

LANKA

# GUARDIAN


Vol. 7 No. 12

October 15, 1984

Price Rs. 3/50

Registered at the GPO, Sri Lanka QJ/75/N/83

## THE HOPPER REPORT



### Play it again, Dave !

**SWRD thought : How relevant today ?**

— Maitripala Senanayake

**Post '77 performance in the agricultural sector**

— N. Shanmugaratnam

**Israel's targets in the Third World** — Jan Pieterse

**American Labour movements** — Gail Omvedt and Bharat Patanker



**EX-STOCK SUPPLIERS  
FOR ALL**

**TUNNELING, MINING, MARINE,  
WATER SUPPLY, AGRICULTURAL,  
CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT & ACCESSORIES**

**EQUIPMENT & CONSTRUCTION Co. LTD.**

**7, CANAL ROW, P. O. BOX 818  
COLOMBO I.**

**PHONE : 3 2 1 1 3 - 2 3 0 5 4**

**TELEX : 21385 GOPAL**

**MUSLIM DE-LINKING**

The Moslem community is the neglected child of Sri Lanka political science. Recognising this deficiency in the studies undertaken by both local academics and the established parties, the LG has tried to focus the attention of its readers on the new currents of thinking within this community and the political significance of this trend.

Last week the All-Ceylon Muslim League endorsed unanimously the resolution adopted by its working Committee which condemned the opening of the Israeli interests section. But the more important issue was not resolved. Influential groups within ACML want the organisation to declare itself as an independent political party and gain legal recognition for that new status from the Elections Commissioner. But another group, pro-UNP succeeded in buying time with a compromise move to have the matter reconsidered by the Working Committee.

The pressures of the present ethnic conflict, primarily a Sinhala-Tamil issue, have forced the Muslim community to recognise the urgent need to protect its own special interests. To do so, it must have a politically independent instrument — a political party which is not affiliated or even vaguely linked to any other party.

The Islamic Socialist Front was Dr. Badi-ud-din Mahmud's SLP reply to Dr. M. C. M. Kaleel's All-Ceylon Muslim League. Dr. Kaleel has been the treasurer of the UNP for years. The ISF is moribund, if not altogether dead. The Muslim community now wants to say "a plague on both your houses".

But because the status of an independent political party or formal de-linking will be a nett loss — and a large one — to the UNP, party loyalists have launched a rear-guard action. Their defect or a split in the ACML seems likely if the Israeli issue remains a lively political question. The visible difference in the way the Muslim audience recieved ex-Speaker Baker Markar and Minister

M. H. Mohammed at the meeting to honour the late Sir Razik Fareed was a pointer also to the conflicting trends within the pro-UNP Muslim constituency.

**DEFENCE-ORIENTED**

Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel left the island to address the prestigious "European Management Forum" at Davos with a melancholy eve-of-departure message. When he returns he will get down to work on a budget which will have to be very sparing in disbursing funds to many ministries, including the development programmes, that come under some ministries. The reason? "There will be an increase in defence spending... but I will try very hard not to impose burdens on the ordinary man".

**NEW OFFENSIVE**

On the same front-page of the SUN which announces a 'defence-oriented budget' is an interesting item by two of the paper's investigative reporters. Malaria has opened a new front and the defences of the Mahaveli settlers, stricken by this disease, are down because the health authorities are short of funds to purchase slides. While the numbers of Dry Zone families attacked by a disease once regarded as totally eliminated are "swelled by settler families from the Mahaveli programme" officials of the anti-malaria campaign complain that they must be content with "guesstimates" for lack of the equipment necessary to carry out tests.

**Immense contribution**

I congratulate you on your success in providing a forum of informed opinion on political and cultural issues in Sri Lanka. In publishing articles such as Gananath Obeyesekera's recent analysis of political violence, *Lanka Guardian* makes an immense contribution to the preservation of democracy.

**Dr. Les Hiatt**  
Reader in Anthropology  
University of Sydney

**Seeming paradox**

N. Shanmugathan writes (LG 1 Oct.) that Section 29(2) was one of three safeguards the Soulbury constitution provided (the other two being the Senate and the PSC). He goes on to say that the "passing of the Sinhala Only act in 1956 clearly violated Section 29(2)" and adds "the Tamils could do nothing". He should explain whyever not. Either 29(2) was a safeguard as Mr. S. claims, in which case the 1956 act could have been challenged in the courts right up to the Privy Council, or it was not a safeguard, in which case there need not be all this fuss about it being omitted in the 1972 constitution. It is time a senior Tamil spokesman (like Mr.S) ventured to explain this seeming paradox.

**S. Jayasinha**  
Colombo 4.

**LANKA  
GUARDIAN**

Vol. 7 No. 12, October 15, 1984  
**Price 3/50**

**Published fortnightly by  
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.**  
No. 246, Union Place,  
COLOMBO-2.

Editor: **Mervyn de Silva**  
Telephone: 5 4 7 5 8 4

**CONTENTS**

Letters	2
News Background	3
Bandaranaike — his relevance today	7
Aid Group Meeting	10
Economic policy and Agriculture — (2)	14
U. S. Report — (2)	18
Israel's Role in Third World — (3)	20
In memoriam : Ghassan Kanafani	23

Printed by **Ananda Press,**  
82/5, Wolfendhal Street, Colombo 13.  
Telephone: 3 5 9 7 5

## **[Syndrome, not disease]**

Considering [the vast [array] of unassailable facts Kumari Jayawardena has marshalled in her sustained onslaught on the Sinhala Buddhists it is indeed remarkable how little truth there is in her thesis. If I understand her at all her thesis is that all ethnic conflict in this country over the last century has been the result of some inherent vice in the Sinhala Buddhists, either genetic or cultural. This is greatly absurd.

Ms. Jayawardena should know that for the (almost) 150 years of British occupation, and even a considerable period after that, Buddhists in this country were non-persons. Indeed, for much of that time it was not possible, in decent company, to admit to being a Buddhist without causing acute embarrassment to everybody present. It was not unlike breaking wind in front of the ladies. All those manifestations, of what Ms. J calls "chauvinism" were caused by the efforts made (some perhaps ill-conceived some even crude) from time to time by individual Buddhist leaders to raise the Buddhists up from this social abyss by building up their self-respect.

Although professional do-gooders like Virginia Leary could after a flying visit write with insouciant confidence: "The British maintained a neutral position with regard to the ethnic groups", the Sinhala Buddhists never had a state recognised school till as recently as 98 years ago when they succeeded in getting the Board of Education to recognise 1 Buddhist bilingual school and 11 "vernacular" schools as against the already existing (well over) 1100 state assisted Christian schools. (I speak of the Sinhala Buddhists as an ethnic group because 94% of the Sinhala people are Buddhists.) If Ms. J with her obvious talent for collecting facts, were to take the trouble to study the position of the Buddhists in this country even today she will find that the causes for

what she calls "Buddhist chauvinism" are still very much present. The "chauvinism" is the syndrome not the disease.

One final point. Ms. J is quite definitely wrong when she says that the 1972 constitution changed "the earlier secular nature of the state". On the contrary, both the 1972 and the 1978 constitutions merely reproduced the constitutional position that had existed since 1815. Article 5 of the Kandyan Convention read as follows:

The religion of Budhoo, professed by the chiefs and inhabitants of these provinces, is declared inviolable, and its rights, ministers and places of worship are to be maintained and protected.

That the British were not happy about this special position they had been obliged to accord to Buddhism which was not given to any other religion was made clear, when, following the 1818 uprising of Keppetipola, the governor took the opportunity to replace the Convention with a Proclamation dated 21 November 1818, which John Davy describes as "a new constitution". In the Proclamation Brownrigg thought it prudent to lay down that the special position given to Buddhism did not mean that other religions would not be protected by the government. Article 16 of the Proclamation was as follows:

As well the priests as all the ceremonies and processions of the Budhho religion, shall receive the respect in which in former times was shown them; at the same time, it is in no wise to be understood, that the protection of the government is to be denied to the peaceable exercise by all other persons, of the religion which they res-

pectively profess, or to the erection, under due licence from His Excellency, of places of worship in proper situations.

Ms. J should explain in what way the present constitutional position differs from this. No one can blame Ms. J for her total lack of empathy for the Buddhists who form 70% of the population of the country. Such things are not volitional. But anyone who comes forward as a didactic and censorious critic of the track record of one single ethnic group is morally obliged to tell the truth in the round.

**S. Wirasekera**

Nugegoda

## **Pseudonyms and Media**

Whether it be in the Tripitaka, the Jataka Stories, the Bible, the Gita, the Sigiriya Graffiti or in our own newspapers, it is the message and not its authorship that has been of first concern to the recipient public. Thus even from early times the communicator was possessed of a representative character. He was part of a communitarian communication's tradition with a combined role of prophet and annalist. Anonymity though has inconsequential aspect in this important role was nevertheless symbolic of its communitarian dimension.

The massification of modern media has only heightened these prophetic and representative roles. It is not merely production circulation and consumption that have given a 'mass' character to social communications. There has also been an updated massification of the above mentioned roles as watchdog of the public life and as voice and animator of the masses. This is well summed up in the Belo Horizonte document of 1981 when it describes media persons as craftsmen of news and interpreters of social cultural and economic events in a country.

(Continued on page 17)

# THE BY-ELECTION TRANQUILLISER

Mervyn de Silva

**T**he by-elections at Minneriya and Kundasale should be seen as a cautious, attempt by an embattled UNP to give a Vitamin (B) shot of 'democracy' to the body politic while trying at the same time to tranquillise a restive electorate.

Needless to add, Minneriya and Kundasale were both hand-picked with care and calculation. For there has been no lack of opportunities to hold by-elections in many other constituencies. <sup>5</sup> Ambalangoda for, example.

The UNP knew — and so did most people — that it had a pretty good chance of carrying both constituencies. Especially in a three-cornered contest, the perennial dream of all Sri-Kotha election strategists.

If these two by-elections have some political significance it has not much to do with UNP's motives and strategies. The real importance of the result will rest on the comparative performance of the SLFP and its rebellious off-spring, SLMP. After Mrs. Bandaranaike's long entrenched dominance was cleverly undermined by the UNP's unparalleled act of political revenge in 1980, the SLFP's strong-willed leader was reduced to what she called "a kallathoni status". The party was then riven by differences that were not merely policy or personality conflicts but squabbles in a family totally identified with the party from its inception. This last fact is now dramatised by the presence of Mrs. Bandaranaike's son-in-law and SLMP general secretary as a candidate at Minneriya. So the question whether those conflicts within the family will be resolved sooner or later will remain important whatever the polls performance of the two rivals.

More significant however is the object of this rivalry. When Messrs Ilangaratne, Kumaratunge, Kularatne, Udagama etc were joined by Chand-

rika, political observers, recognising that this was no "lunatic fringe" organisation (Anura's contemptuous description), greeted the emergence of "a Third Force". Traditionally, the Old Left (LSSP, CP and MEP) and then the JVP, has played that role vis-a-vis the major competitors, the UNP and SLFP. Chandrika's reaction to that interpretation was dismissed by the SLFP as a haughty retort: "We are not trying to be a Third Force; **We are the Second Force**" she said.

It is this claim that will be tested at the polls. If the S. L. M. P. even comes second in both, the boast would be shown as far from empty. What if Vijay comes second at Minneriya? In that event too, the S. L. M. P. would have scored a major psychological victory. With much conviction, the S. L. F. P. has styled itself as a party which has a strong rural base, drawing very special strength from the rural middle-class and its articulate spokesman the Sinhala-Buddhist intelligentsia. The S. L. F. P., confronted by a new challenger, was inclined, perhaps too eagerly, to dismiss the S. L. M. P.'s extraordinary May Day performance as a one-shot triumph and its other displays of bouyancy, as likely to be short-lived successes. More thoughtful SLFP'ers however took the threat seriously and were ready to admit, at least in private, that the S. L. M. P. appeared to have an unusually attractive appeal for a new generational group — the hybrid sociological product of both the JVP (if not ideologically so leftist) and the UNP's post-1977 "open economy", the new values and life-styles of a consumerist society. A special report by a LG staff writer identified this outlook as that which belonged to "a JVP-dissident Premadasa constituency."

Will the S. L. M. P.'s base remain essentially urban and semi-urban? If so, its parent party, the S. L. F. P.

would have no great cause for anxiety. The path to parliament starts from the countryside in this predominantly agricultural country. The new party was, likely to make only minor inroads to the Freedom party's traditional support base. The super-star personality of Mr. Kumaratunge reinforced such arguments.

The Maitri-CP de Silva combination made the NCP an SLFP stronghold. Only in 1977 did the UNP take this province by storm. Mr. C. P. de Silva's support didn't do the UNP any good in 1970. It is not for nothing then that Vijaya has decided to take his chances at Minneriya. But it is not only a test of the S. L. F. P.'s claims to superiority in the rural areas. It may also tell us how far the sweeping changes of 'the open economy' and the accompanying social consequences have affected the countryside, **particularly the attitudes of the rural youth.**

A good 'second' by Vijaya will not only indicate an altered balance of forces within the Opposition but compel serious students of politics to turn a more searching eye on the impact of post-1977 life-styles on rural youth.

The UNP is in an apparently "no loss" situation. The closer the competition between the two rivals the better. But what in normal circumstances would be sound tactics could prove otherwise. The by-elections expose the differences within the UNP heirarchy, differences that are sharpening under the pressures of both the current crisis as well as the emerging succession in-fights.

This may cheat the UNP of these advantages anticipated by its long-term game-plan. Give the electorate the illusion of a full restoration of democracy, encourage the Opposition's hopes of success at the next elections, promote in the meantime Opposition feuds, and then use the full resources of the State machine, Referendum-style, to perpetuate UNP rule.

# Clergy and Monaragala peasants' struggle

**W**ith the news that a delegation of high-ranking monks and Christian priests, including some Tamil clergymen, will visit India on a "peace mission" in which they hope to 'open a dialogue' with Tamil expatriate groups, comes also an appeal to the people of Sri Lanka. The statement concerns the transfer of lands in the Monaragala district to three multinationals. (The LG has published two articles on this question on August 15 and September 1).

The impressive list of signatories include 35 monks, 10 Catholic and Anglican priests and nuns, prominent politicians like Mr. Dinesh Gunawardena MP, Mr. Vijay Kumaratunge, (SLMP) Mr. Bernard Soysa (LSSP) and Mr. K. P. Silva (CP), several trade unionists, representatives of peasants organisations and well known academics such as Prof. Sarachachandra, Prof. Carlo Fonseka Prof. Kumari Jayawardena and Prof. Wiswa Warnapala.

The monks represent influential organisations like the Sri Lanka Bauddha Maha Sammelanaya and the Sri Lanka Buddhist Congress.

It is not only this "alliance" of the clergy of different faiths which makes the appeal noteworthy but the nature of the issue and the content of the appeal.

**It says: "By arranging for the destruction of both the village and the temple, the damage caused to the cornerstone of the traditional religious way of life to the peasantry is immense. Not only that. Hotels and holiday resorts for the rest and recreation of the foreigners will make their entrance. The havoc caused by the destruction of culture, evident in areas dominated by foreign companies and around tourist hotels, will visit this area too".**

54,000 acres of farmer's land will have to be given to the cultivation of sugar cane, and 30,000 acres will be allotted to three foreign firms: Bookers International (UK), Nakkala Sugar (HVA, DUTCH) and Mehta Int. Co. (Indian-African)

who are major share-holders of this first important essay in agri-business.

## The signatories:

Ven. Maduluwawe Sobitha Thero — Sinhala Bala Mandalaya; Ven. Murutethetawa Ananda Thero — Govt. Nurses Union; Ven. Diviyagaha Yassassi Thero — Sri Lanka Buddhist Congress; Ven. Induruwa Sumanasara Thero — Trustee Buddhist Research Centre; Ven. Bosselle Dharmawasa Thero — Sri Lanka Bauddha Maha Sammelanaya; Ven. Athureliya Indrarakshe Thero — Sasanarakshe Mandalaya, Matara District; Ven. Wahakula Sri Indrasara Thero — Chief Sanganayaka Siyana and Pitigala Koreles; Ven. Daramitipola Ratnasara Thero — Pavid Handa (Voice of the Clergy); Ven. Pitawala Dhammakiththi Thero — Manawa Hithawaddi Bikshu Sanvidanaya; Ven. Hokandara Sri Wimalanayakke Thero — Deputy Sanganayake Hewagama Korale; Ven. Wellawaththe Ganabiwansa Thero — Jathika Jala Baddu Virodhi Sanvidanaya; Ven. Madampagama Assagi Thero — Sri Lanka Mahajana Pavid Sanvidanaya; Ven. Labuduwe Sri Dhama Thero — Rajopavanaramaya; Ven. Aththidiya Dammasiri Thero — Siri Parakumba Pirivena; Ven. Vetharandeniya Chandrajothi Thero — Sri Sambuddhaloka Viharaya; Ven. Puwakgaha kotuwa Seelaratne Thero — Vidyalankara Pirivena; Ven. Gonaduwe Pangnalankara Thero — Purwarmaya; Ven. Kirimatiyawa Pangnasagara Thero — Vidyasagara Pirivena; Ven. Panditha Illambe Dhammalankara Thero — Vidyaratne Pirivena; Ven. Bhuddiyagama Dhammasiri Thero — Naigala Rajamaha Viharaya; Ven. Madagame Vajira Gname Thero — Piriven Teachers College; Ven. Bellanvila Wimalaratne Thero — Sri Jayawardenapura University; Ven. Kevitiyagala Dhammasiddi Nahimi — Ratnaramaya; Ven. Mandawala Pangnaratane Thero — Nagendraramaya; Ven. Bandagiriye Medananda Thero — Nugegoda; Ven. Kamburupitiya Nandaratan Thero — Inspector of Pirivenas; Ven. Ithtapan Dhammalankara Thero — Pannipitiya; Ven. Gigummaduwa Anoma Thero — Siri Mangalaramaya; Ven. Niwanthidiya Ananda Thero — Valukaramaya; Ven. Kavsigamuwe Rewatha Thero — Ganeyaya Temple; Ven. Welimada Dhammagevesi Thero — Vidyasagara Pirivena; Ven. Mandawela Pangnawansa Thero — Gothami Temple; Ven. K. Vajirawansa Nahimi — Sri Dhammaddinaramaya; Ven. Thelwathe Nagitha Thero — Gothami Temple; Ven. Karambe Gunanand Thero — Sri Nagala Raja maha Viharaya; Ven. B. Chandraratne Thero — Kahadawa ancient temple; Rev. fr. Yohan Devananda — Devasarana Development centre; Rev. fr. Paul Casperz — Sathyodaya; Rev. fr. Lakeshman Peries Holy Emmanuel Church; Rev. fr. S. K. Perera — President Sri Lanka Methodist Church; Rev. fr. Earnest Poruthota; Rev. Swami Premathmananda — Rama Krishna Mission; Rev. fr. Shelton de Silva — Kollupitiya; Rev. fr. Tissa Balasuriya — Centre for Society and Religion; Rev. Sis Maud. Superior Order of the apostelic Carmels; Rev. Sis Josephine — Superior Order of the Holy Family;

Kularatne Wickremasingha — All Ceylon Peasants Congress; V. A. Samarawickrema — Sri Lanka National Peasants Congress; G. H. Podi Appuhamy — Govi Jana Maha Sabhawa; John Edissuriya — Govi Jana Sammelanaya; Athawuda Seneviratne — Sri Lanka Agricultural Workers Union; D. D. Perera — Sri Lanka Mahajana Govi Sammelanaya; Y. P. de Silva — Sri Lanka Mahajana Trade Union Federation; Ranath Kumarasingha — United Labour Federation B. Henry — Ceylon Trade Union Federation; G. Amaradiwakara — Local Government Trade Union Federation; P. D. Wimalasena — Government Trade Union Federation; George Perera — Ceylon Federation of Labour; Wilbert Aththuduwa — Sri Lanka Independent Trade Union Federation; L. W. Punditha — Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions; H. N. Fernando — Ceylon Teachers Union; Poulter Gunawardene — Sri Lanka Jathika Guru Sangamaya; Gunasena Mahanama — Govt. Clerical Servants Union; J. D. Silva — Wurthiya Eksath Kirime Comituwa; Jayarathne Maliyagoda — Lanka Podu Sevaka Sangamaya; V. L. Pereira — Workers-Peasant Liberation Front; Leela Ferdinands — Karmika Prawahana saha Podu Kamkaru Sangamaya; E. M. Bandara Manika — Progressive Womens Front; Manori Muththetuwegama — Sri Lanka Womens Front; Kumuduni Rosa — Womens Centre; Rose Fernando — Centre for Peoples Education; Chandrika Kumaratunga — Sri Lanka Mahajana Womens Organisation; Sunila Abeysekera — Media and Women Group; Upali Jayaweera — Anthar Vishva Vidyala Sishya Bala Mandalaya (Inter University Students joint Committee); Ven. Welhena Dammasiri Thero — Sri Lanka Mahajana Student Organisation; Nihal Senevirathne — Samajawaddi Sishya Sammelanaya (Socialist Student Federation); Wasantha Somarathne — Lanka Sishya Sammelanaya (Lanka Students Federation); W. A. Jayantha — Lanka Jathika Sishya Sammelanaya; Janaka Ranepura — Sri Lanka Sishya Sammelanaya; Nimal Karunasiri — Sishya Subasadaka Sangamaya (Students Welfare Society); S. G. Punchihewa — Movement for the Defence of Democratic Rights; Susil G. Seneviratne — Worker-Peasant Institute; Bala Krishnan — Ceylon Social Institute; M. B. A. Tennekoone — Smastha Lanka Sanskruthika Peramuna; Jeffry Abeysekera — Christian Wokers Fellowship; Dayaratne Ranepura — Samajavadi Kavi Perumana; Nandana Marasingha — Janatha Sanskruthika kendraya; P. Malalgoda — Samastha Lanka Sinhala Kavi Sammelanaya; Bernard Soysa — Lanka Samasamaja Party; Vijaya Kumaratunge — Sri Lanka Mahajana Party; N. Sanmugathan — Ceylon Communist Party; Dinesh Gunawardena — Mahajana Eksath Peramuna; K. P. Silva — Sri Lanka Communist Party; Kuliypitiya Prenanda — Prajathanthravadi Janatha Peramuna; Wasantha Disanayakke — Janatha Sangamaya; T. N. Perera — Revolutionary Marxist Party; Stanley Wimalasiri de Silva — Socialist Workers; K. Thiranagama — Nava Lanka Communist Party; Ossie Abeygunasekera — Sri Lanka Mahajana

(Continued on Page 5)

# ARAB PRESSURES

**M**r. M. H. Mohammed's mission to Saudi Arabia has been a success, government sources told the press. Saudi Arabia, the main financier of the Maduru Oya development program, was expected to release funds in June-July this year but delayed doing so when the Israeli interests section was established. According to Mr. Mohammed, who handed over to King Fahd a letter from President Jayewardene, Sri Lanka's assurances that the Israeli interests section will not be expanded nor its diplomatic status raised have been accepted by the Saudi authorities.

However Arab responses to the Israeli issue remain unclear and uncertain.

A Colombo employment agency recently received the following telex from its principals in Dubai, the ISLAND reported:

**"Very much regret to inform you because of Israeli support**

**to Sri Lanka government, KUWAIT has stopped pro tem issue of work visas to Sri Lankan nationals"**.

Kuwait, which boasts the highest per capita income in the world, pays the best wages. A disillusioned job seeker who had been offered work in Kuwait, Mr. P. K. S. de Silva told the paper I spent several anxious months awaiting employment in Kuwait. Now all the effort is in vain. Will other Middle East countries do the same?

Another executive of an job agency in Colombo whose "line" is Libya to which country he sends skilled workers told the L. G. that he had 94 waiting for visas but there has been "unusually long delay" in receiving a reply from Tripoli.

Arab attitudes to the question of Sri Lankan migrant workers and connected issues will become much clearer with the visit to Colombo of the Arab League's Secretary-General Dr. Klibi. According to PLO sources, Dr. Klibi has planned to visit Sri Lanka this month.

## Clergy and . . .

(Continued from page 4)

Party Youth Federation; Jayasoma Wijayathilake — Sri Lanka Communist Youth League; Ediriweera Sarathchandra; Pro. Carlo Fonseka; Dr. Mrs. Kumari Jayawardene; Dr. Nalin de Silva; T. W. Rajarathnam — Retired Supreme Court Judge; Karunasena Jayalath; Ariyawansa Pathiraja; Gunasena Vithana; Prince Rajasuriya — Mirje; Monaragala Govi Jana Sahayogitha Kammituwa; Solidarity Committee for the Peasants of Monaragala; W. A. Wiswa Warnapala — Asst. professor University of Peradeniya; V. Kanapathipillai — Lecturer, University of Peradeniya; B. Gajameragedera — Lecturer University of Peradeniya; M. Sinnathamby — University of Peradeniya; Gamini Samaranyakke — Lecturer University of Peradeniya; Ven. Dr. Ariyasena Thero — Lecturer University of Peradeniya; P. Wickremasekera — Senior Lecturer University of Peradeniya; L. Dias Hewagama — Senior Lecturer University of peradeniya; S. Liyanage — Lecturer University of Peradeniya; W. Senanayakke — Lecturer — University of Peradeniya.

## FOR WELL OVER A HALF A CENTURY ARISTONS HAVE BUILT UP

GLOBAL REPUTATION IN THE FIELD OF EXPORTS AS WELL AS IMPORTS  
ARISTONS HAVE OPENED OUT NEW VISTAS IN NON-TRADITIONAL  
EXPORTS IN AN ENDEAVOUR TO CONTRIBUTING FOR NATIONAL GROWTH

HEAD OFFICE

## ARISTONS LTD.

5, Gower Street  
Colombo 5.


**ARISTONS TOURS**  
No. 5, Gower Street,  
COLOMBO 5.

**EXPORT DEPARTMENT**  
140, Front Street,  
COLOMBO 11.

Phone: 588436, 82102, 81036

Cables: 'TURNTIDE'

Telex: 21302 RUWANI



**if  
there's  
a will  
there's  
a way!**

Guided by nature's strange powers, he weaves and weaves a nest so perfect in craftsmanship. The Baya weaver or as we know the Wadu Kurulla builds his home with sheer determination, limitless patience and unswerving courage. It is his 'home sweet home' — a place of his own. Today in Sri Lanka it is building time. And everyone of us could now yearn realistically to achieve that ideal — a home of our own. We at the Building Materials Corporation are with you all the way, serving you to make your dream home — a reality.



**Building Materials Corporation**

192/10, Srimath Bandaranaike Mawatha, Colombo.

Phoenix



# Bandaranaike — his relevance today

Maitripala Senanayake

SRI Lanka is now undergoing a period of social and political turmoil, and this national crisis, the impact of which has penetrated all institutions and values of the people of the country, is contextually the most appropriate occasion to examine the relevance of the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on this occasion of the 25th anniversary of his death. Bandaranaike gave birth to a new era, the chief feature of which was the emergence of the common man of the country. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, as the exponent of a new tradition in the politics of Sri Lanka, initiated political reforms with a view to generating a political awareness in the minds of the rural people, and thereby getting the rural people to play the leading role in the political life of the country. Franchise become meaningful to the rural people only after they were socialised into the political process by Bandaranaike. In this respect, Bandaranaike paved the road for the emergence of the common man, whose lot he wanted to improve in order to accelerate the process of social and economic change. He viewed Sri Lanka in terms of the aspirations of the rural masses who suffered under the colonial rule for several centuries. The economic and social changes, which came to be produced as a result of the ideology of Bandaranaike, have now been reversed by a regime committed to total dependency on foreign capital and neo-colonialism. The country, in the last seven years, witnessed a process of change induced by the interests of foreign capital, and the chief feature of which was the complete reversal of policies, strategies, values and attitudes of the people, for which the late Bandaranaike, with vision and dedication, gave his blessings nearly twenty five years ago.

Bandaranaike's political ideology, which later came to be dubbed as

'middle way politics', derived inspiration from the nationalist ideology, the hall-mark of which was the commitment to maintain a link with the historical past of the country. Historical tradition of Sri Lanka inspired him to devise a political strategy capable of enthusing the rural people. It was his commitment to traditions of the country and the recognition of their impact in the political life of the country that encouraged him to provide leadership to a political movement that aimed at the restoration of language, religion and culture of the island. This, in his view, was the appropriate political strategy with which he wanted to inspire the down-trodden rural masses, and the cultural symbols were used to inaugurate a new era for the common folk of the country, and the impact of these cultural symbols had an effect on the subsequent process of political and social change which the country witnessed after the political watershed of 1956. Certain groups of politicians and academicians have been trying their best to discount the importance of the change of 1956 but its impact is still a force in the minds of the rural masses. The reversal of the process inaugurated in 1956, which came with the victory of the UNP in 1977, brought into existence a new political trend aimed at the de-politicisation of the rural masses.

## Retrogressive

De-politicisation is a retrogressive trend in a democratic polity and such processes eventually results in dictatorial styles of Government. The emergence of the common man, to which Bandaranaike provided leadership with the numerous social and economic changes which emancipated the common man from various economic and social bondages, was resented by the champions of elitist politics and the elitist social forces whose only desire was to

September 20 was the twenty fifth anniversary of the assassination of Mr S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. This article, a contribution to the commemoration ceremonies was written by Mr. Maitripala Senanayake, Minister of Trade and Industry in the S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike government and Minister of Irrigation and Power in the Sirima Bandaranaike government.

reverse the process. Today one can see that several fundamental changes have been made to de-politicise the masses; the legislative process is now an elitist process alienated and divorced from the mass base of politics in the country. In the electoral changes, we do not see an uniform pattern and the 'chit system' and by-elections represent a characteristic feature that cannot inspire confidence in the voting population of the country. It was S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who led a consistent struggle in the Sri Lankan legislature to modernise the electoral process with a view to making the franchise meaningful to them and he, as the Minister of Local Government, wanted the abolition of the 'coloured ballot boxes' system in 1946. He wanted to modernise the electoral laws and procedures because he, rather perceptively, saw a linkage between electoral modernisation and electoral participation; in other words, the improved electoral procedures encouraged the involvement of the rural people in the political process of the country. The appointment of the Select Committee on Election Law and Practice in 1958 represented a landmark in the modernisation of the electoral process in Sri Lanka and the recommendations of this Committee, including the reduction of the voting age to 18, made a series of changes aimed at the modernisation of the electoral process. It was under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike that the youths — persons of 18 years of age — received the right to vote and thereby to get themselves involved in the elections of the country. Today the youths represent a vital segment of the Sri Lankan electorate and they, however, forget the fact that certain political parties which seek their support by drawing them into

various political tamashas were at the forefront of the struggle to prevent the youths from obtaining the right to vote at the age of 18.

The ideology of Bandaranaike was to provide means and channels for the total political involvement of the rural masses, and it was the 'ballot box' process which he recognised as the proper means to achieve political power. He, therefore, expected the game of politics to be played in the form of a clean democratic game and he, unlike the theorists and practitioners of the 'five star democracy', did not envisage the robbery of ballot boxes. The latest amendment to the Parliamentary Elections Law, which recognised the possibility of the loss of ballot boxes at an election, is a complete negation of representative government based on the concept of the free vote. No liberal democratic politician of the calibre of Bandaranaike, who valued the free citizen, would ever agree to such a draconian and Machiavellian piece of legislation, the sole purpose of which is to devalue the fundamental aspect of parliamentary democracy.

### Village Committees

The abolition of the Village Committees, which, as a nascent democratic institution that flourished in the island from times immemorial, was yet another achievement of this Government, and this again was a breakaway from the democratic tradition of the country, preservation of which was one of the chief characteristics of the late Bandaranaike. It was S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who converted the Village Committees as elected democratic bodies capable of undertaking the improvement of the villages. They, in addition to their role as popular institutions in charge of minor works of rural development, brought about a qualitative change in the democratic process at the village level and afforded numerous opportunities to the people to emerge as leaders. These Village Committees, as an unit of representative government in an underdeveloped polity, acted as a spring-board to national political leadership; most of our leading politicians used such local governmental institutions to carve out areas of political influence.

It was Bandaranaike who opened this door to the rural leaders to emerge as national leaders, and this made a great contribution to the national political leadership in the country. Such democratic institutions are a sign of a competitive political system and they provided opportunities to people to get themselves involved in the participatory forms of democratic government and Bandaranaike valued this process as a manifest need of a democratic society. He, recognising the importance of village development through such democratic units of government and considering their importance as organs capable of making and grooming leaders, organised the Annual Conference of Village Committee chairmen, and he was able to keep himself informed of the process of village development through this Conference. Today this important unit of government, which was based on an ancient democratic tradition of the country, has been abolished giving way to a non-elected village institutions which, in view, is only an appendage of the party in power. This new organisation at the village level, about which there is plenty of glib talk in the country, is not an institution which derives power from the people. This shows that this Government, as the late Bandaranaike stated at the Village Committee Conference in September, 1953 referring to a previous UNP regime, has completely failed to grasp the fundamental fact that local government is the very foundation and basis of any democratic system of government'. Bandaranaike resolutely defended and protected this foundation of democratic government in Sri Lanka; equally he modernised to suit the changing pattern of society in a developing country and this too was a contribution to the process of democratisation of the politics of Sri Lanka.

Bandaranaike, as he stated in July, 1951 in parliament, was compelled to form his own political party because he was truly inspired by an urge to serve the people of his own country to the best of his ability. He organised and built the political party — the Sri Lanka Freedom Party — on the basis of accepted norms of party government and even when the party came to enjoy

power, he, unlike the present day champions of the 'five star democracy', did not make the party apparatus a repressive organ of political power. He allowed the party to move into the legitimate areas of power and thereby the good traditions of party government were allowed to operate during his period of leadership. He therefore was a true politician of the great democratic parliamentary tradition. In other words, he did not get his party organisations and branches to terrorise people, intimidate voters at free elections and break rallies and meetings of the Opposition parties. The party apparatus, during his period of office, played a policy-advisory role, and acted more in the nature of a democratic political party which was prepared to accept the un-intimidated verdict of the people.

### Political Thuggery

Bandaranaike never wanted to convert his political party into an organised source of political thuggery and intimidation; it was the same with his trade unions. He only envisaged his party to be a democratic alternative political party of capturing political power with a view to serving the people. Today political thuggery and intimidation have become a way of life, and they take place with the blessings of those in power. Trade unions, though he encouraged and modernised as necessary instruments of democratic government, were not allowed to operate as extra-parliamentary organisations of political intimidation of the party in power. Trade union organisations, instead of playing their legitimate role as associations intended to defend and protect workers rights, are organisations engaged in political intimidation through the use of repressive political tactics. This applies to the trade unions affiliated to the party in power. Bandaranaike condemned all manifestation of political violence; he never relied on private armies consisting of political thugs and also did not place reliance on political violence as a means to achieve political objective. He never made use of political violence to muzzle the opposition. Legitimate channels, both inside and outside Parliament, were used to fight the Opposition

and this quality of his attachment to accepted norms and traditions of parliamentary government helped in the growth of a competitive political tradition which the emergence of the strong-arm political tactics currently employed by the people in power, has been destroyed to the utter disappointment of those democratically-minded people who value cherish democracy as the best form of government. One has to carefully examine the purpose of the new political trends in order to understand the relevance Bandaranaike, especially those intimidatory political tactics aimed at the de-stabilisation of the strongest alternative political party (SLFP) in the country. In 1951, the late Bandaranaike, addressing a meeting at Madampe, recognised the importance of the existence of two or more political parties in a democratic parliamentary system and exhorted the right of the people to choose a government of their own choice. This, above all, shows that Bandaranaike despised attempts by political parties to establish themselves as one-party government, and this is a process which we witness today in the Sri Lankan political arena. Bandaranaike, as far back as 1951, envisaged the dangers, both real and potential, of one-party dictatorship. His ideas and views on such anti-democratic tendencies are relevant today and they need to be mastered in order to plan a strategy to prevent the country from drifting towards a dictatorship.

### Non-Alignment

Bandaranaike, as one of the perceptive politicians of this century, recognised the potentialities of smaller nations in the arena of world affairs, and he, guided by this principle of international relations, became the architect of a foreign policy which, in the course of time, became a model for smaller nations in the non-aligned world. As one of the chief architects of the policy of non-alignment, he played a leading role in influencing the newly-emergent nations to adopt non-alignment as a means to realise their place in the modern international society. Identifying the problems of the emergent-world

in which countries like Sri Lanka has to find a place, he wanted the colonial society, from which these nations emerged independent, to be transformed into a free society, and this process of transformation came to be described as the period of transition. He had his own vision and the philosophy of transition; he wanted the transition to be effected against the background of changing world conditions. His concept of transition based on a prophesy — contained the seeds of fusion of both the old and the new. It was based on a link with the past. This, in fact, meant that most of his policy strategies derived inspiration from both the old and the new, and he, thereby, successfully emerged as the leader who rightly grasped the influence of the Buddhist cultural tradition in the awakening of the Sri Lankan nation. His policy of non-alignment, which flourished into a major national policy in the hands of the Bandaranaike regimes in the past few decades, has now been totally reversed and the country, as an important small nation in South Asia, is a dependant nation, the foreign policy of which is in a state of constant crisis. On this occasion of the death anniversary of the chief architect of the policy of non alignment, we need to show our commitment to this policy in order to preserve our national sovereignty. He, therefore, firmly believed in the need to maintain friendship with all the countries and this was the cornerstone of his foreign policy.

His economic philosophy, unlike the neo-colonialist subservient economic policies of the present day, was based primarily on the recognition of the fact that underdeveloped countries, emerging out of colonial rule, need to build a self-reliant economy. On the basis of this perspective, many radical economic and social policies were adopted to develop a self-reliant economy in the country and those policies, though took sometime to nature into a social development strategy, laid the foundation for the development of a new phase in both agriculture and industry. The redistributive justice and the concept of welfare

guided these policies and changes which transformed the Sri Lankan society under the leadership of the late Bandaranaike. Local industries, he emphasised, needed to be encouraged to achieve self-sufficiency in certain basic consumer goods, and the concept of import substitution became the guiding factor. Because of the emphasis he laid on local industries, a network of local industries developed in the country saving valuable foreign exchange and generating employment. This process of local industrialisation has now been reversed. The industrial base, which our Governments built on the basis of Bandaranaike's belief in the concept of reliance, is now on the verge of complete collapse as a result of the entry of the multi-national companies as the saviours of the Sri Lankan economy. Local industrialists, who benefitted from the Bandaranaike policies, became staunch supporters of our opponents who within a span of seven years, reduced them to mere sales agents of the exploitative Multi-national companies. Local industrialists, in his context of the process of exploitation of the economy by the Multi-nationals, need to project their minds back to the Bandaranaike period to see the relevance of his policies to the rejuvenation of the economy through a form of local industrialisation.

Bandaranaike was an ardent champion of the national sovereignty of the country, and he never was prepared to barter national sovereignty for paltry economic gains or a package of foreign aid. It was the 1956 regime, under the astute leadership of the late Bandaranaike, which took over the control of Katunayake and Trincomalee bases and this act of the Government, he emphasised, represented a genuine attempt to complete the process of political independence of the country. His view was that the take-over of the bases at Katunayake and Trincomalee fell in line with the foreign policy of the Government. The existence of the bases under the United Kingdom, Bandaranaike reiterated on a number of occasions, was a threat to the national sovereignty and it, above

(Continued on Page 19)

# DONORS' "DEEP DISQUIET"

David Hopper

**M**r. Secretary, my colleagues have done the usual number jugglery. For those of you that keep the record, last year we announced a total of \$543 million including a \$70 million structural adjustment IBRD loan which we were then actively negotiating with the Sri Lankan authorities. The pre-condition for all Bank structural adjustment activities is an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and this time last year there were discussions taking place between the authorities of Sri Lanka and the IMF. Subsequent to our meeting, the Sri Lankan Government undertook further discussions with the IMF on the conditions for a Fund standby. They had met most of the conditions previously discussed, but the ones covering budget and borrowing ceilings had to be resolved with Cabinet concurrence. Internal discussions within Sri Lanka made it clear that the uncertainties of domestic and international political and economic circumstances might militate against the Government's ability to fulfill the proposed agreed conditions. Therefore, discussions with the Fund were suspended, and our talks on a structural adjustment loan were also put into abeyance. If we deduct the \$70 million for the SAL from last year's indications figure, the amount would be \$473 million. The amount indicated this year excluding a structural adjustment loan is \$541 million, up from \$473 million last year, an increase of 14.4 percent. The non-Mahaweli project indications went from \$318 million in 1983 to \$373 million today, a rise of 17.3 percent. The indications made at this table for the completion of the Mahaweli project were about \$66 million. Food and commodity aid was reduced slightly over last year from \$115 to \$102 million, but there are some Governments still to act on food

agreements. In SDR terms, which buffers a bit the strength of the U. S. dollar, indications rose from SDR 441 million of last year to SDR 521 million this year — an increase of 18 percent. These are, I think, most gratifying increases and come very close to the amounts that are needed by the nation's development programs.

**".....Should this be the outcome, I think there is little doubt that this Group would feel that the partnership has substantially failed and the partners, while unlikely to abandon further help, would certainly reduce significantly the resources they are willing to commit to future endeavours....."**

Dr. Tilakaratna, my closing remarks are going to dwell on issues that I know you and your Minister are well aware of. I realize that nothing I will say to you will be new, nor will what I say surprise you. I know that in these remarks I am talking to the converted, but I hope that you can carry what I say to your Minister and, through him, to the Cabinet of your Government. I know the problems that you and your Minister have, and the frustrations that you both experience, in dealing with the many expenditure Ministries that can and do claim larger and larger shares of the budget's limited resources. Indeed, all of us around this table appreciated very much the scope and vision that was embraced in the Minister's statement this morning and in your remarks this afternoon. **But once more at a Sri Lanka Aid Group meeting, my remarks must play again on the somber notes of the gap between intent and practice, between thought and action. We have played this theme too often. Each time**

we meet we have an indication that the structural foundations of the economy are of deep concern to the Government and that moves to improve the strength of the longer-term outlook on the economy will be undertaken in the near future. It is true that somehow or other the economy manages to make it through each year on an uncertain

path and with the aid of unexpected windfalls. But the structural problems persist to plague our discussions this year and, I fear, next year as well. **I think we have to recognize that this group is not a political body nor one with the power to elect, and that, while we give your Minister good marks for the past, our concerns are not founded upon the record, but upon our deep disquiet about the outlook for the economic future of your country. It is important, I think, to distinguish between what we are concerned with here and the political record. We certainly appreciate very much the management that the present Government has given the Sri Lankan economy. But this management has not been without serious uncertainty and concern to your partners. While we have not hesitated to express this concern, we have not found it answered either by the presentations today, or by the actions of the past. In reviewing the past, it is true that**

events have often worked to Sri Lanka's favor. Certainly the outcome has been better than the predictions of most of us here, but we are all fearful that unless the structural aspects of the nation's economy are attacked forcefully, the present gains will evaporate, and the growth momentum that all of us have striven for will be lost to the tyranny of external debt service, rising budget deficits and inflation. **Should this be the outcome, I think there is little doubt that this Group would feel that the partnership has substantially failed, and the partners, while unlikely to abandon further help, would certainly reduce significantly the resources they are willing to commit to future endeavors.**

Let me try to put all this into perspective. The Mahawali program has obviously dominated the considerations of this Group as well as the Government's investment program. The Aid Group has expressed during this period deep concerns about the structural adjustment needs of the economy, and we have urged the Government to make early and substantial moves to take command of its economic affairs and launch overdue measures of structural reform. We have understood and have been patient with the various intervening national priorities that have made such moves politically or socially difficult. There were election processes in 1981 and 1982 that excused a full press of Government action for change, and the members of this Group eased their call for an implementation of the necessary policy prescriptions. In 1983, the civil disturbances that occurred in July reduced the scope for economic policy change. This year we are faced with the fact that the civil disturbance problem is still not resolved although things appear quiet and we all fervently hope they remain that way. But the election issues are behind us and, frankly, I think most of us around the table expect more, a great deal more, to be undertaken and carried through by the Government to resolve the structural problems that so seriously afflict the national economic outlook. **We are unanimous in our belief that these reforms should be launched**

**within this year. The outcomes of this year's accounts and the budget for next year will be watched closely by all of us for signs of a strong and determined Government, willing to make the effort to bring the economy into line with long-term growth requirements. I do not think I am wrong when I say that if changes are not seen to take place, donor confidence will be undermined and the aid indications of the future will not continue on the scale of the past few years. I hope you will pass this most serious warning to your Minister, and through him, to his colleagues in Cabinet.**

**".....We are unanimous in our belief that these reforms should be launched this year....."**

I will not go into substantial detail of the economic issues that need to be met and taken in hand by the Government. You have touched on these in your remarks this afternoon and they were mentioned by your Minister in his opening statement this morning; they are also covered extensively in the Bank's Memorandum prepared for this meeting. Chief among them are the issues of budgetary discipline, the problem of an imbalance between domestic savings and investment, the high import propensity and the low growth of exports. The inflexibility of the savings ratio is a matter of concern to all of us as I know it is to you and to your Minister. We would like to see it a matter of most serious concern to all the nation's leaders.

There are several matters that we have referred to under the shorthand term of "incentives". We have used the term to embrace the set of governmental actions necessary to encourage greater private sector participation in the economic growth of the nation. These incentives include: a re-examination of interest rate policies, further encouragement to private sector investments, reasonably assured profit margins for export industries, an exchange rate policy that insures the rupee being held at levels that will give Sri Lankan exporters the assurance they need to make longer-

term supply commitments to foreign importers, Government policies for the support of a massive revitalization of Sri Lanka's traditional export sectors and an improvement in the management of these sectors; in short a recasting of the pattern of economic rewards accruing to participants in a revitalized national economy. One has only to examine Sri Lanka's recent experience in the agricultural sector to realize how responsive the economy can be to a proper incentive package. Mr. Secretary, we urge you to carry a message to your authorities that the members of this Group of partners in Sri Lanka's development believe that if a properly designed

set of incentives is made available to the non-agricultural sectors of the economy, a transformation similar to that which has taken place in agriculture can, and will occur, in plantations, in exports, and in domestic manufacture. We have agreed on many occasions that very serious past mistakes in national economic policy have greatly distorted the capacity of these sectors to contribute properly to the nation's well-being. In fact, the legacy inherited by the present Government is the need to rectify these mistakes. **But using past errors to excuse inaction now is not an acceptable Government policy.** We anticipate that action on a suitable incentive framework for economic growth will be effectively pursued before our next meeting.

The public sector enterprises are part of the overall problem of the economic structure in Sri Lanka. Suggestions have been made around this table for the sale of public sector enterprises to the private sector in order to make them more effective contributors to national income and to reduce their burden on the national budget. The Government should carefully consider this option. The public operation of most of these enterprises has failed to tap successfully their potential contribution to national revenue. But regardless of how the Government handles the future of

the state enterprises, there can be no question that they must be made more efficient. Both the Minister's and your statements to the Group have identified the state sector enterprises as a weak area in the economy. They should be contributing heavily to public income, and they will need to do so if the public savings of the nation are to match future investment requirements.

On the external side, the export incentive structure is only one of the problems faced by the Government. There are questions of how best to handle available external resources; of how best to establish the priorities to be given to the use of available resources; of how best to manage the present debt burden, particularly as debt service ratios rise in the years ahead; and, of how best to meet the nation's foreign exchange requirements. The last question is very significant. **Sri Lanka must reduce its commercial borrowings.** These borrowings have been used mainly to cover budgetary deficits that should have prompted either higher domestic taxes or reduced current and capital expenditures. The nation cannot continue to use foreign savings in order to live beyond its capacity to save for itself. **The burden of debt service will eventually force a retrenchment of economic activity to the level of the national means.** All of us here are apprehensive that Sri Lanka is close, too close to that line. What is needed is a careful analysis of the patterns of public spending to find areas where reductions can be made or other economies effected. With only a limited capability to buffer adverse external economic shocks, close monitoring of the nation's international reserves position is a vital necessity as is careful planning and budgeting of available or anticipated foreign exchange. This admonition is not new to you. But, again, I make it not for you or your colleagues but for the wider audience of the nation's Cabinet.

Questions have been raised around the table on the subsidies built into the budget. You specifically mentioned fertilizer, and while I

cannot disagree with your comment on the importance of low-cost fertilizer to sustaining the growth in output from the nation's rice farms, the issues surrounding the use of a fertilizer subsidy as a production incentive for farmers constitute a slippery area for economic and policy analysis. In Sri Lanka's case it needs much further investigation. Experience elsewhere reveals that product prices outweigh factor prices as the operative element in farm-gate incentives. However, this is not the place to settle the niceties of farm management or the questions of equity between producer

**“.....But using past errors to excuse inaction is not an acceptable government policy.....”**

and consumer, budgetary considerations and price levels. Instead, I would suggest that these issues along with issues of subsidies to the transport sector, to the food stamp program, to public sector corporations, and so on, be examined closely by the Government **with a ruthless eye** for what is necessary to retain and what can be dropped for the overall benefit of national development. For example, when the present Government adopted the food stamp plan, the hope was expressed at this table that there would be a progressive reduction in the number of people benefitting from the plan. That has not occurred. **In fact, the only erosion that has taken place has been in the real value of the stamps—an erosion that has had distressing consequences for the poorest groups in the nation whose levels of living the scheme was originally designed to protect.** This has been, rightly, a matter of concern to all the members of this Group. A re-examination of the food stamp program, its eligibility criteria and its benefit flow should be high on the priority list for review by the Government as it seeks to control recurrent expenditures. There are many other subsidies; you know them far better than I. All of them should be scrutinized with the harsh judgment that they are competitors for resources vital to national development. There were several of our donors who touched on questions about

the social structure of the economy. When the donors entered into the pact with the Government of Sri Lanka in 1978, that an extraordinary assistance effort would be made to support the accelerated Mahaweli development program, there was a tacit agreement that in return for additional resources, the Government would strive to maintain the social standards and physical quality of life for which your island nation had become justly renowned. There is an evident concern on the part of many donors that, in fact, the level of living of many of Sri Lanka's citizens has been permitted to slip

over the past several years. In effect, we fear the pact has not been met by the Government. The study that is now being undertaken by the Central Bank of Ceylon with the assistance of several Aid Group members will enlighten all of us about what has happened in the social sectors. Yet, I would hope that your Ministry, in collaboration with other concerned Ministries, will not await the results of the study before giving this important subject a most careful review. Minister de Mel touched on what is fundamentally a social sector issue in his discussion on terrorism. I was impressed with the thorough and wide understanding of a most difficult problem that he provided for us in his remarks. I join all others at this table in hoping that there will be soon an agreement between the two communities in Sri Lanka. However, what Minister de Mel did not explain satisfactorily to me is the economic foundation of the terrorism problem. I fully agree with him that terrorism arises from some kind of “breeding ground”; I would like to know more about the “breeding ground” in Sri Lanka and what, if anything—and there very well may be nothing that this Group can do in its support of the development partnership with Sri Lanka to reduce or eliminate the “breeding ground”. The Minister did refer to unspecified “grievances” of the minority community; grievances that in his view need

to be rectified. I would assume from his remarks that such a rectification must play a major role in the considerations of Government in formulating the public investment program, in the pattern of recurrent budget expenditures and in the pursuit of other national economic activities. Although, quite properly, the Minister did not discuss these matters with us, I think I speak for all of us at this table when I say that we hope your Government will make every effort to undertake activities that will seek to remove at least the economic elements in the breeding ground of ethnic terrorism. That is not to say that the problem is even primarily economic. It obviously is not. As the Minister took pains to point out, its roots are historical, cultural, and social; it is a transcendent problem to be found in all aspects of national life. As our concern at this table is for the economic well-being of all the nation's people,

we urge the Government to make an early address to the economic components of communal stress, and we stand ready to provide such assistance as we can give to support the Government in this endeavor.

your nation is of small geographic size, and can ill-accommodate a rapidly growing number of people. I would commend to the Government an early examination of national demographic trends and the

**“.....in fact, the only erosion that has taken place has been in the real value of the stamps — an erosion that has had distressing consequences for the poorest group in the nation whose level of living the scheme was originally designed to protect.....”**

One of our donors mentioned the growth of population in Sri Lanka. I know others share the concern of that donor that, despite Sri Lanka's commendable record of relatively low population growth rates over the past two decades, there is disturbing evidence these rates have risen slightly in recent years. Sri Lanka is not on the list of countries endangered by a population explosion. However,

effectiveness of the family planning program. You indicated that it is not so much a money problem as it is a difficulty of administration — a difficulty not uncommon among developing nations. If this is the case, it suggests that there are inefficiencies in the handling of resources, and I would hope that the Government will soon correct these.

**(To be continued)**

## **A BOOK OF THE TIMES**

### **RECENT POLITICS IN SRI LANKA. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION & THE REFERENDUM 1982**

**BY PROF. WISWA WARNAPALA & Dr. L. DIAS HEWAGAMA**

Authors' analysis castigates the executive presidential system in Sri Lanka fifty years after universal franchise has been successfully practised and democratic traditions well established in the country.

**Earlier Price Rs. 275/-**

**New Price Rs. 225/-**

*For the two copies & above @ Rs. 200/- (Postage extra)*

## **HETTIARACHCHI ENTERPRISES**

26, KOTUGODELLA STREET,  
KANDY.

Tel. 24077

# The growth performance of the agricultural sector

N. Shanmugaratnam

The record of agricultural growth since 1977 is better than that of the previous seven years. However, the pattern is remarkably uneven as shown in Table II. An examination of the main sub-sectors of agriculture for the 1977-1982 period would show that the major contributions to growth have been paddy, coconut and 'others', a category which includes subsidiary food crops, minor export crops and livestock. When the general trend of output is analysed in terms of indices for the past twelve years since 1970 the tree crops sector's per-

formance is very disappointing. Tea and rubber have not shown any convincing signs of recovery. Their output has exceeded the 1970 mark for the first time only in 1982.

Individual growth rates of main sub-sectors given in Table II reveal the pattern of unevenness more clearly. On the average tea and rubber have registered negative growth rates for 1978-1982. Coconut has shown signs of recovery towards pre-1970 levels. Paddy regained and surpassed the 1970 (1.616m tonnes) mark in 1977 and has

been recording output figures of over two million tonnes although it has recorded a negative growth for 1982. Subsidiary food crops gained some fillip during the 1970-1977 period due to import restrictions which offered a protected local market with inflated prices for onions and chillies. Both these crops showed a drop in cultivated area and output for the two years following the liberalization of imports since 1977. They seem to have picked up again from 1980.

A general feature that strikes any observer of the growth performance of the different sub-sectors of agriculture is that output increases have taken place remarkably in crops cultivated largely, as in coconut and almost exclusively as in paddy and 'others', by small holders. It may be too hasty to generalize on this basis alone that the peasant sector lends itself more easily to growth oriented policies than the plantation sector. Nevertheless, the apparent contrast between the protracted stagnation of the plantation sector as exemplified by tea and the relatively more dynamic physical progress in terms of national output and yield per hectare in a peasant crop like paddy calls for some explanation. This point will be taken up in the next section devoted to contradictions of the agrarian structure. A look at some more physical indicators will be helpful in understanding the problems and peculiarities of the different components of the agricultural sector.

The consistently poor performance of the plantation sector is a manifestation of the cumulative effects of several factors that have operated for years. The agronomic preconditions to ensure economic efficiency over time with tree crops

TABLE II

Growth Rates of Agriculture and Its Main Components 1975-1982  
(At Constant 1970 Factor Cost Prices)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Average 1978-82
1 Agriculture, hunting & fishery	-2.4	1.2	10.4	5.4	2.0	3.1	6.9	2.9	4.06
2 Agriculture	-2.5	1.0	11.4	5.0	1.5	2.6	6.6	2.6	3.66
3 Tea	4.9	-8.2	6.1	-4.3	3.5	-7.5	10.0	-10.7	-1.80
4 Rubber	17.6	2.2	-8.2	5.6	-0.8	-13.0	-6.7	0.5	-2.90
5 Coconut	8.1	-12.8	-7.0	15.4	6.3	-11.0	11.5	11.3	6.70
6 Paddy	-30.0	9.4	37.5	12.7	1.4	11.9	3.6	-3.3	5.26
7 Others	6.0	4.1	9.2	0.5	0.2	4.6	8.0	6.7	4.00

Source: Central Bank of Ceylon Annual Report 1982.

TABLE III

Cumulative Percentage of Total Extent Replanted — Tea and Rubber, 1970-1982

Year	Tea	Rubber
1970	6.74	50.34
1973	9.90	55.02
1976	11.89	59.23
1979	13.94	63.82
1981	15.88	75.77*
1982	16.88	79.04

\*Drop in total area under rubber by 9.55%

Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Review of the Economy and Annual Reports.



are the maintenance of an optimal age composition of the plantations and the judicious application of yield increasing inputs. The progress of replanting has been extremely poor in the tea sector as shown in Table III. For the past twelve years the average annual rate of progress has been less than 1 per cent. This has not shown any improvement during the past six years. With rubber, the progress of uprooting old plantations has outpaced replanting, leading to a drastic drop in area under rubber and thereby giving the impression of a higher replanting rate in Table III.

The extensive phase of tree crop production had long come to an end. In fact the areas under tea and rubber have been declining over the past several years. In such a situation an increase in output is entirely dependent on the yield factor. The close relationship between productivity of land as reflected by yield per hectare and total production in the case of tea and rubber is quite striking. In the case of rubber the area under tapping has been declining without any substantial compensating effect in terms of productivity of the existing land. Rubber yield has been declining even faster than the uprooting of old plantations. On the whole, tea and rubber plantations are beset with the serious problem of senility, and the poor rate of replanting does not offer any hope of a systematic and early recovery. Tea yield is also depressed by poor bush densities in many plantations. Infilling, like replanting, has been very slow.

Another key indicator of agronomic efficiency is the application of fertilizer at required rates and at the correct times. Fertilizer application to the three main export crops has remained below the recommended levels. Table IV shows that the tree crops sectors has not been able to maintain a growing or steady level of fertilizer input. Thus, even the short-run prospects of increasing yield by higher doses of nutrients as prescribed by the respective research institutes have not been realized.<sup>16</sup> The low level of fertilizer application for the tree crops has been generally attributed to the increasing costs of fertilizers even with the subsidy. Apart from

the high price of fertilizer it would seem that there are other factors related to plantation management and the overall structural inefficiency of the system. The disincentive created by the higher prices of fertilizers seems to be relatively lower for tea and rubber than for paddy as shown by the fertilizer-product price ratios given below. The price of NPK mixture issued by the Fertilizer Corporation has been used

for the calculation in the absence of information on retail prices of fertilizers. The ratios can be regarded as only crude indicators of the relative movements of prices of fertilizer and the product. Although the fertilizer-product price ratio for paddy is higher than that for tea and rubber it has displaced tea as the single biggest consumer of fertilizer. This raises the question whether higher prices were the

TABLE IV

Fertilizer Sales by Crop 1970-1982 (x1000 Metric tons)

Year	Tea	Rubber	Coconut	Paddy	Others	Total
1970-73 (average)	102 (31.5)	16 (5.0)	52 (16.0)	99 (30.5)	55 (17)	324 (100)
1974-76 ( " )	99 (38.7)	12 (4.4)	32 (12.5)	72 (28.0)	42 (16.4)	256 (100)
1977	80 (27.0)	12 (4.0)	29 (10.0)	122 (41.0)	55 (18)	298 (100)
1978	116 (30.5)	21 (5.8)	43 (11.0)	136 (35.7)	65 (17)	380 (100)
1979	105 (28.0)	23 (6.6)	50 (13.4)	130 (35.0)	64 (17)	372 (100)
1980	110 (25.0)	22 (5.0)	56 (13.0)	190 (43.0)	62 (14)	440 (100)
1981	103 (28.0)	17 (5.0)	38 (10.0)	156 (43.0)	53 (14)	365 (100)
1982*	103 (27.0)	16 (4.0)	30 ( 8.0)	167 (44.0)	63 (17)	379 (100)

\*Provisional

Note: Figures rounded off

Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Various Annual Reports.

TABLE V

Cost of Production 1kg. Tea and Rubber

	C O P Rs.	Average price Colombo net Rs.	Producer margin Rs.
<b>Tea</b>			
1970	3.35	3.59	0.24
1971	3.39	3.99	0.60
1972	3.52	4.18	0.66
1973	4.47	4.23	-0.24
1974	5.55	5.88	0.33
1975	6.70	6.15	-0.55
1976	7.42	7.80	0.38
1977	8.19	13.15	4.96
1978	11.89	15.55	-0.34
1979	13.43	11.14	-2.29
1980	18.71	17.73	-0.98
1981	18.79	17.71	-1.08
1982	21.97	22.52	0.55
<b>Rubber</b>			
1970	1.52	2.00	0.48
1971	1.67	1.74	0.07
1972	1.65	1.78	0.13
1973	1.87	2.57	0.70
1974	2.46	2.82	0.36
1975	2.75	2.49	-0.26
1976	3.28	4.34	1.06
1977	3.74	4.51	0.77
1978	4.85	6.92	2.07
1979	6.86	9.15	2.29
1980	8.20	10.62	2.42
1981	8.92	10.04	1.12
1982	9.66	10.18	0.52

Source: Central Bank of Ceylon Annual Reports.

only factor that worked against increased fertilizer application in the plantation sector. The fertilizer-product price ratio for tea, rubber and paddy respectively was as follows: 1978—0.13, 0.22, 0.6; 1979—0.11, 0.14, 0.43; 1980—0.12, 0.20, 0.70; 1981—0.16, 0.28, 0.83 (Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, *Review of the Economy 1971, 1981*).

One of the most critical developments in the plantation sector since 1977 is the growth of wages for labour which were kept virtually frozen for many decades. Tea production has remained a labour intensive venture throughout and historically wages constituted the major cost component. This has become even bigger with the granting of wage increases which were long overdue. The wage increases were necessitated by two factors. One is the long-standing demand of the plantation workers for more reasonable wages. The other was the need to attract village labour for estate work in certain regions which suffered from labour shortage created by the repatriation of Tamil workers to India. Labour charges amount to more than 55 per cent of the cost of production of tea.

If the cost of production is an index of efficiency, the plantation sector is grossly inefficient (refer Table V) as it has not been able to increase productivity of labour to levels that can ensure good profit margins. At the present level of

production technology in the field, labour productivity can be increased only with the aid of agronomic intensification (i.e., use of HYV and chemical inputs) and more intense labour control. The former is constrained by factors already stated. The latter method has its physical limits as no mechanization is feasible, and given the agronomic deficiencies the scope is highly restricted. It has been reported by the Central Bank (1982) that in recent years many estates have shown negative producer margins as a result of wage increases. The wage increases have indeed exploded a long standing popular myth that the plantation system was model of efficiency.

This "efficiency" was primarily dependent on the structure of labour control and low wages. Once wages started moving upwards due to inevitable causes the most crucial prop of 'efficiency' began to give way. The extremely poor performance of some plantations as an immediate result of higher wages also exposed the long term managerial neglect of the agronomic conditions. The performance of the paddy sector has shown a close relationship with annual rainfall and the availability of supplementary irrigation facilities. An analysis of long term statistics (1870-1980) has shown that during the last three decades while yield and total production have increased considerably, fluctuations due to drought or very

low rainfall are more pronounced than in the pre-modernization period. This is due to the greater susceptibility of the improved varieties to drought. Dry zone settlement schemes have become the major source of rice supply in Sri Lanka. Almost 75 per cent of the area sown in Maha and 58 per cent in Yala are in the dry zone. Dry zone's bimodal pattern and uneven distribution of rainfall within seasons have a direct bearing on crop performance. Development of the irrigation infrastructure has been a major basis of agronomic intensification along with the other essential ingredients of the modernization package such as HYV, fertilizers and agrochemicals. At present about 65 per cent of the area sown in the dry zone are under improved varieties. Of the two contributors to total production, area and yield per unit of land, the latter has assumed a greater role since 1978 as shown by the figures (See Page 17) for the period 1971-1982.

Going by yield performance of paddy, the post-1977 period is one of intensification of paddy production. The government will increase the pressure on the pace of intensification as the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme brings the land frontier to the end of its extensive margin. A measure of cropping intensity of paddy land over time (i.e., seasons) is the ratio of Net Harvested Area / Asweddumised Area as shown in Table VI. This and the Net Harvested Area/Sown Area ratios are also indicators of the effects of the factors that contribute to crop failure; lower the ratios higher the area affected by crop failure. Taking yield and cropping intensity as indicators intensification the 1978-1982 period has achieved more than the 1970-1977 period. It may be mentioned that part of the credit for the better performance during 1978-1982 goes to the weather conditions which turned out to be more favourable than during the previous period. Improvements in the irrigation facilities may have been another contributory factor although it is difficult to determine the exact contribution with the information available. The figures in Table VI also imply that the Annual Cropping Index can be raised much further through intensification.

TABLE VI

Annual Cropping Indices — Paddy (1970 - 1982)

Year	NHA/AA	(Average)	NHA/SA	(Average)
1970	1.07		0.80	
1971	1.02		0.81	
1972	0.92		0.75	
1973	0.98		0.79	
1974	1.12		0.82	
1975	0.82		0.73	
1976	0.86	1970-77	0.75	1970-77
1977	1.03	(0.98)	0.80	(0.78)
1978	1.10		0.83	
1979	1.07		0.82	
1980	1.11		0.86	
1981	1.12	1978-82	0.85	1978-82
1982	1.00	(1.08)	0.78	(0.83)

Source: Central Bank of Ceylon Review of the Economy and Annual Reports for various years.

Note: NHA — Net Harvested Area.  
AA — Asweddumised Area.  
SA — Sown Area.

*Average Annual Growth Rates (Paddy)*

<i>Period</i>	<i>Net harvested area</i>	<i>Yield/Ha</i>	<i>Growth rate of paddy output</i>
1971-1977	3.0	-0.6	2.4
1978-1982	0.2	5.2	5.4

*Source:* Central Bank of Ceylon, Relevant Annual Reports.

In the irrigation schemes there is an evident correlation between yield and proximity to the top end of the distributary channel. The "top-enders" — "tail-enders" dichotomy is almost universal in the irrigation schemes. The problem is not purely one of technical defects in the design of the irrigation system. It is also a management problem arising out of the individual allotment-based "independent" from of production. The "top-enders" dichotomy is a factor contributing to reduced overall cropping inten-

sity. The problem is already present even in the new settlements of the Mahaweli Project. Despite the highly publicized "scientific" physical planning and "new styles" of project management — with assistance from foreign experts — the serious problem has become systemic in the Mahaweli settlements. This would mean that a fuller use of the irrigable land will be hard to achieve. We will return to this point later.

(To be continued)

**Letter**

**Pseudonyms . . . .**

*(Continued from page 2)*

The greatest danger of the recent move to forbid the use of pseudonyms is its tendency to demassify media in terms of this communitarian dimension of social communication. It can be more damaging to democracy than the elimination of collective responsibility from a Cabinet of Ministers. The pseudonyms in which media persons merge their individual identity have become mere symbols of their collective search, study, investigtive reporting and shared consensus.

If pseudonyms have been used as a cover for yellow journalism inuendos or invectives due action should be taken to ascertain the responsibility. For as stated in the Mac Bride Report 'It is not journalists who need a high standard of ethics so much as their employers who give orders that are often repugnant to the working reporters'. The same report also calls for an assurance of the professional independence and integrity of all media persons.

The circumstances of the 207 journalists mentioned therein as dead, imprisoned, wounded or missing in the course of action do not reveal a lack of courage among professionals as presumed by the promoters of pseudonym — phobia. We do not lack parallels in our own milieu.

The attempts to muzzle the media at the turn of the past two decades have had their own lessons for today. The resulting birth of alternative media in the form of the small periodical press and political drama prove that the prophetic role of community communicator surface in new dimensions to meet the challenges of the times. Similar circumstances have led to a vibrant underground press and community media elsewhere in Asia. These achievements of a people's ingenuity whetted by the irrepressible desire to communicate should while warning media-meddlers help media persons grow in this professional commitment.

**Hector Welgampola**  
*Chairman U.C.I.P. (Sri Lanka)*  
*Catholic Press, Colombo 8*

**INVITE US TO  
 CATER FOR  
 YOUR PARTY**

Catering is our speciality  
 We cater for any  
 function large or small,  
 weddings, engagements,  
 cocktails, luncheons,  
 dinners.

**PAGODA**  
**RESTAURANT** too  
 Is available for your party.  
 Phone: 23086, 29236.



**PAGODA**  
 105, Chatham Street,  
 Colombo 1.

Cyril Rodrigo Restaurant

# WORKING CLASS MOVEMENTS

Gail Omvedt and Bharat Patanker

The unemployed of Buffalo and northern Minnesota are white; those stalking the streets of Harlem and Chicago are black and brown. The dialectic of race and color has its significance here too.

Of course, not all whites are alike. Those of English descent (the WASPs — “white Anglo-Saxon Protestant”) are still more or less at the top, and the working class and middle levels are filled by people of Irish, Italian, Scandinavian, Polish, etc. descent. But these white migrants were heavily “Americanized” in the course of their entry; they lost their languages, much of their culture and to a significant degree even their identification with their original homeland. They internalized the dominant ideology of individualism, democracy and “free enterprise”, an ideology which makes it almost impossible for them to deal with the increasing social trauma or their own unemployment, let alone understand what is happening throughout the world. A cousin, out of work for four years except for occasional road construction jobs, and angry at the ecological devastation he sees of the northern forests, will still say, “we built up this country by hard work”, will still feel resentfully that people in the rest of the world have only “taken” aid and technology from the U.S. to turn it against us and “take away our jobs”; Here, significantly, the “third world” minorities are different, and their difference has its impact on the union movement itself.

U.S. unionism, though lacking a socialist ideology and heavily dominated by capitalistic bureaucracy, has had a very militant history. In recent years, though, the dominant response of the bureaucracy to the crisis has been a meek one: facing companies that have said badly, take a pay cut and ignore the issue of work

conditions or we’ll close the plant and move away, they have simply accepted the policy of “give-backs”. But workers in many cases have fought back regardless. A nationwide bus strike, a wave of teachers’ strikes, a local nurses’ strike were among the few we saw during our visit. There has been in fact a vigorous-rank-and-file movement, a movement for union democracy, going on in various ways and waves since the 1960’s. Earlier waves were closely linked to the Black movement, Chicano movement, women’s movement etc. — from the RUMS or “revolutionary union movements” in the Detroit auto plants in the late 1960’s which gave birth to the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (equally important though not as well known as the Black Panthers), to Mexican farm labour organizing of feminist-linked organising of women office workers. Today we saw something of the new rank-and-file movement in a function of TUAD (Trade Unionists for Action and Democracy) we attended in Chicago, where steel workers, electrical workers, auto workers and countless others were present. One-half the crowd were women, ready to speak of their women’s caucuses forming everywhere, three-fifths were black, and the cultural program was an exhibit of “break dancing”, that new creation from the black ghettos which seems a combination of dancing and gymnastics to a machine-line rhythm.

Those used to the Indian union movement would have found much strange about that evenings program: no speeches about the “red flag”, no calls for socialism, only a brief discourse on “reaganomics”. It took a Mexican visitor, linked with a worker’s struggle in the Southwest, to remind these Chicago workers of the history of Mayday, which was only three days away! (And in spite of the fact an award that night was

given in the name of Lucy Parsons, whose husband was one of the original martyred activists of Haymarket). But, while the lack of a socialist ideology is a major problem in the U.S., the question that was provoked in our minds was whether the red-flag rhetoric has made much actual difference for Indian workers in terms of their ability to make wage gains or achieve union democracy — much less their ability to transform a whole society? In the TUAD meeting it was crystal clear that all the union officials are workers themselves (even the worst bureaucrats are one-time workers). Middle-class experts, particularly in the field of safety and health, and sympathizers were around, but they did not speak as union representatives, rather as either hired functionaries or allies.

## Imperialism and Racism

Clearly the rise of nonwhite and women membership is going to have a major impact on the future of U.S. unionism. but it is outside the sphere of production and directly in confrontation with imperialism that the dialectics of race and color has its greatest significance and perhaps even its greatest link with a new socialist ideology. For the “third world within” imperialism is no distant phenomenon, but (at least in part) an aggression against their own people. The majority of white Americans socialized to beliefs in individualism, free enterprise and the U.S. government’s own beneficence, have reacted to the upsurge of the third world as an assault on their identity. They find it impossible to understand why the majority of the world’s people’s are not grateful “for all we have done for them”; they are angry at Carter for “giving away our Canal”; they raged over the long captivity of Americans in their embassy in Iran. There seems to

be a deep, enophobic emotional set that provides a basis for faith in Reagan and the right, for a dismaying sense of satisfaction about Grenada, a nation of 200,000, people being stamped on as a kind of revenge for humiliations in Vietnam, Iran, Lebanon and elsewhere.

With the non-whites of course it is different. The presence of Afro-Americans and Hispanic Americans means that the political cost of openly committing U. S. troops to stop revolutions in either Africa or Latin America is much greater than in the case of Vietnam. Already the difference can be seen in regard to the on going Central American revolutions. The Vietnam anti-war movement had its base in the universities and in both youthful idealism and the self-interest of those susceptible to be drafted to fight overseas. The current anti-intervention movement already has its primary base in the communities, both non-white and white, in the churches and to some extent even in the unions.

This is because of the direct organizational and social linkages between central America and the U. S. The fact that nearly all Latins are Catholic, and that a majority of these in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala (including most priests and even some bishops) are on the side of the revolution has its effects on both Catholics and Protestants in the U. S, where "Liberation theology" is appearing to counteract the fundamentalist religious madness that Reagan and the Right manipulate. The fact that four American nuns were among the tens of thousands raped, tortured and murdered by CIA-supported terror squads in El Salvador has its repercussions in the home towns of these women, in their churches, in their communities. The fact that union activists are among those murdered also hits home — the AFL-CIO bureaucracy may be linked with CIA efforts to subvert unionism everywhere; its president Lan Kirkland may be a signatory to the "Kissinger report" aimed at stopping the central American revolution, but local unions of the same AFL-CIO have voted resolutions against U. S. intervention, have sent official delegations to attend union

conferences in Nicaragua. The growing role of Blacks, Spanish-speakers and others is a significant part of this union response, which did not exist in the case of Vietnam.

The movements of the U. S. "third world minorities" themselves have varied and complex histories, but seem to be entering a new phase since 1980 which promises a new form of interraction with socialism. To take only the case of the Black movement, this went from the "integrationist" phase of the civil rights movement of the 1960's to a growing nationalist (even separatist) trend whose themes were "black power" and "black is beautiful" whose left wing impelled by workers and student revolts turned to marxism.

1980 saw the beginning or revival of many militant local grass-roots organizations as well the founding of two radical nation-wide groups, the National Black United Front and the National Black Independent Political Party. On the base of tremendous community turmoil and a widening cultural impact on the entire U. S. society — black singer Michael Jackson is the biggest thing in the white community as well, especially among the very young (even our kindergarten-going daughter knew his name) — blacks seem to have a contradictory relation with almost all political parties: "young people these days are in a fierce mood and are ready to move — but none of the left parties, even the black nationalist ones, do more than scratch the surface of what's going on", says a young Boston Black.

(To be continued)

### Bandaranaike . . .

(Continued from page 9)

all, interfered with our stand on non-alignment. Today, forgetting what Bandaranaike did to this nation and her sovereignty, another agreement has been concluded in respect of the oil tanks in Trincomalee, and a controversy has arisen on this issue which, as before 1956, threatens the national sovereignty, and it shows that the country is moving away from the traditional concept of non-alignment which gave Sri

Lanka a place in the arena of international politics.

The over-all deterioration in the country and the complete reversal of certain policies display a political trend that is pregnant with great danger. The very foundation of democracy has been threatened and there is a massive erosion of the rights and liberties of the people. Laws necessary at times of grave emergency have been written into ordinary laws of the land and this apart from their interference with the basic rights of the people, portends a danger to very basis of democratic government for which Bandaranaike fought for nearly four decades. A mere peep into all these aspects influences us to think that Bandaranaike's thought, ideology and strategies are absolutely relevant today and it is this message that we need to give the people of this country.

### SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Present Air Mail Rates  
to the following countries:

Canada / U.S.A. for 1 copy L/G  
US\$ 40.00 (Rs. 1000/-) for 1 year  
US\$ 25.00 (Rs. 625/-) for 6 months

\* \* \*

U.K., Germany, New Zealand,  
Australia, Netherlands, France,  
Japan, Holland, Phillippines, Aus-  
tria, Norway, Sweden, China,  
Ireland, England, Switzerland,  
Nigeria, Belgium, Denmark, Paris,  
London.

US\$ 30.00 (Rs. 750/-) for 1 year  
US\$ 17.50 (Rs. 437/50) for 6 months

\* \* \*

Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Du-  
bai, Baharain, Arabian Gulf, Syria.  
US\$ 25.00 (Rs. 625/-) for 1 year  
US\$ 15.00 (Rs. 375/-) for 6 months

\* \* \*

India, Pakistan.  
US\$ 20.00 (Rs. 500/-) for 1 year  
US\$ 12.50 (Rs. 312/50) for 6 months

\* \* \*

Local  
Rs. 115/- for 1 year  
Rs. 60/- for 6 months

# ISRAEL'S STRATEGY

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

*'We will say to the Americans: Don't compete with us in Taiwan; don't compete with us in South Africa; don't compete with us in the Caribbean or in other places where you cannot sell arms directly ... Let us do it. You will sell the ammunition and equipment through an intermediary. Israel will be your intermediary.'*

— Ya'acov Meridor,  
Ha'aretz, 25 August 1981

Official or semiofficial statements concerning Israel's involvement in third world countries usually say that Israel is interested in furthering its arms sales and technological exports as well as improving its diplomatic ties with third world countries. The arms business helps Israel overcome the diplomatic isolation imposed on it by Arab countries, according to a recent report published by Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Institute for Strategic Studies.<sup>40</sup> Israel's involvement in Honduras/Nicaragua and El Salvador is said to be related to reports of links between the PLO and Central American movements.<sup>41</sup> Sometimes the defence of Jewish communities in some of the importing states is also mentioned as a consideration. underlying these considerations there is a more involved strategic thinking.

Key elements in understanding Israel's strategy in relation to third world countries are Israel's notion of self-reliance and the relationship between Israel and the United States. Israeli self-reliance dates back to the Zionist idea of self-emancipation of the 1880s, reformulated by Ben Gurion as 'orientation on ourselves,' and since become a part of Israel's national security doctrine, at least according to Dan Horowitz.<sup>42</sup> This has taken shape in, among other things, Israel's arms industry. However, the fact that Israel's military industry has been developed with massive US assistance and participation, financial, technical, and corporate, is a reminder that Israel's 'self reliance' has flourished under US tutelage. Similarly, Zionist

'self-emancipation' took place largely under British tutelage.

Israel was first identified as a Western camp follower when it took the US lead vis a vis Korea and in withholding recognition from the People's Republic of China; this led to its being excluded from the Bandung conference of nonaligned nations in 1955. It was the beginning of Israel's isolation among third world countries. Nevertheless, as a 'pioneer' nation, giving pragmatic, 'nonideological' forms of development assistance, Israel retained access to many countries, particularly in Africa. The army plays a central role in Israeli society, institutionally and in its 'integrative' functions, and this trait of the centrality of the military has been a basis of affinity with many Latin American regimes.<sup>43</sup> Israeli army veterans occupy important positions in Israel's foreign aid system in Africa and Latin America.<sup>44</sup> Israel sided with France in the Algerian conflict and provided training to the OAS; a common antagonism to Arab national liberation was the basis of French arms supplies to Israel.

Strategic cooperation between governing circles of the United States and Israel dates back to the time when Israel began to be viewed as a buffer against radical Nasserism. In the sixties, Israel assisted US penetration of African countries. The regimes of Mobutu in Zaire and Bokassa in the Central African Republic are among the fruits of this cooperation. In 1971-72 Israel and Britain cooperated in bringing Idi Amin to power in Uganda.<sup>45</sup>

The first strategic agreement between the US and Israel dates from 1962, with the Kennedy administration, reportedly entitled: 'Strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel in relation to Latin America and counter-insurgency.'<sup>46</sup> One year later the Kennedy administration approved the sale of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel, and in 1965 the Johnson administration allowed

a sale of A4 Skyhawk jet fighters. Still France remained, since 1953, Israel's main arms supplier until, upon the end of the Algerian war, France reviewed its Middle East policies and sold Mirages to Lebanon in 1967, and to Libya in 1969. This prompted the expansion of Israel's arms industry from its small beginnings in the fifties.

Israel's victory in the 1967 war changed the balance of forces in the region, and in a major development the US provided Israel with 50 Phantom fighters in 1968. US-Israeli collaboration during the Jordanian crisis of 1970 strengthened mutual relations. But above all, the onset of the 'Vietnam syndrome' in the US, detente, and the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of 'sub-imperialism,' inspired the momentous, almost tenfold, increase in US military assistance to Israel in the 1971-73 period. Moreover, 'In November 1971, the US quietly signed an agreement to provide technical information and assistance that would allow Israel to produce advanced weapons components itself. This had important immediate economic advantages for Israel, allowing it to develop further its military-industrial base and become an important arms manufacturer and exporter in its own right.'<sup>47</sup>

The October war of 1973, followed by the oil embargo initiated by the Saudis, gave another boost to Israeli 'self-reliance' under US sponsorship. On the Israeli side there was an interest 'to prevent a situation that would allow an outside power — namely the United States — to dictate the terms of a future cease-fire by threatening to withhold vital military supplies'; while on the part of the United States, 'one can presume the interest of US strategists in avoiding any need to resupply Israel with weapons and munitions during future active hostilities.'<sup>48</sup>

Thus, the purchase by Israel of entire production lines from the US, the production of weapons produced under US licence, and of several

major Israeli military products (e.g. Kfir-C2, IAI-202 Arava), date from 1973 and after. A major Israeli military export item such as the Kfir jet fighter — itself a rebuild of Dassault's Mirage V — uses approximately 45 percent US components, including a General Electric engine. The chickens had come home to roost since US **private** investment in the Israeli arms industry, notably on the part of Rockefeller Associates and Control Data Corporations, ranging from 33 percent participation to full ownership, dated already from the sixties.<sup>49</sup> The semblance of Israeli autonomy in arms production helped maintain the pretense of US even-handedness in the Middle East. It also served to shield the Washington-Riyadh axis from radical Arab criticism at a time when it had become a crucial avenue to keep OPEC in line.

In 1974 with the Nixon-Kissinger administrations another US-Israeli agreement concerning strategic cooperation was signed. US military sales to Israel had grown from \$140 million in 1968-70 to \$1.2 billion in 1971-73 and \$4.5 billion in 1974-76.<sup>50</sup> In 1979 a Memorandum of Agreement was concluded. Followed by the Memorandum of Understanding signed by defence minister Sharon and secretary of defence Weinberger on 30 November 1981. Reportedly, this included a secret clause regarding a military plan for Latin America, involving 'the participation of Israel in the case of an invasion of Nicaragua or Cuba.'<sup>46</sup>

This was a period of rapid geo-strategic changes. In 1979 Iran was 'lost' and Afghanistan invaded. Carter's human rights presidency became a presidency of remilitarization, from El Salvador to its focus on the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia) and the Persian Gulf. Israel was now the only reliable US ally in the Middle East. With the Reagan administration the United States embarked on an aggressive roll-back policy, justifying a budget shift from social expenditures toward a multibillion military spending spree with a ubiquitous 'Soviet threat.' Foreign policy, formulated by secretary of state Gen. Haig, consisted of 'drawing the line in El Salvador' and 'going to the source,' combatting 'international terrorism' as one

of the main expressions of the 'Soviet threat,' while the underlying issue in standing up to the red menace was defined as a 'resource war' over strategic minerals. From Morocco to Pakistan, from Central America to the Caribbean, the empire lashed out. Of Israel, Reagan said this in February 1981: 'If there were not Israel with that force, we'd have to supply that with our own, so this isn't just altruism on our part.'<sup>51</sup>

The Reagan administration coincided with the second, more militantly rightwing Begin government. Playing upon the perception of Oriental Jews of the Labour Alignment as pro-American, Ashkenazi, elite, Begin played the anti-American card internally. The Begin government engaged in some high wire politics. On December 13, two weeks after signing the Memorandum of Understanding with the United States, a bill was rushed through the Knesset which effectively annexed the Golan Heights. In the west Bank the Civil Administration had been installed in November, also a step toward annexation. The cooperation agreement was suspended then abrogated, yet survived de facto. But at the same time, loud enough for American ears to hear, the Begin government began to echo US foreign policy. In late December 1981, defence minister Sharon spoke at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv on Israel's military plans:

A source of growing anxiety for us and the Western world which will certainly develop into the most important challenge for the eighties is the Soviet expansionist strategy directed at the Middle East and Africa. It should be perfectly clear that in the new strategic environment, Israeli security interests are influenced by developments and events which occur outside the sphere in which Israel has hitherto concentrated its attention... Beyond the first, traditional circle of confrontation which surrounds Israel, Israeli strategic interests demand that we expand into two geographic regions, which constitute a security interest for us: The peripheral Arab states and all those peripheral countries, the status and political — strategic orientation of which may have dangerous effects on Israel's national security.<sup>52</sup>

A strategic reorientation for Israel was outlined also in Oded Yinon's **Strategy for Israel in the eighties**,<sup>53</sup> published in February 1982.

Yinon starts from the premise that Arab states in the region, in view of their internal divisions (along political, religious, ethnic lines) and economic problems, constitute threat to the state of Israel only in the short run, not in the long run: Israel's strategy in the region should be aimed at the break-up or dismemberment of Arab states, by means of forming alliances with ethnic and political minorities in the region — the strategy followed in Lebanon. The threat to Israel in the long run however is considered to be Soviet influence (specifically, aiming to gain control over the Persian Gulf and southern Africa), in the light of the 'resource war.' In other words, a perspective completely in with the tenets of US foreign policy.

These were echos of US foreign policy but with a difference: the reorientation of strategy from 'Arab threat' to 'Soviet threat' was combined with an implicit project of regional hegemony and an enlarged definition of Israel's national security interests. After visiting Namibia in 1982 Ariel Sharon defined Israel's strategic concerns to include Africa and much of Asia.<sup>54</sup> In April 1983, statements by Moshe Arens, former ambassador to the US, then defence minister, about a reorganization of the IDF were accompanied by a map showing Israel's 'Arc of Intervention' stretching from Tunisia to Afghanistan.<sup>55</sup>

In 1981 Ya'acov Meridor, economic coordination minister, told a gathering of Israeli businessmen: 'Israel coveted the job of top Washington proxy in Central America.'<sup>56</sup> Financial assistance to El Salvador, refused by the US Congress, was supplied instead by Israel (\$21 million in 1981) through the back door, to be repaid out of the \$2.5 billion in US aid annually going to Israel; In a similar predicament in relation to the **contras** operating against Nicaragua, in April 1984, Israel bailed out the CIA with an amount between \$20 to 30 million.<sup>57</sup> A qualitatively different type of assistance from arms sales and training, which were also provided. Israeli advisers in South Africa in 1981 numbered 200. In sum, Israel volunteered to do the 'dirty work'

of the New Cold War. What in 1976 had been a cause of concern in pentagon circles, that Israel could re-export American technology to other nations, circumventing Congressional restrictions, became an **asset** in 1981 with a New Right administration in the White House that was bent on circumventing congressional restrictions. A long term strategic understanding between American and Israeli circles emerged or reemerged, from the backrooms of policy implementation into the Oval Office.

Israeli participation on the frontlines of the new cold war however is contingent upon US recognition of Israel's security interests. The way in which Israel's strategic reorientation was formulated by Sharon, in terms of Israel's national security interests, suggests that for Israel to assume an anti-Soviet posture is equivalent to its adopting a 'Greater Israel' strategy. During spring 1982 US provisions of

military equipment to Israel were stepped up. Then the **Pax Hedraica** was established in Lebanon with cluster, phosphorus and concussion bombs, courtesy USA. US foreign policy attempted to isolate the PLO from the Arab world by portraying it as both 'terrorist' and an extension of Soviet military presence.

(To be continued)

REFERENCES

40. *Al Pajar*, 4. 5. 84
41. *New York Times*, 22. 4. 84
41. Dan Horowitz, 'The Israeli Concept of National Security,' in Talal Aasid and Roger Owen, eds, *The Middle East*, London, MacMillan, 1983
43. Edy Kaufman et al, *Israel-Latin American Relations*, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1979, 48-51
44. Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennet, eds, *The Political Influence of the Military*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980, 506
45. Mahmood Mamdani, *Imperialism and Facism in Uganda*, London, Heinemann, 1983
46. *Wochen Zeitung*, Nr B, 24. 2. 84
47. Joe Stork, 1983, 19
48. Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, 'Middle East: Conspicuous Consumers in the Arms Race,' *Win*, 2. 3. 78
49. See Erik Hooglund, 5-6
50. Joe Stork, 1983, 19, 21
51. Naseer Aruri, 'The United States and Israel: That Very Special Relationship,' in Aruri et al, 1983, 5
52. *Palastine Focus*, August 1983
53. Oded Yinon, 'A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties,' in Israel Shahak, ed, *The Zionist Plan for the Middle East*, Belmont, MA, AAUG, 1982
54. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, *New York Times*, 6. 1. 83
55. *Monitin*, April 1983; *Palastine Focus*, August 1983
56. *NACLA*, Vol XVII, Nr 3, May/June 1983, 43-4
57. *New York Times* 21. 7. 83; *International Herald Tribune* 21. 5. 84

Krisp, Fresh...

MUNCHEE

- ◎ NICE BISCUITS
- ◎ HAWAIIAN COOKIES
- ◎ MILK SHORT CAKE



Ceylon Biscuits Limited  
P.O. Box 3, Pannipitiya.



FRESHNESS AND FLAVOUR GOODNESS OF



# Ghassan Kanafani — journalist teacher, revolutionary

**W**riter, journalist, Palestinian leader and militant, Ghassan Kanafani was born in Acre in the North of Palestine on the 9th of April, 1936. He lived in Jaffa until he had to emigrate with his family in 1948. He then lived in several Arab cities like Damascus, Kuwait and Beirut, where he finally settled down in 1960 and remained until assassinated

For a while Ghassan worked as a teacher, both in Damascus and Kuwait, and then entered the field of journalism at an early age. In 1963, he became the editor-in-chief of one of the Lebanese daily papers, but he continued to contribute articles to several weekly and daily publications.

Ghassan joined the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1954, and from that time on he was involved in the Arab-Palestinian struggle, both in his commitment and his practice. When the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was formed, Ghassan was among its leading cadres. In 1969, he became the founding editor of its weekly paper, *Al Hadaf*. Later he was elected a member of the Front's politbureau and became its official spokesman.

A proficient novelist, successful journalist and political commentator, Ghassan was also a stimulating lecturer and debator, as well as a sharp influential critic and a strong, progressive militant. He was also engaged in the art of Painting, which he taught in his early working life. He left quite a number of well known water colors, oil paintings, and posters, as well as pencil and crayon sketches, which were later exhibited,

Ghassan was a very warm, likeable person with a bright sense of humour and a straightforward and humble personality. He was loved and is remembered as a brilliant revolutionary comrade who never lost sight



of the main goals and priorities in spite of all the fields in which he was active.

His works are still alive, not only as a source of inspiration but as documented Palestinian history, art and political analysis from a period now ended. His short stories and theater focus on Palestinian experience of life under occupation and in exile and the immense suffering caused by this situation. However he never appeals to the pity of bourgeois 'good-doers', but carries this situation to its logical consequence: through revolutionary struggle the Palestinian people reconquer their pride and identity. His political analyses focus on issues which are not less central for the Palestinian revolution today, than when he wrote them.

## Political Analysis

In "The 1936-1939 Revolt in Palestine" Ghassan analyzes a period which is central for understanding the problems and possibilities of the Palestinian revolution. As he states, "In the whole history of Palestinian struggle the armed popular revolt was never closer to victory than in the months between the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1939". This revolt was defeated, and Ghassan analyzes the reason for this defeat. As Marx analyzed the

---

Twelve years ago, Ghassan Kanafani was killed by Israeli agents in Beirut, but his life and works had already deeply influenced not only the Palestinian revolution, but revolutionaries, nationalists and humanists all over the Arab world and abroad.

---

reasons for the defeat of the Paris Commune and Lenin analyzed the reason for the defeat of the 1905 revolution, Ghassan clearly saw that the same approach was necessary in order to strengthen the revolution, by learning from experience.

Ghassan analyzes the class composition of the Palestinian nationalist resistance, of its leadership and of the mass movement. He finds that the mass movement mainly consists of poor peasants, workers and beduins, while the leadership is dominated by feudal landlords, bourgeois and petit bourgeois forces. All these forces do have conflicting interests with Zionism and British imperialism, but "... the main outlines of the fundamental role that the feudal-clerical leadership was to play were established—it was to be a 'struggle' for a better position in the colonialist regime. But they could not engage in this 'struggle' without rallying around their support, the classes that were eager to free themselves from the yoke of colonisation. With this end in view, they drew up a programme that was clearly progressive, adopted mass slogans, which they were neither willing nor able to push to their logical conclusion, and followed a pattern of struggle which was quite out of character." (p. 10) The leadership found its allies in the Arab rulers especially in Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, but as Ghassan points out, the Arab ruling classes were forced to support British imperialism against their counterpart in Palestine, which was in effect leading the Palestinian nationalist movement. The Brits managed to crush the revolt, mainly by "striking at the poor peasant revolutionaries with unprecedented violence, and employing their extensive influence with the Arab regimes

which played a major role in liquidating the revolt." At the height of the revolt the Arab rulers were able to make the Palestinian nationalist leadership stop the revolt: "In obedience to the orders of the kings and emirs, the strike was called off, and the activities of the revolt came to an end within two hours of the call being published." (p. 20) The Brits had been confident that Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Transjordan "were prepared to use their influence with the Palestinian leaders and put an end to the revolt" (p. 20) and they were, as Ghassan shows, completely right in estimating that the Arab rulers would give priority to their alliance with imperialism, not to the Palestinian nationalists. At this early stage of the Palestinian nationalist movement, Ghassan demonstrates how the Palestinian bourgeois cannot lead the revolt to success; whatever their intentions, their strategy leads to defeat because of their dependence on their alliance with imperialism.

Analyzing the relation between Zionism and British imperialism, Ghassan concludes that without the support of imperialism in this stage Zionism could not have succeeded in usurping Palestine after the Second World War. The British slaughter of the revolt destroyed the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement and inflicted heavy losses upon the masses. Thus "the period taken to complete the second chapter of the Palestinian defeat—from the end of 1947 to the middle of 1948—was amazingly short, because it was only the conclusion of a long and bloody chapter which had lasted from April 1936 to September 1939" (p. 27).

In the period of the revolt, Ghassan points out that the depth of the alliance between Zionism and British imperialism clearly can be seen from the fact that British as well as Zionist tactics and strategy were based on the existence of an alliance. The Palestinian leadership, however was not able to see or draw the political consequence of this fact, but believed that British imperialism would give them concessions. This was the only reason for them to stop the revolt in a situation where British imperialism had taken a clear position for the Zionist bourgeoisie, and only

the force of the revolt itself objectively served the interests of the Palestinian nationalist movement, including its leadership.

Turning to the main Palestinian left-wing organization the Palestine Communist Party, Ghassan explains that already in the early 20s and 30s, the progressive labor movement—Arab as well as Jewish—had suffered crushing blows. The Zionist movement sought to isolate and destroy the CP, most of whose leaders were Jews who resisted being contained by Zionist labor organizations. In 1930, the party admitted that it had "adopted an erroneous attitude towards Palestinian nationalism". However, the party proved incapable of carrying out the task of mobilizing Palestinian Arabs. But despite their small number, their relative isolation and their failure to reach the Palestinian Arab masses, the communists threw all their weight into the 1936 uprising.

The aim of this analysis is of course not to minimize the heroic struggle of the Palestinian nationalists, or to minimize the immense brutality with which the revolt was crushed. On the contrary, through the history of the world, it has so many times been demonstrated that imperialism is prepared to use the most horrendous weapons at its disposal, when threatened by a strong, popular anti-imperialist or socialist movement: the Paris Commune, the Spanish Civil War, the Greek Civil War, Chile etc. However the world history also shows that a strong revolutionary movement, which learns from its mistakes, can achieve victory although having to fight the strongest power in the world; the experience of the Russian Revolution, Cuba, Vietnam, Democratic Yemen, etc.

#### **Learning from history**

In this way the studies of Ghassan Kanafani provide necessary lessons for the Palestinian revolution of today. True, the class composition of the Palestinian revolution has changed, and the main imperialist force in this area is no longer Britain but the USA. Yet because Ghassan analyzes the class forces of the revolution and its strategy when fighting Zionism and necessarily imperialism and Arab reaction his conclusion is as central now as

it was then. Though the Palestinian bourgeoisie truly is fighting for the national cause and has a role to play in the revolution, it cannot lead the revolution to victory. Also, as Ghassan never ceased to point out, the network of imperialism clearly puts Arab reaction on the enemy side. Therefore understanding and fighting imperialism becomes as central for Ghassan as it was for Lenin, when he pointed out the consequences of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. Therefore Ghassan's works are not only important for understanding the conditions for the Palestinian revolutionary struggle, but also a contribution to the world-wide anti-imperialist struggle.

Continuously Ghassan showed that imperialism is not a myth or a world of the mass media, it is a mobile body, an octopus which colonizes and exploits, spreading itself through western monopolies. Addressing himself to a group of students, Ghassan said, "The goal of education is to correct the march of history. For this reason we need to study history and apprehend its dialectics, in order to build a new historical era, in which the oppressed will live, after their liberation by revolutionary violence, from the contradiction which captivated them". Ghassan had not only achieved the knowledge of dialectical materialism, but applied it in his work. The concept that he believed in and lived for was distinct in what he said and wrote. As the primary contradiction, the one with imperialism, Zionism and racism, is an international, and the only solution is to destroy these threats by a united and steadfast armed struggle he encouraged and aided the spirit of internationalism among all the people he addressed or knew. This belief made him reject all compromises, all bourgeois and deviating solutions, which do not encompass or apply the thesis and development of the revolution and its long path towards liberation, striking the interests of imperialism and consolidating with the masses.

Ghassan Kanafani's commitment remains, as does his deep love for the cause of the oppressed masses and their struggle, and the results of his work with them, for which he was martyred.

—(From 'Democratic Palestine')

# What's in a name? Everything~ when it's Thomas Cook. 870 offices in 145 countries.



**Thomas  
Cook**

The trusted name in travel. Everywhere.  
15, Sir Baron Jayatilleke Mawatha Colombo 1.  
Telephone 22511-13 Telex 1278

GARADS

People's Bank  
for Dynamic  
and  
Better Banking



**THE PEOPLE'S BANK**