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TRADITION, NATIONALISM AND NATION-BUILDING IN SOUTHERN ASIA

S. Arasaratnam
Professor of History
University of New England
Australia

The role of tradition in national integration, in the newly independent states of Southern Asia is both functional and dysfunctional and tends to operate in many contradictory directions. Almost all these nation states, called into existence after the end of the second world war, consist of old societies, each with its own rich and variegated past, endowed with distinct cultural personalities and records of cultural self-expression. Many elements of these cultural traditions have survived to the present day and the tradition is a living force that contributes to the shaping of the destiny of each state in the present and the future. Not even in areas of the most intensive western impact has it been possible to uproot this tradition entirely. It has thus lived on in various shapes and guises, transmuted perhaps, modified significantly sometimes even out of recognition, but there is no doubt of its powerful presence in these societies. Whatever policies the leaders of these nations seek to pursue in national integration, popular participation in government, restructuring of society or economic growth—the potent force of tradition must be understood and admitted as a basic fact of life.

There is a large body of literature that looks at the interrelation between tradition and modernity in various problem areas of national integration and economic development in relation to south and southeast Asia.[1] The purpose of this essay is to look at the role of tradition in the growth of nationalism in the era of nationalist struggle against colonial rule and to pursue the problem into the era of the nation-state and the consolidation of the nation, with the known examples of some of the states of southern Asia. The states chosen to illustrate the issues that have been considered are India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and Malaysia.

For a greater part of the 19th century, in the first stage of the growth of nationalism in the colonial territories of Asia, a western model was followed. Nationalism went hand in hand with liberalism and secularism and the ideal society and state were individualistic, democratic, egalitarian and unitary. Nowhere were these ideals embedded in early nationalism as in India, the pioneer nationalist movement of Asia. The early Indian liberal nationalists had no use for the past, which they considered dead wood, to be buried and forgotten. India had decisively turned its back on the past with the British conquest. The founding fathers of Indian liberal nationalism consistently decried revivalism, trends towards which were becoming visible in the last quarter of the 19th century and they considered these attempts at revivalism the enemy of nationalism and progress.[2]

This concept of a decisive break with the past was an even more prominent feature of Ceylonese nationalism where it continued even after independence. Both the Indian and the Ceylonese liberal nationalists had a model of nationalism and modernization adopted from the west. In both cases they were looking forward to the future and saw the past as irrelevent to this future. They had both no necessity for mobilization of large masses of people who had not been exposed to western ideas. They operated as a closely knit, ideologically united group of elites from different parts of the country. They were so much enamoured by the ability of members from various regions, ethnic and linguistic groups and religious communities to come together that they felt that this horizontal linkage was what mattered most to the forging of a strong nationalist movement and eventually to nation-building.

In Ceylon the entire nationalist movement was conducted on these assumptions. Any problems that arose between communal groups were sorted out between elite leaders of these groups. The successful achievement of independence in 1947 with these ideas still predominant further strengthened such a concept of nationalism and the party that assumed control of government, the United National Party, was formed on the basis of a horizontal integration of a thin crust of westernized professional and commercial elite drawn from all ethnic and religious groups of Ceylonese society.[3]

A broadly similar situation prevailed in Malaya during the period of the transfer of power from the British. Though western impact was less intense and the wider implications of western nationalist ideology were not consistently worked out, the assumption of a secular, forward-looking, liberal nationalism was clear in the formation of the Alliance of existing command parties as a broad nationalist front to prepare for the transfer of power. Again, as in Sri Lanka, tradition and culture were not vocally used for purposes of political mobilization. These assumptions held good for a good decade after independence[4].

In opposition to the liberal, secular nationalism of the western model arose the powerful ideas that sought to base nationalism on the solid foundations of a society's traditional past. They saw the modern phase of nationalism, not as a novel, essentially different phenomenon, causing a break with the past, but rather as an extension of this past, a rebirth of the old society, its renaissance in a new form. Again, it was in India that these ideas were developed into a well-rounded philosophy and nationalist movement built up on its foundations which carried out the struggle for independence for half a century.

In India, as subsequently in other societies where cultural nationalism spread, the first stage of this movement sees a revival of traditional religion and traditional culture and the fostering of a pride in their antiquity. This trend was assisted by the rediscovery of elements of the high culture and an awareness of the peak periods of achievement of that people. Thus Hindu reformation movements such as the Arya Samaj, the Theosophical Society, and the Ramakrishna Missions and Vivekananda Societies were a necessary prelude to the redefinition of nationalism that they soon produced. Under the influence of these socio-religious movements, there soon arose a group of political interpreters of the new nationalism and a band of its militant practitioners. The traditionalists sought to look for a connecting link in India's evolution from past to present and saw it in the continuity of its religious tradition. Specifically, the *Dharma* or the moral order in Hinduism was eternal and contained the essence of the Indian spirit. This spirit or soul was equated with the modern concept of nation, which was therefore nothing new to the Hindus, who had been aware of it and experiencing it all along. It was now stifled as a result of foreign domination and had to be nurtured and rejuvenated with the expulsion of the foreigners.

The traditional foundations of nationalism served towards a vertical integration, bringing into the process of nation-building whole groups of peoples unaffected by and isolated from western rule. It enabled the message of nationalism to be carried across to them in a manner they appreciated and in an idiom they understood. The success in political mobilization of the rural masses, after the propagation of this form of nationalism, was dramatic. From the last decade of the 19th century, increasingly, non-English educated peoples from towns and villages were brought into nation-consciousness and participation in nationalist political activity. With the advent of Mahatma Gandhi, who carried this almost to perfection, the results were phenomenal. Not only did he posit the goals of nationalism in traditional terms, he also fashioned a methodology of political action in terms of a traditional ethic. He often referred to independence as *Rāmrājya*, or rule of Rama, the incarnation of the Hindu protector deity Vishnu. The

means of achieving this independence was *satyāgraha*, or struggle for truth, set in terms of an individual pursuit of the ideal for truth, and *ahimsā* that would lead to the goal of salvation as *moksha*.

The use of religious symbols and worship forms was an important element in this integration and mobilization. The earlier religious nationalists were quite open in the use of Hindu worship forms to stir up nationalist activity. One of the early expressions of this was the Ganesh *poojas*, inaugurated by Bal Gangadhar Tilak in eastern India. In Bengal the potent cult of Kali, the mother goddess, was brought in to support nationalism. In both cases, the religious fervour that was attendant on the worship served the cause of nationalism and produced a frenzied militancy in the first decade of the 20th century that often led to violence. Gandhi was more subtle in the use of religion. He attempted to integrate at the plane of spirituality and morality rather than of sectarian worship. But the very physical appearance of Gandhi and his life style, together with his political idiom was such as to infuse Hindu sentiments among his followers who saw him as a Hindu ascetic saint leading them to the promised land of freedom.

Another aspect of traditional nationalism was the use of the past to create nation-consciousness. A pride in the past, a satisfaction in its achievements, was an essential tool in the effort at integration. It was important to infuse the idea of continuity of the body politic and the body social. It was also important to infuse a belief in the ability of a people to stand on its own feet. One of the great handicaps the nationalist movements had to fight against was the utter apathy, the great diffidence on the part of the subject people, and the consequent inability to conceive of anything other than permanent subjection and dependence. In many areas the will to survive was gone and a subjection of the body had been followed by a senility of the mind and spirit. Lacking the ability of the western-educated classes to seek to compete with the west on its own terms, lacking a belief in the viability of their own traditional political and social systems and values, they were completely withdrawn from the world of nationalist politics. They were in a position to be manipulated on behalf of imperial interests against the incipient nationalist movement by strong-willed imperialists such as Lord Curzon (Viceroy of India 1899—1905) or clever manipulators like Lord Minto (1905—1910).

Pride in the past and an identification with it was thus an essential methodology of the new nationalism. This was done by a selective interpretation of history, by emphasising and placing before public view peak periods of past achievement and by parading before them hero figures from past history, some of whom were fresh in folk memory. In the case of Hindu history, with its long and many-

hued past, it was difficult to recreate a universally agreed historical period in which all could share equally. Hence the image recreated was more a concept of a historical past, a sampling of various cultural achievements over a wide time span. Thus the Vedic age, the age of Upanishads, the age of Mauryan political hegemony, of the Gupta Hindu synthesis were selected as these peaks of memory and their characteristics were idealised and presented before the people. Qualities desirable in the modern social context were ascribed to them. These qualities were monotheism, personal devotion to God, abstract speculation on creation and the ultimate reality, social equality between groups and individuals, high social status of women, high levels of literacy and education.

In periods of the recent past, it was possible to revive memories of historic personalities. Thus many who fought against foreign invasion in the various regions of India were made the object of a personality cult, some with deification and veneration of the great and the good common to Hinduism. The most potent of these cults was that of Shivaji, the 17th century Mahratta ruler who fought against the powerful Moghul Emperor Aurangzeb to keep alive an independent Hindu Kingdom in western India. Other hero figures included those Hindu princes who had resisted Islamic expansion in one form or another in the various regions, rulers who had fought against the expanding British power and more latterly heroes of the Mutiny of 1857. They were heroes of traditional Hindu India, well known to the most illiterate of the rural masses with whom they could identify in a way they could not with the westernized political leaders of urban India.

Likewise, when the Islamic nationalist movement of India got going, the integrative forces of religion, traditional culture and historic memory were to assert themselves. The Muslims had a more direct link with the traditional past and a historic continuity from the establishment of Islamic power in India with the foundation of the Ghaznavid principality in 1021 A. D. The secular aims of the nationalist movement led by M. A. Jinnah and his immediate following of English-educated professionals was matched by the theocratic ideals of the *ulama* and the religious leadership of the Islamic community. The historical consciousness of the Indian Muslims was more sharp and was kept alive by a historiography which specialised in biographical writings of great warriors and founders of Islamic power. A number of hero figures could be raised for popular consciousness and used to rally opinion and integrate people.

In Sri Lanka, the use of tradition to integrate a people occurred much later, some years after independence. But when it did occur it followed the same general principles as in India. The religious culture of a community, Buddhism in this case, provided the basis of the search for unity. This was combined with a delving into the

past to assert elements of continuity and of an erstwhile greatness as a rationale for present militancy. The continuity was provided by the establishment of the Buddhist faith in the island in the 3rd century B. C. and the conversion of the Sinhalese people to this faith. The preservation of the Buddhist faith in Sri Lanka, the ensuring of its continuous existence became the dynamic of Sinhalese history and the destiny of the Sinhalese people. Hero figures from past history and peak periods of power and cultural achievements were brought back into popular memory by popular writing and propaganda. The existence of a continuous tradition of Buddhist historiography made this possible and plausible. Defenders of Sinhalese political power and supporters of Buddhist institutions became folk heroes of the modern age. By this means was brought about a successful mobilization of Sinhalese political power and a unification for common goals of a diverse and segmented people who had so far not been brought into national consciousness or the political process.

We have then two models of nationalist integration: the one successfully bringing together a thin layer of people horizontally from across different groups in different regions of the country, and the other also successfully bringing together several hierarchies of groups of a society vertically. It is undoubtedly true that the latter is the more potent form of integration, displacing the former type rapidly whenever they come into conflict. Two instances of such conflict may be noted. In the Indian case, we see a bitter competition for the leadership of the nationalist movement in the period 1890—1910 between two wings representing these two models. It was dramatised in a personal conflict between the two leaders Gokhale and Tilak. The eventual outcome was the victory of the traditional and cultural nationalism over liberal, secular nationalism. Likewise, in Sri Lanka, the 1950s saw a bitter conflict between religio-cultural Sinhalese nationalism and liberal nationalism fought in a different context when the masses had been enfranchised. Here the victory of cultural nationalism was even more overwhelming, with a decisive repudiation of the liberal model in 1956 and the fundamental social changes that followed. In the Malaysian case, a somewhat similar situation appeared in 1969, when an upsurge of cultural, ethnic nationalism led to the repudiation of a broadly liberal, secular nationalism that preceded it.

Thus whenever the tradition-oriented, religion — and culture — based forces of nationalism confronted liberal, secular and western models of nationalism, they have easily been able to knock the latter over. But a more complex problem arises where conflict develops between these cultural nationalisms that have to coexist within a nation-state. If the subcontinent of India were occupied exclusively by Aryan Hindus, or Sri Lanka was a totally Sinhalese Buddhist state, or Malaysia was

populated solely by Malay Muslims, then the traditional cultural forces would be very potent forces of national integration. The problem is that all these are multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-cultural societies which would be hard put to it to find foundations of a common culture and a common tradition. In the event, the era of traditional nationalism has been one of intensifying conflict in all these nation-states.

The greatest polarization and the most dramatic conflict took place in the Indian subcontinent. Two traditions, two cultures, two historical pasts confronted each other in the 20th century and the conflict could only be resolved by the partition of the subcontinent. The Islamic tradition separated itself out to form the nation-state of Pakistan, leaving the predominantly Hindu element as the foundation of the state of India. But this was not the end of the story. The Hindu/Muslim dichotomy was only one element in the traditional cleavages in Indian society. There were many others, both within the broad body of Hindu tradition as well as within the Islamic tradition and these were now to assert themselves.

Historical consciousness, consciousness of the identity of tradition feeds on itself and gathers momentum as it develops. What appear as blurred images, vaguely formed identities move into sharper focus as the process goes on. As the historical consciousness of a people becomes sharper, levels of identity and of separateness emerge. What appeared at one stage an integrating, unitary tradition can dissolve to reveal a multiplicity of traditions underneath it. Again the classic example of this would be the Indian case. Indian religious nationalists chose the Hindu ideal as the framework for the integration of the majority of Indians professing Hinduism. This introduced a tendency to look back at the past for inspiration and guidance. The past of various regional cultures in India became sharper and emerged as more powerful guiding and integrating factors. This was a great spur to regionalism which in turn strengthened the consciousness of a language-culture that had taken root and flourished in a region. In this way regionalism flourished and was given a further boost by the linguistic re-organization of the states of the Indian Union in 1956. Powerful regional cultures in India today are those that have lengthy historical traditions of independence and cultural achievement. Tamil, Telugu, Marathi, Punjabi and Bengali regional cultures have strong foundations for national identity of their own and some of them have emerged at various times to threaten national unity.

The case of Pakistan also provides a good illustration of the impermanence of a particular traditional framework in the development of nationhood. Pakistan was formed on the basis of an Islamic religious identity: that the Muslims of India were a separate nation and should be grouped into a separate nation state. In spite of the

almost insurmountable obstacles, the country was partitioned in a sea of blood and a nation-state came into existence composed of two historical entities in the northeast and northwest of India separated by over a thousand miles of hostile country. Only the bond of Islam held the two units together, which in the euphoria of the Islamic nationlist struggle of 1940—1947, appeared as lasting and permanent. Soon, however, other elements of tradition began to assert themselves. The most powerful of these was the language-culture identity. The more homogenous Bengali-speaking people of Pakistan began to discover that the religious and the cultural loyalties conflicted often and irreconcilably. They discovered that the cultural tradition that had been passed over in the religio-political movement was a stronger integrative factor for their people; that when the two loyalties conflicted, the cultural and linguistic identity gave them much greater emotional satisfaction than the religious. And when this was compounded by an economic exploitation from the western region, the stage was set for a most violent nationalist conflict with the government of Pakistan. The most recent of the nationalist movements of southern Asia resulted in the creation of a new nation in the Indian subcontinent, the state of Bangladesh. From the point of view of cultural tradition, this is perhaps the most integrated of South Asian nation states.

In Sri Lanka, the traditional culture orientation of nationalism also proved disintegrative of a territorial Ceylonese nationalism. The emergence of Buddhist Sinhalese nationalism in the 1950's triggered off a process of conflict. It was very exclusive, keeping out other communities in the state. It was a tradition of conflict and hegemony, of the assertion of Sinhalese supremacy over challenges from the other major community in the island, the Tamils. The inevitable result was the alienation of the Tamils and their exclusion from this form of nationalism. They went on to construct a traditional framework for their own nationalism and separatism. The hero figures among the Sinhalese were those who had successfully fought against the Tamils and repulsed their invasions. The fact that this happened after the achievement of independence complicated matters. In India the conflict between the Hindu and the Islamic traditions was sorted out before independence. In Sri Lanka the identification of the Ceylonese nation with Sinhalese nationalism occurred after independence, with no solution for the Tamils except the ultimate step of secession. Predictably, Tamil traditional nationalism grew in response to the strength of Sinhalese nationalism. A past was recreated of independent and individual existence in their own territorial homelands in the north and the east of the island. The identity was predominantly a linguistic and cultural identity with appeals to the antiquity and purity of Tamil culture and its implantation from very early times on Ceylonese soil.

Implicit here was the rejection of exclusive Sinhalese claims to the island as the home of the Buddhist faith. That is to say, there were two traditional nationalisms on this tiny island home.

Malaysia in this respect provides a different version of the problem of indigenous traditions. There is only one cultural tradition indigenous to the territory of the Malay peninsula and that is the Malay Islamic. The other traditions, such as the Chinese and the Indian, though old in themselves, are new to the territory of Malaysia. But this does not prevent the people, in their search for a traditional identity and a traditional nationalism, from reaching out across the seas for the culture of their original homelands. The liberal, non-sectarian, western model nationalism had the advantage of muting the tradition of each of the communities and thereby of playing down the differences and the separateness. When Malay nationalism began to strengthen itself by looking back to the roots of its traditional past, problems of national integration were raised. Separateness and differences were emphasised. The Malay cultural past was something the others could not identify with and merely served to remind them of a past that they had left behind in their countries of origin. Tradition thus functioned as disintegrative and fissiparious even more than in the other states discussed above, where diverse traditions had at least the quality of having existed in hostility or in isolation in the same territorial region for centuries. Here the traditions were strangers to each other, with no common links which could be seized upon to foster integration. This was the reason why tradition based nationalism had not been an important element of the political scene in Malaysia during the independence movement or for some years after independence.

It appears that tradition oriented nationalism poses different types of problems in colonially subject territories from those in independent nation states. When traditional cultural nationalism asserts itself in independent states, it may lead to the hegemony of one such tradition over others in the nation-state. This hegemony, or attempted hegemony, leads to stresses and strains within the state, of conflict and even of dismemberment of the state. However, in situations where more than one cultural tradition and the nationalistic upsurge that feeds on it can coexist peacefully, without the attempted imposition of one on the other, then a stage of equilibrium may be said to have been reached in that nation-state. The way may be paved for national integration by the removal of potentially disintegrative forces. It could be plausibly argued that India has reached this stage.

The retrogressive nature of cultural nationalism springs from its backward-looking character, its attempt to recreate a mythical past and to deny the changes that have taken place in the intervening years. This spurs it to attempt to establish hegemony systems as was possible

and was achieved in past history. The leaders of cultural nationalism face the impossible task of trying to match a mythological golden age with the realities of contemporary political and economic power and the balance of inter-communal and international forces. In its most extreme xenophobic form, it spends itself trying to achieve the impossible, creating a great deal of instability and unrest in the process. But when cultural nationalism is 'tamed' by some forms of radicalism or by progressive social philosophies, then their dynamism could be channelled in a reformist direction. It is possible to use the vertically integrative character of traditional culture to get an entire people to move towards meaningful goals in a state. The push towards change comes from below and is not imposed from above. This in turn can be utilized in the direction of national integration and social modernization.

In India, for example, Tilak, the leader of the traditional nationalist movement, had far more potential as a social reformer than did the liberal Gokhale, though unfortunately he did not choose to exert himself along these lines. Mahatma Gandhi achieved a great deal in the change of attitudes towards untouchability by working through the framework of tradition.

The achievement of power and the confrontation with the realities of the exercise of power also 'tames' cultural nationalism and moderates its aims. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (D. M. K.) in India was for long potentially secessionist movement threatening the unity of the Indian republic. The attainment of political power by this party in the state of Tamilnadu in 1967 diverted its attention to the operation of a political system and to attaining its cultural and nationalist goals through this system. After two successive administrations, it has successfully achieved these goals, removed some of the major causes of grievance and has in fact settled down as part of the establishment in an all-India context. The same could also be said, with some modifications, about the force of Sinhalese cultural nationalism in Sri Lanka. It won power in 1956, enacted some major reforms achieving its aims, failed in others, and spent itself in the process. It was subsequently moderated by Marxist socialist forces, which infiltrated this nationalist movement and took over its leadership. Its aims were thus modified, and economic and social goals took precedence over cultural and religious revival.

The dynamism of a cultural tradition in the modern state is difficult to gauge. It lies beneath the surface and one cannot estimate the depth of its roots. Quite often when traditionalist nationalist movements surface, their intensity is breath-taking. It is important, though disconcerting, to note that in almost all the phenomena of traditional cultural nationalism noted above, the movements took contemporaries by surprise and swept all before them.

NOTES

1. Some examples of these are: Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Vertra *ed. Political Culture and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, 1965; David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, University of Chicago Press, 1965; Clifford Geertz *ed., Old Societies and New States*, The Free Press, 1963; Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India*, University of Chicago Press, 1967.

2. The large corpus of published writings and speeches of S. N. Bannerjea, G. K. Gokhale and M. G. Ranade are full of these ideas. Significant excerpts from these are provided in Wm. Theodore de Bary, *Sources of Indian Tradition*, Columbia University Press, pp. 673 - 703.

3. This interpretation is broadly agreed upon by all our commentators on the Ceylonese political process. See e. g. Howard W. Wriggins, *Ceylon: The Dilemmas of a New Nation*, Princeton University Press, 1960 *passim*; R. N. Kearney, *Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon*, Duke University Press, 1967, pp. 20 - 40; S. Arasaratnam, *Ceylon*, Prentice Hall, 1964, pp. 1 - 20.

4. The main authority on this period, while emphasising the importance of communalism below the surface, notes the integrative role of the Alliance. K. J. Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya*, O. U. P., 1965, pp. 209 - 215.

5. An abundant literature exists on the ideas of this nationalism. The original writings of its innovators can be seen in brief in de Bary, *Sources of Indian Tradition*, pp. 705 - 732. Interpretative writings include B. Majumdar, *Militant Nationalism in India and its Socio-religious Background*, Calcutta; A. Tripathi, *The Extremist Challenge*, Orient Longmans; D. Argov, *Moderates and Extremists in the Indian Nationalist Movement*, Asia Publishing House; S. Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale*, University of California Press.

THE ROYAL CONSECRATION IN MEDIEVAL SRI LANKA: THE PROBLEM OF VIKRAMABĀHU I AND GAJABĀHU II

Sirima Kiribamune
Sr. Lecturer in History
University of Sri Lanka

Vikramabāhu I (1111—1132) and Gajabāhu II (1132—1153)[1] are two of the problem kings of Sri Lanka. The two of them, father and son, ruled without the royal consecration and the problem that confronts us is why this had to be so.

It is rather unfortunate that we do not have a single literary work dealing with the political and legal institutions of ancient Sri Lanka. The rules and regulations which governed institutions such as kingship have to be gleaned from the actual practices noticed in historical sources and chance statements made in them. By the twelfth century A. D., the period to which Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhu II belong, kingship was a well-established institution. From the less pretentious position of a chieftain in a limited territorial region, kingship had over the centuries acquired new dimensions in pomp and pageantry, in nature and functions. The not infrequent palace coups and wars of succession recorded in the chronicles of Sri Lanka suggest that there were differences of opinion regarding eligibility for kingship. It would seem that the rules were changed at times to suit certain situations and interested parties. However, there seems to have been, at least in the twelfth century, a rock base of accepted opinion as to the pre-requisite conditions for the acknowledgement of a legal monarch. The non-fulfilment of these conditions did not preclude a ruler's right to rule and wield authority, but it seems to have denied him a certain legality. Such monarchs appear to have been precluded from the royal consecration at which presumably a new consecratory title was conferred on them and a fresh regnal year proclaimed. There were only two consecratory titles in use, Siri Sangabo and Abhā Salamevan and they alternated with every fresh consecration. It would seem that an unconsecrated

ruler could use one of the above titles, provided he continued to use the same title as his predecessor, for the alternative title could only be conferred on consecration. Similarly the regnal year which he was entitled to use was that of the last consecrated ruler. In other words it would be the Siri Sangabo year or the Abhā Salamevan year that would be current, depending on which title was conferred at the last royal consecration. It is only on the basis of these assumptions that one can explain why Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhu II who wielded full authority as kings of Polonnaruva, were denied consecration and were forced into the situation of using the regnal years of Jayabāhu I (1110—1111) to date their records.

At this point it might be useful to state briefly the circumstances relating to the accession of Vikramabāhu I and the political climate which prevailed during his reign and during that of his son and successor Gajabāhu II. Consequent to the expulsion of the Coḷas, Vijayabāhu I (1055—1110) effected the political unification of the island. His brother Jayabāhu was the recognized heir to the throne and Vikramabāhu, the son of Vijayabāhu I was given the title of Ādipāda and entrusted with the administration of the province of Rohaṇa. The basic assumption in this scheme was that Jayabāhu would succeed Vijayabāhu I and that Vikramabāhu would be next in the line of succession. However, this scheme was set aside by Jayabāhu's sister Mittā and her three sons, Mānābharaṇa, Kittisirimegha and Srī Vallabha. On the death of Vijayabāhu I they placed Jayabāhu on the throne (no departure from the original scheme so far) and Mānābharaṇa and not Vikramabāhu was recognized as the next in the line of succession. Vikramabāhu who naturally took objection to this, fought against Jayabāhu and the sons of Mittā and conquered Polonnaruva. In the process he lost both Rohaṇa and the province of Dakkhiṇadesa to Mānābharaṇa and his brothers, who ruled them independently of Polonnaruva. It is to this depleted kingdom of Polonnaruva that Gajabāhu later succeeded.

For the problem at hand, the most pertinent question which arises from the events tabulated above is—what were the compelling factors or what would have been the arguments used in favour of Mānābharaṇa as against Vikramabāhu? The opinion expressed in the *Cūḷavaṁsa*, the main chronicle dealing with the history of this period, is that they were flouting former custom in recognising Mānābharaṇa as the heir to the throne after Jayabāhu.[2] Inheritance through one's mother's brother is an essential characteristic of a matriarchal society, and such tendencies are not completely absent in Sri Lanka during this period. However, it would not have been possible to push this line of argument without precedent, the customary law of succession being along the paternal line. Also, if mother-right was the argument in favour of Mānābharaṇa, his claims should have been advanced over

those of Jayabāhu as well. It would seem that the operative factors have gone unrecorded. These factors, whatever they were, were sufficiently cogent to deny Vikramabāhu and his son Gajabāhu the status of consecrated monarchs, despite their gaining the throne of Polonnaruva.

That Vikramabāhu I was not consecrated is specifically stated in the *Cūḷavaṁsa*.[3] Mānābharaṇa of Dakkhiṇadesa and his brothers ruling Rohaṇa are made to express the view that Vikramabāhu's position at Polonnaruva was illegal as he was not a consecrated monarch.[4] The Chronicle, however, is silent on the question of Gajabāhu II's consecration. He is said to have taken possession of the kingdom (*hathagathaṁ katvā*)[5] after the death of Vikramabāhu I. This does not convey the conviction that Gajabāhu's was an acceptable succession. It is perhaps worth noting that neither the *Pūjāvaliya*[6] nor the *Rājāvaliya*[7] mention Gajabāhu II in their king lists.

The epigraphical records of Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhu II provide the best proof that they did not enjoy complete status as sovereign rulers. Inscriptions belonging to their reigns are invariably dated in the regnal years of Jayabāhu I, wherever it was considered necessary to do so. (There are some undated inscriptions too of Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhu II). Jayabāhu did not rule for long at Polonnaruva, for Vikramabāhu took to the field soon after the former's accession. But there are inscriptions dated in the eighth,[8] twenty-third,[9] twenty-fourth,[10] twenty-seventh[11], thirty-fifth[12], thirty-eighth[13], fortieth[14] and forty-third[15] years of Jayabāhu's reign.

Among the regnal years of Jayabāhu I noticed above, the eighth year occurs in two inscriptions from Budumuttava, a place in Dakkhiṇadesa which was the principality of Mānābharaṇa. Mānābharaṇa had fought against Vikramabāhu and had set himself up as an independent ruler in this province, usually enjoyed by the heir to the throne or the Mahādipāda. One of the inscriptions at Budumuttava records a donation to the god Vikkirama Calāmega Īsvara of Vikkirama Calāmegapura. The practice of naming cities and temples after the rulers who founded or patronised them is quite common in both South India and Sri Lanka. The only contemporary king with the Vikrama name was Vikramabāhu I and if he is the ruler referred to as Vikrama Calāmega, it would appear that he enjoyed some measure of recognition in this region. Two other kings who had the name Vikrama are known to have had partial control of the country during the period of the Coḷa occupation, prior to Vikramabāhu I.[16] It could be argued that this shrine was perhaps named after one of them. This, however, is unlikely because Sinhalese rule was limited to Rohaṇa during this period and Budumuttava is a village in the Kurunegala district.

The other inscription from Budumuttava records an order issued by the five chiefs of Vīrabāhu devar who can be identified with Mānā-

bharaṇa. This confirms the view that the locality in question was in fact under Mānābharaṇa. That Vikramabāhu was ruling at Polonnaruva in what would have been the eighth regnal year of Jayabāhu is fairly clear from the evidence at our disposal. A Tamil inscription found at Polonnaruva indicates quite specifically that the 15th year of Gajabāhu corresponds to the 38th year of Jayabāhu.[17] According to the *Cūḷavaṁsa* Vikramabāhu I occupied the throne for 21 years,[18] thus leaving Jayabāhu only a two year regnal period. Therefore Vikramabāhu I would have been ruling at Polonnaruva in the so-called eighth year of Jayabāhu I.

Thus the Budumuttava inscriptions introduce us to a rather peculiar situation in Dakkhiṇadesa. The province governed by Mānābharaṇa is independent to all intents and purposes but concedes a certain amount of recognition to the ruler at Polonnaruva. But despite this the official scheme of dating is not in the regnal years of the current ruler at Polonnaruva, Vikramabāhu I, but in the regnal years of the ruler he had deposed, Jayabāhu I. It cannot be argued that the practice may have been continued because Jayabāhu was still alive, for although the death of Jayabāhu is announced in the reign of Vikramabāhu I,[19] the regnal years of Jayabāhu continue to appear even in inscriptions of Gajabāhu II.

Not many inscriptions of Vikramabāhu I have come to light. One which is a record of his queen Sundaramahādevi,[20] is fragmentary and no date occurs in the sections that can be read. Yet another inscription[21] which belongs to the reign of Vikramabāhu I and which is in fact an immunity grant made by him is dated in the regnal year twenty-three without any indication as to whose regnal year is meant. At the beginning of the inscription Vikramabāhu is introduced with a number of grandiose epithets. Next the purpose of the record is stated and lastly the date is given as the full moon day of Asela in the twenty-third year. In normal circumstances this year should be taken as the regnal year of the king who was responsible for the inscription. Paranavitana who has edited this inscription takes it as that and gets into serious difficulties. If a record has been dated in the twenty-third year of Vikramabāhu I, the dates in *Cūḷavaṁsa* (twenty one years for Vikramabāhu) have to be set aside as unreliable. But it would be more reasonable to assume that the date in the present record is a date in the regnal year in current use as in the Budumuttava inscriptions. As suggested earlier[22] Jayabāhu I would have been set aside in his second regnal year. Therefore the twenty-third year of Jayabāhu would correspond to the last year or twenty first year of Vikramabāhu. Thus there would be no conflict with the dates given in the *Cūḷavaṁsa*. If on the other hand one were to accept Paranavitana's interpretation that Vikramabāhu was on the throne in his twenty-third regnal year, we have to assume that Jayabāhu I was removed almost immediately after his accession.

As mentioned earlier,[23] an inscription at Polonnaruva states that the thirty-eighth year of Jayabāhu corresponds to the fifteenth year of Gajabāhu II. This would give twenty-three years to both Jayabāhu and Vikramabāhu. Therefore on Paranavitana's reckoning Vikramabāhu's accession would have taken place in the very first year of Jayabāhu I. This is not impossible but somewhat improbable. According to the information in the *Cūḷavaṁsa* Vikramabāhu was taken completely unawares by the coup-d'etat at Polonnaruva. Vijayabāhu I had died, the consecration of Jayabāhu had taken place and the armies of Polonnaruva were on their way to the South to forestall Vikramabāhu when the latter was alerted.[24] Vikramabāhu's was not a straight march to Polonnaruva. Six engagements were fought before reaching the capital city.[25] A certain length of time has to be allowed for these events making it very unlikely that the first year of Jayabāhu I corresponded to the first year of Vikramabāhu I. In the light of all this the irresistible conclusion is that the twenty-third regnal year in the immunity grant of Vikramabāhu I is a date in the regnal year of Jayabāhu I, this being the official scheme of dating in current use. Therefore one cannot agree with Paranavitana that we have here an instance where the regnal years of Vikramabāhu were used for purposes of dating.

The above position is further strengthened by an inscription belonging to the reign of Gajabāhu II, dated in the 40th year.[26] Unlike in the last inscription where the date occurs at the end of the record, in this instance the date is given at the very beginning. It starts off with "Srī, the 40th year" and there is no clue as to whose 40th year is meant. The inscription records a grant made by a palanquin-bearer of the Agampaḍi community of Gajabāhu. There is absolutely no doubt that the record belongs to the reign of Gajabāhu and by no stretch of one's imagination can it be assumed that Gajabāhu reigned for 40 years. The inevitable conclusion is that the date is in the regnal year of Jayabāhu I (this would correspond to the 17th year of Gajabāhu) for that was the official scheme of dating during this period.

That dates reckoned in the regnal years of these two rulers were not acceptable for official purposes is brought out clearly in the Tamil Pillar Inscription at Polonnaruva cited earlier.[27] Here it is stated that the record was issued in the 15th year of Gajabāhu, but the date that is mentioned first is the 38th year of Jayabāhu. This would have been necessary if the regnal years of Gajabāhu sufficed for official purposes.

The Budumuttava inscriptions made it clear that in Dakkhiṇadesa the regnal years of Jayabāhu I were used for purposes of dating in spite of the fact that Vikramabāhu was ruling at Polonnaruva. That the same practice was current in Rohaṇa, the independent province of

the South, is proved by the Kaṭagamuva inscription.[28] This is dated in the 35th year of Jayabāhu (this would be the 12th regnal year of Gajabāhu) and records a grant by King Mānābharaṇa. Katagamuva (about 3 miles to the west of Situlpahuva), in the Southern Province is located in what would have been the Province of Rohaṇa. That Mānābharaṇa of Rohaṇa was a contemporary of Gajabāhu II can be established from the evidence in the *Cūḷavaṁsa*. Therefore we find that the common practice adopted both in Dakkhiṇadesa and Rohaṇa was to ignore the regnal years of both Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhu II and to use the regnal years of Jayabāhu I, the last consecrated ruler of Polonnaruva.

That the regnal dates of Jayabāhu were the only valid dates for the periods of Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhu II find further corroboration in an inscription belonging to Sundara Mahādevi, who calls herself the queen of Vikramabāhu and the mother of Gajabāhu. This record is dated in the 27th year of Jayabāhu.[29]

An inscription dated in the 43rd year of Jayabāhu mentions a grant made by Gajabāhu and subsequently confirmed by Mānābharaṇa.[30] This seems to be a spurious record[31] but the date and contents show that there is some historical basis to it. The 43rd regnal year of Jayabāhu would correspond to the 20th year of Gajabāhu, who according to the *Cūḷavaṁsa* had a 22 year regnal period.[32] Mānābharaṇa of Rohaṇa is known to have taken temporary control of Polonnaruva on two occasions, once during the tail end of Gajabāhu II's reign and again after his death. It would seem that the contents of this record refer to the first occasion when Mānābharaṇa took control of Polonnaruva.[33]

The dated records belonging to the reign of Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhu II are spread throughout a period extending from about the 6th year of Vikramabāhu's reign to almost the end of the reign of Gajabāhu II. Among them there is only one instance when the regnal year of Gajabāhu is mentioned but that its validity was not recognised is clear from the fact that it is preceded by a date in Jayabāhu's regnal years. It would follow that both rulers lacked legal status. Vikramabāhu I was denied the royal consecration according to the *Cūḷavaṁsa* and there is no doubt that Gajabāhu II suffered the same privation.

Here it may be relevant to draw attention to an official designated "saṁvaccharika-nāyaka" in the *Cūḷavaṁsa*. At a time when the Sinhalese were experimenting with various leaders to rid the country of Coḷa domination, the Saṁvaccharika-nāyaka is said to have made known to the minister Buddharāja that prince Kitti (later Vijayabāhu I; 1055—1110) who was eligible for the throne was available and should be protected.[34] Paranavitana translates 'saṁvaccharika-nāyaka' as 'Chief

of Calendar'.[35] That this officer played a key role in the choice of a suitable prince to rule the island is very significant, for the announcement of a fresh regnal year was closely tied up with the legality of the succession.

Another noticeable feature is that the commonly used royal titles Siri Saṅgabodhi and Silāmeghavanna (Salamevan) are never directly associated with either Vikramabāhu I or Gajabāhu II. These titles are noticed in the historical sources of Sri Lanka from about the fifth century A. D. the evidence being clearer and more plentiful after the eighth century A. D.[36] It is very probable that they were conferred at the *abhiṣeka* or consecration. Jayabāhu I predictably is given the title in two Tamil inscriptions.[37] In all the other records where Jayabāhu's name is used for dating he is referred to as Jayabāhudeva,[38] Jayabāhu-devayanvahanse[39] or Jayabāhu-vathimiyanvahanse.[40] These instances make it quite clear that even though entitled to them, rulers did not necessarily use these titles in their records nor were they invariably referred to by them in contemporary inscriptions. Therefore the fact that neither Vikramabāhu nor Gajabāhu are specifically referred to by these titles does not necessarily prove that they were not entitled to them. The only evidence of a more positive nature is provided by the Māṅkanai inscription[41] where in the same record Jayabāhu is given the title Abhaya Salāmegha and Gajabāhu and Mānābharaṇa (the ruler of Rohaṇa) are referred to as Gajabāhu-tevar and Mānābaraṇa-tevar respectively. It could be argued that the author of the inscription who, according to the contents of the record, was a beneficiary at the hands of Gajabāhu, would not have even inadvertently omitted the Silāmegha or Sirisaṅgabo title, if Gajabāhu was entitled to either of them, especially in view of the fact that Jayabāhu whose regnal years are used to date the inscription is given the title Abhaya Salāmegha.

Earlier in this paper it was suggested that the deity, Vikkirama Calāmegha Iśvara and the city, Vikkirama Calāmeghapura were named after Vikramabāhu I.[42] The practice of using royal titles to name religious institutions is not uncommon. The *Cūḷavaṁsa* states that Kassapa V erected a building known as the Silameghapabbata in the Abhayagiri vihara.[43] Confirmation of this is to be had from an inscription at Anuradhapura.[44] The same inscription bears testimony to the adoption of the Salamevan title by Kassapa V. This therefore is an instance where the king's title is conferred on a religious building constructed by him. Closer to our period we have an inscription dated in the 24th year of Jayabāhu (this would in fact belong to the reign of Gajabāhu II) which records a grant made to the Brahmanas of the Jayaṅkoṇa Calāmeka Caturveti-maṅkalam. The inscription was found about four miles from Mihintale indicating an establishment close to Anuradhapura. This institution was no doubt named after Jayabāhu who is known

to have had the Salāmegha title. It has been suggested that this was the same as the Vijayaraja Caturvedi maṅgalam of the period of Vijayabāhu I, re-named during the reign of Jayabāhu I[45]. That the name continued to be used during the reign of Gajabāhu II is not strange, as Jayabāhu's name and regnal years were currently in use for official purposes. From this evidence it would be patently clear that Vikkirama Calāmega Isvara and Vikkirama Calāmegapura were named after a ruler who had the Vikrama name and Calāmega (Salamevan) title[46]

The identification of Vikkirama Calāmega with Vikramabāhu I necessarily means that he was entitled to use the Salamevan title. This would seem strange because the two titles Siri Saṅgabo and Salamevan alternated with every succession. Vijayabāhu I had the title Siri Saṅgabo[47] and Jayabāhu who followed him adopted the Salamevan title. Therefore Vikramabāhu I, if he was entitled to one of them, should have had the title, Siri Saṅgabo. Vikramabāhu was a rebel and had forced Jayabāhu to vacate the throne. It cannot be contended that Vikramabāhu adopted the title in defiance of Jayabāhu for both he and Gajabāhu seem to have acquiesced in the position that they were not entitled to certain privileges. They and members of their family did not defy the rule that official dates should be in the regnal years of the last consecrated monarch. That Vikramabāhu would have used the title Salamevan in defiance has to be ruled out.

In these circumstances the only possible explanation is that an unconsecrated ruler could use one or other of the official titles, provided it was the one that was last recognised. This would suggest that the title was in some way linked with the official chronological scheme. Current regnal periods were perhaps considered in terms of either the Siri Saṅgabo era or the Salamevan era[48] and rulers who were not entitled to the royal consecration although unable to announce a fresh era and a fresh title accompanying it, were expected to continue recognising the Salamevan or Siri Saṅgabo era, whichever was current at the time of their accession. With this perhaps was linked the possibility of using the current official title. It is only in these terms that one can explain the possible use of the Salamevan title by Vikramabāhu I. Such an assumption must, however, remain tentative until we have direct evidence to show that Vikramabāhu I in fact used an official title. The present evidence is of a somewhat indirect nature where a king's titles are conferred on a city and a deity and the evidence which suggests that the king in question was Vikramabāhu I is circumstantial.

That Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhu II did not enjoy full official status and were not consecrated monarchs is further confirmed by the fact that there are no extant coins issues by either of them. Numerous

coins issued by the monarchs of Polonnaruva have come to light and it cannot be assumed that the coins of these two monarchs were singled out for destruction or have escaped detection.

As far as the *de facto* position of the two rulers was concerned, it must be pointed out that the above disabilities did not seriously undermine their authority to rule. Both rulers are referred to by the usual royal epithets that were in use during this period, the most common being devayan[49] or devayanvahanse[50]. This term, used for consecrated kings and even provincial rulers carries no distinction. Apart from this, Vikramabāhu I is referred to as 'Laṅkesvara' (Lord of Lanka)[51] and Gajabāhu II is given a more prestigious title—"anasakviti"[52] (one whose authority spreads over the entire universe). Vikramabāhu's right to the throne is never questioned by the *Cūḷavaṁsa* and Gajabāhu in one of his inscriptions claims the right to the throne by descent "parapuren himi raja pamaṇuvā siti".[53] Both rulers are known to make land grants[54] which were obviously legally valid, their commands in this connection being referred to by the legal term "vyavasthā". In the Kapuruvadu Oya inscription,[55] Gajabāhu is seen enjoying all the trappings of executive authority. He sits in the Citrakūṭamaṇḍapa or Assembly Hall, surrounded by his ministers, performing the functions of royal office and making royal proclamations for whatever was deemed necessary.

In the light of the above facts the *de jure* position of Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhu II becomes even more bewildering. There was obviously a very strong reason why they were denied the consecration with the attendant privileges to take on a fresh throne name, inaugurate a new regnal year and issue coins. Whatever the customary law was that was operative in this connection, it was sufficiently well entrenched and had perhaps gained a certain sanctity that the kings of this period neither could flout it nor did they even try to, except perhaps in one instance.[56]

The qualifications for kingship are at times set out explicitly in our sources but more often they are implicit in certain situations. The cases of Vikramabāhu and Gajabāhu could be tested against these criteria and by a process of elimination it might be possible to find out the reasons behind the predicament of these two rulers.

Prince Parākramabāhu, when he announced his intention to unify the island, is reported to have stated that his three fathers (Mānābharaṇa, his father and his two paternal uncles, Kittisirimegha and Sri Vallabha) and his mother's brother, Vikramabāhu I, ruled the country like *gāmabhojakas* (village chiefs) unable to unite the country and abandoning the desire for royal consecration (*abhiṣekha*).[57] The implication here seems to be that these rulers were denied the 'abiṣekha'

because they did not wield authority over the entire island. This, however, is not a tenable position. There is reason to believe that at least Vikramabāhu I was recognised as the chief monarch of the island by his contemporaries in Dakkhiṇadesa and Rohaṇa. The possible extension of his authority over Dakkhiṇadesa has already been noticed.[58] That the king of Polonnaruva had a nominal status over the rulers of the other principalities is implicit in a statement by the latter that it was no disgrace to have Vikramabāhu, who was older than they, in the chief kingdom but that they should oppose Gajabāhu, who was a youngster.[59] Even if one concedes that Vikramabāhu did not have authority over the entire island, this would not have debarred him from the consecration. We have with us the classic example of Jayabāhu I whose legal position is in no doubt. When he ascended the throne, disregarding the claims of Vikramabāhu to the post of Mahādipāda, he did not have authority over Rohaṇa, the principality of Vikramabāhu. One might also mention that consecrated kings who ruled parts of Sri Lanka are particularly noticed in the post-Polonnaruva period. Therefore it cannot be said that authority over a united Sri Lanka was a *sine quo non* for the royal consecration.

That a monarch, to be acceptable, should be born of royal parents of equal birth is implied in many situations noticed in the chronicles of Sri Lanka. A case in point is that of Sotthisena, the son of Mahānāma who was set aside by his sister Saṃghā, the daughter of the Mahesi or chief queen—the reason being that the former was born of a Tamil lady.[60] The case of Kassapa I is yet another instance where having a mother of unequal birth was considered a disqualification.[61] Neither Vikramabāhu nor Gajabāhu fall into this category, the former being the son of Vijayabāhu I and his Kalinga queen, Tilokasundarī[62] and the latter the son of Vikramabāhu and his queen Sundaramahādevī.[63]

Harking back to certain early episodes in the *Mahāvaṃsa* relating to rulers such as Vijaya and Paṇḍuvāsudeva, a consort of equal status was considered necessary for the royal consecration.[64] This could not have been a difficult proposition for either of the two monarchs. In fact Vikramabāhu I's queen Sundara-mahādevī is described as one who was descended from the Ikṣvāku dynasty and the family of Suddhodana and as one who belonged to the Solar line of kings.[65]

"Āpā Mahayā siri vinda pilivela sey rajva"—'having enjoyed the good fortune of being āpā and mahayā, thus attaining kingship in due order'[66] is a claim often made by rulers who set out their right to the throne. Vikramabāhu is known to have enjoyed the title of āpa[67] but the title of Mahapā or Mahayā, usually given to the heir to the throne was denied him. However, we have many examples of rulers who were consecrated without this formality. To mention only two instances, there was Sāhasamalla,[68] who was invited over from

Kaliṅga after the death of his brother Nissaṁkamalla and Kalyānavatī,[69] his queen, who owed her position to a minister who acted as king-maker. Neither of them had the opportunity of enjoying the position of äpa or mahapā. The reasons behind the plight of Vikramabāhu and Gajabāhu still seem elusive.

Yet another problem which needs to be commented on is the fact that neither Vikramabāhu nor Gajabāhu had custody of the Tooth and the Alms Bowl Relics of the Buddha. An inscription which can definitely be dated to the period after Vijayabāhu I and more approximately to the period of political confusion on the eve of the accession of Vikramabāhu I states that the Tooth Relic was entrusted to a group of Velaikkaras for its protection. Those responsible for this act were the ministers of state and the monk Mugalan of Uttaramūla.[70] According to the *Cūḷavaṁsa*, the Tooth and Alms Bowl Relics of the Buddha were removed to Rohaṇa by the Buddhist monks because of the anti-Buddhist activities of Vikramabāhu. It would seem that the Relics were in Polonnaruva at the time Vikramabāhu captured the throne. Whether he attempted to take custody of them and failed is a problem which cannot be settled in the present state of our knowledge. The Relics remained in the custody of the Rohaṇa rulers until they were secured by Parākramabāhu I. During the intervening period Mānābharaṇa of Rohaṇa tried to establish himself at Polonnaruva and brought the Relics with him, perhaps with the idea of buttressing his claims.[71] Later on Parākramabāhu I waged a protracted war in Rohaṇa, a major consideration in it being the securing of the Relics. There is no doubt that during this period the custody of the Tooth and Bowl Relics of the Buddha gave added prestige and perhaps even legitimacy to a ruler but it cannot be maintained that without them, the consecration of a ruler was not possible. Parākramabāhu, according to the *Cūḷavaṁsa* was consecrated twice, the first time when he took over the kingdom of Polonnaruva consequent to the death of Gajabāhu[72] and the second time after he had defeated Mānābharaṇa who had challenged his position and taken temporary control of Polonnaruva.[73] It was only after both these events that he was able to secure the Relics.[74] This makes it amply clear that the absence of the Tooth and Bowl Relics of the Buddha would not have stood in the way of the consecration of either Vikramabāhu or Gajabāhu.

In two of his inscriptions, Nissaṁkamalla (1187—1196) addresses his mind to the problem of eligibility for kingship. He of course is dealing with a peculiar political situation where he and his dynasty faced opposition from various, factions both local and foreign. Therefore, the rules laid down by him were no doubt tailored to meet his own situation. Nevertheless they might shed some light on the accepted principles relating to kingship during this time. The inscribed records of Nissaṁka-

malla make it quite clear that he was looking out for popularity for himself and his dynasty and therefore he might not be expected to promulgate rules and regulations which were contrary to customary practice.

The Galpota inscription of Nissaṁkamalla[75] lays down that after the demise of a king, his children who held the titles of āpā and mahapā should be considered for the throne. The position is slightly different in his inscription at the north gate of Polonnaruva.[76] This opens the door to all royal princes, failing the *yuvaraja* or the heir to the throne. Vikramabāhu and Gajabāhu do not stand disqualified on this score. Both inscriptions agree that in the absence of royal princes, the choice should fall on the queens. The two other points on which these two epigraphs agree are: (1) members of the Govikula should not be considered for kingship and (2) non-Buddhist rulers such as Coḷas and Pāṇḍyas (Coḷas and Keraḷas in the inscription at the North Gate) should not be placed on the throne. The inscription at the North Gate adds that this should be so as the country belongs to Buddhism.

There is no question that Vikramabāhu and Gajabāhu belonged to the royal family which claimed to be of the Kṣatriya caste, and so the strictures placed on the Govikula should not apply to them. As for the second objection, these two rulers were neither Pāṇḍyas, Coḷas nor Keraḷas. Here one should not, however, miss the point that these people were disqualified not because they were foreign, for in that case Nissaṁkamalla himself was a foreign prince, but because they were not Buddhists, and Sri Lanka, asserts one record, belongs to Buddhism. Could this be of any relevance to the problem at hand? Was Nissaṁkamalla only appealing to popular emotion in order to deal with a situation peculiar to his time? Or were there time-honoured strictures against non-Buddhists who attempted to gain the throne of Sri Lanka?

That kingship was closely tied up with Buddhism is a point that cannot be easily missed even by one who takes a cursory look at the sources relating to the early history of Sri Lanka. This association seems to have been of significance even for the consecration ceremony. The Jetavanārama slab inscription of Mahinda IV[77] states that it was decreed by the Buddha that those who were not Bodhisatvas[78] will not be kings of Sri Lanka. It goes on to say that kingship was bestowed on a person by the community of bhikkhus for the purpose of defending the religion of the Buddha and that at the time of consecration the king ties a white scarf, signifying the attention he would pay to the community of monks.[79] There is also the instance of Vijayabāhu I whose consecration takes place in the hall which housed the Tooth Relic of the Buddha and the statement that he placed the throne

on his head at the request of the Sangha.[80] From this evidence it would seem that Buddhist monks played a prominent part in the inauguration of a ruler. We often find the Chronicles labouring the point that the king's main duty was to protect the people and Buddhism[81] and they do not tire of listing the services rendered to Buddhism, by individual rulers. Similar sentiments are often expressed in the inscriptions as well.[82] A statement in the Dāṭhāvamsa might also be relevant in this connection. Parakkama, the general who helped Līlāvatī to ascend the throne for the third time (1210—1211) is said to have trained (with a view to kingship) a Pāṇḍyan prince named Madhurinda in the arts and made him conversant with the doctrines of Buddhism.[83] It is very likely that this prince was not born a Buddhist and Parakkama who was aware of the strictures imposed on non-Buddhist aspirants to the throne of Sri Lanka tried to remedy the situation in his own way. The underlying assumption in all these statements is that the king was expected to be a Buddhist by religion. Thus Nissaṅkamalla was only emphasising the point—no doubt in the interest of his dynasty—when he raised the cry that Pāṇḍyas, Coḷas and Keraḷas should not be considered for the throne because they were non-Buddhists.

From this arises two questions (1) Were Vikramabāhu and Gajabāhu not Buddhists? (2) If so, could they have been denied consecration on this count?

Vikramabāhu was the son of Tilokasundarī, a foreign princess, chief queen of Vijayabahu I.[84] Although there is no direct reference to her religious learnings, there are certain indications that she was perhaps not a Buddhist. The *Cūḷavaṁsa* states that she broke the rule which made Buddhist monasteries places of refuge and for this offence she was deprived of all her revenues and was led out of the city by her neck. In this way the king is said to have appeased the community of monks.[85] For the chief queen to have been so disgraced in order that the monks be placated, it is very likely that she was not only a non-Buddhist but also that her actions were directed against Buddhism. Furthermore, the *Cūḷavaṁsa* while summing up the reign of Vijayabāhu I lists the Buddhist works of the ruler and adds to it certain Buddhist monuments put up by the *yuvaraja* and by one of his daughters, Yasodhara. There is no mention of anything uudertaken by his queens or his other children. In the circumstances there was every chance for Vikramabāhu to have come under the influence of his mother. If her disgrace had made any impression on his mind, he could not have harboured very kindly thoughts towards the community of Buddhist monks.

Direct evidence which confirms the above deductions is not lacking. The *Cūḷavaṁsa* has a somewhat lengthy account of the privations

suffered by the Buddhist monks and their monasteries at the hands of Vikramabāhu. It is said that temple lands were given over to those who were in his service and monasteries in the capital city were made the dwelling places of foreign soldiers. The wealth that had been offered to the Tooth and Bowl Relics, the king is supposed to have used as he pleased and because of all this the monks are said to have removed the Relics to Rohaṇa.[86] Obviously they did not expect Vikramabāhu to grant due honour to the Relics. All this smacks of a non-Buddhist ruler, but for some unknown reason the *Cūḷavaṁsa* is reluctant to make this admission. The furthest it goes is to say that Vikramabāhu and his associates were behaving like heretics (titthiya tulyānaṁ) when they harmed the Buddhist religion.

The inscriptional evidence supports the position taken up in the preceding discussion that Vikramabāhu was not a Buddhist. To cite the negative evidence first, there is no contemporary record of any Buddhist monument or even a grant to a Buddhist institution which can be credited to Vikramabāhu. On the other hand, the second inscription at Budumuttāva shows that a Śaiva temple was named after him.[88] This alone is no proof that Vikramabāhu was a Hindu for even good Buddhists like Vijayabāhu I lent their names to Śaiva monuments.[89] Evidence of a more direct nature is found in the Kahambiliyāva slab inscription of Vikramabāhu.[90] The king's virtues and prowess are described in a number of epithets. Among them are two epithets of a religious significance — "Pārvati-pati-dattāsir-vīra-mahā-vṛṣa", 'the heroic great bull who has been given the blessings of the husband of Parvati (Siva) and "Rāja Nārāyana", 'a king like unto Vishnu'. Both have very clear Hindu associations. It is also significant that none of the epithets applied to Vikramabāhu in this record have the slightest connection with Buddhism. It is fairly clear from the evidence cited so far that Vikramabāhu I was not a Buddhist.

Gajabāhu II seems to have been somewhat of an eclectic person. Practising the traditional policy of toleration usually followed by the rulers of Sri Lanka, he gave his patronge to both Buddhism and Hinduism and the many records of his reign show that both these religions were freely patronised by private individuals as well. Foremost among the Buddhist devotees of his time was his mother Sundaramahādevī, the chief queen of Vikramabāhu I.[91] The king's own patronage of Buddhism is attested to by contemporary records. A grant made to a Buddhist temple at Polonnaruva is the subject of a Tamil inscription.[92] Although the position is not very clear, this was possibly a royal grant for, the inscription is wound up with the statement that whoever acted contrary to this would be disobeying the orders of the king. The Ruvanvalisaya at Anuradhapura also shares in the munificence of the king, being in receipt of a land grant.[93] Gajabāhu held the

Buddhist Sangha in high esteem, so much so that his political rivals enlisted its support when they wished to come to terms with him. Mānābharaṇa of Rohaṇa came to Gajabāhu in the company of Buddhist monks when he wished to enter into an alliance with him.[94] Gajabāhu himself sought the help of the Sangha when he was driven to dire straits by the armies of Parākramabāhu in order to reach a settlement with the latter.[95] The agreement itself was said to have been inscribed on a stone at Maṇḍalagiri Vihāra,[96] a copy of which has been found at the Saṅgamu Vihāra.[97]

Patronage of Buddhist temples and good relations with the Sangha do not necessarily mean that the king was a Buddhist. The only possible arguments in favour of such an assumption arise from the Saṅgamu vihāra inscription and the Nelubava Pillar inscription.[98] The former, which is a political agreement between Gajabāhu and Parākramabāhu I, ends with the statement, "anyone who acts contrary to this would be going against the authority of the Triple Gem."[99] It could be argued that the Triple Gem was invoked by the Buddhist monks, through whose active intervention this agreement was brought about. Also one of the parties to the agreement was Parākramabāhu I, an acknowledged Buddhist. The Nelubava Pillar inscription which records a grant to the Ruvanvalisaya ends with a request to future kings to protect this grant, acquiring the merit accruing from it, as if they themselves had made the donation. These might be interpreted as sentiments peculiar to a Buddhist but in view of the religious eclecticism of the time, a Hindu ruler could very well have been conscious of the merit accruing from a donation to a Buddhist temple.

Apart from private grants to Brāhmaṇas and places of Hindu worship which can be dated in the reign of Gajabāhu II, two inscriptions bear witness to the king's own patronage of Hinduism. One of them records the setting up of a pillar as a boundary mark for the Brahmadeya village of Kantalay[100] and the other is a grant made by Gajabāhu to a certain Dāpera Rangidāge Hināhi, who made an image of Skanda and other gods for a Laksapūjā.[101] The propitiation of Skanda and other attendant deities is a clear indication of the king's Śaivaite leanings.[102] The king is also credited with the patronage of Brāhmaṇas attached to the Koneśvaram temple at Trincomalee in the *Taksiṇa Kailāca Purāṇam*.[103]

Although the *Cūḷavaṁsa* does not refer directly to Gajabāhu's religious leanings, certain statements in it seem to imply that under him Buddhism could not expect the patronage usually accorded to it by a Buddhist ruler. The chronicle does not attribute any Buddhist monument to him. He is accused of bringing over nobles of heretical faith from abroad.[104] The rationale for Parākramabāhu I's war with Gajabāhu

is made out to be the welfare of the people and Buddhism.[105] Even when the Buddhist monks intercede with Parākramabāhu I on behalf of Gajabāhu, they argue that Gajabāhu was old and close to death and he had no sons or brothers, and Parākramabāhu would soon have the opportunity to work for the welfare of the people and Buddhism. As this particular section of the *Cūḷavaṁsa* is specially bent on eulogising Parākramabāhu I, one cannot ignore the subjective bias of the author. The position taken up by the *Cūḷavaṁsa*, however, seems to rest on something more tangible than the fertile imagination of the author. The most significant piece of evidence which supports this view is contained in the Devanagala inscription of Parākramabāhu I.[106] Here it is claimed that he waged war with Gajabāhu and Mānābharaṇa in order to restore Buddhism which had been ruined for a period of forty-two years since the death of Vijayabāhu. This is not a vague generalisation of a royal bard which can be brushed aside as pure eulogy. It is a specific statement which involves a precious period, and that includes the reign of Gajabāhu II, hence its significance. Moreover, the record is dated in the twelfth year of Parākramabāhu I, which is roughly about twelve years after the death of Gajabāhu, when memories were still fresh and it is very unlikely that Parākramabāhu would have made a public statement such as this without any basis.

One other clue which suggests Gajabāhu's leanings towards Hinduism is his retirement to Gangātaṭāka (Kantalay) after he had come to terms with Parākramabāhu I and settled the succession to the throne in the latter's favour.[107] After a period of long and bitter fighting, Gajabāhu had come to the end of the road as it were and whatever hopes and aspirations he entertained earlier had to be abandoned with the recognition of Parākramąbāhu as his heir. The choice of Gangātaṭāka at this stage of his career might have been prompted by religious considerations. The Palamoṭṭai Tamil inscription which can be dated in the 42nd year of either Vijayabāhu I or Jayabāhu I shows that Kantalay was clearly a Hindu centre. According to this inscription Kantalay was called Vijayarāja Caturvedimaṅgalam and the Śiva temple found here was known as Ten Kailāsam (Southern Kailāsam)[108]. Caturvedimaṅgalam is the term usually applied to a Brahmin village. That Gajabāhu had associated himself with this Brahmin settlement is known from his Kantalay inscription referred to already.[109] That this area continued with its Hindu associations for much longer is proved by the Kantalay stone seat inscription of Nissaṁkamalla which refers to the region as Caturvedi Brahmapura.[110] An alms hall built by this ruler was named after Pārvati, the consort of Śiva. Archaeological evidence also supports the assumption that this was a centre of Śaiva worship.[111] Thus it would seem that Gajabāhu II, bereft of all hope, chose to spend his last days in a Hindu atmosphere, where he could devote his time to religious activities.

If religion was the determining factor as regards the status of Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhul I, it should be possible to test this against other non-Buddhist rulers of Sri Lanka. However, such testing need not cover the entire dynastic history of the country, for as pointed out at the beginning of this paper[112] rules and practices were liable to change from time to time. The period from Vijayabāhu I (1055—1110) to the end of the reign of Māgha (1236 A. D.) is the most relevant period for such an investigation, but unfortunately for us there is only one ruler who was definitely known to have been a non-Buddhist—this being Māgha. There is no ambiguity about the religion of Māgha in the *Cūḷavaṁsa*, which refers to him as one who held false beliefs[113]. On the basis of the arguments advanced so far, Māgha would not be entitled to the royal consecration. However, the information in the *Cūḷavaṁsa* is that he was consecrated.[114] In the face of this, the entire argument falls. However, a closer examination of the *Cūḷavaṁsa* shows, that this consecration of Māgha was not recognised. The consecration itself was said to have been performed by his chief warriors[114], men who had accompanied him from Kaliṅga.[115] Such a consecration would not have been very meaningful in the local context and that it was not acceptable is patently clear in the statements of the chronicle itself where the regnal period of Māgha is referred to as a "rājantara" or interegnum.[116] The *Pūjāvaliya* speaks of Māgha's reign as the "Demaḷa arājitaya",[117] conveying similar sentiments. Thus Māgha's reign does not seem to have been officially recognised and it would follow that the so-called "abhiṣeka" of this ruler was not legally valid. No coins of Māgha have been found and there are no inscriptions so far found which can be attributed to him. Therefore the case of Māgha seems to support the contention that kings of Sri Lanka had to be Buddhists in order to gain official recognition. These same sentiments are reiterated in the *Cūḷavaṁsa* when it comments on the religious activities of Parākramabāhu II, when it says that Lanka does not remain (for long) in the hands of heretical kings but it flourishes under kings of the true faith.[118] The author of the *Pūjāvaliya* comes out even more strongly in the same context when he says that it was not proper for heretical kings to rule Lanka which befits only those of the true faith. This he says is an established truth (ekāntha dharmayeka).

This then was perhaps the 'established' law and it was perhaps this law that operated against Vikramabāhu I and Gajabāhu II. Sri Lanka was the Island of Buddhism—"Dhammadīpa" and its rulers were expected to be Buddhists. Those who were not, were tolerated but grudgingly.

NOTES

1. The dates mentioned in this paper follow the chronological tables in the *University of Ceylon History of Ceylon* (UCHC), Vol. I, Pt. II, ed. S. Paranavitana, Colombo 1960.
2. *Cūlavaṁsa* (*Cv.*), ed. W. Geiger, Pali Text Society, London 1925. Ch. LXI, v. 4.
3. *Ibid.*, Ch. LXI, v. 47.
4. *Ibid.*, Ch. LXI, v. 30.
5. *Ibid.*, Ch. LXIII, v. 19.
6. Ed. A. V. Suraveera, Colombo 1961—a thirteenth century work which contains a short dynastic history of Sri Lanka.
7. A Sinhalese Chronicle datable in the 18th century.
8. S. Paranavitana, 'Two Tamil inscriptions from Budumuttava', *Epigraphia Zeylanica* (*EZ*), Vol. III, No. 33.
9. S. Paranavitana, 'Kahambiliyava (Kaudulu—vava) Slab-Inscription of Vikramabāhu I', *Ibid.*, Vol. V. No. 39.
10. K. Indrapala, 'A Pillar Inscription from Mahakirindegama', *Epigraphia Tamilica*, (*ET*), Vol. I, Pt. I, No. 2
11. S. Paranavitana, 'Devanagala Rock Inscription of Parakramabhāu I' *EZ*, III, No. 34.
12. W. S. Karunaratne, 'Katugamuva Slab-Inscription of Manabharana', *EZ*, V, No. 11.
13. H. C. P. Bell, *Archaeological Survey of Ceylon*, Annual Report (ASCAR), 1909, p. 27.
14. K. Indrapala, 'An Agampadi Inscription from Hingurakdamana', *ET*, I, Pt. 1, No. 4.
15. K. Kanapathi Pillai, 'Mankanai Inscription of Gajabāhu II', *University of Ceylon Review*, XX, No. 1, pp. 12 ff.
16. *Cv.*, Ch. LVI, v. 1 and v. 11.
17. *ASCAR*, 1909, p. 27.
18. *Cv.*, Ch. LXIII, v. 18.
19. *Ibid.*, Ch. LXIII, v. 1.
20. S. Paranavitana, 'Polonnaruva: Fragmentary Slab-Inscription of Sundara—Mahadevi', *EZ*, IV, No. 9.
21. S. Paranavitana, 'Kahambiliyava Slab-Inscription...', *op. cit.*
22. See above, p. 13
23. See above, p. 13—15.
24. *Cv.*, Ch. LXI, vv. 1—8.
25. *Ibid.*, vv. 12—17.
26. K. Indrapala, 'An Agampadi Inscription...', *op. cit.*
27. *ASCAR*, 1909, p. 27.
28. W. S. Karunaratne, *op. cit.*
29. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Dimbulagala: Mara-Vidiye Rock Inscription', *EZ*, II, No. 34.
30. S. Pathmanathan, 'The Tamil Inscription from Mankanai', *Pavalar Thuraiappapillai Nootandu Vilzha Malar*, Part II, 1972, pp. 81—88.

31. K. Kanapathi Pillai, *op. cit.*
32. *Cv.*, Ch. LXXXI, v. 5.
33. Paranavitana suggests that the text refers to the 2nd occasion when Mānābharaṇa was in control of Polonnaruva (*EZ.* VI, p. 9). That we have a definite correlation of dates in the Polonnaruva inscription of the 38th year of Jayabāhu, corresponding to the 15th year of Gajabāhu, bears repetition. Accordingly the 43rd year of Jayabāhu would correspond to the 20th year of Gajabāhu, who had a 22 year reign. The second occupation of Polonnaruva by Mānābharaṇa took place after the death of Gajabāhu and the contents of this inscription cannot refer to that period.
34. *Cv.*, Ch. LVII, v. 4.
35. S. Paranavitana, 'Panakaduva Copper-Plate Charter of Vijayabāhu I', *EZ*, v., p. 5.
36. *UCHC*, vol. I, pp. 364—365.
37. Paranavitana, 'Two Tamil Pillar Inscriptions...', *op. cit.*
38. K. Indrapala, 'A Pillar Inscription from Mahakirindegama', *op. cit.*
39. W. S. Karunaratne, *op. cit.*
40. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, *op. cit.*
41. K. Kanapathi Pillai, *op. cit.*
42. See above, p. 14.
43. Cv., Ch. LII, v. 58.
44. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Anuradhapura: Slab Inscription of Kassapa V', *EZ*, I, No. 4.
45. K. Indrapala, 'An Agampadi Inscription . ' *op. cit.*
46. The Palamottai Tamil Inscription (*EZ*, IV, no. 24) of Vikramra Calamega is not clear whether the regnal date in the record is Vijayabāhu's or Jayabāhu's. Until this is settled the evidence in the inscription cannot be used for the purpose of this discussion.
47. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Ambagamuva Rock Inscription of Vijayabāhu I', *EZ*, II, no. 35.
48. Paranavitana makes the same observation when he says: "In dating documents during this period in Ceylon, the year was not referred to by a recognised era like the Buddha varṣa or the Saka varṣa, but to the era of the inauguration of an Abhā Salamevan or Siri Saṅgabo, the throne names borne alternately by the medieval kings of Ceylon. *EZ*, V. p. 5, f. n. 2).
49. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Dimbulagala...', *op. cit.*
50. S. Paranavitana, 'Kahabiliyava Slab-Inscription...', *op. cit.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. C. E. Godakumbura, 'Kapuruvaduoya Pillar Inscription of Gajabāhu II', *EZ*, V. no. 38.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.*
56. See below.

57. *Cv.*, Ch. LXIV, vv. 33—35.
58. See above, p. 14
59. *Cv.*, Ch. LXIII, 14 vv. 21—22.
60. *Ibid.*, Ch. XXXVIII, vv. 1—2.
61. *Ibid.*, v. 80 ff.
62. *Ibid.*. Ch. LIX, vv. 29—32.
63. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Dimbulagala...', *op. cit.*
64. *Mahavamsa*, ed. W. Geiger, P. T. S. London 1934, Ch. VII, v. 47; Ch. VIII, vv. 17—27.
65. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Dimbulagala ', *op. cit.*,
66. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'The Two Tablets of Mahinda IV at Mihintale', *EZ*, I, no. 7.
67. *Cv.*, Ch. LX, v 88.
68. His legal status is in no doubt for he uses the Siri Sangabo title and his regnal years are used for the purpose of dating records. (*EZ*, Vol. II, no 36.)
69. She had the title Abha Salamevan and her regnal years are used for official dating. (*EZ*, Vol. IV, no. 10.)
70. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Polonnaruva: Slab Inscription of the Velaikkaras', *EZ*, II, no 40.
71. *Cv.*, Ch. LXX, v. 310.
72. *Ibid.*, Ch. LXXI, vv. 19—32.
73. *Ibid.*, Ch. LXXII, vv. 311—329.
74. *Ibid.*, Ch. LXXIV, v. 126.
75. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Polonnaruva: Galpota Slab Inscription', *EZ*, II, no. 17.
76. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Polonnaruva: Slab Inscription at the North-Gate of the Citadel', *EZ*, II, no. 28.
77. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Jetavanarama Slab Inscription of Mahinda IV', *EZ*, I, no. 20.
78. Persons destined to attain Buddhahood.
79. (*Siri Lakhi*) *no bosat hu ro raj vanhayi sähakula kot savaniya munirajhu* (*viyaran*) *lad tumā pay sivan rak* (*nuva*)*s mahasanghu pilivayu raj siri pämina sana bisev vindna* (*da*) *vas maha*/*sa*/*ng hat meheyat uvasar vas* (*seve*) *bandna*
80. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Polonnaruva: Slab Inscription of the Velaikkaras'.
81. *Cv*, Ch. LXXX, vv. 9—14.
82. D. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, 'Polonnaruva: Slab Inscription of Sahasa Malla', *EZ*, II, no. 36.
83. Canto I, vv. 4—8 (Colombo 1946)
84. *Cv.*, Ch. LIX, vv. 29—31.
85. *Ibid.*, Ch. LX, vv. 54—55.
86. *Ibid.*, Ch. LXI, vv. 54—61.
88. See, above p. 14.

89. S. Paranavitana, 'A Tamil Slab Inscription from Palamottai' *EZ*, IV, p. 194.
90. S. Paranavitana, 'Kahambiliyava Slab Inscription...'
91. An inscription which can be dated in the reign of Gajabāhu states that she had a road constructed between two temples, which were in turn provided with images, dagobas and Bodhi trees. It is also on record that she made a grant to the temple known as Demala paha. (*EZ*, Vol. II, no. 34.)
92. *ASCAR*, 1909, p. 27.
93. Vol. VI, Pt. I, no. 23.
94. *Cv.*, Ch. LXXX, vv. 179—182.
95. *Ibid.*, vv. 327—330.
96. *Ibid.*, Ch. LXXI, v. 3.
97. S. Paranavitana, 'Samgamu Vihara Rock Inscription', *EZ*, IV, no. 1.
98. *EZ*, VI. no. 23.
99. The Buddha, his doctrine and the Sangha.
100. K. D. Swaminathan, 'An Inscription of Gajabāhu II', *Ceylon Historical Journal*, Vol. X, nos. 1—4, 1960—61.
101. C. E. Godakumbura, *op. cit.*
102. Same as Laksa-arcanā. Performed on behalf of devotees. Offerings are made to the accompaniment of the recital of a lakh of names of the god. This figure is made up by the repetition of the sahasranāma a hundred times. "A study of Saivism of the epic and the Purānic Periods." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis. K. Kailasanatha Kurukkal, Poona, 1960, p. 635.
103. Ed. P P. Vaittiyalinka Tecikar, 1916, vv. 95—97.
104. *Cv.*, Ch. LXX, vv. 53—55
105. *Ibid.*, vv. 210 and 248.
106. S. Paranavitana, 'Devanagala Rock Inscription...'
107. *Cv.*, Ch. LXXI, v. 1.
108. S. Paranavitana, 'A Tamil Slab Inscription from Palamottai...'
109. See above, page
110. D. M. de Z Wickremasinghe, 'Kantalai Gal-Asana Inscription of Kitt: Nissamkamalla'. *EZ*, II, no. 42.
111. S. Paranavitana, 'A Tamil Slab Inscription from Palamottai...'
112. See pp. 12—13.
113. *Cv.*, Ch. LXXX, v. 56.
114. *Ibid.*, v. 73.
115. *Ibid.*
116. *Ibid*, vv. 59—60.
117. Ch. 34.
118. *Cv.*, Ch. LXXXI, vv. 1 & 31; LXXXIV, v. 7; LXXXVII, v. 46.

'EMPIRICAL' BUDDHISM AND PHILOSOPHY

A. D. P. Kalansuriya,
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy,
University of Sri Lanka,
Peradeniya Campus,
Sri Lanka.

1. Introduction

1.1 An attempt seems to have been made in the Buddhist world to interpret Early Buddhist Philosophy on an empirical footing associating the Humean type of Empiricism in the English-speaking world. A pioneer work in this field is Dr. K. N. Jayatilleke's *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge.*[1] In it he says "We find at the same time that many of the doctrines of Buddhism are claimed to be inductive inferences based on the data of extrasensory perception. In this respect extrasensory perception is treated at the same level as normal perception and it is considered possible to make both valid and erroneous inferences on this data".[2] Alternatively it looks as if the main point seems to be the question of the epistemological standing of extrasensory perception. This paper deals directly with this question.

1.2 Karma and Rebirth are two significant concepts in the Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. According to Jayatilleke, Karma is one of the prominent doctrines derived as an inductive inference on the basis of the data of extrasensory perception.[3] The concept of rebirth too is explained by him in a similar way. For instance, Jayatilleke says that "The Buddhist Theory of Survival has its origin in the Enlightenment of the Buddha and not in any traditional Indian belief. It is said that it was on the night of his Enlightenment that he acquired the capacity to know his prior lives".[4] Now hypothetically assuming the claimed inductive basis of the significant concepts such as Karma and Rebirth in early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, we wish to examine the credibility of this thesis.

2. The Problem

2.1 To start with, what are inductive inferences? An inductive inference is a generalization from observed concomitance. This idea can be made clear in the following way. For instance, inductive reasoning is taken to cover all the cases in which we pass either from a particular statement of fact or from a set of particular statements of fact, to a factual conclusion which they do not formally entail. Therefore the inference may be to proceed directly by analogy from a particular instance to another, or from a series of particular instances to a general law. However, in this kind of inductive reasoning there is one significant assumption we make, namely, the acceptance of an important measure of the uniformity in nature. The marked feature of this line of argumentation is the avoidance of an inconsistency between the factual premise and the factual conclusion which does not formally entail. But if inductive inference exhibits the above features, can one find them in the so-called inductive inference that Jayatilleke claims to have found as regards many of the doctrines of Buddhism? To put the issue yet more generally, can there be inductive inferences based on the data of extrasensory perception? The issue is a somewhat larger one to which we should now turn.

Jayatilleke does not attempt to define 'extrasensory perception'; but contends by saying that "....many of the doctrines of Buddhism are claimed to be inductive inferences based on the data of extrasensory perception....."[5] etc. But he says at some other place, "...some of these experiences such as ante-natal retrocognition have been claimed by people under deep hypnosis. For others such as telepathy and clairvoyance, it is believed that there is a certain amount of experimental data which tends to confirm the existence of such faculties. We have reason therefore to believe that genuine claims were made about having these experiences. The other question is whether these experiences were veridical or delusive. This falls outside the scope of our study and we do not propose to examine it here".[6] To some extent, these assertions indicate that Jayatilleke seems to have misconceived the role of a theory of knowledge.

2.2 Epistemologically speaking, there seems to be an attempt to evade the issue and to refuse to accept the gravity of the significant theoretical problem which crops up here. The question as to the veridicality or delusoriness of these experiences is vital to his interpretation of Buddhistic theory of knowledge as the emphasis is empirical. Two things follow. Firstly, the ambiguity of the scope of this monolithic theory of knowledge; and secondly that this theory is nothing but a hotch-potch of both empirical and non-empirical concepts belonging to two different contexts. It deals with empirical and non-empirical concepts: but purports to determine their epistemological status through empiricism. Such

a theory has the effect of an oscillation between the empirical and non-empirical environments and this only makes the problem as to the veridicality or the delusoriness of these experiences recede into the background. Apparently, Jayatilleke does not see this significant point, and believes that this problem falls outside the scope of a possible Buddhistic theory of knowledge. But this belief is false.

3. Concepts such as veridicality, delusoriness and experience

3.1 From a glance at the general map of perceptual concepts, it will be seen that the concept of 'experience' occupies the most vital position. And, empirically speaking 'experience' forms the very basis of our perceptions. But what is perception? In contemporary philosophy of the English-speaking world, 'perception' is understood in multifarious ways. According to D. M. Armstrong, "Perception is a flow of information, a flow that goes on the whole time that we are not completely unconscious".[7] Elsewhere he adds that "...perception is nothing but the acquiring of true or false beliefs concerning the current state of the organism's body and environment".[8] As R. J. Hirst interprets it, "..perceiving is a relation between person and public object in which a mode of active experience, perceptual consciousness, is caused in him by the stimulation of his sense organs by the object or by emanation from it".[9] D. W. Hamlyn holds that "...in the primary sense 'perception' can signify any means whereby we come to recognize, identify or characterize something by means of the sense".[10] According to these views, 'perception' has something proximate to do with the human bio-chemical system and the environmental world around. Conceptually speaking, 'sense experience', 'perception', 'identification', 'environmetal world', 'bio-chemical system' seem to be the significant concepts in this conceptual system.

3.2 Basically deviating from the scope of recent perceptual philosophy as envisaged in the English-speaking world, Jayatilleke's English work attempts to widen the scope by inclusion of an alleged new species of experience called 'extrasensory experience' or 'extrasensory perception',[11] the material for this widening is claimed by him to be found in the Pali Nikāyas. Is this novel inclusion theoretically permissible in a theory of knowledge which is at the same time claimed to be empirical? Are the so-called 'extrasensory perceptions' perceptions at all, and, if so, are they veridical or delusory?

3.3 Let me start with the second question. What sort of an answer does Jayatilleke supply in this connection? It will not do to say that he is of the opinion that "...this falls outside the scope of our study and we do not propose to examine it here".[12] This would be a proposal to close the most controversial study, logically appropriate to his proposed empiricism-based Buddhistic theory of knowledge.

On the other hand this way of putting the case makes it theoretically impossible for us to examine as to whether many of the doctrines of Buddhism are inductive inferences or not. To put the case more explicitly, the veridicality or the delusoriness of 'extrasensory perception' needs careful examination, and is precisely what needs to be established mostly in a theory of knowledge. The following assertion of Ayer perhaps illustrates the logical reasoning underlying this need: "……that there cannot be a mental state which, being as it were directed towards a fact, is such that it guarantees the fact is so. And here I am not saying merely that such states never do occur or even that it is causally impossible that they ever should occur, but rather that it is logically impossible. My point is that from the fact that someone is convinced that something is true, however firm his conviction may be, it never follows logically that it is true".[13] It seems to follow from this that the claims in the Jayatilleke-interpretation remain unestablished on the one hand, and appear arbitrary on the other.

That Jayatilleke's claims are arbitrary is also seen from his own following statement: "It may be asked whether the claims to extrasensory perception belong to the mythical and miraculous elements in the Canon and whether these claims were actually made by the Buddha and his disciples. There is reason to believe that these claims were actually made. There is no doubt that Yoga-practices prevailed among the thinkers of the Middle and Late Upanisads, the Jains, some of the Ajivakas and the Buddhists. Claims of this kind were common to all these schools".[14] But this is no more than an impressive display of historical and mythical data. It does not establish the claims in question. To put it a little more explicitly, this display does not even specify the veridicality of the claims, let alone their establishment.

3.4 A theory of knowledge, perhaps, generally speaking, tries to account for all perceptions by distinguishing between perceptually true and perceptually false statements. But it seems the case that Jayatilleke closes the inquiry by merely stating the claims only. But to make a claim does not exhaust all what we have to say about a possible Buddhist theory of knowledge or any theory of knowledge. In fact Jayatilleke, the claimed empirico-epistemologist, should have done the following:

(i) A careful examination of the said claims in the Canon to limit his 'language-game' together with an understanding of the group or family of concepts
and

(ii) A genuine attempt to establish the veridicality of the said claims.

In fact he avoids both (i) and (ii) above. The implication is far too much than what Jayatilleke believed. In this paper an attempt is made to work out this implication.

As previously stated, Jayatilleke seems to equate normal perceptions and extrasensory perceptions without making a logical investigation to unearth their logical nature. An implication which follows from this unsupported claim is the logical limitation of the scope of his theory to the category of veridical perception alone. To put the case a little more explicitly, extrasensory perception, according to him, is not different from veridical (normal) perception, epistemologically; for extrasensory perceptions are but perceptually true ones. On the other hand on no grounds he could accept 'delusions', 'hallucinations', 'illusions' and 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions' as all perceptions are accepted to be veridical perceptions or perceptually true ones. His treatment of extrasensory perceptions and normal perceptions as if they are veridical, would evidently suggest it.

Alternatively, it is seen that this thesis accepts an extremely limited concept of perception though a seeming attempt is made to widen the scope of Jayatilleke's perceptual philosophy by an inclusion of alleged extrasensory perception. This enlargement makes Jayatilleke's task still more difficult as he is left with only one category, namely, 'veridical perception' to account for all perception. For, as mentioned above, a theory of knowledge tries to account for all perceptions by distinguishing between perceptually true and perceptually false statements. To be plain, the scope of his study is unlimited whereas the only category in terms of which he tries to give content and body to it is 'veridical perception'.

3.5 To limit 'perceptions' to the category of 'veridical perception' alone is the most primitive logical principle in Jayatilleke's interpretation. But in essence it is a logically unsound principle which makes this version mythical. This I hope to show in what follows.

3.5.1 At the outset, however, it must be emphasized that the term 'perception' is ambiguously employed by Jayatilleke. For instance, it is used without much proviso added to refer to both 'perception' on the one hand and what he purports to refer to by 'extrasensory perception' on the other. Same is the case with 'experience'. This amounts to the misusing of the terms 'perception' and 'experience'. The point will be highlighted once the argument in this paper is established.

3.5.2 At this juncture, it is to the point to emphasize the basic need to account for other perceptions such as illusions, hallucinations, delusion and veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions in a theory of knowledge. For a theory of knowledge tries to account for all perceptions by distinguishing between perceptually true and perceptually false statements. Jayatilleke looks as if he comes very near to the starting point of the examination. That he makes an effort is evident from the assertion he makes to the effect that "The other question

is whether these experiences (extrasensory experiences) were veridical or delusive". [15] However we saw above how he closed the discussion by saying that the study falls outside his scope.

3.5.3 Yet we wish to continue from where Jayatilleke concluded, namely, 'delusory perception', to show the theoretical defect of the assertion as far as the epistemological endeavour is concerned. And at the outset we wish to emphasize the meaningfulness and the existence of perceptions very different from both normal veridical perceptions and delusion (delusory perception) he initially hinted at, and, we also attempt to exhibit the philosophical significance of at least one of these perceptions in the context of Early Buddhist theory of knowledge. And at the end, we believe that this category of perception and its very logical nature will undercut the main crux of Jayatilleke's argument which incorporates 'extrasensory perceptions' and the concept of inductive inference. We wish to develop our thesis through certain concepts of non-veridical perception envisaged in the English-speaking world. Let me begin with a point appropriately raised by the British philosopher J. L. Austin in his 'Sense And Sensibilia'.

4. J. L. Austin and 'delusion'

4.1 Austin critically analysing A. J. Ayer's formulation of 'the Argument from Illusion' says that there are two clear implications of the latter's argument. They are "(a) that all the cases cited in the argument are cases of illusion: and (b) that illusion and delusion are the same thing"[16] But what is this so-called 'Argument from Illusion'? According to Ayer, it runs as follows: "This argument, as it is ordinarily stated is based on the fact that material things may present different appearances to different observers or to the same observer in different conditions, and that the character of these appearances is to some extent causally determined by the state of the conditions and the observer".[17] As examples Ayer cites mirror-images, refractions, hallucinations, double visions, apparent variations in taste, etc. and categorises all of these as illusions. Quite correctly, Austin points out Ayer's error in confusing illusion, delusion, and hallucination. So he adds "..... 'an illusion' (in a perceptual context) does not suggest that something totally unreal is conjured up.....; whereas the term 'delusion' does suggest something totally unreal, not really there at all".[18]

4.2 What is demonstrated by these examples is that there are some data (by necessity extra-linguistic) to be noticed. And these contents make the phenomenon of illusion very different from objective hallucinations on the one hand and delusions on the other. Therefore all non-veridical perceptions are not delusions (delusory perceptions).

4.3 In this context it is more than apparent that Jayatilleke's categorization of perception seems ambiguous, inadequate and misleading; for he arbitrarily limits the scope of perception to veridical perception. But in fact the case is that there is, at least, one category of perception which does not belong to either of the two. In short the theory of knowledge under review does not account for all perceptions as it fails to see the meaningfulness of non-veridical perceptions such as,

(i) illusory perception

(ii) hallucinatory perception and

(iii) 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perception'.

Alternatively, one of them or all of them cannot be subsumed under the concept in the Jayatilleke-interpretation since the latter denotes, strictly speaking, the results of mental disorder, fever, starvation etc.

4.4 Broadly speaking, non-veridical perception is of four sub-categories (each basically different from one another) namely, delusion, illusion, hallucination and 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perception'. Only the first type of perception is mentioned in the Jayatilleke interpretation, let alone their proper accounting. The other three categories of non-veridical perception are left out.

5. The Concepts of hallucination and illusion

5.1 An objective hallucination can be defined in terms of a perception reported in the presence of certain stimulations of the sense organs: they include mirages in noontide heat at the farthest ends of straight roads, across extensive fields, etc. In an objective hallucination such as "seeing a mirage" in noontide heat, a host of other environmental conditions are responsible for its generation, besides those of the percipient. Such objective hallucinations are projected by outer atmospheric conditions: furthermore, they are accessible to public perceptual experience as physical objects such as chairs, omnibuses, etc. are but with a difference. For there is no water really there, viz., at the farthest ends of straight roads, across extensive fields, across farm country, etc., at noontide heat.

But are they different from delusions (delusory perception)? We may cite as illustrative examples of delusions, the following: delusions of grandeur, delusions of persecution, etc. With reference to this phenomenon, Austin says, "An illusion (in a perceptual context) does not suggest that something totally unreal is conjured up ... whereas the term 'delusion' does suggest something totally unreal, not really there at all".[19] Elsewhere he adds " delusions are a much more serious matter—something is really wrong, and what's more, wrong with the person who has them. He needs to be cured".[20] In short, granted an absence of sensory contacts and artificial phenomena such as

toxins, drugs, suggestion, etc., delusions are the results of mental disorder, fever, starvation, extreme thirst, acute anxiety, delirium tremens, etc. On this basis the person has to be cured. R. J. Hirst the English-speaking perceptual philosopher appreciably strengthens this view when he says, "Thus owing to drunkenness, fever, privation, emotional disturbance or even perhaps drowsiness, the person confuses such imagery with perceived objects."[21] Consequently, the statements made by such people are not true. Such statements endorse nothing as regards the world around us. Nor do they imply a special super-human ability in the subject. They are simply delusions because the subject sees nothing as there is nothing to be seen. If so, in the case of 'delusion' there cannot be any knowledge in the sense of knowledge that such and such is the case.

5.2 However, when one sees hallucinations expressed in the form of "seeing mirages in noontide heat at farthest ends of straight roads", etc., the mirages in question are objective and public as well. If so, does one see something in these particular hallucinations? In this connection, J. R. Smythies says, ".. in actual English usage, the words such as 'see', 'look', 'hear', etc., are used to describe hallucinatory sense-experiences as well as veridical ones".[22]

5.2.1 In one sense, they can be used "...in such a way that to say of an object that it is perceived does not entail saying that it exists in any sense at all".[23] And it "is also a correct and familiar usage of the word 'perceive' in which to say of an object that it is perceived does carry the implication that it exists".[24]

5.2.2 Furthermore, Armstrong's concepts such as 'existence-grammar' and 'success-grammar' strengthen the point in question. For instance, phrases of the form 'sees an X' or 'perceives a cat', etc., have 'existence–grammar', but do not imply a cognitive success. However, 'seeing that ', 'perceive that...', etc., do endorse and do imply a cognitive success (discovery of physicality). Hence these phrases have 'success-grammar'. The former expression can very well endorse an hallucination whereas in the latter, such hallucinations are analytically ruled out. This division appreciably strengthens the correct usages of the perceptual verbs such as 'see', 'perceive', etc. And in turn it inevitably strentghens the logical position of objective hallucinations, in the context of perception. Accordingly, there is sense in one's claims that one sees a mirage in noontide heat at the farthest end of straight roads or across extensive fields, etc. Further, this claim is neither a delusion in Austin's sense of this word nor an acquiring of a false belief as Armstrong uses the word 'hallucination'.

5.3 Similarly, it is neither a veridical perception nor a delusion as Jayatilleke entertains these terms. What is thus shown in this

paper is that there is a separate category of perceptions called 'hallucinations' which is such that it differs both from veridical perceptions and delusory perceptions. Thus, this distinction substantially undermines the Jayatilleke interpretation which accepts only veridical and delusory perceptions.

For "experiences such as ante-natal retrocognition" seem neither veridical perceptions nor delusory perceptions nor objective hallucinations nor illusions. However, Jayatilleke takes for granted that they are veridical, though he evades substantiating his standpoint. If so, we cannot expect inductive generalizations from these unsubstantiated and seemingly mythical premises. To put it a little more explicitly, a particular statement of fact or a set of particular statements of fact is non-existent; hence a factual conclusion which they do not formally entail, does not follow.

5.4 To sum up the argument so far, we have attempted to elicit the meaningfulness and existence of certain types of non-veridical perceptions other than the delusions (delusory perceptions) hinted at but not developed by Jayatilleke. I conclude, therefore that it is not out of the question that the following sub-categories of non-veridical perceptions directly affect the very basis of his empirical theory of knowledge. They are as follows:

(i) illusory perceptions,

(ii) hallucinatory perceptions

and

(iii) "veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions" (basically) different from (ii) above.

And as there was no indication or limit, let alone a logical analysis of 'extrasensory perception', we shall have to accommodate statements involving these perceptions within the wider category of veridical perception. But are they veridical perceptions at all?

6. "Extrasensory perception"

6.1 Although Jayatilleke assumes that the 'extrasensory perception' such as retrocognition, telepathy, clairvoyance, etc., must be always assigned the truth-value 'true'[35], we cannot accept it without critical examination. We tentatively suggest that they are neither veridical perceptions nor delusory peceptions. Furthermore, the discussion hitherto shows that there are several perceptions other than the veridical and delusory ones expounded by Jayatilleke. Now we shall attempt a logical analysis of the concept of 'extrasensory perception'.

6.1.2 C. D. Broad coined the technical phrase 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perception' to denominate 'extrasensory perception'. He describes them in this way: "We shall say that a person was having

such an experience on a given occasion, if and only if the following two conditions were fulfilled: (i) He was ostensibly seeing, hearing, touching or otherwise sensibly perceiving a certain person or event or state of affairs as external to his body. Whilst (ii) at that time his eyes, ears, fingers or other receptor sense organs were not being affected in the normal physical manner... "[26] These are cases of 'automatic seeing', 'automatic hearing', etc. But sensation, electrical transmission of impulses to the brain, the environmental forces such as radiant energy in the form of light, pressure waves, etc. which are the sufficient, necessary and constant causes of the occurrence called veridical perception in the sense of a 'successful occurrence' (or as D. M Armstrong puts across, 'success-grammar' of the case), are non-present in the above mentioned cases. Therefore, the information allegedly supplied by retrocognition, telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, etc., are not supplied by any means known to us.

6.2 'Extrasenory perception' understood in this way looks as if it contradicts the laws of physics. However, by definition, if 'extra sensory perception' is limited to telepathy alone, one can probably get around this objection by some sophisticated radiation theory as noted by Arthur Koestler. But telepathy is not the most puzzling of these phenomena. For Koestler adds "A number of researchers, starting with Rhine himself, were reluctantly made to realise that some of their star subjects produced results showing more or less the same odds against chance if the target cards to be guessed had not been previously seen by the agent. Apparently, they did not 'read' the agents thoughts; they seemed to read directly the symbols printed on the cards...This phenomenon was labelled 'clairvoyance' and defined as 'extrasensory perception of objective events as dintinguished from telepathic perception of the mental state of another person'. Some form of 'mental radio' had always been intuitively acceptable to open-minded persons, trusting that science would sooner or later dicover how it worked; the perception-at-a-distance of inanimate objects was much harder to swallow, even with an unprejudiced palate. Gilbert Murray rejected the possibility of clairvoyance ".[27]

6.3 At this juncture, it is very clear that 'extrasensory perception' gets divided into two basically different categories, namely, telepathy on the one hand and other 'extrasensory perceptions' such as clairvoyance, clairaudience, retrocognition, psychokinesis, etc., on the other. The former may avoid it being contradicted by these laws of physics. On this basis the undifferentiated single category of 'extra-sensory perceptions' in Jayatilleke's interpretation gets into a significant theoretical difficulty. For it gets contradicted by the laws of physics. The dubiousness of its empirical nature is thus markedly evident too.

6.4 In this context, a concept like "on the data of extrasensory perception "[28] which is very much in vogue amongst Buddhist empirical

epistemologists such as Jayatilleke seems devoid of meaning; for the attempt in Jayatilleke's empirical theory of knowledge is to give application to a concept without reference to the other concepts that form its normal background. This is what Wittgenstein calls 'an engine idling'.[29] The British philosopher D. W. Hamlyn says that "In such cases the use of the concept is empty",[30] as the background for the appropriate application of the concept is simply missing. Let me be plain in what I mean. My first point is that as specificially and clearly seen in Broad's elaborate amplification, 'extrasensory pereceptions' are not veridical perceptions at all. If not veridical, epistemologically speaking, it by necessity falls into one of the sub-categories of non-veridical perception, namely, illusions or hallucinations or delusions or "veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions". But statements involving non-veridical perception must be always assigned the truth value 'not-true'; for such statements are not true, hence of no epistemological value as far as 'knowing' is concerned. This is an overt amplification of the implicit implication of Jayatilleke's unsupported claim which asserts that statements involving 'extrasensory perception' must always be assigned the truth-value 'true'. But our above analysis very clearly shows the contradictory nature of Jayatilleke's unsupported claim. Terefore, it follows that it is not out of the question that the contradictorily opposite of Jayatilleke's unsupported claim has the valid acceptance.

6.5 My second point is that if statements involving 'extrasensory perception' must be always assigned the truth value 'not-true' (~T), its epistemological role in an empirical theory of knowledge is logically inapplicable in its context. Furthermore, sensation, electrical transmission of impulses to the brain, the environmental forces such as radiant energy in the form of light, pressure waves, etc., are logically non-present in 'extrasensory perception'. Broad's elaboration testifies to it. Alternatively Wittgensteinian 'engine idling' is the criticism which is most appropriate here. For a concept such as "on the data of extrasensory perception" is inapplicable here as the appropriate empirical background is missing.

6.5.1 Why is the background missing? Primarily because the concept lacks an empirical background. If a concept like "on the data of extrasensory perception" is taken for granted as a cardinal one in an empirical theory of knowledge, the claim needs to be established. But its application is simply without reference to the other significant concepts in the theory. In short its body and content are simply not empirical at all. Furthermore, we have shown that 'extrasensory perception' must be always assigned the truth-value 'not-true' (~T). Hence it does not play a role in an empirical theory of knowledge.

6.6 Nevertheless as there is a further possibility to interpret the said concept on the basis of 'data' or 'information' supplied by these 'extrasensory perceptions', we must now examine its philosophical significance. The alleged information by the 'extrasensory perception' is in fact gathered without the normally understood physical means where 'means' refer to the interaction of the sense-organs of the bio-chemical system and its environment. Perhaps, this does not mean that the alleged information gathered 'without means' is meaningless and necessarily false. But as far as sensation, electrical transmission of impulses to the brain, the environmental forces such as radiant energy in the form of light, pressure waves, etc. which are the sufficient necessary and constant causes of the occurrence of 'sensation' and subsequently of 'perception' are concerned, information allegedly supplied without 'these means' cannot by definition play an epistemological role in an empirical theory of knowledge; for such 'data' are not empirical at all.

6.7 But to treat 'extrsensory perception' at the same level as veridical perception is simply voiding the body and content of the concept on the one hand and employing it out of its natural context or outside the language game that is its natural home, As one must quickly come to realize this is "language goes on holiday" as Wittgenstein once remarked.[31] In short, the concept as employed by Jayatilleke is simply meaningless as the limit of the concept is ingnored. Therefore, if the concept is devoid of body and content, it does not have a role to play in a theory of knowledge. That which follows is the impossibility of interpreting the concept also on the basis of 'data' or 'information' supplied by the so-called 'extrasensory perception'. Jayatilleke's claimed 'empiricism' is therefore, a 'pseudo-empiricism' and not any type of genuine empiricism; for any type of empirical background in the sense of a bio-chemical system being successfully affected by what is normally understood as physical forces of an environment independent of it, seems absent.

6.8 Our argument up to now shows that there is no logical inquiry into the means of knowledge though Jayatilleke claims in the Preface to his book that his work contains an inquiry into the means of knowledge,[32] apart from just mentioning that many of the doctrines of Buddhism are claimed to be inductive inferences based on the data of 'extrasensory perception'.[33] As if to defend Jayatilleke's standpoint against a criticism made by me,'[34] P. D. Premasiri says, "He (Jayatilleke) has raised here the question whether they are veridical or delusive, but does not answer it since he has not considered it within the scope of his work. It is clear that the scientific question as to whether they were in fact true does not fall within the scope of a discussion which is confined to the conceptual questions regarding knowledge."'[35] This is a poor defence simply because the concepts of

'truth' and 'knowledge' are significant ones in Philosophy as well as in science. Accordingly, Jayatilleke's failure to make an inquiry as to the means of knowledge is clearly evident. Further, Jayatilleke neither establishes these numerous claims in Buddhism nor subjects the concepts to a thorough logical inquiry. To highlight this point, the following statements which manifest his genuine aim can be quoted "We have tried to show that perception (normal and paranormal) and inductive inference are considered the means of knowledge in the Pali Nikāyas. The emphasis that 'knowing' (jnānaṃ) must be based on 'seeing' (passaṃ) or direct perceptive experience makes Buddhism a form of Empiricism. We have, however, to modify the use of the term somewhat to mean not only that all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience but from extrasensory experience as well. This extension we believe is justified in the reasons that we gave earlier (V. supra 735). The definition of the term in Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy also allows us to use the term 'empiricism' to include the entire conscious content of the mind, and not merely the data of the senses: 'That the sole source of knowledge is experience.....Experience may be understood as either all conscious content, data of the senses only or other designated content' ".[36]

6.9 There are several logical defects in the assertion just made by Jayatilleke. I wish to list them in the following order:

6.9.1

(i) The first logical defect is the treatment that 'seeing' (passaṃ) is equivalent to 'direct perceptive experience'. Primarily, 'perception' which is the noun of the verb 'perceive' stands as a broad term (generic term) involving the primary activities of the five sense organs of the human bio-chemical system. They are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. What follows is very clear, namely, 'seeing' is a particular word whereas 'perception' a generic word. Therefore, any interchangeability leads to misuse of words.

(ii) Secondly, there are several uses of the concept 'direct perceptive experience' or 'direct perception'. D. M. Armstrong and J. L. Austin use the said concept in connection with their particular arguments against the 'sense-datum terminology'. For instance, Armstong says, "Since sense-impressions do not stand between us and our immediate knowledge of the world, our theory is a Direct realism".[37] A similar view is expressed by Austin: "..... it is not only false but simply absurd to say that such objects as pens or cigarettes are never perceived directly".[38] In this connection I have expressed the following: "The proponents of 'direct perception' emphasize that the immediate objects of awareness are never anything but a physical existent, object or thing

which exists independently of the awareness of it. In other words, what is directly aware must logically exist at the time we are directly aware of it".[39] With reference to 'direct perception' Russell remarks in this way: "..... that the whole theory as to the causes of sensation, which are partly physical and partly physiological makes it unavoidable that we should regard 'perception' as something much less direct than it seems to be".[40] But all these philosophers seem to accept the following, nameley, 'perception' successfully occurs if and only if there is a bio-chemical system and the environmental forces and also that the latter affects the former. But all these conditions are non-present in the context of 'extrasensory perception' (see Broad's view above). This is clearly evidenced by Jayatilleke's following assertion too. "When the Buddha says that there arose in him the knowledge and insight that Uddaka Ramaputta had died the previous night (ñāṇañ ca pana dassanaṃ udapādi: abhidosakālakato Uddako Rāmaputto ti, M. I. 170)* we have to presume that this knowledge and insight was had by means of extrasensory perception ....."[41] It seems as if Jayatilleke wants us to denote this sort of extrasensory perception by 'direct perceptive experience'. If so, we are perplexed. Why is it that this type of 'perception' be denoted as 'direct perceptive experience'? And, what about the type of perceptions that is spoken of by Austin, Armstrong and Russell?

(iii) Thirdly, for instance, Jayatilleke claims in his previous quotation "...not only that all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience but from extrasensory experience as well". We shall spell out his statement in this way.

(a) "All our knowledge is derived from sense experience = (P).

The contradictory of P is

(b) "Some of our knowledge is not derived from sense-experience = (~ P)

Accordingly, P and ~ P are but contradictory statements.

P	(P . –P)
T	T F F
F	F F T

Therfore, though Jayatilleke did not notice, his impressive proposal to modify the use of the term 'experience' has resulted in affirmation of a 'contradictory opposite' in one and the same statement.

(iv) Fourthly, the above defect is further highlighted once the implication of the term 'extrasensory' is worked out. For instance, if 'sensory' such experiences are denoted as 'sense-experiences' implying 'sense-perception'. And this sort of perception successfully occurs if and only if there is a bio-chemical system and environmental

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forces and furthermore if and only if the latter affects the former. If so, does not 'extrasensory' imply 'non-sensory' and therefore non-empirical? Does not Jayatilleke's further claim, namely, "that the restraint of the senses, the development of mindfulness and the elimination of the five impediments result in the possibility of attaining the first up to the fourth jhana, in which there is a perfection of equanimity and mindfulness"[42] testify it?

Indeed Runes' definition of empiricism speaks about "the entire conscious content of the mind"; but its footing is thoroughly empirical involving basically sense-experiences. And Jayatilleke's modification logically asserts very much more. The result is ambiguity; for it stretches into wide philosophy of religion. What is evident at this juncture is an absence of clear-cut words. As "the entire conscious content of the mind" needs to be understood in the context of "a perfection of equanimity and mindfulness," in the wide philosophy of Buddhism, Jayatilleke seems to have neglected this way of looking at the issue.

Yet, his way of looking at the issue makes him posit "a ghost in the machine". What follows is elimination of genuine empiricism in favour of an impressive pseudo-empirical subject called "entire conscious content of mind". If the expression "entire conscious content of mind" is used as a name which purports to name one's mind, then, what is so named cannot but be an unidentifiable ghost in the machine — which is one's body. This metaphysical tone is further evident from the following: "Briefly, it consists in the practice of the virtuous life (ariyena sīlakkhandhena samannāgato, M. I. 346) followed by the restraint of the senses (indriya-saṃvara, loc. cit.,), the development of mindfulness (satisampajañña - loc. cit.), and the elimination of the five impediments (pañcanīvaraṇe pahāya, M. I. 347). This results in the possibility of attaining the first up to the fourth jhana in which there is "a perfection of equanimity and mindfulness" (upekkhānatipārisuddhiṃ, loc cit.). In this state there would be manifested the six-fold higher knowledge (abhiññā)."[43] These statements do not, however, assert an 'empiricism' but a 'pseudo-empiricism'. For "'mind' is not the name of another person, working or frolicking behind an impenetrable screen; it is not the name of another place where work is done or games are played".[44]

6.10 In fact, if the basis of a proposed theory of knowledge is some form of empiricism, then minding cannot be understood in logical isolation from the bio-chemical system of man. For, empiricism though understood, defined and described in multifarious ways, basically

* Majjhima Nikaya

is the theory that sense-experience rather than reason is the one and only source of knowledge: all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience. Furthermore, empiricists usually mean by 'experience' is nothing but sense-experience. This emphasis is highlighted by Bertrand Russell's definition of empiricism, namely, "all synthetic knowledge is based on experience".[45] Here knowledge is characterized as synthetic precisely because it is not devoid of factual content; and it is not devoid of factual content precisely because it is refutable by future sense-experiences. Therefore there is no such thing as empirical knowledge which is altogether free of at least the present and future sequence of sense-experiences.

6.10.1 However, the general thesis of empiricism can receive different emphases and refinements. For example, "..... empiricism has been so much determined in scope and direction by the counter-theory to which it has been opposed ....." [46] In this sense, Jayatilleke's purported empiricism seems opposed to rationalism and idealism; and furthermore, it attempts to enlarge what is generally accepted as empiricism in an attempt to give a significant place to the so-called extrasensory perception. Yet it is very illogical to extend one's emphasis too widely so that one's theory itself be contradictory. It is impossible reconcile a way of doing philosophy which consists in extending the use of 'empiricism' in such a way that it entails the rejection of what is ordinarily understood by 'empiricism'.

6.11 If those who practise 'pseudo-empirical' metaphysics are still empiricists they uphold a strange species of 'empiricism which has none empirical principles at its base. This is evident from whatever it is that is alleged to be referred to by the use of the expression "entire conscious content of the mind"; for, if anything is referred to by such use, it is certainly something beyond sense-experience or sense-observation. It is said that "when the mind is concentrated, pure, cleansed, free from blemishes, purged of adventitious defilments supple, plaint, steady and unperturbed, that he is said to 'turn and direct his mind to knowing and seeing' ". Surely if there is anything this statement is about, if there is any sort of 'mind' successfully referred to by the use of this sentence, then that 'mind' is logically isolated and divorced from the bio-chemical system of man: and a theory which is committed to such an isolation cannot possibily claim to be empirical in any sense, for every empirical statement is such that it is not divorced from and not free of reference to at least the present and future sequence of sense-experiences identifiable in the bio-chemical system.

6.12 Alternatively, no one can see whatever it is that is supposedly referred to by the use of the word 'mind'; no one can hear it; no one can smell it; no one can taste it; and no one can feel it. What empiricism is that?

7. **Conclusion:**

7.1 Epistemologically speaking, 'perceptions' in question have a definite truth value once they take the form of perceptual statements. If so, are perceptual statements (i. e., those that embody extrasensory perceptions) = 'P' in the Jayatilleke's interpretation, true? The fact is that the truth of these statements is unestablished. And Jayatilleke makes no attempt whatever to establish their truth. Even his stating the case is logically inappropriate.

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THE TRAVEL PATTERN AND COMPLEMENTARY AREAS OF THE CENTRAL PLACES IN NORTHERN SRI LANKA.

P. Balasundarampillai
University of Sri Lanka
Peradeniya Campus
Sri Lanka

Northern Sri Lanka comprises three districts of Sri Lanka, namely Jaffna, Mannar and Vavuniya. The region is mainly settled by Sri Lanka Tamils and Hindu culture is predominant here. The history, customs and traditions of this part of the country are markedly different from those of the southern part of the Republic. Topographically, the whole region is essentially a plain with most areas below 300 feet. The Jaffna Peninsula and the Islands adjoining it are flat low lying areas nowhere rising above 50 feet. The sedimentary limestone on the Peninsula which provides good ground water has assisted the growth of the region. Seasonal rainfall patterns and lack of ground water resources on the mainland (taken to mean the area south of the Peninsula) have restricted the development of agriculture and settlements. Malaria, cholera and other endemic diseases also prevented the development of the Mainland prior to the 1950's. Primary activities such as agriculture and fishing are dominant in the economic structure of the region. However, tertiary activities and financial remittances particularly from other parts of Sri Lanka are important elements in the geographical functioning of the Peninsula. Since 1970 there has been a change in the pattern of the economic structure and consumer behaviour due to the agricultural progress, particularly the chillie and onion cultivation.

Population

In 1971, there were 874,285 inhabitants in Northern Sri Lanka and this represents 7 per cent of the total population of Sri Lanka. In population and distribution there is a great contrast between the

Jaffna Peninsula and the Mainland. There were 1015 settlements in the area in 1971. The largest being Jaffna with a population of 107,663. There were 158 settlements with ten or less people. The number of settlements in the Jaffna, Mannar and Vavuniya districts are 280, 307 and 428 respectively. The Peninsula with 77 per cent and the Mainland with 23 per cent of the total population have 195 and 820 settlements respectively. There is a marked difference in density between the Jaffna Peninsula with 1517 persons per square mile and the Mainland with 77 persons per square mile in 1971.

Settlements and Hierarchy

Settlements may normally be classified as hamlets, villages, towns and cities. These categories imply the existence of broad classes of settlements that differ in their functional complexity. The differences between settlements are not only a matter of physical size, but also total population variety and level of central functions and these show the existence of hierarchical patterns. Generally, higher order places with large population have more central functions, functional units and command larger complementary areas than lower order places. The main idea in the concept of a hierarchy, the idea of definite orders of central places, is directly opposed to that of a smooth continuum of urban places. Berry has argued, however, that there is ample evidence for the existence of a hierarchy, but on the other hand there has been no satisfactory evidence provided that would suggest that a hierarchical class system does indeed exist.

Seven grades of central places are identified by the author from the field survey carried out in 1968 & 1969 and further in 1973 & 1974. These settlements can conveniently be termed as city, major towns, towns townships, large villages, villages and hamlets. The differences between Jaffna (city grade) and Vavuniya and Mannar (major town grade) settlements are very clear. The discrete pattern of the hierarchy is dominant in city, major town, town, and township centres, but in the lower orders a continuum of declining importance is visible.

The hierarchy of centres described above was expected to be influenced by consumer travel patterns and the size of the complementary areas of central places. The travel patterns and complementary areas of centres also show their nodality and centrality positions. The centrality or nodality of places may be measured directly by assessing movements to and from central places or indirectly by appraising settlement characteristics especially functional characteristics, which are presumed to reflect movements. The analysis of transport structure and travel patterns are taken here in order to demarcate the urban sphere of influence with other factors.

Transport Structure

The transport facilities and mobility of population of an area are the indicators of the degree of economic and social development. Transportation routes are essential for the flow of goods, people and information around the central place system. The movements connect the several elements of the system into an integrated whole, whilst transport facilities assist the growth of centres and increase the movements of people. The structure and the means of transport are the essential factors determining travel patterns. The difference in density of roads between the Peninsula and the Mainland is very clear. On the Mainland, except for a few main roads such as Jaffna - Kandy, Talaimannar - Anuradhapura, Mullaitivu - Mankulam and Parayanalayankulam - Vavuniya, the majority are impassable and not open to traffic at certain times of year. A large number of small settlements on the Mainland are not served by roads. This affects the mobility of their population. But on the Peninsula, the road network is fairly developed and most settlements are connected to main or secondary roads. There are two railway systems. One is in the centre, between Kankesanthurai-Iratperiyakulam and the other is in the South West, between Talaimannar and Neriyakulam. Both railways meet at Madawachiya nearly 14 miles from the area's southern boundary.

The structure of the transport network of the area is analysed by graph theory. Garrison[1] and Kansky[2] used graph theory to analyse transport structure in the U. S. A. and in Sardinia. For the analysis of network structure the main trunk roads and main motorable roads are taken into consideration. The network refers to a geographic location interconnected in a system by a number of routes. This suggests three fundamental building blocks: origins, routes and destinations. The term structure denoted the layout, geometry or network pattern of transportation systems. These expressions, which may be used synonymously, imply a set of spatial relations between distinguishable elements of transportation networks in respect of each other and to the organized whole. By measuring such relationship we can quantify the notion of structure.

Graph theory, as a branch of combinatorial topology provides us with an appropriate language suitable for the measurement and analysis of the structure of transportation networks. Graphs, defined as sets of systematically organized points and lines, are similar visual representations of abstract concepts and relations. Christaller's $K = 4$ system of central places is based on transport principles.

Some important measures of Kansk's proposals are examined here to analyse the fundamental structure of the network. For the fundamental measures of network of the study, the Peninsula and the Mainland

are treated separately. In graph theory, the cyclomatic number (or first Betti number), Alpha, Beta and Gamma are important. The formula to U is as follows:[3]

$$U = e - V + P$$

e = edges or routes
V = vertices or nodes
P = number of subgraph

The cyclomatic number of the Jaffna Peninsula and the Mainland road network is as follows:

	$U = e - V + P$
Peninsula	$226 - 140 + 1 = 87$
Mainland	$68 - 53 + 1 = 16$

The cyclomatic number shows the transport network differences between the Peninsula and the Mainland. The Peninsula centres are more connected than the Mainland centres.

The Alpha measure is an adjusted form of cyclomatic number U. The formula X is for planar graph.[4]

$$X = \frac{U}{2V} - 5$$

Alpha measure for Peninsula

$$X = \frac{87}{280} - 5 = 0{\cdot}31$$

Alpha for Mainland

$$X = \frac{8}{106} - 5 = 0{\cdot}079$$

The Alpha index for the Peninsula is six times greater than for the Mainland, On the Peninsula, the graph is not connected to a maximum level. The absence of diagonal connections is the main reason for the low Alpha index. The road pattern of the Jaffna Peninsula reflects rectangular and quadrangular patterns.

The measure of the degree of connectivity of a transport network is given by the Beta index.[5] This expresses the relationship between two individual elements in the network. The connectivity of the network increases with the decreasing number of vertices. The degree of connectivity depends on the number of edges. The connectivity index of the Peninsula and the Mainland is as follows:[6]

$$B = \frac{e}{V}$$

$$\text{Peninsula} = \frac{58}{53} = 1{\cdot}09$$

$$\text{Mainland} = \frac{226}{140} = 1{\cdot}61$$

The Gamma index (X) is a ratio between the edges and vertices of a given transportation network. The formula is as follows:

$$Y = \frac{e}{3(V-2)}$$

The Gamma index for the Peninsula is ·52 and for the Mainland ·036. The value of 1 expresses a complete network. This analysis shows that the Peninsula has a developed network. However, the network is not fully developed and the low value for the Mainland represents a poorly developed transport network.

Frequency of travel

The frequency of travel patterns depends on the nature of employment, income and other service facilities. The commuter population in the area is very small except in Jaffna although even here the numbers are small. The absence of industries in towns, and limited travel opportunities clearly restrict the commuter population. The general absence of a large scale commuter population therefore means that the movement of people are mainly for the purchase and consumption of central goods. Social visits such as visiting relatives and attending social events are also significant. The main purpose of travel therefore are for shopping, going to cinema or hospital or attend a court or offices or social visits.

Owing to the absence of large scale, private car ownership, the public depends almost entirely on bus services for travelling. The train service is used mainly for long distance journeys but the inflexibility and unavailability of train service for many villagers restricts their use. Bicycles are used but mainly for short distance movement. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the bus service pattern largely reflects consumer movement and the urban sphere of influences.

Bus services were used by Green[7] in the United Kingdom and Europe and Sven Gunland[8] in Sweden to demarcate the urban sphere of influence of community interest areas. Carruthers[9] used bus service pattern for the classification of service centres in England and Wales and to study the relationship between town and country. He used public transport not only to demarcate the hinterland areas but also to determine the higher order service centres. The service areas of the service centres within Greater London were demarcated based on the public transport system.[10] However, the importance of bus and train services in the U. K. has declined particularly since the 1960's as a result of the increase in private car ownership. The present role of bus service in public transport in Sri Lanka is very similar to the bus transport pattern of U. K. in late 1940's and 1950's.

Detailed analysis of bus services in the area helps to explain the travel patterns and service areas of central places. In Sri Lanka, the national bus service is under the state owned establishment of the Ceylon Transport Board. Before 1958, the bus service was operated by private companies: there were five companies on the Peninsula, one in Mullaitivu and another in Mannar. A few bus routes were operated by co-operative societies and traveller's associations. The Government's nationalization of all private bus companies in 1958 was a step towards the improving of the service, through reorganization and the division of the Island into different transport regions. The northern region covers most of the area.

There are three main bus depots: Jaffna, Point Pedro and Mannar, small depots at Vavuniya, Karainagar, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. The number of services expanded in the 1950's with the metalling of roads. Before 1958, regular bus services were only operated on a few profitable routes. After nationalization, new routes were inaugurated, particularly on the Mainland, and the services were expanded. However, this expansion was restricted between 1958 and 1965 due to an inadequate number of buses, and the opposition of local people to the use of Sinhala registration number plates on vehicles. Since 1965, opposition has diminished and new buses have been added to depots in Jaffna and other places. Even so, the general shortage of buses is still the main factor preventing the opening of new bus routes and increasing the frequency of services in many areas. Motorable roads and the population size of settlements are now the two determining factors in the development of bus services but the small number of passengers and the poor roads on the Mainland prevent the development of services and except for a few interior routes, the distribution of bus services is restricted to main roads on the Mainland.

The frequency of services and the average number of people travelling routes are the two most important criteria in identifying urban spheres of influence. The cumulative frequency of scheduled bus services per day indicates the distribution pattern of bus routes and their importance. The frequency of services is low except on the main central routeway. Some of the bus routes have only two services per day. On the Peninsula the density of bus routes and frequency of services are high except in a few isolated, interior settlements. There are between 101 – 150 bus services per day on Jaffna - Palaly - Keerimalai, Jaffna - Kodikamam, Jaffna - Kankesanthurai - Keerimalai, Jaffna - Manipay - Karainagar, Jaffna - Point Pedro and Jaffna - Islands routes with Jaffna having a prominent position in the bus and train transportation system. Bus services link it with the whole of the Peninsula, and all the important centres on the Mainland. In addition, long distance bus services operate to Tricomalee, Batticaloa, Matale, and towns in East and Central Sri Lanka. The frequency of services to

places on the Peninsula varies from ten minutes on the main routes to an hour on the minor ones. On minor routes services ranges from one to three per day.

Point Pedro is the main bus service centre in the Vadamaradchy division. There 22 bus routes and the town is connected with all the major settlements in the Vadamaradchy division. Short distance bus services link Valveddithurai and Nelliyady with Point Pedro. Point-Pedro and Jaffna are linked by three separate routes. Other important routes are Point Pedro-Kodikamam and Point Pedro-Aliyawalai and Kodikamam is the main express railway station for Vadamaradchy division.

Atchuveli, Chunnakam, Chankanai, Chavakachcheri and Kayts are the next most important bus service centres on the Peninsula and from one to ten services operate from each of these centres. Chavakachcheri is located on the main route linking Jaffna to the southern part of the Peninsula. Twenty-one services operate through or originate from this centre. Atchuveli, Chankanai and Chunnakam are bus service centres at divisional level in the Valikamam area. Services originating from these centres are of a short distance nature. Kayts is a terminal town, and five services operate to and from it. Kodikamam and Palai have express train halts and bus service centres for Eastern Tenmaradchy and Pachchilapalai. Kodikamam is linked with Point Pedro and Atchuveli. All Jaffna - Mainland and long distance buses pass through these centres and this affects their importance.

On the Mainland, the bus service centres are Mannar, Vavuniya, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Murungan, Mankulam and Punakari. Of these Mannar is the main centre and twenty-six bus services operate from it. The centre is connected by long distance services with Jaffna, Vavuniya and Anuradhapura. The western coastal area of the Mainland is connected to Mannar by bus services and most of the services are found in the area from Mannar to Erukalampiddy in the west to Murungan in the east. The frequency of services on other routes is low, ranging from one to three per day. Murungan is the other bus service centre in Mannar district, operating services to Silawathurai, Madhu Road, Madhu Church, Palampiddy and Pandivirichchan. This centre is also second in the functional hierarchy in the Mannar district. Punakari is a small bus service centre, operating four services.

Kilinochchi, Mankulam and Vavuniya are the main bus service centres in the central part of the Mainland. Except for some long distance services, these centres developed short distance services in the 1960's as part of the colonization schemes. From Kilinochchi ten services operate to neighbouring colonization settlements e. g. to Uruthirapuram, Tharmapuram, Kandawalai, Vaddakachchi and Ramanathapuram. Since the establishment of a sub-bus depot in Vavuniya

in 1968, the bus services have increased. Vavuniya South Sinhala and Tamil and Cheddikulam division settlements are all connected with Vavuniya by a low frequency of services. Eastern coastal area and Vavuniya North division are served by Mullaitivu.

The bus passenger movements in the area reflects the importance of bus routes and central places. More than 20,000 people visit Jaffna daily. The people go there to obtain various central goods and services. However, nearly 5,000 commuting population is included in this figure. Because it is a regional centre, the people come from all parts of Northern Sri Lanka although, the majority of the people are from the Islands, Valikamams, Tenmaradchy and Vadamaradchy. For low order functions the Island and Valigamam people visit more frequently than the Mainland people.

Over 6,000 people visit the second order centres of Mannar and Vavuniya daily. These centres attract people from a large area of the Mainland. In the case of third order centres, between 3,000—6,000 people visit Kilinochchi, Point Pedro, Chavakachcheri and Chunnakam. The number of people visiting Point Pedro remains more or less constant but in the other centres the daily figure fluctuates because of periodic market functions. Small townships such as Kayts, Chankanai, Mullaitivu, Kodikamam, Palai, Murungan and Pandatharippu have between 1,000—3,000 visits per day whilst the smaller places are visited by less than 1,000 people daily.

Concept of range and service areas

Service areas of central functions and central places is one of the most important aspects of central place theory. The range of a good or service is determined by the distance the dispersed population will travel to purchase the good from a centre "..... ..... a product of the simultaneous spatial effects of all the factors of demand and supply involved in the purchase of central goods and services. The good has both upper and lower limits to its range. The upper limit is the maximum possible radius of sales beyond which the price of the good is too high for it to be sold, either because of the increase of prices with distance untill consumers will no longer purchase the good (*the ideal limit* where demand becomes zero), or because of the greater proximity of consumers to an alternate competing centre (the real limit)[11]. The minimum is called the population threshold which was discussed in chapter five.

Each central function found in a central place has its own complementary area. The size of the complementary area depends on the hierarchical level of functions. Lower order functions such as primary schools or retail stores or co-operative stores have small complementary areas, whereas higher order functions have large

complementary areas, such as district administration and provincial hospitals. There are two types of functions which can be defined based on their complementary areas. The first type of functions such as administration and certain commercial functions have defined complementary areas and there are 32 central functions of this category found in the area. The second type of functions are mainly commercial and social functions which do not have defined complementary areas. In the first type of central functions it is possible to demarcate their exact complementary areas, but in the second type of central functions the complementary areas can only be determined only through analysis.

The service areas of central places are an aggregation of service areas of central functions. The lower order places with lower order functions have a small service area, the higher order places with higher and lower order functions command large service areas. In order to demarcate service areas of higher order central places, the following factors are taken into consideration; Bus service analysis, the central functions with defined service areas, population threshold sizes of functions and the information gathered from field survey. These factors give valuable information about town and country relationships.

The consumer movement and the service areas of the central places are well expressed by above factors. The information about consumer movements and consumption of goods was gathered from traders, administrative offices, local authorities and the people involved in central goods supply. The consumer behaviour and movements are not complex in the area as in western countries. Basically, Northern Sri Lanka is not a mass consuming society and it is a peasantry society with a very low per capita income. The Socio-Economic Survey of 1969—70 indicated that 40 percent of the households in Sri Lanka earn less than Rs 200 per month. A further 40 percent of the households earn between Rs. 200 and Rs. 400 per month.[12] The income pattern of Northern Sri Lanka is more or less same as the national income pattern. On average each Ceylonese family spends 60 percent of his income on food items and this money goes directly to the local co-operatives, retail stores and local markets. Most food commodities have to be bought at local co-operatives because of the subsidised ration scheme. In addition to this, acute scarcity of durable consumer goods and extra-ordinary high prices restrict the purchasing power of the people. The dowry system also prevents people from purchasing durable goods. This assists thriftness in the society and people prefer to keep their savings in the form of money or gold. For travel purposes, non-commercial functions play a vital role. Ordinary people visit central places mainly not for shopping but to visit a hospital or a court or government offices or to go to a cinema or social and cultural event.

As pointed out earlier, the author recognized the hierarchy of centres, i. e. cities, major towns, towns, townships, large villages, villages and hamlets. The complementary areas of the first four classes of central places are taken here for discussion. Spatial interdependence of centres and functional wholeness of the system are two fundamental characteristics of central place theory. To a large extent, Northern Sri Lanka fulfills these two conditions. Towns within this area are more interlinked than with the towns outside the area. In terms of its functional wholeness, the area can be treated as a closed system under Jaffna. In the context of Sri Lanka, Jaffna, Kandy and Galle are the second tier of urban centres after Colombo in the urban hierarchy. The second order hierarchical level of national function are found in Jaffna.

The First Order - Jaffna

The service area of Jaffna covers the whole of the area. Earlier reasons which explain the 'functional wholeness' of Jaffna were given. The entire area is embraced by Jaffna for specialized and higher order functions, particularly administrative, educational and social functions. The cultural differences between the study area and the area to the south also limits the sphere of influence of the city. Bus service patterns show all the important centres of the area which are linked with Jaffna.

The Second Order - Mannar and Vavuniya

Mannar and Vavuniya service areas cover a large part of the Mainland. The extent of the service areas is very similar to the administrative boundaries of the districts. The service areas of these two places are relatively easy to define, because of their role in administration and other higher order functions. When compared with Peninsula towns, these places have little competition from low order places and there are no town status central places in Mannar or Vavuniya district.

The Third Order-Kilinochchi, Chavakachcheri, Point Pedro and Chunnakam

Third order centre service areas are more difficult to demarcate. The first and second order centres complementary are similar to the area and the district areas. But in the third order centres, in addition to the above factors, physical factors also influence size. Kilinochchi's complementary area covers the whole of the Mainland part of the Jaffna district and the southern part of Pachchilapallai division. It functions as a main central place for Southern Jaffna district. Its influences became more dominant after the creation of Kilinochchi parliamentary constituency and township. Before the 1960's the Punakari area was more strongly linked to Kilinochchi. The

development of bus services between Punakari and Kilinochchi and other colonization settlements explains the growth of its sphere of influence.

Chavakachcheri's service area covers the whole of Tenmaradchy and Pachchilapallai except Mullipattu. Thondamanaru and the Upparu lagoons divide Tenmaradchy from the rest of the Peninsula. Tenmaradchy is physically a peninsula within the Jaffna Peninsula. Bus service patterns and functional areas of the D. R. O., the Magistrate Court, the District Court, the Department of Excise and hospital functions cover the whole of Tenmaradchy and Pachchilapallai.

The Vadamaradchy area is covered by Point Pedro. Similar to Tenmaradchy, Thondamanaru lagoons separate Vadamaradchy from Valigamam, Tenmaradchy and Pachchilapallai. Bus services, transportation networks and administrative functions for Vadamaradchy are focused on Point Pedro. The Divisional Revenue Office area, the Magistrate Court and the police service area all cover the same complementary area.

This is the main centre for the Valikamam division. The service area of Chunnakam covers the most populated and fertile market gardening area. The centre functions as a primate agricultural market centre. Bus service facilities from this centre also indicates its sphere of influence. The influence of Jaffna restricts the influence of Chunnakam on the southern and western side. The number of fourth order centres such as Kankesanthurai, Chankanai, Tellipalai, Pandatharippu and Atchuveli restrict competition in the supply of agricultural goods. The absence of administrative functions in Chunnakam puts it at a disadvantage when compared with Point Pedro, Chavakachcheri and Kilinochchi.

The Fourth Order—Centres

There are 17 places in this category. They are all important townships and play a major role in providing goods and services at divisional or sub-divisional level. Towns like Mullaitivu and Murungan play a role in supplying goods and services at sub-district level whilst Peninsula towns such as Kayts, Chankanai, Palai are mainly divisional level towns. Places like Kankesanthurai, Tellipalai, Pandatharippu, Valveddithurai and Kodikamam are mainly sub-divisional level. The size of the service areas and the distance between towns are mainly determined by population. On the mainland, the size of the service areas is larger, because of the scanty distribution of population. On the Peninsula, the average distance between fourth and higher order towns is less than four miles.

The service centres of the area are mainly associated with state orientated functions. The functions have defined service areas. These reflect the size and shape of the service areas of the centres. The

size of the service areas differs between the Peninsula and the Mainland, because of the distribution of the population. The public transport pattern reflects the real travelling pattern in the area. Even in fifth order settlements, Village Council areas reflect the service areas of the fifth order centres. The sixth order places on the Mainland are associated with Grama Sevaka divisions.

Conclusion

The transport structure of an area reflects the pattern of economic and social development. The differences between the Peninsula and the Mainland are noticeable. In all quantified transport indices differences existing between the two regions reflect their economic productivity. In underdeveloped countries, public transport plays a significant role in the movement of people. This is evident in Northern Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has not yet become a country of large scale private ownership of cars or mass consuming society. The public transport pattern and the defined service areas of administrative areas and other functions reflect the service areas of the central places. These factors with other general information about town-country relationships are found effective in demarcating service areas of higher order centres. However, one might be able to observe very small anomalies in this general with an exhaustive consumer survey.

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BRAHMI INSCRIPTIONS OF TAMIL NADU— AN HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT

K. V. Raman
Professor of Ancient History and Archaeology
University of Madras
India

Tamil inscriptions discovered mainly in the southern districts of Madurai, Tirunelveli and Ramanathapuram, known as the Pandyanadu, have rightly assumed importance in any discussion relating to the early history of Tamil Nadu. These inscriptions, which came to light in the early twenties of this century, were till recently very vague and undefined. Great efforts were made by early doyens of epigraphy like H. Krishna Sastri, K. V. Subramania Iyer and Gopinatha Rao who did considerable pioneering work in the field and identified many words and read them with the help of the known Asokan and the Bhattiprolu Brahmi inscriptions. Yet some peculiar letters and word-formations presented a hurdle to their satisfactory reading. K. V. Subramania Iyer with his admirable insight could recognise the language of these inscriptions as Tamil written in an adapted Brahmi-script. Yet, many letters remained unidentified and hence the readings of word-formations were consequently fragmentary and incomplete. But, in recent years, considerable improvement in their reading, done especially by Iravatham Mahadevan[1], has enabled the scholars to identify clear Tamil words. Meaningful sentences, giving the names of persons, places, gifts etc., have come to light. These inscriptions, about 75 in all, form the earliest corpus of Tamil inscriptions available and are datable to a period ranging between 200 B. C. and 300 A. D. A comparative study of these inscriptions, their scripts, as well as their content, with similar and well-dated epigraphs of Asokan times and the Buddhist sites at Bhaṭṭiprolu in Andhra enables us to arrive at this time bracket. In Tamil Nadu itself potsherds with engravings in this script have been found in well-dated strata in the Arikamedu excavations. Many more similar inscribed

sherds have been found in the excavations at Aḷagarai, Uraiyūr (Trichy District), Korkai (in Tirunelveli District) etc. thus confirming the same chronological horizon for these inscriptions. (T. V. Mahalingam, *Inscribed Potsherds from Alagarai and Uraiyur.*)

These inscriptions are fragmentary and their language is colloquial Tamil with an admixture of Prakrit words. These record the donations or gifts made to the Jain monks who resorted to the natural caverns and cliffs for their severe penance. The donors were mostly merchants (probably some of them Jains) though kings, chieftains and the common folk were also there. The gifts were in the form of cutting or carving the smooth stone beds for the monks to lie on or cutting a drip-ledge (*tāra-ani*) in the face of the rock so as to prevent rain water from entering into the interior of the cave or putting up a country roof of palm leaves (*kūrai*) in front of the cave to protect it from sunlight. Most of the caverns face east as in the morning direct sunlight would splash in the interior of the cave. In a recently discovered inscription at Ariṭṭapaṭṭi, the cave is called *Muḷakai.*

Apart from their linguistic interest these inscriptions, present much valuable material for the early history of Tamil Nādu. We get in them the names of kings, chieftains, dynasties, personal names and titles, village and town names, the articles donated by the various classes in society, etc. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the significance of the data furnished by these inscriptions under various heads, mentioned above.

I. Dynastic Names:

1. *Caḷivaṉ*: This is mentioned as a prefix for the name Atanaṉ in the newly discovered inscription at Ariṭṭapatti[2]. Caḷivan is to be taken as another form of *Caliyan* by which name the Pāṉḍyas are known in the Sangam literature and also later. Caḷiyan is also used in the name Neṭuñcaliyan, occurring in the Māṅkulam inscription.

Vaḷuti, Kaṭalan and Paṇavan: All these terms occur as prefixes for Neṭuncaḷiyan. They are alternative names for the Pandya dynasty (Nagaswamy *Kalveṭṭiyal* P. 53).

II. Kings:

Neṭuncaḷiyan: Mentioned in the Māṅkulam inscription. It records his donation to the monastery (*Pāḷi*) at Māṅkulam. Another donation to the same monastery by Caṭikan the father of Iḷam Caṭikan, the brother-in-law (*Sāḷakan*) of Neṭuncaḷiyan is also recorded.

This would show that the Pāṉḍyan King and his relatives extended their patronage to the Jain monks. Since the inscription is datable to the 3rd century B. C., it is felt that Neṭuncaḷiyan of this inscription might be earlier than Talaiyalaṅkānattu Neṭuncaḷiyan and Āriyappaṭai Kaṭanda Neṭuncaḷiyan[3] of Sangam fame (Mahadevan).

2. *Cēra King*: The Pukaḷūr inscription mentions the Cera kings Ilaṅkaṭuṅkō, son of Peruṅkaṭuṅkōn, the son of king Ātan Cellirumpoṛai. The first mentioned king donated a cave at Pukaḷūr to a Jain monk after he became the heir-apparent. When we bear in mind that the same Cera kings have been mentioned in the Sangam poem *Patiṟṟuppattu*, we will be excited to see contemporary inscriptional evidence with all its implications on chronology and geneology (56 and 57).[3a]

III. Chieftains and Officers:

1. *Ataṉ*: Probably the name of a family line used as a suffix in the name Peratan of Pākkanūr in Kongar Puliyaṅgulam inscription.

Occurs in the name of the Cera King Ātan-Cel-Irumpoṛai (Pukaḷūr 56); occurs as suffix in the name Ātan Cāttan at Kunnakkuḍi (69), occurs as a personal name of a goldsmith and also a cloth merchant at Alagarkōil. (30, 35, and 43)

2. *Ātanan Calivan Velivan*: Donated the Cave at Ariṭṭāpaṭṭi.

3. *Antai Cēndan* (?) mentioned in Mettupatti inscription.

4. *Kaṇiman* the Chieftain who took Tēnūr mentioned in the inscription at Māmandur. (71)

5. *Peru Paraṇan*, the chieftain of Erukkaṭṭuṛu mentioned in the inscription Pillaiyarpaṭṭi. (75)

6. *Kūran-Ōri*, probably a member of the Ori clan mentioned in Pukaḷūr inscription. (59)

7. *Pittan*: Probably an officer under the Cēra (Pukaḷūr) at Nalliyūr.

8. *Tinnan Etiran Cēndan*: Probably a chieftain or king mentioned in the Āndipatti coins.

IV. Monks:

1. *Kaṇiyananta Āsiriyar*: Occupied the monastery at Māṅkulam (1 and 2) Neṭuñceliyan and his brother-in-law gave gifts to his monastery.

2. *Kuvuṭi Iten*—mentioned in Sittannavasal as a monk who was born in Kumuḷūr in Eruminātu. (27)

3. *Ariti* of Eḷaiyur had its monastery at Karuṅkāḷakkuḍi. (28)

4. *Kāsapan*, the monk mentioned at Alagarkoil. (41)

5. *Nūtan* living in the dormitory at Kuṉṛattūr. (55)

6. *Cenkāyapan*—a Jaina Monk (*amaṇṇan*) from Yaṟṟūr, who lived in the cave at Pukaḷūr. The Cera King Ilankaṭunko caused the beds to be cut. (56 and 60)

7. *Cenkāyipan*—occupied cave at Tiruchi. (68)

8. *Cantirananti*—his place of penance at Tirunātankuṉṛu where he died observing fifty-seven days of fasting. (76)

9. a nun of Sapamita..... (Alag. 36)

10. *Ven-Kasipan* donated a bed at Marukaltalai. (29)

V. Merchants & Guilds:

Majority of the donors of these caves were merchants and tradesman. Trade guilds called *Nigamam* were also active in the region. Even in the medieval times large sections of trading classes patronised Jainism.

1. *Vel-arai-nikamatōr*: The mercantile guild of Velarai donated a bed at Māṅkulam. The Village of Vellaraipaṭṭi which is very near Māṅkulam in Melur Taluk is probably mentioned here as Veḷarai. (Mank. 6)

The same merchant guild caused a lattice to be given (Mank. 3).

2. *Viyakan kanatikan*, the salt merchant (*Uppu-vāṇikan*) donated a stone-bed in the Alagarkoil cave. (34)

3. *Neṭumalan*, the sugar merchant (*paṇita-vaṇikan*) gave some gift. (37)

4. *Elacacantan*, the iron-monger gave some gift. (38)

5. *Elava Atan*, a cloth merchant (*aruvai-vānikan*) of Venpali gave some gift. (43)

6. *Atti*, a gold merchant (*pon-vānikan*) from Karūr gave a bed at Pukaḷūr (66)

7. *Tevan cāttan*, a merchant in precious (*Maṇiy-vaṇṇakan*) stones made seven beds (72)

8. *Kalitika Antai*, a Merchant-prince of Vel-arai (Māṅk. 3)

VI. Place-Names:

1. *Velarai*—Probably Veḷḷaripaṭṭi near Māṅkulam in Melur Taluk. A merchant-guild flourished here (see note V. 1. also)

2. *Toṇḍi*: Iḷavan a devotee from here (12) gave a gift to Kilaveḷavu cave—probably the famous Toṇḍi, the port on the east coast (9)

3 *Pākkanūr*—Peratan Pittan of this village thatched a canopy at Konkar—puliyangulam. Perhaps identifiable with the present village of Pāganūr (12)

4. *Petalai*—Mentioned in the inscription at Vikkiramangalam (14)

5. *Patinur*—Mentioned in the Meṭṭuppaṭṭi inscription (23)

6. *Cirupāvil*—Mentioned in the Cittannavāsal inscription.

7. *Kumulūr*—In Eruminatu, Cittannavāsal inscription.

8. *Elaiyūr*—The monk Ariti was from this village (28)

9. *Matirai*—Common form for Madurai (Alag. 31)[4]

10. *Vēnpal*. A cloth merchant of this place mentioned in the inscription (43).

11. *Erukkāṭṭūr*—Pololaiyan of this place was from Ceylon (51).

12. *Iḷam*—Ceylon; householder from this place gave a gift at Tirpparaṅkuṇram (51).

13. *Vintaiyur*: A Ceylonese (Caiyaḷan) at this place gave a gift to cave at Muttupaṭṭi (52).

14. *Nākapērūr* — Mentioned in the same place; probably it is an old name of the present village of Nagamalai very near Muttupaṭṭi (53)

15. *Yarrur*—A Jain monk of this place Cenkayapan lived in the cave at Pukaḷūr. The Cera King gave gifts to this. This may be identified with the present Āṟṟūr near Salem which is not far away from Pukaḷūr (56-60).

16. *Nalliyūr*—Kīran and Ōri of this place are mentioned in Pukaḷūr inscription (58-59). Probably it is the Nallur of the Kōsars[5].

17. *Karūr*: A gold-merchant from Karūr gave a bed at Pukaḷūr (66).

18. *Tenūr*: This was captured by the hill-chieftain Kaniman (Māmandur 71).

19. *Erukkāṭṭūr*: The chieftain of this place was Perumparaṇan whose gift is recorded in Pillaiyarpaṭṭi (76).

20. *Nelveli*: Atanan of this place gave a gift to the Ariṭṭapaṭṭi Cave.

21. *Erumi-nātu*: This is mentioned in Cittannavasal inscription (27). This reference is to the territorial division *Naṭu* is interesting.

VII. Personal Names:-

Besides the names of kings, chieftains, monks and merchants, we get a few more personal names which are given here:

1. *Caṭikan*, the father of Ilañcaṭika and brother-in-law of Neṭuñceḷiyan (2).
2. *Cantaritan*:- gave a bed at Māṅkulam (5)
3. *Ariṭan*:- gave a bed at Tiruvātavūr (7)
4. *Ilavan*:- a devotee for Toṇdi (9)
5. *Upparuvan*:- a lay devotee (10)
6. *Ceruātan*:- gave plaited fronds for the canopy (11)
7. *Antai-pikan* (13)
8. *Kuviren of Petalai* (14)
9. *Cenkuviran* (15)
10. *Kuviratan* (16)
11. *Chatan* (17) also in Arikamedu No. 9
12. *Mutikularan* (AKM, No. 15).
13. *Yaduvolabhuta* (AKM No. 20).
14. *Iravi* and his son *Kasi-nakan* and *Kaniy-nantan* and their gifts (32) *Iravi* was used by the Ceras as the prefix in later times.
15. *Antuvan*:- Donor in Tirupparaṅkuṇram insc. (48) Name familiar to the Sangam literature.

Assessment:- The foregoing analysis would go to show the historical value of the inscriptions. *Firstly*, they represent the earliest body of epigraphical evidence available in the Tamil Country even as the Asokan edicts are to the rest of our country. It is a well-known fact that Asokan inscriptions are found only up to the Mysore

country and none has been found in Tamil Nadu or Kerala. But the provenance of these inscriptions in more or less the same script (with certain modifications or adaptations to suit the genius of the Tamil language) and also closely following it in point of time is indeed significant. They certainly go to underline the scriptal unity of the Indian subcontinent in spite of the linguistic diversities. It is interesting to note in this connection that the same trend is seen in Sri Lanka also, where Brahmi came to be adopted to Prakrit. South India was thus linked to the rest of the country by scriptal tie. Moreover, Prakrit terms were freely mixed in the local language. It was perhaps the most powerful and popular tongue that was widespread in the entire subcontinent and Sri Lanka, much earlier than Asokan times. Here again, the Tamil country partook in the great movement. The use of a number of Prakrit words in the Brahmi inscriptions attest to the popularity of the language. Tamil people were familiar with the words long before the advent of the Brahmi script. Their familiarity with the Prakrit language should be traced to the pre-Asokan times when Brahmanical tenets had arrived.[6] That Prakrit language was well absorbed and assimilated is well reflected in these early inscriptions. *Secondly*, the Brahmi inscriptions were widespread in the different parts of the Tamil country. We can no longer dismiss them as the script adopted by a few Jainas who were learning the local language. The uniformity of the script available in Tirunelveli, Madurai, Tiruchi, South Arcot and Chingleput shows that it was well established and well understood over distant places. They were no longer confined to the Jain or Buddhist establishments alone. They are found used by the common folk on the pots and vessels as found in the recent excavations at Korkai, Uraiyūr, Aḷagarai and not to speak of Arikamedu near Pondicherry, the well-known site having the inscribed pot sherds in abundance. They have also been found in the coins recently discovered at Andipatti in North Arcot District. What do all these indicate? They certainly indicate a stage when this script was commonly understood and used in the day-to-day transactions. It was not the script of the elite alone, it was the script of average lettered man to whom the inscriptions were addressed. Potters have used it to write their names on the vessels. King Neduñceḷiyan has used the script for recording his donation at Maṅkulam near Madurai. The Cēra heir-apparent has recorded his donation in the same script at Pukāḷūr near Tiruchi; again, the chieftain who took Tenur wrote his donation in the script in Mamandūr near Kāñchi (Chingleput Dist). Thus, it can be seen that in point of space, it was widespread from Kāñchi to Tirunelveli. In fact, it is found even beyond the sea in a big way in Sri Lanka[7]. Again, from the point of view of social strata, it was popular with the prince as well as the potter.[8] Moreover, the usage of certain letters like ḷ ḻ ṟ and ṉā to suit peculiar phonetic values

in the Tamil language would again show that the script had been consciously adapted and absorbed into the local matrix as could be done not by strangers but the local elite. If this script had been only for the outsiders for their own consumption, they would have carried on with the script with which they were already familiar as in other parts of India. But only people with deep insight into the linguistic or phonetic values of Tamil could have devised or evolved the letters to express the special sound values of the Tamil language not found in the contemporary scripts elsewhere. *Thirdly*, the provenance of the inscriptions has to be viewed in a larger perspective of the process of acculturation or cultural evolution. This aspect has been discussed admirably by Clarence Maloney[9]. He has shown how it was during the Sangam Age (first three centuries A. D.) that South India was moving beyond the subsistence economy and entering a new phase marked by growth in trade, formalized religion, structured society, permanent buildings and writing. The well-developed literary forms of this Sangam period, according to him, had their roots in the earlier writings of Brahmi inscriptions of 3rd and 2nd centuries B. C.[10]. "Here archaeology and epigraphy provide evidence antedating the literary sources by at least three centuries and show something of the process of acculturation and development of civilization". This is a very significant point to be noted in evaluating the importance of the Brahmi inscriptions. He has brought out strong evidence based on archaeological and literary sources to show how the adoption of script at that stage was natural and in keeping with the general process of acculturation *Fourthly*, the naive belief that the Tamil Brahmi inscriptions stand in isolation and are unconnected to the later Tamil *Vatteluttu* script is no longer true. The recent discovery of a number of hero-stone inscriptions in North Arcot, South Arcot, Salem and Dharmapuri Districts clearly datable to 5th or 6th century A. D. have shown that they are derivations of the Brahmi.[11] There is no break in the development or evolution of Brahmi into the later stages. This clearly shows the continuity of the scriptal heritage. *Fifthly*, colloquialism used in these inscriptions has been taken by some as their besetting sin and therefore according to them they do not mean any stage in the linguistic or literary evolution of Tamil[12]. Nothing can be more unhistorical than this. Inscriptions are the only contemporary evidence which have come down to us without interpolation unlike literary works which were copied and recopied down the ages. The importance of the inscriptions in linguistic studies is now widely recognised and cannot be over-estimated. As Prof. T. P. Meenakshisundaram has rightly observed, "in inscriptional records, we have more of the colloquial language as it was current in the varying ages to which the records belong"[13]. Colloquialisms and even scriptal errors underline the fact that the commonfolk were using the script

to convey their ideas in their own colloquial manner. In fact, it is through inscriptions that scholars are able to see dynamic changes that have occurred in the script as well as in the phonetic values. From century to century the evolution is discernible more in the inscriptions than in standardised literature. Not only that, even the regional variations are reflected in the inscriptions. All these facts have to be borne in mind while evaluating Tamil Brahmi which can indeed be termed as the progenitor of the Tamil script. *Last* but not least are the contents of the inscriptions which are no less valuable than their form. They have already been analysed in their various subject headings above. They throw useful light on the place-names, names of chieftain, kings, social and economic institutions like guilds, trades men and also religious sects and their practices and provide interesting data comparable to the data available in the Sangam literature and other sources elsewhere like the Asōkan, the Sātavāhana and Sri Lanka inscriptions. Let us look into them more closely and make the following general observations.

1. **Kings:** Taking the kings' names first, it is indeed significant to see the Pāndyan King Neṭuñceḷiyan issuing a record of his donation to the Jain monk at Māṅkulam. Similarly, the Pukaḷūr inscription records a grant to a Jain monk by the Cēra heir-apparent Iḷaṅ Kaṭuṅkō. These two would be the two earliest royal documents available in the Tamil country in their original contemporary script. Hence, they are very important in their general pattern, language, form and script. They may also indicate *prima facie* that the script used was also the official script of the times. The importance of the Pukaḷūr inscriptions for the Cēra genealogy and the genealogy found in *Patiṟṟuppattu* has already been commented upon in detail by Mahadevan and the same need not be repeated here. One difference between the Māṅkulam royal grant and the Pukaḷūr one may, however, be pointed out here. While the former does not mention the regnal year (as later inscriptions do), the latter specifically says that the grant was given by him on becoming the heir-apparent. Moreover, the Pukaḷūr inscription mentions the father (Peruṅkaṭuṅkōn) and the grandfather (Ātan Cel-Irumpoṟai) of the donor in a manner very much reminiscent of the later royal copper plate grants, giving the genealogy of the donor. Hence, we can say that the Pukaḷūr inscription is nearer to the standard pattern of royal grants, which is in the true Indian tradition found in different parts of our country (Also compare the royal grants of the early Sātavāhana kings).

2. **Dynastic Names:** The occurrence of the various dynastic names in the inscriptions is also very interesting. The use of several names like *Vaḷuti, Ceḷiyan, Kaṭalan, Paṇaṟan* to denote the Pāṇḍyas clearly shows how deep-rooted their knowledge was about the Tamil tradition

regarding the Pāṇḍyas. Beginners in and strangers to a language could never use such telling and rare prefixes for the Pandyas. Similar synonyms have been used such as '*Tana*' (55) for *sthana* and *Irukkai*; *Caiyaḷam* and *Ilam* for Sri Lanka (52).

3. **Jainism**: In the history of Jainism in Tamilnadu, these inscriptions have thrown new light, almost unknown to literature. The provenance of these inscriptions in remote villages and hills show the penetration of Jain faith into the interior places, right into the heart of the Tamil Country. Places like Alagarmalai, Tirupparaṅkuṇram, Tiruvātavūr, and Kuṇrakkuṭi are known to us from literature only as centres of Vaisnavism or Saivism. Tamil literature does not speak a word about the Jain settlements and monasteries that were once there. It is through these inscriptions that we come to know that Jainism had considerable hold on the people, and was patronised by kings, traders and the common folk. The names of the Jain monks listed in the paper above are unknown to literature. Names like Ariṭṭan (of Ānaimalai), recall well-known names like Mahā Ariṭṭan (of Sri Lanka fame), Hariti, etc. Similarly, the names like Cenkayapan (at Pukaḷūr) and Venkayapan (at Marugāltalai) 'would seem to denote the denominational *white* and *red* sects of the Jains, so well known in later days' (K. V. Soundara Rajan). Further, the Jains were organised in *Sangas* having groups called *ganas*. The word *Kaṇi* occurring in the Māṅkulam inscription obviously stands for the *Gana* (Nagaswamy) Can kaṇiy-nanta-āsiriyar be taken as the guru of *Nandi-gaṇa* which was one of the well-known Jain *gaṇas*? Sambandar, the *Tēvāram* hymnodist, refers to the existence of various such Jain ganas around Ânaimalai in his Padikam on Madurai. I feel that Tamilnadu like Kalinga and Karnātaka was more sympathetic to Jainism than Buddhism throughout its history. Even the Sangam literature is rather silent on Buddhism.

4. **Language**:- Again, the vocabulary of the Tamil words used and the subtle differences in the words like *Arutta* and *aruppitta* (56), *Ceita* and *Ceipitta* and *Paṇvitta* (71, 72) *kuṭutta* and *Kuṭuppitta* etc. would again point to the fact that the authors were well rooted in Tamil traditions. The use of a number of Prakrit words like *Dhammam, adhiṭṭānam Nigammam, Upacaka, nicitikai* etc. along with such pure Tamil words like *irukkai, urai, Uppu,* (salt) *Aruvai-vaṇikan, Makan, aimpattēḷu* etc. would clearly show a stage when Prakrit and Tamil had already been well fused and assimilated and that the authors were strangers to neither of them. Examples of Prakrit words well assimilated into the Tamil form can be cited here. *Nigama* is the Prakrit word for 'guild' and the members of the guild are Tamilised into *Nigamattōr* (6). *Suta* for son is adapted as *Sutan* (3); *Kuṭumbika* as *Kuṭumpikan* (51). All these would go to show clearly that the authors were the sons of the soil who had integrated the

Prakrit language well into their system by the necessary adaptation. It is interesting to compare the words used for various traders in these inscriptions with those found in the Sātavāhana Brahmi inscriptions. *Tila-Piṣṭakas* (oil monger) *Swarṇakāras* (goldsmith), *Maṇikāras* (dealers in provision stores) and *Kumbakaras* (potters), are used in the Sātavāhana inscriptions. But in the Tamil Brahmi inscriptions, *Kuluva-Vanikan*, *Pon-vanikan Aruvai-vanikan* etc. have been used. This again shows that they were well-versed in the Tamil language. Thus we can envisage two stages in this process of adaptation and assimilation. (1) Absorption of Prakrit words into the Tamil matrix. The beginning of this process is shrouded in antiquity. All we can say is that it was part of the sub-continental spread of Prakrit which must have started a long time before Asoka. The language of the Brahmi inscriptions of Tamilnādu represents a well-integrated stage. Prakrit words have been very convincingly and satisfactorily adapted to the Tamil form and genius as has been shown above. (2) The second and the later movement was the adoption of the Brahmi script in the wake of its spread all over India and Sri Lanka under the imperial patronage of Asoka (3rd Century B. C.). Tamilnadu was no exception to this new wave. Brahmi script was adapted to suit the peculiarities of the Tamil phonetics. Letters like *ḷa*, *ḻ*, *r* and *na*, hitherto unknown to the Brahmi, were introduced in Tamil inscriptions to express the peculiar sound-values. The adaptation could have been done not by strangers or beginners in a language but by the Tamil elite well nurtured in that language who were also already familiar with the Prakrit language (which had an earlier advent).

The free use of Prakrit words in the inscriptions should not therefore mislead us to think that the authors were immigrants, or strangers. As pointed our earlier, Prakrit words had already become part of the day to day spoken Tamil language. Only the Brahmi script was new and it was used to express the existing assimilated language. This will lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the language of the Brahmi inscriptions was well understood by the average lettered people of Tamilnadu, to whom they were indeed addressed.

Once this script was adapted to the Tamil language, it had its own further evolution in subsequent times. Scholars have shown how the *Vaṭṭeluttu* inscriptions found in the recently discovered hero stones of Tamilnādu are a logical evolution of the Brahmi inscriptions[14]. This will again prove that the Brahmi inscriptions do not stand in isolation but had a continuous currency and evolution.

The comparison of the Tamil Brahmi inscriptions with the data obtained in the ancient Tamil Grammar *Tolkāppiyam* is absolutely relevant and it throws many interesting problems which have been discussed by scholars and which need not be repeated here again.

Suffice it to say that the study has convincingly shown that the earlier ones among these inscriptions are anterior to the *Tolkāppiyam*[15] and the later ones overlap with it. As such, they are helpful in building reliable land-marks in the scriptal and linguistic evolution.

5. **Sri Lanka Inspiration**:- The location and distribution of these inscriptions also have an interesting story to tell. All the earlier inscriptions are concentrated in the Pandyan Country (e. g. Māṅkulam, Meṭṭupaṭṭi, Vikkiramamaṅkalam, Karuṅkālakkuḍi, Kīlavaḷavu, Koṅgar — Puliyaṅgulam, Cittaṉavāsal, Tiruvāṭavūr etc.) Whereas the late ones are both found in Toṇḍaimaṇḍalam (e. g. Mamaṇḍūr and Tirunāṭarkuṉṟu). Those found at Erode (Araccālūr) and Tiruchirāppaḷḷi (Pukaḷūr) are also of the later group. The available limited evidence shows that the earlier varieties are not found to the west or south of Tiruchirappalli. This may indicate that the Madurai region was the epi-centre in the Tamil country for the spread of this script whereas the Toṇḍaimaṇḍalam region was the peripheral area. From where did Madurai receive this impact? When we see the high concentration of exactly similar Brahmi inscriptions in Sri Lanka, we have to trace the impact to Sri Lanka which, in all probability, received the Prakrit and Brahmi influences through the sea route (from Gujarat or Kalinga)[16]. The mention of the donation by a householder from Sri Lanka (*Ilakkutumbikan*) to the monastery at Tiruppaṟaṅkuṉṟam and yet another from Sri Lanka mentioned in the Muttupatti inscription would add credibility to this assumption that influences from Sri Lanka had played a vital role in the spread of these inscriptions to the Pandyan territory. Moreover, as pointed out by J. Sundaram,[17] there is similarity between the caves in Sri Lanka and the Tamil country in that we find the inscriptions in brows of caves only in these regions. All these factors undoubtedly link up the Brahmi inscriptions of Pandyanadu with those of Sri Lanka, which in all probability served as the source of inspiration for the former.

Tamil Brahmi inscriptions also show closeness to the Bhaṭṭiprolu southern script variety, but they cannot be directly linked because of the seeming gap in the intervening area. As pointed out earlier, the northern portions of Tamilnadu i. e. Toṇḍaimaṇḍalam and even Chōḷa-maṇḍalam up to Tiruchi have not so far yielded Brahmi inscriptions of the early period, comparable to Bhaṭṭiprōlu. Their presence only in the southern extreme would show that the impact was probably from their neighbouring island of Sri Lanka. This problem needs greater attention and the Brahmi inscriptions of Sri Lanka have to be compared in detail with those of Tamilnadu and studied in depth to get more precise information.

6. Thus, the Brahmi inscriptions found in the cave resorts in different parts of Tamilnadu and also increasingly found in pot-

sherds in several excavations form an important source material for the early history of Tamilnadu, throwing invaluable light on the evolution of the Tamil script, language, state of Jainism, and other varied aspects of the social, political and economic life of the Tamils. Especially, when we know that the earlier ones among them may well go back to the pre-Sangam times and many were co-eval with the Sangam literature, their value is enhanced. The spectrum of Tamil society, its language, and its script that is pictured in its true historical setting in these inscriptions has to be studied with all the care it deserves.

7. There is every likelihood of many more cave-inscriptions coming to light. The inscriptions of the excavated potsherds are also on the increase. All these are opening up a new vista in our field of enquiry. Somehow, the early coins of Tamilnādu are eluding us. Except for the Āndipatti hoard of coins, and the Sātavāhana bilingual coin the early Pāṇḍyan and the early Chōla coins are without any script[18]. But there is every possibility of finding coins bearing Tamil Brahmi inscriptions sooner or later. This will add a new dimension to the problem.

NOTES

1. I. Mahadevan, *Corpus of Tamil Inscriptions* (Madras, 1968)
2. K. V. Raman and Y. Subbarayalu, *A New Tamil Brahmi Inscr. at Arittapatti, Journal of Indian History,* (August 1971) Also K. V. Raman. *Some Aspects of Pandyan History,* (Madras 1971) for a revised reading.
3. R. Nagaswamy, *Kalvettiyal* P. 53.

3a. Numbers in brackets are the inscriptional numbers given in I. Mahadevan's *Corpus, op. cit.*

4. This form occurs in later inscriptions also. This was the common form and not an error as has been taken by a writer (*J. I. H.* LI. pt. II).
5. I. Mahadevan reads it as Nalliyur but Nagaswamy reads it as Nalpiyur (*Kalvettiyal* P. 69.)
6. For the pre-Asokan times, we have the evidence of the *Artha-Śāstra* which speaks about Dakshinapatha abounding in a variety of trade articles and particularly the pearls from the Tambraparani river in the Pandyan country (*Pāṇḍyakavāta*) and cotton fabrics from Madurai. (K. A. N. Sastri. *A History of South India,* P. 84).
7. W. S. Karunaratne, as quoted by Clarence Maloney *Archaeology in South India.*
8. K. V. Soundara Rajan draws a line between the cave inscriptions and the pot inscriptions. He holds that the former may

represent an earlier stage and the latter a stage when the script became popular and spread to the common folk. (*Journal of Kerala Studies I*, No. 2 & 3, P. No. 144. ff.)

9. Clarence Maloney, *Archaeology in South India, Accomplishment and prospects.*

10. The same trend of urbanisation, opening up of ṭrade, introduction of script are also to be in the Sātavāhana Country in the last Centuries B. C. Their inscriptions are full of references to trade guilds, traders, urban centres like Pratiṣṭhṇa, Amaravati etc.

11. R. Nagaswamy, *op. cit.* P. 27.

12. *J. I. H. op. cit.* P. 309, This writer applying the modern forms of certain words call many of the older forms found in inscriptions as 'errors' and 'mistakes' which is indeed very unscientific.

13. T. P. Meenakshisundaram, *A History of the Tamil Language*, (Poona 1966) P. 7.

14. R. Nagaswamy, op. cit.

15. Sa. Ganesan, *Seminar on Inscriptions* pp. 54—55.

This has been generally accepted by many other scholars too. One scholar however does not want to face the issue but simply says 'any comparative study of these epigraphs and *Tolkāppiyam* will take us nowhere' *J. I. H. Aug.* 73. p. 309.

16. For a discussion of the sea route influences see (Clarence Maloney) *Beginnings of Civilization in S. India.*

17. *Seminar on inscriptions*, Op. cit. p. 76.

18. This is indeed surprising especially when we see even the early Sātavāhana Kings like Satakarni I (175 - B. C.) issuing coins with their names, The coins of Gautamiputra Satakarni (1st century A. D.) run into thousands (M. Rama Rao, *Studies in the Early History of Andhradesa*, Madras 1971 p. 30 & 37.)

THE DATE OF KHĀRAVELA AND THE EARLY SĀTAVĀHANAS

T. P. Verma
Banaras Hindu University
Varanasi
India

Now it is generally accepted that the chronology of Khāravela is linked up with the early Sātavāhanas. But there is no general agreement regarding the initial date of the Sātavāhanas as well as that of Khāravela. It varies by several centuries.[1] The chronology of the early Sātavāhanas mainly depends on the testimony of the Purāṇas whereas that of Khāravela rests on the mention of some contemporary kings and dates in his Hāthigumphā inscription. This inscription of Khāravela is one of the most disputed documents not only because of its contents but also because of its palaeographical peculiarities. The main reason for this seems to be its irritably worn out condition which gave rise to several variant readings. Here we do not propose to discuss all these variant readings but will concentrate on some facts contained in the epigraph which throws some light on its date.

There are at least three considerations for determining the date of Khāravela. These are (i) the mention of some contemporary kings, references to dates or era, if any, and, the palaeography. As regards the first there are three names of kings which could be deciphered with various degrees of satisfaction. Of these the reading of the name of Sātakarṇi only is beyound dispute. Of the other two names of *Bahasatimitaṁ* and *Dimita*, very often identified with Demetrius the son of Euthydemes, the reading of the latter is extremely doubtful.[2] Considering the late date of this inscription, as we shall see shortly, and, the doubts prevailing about the exploit in northern India by Demetrius and, also the paucity of evidence to think of Mathura as his capital, it is impossible to arrive at any conclusion on this basis. If we accept the chronology proposed by us the

yavanarāja may be any Śaka Kshatrapa of Mathura or even the proposed name may be Vimaka (Wema Kadphisis) as proposed by Dr. P. L. Gupta.[3] Similarly the identification of *Bahasatimitaṁ* or *Bahapatimitaṁ* with Pushyamitra merely on the ground that Bṛhaspati (Jīva) is the regent, nakshatrādhipa, of the nakshatra or zodiacal asterism Pushya, also named Tishya, in the constellation Cancer or the Crab, cannot be regarded as final in the absence of more convincing evidence'.[4] In no case Khāravela can be regarded as a contemporary of Pushyamitra who ruled from about 187 to 151 B. C.[5] Although Dr. Shashi Kant believes that Khāravela ruled from c. 185 B. C. to c. 172 B. C. he does not regard Pushyamitra as his contemporary.[6]

But the case of Sātakarṇi is worth considering; he seems to be Sātakarṇi the First, the third king of the Sātavāhana dynasty, variously been assigned a date ranging between 3rd century B. C. to 1st century B. C. Some early scholars such as Rapson and Smith prefer to place the early Sātavāhanas in the 3rd century B. C. Their calculation is based on a statement of the Purāṇas that the 'Āndhras' ruled for four and a half centuries. However different Purāṇas are not unanimous on this point. They also give different names and order of succession of the kings assigned to this dynasty. For example *Matsya Purāṇa* gives a list of thirty names but says that 'these nineteen Āndhra (kings) will enjoy the earth'. Similarly most of the *Vāyu* manuscripts say that these thirty Āndhras will enjoy the earth but enumerate only seventeen, eighteen or nineteen kings. But almost all the Purāṇas are unanimous on the point that the founder of the Sātavāhana dynasty was Simuka, also variously misspelt as Śiśūka, Sindhūkka and Sipraka, 'will assail the Kāṇvāyanas and Suśarman, and destroy the remains of the Śuṅgas' power and will obtain this earth'.[8] We have no reason to reject this statement of the Purāṇas. If we accept this we get a definite clue for calculating the date of the beginning of Sātavāhana dynasty. In the Purāṇic lists of the future kings[9] it is stated that 137 years after the accession of Chandragupta Maurya the Śuṅgas will rule for 112 years and then the Kāṇvāyanas for 45 years whose last king Suśarman will be killed by Simuka. Thus a total of 294 years had passed away after the accession of Chandragupta, say about 324 B. C. when the Sātavāhana dynasty was established by Simuka, a date which falls in 30 B. C.[10] Simuka is said to have ruled for 23 years and his successor Krishṇa for 18 years (some times 10 years). Thus the date of Sātakarṇi falls in 11 A. D. (or 3 A. D.). We agree with Prof. Raychaudhury that Simuka was for some years a contemporary of Suśarman (40—30 B. C.) and flourished in the first century B. C.[11] but are hesitant to accept the view that his reign period be counted from some time before 30 B. C., keeping in view that he established the Sātavāhana power after

killing Suśarman in that year. We also do not know how he arrived at the dates of the kings of this dynasty when he assigns c. 60-37 B. C. to Simuka and c 37—27 B. C. to Krishṇa and c. 27—17 B. C. to Sātakarṇi.[12] Similarly Dr. D. C. Sircar also, though he arrives at the same date of 30 B. C. for Simuka,[13] assigns Sātakarṇi I a rule about the end of the first century B. C.[14] It is not clear how he proposes to accommodate three Sātavāhana kings who ruled for about 59 years within the remaining last thirty years before the beginning of the Christian era. Under the rigours of this view he speculates the existence of another Sātakarṇi II[15] and assigns the Sāñchī inscription on the southern gate of the main stupa to him. In his support he brings out a passage from the *Periplus of The Erythrean Sea* and observes that '*Saraganus* may be regarded as a Greek corruption of *Sātakarṇi* and the elder Saraganus of the *Periplus*, who appears to be the earlier, of the two rulers of that name, may be no other than Sātakarṇi I of the Sātavāhana dynasty; but the language of the passage seems to suggest that the northern Konkan passed from the elder Saraganus (or his successor, a younger Saraganus) to Sandares shortly before the time of the author, *i. e.* some time about the middle of the first century A. D. This Sātakarṇi, therefore, may have been a descendant of Sātakarṇi I.[16] He is hesitant also in accepting Sātakarṇi I as the contemporary king of Khāravela. Commenting on the word *Sātakamni* occurring in the Hāthīgumphā inscription he observes as follows:

> This king seems to be that Sātakarni who ruled shortly after the husband of Nāganika according to the Purānas. Palaeographically the Hāthigumphā inscription is slightly later than the Nānāghāt records. It may be pointed out that the letters of the Sāñchi inscription of Sātakarni (Plate in *J. B. O. R. S.*, 1917) resemble the script of the present record and may belong to Sātakarṇi II. Of course, if this slight development is overlooked, we may identify both these Sātakarṇis with Sātakarṇi I. But it should be remembered that the big Nānāghāt record was possibly engraved after the death of that king.[17]

Here it seems that according to Prof. Sircar there are two main difficulties in accepting the supposed two Sātakarnis as the same person; firstly the early date of Sātakarni whom he puts in about the end of the first century B. C; secondly the palaeographic consideration of the records concerned. We will take the palaeographic problem later but should consider the date first.

As regards the date Prof. Buhler observes that the 'characters of the Nānāghāt inscriptions belong to a period anterior by about 100 years to that of the edicts of Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi I, and his son Vāsishṭhīputra Pulumāyi'.[18] Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi is roughly assigned a reign period of 24 years between 106 — 30 A. D.[19] If we accept

Buhler's estimate regarding the date of Sātakarṇi it falls in the first quarter of the first century A. D ; a date which agrees with our calculation falling between A. D. 11 and 29. Mention of Sātakarṇi in Khāravela's inscription indicates that the former was an elder contemporary of the latter. Thus the date of Khāravela must fall in the second (or even third) decade of the first century A. D.

The second consideration is the mention of some dates in the epigraph of Khāravela. In the line 16 of the inscription earlier scholars read and interpreted '165th year of Rajā Muriyakāla.'[20] But now nobody accepts the existence of a Maurya era in this inscription as the revised reading does not permit any such assumption.[21] The second passage which mentions some date in the sixth line of the epigraph runs as follows :

Pañchame cha dānī vase Naṁda-Rāja tivasa-satao (ghā)ṭitaṁ Tanasuliyo vāṭā panāḍīm nagaram pavesa(ya)ti.

Here Nandarāja has been taken to be a king of the Nanda dynasty of Magadh, and the expression *ti-vasa-sata* is either 103 or 300 years. If we accept this the expression cannot mean 103 years because it will synchronize with the reign period of the Mauryas; and the Mauryas find no mention in the epigraph. Similarly it should not be taken, as matter of fact, 300 years but rather three centuries in 'round number'.[22] Some scholars have tried to count this from 324 B. C.,[23] the supposed date of accession of Chandragupta Maurya, or two years earlier *i. e.* from 326 when the Nanda dynasty may have been overthrown.[24] In our opinion this loose expression of 'three centuries' may be counted from any date in the late 4th century B. C. when Nanadas were in power and might have invaded Kalinga, and does not affect the date of Khāravela who flourished in the early 1st century A. D. De la Vallee-Poussin maintains Khāravela to be 'apres, beaucoup apres 150', probably early 1st century A. D.[25]

As regards the palaeography of this epigraph it undoubtly belongs to the 1st century A. D. Similarly the records of the Nānāghāṭ belonging to the time of Sātakarṇi or his wife Nāganikā also cannot be separated by a wide gap. Sri R. P. Chanda, although does not try to date the inscriptions from the third century B. C. to the second century A. D. individually, but chronologically arranges them in the following order :[26]

1. Edicts of Aśoka.
2. Nāgārjunī Hill cave inscriptions of Aśoka's grandson Daśaratha.
3. Besnagar Garuḍa pillar inscriptions (*sic*).
4. (a) Inscriptions on the railing of Stūpa I at Sāñchī.
   (b) Inscriptions on the railings of Stūpa II at Sāñchī.

(c) Bharhut railing inscriptions.

(d) Inscriptions on the remnants of the old Bodh Gaya railing.

5. (a) Besnagar Garuḍa pillar inscription of the year 12 after the installation of *mahārāja* Bhāgavata.

(b) Inscriptions of Nāganikā, widow of the Āndhra king Sātakarṇi I in the Nānāghāt cave.

(c) Bharhut *toraṇa* (gateway) inscription.

6. Hāthigumphā inscription of Khāravela, king of Kalinga.

7. Sañchī *toraṇa* inscriptions.

8. Inscriptions of the time of Soḍasa.

9. Inscriptions of Kanishka.

Thus R. P. Chanda brackets the Nānāghāt cave inscriptions with those at the Besnagar Garuḍa pillar, belonging to mahārāja Bhāgavata and, the Bharhut *toraṇa*. Then he puts Hāthigumphā and the Sāñchī *toraṇa* inscriptions, both mentioning the name of Sātakarṇi I. Thus Chanda's Nos. 5 to 8 may be taken roughly to belong to the early 1st century A. D. (or close of the 1st century B. C.)[27]. Obviously palaeography was not the only consideration for giving this order to the inscriptions before Śrī Chanda. A study of the history of the development of the Brahmī script in this period reveals that there were many tendencies influencing the formation of the individual letters.[28]

Until the close of the first century B. C. the Brahmī script developed uninterrupted on the old traditional lines established during the time of Aśoka. Its growth was very slow and to some extent static. The tool and the technique of writing was almost the same as used in the Aśokan inscriptions. The changes which had taken place till the end of the 1st century B. C. were mainly due to the fact that the art of writing was becoming known to more and more persons with increased chances of introducing individual mannerisms and personal habits. This and the teacher-taught traditions paved the way for freaks, seemingly developing into regional traits. But by the close of the first century B. C. the Śakas established themselves in north-west India and they introduced some revolutionary changes in the art of writing Brahmī script. The tendency to equalise the verticals of letters like *pa*, *la*, *sha*, *sā*, and *ha* and to angularise the curves had already started during the first century B. C. This change was led by the coins, obviously influenced by the Greek lettering. The Śaka Kshatrapas used an edged pen for writing which gave a new face to the Brahmī letters, producing an effect not dissimilar to Greek lettering. Dr. A. H. Dani rightly observes that 'this was not

an isolated phenomenon' and 'the well known use of square omicron on the Śaka and Parthian coins' can be related to this.[28] The inscriptions of the Kshatrapas of Mathura are well marked for their neat and well formed letters. These new tendencies were accepted in other parts of the country also. But in remote areas like Orissa and Mahārāshtra etc. they reached gradually. This is the reason why we find older forms persisting along with the new forms in the inscriptions of these areas. Scribe's hand and personal mannerism also may be held responsible for such differences. Therefore while other evidences agree in pointing out a contemporaneity of two sets of inscriptions the palaeography should not be regarded as a serious objection. Palaeographic difference is much wider between the Nānāghāt and the Sāñchī *toraṇa* inscriptions which are regarded as belonging to Sātakarṇi I,[29] when we compare it with the Hāthigumpha inscription of Khāravela. If one compares the beautiful carved inscriptions of Ṛishabhadatta at Nāsik with that of the badly carved one at Karle belonging to the son of Ṛishabhadatta one may find such differences. A look at the tables analysing the individual letters of the Hāthigumphā inscription and those of the early Sātavāhanas found at Nāsik and Nānāghāt will make our point clear.

Thus on the basis of the arguments indicated above we may conclude that Sātakarṇi I (C. 11—29 A. D.) of the Sātavāhana dynasty was an elder contemporary of Khāravela who ruled in the first quarter of the first century A. D.

REFERENCES:

1. *CHI*, Vol. I, p 642 and pp. 481 ff. and also Sten Konow, *Acta Orientalia*, I, 1923. p. 12 ff. for various dates proposed.

2. *Cf.* Tarn, W. W., *Greeks in Bactria and India*, pp 457—58. 'In 1919 the late Dr. Jayaswal and the late Professor R. D. Banerji made a fresh examination of the rock, and Jayaswal announced that he had read the word Yavanarāja, followed by the proper name Dimata; he has stated that he found the syllable-ma clear and ultimately with great difficulty read Dimat(a). This reading, and its interpretation as the Greek king Demetrius, were accepted both by Banerji and by Dr. Sten Konow. Konow, however, said of his own reading: 'I can see Yavanarāja, as read by Mr. Jayaswal, and of his Dimata the *ma* is quite legible; he did not say if he could see the supposed faint traces of the rest of the word ..... Jayaswal's version in 1927 was: 'On account of the report (uproar) occasioned by the acts of valour i. e. the capture of a fortress etc. previously mentioned the Greek king Demet(rios) drawing in his army and transport retreated to abandon Mathura. 'Then in 1928 Jayaswal puts for-

ward a totally different view: what the inscription refers to, he said, is the Greek king (he does not say Demetrius) being beaten off from Pātaliputra when he attacked it and retreating to Mathura.'

3. In a discourse Dr. P. L. Gupta, formerly the Curator of the Patna Museum, said that 'after checking the plaster cast of the inscription placed in the Patna Museum he came to the conclusion that the name concerned may be Vimaka.' Palaeographically it is not unprobable as in a worn out inscription like this *va* and *da* may look similar, *ma* is common to both versions and *ta* may be read as *ka* also. Though this is a very tempting suggestion but its probability is very remote as Wima Kadphises cannot be placed in the first half of the first century A. D.
4. Raychaudhuri, H. C., *PHAI*, p. 374.
5. *Ibid*, p. 378.
6. Shashikant, *Hāthigumphā Inscription of Khāravela and the Bhabru Edict of Asoka*, Delhi, 1971, pp 39—43.
7. Pargiter, *DKA*, p. 36.
8. *Ibid*, p. 38 and 71.
9. *Ibid*, pp. 70—71.
10. Raychaudhuri, H. C. *op. cit* pp. 403ff.
11. *Ibid*.
12. *Ibid*, pp. 414 ff.
13. *AIU*, p. 195.
14. *Ibid*, p. 200.
15. *SI*, p. 215, fn. 1.
16. *AIU*, pp. 199—200.
17. *SI*, p. 215, fn. 1.
18. *ASWI*, Vol. V, p. 65.
19. Sircar, D. C., *AIU*, p. 202.
20. For detailed discussion see *CHI*, Vol I, pp. 481—82 and *PHAI*, p. 373 ff.
21. Sircar, D. C., *SI*., p. 218, fns. 13, 14, 15 and for the Sanskrit version see p. 221.
22. For arguments see Banerjee, R. D., *JBORS*, 1917, pp. 495 ff.
23. Raychaudhuri, H. C., *op. cit*.. p. 406.
24. Cf. Sircar, D. C., *SI*, p. 215, fn. 7.

25. L. de la Vallee-Poussin, *L'Inde aux temps des Mauryas et des barbares, Grecs, Scythes, Parthes et Yue-tchi*, p. 198, as quoted in *GBI*, p. 457, fn. 3.
26. *Mem. ASI*, No. 1, pp. 14-15.
27. Cf. Verma, T. P., *PBS*, p. 62.
28. *IP*, p. 52.
29. See *PHAI*, pp. 415-16.
30. *ASWI*, Vol. IV, pl. lii, nos. 5 & 7 and pl. xlviii no. 11.

ABBREVIATIONS

AIU Age of Imperial Unity, History and Culture of Indian People, Vol. II.

ASWI Archaeological Survey of Western India.

CHI Cambridge History of India, Vol. I, ed. E. J. Rapson, 1st Ind. Reprint.

DKA Dynasties of the Kali Age, by F. E. Pargiter, London, 1913.

GBI The Greeks in Bactria and India, by W. W. Tarn, Reprinted in 1966.

IP Indian Palaeography, by A. H. Dani London, 1963.

JBORS Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Patna.

Mem ASI Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India.

PBS Palaeography of Brahmi Script, by T. P. Verma, Varanasi, 1971.

PHAI Political History of Ancient India, by H. C. Raychaudhuri.

SI Select inscriptions bearing on Indian History and Civilization, by D. C. Sircar, Second Edition.

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