

LANKA

GUARDIAN

Vol. 12 No. 9 September 1, 1989 Price Rs. 5.00 Registered at the GPO, Sri Lanka QJ/32/NEWS/88

MASSACRE AT

THE FULL STORY

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regional conflict**

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PRICE UP

A loaf of bread which cost 3.30 in early August will now cost Rs. 3.60 while a kilo of flour has gone up to Rs. 9.40 when it was only Rs. 8.50 a week ago. The price of both items was raised in June-July. Milk products sold by MILCO have also been increased. A bottle of sterilised milk will cost Rs. 6.15, when the price up to mid-August was Rs. 5.25. The price of a packet of milk has been jacked up by 80 cents to Rs. 5.40. A kilo of sugar costs Rs. 24 in the shops though the CWE sells it at Rs. 22.

TEA INCOME

From Jan-May this year Sri Lanka's main export crop, tea earned Rs. 3,751 million for 65.2 million kilos, says a report by Forbes and Walker, which contrasts export income and volume for the corresponding period in 1988.

For 81 million kilos, Sri Lanka earned Rs. 4,646 million, thus showing a nearly 900 million rupees drop.

STORM AHEAD

"We are not using our strength to bring home to the government and the people an awareness of the imminent collapse of the economy", was the consensus at an executive council meeting of the Ceylon National Chamber of Industries, reported *The Island*. Some people at the top thought that the dark clouds had passed with the end of the transport strike, but the storm is coming, one member warned.

Earlier delegates from twelve chambers representing five thousand business organisations met the Secretary to the President and told him that business was at a virtual standstill. At stake were 200,000 jobs, they said.

MEDIA VISA

Of course Mr. Sam Chetty finds Sweden's concern for the armed conflicts in Sri Lanka, human rights violations and Amnesty International irrelevant (LG 1.7.89.). As a true dilettante he devotes his efforts to a fierce personal attack simply because I used the word "sponsor" in the sense "pay for" which is accepted by any dictionary.

However the point is that the former Sri Lankan Government found the aforesaid points highly relevant. So relevant that they denied visas to me and my colleague at the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation. Unfortunately, it is sometimes easier to do away with the messenger than to solve the problems in a country.

Apparently Mr. Chetty and I have different views on Sri Lanka. I may loathe some of his views, but I will defend his right to express them in public. And I will criticise any Government (particularly the Swedish) if it meddles with his visa because they find him controversial.

Where Mr. Chetty stands in this respect the readers of Lanka Guardian already know.

Thomas Bibin
Swedish Broadcasting Corporation
Gottenberg

(This correspondence is now closed)
— Ed.

LANKA GUARDIAN

Vol. 12 No. 9 September 1, 1989

Price Rs. 5.00

Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.


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THE ARMY — A NEW ACTOR

NEWS
BACKGROUND

Mervyn de Silva

A fierce military confrontation between the Armed Forces and the JVP-DJV along with the first shot in what could be a coming confrontation between Parliament and the Presidency were the dominant features of national politics this past fortnight. Nobody has bothered to keep a head-count but if the daily death toll given in the non-official media is close to the truth, the killings may have reached 1,000 from early August to Sept 1st. And that's higher than the casualty figure in Lebanon, the commonest parallel in the world press for war-torn Sri Lanka.

The official statistics for "arrests" or "detention for questioning" published in the daily papers suggest several thousand 'suspects' rounded up in massive, islandwide security sweeps or 'C. and S.' operations, the jargon for cordoning off a village, part of a small town or city suburb and conducting a house-to-house search for 'subversives'. On and off, there is a report of hard-core subversives arrested or a district leader captured. Occasionally a name is given. Security itself dictates of course that not all sensitive information can be disclosed to the press.

The point is what percentage of those killed or seized is "hard-core", and how much represent what's styled in the preferred counter-insurgency patois "peripherals". In terms of success, partial success or failure, that's what matters.

Second, the extent of the "intelligence penetration" i.e. the information collected, quantity and quality, on command structures, operational plans etc.

Since we are not privy to such information, no comment is possible.

Third, how far has the current offensive, particularly in the villages, won over the law-and-order, peace-loving communities and groups, and to what extent has the toughness of the exercise alienated these? And here, one has to draw a line between the operations of the regular forces, and the work of several shadowy para military outfits which represent what the opposition parties in their statement described as "counter-terror" i.e. the State's answer to terror.

The regular armed services are over-stretched. Anything up to a third is still deployed in the north-east and the sensitive border areas. About 10-15%, one guesses, may be engaged in providing security for VIP's and for strategic installations. That leaves a little over 50% to undertake an islandwide (or seven provinces) counter-insurgency campaign.

Thus the JVP's deadline to soldiers to quit their posts. The appeal was backed up by a warning. The retaliation was going to be merciless.

Since no *en masse* desertions followed, it is fair to say that the Army, meaning the three services and the Police, stood their ground. In that sense, the Army had arrived as an institution. It is no secret that the security establishment has been disappointed and restive, if not dejected and angry, ever since the Emergency was removed and nearly 2,000 detainees released. There is hardly a security establishment in the world which does not wish to be

armed with special powers to tackle "terrorism," "low-intensity conflict," "insurgency" etc. Such powers strengthen their hand while protecting them from penalties under the normal law. The re-introduction of the emergency was the first victory of the National Security Establishment.

In a wider context, it also meant a critical turn in the inevitable "two line" battle that almost every regime, especially those that are answerable to an electorate, faces. We have gone through that exercise before in the war against the Eelam separatists. Crudely formulated it is the contest between "the political settlement" supporters and the "military solution" advocates. President Premadasa, evidently, stood for the first approach — negotiations, cessation of hostilities and a political deal. This anyway is the approach he has adopted with the LTTE.

The militarists were in a strong position during the Northern war. The 'enemy' was Tamil, and its cause 'separatism' or Eelam, while the Government and the Army were 90-100 percent Sinhala. The choice is not so easy with the JVP which is 100 percent Sinhala, although its objective is equally or more challenging — State Power.

There is a middle position in the debate — a military campaign in order to force the 'enemy' to the negotiating table. In short, convince the 'enemy' that it cannot win militarily, and then it'll be better disposed to talk peace.

Paradoxically, President Premadasa's talks with the 'Tigers' may have helped reinforce the case of the 'militarists'. The

LTTE is talking to the President Premadasa not because it has suddenly discovered what a fine chap he is or that a Sinhalese regime can be reasonable but because of what the IPKF has done in 2 years. The world's fourth largest army has not crushed 3-4,000 'Tigers' but it has certainly battered and bruised the ferocious feline badly. The 'militarists' wanted the Sri Lankan army given the chance to do the same with the JVP-DJV.

Will they prove their point? Though assorted groups and well-intentioned individuals have met President Premadasa in an attempt to stop the blood-letting, no progress has been evidently made.

ECONOMIC FRONT

Meanwhile, the JVP hit back on another front, its own counter-attack on a strategic, but non-military, front — paralysing the administration and crippling the business sector. Both are further blows to a national economy on the verge of collapse. (See **Trends**). Soldiers can

force open shops and give the Pettah and suburban bazaars an appearance of normal activity but no army can transact international business. It is an economy slowly grinding to a halt that has hurt the vital export trade, and put pressure on the poor Sri Lankan rupee. With Mr. Paskaralingam's visit to Washington and the IMF talks in Colombo, the situation is critical. As the *Financial Times* wrote 'The influence of Fund thinking is already being reflected in the accelerated depreciation of the S. L. rupee over the last few weeks. Failure to reach an agreement with the Fund would make it almost impossible for Sri Lanka to obtain the commercial credits needed to finance its import bill and the current account deficit'.

OPPOSITION MOVE

The Opposition treads warily between the Armed Forces and the JVP in its statement calling for a 'Provisional Government', answerable directly to Parlia-

ment, and a for a new Constitution that would abolish the Executive Presidency. In recent weeks, Opposition parties and MP's have been extremely critical of 'human rights violations' by the State's security agencies. But it has now changed its line.

'The country needs its armed forces and the police. The unconscionable conduct of a few amongst them must not blind us to their sacrifices and the need of their services.'

Does the Provisional Government idea mean a 'parallel power centre' to the Presidency? The UNP has a clear majority. Therefore a government with a secure parliamentary majority must necessarily mean a UNP dominated administration, unless the party splits, and a section teams up with at least the other major party, the SLFP. If that happens, it would be absurd to think that Mrs. Bandaranaike twice prime minister would serve a UNP Prime Minister.

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After the ambush, the reprisals

David Housego visits the scene of killings by Indian soldiers in Valvettiturai.

Western democratic governments have long known that a price to be paid in fighting guerrilla conflicts overseas is that their armed forces get drawn into acts of barbarity which domestic public opinion finds unacceptable. India, possibly the first non-*Aligned* nation to mount a major peacekeeping operation abroad, is running into the same experience in Sri Lanka.

On Tuesday I was the first western reporter to visit Valvettiturai, a small coastal town near Jaffna, where Indian troops carried out reprisals on August 2 after the Tamil Tigers, the Tamil guerrilla movement, ambushed one of their patrols close to the main square, killing six Indian soldiers and wounding several others. After 4½ hours of walking around the town and questioning many people, it becomes clear that angered soldiers deliberately shot dead unarmed civilians, burnt a large number of houses, and brutally beat many of the boys and men they caught. The local Citizens Committee has identified 52 bodies and says that over 120 houses were burnt — making it by far the worst atrocity alleged against Indian troops in the two years they have been in Sri Lanka.

Most of the killings took place in the hours after the ambush, but the burning and ransacking continued for another two days while Valvettiturai was under curfew and surrounded by Indian troops.

What is also certain is that the official Indian explanation for the deaths — that civilians were caught in crossfire in the wake of the ambush — has no credibility. Mr. S. Selvendra, the President of the Citizens

Committee and a chartered accountant, is calling for a public inquiry.

Almost a fortnight after the event, a smell of charred remains hangs over Valvettiturai. Of the 15,000 people perhaps half have left in fear or despair. Many who remain are distraught over the loss of relatives or belongings, and uncertain how to begin again or where. What seems to have happened on August 2 is that two patrols of Indian peace-keeping Force (IPKF) troops — about 30 men in all — approached the centre of the town on foot in parallel columns at about 11.15 in the morning. This was market time when the streets were most crowded. They were ambushed by firing from the roof and the street. Six soldiers were killed and 13 injured, including an officer. Even by Tiger standards of brutality, these were heavy casualties to inflict at a time when peace negotiations are underway.

What follows are abbreviated eyewitness accounts of four particular incidents that occurred after the ambush.

● **Mr. N. Senthivadivel**, 50 was in his photographer's shop overlooking the square when the firing began. He threw himself to the ground. Later he was taken out and made to sit cross-legged with about 25 people on the square. From there he saw soldiers set fire to some of the shops and throw kerosene to add the flames.

● At about 2 p.m. a soldier came along and said in broken English that he was going to shoot them. Two jeeps arrived and firing began. The soldier then turned round to those seated and fired on them. Two people Mrs. K. Sivapackiyam, a wash-

erwoman, and Mr. K. Thangaraja were killed and 10 more injured.

● **Mrs. S. Rajeswary**, 52, is the wife of the head of the divisional land survey office. After the firing about 50 people sought shelter in her house — well over 200 yards from the square — because it has a concrete roof and thus offers protection against shelling.

About 1.30 p.m. four soldiers broke into the house. She came out of the kitchen into the hall with her husband; they were holding their hands up. She pleaded with her husband not to step forward but he advanced to speak to the soldiers. They shot him. They then called for the other men and shot four of them.

After that they sprayed bullets killing four more people and injuring nine. Apart from her husband, Mrs. Rajeswary also lost her eldest son, 28 who was trapped in his shop which had been set on fire.

● **Mr. A. R. Sivaguru**, 68 a retired postmaster, with some 70 other people he took shelter in the house of Mr. Sivaganesh which also has a concrete roof. About 4 p.m. some six soldiers climbed over the back wall of the house and entered the courtyard. Women fell at their feet crying and pleading with them not to shoot but were kicked aside. A sergeant then separated the young men — ages ranging from 18-35 — and told them to sit in front of the cowshed next to the house. The soldiers then fired on them, killing four. When one woman screamed at her husband's death she was told to be silent otherwise she would be killed.

● **Mr. Madaraja Anantharaj**, principal of local school and secretary of the Citizen's Committee, still bears the mark on his face of wounds he received. This account of his treatment

at the Udupiddy IPKF camp nearby is taken from his sworn affidavit. "There (at the camp) I saw many people who came along with me bleeding and crying. Four Sikh soldiers then started beating me with heavy wooden rods and with their fists.

"One soldier dashed my head against the wall. One soldier pressed a wooden rod on my throat and was standing on the rod which was preventing my breathing. At that time I heard a voice shouting 'Kill him, kill him.' I was almost losing consciousness when I managed to push the rod on my throat away, toppling the person who was standing on it...

"The next day, the Commanding Officer of Vadamarachchi (region), Brigadier Shankar Prasad, the deputy Commander, Col Auja, and the Udupiddy Commanding Officer, Colonel Sharma, met me and expressed their apologies... The Brigadier told me I had been ill-treated by mistake..."

Several questions remain. Why did the Tigers launch such an ambush? The Indians believe it was a deliberate provocation by the Tigers, intended to trigger off an overwhelming Indian response. The Tigers were thus hoping to undermine during the current negotiations the IPKFs image as a force able to provide security for the Tamils.

It is unclear exactly how much support the Tigers have got in Valvettiturai, which is one of their strongholds and the birthplace of many of their leaders, or how many of their men were killed in the action.

Why did the Indians respond so brutally? Part of the answer is that their troops have been under great strain in the Vadamarachchi region, with isolated patrols coming under attack and

the Tigers firing rockets into the IPKF camp. This has left officers and men with nerves on edge.

Valvettiturai itself had been free of incidents — the result of an unexplained understanding between the IPKF and the Tigers. But some Indian officers believe that the Tigers have abused this understanding by encouraging their cadres to seek shelter in the town. Thus when the Tigers broke what was seen as their side of the bargain, the Indians took their revenge. The wounding of an Indian major also provoked anger.

Were the killings and the brutality the result of soldiers running amok or did they have the approval of their officers? With substantial reinforcements brought into Valvettiturai in the wake of the ambush, officers were certainly present in the town during the shootings and the burning of homes. Some inhabitants believe that senior officers gave their tacit approval to the reprisals, if not more.

One of my informants claimed that he had heard a senior officer say in anger not long before "I will burn Point Pedro" (a neighbouring town where there has also been trouble.) "I will kill everybody". These may have been ill-chosen words of intimidation treatment literally. But other Jaffna residents believe that the IPKF sees fear as an important weapon in the control of terror.

The IPKF now hopes that the incident will be forgotten as quickly as possible. Its officers are against a public inquiry because they do not believe they would get a fair hearing. They say, with justification, that no Tamils would dare support the Indian army publicly while the Tigers will intimidate witnesses in their favour.

But it is difficult to see how, without some judicial inquiry the record can be set straight.

841 murders in a month

Parliamentary Affairs and Justice Minister Vincent Perera told Parliament that 841 persons had been killed between July 16 and August 18, 1989. The minister was moving a motion for the continuation of the State of Emergency. Seventy-nine of the killings were described as political murders, and the others as homicides. The motion was passed 110 for and 77 against. All SLFP, MEP, USA and TULF members voted against. Sri Lanka Muslim Congress members were absent.

Call for provisional government

Five opposition political parties have called for a provisional government by Parliament. They are the SLFP, MEP, USA, EPRLF and SLMC. In a statement calling for an end to violence the five parties said that presidential form of government had totally failed. They said that the executive presidency should be replaced by a prime minister responsible to parliament; free and fair elections would follow.

"The forces not represented in parliament must be included in this process by means of consultation. But peace must first be established and normalcy restored", the statement said.

Sri Lanka slips towards the abyss

There is a sense in Sri Lanka of a country slipping towards the abyss. Two of the gloomiest assessments of recent days have come from the country's leaders.

President R. Premadasa, who launched his new administration on a hopeful note of reconciliation eight months ago, said: "An atmosphere of sorrow, fear and terror has overtaken the country. In schools and universities, villages and towns, violent attacks and brutal killings (have) increased".

Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike, leader of the Opposition and head of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, told Parliament: "The economy of the nation is fast deteriorating and the democratic structures are crumbling. The coming conflagration will soon engulf us all if we cannot intelligently and unselfishly halt it".

"Conflagration" may be too strong a word. But it is increasingly touch and go how long the government's authority can stand up to the inroads being made by the extremist Sinhalese organisation, the JVP. In the past two or three months, they have enormously extended their grip through government offices, state-run and private enterprises — using the tactics of fear and intimidation to provoke shut-downs at will.

Managers negotiate with anonymous JVP cadres who contact them by phone over the running of their enterprises. "It's the JVP that calls the tune," says the head of one state corporation.

To a visitor returning to the country after a gap of more than two months, the most stri-

king change is that the violence has now spread its tentacles to Colombo and Kandy, the two largest cities that were until recently relatively isolated from it.

Terrorist killings, police reprisals and the dumping of often mutilated bodies by the roadside — five were recently found on the beach at Mount Lavinia, a middle-class suburb of Colombo — mean that the threat of death has crept closer to everyone's doorstep.

In the increasingly brutal battle between extremist organisations, including the Tamil Tigers in the north, and the security and paramilitary forces, it is reckoned that over 800 people a month are being killed across the country.

As it gains ground, the JVP's aim seems to be disruption that will eventually bring down President Premadasa's regime. Its ideological roots lie in a mixture of wounded nationalism, revolutionary anarchism, Marxism, and a romantic idealism of a village past that inevitably recalls Pol Pot's movements in Kampuchea.

Its support stems from all the frustrations of half-educated and unemployed youth — and as such it has the sympathy and understanding of many in the middle class who have most to fear from its success.

In a country's downward slide there are few landmarks to chart the course. But one hurdle that looms ahead is that the government will find it increasingly difficult to finance much-needed imports of grain, sugar and fuel without an agreement with the International Monetary Fund

on a now long-delayed \$87 m (£1 m) drawing from the Fund's structural adjustment facility.

The foreign exchange reserves are virtually depleted and foreign banks are increasingly reluctant to provide needed guarantees on credit lines for Sri Lanka. The Fund, which is sending a further mission to Sri Lanka in a week's time, is seeking food and fuel price increases to curtail Budget subsidies.

The President fears these could play into the hands of the JVP. But without an agreement with the IMF and the balance of payments relief this could provide, Sri Lanka could face worse shortages and higher inflation.

With the economy, as with the country's political woes, President Premadasa inherited the problems he now faces. But his seven months of management seems to have left them worse. He has ruled according to his own instincts, consulted his ministerial colleagues minimally, and relied dangerously on astrologers. He now finds himself increasingly isolated.

In retrospect, his aim seems to have been to build up an alliance with the "have-nots" of society — including the lower-caste groups from which he comes, the JVP and the Tamil Tigers. He thus shunned the Colombo establishment, launched populist economic programmes and appealed for negotiations with the JVP and the Tigers.

But the ball of wool unwound in his hands. He released 1,850 JVP supporters, including some hardliners, shortly after he came to power, in a gesture of goodwill.

But the movement responded by intensifying the pressure against him so that he was forced to reimpose the Emergency and to resume the crack-down against them. Meanwhile much intelligence work had been lost and the police demoralised.

In his dealings with India, the President had hoped that he could force a speedier withdrawal of the Indian forces by a blustering, public approach. He has had to meet a humiliating retreat to the more normal methods of diplomacy.

His major success has been his agreement with the Tigers who announced on June 28 the ending of their 17-years guerrilla war with the government. But this understanding has still to survive the test of a Sri Lankan agreement with India, which is refusing the immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian troops that the Tigers are demanding.

As Mr. Premadasa has grown more isolated, so Colombo has been thick with rumours of plots to overthrow him. "I sometimes feel I cannot get to sleep at night for all the whisperings," says one diplomat. But constitutionally it is very difficult to remove the President. There is also no sign that the army would want to pull down the country's institutions which would be the consequence of a coup d'état.

An accelerated Indian troop withdrawal would undoubtedly strengthen the President's position and remove one of the thorns in the JVP's campaign against him. But regaining the initiative against them requires the long and patient intelligence work required to dismantle their organisation.

In the President's seeking the advice of his cabinet ministers and of Parliament this week, some see the signs of a chastened man now more willing to consult. But on the edge of the abyss, the President still seems to have most confidence in himself.

— Financial Times

Indian weekly on pullout plan

The Economic and Political Weekly of India has said in an article that Sri Lanka's request for the withdrawal of the IPKF should have been grabbed by India since it is becoming clear that India has got into an impossible situation and, the rank and file of the IPKF, for no fault of theirs, have simply been led to the slaughter in that unfortunately hostile environment.

The Economic and Political Weekly of India further states that the benevolent intervention of India in Sri Lanka which was thought would be roses, roses all the way has now degenerated into a nightmarish quagmire with mounting casualties.

The IPKF is now formally described in Sri Lanka as an occupation army.

Describing the IPKF advent to Sri Lanka as a misadventure, the leading Indian journal states that the IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka at the invitation of the Sri Lankan government, to assist the government in maintaining and protecting the territorial integrity of that country and also to ensure that the Tamil speaking minority in the North and East would enjoy and be assured of regional autonomy — something incidentally, the Sri Lankan government was anxious to grant.

Having gone there on the request of Sri Lanka, one would have thought a request by the same government to withdraw those forces should have been enough, especially since the

stated objectives of the governments of India and Sri Lanka were the same.

But now it transpired that the IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka not to safeguard the territorial integrity of that country then as now under attack by Tamil chauvinists, but in order to protect the lives of Tamils.

Going by his logic since people speaking one or other of the Indian languages and ethnically similar to Indian live in every other part of South Asia and even further beyond, would India send troops whenever and wherever any of these communities is perceived by India to be imperilled?

If India can send troops to save Tamil lives in Sri Lanka and decide to remain even if the group which India wanted to save by sending its troops are now demanding that they should leave, should it not also save Bengalis in Bangladesh, Nepalese in Nepal or Urdu, Punjabi and Sindhi speaking (all Indian languages, included in the eighth schedule to the constitution) in Pakistan? asks The Economic and Political Weekly.

The article further states that straightforward self interest should have persuaded India not to encourage a band of potential Pol-Pots in Sri Lanka bearing different initials and acronyms against their names for the ethnic and linguistic mix in India is far more explosive than in Sri Lanka. But then can a regional super power pass up such temptations to play god in its own backyard? The Economic and Political Weekly of India asks.

India's Lanka Policy in Retrospect

Urmila Phadnis

On July 29, 1987 when the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement was signed, it was considered to be a landmark in cooperative bilateral relations and was lauded as such over a wide spectrum of public opinion in the two countries.

In less than two years, however, it has become a source of attrition between the two to such an extent that India-Sri Lanka relations have dipped to an all-time low. This is in sharp contrast to the amicable manner in which bilateral problems had been sorted out in the past four decades to the mutual satisfaction of the two countries.

Thus, on the issue of the political status of persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka or on the question of the sovereignty over Kachchattivu, — both of which had defied solution for decades — mutually acceptable agreements were negotiated in a spirit of cordiality, accommodating each other's interests and concerns. In the case of the "stateless" persons of Indian origin, as and when differences arose on issues pertaining to the interpretation of some of the clauses of the Shastri-Srinivasa Pact of 1964, they were amicably settled.

However, this has, so far, not happened in the case of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement. In the past couple of months the issue of the withdrawal of the IPKF has not only become increasingly contentious but, worse, the two Governments have tended to become more and more strident in asserting their respective stands on it. Moreover, the controversy threatens to vitiate some of the substantial issues covered under the Accord

such as the devolution package, the status and legitimacy of the North-east Province which had come into being under the provisions of the Agreement.

Part of the explanation for this discord over some of the provisions of the Accord stems, on the one hand, from the political demands on the recently elected President R. Premadasa in insurgency-ridden Sri Lanka, and, on the other, the electoral compulsions besetting Rajiv Gandhi. This would also largely explain the abrasive tone of the letters exchanged between the two and the brusque style in which diplomacy is being conducted between the two Governments.

These political exigencies notwithstanding, the antipathy which seems to have suddenly erupted over the Agreement in Sri Lanka and the rather widespread questioning of New Delhi's involvement, particularly in committing the IPKF in the internal conflict in the island which has suffered in India become intelligible if they are set in a historical context.

Thus, one needs to take note of the 'India factor' which has been a recurring theme in the tragic Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic conflict over the years and its spill-over effect in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu, both of which were considered in New Delhi to be the cause of concern to larger Indian security considerations.

It is noteworthy that the salience of 'India factor' is somewhat different in the 1987 Accord, compared to earlier bilateral understandings or arrangements. To begin with, the Accord's focus — the status of the Sri Lankan Tamils — is within the domestic purview of Sri Lanka. Nonetheless, the political developments on both the sides have been such as to push it into the bilateral realm. This

has been particularly conspicuous since 1983 when the ethnic explosion in the island-state was such as to drive a large number of Sri Lankan Tamils as refugees to Tamil Nadu in India.

Such a development underscores the complexity of the problem and the response of Tamil Nadu and Delhi to it. Thus, in 1981 when the communal violence had erupted in Sri Lanka, the non-Congress A I A D M K Government had been somewhat restrained in its utterances. Though the Opposition leadership, particularly that of the DMK did try to make capital out of it, its activities were curbed.

On its part Delhi did express its concern over the conflict but made it clear that it had no desire "to interfere in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka". Also, unlike the Opposition DMK, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran, while continuously sympathising with the Tamils' plight in Sri Lanka, was critical of the TULF's campaign for Eelam.

As against this, the magnitude of the July 1983 ethnic violence and its implications for Tamil Nadu were far more volatile and intense with both the Opposition and the ruling parties, pressing Delhi to take firm measures, such as raising the issue in the United Nations, the scrapping of diplomatic relations and even armed intervention.

In response, almost immediately after July 1983 violence, Indira Gandhi deputed, in consultation with President Jayewardene, External Affairs Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, to Colombo for consultations and to allay fears aired in the Sri Lankan press of India's possible intervention. However, it is not without significance that about the same time Sri Lanka sought assistance for military help from UK, USA, Pakistan and Bangla-

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des, to cope with its ethnic crisis. Not only help from India was not sought but the very fact of approaching other foreign powers for military assistance was somewhat unconvincingly denied by Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lankan Government's move appeared to have been an attempt to pre-empt Indian involvement in the event of escalation of ethnic conflict. Moreover, the Sri Lankan attempts to secure military help from foreign powers seemed to imply an increasing divergence between the security perceptions of the foreign-policy managers between India and Sri Lanka. Thus, the foreign-policy orientations and some of the measures of the Sri Lankan regime — with a certain tilt towards the Western powers, particularly USA — were viewed as having the potential of adversely affecting India's security interests.

Thus, Sri Lanka's consideration of the lease of the empty oil tanks in Trincomalee to a West-dominated consortium, alleged grant of rest and recreation facilities to the American Navy in the Trincomalee harbour, and expanded facilities to the Voice of America, which it was believed, could serve the military and intelligence purposes of the US ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean, were measures perceived by India as detrimental to its security interests.

It was in this overall context that the Tamil issue in Indo-Sri Lankan relations had thus assumed geo-strategic as well as political dimensions. On surface, their manifestation was as significant as their subterranean streams. And it is in such a configuration of overt and covert activities on both the sides that the erosion of mutual credibility and trust assumed increasing criticality over the years.

India's Sri Lanka policy during the eighties was thus evolved in such an environment of which the Tamil issue was a part as well as its by-product. The enunciation of this policy could

be traced to Indira Gandhi's statements within the Parliament and outside in 1983 and thereafter. Thus, soon after the July 1983 holocaust and Foreign Minister, Rao's visit, she maintained in the Parliament on August 6, 1983 that her government had "made it clear in every form and in every possible way that India does not pose any threat to Sri Lanka, nor do we want to interfere in their internal affairs.... We want the unity and national integrity of Sri Lanka to be preserved. At the same time... the developments in Sri Lanka affect us also. In this matter India cannot be regarded as just another country. Sri Lanka and India are two countries that are directly involved. Any extraneous involvement will complicate matters for both our countries".

Though manifesting in sharper terms in the wake of the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, it seems that Indira Gandhi's Sri Lanka's policy had three major impulses: (1) external alignments of Sri Lanka to the extent they were related to India's security, concern in the region; (2) its federal imperatives; and (3) the thrust of geographical proximity and ethnic contiguity across the border.

This implied a three-pronged approach: (1) devise ways and means to keep the external powers away from the ethnic arena; (2) facilitate the building of pressures to help Tamils wrest legitimate concessions from the Sri Lankan Government; and (3) underscore its desire for the preservation of the unity and integrity of its neighbours.

In effect, however, the multi-pronged character of such a policy was such as to lead to a two-track strategy: mediatory and militant-supportive. In several respects they were not mutually reinforcing and complementary.

Though shifts in emphasis towards India's Sri Lanka policy can be discerned from time to time, its basic premises, initiatives and strategies have hardly

changed since Indira Gandhi's times. If at all, the contradictions of such a multi-pronged approach have sharpened and the entry of many more actors in the arena of bilateral relations have led to a greater drift and tension therein.

To begin with, on the Sri Lankan side, the failure of the Sri Lanka regime to evolve a national consensus for a framework for ethnic conflict management were hardly conducive for a political solution. Besides, the interlocking of the violence of the State and that of the Tamil separatists was such as to increasingly alienate the minority community from the Centre.

Almost simultaneously, the support to the Tamils from India was viewed with concern from Colombo for two reasons: (a) the increasing realisation of its inability to deal with it on its own; and (b) the growing silence of India for any mediation vis-a-vis Tamils in view of the fact that no direct dialogue between the two seemed possible.

Over a period of time, incompatibilities between the mediatory and militant-supportive strategies began to surface. The former certainly worked in conjunction with the UNP regime, the latter operated despite Sri Lanka's protestations and India's denials.

The denials lost their credence in the wake of media disclosure in 1985, the episode of the kidnapping of the Allan couple and subsequently the seizure of large cache of arms from some of the militants in 1986. By 1986-87 the fact of India's active support to the Tamil separatist groups was no more incontrovertible. In fact the open assistance of several crores of rupees by the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu to the LTTE during Colombo's offensive into the Tamil areas in the early months of 1987 and earlier, the offer as well as disbursement of money to some others by the DMK leader Karunanidhi, hardly left any doubt as to which group was being favoured or patronised by the

various regional parties and also Delhi.

Besides, on the moderate-militant continuum, a significant development can be discerned during 1983-87. The initial pre-eminence of the moderate TULF, as evident during the discussions of the All-Parties Conference (APC) in Colombo in 1983-84 had gradually given way to the recognition of the pre-eminence of the militant groups as it happened in Thimpu in 1985. Subsequently, the presence of a somewhat recalcitrant Prabhakaran during the SAARC discussions at Bangalore in 1986 was the recognition of LTTE's *primus inter pares* position among the Tamil groups.

This might be viewed as an acceptance of the ground reality. In arriving at the 'ground reality' the Indian politicians particularly those in Tamil Nadu had played an important role. The Central Institutions and its covert and overt agencies working in the South also contributed to this by either conniving at or acquiescing in the process of the marginalisation of the moderate vis-a-vis the militants, particularly the LTTE.

It is noteworthy that mediation with the militants could be had through the 'good offices' of India but not necessarily on its terms. The ups and downs of the Thimpu parleys were instructive in this respect. The militants made it clear in the discussions that they were prepared to go with India upto a point but not beyond it. In the second round of talks in August 1986, for instance, their emphatic insistence that the Tamil homeland concept was not negotiable, broke up the exercise.

The Thimpu round of talks brought out New Delhi's vulnerability. Subsequent developments, such as Rajiv Gandhi's attempts at the Bangalore SAARC Summit to bring Prabhakaran round to negotiations proved futile. Worse, it led to an open breach between the LTTE and the Government. Thus, when press-

ured by the Centre to consider the devolution package by the end of 1986, Prabhakaran is alleged to have said: "I have not one but five fingers to use on my trigger". Incidentally, even M. G. Ramachandran, an ally of Rajiv Gandhi and the patron of Prabhakaran was either unable or did not want to persuade the LTTE leader to come round to negotiations.

A Collapse of Old Hierarchy

Today the last seams of social cohesion are unravelling. Sri Lanka has become a free fire zone for everyone old enough to heft a Kalashnikov or grenade. Moderate political figures have been assassinated right and left, violence-enforced strikes have brought the economy to its knees, and civil authority has been reduced to all but complete impotence. This was made abundantly clear when Colombo undertook recently to subject all news reports to censorship. It lifted the rule last week after the chief censor was murdered.

That an island so blessed by nature could have descended into hell so fast could make a parable of human fallibility. Whatever the quick answers might be, though, the moral of this lesson is obviously eluding Sri Lankans in the thick of chaos today. What began as a protest against second-class citizenship by the country's minority Tamils has become a conflagration too quickly to blame it on that spark. The introduction of Indian troops as a desperate resort is also too simple a target.

When Sri Lankans are able to look back on this terrible passage, they may find that the Tamil Tigers and Rajiv Gandhi had very little to do with the civil war's real meaning. They may look for a more instructive lesson in an extraordinary phenomenon: the JVP uprising of 1971. Although put down with a fearsome cost of lives, the

In such a context, soon after the seizure of the cache of its arms in Madras the LTTE leadership preferred to move to Jaffna and adjacent area where it had already established a parallel administrative set-up. Prabhakaran's spokesman, Balasingam commented that the LTTE was now "free from the shackles of

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revolt amounted to what was very nearly a total war of the generations.

Led by students and a radical philosophy, it was a spontaneous outpouring of rage by the young against the old. That the government of the time proceeded to give Sinhalese youths preferences in civil service and schooling opportunities reflected the ways in which they felt society had cheated them. Those preferences in turn became a principal grievance that led to the Tamil Tigers and their secessionist movement. But the JVP rising was aimed at privileges in Sinhalese society: the caste structure and economic system. The persistence of hierarchy has been evident in the fact that every head of government in Sri Lanka came from the elite Goyigama caste up till Rana-singhe Premadasa's inauguration this year. He is the first leader who climbed to the top.

He played the card of ordering the Indians out only after desperately trying to come to terms with the Tigers. His new tone of conciliation extended to Mr. Gandhi last week offers some hope that an Indian withdrawal can be achieved without wider turmoil. But it's not much hope. Asia has seen a similar case of the collapse of an old frame-work of authority with nothing to replace it. It was in the 1970s, and the country was Cambodia.

Editorial — Asiaweek

How Benazir plans to solve Sindh problem

M. B. Naqui

KARACHI

PAKISTAN Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's strategy for tackling the challenge that the Sindh situation presents is now becoming clear. It is a three-prong effort.

The first is streamlining the administrative machinery to tackle the law and order situation more efficiently and maintaining peace through effective police and administrative measures.

The second concerns tackling disaffection and alienation among the Urdu-speaking urban young men of Karachi and Hyderabad by both forging a more smoothly-working relationship with the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and by extending the popular base of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in urban Sindh.

The third prong consists of asserting her own personal popularity in the interior of Sindh and arresting any possible erosion of support for the PPP among the ethnic Sindhis, among whom the message of a purely ethnic Sindhi nationalism had spread extensively and was thought to be acquiring dangerous dimensions.

The PPP leadership at the Centre has, strangely, taken a long time to wake up to the seriousness of the Sindh situation and has fielded its biggest and most effective gun only now. However, it is not clear whether the Prime Minister can actually be persuaded to spend as much time in Sindh and Karachi as she has done during the last two weeks. During this period, most of the Central Government was more or less camping in Karachi.

While the more dramatic action is in the north—in Lahore, Peshawar and Islamabad—the continental shift that has been taking place in Sindh is not

easily visible to superficial observers of even the PPP. But the new radical political approach, particularly in Karachi and Hyderabad, is regarded by all analysts as intelligent and hopeful. The delicacy of the PPP's task is, however, obvious.

READY TO ACT

The challenge facing the PPP in rural Sindh is to arrest the incipient erosion of its support among old ethnic Sindhis. This process had actually started as a result of the combined efforts of hardline Sindhi nationalists after their defeat in last year's elections, on the one hand, and the PPP's inevitable decision to forge an alignment with the MQM, on the other.

The PPP, perhaps, took some time to take its soundings of the underlying trend of the recent ethnic tensions in Sindh's interior and is now ready to act.

The top PPP leadership is being accused of being too soft on the MQM which is being accused openly by Sindhi nationalists of wanting to divide Sindh. The PPP can certainly counter this with the charge that those who create conditions in which isolated Urdu-speaking families are forced to migrate to Karachi and Hyderabad are themselves promoting the process of division by destroying the normal tranquility of society. But the vulnerability of the PPP to the charge of ignoring or betraying Sindhi nationalistic sensibilities by trying to protect the Urdu-speaking minority remains a fact to be reckoned with.

In the view of most political analysts who have welcomed the new moves as a necessary response to the challenge, doubts persist whether each part of the strategy would be implemented with the requisite political *savoir faire*. The easiest part of the campaign launched by Prime Minister Bhutto during the last

fortnight is the realigning of the administrative apparatus and redeploying of the bureaucratic forces and talents available.

The person the Prime Minister has chosen as the Governor of Sindh, Justice Fakhruddin Ebrahim, is proving to be an excellent choice who is the one man who is actually getting to grips with the most ticklish problem of all: maintaining peace and controlling the universities in Karachi and Hyderabad. This goes to the very heart of the basic administrative problems afflicting Sindh.

While the Provincial Cabinet seems to have abdicated its role, it is the Governor who, almost single handedly, in his capacity as the Chancellor is trying to turn these strife-torn universities into places of education again instead of being battlefields in a confused war among various armed militias.

The trickiest problems are expected to be encountered, however, in the two political prongs of the PPP strategy. Mrs. Bhutto has said that there are forces that wish to divide Sindh and that she was out to defeat them by her message of peace and goodwill for all the inhabitants of Sindh. Who or what these forces are she, naturally, did not spell out. But all those who have their fingers in the pie have taken notice of it.

TARGET GROUPS

Several target groups could be in her mind. The likeliest foe in the eyes of her ethnic Sindhi followers would be the PPP's nominal allies, the MQM, with whom she has painstakingly mended fences recently and signed yet another concordat. For its part, the MQM would dread the true-blue Sindhi nationalism of Mr. G. M. Syed's followers of Jeay Sindh and the supporters of the Sindhi, Baluch and Pashtun Front (SBPF).

(Continued on page 13)

Convention demands self-rule for Tibet

NEW DELHI

The international convention on Tibet and peace in South Asia condemned the continuing "illegal occupation of Tibet" by China and urged the Chinese leadership to give Tibetans right of self-rule.

The convention said "Tibet has been a free country with its distinct culture, language and heritage."

It called upon China to respect the UN resolution 1514 which states that the "subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, which is contrary to the charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of the world peace."

India condemns Tibet meeting

K. K. Sharma

NEW DELHI

A three-day international convention on Tibet and peace in South Asia, which ended in New Delhi recently has embarrassed the Indian Government because of the support it drew for the cause of Tibet's independence from China.

The convention, organised by leading Indian liberals, was condemned in a statement to Parliament by Mr. Natwar Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs, who claimed the Government knew nothing about it.

China was attacked during the three-day convention for its repression of the Tibetans.

The Indian Government is embarrassed because among delegates to the convention were a former President of India, Mr. Zail Singh, a former President of the ruling Congress (I) Party Mr. S. Nijalingappa, and many leading Indians belonging to the main political parties. This reflected the widespread sympathy among many Indians for the Tibetans.

The two-day convention was inaugurated by former President Zail Singh and attended by former Congress President S. Nijalingappa, former ministers Rabi Ray and Ravinder Verma and Bharatiya Janata Party chief L. K. Advani. The convention said the Chinese Government should stop "acts of repression and suppression" against Tibetans, respect the sentiments of Tibetans and restore to them their due.

There was unanimity among the participants on Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama's five-point peace plan. The meeting urged the UN to play a more active role in the Tibet issue.

In his speech, Sir Bernard Braine, a senior member for the British House of Commons, said "we rail against apartheid in South African, and rightly so, but what about apartheid in Tibet — where the invaders displace the natives, treat them with contempt, drive them off their own land and bring in Chinese settlers."

Sir Bernard said "we should make every endeavour to make legislators and organisations

aware of the happenings in Tibet. History is littered with examples of disasters which follow from failure to take a stand against tyranny."

He said "our government has made and will continue to make strong representations to the Chinese authorities about their conduct in Tibet as it has done also about the slaughter of young students in Beijing."

Some speakers said as long as Tibet remained fully militarised with Chinese forces, it would be futile for Nepal to claim the status of a "zone of peace."

Lord David Ennals, former British Foreign Secretary and President of the Tibet society, also advocated the right of self-determination for Tibetans thousands of whom, he said, were being victimised and harassed.

Convention convener George Fernandes said the Dalai Lama's proposal had received universal support.

He urged the Chinese government to respond to the peace plan and open negotiations with the representatives of the Tibetan leaders to find an amicable solution to the problem.

How Benazir...

(Continued from page 12)

The nominal opposition, the IJI, seems to be a broken reed insofar as Sindh Province is concerned as it does not move too many people here. The political forces that are actually operative on the ground and habitually accuse one another are mainly PPP and MQM activists.

The PPP's relationship with the MQM is highly ambivalent. Both sides take offence at even minor turns of phrase. Both sides are being pulled in opposite directions through pressures from below.

While the leadership on both sides have remained quiet, the workers at the grass-roots level have been working hard against each other. Indeed their student wings have fought bloody battles with guns. The MQM can not tolerate the PPP design of ex-

tending its support among the Urdu-speaking people in Karachi and Hyderabad. Similarly to PPP workers do not like any toleration of, and cooperation with the MQM.

Moreover PPP activists in Sindh, having been deeply affected by ideas of Sindhi nationalism, are extremely sensitive about any action that suggests any consolidation and strengthening of the MQM. Yet, the PPP Government cannot afford to alienate the MQM leadership. Otherwise the latter would actually team up with the Nawaz Sharif-led IJI.

Although the MQM's trouble-creating capacity is still largely untested, the PPP simply cannot afford to take the risk of finding out. Anyhow it is for the PPP leadership to find ways to end the hatred between PPP and MQM workers that is being held in check with great difficulty.

Surreptitious pleasures in Serendip

Derek Brown

Reporting from Sri Lanka is a depressing business these days, so I took a couple of hours off recently to nip over to Royal Ascot.

Not as silly as it sounds: Royal Ascot is only a few hundred yards down the road from the incomparably eccentric and beautiful Galle Face Hotel (founded 1864: "Dedicated to Yesterday's Charm and Tomorrow's Comfort": "We Admire Your Decision Not To Smoke," and many more mottoes).

Outside the hotel, hawkers offer kites, model boats, subscriptions to bogus charity schools, and the company of their alleged sisters. As low life goes, this is the pits.

The Royal Ascot, on the other hand, is high life. It's one of several Colombo betting shops, where the Berties, Reggies and Sonnies of Sri Lanka society follow the affairs of the turf in passionate detail.

Back in the 1950s, in one of its periodic attacks of humbug, the Ceylon establishment decided that betting on geegaws was popular, and therefore a bad thing. It banned the practice and no doubt leaned back in the glow of satisfaction common to all legislators who have made the world a duller place.

But not for long. What the government failed, forgot, or forbore to do, was to ban betting on foreign racing. Result: the 2.25 at Kempton Park, is discussed and analysed here with almost Irish devotion. There are half a dozen daily racing papers packed with tips and supposedly inside information. The better-known form books and guides are photo-

copied and distributed promptly, complete with dire warnings of penalties for breach of copyright, at a fraction of their UK subscription rates.

In the Royal Ascot and other clubs, race commentaries are broadcast live over Tannoy systems. Downstairs the small punters fritter away their rupees and dream wild dreams; upstairs the serious money is exchanged in plushly carpeted style. The minimum stake is 500 rupees, or 250 each way (about £10). But only tyros and Guardian correspondents mess around at this level. Not infrequently, 100,000 rupees are won and lost in a night; about seven times the average annual per capita income.

On the penultimate day of Royal Ascot week, there was tremendous whooping over a six-race combination bet of stupendous complexity, featuring doubles, triples and other mysteries, which produced five winners and a lot of happy smiles.

Given the four-and-a-half-hour time difference, the main business of the British racing afternoon is conducted in the early evening, concluding around 10 o'clock. Afterwards, at least while there is no curfew, there is a choice of supper venues. The five-star hotels, which lie like beached whales along a glorious seafront from which tourism has been all but eliminated, offer sumptuous dining.

Alternatively, there's the Hotel de New Pilawaos, which isn't a hotel at all. Here food is brought to the car by smiling youths in sarongs. On a good night in better times, they would

play loud music and dance on your bonnet and roof. Egg hopper, a rice-flour pancake with an egg cooked in the middle, with a side order of fiery chicken chilli and a fizzy drink: fifteen bob a nob. Highly recommended.

To round off the evening, much more expensively, a last shot may be taken at one of the thinly-attended hotel discotheques. Here are the last or bravest remnants of Sri Lanka's bright young things, gyrating to amplified Western sounds, reproduced with uncanny accuracy by talented and entirely unoriginal local bands.

No hint here of the latest sniffy crackdown on pleasure. It has been decreed that to save the nation for Buddhism and family virtue, there shall be no kissing on telly (which produces some remarkably jerky soap opera) and no unseemliness in public places. The fire engines are expected soon to reappear on Galle Face Green where, some years ago, couples who dared to hold hands were promptly hosed down.

There is no bar on violence, either real-life or fiction. The cinemas offer horror and war plain old multiple axe-slayings. The papers daily record massacres, assassinations, the progress of two bloody rebellions, and the sanguinary efforts of the security forces to contain them. More than 1,700 killings this year — and that's only the official figure.

Meanwhile, the once-notorious beach trade in small boys has dried up for want of customers, religious broadcasting has been stepped up and screen slaughter is unadulterated by adultery.

(Guardian)

ETHNICITY AND CLASS

Dayan Jayatilaka

The main difficulty in getting class consciousness to break through nationalism, is that the **ethnic community** is older than modern classes, though perhaps the **modern nation** is bound up with capitalism. Certainly in Asia, the ethnic group is older than modern classes. Further more, the artificial race memory of an individual is much older than his knowledge of himself as a member of a class. A Sinhala worker is Sinhalese first, in terms of self-identity, and a worker, second. The problem is not merely one of an 'imagined community' as Benedict Anderson would have it, but also of an 'imagined continuity' of thousands of years (the Mahawamsa mind-set)!

This is not a problem when class and race do not need to diverge (e.g. the Chinese revolution and all national liberation struggles). But when divergence is necessary, it is not class but the older ties and forms of consciousness that triumph - religion (Iran), race, nation, ethnic group, tribe. Régis Debray makes pretty much this point in his **"Critique of Political Reason"** but fails to address the question of the exception - a gigantic historical one - of the Russian revolution in which Lenin and the Bolsheviks successfully broke through nationalism, twice over (vis à vis the right of self determination of other nations within Tsarist Russia and also in the case of World War 1).

What then of the Russian revolution? There, the workers and peasants did not feel themselves part of the nation because the nature of the state was a pre-capitalist autocracy which **excluded them**. In Europe however, Social Democracy, universal suffrage, capitalist development and the welfare state

had given the working masses a stake in the nation state. Hence their behaviour in World War 1. A few commentators like E. H. Carr point out that when Marx and Engels say in the Communist manifesto that "the working class has no country", it is not a proud statement of principle, but a lament. There is another sentence which says "one cannot take from them what they have not got". Securing a place in the country was therefore very much part of the struggle of the working class as envisaged by Marx and Engels and this is indeed what the Second International tried to do. The result was a diminution of internationalism. In Russia, where this did not succeed, internationalism was viable.

In Sri Lanka, especially after 1956, the working masses feel they have a stake in the system. And they do - an example is how the language policy materially benefitted the petty-bourgeoisie. So, given the older form of national consciousness, can we hope that class consciousness can break through in Sri Lanka when the labouring masses feel they have a place in the existing order of things?

Does all this mean, as I have posed earlier, that we have to revert to the Menshevik problematic and support capitalist development for a long period? No, because in the periphery, dependent capitalism utilizes, props up and even re-creates archaic relations of production for the purpose of surplus extraction. This realization is as old as the Comintern and its most sophisticated and recent proponents are Samir Amin, Ernesto Laclau and Pierre Philippe Rey (and in Sri Lanka, Newton Gunasinghe). In order therefore to uproot these archaic relations, capitalism itself has

to be attacked i.e. the socialist revolution made. But the problem is that petite bourgeois chauvinism, which was once of utility to the bourgeoisie in that it kept the exploited masses divided and diverted, subsequently not only proves **dysfunctional to the logic of dependent accumulation** (which is what Ronnie de Mel, in his own terminology, was saying all these years), but also reduces the chances of making that (necessary) socialist revolution. So, it is a vicious circle out of which I for one am unable to break out conceptually, in a satisfactory fashion.

I also disagree with the view that the successful development of an **ethnically integrated** capitalism, will cut the ground from under the JVP and similar phenomena. The fact that META international is an Indian company, caused a chauvinist strain to be present in the Moneragala peasant struggle. It is the 'ethnically integrated' capitalism of the post-colonial period that led to the change in Philip Gunawardena's line, the rise of the SLFP, the so-called Masala Vade line of the left, the anti-Indian and anti-Borah line of the JVP in the 1960s and the pro Sinhala bourgeois state capitalism of '70-'77. The criticism of the UNP was precisely that it was both pro-imperialist and ethnically integrated ('thupahi'). The absence of chauvinism in the opposition in 1977 to the extent that the UNP could include a clause on Tamil grievance in its Election Manifesto and still sweep the board in '77, was because the government of the immediately preceding period had not roused Sinhala passions against itself on the ethnic issue. This is because it 'kept Tamils in their proper place'

and managed a dependent capitalism, which was however, not ethnically integrated but was heavily tilted towards Sinhala business.

Some hope that the maturation of the Sinhala and Tamil bourgeoisies, as classes (or class fractions), over the last decades, will permit such an 'ethnically integrated' model of capitalist development this time around, which they see as a panacea for the current social ills. I, for one, have my doubts.

The return of Tamil business, with the superior international contacts and entrepreneurial experience, the reflux to Colombo from Jaffna, South India and the West of the July 1983 refugees—professionals, house owners, small businessmen, wholesale traders in the Pettah, the restoration of the Sinhala-Tamil bourgeois alliance (Colombo-Jaffna-Madras-Western expatriate), the ethnic re-integration of the public service, police and armed services, the reversal of the 1956 language policy, the removal of district/ethnic quotas in University entrance, may all give rise to those same social strata, this time having an added anti-Indian dimension. The Sinhalese will be resentful of post war prosperity in the Tamil areas (which will be manifested in an upsurge of demand in those areas as money is pumped in) and the North/South question will re-surface due to **uneven and unequal economic development**, with the hostility of the Sinhalese being diverted away from the capitalist class and whichever regime towards the Tamil autonomous unit. The actual presence, once again, of Tamil and this time, of Indian capital as fractions of the power bloc, possibly even the physical presence of these bourgeoisie, will give a material basis to chauvinist distortions of the class struggle. The incorporation of the Tamil bourgeoisie and a fraction of the nationalist Tamil petite bourgeoisie will be a contradictory process which will alter the composition of the

power bloc while generating contradictions within it, possibly due to a reaction from the non-monopoly sections of the Sinhala bourgeoisie.

The consequences will be as in Uganda and Fiji, and we have enough experience from July 1983 to know that the hostility will not stop with Indian or Tamil **bourgeois** targets.

It is difficult to communicate the feelings evoked as one watches the JVP and the Tigers drawing away from us in the 'race' and to be left not only lagging far behind but with the sensation of running up a downward moving escalator. The painful irony is that finally, the UNP, the state and the system **are** being caught on two fronts, not by the 'natural allies' the Sinhala and Tamil Marxists, but by mutually hostile petite-bourgeois chauvinists, the LTTE and JVP. In other parts of the Third World, the phenomena of repression and militarization helps radicalisation, but here it was directed initially against the Tamils and was hence applauded by the Sinhalese! Now it is directed against those who are opposed to the 'de-militarization' and 'decolonization' of the north and east by the Sinhalese. Therefore the type of radicalization it results in is a 'radical racism', a 'racist radicalism'.

The militancy of the JVP and LTTE youth should have been channelled in the direction of an authentically socialist revolution. Then, the Indian, or any other interventionist army could have been fought shoulder to shoulder. That is how things should have been. But then again, can the militancy these movements display, which is really a **fanatical frenzy**, be evoked by revolutionary appeals? Neither the LTTE nor the JVP would have gone in for the 1954 Geneva talks or the 1927 Paris peace talks as the Vietnamese Communists did. Not even in the days of Che did the Cubans so much as fire a rifle shot at the U.S. military base that exists on the soil of

Cuba, in Guantanamo. Like the Cubans, the Nicaraguans today are really doing their best to ward off a U.S. military intervention. Such sober and responsible revolutionary realism, which Lenin valued highly, seems alien to the JVP and LTTE. When Pulendiran, Kumarappah and the LTTE cadres who were in custody, a political campaign throughout the north and east and Tamil Nadu, a campaign of mass agitation, could have forced the Indians into securing their release to save the accord. Why then the decision to take cyanide? I doubt whether we can separate the fanaticism with which the LTTE fights the IPKF from that with which they shot the Sinhala hostages in Jaffna and burnt the Sinhala passengers alive. Similarly, the JVP's motivation displayed in the raid on the Katunayake air base is the same as that manifested in the slicing of young Daya Pathirana's throat on the last Poya day of 1986.

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Locked in the Debt trap

Part (III)

Akmal Hussain

From the perspective of development, 20th century mainstream economics has four major features:

(1) RESOURCE ALLOCATION

It is essentially concerned with the allocative problem, i.e. Organizing most efficiently available resources for the production of precisely that combination of goods that consumers demand with their income. Of course the question of why some people are rich and others poor, i.e. how a particular distribution of income came about was not adequately explained by mainstream economics (as we have shown in Part-I of this series of articles). Similarly unexplained is how the taste for certain goods is determined, and how the presumed consumer psychology of desiring an unlimited volume of goods regardless of the deprivation of others comes about. These questions were swept under the carpet by means of two assumptions:

- (a) The consumer is sovereign, i.e. His tastes and preferences are internal to him and are influenced neither by other consumers, nor by the market.
- (b) The larger the quantity of goods the consumer has the greater is his satisfaction, regardless of what happens to others. (This is the so called consumer rationality assumption).

(2) THE MARKET

The second major feature of neo-classical or mainstream economics is that it sees the free market mechanism as the framework for the most efficient allocation of resources for the production of goods, and the most efficient distribution of these goods amongst consumers with pre-determined income. The market according to neo-classical

theory mediates between competing consumers and producers to determine a set of prices. Once prices are fixed they act as reference points for two sets of actors: Prices guide producers to allocate their given resources to produce just the right combination of goods which will maximize their profits; prices also guide consumers to select with given incomes just the right combination of goods that will maximize their satisfaction.

Having developed an argument for the efficacy of the market on the basis of highly restrictive assumptions, Neo-classical economics then proceeds to apply it on a global scale. It takes the world market as it existed at the height of the colonial period in the late 19th century, and sees it as the ideal framework for the most "efficient" production and distribution of goods on a world scale. Having conceived of the world market in an abstract and ahistorical way it then prescribes the theory of "comparative advantage." Simply put this theory suggests that each country should specialize in producing goods in which it is "relatively efficient", and through free trade import goods which it cannot produce at competitive prices at home. This way the theory argues, national and world incomes would be simultaneously maximized. Of course the theory neatly ignores the question of how it came about that in the 19th century (when this theory was propounded) some countries were more efficient in manufacturing goods and others in agricultural goods; or why over time the income gap between industrial countries and agricultural countries has been growing rapidly. Moreover the actual world market to-day is by no means free, given the fact that the industrialized countries are placing import barriers on goods from the Third World.

In spite of gaping holes in their logic, the World Bank and the IMF continue to harp on their free market ideology and the kept economists of the establishment, in Third World countries play to the same tune.

(3) MAN AND NATURE

The third major characteristic of Neo-classical economics is that it regards nature as a set of "resources" divorced from man and to be "exploited" by him in the process of making profit. As we have seen in Part-I of this article, this economics sees the individual as atomized and separate from society, rather than in terms of his social relations; in the same way, it sees nature in terms of its component elements that are to be exploited, rather than as an organic wholeness that is in a delicate ecological balance within itself and with man.

The consequence of this approach to nature was that market or profit criteria began to be applied to nature at the level of individual project selection. The problem in this case is that private profitability only takes account of the costs and benefits of the project concerned and not for society as a whole, or for the next generation. Thus for example a pesticide manufacturing plant that throws toxic waste into the rivers, does not count as part of its cost, the loss of fish species downstream. Similarly the wood contractors who cut trees in river watershed areas, do not include in the sales price of wood the social cost of flooding and soil erosion caused by their free cutting. Finally manufacturers of aerosol sprays which emit chlorofluorocarbons do not include in the price of the product the damage to the ozone layer of the earth and the consequent increase in skin cancer frequency in the world.

The conflict between private gain and social or ecological loss that is inherent in the market criteria for project selection has over the years brought devastation to the earth's environment. It has initiated processes of desertification and resultant famine in sub-saharan Africa, global warming associated with carbon dioxide emissions from industrial plants and depletion of the ozone layer of the earth. These processes which are the uncounted aggregate cost of individual investment decisions are now beginning to undermine the delicate ecological balance of our planet and hence threatening life on earth.

(4) STATE INTERVENTION

The fourth main feature of modern economics and one that the Neo-classicists have not sufficiently recognized is the discovery by Kalecki and Keynes that the market mechanism on its own cannot ensure full employment. This important contribution laid the theoretical basis for state intervention in the advanced capitalist economies in the period following the Great Depression of the 1930's. Although Keynes demonstrated the possibility of market equilibrium at less than full employment, he was concerned with a short-run situation where productive capacity in the economy was fixed. Subsequent economists like Harrod and Domar showed that even when productive capacity was changing the market mechanism could not ensure economic stability, i.e. Market forces cannot ensure full employment during the process of economic growth. It was Joan Robinson who in a vivid demonstration of the Harrod Domar theory showed that economic stability during the process of economic growth is like a knife edge: If external factors push the economy off the stable growth path, then market forces in fact act to cumulatively move the economy **away** from this stable growth path, rather than bringing it back onto it.

While the theoretical basis for state intervention was rigorously established, the instrument of this intervention was conceived in terms of a centralized nation state through monetary and fiscal policy. In the contemporary world monetary and fiscal interventions are being done at an even more centralized level than the nation state. If we think about it, the economic stabilization programmes being imposed by the IMF/World Bank to-day, constitute massive interventions in the economies of Third World countries, by supra state institutions that are centralized at a global level. Yet the irony is, that it is precisely these global institutions of economic intervention that are propounding the ideology of the free market mechanism at the level of the nation state!

CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES FOR 21ST CENTURY ECONOMICS

To-day as we stand amidst the global economic and ecological crisis it is evident that 20th century Neo-classical economics is at an end. The four features of this economics that we have discussed above, indicate the concerns of a new economics of the 21st century. This economics would contribute to achieving a new relationship between man, nature and growth. This new relationship would be sought in a world where nations struggle to achieve a decentralized democracy within states, on the one hand and on the other a global co-operation to preserve the ecology of our planet, to maintain peace and to overcome poverty.

1. HUMAN COMMUNITY AS THE FOCUS The focus of economics must shift from mere resource allocation. It must concentrate on the problem of the fulfillment of the human potential, within the context of social organization and limited non-renewable resources. The emphasis would therefore shift away from short term profit maximization at the micro level and value indices of GNP at the

macro level. Instead the new performance criteria would be the quality of life within an inter-generational perspective. For example how many more people have been provided with clean drinking water, what is the state of housing, transport and education, what new forms of production organization have emerged that unleash the creative possibilities of the individual and which enable control of the local community over its economic, social and ecological environment? Some work on the quality of life indices and a new welfare theory has already been done in this regard by Prof. A. K. Sen at Oxford. Much more work lies ahead in this field.

2. NEW PROJECT EVALUATION Project selection would be done not just in terms of its **internal** costs and benefits, but also in terms of its external effects. This is in the field of Social Cost Benefit analysis on which considerable work has been done by economists like Dasgupta Pearce, Little and Mireloes. The major problem with even Social Cost Benefit analysis however is that it fails to take account of two vital dimensions of sustainable development: The capacity of a particular project to further the goal of an integrated and self reliant community on the one hand and conserving the ecological balance on the other. These concerns must be brought into a new calculus of project evaluation.

3. INTERLOCKING CRISES AND NEW FINANCE CONCEPTS The new economics must come to grips at the global level with the interlocking crises of economy and ecology. Mechanisms of finance production and distribution must be found, which can enable nation states to achieve a selective de-linking from the current centralized processes of finance and accumulation. At the same time forms of international finance must be developed that ease

(Continued on page 21)

The Ethnic Conflict Regionalised

Kumar Rupesingha

The growing militarization of the conflict in Sri Lanka led to the direct involvement of the government of India. However, it would be an oversimplification to argue that India's concerns were motivated entirely by the ethnic strife and the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils. We need to bear in mind the internal compulsions as well as the security interests that shaped India's policy in relation to the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka.

Firstly, the problem for the India has been to get militant Tamil armed groups to accept a solution within a unitary Sri Lankan state. The presence of a Tamil guerilla army in South India was a source of embarrassment to the central government, who had officially denied their presence despite evidence to the contrary. It is now clear that Delhi did pursue a dual track policy. After the 1983 pogrom, the Indian government intervened directly as a third party concerned with settling the dispute within the unitary state of Sri Lanka. With this objective in mind, the government of India mediated in organizing several conferences, leading up to the 19 December proposals. Simultaneously, India was arming sections of the Tamil militant movement, providing them with training and base facilities, while attempting to control the direction of the movement and encouraging dependence and subservience to Indian geo-political concerns. The Indian central government could not possibly intervene in South India for fear of provoking Tamil Nadu nationalism. However the guerilla movement had by its own misbehaviour in Tamil Nadu provided the space necessary for India to move against the militant leadership. Moreover Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had suffered electoral losses and

was also facing ethnic violence, particularly in Punjab. It was also likely that he was able to persuade some of the Tamil Nadu leaders to agree to the Accord.

Indian intervention was further made possible through the escalation of the conflict by the Sri Lankan government, by means of a well-planned economic blockade of the Northern peninsula, from January 1987. In May the government of Sri Lanka deployed massive troops and air attacks on the Northern province, thereby creating a siege on the militants and forcing them within the town precincts. This attack was concentrated on the LTTE stronghold of Vadammarachy. In response, India challenged the Sri Lankan government by air lifting food supplies to Jaffna Peninsula and thereby opening the way for the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord.

The only way in which the government of Sri Lanka could govern was to arrive at some accord with the Tamil guerilla movement. The war was draining massive resources from development; further, for a country dependent on foreign aid, international criticism would have had repercussions on aid for the future as well. Dissent and political opposition to the government were also building up in the South, where both the democratic opposition and the underground were engaged in various forms of protests. There was also a danger that the civil war, which had been restricted to part of the country could become generalized civil war against the entire regime. For both Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene, then, the Accord meant a natural and necessary respite to gain political capital.

3. The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement: Conflict Resolution or Conflict Escalation?

3.1. Essentials of the Agreement and Initial Reactions

The Preamble to the 1987 Accord underlines the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. It acknowledges Sri Lanka as a "multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society" consisting of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers. It recognizes that the Northern and Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of the Sri Lankan Tamil-speaking people. In theory this constitutes, as we have noted, a fundamental departure in the conception of Sri Lanka as a Buddhist theocratic state, contained in the Republican Constitution of 1972 and reaffirmed in the Constitution of 1978.

According to the Agreement these two provinces would function as a single administrative unit, after elections to the provincial Councils, to be held not later than December 1987. Further, a referendum is to be held before December 1988 for the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether this should remain linked with the Northern Province or become a separate administrative unit with its own Provincial Council. However, the Accord also stipulates that the referendum may be postponed at the discretion of the President. The referendum is now scheduled for 5 July 1989.

The Agreement provided for cessation of hostilities, the surrender of arms held by Tamil militant groups, and the return of the Sri Lankan army to barracks within a specified time frame. General amnesty to be granted to all political and other

prisoners held in custody or convicted under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and emergency laws.

The Accord also brought in the Indian army as a peace-keeping force to supervise the surrender of weapons by the Tamil militants and to facilitate the restoration of normalcy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. By agreeing to grant political concession to the Tamils, Jayewardene abandoned his carefully-nurtured Sinhalese nationalist constituency. By signing the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, Jayewardene abandoned the anti-Indian Sinhala Buddhist forces that he himself had promoted throughout his Presidency. The Sinhala nationalist constituency felt betrayed and abandoned, and transferred their loyalties to the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and increasingly to the extra-Parliamentary opposition mobilized around the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. A new front merged calling itself the Dehasapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV) Patriotic Peoples Front. In the South of Sri Lanka, reactions were mixed. Some sections welcomed the proposals for devolution of power to the North and East, whilst others objected to the role of India. The announcement of the Accord met with protest marches organized by militant Buddhist sections. There were outbreaks of violence directed mainly against state property. The government introduced curfew throughout the entire country, with strict instructions to maintain law and order. At the ceremonial signing of the Accord and while inspecting the guard of Honour, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was physically attacked by a sailor. The attempted assassination of the President and members of his entourage was a clear attempt at destabilizing the Agreement.

The ethnic conflict and the internationalization of the conflict had made everybody inattentive to the growing cleavages among the Sinhalese themselves. Suddenly after the Accord the Sinhalese started killing each

other. As long as the Tamils appeared to have been the common enemy, the Sinhalese appeared to be politically united, but with the appearance of the Indian Peace-Keeping Forces, this front was broken and the Sinhalese turned the guns upon each other.

Political killings are the gravest manifestations of the current crisis in Sri Lanka, most pervasive in the Southern part of the country. The Sinhalese population has been experiencing a wave of terror by various death squads and assassinations which has dominated the situation since the time of the Accord. Recent reports indicate a daily toll of over 25 people killed by the extremist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the DJV over the past few months — the majority being members of the ruling United National Party (UNP) and security forces personnel. The death list also includes members of the United Socialist Alliance (USA) which extended support for the Accord. The campaign of terror and intimidation launched by the Dehasapremi Janatha Viyaparaya has dominated the political situation in the South. The extent of its influence is indicated by the following observation:

The campaign of terror and intimidation launched by the DJV, since August 1987 has taken a heavy toll. Members of the UNP and of the left Parties, petty government officials, servicemen and civilians have all fallen prey to the vicious death squads that operate under the cover of "patriotism". The label of "traitor" is attached to all those who supported the Peace Accord, ...

Victims have been burned to death, stabbed, hacked, decapitated. The common practice at present is to shoot and then to stab. (C. S. D.)

In the North, Tamils greeted the Agreement with mixed feelings. The people in the North felt that it meant that the Sinhalese army would be with-

drawn from the area, providing a much-needed respite from state terrorism, internecine killings and a perceived genocidal situation. However, when Rajiv Gandhi arrived in Colombo it was clear that he was not able to obtain agreement from the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran. Later, at a public meeting in Jaffna, Prabhakaran maintained that he had grave reservations but had to accept a near fait accompli presented by Rajiv Gandhi. The position of the government of India, however, was that not only had Prabhakaran consented to the Agreement, but he had also reaffirmed his position in the Agreement of 28 September. Regardless of the above contradictory positions, Prabhakaran was certainly not happy about laying down arms or yielding on the secessionist demand for "Tamil Eelam" — despite the offer of the dominated role in the proposed interim administration, financial support and permission to carry personal arms. The position of some other Tamil politico-military organizations (EPRLF, EROS, PLOT, TELD etc.) was one of critical support for the Accord, where the Accord was seen as an "interim solution" — not the basis for a long-lasting solution to the nationality problem.

3.2. The Role of India and the IPKF

A peace-keeping force is not a fighting force. It can function only if the parties abide by their agreements in good faith. Its members are entitled to shoot in self-defense, but it was not intended that the force should resist the advances of of the armed forces of either side. That remains a matter for diplomatic action.

It seems that neither the Indian nor the Sri Lankan government had seriously entertained the possibility of a UN Peace-Keeping Force. This reflects the attempts by both governments not to internationalize the conflict, so as to retain its "internal character" and keep it con-

fined within the region. True, President Jayawardene had on several occasions tried to bring other powers into the conflict and did succeed in obtaining assistance from Israel, Pakistan and South Africa in the militarization of the armed forces. But as he himself admitted, the support for a military solution had turned lukewarm and the western countries, on whom Sri Lanka depended for foreign aid, had all advised him to work through India.

The Peace-Keeping force was to be a limited to a few thousands. However, given the intransigence of the LTTE in refusing to surrender its arms, Indian troops eventually sent to Sri Lanka numbered over 50,000. There seems to have been very little contingency planning in the operation, and troops were sent without much consideration of local requirements. The Indian Peace Keeping Force was itself a multi-ethnic army. This experience is recounted by one observer as follows.

"Over a period of 20 days, the Indian Armies direct attack on LTTE positions, and defence from LTTE attacks, was coupled with the Indian Armies attack and storming of still unevacuated Jaffna — and many villages and settlements throughout the Peninsula — with widespread indiscriminate and sustained artillery shelling. There was air-striking from helicopter as well. It was not "cross-fire" that incidentally killed thousands of civilians. The majority were killed unavoidably inside their houses and huts under shelling, or were shot at random by the roads and on the streets.

Alongside the firing and shelling there was an Indian Army command to the population to evacuate Jaffna town and other places which made an estimated 175,000 families (i. e. about 500,000 people) refugees in the outskirts of Jaffna within days.

(Edwards Marina)

The following factors pertaining to the politico-military situation in Tamil areas need to be taken into account in assessing the prospects for restoring peace and normalcy:

1) The situation was exploited to the full by the LTTE leadership in adopting a two-pronged stratagem. One was continued escalation, through attacks on the armed forces as well as Sinhala civilians, as a means of providing reprisals against the Tamil populace. The other was the imposition of LTTE hegemony in the Tamil areas through armed attacks against other Tamil politico-military organizations, and the "banning" of mass organizations that refused to accept its leadership. The very same tactics were continued in the post-Accord period, through attacks against the IPKF and other Tamil organizations which had decided to support the Accord. Hence, prospects for restoring peace and normalcy in Tamil areas will largely depend on the future tactics of the LTTE, as well as the capacity of the other Tamil organizations to project a viable, democratic alternative to the LTTE.

2) The ambivalence in the politico-military strategy of the government of India and IPKF. It is now clear that the government of India did not conceive of a situation where its armed forces, initially welcomed by the Tamil people as their protectors, would be drawn into a protracted armed conflict with the LTTE. Intransigence on the part of the LTTE and IPKF misperceptions of its own mandate were key factors that led to the outbreak of open armed hostilities on 10 October. And when this happened, the IPKF did not have any contingency plans to minimize deprivations and loss of lives amongst the civilians. On the contrary, IPKF reprisals were swift and indiscriminate, causing immense sufferings. Although there has been marked improvement in the efficiency of IPKF operation in

protecting civilian lives, excesses of the initial phase have left scars on the psyche of the Tamil populace.

In all this, it must be remembered that the IPKF was severely constrained by confused signals from Delhi. An army originally sent to supervise the laying-down of arms was now asked to engage in military operations, under provocation from the LTTE, in an urban setting where the armed militia of the LTTE was entrenched. The military command had not only to take quick decisions, but had to formulate a strategy to drive the LTTE away from the urban centres and into the jungles. At the same time, the IPKF was constrained by the policy decision from Delhi that room should be kept open for the LTTE to join the democratic process.

(To be Continued)

Locked in . . .

(Continued from page 18)

the capital constraint of Third World countries without locking them into a crippling debt trap. International financial relations must reflect our awareness that the systematic transfer of non-renewable resources from the Third World to the First World and the endemic poverty crisis will have adverse repercussions at a global level for the preservation of peace and ecology.

4. ECONOMICS AND PRAXIS Finally economics in the 21st century must become part of a new Praxis, in which man is both the subject as well as the object of development. Knowledge and action must be integrated into a new dialectic at the local, national and global levels.

Comparing 1st and 2nd tier NIC's

Ganeshan Wignaraja

This section reviews some of the available evidence on human resource development and building technological capabilities in the East Asian NICs in recent years¹⁴ and a group of "Second tier aspiring NICs" (Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Kenya). Empirical evidence on the development of technological capability at the firm level is difficult to present concisely because it is normally presented in a detailed case study format rather than as summary statistics. On the other hand, quantitative data on national technological capability is readily available. Thus, undertaken by the East Asian States to create the supply of technical manpower necessary to assimilate technological development. The review will proceed through three stages: (a) general and vocational educational attainments; (b)

scientific and technical manpower attainments; and (c) expenditures on Research and Development (R & D).

The significance of formal education to labour skills and national technological capability can hardly be overstated. Many debates continue about which level or orientation of education is the most conducive to national technological capability, but it is probably accepted that all forms of education, broadly defined, feed into the formation of a skilled flexible and efficient work force. Table 2, sets out the basic data on secondary educational attainment for the East Asian NICs and the "second tier newly industrialized countries". There are great differences between the two groups of countries. The four East Asian NICs have a genuine

claim to have 70% or more coverage by 1984, while the others lag far behind. What is important for present purposes is that the East Asian NICs, along with Sri Lanka and Malaysia, had ensured secondary education for over a third of their population by 1986, providing the broad base for skill development needed for export success.

Vocational education, i.e. secondary education aimed at preparing pupils directly for a trade or occupation (other than teaching), is generally considered of great significance for national technology development. Again, the East Asian NICs lead the second-tier NICs. Within the East Asian NICs, the relative lead of South Korea and Taiwan (i.e. relative to the total population) appears overwhelming. Inter-

TABLE 2
HUMAN CAPITAL AND TECHNOLOGY

	Nos. enrolled in secondary education (as % of age group)		Pupils enrolled in vocational education (as % of population)		Proportion of students in univ. education in Science and Technology		Scientists and Engineers in R & D (per million inhabitants)		Gross R & D expenditure (as a % of GNP) Mid 1980s	
	(1965)	(1985)	1984		1980s		1984			
(First tier NICs)										
SOUTH KOREA	35	91	2.04		42		802.9		1.1	
TAIWAN	38	81	2.20		n.a.		1,285.3		0.9	
SINGAPORE	45	71	0.36		60		960.4		0.5	
HONG KONG	29	69	0.59		48		n.a.		n.a.	
(Second tier NICs)										
MALAYSIA	28	53	0.13		33		182.0		n.a.	
THAILAND	14	30	0.75		21		150.0		0.5	
SRI LANKA	35	61	1.20 ^a		21		220		0.18	
KENYA	4	19	0.05		34		28.0		n.a.	

Notes: a = 1981, n.a. = not available

Source: Database of UNESCO, Paris, 1987.

tingly enough, Sri Lanka has more pupils enrolled in vocational (as a percentage of population) than Singapore and Hong Kong.¹²

The general education figures may be **quite misleading** as measures of technological capabilities of a country, if the proportion of trainees in technical subjects and the quality of their training differ widely. There is no objective measure at hand for assessing quality, but UNESCO does provide figures on the proportion of students in science and technology and numbers of engineers employed in R+D in the sample countries. The technical orientation of higher education is exceptional in Singapore and is high in South Korea and Hong Kong. Taiwan's figure is not available but maybe presumed to be similar to South Korea. Malaysia and Kenya do invest fairly heavily in technical education lagging approximately 10 percentage points behind Korea and Hong Kong. Thailand and Sri Lanka, however, rank lowest in the league of Second tier NICs.

We now consider the numbers of scientists and engineers in R+D in the sample countries. Note that R+D includes non-manufacturing, so that for many countries a large proportion may be accounted for by agriculture, defense, energy and so on. Moreover, even industrial R+D may be conducted in **government laboratories unrelated to production**, so that their impact on actual technology use is minimal. The evidence shows that the three East Asian NICs in which data is available have the highest density of R+D scientists in their populations. Taiwan is in a distinct class of its own, with a density approaching France and the United Kingdom. (The numbers of Scientists and Engineers in R+D per million inhabitants are 1,545 and 1,364 for the United Kingdom and France respectively). Sri Lanka leads the group of Second tier NICs with a density of 220 Scientists and Engineers in R+D (per million inhabitants), but lies well below the East Asian countries.

Formal R+D expenditure is probably a good way of comparing total technological effort in industrialized countries, with roughly similar levels of basic technological competence and similar pace of 'minor' technical progress. In developing countries at radically different levels of industrialization, it is impossible to make this sort of assumption. The bulk of technological effort is devoted to mastering technologies in place and to all sorts of minor improvements and adaptations. The starting points of different countries are also vastly different. Thus, simple comparisons of formal R+D spending may tell us little about relative technological competence or effort, particularly when the orientation, location and financing of R+D also differs.

Bearing these caveats in mind, let's look at the evidence presented. South Korea and Taiwan again stand out by virtue of their technological effort and compare quite well to France and the US and Japan which spend 1.8 and 2.6 percent of GDP respectively. We were unable to obtain data on Hong Kong, Malaysia and Kenya. By contrast, Sri Lanka devotes a very small proportion of its resources to R+D — a fact that has not changed for over a decade. For example, in 1975, Sri Lanka spent 0.2 percent of GNP on R+D.¹³ Today, the total amount spent on R+D has dropped to 0.18%. A recent study on Science and Technology in Sri Lanka highlights this fact: "It is evident that in Sri Lanka science and technology development has stagnated for many years without showing much improvement. Although manpower has shown an increase over the years, R+D expenditure shows no corresponding improvement. This suggests that infrastructure development and provision of adequate level of resources per R+D person has not improved, and in fact has deteriorated over the years, with a relatively high proportion of research scientists having to depend on a smaller amount of resources for R+D".¹⁴

Inadequate provision of resources to R+D, in absolute terms,

is **not** the only barrier to Sri Lanka's technological development. Far more serious is the fact that relatively few firms have R+D departments and that there are limited linkages between the state sponsored science and technology institutes and industry. As another recent study put it: "In the private sector, research and development is confined to a handful of firms. There are in addition three publicly supported laboratories for industrial research. For the most part, these have relatively poor links with their clients in the productive sector. To complete the picture, there is only a modest amount of research in academic institutions of direct relevance to industry".¹⁵

This section has provided a brief sketch into a rich and fascinating area of empirical economic research that requires further study. The tentative conclusions from the data confirm the propositions advanced in the previous section. That is, the East Asian NICs invested heavily in human and technological capital vital to sustainable industrialization. The investments were directed at:

- (a) the generation of a large, literate, industrial labour force that was receptive to intensive on-the-job and external training at the firm level;
- (b) the creation of a pool of **good quality** middle-level and highly skilled technical manpower necessary to absorb imported technologies and to build on them through time; and
- (c) the creation of adequately staffed and funded R+D departments within manufacturing firms and government funded research institutes, closely allied to industry.

In this context, South Korea and Taiwan are in a distinct class of their own and compare well to the technological efforts of developed countries (like France and the United Kingdom). Singapore and Hong Kong have also undertaken impressive investments in general and technical manpower. On the other hand,

Sri Lanka represents a paradox — the country has fostered a massive formal education programme in general skills (leading to O and A level qualifications), while paying less attention to technical education and training (in the field of engineering and lower-level craft skills). Similarly, the country suffers from an acute shortage of R+D facilities within and outside industry. The lack of all levels of high quality, technical manpower and R+D centres will continue to be a serious bottleneck to industrial growth and expansion of manufactured exports in Sri Lanka, unless corrective measures are introduced.¹⁶

4. SOME LESSONS FOR SRI LANKA FROM THE NICs

The development record of the East Asian NICs, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, has not gone unnoticed in other developing countries. Thais, Malaysians and Filipinos have been encouraged by their leaders to "look east" for positive values, attitudes and behaviour conducive to entrepreneurship and a disciplined workforce. Similarly, policy makers have drawn upon the industrial experience of the East Asian NICs to design policy reforms to launch the "second tier NIC's" on trajectories of rapid industrialization. A number of international financial institutions have followed suit and attempted to package these policy reforms into blanket adjustment strategies, accompanied by stabilization programmes, for all developing countries.¹⁷

These efforts are useful to stimulate economic growth, but may not result in sustainable industrialization for developing countries. The adjustment strategies and stabilization programmes provide enhanced financial grants and low interest loans for infrastructural facilities and designs for the reform of "key prices" and incentive systems for industry (exchange rates, taxes and tariffs). However, most crucially, they tend to neglect the **dynamic impetus** provided by technologi-

cal capability. Ultimately what took place in the East Asian NICs was an "industrial revolution" fuelled by the acquisition of capabilities to cope with rapid technological change. If other developing countries are to achieve efficient and sustainable industrialization, then the appreciation of technological capabilities **must** go hand in hand with price and incentive reforms for industry.

Thus, the issue that emerges is, what are the lessons for Sri Lanka to be learned from the East?

1. The industrial take-off of the NICs was not just a matter of opening the economy and letting free market forces prevail. There was a considerable economy wide planning and a high degree of co-ordination between the state, the industrial community, the banking sector and the external aid agencies on the drive for industrialization. As Professor Amartya Sen, Harvard University has commented on the NICs "If this is the Free Market, then Walras auctioneer can surely be seen as going around with a government white paper in one hand and a whip in the other".¹⁸
2. There was clear-cut outward-looking industrial strategy which demarcated a transitional pathway for sustainable industrialization. Such a strategy was permitted to run its course into the long run and minimized the trade-offs and conflicts among a number of objectives — including output and employment, local and foreign interests, growth and equity etc. In short, the achievement of industrialization was an unambiguous national strategy and goal of the East Asian NICs, with a well co-ordinated process and clear cut indicators by which the process could be judged.
3. Within this strategy, prime emphasis was placed on the question of building technological capability. Neglecting technological capability in the

process of industrialization is on par with attempting to drive at a hundred miles an hour, with the handbrake on and the gear lever in neutral.

4. Much of the technological activity in the NICs took place within manufacturing firms. Professor Sanjaya Lall, Oxford University, argues that learning at the firm-level "is based partly on the experiences of production, partly on importing 'ready made' knowledge from industrialized countries and partly on a deliberate process of investing in the creation of knowledge"¹⁹, and not simply through formal research and development. This is also not something that can be left to the mere will and pleasure of the private firm. It is a fundamental part of the human capacity building for an industrial part of the human capacity building for an industrial push.
 5. The state supported these efforts of manufacturing enterprises by providing incentives for technological activity (particularly in adapting and improving existing technologies), supplying high quality technical manpower (Industrial engineers technicians and managers) from the educational system and creating research and development institutes geared to solving the technical problems encountered in production for export (quality control, preventive maintenance, process and product modifications and improvements and eventually, product innovations).
- Sri Lanka has a potential for building upon four major advantages to move towards an industrial transformation. These advantages are: over a decades experience with the outward-looking strategy; a large general skill base created by the education system; inflows of external resources and the existing science and technology institutions. But both the positive and negative lessons touched upon in this paper have to inform the formulation of a future industrial strategy. There is an additional

(Continued on page 28)

A politician but not a statesman

James Manor's book review of Mr. J. R. Jayawardene's biography by de Silva and Wiggins is quite good especially where he tries to focus attention on what Jayawardene achieved during "that tempestuous decade" from 1977 to 1988.

Prior to 1977 Mrs. B pursued an unmatched non-aligned foreign policy culminating in that international gathering at the 1976 non-aligned conference in Colombo. Unfortunately here domestic policy was a total disaster — a closed economy. Among her grave and irreversible errors were:-

1. the take over of the plantations and the subsequent loss operations of the JEDB and SLPC.
2. the take over of schools.

The U N P appointed flunkys and favourites everywhere and thus ensured mismanagement in so many areas. J.R. himself may not have been personally corrupt but he despoiled so many others.

As Minister for State Plantations the administration of the two plantation bodies today has been a total loss. What he touched he never adorned.

The Independence of the judiciary was severely eroded during his tenure of office.

During the holocaust of 1983 whilst Borella was burning J R merely watched the flames from his Ward Place residence and came on TV to address the nation some 4 or 5 days later. How he did reassure the nation as a Leader is another story too well known to recount.

Mr. Jayewardene ushered in an era of the "free economy" but with it, came many evils. To give you a few examples:

1. Parliamentarians and society in general tended to become increasingly corrupt and venal. The UNP bought support of MP's with "gifts" of Pajeros, Volvos, BMC's and turned a blind eye on the illicit felling of timber by politicians. There were many other offences too numerous to mention here.
2. When the UNP had a golden opportunity to settle the Tamil problem at the outset of the regime it quailed and understandably because JR's past record (witness the famous march to Horagalla) was difficult to shed.
3. As Minister of Higher Education the proliferation of the Universities and their general administration was a total disaster.

History and historical writings must be researched and recorded impartially. Bias on account of personal relationships should not enter the picture, which is, why James Manor's review has much in it to commend itself. Having said all this, I must take my hat off to Mr. Jayewardene's extreme adroitness and ability as a *pure politician* unmatched even by Machiavelli's "Prince". Sure he was SL's most remarkable politician but by no stretch of the imagination was he a statesman.

Ex-CCS

India's...

(Continued from page 11)

Indian diplomacy." Thus ended a critical phase of India's mediatory role between Colombo and Jaffna.

So far, Delhi's mediation had been operative at two inter-related levels: (a) initiatives for a devolution package acceptable to the Sri Lankan Government as well as the militants; and (b) India's role as a 'third party' to facilitate dialogue between the two on devolution as well as other issues. Here again the objectives of the contending parties were such as to make India's tight-rope walking hazardous as well as protracted.

Thus, India had to contend with not only the intra-group tussles and inter-group feuds among the Tamils (often in the context of the Tamil Nadu factor) but also deal with a situation among the Sinhalese where there was no national consensus on the ethnic issue. The majoritarian thrust of its polity, the virtual absence of a bipartisan approach to the national questions and the rising Sinhalese Buddhist militancy as symbolised by the JVP were some of the contributory factors for the inability of the UNP regime (as also of its predecessor) to deal with the ethnic issue. Under the circumstances, the devolution package which did not have national sanctions became all the more suspect because of its Indian origins whether it was at the All Parties Conference during 1983-84 or thereafter.

In this medley of factors India acquired a 'participant' status and a political as well as a military role in Sri Lanka under the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987. In one respect, the Accord could be viewed as a major triumph of India's Sri Lanka policy as it fulfilled all the three objectives enunciated by Indira Gandhi. In another, it had seeds germain to bilateral discords because of the divergent pulls of the three objectives particularly when posited in the context of the militants' Eelamist demands, on the one hand, and fragility of the political structures of Sri Lanka, on the other.

(To be continued)

Thought, Conscience, Torture: Case Law

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION

(A Case Book) By **R. K. W. Goonesekere** (Law and Society Trust)

BOOK
REVIEW

Mr. R. K. W. Goonesekere, my former teacher, has in this well constructed case book consisting of six chapters collected the leading cases decided by our Supreme Court dealing with the Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and Freedom from torture. These comprise Articles 10 and 11 respectively of the 2nd Republican Constitution of 1978.

He has also included cases dealing with the Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, Freedom of speech and expression and the Freedom of association which includes the Freedom to form and join a trade union. These correspond to Articles 13, 14(1) (a), 14(1) (c) and 14(1) (d) of the Constitution. Mr. Goonesekere has also included in a substantive chapter the "Basic Documents" which enable the reader to view the issues raised in these cases in a wider perspective. These documents range from the chapters on Fundamental Rights in the 1972 and 1978 Constitutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1940, extract from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 to which Sri Lanka is a signatory and the Syracuse Principles of 1984. The Syracuse Principles are particularly relevant as they seek to elucidate the conditions in, and the terms upon which, a State may curtail Fundamental Rights in times of National crisis. He has also included Regulations framed under the Sri Lanka Foundation Law No. 31 of 1973 which established the Commission for the Elimination of Discrimination and Monitoring of Fundamental Rights Comprehensive as this list is, perhaps it would have been more complete had it included the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on International Civil and Political Rights, to which

Sri Lanka is not yet a signatory.

It is not proposed in this review to set out in detail the contents of each of the five chapters. However it is sufficient to state that an examination of their contents reveals that great care and thought has gone into the compilation of this case book.

Chapter 2 which relates to the Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detentions prefaced by a useful compilation of the relevant extracts of the statutory framework germane to the exercise of ordinary Police powers relating to arrest and detention with or without a warrant, under the Code of Criminal Procedure Act and the Police Ordinance. Consideration is also given to the vexed issue of "bail" with the inclusion of lengthy extracts from the judgment of Ramanathan, J. in the case of *A.G. vs Punch Banda* (1986) 1 SLR 40. The other extracts encompass Police powers under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, arrest and detention under Emergency regulations and a reference to the salient Constitutional provision of 1978 and the corresponding restrictions contained in these provisions.

Mr. Goonesekere has gone on to compile the leading decisions relating to the Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, which illustrate the scope and content of this right. Under the general classification there are extracts from the well known judgement of Gratian, J. in *Muttusamy Vs Kannangara* (1951) 52 NLR 324 and *Corea Vs The Queen* (1954) 55 NLR 457. Other extracts include recent "cause celeb res" such as *Gunawardana Vs. Perera* (1983) 1 SLR 305 the effect of which judgment was whittled down by subsequent amendments to

the Police Ordinance, and *Kapugeekiyana Vs. Hettiarachchi* (1984) SLR 153 where the Supreme Court adopted the salutary course of permitting oral evidence to be led in certain contexts.

Chapter 2 also includes an excellent analysis of the Constitutional and legal framework relating to the Public Security Ordinance and the validity of Emergency Regulations and Orders. This is complemented by a compilation of extracts from contemporary judgments of our Superior Courts which have delineated the legal framework and fetters on the power of arrest under Emergency Regulations. This chapter concludes with a survey of the leading judgments relating to preventive detention under the Public Security Ordinance. The case law in this area compiled by Mr. Goonesekere reveals that our Superior Courts have had to, in *ter-mina*, grapple with the presence of ouster clauses which have attempted to preclude the review of the legality of such orders. Mr. Goonesekere has also referred to the bold judgement of Sarath Silva, J. in *Siriyaalatha Vs. Paskeralingam* (HCA. 7/88 CAM 7.7.88) which reveals that the Courts have been vigilant at safeguarding the rights of the individual while being involved in the complex and delicate task of balancing the competing interests of the State and the individual in this important area of our Law. In that case Sarath Silva, J. demonstrated a great degree of judicial activism and extended the grounds of review to include the established doctrine of Reasonableness in public law, thus rejecting the restrictive approach adopted by the former Supreme Court in *Hirdramani Vs. Ratnavel* (1972) NLR 87.

Chapter 3 of the case book which covers the Freedom of speech and expression is prefaced by a concise introduction which includes an overall picture of some relevant statutes that have a bearing on this issue.

Mr. Goonesekere next proceeds to set out the scope of this Constitutional guarantee by reference to extracts from leading judgments of the Supreme Court in this vital area of our Law. The case law reproduced includes the controversial decision of the Constitutional Court under the 1972 Constitution in the "Lake House" nationalisation case (ANCL Bill) and *Visvalingam Vs. Liyanage* (1984) 2 SLR 123 where the Supreme Court held that this fundamental right includes a free press and the right of a recipient to information. This chapter also includes an extract from the judgment in *Ratnasara Thero Vs. Udugampala* (1986) 1 SLR 461 or the "Pavidi Handa" case where the illegal action of the Police in seizing 20,000 printed pamphlets opposing the 4th Amendment which sought to extend the life of Parliament so shocked the conscience of the Court that a substantial sum of compensation was awarded to the Petitioners as damages. However it is well known that, regrettably, the police officer concerned in this case was rewarded with a promotion for his efforts! But the inclusion of such encouraging decision has not resulted in the omission of equally relevant decisions like *Dissanayake Vs. Sri Jayawardanapura University* (1987) 2 SLR 254 where the Supreme Court emphasized that the exercise of the right is not absolute and may in the case of a member of an institution be regulated by rules imposed in the interests of discipline subject to such regulation being lawful.

Further substantive restrictions that have been recognized by the Law of Parliamentary Privilege, Contempt of Court, Defamation, in the interests of religious harmony, Public Order and restrictions during Emer-

gency are also outlined by the inclusion of statutory and case law extracts. The extracts from the Supreme Court decisions in *A.G. Vs. Nadesan* (S.C. 1/80) and *A.G. Vs. Siriwardene* (S.C. 3/80) exemplify the limits of fair comment and proper criticism of Parliamentary proceedings. Mr. Goonesekere has also included the decision in the case of *Hewamanne Vs. Manik da Silva* (1983) 1 SLR 1 which held that the publication of a report of the proceedings of Parliament, even though fair and accurate and made without malice is not protected under the common law. In case where such publication amount to contempt of Court. This decision was followed by an amendment to the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act in 1984 which granted protection to the publication, bona fide and without malice, of any extract of any paper published by order of Parliament.

This chapter concludes with an examination of the permissible restrictions during an Emergency as reflected in the Supreme Court decisions in *Siriwardene Vs. Liyanage* FRD (2) 310 or the "Aththa Case" and *Janatha Finance Vs. Liyanage* FRD (2) 373 which involved the closing down of the "Aththa" newspaper and the sealing of a printing press respectively.

The Freedom of association and Freedom to join a trade union are the subject of chapter 4. Apart from a useful "Introduction" this chapter consists of an extract from the Supreme Court judgment in *Gunasekara Vs. Peoples Bank* (1986) 1 SLR 338 which dealt with a declaration sought in the District Court by an employee that a condition of employment barring his membership in a trade union as a pre-condition to promotion was violative of his rights enshrined under the 1972 Constitution. The Court held this to be a violation and went on to further recognise the protracted struggle that the Trade Union movement had to wage in order to secure the recognition of the

of the Freedom to join a trade union as a Fundamental Right. This section also includes an abstract from the Supreme Court decision in *Hasapala Vs. Ranjil Wickramasinghe* FRD (1) 143 where the Court held that the right to strike was not a fundamental right.

Chapter 5 covers the Freedom of thought, conscience and religion and includes an extract from the decision of the Constitutional Court under the 1972 Constitution on the "Place and Objects of Worship Bill". The Court held that the regulation of the construction of places of worship did not displace Buddhism from the special status accorded under the Constitution. Implicit in the reasoning of the Court appears to be a recognition of the need to harmonize the special status accorded to Buddhism with the rights guaranteed to all other religions.

The concluding chapter covers the Fundamental right of Freedom from torture and degrading treatment which is an absolute right not subject to any restrictions under the 1978 Constitution. As in the case of the earlier chapters there is a skilful compilation of the leading decisions on this vital right which has acquired prominence of late and become the subject matter of frequent litigation in recent times. The case extracts include the decisions of the Supreme Court in *Thadchansmoorathi Vs. A.G.* FRD. (1) 128 and *Velmurugu Vs. A.G.* (1981) 1 SLR 408 where a restrictive view was taken of State responsibility for the unlawful acts of subordinate officials. As succinctly stated by Mr Goonesekere, subsequent judgments, inspired perhaps by Mr Justice Sharvananda's dissenting judgment in *Velmurugu's* case, evidence a discernible trend in favour of a broader view of State responsibility. This chapter ends with an extract from the Supreme Court determination in the "In re Essential Public Services Bill" D.S.C. (PB) 1979 Vol. 1, 63, to the effect, inter alia that a compulsory forfeiture of property is

violation of Article 11 and constitutes inhuman treatment and punishment. It is interesting to note that substantially the same conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court in its determination on the constitutionality of the 6th Amendment which sought to penalise the demand for a separate State with the unrestricted forfeiture of property. Perhaps this judgment could also have been usefully included in the casebook as these cases are illustrative of judicial revolution at any act which would constitute inhuman treatment and punishment even in times of grave national crisis.

Mr Goonesekere has to be congratulated for finding the time to compile a volume of this nature which amply reflects his wide experience in the field of Human Rights Laws, as law teacher and public law practitioner. It is hoped that Mr Goonesekere would complement his work with a further volume dealing with the Fundamental Right to Equality and the Supreme Court Rules which spell out the procedure by which an individual may move the Supreme Court to vindicate his Fundamental Rights in the event of an infringement or imminent infringement. In this context, his views on the one month time limit prescribed in Article 126 (1) of the Constitution would be most useful. The Law and Society Trust has done a great service by sponsoring the publication of this excellent casebook which is reasonably priced. I am certain that this book would be of great value to the Bench, Bar, law-students and indeed, to any person interested in the protection and furtherance of Fundamental Rights.

— **Faisal Musthapha**

Comparing...

(Continued from page 24)

challenge for Sri Lankan policy makers. That is, how to relate such a strategy to the need for equity and the absorption of large numbers of educated, unemployed youth. This is what, in a fundamental sense, 'Jana-saviya' is all about.

NOTES

- 1 These countries have also been called the Gang of Four or the Four Dragons by academic economists and more gently, the Four Little Tigers by the Chinese.
- 2 These rates are for the period 1963-1986 and taken from UNICEF (1989), Table 6.
- 3 See World Bank (1987).
- 4 Comparisons of the industrial structures between the East Asian NICs and other developing countries and of the processes involved in deepening industrialization in these countries (particularly the creation of large capital goods and high technology-intensive industries) is comprehensively examined in Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986).
- 5 Useful overviews of the issues and problems relating to Sri Lanka's industrialization thrusts in the post-war period are Karunatilaka (1987); Lakshman (forthcoming 1989); Kelegama and Wignaraja (forthcoming 1989); Athukorala (1986) and Kelegama (1989).
- 6 An early influential statement of the free market view is Little, Schotzky and Scott (1970). More recent works include Balassa (1988).
- 7 See Wignaraja (1987).
- 8 See, for example, Jones and Sakong (1980). Also see IDS (1984).
- 9 The quotation is from Wignaraja (forthcoming 1989). These points are also elaborated in Singer (1988).
- 10 Technological capability can be broken down into 3 broad areas:
Entrepreneurial: To conceive a new project, organize the resources needed, carry through the concept to completion and set up the institutional base for its continuation.
Managerial: To organize all the organizational, financial, operational (non-technical), marketing, personnel and related functions needed for the firm to achieve and retain commercial success.
Technological: To execute all the technical functions entailed in setting up, operating, improving, expanding and modernizing the firm's productive facilities.
- 11 Consult, for example, Taitel (1984); Westphal, Rhee and Pursell (1981).
- 12 See Lall and Wignaraja (forthcoming 1987).
- 13 Refer to Taitel (1984); Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986) and Lall and Wignaraja (forthcoming 1989).
- 14 Section III draws on material presented in Lall and Wignaraja (forthcoming 1989).
- 15 The details of Sri Lanka's investments in technical training may be obtained from Ministry of Plan Implementation (1982).
- 16 See Liyanage and De Silva (1987).
- 17 The quotation is from Liyanage and De Silva (1987), p. 47.
- 18 See Weiss (1988), p. 2.
- 19 This point has been highlighted before by several studies. Consult ILO

(1971); Liyanage and De Silva (1987) and Kelegama and Wignaraja (forthcoming 1989).

20 See Wignaraja (1987) for an elaboration of this point.

21 Sen's quotation was cited in Singer (1988), p. 33.

22 See Lall (1987).

Kuala Lumpur, Singapore clash over US bases

Lim Siong Hoon

Malaysia and Singapore are on a foreign policy collision course about whether Singapore should accept US military bases.

Singapore said last week it might want to host some of the US naval and air military units now stationed at the Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines.

Two senior foreign Malaysian ministry officials have twice this week criticised the idea. Mr Ahmad Kamil, the foreign ministry secretary general, said Singapore's proposal was without logic. "Any proliferation of bases is against what we (the Association of South East Asian Nations) had set out to do," he said.

Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, Malaysia's Defence Minister, said he told a visiting US Admiral that establishing a US base in Singapore or the use of military facilities in Singapore by the US could jeopardise efforts to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (Zopfan) in South East Asia.

Malaysia has invoked the Asean-established principle of "Zopfan", conceived during the Vietnam war. This seeks, in part, to disengage the US and the Soviet Union from military involvement and interference in the region.

Two months ago, a US military team surveyed Singapore facilities for two squadrons of fighter jets and small navy units. Neither Singapore nor the US has confirmed it will go ahead with the plan.

Singapore, more hawkish than its five Asean neighbours, wants a continuing US military presence in the region.

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