

TRIBUNE

CEYLON NEWS REVIEW

MARCH 20, 1972

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VOL. 17, NO. 23



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AND THE COWBOY

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OVER SHANGHAI
COMMUNIQUE

● AUSTRALIAN
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FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

The Mandarin and the Cow Boy

10th March, 1972


Tribune has been able to increase its pages to 24 for its issues in March, but there is a very persistent demand from its readers that we appear once every week as before. We hope that we can do this from April, but it is not a promise. If the plans we are working on today materialise, we hope that in April we appear four times,

and should we attain this target we will be able to keep this schedule thereafter. There is no lack of material, locally and from abroad, for a weekly edition, and it would not be difficult to have *copy* for a fifty page issue every week. But, unless we have a proportionate increase in our advertising, we will not be able to increase our pages. To increase the price at this juncture does not seem opportune. There are readers, however, who insist that price increase will not matter as long as they get the kind of material we publish in the *Tribune* in increasing volume.

THE WORLD PRESS is still full of the Nixon visit to China. Whilst the Nixon claim that it was a *Week That Changed the World* still reverberates throughout the world, the best quip on this came from the *Foreastern Economic Review* of Hongkong of March 4, 1972 with *The Week That Changed Nixon*. The paper published pictures showing Nixon "yesterday and today: they include some poignant reminders of his visit to Taiwan in the late 1950's when he was Vice-President in the Eisenhower Administra-

tion. This week, as President Nixon returned to Washington from his momentous visit to Peking."

The *Foreastern Economic Review* then had a very interesting piece seeking to illustrate the Shakespearean dictum that "passion is catching" — as Mark Antony had observed. It went on: "*Julius Caesar* seemed to bear more than a passing relevance to this tide in the affairs of men. Could not Nixon have said, with Decius, upon landing in Peking: 'Here lies the east; doth not the day break here?' And might not Chairman Mao bend in cautious whisper to Premier Chou: 'It is the bright day that brings forth the adder; and that craves wary walking' At that final meeting in Shanghai, could Nixon have murmured to his host 'Only be patient till we have appeased the multitude, beside themselves with fear. (And in Taipei, might not the Gimo admonish Nixon's emissary: 'Thou has described a hot friend cooling'; or with Antony: 'But yesterday the word of Caesar might have stood against the world Alone, contemplating 'Liberation' of the mainland, could not President Chiang wryly reflect: 'The people twixt Phillippi and this ground do stand but in a forced affection.' Was Nixon's most recent message to Chiang that of Brutus: 'If we do meet again, why, we shall smile! If not, why then, this parting was well made.' In the nervous and poulticed



Founded 1954

A Journal of Ceylon and World Affairs

MARCH 20, 1972

Vol. 17 No. 23

43, Dawson Street, COLOMBO. 2

Telephone: 33172

basement of White House, could Henry Kissinger even now be sighing zealously in his master's ear; 'we must take the current when it serves, or lose our ventures'; only to have President Nixon, ever troubled, enquire like Brutus in startled recollection: 'Is not tomorrow, boy, the Ides of March?''

This is excellent writing which is at the same time most revealing. It will be a long time before the world will know the full depth and significance of the week Nixon spent in China. Already the most interesting tid-bits have begun to surface. The Washington review *Aviation Week* in a recent issue, 28/2/72, stated that the US may end its spy flights over China. It said that such flights were likely to be cancelled as a result of President Nixon's visit to China. It stressed that no decision had yet been taken but flights by pilotless aircraft and U-2 spy planes were expected to be suspended indefinitely. Plans for sending the new Boeing-made *Compass* pilotless aircraft would consequently be dropped, the *Aviation Week* said. *Compass* missions were to be sent from the US base on the Diego Garcia islands in the Indian Ocean.

THIS REVEALS one use to which the Anglo-US base in the Diego Garcia base would have been put. Very little publicity has been given to the goings-on in Di-

ego Garcia. So also to the SEATO-naval exercise code-named *Sea Hawk* which had begun on February 15 in the South China Sea. Taking part in the manoeuvres which lasted until February 29, were ships of the Australian, British, New Zealand, Philippines, Thai and US navies. US press reports stated that the Pentagon had despatched the carriers *Constellation* and *Kitty Hawk* to the Gulf of Tonkin. Political observers have noted that this redeployment of US carriers in Indo-China waters had been timed to coincide with President Nixon's talks in Peking. Was this done to impress the Peking leaders with a show of strength? Or was there any other motive? In any case, Peking was silent about this bellicose move. Under normal circumstances, Peking would have blared forth denunciations of American and Imperialist intrusion into the China seas.

This show of strength was kept very much in the background by the Americans. President Nixon went out of his way to woo Mao and Chou. He did not play ping pong, but he endeavoured to show how good he was with the chopsticks. And Peking played the game with the choicest Mandarin subtlety. Apart from invitations to two Senators, Scott and Mansfield, the *AP* reported that President Nixon's two daughters and sons-in-law had been in-

vited to visit China. Nixon's elder daughter, Mrs. Tricia Cox, told newsmen at a White House reception on March 1 that her parents delivered the invitation from the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou-En-lai when they returned from Peking. "We are all so excited," she said. Mrs. Nixon said that no date had been fixed for the trip.

In the meantime, the *AFP* reported from Washington that the House of Representatives Speaker Carl Albert had threatened to take "appropriate action", if the Republican and Democratic party leaders in the House were not invited to go to China as were the Senate leaders. President Nixon had announced that the Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield and Republican minority leader Hugh Scott had been invited to Peking by the Chinese Premier. "I have no desire to go to China", Mr. Albert had said, but he wanted the House Democratic leader, Mr. Hale Eggs and the Republican minority leader, Mr. Gerald Ford, be invited along with their Senate colleagues.

According to *Reuter*, the latest status symbol around Washington was the padded blue "people's coat" from China. A few members of Nixon's team had worn these coats whilst in China itself. Whether these persons will wear Mao's badges is something which cannot be foretold at present, but there

is no reason why Nixon himself should not sport the Mao badge. Although Nixon had consulted the best China experts in the US, they had been guilty of a *faus pas* which earned headlines throughout the world. The invitations sent out by President Nixon to the State Banquet which he gave his hosts were printed in old-fashioned character-style now used mostly in Taiwan, with the characters arranged from top to bottom instead of left to right, and the phrasing was also archaic. The style was in common use only in Taiwan. The invitations had been prepared in Washington, where translators have more contact with Taiwan than China. Foreign newsmen permanently assigned to Peking said that some of the Chinese were upset by it while others had only laughed. A White House spokesman had said (in Peking) that Chinese protocol officials had told them that although the style was old-fashioned, it was perfectly correct. They had said that Mao had written his poems in it. An American official had shrugged: "That's what happens when you have 20 years without contact between people."

None of the diplomats resident in Peking were invited to this dinner which was in return for the one given by Premier Chou on the day Nixon had arrived. President Nixon's visit was a great disappointment to the ambassadors and other diplomats

stationed in Peking. Since the US and China have no diplomatic relations, no invitations were sent to members of the diplomatic community. They had been excluded from everything connected with President Nixon's visit to China. They could not drive to the airport for Nixon's arrival, they were not invited to the state banquet, and they had no chance to see Mr. Nixon. "It was a situation without precedent."

ANOTHER EPISODE

in Peking which threw light into the way the administrators ran the country (in the hope of creating an image) merits mention. AP, in a cable from Peking on February 24, stated that when Mr. Nixon and Mrs. Nixon had visited the 500-year old Ming tombs outside Peking, they found scores of apparently holidaying Chinese carrying new transistor radios and sporting colourful garb—a sight they had not seen elsewhere in the country. After the Nixons left, functionaries went among the people collecting the radios. As the Nixons had approached the tomb of the Emperor Chanow, they paused to watch four Chinese school girls singing and jumping ropes. The Nixons had beamed, shook hands and chatted with the four youngsters and the two women who held the rope for them. As soon as the Nixons turned to enter the tombs, the little girls took off the bright ribbons

around their pigtails, rolled up their rope and departed.

At one outdoor concrete picnic table just below the towering pagoda of the tombs, two couples played cards in the minus three degree centigrade cold while American television photographers recorded them. Newsmen had asked a senior member of the White House staff how he thought the people had come to the remote site, several km from any population

SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Minimum Subscription
Rs. 30 per 60 issues,
post free in Ceylon.

For air mail and sea mail rates abroad, please write to the Circulation Manager, mentioning the country of destination.

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centre, in a country which has few automobiles and only a limited number of tourist buses. "You raise a good point", he had said. Each time the President had stopped to talk to little groups of girls in the gardens cameramen had taken shots.

This story had an interesting comeback. *AP* reported from Washington on March 2 that the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, had offered President Nixon a quick personal apology last week when *ersatz* Chinese tourists carrying transistor radios had turned up during Nixon's visit to the fabled Ming tombs. Chou had volunteered an expression of regret—perhaps after learning that American newsmen had exposed the charade and was quoted as telling Nixon it was a mistake. Two days later, however, similarly equipped tourists had shown up when President Nixon and Mrs. Nixon had toured the parks and islands of Hangchow, one of China's favourite resort cities. . .

Just as the Chinese had tried to create a favourable image with people walking in the park with transistor radios and children in colourful garb with beautiful ribbons on their pigtails, the Americans had endeavoured to put up a mighty TV show to keep the US public fully focussed on Nixon in China. No better pre-election, pre-primary gimmick could have been thought of, for instance, than

Nixon on the moon, but next best to the moon, it was Nixon in China—also unexplored, inaccessible territory so far as the present generation of Americans were concerned. But even the best of gimmicks have a tendency to boomerang. This is what the *AP* reported from New York on February 26: "..... Some of the original enthusiasm among the US public over the Nixon visit to China has waned—with the live television pictures which started on Monday night (Feb. 21) going through Friday with very much of repetition and little of surprise. The Columbia Broadcasting network last night cancelled its live coverage from Peking in favour of commercial domestic programme explaining that it was getting tired of relaying 'picture postcard material' after a long day at the Great Wall. Many viewers complained to TV networks that they had more than enough from China and wanted their favourite comedy or dramatic programme back. And as press and television reporters sent from Peking more critical—even cynical—reports about a regimented Chinese people and the staging of 'happiness shows' for the Nixons, US viewers also became more jaded. 'We have China coming out of our eyeballs,' some viewers phoned their networks. 'What's going in the US?'....." The Chinese had tried to put on a better show than what realities warranted, and Nixon

had hoped that this would make a big break for him with the TV public—but it did not turn out to be the mighty success he had hoped. Too much of a good thing often turns bad. And this is what Chou also discovered when functionaries had collected the radios immediately after the Nixons went out of the scene—forgetting the press reporters, photographers and the TV men who were still about the scene tailing behind the Nixons.

IN THE SAME WAY

Nixon was given a rousing reception back in Washington, Premier Chou En lai was given a big reception by more than 5000 people at Peking airport when he had returned from Shanghai on February 28 after seeing off President Nixon. Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and the top echelon of the Chinese hierarchy were among those who had gathered at the airport to welcome a triumphant Premier. "Thousands of Red Guards, soldiers and girls greeted Mr. Chou who shook hands with numerous people in the crowd. Slogans raised by the crowd hailed Chairman Mao's *proletarian diplomatic line* and the sound of gongs, drums and cymbals mingled with the slogans"

China had every reason to be happy about the Maoist "proletarian diplomatic line" which had, in the view of many observers, made a real paper tiger of Nixon America.

The *New York Times*, under the heading *Chinese Subtlety Has Edge Over U.S. Diplomacy* published an excellent review from its correspondent Max Frankel reporting from Anchorage in Alaska where Nixon touched down on his return from Shanghai. "China has been on the American television", said Frankel "in brilliant colour for eight days, just about exhausting the attention span of a nation of frantic tourists We've come, we've seen, we've conquered. We switch you now to New Hampshire." But Frankel's comment on the *veni, vidi, vici* attitude of the Nixon - Kissinger combine is most interesting. "We have been there, but we have not seen much and we have not conquered the subtle diplomacy of the Chinese or the colossal ignorance of both sides which created this legacy of hostility in the first place. Frankel criticised Mr. Nixon and "his impressario for Chinese ballet, Dr. Henry Kissinger" for having done what they had deplored in their predecessors "by committing the prestige of the President to the diplomacy of goodwill and what used to be known contemptuously as "atmospherics."

Frankel was vitriolic when he continued: ". . . Not since the cavortings of Nikita Khrushchev in the banquet halls of the Kremlin have there been scenes like the table hopping, toasting of Nixon and company in the Great Hall of the

People that first night in Peking, to the strains of *Turkey in the Straw* and other revolutionary airs, brilliantly orchestrated by the band of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in full view of those nervous allies in Japan and even Europe and practically within the earshot of the sinking Chinese nationalists in Taiwan. Nor has Mr. Chou given the anti-imperialists of the world much reason to fear betrayal of the doctrines of Revolution. He had already acclaimed the President as a courageous man and now he was working for his place in history by offering the Great Hall and the Great Wall as stages for television drama by giving China the televised new image of a nation of genteel, hospitable, hardworking and long suffering innocents lured out of their isolation by the dear old Americans who used to fly the hump and fought the Japanese and stared down the Russians and, on this one jet journey to Peking, dutifully learnt the error of their ways in Taiwan and Vietnam. All this and not the Nixon-Chou En lai communique of soberly balanced disagreements and modestly circumspect agreement was the essence of the China caper."

This, more or less, sums up what most hard-headed observers have had to say about the Nixon Chou communique. According to Frankel, the communique had been anticipated and had been more or less agreed upon during the

Kissinger negotiations. "It was just that this time the world was finally startled into giving the attention the rapprochement deserved. The President and the Premier had to meet to ratify and to reveal the diplomatic bargain and psychological breakthrough that they have already arranged at long distance over the last three years." The essential agreement was that China and the USA now shared enough common interests on the world scene to forget their ideological obsessions and fears of each other. They agreed that their conflict in Korea had all been "a ghastly miscalculation fomented by irresponsible men in the Kremlin." They also seemed to agree that China "had not really been the aggressor that Americans had imagined in its war with India in 1962." It was clear that with the exception of Taiwan, they had no real dispute between themselves. Both communist and nationalists Chinese deemed Taiwan to be part of China, and Nixon was prepared to grant that the US no longer challenged that fact. Since the 8000 odd Americans troops on Taiwan were there largely to service the conflict in Vietnam, the President was also ready to promise their gradual but certain withdrawal. Since China lacked the means to conquer the island by force, Chou was prepared to let the President see a prospect for the peaceful settlement of the dispute by the Chinese themselves with no fur-

ther American interference "in what has all along been a civil war."

AND SINCE there was no real prospect of military action across Taiwan Straits—in either direction—there was no difficulty in assuring the diplomatic purists though not in the Peking communique itself that the American defence commitment and diplomatic recognition of Taiwan would be honoured until the final settlement. This is undoubtedly anomalous for Washington to be committed to what is now conceded to be merely a province of China. "The trip now ended was proof enough that Americans know the location of the real Chinese capital and tribute enough for the Government that now reigns there." In return "for these recognitions of reality", the Chinese leaders have allowed Mr. Nixon to represent as great concessions the opening of communications and exchanges of people, ideas and goods which they seemed quite eager to have in any case. "Actually they did not give the President the level of official contact and the pace of exchanges for which he hoped. Having achieved a new American litany on Taiwan, they now pressed for more, from Tokyo as well as from Washington. Mr. Chou refused to come to Washington or to send his officials there as long as some other Chinese embassy functions in the United States, and he promised to be rath-

er fastidious about managing the new exchanges through unofficial contact with American institutions and individuals."

Chou had made it clear that he wants the US troops off Taiwan so that it would inspire political change in the island by making eventual absorption appear inevitable. "He will succeed even in this," was Frankel's verdict. The Americans when they get back to US soil will realise the inevitability of all this. The rest of the journey and the communique will fade into oblivion. "The real record of this journey", he concluded, "is not the communique. The picture that ought to linger is the one of President Nixon seated between Premier Chou En-lai and the wife of Mao Tse-tung, in the Great Hall of the People, watching women soldiers in ballet shoes shooting target practice at a caricature of Chiang Kai-shek. The President then said the next day he loved the dancing and the music and he called it a play with a powerful message....."

Such was Frankel's approach to the whole Nixon odyssey to China. Though a little cynical and more than tough on Nixon, the *New York Times* correspondent's despatch written no doubt during the flight from Shanghai to Alaska (and filed from Anchorage), is a classic in interpretative analysis. The comments of other correspon-

dents who display equally perceptive insight into men and matters in the US generally tend to be very nearly what Frankel has felt. Easwar Sagar, the *Indian Express* correspondent, writing from Washington on February 28, stated that "it is Premier Chou En-lai of China rather than Mr. Nixon, the US President, who has emerged as the clear winner after the week-long China summit." Though Kissinger has been at pains to stress that the US had not really given away anything, "the document itself makes it evident that the Chinese have gained quite a few concessions whilst giving away absolutely nothing themselves. This, combined with the international prestige by a self-solicited Nixon visit, has made China taller than it has so far been, particularly in Asia."

Sagar also raised the question whether there had been any secret understandings which had not been mentioned in the communique. "The tight secrecy in which the talks were first arranged and then conducted, only gives ground for the fear that much more than what is disclosed now may have been discussed. Only future events as Mr. Nixon himself has said, will unfold how close the US and China have moved towards each other and whether this is to benefit the countries of Asia or to harm their interests."

**THOUGH THE RAPPRO-
CHEMENT** between the US and China have been ge-

nerally welcomed throughout the world, (except in countries like North Vietnam, Taiwan, North Korea and the like), the reaction to the communique has been most cautious and uncertain. But the outspoken among commentators have been unanimous that China has got the better of the deal.

Premier Chou En-lai was the mandarin *par excellence* who knew everything about dealing with a rather buoyant American cowboy, impulsive and go-getting, more anxious that "the show must go on" rather than what he got out of it. The mandarin has certainly got the better of cowboy. In fact, the mandarin has tied the lasso of the cowboy into knots—and it will take the cowboy some untying to get the knots untied and the lasso straightened out once again. The mandarin has also outwitted the Germanic fox—the fox the cowboy had domesticated to do his bidding. This is a long story which will soon be legend. In Asiatic Asia, the mandarin's stature has grown immensely: and, people will laugh behind the cowboy's back—they will be afraid to say anything to his face because he has too many guns on him.

The "proletarian diplomatic line" of Mao Tse-tung has no doubt won a great victory. But not in the way the Peking leaders will want or the Nixon entourage led by Kissinger will desire. The China summit

spells the promise of the US-China *detente*. This has been rightly welcomed throughout the world. A thaw in US-China relations has been long overdue. Whether this will ultimately settle into "a global spring" of peace and happiness is no doubt dependent on factors not all of which are within the control of either or both countries. Between themselves, China and the USA cannot determine the fate of the world.

If nobody else does, Chou En-lai fully realises this, China has taken care to proclaim that she does not seek to be a super-power. Nixon has yet to realise that being the head of a super-power does not automatically make him a super-personage entitled to dictate to the world. Living in the clouds of a super-power paranoia, Nixon does not as yet seem to realise that Chou has got the better of the bargain. Nixon will soon be confronted with the problem of what he could do with the cards which he thought were his trumps. He will have to rearrange his pack much sooner than he expects.

The Nixon—Chou communique, in the ultimate analysis, is an exercise in cynical politicking. Both sides have shed some of their friends by the wayside. But both sides continue to assure them of friendship,

Peking still holds out promises to Hanoi whilst negotiating with its arch-enemy.

Washington has undertaken to leave Taiwan to its fate progressively, but still holds out that its defence treaty with the Generalissimo was still an enduring commitment. The resurrection of the five principles of the *Pancha Sila* is a clever piece of cynical showmanship. It proclaims peaceful co-existence, but people cannot easily forget that when Krushchev wanted to establish a basis of peaceful co-existence with the USA of Eisenhower it was opposed by Peking. Mao's line at that time was that there was an unending war between the undeveloped and developed, between the villages and cities, etc., etc., a dogma which was projected strongly by Lin Piao who has since vanished from China's political scene. There could be no compromise with imperialism Mao had said, especially American imperialism.

In view of Nixon's impending visit to Moscow, the President must have been at pains to assert that there was no collusion against third countries. There is no reference to Moscow in the communique. But there is one about India. This has been regarded by the Indian PM and the Indian press as an unnecessary and unwanted intrusion into the internal affairs of India. To speak about self-determination for Kashmir, it has been pointed out, seems most incongruous for a Chinese. "The principle of


self-determination is a principle the Han race never accepted or respected." Tibet is a case in point. And the USA is the least equipped, Indian papers have stressed, to ordain that any other country should pull out its troops or determine its boundaries after its own record in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

China has every reason to feel triumphant. Nixon and Kissinger have fallen lock, stock and barrel for Mao's *proletarian diplomatic line*. And they have committed the USA to a communique which is pregnant with many dangerous potentialities for the USA. Within the USA itself there will be many who will regard the China summit as a "sell out". The many friends the US has dropped to establish this *detente* with China will also quietly revolt each in their own way. And countries like India will be on the alert ready to see a Sino-US tiger behind every bush.

And Mao himself will find it extremely difficult to explain his new *proletarian diplomatic line* to his erstwhile friends in North Vietnam, North Korea and in all the revolutionary movements encouraged by China so far. It will be interesting to see how far the plea that this policy of "peaceful co-existence" with the USA was essential to deal with the social-imperialistic revisionists in Russia and the reactionary neo-imperialist expansionists in India will be accepted by Peking's friends.

Mandarin Chou and cowboy Nixon must think up a new act to keep the show going. Otherwise others actors will take their place. Chou will

go the way Lin Piao and Nixon will lose the next Liu Shoo-Chi went, and elections.



"Brave new world? Who? Me?"



Cartoonists' view of summit; two who may benefit: Out from under the shadow.

INDIA

FEAR AND ALARM OVER

Shanghai Communique

New Delhi

Richard Nixon and Chou En-lai have made India a particular target of their unremittent hostility. Their collusion, witnessed during the Indo-Pak war, now formalised, will get intensified in the months to come. This is the reading in knowledgeable circles here of the Peking communique on the conclusion of Nixon's visit to China. It is, however, a most deceptive and tricky document, according to foreign policy experts. The undoubted low-key narration in the communique is designed to still or dispel the fears and suspicions entertained all the world over.

The apparent mildness of the document and the strident Chinese declaration of its being averse to becoming a super-power and similar clap-trap have beguiled a section of public opinion in India into believing that the fears entertained by India about a possible division of spheres of influence of this part of the world by Washington and Peking were misplaced.

Quite on the contrary, the communique has only heightened those fears given repeated expression to by the Prime Minister in her recent election speeches. The Chinese declar-

ation that it firmly supports the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes an ultimatum which cannot but cause alarm in New Delhi.

This is an intimation by the Chinese that they are bent upon breaking up the territorial integrity of India. This coupled with the recent Chinese troop movements along the Himalayan border can create a menacing situation.

It is reliably understood that all along the border front NEFA to Ladakh small clusters of Chinese troops have been muzzling into what they call "disputed territory." This is particularly so in the central sector, where Bara Hoti is located. A large number of them have barged in at Shipki La recently.

It is particularly noted in New Delhi that the Joint Communique was issued even before the final Shanghai banquet. The inference drawn is that the Chinese and Yankees did not find any difficulty in arriving at substantial agreement on most issues discussed. This was expected, as Nixon's journey to Peking was that of a penitent sinner.

And the result is terrifying. They have divided up Asia and

the Pacific. The communique says that neither USA nor China will have hegemony in this vital and sprawling region. This is true, what seems to be left out from the communique is that hereafter they will mutually share the domination of this region.

This is clear from many other facts that have been stated in the document. The Americans have given up Taiwan. The Chinese, though unilaterally, have demanded a neutral Japan. The Americans have, for the first time, said they will completely withdraw their troops and installations from Indo-China states, whether or not they achieve a negotiated settlement on the basis of their Eight Point Programme.

This unprecedented gesture of Yankee generosity acquires special significance in the context of the Chinese silence on North Vietnam. The Chinese mentioned only the Seven Point Formula of the PRG of South Vietnam, but not that of North Vietnam. Both the Chinese and the Americans must have agreed on a set-up in South Vietnam which will not be amenable to Hanoi.

The Vietnamese seem to have smelt the rat even be-

fore the sinner landed in Peking in sackcloth and ashes. It appears that the Japanese recently sent a team to Hanoi for talks at the instance of the Vietnamese. The Japanese have also started building bridges with North Korea whose Foreign Minister suddenly went off to Moscow the other day.

The week that Nixon spent in the Forbidden City and elsewhere in China is described as "the week that changed the history of the world." It might well be so. The hegemony the Chinese and Yankees will jointly exercise over the Pacific and Asia heralds a new phase in world history. American credit will now pour into China, according to China—watchers here.

On several issues, they have stated their seeming differences, but it is strikingly significant that they have hardly any differences on the Indian sub-continent. The difference is only in emphasis. Both called for the withdrawal of Indian troops from Bangla Desh and from across the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir, while New Delhi has stated more than once that the old cease-fire line no longer held good.

While doing so the American side referred only to the UN Security Council Resolution of December 21, which was acceptable to India, whereas the Chinese side referred

to the UN Resolution—meaning, the General Assembly Resolution which was totally unacceptable to us.

True, neither side has underwritten the territorial integrity of Pakistan. In other words, depending upon future developments, both will not be averse to recognising Bangla Desh. Indeed, the US is expected to do so in a couple of months.

As for the Chinese, they have put Bhutto on a leash. They also will recognise Bangla Desh if Bhutto undertakes his projected trip to the Soviet Union and accepts any of its advice. Bhutto is on probation as far as the Chinese are concerned.

As for India, we have been called upon by the mendacious Mandarins to concede the right of self-determination to the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Yankees, on the face of it, have not been that harsh. But they will continue to arm what is left of Pakistan and prevent reasonable settlement between that country and China. The suspended US credit to India might as well remain more or less suspended for ever for the US interest has shifted to China.

Unlike India, the Soviet Union is not named anywhere in the Joint Communique. But the main graphs in the communique point to that country.

We are sought to be harassed because of our treaty with Moscow.

There are several key paragraphs in the Communique that are directed against the Soviet Union. For instance, while shouting out their mutual "renunciation" of hegemony over the Pacific and Asia, the communique goes on record that "each is opposed to the effort by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony"

Which is this country, or group of countries, alluded to? They have in mind only the Soviet Union.

The group could be the Soviet Union and India, which have been coming close to each other especially during the Bangla Desh Liberation.

A key para says that "both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the people of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of influence"

An interpretation has been set out that this is an assurance to Moscow that the Chinese and Yankees are not conspiring against that country. But the first part of the para could refer to the Sino-US charge that the Soviet Union colluded with India in dismembering Pakistan.

All in all, New Delhi has cause to worry about a great deal. For the Peking communique is nothing short of a declaration of war on India.

A. Raghavan

AUSTRALIA

A Socialist View of The Nixon - Chou Communique

Sydney,

As was already fairly clear before its publication, the official communique on President Nixon's talks with the leaders of the People's Republic of China foreshadows the development of contacts between the two governments, between American and Chinese scientists, journalists and others, and the fostering of bilateral trade relations.

What almost exceeded expectations was the breath taking hypocrisy of Nixon in putting his signature to the pledge, contained in the communique, that "neither side should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to the effort by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."

For the long-time pretender to domination in this region, whose bombers continued raining death and destruction over Indochina even as he took up the pen to sign his name, this was brazen stuff indeed. Even in the wording of this sentence there was an implied contradiction to the statement, elsewhere in the communique, that "it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world . . . to divide up the world into spheres of influence."

For the rest, the communique largely consists of separate statements by the two sides on issues on which they could not agree, notably the Indochina war and Taiwan.

However one cannot avoid the view that, overall, the statement enhances the credibility of Nixon's spurious current "Vietnamisation and withdrawal" policy on Indochina since there is unfortunately no specific rejection of this in the Chinese section of the document. But all this is the merest beginning. The governments of two countries as important as the USA and China have not effected a policy change towards each other as dramatic as the one the world is now witnessing just for political peanuts.

Both Peking and Washington perceive their central and most important foreign policy task as working to gain advantages in their relations with Moscow, each according to its lights. Having reached this assessment, working to resolve their differences with each other becomes an important task in itself and also an important function of their central problem vis-a-vis Moscow. It can be expected that with the toasting and speechifying from both sides now over, no

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effort will be spared in tackling the nitty-gritty of Sino - US problems in the months and years ahead.

Professor Alan S. Whiting, of Michigan State University, USA, is widely credited, along with fellow Asia specialist Prof. D. Barnett, with authorship of the scenario which led the US Administration to make its 180-degree turn in China policy and Nixon to propose his visit to Peking. In an article in the January edition of the Tokyo-based diplomatic quarterly, *Pacific Community*, Prof. Whiting provided invaluable insights into the possible areas of longer-range Sino-American discussion. South-east Asia (that means, above all, the Indochina war) he excluded from consideration in this regard, saying that "too sharp a conflict with multiple constituent interests on both sides prevents resolution (of South - east Asian problems) in this forum."

But he was on the contrary mildly optimistic of progress on the problem of Taiwan. His account of the US attitude toward a Taiwan settlement in fact closely parallels the "five principles in relation to Taiwan" put by Nixon's special adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to the chairman of Japan's Democratic Socialist Party, Ikko Kasuga, at a meeting in the White House on December 3. The "five principles," which are a mere detailed statement of what appears in the communique, can be summarised as follows:

1. The US would maintain its defence commitment to Taiwan, as provided in the US-Taiwan Treaty.

2. Economic aid to Taiwan would be reduced in gradual steps,

3. The US would firmly oppose any use of force in settling the Taiwan issue (i.e., would oppose any attempt by Chiang Kaishek to invade the mainland, as well as any attempted invasion of Taiwan by the PRC).

4. US forces on Taiwan, now numbering 9000, would be reduced by gradual steps.

5. The Taiwan issue should be settled between China and Taiwan. But some 10 years would be required for any such settlement.

But it is in North-east Asia that Nixon's Asian scenarist, Prof. Whiting, sees the greatest chances of fruitful Sino-US accommodation. This region, he writes, in contrast to South-east Asia, "has no immediate crisis issue, nor is it any longer an arena of great power conflict played out through proxy conflict among smaller allies." On the contrary, North-east Asia "offers potential areas of convergent interest wherein a willingness to share in the compromise of unilateral goals may bring common gains through multilateral arrangements."

While noting that, given the current developments between Washington and Peking, any genuine multilateral develop-

ment pivots on the position of Japan, as the most powerful influence on interaction in the region, Whiting postulates two particular areas with the potential for multilateral effort: ocean resources, particularly offshore oil, and arms control.

On the first matter, he fore-shadows exploitation of the rich oil resources believed to lie off the whole length of the Chinese coast by a multi-national consortium, with Japanese and US participation, but with ownership and basic financial interest being retained by the PRC. On the still thornier question of arms control, he suggests as an idea likely to be canvassed an accord between the PRC, the US, Japan, the two Koreas and the Soviet Union to exclude nuclear weapons from an area covering a 1500-mile radius from Tokyo.

While noting the complexities and difficulty of turning such perspectives into realities, Whiting stresses the magnitude of the changes which are occurring when he writes: "Not since 1941 has a single year signalled a decade of such impending change in the international relations of Asia as 1971 . . . The interrelations of Washington, Peking, and Tokyo can no longer be viewed as separate pairs of bilateral lines. Gone is the rigid confrontation of alliances which juxtaposed the 'socialist camp' against the 'free world.'"

There is another vital dimension to these changes, which has been totally obscured in the Australian media by the Nixon visit to China. Much more important than the color of Patricia Nixon's dress at the Forbidden City is the rapidly developing co-operation between the Soviet Union and Japan.

These two countries, spurred by their common (if differently motivated) sense of grievance at the turn in relations between the US and China, are pulling out all the stops in developing their relations in all fields. The regular USSR-Japan foreign ministerial conference held in Tokyo in January decided that the already well-established Japanese role in developing the natural resources of Siberia should be greatly stepped up, and, most important, that, after a 16-year suspension, negotiations should be resumed on the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan. An exchange of visits by the Prime Ministers of the two countries is already in the diplomatic works, with Alexei Kosygin likely to start the ball rolling with a visit to Japan this year.

How should socialists regard the new constellation of power relations in Asia which is emerging?

As a general point, the latest developments hammer what ought to (but won't)

be the final nail in the coffin of the idea that socialists can effectively orient their thinking about world affairs on the attitudes of any particular government. Socialists must learn to do their own thinking about such questions or be doomed to the "political impotence of parroting what are often only temporary propaganda positions reflecting the changing interests of a nation-state.

But there is one aspect of the new scene which overrides all others in importance and that is the continuing Indochina war.

It should not have gone unnoticed that the delegates of the Vietnamese liberation forces to the Paris Conference on Vietnam chose the moment of Nixon's arrival in Peking to deliver their most savage attack ever upon the Nixon administration's policy of aggression in Indochina, and followed it up by taking the unprecedented step of walking out of the conference before the Americans could say a word in reply. If that was not a clear signal to their friends all over the world of their attitude in the new Asian scene, then all the rules have changed.

Great Powers are by definition rather well able to look after themselves. The embattled peoples of Indochina sense a danger that in the present shift in Great Power relations they might once ag-

ain become, as they feel happened to some extent in 1954, a victim of the shift. It is this danger which merits the closest attention.

There was more than a touch of prophecy in the words of the Japanese Communist Party newspaper, *Akaha*, when, in an article on the Nixon Doctrine published on August 21, 1971, in the month following the first announcement of Nixon's visit to China, it said: "The urgent common task before the world's anti-imperialist forces is to overcome all arguments that tend to embellish and exonerate Nixon, and to strengthen the struggle for support of and solidarity with the struggle of the Indochinese peoples."

Malcolm Salmon.

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MAO'S PREDICAMENT

Hanoi Disappointed

Berlin,

The process of disillusionment with Mao, regarding Vietnam, has greatly intensified. Peking's request to Hanoi and the Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam not to do anything that would embarrass the American guest was turned down with contempt. On the other hand, Hanoi did everything to snub Mao.

On the day Nixon reached Peking, the official North Vietnamese daily, "*Nandahn*", published the full text of the Soviet Communist Party Secretary - General Brezhnev's message to the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of Indo-China (held near Paris), which was boycotted and attacked by Peking. Brezhnev's message was read in Paris on February 11, but Hanoi reserved it for February 21, as a missile against Nixon being received by Mao in Peking:

On the eve of Nixon's visit Hanoi's military publishing house released a book entitled "Nixon's criminal records", at a time when the Maoists were trying to white-wash the image of the bomber and killer of the Indo-Chinese people, A documentation of US crime in Indo-China and the impli-

cations of the "Vietnamisation" of the war, the book, in its introduction, warns against appeasement policies.

At the same time, in order to demonstrate that the American people are not enemies of the Vietnamese, on the day Nixon arrived in Peking, a top DRV official received American scientist and Nobel Prize-winner, Prof Wald, a leader of the anti-war movement in the US, in Hanoi with great pomp and honour.

On February 23, when Nixon was engaged in prolonged secret talks with Chou En-lai, North Vietnamese Defence Minister General Giap, in a message to Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, paid tribute to the Soviet Army, and "deeply appreciated the fraternal friendship between Soviet and DRV defence forces."

While hailing the "unceasing aid" the Soviet Army gave the Viet Army, General Giap told Marshal Grechko, that the Soviet Army is "rendering an important contribution toward strengthening of the socialist system and protection of peace and security of countries throughout the world."

SNUB NO. 3 came from Paris where a spokesman of

the DRV delegation at the Vietnam conference, Nguyen Thai Le, made it clear, at a special press conference, that there would not be a resumption of negotiations with the Americans during the days Nixon stayed in China.

He strongly rebutted the allegation in the American press, that a top North Vietnamese representative was flying from Paris to Peking to meet Nixon or one of his aides. "Such rumours were totally unfounded", said the Vietnamese spokesman. This denial was made with the express purpose of telling the world that China could not be any kind of arbiter.

This spokesman in Paris also condemned the hypocrisy "with which Nixon had spoken in Peking." World pressmen in Paris took this February 24 Press conference as "Vietnam's rebuff" to the Nixon-Mao summit.

Vietnamese sources in Paris were very bitter that China boycotted history's biggest anti-Imperialist conference on Indo-China, held in Versailles, which was attended by 84 countries, including America, North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Vietnamese patriots are fully aware of Chinese double-dealing. While, in 1965, Peking's leaders assured Hanoi of their "full support" and readiness to make the "greatest national sacrifices" in the

struggle against US aggression, Mao gave a secret assurance to Washington, that China "would fight only in case the US attacked the PEG directly."

The "Pentagon papers" further reveal, that the US intensified the Vietwar and launched the most savage raids in the north after this treacherous Peking assurance was delivered to the US ambassador at the "China talks" in Warsaw.

Whatever might be the secret decisions taken at the Nixon-Mao summit on the Indo-China question, the DRV, PRG, Pathet Lao and Cambodian patriots will not listen to Mao any more and reject Nixon's Eight-Point Trick.

Kunhanandan Nair.



Okay, it's a deal: We leave the fate of Taiwan to you, you leave the fate of America to Vietnam.

TAMIL NADU

D. M. K. 's Separatist Itch?

By M. BHAKTAVATSALAM,
Former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu

The DMK in Tamil Nadu came to power in 1967 because the people wanted a change after continuous Congress administration and also because the DMK indulged in rash promises to the electorate. The people in Tamil Nadu were, however, getting disillusioned at the poor performance of the DMK Government and at the serious lapses in the administration. At the mid-term election, in 1971, the DMK wisely placed before the electorate only two issues: the leadership of Mrs. Indira

Gandhi and the acceleration in the ushering in of democratic socialism.

The DMK did not put forth any of its pet theories before the public; therefore, the people solidly voted for the DMK. But for the solid support of the Congress the DMK could not have secured its large majority. It has to be remembered that Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi and Education Minister V. R. Nedunchezian won the election only by narrow majorities, and but

for the support given by the adherents of the Congress organisation, they would have been defeated at the polls.

After coming to power, the Chief Minister and his party have been kicking up a row with the Centre on one issue or another. Unilaterally, the DMK Government appointed a committee to study Centre-State relations, and they wanted the Centre to accept the recommendations of the Committee.

They held a conference before the elections and put forth the demand for complete autonomy of the State with a loose federation with the Centre.

Regarding the Cauvery waters dispute between Tamil

Nadu and Mysore, the Chief Minister even chose to condemn the Centre for not constituting a tribunal as demanded by him. It looked as if the Chief Minister was more interested in finding an opportunity to condemn the Centre than to solve the dispute between Mysore and Tamil Nadu.

I expressed my views at that time, that it was not in the interests of Tamil Nadu to demand a tribunal. The Chief Minister has now chosen to equate the Bangla Desh issue with the dispute which he has raised in regard to Centre-State relationship.

There is, indeed, no comparison between the two. Pakistan was asked for and secured on the basis of a Muslim majority. The eastern and western parts of Pakistan were not contiguous, but were separated by 1200 miles of Indian territory; therefore there could not be a real nation or country comprising East and West Pakistan.

The advocates of Pakistan were not even interested in the Muslim population of East Pakistan. They were only interested in ruling over these people and exploiting them.

Bangla Desh, which had a large majority, population-wise, in Pakistan, had never had any proper share in the administration. It was the military junta in West Pakis-

tan which was ruling over them and, as Mr. Bhutto himself, has pointed out, a handful of capitalists sought to exploit the rich soil of Bangla Desh.

West Pakistan did not follow any democratic methods even after the elections in which the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, won by a massive majority.

The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister conveniently forgets all these points. He simply states that because Pakistan interfered in the provincial rights of East Pakistan, Bangla Desh chose to attain independence.

The Chief Minister points this out as a warning to the Centre in India. He expresses his view in clear terms that this lesson should be learnt by the Centre. This is mischievous and misleading. The question of Centre-State relations is a routine matter. The framers of the Constitution, led by Dr. Ambedkar, had in mind that the Centre should be a strong one. To make a demand for autonomy as such as if there is no autonomy in the States, certainly smacks of separatism.

It is really reprehensible that the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu should have chosen to launch a persistent campaign against the Centre during the emergency.

No one is able to understand what exactly the DMK means by autonomy, although the Chief Minister is anxious to assure the people that his intention is not to weaken the Centre or impair the unity of the country. The demand will undoubtedly seek to weaken the Centre.

One of the important Ministers of Tamil Nadu, Mr. Nedunchezian, is reported to have stated at a public meeting, that, except Defence, the Centre should not have any other subject to deal with.

The same Minister has also propounded the proposition that after Gandhiji and Nehruji, one cannot think in terms of an all India leadership any longer, and that the present popularity of Mrs. Indira Gandhi could only be short-lived. It looks as if the DMK is itching for a conflict with the Centre for their own reasons.

It is, of course, for the Central Government to deal with the situation as it develops: but I have no doubt that the people of Tamil Nadu will not countenance this confrontation by the DMK with equanimity.

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Bangla Desh and F P Adventurism

By Serendib.

March, 11, 1972

The news that Ceylon had extended full diplomatic recognition to Bangla Desh was announced locally on the morning of March 5. The decision had evidently been taken a few days before, but the Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, had sent a message on March 4 to the Bangladesh P.M., Sheik Mujibur Rahman, conveying the Ceylon Government's decision to accord full recognition to Bangladesh as a sovereign and independent state. The letter sent to Dacca was released by the Ministry of External Affairs and Defence on March 5 and it read: "I am happy to inform you that the Ceylon Government has decided to accord full recognition to Bangladesh as a sovereign independent State. I wish to extend to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and through you, to the Government and people of Bangladesh the sincere greetings and best wishes of my Government and the people of Ceylon. I look forward to the establishment of close relations and friendly co-operation between our two countries and Governments in our mutual interest." This information was conveyed to Prime Minister Rahman in Moscow where he was on his final stages of his state visit.

Ceylon was thus the last Commonwealth nation in the Asian region to recognise Bangladesh. Ceylon had delayed recognition until Pakistan had "come to terms with Bangladesh", but finding that this was not likely to happen at any time in the future in a manner that would preserve the "territorial integrity" of Pakistan as created in 1947, Ceylon had obviously decided to recognise the reality of Bangladesh. The Ceylon Government was also in touch with Dacca to establish a direct telephone link between Colombo and the Bangladesh capital. When Pakistan, east and west, was one unit, Colombo was linked to Dacca by radio through Karachi but with the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country, contact with Dacca was being maintained through London and this was prohibitively expensive. It will be recalled that over 9000 tons of the 10,000 tons of coconut oil bought by Pakistan previously had been shipped to Dacca. No sooner had recognition been accorded, Ceylon had set in motion negotiations to sell coconut oil to Bangladesh and the now nationalised BCC Ltd has, it is reported, taken the necessary steps for this purpose.

There has been a great deal of comment locally and elsewhere about Ceylon's delay

in recognising Bangladesh. The Commonwealth Secretariat's head, Mr. Arnold Smith, was in Ceylon in the last week of February. He came to Ceylon from a visit to Dacca. He had come to sound the Government about admitting Bangladesh to the Commonwealth. It was known before Smith left Ceylon that Ceylon had no objections to Bangladesh being admitted to the Commonwealth, but few expected direct diplomatic recognition by Ceylon to follow so soon.

Significance is also attached to the communique Nixon and Chou had issued in Shanghai on February 27. The Chinese part of the joint communique stressed the right of all nations to "safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries." Nevertheless, five sentences further on in the communique, the Chinese side omitted any reference to "territorial integrity" in expressing support for Pakistan's "struggle to preserve independence and sovereignty". This was a hint, no doubt, that Peking was beginning to accept the concept of an independent Bangladesh. This meant that China did not place much hopes on Pakistan's ability to recover its economically vital former eastern wing.

Though India was "unpopular" with both Chou and Nixon, observers felt that this cautious omission regarding Pakistan, in a most carefully-

worded joint statement, was clear indication that the US would sooner or later recognise Bangladesh, whilst China would not "object" to states friendly to her recognising Bangladesh, although she herself might not recognise Bangladesh in the foreseeable future.

But Chira has much to worry about Pakistan. Bhutto does not seem able to establish the necessary degree of unity within West Pakistan itself to pull it out of the rut. Gul Hassan and Rahim Khan have been pushed out by Tikka Khan and Zafar Chaudhry as the heads of the army and air force and this does not portend good for Bhutto himself personally. The Pathan and Baluchis have openly threatened to declare war against the Punjabi domination in Pakistan. It must be remembered that the 22 families which own and rule Pakistan come, in the main, from the Punjab. There is every likelihood that West Pakistan will very soon be plunged into a civil war of its own—and this may be precipitated by "butcher" Tikka Khan who may want to crush the Baluchi and Pathan revolt with an iron hand. This would split the Pakistani Army and trigger a bloodbath between the Punjabi and Pathan units. This would also involve Afghanistan and India in the turmoil which will inevitably lead to the dismemberment of West Pakistan. To prevent this calamity, politically opportun-

ist Bhutto and the blind militarist Tikka Khan might start a diversionary *Jehad* against India over Kashmir and other issues. This would be the more attractive alternative before the present rulers of Pakistan rather than crack down immediately on Pathan and Baluchi agitation for provincial autonomy. How China and the USA will react to this developing situation in Pakistan is not known, but it is obvious that the people in Ceylon (and even the daily press) seem to be completely oblivious to such possibilities.

An interesting sidelight into the question of recognising Bangladesh came up in Ceylon towards the end of last month. Mr. Amaradasa Fernando, the Secretary of the Friends of Bangladesh in Ceylon, had gone to Dacca and the new state on a two-week visit. On his return he was interviewed by local daily papers, and in a front page story in the *Times of Ceylon*, on February 25, 1972 it was reported that: "the people of Bangladesh were saddened by the non-recognition of their country by Ceylon. This was stated by Mr. Amaradasa Fernando, the Secretary of the Friends of Bangladesh, who returned to Ceylon after a tour of that country. Mr. Fernando said that he was able to impress upon Bangladesh leaders the difficulties that Ceylon faced with the 'voices of a separatist movement being hard in Ceylon itself'. The leaders

of Bangladesh appreciated these difficulties....."

The *Ceylon Daily News* on February 26, 1972, also gave frontpage prominence to Mr. Fernando. The report read: "... 'For us there was no other way but separation. We cannot see a similar situation in your country', said Sheik Mujibbur Rahman to Mr. Amaradasa Fernando, General Secretary of the Friends of Bangladesh. Mr. Fernando returned to Ceylon after a two weeks stay in Bangladesh. 'We were in a majority in Pakistan; we were one thousand miles apart. We earned 70 percent of the foreign exchange of Pakistan but we were given only 30 percent for our expenditure from the Central Government. The best jobs were not open to the Bengalis, they were filled with West Pakistanis. Except in exceptional cases, only the clerical and labourers jobs were open to Bengalis. The Bengalis were bled white; we were a virtual colony of West Pakistan; and finally genocide was committed on our nation. If the Dravidians (Tamils) are exploited and faced linguistic and physical annihilation as the Bengalis before liberation, then their cause is just,' Mr. Abdul Samad Azad, Foreign Minister, also agreed with Sheik Mujibbur Rahman on his observation regarding the so-called 'Yal Dosh' of the Ceylon Federalists....."

Whilst Mr. Amaradasa Fernando was touring Bangla-

C O V E R

This week's cover is a picture of one of the mythological figures decorating the gopuram of the Hindu temple of Muneswaram near Chilaw. It is a close-up with a telephoto lens and it therefore bears the distortion of the angle from which the picture was taken. It is a striking shot from one of the oldest Hindu temples in Ceylon. The present building and gopuram are new. The legendary temple, where Rama is said to have worshipped when he had come to wage war on Ravana, was destroyed by the Portuguese. Everything had been reduced to dust. But the most sacred idols and the lingam had been secretly taken away to be hidden in the forest fastness along the banks of the Deduru Oya. The temple was rebuilt on the same hallowed spot during British times. The present buildings do not have the mighty grandeur of what it once had been, but hundreds of thousands of worshippers flock to the place. Muneswaram has an important place in pre-Vijayan history and literature and is one of the links with ancient Ceylon.

giving lands to Sinhalese in the north and north-eastern regions, the Ceylon Government was trying to reduce the Tamils to a minority in their own territory, he charged.

"Tamils had also been systematically eliminated from the defence forces since the present Government took office in 1970. Today they constituted less than one per cent, although 30 per cent of the country's population were Tamils. Representation in the Police Force too was "not in proportion to our numbers", he said. Mr. Chelvanayakam accused the parties in power in Ceylon of driving the Tamils to a position in which only separation could save them.

The *Ceylon Daily News*, also of February 24, 1972, under the heading: FP LEADER IN MADRAS published the same *PTC-Reuter report*, on its front page.

The *Times of Ceylon* on February 26, 1972, under the heading: SJV SEEKS AID IN MADRAS stated that: The Leader of the Federal Party, Mr. S. J. V. Chelvanayakam told a Press Conference in Madras on Thursday that his party would be "compelled to think in terms of seeking an independent state for Tamils in Ceylon." A report published in the *Indian Express* on Tuesday stated: "Mr. Chelvanayakam, who is here "to mobilise support" for Ceylon Tamils' fight for equal rights, told newsmen his party wan-

desh, the FP leaders Mr S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and Mr. A. Amirthalingam were touring Tamilnadu in South India. Their activities were reported in the Indian and local papers, and the reports published in Colombo give a fair idea of the speeches and statements they had made in Madras and other places. The *Sun* of February 24, 1972, under the heading: TAMILS MIGHT HAVE TO AGITATE FOR A SEPARATE STATE—CHELVANAYAKAM, published a *PTC-Reuter* message datedlined, Madras, Wednesday February 23, which read: "The Leader of the Federal Party of Ceylon said here today the Tamil speaking people of the country might short-

ly have to agitate for a separate State for themselves. Mr. S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, whose party claims the support of the majority of Tamil people in Ceylon, told reporters the struggle might begin with the promulgation of a new Constitution expected in April or May. "It will be a nonviolent struggle," he said.

"Mr. Chelvanayakam who has been meeting Ministers of the Tamil Nadu State (which is itself Tamil speaking) during his visit to India said his Party which has a strength of 13 in Parliament had rejected that Draft Constitution because it failed to provide guarantees for preserving the rights of the Tamil minority. By

ted an autonomous State comprising all Tamil provinces with federal government dealing with Defence, Foreign Affairs, Communications and Currency.

“He said his party would launch a non-violent agitation against the draft Constitution which denied the Tamil people, who formed 30 per cent, of the island's population, their political, linguistic, religious and economic rights. He described the Constitution, to be promulgated in April, as ‘a chapter of slavery.’ Mr. Chelvanayakam said as the Sinhalese majority had rejected all the amendments moved by Federal Party members seeking equal rights for the Tamil minority, they had withdrawn from the Constituent Assembly.

“He feared the attitude of the Sinhalese majority would drive the Tamils to seek an independent and sovereign State. He alleged that the Tamil region was ‘deliberately neglected’ in the matter of industrialisation and economic development. Asked whether he would take the issue to the United Nations, Mr. Chelvanayakam said he had no great faith in the world body which kept its eyes shut to the largescale genocide by the Pakistani military rulers in Bangladesh.

“Mr. Chelvanayakam has met Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi, Tamil Arasu Kaz-

hagam leader M. P. Sivagnana Gramani and Muslim League leader Mohammed Ismail M.P. Mr. Chelvanayakam said he proposed to visit New Delhi and other national capitals to canvass support for the Ceylon Tamil's cause.

“On his talks with Tamil Nadu leaders, Mr. Chelvanayakam said while some were sympathetic, others said it was an internal problem of Ceylon. Mr. Chelvanayakam is accompanied by Mr. A. Amirthalingam, Federal Party secretary.”

It is not clear why these two FP leaders should have set out on this highly adventurous and opportunist political journey to Madras. No politician in Ceylon in his senses would want to indulge in such clearly foolish activities, especially when it could be considered treasonable. Treason, in a legal sense, could be justified, under certain circumstances, but when there is no cause for it can lead to political disaster.

On the same day that Mr. Chelvanayakam was raising this cry of a separate Tamil state in Madras, Mrs. Indira Gandhi in a speech at Jaipur had warned India against communal and separatist forces. The PTI message read as follows: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, today warned those spreading communalism and separatism that the country had “put up with them for long

and will not tolerate them any more.” Addressing a huge election meeting here, she said: “I am not threatening anyone. However, I do want to make it clear that I am very firm about it. Once I decide to do something, no power on earth can stop me”. Her 40-minute speech here was the fiercest attack so far on communal parties and feudal elements during the current election campaign.

The *Indian Express* in its issue of March 2, 1972 published the following report from its correspondent in Colombo, K. Nadarajah. It stated, under the heading DEMAND FOR A TAMIL STATE CONDEMNED, that: the vast majority of Ceylonese—Sinhalese and Tamils alike—simply abhor the Tamil Federal Party's idea of a separate state for the Tamil-speaking people in north and east Ceylon. This is the unanimous reaction here to the visit of Tamil Federal Party leader S.J.V. Chelvanayakam to India to solicit support for the demand for a separate State for the Tamils. Leaders of political parties in Ceylon, both right and left wing, and of activist groups are confident that no leader in India would lend support or sympathy to the idea.

The contention that if Bangladesh could be created, why not a Yaldesh for Tamils is ridiculous beyond measure, the leaders say. The Ceylon Communist Party (Peking

wing), led by Mr. N. Shanmugathan, in a statement released here today called upon the Tamil people to repudiate the "anti-national and reactionary policies" of supporters of regional autonomy. It said the inspiration for the agitation set afoot by the Federal Party for a separate State for the Tamils drew inspiration from the creation of the "Indian satellite State of Bangladesh", and pointed out: "Ceylon, on the contrary, is geographically a small country and economically a single unit. The demand for a separate Tamil State is not only self-defeating but also reactionary. It divides instead of uniting the progressive forces from among the Sinhalese and the Tamils and will further aggravate communal disharmony. It also provides the opportunity to the reactionary forces to let loose repression against the Tamils and thus distract the entire people from the economic and political problems facing them".

On the following day, March 3, the *Indian Express* published a further report from its Colombo correspondent under the heading CEYLON GOVERNMENT WARNS THE SEPARATISTS:

The Ceylon Government will "deal firmly" with any separatist or secessionist moves in Ceylon or anyone raising the communal cry here.

A Ministry of Defence and External Affairs source said today that the Government was in no mood to tolerate communalism from any source, particularly at this critical juncture in Ceylon's development. The Ministry source was referring to reports in the Indian press of attempts by Tamil Federal Party leader S. J. V. Chelvanayakam to canvass support from Tamil leaders in South India for a separate State within the Federal set-up for the Tamil-speaking people in north and east Ceylon.

The source said the Federal Party was trying to boost its position among the Ceylon Tamils by creating visions of a separate State with support and sympathy from friends across the Palk Strait. He said the Government was convinced that no Indian leader or party would interfere in the internal affairs of another country.

He said they were genuinely sorry that communal disturbances in Ceylon in 1958 had left so many dead and hoped that immediate Government action would nip in the bud any future attempt to create ill-feeling between the different communities in the island. The Government, he said, was armed with necessary legislative and emergency powers to deal with situations caused by communal parties and diehards.

Meanwhile, Mr. Chelvanayakam said he would discuss

the problems facing the Tamil-speaking population of the island with the Indian Government leaders in New Delhi during his next visit to India. He stated this in an interview today in "*Virakesary*", the Tamil daily of Ceylon, on his recent six-day visit to Tamil Nadu.

The *Daily Mirror* and the *Sun* wrote vigorous editorials condemning the move by the Federalist leaders to agitate for a separate state. At the SLFP Executive Meeting on March 8 this question was evidently taken up and the Prime Minister had stated that appropriate action would be taken against those who raised such demands.

There is also much consternation even among the Tamils that the FP leaders should indulge in this kind of brinkmanship which could very well lead to another communal holocaust as in 1958. It is obvious that the FP has reached the brink in its political bankruptcy to jump into this lunatic fringe of meaningless political adventurism. The emergence of Bangladesh had evidently prompted this opportunist attempt to exploit a situation but it betrayed the amateurish political logic of the FP leadership.



CHINA

Taiwan's Dilemma

Hongkong,

Even before Nixon went to Peking, Taiwan had made it quite clear that it had been let down. The secret Kissinger parleys in Peking last year were bad enough, but the decision of the UN to admit Communist China and throw out Taiwan was a disastrous blow. But the ruling circles in Taiwan still felt that they would be able to exist as an independent entity under US protection.

However, as the days of the Nixon visit to China drew nearer, it was felt that even this was at stake. President Chiang Kai-Shek, who is serving his fourth six-year term had announced on February 20 that he wanted to step down. This 84-year old President told the National Assembly that he had been in office for a long time and requested the delegates to choose a successor. But the delegates appealed to him to continue for a fifth term.

On February 21, the Taiwan National Assembly criticised President Nixon's visit to China and passed a resolution which was transmitted to him through the US embassy in Taipei to reach him in Peking no sooner he arrived there. The resolution said

that the Peking Government had no right to represent the Chinese people and that Taiwan's avowed policy of overthrowing that Government would not be changed under any circumstances at any time. "It is absolutely impossible to negotiate with or appease the illegal rebel group", the resolution said. It was the same unrealistic attitude Chiang Kai-shek has adopted for the last twenty odd years, but this time it did not have the backing of the US government. And, Nixon was already in close and intimate negotiations with the "illegal rebel group".

When the Nixon-Chou communique was released on February 27 in Shanghai, there was consternation in Taipei. From all reports reaching here it was clear the ruling circles in Taiwan were in a state of confusion and shock. At first official spokesmen refused to make any comment stating that they needed time to study the communique. But as the trauma passed, officials were willing to examine some of the implications of those parts of the communique which related to Taiwan. One thing which baffled them was what the communique meant when it said that the US would "ultimately" with-

draw its forces from Taiwan. These officials indicated that they felt consoled that Kissinger in a press conference in Shanghai immediately after the communique, assured everybody that the US would stand by its treaty commitments to Taiwan. But, whatever the quibbling, it was clear that the US had given up its two Chinas policy and that Taiwan would have to fend for itself.

On February 28, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of China issued a statement, which said. "According to President Nixon, he made the trip to the Chinese mainland with the hope that it might bring a generation of peace and relax tensions in the Asian and Pacific region. Actually, the effects of President Nixon's visit are diametrically opposite to what he expected, and the countries in the Asian and Pacific area will be among the first ones to suffer from its aftermath." It called on countries in the area "to rely upon their own determination and strength and spare no efforts in consolidating unity and co-operation among themselves. They should not entertain the slightest delusion of co-existing peacefully with the Chinese communists."

Taiwan newspapers strongly criticised the communique, and as the island republic realised with shock that the US might be withdrawing its sup-

WITH COMPLIMENTS

C. V. BHATT


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