


● **SRI LANKA: The fallacy of the trickle-down theory** ●
— *Geraldine Gamburd*

LANKA GUARDIAN

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Once
more
the
**Dravidian
Demon...?**

— *Mervyn de Silva*

POLLS:

PERESTROIKA: No other way for the U. S. A.

— *Susirith Mendis*

UNP-SLFP and the High-Low Poll debate

— *S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe*

JAFFNA: Will polls bring peace ? — *R. Kumar*

Exit Vernon Walters, a modern Mithridates

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TRENDS & LETTERS

VIOLENCE CONTINUES

"Unknown gunman" continued to shoot SLFP candidates and close supporters, after SLFP Assistant Secretary and Kalutara district candidate Indrapala Abeyweera and two others were killed mid January. Candidates were killed at Matara and Hakmana, others were shot and injured at Dewinuwera, Ehatuwewa, Medirigirya and other places.

A UNP candidate was injured and four supporters killed when gunmen stormed the UNP elections office in Kandy.

Police said that each candidate will be provided six armed body guards.

NOT SERIOUS?

Is Sri Lanka not taking the drugs menace seriously enough? A man who should know, Mr. J. C. Janz, Chairman of the Dangerous Drugs Control Board, thinks that it is not being taken seriously enough by the authorities, perhaps through lack of awareness.

And, it is being completely ignored by political parties, unlike in the US where the issue is included in party manifestos.

"Despite tighter controls at ports and airports a great deal of drugs seems to be arriving in the country, possibly through those who are not subject to such checks", Mr. Janz told the *Weekend*.

MUSLIM DEMANDS

Representatives of the large gathering of Muslims which met in Colombo to felicitate President Premadasa, handed him a memorandum listing many demands. Among them: Amendments to the Ceiling on Housing Act and Rent Act, and provision for exemption of Wakf properties in those Acts; appointment of Moulavi teachers and, in particular, to detail them to non-Muslim schools to teach religion; and Gam Udsava 1990 for the Eastern Province, and housing schemes for Muslims in areas with a concentration of Muslims.

Nicer

Thank you very much for publication of the article I sent you under the title "Presidential Election 1988 in Sri Lanka: Manoeuvring of the Extra-democratic Contenders" in LG of January 1st. Your vote of confidence is much appreciated and tends to reinforce the faith the intelligentsia has placed in LG.

However, it would have been nicer if you agreed on the set of initials you were going to use on 'Mr./Ms. Madanayake'. On the cover and page 1 you have used 'A.R.B.' while on the article itself it is 'A.R.T.'.

Thank you once again

A.R.B. Madanayake

Sorry, A.R.T.

— Ed.

Critical appreciation

Professor Ralph Pieris' rejoinder (LG, January 1, 1989) to my essay on the late Dr. Newton Gunasinghe (LG, November 15, 1988) has belatedly come to my notice. It is rather unfortunate that Professor Pieris, the doyen of Sri Lankan sociology, has misconstrued the essence and spirit of some of my formulations.

When I used the term 'liberal' to characterize the pre-Newtonian (in the Gunasinghean sense) sociology in Sri Lanka, I did not mean derogation or abuse. Critical appreciation — that is all I meant. I think my intentions were reasonably clear in the text.

I am, nonetheless still reluctant to equate any "collective Marxist analysis" (that is how Professor Pieris describes his own work) with "rigorous Marxist scholarship" (my formulation).

I plead 'not guilty' to the charge of "distorting the work of others."

Jayadeva Uyangoda
University of Colombo

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How real is the D.M.K. Demon?

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NEWS
BACKGROUND

Mervyn de Silva

The cartoonist exaggerates to make his point. (See Cover) The huge, menacing head looks over the wall at Wijesoma's poor, frightened Sinhala citizen. Is the situation really scary?

Not really. The DMK victory in Tamilnadu, far more impressive in terms of seats than votes was a humbling slap across Prime Minister Gandhi's face rather than a major setback to the India-Sri Lanka Accord and the democratic process it set in motion in the North and East.

"The fight is between the DMK and the Congress (I)" said an over confident Rajiv Gandhi addressing a rally at Chidambaram a few days before the polls. He was quite wrong since his party came third — beaten by the party formed by MGR's mistress and leading lady after Tamilnadu's super-star died over a year ago.

In fact, he was way off the mark because in the battle for seats there was hardly any fight at all, the DMK winning 151, nearly a two-thirds majority. The seat-count in a first-past-the-post system is of course a distortion of actual popularity. The DMK collected 8 million, and the Congress got half that number.

No. The Tamilnadu result should not be seen by the Sri Lankan student of Indian or sub-regional politics in a purely DMK victory and its impact on Sri Lanka perspective.

On the contrary, it should be examined in terms of Prime

Minister Gandhi's growing problems, the disarray in the Congress leadership in several Indian states, and the emergence of new anti-Congress coalitions.

The DMK victory saw Indian leaders from the North like former Finance Minister V. P. Singh and a possible Prime Minister, and the Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh, Mr. N. T. Rama Rao, and Karnataka, Mr. S. R. Bommai, and West Bengal Jyoti Basu, rush to Madras to stand alongside Mr. Karunanidhi on the platform as several hundred thousands thronged the grounds at the victory celebrations. The CPI(M) leader, Mr. Jyoti Basu called it a "brilliant victory". Mr. K. P. Unnikrishnan of the Congress (S) called it a "slap on the face of Rajiv". The trouble is that Mr. Gandhi staked his personal prestige by campaigning so energetically in an election that didn't really need his involvement. He visited Tamilnadu 14 times — more than any other Indian state!

His misjudgments have tended to expose his political immaturity. When the obvious thing to do was to align himself with Jayalalitha, he took Congress crony Moopanar's reading of the situation far too seriously.

Of course, if the Congress (I) had won, Moopanar would have been Chief Minister. Now, both Moopanar and Mr. P. Chidambaram, the Union Minister for Home Affairs who played a key role in the Indo-Sri Lanka negotiations are in trouble. A report from Madras said:

A prominent Congress (I) MP from Tamil Nadu, Mr. K. Ramamurthy, today called upon the

TNCC (I) president, Mr. O. K. Moopanar, and the Union Minister Mr. P. Chidambaram, to resign from their posts owning moral responsibility for what he called a 'humiliating defeat' in the Tamil Nadu Assembly elections.

Mr. Ramamurthy said they must be dismissed if they did not step down. These two leaders had misled the Prime Minister and party president, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, into going it alone in the elections, he said.

The TNCC (I) must be revamped and the "old bandicoots thrown out", he said.

Mr. Gandhi's personal popularity has plummeted, and his Congress party is torn by divisive conflicts and besieged by a gathering Oppositional movement. Broadly speaking it is a coalition of regional parties in the South and by anti-Congress parties and personalities in the North. Besides, this strong anti-Gandhi trend has surfaced in a pre election year. So Mr. N. T. Rama Rao, the Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister may have been right when he called it 'the maiden victory' for the National Front, in this very sensitive year. The report added:

The Chief Minister said the DMK victory, coming close on the heels of the losses suffered in several other States by the Congress (I), should make its leaders ponder what went wrong with their party. Asked if he would demand Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's resignation in the wake of the Congress (I) debacle in Tamil Nadu, Mr. Rama Rao said: "I

won't do so, let him continue in power. The entire population rises as one man to say "We don't want you", even then he is sitting in the seat of power. Let him indulge in introspection".

The Tamilnadu result is more significant in the context of the strongly emerging anti-Rajiv national political trends and the possibility of a change of government in New Delhi than in terms of immediate consequences to Indo-Sri Lanka relations, with special reference to the Tamil question.

True, the DMK is the parent movement of Tamil nationalism or more accurately regional nationalism, primarily linguistic in character. And Mr. Karunanidhi is the far more authentic spokesman of this nationalism than MGR ever was. He is the 'Godfather' of the Dravidian movement as his victory speech made clear.

"It is" he proclaimed" a verdict against the behaviour of the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, his speeches in Tamilnadu and his efforts to suppress the feelings of the Dravidian people."

But that does not mean he will come charging in to help Mr. Prabhakaran who insulted him by turning down a 50,000 (Indian) rupee donation to the LTTE and made the affront more stinging by getting Dr. Stanislaus Balasingham to leak the news to the Madras press — after taking 20 lakhs from MGR, of course!

Moreover the people of Tamilnadu are heartily sick of the 'Tigers' and the refugees. This does not mean of course that the DMK will remain silent, if there is harassment or 'terror' by the Sri Lankan government or army. The DMK will try to restrain the IPKF, persuade the LTTE to join the mainstream after a ceasefire, and hold talks.

Barriers after school children die

An unprotected rail-crossing cost 45 lives, mostly of school children, and injuries to seventy when a train ploughed into a school bus on Galle Road at Ahungalla. President Premadasa appointed retired Appeal Court Judge D G Jayalath, a one man commission, to inquire into the collision. The President ordered payment of compensation to the bereaved families; he also ordered the Railway department to put up barriers immediately at all unprotected rail crossings in the island. There are 758.

According to Transport Ministry sources the Treasury had failed to provide money for this purpose earlier. Ahungalla residents told newsmen that they had been pleading for a rail gate at this spot for many years.

An editorial in *The Island* said: "While the immediate action taken to compensate the victims should be commended, it has to be pointed out that official inquiries held into such tragedies in the past have been exer-

cises in futility. When tragedies of such proportions occur it becomes almost mandatory to order such inquiries. But in Sri Lanka we have not heard of responsibility being fixed on any specific individual, or the guilty punished. There have been many such disasters both man made and natural. But have we heard of these responsible being brought to book? Dams have burst causing death and devastation, innocents have been massacred, and many jail breaks taken place. Inquiries were held and bulky reports written. But unlike in other countries, responsibility is not fixed on any individual nor do those at the top take responsibility for the mistakes of their subordinates as in parliamentary democracies.

The obvious cause for the accident was that the level crossing was not protected. It is indeed a tragedy that despite frequent collisions between trains and vehicles there are still many unprotected level crossings on the busiest roads".

India to consider bilateral treaty

An Indian High Commission press release said that High Commissioner J N Dixit at a meeting with President Premadasa had conveyed to him that the Indian Government was willing to consider "the suggestion from Sri Lanka for a bilateral Indo-Sri Lanka Treaty of Peace, Friendship and co-operation on the principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity."

President Premadasa indicated that a draft of the Treaty would be conveyed to the Government of India in the near future, the release said.

Return of Mendis

Viraj Mendis (32) returned home on January 21 escorted by two British policemen, an immigration official and a priest, after losing his two year battle against deportation, conducted from sanctuary in a Manchester church. He had been in Britain for 14 years, but was declared an illegal immigrant when his student visa expired and he sought refugee status.

Immediately on arrival in Sri Lanka he called a press conference at the Galle Face Hotel and announced that Britain was racist.

Bleak future for Sri Lanka

An encouraging number of troubled countries ranging from Afghanistan to Namibia has started the New Year optimistic that things may, at last, be getting better. Sri Lanka is sadly not one of them.

The Indian Ocean island, ravaged by years of racial violence, dues begin 1989 with a new President and, theoretically, a chance to start afresh. Mr Ramasinghe Premadasa, the outgoing Prime Minister, took over from President Junius Jayewardene recently, having squeaked home for the ruling United National Party in last month's presidential election, a poll the conduct and outcome of which give very little cause for optimism.

The election had the lowest turnout (55 per cent) in the nine elections since 1947, voters being deterred through alienation or intimidation. Those that did vote divided fairly closely between the two main candidates, Mr Premadasa securing 50.4 per cent of the vote to defeat Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, a former Prime Minister who leads the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Turnout in the northern heartland of the minority Tamils was a derisory 15 per cent; in the south the revolutionary left-wing guerrillas of the JVP demanded an election boycott, using a ruthless and indiscriminate campaign of terror to keep voters away from the polls.

Model democracy

The tragedy of Sri Lanka is that it started independence in 1947 as a model of peaceful, post-colonial democracy, with full and free elections, a healthily expanding economy, a sophisticated institutional infrastructure, a high literacy rate and a huge potential for foreign exchange earnings from tourism.

Successive Prime Ministers and Presidents have pursued policies which have transformed the island into an ethnic battleground on the brink of economic ruin. But the biggest damage has occurred during the 11 years under President Jayewardene who switched the country to a presidential system of government. His most crucial error may have been to change the constitution in 1983, calling a referendum instead of a general election. This denied the various opposition groups the chance to test their views at the ballot box and prolonged his own tenure for a further six years.

The effect was to force two key elements of the opposition underground and both took up arms. The militant Tamils found increasing support for their violent campaign towards the creation of "Eelam", a separate Tamil state. Leftist members of the JVP party, mainly students, organised into a group of Marxist revolutionaries and took their armed struggle to the streets and, ultimately, to the heart of the capital, Colombo.

Treaty with India

The Sri Lankan armed and police forces proved incapable of containing either insurgency. Last year President Jayewardene gave up on the Tamil problem and signed a peace treaty with India, the Tamils' protector, enabling the Indians to send in a peace-keeping force which now numbers around 80,000 troops. The JVP, combining revolutionary aims with anti-Tamil Sinhalese nationalism, continues to hold the south of the island in a grip of terror.

Unfortunately Mr Premadasa, like Mrs Bandaranaike, vowed during the election campaign to send the Indian peace-keeping force home. He has also offered

terrorists an olive branch, inviting them to return to the democratic fold and participate in next month's parliamentary elections if they renounce violence. If, as seems likely, they refuse, he has promised a ruthless campaign to root them out. It might be better to concentrate all efforts against the small but crippling band of Sinhalese terrorists and keep the Indian peace-keepers to look after the Tamils, at least for the time being, rather than risk further bloodshed in the Tamil north, a rift with India and the possible partition of the island.

(Financial Times)

SLFP calls for international monitors

The Sri Lanka Freedom Party has called for monitors from Western countries, in addition to those from SAARC nations, for the February 15 General Elections. International political groupings representing mainstream tendencies in the West have been contacted, SLFP sources said. Among them are the International Democratic Union, the Liberal International, the Socialist International and the Christian Democratic International.

Attempts are being made to invite a group of observers from the SAARC countries as well and informal negotiations are under way, according to local representatives of the Observer Mission which monitored the Presidential Election last December.

Former Opposition Leader Anura Bandaranaike who was due to meet President Premadasa to discuss the serious security problem faced by SLFP candidates was expected to take up with the President the issue of inviting foreign observers to monitor the polls, as well.

Letter from Jaffna

Setting the Stage

R. Kumar

The people of Jaffna observed Uma Maheshwaran, are like spectators in a foot ball game — ready to cheer the winning side. Peculiar to Tamil politics is appreciation of success. Success has always been the name of the game.

Progress in politics is like swimming in the sea. If you swim in the direction of the tide, you may go a long way. If you swim against the tides then, progress is difficult: you may still progress — slowly, or be in the same place or drift, depending on your strength and the strength of the tide. But the political sea is often turbulent, full of surprises and tides that change. Success depends on the knowledge of the tides.

Yet, even those ignorant of the tides, are often greeted by success — if they happen to be swimming in the direction of the tide. Intoxicated by success, soon they forget the role of the tide. But when the tides change, their story becomes sad like that of the LTTE.

LTTE was an organization with a sensational record. They often made the headline news. Named after a football team, inspired by Clint Eastwood and fathered by a film idol, they thrived and grew to be a brilliant organization with a bloody record. But today they are cornered in the jungles of Vavuniya — for the complete lack of political wisdom.

The Tamil lawyers on the other hand kept out, by the LTTE from the parliamentary ball game, have now staged a dramatic come back.

Driven to exile by the militaristic Jayawardene and the militants his regime gave birth to, they are now back with a powerful backing, that is bound to ensure its survival and growth.

The Jaffna man, though acutely aware of the sacrifices of its dedicated youth, is likely to vote TULF on pragmatic grounds, hoping for an ideal combine TULF and LTTE. LTTE to clear the ground, to do the dirty work, to chase off the Sinhalese from the North and East and the lawyers regiment — the TULF — to take the war to Kotte.

The Tamil bureaucratic elite is now coming out of its safe enclaves; from its government jobs, from Colombo, from here there and every where. It is waking up from its long slumber, yawning and complaining (in private ofcourse) as to how stupid and destructive the boys have been.

Once peace is established, and the "elders" are able to barter their daughters and trade their sons — in peace — then the role of the militant youth in the affairs of the North and East can be declared as over.

Though it is the LTTE that shook the Tamil tree, it is now helplessly watching the militants it once massacred picking up the fruits. Though most of militants have come to accept the laws of the new game, what chances do they have against the old masters? What scope do they have, once they have cleared the ground and set the stage, for an act that they can take part, but not win?

They will have to watch helplessly, as LTTE is watching them, the Tamil elite taking over.

Citizens Volunteer Force

A Citizens Volunteer Force (CVF) is to be raised in all the Provinces, caretaker Information Minister Festus Perera

told a press briefing after a Cabinet meeting. The CVF will assist in the preservation of public order, quelling of disturbances and protection of public property, the Minister said. It would also help in arresting and disarming individuals or groups illegally in possession of arms and "allied war-like material".

Defence Ministry sources said later that about 10,000 youths would be recruited after "thorough screening". CVF units will be formed provincially and will function under the operational control of commanders responsible to the Inspector General of Police.

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THE REGION

China visit a major foreign policy gain

Mohan Ram

BEIJING

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit here last week rolled up a major foreign policy gain for India as the world's two most populous nations pledged to seek friendly relations without allowing their border dispute to impinge on the process, according to Asian and Western diplomats here.

But this diplomatic gain, while deflecting immediate domestic pressures, may not translate into political capital because Mr. Gandhi might still come under heavy pressure at home to find an early solution and on India's terms.

On his return home Mr. Gandhi was obliged to deny any secret or informal border deal with China, and sought to avoid the impression that he had written off territory, these diplomats pointed out.

Diplomats here say it was unwise to have expected instant results on a long-standing problem even though Indian academics, politicians and the media had focussed almost entirely on the border issue on the eve of his visit.

A joint working group headed by India's Foreign Secretary and a China Vice-foreign Minister (which meets at the official level) is to make recommendations on a overall border settlement. It means the inconclusive official level talks since 1961 which ran into eight rounds has been wound up.

SILENT

The joint communique at the end of the visit was silent on the time frame for the working group's task though Mr. Gandhi

has annotated it to say that the group after a few meetings would set its own time frame. Therefore the time frame is for the group's work and not for the settlement of border dispute as such which Mr. Gandhi had wanted.

Indian sources have said the group is also charged with ensuring peace and tranquillity on the border but the communique has nothing to say on this.

While Beijing talks seem to have given a new start to the border negotiations they have failed to raise the dialogue to the political level. This falls short of non-official Indian expectations.

The least that was expected in India was a set of confidence-building measures to avoid incidents like the Sino-Indian clash in June 1986 followed by charges of Indian intrusion and Chinese charges of India nibbling away at its territory all across the McMahon Line.

There was no reference in the joint communique to the border peace. One can only surmise that the working group would concert the ground rules to freeze the border situation through a joint approach to avoid a crisis like the one in 1986.

It was surprising that there was no public Chinese reference during the visit to border peace while the Indian Prime Minister referred to it thrice.

India has conceded the Chinese positions on two vital points—that bilateral relations should be lifted above the level of the border dispute, and in the immediate context to avoid

border tension which effectively means a freeze militarily on the eastern sector where the McMahon Line with its two disputed versions is the line of actual control.

China is a satisfied power, having secured control most acceptable to it in Aksai Chin, through which the Sinkiang-Tibet highway passes, in what is Indian claimed territory. So it is in no great hurry for a settlement.

PRESSURE

The pressure if anything is on India and from the tone of the Beijing talks one can surmise that the initiative on the border was entirely India's and not of the Chinese.

In the past China had offered only the broad principles of a settlement but India had been asking for the specifics. The success of the working group would lie in narrowing this gap under political guidance.

The Chinese leadership seems to realise that the domestic political constraints of an election year would prevent Mr. Gandhi from seeking an early settlement because it would entail concessions to China. But the Chinese showed a positive attitude to talks with him because they reckon that he would win for himself another term in office to be able to clinch the issue in about three years from now.

In any case, bilateral relations with India rank higher with the Chinese than a border solution. But in contrast Indian opinion is obsessed with the border, diplomatic observers here say.

—India Abroad News Service.

(Mohan Ram is a well known Indian Marxist writer)



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Asian immigration issue divides Australia

Chris Sherwell

Like a swelling boil, an infectious issue has resurfaced on Australia's body politic, disturbing the psyche of whole sectors of the country's 16 m population. The issue is immigration, specifically Asian immigration. And it is sensitive enough to divide the country.

It has already opened a split within the opposition Liberal Party, which with its National Party coalition partner has made most of the running on the issue. A concerned Mr. Bob Hawke, the Labor Prime Minister has berfed up the post of Immigration Minister.

Opinion polls show large majorities in favour of slowing down Asian immigration, and the spectre of racism looms. Slogans such as "Asians out" can be seen on roadside rocks up the New South Wales coast. Talk-back radio shows confirm the sentiment. One well known commentator's car was daubed with a swastika after he attacked the coalition view.

Among local Vietnamese, Chinese and Japanese there is deepening anxiety about the debate. Abroad Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, has said it threatens Australia's standing in Asia.

Of course, immigration is not new as a political issue in Australia. A hundred years ago the New South Wales government tried to prevent the landing of Chinese immigrants. The White Australia policy later became a commonplace.

In the 25 years following the Second World War, millions of Europeans streamed in. Up to half came from the UK and Ireland, reinforcing the dominance of Anglo-Celtic peoples in Australia. For much of this period, other Europeans were the victims of prejudice.

Lately, the proportion of Asian immigrants has increased

markedly, to above 30 per cent of the annual influx. But overall the numbers remain tiny: on one calculation they will comprise less than 10 per cent of the population until far into the 21st century.

Over the past two decades, both sides of politics have adopted a bipartisan position on immigration and promoted "multiculturalism" — in effect, a tolerant, cosmopolitan Australia.

Yet in the space of a few months the Liberal and National parties have pulled it into question. "One Australia" is what they now stand for, and "social cohesion". The trouble is, everybody is reading more into it.

That the subject surfaced as a public issue was perhaps inevitable. A specially-commissioned government inquiry on immigration headed by Mr. Stephen Fitzgerald, former ambassador to China, published its findings in May, and it criticised existing policies.

It said current selection mechanisms would produce tens of thousands more immigrants than the planned programme, and that there was insufficient attention given to potential migrants' labour market skills and business talents.

More importantly, it warned that public support for immigration was threatened by widespread mistrust and falling consensus. The immigration programme was not identified in the public mind with the national interest, it said.

Such suggestion were like manna for the opposition. Having seen the Labour Government steel its economic policies, this was an issue which would distinguish the coalition from the Government and find broad support.

Before the report's publication, opposition figures began talking more about the issue, saying in particular that the "cultural compatibility" of migrants should be taken more into account. Mr. John Howard, the Liberal leader, began advocating an increase in skilled and business migration.

Over subsequent weeks, Mr. Howard began rejecting multiculturalism as aimless and divisive, saying it should be changed. Having made immigration a political issue, he took it a critical stage further earlier this month with a calculated comment about Asian immigration.

If the level of Asian immigration was too great "in the eyes of some in the community", he said, "it would be our immediate term interests and supportive of social cohesion if it were slowed down a little so that the capacity of the community to absorb were greater".

The result was raging argument. Some pointed out that a greater emphasis on business and labour skills would actually entail more Asian immigrants. The opposition was accused of being racist and wanting a discriminatory immigration selection policy.

The real trouble came when two senior National Party leaders explicitly urged curbs on Asian immigration and suffered no reprimand. For those "small l" Liberals content with two decades of bipartisanship with Labour, it was too much.

The coalition had not yet finalised its immigration platform, and they spoke out loudly. As the Liberal Party began tearing itself apart, the issue looked like backfiring, and Mr. Howard banned further public statements.

(Continued on page 22)

Soviet Historians Reappraising Trotsky

Craig R. Whitney

MOSCOW

As they continue exposing Stalin's expressions and trying to correct the many distortions of official history, historians and journalists here have begun to sketch a clear picture of a complex figure whose role in setting up Soviet power was blotted out for 60 years: Leon Trotsky.

What emerges, as researchers begin to scratch beneath the now discredited version of history that Stalin left to posterity to reveal what lies underneath, is far from a rehabilitation of Trotsky or his ideology of permanent revolution.

But in the new version, Trotsky is no longer the traitor, subversive provocateur and spy that Stalin's propaganda made him out to be. The new history describes his close relationship to Lenin after the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, and his contributions as war commissar in building the Red Army and winning the Civil War from 1918 to 1920.

It also portrays him as a man later blinded by personal ambition to succeed Lenin, spinning out unrealistic theories of "permanent revolution" that in the end played into Stalin's hands instead.

And almost every Soviet writer and historian now generally accepts the view that it was Stalin himself, not Lavrenti Beria, who ordered Trotsky's assassination. On Aug. 20, 1940, a Spanish Communist named Ramon Mercader smashed a mountain-climber's axe into Trotsky's skull in Coyoacan, a suburb of Mexico City. He died the next day.

None of this comes as news to Western historians, or independent-minded Soviet historians and writers long aware of the facts.

As with the recent revelations of Stalin's crimes, what is happening is that ordinary

Soviet people are now being allowed to learn things long suppressed.

The historical truth is a weapon for the Gorbachev policy of economic restructuring — the necessary dialectical foundation for his attempt to replace the economic and social system Stalin put in place 60 years ago with a new system more in time with modern times.

Adam B. Ulam, professor of government at Harvard University, said: "Trotsky is no longer the evil spirit of Russian history. He's simply a political leader who held rather unacceptable views in many ways."

As Mr. Ulam noted, the treatment given to Trotsky is not at all like the nearly complete rehabilitation accorded to another of the early revolutionary leaders, Nikolai I. Bukharin, whose ideas about how to develop the Soviet economy were more like Mikhail S. Gorbachev's than Stalin's. "They're having a modest personality cult with Bukharin," Mr. Ulam said.

"Before, Trotsky was just blacked out," Mr. Ulam said. "It's acknowledged now that Trotsky was war commissar. But mainly his story is being used to dump on Stalin."

The most recent assertion, that Stalin ordered the assassination, was published in the weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on Jan. 4. The Journal even named the Soviet secret police agent who provided \$5,000 and a false passport to the assassin — a colonel of the NKVD named Leonid Eitingon, who used the pseudonyms Leontyev and Rabinovich.

The article by the historian Nikolai A. Vasetsky said, "Contemporary Trotskyists try to portray Trotsky's calls for a 'second revolution' in the U.S.S.R. as prophetic, considering the present policy of restructuring as the embodiment of a program of political revolution.

"But restructuring first of all, means the elimination of deformation and distortion from the Leninist conception of socialism. The Trotskyist program became in the end, just a political game. In his struggle with Stalin Trotsky tried to replace one 'ism' — Stalinism — with another 'ism' equally harmful to Leninism — Trotskyism."

Mr. Vasetsky's article, and one published in *Pravda* on Sept. 9 by Colonel General Dmitri Volkogonov, agreed that it was not Trotsky's ideological errors, as Stalin later asserted, but Trotsky's relentless ambition and constant calls to bring down Stalin that were the driving force of the clash between the two.

In Mr. Volkogonov's words "Trotsky, in the years when he was active in the party, was not an enemy of the revolution or of socialism. But he was the enemy of Stalin. The source of his tragedy lay not so much in his struggle with Stalinism as in his struggle with Stalin for power."

Roy A. Medvedev, the Marxist historian who was thrown out of the Communist Party in 1969 for exposing Stalin's misdeeds 20 years before it became officially permissible to do it, said:

"You have to realize that one reason for the surge in articles about the figures of the past is that now there is no generally recognized official history. The old text-books were full of 'white spots' — omissions — and known to be false. For that reason, we couldn't hold examinations in history courses last summer. Unless you know about Trotsky, you can't write the history of the October Revolution or the Civil War — so it's a requirement of this new stage in the development of our ideology."

Mr. Volkogonov's article told how Trotsky's close relationship

(Continued on page 22)

POLLS: The future of the Left movement

Susirath Mendis

Many analyses have been appearing in the press and the 'Lanka Guardian' on the Presidential Elections. They have centered round the question of whether there would have been a different result if the elections were held in a more conducive environment and the voters were able to exercise their franchise devoid of intimidation and threats.

I have ventured here, (1) to look at the performance of the SLMP candidate at the Presidential Election Mr. Ossie Abeygunasekera as an index of the current electoral strength of the USA, and on that basis predict the probability of the USA finding representation in parliament at the General Election, and (2) to discuss what options will be available to the broad left in its aftermath.

It has been said that the reason for the poor performance of the SLMP is due to three main causes. The most important was the tremendous pressure brought upon the SLMP/ NSSP combine by the calculated and concerted effort on the part of the armed groups to disrupt its campaign. It was the SLMP candidate that had to bear the brunt of the deadly violence of these groups and found many of his key organisers gunned down in cold blood. As a result the SLMP were greatly hampered and they were able to hold only about 25 meetings and Mr. Abeygunasekera, for reasons of security could attend much less. Secondly, the ambiguous nature of the support of the LSSP and the CPSL and the refusal of the USA to allow the use of its symbol created a doubt in the mind of the voter who may otherwise have voted for the SLMP candidate.

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Thirdly, most, even those within the camp, now accept that the people were choosing a President and except for the ardent loyalist, the rest of the voters did not consider the SLMP candidate as a serious contender. These factors certainly affected the possible poll of the SLMP, but to what extent? My view is that it was only marginal. Therefore, while it would be reasonable to expect a higher poll for the USA at the General Election, it would be optimistic to assume that it will be substantially more than what the SLMP candidate received in December.

I have analysed the results of only 17 of the 22 electoral districts as the USA will not be contesting the electorates in the North/East except for Digamaddulla. The EPRLF is also con-

testing this district and the handful of votes that the USA may get in Ampara electoral division will be of little significance. In the other electoral divisions in that district Samanthuraj, Kalmunai and Pattuvil — the SLMP vote in the Presidential Election will go to the EPRLF en block.

Table I. shows the total vote and the percentage of the total valid votes obtained by the SLMP. It had its best percentage in the electoral district of Colombo at 4.62% and performed worst in Mahanuwara with 1.46%. The SLMP had a total poll of 127,560 which is 2.84% of the total valid poll in the 17 districts. It is significant that the SLMP has not polled the crucial 5% of the valid poll in any of the 17 electoral districts under consideration.

Table I.

Polling strength of the SLMP candidate in the 17 districts.

Electoral District	Registered Voters	Total Poll	Valid Voter	SLMP Votes	SLMP %
Colombo	1,088,640	729,807	718,875	33,237	4.62
Gampaha	969,634	722,695	713,118	21,871	3.07
Kalutara	570,198	364,293	357,982	13,143	3.72
Mahanuwara	628,373	427,954	421,971	6,166	1.46
Matule	214,939	64,081	62,956	1,110	1.76
Nuwara Eliya	229,510	183,733	180,413	3,371	1.87
Galle	571,109	279,318	275,123	6,206	2.26
Maturu	451,926	106,671	105,109	2,891	2.75
Hambantota	295,161	87,001	83,982	2,116	2.52
Kurunegala	784,980	392,883	388,598	7,717	2.00
Puttalam	318,755	198,012	195,449	3,675	1.90
Anuradhapura	334,063	132,936	131,157	2,497	1.90
Palonnaruwa	193,145	48,607	47,522	957	2.00
Badulla	329,464	137,486	134,442	3,440	2.60
Monaragala	161,927	27,335	26,521	693	2.60
Ratnapura	457,225	349,619	345,573	8,412	2.40
Kegalle	437,191	296,031	291,863	6,788	2.30

Table 2. is a projected USA poll working on the extremely optimistic and equally unlikely possibility that the USA may poll 50% or 100% more in each district at the general election. It also takes into account the possibility of a higher poll — 70% or 75%. It shows that the USA will have to poll 227,946 votes which is a 78.7% increase in its share of the vote in the first of the four possibilities and a maximum of a 150.7% increase in the last. Can the USA poll this much? Let us assume it can and will.

Table 3. shows in descending order the SLMP percentage poll in the 17 districts. If the USA polls 50% more (as a percentage) of the valid votes cast at the general election than at the presidential, it gets above the crucial 5% in TWO districts — Colombo and Kalutara. If it polls a 100% more, it gets into contention in 7 districts and Ratnapura comes a near 4.8%. I have included Ratnapura as it was considered a traditionally left district. Is getting above 5% of the valid poll good enough? The last column in the table gives the minimum percentage that is required for a party to be entitled to a single seat. Except for Colombo, the USA will not qualify for allocation of seats in any of the other 7 districts, as the qualifying percentage is way above 5% with Monaragala, Polonnaruwa and Matale needing 25% for a single seat!!

It is quite obvious from these data that even if the USA doubles its poll at the general election, it will get only ONE seat in parliament. The answer to the question about those on the national list is clear. Only the two major parties can hope to get representation via the national list, as the others are either too marginal in their ability to gather votes to reach a national 5% poll or are only regional in that they will not have a national average above 5%. This brings us to an in-

Table 2

Projected USA poll at the general election
at extremely optimistic levels

Electoral District	50% Swing 70% Poll	50% Swing 75% Poll	100% Swing 70% Poll	100% Swing 75% Poll
Colombo	52,810	56,582	70,413	75,443
Gampaha	31,290	33,525	41,675	44,652
Kalutara	22,272	23,863	29,696	31,817
Mahanuwara	9,632	10,321	12,844	13,761
Matale	3,972	4,255	5,296	5,674
Nuwara-Eliya	4,514	4,836	6,008	6,438
Galle	13,522	14,520	18,070	19,361
Matara	13,065	13,998	17,399	18,642
Hambantota	7,810	8,368	10,414	11,158
Kurunegala	16,485	17,662	21,979	23,549
Puttalam	6,359	6,813	8,479	9,085
Anuradhapura	6,664	7,141	8,886	9,521
Polonnaruwa	4,056	4,345	5,408	5,794
Badulla	8,994	9,637	11,992	12,849
Monaragala	4,421	4,736	5,894	6,315
Ratnapura	11,522	12,345	15,362	16,460
Kegalle	10,558	11,312	14,078	15,083
Total Poll	227,946	244,259	303,893	319,802
% Increase from Dec '88	78.7	91.5	138.2	150.7

Table 3

Projected USA percentage poll as against the
minimum required to gain a single seat

Electoral District	SLMP Poll Dec '88	58% increase in poll	100% increase in poll	Minimum % per seat
Colombo	4.62	6.93	9.24	5.26
Kalutara	3.72	5.58	7.44	10.0
Gampaha	3.07	4.61	6.14	6.25
Matara	2.75	4.13	5.50	12.5
Badulla	2.60	3.90	5.20	14.3
Monaragala	2.60	3.90	5.20	25.0
Hambantota	2.52	3.78	5.04	16.7
Ratnapura	2.40	3.60	4.80	11.1
Kegalle	2.30	3.45	4.60	12.5
Galle	2.26	3.39	4.52	10.0
Kurunegala	2.00	3.00	4.00	7.6
Polonnaruwa	2.00	3.00	4.00	25.0
Anuradhapura	1.90	2.85	3.80	14.3
Puttalam	1.90	2.85	3.80	16.7
Nuwara-Eliya	1.87	2.81	3.74	20.0
Matale	1.76	2.64	3.52	25.0
Mahanuwara	1.46	2.19	2.92	9.09

interesting observation. Even if there was no cut off point at all, the results would still be the same. The lowest minimum needed to get a single seat is 5.26 in the Colombo district, which is above the cut off point! If the government did its calculations right, once it had decided to reduce the cut off point from 12.5% to 5%, it could have made a seemingly magnanimous gesture by declaring that it was removing the cut off point altogether. It would not have made any difference at all!!

What does all this leave the USA with? It will have a single seat in the new parliament as in the previous one. It will be less of a voice in the opposition than before with a large contingent of SLFP and EPRLF/TULF MP's dominating. Again a lone voice in the wilderness? Did it help in the last 12 years?

It is clear that Sri Lanka is gradually becoming a two-party system with regional groupings controlling the North/East. In the national arena, the small parties are getting further marginalised. The left which was the 'third force' can no longer be labelled this.

What then, can be said of the 'fourth force' which is staying out of the parliamentary game? What is its intrinsic political formation? Is it ultra-left? Is it fascist? What role is it playing in the current situation? Will it coagulate and concentrate into an identifiable whole that can be definitively categorised as belonging to a particular wavelength in the political spectrum? If it dissipates its seemingly directionless energy, where will the debris fall? If one takes the post '71 scatter as an indicator, most is bound to fall into the governing party as the best hopes of

future material fulfilment lie there. This is what happened in 1971. And according to the latest press reports from Diggamadulla, what is happening now. Almost none fell back into the traditional marxist parties, from whence they had come. Will the JVP (if not DDV) be able to replace the traditional Left and their aging leadership as the Left alternative in the Sri Lankan political scene? The question mark at the end of that sentence looms large. At present reckoning they seem unsuitable for that role even if, as I said earlier, their political motivation and ideology is clearly identified as being Left.

If they maintain the present momentum and continue, the traditional Left parties are bound to get marginalised further. In

(Continued on Page 32)

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Sri Lanka's Presidential Election

S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe

In Sri Lanka's December 19th presidential election, prime minister R. Premadasa (64) of the ruling United National Party (UNP) beat former prime minister Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike (72) of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Mr. Ossie Abeygunasekera (38) of left-of-centre Sri Lanka Mahajana Party (SLMP) (Table 1). The election will long be remembered as the most violent ever general election in the country's history. Sri Lanka has had nation-wide general elections based on universal adult suffrage since 1931, twenty years before India has had its first such in 1951-52. Between independence (1948) and 1977 Sri Lankans have changed governments six times through the ballot. On this occasion, two extreme nationalist groups, the Tamil Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the north and the Sinhalese Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP or National Liberation Front) in the south opposed with violence the presidential elections, each for different reasons.

LTTE which opposed the Indo-Lanka Accord and the provincial councils established under that Accord did not want the Tamils in the northern and eastern provinces to give legitimacy to the elections that perpetuated the existing political order. The JVP wanted presi-

dent J. R. Jayewardene's government to resign before the elections and the Indian Peace keeping Force (IPKF) to leave the country, to guarantee a "free and fair" election. Given the circumstances, neither demand could have been met.

The JVP was more ruthless than the LTTE in the use of violence against the election. It murdered more than 800 UNP and SLMP supporters and a number of officials and members of the security forces. In the two months prior to the election, JVP instigated work stoppages that paralyzed government offices, factories, banks and even hospitals. Fuel supplies, public transport, and trade activity were disrupted and all the universities and schools outside the northern and eastern provinces (NEP) were shut down.

There are reasons to believe that local-level SLFP sympathizers sometimes joined the JVP to instigate such disruption. The SLFP leadership too was not unhappy about the embarrassment that these events caused to the government. The government met violence with counter violence through security forces and para military groups and, according to opposition sources, groups known as "Green Tigers" who were armed by the government. Mr Premadasa tried

to get the JVP to agree to a truce and perhaps support his candidature at least indirectly. He carefully avoided naming the JVP as the group responsible for the violence although President Jayewardene consistently did so. The JVP, however, did not respond to Mr Premadasa's overtures and the violence against the UNP continued unabated.

While the disruptions were going on Mrs Bandaranaike negotiated with the JVP and six other minor parties to form an electoral alliance. As a result a five party Democratic People's Alliance (DPA) led by the SLFP was formed to back Mrs Bandaranaike's candidature. However, the JVP was not a member of the Alliance and turned against the SLFP as well. From early November several of Mrs Bandaranaike's political rallies were disrupted by the JVP and some party workers were killed. More importantly they declared that the election was totally unacceptable and "illegal" and appealed to the people to boycott it. Those who defied the JVP were risking the wrath of JVP including death.

I Issues

All three candidates promised to restore law and order, and send the IPKF home. UNP's Premadasa and SLMP's Abeygunasekera promised to work the provincial councils to settle the ethnic problem. The former also promised to replace the Peace Accord with a friendship treaty with India. The latter was supported by the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) that is in office in the recently established NEP provincial council. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) also requested Tamils to vote for the SLMP candidate. Mrs Bandaranaike, gave a commitment to abrogate the Accord but at the same time

Table 1

	Valid votes (ml)	%
R. Premadasa (UNP)	2.569	50.4
Sirima Bandaranaike (SLFP)	2.290	44.9
Ossie Abeygunasekera (SLMP)	0.236	4.5
Total valid vote	5.095	100.0
Rejected vote	0.091	1.8*
Total polled	5.186	55.3†
Total registered vote	9.376	—

* As a percentage of total poll.

† As a percentage of total registered vote.

Source: Department of Elections.

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establish a permanently merged regional council with additional powers in the Tamil areas. However, her effort to enlist the support of the LTTE failed.

On economic policy Mr Premadasa emphasized the positive aspects — more consumer goods, more jobs etc — of the UNP's 'open' economy policy in contrast to the era of food shortages and unemployment in the 1970-77 Bandaranaike administration. He also focussed on the successes of the government 'Lead Projects' such as the 2 billion US dollar Mahaweli River Diversion project and the one million houses program. For the future he offered a poverty alleviation program that included a monthly grant of US \$ 30 each to 1.4 million families (half of the population) on food stamps.

Mrs Bandaranaike criticized the UNP's failure to control inflation, the increase in unemployment after 1982, and the UNP's inability to help the poor. However, unlike Mr Premadasa, she failed to offer the poorer voters anything particularly new or specific to improve their conditions.

The third candidate Mr Abeygunasekera had a traditional left economic program that promised a planned economy under a socialist dispensation.

II

Results

In a country which normally polls 60% or more in national elections, the December poll of 55.3% was the lowest ever in a Sri Lankan post-war election. District-wise it varied between 78.5% in Nuwara Eliya which has a strong 'Indian' plantation Tamil presence, to 13.3% in Wanni which is predominantly Sri Lankan Tamil. Electorate-wise it varied between 82.2% in Haputankota a predominantly Sinhalese electorate but with a sizable Indian Tamil vote, to 4.4% in Hakmana an almost 100% Sinhalese electorate in the interior of the southern province. In so far as the Sinhalese majority areas were con-

cerned it can be said that by and large the electoral voting percentage varied almost directly in proportion to the degree of violence that prevailed in the respective electorates. One question that has been raised is whether the final result would have been any different if there had been a "normal" (i.e. high) poll, at least in the low polling provinces outside NEP. Three points need to be noted here.

Firstly, the JVP/LTTE threat was undoubtedly the major factor that kept away a large number of voters from the poll. However, given the prevailing climate of violence, some would have voluntarily avoided voting for reasons other than fear. Many Tamils, especially in the northern districts, would have viewed the election as a contest among the Sinhalese that was not particularly relevant to them. Some Sinhalese could have been disillusioned with all three candidates, particularly the two principal contenders and their respective parties UNP and SLFP and decided not to vote. This probably partly explains the drop of about 10 to 15 percentage points below the usual norm, in the poll in the Colombo city electorates where the JVP threat was minimal if not non-existent.

Second, for a high poll to have taken place normal peaceful conditions should have prevailed in the country. If such normalcy prevailed the major issue in the election, i.e., the restoration of peace and law and order would not have arisen. This clearly would have enormously helped Mr Premadasa's candidature because many voters turned against the government on this issue.

Third, if a semblance of "normalcy" was re-established just prior to the polling day by a JVP declaration that it would not oppose people voting, arguably the poll could have been higher although peace and normalcy in the full sense of the word would have been lacking. The highly controversial ques-

tion is whether given such a situation the result would have been different. The SLFP in its post-election statements has suggested that a high poll would have ensured a victory for its candidate while UNP spokesmen quite naturally have denied it. The answer depends on whether a possible high poll in Sinhalese majority areas that had a low poll in December would have helped Mrs Bandaranaike to wipe out Mr Premadasa's majority. Of course the SLFP claims that JVP and UNP threats prevented more of their supporters from voting while the UNP claims that JVP and SLFP threats did the same to their vote.

LOW POLL

The electoral arithmetic that provides a pointer to answer the above question is as follows. In the 1982 presidential election UNP polled 52.9% and SLFP 29.1. To the latter one should add the 2.7% polled by Mr Kumar Ponnambalam of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) one of the DPA partners who supported Mrs Bandaranaike in December. Thus to win on the first count with an absolute majority (50% + 1 vote) the SLFP with a total share of 41.8% in 1982 required a swing of 8.2% against the UNP and other non SLFP opposition parties. A swing of 5.6% in favour of the SLFP would have given it 47.4% of the vote as against 47.3% for the UNP, but not an absolute majority. According to Sri Lanka's electoral laws such a situation would have required a count of the second preferences of the third candidate to decide the winner. In reality the national swing against the UNP was only 2.5% and the swing to the SLFP-ACTC coalition was only 3.8%. Given the SLFP poll of 4.6% the SLFP would have required another 5.1% from the UNP to win on the first count. Could the SLFP have made it if the poll was higher and closer to "normal"?

To answer this question we examined whether there was a

strong association between relatively good SLFP district-level performances (high swings in its favour) and high polling. Conversely is it possible to say that in districts where the poll was high the UNP fared poorly? In Table 2 we have divided the electoral districts into six groups according to the percentage of the registered voters who cast a valid vote. The figures show that there is no strict systematic relationship between the average poll and the swing against the UNP. In point of fact the case can be argued both ways. For example, those who believe that the low poll favoured the UNP can point out that starting from Group 2 and omitting Group 3, the swing against the UNP weakens as the average poll declines. In fact, in Group 6 there is an improbable 11.6% swing in favour of UNP. However, those who wish to argue that a high poll could also have favoured the UNP will point out that in Group 1 which had an average poll of 74.6%, the swing against the UNP was only 2.9% which is significantly lower than the 5.2% swing in Group 2. The association between a high poll and a swing against the UNP on a district basis, as measured by the rank correlation coefficient is 0.313 which is a weak association.

We also looked at how the UNP and SLFP fared in each electorate within each district. It is reasonable to argue that if in any given district the SLFP generally won the seats which polled above the average poll for that district, a high poll would have favoured the party. The SLFP won 48 seats outside the predominantly Tamil north and east. Of that number 22 (46%) were seats that had a poll higher than the average poll for the district to which the seat belonged. However, in the case of UNP also 37 (42%) of the 88 seats it won in the south were in the same category. This 4 percentage point difference between the two parties is also not very significant.

Table 2
Presidential Poll : 1982-1988 Swing

	Average Poll		UNP Poll		Swing against the UNP in 1988 %
	%	%	%	%	
	1982	1988	1982	1988	
All Island	80.1	54.3	52.9	50.4	-2.5
Group 1					
Districts polling between 70%-89%	83.4	74.6	54.6	51.7	-2.9
(N'eliya, R'pura, Gampaha, Digamadulla, Puttalam)	(82.3)	(74.1)	(53.6)	(50.5)	(-3.1)
Group 2					
60%-70%	82.1	66.8	56.5	51.3	-5.2
(Kandy, Kegalle, Colombo, Kalutara)					
Group 3					
50%-60%	65.0	54.8	47.6	48.9	+1.3
(B'caloa, T'malee)					
Group 4					
40%-50%	84.9	46.3	53.8	49.3	-4.5
(Kurunegala, Galle Badulla, A'pura*)					
Group 5					
20%-30%	83.5	26.7	51.2	50.0	-1.2
(Matale, Pollon- naruwa, Hambantota, Matara but excluding Jaffna which polled 20.3%)					
Group					
10%-20%	71.1	48.2	48.2	60.1	+11.9
(Monaragala and Vanni)					

Note : In group 1 figures in parentheses show calculations excluding N'eliya, where the Indian Tamil vote is important. The groups 3 and 6 indicates swings in favour of UNP.
* A'pura poll was 39.7%.

Source : Computations based on the official results released by the Department of Elections.

Table 3
1988 Presidential Election:
Estimated Ethnic Distribution on the valid vote (000)

	1 Total Registered voters		2 UNP		3 SLFP		4 SLMP		5 Total		6 Percentage voting (5/9)	7 Share of total valid vote polled
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%		
Sinhalese Buddhists	6610	70.5	1694	45.6	1935	52.1	85	2.3	3714.0	100	56.2	72.9
Sinhalese Christians	450	4.8	190	60.1	110	34.8	16	5.1	316.0	100	70.2	6.2
Sri Lankan Tamils	1219	13.0	160	38.6	130	31.3	125	30.1	415.0	100	34.0	8.1
Indian Tamils	356	3.8	200	85.1	30	12.8	5	2.1	235.0	100	66.0	4.6
Muslims	694	7.4	325	78.3	85	20.5	5	1.2	415.0	100	59.8	8.2
	9376	100.0	2569		2290		236		5095.0		283.2	100.0

Note: Malays, Burghers (Eurasians) and other small groups add upto about 50,000 (0.5%) of the voters. This category is omitted from the table.

There were no reliable opinion polls to prepare the above estimates. It was done on the basis of voting patterns in the 22 electoral districts, and other information gathered informally from election sources.

Source: Population ratios have been taken from the Department of Census and Statistics, *Population Census 1981*.

SWING

A swing exceeding 8.2% against the UNP took place only in Colombo district (8.6%). Even in the 90% Sinhalese Gampaha district which adjoins Colombo, the only district with a poll higher than 70% that the SLFP won, the swing was only 4.4%. Thus, given the SLMP shares in the respective districts, even if one were to assume a uniform swing of 5% (double the actual national average) in favour of SLFP in Groups 4, 5 and 6 (excluding Vanni) and a poll of 65% (actual poll in this combined group was 38.7%) the final result would have been UNP 49.6% (2.97ml), SLFP 46.1% (2.76ml) and SLMP 4.3% (0.26ml) giving the UNP a 210,000 lead. In a second count unless more than 80% of the SLMP vote were to have Mrs Bandaranaike as a second preference, which is highly improbable, Mr Premadasa probably would still have won. In fact the information we have is that while in the

Sinhalese areas the second preference in the SLMP vote was largely for Mrs Bandaranaike in the Tamil areas which accounted for over 40% of the SLMP vote, the second preference was more for Mr Premadasa.

Given our estimate of the ethnic distribution of the vote (Table 3) we asked the question whether a poll of 80% among the Sinhalese Buddhists would have made any difference to the final result. Here again Mr Premadasa would probably have got slightly more than 49%, about three percentage points ahead of Mr Bandaranaike, thereby necessitating a second count. Then Mrs Bandaranaike could have won only if about two-thirds of the voters for the third candidate Mr Abeygoonasekera had given their second preference to her.

MALPRACTICES

Given the low poll and the generally unsatisfactory atmosphere that prevailed on polling

day, in theory, election malpractices on a largescale could also have influenced the final result. Mrs Bandaranaike in her post-election press conference suggested this possibility. In particular she protested against the fact that in the Monaragala District 49 polling booths involving about 45,000 voters never opened for voting. In fact the SLFP is expected to file an election petition challenging the result on grounds of electoral malpractice.

The ten-member SAARC observer group who observed the poll in five districts and entertained submissions from political parties and others, in a preliminary statement noted that the "problem of general intimidation during the election campaign was unprecedented" and also made references to election "irregularities". However it concluded that "in the face of threats of intimidation and

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Sri Lanka's Health, Ecology, and Participatory Democracy

Geraldine Gamburd

In the very near future health, ecology and participatory democracy will become everyone's most important concern. From the widest view health includes the health of our entire earth, all the plants, all the other animals, and we people ourselves. We must be concerned for the air, the water and the soil as well as for all the living creatures (the whole ecosystem). As Buddhism has always taught us we must have reverence for life. As ecology teaches us we (including people) are all part of one encompassing system; what is good for one part is good for all parts and by the same token what is damaging for any part is also damaging for all the other parts. We need to think in new ways that make both difference and equality possible.

In such a circular, all surrounding system, where must we begin to become aware of threats to health, ecology and equality, and then beyond to their positive maintenance? Everywhere at once of course! But most especially where damage is current and outrageous. We can begin with the air we breathe, and the salt water of the sea, the sweet water we drink, the soil which nourishes us, and harmonious social relationships.

In the United States the seas, air, soil and equality are all being threatened. The seas around the coastline are more often being declared off limits for swimming and or shell fishing because of pollution resulting from sewage system runoffs or chemicals dumped by medical establishments or manufacturing plants. The oceans

are dying. Acid rain is killing forests and lakes. Pesticides in foods are killing people and the very earth itself. Auto emissions and burning of coal to generate electricity pollute the air we breathe and change the climate itself by contributing to the green house effect and global warming. The industrial mode is not only outdated, it is dangerous. We must turn to an entirely new way of living and new way of thinking in a post-industrial world.

In Sri Lanka, the industrial mode has brought leftover London buses and other machines in poor repair which spew their carbon poisons into the air. If new industries in the investment promotion zones are not required to pass pollution tests before they are accepted they must be stringently monitored. Promises are easy to make. What will happen to fishing and the food chain if our beautiful seas are poisoned? What gain if new irrigation dams cover fertile land in order to open up less fertile land elsewhere? What if irrigation plans lead to wholesale large scale deforestation, which leads to drought, erosion and eventual desertification? Perhaps even more serious, the very earth will become warmer when there are fewer trees to absorb the excess carbons. This in turn will cause a green house effect over the entire globe and lead to global warming. Without trees to clear away carbons and to produce oxygen, we will have lost the lungs of our planet; without lungs the planet will die. All of these things together create ecosystemic imbalance. The soil must also be saved from fertilisers and pesticides which change the biological and chemical balance achieved

over millennia by soil and microbes. We must continue or return to natural organic farming. We must safeguard the temperature the air, the sea, the soil, those benefits of our planet which so far have not been found on any other planet, even those trillions of light years away. Equal harmonious participatory human relationships could be the key to a constructive post-industrial way of life.

We must treasure our earth as a living system in ecosystemic balance. That living system is influenced and changed by all its parts but the behaviour of we human beings is becoming more and more predominant, outweighing the other parts. That is why we have a special branch of ecology that is called human ecology. When we burn petrofuels and cut forests, when we change the landscape and dump chemical refuse, when we use chemicals in fertilizers and pesticides, we upset the ecological balance. We can learn from our ancestors; what they did that was positive we can retain; the mistakes they made we can refuse to emulate. We can learn from our contemporaries; we can take on their positive attributes; when they bring their mistakes to us we can say we do not wish to repeat them but rather we wish to learn from them. If they have ruined Silicon Valley in California and suggest bringing the major pollutor, silicon chip manufacturing plants, to more pristine areas, we can learn from their mistakes and refuse that kind of industry. If they have used birth control mechanisms which have resulted in deaths of young women whether they be a birth control pill or some kind of vaginal shield,

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we can learn from their mistakes and refuse that kind of mechanism. If anything, so called health items or pesticides, has been banned in the country of origin, we can refuse to import that item. If MSG (monosodium glutamate) which is used by some restaurants to enhance the taste of food items, especially vegetables, is offered to our restaurateurs we need to point out that it is being used less and less in the first world because it has caused severe reactions, and even death in some people. Cigarette smoking is now being encouraged by stepped-up advertising campaigns. As the first world is increasingly banning smoking because of its clear hazard to health, the third world is being targeted as a consumer market. In a famous phrase - just say no!

These few but significant examples suggest that to save the ecology (plants, animals and people, air, water and soil) from our current human behavior, or 'misbehavior', we must become aware of that behavior and its overall consequences. So far we have pointed to primarily biological consequences of cutting forests, polluting with chemicals, and causing harm to health with pills, preservatives, and cigarette smoking. It is also important to consider the damaging social consequences and to consider the economic, social and political behaviors which encourage these 'misbehaviors'.

The major source of 'misbehaviors' is lack of equal access. When access to resources and benefits like land and water is unequal, excess wealth and poverty can result. When access to information and decision making is unequal, decisions are apt to benefit disproportionately those with the access. If only a few have access to the forests, chemical plants and cigarette manufacturing, they may make decisions which benefit themselves in the short run. They may not even consider the rest of us or health or environmental effects in the long run. If only

a few have information, the rest of us may assume they will make the 'right' decisions but the 'right' decisions for whom? for health or for profit? and in the short or long run? We all need access to all these areas of behaviour to minimize as much as possible 'misbehaviors' and damaging consequences. That kind of access is often called participatory democracy. We are suggesting that participatory democracy is at least one solution to economic, social and political 'misbehaviors'. (For elaboration on his idea and examples below see Gamhard 1987.)

There are several different kinds of behaviors which have been labeled participatory democracy. To specify exactly what we mean we can apply several tests. One test must be equal access to resources and benefits, information and decision making power. Another must be that all will benefit in an equal way. Yet another test must be that it will have a positive or neutral effect on health and environment.

Sri Lanka, so often in the forefront with social experiments is not lacking in experiments with participatory democracy, some of which pass at least the first two tests above. Attempts to move toward a constructive participatory democracy process that puts people in the center, appear with varying degrees of success in organizations such as PIDA (Participatory Institute of Development Alternatives), TCCS (Thrift Credit Cooperative Societies), Freedom From Hunger Campaign (FFHC), Sarvodaya and a government Change Agents Program (CAP). All five of these programs claim to strive to foster grassroots development. The process of developing local self-reliance by means of local catalysts or change agents is vital to each of these programs. These small grassroots process or programs encourage people to save and gain control over land or business or both. If one asks the question as to whether these projects or processes lead to

1) equality in social relationships among people and 2) to balance in ecological relationships between people and the environment, a positive conclusion will be reached for social relationships and a much weaker, negative, or only neutral, one for the environment. The emphasis by grassroots organizations on improving the lot of all people, but especially that one of the poorest 20 to 40% suggests a sincere effort to balance social relationships, to provide access to resources and benefits, to information and decision making for all. Except for the Freedom From Hunger Campaign as we will note, one hears little discussion about balancing ecological relationships. Neutrality toward the environment could be replaced by active concern and awareness at these local levels. A positive concern with health and physical well being is certainly already a part of the Sarvodaya programs to improve wells and water supplies in general, and to improve nutrition, sanitation and housing.

The Freedom From Hunger Campaign was established in Sri Lanka in the early nineteen sixties in response to Food and Agriculture Organization International FFHC. Since 1973 it has worked jointly with the West German FFHC and receives support from Community Aid Abroad of Australia. Since 1979 it has had a program to rehabilitate small reservoir village communities. They flourished in the upper portions of river basins in the dry zone from 500 B. C. to 1500 A. D. Now an area overgrown by jungle, people practice slash and burn farming. "What is worse is that exploiters in the form of money lenders, traders, and produce merchants have stepped in and converted the cultivation programme to suit a market economy. These farmers now have to support middle men who lead a better life than these farmers can afford". Shifting cultivation and illegal felling of trees by timber merchants are impoverishing the land, FFHC

hopes to "improve the quality of life of these rural poor... and to bring the land use pattern... into ecological balance with the environment... it is hoped to encourage them to revive the ancient systems where the local people managed their own affairs through mutual help" by means of Reservoir Council and Reservoir Maintenance fund. The program potential could be to develop seven thousand reservoirs to benefit one hundred thousand families (five hundred thousand persons) Ratnatunga: pp. 1 and 2). Between 1979 and 1983, one hundred sixteen reservoirs have been restored at an average cost of Rs 12,000 (\$500) per family in 1983. (p.xiii). By March 1985, one hundred sixty reservoirs had been restored.

FFHC does not develop reservoirs on its own but in partnership with Reservoir Councils offers training, financial assistance, and assistance in working with extension officers. "The objective is to establish groups of self supporting farmers which could, in less than five years, become stable self reliant communities living in ecological balance with the environment." (Ratnatunga: foreward)

In the one fourth of the area which was not abandoned in 1500 A. D. the FFHC program has not been able to set up such viable "rehabilitated" living situations. The reasons stated is the size and density of the population which has resulted in fragmentation of land holdings. Even when FFHC funded reservoir improvement the farmers could not get together to establish a Reservoir Maintenance Fund. The income from small holdings was inadequate to support the population or the fund. (Ratnatunga: p.4)

In contrast in three quarters of the area where the agricultural systems collapsed about five hundred years ago it is thinly populated. In this area the program hopes to 1) stop the illegal felling of trees, reduce slash and burn farming by cultivating paddy (two acres per

family) in restored reservoir areas 2) grow orchards in homestead-market gardens (one and one half highland acres) 3) reforest the upper hill slopes and 4) convert the lower hill slopes to contour pastures (Ratnatunga: p. 3). The farmers will have access to all four resource areas. Farms will be viable; soil and water will be conserved; soil will become more fertile.

FFHC cooperates on only small reservoir rehabilitation, those that "irrigate less than fifty acres of paddy land... hold not more than three feet of dead storage... (and) hold six feet of water above the still level of the sluice." (Ratnatunga: p. 8) This enables farmers to build and maintain the system manually by themselves. Each season they contribute two bushels of paddy from each acre harvested, to the Reservoir Maintenance Fund. The farmers manage their own affairs making decisions about the reservoir and bund, sowing, plowing and water management at the Reservoir Council Meetings. They cooperate and come to decisions not only about the valley floor paddy area but the homestead gardens, pastures and forest areas as well. (Ratnatunga: pp. 8-) Excess population will be encouraged to other colonization schemes. A relatively small population and group size are crucial to ecological balance and local self reliance (social balance).

FFHC provides outside help to begin this process of self help. It includes money for 1) subsistence while restoring the reservoir (payment is for the volume of earth work done) 2) materials like cement and tools 3) skilled labor and technical supervision 4) training of local people 5) initial provision of fertilizer (including agro-chemicals) and seed. (Ratnatunga: pp. 12-13 and 38)

There are programs to supply water within reasonable distances so women can tend to other chores like producing fruit and vegetables in home gardens. Women are being taught about new foods that may be grown

in their own agro-ecological region, simple food processing techniques, better methods of preparing foods and balanced local diets. Where necessary they are taught to sew. Although

population data is gathered and kept in the reservoir village record book, population planning is left to special governmental institutions.

In the future FFHC hopes to consider a number of other possibilities for their small reservoir communities. These include having community members take on responsibility for non-farm activities, house building and small cottage industries based on local materials. Organized marketing procedures, proper banking procedures and credit societies will be necessary to keep the villagers free from becoming indebted to money lenders and middle men.

Vice Chairman, D. D. Witenachchi describes the working of one specific project as follows:

The Tantirimale Project consists of 85 tanks, the approximate cost of restoration being Rs. 2,700,000. Nearly 800 families will be benefitted. They will be able to cultivate paddy both during Maha and Yala seasons. Since the total extent of land under paddy is 1800 acres, the total quantity of paddy that will be purchased at a conservative average of 40 bushels per acre will be 72,000 bushels. At Rs. 63 per bushel the value of the crop for a year will be Rs. 4,320,000. Thus it will be observed that more than the total outlay of money can be recovered in one harvest alone. This is indeed a remarkable achievement.

Money for the rehabilitation of 13 tanks has been donated by West Germany and the balance 72 tanks are being undertaken on contributions from Community Aid Abroad, Australia. We are grateful to both these donor countries for their interest and for their very generous support.

In contrast, experiments with top-down government growth programs pursued especially vigorously since 1977 present more health problems for most of the people and the environment. Industrial programs and projects like Foreign Trade Zones (renamed Investment Promotion Zones), Tourism and the job opportunities in the Middle East put wealth in the centre and choose to intensify production. They aim to improve conditions by a trickle down approach. The stated policy of the government is to achieve more equal access and development have led instead to increasing impoverishment of ordinary people and increasing wealth and luxuries for only a very few. While

succeeding in supporting more people (a sizeable population increase) the overall direction of these top-down programs appears to be depletion of resources and imbalance with nature, while the traditional hierarchy maintains a secure hold on new technology and processes of social change.

Massive colonization schemes and the Mahaveli Irrigation Project have intensified production in agriculture. It has been said of colonization schemes begun in the 1920's to provide frontier land, that "within the colony context a handful of families have managed to achieve high income and high living standards amidst a mass of settlers who

eke out a day-to-day existence... They already affluent have as a result become richer and the poor become increasingly dependent on them for survival" (Wanigaratne 41). Studies suggest the same problems of rich and poor holders are occurring in Mahaveli river project. There is evidence of land leasing, indebtedness, and division into rich and poor along traditional lines. A follow-up study of a change agents program designed to solve these problems recommended 1) training unit managers to initiate community organizations and development, 2) organization of groups, 3) linking the groups and sharing development information, and 4) regular interaction, action, reflection, a tentative plan, action, reflection etc. (Wanigaratne). In short the study recommended creating a grassroots process within a top-down project. It recommended participatory democracy to achieve equal access, benefits and decision making powers for all. These economic, social and political behaviors could encourage constructive behaviors and beneficial consequences for health and the ecology.

Especially 'sacred' to each culture are its own eating habits. It is an area in which all of us justly fear to tread. Yet since each of us readily 'takes or leaves' recommendations about food, it can not hurt to note that a diet of rice and a rich variety of vegetables with protein (from soy or other beans or fish or nuts) and with only a few fruits in season, has been highly recommended by many nutritionists, especially from Japan. As I recall this is approximately what was available in villages in Sri Lanka. In areas where intestinal problems, especially worms, are endemic, washing raw vegetables in a potassium permanganate solution is often recommended. All people would benefit from eating foods produced by organic farming without the use of artificial fertilisers and especially without the use of pesticides.

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ENTREPRENEURS ALL

*Dig dig, the Swiss Francs fall
into the numbered slots,
The ledgered vaults
There, electronically incognito.*

*Here, you may not amble musing
Bank balance thoughts,
Side walks are disembowelled
Telecom, Gas, and for the washable rich
Metered water and rich sewerage*

*Open up for each!
Each needs separate surgery
The Surgeon General pays
In Dollars, Marks or Sterling
For each pleasurable
Manipulation of Underdeveloped bowels*

*There's someone else who pays.
The father of the man
Crying for Swiss milk spray dried
Humanised at four rupees a tin
(Ha! Just a pediatricians humane dream)*

*Each of these actors has just received
Another lease of time to play his part
Some frolic to Frankfurt in the fall
We dig up the decades skeletons and depart.*

U. Karunatilake

Part II

The Sangha, Civil Society, and the State

Jagath Senaratne

Let me also note, lest I be misunderstood, that the Sangha has certainly not been immune to the diverse political currents and ideologies operating in greater society. No student of Sri Lankan society could make such an assertion. For that matter, the ideology of 'exclusivist' Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism is closely connected with the Sangha due to mythological, historical, and contemporary political reasons. Surely, it is not an overstatement to say that one of the still unresolved issues upon which the further existence of a sovereign Sri Lankan polity is intimately linked up with, is the question of how the Sangha and Sasana, as institutions, come to grips with the needs of a modern, multi-ethnic polity in Sri Lanka. However, let us create the circumstances for the Sangha, through dialogue and reflection, to 'learn' gradually the changes it must undergo within the modern Sri Lankan polity. I am certain that this learning process, given time, will ultimately bear fruit. Of course, if the laws of the land are violated then the ordinary legal process must take its course; that should be clearly understood. But it would be totally counter-productive, i.e. for the Sangha as well as the polity, if hasty legislation paves the way for party political interference to 'control' the Sangha.

Furthermore, to pick up the question of the 'party-political-process', it is of course correct that political parties woo and influence the Sangha, and vice-versa. However, this is in the realm of persuasion, and not (whether implicit or explicit) coercion. It is my position that the interaction between these

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two entities within 'civil society' — i. e. Political Parties, and the Sangha — should maintain their present relationship of healthy tension, and that the cards should not be stacked against the Sangha to the benefit of, specifically, the political-party-in-power. I advocate this irrespective of the particular hue of the party concerned; this is a principle on which their can be no compromise.

In conclusion let me state that I would advocate measures for maintaining discipline which are completely internal to the Sangha — the State should have the right to step in only if criminal acts have been committed. The nature of these disciplinary bodies 'internal' to the Sangha will have to be carefully worked out; one can anticipate some difficulties due to the non-centralised structure of the Sasana (one of the main sources, if I may add, of its strength and resilience as an institution of civil society). □

(Concluded)

Asian . . .

(Continued from page 9)

Labour, having held back in the hope that the issue might bring down Mr. Howard, began exploiting the strains. Prime Minister Bob Hawke said any discriminatory policy would be "morally repugnant and economically insane".

The coalition finally confirmed its new position this week — different from Labour's but a compromise the opposition can apparently live with.

Any government, it said, "must reserve the right from time to time to vary and alter policy, including adjustments to the size and composition of the immigration programme in response to changing requirements, be they social, economic, political or humanitarian". At the same time it declared that it

would select people for immigration to Australia "regardless of race, religion or origin".

To test the opposition, Labour on Thursday put forward a motherhood motion in both houses of parliament calling for a commitment that "race or ethnic origin shall never, explicitly or implicitly, be among" the criteria to determine the composition of the migrant intake.

Mr. Howard let it go to a vote, and Labor pulled in a handsome haul of three Liberal MPs and one Senator who crossed the floor. Two others abstained. Today the Liberals and Nationals insist all is well, and are standing their ground. But Australia's politicians have a tiger by the tail. No one cares to predict where it will take them, or for that matter the country.

Soviet . . .

(Continued from page 10)

to Lenin during the Civil War, and his superior intellect, drove Stalin to fits of jealousy. Soviet readers have now been able to read how Stalin conspired against Trotsky after Lenin's death, sent him into internal exile in 1928, banned him from the country in 1929, and deprived him and his family of Soviet citizenship in 1932.

Mr. Vasetsky's article quoted from Trotsky's diaries from 1935: "If neither Lenin nor I had been in Petersburg, there wouldn't have been any October Revolution."

Another entry the same year refers to Grigori Zinoviev, executed with Lev B. Kamenev after both were found guilty of plotting against Stalin in the show trial of 1936:

"Zinoviev told me, with some embarrassment, 'You don't think Stalin hasn't discussed the question of your physical elimination? He has both thought of it and discussed it. Take the necessary measures.'"

He did, but in the end they were inadequate.

(New York Times Service)

Vernon Walters vs the non-aligned

(Profile of a Crypto-diplomat)

Ellen Ray and William Schap

In 120 B.C., Mithridates VI of Pontus inherited the throne at the age of 11, and was immediately targeted for assassination by most of his relatives. He fled to the mountains and spent some years training himself to be his own master spy, combining "the cunning of the spy with the anxieties of the brutal despot whose intelligence he collected," and while in exile he "mastered twenty-two languages and dialects, travelling over Asia Minor — at the age of fourteen — disguised as a caravan boy. He visited many tribes, learned about their customs and spied upon their military strength."¹

Mithridates returned to Pontus, and after murdering his mother, his sister (whom he had married), and his sons, spent eighteen years terrorising the lives of Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey. He was, even for his times, singularly brutal, responsible for the massacres of hundreds of thousands of people in the far corners of the known world, "one of the most formidable opponents Rome ever had."²

Except for the family problems,³ there are interesting parallels between the affairs of Mithridates the Great and Vernon Anthony ("Dick") Walters, the current United States Ambassador to the United Nations. For one thing, Walters is a well

known linguist who speaks eight languages and many dialects and "likes to slip into a country unannounced before a meeting with a head of state so he can ride the buses around and pick up the local slang and intonation."⁴ More to the point, Walters, like Mithridates, is linked to countless coups, and massacres around the world. But while his role as linguist is widely publicised, his high stature as Grand Master of state terrorism, his decades of ties to wholesale butchery in Iran, Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, and most recently, Nicaragua, do not appear in the State Department press releases, or the raft of puff pieces about him in the mainstream media.⁵

Vernon Walters^{*} enlisted as a private in the US Army shortly before Pearl Harbor.⁶ After the US entered the War, he attended infantry school and graduated as a Second Lieutenant in 1942, and attended the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland. In October 1942 he "took part in the assault landing at Safi, Morocco." (This appears to be the extent of Walters' combat experience.) He then taught "Prisoner of War Interrogation" at Camp Ritchie. Although not mentioned in this official biography, Walters later trained Brazilian troops at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he became close friends with a young officer, Humberto Castelo Branco, who, more than 20 years later, was to take power in the coup which overthrew President João Goulart and installed a long-lasting regime infamous for its brutality

and torture of leftists, especially students and unionists.⁷ Walters was aide de camp to General Mark W. Clark in Italy and then, until the end of the War, combat liaison officer with the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division in Italy (living on the same floor with his friend Castelo Branco).⁸ All the above mentioned countries are ones with which Walters was later to have significant ties.

Walters spent more than 25 years in a succession of military assignments, usually as military attaché or interpreter, and generally under the aegis of the Defence Intelligence Agency. He was in Brazil in 1945 with Secretary of State Marshall and President Truman, and attended the 1947 Pan American Conference in Bogota, Colombia. This was his first brush with revolution and counterrevolution; the massive protests against the Conference were met with bloody retaliation which left more than 2000 dead. Curiously, Walters received a medal for his service during this incident, leading to speculation about his role in the events.⁹

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Walters was all over the globe, most significantly, as we will see below, in Iran, Italy, Brazil, France and Vietnam (only one month, in 1967, from which, presumably, he derived the experience to write his "Sunset at Saigon"). He spent three years in secret negotiations with the Chinese, and in the words of his official biography, "smuggled Henry Kissinger into Paris on 15 different occasions to conduct such negotiations."

The authors are Directors of the Institute of Media Analysis, USA. This contribution is reproduced from COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN

^{*} (See page 29)

His military promotions were unprecedented, considering his beginnings as a private. His Brazilian escapades in 1964 earned the Colonel a promotion to Brigadier General; his one month in Vietnam three years later got him his second star, as Major General; and when, in April 1972, he was appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, he became a Lieutenant General. He retired in July 1976 and spent the Carter years in an action-packed civilian career. Then shortly after President Reagan entered office, Walters returned through the revolving door and began four years, State Department service as Ambassador-at-Large, before becoming UN Ambassador.

Prior to examining his post-military career, it is enlightening to review Walters' far-flung operations in the coup-filled years from 1953 to 1973.

WALTERS admits, and associates confirm, that he was involved in the 1953 putsch which overthrew the government of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and reinstalled the young Shah.¹⁰ In the early 1960s he was military attache in Rome, actively blocking the Kennedy administration's "opening" towards the Italian left.¹¹ Presumably Walters was involved in the massive CIA campaign to fund lavishly the Christian Democratic Party in its otherwise risky electoral battles against the Communist Party of Italy. While it is not known whether Walters knew CIA veteran Hugh Montgomery¹² in the 1960s, at present he and Walters *do* work together; Montgomery is Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs in the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador, according to the current U. N. diplomatic list.

In 1962 Walters was posted to Brazil as military attache. Although Walters insists he was nothing more than a "well informed observer" of the events that followed,¹³ it is obvious that he was up to his neck in the plotting which culminated

in the bloody coup of 1964. He was, according to Jan Knippers Black, the "linchpin, the one person all the officers would talk to while they were still afraid to talk with one another."¹⁴ Indeed, he was such a good "observer" that he told Washington one week in advance the exact day the coup was to take place.¹⁵ Moreover, he breakfasted with Castelo Branco the morning after the coup began, urging him to assume the presidency, and launched with him the day after the inauguration.¹⁶ Walters never acknowledged Castelo Branco's consummate viciousness nor conceded the enormity of his regime's acts. In his autobiography he wrote: "I never saw Castelo Branco do a mean thing or heard him say a shameful word. The normal integrity of the man was beyond challenge."¹⁷ And as to the installation of the brutal Brazilian military dictatorship, he wrote: "A regime basically unfriendly to the United States had been replaced by another one much more friendly. Some may regard this as bad. I do not. I am convinced that if the revolution (*Sic*) had not occurred, Brazil would have gone the way of Cuba."¹⁸

In fact, various government documents suggest that Walters played an extremely crucial role both in fomenting and in accomplishing the coup. In the year preceding the March 31, 1964 start of the coup, a series of CIA documents — some still classified, some partially released, and some fully declassified — describe a meticulous investigation into the attitude of the Brazilian military regarding the Goulart government. One written in May 1963, notes that "Military becoming more anti-Goulart."¹⁹ Another, in July, worries, about "Military's hesitance to overthrow constitutional regime."²⁰ Shortly thereafter, another document describes the "possibility of a rightist coup."²¹ During this period, the best situated to sway the hesitant rightist military leaders was Colonel Vernon Walters who, as it happens,

was promoted to Brigadier General within a year of the coup.²²

Another set of declassified documents are equally damning. They detail a U. S. plan called "Brother Sam" which not only describes foreknowledge of the coup, but also notes the probability of Castelo Branco's assuming its leadership, and indicates that if the coup appeared to be failing, the U. S. Navy was to intervene. These are the same documents which describe Walters's breakfast with his old friend, Castelo Branco.²³

Walter's friendship with Nixon, solidified in 1958 when he protected the then Vice President from the spitting, rockthrowing crowds in Venezuela, led to his appointment, in April 1972, as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, a post he filled under four Directors, Richards Helms, James Schlesinger, William Colby, and George Bush. John Dean testified during the Watergate trials that he had been told Walters "was a good friend of the White House and that White House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have some influence over the Agency".²⁴ He served from 1972 to 1976, a seminal period in CIA history which ran from Watergate through the overthrow of Allende in Chile to the Church Committee hearings, the intervention in Angola, and the Planning of the assassination of Orlando Letelier. Vernon Walters played important roles throughout this period.

Part of the Walters mythology is his allegedly firm, moral, and indignant refusal to be a part of any cover-up of what came to be known as the Watergate scandal. Indeed, his autobiography paints a picture of incorruptible valor: "I looked (John Dean) right in the eye and said, 'Fire everyone connected with this'".²⁵ The fact is that when Walters was first asked, by Nixon aide Bob Haldean, to warn the FBI (falsely,

that a strenuous investigation of Watergate would jeopardize ongoing CIA operations, he did just that. Within minutes of receiving those orders, he was on his way to FBI Director Patrick Gray.²⁴ Several days later Walters was still stonewalling, advising John Dean that the then Director, Richard Helms, wanted to distance himself and the Agency from the growing scandal. They did not want to expose the administration's deep involvement; they just wanted to keep the Agency out of any further involvement. In fact, for all his posturing Walters never retracted the phony warning he had delivered to Gray.²⁵ He connived with Dean on possible scenarios to use.

Two weeks after his first, eager involvement, Walters realised he could not stall the investigation much further. When Gray, also anxious to protect himself, asked Walters if he could put the CIA's request in writing, Walters said he could not write such a "spurious" letter. The relieved Gray then understood that he could let the investigation, already with a momentum of its own, go on; Walters did not want to be in the position of wittingly covering up crimes, especially as so many people would know about it. Still, it was almost a year later that he first informed the Department of Justice of his knowledge of the White House's efforts to have the CIA stop the FBI, and during that year he received the Agency's Distinguished Intelligence Medal for doing such a good job of keeping the CIA out of the Watergate murk.²⁶

Yet, as Jeff Stein has pointed out, "Walters's recounting of the affair leads me to believe he was naive and misled. 'I had been in Washington for six weeks at this point and it simply did not occur to me that the Chief of Staff to the President might be asking me to do something that was illegal or wrong.' But at this point in his career, Walters had been

engaged in various intelligence operations for more than thirty years."²⁷ His year of silences speaks more eloquently than his diffident autobiography.

ONE of the most controversial series of charges against Walters involve his connections with the fascist opposition to the administration of Chilean President Salvador Allende, to the overthrow of Allende, and to the assassination of former Chilean Defence Minister Orlando Letelier.

While DDCI, Walters was in charge of the close liaison between the CIA and the Chilean intelligence services, which co-operated closely in the efforts to overthrow the Allende government. They also reportedly received considerable help from Walters's friends in the Brazilian service.²⁸

But the most controversial allegation against Walters is that he was complicit in the assassination of Letelier.²⁹ In July 1976 the police in Paraguay had in jail an alleged CIA informant, a possible cause of considerable embarrassment to the US. At the same time, Conrado Pappalardo, the assistant to Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner, was pressuring the US Ambassador, George Landau, to comply with a request made by Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet to Stroessner. Pinochet wanted two Chilean agents to travel to the US on false Paraguayan passports, which Stroessner had approved, but they now needed US entry visas, and the two agents were in Paraguay waiting for the visas. When Ambassador Landau expressed concern and remarked that the request was rather unusual, he was told by Pappalardo not to worry, that DDCI Vernon Walters knew all about it and that the two men were to report to Walters when they arrived in the U.S.

Landau was unable to reach Walters, who was on leave in Florida at the time, and after considerable soul-searching, he

issued the visas. But he took some precautions, photocopying the passports before returning them, and, sending detailed memorandum to the State Department and the CIA. Landau assumed that the issuance of the visas related to some CIA-Paraguay deal to free the imprisoned agent. However, on August 4, Landau received a cable from Walters indicating that he knew nothing of the matter, that he had no plans to meet with the Chileans, and suggesting that Landau confer further with the State Department. Landau notified the Paraguayans that the visas were to be considered revoked and demanded the passports back. Thereafter, Walters did travel to Paraguay, ostensibly on a mission involved solely with the captured agent.

Despite repeated requests Landau did not get the passports back until October 29, and they were returned with the photographs of the bearers removed. But Landau had photocopied the passports; later he was to learn that one of the two "Chileans" was Michael Vernon Townley, one of the men who planted the bomb which, on September 21, 1976 — when he was awaiting the return of the passports — killed Letelier.

It is almost impossible to believe, from all of the studies which have been published, and from the testimony of several trials and congressional hearings, that Vernon Walters did not have advance knowledge of a major Chilean secret police operation in the US being planned in July and August of 1976, but no directly incriminating evidence has been found. Walters vigorously denies any connection with, or foreknowledge of the Letelier assassination, although he has admitted to many meetings with Colonel Contreras in his years as DDCI.³⁰

Whatever his reasons for leaving the Ford administration well before the elections, Walters spent the Carter years close to the friends he had made over

the past three decades. And playing upon those friendships proved no fiscal hardship. In 1980, for example, Walters made nearly half a million dollars, \$3,00,000 of which was a fee from what may be one of the most misleadingly named companies in the United States, Environmental Energy Systems, Inc. of Alexandria, Virginia, which is, curiously, a major arms merchant. The money was a consultant's fee for assisting them in their efforts (apparently unsuccessful) to sell tanks to the King of Morocco. As the company president told the *New York Times*, "We went to him because he had the connections, he knew the King of Morocco."³³ In fact Walters has used his relationship with King Hassan through the years, ever since 1942, when he gave the then 13-year-old Crown Prince a ride in his Army tank.

Walters's work with Morocco during this time period has even more ominous overtones. He was (and possibly still is) a general partner in a Vienna, Virginia organisation called Morocco Travel Advisers. In a letter to the Senate submitted with his April 1, 1981 Disclosure Statement he said the company "provides tours of Morocco for and at the expense of US travel agents." But he also noted that it was involved in "the development of tourism in the far south of Morocco and in the contested area." Of course, "the far south of Morocco" is that portion of Western Sahara "given" by Spain to Morocco, when it abandoned its colony known as Spanish Morocco, and "the contested area" is that portion given by Spain to Mauritania, abandoned by it, and claimed by Morocco. Both portions, however, comprise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, whose people, led by Polisario, have been struggling for their independence for many years. Moreover, it was Walters, as DDCI, who convinced the Spanish to relinquish its colony to Morocco and Mauritania in the first place.³⁴

If "Environmental Energy" means military equipment, we can only surmise what "Travel Advisers" means. It would appear to be aimed directly at Polisario and the Sahrawi people.

Vernon Walters was perhaps President Reagan's most prominent apologist for the brutal military dictatorship of General Romeo Lucas Garcia of Guatemala. He visited Lucas Garcia three times; in a May 1981 press conference in Guatemala City, Walters said the US wanted to help Lucas Garcia defend "peace and liberty."³⁵ When asked about Guatemalan human rights violations, Walters said: "There will be human rights problems in the year 3000 with the governments of Mars and the moon. These are some problems that are never resolved."³⁶ A month later, US and for Guatemala resumed at a significant level.

Walters had ties with Guatemala and its murderous leaders from his "civilian" interlude in the late "1970s. One of the clients he listed in his Senate disclosure statement was Basic Research International, SA, "an international oil cartel scouting the fields of Guatemala." They paid him \$1000 a day as a "consultant," to try to influence the Guatemalan government to lift oil production quotas. It has been charged that in this project, Basic Research issued exaggerated estimates of Guatemalan oil reserves which the State Department then used to justify continued US support for the brutal regime. In fact, it has been reported that he continued to represent this company unofficially even while in Guatemala officially, during the May 1981 trip noted above.³⁷

Walters continues to flack for Guatemala. In 1985 he told an interviewer that the administration's "quiet diplomacy" really worked; the Guatemalan military is "not killing as many people as they did before."³⁸ This faint praise was not even true: virtually all reports in-

dicated that the Guatemalan government at the time continued to have the worst human rights record in the area.

WALTERS was appointed a senior adviser to then Secretary of State Alexander Haig on April 1, 1981, just two months after Reagan took office. On July 22, 1981, after Senate confirmation, he was sworn in as Ambassador-at-large. Among his earliest duties was a deep involvement in the administration's war against Nicaragua. In 1981 and 1982 he made numerous trips to Argentina to arrange for that government's training of *contras* and for their handing of various secret payments to *contra* leaders particularly prior to the final approval of the CIA's original plans.

Ironically, the Argentine regime was not well repaid for its clandestine help to Walters in supporting Reagan's Nicaragua policies. The *New York Times* was unusually frank: "In dozens of recent world missions, Mr. Walters has hurried six times to Argentina alone most recently taking on the thankless task of telling his friends in the junta that, with war beginning in the Falklands, Washington had to side with Britain."

Walters had a special role in the building up of the *contra* forces waging their brutal war against Nicaragua. According to the testimony of former *contra* leader Edgar Chamorro,⁴⁰ Walters was instrumental in consolidating the forces of the former members of Somoza's National Guard.

"At that time, the ex-National Guardsmen were divided into several small bands operating along the Nicaragua-Honduras border. The largest of the bands, headed by Enrique Bermudez, a former Colonel, was called the 15th of September Legion. They were not an effective military force and represented no more than a minor irritant to the Nicaraguan government. Prior to the UDN's merger with these people, General Walters him-

self arranged for all the bands to be incorporated within the 15th of September Legion, and for the military government of Argentina to send several army officers to serve as advisers and trainers... the new organisation was called the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (National Democratic Force), or by its Spanish acronym, FDN."

One of Walter's most significant achievements in his personal war against Nicaragua was a secret agreement he negotiated with the then President of Colombia, Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala aimed at setting up a top secret US military base on the Colombian island of San Andres, only 125 miles off the east coast of Nicaragua. Some \$50 million worth of sophisticated tracking radar and anti-aircraft batteries have reportedly been installed on the island and nearby keys.⁴¹

Walters has remained intimately involved with Morocco for more than 40 years. Most recently he seems to have played a considerable role in the rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco, which led to a cooling of Algerian support for Polisario. Walters is said to be close to the number two man in Algeria, Prime Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi, who lived in the US in 1976, and through whom Walters arranged for the first official visit of Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to Reagan.

Another likely Walters operation in Morocco was the use of that country, in 1981, for meetings between high US officials and Angolan traitor Jonas Savimbi. Walters had been DDCI during the CIA's operations in Angola in 1975 and 1976, and had tried to get the Brazilians (unsuccessfully) and then the French (successfully) involved in the operations.⁴² Walters's presence in Africa is ubiquitous; nearly every year as Ambassador-at-Large he made whirlwind tours of numerous

African countries. In one instance, Angola was bombed by South Africa just after he departed.

In February 1985, Walters was nominated by President Reagan to succeed Jeane Kirkpatrick as United Nations Ambassador. Although most reputeage continued to praise Walters, reiterating all the old war stories, some of the journals were less than flattering. As Claudia Wright noted in the *New Statesman*, "Walters's candidacy for the UN post carries an unusual cachet: Directly or indirectly, he has been involved in overthrowing more governments than any other official still serving in the US government."⁴³ And even *US News & World Report* pointed out that Secretary of State George Shultz wanted Walters in the job, but without cabinet rank, "to signal a lowered US appraisal of the worth of the world body."⁴⁴

Indeed, the downplaying of the role of the United Nations is a pillar of Reagan's foreign policy. And Walters is a staunch adherent of the Reagan Doctrine which, in its haughty disdain for international law, would just as soon see the world body destroyed. He has called the UN a "measured disappointment," because it has "drifted away from resolution of conflicts." Walters has promised to be "very tough," to "work very hard to change these voting patterns (unfavourable to the US)."⁴⁵ His professed love for conflict resolution belies the administration's — and Walter's — contempt for the World Court, as evidenced by their refusal to participate in the case brought, successfully, by Nicaragua to challenge the contra war.

Recent press reports note that Walters has been absent from his UN post nearly continually the past few months, travelling around the world on more secret missions. As usual, his trips go undocumented while incidents of US-sponsored terrorism continue unabated.

If all else fails, Walters is not above simple blackmail. *US News & World Report* has described how he fended off a potentially hostile Senator during the Watergate hearings by discredibly threatening to bring up at the hearings the time the Senator had asked Walters, then military attache in Paris, to ship some luxury items illegally through military channels for a group of junketing Senators.⁴⁶ These are the kinds of moves Mithridates would have approved.

It is reported that General Walters will be the next U.S. Ambassador in Bonn.

Footnotes

1. Richard Wilmer Rowan, *The Story of Secret Service* (New York: Literary Guild, 1937), pp. 7, 10.
2. Webster's Biographical Dictionary, 1st ed. (Springfield, MA: Merriam, 1971), p. 1011. According to Webster's Mithridates committed suicide in 63 B.C., at the age of 69, although Rowan says that "one of his sons whom he had unaccountably neglected to murder brushed him from his throne with a powerful draught of poison," *Op. cit.* n. 1, p. 12.
3. Walters, 69, a lifelong bachelor and a devout Catholic, lived with his mother until her death a few years ago and currently lives with his sister, who holds the Bible when Vice President George Bush (his former boss at the CIA and a predecessor at the U.N.) swore him in as UN Ambassador. Jeff Stein, "Mystery Man of American Diplomacy," *Boston Globe Magazine*, August 29, 1982, p. 12. A shorter version of this article appeared as "Vernon Walters: Secret Agent," *City Paper* (Washington, DC), December 3, 1982. Michael Massing, "America's Top Messenger Boy," *New Republic*, September 16, 1985, 22; *US News & World Report*, June 3, 1985, p. 13. His friends call him "asexual." He says he "married the US government a long time ago," *Washington Post*, December 16, 1985.
4. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3 p. 12. Walters "has developed near-perfect imitations of Pope John Paul II, Franco, and Castro. He is said to do a mean Auguste Pinauche," *Washington Post*, December 16, 1985.
5. The major media are extraordinarily kind to Dick Walters. See, for example, "An Envoy Who Specializes in Sensitive Missions," A profile in the *New York Times*, June 3, 1982, in which he is quoted as responding to his critics, "If I was a bad man, I couldn't keep doing this." And, "Reagan Nominates Walters To Be Ambassador to UN" in the *Wash-*

- ington Post, February 9, 1985, which highlights the "stern warning" he gave Roberro D' Aubuission not to assassinate the US Ambassador. Yet the Times Piece notes that "his de-emphasis of the human rights issue" has won praise from conservatives, and the Post points out that "his strong anticommunist views... have made him a favorite of conservative Republican administrations. "Walters refers to the 1953 coup in Iran, the 1954 coup in Guatemala, the 1964 coup in Brazil, and the 1973 coup in Chile as "revolutions." His perspicacity is tempered by his knee-jerk right-wing sentiments. In March 1986 he was quoted; "I mean, how do we really know that Marcos is this unpopular? Marcos does have the support of the two largest parties in the Philippines." M Magazine, March 1986 p. 82. In another departure from reality, Walters is one of the few people left in the world who still denies that the United States ever tried to kill Cuban President Fidel Castro. Washington Post December 16, 1985.
6. The underlying data are from the State Department biography of August 1981.
 7. Stein, *op cit.*, n. 3, p. 28; Michael Massing, "America's Top Messenger Boy," *New Republic* September 16, 1985, p. 22.
 8. Massing *op cit.*, n. 7, p. 22.
 9. Ramon Jimeno and Marcela Caldas, "Vernon Anthony Walters: El Agente Secreto de la Diplomacia Silenciosa" in *Zona* (Bogota, Colombia), April 23, 1986 p. 46.
 10. Claudia Wright, "Brass Knuckles for America," in *New Statesman*, February, 8, 1985, p. 20
 11. *Ibid.*
 12. Montgomery was with the CIA in Italy from 1965 to 1969 and returned there in 1975 as CIA Chief of Station until 1980 Steve Weissman, "Ecco La Cia in Italian" in *La Repubblica*, January 15, 1976, reprinted as "Hello Hugh Montgomery," in Philip Agree and Louis Wolf, eds., *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe* (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1978), p. 165 CAIB, Number 12 (April 1981), p. 41.
 13. Massing *op cit.*, n. 7 p. 22
 14. Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977)
 15. Massing *op cit.* n. 7, p. 22
 16. *Ibid* Stein *op cit.* n. 3 p. 29
 17. Quoted in *The Progressive*, April 1985, p. 10.
 18. *Ibid.*
 19. Central Intelligence Agency Summary of Declassified Documents, reference to: Office of Current Intelligence, Special Report, OCI No. 0278/63 B, May 3, 1963.
 20. *Ibid.*, reference to: Draft National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 93-2-63, July 2, 1963.
 21. *Ibid.*, Information Report TDCS-3/553, 860, July 19, 1963.
 22. Massing, *op cit.*, n. 7, p. 22. Walters insists that none of the declassified material "shows any participation by me," which may be true as far as it goes, but hardly justifies John Goshko's assertion that "no evidence has been offered to support (the charge that Walters encouraged the coup)." *Washington Post*, February 9, 1985, p. A6.
 23. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 29; *Washington Post*, December 29, 1976. The Post article says that the part of the plan which called for the airlifting of small arms from a carrier off the coast was codenamed "Quick Kick."
 24. David Wise, *The American Police State* (New York: Random House, 1976), p. 245.
 25. Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (New York: Doubleday, 1978).
 26. David Wise, *op. cit.*, n. 24, pp. 243-44.
 27. *Ibid.*, p. 245.
 28. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-46; John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 529.
 29. Stein. *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 35
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 36. It is interesting that one of Walters's old chiefs, Averell Harriman, was, according to Thomas Powers, "lobbying for the hardest line against Allende." Thomas F. Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 231.
 31. For the details of the account which follows, see Jeff Stein, "Vernon Walters and the Death of Orlando Letelier," *Boston Globe*, August 29, 1982, p. 50; Taylor Branch and Eugene M. Propper, *Labyrinth* (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 1-14; John Dinges and Saul Landau *Assassination on Embassy Row* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 382-89; Donald Freed with Fred Landis, *Death in Washington* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1990), pp. 184-86.
 32. Letter, Vernon A. Walters to Al Lakin, Editor, *Boston Globe Magazine*, September 14, 1982, p. 2, responding to the Jeff Stein article cited *supra*, n. 3. Michael Massing (*op. cit.* n. 7, p. 23) says that Walters acknowledged two meetings with Contreras, but his letter denies discussing Letelier "in any of the meetings with Colonel Contreras," language which suggests rather a greater number of encounters.
 33. Jeff Gerth, "Former Intelligence Aides Profiting From Old Ties," *New York Times*, December 6, 1981.
- This incidentally, is one of the most informative articles available on the subject. The income figures come from Walters's own disclosure statement filed with the Senate on April 1, 1981.
34. According to Jeff Gerth's congressional sources, "One of Mr. Walters' last missions in the CIA was a trip in late 1975 to Spain, where in meetings with King Hassan II of Morocco and Spanish officials he convinced Spain to give up control of Western Sahara, a Spanish colony in Africa long sought by Morocco." *New York Times*, December 6, 1981.
 35. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 24.
 36. *Ibid.* Walters was accompanied on his May 1981 trip to Guatemala by Frank Ortiz, who had been removed by President Carter from his post as Ambassador to that country because he was considered "too conciliatory" to the regime *Washington Post*, May 13, 1981.
 37. *New York Times*, June 3, 1982; CAIB, Number 13 (July-August 1981), pp. 45, 48; *New Statesman*, February 5, 1982; *Washington Post*, July 14, 1981; December 16, 1985.
 38. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 25.
 39. *New York Times*, June 3, 1982.
 40. Transcript, sworn testimony of Edgar Chamorro before the International Court of Justice, at The Hague, in *Nicaragua v. United States of America: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua*.
 41. Jimeno and Caldas, *op. cit.* n. 9, p. 47.
 42. See CAIB, Number 13 (July-August 1981), p. 20; John Stockwell *In Search of Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1978) pp. 184, 192.
 43. *New Statesman*, February 8, 1985, p. 20.
 44. *US News & World Report*, February 18, 1985, p. 10. In fact, the dispute over cabinet status, in being leaked to the press, led to agreement that Walters would have cabinet rank, but was followed by another dispute whether Walters would automatically serve on the National Security Council According to the *New York Times* (March 26, 1985, p. 1), Walters was "so distressed at not being asked to serve on the council that he submitted his resignation this afternoon." His petulance was short-lived; the next day it was announced that Walters would accept the UN post even though it did not include an automatic seat on the NSC. The President's press secretary did announce, though, that the President had the "highest regard" for Walters and valued his counsel. (*New York Times*, March 27, 1985, p. A3.)
 45. *US News & World Report*, September 3, 1985, p. 29.
 46. *US News & World Report*, June 3, 1985, p. 13.

Walters' hits at stance of non-aligned

Lionel Barber

WASHINGTON

Non-Aligned countries were accused of "spite and envy" by General Vernon Walters, the outgoing US Ambassador to the United Nations. He said he had had more trouble in the world forum with the Non-Aligned Movement than with the Soviet Union or China.

Mr. Walters said anti-American "name calling" at the UN had subsided during his three-year term as US ambassador, but he added: "I am not an admirer of the Non Aligned Movement because it isn't non-aligned; it is heavily aligned against the US and the freedom-loving nations like Western Europe, with an enormous tendency to blame us for the troubles they brought upon themselves."

Mr. Walters praised Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, for contributing to a new spirit of superpower co-operation.

He said the improved relationship had made the UN "no business." He went on to describe recent UN peacekeeping successes in Afghanistan, Angola and the Gulf as "unprecedented."

The positive assessment by Mr. Walters, a veteran diplomat who first served under President Harry Truman, marked a shift from earlier hostile US views of the UN.

It also followed Mr. Gorbachev's speech to the General Assembly last month in which he called for an important role to be assumed by the world forum.

However, in an interview with the Associated Press released on his 72nd birthday, Mr. Walters said he remained disappointed

by the voting record of the 102-nation Non-Aligned Movement, dominated by developing and socialist nations.

Mr. Walters said the non-aligned nations voted against the US 80 per cent of the time, often out of spite and envy. "A great deal of the non-aligned vote against us for the sheer pleasure of doing it," he said. "It has nothing to do with their own national interest."

Mr. Walters, a former deputy head of the US Central Intelligence Agency, declined to name specific countries in the movement which includes Egypt and Pakistan (both large US aid beneficiaries), Cuba, India, Syria and Angola. Mr. Walters noted, however, that not all members were anti-American.

Last year a US report noted that the Non-Aligned Movement voted with the US 12.9 per cent of the time on average. China's vote coincided with the US position 13.3 per cent of the time, and the Soviet Union's 10.2 per cent.

Mr. Walters gave credit to Mr. Gorbachev for changing the style and content of Soviet foreign policy.

"In the old days, if we said it was 'black,' the Soviets said it was 'white,'" he observed. "That's no longer there and the possibility of playing off east against west has largely disappeared."

F.T.

Sri Lanka's...

(Continued from page 17)

actual violence, the electoral process, even though it may have been flawed in the percep-

tion of some, did in fact take its course, should be viewed positively".

A local observer group, People's Action for a Free and Fair Election (PAFFREL) consisting of a number of NGOs observed the poll in all twenty two districts. In an interim report it says that the group "analysed the possible impact of the general atmosphere of intimidation and the resultant low poll on the election result" and notes that it was difficult to draw any "incontrovertible conclusions regarding the probability of the outcome". However it has catalogued many "undesirable features" of the poll. A detailed report will be released by PAFFREL shortly.

These and other reports suggest that nobody can be absolutely certain what the result would have been if polling took place under normal conditions. However, neither do they suggest that the result was decisively influenced by electoral malpractices. Thus, the explanations for the outcome lie in political factors of which there are many.

(To be continued)

Notes

(I am grateful to K. M. de Silva, A. I. N. Ekansyake, Vidyareshi Samarasinghe and G. H. Peiris for their valuable comments on a draft of this paper. I also thank Deleni Gunewardene and Eranganie Wijeratne for assistance with the statistical computations, A. G. Seelawathie for preparing the map and Sepali Liyanamana for word processing the manuscript. All errors of course are mine.)

1. The electoral district of Vanni consists of Mannar (95), Mullaitivu (91) and Vavunia (92) electorates shown on the map.
2. When the results were officially announced by the Elections Commissioner he stated the representatives of the three candidates agreed to the result presumably on the basis that the failure to open the 49 booths in question would not have made any difference to the final result.

3. Island, December 12, 1988.

4. Ceylon Daily News, December 30, 1988.

* Walters visited Sri Lanka in Nov. 1984 to discuss militants and intelligence support requested by President Jayewardene.

Sumithra Pieris' 'Sagara Jalaya'

(Based on novel by Simon Navagattegama)

CINEMA

Navagattegama would not shock anyone with this portrayal of a desperately poor woman in the harsh Vanni. His 'Suddhilage Kathawa' was seen as an insult to Sinhala rural womanhood because of Suddhi's readiness to undress at the drop of a hat (even if degrading poverty was the cause). Her cavalier attitude towards sex in a rather conservative environment did not appear all that convincing.

'Sagara Jalaya' is a different film and is for several reasons better than 'Suddhilage Kathawa' even though both are about a woman left to fend for herself in dire straits in the miserably poor, dry jungle country of Vanni. Sumithra Pieris' film has been lifted out of the ordinary by the consummate artistry of Swarna Mallawarachchi's wonderful performance. She has proved herself to be about the best actress in the Sinhala film world, especially in very demanding situations. We have not had a better, a more searching, and such a finely etched character as the one Swarna attempts to portray here. She is supported extremely well by the small boy, who plays the role of her son. The girl, who is his cousin and punchiamma played by Saratchandra, are equally convincing.

Sumithra Peiris in directing this film has done a better job than her husband who produced 'Beddegama' sometime ago. I need not discuss Lester's film here as it has been analysed by Ian Goonatilake well enough. What must be mentioned here, however, is that Sumithra has been more fortunate in the choice of the central 'star'. On the other hand Ravindra Randeniya looks too well fed to be a convincing character in the Vanni, which is on the verge of desolation and hardly capable of sustaining a thriving human community of opulently well proportioned men and women. Randeniya's choice therefore is

the one mistake, and glaring enough not to be ignored, in an otherwise satisfying cast. Trillicia Gunawardena though cast in a minor role, looked more like the Vanni type, and so was the person acting as the Panikkiya.

We have had three films dealing with people in the semi-wild, poverty stricken environment of the dry zone. "Beddegama" was the first and "Suddhilage Kathawa" the second. They have explored three different aspects of life in surroundings which are unfamiliar to most. Yet because of a certain strangeness, these films have not only attracted some of the best talent in the film world, but also attracted large audiences. The fascination is probably akin to the one evinced in going to Yala or Wilpattu. But the authors of the stories in these films were really interested in the almost hopeless struggle of human beings caught in merciless demands of the climate, the jungle, poverty, and most of all the cruelty of human beings themselves in their interactions and relationships. Leonard Woolf in the 'Village in Jungle' was the first to explore the merciless struggle between the harsh environment and the scarcely civilised (almost animals) human beings in the dry Hambantota district. Lester's interpretation of the story in his film left much to be desired, and unfortunately it was not one of his best films even though a great deal of effort went into it.

The second was Navagattegama's 'Suddhilage Kathawa'. The community looked at in this film was not as primitive as the one dealt with by Woolf. This story was set in the kind of dry zone village we know. All the characters share the kind of values that are prevalent in poor village communities anywhere in the island. This is Navagattegama's own country, and he knows it in his bones.

But he was not very fortunate in the film interpretation. The director put greater emphasis on the sexual deviation that the woman exhibited, than on the delicate relationship between that and the surrounding poverty, exploitation, and the lowering of standards of human conduct when people are subjected to the stresses of poverty and deprivation.

The third of this trilogy on life in the dry zone has been ably handled by Sumithra Peiris. The main character, as I have already mentioned, finds superb expression in Swarna. In loneliness, in the company of her little son, (or the husband before his death), or in confrontations with the 'Punchiamma' or the 'Bappa' or 'Panikkiya', Swarna is the harassed woman caught in a world she thinks is working against her after her husband's death. She is unequal to the task of coping with wretched poverty and others' lack of sympathy for her. She is impatient with everyone. Delays hurt her as much sheer calculated insults and indifference. She is enraged by the way 'Punchiamma' (of the son) comes too late. She is also proud, even too proud to accept the kurakkan, when she believes that accepting it from the mudalali might lead to people misunderstanding her relations with him.

All this she depicts with unequalled art and with conviction. One is moved by her helplessness, and the way she builds up in her imagination a world that is seething with cruelty and indifference. When the mudalali assures her that everything would be looked after, she does not go into ecstasies. She is subtly moved by the man's assurances, yet retains the appearance of neglect. Swarna

(Continued on page 32)

An Anthology of Sri Lankan Poetry

Edited by Rajiva Wijesinghe

Published by the British Council

BOOK
REVIEW

The gem miners in Ratnapura do a better job when they, waist deep in the muddy waters of a gem pit take some soil with water in large shallow closely woven cane baskets, swirl the mixture (of clay gravel, and miscellaneous rubble, and hopefully gems) till one or two heavy dark stones are left at the bottom, and redeem them for closer scrutiny. Rajiva Wijesinghe is still to be seen waist deep in a muddy pit, leave alone wearing a native 'amude'. In his still laundry fresh liberal attire, he parades in the shadow of Bawan colonnades of the centre for British popular culture (I don't want to make Leavis gyrate in his grave) holding the Union Jack aloft and calling the untutored faithful natives to prayer and sermonising.

Anthologies serve only very limited purposes, and those purposes could not be narrower than in what is before us. Bringing together a few lines by nearly everyone who has written something in English defeats even the very narrow aims that the editor imposes on himself. This is a literary tourists guide to versification in this country, and tourists are often not the best of students. They are in hurry to savour the maximum at minimum cost in effort and money. So here we have ripe yellow bananas in baskets, fishermen on the beach, Buddhist priests in their bright yellow robes, bits of Anuradhapura statuary, a forlorn reservoir, a jungle scene from Yulu, and a waterfall. Like some clever guides, the pictures may even be of scantily attired brown women bathing, almost naked men ploughing, or a moon shedding its weak light on a dagoba.

We do not expect a serious anthologist to go about assemb-

ling all that has been attempted with a view to indicating the maximum scope and range, and in the rush missing on depth, in subject matter or styles or both. A more useful purpose would have been served if a few poets were selected for comment and placing. The resulting exercise would have been of great benefit to both the student and interested general reader, and for him to learn something about how some poets have sensitively reacted and responded to their unique environment, and how they have coped with the problem of presentation.

Going through this anthology, one is tempted to ask the Godfrey Goonetilleke question. Have they successfully broken the 'metaphorical barrier' if that is what has to be done to produce something uniquely Sri Lankan? Or are there other things to be looked at, or other criteria by which to judge if we have mastered the fusion of an alien language with our experience? I suspect there more things than just 'metaphor', and I say this with all due respect to Godfrey's skill in precise wording of his findings.

How do poets presented here cope with their multi-faceted, and often intractable problem of writing in English we hardly use with the confidence, force, and precision of a native of the British Isles, or U.S. and Canada or Australia (leave other countries alone for the time being)? Except for Lakdas Wickramasinghe about whom Rathuwegama has written very sensitively, there is hardly anyone here who has addressed himself or herself seriously to the key area of 'adaptation' (for want of a better word). For survival all beings or or-

gans or organizations must learn to adapt to circumstances in which they find themselves. Otherwise they perish. Very rarely could we alter our circumstances, and if we do that too only to a negligible extent. What is the capacity shown in the bulk of these poems for 'adaptation'. I fear, reared in a highly artificial environment, most of these poets have not shown any capacity or skill in this much needed faculty for survival. For the most part, the idiom is stilted, bookish, with echoes of favourite modern English or American poets. Poetry a la Lanka is the 'Ceylon Tea' kind of brew. The original leaf is plucked by Indian labour, processed in machinery perfected by the British, and exported largely by Borah merchants. Where do the local Sinhalese come in? May be they drive the bullock carts or lorries that transport the chests of the processed commodity from the estates to the port.

Rajiva Wijesinghe should know that a Sri Lankan anthologist owes it to the rest of poetry reading world to present not 100% what 001% of the local population cares to write and read, but to give an idea of what 90% of the population have access to in their own languages. Rajiva as the local Brahmin, with visiting Brahmins like Hulpe and Siriwardena, at the B.C. temple imagine that 99% of the local population are Brahmins like themselves, and care not whether they would understand the lingo of the sacred priesthood. The alarming fact is the rapid strides the 'temple' has made in gathering the dispersed faithful, and making them believe that they represent the entire country.

T. G.

Polls the future...

(Continued from page 13)

the layman's mind, the JVP is a radical Left party. It attracts the young left-wing radical and intellectual. The average JVP party worker is a believer in the radical transformation of society and its economic relations. These groups would have been the natural supporters and members of the LSSP and the CPSL 25 years ago. However fascistic or adventurist their strategy has been, it has eaten into the traditional Left support and recruitment base. It is useless to repeat *ad nauseam* that the JVP is fascist and not marxist, even though the JVP has systematically acted in a way which has strengthened the Right. The traditional Left has been unable to confront the JVP threat to its position in any successful way. There is no denying that the JVP grew at the cost of the traditional Left.

The traditional Left parties have been in the parliamentary game too long to change their ways substantially. The great 'Hartal' days and peoples action is beyond their capabilities now. Unfortunately, they cannot gain substantial representation in parliament where they may have been able to make a significant contribution. What then is left for the Left?

How best can the left perform its role in the future? It depends on a few important questions. For one, do the people of Sri Lanka want socialism? If the answer is in the negative, the problem is easily solved. The Left should wrap up its political activity and gradually cease. Their historical role is over. If on the other hand, socialism is still current coinage, then obviously the Left is now using a counterfeit, for, very few seem to be buying its programme. They need to radically alter their strategy. Discover the correct idiom to communicate with the people and use it systematically. The "sagathen palenavun" are

still there, but they speak and understand a different language. They do not dance any longer to the old tunes. Use a vehicle that the people trust and are familiar with.

The two-party game seems well entrenched now. The SLFP has moved to the Right with the left-inclined leaving it *on its own*. This was the great mistake. To my mind there is only one way left for the traditional Left. Reverse that trend. Move into the SLFP. Gradually and systematically radicalise the SLFP in the next decade. Offer the people a real alternative, and not what is available now.

Sumithra...

(Continued from page 30)

has caught the nuances of all the feelings a woman has when she is about to be offered some assistance at a price. She would not have him stay overnight in her hut when the mudalali brings for her the two bags of kurakkan late in the night. Then the venom with which she meets the mudalali's wife when the latter learns how her husband was secretly sympathetic towards her and comes to expose her, is done with convincing gusto and feeling.

This is Swarna's best film. Her capabilities have been given full freedom to develop.

Even in passing, mention must be made of the vital role of the two children, who seem to be much better than the two children seen in the recently telecast Illangaratne's 'Ambayaluwo'. These two children gave very convincing performances, and some of the subtleties of their innocent conversation were well exploited.

Tilak A. Gunawardhana

Sri Lanka's Health...

(Continued from page 18)

Sarvodaya's program for clean water supplies, sanitation and nutrition seem to meet requirements for a healthy lifestyle. It remains for widespread patterns of participatory democracy to make access to sufficient food a reality. In recent times statistics show that while wages increased three-fold, inflation increased fivefold leaving ordinary people forty percent less able to purchase goods. Stockwin has noted that with a pattern of multinational development "a country inherently capable of feeding itself has been subsidized into being dependent on imports".

Grassroots participatory democracy has the potential for bringing health to the entire earth by correcting economic, social and political 'misbehaviors' of unequal access. In Sri Lanka, PIDA, TCCS, FFHC, Sarvodaya, CAP and also others, e.g. ARTI, have already begun the process of change from the gigantic megalith of destructive top-down programs. They have made one step toward the constructive processes of participatory democracy. The ecological goal of healthy people on a healthy planet is the next logical step.

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