

● **The Bomb that General Zia left behind** ●

— Hedrick Smith

LANKA

GUARDIAN

Vol. 11 No. 9 September 1, 1988 Price Rs. 5.00 Registered at the GPO, Sri Lanka QJ/84/NEWS/88

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TRENDS

TORTURE ?

"Lalith cautions police against torturing those in their custody", said the Sun. But, "Leave no room for adverse criticism, Lalith tells Police", said the Government controlled DAILY NEWS reporting the same event. These were the two headlines, each casting a somewhat different emphasis, but both news papers carried more or less the same text.

National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali was addressing the Police at the opening of a police complex at Thanthirimale. The Minister said: "It is lawful for the police to take anyone into custody

for questioning but it is unlawful to torture them. In order to obtain confessions or information, Fighting terrorists does not mean behaving like terrorists".

The Minister also said: "Don't take sides, be impartial and have neither friends nor enemies. If you have to arrest a man you can do so but you must not torture any person in your custody; that is illegal. The Opposition sometimes accuses the police of torturing persons to obtain confessions, therefore the police should be careful not to indulge in illegal acts".

If Mr. Athulathmudali has been correctly reported, and the Government's own Daily News is unlikely to do otherwise, the police must be careful not to indulge in illegal acts because the Opposition sometimes makes a fuss about them. In any event, human rights groups will surely note the Minister's speech as a favourable signal; it is the first time that a government minister has allowed himself even an implied admission that there could be torture in police custody.

JOBS FOR ALL

The Prime Minister, it was reported last week, will lead a "massive employment thrust" to find employ-

ment for all 1.2 million persons who are without jobs. An accelerated program is to be launched immediately to provide jobs for 200,000 youths within the next two to three months. The decision was made at a high level meeting chaired by President Jayewardene.

Prime Minister Premadasa, it was also reported, has submitted a detailed action plan to solve the unemployment problem. Mr. Premadasa's plan anticipates the provision of 200,000 jobs by December, plus 450,000 next year and another 500,000 by 1990.

Mr. Premadasa intends also to take effective steps to counter bribery, the report said. There will be legal provision to make the declaration of assets compulsory.

Meanwhile, the WEEKEND quoting sources close to the Prime Minister, said that Mr. Premadasa will not make himself available as a Presidential candidate unless he is the unanimous choice of the party. According to other sources Mr. Premadasa's position is that where there is a captain and a vice captain, the vice captain must lead the team if the captain does not wish to do so; and that there should be no controversy about that.

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LXXX

GUARDIAN

Vol. 11 No. 9 September 1, 1968

Price Rs. 8.00

Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.

No. 745, Ulan Place.

COLOMBO - 3.

Editor: Mervyn de Silva
Telephone: 547584

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Will he? Won't he?

Mervyn de Silva

"**S**hall I stand?" is the caption to a picture of a pensive president JR in the latest issue of the London *ECONOMIST*. Right question, good caption. For the UNP, the SLFP and Mrs. Bandaranaike, the other Opposition parties and the Sri Lankan voter, the question can be re-framed: "Will he? Won't he?"

On most matters, even the non-controversial and the mundane, JR, likes to play it close to the chest. Never has it been closer. For obvious reasons. The stakes are high, very high, the highest. Second, the situation is so complicated and uncertain that even he cannot calculate, as he always does, the consequences of this or that choice... certainly not beyond the second or third step. And by temperament, he is a man who likes to see a problem through to the last twist and turn, and final resolution. It is with such a cast of mind that he has practised his kind of politics for 50 years — the art of the possible.

Only once before has he confronted such a challenge. But there was good reason for that — a huge external factor was involved, a massive incalculable: INDIA. It is only when he realised (Vadamarachi and 'Operation Liberation') that the next few developments in a rapidly accelerating train of events could lose him (and Sri Lanka) nearly everything, that he acted, by instinct more than intelligence as he admitted to this writer, and saved the situation by signing the Peace Accord.

But the Peace Accord didn't save him. And yet he is stuck with it. He must hope that it will finally rescue him, and the UNP. So playing for time, he has kept postponing the day of decision — Who will contest Mrs. Bandaranaike?

If in the long weeks of 'Operation Liberation', the situation

slipped quickly not just from President JR's hands but from Sri Lanka's grasp, the present situation is near-unique — and unique to JR. The problem is entirely domestic — the Presidential election and the UNP candidate. Among the possible candidates is President JR himself, since only a 2/3rd majority can remove the two-term limitation in a constitution that is notoriously amendment-prone.

Nonetheless, President JR is not in total command of this exclusively internal situation — the great external factor still intruding. The "Tigers" tamed or at least at bay. If not destroyed, and some sort of provincial polls in the North and East, could, just could, change the political mood in the South. And if it does, the man identified with the Peace Accord — rather than a Cabinet colleague who was opposed or critical — would be the strongest UNP contender.

Or, put the situation the other way round. President JR staked his political career and more on the Peace Accord. The "more" stood out clearly in the 16 Indian Air Force helicopters that scudded by, when the mobs were rampaging in the streets of the capital, sometimes a few hundred yards away from the heavily secured nerve-centers of power in this country. Right now, with its essential aims unrealised, the Accord has been a hefty minus to JR and the UNP government in terms of Sinhala opinion.

In the short run, and that's all that counts now, the minus cannot be converted into a plus. (It might have remained plus if 14 LTTE prisoners were not provoked into swallowing their cyanide capsules in late Sept. 1987, after a commando raid on their cell, a plain cock-up). However, if the minus can be significantly reduced, the UNP's block vote, money, the advantages of State power, and perhaps the

NEWS
BACKGROUND

grudging support of the minorities, could combine to give a UNP candidate a fair chance.

With the ideal conditions beyond reach, the sharpest political mind in the country has prepared for the worst, hoping for the better, conscious of the crucial importance of time, and General Kalkat's capacity to ensure conditions that would permit a North East poll; a poll at least as credible as the one in the Southern province, hopefully Galle rather than Hambantota. After his visit to Tamilnadu, Mr. Gandhi made up his mind. By postponing Tamilnadu polls, the Indian Prime Minister bought himself 6 more months — those very months which are vital to President JR. Having then conveyed to the Tamilnadu voter his exasperation with the "Tigers" (and offering the state a better deal under Presidential rule than under any elected administration) Mr. Gandhi told General Kalkat that he had a free hand — meaning give the "Tigers" the works.

Of course any student of guerrilla warfare and insurgency — and the Tamil separatist revolt is a mature one, knows that a conventional fighting force can never totally destroy what is after all the armed movement of an aggrieved people. JR knows that very well. All he, and Gandhi, want the IPKF to do is to batter the LTTE military machine so hard that the ceremony of elections can be held in the full view of Tamilnadu and the world. If the "Tigers" wreck the exercise through violence, it will strengthen Gandhi's propagandist hand vis-à-vis the Tamilnadu electorate. Meanwhile, the exercise will help appease some Sinhala opinion. How much, nobody knows.

PARTY FIRST

President JR is a party man, most than most. I would say, party man first and last. In preparing for the worst (that is, a UNP government without him) uppermost in his mind has been the unity of the United National party. He has let it be known that Prime Minister Premadasa, Lands Minister Dissanayake and National Security Minister Athulathmudali are all aspirants and deserving candidates. But the party must finally decide. In the process, the Prime Minister has emerged strongly, with the most junior of UNP leaders, Mr. Athulathmudali evidently ready to serve a future President Premadasa but never a President Dissanayake. A three-way split thus became a 2½ way split — a split nonetheless.

And that left President JR with two choices: (a) entering the fray himself or (b) changing the Party-State relationship, the power-question so that real authority lies with the Party of which he remains the Leader. In short, what many a Third world leader has done, from Ne Win whose 20 year back-seat driving is coming to an end, and Lee Kuan Yew who is still firmly in the driver's seat.

As for choice (a) President JR's problem is once again — Time. Could this fundamental structural change, State power located in the Party and its Supreme Leader, and not in government, be successfully initiated in a matter of months? Difficult.

The second option is the more attractive. After consultations with Prime Minister Gandhi and the top Sri Lanka policy planners (Bouch Block, Defence, and RAW, with a Prime Ministerial ear to the Congress leadership in Madras) High Commissioner Dixit has returned to Colombo to inform President JR last weekend that the IPKF can guarantee a credible poll, party and popular participation an open question.

It is in this light that these passages from President JR's speech — and indeed the speech itself, on hardly the most appropriate occasion — should be read:

Accord only way to peace

— J. R.

The violence, death and destruction that have overtaken the country since then are too recent for me to recount. Those gory incidents should be fresh in the memory of the people. The military operations in the north and east from 1983 to 1987 cost the lives of over 900 Lankan soldiers. Some 1,400 Lankan troops were maimed and wounded. The annual toll accounted for 225 soldiers fallen and 350 wounded in the battlefield.

"That was the situation when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed a peace accord to end this violence. The accord held out the promise of an era of peace for the country again. The accord meant the end of war.

"I had other reasons for being eager to accept the hand of friendship extended by Prime Minister Gandhi. Some sections in India were helping the terrorists. They were supplying them with arms and funds.

"The parties to the agreement were the Sri Lanka government, the militant groups fighting in the North and East — LTTE, PLOF, EPRLF, EROS, TELO and ENDF, and the TULF, which had been carrying on a non-violent campaign. So it was an agreement between our government and these seven groups.

"All seven groups accepted the accord and signed it. That signing heralded a period of peace in the country after several years of bitter strife.

"We had planned to hold the PC elections by the end of December last year and the proposed referendum for the North and East in April 1988. But the LTTE reneged on the accord hardly one month later and hostilities started

again. However, the other militant groups which subscribed to the accord did not change their stand. They laid down their arms and prepared themselves to enter the political mainstream. In fact, some groups have already sought registration as recognised political parties. Some of these leaders have met me for certain discussions.

"The IPKF continue to remain here because the LTTE made their presence necessary. The IPKF came here on our invitation, to keep peace. But they have become embroiled in a protracted war instead."

The President pointed out that only 55 Lankan soldiers had died in the north and east after the signing of the accord.

But so far, 436 Indian soldiers have been killed and 1416 others wounded in operations in the north and east. These Indians have laid down their lives for a cause, here. If the IPKF was not brought in under the accord, it is our boys who would have been killed and wounded. We can presume that at least 486 Lankan boys who would have died are now among the living and 1416 others have escaped injury, thanks to Indian soldiers fighting our battle!

"I can ask the IPKF to go back home. But then our soldiers will have to take up the fighting with the LTTE. Don't forget, there's a war in the south too. The ministers, MPs, and PC members of the UNP and USA are asking for protection. Killings continue unabated in the south. The driver of Mr. Dayananda Wickramasinghe, the Deputy Labour Minister, and several others were gunned down in a recent incident. The subversives don't believe in killing a person with one shot but, with several.

Several battalions are now stationed in the south. Other provinces too, require the security backing of the army. We don't have security personnel to spare for service in the north. We've taken steps to train more personnel and they have to be equipped with arms after training.

"This entails massive expenditure. A supplementary vote for Rs. 1000 million to meet military costs will have to be passed in parliament shortly. It's a pity that this money, which can be used to generate more jobs and increase the value of food stamps, should be 'wasted' in military spending. We are not alone in this.

"There are many countries in the world who are compelled to spend their resources on wars. India spends Rs. 10 million a day on the IPKF here. India is losing men in a war fought here for our sake! But it's now an international tradition for one country to fight for another that is militarily weak.

"Even Mrs. Bandaranaike sought military assistance in 1971. But she did not have the need of thousands of Indian troops here. Thanks to Indian help, we are not spending a cent on military operations in the North and East today," he said.

The President said he expected nothing but peace for the country as an outcome of the Peace Accord. He hoped that the back of the LTTE resistance would be broken soon or they would accept the accord.

The devolution of power to provinces was not something new he pointed out. The subject originated in the colonial days, and one could trace its evolution through the days of the Donoughmore and Soulbury Commissions up to the more recent talks in Thimpu and New Delhi.

"The only new element in this devolution package is the temporary linkage of the North and East. There is no ground for any one to oppose the other aspects of the accord.

Ronnie as Catalyst?

Politics is the art of the possible—Opposition leader Anura Bandaranaike's favourite quote these days. The 'Ronnie operation' is Anura's first important essay on this maxim. Its political implications for the SLFP and thus for the prevailing balance of forces in the country, an ever-shifting balance as it is, stretch beyond the personal Anura-Ronnie relationship.

Ronnie de Mel is no ordinary Finance Minister. He is the longest serving in Sri Lanka's parliamentary history. He is Mr. Open Economy to the world outside, where Mr. de Mel is probably the best internationally recognized Sri Lanka personality after President JR. His entry into the SLFP marks radical change in SLFP's economic thinking; in part a gut-reaction to its negative 'quotas-and-queues' image and partly a direct outcome of the impact of the outward-looking economic strategy of the UNP on the SLFP's new generation, with Mr. Anura Bandaranaike its authentic voice and natural leader.

Deepert down, the nascent national bourgeois, and the cloth-and-banjan mudalalis who spearheaded the "1956 Revolution", have arrived. The Doors of political power opened to them after 1956 and 1960 with the SLFP pursuing a policy of "protectionism" behind high tariff walls. These more genuinely native businessmen have been accommodated, more or less, in the economic system and the power structure. Those who failed to amass sufficient capital have fallen by the wayside. The rest have eagerly adjusted themselves to the new economic environment.

This is particularly true of their offspring, more westernised, and cosmopolitan. There has been

a quiet merger of the old established pro-UNP strata and the post-56 'new class' which was nurtured by the SLFP's protective autarchic policies. This has been made possible of course by the much stronger, relentless force of economic integration — poor Third World Sri Lanka sucked into the global economic system, with little or no nationalist resistance, through the system's two main agencies, the World Bank and the IMF.

Equally interesting is a discernible shift of SLFP thinking on India and the Peace Accord. (See Anura Bandaranaike's interview.) In his first speech to Parliament, Mr. Ronnie de Mel did not retreat on his own firmly held position that the 'Peace Accord' was an unavoidable, if unpleasant, step towards a political settlement of an ethnic conflict to which there was no military solution. Such a settlement to a problem that may lead to partition was impossible. Mr de Mel argued for many years, without Indian help. His thesis has not changed at all.

What has changed is the ground situation through the failure to implement the Accord, letter and spirit. And that guilt lies within the government, he said. "The tug-o-war" inside the cabinet and 'acts of sabotage" by "powerful elements in the government" were responsible for this failure.

The double-shift in the SLFP approach has had reactions within the SLFP (the more traditionalist sections) and outside it. The ELFP leader, Mr. Rukman Senanayake and the party Secretary have launched an anti-SLFP tirade to create open differences in the 7 party oppositional front.

PROTESTS OVER INDEMNITY BILL

No proposed law of the government has provoked such widespread expressions of concern and unequivocal criticism than the Indemnity Bill. While the main opposition party, the SLFP, which has held office on three occasions (16 years in all) issued a statement recently to explain why it objected to this move, the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) passed a resolution that examined the dangerous implications of the Bill.

Bar Council attacks Indemnity bill

The Bar Council of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka yesterday expressed its grave concern at the proposed Indemnity Bill of the government.

Fifty seven members of the Council met yesterday at a leading Negombo Hotel and unanimously moved that "the bill is excessively wide in its terms in that it grants immunity from suit even to acts which were not done bonafide and the acts of private individuals not acting in any official capacity and without lawful authority.

The resolution also stated that the bill will deprive persons who have suffered injury or harm of their constitutional and legal remedies.

The Bar Council accordingly asked the government to withdraw this bill in its present form." □

Cover for a period of terror, says SLFP

The Indemnity Bill gazetted by the Government deserves only outright condemnation, says the SLFP in a statement issued after a Central Committee meeting. Excerpts:

"Considered in the background of unprecedented killings of the country's youth by persons in civilian clothes, going about in vehicles without registration numbers and leaving behind a trail of blood and burnt, mutilated bodies, the calculated effort of the Indemnity Bill seems quite clear; to cover up and protect certain persons over a period

of more than eight years extending over 24th July 1979 to December 1987 from all their sins against human rights in this country.

"The Bill is not only retroactive over such a long period of terror but so completely discriminatory and unjust that it knocks out even the last vestige of any pretence to a Rule of Law in this Island". □

Catholic protest

The Catholic priests of the Archdiocese of Colombo have unanimously condemned the proposed Indemnity Bill which they claimed is not only a draconian piece of legislation but also a violation of the rights of the democracy-loving people in the country.

This is stated by Rev Fr. Reid Shelton Fernando, Director Paul 6 Centre.

The communique adds if this bill is enacted into law, many acts considered illegal under the existing law becomes legal and vice versa. Thus paving the way for those enforcing law and order in this Country to take the law to their hands under the provision of this law. This would be a further addition by the state to a deteriorating violation of human rights situation.

Harvesting

*Harvesting is a curling
Of paddy in quick bangled arms
Of stacks of growing hopes
Art learnt under scorching sun.*

*Harvesting is a replenishing
Of a repertoire of plaintive chants
That the wind keeps echoing
Over the twitter of sailing birds.*

*Harvesting flutters hopes
Like cranes rising from the field
Beating the paddy into waves
Before the sickles circle them low.*

*Harvesting is a summons
For buffaloes to leave the puddles
And chase each other around
On a heaving threshing floor.*

*Harvest is a cloud of parrots
Descending on a burst of grain
Changing from soft green to gold
Under a sun in full display.*

*Harvesting is a reaping of riches
That months of work and waiting bring
It is a sharing of each others sweat
Reflected on faces of contentment and pride.*

Tillak A. Gunawardhana

Lawmen and lawlessness

When 'lawmen' turn lawless President JR laments that "defence spending" needed to combat terrorism is devouring funds that could be used for development or social welfare. The Minister of National Security argues strongly that an increased defence vote is a "must" for a country like Sri Lanka. But where's the security?

Far from guarding the homes of law-abiding citizens (or even the person and property of the local VIP) the newly created 'Home Guards' have become a major threat to law and order, and a problem for both government and society. Last week, a group of Home Guards raided a poor home not too far from Colombo and attempted to rape a girl. The SUN reported:

"A 15 year old girl was shot dead by three Home Guards when their attempts to abduct her failed. The Home Guards on sentry duty at a UNP Provincial Councilor's residence had entered the house of the girl and shot her dead in the living room. One of the men, the mother, said, had tried to forcibly remove her daughter. . . ."

But 'Home Guards', picked as a ruse for their political loyalty, serve party or individual politician. They have minimum training and little discipline. What of the regular services, where discipline is presumed to be of the highest order. The ISLAND reported:

"An armed gang of 60 persons in service uniforms went on a rampage in Ekala, Ja-ela, close to the SLBC transmitting station,

completely destroying 10 boutiques and one house badly damaged. The gang also attacked and badly damaged passing cars and motor cycles. About ten civilians sought medical attention for minor injuries. The house which was attacked belonged to an illicit liquor brewer. Only his wife and six children were in the house".

The uniformed men soon identified as members of Air Force, the elite service. The damage has been estimated at 1.6 million rupees. Earlier in the month, a captain was arrested for robbery — the pay roll. Soldiers and navy personnel have also been taken into custody in the recent past for all sorts of mayhem and crime.

Yet, for all these outrageous outbursts of indiscipline and lawlessness, the Armed Services and the Police are the State's sole instruments for maintaining Law and Order. What will happen when these very agencies disrupt that which they are expected to preserve? And what does it signify? What can the State do? (See Indemnity Bill).

Institutions crumble to announce cremors under the old structures of Sri Lankan society.

M.

DEAF

*Here, in the evening, is a brief peace
Seas murmur, cool hands on stone
Sign their minds release
The sea loves the land
Curve against curve they lie together
And in this surging love, in a trice
They are deaf to the growl of strife.*

U. Karunatilaka

'India is our friend. . . we will negotiate with India'

— Anura Bandaranaike

Among the more interesting themes which emerged from the 45-minute session conducted in Colombo by **Thomas Abraham**, THE HINDU's Colombo Correspondent.

— Mr. Bandaranaike's repeated emphasis that the SLFP was "not anti-Indian," even if it disagreed with aspects of Indian policy.

"Sri Lanka cannot be hostile to

India. This is a geopolitical reality. . . . We have to deal with India. India is our neighbour, India is our friend, and we would like to deal with India without having any problems".

— his differentiation between the SLFP's foreign policy stance and its approach to bilateral relations with India and the UNP's course. "I think that India felt that the Government of Sri Lanka was thoroughly hostile. . . . in fact, the Accord was forced by India. In my view, to keep Jayewardene in check."

(Continued on page 11)

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The Indo-Lanka Agreement of July, 1987: Retrospect

Shelton U. Kodikara (University of Colombo)

The Indo-Lanka Agreement signed on 29th July 1987 had antecedents going back to 1981, possibly even to an earlier period, and it had also an immediate antecedent in the paratropping of food supplies and drugs over the Jaffna peninsula by the Indian Air Force on 4th June 1987.

The significance of the year 1981 was that the Government of India for the first time made representations to the Government of Sri Lanka regarding violence against Tamils during the ethnic riots of that year, and the intervention of the Government of India was a direct result of representations made to it by the Government of Tamilnadu, led by the late M. G. Ramachandran, who had started to take an active interest in the affairs of Sri Lanka Tamils by this time.

It was certainly not the case that the Government of India's interest in Sri Lanka Tamils was entirely a matter of prodding from Tamilnadu. The ethnic riots of 1981 in Sri Lanka were a relatively mild affair compared to the serious proportions of the anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983, which had been sparked off by an act of Tamil terrorist violence directed against the Sri Lanka army in the North.

It would now appear to be the case that the Government of India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was even before 1983 arming and training Sri Lanka Tamil militant cadres in camps in India and using these cadres for intelligence gathering.¹

To answer the question why India was even at this early stage involving itself with a Sri Lankan terrorist movement one gets into the sphere of what is now often referred to as the

"geopolitical realities" of the South Asian region. Whether or not the term is regarded simply as a euphemism for India's predominance and pivotal position as the dominant power in this region, it certainly relates to the Indian view, postulated from the early post-independence years, that regional security was essentially an Indian concern and that states neighbouring India must adjust their security concerns in the context of the larger security of the Indian subcontinent, of which India was the sole custodian. Pakistan's non-compliance with this postulate and its basic divergences with India on a number of other issues, Kashmir included, involved it in four wars with India to date. But with the smaller states of South Asia, India, has from time to time asserted its own version of the Monroe Doctrine.² We do not include Bangladesh in the category of small states in the Southern region. Despite its low economic rating in the system of South Asian states, it is the most populous Muslim state in the region, the circumstances of its birth have insured it from undue interference from India, and it is pursuing a foreign policy which is quite divergent from that of India without any adverse consequences which are discernible.

It has been different with the smaller states of the region, Sikkim, largely because of its strategic position as a Himalayan gateway to India, lost its semi-independent status and was incorporated into the Indian union by Indian intervention in the internal instability in Sikkim which arose from rivalry between the Chogyal and the Sikkim Congress. Bhutan has improved somewhat from its protectorate status *vis à vis* India but cannot adopt any foreign

policy stance which is seen by India to affect its regional security interests. As regards Nepal, it was Nehru himself as early as 1950, who asserted the "hands off" policy to other powers and under whose aegis the Nepali monarchy consolidated its power against the hereditary Ranas in the internal political system.

In the case of both Bhutan and Nepal, however, India was acting in accordance with treaties concluded with these states in 1949 and 1950, respectively.

What was most significant about the Indo-Lanka Agreement of July 1987 was the manner in which, by one stroke of the pen, as it were, Sri Lanka was squarely brought into the Indian security fold under its terms where no commitment impinging on security had existed on paper in the dyadic relationship before.

The new security commitments are all included in the Letters of Exchange which accompanied the Agreement, not in the Agreement proper and are to the following effect:

1. The two countries "will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensure that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lanka relations".
2. Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.
3. Restoration and operation of the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.

¹ A paper presented to a two-day Seminar on 'The Accord' organised by the Colombo University. The writer is the Head of the International Relations Dept.

4. Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.

India's own reciprocal obligations under the Letters were to deport Sri Lankan citizens found to be engaged in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secession and to provide training facilities and military supplies to Sri Lankan security forces.

There are strong grounds for asserting that India's main objective in signing the Agreement was strategic — that is, that the Letters of Exchange contained the essential purpose of India's policy towards Sri Lanka, and that the proposals for the resolution of the ethnic crisis contained in the text of the Agreement and the Annexure were, in fact, subsidiary objectives, from the Indian view.

It is now generally agreed that a strong Indian perception after about 1980 that Sri Lanka's foreign policy was prejudicial to Indian security interests guided Indian policy towards Sri Lanka. Muni is exaggerating the case when he asserts that the Sri Lanka government "particularly since 1980 when Indira Gandhi came back to power in India, initiated moves to ruffle India's regional security sensitivities to force India compromise on the Tamil issue". These moves Muni has identified as:

- (a) employing "on the suggestion of the US", the Israeli intelligence agency and Western mercenary agencies to help it fight the Tamils",
- (b) exclusion of Indian tenders "from the oil tank farm development projects to suit the Western firms",
- (c) establishment of a "strategic relationship" including military supplies and exchange of military officers for training purposes with Pakistan and China, "India's known regional adversaries", and

(4) conclusion of a "fresh agreement with US for the expansion of the Voice of America facility in the Island", which could serve "military and intelligence purposes particularly with regard to the US ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean region".³

Muni makes reference to the LTTE militant leader Prabhakaran's disillusionment with the Government to India for "advancing their security interests in relation to Sri Lanka, at the cost of Tamil aspirations and sacrifices". The reference here is to what Muni has called the "fragile arrangement under which the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka (the homeland claimed for themselves by Sri Lanka Tamils) are to be merged provisionally under the terms of the Agreement until a referendum is held in the Eastern Province within a stipulated period to determine whether it would have a separate existence.

This aspect of the Agreement is discussed later in this paper. It is interesting, however, that Muni makes no mention of Trincomalee as being the subject of a "move" on the part of the Government of Sri Lanka to erode Indian security interests though he does mention that "US strategic calculations during the early eighties had viewed the utility of Trincomalee harbour in the chain of facilities available for the Western naval movements in the Indian Ocean."

It has now become abundantly clear that Indian opinion both official and unofficial had, throughout the eighties, been obsessed with the misperception that the US under pro-Western tilt in the Jayewardene Government's foreign policy was trying to obtain "base facilities" in Trincomalee. The well-known Indian journalist, Inder Malhotra, was expressing a consensus Indian view when he alleged both that the Sri Lanka government and its security forces were indulging in a deliberate "butchery" of Sri Lanka Tamil civilians "under the guise of fighting terrorism", and that what went on between the Government

of Sri Lanka and the United States over Trincomalee needed "to be watched very very carefully", an exhortation made more explicit by Professor K. Subramanyam in the following terms:

The U. S. appears to have accorded in the recent period a greater priority to Sri Lanka and its maritime facilities than was the case in the past. This is understandable in view of (a) the greater need for facilities in the Indian Ocean, because of the increased level of U. S. naval presence, and (b) to develop Sri Lanka or other similar alternatives as back-up options in the event of denial of the Subic Bay in the Philippines to the U. S. Navy at some future date.⁴

In the prosecution of the war against Tamil militants, civilians had inevitably become caught up in the cross-fire or became victims to bombardment, largely because militant strongholds were invariably located in the midst of civilian centres of population. After the Indian Peacekeeping force (IPKF) took over the campaign against these militants, however, it was the Indian army which became the target of reproach not only for civilian casualties, but also for other misdemeanours against the Tamil civilian population of Sri Lanka.⁵

Further, however much spokespersons for the U. S. government might disclaim intentions of making Trincomalee a base facility, the notion that this valued harbour could become a potential threat to India on its southern flank when it already had two powerful adversaries on its northern flank became an *idee fixe* in the collective Indian consciousness.

The Indo-Lanka Treaty of 1987 provided India with the guarantee not only that Trincomalee would not be used "in a manner prejudicial to Indian interests", but also that the oil tank farm located in Trincomalee would be jointly developed and operated by India and Sri Lanka.

When we consider these provisions of the Letters of Exchange which accompanied the 1987 Agreement, we are confronted by the familiar horns of the "security dilemma". The Letters represented a big victory for India and significant

enhancement in its prestige and power as the custodian of the security of South Asia. By the same token it also represented a loss of both power and esteem to Sri Lanka, a small state which had since independence in 1948 pursued an active role in international affairs.

India had a stake in the regional security of South Asia. At the same time, India had a stake in the ethnic crisis of Sri Lanka. Both India and Sri Lanka were caught in the convolutions of their own, and also in each other's domestic politics. India got involved in the peace process in Sri Lanka for reasons connected with its own internal political compulsions. Having done so, however, India also furthered its regional security interests at the expense of Sri Lanka.

II

The prelude to the Indo-Lanka Agreement of July 1987 was the dramatic and controversial paradropping, by the Indian Air Force, of food supplies and drugs for the Sri Lanka Tamil people of the North on 4th June 1987. The previous day, June 3rd the Sri-Lanka Navy had turned back a flotilla of boats carrying these selfsame supplies. The paradropping, therefore, came as a blatant show of force from the subcontinental Big Power, which sent five Mirage 2000 jets to accompany the cargo planes. The message was loud and clear. India was sending these relief supplies as a humanitarian gesture in support of the Sri Lanka Tamil population of the North, who were said to be suffering hardships both as a result of the cutting of fuel and other supplies by the Sri Lanka Government in retaliation against militant attempts to flout central authority and collect taxes as well as of a military offensive mounted by Sri Lankan security forces in Vadamarachchi in the Jaffna peninsula in May 1987.

The Vadamarachchi operation, which was meeting with success was suspended by the security forces because of the Government of India's

(itself triggered by Tamilnadu's remonstrances with New Delhi) on behalf of the militant Tamil cadres and their leaders. And the burden of the song both in Madras and New Delhi, was that the solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis should be a political not a military solution.

India's role in Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis sprang from three main considerations. First, the ethnic crisis of Sri Lanka had impinged on the internal politics of Tamilnadu, and pressure from Tamilnadu political parties on the problem of Sri Lanka Tamils had made them a part of the domestic political process for India. Second, separatism in Sri Lanka could have adverse repercussions on India which was itself faced with separatist demands in Punjab-Assam and elsewhere, so much so that India had a vested interest in Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity. The third dimension related to the strategic scenario mentioned in the first part of this paper which took precedence over the other two dimensions and which, essentially, amounted to India asserting its right to restrict the dimensions of the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis to

India is our...

(Continued from page 7)

— a more measured or moderate position than before on the presence of the IPKF and on the future of the Accord. Mr. Bandaranaike did not ask for an immediate withdrawal of the IPKF although he thought that SLFP government would not want the IPKF to stay on. He did not mention scrapping the Accord, but said that the SLFP in power would want to start talks with India to "negotiate" some aspects of the Accord.

— reiteration of the opposition to "merger" of the Northern and Eastern provinces (either on a permanent or provisional basis) combined with the recognition that some measure of devolution was necessary for the Tamils.

— the criticism that "the fundamental problem with the Accord is that the major parties to the conflict were never consulted... it was a quick fix."

a strictly regional framework of reference outside the ambit of extra-regional powers and also to asserting its right to be considered the sole regional arbiter in this crisis.

NEXT: India in Lanka's Internal Affairs

Notes

1. When precisely the arming and training of Sri Lanka militants in India began is not clear. According to a U.S. military intelligence analyst, the process had begun before 1983, and "mushroomed beyond New Delhi's control" thereafter. See Tom Marks, "Caucasus Insurgency in Sri Lanka: Asia's Dirty Little War", *Soldier of Fortune*, February 1987, p. 47.
2. S. D. Muni, "Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement: Regional Implications", *Motilal*, August 15, 1987, p. 19.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
4. Cf. Indar Malhotra, "Some Rude realities", *World Focus*, Vol. 6(11), November-December 1985, p. 16; Subrahmanyam's views are quoted in Sreedhar, "An Anatomy of the Trinamoolas Deal", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 8 (June 1984), p. 242.
5. In a statement made in July 1988, the LTTE has alleged that Indian troops had, during the previous nine months, killed a large number of Tamil civilians, raped women, and destroyed millions of rupees worth of property. See *Daily News*, July 12, 1988; for similar allegation by PLOT, another militant group, see *The Island*, 28 July 1988.

— the recognition that "there is substance" in the feeling among Sri Lankan Tamils that they have been discriminated against over the years. This is reflected in "the fact that the LTTE has been able to muster this kind of fighting force and... (in) the kind of sympathy they enjoy in the North."

— a statement of intention to the effect that the SLFP in power will "talk to the LTTE, negotiate with them directly, and on the basis of equality of all races in this country... begin our new approaches."

— a preference for bringing the JVP into the political process: "if they lay down their arms, and if they accept the democratic process, then they must have a stake in a future government... may not want to have it at all, but every effort must be made... I see no difference between my offer to Mr. Wijeweera and the President's offer to Mr. Prabhakaran."



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A bomb ticks in Pakistan

Hedrick Smith

Arshad Z. Pervez, A dark-haired Pakistani-born Canadian fond of polyester suits and known by the nickname Archie, hurried into the bar of Toronto's Hilton Harbour Castle hotel, fretting about the traffic. He was late for a rendezvous with John R. New, a balding middle-aged American who Pervez thought was a steel salesman. Nursing their Johnnie Walkers, the two men satled down to discuss their illicit export deal.

It was June 9, 1987. Seven months before, Pervez, a 42-year-old export-import trader, had met with Albert Tomley, International marketing manager of the Carpenter Steel Corporation of Reading, Pa., to inquire about buying 25 tons of a highly sensitive item: specially strengthened Maraging 350 steel. Tomley tipped off the United States Government, and customs agents set up a sting operation. John New, the "businessman" with whom Pervez was drinking in Toronto, was, in fact, an undercover agent.

Why, the Americans had asked several times, did Pervez's Pakistani client, a shady procurement firm headed by retired Pakistani Army Brigadier Inam ul-Haq, want this immensely strong steel? Pervez gave different answers. First he said that the steel would be melted down — implausible for such an expensive item. Later, Pervez said it would be used in the Pakistani space program, then in Karachi University's engineering department. Finally, he said it would be used to make high-speed turbines and compressors.

But American exports knew its real purpose: the steel would be shaped into super-strong, ultrafast gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium — the key ingredient in an atomic bomb.

Hedrick Smith is Washington correspondent for the New York Times magazine. His new book, "The Power Game: How Washington Works," was published by Random House.

"What the C.I.A. has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct... They told us Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but they now know we have it."

— **De Abdul Qadeer Khan**
Director of the Kahuta Uranium Enrichment Facility

The United States Government blocked an earlier Pakistani effort to export Maraging steel, but the Pakistanis had managed to acquire some in Europe. Now they were trying again — defying American law and violating President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq's repeated assurances to the American Government that Pakistan had no nuclear weapons program.

As the months of haggling came to a head on that June evening in Toronto, Pervez and New moved upstairs to the privacy of New's room. The smell of New's cigars bothered Pervez; he would have been more bothered had he known that Frank J. Rovello, another undercover agent, was next door, videotaping the meeting through a camera concealed in the television set in New's room.

The talk turned to delivery dates and letters of credit. Pervez wanted to be sure of his personal rake off, having arranged a big kickback — \$40,180 — by persuading Carpenter Steel to quote an inflated price and then skimming the profit.

Suddenly, Pervez expanded his shopping list. If this deal worked he said, he wanted 11 more shipments of steel, \$2 million worth in all. And he wanted to buy beryllium — "for the oil industry," he said, but to New it was a dead give-away; beryllium is used as casing for the fissile material in an atomic bomb to increase its explosive power. Pervez suggested bars of beryllium be smuggled out concealed in the steel shipments.

As they discussed the final shady steps of the operation, Pervez had a fleeting worry. Eyeing New he said: "You could be a spy".

"They don't hire spies that are bald-headed and have glasses" New said, waving him off. "They're all James Bond with the broads you know."

It was then the Pakistani made a telling admission: "The Kahuta client is ready."

"It's going to the Kahuta plant," New nodded, secretly triumphant on hearing the magic word.

American intelligence had identified Kahuta, a sprawling, heavily guarded facility in the hills east of Rawalpindi, as the centerpiece of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. It is at Kahuta that Pakistani scientists have fabricated the enriched uranium core of an atomic bomb.

In July, Pervez went to Pennsylvania to check the steel and to cash in his kickback. As he sat in his car with his wife and two children, customs agents arrested him.

Pervez's arrest set off a storm in Congress, with some Congressmen demanding an immediate halt to the huge American aid program to Pakistan. In August 1985, 14 months after three Pakistanis had been arrested in Houston trying to export triggering switches for atomic bombs, Congress had passed an amendment — dubbed the Solarz amendment after its sponsor, Representative Stephen J. Solarz,

a Brooklyn Democrat — requiring aid be cut off to any country caught trying to export restricted American equipment for a nuclear weapons program. The Solarz amendment was intended to stop precisely the kind of operation Pervez and his Pakistani supporters had brazenly launched only a year later.

Although President Zia denied all Government involvement — fuming in a December press interview that the Pervez affair was “a cooked-up case” arranged by the American Government to embarrass Pakistan — Pervez’s notebooks contained entries identifying his project as “atom” and “military” and noting that “my expert is procurement manager for nuclear plant”. And Pervez’s files included a letter from Brigadier Iqbal urging him to remember “the national interest.”

Despite this overwhelming evidence, on Dec. 18 — only a day after a Philadelphia jury convicted Pervez of conspiracy to export illegally beryllium and Maraging steel — a Congressional conference committee cleared the way for a massive new infusion of American aid to Pakistan. In January, President Reagan granted Pakistan a waiver from the aid cutoff imposed by the Solarz amendment, declaring that continued aid to Pakistan was “in the national interest.”

To many Congressmen, the Pervez case forced an unpalatable either/or choice: either support the aid to Pakistan, thereby insuring the continued flow of arms to the mujaheddin rebels battling Soviet troops in neighboring Afghanistan; or vote for an aid cutoff, thus strengthening the American campaign to stop the spread of nuclear weapons — and perhaps preventing an incipient nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India. A minority argued that Washington could cut aid to Pakistan and still get aid to the Afghans.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz made a personal appeal to Congress: after President Reagan’s summit talks with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Shultz said Moscow was on the verge of withdrawing from Afghanistan — this was no time to pull the rug out from under the Pakistani Govern-

ment. In the end, a majority went along, but some prominent Democrats in the House, including Solarz, Howard E. Wolpe of Michigan, and Mel Levine of California, and in the Senate, including Ohio’s John Glenn and California’s Alan Cranston, vehemently protested.

“We have 132 nations who have pledged not to go the nuclear weapons route,” Glenn said in an interview, referring to the signers of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. “The danger of not keeping faith with those other nations — and seeing more of them go the nuclear weapons route — is a far greater danger to the world than being afraid to cut off the flow of aid to Afghanistan. It’s the short-term versus the long term.”

In January, in a report compiled for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 experts on nuclear proliferation underscored that long-term danger. “If present trends continue, an open-ended nuclear arms race in South Asia appears inevitable; arguably it has already begun” they wrote. “If the ongoing tensions between (Pakistan and India) cannot be eased, . . . there is reasonable cause for concern that momentum will build for the integration of nuclear armaments into the armed forces of both nations. . . . The inherent risk that nuclear weapons might be used would also grow.”

Both Pakistan and India are on the brink of building nuclear arsenals — although so far, according to American officials, Washington has no hard evidence that either country has actually assembled atomic bombs. Indeed, last Dec. 17, President Reagan certified to Congress — as he must each year to justify aid to Pakistan — that “Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.”

But Administration officials told Congress last month that both countries have all the components as well as the technical ability to assemble nuclear weapons very quickly. Robert A. Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, said bluntly that “Pakistan

has acquired the technical capabilities needed to possess a nuclear explosive device, but so far has not made the political decision to do so. . . .”

The prevailing Government estimate is that it would take Pakistan at most a few weeks or months to assemble a bomb once President Zia gave the go-ahead. Some officials share Representative Solarz’s view that it’s more “a matter of hours or days.” The different estimates largely depend on officials’ uncertainty over whether the Pakistanis have yet taken one of the final steps — precision machining the uranium-metal core.

The American estimate is that by the end of 1987, Pakistan had produced enough fissionable weapons-grade uranium for four to six atomic bombs, and India enough plutonium for about 40. The Pakistanis, asserted Representative Solarz, “have the nuclear equivalent of a Saturday night special. It may not be technically elegant, but it’s capable of doing the job.”

The buildup continues, and Carnegie’s task force of experts estimates that “by late 1990, Pakistan could have as many as 15 Hiroshima-size devices, while India might have produced more than 100.”

Before 1966, India had a significant technical edge. It had tested a nuclear device in 1974; Pakistan has never held an atomic test, although since mid-1985, according to American officials, the Pakistanis have tested several of the carefully shaped, high-explosive implosion devices needed to achieve the explosive chain reaction in an atomic bomb.

American experts believe the Pakistanis do not need to test an actual bomb. Sometime during the early 1980’s, they say, the Chinese gave the Pakistanis a rollable, tested bomb design, exchange for Pakistan’s sharing its modern uranium-enriching technology. During the last several years, Chinese scientists have reportedly visited or worked off and on at Pakistan’s Kahuta facility.

The Chinese design, American officials say, enables Pakistan to produce a much more sophisticated atomic bomb than the crude five-

can weapon an American B-29 dropped on Hiroshima. American officials estimate that while India can make a bomb weighing less than a ton, Pakistan can make one weighing less than 400 pounds.

The more sophisticated the design, the smaller can be the bomb," an American official explained. "So you can put it on more planes other than big, slow transports — in Pakistan's case, on American F-16's or French Mirage V's."

Two key events served as the catalysts that drove Pakistan in its relentless campaign to build an atomic bomb. In 1971, India defeated Pakistan in the bloody war that gave Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, its independence. Three years later, India exploded its own nuclear device — prompting Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Pakistan's Prime Minister, to declare that Pakistanis would "eat grass" if necessary to match India.

The Pakistani drive to achieve rough nuclear parity with India has depended on a global network of clandestine agents, operating through dummy corporations and third countries, who have worked doggedly and ingeniously to acquire the embargoed, high-priced technology for "the hot box" (as Western agents refer to Pakistan's nuclear program). In one operation that lasted three years, for example, an entire raw uranium processing plant was exported from West Germany to Pakistan — piece by piece.

Since the mid 1970s, Western police and intelligence agents from Hong Kong to Houston have tracked the Pakistani network. In June 1984, three Pakistanis were arrested in Houston for illegally trying to export 50 krytrons, ultra-high-speed electronic switches used in atomic bombs. Two turned state's evidence and the third pleaded guilty to a lesser charge, serving only three months in jail before being deported. Cables found in the defendant's possession linked him to the director of procurement for Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission.

Last July, just a week after Pervoz was arrested, an American couple, Arnold I. and Roma K. Mandel, were indicted in Sacramento on charges of illegally exporting \$993,000 worth of sensitive electronic equipment, including oscilloscopes used to analyze elements in an atomic bomb; some of it was bound for Pakistan.

In all of these cases, the Pakistani Government routinely denied any involvement.

The central, almost legendary figure in the Pakistani scientific cabal is Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a tall urbane German-educated metallurgist who is the founder and director of the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility. During the early 1970's Khan worked for a Dutch engineering firm where he gained access to classified uranium enrichment facilities in Almelo, the Netherlands. After he returned to Pakistan, the Dutch Government charged that he had taken with him designs for the enrichment process, as well as detailed lists of the equipment needed for uranium enrichment and their Western manufacturers — in short the industrial blueprint for Kahuta.

At home, Khan is a prominent figure, hailed as "the Einstein of Pakistan." American officials say he has direct access to President Zia (who is believed to have taken a great interest in the nuclear program, despite his diplomatic pose of ignorance). Khan likes to boast, declaring in a press interview in March 1987, for example, that "what the C.I.A. has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct. . . . They told us Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but they now know we have it."

Around the same time, President Zia himself told Time magazine that "Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes." Khan and Zia made their statements as India was conducting large-scale military exercises near the Pakistani frontier, and some American officials suspect the Pakistanis were warning New Delhi to beware of Pakistan's nuclear muscle.

But Zia hastened to add that his Government did not actually intend to make atomic bombs — playing on an ambivalence that has long kept the United States Government off balance.

Over the years, Zia has outfoxed Washington, cleverly moving Pakistan to the threshold of becoming a nuclear weapons state without forfeiting American aid. He has repeatedly brushed aside American "red lines" seeking to impose limits on his program, and refused demands to open the Kahuta plant to international inspection. As Solerz put it, "He's played this country like Jascha Heifetz played the violin."

Three American Presidents — Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan — have tried and failed to halt Pakistan's march toward an atomic bomb. In 1976, Ford sent then Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to try to talk Pakistan out of buying a plutonium reprocessing plant from France. Carter cut off aid the following year. After the United States persuaded France to cancel the deal, American aid was resumed; but Carter cut it off again in 1979, when he learned of the uranium enrichment plant being built in Kahuta.

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and suddenly the policy equation was turned upside down: the following year Carter offered Zia \$400 million and Zia spurned it. In 1981, President Reagan promised Zia an enormous \$3.2 billion, six-year aid package. The Reagan Administration also persuaded Congress to grant Pakistan a six-year waiver of the law barring aid to a country that imports unsafeguarded enrichment technology. Zia was a vital ally Reagan officials argued, and providing him with modern conventional arms would give him an incentive to slow down his atomic push.

By 1984, however, White House officials were receiving alarming intelligence reports from Kahuta. In August, President Reagan drafted a letter to Zia warning Pakistan not to cross "the red

line" of enriching uranium above 5 percent. (Weapons grade is 90 percent enriched Natural uranium is only 0.7 percent but scientists say that reaching 5 percent is a critical ceiling, because it entails completing most of the work needed to reach weapons-grade.) But though some officials urged Reagan to issue an unambiguous warning, the President's letter, sent on Sept. 12, was a compromise—warning that if Zia crossed the 5 percent "red line," he would face unspecified "grave consequences."

In November 1984, according to American officials, President Zia gave written assurances to Reagan that the American limit would be respected. But Pakistan's Ambassador, Jamshed K. A. Markor insisted in a recent interview that "there was never a commitment on the percentage."

Within a year, American intelligence reported "the red line" had been violated. Yet when Reagan met Zia at the United Nations in October 1985, according to one senior adviser, the President did not challenge the Pakistani leader about the breach. By mid-1986, this official said, a Special National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Kahuta had gone all the way—it had produced weapons grade uranium.

By late 1987, after Pervaz's arrest and after Reagan's six-year aid package had run out, the debate over suspending or at least reducing American aid went public. At the heart of the debate was a basic disagreement over the central question: how much leverage can Washington reasonably expect to exert—foreign aid program or not—when it comes to a matter that President Zia obviously regards as essential to Pakistan's national survival?

Shultz and Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for political Affairs, argued that cutting aid to Pakistan would not stop President Zia's atomic program. What's more, State and Defense Department officials contended that an aid cutoff might provoke Zia, a proud nationalist, into actually testing a bomb to prove his indepen-

dence, whereas continuing aid might convince him to refrain from crossing that final threshold.

As Armacost said in an interview, Pakistan is "a country that on one frontier which has exploded a nuclear device, and on another frontier has the Soviet Union putting pressure on (it) through Afghanistan, and doing it daily." In this view, the very unpredictability of American aid has impelled Pakistan to seek a nuclear deterrent. Said Armacost: "The constant debates in Congress about cutting off aid, and our past aid, and our past aid cutoffs, plus the election of a new (American) President—all these have driven the Pakistanis not to rely totally on us..."

Glenn, Solarz, Kenneth L. Adelman, then director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and some C. I. A. officials countered that even if American aid to Pakistan were cut, Zia would continue the aid flow to Afghan rebels. "The Paks are aiding the Afghan mujaheddin not as a favor to the United States but in their own interest," Solarz asserted. "They are desperate to get the three million Afghan refugees out of their country and the only way to do that is to get the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan."

As for the argument that cutting off aid would provoke Zia into testing a bomb, Solarz and the other dissenters argue that the Pakistanis have refrained from exploding a bomb not because they fear a response from Washington but one from New Delhi—that a test would set off an Indian response, possibly even a reprisal. "We know the Indians have a capability that exceeds ours," Pakistani Ambassador Markor acknowledged. "Right now, they have enough plutonium for at least 16 to 20 hydrogen bombs and there aren't 16 targets, in all of Pakistan. So it doesn't make sense for us to test."

Finally, those who advocated an aid cutoff argued, the time had come for the United States to set an example for other would-be nuclear nations, to

enforce the legal sanctions passed by Congress, and to protect the President's credibility. "It's terrible to have the President cock the trigger and not pull it," Adelman declared. "His credibility is on the line."

But last December, neither the Administration nor the majority in Congress wanted to risk a rift with Pakistan—especially with the Soviet Union talking about withdrawing from Afghanistan. In the dying days of the 1987 Congress, a petition by Solarz and two dozen other House Democrats on cutting aid to Pakistan was sidetracked. And a conference committee shelved Senator Glenn's effort to condition the new Pakistan aid package on "ve liable" assurances that Pakistan was not producing weapons-grade uranium.

In mid-January, President Reagan set aside the final, embarrassing legal obstacle raised by the Pervaz case, and the American aid program to Pakistan was resumed. When Arshio Pervaz was sentenced to five years in jail last month, it barely caused a ripple.

Today, despite assurances from senior Pakistani officials that orders have been given to respect American laws, customs agents detect no slackening in the Pakistanis' hunt for hot technology.

"My sense is the Pakistani effort is not really hindered or halted by anything the U. S. does," said one senior customs official. Last month, Robert Peck of the State Department testified to Congress that, though some Pakistani operations have been stopped, "We are aware of some activities which give us cause for continuing concern."

But if Gorbachev begins to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan by next May, as he has suggested he will, the specter of a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan may bring more compelling pressures on American policy. Staunch advocates of nuclear nonproliferation believe that Soviet withdrawal will alter the political dynamics in Congress, and they are preparing to seize the opening.

(Continued on page 20)

The implantation of Sociology in Asia

Ralph Pieris

The intellectual dependence of colonial social science on Western models continued after independence. As mentioned earlier, this dependence led to the introduction of those disciplines which were most dehumanized, farthest removed from contemporary realities. Yet the humanistic, less technical, political economy, which took cognizance of non-economic variables may well be more appropriate for Asian countries than modern economic science; for, as Myrdal explains:

... while in the Western world an analysis in economic terms — markets and prices, and unemployment, consumption and savings, investment and output — that abstracts from modes and levels of living and from attitudes, institutions, and culture may make sense and lead to valid inferences, or analogous procedure plainly does not in underdeveloped countries. There are times when such abstractions; a realistic analysis must deal with the problems in terms that are attitudinal and institutional and take into account the very low levels of living and culture.¹⁷

The implantation of Western-oriented theories and methods continues likewise in other social sciences. In sociology, the validity of the random opinion survey for Asian countries has been contested. The applicability of many other theoretical models such as the Parsonian 'pattern variables' has been questioned.¹⁸ In psychology, test materials such as the Thematic Apperception, based as they are on Western cultural themes, are again meaningless in Asian contexts.

It is in anthropology that the very assumptions of Western scholarship are open to serious question. A sense of urgency prevails because, owing to rapid transformation or even disappearance of ancient cultures, 'anthropology is in danger of losing the largest portion of its laboratory just at the time when it becomes able to use it effectively.'¹⁹ Hence the urgent need to record 'all sorts of data on societies which are now rapidly changing.' For developing countries the year or two during which these changing

societies are 'pegged down' for the purpose of ethnological recording uses up one of the scarcest factors in development — namely, time. The task of planners in developing societies is to create new, national identities qualitatively different from the parochial affiliations which interest ethnologists. The preservation of the minutiae of local traditions is an antiquarian exercise. Clearly the urgencies of Western anthropology are diametrically opposed to the aspirations of developing countries. They converge only in so far as the elites of new nations succumb to nativist pressures to 'preserve' tradition. And indeed, in respect of the social sciences, there is a curious equivalence between modern urban-industrial societies and traditionalistic communities in which no development takes place at all, in the sense that both are amenable to analysis in terms of formal models. As Gerschenkron points out:

... Paradoxical as it may sound, the analysis hatched on a general standard for values is best adapted to, say, the Navaho Indians on the one hand and to the present American society on the other. This perhaps explains the strong affiliation that exists between anthropology and modern sociology, and perhaps the strong though illusory feeling, so frequently expressed, that *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose* — illusory because it overlooks the fact that the conceptual schemes may have had much less well for the intervening stages of development.²⁰

The humanities, including sociology, flourish in societies at the intervening stages of development.

The position of social science in Asian countries was not improved by the post-independence entry of academic institutions of non-colonial powers to the Asian scene, amounting to a 'virtual' bombardment of massive Western research on the underdeveloped countries in recent times.²¹ Apart from current allegations of 'academic colonialism', of the use made of foreign social scientists for intelligence work in Asian countries, sometimes sub-contracted to impoverished local schol-

ars,²² there remains the fact that in many countries the foreign research was detrimental to the endogenous development of the social sciences. Instead, Asian scholars were devoting themselves to problems and areas of research determined in the West using Western methods and theories. Moreover, the raw material for the development of 'area study programmes', and institutes of Asian studies created in the West, was provided by scholars of underdeveloped countries, without equal advantage to themselves. The president of a leading American university remarked that during summer, faculty members of United States universities 'have scattered to the corners of the earth — not to escape, but to learn. And on their return, like bees from honey flights, the entire university hive is the beneficiary.'²³ The developing countries are the sources of the honey which goes to enrich the academic hives of the West. By 'supervising' doctoral candidates from Asian countries, the university professor of the Occident gains an experience denied to his Asian counterpart, who must forever be content to accept dictation of aims and methods of social science from the West, even if ill-adapted to the study of his own situation.

A radical solution has been proposed by an Indian writer, on the assumption that sufficient assistance has been received in the past twenty years, and further continuation of that assistance 'can be only at the risk of distorting the development of normal process' of scholarship. In fact the next five years should be 'construed as the time of consolidation for work in the social science disciplines', and it may even be desirable to declare a moratorium on foreign academic aid during this five-year period.²⁴ This thesis is supported by the Japanese experience. According to Kunio Odaka, the 'state of prolific confusion and diversity' in post-war sociology in Japan, 'became even more marked in the

present period because scientific communication with Western countries was reopened. In this sense the flourishing and prosperous growth in the post-war years contained its own dangers.' A search for focus became necessary.³²

The task of sociology in the developing countries of Asia and Africa has been outlined by Jan Szczepanski, President of the International Sociological Association:

... Some of these are very old civilizations, much older than the European, and they are searching now for proper ways of modernization and for a modern national identity. Some are trying to advance from their traditional tribal organization to modern national organization, but at the same time are anxious not to lose their ancient cultural identity. The ambition of sociologists from these countries is to build up their own systems of sociology capable of providing a set of concepts and theories that will permit more adequate description of their societies than do the concepts and theories developed in Europe and America. And it is in this endeavour that they see the differentia specifica of their sociology.³³

Unfortunately, few sociologists in the Asian region have set themselves this task as a real ambition, most sociologists being content to adopt the Western conceptual kit without serious question as to its transferability. In Japan alone, a long tradition of sociology, dates from about 1879, when the word *shakaigaku* or sociology first appeared in print. Since 1935 certain sociologists criticized the analytical view of formal and psychological as sociology abstract and sterile. According to Shimet, sociology is a synthesizing science whose mission it was to study the interrelations of the various fields of social life.³⁴ In other countries, the the social structure and culture provided built-in modes of adaptation to social change,³⁵ so that the radical disorientation which engenders sociology is absent, and the discipline can be implanted only as a dehumanized technique for social book-keeping. For the rest, social awareness is only just beginning to manifest itself, having so long been thwarted by traditionalism. Some sensitive scholars developed humanistic interests

outside their disciplines. It is significant that a leading Thai economist has chosen to study the life and writings of King Chulalongkorn (1853-1910) who was responsible for the selective modernization of Thai Society. Such studies can have a greater significance for the growth of the social sciences in Thailand than abstract economic theorizing.³⁶

A basic prerequisite for the social awareness which is the harbinger of sociology, is a correct diagnosis of historical situations.³⁷ This involves clarification of the repertory of convictions and aspirations of a people. These ideas are not always in the forefront of men's consciousness. Periods of radical transformation however give rise to paradigmatic experiences which induce thinkers and social reforms to articulate their convictions, and it is these articulations that, in the final analysis, come to be the bases for a science of society. And it is here that sociology stands at the cross-roads in Asia. For traditionalism has not completely lost its hold. A report on an essay contest designed to ascertain the Indonesian image of their national self states: 'About ten per cent of the entries are concerned with Western influences on Indonesia, and three-quarters of all these comments are negative. Western culture must be discarded in favour of traditional culture to avoid divisive and debilitating cultural clashes... there are only a few direct references to progress as an important national objective...'³⁸

Many intellectuals see it as their task to withdraw into contemplation of a cultural heritage, inspired by political leaders who advocate a programme of social reconstruction which will base contemporary society traditional values. But reviled out of its context, tradition becomes schematic, formalist, utopian, for the simple reason that it does not arise out of contact with the actualities of contemporary life. And committed to an existence based on this shadowy image of tradition, even the intelligentsia exists on a derivative level, fearing to live spontaneously lest they be branded as traitors.

It is understandable that traditionalism centred though it may be on superficial caprices, and offering only a derivative life, has evoked considerable popular response. But it is the reaction of people in revolt against the vacuity of their actual life, a people who, having lost the capacity for sincerity of feeling or knowledge, take up an idealized, utopian image of tradition to lend meaning to their lives. Reflecting current ideological trends, sociologists in some Asian countries have adopted theoretical models which, by analysing social structure in terms of elements of immobile societies, have in fact assumed the utopian image of society, an assumption which is detrimental to realistic research on contemporary problems.³⁹ Sociology can emerge in Asian countries only as a consequence of erosion of an empty traditionalism, which hampers understanding of the demands of a changing society. For only with the eclipse of traditionalism can a live faith be evolved appropriate for contemporary reality, and it is in such a context that a live sociology can grow. As Herbert Marcuse has wisely said, 'Such abstraction which refuses to accept the given universe of facts as the final context of validation, such "transcending" analysis of the facts in the light of their arrested and denied possibilities, pertains to the very structure of social theory.'⁴⁰

Postscript

The situation of the social sciences differs considerably in the different countries of Asia. Economics was the earliest to be established in the universities, usually as a major social science department or faculty, within which some other disciplines were more or less uneasily accommodated. Anthropology was prominent, particularly in former colonies and in countries with tribal populations. Political science was a major faculty in those countries which followed the classification of the social sciences in the colonizing states of continental Europe, e.g. Vietnam.

It was sociology and social psychology that were the latecomers. When

the University of Ceylon emerged as an autonomous degree-granting institution in 1942, there was no provision for either psychology or sociology; the library did not have any of Freud's work, and the only work on sociology was Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*, because it happened to be published in a series on Philosophy. Even when sociology was introduced earlier in countries like India, it had a chequered career. It is least developed outside India and Japan, and has yet to emerge in some countries. Even in India, sociology has been a spillover into the universities from tribal research institutes and anthropological surveys, and bears the marks of its origin. This genesis of sociology had its impact on the scope and methods of research (witness the anthropological museum in Calcutta University) and on the content of university curricula. In general, it encouraged microscopic village studies, and macro-social research which would have been useful for planners and administrators was neglected.

The achievements of social scientists in Asia then, are negligible, peripheral to the progress of the disciplines in the west; imitative rather than innovative. Nor do I believe that the backward state of these disciplines — and Asian social scientists would be the first to admit these deficiencies, usually attributing academic backwardness to lack of "facilities" and funds — can be necessarily remedied by the introduction of non-existent subjects like sociology into university syllabi, or by strengthening weak disciplines by the employment of foreign scholars. It is the absence of international development within the social sciences, as transplanted in Asia, that is responsible for the absence of disciplines such as sociology, and that lack of internal development is attributable to the insulation of social scientists from significant practical problems. Where there has been awareness of the need for a discipline like sociology, scholars have been remarkably ingenious in smuggling it in via the established disciplines. In Europe sociology did not flourish as an autonomous discipline in the universities until

recently. The founding fathers — Durkheim, Weber, Simmel and Pareto, held university chairs in other disciplines — economics and philosophy.⁴¹ But pressing social problems impelled them to move outside the frontiers of their disciplines, narrowly defined. In other words, the existing disciplines — philosophy, political economy and law — proved inadequate to encompass the range of social phenomena encountered in the real world, and a new science was called for, though its shape and content had necessarily to differ from what its originators, Comte and Herbert Spencer, conceived it to be. That, it seems to me, is the manner in which any social science can take root, and become part of the living intellectual tradition of a given country.

On the other hand, where new disciplines have been artificially grafted on to the academic institutions of new states, without the intellectual ferment to generate them from within, they languish in an existential vacuum, or vegetate as formal "subjects" adopted from a foreign intellectual tradition and imposed on students by uncommitted teachers. We have already cited Durkheim's preconditions for the spontaneous growth of sociology. Where there is satisfaction with traditional institutions and values, where intellectuals are eager to justify traditional cultures, nothing can induce thought to apply itself to social problems. Social and economic development has to proceed in terms of traditional categories of thought. Faith in the power of reason, that is, science, to study and shape social reality — the second precondition for the emergence of sociology — was, according to Durkheim, present in France where the old social order had been more completely uprooted than elsewhere. The French Revolution was not merely emancipation of the masses from political bondage; it paved the way for liberation of the mind, for conscientization.⁴²

In colonial conditions both these preconditions were lacking. Traditionalism remained the dominant ideology. Where it was shaken colonial rule, it was western social science that was available to under-

stand the changes taking place and to postulate the goals of the new social order that was to emerge. Highly abstract specialism such as econometrics splintered off from the sociologizing mode of classical political economy. Practitioners of the economizing mode, divorced from political and ethical realities, revelled in what Veblen called "fantasied universes of self-contained meaning". The most abstract forms of economics gained currency in colonial universities, and the intellectual dependence of colonial times continued unabated after independence. The Economic Problem was the focus of attention, and belied the prognosis of Lord Keynes in 1945 that "the day is not far off when the Economic Problem will take the back seat where it belongs, and the arena of the heart and the head will be occupied, or reoccupied, by our real problems of life and of human relations, of creation and behaviour and religion". The best minds in Asia addressed their research to some invisible jury in an intellectual centre of gravity in the west, and in so doing, tacitly accepted exogenous values as development goals.

It should be recalled that savants like Radhakamal Mukherjee, who wrote on institutional economics in the 'twenties, were disregarded by the Economic Establishment. The revival of the institutional approach was a "pizza effect", reentering its country of origin through the western-oriented approach of Gunnar Myrdal, whose *Asian Drama* makes no mention of the sociologizing mode pioneered by Mukherjee, or even the founding fathers Durkheim, Pareto and Weber. Perhaps this was to underscore the "originality" of his approach. But a basic problem remains: whereas Myrdal's modernization ideals would require a radical change in the psychology, culture and social structure of undeveloped countries, the disciplines concerned do not come into the picture. In contrast, Pareto took the position that non-rational behaviour was more widespread than rational, and proceeded on that assumption, without attempting changes in prevailing patterns of behaviour via disciplines such

as psychology. Hagen's *On the Theory of Social Change* remains the only attempt by an economist to penetrate the psychological dimension.

Notes

24. G. Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, Vol. 1, p. 19-20, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968.
25. cf. Saran, *op. cit.*
26. W. C. Sturtevant, Urgent Anthropology, in *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 8, No. 4, October 1967, p. 335.
27. A. Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, p. 67, Harvard University Press, 1962.
28. Myrdal, *ibid.* This 'bombardment' is not always productive of results. 'Although American social scientists have been pouring into Mexico for 50 years, there is hardly a piece of research that gives us any real information about the country' (Joan Davies, review of Cumberland's *Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity* (Oxford University Press), in *New Society*, 24 October 1968.
29. cf. the timely discussion in Seminar, 112, December 1968 on 'Academic Colonialism. A Symposium on the Influences which Destory Intellectual Independence'. For an account of a conference convened to examine criticism of foreign researchers by South-East Asian scholars cf. G. Kanabele, 'Academic Imperialism in South-East Asia', *East-West Center Magazine*, Vol. 1, No. 1, spring 1968.
30. J. A. Perkins, *The University in Transition*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1966 (my italics) p. 21.
31. G. Kumar, Servitude of the Mind, *Seminar*, No. 112, December 1968, p. 34.
32. K. Odaka, Sociology In Japan, in H. Becker and A. Boskoff (eds.), *Sociological Theory in Continuity and Change*, p. 720, New York, Dryden Press, 1957.
33. J. Szezepanski, 'The International Sociological Association and Development of World Sociology', *Sociological Abstracts*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 15 February 1968.
34. Odaka, *op. cit.*, p. 713, 717.
35. It is not possible to consider in detail the implications of the 'loosely structured' society and pragmatic culture of Thailand, but see G. Wijeyawardene, 'A Note on Irrigation and Agriculture in a North Thai Village', *Felicitation Volume of Southeast Asian Studies*, Bangkok, Siam Society, 1965. 'A group of psychiatrists touring the world stated that the Thai were mentally the healthiest people they had encountered anywhere' H. Freyn, 'Culture and Economics in Thailand', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 12 January 1961.
36. Prachoom Chomchai, *Chulalongkorn the Great*, Tokyo, Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1965 (East

Asian Cultural Studies Series No. 8). Professor Chomchai is planning a further study on the basis of documents he has collected. In India, it is remarkable that no sociologist has undertaken an analysis of the writings of Mahatma Gandhi, although there are systematic compilations of his works.

37. Mannheim, *loc. cit.*
38. G. J. Pauker, 'Indonesian Images of their National Self', *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Special Issue on Attitude Research in Modernizing Areas, p. 310, 317, 1958.
39. cf. R. Dahrendorf, Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64, No. 2, 1958.
40. H. Marcuse, *One-dimensional Man* (London, Sphere Books, 1968).
41. In India, D. P. Mukherji, Professor of Economics at Lucknow University, adopted the sociologizing mode of thought (cf. particularly his *Diversities*).
42. That is, critical self-insertion into reality. Paulo Freire, *Cultural Action For Freedom* (London; Penguin, 1972) p. 42.

(Concluded)

A bomb...

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If there is one lesson those advocates might draw from the Pakistan story, it is that the drive for nuclear weapons is deeply bound up with the issue of national survival. Nations like Pakistan — as well as Israel and South Africa, which experts assert have advanced even further down the path of building nuclear arsenals — perceive themselves surrounded and menaced by enemies. They are therefore unwilling to forswear the nuclear option without durable security agreements.

During the last 40 years, the long and bitter tensions between India and Pakistan have three times flared into war, and have nearly done so on several other occasions. It is possible that the two states will continue to hover in their present, highly precarious situation — both on the brink of building nuclear arsenals. Or one of them, perhaps prompted by some incident, may break the barrier by testing a weapon.

There is a third possibility that India and Pakistan, perhaps under diplomatic pressure from outside, will conclude an agree-

ment to prevent an escalation of their nuclear arms race.

In 1985, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reached a verbal agreement with Zia that neither side would attack the other's nuclear facilities. But the understanding has never been formalized, and it did nothing to stop the nuclear competition.

Since then, Pakistan has offered to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India does, to agree to a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia if India does, to accept outside inspection of its nuclear facilities if India does, and to forswear nuclear tests if India will.

So far, the Indians — who themselves are worried about China's nuclear forces — have been unwilling to put themselves on a par with the Pakistanis. India has resisted American entreaties to forswear nuclear testing or to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, arguing that this amounts to discrimination by the super-powers. Only if the big powers agree to stop testing will India go along.

In the opinion of many American diplomats and private experts, the situation demands a new diplomatic drive — involving Moscow as well as Washington — to press hard for a regional accord.

What you're looking at is two de facto nuclear weapons countries looking across a common border," observed Leonard S. Spector, who chaired the group that wrote the Carnegie Endowment report. "Each has to take the other's nuclear capability very seriously and do some planning, and that starts them up the escalator: first, accumulate components; third figure out where the weapons would be assembled and what planes would carry them, perhaps training pilots and doing military planning.

"So far we've been dealing with nuclear installations," Spector said. "It will go to militarization. That's where we're heading. The trick is to intervene now and stop that part of the process. We have to bring around before both sides start building weapons and deploying them".

The religious "doubt" of the perfect Spy

David Ignatius

WASHINGTON

Say what you like about Harold (Kim) Philby, the Soviet spy who died in Moscow last week. He was a traitor to his country and class, a cad with women, an unreconstructed Stalinist. But the fact is, he made a lot of people very rich.

Not directly, of course. Mr. Philby was stuck in Moscow the last 25 years, thousands of miles from the nearest literary agency. But his incredible life story was cold and sold so many times, in spy novels and nonfiction books, that he might as well have been a hamburger franchise. Readers may have known him as Bill Haydon or Magnus Pym or Maurice Castle, but the characters were usually versions of Kim Philby.

Mr. Philby was truly the perfect spy. He had all the masks available to a member of the British ruling class: the weatherbeaten face, the slight scammer, the charming diffidence, the protective alcoholism. When reporters from *The Sunday Times* of London published the first biography exposing details of his treason in 1966, they called him "the spy who betrayed a generation". They were not overstating the case. The Philby story, as told and retold, established the modern archetype of betrayal.

His crime was larger than life. He was a charming, brilliant man, the son of a distinguished British explorer and a product of the self-protecting world of the British upper class. He entered the British Secret Intelligence Service in 1940 and quickly became one of its brightest young lights. He stayed on the fast track after the war, serving as chief of British counterespionage operations against the Soviet Union, then as the SIS representative

in Washington, where he socialized often with his old friend James Angleton, the CIA counter-intelligence chief.

He seemed to lead a charmed life until 1951, when the British spies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean fled suddenly to the Soviet Union and Mr. Philby came under suspicion as the "third man" who tipped them off. The British lacked hard proof that Mr. Philby was a Russian agent, and he was initially cleared. But when new evidence emerged in 1963 and the British appeared ready to reopen the case, Mr. Philby fled to Moscow.

Why did he do it and how did he get away with it? Those questions have haunted spy writers — and fattened their bank accounts — ever since.

"None of us is yet equal to the dimensions of this scandal," the British spy novelist and former spy John le Carré wrote in an introduction to the 1966 biography of Mr. Philby. "Like a great novel, and an unfinished one at that, the story of Kim Philby lives on in us."

Mr. le Carré's novels helped make the themes of the Philby — betrayal and decay in the spy world — into a literary sensibility that changed modern fiction. In *George Smiley*, Mr. le Carré created a kind of anti-Philby, a stolid, overweight, world-weary and resolutely middle-class spy who must reckon with the havoc created by Philbys. In "Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy", the book that introduced the term "mole" into common usage, a Philby-like character named Bill Haydon betrays Smiley's SIS and seduces his wife, Ann, as well.

"Haydon had betrayed", writes le Carré at the end of the novel. "As a lover, a colleague, a friend; as a patriot, as a member of that inestimable body that Ann loosely called the Set; in every capacity. Haydon had overly pursued one aim and secretly achieved its opposite. Smiley knew very well that even now he did not grasp the scope of that appalling duplicity.

Mr. le Carré explored the deeper mysteries of the Philby case in his most recent novel, "A Perfect Spy." He focused on the complex psychological factors that lead the book's protagonist, Magnus Pym, to commit treason. In discussing Magnus' relationship with a manipulative father, Mr. le Carré echoed what he had written almost 20 years before about the real-life Philby:

"Duplicity for Kim Philby was something of a family tradition. However Philby reacted to his eminently distasteful father, whether he wished to destroy or outshine him, or merely to follow in his footsteps, he could hardly fail, in the outposts where they lived, to inherit many of his characteristics." If St. John Philby "had labored all his life to create in Kim the irresistible chemistry of the boy's later betrayal, he could not have done much more," Mr. le Carré wrote.

It was the theology of betrayal, rather than the psychology, that fascinated Graham Greene. The novelist had worked closely with Mr. Philby in the SIS during the war, and he remained in contact even after Mr. Philby went to Russia. In a 1966 introduction to Mr. Philby's autobiography, "My Silent War," Mr. Greene described a man tortured, like so many of Mr. Greene's fictional characters, by a crisis of faith.

"Like many Catholics who, in the reign of Elizabeth, worked for the victory of Spain, Philby had a chilling certainty in the correctness of his judgment, the logical fanaticism of a man who, having once found a faith, is not going to lose it because of the injustices and cruelties inflicted by erring human instruments," Mr. Greene wrote.

Mr. Philby's betrayal was so monumental, and so perfectly managed, that it left a wisp of doubt in the minds of a few conspiracy buffs. Had his treason

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The writer is editor of the Outlook section of *The Washington Post* and author of "Agents of Innocence: A spy Story."

RAJAKARIYA: learning from the past

S. Pathiravilane

The stupendous constructional works of the ancient Sinhalese win the unhesitating admiration of the present generation. What is more surprising is their success in organising the labour and other resources necessary for their construction. The present day economists perhaps can learn more from them than from the text-books that they read for their foreign degrees."

This passage, from an article published in 1957, was quoted in recent contribution to the *DIYANA*.

The writer is N. K. Sarkar, an applied economist from India who lectured at the University of Ceylon, Peradeniya, in the 1950's. His thoughts were expressed in a brief essay published in the *Ceylon Economist* a little after 1956, the year when the country's rulers trembled before a new phenomenon — people's power.

Sarkar was not heaping idle compliments of his hosts, as foreigners usually do, but taking a serious look from the point of view of his discipline on how these 'stupendous construction works' were possible. Thirty years ago there was no environmental conscious, indigenous-resourceful outlook, so his seminal ideas, like the sower's in the Bible, fell on stony ground.

Besides, the rising expectations of those years (they are still rising), the impatient demands of the workers egged on by their shortsighted leaders, pushed aside what was the more urgent problem of nation-building. But thirty years after strikes, coups, insurrections, racial violence, foreign intervention and now near economic bankruptcy, the task of pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps seems necessary to prevent the country from sinking further into the mire.

Can the ideas Sarkar put forward thirty years ago take root now? Today some of the developing countries are trying out indigenous methods of solving

problems like housing the houseless, treating the sick (acupuncture, ayurveda, magic and ritual) and leading more meaningful lives. Sarkar's suggestion that we fall back on a modernised version of Rajakariya to reconstruct (perestroika!) as the ancient Sinhalese did may be the answer.

As China's leader Deng Xiao Ping has said, it does not matter whether the cat is black or white, if it can catch mice. So let us hear Sarkar a little more:

"In using the modern version of the Rajakariya system it will be necessary first of all to launch an intensive propaganda among the villagers asking them to volunteer for the project in exchange for food and a small cash allowance.

"Since 20-40 per cent of the villagers are idle at some part of the year or other and add nothing to the total income of the household during those months, the free supply of food should be a sufficient attraction for them to volunteer. The appeal to their patriotism, the feeling that they are doing an act of self-sacrifice for the good of the country and the small cash payment will add to their incentive to join.

"The fact that the work will only be for a short period will help to overcome their psychological resistance to move out of their village."

Needless to say only a popular government 'with deep roots among the people', as Sarkar describes, can engender this spirit of self sacrifice and patriotism. But even under a government that is popular will the thought of Rajakariya, identified today as a trapping of the feudal system, be found acceptable?

But though feudalism may be discredited, its trappings are still highly admired. The reluctance of some educated youth to do certain jobs is because the job is seen not merely as a source of income but, more important, social status — *thathaya*. This is not a feudal survival so much as a human failing. The social system

under the Sinhala kings worked because the place and position of the individual were considered in granting tenurial services.

As Sarkar points out, Rajakariya was not a form of slavery as the British officials who came here made out. If that was slavery, he says, then compulsory military service is also slavery. It is said that the British when confronted with Rajakariya strongly objected to its 'discrimination', 'injustice' and medieval structure. But having to run the country on a meagre cash flow they found they had to compromise their 'humanitarian' objections.

In 1801 they did away with the tenurial land system but retained the compulsory labour services. The people soon found that work which was done as 'an act of piety' under the Sinhala kings had degenerated under the British into an oppressive labour system with whippings and floggings and at times with no pay.

When Caleb Brooke, a man influenced by the radical thinking of his time, came around 1830 to recommend improvements to the newly added jewel to the British Crown, he was a trifle embarrassed at what the British officers had done when making those 'progressive' changes. In the Maritime Provinces, for instance he found that:

Fishermen were forced to serve before they could salt and dry their fish in Puttalam.

In Macara, men had complained that they were compelled to work as hard labour, that they were not paid and were liable to be flogged.

In Galle, Muslims were forced out of their occupations and compelled to work without pay, flogged, deprived of subsistence which even criminal prisoners were entitled to, in Puttalam again. "nearly a hundred families of weavers had removed to avoid being pressed for government service in cutting canals, making roads, carrying salt, felling trees etc."

It was not surprising that Colebrooke promptly abolished the ancient system of obtaining 'gratuitous' labour which had degenerated into a system of slavery under the British. Had the men who came from the Age of Enlightenment been truly enlightened they may have understood why the ancient tenurial system of Lanka endured for hundreds of years.

Unfortunately, the British who had outgrown their feudal system were too hasty in trying to destroy it in Sri Lanka. A smoother transition would have been to let the people outgrow this system rather than forcibly remove it, like pulling down immature fronds from a coconut palm. The consequences of dismembering a living body are still visible in our time after nearly 200 years of the British connection.

To return to Sarkar's essay: "The secret of the creation of a prosperous civilisation by the ancient Sinhalese," writes Sarkar, "lies in the way they organised society and oriented social values". The social values of today have undergone a tremendous beating and are awaiting a new leadership. But the organisation that was, is still capable of being revived.

"The efficient functioning of the Rajakariya system presupposes", says Sarkar, an intimate knowledge on the part of the administrators and planners of those days of the social and economic system of the country. They must have had some rough idea from their past experience, of the number of labour days that would have been necessary for the construction, say, of an irrigation dam.

"They must have possessed a fairly accurate knowledge of the surplus labour available in different parts of the country and at different times of the year. Fortunately for Ceylon, the rice cultivation season varies from village to

village, so that a perennial supply of labour could be organised by planning a rotational quota from every village for a few months".

Some of the vast funds that the country spends on projects can be saved, Sarkar says, by a self-financing method which has the merit of not creating inflation. This can be done by levying a construction tax on every adult who does not volunteer for Rajakariya. Collection of the tax, he suggests, should be related to some benefit that the public gets from the state like ration books. To discourage tax evasion he suggests collecting only ten cents per adult per month.

The revenue collected from such system of taxation he estimated at Rs. 6 million which would have been sufficient at that time to employ 8000 workmen per year at cost of Rs. 2 per adult, of which one rupee was a cash allowance and the other being the cost of his food.

"This method of financing projects", he says, "will avoid creating any inflationary pressure, because the money income generated by the constructional work will equal the reduction in the disposable income of the community. It is possible that some directional change in the demand may occur and shortages of particular commodities may arise. It will be necessary for the government to build up a buffer stock in those essential goods in which a rise in demand may be expected and to be prepared with a plan of rationing if the need arises".

He does not frown on the use of mechanised methods altogether, but suggests the use of it where hand labour is not possible. "Plans should be made as the hydro-electric project proceeds, to start electrically driven small factories in congested rural areas and also towns, so that as the labourers are released from the constructional projects they may be absorbed in the small power-driven factories".

The religious...

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perhaps been to perfect? Was there a chance that the great Kim Philby had held something back from the Russians? Could he have been, at some absolute level of self-understanding, not a double agent, at all but a triple agent, whose heart still secretly resided in England?

In the last several years, bizarre theories had begun to find their way into print. Mr. Philby was lonely and wanted to go home. He was secretly in contact with the SIS. He had been duped by Sir Stewart Menzies, who was head of SIS had suspected that he was a Soviet agent and fed him false information.

Rubbish, says a CIA veteran who followed the case closely. "The man was a Soviet spy, from first to last."

The fanciful theories may say more about the public fascination with Mr. Philby than about the man himself. By the time of his death, he had taken on the attributes of a fictional character.

Still, there remains a mystery about him, a delicious ambiguity about his motivations that is likely to engage another generation of spy novelists. Mr. Philby offered some hints this year, when he talked in Moscow with Phillip Knightley of *The Sunday Times*. In his first lengthy interview with a Western journalist in 25 years, Mr. Philby spoke of the crisis of doubt and depression he experienced in Moscow during the late 1960s.

"I felt frustrated and fell into a deep depression," he said, "started to drink heavily again, and worst of all, became prone to doubt. Had I done the right thing? You see, I never swallowed everything. I never took it all in."

Perhaps that is the epitaph he wanted. He had spied for Moscow, been perhaps the greatest agent in modern history, but he had never succumbed entirely to the cause. At the core of his life was a void.

Vikram Seth's form

There is a great deal I could say in reply to Izzat Hussain's rejoinder to my "postscript". But if I were to discuss the relative merits of free verse vs. metrical verse (for me, Frost's aphorism says all that is necessary on this subject), or of the mandarin Wallace Stevens vs. the sociable Auden, this exchange might be of interest only to a few. I shall therefore confine myself to what is directly relevant to Vikram Seth's use of his verse form.

Hussain writes: "There is nothing comparable in Anglo-American literature to Seth's fluent use of elaborate a form for an entire novel in verse." Does Hussain know John Fuller's *The Musicists*? It isn't of full novelistic proportions, but it is a long tale in verse (about half the length of *The Golden Gate*) which adopts both the Pushkin manner and the Pushkin stanza. It is certainly 'fluent' though not as brilliant as *The Golden Gate*. Moreover, since it was

published in 1980, it was possibly together with Johnstone's version of *Oregan*, a formative influence on Seth's novel.

Hussain also writes: "It is probably easier for an Indian writer than for his Western counterparts to revert to the classical resources of 'reason, rhythm, rhyme'". If this were true, one would expect the metrical tradition to be dominant in Indian poetry in English; in fact, the great majority of Indian poets in English today write in free verse (as do most Sri Lankan poets, as Hussain himself has noted). The reason for this is that the English verse tradition is not alive for them as it is for British poets — modernism notwithstanding. Seth's form is a sign not of Indianness but of his openness to Western cultural traditions — his 'universality', if you like.

Hussain should take into account the fact that for a poet who

decides to write a novel in verse, there is little point in using a form without metrical complexity he might as well write then in prose. The challenge for a dexterous craftsman lies in adopting an elaborate metrical form, and yet sustaining within it the material of ordinary life and the rhythms of everyday speech — as Byron did in *Don Juan*, Pushkin in *Eugene Onegin* and Seth in *The Golden Gate*. Each of these works is, above all, a performance, and it is the way in which they combine the glittering structure of the verse with colloquial ease and naturalness that gives them their perpetual surprise and delight.

However, the point I have disputed is a small blemish — a momentary flight of over-ingenuous fancy — in an otherwise excellent critical essay for which I am grateful.

Reggie Siriwardana

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
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