPreliminary Release No. 1, Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo, June 1981.
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