THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SRI LANKA

Under

S. W. R. D. BANDARANAIKE

H. S. S. NISSANKA

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A turning point in the history of a newly independent country in Asia

by

H. S. S. NISSANKA B.A. (Hons.); M.A.

Foreword
by
K. P. S. MENON

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FOREWORD

I found this book absorbingly interesting. I read it not only with pleasure and profit but with a certain pride of the achievements of a friend and college-mate, who was the brightest among my contemporaries at Oxford more than half a century ago.

"The child is father of the man". Early in life, Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike began to chafe at the stuffy aristocratic atmosphere of his surroundings. He also reacted against some aspects of life at Oxford, though he made his mark there in more field than one. "Oxford", said Mr. Bandaranaike, "was the dearer to me because she made me love my own country better."

Mr. H. S. S. Nissanka has shown how Mr. Bandaranaike's sweet-sour experiences in England contributed to his philosophy of life which was reflected in his foreign policy. To dwell on his personality in the making of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka is not to indulge in the cult of personality. After all, personality does count. Mr. Bandaranaike's personality counted as much in the evolution of Sri Lanka's foreign policy as Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's in India. Perhaps it counted even more. In independent India, Mr. Nehru had a virgin field in foreign affairs; Mr. Bandaranaike took over a field, full of furrows, produced by his fervently pro-British and anti-communist predecessors. Moreover, as Mr. Nissanka has pointed out, he had to educate the public to take an interest in foreign affairs.

That was not the case in India. In India the educated section of the people, represented *par excellence* by the Indian National Congress, had always taken an interest in issues of forign policy. For instance, at the annual session of the Congress in 1897, (when Mr. Nehru, who was to be the principal architect of independent India's foreign policy, was only 8 years old) the President, Sir C. Sankaran Nair (who, incidentally, spent the last summer of his long life in 1933 in Kandy, studying Pali from a Buddhist monk in order to be able to read the Buddhist scriptures in the original) said thus: "Our true policy is a peaceful policy. We have little if anything to expect from conquests. With such capacity for internal development as our country possesses, with such crying need to carry out the reform absolutely necessary for our well-being, we want a period of prolonged peace. We have no complaint against our neighbours, either on our north west or our north east frontier."

These are words which Mr. Nehru himself could have said. He, too, had nothing against his neighbours to the North West or to the North East—that is against Russia or China. Nor had Mr. Bandaranaike

anything against them. On the contrary his predecessors had everything against them. In their eyes and especially in the eyes of Sir John Kotelawala, who once said that he was prepared to support even the devil in opposing communism, Russia and China formed the spearhead of an international conspiracy against freedom and democracy. In this respect, as in others, he was toeing the line of the Mother Country. The Russian Bogey was one of the cardinal articles of Britain's foreign policy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and when the bogey put on the red cloak of communism, it looked all the more formidable. Mr. Churchill used to rant against "the foul buffonery of communism", and Mr. Poincare against "that howling wilderness of communism, Russia". Mr. Churchill moved away from this position after Stalin's death and recognised that "a new mood, if not a new spirit" had set in the Soviet Union. But under its first two Prime Ministers the Government of Sri Lanka still clung to its old colonial attitude. It refused to establish diplomatic relations with any communist state. Even the much-vaunted, or in American eyes, the disreputable, rubber-rice deal between Sri Lanka and China was a reluctant offshoot of circumstances, not the least of which was the USA's hamhanded interference.

Before independence and for a decade thereafter, Sri Lanka was like an elegant villa, the doors and windows of which were hermetically closed to foreign winds, except those blowing from the West and particularly from Great Britain.

To a large extent, that was the case with India, too, in the British days. The supreme service rendered by Mr. Bandaranaike was to throw the villa open to winds from every quarter and at the same time to strengthen its foundations, lest it should be shaken or blown away by the blasts of power politics.

How this miracle was accomplished—and it was nothing short of a miracle in that enchanted isle which used to rest so cosily in the lap of Great Britain—is the story of this book. The nature of the policy of non-alignment, as practised by Mr. Bandaranaike, the influences, personal and impersonal, which went to the making of this policy, and its effects, political, economic and cultural, are all described in this book with an array of facts and figures, meticulously collected and immaculately presented.

This book describes how Mr. Bandaranaike effected a virtual transformation of Sri Lanka's relations with states far and near, old and new, and especially with the newly independent countries. Even in its relations with its hoary neighbour India, there set in, in the time of Mr. Bandaranaike, a new glow, which was illumined by the personal

friendship between Mr. Bandaranaike and Mr. Nehru and has been continued by their illustrious successors, Mrs. Bandaranaike and Mrs. Indira Gandhi. So serene and impartial was Mr. Bandaranaike's conception of non-alignment that in the United Nations, on one or two crucial occasions, Sri Lanka, as pointed out by Mr. Nissanka, did not hesitate to non-align herself even with India. All this is described in a well documented chapter on " The voting behaviour of Sri Lanka in the U. N. ". It shows how in the brief span of four years the stature of Sri Lanka grew in the eyes of the world and how the world assembly recognized her position by electing her unanimously to the Security Council in 1959.

A few months ago a book called " India's Foreign Policy in the Nehru Years " was published in India. It was a compilation of articles edited by a distinguished writer and administrator, Mr. B. R. Nanda. What a dozen scholars and diplomats, including myself, had attempted to do for the Nehru years has been skilfully accomplished, single-handed, by Mr. Nissanka for the Bandaranaike years.

1st January, 1976.



PREFACE

SRI LANKA, the 'Resplendent Isle' situated at the Southern tip of the Indian subcontinent, has a recorded history dating back to the time when Vijaya, an Aryan prince from North India is said to have established a sovereign state of the Sinhala race in the 6th century B.C. She has had very rich traditions of maintaining economic, cultural and diplomatic relations with the outside world. From the 16th century onwards her maritime provinces were successively dominated by the Portuguese, the Dutch and finally the British. But it was only in 1815 when the chieftains of the last Sinhala stronghold in the hill country, disowned their king and voluntarily accepted the British Raj by signing the Kandyan Convention in exchange for certain safe-guards (which the British never had any intention to honour) that the island finally, and for the first time in its long and celebrated history, went completely under foreign rule.

Constitutionally, British rule ended on 4th February 1948 when Ceylon as the island was then called by the Europeans, became a Dominion of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The accession of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike to the position of Prime Minister on 12th April 1956 became a turning point in the history of the post-British period. Not only did it mark the beginning of a new era in the foreign policy of this country but also it culminated in the realisation of his cherished hope on 22nd May 1972 when (during the Premiership of his illustrious widow Mrs. Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike), this island became a Republic under its ancient name "*Sri Lanka*".

It is generally accepted that S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike gave a new orientation to the management of the foreign affairs of Sri Lanka by formulating and implementing the policy of neutralism and non-alignment. This book is an attempt at an appraisal of this view.

I undertook this study as a partial requirement for a professional degree for which I was reading at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A., during the academic year of 1967-68. I am grateful to the U.S. Educational Foundation in Sri Lanka and the 11E, New York, for giving me a Fulbright Scholarship Grant which enabled me to pursue my post-graduate studies. I am also deeply grateful to Prof. Marshall R. Singer of the University of Pittsburgh, under whose guidance and counsel

this book in its original form was written. It is with a sense of gratitude that I recall Professors Michael Flack, Ebert de Vries, Alex Weilenmann, Daniel Cheever and Alvin Roseman of the same University, who gave me invaluable guidance in my research into foreign affairs.

I express my deep appreciation of Sri K. P. S. Menon, brilliant scholar and veteran diplomat of India and honoured friend of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, for his kindness in writing a foreword to this book.

I am very greatful to Mr. Tissa Wijeyeratne, the former Additional Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka; Mr. Hemasiri Premawardene, the former Secretary to the Ministry of Cultural Affairs; Mr. Ridgeway Tillekaratne, the Secretary to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and Mr. P. B. Dissanayake, Deputy Director, Department of Information, for the active interest shown by them in the publication of this book.

I must also thank the Ceylon Tourist Board for designing the cover and my friends: D. G. A. Perera for valuable suggestions, M. F. M. H. Fakhir, M. R. B. Fernando for helping me in proof reading and all those who did their part well at the Government Press to bring out this book within a very short time. I must thank my wife, Rukmani for sharing with me the burden of producing this book.

Finally it is with a profound sense of gratitude and dedication that I remember here the late Prof. K. N. Jayatilleke (of the University of Sri Lanka), scholar, guru and friend, for inspiration, encouragement and advice which he has always given me.

H. S. S. NISSANKA.

10th January, 1976.
Ministry of Education,
Colombo 2, Sri Lanka.

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1. Background to Non-Alignment

IN many ways the Second World War was the turning point in the history of nations. The horror and misery it engendered may be looked upon as the birth pangs of a new world forum—the United Nations Organisation. This indirectly provided the frame-work to contain the forces of strife between the emerging power blocs, largely within the limits of what came to be known as the Cold War. Another phenomenon that emerged out of the chaos of this world holocaust was the gradual weakening of the old colonialism of the western powers. The nationalist forces of India, Indo-China and Indonesia managed to fight and gain their freedom from the British, French and Dutch respectively. In the wake of these changes and partly as a result of them, other countries like Burma, Ghana and Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) also gained their political freedom.

What happened in Sri Lanka was not really the achievement of political independence by its people but a transfer of political power from the hands of the colonial rulers to that of a group of politicians in whose hands the British felt that their interests continue to be secure. The British delayed to handover power even after they had already done so in India, Pakistan and Burma until they could make

sure that a reliable pro-British "Ceylonese" leader emerged. Sir Charles Jefferies, the then Under-Secretary of the British Colonial Office had made this point very clear in the following words.

> "There were to begin with, the defence interests of Britain and her allies. Ceylon is a vital point. If independenc is once granted, there could be no going back. Everyone was prepared to trust Mr. (D.S.) Senanayake, but he had yet to be elected, and even if he were, an independent Ceylon might well at some future time come under the control of a government which was not friendly to Britain. What safeguard could there be against that? This was fair enough, but Sir Oliver (Sir Oliver Goonetilleke who was to become the first Ceylonese Governor-General of Ceylon) could reply with equal fairness that the British and other nations were continually having to entrust their denfence interests to foreign countries over which they had no control. Why should loyal, friendly Ceylon be considered less trustworthy than other countries....."[1].

Therefore, the British delayed negotiations until D. S. Senanayake's victory at the polls in September, 1947. The basis for the negotiations then was not the national interests of the people of this country but the declared loyalty of the ruling elite to the British. A version of the inside story of these negotiations runs as follows:

> "Sir Oliver related how he impressed the tough men of Whitehall by declaring as far as loyalty to the British Crown was concerned, were the British to be involved in another war, there would be a race between Australia and Ceylon to come to Britain's aid and Ceylon would be there first"[2].

The independence so negotiated came in the form of the following bilateral agreements which ensured a pro-British foreign policy. (Please see Appendix I for the full text of these agreements.)

(1) The Defence Agreement.

(2) The External Affairs Agreement.

(3) The Public Affairs Agreement.

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1. Jefferies, Charles—*Ceylon: The Path to Independence*-Praeger, New York, 1963. P. 115.

2. Fernando, J. L.-*Three Prime Ministers of Ceylon*-M. D. Gunasena & Co., Colombo, Ceylon, (1963) P. 90. (Mr. Fernando wss a veteran Ceylonese journalist and a close friend of the late D. S. Senanayake and Sir John Kotllawala.)

These agreements were signed in Colombo on November 11th, 1947 by D. S. Senanayake on behalf of Sri Lanka and Sir Henry Moore on behalf of the United Kingdom. The agreements were the basis of the "Ceylon Independence Act (1947)*" which was simultaneously passed by the legislature of the two countries concerned and which finally received royal assent on December 10th 1947[3].

From the day of independence right up to the rise to power of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in April 1956, Sri Lanka was guarded and guided by the British. Sir Ivor Jennings who came to Sri Lanka as the Principal of the "Ceylon University College" (affiliated to University of London) had been an indispensable man in steering of the course of "Ceylon's emancipation." During his time the University College grew into a full-fledged university known as "University of Ceylon" which was, in essence, a stereotype British University devoid of any native cultural roots. This university produced, with rare exceptions, a generation of graduates steeped in the British values. The ruling elite that came to power in Sri Lanka in 1947 had been nurtured in English schools and colleges or in the Anglicized missionary high schools. The guiding light of the D. S. Senanayake period would seem to have been Sir Ivor Jennings of whom the late D. S. Senanayake, by all accounts, thought very highly. "If D. S. Senanayake felt that his intentions were honourable he was not easily deflected from the path he had decided to tread. Often during my Wednesday-morning breakfast talks with him he told me of the great debt that Ceylon (and he) owed to Ivor Jennings, then Principal of the University of Ceylon, for free advice and help that that celebrated constitutional authority had given to Senanayake in the latter's negotiations with the British to secure independence for his country."[4]

The elite who took over Sri Lanka were pro-British and as to their calibre, no impartial student of Sri Lanka's recent history would disagree with the following observation of Prof. Marshall R. Singer.

> "When the British made the decision to grant a substantial degree of political authority to "natives" in 1924, 1931, and finally complete political independence in 1948, they granted that power to Ceylonese who were most Westernized—to those most closely approximating themselves. In terms of social background this meant that the group to whom the British first began to transfer political power were:

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3. Jefferies, Charles—*Op. cit.*—Pp. 120–127.

4. Fernando, J. L.—*Op. cit.*—P. 33.

* Please see the Sessional Paper XXII—1947—*The Independence of Ceylon* Nov. 1947, given in the appendixPP. 138–154

1. Broadly Ceylonese,
2. Largely Christian,
3. Mostly high caste,
4. Highly urbanized,
5. Largely engaged in Western-type of occupation,
6. Of the highest economic and social class.

More important for the operation of the political process in Ceylon, in terms of self-image and world outlook, those individuals at the most Westernized end of the spectrum possessed a strong sense of identification with the British values, attitudes, and perspectives." [5]

It is interesting to note that in 1955 during the Prime Ministership of Sir John Kotelawala, Sri Lanka had 12 permanent secretaries in various ministries and 8 of them were persons who had been decorated with British imperial honours, such as C. M. G., O.B.E., etc.

It is true that the Ceylonese ruling elite of this period had gained a high reputation for efficiency in administration of home affairs but they did not possess such skill and sophistication in the matter of foreign affairs. Sri Lanka retained the services of the British in many fields. Sir Henry Moore (1948-49) and then Lord Soulbury (1949-54) were the first Governors-General of independent Sri Lanka ; her first Chief Justice was the Englishman, Sir Alan Rose. As acknowledged by D. S. Senanayake, Sir Ivor Jennings was there as the unofficial " guru " who guided Sri Lanka in both domestic and foreign affairs. In addition to these men, a large number of Britons was retained over from the colonial days to serve in the higher echelons of the Ceylon Civil Service, as Government Agents, Permanent Secretaries, etc., in the young brown Dominion.

Up to the time that the UNP regime suffered its first defeat in 1956, Sri Lanka had done many things to please the British. The Duke of Gloucester, brother to the King of England, was invited to inaugurate the Independence Ceremonies in Colombo which were attended largely by Commonwealth countries. The United Kingdom was represented officially by the Earl of Listowel, the then Minister of Colonial Affairs. The ensuing ceremonies were a colourful scene in the drama of Sri Lanka's independence. The climax of this drama was to be the visit of Queen Elizabeth II and her husband to Sri Lanka, in April 1954, during the Prime-Ministership of Sir John Kotelawala.

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5. Singer, Marshall R.—*The Emerging Elite : A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon*—M. I. T. Press (1964). P. 49.

Sri Lanka's Prime Ministers attended a number of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences, and they considered it an honour for their tiny country to sit on equal terms with the Prime Ministers of other more powerful Dominions. These Dominions—Canada, Australia, New Zealand—were quick to recognize Sri Lanka's independence and establish diplomatic relations with her; and the same recognition followed, from the U.S.A. Thus Sri Lanka in the dawn of her Independence, turned, very naturally it seemed, to the West for guidance and inspiration in her development. Her diplomatic connections reflected this attitude—from 1948 to 1956, no diplomatic liaison was established with any member of the Soviet bloc, who were considered to be of the enemy camp. The first three Prime Ministers—D. S. Senanayake (4th February 1948—22nd March 1952), Dudley Senanayake (26th March 1952—12th October 1953), and Sir John Kotelawala (12th October 1953—12th April 1956), and the United National Party (UNP), were firmly anti-communist.

All these Prime Ministers were exclusively pro-Western and their policy had been dictated by the following three factors :

(i) Their personal conviction that communism was an evil and anti-religious philosophy ;

(ii) The local Marxists, who, linked with the Communist countries, threatened the political stability and the ruling party's interests.

(iii) The necessity of friendship with the West (especially the UK) to solve the economic problems of Sri Lanka, and her inability to maintain a large army with modern equipment for defence purposes.

The last of the three factors given above had been repeatedly mentioned by D. S. Senanayake. This aspect of his foreign policy is well depicted by J. L. Fernando in his "Three Prime Ministers of Ceylon."

> "Later, as Prime Minister, he (D. S. Senanayake) saw clearly the need of a small country like Ceylon placed in a strategic position in the East, for friendship with England and the Commonwealth. There was a wealth of meaning in his reply to the pressmen in Bombay who had questioned him on November 5, 1948 on his way back from a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, on Ceylon's policy vis-a-vis the Commonwealth.
>
> 'Ceylon will remain in the Commonwealth of Nations as long as we feel our place is safe and our interests are not jeopardised.'

"In his personal conversations D. S. Senanayake spoke freely of his wish that Ceylon, a small dot in the map of Asia, should always retain and promote friendship with Great Britain and the Commonwealth ....."[6]

During D. S. Senanayake's regime, Sri Lanka had been active over an issue of great international importance. When the Dutch launched assaults on Indonesia on the 19th December 1948, Sri Lanka, in protest against the Dutch 'aggression' closed her ports and air space to Dutch ships and aircraft. At the Asian-African-Australian Conference on Indonesia held in New Delhi on 20th January 1949, Sri Lanka took an active role in urging that the Dutch aggression should not be tolerated. At home, this stand brought popularity to the Senanayake regime. It was true that this action went against a member of the Western bloc, but the important point to be remembered here was that it did not injure British interests.[7] At this stage it is necessary to recall that S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was the leader of the House of Representatives and a Minister of D. S. Senanayake's cabinet. It was he who represented Sri Lanka at the above-mentioned conference.

Sri Lanka played a prominent part at the Conference of Foreign Ministers which met in Colombo on 9th January 1950 with D. S. Senanayake in the chair. The United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka participated in this conference which laid the foundation of the Colombo Plan. At the conference not a single cold war issue was discussed and the whole conference was designed to create an impression that its sole concern was to give material support to South East Asian countries marching towards 'progress.' Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam, too, joined the Colombo Plan project. The U. S. A.; too, expressed her desire to extend her aid to this part of the world. The Colombo Plan was an attempt to strengthen the British Commonwealth. At the same time, as Professor E. F. C. Ludowyk points out, the Colombo Plan provided an opportunity for the powers of the Western bloc to penetrate into the economies of the aid-receiving countries. In the thinking of D. S. Senanayake and his colleagues, this was a necessity as well as a political expedience.[8]

The most important external affairs act of the Dudley Senanayake regime was the Sri Lanka-China rubber-rice pact of 1952 which enraged the U. S. A. There is an important secret document—a tele-

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6. Fernando, J. L.—*Op. cit.*—P. 36.

7 Jansen, G. H.—*Non-alignment and the Afro-Asian States*—Praeger, New York· 1966. Pp. 83–103.

8 Ludowyk, E. F. C.—*A Modern History of Ceylon*—Praeger, New York, 1966. Pp 225–226.

gram sent by the Sri Lanka Government to the Government of the U. S. A.—which tells a different story. According to this telegram, Sri Lanka was prepared to sell her rubber to the U. S. A. at a price lower than that offered by the government of the People's Republic of China. As the U. S. A. did not respond to this offer, Dudley Senanayake was obviously offended and felt that, contrary to his expectations, the U. S. A. had let him down. The outcome of this Sri Lanka—U. S.A. relation has been described well by Professor Ludowyk in the following words :

> " The USA's hostility to Ceylon's trade with China, its clumsy manoeuvres to interfere with shipping and prevent it from handling the rubber and the rice, provoked a quick and angry reaction both from the Opposition and from the nationalists in the country. If Washington had intended to win, then it had set about in most inauspiciously. Wriggins' comment 'From the specially Ceylonese point of view Washington's policies that preceeded and followed Ceylon's economic agreement with China left a most unsavoury taste' is appropriate. "[9]

By the rubber-rice deal, Sri Lanka had to give de jure recognition to China and this the Dudley Senanayake government did without hesitation. Prior to this, however, the United Kingdom had given its official recognition to Red China. Thus, Sri Lanka's recognition of China was not an action that would have raised eyebrows in London, though it did attract glares from Washington. The foreign policies of both the Senanayakes, father and son, remained consistently in harmony with that of Britain. For details please see Mr. J. R. Jayawardene's statement given in the Appendix, P. 174.

By, 1953, when Sir John Kotelawala became Sri Lanka's third Prime Minister, the world was clearly divided into the three camps—the Western bloc, the Soviet bloc, and the Non-aligned neutral countries. By conviction, Sir John was anti-Communist hence, anti-Russian, to a greater exetnt than either of his predecessors. The continued vetoing by Russia of the application made by Sri Lanka to join the UNO gave further justification for his anti-Communist policy, which was dictated by her two-fold self-interest. Mr. G. H. Jansen, a well-informed authority in Asian affairs reveals a fact unknown to many writers on Sri Lanka. This is what he says with regard to the Asian Prime Ministers' Conference in Colombo, in 1954.

> " When we reflect how eagerly some small states competed for United Nations membership, not merely as a guarantee of their independence but as a proof of their existence, it is refreshing to find that at Colombo one of the participants was reluctant to become a member. This was Ceylon, whose admission had been

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9 Ludowyk, E. F. C.—*The Story of Ceylon*—(1962) Faber, London. Pp. 288–289.

vetoed by Russia. Nehru proposed that the four other participants should jointly recommend Ceylon's admission. Sir John replied that the matter had been discussed by the Ceylon Cabinet; it preferred Ceylon's request to 'take its normal course'—that is, be further delayed. Admission, it considered, would cause difficulties, because of Ceylon's vital rice-rubber trade agreement with Communist China, rubber being one of the strategic materials included in the United Nation's embargo on trade with China. Mr. Nehru said no absolute ban was enforced, but Ceylon prudently did not wish to take any risk."[10]

If Sri Lanka were to become a member of the UN, Sir John feared that she would have to give up the rubber-rice trade with China—the economic consequences of such a move would have been detrimental to Sri Lanka.

The other motivation was to make capital out of the Russian veto to arouse public opinion against the local Marxists.

Analysing Sir John's behaviour and contributions at the Asian Prime Ministers' Conference held in April 1954 in Colombo, the Bogor Conference (December 1954), and the Bandung Conference in April 1955, one could easily see that he was more concerned with attacking "Communist imperialism" by which he meant Russian imperialism, as is revealed by the following statement, which was made at Bandung:

> "There is another form of colonialism, however, about which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in our minds and to which some of us would, perhaps, not agree to apply the term colonialism at all. Think for example of these satellite states under communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe—of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. Are those not colonies as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa or Asia? And if we are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty to openly declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?"[11]

This unexpected onslaught on Russia by Sir John turned tables on Nehru who was eager to bring about an Afro-Asian solidarity. However, Sir John's behaviour at Bandung was much appreciated by the USA and the UK as it was apparent from the headlines given to him

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10 Jansen, G. H.—*Op. cit.*—P. 161.

11 Kotelawala J. L.—Bandung 1955—Dept. of Information Govt. of Ceylon—Pp. 18-20.

in their press. This Bandung episode occasioned S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike to bring a vote of no confidence in the parliament against Sir John, but the latter was saved by the majority vote of his ruling party in the House, though some of his party members were notably absent at the time of the taking of the vote. This victory of Sir John indicated that his pro-Western and anti-Russian policy was in general approved of by his party.

Economic Factors

During the period from 1948 to 1956, economic needs of Sri Lanka too, played a decisive role in the formulation of her foreign policy.

During the period from 1948 to 1956, Sri Lanka's export trade formed roughly about 30 per cent. of her Gross National Product. The agricultural products such as tea, rubber and coconut were her major export commodities, and these amounted to about 95% of her export trade. Industrially she was very under-developed. She had to rely heavily on imports not only of machinery and textiles but also of consumer goods such as rice, flour and sugar. Therefore, a fall in her export volume and value was sure to create much difficulty. As the world price demands of tea, rubber and coconut continued to fluctuate the need to have favourable and dependable foreign assets began to be felt in Sri Lanka. The unexpected fall of her external trade in 1952 could not be averted even by D. S. Senanayake who had won the goodwill of the British. Having learnt from this experience, both Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala were compelled to devise means of having a favourable balance of trade for Sri Lanka. Both these Prime Ministers were anxious not to lose the trade with the traditional customers such as the Commonwealth countries and other Western countries. At the same time, both Senanayake and Sir John were conscious of the danger of relying entirely on these customers. Apart from the trade relations with them, she entered into trade agreements with the following Communist countries ; People's Republic of China (Ceylon Treaty Series No. 1, 1953), Yugoslavia (Ceylon Treaty Series No. 5 1953), Poland (Ceylon Treaty Series No. 2 1956), and Czechoslovakia (Ceylon Treaty Series No. 3, 1956).

In Sri Lanka, a certain section of the UNP feared that trade with the communist countries may strengthen the hand of the local left-wingers, their political enemies. For the trade treaty with China, Dudley Senanayake was, according to some, " to be pardoned " for he had no alternative. Sir John, though he signed these treaties with the Communist countries, did not try to promote unduly Sri Lanka's good relations, or even the trade with these countries. In fact, as shown in Chapter 8, during Sir John's regime, the trade with China was allowed to deteriorate. He could afford to let this happen because

of Sri Lanka's export trade with countries of the Western bloc, which increased during his Prime-Ministership. This rise in trade with the Western bloc-countries might have contributed to his exclusively pro-Western foreign policy.

Interest Groups

At the three general elections held from 1947 to 1956, foreign affairs of Sri Lanka never became a major issue. When the UNP wanted to attack the local Marxists it occasionally dragged Russia and China into local politics. The Dutch aggression in Indonesia in 1949 and Korean War also created some sensation in the Island but these issues never became grave questions of public concern.

The opposition parties, when they wanted to attack the UNP, would speak in anti-Western tones at local political rallies. But on the whole, the general public never listened more than desultorily to these harangues. Even during the election of 1956, the foreign policy did not become a burning issue. But during that election, it did, however, play a significant part—a more significant part than it had played during any previous election. (This was due in part to the fact that the 1956 electorate itself was a more literate and educated one, more interested in and responsive to world affairs).

During this election, the UNP was criticised as the party which had "sold Ceylon to the Americans," and it was further alleged that it had a secret deal with the USA to make Sri Lanka a member of the SEATO. This was meant to imply that she would have to share the fate of Korea and Vietnam. The opposition parties made capital of the untimely visits of John Foster Dulles and Bishop Lucas, early in 1956, to Sri Lanka as proof of the UNP's links with the USA. In a well-known political election cartoon entitled "Mara-Yuddha" (a Sinhalese word, with religious overtones, meaning "Struggle with Evil"), the struggle that the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist must make with the "American-influenced anti-nationalist". UNP was equated with struggle with the forces of evil that the Gautama Buddha went through before attaining Englightenment 2500 years ago. In this cartoon, the UNP headed by Sir John Kotelawala was depicted as Mara, the personification of Evil, at the head of whose forces marched Uncle Sam bearing his particular weapon—American dollars. As far as the non-Westernized rural Sinhalese Buddhists were concerned, this widely-circulated cartoon proved to be the most effective weapon ever used in a General Election up to that time. The "Lankadipa", (a widely-read Sinhala daily of the Times group) carried a cartoon on the 13th of March, 1956 depicting John Foster Dulles garlanding Kotelawala (labelled "Hero of Bandung") with a vast garland of dollars.

Before the campaign for the 1956 election, the public interest in the Ceylon—USA treaties, (mentioned below) was negligible.

(1) Ceylon-USA Treaty on the exchange of official publications (Ceylon Treaty Series No. 1, 1949.)

(2) Ceylon and USA agreement for Technical Co-operation under the Point Four Programme signed at Colombo, 7th November 1950 (Ceylon Treaty Series No. 12, 1950).

(3) Ceylon-USA agreement for broadcast of The Voice of America over Radio Ceylon—signed in Colombo 14th March, 1951 (Ceylon Treaty Series No. 5, 1951)

(4) Ceylon-USA agreement for the broadcast of Voice of America over Radio Ceylon, signed in Colombo, July 14th, 1954.

At this stage it is worth considering the question as to who shaped the foreign affairs of Sri Lanka and her foreign policy during the period from 1948 to 1956, when the public were not so conscious of world events.

Most of the members of the ruling United National Party and many members of its parliamentary majority had little interest and less sophistication in international affairs. As observed by Gunnar Myrdal, " the UNP was never a strong and well-constructed political machine. It had no grass-roots organization, no tradition of collective leadership and no firm party discipline. " [12]

The Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka, right from the beginning of Independence, had kept to themselves the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs. Over important issues, they discussed foreign policy matters with the Cabinet Ministers on an ad hoc basis. The left-wing newspapers and the " Times " group of newspapers—especially the Sinhala-language daily " Lankadipa " occasionally published editorials criticising the foreign policy measures taken by the Government. But the leading Lake House group of papers were dogmatically pro-UNP in the real and significant foreign policy issues. The figures given below [13] show the circulation of the national newspapers belonging to the two major groups before and during the General Election, 1956. The English-language " Daily News " and the " Times ", which are read for the most part by the English-educated classes, show increases in circulation of 6.8% and 22.2% respectively during the election. The " Dinamina " and " Janata " from the Lake House group, read by the Sinhalese-educated masses, have far bigger circulations

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12 Myrdal, Gunnar—*Asian Drama*—(1968) Twentieth Century Fund, Newyork Vol. 1, P. 348.

13 Weerawardene, I. D. S.—*Ceylon General Election 1956*—M. D. G Colombo, Ceylon, (1960). Compiled from figures given on Pp. 127-128.

and show increases of 17.9% and 10.0% in circulation during the election. But the most interesting fact is that the Sinhala-language daily from the "Times" group, the "Lankadipa", shows a staggering 61.7% increase in circulation during the election; this newspaper, unlike its English-language sister-paper the "Times", followed an editorial policy of hitting hard at the UNP during this time. The increase in its circulation during the election, in view of the result of that election, was significant.

The circulation of Sri Lanka's leading national daily-papers before and during 1956 Election

Paper	*Prior*	*During*	*increase*
Dinamina (Lake House)	67,000	79,000	17.9
Janata (Lake House)	28,000	40,000	10.4
Daily News (Lake House)	44,000	47,000	6.8
Lankadipa (Times group)	47,000	78,000	61.7
Evening Times (Times group)	18,000	22,000	22.2

During the time of D. S. Senanayake, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke and Sir Ivor Jennings had been the most influential advisers on foreign policy matters. These two were acknowledged experts on foreign affairs. But these two did not win the confidence of Dudley Senanayake, who succeeded his father. He was prepared to listen even to the views of the opposition especially on matters connected with trade with Red China. Dudley Senanayake's first short regime was not very significant from the foreign affairs point of view as he was, during that period, bogged down by a number of nagging domestic problems.

Upto 1956, Sir John had been the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka who involved himself most in the tug-of-war of international politics Records of his activities reveal three persons who guided or gave him inspiration in his ventures into foreign affairs.

In the thinking of Sir John, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke who had succeeded Lord Soulbury as the Governor-General in July, 1954, was his most indispensable adviser, in foreign as well as in domestic affairs. As reported by Jansen, Sir Oliver's indispensability to the government of Sri Lanka could have been well observed during the Colombo Conference of Asian Prime Ministers held in April, 1954.

> "... although all five delegates (Asian Prime Ministers) were members, its two outstanding participants were Sir Oliver Goonetilleke of Ceylon and Krishna Menon of India..

"In the drafting committee, Sir Oliver, Krishna Menon and Desai had laboured through the nights of the 29th and the 30th April to have some drafts ready for the premiers when they reassembled in Kandy on the 1st May .. The Committee was also at a deadlock. In desperation it asked Sir Oliver to try to produce a draft on his own responsibility....." [14]

(This draft was ultimately accepted by the Asian Prime Ministers.)

C. C. Desai, High Commissioner of India in Sri Lanka, was a close friend of Sir John. It was this foreign diplomat who advised Sir John to take the initiative to summon the Asian Prime Ministers' Conference in 1954, which brought the latter some prestige. As Jansen reports,

"American and British diplomats were busily in contact with the Ceylon Foreign Ministry; the Americans because of their fears that the meeting might lead to an extension of Mr. Nehru's influence, and the British because they were afraid that the Commonwealth idea might be weakened by such a regional gathering...." [15]

Eventually, however, Desai's influence was overpowered by that of the American diplomats in Colombo. At that time Sir John was going to Bandung, and as mentioned before, he actively disrupted that conference and contributed to the curtailment of Nehru's influence at Bandung. All this was well in keeping with the American aspirations in the early fifties.

As the "Three Prime Ministers of Ceylon" reveals and as many familiar with Sri Lanka's politics can recall, there was another person who guided Sir John. This was Mr. Esmond Wickremesinghe, the Managing Director of the Editorial Section of Lake House, who was a sophisticated product of Sir Ivor Jenning's University of Ceylon, and who influenced heavily the editorial policies of the Lake House Press. He was one of the handful of Ceylonese who had followed world politics with keen interest. His ideas were pro-Western, and therefore his thinking coincided with Sir John's, and he had the sophistication and the finesse that the heavy-handed and sometimes blunt Sir John lacked. The following episode provides an insight into Sir John's lack of sophistication as far as international politics was concerned, and the relationship between him and his advisors in this field.

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14 Jansen, G. H.—*Op. cit.*—Pp. 153–154.

15 Jansen, G. H. —*Ibid.*

"At Esmond Wickremesinghe's request I (J .L. Fernando, a veteran Lake House journalist) had asked Sir John to call at Wickremesinghe's home one night late in 1955 to allow us to learn something of Ceylon's foreign policy of the time. Having got to know of this engagement, the Governor-General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke himself suddenly appeared on the scene. Esmond Wickremesinghe had at that time already proved himself to be an able adviser on foreign affairs, a subject which he was constantly following in the foreign newspapers and journals .....It was in this background of knowledge that Esmond Wickremesinghe on this particular night in his home gave the three of us—Sir John, Sir Oliver and myself—a learned dissertation on Far-Eastern affairs which, I am quite sure sounded like Greek or Elu Pali to Prime Minister Kotelawala. It did to me..... When Wickremasinghe ceased speaking, Sir John was beyond his depth and silent....[16]

In Sri Lanka when the general public of that time was not alive to rapid flux of international politics, when the ruling party members were not very conversant with such affairs, and even when the Prime Minister himself did not seem to possess a clear and balanced view of the world situation, it was the three persons mentioned above—C. C. Desai (upto the time of the Bandung Conference), Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, and Esmond Wickremasinghe, together with the British and American diplomats stationed in Colombo, who actually guided the course of Sri Lanka's foreign affairs, during the Prime-Ministership of Sir John Kotelawala.

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16 Fernando, J. L.—*Op. cit.*—Pp. 81-82.

2. Formulation of a New Policy

THE year 1956 was of significance to Sri Lanka. Traditionally, it was the 2500th anniversary both of the passing of Gautama Buddha, revered by about 67% of the population as the founder of their faith, and of the landing of the forefathers of the Sinhalese on the Island. Popular legend also made it the year in which the legendary hero and ruler 'Diyasena' was to appear in Sri Lanka bringing prosperity, peace and harmony, as well as national and religious resurgence to the island.

The ruling party, the UNP, ill-advisedly brought forward the date of the general election (which was to have been held in 1957) and fixed it for April 1956. This move no doubt enabled the 'Diyasena' legend to play its part in arousing the great wave of public feeling which over-threw the pro-Western government of Sir John Kotelawala ; and S. W. R. D. Bandaraniake, cast in the role of Diyasena by the masses, was swept into power at the head of a coalition, the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (Peoples' United Front).

This change of government was considered by many as the end of an Era—as the downfall of an unrepresentative aristocracy to be specific.[1] The changes brought about by the Bandaranaike regime were many; of these, the change in the foreign policy stands conspicuous, as a change in direction which continued long after the death of Bandaranaike himself. The foregoing discussion is an attempt to find out the factors that led Bandaranaike to formulate a foreign policy so different from those of his predecessors.

Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, born on 8th January 1899, was the only son of Sir Solomon Dias Bandaranaike, K.C.M.G., who was the most powerful pro-British Sinhalese aristocrat of his day. As a child the young Bandaranaike was tutored by an English governess, and at the secondary school stage, he was sent to St. Thomas' College, Sri Lanka, a very expensive missionary high school devoted to inculcating British attitudes and values in its pupils. Thus he was born into a family of great wealth and first social rank, the son of a powerful aristocrat, and was reared in an atmosphere of adulation for everything British.

Sir Solomon, wanting to see this son a chip of the old block, sent him up to Christ Church College at the University of Oxford, England. Reading humanities there, he soon won and maintained throughout his Oxford career a reputation as a brilliant orator; but he was somewhat disappointed to obtain only an Upper Second Class degree, when his fellow student K. P. S. Menon of India obtained a First Class degree.

Without doubt it can be said that Oxford had a decisive influence on Bandaranaike. The attitudes generated in him by his experiences as an undergraduate, described below, would have been, it is reasonable to suppose, the direct opposite of his father's adulatory attitudes towards the British:

> "My first year at Oxford, once the novelty of things had worn off and I had settled down to College routine, I recollect as a period of disappointment and frustration. In all directions I found myself opposed by barriers, though invisible and impalpable, were none the less very real. I wrote a story for our college magazine "The Cardinal's Hat" that was politely returned.... But the most humiliating disappointments were reserved for the social sphere. With positive rudeness and brutal frankness one might be able to deal ..... effectively; bounders and snobs can be suitably handled. But the tragedy of it was that the vast majority of my fellow undergraduates did not behave in the former manner and

1 The well-known Sinhala writer Martin Wickremasinghe, described this in a widely-read article as the "The Fall of the Brahmins", "Brahmin" being used as a derogatory term for a vitiated elite divorced from the aspirations of the masses.

were certainly not the latter. The trouble was far more subtle and deep-seated; in a variety of ways one was always being shown, politely but unmistakably that one was simply not wanted. It is terribly wounding, after laboriously patching up an acquaintanceship with one's neighbour at dinner in the Hall or at the lectures, to be passed by him in the street as though he had never seen one, or still worse, to see him hurry off with a hasty nod through fear that he might have to walk with one along the street, or again notice the embarrased manner in which an urgent engagement is pleaded whenever an invitation to lunch or tea is extended . . . ."[2]

Bandaranaike wrote about many bitter memories of his formative days spent in England. Referring to a difficulty in finding lodgings, he wrote that he had to tramp round every house which had a board up "Rooms to let" and usually he was told that the rooms had just been booked by someone or frankly told that they did not like to have Easterners. (He apologetically admitted that some Eastern students did have bad reputations.) The treatment he received from the English must have come as a shock to the young man reared in an atmosphere of respect, regard and almost veneration for the British. Bandaranaike, sensitive and idealistic, was shocked by the lack of sensibility, the lack of true courtesy, of human warmth (though impeccably cloaked in politeness) displayed by the British at that citadel of British culture, Oxford. Thus, while appreciating the British genius in those aspects where it was admirable, he no longer idolised them; therefore it is not surprising to see that he did not change into a "brown sahib" at Oxford, but remained an earnest Easterner rooted in his entirely different culture.

Through patience, perseverence and talent he made a name for himself at Oxford soon enough. "The Oxford Magazine" and "Isis", the two university magazines, and other journals such as the "Morning Post" and the "Cherwell" started reporting Mr. Bandaranaike's brilliant achievements in the Oxford Union. On 17th November 1921, the "Isis" referred to his speech as the "best speech of the evening." On 9th November 1922, the Oxford Magazine reported, "Rare eloquence is rarely heard in any debating society, but we heard it tonight from Mr. Bandaranaike." Bandaranaike's speech on the debate on "That the Government should adopt at once a Foreign Policy based on the League of Nations," was reported on 24th May 1922 in the "Isis" in the following words. "The one man power diplomacy is no longer right; and of the conference, the one at Washington is the only one that has ever succeeded.

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2 Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D.—*Speeches and Writings* (1963) Ceylon Govt. Publication (R 1158–2006 (2/61)) P. 9.

2 A–A 15785 (75/7)

Geneva, in particular, had made deeper the cleavage of Europe. The USA could no longer be counted upon. The present methods of diplomacy are impotent . . . ."

In the many speeches he made at the Union Society, the line of anti-colonialism was always visible. As his career progressed at Oxford, he had the distinction of being elected Secretary of the Union Society, defeating Malcolm Macdonald. Sir Anthony Eden was his neighbour at his rooms in the 'Old Library', and K. P. S. Menon was a close friend. He gained great prestige and social standing at Oxford. But his thoughts and feelings of this time, revealed by Bandaranaike himself in his memoirs of Oxford, were significant:

> "I had gained entrance to the richest inner chambers of varsity life. And the key that had opened these doors was, as I thought it would be, success. It was a new and not altogether displeasing experience for me to walk about the streets, while undergrads nudged each other and whispered, pointing me out, "This is so and so." Young men no longer hesitated to greet me and walk along with me, who would have avoided me furtively before. What snobs the majority of Englishmen were! In an extremely gentlemanly way, of course ..... There is nothing that saps the self-respect of a man more than the feeling that his fellow-men, with whom he is brought in contact, are continually looking on him as an inferior being who is fundamentally repugnant to them. This iron had entered my soul in the earlier period of my varsity life; and it coloured my attitude towards Oxford to the end. And it is this which saved me from being more submissive to, and receptive of, the influence of the university; from acquiring . . . . an Oxford manner and an Oxford accent".[3]

Summing up a series of 18 articles he wrote about his life at Oxford, he remarked:

> "As I thought of Oxford, there was a strange dryness in my throat, and in humbleness of heart I realized the truth that for all the fine airs I liked to give myself about her, I too loved Oxford passing well, and was proud to acclaim myself one of her grateful sons. And Oxford was the dearer to me because she had taught me to love my own country better."[3]

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3 Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D.—*Op. cit.*—Pp. 41-42.

This was Bandaranaike fresh from Oxford, from whence he graduated was called to the Bar. Returning to Sri Lanka in 1925, he was touched by the warm reception given him by the people of Sri Lanka, particularly those of Siyane Korale, the home of the Bandaranaike clan.

While practising as an advocate (attorney), Bandaranaike entered politics. In 1927, he was elected to the Colombo Municipal Council, and in 1931, he was sent as the unopposed member for Veyangoda to the State Council. Up to 1947, he held many important positions in the State Council. He entered the new Parliament of Sri Lanka as an M.P. (Member of Parliament) for Attanagalla at the General Election of 1947 in which his rival got 4,609 votes to his 31,463 votes.

Under D. S. Senanayake, he was the Minister of Health and Local Administration, and also was the Leader of the House. On the 12th July 1951, he resigned from the Cabinet and crossed over to the Opposition with a following of a number of fellow-M. Ps., dissolved the Sinhala Maha Sabha which he had fostered for several years and founded a new political party—the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. At the 1952 general election his party secured 9 seats enabling him to be the Leader of the Opposition, the position he held till the General Election of 1956.

D. S. Senanayake was obviously disappointed by the behaviour and the thinking of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike; had the latter's father, Sir Solomon, been alive at the time, he too would have been so. Many different interpretations have been given to Mr. Bandaranaike's revolt against, and break from, the UNP. Professor Wriggins has noted some of them, as given below :

(1) Bandaranaike understood that being in the UNP, his chances of succeeding Mr. Senanayake as the Prime Minister were remote as the latter was grooming his nephew Major Kotelawala for the job.

(2) The Senanayake-Kotelawala-Jayewardene families continued to feel that the younger Bandaranaike, like his father, considered them to be of inferior social status.

(3) D. S. Senanayake kept foreign policy matters to himself and did not trust Bandaranaike. [4]

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4 Wriggins, W. H.—*Ceylon : Dilemmas of a New Nation*—Princeton, N. J. Princeton University Press, 1960. Pp. 110–111.

Another two interpretations which were current at the time could be added to Professor Wriggin's list :

(1) Bandaranaike was aware that there was a growing sense of frustration and disappointment in the country, and no fundamental changes in the country had been brought about by the UNP. Therefore the days of the UNP were numbered. Hence he felt that he should quit the UNP if he were to realize his goal of becoming the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

(ii) Bandaranaike sincerely wanted to serve his country and according to his conviction, the UNP, led by the familially connected Senanayake-Kotelawala-Jayewardene trio, was unable to solve the country's problems. On the point of the means of solving those problems, Bandaranaike's thinking was different from that of the Senanayake group.

At the Inauguration of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, on the 2nd September 1951, Bandaranaike, speaking about the various motives ascribed to his resignation from the UNP and the Cabinet, made these remarks.

" I wish to state categorically that the real and only reasons for resignation were :

(1) that the policies for which I had been pressing from the start were not only not implemented but finally rejected contemptuously ;

(ii) " that there was apparently a plot going on, on the part of some persons, while keeping me in the government and making use of me, to discredit me in every possible way both directly and indirectly. " [5]

The second interpretation given above was based on Bandaranaike's speech at the House of representatives delivered on the occasion of his crossing over to the opposition. In that speech he anticipated misinterpretations and distortions of facts as weapons that might be used against him.

In real politics, what matters is not motives but actions. The fact is that Bandaranaike broke away from the UNP, obviously because he differed from D. S. Senanayake's ways of thinking. Of the many issues over which Bandaranaike differed from Senanayake and the UNP, Sri Lanka's foreign policy is the one on which attention will be focussed in this study.

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5 Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D.—*Op. cit.*—P. 145.

Having revolted against the UNP, Bandaranaike had to offer something new in the form of his party's policies. Besides, this need of going against the "old regime", (which seemed to be more psychological than material), there were other inspiring factors that prompted him to formulate a new foreign policy.

As shown earlier in this chapter, Bandaranaike, during his formative years developed somewhat of an anti-British attitude, a need to retaliate to British snobbery. Criticizing D. S. Senanayake's foreign policy in the House of Representatives, on 23rd July 1951, Mr. Bandaranaike tried to show that Sri Lanka foreign policy was fettered to the foreign policy of the United Kingdom. To substantiate his argument he spoke thus:

> "Take the case of our recognition of China, a very good thing in itself. But when the Commonwealth Conference was to be held in Colombo, a few days before the opening of that conference why did our country rush to take this rather unusual progressive step by granting recognition to the People's Republic of China? I will tell you what my own impression of that is. England had decided for reasons of her own, connected particularly with Hongkong, that it was necessary for her to recognize China before the Colombo Conference ..... and we, of course, had to get into line." [6]

Aside from what Bandaranaike learnt and experienced at Oxford, two other factors—religion and the Indian National Movement—seem to have had a decisive influence over the conceptualization of his foreign policy. The religion that influenced him most was Buddhism. He was born a Christian. Shortly after his return from Oxford (1924) he became a Buddhist—this is his first revolt against the "old regime" for, his father, typifying that regime, had been a staunch pro-British Christian. To be a Christian in Sri Lanka in that era carried with it a certain measure of social prestige, for it was the religion of the rulers of the island, the British. In the early 1930s he wrote an article entitled "Why I Became a Buddhist," in which he stated that Buddha's teaching and the way of life had special appeal both to his heart and his mind. He wrote that, "the Buddha Dhamma (teaching) has emerged triumphant from the test of my reasoning."

In an address to the World Fellowship of Buddhists in Kandy on 27th May 1950 he made the following observations:

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6 Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D.—*Towards a New Era—Selected Speeches Made in the Legislature of Ceylon*—Ceylon Govt. Press, 1961. P. 689.

3—A 15785 (7/71)

"It may be true that Communism rejects the religious idea. But let us remember that Western capitalism, out of which Communism sprang logically and almost inevitably, had itself long lost any real sense of spiritual values owing to the increasing emphasis laid on material things.

"At this time it behoves all persons of understanding and goodwill throughout the world, to make a supreme and concentrated effort to avert the doom that appears to be rushing on us all..... To-day what is needed is a rediscovery of the Middle Way."[7]

The last word in this quotation refers to a Buddhist concept known as "Majjhima Patipada" which describes a correct way of life. Avoidance of extremes is a marked characteristic of this Buddhist way of life. One cannot live harmoniously when one is attached to one group in opposition to another.

This doctrine of the Middle Way seems to have had a great influence over Mr. Bandaranaike's concept of neutralism and non-alignment which he claimed as the basis of his foreign policy. In the light of world politics, this concept of neutralism and non-alignment was the avoidance of getting involved in either the American or the Russian camp. The "Middle Way" according to Buddhist concept is not a way of innocuously insulating oneself from unpleasant realities, but a dynamic concept of harmonious living amidst extremes of diametrically opposing elements. This concept is somewhat close to the current concept of Functional Approach to World Peace.

The Indian National Movement under the leadership of Surendranath Bannerjee, Aravind Ghose, C. R. Das and Rabindranath Tagore, etc., created the cult of the "Swadeshi" in India, (this was a movement to promote home industry), during the first two decades of the 20th century.

Returning from Oxford to Sri Lanka, Bandaranaike started a Swadeshi movement modelled on the Indian one. Particular attention was drawn to the handloom industry and this was directly influenced by Ghandi's "Charka" movement, the Indian handloom movement which was launched to hit at the British textile industry.

Bandaranaike was one of the first Ceylonese leaders to discard Western dress, which he did soon after his return from Oxford in 1925. (Even in this he went against the custom of the ruling elite of the time, who wore top hat and tail-coat in imitation of Whitehall politicians.) He attended top state functions in hand-woven and hand-spun material, for which the cotton had been grown in Sri Lanka itself.

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7 Bandaranaike.— Speeches and Writings—P. 107.

In the political field, as for ideas and inspiration, Bandaranaike had more from Pandit Nehru than from anybody else from anywhere in the world. Both had similar experiences and aristocratic upbringings (but the father of Nehru, Motilal, was a freedom fighter quite different from Sir Solomon Bandaranaike, who had given himself over body and soul, to the British.) Nehru and Bandaranaike had great similarities of perception with regard to national and international politics.

Local politics, too, had an impact on the conceptualization of the foreign policy of Bandaranaike. The left-wing leaders of Sri Lanka, Messrs. Dr. N. M. Perera, Phillip Gunawardene, S. A. Wickremesinghe, Pieter Keuneman and Dr. Colvin R. de Silva had successfully created the impression among the younger generation that cordial relationship with the Communist bloc was a sign of progressive thinking and that the foreign policy of D. S. Senanayake was a reactionary 'square' one. In the 1956 general election, Bandaranaike made a no-contest pact with the left-wing parties and Philip Gunawardene, the man known as the "father of the Revolution" in Sri Lanka, too, was given a portfolio in his Cabinet, which was formed on 19th April 1956. Another left-wing leader, Mr. T. B. Subasinghe, who was a Bandaranaike confidante, was appointed parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs (which dealt with the foreign policy matters) while yet another left-winger, Mr. T. B. Illangaratne was also a member of the Cabinet. Thus the left-wing influence too might have contributed to the formulation of a policy that was to have an appeal to the "progressives".

While serving as a minister in D. S. Senanayake's Cabinet Bandaranaike showed a keen interest in foreign affairs. At the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in March 1947, he, the Leader of the Sri Lanka delegation, expressed two ideas. (1) Asia should be free, strong and united. (2) India must be generous to the small nations and the historical bonds between India and Sri Lanka must be strengthened in the future. Writing an article to the "UNP Journal" in 1947, about the same conference, he suggested an idea of setting up an "Asian UNO"—"A federation of free and equal Asian countries." This idea, according to the article, was promptly accepted by Pandit Nehru, who went to the extent of calling the Conference's attention to the creation of an Asian Secretariat. Speaking at the Asian Conference on Indonesia held in New Delhi on the 20th January 1949, Bandaranaike stated that under no circumstances should they (the members of the Asian Conference) tolerate any form of colonialism.

Bandaranaike's ideas on foreign policy matters, before he became the Prime Minister, came mostly in the form of criticism of his predecessors' foreign policies. On 17th June 1952, on the occasion of the debate on the Throne Speech at the House of Representatives, he advanced the following arguments :

(1) Sri Lanka, so far, had failed to formulate a well-defined and independent foreign policy and those in power apparently had no sophistication in current and international affairs.

(2) Sri Lanka, though small, in her own interests and in a wider context, should play an important and constructive role in international affairs.

(3) In foreign affairs, her dependence on British advice and guidance was not conducive to the interests of Sri Lanka.

(4) Wherever bi-polar power bloc conflicts existed, she should show an attitude of neutrality.

(5) Sri Lanka should, in South East Asia, occupy a position analogous to that of Switzerland in Europe.

Bringing a vote of no confidence in the Government in view of the attitude adopted by the then Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawala at the Bandung Conference, on the 27th April 1955, at the House of Representatives, Bandaranaike, for the first time not only approved of the "Panchaseela"—the five principles formulated by Pandit Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai, but also took a firm stand in support of Pandit Nehru.

Foreign Policy Formulation

In 1956, Bandaranaike the critic of the foreign policy of his predecessors had to face the challenge of formulating a foreign policy which had to differ radically from that of the UNP regime. For the first time, he began to be aware of the elements or environmental factors that should be taken into consideration—idealism had no bounds and barriers but the reality had. His personality, as observed hitherto, began to play a decisive role along with the environmental factors, in the formulation of his foreign policy.

The first precise pronouncement of Bandaranaike's foreign policy took place on the 5th July 1956 when he was addressing the Press Association in London, when he went there to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. He spoke thus :

"We who have recently regained our freedom, are feeling our way, groping forward, keeping our minds open in many matters and in many ways, in order that we may discover for ourselves that form of society which is best suited to our own needs. How does it work ? Take the subject of foreign policy. Our attitude .... is an attitude of neutralism, and is one which some in the West do not understand, perhaps do not wish to understand. It is not a sign of cowardice, it is not a desire to have the best of both worlds. It is something much more than a negative and a passive attitude ; it is something very positive .....

"We want peace ..... That is why, in the pursuit of peace, some of our countries feel that we do not wish to align ourselves with power blocs.... built on mutual fear and suspicion..... which, in the name of defence, find themselves compelled to create a Frankenstein which perhaps they themselves may not ultimately be able to control.....

"I do not say that we should not protect ourselves. We must keep our eyes open, but we must not think in terms of hatred of some particular country, of some particular ideology .... Now I feel that in pursuing this ideal of peace for us, it is best that we do not align ourselves with these military blocs either of the West or the East ; that we preserve friendship with all and try perhaps to provide a bridge between the two radically opposed points of view. Neutralism, but dynamic neutralism, is in the interest not only of our own countries but of mankind as a whole."[7]

In a statement made to the House of Representatives of Sri Lanka on July 24th 1956, Bandaranaike repeated the sentiments he voiced in the quotation given above.

He also added, on that occasion, that neutral countries reserved to themselves the right to criticise their friends, whenever they felt that such friends had not acted correctly, and also that the neutral countries were strongly opposed to any attempts by big powers to bully any small country.

On 18th March, 1958, in his address at the Chinese Commodity Exhibition, Colombo, Bandaranaike added another very important line to his foreign policy as is evident from the following statement.

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7 Bandaranaike, *Speeches and Writings* (*Op. cit.*)—Pp. 374-375.

"The idea has been developing in my mind for some time that the time has come to pursue one of the important decisions of Bandung in greater detail in the realm of economics. It is my intention, if the countries concerned agree, to suggest the holding of an economic conference, if necessary of all the Bandung powers, perhaps the restriction being made at the beginning to Asian countries for this purpose .... it may be desirable to consider certain common problems of planning not only merely on a national basis now but at least as a beginning, on a regional basis. . . ." [8]

As evident in the writings and the speeches quoted above, Bandaranaike's foreign policy objectives were as follows:

(1) Maintain friendship with all countries while reserving the freedom to criticise them, when occasion arises.

(2) Bridge the gap between the power blocs with a view to preserving peace in the world.

(3) Freedom to develop Sri Lanka's external relations with a view to fulfil national interests,

(4) Opposition to any form of colonialism—opposition to the coercion or domination of small countries by big powers.

(5) Afro-Asian solidarity-extending from the political to the economic field.

Bandaranaike's Contemporaries

On the objectives of foreign policy, Bandaranaike and Pandit Nehru thought very similarly. When the former came to power in 1956, Nehru had already developed a well-defined foreign policy for India, and by 1956 India's prestige in the diplomatic world was gaining ground and shortcomings and oversights of Indian foreign policy were not quite conspicuous. Therefore Bandaranaike, the premier new to the job, was sincerely prepared to develop his foreign policy broadly on the lines of the Nehru foreign policy ; and thus it becomes necessary to point out what those lines were.

As early as September 1946, Nehru made it clear that freedom from entangling blocs was to be a principal element in free India's foreign policy. [9] As time passed, non-alignment became a cardinal principle of Nehru's foreign policy, as the following idea which was to be repeated whenever he spoke on this subject, shows:

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8 Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D.—*Speeches and Writings* (*Op. cit.*)—P. 419.

9 Jansen, G.)H.—*Op. cit.*—P. 54.

"We should not align ourselves with what are called power blocs. We can be of far more service without doing so and I think there is just a possibility—and I shall put it higher than that—that at a moment of crisis our peaceful and friendly efforts might make a difference and avert that crisis." [10]

After the success at the Korean crisis, Nehru optimistically made the following remarks : "I feel that India can play a big part, and perhaps an effective part in helping to avoid war. Therefore it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be lined up with any group of powers which for various reasons are full of fear and prepare for war." [11]

In a speech broadcast over "Radio Ceylon" on May 2, 1954 Nehru came out with a formula evolved by Mr. Chou En-lai and himself to prevent the outbreak of war. That was the famous formula "Panchaseela"—the "Five Principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity, sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence." Commenting on these, Nehru declared, "If these principles were recognized in the mutual relations of all countries, then indeed there would hardly be any conflict and certainly no war." This is clearly an idealistic approach to the problem, and this idealism was shared by Bandaranaike. The Bandung Conference had produced a formula for the same purpose—this was known as the "Ten Principles." which was declared by both Nehru and Bandaranaike to be identical in spirit with "Panchaseela."

On another issue, too, these two leaders held the same views—the issue of colonialism and imperialism which was regarded by both as the enemy of national freedom. This idea was precisely pronounced by Mr. Nehru on 24th April 1955 at Bandung :

"We are determined, in this new phase of Asia and Africa,.... ....not to be dominated by any other country or continent. We are determined to bring .....prosperity to our people and to discard the age-old shackles that have tied us not only politically, but also economically—the shackles of colonialism and other shackles of our own making.....we are great countries in the world who live in freedom without dictation..... There will be no yes-men in Asia, nor in Africa....We value the friendship of great countries, but we can only sit with them as brothers.." [12]

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10 Nehru, Jawaharlal—*Speeches*—Indian Govt. Publications, Vol. 1, P. 262.
11 *Ibid.*
12 Nehru, Jawarharlal—*Speeches*—Indian Govt. Publications. Vol. 9. P. 289,

"Bridging the gap" between the power blocs was a fascinating goal upheld by both Bandaranaike and Nehru. Commenting on the "Mission in Korea" the latter made this remark, at Lok Sabha on the 24th December 1953.

"Why did we go to Korea? We went to Korea because, if we had not gone, there would have been no truce and no cease-fire and the war would have gone on....it is factual statement that no other country was willing to fill in that particular gap." [13]

Bandaranaike was aware of Sri Lanka's position—small, weak, and a poor country—therefore, for him, the unity of Afro-Asian countries was a crying need of the day because of the conviction that unity is strength. Also, he was aware that India had far better communication channels than had Sri Lanka to obtain information necessary for diplomatic manoeuvring and this too, contributed to Mr. Bandaranaike's conviction that he should maintain close communications with Mr. Nehru.

Bandaranaike found it easier to decide on a foreign policy based on non-alignment and friendship with all countries because of the fact that there were Asian and African leaders who shared the same views regarding foreign policy matters. The spirit of "Panchaseela" was visible in the following foreign policy statement of yet another leader, who, though not an Asian or an African, yet seemed to share the views of the Afro-Asians—Josip Broz Tito, President of Yugoslavia. The following quotation is an extract from a speech delivered by him at New Delhi, in the Lok Sabha, on December 21st 1954:

> "Why we are in favour of the principle of equality in relations between states and nations, and against interference from whatever side in the internal affairs of other nations? First, because such interference means an infringment and a threat to the independence of countries in whose internal affairs others are interfering. Secondly, because it is the most marked reflection of the division of the world into spheres of interest, a situation fraught with dangers of armed conflict. Thirdly, because it means the prevention of integration of nations, since such a thing is impossible between subject and ruling nations. This is the attitude that has given rise to our consistent and basic stand against colonialism, which contains all the negative elements which I have mentioned." [14]

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13. Nehru, *Op. cit*—P. 244.
14 Tito, Josip Broz—*Selected Speeches and Articles*—(*1963*) *Naprijed* P. 163.

What Bandaranaike called "dynamic neutralism" seems to run parallel to Marshal Tito's idea expressed below. (This is an extract from a speech given at the Great Moscow Rally on June 19th 1956.)

> "When I say active co-existence, under this term, I mean a ceaseless process of contracts, co-operation and efforts to find peaceful ways for the solution of mutual questions under dispute as well as other international problems. For, if we have a stagnant co-existence, so that we are living side by side, but each one for himself, just tolerating each other for sheer expedience, without doing anything to bring together the various nations, then we shall achieve nothing by that sort of co-existence." [15]

On several occasions Bandaranaike said that he did not like the use of words such as "neutralism" and "uncommitted" to describe his foreign policy, which he insisted was a positive one. A similar view was held by another contemporary Asian leader, U Nu of Burma. William C. Johnstone makes the following remark regarding U Nu's foreign policy.

> "U Nu's venture in international diplomacy was in accordance with an evolving interpretation of the basic principles of non-alignment with power blocs which are antagonistic to each other, and of "developing friendly relations with all countries." In earlier statements he and his colleagues had asserted that pursuit of an "independent" foreign policy or a policy of non-alignment did not mean aloofness from international issues and problems. It was not isolation or withdrawal and on several occasions U Nu and his Ministers had asserted that the Burma government must contribute positively to the easing of international tensions—must make some contribution to international peace." [16]

> "On July 19th, 1956, U Nu as President of the AFPFL made his annual Martyr's Day speech. In this speech he explained that Burma's 'neutral foreign policy" had three features; 1. non-alignment with any power-bloc, 2. friendship with all countries and 3. positive endeavours to bridge the gulf between opposing blocs and to promote peace." [17]

The principles of non-alignment and anti-colonialism were generally accepted by the Afro-Asian leaders like Dr. Sukarno, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Kwame Nkrumah. The 29 signatories to the Bandung Declaration had, although some of them had been aligned with power blocs, a common ground to stand on. The basis of this common ground was the 10 principles (embodied in the Bandung Declaration) which

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15 *Op. cit.*—P. 187.

16 Johnstone, W. C.—*Burma's Foreign Policy*—(1963) Harvard Univeristy Press. P. 96.

17 *Op. cit.*—P. 103.

in essence is nothing more or less than the Nehru-Chou En-lai "Pancha seela" which was enthusiastically upheld by Bandaranaike. Therefore, in matters of foreign policy, the ideas and principles of Bandaranaike were generally shared by other Afro-Asian leaders with whom he had close ideological links.

As revealed in this chapter, the conceptualization of Bandaranaike's foreign policy of neutralism and non-alignment was the result of many factors of which his psychological need to change "the old order" would seem to be the strongest. He was convinced that the best national interests would not be realized under the "old order".

3. Diplomatic Relations Since 1956

A NEW government with a foreign policy different from that of the old government, coming into power has to bring about a radical change in the machinery with which its new policy has to be implemented. In 1956, certain changes in Sri Lanka's Foreign Ministry took place. Bandaranaike took over the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs which, in the previous government had been under Sir John Kotelawala. The next most important position in the ministry was the permanent secretaryship. This post, during the Kotelawala regime had been held by Gunasena de Zoysa, C.M.G., who had continued in it till he was sent to the United Kingdom as Sri Lanka's High Commissioner in 1958.

The Ministry of Defence and External Affairs had a comparatively simple and small structure which was not subjected to any radical change by Bandaranaike. The "Ceylon Year Book 1955" gives the following details of Ceylon's diplomatic relations with other countries.

"Since Ceylon gained independence, diplomatic relations have been established with Australia, Austria, Burma, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,

Malaya, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Ceylon has, however, missions only in the following countries."[1]

According to the list given below, in 1955, Ceylon had diplomatic relations with 21 countries but there were only nine representatives abroad. Of these nine, three bore the imperial honour Knight of the British Empire (K.B.E.) This would seem to indicate a pro-British and generally pro-Western attitude in these men. Mr. A. E. Goonesinghe was an unsuccessful candidate of the UNP during the previous general election. The rest of the representatives had been strong supporters of the same party.

Sri Lanka's Diplomatic Representatives Abroad—1955

Country	*Name of Representatives*
Australia	Mr. P. R. Gunesekera
Burma	Mr. A. E. Goonesinghe
India	Sir Edwin Wijeyeratne, K.B.E.
Indonesia	Mr. M. Sarawanamuttu
Italy	Mr. H. A. J. Hulugalle
Japan	Sir Susantha de Fonseka, K.B.E
Pakistan	Mr. T. B. Jayah
United Kingdom	Sir Claude Corea, K.B.E.
United States of America	Mr. R. S. S. Gunewardene

(Source : Ceylon Year Book 1955)

A. E. Goonesinghe was the only person who did not continue to serve in the diplomatic service under the Bandaranaike regime in the year 1956. All the rest were retained even during the year 1957 by Bandaranaike. In 1958, two of them gave up due to ill-health and the other five continued to serve even during the year 1959. Mr. R. S. S Gunewardena and Sir Claude Corea continued as Sri Lanka's Representatives in the U.S.A. and the U.K. respectively. In 1959, the latter was appointed to the post of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Allowing these persons who were the strong supporters of the pro-Western UNP government to serve as the diplomatic representatives of the new government, according to some local critics, left room for suspicion of Bandaranaike's foreign policy in practice. This criticism seems to stem from an inadequate understanding of Bandaranaike's foreign policy, a marked characteristic of which was the attempt to develop "friendship with all nations." Thus he might have wanted to retain those who had estab-

1 *Ceylon Yearbook 1955*—Ceylon Government Press, Colombo. Pp. 22–23.

lished cordial relationships with important countries like the U.K. and the U.S.A. or on the other hand, it could have been that his policy, as far as these countries were concerned, did not differ from that of his predecessor, Sir John.

During the period of Bandaranaike, Sri Lanka had established diplomatic relations with fifteen more sovereign states. Out of these, six (People's Republic of China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and the USSR) were Communist countries. The other nine countries were: Afghanistan, Greece, Israel, New Zealand, Philippines, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and the UAR. In 1959, Sri Lanka had high level diplomatic relations (either through ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary or high commissioners) with the following countries: Australia, Canada, China, France, Greece, West Germany, India, Japan, Malaya, Pakistan, Poland, Spain, the UK, the USA, and the USSR.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with the above mentioned six communist countries indicates a change in the direction of the foreign policy as executed by the Bandaranaike government. At the same time, Bandaranaike was equally enthusiastic about developing such diplomatic and friendly relations with other countries.

Grouping of International Agreements

The bi-lateral agreements entered into during the period from 1956 to 1959 inclusive, by Sri Lanka with the states belonging to the different power blocs in the world is an indicator of the extent to which the 'non-alignment and being friendly to all nations' foreign policy was practised by Bandaranaike.

The treaty that Bandaranaike signed for the first time after coming into power was the one with the USA. This treaty between the Governments of Sri Lanka and the United States, for the grant of economic aid to Sri Lanka, was signed on 28th April 1956 within the first few days of the coming into being of the Bandaranaike regime. It was a well-known fact that this agreement was a result of negotiations conducted by the Kotelawala government. The line of foreign policy that Bandaranaike had pledged to implement was known to the American Embassy in Sri Lanka. Whatever the American motives in signing this treaty may have been, Bandaranaike was not hesitant to sign the treaty that was to grant economic aid to Sri Lanka. This was done in spite of the fact that during the election campaign of 1956, Bandaranaike's supporters vehemently attacked Sir John's regime on the ground that it was "under the influence of American dollars."

During the year 1956, Mr. Bandaranaike entered into agreements with the following countries.

1. *United States of America*—(Agreement for the grant of economic aid to Ceylon, signed on 28th April 1956—Ceylon Treaty Series No. 4, 1956.)

2. *People's Republic of Hungary*—(Trade Agreement—Ceylon Treaty Series No. 5, 1956.)

3. *People's Republic of Bulgaria*—(Trade and Payment Agreement, signed 19th June 1956, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 6, 1956.)

4. *Federal Republic of Germany*—(Agreement for Technical Co-operation, signed on 2nd October 1956—Ceylon Treaty Series No. 9, 1956.)

5. *Republic of Czechoslovakia*—(Agreement for Economic Co-operation—signed 16th August 1956, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 10, 1956.)

6. *India*—(Agreement for relief from or avoidance of Double Taxation of income—signed September 10th 1956—Ceylon Treaty Series No. 1, 1957.)

7. *Canada*—(Agreement for Co-operative economic development of Ceylon under the Colombo Plan—signed on 21st December 1956, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 11, 1956.)

Agreements Made in 1956 Analysed According to Blocs

With Western Bloc	With Communist Bloc	With Non-aligned	International
3	3	1	0

During the year 1957, the Bandaranaike regime had entered into agreements with the following countries.

1. *United Kingdom*—(i) Trade with Maldive Islands, signed on 11th February 1957, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 2, 1957; (ii) UK Service Establishments in Ceylon signed on 7th June 1957, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 4, 1957.)

2. *Federal Republic of Germany*—(Trade and the Saar Question, signed 20th June 1957, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 5, 1957.)

3. *Italy*—(Trade and Technical Co-operation, signed on 23rd April 1957, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 6, 1957.)

4. *Czechoslovakia*—(Extension of Trade Agreements, signed on 16th December 1957, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 7, 1957, and Nos. 4 & 5, 1958, which latter two were signed on 14th December 1957.)

5. *People's Republic of China*—(i) (Trade and Payment Agreement —signed 19th September 1957, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 8, 1957. (ii) Agreement on economic aid to Ceylon, signed on 19th September 1957.)

6. *People's Republic of Poland*—(Extension of Trade and Payment Agreement of 1955, signed 11th November 1957, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 10, 1957.)

7. *People's Republic of China*—(Agreement on the grant of a loan prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes or income—Ceylon Treaty Series No. 11, 1957.)

8. *International*—(Approval of the Status of International Atomic Energy—Ceylon Treaty Series No. 7, 1957.)

Total Agreements Made In 1957

With Western Bloc	With Communist Bloc	With Non-aligned Countries	International
5	4	0	1

During the year 1958, Sri Lanka entered into agreements with the following countries.

1. *India*—(Trade agreements on tobacco, signed 13th January 1958, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 2, 1958.)

2. *U.S.S.R.*—i. (Agreement on cultural co-operation, signed 15th January 1958, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 1, 1958.) ii. (Agreement on economic and technical co-operation, signed 25th February 1958, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 3, 1958.) iii. (Trade Agreement signed 28th February 1958, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 6, 1958.)

3. *U.S.A.*—(Agricultural Commodity Agreement, signed 30th June 1958, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 7, 1958.)

4. *Italy*—(Extension of Trade Agreement—Ceylon Treaty Series No. 8, 1958.)

5. *Canada*—(Agreement on co-operative economic development of Ceylon under the Colombo Plan signed 22nd May 1958, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 19, 1958.)

6. *Sweden*—(Agreement on technical cooperation in the field of Family Planning, signed on 22nd May 1958, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 10, 1958.)

7. *People's Republic of China*—(Agreement on the grant of a loan to the government of Ceylon as a support in its flood relief rehabilitation work—signed on 17th September 1958, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 11, 1958.)

8. *Federal Republic of Germany*—(Agreement regarding the establishment of a Ceylon-German Training Workshop for training skilled workers for omnibus plants in Colombo, signed on the 9th October 1958, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 1, 1959.)

9. *Australia*—(Trade Agreement signed on the 11th of November 1958, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 4, 1959.)

Agreements Made in 1958 Analysed

With Western Bloc	With Communist Bloc	With Non-aligned Countries	International
6	4	1	0

During the year 1959, Sri Lanka entered into agreements with the following countries.

1. *People's Republic of China.*—(Agreement on air transport between Ceylon and China, signed 26th March, 1959, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 2, 1959.)

2. *Federal Republic of Germany.*—(i) (Revision of trade Government first signed on 1st April 1955, approved by the Cabinet on 29th April 1959—Ceylon Treaty Series No. 3, 1959.) (ii) Agreement re-assistance amounting to six million German marks to Ceylon Government in support of flood reconstruction and rehabilitation work, signed 16th June, 1959, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 7, 1959.).

3. *Poland.*—(i) (Extending of agreement on trade and payment first signed 2nd December, 1955, approved by the Cabinet on 27th May, 1959, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 16. 1959.) (ii) (Trade agreement, signed November 27th, 1959, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 4, 1960).

44. *Italy.*—(Regarding air service between Italy and Ceylon—Ceylon Treaty series No. 6, 1959).

5. *United Nations.*—Convention on the "Recovery Abroad of Maintenance" signed 20th June, 1959, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 8, 1959..

6. *Geneva Convention*—of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of War Victims. Ceylon Treaty Series No. 9, 1959.

7. *Italy*—(Re-extension of Trade agreement signed on 23rd April, 1957, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 10, 1959).

8. *People's Republic of China*—(Protocol relating to the exchange of commodities in 1959 between Ceylon and China, first signed on 13th June, 1953, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 11, 1959).

9. *U.S.A.*—(Agreement on the amendment to the original agreement for financing certain educational exchange programmes first signed on 17th November, 1952. The USA letter addressed to Mr. Bandaranaike, dated 29th July, 1959, was replied by Mr. W. Dahanayake (his successor) on the 7th October, 1959. Ceylon Treaty Series No. 12, 1959).

10. *UPI Convention*—in Ottawa, 3rd October, 1957—Ceylon Treaty Series No. 13, 1959.)

11. *International Convention*—on insured letters, boxes and postal parcels, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 14, 1959).

12. *Yugoslavia*—(i) (Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between Ceylon and Yugoslavia signed on 5th May, 1959, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 15, 1959.) (ii) (Protocol-Trade Agreement signed on 24th July, 1959, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 15, 1959).

13. *Convention*—concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between states, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 18, 1959).

14. *Burma*—(Trade Agreement signed on 25th September, 1959, Ceylon Treaty Series No. 19, 1959).

Agreements Made In 1959 Analysed

With Western Bloc	With Communist Bloc	With Non-aligned Countries	International
5	4	3	5

Agreements Made During the Bandaranaike Regime, Classified According to Power Blocs

Year	With Western Bloc	With Communist Bloc	With Non-Aligned Countries	International
1956	3	3	1	0
1957	5	4	0	1
1958	6	4	1	0
1959	5	4	3	5
1956 to 1959	19	15	5	6

Any treaty is an indication of communication between the contracting parties. The table given over-leaf provides a rough idea of the extent of communication between Sri Lanka and the countries with which she had entered into agreements during the Prime-Ministership of Mr. Bandaranaike.

Treaties Made with Countries of the Communist Bloc

Country	Trade and Commercial and Business	Technical, Economical Co-operation and Aid	Cultural Relations:	Total
Hungary	1	—	—	1
Bulgaria	1	—	—	1
Czechoslovakia	1	1	—	2
China	3	2	—	5
Poland	3	—	—	3
U. S. S. R.	1	1	1	3
Total ..	10	4	1	15

Treaties Made with Countries of the Western Bloc

Country	Trade and Business	Technical and Economical Co-operation and Aid	Cultural Relations	Total
U. S. A.	1	1	1	3
West Germany	2	3	—	5
Canada	—	2	—	2
U. K.	2	—	—	2
Italy	3	1	—	4
Australia	1	—	—	1
Sweden	1	1	—	2
Total	10	8	1	19

Treaties Made With Non-Aligned Countries

Country	Trade and Business	Technical and Economical Co-operation and Aid	Cultural Relations	Total
India	2	—	—	2
Burma	1	—	—	1
Yugoslavia	1	1	—	2
Total	4	1	—	5

Comparison of Agreements

With the exception of the United Kingdom, Bandaranaike maintained good relations with all the countries with whom such relation had been established under his predecessors. The treaty that departed from the policy mentioned above was one known as the Ceylon-United Kingdom Defence Agreement of 1957. The peaceful and friendly negotiations between the two parties over this question brought about a solution in the form of a bi-lateral agreement which will be discussed in a later chapter on Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom.

When Sri Lanka achieved independence in 1948, the USA was one of the few countries to grant almost immediate diplomatic recognition to her. But the first important connection between the two countries was established by the Ceylon-USA Agreement for Technical Co-

operation under the Point Four Programme signed at Colombo on 7th November, 1950. The two agreements entered into in 1951 and 1954 allowed the USA to use Radio Ceylon to broadcast its "Voice of America" programmes. The most elaborate and important (from the point of view of Sri Lanka) agreement between the two countries was the one entitled "General Agreement for Technical Co-operation," signed on 28th April, 1956. The following extracts show the main characteristics of this agreement.

> "*Paragraph II*—Recognising that the effectiveness of this assistance program will be enhanced by the two governments sharing reasonably the financing of co-operative operations hereunder and by the expenditure of local currency which may derive from the assistance provided hereunder by the Government of the United States of America, the Government of Ceylon agrees : (*a*) to bear a fair share of the cost of co-operative projects or operations carried out pursuant to this Agreement.....
>
> "*Paragraph IV* (*b*)—The Government of Ceylon will give full and continuous publicity in Ceylon to the objectives and progress of the program under this Agreement, and will make public, when termination of this program and at such other times during the course of the program as the Government of the United States may request, full statements of operations hereunder, including information as to the use of Assistance received and the use of the local currency deposited in the 'Special Account.'
>
> "*Paragraph V* (*b*)—The Government of Ceylon agrees to receive persons designated by the Government of the United States to discharge the responsibilities of the Government of the United States under this agreement and to permit such persons to observe without restriction the distribution in Ceylon of commodities and services which may be made hereunder, including the provision of the facilities necessary for the observation and review of the carrying out of this Agreement and use of Assistance furnished under it." [2]

Thus according to this agreement the American aid was to be used under the control and supervision of the US agents, who reserved the right to stop the aid. (In this the United States followed her usual standard procedure when signing any aid Agreement.)

The 1959 Agreement 'Financing certain Educational Exchange Programmes' was a modification of the 1952 Agreement. The following two extracts are from this agreement.

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2 Ceylon Treaty Series, No. 4 1956. Pp. 2–3.

"*Article I, Paragraph I.*—There shall be a foundation to be known as the United States Educational Foundation in Ceylon (hereinafter designated the Foundation) which shall be recognized by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon as an organization created and established to facilitate the administration of an educational program to be financed by the funds made available from currency of Ceylon held or available for expenditure by the United States for such purpose.

"*Article* 8.—In addition to the funds provided for in the first paragraph of the article, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon agree that up to an aggregate amount of 1,428,000 Ceylon rupees acquired by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to the Agricultural Commodities Agreement between the United States of America and Ceylon dated June 18th 1958, as amended, may be used for the purposes of this Agreement." [3]

During this period Bandaranaike's government had signed three agreements with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The trade agreement (the first agreement with the USSR) made provision for Sri Lanka to sell her tea and rubber, etc. to Russia and in return Sri Lanka had to buy petroleum products, machinery and many other articles produced in Russia.

The agreement for the promotion of cultural co-operation opened up a new line of communication between the two countries. The preamble to the agreement has a greater significance because of its declared acceptance of the spirit of "Panchaseela" as evidenced by the following extract:

"The Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to conclude an agreement for the promotion of cultural co-operation between the two countries on the basis of mutual respect for each other's internal affairs, equality and peaceful co-existence have agreed as follows:

Article I.—The contracting parties will, in every way possible, strengthen and develop cultural co-operation between the two countries.

Article II.—The contracting parties will promote the exchange of experience and achievement in the fields of literature, art, music, radio broadcasting, education, public health, physical health, and sport.

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3 Ceylon Treaty Series No. 12, 1959. P 2.

Article III.—The contracting parties agree to render mutual assistance in training native technical, scientific and cultural personnel.

Article IV.—The contracting parties will, on a mutually acceptable basis, encourage co-operation in the exchange of films, slides and transparencies.

Article V.—The contracting parties will facilitate visits to each other's territory by cultural delegations (including sports) and by citizens of their respective countries."[4]

The agreement on economic and technical co-operation seems to be the most important agreement that was ever made with the USSR. The expression "non-interference in the internal affairs of each country" had been added to the preamble, unlike in the case of the two earlier agreements. According to this agreement, the USSR was to give Sri Lanka Government a loan of 120,000,000 roubles at 2.5 per cent interest per annum. The agreement contains a list of 16 projects that were to come under this agreement on economic and technical co-operation. They are as follows:

(1) The construction of the dam and irrigation canals to supply with water to the newly developed lands of the extent of 20,000 acres in the Malwatu Oya basin.

(2) Preparation of the Kelani Ganga basin for flood control.

(3) Preparation of the Kalu Ganga for flood control.

(4) Clearing of jungle land and land development for the plantation of sugar-cane in Kantalai.

(5) Clearing of 5,700 acres of jungle in Hambantota for cotton plantation.

(6) Establishment of a metallurgical works centre.

(7) Establishment of a factory for motor car tyres and tubes.

(8) Mining of peat at Muturajawela.

(9) Establishment of a flour milling plant with an annual capacity of up to 70,000 tons of wheat and construction of a grain elevator of up to 20,000 tons capacity.

(10) Establishment of a plant for building materials and pre-fabricated units for house constructing.

(11) Establishment of a cold storage plant for storing 200 tons of fruits and vegetables.

(12) Establishment of a pilot plant for extracting flour from manioc with an output of 100 kg. per shift.

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4 Ceylon Treaty Series No. 1, 1958.

(13) Rendering technical assistance in the development of fisheries.

(14) Rendering technical assistance in the utilization of the by-products of salt manufacture.

(15) Rendering assistance in equipping science teaching laboraories for junior secondary schools.

(16) Rendering technical assistance in the restoration of some irrigation structures damaged by floods.[5]

This Ceylon-Soviet Agreement covering a wide-range of needs had the following note: "The list of projects and works may be further specified or modified upon the agreement of the Parties within the amount of credit extended under this Agreement." Further, in Article 10 of the Agreement, the following conditions were also included. "The prices of equipment, machinery and material to be supplied by the USSR to Ceylon will be fixed on the basis of the world market prices. Should the cost of designs, surveys, and investigations supplies of equipment, machinery and materials and other services to be rendered by the Soviet Party under Article 4 of the Agreement exceed the amount of credit, i.e., 120,000,000 roubles, the amount in excess shall be paid by the Ceylon Party by deliveries of Ceylon goods to the USSR on the same terms and conditions of the Ceylon-Soviet Trade and Payment Agreement in force....."[5]

The Ceylon-USA Agreement for economic and technical co-operation had not included a list of projects and hence it was a general agreement; the Ceylon-Soviet Agreement was to deal with the selected specified projects only. Another difference between the two Agreements was that according to the Ceylon-Soviet Agreement, Sri Lanka was to be loaned the roubles, which meant that her external assets would go up, at least for a short time. (The amount had to be eventually repaid in Sri Lanka goods or in pounds sterling.) In the case of the Ceylon-USA Agreement, she was to receive in the form of grants, a larger amount of wheat, the sales of which were to be converted into local currency. This had the advantage, (for Sri Lanka) of helping to conserve external assets.

The next most important agreement Bandaranaike made was the one with the Federal Republic of Germany—the Agreement regarding assistance amounting to six million German marks to the Government of Sri Lanka in support of its flood reconstruction and rehabilitation. According to this Agreement Germany had undertaken to finance and give technical assistance for the following items.

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5 Ceylon Treaty Series, No. 3, 1958. Pp. 3, 4 and 5.

1. The steel superstructures for a maximum of ten bridges and sub-structures for one of the bridges.

2. About 300 running meters dismountable bridges of interlinkable sections.

3. The design and technical equipment for a roofing tile factory.

4. The design for a motor ferry-boat and in as far as the funds mentioned in section (i) above suffice, supply a model motor-ferry boat.

5. Qualified German staff pursuant to Annexes i, ii and iii. [6]

The spirit of the whole Agreement seemed to be based on mutual co-operation and there was no trace of the strict control of the German assistance by the Government of Germany. The spirit of friendship was the declared motive—" to intensify the friendly relations existing between the two countries and their peoples. "

Two of the Agreements entered into by Bandaranaike with the People's Republic of China too were of great economic benefit to Sri Lanka. The one on economic aid had, in its preamble, a special reference to " Panchaseela."

> " For the purpose of promoting friendly co-operation between Ceylon and China and of strengthening the friendship between the two peoples, on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, and animated by the lofty desire of the two countries to give each other mutual support and assistance, the Government of the People's Republic of China has decided, after negotiations between the two contracting parties, to grant economic aid without repayment and without any attached conditions to the Government of Ceylon for the Rubber Replanting Subsidy Project .....
>
> " *Article I.* The Government of the People's Republic of China agrees to grant econmic aid to the Government of Ceylon for a period of five years from the date on which this Agreement came to form of 15,000,000 Ceylon Rupees annually, and with the total value of 75,000,000 Ceylon Rupees for the period of five years. " [7]

Bandaranaike's agreement with China on a loan of Rs. 50,000,000 at 2.5% interest per annum carried a paragraph which had a significance to his foreign policy. The paragraph 1 of the said Agreement is given below :

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6 Ceylon Treaty Series—No. 7, 1959. P 1.

7 Ceylon Treaty Series, No. 9, 1957.

"The Government of the People's Republic of China is in deep sympathy with and concerned about the serious flood distress the Ceylon Government and people experienced at the end of 1957. On the basis of traditional friendship between the peoples of China and Ceylon, and in the spirit of strengthening the co-operation among Asian and African countries in accordance with the five principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the resolutions of the Bandung Conference, the Chinese Government is prepared to grant the Ceylon Government a loan not exceeding the total sum of 50,000,000 Ceylon Rupees, as a friendly support to the Ceylon Government in its flood relief rehabilitation work." [8]

For the first time the "Afro-Asian friendship" concept had entered into an agreement. The above loan was to be given by China in the form of equipment, material, or other supplies required by the Ceylon Government.

The two Agreements—the one with Czechoslovakia and the other with Yugoslavia, both designed to promote friendship between the parties by means of economic and technical assistance co-operation, were significant because they indicated the widening of Sri Lanka's overseas contacts. The "Ceylon-Canada Agreement" on economic aid indicated the continuation of generous economic aid by Canada—a relationship which originated with the birth of the Colombo Plan in 1950. The trade agreements listed above are of importance because they contributed to the increase in the volume of the exports and the widening of the world markets for Sri Lanka's export and import trades.

The economic and technical co-operation agreements with Sweden and Italy were significant too, because these agreements helped to widen the extent of Sri Lanka's relations with the Western bloc. The guiding spirit of Bandaranaike's foreign Agreements, as referred to earlier, seemed to be the desire to prevent Sri Lanka being dragged into the orbit of any powerful bloc, either Western or Communist.

The foregoing is a discussion on the nature and contents of the actual Agreements entered into during the Government of Mr. Bandaranaike. The writer observes that there are differences between the figures agreed upon and the actual figures received in terms of aid received or business carried on. There will be a more detailed discussion of this aspect in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 of this study.

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8 Ceylon Treaty Series No. 11, 1958. P. 1.

4. Bandaranaike and The United Kingdom

THE object of this chapter will be the appraisal of Sri Lanka's relationship with the United Kingdom after independence, and the determination of how far and in what direction that relationship was changed by Bandaranaike.

The independence of Sri Lanka in 1948 provided a new and unusual kind of member to the British Commonwealth. Although the House of Commons of the United Kingdom passed three readings of the "*Ceylon Independence Bill*" (introduced on 12th November 1947) without a single dissenting vote, the House of Lords thought it appropriate to give voice to what was to be the official British attitude towards the independence of Sri Lanka. Introducing the Bill for its second reading in the upper House, the Lord Privy Seal made the following observation :

> "This is the first occasion in our history upon which a colony developing this system of self-government of its own accord, has deliberately sought to become a Dominion State in the Commonwealth. It is the first time that such a thing has occurred, but we hope and expect that it will not be the last ....One of the first

acts of this government has been to sign with Ceylon the three vital agreements .... I need hardly say that that agreement (defence agreement with Ceylon) receives the hearty support and approval of Australia and New Zealand, to whom the communications are .... so vital. Then the agreement provides that Ceylon will grant to His Majesty's Government necessary facilities including the use of naval and air bases, military establishments and so on. Finally, it is provided that His Majesty's Government shall continue to exercise control over and jurisdiction over His Majesty's Forces stationed in Ceylon .... "

Viscount Swinton made the following remark on the same occasion :

" .... in peace and in war, over many years, Ceylon has been a loyal and valued partner in the British Commonwealth. Today, true to that tradition, Ceylon of her own free will has affirmed her determination to take her full and rightful place in the .... Commonwealth. .... Ceylon is a vital link in the Commonwealth defence, and in Commonwealth communications .... "

Lord Soulbury, later to be appointed the first Governor-General of independent Ceylon, spoke thus :

" .... Ceylon is the first colonial non-European people to reach independence within the Commonwealth .... Ceylon is the first and will not, I feel sure, be the last of many other communities who will in due course, attain the same independence under the Crown, until the British Empire becomes one vast family of self-governing states—to quote the Statute of Westminster : 'United by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." [1]

Thus, according to the reasons given in the above quotations from speeches by three influential members of the British House of Lords, Sri Lanka was a welcome new member to the British Commonwealth. The government of D. S. Senanayake, consisting almost entirely of Western-educated elite oriented towards the British values, decided that Sri Lanka too accept the 'common allegiance' to the Crown of England and the 'free association' which are spoken of as the main characteristics of the British Commonwealth. In addition, besides the declared willingness to keep the three agreements, Sri Lanka continued to carry on the system of appeals to the Privy Council of the United Kingdom, and even acknowledged the Queen of England as the constitutional monarch of Sri Lanka. (Even in Sri Lanka pass-

1 All the above quotations are from the Hansard of the House of Lourds, United Kingdom, December 4th 1947.

ports issued in 1970, the Minister of External Affairs of Sri Lanka asked that their bearers be allowed to pass 'without let or hindrance, in the name of her Majesty the Queen of Ceylon.')

It was definitely to Britain's advantage that this new type of Commonwealth member remained on cordial terms with her, for in a very real sense, Britain lived by her own trade. The very profitable overseas trading ventures and other enterprises which had so far been carried on under the protection afforded by the imperial flag, had now to depend, for their continued existence, on the goodwill of the newly independent peoples to a very great extent. The Commonwealth was in effect nothing but a device aimed at ensuring the continued prosperity of the widespread British commercial interests, after the fall of an Empire which had existed for the purpose of protecting those interests. The success of this device depended upon the successful creation of certain attitudes towards Britain in the newly-independent former colonies—attitudes in which respect and affection towards Britain would dominate. As far as the immediate post-Independence ruling elite in Sri Lanka were concerned, the British Establishment in Sri Lanka had been successful in this endeavour.

When Bandaranaike came to power in 1956, Sri Lanka had gained some experience as a member of the British Commonwealth. She had participated in all the annual conferences of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and Finance Ministers. From 1948 to 1956, she had maintained a very cordial relationship with all the Commonwealth countries and had been as loyal a Commonwealth member as Britain herself would wish. None of the three Prime Ministers who had held office up to 1956 had ever indicated in any way that the "Ceylon-U. K. relationship" as it existed from independence should be changed.

Bandaranaike's attitude to the Commonwealth and to Britain itself differed substantially from that of his predecessors. He realized the main purpose behind the creation of the Commonwealth: the maintenance of British commercial enterprises, military power and prestige in the absence of the Empire. But he also realized that certain material advantages could accrue to Sri Lanka because of her membership in it. Therefore he at no time suggested that Sri Lanka should opt out of the Commonwealth, as Burma had done. In the address to the Commonwealth Press Association in London on 5th July 1956, he spoke thus:

"I said we wished to continue within the Commonwealth. What are my feelings towards the Commonwealth ? I do not think we ought to indulge in more sloppy sentimentality over the Commonwealth. I do not think we have much to gain by that type of sentimental attachment to the Commonwealth. . . . . "[2]

At this conference Bandaranaike stressed on the following points:

1. There are advantages in belonging to the Commonwealth—economically belonging to the sterling bloc (at the time), and consultations and discussions are held within it on a friendly basis on various problems.

2. It is valuable to belong to a common tradition of freedom and democracy which is a legacy of the British governmental system.

3. Deliberate efforts should be made to promote such democratic traditions whenever possible. This can be done only if British Commonwealth takes an active role on the middle path which does not belong to any bloc.

This indicates that at least early in his career as Prime Minister, Bandaranaike nursed some hope that the British Commonwealth would stand as a third force in the world, between the two belligerent giants. He soon realized that the idea was a fanciful one, but perhaps this accounted for some of his early attachment to the Commonwealth idea. Besides, as regards other white dominions, from the very dawn of her independance Sri Lanka had had a very cordial relationship with these countries—Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and this situation did not change in any way during the Bandaranaike regime. These countries had been very generous also in extending their aid to Sri Lanka. With regard to these countries Mr. Bandaranaike did not try to pursue a policy different from that of his predecessors.

As regards Britain, we find in Bandaranaike an attitude to that country which contrasts sharply with those of his predecessors. He felt impelled to change the some-what paternalistic attitude that Britain had taken up towards independent Sri Lanka, and her acceptance of this attitude. This involved reforms in her political, economic and social life ; it also involved the changing of the attitudes of the public of Sri Lanka.

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2 Bandaranaike—*Speeches and Writings*—P. 376.

One of the first acts of Bandaranaike's government was the abolition of the practice of granting imperial honours to Ceylonese. It had long been a practice of the British Imperial government to grant these honours (knighthoods, decorative orders, etc.) to such citizens of the colonies as were regarded to have served the Crown with loyalty and ability, as well as to distinguished citizens of the metropolis itself; but it was also no secret that in some cases such honours had been conferred upon men whose sole claim to distinction lay in their contributions to the coffers of the ruling parties. Many prominent members of the ruling UNP bore such honours; Bandaranaike felt that the practice of accepting imperial honours was not compatible with sovereignty and independence of Sri Lanka as it created an attitude of regarding a foreign country—Britain—as the fount of honour.

As far as the United Kingdom's interests were concerned, the most disheartening challenge from Bandaranaike came when he demanded the withdrawal of British armed forces, and removal of the British naval and air bases from Sri Lanka. During the 1956 election, Bandaranaike's victorious MEP had pledged to free Sri Lanka from the presence of the British forces in the Island. Having the bases in Sri Lanka was inconsistent with his policy of neutralism and non-alignment with power blocs. Soon after his coming into power he proceeded to put this pledge into action. Within the first three months of coming to power he started negotiations on this problem with the British. On 5th of July 1956, at the Commonwealth Press Conference, he spoke thus on the spirit in which this problem would be settled.

> "In the pursuit of this policy—not motivated by any dislike or hatred of this country (Britain) of whose people we have all, my country and myself personally, a high regard—the present government of Ceylon has expressed its intention that the bases in Ceylon of Britain should cease to exist ..... As you may know, it is entirely left to us, a matter completely within our discretion whether we shall permit these bases to continue or not. We have expressed not merely a wish or desire but a definite intention that the bases shall cease, but we wish to do it in a friendly way and we wish to discuss, as indeed we are doing now, with the British Government the method of doing it without causing dislocation, inconvenience or embarrassment to the British Government, or indeed to ourselves. We are discussing other matters such as certain facilities that the British Government might like to have in our country, but we wish to take this step as it is one which is very fundamental to our

thinking, but we also wish to do it while preserving the friendship and the close associations which exist, and I hope will continue to exist, between Britain and ourselves." [3]

Bandaranaike gained popularity and a certain amount of acclaim from the Opposition as well as from his own supporters when the news of his negotiations with the British was made public. The Franco-British invasion of Egypt over the question of Suez (1956) prepared a psychological atmosphere conducive to take up the issue of British bases and armed forces in Sri Lanka. There was rumour current that two of the British warships used in the invasion had been refuelled at Trincomalee. This rumour (it was later proved to have been devoid of truth) created the fear of Sri Lanka's being involved in a war, and that on behalf of imperial powers against an Afro-Asian country. Bandaranaike made use of this rumour. Addressing the House on 11th December 1956 he made the following statement. "The 'Newfoundland' refuelled thereafter somewhere else, before it proceeded there. But in a way, may I say, I was glad that this incident arose in that manner because it enabled me to point out to the British government that the indefinite continuation of such facilities, even after the bases have been handed over to us, creates really an impossible position in the light of the foreign policy of our Government." [4]

Left-wing leaders too began to voice their fears that Sri Lanka was being dragged into a war because of the presence of the British military on the Island. Dr. N. M. Perera, the Marxist Leader of the Opposition said: "I can only hope that world public opinion would be mobilised to prevent England and France from following this disastrous course of action which they intend to take. In this settling of a possible war in the Middle East, it becomes more urgent than ever for Ceylon to take complete control of her bases so as to prevent Trincomalee and Katunayake being used by England or any other power and thus drag us into the vortex of war." [5]

On 26th September 1956, Bandaranaike announced in the House that the British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, had given him an assurance that the bases would not be used in connection with any military action.

Such was the background of taking over the British bases by the Government of Sri Lanka. Finally the agreements were signed by the two parties concerned on 7th June 1957 in Colombo. Both parties demonstrated their liberality and generosity. Unlike the abrupt and blunt-take over of the Suez Canal by President Nasser of Egypt,

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3 Bandaranaike—*Speeches and 'Writings*—P. 375–376.

4 Bandaranaike, S, W, R. D. —*Towards A New Era*—P. 842.

5 *Ceylon Daily News*, 14th September 1956.

Bandaranaike was to give a period of five years to complete the act of handing over. However, the Agreement providded the retention of some facilities by the British. The major paragraphs of the Agreement which cover the salient point are given below.

"*Paragraph 1.* In accordance with the declared policy of the Ceylon Government that United Kingdom bases in the Island hereafter referred to as 'the Bases' should be closed down, the the Naval Base at Trincomalee and the Royal Air Force Base at Katunayake will be formally transferred to the Ceylon Government on 15th October 1957 and 1st November 1957 respectively.

"*Paragraph 2.* Subject to sub-paragraphs 3 and 4 below the United Kingdom will continue to use certain facilities for a limited time hereafter referred to as "the rundown." Such use of some of the facilities will cease between two to three years and of all will cease by the 1st March 1962, provided that, if the process of rundown is interrupted by causes outside the control of the United Kingdom Government, the period of rundown may be increased as may be mutually agreed.

"*Paragraph 5.* In addition to the grant of facilities under sub-paragraph 3 above, the Ceylon Government will give to the United Kingdom Forces all necessary facilities and assistance in connection with (i) the withdrawal of the Forces (ii) the removal or disposal by the Forces of all their stores, equipment and other movable property.

"*Paragraph 6.* The Government of Ceylon shall pay to the United Kingdom Government the sum of Rs. 22 million in five equal instalments of Rs. 4,400,000 in each of the Ceylon Government financial years 1957-58 to 1961-62 inclusive. This payment will be made in respect of the installations to be transferred to the Ceylon Government and the cancellation of certain claims between the two Governments arising out of the occupation or disposal of the bases by the United Kingdom Forces. Detailed provisions regarding financial matters are contained in the Annex to this letter, which Annex shall be regarded as an integral part thereof. In each year payment will be made in Rupees within the total of United Kingdom's estimated governmental expenditure in Ceylon, any balance being paid in sterling at the rate of Rs. 13.3102 to 1 pound sterling.

"*Paragraph 8.* The United Kingdom Forces and the members thereof will continue to enjoy, during the period of rundown, all the immunities and privileges hitherto enjoyed by them.

"*Paragraph 9.* During the period of rundown and after its completion the Ceylon Government in accordance with normal Commonwealth practice but subject to the requirements of the

general policy of the Ceylon Government, will continue to allow (*a*) United Kingdom naval vessels to refuel at Colombo ; and (*b*) aircraft of the United Kingdom Forces, and on charter to those Forces, to overfly and stage in Ceylon. "[6]

Reproduced below is paragraph 2 of the Annex on Financial Matters to the above-mentioned agreement.

"Ceylon will take over all the United Kingdom Forces installations (including any United Kingdom interest in the land) vacated, except—

(*a*) The Fuel Tanks at Colombo and Trincomalee.
(*b*) The present Royal Air Force site at Colpetty including Steuart Lodge and Coolgardie.
(*c*) Trenchard House.
(*d*) Two naval residences in Gregory's Road, Colombo.
(*e*) Thirty prefabricated houses at Trincomalee.

The installations taken over will include fixed fans, all water plant, the generators and electrical systems Royal Naval Yard, Trincomalee, Diyatalawa. . . . . "[7]

On the 15th of October 1957 Trincomalee base was ceremonially taken over by the Government of Sri Lanka. On that occasion Bandaranaike made a jubilant speech of which an extract is given below :

"Our foreign policy which is based on friendship, co-operation with all nations and non-alignment with any of the power blocs of the world, necessitates such a step if such a policy was in fact to be effective. I am very happy to say that the negotiations which were carried on between us and the United Kingdom for this purpose were conducted in a spirit of cordiality and in an atmosphere of friendship, and a very satisfactory settlement of this matter in that spirit has been achieved—which is a further tribute to the manner in which those countries which are associated with each other in the Commonwealth of Nations can settle a difference of opinion that may arise between them in a spirit of friendship without impairing the relationship which exists among the members of the Commonwealth of Nations. This step which was taken.....will have the effect of strengthening that friendship. "[8]

On 1st November 1957, Katunayake Airport was taken over at a ceremony at which Bandaranaike officiated. This was the last British base in Sri Lanka. In taking it over, Bandaranaike said in his speech, "Today our independence is complete ! "

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6 Ceylon Treaty Series No. 4, 1957.
8 Bandaranaike S. W. R. D.—*Speches and Writings*—P. 398.

Another instance of Mr. Bandaranaike's attitude towards Britain may be seen in his attempts to change the British-type governmental institutions of Sri Lanka and make her a republic within the Commonwealth.

Bandaranaike proposed not only to change the British form of government but also to change and revise the Constitution of Sri Lanka ; the architects of which had been the two Britons, Lord Soulbury and Sir Ivor Jennings. On 7th November 1957 he brought a motion in the House to appoint a Joint Select Committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate for the purpose of revision of the "*Ceylon Constitution.*" Introducing the motion, Bandaranaike made the following statement :

> "I move, 'that it is expedient that a Joint Select Committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate should be appointed to consider the revision of the Ceylon (Constitution and Independence) Order-in-Council, 1946 and 1947, and other written law with reference to the following among such other matters as the committee may consider necessary :
>
> (1) the establishment of a Republic ;
>
> (2) the guaranteeing of fundamental rights ,
>
> (3) the position of the Senate and Appointed members of the House of Representatives ; and
>
> (4) the Public Service Commission and the Judicial Service Commission."[9] .

In a memorandum submitted in January 1959 to the Joint Select Committee for Revising the Constitution, Bandaranaike remarked that an executive form of government would be the best for Sri Lanka. In this memorandum he went so far as to say that the British parliamentary system was, in effect, a dictatorship clothed in democratic forms and therefore should be changed. On this issue of making Sri Lanka a Republic, Bandaranaike had this to say (in a speech made at the Commonwealth Press Association in July 1956) :

> "I have on behalf of my Government informed the Conference (the Commonwealth Premiers' Conference) that we intend to make our country a Republic within the Commonwealth, though this does not stem from any personal hostility. The Queen of England is indeed a very gracious lady. We in our country have no feeling of dislike or hostility either towards Britain or Her Majesty, but we prefer a Republican form of Government which

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9 Hansard H. R. 07.11.57—Cols 1135

A—15785 (7/75)

we consider more suited to our country, and the Queen herself is too far away with too few personal contacts to stimulate that feeling of personal attachment which you have for her ..... "10

The recommendation of the Buddhist Commission Report that Sri Lanka be made a Republic and the anti-monarchist propaganda of the Marxist parties no doubt contributed to this decision on the part of Mr. Bandaranaike. But it is reasonable to suppose, too, that to his mind, the idea of acknowledging the Queen of England as the monarch of Sri Lanka smacked somewhat of imperial domination.

Neither of these proposed reforms—making Sri Lanka a republic and changing the parliamentary form of governmental institution—was eventually carried out by Bandaranaike, and there is reason to believe that the idea of dispensing with the Queen was for some reason dropped by him. But the very fact that the issues were raised created significant effects. The fact that Mr. Bandaranaike questioned the effectiveness of these British-type institutions and the publicity given to these issues in the local press further helped to weaken the "looking up to Britain" attitude which had been hitherto prevalent.

The taking-over of the British bases and the abolition of Imperial Honours too helped substantially to reduce what may be called the psychological domination of the elite by the British forms of thought. Due to these reforms of Bandaranaike Sri Lanka became noticeably less Britain-oriented.

In one aspect he was not able to change British domination—in the all important economic aspect. The bulk of Sri Lanka's trade was still conducted by British firms, and most of her profitable enterprises were British owned.

It could be seen, thus, that Bandaranaike had with Britain what may be called, in the jargon of psychology, a 'love-hate' relationship. In contrast to his predecessors who were inclined to accept and approve of anything that derived from Britain, Mr. Bandaranaike was critical of her; he was not overpowered by the glamour that Britain still had, at that time, for the countries over which she had once ruled. It was undeniably Bandaranaike who drew Sri Lanka away from the habit of looking to Britain for guidance in the matter of foreign affairs, and on matters of world crises, he rarely sided with Britain. Yet, he was very careful, in his language and tone, never to antagonise Britain, or to take an actively hostile tone to that country, as many of of his fellow Afro-Asian leaders did. While he drew Sri Lanka away from being in the position of a follower of Britain, he very clearly wished to be on good terms with that country, and not to incur its hostility.

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10 Bandaranaike—*Speeches and Writings*—P. 376.

5. The Indo-Sri Lanka Relation on a "Domestic Problem"

AS far as Sri Lanka was concerned, Bandaranaike had only two major problems which had to be settled at international levels. Those were (1) taking over of the British bases and (2) the "stateless Indians" in Sri Lanka. As was discussed in the fourth chapter of this study, Bnadaranaike proved that his foreign policy of neutralism, non-alignment and friendship towards all countries was an effective means to deal with the problem of taking over the British bases. The purpose of this chapter is to see how far Bandaranaike was successful in dealing with the second, and economically the more important problem.

History of the Problem

From the 2nd century B. C. up to the 19th century there were periodical immgirations from South India to Sri Lanka. On many occasions the South Indians, especially under the Chola and Pandya dynasties, invaded Sri Lanka and the Kings of Sri Lanka had to wage war against them to defend the "land of the Sinhalese" (Sinhaladvipa; the ancient name for Sri Lanka) from the invader. The Sinhalese were no longer able to resist the South Indians immigrating to Sri Lanka during the whole of the 19th century, for in 1815, after a long struggle, the island had come under the domain of the British.

During the 2nd half of the nineteenth century, the Britons who had decided to open coffee plantations in highlands imported, with the help of the British administrators of the Island, thousands of Indians from South India for the purpose of their being used as cheap labour in the tea and coffee estates, since the proud Kandyan Sinhalese, who had fought the British for more than twenty years, did not wish to work in their estates. Thus a large number of South Indian Tamils was added to the population of Sri Lanka during the 19th century. The following table, compiled by Dr. S. U. Kodikara from census reports, indicates the increase of their numbers during the last century and half. [1]

1827 — 10,000	1921 — 493,944
1847 — 50,000	1931 — 692,540
1877 — 146,000	1946 — 665,684
1911 — 457,765	1961 — 949,684 [1]

In a speech made at the Lok Sabha, on May 15th, 1954, Mr. Nehru stated that there were about 1,50,000 Indian citizens mostly engaged in professional ventures in Sri Lanka, and that since they were Indian citizens, India was bound to look into their grievances. He also stated that there were 600,000 or 700,000 people of Indian descent in Sri Lanka but they were not citizens of India, and therefore they belonged to the category of "stateless" people for whom India could not have any responsibility. Nehru referred here only to those Indians who had emigrated to Sri Lanka to work in the tea and rubber estates and consequently did not return to India. They were not illegal immigrants. But to complicate matters further, there was still another section of Indians in Sri Lanka—the illegal immigrants who had started to sneak into Sri Lanka by night in boatloads.

According to the estimate of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who became Prime Minister of Sri Lanka in July 1960, there were about 100,000 illegal immigrants from India in the year 1961. By 1964, the total number of Indians had grown to about 1,250,000. [2] Thus the number of Indians in Sri Lanka, composed of bona fide Indian citizens, 'stateless' people, and illegal immigrants from South India was growing rapidly, bringing economic and political consequences which alarmed the Sinhalese. [2]

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1 Kodikara, S. U.—*Indo Ceylon Relations Since Independence* (1965) Ceylon Institute of International Affairs, Colombo. P. 6.

2 Bandaranaike, Mrs. Sirimavo—*Indo Ceylon Problem and the Future of the Sinhalese* (1965) National Education Society, Colombo. P. 1–2.

As early as the 1920s, some Ceylonese national leaders like D. S. Senanayake and A. E. Goonesinghe saw the consequences, in the future, of the free flow of Indian immigrants to Sri Lanka. Under the British rule those leaders had to be cautious in suggesting measures to curb the increasing number of Indian immigrants. A slow and gradual policy of Ceylonization aimed at ousting the Indians in Government departments took place up to 1939. A greater alarm was raised by the people of the Kandyan (the rubber and tea growing highland) districts, where the 'stateless' Indians posed a political and economic threat. The 1947 General Election was an eye-opener—7 Indians were elected to Parliament as representatives of the Kandyan districts. This election indicated that the Indian estate labourers, who had enjoyed franchise as a result of the Donoughmore reforms of 1931, had become the decisive factor in about 14 electoral districts of Sri Lanka. The Kandyan Sinhalese, who were the native population of these districts, had become an improverished, landless people, as a result of the British policy of granting land to British planters. After Independence, the Kandyan Peasantry Commission was set up to inquire into the grievances of the Kandyans, who had suffered much because of the encroachment on their land by the British tea-planters and their Indian labour. This body was one of the strongest voices in Sri Lanka to press for a quick solution to the "Indo-Ceylon problem."

Certain political leaders gave the problem a different twist, by advancing the idea that one day India would overrun Sri Lanka by using her superior strength and the presence of so many Indians therein. As a solution to all these problems—economic, political and national security—the only measure that national leaders could think of was to send away as many 'stateless Indians' as possible back to India. However, this exodus was a subject that had to be dealt with by both India and Sri Lanka. The Nehru—D. S. Senanayake talks of 1947 laid down conditions upon which those Indians could be given "Ceylon citizenship." However, the two Prime Ministers could not agree on the practical interpretations of the agreement, so that it was not implemented.[3] Senanayake introduced the citizenship acts—the "*Ceylon Citizenship Act of* 1948" and the "*Indian and Pakistani Residents Act of* 1949"—which disenfranchised the estate Indian population, who by the terms of the "*Ceylon Citizenship Act*" did not qualify to be citizens of Sri Lanka. The conditions of the Indian and Pakistani Residents Act was not acceptable to Nehru. Further discussions on this subject were held between Nehru and Dudley Senanayake when they met in London in 1953. Even on that occasion Nehru was not willing to accept the idea of the repatriation of those Indians who failed to get citizenship of Sri Lanka.

3 Kodikara—*Op. cit.*—Pp. 102-103.

However, later on, he invited the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka (at that time, Sir John Kotelawala) for further discussion on the subject. These talks led to the "*Indo-Ceylon Agreement of January* 1954. Three articles from this agreement are quoted below.

> "*Article* 2. The Government of Ceylon proposes to undertake the preparation of a register of all adult residents who are not already on the electoral register and will maintain such registers up to date. When this register is completed, any person, not so registered will, if his mother tongue is an Indian language, be presumed to be an illicit immigrant from India and liable to deportation and the Indian High Commissioner will extend all facilities for implementation of such deportation.
>
> "*Article* 7. In regard to those persons who are not so registered, it would be open to them to register themselves as Indian citizens ; if they so choose, at the office of the Indian High Commissioner in Ceylon in accordance with the provisions of article 8 of the Constitution of India. It is noted that Ceylon proposes to offer special inducements to encourage such registration and that those inducements will be announced from time to time. The Government of India will offer administrative and similar facilities to all persons of Indian origin to register themselves as Indian citizens under the Constitution of India, if they so choose, and will also give publicity to the availability of such facilities.
>
> "*Article 8.* Both Prime Ministers are desirous of continuing the present practice of close consultations between the two Governments in matters affecting their mutual interests." [4]

The 1954 January Agreement, in essence was an escape from practical difficulties. Hence its failure led to another agreement of a similar nature in October 1954. However, again the two parties could not agree on the legal position of the so-called 'stateless people'. Sri Lanka maintained that the persons of Indian origin continue to be Indian nationals and citizens, whereas India stuck to the view that only those who held Indian passports or who had registered in the Indian registration list according to article 8 of Indian Constitution were Indian citizens, and that others belonged to the category of 'stateless people.'

Again a dispute arose as to the interpretation of the January and the October Agreements of 1954, and Nehru made this remark in the Lok Sabha on September 6th, 1955, speaking on this problem. "This question, basically, is between the Ceylon Government and these people. They are not our citizens, which we must remember." [5]

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4 Ceylon Treaty Series No. 1, 1954.
5 Nehru—*Op. cit.* P. 371

Even the October Agreement did not change this stand by Nehru. The two parties had given different interpretations to certain clauses of the Agreement. Sir John was not willing to accept the suggestion made by Nehru that the case should be submitted to arbitration. On 12th April, Sir John Kotelawala's tenure of office ended, with the problem still unsolved.

Bandaranaike and the "Indo-Ceylon Problem"

S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike became actively engaged in finding a solution to the Indo-Ceylon problem as early as 1933. On the 11th December 1933, he moved the following motion in the State Council of Sri Lanka.

> "That in view of the serious and increasing unemployment among Ceylonese workers immediate steps be taken for the restriction and effective control of immigration into Ceylon of workers from other countries."

This motion was passed with little amendment by a majority of 24 votes (30 ayes and 6 noes). The amendment was to request the Governor to appoint a Commission to report on the problem. In the course of the debate on the motion Bandaranaike traced the history of the non-Ceylonese immigration into Sri Lanka and pointed out that in 1932 there were 651,000 of Indian labourers working in the tea estates of Sri Lanka.

On the occasion of the second reading of the 'Immigration Bill' of 1941 at the State Council, on 20th March 1941, Bandaranaike, the then Minister of Local Administration, summarized the development of the Indo-Ceylon problem from 1933 to 1941. He stated that India was not even prepared to appreciate the difficulties of Sri Lanka in bringing about a settlement to this problem.

On the 2nd of March, 1954, Bandaranaike, at that time the leader of the Opposition, brought a motion in the House refusing to endorse the ratification of the Nehru-Kotelawala Agreement of January 1954. The motion which was defeated by a majority of 37 votes is quoted below.

> "That this House refuses to endorse the ratification of the joint proposals reached between the Prime Ministers of Ceylon and India as the proposals sacrifice the interests of the nation as a whole and, in fact, militate against the interests of all sections concerned, and will only result in the worsening and embittering of the relations between the two countries by disagreements over interpretations of implementations."

Bandaranaike opposed the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill of March 1955 on the ground that the Bill when implemented would complicate the "Indo-Ceylon problem" further. He asked as to what the Government could do with those Indians who failed to get citizenship since Sri Lanka cannot land them by force on Indian shores.

Such was the background to the problem of non-citizen Indians in Sri Lanka when Bandaranaike became the Prime Minister in April 1956. During the year 1955, Bandaranaike had indicated the line of action that he would follow if he were given the power to do so. He made several public statements to the effect that the 1954 Nehru-Kotelawala Agreement should be abrogated and the issue should be taken up afresh with the Indian authorities.

Bandaranaike's attitude to the "Indo-Ceylon problem" was expressed in his party policy statement in February 1955 :

"....the wisest course would be to abrogate (the 1954 Agreement) by friendly discussion, to go on with the registering of Indians who have applied for our citizenship, and when that task is completed, to take up the question of those who have failed to obtain our citizenship with India on a fresh basis."[6]

On 4th of May 1956, Bandaranaike made the following statement on the Indian problem in the House :

> "As to the Indian problem itself, I am sorry it did not receive any mention in this (Throne) Speech, but as the House is aware, I have made some statements on the matter. I shall take this question up in an informal way, at a very preliminary level, with Shri Jawarharlal Nehru in London....and later on I shall have further discussions with him at a formal level in order to go into this question .... I am very hopeful of .... getting some very satisfactory solution to the problem...."[7]

On 20th November 1956, Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, India, in replying to a question on the 'stateless people' of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, made the following statement which showed signs of improving relationship between India and Sri Lanka.

> "According to the latest available figures there has been improvement in the rate of disposals of applications for Ceylon citizenship. During the period from January to August 1956, 2342

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6 Free Lanka—Feb. 16, 1955.

7 Bandaranaike—*Towards a New Era*—P. 779.

applications covering 9036 persons have been accepted and 50,331 applications covering 162,132 persons have been rejected. As against these, during the same period in 1955, only 361 applications covering 55,266 persons have been rejected." [8]

Both Nehru and Bandaranaike were pre-occupied with other more urgent issues during the year 1956; and no progress was made in bringing a solution to the Indo-Ceylon problem. In May 1957, Prime Minister Nehru visited Sri Lanka, and was received with great warmth and cordiality by Bandaranaike, who had great respect for, and great similarities of perception with (on world issues) the Indian leader. The joint statement issued by the two leaders on this occasion, though expressing the hope that the problem would be solved, did not offer any definite ways and means to that end:

> "The Prime Ministers availed themselves of the opportunity.... to exchange views on .... Indo-Ceylon relations .... There are certain outstanding problems between India and Ceylon that yet await satisfactory solution. The Prime Ministers feel confident, particularly in view of the cordial relations that exist between the two countries and their co-operation in so many spheres that these problems can and should be solved satisfactorily to both countries." 9

However, in June 1957, Bandaranaike still could not offer any definite plan or means for the solution of this problem. On the 19th of that month, questioned by the Opposition on this issue during the debate on the Throne Speech, he could again only make a very general statement:

> "With regard to the Indian problem, this is a problem we have discussed for many years. It is almost a Gordian knot, so that we cannot produce a solution in the Governor-General's speech. We do hope to go into this question and come to some agreement. I think that this is a reasonable point of view. Please do not look at it from only one point of view ...." 10

Further discussions with Pandit Nehru in Delhi in December 1957 brought no results. (Neither was the content of this discussion publicised.) In December 1957, the generous assistance given to Sri Lanka by India in the rescue and rehabilitation work following the disastrous floods suffered by the island in that month, probably led Bandaranaike to extend benefits to stateless Indian workers in Sri Lanka by his February 1958 National Provident Bill.

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8 Foreign Affairs Record (Govt. of India)—Vol. V. 1956, P. 161.

9 *The Foleign Po.icy of Ceylon*—Ceylon Govt. Publication,—1961. P. 106.

10 Bandaranaike—*Towards* A *New Era*—P. 786.

However, in 1958, in spite of the Nehru-Bandaranaike friendship, the Indo-Ceylon relation took a definite turn for the worse. Early in that year, the Indian Government was constrained to ask the Government of Sri Lanka in an aide memoire, that it would appreciate the Sri Lanka Government's clarifying its position on the question of granting or extending visas to the Indian business community in Sri Lanka. This request was considered by some elements in Bandaranaike's Government as an interference in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka, and resented as such. About this time, too, one Mr. P. K. Doraisamy, a 'stateless person' whose application for Ceylon citizenship had been turned down by the Sri Lanka Government, sued the Government of Sri Lanka in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka on the grounds that he was wrongfully deprived of the Sri Lanka citizenship and was entitled to it. When the Supreme Court upheld this point of view, the Government of Sri Lanka appealed to the Privy Council in London, only to have the Privy Council, too, upheld the decision of the Supreme Court. This decision proved to be a great morale-booster for the stateless persons who now joined, in some cases, the Federal Party in their anti-government protest activities.

In June and July 1958, Sri Lanka erupted into violence with the race riots springing out of the language policy of the Bandaranaike government. This further estranged the Indian Tamil population from the Sinhalese, and increased their hostility to the government. The situation was worsened by certain Indian leaders, like Shri Rajagopalachari and the leader of the D. M. K. (Tamil Nationalist Party of India), who made certain public utterances much resented by the Sinhalese. The latter talked of a Tamil State which included parts of India as well as the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka while the former was quoted to have said that the Tamils of Sri Lanka, Indian and Ceylonese, should have their own autonomous state. These statements provoked Bandaranaike, normally inclined to be very cordial to India, to remark that certain Indian leaders should be more careful in speaking of a foreign and sovereign state. In the meantime, the increasing figures depicting the number of Indian nationals and "stateless persons" in Sri Lanka too contributed to this fear among the Sinhalese. In 1956, there were 864,000 Indians and stateless people in Sri Lanka of whom 440,743 were estate workers, while there were only 1440,032 Ceylonese workers employed in the estates.[11]

The statement made by Mrs. Lakshmi Menon in the Lok Sabha in November 1958 showed that the Indian stand on the problem of the workers of Indian descent in Sri Lanka had remained unchanged :

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11 *Statistical Abstract of Ceylon, 1963* P. 172.

"The plantation population of Indian origin constitutes a third category of Ceylon residents. They are about nine lakhs. They have been in Ceylon as plantation labour for a long time. Most of them were born there. This so-called Indo-Ceylon problem is the question of Citizenship rights for this estate labour .... which according to our views is entitled to Ceylon citizenship.

"The Government of Ceylon issues periodical statistics on the progress of registration of these persons as Ceylon citizens. According to the latest statistics received, out of a total of 2,37,034 applications covering an estimate of 8,29,619 persons, filed by persons of Indian origin for Ceylon citizenship, only 24,923 applications covering 96,923 persons had been accepted until the end of August 1958 ....

"In his (the Ceylon Prime Minister's) discussion with our Prime Minister in December 1957, he made it clear that his attitude like ours was based on the recognition that this is a human problem which calls for a human approach. In Parliamentary debates on this subject in August 1958, he ruled out any inhuman methods as both impracticable and undesirable and declared that he was hopeful that "reasonably the problem could be solved." He also recognised that there was a lot of goodwill in India towards Ceylon ....

"In effect, the persons who have been refused Ceylon citizenship have been rendered "stateless"—They cannot become Indian unless they are registered as such. They could only be registered if they apply for Indian citizenship of their own free will and if they are qualified for registration under our laws.....

"Our stand continues to be that these people have, by decades of their residence in Ceylon, and their contribution to Ceylon's development, earned the right to continue their way of life in the country of their adoption. Those of them who wish to become Indian citizens of their own free will, can apply to our High Commissioner in Ceylon .... and if they qualify under our citizenship law, our High Commissioner will register them as such. We have made this position clear in all our discussions with the Ceylon authorities." 12

Further evidence of Bandaranaike's attitude towards this problem could be seen from the fact that shortly afterwards, he decided to abolish the separate register kept by the government of Sri Lanka

12 Foreign Affairs Record (Govt. of India) November 1958. P. 261.

for the Indians who had been given Lanka citizenship, and to integrate them in one register with other Lanka citizens. He informed Pandit Nehru of this decision, and his reaction to Nehru's letter of thanks is worth noting.

> "I wrote a personal letter to Pandit Nehru saying that the Joint Select Committee.....consider that they do not feel there is any justification for distinction between one section of citizens and another, and this anomaly the Joint Select Committee proposes to eliminate. I received a very friendly letter from Pandit Nehru. The Prime Minister of India thanked me very much for the information that I conveyed and did not express one single word in opposition. He acknowledged receipt with thanks, the courtesy of our informing him.....and beyond that not one single word of protest or objection has been raised by him." [13]

It would seem that Bandaranaike's delight at being in accordance with Nehru on this one point in the problem throws some light on his failure to take any substantial step in the solution of the problem as a whole. Because of his great respect and admiration for Mr. Nehru, he failed to bring forward proposals which would not have been very palatable to India. Thus the Nehru-Bandaranaike friendship stood in the way, to some extent, of resolving the Indo-Ceylon problem. As Dr. Kodikara points out, all through the nineteen thirties and the forties, Bandaranaike had been one of the chief advocates for the repatriation of labourers of Indian origin from Sri Lanka; but, as we have seen, his attitude to the problem changed greatly when he became Prime Minister. He did not bring sufficient pressure on the Indian government with a view to finding a solution to this problem which would be in keeping with the interest of Sri Lanka, in this he was unlike any of his predecessors, and indeed, unlike his widow Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike who was successful in bringing about a solution to this knotty problem.

It would be seen from this then that in the matter of the "Indo-Ceylon problem," Bandaranaike sought to carry out his policy of friendship with all nations to the detriment of his own country. This inclination to let a personal relationship, however valued, stand in the way of national interest, must inevitably detract from his stature as a statesman. This is the general impression one

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13 Bandaranaike—*Towards A New Era*—PP. 161–162.

could get by going through the history of the problem. Bandaranaike did not fail to realize the inherent difficulties of Sri Lanka to bring any kind of pressure such as political or economic on India. It was diplomatic on his part not to rush but to promote friendship very patiently with Indian leaders. This policy of Bandaranaike became the most important factor which led to a final solution found by Mr. Shasthri, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mrs. Sirimavo Dias Bandaranaike within the next two decades.

6. Bandaranaike and the World Crises

IN order to appraise Bandaranaike's foreign policy of "neutralism and non-alignment, friendship with all nations, and bridging the gap between power blocs with a view to help maintain world peace", it is necessary to see to what extent he actually followed such a foreign policy in dealing with the various world crises which occurred during the tenure of his office as the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

Apart from many other documents and witnesses, the Hansard Reports of the Parliament of Sri Lanka and the Records of the United Nations General Assembly (especially the UN year books and the monthly magazine UN Review) covering the period from 1956 to 1960 indicate that Sri Lanka had been very active in responding to world crises.

Suez Crisis

The news of President Nasser's nationalization (or, as the British and the French had it: seizure) of the Suez Canal Company on 26th July 1956, became a matter of grave concern to Bandaranaike At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in London between 27th June and 6th July, 1956, a general discussion on the

Middle East had taken place but nothing spoken there seemed to have indicated the imminence of the Suez Crisis. There is evidence to indicate that the news of the Suez nationalisation came as a shock to Nehru, too, as expressed in a statement he made to the Lok Sabha, on the 31st July 1946. Nehru, Marshal Tito and Colonel Nasser had been in conference at Brioni in Yugoslavia a few days before the nationalization and it was during this conference, on the 19th of July, 1956, that President Nasser learnt that no aid was forthcoming from the United States for the building of the Aswan high dam. This news had a direct bearing on the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal on the part of President Nasser, but he did not indicate to the other two leaders anything of his intensions during the Brioni Conference. Thus the news came as a shock to most world leaders.

As discussed in Chapter 4, Bandaranaike had, by the time of the nationalization of the Suez, already started negotiations with the British authorities to the take over of the bases in Sri Lanka. "While these negotiations, which were both difficult and delicate, were in progress, Colonel Nasser moved against the Suez Canal company. Bandaranaike, anxious not to say or do anything which might prejudice a new bases agreement with Britain, was more cautious in his initial reactions to the nationalization than might have been expected, or than was expected by his followers.....".[1] As pointed out by James Eayrs in the above quotation, Bandaranaike had to be extremely cautious. This cautious attitude is clearly indicated in the following statement issued by him on the 27th July, 1956.

> "It is obvious that the step taken has many serious implications. I do not wish to make any detailed comment at this stage except to express the hope that immediate discussion amongst Powers most closely connected with this issue appears to be necessary to secure even at this late hour some frienily understanding and so avoid a grave set-back to recent prospects of peace that seem to be manifesting themselves. I shall consider whether any urgent discussions between our countries in Asia, namely the Colombo powers, or.even in a wider level; the Bandung powers, might be necessitated by the present situation."[2]

Bandaranaike was the first statesman in the world to suggest the need to have "immediate discussion amongst Powers most closely connected with this issue." This idea was quite different from that of Sir. Anthony Eden, the then British Prime Minister, who had telegraphed President Eisenhower on 27th July 1956 suggesting that

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1 James Eayrs—*The Commonwealth and Suez*—(1964) Oxford University Press, London P. 23.

2 Ceylon Newsletter (Govt. Publications)—30th July 1956.

the three powers, USA, UK, and France should exchange views, align their policies and concert together as to how they could best bring maximum pressure to bear on the Egyptian government. In that telegram Sir Anthony stated that, he and his colleagues were concerned that they must be ready to resort to force, as a last resort, "to bring Nasser to his senses." The quick responses from Australia, New Zealand and Canada did not suggest any way out other than giving their moral support to the British stand. South Africa was, however, cautious and did not take this attitude. Nehru, in the Lok Sabha, too did not make any definite suggestion as to the possibility of a solution to the crisis. The President of the USA, in his telegram of 28th July 1956, to the British Premier, proposed "immediate consultation among the largest possible number of martime nations affected by the canal's new status." The British Premier accepted the US idea of a conference but decided to restrict the number attending it to the three Western Powers, the USA, the UK, and France.[3] The tension in the Middle East during July and August 1956 clearly indicated the possibility of a war between power blocs. Bandaranaike thought that it was time to attempt to bridge the gap. He thought of acting in concert with the non-aligned countries as well as through the Colombo powers. The following extract from a statement made by him on 30th July 1956 confirms the above observation.

> "I have explored the possibility of at least the Colombo Powers discussing this matter very clearly, but I feel, it is a feeling that is shared by others whom I have had an opportunity of consulting at the moment—that in the light of wider conferences in which we may all participate taking place early, it is better just for the present to watch the situation. I am of course keeping in touch with our Representatives at the United Nations in any developments that may take place there, if at all—not very likely perhaps regarding this question..... I repeat the overriding necessity, within the scope of honour and adherence to certain fundamental principles of preventing this situation deteriorating to any point of serious danger."[4]

On the 2nd August 1956, the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States issued a statement proposing that a conference of twenty four countries should be held in London on August 16th 1956, and that the invitations to that Conference be extended by the United Kingdom. Of these countries, the following were parties to the Suez Convention of 1888: Egypt, Italy, Spain,

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3 James Eayrs—*Ibid.* P. 23.

4 Hansard—H.R. 30th July 1956 Col. 1106.

United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Turkey, and the USSR—this last had been present at the Convention as Tsarist Russia. Besides these nations, the following other countries too were invited to this conference: Australia, Sri Lanka, Denmark, Ethiopia, Indonesia, United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Norway, Pakistan, Greece, India, Sweden.

Bandaranaike was at first rather hesitant about accepting this invitation because he felt that the conveners had already made their decisions in advance—to establish an international control of the operation of the Suez Canal—and that this idea had already been rejected by Egypt. Bandaranaike contacted Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Nehru and other Asian leaders for further clarification on this point. On 9th August 1956, speaking on the Suez crisis in the House, he made the following points clear.[5]

(1) Sri Lanka does not question the right of Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal.

(2) Sri Lanka desires to obtain a peaceful settlement.

(3) It is possible to obtain reasonable guarantees, for the use of the Suez Canal from Egypt.

The London conference, attended by all except two of the powers invited (Greece and Egypt) met from the 16th to 23rd August 1956. The absence of Egypt precluded any final settlement. The 18 powers supported a proposal to make the control of the canal international, and India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and USSR opposed this move. As a method of implementing the 18-power proposal it was suggested to form a Canal Users' Association, but Japan, Ethiopia and Pakistan declined to be members of such an association. At the first London Conference, Sri Lanka's delegate Sir Claude Corea stated that a solution should be found first on the basis of the sovereignty of Egypt. Finding inadequacies in the proposals made by India and Pakistan, Sir Claude introduced the following formula which did not receive any majority support.

"The Governments represented at the London Conference on the Suez Canal, seeking in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations for a peaceful solution of the situation that has arisen in connection with the Suez Canal,

5 Hansard—HR. 11th Augt. 1956. Cols. 138—145.

Suggest for negotiations with the Government of Egypt the following proposals.

(1) They recognize the Sovereignty of Egypt over the Suez Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, and its legal right to nationalize the Universal Suez Canal Company.

(2) They also recognize that the canal is an international waterway and is subject to the Convention of 1888 which guarantees at all times and for all the powers its free use.

(3) They further recognize that it is in the interests not only of Egypt but also of all user countries that :

(*a*) the canal should be operated and maintained efficiently and improved to meet the needs of all users now and in the future.

(*b*) the dues collected for the use of the canal shall be reasonable and fair, and sufficient for the proposed maintenace and improvement of the canal and to apply it for the benefit of Egypt.

(4) They therefore recognise that it is to the advantage of Egypt and all users that in the operation of the Canal there should be co-operation between them with a view to obtaining the fullest support of technical skill and financial aid in the operation of the canal.

(5) To this end they recommend that the Government of Egypt should consider the establishment in Egypt of a Board or Corporation consisting of representatives of Egypt and all user countries, in which will be vested all rights and facilities to operate the Canal efficiently. The Board or Corporation shall be under the general direction of the Government of Egypt."

The idea of a Suez-users' Corporation (operated under the direction of the Government of Egypt, brought forward by Sir Claude was done so under the instructions of Bandaranaike, and this fact was revealed by him to the House on the 18th December 1956. President Nasser who was against the 18-power proposal seemed to favour this proposal. He sent the following cable to Mr. Bandaranaike on 3rd September, 1956.

"Your Excellency—Having gone through the records of the London Conference on the Suez Canal, I wish to express to Your Excellency the Egyptian peoples' and my own appreciation of the wise and fair attitude of your delegation and its support of

the right of Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal Company and safeguard its own independence and dignity. I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my highest consideration—Gamal Abdel Nasser." [6]

An invitation was extended, later, by President Nasser to Bandaranaike to pay a visit to Egypt.

In the morning of the 30th October 1956, Israeli troops invaded Egyptian territory. On the same day at 4.15 p.m. (GMT), the French British ultimatum asking the belligerents to withdraw 10 miles from the Suez Canal, was issued but it was ignored by Egypt. On 31st October, Egypt was bombarded and thus the war began. The US effort to bring the Suez issue before the Security Council was a failure due to opposition from France and UK, both of whom were members of the Security Council. These two countries objected to have the issue taken up in that body. The UK found that only two of her allies—Australia and New Zealand—sided with her; Canada and South Africa, as well as the Asian members of the Commonwealth and the USA, clearly did not support the hasty French-British action. The General Assembly of the United Nations met in an emergency session on 1st November 1956 to use the technique of '*uniting for peace*' to solve the Suez Crisis. Sri Lanka's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Mr. R. S. S. Gunawardene welcomed the US initiative to summon the General Assembly. His speech at the UN Emergency Session indicated the following points.

(1) As a member of the Commonwealth, Ceylon Government strongly disapproves of the action of British for whom Ceylon always had high esteem,

(2) Both the United Kingdom and France who should have joined the Security Council to halt the initial aggressor, had themselves committed a further act of aggression,

(3) The action of the three powers, UK, France, and Israel who have sworn to uphold the Charter was a serious threat to the effectiveness of the UN. [7]

Mr. R .S. S. Gunawardene on this occasion read Bandaranaike's message which expressed Sri Lanka Government's appreciation of the stand taken by the United States. Sri Lanka supported the US-sponsored resolution demanding cease-fire and creation of a United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez to keep the belligerents apart.

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6 Hansard HR.—18.12.56—Col. 1158.

7 Official Record of the U. N. General Assembly—Special Sessions (8 Nov. 1956) PP 40—41

She was also an active co-sponsor of the resolution introduced by the Indian delegation. This resolution, adopted by a vote of 59 to 5 with 12 abstentions was designed to bring pressure on the UK, France and Israel to withdraw immediately. The major points of the resolution were as follows:

> "Reaffirm its resolution of 2nd November 1956 and once again call upon the parties immediately to comply with the provision of the said resolution ;
>
> "Authorize the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the movements of military forces and arms into the area and request him to report compliances forthwith and, in any case, not later than twelve hours from the time of the adoption of the resolution ;
>
> "Decide to meet again on receipt of the Secretary General's report referred to in operative Paragraph 2 of this resolution."

In complying with the Secretary-General's request to contribute to the UNEF Sri Lanka Government informed her willingness to contribute the following items :

(1) A contingent composed of an infantry and a small administrative staff totalling 150 men under the command of a major ;

(2) The contingent will be equipped with personal weapons, two motor cycles, three jeeps, and four 3-ton vehicles.

Bandaranaike was active in another way. He took part in the Prime Minister's Conference of Colombo Powers, held in Delhi in November 1956. The Afro-Asian 19-power resolution was fundamentally based on the joint statement issued by this conference. As revealed by Bandaranaike, on the 11th December 1956, in the House of Representatives of Sri Lanka, he had been active in the following ways :

(1) Bandaranaike decided to go to the United Nations to address the General Assembly with a view to informing that Assembly on certain vital points discussed at the Delhi Conference.

(2) On his way to the United Nations he met British Premier Sir Anthony Eden and certain other ministers to explain the views of the Colombo Powers as well as his own view. One of the major points that Bandaranaike mentioned to Sir Anthony was that without immediate withdrawal of troops from Egyptian territory no other settlement could be reached. Sir Anthony who was for 'phased withdrawal' did not agree with him.

(3) At the UN, for the first time, Bandaranaike started to criticize Sir Anthony's 'phased withdrawal' and said that this decision was a "great mistake." Referring to both Suez and Hungary issues Bandaranaike said that 'both are to be condemned and deplored alike.'

(4) Bandaranaike conferred with the President Eisenhower and expressed his admiration for the United States' willingness to go against even her friends 'on the merits of the case.'

(5) He went to Canada to confer with the Canadian leaders and explain to them the Colombo powers' stand.

(6) Conferred with Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, who consulted Bandaranaike about the British withdrawal announcement to be made in the House of Commons.

(7) Obtained an assurance from the British that the bases at Katunayake and Trincomalee would not be used in the Suez crisis.

Thus Sri Lanka played an active role in the Suez crisis. There had been 11 resolutions introduced in the General Assembly of the United Nations as tentative solutions to this problem, and Sri Lanka had voted in favour of all these resolutions, as did the USA. (Russia had supported the 19-power AfroAsian resolution 999 ES—1, and 1002 ES-1.) Russians on the whole opposed the resolutions and abstained from voting on 4 of the resolutions on Suez.

Bandaranaike's response to the Suez crisis certainly pleased the Arab nations who seemed to have developed a new confidence in him. When the United Nations General Assembly felt the need of appointing an Advisory Committee to guide the UNEF in the Suez Canal area, Poland brought an amendment calling for the addition of Czechoslovakia to the list of countries forming the Advisory Committee but that amendment was rejected by 23 votes to 31 with 14 abstentions. An Iranian amendment to replace Iran by Sri Lanka in the membership of the Advisory Committee was passed without any dissenting votes. This was an indication of the appreciation of Sri Lanka's foreign policy by a large number of countries. Thus the Suez issue provided Bandaranaike an opportunity to display what he meant by his foreign policy. Sri Lanka made friends with the Arab countries within a very short time; came into close contact with the USA while clearing the way for a good relationship with the communist bloc as well, while maintaining the close ties she already had with non-aligned Afro-Asian countries. She also made use of the opportunity to come to an early settlement with the United Kingdom on the question of the British bases and above all, within her limited means, she was able to bridge the gap between the blocs.

Hungary Crisis

By the 24th October 1956, while the Suez Crisis was still a burning question in the world, news of a revolt in Hungary and the presence of Russian troops in that country sounded a new danger. The general and prompt reaction from the world was a demand for the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Hungary. The Russians announced that they would withdraw their troops after consultation with the Warsaw Pact countries; possibly on the 29th or the 30th of October 1956. According to Russian reports her troops had been withdrawn from Hungary on 30th October, the fateful day that Israel, together with France and Britain, chose to invade Egypt. Suddenly Russian troops with greater force returned to Hungary. "By the 2nd of November 1956, there were in Hungary an estimated 75,000 to 200,000 Russian troops and 1,600 to 4,000 Russian tanks." [8] As a result of this development the situation in Eastern Europe became very explosive.

It was a puzzle to the West that both Nehru and Bandaranaike so far had shown a lukewarm interest in the Hungary crisis. Mr. Nehru's explanation to this allegation was that he was in want of facts about the Hungary problem, and therefore he had been extremely cautious in making a public statement. At the time of the Hungary crisis, Sri Lanka did not have diplomatic relations with either Russia or Hungary. Therefore she too suffered from a lack of facts. However this explanation was not enough to dispel the suspicions of a 'double standard employed by the leaders of the non-aligned nations in judging world affairs' that had arisen in the minds of the Western leaders. The following comment by Prof. Wriggins about the Colombo Powers' meeting in mid-November 1956 in Delhi to discuss the Suez and Hungarian issues was a reflection of the Western opinions of the attitudes of Nehru and Bandaranaike to this question:

> "Under Indonesia's encouragement, the Colombo powers were invited to Delhi in mid-November to consult on a common response to the highly dramatic events.... Agreement on the Egyptian events were easy, but there appears to have been a great deal of discussion on how best to express disapproval of the use of Russian troops in Hungary. In the end they approved of the steps already taken in the United Nations to induce a cease-fire in Egypt and to establish an international force to help separate the belligerents. They welcomed the promise of the Israeli, French and British government to abide by the United

8 UN Special Committee Report on the Problem of Hungary, P. 27.

Nations resolutions and urged them to with draw their troops forthwith. They had watched with deep distress the events in Hungary, asserted their right of all peoples to determine their own destiny, and were of the opinion that the Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Hungary speedily. They saw both sets of events as action by larger countries against small countries and they viewed with great concern the revival of the spirit of colonialism and its methods, whatever form it may take."[9]

It is true that the Colombo powers were very careful in their criticism of the Russian invasion in Hungary. Bandaranaike, at the General Assembly, on the 2nd November, referring to the charge of 'lukewarm' attitude, said that he strongly repudiated that charge. He said that he and some Asian leaders were not given even twenty-four hours' time to study the problem and instruct their representatives. Some extracts from his speech appear below :

"With regard to the second resolution on Hungary, it was.... good in parts and bad in parts. We agreed with the request that Russian troops be withdrawn from Budapest and from Hungary without any delay. We could not quite agree with that portion of the resolution that requested that free elections be held in Hungary under the eyes of the United Nations observers. You will have noted what we said at Delhi.... that the Russian troops should be withdrawn and that Hungary should be left free to work out its own destiny. Why should we dictate to any country that it shall have elections as we want it to have them ? Surely whether it is a Russian dictatorship in Hungary, an Anglo-French dictatorship in Egypt, or even the dictatorship of the United Nations which militates against the sovereignty of a country, they are still I think, equally unwise and undesirable."[10] For the full text of the speech, please see the Appendix PP. 180-190.

There were altogether 9 resolutions on the Hungary problem. Both Sri Lanka and India abstained from voting for the 7-power resolution 1005 (ES 11) which was supported by the USA and the UK. Russia voted against it. Sri Lanka voted for the Cuban resolution No. 1127, supported by the USA and UK. India abstained, and Russia voted against this resolution. The Resolution (1128) brought by Sri Lanka, India and Indonesia was supported by UK and US and was opposed by the USSR. On the whole Sri Lanka had voted 5 times for the resolutions opposed by Russia, and abstained 3 times in the case of resolutions supported by the USA.

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9 Wriggins—*Op. cit.*—P. 453—454.

10 Bandaranaike—*Speeches and Writings*—Pp. 385–386.

On the 10th of January 1957, the General Assembly of the United Nations appointed a "Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary." Mr. R. S. S. Gunawardene, was one of the five members of this committee. The others were from Australia, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay. This committee was not allowed to visit Hungary. However the committee conducted its investigations in places like London, Rome and New York.

Bandaranaike, by August 1958 had come to realize that Sri Lanka could no longer approve of Russia's designs in Hungary. He did not display at this point the courage necessary to "criticise friends when they behave wrongly". He had to be cautious lest strain the newly established friendly relations with the USSR.

On July 16th 1958, the House of Representatives of Sri Lanka passed a non-official motion condemning the secret trial and execution of Imre Nagy, the former Hungarian premier, as an act against the interest of socialism and democracy. I. M. R. A. Iriyagolle, a member of Parliament, was the mover of this motion. In the House, two members of the Communist Party voted against it while the ruling party members under the leadership of Bandaranaike abstained. The Trotskite Party and the UNP voted for the motion which was passed by 15 to 2 votes.

At the debate on the motion Bandaranaike said that he was disturbed abou tthe execution of Nagy. But he added that it was improper for him to express an opinion on it before the investigation was completed by the UN Special Committee on Hungary of which Sri Lanka was a member.[1] This explanation, however, did not satisfy those who accused Bandaranaike of showing a "double standard."

Even after the report of the Committee on Hungary appeared, and was accepted by the UN, Bandaranaike was silent on the Nagy execution issue. The Report on Hungary was endorsed by the General Assembly on September 14th, 1959 by 60 to 10 with 10 absentions. Under specific instructions from Bandaranaike, Sri Lanka in spite of being a member of the Committee on Hungary abstained from voting. The Report of this Committee on Hungary had brought out the following four conclusions which stood against the Russians:

1. The rebels of Hungary were not fascists as the USSR had repeatedly alleged. They had been led by democratic party leaders who had been granted permission by the Nagy Government to resume political activities.

2. The Committee found evidence to believe that the USSR was invited to intervene.

3. The Committee found evidence to believe that the USSR troops used in the first intervention were not entirely those that were stationed near Hungarian frontiers under the Warsaw Pact.

4. The USSR's claim that no Hungarians were deported to the Soviet Union was not true for the Committee found evidence to believe that such deportations had taken place.

Sri Lanka's left-wing leaders, mostly Commnists, criticiszed Mr. R. S. S. Gunawardene as an "American stooge" and Bandaranaike tried to defend him, but, later on, in 1958, Mr. Gunawardene was given 'some other important assignment' and Sir Claude Corea was sent as Sri Lanka's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Probably this change could be interprted as an outcome of the Hungarian crisis, and a move made to please the Soviet bloc. However, Bandaranaike showed willingness to work with the United Nations and contributed to its Hungary Relief Fund.

Minor Crises—I Algeria

In respect of this issue, Bandaranaike expressed his sensitivity but did not take an active part in bringing about a solution to the question. (The Algerian problem did not reach the point of eruption during Mr. Bandaranaike's tenure of office.) The following quotation from R. S. S. Gunawardene indicates the position taken by Sri Lanka in the matter.

"We refuse to accept the French thesis that Algeria is an integral part of France. We do not recognize the right of a colonial power to declare any of its colonies as an integral part of its metropolitan territory." [11]

II—Cyprus

"There has been some improvement in the situation in Cyprus. We welcome the truce which has put an end to the reign of terror and counter-terror. Conditions now appear favourable for a settlement in accordance with the wishes of the people of Cyprus." 11

11 These quotations are from the UN Monthly Review, November 1957. P. 87.

III—West Irian

" We consider this a colonial issue. It has affected the good relations of Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. We sincerely hope that through the United Nations a spirit of negotiations will be found for the solution of this vexed problem. " [11]

IV—Lebanon and Jordan

In August 1958, the United States and the United Kingdom sent their armed forces into Lebanon and Jordan. On 5th July 1958, the Security Council met to discuss the situation in Lebanon which has complained in June of UAR intervention. Jordan too had made a similar complaint against the UAR in July of the same year.

As Secretary-General Hammarskjold indicated, this was not an occasion for the UN peace-keeping forces to intervene ; however, the British and the US troops had moved into these countries. This was considered by the Russian bloc as ' a deplorable act of intervention '. Particularly in Sri Lanka the Marxist parties who lost face in the country as a result of the Russian invasion in Hungary now made capital out of this ' armed intervention by the UK and the USA. '. In the House of Representatives some of the left-wing leaders criticised Bandaranaike for not actively condemning that particular intervention. In replying to those critics, Mr. Bandaranaike, on the 14th August 1958 made the following statements. [12]

(i) We oppose intervention of one country in the internal affairs of another—we feel that these forces, the United Kingdom and the United States forces, must be withdrawn without delay.

(ii) I have in my hand a resolution tabled by Andrei Gromyko of the USSR :

" The General Assembly, recognizing the necessity of adopting urgent measures to ease tension in the Near and Middle East area in the interest of preserving universal peace, recommends to the Governments of the United States and Great Britain to withdraw their troops from the territory of Lebanon and Jordan without delay, instructs the United Nations Secretary-General to reinforce the United Nations Observer Groups in Lebanon in accordance with the plan presented by the United Nations Observers ' Group in Lebanon in its second report, and to send a group of observers to Jordan with a view to supervise the withdrawal of the American and British Troops from Lebanon and Jordan and the situation along the frontier of those countries. "

12 Hansard HR—14th Augst. 1958—Cols 313—317.

Bandaranaike continued: "These views, I am happy to say, correspond entirely with my own and those are my instructions that ....I conveyed to Sir Claude Corea."

However the USSR was unsuccessful in introducing that resolution in the General Assembley. Even at the Security Council on Lebanon and Jordan crises the USSR resolution had no supporters other than the USSR itself.

Bandaranaike also said that he had asked Sir Claude Corea to bring a certain resolution suggesting the establishment of a permanent small police force by the United Nations.

Although Bandaranaike was very pleased with the Russian draft resolution, it was the one submitted by the Arab countries that was unanimously passed by the General Assembly. Sri Lanka was one of the active members of the UN that canvassed for the Arab resolution—(1237 (ES III)). In compliance with this resolution both the US and the UK agreed to withdraw their armed forces from Lebanon and Jordan.

The United Nations Review of September 1958 had given a fair coverage to Sir Claude Corea's speech on the Lebanon and Jordan crises. The full report on this speech, made on 8th August 1958, is quoted below:

> "An indication of the extent of support and assistance which had been rendered the Arab States by other African and Asian members in connection with the adopted resolution was given by Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon. He told the Assembly that the African and Asian group had been considering the problem and making a great effort to reach a solution, and that their efforts had been certainly helpful in producing 'this great gesture—a gesture which shall be an example to this Assembley for all time as one which is clearly in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations.'
>
> "The Arab states themselves were thus enabled to see what could be done, he said, 'The African and Asian countries left it to the Arab states to see what they could do. We are glad that the Arab states shouldered this great responsibility so successfully that within a very brief period, probably not more than twenty-four hours, they were able to reach an agreement." 13

13 UN Review, September 1958—P. 9 and 40.

During Bandaranaike's tenture of office, only three problems came up that could be called world crises. They were :

(i) Invasion of Egypt by Anglo-French-Israeli Forces over the question of the Suez Canal,

(2) Russian invasion in Hungary, and

(3) The US and UK troops landing in Jordan and Lebanon.

Out of these three issues, Bandaranaike took the keenest interest in the Suez question. This, as admitted by Bandaranaike himself at the United Nations, was due to Sri Lanka's paramount concern for her foreign trade. 75% of her trade went through the Suez Canal. Therefore the preservation and proper functioning of that waterway was vital to her interests. Besides this, other factors, mostly psychological were there. The invasion of Egypt was seen as a revival of colonialism and an attack on a member of the Afro-Asian group. The other motive such as preserving peace definitely played a secondary part.

Bandaranaike was also very careful not to do anything which might jeopardise the newly-developed friendship of Sri Lanka with Russia ; he was equally careful not to offend the USA. He sent the pro-American R. S. S. Gunawardene to Washington as Sri Lanka's ambassador. When a member of Parliament brought certain private motions—(1) that Sri Lanka should severe links with the Commonwealth in protest against British imperial policies in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, and (2) that Sri Lanka should condemn the USA and the UK for landing troops on Lebanon, Bandaranaike attacked the motives of the mover (who happened to be his cousin) and was instrumental in defeating those motions.

In conclusion it could be pointed out that Bandaranaike, as far as Sri Lanka's reactions to world crises were concerned, tried to maintain a balance between the pro-Western and pro-Russian attitudes. In this he was motivated, it is reasonable to suppose, by a desire to fill the gap between the belligerent power blocs.

7. Voting Behaviour of Sri Lanka in the United Nations

THE purpose of this chapter is to examine the factors that determined the voting behaviour of Sri Lanka in the United Nations during the Prime-Ministership of Bandaranaike.

The policy of neutralism claimed to have been followed by Bandaranaike should be reflected in the voting behaviour of Sri Lanka in the General Assembly during the time of his Prime-Ministership. In other words, the ideology of neutralism should be a factor that determined her voting behaviour in the UN. Whether this is actually so has to be determined by examining the voting of Sri Lanka in the UN records.

It is proposed to examine the nature of the various determinants that influenced Sri Lanka's voting at the UN's General Assembly--such as the ideological, economic, cultural and political ties of Sri Lanka with other countries. For a general overall view, all the roll-calls both at the plenary sessions and at the committees of the General Assembly shall be tabulated. It can be noticed that during the committee stage, some members of the UN General Assembly engaged in heated debates and voted differently from each other, but have remained passive when the roll-call votes on the same subject

were taken up in the General Assembly. Hence in determining the voting behaviour of any country at the UN, it is necessary to count all the committee stage votes as well as the roll-calls in General Assembly.

Certain roll-call votes on issues such as human rights were, to some members not so important as the issue of the admission of Red China to the UN. Hence, for determining the attitude of Sri Lanka to such issues, specific issues will be taken up and analysed separately. For the determination of her relations with either bloc, a separate table will be prepared on the basis of differences in voting by the USA and the USSR. In this table the concurrent votes by both these pcwers shall be excluded from the calculations so that her standing with regard to one or the other of them on these issues would be properly revealed. For such a determination, the writer feels that an assessment of votes on the basis of ranking system (giving a negative vote 5.5, an abstention 25.5, and an affirmative vote 70.5) is rather misleading. For instance, a member may abstain simply because the USA abstained from voting on a particular issue, and in order to determine why this particular member abstained, one has to look into various ties that exist between it and the USA. Sri Lanka's voting position should be analyzed in this light. Hence the method that the writer proposes to use in this chapter is the method of correlating roll-calls.

Influence of Power Blocs

Voting records of the General Assembly of the United Nations provide some index to the foreign policy of any member nation. Whether Bandaranaike's claim to be free from bloc alignments is true or not can be studied by looking into the voting figures. Sri Lanka's voting behaviour at all roll-calls both at the General Assembly and at committees during the years 1956-59 have been examined, and her voting correlations for those years respectively with the USA and the USSR have been tabulated.

TABLE No. 1

Sri Lanka's Voting Correlation Percentages with the USA and the USSR at the U.N. on all Roll Calls

Year	*Total No. of roll-calls*	*Correlation with USA*	*Correlation with USSR*
1956 ..	33	60	48
1957 ..	41	34	46
1958 ..	39	43	56
1959 ..	42	47	64
1956 to 1959..	155	46	53

The average correlation on all the issues for the period under review indicates that Sri Lanka has voted slightly more with the USSR—there is a lead of 7 points in the average points percentage. However, it cannot be said that this ratio of voting indicates that she has aligned herself with the USSR ; it shows, rather, that she has not allowed herself to be carried away by either bloc unduly.

In order to determine Sri Lanka's attitude towards the major power blocs more clearly, it is necessary to examine the issues at the UN with each other. (The table given above includes all issues that came up for voting during the years 1956-59 ; but in the one given below, the issues on which the two major powers voted concurrently have been excluded from the calculations.

Sri Lanka's Voting Correlation With the USA and the USSR on Controversial Issues—1956–1959

Year	*No. of roll-calls*	*Corrlation with USA*	*Correlatioen with USSR*
1956 ..	.. 24	46	.. 33
1957 ..	.. 34	20	.. 35
1958 ..	.. 29	24	.. 41
1959 ..	.. 31	32	.. 54
1956 to 1959 ..	.. 118	30	.. 40

(Figures compiled by writer from data found in the UN Yearbooks)

These figures show that there is a slight but definite bent in Sri Lanka's voting at the UN towards the Soviet bloc. However, to judge merely on these figures would be wrong. During the period under discussion, she has voted as a non-aligned Afro-Asian nation ; and it was rather the Soviet Union's policy that was changed to accord with the Afro-Asians.

" Certainly by 1957 Soviet appraisals of the UN as a useful political arena had changed, and their alignment with the non-aligned countries had increased. Hammarskjold was useful to them in the sence that he had effectively supported neutralist sentiments and action in the Suez crisis. "[1] Since the Bandung Conference of 1955, Afro-Asian countries were mostly united as an anti-colonial front, and the USSR, for reasons of her own, championed their cause. The reason for Sri Lanka's greater correlation with the USSR could be understood by studying the list of important issues which came before the UN during this period. (Table overleaf.)

1 Alker, H. R. & Bruce, M. R.—*World Politics in the General Assembley*, Yale University Press, 1956. P. 83.

Table No. 3—Sri Lanka's Voting Correlation with the USA and the USSR During the Period 1956-59; Analysis by issues

Year		issue	Correlation with USA	Correlation with USSR
1956	1.	Middle East and Hungary Questions	92.6	0.0
	2.	Algerian Question	0.0	100.0
	3.	Representation of Red China	0.0	100.0
	4.	Human Rights	0.0	100.0
1957	1.	Disarmament Question	37.5	12.5
	2.	UN Emergency Force Issue	100.0	0..0
	3.	Algeria, Hungary, Cyprus, West Irian and Korea Issues	0.0	42.8
	4.	Red China Issue	0.0	100.0
	5.	Composition of the General Assembley	0.0	100.0
	6.	Trust Territories	22.2	44.4
1958	1.	Disarmament	0.0	37.5
	2.	UN Emergency Force Issue	100.0	0.0
	3.	Hungary, Algeria, Cyprus and Korea Issues	28.5	28.5
	4.	Human Rights	0.0	100.0
	5.	World Refugee Problem	100.0	0.0
	6.	Capital Development Fund	50.0	50.0
1959	1.	Nuclear Disarmament Questions	12·5	62.5
	2.	Palestine, Hungary, Algeria S. Africa, Korea and Tibet Issues	50.0	16.6
	3.	Representation of China	0.0	100.0
	4.	Enlargement of ECOSOC and Trusteeship Councils	57.1	42.8
	5.	Other Colonial Issues	22.2	77.7

(Figures compiled by writer from data given in UN Yearbooks)

Sri Lanka's stand on various issues at the General Assembly seems to have been directly guided by Bandaranaike. This is apparent from his public statement on the Suez and the Hungarian issues. In his speech at the United Nations on 22nd November 1956, he described how he gave instructions to his representative at the UN at 3 a.m. at night.

A study of the statistics given above shows that Sri Lanka has voted on the merit of each issue (as defined by Bandaranaike) rather than in response to any pressure made by either of the big powers. She had not hesitated to vote 100 per cent. for or against either of the big powers on some issues. This is in keeping with the avowed spirit of neutralism and non-alignment. This observation is further supported by the following quotation from Bandaranaike himself.

"It (neutralism) certainly means this ; that in pursuit of that policy we reserve to ourselves the right of criticising our friends ..... when we feel that they have not acted correctly ....."[2]

The spirit of neutralism associated with the foreign policy of Sri Lanka during this period had grown around four cardinal principles —namely, non-alignment, anti-colonialism, humanitarianism and world peace. Sri Lanka had been sensitive to any question having a bearing on any of the four principles mentioned above. On such matters, her consistent standing on voting during this period has been based unequivocally on neutralism, her avowed foreign policy, her voting statistics for two years not of this period—1963, under the Ministry of Mrs. Bandaranaike and 1965 under the Ministry of Dudley Senanayake—are given below for comparison.

Table 4—Sri Lanka's Voting Correlations on Controversial Issues for 1963 and 1965

Year	*No. of Controversial*	*Correlation with USA*	*Correlation with USSR*
1963 ..	.. 24	12	.. 66
1965 ..	.. 39	05	.. 48

(Figures compiled by writer from data given in UN Yearbooks.)

Especially in the year mentioned, 1963, the statistics would seem to suggest that Sri Lanka had almost aligned herself with the USSR ; however, when the component issues are analysed it could be seen that here too, the Soviet Union had taken care to vote with the Afro-Asian countries like Sri Lanka on 'colonial' issues ; the only issues not of this kind on which Sri Lanka had voted with the USSR are the Red China and Korea issues.

Table 5—Sri Lanka's Voting Correlation with the USA and the USSR on Controversial Issues, 1963 and 1965. (Analysis by Issue)

Year		*Issue*	*Correlation with USA*	*Correlation with USSR*
1963 ..	1.	Nuclear Weapons Issue	66.6	.. 33.3
	2.	S. Africa's Apartheid Policy ..	0.0	.. 100.0
	3.	Representation of Red China ..	0.0	.. 100.0
	4.	Korean Question	0.0	.. 100.0
	5.	Enlargement of ECOSOC and Security Council	100.0	.. 0.0
	6.	Human Rights	0.0	.. 91.0

2 Hansard H R—24 July 1956—Col 1779

5—A15785 (7/75)

Year	Issue	Correlation with USA	Correlation with USSR
1965	1. Peace-keeping Operations	50.0	0.0
	2. Disarmament	50.0	50.0
	3. S. Africa and Rhodesia Issues	0.0	60.0
	4. The Red China Question	0.0	100.0
	5. Colonial Issues	13.4	86.6
	6. Korea, Tibet, Cyprus, Palestine and Oman Issues	0.0	0.0

(Figures complied by writer from data given in UN Yearbooks).

Even during the Prime Ministership of Mrs. Bandaranaike, which some Western observers referred to as a period of 'drifting towards Communism' Sri Lanka had voted 100 per cent. with the USA on some issues. Dudley Senanayake has tried to introduce a balance once again when he came to power in March 1965. Sri Lanka had absented herself at the voting on over six important issues at the UN in 1965, most certainly out of a desire to support (or not to differ from) the USA. This desire to please the USA was perhaps motivated by the promise of a loan of Rs. 75,000000 from that country to the Government of Sri Lanka. However, even under the regime of Dudley Senanayake, her position in regard to some issues, as for instance that of the admission of Red China into the UN, has not changed.

The British Impact

On many occasions, Bandaranaike had announced that cordial relations with Great Britain should be fostered and maintained. The voting behaviour of Sri Lanka certainly does not indicate the impact of such a relationship with Britain. The statistics given in Table 6 taken together with the earlier tables, indicate the true nature of her attitude to Great Britain, under whose rule she had been for 133 years of her recent history, from 1815 to 1948.

Table 6—Sri Lanka's Voting Correlation with Great Britain on all Roll Calls

Year	Total No. of Roll-calls	Correlation with UK
1956	33	36
1957	41	26
1958	39	28
1959	42	38
1956 to 1959	155	32
1963	29	24
1965	52	21

(Figures complied by writer from data given in UK Yearbooks).

Table 7—Comparison of Sri Lanka's Voting Correlations with the USA the USSR and the UK

Year	Total No. of Roll-calls	Voted with USA	Voted with USSR	Voted with UK
1956 to 1959	155	46	53	32
1963	29	27	72	24
1965	52	28	61	21

(Figures compiled by writer from data given in UN Year books.)

Thus, compared to the USA and the USSR, Sri Lanka's voting correlation with the UK was very much lower than that with either of the other two countries. Throughout the period 1956-59, her major areas of disagreement with UK at the UN had been colonialism and human rights. The Commonwealth tie does not seem to have had any bearing on the voting behaviour of Sri Lanka at the United Nations. As one can see from the table below (Table 8) she has voted on the independent merits (or otherwise) of the issues themselves, irrespective of the stand taken by the United Kingdom.

Table 8—Sri Lanka's Voting Correlation with Great Britain, 1956

Year	*Issue*	*Correlation with UK*
1956 ..	1. Middle East (Suez) Issue	.. 45
	2. Hungary ..	.. 66
	3. Algerian Question ..	.. 0
	4. China ..	.. 0
	5. Human Rights ..	.. 0
	6. Other Colonial Issues	.. 0

(Figures complied by writer from data given in UN Yearbooks.)

Economic Relations

It is a generally accepted theory that economic relations have a decisive effect on the foreign policy of any country. If this theory is universally valid, Sri Lanka should have a very high percentage of voting correlation with the United Kingdom, with whom she carries on the bulk of her trade.

The figures given in Table 9 show that though Sri Lanka had the largest trade volume with the United Kingdom and had a favourable export trade with the USA, her voting correlations at the UN with

Table 9—Sri Lanka's Voting Correlation on All the Roll-Calls at the UN with Various Countries, and Her Trade Relations with those Countries 3

Country	*Imports*				*Exports*				*Voting correlation 1956–1959*
	1956	*1957*	*1958*	*1959*	*1956*	*1957*	*1958*	*1959*	
Burma ..	145.3	165.3	101.3	132 3	—	0.8	0.2	1.2	90
India ..	212.8	226.1	220.3	246.5	71.5	49.8	37.2	53.1	92
Indonesia ..	16.6	19.5	7.0	3.6	—	—	—	—	89
Pakistan ..	6.9	8.3	6.3	25.7	6.6	8.3	9.9	12.9	66
USSR ..	—	—	—	2.3	—	—	—	23.9	53
UAR	14.1	12.2	22.5	12.0	27.1	28.9	16.9	27.8	80
UK	344.7	369.0	410.4	495.4	498.4	458.3	565.2	479.0	32
USA	40.7	67.4	76.6	137.4	140.1	147.0	135.0	163.8	46

(Trade values in millions of rupees)

both these countries is comparatively low. Sri Lanka's import trade with India and Burma is of a greater volume, but she did not have

3 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1960, p. 129.

a favourable export trade with either of these countries. Indonesia, Pakistan, and the UAR (United Arab Republic) had a comparatively smaller volume of trade with Sri Lanka. But her voting correlation with these latter countries, as compared to those of the West, was very high.

This high voting correlation with the Afro-Asian countries, could be interpreted as being due to factors other than economic, since Sri Lanka's trade with these countries was either comparatively low in volume, or does not show a favourable balance. These factors were political, cultural and psychological—while her connections with the UK and the West were more economic than otherwise. As discussed in Chapter 8 of this study, Sri Lanka's export trade, especially the tea trade was and still is, under the control of the British who were not very well disposed towards Bandaranaike's policies in general and to the taking over of the bases in particular. Table 10 indicates that during the time of Bandaranaike, the Sri Lanka's production of tea had been on the increase but the price of tea had never reached the level it had during the days of Sir John Kotelawala, who had been much more pro-British in his outlook.

Table 10—Sri Lanka's production of tea and prices per lb. 1953 to 1960

Year	*Total production of tea in thousands of pounds*	*Value of a pound of exported tea (F.O..B) in rupees*
1953 ..	.. 343,034	.. 2.43
1954 ..	.. 366,738	.. 3.12
1955 ..	.. 380,103	.. 3.09
1956 ..	.. 375,578	.. 2.91
1957 ..	.. 397,775	.. 2.87
1958 ..	.. 413,155	.. 2.99
1959 ..	.. 413,130	.. 2.64
1960 ..	.. 437,704	.. 2.73

Although Sri Lanka's export trade with the United Kingdom amounted to 30.45 per cent. of her total export trade during Bandaranaike's regime, the fact that the most prosperous tea estates in Sri Lanka were British-owned minimised the economic importance of this connection to Sri Lanka as far as profits were concerned, for, this means that more money went out of the country as profits of the British companies than was retained in the island, and this is so even now. In contrast, she had a favourable balance of trade with the USA, and also a substantial amount of economic aid from that country during this time. The volume of aid received from UK was negligible. As a consequence of this, Sri Lanka's voting correlation with the USA was much higher than her correlation with

the UK. It was due to Bandaranaike's foreign policy, too, that Sri Lanka started receiving aid from the communist bloc countries. For a period of 13 years, from 1950 to 1963 Sri Lanka had received a total of Rs. 457.3 million from the Western bloc countries as economic aid. During the much shorter period of 6 years (from 1957 to 1963) she received a total of Rs. 373.8 million from the Communist bloc. The voting records indicate that, during the Ministry of Bandaranaike, her voting correlation with the USSR was much higher than her correlation with the USA and its Western allies, though in 1956 she did not even have diplomatic connections with the USSR. Bandaranaike came to power in April 1956, and diplomatic connection with the USSR was established by 1957 ; the voting records of the years 1957 to 1959, the years of Bandaranaike's Prime Ministership, show a higher correlation of Sri Lanka voting at the UN with the USSR. On the other hand, the year 1956, during which Bandaranaike had signed a treaty with the USA for the grant of a substantial amount of aid from that country, showed a high correlation of 60 per cent. votes with the USA as against 48 per cent. correlation of votes with the USSR. In 1959, Sri Lanka's voting correlation with the USA and USSR was 47 per cent. and 64 per cent. respectively.

It would be misleading to think that Sri Lanka's voting behaviour at the UN was influenced entirely by economic factors. She maintained high correlations with the non-aligned bloc of nations with whom her economic ties are not strong. However, in the context of the cold war, and in relation to the big powers, the economic factor does seem to have played a considerable part in her voting behaviour at the United Nations.

Afro-Asian Solidarity

Sri Lanka has had the highest correlation of voting with the six leading Afro-Asian countries, all of which profess to follow a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. As stated earlier, ever since the Bandung Conference (1955) the representatives of these countries used to meet regularly before any kind of roll-call at the General Assembly of the UN, and informally discuss any controversial issues that might have to come up before the Assembly. This concerted action was well reflected in their voting behaviour. Pakistan, which at that time was aligned with the West, was also listed along with these countries, so that Sri Lanka's voting correlations with these countries may be compared. It could be seen then from these statistics

that Sri Lanka has had a high correlation with all six of these countries—Burma, Ghana, India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia.

Table 11—Sri Lanka's Voting Correlation with the Leading Neutralist Countries

Year	*India*	*Burma*	*Egypt*	*Yugos lavia*	*Ghana*	*Indo nesia*	*Pakis tan*
1956 ..	94	94	72	81	—	91	78
1957 ..	92	87	85	85	78	90	39
1958 ..	92	97	84	82	92	87	66
1959 ..	92	85	81	83	83	88	81
1956 - 1959	92	90	80	82	84	89	66
1963 ..	84	89	83	86	91	89	78
1965 ..	72	74	69	69	74	—	69

(Figures compiled by writer from data given in UN Yearbooks.)

Out of these seven countries, Sri Lanka's voting correlation is lowest with Pakistan. During 1956 and 1957, Pakistan followed an extreme pro-Western policy but since 1958 she too had voted against the West—on such issues as the Algerian question, and as a result, her correlation percentage with Sri Lanka has gone up after 1957. Excluding Pakistan, with the other six neutralist countries, Sri Lanka had an average voting correlation of 80 during the period from 1956 to 1959.

Of the seven countries listed above, Sri Lanka had close cultural ties only with India and Burma. It can be seen that she had maintained a high percentage of voting correlation with Ghana, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia despite not having close cultural ties with these countries. The only decisive factor that brought these countries together on the voting is the similarity of perception engendered by the common ideology of neutralism. This observation is supported by a number of students of Afro-Asian politics.

> " The philosophies of ' positive neutralism ' expounded by those advocates of non-alignment in Asia, the Middle East, and Black Africa are variations on a common theme that finds expression in the lesser leaders of the emergent states throughout Asia and Africa .The top politicians of Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, Morocco, and Guinea are, like Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah, all self-avowed apostles of non-alignment. They are all responding to the same historical forces—internal weaknesses, a recent colonial past, and global bipolarity. The Afro-Asian neutralist leaders have set for themselves four permanent objectives—consolidation of their political independence, elimination of the last traces of European colonialism, developing their national economies, and playing a special role in separately and jointly making efforts to resolve big-power conflicts. " [4]

4 Lefever, Earnest W., in *Neutralism and Non-Alignment*, edited by Laurence W Martin. (1962) Praeger, N.Y., P. 93–97.

The Afro-Asian unity became an influential factor at politics in the United Nations. Sydney D. Bailey refers to this fact in the following words :

> " The influence of the states of Africa and Asia at the United Nations affairs has been growing not only because the number of such states in the United Nations increased, but also because they are now organised for common action, sharing common ideals and aware of their strength when united .....
>
> " The Afro-Asian group meets as required, the chairmanship rotating the members on a monthly basis. The group as such takes no decisions except by unanimity. . . . " [5]

This explanation by Sydney D. Bailey explains the high correlation of Sri Lanka voting with the members of the Afro-Asian bloc.

Indian Leadership

During Bandaranaike's regime Sri Lanka had the highest correlation of all with India. The ties between India and Sri Lanka are many. The similarity of perception existing between their two leaders at this time, Pandit Nehru and Bandaranaike, and their personal friendship seems to have been the greatest tie that existed during the period under discussion. Bandaranaike upheld Nehru as the uncontested leader of the Afro-Asian countries long before the former became the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. It should be recalled that once he went to the extent of moving a vote of no confidence in the then Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawala, because the latter took a somewhat anti-Nehru attitude at the Bandung Conference in 1955. On the other hand, when Bandaranaike was assassinated in 1959, Nehru went to the extent of declaring a day of public mourning in India.

Apart from this personal tie between the two leaders, Sri Lanka is ethnically and culturally linked with India in many ways. The Ceylonese are of the same Indo-Aryan and Dravidian stock that the Indians are. Buddhism, which is the religion of about 67% of the population of Sri Lanka, came from India, and Hinduism, followed by about 20% of Sri Lanka's people, is the religion of India ; she has maintained close line of communication with India for more than 2500 years. In addition, both countries had a similar recent history of British rule, and economically, both countries have inherited similar problems from the era of British colonialism. (For further details on this point, see Chapter 2 and 10 of this study.)

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5 Bailey, Sydney D.—*The General Assembley*—(1960) Praeger,)N.Y. Pp. 38–39.

Thus, Sri Lanka was linked to India by very strong ties, in a closer bond than to any other country in the world. This fact is clearly reflected in a comparison of Sri Lanka's and India's voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly. It could be seen from the statistics given in Table 12 that both countries had voted the least with the United Kingdom despite their both being members of the British Commonwealth; both countries had the highest correlation of voting (of the countries examined) with the USSR and from 1956 to 1959 their voting positions in the UN have been almost identical with each other's.

Table 12—A Comparison between the Voting Correlation of Sri Lanka and India with the USA the USSR and the UK on controversial issues.

	Correlation with Sri Lanka			*Correlation with India*		
Year	*USA*	*USSR*	*UK*	*USA*	*USSR*	*UK*
1956 ..	46	33	25	41	20	29
1957 ..	20	35	20	17	23	11
1958 ..	24	41	13	20	40	17
1959 ..	32	54	35	21	45	18
1963 ..	12	66	16	20	66	20
1965 ..	5	48	7	15	53	28

(Figures compiled by writer from data given in UN Yearbooks).

Yet, close though Sri Lanka's voting behaviour has been to India, she has not entirely surrendered her judgement to India. Over a number of issues, Sri Lanka had voted differently from her neighbour during this period. Some of them are listed below.

1956 (1) Hungary Question—Resolution 1127
(2) Hungary Question—Resolution 1132

1957 (1) French Togo land Question—AC 5/L 508
(2) Disarmament Question—A/CI 229

1958 (1) Cyprus Question—A/CI 174

1959 (1) Peaceful Use of Outer Space—A/CI/L 248
(2) Korean Question—Resolution 1455
(3) Enlargement of Social & Security Councils—Resolution 1404
(4) Membership of the Trusteeship Council—A/C 277
(Source: UN Yearbooks.)

While thus exercising her individual judgement to be different over a number of issues, in the main Sri Lanka had voted with India, establishing the highest correlation of votes with that country. The graphs appearing overleaf, comparing the voting of Sri Lanka and India on (*a*) all issues coming up before the UN General Assembly during the period 1956-59, and (*b*) controversial issues coming up in that body, illustrate this fact very clearly.

Sri Lanka's voting correlation at the U.N. with the USA, the USSR, and the UK, 1956-1959. (On controversial issues.)



India's voting correlation at the U.N. with the USA, the USSR, and the UK, 1956-1969. (On controversial issues.)



Sri Lanka's voting correlation at the U.N. with the USA, the USSR, and the UK, 1956-1959. (On all issues)



Neither of the two major power blocs—the Western one or the Soviet one, seems to have exercised much influence on Sri Lanka's voting behaviour in the period under discussion : that of the Prime-Ministership of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. When he came to power in 1956, Sri Lanka had been following a clearly pro-Western foreign policy. On his accession to power, this policy was changed immediately to one of neutralism and non-alignment. Even after his assassination on 26th September 1959, his policy was still followed by Dr. W. Dahanayake who succeeded him as Prime Minister, till March 1960. Even up to this date (1975) Sri Lanka has been following a path of neutralism, as was the desire of Bandaranaike.

Sri Lanka's tie with the British Commonwealth and the former British Empire has in no way displayed any infiuence over her voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly. Even the personal friendship which existed between Bandaranaike and Sir Anthony Eden, the then British Prime Minister, from the time of their undergraduate days at Oxford did not prevent the former from taking an anti-British stand on the Suez question in 1956. In fact, of the three countries USA, USSR and UK, Sri Lanka has had the lowest voting correlation with the last-mentioned country, despite her recent ties with it.

The generally accepted theory that economic relations have a bearing on the voting position of any country at the UN holds true for Sri Lanka as far as her voting correlations with the two major powers, the USA and the USSR, and her correlation with the United Kingdom, are concerned. But the influence of the economic factor does not explain her high rate of correlation with countries with whom she has little or no profitable trade, and who are certainly not in a position to give her any form of economic aid.

Sri Lanka's desire to promote friendship and co-operation with her neighbours (many of whom shared a common inheritance of colonial past) seems to be, perhaps, a decisive factor in her voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly. The policy of neutralism as viewed by Bandaranaike was a positive concerted effort made by the like-minded ; and this policy is clearly reflected in Sri Lanka's voting behaviour which has the highest correlation with the leading Afro-Asian countries. In other words, a policy of Afro-Asian solidarity maintained by neutralist action seems to have had the most decisive influence in moulding Sri Lanka's voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly.

Of all such neutralist countries, Sri Lanka has had the highest correlation of voting with India. The many factors that have made this so were discussed under the heading 'Indian Leadership.' But even here, the greatest common factor which influenced this close correlation was the close common devotion of both Pandit Nehru and Bandaranaike to the policy of neutralism ; there is also evidence for believing that the latter consulted the former before taking any decisions on 'cold war' issues.

Sri Lanka's voting behaviour at the United Nations during the regime of Bandaranaike gained her a certain amount of world recognition and prestige during the short period of four years. In 1959, Sri Lanka campaigned for membership in the Security Council and without any opposition she was elected to that body in place of the outgoing member, Canada on the 12th of October 1959. During this period Sri Lanka's representative at the United Nations was elected to important positions as Office-bearer on a number of Committees of the UN and her special Agencies.

8. Foreign Trade

AN analysis of Sri Lanka's export and import trade behaviour during the period from 1952 to 1960 might be useful to understand to what extent Sri Lanka was free to implement her foreign policy in the economic sphere during the time of Bandaranaike. As hitherto revealed in this study Bandaranaike's policy was on the whole veiwed with less than enthusiasm by the Western bloc in general and the United Kingdom in particular. In terms of Sri Lanka politics, trade, even with the Devil, was trade and was justified. As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this study, the anti-Communist regimes of Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala did not hesitate to sign trade agreements with Communist China, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. With regard to the agreement with China, one could see that Dudley Senanayake was compelled by necessity to sign it, but Sir John, too, the most staunchly anti-Communist of all the Prime Ministers, signed trade agreements with three of the Communist countries. This change in her trade relations was beneficial to her economy. During the period under this study 90 percent of her foreign exchange was earned from the sale of three agricultural products —tea, rubber, and coconuts. Where production is primary and the economy is undiversified, the expansion and diversification of the market was something that boded more stability.

The unexpected fall of Sri Lanka's export trade in 1951 and 1952 made it impossible for Sri Lanka to continue her rice subsidy and as a consequence she signed the famous rubber-rice pact with Communist China. Again in 1954 Sri Lanka's export trade increased in volume and value. According to a survey by ECAFE, the increase of world demand and consequent increases in the prices of tea and rubber resulted in an increase in Sri Lanka's export trade by 27 percent in 1954 as compared with 12 percent rise in 1953 and a 28 percent fall in 1952. Further, this survey revealed that the domestic rice production of 40000 tons met only one half of the country's needs. Sri Lanka had to import a large quantity of foodstuff such as rice, flour and sugar. The cost of such consumer goods imported during 1952-53 had averaged 32 percent of the gross national product of Sri Lanka.[1] In order to import such a big quantity of foodstuffs she needed to maintain a satisfactory trade balance abroad. In 1955, her total export trade value was Rs. 1872 million and she was left with a surplus of Rs. 480 million. As a result, the trade index rose from 155 in 1954 to 160 in 1955. This rise in trade was considered as a high mark of achievement for the pro-Western government of Sir John Kotelawala. However, during the second half of 1955, her export trade began to deteriorate. When Bandaranaike took over the government in April 1956, it was left for him to arrest that deterioration. The new party in power proclaimed that a new trade policy should be followed to diversify her trade. Mr. T. B. Illangaratne, a Minister in the Bandaranaike Cabinet, spoke thus on this matter :

> " Prior to 1956, Ceylon's extenal trade, both import and export, was confined to a comparatively small number of countries. This was an unsatisfactory situation as it meant that the entire trade was dependent on the goodwill of those countries. Ceylon's policy since 1956, in accordance with the Government's foreign policy of neutrality and non-allignment was concerned with the diversification of Ceylon's overseas trade and building up new markets. "[2]

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1 ECAFE—*Economic Bulletin Vol. V, No. 1*—P. 67.

2 Illangaratne, T. B.—*Economic and Social Progress* (1963) Ceylon Govt. Press. P. 45. (This book was presented to Parliament as a supplement to the Budget Speech, by Mr. Illangaratne, the Finance Minister.)

Prior to 1956, Sri Lanka had markets in 25 countries and paved the way for markets in communist countries in addition. The following statistics indicate that Sri Lanka had more than 50% of her trade with Commonwealth Countries.

Table 1—Percentage Value of Sri Lanka's Imports and Exports, 1948–59

Imports	*1948*	*1953*	*1954*	*1955*	*1956*	*1957*	*1958*	*1959*
Commonwealth Countries and British possessions	45.3	56.0	49.8	51.9	46.4	46.3	46.5	48.6
Other Countries	46.6	43.9	50.1	48.0	53.5	53.6	53.4	51.3
Exports								
Commonwealth Countries and British possessions	58.9	51.7	57.5	54.5	56.3	53.5	57.9	52.1
Other Countries	41.0	48.3	42.5	45.5	43.6	46.4	42.0	47.8

Source ; Statistical Abstract of Ceylon, 1960. Pp. 192 and 194.

The trade with UK for the years 1953, 1954, and 1955 accounted for respectively 22.3, 22.9, and 21.9 per cent of the total import trade value and 25.9, 28.8 and 26.8 of the total export trade of Sri Lanka for those years. During 1953, and 1954, next to UK, Red China was the biggest customer of Sri Lanka. Her import trade with China dropped from 12.3% in 1954 to 5.88% in 1955. In export also, the trade with China dropped from 11.3% in 1954 to 6.50% in 1955.

We may recall at this point that the USA was extremely displeased with the 1952 trade agreement between Sri Lanka and China. Her trade with the USA dropped from 7.98 percent in 1953 to 6.83 percent in 1954. We may recall Sir John's anti-Communist pronouncements. The export trade with the USA then went up to 9.40 percent of the total export trade of Sri Lanka in 1955.

Although Bandaranaike attempted diversification of Sri Lanka's foreign trade he could not substantially change the pattern of foreign trade that had been there prior to 1956, as could be seen in Table 1.

During this time (1956-1959) Sri Lanka's balance of trade became unfavourable, as indicated below.

Table 2—Balance of Trade of Sri Lanka 1956–1959

Year		*Balance of Trade*
1956	..	+102 Million Rupees
1957	..	—124 Million Rupees
1958	..	— 6 Million Rupees
1959	..	—252 Million Rupees

Source : Statistical Abstract of Ceylon—1960.

The unfavourable foreign trade balance in 1956 continued on a magnified scale during the year 1957 and it resulted in a deficit largely due to two factors : (1) fall in the f.o.b. tea prices by 7.3 and (2) the closure of the Suez Canal in the second half of 1956. In 1957, tea export had increased by over 19 million pounds but the value of tea export had declined by about Rs. 225 million. Here it may be recalled that the largest buyer of Sri Lanka tea was Britain whom she had offended by her stand on the Suez Canal crisis during the second half of 1956. The price of tea continued to decline. The price index which was at 162 in 1955 fell to 152 in 1956, 145 in 1957, 142 in 1958. In 1959 it rose again, to 148.

Sri Lanka's exports to Commonwealth countries had dropped from Rs. 928.6 million in 1956 to 848.6 million in 1957. It rose to Rs. 954.9 million in 1958 but dropped to Rs. 881.3 million in 1959. Out of the Asian Commonwealth countries her export trade with India and Pakistan consisted of a small percentage of the total. At no time had her export trade with Pakistan arisen beyond 0.7 percent, nor had it risen beyond 4.3 per cent with India. Therefore, when we refer to the British Commonwealth countries in this context, it would be mostly the white Dominions that would have to be considered. During Bandaranaike's time Sri Lanka had constantly attacked the apartheid policy of the Union of South Africa, but Sri Lanka continued to carry on a profitable trade with that country.

Table 3—Percentage Value of Sri Lanka's Trade with South Africa, 1956–59

Year	*Import*	*Export*
1956	0.5	5.49
1957	0.2	5.22
1958	0.3	5.21
1959	0.2	4.74

Source : Ceylon Year Book, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959.

As indicated by the above statistics, Sri Lanka had a profitable export trade with South Africa, though she did not have any formal diplomatic connection with that country because of her apartheid policy.

Sri Lanka's export trade with Australia dropped from Rs. 95.0 million in 1956 to Rs. 93.3 million in 1957, and from Rs. 111 million in 1958 to Rs. 106.0 million in 1959. Her trade balance with Australia remained satisfactory. The export trade with Canada was at Rs. 93.4 million in 1956 but gradually it declined to Rs. 77.3 million in 1958 and again rose to 86.0 million in 1959.

Export trade with West Germany and the USA provided Sri Lanka with the most satisfactory balance of trade. Export trade with Germany declined from Rs. 59.4 in 1956 to Rs. 50.9 in 1957. But in 1959 the export trade increased to Rs. 92.8 million leaving a surplus of Rs. 18.7 million as the balance of trade.

Sri Lanka's export trade with the USA dropped from Rs. 147.0 million in 1957 to Rs. 135.0 million in 1958 but it increased to Rs. 163.3 million in 1959, she had a surplus trade balance of Rs. 26.4 million with the USA.

Sri Lanka's trade with Czechoslovakia was not favourable to her as regards the balance of trade. Ever since trade was started with that country the balance had always been on the side of Czechoslovakia. For instance, in 1959, her export trade with Czechoslovakia came to Rs. 2.4 million while the import value came to Rs. 5.8 millions. In 1959, trade was started with the USSR. She had export trade to the value of Rs. 23.9 millions in 1959 and the value of import was Rs. 2.4 million leaving her with a surplus of 21.6 million.

The rubber export values increased from 17.7 per cent of the total export value in 1956 to 18.9 percent in 1959. The f.o.b. price of rubber declined by 7.3 percent in 1957. During the term of office of Mr. Bandaranaike, China was the biggest buyer of Sri Lanka's rubber. The trade with China declined from Rs. 182.2 million in 1956 to Rs. 167.6 million in 1957, and to Rs. 77.7 million in 1958. In 1959 there was a slight increase in the export trade with China. But the import trade continued without any decline. Its values were Rs. 133.8 million in 1956, Rs. 83.8 million in 1957, Rs. 151.8 million in 1958, and Rs. 150.8 million in 1959.

Out of all the non-aligned countries it was only with the UAR (Egypt) that Sri Lanka had a profitable surplus trade balance. The balance of trade with India was the most unfavourable to Sri Lanka. In 1959 alone, her deficit balance with India was Rs. 193 million.

Up to 1959, the only diversification of the pattern of trade (undertaken after 1956) that was profitable to Sri Lanka was the trade with the USSR. Apart from this change, the pre-1956 pattern of trade remained more or less the same. This was mainly due to the fact that it was extremely difficult to break the British domination—almost monopoly—of the export and import trade of Sri Lanka.

It was the British trader, the middle man, who made substantial profits from this trade. Most of Sri Lanka's high-altitude tea estates which produced the best teas were owned by British companies. Before coming into power, Bandaranaike had given an election pledge to nationalize these foreign-owned tea-estates. In spite of repeated requests and pressure from within his own Cabinet (mainly from the strong-minded Marxist Phillip Gunawardene) to carry out this pledge, Bandaranaike cautiously avoided action on this issue. There was another demand from the socialist element in the Government, to nationalize the oil companies in Sri Lanka mostly owned by US and British firms. This too was put aside by Bandaranaike. Thus, he was not able to implement policies which he had thought to be of long-range benefit to the country. The chief obstacle to the implementation of these policies was the existing trade pattern of Sri Lanka, which had become entrenched since its evolution in the colonial times, and her utter dependence on the foreign earnings brought in by this existing pattern of trade.

Sri Lanka's foreign trade had to depend entirely on another factor, shipping. She did not have her own shipping lines, in spite of her harbour facilities, which many other Afro-Asian nations do not possess. She depended heavily on British shipping for her trade. During the tenure of Bandaranaike's Premiership, the idea of establishing a national shipping line, part private owned and part government owned, was being considered very seriously. But before this idea could be put into action, Bandaranaike was assassinated, and the man who was most interested in the shipping lines became implicated in the murder trial that followed and was sent to serve a life sentence in jail. (He died there a few years later.) The idea of establishing a national shipping line was revived during Dudley Senanayake's regime, but it was during Mrs. Bandaranaike's second tenure of office as the Prime Minister (after 1970) that this idea was implemented after it had survived serious attempts made by a former imperial power to sabotage it. The sabotage attempts received wide publicity in the Lake House group of newspapers.

Right up to 1956, Sri Lanka profited greatly from the shipping that entered her strategically situated harbours. But from 1956 to 1959, there was a sharp decline in the shipping revenues as indicated by the satistics given below. This drop in the harbour revenues was attributable mainly to the crop of dock-workers' strikes that occured during

Bandaranaike's regime, mainly inspired by the left-wing leaders.

Table 4—Vessels Entering Sri Lanka Ports 1955–59
(In thousands net tons)

	1955	1956	1057	1958	1959
Total No. of Vessels ..	12,926	11,199	8,159	8,725	8,435
British Vessels ..	6,052	5,479	3,962	4,416	4,610

Source : Ceylon Statistical Abstract 1960.

There was still another factor which had a great impact on Sri Lanka's economy and foreign trade. There were 12 banks operating in Sri Lanka by 1957, and 11 out of these were foreign-owned. Mr. Ilangaratne stated that those foreign banks had not brought any capital as such to the country ; they did their business on the basis of rupee deposits made in Sri Lanka, and the profits were sent out—the profits sent out by these banks amounted to about Rs. 5 to 6 millions per annum.[3] The following were the foreign banks operating in Sri Lanka during this time :

(1) Chartered Bank of India Ltd.
(2) The Eastern Bank Ltd.
(3) The Hatton Bank Ltd.
(4) The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
(5) The State Bank of India.
(6) The Indian Bank Ltd.
(7) The Indian Overseas Bank Ltd.
(8) The Mercantile Bank of India Ltd.
(9) The National Overseas and Grindlays Bank Ltd.
(10) The Oriental Bank of Malaya Ltd.
(11) Habib Bank (Overseas) Ltd.

The "*Central Bank*" as the agent of the Government of Sri Lanka, administers the exchange control. Since 1957, the Central Bank tightened its control on the exchange. But the non-Ceylonese residents going back to their countries were allowed free transfer of their entire holdings. Under Bandaranaike, a policy of Ceylonisation of foreign trade was given impetus by reserving a number of countries such as Austria, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, Hungary. Japan, Poland, Rumania, USSR, and Yugoslavia only for the Ceylonese traders. Import of certain goods such as textiles, motor cars and watches and export of certain commodities like timber were also reserved for the Ceylonese traders.

3 Illangaratne—*Op. cit.* P. 57.

The number of registered Ceylonese traders had increased from 772 in 1955 to 1179 in 1960. Even by 1963, according to Finance Minister Mr. Ilangaratne, Sri Lanka's export and import trade was, however, still dominated by the foreign business houses, of whom most are British and a fair number is Indian.[4]

In order to break the traditional pattern of trade which was almost entirely controlled by the British and Indian houses of commerce, Bandaranaike held a plan for something like an Asian Economic Community. He thought that there should be a regional development, at least to begin with, with a number of Asian countries including Communist China. According to him, such a regional economic venture was approved even by the famous Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal

Accordingly, the first preliminary session of the Afro-Asian Economic Conference was held on 25th May 1959 at Colombo. Mr. Bandaranaike, the convener of the conference, in his welcome speech stressed the need for "commodity trade in the region," diversification of exports by processing raw materials where economically feasible, establishment of national regional banks as a solution to the problem of payment.[5]

Bandaranaike's Ten Year Plan was prepared after consultation with economists such as J. B. Hicks, Nicholas Kaldor, Joan Robinson, Oskar Lange, John Kenneth Galbraith, Ursula K. Hicks and Gunnar Myrdal. In order to implement the Ten Year Plan Sri Lanka needed, either in the form of loans or in the form of grants, Rs. 150 million annually, and already she had tapped many countries such as the USA and West Germany as well as USSR and China as creditors. This need to borrow money stood in the way of initiating changes in the trading pattern—an upset in the balance of trade would lower the credit-worthiness of Sri Lanka in the eyes of potential creditors.

Professor Myrdal's comments and advice to the National Planning Council (Sri Lanka) at its meeting on March, 11th 1958 on planning and related matters seem to have been taken very seriously by Bandaranaike. On this occasion, Gunnar Myrdal made the following points clear :

(1) Immediate take-over of foreign-owned enterprises such as plantations would not be wise. Sri Lanka should instead work out a 15 or 20 year scheme through which foreign assets would pass into Ceylonese hands.

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4 Illangaratne—*op.at.* P. 57

5 Bandaranaike—Speeches and Writings—P. 157.

(2) Sri Lanka needs both foreign capital and know-how for industrialization.

(3) Sri Lanka should not rely on the inflow of foreign capital only on a government to government basis. Such a policy would restrict her capital imports to countries for whom governmental lending was good cold war business.

(4) Sri Lanka should have a system like a management contract with which she could have agreements between her government and the foreign firms.

(5) The foreign policy should link to Sri Lanka's development efforts. "An active development effort must therefore be accompanied by measures designed to regulate the inflow of non-essential imports and maximise the amount of foreign exchange available for the import of capital goods or materials."

Bandaranaike's foreign policies angered the British who controlled most of Sri Lanka's external trade; certain aspects of his domestic policies and certain elements in his government aroused the fear and the suspicion of foreign investors who had invested or intended to invest in Sri Lanka. These two facts taken together led to the sharp decline of her foreign trade during the first part of Bandaranaike's regime. It was this decline that led him to consider economic alternatives and gave serious attention to the task of shaping her foreign trade to bring the maximum benefit to Sri Lanka. But here he was less than successful; his non-aligned foreign policy had the support of a large number of Afro-Asian countries, and with that support, he could deal with issues such as the Suez crisis with confidence; he was free to do so. But in the case of her foreign trade, not only did his non-aligned foreign policy measures boomerang and react unfavourably on it; but also he found that he was unable to change the traditional trade patterns dominated by foreign houses of commerce, within the democratic framework. By Sri Lanka's very dependence on those trading patterns, he was fettered to them, and unable to take the drastic steps which would have been necessary to change them, in the short span of years that he was the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

9. Foreign Aid and Investment Capital

THE foreign aid (in the form of loans and grants) and investment capital received during the time of Bandaranaike should be an indicator not only of the effectiveness, but also of the nature of the foreign policy followed by him.

As discussed in Chapter 8 of this study, during Bandaranaike's tenure of office Sri Lanka had had a record deficit of Rs. 252 million in the balance of trade in 1959, culminating three years of deficits in foreign trade. In 1955, the Government's external assets were at Rs. 80 million. In 1956 the external assets were reduced to Rs. 70 million and gradually the assets decreased to Rs. 15.2 million in 1959. Thus the entire period from 1956 to 1959 Sri Lanka was in great financial difficulties. This was not by any means peculiar to Sri Lanka. All newly independent countries in Asia and Africa had similar difficulties at this time. These countries were faced with problems of national development for which all of them (with the exception, to some extent, of Burma) depended on foreign capital investment, loans and aid. For example, India, for her first, second and third Five Year Plans needed Rs. 20510 crores. Of this amount, 20 percent (about Rs. 4216 crores) was expected to come from foreign aid and private investments [1].

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1 Jain, R. K.—*International Economic Co-operation* (1967) Popular Books, New Delhi, P. 98.

From 1950 onward, Sri Lanka continued to receive foreign aid and invited foreign capital investments. In 1959, the "Ten Year Plan" based on long-term strategy was formulated. This was Sri Lanka's first comprehensive development plan formulated in consultation with some world famous economists (referred to in Chapter 8). For the implementation of this first Ten Year Plan, Sri Lanka needed a sum of Rs. 150 million annually as foreign aid. The above mentioned advisors also emphasized the need for foreign capital investment in Sri Lanka. However, certain members of Bandaranaike's party (and the Cabinet itself) had begun to voice actively a dislike for such foreign private investment and aid. Mr. T. B. Subasinghe, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, was a spokesman for this group, which showed contempt for aid and the "strings which were attached to it." On the other hand Phillip Gunawardene, the Minister of Agriculture and Lands was anxiously campaigning for the nationalization of the foreign-owned tea estates. Severe droughts followed by devastating floods in 1957 compelled Bandaranaike to make a world-wide appeal for aid. In these circumstances—draining of foreign assets, deficits in foreign trade, unexpected natural disasters and above all, the urgent need for development—Bandaranaike had to follow, as far as local and domestic policies were concerned, a path based on compromise between the one for foreign aid and the one against it.

Foreign Aid

During the period prior to 1956, Sri Lanka's external aid came mainly from the Colombo Plan and the United Nations and its related agencies. The Colombo Plan Aid came mainly from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The USA too started contributing to the Colombo Plan; the UK contribution was almost negligible. From 1954 onward, Japan too became a contributor to the Colombo Plan. The aid from these countries came in the form of loans, grants, and technical assistance, on a government to government basis.

According to the Annual reports of the Colombo Plan, up to 1956, Sri Lanka received the assistance from the major contributors as indicated in Table 1:

Table 1—Economic Aid from Major Contributors 1950–56
(Figures are in millions of rupees, Approximately)

Country	*Technical Assistance*	*Capital Aid*	*Total*
Australia	3.4	25.4	28.8
Canada	3.7	50.8	54.6
New Zealand	—	10.2	10.2
USA	—	54.5	54.5

Source : Colombo Plan Annual Reports

Under the technical assistance programme of the Colombo Plan, Sri Lanka received the services of experts in various fields such as health, education, and agricultural engineering. Also, a large number of Ceylonese was sent abroad for specialization and training. For instance, from 1951 to 1953, Sri Lanka received technical assistance as indicated in Table 2, and Table 3.

During the period from 1956 to 1960, as compared with the previous four years, the contribution from the Commonwealth countries had a sharp decline. But the contribution from the USA had almost trebled. Sri Lanka received sizeable economic aid from the USSR, China, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and West Germany, too, during this period.

Table 2—Technical Assistance, 1951–53

Country	*No. of Experts Sent*	*No. of Trainees Received*
Australia ..	9	57
Canada ..	16	10
New Zealand	2	34
U. K. ..	37	120
India ..	5	44
Pakistan	—	3
UN Agencies	142	31
Total ..	211	299

Source : Colombo Plan Annual Reports.

Table 3—Total Technical Assistance 1951–56

Contributors	*No. of Experts Sent*	*No. of Trainees Received*
Colombo Plan Contributors	142	512
UN Agencies	244	68

Source : As above

Table 4—Foreign Aid Pledged—1956–1960

(*Figures approximately in Rs. Millions*)

Country	*Total Amount*
Australia	11.3
Canada	20.9
New Zealand	1.9
USA	155.5
West Germany	6.9
USSR	142.8
People's Republic of China	125.0
Czechoslovakia	15.0
Yugoslavia	73.3

Source : Colombo Plan Reports and Ceylon Govt. Publications on Foreign Aid (1966 July I–RR 16114 and 1968 August 11,1600)

1959 was the last year of Bandaranaike's life. As the Ten Year Plan also stressed the need for foreign economic aid, Sri Lanka from 1958 onward tried to get more foreign aid. During 1959, foreign aid amounted to Rs. 87,747,600. Of this amount, Rs. 23, 935, 6000 came as grants from USA, Canada, and New Zealand.

Table 5—Foreign Aid Received 1959 (In Rupees)

Countfy	*Total*	*Loan*	*Grant*	*Technical Asst.*
USA	35097750	14337000	13635750	7125000
Canada	9700000	—	9700000	—
N. Zealand	599859	—	599850	—
Yugoslavia	14850000	14850000	—	—

Source : Ceylon Yearbook, 1959, 1960.

Table 6—Scholarships Granted and Experts Sent, 1959

Country or Agency	*No. of Scholars*	*No. of Experts*
USA	46	28
Colombo Plan	146	37
USSR	2	40
Yugoslavia	3	—
Netherlands	4	2
China	2	—
Poland	2	—
UN Agencies	12	23
Totals	217	130

Source : Same as above.

Up to 1956, experts and scholarships were confined to the Colombo Plan countries and the UN specialized agencies. But, from 1956 onward, under technical assistance programmes, Sri Lanka began to receive experts from the countries of the Communist bloc and also, scholarships too were awarded from these countries, though on a very small scale.

Bandaranaike's foreign policy was followed by his widow, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, as the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka from July 1960 to March 1965. For the first 2½ years of her tenure of office, Mrs. Bandaranaike continued to maintain the same relationships with foreign countries that her husband had. Therefore, any economic aid received during the period from 1956 to 1962 or 1963 also could be considered as aid received as a result of the foreign policy of Bandaranaike.

For the period of 13 years (1950-63) Sri Lanka received economic aid, as given below, to a total of Rs. 457.3 millions of which Rs. 243.6 million came as grants and Rs. 213.7 millions as loans, from the Western bloc.

Table 7—The Actual Amount of Aid Received from Western Bloc Countries up to July 1963 (Figures in Millions of Rupees)

Country	*Grants*	*Loan*	*Total*	*Allocated*	*Unallocated*
Australia	37.7	—	37.7	35.7	2.0
UK	3.6	33.3	36.9	36.9	—
Canada	111.0	57.2	168.2	150.5	17.7
N. Zealand	12.5	—	12.5	12.5	—
USA	68.9	75.2	144.1	115.9	28.2
W. Germany	8.9	48.0	56.9	56.9	—
Japan	1.0	—	1.0	1.0	—
	243.6	213.7	457.3	409.4	47.9

Source : Illangaratne—*Ibid.* Tables compiled by writer.

The economic aid from the Communist bloc during a period of 6 years (1957-1963) amounted to Rs. 373.8 million—Rs. 125.0 million in grants and Rs. 248.8 million in loans. The economic aid from the Communist block was a direct result of Bandaranaike's foreign policy of neutralism and non-alignment.

Table 8—The Actual Amount of Aid Received from Communist Bloc Countries up to July 1963 (Figures in Millions of Rupees)

Country	*Grants*	*Loan*	*Total*	*Allocated*	*Unallocated*
China	125.0	50.0	175.0	42.6	132.4
Czechoslovakia	—	18.0	18.0	18.0	—
USSR	—	142.8	142.8	83.7	59.1
Poland	—	38.0	38.0	3.5	34.5
Totals	125.0	248.8	373.8	147.8	226.0

Table 9—The Actual Amount of Aid Received from Non-aligned Countries and International Agencies upto July 1963—(Figures in Millions of Rupees)

Country	*Grants*	*Loan*	*Total*	*Allocated*	*Unallocated*
Yugoslavia	—	73.3	73.3	5.8	67.5
India	—	50.0	50.0	—	50.0
UN Agencies	12.5	—	12.5	12.5	—
IBRD	—	184.8	184.8	184.8	—
Totals	12.5	308.1	320.6	203.1	117.5

Source : Illangaratne—*Ibid*-Tables compiled by the writer.

Foreign Private Capital

During the past two decades, various arguments for and against foreign private capital investment in the developing countries have been advanced. By overlooking the disadvantages of foreign private investments, Sri Lanka from 1948 onward invited foreign investment.

During the time of Sir John Kotelawala's Prime Ministership, a persistent effort was made to draw foreign private capital into Sri Lanka, Bandaranaike too did not deviate from Sir John's policy regarding foreign investment, but due to the fear of potential danger of nationalization of foreign firms (which had been engendered in would-be investors due to Bandaranaike's socialistic policies) much foreign capital could not be attracted into Sri Lanka during this time.

Table 10—Foreign Private Investment 1949–1962
(In Millions of Rupees)

Year	Foreign Private Capital Invested	Foreign Private Capital Taken out	Profits and Dividends Sent out by Foreign Firms
1949 ..	.. 3.4	.. 27.5	.. 35.9
1950 ..	.. 3.6	.. 36.1	.. 67.4
1951 ..	.. 8.7	.. 72.5	.. 84.4
1952 ..	.. 7.1	.. 25.9	.. 60.6
1953 ..	.. 3.5	.. 28.3	.. 54.3
1954 ..	.. 11.3	.. 31.3	.. 61.2
1955 ..	.. 3.4	.. 52.4	.. 84.9
Totals 1949 to 1955	.. 41.0	273.9	448.7
1956 ..	.. 5.3	51.9	.. 83.3
1957 ..	.. 3.1	.. 44.5	.. 81.4
1958 ..	.. 3.8	.. 27.4	.. 66.6
1959 ..	.. 1.9	.. 13.6	.. 58.4
Totals 1956 to 1959	.. 14.1	137.4	289.7
1960 ..	.. 3.7	.. 58.8	.. 63.9
1961 ..	.. 3.3	.. 10.9	.. 49.5
1962 ..	.. 7.4	.. 8.9	.. 48.6
Totals 1960 to 1962	.. 14.4	28.6	162.0

(Compiled from statistics supplied *Op. cit.* —Illangaratne)

By the latter part of his tenure of office, however, Bandaranaike seemed to have realized the myth of the advantage of foreign private investment and aid. The statistics given in Table 10 are very revealing.

A cardinal principle of Bandaranaike's foreign policy was "friendship with all nations"; hence he might have been rather reluctant to hurt the countries of the foreign entrepreneurs. Bandaranaike, according to the above statistics, did not prevent the freedom of those entrepreneurs to take 'their' earnings out of Sri Lanka. During this time she attracted only Rs. 14.1 million in new foreign investments, against a total of Rs. 427.1 million taken out of Sri Lanka by the foreign private investors.

At this point we may recall that Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike came to power in 1960. She seemed to have realized the need for preventing the draining of Sri Lanka's wealth through the channels of foreign private entrepreneurs. The above statistics reveal that during 1960-1962, there had been a tighter control of capital flowing out of Sri Lanka. Bandaranaike, towards the latter part of his period of office, seemed to have realized the danger of depending on foreign aid and foreign capital for private enterprises. This was reflected in the speech made by him on the occasion of the commemoration of the third anniversary of "Ceylon-America Economic and Technical Aid Cooperation."

> "As you know there is a great deal of truth in the saying that 'God helps those who help themselves' I do not want my country or any of our countries to sink to the position of being dependent for our economic prosperity, or indeed for our economic existence, on the generous help which many of our friends throughout the world are prepared to give. We have to help ourselves. It is with that basic idea in my mind that I have made this proposals to a number of other countries both in Asia and Africa who have, I am glad to say, welcomed the proposal, which I think will materialize towards the end of this year.[2]"

At the Afro-Asian economic conference held in Colombo on 25th May 1959 Bandaranaike remarked that economic assistance was not very healthy for economic development.

> "Naturally, we are all most grateful to our friends in this world, as well as the various International Organizations, for the assistance that they have rendered, and are rendering our countries by way of loans and assistance in various ways. We are most grateful to them and it is very useful to us, but I cannot escape the conviction that this sort of assistance may well become a type of economic drug where there is undue and increasing dependence on that to an extent, perhaps, that it is not very healthy for our own economic development. Many of our countries may, quite inadvertently, become drug addicts economically by dependence on foreign aid from our good friends all over, to whom I extend my thanks again for the assistance they have given us and are going to give us."[3]

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2 Bandaranaike—*Speeches and Writings*—P. 446

3 *Ibid.* P. 458.

The above-mentioned views of Bandaranaike seemed to reflect his compromising attitude to foreign aid. However, his neutralism and non-alignment policy was successful in drawing economic aid from a new source, namely the Communist countries, while at the same time attracting aid from the Western bloc members—especially the USA.

10. Cultural Dimension

IN modern Western diplomacy, the cultural relations have begun to play an important role ; hence that kind of relations are some times referred to as the fourth dimension of foreign policy. In an appraisal of Bandaranaike's foreign policy, therefore, it is necessary to see how far, Sri Lanka during the period from 1956 to 1959 engaged in cultural relations as an integral part of her foreign policy.

During the last 2300 years, Sri Lanka has had a tradition of cultural intercourse with the outside world—with Egypt, India, China, and even Greece and Rome. The kings of Sri Lanka, as an instrument of foreign policy had sent cultural missions into such countries as friendly gestures. However, because of the foreign domination of Sri Lanka from the sixteenth century onwards, she could no longer successfully engage in such foreign relations ; and as to cultural aspects, her doors were open only to the free inflow of British 'culture'. During the British colonial times, some Ceylonese became so steeped in this that they were proud to claim that Sri Lanka was a 'Little bit of England' ; but many others were ashamed of this. Dr. Edward T. Hall argues that culture is communication.[1] If he is right, Sri Lanka had communication—one-sided communication—mostly with the British during this period. Sri Lanka had very little access to other cultures, for instance, she knew nothing of the Chinese, the Russian, the

1 Hall Edward T.—The Silent Language Greenwich. Pp. 93–98

American, or the French ways of life. Even the University degrees of these countries were not recognised in Sri Lanka. As a result the flow of communication through university levels was almost non-existent. One would be surprised to hear that the medical degrees of both Russian and American universities were not recognised by the Government of Sri Lanka till recently. During the period from 1948 to 1956, Ceylonese students were sent mainly to England for post-graduate studies. During the post-Bandaranaike period, the largest number of Sri Lanka undergraduate students abroad was studying in India; but very few had gone there for post-graduate studies. This position did not change even during the first two years of Bandaranaike's rule.

Number of Sri Lanka Students in Foreign Countries 2

Country	*No. of Students (1956)*	*No. of Students (1957)*
Australia ..	.. 41	.. 37
India ..	.. 1150	.. 1002
United Kingdom	.. 233	.. 221
Italy ..	.. 1	.. 1
Switzerland	.. 1	.. 1
Japan ..	.. —	.. 7
Canada ..	.. —	.. 18
USA ..	.. 17	.. 17

Under Colombo Plan and the UN Agencies, during 1951-1956, 580 Ceylonese students had visited foreign countries for specialized studies but they too were sent mainly to Britain or to other Commonwealth countries. The "Ceylon-USA Agreement on Technical Co-operation" under the Point Four Programme enabled Ceylonese students to study in the USA from 1951 onwards. There were 23 students from Sri Lanka in the American Universities in 1951, 41 in 1952, 17 in 1953, and 19 in 1954. This trend has continued. It was during Bandaranaike's time that for the first time Ceylonese medical students were sent to the USSR on scholarships. In 1959, Yugoslovia, Netherlands, China, Poland, and Japan also granted scholarships to Ceylonese students (see Chapter 9 for further details.) During Bandaranaike's time new cultural contacts and avenues were opened to Ceylonese students at University level, thus enabling Sri Lanka to go out of the cultural orbit of the British Commonwealth. Under the US system of Fulbright Grants, Sri Lanka too received African and American students and visiting professors. Thus students in Sri Lanka too got an apportunity of getting to know foreigners from cultures hitherto strange to them.

2 UNESCO : The Book of Facts and Figures.

Bandaranaike, at the 1956 General Election Campaign, pledged to promote Buddhism and native culture. In keeping with this pledge he sought to promote Sri Lanka's cultural relations with her neighbours. India was the land where Buddhism originated and Buddhism was the majority religion of most of the Asian countries. Bandaranaike sought to promote her friendship with the Buddhist countries at high-ranking diplomatic levels.

The 2500th anniversary of the passing away of Gautama Buddha coincided with the coming into power of the Bandaranaike government, and the Buddhists of Sri Lanka were looking forward to this anniversary which was called the Buddha Jayanti. Bandaranaike established a new Ministry for Cultural Affairs and under the auspices of this Ministry, and invited celebarated Buddhist scholars from all over the world to attend the Buddha Jayanti celebrations in Sri Lanka. Accordingly a large number of Buddhist scholars visited this country. Nepal was the land of Gautama Buddha's birth and on invitation, both King Mahendra of Nepal and his Queen visited Sri Lanka. Prince Norodom of Cambodia too was invited, and the royalty from both these countries was welcomed very warmly.

Sri Lanka's invitations to the Prime Ministers of three leading Asian countries—India, China, and Japan—too were accepted. During the months of February and May, 1957, these dignitaries visited Sri Lanka and their visits were given an almost religious colouring as they came in connection with the Buddha Jayanti. As a result, the Ceylonese masses from their villages came in thousands to see them and listen to their speeches. To all the five dignitaries mentioned above, the red carpet was unrolled, streets were decorated, and they were taken to see the many places of Buddhist interest in Sri Lanka—the ancient cities of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, and the Temple of the Tooth Relic in Kandy.

Relations with China

Mr. Chou-En-Lai, the Prime Minister of Communist China, who visited this country, won the hearts of the villagers of Sri Lanka by offering flowers at Kandy's Temple of the Tooth, and making a personal contribution to its building fund. On this visit of Chou-En-Lai, Mr. Bandaranaike also discussed certain political matters with him, on 5th February 1957 ; and a joint statement bearing that date was issued by the two Prime Ministers :

6—A 15785 (7/75)

"We the Prime Ministers of Ceylon and of the People's Republic of China, have taken the opportunity, on the occasion of the visit of the Prime Minister of China to Ceylon, to discuss many matters of mutual interest to our two countries. Our talks were full and frank, and conducted in an atmosphere of greatest cordiality and friendship.

"We re-affirm our adherence to the principles accepted by the Asian-African nations that met in conference at Bandung in 1955 which were an extension of the five principles of international co-existence and co-operation, popularly known as 'Panchaseela.'

"This is a transitional period of world history. In eras such as this it is not unusual to find divergent outlooks of varying conceptions of society. But we believe that nations can live in peace with one another despite these divergences and differences in social system.

"Our two countries have been bound by ties of friendship for many centuries. While recognizing and respecting differences of outlook that may exist between us, we are determined to strengthen those ties, develop our economic co-operation and cultural exchange and foster co-operation to our mutual benefit and in the cause of Asian-African solidarity and world peace." [3]

In this joint statement, both Prime Ministers recorded their disapproval of antagonistic military blocs, and also, their opposition to "aggression and expansion of imperialist and colonialist forces" that were still trying to "thwart freedom and progress" of Asia and Africa.

In March of this year, Wilmot A. Perera was sent to Peking as Sri Lanka's Ambassador to the People's Republic of China and the first Chinese Ambassador to Sri Lanka was sent in May 1957. Besides the scholarship exchange programmes, the exchange of ambassadors paved the way for cultural contacts in greater volume. Chinese literature, including volumes of Mao's Speeches and Writings (at very low prices and in handsomely-bound volumes) started flowing into the country. Chinese dance and drama troops were well-received in Sri Lanka, and Ceylonese artistes, too, though fewer in number, were sent to China. Some young militant Sinhalese writers translated a number of Chinese revolutionary literary works into Sinhalese.

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3 *The Foreign Policy of Ceylon,*—Extracts from statements by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and text of joint Statements issued by him and Visiting Heads of States—Govt. Information Dept. Ceylon Pp. 103–105.

Relations with India

Bandaranaike was aware of the many deep-rooted ties between Sri Lanka and India. It was a cultural mission sent by Emperor Asoka which brought Buddhism to this land. Ever since that time thousands of Buddhists had visited India on pilgrimages. Buddhist chroniclers in Sri Lanka had kept accurate historical records of what happened in India, even so early as before the birth of Jesus Christ. Friendship with India was vital to Sri Lanka's security not only in the past, but also in the present. Bandaranaike, knowing well this need, had always aimed at developing good relations with India. A well-timed invitation was sent to Pandit Nehru to visit Sri Lanka in connection with the Buddha Jayanti. The programme of the visit had been so arranged as to give it the serenity of a pilgrimage. Nehru, with his daughter Mrs. Indira Gandhi, spent 3 days in Sri Lanka. On the 18th May the visitors accompanied by Bandaranaike, paid a visit to the ancient Sinhalese capital, Anuradhapura. In this city there is an ancient statue of the Buddha which had made a great impression on Nehru, by reason of its expression of profound tranquility awareness, and compassion. (Nehru had always carried a photograph of it with him during the many days he spent in jail during India's fight for freedom.) Even on this occasion the sight of this statue awed both men into a few moments of complete silence. Pandit Nehru was welcomed all along the way by the people and a joint statement was issued by the two Prime Ministers on 20th May 1956.

In this statement, the prime ministers reaffirmed their faith in 'panchaseela' and recognised the importance of the UN and its role in securing world peace. They also expressed great concern about the development of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons by big powers. The statement contained many ideas which had been expressed by both the parties concerned many times before. With regard to the problem between India and Sri Lanka, however, this was all they stated :

> "There are certain outstanding problems between India and Ceylon that yet await satisfactory solution. The Prime Ministers feel confident, particularly in view of the cordial relations that exist between the two countries and the co-operation in so many spheres that the problems can and should be solved satisfactorily to both countries."[4]

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4 *Op. cit.* P. 110.

Throughout the period from 1956 to 1959, on cultural-diplomatic levels, Bandaranaike maintained the Indo-Sri Lanka friendship. In June 1959, India's President Dr. Rajendra Prasad visited Sri Lanka at the invitation of Bandaranaike. India too had her own Buddha Jayanti celebrations and Bandaranaike was accorded a warm welcome on this occasion. During the Buddha Jayanti year, India reduced her train fares by about 50 percent which enabled thousands of Ceylonese pilgrims to visit India and the Indian government had also made special arrangements regarding accomodation for such pilgrims.

The goodwill of India was shown to Sri Lanka when the latter country suffered great damage as a result of phenomenal floods occurring in December 1957. The Indian Government came to the rescue immediately with aeroplanes, helicopters and boats, clothes, food and medicine, together with engineers from the Indian Army Rescue Unit. Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, the Parliamentary Secretary to India's Ministry of Internal Affairs, gave a report of India's help to Sri Lanka in the Lok Sabha on the 11th February 1958. She reported that the Indian Air craft flew over 150 sorties on a round-the-clock schedule and dropped a total of over 600,000 pounds of food and medical supplies.

Relations with Japan

Sri Lanka had had diplomatic connections with Japan before the period of Bandaranaike; but they were fostered greatly during this period. The Prime Minister of Japan at the time, Mr. Nobusako Kishi was invited to Sri Lanka during the time of Buddha Jayanti He spent three days in the Island. The following joint statement was issued by the Prime Ministers Kishi and Bandaranaike :

> " Japan and Ceylon share a common religion, Buddhism, and are linked together by the ties and traditions of this common Buddhist culture. These bonds enable their countries to make a special contribution to peace and welfare of humanity in the spirit of Buddha Dhamma and the two Prime Ministers affirm the resolve of their countries to collaborate in this spirit for their common good. " [5]

The statement went on to say that " among matters discussed were ways and means to foster economic co-operation between the two countries. " The Ven. Othani, the Chief High Priest of Japan too visited Sri Lanka in connection with the Buddha Jayanti celebrations.

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5 *Op. cit.*—P. 112.

Relations with the USSR

At the end of April 1957, the first USSR Ambassador ever sent to Sri Lanka arrived in the Island. This led to an establishing of cultural contacts with Soviet Russia. Sri Lanka had a flood of Russian literature—the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin as well as the works of Tolstoy, Chekov, and Dostoevsky made their appearance in Sri Lanka, in well-bound but low-priced volumes. (The handsomely-bound copies of the three volumes of 'Das Kapital' were available in Sri Lanka at price equivalent to less than two US Dollars) Several Russian film festivals were held in Colombo, and at the University of Ceylon, Peradeniya.

Bandaranaike selected as Sri Lanka's first Ambassador to the USSR Dr. G. P. Malalasekera, Dean of of the Faculty of Oriental Studies at the University of Ceylon, a well-known, respected and learned Buddhist leader. In the Soviet Union, Dr. Malasekera delivered several lectures at Russian Universities covering subjects of Sri Lanka's history, culture, and Buddhism. A number of modern Sinhalese classics was translated into Russian by some Russian scholars who learnt Sinhala in a very short time. Several Russian magazines published articles on Sri Lanka, including some on the native Sinhala system of medicine. The study of the Russian novel became a serious subject in the faculty of Sinhalese literature in the University of Ceylon. In fact, one well-known and well-thought of Sinhala writer went so far as to say that the essential spirit of the Russian novel was Buddhist! It would not be wrong to say that it was during the regime of Bandaranaike that the educated intelligentsia of Sri Lanka really became aware of Russia as a source of intellectual and artistic inspiration, and to some extent a source of inspiration in the sociological and technological fields as well. The image current among this class in Sri Lanka of Russia, as a a grim country of cold winters, regimentation, purges and forced labour began to fade to a considerable degree.

Czechoslovakia

On invitation from Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Vilian Siroky, accompanied by the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vaclav David, visited Sri Lanka in February 1958. During this visit the Czech leaders were cordially welcomed, and the two Prime Ministers conducted their talks in a relaxed atmosphere. The matters discussed included the Middle East and the stockpiling of atomic weapons. A quotation from the joint statement issued by the two leaders is given below:

"The Prime Ministers expressed their satisfaction at the manner in which the economic, trade and cultural relations between the two countries have been developing in the recent years. They hoped that their relations will develop further in the future to the benefit of both countries."[6]

Relations with Canada

Bandaranaike, on his visit to the United Nations, made it a point to visit Canada and confer with the Canadian leaders on the subject of the Suez crisis. When Mr. John Diefenbaker became the Canadian Prime Minister, he was extended an invitation to visit Sri Lanka, and accordingly Mr. and Mrs. Diefenbaker arrived in Sri Lanka on 26th November 1958. As it was the first time that a Canadian Prime Minister had ever visited this country, and in recognition of the genuine, disinterested and generous aid that Canada had always extended to Sri Lanka, the Island welcomed them warmly. Bandaranaike made the following remarks at a luncheon given in honour of the visiting Canadian Prime Minister and Mrs. Diefenbaker :

"Canada has ungrudgingly come to our help and assistance, and we value it all the more because we realize that she has nothing to gain by the assistance she is giving to us and to other Asian countries."[7]

Relations with Yugoslavia

Bandaranaike invited another head of state, an opostle of the policy of non-alignment and neutralism, strangely enough, from Europe. This was Josip Broz Tito of the Republic of Yugoslavia. President and Madame Tito arrived in Sri Lanka on 21st January 1959 and were received with great enthusiasm. The Yugoslavian President was accompanied by a number of dignitaries from his country. During his six-day stay he drew large crowds all over the island. Bandaranaike and President Tito held long discussions on the subject of bloc politics and the resultant world tension. The following is an extract from the joint statement issued by the two leaders :

"The talks were held in an atmosphere of cordiality and understanding and mutual respect. The exchange of views on international problems was profitable and helpful and there was agreement regarding the need for increasing cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the economic and cultural spheres."

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6 *Op. cit.*—P. 115.
7 *Ibid.* P. 96.

Relations with Burma

Burma and Sri Lanka too had maintained their cultural links for the last eight centuries. For Burmese, Sri Lanka is a land for pilgrimage. During the Buddha Jayanti, a large number of Burmese visited this country. The cultural Ministry of the Bandaranaike government sent a group of Buddhist scholars to Rangoon to take part in the Burmese Government-sponsored Buddhist Convention which was entrusted with the work of carefully reading through Buddhist scriptures with a view to preserving their pristine purity. Burma is a non-aligned country with a population over 90 per cent. Buddhist. Therefore, the keen interest shown by the Bandaranaike government in the Buddhist Convention contributed to the good relations already existing between the two countries.[8]

As far as the cultural dimension was concerned, there was a marked difference between the Senanayake-Kotelawala regimes and that of Bandaranaike. In fairness to Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala, it has to be admitted that it was they who opened up the initial communications with Red China, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslavakia by means of trade treaties. Also, during their times, friendship with Japan and Burma was already in existence. However, compared with the attention and interest that these two Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka showed their Western friends, the attention paid to non-Western friends was almost negligible. Under Bandaranaike, cultural relations were given a greater impetus, as he considered them to be an effective instrument of foreign policy. At great expense he entertained many leaders from the different parts of the world. During his time, many works of political science and literature from the Communist countries as well as Western countries were translated into the national languages of Sri Lanka and circulated throughout the Island, even in its rural areas. The visits of the foreign dignitaries, together with the attendent wide publicity given to these visits in the local press, made an impact upon the people of Sri Lanka and widened their political awareness of the world. It was only after 1956 that Sri Lanka was freed from the cultural isolation and the exclusive cultural orbit of the British Commonwealth. It was only after the ascendance of Bandaranaike to power that people belonging to different cultures and ideologies in the modern world, such as Americans, Russians and Chinese, began to communicate with the people of Sri Lanka to any appreciable extent at all.

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8 *Op. cit.*—P. 119.

II. Summary and Conclusions

THIS heterogenous world of ours changes swiftly in all spheres of economics, politics and ideology. In such a world, where international relations are in a state of flux (a phrase often used by Bandaranaike) where national objectives change from day to day, and where power concentrations and centres of gravity keep moving, a tiny country like Sri Lanka cannot stick to a rigid and unchanging foreign policy. This, however, does not mean that Sri Lanka's foreign policy should not be constistent; it should be, rather, pragmatic and rational, strategically planned, easily comprehensible, and free from ideological dogmatism and bureaucratic red-tapism, so that her national objectives could be realized in terms of specific targets.

With this remark in mind, an effort will be made in this chapter to assess the foreign policy of the late S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike on which foundation the foreign affairs of Sri Lanka from 1956 to date are claimed to have been built.

In academic circles there does not seem to be any difference of opinion on the point that S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was the author of the foreign policy of non-alignment which has been implemented by

Sri Lanka. However, a certain section of the political circles of this country advances a different theory—that prior to 1956, the non-alignment policy had been already implemented. On the 8th January 1951, D. S. Senanayake the first Prime Minister of independent Sri Lanka declared that he would follow the "middle path" in foreign affairs. His successor and son, Dudley Senanayake declared on 16th July 1953, his foreign policy in the following words: "....our foreign policy is not to align ourselves with one bloc or the other blindly and regardless of the interests of our people."[1] Dudley Senanayake's successor (and cousin) Sir John Kotelawala introducing his foreign policy on 14th of November, 1953, spoke thus: "In all International relations we will continue to have an independent approach without aligning ourselves with any bloc. We will wholeheartedly follow the path of peace. In South and South-East Asia we will endeavour to maintain the friendliest relations, with whom we have historical, cultural, and religious ties."[2]

Though such policy statements had been made in public by the leaders of the U. N. P. governments, there is considerable evidence to prove that in actual fact, they did not follow a middle-path in foreign relations, but a path somewhat right of centre. Prior to 1956, Sri Lanka governments did not seek to develop diplomatic relations, or have any representatives, either in Chnia, or in the USSR, or in any other Communist country. The UNP governments were obsessed with the fear of international communism (see "The UNP Journal"—Independence Souvenir 1952, p. 21, and Sir John Kotelawala's "Bandung 1955" pp. 13-15). Sir John's desire to see Sri Lanka a member of the SEATO too was due to this fear of communism. As a matter of expediency, during the early UNP regime, a trade pact was signed with a communist country—China. But this in no way led to the acceptance of China by Sri Lanka on the same friendly basis that she had accepted non-communist and Western-bloc countries. However, the leaders of the Opposition in all the relevant debates on foreign relations, both inside the House and outside it, advanced weighty argument to establish the fact that the UNP regimes prior to 1956 did not put into practice the policy of non-alignment which had been declared in public by their leaders. (See speech by Dr. N. M. Perera, Hansard Vol. 8, Cols. 500-505, speech by Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, Hansard Vol. 8, Cols. 275-278, speech by Mr. Pieter Keuneman, Hansard Vol. 10, Cols. 205-212, and Hansard Vol. 14, Cols. 446-454, speeches by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. Hansard Vol. 14, Col 511-514 and Hansard Vol. 17, Cols. 535-537. For the above quotations please see the appendix 6.)

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1 Hansard H R—Vol. 14—Cols. 554–55

2 *ibid*—Vol. 16—Col. 710.

After S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike quit the Cabinet of D. S. Senanayake on 12th July, 1951, he became a severe critic of the foreign policy of that regime. He accused D. S. Senanayake of following a foreign policy which was " committed to be drawn at the chariot wheels of the United Kingdom, and the States. " [3] On 16th July 1953, Bandaranaike levelled the same criticism against Dudley Senanayake's foreign policy, [4] and on 17th May 1954, against Sir John's foreign policy, and that his (Sir John's) avowed intention to " join even with the devil to oppose Communism " was not in keeping with his declared foreign policy of neutralism and non-alignment. [5]

In the course of his criticism and constructive thinking on the subject of foreign policy from July 1951 to April 1956, Mr. Bandaranaike developed a case for neutralism and non-alignment as the best foreign policy for Sri Lanka. Why did he do so ? G. H. Jansen, an authority on Afro-Asian affairs provides a simple answer. He says that " Ceylon non-alignment is a by-product of rubber and tea. " [6] Any serious student of the Bandaranaike policies will not be satisfied with such a simple answer as this.

In order to find an adequate answer to this question, one has to study the historical development of the concept of non-alignment and the socio-economic and political forces at work in Sri Lanka during this period. Above all, the personality development of S. W. R. D Bandaranaike should be studied since it was this factor that had a decisive influence on the policy formulation of his time. The following factors seem to have had a great impact on the formulation of the foreign policy of neutralism and non-alignment for Sri Lanka by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike.

1. *Psychological disposition of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike*—a strong psychological need to rise against the old order (which at certain stages seemed to have been dominated by two people personifying that order—his father Sir Solomon Dias Bandaranaike and D. S. Senanayake respectively) and a love-hate attitude towards Britain and the British which resulted, in the main, from his experience at Oxford, the citadel of British learning.

2. *Bandaranaike's genuine and strong desire to promote national interests—by assertion and exercise of national independence.*

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3 Hanoord H R—Vol. 10—Col. 1410.
4 *ibid*—Vol. 14—Cols. 509–511.
5 *ibid*—Vol. 17, Cols. 535–36
6 Jansen Op. cit—P 125

3. *The impact of Buddhism—the concept of the "Middle Path".* (SWRD was the first politician of this country to refer to this doctrine as useful in finding a solution to world conflicts—on 27th May 1950)

4. *The impact of the Indian National Movement.*

5. *Inspiration received from Pandit Nehru and from other charismatic leaders of the Third World*—such as Nasser, Nkrumah, U Nu and Tito.

6. *The influence of foreign policies advanced by the left-wing leaders of Sri Lanka—especially Dr. Colvin R. de Silva* (Hansard Vol. 10, Cols. 275-77) and Mr. Pieter Keuneman (Hansard Vol. 10, Cols. 207-209) (Please see the appendix 6).

7. *Political necessity to formulate a foreign policy different from that of the UNP,* more in keeping with the popular aspirations given expression to in the revolutionary general election of 1956.

During the late forties and the fifties of this century, in Sri Lanka there was little public interest in foreign policy matters. Even in the Cabinet of the first four prime Ministers of independent Sri Lanka, most of the ministers lacked knowledge and interest in matters of foreign policy. In such circumstances it was logical that S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike should have taken the responsibility for the formulation and the implementation of the foreign policy on himself during his tenure of office as the Prime Minister.

As outlined in three major speeches—the first made at the Commonwealth Press Association in London in July 1956, the second at the UNO in November 1956 and the third at the Afro-Asian Economic Conference in Colombo in May 1959—and as obvious from the management of foreign affairs, Bandaranaike seems to have gone by the following guidelines or broad policy objectives.

(1) Active engagement in "preventive diplomacy" to bridge the gap between the power blocs.

(2) Exercising the freedom to develop Sri Lanka's foreign relations with a view to maximizing and promoting her national interests such as national security and economic progress.

(3) Opposition to any form of colonialism and the domination of small powers by big powers, and the positive support of all national liberation movements among the hitherto subjugated peoples of the world.

(4) Non-alignment with military blocs.

(5) Friendship with all nations, while reserving the right to be critical of them and deal accordingly with them should the need arise.

(6) Maintenance of world peace by adherence to "Panchaseela" and Bandung declarations.

(7) Promotion of Afro-Asian solidarity in both political and economic fields.

Bandaranaike did not fail to recognize the inherent difficulties standing in the way of following these guidelines. The West was reacting strongly against the policy of non-alignment (John Foster Dulles condemned it as an "immoral" policy). Bandaranaike realized that by developing relations with the West alone a country like Sri Lanka could not have sufficient leverage advantage in diplomatic relations. This was evident in a confession made in the House of Representatives, on 21t June 1955 by the then Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala, who said. "We have received no aid whatsoever from the United States of America."[7] A Junior Minister of the then UNP regime, R. G. Senanayake, on 22nd January 1953 lamented that in spite of their repeated appeals for Point Four Aid, they had got, so far, only a cook for Kundasale Girls' School of Agriculture. By means of the UNP foreign policy Sri Lanka could not exercise freedom to do the best for the country in securing aid or in promoting and diversifying her external trade.

For implementing a foreign policy based on the guide-lines mentioned above, as realized by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Sri Lanka should establish, and further diplomatic relations, not only with the Capitalist countries, but also with the Communist countries and other non-aligned countries of the East as well as of the West. During the period from 1956 to 1959, Bandaranaike established dipplomatic relations, for the first time, with six countries of the Communist bloc—the USSR, China, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, and Yugoslavia, while maintaining the same cordial relations already established by the UNP government with the Capitalist bloc countries. Bandaranaike established diplomatic relations with the following non-communist countries too—Afghanistan, Greece, Israel, New Zealand, the Phillippines, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and the UAR.

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7 Hansard, H. R.—Vol. 21, Col. 143.

From 1956 to 1959 Sri Lanka entered into 45 agreements concerning trade, aid, technical and economic co-operation and cultural relations. Of these, 19 were with the Western bloc countries, 15 with Communist countries, 5 with non-aligned countries and six with international organizations. Judging on the basis of cold war politics, 42.2 per cent of the agreements were with Western bloc countries, 33.3 per cent were with Communist countries.

In order to make the policy of non-alignment a dynamic one, the need to re-organize and improve the Foreign Ministry and the Overseas Service of Sri Lanka was felt by Bandaranaike. He wanted to organize the Foreign Service so that the career diplomats could go right up the service as has been done in some important countries.[8]

Bandaranaike acted on the realization that a small country like Sri Lanka could contribute to world peace by participating in a concerted effort by the Third World Powers (mostly the Afro-Asian nations) at the United Nations.

With some of the countries given in the table No. 11 in the 7th chapter of this study, Sri Lanka had very little trade and other economic ties. Yet the high voting correlation indicates similar popular aspirations and the effect of a common heritage of suffering under Western domination. Therefore a feeling of the need to march together is shown by the statistics given in that table.

Bandaranaike's attiutde to the super-powers is well illustrated in Sri Lanka's voting behaviour at the United Nations. His efforts to get away from the British diplomatic orbit is also revealed in the statistics given in the table No. 12 of the chapter seven.

During the period from 1956 to 1959, there had been 155 voting roll-calls at the United Nations General Assembly, and Sri Lanka's voting correlations with the UK was the lowest of all in a comparison of her voting correlations with the three powers, the USA, the USSR, and the UK. One phenomenon in relation to the USSR was that Sri Lanka's correlation with that country was on the increase during the period of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike's Prime Ministership. Sri Lanka during this period had the highest voting correlation with India, securing a percentage of 92, and with Burma (90). There were 118 controversial issues (issues on which the USSR and the USA took opposite sides). Over such issues Sri Lanka's voting correlation with the USA was 30 per cent while with the USSR it was 40 per cent.

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8 Hansard, H. R.—Vol. 32, Col. 380.

The voting at the UN by Sri Lanka was directly guided by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. An analysis on the issues taken one by one shows that Sri Lanka has voted sometimes wholly with the USA and sometimes wholly with the USSR. This indicates that on these issues Bandaranaike courageously exercised his independent judgement, resisting any pull made by the super-powers to draw Sri Lanka into either of these camps. The power of such pulls in terms of aid and trade must have been considerable.

Although Sri Lanka's voting correlation at the UN is highest with India, yet over some issues she had not voted with India. (e.g. on the Hungary question—see UN General Assembly Resolutions No. 1127 and No. 1132, Korean question, Resolution No. 1455, and Disarmament question A/CT 229). This mature political behaviour brought prestige to Sri Lanka at the U.N. It was as a result of this that she was chosen to the membership of the Security Council on 12th October 1959.

At the UN, Sri Lanka under S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike had made a conspicuous effort to follow his policy guide-lines which were mentioned earlier. The stand taken by Sri Lanka, in connection with issues such as the re-admission of China to the UN, and the Middle East crisis gained much prestige for her at the UN. Therefore it is not only rational but realistically expedient to continue the guidelines laid down by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in a spirit of dynamism.

Students of international politics generally are in agreement on the point that foreign policy and external trade policy of a country should be geared to each other, and that there should not be any contradiction between them. In reviewing the stand taken by Bandaranaike it is appropriate to draw attention to an observation made by Mr. T. B. Ilangaratne when he was the Minister of Finance in 1963. "Prior to 1956, Ceylon's external trade, both import and export, was confined to a comparatively small number of countries. This was an unsatisfactory situation as it meant that the entire trade was dependent on the goodwill of those few countries. Ceylon's policy since 1956, in accordance with the Government's foreign policy of neutrality and non-alignment was concerned with the diversification of Ceylon's trade and building up new markets." [9]

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9 Illangaratne. T. B.—*Economicand Social Progress*—Ceylon Govt. Press (1963) P. 45.

According to the trade policy advocated by D. S. Senanayake, Sri Lanka should trade even with the devil, if that trade was advantageous to her. (See Hanzard Vol. 21—Col. 133). By establishing trade relations with China (in 1952). Yugoslavia (1953). Poland and Czechoslovakia (1955), both Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawela tried to translate D. S. Senanayake's trade policy into action. But no effort was made to trade with the USSR. Since the UNP trade policy was not consistent with the generally right-wing Pro-Western stand it took on foreign affairs, it was only during the time of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike that the trade policy and general foreign policy were consistent with each other, and made to gear to one another.

Mr. Bandaranaike made an effort to free Sri Lanka's trade from the stranglehold of the British monopolists. The Table No. 1 of Chapter 8 bears witness to this observation.

Trade with the UK for the years 1953, 1954, and 1955 accounted for respectively 22.3, 22.9, and 21.9 per cent of the total import trade value and 25.9. 28.8, and 26.8 per cent. of the total export trade of Sri Lanka for these years. During 1953 and 1954, next to UK, Red China was the biggest customer of Sri Lanka. Her import trade with China dropped from 12.3 per cent. in 1954 to 5.88 per cent. in 1955. The export trade with China dropped from 11.3 per cent. in 1954 to 5.60 per cent. in 1955. We may recall at this point that the USA was extremely displeased with the 1952 trade agreement made by Sri Lanka with China. The trade with the USA dropped from 7.38 per cent. in 1953 to 6.83 per cent. in 1954.[10] It is clear that this unhappy situation was a consequence of not having a sufficiently diversified external trade on the part of Sri Lanka. Bandaranaike did his best to set the path clear for diversification of external trade but the reactionary forces in the world of trade dominated by the West were too strong for him to break, in the tragically short time left to him. The balance of trade as shown below indicates the forces that stood in his way of economic emancipation in the field of external trade.

Balance of Trade of Sri Lanka 1956–59 [11]

Year	*Balance of Trade*
1956	+ 102 Million Rupees
1957	— 124 Million Rupees
1958	— 6 Million Rupees
1959	— 252 Million Rupees

10 *Statistical Abstract of Ceylon*—(1960) P. 192
11 *ibid*—1960. p. 194

Out of all non-aligned countries, it was only with the UAR that Sri Lanka had a profitable trade balance. The balance of trade with India was the most unfavourable to Sri Lanka. Up to 1959, the only diversification of the pattern of trade after 1952 that was profitable to Sri Lanka was the trade with the USSR.

Sri Lanka's foreign trade had to depend entirely on another factor, shipping. She depended heavily on the British shipping lines for her trade. To get out of this impasse, Bandaranaike was seriously engaged in establishing an independent shipping line for Sri Lanka, but he did not live long enough to see this ambition materialized.

S. W. R. D. envisaged a plan similar to that of the European Economic Community for Asia and Africa, and took the necessary preliminary measures for it by getting up the Afro-Asian Economic Conference which met on 25th May 1959 in Colombo.

By the end of his regime in 1959, he had left behind a legacy of ideas which depended on his successors for successful conversion into reality. As stated earlier, the foreign policy of the previous regime failed to obtain foreign aid in any substantial measure. The aid received throurgh the Colombo Plans was far from adequate. From 1956 to 1963, Sri Lanka received economic aid to the total of Rs. 457.3 million of which Rs. 243.6 million came in the form of grants and Rs. 213.7 in the form of loans from the Western bloc.

The economic aid from communist countries during the period of six years (1957-63) amounted to Rs. 373.8 million. Of this amount, Rs. 125 million was in the form of grants, and Rs. 248.8 million in loans. The aid from the Communist bloc was a direct result of the foreign policy of Bandaranaike. But above all, his policy enabled Sri Lanka to get aid from the Western bloc as well. This shows that the policy of non-alignment followed by S. W. R. D. gave Sri Lanka a greater leverage in bargaining for foreign aid.

Bandaranaike realised the dangers of getting foreign private capital for development purposes. During the UNP regime, great pains were taken to draw foreign capital into Sri Lanka for investment. From 1949 to 1955 Sri Lanka got Rs. 14.0 million as investment capital, but had to release, during the same period, Rs. 273.9 million as capital, and Rs. 448.7 million as profits and dividends to be taken out of Sri Lanka. During the period of Bandaranaike, Sri Lanka got nearly 14.1 million rupees as capital for investment, but had to release Rs. 137.4 million as capital and Rs. 289.7 million as profits to be taken out of the country. The situation prompted him to make

the following statement at the Afro-Asian Economic Conference. "Many of our countries may quite inadvertently become drug addicts economically by dependence on foreign aid from our good friends all over...."[12]

Two international crises took place during the first year of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's life as the Prime Minister—the invasion of Egypt by the joint forces of the UK, France and Israel over the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the march of the USSR armies into Hungary. These two major events provided an opportunity to follow his declared policy guide-lines. In the preservation of world peace by means of preventive diplomacy and filling the gap between the contending parties Bandaranaike played a leading role as the representative of the Asian powers. His role enabled Sri Lanka to serve in the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the UN Commission on Hungary. The support given by him to Nasser, the President of the UAR paved the way for greater friendship with the Arab world. He showed great interest in the Suez crisis because the safety of the Suez Canal was vital to the economy of Sri Lanka.

The UNP regime prior to 1956 was obsessed with the idea that Sri Lanka's national security was threatened by her immediate neighbour India, and by the Communist giants, the USSR and China. The strategy adopted by Bandaranaike to deal with this "external threat" was to actively campaign for the "Panchaseela" policy enunciated by Pandit Nehru and Premier Chou-En-Lai.

With regard to two other problems in connection with India—the unfavourable balance of trade and the problem of the people in Sri Lanka of Indian origin (the so-called "stateless" people) Bandaranaike was convinced that they could be solved only by promoting friendship between India and Sri Lanka, so that negotiations could be made in an atmosphere of cordiality. He brought India and Sri Lanka closer, during his lifetime. But he failed to bring about a final solution to these problems. However, the path shown by him—that of making negotiations in a cordial atmosphere —was found to be correct.

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12 Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D.—*Towards a New Era*—P. 458.

As far as the cultural dimension of foreign policy is concerned. Bandaranaike was able to let Sri Lanka go beyond the cultural orbit of Britain into a broader world. His cultural and technical co-operation agreements enabled Sri Lanka to send students to countries like the USA, the USSR, West Germany, and Japan. During his time, a number of cultural missions was exchanged with countries of differing political hues and the cultural relations of Sri Lanka with the outside world were diversified and enriched. Thus Bandaranaike provided the people of Sri Lanka with a broader and more balanced view of the world, something new for the people of Sri Lanka who had been given the usual narrow and biased world view through the lens of a colonial power.

A critical student of the policies of Bandaranaike will not subscribe to the view that he was an idealist in foreign policy matters. His dealings in connection with the external affairs of his country always had the national interest in the forefront. His efforts were motivated by the national interest of gaining either political or economic leverage for Sri Lanka. In that sense he was a realist and a pragmatist. He is accused of being somewhat of a sentimentalist, and of allowing this weakness to affect his policy decisions on foreign affairs. But in actual fact, would things have been better for Sri Lanka had he been, as Metternich was in the 19th century, a pure bundle of principles ? Such a psychological disposition—that of being a bundle of principles—does not go very far in this age of personal diplomacy. He believed in friendship and personal contacts (He met 7 Prime Ministers, one deputy Prime Minister, and two presidents in Sri Lanka, and several other heads of states abroad, during his short period of Premiership). After every such meeting he was able to promote better understanding between himself and the leader concerned. If a touch of sentimentality contributed to this, it should not be a cause for complaint. In friendship, he was better able to fulfil the national interests of Sri Lanka. Thus he left behind a legacy for personal diplomacy for his successors to follow up.

Alignment with one bloc or the other is the logical alternative to the policy of non-alignment. Of the 144 independent countries in the world today, as many as 80 have either positively chosen the policy of non-alignment or have let themselves fall in line with it. The increase in the number of participants at the Non-aligned Conferences from Belgrade to Algiers bears witness to this. Both the USSR and the People's Republic of China, from the mid-fifties onward, have publicly supported the cause of non-alignment—(Russia after the

death of Stalin in 1953 and China after the Nehru-Chou En-Lai detente of April 1954 which led to the declaration of the famous "Panchaseela.") On the other hand, right from the early fifties, the USA did everything possible to nip the non-alignment movement in the bud. The US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the author of SEATO, during his visit to Pakistan in 1953 voiced the US attitude to the non-alignment movement by describing it as "immoral." But in the early sixties, President John F. Kennedy softened this US attitude and paved the way for a better understanding of this policy in America. It seemed to be unintelligible to the majority of the American people who were used to a dichotomous way of thinking in world politics. If we are to accept Dr. Henry Kissinger's views as ones reflecting American thinking—his recent statements on non-alignment made in New Delhi—they indicate a radical change in the American attitude to non-alignment, which now seems to be acceptable and intelligible to the US policy-makers also. Thus it is clear that the non-alignment policy is now on the way to being universally recognized and counted with.

The policy of non-alignment does not mean merely non-involvement in the cold war. It has become an inherent component of national sovereignty and freedom of thought and action. Therefore it has become a policy dear to the nations newly freed from colonialism and ruthless exploitation.

As Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike stated at the Lusaka Non-aligned Conference, the policy of non-alignment has served as a "front-line defence against external threats.[13] The various threats to peace that occurred in different parts of the world since 1950 indicate that on the whole the non-aligned countries were safe and that they could enjoy peace undisturbed by external threats. Only a few of the non-aligned countries such as India and the UAR had to resort to war; but in the early seventies even these countries came out victorious over two powers aligned with the Western bloc—over two members of the SEATO and NATO respectively.

As far as the maintenance of national sovereignty and peace is concerned, the aligned powers are in no way better off than the non-aligned ones. Two members of the NATO, Greece and Turkey, were at war with each other over Cyprus. SEATO let down its member—

13 Ceylon Government Press Release on the Lusaka Conference—Sept. 1970—P. 2

Pakistan—and could not save her from a defeat in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Alignment very often means that the aligned country is committed to be "drawn at the chariot wheels....." of one of the super-powers. Therefore for a nation to be aligned is to expose itself to a greater risk of involvement in war. As far as Sri Lanka is concerned, non-alignment provides her with the greatest national security.

Alignment with a power-bloc is not confined only to military relations; it goes hand in hand with economic domination. The South American countries which are members of the OAS have to face evil consequences of being economically dependent on the USA. As envisaged by the leaders of the non-aligned countries such as Bandaranaike and Nehru, it would be very difficult, almost impossible ,for a nation aligned with a power-bloc to diversify its external trade relations. For Sri Lanka, therefore, alignment with any power bloc would be suicidal, both as far as national security and economic progress are concerned; but non-alignment is economically and politically expedient and feasible. As far as the newly independent countries are concerned, alignment with a power-bloc is a continuation of colonialism in a new guise, as it curtails the country's national independence and is inimical to the growth of a sturdy national economy. On the other hand, non-alignment provides a flexible approach to the problems of survival and growth as a nation in a fast-changing world. It provides the correct politico-economic environment in which an emerging nation can grow to sturdy and healthy maturity economically and politically. There is little doubt that the people of Sri Lanka, irrespective of differences in their political ideology, whole-heartedly endorse the farsighted foreign policy of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, a policy which he based firmly on neutralism and non-alignment.

Appendix

(1) Sessional Paper XXII (1947).

(2) Texts of the UK-Ceylon Agreements signed on 11.11.47 Defence-External Affairs—Public Affairs.

(3) Text on the Agreements on the Bases in Sri Lanka signed on 7th June 1957.

(4) Bandung Declaration.

(5) Text of Panchaseela enunciated by Nehru and Chou-en-lai in 1954

(6) Relevant quotations from Hansard.

Dr. N. M. Perera Vol. 8—Col. 500-505.

Dr. Colvin R. de Silva—Vol. 8—Col. 275-278 and Vol. 10—Cols. 275-77.

Pieter Keuneman—Vol. 10—Col. 205-212.

Jayawardene J. R.—Vol. 21—Col. 132-133.

Bandaranaike S. W. R. D.—Vol. 14—Col. 511-514, Vol. 17—Col. 535-537.

Bandaranaike S. W. R. D.—Speeches and writings : speech delivered at the United Nations General Assembly. (full text)

THE INDEPENDENCE OF CEYLON

THE DOCUMENTS

IN a statement in the Parliament of the United Kingdom and the State Council of Ceylon on June 1, 1947, it was announced that as soon as the necessary agreements had been negotiated and concluded on terms satisfactory to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Ceylon, immediate steps would be taken to "to confer upon Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations". This phrase was intended to imply that the Island would enjoy the status of a fully, sovereign member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, *i.e.*, the status commonly known as Dominion Status.

2. Immediate steps were taken to take advantage of this offer and "Heads of Agreement" were reached for submission to the Cabinet. The Cabinet examined the documents at an early meeting and authorized me to sign the Agreements as soon as the text of the Ceylon Independence Bill had been settled to its satisfaction. On November 11, 1947, accordingly, His Excellency the Governor signed the Agreements on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom and, in accordance with the direction of the Cabinet, I * signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon.

3. The problem of Ceylon is unique in that it has to jump from semi-colonial status to independent Dominion Status. The older Dominions first obtained internal self-government and then gradually developed complete powers in respect of defence and external affairs. The Statute of Westminister deals only with legislative powers. Matters relating to defence and external affairs are settled partly by practice and partly by arrangements made at Imperial Conferences. Ceylon had to secure the abolition of the limitations in its Constitution, the extension to it of the legislative powers conferred by the Statute of Westminster, and the application of the practices relating to defence and external affairs. Also, there are in Ceylon (unlike the earlier Dominions) public officers appointed by or on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Colonies for whom he has a special responsibility. It was therefore agreed that five documents were needed to bring Dominion Status into operation :—

(1) A Ceylon Independence Act passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom to confer on the Ceylon Parliament full legislative powers and to deprive the United Kingdom of responsibility for the Government of Ceylon ;

D. S. Senanayake

(2) An Order in Council to remove the limitations on self-government in the Ceylon Constitution;

(3) An External Affairs Agreement to provide for certain matters relating to external affairs;

(4) A defence Agreement of such a nature that the necessary measures could be taken for the defence of Ceylon; and

(5) A Public Officers' Agreement transferring to the Ceylon Government the responsibilities hitherto vested in the Government of the United Kingdom in relation to public officers.

4. The Ceylon Independence Bill was introduced into the Parliament of the United Kingdom on November 13, 1947. Its text is given at the end of this Memorandum as Document 1. The amending Order in Council is a "prerogative" instrument which cannot for technical reasons be published in draft form, though its provisions have been approved by the Ceylon Government and are summarized below. The three Agreements are being published in London today in a White Paper whose text is annexed to this Memorandum as Document 2. The five documents are analysed below.

The Ceylon Independence Bill

5. The purposes of the Ceylon Independence Bill are:—

(1) to confer on Ceylon the legislative powers conferred on the older Dominions by the Statute of Westminster, 1931, and on India and Pakistan by section 6 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947;

(2) to deprive the United Kingdom Government of responsibility for the Government of Ceylon by a provision similar to section 7 (1) (*a*) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947; and

(3) to amend the law of the United Kingdom in matters relating to armed forces, naturalization, divorce, shipping, copyright, &c. so as to place Ceylon on the same footing as the other Dominions.

Certain consequential changes in the law of Ceylon will be required, but for the most part these will be enacted by the Parliament of Ceylon in due course in such manner as it thinks fit.

The Bill will take effect on "the appointed day" to be fixed by Order in Council. This day depends on the date of the Royal Assent to the Ceylon Independence Act and the enactment of the amendments to the Constitution. It is under negotiation with the United Kingdom Government.

6. Clause 1 (1) of the Bill reproduces section 4 of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, and deprives the Parliament of the United Kingdom of power to legislate for Ceylon except at her request and with her consent. It has in substance the same effect as section 6 (4) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.

7. Clause 1 (3) incorporates the First Schedule and brings in the remainder of the Statute of Westminster—other than section 11, which is reproduced in clause 4 (2)—except in so far as that Statute applies to specific Dominions. The provisions so incorporated may be summarized as follows—

(i) Paragraph 1 of the First Schedule applies section 2 of the Statute of Westminster. Ceylon will cease to be a "colony" by virtue of clause 4 (2) of the Bill and the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, will cease to apply to the Island. The Ceylon Parliament may repeal or amend all Imperial legislation applying to the Island. A similar provision is in section 6 (1) and (2) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which does not however refer to the Colonial Laws Validity Act because British India was not a "colony".

(ii) Paragraph 2 of the First Schedule applies section 3 of the Statute of Westminster or part of section 6 (1) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. It means that Ceylon may enact legislation covering acts or persons outside her territory.

(iii) Paragraph 3 of the First Schedule applies section 5 of the Statute of Westminster so as to give the Ceylon Parliament full power to regulate merchant shipping.

(iv) Paragraph 4 of the First Schedule applies section 6 of the Statute of Westminster so as to give the Ceylon Parliament full power to establish and regulate Prize Courts.

8. The following provisions of the Statute of Westminster are not reproduced because they have no relevance to Ceylon:—

(*a*) Section 7 which relates to the federal system of the Dominion of Canada;

(*b*) Section 8 which deals with the Constitution Acts of Australia and New Zealand;

(*c*) Section 9 which relates to the federal system of the Commonwealth of Australia;

(*d*) Section 10 which prevents sections 2 to 6 from applying to Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland until they are adopted by them.

9. The right of secession is not specifically referred to either in the Statute of Westminster, 1931, or in the Indian Independence Act, 1947. It is, however, implicit in sections 2 and 4 of the Statute of Westminster and section 6 of the Indian Independence Act. These provisions are reproduced in clause 1 (1) and the First Schedule of the Ceylon Independence Bill. Ceylon will thus have the same right to secede as any of the other Dominions, including India and Pakistan.

10. Clause 1 (2) is intended to deprive the Government of the United Kingdom of the responsibility for the government of Ceylon, since this responsibility passes to the Government established under the Ceylon Constitution. A similar provision is contained in section 7 (1) (*a*) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. There is no such provision in the Statute of Westminster because responsibility had passed to the Governments of the Dominions long before 1931.

11. The remainder of the Bill consists of technical amendments to Imperial legislation and may be mentioned very shortly :—

(*a*) Clause 2 makes Ceylon a Dominion for the purposes of the Army Act and the Air Force Act which regulate the discipline of the United Kingdom forces : *i.e.,* United Kingdom forces in Ceylon will be subject to the same rule as if they were in Canada or South Africa. The matter is dealt with differently by section 12 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, because there were special provisions of the Army Act and the Air Force Act applying to India. The jurisdiction and authority of the United Kingdom Government over United Kingdom forces is, however, retained by that section.

(*b*) Clause 3 deals with the divorce of persons having United Kingdom domicile and reproduces section 17 (1) to (3) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.

(*c*) Clause 4 authorises consequential amendments in the laws of the United Kingdom either by express enactments in the Second Schedule or by Order in Council. In India and Pakistan similar amendments may be made by Order in Council under section 18 (2) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.

(*d*) The specific enactments in the Second Schedule deal with the following matters :—

(i) Ceylon can naturalize British subjects on the same terms as the other Dominions ; there is nothing about Ceylonese nationality because that is a matter for the Ceylon Parliament.

(ii) Ceylon may be given the same Imperial preference in the United Kingdom as the other Dominions; there is nothing about Imperial preference in Ceylon because that is a matter for the Ceylon Parliament.

(iii) Ceylon's High Commissioner in London will be given the same tax exemptions as the High Commissioners of other Dominions.

(iv) Ceylon loans in London may, at the request of Ceylon, become trustee securities on the same terms as other Dominion loans.

(v) Ceylon armed forces in the United Kingdom will be treated in the same way as the armed forces of the other Dominions when in the United Kingdom.

(vi) Ships and air craft registered in Ceylon will be treated in United Kingdom law as Dominion ships and aircraft.

(vii) Matrimonial decrees by the Ceylon Courts will be treated in the same way as similar decrees in other Dominion Courts.

(viii) Ceylon will be treated with the other Dominions for the purpose of copyright law.

12. It will be seen that Ceylon has been given exactly the same status in the British Commonwealth as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, New Zealand, the Dominion of India and Pakistan. All the relevant provisions of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, and the Indian Independence Act, 1947, have been applied.

The Constitutional Amendments

13. The provisions of the new Order in Council are summarized very shortly in paragraph 4 of the White Paper (Document 2). Its essential purpose will be to remove from the present Constitution all provisions which are inconsistent with independence within the Commonwealth. Under the present Constitution, His Excellency the Governor represents the Government of the United Kingdom as well as His Majesty the King. His office must be replaced by that of a Governor-General who represents His Majesty alone. Clause 3 of the External Affairs Agreement (Appendix II of Document 2) provides for the Governments of the United Kingdom and of Ceylon to be represented by High Commissioners who will form the channel of communication between the Governments when direct communication between Prime Minister and Prime Minister or between the

Commonwealth Relations Office and the External Affairs Department is not preferred. In accordance with the constitutional convention recorded by the Imperial Conference of 1930, which is applied by Clause 1 of the External Affairs Agreement (Appendix II of Document 2), the Governor-General will be appointed by His Majesty on the advice of the Ceylon Government.

14. The Governor-General being the representative of His Majesty must be in the position of a constitutional monarch. He must therefore be deprived of all the functions vested in the Governor as representative of the Colonial Secretary and of all discretionary powers which are not in accordance with the constitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of similar powers and functions in the United Kingdom by His Majesty. The words " generally speaking " are correctly used in the White Paper because it is not proposed to apply in Ceylon all the conventions relating to the appointment, transfer and disciplinary control of public and judicial officers. The functions of the Public Service Commission and the Judicial Service Commission are being retained.

15. Among the powers of the Governor which will disappear is that of reserving Bills of special classes for His Majesty's assent. A general power of reservation is contained in the Constitutions of the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, and New Zealand, though in accordance with a resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1930, His Majesty acts on the advice of Dominion Ministers. In Ceylon it has been decided completely to abolish the power.

16. The Order in Council will also abolish completely the power of the King in Council to legislate for Ceylon in respect of defence, external relations and constitutional amendments. Section 1 of the Ceylon Independence Act, applying section 4 of the Statute of Westminster, will also prevent the enactment of Imperial legislation for Ceylon unless Ceylon has requested and consented to the enactment thereof. Consequently the Island will have complete control of its own legislation, including its Constitution.

The External Affairs Agreement

17. The purpose of this agreement is to give the Island the full international status of a Dominion. It will be able to apply to the United Nations Organization for membership and its application will have the support of the United Kingdom. It will be able to appoint its own diplomatic representatives or to use those of the United Kingdom if it prefers to do so. It will be able to make its own treaties and agreements subject to the rules relating consultation and

co-operation laid down by the Imperial Conferences, and these rules apply equally to the United Kingdom. What they mean in practice is that the United Kingdom will keep Ceylon fully informed about its actions through the Commonwealth Relations Office and that Ceylon may make any representations it thinks fit either directly or through the High Commissioners. Similarly, Ceylon will keep the United Kingdom fully informed and will, if necessary, receive representations through the same channels. Clause 6 is the usual formula when a new international entity is set up.

The Defence Agreement

18. Ceylon may as a Dominion establish such defence forces as it pleases and under Clause 3 will obtain such assistance as it may require from the United Kingdom. In so far as it cannot provide for its own defence, it may rely on the forces of the United Kingdom, which for this purpose will be provided with such bases and facilities as may be agreed upon. Clause 1 binds Ceylon to render assistance only to the extent that it is in its interest to do so. The forces to be stationed will be agreed by the Ceylon Government and the bases provided will remain under its control, as has been the practice in the other Dominions. The provision of bases is a well recognized international practice where both parties gain from the arrangement : *e.g.* the United States have bases on British territory.

The Public Officers' Agreement

19. The Public Officers' Agreement applies to the officers specified in Clause 1, namely, officers who hold appointments subject to the approval of the Secretary of State or who entered into agreements with the Crown Agents in one of the categories specified in the clause. The three classes of officers are, except for a slight change of date, already covered by section 63 (1) of the present Constitution. Clause 2 protects the officers' present conditions of service but does not prevent a general revision of salaries. Clause 3 gives the same right of retirement as section 63 of the present Constitution, except that it confers no compensating provision for loss of career where the officer is transferred to a post in the Colonial Service. Clause 4 reproduces the substance of section 64 of the present Constitution. Clause 5 is considered necessary because the officers will no longer be under the control of the Secretary of State.

D. S. SENANAYAKE,
Prime Minister.

Office of the Prime Minister,
Colombo, November 14, 1947.

A BILL

To make provision for, and in connection with, the attainment by Ceylon of fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations.

A. D. 1947.

BE it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :—

Provision for the fully responsible status of Ceylon

1.—(1) No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on or after the appointed day shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to Ceylon as part of the law of Ceylon, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that Ceylon has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof.

(2) As from the appointed day His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall have no responsibility for the government of Ceylon.

(3) As from the appointed day the provisions of the First Schedule to this Act shall have effect with respect to the legislative powers of Ceylon.

Amendment of Army and Air Force Acts.

2. As from the appointed day Ceylon shall be included in the definition of "Dominion" in paragraph (23) of section one hundred and ninety of the Army Act and of the Air Force Act (which section, in each Act, relates generally to the interpretation of the Act), and accordingly in the said paragraph (23), in each Act, for the words "and Newfoundland" there shall be substituted the words "Newfoundland and Ceylon".

Divorce jurisdiction.

3.—(1) No court in Ceylon shall, by virtue of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts, 1926 and 1940, have jurisdiction in or in relation to any proceedings for a decree for the dissolution of a marriage, unless those proceedings were instituted before the appointed day, but, save as aforesaid and subject to any provision to the contrary which may hereafter be made by any Act of the Parliament of

the United Kingdom or of Ceylon, all courts in Ceylon shall have the same jurisdiction under the said Acts as they would have had if this Act had not been passed.

16 and 17 Geo. 5, c. 40.

(2) Any rules made on or after the appointed day under subsection (4) of section one of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, for a court in Ceylon shall, instead of being made by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, be made by such authority as may be determined by the law of Ceylon, and so much of the said subsection and of any rules in force thereunder immediately before the appointed day as requires the approval of the Lord Chancellor to the nomination for any purpose of any judges of any such court shall cease to have effect.

(3) The references in subsection (1) of this section to proceedings for a decree for the dissolution of a marriage include references to proceedings for such a decree of presumption of death and dissolution of a marriage as is authorised by section eight of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937.

17 Edw. 8 an 1 Geo. 6, c. 57

Consequential amendments not affecting the law of Ceylon.

4.—(1) As from the appointed day, the Acts and Regulations referred to in the Second Schedule to this Act shall have effect subject to the amendments made by that Schedule, and His Majesty may by Order in Council make such further adaptations in any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of an earlier session than this or in any instrument having effect under any such Act, as appear to him necessary in consequence of section one of this Act:

Provided that this subsection shall not extend to Ceylon as part of the law thereof.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Interpretation Act, 1889, the expression "colony" shall not include Ceylon in any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on or after the appointed day or in any such Act of this session passed before that day to provide for the independence of Burma as a country not within His Majesty's dominions.

(3) Any Order in Council made under this section may be varied or revoked by a subsequent Order in Council and, though made after the appointed day, may be made so as to have effect from that day.

(4) Every Order in Council made under this section shall be laid before Parliament forthwith after it is made, and if either House of Parliament within the period of forty days beginning with the day on which any such Order is laid before it resolves that an Address be presented to His Majesty praying that the Order be annulled, no further proceedings shall be taken thereunder and His Majesty in Council may revoke the Order, so, however, that any such resolution or revocation shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the Order or to the making of a new Order.

In reckoning any such period of forty days as aforesaid, no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.

26 and 57 Vict. c. 66.

(5) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (4) of section one of the Rules Publication Act, 1893, an Order in Council made under this section shall not be deemed to be or to contain a statutory rule to which that section applies.

Short title and commencement

5.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947.

(2) In this Act the expression "the appointed day" means such day as His Majesty may by Order in Council appoint.

FIRST SCHEDULE

Legislative Powers of Ceylon

and 29 Vict. c. 63.

1.—(1) The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, shall not apply to any law made after the appointed day by the Parliament of Ceylon.

(2) No law and no provision of any law made after the appointed day by the Parliament of Ceylon shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Parliament of Ceylon shall include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of Ceylon.

2. The Parliament of Ceylon shall have full power to make laws having extra-territorial operation.

57 and 58 Vict. c. 60.

3. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions of this Schedule, sections seven hundred and thirty-five and seven hundred and thirty-six of the Merchant Shipping Act. 1894, shall be construed as though reference therein to the legislature of a British possession did not include reference to the Parliament of Ceylon.

A. D. 1947.

1st Sch. —*contd.*

53 and 54 Vict. s. 27.

4. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions of this Schedule, section four of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 (which requires certain laws to be reserved for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure or to contain a suspending clause), and so much of section seven of that Act as requires the approval of His Majesty in Council to any rules of Court for regulating the practice and procedure of a Colonial Court of Admiralty, shall cease to have effect in Ceylon.

SECOND SCHEDULE

Amendments not Affecting Law of Ceylon

British nationality

1. The following enactments (which provide for certificates of naturalisation granted and other things done under the law of one part of His Majesty's dominions to be recognised elsewhere), namely—

s. 17.

(*a*) section eight of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914; and

6 and 7 Geo. 6 s. 14.

(*b*) paragraph (*c*) of section eight of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1943;

shall apply in relation to Ceylon as they apply in relation to the Dominions specified in the First Schedule to the said Act of 1914.

2. As respects goods imported after such date as His Majesty may by Order in Council appoint section four of the Import Duties Act, 1932, and section two of the Isle of Man (Customs) Act, 1932 (which relate to Imperial preference other than Colonial preference), shall apply to Ceylon.

22 and 23 Geo5i s. 8.
22 and 23 Geo. 5 s. 17.

3. In section nineteen of the Finance Act, 1923 (which, as extended by section twenty-six of the Finance Act, 1925, provides for exemption from income tax and land tax of the High Commissioner and other officials of self-governing dominions), the expression "self-governing dominion" shall include Ceylon.

13 and 14 Geo. 5 s. 14.

15 and 16 Geo. 5 s. 36.

4. In the Colonial Stock Act, 1934 (which extends the stocks which may be treated as trustee securities), the expression "Dominion" shall include Ceylon.

24 and 2E Geo. 5 s. 47.

Visiting forces

A. D. 1947

5. The following provisions of the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933, namely—

2nd Sch. —s nip.

(*a*) section four (which deals with attachment and mutual powers of command);

23 and 24 Geo. 5 s. 6.

(*c*) the definition of "visiting force" for the purposes of that Act generally which is contained in section eight thereof;

shall apply in relation to forces raised in Ceylon as they apply in relation to forces raised in the Dominions within the meaning of the Statute of Westminster, 1931.

22 and 23 Geo 5 s. 4.

Ships and aircraft

6.—(1) In the definitions of "Dominion ship or aircraft" contained in subsection (2) of section three of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, and in that contained in Regulation one hundred of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, the expression "a Dominion" shall include Ceylon.

2 and 3 Geo. 6 s. 62.

(2) Paragraph (2) of Regulation 54 of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 (which confers power by notice to requisition from certain British subjects and companies or accommodation in ships and aircraft) shall not authorise service on a British subject resident in Ceylon or a corporation incorporated under the law of Ceylon.

7. The Ships and Aircraft (Transfer Restriction) Act, 1939, shall not apply to any ship by reason only of its being registered in, or licensed under the law of, Ceylon; and the penal provisions of that Act shall not apply to persons in Ceylon (but without prejudice

2 and 3 Geo. 6 s. 70.

7—A 15785 (7/75)

to the operation with respect to any ship to which that Act does apply of the provisions thereof relating to the forfeiture of ships).

25 and 26 Geo. 5 s. 70.

8. In the Whaling Industry (Regulations) Act, 1934, the expression "British ship" to which this Act applies shall not include a British ship registered in Ceylon.

Matrimonial causes

7 and 8 Geo. 6 s. 43.

9. Section four of the Matrimonial Causes (War Marriages) Act, 1944 (which provides for the general recognition in British courts of decrees and orders made by virtue of that Act or of any law passed in a part of His Majesty's dominions outside the United Kingdom and declared by an Order in Council to correspond to that Act) shall, in relation to the making of any further Order in Council as respects a law of Ceylon, apply subject to the same provision for securing reciprocity as is made by proviso (ii) to subsection (1) thereof in the case of Dominions within the meaning of the Statute of Westminster, 1931.

A. D. 1947.

2ND SCH. —s nip.

Copyright

1 and 2 Geo. 5 s. 46.

10. If the Parliament of Ceylon repeals or amends the Copyright Act, 1911, as it forms part of the law of Ceylon, then—

(*a*) Except by virtue of sub-paragraph (*b*) of this paragraph, that Act shall no longer apply in relation to Ceylon as a part of His Majesty's dominions to which the Act extends so, however, that this provision shall not prejudicially affect any legal rights existing at the time of the repeal or amendment;

(*b*) Ceylon shall be included in the expression "self-governing dominion" for the purposes of subsection (2) of section twenty-five and subsection (3) of section twenty-six of that Act (which relate to reciprocity with self-governing Dominions having their own copyright law) and the said subsection (2) shall have effect in relation to Ceylon as if that Act, so far as it remains part of the law of Ceylon, had been passed by the Parliament thereof.

IN a statement in Parliament on June 18th, 1947, it was indicated that when Agreements on a number of subjects had been concluded on terms satisfactory to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Ceylon Government, steps would be taken to amend the Constitution so as to confer upon Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations.

2. Agreements (of which texts appear in Appendices I, II and III of this Paper) have now been concluded on the following matters of mutual concern :—

(*a*) Defence ;
(*b*) External Affairs ;
(*c*) Certain matters affecting public officers.

3. The steps necessary to confer upon Ceylon the new status mentioned above are :—

(*a*) The enactment of an Act of Parliament on the lines of the Bill of which the text has now been published ; and
(*b*) the amendment of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, so as to bring it into a form suitable for a fully self-governing member of the British Commonwealth.

4. The principal alteration proposed in the Order in Council are as follows :—

(*a*) In place of Governor there will be a Governor-General who in the exercise of his powers and functions will generally speaking act in accordance with constitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of similar powers and functions in the United Kingdom by His Majesty.
(*b*) The powers reserved to His Majesty to make laws for Ceylon in matters relating to Defence and External Affairs and to amend and revoke the Order in Council will be abolished.
(*c*) The provisions for reservations of Bills for His Majesty's pleasure will be revoked.

APPENDIX 2

DEFENCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CEYLON

UNITED KINGDOM—CEYLON

Defence Agreement

WHEREAS Ceylon has reached the stage in Constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in no way subordinate in any aspect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegiance to the Crown.

And whereas it is in the mutual interest of Ceylon and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the necessary measures should be taken for the effectual protection and defence of the territories of both and that the necessary facilities should be afforded for this purpose ;

Therefore the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows :—

(1) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon will give to each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communication as it may be in their mutual interest to provide. The Government of the United Kingdom may base such naval and air forces and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as may be required for these purposes, and as may be mutually agreed.

(2) The Government of Ceylon will grant to the Government of the United Kingdom all the necessary facilities for the objects mentioned in Article I as may be mutually agreed. These facilities will include the use of naval and air bases and ports and military establishments and the use of telecommunications facilities, and the right of service courts and authorities to exercise such control and jurisdiction over members of the said Forces as they exercise at present.

(3) The Government of the United Kingdom will furnish the Government of Ceylon with such military assistance as may from time to time be required towards the training and development of Ceylonese armed force.

(4) The two Governments will establish such administrative machinery as they may agree to be desirable for the purpose of co-operation in regard to defence matters, and to co-ordinate and determine the defence requirements of both Governments.

(5) This Agreement will take effect on the day when the constitutional measures necessary for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations shall come into force.

DONE in duplicate, at Colombo, this 11th day of November, 1947.

Signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland :

Sgd : Henry Moore

Signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon :

Sgd : D. S. Senanayake.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CEYLON

Whereas Ceylon has reached the stage in constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in no way subordinate in any aspect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegiance to the Crown ;

And whereas the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ceylon are desirous of entering into an agreement to provide for certain matters relating to external affairs ;

Therefore the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows :—

(1) The Government of Ceylon declares the readiness of Ceylon to adopt and follow the resolutions of past Imperial Conferences.

(2) In regard to external affairs generally, and in particular to the communication of information and consultation, the Government of the United Kingdom will, in relation to Ceylon observe the principles and practice now observed by the Members of the Commonwealth, and the Ceylon Government will for its part observe these same principles and practice.

(3) The Ceylon Government will be represented in London by a High Commissioner for Ceylon, and the Government of the United Kingdom will be represented in Colombo by a High Commissioner for the United Kingdom.

(4) If the Government of Ceylon so requests, the Government of the United Kingdom will communicate to the Governments of the foreign countries with which Ceylon wishes to exchange diplomatic representatives proposals for such exchange. In any foreign country where Ceylon has no diplomatic representative the Government of the United Kingdom will, if so requested by the Government of Ceylon, arrange for its representatives to act on behalf of Ceylon.

(5) The Government of the United Kingdom will lend its full support to any application by Ceylon for membership of the United Nations, or of any specialised international agency as described in Article 57 of the United Nations Charter.

(6) All obligations and responsibilities heretofore devolving on the Government of the United Kingdom which arises from any valid international instrument shall henceforth in so far as such instrument

may be held to have application to Ceylon devolve upon the Government of Ceylon. The reciprocal rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of the application of any such international instrument to Ceylon shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of Ceylon.

(7) This Agreement will take effect on the day when the constitutional measures necessary for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations shall come into force.

DONE in duplicate, at Colombo, this 11th day of November, 1947.

Signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Henry Moore

Signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon:
D. S. Senanayake.

APPENDIX 3

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF CEYLON AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING UNITED KINGDOM SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS IN CEYLON

From: His Excellency Sir Cecil Syers, High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Ceylon

To: The Honourable S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon.

Office of the
United Kingdom High Commissioner,
Colombo, Ceylon.
7th June, 1957.

My dear Prime Minister,

I write this letter to place on record the main points which the Ceylon and United Kingdom Delegations have agreed on behalf of their two Governments in the talks which began in Colombo on 29th March regarding United Kingdom Service Establishments in Ceylon. These are as follows:—

(1) In accordance with the declared policy of the Ceylon Government that United Kingdom bases in the Island (hereafter referred to as "the Bases") should be closed down, the naval base at Trincomalee and the Royal Air Force station at Katunayake will be formally transferred to the Ceylon Government on 15th October, 1957, and 1st November, 1957, respectively.

(2) Subject to sub-paragraphs 3 and 4 below the United Kingdom Government will continue to use certain facilities for a limited time hereafter referred to as " the rundown ". Such use of some of the facilities will cease within two to three years and of all will cease by 1st March, 1962, provided that, if the process of rundown is interrupted by causes outside the control of the United Kingdom Government, the period of rundown may be increased as may be mutually agreed.

(3) During the rundown the use of these facilities will be subject to the general control of the Ceylon Government and the Ceylon Government reserves to itself the right to deny such use to the United Kingdom Government if any situation arises where, in pursuance of its general international policy, the Ceylon Government finds it necessary to do so. Subject to this condition the Ceylon Government will grant the United Kingdom Government the free and uninterrupted use and operation of these facilities and the right to administer their establishments as at present. The United Kingdom Government for its part will not, in the use of the facilities, interfere with such plans of development as the Ceylon Government might undertake in the areas concerned. If any difficulties should arise in this connection the two Governments will consult together in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution.

(4) Detailed arrangements regarding the facilities which it is intended the United Kingdom may continue to use, and arrangements which it is intended to put into operation to implement sub-paragraphs 1 to 3 above in other respects, will be made.

(5) In addition to the grant of facilities under sub-paragraph 3 above, the Ceylon Government will give to the United Kingdom Forces all necessary facilities and assistance in connection with (i) the withdrawal of the Forces (ii) the removal or disposal by the Forces of all their stores, equipment and other movable property.

(6) The Government of Ceylon shall pay to the United Kingdom Government the sum of Rs. 22 million in five equal instalments of Rs. 4,400,000 in each of the Ceylon Government financial years 1957-58 to 1961-62 inclusive. This payment will be made in respect of the installations to be transferred to the Ceylon Government and the cancellation of certain claims between the two Governments arising out of the occupation or disposal of the bases by United Kingdom Forces. Details provisions regarding financial matters

are contained in the Annex to this letter, which Annex shall be regarded as an integral part hereof. In each year payment will be made in Rupees within the total of United Kingdom estimated governmental expenditure in Ceylon, any balance being paid in sterling at the rate of Rs. 13.3102 to £ 1.

(7) Installations to be transferred to the Ceylon Government in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the said Annex shall be handed over as and when vacated by the United Kingdom Forces.

(8) The United Kingdom Forces and the members thereof will continue to enjoy during the period of rundown all the immunities and privileges hitherto enjoyed by them.

(9) During the period of rundown and after its completion the Ceylon Government, in accordance with normal Commonwealth practice but subject to the requirements of the general policy of the Ceylon Government, will continue to allow (*a*) United Kingdom naval vessels to refuel at Colombo ; and (*b*) aircraft of the United Kingdom Forces, and on charter to those Forces, to overfly and stage through Ceylon.

(10) The United Kingdom Delegation supplied to the Ceylon Delegation a programme of the numbers of locally recruited employees of the United Kingdom Forces who it was intended would, as a consequence of the rundown, cease to be employed by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom authorities will furnish at regular intervals both forecasts of future redundancies and particulars of impending discharges.

I should be grateful to have your confirmation that the foregoing is acceptable to the Ceylon Government as a summary of the results of our discussions and that this letter and your reply shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments.

Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) C. G. L. Syers,
High Commissioner.

The Hon. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Ceylon,
Colombo.

ANNEX ON FINANCIAL MATTERS

The detailed provisions regarding financial matters (referred to in sub-paragraph (6) of the letter to which this forms the annex) are as follows—

1. The claims of each Government arising out of the occupation or disposal of the Bases were made known to the other Government and were discussed at the talks mentioned in the said letter. These claims are cancelled and the Ceylon Government undertakes the settlement of outstanding balances on existing claims and of any future claims by third parties in respect of damages compensation relating to requisitioned property occupied by the United Kingdom Forces.

2. Ceylon will take over all the United Kingdom Forces installations (including any United Kingdom interest in the land) as vacated, except—

(*a*) The Fuel tanks at Colombo and Trincomalee.

(*b*) The present Royal Air Force site at Colpetty including Steuart Lodge and Coolgardie.

(*c*) Trenchard House.

(*d*) Two Naval Residences in Gregory's Road, Colombo.

(*e*) Thirty prefabricated houses at Tricomalee.

The installations taken over will include fixed fans, all water plant, the generators and electrical systems at Royal Naval Yard, Trincomalee. Diyatalawa, and Royal Air Force Station, Katunayake, and refrigerating equipment at Lotus Road Cold Stores but not movable refrigerating units at Mud Cove, Trincomalee. All other fixtures, fittings, equipment, machinery, cranes, hoists, plant and stores other than normal landlords' fixtures will be excluded.

3. During the period of the rundown the following arrangements shall apply: —

(*a*) The United Kingdom Forces will make no payment in respect of rates payable to local authorities and maintenance of public roads.

(*b*) The United Kingdom Forces, who will be paying the operating costs of the water and electrical systems at the Bases, will charge for all supplies made either to the Ceylon Forces or to non-service users, and will not make any payment to the Ceylon authorities for the supplies used by themselves or in respect of the use of any facilities still operated by them.

(c) If the United Kingdom authorities should wish to dispose of installations, other than those to be transferred to the Ceylon Government under this agreement, the Ceylon Government will be consulted and will give sympathetic consideration to the grant of such facilities as may be necessary to enable the United Kingdom authorities to obtain a fair price for the installations concerned. If the United Kingdom authorities wish to dispose of freehold properties other than those to be transferred to the Ceylon Government under this agreement the Ceylon Government will be consulted.

(*d*) At the Royal Ceylon Air Force stations no charges against the Royal Air Force will be made for the use enjoyed by Royal Air Force of common user facilities operated at no appreciable extra cost by the Royal Ceylon Air Force, e.g. air traffic control, fire and crash services, navigation aids. Similarly in the case of common user facilities operated by the Royal Air Force no charges against the Royal Ceylon Air Force will be made provided no appreciable extra cost is involved. So long as any common user facilities at Katunayake are operated by the Royal Air Force or the Royal Ceylon Air Force, the cost of maintenance, to standards which will be mutually agreed, of runways, aprons, taxi track, and roads will be shared equally between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Ceylon Air Force. Until this maintenance work can be performed by the Royal Ceylon Air Force it will be undertaken as an agency service by the Air Ministry Directorate General of Works. In the event of the airfield at Katunayake being used by international civil air traffic the agreement of the Royal Air Force to accept a liability for paying half the cost of airfield &c. maintenance would require revision.

(*e*) After 1st November, 1957, the Royal Ceylon Air Force will assume responsibility for any rent payable to private land owners in respect of land occupied by the Royal Air Force. The Royal Air Force will reimburse the Royal Ceylon Air Force the same proportion of the total net rent paid by the Royal Ceylon Air Force in respect of the said land as the area of land occupied by the Royal Air Force bears to the total of the area of the said land. The proportion of rent to be reimbursed will be adjusted at intervals as and when the Royal Ceylon Air Force progressively takes over land and buildings at present occupied by the Royal Air Force.

(*f*) The Royal Ceylon Air Force will assume complete responsibility for the cost of operation and maintenance of facilities transferred to them.

(*g*) Each Air Force will be responsible for the cost of maintaining buildings occupied by it.

4. The procedure for the disposal or surplus equipment and stores will be as follows :—

(*a*) The Ceylon Government will be given the first option to purchase equipment and stores of which the United Kingdom authorities may wish to dispose during the rundown period.

(*b*) The United Kingdom authorities will notify the Ceylon Government of equipment and stores available for purchase, together with the prices proposed, and the Ceylon Government will within 21 days of such notification state whether they desire to purchase the equipment or stores and if so the price they are prepared to pay.

(*c*) If the Ceylon Government's offer is acceptable as regards price and other terms to the United Kingdom authorities the equipment or stores will be handed over on payment.

(*d*) If the Ceylon Government does not make any offer in accordance with paragraph (*b*) above, or if their offer is not acceptable to the United Kingdom authorities, the equipment or the stores concerned will be removed by the United Kingdom authorities or offered for sale by auction or otherwise without further reference to the Ceylon Government provided that in exceptional cases by mutual agreement the equipment or stores shall not be offered for sale.

(*e*) The Ceylon Government will subject to its normal regulations and practices regarding visas issue any necessary visas and permits to residents of other countries who apply to visit Ceylon for the purpose of purchasing equipment or stores of which the United Kingdom authorities may wish to dispose. In the case of purchases of equipment or stores by such residents of other countries, the Ceylon Government will so far as possible grant any export licences which may be necessary for the removal of the equipment or stores from Ceylon.

(*f*) Customs duty on equipment and stores sold will be payable by the United Kingdom authorities at the rate of 20 per cent. of the sale price for all items other than cars and imported furniture, to which the normal rates will apply except that no duties will be payable in respect of equipment and stores which are sold to the Ceylon Government or which were purchased locally by the United Kingdom authorities. In the case of equipment or stores purchased by residents of countries other than Ceylon, the Ceylon Government will grant to the exported drawback of duty at the time of export on production of evidence that the articles exported were disposed of by the United Kingdom authorities.

(*g*) The above procedure shall not apply in the case of equipment and stores transferred to the Ceylon Government as part of facilities transferred for operation by them, payment for which shall be on the basis of United Kingdom Services vocabulary rates plus departmental expenses less depreciation.

No. 2

From : The Honourable S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon.

To : His Excellency Sir Cecil Syers, High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Ceylon.

My Dear High Commissioner,

I refer to your letter of 7th June, 1957, setting out the results of discussions which began in Colombo on 29th March, 1957 regarding the United Kingdom Service Establishments in Ceylon, which reads as follows —

"I write this letter to place on record the main points which the Ceylon and United Kingdom Delegations have agreed on behalf of their two Governments in the talks which began in Colombo on 29th March regarding United Kingdom Service Establishments in Ceylon.

(All the clauses of the above document are repeated in the rest of this document).

APPENDIX 4

Text of the Final Communique issued at the conclusion of the Bandung Conference

THE Asian African Conference convened upon the invitation of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan met in Bandung from the 18th to the 24th April, 1955. In addition to the five sponsoring countries the following 24 countries participated in the Conference :

1. Afganistan
2. Cambodia
3. Peoples' Republic of China
4. Egypt
5. Ethiopia
6. Gold Coast
7. Iran
8. Iraq
9. Japan
10. Jordan
11. Laos
12. Lebanon
13. Liberia
14. Libya
15. Nepal
16. Philippines
17. Saudi Arabia
18. Sudan
19. Syria
20. Thailand
21. Turkey
22. Democratic Republic of Vietnam
23. State of Vietnam
24. Yemen

The Asian-African Conference considered problems of common interest and concern to the countries of Asia and Africa and discussed ways and means by which their peoples could achieve fuller economic, cultural and political co-operation.

A. Economic Co-operation

1. The Asian-African Conference recognised the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region. There was general desire for economic co-operation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty. The proposals with regard to economic co-operation within the participating countries do not preclude either the desirability or the need for co-operation with countries outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital. It was further recognised that the assistance being received by certain participating countries from outside the region, through international or under bilateral arrangements, had made a valuable contribution to the implementation of their development programmes.

2. The participating countries agreed to provide technical assistance to one another, to the maximum extent practicable, in the form of : experts ; pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes ; exchange of know-how and establishment of national and where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in co-operation with the existing international agencies.

3. The Asian-African Conference recommended : the early establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development ; the allocation by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a greater part of its resources to Asian-African countries ; the early establishment of the International Finance Co-operation which should include in its activities the undertaking of equity investment ; and encouragement to the promotion of joint ventures among Asian-African countries in so far as this will promote their common interest.

4. The Asian-African Conference recognised the vital need of stabilizing commodity trade in the region. The principle of enlarging the scope of multilateral trade and payments was accepted. However, it was recognised that some countries would have to take recourse to bilateral trade arrangements in view of their prevailing economic conditions.

5. The Asian-African Conference recommended that collective action be taken on by participating countries for stabilising the international prices of and demand for primary commodities through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and that as far as practicable and desirable, they should adopt a unified approach on the subjects in the United Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on International Commodity Trade and other International forums.

6. The Asian-African Conference further recommended that : Asian-African countries should diversify their export trade by processing their raw material, wherever economically feasible, before export ; intra-regional trade fairs should be promoted and encouragement given to the exchange of trade delegations and groups of businessmen—exchange of information and of samples should be encouraged with a view to promoting intra-regional trade ; and normal facilities should be provided for transit trade of landlocked countries.

7. The Asian-African Conference attached considerable importance to shipping and expressed concern that shipping lines reviewed from time to time their freight rates, often to the detriment of participating countries. It recommended a study of this problem, and collective action thereafter, to induce the shipping lines to adopt a more reasonable attitude. It was suggested that a study of railway freight of transit trade may be made.

8. The Asian-African Conference agreed that encouragement should be given to the establishment of national and regional banks and insurance companies.

9. The Asian-African Conference felt that exchange of information on matters relating to oil, such as remittance of profits and taxation might eventually lead to the formulation of common policies.

10. The Asian-African Conference emphasized the particular significance of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, for the Asian-African countries. The Conference : welcomed the initiative of the Powers principally concerned in offering to make available information regarding the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes ; urged the speedy establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency which should provide for adequate representation of the Asian-African countries on the executive authority of the Agency ; and recommended to the Asian and African Governments to take full advantage of the training and other facilities in the peaceful uses of atomic energy offered by the countries sponsoring such programmes.

11. The Asian-African Conference agreed to the appointment of Liaison Officers in participating countries, to be nominated by their respective national Governments, for the exchange of information and ideas on matters of mutual interest. It recommended that fuller use should be made of the existing international organisations, and participating countries who were not members of such international organisations, but were eligible, should secure membership.

12. The Asian-African Conference recommended that there should be prior consultation of participating countries in international forums with a view, as far as possible, to furthering their mutual economic interest. It is, however, not intended to form a regional bloc.

B. Cultural Co-operation

1. The Asian-African Conference was convinced that among the most powerful means of promoting understanding among nations is the development of cultural co-operation. Asia and Africa have been the cradle of great religions and civilisations which have enriched other cultures and civilisations while themselves being enriched in the process. Thus, the cultures of Asia and Africa as based on spiritual and universal foundations. Unfortunately, cultural contacts among Asian and African countries were interrupted during the past centuries. The peoples of Asia and Africa are now animated by a keen and sincere desire to renew their old cultural contacts and develop new ones in the context of the modern world determination to work for closer cultural co-operation.

2. The Asian-African Conference took note of the fact that the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa, in whatever form it may be, not only prevents cultural co-operation but also suppresses the national cultures of the people. Some colonial powers have denied to their dependent peoples basic rights in the sphere of education and culture which hampers the development of their personality, and also prevents cultural intercourse with other Asian and African peoples. This is particularly true in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, where the basic right of the people to study their own language and culture has been suppressed. Similar discrimination has been practised against African and coloured people in some parts of the Continent of Africa. The Conference felt that these policies amount to denial of the fundamental rights of man, impede cultural advancement in this region and also hamper cultural co-operation on the wider international plane. The Conference condemned such a denial of fundamental rights in the sphere of education and culture in some parts of Asia and Africa by this and other forms of cultural suppression. In particular, the Conference condemned racialism as a means of cultural suppression.

3. It was not from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilisations and cultures that the Conference viewed the development of cultural co-operation among Asian and African countries. True to the age-old tradition of tolerance and universality, the Conference believed that Asian and African cultural co-operation should be developed in the larger context of world co-operation. Side by side with the development of Asian-African cultural co-operation with the countries of Asia and Africa desire to develop cultural contacts with others. This would enrich their own culture and would also help in the promotion of world peace and understanding.

4. There are many countries in Asia and Africa which have not yet been able to develop their educational, scientific and technical institutions. The Conference recommended that countries in Asia and Africa which are more fortunately placed in this respect could give facilities for the admission of students and trainees from such countries to their instituions. Such facilities should also be made available to the Asian and African people to whom opportunities for acquiring higher education are at present denied.

5. The Asian-African Conference felt that the promotion of cultural co-operation among countries of Asia and Africa should be directed towards:

(i) the acquisition of knowledge of each others country;
(ii) mutual cultural exchange; and
(iii) exchange of information.

6. The Asian-African Conference was of the opinion that at this stage the best results in cultural co-operation would be achieved by pursuing bilateral arrangements to implement its recommendations and by each country taking action on its own, whenever possible and feasible.

C. Human Rights and Self Determination

1. The Asian-African Conference declared its full support of the fundamental principles of Human Rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.

The Conference declared its full support of the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the United Nations resolutions on the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a pre-requisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights.

2. The Asian-African Conference deplored the policies and practices a racial segregation and discrimination which form the basis of government and human relations in large regions of Africa and in other parts of the world. Such conduct is not only a gross violation of human rights, but also a denial of the fundamental values of civilisation and the dignity of man.

The Conference extended its warm sympathy and support for the courageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination, especially by the peoples of African and Indian and Pakistan origin in South Africa; applauded all those who sustain their cause; re-affirmed the determination of Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their own countries; and pledged to use its full moral influence to guard against the danger of falling victims to the same evil in their struggle to eradicate it.

D. Problems of Dependent Peoples

1. The Asian-African Conference discussed the problems of dependent peoples and colonialism and the evils arising from the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.

The Conference is agreed:

(*a*) in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end;

(*b*) in affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitute a denial of fundamental human rights, in contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation ;

(*c*) in declaring its support of the cause of freedom and independence for all such peoples ; and

(*d*) in calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples.

2. In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-determination, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay.

E. Other Problems

1. In view of the existing tension in the Middle East, caused by the situation in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

2. The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

The Asian-African Conference urged the Netherlands Government to reopen negotiations, as soon as possible, to implement their obligations under the above-mentioned agreements and expressed the earnest hope that the United Nations would assist the parties concerned in finding a peaceful solution to the dispute.

3. The Asian-African Conference supported the position of Yemen. In the case of Aden and the southern parts of Yemen known as the Protectorates, they urged the parties concerned to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

F. Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation

1. The Asian-African Conference, taking note of the fact that several States have still not been admitted to the United Nations, considered that for effective co-operation for world peace, membership in the United Nations should be universal, called on the Security

Council to support the admission of all those States which are qualified for membership in terms of the Charter. In the opinion of the Asian-African Conference, the following among participating countries, which were represented in it namely : Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, a unified Vietnam, were so qualified.

The Conference considered that the representation of the countries of the Asian-African region on the Security Council, in relation to the principal of equitable geographical distribution, was inadequate. It expresses the view that as regards the distribution of the non-permanent seats, the Asian-African countries which, under the arrangement arrived at in London in 1946, are precluded from being elected should be enabled to serve on the Security Council so that they might make a more effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace, and security.

2. The Asian-African Conference having considered the dangerous situation of international tension existing and the risks confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of all nations to the terrible consequences that would follow if such a war were to break out.

The Conference considers that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilisation from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilisation to proclaim their support for disarmament and for prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition.

The Conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement such disarmament and prohibition and that speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end.

Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons.

3. The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the question of world peace and co-operation. It views with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war. The problem of peace is correlative with the problem of

international security especially through the United Nations, in bringing about the reduction of armament, and the elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control. In this way, international peace can be promoted and nuclear energy may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would help answer the needs particularly of Asia and Africa, for what they urgently require are social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

Freedom and peace are interdependent. The right of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples, and freedom and independence must be granted, with the least possible delay, to those who are still dependent peoples. Indeed, all nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Free from mistrust and fear, and with confidence and goodwill towards each other, nations should practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and develop friendly co-operation on the basis of the following principles:

(1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

(2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.

(3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small.

(4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.

(5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

(6) (*a*) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.

(*b*) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.

(7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

(8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

(9) Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation.

(10) Respect for justice and international obligations.

The Asian and African Conference declares its conviction that friendly co-operation in accordance with these priciples would effectively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, while co-operation in the economic, social and cultural fields would help bring about the common prosperity and well being of all.

The Asian-African Conference recommended that the five sponsoring countries consider the convening of the next meeting of the Conference, in consultation with the participating countries.

This Communique was unanimously adopted by the Heads of the twenty-nine States whose names appear below —

Afghanistan	...	H. R. H. Sadar Mohammed Naim
Burma	..	H.E. U. Nu
Cambodia	..	H.R.H. Norodom Sihanouk
Ceylon	..	The Right Honourable Sir John Kotelawala
China	..	H.E. Mr. Chou En Lai
Egypt	..	H.E. Lt.-Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser
Ethiopia	..	H.E. Mr. Ato Aklilou Habtewold
Gold Coast	..	H.E. Mr. Kojo Botsio
India	..	H.E. Shri Jawaharlal Nehru
Indonesia	..	H.E. Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo
Iran	..	H.E. Dr. Ali Amini
Iraq	..	H.E. Dr. Mohammed Fadhil El-Jamali
Japan	..	H.E. Mr. Tatsunosuke Takasaki
Jordan	..	H.E. Mr. Sayyed Wahid Salah
Laos	..	H.E. Mr. Katay D. Sasorith
Lebanon	..	H.E. Mr. Sami Solh
Liberia	..	H.E. Mr. Momolu Dukuly
Libya	..	H.E. Mr. Mustapha Ben Halim
Nepal	..	H.E. Major-General Sovag Jung Thapa
Pakistan	..	H.E. Mr. Mohammed Ali
Philippines	..	The Hon. Carlos P. Romulo
Saudi Arabia	..	H.R.H. Prince Faisal

Sudan	..	H.E. Mr. Sayed Ismail El Azm
Syria	..	H.E. Mr. Khaled El Azm
Thailand	..	H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh
Turkey	..	H.E. Mr. Fatin Rustu Zorlu
Viet-Nam (South)	..	H.E. Mr. Nguyen Van Thoai
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam	..	H.E. Mr. Pham van Dong
Yemen	..	H.R.H. Seiful Islam Al Hassan

APPENDIX 5

PANCHASEELA

Enunciated by Nehru and Chou-En-lai in 1954.

(1) Mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty.

(2) Mutual non-aggression.

(3) Mutual non-interference in each others' affairs.

(4) Equality and mutual benefit.

(5) Peaceful co-existence.

APPENDIX 6

[HANSARD VOL. H. R.—VOL. 8—COLS 275-278]

(*Dr. Colvin R. de Silva*—4.7.50)

. . . Let us say in so far as these two main rivals (Americans and Soviet blocs) in the world arena have concentrated on the organization of rival blocs with which they seek to draw and compel all the countries of the world, in so far as that policy is concerned, in our considered view it is no part of the task of Ceylon to enter either into that rival power bloc or to drag along at its tail.

It is not by accident that the Amendment that was tabled speak of the failure of this Government to develop an independent foreign policy. By that we are driving home the fact that as I showed earlier, we are being dragged at the tail of one power bloc, but we do not thereby mean that we call upon this country to attach itself at a tail of another power bloc even though at the centre of that power bloc is the USSR. What then if I may wind up the last portion of my speech to which I am coming.

What about the fundamentals of proper and correct foreign policy for this country ? How are we to navigate amidst these rival power blocs not falling either into Scylla or into Charybdis ? I say that certain obvious fundamentals will have to be observed if that is to be done. The first and foremost that our foreign policy should be rooted not in the interest of a thin ruling stratum but in the interests of the broad masses of the people of Ceylon. The interests of those broad masses of the people of Ceylon, I wish to stress are identical with the interests of the broad masses also of a Soviet Union, even though, I draw a distinction between them and their rulers. Therefore their interests also demand that in the face of any imperialist adventure, attack, or intervention against that country, in the interest of themselves and also of our basic interest, we will be bound to defend that country against imperialist attack. That however, also is another corollary. If we defend the conquest of the masses throughout the world even as we defend such conquest of the masses as have been made in the country, then that requires even as we would on the one hand defend the Soviet peoples against imperialist attack, the defence for instance, of the Yugoslav peoples against reactionary cominform attack. The second aspect of our foreign policy would have to be that while I have already stated, refusal to be drawn into any power bloc, refusal, therefore immediately to be harnassed to the Anglo-American war drive against the Soviet Union and, indeed, refusal—not meaning only in the negative sense of declining to go with them but aiming positively at the breaking of all those remaining links with the so

called British Commonwealth which this Government is undertaking to preserve. It is only if we have thus effectively broken away from those reactionary associations that we would be able to stand up in the world and say that we are truly independent.

I find in His Excellency's speech—this important paragraph : that our Government is developing relations with various countries. I find Burma and Pakistan mentioned, for instance. Yes, we are sending representatives to Karachi and to Rangoon. Why do we not send accredited representatives yet to Moscow, to Peking, to Prague and to Belgrade ?

The third pillar—the third of the trine pillar which will be the support of a correct foreign policy for us is a necessity that this country, which itself has yet to complete its struggle of the masses of the South East Asia in particular and the colonial countries in general to free themselves of colonial subjugation. Now it is that third pillar which brings me to the final aspect of the Government's foreign policy with which I want to conclude.

[HANSARD HR—VOL. 10—COLS. 275-277]
(Dr. Colvin R. de Silva)

In the first place in our belief any Government that is seeking really to protect and defend the independence of this country will immediately cut away from the so-called British Commonwealth of Nations. That is the only way it can truly place itself in a position to enter into free and equal negotiations with all countries that are ready to negotiate with us on the basis of respect for our national independence. So long as you are tied to the chariot of a particular country, I should say, be it any country such action becomes impossible.

Dr. Colvin R de Silva, in the course of his speech at the House, stressed on the following policy guide lines.

(1) Sri Lanka should immediately cut away from the British Commonwealth of Nations.

(2) Sri Lanka should abrogate all so-called Defence Agreements and other unequal agreements entered into by Sri Lanka.

(3) Should seek friendly relations with all states on the basis of respect for national independence.

(4) Quickly promote mutual and friendly relations with all the Asian powers.

(5) Refuse any facilities whatsoever to the imperialists in their activities of intervention taking place in Asia.

(6) Offer no aid whatsoever to, or entangle ourselves in the war plans of the Anglo-American Imperialists against the Soviet Union, China and their allies.

J. R. JAYEWARDENE

[HANSARD H.R.—21st JUNE 1955—COL. 21, COLS. 132-133]

Mr. Speaker, there are two main principles upon which our foreign policy has been based since the day we attained independence. One is the preservation of our political freedom, the other is the furtherance of our foreign trade and the development of our internal resources.

In regard to the first principle, namely, the preservation of our political independence we have decided to our own free will to be a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. We have also decided to enter into agreement with the United Kingdom for her to come to our aid when we so desire it and for our mutual benefit. We will enter with further agreements whenever they become necessary. I cannot visualize today what those would be but I refer to any agreements with any other country for the preservation of our independence.

The first principle then is that if any Government, whether it is this or any other, likes our country to be free, it must consider what foreign policy would help our country to preserve our freedom. This Government (UNP's) as I stated, has decided to be a Member of the Commonwealth of Nations, firstly, for that purpose and secondly, to enter into an agreement with the United Kingdom for the purpose of mutual defence.

For the purpose of developing our internal resources we are a member of the sterling area because 80 to 90 per cent of our foreign trade is with members of the Commonwealth. A country like ours needs to keep her sea routes free and open and no agreement, no membership of any group or bloc, would help us more than being a member of the Commonwealth of Nations.

Apart from that we have no obligations or reservations. We have entered into a trade pact with the People's Republic of China. We recognized the Chinese Republic even before other members of the Commonwealth did so—even before, I think, the United Kingdom recognized China. We decided to enter into trade agreement with China in spite of protests from some of the members of the democratic blocs of the world.

Therefore, it is quite clear that as far as our trade is concerned, we would trade with any country in the world. As the late Rt. Hon. D. S. Senanayake said, we would trade even with the devil if it suits our purpose and if it does not in any way barter away our freedom....

[HANSARD HR—VOL. 8—COLS. 500-505]
Dr. N. M. Perera—7th July 1950

With regard to foreign policy, there are one or two points that I must urge. The hon. Member for Wellawatte-Galkissa, as I have already pointed out, was not seriously maintaining the position of neutrality at all. That is indeed a point admitted by the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the hon. Minister of Defence and External Affairs. Most hon. Members of the Government will admit that the hon. Member wanted a positive policy. Elements of that positive policy the hon. Member laid bare before the House.

First of all, an active policy of support for the liberation movements in South East Asia in particular and in all Colonial countries in general. Secondly, a clear enunciation that we would not support any bloc but nevertheless also a clear enunciation that we would not support or endorse any imperialist intervention against the USSR. Thirdly it is a corollary of the enunciation of an independent foreign policy that we should immediately sever our links with the British Commonwealth and set up a republic in Ceylon having no further truck with any Commonwealth country in the sense of dictation to this country in regard to its foreign policy. Those points were clearly laid down and set out by my good Friend the hon. Member for Wellawatta-Galkissa (Dr. Colvin R. de Silva).

I want to explain one or two points because there seem to have been some misunderstanding. My good Friend the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence and External Affairs seemed to infer from those points that the hon. Member for Wellawatta-Galkissa contemplated the possibility or forget the consequence therefrom, that this policy would necessarily mean the immediate declaration of war against a large number of countries.

The hon. Parliamentary Secretary, I think, though fairly new to the saddle, knows enough to realize that it does not necessarily follow that when a country supports or opposes a particular policy that that country should go to war. The Members of the Government did not declare war on Holland when it refused to endorse the imperialist adventure of Holland in Indonesia. (Mr. Kumaraswamy: "undeclared war.")

Not even undeclared war was waged, but there was positive action by this Government by its refusing certain air facilities and harbour facilities. That did not involve the declaration of war. Similarly, a small country like ours must necessarily declare a policy and express a point of view and take a positive stand in matters connected with the liberation movements of these countries.

Now the Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister (D. S. Senanayake) was delightfully vague. He made absolutely no commitments at all. He said, "The Commonwealths' ambition is peace". Our ambition is peace. We are for peace." Of course, everybody is for peace.

The Commonwealth is for peace and therefore attacks the poor people of Malaya on the ground of peace. Does the right hon. Gentleman endorse that policy on the ground of peace. Even Hitler started war on the ground that he was for peace. (An hon. Member : What about Korea ?) Precisely that is what I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman. What is going to be his policy if the British Government decides tomorrow—it has already decided to send ships—to use Trincomalee for keeping the United States adventure in South Korea ? What will be the policy of this Government ? Will it say "no right to use Trincomalee as a Base" ?

Certainly, the Members of the Opposition today demand a positive statement as to what is the attitude of the Government in this mater. We do not want a delightfully vague statement of peace ; that we are not angry with anybody ; that we are friendly with all our neighbours. Concretely what does that mean ? If as a result of the failure of their adventure, in South Korea the United States' Government decides to wage full scale war, as was pointed out by my hon. Friend the Third Member for Colombo Central (Mr. Keuneman) including the defence of Formosa against the Chinese People, what will be the additude of this Government ? We are entitled to know that. In the name of peace the Commonwealth might launch an attack on Formosa, or maybe as the mainland, as a straight and direct attack on China. What support would that attack of the Commonwealth receive from this Government ? What will be its attitude ? Australia, New Zealand and Canada are taking positive attitudes in regard to South Korea, Formost and Malaya. We must know precisely where this Government stands. Can this Government, step by step, without consulting this House or this country, lead this peaceful country to another holocaust ? That is what is happening and I think hon. Members on this side of the House certainly would like a much clearer enunciation by the Government of its foreign policy.

Having said that I want also to make one position clear. When my good Friend the hon. Member for Wellawatta-Galkissa took up the position that we are not in favour of trailing behind either bloc, he also meant that we are opposed to my attempt by either of those blocs to impose a particular line of action on any one Government.

I am in particular referring to the attempt to drag on Yugoslavia for instance by the Soviet Government. It was admitted or interpreted by the hon. Third Member for Colombo Central that that might mean necessarily supporting the American Government, the USA ; because apparently at the present moment Yugoslavia gets a certain amount of Marshall Aid or even other aid from capitalist countries.

I see no inherent contradiction in the position that Yugoslavia should get whatever help it can just as much as we have been asking this Government to get agreements if they can with Yugoslavia with Western European countries, with Soviet Russia, and get whatever advantage we want. So also, Yugoslavia is fully entitled to get whatever help it can. That does not mean Yugoslavia is subordinate to the USA because at the recent meeting of UNO when this question of South Korea cropped up, Yugoslavia took up the positive attitude of oppositions to any action by UNO and demanded quite rightly that all parties should be asked to withdraw from Korea and allowed those Koreans to settle their own problems. They are entitled to settle their own problems.

But there was something with which I heartily disagree in what the hon. Third Member for Colombo Central said and which sounds to me very curious. The position taken up by my good Friend was that differences in ideology would not matter, differences in social systems can exist and different peoples and Governments having these various ideologies, can exist without going to war ; therefore, why should not these countries, even America, Britain and all the imperialist countries, live peacefully side by side with the other socialist countries, countries like Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland, including USSR and China in the Far East ? He said it was possible for these two entities to exist side by side. (Mr. Keuneman, the hon. Member has not understood what I said) I am sorry if it is so. So the possibility of living peacefully side by side and having good capitalists and good imperialists side by side does not exist. It is inherent in the nature of capitalism that there should be war.

(P. G. B. Keuneman)

[HANSARD H.R.—VOL. 10—COLS 209-210—27 JUNE 1951]

..... It is hypocritical for any one to say that the Government is following a policy of middle way. How can this Government say that is following a policy of middle way when in actual fact it has given bases and military facilities here in Ceylon to one camp in the world ? How can this Government claim that it is following a policy of middle way when it is carrying on trade with and extending diplomatic relations to only one camp in the world ? If that is following a middle way then it is the most extraordinary middle way that I have ever heard of in my life.

If this Government is really going to carry out a policy of middle way, if the Government really believed that we should not be involved in war whatever the right and wrongs of the disputes if this Government felt that we should not bind ourselves to this section or to that section of the dispute, then it should have carried out a different policy.

First and foremost, the Government must end the situation whereby bases and military facilities are given to one set of powers only ..... A real middle way would not mean having trade relations with Britain, America and their satellites only. It would mean developing relations with the other countries of the world in trade, in culture, and in respect of normal exchanges between nations. That would be a policy of a middle way. . . . .

If they are following a policy of a middle way ..... why not take diplomatic, constitutional steps and approach all our neighbouring countries and to five major powers the USA, USSR, Great Britain, France and China. Approach them and offer to conclude a treaty, if not a pact with them by which we guarantee not to assist any attack on them or to take part in any attack on them and ask them likewise to agree not ta take part in any attack on us..... (Hansard HR' Vol. 14—Cols. 446-454 15th July 1953—by Mr. Keuneman is a review of the foreign affairs of Sri Lanka in the light of the above guide lines.)

[HANSARD H.R.—16TH JULY 1953, VOL. 14, COLS. 511-12]

S. W. R. D. BANDARANAIKE

As far as America is concerned, I have no hatred against her. I cannot help that, as my knowledge of America is confined to the America of Washington Irving, the America of Mark Twain, the America of Jefferson and of Abraham Lincoln. However, in all their ideals is love. I am not prepared to say that with regard to the present America. Certainly, the present people as represented by Senator McCarthy's views are thoroughly un-American as I can see. He is more the enemy of America than the Soviet Union or anybody else. Nor have I hatred against Soviet Russia as such. She has also certain new lessons to teach us, particularly, the absence of this racial discrimination which exist with the democratic capitalistic people to whom this Government is so much attached. For instance their policy is better than that of the South Africans. Surely the racist policy of Dr. Malan, racially and otherwise is repugnant to them, as certain theories and

economics in Soviet Russia may be repugnant to them. Therefore for an Asian country, in my opinion, in the context of world affairs today, our position must be one of not only friendliness with all nations but a certain aloofness from any of those power blocs. In this alone lies, in my opinion, the safety and security particularly, of the people of South East Asia.

[HANSARD HR—7th May, 1954 Vol. 17, Cols. 535-536]
(S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike)

" The right hon. Gentleman (Sir John Kotelawala) soon after he became Prime Minister, made a public statement at a dinner at some United Nations Association where he expounded a certain foreign policy for this country. What did he say ? We kept strictly neutral as between the warring power blocs of the world, and he combined that statement with such a warm eulogy on Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as though it obviously meant that he approved of that type of policy that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru follows. Very well. Now yesterday, in his explanation he says that he will join the devil himself in order to oppose communism. The main reason for that is presumably he felt that the passage of these troops through Ceylon in some way helped, as he considered, to fight against communism in Indo-China. He gave that explanation. What, does that mean ?

In the days of the late Mr. D. S. Senanayake, we knew what his policy was. In his own blunt way he explained it. He said " We have known England. We are friends with England. We are with England. " We understood his point of view and he gave expression to that point of view more than once. But with regard to others he said. " We have nothing to do with them. We would like to be friendly with all.'' Beyond that he said nothing.

My hon. Friend (Sir John) when he assumed duties in fact appeared to completely reverse that previous poicy. From day to day we do not know what precisely his policy is in regard to foreign affairs.

I am not concerned whether Ho Chi Minh is a communist or how far he is communist, whether it is dark red, pale pink or whatever it is. It is not so much an issue. All we do know as a fact is that France's grim determination to retain her colonial hold over Indo-China, her grim and persistent determination for the last seven years, has only disappeared today owing to the struggle and sacrifices of Ho Chi Minh and Viet Minh.....

THE NEW ERA

(Full text of Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, on 22nd November, 1956 by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike)

As Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of my country, I am indeed very pleased to have the opportunity of attending this my first session of the General Assembly.

I am pleased to be here for another reason: that is, that I come here fresh from the Conference at New Delhi of the Prime Ministers of the Colombo countries, whose joint statement, issued after the New Delhi Conference, I find has been referred to on various occasions by several speakers. I welcome the opportunity of being able, where necessary, to explain to you more fully what we feel with regard to some of the important problems that you have been called upon to deal with at this time.

At the outset, I wish, Mr. President * to offer to you on behalf of the Ceylonese delegation our congratulations on your election to this high office. I have no doubt that your long devotion to the ideals and the causes which this great Organisation represents, and the recognition by representatives of your high qualities of devotion, ability and tact, have been responsible for your election. Personally I have an especial pleasure in your election because your country is in the same region as mine, and between my country and yours there have been close and friendly cultural and other bonds for many centuries.

My country, together with many others, languished in the anteroom of this Organisation for many years, before, by a signal stroke of statemanship last year, sixteen countries were admitted to membership of the United Nations.

I regret that there are still countries which are awaiting admission, countries whose claims to such admission appear to many of us to be unquestioned, and whose admission will undoubtedly make more fully representative the membership of this great world Organisation for peace. I hope that before long their claims will receive the consideration which is their due. Amongst them, I wish to mention in particular such countries as the People's Republic of China and Japan.

I read with great interest the annual report of the Secretary-General. There are some matters of importance in which appreciable success has been achieved in the year under review. In certain others valuable progress has been made, and in all I suppose it might be said that a certain degree of continuous activity appears to have been maintained.

Prince Wan Waityakoon of Thailand

I should like to take this opportunity, if it is not out of place, to congratulate the Secreary-General on the able, efficient and devoted manner in which he has been and is performing his functions, particularly during recent events. The Secretary-General, as the chief executive officer of the United Nations has already enhanced the reputation and prestige of the United Nations. I congratulate him and I congratulate ourselves on possessing an officer of such pre-eminent and distinguished qualities.

I suppose it is true that the normal activities of the United Nations have been overshadowed by certain happenings subsequent to the period covered by the annual report of the Secretary-General. I refer to happenings in Egypt and in Hungary. These events have provided, on the one hand, a crucial test for United Nations and on the other hand, a great opportuntiy. I should like to say that it is my opinion that the United Nations has emerged out of these crises with its reputation and prestige enhanced.

I have heard, no doubt, many people here criticize the United Nations on the grounds that it is slow to act, that when it does act it cannot act effectively, that it sometimes tends to lose itself in diffused thinking, and still more diffused decisions. Those who criticize the United Nations should bear in mind, that, in all the circumstances of the case, the United Nations has proved as successful, sometimes even more successful, than what one might have realistically expected. The United Nations is not a super-state possessed of forces, armed forces, capable of asserting its authority even over powerful members or non-members who may act contrary to the purposes of the United Nations. It can and does bring to bear in certain cases, as it has done in the past, success, and in certain others at least a very salutary restraining influence.

I naturally wish to say a few words on the two questions that are exercising our minds today: Suez and Hungary. I do not propose to delay you with a reiteration of the whole history that has led up to these tragic happenings.

In the case of Suez, I wish briefly to recount facts that are important to the background of our thinking in this matter. The President of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company. I do not find in any quarter a disposition seriously to question his right to do so. Although the manner in which it was done, may be considered expedient by some and incorrect by others, the basic fact of his right to do so has not been questioned. If that is correct, I consider that it follows as a corollary to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company that the power of operation of the Canal should also vest in Egypt.

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But that is not the whole story. There are important international interests in the Suez Canal that also need to be safeguarded—we are all agreed on that—interests that I feel could adequately have been safeguarded, while recognising the right of nationalisation and the right of control following thereon, by entering into a convention on somewhat similar lines to the Constantinople Convention of 1888, but with further provisions, if you need it, to provide for some consultative or advisory committee whose advice Egypt would have been compelled to seek in dealing with important matters of an operational nature. If there was a disagreement between the two, surely some machinery for arbitration in such instances could have been devised. That would have been the most hopeful method of procedure in order to obtain agreement, while satisfying what both sides claim to be certain fundamental needs. But the moment that a majority of the countries assembled at the London Conference decided on international control of the operation of the Canal, fundamental difficulties immediately arose. The mission to Egypt, led by the Prime Minister of Australia for discussions with Colonel Nasser, was bound, in the circumstances, to prove a failure. I cannot believe that anyone seriously contemplated that it could be otherwise. Thereafter, quite rightly, the Powers more immediately concerned referred this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations and an agreement on certain principles—no less, the six principles—by England. France and Egypt was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council.

What we fail to understand is this: why were not negotiations proceeded with on the basis of those agreed six principles to see how far agreement could be reached ? I have yet to understand why either one side concerned, or the other, or both, failed to requisition the good offices of the United Nations in order to carry on those negotiations. The matter was referred to the Security Council of the United Nations in order to pursue the method of negotiation as against that of force which had been threatened earlier. It had reached the point when those negotiations could take place on an agreed basis for discussion.

Why did they not take place ? Why was it necessary to have the intrusion before further discussion of this unfortunate resort to force ? Israel made an attack on Egyptian territory. Why pray ? Because it had grievances in the past ? Because it feared Egypt's aggression or attacks in the future ? Why was this particular moment chosen ? I never chose to condemn anyone until condemnation is based on proof. But is it not somewhat difficult to escape from the belief that the Israeli action followed by that of the Anglo-French forces, were not altogether unconnected with each other, that Israel, at the every least, may have thought and in a moment of inspiration,

that that was a good moment for it to move, and that attack by it then would produce action on the part of the British and French which would in fact amount to support of that ?

However, as I said, I prefer not to attach motives to anybody. Until something is definitely proved, I prefer not to condemn anyone. It is a mistake to do so. But it does seem to me at least a rather strange coincidence that those events, in that order, should have so taken place ; it is a very unfortunate coincidence. I am glad that the United Nations immediately dealt with the matter and arrived at certain decisions and that those decisions are now in the process of implementation.

May I say here that I appreciate very much the fact that even in principle England, France and Israel accepted the decision of the United Nations for a cease-fire and for a withdrawal. I only hope that those steps will materialise very quickly.

I must tell the Assembly that it is my view, and the view of my colleagues, the other Asian Prime Ministers, that the position is still extremely delicate and dangerous. We do not feel that there is any occasion for undue complacence. I am glad that, substantially a cease-fire has taken place. But the withdrawal has not yet taken place. A United Nations Emergency Force is already in the process of being established in Egypt in order to carry out the decision of the United Nations in supervising a withdrawal of those forces. I say this, and I say it with all seriousness, that as long as foreign troops—be they Israeli, British or French—continue to remain on Egyptian territory, the position is one that is fraught with the greatest danger and one that may bring about results leading to a third world war.

I wish to say that those forces must be withdrawn now without any delay. I wish to say that I think it would be very unwise to follow some principle of a phased withdrawal, a withdrawing of those forces in numbers according to the numbers of the United Nations Force who enter : a hundred United Nations troops going into Egypt and a hundred being withdrawn ; two hundred United Nations troops going in and two hundred being withdrawn, and so on. There can be no greater mistake than that.

The moment that even a token United Nations force is established on Egyptian territory, it will be sufficient occasion, in the interests of us all for Israeli forces to be withdrawn behind the armistice line, and British and French forces to be withdrawn from Egyptain territory. I cannot conceive that either Egypt or Israel would make an assault upon forces of the United Nations. I just do not believe it. So that it is really not required for a large force of the United Nations to be present before those forces are withdrawn.

The first and the most vital thing is a withdrawal of forces from Egyptian territory now as early as possible. If that does not happen, even if under the guise of "volunteers"—and we know that "volunteers" mean—other countries, in order to secure the observance of the decisions of the United Nations, take steps, I fear that the results may be very far-reaching and all our efforts so far may be swept away in a moment.

There is another important thing, of course: the early clearing of the Suez Canal. That is very important to all of us, particularly to my country. Most of the trade of Ceylon—seventy-five per cent of it passes through the Suez Canal. I take it that, not only for us but for other countries, Western as well as Asian, it is important that the Suez Canal be cleared as early as possible. I feel that it should be done under the auspices of the United Nations.

There is one point regarding that matter, namely, whether the clearing of the canal should start at once in full force, prior to any substantial withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory or whether it should begin subsequent to that. I hope that such quibbles will not stand in the way of the practice of doing the thing that is necessary. I personally feel that a substantial withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory at once would greatly facilitate the further task of clearing up the Suez Canal. I am quite sure that Egypt —at least, this is my hope—will not object to the United Nations, under its flag, using whatever material and tackle—and it is rather specialised tackle which is required for this purpose—that are available, whatever source it happens to come from, in order to clear the Canal.

The withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt immediately and the very quick clearing of the Suez Canal must then be followed by negotiations regarding the Canal on the basis of those six principles, which presumably still stand. Those are steps that are necessary to be taken at once. Those are the steps which I hope the United Nations will try to achieve in the course of its deliberations in the days to come.

With regard to the general settlement of the rather complicated and complex affair of Western Asia, that is another matter. I sincerely hope that some time those troubles also can be settled, particularly those between Israel and its Arab neighbours. I trust that when the bitterness of these incidents has died down to some degree, it will be possible for those primarily concerned at least to have a talk about an honourable settlement of those differences. But I hope that that long-term process will not be mixed with the immediate needs that have arisen today out of this situation. I am not so optimistic as to believe that those differences can be settled at an early date: I do not

believe so for a moment. First things come first, so let us deal with these first problems which I mentioned and which are essential to prevent the possibility—believe me, the probability—of a serious worsening of a situation, which some may feel, superficially, is now assuaged. It is not so.

I wish to say a few words about Hungary. There seemed to be a feeling in the minds of some people that some of our countries were indifferent, or even lukewarm, about certain happenings in Hungary. I wish strongly to repudiate this charge.

What happened ? It will interest the Assembly to know that when the very first draft resolution regarding this Hungarian episode was introduced here, it was done in such a desperate hurry, it was sent from the Security Council to the General Assembly so quickly for a vote to be taken within a few hours, that some of us had no opportunity to bring our minds to bear on the problem or even to send instructions to our representatives here as to how they were to vote. I was fast asleep in Colombo when an urgent cablegram from our permanent representative here was received by the Permanent Secretary, asking for instructions as a vote was going to be taken. I had not all the facts or data before me. I could not even get my office open in order to get such papers as were available there at that hour of the night.

We are rather respectable in Colombo. We go to bed fairly early and we remain there till morning. What could I do ? I instructed my Permanent Secretary to send off immediately a cablegram to our representative here, making certain general suggestions and asking him to consult with other groups with which we associate in taking action. We abstained from voting. This is how that abstention came about.

Is it really not possible, when this Worly Organisation discusses subjects of paramount importance, to allow a certain reasonable measure of time for consideration and consultation before important decisions are arrived at ? It seems to be a great pity if the urgency of the situation—if I may so call it demands the taking of action in that horrid manner. That is what happened, I believe, that in the case of some other Asian countries also they had no time to issue instructions to their representatives or even to consider the matter. There seemed such a desperate haste to get something through—a desperate haste I fail to understand. I do not think that the lapse of a few hours, twelve hours, would have made such overwhelming difference to the case.

With regard to the second resolution on Hungary that was moved here, it was like the proverbial curate's egg, good in parts and bad in parts. We agreed with the request that Russian troops be withdrawn from Budapest and from Hungary without any delay. We could not quite agree with that portion of the resolution that requested that free elections be held in Hungary under the vigilant eyes of United Nations observers. You will have noted what we said at Delhi. What we said there was that the Russian troops should be withdrawn and that Hungary should be left free to work out its own destiny. Why should we dictate to any country that it should have elections as we want it to have them ? Surely, whether it is a Russian dictatorship in Hungary, an Anglo-French dictatorship in Egypt or even the dictatorship of the United Nations which militates against the sovereignty of a country, they are all, I think equally unwise and undesirable.

What were we to do with a draft resolution, part of which we agreed with and part as disagreed with ? I asked my representative here to secure a separate vote on the separate parts. When the resolution as a whole was put to the vote, we followed the only logical course ; we abstained from voting, having expressed our views quite clearly and openly from this rostrum.

The latest resolution, that proposed by Cuba, the debate on which I had the privilege of listening to here yesterday, was passed by a majority vote. Another resolution introduced by India, Ceylon and Indonesia was also passed. I leave it to the ingenuity of the Secretary General to reconcile the two decisions. However, I feel that the resolution introduced by us was more reasonable and logical than certain respects of the wording of the other resolution.

The Assembly has also passed a resolution calling for relief in Hungary. We decided to recommend that to our countries and to do it ourselves, at the Delhi conference, and our Governments are doing it. My Government has voted for this a few days ago. We are a poor country but we have decided to give what we could give towards relief, in Hungary as well as Egypt. Budapest needs relief, does not Port Said ? They all need relief. If I may be forgiven for using the phrase—and I do not say it disparagingly of anyone—there is no fundamental difference, to my mind, between the thug or rowdy who deals a man one blow and the thug or rowdy who deals a man two blows. Fundamentally, both are worthy of condemnation. That was our attitude regarding Egypt and Hungary.

However, let us remember this. Mere dialectics are not sufficient in dealing with these situations. Let us learn the lessons which Egypt and Hungary teach us. Let us deal with the immediate, pressing problems, and let us gear up the World Organization, if we can, to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in the future. That seems to be the wise course to follow.

We gain nothing by undue mutual recrimination and revilings. As a Buddhist, I remember the story of Buddha and the answer he gave to an opponent who came before him and abused him for hours. He listened to him patiently and said "My dear friend, if you invite guests to a banquet and the guests do not come, what do you do with the food that is prepared ?" "Oh" was the reply, "I and my family will consume the food if the guests do not arrive". So he said to the man who had abused him : "You have offered me your abuse. I am not receiving it. You can take it yourself".

Mutual recrimination and the wounding of one another's feelings by sharp retorts and angry words will not help us very much. But there are certain things to which we cannot be blind. What have we to do now ? I have suggested the immediate steps to be taken in Egypt and the immediate steps, on which the Assembly has decided, that should and must be taken in Hungary.

I would appeal to the Government of Hungary not to oppose the recommendation of this Assembly that some important observers go there in order to observe the situation and to discover the truth or otherwise of the charges that have been made on the one side and equally vehemently repudiated on the other. I appeal that that step be taken, and I appeal to the British, French and Israelis to withdraw their troops—as indeed they have agreed to do—now without any delay. In that way the good name of these countries, as well as, perhaps, world peace, will best be safeguarded.

There is a further significance, of course, in these happenings, and I would draw your attention particularly to this. We of Asia who have suffered under imperialistic colonial rule for many centuries are, naturally, extremely sensitive towards anything approaching a resurgence of the spirit of imperialism and colonialism. I hope we are wrong, but we feel strongly that the happenings in Egypt, and perhapse the echo of these happenings in Hungary, are a manifestation once again of a certain resurgence of the spirit of colonialism, the desire of a strong power to achieve its purposes and to impose its will, even by force, on a weaker Power.

Are you surprised that we lay greater emphasis on Egypt than on Hungary ? Far more dangers are inherent for the world in the Egypian situation than in the Hungarian. We deplore both, of course. But the Assembly very rightly came to the conclusion that the problem of Egypt was a more urgent and serious one than that of Hungary, althought both are to be condemned and deplored alike.

You will see, therefore, the importance of these happenings and how strongly many of us—the vast majority of this Assembly— feel on these matters. It is not too late even now to put things right. It is not yet too late to remedy this situation, although I greatly fear that the bitterness created by these incidents will not be easily forgotten and will not be easily forgiven. But let us hope that the preservation of peace now and the lapse of time will again restore that confidence that has been so seriously and tragically shattered. We had got into the habit recently of believing that great Powers of the world were united in upholding peace and decency in dealings between man and and man, between nation and nation.

We believed that this great Assembly provided the opportunity for all, great and small, to unite in achieving that objective. But when great Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, themselves set in a way that has brought on their heads the condemnation of this Assembly, can it not be realized how gravely that confidence is shattered, particularly in the minds of those of us who are small and weak and who had hoped that in this new world we would be able, without national or international brigandage and piracy, to work out our own destiny and to advance towards peace and happiness ?

These are the results of these happenings. I have dealt with the two important problems of today, the problems of Egypt and Hungary —with the position as I see it and the steps that should be taken immediately and also perhaps in the not the distance future. I wish now to say a few words about Asia. There is some misunderstanding of the position of some of our Asian countries, and I wish to explain the position to you fairly.

Many of our countries in Asia have re-emerged into freedom after three or four hundred years of colonial imperialist rule. In this epoch of newly-gained freedom, we find ourselves faced with a dual problem within a problem. First, there is the problem of converting a colonial society politically, socially and economically into a free society, and then there in the problem of effecting that conversion against a background of changing world conditions.

The world is in a state of change and flux today. The world is going through one of those rare occasions. They happen at certain intervals of a changeover from one society to another, from one civilization to another. We are living today, in fact, in a period of transition between two civilizations, the old and the new. During a period like this, all kinds of conflicts arise ideological, national, economic, political. That has happened in the past, and in the past those conflicts were settled by some nice little war here or there. Today we cannot afford the luxury of war, for we all know what it means.

Therefore, the task for us today is a far more difficult one than ever faced mankind before: to effect this transition to some form of stable human society, and to do it amid a welter of conflicts, with reasonable peace and with the avoidance of conflicts that burst out into war, for war is unthinkable today. This is an age when we have to live and let live, when we cannot afford to hate each other so much that we are prepared to sacrifice all mankind in the name of peace or for some other reason. We cannot afford to do that today. Within the limits of honour, of course, and those principles which we hold dear, we have to live and let live.

That is the philosophy behind the doctrine of co-existence. We have to build up a new society for ourselves, as I have said, which best suits the genius of our country. We should like to get some ideas and some principles from this side, and some from the other, until a coherent form of society is made up that suits our own people in the context of the changing world of today. That is why we do not range ourselves on the side of this power bloc or that power bloc. That is the philosophy of neutralism. It is not something dishonest; it is not a matter of sitting on the fence to see whether we can get the best of both worlds. It is a position that is inexorably thrust upon us by the circumstances of the case. It is a position that will be of great help in the world situation today, for we do provide a bridge over the gulf between the two opposing factions.

We are supposed to be the "uncommitted" nations. I strongly object to that word. We are committed to the hilt. We are committed to preserve decency in dealings between nations we are committed to the cause of justice and freedom as much as anyone is. That, briefly, is our position in Asia. I trust it will not be misunderstood.

Sometimes the feeling comes over me, as I am sure, it does over many of us, that the fight is not worthwhile that there is, in fact, no hope for mankind to escape the perplexities, problems, conflicts, hatreds and enmities that seem to be arising all about us. But sometimes when I feel like that, I am fortified by the thought that through the dark fabric of human history there passes one golden thread of unfailing strength and firmness—the unconquered, unconquerable spirit of man. It has manifested itself through the ages in various, diverse, different ways first of all, the unconquerable spirit of man fighting for bare survival and existence; later, fighting for various causes—national causes may be, or the cause of justice the cause of freedom or the pursuit of truth on the part of the great religious leaders down through history. Today it is needed in the cause of human friendship and of peace.

What is peace ? Peace is not merely a negative thing—the absence of one set of people trying to kill another set of people. No doubt the prevention of war is a necessary factor for peace, but peace, believe me, is something much more positive than that, for peace in its true sense means human understanding, human friendship and co-operation out of which, indeed, peace in its true form alone can rise. I look upon the United Nations as the one machine available to mankind today through which it can express this unconquerable spirit of man in its efforts to achieve that peace, friendship and collaboration.

My country is a small one, a weak one and a poor one, but I venture to think that today, particularly in an Organisation such as this, the service that a country can render—that a Member can render—is not to be measured alone by the size of that country, its population, its power or its strength. This is an Organisation which expresses itself most effectively by bringing to bear a certain moral force—the collective moral force of decency of human beings. That is a task in which the weak as well as the strong can render a useful service, and I give the Assembly the assurance, on behalf of my country, that as far as we are concerned every endeavour that we can make in all sincerity to assist in the achievements of those noble ideals for which this Organisation stands will always be forthcoming in the fullest measure.

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