

REPORT



**POLITICS, POWER
DYNAMICS & DISASTER**

A SRI LANKA STUDY ON TSUNAMI AFFECTED DISTRICTS

Sonali Moonesinghe

International Centre for Ethnic Studies

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I. INTRODUCTION

Responding to global disaster in general is a colossal task and the recovery process is a challenge. The recent tsunami disaster has been overwhelming, adding to ongoing conflict and post-conflict related challenges for long-term recovery and re- building efforts, both at national and international levels. The primary objective in the Sri Lanka study is to document the implications and potential impact of local, socio-political dynamics on disaster response, long-term development and reconstruction efforts. The study focused on three geographically separate administrative districts: Mullaitivu in the northern, Amparai in the eastern, and Galle in the southern regions of the country. Each of the districts, reveal its own unique characteristics in terms of geographic location, historical experiences and socio-political dynamics.

In order to understand some of these challenges unique to specific locations, we note the nexus between underlying local politics, socio-economics, culture and disaster recovery and relief responses. Ground realities can provide some useful insights to aid actors on hurdles to be expected and challenges for program strategizing and implementation of relief assistance. Contextualizing the implications for development planning, we hope, will enhance sensitivity and facilitate a pragmatic approach to resource allocation amidst ground realities.

Country Background & Context

In Sri Lanka, we are dealing with a population that has been directly and indirectly affected by two decades of protracted armed conflict and most recently, the tsunami disaster. While the entire country has been affected, the north and east have borne the brunt of the conflict. What we have observed in this study, is the manner in which communities in different regions, have responded to disaster. And that the ability of both existing and emerging structures to deal with it is largely determined and shaped by diverse factors and prior experiences.

Over the years, large numbers have been displaced both internally and externally as a result of the conflict. Entire families and/or family members and children have been killed or have gone missing. Physical infrastructure has been destroyed, means of production damaged or ruined and livelihoods particularly for the poor, in areas affected by both armed conflict and natural disaster, have also been destroyed, disrupted and/or deteriorated over the years. Many people have been dispersed among families living in various parts of the country. Others more fortunate have migrated externally, adding to an ever increasing diaspora in western countries.

Furthermore, administrative and technical capacities in these affected districts have been seriously impaired. The destruction of basic infrastructure and communications for instance, has led to difficulties in filling vacancies in essential administrative and technical posts in some areas and a scarcity in skilled, trained human resources. Both man-made and natural disaster has limited capacity development of local communities, existing local institutional structures, civil society groups and has restricted their ability to participate in reconstruction and development activities. Inconsistent state administrative policies have led to different interpretations when implementing same-resulting inefficiencies in implementation and the poor delivery of basic public services or often the absence of it, has caused the emergence of alternative structures to fill the void in service delivery.

In some districts, parallel service structures have emerged to address the needs of communities particularly during periods of man-made and natural disaster. In areas where institutional structures appear to be in place and the potential for service delivery exist, politics and corrupt practices tend to impede the overall process. It is within this contextual background that the study has attempted to observe disaster response and highlight the dynamics of power and politics as it unfolds at local levels.

Administration & Local Government:

The study provides a general overview of the administrative structure, institutions and community organizations, looks at each of the districts and how they have dealt with disaster by focusing on the following key areas: structures of authority, politics and power dynamics as it unfolds at local levels, and its links to disaster relief and recovery efforts. The study also examines the role of non-state administration and civil institutions that function parallel to state structures. In addition, it attempts to identify informal associations, networks and hierarchies that operate across and within communities, multiple sources of authority and structures of power which include 'subterranean forces' often mobilized at local levels. Patron-client relationships are emphasized as an underlying theme in the study. Relationships in which the 'patron' is dominant and exercises control over the distribution of limited resources as rewards and favors among clients, typically characterize partisan politics, the political processes, public administration and service delivery in Sri Lanka. Prior research in the south has noted that since the 1970s, political parties have become established as a key medium of patronage and power at the local level.

*"Local MPs act as conduit for the distribution of virtually all state resources within a particular constituency.... the influx of foreign assistance meant that the party had more resources than ever before to distribute to its following."*¹ Not surprisingly in such highly politicized environments, the flood of external assistance and resources particularly in the post-

tsunami period, have revealed that subversive manipulation of relationships between communities and institutions tend to thrive.

District Administration:

Local government and administrative structures were important aspects of this study because of their role during times of major disasters. It is relevant to note here that territorial administration in Sri Lanka has its roots in the British colonial period, when a highly centralized administrative structure was established. This is still evident in the districts' local administrative bodies, currently operating as a 25 district, 'de-concentrated' administrative structure.² It comes under the purview of a Government Agent (GA) aka District Secretary (DS). Each of the districts are divided into Divisions under a Divisional Secretary (DS) and further subdivided into Grama Niladari Divisions (GN Divisions). The Grama Niladari (GN) aka Grama Sevaka (GS) heads the lowest tier of the centralized hierarchical administrative structure. The GN is also considered the representative closest to the communities at village level. In addition, several central government agencies and ministerial representative bodies function in the districts, for example, in the fisheries, education and health sectors, which were fairly significant in this study. Local administrative bodies and agencies, their interactions with the center, communities, local institutions and external actors, revealed some of the power dynamics that impact on disaster response in the districts.

Local Government:

A local government system has been in existence since the early 20th century. This was brought under the framework of the Provincial Councils (PC) system relatively recently.³ There is a Provincial Council for each Province which consists of two or three districts. Local government bodies that function within the framework of a PC are Municipal Councils, Urban Councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas. In the north and east, the elected Provincial Council has not been functioning, since 1990. The province is administered by the central government

through a Governor appointed by the President. The north and parts of the east also have a system of dual administration and power, that of the state and the LTTE.

Field work did not indicate a close, robust working relationship between Provincial Councils and local administration bodies in terms of disaster response. It appeared that the PC role was often limited to specific functions. Discussions in the field usually revolved around central budgetary allocations or more often than not, inadequate allocations to district sectoral departments. It was evident however, that multilateral, bilateral donor fund disbursements in support of specific development projects⁴ were channeled through the NE Provincial Council. While the role of local government appears to be limited in general, it was noted that relationships between PCs and administrative bodies varied in different districts. The scope of this study did not include a close analysis of the role of elected, local government bodies in the post-tsunami period. However, what was indicated was a need to strengthen and develop an effective decentralized, local government system. Discussions revealed that the role of local government is limited in general and a tendency to subordinate the role of local government staff to that of district administrative officials prevail. Discussions with INGOs, community representatives and beneficiaries indicated a more defined and active role of the state's administrative bodies at various levels. This study has focused more on district level administrative structures and their relatively prominent post-disaster role than that of local government bodies.

Overview of the Districts:

Mullaitivu District: Located in the north, this district covers an area that has been subjected to the direct impact of armed conflict. In addition, Mullaitivu was probably the worst affected by the recent tsunami destruction.⁵ The district is unique in that it comes under the administrative control of the LTTE, but at an operational level, has in place a dual system of administration. Public Services are carried out under the apparatus of both the central government district

administrative body as well as civilian administrative structures established and developed by the LTTE. Fieldwork reveals how these civilian institutions were established during the war to provide essential public services and have since, evolved over the years. With years of experience in dealing with disaster situations, these institutional structures, together with the military units, community based entities, state agencies and state administrative bodies, responded to the immediate tsunami crisis and were able to coordinate a fairly efficient system to deal with longer term reconstruction efforts.

In a paradoxical sense, disaster has created conditions under which a parallel civil administration and new institutional structures have emerged. What was most striking was the apparent ease in which the state apparatus and the LTTE structures worked side by side in the aftermath of the tsunami, to respond to community needs in the district. Clearly there was a galvanizing mechanism which was able to prioritize and mobilize limited available resources, when a disaster of such magnitude came unexpectedly. The emergence of a communication and authority center is typically problematic in such situations. However, this district appears to have coped relatively well. Although badly affected by both armed conflict and the tsunami, in terms of security concerns, the district appeared to be stable.

Amparai District: Ironically, the Amparai District in the east was far from stable. It is in fact a politically volatile region, particularly the coastal belt and its surroundings, which was hard hit by both man-made as well as natural disaster. With a population that is comprised of three ethnic communities, concentrated in segregated pockets, it is plagued with a complex history of inter-communal associations and tensions. The district has been affected by the 20 year armed conflict as well as intermittent violent clashes between Muslim and Tamil populations. Some areas have been affected more severely by these inter-communal clashes than the 20 year armed conflict between the state and Tamil militant groups. Community members in Amparai often refer to the 'war', as the one between Tamil and Muslim communities in the east."

In addition, its people in the coastal areas, are still subjected to continuous violence from various armed groups, referred to as 'third forces.' They could even be characterized 'extra-terrestrial forces,' as most are elusive and manage to operate in spite of the heavy presence of a range of state security forces. Partisan politics has taken on additional dimensions, of 'ethnicized' politics played out on the ground. Local administrative bodies reflect a pattern that is evolving in a direction that reinforces community segregation. In turn, local community responses to disaster relief and long-term recovery appear to be heading toward trajectories of new conflict, where emerging local institutional structures are acquiring an 'ethnicized or communal bent.'

Galle District: As a result of its location in the southern region, the Galle district was not affected by the conflict as was the case of the other two districts. But it was severely affected by the tsunami and its communities are subjected to constant natural disasters such as annual flooding. What was strikingly evident in this district was the extent of partisan politics in the community, the operational impact of a centralized administrative structure and structural hierarchies that muffle the voice of the people at grassroot levels. In addition, there are indications of extra-legal entities-the 'subterranean forces' that operate in various ways. This results in negative consequences for communities in general, and for the disaster affected in particular. While this presents serious challenges and potential obstructions to relief assistance and long-term reconstruction efforts, the communities have shown remarkable initiative in responding to the immediate needs of the people in the aftermath of the natural disaster. Some of the informal, traditional institutional structures that still function in the communities indicate potential for providing material and moral support in times of disaster, particularly in terms of collective coping mechanisms, which should be tapped into and examined further in relief program planning.

Child-Care Institutions & Prioritization of Children

The study also highlights childcare capacities in the districts wherever possible and has attempted to identify some of the entities that play a

role in the care of children. The war and the tsunami have resulted in an enormous number of children who have been killed, displaced, orphaned and or separated from their families. In Mullaitivu, the war has affected most of its population and the tsunami has affected a large number of children, who have died as well as caused others to become orphans or be separated from their parents.⁶ What is evident on the ground in all three districts is that there still is an emphasis and prioritization of the traditionally strong family and neighborhood networks to address the needs of children in times of family or social catastrophe. Foster Care appears to be the preferred mode for child care when major disasters cause children to be separated from families or orphaned. Alternative arrangements however, have emerged in the last two decades.

In some areas, decades of conflict, constant displacement and disruptions of family life have led to a disintegration of traditional social networks and destruction of family ties.

Alternate institutional structures such as 'Homes' have been established, particularly in non-state administered areas. They serve as substitute arrangements, to fill the void in taking care of the needs of large numbers affected. Children's 'Homes' are a common phenomena in the north and east where children whose parents are not necessarily deceased but cannot afford to provide basic care giving requirements, are being taken care of. These local institutions set up in times of war provided critical support for children orphaned by the tsunami. Religious institutions have made a tremendous contribution by providing child care support in all districts observed.

2. METHODOLOGY, SCOPE, & CHALLENGES:

Fieldwork was carried out over a three month period from October to December, focusing exclusively on qualitative research. Within a restricted time frame, the study emphasized a participatory approach by residing in each of the districts for one month, during which time the fieldwork was conducted. This report is based on semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, informal discussions and interviews.

vide Appendix I attached to this report for the list of interviews and group discussions. Fieldwork is supplemented by a literature review which is attached as Appendix 2. The transcript of a case history which brings out the struggles, despair and pain in the lives of the community in the context of war and the tsunami, is attached as Appendix 3.

Scope

The study focused on three districts, in the north, east and south, affected by the tsunami as well as the conflict. In each district, we selected areas most affected by the tsunami, concentrating on DS divisions that were considered directly affected, based on the rough estimations of damage and destruction in the area. Galle and Amparai districts which are large districts, had several divisions affected. Galle had certain pockets which were severely affected and Amparai had stretches of coastal areas completely affected both by armed conflict as well as the tsunami. Mullaitivu had one division completely devastated and one indirectly affected. However, the entire district was severely affected by the war. In the east and southern districts, we covered only a few divisions, primarily along the coast, and attempted to focus on the unique specificities of each district while capturing a diverse range of communities affected by disaster. The criteria, that determined to a large extent the number of areas in which field work was carried out, was the time frame involved in this study, which did place limitations on the time spent in the field. This also meant that the study focus was narrowed to a few key local institutions and administrative bodies that played a significant role in disaster and post-disaster situations.

Challenges

Attempts to grasp community specificities, social complexities and political dynamics within a limited period certainly posed some challenges. There were some constraints during the fieldwork phase such as pre-election tensions and post-election violence in the Amparai District which halted our work. Staffing issues created some delay in

implementing work in the Galle district. Work in Mullaitivu was carried out under difficult circumstances, due to the lack of basic services i.e. electricity, running water, communication systems and infrastructure. However, support from the community, authorities and assistance compensated in many ways. Concern that the district which is outside state administered territory constitutes a high risk zone in terms of security, turned out to be futile. Fieldwork in this post-conflict, transitional period in Mullaitivu posed no security issues.

Structure


The report is organized in six parts: Part I provides an overview of the study, primary objectives and areas of emphasis; Part 2 the methodology, scope and challenges; Part 3 deals with the background of each of the three districts and provides a contextual setting. It outlines the geographic characteristics and physical features that had a bearing on disaster impact; demographics, history and politics; socio-economic contexts; existing local administration, governance and institutional bodies that operate in each district.; Part 4 discusses local administration, institutions and community responses to disaster in each of the three districts; Part 5 raises some of the key points and major issues in the districts; Part 6 concludes and highlights prevailing conditions, sociopolitical dynamics specific to each district and its implication for relief, recovery and long-term development efforts.

2. DISTRICT BACKGROUND

Mullaitivu District:

Geographic Description & Demographics

Mullaitivu district is a new district created in 1979, and part of what has traditionally been known as the Vanni region in the northern part of Sri Lanka. For administrative purposes, it currently constitutes part of the Vanni electoral district. Mullaitivu occupies the eastern part of the main land of the Northern Province. It is bounded by Killinochchi district in the north, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and part of Mannar districts in the south, the sea and coastal area in the east and Mannar in the west. Covering approximately 927 square miles of land area, the geographic landscape of Mullaitivu includes vast areas of forest, open plains, salty marshes, rivulets and lagoons. The coastline areas extends from Chundikulam in the north to Kokkilay in the south and the land upto a distance of three to four miles inland is said to be on the same level as the sea⁷. Lagoons are an important physical feature of the district, of which Nanthidkadal is the largest, Kokkulai, Nayaru and Mathalan are the other well known lagoons. Clearly its geographic, physical features play an important role in shaping the livelihoods of the communities, but it is also evident that it has been a significant factor in terms of determining the extent of disaster impact in the area. Natural disaster in general, the tsunami in particular as well as decades of war has taken its toll, the scars of which, are all too vividly evident.



The district's population is indicated as approximately 77,512, as per the last comprehensive population census of 1981. As of December 2003, the estimated population in the district is indicated

as 140,675.⁸ Population statistics show an ethnic composition that is almost 100 percent Tamil. Earlier field work and statistics indicate the existence of other communities in the area—the highest figures being those of the Muslim community or 'Sri Lankan Moors.'⁹ At the time fieldwork was conducted, small pockets of Muslim communities were also residing in Mullaitivu. Discussions with the community revealed they were part of the population displaced to Puttlam during the war but have returned after the CFA and signing of the MOU.

Table I

Population By Ethnic Group In Mullaitivu District: 1981, & 2001-2003.

Year	Sinhalese		Tamil		Muslims		Others		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1981	3,948	5.09	69,670	89.88	3,777	4.87	117	0.15	77,512	100
2001 [#]	8	0.01	79,544	99.99	Nil	0	Nil	0	79,552	100
2002 [#]	28	0.03	85,148	99.92	28	0.03	25	0.02	85,209	100
2003 [#]	23	0.01	140,556	99.91	49	0.03	47	0.03	140,675	100

Source: Dept. of Census & Statistics

2001, 2002 & 2003 Figure Source: District Secretariat, Mullaitivu.

* = Subject for the confirmation by Dept. of Census & Statistics

= Permanent & Displaced Population within District

History & Political Context:

Historically the Vanni, which includes Mullaitivu, had been an independent region of multiple principalities under semi-independent chieftains. Prior to being named 'Vanni' it had been known as 'Addankappattu', "a rebellious province" independent of both Jaffna and Anuradhapura Kingdoms. Its present residents are proud of its rebellious history particularly its stand against colonial invasion wherein

Bandara Vanniyan features as a local hero.¹⁰ In recent history, Mullaitivu has experienced its share of more wars and natural disaster which included a major hurricane in 1964 that caused large scale displacement from the coastal areas to interior divisions. The tsunami in turn caused severe damage and major losses in the district.¹¹ The district has also been a major battle ground in the armed conflict between the state and Tamil Militant Groups. Since 1989, the LTTE has emerged as a primary contender in this conflict. Certain areas of the district has also been the theater of confrontations between the LTTE and IPKF, the Sri Lankan military as well as other Tamil Militant group activities. Civilians residing in and around the area suffered¹² as a result.

The war had a major impact on the Mullaitivu community—the fishing community in the coastal areas in particular during the three most intense phases of the conflict, 1987-88, 1990 and 1995-96.¹³ Extensive shelling particularly aerial shelling and naval patrol fire had a disastrous impact on the coastal communities, their occupations, families and lives. Vide Appendix 3 case history, a story shared with us by a fisherman's wife who lost all four of her children in the tsunami and suffered immensely during the war. The Mullaitivu village, an area covering approximately 10km from Kallapadu to Vadduvahal, where 90 per cent of the people are fishermen, and remainder farmers and small traders, were severely affected by the war as a result of 'direct occupation' by Sri Lankan forces, as well as the tsunami. Their livelihoods were disrupted and/or totally destroyed and whatever buildings and homes the war did not destroy were wiped out by the tsunami. Statistics show that the entire population in the Maritimé pattu AGA Division for example, has been displaced over the years as a result of the war reflecting either internal displacement, resettlements or displacement from other areas.¹⁴

“Some people left to India in 1990. They returned in 1996..... The refugees in India were paid money according to their age by the [Indian] government. They could not do any work or fishing there. Mostly they were earning their living doing labor jobs. After returning from India, these people were harassed by the navy. After going fishing in the sea only a few of

them returned. Reason the navy has killed them..” Fishing Community, Manalkudiyiruppu.

Socio-Economic Context:

Its location and geo-physical features such as a coastal belt of 70 km, and the presence of tanks and lagoons has made the fishing occupation both inland and marine one of the most lucrative to the community in Mullaitivu. Agriculture is the next most significant occupation together with livestock farming.¹⁵ Fishing is carried out as a full-time occupation as well as part-time where some are engaged in agricultural activities as well. Historically, seasonal fishermen from the south, groups of Sinhalese fishermen used to visit Mullaitivu district annually during February to September.¹⁶ But the war, restrictions in access to the seas, particularly deep sea fishing and the impact on the fishing industry in general has resulted in the cessation of seasonal migration of fishermen to the area.

Communities engaged in coastal fisheries experienced widespread destruction and loss of assets such as boats, fishing equipment, nets, ice plants, fuel supply stations including their houses. Although the situation had eased somewhat after the signing of the MOU, the tsunami exacerbated conditions by shattering what remained of the most important livelihood of the coastal population. Service providers that depended on the fishing industry directly and indirectly were also affected. i.e. ice-making, packing, transportation of fish, boat engine repairs, markets, shops etc. Discussions with fishing communities who are presently residing in transitional camps, reveal the extent of their hardships over the years.

“During war in 1990 our village was affected. In 1990 we were living in big luxurious house[s]... These were destroyed during the war completely. We moved to India on transit and returned later and lived under trees. We improved little by little doing small jobs. This time [after the tsunami] we lost everything and was brought down to rock bottom. We were mostly doing prawn and shrimp industry and came up in life. In [the] tsunami we lost all out belongings including [self] respect.”

“During peacetime there was less harassments by the navy. There was good business, fish was sent out and we earned a lot of money. Our biggest problem is the army check - points When all the prawns are dumped on the ground and again loaded, the color changes to red. Here the price of prawns is Rs 300/= per kg but in the south it is Rs 600/= all this is because the color is changing to red”

Additionally, the war destroyed ice manufacturing companies and storage facilities resulting in a loss of fish. The destruction of roads and poor transportation services, border check point delays in turn, decreased the supply of fish to Colombo markets. State restriction of goods has placed limitations and delays on the types of boats and engines brought into the district. Particularly after the losses experienced post-tsunami, these factors have added further to the deteriorating fishing industry.

Years of war, state imposed economic sanctions, restrictions on items such as fertilizers, insecticides¹⁷ and state bans on exports to the south has taken its toll on the agricultural sector as well. Prior to the conflict, a large percentage of the population depended directly or indirectly on paddy cultivation, crop production and livestock farming occupations and was an exporter of agricultural goods. Today, the status of the north-east region is that of a net importer of food. The war has also caused the destruction and loss of animals which led to a significant decline in the livestock population. Cultivation has been affected by the tsunami as well to some extent, with agricultural lands in certain areas affected since the water came far inland in the district. Communities noted they were unable to cultivate or to continue animal husbandry.¹⁸ Most, if not all communities residing in the district of Mullaitivu, have been seriously affected by the war, which has resulted in a reduction of cultivation, loss of livestock, reduction in timber harvesting, inability to continue in the fishing occupation, massive community displacements, unemployment and increased levels of poverty.¹⁹The effect of years of conflict together with the natural disaster

has seen the stark destruction and deterioration of socio-economic development in the district.

Local Administration & Governance Institutions:

The district has a parallel administrative system managed by both the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. The state administrative structure is headed by a GA for the district of Mullaitivu. It has five administrative divisions headed by a DS, 127 GS divisions under Grama Sewaka Officers which covers 632 villages.

Table 1

DS/AGA Divisions	GS Divisions	Villages
Puthukudiyiruppu	19	174
Oddusuddan	27	114
Thunukkai	20	43
Manthai East	15	73
TOTAL	127	632

Mullaitivu comes under the North-East Provincial Council Local Government System. However, an elected council lasted only a little over a year in the north-east, it was dissolved by the central government in 1990.²⁰ A Governor has been appointed by the President to head the NE province which has the structure in place but lacks elected provincial and local bodies. While its role is limited and overshadowed by the central government as well as district administrative bodies,²¹ it acts as an implementing organization for World Bank and other major donor supported rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in the NE.

The district appears to have a fairly broad institutional structure at community level both formal and informal.²²The Fishermens Co-operative Societies, Tamil Teachers' Union, Teacher's Welfare Associations or 'Kalaham' and Farmers Societies, registered NGOs as


well as religious institutions such as the Catholic Church, were those most visible in our study, considering their role and activities on behalf of the communities. The church, because of the very nature of its organizational structure, has played and continues to play a significant role among communities facing crises and disaster. Representing specific occupations, the primary role of local 'Societies' revolve around economic and welfare activities, to facilitate their occupations and essentially provide support for members in times of difficulty.

Time limitations restricted access to detailed information, However, it is likely that most of these societies had roots in earlier associations based on caste-based occupations. They appear to have evolved over time, initially as voluntary associations and later reorganized on a formal basis, under state policies at different periods in the country.²³ Interestingly, certain occupations such as barbers, washerfolk, (dhobi) jewellery makers aka goldsmiths etc. considered 'lower caste occupations' have had no cooperative societies to represent their interests in a traditionally, hierarchical society. The socio-economic structure was typically dominated by landowning and land-based occupational castes. However after the 90s period, members of these groups had been organized into societies²⁴ under the LTTE administration, with the aim of developing communities based on their collective interest. Overall, the district reflects institutions that function at multiple levels in responding to community needs during post and ongoing disaster periods.

Amparai District:

Geographic Description & Demographics:

Amparai is a newly created district, formed in the 1961 time span, precipitated most likely with new resettlement schemes and the expansion of population. Previously a part of Batticaloa district, today it is one of the three districts that comprise the Eastern Province. The creation of the district is surrounded in controversy and appears to be shrouded in manipulative electoral politics. The discourse on politically



motivated district formation and marginalization of communities in the eastern region is well illustrated in the following:

“ Slowly, Sinhala people have been brought in by different governments. They colonized the East, thereby systematically reducing the share of the Tamils in the population of the East. This process culminated in the formation of Sinhala districts, and Sinhala-majority electorates that secured Sinhala Members of Parliament. Further addition of about 63 Grama Sevaka Divisions from the Uva Province to the Amparai District made Amparai a Sinhala-majority district overnight, whereas 74% of the population had previously been Tamil-speaking.”²⁵

Its geographic boundaries consists of Periyaneelavanai in the north, Paanama in the south, Mahaoya river in the west and the Indian Ocean on the east. The district’s landmass includes lagoons, rivulets and marshy lands. Its geophysical features characterized by low lying lands, subject certain areas to constant flooding particularly during the north-east monsoon/rainy season. The district has also experienced severe storms and a major cyclone in 1978, which has had a severe impact on the coastal areas.

The district covers approximately 4415 square km of land area and a population of approximately 605,553. Its population composition reveals a diverse body representing all communities. Muslim population figures comprise the highest percentage according to statistics; the ethnic ratio is approximately 42 percent Muslim, 39.33 Sinhalese, 18.76 percent Tamil and 32 percent other.²⁶ Statistics also show that in Amparai, a high percentage of Muslims have been affected by the natural disaster/tsunami.²⁷ Along the coastal belt in the east, population distribution patterns along ethnic groups are clearly reflected by alternate Tamil and Muslim villages and towns. McGilvray’s reseach in the 1970s noted that “the Tamils and the Moors although they may live in close proximity to each other in physically contiguous, ‘peasant towns’ always segregate themselves into distinct homogenous residential neighborhoods.” (McGilvray:1974).

Table 2

Population By Ethnic Group In Ampara District: 1963-1981, 2001

Year	Sinhalese		Tamil		Muslims		Others		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1963	62,160	29.35	50,480	23.83	98,270	46.39	910	0.43	211,820	100
1971	82,86	30.38	63,921	23.43	125,093	45.86	908	0.33	272,790	100
1981	146,371	37.65	79,725	20.51	161,481	41.53	1,209	0.31	388,786	100
2001	231,771	33.33	110,590	18.76	245,089	41.56	1,894	0.32	589,344	100

Source: Dept. of Census & Statistics

2001 Figure Source: District Secretariat Amparai

The distribution and demographic composition of its population is a unique feature of Amparai’s political history. More appropriately, what is perceived as a moulding of its demography, is via colonization policies of the state in support of irrigation schemes. Its history merits some attention here because it is closely linked to current local social-political complexities. This may provide some insights into the depth and complexity of issues faced by different communities in Amparai, which has a direct bearing on access to and distribution of aid and assistance.

History & Political Context:

Historical Roots

Anthropological research and historical information reveal a process of assimilation and harmonious relations between the two communities in the region over centuries. Inter-marriage between the local Tamil and Muslim population had been common to a significant degree, evident in the marriage and descent systems of these communities. They are known to be identically matrilineal and matrilocal to the point of sharing identical clan names in some cases.²⁸

The unique nature of the eastern region communities' relationship (Muslim and Tamil) over the years is reflected in commonalities of language, social organization and cultural practices. This has unfortunately deteriorated and today we see the mistrust and ultimate manifestations of violence on the ground. To a large extent, this has been the result of competition over limited resources and political machinations reinforcing identity-based criteria. Awakening of an ethnic identity consciousness meant a gradual moving away from the natural process of assimilation.²⁹ The visible result of this has been that Tamil/Muslim communities in the more recent past maintained their distinctive cultural identities in the region, with each community living in interspaced villages. The population along the coastal areas in particular, is distributed in segregated pockets. In spite of a heightened awareness of cultural traits, the two communities had managed to co-exist relatively peacefully in the past. Unfortunately, this situation changed in the post-independent period with state policies and partisan politics contributing heavily to these changes.

It is noted that "the polarization of Muslims versus Tamils in Sri Lanka has been caused to a significant degree by opportunistic political strategies and tactics at the national level, and the construction and propagation of ethnic or "racial" differences carried out by urban elites."(McGilvray: 1974). An increasing population, scarcity of lands in the region, state colonization schemes and economic pressures have brought about tensions that eventually erupted. This has laid the foundation for inter-communal conflicts in the east, which has escalated into the complex patterns of violence observed today. While the war in 1983 further strained the relationship between the communities, 1985 appears to have marked a turning point in community relations where armed violence among the communities became the order of the day.

"The ethnic violence that broke out after 1985 exposed the Muslim community – particularly in the North and East both to terrorism by Tamil militants and to State terrorism." (Ismail et al. : (2005)

Recent Historical Events

In the recent past, Amparai, particularly its coastal belt has been subjected to devastation by the tsunami as well as the 20 year war between the state and the LTTE. History also reflects a pattern of conflict in the east originating in the post-independence period. Beginning with Sinhala and Tamil community conflicts, violence in the area include Sinhala and Muslim community tensions, extending to tensions between Muslim and Tamil communities, and today they include violence and fragmentation within Tamil communities.

Historical events appear to have contributed to and exacerbated some of the visible tensions in Amparai today. Particularly in relation to access and allocation of land in the context of resettlement planning in post-disaster situations. For example, there is a general consensus among community members that the establishment of the Galoya Scheme³⁰ and ensuing resettlement of primarily Sinhalese peoples initiated a series of conflicts between the settlers and (Tamil speaking) residents, who were eventually forced to leave the lands and areas they had traditionally owned and/or resided in.³¹ The west of Amparai reflects a population of largely Sinhalese Buddhists, who have been resettled as a part of various irrigation projects carried out under the state's major post-independence colonization scheme.³² Resettlement of population groups for purposes of agricultural development in the dry zone caused significant demographic shifts within the Amparai region, in areas that Tamil populations had traditionally resided. It was noted that few Tamil people among several thousand Sinhalese had been able to acquire land in newly irrigated areas. This gradually resulted in the Tamil population either selling or abandoning their lands.

Statistics indicate that Tamil communities gradually decreased in numbers over the years in the area. (see Abeysinghe (1976); McGilvray (1974); Saminathan: (2005); Table 2 Ethnic Ratio Chart) with a comparatively significant increase in the Sinhala population figures. Muslim population figures also reflect a decrease in numbers, however these figures reflect numbers higher than both Sinhalese and Tamil in the district. (See Table 2).

Prior research provides ample indication and insights into the tone and direction that future politics would take, by pointing to cleavages among diverse communities. Moore notes the ideological interpretations of the colonization process by raising some of the flaws in the dry-zone irrigation-cum colonization projects. He emphasizes its negative impacts on the peasant population particularly small holders and reveals ethnocentric dimensions of territorial settlement patterns.

"To recognize officially the very evident need for a hired labor force even in settlement schemes where individual allotments measure only three acres, would implicitly undermine the myth that relates Dry Zone settlement to the glories of ancient Sinhalese society and to the re-creation of a Sinhalese peasant society. And here the term 'Sinhalese' has been used very intentionally. For not only have large-scale irrigation schemes intruded Sinhalese settlers into areas formerly occupied mainly by Tamil speakers – Sri Lanka Tamils or Muslims—but this has mainly by Tamil speakers – Sri Lanka Tamils or Muslims—but this has been the conscious and admitted intention. There is thus a territorial dimension to what has been termed, in relation to Sinhalese political and cultural resurgence, 'The Myth of Reconquest.' Land policy and the ideologies which support it, have in general focused much more on the control of land than on the cultivation or use of land." (Moore: 1985).

Muslim communities too have raised concerns over the loss of their traditional land. In addition to distributing newly opened up lands among the new settlers, lands owned and developed by Muslim communities for many generations they claim, were taken from them on the grounds that they were temple lands (Viharagam) and for purposes of establishing sugar factories.³³ The resettlement of landless Sinhalese peasants in the eastern region mostly inhabited by Tamil as well as Muslim peoples, has given prominence to land access and ownership as a contentious point of debate in ethnicized politics. Demographic shifts have provided the basis for continued contention contributing to current local political tensions in the district as reflected

on the ground. Land issues have been further exacerbated after the natural disaster due to a scarcity of available state land and the difficulties in allocating private land for resettlement. For example land traditionally owned by one ethnic group meant that there were negative responses to the relocation of other communities in the area. NGOs and local administrative authorities have had to face such challenges in post-tsunami, reconstruction and rehabilitation planning and programs.³⁴

Current Political Trends

Tamil-Muslim tensions have manifested itself most violently in the eastern part of the country, and coastal communities continue to be subjected to various forms of armed violence due to friction between the two communities. Additionally, the prevailing thinking among eastern Muslims is that the southern Muslim leadership does not necessarily reflect the interests of the north-eastern Muslim community. There is a school of thought that emphasizes differences between north-east Muslims and southern Muslims not only in their politics but in terms of culture and social structures as well.³⁵ The history of inter-communal politics and conflict dynamics in the east would require a separate study of its own. For purposes of this study, we have noted issues of relevance and significance, which reveal political partisanship in a multi-polarized setting and a 'communalization' of post-disaster relief and reconstruction activities. In an environment where inter-community and intra-community tensions prevail, and communities lack faith in political representation including state administrative institutions, alternative, homogenous entities have emerged locally, to fill a void and respond to community needs.

What this additionally indicates is an emerging dangerous trend, where post-disaster relief efforts are reinforcing ethnic/communal dimensions, where interventions are creating new tensions adding to further conflict among communities.

The current political scenario in the district is complex and inter-group, intra-group violence is rampant. The CFA and signing of the

MOU has established certain territories as 'state administered' or 'LTTE administered,' each with their own separate security forces. In the north, the territories and border points are clearly demarcated with security checkpoints at each entry and exit points. This is not the case in the east. Of the 20 divisions in Amparai, three divisions are partly under LTTE control with no clear entry and exit points.³⁶Hence the areas they can carry out public services and assist communities as in the north is unclear.

The Political Wing offices established in state administered areas after the ceasefire to develop civilian structures and communications, have been dismantled after violence in the region escalated killing a number of their representatives. A split within the organization, has at one level resulted in the area becoming an arena of contested authority, with constant attacks between factions. At another level, violence continues with shootings and killings carried out by so called 'unidentified armed groups' and or 'paramilitaries' that operate in the area. Often the responsible parties are never identified and various theories abound. In addition, the district is heavily militarized by state security forces as well. The Special Task Force (STF) presence predominates particularly along the coastal areas, and is the accepted 'authority' enforcing security, 'law and order' in the area supplemented by Home Guards and the regular police force. Where STF authority ends in the south of Batticaloa district, the Army authority control points begin.

The communities, particularly along the coast have been subjected either directly or indirectly to the impact of the fully fledged war between the state, LTTE and other militant groups. Although the ceasefire went into effect in 2002, the east and Amparai have not been spared from continued, sporadic violence. Other militant groups or 'third party forces' appear to maintain a strong presence in the area and are active in spite of the state armed forces who also maintain a large presence. Confrontations among these various military factions and increasing civilian vulnerabilities as a result of the massive presence of state forces and militarization in the area, has continued after the CFA

and is present to date. The breakaway faction of the LTTE under Karuna, a former military commander of the eastern region, has exacerbated the violence with constant attacks against one group or another.

Attempts to get a grasp of the situation is difficult if not impossible in a volatile locality within a limited time period. In such an environment, discussions with community leaders, administrative officials and people in the villages shed little light on current matters. Most interviewees noted the operations of 'third forces' or 'unidentified groups/armed persons' but were unable to identify who they were or preferred not to comment due to security issues. Discussions with a Muslim community leader in Pottuvil Town noted the following.

"LTTE was split into two groups. After that there are shootings taking place continuously. They are killing their own people. Not Sinhalese or Muslims. We do not know who is killing whom. It is happening among them."

He noted that this happens even though the state armed forces are present "While they are on duty only these murders are taking place" when asked why this cannot be prevented, he stated,

"...That we have to ask from Forces only. Since it has not been able to be traced by anyone they say this is what the guerilla war is [that] 99% of the time it is not possible to trace it."

In an environment of state war and internecine conflicts, various divisions in the district have been affected differently. Some divisions were affected primarily by inter-community violence, others were caught in the crossfire between state and the LTTE, yet others have faced the impact of clashes among Tamil militant groups. Community protests against violence and any dissent is conveyed in the form of 'harthals,' all of which has its periodic bouts of escalation. The local scenario is also colored with ritual appearances of national politicians most often prior to various elections or some ceremonial event creating further confusion on the ground adding to the burdens of local security forces. In addition

to war and violence, the district's coastal areas were badly affected by natural disaster.

"it [Thirukkovil Division] was badly affected. five villages have been displaced. Now after the MOU was signed with Ranil's Government we have resettled the five villages. It is more than 1500 families. Community buildings, schools and a lot of government buildings were destroyed. Damage was due to artillery fire." There were more than 6000 families that were affected by tsunami in our division. They lost every thing.... These people were affected by flood as well. First the tsunami struck, then 2 weeks later it flooded."

(Discussion ADS Thirukkovil)

"Actually here the racial violence was the biggest one between the Muslims and Tamils. The other things are the unidentified armed groups we don't know who they are because people are reluctant to say. Sometimes they may know the people but they don't come out because [of] problem[s] they may face. These days there are clashes between the movements. The Tigers, EPRLF and EPDP those days [prior to 1990]"

(Discussion with divisional administrative official)

"Here you find racial conflicts between Muslims and Tamil very often. In one area there are two DS Office functioning. One for Muslim and the other one of Tamils. There were two cooperatives, and even two hospitals.."

(Discussion Navithaveli Divisional Administrative official)

The scenario on the ground indicates multiple structures of authority, officially and unofficially. The state administration, state forces, the LTTE and all other factions appear to constitute the multiple structures that exercise different forms of power and control within ambiguously defined territorial spaces. Who or more appropriately how many more collaborative or independent sources of power, exercise authority and control in the area is unclear. Responses to disaster over the years and to the recent tsunami crisis has been shaped by the district's

local dynamics and ground realities. Local and foreign institutions as well as communities have to respond to disaster situations under such conditions. Management and coordination or non-coordination of relief and assistance is therefore determined to a large extent by these factors.

Socio-Economic Context:

Amparai is situated in the dry zone, and is a predominantly agricultural district. The primary livelihood of its people is paddy cultivation including sugar cane and chena cultivation. Fishing is the next important livelihood and livestock (cattle) farming. Muslim communities in Amparai are extensively involved in agricultural farming apart from trade and small business occupations they traditionally engaged in. Akkaraipattu, Samanthurai and Ninthavur are well known as agricultural farming areas. In these farming communities, both Tamil and Muslim do not live adjacent to their fields, instead they live in the coastal towns and commute to work their land on a daily basis. They cultivate adjacent tracts of paddy land and live in neighborhoods within defined ethnic boundaries.³⁷ This may provide for community 'comfort zones', but in terms of practical reality, it tends to enhance subtle divisions and heighten identity consciousness among community groups. In turn, this increases their level of vulnerability to convenient political manipulations, and exposes them as easy targets to continuous violence as observed on the ground.

Navithaveli is a newly created division which now reflects a higher percentage of the Tamil population. The negative effect this has on Muslim farmers is tremendous.

"We were not directly affected by the war. But lot of our farmers were slaughtered when they go to their lands for cultivation..... People living near the cultivation lands before the war, are now living near coastal areas. ... For e.g. Muslims lived at a village called Navithaveli and during the war, since they could not live there any longer, they shifted here. They cannot go back there as

Tamils have put up houses in Muslim land and these Tamils are claiming those lands as Tamil Lands. "

Discussion: Local Islamic NGO

Fishing is the second most significant livelihood source, which includes both inland and marine fishing, particularly among the coastal belt communities. The most critical issues that emerged in both northern and eastern districts are numerous setbacks due to war and a severe blow to the fishing industry as a result of the tsunami. Seasonal fishing where Sinhalese fishermen would migrate to the eastern regions has ceased to exist today. Communities where these fishermen had settled down, inter-married and assimilated with local populations is still evident in older divisions such as Karaithivu.³⁸ Interviews and discussions with fishing communities and fisheries cooperative society members (both in the north and east) noted major drawbacks resulting from the security situation. State restrictions on deep sea fishing, fishing at night in particular, prawn cultivations in the lagoons and inland fishing, resulted in its total abandonment in some areas.

The communities participated in different types of fishing i.e. (Karaivalai) shallow water fishing, deep sea fishing, Madal fishing (beach seine fishing), freshwater/river and lagoon fishing and each required the use of different nets, boats and fishing equipment. Each group also noted that disaster and war had affected them in different ways. Madal fishing, (a specific technique in fishing) in Addalachchanai for example, is affected by the 200 meter buffer zone. The nature of the fishing technique requires that they reside close to the shore. This particular mode of fishing requires constant scanning of the sea for fish shoals, with a quick follow up to get their catch from the sea. It is a collective effort on the part of a large group of fishermen with community members participating at times. The process involves the throwing or spreading of the net from two directions and hauling the nets with their catch back to shore. Although this form of fishing requires less number of boats it is considered a difficult occupation in the community. Encouraging deep sea fishing is preferable according

to a local administrative officer but that would raise problems locally, due to the lack of space to dock boats.

Freshwater/river fishing had been a generational occupation in certain villages,³⁹ but they had been badly affected after the tsunami due to salt water contamination of the river, destroying the fish supply. Most often freshwater fishing is supplemented by livestock, poultry farming in order to supplement their livelihood. In one particular village, many of the fishermen stated that they are currently involved in daily labor work for survival, others noted that they are engaged in selling fish bought from seafaring fishermen. Assistance from the fisheries societies they belong to has been insufficient due to the lack of resources and there has been no support from the state fisheries department. The Samasam (parent body of fishing community societies/associations) appears to have been ineffective in providing support for the fisheries society members of particular villages. Discussions conveyed that there was a general perception of existing exclusionary practices in terms of providing assistance for their community.

"There are two societies. There are two wards, one and two. Two societies for two wards. Adjoining village is a Muslim village. They have their own fishing society. Muslims receive relief. Tamils don't receive any relief."

Local Administration, Governance & Institutions:

Amparai is divided into 20 Divisional Secretariats, 505 Grama Niladari Divisions and 828 villages that come under these divisions. The District's Administrative body is headed by a District Secretary aka Government Agent (GA) and an Additional GA who has been appointed after the Tsunami disaster. Local government is represented through 14 Pradeshiya Sabhas and 2 Town Councils, one in Amparai Division and the other in Kalmunai. Local government role and responsibility as defined in the district is the same as in all districts, extending to the various sectors i.e. rural development, infrastructure, health, education, minor irrigation etc. Administrative Officials noted

that rehabilitation and reconstruction work was going on in the north-east and Amparai, referring to implementation by *"the government through the Provincial Council funded by the World Bank..."* Discussions with the DS's has noted for instance that the DS's function as the Special Commissioner or Chief Administrator for the Pradeshiya Sahbas in the area. The Special Commissioner oversees the PS administration, which indicates a subordination of local government staff roles in practice.

"[The] Divisional secretary is the man who is also acting as a secretary of the Pradesasaba. Because of this problem the person elected as a Chairman, [of the Pradeshiyasabha] he becomes a peon of the DS office."

In Amparai, the study focused primarily on administrative divisions that cover coastal towns and villages which have been subjected to all types of disaster, war violence and natural disasters. Historical processes and its socio-political environment has defined the responses of organizations, administrative and institutional structures in the district. It tends to reflect a pattern that both reinforces and predisposes communities to ethno-centric divisions. A pattern of separateness among homogenous communities each with their own DS's and GS's is reflected within administrative and local government structures. For instance local government bodies in Amparai such as Pradeshiya Sabhas in Akkaraipattu are bifurcated into two, reflecting Tamil and Muslim polarization.⁴⁰ Some administrative divisions in the district are subdivided and segregated based on a particular community i.e. Kalmunai Muslim and Tamil divisions, and eventually it appears that whole new divisions emerge, whose creation is justified on the basis of a numerical ethnic majority, in order to accommodate a particular community.⁴¹

Navithenveli, Sainthamaruthu, Karaitheevu divisions are some of these recent creations. Karaitheevu for example was a part of Ninthavur DS Division. But this particular area in Karaitheevu was populated

mostly by Tamil peoples. Due to the inter-community (Tamil-Muslim) tensions, violence and the reluctance of the peoples to travel to Ninthavur, a Karaithvu sub-division was demarcated in 1985 and created as a DS division in 1990.⁴² Navithenveli division was originally a part of Samanthurai but was created as a division recently in 2001. Its population is approximately 70 percent Tamil and the rest are Muslim and include a few Sinhalese who have been assimilated into the Tamil communities. Sainthamaruthu was originally a part of the Kalmunai administrative division but, in 2000, formed a separate division based on its population composition, mostly upon requests of the community who were primarily Muslim. The population in Sainthamaruthu is now 100 percent Muslim.⁴³

All of this has meant that local responses to both war and natural disaster varied among divisions. In some situations, each DS Division and or each GS division, villages or individual communities have come up with their own institutional structures to provide relief. Local institutions/NGOs have emerged in response to service the needs of the different ethnic communities and/or groups. For example in primarily Muslim populated areas, Islam-based NGOs and/or the mosque play a major role in that particular community. In Tamil populated areas, it appears that Tamil communities and/or NGOs are most likely to provide services.

Galle District:

History, Geographic Description & Demographics:

Galle District is situated in the southern region of the country, and is one of three districts that constitute the Southern Province. Historically, Galle has been a significant trading port for Arab, Portuguese and Dutch traders for instance, and is considered a capital city in the south because of its natural harbor. Until the Colombo harbor was established, Galle had been important and popular as the port of call for loading and transshipping of cargo. The district's total landmass covers an area of approximately 652 sq miles.⁴⁴ Its natural boundary lines consist of



the Bentara River, in the north and the Indian Ocean on the south and west sides. Its eastern border is flanked by parts of Matara and Ratnapura districts. The district's landscape varies in terms of its geographic physical features, which includes a large coastal area, flat lands, hills, sections of the Sinharaja Forest and major rivers in the south.

The district's population is indicated as approximately 990,539⁴⁵ of which approximately 94 percent are Sinhalese, 3.6 percent Muslim, 1.2 percent Sri Lanka Tamil, 0.9 percent Indian Tamil and the rest constitute a small and diverse group of Burghers, Malay, Chetti, Baratha and others.⁴⁶ The district's historical significance as a port of call attracted a wide range of travelers, traders including colonizing forces, which has contributed to the diversity of its population, particularly among its coastal communities.

Socio-Economic & Political Context:

Primary livelihoods of the districts population are fishing, agriculture which includes tea, rubber, coconut and paddy cultivation as well as cinnamon, pepper and other smaller crops, tourism and small industries such as coir, lace making, mask and wood carving, brick manufacturing etc. The establishment of rubber and coconut estates in the district contributed to the growth of the coir- based industry common in the region. Additionally, a large percentage of the population is employed in government services. Field discussions noted that livelihoods most affected have been in the fishing, tourism and coir industries, and that there should be a concentrated effort to target and coordinate aid and assistance flow to these sectors.

The district has also been a witness to violent conflict and has been a seat for insurgencies that originated in the southwestern part of the country. While the north-eastern districts have been and are currently experiencing armed conflict with ethnicized dimensions, the south has seen the birth and revival of the Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP), the political organization comprising of Sinhala youth, that formerly led two violent, armed insurgencies/conflicts against the state. What is noteworthy is that the conflicts in both regions appear to have originally stemmed from disillusionment, frustration and an increasing radicalization of the youth, in their attitude towards existing social, economic and political conditions, and what was perceived as exclusionary state policies. The JVP has since joined the national political process and has emerged as a prominent political force. Its members have played a fairly important role in the aftermath of the natural disaster in responding to community needs in the southern district.

Local Administration, Governance & Institutions:

Galle comes under the Southern Provincial Council (along with Matara and Hambantota districts) under the prevailing local government system. Its local government bodies consists of 15 Pradeshiya Sabhas, 1

Municipal Council and 1 Town Council.⁴⁷ For administrative purposes Galle is divided into 18 Divisional Secretariats, 896 Grama Niladari Divisions and 2,311 villages⁴⁸ that comes under the authority of the GA or District Secretariat for the Galle District. For purposes of this study, our research was limited to a few villages in five DS Divisions, which were most severely affected. To a large extent we covered the local fishing communities and institutions. This was not due to any particular selection criteria but purely because large numbers affected by the tsunami were from the fishing communities.

The district has a varied institutional structure comprising a combination of traditional and more recently developed institutions at community and state levels. We observed that religious, educational and cultural institutions have played a significant role. Their potential for community support in times of crisis and disaster is true of other districts as well. In the aftermath of the natural disaster, religious institutions i.e. temples, churches and mosques as well as schools have provided assistance and has been a standard source of shelter to those affected in coastal areas.

3. DISASTER RESPONSE IN THE THREE DISTRICTS

Local responses to disaster in the districts revealed that a wide range of institutional structures operate and continue to function in diverse ways in order to deal with the crises. Geographic characteristics, historical roots, political history including current dynamics, socio-economic and cultural contexts in each of the districts have shaped the manner in which they have responded to and coped with both war and natural disasters. Local institutional structures have evolved, developed and/or disintegrated depending on the surrounding environment. Despite challenging local conditions and difficulties there appears to be a strong institutional base from which affected communities can and have received some benefit and support.

Disaster Response in Mullaitivu

Religious Institutions:

The Catholic church with a history of over 300 years evolved with the country's colonial history. Their role in the community is significant not only because it is a strong institutional structure in itself, but also due to its support for the development of an institutional base in the communities.⁴⁹

The church is an integral part of the lives of coastal region communities, and as the local parish priest stated, "*the church is the*

community and the community is the state."⁵⁰ They have naturally been a source of strength and support to the peoples during periods of displacement over the years, resulting from anti-tamil riots in the 70s followed by the war in 1983. During the conflict years, the church had taken on an increasingly significant role in the community, providing much needed support and basic service, particularly since NGO presence was non-existent.

Further, the church owns large tracts of privately-held land in the district. Numerous tracts of land have been committed to the rehabilitation of displaced peoples during the war as well as after the tsunami. Priests and nuns from different parts of the country had convened in the district in the aftermath of the tsunami to provide physical and particularly emotional support and counselling to the traumatized peoples. The church has a social service arm funded internationally by CARITAS operating through local entities such as HUDEC and CEDEC, which are involved in numerous post-tsunami community recovery and rehabilitation efforts across various sectors. They have undertaken activities in permanent housing, water supply and sanitation, fisheries sector, education, health infrastructure reconstruction and livelihood support among others.⁵¹

Church representatives, for instance, have intervened in overcoming arbitrary restrictions imposed by state officials. For example strong antibiotics that were necessary after the tsunami for patients who had developed serious internal problems after swallowing water were not available locally. When private arrangements were made to import them taxes were imposed and official circulars were cited as reasons for denial. Entities providing independent donations of goods and assistance to the district in the post-tsunami period, faced various bureaucratic procedures and obstacles. The priests/nuns were active in efforts to overcome such situations.

"I can say of a sister who had got down a whole lot of antibiotic medicines with some international connections. But the Government didn't allow her to bring [them] here. They wanted

her to pay a terrible amount of tax. They said who are you to bring these things. You can't do it. So the medicines are lying in the harbor for months and months. Even now there are 400-600 containers there in the harbor un-cleared. People cannot pay the tax they are demanding. Then charges go up. So we said we don't want it."

"One of my relatives had sent a one-container load of things like milk food supplies and pillows etc. Virtually for about two or three weeks we were going up and down and we were trying through some contacts with government officials. But we couldn't. They said there was a circular you must pay the taxes and take [the goods]. The Finance Minister issues it. Therefore nobody wanted or was willing to take by saying, "You take it without paying the tax". So we had to finally pay the tax and take it out.... The Government was really miserable.... the Arch Bishop's Secretary; he knows what he is doing and has contacts. They have also got down things and they wanted to send certain things to North East. Then the officials there said "You can't send it to North East" and gave it to another area. These were not in writing, but of course you can't just take it. He [Harbor Official] didn't sign the documents. So finally what we did was, we got the Moratuwa GA to sign the documents saying that things are coming to them. Part of the things went there and part of the things we got. So we got around the difficulties in that way. We faced that kind of administrative hassles and situations."

Civil Society, NGOs and Local Community Organizations:

The collective and voluntary responses on the part of civil society is represented in the education sector of the district. The Teachers Welfare Association is an active institution that has been organized in each school and has evolved over the years. These voluntary type associations were established in the community prior to the tsunami, to include both teaching and non-teaching employees as beneficiaries for welfare support and assistance. Difficult socio-economic conditions in the

district have necessitated the rise of informal social support networks such as these, particularly when state support was insufficient or had ceased. Funds are collected by contributing a small percentage of the teacher's salaries on a monthly basis and are utilized to meet some of the specific needs of teachers, children or related needs.⁵² With limited funds, they cannot play a major role in the community. However, they have contributed physically by volunteering their services and providing emotional and moral support. For example, through personal visits to parents and children in times of war, advising them, encouraging school attendance and looking after the injured. Following the tsunami, teachers who were not affected, assisted those in the shelters and provided psycho-social help and counseling.⁵³

The Tamil Teachers' Union (TTU) on the other hand includes a broad-based membership of all government school Tamil teachers represented at District and National levels. Established in 1963, its primary role at the time was to function as a trade union, to ensure the basic rights of Tamil teachers particularly in the north-east, and confront the state/education department injustices in cases such as teacher appointments, due promotions, salary anomalies, distortion of Tamil history and culture in government printed textbooks etc. During the war, the union was involved in bringing human rights violations against teachers and school children to public attention.⁵⁴

"During wartime the schools were bombarded here students were killed in their uniforms, teachers, principals were arrested by the military and tortured and killed some were [im]prisoned. Our association exposed all these atrocities and fought against them and we were successful in finding some solutions against these violations. This situation prevailed during warime."

Post-tsunami activities involved assisting the affected peoples, particularly teachers who had lost family members, by paying personal visits and assistance in helping them through their grieving period. They had played an important voluntary role in the early days following the disaster when the people were in emergency shelters/schools. Once

they moved into transitional camps, the TRO took over the management and coordination of assistance.

The TTU appears to be operating on limited funds which meant their supportive role and contribution to the community in times of emergency has had its limitations. They have been able to meet partial expenses involved in the payment of union staff salaries, conduct tsunami awareness seminars jointly with the zonal education office in the district among others.⁵⁵ Funds were obtained by collecting Rps 2/= per day for one year through deductions from each member teacher's salary. As a collective body they have been able to appeal to international organizations particularly Tamil diaspora organizations such as Old Boys Associations and alumni residing overseas. Reconstruction of two schools have been undertaken by such organizations as a result. Puthukudiyiruppu Central College Old Boys Association for instance, assisted in introducing information technology programs to A Level students. Constant displacements and migrations in the past decades has resulted in extentions of local associations and organizations overseas. This is a tremendous support and resource base for the district's communities. 'Transnationalization' of the local institutional base is a phenomena that has emerged since the war.

In the agricultural sector, Rural Development Societies (RDS) which include Womens' Rural Development Societies and Farmers' Societies (FS) are established in each GN division and come within the purview of the state administrative structure. The RDS's are responsible for a broad range of village development activities⁵⁶ while FS's responsibilities cover defined agriculture based, irrigation/cultivation development activities.⁵⁷ The societies constitute the Mullaitivu District Farming Society Forum represented at district level. These institutions however have been unable to function effectively during the war years due to multiple displacements, inability to access/cultivate the land and the lack of operating funds. After the 2000 period, the FS's gradually began to mobilize its membership and resume their functions. These institutions were able to distribute some post-tsunami assistance to the

affected farmers, provided by the FAO/agricultural department i.e. cash compensation, food stamps, fertilizer etc.⁵⁸

Fishing is a primary occupation in the district and inevitably fishermen's societies play an important role in providing support for the fishing community. There are both fresh water and marine fishermen's societies⁵⁹ that form the Mullaitivu District Fishermen's Co-operative Societies Union aka the Federation of Fisheries Co-operative Societies (FCS) -the parent body- which is referred to as the 'Samasam' by the fishing communities. The communities of the fishing occupation are a closely knit body⁶⁰ organized around the fishing cooperative societies (24 between 12 villages) and the main Samasam. In fact it was noted their role was similar to that in a large extended family, where the Samasam acts as the head of the family in providing and supporting the cooperative's 'family members'.

The fishermen claim the cooperative societies and the Samasam have always played a vital role in helping the fishing industry in their district by mobilizing scarce resources and distributing them evenly among each of FCS's during the war and natural disaster. Since the war began, the unions have not received any assistance from the government fisheries department, hence the Samasam has emerged as a strong body that provides support, with whatever funds obtained through local and foreign NGOs. They had regular monthly meetings before the tsunami, which the society members attended, particularly during the war period when essential items such as fuel, kerosene oil etc., were obtained through the Samasam at controlled prices.

"During the wartime, the meeting [FCS meetings] was important to us. We had a scarcity of kerosene oil, one litre of kerosene sold at Rs 100 to Rs 200 in the black market. If we attend the meetings we can obtain 3 to 4 liters of kerosene oil through Samasam control[led] price. This cannot be bought from the outside. Samasam only distributes items like kerosene oil, soaps etc. Do you know that there was a time we have washed our clothes by using palmayrah fruit juice, because these items were banned by the

government's economic embargo. These societies were there to serve our community during those difficult times." (discussions with fishing community)

After the tsunami, the Samasam has functioned as an important mechanism and medium of communication between assisting organizations and the fishing societies. They have distributed boats and other equipment received by INGOs/NGOs among the fishermen's societies. Needs of the fishing communities are communicated to state administrative bodies through the Samasam particularly during disaster situations. Community societies in all sectors form a head Samasam and represent the interests and concerns of each occupation.

"All these unions of each sector join together and formed Samasams. i.e. samasam for fisheries, for farmers etc. Then all these samasams join together to form a body... During situations like this the body [Samasam] helps us to fulfill our needs through making contacts with the GS, AGA and GA. We depend on them. They have the responsibility to make necessary arrangements with the government in providing government assistance." (discussions with fishing community & farming community leaders)

INGO/NGO role in the north-east had been limited during the war years until the recent tsunami, which witnessed an increased role in the area albeit with its activities closely coordinated and distributed along sectoral lines. The Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation Organization (TRRO) and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) are organizations that emerged in response to disaster situations. They are two entirely separate entities.

The TRRO was set up after the 1977 riots, to primarily address the issues of displaced Sri Lankan plantation Tamil communities, who were badly affected during this period. They were extensively involved in rehabilitation and livelihood support of these communities who, for security reasons, wished to be relocated to the north-east areas. After the 1983 riots and ensuing war, their focus shifted to include assistance

for large scale internal displacement within the north-east. Internal dissent, fragmentation and the emergence of TRO, which had begun to play an increasingly important role in the area during this period, witnessed a gradual diminishing of TRRO's role even though they still exist in the district.⁶¹

A key actor in the district has been the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). The roots of its origin goes back to India, where the idea was formulated after the 1983 war, precipitated by a need to respond to a large number of displaced peoples. Its main objective during the war was to provide relief and rehabilitation support such as food, water, housing, sanitation, medical assistance, and livelihood support for the displaced. It is now involved in various long-term development activities in various sectors such as health, housing, education particularly primary schooling and childcare among others.

The first branch was established in Mullaitivu and expanded into several districts. The district of Mullaitivu has today, a coordinator in every village. In the Vanni region, they support a number of community-based organizations in various divisions, which are involved in livelihood and welfare activities. Apart from regular staff they also have a number of community volunteers who are mobilized during disaster or emergency situations. This was an important asset during the tsunami. Based on the organizational structure, management and operational activities, the TRO is clearly geared towards meeting both emergency situations to provide assistance through its volunteer base, as well as longer-term recovery and development efforts supported by regular staff. The organization is playing an active role in post-tsunami co-ordination and delivery of aid and assistance and management of transitional shelters. The gradual evolvement of TRO into large scale national operations with international branches, is a good example of the transnational nature of local institutional structures, which have emerged in response to the needs of war affected communities in the north-east.

LTTE Civil Institutional Structures & Public Services

Alongside state administration and line agencies, the civil institutional structure established by the LTTE covers various sectors and agencies, which are present in the district. Some of the key institutions in their executive division includes the police for law enforcement, military and naval (Sea Tiger Unit) units, and a judiciary with approximately six to seven courts in the district,⁶² (Tamil Eelam Courts). Financial institutions have been established through the Tamil Eelam banking system. The Tamil Eelam Administrative Services body, oversees their entire administrative structure and also facilitates coordination with state administrative structures. The study observed a few institutions which play an important role in disaster response and management, as well as long-term reconstruction and development efforts.

The medical sector which functions through the establishment of Tamil Eelam Health Services, comprises of The Center for Health Care (CHC) Team. It include mobile clinics, trained paramedics, and hospitals such as The Thileepan Medical Center and Ponnambalam Hospitals. The Thileepan Medical Services for instance has set up several centers in remote areas in order to provide medical services for communities who have no access to hospitals, etc. The Center for Healthcare identifies the needs of different areas and coordinates medical teams that go into villages. The CHC also coordinates with the MOH/DPDHS local office in servicing transitional shelters, and works closely in meeting the medical needs of these communities in the post- tsunami period. They have set up Health Care Teams consisting of medical volunteers, trained students and community members to maintain health and sanitation standards and raise health awareness in the shelters. As human resources are limited in the medical field in this district, it was noted that pooling of human and material resources by the LTTE medical staff and DPDHS was a source of significant support for the communities in the post-tsunami period.⁶³

The education sector includes a law college, medical college and a fine arts college. A vocational training college has been set up in the

tsunami affected division to meet the technical needs in the area. It is aimed at developing much needed skilled labor and a technical resource base within the community, as a part of long-term reconstruction and development planning. The Planning and Development Secretariat (PDS) Mullaitivu branch has established a tsunami unit, the "Project Implementation and Coordination Secretariat," to coordinate and monitor post-tsunami work in the district. New structures were established in the district to respond to the immediate needs of the tsunami disaster such as an 'Emergency Task Force' and 'Village Development Forum,' coordinated by the PDS. Within two days, following the tsunami, The Task Force was formed as a collective effort to respond to emergency needs. It consisted of representatives of all of the district's key administrative and institutional bodies, i.e. government officials, LTTE, religious institutional representatives, TRO, health, education sector representatives including students and community volunteers.

A well-known local school served as the main center of operations where rescue operations, provision of medical relief, food, clothing and supplies, transporting injured and victims to other local schools were coordinated. It functioned simultaneously as a temporary emergency shelter.⁶⁴ Students played a major role during this time in assisting with medical emergencies. All 'A' Level students (11th & 12th grades) have been trained in first aid and have a history of providing community assistance in times of crisis.⁶⁵

Community members and the various administrative and institutional representatives unanimously noted the tremendous role played by the LTTE units in carrying out rescue operations, relief and assistance in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami.

"Every student shared the responsibilities. We didn't have medical staff to dress the wounded people, but the children did all that and were helpful to the doctors. Lot of medical students came from Jaffna. They treated them [injured] and ensured they don't get

any infections because it is very important to see that any diseases would not infect these people."

"Soon after the tsunami within 30 minutes it was the Tigers who were at the scene and helping the people. No one can deny this fact. They were acting very fast in giving first aid, removing the injured from the scene and sending them to hospitals, rescuing people who were dragged into the sea and activities like that. Here in hospitals there were only a few doctors available. The Medical Unit of the LTTE also played a major role thereby preventing large numbers in loss of life. The decomposed bodies were buried and antiseptics were sprayed and the places were cleaned completely. People were allowed only after these measures were complete." (Discussions with education sector representatives)

"In the meantime, tigers had organized the vehicles, tractors, lorries, and buses. Many of the buses that were near the seashore were completely destroyed or gone into the water. So, these had come from Mulliyawalai. They organized [it] very well I would say. Then, there were the sea tigers swimming and getting the people out of the sea. So, they organized that part of the relief programme. The dead people's bodies were brought to the shore. First, two or three days it was recovering the bodies. Transporting the injured ones to hospitals was at the initial stage. It was the major part. All the survivors got cut, because we had these barbed wires. Not even barbed wires, commando wires which were used by the Sri Lankan Army. Once your skin or clothes get entangled you can't just remove it unless you get a bad cut. So these people had cut injuries all over the bodies."

(Discussion with Religious Leader)

All senior Sea Tiger cadres are trained to provide medical services under emergencies or any type of disaster, often with minimal resources. Their experiences come from lessons learned during the war, when there were no vehicle facilities to move from place to place. They had to walk

two to three days and often after battles would walk back carrying their injured. As a result, they have learnt to improvise and maximize their skills. Their experiences include managing with minimal medical equipment, for example they have improvised by substituting saline tubes without needles, for blood transfusions.⁶⁶ This training they believe has prepared them to respond quickly and efficiently to the tsunami emergency, which in turn was noted with appreciation by the local community.

Both the State and LTTE administrative bodies have established and mobilized parallel village level bodies to participate in the district's relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. The Village Development Forum (VDF) was set up post-tsunami by the LTTE in the tsunami affected division, and has representative structures in each village. Their meetings are conducted and coordinated on a regular basis. The VDF is a community-based structure and includes a group from existing local institutions, representatives of various occupations/occupational societies as well as government representatives. This entity represents the interests of villages affected by the tsunami, identifies village needs and prepares village development plans for the third phase of rebuilding and reconstruction.

Village Rehabilitation Committees (VRC) on the other hand were already existing community-based structures set up in the entire district, in every village after the MOU was signed. It comprised of very much the same resource pool as the VDF, representatives of community-based organizations, temple trustee members and other village leaders. The district administration body under the GA mobilized this organization, to communicate with and assess the needs at village level which was also a mechanism used to link up with the center via TAFREN in responding to tsunami relief and recovery efforts. It was noted that state administration bodies and the LTTE maintained close communications and coordination on post-tsunami activities.⁶⁷

Child Care Services and Institutions

Child care institutions in the district are primarily supported and managed by TRO as well as the Catholic Church. The church has a long history of establishing homes and hostels. The Holy Family Nuns Convent Girls Home, for example, was established in 1941 in the district. Since the 1983 outbreak of armed conflict, the TRO has played a major role in the management and operation of children's homes in the region. A local NGO, the Center for Womens' Development and Rehabilitation (CWDR) is also involved in managing some homes.⁶⁸ There is a total of approximately 952 children in 11 homes in Mullaitivu District.⁶⁹ The LTTE also support two homes of which one is in the district. One home is for boys and the other is for girls.⁷⁰ There are no state run homes/childcare institutions in the district however, it was noted that some financial support from the state is received through the state administrative body.

Mullaitivu statistical reports indicate there were approximately 321 orphans⁷¹ prior to the tsunami. The tsunami left many more orphaned children and several dead.⁷² Institutions established in the district to address the needs of children who were disabled, orphaned and/or whose parents were disabled and/or impoverished during the war, were able to absorb children affected by the tsunami. The Senthair Home and approximately 131 of its children were tragically destroyed by the tsunami. The remaining few were taken into a home managed by CWDR while a new home was being constructed. New institutions were also set up post-tsunami by the church. i.e. Father Robinsons Boys Home which has 55 children⁷³ to accommodate tsunami affected children. CARITAS plays a key role in providing funding for this home including the support of child rights-based programs/seminars etc.

Disaster Response in Amparai

Religious Institutions:

All religious institutions and leaders have played a role in Amparai in assisting communities, particularly in times of disaster. Physical

structures of religious institutions always provide safe havens and its leaders are actively engaged in social activities and basic public service including emotional and spiritual support in times of crisis. Mosques, kovils, churches and temples as well as homes of relatives and local schools have typically provided temporary refuge for communities affected by natural and war disaster. They have served as emergency, temporary shelters both during periods of armed conflict as well as in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. After a major cyclone that devastated the area in 1978 for example, the church was extensively involved in providing community services.⁷⁴

The Jumma Mosque, the main local mosque in a particular locality where the population is predominantly Muslim, is instrumental in providing community services, relief assistance, shelter etc. in times of crisis.⁷⁵ This Islamic institution is a closely knit and well organized institutional structure where local mosques are linked to a main head mosque, in turn linked to the Grand Mosque in the district. Mosque Committees are important decision-making bodies and along with independent sources of income they have responded to community needs in times of emergency. In primarily Muslim areas, the authority of the mosque and their role in the community is significant and widely accepted. *"If there is a sudden disaster like the tsunami we first informed the GA and Mosque head."*⁷⁶ Churches and Buddhist monks in turn have provided extensive support for the tsunami affected in terms of emergency assistance and shelter. Apart from emergency assistance, they are also engaged in extending social services i.e. educational support for children, peace initiatives by establishing 'peace centers' etc.⁷⁷

Traditional leadership roles within the local communities have been exercised by religious leaders in mosques and temples (Hindu) as a practice over generations. Today, both the Temple Board of Trustees and Mosque Trustees, play a significant role in the resolution and/or diffusion of inter-community violence. Religious leaders from the two communities facilitate negotiations among Muslim and Tamil community members particularly during periods of inter/intra-group and community violence escalations. In the recent mosque bombing

during post-presidential election violence, and ensuing hartals in Akkaraipattu for example, community leaders and both members of Mosque and Hindu Temple Committees were engaged in discussions and communications with various groups in attempts to diffuse the situation. Since the district reflects a high percentage of Muslim inhabitants, the mosque and mosque-based entities, Islamic organizations/local NGOs naturally play an important role in providing community services.

Local Administrative Institutions & Political Entities:

Community discussions indicate that partisan politics and political interference play a big role in assistance delivery in the area. For example, there is interference in the quick delivery of relief goods and services by divisional administration officials. They are being channeled in ways to create the impression among affected communities, that goods are being directly provided by the politician/s concerned. What is evident is that there are indications of donor provided aid/goods⁷⁸ being subverted as political tools, to influence the public and sway the vote in the politicians favor through this process. This results in undue delays in meeting the immediate needs of beneficiaries.

"No we are having a private building as a warehouse. And the politicians are expecting that the goods we receive should be delivered through them. When we move directly, the political support reduces. All the government assistance will be distributed through the DS. When DS is doing these things the public will think "why is there an MP for this area?" So the politicians expect us to hold a small function and distribute the goods through them. This is why they have troubles with us."

"There are very limited resources supplied by the government such as vehicles and food items. Due to that our functions are delayed. We are unable to serve the correct people at the right time. And there is a political threat. When we want to do something they are expecting us to do that through them. We have no time to do so

and do not want to be involved in that. Due to that there is a dispute in between us."

(Sainthamaruthu administrative official)

In Amparai, there are nine MPs representing various parties including ministers in the district. Situations arise where political influence dictates and other times when political representatives and political 'supporters' channeled assistance to their own ethnic constituencies. It was noted that ethnicized party politics played a role in assistance and service delivery in divisions with mixed communities and several MPs. The reluctance to seek or provide medical services outside of a division consisting primarily of a particular community, and the 'political fix' that circumvents this is illustrated in the following:

"The reason is - e.g. in hospitals doctors and nurses are Tamil. Therefore Muslims are afraid to go these hospitals and take treatment."

"We do not know the politicians' ideas. There are two parties. This hospital was completely affected by tsunami. At that time the doctors were asked to serve at a certain hospital. The DMO does not like to go there. One doctor's brother is a politician. So he used his influence and forcibly got this building to open a hospital here."

"Now in Sainthamaruthu there are no state lands available. Only private lands. Even that land is a marshy land. There are lands available in Sammanthurai. There is a possibility to resettle these people there. All the facilities are available there. But when we discussed this with the public the politicians did not like the idea. They are taking action against us. Another thing is that there is a hospital in the ground floor. It was functioning in a mosque earlier. We had the store in ground floor. Suddenly politicians came and ordered us to remove the things and shifted the hospital here. After that there are no doctors here."

The operation of a highly hierarchical order within the administrative apparatus functions as another obstacle to direct

communication between communities, their representatives and senior officials. It denies them the access and opportunity to voice their concerns, grievances and engage in direct discussions. Community approach to senior officials has to be made through the different administrative tiers in order of hierarchy. The communities' perception is that this is simply the unchallenged order of things.

"Why don't you speak to the AGA?"

We can't speak to him directly. Only the GS's talk to them

Can't you speak through your society? What is the obstruction?

We have to speak to the other officers... Only the people who know him can speak to him.

Can't you speak to him directly?

No, we can't speak to him directly"

(Transcript-fishing community discussion)

A Disaster Management Committee had been established over a decade ago at district, divisional and village levels represented by various institutional bodies. However, it appears that newly established divisions had these committees set up after the tsunami.⁷⁹ Members consist of DSs, local NGOs, religious institutional trustees, sectoral and government department heads. Schools and IDP centers have been identified in order to accommodate displaced peoples and INGOs have been notified of specific services they are responsible for providing.⁸⁰ This indicates there are institutions in place to respond to disaster situations which could and should be utilized as a coordination mechanism, however this does not appear to have taken place. Overall, some divisions have to a certain extent shown more organizational capacity and efficiency in mobilizing existing institutions and communities to respond to disaster than others. This appears to depend largely on the professionalism and ability of individual divisional heads. Examples of such divisions were Sainthamaruthu and Karaithivu.

Community Organizations, NGOs & Associations: At village level, there were institutions that were established pre-war and others that developed more recently. Village organizations/Sangams (Kirama Udaya Sabha) prior to the war were functional in providing a supportive role for village development work. Womens' organizations, farmers' organizations and welfare societies provided occupational and social support in some areas on a voluntary basis. However, their functions appear to have disintegrated after the war began and others have evolved in order to respond to specific needs and issues that arose with the unfolding war.

Fishing cooperative societies for both sea and freshwater exist⁸¹ but their assistance has been limited. The freshwater fishing community appears to have been organized into societies in the seventies, prior to that freshwater fishing appears to have been an individualized occupation which had evolved out of necessity. Alternating between agriculture, farming and fishing occupations is a common phenomena in the area.

"No fishing societies existed then. We were using wooden boats. We were fishing individually Fishing societies were started about 25 years back. There were no such societies before. We have been fishing since 1957. Before that we did farming."

Discussion with freshwater fishing group

Local communities have shown initiative and taken independent steps to respond to disaster situations by establishing community-based institutions i.e. citizens committees, and peace committees which play an important role in the district. Citizenship committees and peace committees appear to have emerged in response to adversities faced by the communities during war. Peace committees are formed at both district and divisional levels, to address the violence between Muslim-Tamil communities as well as pre-and post-election violence, and play an active role in diffusing inter-community tensions. But it also appears that these committees are established and function separately, one for

each community, or two office bearers heading the committee, one Muslim and one Tamil member.

" We have formed citizen committees. There are two citizens committees functioning. One for the Muslim division and the other for the Tamil division. They have performed peaceful social activities... "

(Discussion with local NGO/SEVO members, Kalmunai Tamil Division).

"The Citizens Committee was born when there was a split amongst us at the time of the creation of the Pradeshiya Sabha. The Committee now has a Joint Presidentship. One Muslim and one Tamil."

In Thirukkivil, a primarily Tamil division, where villages were severely affected by both war and tsunami, it was noted that TRO responded soon after the tsunami to assist the communities. However, their role is not prominent in Amparai as in Mullaitivu and security concerns were noted as a reason for this. The ability of this organization to provide relief services in the east has become increasingly difficult as a result. Discussions with a Muslim NGO stated that it was founded on the principles of Islam to help the needy and poor. They noted that support for Muslim communities in terms of material and financial resources were provided by mosque-based entities and local muslim organizations.⁸² The communities also received international support from INGOs such as Islamic Relief and Organizations based in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

The existence of two NGO consortiums is a further indication of the divide reflected in the community's disaster responses. One was established at the height of the conflict after 1990 and is based in Akkaraipattu. The other more recently established, approximately four years ago, is based in Amparai town. The Akkaraipattu consortium has been set up to coordinate relief and recovery work, provide services and meet both emergency and long-term needs off war affected peoples.

And as it appears, it covers areas in which a large number of Tamil communities reside i.e. Thirukkivil, Alayadivembu, Pottuvil, Akkaraipattu. The more recently established consortium for humanitarian affairs in Amparai includes a large number of NGO bodies, in which the GA serves as the president. Cooperation between the two and efforts to link up do not appear to have been successful so far.⁸³ The lack of cooperation means there are difficulties in coordinating responses to disaster, the channeling of resources, aid and assistance is split and perhaps fragmented across communities. The implications of the emerging trend is dangerous, it is one that promotes and adds to tensions and increasing conflict among community groups.

On the other hand, in the first few days following the tsunami, the humanitarian response transcended this communal divide. Peoples from all communities, the state forces and LTTE had responded to meet the immediate needs of the affected communities.⁸⁴ State forces in particular the STF, have taken on a significant role in the post-tsunami period in terms of providing emergency assistance, transportation facilities for the injured and dead bodies, food for the affected etc. Their role however has gone beyond responding to emergencies, to providing civilian services by organizing disaster preparation workshops in every GS division in Thirukkivil.⁸⁵ It was not clear if this was a coordinated effort directed and authorized by state administrative bodies. However, when a state military apparatus engages in services typically provided by civilian institutional structures, there is an overstepping of the boundaries between state civil institutions and state forces.

LTTE Civilian Structures & Role

The LTTE role in Amparai revealed a restricted and minimal role in providing disaster support. Their civilian institutional structures were not as visible, in contrast to the north. There appear to be practical constraints which has led to the inability to respond to civilian needs during disaster. More significantly, local politics and volatile ground

situations discussed previously have been cited as reasons for their restricted post-tsunami recovery efforts⁸⁶ in the area.

Child Care Services & Institutions

In Amparai, there are several registered and non-registered homes, of which, approximately 17 are known privately run Children's Homes. Of these, six are indicated as state registered children's homes.⁸⁷ An additional Eleven Homes were also noted as functioning in Amparai.⁸⁸ There are forty three known child care centers operating in the district according to DCPC sources. It appears that there are various organizations representing all communities operating and providing child care services on an ad hoc basis in the district. Not all of these are registered therefore monitoring these institutions are problematic. Different religious institutions, local organizations/NGOs appear to be operating pre-schools, child care centers, daycare centers etc. There is no official, accurate and comprehensive documentation of information. As it appears, there does not appear to be one source from which such information can be obtained.

State support for child care, children's protection and welfare services is represented through the establishment of Women and Children's Bureaus in approximately thirteen police stations in the district.⁸⁹

The District Child Protection Office (DCPC) is currently functioning in the district and maintains a presence in the Katchcheri, GA's Office.

Serious concerns have been expressed by community officials, over issues of children's neglect and abuse in the post-tsunami period.⁹⁰ Children who have lost their mothers are undergoing severe hardship, as fathers are usually too immersed in their grief or, often drunk or remarried. Children left unattended are not attending school and are often found on the streets. The potential for the number of street children increasing here is great. Missing and/or children separated

from families is another area of concern that was expressed. An urgent request for assistance to address these issues were made by the officials.

Disaster Response in the Galle District

Religious Institutions:

In the southern district, populated by a higher percentage of Sinhala communities, Buddhist monks have naturally assumed a prominent role in assisting the victims by organizing shelters, cooked meals, clothing and other basic essentials. Community reliance on religious institutions in times of crisis was evident here as in other parts of the country.

"In most instances they had moved into temples and churches based on their traditional beliefs that the monks and priests could lead them in a crisis."

(Habaraduwa DS)

Unfortunately, negative aspects of these institutions also surfaced. Discussions with communities indicated that certain temples/priests were motivated by profit or partisan politics which meant that this dictated the manner in which relief aid was distributed. The traditionally significant role played by Buddhist monks in southern villages, are emerging today as a strong political force in the state. Links between monks and local politicians, for instance, appears to have resulted in a situation where communities are referring to certain temples as "JVP" or "UNP" temples. Aid goods are dispatched to and stored in temples patronized by a particular politician. These appear to have been distributed among communities who were supporters of that particular politician's party resulting in party affiliations assigned to such temples.

In one instance, temple lands identified for permanent housing could not be used as it was either sold or leased by the priest to an international organization for development purposes.⁹¹ In other cases there was a perception that certain churches reflected bias in providing assistance.

"He too [priest] helped his acquaintances. The name of the temple is 'Amarasinghe Aramaya' and he also has become one of the mudalalis now a days. The non- governmental organizations issued many items to the temple hoping that the temple would help the tsunami victims, but I should say that we have never received even a parcel of food."

"Church's distributed items, that is only for Christians. They drove us away."

(Discussions: local community members)

Local Community Organizations, Formal & Informal Institutions:

Ritual practices by local cultural institutions appear to have played an important role in providing relief in terms of spiritual and psycho-social counseling for individuals as well as community members in general. Traditional healing ceremonies, "Shanthi Karma" are conducted at individual, community and village levels as precautionary and preventive, curative, appreciation and gratitude measures in many parts of the country. Various forms of ritual ceremonies and blessings are conducted according to the prevailing need and situation. In cases of natural disasters i.e. floods and droughts certain rituals, "Gam Maduwa" and "Dewol Maduwa," are performed for the benefit of the community and village. They also perform ritual blessings for the protection of land, property and homes, "Bahirawa Puja," against disaster. "Gara Maduwa" is a ritual performed by the fishermen on the beach. "Thovil" ceremonies are typically performed to achieve a certain level of emotional stability.

In the Galle district, as in other affected districts, the tsunami impact revealed a scenario of death, destruction and psychological trauma for many. Healing rituals were performed for people who were injured, sick, and for others who had lost close family members including their children. To a large extent, people were suffering from immense trauma, and these rituals appear to have held sufficient psychological appeal for

the people, to provide much needed strength and support. Ritualistic practices also offer hope in times of tremendous suffering and loss.

These healing practitioners had also arranged for Pirith chanting⁹² ceremonies to be performed in public places, particularly in locations where large numbers died, in order to purify the village. It is also done to offer merit to the deceased so they can have a better after life without enduring so much suffering. Community member noted that they needed spiritual consolation as well as protection, as they were scared after experiencing death in such large numbers, piles of dead bodies and burials in surrounding areas. The psychological aspects of such traditional practices of existing local institutions are significant in terms of community psycho-social well-being and should be considered for further study and inclusion in future post-disaster welfare programs.

"When we do a thovila ceremony what we do is to enable the patient's mind to concentrate on one place."

"I performed on some patients. Some people were seriously ill. In some families, parents died, leaving the children alone. In some cases the children died, leaving their parents behind. Then all were undergoing a profound shock."

Some are happy while some others do these things to make them temporarily forget that they don't have any thing to eat or drink and they have no places to stay and so on.

(Discussion with ritual healer, ceremonial dancer in the south)

Village development societies established at community level prior to the disaster appear to have utilized their resources for purposes of providing community welfare assistance in general. There were other societies such as the death society, women's societies etc. They would for instance pool their efforts on a collective basis when carrying out Shramadana (volunteer efforts) work in the villages. Their role in the wake of the disaster however, was not very evident in community discussions in the district. Apart from the Grama Sevaka who represents a cluster of villages, and is expected to report their requirements and

grievances, post-tsunami relief committees appear to have been set up in order to address the issues faced by affected communities.

"In every village there is a committee elected by the villagers. People can forward their problems and proposals to this committee."

In the event of a Sharamadana campaign, all the villages act collectively in unison.

There were societies in the village such as the death society, village development society and women's societies. After the tsunami people established some new societies too, they started to have relationships with the Divisional Secretariats and offices. They gave some aid to the people, but did not assist the people in a special way. People got assistance from NGO's.

Failure to recognize and mobilize existing local resources, appears to have obscured the role that certain community-based societies might have played in the disaster response process. Their potential for effective services and contribution in long-term recovery and development efforts seem to have been overshadowed by the convergence of multitudes of NGOs in the district with international funding for the most part, as well as INGOs⁹³ in the post-tsunami phase.

Local livelihood committees⁹⁴ are informal bodies that have emerged in the post-tsunami period. They are indicative of collective efforts in a localized context, to represent and give voice to the immediate needs and grievances unique to particular groups within the community. Actual achievements as a collective body however was not so clear, as they are confronted with numerous obstacles and challenges in dealing with an overburdened, bureaucratic, administrative structure. Post-tsunami policies/regulations appear to be unclear and confusing at times. Numerous "circulars" issued by the central government for instance are often contradictory, therefore, implemented on the basis of the subjective interpretations of local administrative officials. Access to, and communication with senior officials is often difficult. In addition, inefficiencies and corruption at village level appear to be fairly common

among administrative officials, while political interferences and partisan politics appear to determine the direction of relief assistance.

"The problems related to administration have to be solved. It is impossible to work based on circulars and organisational codes."

"The biggest challenge was the constant changes of the circulars and bills of the Treasury."

Finally the people accuse the Divisional Secretary and the Grama Seweka. We have letters in which some politicians had asked us to favour certain people who are their friends and relations.

"Whatever the influences are we have executed justice in the permanent housing project, we have undergone severe threats in the process, we have faced even death threats because of political interferences, we can't execute our duties properly."

Discussion: Grama Sewakas

The fishing communities are typically organized along both formal and informal institutional lines. At the formal level, most fishing communities are represented through Fisheries Cooperative Societies (FCSs). It is headed by the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources at National level, and is a part of the centralized network of a state apparatus. Among coastal communities affected by natural disaster Fisheries Cooperative Societies (FCS) as in the other districts, are an important part of the formal local institutional structure. There are FCSs in all divisions, headed by one main Fisheries Cooperation at the district level, The District Fisheries Cooperation. Issues and matters relating to affected fishing communities are handled by the Fisheries Cooperation which comes directly under the purview of the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources.

Observations on the ground have indicated that the effectiveness of the fisheries societies obtaining relief assistance for member communities vary in different areas-some are more effective and exercise more negotiating power than others. While some have been able to

receive tsunami relief assistance by aggressively asserting their demands, other societies have not been able to assist with fishermen's needs. It appears that often, the office bearers of cooperative societies benefit-hence regular members are disgruntled and of the opinion that fishing cooperatives do not serve any purpose.

"They achieved their demands by intimidating even the minister and also by obstructing the road with logs pieces of the boat and other materials. This incident happened in Wellagoda in Magalle. This government repaired their boats and other engines. The Minister of Fisheries tried to build temporary houses with piece of wood for them, but they refused, because they wouldn't be able to live in them for long. Then the government promised to build permanent houses for them. Some peoples get these benefits by the government while some others don't."

"I am a cooperative society member. But there is no service provided to us from them. We have been given new identity cards and we participate in everything."

"We have two fisheries societies, in both of which there is the same secretary, the same president and the same treasurer. They were the people who select people who are eligible to provide food and other items. They don't give anything to those who are not in the good books with them."

"No, there is no point. Not a single fisherman has got anything for the last 18 years. They help only their friends and relations. They charge the membership fees, but there is no any advantage for the members. As some villagers have forwarded petitions, they [cooperative society officials] have declared that they will never help anyone."

(fishing community discussion Sinhadeewaragama)

Fishing communities also belong to a complex informal structure of a 'mudalali system' which operates along the lines of patron-client

relationships. Fishermen are organized under a Mudalali system. Several Mudalali's operate in the district and each appears to control a specific territorial space with a group of fishermen who supply them with their fish catch. Mudalali provides them with the boat, fuel, ice and other equipment⁹⁵ and in turn, they are given one third payment for the value of the fish. Mudalali's in turn sell it to consumers and make a profit. In the early days this system had served as a security buffer for non-boat owning, fishermen who went to sea. Seasonal fishermen for example depended on the patronage of the Mudalali's to support them through private loan-based credit systems during off-season, when they temporarily halted their fishing livelihood.

They had been locked into an interdependent but mutually reciprocal relationship in the past, which today, does not appear to be equitable. They noted that the system has changed in the last 25 years and the system was no longer favorable to small fishermen.⁹⁶ They were caught up in a monopoly where the Mudalali's dominated.

"Those mudalali's never want to see improvements of our lives. They always want us to work under them."

Unfortunately the pattern of aid distribution that followed, and the ways in which it has been channeled after the tsunami, appears to have added to discrepancies in their relationship. This has tilted the economic balance in favor of the more powerful Mudalalis. For example, boat owners who had sold some of their boats prior to the tsunami had kept their licenses, registration documents etc. After the tsunami they used these documents to receive new boats, which deprived those who had really suffered losses.⁹⁷ It is also evident that partisan politics plays a role among certain Mudalalis' operations, or for example in cases where political supporters/affiliates who happen to own boats.

"In case of any quarrel also, the police release them, [Mudalali's] due to their financial power. Even the non-governmental organizations have come and given sailing boats to those who have their acquaintances. Those who can speak English well also get their things done." (Fishing community discussion)

"Mr. X⁹⁸ is a member of the U.N.P. and it was by his boat that my 16 years old son went to the sea."

INGOs/NGOs, Local Administrative Institutions and Political Entities:

A particularly striking feature in this district is the major explosion of INGO/NGOs in the post- tsunami phase, particularly their uncoordinated operations and ad hoc activities. These entities have played a major role in providing assistance to the area, but to a large extent their assistance has been uncoordinated. Imbalances and inequities in aid distribution appear to have caused more difficulties and confusion for state administrative officials. Poorly distributed, assistance and benefits to the affected communities have resulted in the duplication of relief assistance in some situations, excluding the more severely affected while benefiting a few in other situations. This has led to resentment, frustration and social disharmony among the communities and villages.

"Many organizations have mushroomed everywhere, but they only make us fill in number of forms, but we have not received any assistance. There are occasions where non- tsunami victims received donations & aid. Sometimes even the boats have been provided to such people."

(fishing community-Discussion)

Local NGOs, INGOs and/or individuals in certain cases have been involved in various propaganda activities in order to receive funds for the benefit of tsunami victims, when in actual fact the communities received little or no relief. These situations were repeatedly brought to our attention in the course of our discussions and appear to have been common occurrences in this district. Some indications of the manner in which institutional structures have been utilized to capitalize on human disaster and divert resources into 'disaster-based enterprises' is revealed in discussions with community members. The following

discussion notes the processes by which various entities obtain aid funds and create a profit generating enterprise by exploiting the dire conditions of tsunami affected communities.

“Some non-governmental organizations do it. [taking photographs] We didn't deny it, we hope[d] that we will get something. There will be our photos with non-governmental organizations and even with individual foreigners. They might be showing those photos in their countries and getting certain things for them sometimes. When a foreigner has a friend in our country, he asks them to take the photos of tsunami affected places and victims and send them to those countries. Then the foreigners show photos to some institutions of their countries and get aid by them. He shares the aid with his Sri Lankan friend. A small amount is spent on real tsunami victims and gives them some food. Then they again take some photographs of it, show them in their countries who donated them and get more aid from them. The lion's share is between that those foreigners and our Sri Lankans and this process is happening continuously.”

(Dodanduwa fishing community)

“... some NGOs try to deceive us in various ways. They get information and go. They might be using that information to earn money internationally. After identifying the motives of these errant people I was very tough and cautious with them. I have seen thousands of internet sites requesting money for tsunami victims in Sri Lanka. Where is this money going? Various crooks are using this money for their benefits. This is another side of the problem.”

(Divisional Secretary-discussion)

To a large extent, long-established local institutions such as Sarvodaya, Sevalanka, Samurdhi⁹⁹ have provided some support in responding to local community disaster-based needs.

In several discussions, it was also revealed that certain political parties had been more successful in assisting the people such as the JVP in the district. Party members had established the “Sahana Seva Balakaya” (Relief Service Taskforce) during the post-tsunami period to respond to emergency community needs and services. In the Galle district, there were approximately 2000 members including various professionals in this entity. They were involved in providing emergency services, building temporary shelters/sheds, mobilizing community members to assist with damaged infrastructure repairs, counseling peoples by emphasizing the importance of collective strength and efforts in order to overcome their problems etc.¹⁰⁰

“From the beginning NGOs like Lion's club, Sevalanka were with us. The ‘Sahana Seva Balakaya’ of JVP and Participatory Development Forum was among the local institutions in the operation. They did a remarkable service. They are really versatile and hard workers. They were here at a time their service was really needed. The service done by the JVP should specially be mentioned in this moment. They organized a medical camp and managed to run it for about three months continuously. They also initiated temporary shelter building projects at the beginning.”

(District Administrative Official)

New organizations have emerged at district administrative level to deal with natural Disasters, one in particular in the form of a “Disaster Management Committee,” was established in the district in 2003 after a major flood in the area. The committee was able to respond to emergency relief activities based on their prior disaster relief experience. After the tsunami there seems to have been an increase in national level politicians' participation in the committee.¹⁰¹ It had primarily functioned as a relief implementation body based in the GA's office. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami it appears that this structure functioned effectively with no indication of partisan politics at this juncture. However, a significant increase in the presence of politicians in this organization, clearly indicates their prominent role in the district.

"An organization has been established on "Disaster Management Committee" in the District. The Politicians of the District, MPs, Cabinet Ministers, Secretaries of the Division and various other representatives are involved in this."

(District Administrative Official-Discussion)

While certain administrative divisions and individual administrative officers reveal coordinated efforts and an efficient approach in mobilizing available resources to respond to and deal with disaster recovery, and longer-term reconstruction efforts, most communities have conveyed frustration, anger and despair at their unchanged situation almost one year after the tsunami disaster. The extent of politicization, specifically partisan politics, political manipulations and its impact on the peoples was a constantly recurring theme in our field discussions. Political patronage for instance is obtained through political brokers or intermediaries who mobilize local support for elections, and comprise a network of patronage. In a society where the patronage system operates "lists, letters and signatures" is a mechanism which is used and functions on the ground to the advantage or disadvantage of community recipients, when requesting public services or, in this situation unfortunately, tsunami relief and assistance. The politicization of aid distribution and corrupt practices that surround the process, appear to have seeped into local institutional structures at various levels. This was never more evident than in the following discussions and extracts with fishing communities.

"We even received letters from politicians. They had sent letters to people in order to provide aid."

(GS discussion)

"I can boldly say that the village Magalle has such situation, when issuing such aid. What has been taken into consideration is not whether he is a fisherman but whether he pasted posters for a certain political party during the elections. Those were the people who

were eligible to receive such boats. But half of them have already sold those boats."

"First, the fisheries inspectors came to the area. They came to take advantage from us. The Grama Niladari also prepared the lists to his whims and fancies. If legal actions are [to be] taken, from the top official to the minor officers [they] should be called to justice. When the societies [Fisheries Societies] receive goods, the President, the Treasurer, the Secretary and members first distribute them among themselves and nothing is left for others. The Tsunami hit everyone without any discrimination, but when goods are distributed among the victims, they make use of political and other differences. It is from the fisheries societies that they offer everything to those who have friendships and personal relationships. Actually we should not blame what you call politics. It is people in the village who create problems due to political differences. Our neighbour stole my boat engine. I lodged a complaint in the Police. I forwarded all my documents obtained from the Ministry.

Q: What type of cooperation did you get from the Police?

A: Even there, the power of money and politics play their roles"

"Because of my political background, the government did not give what I should deserve. But others because of politics shrewdly got what they wanted. We don't blame anyone....."

"Some people get what they want, by spending money.... by politics. Also we are not rich enough to give Rs.35, 000 - 40,000/- as commissions. Those who have that ability are assisted by the President of societies. Some non-governmental organizations have provided boats to those who have not even come to the bank of the sea. They display that boat on their compounds as an exhibit."

The political support provided by politicians to the district in the early stages of the disaster had changed with the huge influx of local, foreign and donor funded aid coming into the area. Both communities

and officials in the district noted the increased imbalance and disharmony within the communities caused primarily by the uncoordinated aid flow. This appears to have added to existing political machinations and attempts to distribute goods to political constituents on a partisan-based approach. This is a major obstruction and challenge, even a security concern for administrative officials implementing relief and reconstruction work on the ground. Fishing community members informed that they were threatened by underworld gangs, typically mobilized by the local politician/s.

“With the emergence of this situation the unity that prevailed among the local politicians began to disappear. They started to demand more and more for their areas. They tried to manipulate me also but I firmly rejected their biased demands. I always try to treat every one equally. I was determined not to give into their demand from the beginning.”

(Administrative Official)

“We have letters in which some politicians had asked us to favour certain people who are their friends and relations..... Whatever, the influences are we have executed justice in the permanent housing project, we have undergone severe threats in the process, we have faced even death threats because of political interferences, we can't execute our duties properly.”

(Administrative Officials)

Child Care Services & Institutions:

The district has both private voluntary childcare services as well as state services. State run childcare institutions come under the purview of both central and provincial governments.¹⁰² These institutions basically provide two types of services, probation and rehabilitation. There are five probation offices and six childcare institutions that lack childcare workers. Of the private homes, approximately 26-27 are registered.¹⁰³ In addition, there are children's clubs and day care centers

which are operating as well. In the aftermath of the tsunami, however, most children had been taken under the care of families and friends with the exception of a small number, who were taken into homes or institutions.

The Christian Childrens Fund (CCF) appears to have undertaken responsibility in providing childcare related assistance i.e. compiling information on affected children per district in the southern region as well as the monitoring and follow up of child-abuse reports if any. The OHCA Humanitarian Information Center, also maintains statistical information on affected children. Discussions with state-run facilities indicated a need for resources both human and material as well as the need to develop its capacity to provide effective childcare services. Overall, community response towards the children in post-disaster periods indicate a prioritization of traditional family and community networks and fostering is encouraged in the area.

4. MAJOR ISSUES & KEY POINTS

- * The operation of a highly centripetal administration system has negative impacts on relief and recovery efforts. Time consuming bureaucratic procedure and centrally issued directives contradict ground realities, cause confusion and prevents efficient delivery of relief aid, assistance and public services in general. Numerous state agencies have caused role confusions, overlapping duties/functions resulting in minimal accountability. This has added to the numerous challenges at various levels in the districts, in terms of disaster response and management.
- * Poor and/or a lack of coordination in relief response and recovery efforts, of both external interventions and local entities, has resulted in imbalances and inequities of aid distribution. The influx of large sums of unmonitored funds/goods upsets the equilibrium of a society with glaring socio-economic disparities. Duplication of assistance to some communities and a total exclusion of others, has led to a disintegration of prevalent social harmony among communities and villages. Reported initial cooperation and support for and among affected communities which transcended ethnic/religious divides had disintegrated with increasing external aid-this was conveyed in all three districts. In the north, the inability to resolve the question of post-tsunami funding has further exacerbated existing political tensions.

- * External agency interventions in emergency assistance appears to have by-passed local administrative officers in some cases. Officials expressed dissatisfaction particularly on a lack of communication on the part of these agencies. The result of a post-disaster increase in externally funded NGOs in the area has had the effect of a failure to integrate and/or exclude community-based organizations from the local recovery and development processes. Issues of weak administrative capacity, inefficiencies and communication difficulties exist when attempting to implement emergency assistance. It is important however, to ensure inclusiveness and participation of administrative officials at all levels and communities in relief and recovery efforts.
- * State administrative structures, non-conventional structures, as well as informal institutions have emerged locally and operate within different contexts. The functioning of dual administrative structures in the north-east should be considered in the context of wider politics and the unresolved political questions facing the region and its communities. In an overburdened, bureaucratic administrative system that typically functions inefficiently, there is a strong potential for subjective interpretations and application of state directives, "circulars," in ways that can delay or at times deny aid/assistance. Overall, this has had a negative impact on most communities. (see Mullaitivu District, Catholic Church Father discussion and Galle District)
- * Strong formal institutional structures operate in the three districts which function as alternative sources of relief assistance and service delivery to disaster affected communities. Religious institutions play a key role among these institutions. All districts indicate that churches and mosques have strong social service affiliate organizations. Along with temples and Buddhist priests, religious institutions and leaders have emerged as important actors during times of crisis, when state structures have been

unable to meet community needs. Their prominence and significance in the communities has increased out of the need to fill a void in providing basic social services, particularly in times of war and natural disasters.

- * Informal networks and associations in the community i.e. teachers welfare associations, fishing mudalali networks typically function in ways that benefit communities. Certain informal associations which reflect patron-client relationships do not necessarily have a positive impact on communities. Traditional patronage systems have now been politicized and function in a different manner, to the detriment of the client/beneficiaries. There are other types of informal associations which constitute the 'subterranean forces,' underworld gangs, drug gangs, unidentified armed groups etc., that can be mobilized and used against community interests, often to their detriment. In a culture of armed violence and high levels of politicization, local administrative officials have expressed concerns regarding potential threats and difficulties in implementing their work. (see Galle, Amparai)
- * The entry of partisan politics into aid distribution or the 'politicization of aid distribution' in the post-tsunami period, (see Amparai and Galle) has opened up avenues for increased political interferences. The influx of external aid/goods has meant that a party has more resources to 'distribute' to its following. The subversion and manipulation of community-institutional relationships i.e. the mudalali patronage system, and further encouragement of divisive, ethnicized partisan politics, has hampered and delayed relief and recovery efforts in the districts.
- * Political partisanship in a multi-ethnic environment as in Amparai, has resulted in a 'communalization' of post-disaster relief and reconstruction efforts. Local administrative and institutional efforts in addressing community issues, reflect a

trend where the environment necessitates that each administrative division, community and organizations representing a particular community, provide assistance for their respective communities.

- * In local surroundings where multiple-structures of authority and actors operate in contested territory, and a high degree of militarization and armed violence exist, accessing and obtaining comprehensive information on affected communities is a challenge. Coordination, implementation and ensuring continuity of programs requires negotiations with multiple parties to ensure a relatively smooth flow of work. (See Amparai permanent housing and resettlement programs in private lands when state land is unavailable) Additionally, when ad hoc programs are carried out in all sectors by various entities INGOs/NGOs etc. amidst local power struggles, there is a serious need for effective monitoring, follow-up and ensuring of continuity.
- * Diaspora role as individuals and collective actors has taken on an increasingly significant role in providing relief and recovery assistance to communities, particularly in the north and east districts. The emerging 'transnational body' among Muslim and Tamil communities appears to be playing an important role in the region, in filling a void and providing alternative forms of development assistance in conflict torn areas of Sri Lanka, currently, in the context of natural disaster. Tamil diaspora organizations in the north have been significant in providing assistance over decades of war and following the current natural disaster. In the east/Amparai, immigrant residents in the Middle-East as well as organizations based in Saudi and Kuwait for instance have provided aid and assistance to Muslim communities following the tsunami. There are indications of an emerging role of global Islamic supportive networks active in Muslim communities in the region.

* A number of children's homes and childcare centers exist in the districts. In Mullaitivu information is maintained and received from the PDS. In the other two districts there are indications of numerous private childcare institutions, that have existed prior to the tsunami as well as the establishment of new institutions. State agencies that provide childcare and related services also operate in the regions. However, there is no one source from which comprehensive information can be obtained, as there is a lack of accurate official statistical information that is available or accessible.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Disaster response in the districts, relief and recovery assistance and longer-term development planning should ideally be considered in the context of the following realities:

- i. The broader politics of the country which include the history of conflict and disintegrating relationships among its diverse communities, post-conflict transformations, and stagnating peace negotiations;
- ii. Centralized administrative structures that nurture and perpetuate a hierarchical order in the political and social spheres;
- iii. Emerging alternate and/or parallel administrative and institutional structures that operate in the public service delivery arena in the absence of clear state policy, contradictory and/or the practice of exclusionary policies;
- iv. A political system that revolves around partisan politics supporting patron-client relations vs the rule of law;
- v. A political culture mirrored in violence, community strife, political machinations that influence administrative bodies, local institutional structures and their roles.
- vi. An environment of wide social-economic disparities with a history of creating disillusioned, radicalized militant youth,

resulting in armed conflicts to address political grievances, social and economic conditions.

Dealing with post-disaster challenges involved in the relief and recovery process in Sri Lanka; requires a broad-based understanding and awareness of local historical processes, socio-political dynamics both in the country and affected regions. The study reveals that wider politics and local conditions are closely linked to disaster recovery and responses. The ways in which the districts have dealt with and coped with disaster situations have been to a large extent determined and shaped by national and local conditions. It also shows that allocation of resources for post-disaster interventions can influence and create new dynamics locally with national implications.

Understanding these conditions and dynamics are never simple, most often it is complex even more so in situations of conflict or conflict transition periods. The districts have shown that in the absence of a strong state role in providing public services and/or emergency assistance during disaster periods, various actors, structures of authority, formal/informal associations and institutions both local and transnational, have emerged to fill the void. Identification and communication with these entities is important and maybe necessary to facilitate the recovery and construction process. Awareness of these realities will enable those providing assistance to approach relief and recovery efforts in a pragmatic way. The study has also attempted to identify situations where the potential for misappropriation of resources are present or, the existence of conditions that prevent resources and assistance from reaching affected communities/beneficiaries. Acknowledging ground realities is essential for program strategizing, resource allocation and delivery of emergency assistance, as well as development and enforcement of effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

In all districts, a high degree of politicization is reflected in administrative and institutional structures at various levels. Prevailing socio-political dynamics, cultural practices and deteriorating economic conditions often determine, influence and channel external relief

assistance and programs. While the politics of the country, in a post-war transition phase has in general had a negative impact on all three districts, it has posed specific challenges in some areas. In Mullaitivu, the issue of aid and assistance for long-term reconstruction is linked to national political dynamics, which appears to have wider political implications for the region. The inability to resolve core political issues has impacted negatively on aid delivery, resulting in further setbacks and continued deterioration of relations between the LTTE and state. In other districts, aid and assistance is politicized and vulnerable to local political manipulations, which can delay and/or deny affected communities their basic survival needs.

Local administrative structures and institutional bodies that are in place can assist, facilitate or impede overall relief and recovery efforts. Centralized structures and bureaucratic procedures obstruct and complicate program implementation. In contrast some of the alternate/parallel structures appear to function more efficiently. The study shows that years of conflict has led to a depletion of human and material resources. In turn, a weakened administrative/technical capacity or the lack thereof is evident in some areas more than others. In addition to structural challenges, subtler social barriers, hierarchical structures and local power-relations have a significant impact on aid and assistance delivery in all districts. They often determine the nature and course of interactions with local communities, public officials and structures of authorities. The allocation and distribution of resources and delivery of relief assistance is inevitably influenced by these underlying factors. We hope that this study provides an overview and understanding of the local contextual setting in which disaster response and management takes place. On behalf of the affected communities, we also hope that the study can contribute in some way toward facilitating and/or strategizing relief, recovery and reconstruction efforts.

APPENDIX I - INTERVIEWS

MULLAITIVU DISTRICT

Interviews

Fishing Community Women
Planning and Development Secretariat Representative (PDS)
Father Robinson, Catholic Church
Father James, Catholic Church
Holy Family Convent Nun
Hindu Priest, Thanneerutu Pilaiyar Temple, Mullaitivu
President, Temple committee-Vatrapalai Amman Temple,
Mullaitivu
Muslim Village Leader
President, Tamil Teacher's Union (TTU)
Representative of Arts Culture and Drama Group, Mullaitivu
Member of Parliament, Mullaitivu
Assistant Zonal Education Director
Assistant Government Agent, (aka DS) Puthukudiyiruppu
Medical Officer - DPDHS Mullaitivu
Assistant Government Agent, Maritimpathu
Grama Sevaka, (aka GN) Maritimpathu
Tamil Rehabilitation Organization Representative (TRO)
Rural Development Society Member (RDS)
Government Agent, Mullaitivu District

Focus Group Discussions

Fishing Community, Manalkudiyiruppu, Mullaitivu District
Fishing Community, Vannankulam, Mullaitivu District
Fishing Community, Kallappadu, Mullaitivu District
Community Leaders, Puthukudiyiruppu, Mullaitivu District
Teachers Vijayananda College, Mullaitivu District
Teachers Mullaitivu Maha Vidyalayam, Mullaitivu District

Informal Interviews

Fishing Community Member
Fishing Community People
Trading Community Women
Planning and Development Secretariat Representative, (PDS)
Mullaitivu
Fr. Jude, Catholic Church, Swami Thotam
Fr. Robinson Catholic Church
Fr. James Catholic Church
LTTE Sea Tigers Representative Mullaitivu District
Barathy Illam Children's Home, Mullaitivu District
Iniya Vaalvu Illam Children's Home, Mullaitivu District

AMPARA DISTRICT

Interviews

Planning Director, Kachcheri (GA's Office) Amparai District
Social Service Officer, Addalachchenai Division
Assistant Divisional Secretary-Navithanveli Division
Assistant Divisional Secretary-Thirukkivil Division
Divisional Secretariat, Kaarathivu Division
Assistant Director of Planning, Kaarathivu Division
Government Agent, Ampara District
DCPC Officer Ampara District
Member of Parliament, (TNA) Ampara District.
Buddhist Priest Kalmunai Division
Buddhist Priest Panama Division

Director, Center for Peace Studies, Muslim Non Governmental Organization
Representative Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, Ampara District
Assistant Divisional Secretary, Pothuvil Division
Reverend Brother Mathew, Catholic Church, Kalmunai (Tamil Division)
Village Leader, Pothuvil Division.
Lecturer South Eastern University, Oluvil, Ampara District
Director Disaster Management Center, Ampara District

Focus Group Discussions

Representative Fishing Community
Members SEVO Women's Group Non Governmental Organization
People Fishing Community
Grama Sevakas Kaaraithivu Division
Grama Sevakas Thirukovil Division
Social Service Officer & Assistant Director of Planning, Sainthamaruthu Division
Board of Trustees Kadalkarai Mosque
Board of Trustees Kaaraithivu Hindu Kovil
Kalmunai Tamil Community, Navithanvelli Division
Members Al Usua Islamic Welfare-Child Care Center

Informal Interviews

Government Agent, Ampara District
Sri Lanka Task Force (STF) Representative
LTTE Political Wing Representative
Karaithivu Temple Committee Members
Gypsy Community Members

GALLE DISTRICT

Interviews

Grama Sevaka, Magalle Division
Divisional Secretary, Galle District

Low Country Dancer/Ritual Dancer
Buddhist Priest, Vijayananda Temple
Member of Parliament, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, Habaraduwa
Divisional Secretary, Habaraduwa Division
Assistant Director & Fisheries Inspection Officer Galle District
Director of Planning, Galle District
Assistant Government Agent, Galle District
Officer for Recovery and Reconstruction, Galle District
Inspector of Fisheries Harbor, Hikkaduwa
Officer at "Project" Galle, NON Governmental Organization

Focus Group Discussion

Members Fishing Society, Magalle Division
Fishing Community Members, Thalapitiya Division
Mixed Community, Thalapitiya Division
Fishing Community, Dodanduwa Division
Fishing Cooperative Society Members-Hikkaduwa Division
Fishing Cooperative Society Members-SinhaDeewaragama, Koggala Division
Fishermen and Mudalali's -Dewata Division
Grama Sevaka's 4 gravats, Galle District
Fishing Community, Ambalangoda Division
Community, Ginthota West, Division
Fishing Community, Unawatuna Division
Members Tsunami Rehabilitation Committee, Thalapitiya Division

Informal Interviews/Discussions

Community members of village, Hikkaduwa Division
DS Hikkaduwa Division

APPENDIX 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

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APPENDIX 3 - CASE HISTORY

Interview with a lady from the fishing community who lost her 4 children in the tsunami

Were you living in this village even during the war time?

We were closer to the seashore. Always the helicopters comes fires and lots of people have died. Some people while pulling their net got fired from the helicopter and died. One day the war plane call 'Bukkara' bombed in Mathadal and 36 people were killed on the spot. Their bodies were destroyed without recognition. Haven't you heard about it?

Yes we heard. When you say closer to the seashore does it mean that your house was located close to the sea?

Yes. Our occupation is fishing. Therefore we live on the seashore. If we live far it is difficult for our occupation. But very often we get caught to the helicopter firing and Navy attacks.

So you have lost a lot due to this war.

Yes. One artillery shell fell on to our house and half of the house is now destroyed by that. If we had been in that spot we would have been killed. Luckily we ran away.

Have you had any measures to protect you from this shelling and helicopter firing at that time?

We have had bunkers. When there is a shell / bomb attack, there will be great ground vibration and we are scared to sleep inside the bunker. We prefer to runaway from the spot rather than be in the bunker. When they attack all over the village we used to run around the village.

The Army shelled you from which camp?

Army was at Mullaithivu.

Were you living in the seashore when Army was in Mullaithivu?

Yes. Not in this area. It is 10 miles away from here. The artillery shell will come more than 10 yards, It will go for certain distance then blast.

When did you live in Mathadal?

We were there in 1993 /1994.

Before that where were you?

Before that we went up to India and came back.

Why did you go to India?

Because of the problems in this country we went to India and lived there for 3 years. Even though we came back the problems are not yet over. After this tsunami only we are free here.

Which year did you leave your village first?

1989 we left our village as refugees.

What is the reason you were refugees?

We were living in Mullaithivu. There was a big Army camp there. The Army always comes and arrest people. The Indian Army was also there at that time. Very often the LTTE and Indian Army fight and lots of people die due to the cross fire. One of my uncles (father's brother) died while having his meals at home because of the crossfire.

Since it's a problem to live close to the Army we moved to distant areas. After that also we got attacked by air attacks. Two of my brothers in law also got injured because of these air attacks. After those incidents we moved to India. Also there was an economic restriction. Things were so expensive. Things were not available here because the Army will not allow anybody to transport them. That is another reason for moving to India. If we had been remained here we would have been dead due to a lack of food.

Who came here first the Sri Lankan Army or Indian Army?

First time the Sri Lankan Army came. Since their military capacity was insufficient they brought the Indian Army too.

Which Army devastated you a lot?

Sri Lankan Army.

What kind of losses other than death of people?

They mostly attacked from the air than arresting people.

Were there lots of buildings destroyed because of this?

Yes. And they put bombs only to the crowded places. Therefore lots of people were killed. During that time the civilians were killed more than the LTTE

When you were displaced did you go to India at first?

No. First we were displaced into the areas like 10 miles or 15 miles from this place in the same village. It didn't work out, then only we went to India

So you went to India in your own money

Yes. We spent our own money and went.

How did you manage after going there?

We stayed in a camp. The government of India also gave some cash as a relief measure on a monthly basis. But it was not enough. We also

worked and spent the money earned for meals. Still we could not manage there so we came back here.

What kind of jobs did you do there?

It is very difficult to work there, it is a poor country too. The people who belong to that country were also working for Rs. 10/- or Rs. 15/- per day.

Can you tell us the jobs you did there?

I worked at the rice mill carrying heavy loads of rice bags. That is the work I did mostly. Sometimes we go to work cutting trees and cleaning them. All this work was very tough.

Do both men and women go for this type of work?

Yes both husband and wife used to go leaving the children at home.

What kind of income did you earn out of this work?

When we were there we got Rs. 15/- for men and Rs. 60/- for women per month. Is this enough for us to live there? But they gave us rice. If we get sick the money given by them is not enough to take medicines even for one day. As soon as we reached that country lots of people and children suffered with diarrhoea and some of them died. There are lots of differences between our country and that country. We eat rice here. There they make rice with tamarind. At the beginning after eating that rice most of us got diarrhoea. People spent lots of money on medicines.

Is it because you all were in the camp?

Yes. In the camp it is very dirty and unhygienic.

Didn't you get any help other than from the Indian Government?

No, if that government had ignored us all us would have died, only that government helped us.

When did you come back to Sri Lanka?

In 1992, we couldn't manage there. We sold all our jewellery there and came back with imitation earrings.

Where did you live after coming back to Sri Lanka?

When we came back the army stopped us at the Thandikkulam Army Camp. We told the Army lies that we are coming from Colombo and lost all our bags in the train, because I was only 20 years at that time. Not married even. We registered ourselves since we didn't have identity cards and came out from Thandikkulam with great difficulties.

Why did the Army stop you at the Thandikkulam camp? They kept only you or all the people?

Not all the people. Some of us only stopped due to age problem. Since we were young they thought that if we were allowed to come here then we will join the Movement. We had thrown all the cloths and documents which we brought from India. We had nothing to prove that we came back from India.

So when you were there you were not married.

Not married.

Were you staying there with your parents?

With my brother.

Where did you live after coming back from India?

After coming back we suffered a lot for lack of food.

Where did you all stay?

We were at Keelpalam. Since we were unable to find jobs there we came back to the seashore to continue our fishing occupation.

After coming back here until when did you remain at the seashore?

From 1992 to till now 2005. In 1992 we were there, in 1996 the movement recaptured Mullaithivu from the Army, by 1997 we came here.

Did any body help you as a war victim when you returned from India?

Nobody help us at that time. Only UNICEF pays a visit once in a way to give milk powder tins.

You told us that you have suffered a lot after coming back from India. Even at that time did no one come to help you?

We didn't have any proof that we returned from India. Later we begged our Grama Sewaka and after 5 to 6 months only he was able register our names. Only after that we got our ration as rice and other things. Although at that time they didn't give much for ration. Rps.300/- worth of goods for one month per head ie.3 kg rice, 2 kg sugar and 500g dhal and a small Appalam.

Who gave this? Is it from the government?

Yes government.

Other than the government did any local organizations came to help you?

No. no such organizations came.

During that time what are the jobs you did for your needs?

We were working at the saltern. Otherwise just wandering on the seashore. If the husbands have gone to work then the wives will work them.

So, you are living here from the time that Mullaithivu was taken over by LTTE.

Yes.

Were there any organizations that helped you or were you continued your fishing occupation once you came here?

We do not want to except that some one will feed us. We earned for ourselves. Even after the tsunami I have not bought things on the card. Its only after my sister came from Mannar that she made arrangements and got me a card and now I am buying thing on the card.

What do you mean by card?

Here after the tsunami they registered the people and gave a card [ration]. All the people bought things for the card. But we never thought of obtaining a card. Even the compensation for the lost of my children was collected by my sister. I have not seen that money or used it.

Where is your sister living now?

She is in Mannar.

Do you have any other brothers or sisters?

One sister is in India.

Other than these two sisters do you have any other brothers or sisters?

We are 4 members in our family. One sister is in India. And I have a brother. My brother also lost 4 children.

Where are your sisters living?

One sister is in India and other one is in Mannar.

Is that sister who lives in Mannar collected the money?

Yes. The GS has requested us to collect the money because if we do not accept the money then it will be send back. So my sister came and got the money. At that time I was hospitalized in Vavuniya.

Did she give you that money?

No we did not want to keep that money. Since we owe her some money we settled this amount against that. Actually my husband did not ever want to get that money. We do not want money in place of our 4 lost children. So we thought of distributing that money to 4 other children who have lost their parents in the tsunami. But we had borrowed money from my sister to buy this engine which cost Rs.1,30,000/- to do our occupation. So I decided to settle her loan before we die. If we had given this money to orphans and we die then this will be always be an unsettled loan. Therefore, I told her to take the money.

Did you buy this with your own money?

Yes it was bought with our money. When we went to buy this my self, my 3rd and 4th sons also accompanied with my husband. They donated us an engine which is kept inside. These nets and other things are bought by us. These cost more than Rs.1,00,000/-. There are 5 or 6 nets missing now. We have lost them.

Can we discuss about the tsunami incident? Will it be a problem for you talk about that?

No.

Since that was a Sunday didn't you go to the church on that day?

My 4 children were very small. But on the previous day my eldest and the second children said that they wanted to go to the church. They even went to the previous day mass. I think god wanted to take them and he stopped them going to the church. Otherwise it wouldn't have happen, my children would have escaped. We ran nearly 50 meters away from the seashore. Some children who are the same age as my daughter who were running along with us are still living.

One girl similar to my daughter's age has no mother, the father holding her younger sister also ran with us and is still living. The waves pushed me down when I was 50 meters away from the seashore. My children were far before me and almost reached the safe area came back again and fell into the water. They had escaped, but when they saw me struggling in the water they came back and fell into the water crying Amma!. They were not injured at all. They drank too much water and because of that they died.

Were you also running from the water at that time?

I thought that I was going to die. I struggled inside the water a lot, but god wanted me to live and suffer more, I think I have committed lots of sins.

Where was your husband at that time?

He was at the seashore. He came running but got caught to the waves. The waves had taken him and put him on to a Palmyra tree. He does not know to climb trees. Since he was put on to that tree he held onto it tightly and escaped.

You said that two of your children ran before you.

Yes. My first and second children ran before me. I was carrying my third and fourth children. I didn't know why we are running. Most of the people said that 'kibeer' [kfir bombers] were coming, I got tired and put my children down and turn back I saw a huge black thing coming only then I realized that the sea was coming. I carried my children and took 2 steps forward when I got caught by the wave. I felt that some thing pulled my two children from me. After that I didn't see my children. We have not even got their bodies. When I was struggling inside the water I thought the whole world is going to come to an end as the father says in the church. I always wanted to see my sister who lives in India before I die.

Even at that time I was worried that I am going to die without seeing her. I was pretty sure that I was going to die because I had drunk so much water. At that time again another wave came and took me up and put mw inside a boat. I thought that it was a dream, I could not believe anything. When I opened my eyes I saw people with injuries wading from the sea. I got up started and crying saying that I have lost my husband and the children. While I was crying my husband came behind me.

Did you see the tsunami waves?

Yes I saw the sea.

Before that were you at home?

When I was at home I saw my brother and others were running. Then only I thought that Kibeer was coming and start running too. Our house is located 400 meters away from the sea shore. We had run nearly 150 meters further up the water came up to 600 meters.

What was the sea like at that time?

There were lots of water currents. When I drank the water it was not salty. It was like normal water I drank lots of water.

Didn't you feel any difference?

No there is no difference.

You said that the water was black when it was coming

Yes it was black. Usually the sea is blue colour. But when it was coming at that time it was dark black.

How many feet high were the waves were at that time?

May be it was 8 feet high.

Now you said that you have lost control of your two little ones whom you were holding. Then what happen to the other children?

They ran and got onto the sand mountain. Our neighbors called them to run further up. I think they had seen me putting down the other two children. So when the sea came and hit me they came back to the water. They love me a lot.

Did they come very close to you?

No. They didn't come close to me. I didn't see them. They ran far ahead and I was told that when I got caught to the sea they had came running to me but the waves had taken them also. God loves children that is why he has taken more children than adults. I should have died in these waves. All four of my children are dead and I am alive. We have committed lots of sins. These children are so innocent they do not know what is good and bad. If god has taken the lives of these children, I would say that he has no mercy at all.

After this incident what did you do immediately? Did you have a place to stay? What did you at that time?

The Movement immediately came to the spot with vehicles and took us to the school. Ambulance was brought immediately to save the

injured and serious people. The nurses at the Mullaithivu hospital were so helpful. They gave clothes and white material pieces and people were immediately taken by tractors to the hospital. Some people died halfway to the hospital. But the Movement saved lots of peoples live. If they had not been here the total number of deaths would have gone further up. Some bold fellows used the unbroken boats to save the people.

So who do you think was most helpful to the people immediately after this incident? Who helped you all immediately?

The Movement only helped us. Government did nothing to us. Once we were kept at the school, after that these organizations started helping us.

What kind of help the Movement provide for you?

They donated clothes, food, medicines every thing. They even did counseling to console us.

The LTTE took you all immediately from the seashore to the school by vehicles?.

Yes. They helped us to bury the dead bodies before they start decomposing. It was they who collected the bodies and did what they could do for us.

After they left you at the school how did you manage? Did they help you or some others?

More than the helping for the people who are alive they were busy with making arrangements to bury the bodies before it get decompose. There were not enough coffins. So they wrapped the bodies with white cloths and buried them in holy land. if it is one or two we could have been able to keep the body for few days. It is numerous. Didn't you come here on that time?

No we were not here. Other than LTTE were there any other organizations that came to help you immediately?

Red Cross Society came later and helped us.

What kind of help did they offer you?

They helped us to find the missing children. Some were admitted to Vavuniya and Kilinochchi hospitals. They went and got their names and informed us that our children/brothers/sisters were alive so we could go and see them. They also donated medicines and treated injured people.

Who did that?

The Red Cross Society.

At that time how did you manage food and clothing?

They distributed food parcels but none of us ate. We were so worried at that time and could not eat. The parcels were thrown.

In some areas majority of the tsunami victims were females. What was the situation here? How are the injured females obtain clothing etc.?

Immediately [after the tsunami] some men gave their clothing for the females whose dresses were torn. But later the Movement gave clothes collected from houses located in other areas.

Was happened to you?

My clothes were not torn. I got caught to the sea after passing 450 meters from the Seashore. My cloths were not damaged like others. I had a bath only after four days and changed my clothes. By that time the movement donated clothes including underwear.

So at that time were food parcels given?

Yes. Later they cooked food and gave us. At the camp itself they cooked and served us.

Until you got to the school did they provide you with food?

Yes, they only provided food for us.

Who are you referring to?

The LTTE. Our leader has allocated some millions for us. Nobody came to help us immediately. After 10-15 days after the incident others came to help us. Before that burying the bodies, providing food and clothing were done by the LTTE only. Not even our government came to help us immediately.

How many days did you stay at the school?

Nearly 3 months.

The movement helped you immediately. After how many days did other organizations come to help you?

After 10 days they also started.

How about the Red Cross Society?

They immediately provided us medical facilities. They didn't provide clothes or food.

You came back from the school after 3 months.

The other organizations built houses and gave lots of things.

Other than LTTE can you tell us about the other organizations that provided help as well?

World Vision provided us housing schemes. Oxfam provided kitchen utilities and sanitary facilities such as toilets etc. we lost every thing. They also donated lots of clothes later. Some organizations gave us bicycles. We do not have transport facilities. Some organizations gave sewing machines, boats, nets and engines. Caritas Organization also helped us. They gave Rs. 5,00,000/- or 6,00,000/- worth of equipments to do the occupation.

Have they given it to every body?

No. It was given only to those who have done fishing as their occupation.

What is the main occupation of your villagers?

Fishing. Fishing was the occupation of all the people who have been affected by this tsunami.

How far is your house from the seashore?

Our house was located 400 meters away from the seashore.

Still your house remains there?

No. it is devastated. I thought of taking you to show my house. Since it is about to rain and all of you are getting late I gave up the idea.

So you got lots of help from the organizations?

Yes. Now they are helping. Since the organizations are helping our Movement does not get involved.

Do they come and talk to you and console your grievances?

Yes. Other than our organization lots of people came from foreign countries, such as Canada, France etc to talk with us and shared our grievances.

When you say foreigners are they like us or white people?

Answer Not clear.

So they have gone from Sri Lanka and now came back to help you.

Yes. They have come now to help us. Some of the students who are studying in foreign countries also came. I am the one who dealt with most of these people who came to see us. The president of this camp is my uncle. Since others do not like to talk with outside people he brings everyone to me.

When you were at the camp other than LTTE and international organizations have you got any help from people living in the surrounding areas of your camp or any of your relations?

The school students living in surrounding areas of our camp and other people are the people who came and cooked us food. We are so obliged to them, they gave clothes soon after we reached the camp. But I was not in a position [state of mind] to take the clothes and change. But others got it.

How about your relations? Did any one help you?

When we say relations my sister who is in Mannar immediately sent her husband with money and clothes. She is a sick person, she cannot handle these things. So many people from foreign countries brought lots of money and gave. I did not get a single cent from anyone. Some white people and our people who live in foreign countries gave Rs. 1000/-5000/- or 10,000/- to all the people.

Did they come directly to the camp and gave the money?

Yes they came camp by camp and gave money directly. When they go to see the seashore if our people there were crying (balance not recorded)

Is this is a temporary shelter for you?

Yes it is a temporary shelter.

Are there any arrangements made for a permanent house?

We will be getting a permanent house closer to our previous house. They are building houses for people living 200 meters away from the seashore.

Are they building these houses in your own land?

Yes.

Which organization is helping you in this project?

TRO and Caritas organization.

Do you think that all the facilities are provided to you in this camp?

Yes all facilities have been provided.

So what are the problems you face being in this camp?

We have no problems here. Only thing is we are sad because we have lost our loved ones other than this there are no problems. They are doing every thing for us.

You said that organizations (eg: TRO) helped you. Do these organizations come and discuss with the people their problems and requirements before they help?

Yes. They hold public meetings and at that time they will ask us to come out with our problems and requirements and have discussions with us.

Do all the people attend these meetings?

Yes every body will go and discuss matters with them.

Who organizes these meetings?

Mostly one of the members from the Movement will chair these meetings. They monitor the activities of these organizations to see whether their services are provided in a correct way.

Where are these meetings held?

Oxfam used to have meetings, sometimes TRO. The organizations that have plans to build houses used to have frequent meetings.

Where do they hold the meetings?

There is a big Margosa tree. Under that tree they will conduct meetings. Since it is close by when they want us to come at 4.00 pm all of us will go.

Do they ask you at that time what you need?

Yes. They ask us what we need.

Are they fulfilling most your requirements?

Yes. Most of our requirements are fulfilled. One of the members of the movement will come to monitor these things.

Are one of them present in all the meetings?

Yes. One of them only will chair the meetings.

Who is building your permanent house?

Each organization builds houses for each village. For us SLRC will build the houses.

Since your previous house was located 400 meters away from the seashore will SLRC build your house too?

Yes they will build the house.

Will they build it in the same place?

Yes in the same spot they are going to build a house.

Is SLRC building it?

Yes. SLRC.

Has the government or GA provided assistance to you?

They have not done anything yet.

What about their program/plan for giving funds to build permanent houses?

They give cash only to the people who live more than 200 meters away (out of buffer zone) from the seashore and can obtain a permanent deed for their land.

You are also living 200 meters away isn't it?

No the deed is in my mother's name.

If so you will not be getting the money?

No all of us are not getting this money.

Why?

Truly speaking the people who lived below 200 meters limit have lost their lives and properties. But none of them have got this money.

Haven't the people who live 200 meters away got the money?

Some people got it. But most of the people who got this money are not affected by the tsunami.

Why is that?

Do not know. Our people also protested against to this. But the people who have got affected by the tsunami didn't receive this cash.

When your house was razed to the ground didn't you get the compensation?

They gave. But very few people only received it. Now if there are 200 families in our camp only 40 out of that got the cash.

How many families lived within 200 meter boundary?

There are very few lived 200 meters away from the seashore. May be 100 families I would say.

Out of them how many got this money?

Very few of them got this money.

When we say within 200 meters that means from the sea 200 meters. When we say away from 200 meters, that is nearly 300 or 400 meters away from the seashore. So which group of people were most affected by this tsunami?

The people who lived within the buffer zone were affected badly.

Now you say that the government is providing compensation for the affected people. Who do you think should be given more assistance?

It should be given to the people who are really affected. (Something said. But not clear) I think you are getting late.

No we can stay further.

The other brothers are waiting

They will wait inside the van. So you were saying that people who lived within 200 meters from the seashore were more devastated than others?

Yes.

You feel that they should be compensated more than the others?

Yes. The people who really lost everything should be assisted. Why should the unaffected people get this assistance?

If so who is getting the assistance donated by the government?

Most of the people who are getting this assistance are not affected by this tsunami.

Through whom are you receiving this money?

The government registered the affected people and took the list with them. They have decided not to give financial assistance to the people who lived within 200 meters and they have not notified them.

The government did not send money to the people who lived within 200 meters from the seashore?

Yes therefore they have not got this money. If they had sent the money it would have been distributed here.

The people living in that area did not ask for a reason?

They asked. But they still have not got it.

No one knows the reason?

Other than this money have you got any other financial assistance from the government?

They started to give Rs. 5,000/- per month to us. Only 3 months they paid. After that it is stopped.

Other than this did they give any compensation for the parents who lost their children?

Government did not do anything. But some organizations made arrangements for those parents to get a provident fund facility by giving them an opportunity to work for Rs.500/ per day and after 10 or 12 days they deposit that money (Rs. 5000/) to the bank.

Do they deposit every month?

Not every month only once they will deposit. After 60 years of age we can withdraw it.

Is that project over and the money deposited?

No we are working only now.

Who is doing this project?

Oxfam.

To build houses how much money did you receive?

Rs. 50,000/-

Who received this Rs. 50,000/- ?

The people who live away from 200 meters from the seashore.

Who are the people getting this money? On what grounds do they decide who should be paid and who should not be paid?

That we do not know. According to the name list sent by them only the money is distributed.

Who sends the name list?

The government.

Who gave the name list to the government?

They will get it from here.

Who takes the names from here?

The GS

So, the list sent by the GS gets paid?

Yes. But the GS gave the money, only to those who live 200 meters away from the seashore.

Did you not get the money?

The deed was in my mothers name so the money came in her name.

Has she collected the money?

Yes.

For some people they are building houses (not clear)

They have asked the people who have got Rs.50,000/- to put the foundation for the houses.

This Rs. 50,000/- is given to those people who live away from 200 meter boundary.

Yes.

What kind of steps were taken for the people who lived within 200 meter limit.

Since the original lands of the people who lived within 200 meters from the seashore goes under the buffer zone they have been given new plot of lands with houses from this side.

Which organization helping for that project?

SLRC.

You told us that you saw the sea coming up

Yes. I was.

You said it was black in colour.

Yes.

Did the black colour change colour or did it remain the same?

No it remained the same

Since you were residing at the seashore did you notice any symptoms of tsunami 2 or 3 days ahead?

The elderly people living with us said that the sea (not clear) has gone up a little and they also said the colour of the water had changed.

Did they say that the sea level has gone up?

Yes they did.

During that time what was the climate like?

Climate was normal. But just before the tsunami it was raining and some black objects were washed to the seashore.

Some people say that the sea made loud sounds

Yes we heard something like a firecracker noise.

Was this like a firing or shelling noise?

It was so loud.

END OF TRANSCRIPT

END NOTES

- ¹ Spencer, J. *"A Sinhala Village in a Time of Trouble,"* pp.11 (1990)
- ² See ARD, Inc.,(2005) USAID Study "Local and Provincial Government Assessment;" and Abeysinghe, A. (1989) " Devolution of Power & The Provincial Council System" for details on decentralization and local government issues .
- ³ In response to the armed conflict in the northeast, under the 13th Amendment to the constitution in 1987, Sri Lanka introduced the provincial council system as a part of a decentralization move, with the intent to devolve a broad range of administrative power and authority to the provinces.
- ⁴ NECORD, NEIAP, NEHRP, NEERP, NECCDEP etc. These projects are involved in the reconstruction of the region covering various sectors i.e. irrigation & agriculture, community restoration & development, coastal community development, housing reconstruction among others since the conflict. See Donor Funded Projects Profile, www.nepc.lk/project.asp.
- ⁵ *"The North East is the region worst affected by the tsunami. The percentage of the coastal population affected ranges from an estimated 35 percent in Killinochi to 80 percent in Mullaitivu, and 78 percent in Amparai coastal district divisions compared to the southern districts of Galle, Matara and Hambantota with less than 20 percent of the coastal population affected, albeit with scattered pockets of severe damage."* Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment, Prepared by: ADB, JBIC and WB (January 2005)
- ⁶ ADB/WB/JBIC Sri Lanka Post-Tsunami Recovery Program, "Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment" (2005) reports 900 as orphaned or separated from families. The Department of Census and Statistics reports

66 children as orphaned, losing both parents, Final Report-Census on the Buildings and People Affected by the Tsunami Disaster (2005)

- ⁷ J. P. Lewis, *A Manual of the Vanni Districts, Ceylon*, pp.2 (1895); Discussion with the Sea Tiger Unit representative also indicated that this was one of the reasons that the tsunami impact on the area was so severe.
- ⁸ December 2003 Census
- ⁹ Sinhalese population 23%; Sri Lankan Moors 49%; Malaysian 18%; and Others 29% – source: Statistical Handbook Mullaitivu District (2004) Population figures classified by ethnic group as of December 2003 Census.
- ¹⁰ Bandara Vanniyan was one of the prince/chieftans who ruled the principality in the Vanni region (Panankamam) during the British period. In the 1800's he was involved in rebellious actions against the British and supported the Kandyan kings in their efforts in opposing them. He captured the Fort that the British established in Mullaitivu and was involved in a series of battles against the British. In 1811 he was defeated in a major battle with the British. He died at the age of 34, a monument in his honour is still in existence.
- ¹¹ Apprx 5033 houses damaged both within and beyond the (200 meter) buffer zone; apprx 8212 people are in welfare centers; apprx 14,390 people directly affected living with friends and relatives; apprx 5827 families have been directly affected; apprx 3323 persons were registered as dead and missing as of March 23, 2005 – source: PDS Mullaitivu Branch. Mullaitivu GA reports 3390 dead and missing as registered on May 5, 2005. Source: Mullaitivu District, Situation Report on National Disaster Tsunami, (May 5, 2005).
- ¹² The areas surrounding a Hindu Pillayar Temple in Thannirootru had been flattened by the IPKF – Discussion with Temple Head Priest; *"Mullaitivu suffered greatly during the war on account of the military activities of first the Sri Lankan Army and the Indian Army later on (1986-89). . . . frequent shelling from the Army Camp resulted in displacement of people. People were arrested and Army units committed other atrocities including rape. The arrival of the Indian Army was equally bad; they too committed atrocities . . ."* Discussion with local TRO representative; students of a leading school in the district was subjected to recruitment pressure by the EPRLF for the Tamil National

Army during the time of the Indian Army presence in the area prior to 1989 – Discussions with School Teachers.

- ¹³ The armed conflict between the state and the LTTE escalated at certain points during its approximately 20 year history. The war unfolded in three phases, interspaced with ceasefires and peace talks. However with each phase of the war as it resumed after the failure of peace talks, it tended to increase in intensity, which had a tremendous impact on the population in the region.
- ¹⁴ 24,704 resettled; 3616 internally displaced; 6519 displaced from other areas. Total populations of Manthai East and Oddusuddan divisions in the district were also displaced, Mullaitivu District (2004) All three divisions were 'occupied' by the Sri Lankan Army during the war years until the 1996 period. Discussions of the disruptions faced by the Maritimpattu division peoples during interviews with community members and PDS representative noted: "from 1990-1996 the Sri Lankan Military occupied this area and people were displaced from here to Mulliavali, Vatrpalai areas. In 1996 this area was recaptured by the LTTE but people could not come back as there was a threat of the SL Military recapturing it. After the ceasefire people came back" source: Statistical Handbook
- ¹⁵ Apprx 17,935 families are engaged in the fishing sector and 3,104 in agriculture. Source: Mullaitivu District Handbook (2004)
- ¹⁶ J.P. Lewis, Mannual of The Vanni Districts (1895)
- ¹⁷ Interviews noted that these restrictions were made on the assumption that they would be used to produce explosives/bombs, which resulted in community-based organizations supported by the LTTE producing natural (cow dung-based) fertilizers, – religious leader interview.
- ¹⁸ Discussions with Puthukudiyiruppu Division farming and fishing communities
- ¹⁹ Assessment of Needs in the Conflict Areas, prepared by ADB/WB/UN (2003)
- ²⁰ Mullaitivu district has 4 Pradeshiya Sabhas , source: www.unescap.org
- ²¹ Government expenditure for local government accounts is only 3% of the budget Source: *Local and Provincial Government Assessment*, US Aid. (July

2005) This is revealing in terms of the limited and subordinated role of PCs indicating also the level of prioritization for effective decentralized administration and governance.

- ²² Some institutions most often cooperative societies, unions etc. are directly linked to the formal district administrative structure, officially formed at the GS Division levels and interact with GS's in implementing state policies and receive some state funding. Informal institutions appear to be loosely knit organizations formed by communities on a voluntary basis to represent the interests and welfare of a particular group or community.
- ²³ See Hettige, S.T., "Wealth Power and Prestige" (1984) outlining the transformation and alteration of traditional power structures, particularly since independence notes that "*Along with the reorganization taking place in the local power and authority structure, the emergence of various forms of village level associations was also evident in the countryside even before independence. These associations were centered on economic and welfare matters and were interconnected with the emerging local power structure.*" (pp. 142)
- ²⁴ Discussion with a farmers' society member also a generational/long-term resident in the district.
- ²⁵ Saminathan, D. "Dealing with Diversity" pp. 115-16 (2005)
- ²⁶ District Statistical Information Handbook (2003)- most current information available.
- ²⁷ Approx 7,258 deaths out of total death figure of 12,562 of muslims inslandwide, 1,069 are missing and 14,353 families are reported as displaced - source: "An interim Report on Loss Assessment of Tsunami - Affected Muslim Areas in Sri Lanka, (November 2005), Muslim Infomation Center.
- ²⁸ See McGilvray's research in the the Eastern region in his discussion on Tamil-Muslim relations and the origins of the Muslims/Moors and their settlement patterns in the Eastern region. (McGilvray: 1974)
- ²⁹ McGilvray notes " Vestiges of the hereditary incorporation of Moors into the organic, hierarchicl rituals of major Hindu temples continued well into the 20th century in some areas, before the awakening of Moorish religious and ethnic consciousness [which] led to a renunciation of these duties." pp. 20, Tamils and Moors: Caste and Matriclan Structures in Eastern Sri Lanka, (1974)

- 30 Under the Gal Oya Project, over 150,000 Sinhalese peasants were resettled in the area. The scheme began in 1949 and the initial settlers began arriving in 1950. (McGilvray: (1974); (Sitrapalambam: (2005)) In addition the Allai, Kanthalai, Morawewa and Padavia irrigation schemes and ensuing allocation of land to Sinhalese communities are commonly perceived as planned Sinhala colonization schemes in the Eastern province, which has emerged as state colonization policies that have adversely affected the Muslim and Tamil communities. (Ismail; Abdulla; Fazeel: (2005))
- 31 Discussions with Tamil community members noted that extensive tracts of land owned by the Tamil peoples were classified as jungle land and taken over by the state for its dry zone development/resettlement scheme.
- 32 Older settlements also exist such as Paanama, which is considered an ancient (purana) village where the population is 100 % Sinhalese. The population had settled in the area over two centuries ago, fleeing from the British in the Kandyan regions during revolts (Wellassa Keralla/revolt). Information about indigenous inhabitants in the Paanama area if any, at the time the Sinhala population arrived was not available.
- 33 Reference to Kantale State Sugar Industry in the Trincomalee District in a discussion of the creation of new administrative boundaries and land allocations see *"Muslim Perspectives From the East,"* Ismail et. al. (2005)
- 34 A Sarvodaya Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project is one case in point. One of their programs aimed at resettling 250 tsunami affected Muslim families encountered difficulties. The land to be used for this purpose was Muslim owned, however the GN division (Aththapalam) is primarily populated by Tamil communities. This caused problems as they were faced with a lot of opposition including anonymous threats etc. The landowner too was faced with security concerns and the project stalled. The settlement of a few families would not have faced opposition but 250 families was an issue since the community felt there were political machinations involved. Based on discussions with and advice from the communities concerned, Sarvodaya made the decision not to resettle all 250 families in one place, instead, split the settlement of families between Wattawan in Batticaloa and Aththapalam in Amparai. (discussions with Sarvodaya Program Manager, Amparai)

- 35 Hence the creation of the SLMC in 1989 to represent the interests of the North-Eastern Muslim communities. Source: discussed in paper published by Muslim Peoples National Alliance, "Political Identity and the Leadership of Sri Lankan Muslims," discussing differences and identity of North-Eastern Tamils vs Southern Muslim politics (Tamil document translated)
- 36 Discussions with local administration officials.
- 37 McGilvray, pp. 20, (1974)
- 38 *"Earlier they [Sinhalese fishermen] were here. Now they have inter-marriage here and that identity disappeared. There are many Sinhalese – Mendis Appu, Carolis Appu, Sethuru Amme. They are bright persons." "This is a very traditional village. It has connection with the King Gajabahu [the] Second. This temple is very much connected with the Second Gajabahu, the Amman kovil temple. He had awarded lands to this Temple at that time"* (Karaithivu Assistant Director of Planning)
- 39 Discussion with fishermen, Chenaikuddiruppu Village, Kalmunai Tamil Division
- 40 Note recent local government PC elections in 2006, which permitted limited elections in parts of the East resulted in the creation of new PSs i.e. 'Karaithivu Pradeshiya Sabha' It would be interesting to observe the percentages of communities that constitute its constituency.
- 41 Discussions on the ground noted that there is some thinking along the lines of requesting a Muslim GA in Amparai.
- 42 Discussion Karaithivu DS.
- 43 Discussion Sainthamaruthu Administrative Division Officials
- 44 Galle District Planning Report (2002)
- 45 *Southern Province in Figures 2004*, Provincial Planning Secretariat Report, statistical information obtained from Department of Census and Statistics, 2001 Census.
- 46 Galle District, District Secretariat Administration Report 2002
- 47 www.unescap.org - current official information was not available
- 48 *Southern Province in Figures 2004*, - Provincial Planning Secretariat Report.

- 49 The church had been fairly instrumental in assisting with the formation of citizens committees in the early 1980s period, when there was no political representation in the area. This gave community a sense of social cohesion and enabled them to articulate their problems to the government and media. Discussion with Catholic Priest
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 Discussions with Catholic Church Priests and Holy Family Convent Nuns.
- 52 For example when they go on transfers, assistance with participation in competitions, for gifts to children on children's day. Funds were also used for instance to open a bank account in the names of the children of a school's sanitary laborer who died.
- 53 Discussion with teachers at Mullaitivu Maha Vidyalayam – psycho-social counseling as it is meant here is not in a technical sense, but by being available to console and communicate with the badly affected and traumatized, particularly those who have lost families and to offer basic advise and assistance. It is a reflection of traditional voluntary efforts by community members to offer support, collective coping, in times of dire situations.
- 54 Tamil Teachers Union Representative discussion
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 implementing government contracts for road development, paddy field pathways, nursery's (for children) libraries
- 57 i.e. Dam maintenance and repairs, distribution of pesticides, fertilizers, paddy received through foreign assistance, distribution of agricultural tools.
- 58 Discussion with Member of RDS and Farmers' Society;
- 59 There are two freshwater and 19 marine fishermen's societies in Mullaitivu District. Source: Mullaitivu District Statistical Handbook (2004). Discussions with fishing communities in the district however indicated there are currently 24 fishermens' societies.
- 60 In the village Kallapadu, it appears that the fishing community are a fairly endogamous group, furthermore are closely bound by their religious faith, Catholicism. *"All the people in this village are of the same faith and are all*

related to each other....we worked together peacefully. We marry among ourselves, marriage with someone coming from outside is rare."

- 61 Discussions with Catholic Church Father.
- 62 Discussions with a local religious leader
- 63 PDS and DPDHS Representatives
- 64 Affected civilians were sent to a school/s assigned to a designated Grama Niladari Division and their respective village clusters. This prevented communities from separation after the disaster and facilitated the move to and enabled better coordination in transitional camps
- 65 Discussion, Teachers of Vidhyananda Maha Vidyalayam
- 66 Discussion, Sea Tiger Representative
- 67 The GA stated that she was informed and updated on VDF meetings and activities taking place.
- 68 CWDR is a local NGO established in 1992 and resgistered under the social welfare ministry. Focusing primarily on war affected women and children their work is carried out in the NE. Their aim is to ensure that the rights of life and human dignity of women and children are not violated.
- 69 1. Vaanail Childrens Home; 2.Kantharuban Arivicholai; 3.Barathy Nilyam; 4. Punithapoomy; 5. Vaikarai; 6. Inniyavalvu; 7.Senthalir; 8.Anpucholai Girls Home; 9.Isidore Childrens Home; 10.St. Andrews Boys Home; 11. S. Indian Thirusabai Girls Home; Information provided by the LTTE Peace Secretariat statistical report.
- 70 These are cases where the children have lost both parents. Sencholai Home for girls is in Killinochchi and Kantharuban Arivicholai for boys which is in Mullaitivu district.
- 71 Those who have lost both parents
- 72 Approximately 1180 children age group 15 and younger have been registered dead. Source: Situation Report as of May 5, 2005, Mullaitivu District Kachcheri. Apprx 5498 children are recorded as 'affected' by the tsunami. Source: "Major Damages and Losses by the National Disaster "Tsunami," Mullaitivu District Report January 21, 2005, Kachcheri.

⁷³ Funded internationally by Caritas, through HUDEC, a church-run national charitable organization, the social service arm of the church.

⁷⁴ Interview: Kalmunai - Catholic Church Reverend Brother

⁷⁵ In primarily Muslim areas indications are that Islamic Religious Institutions dominate.

“ Before the tsunami were there other religious organizations apart from mosque providing social services for the community?

When we say religious organization, here there are only Muslims.

What about catholic church?

No it is 100% Muslim area.” Interview: Sainthamaruthu Administrative Official – transcript excerpts

⁷⁶ Interview: Sainthamaruthu Division Administrative Official

⁷⁷ Interviews: Buddhist Priest-Kalumunai and Church Father.

⁷⁸ This is aid that is provided directly to the central government and channeled through the GA and District Administrative Structure for distribution to the communities. It was noted that INGOs requested lists of affected people from the Divisional Secretaries and they distributed goods directly to the affected, hence the inability to coordinate was a major issue. Discussion DS Official.

⁷⁹ Sainthamaruthu is one example

⁸⁰ Sainthamaruthu DS Officials – Discussion.

⁸¹ There are 69 fishing cooperative societies (coastal and inland) established in 12 DS Divisions as of 2003 – source District Statistical Handbook (2003)

⁸² i.e. Jamiyathul Ansarul Suathul Mohammady (JASM)

⁸³ Discussions with District Administrative Official.

⁸⁴ Discussion: Thirukkivil Administrative Officer “*People of all communities Sinhalese, Upcountry Citizens and Muslim brought thing by lorries and distributed. It was after 2 weeks that the NGO's arrived. During the Disaster time the STF, Police, MP's, local society boys, our office staff, LTTE people got*

together and helped us;” “Most of the employees working for Ingo's are Tamils. Muslims are very few. So, the attention of NGO's are turned towards Tamils. But we could Clearly witness the unity on all communities after the tsunami.” Discussion: Islam-based local NGO, Center for Tsunami Disaster Risk Management (CIDRM)

⁸⁵ “ *One of the STF persons from the Thirukkivil area organized meetings in all the GS divisions. The people from each division were invited and they discussed how to prevent and handle natural disasters such as tsunami, floods, cyclone and earth quakes. They have also appointed a group of 15 people for each division in this regard.*” Discussions with local GS's.

⁸⁶ “*Other movements in the sense the cadres who were separated from LTTE have formed other group such as TELO, EPRLF and PLOT. They come with the support of other gangs to attack these people and these people [LTTE] attack back..... By Karuna group and EPDP also..... At this present situation they [LTTE] cannot come and be with the public and help them. If they come here then there will be a breaching of Peace Accord and a conflict may rise. Therefore they have now withdrawn from here and are keeping away.*” Discussion: Grama Sewakas; Amparai LTTE Political Wing Representatives expressed similar concerns.

⁸⁷ (1). Akkaraipattu Vipulananda Childcare Center established 1992 - apprx. 89 children; (2). Sainthamaruthu Thafa Child care Center established 1987 – 30 children; (3). Veeramunai Seerpadathevi Childcare Center established 2003 – 25 children; (4). Karaithivu Ramakrishna Childcare Center established

1937 – figures not available (5). Paandiyiruppu St. Mary's Boy's Home established 1983 – 40 children; (6). Thambiluvil Thirunavukarasunayanar Childcare Center date established unknown – tsunami has destroyed information re Home. Source: A Sociological Study of registered Childcare Centers in Amparai, unpublished paper.

⁸⁸ Swamy Vivehananthan Childrens Home; Ramakrishna Mission Girls Home; Little Flower RC Girls Home; Methodist Boy's Home; Methodist Girls Homes (2 homes) Al Usawa Boys Home; Amman Girls Home; Jesus Live Childrens Home; Christian Girls Home; Gamiya Manpail. Information provided by the Peace Secretariat, LTTE.

⁸⁹ DCPC Child Protection Officer Amparai – Interview

- 90 Discussion - Karithivu Grama Sewakas
- 91 Community individual was informed by the DS that the priest had sold the land to a Japanese Organization for construction therefore the land was not available.
- 92 Religious chanting for blessing
- 93 UN OCHA office compiled statistical information indicate 77 registered International and domestic organizations as well as 6 individual volunteers working in the Galle District, however there are numerous unknown entities operating as well.
- 94 Discussion with Gintota-Benthara Livelihood Society, the JVP political party had been instrumental in setting up these committees one month after the tsunami.
- 95 This may have been the practice in the past however today the Mudalali's deduct the cost of ice and split 50% of fuel costs from the fishermen.
- 96 Sinhadeewaragama fishing communities
- 97 Dodanduwa fishing communities
- 98 For ethical reasons names are intentionally excluded.
- 99 A social protection mechanism supported by the state, it includes a variety of components i.e. cooperatives, savings clubs, micro-credit, monthly voucher system where families falling under a defined poverty line are supposedly provided with vouchers redeemable in local multi-purpose cooperative stores.
- 100 Discussions with JVP Member of Parliament; community members - Sinhadeewaragama; DS administrative official.
- 101 A politician was appointed as the chairperson of the committee.
- 102 Discussion State Children's Institution, Probation & Childcare Officer
- 103 Discussion UNICEF protection officer



'Nandi Kadal' - Tsunami hit area - Mullaitivu



UHICEF built Temporary Schools - Mullaitivu Mahavidyalaya



Tsunami shelter site - Mullaithivu




Catholic Church/ Don Boscoe provided Boats - Mullaithivu



Ruined fishing boats - Galle



Affected family living in temporary shelter in Dewata, Galle District



Samanthurai, militarization in Amparai

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