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Post-War Re in Sri Lanka
Prospects and Challe
Edited by
Dhammika erat
Kristine Höglund Michael Schulz Kalinga Tudor Silva
 

Construction

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POST WAR RECONSTRUCTION IN SRI LANKA
Prospects and Challenges
Edited by
Dhammika Herath Kristine Höglund Michael Schulz Kalinga Tudor Silva
The four editors of this volume have made equal contributions in terms of editing the book.

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POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION IN SRI LANKA
Prospects and Challenges
Edited by
Dhammika Herath Kristine Höglund Michael Schulz Kalinga Tudor Silva
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR ETHNIC STUDIES KANDY, SRI LANKA
The four editors of this volume have made equal contributions in terms of editing the book.

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International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), 2010
ISBN 978-955-580-123-2
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.
Enquiries should be addressed to the publisher.
First published October 2010
National Library of Sri Lanka-Cataloguing-In-Publication Data
Post-War Reconstruction in Sri Lanka/edited by Dhammika Herath and others.-
Kandy: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2010 310 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN 978-955-580-123-2
i. 355.028 DDC 22 ii. Herath, Dhammika 1. Reconstruction 2. Military Science
International Centre for Ethnic Studies 554/6A, Peradeniya Road Kandy, Sri Lanka
Cover Images: Top left and right: The newly constructed Oddamavadi Bridge across Batticaloa lagoon in the Eastern Province on the left and the old bridge on the right. The image is by courtesy of United Nations Office for Project Services, Colombo.
Bottom: Tamil children look on at a shelter for war-displaced Tamils in Vavuniya. The image was taken from NowPublic.com (http://www.nowpublic.com/world/ sri-lanka-tamil-refugees-may-end-permanent-camps-0) published by B12N on 3 July 2009 in "Sri Lanka: Tamil refugees may end up in permanent camps".
Printed by Anura Printers 149, Kandy Road Kurunegala, Sri Lanka anuraprinters@gmail.com

Contents
Notes on Contributors
Introduction
Acknowledgements
Chapter 1:
Chapter 2:
Chapter 3:
Chapter 4:
Chapter 5:
Chapter 6:
Chapter 7:
Multiculturalism and Nationalism in a Globalising World: The Case of Sri Lanka Kalinga Tudor Silva and Siri Hettige
Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka Michael Schulz and Pradeep Peiris
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xix
1.
17
Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 49
Dhammika Herath
Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation from a
Buddhist Perspective
Sumana Ratnayaka
Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka: Consolidation of Peace and Nation-Building S.M.M. Ismail, M.M.Fazil and A.Rameez
Kashmir: Building Peace through Democratic Governance Karuna Thakur
The Role of Resettlement and Sheltering in PeaceBuilding Process: The NEHRP Experience in Jaffna C. Elankumaran
81
95
125
143

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Chapter 8:
Chapter 9:
Chapter 10:
Chapter 11:
Chapter 12:
Chapter 13:
Conflict and Livelihood Revival: Evidence from Affected Communities in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka
Nina A. Brattvoll and Ponniah Sivarajah
Prospects on the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood to Sustain Peace and Development in Northern Sri Lanka
G. Mikunthan
Nucleus Entrepreneur Exchange: Sustainable PeaceBuilding through Economic and Social Integration Amina Yoosuf
Peace Processes and Peace-Building in Sri Lanka: Special Reference to the Setting up of the De-Merged Eastern Provincial Council Seyed M. M. Bazeer
Eastern Fish are Still Singing, Does Anyone Listen? Self-Perceptions and Identity on Social Inclusion of Youth in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka Fazeeha Azmi and Ragnhild Lund
Out of Horror, Hope: Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone Janet LeValley
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183
207
217
233
251

Notes on Contributors
Fazeeha Azmi, Lecturer at the Department of Geography, University of
Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. She received her MPhil in Social Change (Development Studies) and PhD in Geography from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). (Fazeehaazmig gamil.com, fazeeha...azmiasvt.ntnu.no)
S. M. M. Bazeer, holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of
Peradeniya (1981). He is an Attorney-at-Law of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka (1987), and a practicing solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales (1993). He is the Director of the Sri Lankan Muslim Information Centre (UK). (sbazeer@yahoo.co.uk)
Nina Brattvoll, Program Assistant, UN-OCHA Office, Bogota,
Colombia. (nina5Qnameplanet.com)
Chelliah Elankumaran, Senior Lecturer (Gr.I), University of Jaffna. He
obtained his PhD in Medical and Economic Statistics at Massey University, New Zealand in 2001 in collaboration with University of Jaffna. (elankumaran@jfn.ac.lk).
. M. Fazil, Lecturer in Political Science at the Department of Social
Sciences at South Eastern University of Sri Lanka (SEUSL) from 2005. (fazrasmG seu.ac.lk, fazilmohGgmail.com)
Dhammika Herath, a researcher affiliated to the School of Global
Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He specialises broadly in the fields of development, governance and conflict resolution. He obtained his PhD in 2008 from the University of Gothenburg in Sweden in Peace and Development Research. (dhammikkayahoo.com, dhammika.herath(aglobal studies-gu.se)
S. T. Hettige, Professor of Sociology, Director/SPARC, University of
Colombo. (sthettigwebmail.cmb.ac.lk)

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viii
Kristine Höglund, Associate Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden. (kristine.hoglundg) pcr.uu.se)
S. M. M. Ismail, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Vice-Chancellor of the
South Eastern University. (smmismail®seu.ac.lk)
Janet LeValley, Senior Professor and Head of Psychology Programs at
American National College, Colombo, Sri Lanka (degree program, affiliate of Missouri University of Science and Technology, USA), has been serving as Program Director of CCCWD (Center for Child Care and Women's Development). (nagadaughter@hotmail.com)
Ragnhild Lund, Professor at the Department of Geography, Norwegian
University of Science and Technology (NTNU). (ragnhild.lundesvt.ntinuino)
G. Mikunthan, Senior Lecturer (Gr. I) Head of the Department of Agricultural Biology since 2004. He holds a BSc (Agriculture) from Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, India (1989); and a Master of Philosophy in Agricultural Entomology at Post-Graduate Institute of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya and a Doctoral degree from University of Agricultural Sciences, Bangalore, India. (gmikunthanggmail.com, mikunthangjfn.ac.lk)
Pradeep Peiris is the Unit Head of Social Indicator, the survey research unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives, a think-tank based in Colombo and he is one of Sri Lanka's pioneering pollsters. He is currently a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. (pnpeiris@gmail.com)
A. Rameez, Lecturer in Sociology at South Eastern University of Sri Lanka (SEUSL). He has recently completed a Post-Graduate Diploma in Conflict Resolution and Peace Preparedness conducted by the University of Bradford, United Kingdom. (arameez@seu.ac.lk,aramees 2001@gmail.com)

ix
Sumana Ratnayaka, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Pali and Buddhist Studies at University of Peradeniya from May 2002 to date. He holds a BA Hons. from University of Kelaniya and MLitt. from University of Oxford. (sumana_ratnayakasayahoo.com)
Michael Schulz, (PhD) is Associate Professor in Peace and Development Research at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. (michaelschulzGglobalstudies-gu.se)
Kalinga Tudor Silva, Professor of Sociology and formerly Dean, Faculty of Arts, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. He is presently the Executive Director of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Kandy & Colombo. (ktsilva@ slt.lk)
Ponniah Sivarajah, Senior Lecturer (Gr. 1). of Agricultural Economics at the Eastern University, holds a PhD in Agricultural Economics from TNAU, India; a MSc in Regional Development Planning from AIT, Bangkok, Thailand; and a BSc (Agriculture) from the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. (sivaponniah Gyahoo.com, psiva21 agmail.com)
Karuna Thakur, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science in the University of Jammu, Jammu & Kashmir, and holds PhD on conflict in Kashmir from Jamia Millia Islamia University, Delhi. (karunathakurl 181Gyahoo.in)
Amina, Yoosuf, Director, Nucleus Foundation, holds a BA in Sociology (1996) and an MA in Sociology (2002) from University of Peradeniya. (amina@nucleus.lk, aminayoosuf@ gmail.com)

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Introduction
This book consists of a collection of papers from the conference "Peace and Development in Sri Lanka” which took place in Kandy, 23-25August 2009. The purpose of the conference was to bring together and initiate a process of dialogue among local and international researchers and doctoral students, who study peace and development issues in Sri Lanka, and practitioners seeking to address the same issues. The practitioner side was represented by professionals engaged in peace and development through their work in International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs) and government institutions. The papers in this book reflect the participants' practical experience and research findings stemming from ongoing research projects.
Sri Lanka now faces the prospects and challenges of post-war reconstruction in the northern and eastern provinces. This book provides a diversity of views on a range of issues relevant for post-war reconstruction. It serves to facilitate dialogue between the academic community and the practitioners. The academic researchers with a commitment to peace and development analyse the past failures and explore future prospects with the benefit of hindsight. The practitioners share their assessments and experience of the ground situation with the academic researchers. In combination, the different perspectives can generate a pool of policy relevant knowledge and expertise necessary to facilitate reconstruction, reconciliation and longterm conflict transformation in the war-affected regions.
This book lays a heavy emphasis on the potential for reconstruction, reconciliation and development in the war-affected regions of Sri Lanka. It is apparent that at the level of planning and implementation, reconstruction and development cannot be addressed by social scientists alone. These are processes that require expertise from both the social and natural sciences. Thus, this book aims to bring together scholars from a number of fields of study; the social sciences as well as the natural and applied sciences. In order to assist in the interaction

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between practitioners, researchers and doctoral students from a wide spectrum of disciplines, they have been asked to contribute to the book that is organised around the following sub-themes.
- Peace processes, peace-building and peace-making; failures and
future prospects
- Social reconstruction and reconciliation
- Physical reconstruction and development
-International mediation in peace and development
- International aid and conflict
- Strengthening of livelihood and development capacities
- Poverty, vulnerability and conflict
- Displacement and migration
- Social and psychological care for the victims of violence
The book is structured so that it begins with the macro perspectives and how one can place the Sri Lankan case within the larger structural and global setting. Sri Lanka is not an isolated island; on the contrary, for hundreds of years it has been influenced from the outside. In addition, the war that erupted in 1983 was yet an example of a type of ethno-national war that has plagued other parts of the world as well. At the same time, Sri Lanka has a unique cultural and societal history. Therefore, there is a need to analyse different aspects of the challenges that Sri Lanka is facing in the post-war context.
Hence, in the first chapter, Multiculturalism and Nationalism in a Globalising World. The Case of Sri Lanka by Kalinga Tudor Silva and Siri Hettige, it is argued that the Sri Lankan case needs to be understood and placed in a longer historical perspective. The chapter shows that multiculturalism was the name of the game in Sri Lanka with a high level of interaction, as well as exchange of experiences and traditions between the ethnic, religious and linguistic groups of the country. At the same time, these groups were allowed and did preserve their own distinct cultures and identities. With the rise of ethnonationalism in the 20th century, however, rivalry and parochial nationalist sentiments have altered this high level of tolerances which

Introduction xiii
has contributed to the eruption in a war with a high cost in human casualties. Hence, the authors argue that despite difficulties to implement multiculturalism, it serves as an alternative to conflict and intolerance, and history has shown that it can work.
In the second chapter, Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka, Schulz and Peiris discuss the meaning of reconstruction and provide an analysis on why the peace process between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) failed. The main argument is that the people on both sides of the conflict divide never were involved and/or participated in the peace process in any meaningful way. Further, the ceasefire period was mainly an elite-driven project, and never seemed to have a serious ambition to solve the political differences, and to launch a reconstruction process in the war zones in the country. Hence, the ceasefire period not only prevented people from participating in the conflict transformation process, it became also a preparation phase for
2 16eW W2 T.
Herath in chapter three, Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction, is in line with the previous chapter, and highlights the need to involve all levels of society in the re-building of Sri Lanka. He examines the prospects for social reconciliation in post-war Sri Lanka from a conflict transformation perspective. As a peace researcher he argues that the current emphasis on material reconstruction is necessary but insufficient to foster social reconciliation. After the last war, in which the LTTE was completely militarily defeated, it is of immense importance to ensure that the GOSL's efforts to create material reconstruction in the North and East of the country also include social reconstruction elements. Without ensuring that the people living in the war-torn areas are the ones that the reconstruction is aimed for, as well as to ensure that the people are involved, it will be difficult for the GOSL to win the minds and hearts of the people. The risk is further grievances and ethno-nationalistic confrontations.

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Chapter four examines the potentials for social reconciliation between the different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. In Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation from a Buddhist Perspective, Ratnayaka brings in a
Buddhist perspetive and elucidates the possibility for reconciliation
along Buddhist values and ethics. In many ways, this chapter shows the need to not solely place reconciliation efforts on the interrelationship. It is also a responsibility to look into the individual as well, or as Ratnayaka expresses it "every individual has a 'war against oneself, which makes one one's owns rival, too”. Hence, an advise to the majority of Sri Lankans, who are Buddhists, is to consider how to reconcile with oneself before reconciliation attempts with the 'other can be launched or be improved.
In chapter five, Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka: Consolidation of Peace and Nation-Building, Ismail, Fazil and Rameez engage in an analysis of external interventions and involvement in the conflict in Sri Lanka. Specifically, Japan's role as a quiet actor in Sri Lanka's last peace process is examined. Since many Western countries, as well as Western NGOs, have received immense criticism by the GOSL and in the media, Japan serves as an interesting and important example of external involvement in reconstruction and peace-building efforts. Without external involvement in one or another way, which emphasises local ownership, it will be difficult for GOSL to launch an all embracing and inclusive peace and reconstruction processes. The authors argue that despite Japan's failed mediator role, ending in 2003, it has continued to gradually work to successfully implement development assistance and reconstruction in different aspects.
In chapter six, Kashmir. Building Peace through Democratic Governance, Thakur brings another external example, the conflict of Kashmir, and presents an analysis of how peace-building through democratic governance can be made. This chapter shows how international experience, such as the one in Kashmir, can lend insight into the conflict and challenges of Sri Lanka. Reform of the political system is needed after increased ethnic tensions, followed by increased ethnic militancy, secessionist demands, and repressive responses from the

Introduction xv
government. Thakur emphasises the need to make political institutions transparent, more decentralised and democratic. Again, arguments are found for why civil society and the grassroots need to be involved, and that a top-down process risks failing.
In chapter seven, The Role of Resettlement and Sheltering in PeaceBuilding Process: The NEHRP Experience in Jaffna, Elankumaran brings up the issue of resettlement and sheds light on the problem of providing shelters for the many people who are displaced from their original homes. This chapter studies the contribution of international financial agencies in the material reconstruction of the war-torn areas. In focus is the North-East Housing Reconstruction Programme commenced in 2004 for the internally displaced persons (IDPs). Although some of the IDPs had some positive impact from the programme the vast majority had complaints and felt that they were not living in peace and could not participate in the development process. Hence, again, the chapter proves the need to involve the people who are directly hit by the war in order to circumvent new grievances and frustrations.
In chapter eight, Conflict and Livelihood Revival. Evidence from Affected Communities in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, Brattvoll and Sivarajah present a case study of the Eastern province which is severely affected by lack of livelihood capacities. They interviewed Tamils and Muslims in the Batticaloa district in the East about their livelihood situations. The authors say that "frequent displacement, loss of land and employment opportunities impacted the livelihood" negatively and in particular, in the rural areas. In their policy recommendation they underline the need to first restore trust in order to build the livelihood capacities.
In chapter nine, by Mikunthan, Prospects on the Renewal of AgricultureDriven Livelihood to Sustain Peace and Development in Northern Sri Lanka, agricultural aspects of the recovery work in Sri Lanka are discussed. Mikunthan shows what implications the war has had on the agriculture in the North of the country, and shows the need to re

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vitalise agriculturally-driven livelihood capacities, not least among the internally displaced people. A gender aspect is also raised, underlining that women could take part and be trained in agricultural technologies and agro-based business activities in order to improve their incomes.
Yoosuf, in chapter ten, Nucleus Entrepreneur Exchange: Sustainable Peace-Building through Economic and Social Integration, shows that sustainable peace-building must address economic and social integration issues. Some of the challenges for entrepreneurs are the difficulties to receive Business Development Services, overcome ethnic mistrust, establish new networks and overcome unawareness of the opportunities. Hence, the author underlines the significance of having inter-ethnic integration projects that also improve the livelihood capacities.
In chapter eleven, Peace Processes and Peace-Building in Sri Lanka: Special Reference to the Setting up of the De-Merged Eastern Provincial Council, Bazeer discusses the challenges of establishing the provincial Councils. In the post-war experience phase, the author discusses the issues of restoring political legitimacy, especially the setting up of provincial council in the Eastern province and its political relevance. It is argued that in the East, a certain extent of reconciliation between the ethnic groups has been achieved with the help of the local Councils.
In chapter twelve, Eastern Fish are Still Singing, Does Anyone Listen? Self-Perceptions and Identity on Social Inclusion of Youth in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka, Azmi and Lund demonstrate how the political history of Sri Lanka has tended to paint a negative picture of youth and how a new positive picture needs to be reconfigured in the light of post-war developments. They argue that both internal and external conditions have changed and that youth need new life opportunities. In interviews with youth from the East the authors reveal that many young people feel excluded and discriminated. They fear to be left without opportunities to influence their future. Education and training seems to be of utter importance in order to improve their

Introduction xvii
labour market chances, but this demands resources, support systems and training facilities. The study also underlines the need to involve the youth in restructuring society, not least because the youth is very aware of the realties and challenges of the post-war context.
Far too many reconstruction attempts neglect the children of the war. However, in the final chapter thirteen, Out of Horror, Hope: PsychoSocial Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone, LeValley illustrates how drawings by children reveal hidden psychological trauma and the chapter discusses the results of an action research project on training of teachers to address the psychological needs of children. Hence, there is an immense need to include children in the reconstruction of war-torn societies.

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Acknowledgements
This book would not have been feasible without the input from several individuals and organisations. Primarily, the Peace and Development conference (August 2009) in which the papers in this book were first presented, was made possible due to a grant from the Swedish South Asian Studies Network (SASNET). The conference on Peace and Development in Sri Lanka was held in Hotel Tourmaline, Kandy, Sri Lanka on 23-25 August 2009. More then 40 scholars and practitioners linked to various sectors dealing with peace and development issues in Sri Lanka participated. A special thanks to all those who participated in the dialogue and shared their views in the discussions and to those who have contributed to this book. There were four organisations that arranged the conference, International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), University of Gothenburg, University of Peradeniya and Uppsala University. However, the conference would not have been possible without the institutional
support of ICES, which provided all the logistics around the
conference.
The editors also take this opportunity to thank Iranga Silva for her valuable contribution to edit and prepare the articles of this book for publication in a very short time. A special mention of thanks is due to Anupama Sree of International University of Japan, Niigata, Japan for her assistance in editing some of the chapters. The editors also would like to thank the following staff members at the ICES for organising the conference and making this book a reality; Chalani Lokugamage, W. H. M. D. Bandara, Saleeka Peiris, Vasantha Premaratne, Asoka Ekanayake and W.M.P. Wickramasinghe who also supported the logistics arrangements of the above conference. In addition to those mentioned here, there are several others from the four collaborating institutions who supported the conference and publication of this book and the editors are grateful for their valuable contributions.

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CHAPTER 1
Multiculturalism and Nationalism in a
Globalising World. The Case of Sri Lanka
Kalinga Tudor Silva & Siri Hettige
Introduction
For many observers 'one world and many cultures' sums up the true nature of the contemporary world (Banerjee & Lindstead, 2001). Globalisation is identified as a process of time-space compression affecting the entire world. "World becomes smaller each and every day. We see it turning into a global village” (McLuhan, 1964: 93). At the same time it is argued that globalisation does not lead to an undesirable and more or less sterile cultural homogenisation as such on a global scale but rather a celebration of cultural diversity without necessarily harming the integrity of any specific cultural traditions. In this view the global television channels, internet, tourism and travel industry and other agents of globalisation are precisely the mechanisms that foster the celebration and mutual appreciation of multiculturalism within a globalising framework. In addition, the ability of the global consumers to taste and appreciate different cuisines, whether Japanese, Mexican, Thai, Indian, Chinese or Ethiopian, is seen as an important aspect of the multicultural experience in a rapidly globalising world.
This is a revised version of a paper titled "Multiculturalism in a Globalising
World: Views from Sri Lanka” presented at the Sri Lanka Conference on Peace and Development held in Kandy from 2009 and the 18th Biennial General Conference of AASSREC, held in Bangkok from 27 to 29 August 2009.

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The 'trans-national and trans-cultural existence' of diverse groups such as refugees, migrant workers and the executives of multinational Corporations and international agencies is another important dimension of globalisation and multiculturalism in the contemporary world (Dijkstra, Geuijen & Ruijter, 2001).
As a theory and practice, multiculturalism refers to a broad set of ideas, policies and principles favourable to the development and peaceful coexistence of a plurality of cultures. It seeks to promote tolerance, mutual respect and free flow of ideas across cultures in ways that enrich them all without necessarily undermining each other. It assumes that each culture, in whatever way we define it, offers something positive to the bearers of that culture as well as to the humankind in general. Multicultural practice in fields such as education, mass communication and cultural policy aims to inculcate a concern and a healthy respect among people for one's own culture as well as for other cultures with whom they interact. According to Gollnick and Chinn (1986), "Individuals who have competencies in and can operate successfully in two or more different cultures are bicultural or multicultural". Goodenough (1976) defined multiculturalism as the 'normal human experience' in that most contemporary people participate in multiple cultures due to migration, international travel and mass media.
In some ways multiculturalism represents a unique response to the historical and sociological realities in countries like the US, Canada and Australia created through European colonisation and successive influx of migrants. Following the failure of the unrealistic expectation of a complete assimilation of all newcomers in each of these societies into a common culture (the 'melting pot' theory), the notion of multiculturalism was invented and the ethnic minorities were encouraged to preserve and promote their cultural heritage while sharing broader democratic traditions and social values in the respective host countries. In this sense multiculturalism ran counter to

Multiculturalism and Nationalism in a Globalising World 3
the efforts at cultural homogenisation or even cultural imposition that were part of the established but often unstated social policy and political philosophy in the earlier period.
Cultural pluralism advocated by multiculturalism is necessarily rooted in democratic social values such as freedom and equality of opportunity which in turn are Western in origin. The right to preserve one's cultural identity, heritage and distinctive life style is seen as a basic human right of the individual. On the other hand, adherence to democratic values provides a common framework for interaction among people of different ethnic communities. Multiculturalism is opposed to evaluation of one culture using the standards of another culture. Similarly one's cultural identity should not interfere with his or her access to opportunities.
In defense of globalisation against a wave of attacks from anti
globalists, Amartya Sen stated the following:
The polar opposite of globalisation would be persistent separatism and relentless autarky. It is interesting here to recollect the images of seclusion that was invoked with much anxiety in many old Sanskrit texts in India.... This is the story of well frog-the kupamanduka-which lives its whole life within a well and is suspicious of everything outside it.... The well frog has a world view that is entirely confined to that well. The scientific, cultural and economic history of the world would have been very limited had we lived like well frogs (Sen, 2002: 12).
Globalisation and multiculturalism, however, are by no means unproblematic notions. Instead of representing the social reality in its full complexity, these terms are often seen as rhetorical devises that serve to gloss over growing social inequality resulting from worldwide penetration of global capital commanded by multinational corporations. According to Banerjee and Linstead (2001), the

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discourses of globalisation and multiculturalism simply mask new forms of colonialism that appropriate surplus on a global scale and at the same time reinforce cultural domination of the West through global electronic media like CNN, worldwide educational processes and an expanding network of international agencies with widest possible reach throughout the world. In this sense globalisation and multiculturalism are seen as twin processes that simultaneously open up the entire world for capitalist expansion and a corresponding spread of a worldwide consumer culture driven by global media accompanied by the cultivation of tastes and imaginations.
Stuart Hall (1991), one of the strongest critics of multiculturalism, has argued that it merely creates "an exotica of difference' without addressing the question of unequal relations among different cultures in the world. Similarly Banerjee and Linstead (2001) point to the contradictions within the multicultural policy of Australia.
...a multicultural Australia is one that happily celebrates the consumption of tandoori chicken and tom yum soup without addressing the power relations between cultural communities. Following this logic, Cuban communism is not a part of 'culture' as is defined by the dominant ideology. However, Cuban jazz is an element of culture that is allowed to be produced and consumed, and is spectacularised as an example of the cultural diversity that is prevalent in Australia. Power, economic or otherwise, continues to be monoculturally deployed in the way reality is defined for 'ethnic communities (the term 'ethnic' is itself loaded with multiple meanings and exclusions...). This celebration of cultural pluralism is predicated on an established hierarchy of cultures and multiculturalism consolidates these hegemonic relations without challenging the hierarchy of the majority and the minority.
The rise of highly parochial and violent ethnic nationalisms in societies going through rapid change, in particular, has been identified

Multiculturalism and Nationalism in a Globalising World 5
as a reaction against the globalisation agenda of the ruling elites and multinational corporations.
Globalisation has subjected the traditional functions of family, community, church and nation-state to pressure. The advance of globalisation leads many people to revert to what they see as their own ethnic identity; they invoke traditions and a history which they sometimes manipulate to promote individual and group interests. In other words, increasing globalisation fosters favourable conditions for
all sorts of particularisation, localisation and even fragmentation (Dijkstra, Geuijen & Ruijter, 2001: 58).
One of the key problems faced by multiculturalism in post-colonial societies like Sri Lanka is that it runs counter to the dominant ethos of cultural assertiveness which in turn originated from anti-colonial struggles in these societies. Nationalist critics like Gunadasa Amarasekara has referred to multiculturalism as a recipe for 'cultural achcharuism' or a hotchpotch of cultures without a common core or a sense of direction (Gunawardana, 1991: 1).
Sri Lanka may be seen as an important site to explore globalisation and multiculturalism debates from a number of perspectives. As an island nation subjected to over 400 years of colonial rule, Sri Lanka has been subjected to economic and cultural domination of the West over a long period of time. This has shaped the economic and cultural formations in the country in significant ways. On the other hand, the anti-colonial struggles in Sri Lanka were rather tame and certainly less volatile compared to neighbouring India. Sri Lanka developed one of the most comprehensive welfare states in the developing world from 1930s onwards resulting in rapid advances in literacy, health and many other social indicators. In the post-independence era, particularly after the official adoption of liberalisation policies in 1977, Sri Lanka became more open to globalisation processes in economic and cultural terms. Even though Sri Lankan society is known for its

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multi-ethnic character and multicultural heritage (Silva, 2002; Gunawardena, 1991), ethnic tension fuelled by diverse grievances among majority and minority ethnic groups has shaped politics and armed struggles in the country in recent decades.
Sri Lanka as a Multi-Ethnic Society
According to the last island-wide Census in 1981, the population of Sri Lanka consisted of six different ethnic groups leaving aside the
smallest of groups such as the Veddas, nearing extinction.
Table 1: Population of Sri Lanka by Ethnicity, 1981
Ethnic Group Number Percent
Sinhalese 10,979,561 74.0 Sri Lanka Tamil 1,886,872 12.7 Indian Tamil 818,656 5.5 Sri Lanka Moore 1,046,926 7.0 Burgher 39,374 03 Malay 46,963 0.3 Other 28,398 0.2 Total 14,846,750 100.0
Source: Census of Population and Housing, 1981, General Report.
Thus the 1981 Census classified the Sri Lankan population into six different ethnic groups with the majority ethnic group, the Sinhalese, comprising 74 percent of the population followed by Sri Lanka Tamils (12.7 percent), Sri Lanka Moors (7.0 percent), Indian Tamils (5.5 percent), Malays and the Burghers (0.3 percent). Since 1963 Europeans and Veddas were included among the others' as their numbers had become increasingly smaller due to emigration in the case of the Europeans and possibly due to increased identification with
* The results of 2001 census are not considered in this paper as it excluded a
number of census blocks in Northern and Eastern provinces in Sri Lanka with a preponderance of minority ethnic groups.

Multiculturalism and Nationalism in a Globalising World 7
larger ethnic groups in the case of the Veddas. In determining the ethnicity of people, the Census enumerators were guided by the selfidentification of the people themselves. This procedure may have encouraged marginal groups such as Veddas to underreport their separate identity and identify themselves with nationally or regionally significant larger ethnic groups. The Census report also noted that following the granting of citizenship rights many Indian Tamils declared themselves as Sri Lanka Tamils giving rise to some confusion about the relative significance of Sri Lanka Tamils and Indian Tamils as historically evolved and socially significant ethnic categories. In the case of individuals having mixed parentage, they were identified as of the same ethnic group as one's father, further restricting reported ethnic diversity in the country.
With the possible exception of Burghers and Malays, the members of different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka are hard to identify by their physical appearances. The differences between ethnic groups are manifested in differences in names of individuals, language spoken, religious practices, dress in which they appear in public and some minor variations in diet. While the Sinhalese are largely Sinhala-speaking, Tamils and Muslims were typically Tamilspeaking and Burghers are English-speaking. It is important to stress that each of these differences is culturally transmitted and socially determined.
In terms of religious diversity, the Sri Lanka population consist of Buddhists (69.3 percent), Hindus (15.5 percent), Islamists (7.5 percent), Roman Catholics (6.9 percent) and other Christians (0.7 percent). The bulk of Sinhalese (over 90 percent) are Buddhists, Sri Lanka and Indian Tamils (over 80 percent) are Hindus, Muslims and Malays are (over 95 percent) Islamists and Burghers are Christians. It is important to point out however that a significant numbers of Tamils (over 10 percent) and Sinhalese (over 6 percent) are Catholic or Anglican by religion.

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Sri Lanka's Multicultural Heritage
As an island nation Sri Lanka is situated in the principal oceanic trade route between the East and the West. Throughout its known history Sri Lanka has been a meeting place for people from different parts of the world. Called "Hybrid Island' (Silva, 2002), for the 'mixed, hybrid and multicultural nature of the island's society and culture', throughout its long history, different communities lived side by side without having to face an assimilation or incorporation drive on the part of ruling groups and having enough opportunities to interact and exchange diet, music, customs and ideas with each other. Celebrating this cultural diversity in Sri Lanka Radhika Coomaraswamy, (1991: 7) observed "We can justly be proud of that diversity-not only of Theravada Buddhism or Saiva Siddanta, but also of thovil ceremonies, of Mukkuwar folk songs, of George Keyt, of Geoffrey Bawa, of the anonymous craftsmen who have worked on our traditional furniture, jewellery or embroidery”. If "multiculturalism involves the acceptance of the right of every ethnic group to maintain its own cultural traditions and develop its own cultural life” (Siriwardena, 1991: 15), this has been the situation in Sri Lanka certainly before the rise of Nationalist ideologies in the 20th century.
The multicultural heritage of the island is reflected in several features. The Hindu-Buddhist interaction evolved over a long period of time (Liyanagamage, 1978), is most evident in religion and ritual in Sri Lanka. It is well known that Theravada Buddhism being an atheistic philosophy, the deity cults in popular Buddhism have borrowed heavily from Hinduism and pre-Buddhist religious traditions. As reported by many anthropologists, popular Buddhism in Sri Lanka is a syncretic religion which combines a long-term goal of salvation derived from Buddhist Suttas with a short-term goal of worldly success derived at least partly from these deity cults. One of the most popular deities in Sri Lanka, Kataragama, is worshiped collectively by the Buddhists, Hindus and other religious followers forming a community

Multiculturalism and Nationalism in a Globalising World 9
of cult members during the annual festival in this most sacred pilgrimage centre.
Even though the Sinhala-Buddhists tend to be increasingly in command of this pilgrimage centre and it ritual processes, the ascetic Hindu sadhus and samis annually visiting this shrine receives the highest respect and devotion even from the Sinhala devotees showing a continuing Hindu-Buddhist interaction through the medium of the Kataragama cult. Gombrich and Obeyesekere (1988:184) discovered that "The Tamil samis of Kataragama have had an enormous influence on the contemporary religiosity of Sinhala-Buddhists. Several of them were charismatic persons held in highesteem by Sinhalas who came under their influence". Further they found that ritual practices like kavadi, penance and fire-walking were carried out collectively by the Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil-Saiva followers typically under the leadership and guidance of Hindu priests. Finally they noted a widespread diffusion of a bhakti religiosity among the urban poor and other classes in society irrespective of ethnicity largely due to the influence of parallel trends among Hindus in South India.
The linguistic gap between the ethnic groups must be understood in the light of three forms of bilingualism commonly encountered in Sri Lanka. First, the elite segments of all ethnic groups use English as a home language and a language of education, business and socialising to varying degrees making it possible to interact freely with one another irrespective of ethnic identity and the distinctive ethnic language associated with the respective ethnic group. In this instance English serves as a link language linking only the upper layers of the various ethnic groups (Kandiah, 1978). Second, among the lower classes such as the people in urban slums and shanty communities, market towns and bazaars and the plantation workers in selected areas Sinhala-Tamil bilingualism has evolved as a means of overcoming ethnic barriers in day-to-day communication in multi-ethnic settings (Silva, 1995). In these situations the Tamil speakers may develop a

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working knowledge in Sinhala and vice-versa depending on the circumstances. For instance, one study discovered that in the inner city slum communities in Colombo (e.g. Slave Island) and several other cities (eg. Mahaiyawa in Kandy) in Sinhala-majority areas in Sri Lanka Tamil has become a lingua franca among all ethnic groups, including some Sinhalese households in these communities given the fact that Muslims and Tamils are often in the majority within these inner city populations (Silva & Athukorala, 1992). Third, Muslims in many parts of Sri Lanka speak Tamil and Sinhala languages sometimes with equal proficiency. This has made them an effective intermediary between predominantly Tamil-speaking and predominantly Sinhalaspeaking people in certain areas in the Country. These forms of bilingualism in turn must be seen as ways of overcoming the language barriers in a multi-ethnic society.
Medical anthropological research in Sri Lanka reveals that there has been a significant exchange of traditional medical ideas, texts and practices between different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. While the Ayurveda system popular among the Sinhalese has been influenced mostly by the Ayurveda traditions developed in Northern India, the Siddha traditions of South India too has impacted on the Sinhalese health culture in some important ways. For instance, researchers argue that notions like valippu (fits), illappu, kolesanniya (chest coma) widely recognised in the folk health culture of the Sinhalese and the relevant therapies have been introduced via the Siddha tradition (Silva, 1992). Much of astrology, healing rituals and related metamedical ideas are also shared among Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims.
The examples of interactions, exchanges and Cultural hybridity among the Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil-Hindu and Muslim cultures noted above suggest that there is a common pool of knowledge, beliefs and practices connecting these cultures in critically important cultural domains like language, medical practices and ritual. In other words it is an undeniable fact that the Sinhala-Buddhists share certain

Multiculturalism and Nationalism in a Globalising World 11
components of their cultural heritage with the Tamil-Hindus and other ethnic minorities in Sri Lanka. It is this joint cultural heritage that can form the basis for a multicultural Sri Lanka.
Rise of Ethno-Nationalisms and Challenges for Social Harmony in Contemporary Sri Lanka
During the past several decades, the long-established multi-cultural heritage in Sri Lanka has been rapidly negated by the development of rival ethno-nationalisms among Sinhalese-Buddhists and TamilHindus. Both Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms evolved in the 20th century as reactions against westernisation in general and Christianity in particular. They led to increased self-awareness within each community and an assertion of their distinctive identities initially in language and religious terms. Initially their common enemy was colonial regime and Christian missionaries who were engaged in conversion and promotion of Western values. Once the British rai left and electoral politics was established, SirhraBuddhist nationalism gradually gained an upper hand and acquired a hegemonic character, particularly after Sinhala-Nationalist forces gradually gained control over the state in 1956 (DeVotta, 2007). The ruling elites, in turn, introduced language policies, university admission systems, education policies and land settlement policies that allegedly interfered with minority rights and cultural sensitivities (Kearney, 1967). This, in turn led to the emergence of a militant
Tamil nationalism that sought to militarily challenge the Sri Lankan
state in order to establish an independent Tamil homeland (Eelam) in Northeast Sri Lanka under the leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Partly under the influence of local issues such as problems from the Sri Lankan state, the LTTE as well as the worldwide resurgence of radical Islamism, the Muslims in Sri Lanka too increasingly asserted their separate identity and rights through the formation of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and other mobilisation strategies.

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These nationalist movements led to outright violence in Sri Lanka in the forms of ethnic riots that broke out from 1956 onwards, armed conflict between the state and the LTTE that ended with the elimination of the LTTE in 2009 and numerous other manifestations of inter-group rivalries. Instead of mutual tolerance and mutual accommodation that was the hallmark of the multicultural heritage discussed in earlier sections, mutual suspicion and a process of increased spatial segregation along ethnic lines has been set in motion in recent years.
The Sinhala-nationalist propaganda has increasingly asserted the view that Sri Lanka is an essentially Sinhala-Buddhist country employing seemingly well-founded historical notions such as dhammadipa (island of dhamma) and Seehadeepa (land of the Sinhalese). These hegemonic ideas leave limited social and political space for minority communities that have increasingly become anxious about their future in Sri Lanka (DeVotta, 2007). The political spectrum in contemporary Sri Lanka ranges from what Venugopal (2000) identified as 'cosmopolitan capitalism' represented by the UNP to 'sectarian socialism' represented by Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the People's Alliance located right in the middle of this spectrum with the ability to pull supporters from either extreme. Any prospects for devolution of power for the benefit of minorities that may be seen as a sine-qua-non for promoting multiculturalism, democratic participation and ensuring peace and stability in the country, have been largely undermined by the increased mobilisation of Sinhala-nationalist forces within and outside the state. Even though the school curriculum at the secondary school level has been designed as a multicultural one, the medium and religion wise segregated school system itself provides limited opportunities for children from different cultural groups to interact with each other in ways that promote their mutual understanding (Jayasena n.d.). With the introduction of mother tongue as the medium of instruction in the universities in the 1960s

Multiculturalism and Nationalism in a Globalising World 13
ethno-linguistic segregation has become a dominant feature of the higher education institutions as well. As a result, most of the members of the country's elites have also become monolingual and incapable of transcending the linguistic boundaries.
The above developments have shaped the outlook of the state bureaucracy, political parties, media institutions and even law enforcement agencies. They also naturally affect the lived experience of ordinary people and formation of attitudes and perceptions. It is significant that the lack of opportunities for children and youth to move out of ethnic enclaves decisively affects the identity formation (Hettige, 2009). Educational segregation mentioned above is a major factor contributing to this process.
In the religious sphere the post-independence evolution of Buddhism as the state religion has been detrimental to Buddhism particularly in influencing the moral values of the Buddhist masses as well as to the other religious groups in the country (Tambiah, 1992; DeVotta, 2007). While the state sponsorship of Buddhism since the 1950s must be understood against the background of the nationalist reaction against the privileges enjoyed by Christianity in the colonial period, it has made it difficult to evolve a cultural policy accommodating diverse religious traditions in Sri Lanka. In more recent times separate government departments have been created for the promotion of Buddhism, Hinduism and Islamism but this has not facilitated the development of mutual respect or recognition of core religious values among the various religious groups.
All ethno-nationalist movements in Sri Lanka have incorporated some anti-globalisation propaganda in matters such as opposition to NGOs, opposition to foreign interventions and campaigns against conversion by new Christian movements. On the other hand, these movements themselves are influenced by Certain globalisation processes such as formation of a Tamil diaspora supporting the LTTE campaign,

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funding from the Gulf region for some Islamic activities particularly in Eastern Sri Lanka as well as overseas funding for Sinhalese nationalist organisations like Hela Urumaya and JVP.
Multiculturalism versus Ethno-Nationalisms in Sri Lanka
The analysis presented in the preceding sections indicate that the prospects for multiculturalism have progressively eroded in Sri Lanka in the light of rise in ethno-nationalisms, that may be understood as a reaction against globalisation processes and, at the same time, an outcome of certain globalisation trends. In spite of the head start Sri Lanka had in terms of a strong multicultural heritage from the preColonial era, political and social developments in the country particularly in the post-independence era have served to promote intolerance and mutual suspicion across the ethnic divide and alienate ethnic and cultural minorities. The Sri Lankan experience clearly illustrates the dialectic interaction between globalisation and ethnonationalisms in the third world and the manner in which the advance of multiculturalism is adversely affected by the rise of ethno-nationalist forces. It will not be an easy task to set in motion a more comprehensive multicultural agenda in contemporary Sri Lanka in view of the current social realities and political atmosphere. While a strong multicultural policy genuinely supported by the state and civil society is certainly a prerequisite for peace and stability in post-conflict Sri Lanka, it requires a powerful advocacy effort to inject a stronger dose of multiculturalism in state policies and programmes relating to mass media, education, official languages, cultural affairs and registration of persons. On the other hand, a global consumer culture must not be upheld and aggressively promoted in the name of globalisation and multiculturalism as pointed out by Commentators such as Stuart Hall (1991) and Banerjee and Linstead (2001) and here a nationalist critique of globalisation and multiculturalism can perhaps play a corrective and constructive role in social development. At the same time multiculturalism must be revisited and refined as an

Multiculturalism and Nationalism in a Globalising World 15
overarching social policy that can effectively address the challenges posed by aggressive and conflict-inducing ethno-nationalisms. Multiculturalism provides an effective counterpoint to the parochial nationalist search for pure ethnic identities and exclusive ethnic homelands where there is either no space at all or only marginal space for 'ethnic others'.
References
Banerjee, S. B. and S. Linstead (2001) "Globalisation, Multiculturalism and Other Fictions: Colonialism for a New Millennium” in Organisation 8 (4), pp. 683-722. Commaraswamy, R. (1991) "Towards a Multi-cultural Society” in Sri Lankan Culture: A Symposium, Colombo, Department of Hindu Religious & Cultural Affairs, pp. 7-13. DeVotta, Neil (2007) Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka, Hawaii, East West Centre. Dijkstra S., K. Geuijen and A. D. Ruijter (2001) "Multiculturalism and Social Integration in Europe” in International Political Science Review 22 (1), pp. 55-83. Gollnick, D. M. and P.C. Chinn (1986) Multicultural Education in a
Pluralistic Society, Colombus, Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company. Gombrich, R. and G. Obeyesekere (1988) Buddhism Transformed Religious
Change in Sri Lanka, Princeton, NJ, University of Princeton Press. Goodenough, W. (1976) "Multiculturalism as the Normal Human Experience” in Anthropology and Education Quarterly 7, pp. 4-7. Gunawardana, A.J. (1991) "Some Questions about Multiculturalism” in Sri Lankan Culture: A Symposium, Colombo, Department of Hindu Religious & Cultural Affairs, pp. 1-6. Hall, S. (1991) "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity” in
A. D. King (ed.), Culture, Globalization and the World-system, London, Macmillan. Hettige, S.T. "Education, Identity Formation and Citizenship” in A. Little and S.T. Hettige (eds.), Youth and the Open Economy in Sri Lanka: Opportunities and Divisions in a Globalizing World. (Forthcoming). Jayasena, A. (n.d.) School texts, their preparation and use in keeping with the
needs of a multicultural society, Maharagama, NIE.

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Kandiah, Tiru (1978) “Disinherited Englishes: The Case of Lankan English”. A paper read at the Conference on English in Non-Native Contexts, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, June. Kearney, R. N. (1967) Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon,
Durham, Duke University Press. Liyanagamage, A. (1978) "A Forgotten Aspect of the Relations between the
Sinhalese and Tamils" in Ceylon Historical Journal 25, pp. 95-142. McLuhan, M. (1964) Understanding Media, New York, McGraw-Hill. Sen, Amartya (2002) "Globalization, Inequality and Global Protest” in
Development 45 (2), pp. 11-16. Silva, K.T. (1991) "Ayurveda, Malaria and the Indigenous Herbal Tradition
in Sri Lanka” in Social Science and Medicine 33 (2), pp. 153-60. ----- (1995) "Ethnicity, Multiculturalism and Violence among the Urban Poor in Sri Lanka” in Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences 17 (1&2), pp. 79-94. ----- and K. Athukorala (1991) The Watta-Duvellers: A Sociological Study of
Selected Urban Low-Income Communities in Sri Lanka, Lanham, University Press of America. Silva, N. (ed.) (2002) Hybrid Island. Cultural Crossings and the Invention of
Identity in Sri Lanka, Colombo, Social Scientists Association. Siriwardana, R. (1991) "Towards Multiculturalism in Sri Lanka" in Sri Lankan Culture: A Symposium. Colombo, Department of Hindu Religious and Cultural Affairs, pp. 14-19. Tambiah, S.J. (1992) Buddhism Betrayed? Buddhism, Politics and Violence in
Sri Lanka, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. -

CHAPTER 2
Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka
Michael Schulz & Pradeep Peiris
This chapter explores the possible traits that can give the explanations to the failed Sri Lanka peace process, and that now has ended with the government's military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels. The peace process between 2002 and 2008 was seen as part of a broader reconstruction process in which the ceasefire agreement was one of several steps to be taken in an overall conflict transformation process. The main arguments/hypothesis lie in the challenge to relate the conflict transformation to all levels, the elite level, middle range level, and the grassroots level, simultaneous and building viable relations within and between each level. Further, the way key players in the negotiations shifted agendas and strategies
during the process, only spurred mistrust in an already fragile peace process. The focus on crisis management issues overshadowed the few long-term peace building initiatives. The neglect of long-term initiatives thereby prevented the opportunities to comprehensively and all embracing draw each level into the conflict transformation process. These much needed relationship and trust building efforts could in turn have tackled the key issues of the conflict, as well as been used to explore the vision of peace that they jointly seek to achieve. Neither did a critical mass of a mobilising force from civil society and the grassroots levels ensure to pressure extensively for building peace from below. Hence, this study intends to pose questions about the link between reconstruction and improvement of life at a local level, and the top-level peace process.

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The start of the Sri Lankan peace process in February 2002 gave hopes that the internal war that erupted between the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the rebellious Tamil LTTE in 1983 would finally come to an end. In the spring of 2006 both parties still claim the existence of this ceasefire agreement despite many violent incidents in which the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) or the LTTE, and mostly civilians lost their lives. In fact, the number of battle related deaths during 2006 exceeded more than 3,500 casualties, which is far more than 1,000 deaths that is used as the most common threshold definition of fullscale war. With the formal breakdown of the ceasefire in the beginning of 2008 we saw the outbreak of a large-scale war. Even before this outbreak in the conflict there had already been close to 2,000 battle related deaths in 2007 (Uppsala Conflict Database website).
Both signatories of the ceasefire agreement understood that the ceasefire agreement at best served only as the first step towards a final political solution of the conflict. The question that follows is why then this peace process initiated bilaterally came into a stalemate and fell back on full-scale war? Further, what challenges the GOSL is facing after the military victory over the LTTE? In other words, the chapter deals with identifying the needs that exist at the various societal levels and what visions of peace we can find. Partly this is linked to what is labelled as root causes. However, one also must remember that it is problematic to adopt the conventional belief that problems with any type of conflict resolution intervention is "...that the cause of failure, or less than adequate outcomes, is the failure to address the root causes of the conflict” (Woodward, 2007: 145-46).
Woodward claims that there are three basic explanations for why
international interventions have failed.
1) The divergence between the complexity of a conflict and actual invested resources and the willingness to solve it (Woodward, 2007, Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, Stedman et al 2002);

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 19
The problems linked to coordination of the donors involvements as well as local agencies (Woodward, 2007);
The problems of investing enough as well as balancing resources to relief and state building (Woodward, 2007; Milliken, 2003).
In this chapter a critical analysis of the peace process and beyond will follow both in terms of negotiations, implementation of the ceasefire agreement, as well as the impact of the aftermath of the military defeat of the LTTE at other levels of Sri Lanka society will follow. The ceasefire agreement was neither a full-fledged political settlement of the core issues nor a road map for how the political discussion should have proceeded. Also, in the case of Sri Lanka, it will be shown, in line with previous studies, that the post-agreement phase, in which implementation of a signed agreement follows (Stedman et.al., 2002), is the more difficult phase of a conflict transformation process. A sustainable peace-building process also requires establishment of further mechanisms that also approach the structural underlying current causes of a conflict. This is often a neglected aspect in negotiations, or put aside in advantage for shortterm considerations, i.e. security related issues. Hence, it is important that one also analyses the way in which the parties have approached these issues in the post-agreement phase. In addition, instead of concentrating the analysis to the root causes of the conflict situation, we also must seek the answer to find the kind of peace we are searching for? Ritchmond claims that
Rarely is there a explicit connection between action and the end goal of a specific type of peace... the whole apparatus of peace is sometimes colonial and racist in that it implies the transference of enlightened knowledge to those who lack the capacity or morality to attain such knowledge themselves. Yet, the alternative is far less palatable. This is the most difficult dilemma inherent in the research of conflict and peace: we put ourselves in this same position (Ritchmond, 2007:268).

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Finally, the war that now has ended leaves the GOSL with new challenges, as well as expectations, to handle the political issues that caused the grievances in the first place.
Previous Studies
What can we learn from previous studies in order to understand what is taking place in contemporary Sri Lanka? Bapat (2005) claims that when a civil war lasts more than four years it becomes more difficult to go to the negotiation table. Particularly, if the government's repression against an insurgent groups fails and the insurgents continue to fight, the chances for negotiations decrease. However, if the costs of war become high, particularly when no side can achieve to an all-out military victory, parties show increased willingness to try the option of negotiation. This does not necessarily imply that they go to the negotiation table because they believe that talks will give them what they want, rather it can be a way to test whether the other side has become less dogmatic in their position, or merely to give the combatants some time to rest and win time to re-group (Svensson,
2006; Walters, 2002).
It seems in the Sri Lankan case that the GOSL re-armed and prepared for a military campaign when the new government was installed in 2004, and the current President Rajapaksa came to power in November 2005. According to Uyangoda's (2007) analysis neither the LTTE nor the GOSL was really prepared to compromise on the crucial issues linked to models of power-sharing and federalism.
Civil wars since the end of the Second World War have lasted longer if they include peripheral insurgencies and issues about land or natural resources. If the rebels also have access to finance from contraband goods like opium or cocaine' or 'when the rebel force can extract more from a region during the course of a war, say by "taxation' or 'drug trafficking (Fearon, 2004: 297f). The underlying argument is that it is

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 21
easier to finance rebel forces and thereby increase the military capacity of the combatants.
Collier and his research colleagues (2005) have shown that countries where the population is equally poor and where a dominant ethnic group (constituting 45-90 percent of the population) exists, as well as in cases where rebel groups access important natural resources, there is a high risk that those countries end up in civil war situations. If the people, particularly men, are poor but have had access to some education the risk is even higher. Both greed and grievances factors matter, at different phases of Conflicts, in explaining the cause to civil war. Particularly countries such as Angola, Congo and Somalia in Africa are examples where parts of the above factors are valid. According to Collier, Sri Lanka also fits partly with this model.
Nevertheless, this may partly explain why a civil war erupts, it continues, or re-erupts, but it does not explain why some civil wars end successfully and some do not. From other studies we learn that when parties actually are conducting talks it is striking that "contrary to common expectations, combatants do not have the greatest difficulty resolving underlying conflicts of interest and reaching bargains” (Walter, 2002: 5). Why then is it the case that around two thirds of all negotiated settlements do end in failed implementation? Walter's answer to this question is that parties face a security dilemma when implementation of an agreement shall follow. Usually, parties sense a real or perceived, risk to demobilise combatants if there is not a third party security guarantee. Most civil wars in which a signed agreement was the outcome did not have a third party security guarantee. The most important factor for the successful ending of civil wars is "the structure of the post-settlement transition period” (Walter, 2002: 91). If a third party security guarantee as well as a power-sharing arrangement can be agreed upon, the likelihood that the combatants will implement according to the agreement will be
high.

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In addition, Walter has observed, that one could divide conflicts into three major phases. These three stages could be termed the prenegotiation phase, the actual negotiation phase and finally the implementation phase. The implementation phase is in Walters meaning the carrying out and realisation of agreed points of an accord. Some call these implementation phases as peace processes (see Darby & MacGinty, 2000; Rothstein, 1999). Peace processes as well as implementation of agreed accords usually are parts of a broader reconstruction process (cf. Steadman, 2002). Research on the first two phases is numerous while few exist on the actual implementation phase. Walters claim that the lack of implementation of the agreements (military, political or territorial) explains why parties return to violence. Recent research (Jarstad & Sundberg, 2006; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2006) contradict these statements and rather indicate that the execution of the agreement does usually follow, but still parties often end up in renewed violence, despite power-sharing arrangements. Hence, we need to differentiate between the successes of implementation of agreements from peace. Of course, it is an empirical question to see whether the Sri Lankan case fits with these explanations. Further, we therefore also need to conduct qualitative indepth case studies, enabling the formulation of general explanatory theories to be also cultural sensitive (see for instance Surhke's et al., 2005, critique of Collier)
In addition, we will add two hypothetical explanations to Walter's conditions for how to successfully end the Sri Lankan civil war. One is linked to the way in which the various levels of society become involved in the implementation phases. And the second is to what extent is grassroots activities, such as people-to-people programmes, link the warring parties together? In other words, the underlying assumption is that if other levels are engaged in the transformation process, and the more relationships are built between the peoples, the more interdependence between the parties occurs (Lederach, 1997). Theoretically, to break up these linkages would then have been very

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 23
costly for the top leaders, i.e. GOSL and the LTTE, and this would avert them from going back to war. So far, despite exceptions, the GOSL and LTTE did not sense a coherent and widespread pressure from below.
Finally, a growing amount of literature comes forward with the critique of the 'liberal peace' (Ritchmond, 2005; Paris, 2004; Duffield, 2003, 2001; Pieterse, 1998). These studies are indicating that if the end-goal, liberal-peace, could be achieved then that situation could very-well be defined as a peaceful situation, however, the agencies that argue for 'liberal peace' tend to push for quick liberalisation and do not see that "the methods they used to effect this change, including their failure to anticipate and forestall the destabilizing effects of liberalization, proved to be the Achilles heel of peacebuilding” (Paris, 2004: 6). The very recipe for how to reconstruct, i.e. pushing for quick liberalisation that fosters turmoil, uncertainties and conflicts that easily can bring actors in a country back to war, needs to be challenged. Hence, it becomes immensely important to seek answers to how peace agreements actually affect, in terms of peace, at the grassroots level, where most victims of the war often can be found. The re-distributive mechanisms that should strengthen security, the socio-economic situation and build the livelihood capacities for the ordinary people must be included. In short, to what extent had the agreement in the Sri Lankan case a writ-large peace impact for people and further to what extent is the GOSL taking these aspects into consideration after the military victory?
In this new so-called post-conflict situation, we also have the peacemakers', who Darby & MacGinty (2000) has labelled the 'dealers', who are eager to use the momentum of an agreement for a quick start in a reconstruction process for peace and development. The need of speed in implementation is often done in order to gain public support and make the 'zealots, the opponents of the agreement, less willing to (re)use violence. However, the zealots, or the so-called 'spoilers'

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(Aggestam, 2006), often take to violence in order to protest the agreement, which risk bringing a halt to the premature reconstruction process. These violent outbreaks most often create severe setbacks in the peace processes and the reconstruction phases (Darby & MacGinty, 2000: 233).
Furthermore, the external factors, i.e. the international community and the donor society, are according to conventional literature, an important contributor to peace-building. Several studies on aid assistance elaborate/explain the linkage between external aid and the setbacks/successes in post-conflict societies (Junne & Verkoren, 2005; Brynen, 2000; Duffield, 2001; Forman & Patrick, 2000).
External Factors (International community, donor society, regional powerslorganisations, INGOs etc.)
Legacy of W Success? war and Reconstruction violence ~
Failure?
Internal Factors (Commitment to peace by warring parties, strength of civil society, strength of economy, degree of institutions that support peace etc.)
Figure 1.1: A model that indicates which factors that have an impact on successful/failed reconstruction.
However, it is also important to remember that in successful cases, such as El Salvador and Mozambique, it is not international aid alone that explains success. Internal factors relate to the commitment of the

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 25
parties to the process, the type of reconciliation, form of transitions etc. Hence, it clearly seems to be an empirical research issue to find out how external or internal factors relate to successful outcomes of the reconstruction efforts in a particular war ridden society (see Figure 1.1).
Reconstruction
Reconstruction is usually seen as the re-building of material infrastructure, while social reconstruction refers to the reconciliation processes of the people. In this study, reconstruction, as well as reconciliation, implies a process of change from war to peace over a certain time span towards a transformation of both above-mentioned dimensions. It is far from a deterministic process, but rather constitutes a long, rocky and complex process affecting and involving most actors, institutions and structures of society. Conflict may continue in some form, even after an agreement is signed, but gradually it would be handled in a less violent way that would end the conflict, in the best case, in an accepted and institutionalised way, with a high legitimacy and credibility for courts, mediation, arbitration and the like, to handle future conflicts peacefully (Milliken, 2003; Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2005; Covey et.al., 2005; Junne & Verkoren 2005; Crocker et al., 2001).
In a sense, reconstruction includes a dimension where society, after a violent period, enters a phase of preconstruction, in which certain temporary institutions are established in order to create the transfer from a violent situation to a less violent one. The idea is that they serve as 'starters' of the beginning of the rebuilding peace in a warridden society. In reality, these efforts have a clear crisis orientation, aiming to erode the violent situations.
Again, a long-term process most likely makes the external actors increasingly involved and become a party to the conflict/

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reconstruction processes. The transformation from an actor devoted to crisis management to one involved in peace-keeping is difficult when the process is slow and with violent backlashes (Aggestam, 2006). In particular, the risk of backlash is great if the intervener has little or no legitimacy as a third party. Also, in cases where no third party is involved in order to halt the violence, parties prepare ways to ensure ceasefire and monitoring of it. It is important to place focus on what security arrangements the parties have agreed upon and how they are implemented in the immediate post-agreement phase (Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2005).
The aspect of construction largely refers to the building up of societal, economic, and socio-economic capacities that did not function at all, or was used in a violent way. Crisis oriented missions need to be addressed and linked to the transformation of the more long term process as well as to external and internal actors. Otherwise the risk is that the crisis management efforts in themselves fostering new violent
StÍULCtU1ICS.
Also, re-construction, or rather reconciliation, in a sense includes the meaning to reintegrate parts of society that functioned benevolently before war i.e. violence broke out. Such elements are related to re-building of trust, social capital, friendship etc. In order to do so, institutions and mechanism in society have to be futureoriented and aiming to build sustainable relationships between former enemies. In order to do so, the painful past has to be addressed in such a way that it enables conflicting parties to remember it, cope with it, understand it as well as find ways to go beyond it. It is not about forgetting but finding ways to become capable of both listening, in an emphatic way, as well as telling of one's own dire experiences. Such forms of reconciliation have to let conflicting parties take part in various forms of conciliation (seminars, meetings, trauma therapy) etc. (Gloppen et.al., 2005; Biggar, 2001; Lederarch, 1997).

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 27
Forgiveness is not possible without first addressing the issue of justice. It is not possible to forgive before an acceptance and recognition that pain and injustice has been inflicted. As Rothstein claims "the victimized individual and the victimized group need to have their losses recognized by the enemy so that the grief is validated' and their self-esteem is raised” (Rothstein, 1999: 240, quotation from Kritz, 1995: xiii).
However, none of the key concepts discussed above can be approached without addressing peace in itself. Here, the basis of conflict resolution has to be approached. In order to form a long-term peace-building process the key issues of the conflict need to be addressed. Hence, conflict resolution is "a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in an (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live withand/or dissolve-their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another” (Wallensteen, 2001:53).
Parties in conflict are very often afraid that things can go wrong (again) and therefore reconstruction must also include a more longterm process of prevention (or provention, cf. Burton 1990). Conciliation has, naturally, very often a focus on the past. A lot of effort is placed on making it possible to understand why perpetrators committed crimes during the wars, and why it could happen. Conciliation should lead to a restoration of trust, or rather decrease the distrust to such an extent that it enables former warring parties to look for a common peace building process. Only when the past has been approached can the future be built. As soon as future visions increasingly materialise, and also become realised, a more sustainable reconciliation process can begin. It is crucial that society builds institutions that foster such undertakings. For instance, issues that are usually approached relate to how to rewrite history books in elementary schools or how, one should build a functional integrative (peace) economy. In general, it dwells on how projects of collaboration and integration (education, construction, housing,

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settling etc.) are made. Particular institutions that encourage such undertakings need to be established.
In summary, the process of reconstruction implies a timeframe with not only a beginning but also an end. The pre, during and postagreement discussion in relation to war and violence indicate the potential to analytically divide the process into different stages. As social scientists we could perhaps identify and define them as well as examine if research has equally focused on these phases. A methodological advantage would be to synthesise the above aspects in the model of analysis.
Background to the Conflict
The internal war that erupted in Sri Lanka in 1983 is usually described as an 'ethnic war' between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority located mainly in the North and North East of Sri Lanka. The explanations to the root causes to the conflict are found in the colonial past. The Tamil population was, mainly due to their educational skills, overrepresented within the central government administration of the British colonial rule. This created a sense of Sinhalese inferiority against the minority. Furthermore, in the colonial time, the British as they did in other colonies, emphasised ethnicity, not least in order to strengthen their colonial control. However, this fostered ethno-national sentiments among the Sinhalese majority, also increasing anti-Tamil stereotypes and attitudes. Hence, a common shared Sri Lanka nationalism was sidelined in favour of ethnic mobilisation, although initially against colonial rule. In contrast to India, no leader, such as Mahatma Gandhi, could unite the groups into one common direction against the British rule. Examples of mobilisation around ethnic identity is that Tamil People's Organisation was formed in 1920, the Sinhala National Congress was formed in 1937 and the Muslim Congress in 1944. When independence followed in 1948, the Sinhalese majority took the
 

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 29
control over the central government and in the eyes of the Tamils, a process of Tamil exclusion followed. For the Sinhalese population, it was rather seen as an expression of bringing the majority into their rightful state power positions. The 1956 reform, the Sinhala Only Act, created the first serious reaction from the minorities who increasingly felt discriminated by the Sinhalese majority (Frerks & Klem, 2004).
The 'ethnic mobilisation accelerated until the 1970s still in a nonviolent way. However, in the 1970s the LTTE started to build up its power base and did, within a decade, practically wiped out any inside' challenger to the position as the sole representative of the Tamil people (cf. Swamy, 2002). They also became the main Tamil military actor in the civil war that broke out in 1983. It is not until after the ceasefire agreement was signed in 2002 that a more serious challenge came to the fore. Not even groups that previously were supported by the GOSL, such as the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), could seriously challenge the LTTE. However, and in the eyes of the LTTE, one serious threat came forward, and was stemming from the Karuna faction that left the LTTE in 2004.
Hence, the conflict is usually described as an ethnic conflict, in which two major actors are participating, the Tamil tigers (LTTE) and GOSL. However, as is with most internal wars, the complexity is far more than solely describing the conflict as a two-actor conflict. This has become even more important to underline since the LTTE completely has disappeared as a political and military force in the country. For example, the Muslims, labelled sometimes as having a Tamil ethnicity, have increasingly formed their own identity whose political goals not at all overlap with the LTTE. Internally, the ethnic. groups are further divided on major issues related to the conflict, as well as along class, caste and geographical identifications. Hence, and in line with other internal wars, the "...conflicts can become self.
* Colonel Karuna is the nom de guerre of Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan who
left the LTTE together with combatants loyal to him.

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stimulating/self-perpetuating. If such conflict-as-process continue, they can, through positive feedback, overwhelm their original startup conditions and destroy the systems of which they are part” (Sandole 1999: 201). Sandole refers to security systems (exogenous as well as endogenous) that break down the eigendynamik' of the complex conflict cycle that continues to fuel the violence. The issue is whether the positive feedbacks actually do exist in the Sri Lanka case?
The Ceasefire Agreement and Its Implementation
In February of 2002 the GOSL and LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement. This was meant to be the beginning of a peace process leading to a political solution of the civil war that erupted in 1983. Both parties agreed that they will
...recognize the importance of bringing an end to the hostilities and improving the living conditions for all inhabitants affected by the conflict. Bringing an end to the hostilities is also seen by the Parties as a means of establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can be taken. The Parties further recognize that groups that are not directly party to the conflict are also suffering the consequences of it. This is particularly the case as regards the Muslim population. Therefore, the provisions of this Agreement regarding the security of civilians and their property apply to all inhabitants (Memorandum of Understanding, 2002: 1).
Hence, a long-term political ambition was included in the agreement, emphasising that it was not merely meant to end the fighting but that the political issues should be solved in a forthcoming negotiated settlement. However, the agreement did not outline a guideline or principle for a political settlement of the conflict. Naturally, most of the paragraphs have a clear bias towards security issues, either military or civil. However, the lack of a declaration of principles on how to go forward with the political issues that brought the parties into a violent

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 31
conflict in the first place, forces the parties to find further mechanisms that bring them into continued political talks.
As has been argued elsewhere (Lederach, 1997), the establishment of a ceasefire can only be the first step in a much deeper conflict transformation process of the conflict. At the same time, the topleaders had diverging goals with the CFA and the peace process. As Rupesinghe (2006) has underlined, the LTTE had a need to find a parity position vis-a-vis the GOSL, but also be recognised as the sole representative of the Tamil people. For Prime Minister Ranil
Wickeremsinghe's government it was important to achieve a ceasefire
agreement and work towards peace in order to secure the economic developments of the country. His platform in the elections was built upon the promise to work for peace. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe took on the negotiations and the peace process as the primary task of his mandate. Furthermore, as it has been shown elsewhere
(Weerakoon, 2006) the parties took several risks in the process of
building confidence and trust towards the LTTE. For instance, the LTTE, being exposed via a third party as Norway, as well as the staff of the Scandinavian Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), risked revealing to the GOSL the amount of LTTE forces and positions within the areas they controlled. Another example is that the GOSL choose to withdraw its security forces around Colombo in a confidence-building gesture, thereby risking that LTTE suicide bombers could attack the capital. Hence, both sides calculated that the political gains were high enough by establishing the CFA, and could therefore take security risks in order to indicate to the other side their willingness for peace.
The spoilers to the peace process, at the time of the signing of the CFA, could rather be found within each group. For instance, the Muslims felt that they did have less saying in the process and did mobilise political force to strengthen their role in the process. Also, the very existence of the Karuna faction signalled to the LTTE that it

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is not only them who represented the Tamil people's voice. For the government's strong opposition mainly came from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) (Peoples Liberation Front) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) (National Heritage Party) that is constituted of Buddhist monks. Both these parties were the strongest opponents against any political, federal solution. Also, the GOSL faced a difficult position in parliamentary due to the fact that the previous President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, belonged to the People's Alliance that lost the elections against the United National Front. The President could at any point dissolve the parliament and call for general elections, which she did in 2004, and thereafter brought her own party back to power. The new government of President Rajapaksa elected in November 2005 has to consider how to balance between finding a peace route and at the same time counter-balance the JVP and the Buddhist monks and their one-Sri Lanka position, despite the fact that they are part of the same political coalition.
Further, most decisions did take place at the high table', and not at other levels. One example of an institution that could have served as a coordinating function vis-a-vis other parts of society was the Peace Secretariat of the GOSL. The Peace Secretariat was one outcome of the GOSL that should work with implementation issues of the CFA and further political talks. However, one critique against the Peace
Secretariat was that no other tasks were taken on board, linking the secretariat too much to the top-leader's action in the Track 1
diplomacy with the LTTE. A fact-finding, monitoring or evaluating capacity was never well-developed. Particularly, compared with for instance, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, links with think-tanks and the
academia or networking within the civil society that could have provided inputs for how a federal solution could be elaborated did not materialise.
Also, the LTTE continued with its dominant position within their areas. Challenges from other groups, such as the Muslims, or later the

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 33
splinter group led by Karuna in 2004, were seen by the LTTE as a direct threat to their self-declared position as the sole representative of the Tamil people. Hence, a plural and vivid debate at the elite level could never develop; neither did the grassroots and civil society become involved in the process (Orjuela, 2004; Orjuela, 2003; Rupesinghe, 2006). In fact, as Liyanage (2006) underlines, the dominant conflict resolution discourse prevalent in civil society prevented them from outlining an action-oriented social movement frame where the GOSL and the LTTE were seen less as partners in peace, but actors that should be opposed and criticised for their failures of peace and violations of the populations' rights. Hence, they also became donor-oriented and dependent, seen as partners at other societal levels in the peace process together with the GOSL and LTTE. Hence, the task to empower the people was neglected.
The Structural Issues
The larger issues of the conflict, are usually described as being the final form of the political solution (some form of power-sharing to federalism since statehood for the Tamils are out of question following the LTTE defeat), the internally displaced people that amount to approximately 320,000 in July 2010 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website), the so-called High Security Zones and land issues, and the reconstruction needs, have not been addressed in a creative way during the 2002-08 CFA period.
Federalism as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism
The overall basis and formula from which seemingly the GOSL, with Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, as well as the LTTE, had declared its willingness to go for a final peace deal was the federal one. The initial optimistic view that both parties had shown a substantial compromise on one of the key issues soon faded away when a different interpretation of the meaning of a federal solution came forward. The

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GOSL searched for a minimalist solution, i.e. as little autonomy as possible. Even among Wickremesinge's own camp, within his United National Party (UNP), some searched for a minimalist position. They also had to balance against the political pressure from the JVP and other Sinhala nationalists ensuring that Sri Lanka was not being sold out. The LTTE, in contrast, rather was pushing for a break-up of Sri Lanka towards a solution as close as possible to statehood (Uyangoda, 2006).
Hence, no real exchange of ideas in a problem-solving spirit occurred. This could, perhaps, not be expected from top-leaders. However, despite the initial willingness to study and take into account different forms of federalism from abroad, no real forum developed for finding a common ground on federalism. Also, despite important exceptions, no real large-scale close linkage between think-tanks (across Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese representatives) on the middle range level gave these essential inputs to the political elite. One could expect that think-tanks, less in focus of the media, could explore and test different ideas that later could provide as inputs for the elite to bring with them to the negotiations for a federal solution that all sides could live with. Hence, investments in building such platforms are important for building the basis of a future peace and reconciliation process.
The Internally Displaced Persons and Land Issues
The figures, starting from the summer of 2006, and following the escalation of the conflict, more than 200,000 Sri Lankans have been forced to leave their homes and became internally displaced. Thereby, Sri Lanka has currently 500,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (www.internal-displacement.org). In a total, and before the escalation of violence in the spring-summer of 2006, more then 70,000 people have been killed, around 800,000 Sri Lankan have been displaced and one million left the country since the outbreak of violence in 1983 (Radwan, 2004). The suffering and difficult livelihood situation of

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 35
these IDPs have to be considered in any political settlement. The
government has set up plans for North/East relief and has developed a joint platform with NGOs but not in the LTTE-controlled areas. The LTTE did not build a parallel structure. A Joint Task Force between government and LTTE was first established but was replaced by subcommittees (relief, military an political issues) in order to take care of
the IDPs needs which both parties had a Concern for (Kelegama, 2006).
Despite the fact that around half of the IDPs did return to their original places, it still did not create the livelihood capacities that were needed. Furthermore, due to the existing High Security Zones and other military areas, freedom of movement was delimited. Also, landmines, damage to property, occupation of IDP's former land by other IDPs, created further difficulties. In addition, documents of ownership which often they lost in the war do not exist, thereby also creating a legal dilemma in the land disputes. In summary, despite intension and a quick response by the parties to provide urgent help to IDPs it soon eroded and after 2003 the pace of relief was dramatically slowed down, thereby negatively effecting IDPs situation. Also, both the IDPs and others in the North/East increasingly feared that their children would be recruited as child soldiers by the LTTE.
Since the end of war in May 2009 we find 250,000 (BBC News website) displaced people in the previous war zones in the North of Sri Lanka. This leaves the GOSL with a huge task to quickly find ways to
handle these issues.
The Grassroots Voice
Let us take a look at where the grassroots or masses stood in the whole peace negotiation process. We might not have access to a comprehensive account on the grassroots position on the whole gamut of issues surrounded the peace process. Nevertheless, available survey

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findings, numerous qualitative studies conducted during this period of 2001 to 2008, and, of course, election results of 2004 and 2005 elections and election polls give us valuable insight into the public opinion on certain vital issues related to Sri Lanka's peace process.
If one observes the trajectory of the public opinion on Sri Lanka's peace process through all the above modes, it is clear that the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE began to contemplate a negotiated settlement in 2000 in a climate where people either wanted it or at least accepted it as a solution to the protracted ethnic conflict. Soon after the main protagonists started their negotiations, people not only appreciated it but began to support the process. Minority communities such as Tamil, Muslim and Upcountry Tamil who always supported a negotiated settlement, continued to support that position. The Sinhalese community who would have had to compromise some of the privileges that they enjoyed since independence as the majority community, also began to support the negotiated settlement at the beginning of the peace process. However, within a span of one year, public opinion polls began to reveal that people were losing their faith in the negotiation process and were becoming intolerant not only towards the process but also towards its main stakeholders, especially the Norwegian mediators, peace monitors and the international community in general. Since the 2004 general election and 2005 presidential election the position of the majority Sinhalese community was very clearly in support of a military solution while the minority communities silently stood by their favourite peace solution.
Talk for Peace
Sometimes it is true that the elite make decisions and the masses follow. However, Sri Lanka's failed peace process sets an excellent example of the risk of not keeping the masses engaged in the process. According to the Peace Confidence Index (PCI) conducted by Social

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 37
Indicator, the survey unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives, the CFA was signed when there was considerable public support for a negotiated settlement. The signing of the CFA further boosted the public support for the negotiated settlement. For example, in June 2001, 60 percent of the Sri Lankans supported a negotiated settlement while 7 percent supported a military solution. By September 2002, the support for a negotiated settlement increased by 12 percentage points and even amongst the Sinhalese community about 68 percent supported it. The minority communities, unsurprisingly, overwhelmingly supported a negotiated settlement even before the CFA was signed. However, the government and the LTTE did not make any meaningful effort to capitalise on the growing public support and rope the masses into the peace process. Even amongst his party-United National Party-only few confidantes of the prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe were kept informed of the negotiations leaving majority of the party seniors uninformed. The Ranil Wickremesinghe government did not attempt to initiate mass mobilisation programmes unlike the previous regime that initiated programmes like “Sudu Nelum” (White Lotus) or “Sama Thavalama’ (Peace Caravan). Therefore, the masses were limited to just being a group of silent observers instead of stakeholders.
The Peace Confidence Index (PCI) shows the public assessment of the two parties in the conflict in terms of how sincere they are to the peace process. Obviously, a majority trusted the government rather than the LTTE, but what is more important is that the level of trust in both parties increased with the beginning of signing of the CFA. As it is shown in Table 1.2, in May 2001, 50 percent agreed that the government is committed to finding peace through talks while 16 percent believed the LTTE too was committed to find peace through talks. One in every four persons supported maximum participation in the peace talks-the government, the opposition, Tamil and Muslim parties and a third party (Social Indicator, May 2002: 16). In May 2002, about two thirds of the Sri Lankans believed the third

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party's involvement was either essential or would make a positive impact (Social Indicator, September 2002: 17). Over 40 percent of the Sri Lankans approved the Norwegian assistance in the peace process (Social Indicator, September 2002: 17). More than two thirds believed that the SLMM that was setup to monitor CFA violations was essential or at least had a positive impact. Not only that, a majority believed that the SLMM was impartial and effective at the early stages of the CFA (Social Indicator, September 2002: 22).
The first round of peace talks held in Sathahip, Thailand not only attracted the attention of the international peace workers but also of the local communities. Four out of every five Sri Lankans were aware that peace talks took place between the government and the LTTE. However, amongst those who were aware of the talks only a few knew about the decisions taken at the talks (Social Indicator, September 2002: 26). This indicates the fact that peace talks under the Ranil Wickremesinghe government lacked methods in keeping the masses informed.
No-War, No-Peace
As many analysts pointed out, CFA only ceased the violence and direct confrontation between the government and the LTTE, but it did not stop the violence and human rights abuses within the Tamil society. By the time the international community attempted to address the human rights violations, in March 2003, the direct talks between the government and the LTTE came to halt. However, though the LTTE pulled out from direct talks, neither the LTTE nor the government attempted to pull out from the CFA. Hence began the negative developments of the peace process where the protagonists neither attempted to progress the peace talks nor returned to armed conflict.

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The Peace Confidence Index (PCI) surveys showed that the masses still preferred the peace talks' as the best way of achieving peace in the country (Social Indicator, July 2003: 14). Only 13 percent of the Sinhalese community felt that the government defeating the LTTE was the best solution. By mid-2003, the media had given wider coverage to the sinking of LTTE's ship carrying arms by the Sri Lankan Navy and the escalating CFA violations by the LTTE. The government as well as the LTTE lost the public trust that they are committed to find peace through negotiation. By July 2003, the agreement that the government is committed to a peaceful solution dropped by 15 percentage point compared to year ago (Social Indicator, July 2003: 16). Any way the majority did not trust that the LTTE was committed to a peace negotiation. Nevertheless, 28 percent trust that people had in September 2002 declined to 20 percent by July 2003. But a majority of the public expected wider participation in the peace process (Social Indicator, July 2003: 20). Even though the opinion on the international involvement did not change, the perception about Norway and the SLMM began to turn sour by July 2003.
In the meantime, surveys reported on the public attitude towards issues like federalism that came to the discussion table after the Oslo communiqué where the government and the LTTE agreed to find a solution within a federal framework-however, it should be noted that the LTTE and the government later denied it. According to the Knowledge Attitude and Practices survey that Social Indicator conducted in 2003, 39 percent of the Sri Lankans were for a federal type system where the power of the centre would be reduced and the power of the regions increased. However, the frequent debate on the issue of federalism boosted the trust amongst communities and by 2004, according to the same survey conducted in 2004, the support for the federal model increased up to 49 percent. However, since then, the support for the federal solution has never been that popular amongst the Sri Lankans.

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 41
By September 2005, people wanted the government and the LTTE to come out of the stalemate situation and progress for a permanent solution. Eighty seven percent of the Sri Lankans felt the continuation of a no-war, no-peace condition was bad and wanted parties to find a permanent solution (Social Indicator, September 2005: 12), and this was felt across all ethnic divisions. The government and the LTTE lost the public trust on their commitment to peaceful resolution. In September, only 12 percent of the Sri Lankans believed that the LTTE was committed to finding peace through negotiations (Social Indicator, September 2005: 18). While admitting that the CFA brought benefits to them, four out of every five persons wanted the government to hold talks with the LTTE to review the CFA. In the background of escalating CFA violations, people expressed the importance of SLMM for the success of CFA, nevertheless more than half of the Sri Lankans believed SLMM was not impartial (Social Indicator, September 2005:30). According to the survey findings, the stagnation and negative turn of the peace process particularly after the assassination minister Kadirgamar attracted public frustration, not only towards the government and the LTTE but also towards the other stakeholders of the process. According to the Peace Confidence Index conducted in September 2005, majority of the Sri Lankans wanted to discontinue the Norwegian facilitation in the Sri Lankan peace process.
War for Peace
The year 2006, surely marks the beginning of the last wave of confrontation between the government and the LTTE. The battle erupted on the Mavil Aru anicut continued for almost three years and was concluded by eliminating the LTTE's military capacity. One fourth of the Sinhalese community began to support the military solution while 60 percent still held onto the belief in peace talks (Social Indicator, November 2006: 17). While over 75 percent of the Sinhalese trusted that the government was committed to a peaceful

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resolution, only 2 percent of them believed the sincerity of the LTTE. By November 2006, less people began accepting that the CFA brought benefits and half of the Sinhalese community believed that the CFA was no more valid. Two thirds of the Sinhalese claimed that they did not believe the CFA was impartial and the same percentage wanted Norwegian facilitation to be ended. The survey findings suggested that the Sinhalese were either ignorant of or did not believe the internationally widespread accusations of human rights abuses. For example, majority of the Sinhalese community believed that killing of 17 aid works in Muttur was done by the LTTE.
By August 2008, more than half of the Sinhalese community clearly supported the military solution by defeating the LTTE (Social Indicator, August 2008). However, majority of all communities believed that a political settlement was either essential or at least useful. About 70 percent of the Sinhalese community felt that country was close to achieving a permanent settlement to the ethnic conflict while majority of the minority communities felt that country was not at all close to a permanent settlement. This highlights the qualitative difference of the meaning of a permanent settlement to the minority and the majority Community. It suggests that to the majority Community the end of war by any means was a permanent settlement while the minority communities did not believe that the end of the war would bring a permanent solution.
This analysis of public opinion suggests that public opinion has gone on one circular path since 2001 and have reached almost the same position after seven years. Since the role of the people was reduced to just spectators instead of stakeholders, years of peace process has not changed the attitudes and perception of the masses on the key issues pertinent to the peace building of Sri Lanka. Hence, the years of peace process has not only failed striking a win-win solution but also failed to achieve the desired societal change. Therefore, even after the military victory, pursuing for reconciliation and establishing pluralistic

Reconstruction Challenges in Sri Lanka 43
society in Sri Lanka will be a daunting task. Particularly in the absence of LTTE, political leaders would not find electoral incentives to push for such social transformation.
Conclusion
At each level, several problems developed that eventually brought the Sri Lanka peace process to a stalemate, followed by escalation of violence. These factors could be summarised as follows:
Top leader level: The findings of the study indicate 1) lack of controlling security institutions, i.e. lack of third party security guarantee, 2) lack of support of the political elite for political compromises.
Middle range level: The findings show that the actors in the civil society actually worked on identifying the grassroots needs and visions of peace but could not influence/prevent the top-leaders from returning to violent means. Further, among the few civil society organisations, too many are donor-oriented and saw themselves as assisting partners to the GOSL and LTTE in the peace process, thereby neglecting the voices of the grassroots. Further, they lacked capacity and resources to implement alternative political solutions to the key issues, and did not extensively work to 'test ideas in the
public.
Grassroots level: The ordinary people, their needs, and their difficult livelihood situation was not followed up, nor mobilised. No greater mobilising forces, from below and across the ethnic lines, in the forms of social movement, peace movements, or alike, could thereby pressure the parties forward in the peace process.
In this chapter we tend to focus excessively on potential explanations why the peace process faded away. Also, show that despite the military

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defeat of the LTTE the GOSL has to consider above aspects if it wants to build a peace that holds. In a second phase, we also need to include the future expectations on what kind of peace people desire. In general, we need to inquire further what visions of peace that exist at various levels, in particular at the grassroots level. Also, the existing grievances in the eyes of the people, seemingly underlying the conflict, need to be related to peoples' perception in the solutions. The hypothetical assumption derived from this study is that there is an existing gap between the wanted solutions at the top-level, and the grievance felt at the grassroots level (with or without the LTTE) that needs to be considered in a reconstruction and peace-building process
in Sri Lanka.
References
Aggestam, Karin (ed.) (2006) (O) rättfärdiga krig, Lund, Studentlitteratur. Bapat, Navin A. (2005) "Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes” in
Journal of Peace Research, 42 (6), 2005, pp. 699-717. BBC News (2009 May 21) "Poll Pledge for Sri Lanka Tamils", available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8060718.stm accessed on 23 September 2010. Biggar, Nigel (ed.) (2001) Burying the Past. Making Peace and Doing Justice
after Civil Conflict, Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press. Brynen, Rex, (2000) A Very Political Economy. Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza, Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press. Burton, John, (1990) Conflict Resolution and Provention, London, MacMillan
Press Ltd. Bush, Kenneth D. (2005) The Intra-group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka, Learning to Read between the Lines, New York, Palgrave /MacMillan. Collier, Paul, V. L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap, Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank Report, Oxford University Press. ------ and Nicholas Sambanis (2005) Understanding Civil War. Evidence and Analysis, Volume 1 Africa & Volume 2 Europe, Central Asia and Other Regions, The World Bank.

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Covey, Jock, Michael J. Dziedzic and Leonard R. Hawley (eds.) (2005) The Guest for Viable Peace. International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.) (2001) Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2006) Making War and Building Peace. United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Duffield, Mark (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merger of
Development and Security, London, Zed Books. 2003( ہے۔ س سے سے سلس) "Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relation of Global Liberal Governance" in Jennifer Milliken (ed.), State Failure, Collapse, e Reconstruction, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., pp. 291-312 | Fearon, James D. (2004) "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so much Longer than Others?” in Journal of Peace Research, 41 (3), pp. 275-301 Forman, Shepard and Stewart Patrick (eds.) (2000) Good Intentions. Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery, Boulder/London, Lynne Rienner Publishers. Frerks, Georg and Bart Klem (eds.) (2004) Dealing with Diversity. Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Gloppen, Siri, Elin Skaar and Astri Suhrke (eds.) (2005) Roads to Reconciliation: A Conceptual Framework, Lanham, Maryland, Lexington Books. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website available at http://www.
internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes) 17E8CFF727BBFB54DC12576B3002DEBD9?OpenDocument#44.2 .1 accessed on 29 September 2010. Jarstad, Anna and Desiré Nilsson (2006) Political Pact.-No Promise of Peace? Conference paper presented at the Swedish Network of Peace and Conflicts and Developments Research's annual conference on "Globalization and Peacebuilding", 6-8 November 2006, Uppsala, Sweden. Jarstad, Anna and Ralph Sundberg (2006) Peace by Pact. Theory and the Data of Peace Agreement Implementation, Conference paper presented at the Swedish Network of Peace and Conflicts and Developments

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Research's annual conference on "Globalization and Peacebuilding", 6-8 November 2006, Uppsala, Sweden. Junne, Gerd and Willemijn Verkoren (eds.) (2005) Post-Conflict Development. Meeting new Challenges, Boulder/London, Lynne Rienner Publishers. Kelegama, Saman (2006) “Transforming Conflict with an Economic Dividend: The Sri Lankan Experience" in K. Rupesingehe, Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka. Efforts, Failures and Lessons, 2 Vols, Colombo, Foundation for Co-Existence, pp. 205-43. Lederach, John Paul (1997) Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press. Liyanage, Sumanasiri (2006) "Civil Society and the Peace Process” in
Rupesinghe 2006, pp. 279-302. South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), "Memorandum of Understanding" signed on 24 February 2002 available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/shrilanka/document/papers/memorandum2002.htm accessed on 22 September 2010. Milliken, Jennifer (ed.) (2003) State Failure, Collapse, e Reconstruction,
Oxford, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Orjuela, Camilla (2003) "Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society?” in Journal of Peace Research, 40 (2), 2003, pp. 195-212. ------ (2004) Civil Society in Civil War. Peace Work and identity Politics in Sri Lanka, dissertation thesis, Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University. Paris, Roland (2004) At War's End. Building Peace. After Civil Conflict,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Pieterse, Jan Nederveen (ed.) (1998) World Orders in the Making. Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond, London/New York, Macmillan Press/St. Martin Press. Radwan, Ismail, (2004) Sri Lanka: Development in a Conflict Affected Environment, Finance and Private Sector Development, The World Bank, South Asia Region. Ritchmond, Oliver P. (2005) The Transformation of Peace, New York,
Palgrave/Macmillan. ------ (2007) "Critical Research Agendas for Peace: the Missing Link in the
Study of International Relations' in Alternatives, 32 (2), pp. 247-74. Rothstein, Robert L. (eds.) (1999) After the Peace. Resistance and
Reconciliation, Boulder/London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

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Rupesinghe, Kumar (ed.) (2006) Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka. Efforts,
Failures and Lessons, Vol. 2, Colombo, Foundation for Co-Existence. Sandole, Dennis J. D. (1999) Capturing the Complexity of Conflict. Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era, London & New York, Pinter. Schnabel, Albrecht and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (eds.) (2005) Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Tokyo/New York/Paris, United Nations University Press.
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Index, 2001-2004", Centre for Policy Alternatives.
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Stedman, Stephen John, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.) (2002) Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder/London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
IN Suhrke, Astri, Espen Villanger and Susan L. Woodward (2005) “Economic Aid to Post-Conflict Countries: A Methodological Critique of Collier and Hoeffler" in Conflict, Security and Development, 5 (3), December 2005, pp. 329-61. | Svensson, Isak (2006) Elusive Peacemakers: A Bargaining Perspective on Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts, Dissertation Thesis, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Swamy, M. R. Narayan (2002) Tigers of Lanka. From Boys to Guerrillas,
Colombo, Vijtha Yapa Publications.
Uppsala Conflict Database website available at www.pcr.uu.se/research/
ucdp/databases accessed on 30 September 2010. Uyangoda, Jayadeva (2006) What Kind of Peace is Possible-Sri Lanka Case Study. Transition from Civil War to Peace. Challenges of Peace-building in Sri Lanka, Colombo, Social Scientist's Association (working paper). ------ (2007) "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing Dynamics” in Policy
Studies 32, East-West Center, Washington D.C., pp. 1-75. Wallensteen, Peter (2002) Understanding Conflict Resolution, War, Peace and
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Woodward, Susan (2007) "Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve Peace-building Interventions” in Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1 (2), June, pp. 143-70.

CHAPTER 3
Social Reconciliation amidst Material
Reconstruction
Dhammika Herath
his chapter presents the findings of the first phase of a study which
investigates the community sensitivity of the actual material
reconstruction process that is taking place in the north and east of Sri Lanka and to examine whether the reconstruction process leads to social
reconciliation in the minds of the war-affected people. The GOSL has
initiated a large-scale material reconstruction project, which aims to rebuild the infrastructure and other physical assets destroyed by war.
e chapter agues that while material reconstruction is indeed necessary and contributes to improving social relations between people of different ethnicity, the undue focus on physical rebuilding and insufficient attention on social reconstruction hampers prospects for
social reconciliation among the divided ethnic masses. The chapter finds
that there is some level of resistance to the material reconstruction mong the people in the northeast as the project of reconstruction does
not have active and effective involvement of all stakeholders at all stages.
The chapter shows that effective social reconciliation requires concerted and conscious attempts by the government, CSOs and donors. Further, it argues that while well-designed specific activities can support reconciliation, a favourable socio-political (macro) environment is essential to guarantee long-term social reconciliation.
he Northeast of Sri Lanka after the War

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after recapturing these areas from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a rebel group that was fighting and controlling more than half of the landmass in the northeast for about 20 years in various periods of time. By early 2007, the government was able to wrest control of the east from the LTTE and by May 2009, the government security forces had eliminated the leadership of the LTTE in its entirety. Majority of the rank and file of the LTTE was also killed in the battle and more than 10,000 cadres are being rehabilitated in government detention centres. For all intent and purposes, Sri Lanka is a case of military victory of one side over another, although there have been four previous peace processes, which unsuccessfully attempted to solve the conflict through negotiation.
After regaining control of the northeast from the LTTE, the government is implementing a grandiose material post-war reconstruction project to rebuild the war-torn areas and foster development. The government sponsors large-scale development projects such as highways, railways, bridges, power plants, and industrial development in the northeast. Thus, the government appears to have demonstrated genuine interest in developing the war-affected regions of the country, not only due to the potential contribution it can make to Sri Lanka's gross domestic product (GDP) but also for the purpose of winning the hearts and minds of the Tamil community, which had been backing a rebel organisation for nearly three decades to win them a separate homeland. Hence, it is highly significant to examine the extent to which the government is actually winning the hearts and minds of this minority people, major section of which distrusted the government for many years. The author of this study finds that the community leaders, civil servants, local Tamil and Muslim politicians, and civil society representatives in the northeast are of the view that the government has not fully been successful in talking to the emotions of the people in the war-affected regions. Many people feel that plans for reconstruction have been made by the central government without proper consultation of the stakeholders in the northeast; hence, there

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 51
is no sense of ownership of the reconstruction project among the Tamils and Muslims. Therefore, can the material reconstruction project and post-war political dynamics trigger a process of social reconciliation between the politically divided three ethnic groups that inhabit the northeast; Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims?
It can be readily seen that the GOSL has a serious responsibility to assure proper material reconstruction in the northeast as this area has been affected by close to three decades of intensive intrastate warfare, which has destroyed human lives and material property including infrastructure. As mentioned already the government does appear to be serious and genuine about creating physical development and material rebuilding. However, one would also argue that sustainability of post-war reconstruction hangs not just on physical revival alone but on the social reconstruction of the minds of people, who have suffered violence of many sorts. In fact, material reconstruction does contribute to the social reconciliation; yet, the specific nature of the project of reconstruction can either set people further apart or bring them together. The study presents the findings of the qualitative phase of the study, which also plans to have a survey component, which has not yet been implemented.
The Research Problem and the Methods
Nurturing reconciliation among such groups can be a challenging task. Conflict resolution literature gives ample evidence to show that there are many cases in which conflicts restart after brief periods of relative peace as parties to conflict feel that their needs have not been addressed (Mial, 1999). Therefore, this study asks a very important
question which is highly relevant to the long-term sustainability of
The author plans to examine social reconciliation through a household survey in the northeast. The qualitative study is expected to generate sufficient information, which will facilitate a comprehensive survey. So far there has not been any systematic study of this nature in the post-war Sri Lanka.

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peace in Sri Lanka; does the reconstruction project foster reconciliation? How can social reconciliation be made possible?
The reconstruction process is less likely to be meaningful unless it leads to the wellbeing and satisfaction among the people, who have been affected by the conflict. There are few systematic studies on the prospects of post-war social reconciliation between different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, although substantial domestic and international aid presently flows to the material reconstruction project. Thus, this study would be of great relevance not only to the scholars in the field but also to the government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international governments and donors.
This study relies on qualitative data collection techniques, mainly, close observations, interviews, group discussions and analysis of secondary literature. The most important purpose of the interviews and group discussions was to study prospects of social reconciliation in the northeast by analysing views expressed by a range of different stakeholders such as state officials, representatives from NGOs, religious leaders, leaders of Community-based organisations (CBOs) and other civil society actors to ascertain their perceptions towards the reconstruction project. Further, there were several group discussions with displaced returnees in the north, especially, in resettlement villages in Mannar and Vavuniya. The meaning of reconciliation can, of course, vary from one cultural context to the other. Thus, it is important to find out how the people in the northeast define social reconciliation. This study uses interviews and group discussions to understand how people and the civil society actors look at reconciliation and to know whether they think social reconciliation has become a reality in the northeast. The study attempts to understand the extent to which the reconstruction project addresses the actual needs to the general public. A comprehensive understanding of people's perception towards the reconstruction project requires a quantitative analysis with a representative sample of respondents from the northeast. The author expects that qualitative information

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 53
generated by this first phase of this study would facilitate such an
mbitious quantitative study in the future.
тhe Conflict in Sri Lanka and the IDPs
The conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE took its toll on the country for about 30 years. The history and the roots of
the conflict in Sri Lanka are well-documented and this vast literature
W. circumvents the need for a lengthy discussion on that subject
discrimination caused the conflict, yet others contest this argument tating that pre-independent South Indian invasions to Sri Lanka are also to be blamed. Nevertheless, most analysts would agree that the Language Act of 1956, University Standardisation of 1970s, 1983 thnic riots and constant failure by the political leaders to address Tamil rievances have been the leading contributory factors to the ethnic onflict of Sri Lanka. Two factors have also boosted the political | significance of ethnicity: the conflicting parties have used ethnicity to | mobilise people around nationalistic ideologies and the Consequences of
the conflict also have led to increasing the significance of ethnicity to people as a grouping factor (Goodhand, 2000; Herath, 2008). In ddition to costing more than 70,000 lives, the conflict in Sri Lanka has caused massive destruction of industrial property, machinery, housing units, infrastructure, farmland and so on. Some estimates suggest that the total economic cost of the war in Sri Lanka is as high as 1,135 billion rupees (in 1996 prices) or in other words, 168.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the year 1996 (Arunatilake et al., 2001).
Sri Lanka at present is travelling through a crucial political juncture,
which may have lasting political consequences in the country and
possibly in the South Asia region. It is in a context of a military victory

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by the GOSL over the LTTE, that a discussion of post-war reconstruction emerges. According to conflict resolution literature, a majority of conflict in the globe corresponds to the current trends in Sri Lanka, that is, although there are many success stories of conflict being solved through peace negotiations, most intra-state conflicts have generally tended to cease with a military victory to one of the protagonists (Miall, 1999; Wallensteen and Axcell, 1995; Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997). Although this may not connote an encouraging message to those engaged in peace studies and activism, peace researchers still have a role in post-war environments, especially, where reconstruction projects are underway. It is not certain whether military victories are sustainable and even if they are, as long as genuine grievances remain unaddressed, seeds for future conflict can gradually grow. However, it may be possible that a well-designed and context sensitive post-war reconstruction project may have the capacity to address genuine grievances of ethnic minorities in Sri Lanka. Peace researchers and generally social scientists can facilitate such a process by generating academically and policy relevant knowledge and meaningful interpretation of the post-war environment.
The most serious issue which the reconstruction process has to address is the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The war displaced thousands of people both from the north and east. Approximately 250,000 or more people were displaced in the last rounds of fighting between the government forces and the LTTE in 2009 when the LTTE took with them every civilian to wherever they withdrew in the face of attacks by the forces. The LTTE claimed that they were taking the civilians with them for the safety of the civilians themselves, a claim not accepted by most civilians. Once the war had reached its end by May 2009, most of those displaced in the last fighting returned to Vavuniya where they were housed in 'welfare centres. UN agencies and many international and local NGOs took care of the basic needs of these IDPs, although most IDPs claimed that living conditions in the welfare centres were poor.
 

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 55
As of 2009, there were IDPs in all the three districts in the East as well. In the district of Trincomalee, most of the IDPs were people who were displaced from within the district; yet according to Business for Peace
Alliance, a civil society organisation, (2008), there were also those who
had been displaced from Jaffna, Vavuniya and Batticaloa. Many of these IDPs engaged in carpentry, agricultural labour, in small business activities or worked in retail shops for their livelihood. According to a study by World Food Program (2008) in March 2008, there were 11,200 returned IDPs living in Eachchilampattai, Seruvila and Mutthur divisions. These were the people who were displaced due to the escalation of conflict since 2006. This said study notes that 63 percent of the above mentioned returnee population had poor food access due to lack of assets and very low income levels. The report estimates that around 54 percent of these people might not have been able to meet their food requirement, had there not been external food aid. Further, the children of IDP families faced difficulties in pursuing their education due to constant displacement and lack of proper facilities.
There were significant numbers of IDPs in Ampara too. By March 2007, there were 2,286 IDP families and 8,752 individuals in Ampara. Of the displaced population, 21 percent has been displaced due to the conflict while 79 percent had been displaced due to 2004 tsunami. The costal belt in Ampara has been a thickly-populated area even before tsunami and as a result, IDPs have added themselves onto the issue of lands and natural resources in the area. The government restrictions on construction of houses near the beach further worsened the issue as people had to find new lands in a land scarce area to build houses. Some ethnic communities, especially, Muslims perceived this as ethnic discrimination as the costal belt they lived was seriously affected by new restrictions.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2008) reported that 7,038 families and 26,484 people remained displaced in Batticaloa district at the end of January 2008. According to Inter

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Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Country Team (2008), there were around 19 IDP camps in the district of Batticaloa. Some of the IDPs were from Trincomalee while some others were from within the district of Batticaloa. The above report referred to security restrictions as a barrier against the return of IDPs to their original locations. By late 2009, just before presidential election, the government began a hurried resettlement programme for the IDPs in Vavuniya. The author observed the resettlement processes in Mannar and Vavuniya in the north and certain parts of the east.
Political Representation and Conflict
Although members were elected to the national parliament from the northeast at every parliamentary election held since independence, constant warfare in 1990s between the GOSL security forces and the LTTE prevented the elections being held for northern and eastern provincial Councils and for most local government bodies in the northeast. However with the fall of the LTTE, in 2008, the government was able to hold the elections to elect representatives for the provincial Council in the east. The governing party People's Alliance (PA), which contested the elections in an electoral alliance with Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP, Tamil People's Liberation Tigers), won the elections. Consequently, Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, the deputy leader of the TMVP, was appointed the chief minister of the Council. The TMVP is a significant political cum military actor in the east and has officially become part of the PA government, although international and local human rights agencies have levelled charges against TMVP for serious violation of human rights such as disappearances, abductions, child recruitments, extrajudicial killings and election rigging. The
TMVP was a breakaway faction of the mainstream LTTE. The break up occurred when the deputy leader of the LTTE, Karuna Amman fell out with the leader of the LTTE and formed TMVP. Nonetheless, Chandrakanthan alias Pillayan, deputy leader of TMVP, later became the leader of the TMVP by ousting Karuna.
 

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 57
respondents of this study from the northeast allege that the provincial touncil elections held in the east in 2008 is not free and fair as claimed у the government but was carried out with serious elections related violence and threats. Elections were peacefully manipulated, said one of
he respondents (Interview 2). Another respondent mentioned...
You can manipulate democracy. Elections were peaceful because people were repressed by powerful actors. You can have peace by arms. Why would I raise my voice if I know that I would be killed? On the surface there were no incidents (on the day of elections) but prior to the elections people were taken by force
and killed (Interview 3).
W. Although the emergence of TMVP out from the LTTE has drawn ignificant attention, the formation of Muslim political cum military roups is also getting the attention of the government and other actors. Although initially some Muslim youths joined the Tamil Struggle, Muslims later aligned themselves with the government of Sri Lanka when they faced threats and intimidation by Tamil militant groups, especially the LTTE. The last five years or so has seen rising activism by Muslim political leadership in the northeast rendering them a distinct political entity. Although the involvement of the TMVP in the affairs of the Sinhalese population is minimal, even as of 2009, TMVP involved heavily with the affairs of Tamils and Muslims. Their engagement with Tamils and Muslims leads to divergent outcomes: there appears to be some tolerance among the Tamils but Muslims view TMVP interference in their affairs with serious anxiety and antipathy (Interview 4).
According to CHA (2006) there were inter-communal tensions over various issues such as the presence of large number of troops, mobilising Muslims as home guards, threats posed by the LTTE to Muslims and so on. The LTTE had a perception that Muslims aided the government military and so, the Muslims suffered hardships at the hands of the LTTE. Further, Muslims and Tamils come into conflict

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with each other over land issues because the LTTE had in certain occasions deprived Muslims of their lands. The LTTE also took ransoms and committed extortions on Muslim traders. The informants of this study also confirmed that with the decline of power of the LTTE in the northeast, the TMVP took over some of the violence previously committed by the LTTE (Interview 5).
The issues over political representations have contributed significantly to the conflict in Sri Lanka. Thus, from a reconciliation perspective, it is necessary to determine whether the current reconstruction effort would address issues over political representation and power. The chief minister of the newly-elected eastern provincial council told a Tamil media on the 23 of November 2008 that he did not possess the power to develop the eastern province, which is under his authority (Tamilwin.com, 2008). This statement by the chief minister indicates that vitality and the efficacy of the provincial council fall short of the aspirations for political autonomy by the minorities. The respondents of this study query the utility of a provincial council, which does not have the power to take decisions concerning the development of the province, which falls under its formal authority (Interview. 6). Thus, the major issue of effective devolution of power to the provinces remains unaddressed. In addition to its impact on development, political power is also a matter of self-dignity for the people of the northeast. Consequently, lack of effective devolution of power to the newly set up provincial Council has caused some degree of frustration among the people.
The Idea of Reconciliation
The term reconciliation has Latin roots and is derived from the Latin expression conciliatus, which means 'coming together'. Reconciliation is social when such a process Concerns a process between groups rather than individuals. Kumar (1999) argues that in the general understanding, social reconciliation refers to a process of re

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 59
establishing the broken relationships between social groups. He, however, notes that such a conceptualisation does not always fit in the actual conditions of a post-conflict society, which emerges from a history of grave violence, social injustice and animosities. Hence, in the immediate aftermath of such serious violations of human rights expecting people to easily restore harmonious relationships can be unrealistic. Moreover, it is not always certain whether social harmony between groups prevailed before the conflict as some of the underlying group animosities and hatred can date back to many centuries. When that is the case, latent conflict predates the manifest conflict and so restoration of relationships can mean bringing it back to the status of latent conflict. Therefore, at a very basic level, argues Kumar, social reconciliation must begin with former enemies accepting each others' right to exist. Then, a process of social reconciliation attempts to promote tolerance and understanding among groups, to develop nonviolent conflict resolution methods, and finally to heal the wounds of violence in the long-term. There are three objectives of a process of social reconciliation; preventing violent conflict, addressing negative emotions (anger, prejudices, misunderstandings), and establishing or re-establishing positive relationships among the conflicting parties.
In fact, this view of harmony not being present before the conflict suggests innovative ways of looking at prospects for social reconciliation in the context of Sri Lanka. Although for much of the history, Sinhalese and Tamils have coexisted in peace and harmony,
the roots of the current ethnic conflict in fact, run into a history of thousands of years to the periods of South Indian invasions into Sri Lanka. Although, some consider the post-independent period to be the beginning point of the current conflict, as historians argue, intergroup rivalries between Sinhalese and Tamils predate this period. Hence, to say that the aim of reconciliation should be to restore the
inter-ethnic relationships to pre-independence level would be
needs to explore an appropriate meaning for social reconciliation in
inadequate as it would mean a situation of latent conflict. Thus, one

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the post-war Sri Lanka. Therefore, the bottom line is that Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims must agree that each ethnic group has a right to exist where they presently are and wherever they want to be in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, social recoraciliation must need to go beyond that to encourage Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims address the past
grievances and to build strong Social and economic relationships.
In order to determine the meaning of social reconciliation in respect of the local context, one can examine peoples' expectations regarding the project of reconstruction. Information gathered from civil society leaders, representatives from religious institutions, state officials, CBO (farm) leaders in Ampara and Trincomalee in the east and Mannar and Vavuniya in the north enable the author to generate a context specific picture of social expectations. The respondents of all walks mention that after three decades of violent conflict, people hope for tangible change in socio-economic and political environment. Below is a summary of key changes which various informants expected to see in post-conflict reconstruction.
o Respect for human rights including the guarantee of physical security
for everybody o Freedom of movement without security restrictions and without
excessive security checks o Civilian control and administration without significant involvement
of the military or armed groups o Freedom to choose political representatives in free and fair elections O Empowerment of the provincial councils to have substantial powers
over local affairs O Speedy resettlement of refugees in their original locations with the
development of necessary infrastructure o Restoring the economy in order to have secure livelihoods O Assistance to rebuild houses and other essential facilities, which have
been destroyed by war O Inter-ethnic dialogue and understanding, so that future will be
without violence
 
 

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 61
though large numbers of people have suffered at the hands of both government forces and the LTTE, people in the northeast demonstrate a remarkable willingness to get on with the ethnic other. Some of those who have suffered extreme violence such as personal injury or death of family members reported unwillingness to forget and forgive but still say that they are willing to interact with the ethnic other without wishing to take revenge. One respondent remarked that taking ravage is not possible as he does not know the individuals, who committed atrocities on his family members (Interview 7). This Tamil man does not wish to direct his anger at the entire Sinhalese community to which the perpetrators belonged. Yet, he clearly shows his anger about the actual perpetrators whom if known, he would want to take revenge. This is indicative of the fact that people perceive the ethnic other as a civilian group to be harmless but understand that there were sections related to armed actors, who committed violence. A previous study by the author
in Vavunya in the north (Herath, 2008) also finds that people have a craving for peaceful coexistence with substantial inter-ethnic
well. For example, farmers and buyers of agricultural commodities already interact across the ethnic boundary as this is an absolute necessity for economic survival. Therefore, as regards the local context,
t seems, social reconciliation is a process in which people may not aluays
guarantee future security.
How Reconciliation Can Be Achieved?

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Some scholars point out that sponsoring material development in post-war contexts is one of the instruments of social reconciliation. Fostering Development is highly significant for sustainable peace, especially, in the context of civil wars where protagonists within a country fight over many issues, which also includes real or perceived inequitable distribution of material resources. Within such a context, there can be calls for the integration of development into peace processes as a conscious effort aimed at sustainable peace. Even the supranational organisations such as the United Nations are shown to be more inclined to support development than they have been in the past (Smoljan, 2003).
One of the most widely known methods for reconciliation is the setting up of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). Many countries affected by violent conflicts have resorted to appointing TRCs in order to promote social reconciliation and establish justice. A TRC was first used in Argentina and many countries have later used TRCS including the well-known case of South Africa. Kumar (1999) mentions that a TRC intends to uncover the past in order to examine all kinds of violent acts perpetrated by conflicting parties. Revealing the past atrocities can sometimes lead to heightening inter-group tensions in the short-run but bringing out past crimes is considered to be essential to ensure psychological healing in the long-run. TRC will also contribute to produce attitudes, which may prompt people to reject violence in the future.
A government taking a community through a transition from a state of violence to genuine democracy may have three options as regards addressing past violations of human rights; trials to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of violence; appoint truth Commissions or do nothing. The trails occur when the government concerned is strong relative to the perpetrators and there is a high public demand for justice. A government may do nothing when the perpetrators are stronger than the government. Truth commissions which may look

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 63
back into past atrocities but may not lead to severe punishments may result when there is a power balance between the government and the perpetrators (Skaar, 1999). Nevertheless, studies around the world point to mixed results from TRCs. Although, many scholars and practitioners advocate the setting up of such TRCs or such formal mechanism to foster reconciliation in post-conflict environments, there are studies, which challenge the effectiveness of those commissions (Gready, 2005; Karekezi, 2007; Selimovic, 2008). Thus, it is necessary to critically examine the utility of such commissions and benefit from already existing experience to determine the relevance of such commissions to the local context in Sri Lanka.
One important issue which concerns this chapter is what sort of outcome is likely in the case of post-war Sri Lanka. After all, who should be put on trial? The GOSL has eliminated the LTTE leadership in its entirety and those still living have been either coopted into the ranks of the government or are being rehabilitated in detention centres. Yet, all those responsible for grave violations of human rights in the LTTE are believed to have been killed in the battle. Thus, there is a strong winner and a presently non-existent loser. Will anybody from the side of the government responsible for violations of human rights be tried? This is a rather unlikely outcome. Therefore, there is no possibility for trial within Sri Lanka and so a TRC is the only possibility if there would be any public demand. However, it is well-known that the TRC has a Western origin and virtually unknown to the general public in Sri Lanka. Thus, a demand for a TRC has to come from the Tamil political leadership as a topdown effort, if they think that TRC would serve a purpose in this context. It seems a TRC remains a distant possibility as long as the government keeps focusing on material reconstruction of war-torn areas as is the case now. Further, some top level state officials operating in the east viewed the problem in Sri Lanka as purely a terrorist issue and saw no need for conflict resolution (Interview 1). Hence, there is very little agreement that there is a psycho-social

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dimension to the suffering of the war-affected people. This points to the need for identifying alternative mechanisms in lieu of a TRC.
Kumar (1999) further explains that in South Africa, in addition to TRCs, peace Committees at local, regional and national levels contributed to social reconciliation through activities such as facilitating communication between antagonistic groups, negotiating disputes and monitoring them, and working with the government and police to make them conflict sensitive. He notes that similar structures such as peace Commissions in other countries like Nicaragua have aided Communication and mediation between conflicting groups and promoted reconciliation through these activities. Additionally, peace Committees got involved in disarmament efforts, monitoring elections, release of prisoners, demobilisation, refugee issues, and human rights monitoring.
As far as Sri Lanka is concerned, there is already existing experience about the utility of local peace committees at local levels. Orjuela (2003) describes how peace committees (PCs) made up of religious leaders and representatives from different ethnic communities were helpful during the war period in combating rumours, controlling possible unrest and preventing violence at local level. She argues that PCs contributed to maintain the ceasefire also by minimising the chances of escalation of conflicts. Although these PCs may now be defunct, it may still be possible to revive them and especially, to benefit from that social network to create a constituency which advocate social reconciliation at local level. The observations by the author also confirm this peace role played by religious federations, especially, in the east.
One of the many approaches used in the reconstruction of war-torn societies is the Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR) method. According to Cliffe et al., the provision of speedy and cost effective reconstruction assistance on the ground and building of a governance

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 65
structure that guarantee local choice and accountability are the two main objectives of community driven reconstruction. This is in fact the application of Community Driven Development (CDD) in a postconflict environment. The essential characteristic of CDR is the involvement of local population in the reconstruction process from the identification of problems, formulation of projects, management of recourses and implementation, monitoring to evaluation. The CDR method tries to decentralise power, political as well as economic to the local level institutions, promote democracy at the local level thus empowering the communities and the disadvantaged groups and provide economic resources to the local bodies that it establishes to implement projects. CDR also helps reduce mistrust between the local population and the administration since they together engage in a process of joint planning, identification of problems and prioritising them and the interventions (Cliffeet.al., 2003).
In some countries amnesty to the parties of the conflict has been adopted as a measure of social reconciliation especially, when trials or truth commissions were not conducive to maintain (negative) peace, that is, to put a stop to fighting. Yet, scholars argue that the efficacy of general amnesty is dependent on other factors such as its utility to lure belligerents to lay down arms, the severity of crimes committed, putting in place other avenues of reconciliation and so on. In some cases, amenities have failed to achieve social reconciliation or reduce violence at all (Arnould, 1997). Amnesty is relevant in the case of Sri Lanka as well because thousands of the former LTTE carders who are presently been rehabilitated seems to have been granted a general amnesty.
Presently, there are small-scale efforts undertaken by both governmental and non-governmental organisations with respect to social reconciliation. Concerned individuals from certain government institutions, for instance the social affairs division of the presidential secretariat, presently have a small-scale programme through which the officials organises inter-ethnic dialogue among young people through

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exchange visits and cultural events attended by youth of all ethnic groups. This programme mainly brings Tamil and Muslim youth from the northeast into Sinhalese areas and gets them to intermingle with Sinhalese youth through various cultural activities. Similar efforts are made by various NGOs as well.
There are also cultural activities promoted by NGOs and media institutions. NGOs have also made efforts to support local level Conflict transformation endeavours by organising conflict resolution workshops and peace committees. A small project named Facilitating Local Initiatives for Conflict Transformation, in which the author also participated as a Conflict transformation consultant, developed a network of partner organisations at the grassroots level, to support Conflict transformation. These partner organisations have organised peace Committees, inter-religious federations, inter-ethnic labour donations projects, seminars and workshops, inter-ethnic sports events and so on to address tensions and facilitate conflict transformation. Many other NGOs also engage in similar endeavours. Most of these efforts by the government or non-governmental actors perform a much-needed social function although they are ad hoc efforts largely occurring without sufficient inter-agency coordination. Their scale is also very limited in the sense of geographic coverage due to insufficient funding. Thus, present efforts can largely be considered as pilot operations undertaken by various organisations. Nevertheless, these pilot efforts are highly significant as they open up valuable lessons, which may be useful to determine appropriate activities suitable for implementation at the national level systematically both by governmental and non-governmental actors.
The local media too can act as an agent of social reconciliation. Presently, the media too is ethnically divided and some media takes ethnic and political positions. Several television stations and groups of artists have produced dramas, documentaries, painting competitions, poster campaigns both to give vent to pent-up emotions and to

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 67
influence peoples attitudes about ethnic other in a favourable
. . - direction. The government as well as the international donors can encourage media to adopt moderate stances toward other ethnic
advantage of such methods is that a radio service can touch thousands of people with relatively little cost. Lessons can be learnt from other countries which have used media to foster reconciliation in ethnicallydivided societies.
When Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims live side by side, various activities supported by government and the donors directly or through
religious events, New Year festivals), conflict resolution workshops, inter-ethnic economic enterprises, development projects requiring
inter-ethnic cooperation and so on can be effective in fostering social
reconciliation. Nevertheless, along with some of the above, other
methods are necessary for reconciliation among the people who live apart such as between Tamils of mono-ethnic Jaffna and Sinhalese and
to foster reconciliation. For instance, broader and effective people's participation in all stages of the reconstruction process may generate the feeling that reconstruction is a fair process getting implemented for the benefit of the people. High geographic mobility, generation of employment and restoration of economy will increase the possibilities for inter-ethnic social and economic exchange in addition to I individual material wellbeing. Hence, a favourable macro sociopolitical environment will have potent impacts as regards social
reconciliation.

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Prospects for Reconciliation in the Material Reconstruction Project
As noted previously, a massive post-war reconstruction process is presently underway in the northern and north-eastern provinces. However, although this material rebuilding is an essential component, preoccupation with material aspects arguably may undermine prospects for social reconciliation as certain social and psychological dimensions are likely to be neglected. Based on the evidence from the northeast, this present study mentions below certain key actions, which can contribute to social reconciliation.
Political Power
The conflict in Sri Lanka is both about the territory and political power, that is, the demand for political representation for minorities. Thus, the social reconciliation hinges heavily on the readiness of the government to offer some form of political power to the aggrieved Tamil minority despite that the government has won the war. The present government has promised to put forward a political solution acceptable to the Tamil community and it remains to be seen whether this will become a reality. The implementation of the 13" and 17" amendments to the constitution can be a step in this direction. The devolution of power may give Tamil community the feeling that they have a stake in the democratic system in the country and such a feeling will contribute to reintegrate the Tamil community to a broad Sri Lanka nation.
Promotion of grassroots democracy is one of the starting points for mass-based political movement towards reconciliation. Already the
elections have been held for the municipal councils of Jaffna and
The full implementation of the 13th amendment would grant greater
political autonomy to the provincial councils and the 17th amendment provides for better governance in the country as a whole.

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 69
Vavuniya in the north and other areas of the east. The political institutions of the war-affected northeast have survived despite nearly three decades of violence, especially, the Tamil political parties such as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) maintains a robust presence. The opportunity to elect their representatives plausibly ameliorates the frustration among the Tamil community over lack of political power. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to foster a local support base for democracy as war may have undermined trust and understanding regarding the democratic systems and its values. One possible activity is training of grassroots leaders so that there will be a network of people to promote democracy. It is nonetheless crucially significant to ensure that there are free and fair elections. The presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010 arguably did not meet this condition due to several factors; there was mass displacement just a few months before the elections and resettlement of those people had just begun; displaced voters did not have access to polling booths at convenient distances; although the government had promised to provide them with sufficient transport facilities to reach the polling stations away from their present locations, according to polls monitors, transport facilities were deliberately disrupted by powerful politicians in order to prevent the IDPs from voting as the IDPs was expected to support the opposition candidate; there were several explosions in the Jaffna Peninsula which were intended to create fear and prevent voters from going to polling
stations.
Physical Security
Physical security is the most important need. People should feel that they are safe. Handle the community as human beings. Trust needs to be built. Then we can talk about economic stability (Interview 8).

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United Nations, other States, local as well as foreign human rights organisations, have criticised both the government of Sri Lanka and LTTE for violations of human rights. Of course, three decades of war has claimed more than 70,000 lives and inured many more. In the post-war period, death or injury related directly to the conflict seems to have ceased. Broad and genuine respect for all kinds of human rights is sine qua non for social reconciliation.
Resettlement and Rehabilitation
The resettlement of the IDPs is presently reaching the end as most people have now been resettled. Field observations in the north, especially in Mannar and Vavuniya, by the author just a few months before the presidential elections found that resettlement was weakly organised and haphazard. Intense warfare had raised almost all housing units to the ground. In many of the villages visited by the author in Mannar, it was even difficult to locate where the houses were and travelling was extremely difficult on the roads leading to the villages due to the destruction by war. By the end of 2009, large numbers of IDPs were being brought to places like Mannar to enable them to cultivate paddy in the Maha season. Yet, weak infrastructure and lack of other public amenities were causing hardships to these IDPs. Despite these difficulties, however, many people the author met mentioned that they were happy to be back in their original villages and said that they were not against living in harmony with the Sinhalese people. Many respondents were extremely critical of the LTTE for being primarily responsible for displacement and kidnapping their children during the last phase of the war to fight against the government (Group Discussion 1 & 2).
It is understandable that the government may not be able to do everything it should do on behalf on the IDPs due to lack of human resources and capital at least in the short-term. This opens up the room for many civil society actors to contribute to addressing the

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 71
problems of the IDPs, especially, emergency relief services, housing
services, social services and psychological help such as Counselling
people with trauma and emotional disturbances and so on.
N
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h.
Representatives from many other local and international NGOs
mentioned to the author that they were willing to support the
- - - - reconstruction and reconciliation efforts but were awaiting the M
permission from the government to do so (Interview 10). It appears
that the government harbours considerable suspicion over the non
governmental organisations as they have contributed to highlight
violations of human rights in the past.
been kept in government custody and are being rehabilitated. This can
be considered as a vital step taken by the government to foster social
society will contribute to minimise prejudices and mistrust about the majority community and the government. Nonetheless, these youth who had taken arms must have employment in a post-war situation.
It is expected that rehabilitation imparts vocational skills to these youth so that they can be employed.
Economic Revival
Physical reconstruction of the infrastructure in the north may contribute to resuscitate the economy of the north and generate employment. Although this is purely an economic exercise, this will certainly contribute to social reconciliation as well because increased economic activity will bring together business people of all ethnic communities. Employment will ensure greater physical mobility and

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will contribute to reducing ethnic prejudices in addition to the direct effect on incomes. Studies have already found that when there is peace, inter-ethnic economic activities increases while violence presses down such interactions. Peace times bring buyers and sellers of agricultural produces together. Further, peace times provide many opportunities for farmers and agricultural labourers to have solid mutually beneficial interactions. For example, in Vavuniya Sinhalese paddy farmers sell their agricultural produce to the Tamil merchants while the Tamil vegetable growers depend on the Sinhalese traders from Dambulla to sell their stocks. Further, the IDPs in Vavuniya provide their labour to Sinhalese and Muslim farmers. These purely economic interactions gradually lead to social and cultural relations as well (Herath, 2008). Nevertheless, transparency and participation must be the foundations of the economic revival as some development projects in the northeast have appeared to antagonise some minority groups. There are cases in which the local population looks at development endeavours with suspicion. A good case in point is the Olluvil harbour project in the eastern township of Ampara where the Muslim community feels that employment related to constructions have been given to Sinhalese from outside the area. Hence, some of the Muslim respondents interviewed by the author thought that the harbour project intended to create Sinhalese colonies to change the ethnic balance in favour of the Sinhalese (Interview 9). The author was not able to find any new Sinhalese settlement close to the harbour or in that general area and, so, this claim about Sinhalese settlement appears to be a misconception. Yet, such suspicion can jeopardise social reconciliation although harbour may generate economic opportunities in the long-term.
Agents of Reconciliation
There is hardly any doubt that the most important actor who can
foster social reconciliation in Sri Lanka is the Sri Lankan government due to power and resources it commands in comparison to civil society
 

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 73
actors. Yet, at present, GOSL does not appear to be consciously working on social reconciliation apart from the material reconstruction project, which is presently driven by a few powerful politicians of the central government. Therefore, the onus falls on the
civil society actors in Sri Lanka, the academics and the international
ddition to various activities by CSOs to promote reconciliation, there re international organisations and NGOs which monitor and collect
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Asian Human Rights Council, Freedom House, International Displacement Monitoring Center, International Crisis Group, Transparency International and so on, time to time, publish reports and statements in respect of human ights, freedom of press and the status of democracy in Sri Lanka.
organisations. w
Studies show that the NGOs face a crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of the public when NGOs engage in peace-related endeavours due to anti-NGO feelings which are dominant in Sri Lanka as a result of the nationalist discourses and, of course, adverse media attacks. Many local and international NGOs have come under state scrutiny and restrictions, which have curtailed the ability of NGOs to play peace building and reconciliations roles (Walton, 2008). Other scholars have also brought up problems relating to the peace building role of the NGOs in Sri Lanka. Goodhand and Lewer (1999) find in a survey of NGOs in the northeast of Sri Lanka that most NGOs have kept away from dealing with sensitive issues such as human rights but focus more on development assistance and relief, which too has been haphazard

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and uncoordinated, although the presence of the NGOs has been a source of protection against abuses of human rights.
It has become the modus operandi of the nationalists to accuse human rights, pro-democracy or anti-corruption organisations as foreign hands attempting to destabilise Sri Lankan state and by de-legitimising such organisations, these political groups try to avoid influence of CSOs. It seems that the nationalists have been highly successful in using media to instill fear and suspicion in the general public about NGOs and have created a strong anti-NGO feeling. It may require concerted efforts both by the state and civil society actors to change this attitude.
Peace and conflict scholars consider the international donors as key actors in post-war reconstruction and reconciliation, although there is not much agreement over the relationship between aid and development (or other favourable outcomes) in the case of developing countries (Addison & McGillivray, 2004). A key study by Burnside and Dollar (2000) finds that aid is positively related to growth in developing countries but domestic policies of Countries too had a profound influence. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) mention that aid is highly instrumental for growth in post-Conflict Countries due to existing weak infrastructures and collapsed domestic revenue. They further find that aid is highly effective in post-conflict countries during the middle years of a post-conflict decade. The implication of this study for Sri Lanka would be that international donors should concentrate their support for reconstruction during the middle years in order to have the optimum effect. However, the flipside of such an approach is that in the short-term, many people will have to live under substandard housing and without other basic amenities as presently the international donors support these amnesties through UN and other agencies. Withdrawal of such support may force the government to take such services on its own but whether this will practically happen is uncertain and will certainly impact on the IDPs. The

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 75
present flow of aid for reconstruction of houses etc. can be justified but it would be more effective if the donors also place more emphasis
This chapter examines the extent to which the present post-war material reconstruction project and consequent socio-political dynamics
contribute to social reconstruction in Sri Lanka, especially, in the regions in which the conflict raged for nearly three decades. The study finds that while there is presently a heavy focus by the GOSL on the material reconstruction of the northeast of the country, the attention
that there is less than anticipated mass enthusiasm as regards the
material reconstruction project. While there is hardly any disagreement that material development is essential for the reconstruction of the northeast, many people have reservations about the manner in which the present reconstruction is taking place. It appears that the present focus on material development such as large scale constructions and industrial development would certainly contribute to social reconciliation to some extent. However, fostering social reconstruction requires much more conscious and concerted effort by a range of actors including the government, CSOs, and the donors. Further, certain notable features of the reconstruction projects, such as certain specific development endeavours, lack of Consultation and meaningful participation by relevant stakeholders from the northeast have harmful consequences for prospects of social reconciliation.
Although the open hostilities have ceased after the military victory by the GOSL, the memories and emotional injuries caused by violence

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may last a longer period, perhaps, a life time. Nevertheless, if genuine peace is to remain, people should be able to put behind the past animosities and be able to accept that everyone has a right to exist. Gradually, people should be able to cultivate new relationships with the ethnic other although it may be difficult for them to forgive and forget' in a short-term. Thus, the reconstruction process needs to emphasise social reconstruction of amicable inter-ethnic relationships and other mechanisms which would assist people to negotiate and resolve the past animosities. There need to be a political process in which people look in retrospect, discuss the past violence, and agree on a path to peaceful conflict transformation. This study has endeavoured to determine whether material reconstruction project gives sufficient space and emphasis on such social reconstruction and examines to what extent the design of the reconstruction project facilitates social reconciliation.
The most serious issue facing the government is the proper resettlement of IDPs. The chapter argues that the manner in which resettlement takes places in the north suffers from poor planning and may have negative consequences for social reconciliation, although most IDPs are happy to return to their original locations even with minimum basic facilities as the conditions of 'welfare centres for the IDP is rather undesirable. In the long-term, the issue of political representation and power are also major issues facing the reconstruction project. The picture emerging from the eastern provincial council does not generate much hope about future prospects of greater political power to the minorities.
Peace scholars have studied various methods of social reconciliation used across the world in post-conflict societies. The chapter points out that the well-known TRC is less likely to be used in Sri Lanka but variety of small scale techniques already used by various civil society actors may prove to be quite useful in order to establish peaceful relations and to heal the psychological wounds of violent conflict.

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 77
living geographically apart. This environment would emerge when several important conditions are met; the need for effective devolution
generate employment.
The chapter argues that the state is the most powerful and important actor having the ability to play the most effective role in supporting social reconciliation. The civil society organisations presently carry out key functions in providing emergency relief for the IDPs and have the possibility to carry out a range of actions, which would support speedy resettlement, grassroots economic revival and social reconciliation.
Nevertheless, the CSOs need better access to the IDPs and
International governments and donor agencies have the possibility to encourage all stakeholders, especially the government and the CSOs,
to play more significant roles in fostering social reconciliation.
Countries: Lessons for Donors,” Conflict, Security ở Development, 4 3), pp. 347-67.
Arnould, V. (1997) "Amnesty, Peace and Reconciliation in Algeria” in
Conflict, Security ở Development, 7 (2), pp. 227-53. | Arunatilake, Nisha, Sirira Jayasuriya and Saman Kelegama (2001) “The Economic Cost of the War in Sri Lanka”, World Development, 29 (9), pp. 1483-1500.

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de Silva, K. M. D. (1997) "Sri Lanka Surviving Ethnic Strife", Journal of
Democracy, 8 (11), pp. 97-111. Gunaratna, Rohan (1998) Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security,
Colombo, South Asian Network on Conflict Research. Cliffe, Sarah, Scott Guggenheim and Markus Kostner (2003) "CommunityDriven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions,” CPR Working Papers No. 7: Social Development Department, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network. Collier P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002) "Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-conflict Societies, Policy Research", Working Paper No. 2902, Washington D.C., The World Bank. Goodhand, Jonathan, David Hulme and Nick Lewer (2000) "Social Capital and the Political Economy of Violence: A Case Study of Sri Lanka", Disasters, 24 (4), pp. 390-406. ----- and N. Lewer (1999) “Sri Lanka: NGOs and Peace-building in Complex Political Emergencies”, Third World Quarterly 20 (1), pp. 69-87. Gready, P. (2005) "Reconceptualising Transitional Justice: Embedded and
Distanced Justice", Conflict, Security e Development, 5 (1), pp. 3-21. Gunasinghe, Newton (2004) "The Open Economy and its Impact on Ethnic Relations in Sri Lanka” in Winslow, Deborah and Michael D. Woost (eds), Economy, Culture and Civil War in Sri Lanka, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, pp. 99-114. Karekezi, Urusaro Alice (2007) "Reconciliation with Justice". Paper presented at the internal Seminar, School of Global Studies, Gothenburg, University of Gothenburg. - Kumar, Krishna (1999) “Promoting Social Reconciliation in Post-conflict Societies: Selected Lessons from USAID's Experience,” U.S. Agency for International Development available at http://pdfdec.org/ pdf docs/pnaca923.pdf accessed on 20 September 2010. Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse (1999)
Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Cambridge, Polity. Orjuela, Camilla (2003) "Peace Building in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil
Society”, Journal of Peace Research, 40 (2), pp. 195-212. Orjuela, Camilla (2004) Civil Society in Civil War. Peace Work and Identity Politics in Sri Lanka (Doctoral Thesis), Gothenburg, University of Gothenburg.

Social Reconciliation amidst Material Reconstruction 79
elimovic, Johanna Mannergren (2008) "Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theoretical Perspectives”. Paper presented at the internal Seminar, School of Global Studies, Gothenburg, University of Gothenburg. vanesathurei, Chandrakanthan (2008) Media Statement available at
www.Tamilwin.com. aar, E. (1999) "Truth Commissions, Trials-Or Nothing? Policy Options in Democratic Transitions”, Third World Quarterly, 20 (6), pp. 110928. oljan, J. (2003) "The Relationship between Peace-Building and Development", Conflict, Security & Development, 3 (2), pp. 233-50. pencer, Jonathan (ed.) (1990) The Power of the Past: Sri Lanka: History and
the Roots of the Conflict, London/New York, Routledge. lensteen, P. and K. Axcell (1995) "Armed Conflict at the End of Cold
War”, Journal of Peace Research, 30 (3), pp. 331-46. and M. Sollenberg (1997)"Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements-1989-96”,Journal of Peace Research, 34(3), pp. 339-53.
eports from Government and Non-Governmental Agencies
Canadian Agro-Sustainability Partnership Inc, (Publication year not
mentioned).
CHA (2004) Ampara District Profile, Colombo, Consortium of
Humanitarian Agencies.
(2004) Trincomalee District Profile, Colombo, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies.
y (2004) District Profile: Batticaloa, Colombo, Consortium of
Humanitarian Agencies. (2006) Peace Audit: Supporting an Enabling Environment for Peace in Sri
Lanka, Colombo, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies. ter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Country Team, Situation Report M # 111, 5 February 2008. Citizens' Committee for Forcible Eviction of People, Commission for Justice, Peace, Human Rights and Human Development, Secretariat, Community Trust Fund, International Movement Against Discrimination and Racism, Justice and Peace for Integration of

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Creation, Law & Society Trust, Rights Now - Collective for Democracy and two others. 2008. Afraid even to say the word. Elections in Batticaloa District: Report of a joint civil society visit to Batticaloa, 16-18 February 2008 (Referred to in this text as (RJCSV).
UNCHR (2008) Statistical Summary of IDP Movements in North-Northeast
Sri Lanka, Colombo, UNHCR.
Interviews and Discussions
Interview 1: The District Secretary (name of place withheld upon request), Interviewed in December 2008 at his office of eastern province of Sri Lanka. Interview 2: A leader of a civil society organisation in Ampara; Interviewed
on 2008-09-28 in Ampara name withheld upon request. Interview 3: President of Chamber of Commerce in XXX; Interviewed on 2008-11-27 in the east; name of district withheld to guarantee anonymity. Interview 4: A representative from a peace education organisation in Trincomalee; Interviewed on 2008-11-27 in Trincomalee; name withheld upon request. Interview 5: A leader of a religious organisation in Ampara; Interviewed on
2008-09-28 in Ampara; name withheld upon request. Interview 6: A leader of a civil society organisation in Trincomalee; Interviewed on 2008-09-27 in Trincomalee; name withheld upon
request. Interview 7: A farmer in Asikulam, Vavuniya; Interviewed for a previous
study on 2005-11-20 at his village; name withheld. Interview 8: A leader of a peace foundation in Trincomalee; Interviewed on
2008-09-26 in Trincomalee; name withheld upon request. Interview 9: A Muslim medical practitioner cum peace activist in Ampara;
Interviewed on 2008-09-29 in Ampara; name withheld upon request. Interview 10: Several Interviews with representatives from various international and national humanitarian agencies operating or seeking permission to operate in Mannar, December 2009. Group Discussion 1: With a set of returnees in Manthai West, Mannar in
December 2009. Group Discussion 2: With a set of returnees in Musali, Mannar in December
2009.
 

CHAPTER 4
Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation from a Buddhist Perspective
Sumana Ratnayaka
ach individual has a dual performance, i.e., in relation to one's inner ind outward personality. A person has to face and deal with conflicts that affect both these personality aspects. One divides concepts into opposites: likes and the dislikes. Being unmindful, one often develops reed, lust, clinging and attachment toward the likes, and hatred, alousy, ill-will and aversion toward the dislikes. One is attracted to the likes and repelled by the dislikes. Yet, one holds on to both because one develops a tendency to keep on grasping the likes and hating the dislikes. This tragic situation will be worsened by an |titäual, ignorant attitudes of drawing margins between these
opposites, attributing self-nature to each character trait.
There is a saying that every war starts in human minds. Every
dividual has a 'war against oneself, which makes one one's own rival, too. Thus, first of all, one must find a way of being reconciled with oneself, transforming one's inner conflicts into non-judgemental observation and insight. This holistic and integral approach to one's own conflicts should be developed cyclically, as a process; the same
proach should be made co-instrumental in any other process of
This paper is originally prepared and presented at the international conference on peace through human development, Oslo, Norway, 5 May 2007 under the title: "How to Deal with Violence: The Buddhist Way". For this presentation I made a few additional improvements on it and changed its title to the present one.

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external reconciliation and conflict transformation. This paper is an attempt to make this approach clearer, with special reference to the selected Pali canonical discourses. This effort includes some examples of real life situations that reflect the theme to a certain extent.
Every worldly person is generally conditioned by identities related to such concepts as their own language, religion, country or place of birth, caste or class and the like. The world does not seem to function without these conventions, yet the more static and substantial we make our identities with them the less dynamic we become. Thus, conflicts arise. Individuals themselves create their own identities and barriers and eventually make them bigger and more diverse, dependent on craving, speculative points of view and I-conceit. When tension, unrest and violence surface it is not only the individuals involved who become victims but the 'innocent as well.
The suttas that contain teachings relevant to this subject are so numerous that we must confine the focus of this paper to a few selected suttas, such as the Angulimala Sutta (M II: 97 ff.), Ambalatthiéà Rahulovâda Sutta (MI: 414 ff), Aranavibhanga Sutta (MIII: 230 ff), Upanisâ Sutta (SII: 31-32), Kakacupama Sutta (MI: 122 ff), Kalama Sutta (A I: 188 ff), Madhupindika Sutta (MI: 108 ff), Kalahavivâda Sutta (Sn: 862-76), Metta Sutta (Sn: 143-52), and Sabbásava Sutta (MI: 6).
Buddhist Criteria of Wholesome and Unwholesome Actions
Before continuing with the methods of how to deal with conflicts let us examine a few criteria of non-violent action found in the Buddha's teaching.
o Any act is considered to be violent or unwholesome if it harms oneself, others (all beings) or both. The opposite of this, i.e., not to harm oneself, other beings or both, is non-violent and
wholesome (MI: 415 ff).

Reconciliation & Conflict Transformation 83
o Comparing oneself with others (all beings) one should not
harm or deprive any being of life (Dhp: 129-30). o Every wholesome act should be free from greed, ill-will and
delusion. Unwholesome or violent acts are acts based on greed, ill-will and delusion (AI: 189).
physical and verbal acts. Violence breaks out in society through the M expressions of these two channels. Thus, for the sake of any peace in society, it is useful to restrain physical and verbal acts. For this | reason sila comes first in the list of three training methods (tisikkha) namely sila (morality), Samadhi (concentration), and pañña (wisdom). That is how the five precepts have become the basic
training for any Buddhist.
Five Precepts
The five precepts (Cf. S II: 167) are useful as training rules for any person who wishes to cultivate sublime qualities (A I: 192; A III: 185) such as loving-kindness, compassion, appreciative joy and equanimity and mindfulness. The first precept helps one to train oneself to refrain from killing and to respect others' rights to live; the second to refrain from stealing and to respect others' rights to own property; the third to refrain from adultery and to respect others' rights to raise their family; the fourth to refrain from telling lies and to respect others' rights to be truthful, honest and confident; the fifth to refrain from intoxicants, respecting others' rights to be sane and mindful. When this training becomes one's habitual practice it will pave the way for a person to cultivate further levels of the training with insight. It is insight that helps one to see and to be in harmony with changing nature. One can then make use of the same fact of changing nature to change and transform one's attitudes positively.

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Attitudinal Transformation
As mentioned earlier it is natural that people are generally conditioned by various identities which eventually get diversified and proliferated by defiling tendencies, such as craving, speculative views and conceit. These three tendencies start growing in relation to the three processes of identity in terms of that 'this is mine' (etam mama), 'this am I (eso han asimi) and this is myself (eso me atta), respectively. Mental proliferations based on these tendencies become so powerful that they in their turn enslave and assail people, making them helpless victims. According to the Madhupindika Sutta, this is a general psychological pattern within any ordinary person. The methods of overcoming these processes of suffering are not confined to a supra mundane goal alone. Janam (knowing) and passam (seeing), which the Sabbasava Sutta suggests for conquering cankers or pollutants (disava) (MI: 7), are two terms useful as a method of transforming suffering into peacefulness
throughout the process of dealing with any conflict.
For this to be practically useful it needs further clarification. We know that anger violates our mental peace and harmony. However, we still tend to get angry when we are confronted with what we dislike. Let us take a step further, to be mindful of the entire process of what is going on within and outside our minds in order to make our mindfulness and observation more and more non-judgemental. Then we may know and see how each process of anger starts as a subtle level of dislike that develops into irritation, then into anger. Our act of knowing and seeing should follow the entire process, much as a keen observer would do watching from outside. (Natthi loke raho nama-papakammam pakubbato, attā te purisa jānāti—saccam vā yadi vā musā: There is no secret to one who commits unwholesome actions in the world, for your mind knows whether they are realistic or false (AI: 147). This method of training will pave the way for us to bring about a deeper level of insight into, for instance, the suffering of anger. An insight into suffering or insight into anger is neither suffering nor anger, but an

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KUWI,
insight, which constitutes a turning point from suffering into confidence (dukkhupanisa saddha), leading into the entire positive cycle of
wholesome experience (SII: 31). That is how attitudinal transformation
of any process of suffering is advocated in the teachings of the Buddha.
The key expression that I may repeat as the turning point of the process of suffering, transforming suffering into peace, is dukkhupanisa saddha, meaning: dependent on suffering, confidence arises. An old Chinese saying tells us, "Trouble is a tunnel through which we pass, not a brick wall to break our heads against.
Suffering comes in a cyclical pattern’, as explained in the Buddha's teaching. Ignorance and craving are significant links of this cycle. The act of knowing and seeing this cyclical pattern of suffering itself gives rise to another cycle of transformation of suffering. It is natural for a person to be confident of this transformation. As a result a person is delighted. Delight paves the way to joy; joy to tranquility; tranquility to happiness; happiness to concentration; concentration to knowledge and vision of things as they are; knowledge and vision to disenchantment; disenchantment to fading away; fading away to liberation; liberation to the knowledge of eradication (of defiling tendencies), (S II: 31-32). The positive process from the turning point, i.e., confidence up to the eradication of defilements, occurs in a cyclical pattern, too. Thus, every practitioner experiences all these characteristics in each person's capacity as a process of the cyclically advancing experience. It explains further that these qualities are worth making use of even at secular levels of cultivating peace and harmony.
Following the Middle Path without Clinging to it
The Aranavibhanga Sutta, i.e., the Exposition of Non-Conflict, draws our attention to the way of practising what is wholesome without
This is generally referred to as bhavacakka or samsaracakka.

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either extolling merely those involved in what is wholesome or disparaging those involved in what is unwholesome. The unwholesome here are the two extremes: the pursuit of sense indulgence and that of self-mortification. The wholesome is the practice of the Middle Way, i.e. the Noble Eightfold Path, which leads to peace-to nibbana. The practice and teaching of the Noble Eightfold Path is without conflict. In another context, the Buddha points out that a person who avoids the two extremes will not cling to the middle either, (So ubhantam abhiniiaya maiihe manta na lippati. Sn: 1048). The Alagaddapama Sutta refers to that one "should abandon even the teachings, how much more so things contrary to the teachings” (Dhammāpi vo pahātabbā pageva adhammā. M I: 135). With reference to how people violate their peaceful minds by disparaging and talking ill of others, a modern poem, written by Venerable Pelene Vajirajnana in Sinhala, reads as follows:
māge metek varada hā adukam tibeddi, kāge kotek varadavat nosoyam nodakvam donen midennata guņen nu vaņin videntat, vājam karam dinapatā sihiyen yedi mam
...when I have so much of weaknesses and shortcomings within myself, I will not look for the same in others; in order to get rid of my weaknesses and to cultivate sublime qualities and insight, I make efforts everyday based on mindfulness.
Reconciliation and Being in Harmony with Differences
Among various conditions of conflict, the Buddha points out how a person clings to his or her local language and faces conflicts. (Cf. tathagato voharati aparamasam: the tathâgata uses the language without clinging to it. DI: 202). The Buddha says that one should neither insist on local language nor override normal usage. For example, in
He belonged to the same Vajirarama Sangha tradition, Colombo, as
Venerable Narada who was junior to him in the Order.

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different localities people may call the same thing a dish (pati), a bowl (patta), a vessel (vittha), a saucer (serdiva), a pan (dharopa), a pot (pona), a mug (hana) or a basin (pisila), (M III: 235; Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, 1995: 1084). So whatever they call it in a certain locality, one speaks accordingly and it does not matter if others understand the same thing by different expressions.
Four Examples from Real Life Situations
Ехатple 1
When I was 22 I applied for a study programme at the Poly-technical College in Jaffna, despite objections from my teacher monks and my parents. I sat at an entrance examination and was selected for the twoyear study course: National Diploma in English from 1975 to 1977. Being a Buddhist monk at that time I had to get permission from my teacher monks to leave my temple for any distant place. Jaffna being the district where the majority of inhabitants are Tamil it was risky for a young monk in his early twenties to get settled there. This is why my teacher monks and parents discussed the matter for hours, hoping to discourage me from going to Jaffna. However, one of my teachers and my father finally agreed to accompany me to Jaffna. It was quite useful that my father managed to speak in Tamil because I had not learned any Tamil at that time. There were about 800 Tamil students, some ten Moslem students and one or two Sinhalese students at the college. I happened to be the first Buddhist monk to attend any study programme there-generally speaking it was unusual for a Buddhist monk to study at a technical college in Sri Lanka. However, I found a way of making it a suitable course for me because a monk would need an English education in order to contribute to the promotion of Buddhist studies and practice outside Sri Lanka.
My father translated what he heard from some students who saw me, a Buddhist monk (from the Sinhalese community) entering the college,

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"That yellow thing is coming (Tamil: manjal varian) My father asked me whether I would still want to continue following the course at that college. I said Yes. As I had told him many times, my motto was that it would be through loving-kindness that I would face any threats and challenges. I enjoyed reflecting on the Buddha's discourses, like the Metta Sutta and the Kakacupama Sutta, which deal with boundless loving-kindness. I also reflected on the stanzas, such as this one:
nahi uerena uerani - Sammantidha kuadalcanann averena ca sammanti — esa dhammo sanantano, (Dhp: 5), meaning that it is ever through loving-kindness that hatred is overcome, never through hatred.
My teacher monk and my father left me the following day. Residing at the Naga Vihara in Jaffna I travelled to Kokuvil (about two and a half kilometres north of Jaffna) by train to attend the course every day. I noticed a few classmates ignoring me, some even staring at me. I reminded myself of my motto, so whenever I saw an opportunity I asked them politely whether they could teach me a little Tamil. This way I continued learning Tamil from my classmates. Eventually I started talking to them in Tamil. Toward the end of the first year each study course organised a get-together. The student participants were supposed to present their performances in English. It was a surprise to everybody that I delivered a speech in Tamil. Of course, my Tamil could not be that good after just one year. However, they all applauded the attempt. -
In my second year I was able to move to a three-room house with all facilities that belonged to a Tamil gentleman, in Chunnakam, about eight kilometres north of Jaffna. At his invitation I taught Sinhalese to some Tamil students at his private institute, in the evenings. Almost everybody in that area knew me, since I was the only Buddhist monk in their village in 1976. The village had a few Hindu temples. When they celebrated special events and Hindu priests chanted mantras, I

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used to attend them. With their permission I recorded what they were chanting. They never forgot to send me a parcel of milk rice whenever they had a feast.
In spite of this generally friendly atmosphere I experienced a couple of unfriendly incidents. One time when I was walking home from the Chunnakam railway station two men on a cycle stopped me and scolded me, using harsh and rude words. As I had prepared my mind right from the beginning of my stay in Jaffna, I managed to respond to them with a smile and some polite expressions to explain briefly that they did not have any reason to scold me. I wished them peace and happiness. Finding no rivalry, they were silent for a while. I said vanakkam (goodbye, in Tamil) and took my leave. I was reflecting on the verse from the Dhammapada. It is ever through loving-kindness that hatred can be overcome, but never through hatred; this is the ancient rule. Another stanza states that one should conquer anger by non-anger, bad by good, miserliness by giving and one speaking falsehood by truth' (Dhp 5: 223).
Example 2
During the first few weeks of my studies at the Jaffna Poly Technical College (1975-77) I found one clever classmate pointedly ignoring me. That was Peter. However, I asked him whether he could teach me Tamil whenever he was free. To my surprise he agreed. I learned a few words and phrases at a time, how to pronounce and apply them. I also got some Pali stanzas translated into Tamil, e.g., stanza 136 of the Suttanipāta:
Na jaccā vasalo hoti - na jaccā hoti brāhmano
kammand vasalo hoti - kammand hoti brahmano, (Sn: 136).
(It is not by birth that one becomes superior or inferior, but by action). Peter translated it into Tamil:

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Pirappālsādiyil uyrndavaro tālindavaro yārum illei, oruvan seyyum seyalhale avanei nallavanākavum kettavanākavum ākkuhinrana.
I appreciated his way of teaching. In the course of a few months we became good friends. He told me and wrote in my class-book that earlier he had had only reasons to hate Sinhalese, but that now, thanks to associating with me, he had reasons to love Sinhalese.
By the end of 1976 he got an appointment as a translator from Tamil into English in a Government office in Colombo. He needed to borrow thirty rupees for the journey. We were then such good friends that he would borrow the money only from me. Later on he became a simultaneous interpreter from Tamil into English at the Parliament of Sri Lanka. He was not familiar with Colombo, so he asked me to help him find accommodation. I introduced him to a Buddhist monk in Colombo and the venerable monk arranged not only to provide him with a room in his temple free of charge, but also to invite him to share the food that the monks received from devotees, when he was there at meal times. In time, the Tamil gentleman, in his turn, agreed to teach English free of charge to the children who attended the temple activities on weekends. As a result, after a couple of years, several students of his became teachers of English as a second language. Regrettably, he left Sri Lanka in 1983, emigrating to England, due to the then ongoing riots involving unsettled ethnic issues in Sri Lanka.
Example 3
In 1992, I was still a Buddhist monk, residing at Stockholm Buddhist Vihara. Mr. Svein Myreng from Norway, who passed away in April 2007 and was an ordained lay teacher of the Venerable Thich Nhat Hanh, arranged to invite me to participate in a one-month-retreat at Plum Village in southern France. There were 225 participants in the retreat, most of them Americans and Europeans. We all meditated

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| together. In the course of about two weeks Ven. Thich Nhat Hanh asked one American gentleman to share his experiences with the
sighing a little. Then he asked us whether we had heard the sound of raining that morning. We did not quite understand what he was
trying to say but he quickly made it clear. Every little rain, he said,
He was responsible for killing many thousands of people. When America lost the war he and other veterans went back to America.
They were not welcomed in American society because they had come
home defeated. People only criticised them and looked down on
them. That particular veteran was so depressed that he eventually | became just a street fighter. Somebody then told him that Thich Nhat Hanh was in exile and conducted meditation retreats and counselling sessions for people like himself. He was very much in need of help but elt guilty asking a Vietnamese for help. Thich Nhat Hanh eventually went to see him, hugging him and telling him that he was not an enemy. Thich Nhat Hanh also invited him to his meditation centre, Plum Village in France. When he made up his mind and went there "Thich Nhat Hanh welcomed and looked after him. To conclude his talk he said that only the story about Angulimala from the time of the Buddha had given him a slight relief that it would be possible some day for people like him to get rid of such deep-rooted suffering as he was experiencing. A few years ago he published a book with all his experiences from war to peace entitled At Hell's Gate: A Soldier's
Journey from War to Peace. His name is Claude Anshin Thomas.
Stockholm Buddhist Vihara was established at Nybrogatan 75, W. Stockholm, on 26 April 1985 and I happened to be its first incumbent monk there. A couple of months after its inception I saw a few black ants in one of the two rooms of the temple. Within a few days they

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had grown into hundreds, thousands. People tried to clean the premises by using a vacuum cleaner, but I did not agree with the method because that would destroy the ants. The two rooms belonged to a translation firm. The director of this company warned me several times that he would lose the contract if I were to continue with so many ants on the premises. The rapid growth of ants and the continuous pressure from my landlord made me think of possible methods of getting rid of the ants without causing any harm to them. One evening about two weeks later the company director came in and warned me again that we would have to leave the premises, increasing pressure on me still further. Just after this visit it occurred to me that I should take responsibility for cleaning the temple. I sat cross-legged in front of the Buddha statue, concentrating my mind on metta (loving kindness): May no harm come to the ants and may they get away from the temple premises safely. After about one hour of focusing on metta toward ants I chanted the Ratana Sutta (Sn: 222-38) three times, holding a white thread of which one end was put into a glass of water, following the traditional ritualistic method. While chanting the Ratana Sutta I reflected on its meaning as much as possible, which made me happy and relaxed. By about 11.00 p.m., I sprinkled blessed water in the temple-apartment and went to bed. When I got up the following morning I found no ants. On the way to his office the director came in at about 7.30 a.m. the same morning and was surprised to notice that the ants had disappeared. The confidence this experience gave me was so great that I shared it with others whenever and wherever appropriate.
Conclusion
It is significant to trace the Buddhist measures of reconciliation and conflict transformation with reference to canonical texts. Wholesome acts are acts based on non-greed, non-ill-will and non-delusion. In other words these actions are based on generosity, loving-kindness and wisdom. Actions of this kind do not harm either others or oneself.

Reconciliation & Conflict Transformation 93
transformation should always be based on seeing (janam) and knowing (passam) and on sublime qualities, such as loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, equanimity and wisdom. A person should pervade all beings, including oneself, with loving-kindness. A
person should sympathise with all others' as well as one's own
|wiktific; such as anger, pride, vanity and jealousy, while cultivating sympathy and compassion. Listening to others who suffer from various
internal and external conflicts is a way of cultivating one's own
explanatory. It is meaningful to understand and follow the Noble Eightfold Path not only as a path leading to peace but also as a continuous path of peace throughout. This process may be seen as a
cyclically operating network of peace.
References
(The Pali editions of the Pali Text Society are referred to by the abbreviations given within brackets after each edition below).
Andersen, Dines and Helmer Smith (eds.) (1913) (re-printed 1990)
Suttanipáta (Sn) Oxford, Pali Text Society.
Length Discourses of the Buddha, Kandy, Buddhist Publication Society. Chalmers, Robert (ed.) (1896) (re-printed 1993) Majhima Nikaya II (M II)
Oxford, Pali Text Society.

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------- (ed.) (1899) (re-printed 1977) Majjhima Nikāya III (M III) London,
Pali Text Society. Davids, T. W. Rhys and J. Estlin Carpenter (eds.) (1890) (re-printed 1975)
Digha Nikaya I (D I) London, Pali Text Society. Hardy, E. (ed.) (1897) (re-printed 1976)Anguttara Nikaya III (A III)
London, Pali Text Society. Hinuber O. von and K. R. Norman (eds) (1995) Dhammapada (Dph)
Oxford, Pali Text Society. Léon Feer, M. (ed.) (1888) (re-printed 1989) Samyutta Nikāya II (S II)
Oxford, Pali Text Society. Morris, Rev. Richard (ed.) (1885) (re-printed 1989)Anguttara Nikaya I (AI)
Oxford, Pali Text Society. Oldernberg, Hermann (ed.) (1879) (re-printed 1969) Vinaya I (Vin II) London, Luzac & Company Ltd. For Pali Text Society. Trenckner, V. (ed.) (1888) (re-printed 1993) Maijhima Nikaya I (MI)
Oxford, Pali Text Society.

CHAPTER 5
Consolidation of Peace and Nation-Building
S.M.M. Ismail, M.M. Fazil & A. Rameez
Japan participated and played a larger political role in the internal and international conflicts than anytime since the post-cold war era. It marks a new development in Japanese foreign policy and its development assistance in conflict torn countries. While Norway has been a facilitator in keeping the talks going since February 2000, Japan's active involvement came after the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) of February 2002. After the peace process began, Japan became
one of the most active members in the international community and
has demonstrated a keen interest in establishing peace in the island (Fazil, 2008: 49-52). The basic objective of this study is to explore the peace-building efforts taken by the Japanese government in the internal ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka from 2000-09 to understand the
new phase of mediatory roles and its effects. Further, this study analyses Japan's foreign policy changes to promote "consolidation of peace and nation-building” (Koizumi, 2007: 2) in Sri Lanka. Finally, this study also examines Japan's collaborative engagement in Sri Lanka with the support of international community and its effectiveness in
A qualitative methodology has been used in this study and the analysis
has been of a critical descriptive nature. The method of data collection
Sri Lankan peace-building process.

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Introduction
Japan has been devoting considerable efforts to peace-building. Japan's peace and security is interlinked with international peace and stability (Fazil, 2008: 49-52). It is, therefore, in the interest of Japan's own peace and security to actively support peace-building activities in coordination with the international community that involved in mediatory roles and consolidation of peace and nation building process in Sri Lanka
Peace-building is a multi-dimensional task that requires a comprehensive and coherent approach. Japan has been promoting the approach of 'consolidation of peace' and 'nation-building since May 2002, when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi first proposed this idea in a policy speech delivered in Sydney, Australia (Fazil, 2008: 22). "This policy has become a new pillar of Japan's international cooperation" (Lam, 2004:3).
The targets of Japan's peace-building diplomacy include number of countries. Reinforcement of Tokyo's peace-building diplomacy is due to the fact that it had a desire to play an active political role with its status as the second largest economy in the world.
A continual image of Japan's foreign policy behaviour is its passive and reactive nature, and a focus on mercantilism and economics (Calder, 1998: 4).
Explanations for Tokyo punching below its economic weight in international affairs include: the legacy of militarism and defeat in World War II; an allergy among its East Asian neighbors toward a more assertive Japan in the military sphere; constitutional restrictions (Article 9) on Japan exercising the use of force to settle international disputes; a pacifistic political culture among the Japanese; resistance within the ruling coalition and opposition parties to Japan playing a more active military role abroad; and the idea that Japan, being a junior partner to the US superpower, should follow the lead of Washington in foreign relations (Lam, 2004:3).

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apan and Sri Lanka celebrated their golden jubilee of diplomatic elations in 2002. The two countries have maintained warm and riendly relations over the past 50 years. Sri Lanka is also known as a raditional friend and supporter of Japan. After World War II, Sri Lanka voluntarily waived any right to receive war reparations from Japan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and it was one of the countries that greatly contributed to creating an international environment favourable, both politically and economically, to the recovery and development of post-war Japan (Fazil, 2008: 49). Furthermore, since 1952, official as well as people-to-people relationships between the two countries have grown significantly through the combination of cultural and economic links between the two governments and the people. Since 2000, an active political relationship has been observed, as the Japanese government has opted to actively help the people and the government of Sri Lanka to find a solution to the ethnic disharmony and conflict among the country's Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority.
A new optimism for a long-lasting peace emerged when the Norwegian government was officially invited in 2000 by both the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to facilitate the peace process. This was followed by Japan being officially invited in 2002 by the GOSL to support for the government's peace bid with the Tamil Tigers, which the LTTE also looked forward to. It was believed to be the most successful attempt was to transform Sri Lanka's two-decade long civil war (Fazil, 2008: 1) into something that resembles peace had commenced with the dawn of the new millennium. The signing of the cease-fire agreement in February 2002 was a significant step taken to start a new beginning to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.
Objectives
The basic objective of this study is to explore the peace-building initiatives undertaken by the Japanese government in the internal ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka from 2000 to until 2009.

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Further, this study analyses Japan's foreign policy changes to promote 'consolidation of peace and nation-building in Sri Lanka. Finally, it examines Japan's collaborative engagement in Sri Lanka with the support of the international community and its effectiveness in Sri Lankan peace-building process.
Methodology
This study is a new phase of the international involvement of Japan in the Sri Lankan conflict thus making it a significant area of study. Japan's mediatory role is a remarkable effort in the history of negotiating peace attempts to resolve the island's protracted ethnic conflict.
This is a qualitative study and the aims of it are to be achieved by a systematic review and analysis of written material. The literary sources can be divided into two groups: (i) peace-building theory, Japan's peace-building efforts and general peace research of particular relevance to the objectives of the study; (ii) literature and research on the Sri Lankan history of the conflict, the latest developments in the peace process-including assessment and evaluation reports, official documents, press releases, letters, speeches and press articles. The research approach is to analyse empirical findings emerging from a review of the textual material in the second group, with the help of philosophy and the theories in the first.
The study was done also from structured and unstructured interviews with key Japanese officials, and attending symposium on "PeaceBuilding in Sri Lanka: Current Situation and Future Prospects" organised by the Outside Europe Research Group, the Japan Foundation and the MEXT Research Grant Programme. Furthermore, email-based structured interviews of university academics in Sri Lanka, titled "University Academics Perception on the Japan's Peace-Building in the Sri Lankan Peace Process from 2000 to until now” were conducted. Informal conversations and meetings have also contributed

Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka 99
to this study. In addition to the above, certain critical and urgent matters have been dealt through telephone interviews.
Conceptual Framework
Keating and Knight (2004: xxxi) argue in chapter two that peacebuilding has been adopted by national governments, non-governmental agencies (NGOs) and regional and international intergovernmental organisations (INGOs) as a means by which the outside world can contribute to the resolution of intrastate (or societal) conflict and to the reconstruction, or construction, of a culture of peace in post-conflict situations. Japan's peace-building begins with efforts to 'consolidate peace', namely, to push forward the process of peace, bring in humanitarian aid, such as assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), restore domestic security, and realise justice and reconciliation. This phase is followed by a process of"...nation building towards a democratic and independent nation through the development of political, judicial, and administrative systems, the development of economic infrastructure, and improvement in healthcare and education” (Fazil, 2008: 22-23). Mr. Tarao, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, stated in November 2006 that peace-building support is an important policy tool to expand freedom and prosperity throughout the world (Fazil, 2008: 22-23).
Briefly we can emphasis that the basic principle and features of Japan's peace-building supports as follows; a) Consolidation of peace and nation-building b) Respect for local communities and their ownership, and emphasis
on the perspective of 'human security
Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in the World Stage
Japan's peace-building initiative involves the government of Japan through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, related ministries and other government organisations including the Japan International

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Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) (Kawakami, 2002: 32-38). In addition to the government of Japan, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also have acted on peace-building with their own agendas.
To promote "...consolidation of peace and nation-building Japan is making efforts in many countries. Japan's desire to engage in peacebuilding is a reflection and an extension of its desire to play a more active role in international affairs after the 1991 Gulf War" (Lam, 2004: 5). "During the Cold War, Japan's support for United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO) was purely financial. The 1990-91 Gulf War demonstrated the immobility of the Japanese policy-making process and acted as the catalyst for a reconsideration of Japan's contribution of military personnel to UNPKO" (Hook et al. 2005: 382). However, in September 1991 the Japanese government proposed the Law on Cooperation on UN Peace Keeping and Other Operations (Fazil, 2008: 46).
The Peace Keeping Operation Law (PKOL) facilitated the participation of Japanese personnel in a number of peace-keeping and peace-building duties (Hooket.al: 383). Since the early 1990s, Tokyo has embarked on UNPKO in places including Cambodia and East Timor, seeking a mediatory role in interstate conflict (for example, the Spratlys dispute between China and the Philippines) and also intrastate conflict in Burma and Cambodia. In Burma, Japan tried to act as a bridge between the military junta and Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi; in Cambodia, Japan successfully brokered peace between two major (Cambodian) factions after armed conflict erupted between CoPrime Ministers Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh (Lam, 2004:5).
Nevertheless, with the relaxation of East-West tension in the late 1980s,
human (civilian) contributions by Japan to UNPKO began: twenty seven civilian were sent to Namibia in October 1989 as part of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group. Thereafter, six Japanese civilians joined UNPKO overseeing the Nicaragua and Haiti elections 1980-90 (Hook and Gilson 2005: 382).

Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka 101
Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme contribution to peace-building has been threefold: economic cooperation through its personnel, cooperation under the International PKOL which is mentioned above, and intellectual contribution in the international arena. Japan's ODA Charter revised in August 2003 stipulates peace building as one of the main pillars in the provision of ODA, and highlights the importance of addressing various causes of conflicts and providing swift and seamless assistance in response to changing situations (MOFA website).
The Japanese media, public opinion and Japan's East Asian neighbors (especially China and the two Koreas) are sensitive to the dispatch of Japanese troops abroad due to Japan's imperial record including World War II. Peace building diplomacy in Asia, unlike the dispatch of Japanese troops to places like Cambodia and Iraq, stirs neither controversy in domestic politics nor arouses the suspicions of Japan's neighbors. Moreover, the MOFA can also use peace building to burnish its image after being marred by a series of financial scandals (Lam, 2004:5).
Director, International Peace Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Mr. Kawakami had stated in his opinion speech:
Japan's role in PKO was preceded by considerable public debate, particularly over the issue of whether Self-Defense Forces (SDF) should be used. This was appropriate as it reflected a division in national opinion-a division that continues to exist. Fortunately for us, recent surveys indicate between 70% and 80% of the population today support PKO, but there are still individuals and political parties opposed to or undecided about Japan's PKO participation. This has not happened with peacebuilding. Certainly there are individuals who single out specific shortcomings, but there has been no real public debate or attempt at consensus building regarding Japan's involvement in peace building (2002:32-38).

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The Japanese state of mind is peace-friendly because of their painful experiences of World War II. Therefore, the public mentality of Japan does not support military personnel involvement in international and intrastate conflicts as peacekeepers, but peace-building is mostly a post-war activity with a basic expectation of ceasefire. Therefore, Japanese government prefers committing itself to the peace-building initiatives rather than peace-keeping thanks to their policies in terms of peace-building.
In order to avoid a one-dimensional dependence on the US-Japan Alliance, Tokyo has sought to supplement (not supplant) the coalition with multilateral approaches such as involvement in APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), and ASEAN Plus Three; supporting UNPKO; looking for free trade agreements and more recently, peace-building in Asia. Japan's role as a peacemaker also balances domestic and regional perceptions that the Country is embarking on a bigger military role as a supporter of the US-led war in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Moreover, Tokyo's diplomatic success in Asia including Sri Lanka would counter-balance the view that China stole a march on Japan when it offered a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area proposal to the Southeast Asian countries in 2001. If its efforts at consolidating peace in Asia are successful, Japan could even strengthen its case for earning a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Against this backdrop, Japan is spending billions of dollars for international peace and security or international development without a proper title of identification. In fact, role of Japan in Asia and the rest of the world generated strong output in terms of economic development. Furthermore, regionally, Japan is facing a real challenge to national security because of the recent North Korean atomic test. In the longterm, Japan should be strengthening its economy to compete with the rapid economic development of its neighbours China and South Korea, Japan needs proper identity to act as a peaceful international

Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka 103
force with its economic power. Japan's contribution to economic development and peace-making around the world might make it a
p p 3. 3 permanent member of the UN Security Council, with it being the second largest contributor to the UN’s regular budget except the United States.
Japan's Role in Sri Lanka
Since its independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has maintained its political system as a democratic country and has also promoted economic liberalisation and structural reform at an earliest stage among South Asian countries. Japan-Sri Lanka diplomatic relations go back to 1952, and Japan continue to support and maintain that relationship with Sri Lanka ever since.
Japan has been helping Sri Lanka's efforts for a negotiated political solution regarding the ethnic issue in the country and has extended ODA for facilitating the strengthening of peace and assisting socioeconomic development in the country. Japan hopes to provide assistance in much needed rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation in the post-conflict situation in the country primarily in the north and east.
Japan's ODA policy to Sri Lanka is stipulated in Outline of Japan's ODA to Sri Lanka
Japan's assistance for socio-economic development of Sri Lanka, which is striving for the economic liberalisation, aims to contribute to the consolidation of democracy and political stability in the whole South Asia region as well as securing safe sea lanes for the Japan's oil imports from Middle East.
Japan also aims to utilize the assistance to accelerate the peace process (MOFA website).
Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Sri Lanka has grown through the past half-century. Currently, Sri Lanka is a priority

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aid recipient country in Southwest Asia, and receives assistance in many forms, including grant aid, technical cooperation and loans.” The bulk of all external aid to Sri Lanka is given by Japan which is about 45 percent. In terms of per capita aid, Sri Lanka has received the largest amount in Asia (Chandrasekharan, 2003: 179).
In the matter of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, since the last decade Japan had been frequently motivating both conflicting parties to come together for negotiation. For easier understanding, particular statements since the year 2000 are shortlisted in the table below.
Japan's economic assistance to Sri Lanka, both technical and financial, also commenced under the Colombo Plan. Japan's programme of economic assistance to Sri Lanka commenced in the mid-1960s. The first such economic assistance from Japan to Sri Lanka was a Yen-loan (enshakkan) of US$5 million (1,800 million yen). It was provided as commodity aid (shohin-enjo) under the label of technical cooperation (gijugsu kyoryoku) in 1965 (Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)). The Japanese aid, which commenced in this manner, increased to $134 million or by about 27 times in 2000, making Japan the largest donor to Sri Lanka. Moreover, Sri Lanka was the eighth largest recipient of Japanese aid, in terms of both grants and loans in the last decade. Japanese grand aid, i.e. funds without any repayment obligations, also started in 1969. This initial assistance took the form of food aid: both $5 million (1,800 million yen). This type of aid also surged at an very rapid rate, raising the total volume of food aid to $37.20 million in 2000, an increase by about 74 times from 1969 (Ratnayake, 2003: 193-99).
The period 1977-2000 witnessed a dramatic surge, in general, of total ODA flows into Sri Lanka and in particular, of Japanese aid. During this period, both grant aid and loan assistance from Japan increased significantly. The cumulative volume of Japanese ODA disbursement to Sri Lanka (19972000) reached $3,073.94 million during this period (Ratnayake, 198-99). Between 1999 and 2002, just $25 million of Japanese aid reached areas in the war-affected north and east of the country, despite their growing humanitarian needs. Total aid from Japan was some $1.15 billion during the same period (Suvendrini Kakuchi, 2003).

105
Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka
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While Norway has been a facilitator in keeping the talks going since February 2000, Japan's active involvement dates from the post-Cease Fire Agreement in February 2002 (Lam, 2004: 8). When the peace process began, Japan became one of the most active members of the international community, which has demonstrated a keen interest in establishing peace on the island (Edirippullige, 2003, 202): 6-7).
In July 2002, Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Tyronne Fernando wrote to Kawaguchi seeking a role for Japan in Sri Lanka's peace process. However, Tokyo responded to that proposal only in 28 October 2002 taking more than three months to respond to Sri Lanka's request. Mediation is possible when there is a request from the conflicting parties. Bercovitch described mediation is a process of conflict management where conflicting actors or their representatives ask for assistance or accept an offered assistance, from individuals, groups, states or organisations (1992: 7). Bercovitch's view clearly explains that Japan had been invited by the Sri Lankan government to take a mediatory role in its internal conflict and also that the LTTE accepted it. Therefore, the Japanese government made the following necessary arrangements and efforts.
At a cabinet meeting on 25 October 2002, the government of Japan appointed Mr. Yasushi Akashi, former Undersecretary General of the
Japan's deepening involvement in the peace process was welcomed by the
Liberation Tigers too (TamilNet, 19 March 2003). Akashi's statement/speech at a donor-supported conference in Oslo on 26 November 2002: On the basis of the request made by the Sri Lankan Government, Japan will positively involve itself in reconstruction support in the north and east, while we appeal to the two parties to achieve sustainable peace, and we will do our share to contribute to the progress in process. He was the first Japanese citizen to join the United Nations Secretariat in 1957 and was Under-secretary-General in various capacities in the United Nations. In 1992-93 he was chief of UNTAC in Kampuchea, chief of UNPOFOR in Yugoslavia in 1993. Since 1999 he has served as chairman of the Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention. He comes in, therefore, with considerable experience in conflict resolution.

Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka 107
United Nations, as a Representative of the Government of Japan, with a view to contributing to Peace-building, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka (MOFA, 2002). Mr. Akashi has made more than 19 visits to the island since then (MOFA, 2009). He had made efforts to negotiate both conflicting parties and also has urged them to take a constructive approach towards direct talks.
Most interestingly, Japan's approach towards intrastate conflicts is reflected in recent comments made by Akashi which is a drastic change that has taken place in term of Japan's policy. Akashi goes on to say that "Japan will no longer be satisfied with writing out checks. We wish to be involved in the action too” (Edirippullige, 2003).
Akashi also became the prime advisor to the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN) established by GOSL and LTTE with the collaboration of the international community to offer tangible benefits to civilians living in those contested regions. "Besides establishing rapport with Colombo and the LTTE, he also sought international support for the Sri Lankan peace process. Akashi also visited the US, India, Norway and the United Nations for this purpose” (Lam, 2004: 10). Adding weight to Akashi's diplomatic efforts, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi visited Sri Lanka in January 2003; met with government leaders and toured the war-devastated northern town of Jaffna.
Japan hosted the sixth round of peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE from 18 to 21 March 2003 in Hakone. It organised the Tokyo Donor Conference in Tokyo held on 9 and 10
The drastic change taken place in Japan's approach towards intrastate conflicts is reflected in recent comments made by Akashi, "Japan will no longer be satisfied with writing cut checks. We wish to be involved in the action too." Proof for such a shift is Japan's recent involvement in conflicts, apart from Sri Lanka, in Afghanistan, East Timor, Ache in Indonesia and southern Mindanao in the Philippines (Edirippullige, Asia Times, Hong
Kong, 19 March 2003, http://www.atimes.com).

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June of 2003 for the reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka. At the Conference Japan’s Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi stated that Japan had been actively engaged in current efforts to build peace in Sri Lanka even before a formal peace agreement was concluded. He also pointed out that the purpose of the Tokyo Conference is in line with this initiative and that Japan will continue to make such endeavours throughout the world (US State Department Website).
Japan's Collaborative Engagement in Sri Lanka with Other International Actors
Diplomatic engagement on Sri Lanka has been characterised by almost weekly statements from some of the most powerful governments around the world, including the US, Britain, Japan and the regional power, India. Therefore, after certain early stages of the entry of Norway as the peace facilitator, it was considered important to have some major wealthy countries for a strong backing for Sri Lanka's peace initiative and strengthen their efforts in the implementation of any agreement between the two parties at conflict (Fazil, 2008: 59). In addition to that, in the second round of talks in November 2002, the GOSL and the LTTE jointly asked for international help to reconstruct the war-torn island. In April 2003, the GOSL announced that it needed US$ 1.3 billion to rebuild the country before it
attended a preliminary donor conference in Washington.
The Tokyo Donors Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka was scheduled to take place in June 2003. The LTTE was excluded from taking part in the preparatory meeting of the Conference which was to be held in Washington as the United States has proscribed the group as a foreign terrorist organisation. The LTTE, rather unexpectedly, announced that it was pulling out from talks in April 2003. Although the ostensible reason was exclusion from the Washington donors' conference, this seemed more excuse than explanation. Despite this high degree of internationalisation, the peace

Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka 109
signed in February 2002 (Pirani and Kadirgamar, 2006:1789). The GOSL, Norway and Japan worked until the last minute to persuade the LTTE to send a delegation to the Conference but their efforts did
institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). The engagement of the international development
community, led by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and many of the bilateral aid agencies, yielded pledges of 4.5 billion dollars in reconstruction and development aid at the Tokyo Donor Conference of June 2003. As time progressed towards the need of very important
and tough periods of diplomacy and incentives, the Tokyo Donor Conference took shape in the form of three countries, namely the United States, Japan and Norway together with the European Union, assuming the mantle of Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donor
Conference (Fazil, 2008: 59)
The tsunami reconstruction aid amounted to 2 billion dollars at the Development Forum in May 2005 (Sri Lanka Development Forum
| 2005) (Pirani and Kadirgamar, 1789). There was an influx of international NGOs and humanitarian organisations of the UN into
Sri Lanka, initially with the peace process in 2002, and then soon after the tsunami of December 2004. This diplomatic,
developmental and humanitarian engagement from international actors has led to both a high internationalisation of the Norwegian
peace process as well as the political economy of Sri Lanka. The high
level of investment in Sri Lanka's finances, resources and people
suggests that the international community desires to make a success
story out of Sri Lanka's peace process through post-conflict reconstruction and development.

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The international community advocated bringing peace to Sri Lanka by pledging aid. At the same time, it has proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. Now the LTTE is listed as a foreign terrorist organisation in countries such as India, the US, UK and more recently in Canada and the EU (Shastri, 2009: 90). As a consequence, the LTTE faced severe international setbacks particularly, after 11 September 2001. As a result of the EU ban, the LTTE demanded the EU member states, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, forming the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to leave the country. The Tamil tigers claimed that the three countries could not act neutrally towards the group when observing the ceasefire. The number of peace observers with the SLMM was reduced radically when the three EU members were forced to leave Sri Lanka on 1 September 2006.7
In the previous sections above, we have studied Japan's peace-making and peace-building roles in the world context and the recent peace negotiation process of Sri Lanka. Japan's involvement with the Norway has strengthened a stronger negotiation process. The Norwegian and Japan's peace initiatives helped Sri Lanka to grab international limelight, which channelled the international financial assistance into post-war
reconstruction activities. However, the brokered Cease Fire Agreement is on the brink of being collapsed since the GOSL and the LTTE
Negotiations handled by the SLMM had largely broken down by the time the LTTE refused to take part in April's Oslo talks in 2003. Then in May 2003, the European Union joined the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Canada, and Australia in listing the Tigers as a terrorist organisation, in effect stopping the flow of funds from the Tamil diaspora in Europe to the militants. The LTTE retaliated by demanding EU members of the SLMM withdraw, halving the size of the body to solely Norwegian and Icelandic nationals. The SLMM has also lost ground with the Sri Lankan government, which rejected the monitors' claims that the military had a role in a massacre of Tamil aid workers in Muttur. Teresita C. Schaeffer, former U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka and director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says the SLMM has become irrelevant.

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prepares for a renewed civil war once again. The next section analyses the above discussed Sri Lankan conflict and peace negotiations by applying the theoretical framework to understand the effectiveness of Japan's peace-building efforts in Sri Lanka.
Japan's efforts in Sri Lanka pushed forward its negotiation process to a certain extent. Pushing forward is interpreted as working as a mediator between the conflicting parties with a goal to take them to the negotiation table, supporting them to make useful discussion and mainly working as a peace broker. Japan's government representative and Japan's embassy in Sri Lanka have continuously pushed the GOSL and the LTTE to cooperate and participate in a productive way. Whenever Mr. Akashi visited Sri Lanka he met the President, Prime Minister, other ministers and government officials (TamilWin 2007). He also visited to Vanni and met the LTTE leader Prabhakaran, political leaders and other high-ranking militant leaders. After the visit, he shared both side's views and highlighted the Japanese government's views and assistance. Both sides respected him and especially his efforts in confidence-building among the conflicting parties when the negotiation process stood at a deadlock. The peace processes from 2002 to 2006 are to a certain extent internationalised in that at the event of any important development ambassadors/ high commissioners of developed countries in Colombo gather immediately and release statements and, at times, negotiate with the government and the LTTE (Interview). In the diplomats meetings for evaluate peace process were held in Colombo, Japan's
Japanese ties with Sri Lanka have traditionally been very government
focused. Thus, engagement with the LTTE was obviously a new dimension. There are no legal restrictions on the LTTE in Japan. The movement's legal status does not seem to be an issue of concern to the Japanese government and they maintained contact with Kilinochchi so long as the Sri Lankan government concurs.
* Interview, Officer of MOFA 2007 (Iwase, 14-03-2007).

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ambassador or its officials are actively involved and try to normalise the situation. In the past, third party could facilitate engagement in the internal conflict; this has been clearly succeeded by the Japanese government and its representatives.
Moreover, the sixth round of peace talks at Hakone, Japan in March 2003 was a very important example of their efforts to negotiate with both protagonists. This was the last dialogue before the LTTE suspended its continued participation in the negotiation process. Japan's new approach of diplomacy directed towards peace-building can be seen through this kind of political role of mediation in this intrastate conflict.
Since the beginning of the peace process in Sri Lanka, the government of Japan and its organisations such as JICA, JBIC and other NGOs/ NPOs have been actively contributing to fulfil humanitarian assistance and reconstruction programmes under peace-building in the waraffected North, East as well as South of Sri Lanka (Interview).
o The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) held the sixth session of peace talks at Hakone, Japan from 18 to 21 March 2003. The parties met amid growing security concerns following recent incidents on land and at sea. While they acknowledged that parallel progress is needed in negotiations on security, economic and political issues, the parties left no doubt that they must now give top priority to improving the security situation, in particular, at sea. The parties undertook to enforce better compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement by their personnel (Press Statement of Royal Norwegian Embassy Berlin, 2003).
Interview Officer of JICA (Hiroyuki, 12-10-2006). Since 2002, Japan has utilised ODA positively before a full peace agreement was signed, in order to contribute to the peace process in Sri Lanka. Also, inside and outside of Japan, JICA has strengthened the collaboration with governmental organisations and NGOs providing reconstruction assistance in Sri Lanka through periodical meetings. Utilising these successful results, community development assistance is ongoing in the northern region, where many people became internally displaced by the conflicts. At the same time, community development assistance in the southern region is being considered.
 

Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka 113
in the process, Japan is sharing her humanitarian or human security ssistance with Sri Lanka and has been diplomatically encouraging oth parties to come to the negotiation table. As Japanese overnment Representative on the Reconstruction and Development fSri Lanka describes, "Japan's interest in Sri Lankan peace, as well as evelopment became more focused, more organized, with greater articipation of various Japanese entities.... Norway is the diplomatic acilitator, Japan is the aid coordinator so to say, the US has its unquestioned military and political clout, and the European Union combines the resources of Europe” (Akashi, South Asia Monitor,
007).
or Japan, aid is not a means of applying political pressure. Instead, it a channel for bringing the fruits of peace'. This not only involves a peace dividend for the North and East, but for the general economic tate of Sri Lanka as a whole. The Japanese argue that there are countrywide connections between peace, economic development and olitical stability. Economic development (with international support) will help resolve the conflict. Therefore, Japan's peace-building invests s hope on the economic development of Sri Lanka. This was also the ogic behind the Tokyo Donor Conference. On 9 and 10 June 2003, Akashi stated,
...we sponsored a major international conference on the rehabilitation and development of Sri Lanka that was attended by 51 governments and 22 international organizations, including the UN. So Japan's interest in Sri Lankan peace and development became more focused, more organized, with greater participation of various Japanese entities (Akashi, South Asia Monitor, 2007).
The conference issued the Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka. The Declaration reconfirmed the nitiation of the peace process and the introduction of a federal ructure within a united Sri Lanka and recognised the role of the conference itself as a donors' community for helping the reconstruction

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and development of Sri Lanka as a whole including the northern and eastern regions of the country. The Declaration also underlined the immediate need to establish an interim administrative system and report the result of the conference to the LTTE. In addition, the Declaration also emphasised the concept of linkage' between the donor's support and the progress in the peace process in that the donors' assistance could be executed in accordance with the progress in peace-building (JICA, 2006). However, unfortunately the LTTE withdrew from the peace negotiations in April of 2003 that posed a question mark on the pledge of donors (ICG, 2006: 6-8; GOSL, 2002; Goodhand and Klem, 2005: 20).
One of the important outcomes of the Tokyo Donor Conference was the establishment of the Co-Chairs to promote the Sri Lankan peace process on 12 September 2006. The Co-Chairs, representing European Union, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway are deeply alarmed by the recent deliberate violations of the Ceasefire Agreement by the Parties. These escalated violence resulted in massive and widespread human suffering, including the abuse of human rights, the displacement of innocent citizens, a humanitarian crisis and an exodus of refugees to India. Meanwhile, representative of Japanese government who actively participated in Co-Chairs meetings and makes efforts for the resumption of peace talks between the GOSL and the LTTE. As a result of the Tokyo Donor Conference, it was pledged a large amount (4.0 billion) of aid to Sri Lanka and until July 2006 it was about 20 percent of aid distributed to Sri Lanka (Akashi’s Speech, 2006).
In spite of the Japanese government's assumption that the peace process would proceed as per the aspirations of the Tokyo Declaration, the progress of initiating peace has been quite disappointing. The Japanese government expressed "deep concern over the current political crisis, in the backdrop of both Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE blatantly violating CFA, which has kept the Sri Lankan peace talks in suspension” (MOFA, 2004) and they have even

Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka 115
emphasised the continuation of the Tokyo Declaration. "Japan will have to carefully consider and respond to the substantial progress of the peace process,” argued the Country Assistance Programme almost the year after Tokyo Conference (Embassy of Japan in Sri Lanka website, 2004). However, it was observed that the actual aid disbursement of Japanese government towards Sri Lanka did not link with poor progress of the peace process.
Many projects are being continued in the war-affected North, East and rest of the country. Since 2002, the government of Japan has provided approximately US$ 95 million by way of project assistance for the development and welfare of the Northern and the Eastern areas of Sri Lanka. This includes the "PEACE Project for rehabilitation of irrigation facilities, the 'MANRECAP Project' for community development of conflict-affected communities, Non-project Grant Aid for Tsunami rehabilitation etc. (Embassy of Japan in Sri Lanka website, 2007). Japan provides humanitarian assistance to war-affected communities' and victims of tsunami. In the North of Sri Lanka the Japanese government reconstructed Vavuniya District Hospital which is not only catering to the Vavuniya district but also the whole of Vanni region and a very essential humanitarian need for war-affected local community. According to the outline of 2004 Japan ODA to Sri Lanka, the following projects were completed in Sri Lanka. The construction of new highway bridge at Manampitiya (Grant Aid), Mannar District
' The government of Japan has made a donation in kind of 3,175 tonnes of
rice for the displaced people in the Northern and Eastern areas of Sri Lanka. The official handing over ceremony was held at Orugodawatte Warehouse on 27 April, 2007. This assistance in kind by the government of Japan was implemented through the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), Embassy of Japan in Sri Lanka. The government of Japan has granted over 1,043 million Japanese Yen (approximately Rs. 1,000 million) towards the construction of the new highway bridge at Manampitiya, which was officially commissioned to the Sri Lankan Government on 25 October 2007. The new Manampitiya Peace Bridge is 302 meters in length and 10.4 meters wide. Parallel to the

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Rehabilitation and Reconstruction through a community approach project (Technical Assistance) and Vavuniya-Kilinochchi Transmission Line Project (Yen loan) were some of them. Furthermore, the Japanese government funded the reconstruction of the Mannar Bridge and its causeway with a view to enabling the main Mannar Island to be reconnected to the mainland which is one of the most important projects in the country, was opened to the public in March 2010.
The government of Japan has extended further support for humanitarian de-mining activities in Sri Lanka and has provided a grant of US$ 3.2 million (approximately Rs. 358 million) to five International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) in order to accelerate de-mining activities in the North and East in the year 2007. In addition to this grant, in the past Japan has contributed more than US$ 12 million (approximately Rs. 1,342 million) to Sri Lanka for mine clearance activities (MOFA, 2007)."*
construction of this new concrete bridge, the approach roads to the bridge have also been constructed to suit the geographical requirements of the bridge, thereby reducing the present traffic congestion and facilitating easy accessibility and faster mobility between North Central Province and Eastern Province. The new Manampitiya Peace Bridge, which has been constructed exclusively for vehicular traffic, will play an important role in accommodating the high volume of traffic on the All road, thereby contributing to the overall improvement of the infrastructure and economic growth in the country (Embassy of Japan in Sri Lanka, 2007). However, this project, "Reconstruction of Mannar Bridge” must be treated as one of the most important projects in this context. Approximately 40,000 people living in the Mannar Island will be directly benefited by this project by way of safe, smooth and increased inward and outward movement of people and essential commodities. It will also facilitate the resettlement of IDPs from a humanitarian aspect. In this context, the Mannar Bridge could be seen as a "Peace Bridge” which will help the restoration of livelihoods of the conflict affected people and communities in Mannar (Embassy of Japan in Sri Lanka, 2007). The Five INGOs are, The Danish De-mining Group (DDG), The Halo Trust, The Mines Advisory Group (MAG), The Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). The grants were
 

Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka 117
The costal belt of Sri Lanka (especially Northern and Eastern provinces) was the hardest hit area; a result of the civil war and also the tsunami. Thus, the area was desperately in need of construction and infrastructure development. Japan's humanitarian projects were absolutely appropriate in the area in terms of the needs of the people. A number of valuable tsunami assistance project on relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction were provided by the Japanese government after the tsunami devastation in 2004 in Sri Lanka. Medical equipments, electricity and generators, bridges and causeways, water bowzers and tanks, gully suckers, school reconstruction, 5S training for school administrative system, road reconstruction, vehicles, icing plant, fishing boats and canoes were provided by the Japanese government during the recovery period. Furthermore, Japan established a friendship village in the Eastern Province which was a peculiar initiative undertaken by the Japanese government and it also undertook Kalmunai Township Redevelopment (KTR) Project in 2008 to promote the town to a greater level.
Moreover, despite the fact that the re-escalation of war since 2006 was witnessed, Japanese government tried to push-forward the Sri Lankan government to find a solution through all parties' consensus to the internal ethnic conflict of the Island via bilateral relations. In this context, President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Foreign Minster Rohitha Bogollagama visited Tokyo from 8 to 11 December 2007 and had a discussion with Mr. Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan and its Foreign Minister Mr. Masahiko Koumura. This discussion mainly focused on the ongoing war, human rights situation, humanitarian issues, economic Cooperation and cooperation in the international arena. Further Japan has provided a continuous supply of enormous aid (food aid) to address the post-war humanitarian crisis' and also
provided for a period of one year, for de-mining activities in several locations in Jaffna, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Vavuniya, Mannar, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu (MOFA website). The government of Japan has decided to extend grant aid (food aid) for vulnerable groups in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (500

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implemented the community participatory peace-building projects. To top it all, economic cooperation of the Japanese government in the island is also continuing without any interruptions.
Conclusion
Actually Japan's mediatory role in Sri Lanka reached a deadlock in 2003. Some scholars also argue that Japan's mediation in Sri Lanka has failed. However, Japan's peace-building initiative still continues in Sri Lanka in terms of development assistance and reconstruction in different aspects. Despite the fact there was no prospect for peace dawning in Sri Lanka by the initiative undertaken by the Japanese government in Sri Lanka, it still plays a key role in the aid distribution coupled with other countries. Amidst an escalation of violence in the island (Sri Lankan) since 2006 to May, 2009, there was no sign of completion of the projects being undertaken by Japanese government in the island too. In the mean time, it is observed that there is strong opposition growing from different angles in Sri Lanka for Norwegian peace facilitation, especially from majority community. On the contrary to this scenario, Japan's effort is still appreciated by all Sri
million yen, 19 December 2007). Mr. Koumura stated that Japan intends to implement economic cooperation to support the medium and long-term economic development, poverty eradication and promotion of the consolidation of peace in Sri Lanka. In this regard, Mr. Koumura explained that Japan will make a formal decision on grant aid of 1,900 million yen next week (14 December 2007). Japan has extended since October 2008 food aid of 5,250 tons of rice to civilians in the northern part of Sri Lanka through the World Food Programme (WFP). On 1 May (Fri), the Government of Japan decided to extend emergency grant aid of up to 4 million dollars (412 million yen) as assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1 May 2009). Japan intends to implement immediate assistance in cooperation with international organisations such as the United Nation Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Japan's Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka 119
Lankans. To top it up, the healthy climate that prevailed over the last one year in the country in the aftermath of the defeat of terrorism in 2009, provided a venue for more development aids flowing from Japanese government towards Sri Lanka. The recent agreement signed by Sri Lankan government and Japanese Special Envoy Yasuki Akashi on the pledge of US$ 436.4 million for development projects in Sri Lanka by Japanese government is a solid testimony for the continued support of Japanese government in the postwar situation in Sri Lanka (Sirilal, 2010). Therefore Japan has a possibility to continue its efforts as a peace broker as well as peace-building contributor.
References
BBC (21 July 2006) "Tigers Reject EU Monitors Appeal", available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/ south_asia/5203216.stm, accessed on November 2006. Bercovitch, Jacob (ed.) (1996) Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory
and Practice of Mediation, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers. Calder, Kent (1988) "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation:
Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics, 40 (4), pp. 517-41. Chandrasekharan S. (2003) "Sri Lanka: Japan and Peace Talks - there is a need to tread carefully", South Asia Analysis Group, Note No. 179, available at http://www.saag.org/ notes2/note179.html, accessed on November 2006. Edirippullige, Sisira (2003) "Japan's Roles in Sri Lankans Peace Process", Asian Times Online, available at http://www.atimes.com, accessed on 9 December 2008. ------ (2003) "Japan's New Role in Peace-building: Sri Lankan Experience",
Asia Pacific, 2 (2), pp. 6-3. Embassy of Japan in Sri Lanka, Press Releases, available at http://www.lk. emb-japan.go.jp/eg/contents/press%20releases/Press%20releases.htm# childcare, accessed on 23 September 2010. "EU Bans Sri Lanka's Rebel Tamil Tigers-Diplomats,” Washington Post, 29
May 2006. Fazil, M.M. (2008) Roles of Norway and Japan in the Peace Negotiations in Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka from 2000-2006, Unpublished Thesis, Meiji University, Tokyo.

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Frerks, Georg and Klem, Bart (2006) Conditioning Peace among Protagonist A study into the use of Peace Conditionality in Sri Lankan Peace Process, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', Conflict Research Unit. Goodhand, Jonathan and Bart Klem (2005) Aid. Conflict and Peace-Building in Sri Lanka 2000-2005, Strategic Conflict Assessment Report on Sri Lanka, Vol. 1. Hook, G. D., J. Gilson, C. W. Hughes and H. Dobson (2005) Japan's International Relations: Politics Economics and Security, Routledge, London and New York. ICG (International Crisis Group), (2006) Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, Asia Report No. 124 available at http://www.crisisgroup. org/-/media/Files/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/124 sri lanka the failure
of the peace process.ashx accessed on 23 September 2010. "Japan welcomed by the Liberation Tigers", available at www.tamilnet.com,
accessed on 19 March 2006. Japan's ODA (Official Development Assistance), available at www.mofa.
go.jp/policy/oda/index.html, accessed on 18 July 2009. JICA's (Japan International Cooperation Agency) Activities in Sri Lanka, available at http://www.jica.go.jp/srilanka/english/activities/, accessed on 30 July 2009. Kakuchi, Suvendrini, "Japan's New Embrace of Peace Diplomacy", available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EB06Dh01.html, accessed on 29 September 2010. - Kawakami, Tereo (2002) "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding-Japan's Role"-Co-organised by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JILA) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 5-7 February 2002. Keating, Thomas F. Keating and Andy W. A. Knight, Andy, W.A. (eds.)
(2004) Building Sustainable Peace, United Nations University Press. Keiichi, Tango, (2004) "Conflict and Development: Role of JBIC, Development Strategy for Peace-Building and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka”, Report, Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). Koizumi, Junichiro, Japan’s Cooperation for Consolidation of Peace and Nation Building, available at http://www.mofago.jp, accessed on 20 July 2009. ----- Inaugural Address of the Tokyo Donor Conference, http://www.
state.gov accessed on 10 October 2008. Lakshman, W. D. (2003) the Distant Neighbors: Fifty Years of Japan-Sri
Lanka Relations, Faculty of Graduate Study, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

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Lam, Peng (2004) "Japan's Peace Building Diplomacy in Sri Lanka”, East
Asia: An International Quarterly (US & UK), 21 (2), pp. 3-17. Lederach, J. P. and Janice Moomaw Jenner (eds.) (2002) A Hand Book of
International Peace Building into the Eye of the Strom, Jossey-Bass. ----- (1997) Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Society, USIP
Press. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan "Outline of Japan's ODA to Sri Lanka," available at www.mofa.go.jp/policyloda/region/sw_asia/srilanka. o.pdf accessed on 23 September 2010. MOFA, (2010) Japan's ODA, White Paper 2, available at http://www.mofa.
go.jp/POLICY/oda/white/2002/part12_3.html accessed on 23 July. 2010. Morrison, Alex, Ken Eyre and Roger Chiasson (eds.) (1997) Proceedings of
the 1996 Canada-Japan Conference on Modern Peacekeeping, Cornwallis, The Canadian Peacekeeping Press. ------ (eds.) (1996) UN Peace Operations and the Role of Japan, Cornwallis,
The Canadian Peacekeeping Press. Mulgan, Aurelia (1995) "International Peacekeeping and Japan's Role: Catalyst or Cautionary Tale?” Asian Survey, 35 (12) (December 1995), pp. 1102-17. Official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan, Japan Sri Lanka Relations, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/srilanka/, accessed on 22 July 2009. Paramanathan, M. (2007) Ceasefire Agreement Facilitated By Norway at Stake (Unpublished Thesis), Jonkoping International Business School, Jokoping University. "Peace and the Tamil Tigers?” Editorial on the LTTE's funding channels, The Washington Post, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ accessed in December 2008. Pirani, Cenan and Ahilan Kadirgamar (2006) “Internationalization of Sri Lanka's Peace Process and Governance, A Review of Strategic Conflict Assessments”, Economic and Political Weekly, 6 May 2006, pp. 178995; also available at http://www.internationalcentregoa.com/southasia/ 10053.pdf accessed on 23 September 2010. Press Statement of Royal Norwegian Embassy Berlin, 2003 available at
http://www.theexpressinstitute.com. Ratnayake, Piyadasa (2003) "Official Development Assistance from Japan Donor Motivations and Recipients Perceptions" in W. D. Lakshman

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(ed.), The Distant Neighbours: Fifty Years of Japan-Sri Lanka Relations, Chapter 10, pp. 222-46. Shastri, Amita (2009) Ending Ethnic Civil War: The Peace Process in Sri Lanka, Commonwealth et Comparative Politics, 47 (1), pp. 76-99. Srilal, Ranga, "Japan Urges World Not to Dictate to Post-War Sri Lanka” available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65F23320100616 accessed in 16 June 2010. TamilNet, "Japan Deepens Sri Lanka Peace Role", available at
www.tamilnet.com accessed ón 28 March 2006. Teresita C. Schaffer (2009) "SLMM has become irrelevant” available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11407/sri lankan conflict.html#6 accessed on 19 July 2009. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2003 April), Summary of the 2002
White Paper on Official Development Assistance. "Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka 10 June 2003" available at http://www.mofago.jp/region/asia-paci/srilanka /conf0306/declaration.html accessed on 30 July 2010. US State Department, http://www.state.gov/, accessed on July 30, 2009. Yasushi Akashi, South Asia Monitor, Tokyo, July 25, 2006 (IANS) it is the text of the interview given by Yasushi Akashi, Japan's special envoy to Sri Lanka, to LANS Deputy Editor M. R. Narayan Swamy, available at http://www.southasiamonitor.org/2006/jul/news/26n3.shtml accessed on 10 October 2008.
Speeches/Lectures
Following resource persons were delivered speech or lecture at the symposium on "Peace-Building in Sri Lanka: Current Situation and Future Prospects” organised by the Outside Europe Research Group, the Japan Foundation and the MEXT Research Grant Programme on 15-06-2006 at the Auditorium, Japan Foundation, Tokyo.
Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Representative of the Government of Japan on Peace
Building, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Sri Lanka. Dr. Jehan Perera, Executive Director, National Peace Council, Sri Lanka. Dr. S. H. Hasbullah, Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography, University
of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. Dr. T. Jayasingham, Eastern University, Sri Lanka

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Name of the Interviewee
Mr. Tanaka Hiroyuki, Senior Country Officer, Southeast Asia Team, Regional Department II, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (12-10-2006).
Mr. Kiichiro Iwase, Southwest Asia Division Asian and Oceania Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (14-03-2007).
Informal Conversation and Meeting
Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Representative of the Government of Japan on Peace Building, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Sri Lanka (15-062006).
Prof. N. S. Cooray, Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan (20-08-2006 & 09-12-2007).
Prof. Kenji Isezaki, Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies, Graduate School of Area and Culture Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan (01-02-2007).
Prof. Monte Cassim, President, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan
(09-12-2007).

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CHAPTER 6
Kashmir: Building Peace through Democratic Governance
Karuna Thakur
For two decades, armed militancy has been an ongoing phenomenon in the Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley of India. In 1989, there was a mass upsurge of protest against the government of India for adopting discriminatory policies since 1947 and denying to Kashmiri people their legitimate democratic rights and freedom. The cumulative discontent of many decades found expression in the form of armed militancy and a demand for secession from the Indian state. As the state apparatus collapsed, the militants gained ascendance resulting in mass migration of minority Hindu community of Pandits from the Valley. The violent conflict of two decades has deeply affected the socio-political scene of the Valley. The economy has suffered a setback and shows no signs of improvement. Return of Kashmiri Pandits remains uncertain. Continuing presence of armed forces invested with anti-terrorist laws has caused serious concern about human rights violations. Even though the democratic process has been revived since 2002, given the multiplicity of issues involved in the multi-cultural and multi-regional state, the government faces a serious challenge of reconstruction and peace-building. The present paper is divided into four sections. The first locates the problem of militancy within the theoretical framework of ethnicity, nationalism and separatism. The second section analyses the factors leading to the alienation of Kashmiri people. The third section deals with the impact of militancy in the state and the last section explores various measures for building
durable peace and stability in the Valley.

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Ethnic Identities: A Theoretical Framework
The concept of a community is subject to a variety of interpretations. In simple words it means a group of people sharing common interactive bonds in a localised context. In terms of membership, it is further defined as voluntary or involuntary (Chandoke, 1999: 243). Unlike an occupational or recreational community where membership is acquired by conscious effort, a religious, caste or racial community is involuntary in nature and is determined by birth. It is of critical importance to human beings who derive their identity from it in a way that the 'valuation' and 'degradation of the community becomes inseparably linked with their own value and dignity (Chandoke: 243). They may feel a sense of loss and even crisis if disconnected from the same. The community also provides its members with a resource or a framework called 'culture' which enables them to evaluate, interpret or make sense of the world (Chandoke: 244). Therefore, ethnic identity is defined by reference to features like shared territory, ancestry, beliefs, historical memory and a feeling of belonging of a selfconscious group which makes use of its identity markers in symbolic or effective ways to distinguish itself from the other groups in the Society.
Identities with their multi-dimensional characteristics are fluid in nature and assert on the basis of one feature or the other. How and when a given variable gains salience is subject to variation and depends upon a number of contextual, structural and contingent factors. Often, motivation for assertion stems from a perceived sense of denial, deprivation and exclusion. Depending upon such a perception a group asserts for change of status, recognition or valuation of its identity. The transformation from an ethnic to a national group occurs when it makes political claims for separation, secession, autonomy or self-rule. However, emotional and sentimental factors are equally significant in fostering bonds of unity which can be expressed in a variety of ways like love for a historical experience, memory or a tradition. This

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argument is supported by Gellner (1983: 11) who regards nationalism as foremost a political principle which requires the congruence of political and national units. In Kohn's (1951: 3) observation the concept of a nation is reinforced at both the social and psychological levels; which means that in a society where multiple groups compete for recognition, the one which an individual accepts as supreme is the nation. In his view political nationalism is, above all, a 'state of mind E and consciousness'. For Anderson (1991: 5-7) nation is an imagined community with a deep sense of belonging which can inspire its members not just to kill but also die for the love of it.
There are divergent views on how identities are formed and mobilised. The perrenialists' emphasise 'continuity as a factor in the growth of a nation rather than its organic or naturalist features as the primordialists do. The so called "Continuous perennialism', thus underlines the importance of history or antiquity of a nation and regards it as a perennial form of human association (Smith, 2005: 50). Recurrent nationalism’ on the other hand refers to a 'collective cultural identity which may take a variety of forms or shapes in different periods (Smith: 51). For the primordialists, identities are given and determined by birth, descent, kinship and founded on a non-rational basis. The constructivists on the other hand, regard ethnic or national identities as constructed by human instruments and efforts rather than the given factors. However, it is fair to argue that they are the outcome of a complex interplay of both the processes: primordial and instrumental. The cultural resource of a community is designed by the elite to suit popular impulses and then channelled into the public domain for mobilisation.
Factors like modernisation, relative deprivation and strain are crucial variables in determining the levels of competition among rival groups in a society for gaining control over political and economic resources. However, it is the political context defined by government policies and institutional structures, their capacity to centralise, accommodate, Co

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opt or adapt which significantly influences the nature, strength and weakness of identities. The availability of alternative spaces to channel demands with the freedom to organise, modify or change group orientation and can also determine the course of such movements (Brass, 1991: 75). Clearly, scholars draw a close inter-relationship between levels of political institutionalisation and incidence of group conflict. Deeper the institutionalisation, greater is the capacity of the system to deflect or accommodate demands from the society.
Atul Kohli (2000: 11) asserts that multicultural and developing societies suffer from weak institutionalisation as democracy was imposed on them over short periods. In the absence of mediatory intuitions, politics in these societies becomes personalised and plebiscitary. Therefore, the degree of institutionalisation and strategies of leadership are the most important variables that influence selfdetermination or separatist movements in the third world countries. He asserts that unaccommodating leaders who adopt inflexible approaches and take recourse to coercive options can lead to a situation of civil war or even violent conflict.
Militancy in Kashmir can be explained with reference to the theoretical framework presented above. The Indian state pursued interventionist and unaccommodating policies in Kashmir, which caused discontent among the people. The political context in Kashmir also lacked the mediatory capacity to channel discontent and accommodate aspirations of the people, resulting in a vacuum, which was filled by secessionist forces. Anthony Birch asserts that certain preconditions make a justifiable case for secession. For instance, a long history of denial and discrimination, forcible annexation of a region, failure to protect security as well as the political and economic interests of the inhabitants. He argues that a history of broken promises, losses and potential gains make a strong case for secessionist movements though the factors that mobilised large number of people to a nationalist cause are ultimately local, popular, contingent, and

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often unpredictable (Birch, 1989: 65). A similar argument is extended by Viva Bartkus (1999: 18-23) who points out that there are four necessary elements for secession: distinct community, territory, leaders and discontent. The timing of the secession is determined by four crucial variables: the benefit of continued membership in a larger political entity, the cost of such membership, the cost of secession and the benefit of secession. A shift or imbalance in these four variables in a sudden manner or over a period of time can cause secession.
These background conditions were present in Kashmir Valley in 1989. The Kashmiris perceived an imbalance in the cost benefit ratio of continued membership in the state. They perceived greater benefits of secession than continued membership of the Indian state. However, no autonomy or secessionist movement can either grow or sustain itself without diplomatic and logistical support from an external power. The genesis, growth and the subsequent dynamics of militant movement in Kashmir have been greatly influenced by the support extended by Pakistan in every possible manner.
Political Alienation
Post-independence India launched a project of modernity which centred around building state institutions and a strong nation. The adoption of a comprehensive liberal, democratic constitution laid down the framework for achieving the cherished goal of socioeconomic and political revolution. However, a more serious task
confronted by it was one of building a cohesive nation out of a society which had hierarchies and diversities as its defining feature. Though the constitution of India served as the reference point for guiding centre-state relations, the compulsion of securing the integration of a sensitive border state made democracy a dispensable option where dissent and competition were discouraged and political assertions of Kashmiri people perceived as a threat to national unity. The process of integration took different forms at different times. For instance, India

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reneged on its promise of holding a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of Kashmiri people which it made at the time of signing of the Instrument of Accession. Instead, the Constituent Assembly of the state was used as an alternative to plebiscite which ratified accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Article 370 was meant to accord a special status to maintain the autonomy of the state but the same became a tool for central government to intervene in the legislative arena of the state and erode its autonomy. The Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 limited the accession to three subjects: defence, foreign affairs and
communication. In 1949, the Constituent Assembly of India inserted a special provision in the form of Article 370 which granted a special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and restricted the legislative powers of the central government over the state to only three subjects: defence, foreign affairs and communications, as they were originally mentioned in the Instrument of Accession. Thus, the state of Jammu and Kashmir did not become a part of the federal arrangement of division of powers between the centre and the states as did the other states. It was granted a special status; which was reaffirmed by the Delhi Agreement of 1952. It recognised among others, the exclusive jurisdiction of the state to legislate over matters specified in the Instrument of Accession, the nomenclature of prime minister for the head of the government, and an elected head of the state. It was also agreed that the state would have a separate flag in addition to the national flag. These provisions were different from the rest of the Indian states which had nominated heads of the state, a single Indian flag and the nomenclature of chief minister for the head of the government.
The constitutional integration of the state was undertaken by the central government in a gradual way through various measures over a period of time. In 1954, through a presidential order, the power of the union parliament was extended to legislate over matters other than those contained in the Instrument of Accession. The jurisdiction of

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the Supreme Court of India and the Election Commission also became applicable to the state. In 1964-65, Articles 356 and 357 were extended to the state which allowed the central government to intervene in the affairs of the state in certain exigencies. A number of changes were made effective to bring about the financial integration of the state.
All these provisions enabled the central government to exercise its desired control over the happenings in the state. Democratically elected leaders were removed and replaced with the favoured ones without any regard for democratic norms and constitutional propriety. The Indira-Sheikh Accord of 1975 was historic as it installed popular Kashmir leader, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah as the chief minister of the state after a political exile of over two decades. However, no democratic procedure was adopted to effect the transition; the incumbent chief minister was simply made to step down on directions from the high command to pave way for the Sheikh. In 1984, another chief minister, Farooq Abdullah was dismissed from office by the governor of the state on the ground that he had lost the confidence of the majority in the legislative assembly of the state without testing the strength on the floor of the house. Such political interventions contributed to instability and bad faith among the people in the Valley. Political accords were designed to meet short-term political gains which were seen by the Kashmiri people as a sell out by the leaders. The Rajiv-Farooq Accord of 1986 was a pre-electoral understanding between two ruling parties; central and the state, not contest against each other and to ensure smooth victory for their respective candidates. Widmalm (2002) terms the accord as a 'cartel' rather than a 'tactical alliance'. The latter, in his view is a short term coalition or cooperation of two parties with different ideologies. However, in a 'cartel' constituencies and powers are divided before the elections with the intent to capture the maximum number of votes and seats. In Kashmir the merger of the two parties before the

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elections was a clearly designed to rig the elections (2002:75). Pran Chopra (1986), a leading journalist observed:
The accord started with two unavoidable political handicaps: First, it robbed Farooq Abdullah of his father's role, so popular with some Kashmiris as a Kashmiri leader standing up to New Delhi in the eyes of his friends and a stooge in the eyes of his enemies. Second, with the major secular parties becoming allies, the indispensable role of an opposition as the channel of popular discontent passed into the hands of Muslim fundamentalists which helped them loom larger than life size.
Such an electoral arrangement foreclosed the options of political articulation and mobilisation on the basis of inter-party competition and ventilation of grievances in the electoral arena. These events became the turning point in Kashmir's political alienation from the government of India. Hirshman (1995: Chapter 1) points out that the option of 'voice' enables citizens in a democracy to express their grievances and make their choices through legitimate democratic channels. It serves as buffer between the masses and the state. Inability to exercise the voice option can compel the masses to exit from the system. It is fair to contend that the electorate in Kashmir Valley in 1989 chose the exit option in a political scenario, which had suffered a crisis of legitimacy of democratic and political institutions.
Impact of Violence
The ongoing conflict of two decades has deeply affected the social and political environment in the state. There is a growing concern over violation of human rights by the militants as well as the armed forces. The process of militarisation has been on the rise since 1990 when it was 150,000 soldiers which increased to 400,000 in 1994. In 2004 it was a massive 500,000-700,000 troops making a ratio of one soldier for every ten civilians (Kazi, 2009: 97). The initial phase of militancy was marked by killings, kidnappings and acts of subversion. Political workers, journalists and human rights activists were routinely

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victimised. Between 1989 and 1990 selective killings of minorities also resulted in mass migration of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley. The second phase of migration occurred in 2003 when 24 Pandits were massacred in Nadimargin the Pulwama district of Kashmir. The Sikh exodus took place in 2000 after the killing of 35 Sikhs in Chhittisinghpura. Migrations from other parts of the state affected by militancy were also reported. Militants targeted migrant labourers for ethnic cleansing. By killing, 40 labourers between 1999 and 2000 on the charge that the demographic profile of the Valley was being diluted (Swami, 2007: 35 -36). The Pandits since their displacement from the cool environment of the Valley to the migrant camps in the high temperature Zone of Jammu have suffered health hazards like heat strokes, diabetes, depressions and increased mortality among the elderly.
Militarisation of a society implies violence and suppression of citizens' rights where coercive apparatus of the state is used for maintenance and consolidation of state power (Simbulan, 1988: 38). Through arrests, detentions and gendered patterns of violence like rape, molestation and abuse women are victimised (Kazi, 2009: xiii). Rita Manchanda writes:
Violent conflict opens up for women the public sphere predominantly controlled by men. As the security forces and armed groups spread institutional terror, civil society is suppressed and the public sphere of men collapses. Men literally and metaphorically retreat into the private sphere, traditionally the domain of women. In these conditions when the organisation of survival becomes critical, men often have to abdicate their roles and female management of survival assumes crucial importance (Manchanda, 2001:15).
Women have been the worst sufferers in Kashmir conflict. They were forced by militants to act as couriers and disfigured in case of refusal. Suspected women informers were specially targeted. Between 1993 and 1995, nearly 81 women were either murdered or abducted (The

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Times of India, 1993). In the early decades of militancy women were ordered to wear burqua and also warned against abortions and contraceptions. The armed forces have also been accused of inflicting cultural violence in the form of rape, assault and molestation (Manchanda, 2001: 72). There is a rise in the number of disappearances and extra-judicial killings. Since 2001 nearly 4,000 men are reported to be missing and approximately 30,000 been killed resulting in a phenomenon of widows and half widows. The current social landscape of the Valley is marked by the presence of orphans, destitutes, widows and half widows (Kazi, 2009: 148). Extra-judicial killings and encounters though an inevitable feature of militarisation became a motivational factor for fake encounters in the Valley as the number of militants killed was recognised as a criteria for granting awards and promotions in services. Public protests and pressure leading to investigations have brought to light numerous cases of fake encounters and extra-judicial killings (Ahsaan, 2010: 30-31).
The violent unrest has also resulted in psycho-social and health-related disorders like hypertension, diabetes and depression. The younger age group of 18-35 is known to suffer from stress-related disorders like hysteria and anxiety. A study of suicides carried out by the Department of Sociology of Kashmir University reported that an average of 15 persons killed themselves each month making it a case of one suicide every alternate day (Hussain, 2002: 246-48). A report released by Shri Maharaja Hari Singh Hospital in Srinagar revealed 150 cases of suicide in a period of two months (The Himalayan Mail, 2009).
Since June 2010 crisis has revisited the Valley resulting in the recall of army after a gap of 15 years. The turmoil was preceded by a series of events which fuelled discontent. In 2008 a bitter row erupted between the two regions of Jammu and Kashmir over the transfer of land to the holy cave of Amarnath which lasted for over 60 days. In 2009 two women were found dead in Shopian district of Kashmir in mysterious

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circumstances, the investigating agencies have yet to ascertain the cause of death. In April 2010, a case of fake encounter was unearthed in Machail near Line of Control (LOC). The discontent which was ritually expressed in the form of stone pelting by the youth after Friday prayers gradually assumed a virulent form in which the security forces were engaged in pitched battles on a daily basis. The face off between the two has resulted in the death of nearly 64 civilians in 80 days. The death toll is continuously on the rise (Siraj, 2010: 9). As the last reports poured in the death toll in hundred days of violence starting from June till September 2010 had risen to 100. The state exchequer has lost Rs 26,000 crore of business. The daily losses of the business community amount to Rs 161 crore (Daily Excelsior, 2010). The protests have not died down and continue, often in defiance of the curfew. Life remains paralysed resulting in complete closure of business, education and other activities. The state administration confronts a new form of stone terror and is in the process of reinforcing and redesigning its riot control infrastructure. Additional troops have also been requisitioned to control the cycle of violence
(The Hindu, 2010).
The current spiral of violence and unrest is governed by the writ of the hard-line separatist faction led by Sayyed Ali Shah Gilani which issues periodic protest calendars outlining the dates and times for shut down, hartal or relaxation calls. Celebration of a festival like Eid has been altered to adjust to a new security discipline which calls for smaller Congregations for offering prayers, without fireworks and lesser spending. The number of days for celebration of the festival has also been restricted by the separatists as a mark of solidarity for those killed in violence. Excursions, movies and other recreational activities have become a security hazard (Wani, 2010: 1).
Continuing violence in the Valley has intensified debates over human rights. The security discourse centres around the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 (AFSPA) extended to the state in

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1990 to deal with insurgency. It empowers the armed forces to use force, destroy fortified positions and carry out search, arrest and detention without warrant. Debates over human security versus state security in alternative responses for retention and withdrawal of security forces from the Valley. Despite official commitment of zero tolerance for human rights, violations persist; both by the militants and the armed forces.
Institutional mechanisms for effective governance lack efficacy which causes distrust among the masses. Judicial commissions set up by the government to probe cases of fake encounters and extra-judicial killings have also not satisfied the people.
State Human Rights Commission lacks effective administrative apparatus to pursue cases which come before it for investigation. Consequently, protection of human rights remains a rhetorical exercise. The code of conduct for the National Human Rights Commission requires a custodial death to be reported to the commission within 24 hours by the deputy commissioner or the superintendent of the district police. However, the state of Jammu and Kashmir is exempt from this requirement because of the special status under Article 370. The state Human Rights Commission lacks effective enforcement mechanism to punish the guilty. Under the law, the reports of violations have to be presented in the State Assembly but the same is not done. Due to the absence of investigative and enforcement apparatuses the National Human Rights Commission also has a limited jurisdiction over the state.
The political response to militant upsurge in the Valley in the other two regions of the state has taken the form of growing assertion by the regional and the sub-regional identities. Each of the three regions of the state; Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh represents a unique geopolitical and cultural identity. These diverse identities have intensified their demands for recognition at different levels. Since 1947, Jammu

Kashmir: Building Peace through Democratic Governance 137
has nursed grievances of discrimination in economic and political sphere by the central and the Kashmir centric leaders. In Ladakh, Leh, Kargil and the Zanskar valleys have mobilised groups to meet their political demands. In Jammu, the Gujjars and the Paharis have been demanding a Scheduled Tribe status for their communities whereas the Chenab Valley region demands an Autonomous Hill Council. Since independence, various political instruments set up by the government to look into the issues of inter-regional and sub-regional autonomy have recognised the inherent diversity and complexity of the three regions of the state and recommended various measures to redress the same. In 1996, the government of the state set up a Regional Autonomy Committee to explore various possibilities of granting autonomy at the regional and the intra-regional levels. However, no concrete measures have yet been spelt out for devolution of powers at different levels.
Democratic Peace
Each conflict is defined with reference to its specific nature, context and historicity. Therefore, the strategies to be formulated must also conform to these background conditions. In Kashmir, political dynamics have operated in numerous ways to change the patterns of militancy from a local mass upsurge (1988) to Holy Jehad (1993) to a unified conglomerate of different militant groups called the Hurriyat Conference (1994-95). The movement in its final phase in 2003 fragmented into different groups due to ideological differences. In 2002, the democratic process was revived and free and fair elections held in the state. It marked an important milestone in the electoral history of the state where except in 1977 elections were always rigged and manipulated. Though popular support for militancy has declined, violence and anti-national activities sporadically appear in the Valley. Democratic politics continues to be interspersed with separatist and militant politics and the social fabric has suffered a rupture. Therefore, the task of rebuilding Kashmir calls for a new agenda of peace and

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democratic development. The policy design has to be guided by its specific socio-economic and political context.
Introduction of democracy is easy, but a far more serious challenge is its sustenance and consolidation. Kashmir suffers from a continuing crisis of governance where disloyal elements thrive. The current phase of unrest was clearly a case of collapse of democratic governance where the institutions failed to deliver in terms of trust, transparency and efficacy, the prerequisite features of a functional democracy. Therefore, it is important to salvage the institutions of governance which have suffered an erosion of legitimacy due to intervention and manipulation by the state. It needs to depart from a state centric, centralised framework to a decentralised, substantive and humane form of governance.
Though the levels of infiltration have reduced the Jehadi infrastructure remains intact which calls for a refinement of intelligence network so that peremptory action can be taken to defeat militant designs. A network of international judicial cooperation and bilateral treaties can facilitate deportation and extradition of militants and also ensure penal action against them. The government's rehabilitative policy will have to be redesigned to accommodate not only the misguided youth who picked up the gun but also the stone pelting terrorists. The criminal justice system must be revised to meet contemporary challenges, at the same time humane prison conditions and a compassionate face of the armed forces can go a long way in achieving the desired results.
At the international level, numerous proposals for resolving the Kashmir conflict have been advanced. These include suggestions like declaring the LOC as the international border, a Trieste' solution proposes a joint control as is exercised by Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste. Similarly, the Tyrol' model suggests a joint control over Kashmir by both India and Pakistan as is done by Austria and Italy over Tyrol. A Tibetan type solution proposes that a community

Kashmir: Building Peace through Democratic Governance 139
demanding separation be externed from the state as China has done to
the Tibetans (Jha, 2007: 225). The proposal of a sub-continent of
several independent states in South Asia is also suggested for India. For
a long time Pakistan demanded Plebiscite as a solution for Kashmir
which has ceased to be a viable option given the internal turmoil and
instability of Pakistan. Most of these proposals also lack practicality as
they overlook the basic realities of alienation of Kashmiri people.
Militancy was a response to an injustice, therefore the corrective measures must respond to that injustice.
Consociationalism has emerged as a very popular model for ethnically divided societies. It aims at accommodating differences among various politico-religious groups. However, such a model when compared with the kind of democracy which operates in India appears insignificant. The intensity of political competition, the diversity of communities and groups, the levels of political mobilisation and participation that prevail in India are much more than the consociational model can accommodate. Such a model on the contrary has an 'elite bias' and hence does not engage the masses in the same way as Indian democracy does. It has been termed as 'exceptional because of its mediatory institutions like the multi-party system, federalism, and coalitional system of forging alliances. The federal structure has acted as a buffer 'deflecting violent conflict from the centre. In Kashmir, violence was a response to political injustice and hence corrective measures must aim at democratic consolidation. It would mean real and sustained participation by citizens in political processes and availability of highest degree of justice, freedom and liberty. The political institutions need to be made more efficacious, transparent and accommodating. An effective measure to safeguard the state political autonomy would be to change the interventionist approach of the central government to a more decentralised and democratic one. Article 356 of the Indian constitution which empowers the central government to take over the administration of the state in case of a constitutional breakdown has often been misused

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for dismissing undesirable chief ministers in the states. Providing adequate safeguards against the misuse of this Article would restore the autonomy of the state in a significant way.
The contours of autonomy, for which there has been a persistent demand since 1947, have to be worked out within the democratic and federal framework of the constitution. The perspective of autonomy must shift its focus away from the elite and centre on the people. Devolution of powers at the regional and sub-regional levels as a constituent part of the Indian federation is an ideal form of autonomy to be conceded. At the regional and intra-regional level an inclusive dialogue with different groups like the Gujjars, Paharis Buddhists and Kashmiri Pandits will be an effective step in fostering peace in the region.
A change imposed from above may not necessarily lead to the desired results. Such a goal requires the civil society to make appropriate assertions so that they safeguard the sanctity of their spaces: social and political. These boundaries have to be defined and protected. Kashmir will also have to move forward and keep pace with a borderless, globalised world of production, consumption and communication flows, and become part of its mobility and competition. However, there is no better prescription for peace than democratic governance. Flexible policies of accommodation, adaptation and cooperation at all levels will ultimately go a long way in expanding democratic spaces and shrinking separatist and secessionist urges.
References
Ahsaan, M. (2010) Kashmir Scan, "Tragedy Underground", 2 (7), July, pp.
30-31.
Anderson, Benedict (1991) (Revised Ed.) Imagined Community: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London, New York, Verso.
Bartkus, Viva (1999) The Dynamic of Secession, U.K., Cambridge University
Press.

Kashmir: Building Peace through Democratic Governance 141
Birch, Anthony H. (1989) Nationalism and National Integration, London,
Unwin Hyman. Brass, Paul (1991) Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, New
Delhi, Sage. Bukhari, Shujaat (2010) "1,500 CRPF Men Arrive in the Valley", The
Hindu, 3 August 2010. Chandoke, Neera (1999) Beyond Secularism: The Rights of Religious
Minorities, India, OUP. Chopra, Pran (1986) "Finding Answers in Kashmir” in The Indian Express, 5
September (Chandigarh). Daily Excelsior, (2010) "Kashmir Unrest has led to loss of Rs 26,000 Crore
Business", 20 September. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, New York, Cornell
University Press. Hirshman, Albert (1995) Propensity to Self-Subversion, Cambridge, Harvard
University Press. Hussain, Sahba (2002) "Will Peace Return? Trauma and Health Related Work in Kashmir” in Urvashi Butalia (ed.), Speaking Peace: Women's Voices from Kashmir, New Delhi, Kali for Women. I Jha, Prem Shankar (2007) "Kashmir: How to Grasp the Nettle?” in Amitabh Mattoo, Kapil Kak and Happymon Jacob (eds.) India and Pakistan: Pathways Ahead, New Delhi, Knowledge World. - Kazi, Seema (2009) Between Democracy and Nation: Gender and
Militarisation in Kashmir, New Delhi, Women. Unlimited. Kohli, Atul and Amrita Basu (eds.) (2000) Community Conflicts and the State M in India, New Delhi, Oxford.
Kohn, Hans (1951) The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origin and WN Background, New York, Macmillan.
Manchanda, Rita (2001) Women, War and Peace in South Asia: Beyond
Victimhood to Agency, New Delhi, Sage. Simbulan, Roland G. (1988) "Militarisation in South East Asia” in Sakamoto (ed.), Asia: Militarisation and Regional Conflict, Tokyo and London, United Nations University. Siraj, Abdul Majid (2010) "Rights of Children” in The Kashmir Times, 3
September, p. 9. Smith, Anthony D. (2005) Key Concepts: Nationalism, New Delhi, Atlantic. Swami, Praveen (2007) "Frightened Flock” in Frontline, (Vol. 24, Issue 16), 24 August, pp. 35-36; Available also on http://www.hinduonnet.com/

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fline/fl2416/stories/20070824504503500.htm accessed on 17 September 2010. The Himalayan Mail, (2009) "Suicides in Valley Show Alarming Increase
This Year”, 8 July. The Times ofIndia, (UNI Report), 24 November 1993. Wani, Riyaz (2010) "Waiting for the Day: After Weeks of Curfew, the Valley Looks Forward to Joy and Celebrations on Eid-Ul-Fitr", The Indian Express (Special Eid Supplement), 10 September, p. 1. Widmalm, Sten Widmalm (2002) Kashmir, Comparative Perspective, Democracy and Violent Separatism in India, London, USA, Routledge Curzon.

CHAPTER 7
The Role of Resettlement and Sheltering in
Peace-Building Process: The NEHRP Experience in Jaffna
C. Elankumaran
For the past three decades, the continuous war and related atmosphere has caused series of displacements, loss of properties and loss of livelihood activities for the majority of inhabitants of Jaffna region. A considerable number of families have not resettled in their permanent places due to the loss of shelter and traditional livelihood activities. Further, similar number of families has not resettled in their villages due to the declaration of high security zones. Some of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) are still living in camps and most of them are temporarily living in neighbouring villages with alternative shelter and livelihood activities. The war is said to be over, but these people are not living in peace and tranquility. The peace-building process is now emphasised, but it commenced when the A9 highway was reopened following the political negotiations and development activities in 2002. One such major peace-building process identified was resettlement of the IDPs after the reconstruction of war-affected shelters. The World Bank funded North-East Housing Reconstruction Programme (NEHRP) commenced in 2004 aimed at resettling the IDPs after reconstructing the fully-damaged houses and also at helping the families who continued to live in their partly-damaged houses. This chapter focuses on the analysis of social and economic impacts of NEHRP on the beneficiary families and to relate the political aspects by investigating the positive effects of the peace-building process and the socio-economic and political impact. The method of this study is

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Continuous Social Impact Assessment (CSIA) of the NEHRP. The primary information collected in NEHRP-Phase II is used as secondary information for the analysis of the current study. The analysis shows that there are positive impacts in the social and economic environment of the benefited families and hence observed a peaceful and happy life in their housing environment. The collective observations seen in all the benefited families of a village shows positive motivations for socio-economic development in their village environment. Resettlement paved the way to recommence their traditional livelihood activities and better sheltering helped them to start a new life for the whole family, especially good educational environment for their children and realising their economic activities in a peaceful environment. A comparison was also made with a large sample of the IDPs who did not benefit from NEHRP. Negative socio-economic impacts are seen in these families and hence their future aspirations of social and economic life seem to be uncertain and questionable. It is noticed that the peace-building process in terms of housing reconstruction programmes and resettlement process have been handicapped ever since the closure of A9 highway in 2006. However, it has been declared that the war is over and the A9 highway is opened again. Hence, accelerated programmes on resettlement, reconstruction of houses, awarding compensation for lost and damaged properties, restoration of traditional livelihood activities, motivating on self-employment and to work on cottage and small industries be encouraged as measures in peace-building and development.
Living in Peace in North-East
Sri Lanka has suffered from a three-decade long civil war, beginning with the 1979 ethnic riots which killed at least 75,000 people of all ethnic communities and maimed, incapacitated or internally displaced greater in number. The human and economic costs of the conflicts are felt most directly by the people of the provinces of North and East.
 

Resettlement and Sheltering in Peace-Building Process 145
The effects of the conflicts have far reaching social, economic, and psychological dimensions. Livelihood, particularly for the poor in conflict-affected areas, has been destroyed and devastated and landmines await many of the returnees. The valuable agricultural land, private lands, and fishing areas have fallen within High Security Zone (HSZ). Many of the displaced people have lost their assets such as lands, means of production as well as their social capital. Intercommunity tensions persisted in the situations of sporadic war and
displacement due to the consequence of conflict and displacement.
The continuous civil war and the related atmosphere in the Jaffna region have caused a series of displacements within the district and from the peninsula to the mainland. The above situation also caused damages to houses, loss of properties and loss of livelihood activities during the past three decades for the majority of the inhabitants of the region. A considerable number of families have not resettled in their original places due to the loss of their shelter and loss of traditional livelihood activities. Further, similar number of families has not resettled in their villages due to the declaration of high security zones. Some of these IDPs are still living in camps and most of them are temporarily living in neighbouring villages with alternative shelter and livelihood activities.
In the Northern and Eastern provinces nearly 326,000 housing units were fully or partially damaged during the last two decades of intensified battles and around 160,754 families (515,084 individuals) were internally-displaced. After the ceasefire agreement between government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in February 2002 nearly 95,000 families (264,000 individuals) returned to their original villages by December 2004. The following table shows the number of people displaced before February 2002 and the number of people who returned by December 2004 by the districts of the provinces of North and East.

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Table 1: The Number People Displaced and Returned in the North-East Region
Names of Districts People People
Displaced (2002) Returned (2004)
Jaffna 113,133 65,376 Kilinochchi 105,570 28,265 Mulaithivu 115,590 58,706 Mannar 46,801 29,931 Vavuniya 73,235 39,404. Batticaloa 26,733 22,056 Trincomalee 19,631 16,310 Ampara 8,391 4,406 Total 515,084 264,454
Source: NEHRP (2005)
The information given in Table 1 regarding the number of people who returned increased by a small percentage by August 2006, after which the resettlement process was handicapped due to the closure of A9 highway. Even though it is said that the people returned to their permanent places, it actually meant that they returned to their permanent DS divisions. They temporarily resettled in the neighbouring villages and in temporary shelters. Another portion of the IDPs need to return to their villages. Although the war is said to be over these people are not living in peace and tranquility. The development process will remain questionable unless they live in peace in their original houses with traditional livelihood activities.
Peace-Building Process After 2002
The peace-building process prior to 2002 struggled over the years through the politically negotiated settlement between the various governments of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. Past records reveal that all these talks failed with no constructive solutions in the process. However, the peace talks initiated in 2002 had showed significant improvements in the peace-building process.

Resettlement and Sheltering in Peace-Building Process 147
A ceasefire agreement was signed between the GOSL and the LTTE in February 2002 and the formal peace talks and negotiations started in September 2002. Peace is the key requirement for reducing conflict related poverty. Due to the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2002, the North-East, particularly the areas of the North were opened and improvement such as gradual resettlements, restructuring the damaged shelters, recommencing some traditional livelihood activities, small scale productions, self-employments, trade and cultivation were seen. These activities were observed by the people of Sri Lanka as a symbol of peace.
Reconstruction activities such as de-mining operations were started and multi-lateral donor agencies such as UN agencies and other concerned NGOs came forward to the conflict-affected districts of the North and East with humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes. A limited number of housing programmes were undertaken by agencies like GTZ, UNHCR, NHDA and NECORD in all the districts of North-East except Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. At the difficult situation of unsettled political solutions the World Bank extended its financial support to NEHRP to reconstruct 46,000 housing units. These measures were recognised and welcomed by the North-East Tamil community as a peacebuilding exercise and had high expectations from these programmes. When the government changed in 2005, the peace-building process seemed to be disturbed by the uncertain and prolonged political negotiations. Finally, when the peace talks for negotiated political settlement failed in 2006 and the war broke-out with the closure of A9 highway, all the above mentioned peace-building processes came to a standstill.
The details of the number of houses damaged that were owned by the IDPs and the people who lived in these houses were collected. The following table shows the data gathered:

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Table 2: The Details of the Number of Houses Damaged in North and East
District Number of Percentage of
Houses Damaged Damage Jaffna 105,064 36.2 Kilinochchi 27,363 09.4 Mulaithivu 22,871 07.9 Mannar 20,082 06.9 Vavuniya 7,640 02.6 Batticaloa 57,943 19.9 Trincomalee 38,310 13.2 Ampara 11342 03.9 Total 290,615 100.0
Source: NEHRU (2005)
NEHRP: A Peace-Building Strategy
The "North-East Housing Reconstruction Programme” (NEHRP) is funded by the World Bank and designed to support the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the conflict-affected regions of the North and East provinces of Sri Lanka as a peace-building strategy. During the last two decades, displacement and resettlement have been the twin concerns faced by the GOSL as well as the provincial, district, and divisional level administrations. Apart from humanitarian relief such as food items, clothes, kitchen utensils, mats, canvases, sheets, etc., a war-affected victim and his family need a shelter, a place to live in with dignity and security.
As stated above, a limited number of housing programmes in the districts of North and East were undertaken by various national and international non-governmental organisations. However, the housing reconstruction programme known as NEHRP supported by World Bank is the major housing programme with a comprehensive coverage aimed at poor, vulnerable, socially and economically disadvantaged families. Peace begins at a house within the family, it spreads to the

Resettlement and Sheltering in Peace-Building Process 149
village, subsequently to the region and finally to the nation; thus providing a proper shelter to the family and resettling them in their original place and advances peace and harmony to the entire society. This is the basic peace building strategy.
For this purpose, a new administrative set-up known as NEHRU (North-East Housing Reconstruction Unit) was established in the merged North-East provincial government under the agreement signed between the GOSL and International Development Association (IDA) in March 2005. The World Bank functioned to credit the required fund to implement NEHRP. The project aims to finance the reconstruction of about 46,000 housing units (36,800 fully-damaged and 9,200 partially-damaged) in the Northern and Eastern districts. The technical assistance for programme implementation includes five
activities:
1. Communication Strategy 2. Technical audit and civil works 3. Environmental impact Assessment 4. Assistance for Management Information system 5. Continuous Social Impact Assessment (CSIA)
Social impact assessment is a methodology to investigate and evaluate the positive as well as unintended consequences and risks associated with planned social change processes. It heavily focuses on social relationships, gender and human interactions with physical and natural assets or capital that shapes the social values and identities. Our understanding of the beneficiaries is complicated by our beliefs and we are aware of the consequences. This CSIA method is adopted in the present inquiry.
The CSIA primarily oversees the transparency and fairness of the beneficiary selection process, monitoring the implementation work and assesses the grievances of the excluded groups. Secondarily, the CSIA explores the socioeconomic impacts on the beneficiaries such as

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social changes, educational achievements, occupational changes, economic changes and life satisfaction.
Jaffna Context of NEHRP
The housing needs assessment undertaken by the World Bank for the North and East in April 2003, initiated by the donor community, estimated nearly 326,000 housing units as partially or fully-damaged during the 20-year long armed conflict. The Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (M/RRR) reported that 160,754 families were displaced in the country, 84 percent of whom were in the North-East. Further, 90 percent of the total 144,890 houses owned by IDPs were damaged. The Jaffna district alone accounts for 45 percent of these damaged housing units. The direct war and several battles led to the destruction of 58 percent of the total housing stock in the North-East.
The aerial bombardments and shelling damaged another 30 percent of the houses. The balance 12 percent of the houses were damaged or perished due to the low quality of the houses such as semi-permanent structured stone houses and mud houses.
The administrative control area of the Jaffna district consists of 15 divisional secretariat (DS) divisions. Our "North-East Housing Reconstruction Project (NEHRP)” area consists of 14 DS divisions and the last DS division named as "Vadamaradchi East' is included in a special project named "Tsunami Housing Rehabilitation Project (THRP)'. The following table shows the damaged houses in the Jaffna district by DS divisions:
Out of 290,615 houses (as shown in Table 2) that were partially or fully-damaged by the director indirect actions of war, the World Bank and NEHRU decided to reconstruct only 31,270 housing units, which is only 17 percent of the affected houses. The NEHRP was

Resettlement and Sheltering in Peace-Building Process 151
designed with a pilot project and four phases to be implemented during a five-year period to rehabilitate the people.
Pilot Project: 2004 Phase I: 2005 to 2006 Phase II: 2006 to 2007 Phase III: 2007 to 2008 Phase IV: 2008 to 2009
Table 3: The Number of Villages and Damaged Houses in Jaffna District
DS No. of GN No. of Fully- Partially Division Divisions Villages damaged damaged
houses houses
Jaffna 28 45 730 5,103 Nallur 40 61 2,024 6,388 Sandilipay 28 60 1,788 544 Chankanai 25 98 1,320 746 Uduvil 30 119 2,757 4,542 Thellippalai 45 198 1,024 1,108 Kopay 31 111 4,648 4,856 Chavakachcheri 60 132 8,289 5,742 Karaveddy 35 194 1,185 615 Point Pedro 35 126 1,632 1,150 Delft 06 24 414 62 Kayts 15 67 378 441 Velanai 30 67 2,289 2,101 Karainagar 09 84 581 185 Total 417 1386 29,059 33,583
Source: District Secretariat (2004)
The Jaffna context on the implementation of NEHRP is planned
along with the plans of the other districts as determined by the
NEHRU for administrative purposes and WB for financing purposes.
The details given in Table 4 show the step by step implementation
plan of NEHRP in the entire project area.

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Table 4: The Number of Houses / Beneficiaries το be Assisted
District Pilot Phase Phase Phase Phase Total
Study I II III IV
Jaffna 125 1,200 4,000 4,000 1,221 10,546 Kilinochchi 100 501 1,000 1,000 146 2,747 Mulaithivu 100 512 1,000 500 184 2,296 Mannar 100 300 600 600 416 2,016 Vavuniya 120 300 200 100 47 767
Batticaloa 100 500 2,000 2,000 1,216 5,816 Trincomalee 115 657 2,000 1,000 73 3,845 Ampara 100 309 500 200 28 1,137 Puttalam --- 650 1,450 --- --- 2,100 Total 860 4,929 12,750 9,400 3,331 31,270
Source: NEHRU (2006)
Phase I: NEHRP in Jaffna
Altogether 1,448 fully-damaged and 187 partially-damaged houses from a total of 79 villages were selected against the initial decision to assist 1,200 houses. The details are given below:
Table 5: Selection of villages and number of beneficiaries in Phase I
DS No. of Fully-damaged % Partially-damaged % Division Villages houses houses
Jaffna 7 177 12.2 57 30.8 Nallur 6 110 7.7 24 12.4 Sandilipay 7 95 6.6 15 8.1 Chankanai 5 80 5.6 10 4.9 Uduvil 9 114 7.8 11 5.9 Thellippalai 5 104 7.2 6 3.2 Kopay 5 165 11.4 12 6.5 Chavakachcheri 16 343 23.6 34 18.4 Point Pedro 5 69 4.8 l 0.5 Karaveddy 5 71 4.8 2 1.1 Delft 3 25 1.7 5 2.7 Velanai 2 40 2.8 10 5.4 Kayts 3 40 2.8 - - Karainagar 1 15 1.0 - - Total 79 1,448 100 187 100
Source: Elankumaran (2006)

Resettlement and Sheltering in Peace-Building Process 153
We used the details of all the 1,635 beneficiaries obtained from the respective DS offices. We executed CSIA in the samples of 10 percent of the beneficiaries from each of the 79 villages. That is, our sample survey of CSIA was conducted for 165 beneficiaries related to fullydamaged houses. We specifically studied about various social, economic and other features of the selected 79 villages to see the background of the project villages and compare with the current stage of NEHRP. The results of the CSIA would help us to understand any positive social and economic impacts generated. We analysed gender issues, ethnic and caste tensions, exclusions, decision-making, political situation and so on to highlight the vulnerabilities of the beneficiaries. We specifically gathered information about the number of families headed by women in the GN divisions.
Ethnic differences are not prevailing in this district as none of the other ethnic groups are living except in Jaffna city as the Muslims and few Sinhalese lived in the area left the district after intensified war in 1990. However, the ethnic differences are prevailing in a division, specifically in the village of New Moor Street' where some people I resettled after the MOU in 2002. This is due to the fact that most of the houses of Muslims have been damaged and they are unable to get help from the neighbouring Tamils. The people of this division were reluctant to spend more money on housing construction or repair as they felt that their investment would be a waste if the war erupts again. Caste issues are also not reported throughout the district, but there are stray cases of complaints in some areas with regards to the approval of applications in this project.
Phase II: NEHRP and CSIA
The second phase was ultimately reduced to 12 DS divisions as the selected villages in the Jaffna Metropolitan division and Point Pedro
DS divisions were dropped. Phase II in Jaffna district commenced in April 2006 and initially contained a total of 100 villages. The District

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and the Divisional Secretariats were active in this phase from April to August 2006 as the political situation was conducive for smooth reconstruction work during this period. The project was immobilised during August and September 2006 due to the then political nature and the closure of A9 highway. However, slow progress was observed from October 2006. In the continuing process a total of 11 villages were dropped due to various practical problems and three new additional villages from the Nallur DS division were included. Hence the total number of villages was ultimately fixed to 92. The completion of this phase was targeted at March 2007, but was delayed by eight months.
The CSIA team of Jaffna district continued to work from the first phase which was concluded in March 2006. The preliminary and basic information on this phase were collected in April and May 2006. The complaints and grievances against the selection of villages and selection of beneficiaries were investigated and reported in June and July 2006. The social impact assessment of selected villages was commenced in July 2006 and continued till March 2007. In this assessment ten percent of the randomly selected beneficiaries in each of the villages were surveyed for social impact. A modified interviewer administrated questionnaire was used for such assessment and types of social impacts were described.
Qualitative descriptions extracted from the analysis of quantitative data and qualitative information were performed every month and reported. The information regarding financial progress and physical progress were collected from the divisional secretariats for reporting. District situation, divisional profiles, and the village profiles of sample survey for CSIA were included in the monthly reports. This paper reports the compiled and updated information and description of this phase throughout the period from May 2006 to March 2007. Macroanalytical results and descriptions were presented. This phase was completed within the following three months and hence the results of

Resettlement and Sheltering in Peace-Building Process 155
micro-analysis on the questionnaire data were presented in the following months.
Village Selection
Village selection was performed by a ranking system in Jaffna district. The drawbacks observed in the first phase were corrected in this second phase. The scoring system for selecting a village was divided into two parts, where 75 points were allocated for quantifiable factors and the balance 25 points were allocated for non-quantifiable factors. The number of selected villages in each of the DS divisions is given below.
The quantifiable factors worth 75 points that were generally considered by various DS divisions are pooled together and listed below:
Extent of damaged to the houses Number of returned / resettled families Vulnerability in the village
Poverty status in the village
Number of war victims
Extent of landmine clearance Number of women-headed families Number of disabled families
Number of large families
0. Number of low-income families
The non-quantifiable factors worth 25 points that were generally considered by various DS divisions are pooled together and listed below:
l. Remoteness
2. Ethnic sensitivity
3. Possible impact on reconciliation
4. Long-term neglect of development

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War-affected village Lack of economic opportunities Backward in education
Lack of community infrastructure 9. Lack of social capacity 10. Directly affected by war 11. Access for development resources 12. Access to service facilities
We collected information on both categories of the points gained by all the selected villages. The selection of villages with appropriate scores with high ranks was described. The reconstruction works have been carried out in rest of the 89 villages and included after revision.
Beneficiary Selection
Beneficiary selection criteria included four eligibility conditions that were issued in the first phase by NEHRU. These are:
1. The beneficiary, including the bread winner, should have
permanently resettled in the selected village
2. The beneficiary should possess a formal right to the land on
which the reconstruction is proposed
3. The beneficiary should possess only one house which is
damaged
4. Family income of the beneficiary should be less than Rs.
2,500/= per month.
The same criterion was adopted in the second phase. The number of beneficiaries assigned at the initial stage is shown in Table 6. A total of 3,884 applicants was recognised as beneficiaries. However, due to the lapses in the administrative functions of the DS offices and failure of submitting documentary evidences in one or more of the four conditions mentioned above, a considerable number of beneficiaries

Resettlement and Sheltering in Peace-Building Process
lost their beneficiary recognition. About 60 percent of the beneficiaries confirmed their status and housing reconstruction facilities.
Table 6: Number of Beneficiaries Selected and Assisted in Phase II
DS No. of No. of Division Villages Beneficiaries Confirmed Retained Confirmed Jaffna 05 (00) --- --- Nallur 05 173 86.5 Sandilipay 06 (05) 122 65.9 Chankanai 08 351 79.0 Uduvil 05 179 98.3 Thellippalai 05 164 100.0 Kopay 24 (21) 695 57.7 Chavakachcheri 21 303 50.1 Point Pedro 01 (00) --- --- Karaveddy 06 97 51.3 Delft 02 22 55.0 Velanai 05 (04) 105 50.4 Kayts 03 42 47.1 | Karainagar 04 65 52.4 Si Total 100 (89) 2,318 59.50
Source: Elankumaran (2007)
157
Background of the Benefited Population
The district project area is described with five sectors of geographical locations. The entire district is divided into five sectors, which are Jaffna urban sector, Valikamam mixed sector, Thenmaradchi mixed sector, Vadamaradchi mixed sector and Islands rural sector. Population characteristics of the selected villages and other socio

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economic characteristics such as social group, economic activities, income ranges, assistance given by the government to the poor income families etc. were analysed.
(a) Jaffna Urban Sector
This phase was dropped in Jaffna DS division and hence the features of selected villages in the Nallur DS division are described where five villages were selected. Altogether these villages accommodated 12,781 persons from 3,310 families. In this sub-population about 507 families were not yet resettled and about 350 families were headed by females. Three of these villages are located in urban area and the other two villages are located in the rural suburbs.
Average income families are living in these villages and the poor income families are supported either by dry ration or Samurthi benefits. Major social groups are labourers; however, the chief occupants, are employed in the government or in NGOs. Selfemployed persons and fishermen are also living in some villages.
(b) Valikamam MixedSector
In Sandilipay DS division, altogether six villages were selected. These villages accommodated about 8,083 persons from 1,954 families. In this sub-population about 263 families were not yet resettled and about 318 families were headed by females. The village environment is of quite rural and average and poor-income families are living in these villages. The poor-income families are supported only by dry ration. Major social groups are labourers, fishermen and farmers. The chief occupants employed in government and NGOs is not evident. Selfemployed persons are also living in some of these villages.
In Chankanai DS division, altogether eight villages were selected. In these villages about 11,184 persons from 2,994 families were living. In

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this sub-population about 553 families were not yet resettled and about 615 families were headed by females. The village environment is rural. Average and poor-income families are living in these villages. The poor-income families are supported only by dry rations. Major social groups are labourers. The chief occupants are also employed as farmers and fishermen. Self-employed persons are also living in some villages.
In Uduvil DS division a total of five villages were selected and these villages accommodated about 8,058 persons from 2,358 families. In this sub-population about 393 families were not yet resettled and about 352 families were headed by females. One of the villages is located in an urban area and the rest are in rural areas. Average and poor-income families are living in all these villages. The poor-income families are supported by Samurthi aid. Major social groups are labourers, farmers, and businessmen. The chief occupants employed in government sectors are also seen.
In Thellippalai DS division, altogether five villages were selected and these villages had a population of 9,538 persons from 2,336 families. In this sub-population, about 553 families were not yet resettled and
rural. Average and poor-income families are living in these villages and the poor-income families are supported only by dry ration. Major social groups are labourers, farmers, and carpenters. The chief occupants are also employed in NGOs. Self-employed persons and masons are also living in some villages.
In Kopay DS division, 24 villages were selected and later three of the villages were dropped. In these selected villages, about 37,609 persons from 8,422 families were living. In this sub-population about 1,432 families were not yet resettled and about 1,435 families were headed by females. One of the villages is of urban type and the rest are of rural type. Average and poor-income families are living in all these villages

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and the poor-income families are supported by dry-rations. Major social groups are farmers and labourers, although toddy tapers are also living in some villages. The chief occupants employed in the government sectors are also seen.
The only DS division is Chavakachcheri and in this division 21 villages were selected. In all about 6,717 families were living in these selected villages. In this sub-population about 1,479 families were not yet resettled and about 1,319 were female-headed families. One village is of urban type and the rest are of rural type. Average and poorincome families are living in these villages. The poor-income families are supported by dry-rations. Major social groups are farmers and labourers, however toddy tapers, agricultural workers, and skilled workers are also living. The chief occupants employed in the government sector are also seen.
(ad) Vadamaradchi Mixed Sector
The second phase was dropped in Point Pedro DS division hence features of the selected villages in Karaveddy DS division are described. In Karaveddy DS division, altogether six villages were selected and all these villages accommodated about 6,569 persons from 1,409 families. In this sub-population, about 12 families were not yet resettled and about 231 families were headed by females. The village environment is of rural type and average and poor-income families are living in these villages. The poor-income families are supported only by dry rations. Major social groups are labourers and farmers, but skilled workers are also living. Some of the chief occupants are self-employed and in government sectors.
(e) Islands Rural Sector
In Velanai DS division, altogether five villages were selected. In all these villages, about 4,234 persons from 1,135 families were living. In this

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sub-population only four families were not yet resettled and about 185 families were headed by females. The village environment is rural and average and poor-income families are living in these villages. The poorincome families are supported only by dry-rations. Major social groups are fishermen and farmers, but self-employed people are also living.
In Kayts AGA division, altogether three villages were selected. In all these villages about 2,205 persons from 607 families were living and in this sub-population about 168 families were not yet resettled and about 94 families were headed by females. The village environment is rural and poor-income families are living in these villages that are supported only by dry-rations. Major social groups are fishermen and farmers, but self-employed and private sector employees are also living.
In Karainagar AGA division, altogether three villages were selected. In all these villages about 2,083 persons from 389 families were living. In this sub-population, the families that were not yet resettled are unknown and about 21 families were headed by females. The village environment is rural and backward and poor-income families are living in these villages that are supported only by dry-rations. Major social groups are fishermen, but labourers and self employees are also living.
Two villages were selected in Delft AGA division. In all these villages about 568 persons from 143 families were living. In this subpopulation the families that were not yet resettled is unknown and about 29 families were headed by females. All the villages are of rural and very backward type. Very poor-income families are living in these villages and they are supported only by dry-rations. Major social groups are farmers, but government employees are also living.
Beneficiaries in the District Situation
The background information of the 12 DS divisions is individually described above. The summary of background information on Phase

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II in the overall district scenario is highlighted in Table 7. The total population living (number of families) in each of the DS division, and the total population encountered (number of families in the selected villages), and the benefited population (number of beneficiary families) are summarised with percentages. This table reveals that the sub-populations encountered in the selected villages together in each of the DS divisions varied from 8-41 percent. The percentages of population benefited by this housing scheme within the selected villages varied from 4-16 percent.
Table 7: Percentage of population targeted and benefited in Phase II
Name of Total Families Percentage Families Percentage
DS Families in Considered of Benefited Division Living Selected for Benefici in Villages
Villages Selection aries
Jaffna --- --- --- --- " سے سے سے Nallur 18,062 3,310 18.32 173 O5.22 Sandilipay 13,523 1954 14.44 122 06.24 Chankanai 13,597 2,994 22.01 351 11.72 Uduvil 15,612 2,358 15.10 179 07.59 Thellippalai 6,652 2,336 35.11 164 07.02 Kopay 20,368 8,422 41.34 695 08,26 Chavakach. 20,249 6,717 33.17 303 04.51 Karaveddy 13,000 1,409 10.83 097 06.88
Point Pedro --- --- --- --- --- Velanai 4,724 1,135 24.02 105 09.25 Kayts 4,382 607 13.85 042 06.91 Karainagar 3,387 389 11.48 065 16.70 Delft 1,715 143 08.33 022 15.38 Total 135,271 31,774 --- 318 ---
Source: Sri Lankan Conference on Peace and Development, 23-25 August 2009.
Socio-Economic Vulnerabilities of Beneficiaries
The features of beneficiaries (2,318 families) are described in the above section with the background information. The beneficiary

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observed in the groups are very convincing. The vulnerabilities of the beneficiaries and their families by social and economic features were
described by DS divisions.
In Nallur DS division, a total of 173 families were benefited. Information from 161 beneficiaries reveals that majority of the beneficiaries are less educated and not qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. About half are large families, one fourth is female-headed families and one fifth is extended families. Majority of them have had mud houses previously and only half of the population has basic facilities such as access to safe drinking water, toilet availability etc. Almost all of them are labourers and skilled workers earning low income.
A total of 122 families was benefited in Sandilipay DS division. Information from 105 beneficiaries reveals that majority of the beneficiaries are less-educated and not qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. About half are large families, one eighth is female headed families and one eighth is extended families. Majority of them have had mud-houses previously and less than half of the population has basic facilities. Most of them are labourers and skilled workers with low income.
In Chankanai DS division, a total of 351 families were benefited. Information from all the beneficiaries reveals that majority of the beneficiaries are less-educated and not qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. More than half are large families, one fifth is female headed families and one tenth is extended families. Majority of them have had mud-houses previously and about one third of the population has basic facilities. Most of them are labourers and skilled workers with low income. In Uduvil DS division, a total of 179 families were benefited. Information from 180 beneficiaries reveals that majority of the beneficiaries are educated and qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. About one third is large families, less than one

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fifth is female-headed families and one fifth is extended families. More than half of them have had mud-houses previously and less than one third of the population has basic facilities. Most of them are farmers and labourers with low income.
In Thellippalai DS division, altogether, 164 families were benefited. Information from 160 families reveals that majority of them are lesseducated and not qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. More than half are large families, less than one tenth is female headed families and less than one fifth is extended families. Most of them have had mud houses previously and less than half of the population has basic facilities. Most of them are labourers with low income.
In Kopay DS division, altogether 695 families were benefited. However, information from the initially selected 710 beneficiaries reveals that majority of the beneficiaries are less-educated and not qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. More than half are large families, less than one fifth is female headed families and less than one fifth is extended families. Almost all of them have had mud-houses previously. Less than half of the population has basic facilities. Most of them are farmers and labourers with low income.
A total of 303 families were benefited in Chavakachcheri DS division. Information from these beneficiaries reveals that more than half of the beneficiaries are less-educated and not qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. More than half are large families, less than one fourth is female headed families and less than one fifth is extended families. Less than one third of the population has basic facilities and majority of them have had mud-houses previously. Most of the people are farmers, labourers and skilled workers earning low income.
In Karaveddy DS division, altogether 97 families were benefited. Information from these beneficiaries reveals that more than half of the
beneficiaries are less-educated and not qualified in GCE (O/L)

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examination. About half are large families; less than one fifth is female-headed families and less than one fifth is extended families. Majority of them have had mud-houses previously and less than one third of the population has basic facilities. Most of them are labourers and skilled workers with low income.
In Velanai DS division, altogether 105 families were benefited. Information from 58 beneficiaries reveals that more than half of the beneficiaries are less-educated and not qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. More than half are large families; about one fifth is female-headed families and about one fifth is extended families. Majority of them have had mud-houses previously and about one third of them have basic facilities. Most of them are fishermen, farmers, and labourers earning low income.
In Kayts AGA division, altogether 42 beneficiaries were benefited. Information from 36 beneficiaries reveals that majority of the beneficiaries are educated and qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. More than half are large families, about one third is female-headed families and less than half are extended families. Majority of them have had stone-houses previously and about half of them have basic facilities. Most of them are fishermen, skilled workers, and others with low income.
In Karainagar AGA division, altogether 65 families were benefited. Information from all the beneficiaries reveals that more than half of the beneficiaries are less-educated and not qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. More than half are large families, less than one fifth is female-headed families and about one fifth is extended families. Majority of them have had mud-houses previously and majority of them have no basic facilities. Most of them are fishermen, although there are labourers earning low income.
The number of families benefited in Delft AGA division was 22. Information from all the beneficiaries reveals that all the beneficiaries

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are less-educated and not qualified in GCE (O/L) examination. More than half are large families, more than one fourth is female-headed families and very few are extended families. All of them have had stone-houses previously and about one third of them have basic facilities. Most of them are farmers and labourers earning low income.
In summary, we can conclude that the beneficiary population is considerably vulnerable in social and economic sense. The vulnerability information described above for the project that was implemented in twelve DS divisions reveals that less educated, low occupational, low income earners have been considered and selected as beneficiaries. Hence, the selection is justifiable. This is supported by the other information on family characteristics of the beneficiaries. The necessity of housing requirements is also proved by giving previous housing conditions and the basic facilities available in their compounds.
Results of Social Impact Assessment
The CSIA was planned to survey samples of 10 percent of the beneficiaries in each of the selected villages. The lists of beneficiaries obtained from the DS offices were used to select the samples of beneficiaries for CSIA. Assigning the sample size was done with proportional allocation to the numbers of beneficiaries assigned or confirmed or in between in each of the villages selected in this phase. However, if the number of beneficiaries in a village is less than ten, it was decided to assign one unit to represent the village. The details of samples selected by DS divisions are shown in Table 8.
The samples were first divided into male-headed families and femaleheaded families to characterise them separately. Age of the beneficiaries, family sizes, occupation of the beneficiaries, occupation of spouses, children or other members, family income, assistance by the government, availability of basic facilities such as well, toilet etc, status of children whether school going or school dropouts etc. were characterised in the

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village profile. The type of analysis and interpretations were of macro analytical type. The results on pooled samples are presented.
Table 8: Details of Sample Survey of CSIA in Phase II
Name of Number Total Number of Number of DS of Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Division Villages Assigned Benefited Surveyed
Jaffna --- 113 --- --- Nallur 05 200 173 27 Sandilipay 05 185 122 17 Chankanai 08 444 351 38 Uduvil 05 182 179 14 Thellippalai 05 164 164 18 Kopay 21 1,205 695 81 Chavakachery 21 604 303 49 Karaveddy 06 150 097 13
Point Pedro --- 189 --- --- Velanai 04 40 105 11 Kayts 03 208 042 08 Karainagar 04 89 065 06 Delft 02 124 022 04 Total 89 3,897 2,318 286
The information on the assessment of social impact due to the award of housing reconstruction for all the twelve DS divisions described above together reveals the following facts:
O Female-headed families with unmarried adult daughters drawn in the samples show very high positive social impacts, especially the social security to the family as well as the future asset to the eldest daughter who will carry this as her dowry.
O Female-headed families with unemployed adult sons without any savings show high positive social impacts especially opportunities for making proper shelter and social security to the entire family.
O Families with school-going children and studying in other higher educational institutions drawn from the samples show

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that they create better housing environment for the education of children. O Families with members who are engaged in self-employments drawn from the samples feel that they need a better housing environment to establish their employments in the new houses and compounds effectively. O Very young families with infants and pre-school children, drawn from the samples feel that their current unhealthy life style in the housing surroundings will be upgraded to a new hygienic housing environment and provide an efficient healthy life in the future. O Families who had open spaces previously as cooking area, drawn from the samples feel that a new housing environment with a closed room as kitchen will help them to prepare hygienic food. O Families with extended family members who live together, drawn from the samples, are happy that they can make better social life patterns in the future housing environment. O Families who lost all household items and properties during the war and living only with the damaged house feel that they could invest the earnings on purchasing the lost items as they do not need to spend more money on reconstruction. O Families with old aged beneficiary drawn from the samples are happy to express that they can not rebuild their houses with the old age and corresponding earnings. They feel that the government has helped them to fulfil their family responsibilities in the sense that the gift of home as dowry to their children is given.
All these facts along with some other outcomes observed and analysed in the sample survey of CSLA reveals positive social impacts through the housing reconstruction programme. This project seems to be contributing towards poverty alleviation and socio-economic development of the disadvantaged segments of the Jaffna society.

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Summary of Conclusions
The study on the total of 3,897 beneficiaries from 100 villages initially selected in phase II of NEHRP, and later reduced to 2,318 beneficiaries from 89 villages, i.e., from 60 percent of the eligible beneficiaries reveal the following:
A total of 2,634 complaints or grievances received from the IDPs regarding the village and beneficiary selection from all the 14 DS divisions show that they are not living in peace and not in a position to take part in the development process. It also reveals that resettlement is imperative for peace and housing reconstruction is an important step towards this goal.
The population encountered in NEHRP with the selected villages varied from 8-41 percent. Most of the families are from poor socioeconomic groups, female-headed families and war victims. The percentages of population benefited by this housing scheme within the selected villages varied from 4-16 percent. Positive social and economic impacts observed among them indicate peaceful life and they are prepared to take part in the future development process.
Socio-economic vulnerabilities of the benefited population such as education level of the beneficiary, family headed by female, family of large size, family with extended members, family with disabled members, family lost members due to war, the status of the damaged house, the availability of basic facilities such as access to safe drinking water and toilet are described. The elevation of their life pattern by this resettlement and sheltering process among these beneficiaries shows positive thinking and the willingness to turn to traditional economic activities.
The distribution of current occupations of the beneficiaries in the groups was classified. The low income earning occupations mostly seen among the beneficiaries are low scale farmers, farm workers,

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fishermen, common labourers, toddy tapers, skilled workers, etc. They are able to run their families, but unable to save money for the betterment of the family including making a better shelter for social security. Presently they feel that they will be able to achieve this.
Sample survey performed in the 10 percent of the beneficiaries in each of the 89 villages revealed that very high positive social impacts are expected in about 50 percent of the families of beneficiaries, high positive social impacts are expected in about 30 percent of the beneficiaries, and less positive social impacts are expected in the rest of the families of beneficiaries. Negative impacts are naturally unseen.
Very high demands for housing reconstruction were seen from the highly affected people. This is observed from the complaints and grievances made by the affected people in almost all the DS divisions. Most of the affected villages were left out in both of the phases. In fact, huge numbers of affected applicants are waiting all over the district to receive the beneficiary recognition and to reconstruct their houses that was damaged during the long conflict. Hence the immediate commencement of resettlement and housing reconstruction for the non-beneficiaries is emphasised.
References
District Secretariat (2004) Statistical Hand Book, Jaffna District, District
Secretariat.
Elankumaran, C. (December 2006) Progress Report submitted to NEHRU
through GTC, Phase I.
------- (July 2007) Progress Report submitted to NEHRU through GTC,
Phase II.
NEHRP (April 2005) Operational Manual, North-East Housing
Reconstruction Programme, NEHRU, NEPC, Trincomalee.
------ (October 2005) Inception Report of the NEHRP, North East
Provincial Council, Trincomalee.
------ (May 2006) Cycle Report of the NEHRP, North East Provincial
Council, Trincomalee.

CHAPTER 8
Conflict and Livelihood Revival. Evidence from Affected Communities in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka
Nina A. Brattvoll 8c Ponniah Sivarajah
The study assesses the impact of civil war on the relationship among communities, and their livelihood opportunities in the Batticaloa district. It was conducted among the Tamil and Muslim communities. Qualitative methods were used to collect and analyse the data and the data was mainly collected through open-ended interviews. The study showed that frequent displacement, loss of land and employment opportunities impacted the livelihood of the Batticaloa district and this was severe in the rural areas as compared to the urban areas. Agriculture and livestock sectors were mainly disturbed by the conflict. People lost their cultivated land, livestock and grazing lands, chiefly due to lack of access and security. Also, none of the respondents were in full-time secure jobs and did not have regular income opportunities. The lack of employment opportunities was due to the reluctance to invest in infrastructure, transport facilities, market and other activities by the government and the private sector. There were no major differences between effects of the war on the Tamil and the Muslim community's livelihood opportunities. The optimism and freedom that followed from the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) provided a basic foundation for the households to revitalise their livelihoods. The major benefit was the abolishment of the restrictions on movement that came as a huge relief. Nevertheless, the lack of employment opportunities created a major obstacle for the revitalisation of

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livelihoods and improvement of living conditions. The access to land had not changed dramatically after the CFA. Although the displaced Tamil and Muslim communities could in theory, move back to their own old land if they wanted, but the lack of trust due to unstable political situation in the area prevented them from making that decision. This in turn had a major impact on reviving livelihoods lost by both communities. A ceasefire period provides opportunities for building peace from the community level and revitalising livelihoods through improvements and reconciliation initiatives. Unfortunately, this opportunity has not been utilised by Sri Lanka, although it need to play an important role in future peace-building approaches and efforts.
Introduction
Since the conflicts between the Sinhalese Government of Sri Lanka and Tamil militant groups escalated into a civil war in 1983, the civilian population increasingly became victims of the armed conflict (Spencer, 1990; Vincent & Sorensen, 2001). The Muslims tried to keep a neutral position between the warring Sinhalese and Tamil parties, but failed to do so. The Tamil militants attacked them because they were not sympathising with their struggle for Tamil Eelam; the Muslims were soon associated with the government side as the government was able to provide protection to them through the Muslim Home Guards (Van Brabant, 1999). Hostilities between the Tamil and Muslim civilian population increased as a result of several attacks and retaliatory attacks by both communities, and there was suspicion among the Tamils that the Muslims to be working as government informants (Van Brabant, 1999). The Tamil and Muslim communities, who used to live in peace with each other in the north-eastern province, became more socially isolated and separated and there was a rise in the suspicions and violence among them (Vincent & Sorensen, 2001). The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of the war on the relationship between Tamils and Muslims; and the impact of the war upon the livelihood opportunities and activities of communities living in the Batticaloa district.

Conflict & Livelihood Revival in the Eastern Province 173
Conceptual Framework
The concept of livelihood is used to describe means of living, but this in itself can be vague and was a source of confusion when used from different sources (Ellis, 2000). A livelihood comprises of the capabilities, material and social assets and activities required for means of living. Chambers and Conway (1992) postulated that a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future. A livelihood comprises of the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household (Ellis: 10). Shanmugaratnam (2004) emphasised that livelihoods are humanly constructed systems and their sustainability has to be seen in terms of the properties of the natural resource base as well as the social relations that constitute them. A livelihood can be regarded as sustainable when it is resilient towards external shocks and stresses, and is not dependent on external support in order to sustain. It has to be able to maintain long-term productivity and not undermine the livelihoods of or compromise the livelihood options open to others (DFID, 2001).
Analysis of Livelihoods
Researchers concerned with poverty reduction, sustainability and livelihood strategies have since the 1980s developed frameworks for analysing and understanding rural livelihoods (Ellis, 2000). "The idea of a livelihood framework as a tool for analysis is simply to capture the main elements which comprise the complex livelihoods of people at a given point in time, and ideally the trajectory and dynamics of change in livelihoods as well” (Schafer, 2002: 16). The framework helps to organise the factors providing and constraining opportunities, and to show the relationship between them. The key elements of a livelihood framework include livelihood assets, strategies, and outcomes (Longley

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& Maxwell, 2003: 2). It regards the asset status of a household as the point of departure in understanding their options and possible strategies. All livelihood frameworks recognise that the access to assets is modified or mediated by a number of contextual social, economic and policy considerations (Ellis, 2000). Livelihood approaches grow out of a food security perspective, but are based on the observation that food is only one among several important basic needs (Longley & Maxwell: 2). Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) has been a popular tool in livelihood analysis in that there was a shift away from a dominant focus on economic growth towards a focus on human wellbeing and sustainability (Solesbury, 2003).
Methodology
Study Area and Data Collection
The fieldwork was undertaken in Batticaloa district in the Eastern province of Sri Lanka, in two Muslim and Tamil communities. Qualitative methods were used to collect and analyse the data. The selection of communities was based on the intention of capturing diversity; and communities in the 'cleared’ (Eravur-6, MichiNagar) and 'uncleared areas were therefore chosen. Selection of respondents was based on a purposive selection process in order to include different sections of the population. This method was chosen since groups of different classes, ethnicity, age, gender, etc. could be interviewed, and the new respondents could be added to fill in the gaps in information that emerges as preliminary analysis proceeds (Mikkelsen, 1998). The respondents were chosen on the basis of ethnicity, age and gender.
Data Sources and Analysis
The sources used for data collection have been a combination of secondary sources such as books, articles, governmental and non
 

Conflict & Livelihood Revival in the Eastern Province 175
governmental information and publications, along with previous research and work done in similar research objectives. An interview guide for group discussions and individual interviews were constructed with the Sustainable Livelihood Framework as adapted by Scoones (1998) and presented in Ellis (2000) as a basis. The fieldwork data has
been analysed at the household level.
Results and Discussion
Asset Status and Livelihood Strategies
The economic, political and social process influencing and determining the livelihood aspects are focused upon as an integral part of the analysis. Personal experiences as well as more general trends amongst the respondents illustrate how the assets and livelihood strategies were affected by the war and the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). Batticaloa district is an agricultural area, and access to land has traditionally been one of the best security factors in people's livelihood portfolio (District Planning Secretariat, 2003). When the war affected the area and people had to migrate, access to land was one of the most immediate losses among many of the respondents. Loss of land affects the livelihood portfolio immediately and is a shock upon the household, which will often lead to a lack of ability to cope (Ellis, 2000: 39; Schafer, 2002). Shocks destroy assets directly without allowing for implementation of preventive measures or time for the household or community to adapt to a changing situation (Ellis: 39). As many of the respondents were building their livelihoods on agricultural activities, their main means of survival also disappeared.
There was a general opinion among the respondents that their old land was of good quality and that they could use the land for agricultural activities as well as for keeping livestock. There were a few respondents who had a rich life with huge land areas available to them and used it for agricultural production for own consumption, as well as for market purposes, and were therefore quite well off. Many Muslim-owned paddy lands were located in Tamil areas and vice

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versa, and through the late 1980s and early 1990s, people from all communities in the Eastern Province were kidnapped or killed when maintaining their fields (Stewart & FitzGerald, 2001). In the early 1990s, as "Eelam War II was initiated, the war became more violent and armed Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese extremists attacked each other's communities (Van Brabant, 1999; O'Sullivan, 2001).
Conflict and Land Use
Discussions revealed that not all the Tamil and Muslim respondents had abandoned their land as a consequence of direct attacks, but decided to leave due to the fear of being targeted. Prior to the war, access to land among the Tamils and Muslims living in the town areas was difficult and unreachable due to security restrictions than in the rural areas, and people did not use the land they possessed as done earlier. Farm land was not used for agricultural activities, but was large enough for livestock like poultry and goats. Due to the surrounding Common land, cows were also kept by many as a part of the household. The war did not lead to a permanent abandonment of most people's land. After being forced to seek refuge in camps due to sporadic heavy fighting, most people could claim their old land back. Access to common land was usually cut off, as the Sri Lankan army or the LTTE mined large areas, which led to deaths or injury of livestock
and people when moving in these areas.
Access to Water
Before the war, access to clean water was not perceived as a problem for all of the respondents. None of them said that water was a major issue when they were forced to seek temporary shelter or stay in refugee camps. Both Tamils and Muslims said that the government provided water as they were staying in refugee camps, and even if access was limited, they said they were able to manage. Access to clean water was not perceived as a problem for any of the respondents

Conflict & Livelihood Revival in the Eastern Province 177
in the town area; not everyone had their own well, but had free access to friends' or neighbours' wells. However, the situation was different in the rural community. NECORD (2003) reports that many of the wells in the rural areas were used to dump dead bodies during the war and were therefore not in use anymore. None of the respondents mentioned this issue, though it was not introduced during the interviews. According to the respondents, wells for drinking water were destroyed during the war and had not yet been reconstructed. Therefore, they collected drinking water from lowlands and boiled it for drinking due to its unhealthy condition. Problems appeared during the dry season when the small streams dried up and they had to go to a common tank approximately one kilometre away. They perceived it as manageable, because, they wanted to live there, but they needed more wells in order to manage better. Access to water was of special concern in relation to the agricultural production. The area become dry in the months of March to October of the year and production was not possible without extra water supply. The land was very fertile, but due to the shortage of water, provided only a few months of good income possibilities following the rainy season (Maha season).
Impact on Livestock
Prior to the war livestock constituted an important part of the household portfolio of many of the respondents; almost all of them said that they had some livestock like poultry and goats. Those who lived in the rural areas had more livestock than those in the town areas and some of the respondents considered themselves as wealthy because of their large stocks of poultry, goats, cows and buffaloes. While goats, cows and poultry gave good income possibilities in the form of milk, eggs and meat as well as contributing to the household consumption and the buffaloes were used for ploughing and transportation. During the war, the livestock was seriously affected as people escaped from their land and left the livestock unattended. Some of the respondents said that even though they suffered from the loss of their animals that

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were killed by land mines, human lives were saved as the animals could be used as indicators of safe areas to walk. Lack of money and lack of space to for livestock were given as the main reasons for not having more than a few poultry or goats after the CFA. The lack of livestock among the Tamils in the rural area was hindering them from building their livelihood portfolio. People used to have buffaloes for ploughing and as they needed to prepare the fields. The job became physically hard as they only had access to mammoties and spades. It was too expensive for them to buy the buffaloes they needed. Respondents stated that they need one or two buffaloes for each family, but they are not able to buy buffaloes because they are too expensive; two buffaloes cost approximately Rs. 30,000. In the town area, lack of space was the major problem in relation to keeping livestock. Those households who kept livestock had mostly poultry and a few goats for consumption. Only a few households who kept livestock had enough animals to make some profit. A problem for many of those who had poultry was the theft of poultry. Some said that they did not know who the thieves were, while some pointed their fingers at the 'other'. The 'other' standing for the Tamils and the Muslims; pointing at each other vice versa.
Traditional Livelihood
Traditionally, the Eastern province has depended heavily on agriculture and fishing, but the lack of security during the war impacted negatively on these income generating possibilities (O'Sullivan, 2001). Employment opportunities among the respondents were destroyed or seriously disrupted, whether they were cultivating their own land or working in the paddy fields, in the milling industry or in other parts of the agricultural sector. None of the respondents were able to keep a secure job due to the unstable and insecure situation during the war. They took the available opportunities of making some money during the calmer periods, but as the hostilities periodically increased, the income generating activities became scarce and unpredictable. As most

Conflict & Livelihood Revival in the Eastern Province
179
of the paddy fields were located in the rural areas where the LTTE was most active, the attacks on the population was a serious problem. Both
communities were engaged in livelihood activities that were not stable
and could not support their living expenses. As shown in Table 1, it is
evident that livelihood activities of both communities were affected by
the conflict due to the need for mobility and access to places of work.
However, for the Muslims the major livelihood activities were business
based and the conflict had a very significant impact denying them access
to potential market areas.
Table 1: Income Generating Activities among Tamil and Muslim Respondents
Tamils
Muslims
Labour work at paddy fields, rice milling etc. Laundry Owners Making sand pots Selling fuel-wood Selling bread Buying fish and selling at market a Fisherman
Garage worker Construction work
• Bus driver Preparation of herbal medicine
Labour work on paddy fields, rice milling etc. 'Businessmen' - buying big and
selling on the market and 'wherever suitable' Selling tea to fishermen at seaside Buying fish and selling at market Buying vegetables from markets and selling in the neighbourhood Making food at home and selling in the neighbourhood. Family working in the bakery Garage worker Selling coconuts and coconut leafs Selling small animals like goats and poultry Managing livestock for livestock
OWiners
Transporting goods for neighbours
Mat making Cashew nut packing Selling mangoes
Source: Brattvoll, 2005

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Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study assessed how the civil war and the Ceasefire Agreement had impacted on the relationship between Tamils and Muslims and their livelihood opportunities in Batticaloa district. The relationship between Tamils and Muslims in Batticaloa district developed from a relationship built on friendship and interdependence to a relationship filled with anger and animosity during the war. This relationship had improved after the CFA, but has not recovered to the same level as before. The suspicions, lack of trust and the negative experiences between two groups that developed through the 'war continued after the CFA. There were no differences in how the two communities' livelihood opportunities were affected by the war. Livestock used to be an important part of the livelihood portfolio, but got affected seriously due to the 'conflict situation. The CFA provided a basic foundation for the households to revitalise their livelihoods. A major benefit was the abolishment of the restrictions on people's movement. People could move without the fear of being attacked, questioned or harassed. During the post CFA period people had returned to their places and gained their livelihood gradually, through creating small business activities. However, the lack of employment opportunities created major obstacle for the revitalisation of livelihoods.
The lack of employment opportunities continued after the CFA and programme activities did not generate much anticipated employment opportunities. Reconstruction and development activities administrated by the government were planned for, but due to difficulties in the rural area, few were implemented. The only job opportunities available in the rural area were through agricultural activities, but due to shortage of water, lack of necessary tools and equipment, transport and long distance to markets also posed difficulties for people. The CFA had not changed the access to land. All the communities could move back to their own old land if they wanted, but the lack of trust due to unstable political situation prevented them. The presence of

Conflict & Livelihood Revival in the Eastern Province 181
landmines was mentioned by some of the respondents, but it did not seem that fear of mines was the main reason for their scepticism. Only a few Tamils had decided to resettle in their old community, and none of the Muslims had decided to return to the rural areas, as they perceived the situation to be too insecure.
Although the CFA had assisted in bringing a partially normal situation in the East to help both the Muslim and Tamil communities to regain their livelihoods, it neither could nor achieve the real goal of stable peace in the areas. The people in the East hoped that the Winds of Change' would bring peace and prosperity to their lives, but the 'wind was just a breeze' that had no impact at all. The opportunity provided by the ceasefire had unfortunately not been utilised in Sri Lanka, but need to play an important role in future peace building approaches and revitalising livelihoods through livelihood improvements and reconciliation initiatives.
References
Brattvoll, Nina A. (2005) "Conflicts and Livelihood Revival: Increasing Tamil-Muslim Tensions in Eastern Sri Lanka". A Masters thesis submitted to the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Development Studies Program, DIEDS, As, Norway, May 2005. Chambers, R. and G. R. Conway (1992) "Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century", Discussion Paper 296, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK. DFID (2001) Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets, Department for
International Development, London, UK. District Planning Secretariat (2003) Statistical Handbook 2002, Batticaloa
District, District Planning Secretariat, Kachcheri, Batticaloa, Sri Lanka. Ellis, Frank (2000) Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries,
Oxford University Press, New York, USA. Longley, C. and D. Maxwell (2003) "Livelihoods, Chronic Conflicts and Humanitarian Assistance: A Synthesis of Current Practice", Working Paper 182, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK.

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Mikkelsen, B. (1998) Method for Development Work and Research: A Guide
for Practitioners, Sage Publications, London, UK. NECORD (2003) Sub-Project Proposal, National Housing Development
Authority, Batticaloa, Sri Lanka. O'Sullivan, M. (2001) "Sri Lanka: Civil Strife, Civil Society and the State 1983-1995", Chapter 7 in F. Stewart and V. FitzGerald (2001), War and Underdevelopment, Volume 2, Country Experience, 2001, Oxford University Press, New York, USA. Schafer, J. (2002) "Supporting Livelihoods in Situations of Conflict and Political Instability: Overview of Conceptual Issues", Working Paper 183, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK. Scoones, Ian (1998) "Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Framework for Analysis", Working Paper 72, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK. Shanmugaratnam, N. (2004) Rural Livelihoods Construction, Environment and Development in War-Torn Areas, Centre for International Environment and Development Studies, NorAgric, Agricultural University of Norway, Norway. Solesbury, W. (2003) "Sustainable Livelihoods: A Case Study of the Evolution of DFID Policy", Working Paper 217, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK. Spencer, J. (1990) Sri Lanka: History and Roots of Conflict, London, UK,
Routledge. Stewart, F. and V. FitzGerald (2001) War and Underdevelopment, Volume 1, The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict, Oxford University Press, New York, USA. Van Brabant, K. (1999) Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey,
Norwegian Refuge Council, Oslo, Norway. Vincent, M. and B. R. Sorensen (2001) Caught Between Borders: Response
Strategies of the Internally Displaced, Sterling, USA, Pluto Press.

CHAPTER 9
Prospects on the Renewal of AgricultureDriven Livelihood to Sustain Peace and Development in Northern Sri Lanka
G. Mikunthan
Northern Province of Sri Lanka is homeland to farm enterprises for over 85 percent of the regional population ensuring their employment and income. Rice is the major cultivable crop of this region; however, the conflict has lessened the opportunity to grow rice by one third and even the production of other crops such as banana, grapevine, onion has declined. Prior to the war, banana, grapevine, chilli and small onion were cultivated aiming for a good price in the southern markets, but the closure of the A9 land route compelled farmers to abandon their cultivation due to the marketing difficulties. The potential areas of coconut and palmyra were affected due to both destruction of palm trees and improper management as a result of internal displacements. On the other hand, the internally displaced persons (IDPs) feel handicapped at the loss of their lands, wealth and family members. Free ration may help IDPs to survive temporarily but measures need to be taken to improve their livelihood through self-income generation. Revitalisation of agriculture-driven livelihood is a must in this region to sustain peace and development. Involvement of women in agriculture has to be strengthened to help families headed by women and to provide job opportunities to widows and for people who are disabled by the war. Conservation farming, integrated pest and nutrient management are some of the key issues to be dealt with during renaissance process. Environment friendly applications such as bio-fertilisers and bio-pesticides have to be prioritised in their usage to

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supplement inorganic fertilisers and pesticides. Vermiculture and other composting technologies have to be introduced to recycle degradable wastes into good compost. Use of inorganic pesticides and fertilisers needs to be limited, especially in Jaffna to reduce further aggravation of pesticide-hazards and environment pollution; and establishment of a Plant Protection Centre to monitor and solve pest problems has been proposed. Post-harvest processing and value addition are to be improved by incorporating new technologies. Marketing sector has to be strengthened with essential infrastructure and effective transport of goods through the A9 between the northern region, especially Jaffna and other places. Strengthening crop-livestock integration would help to uplift family income and nutrient status. Seed materials for crop cultivation and home gardening feed for livestock have to be produced using locally available raw materials by incorporating advanced technologies. Villages for the production of seed for cultivation and feed for livestock have to be established. Agro-industries have to be established to provide job opportunities and to encourage the use of locally produced materials. Youth have to be motivated to involve in agriculture and agro-based industries through need based skill-training and develop them as a steering force to build-up the nation powered with harmonious and friendliness to sustain peace and development
forever under the ideology of 'Mahinda Chinthanaya'.
Introduction
Sri Lanka is a paradise for diverse ethnic groups and biodiversity. It has been divided into nine administrative provinces (Jaffna Plan, 2003: 283). Northern Province of Sri Lanka comprises of two regions, the Jaffna Peninsula with the group of islands and the mainland of Vanni. It consists of five administrative districts, namely, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya and Mannar (Figure 1). Geographically, Jaffna Peninsula is divided into four sub-regions: Valigamum; The Islands; Vadamaradchchi; Thenmaradchchi and Pachilappalli (Figure 2).

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 185
s ۔ اے sy warenas, n. m. var .....”
M
ఢ *NS ლალ }-} NS
Figure 2: Jaffna Peninsula consisting four sub-regions
The Northern Province is homeland to farm enterprises for about 85 percent of its population ensuring their work and income. Cultivation of crops is a successful venture in this region however all have to depend on the challenging market opportunities to dispatch the produce at a best price.
Climate and Rainfall
Jaffna Peninsula falls under the dry zone low country divisions 3 and 4 (DL3 and DL4), which receives a total annual rainfall of about 635

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1,400mm out of which 65-75 percent is received during October-March ("Maha” season) and the rest during April-September (Yala’ season). The total rainfall in the Peninsula when compared with arid zones is high in aggregate terms but highly seasonal (Narayanaswami, 2009).
The north-east monsoon is the main source of rain for the dry zone and lasts from October or early November to late December or early January. Although occasional heavy rains occur in late March and early April the seasonality of the rainfall is so marked that three to four months of drought is common in normal years. In lean years around six months of absolute drought can be expected. These rainy periods determine the cropping seasons and systems. In spite of limited water resources and relatively poor soils, small farmers have developed a highly successful and profitable farming system. Ground water resources are found in the limestone belt in the Peninsula and this is being intensively exploited for cash crop farming. However, there are certain environmental features peculiar to Jaffna that needs serious consideration.
Routes Connecting Jaffna with Other Places
The only land route for transport from the Peninsula to the main land is the A9 road. It was opened and closed when the battle was intensified between the conflicting parties and this situation, often created uncertainty in the usage of the road and this market route was the deciding factor for farmers to select crop to that season. The other short distanced passage is the sea route that connects the two northern and eastern ports, Kankesanthurai and Trincomalee, respectively. The air passage taxed the middle and lower class families heavily by charging US$ 200 for a two-way journey of 300km. Although a short distance, it was the only route used at times when the land and sea routes were closed unconditionally. v

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 187
Figure 3: Maps showing different routes available from Jaffna to mainland

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Sea route is unsuitable for the transport of perishable agricultural products from Jaffna to Southern markets hence the A9 land route is the only option for easy passage. Northern region is connected by land with the rest of the country in a larger area, however, Jaffna peninsula is only connected through the A9 land route with Vanni and other places (Figure 3). The Yarltheuy train, that used to run across the country from Kankesanthurai to Colombo on the longest north-west railway line in the country indicates the connection between not only the two extreme ports but was also a symbol of bridging Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim ethnic communities.
Later the armed conflict totally destroyed this bridge and the train never proceeded beyond Vavuniya to north. At present there is no trace of evidence of such railway line running between Vavuniya and Kankesanthurai except the presence of damaged railway stations building and very few corroded signal posts. The interruption on the long running train service created a vacuum in marketing the transport of passengers and free movement of perishable products from Jaffna to mainland.
Conflict-Affected Cultivation
Northern region of Sri Lanka is the potential counterpart of certain agricultural products in the Southern area and is well known for agricultural commodities such as mango, banana, grape fruits and cash crops like small onion, tobacco and chilli. Rice is the major cultivable crop of this region. Prior to the conflict, the Province had a cultivable area of about 300,000 hectares, of which over 100,000 hectares were under rice. Indigenous rice cultivars such as moddaikaruppan and morungan together with the selection of red and white pericarp hybrid rice varieties were grown. These indigenous cultivars are famous as parboiled rice, which is the preferred form of rice by the Tamil community in this region. However, the conflict has lessened the opportunity to grow rice by one third (Figure 4) and also other fruit and vegetable crops.

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 189
Figure 4: Trend of paddy cultivation from 1985-2006 showing the reduction, due to displacement, expansion of security zones and increase of
soil salinity. (Source: Dept.of Agriculture (Extension), Jaffna)
Over three decades of armed conflict, many displacements were documented year after year and a mass exodus in 1995 left the Communities and their farming with irreparable damage. These intermittent displacements enforced the farmers to leave their fertile lands which over the period were left unattended. Potential cultivable lands were kept on hold and cultivation of crops was stopped for the safety of the Sri Lankan security system. The IDPs were initially placed in temporarily constructed hideouts and welfare centres that never were later converted into their semi-permanent residential places. This conflict is the chief cause for the internal displacements and that subsequently squeezed their savings, properties and their relatives. Internally people were made as refugees and become dependent to sustain their livelihood. As a result of the war farmers lost their main source of income and survived on the menial amount they received as financial and livelihood assistance from the government and the non-governmental organisations.
The war that has lasted for a long period had an adverse affect on the psychological health of the people. Farming communities lost their

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major source of income and have shown reluctance to invest into further cultivation. This insecure situation prolonged for a long period without giving relief to recover their lost properties, thus refrain them from sustaining food security. Both internal and international migration of the people of Jaffna has had a great impact. Nearly 600,000 Jaffna Tamils are spread across the world; in Canada (150,000), Germany (40,000), England (75,000), Switzerland (25,000), Australia (40,000), nearly 100,000 in India and the remaining scattered elsewhere (Balasunderampillai, 2002).
The people who have migrated abroad belong to different strata of the society. Upper- and middle-class youths migrated for education and employment while youth belonging to other categories migrated for reasons of safety and employment. As a result of this pattern of migration, the age composition of the Peninsula is now left with a high percentage in the dependent age group of the population that comprises of old, poor, and the sick people (Balasunderampillai, 2002).
Previous Politics and Policies Aggravated the Problem
Paddy is cultivated purely as a rain fed crop coinciding with "Maha season (September to January). Vegetables and other field crops are grown as irrigated crops. The Peninsula is well-known for its cultivation of small onion and chillies and its contribution towards the annual production in the country. These two crops are cultivated with the help of underground water supply and are not dependent on rainfall. Farmers invest huge amounts of money on these cash crops for a lavish return. Successive government policies to import these items during the harvest season ultimately reduced the commodity price for a while but badly affected the attitude of the Peninsula farmers. Similar incident took place in potato cultivation too; farmers in Jaffna are clever and they happily cleverly decided to grow potato, which was once considered as a crop for hilly areas. In 2002, when the local potato was about to occupy the market, it was imported and sold

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 191
for US$ 0.4 per kg shattering completely the possibility of the country's demand being met by the local potato growers.
This stringent political move caused an unpleasant situation among the farmers. Changing the government's policies not only brought extreme dissatisfaction with the economic policy of the government, but was also considered as an unpatriotic action by the Tamils in the Peninsula who thought that the then government always ignored the plight of the Jaffna farmer. This contributed to an increasing affinity towards militancy by the Tamilyouths (Balasunderampillai, 2002).
Internal displacement affected the psychology of the people and especially the farming sector as a whole. Losing the property, family members and adapting to a different setting which restrict their activities, without the basic facilities to survive are the prime causes that aggravated trauma, depression and other psychological issues. The elderly people suffered even more as their affection for homeland left little toleration for a new surrounding and led to psycho-social problems. Peace can be restored for them when they return to their homeland and commence their usual cultivation.
Salinity and Water Pollution in Jaffna Peninsula
Due to the prolonged drought, salinity is in progress (Figure 5). Intensive agriculture demands continuous extraction of water for irrigation that ultimately allows the saline water enters into the water lens of a well. The situation was further aggravated due to the intrusion of sea water at the coastal areas during tsunami. Most of the coastal cultivable lands are become saline due to sea water intrusion. In addition to this the continuous use of heavy inorganic fertilisers has led to an increase in nitrate nitrogen of the water in the wells in the intensive agricultural areas, with its levels recorded above the WHO permissible limits of 10mg/l (Figure 6). This cautioned the poisoning of water for drinking purpose as well as salinity for irrigation.

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o HT-T-I-T-TTT-T-I-T-T-I-T-I-T-I-T-I-T-I-T-I-T-T- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
s s s \ x. A s s s \ x A s s s \ x . s ss S فيهم ᏭᏜᎦ Ꮽ ܢ '' ؟ ܠ ܐ* S {* ؟ گېلا *ܢ ܢ ؟ & * د ”ډلاي لايه "لم سم "ممم ممې
Figure 5: Increasing of salt in drinking water Source: Sutharsiny et.al., 2008
WHO limit of 10mg/l
Figure 6: Increase of nitrate nitrogen in well water in different cropping systems Source: Jeyaruba and Thushyanthy (2008)
 
 

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 193
Fishing
One of the most important economic activities in the Peninsula is fishing. Peninsula fishermen produced 26 percent of the island's total fish production (Citravadivelu, 2001). The local geography is suitable for engaging in this activity with a decent profit. The Peninsular fishermen did not get many incentives from the government as compared to their southern counterparts. The provisions supplied to the fishermen communities were inadequate in the past which caused distrust on government policies; lack of infrastructure facilities, inadequate support for fishing and restrictions on fishing in the sea further aggravated the situation. In addition to this, the lack of support from the government and non-government organisations to preserve fish, post-catch operations, and maintenance of fishing vessels, nets and other devices had worsened the situation. Actions must be taken to rectify this and new technology has to be given to these fishermen to improve their fishing business.
Crop-Livestock Boost for Organic Agriculture
One of the beneficial effects of the war is the adoption of crop-livestock combination in cultivation. The embargo on availability of inorganic fertilisers in northern region paves the way to find alternatives to supplement the nutrient to crops. Hence the crop-livestock combination was intensified and plant and animal wastes were used to grow crops. This combination has had good effects as it has no hazards to the environment and supported the nutrient balance through their products. Livestock excreta were well utilised to adopt organic farming and is a preferred practice by many farmers thereafter. Mass exodus and subsequent displacements caused irreparable losses of crops and animals that created problem to small scale farmers to recover from the damage.
Categories of War-Affected Victims
The recent changes in the social structure of the northern region are interlinked with the conflict. The armed struggle has brought

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destruction of life and property, misery and displacement for the population and an undesirable impact in day-to-day-life. It finds its way success in seeding the separatism into the minds of people especially on the children of the future generation whom were detained in Vanni.
Due to this conflict a large number of families lost one or more family members, including breadwinners and children. Many were widowed by the war and left to shoulder the responsibilities of caring for their children while doing odd menial jobs due to their poor family background and education. These losses have hardened feelings and affected people emotionally. In addition, a good number lost their limbs leaving them incapacitated for the rest of their lives and a responsibility on the society. Such events have caused a sense of insecurity in the minds of the people in the northern region. This is evident from the recent Jaffna Municipal Council election held in August 2009 wherein around 80 percent of the voters did not show interest in collecting their voting cards and those who did obtain one did not cast their votes. Such an act of ignorance of the basic responsibility of the citizens of a democratic country like Sri Lanka perhaps showcases the failure in building confidence. At this stage, necessary steps have to be taken to win the people in order to restore peace and rebuild the war-affected areas with a concrete plan.
The farming communities comprise a large group of war-affected population surviving in the northern region, almost 50 percent of the people have already migrated to foreign countries and a sizable number migrated to the southern parts of the country. Family members and farm labourers are among the affected group, displaced and incapacitated members (Balasunderampillai, 2002).
Many of them are dependent on the society. These members have to be looked after by providing necessary livelihood support or by training them in suitable self-income generation activities. This has to be focused immediately to meet for any successful and sustainable development in North.

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 195
Women's Participation in Agriculture
Even prior to the conflict, women played a key role as head of the household due to the fact that male members willingly shouldered the responsibilities of financial support through their farming activities. Women helped the male members in farming as family labour but their role was rather restricted to this area. This situation took a different turn during the period of armed struggle. A number of youths were attracted towards the armed struggle and lost their lives which in turn increased the number of female-headed households who took the responsibility of providing financial support for the family. Many of these families are headed by women, who were widowed during the war.
The participation of women in agriculture has to be strengthened to help families headed by women and to provide job opportunities to promote self-earning. The 'Cognitive Social Capital, which covers norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs or perceptions of support, reciprocity, sharing, trust, and it relates to what people feel (Harpham et al., 2002), operates in the name of Vidiyal in Theni district of Tamil Nadu, India and in Maldives can be thought of to demonstrate the power of social Commitment among the villagers to realise the power of self-income generation. It can be considered to set an example to promote women's involvement in agriculture and thereby giving them confidence to stand alone in their own investment rather than depending on government free issues and the INGOs and NGOs relief aids. Free rations and issues never free the people from the clutches of poverty.
Women can be trained on various agricultural technologies and agrobased business activities especially in value-addition projects to improve their income status and to sustain their livelihood. Production of palmyra-based industrial products is the best opted choice to expand its products, which has a good demand and market among the foreigners and those who have migrated to foreign countries.

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Youth Participation in Nation-Building
Education of children is the first priority of the Jaffna parents and they invest all of their earnings into it. This could be easily observed on the Z-score results of GCE A/L examinations of Colombo and Jaffna for university admission. These scores did not differ during war period and students in Jaffna excelled in performance preparing themselves with the help of Lantern lights. After completing the ordinary level examination a sizable number of students sit for the Advanced Level examinations. While a limited proportion of youths from farming communities have the chance to get university education, the rest, face tough situations during the war due to the lack of prospects for agriculture. Moreover, few prefer to retain their lands. In the absence of new job openings or for further studies, they were left with two options to secure their life; first was to migrate to foreign countries to continue their studies or to find employment, and the second was to fall into the clutches of militants. There was no sense of security to the youth after leaving the school in northern region. They had only their national identity cards to surrender during military search operations and had no other valid documents in their custody to prove their noninvolvement in militant's activities; this resulted in arrests based on suspicion. Public movement was restricted during day and completely during night by staging curfew from 7.00 p.m. to 5.00 a.m. As farming was not considered as an occupation during this time it left them in a difficult situation. -
These were some of the traumatic experiences people had to face during the armed conflict. It is now time to relieve the youths from this mental agony of unnecessary arrests and allowing freely moving around for farming and mental refreshment activities. Future projects need to be carefully aimed at relief and rehabilitation of these youths and to get them involved in nation-building programmes under the ideology of Mahinda Chinthanaya Intensive farming with wellplanned programmes would help to make them productive members

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 197
of this society. Agriculture has to be tuned with cost effective, innovative and advanced technologies to attract the youths into this sector. Youths have to be trained in various agriculture-based income generating technologies which are essential for them to initiate self. income generation. The support of information technology (IT) in its real sense would help to attract more youths. IT could be well utilised in farming by providing information of various aspects in agriculture. The Commonwealth of Learning projects lifelong learning for farmers (L3 farmers project) involved in developing digital content to assist farmers through IT; an example of IT and agriculture. Establishing training institutes to disseminate knowledge to youth and give direction to their energy into well-defined constructive programmes of the national development is required for positive reinforcement. The youth should be seen as the building blocks of national development.
The Scope for an Action Plan
The scope for establishing a sustainable development strategy falls into three categories; Immediate, Short-term and Long-term interventions.
The immediate need is to provide emergency assistance to IDPs to sustain livelihood, de-mining the land where these people originally lived and allow them to use their own cultivable land for farming.
Short term efforts have to be directed towards identifying incomegenerating activities that would provide sustainable livelihoods and promote self-reliance among those who have lost their sense of identity and hope for a better future. This will include the provision of revitalisation of social services-health, education and community services. Reinstating faculty of agriculture in its original place at Kilinochchi is urged.
Long term interventions are identified as repairing, widening and building new roads, completing the railway line from Vavuniya to

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Kankesanthurai, repairing affected bridges, completing irrigation works and ensuring continuous and uninterrupted supply of power and energy supplies etc. Coordination between Ministries of Agriculture (Research and Extension), Ministry of Agrarian Services and Development, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Indigenous Medicine and the Ministry of Higher Education, especially faculties of agriculture is inevitable to work on a common platform for sustainable development. Establishment of a university for agriculture, livestock and fisheries is of future perspective to this region.
A Roadmap to Restore Peace and Development
A new chapter in the agriculture sector of the Northern Province has to be opened to assist farmers and attract the youth into farming and farm-based industrial activities. I have highlighted below some of the possible means of activities based on the problems faced in this region.
Transport and Marketing
Easy transport through the A9 road would help the farmers to supply their products to suitable markets in the Southern outlets ensuring dispatch of their products safely and economically. This will improve steady marketing of onion, chilli, banana, grapes, mango etc. and thus, provide a green signal to the agriculture in Jaffna Peninsula after a long time. The longstanding plight of the farmers in marketing their good quality produces would be solved through opening up of A9 route by getting a good price for their produces.
Conservation Farming
Farms and farming activities in this region have to be conserved and renewed with newer technologies. Our farmers use old techniques of crop cultivation. Further, farming in the northern region has suffered greatly under the usage of excessive pesticides for the past two decades. This perhaps led miserably towards the unknown but largest

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 199
consumption of toxic inorganic chemicals by the people through the vegetables (Mikunthan, 2002; Jeyakumaran and Mikunthan, 2008).
Jaffna Peninsula recorded the highest consumption of inorganic chemicals in Sri Lanka which has had an impact on the highest cancer incidence in this country (Dissanayake, 1988). Initiatives have been developed to minimise the use of such inorganic chemicals. Incorporation of organic farming methods can reduce the usage of such chemicals and also improve the management of insects and other pests. Further, this can be a solution not only for the problems of inorganic toxic pesticides but is also good for the safety of crops and the living environment.
Integrated Pest Management
In the traditional sense, Integrated Pest Management (IPM) has an impact on pests of crops wherein various tactics are made available for operation. So far IPM had been misused and practiced only by adopting chemical pesticides alone. This concept was not wellperceived in developing countries and especially in Sri Lanka due to the non-availability of other control tactics. The small landholdings did not allow implementation of the methods in its fullest strength. Moreover, the practice of land partitioning as a social norm, especially to the women, made the situation more complicated for the implementation of such technology in this region. However, if alternate methods are made available, the investment on chemical pesticides would be minimised to produce safe food.
Further, the reopening of the A9 route and thus allowing free flow of materials into Jaffna Peninsula, poses challenges as there is a danger of inflow of excess agro-chemicals. Some agro-chemical companies have their clients in Jaffna and may simply dispatch chemicals to boost their market sale after a long gap. These issues have to be considered very seriously and only the required quantity of agro-chemicals must be allowed in the Jaffna market. Mistakes made in the past should not be

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repeated any more. Alternatively, biological control has to be geared to manage the pests of all crops. This avenue has a big role to play in the future of the northern region agriculture industry.
Сотрояting
Compost is an essential material for successful crop cultivation. The soils of Jaffna Peninsula face a shortage in humus and therefore require addition of compost. When the Peninsula region was connected to Vanni the Vanni compost had a big demand in Jaffna for crop cultivation. In addition, composting is encouraged by recycling the wastes generated in households and other municipal council areas. Effective waste recycling into composting is a real venture for youths. Techniques such as Vermiculture (Piratheeban and Mikunthan, 2006), use of effective micro-organisms, and other efficient composting techniques have to be introduced. This will help to recycle the degradable wastes and to minimise the waste accumulation on the roads. The compost can be enriched with natural good organisms such as Trichoderma and Pseudomonas fluorescence, which are the antagonistic organisms that control plant pathogens and with entomopathogenic fungi such as Nomuraea, Beauveria, Lecanicillium, Metarhizium, Paecilomyces and Hirsutela to control crop pests (Mikunthan, 2008; Thurkathipana and Mikunthan, 2008). Naturally existing, these micro-organisms can be isolated and mass produced in locally available cost effective materials for the farmers' use (Jegathambigai et al., 2008a and b; Mikunthan and Manjunatha, 2006). Wastes can be considered as a source of growing such potential and natural micro-organisms, thereby, making possible effective waste management through recycling.
Integrated Nutrient Management
Nutrient supplement can also be focused upon to replenish the soil with essential nutrients in order to harvest a good crop. Integrated nutrient management needs to be given priority to substitute synthetic

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 201
fertilisers as most of the drinking water in Jaffna has reached the maximum permissible limit of nitrate toxicity (Sutharsiny et al., 2008). Nitrogen-fixing plants can be utilised for these purposes. Promotion of application of green and green-leaf manures (Vakeesan et.al., 2009) is essential to rejuvenate the soil and enrich it with farmer-friendly organisms. In addition, nitrogen fixing organisms can be locally isolated and made available to the farmers in formulations specified under Sri Lankan standards. Local resources can be exploited and offer the best opportunity to explore the potential of establishing agriculture based industries that will ensure employment opportunities to the youths. Application of green and green leaf manures is another area that has to be looked into help the soil to retain its fertility. The existing practice could be enhanced to meet the needs of all farmers (Vakeesan etal., 2009).
Establishment of Plant Protection Centre
Selection and safe use of pesticides, regulation of pesticide inflow and appropriate application of pesticides are of great importance to the agro-industry. Research on selection and appropriate use of newer pesticides must be carried out in order to solve problems encountered in the northern region. Monitoring and restricting the inflow of pests have to be checked. This centre will serve as an apex body to regulate all aspects in plant protection which is an important concern in crop cultivation in recent times. Global warming has had a serious impact on agriculture and is evident from the increasing incidents of insect, mites and diseases in crops. This centre will coordinate all the activities related to plant protection connecting all the departments, NGOs, INGOs and the Faculty of Agriculture by forming an umbrella network. This centre will also play a major role in the future development of agriculture especially tackling the crop pests. Similar centres could be established throughout the country supporting the Registrar of Pesticides and the Quarantine services to keep a vigil on any invasive pests (Mikunthan, 2002).

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Establishment of Bio-Control Units
As an alternative to chemical control, it is time to consider establishing bio-control units to produce bio-control agents of predators and parasitoids, antagonistic fungi and bacteria and entomopathogens such as fungi, bacteria, virus and nematodes can be produced to control pests such as insects, mites weeds, nematodes and diseases. Future agriculture in the northern region has to be planned to avoid any harm to the environment and should focus on the use of eco-friendly management techniques.
Strengthening SEEDCO
SEEDCO is a cooperative society owned by the Jaffna farming community that receives support from the District Secretariat/Jaffna and Office of Deputy Director (Extension), Agrarian Services and Development and the Faculty of Agriculture, University of Jaffna for the production of seeds of variety of crops. It has to be strengthened with adequate instruments and infrastructure materials to produce good seeds for future distribution. In addition, farmers should be trained in seed testing and monitoring.
Re-Plantation to Rectify Manmade Disaster on Palmyra and Coconut
Adding to the damages of war is the loss of valuable trees, such as palmyra, coconut and mango. The palm trees are left without a crown which signifies the intensity of the battles in these areas. Re-plantation of affected trees to provide a good shelter and food to the people has become the need of the hour.
Training Centres to be Established
Training centres need to be established in order to provide training on sustainable low cost technology in agriculture and the fisheries sector. A training centre dealing with sustainable low cost technology and specific skills in agriculture has to be built to provide essential training

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 203
for farming. This will ensure trained youths with educated perspectives. Similarly a training centre for the fisheries has to be established in Mannar or Mullaitivu to provide essential advanced technology in the fisheries sector. These training centres will provide necessary skill training regarding fishing to youths.
Conclusion
Under the direction of His Excellency President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the 180 days action plan of 'Uthuru Vasanthaya programme' is credibly featured incorporating quicker development in all the sectors including agriculture and fisheries. A detailed database on the basis of Grama Seva Niladhari divisions were obtained and pooled. This reliable data will help to focus the problems encountered and find a solution for the farming and agriculture-based industries.
O The barracks and roadblocks are slowly being cleared from the
close-by cultivable fields to allow the people to work freely. O The main land route-A9 that connects the Jaffna Peninsula with the mainland was opened and made available for public
transport. O Goods are being allowed to flow freely into the Jaffna Peninsula after a long time and the prices are maintained as in Colombo markets. O Business agencies and companies are expanding their activities
to Jaffna. O Relaxation of restriction in fishing areas in the sea has been
initiated in certain areas. O Fishermen are allowed longer fishing hours in the sea and are
also allowed to travel further distance on sea. o Telecommunication restrictions are being relaxed and getting
a connection is not that difficult. O All banks have their branches including the Central Bank in the Jaffna Peninsula, and have initiated various loan schemes for farmers.

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O Release of cultivation lands from military occupation is a good start after the end of war. Nearly 11,200 hectares of low land in the Jaffna district has been earmarked for “Maha’ cultivation in the year 2009 itself. That includes 700 hectares that were not cultivated for over a decade. The idea was spearheaded by Senior Presidential Advisor and Head of Presidential Task Force Honourable MP Basil Rajapaksa under the 180 days 'Uthuru Vasanthaya Programme'. According to Jaffna District, Assistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services 700 hectares of cultivatable low land has been identified in Maravanpulo and Thanankillappu areas in the Chavakachcheri Divisional Secretariat and 50 hectares in Ariyalai East. Agrarian Development and Agrarian Services Ministries have jointly provided seed paddy, fertiliser and funds for land preparation at a rate of Rs. 7,000/= per hectare as an incentive to motivate Jaffna farmers.
O Release of schools and houses from the clutches of the military at Usan. The Ramanathan Maha Vidyalayam, a school at Usan was freed from military occupation for public use on 19 August 2009. The residents are also allowed to use the inner roads. This has helped the occupants to move freely along the roads to carry out their farming activities.
The ideology of 'Mahinda Chinthanaya' clearly states its goal to empower youth with adequate training to develop into a task force and provide a harmonious environment to all the citizens irrespective of their ethnic groups in an effort to build up our motherland Lanka. An island rich in biodiversity, Sri Lanka has its potential of natural resources and these resources could be explored while preserving them. Let's hope peace will be restored forever in this beautiful island and it should emerge as a model among the developing nations as a powerful multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country of excellence through friendliness, sharing and maintaining harmonious environment for a better future under this dynamic leadership.

Prospects of the Renewal of Agriculture-Driven Livelihood 205
References
Anonymous, (2003) Jaffna Plan - Programme framework for resettlement,
rehabilitation, reconstruction and development for Jaffna district, p. 283. Balasunderampillai, P. (2002) "Overall Profile of Northern Sri Lanka: Past, Present and Future” in Mikiko Terashima (ed.), Workshop Proceedings: Planning for Reconstruction and Redevelopment in Northern Sri Lanka, Education for Democratic Planning in Sri Lanka Project, University of British Columbia, pp. 48-56. Citravadivelu, K. (2002) Fisheries and Industry, in Mikiko Terashima (ed.), Workshop Proceedings: Planning for Reconstruction and Redevelopment in Northern Sri Lanka, Education for Democratic Planning in Sri Lanka Project, University of British Columbia, pp. 289-97. Dissanayake, C.B. (1988) "Nitrate in the groundwater in Sri Lanka - Implication for Community Health” in Journal of the Geological Society of Sri Lanka, 1, pp. 80-84. Harpham, T., E. Grant and E. Thomas (2002) "Measuring Social Capital within Health Surveys: Key Issues” in Health Policy and Planning, 17, pp. 106-11. Jegathambigai, V., M. D. S. D. Karunaratne, Arne Svinningen and G. Mikunthan (2008a) "Bio Control of Root-Knot Nematode, Meloidogyne incognita damaging Queen palm, Livistona rotundifolia using Trichoderma species”, Communications in Agricultural and Applied Biological Sciences, 73 (4), pp. 681-87. ------- (2008b) "Potential of Trichoderma species on Helminthosporium causing leaf spot on cane palm, Chrysalidocarpus lutescens' Communications in Agricultural and Applied Biological Sciences, 73 (2), pp. 207-16. Jeyaruba, T. and M. Thusyanthy (2008) "Effect of Land Use on Quality of Groundwater: A Case Study from Jaffna Peninsula, Water Supply and Wastewater Management: Progress and Prospects towards Clean and Healthy Society”, Proceedings of a symposium, 23 June 2008, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. pp. 1-6. Jeyakumaran, N. and G. Mikunthan (2008) Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Toxicity symptoms associated with pesticide use among farmers in Jaffna district, Sri Lanka, a paper presented at National Annual Scientific Sessions on Ecological Medicine, on 25 October 2008 at OBLT, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka, p. 15.

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Mikunthan, G. (2002) "The Future Prospects of Plant Protection in the Northern Region of Sri Lanka” in Mikiko Terashima (ed.), Workshop Proceedings: Planning for Reconstruction and Redevelopment in Northern Sri Lanka, Education for Democratic Planning in Sri Lanka Project, The University of British Columbia. pp. 115-30.
------ (2008) Biological Control of Sclerotium rolfsii (Sacc.) using Trichoderma spp. and its small scale production, International Journal
o of Pure and Applied Sciences, 1(1), 1-6.9.
------ and M. Manjunatha (2006) "Mycopathogens associated with pests of chilli and their pathogenicity against thrips, Scirtothrips dorsalis and mite, Polyphagotarisonemus latus”, Tropical Agricultural Research, 18, pp. 163-72.
------ and S. Piratheeban (2007) Performance of epigeic earthworm species in different solid compost making, Proceedings of the 22" International conference on Solid waste technology and management held at Philadelphia, PA USA during 18-21 March.
------- and N. Thurkathipana (2008) “Eco-friendly management of hadda beetle using Beauveria bassiana in brinjal", Communications in Agricultural and Applied Biological Sciences, 73 (3), pp. 597-602.
Narayanaswami, C. (2009) "Some Reflections on North-East Development,”
The Sunday Leader, 16 August, p. 16.
Sutharsiny, A., M. Thushyanthy and S. Saravanan (2008) "Status of water supply wells in Jaffna Peninsula”, Pathmaraja, S. and M. I. M. Mowjood (eds.) in Proceeding of Symposium on water supply, sanitation and wastewater management: Progress and prospects towards clean and healthy society, Postgraduate Institute of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, pp.17-24.
Vakeesan, A., N. Tharshani and G. Mikunthan. (2008) "Green' Manures: Nature's Gift to Improve Soil Fertility” in LEISA 24 (2), June 2008, pp. 16-17.

CHAPTER 10
Nucleus Entrepreneur Exchange: Sustainable Peace-Building through Economic and Social Integration
Amina Yoosuf
Background and Introduction
The Nucleus Foundation (NF) is a non-profit association working in development cooperation under a MOU with the former Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure Development, providing a range of services to partner agencies throughout Sri Lanka. These solutions range from designing and implementing development projects, training programmes, consultancy services and other bespoke interventions. The Foundation was set up as the exit strategy of two longstanding German Development Cooperation (GTZ) projects and has been in operation since 2007. The NF is supported by the GTZ Facilitating Local Initiatives for Conflict Transformation (FLICT) project to implement a programme geared to deliberately and proactively promote inter-ethnic exchanges between entrepreneurs in the Ampara district. This programme seeks to stimulate activities that will contribute to establishing a real and meaningful sustainable communication and exchange process between entrepreneurs of the varying ethnic groups in the region.
Given the conflict situation existing in Sri Lanka until recently it is on the agenda of many organisations to contribute to peace-building through formation of alliances between those in the north and east and the rest of the country. The Nucleus approach is used here not only as a tool for enterprise development but also as a tool to encourage inter

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ethnic and inter-regional exchange between Nucleus entrepreneurs. The Nucleus philosophy is based upon the main tenet of exchange between entrepreneurs and the benefits of working in a group. To this end many activities and events are organised and implemented among these groups. The networking and relationship-building opportunity afforded to them through joint Nucleus activities empowers these Small Medium Entrepreneurs (SMEs) to continue to strengthen the linkages introduced through the activities undertaken jointly. It is encouraging to see these entrepreneurs taking the initiative, being creative in finding means and ways of undertaking development activities and participating regularly and actively in their Nucleus groups despite the limitations placed upon them by the conflict.
The ongoing project is complimented by an action research study that will test out the hypothesis that: Entrepreneurs working in ethnically isolated communities have little empathy for other communities. When persons of such communities are exposed to the Nucleus approach where they exchange ideas and experiences and learn from each other they develop not only business linkages but also develop relationships that cut across ethnic lines, and while increasing incomes they also lead to more social integration and exchanges between the communities contributing to peacebuilding in a sustainable manner.
The activities are designed to focus on developing inter-ethnic relationships among entrepreneurs in Ampara district with a view to promote their participation in the conflict transformation and peace-building efforts in addition to contributing to the upgrading of their enterprises through better organising the demand for Business Development Services and influencing framework conditions affecting their business environment. The study will look at the impact of these relationships resulting from the Nucleus approach on the businesses as well as the business environment in the region in addition to looking at whether the interventions have resulted in creating social as well as economic integration among entrepreneurs of different ethnic groups in the region.

Peace-Building through Economic and Social Integration 209
Rationale
The reasons for conflict are complex and multiple, but most conflicts are inevitably related to economic, political and social factors and are based on marginalisation of some groups based on these factors. In addition to the everyday problems faced by the entrepreneurs in the conflict ridden areas such as lack of access to credit, lack of technology and access to technology, lack of skilled labour, lack of know-how on financial management, high costs of inputs and working capital these entrepreneurs have to deal with the conflict and security situation that prevailed until recently, further impairing their ability to overcome these obstacles.
The NF experiences of implementing this programme during the last year has shown that such exchanges where the real economic, social and political benefits can be felt by these entrepreneurs can lead to more reciprocity of ideas and experiences among them not only related to their enterprises and businesses but also related to the social factors affecting them as a result of the conflict and resulting security situation.
At present the business community in Ampara is divided based on ethnicity and location. For example, Kalmunai is Muslim-dominated when it comes to business while Thirukovil and Ampara are Tamil and Sinhala-dominated areas respectively. One of the key reasons for this is the lack of interaction between these groups. The programme addresses this issue by attempting to bring together these segregated groups. Before, there were no conscious efforts by the entrepreneurs or their associations to come together and exchange ideas and experiences. Once these entrepreneurs realised the advantages that the group lobbying power can bring them and their business environment, they have been more open to participate in this process. The Nucleus Entrepreneur Exchange is designed to bring together entrepreneurs of different ethnic groups within the Ampara district as well as promote cross-regional exchanges between entrepreneurs in the Ampara district with those from the rest of the country. The project stimulates many

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activities which contribute to establishing a real, meaningful and sustainable communication and exchange process between these entrepreneurs. Joint activities are conducted for Muslim and Tamil entrepreneurs of the coastal areas together with the Sinhala entrepreneurs from the Ampara town.
Problems
The following problems have been identified as those affecting the entrepreneurs in the region:
o They are isolated in their enterprises and lack the ability to obtain
required Business Development Services (BDS). o Persons from different ethnic groups in general and entrepreneurs in specific hold an element of mistrust towards those of other communities and ethnic groups due to the prevailing ethnic tensions in the region. O Trade Associations and other entrepreneur support organisations are
ethnically and geographically isolated from each other. o There used to be instances of pressure from the armed groups (paramilitary) for obtaining ransom which, demanding hartals, etc. resulting in adverse consequences for the business environment. O Entrepreneurs do not have an opportunity to network and learn
from one another. O SMEs in Ampara lack access to resources in comparison to other
regions where the conflict has not had a direct impact O There is an element of mistrust between people from the conflict
affected areas and those in the rest of the country. O SMEs in Ampara are unaware of the opportunities available in their
sectors in the rest of the country.
Objectives
The objective of the programme is to contribute to real meaningful and sustainable peace-building and conflict transformation through promoting economic and social interaction and integration between entrepreneurs of different ethnic groups within the Ampara district.

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Approach
The Nucleus Foundation recognises that in order to achieve success in peace-building one should not engage in stand alone peace-building projects but rather offer sustainable and long lasting solutions connected to economic, political and social development so that affected groups are compelled to realise the impact that it has on their lives. The Nucleus Entrepreneur Exchange is designed in a way that entrepreneurs engaged in the process feel the real benefits in terms of the impact of the project on their enterprises and by extension on their livelihoods.
The approach followed in promoting this exchange includes: o Creating inter-ethnic business linkages to promote better understanding between the different ethnic groups in Ampara district where entrepreneurs of one ethnic group participate in joint Nucleus activities with others from different ethnic groups within the district O Increasing networking between ethnic groups and regions creating more economic and social interaction where special events are conducted to develop and encourage Cross-regional business linkages also leading to more social interaction, networking and integration between entrepreneurs in the target areas O Entrepreneurs in Ampara district who are organised in Nucleus groups exchange know-how and ideas with other entrepreneurs from the other provinces through Cross-visits and participating in Common activities O National and regional media coverage is provided to these initiatives in the Sinhala, Tamil and English media (newspapers, radio) in order to increase public awareness and promote this type of interaction while encouraging more persons to join this process o The learning experiences of the programme is shared and disseminated among interested groups and a model is developed to engage entrepreneurs in conflict areas into peace-building efforts
Results
To date many activities have taken place promoting inter-ethnic business contacts between entrepreneurs. Some of these activities were

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related to the promotion of business development while some were related to peace-building and conflict transformation. The activities included:
O cross-visits with entrepreneurs of other regions O experience sharing and idea exchanging events O participation in peace-building activities O participation in motivation programmes
O participation in business development activities
The activities undertaken since the inception of the project in June 2008 has validated the assumption that through the Nucleus Entrepreneur Exchange the entrepreneurs from the east learn and profit from the experiences of their counterparts. It was for the first time that some of them visited the workshop of someone they previously believed to be a competitor. Through the networking sessions conducted in this exchange programmes entrepreneurs from different ethnicities communicated with each other, even they spoke different languages. They shared ideas, thoughts, experiences and problems, they learnt from their colleagues and realised that they share more similarities than differences.
The networking and relationship-building opportunity afforded to them through joint Nucleus activities will empower these SMEs to continue to strengthen the linkages introduced through the activities undertaken jointly. In the first such activity, a group of welders from Ampara visited the Engineering Design Centre, Elcardo Engineering Pvt. Ltd. and also undertook a one-day training programme at the Aruppola Technical College. They also participated in a networking session with their counterparts in Kandy, and it is envisaged that they will make use of these inter-regional business linkages to promote their businesses.
Following are the sectors in which Nucleus groups have been formed and activities undertaken through this programme:

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Sector No. of Nucleus Members Welders 15
Carpenters 25
Beauticians 12
Printers 39 Goldsmiths 12 Poultry 10
Dairy 20
Coir 12
Handloom 12 Service Centres 10
Pre-schools 12
Traders 15
Total 202
Some of the activities implemented for these groups are illustrated below:
The FLICT supported promotion of cross-regional exchanges between
SMEs from the eastern and central provinces saw the carpenters from
Ampara make a two-day visit to Kandy. The carpenters visited Central
Saw Mill in Katugastota to gain an insight about the saw milling and the wood industry. On the second day they participated in a one day training program at the Aruppola Technical College together with their counterparts from the central province.
Comments from the participants of the activity:
O Through this kind of visits most importantly we were able to move with other ethnic groups without any difficulties. Could see some new machines and were able to get a government recognised certificate.
O We were very happy to see the latest and huge machineries at the saw mill.
O I was involved in carpentry work for a longer period. The two days training programme organised by Nucleus was very useful to me as I could see some of the machine which I had never seen before.
O It was a good experience. We were happy that we got a chance to see the saw mill and also do some practical work in the technical college. This visit gave us an opportunity to meet new friends too.

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o Through this visit we got lots of experiences as well as a chance to make
new friends from other communities.
o Through this visit we could see some latest machinery, new technology and the safety measures to be taken before we start our activity, it also promoted understanding among the other communities. Thank you
o We had a good relationship with other communities. Most importantly we got a valuable certificate, so I am really thankful to Nucleus for arranging this programme.
The highlight of this exchange programme Together towards Business Progress took place on 16 November 2008 in Kandy. Over 260 entrepreneurs including 150 from the Eastern province participated in a one-day programme conducted by renowned Personality Training Specialist and Master Trainer Mind Muscle Vibration Therapy and NLP Dr. Kuma Iddamallena. The objective was to strengthen the entrepreneurs to do business leveraging and synergising with others and to encourage the different communities to work in harmony and live in peace.
Together towards Business Progress-Entrepreneurs from five provinces participated; 17 individuals of the printers Nucleus from Ampara district undertook a study tour to Kandy. They participated in a programme on, costing for the printing industry, Conducted by an expert in the field. On the second day they visited printing workshops in Kandy and participated in a networking session with individuals from the Kandy and Badulla Nucleus groups. They were also joined by the Sri Lanka Association of Printers represented by its president Mr. Dinesh Kulathunga, the vice-president, secretary and other board members. The impact of this exchange programme was evident when one member from the Badulla Nucleus agreed to visit his counterparts in the east the following week to repair his machines. A printer from
Ampara said of the visit:
I saved Rs. 45,000/= by participating in this trip, I wanted to order some paper and didn't because I was coming on the trip. Today I heard from the representatives of the National Association that paper prices have reduced by Rs. 500/= a ream.

Peace-Building through Economic and Social Integration 215
We will never forget this experience, we have learnt a lot of new things which we will go back and implement in our enterprises. We learn from each other.
The Nucleus engaged in the dairy sector visited the Ambewela farm in Nuwara Eliya. A field visit was organised for a group of coir producers. The carpenters and welders Nucleus groups received their certificates for the technical training programmes they participated at a special awards ceremony. The individuals from the printing business met to discuss more activities.
A context mapping and relationship analysis workshop was facilitated for Nucleus entrepreneurs engaged in this programme. This is in the context of an action research project undertaken by FLICT to identify how business network created through the Nucleus programme promotes change within the entrepreneurs in the region and achieves the goal of breaking down isolation, division, prejudice, and polarisation between business groups of different ethnicities.
Close to 100 Nucleus members participated in Pada Yathra programme in Panama where they travelled together to Panama and spent one-day interacting with their counterparts in peace-building activities.
Conclusions
The experiences of implementing the Nucleus Entrepreneur Exchange has validated the assumption that through this programme the entrepreneurs from different ethnic groups and regions learn and profit from the experiences of their counterparts. Through the crossvisits between the regions that have already taken place entrepreneurs have already established linkages. A welder from Kandy has visited Ampara to share his experiences with the group there. The printing professionals discussed the possibility of getting their image setting done by a person in Kandy. The beauticians are planning to request for a longer and more comprehensive training programme from their counterparts in Kandy. Altogether the groups from Ampara have

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realised that there is much benefit for them because the programme reduces their isolation and opens up more avenues in terms of new technology, better networking, more business opportunity and exposure to the new happenings in their respective industries.
National level recognition has been achieved for and national level linkages established for some sectors. For example, the Sri Lanka Association of Printers represented by its president, vice-president, secretary and other board members participated at a networking session when the professionals from Ampara visited their counterparts in Kandy. The Ampara group were able to discuss issues affecting their industry and get an input about the latest developments from the national level representatives including the advantages of becoming members of this association and future benefits opened out to them.
Past experiences have indicated that for the entrepreneurs organised in Nucleus, the most important aspect is the ability to come together in a common forum and to discuss their problems and exchange ideas and experiences. This makes them aware that they are not isolated and others face similar obstacles in their businesses. Once the initial trust building is established through Nucleus meetings and regular implementation of activities, entrepreneurs are interested to continue the process. In addition to the economic benefit they derive for their enterprises, there is also a social integration process where the Nucleus meetings and activities become a common forum where these entrepreneurs can share their ideas.
References
The Nucleus Foundation website www.nucleus.lk, (2007) Sri Lanka.
Lederach, John Paul (1997), Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C.
-------, Reina Neufeldt and Hal Culbertson (2007) Reflective Peace Building: A
Planning, Monitoring and Learning Toolkit, Notre Dame, The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame and Catholic Relief Service South East Asia Regional Office.

CHAPTER 11
Peace Processes and Peace-Building in Sri Lanka: Special Reference to the Setting up of the De-Merged Eastern Provincial Council
Seyed M.M.Bazeer
"Peace building is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing the root causes and effects of conflicts through reconciliation"
("Peacebuilding” by Michelle Maiese, September 2003)
A chronological overview of the international approach to conflict resolution in Sri Lanka from the initiation of peace processes in India in 1987, through domestic and internationally mediated ceasefires until the end of the war in 2009. This will enable a detailed analysis of the pre- and post-war phenomenon in Sri Lanka, contrasting the ethnic divide, identity crisis and the diverse political aspirations of the Tamil and Muslim minorities. A look to the future prospects of longterm, sustainable peace in the post-war climate by identification, reconstruction, reconciliation and development of existing and potential issues with regards to all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, noting the set-up of Eastern Provincial council. This chapter intend to focus on the historical background of the ethnic conflict not only discrimination but also as a conflict of pride and prejudice between the communities. It is a positive approach to review the legitimacy of claims of all the stakeholders in the changed scenario of war victories and review their political agenda to seek sustainable peace without paving way for recurrence of conflict in Sri Lanka in the name of

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ethnicity. This chapter does not focus on the pacts and negotiations held between the government of Sri Lanka leaders and the main Tamil political parties such as Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact, DudleyChelvanayagam Pact or Chandrika Kumaratunga's constitutional amendments as they failed to achieve its aims.
Background of the Ethnic Problem
Soon after the Sri Lankan Independence in 1948, the ethnic divide between the two major communities became more apparent in the national politics, with the Tamil representative leaders of the North and East forming their own political party in the name of their own ethnicity. Furthermore, the imposition of the Sinhala Only Act of 1956 created a wider schism between the two major communities in Sri Lanka and reinforced the political identity of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. However, the Muslim community was slow to jump on to the bandwagon of ethnicity based on politics, as they were integrated into Tamil politics under the communal label of Tamil-speaking. Nevertheless, language has always been a medium of communication and not an issue of life and death as campaigned by the Tamil leadership "Mr. S.J.V. Selvanayakam, the Federal leader, refuting the charges made by Dr. Colvin R. de Silva during his recent visit to Jaffna, said that the language question was a life and death struggle for the Tamil Speaking nation in Ceylon whereas to LSSP and CP it would be only a political issue” (Daily News, 1956) that encompassed the Muslims of the North and the East as part of the Tamil-speaking community in their political philosophy. This concept did not reach out to the Tamil-speaking communities that lived beyond the Northern and the Eastern provinces.
The imposition of the Sinhala language as the only official language was first proposed for debate by the United National Party (UNP) and a resolution to that effect was to be passed in their party's special meeting when they were in power, prior to the formation of the Sri

Setting up of the De-Merged Eastern Provincial Council 219
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The Tamil leadership affiliated with the UNP government at that time and the Tamil and Muslim members of both the Parliament and Senate strongly opposed the motion. It was also in this epoch, that the Tamil leadership first proposed the motion of creating two states or a federal state for Tamils: "Sir Kandiah Vaithyanathan who was then the Minster of Industries and social services firmly opposed the decision to debate the resolution of the UNP and most of the Muslim leadership also joined the Tamil leadership and contemplated their proposal for separate state" (Rajani, 1954; 3). The 'Sinhala Only proposition by the then ruling government, UNP, may have been the catalyst that spurred the Tamil leadership to foster their minority complex and thus promoting their political agenda.
As S. L. Gunasekara (1996: 30) points out "S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, Q.C. the leader of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchchi and later of the Tamil United Liberation Front addressing a meeting at the Young Men's Muslim Association at Fort in October 1954 said "It is better to have our own territory, our own culture and self-respect than be a minority in the island living on the good fortune of the majority Community". The proposal for an official language created a fear psychosis that the Tamil language and Tamil culture would be destroyed. The only option that could deter such a predicament would be the proposition for a separate state. The language issue was considered to be the main cause that woke the Tamil national question vigorously to demand for a separate state. The Tamil homeland concept became politically active with the inception of the Federal party. By name, the Federal Party', metaphorically advanced a separate rule for Tamils (sic) Tamil speaking people. The meaning of federal' was not the appropriate word for Tamil Arasu'. In Tamil, Arasu is translated as a government or state, thus the Federal Party had its own perception and conveyed their political message clearly to the Tamil people that they were not part of Sri Lanka but had to assert their selfdetermination in the North and East which they claimed to be their

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own historical homeland. The educated Tamil elites from the North conceptualised the Tamil homeland theory from a historical perspective but the ground support was not sufficient to make it a political claim.
The political turmoil between the government and the Tamil polity went through several talks with a view to resolving their problems which became more and more complex and intractable when the Tamil militants became the key players in the negotiation. Nevertheless, in respect of the language issue the government rectified the grievances of the Tamil-speaking people by enacting legislations, such as; Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1968, Tamil Language Regulations and the 13" amendment of 1987, which identified Tamil and English as official languages alongside Sinhala. Tamil language was also made an official language in the Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka's constitution.
Democracy Vs Armed Struggle
The 1970s standardisation policy of the Sri Lankan government was another basis for consolidating the separate state claim, which gave rise to open declarations by Tamil parties that the only solution to their problem was to set up their own state. Their modus operandi of the issues led to armed struggle as they acknowledged that democratic struggle had failed to deliver goods. The grievances of standardisation was cited as the reason for armed struggle and the Vaddukkodai Resolution was the first public declaration that was aimed at installing a separate state for Tamils, followed by the mandate given by the constituents of S. J. V. Chelvanayagam in his electorate, Kankesanthurai. Although standardisation in education was beneficial to the Tamils who lived in underprivileged educational districts, it negatively affected the Tamil-speaking people of the Jaffna district.
Nevertheless, the two issues of language and standardisation have become out-dated in the last two decades; as the former remains a

Setting up of the De-Merged Eastern Provincial Council 221
matter of proper and strict implementation whilst the later has lost its weight due to major improvements in higher education with the influx of various private and foreign educational opportunities.
The demand for a federal state or autonomous regions eventually became a demand for separate state in a more political and military way. International involvement was initially stemmed from the Thimpu talks, as that was the first time that the Sri Lankan ethnic problem reached out-of-shore negotiations. Despite India being the neighbouring country, the ethnic conflict was considered by the Indian government; on one hand as an obligation towards the people of Tamilnadu but on the other, as a geo-political matter, at a time when there were two international super-power houses competing for global supremacy.
The Thimpu Declaration (1985) completely ignored the Muslims as a distinctive ethnic group and failed to offer an opportunity for Muslims in the delegation to articulate their point of views with regards to their identity and political aspiration despite the fact that they had no separate political party at that time. The Thimpu Declaration was ambiguous and dexterously included all Tamil-speaking people including the Up-Country Tamils who were not demographically present within the identified Tamil homeland. The Thimpu principle was based on four cardinal aims and was an addendum to the
Vaddukkoddai Declaration (1976).
1) Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a nation 2) Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the
Tamils in Sri Lanka 3) Recognition of the right of self-determination of the Tamil nation 4) Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of
all Tamils who look upon the island as their country
The Thimpu talks ended up in unilateral declaration as the Sri Lankan delegation refused to concede to the principles. Nevertheless, this

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international involvement in negotiations led India to progressively widen its involvement, to an extent of trespass on the Northern territory of Sri Lanka by distributing food from the helicopters, subsequently engaging Sri Lanka in a bilateral Indo-Lanka peace accord.
In essence, the declaration of Vaddukkodai resolutions made by major Tamil political parties was rephrased in the Thimpu Declaration by both democratic and armed Tamil groups that jointly agreed to a political solution based on Thimpu principles.
Indo-Lanka Peace Accord
Indo-Lanka Peace Accord was based on the following principle which appeared to have ensured the integrity of Sri Lanka whilst seeking to strike a deal with Tamil parties on a provisional merger of the North and the East. It recognised the multi-ethnic and multi-lingual character of Sri Lanka but again consolidated the general Tamil political thinking that the North and the East were historical habitations of the Sri Lankan Tamill-speaking people. The Thimpu principles identified two distinctive races and Tamil homeland, which the Indo-Lanka Accord gave credence to, whilst recognising the multiethnic society of the North and the East.
1.1 Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Sri Lanka 1.2 Acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a 'multi-ethnic and a multilingual plural society' consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers 1.3 Recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and
linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured 1.4. Also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamillspeaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in
this territory with other ethnic groups

Setting up of the De-Merged Eastern Provincial Council 223
Why Did the Indo-Lanka Accord Fail?
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) claimed that the accord was thrust upon them by the Indian authorities and conveyed its discontent prior to the Accord being signed by the Sri Lankan government and the Indian government. The LTTE became discontented with the Indian initiated peace process where all the Tamil political parties and militant groups were given representation as against the LTTE's sole representative claim and the LTTE used its military superiority as a bargaining chip and insisted on setting up an interim council to have full control of the regions. The LTTE had not given up its motto that "The thirst of Tigers is Tamil eela Homeland' until its annihilation. The LTTE's chagrin was based essentially on the fact that both governments diplomatically sidelined their domineering position. To salvage the Peace Accord, India endeavoured to satisfy the LTTE, by signing a secret pact with the LTTE on 28 September 1987, at the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) Headquarters based at Palali (6)(Sri Lanka) with regards to the allocation of place in the setting up of an interim council for the Northern and Eastern provinces. During the course of implementing the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, all the other Tamil parties and the militant organisations seized the opportunity to align with the Indian government whilst the LTTE became more intransigent in their demand for their nominees in the Interim council and withdrew from its pledges to the Indian government. The LTTE declared war against the IPKF, which they claimed as an occupying army, and ironically the Sinhalese nationalist elements and a section of the government of Sri Lanka shared the same view of the LTTE.
Agreed minutes of Discussions held between His Excellency, The High Commissioner of India, Shri J. N. Dixit and his declaration and Mr. V. Pirabhakaran, Leader of the LTTE and his delegation on 23, 26 and 28 September 1987 (signed Ms. Puri, first Secretary (Political) and K. Mahendraraja, deputy leader LTTE).

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In the UNP manifesto of October 1988 the President sought a mandate from the people to implement his plan to withdraw the IPKF to find a resolution to the ethnic conflict. "If by the time our candidate is elected President the Indian Forces have not left, we will ensure that they are withdrawn” (UNP Manifesto, 1988).
This was an indication by the government of Sri Lanka to bring an end to the Indian involvement, thereby ending the international involvement in domestic affairs. The President elect considered his victory as an endorsement of the unconditional withdrawal of the IPKF; and the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government mutually agreed to settle their problems internally without a third party (international) involvement, and the government of Sri Lanka confirmed this deal in a subtle way in their parliamentary statement that the LTTE conceded to find a negotiated settlement to the outstanding issues directly with the Sri Lankan in a democratis fashion. It was ultimately a trap set against each other; the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka. Moreover, both players felt that the Indian armed forces were an alien force that interfered with the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. The shared ultimate goal of both players was achieved by the withdrawal of the IPKF. This diplomatic wrangle was evidenced in the statement made by the Hon. Ranjan Wijeratna Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defence in Parliament on the 8 August 1989 on the New Delhi talks on the withdrawal of the IPKF, cessation of hostilities and other relevant issues. Once India's involvement in Sri Lanka was removed from this equation, the parties were then pitted against each other.
Norwegian Peace Process
Nevertheless, the involvement of international mediation, was still felt necessary in attaining peace and the offer of Norwegian mediation was welcomed by both parties; the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The international community backed up Norway's mediatory role to
 

Setting up of the De-Merged Eastern Provincial Council 225
seek peace through economic development and encouraged the armed group to enter into democratic politics. Nevertheless, the ceasefire agreement between the government and the LTTE was again defective in its contents as it was primarily aimed at stopping the war and give impunity to the LTTE in the North and the East thus legitimising an armed group which was designated as a terrorist organisation by several countries. The long negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE eventually materialised into a ceasefire agreement (CFA) signed between the parties in February 2002.
The aim of the international community behind the Norwegian role was to bring the LTTE to 'mainstream' politics through its processes but the LTTE's breach of the CFA was not taken seriously by the government of Sri Lanka which turned a blind eye, in the name of peace (Keenan, 2005). The Norwegian Monitoring Mission eventually abandoned their active role as mediators when war broke out in the
East in the middle of 2006.
The military's unprecedented victories in the East put the Sri Lankan government in a superior position, than what it was at the time of signing the CFA where the LTTE claimed to have parity of status and this resulted in re-enlisting the LTTE as a terrorist organisation and abrogating the ceasefire agreement completely.
An Overview of the Failures of Peace Processes
Ceasefire has always been recommended, in order to find space for the peace-making process in an armed struggle. Between 1987 and 2002, there had been several ceasefires between the government and the LTTE and these ceasefires have been used as a political mileage by the governments on one hand, and a breathing space for war preparations by the LTTE, on the other. The ceasefire between R. Premadasa government in early 1990s and the ceasefire between Chandrika

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Kumaratunga government in 1995 ended in the resumption of war for
petty breaches.
The international agenda for gaining peace may not be appropriate as the Sri Lankan context has changed drastically and the government has put an end to military struggle, which had been supported by the majority of the Tamil community. The fall of the LTTE has created a vacuum and has compelled the Tamils to analyse their political aspirations pragmatically. This does not waive the obligation of the policy-makers from finding ways and means to prevent potential conflict.
As described by Jeroen de Zeeuw (2001), one of the actions relating to peace-building in war-torn societies is "Instead of focusing on incapabilities and deficiencies, serious attention should be paid to the available structures and actors operating in the field”.
This appears to be the case in the East. The Eastern Province, whilst being merged with the Northern Province has suffered as a result of not exercising its referendum for over two decades just like the other seven provinces. Unlike the Northern Province, the Eastern Province is unique in demographic composition where no single Community has a superior or domineering political clout; whereby all three major communities live in a competing position. The Muslim community that makes up of 35 per cent in the Eastern province has lost their role in any peace process. From the Indo-Lanka Accord to the Norwegian monitored ceasefire, the Muslims were ignored in peace processes. This exclusive approach gave the Tamil question a single dimension to the problem and the internal conflict within the Tamil-speaking communities including the cast prejudices and alternative Tamil political views of the Tamil community were made irrelevant. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and Tamil Diaspora's campaign also provided legitimacy to the LTTE to its sole representative status.

Setting up of the De-Merged Eastern Provincial Council 227
The Eastern Muslims who had had an unpalatable experience with the Tamil militants and polity were pushed for their own set up of an administrative unit to protect their interests, which seemed to be in line with the Tamil's autonomous claim. The foremost Muslim political party was also forced to make Counter-claims against the Tamils to meet the political aspirations of the Muslims who became more estranged from the Tamil community over years of mistrust and violence (McGilvray, 2001). The same political agenda was adopted by the Muslim party to become the sole representative of the Muslims, as the Eastern Province was the demographic base of distinctive Muslim politics and subject to dominance by Tamil militants.
UNAgenda for Peace
The UN heads-of-state recognised in their Security Council meeting
in (1992) that,
The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The nonmilitary sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters (Wikipedia).
As such, part of the United Nation's strategy for the resolution of conflict, consists of four elements, such as
1) Conflict Prevention
2) Peace-Making
3) Peace-Keeping
4) Peace-Building
The UN agenda for peace seems to be inappropriate to Sri Lanka's current predicament, where the three-decade-old war has come to an abrupt end and the basis that caused a civil war has lost its justification. The Tamil campaign that promoted the LTTE's war

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against the state had its peaks and troughs, but has substantively weakened and the threat portrayed by the media or international community is remote given Sri Lanka's current political climate. The LTTE's armed struggle has historically been unparalleled by any other existing armed organisation in recent history. The collapse of the domestic network of the LTTE and the diluted international network will deter the revival of the armed struggle to its previous glory. However, the Tamil identification with the Israel-Palestinian label cannot be justified. The antagonistic identification with the Jewish founding of their own state of Israel on one hand, and the suffering of the Palestinians on the other, to set-up a state, which they claimed to have lost to the occupiers, is sardonic. It is more or less a war of pride and prejudice where the historical or mystical events play heavily on the minds of the Tamils who feel that the Tamil kingdom should be reinstalled at any cost and their deep-rooted hatred will have no space in Sri Lanka but will remain in a diluted form among the Diaspora community at least for another decade or so, until the next generation become more absorbed into the countries where they live, or revise their views on the changing lives of the people in Sri Lanka in the conflict regions.
Is the UN Agenda for Peace' Suitable for the Sri Lankan PeaceBuilding Process?
Sri Lankan peace-makers are keen to apply the same toolbox that has been applied by the UN in the conflict regions where the war has come to end. Unlike most of the conflict countries where the war ended through negotiations to reach a political solution: a recent example of which is Nepal, where the UN involvement was applauded and its ground engagement of conflict resolution brought forth a solution agreeable to both parties. In Sri Lanka, the war paved way for cessation of hostilities sponsored by an international mediator to halt the war provisionally and the resumption of war led one party to defeat the other thus bringing the 30-year-old civil war to a historical

Setting up of the De-Merged Eastern Provincial Council 229
end. It is unlikely that there will be an armed struggle set off by the defeated elements or any other new groups in the same way as they did in the past. The de facto state and the Norwegian international mediation elevated the status of the LTTE to unquestionable sole representatives of the Tamil people. The aftermath of war has also disillusioned the younger generation to engage in armed struggle, as they cannot match the LTTE's installation of their own administrative area or command of all three forces similar to that of an independent government. This de facto state machinery became approved by the
Memorandum of Understanding signed between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE.
The Tamil diaspora that thrives in the Western and the European countries have always been politically effective to consolidate the conception that the LTTE is the sole representative of the Tamils and no solution could be found without their engagement. The annihilation of the LTTE at Mullaithivu, over a period of three years with military perseverance on the front line and diplomatic war on the table, led to the seclusion of the LTTE by the international community, declaring the LTTE as a terrorist, despite being initially identified as promoters of peace at the beginning of the ceasefire.
Cọnclusion
The question before us now is whether the state of affairs has changed the perceptions of ethnic problem and the approach to the conflict; and whether the stakeholders should revise their conflicting approach (one-sided pólitical aspirations) to conscientious approach (multisided political aspirations) given the ground realities.
De-merger of the Northern and the Eastern provinces and the setting up of a separate provincial administration to the Eastern Province were significant events in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict where the Indo Lanka-Accord that held both provinces together for about two decades

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became a default and a lot of changes have taken place since then. However, the functioning of the Eastern Provincial Council has made a significant impact on the people that live there, especially in terms of reconciliation.
Some political analysts opine that it would be politically prudent for the Sri Lankan government to upgrade the powers of the existing Provincial Council as a solution to the political aspiration of those who demand for devolution of power or to formulate an alternative solution to sustain peace. It appears that there are voices that the full implementation of the 13" amendment may resolve many outstanding issues relating to the minority grievances in the North and the East. The question remains whether the Tamil people of the North who refused to participate fully in the Northern and Eastern Provincial Council elections in 1987 and vehemently supported the separate Tamil state for over two decades, will change.
It is imperative that civil society should be engaged in the local level where the healing process can be put in practice. Asian perspective of peace-building agenda takes into account of the Asian experience of peace building and explores the mobilisation of local civil organisation in peace-building activities,
Local participation in peacebuilding does not only create legitimacy of peace operations but also fosters sustainability of peace efforts. Civil society involvement is particularly beneficial for the implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, which are essential for avoiding the resurgence of conflict. It is crucial to recognise the importance of local ownership of strategies for rebuilding infrastructure and establishing legitimate governance structures. Local ownership helps to make these structures self-sustaining (UN University, 2006).
The Eastern Province seems to have set precedent in the way in which mutual trust can be revived after long mistrust and suspicion between

Setting up of the De-Merged Eastern Provincial Council 231
communities. The inter-racial issues cropped up with the appointment of the Tamil chief minister and the violence of unruly elements had subsided and such recurrences may no longer be a threat to inter-racial relationships. The climate created by the present provincial council administration has created space for more economic activities and free civil society engagement in the future. Most of the problems that remain unresolved may not be a threat to peace unless a proper civil administration is in place.
References
de Zeeuw, Jeroen (2001) Building Peace in War-Torn Societies: From Concept to Strategy, Research on "Rehabilitation, Sustainable Peace and Development", Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, Conflict Research Unit August. Gunasekara, S. L. (1996) Tigers, Moderates' and Pandora's Package,
Colombo. Keenan, Alan (2005) "No Peace, No War: Have International Donors Failed Sri Lanka's Most Vulnerable?” in Boston Review (Summer Issue), Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 31-37. Maiese, Michelle (2003) "Peacebuilding", available at http://www.beyond intractability.org/essay/peacebuildings accessed on 13 September 2010. McGilvray, Dennis B. (2001) A History of Ethnic Conflict Recollection Reinterpretation and Reconciliation Tamil and Muslim Identities in the East, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic Reconciliation, No. 24. Muthiah, Wesley and Sydney Wanasinghe (2005) "Federal Party Chief Answers Leftist,” Daily News, 29 May 1956. (Dr. N.M.Perera referred to this in his Sinhala Only Act debate in Parliament which is Recorded in Hansard Col. 1837-1876 page 246 quoted in Muthiah and Wanasinghe (2005). Tuvo Languages One Nation, One Language Tuvo Nations: The Lanka Sama Samaja Party on the State Language, A Young Socialist Publication. Rajani, (1954) Editorial, "Our Ceylon Letter", Kalki - Tamil Weekly,
Chennai, 1954, p. 3.

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The Asia Foundation (2004 January) "Ethnic Relations and Human Security in Eastern Sri Lanka”, A report based on individual interviews, Foundation for Coexistence. UNP Manifesto, Manifesto of Action: For Investing in People, A New Vision
and a New Deal, 1988. UN University and MOFA of Japan (2006) “Peace-Building: The Asian Perspective". Report of a conference on Peace Building Peace-Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding held at the UN University and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan on 28-29 August (Rapporteur: Linda Kotze). Wikipedia, "An Agenda for Peace” available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
An Agenda for Peace accessed on 14 September 2010.

CHAPTER 12
Eastern Fish are Still Singing, Does Anyone Listen? Self-Perceptions and Identity on Social Inclusion of Youth in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka
Fazeeha Azmi & Ragnhild Lund
Introduction
Youth represents a dynamic force in Sri Lanka although they are cut off by clear social and spatial segregation in terms of opportunities for a better life. Still, their role in Sri Lanka's political arena has been immense and gained wide attention among scholars and researchers (Hettige & Mayer, 2002: 9). The political history of Sri Lanka explains violence and insurgencies as a youth phenomenon, hence, producing a negative image of youth in the Sri Lankan society. Research on youth in Sri Lanka has also increasingly contributed to their negative image. This image has led the planners and policy-makers to incorporate negative assumptions about youth and their potentials in their plans.
After the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the North and East, the need to give young people a more Constructive stake in society has become an urgent goal. This is particularly so in the East which is composed of a young population. The population below the age of 18 in the East comes to 39.9 percent of the total population in the Eastern district of Batticaloa (Government of Sri Lanka, 2007). While at the national level the average of the population below the age of 18 in Sri Lanka is below the world average, which amounts to 29 percent according to The World Factbook (2010)

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wounded by war and growing up in situations of a complex conflict, displacements, deep insecurity and loss. Nowadays, Sri Lankan news headlines often report incidents of killings and abduction of the youth in the newly liberated areas (NewsLanka website). Young people are considered to be both perpetrators and victims of the previous conflict and present situation of post-war.
The changing socio-economic and political environment due to globalisation of Asia as a whole, and Eastern Sri Lanka in particular, has impacted the youth's perception of a better life and opportunities (Lund, 2008: 131-32). Furthermore, the youth in the Eastern coast of Sri Lanka are a generation of different forms of displacements. Therefore, in terms of generational changes to the needs of youth may have changed significantly. However, the youth in the Eastern Province has not received the attention they deserve for recovery, but they have played and continue to play a silent, yet significant part in the development.
The youth can renegotiate their roles in reconstruction and recovery by making space for participation. The overall objective of our study on youth in eastern Sri Lanka (Mobilising youth for recovery and reconstruction in situations of displacement - spaces and places of social inclusion) is to explore how different groups of young people in different situations are affected by and strategise upon displacement and recovery. The chapter addresses how youth may mobilise for social inclusion. It explores whether youth are being exposed to specific spaces of social exclusion and what they are. Based on a pilot study among two youth groups in Batticaloa in early 2010, their individual and collective selfperceptions and identity were studied. Set against new development plans, such as "Mahinda Chintanaya' and rhetoric, such as Revival of the East', they were asked about the future.
Principal researchers are Fazeeha Azmi, University of Peradeniya, Cathrine
Brun and Ragnhild Lund, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

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In the following, we shall present our pilot study methodology and data from the discussions with two youth groups-students and sports activists-as well as discuss the category of youth as conceptualised in literature and understood by young people themselves. Our experiences from the visit to the East provide some glimpses into lived realities of the youth, which are becoming quite challenging and problematic.
Batticaloa, the Place Where the Fishes Sing
Batticaloa is in the eastern coast of Sri Lanka and occupies the central part of eastern Sri Lanka. The city is beautifully located at a lagoon, and small islands lie in the midst of the lagoon which traverses through the district extending 73.5 km to Verugal in the North from Batticaloa city and 35.2 km from the South of the city up to Thuraineelavanai. The population of 515,707 consists mainly of Tamils, Moors, Sinhalese, Euro-Asian Portuguese/Dutch Burghers and indigenous Veddha population.
The first educational institution established in Batticaloa was Methodist Central College, Batticaloa, founded in 1814. Other noteworthy institutions are: Cecilias Convent, Hindu College, St. Vincent Girls' High School, St. Michael's College, and Shivananda Maha Vidyalayam. The Eastern University of Sri Lanka (EUSL), located in Vantharumoolai 16 km north of Batticaloa, was founded in 1980. Its development has been interrupted by the civil war. It is the cultural and economic focal point of the district of Batticaloa and extends its influence towards Trincomalee as well.
Rice and coconuts are the two staples of the Batticaloa district. The lagoon is famous for its 'singing fish', supposed to be shell-fish which give forth musical notes. Prior to the Sri Lankan civil war, there were large scale shrimp farms as well as fish and rice processing activities in the district. But rapid changes are taking place due to physical

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reconstruction work such as road constructions, shrimp farm establishments and other businesses and planning of tourist resorts.
During the war, Batticaloa was claimed by LTTE as part of their Tamil Homeland, Tamil Eelam. The city has witnessed countless murders, rapes, mass massacres and wholesale disappearance of civilians, especially after Black July in 1983 and the subsequent Sri Lankan civil war (Sri Lanka Guardian, 2007). Batticaloa is also the primary focus of attention of Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, better known as Karuna Amman, a former LTTE commander who broke away from the main group in 2004, and formed his own political party, the Tamil-Eala Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, (TMVP). Karuna is now a parliamentarian and TMVP a political party with the ruling political party in the country, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The Muslims, another Tamil-speaking group, were often in the crossfire of the war. In a series of battles which began with the confrontation at Mavil Aru (Mavil Oya) and Sampur (Somapura), Vaharai (Vihare) in August 2006, the Sri Lankan military on 11 July
2007, ousted the Tamil Tigers from their last stronghold of Thoppigala (Batticaloa province) in Eastern Sri Lanka. The town was also one of the worst hit during the tsunami on 26 December 2004, in terms of deaths, physical destructions and displacements.
Methodology
The first stage of the project Mobilising youth for recovery and reconstruction in situations of displacement-spaces and places of social inclusion will involve interviews with key informants such as authorities, people representing the civil society and other resource persons, including visiting where young people are represented, and organisations run by the youth. The aim of the project is to include the youth as active agents in research by networking with them at the sites where they work, live and 'hang out. At a later stage, young
people will also be instrumental in designing the steps of the project as

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it is their priorities that will be the focus of the project. In this regard, we build on experience from the 'real time research' approach that we have developed during our research on recovery after the tsunami disaster which involved participant observation and action oriented methodologies (Brun & Lund, 2008; Brun & Lund, 2010).
While young people will be part of designing the steps of the project, individual and group interviews/discussions and participatory workshops /dialogue meetings with young displaced people will be undertaken to understand their experiences and opinion of their own social positions and life opportunities. This should enable the formulation of individual narratives of youth that can help in understanding social positions, structural oppression, and opportunities for participation in the society. Involving young people in research will also bridge the gap between them and adults (Kirby, 2004: 13). Their active participation may enable them to engage in problems affecting their lives and provide the strength to face future challenges.
During August 2009 a brief field visit to Batticaloa took place; five group discussions/dialogue meetings were conducted with one student group (13 students, seven girls and six boys; three third year and 10 fourth year students), one sports group (four girls and six boys), one war affected IDP group (three girls and three boys), one tsunami affected IDP group (one girl and three boys), and one group with women activists (13 women). The discussions were organised in the following way: they started with an introduction on purpose and summary of the study and of how youth has not been well researched. Thereafter, the young people were asked to conceptualise youth (open ended question) followed by a group discussion about youths' lived realities, participation, problems and challenges. Finally, the groups were asked to envisage Batticaloa in ten years time and write their
scenarios down.

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As already mentioned, the present paper deals with the findings of the discussions with the two of these groups-students and sports activists-as well as discuss the category of youth as conceptualised in literature and understood by young people themselves.
What Constitutes Youth?
Children and youth constitute about 40 percent of the Third World population (Asia 48 percent; Ansell, 2005). Despite their high numbers, until recently they did not receive much attention from policy-makers or academics.
Young people belong to families, communities and nations, hence, we need to examine how they experience their relationships with others, and how adults understand and influence their lives. Youth are also symbolically linked to the future-both their own and that of the wider society. They are therefore actors in their own right, not merely objects of development and victims of the society. Youth in eastern Sri Lanka has grown up under extremely difficult circumstances. The future rests on them. This fact needs to be acknowledged by researchers as well as other stakeholders in the Sri Lankan society.
At the same time the definition of youth in the Sri Lankan society is also gradually changing due to modernisation in various realms of everyday life as well as due to globalisation by way of foreign influence and neo-liberalist policies. In the traditional Sri Lankan rural society, however, the time span for youth was short; for girls it lasted only few years between puberty and marriage. But as a result of higher level of education, migration, unemployment and globalised media, this time span has prolonged.
The category youth is understood by the UN as the period between childhood and adulthood, and ranging from 18–25 years (Ansell 2005: 1). It refers to the transitionary period between childhood and

Self-Perceptions & Identity on Social Inclusion: Youth in Batticaloa 239
adulthood; school and work. It is thus a fluid category, but one which has to be related to the situation in your home/community to provide insights into the lives of young people. Thus, the length of the transitional period and characteristics of youth vary widely from society to society. According to the literature (Ansell, 2005: 14), youth has grown longer because the gap between childhood and adulthood has been extended due to education. More recently, most youth studies have perceived youth as potentially significant political and social (positive) actors.
According to Langevang (2007) youth has been studied in two major ways in research: Firstly, youth as a transitional life stage, in which it is perceived as a stage of life in between childhood and adulthood, and focuses on the process by which young people gradually acquire adult roles and become full members of adult society. These studies have received criticism for neglecting the role of young people's agency and for perceiving youth only in relation with adults. Secondly, youth cultures and sub-cultures are examined, which focuses on young people's cultural agency, their social worlds and experiences in the present. The latter tradition has led to ways in which geography can contribute to childhood studies by focusing on the concepts of place and space in young people's lives, and by focusing on issues such as representation, resistance and identity (Ansell, 2005; Valentine, 1998). The present study falls under this category; as we ask about representations of youth, their self-perceptions and identity in places and spaces of recovery.
Glimpses from the Field
When asked to define what constitutes youth, the young people we talked to argued for a composite understanding of youth. They claimed that youth was normally understood as the people in the age group 18-24 years old. However, in Sri Lanka youth is now a category difficult to define because the government has reduced the minimum

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age for child labour to 16 years. They also claimed that it is impossible to relate to the age category only, because what constitutes youth vary among cultures, ethnic groups and geographies (rural-urban differences, North and South) within the country. Furthermore, what one does matters; whether one is working or is a student. One group emphasised that as students they were still considered as children by their family and university professors. One student told:
Although we are university students, at home and in the university we are considered as kids pillai... We are not kids. Parents are reluctant to handover any responsibilities to us. Even at the university level, the lecturers should understand we are capable. In our Geographical Society, we are doing a lot of work. We elect the president, secretary, committee members.... We are publishing books, we have organised campaigns; on world environmental day, and on environmental protection. All these show that we have skills and we can do.
Finally, they meant that civil status matters, because you are youth only till you marry, even if you marry earlier than 18 years old.
Mobilisation for Social Inclusion
Mobilisation for social inclusion is not a new topic in Sri Lanka. For Example, President Premadasa has used this approach in large-scale development projects. However, mobilisation for social inclusion in the context of Sri Lanka had mostly been associated with politics and in poverty alleviation programmes (Samurdhi). In the political history of Sri Lanka, political mobilisation had always been connected with ethnicity. Peiris (2006: 346) identifies the link between social mobilisation and ethnicity. For example, the political mobilisation of Sinhalese was largely created through the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) parties; the political mobilisation of Tamils was initiated by G. G. Ponnambalam through the formation of Jaffna Youth League'; the political mobilisation of

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Muslims, was done through All-Ceylon Moor's Association' and All Ceylon Muslim League.
However, the recent history of Sri Lanka shows that mobilisation for inclusion in the Sri Lankan context has not always been political, especially, in the regional context of Sri Lanka, where regional identities are created through religion, language and caste too, because, in the recent past social mobilisation for inclusion has occurred along the above mentioned lines Peiris (2006: 341). We feel that such mobilisation for social and cultural inclusion is important to avoid different kinds of problems in the future. In order to target the development objectives of different regions and the country more holistically, it is important to focus on 'who mobilises?’ and for 'what purpose? If youth is not meaningfully included in development processes they may become negative actors. Thus, our expectation is that mobilisation for social inclusion should form the platform to empower and provide spaces to utilise people's agency. In the context of Sri Lanka, where high levels of regional disparity exist, mobilisation for social inclusion should not be limited to regional level; it should go beyond to the national level also.
Lived Realities
What is it like to be young in eastern Sri Lanka? When we asked youth to share their experiences of being youth in Eastern Sri Lanka, they claimed that they still feel unsafe, they have restricted mobility and only "hang out at safe places such as the playground, the student dorm and within their homes.
Sen (1999) argues that freedom is central to the process of development. But the youth in the focus group feel that their individual freedom and the freedom to participate in the normal community life in the East have long been lost. They said that if they had the chance to go to Colombo without any fear of being from the

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East, they could have acquired good qualifications for jobs. They also mentioned that their parents did not allow them to leave their homes after dark. This also shows that the violent history of the East has impeded the freedom to live safely and move around, particularly for the young. We realise too that there is a need to understand the various contextual dimensions of development and post-war recovery. This provides a warning on the overall development situation of Sri Lanka, where the country historically has scored high on the human development index. Our data indicate that this index is situational and regionally biased, and is therefore not representative for the war affected parts of the country.
The youth in the groups also felt that they have few chances compared to youth in other parts of the country in terms of access to employment. They think they are ethnically discriminated: "We are doing well in sports. Our club has won many national awards. But as we are from East and due to our ethnicity, we will not get job in the security forces” (A student from the sports club).
What are Their Strengths?
Youth in the focus groups unanimously stressed that their major strength is their education. However, they highlighted that, as youth they are affected by considerable disparities among the regions and within the region in terms of education. They mentioned the lack of attention given to the development of English and computer literacy in the region. Being a welfare state for a long time, the government of Sri Lanka had attempted to achieve capability enhancement through education. However, there are significant regional differences in the allocation of resources and achievements.
Regional disparities within a country generally occur due to the variation in the availability or allocation of resources. However, in the
context of the Eastern Province, coupled with war and tsunami, there

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is poor allocation of resources in terms of school material, computers and English education hence, youth cannot use education as a mean of social mobility. All the youth we talked to emphasised the role education, employment, economic development and infrastructural development as important concerns, not only to them but to their communities too. Schools are expected to follow national curriculum, prepared by the National Institute of Education. However, there are inadequate variations in resources at local level to provide the expected education. The Sri Lankan government has attempted to equalise educational opportunities after gaining independence from the British colony, by allowing government schools to teach either in Sinhala or Tamil; at present, it is struggling to bring equal opportunities as the rapidly expanding private sector education is mainly restricted to major urban areas in the West and South. If proper attention is not given, higher level jobs may only be a dream for the youth in the East. It is also pertinent to note here that unless the content of the current school syllabi is revised constantly (and with respect to the emerging needs of revival in the East) to provide students with adequate technical knowledge and practical experiences relevant to the country's economy, national universities cannot produce graduates who can fill
the demands created by the country's economy.
When we asked the youth whether they are willing to move out of the East if they get employment outside the region, most of them toldespecially boys-that they are willing to move. They appear highly flexible with regard to choosing their future work places. However, at the same time the members of the focus groups feared that they will not get any employment in the near future as there are several batches of graduated students waiting for employment. This situation needs considerable attention. The rapid increase in the number of unemployed, educated youth has led to episodes of violence in the past, and might easily lead to the same in the future.

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Identity and Participation
When we asked about participation, the young people explained to us that participation is about active involvement' and 'making contributions'. They mentioned that they benefit from participation in a number of ways. They interact with others, exchange their ideas, share the knowledge and talents, and advice others. We also raised the question on prejudice against local participation. The student groups revealed that as they are educated, they are not becoming involved in planning, development and decision-making bodies in their communities. Some of them mentioned that age and gender constrained their participation in certain circumstances. In the sports group, one of the girls mentioned that they are, in general, prevented from participation in sports and youth clubs due to the barriers of cultural expectations from young girls. This attitude is prevalent mainly among Muslim and Tamil communities in the East.
Plans on Eastern Revival
We also wanted to know about the awareness and views of the youth on the national and regional development plans. First we asked, whether they know about 'Mahinda Chinthanaya' (Sri Lankan government's ten-year development plan). In all the groups, the young people laughed and said that they hear about the plan only through media. From their replies we assumed that they do not have any trust on development plans in the country, as they believe, such plans are limited only to papers and are rarely implemented. We also asked about "Kilakkin Uthayam' (Eastern Revival). Most of the youth were familiar with this slogan, but they did not know the content of the plan. They told us that in the name of this plan, a number of infrastructural development projects are taking place in the region at present, such as road constructions and bridges, but they perceived these as irrelevant to cover their immediate needs. As one student said:

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I am a Sri Lankan citizen. If I want to be proud of being a Sri Lankan, the Eastern Province should be developed like the Western and the Southern provinces. During the pre-war period our parents had a good life as they could freely engage in fishing and agriculture. Education was also very good during that time. Our parents did not fear moving out in the night. They went for cinemas and other cultural programmes, and their youth period was a happy one. But, post-war the situation has changed, and youth in the region were almost silenced. Their activities were restricted by parents as well as the government. So our parents were worried about us and we almost lived our lives like a frog in the well' (a young man from the sports group).
The Future
We also asked the young people we talked to, to write down their scenario about the future changes they would like to see in the East socially, economically, culturally and politically ten years from now. One young man from the sports club said this:
Regarding the future we would like to see good changes in the social, economic and political fields, but we are not sure whether the Eastern Revival programmes will continue if there is a change in power. So what we expect for East is not 'Eastern Revival', but a situation where minorities can live with selfrespect and dignity. If a man is alive only he can think about the future.
The group discussion we had with youth and their written contributions on future scenarios, gave a wealth of insights into their needs, their possible contributions to the development of the East, and how they felt they could contribute, if only they were given a role and chance to participate. The answers to the question about their future scenarios are summarised in the following table. It turns out to be a long wish list:

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Social
Improved education
Improved English education
Compulsory primary education Poverty alleviation through employment opportunities A society without any differences in terms of religion and ethnicity Equal opportunities should be provided Trust among different communities should be built People from all communities should be able to move freely within Sri Lanka
Youth should be given responsibilities In East social change is not yet completed. There are considerable divisions in terms of class and caste (high caste, low caste) Participation can bring lot of social changes in a society
Political
-
Improved youth participation in politics Educational reforms should be implemented through political structures Awareness of national politics and on what is happening at the higher levels System of proportionate representation in politics should be abolished Political system in the East should definitely be changed The current political situation is not providing advantages to the East Still people have fear and in the future this situation should be changed Politicians should not work for personal gains East should not be home for paramilitary groups. Peace is important Political influence in education and employment should not be encouraged Politicians should encourage education in East Political violence should be avoided (each month at least five are killed due to political violence) Political parties should not be based on ethnicity or religion
Economic
Providing opportunities for youth in the industrial sector Improving agriculture
Focus on an export oriented economy Attempts should be made to rebuild the war affected economy Facilities for fishing should be ensured - People should be able to live their lives without any political threats

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- They should be able to engage in economic activities without such threats - Paper factory should be reopened and government should make attempts
to export the products - War affected people should be given proper attention. - Under employment and unemployment should not be major problems - Educated youth should be given proper employment opportunities - Insurance schemes should be introduced farmers - Promoting self employment opportunities at village level
Promoting technical education among youth
Cultural
- Discriminating women should be avoided
- Ignoring unnecessary cultural practices
- Should not encouraged intolerable cultural practices introduced by
outsiders who are coming to the East in increasing numbers (merchants, foreign development experts etc.)
Source: Group interviews and written stories from all the individuals interviewed.
Spaces of Social Exclusion
Our pilot study so far has provided some interesting insights into lived realities, self-perceptions and identity among different groups and places. Youth expresses great concern about discrimination and lack of inclusion for their future in the East and Sri Lanka. They expressed their concerns about the negative consequences of war. The situation in the East during the last three decades of war has brought substantial changes in the life of people, where young people are particularly vulnerable. Although people are celebrating the victory of war elsewhere in Sri Lanka, youth in the East feel that they lack safety and freedom. Their movement is confined to restricted places as a result of this situation and deteriorates their wellbeing and citizenship rights.
In spite of such problems, we also found that the youth in the focus groups were ambitious. If new opportunities were presented to them, they would make use of such opportunities.

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Efforts are also required to ensure that young people are provided with sufficient education, training and skill development to gain the knowledge and confidence they need to become successful participants in the regional and national labour markets. We also understood that young people in the groups highly valued the importance of education, particularly because other employment opportunities have dried up during the war.
However, in the light of ongoing technological advances (which are also mainly carried out by foreign and non-eastern specialists), youth from the East may find themselves inadequately prepared for the labour market within and outside the country. In the East we observed and learnt about insufficient training facilities, lack of resources, support system, materials, and an environment conducive for providing services which had adversely affected young people's learning experiences. New approaches are needed to respond to the evolving local and national needs in terms of employment.
In general, it may be concluded that the majority of the youth we spoke to-irrespective of what group they belonged to-showed a high level of awareness of the conditions under which they presently live. This shows that their lived realities in the post-war context are highly complex and may prevent the realisation of their dreams and aspirations for a better. These complexities also intersect with their present identity as neglected and marginalised youth. What we were told by the youth about lack of safety; the fear of becoming marginalised and discriminated on the basis of ethnicity and geographies; the restricted mobility and confinement to places-such as home, school/university/workplace and playground-are basically symptoms of deprivation of freedom and marginalisation. At a more fundamental level, youth's absence and invisibility in development and social change is an indicator of a failure to. empower and provide citizenship rights. Action must, therefore, be taken to address the root causes of these problems.

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References
Ansell, N. (2005) Children, Youth and Development. London, Routledge. Brun, C. and R. Lund (2008) "Making a Home during Crisis: Post-Tsunami
Recovery in the Context of War in Sri Lanka" in Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 29, pp. 274-87. ------ (2009 March) "One Size Fits All': The Narrative on the Notion of One
National Housing Policy in Sri Lanka” in Norwegian Journal of Geography, Vol. 63, pp. 10-32. ---- (in Press) (Development in Practise). "Real Time Research: Decolonising research and assistance on recovery or just another spectacle of researcher/practitioner collaboration? Preliminary paper presented at the World Conference of Humanitarian Studies 2009, 4-7 February 2009, University of Groeningen, The Netherlands. Hettige, S. T. and M. Mayer (eds.) (2002) Sri Lankan Youth: Challenges and
Responses, Colombo, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Kirby, P. (2004) "A Guide to Actively Involving Young People in Research: For Researchers, Research Commissioners and Managers" in INVOLVE, Hampshire, UK, pp.1-33. Langevaag, Thilde (July 2007) “Youth in the City. Life Strategies of Young People in Accra, Ghana", PhD Thesis, Dept. of Geography and Geology, University of Copenhagen. Lund, R. (2008) "At the interface of Development Studies and Child Research: Rethinking the Participating Child" in S. Aitken, R. Lund and A. T. Kjørholt (eds.) (2008) Global Childhoods: Children and Youth in Globalisation, London, Routledge, pp. 131-48. NewsLanka website available at http://www.newsrilanka.com/2010/05/ opportunities-and-challenges-facing-post-war-sri-lankas accessed on 27 September 2010. Peiris, G. H. (2006) Sri Lanka: Challenges of the New Millennium, Kandy,
Kandy Books. - Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Sri Lanka Guardian (2007) "The Black July 1983 that Created a Collective Trauma" available at http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2010/04/blackjuly-1983-that-created-collective.html The Department of Cencus and Statistics (2007). Basic Population Information, Batticaloa District - 2007. Preliminary report based on special enumeration. Available at http://www.statistics.gov.lk/Pop

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Housat/Preliminary%20Reports%20Special%20Enumeration% 202007/Basic%20Population%20Information%20of%20Batticaloa% 20District%202007.pdf, accessed on 29 September 2010. The World Factbook (2010) available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
The World Factbook accessed on 29 September 2010. Valentine, G. (ed.) (1998) Cool Places: Geographies of Youth Cultures,
London, Routledge.
 

CHAPTER 13
Out of Horror, Hope: Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone
Janet LeValley
First came the 'troubled times. Then came the tsunami. Then came the war. Then came now. Through drawings of teachers and children in Northern Sri Lanka, the horror and psycho-social damage of disaster trauma is clearly seen. Unspeakable memories, warped body image, identity and esteem issues reveal themselves in the analysis. Yet a coding of the hopes and expressed needs of the children indicate an inversion of Maslow's hierarchy and an inversion of a similar model from Indian psychology. Self-actualisation and Moksha are guiding motivations, even in the absence of adequate food, water and safety, even in an environment that severely curtails the exploration of social and esteem needs. Drawings and child self-assessment surveys are used to look at the hopes of children in the North and the psycho-social outcomes that result from two sequential, responsive training projects for teachers in 159 schools in Vavuniya. Hope is seen in the facilitation of salutogenic (post-traumatic growth) needs through play and expressivefriendly classrooms, led by developmentally informed teachers.
Sri Lanka has suffered civil war for nearly three decades now. My first year teaching in Sri Lanka in 2003, I pointed out to my driver a very cute fringed trishaw on the road. "I lost one like that”, he said, and explained that was in the troubled times, in Colombo, nearly two decades earlier. "I loaned it to another driver in Colombo. They threw a burning tire over his head and my trishaw burned. It was

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ruined after that”, he said with a sigh. I asked about the driver he had loaned it to. "Oh, he died of course. He was Tamil".
In Colombo, the troubled times involved riots and lynch mobs, looting and burning, actions by Sinhalese majority against Tamil minority. In the North, it was much worse. There were bombs and beheadings, churches shot full of holes, many people killed and tortured and displaced, so much suffering, all the things that come with war.
Several years ago, when I was presenting a training workshop for 160 teachers in the North, during an interim peace agreement, I casually assigned them to make a drawing of something they remember from their childhood. I instructed them to mark themselves with an X and to mark their parent or guardian with an 0. I had some exercise in mind but the exercise had to be abandoned because all the teachers were bent over their pictures, drawing and crying with intense focus and sadness. They asked why I had made them remember what they try every day to forget. Being a neophyte foreigner, I had not anticipated this, so I quietly collected the drawings, redirected the participants, and looked at the drawings later that night, in privacy. What I saw made me quite sick from horror. Being a psychologist, I understood what trauma and perceptual distortion I was looking at.
Here is a very tiny sample of those drawings. I am showing you three but I studied 160.
As the father stands behind a child's swing, the mother is shot by a soldier and, behind a too-small tree, the child (now a teacher) tries to hide from the bombs falling on her house,
and from the man with
a gun.
 

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A child (who is now a teacher) sits upon the edge of a well, her extremely long arms indicating desperation to take out the man who is dead and floating in the well. He has no arms (indicating helplessness) and his face is dark. In
the same drawing she has
represented herself at an older age, in pants and shirt, head shaved, wearing a soldier's hat and carrying a gun and a bag. -
In this drawing, a girl (now a teacher) stands at the edge of a river, contemplating. Her family is apart from her, perhaps displaced, perhaps dead. Is the girl considering whether to jump in? Her arms are held out to the river. Her gaze focuses down. There is no escape for her. Look at how tiny are her feet. They are not the feet of someone who perceives a way out, someone with an idea of escape, a plan of action, some hope.
Children who live in traumatic areas, where war and terror are part of life, are subject to pathogenic effects. These include: somatic problems (Llabre & Hadi, 1994); moral problems (Ferguson & Cairns, 1996); attention, memory, and learning problems (Qouta, Punamaki & ElSaraaj, 1995b; Saigh, Mroueh & Bremner, 1997; Walton, Nuttall & Nutall, 1997); nightmares and sleep problems (Baker, 1990; Punmaki, 1998; Walton et al., 1997); depression (Hadi, 1999; Papageorgiou et.al., 2000; Zivcic, 1993); anxiety (Milgram & Milgram, 1976;

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Vizek-Vidovic, Kutervac–Jagodic & Arambasic, 2000); and behavioural problems such as disobedience, violence and risk taking (Baker, 1990; Garbarino & Kostelny, 1996; Punamaki & Sulleiman, 1990; Qouta, Punamaki, & El-Saraaj, 1995a; Zahr, 1996). These children are also, however, subject to salutogenic effects new possibilities, relating to others, personal strength, spiritual change, and appreciation oflife (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996).
The popular (mis)understanding about children, terror and trauma is that some children suffer pathogenic effects while others are more resilient and gain in strength and character from what they have been through, instead. In that case, it would be the luck of the draw whether a child has any hope of recovery and benefit or not, at least until we discover the golden key to building resilience. The indications of research done on war zone adolescents, however, indicate something quite different. Pathogenic and salutogenic are not two polarised ends of a spectrum. They are directly correlated, parallel processes (Laufer & Solomon, 2006).
Salutogenic Clarity ★ ܓ
AYA
Pathogenic Distortion
Hope is well-founded even, and especially, in those children who are the most psycho-socially damaged. In that case, then, it behoves those who deliver psycho-social services and training to find ways of
 

Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone 255
recognising and nurturing those precious seedlings of post-trauma growth expression and potential. Psycho-social workers and teachers are in a good position to do this, with proper attention and training.
Generally when a disaster strikes, people rush into the area to deliver help with food and clothing, medical care, temporary housing and maybe psycho-social training workshops. Then, soon after, they all leave, and the affected population is left alone. The media goes on to other stories, other disasters, and everyone assumes that particular disaster is now out of the way. But disasters do not end with the attention span of the media and their global market.
One of the most remarkable and atypical cases of disaster relief delivery occurred in response to the 1988 earthquake (25,000 dead, 25,000 displaced) (wikipedia) which struck Armenia 65 years after, in 1915, the genocide that killed between 1 to 1.5 million Armenians and resulted in a huge internationally-strewn diaspora. The Armenian diaspora responded to their mother countrymen, bringing to Armenia psycho-social services, training, intervention, and eventually even legislation. What was most unusual is that a large organised group of mental health providers made a commitment to ongoing responsibility and as part of the community they stayed to participate in the provision of not only temporary solutions but long-term benefits as well (Najarian, 2004). Out of the horror sprang hope.
In the Ruwandan Genocide (Hutus killed about 700,000 people, mostly Tutsis, as well as about 50,000 politically moderate Hutus), massacre, torture, rape and other violence were widespread. Staub et.al., pointed out the enormous psycho-spiritual damage faced by survivors of intense violence; how their identity is compromised along with their worldview and relationships. Those who do violence also, especially those who kill, lose some of their humanity in the process and become spiritually wounded. The researchers advocate a theorybased psycho-spiritual approach to intervention, delivered through

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trained local channels, aimed at eliciting forgiveness and reconciliation after genocide (Staub, et.al., 2005). The researchers, seeking a strategy to prevent the re-eruption of horror, turned to a methodology of instilling hope.
Vavuniya, at the time of this research, was a multi-cultural, multiethnic, multi-religion area (Tamil Catholics and Hindus, Muslims, Sinhalese-Buddhists and Christians), with about 42 local and foreign NGOs, situated at the edge of a disputed border, beset by civil war. The population is traumatised by war loss, tsunami loss, displacement and family separation, the recent forced recruitment of young people by competing political factions, disappearances, assassinations and almost constant sounds and sights of war. In training counsellors and teachers there, I have been lulled to sleep many nights to the not-soaesthetic refrains of artillery fire and rocket launchers.
After the official end of the war, Vavuniya is still facing problems. The population is traumatised by war and tsunami loss, violence and illness, and the inadequacy of resources to fill basic needs. Problems today include: ethnic marginalisation; poverty; health challenges; alcoholism; depression; security force activity and presence; high suicide and attempted suicide rates, especially among youth; family separation, a number of dispirited individuals born and having spent their entire lives in camps even while nearby family homes are forcibly military occupied; and now the huge numbers of IDPs being held in camps in the area, with various unbearable conditions and abuses of power suffered. The children have so many obstacles in the way of securing stability and education. The people face many economic, political and psycho-social obstacles to recovery. Here are some voices of Vavuniya's children:
The house that had laughter does not have laughter anymore (10 yr old female) I am sad because I have lost my mother, father, brother (13 yr
old female)

Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone 257
• People are not getting food (10 yr old female)
• I want a community without war (14 yr old male)
• I need a lot of time (10 yr old male)
• Don't believe anyone (17yr old female)
From these voices can be identified a lack of basic needs, the experience of profound loss, possible cognitive dysfunction, the loss of social trust, a desire for peace, psycho-social and spiritual wounding. Yet out of horror can spring hope.
In this psycho-social context Centre for Child Care and Women's Development (CCCWD) (under the leadership of Sister Rita and with me as Programme Director), backed by sponsorship of Save the Children Foundation and the full cooperation of the Department of Education conducted a survey research in Vavuniya. Data was collected on-site, from five schools in Vavuniya, from 500 students (ranging in age from nine to 18), 18 teachers (teaching experience ranging from nine months to 23 years), two principals, and 70 responses from a suggestion box placed for children. The schools included one boys' school, two girls' schools, and two co-ed. Questions pertained to daily struggles, loss worries, needs, concerns, hopes, expectations, self-understanding, emotional response, personal satisfaction, and preferred resources at three levels of analysis: student, family, community. Data was considered relative to Maslow's hierarchy of needs. The data and findings of particular interest to this chapter are those concerned with salutogenic evidence and thus hope.
Here is a copy of a drawing made by a school guidance counsellor in Vavuniya, showing her assessment of the children's skill levels in various areas of psycho-social and psycho-spiritual variables. The closer she has graphed the variable to centre, the less developed she is assessing that skill to currently be, and thus the more in need of specific support in that area the children are. The further out toward the periphery she has graphed the variable, the more developed she is

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assessing that skill to currently be and thus the less in need of that specific support the children are.
Help Needed Students
games Trust with others - higher education
confidence4N 葬 ܘܘܢctsuHܘ relaxation ܛܠ NA family
ܠܐ ふ*سیار بیشتر lethod of X^。 handing it सिन्त happines= problems Tجن؟؟
Emotional V N WN attachment balance W ܓܵܠ ܐܬܐ ܠܐܲ4ܵܬ Wyth hura
behavior Y
༤,/ Χ health others' concept N.E. in tune with other living aboutγου spirituality beings
Courtesy of Mrs. Marjula Rappal, guidance and counseling teacher
Based on this emic assessment, it would appear to be that the children are extremely compromised in such things as ability to relax, emotional balance, method of handling problems, trust with others, self-confidence, clarity about how others view them, behaviour and family stability. They are somewhat compromised in terms of feeling happiness, having a successful social life, looking forward to higher education. Their strongest skills actually lie in their spirituality, being in tune with other living beings, attachment with other humans and playing games. From this assessment, it would appear that pathogenic problems are there but that salutogenic indications are correspondingly high.
With the children's surveys, we assessed, among other factors, their hopes in particular, the changes they wish they could see at school, at home and in their environment. Here are the findings for change most wanted at home:
 

Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone 259
Response Percentages
Considering these findings within Maslow's hierarchy of needs model, we find an inversion.
Comparison: Maslows Theory to Home Change Most Wanted
Saif Actualization
Physiological Need
Maslow's Pyramid Change Wanted in Horne

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Self-actualisation moves from the topmost level to the base need or base motivation, and the usual base level, physiological needs, does not even register on the chart. With the two lower levels having now become self-actualisation and social, followed by Safety, we see the effects of the salutogenic (self-actualisation) and the pathogenic (social) manifest, driven by safety needs and esteem needs that are not
being met.
In looking at the children's hopes in terms of the changes they most want to see in school, we find a similar phenomenon.
Response Percentages
2ßን፯
Here again we see a heavy emphasis on self-actualisation and only the most minimal mention of Physiological needs (food and water). Again there is an inversion of Maslow's pyramid.
We found the same to be true about their desired change in the environment.
 

Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone 261
School Change Most Wanted
Self CitLati2atiOT
Response Percentages

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Again, Maslow's model is inverted and self-actualisation is the dominant level represented. Even with insufficient water and insufficient food, inadequate safety, impaired social opportunity, and daily threats to esteem, self-actualisation was the basic need and hope expressed by a majority of the children at all levels of analysis-Home, School, and Community. To gain further insight into all these wishes for unity, tranquility, happiness, peace, knowledge, rose gardens, greenery and flowers, another model may be helpful.
In Indian Psychology, there is a Hierarchy of Goals Approximately Similar to Maslow's
/ Artha (prosperity,
4 fame, status), \
/ Kama (physical \ / Pleasures) \
ܠܝ.
Kama corresponds to Maslow's physiological needs. Artha corresponds to Maslow's esteem category. Dharma roughly corresponds to Maslow's social level. Self-realisation (Maslow's self-actualisation) is the key to reaching Moksha, in Hinduism. There are four parts to Moksha:
O Shanti (ultimate peace)
O Videh (ultimate knowledge)
O Kaivalya (ultimate enlightenment)
O Swarga (ultimate paradise),
The children of Vavuniya, with their hope emphasis revolving around unity and togetherness, beauty, peace, a happy idealised paradise are
 

Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone 263
sensitive to Moksha as archetype. The overwhelming emphasis on cleanliness may indicate psycho-spiritual longing for ritual-cleansing, moral purification in an environment too long beset by unspeakable problems and self-actualisation challenges.
This has strong implications for the prioritisation of disaster relief. Psycho-social help must facilitate what is most hoped for among children in disaster zones, thus strengthening resilience and salutagenic (post-traumatic growth) effects. The key to building hope out of the horror is the understanding that the greater is post-trauma pathogenic influence, the greater is post-trauma salutogenic potential.
Responsive to the findings and analysis and community request, a training programme for teachers was designed and launched, of 96 hours duration. The curriculum responded to teacher requests for training in counselling and guidance, adolescent psychology, general psychology, health, sociology, addressing special education needs in a mainstream classroom, teaching children with behaviour and attitude problems, English skills and life skills, conflict resolution, gender psychology and environment. Both pathogenic and salutogenic dimensions are evident, but 80 percent of teachers addressed the pathogenic, requesting training in responding to psycho-social issues.
There were 35 teachers and child education specialists (Child Protection District Officers, representatives from the Vavuniya Health Department and from the Vavuniya Mental Health Department, and the Vavuniya School District Director of Teacher-Counsellors also joined the teachers in our training programme) who completed the training in general psychology, abnormal psychology, adolescent psychology, group dynamics, active learning and play, creative visualisation, psycho-spiritual support and conflict mediation. Instruction for each module modelled active student-centred learning and utilised partnered and small group discussion, play, lecture, video clip analysis, research journal graphics, classroom experientials, critical

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thinking and analysis exercises, classroom application exercises. All instructions were given by me and translated (linguistically and culturally) by Sister Rita (Tamil, Diploma in Counselling). The training was generally scheduled on a one-weekend (16 hours over three days) per monthly basis.
Teachers began implementing their training immediately in the classroom, and continued to build upon it as they acquired new skills in each monthly training session. Post-course assessment revealed that teacher training goals had been overwhelmingly met. Confirmation came in the after-training implementation surveys when 64 percent found the training to be the most useful training they had ever received; 36 percent found it to be extremely or very useful; 88 percent noted that the training has changed their thinking regarding student management and what constitutes effective teaching methods by which students learn happily. They report being more in touch with their teaching Commitment and teaching goals. Sixty percent noted that the training has enabled them to gain better control over their emotions in the classroom (assisting students rather than punishing them, increasing in patience, dealing with their own feelings so that goals could be remembered and better decisions could be taken). Forty percent noted that the training has enabled them to identify and address specific problems with students and to encourage good leadership. Seventy two percent of teachers noted that they had now introduced play, active learning, creative visualisation, and group activities, as teaching/learning methodologies, and that their classroom environment is now more suitable for learning. Sixty percent noted that they had created better student awareness about mental health. Forty percent noted they were now using two-way communication in their teaching. Thirty six percent noted they were able to identify students with mental health problems. Thirty six percent of teachers noted that student attendance increased, leadership in students emerged and there was a healthy change in student attitudes.

Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone 265
Confirmation also came in the form of school reports of miraculously increased attendance; profoundly decreased incidence of in-classroom and schoolyard violence requiring principal or other advanced intervention; a suicide and attempted suicide rate that fell to zero in those five schools, even while adjacent schools had no decrease, and even though the political situation and its adverse economic and security consequences severely escalated during this time.
In the interest of good methodology, it must be pointed out that the teacher training programme was a cornerstone of a larger CCCWD project in the schools and community. Another critical cornerstone was that ten local young women were trained as animators to support classroom efforts, child and family improvement and to communicate with teachers. They did follow-up in between training sessions and communicated problems that required immediate professional consultation. They became skilled in counselling support.
Thereafter came unending requests from educators and community leaders to provide this training in the rest of the schools. As other time commitments and trainer commuting distance from Colombo were not conducive to a 96 hour direct training course for an additional 1,780 teachers, an alternative solution was decided upon. Relief International secured funding for a proposal to train the 35 educators originally trained. They would become trainers for teachers at the other schools.
Schools were assigned into training clusters and the teacher-trainers were divided into groups with team captains and were assigned school clusters of responsibility. The teachers of 154 schools were thus given 12 hours of training, modelling active learning and expressive play and each teacher received a training manual compiled by the Psychologist/ Trainer/Researcher. Animators from the first project were further trained, and more were recruited and trained and were utilised similarly in this second phase.

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Data was collected from teachers, children and animators before the training and again after a month's time of implementation in the classroom. The data collected from children included drawings of themselves and a simple survey in which responses involved circling a happy face, a sad face or a neutral face, in description of their attitudes about life, friends, family, teacher, school, the future, etc. A sample of 100 before training implementation and 100 after training implementation of children's drawings and surveys were randomly selected for analysis. These were used to assess student self-perception, body image, attitudes, emotions and hopes, to identify any beginning changes in the classroom of positive benefit to the children's psychosocial and psycho-spiritual experience, seemingly attributable to the teacher training.
We faced certain challenges in the delivery of our training modules. While 95 percent of the teachers surveyed felt, prior to the training, that psycho-social training for teachers of these children is highly important, it is interesting that 2.7 percent did not think it to be important at all, and 37 percent did not answer the question at all, though they answered the other questions. Also we had fully one third of our teachers who thought play is something to keep separate from studies, confined to a minimum or banished entirely.
Supplementing that data is that 85 percent of the teachers have classrooms that were, by their own admission, chaotic and annoying, serious and responsible or stressful and unhappy learning environments, as opposed to only 14 percent who have learning environments that they would characterise as fun and exciting. This is in classrooms with a teacher-identified rate of over 25 percent of students who could not focus on studies due to trauma. Is it any wonder we had 17 percent of kids with spotty attendance, 19 percent with inappropriate behaviour, over 62 percent who were being violent and aggressive, and some who were suicidal? I am very glad that, given the enormous amount of material from which I had to select so little, I chose to emphasise play.

Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone 267
Perhaps the most frightening of the before-training data is that although teachers estimate a quarter of the students have impaired learning due to trauma, worry, and lack of safety, yet 2.7 percent of the teachers questioned held the opinion that traumatised children cannot learn. Another 16 percent thought the children have to just get it together and move on, and that it does not really require anything special of the teacher. So that is nearly a fifth of the teachers who admittedly were failing to even try to respond appropriately to one fourth of their students.
In this I saw clearly a lack of hope. We wanted to motivate them to care by boosting their skills so that they can let go of the cognitive dissonance that allows them to settle for denial of responsibility in order to live with themselves in a war-affected region with such overwhelming teaching challenges.
The children's pre- and post-training implementation surveys and selfdrawings were quite revealing. Here is a sample of a few of their drawings. In these drawings, psycho-social pathogenic responses to trauma are notably present in tears, missing arms, stunted arms, wounds, protruding ears, horrified expressions, bodies not human or semi-human but non-integrative, long necks, faceless dead, IDP status, the shooting of a gun, the aura of violence in a doorway behind which are disembodied heads to be dutifully carried out in spite of the feeling of groundlessness and the bloating of horrified emotion. Salutogenic outcome is revealed in the quiet, dignified self-respect of the young man who drew himself with carefully pressed clothing, even a tie, a determined stance and expression, and in the smiling young girl with smiling face, hands folded in respectful greeting.
Tears XᎦ. Sad ། Injured
\ ""

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Disintegrative
'.in.
(్య)
午一 لكنه لايكته
This child is looking Protruding Ears
Altered body perception in dangerous, shooting a gun response to aggression and
horrifying violence in home
אS.ץ-האר"ן רן 3 1. ܚܙܝܪܢ
N,
---,
This child's face is frozen in འོ།།
empty-eyed horror as he stands This child shows her
near the faceless dead.
Broken Wing Bird
escape alone, running as an IDP
 
 
 
 

Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone 269
The apparent outcome of the training, as assessed, was most hopeful:
గ్రి
Dignified Happy and self-respect competent
“gx
ή , -
f
Assessment Psycho-Social Before After Intervention Indicator Interpretation 96 96 Benefit
% Universal Pacial Sadlangry 43 17. 60 Expressions Universal Facial Happy/neutral 44 76 73 Expressions No Mouth Unable to express 14 3 || 79 Very Long Neck Sense of over- 17 4 77
dependence Very Protruding High concern with 39 Ears what they heard 3. 雛 Missing Arms Unable to extend 7 0 100
intent into the environment Stunted Arms Limited in 15 9 40
extending intent Discontinuously Damaged sense of 19 7 63 Drawn Body, human physical Abstract or Non- || integrity Human Showing Self Feeling of 6 13 17 Engaged in participation and Action interconnection

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The finding about body image lacking integrity was particularly intriguing. The non-human portrayals of self included insects, flowers, sun and birds. Some of the birds in the before-training self-drawings were depressed and had broken wings, and the sun had no face. In the after-training self-drawing, all but one self-portrayal, a sun, was human and that Sun now had a smiling face.
Some other apparent outcomes of note are:
o Reduction from 3 percent whose perception of self included
becoming IDP to Zero
o An increase from 3 percent whose perception of self included a house to 8 percent, and the 3 percent had shown themselves losing the house while the 8 percent had not
o An increase from zero to 6 percent of students who, posttraining, were able to show themselves with dead family and friends, a way of expressing coming to terms with the unacceptable
o A 2 percent increase in wanting to help oneself and a 3
percent decrease in wanting to hurt oneself
o An 11 percent increase in students who claim their life is getting better and a 2 percent reduction in students who claim it is getting worse
Basically, these findings indicate increased hope for the future, increased ability to express and connect with one's experience, increased perception of self-in-context, increased independence, increased happiness and decreased sadness about life, as well as an increase in feelings of loving toward others and self. It must be noted that these findings characterise children who are war and trauma affected, and whose external environment continued to gravely worsen during the assessment period. Thus out of horror, hope.

Psycho-Social Training Outcomes in the Northern Disaster Zone 271
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The northeast of Sri Lanka c. reconstruction after the end o Government of Sri Lanka has reconstruction programme. T who have latest research findi practitioners with years of ex development and psychologic northeast. This work will be o academics, policy-makers and governmental or donor institu rebuilding processes in the no
Editors:
Dhammika Herath, Research to Peace and Development Rese University of Gothenburg, Swed
Kristine Höglund, Associate P. Conflict Research, Uppsala Univ
Michael Schulz, Associate Pro Research at the School of Globa Sweden
Kalinga Tudor Silva, Professor Faculty of Arts, University of Pt Executive Director of ICES
O
7 8 9 5 5 5 II 8 0 1 2 3 2
ISBN 978-955-580-123-2
 

rrently traverses through a period of nearly three-decades of war. The commenced a large-scale his volume brings together scholars gs on northeast development and erience relating to recovery, ul wellbeing of people of the
interest and practical utility to practitioners in government, nontions in their efforts to guide the ritheast of Sri Lanka.
Fellow at ICES and Researcher affiliated arch at the School of Global Studies, llen
rofessor at the Department of Peace and ersity, Sweden
essor in Peace and Development Il Studies, University of Gothenburg,
of Sociology and formerly Dean, tradeniya, Sri Lanka and presently the
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