Page 1
AD, CON FLICT, AND PEA
OO
JOnathan G00 dh
With Dilrukshi Fonseka, S.I. Keet
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گھر శ్రీ Koninkrijk
der Nederlanden The Asia
 

| EBUILDING IN SRI LANKA
- 20015
hand and Bart Klem
haponcalan, and Shonali Sardesai
Foundation
VOLUME
No 1

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Page 3
AID CONFLICT AND IN SRI LANKA ,
By Jonathan Goodhan
with Dilrukshi Fonseka, S.l. Keethap(
හී Koninkrijk 69
der Nederlanden The Asia Foun

PEACEBUILDING
2000 - 2005
d and Bart Klem
)nCalan, and Shonali Sardesai
|dation KN

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The governments of the Netherlands, Swed The Asia Foundation and the World Bank fun
not be construed as reflecting til
(C) Cop
Secc
Netherlands Min Swedish International De
The Asi Government of the United Kingdo WC
For reproductions ofth
The Asi
3 1/A Raja Colomb Phone: - Fax: +9 WWW.asia
All rig
Printed

en, and the United Kingdom, in collaboration with ded this project. The contents of the studies should he views of the five funding agencies.
oyright 2005
ond Printing
istry of Foreign Affairs velopment Cooperation Agency la Foundation om of Great Britain and Northern Ireland prld Bank
is publication please Contact:
(D
ia Foundation
keeya Mawatha o 7, Sri Lanka
94 11 2698356 94 11 2698358 foundation.org
hts reserved
| in Sri Lanka

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Foreword
This is a seminal study on the relationship between aid, Confli previous strategic conflict assessment conducted in 2000 and for International Development. Since then, development and ( more coherent "joined up" approach to addressing the challen represents a joint initiative by five partners - the governments Bank, and The Asia Foundation - to analyze political events sir Lanka's "national question."
Support for democratization, peacebuilding, and conflict resol international development assistance programs in Countries a where nearly a quarter century of civil war has taken a high to particularly among the poorest and most disadvantaged. Sril respectable rate despite years of civil war but this resiliencer the country has, if peace is restored. This would significantly ranks of middle income countries within a generation.
For this reason, international donors have increasingly realize Particularly since the beginning of the peace process, many d the broader objective of building peace. Two of the chief less assistance programs must be based upon a sound and thorou second, that more strategic and coordinated approaches from needed. Strategic conflict analyses can be useful tools for bo especially here.
Indeed one of the study's useful insights is that the "internatio members have different assumptions and priorities and will pl Sri Lankan peace process. So instead of pursuing unanimity, the case of Sri Lanka, the authors argue that donors should st and builds on areas of convergence in the aims of key membe
We are happy to have supported a study of this quality that pr despite the fluidity of Sri Lankan politics. We hope that it will support a sustainable peace in Sri Lanka and serve as a sourc of conflict analysis in Sri Lanka and beyond.
Douglas Bereuter Suma Chakrabarti Maria Norrfalk
President, Permanent Secretary, Director Genera The Asia Foundation Department for Swedish Interna
international Development Development Cooperation Ag On behalf of the (Sida) Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland

iii. Foreword
Ct, and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. It builds upon a
Commissioned by the United Kingdom's Department diplomatic partners in Sri Lanka have tried to pursue a ges of peacebuilding. This study, by example, of the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K., the World nce 2000 and prospects for a political solution to Sri
ution has become an important component of ffected by civil conflict, none more than in Sri Lanka blin terms of lives and economic opportunity anka's economy has managed to grow at a Therely underscores the much higher growth potential educe poverty and propel Sri Lanka into the upper
d that they can no longer work "around" conflict. Onors have calibrated their assistance according to ons from this experience have been first, that gh understanding of this particular conflict and
the donor (and wider international) community are th shared understanding and coordinated responses,
nal community" is not monolithic, and different ay different, although hopefully supportive, roles in the which has been a cumbersome and elusive process in rive for "strategic complementarity" that emphasizes rs of the international community.
Omises to have a shelf life of years not months contribute to the international community's efforts to :e of inspiration for future joint initiatives in the area
Ruud Treffers Shengman Zhang
l, Director General, Managing Director,
tional Development The World Bank
Cooperation,
ency Netherlands Ministry
of Foreign Affairs

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Page 7
Contents
Acknowledgements
About the Authors τα
Acronyms
Executive Summary
1.
2.
References
Appendixes
introduction
4.1 introduction
Overview of Key Events since 2000................................ 2.1 The run up to the Ceasefire (January 2000 - Febr 2.2 The Ceasefire and Peace talks (February 2002
2.3 The break down of talks and instability (April 200
2.4 Tsunami and P-TOMS (December 2004 - Septeml
Conflict Structures 3.1 introduction 3.2 Structural Dimensions of Conflict in Sri Lanka. 3.3 Conclusions on Conflict Structures.........................
Conflict Dynamics
4.2 The Dynamics of Peace............................................. 4.3 Security Dynamics 44 Political Dynamics: Fragmentation and the Peace 4.5 The Tsunami and Peace/ Conflict Dynamics......... 4.6 Conclusions and Future Scenarios..........................
international Engagement................................................. 5.1 introduction 5.2 Peacemaking .......... 5.3 Development Assistance and Peacebuilding........ 5.4 The Tsunami and International Assistance............ 5.5 Conclusions.
Conclusions and implications.......................................... 6.1 Overall Conclusions 6.2 Implications for Peacemaking. 6.3 implications for Aid Donors......................................
I Basic Timeline (January 2000-September 2005). Il The P-TOMS Mechanism..........................................,

1 Contents
uary 2002) | 19 April 2003) | 20 3-December 2004)............................................ 21 ber 2005). 22
23
29
Process 37
|65
89
97
| 105 | 105 111

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in SriLanka 2000-2005 2
Acknowledgements
All the views expressed in this report are the authors' the facilitators of this study, or those who were intervi their contributions to this study. First, the following pet Debi Duncan, Nilan Fernando, Benedikt Korf, Jens Ler Lekha Srirum, Martin Stuerzinger, and Wolfram Zunze vital logistical support for this study. Special thanks ar inputthroughout the exercise, challenging and deeper for the ongoing guidance provided by the sponsoring ( Workshops to discuss and comment on issues raised i valuable editorial assistance. Finally, we would like to gave some of their time to be interviewed during the C interest and value to them in their efforts to support pe

and do not represent those of the Commissioning agencies, ewed. We would nevertheless like to thank the following for ople who gave useful feedback On earlier drafts of this report: che, Anthea Mulakala, Brian Smith, Chris Smith, Chandra . Second, we thank The Asia Foundation for providing the e due to Nilan Fernando who provided strong intellectual hing our thinking on a range of issues. Third, We are grateful ionors. Fourth, we thank the participants who attended two n the report. Fifth, Alan Martin and Gina Genovese provided thank all the people who are too numerous to mention, who ourse of this study. We hope that the final product will be of ?acebuilding in Sri Lanka.

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About the Authors
Jonathan Goodhand is Lecturer in Development Practice University of London. He helped develop DFID's Strategic widely on the political economy of conflict, peacebuilding in Or On Sri Lanka since 1992.
Bart Klem is a researcher at the Conflict Research Unit of and consultancy in Sri Lanka for the last five years. He ha "Dealing with Diversity: Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace
Dilrukshi Fonseka is an independant reseacher. She previ Studies, Sri Lanka. She has published on human rights, pe
processes.
Soosaipillai. Keethaponcalan is a Senior Lecturer in the University of Colombo. He is a specialist in conflict analys subject in relation to Sri Lanka and South Asia.
Shonali Sardesai is at the Conflict Prevention and ReCons of the World Bank. She co-developed the World Bank's C Framework and the Conflict impact Assessment methodol implementing these tools in conflict-affected environment

3 About the Authors
at the School of Oriental and African Studies, Conflict Assessment methodology. He has published and international assistance and has been working
the Clingendael Institute. He has conducted research s co-edited a volume (with Georg Frerks) entitled and Conflict (2004).
ously worked at the Berghof Foundation for Conflict acebuilding, and the role of women in peace
Department of Politics and Public Policy at the is and resolution and has published widely on this
truction Unit in the Social Development Department Onflict analysis tools including the Conflict Analysis logies. She has played a key role in adapting and s of Africa and Asia.

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000 - 2005 || 4
Acronyms
ACTO ADB
CFA
CPA
0W0
CHA
DFID
EPDP
EPRLF
EU
FCE
GTZ
GoSL.
GDP
HSZ
IPKF
INPACT
ISGA
IDP
ICRC
IFRC
IFIS
IMF
JVP JHU KAP
LTTE
LMC
MIDMK
MP
NPM
NUA
NGO
NEP
NERF
PNM
All Ceylon Tamil Co Asian Development Ceasefire Agreeme Centre for Policy A Ceylon Workers Co Consortium for Hun
Department for Inte Eelam People's Dei Eelam People's Rey European Union
Foundation for CoGerman Developm Government of Sri | Gross Domestic Pri High Security Zone Indian Peace Keер
Initiative for Politic
Interim Self-Gover Internally Displace International Comn
International Feder International Finan
lnternational Mone
Janatha Wimukthi F
Jathika Hela Urum Knowledge Attitud
Liberation Tigers O
Local Monitoring C Marumalarchi Drav
Member of Parliam
National Patriotic
National Unity Alli Non-Governmenta
North-East Provin
North-East Recons
Patriotic National

ngress tBank
!rt
ternatives
ոgreSS nanitarian Agencies }rnational Development mocratic Party volutionary Liberation Front
Existence ent Cooperation - Lanka
Oduct
ing Force
al and Conflict Transformation ning Authority di PersOn
hittee of the Red CrOSS
ration of the Red Cross
cial Institutions
tary Fund
Peramuna
aya
es Perception f Tamil Eelam
Ommittee
vida Munnettra Kazhagam
ent
VMovement
3ՈCԹ
| Organization
cial Council
struction Fund
Movement

Page 11
PCIA
PA
PLOTE
P-TOMS
PRGF
PRSP
PR
SAARC
SLAF
SLFP
SLMM
SLMC
SCA
SAP
SHRN
SMD Sida
TELO
TNA
TRO
TUF
TULF
UNF
UNP
UNICEF
UNHCR
UPFA
USAID
UPF
Peace and Conflict Impact People's Alliance Peoples Liberation Organiz Post-Tsunami Operational Poverty Reduction Growth Poverty Reduction Strateg Proportional Representatic South Asian Association f(
Sri Lanka Armed Forces Sri Lanka Freedom Party Sri Lanka Monitoring Miss Sri Lanka Muslim Congres Strategic Conflict Assessm Structural Adjustment Prog Sub-Committee on Immedi
North-East Sub-Committee on Military Swedish International Dev
Tamil Eelam Liberation Org Tamil National Alliance
Tamil Rehabilitation Organi
Tamil United Front
Tamil United Liberation Fro
United National Front
United National Party
United Nations Children's
United Nations High Comm United People's Freedom A United States Agency for Upcountry People's Front

5 Acronyms
S Assessment
lation of Tamil Eelam
Management Structure Facility
y Paper
or Regional Cooperation
ion
S
ent
gramme ate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the
De-Escalation
elopment Cooperation Agency anization
ization
int
Fund
ission for Refugees
Alliance
nternational Development

Page 12


Page 13
Executive Summary
1. INTRODUCTION
This Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) follows and builds upon a previous assessment conducted for the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) in 2000 (Goodhand, 2001). Like the previous study, it aims to do three things: First, to provide an analysis of the structures and dynamics of conflict and peace in Sri Lanka since 2000. Second, to examine how international engagement has interacted with conflict and peace dynamics, with a particular focus on aid donors during this time period. Third, to identify how the strategies and approaches of international donors can best engage with and help strengthen domestic peacebuilding efforts. The primary end users of this report are expected to be aid donors, but it is hoped that it will be of interest to a wider audience inside and outside Sri Lanka. This volume is the first in a six-part series that includes five supplementary
studies that are part of the SCA.
2. BACKGROUND
The period under study can broadly be divided into four phases: 1. Run up to the ceasefire: in a context of an enduring military stalemate and declining economic conditions, the United National Front (UNF) wins elections in December 2001. 2. Ceasefire and peace talks: a ceasefire agreement (CFA) is signed within a month and the UNF government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) embark on six rounds of peace talks. 3. The breakdown of talks and political instability: Talks become deadlocked; the LTTE suspends its participation and subsequently submits a proposal for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). This sparks off a political crisis in the South, with the President
pr sig
St
O
in

7 Executive Summary
ting over three key ministries, then proroguing rliament and declaring new elections for April 2004. coalition of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and 2 Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) or People's peration Front wins the election. The combination of litical instability in the South and an LTTE split prior the elections that leads to growing violence in the st, means that the prospects for resuming peace talks pear to be remote. 4. The post-tsunami response: :gotiations between the government and LTTE about post-tsunami response mirror the political dynamics of 2 peace process. It takes almost half a year to reach an reement on a Post-Tsunami Operational Management “ucture (P-TOMS), thus boosting the hopes for peace, spite the lack of legal clarity and the turmoil generated nong both Sinhalese and Muslim constituencies.
CONFLICTSTRUCTURES
spite of the ceasefire agreement and peace gotiations, the structural dimensions of the conflict thin Sri Lanka have remained relatively stable. There s been no "seismic shift" in the "tectonic plates" derpinning conflict in Sri Lanka. The constellation of ctors that contributed to the outbreak and sustenance violent conflict - including the nature of the state, its litical culture, the institutional framework of policy, even development patterns and competing tionalisms - remains largely unaffected by the peace ocess. In many respects the "peace" that followed the ning of the CFA has had the effect of freezing the uctural impediments to conflict resolution.
n the other hand, there has been a significant change the external context at both the regional and

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 || 8
international levels. The global "war on terror," growin international engagement in "post conflict" contexts, and Sri Lanka's integration into a dynamic and increasingly assertive wider Asian region have together created new (and sometimes competing) incentives for domestic actors. Though these changes in the external context may have helped create the preconditions for peace talks, they have not yet led to a radical reorderin of political forces inside the country.
4. CONFLICTDYNAMICS
By 2001, the conflict had reached a "hurting stalemate For a range of external and domestic reasons, neither side felt able to further their political goals purely through military means. The UNF-LTTE peace negotiations followed a phased approach that involved ending the violence, creating a peace dividend, and dealing with the core political issues. International acto were central to this strategy by providing security guarantees and reconstruction assistance, and facilitatir peace negotiations.
Although this strategy was a success in the sense that the ceasefire has outlasted the peace talks, which is unprecedented in Sri Lanka, it failed to deliver a lasting even interim settlement. First, the CFA froze rather thau transformed security dynamics. Both parties continued t re-arm and strengthen their military capabilities. Althou "no-war, no-peace" has meant an end to large-scale militarized conflict, there have been high levels of politic violence, including over 3,000 ceasefire violations. Insecurity has grown in the East since the emergence of
the Karuna break-away faction of the LTTE.
Second, although there was a peace dividend of sorts, it has been unevenly distributed and its impacts attenuatec Reconstruction funding was caught up in the politics of the peace process, thus limiting the peace dividend in th North-East. In the South, macro economic reforms introduced by the UNF undermined the economic dividend and led to the perception that the government was unconcerned with the plight of the poor. The lacko

a clear communication strategy about either the peace process or the reform agenda accentuated this view.
Third, the step-by-step approach was based on the assumption that a limited peace could ultimately lead to a transformative peace. With hindsight, however, there could never be complete "normalization" until the core political issues were addressed. It proved impossible to circumnavigate or deal indirectly with the pivotal core of the conflict, this being the question of power sharing and LTTE hegemony in the North East. Without a clear road map for peace talks, the nature of the end goal was always unclear, which created anxieties among external and internal stakeholders. The peace process acted as a "lightening rod" for wider political and societal tensions, exposing the multi-polar and multidimensional nature of conflict in Sri Lanka. The bilateral government-LTTE relationship could not be addressed in isolation from other key inter and intra group relationships, which are briefly outlined below.
Sinhalese Politics
The southern polity holds the key to peace in Sri Lanka. Some of the preconditions for sustainable peace include: a level of stability in the politics of the South including a bipartisan approach to peace negotiations, a strategy for limiting the effects of, or co-opting conflict spoilers, and a significant and stable constituency for peace. There have been some positive trends in recent years partly due to the restraining influence of the proportional representation (PR) system on the nationalist politics of the South. It has acted as a brake on the historic processes of ethnic outbidding and contributed to both mainstream parties' greater willingness to explore a negotiated settlement when in power. However, as this latest round of peace talks shows, it has not produced the stability and longevity of government required to move from a cessation of hostilities to a peace settlement. Perversely, PR has produced more moderate mainstream parties, while encouraging OC communalist minority parties. Furthermore, a political

Page 15
settlement requires state reform and thus constitutional W change, but achieving the necessary two thirds majority th in parliament is less likely under the PR system.
ne
Perhaps the most significant change in the political landscape of the South has been the emergence of the JVP as a political force. The JVP have picked up the
baton of Sinhala nationalism, dropped at least temporarily by the SLFP and UNP. Both the JVP and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) benefited from, and
mobilized around, anxieties in the South generated by the peace process and UNF government policies -
namely unpopular macro economic reforms, concerns about LTTE appeasement, and a perception that the peace process had become "over internationalized." That the JVP have entered mainstream politics is a positive development, but their role in relation to peace negotiations (and P-TOMS) has been to check movement toward federalism.
so
SO
Tamil Politics i
co
se
The peace process exposed a complex set of tri-polar: dynamics in the North-East (LTTE, Karuna faction, the Muslims) and the South (UNP, SLFP, JVP). It also brought out in sharp relief the LTTE's Janus-headed character and the tensions between its military and political 'faces'. In parallel with brutal repression of internal dissent, continued re-armament and repeated
ho ceasefire violations, there has been a new 'offensive' in pursuit of international and domestic legitimacy. 'Non war-no peace' has enabled the LTTE to extend its control. But it has also brought new challenges to its hegemony, namely the re-emergence of eastern regionalism, the growing radicalization of Muslims and the demands that it conform to international norms on human rights and democracy, associated with the internationalization of the peace process. Given the current level of instability in the North-East and South pe at the time of writing, it appears unlikely that in the
a ho short term the LTTE will either come back to the negotiation table or resort to full-scale hostilities.
ISLU

9 Executive Summary
hile the immediate impact of the upcountry Tamils on Le peace process is limited, their growing sense of ievance and radicalization is a notable development nce SCA1, and in the longer term may constitute a ew basis for conflict in Sri Lanka.
uslim Politics
bipolar model of conflict resolution marginalized the Iuslims, which contributed to growing tension, and -metimes open violence, between the Muslim and amil communities in the East. It also exposed divisions ithin the Muslim polity, hardening fault lines between luslims in the southeast (who form a relative majority), Le North-East (who form a fragile minority) and areas ss affected by the war (central hill country, south coast, olombo). A further set of tensions has grown between e political leadership and an increasingly radicalized onstituency of societal leaders and Muslim youth in the utheast. There is a striking parallel between the growth
Tamil nationalism in the 1970s and present day suslim radicalization.
ae Tsunami
he tsunami accentuated rather than ameliorated the onflict dynamics described above. In spite of initial ppes that the tsunami response would provide a space to -energize peace negotiations, it had the opposite effect, cepening political fault lines. Protracted negotiations Pout the institutional arrangements for delivering unami assistance to the North-East mirrored earlier eace talks and exposed the deep underlying problems of
wed governance, entrenched positions, and patronage olitics. Though ultimately the P-TOMS agreement was gned, the process itself further undermined trust etween the two sides. As for its potential to catalyse the cace process, much depends now upon whether and Dw it is implemented in practice.

Page 16
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 | 10
Sri Lanka's current situation may best be characterized as a "pause in conflict" rather than "post conflict." Though one should not interpret all political and societal changes through the lens of the peace process - since many factors predate negotiations and have their own dynamics - it has raised the political stakes as different groups jockey for a position at the table. At th time of writing, the dominant players in this process appear to have stronger incentives for the status quo than structural change. In other words, there has been : shift from a "hurting stalemate" to a "plain stalemate." negative equilibrium has developed in which it is about managing the ceasefire rather than advancing the peace
process.
5. INTERNATIONALENGAGEMENT
One of the most salient changes in the political landscape since SCA1 has been the "internationalization" of peacebuilding. Although the policies and practices of different international actors varied significantly, two broad trends can be identified. First, there has been a more robust and multi-faceted international response to conflict and peace dynamics than has historically been the case. This has included security guarantees, ceasefire monitoring, facilitation of peace negotiations (Tracks One and Two), and humanitarian/development aid provision (Track Three) Second, there have been changes in the division of role between various policy instruments and actors. Reflecting contemporary trends in "liberal peacebuilding," there has been a blurring of the traditional distinction between the conflict resolution and the economic aspects of peacebuilding.
ceasefire Monitoring
The formation of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), a Norwegian-headed body tasked with
monitoring the ceasefire and addressing truce violation: was one of the provisions of the CFA. To the extent tha

there has been a ceasefire for more than three years, the SLMM has been successful. Its limited mandate and problem-solving and consensual approach have helped defuse incidents and maintain the commitment of the key protagonists to the ceasefire. However, under the guise of a ceasefire, the permissive conditions have been created for pervasive human rights abuses and criminality. The emergence of the Karuna faction has complicated the situation, since he was not a signatory to the CFA and therefore not bound by the agreement. The credibility of the CFA and its monitors has become increasingly tenuous, as the number and intensity of the violations increase. Arguably, a broader mandate and greater operational capacities could enable the SLMM to play a more effective role in monitoring and maintaining the ceasefire.
Peace Negotiations
The entire architecture of the peace process has been built around international engagement. The UNF government put its faith in the "international security net" in order to bail them out if things went wrong. Norway was seen as an acceptable and non-threatening facilitator by the main protagonists. Although the LTTE pulled out of negotiations in April 2003, Norway continues to facilitate communication between both sides, and Track Two initiatives are ongoing. Therefore, though peace talks have stalled there is still a peace process. Some of the lessons to be drawn from Norway's role in this process are as follows: first, negotiations were based on a bilateral model of the conflict and sought to forge an elite pact between the main protagonists. Arguably, the exclusion of key stakeholders provoked spoiler behavior. Second, there was a constant tension between the imperatives of conflict management and human rights concerns. The perception that the international community was prepared to soft pedal on human rights issues, particularly in relation to the LTTE, played a role in undermining the credibility of the UNF government in the eyes of India and the

Page 17
southern electorate. Third, there was a growing perception that the peace process changed from being internationally supported to internationally driven, shaped by the priorities and timeframes of external rather than domestic actors. Yet even with an "international tailwind," it proved impossible to "bring peace," showing that international actors cannot simply engineer peace and complex sociopolitical processes are not amenable to external micro management. Finally, the importance of Track Two initiatives should be highlighted. Backdoor talks helped initiate the peace process and have played a vital role in maintaining communication since the suspension of negotiations. A critical challenge appears to be one of building a more robust architecture for the peace process that strengthens the interface and synergies between Tracks One, Two, and Three..
Development Assistance
SCAl donors have increasingly calibrated their policies and programs according to conflict and peace dynamics within Sri Lanka. Their attempts to do this can be divided into three areas of engagement. First, applying peace conditionalities to reconstruction and development aid. Second, dealing with the consequences of conflict. Third, addressing the underlying causes of conflict.
First, at the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka in June 2003, aid donors pledged $4.5 billion as reconstruction and development aid to Sri Lanka, tied explicitly to progress in the peace negotiations. Whether intended by the donors or not, this was interpreted by the parties to the conflict as a form of peace conditionality. In practice, conditionalities or the incentives for increased aid did not have the desired outcome. They were based on an inflated view of aid's importance. There were no mechanisms for ensuring compliance. The common position expressed in Tokyo was subsequently undermined by the reticence of the larger donors to attach political or conflict related conditions to their assistance.
 

11 Executive Summary
:cond, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for e North-East, in order to address the consequences of ar, was a key element of the CFA. Since 2002, there is been a scaling up of assistance to the war-affected eas, but much of it was caught up in the politics of the ace process. A circumscribed peace dividend had the in effects of undermining confidence in the process ld eroding trust between the two sides.
hird, by shifting their priorities to the peace process, me donors arguably strayed too far from their core eas of competence. For these donors, working "on" snflict meant applying peace conditionalities and/or oviding a peace dividend. In practice this translated to being sensitive to conflict dynamics in the Northast, while being conflict blind in the South. A focus on ort-term conflict management was arguably at the pense of developing conflict sensitive approaches to ng-term structural issues such as poverty, governance, ld economic development. Therefore, programs aiming
promote peace in the North-East were undermined r policies pursued in the South. For instance, donors lcouraged the UNF government to simultaneously rce through two major structural changes (negotiating peace settlement and implementing radical reforms), hich created unmanageable tensions within the polity. though many of the smaller bilateral donors have 'come more conflict sensitive in terms of how they gage with the peace process and programming in the orth-East, development policies in the South, funded incipally by the larger bilaterals and multi-laterals intinue as they always have done. This has meant very mited adaptation to a conflict setting of programs in e areas of governance, macro economic reform, civil ciety support, and poverty eradication.

Page 18
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 12
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICYIMPLICATIONS
Conclusions
It is difficult to predict how the dynamics described above will play themselves out in the future. Violence (and peace) involves too many unanticipated consequences. It is also important to note that peace processes almost never involve a smooth transition from war to peace. Continued instability and violence, the destabilizing tactics of spoilers, and the emergence of new unanticipated tensions tend to be the norm. To an extent, the fact that the peace procss in Sri Lanka has generated "micro cycles" of conflict is hardly surprising. Whether these conflicts can be contained and transformed is another question. Previous efforts at peacemaking, like the Indo-Lanka Accord, created unmanageable tensions within the southern and northern polities, which ultimately exploded in the form of renewed and intensified hostilities.
The preconditions for a transformative peace are not in place. There is a lack of "settlement stability," necessary for either side to take the risks required to reach a negotiated solution. The most likely medium-term scenario appears to be a continuation of the negative equilibrium, as neither protagonist is yet ready to endur the costs of war. But the potential for a return to war is inherent in the current situation. A possible trigger for this could be the growing "shadow war" in the East.
A bipolar model with a focus on conflict management rather than transformation may have contributed to the current impasse. As, arguably, did the strategy of "economizing" peacebuilding, based on the mistaken assumption that economic incentives could override political imperatives. However, one should not overstate the role of international actors in such circumstances. In the short-term, at least, the traditional tools of diplomacy and the policy instruments of aid donors, have limited traction over domestic state and non-state actors. This is not an argument for international

disengagement. As the Norwegians themselves have argued, there is a need for long-term engagement and political commitment. In many respects, it is too early to talk of success or failure.
implications for Peacemaking
Based on the above analysis, a number of implications can be identified for international actors involved in
peacemaking (Tracks One and Two).
O Maintaining and strengthening ceasefire
arrangements, which ensure the containment of war is vital. Although there are fears that renegotiating the CFA and the SLMM's mandate risks destabilizing the current equilibrium, the ceasefire in its current form may not survive, given the level of pressure being placed upon it. There may be a need to consider extending the scope of the CFA to cover the full range of military actors and strengthen its:: human rights component. In parallel, SLMM's mandate and capacities may need to be revisited with a view to improving its means of investigation, better public diplomacy, and boosted operational capacity, particularly in the East. ; : . . . . . . . ;
o More thought can be given to developing a
transformative approach to peacemaking and peacebuilding. This would involve raising one's analytical gaze beyond the CFA and the limited peace agenda that the government and LTTE outlined for themselves. Interim processes can help institutionalize political engagement but should not merely freeze the status quo- conditions that show progress toward a transformative agenda can be attached. For instance, questions of human rights, transitional justice, and reconcilia uld have been more central to the negotiation process. - ... : :
O A more inclusive approach to conflict resolution.
could be developed. Arguably the negotiation model was based upon two "killer assumptions." First, that it was a bipolar conflict between two relatively coherent sets of actors. Second, that the leadership

Page 19
would be able to represent a clearly defined constituency and "deliver" a peace deal to them after closed-door negotiations. Bipolarity had perverse impacts in the sense that it generated grievances among those who felt excluded. This was exacerbated by the lack of a communication strategy to reach out to the southern and northern polities. An inclusive approach does not necessarily mean getting everyone around the same table at the same time. But it does mean thinking more carefully about inter and intra group divisions and the vertical linkages between leaders and their constituencies. It is possible to map out a number of areas in which one could expand the scope of the (Track One and Two) negotiations:
o The need to include both mainstream parties
in negotiations is a clear lesson from the UNF-led peace process. The two parties command the confidence of 60 percent of the electorate, potentially a formidable constituency for peace. A bipartisan approach is therefore a sine qua non for peacemaking.
O An adequate formula for including Muslim
representatives in the peace process needs to be found, which goes beyond merely including a Muslim delegate in the government representation. O Ways need to be found to engage with the
"unlike minded," including nationalist groups such as the JVP and JHU. Ignoring or attempting to exclude such groups has not worked and, arguably, they have some legitimate concerns. Engagement could mean building contacts through Track Two and Track Three processes. o Strengthening and supporting Track Two
activities appears to be critical, particularly at a time when formal negotiations have broken down. In the current context, Track Two constitutes in many respects the backbone of the peace process.
 
 

13 Executive Summary
O Although there is a significant peace
constituency in Sri Lanka, its impacts are attenuated by its fragmented nature, lack of information, and distance from the levers of power. There is scope to strengthen work in this area through, for instance, more strategic engagement with the media, particularly the vernacular press.
There is a need to rethink the current consensus on harmonization. This is not working in practice, nor does it lead to the most optimal division of labor within the international community. There should be a shift in emphasis away from harmonization toward strategic complementarity. There is scope to think more creatively about the interfaces between diplomatic, development, humanitarian, and human rights actors, so that the distinctive approaches of each reinforce and complement (rather than undercut) one another. The same also applies to complementarity between countries - for instance the "good cop" roles of the European countries, versus the "bad cop" roles of India and the U.S. - and between conflict resolution tracks as the synergies and linkages between Tracks One, Two, and Three could be further strengthened.
International actors should be cognizant of Sri Lanka's regional context. This has a number of implications including listening to what Asian actors have to say about the conflict, incorporating their concerns into emergent strategy and analysis and in so doing "de-Westernizing" international peacebuilding. Given the sensitivities around excessive international involvement and the current level of domestic support for India, now would seem to be an opportune moment for India to consider the role as an additional co-chair, joining the EU, U.S., Norway, and Japan - though it is recognized that India, given past experiences in Sri Lanka, is wary of taking on the role of peacemaker.

Page 20
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 14
Implications for Aid Donors
If donors are to work more effectively "in" or "on" conflict, they must develop a more realistic assessment their role and impacts. By attempting to stand on the same ground as the diplomats, aid donors have not bee playing to their comparative advantages. The implications of our analysis in relation to the "three C. (conditionalities, consequences, and causes) are as follows:
First, the lesson about peace conditionalities is that applied crudely and without a strong political process t back them up, they have limited or even perverse impacts. Since the tsunami, the aid landscape has changed substantially. The threat of withholding aid in an "over-aided" environment will have very little effect The debate should now shift toward thinking about positive conditions on aid and gaining influence throug engagement. P-TOMs may be one immediate way of doing this. It is extremely important that donors invest the requisite political and financial capital into supporting the practical implementation of this mechanism.
Second, in order to address the consequences of conflict, there is scope (and a need) to substantially scale up assistance to the North-East to build a visible peace dividend. This will help meet immediate humanitarian needs and boost confidence in the peace process. Reconstruction programs may simultaneously contribu to the de-escalation of conflict and address its underlying causes by tackling the problem of chronic poverty in the North-East. This may involve developin pragmatic institutional arrangements in order to delive such programs and to build capacities at the local level.
Third, there is potential for donors to do more to address the underlying causes of conflict, particularly ir the South. A key lesson from Sri Lanka is that peace conditionalities may have limited traction when the broader framework of aid conditionalities remains unchanged - especially when some of these conditions

of
te
may be inimical to peacebuilding. The larger donors in particular can have a significant impact upon the structural dimensions of conflict by working in a conflict sensitive way on areas like governance, economic reform, and poverty. This however may mean (depending on the donor) a significant reorientation of Current strategies and approaches. Becoming more conflict sensitive necessarily means becoming more political, in the sense of being more attuned to the political context and governance structures within Sri Lanka. Some of the implications of this are outlined below.
Governance. In this report, conflict in Sri Lanka is conceptualized as a crisis of the state. In seeking to address this crisis, internationally supported "good governance" programs have often hindered rather than helped. There is a need to develop more conflict sensitive governance programs based upon a careful analysis of "actually existing" politics and the key drivers of change within the country. There is scope to work on governance issues more imaginatively. For example, exploring Asian models of developmental states that may be more applicable to Sri Lanka than Western models; engaging more proactively with political parties in a range of areas including policy dialogue and institutional development; initiating dialogue with a more diverse group of actors - including the JVP - on different options and models of governance; focusing more on governance at the provincial and local levels in order to improve delivery and accountability at the community level.
Civil society. To some extent, donors have engaged with civil society as an antidote or alternative to the state. In practice this has meant avoiding the core governance and peacebuilding challenge of how civil society can engage with and hold the state accountable. Some donors have begun to realize this, but more could still be done to support the political, as well as the service delivery role of civil society actors. There is scope to target actors and organizations at the meso level as they may hold the key to developing stronger links between

Page 21
Tracks Two and Three in order to build a more stable pr and influential peace constituency. As already SL mentioned, donors could also reach out more to the de "unlike-minded" within civil society, given their significant influence on public opinion. Finally, there may be scope for large-scale and locally managed framework funding for civil society initiatives.
Economic reform: The breakdown of peace talks cannot
be attributed to the UNF government's package of macro economic reforms. But the Sri Lankan case does raise serious questions about the scope, sequencing, mix, and speed of reform programs in fragile transition contexts. If peacebuilding is an overriding priority, then there may be a need to rethink models based purely on a calculation of optimum economic "efficiency." More thought could have been given to the political impacts and the distributional effects of economic reforms. There is also scope to draw upon and learn from comparative regional experiences in the area of macro economic reform.
Poverty: Poverty eradication is a declared priority of the
Sri Lankan government and donors alike. But the
growth of relative poverty and the expansion of pockets of exclusion in the North-East and South have had the effect of undermining faith in the government, the development project, and the peace process. Reenergizing efforts to address poverty and social exclusion would have a wider pay off in relation to the peace process. The JVP are one of the only political groups to put social exclusion at the heart of their agenda. This may be one of the few areas where international donors and the JVP have some common ground to explore.
Tsunami relief and reconstruction: Finally, it is widely recognized that large injections of funding have the potential to adversely affect both short-term conflict dynamics and the long-term causes of conflict. A conflict sensitive approach must involve the accountable and balanced distribution of resources with the participation of affected populations. Support for a coordinated approach through P-TOMS should be
 

15 Executive Summary
ioritized. This is also another area of international pport in which regional approaches could be further veloped.

Page 22


Page 23
1. introduction
In 2000, the DFID commissioned a Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) entitled "Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka" (Goodhand, 2001). The study examined the roots and dynamics of violent conflict in Sri Lanka, leading to recommendations for how development donors could more effectively support peacebuilding processes. In the five years that have passed since SCA1 there have been a number of defining events that have altered conflict and peace dynamics in Sri Lanka. Notable among these have been: the signing of a cease-fire agreement in February 2002; the initiation
of six rounds of peace talks between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and LTTE; the break down of peace
talks leading to an ongoing no-war/no-peace stalemate;
the election of a new government in April 2003; and the tsunami of December 26, 2004 in which over 30,000 people died in Sri Lanka. The socio-political and economic landscape has been transformed by these
events. It was therefore decided by the governments of
the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Sweden, the World Bank, and The Asia Foundation, to support a second SCA (SCA2) in order to update both the analysis and recommendations from the original study.
This report, which is the primary output of SCA2, covers the period 2000 - 2005. Since SCA1 (and other studies)' examined the underlying structural bases of conflict in some depth, SCA2 focuses primarily on its short to medium-term dynamics. The aims of SCA2 are threefold. First, to deepen understanding of the current dynamics of conflict, with particular reference to the peace process and international engagement. Second, to take stock of international actors' efforts to support peacemaking and peacebuilding processes. Third, to identify opportunities and entry points for international
pel
civ
1 See for instance: Bose (1990), Bush (2003), De Silva (1998), Spencer (1990), Tam
* Bastian (2005), Burke and Mulakala (2005), Rampton, and Welikala (2005), Phili
 

17 introduction
nors to engage with and strengthen domestic acebuilding processes. The future trajectory of conflict Sri Lanka hangs in the balance at the time of writing. is hoped that a careful and fine-grained analysis of this riod will yield valuable insights for those attempting better understand and support the peace process or a broader peacebuilding context. Although velopment donors are expected to be the primary end ars of this report, it is hoped that it will be of interest a wider audience both inside and outside Sri Lanka.
is study was conducted over a six month period. It rolved two field trips to Sri Lanka for duration of five eks, which included some 125 interviews in the orth, East, Hill Country, and South. A wide range of keholders were interviewed from the state, private, il society, and international sectors. SCA2 is also mplemented by five thematic studies and a literature view (Klem, 2004).
is report is divided into six sections: after the roduction, Section 2 provides a short summary of key ants since SCA2. Section 3 briefly explores the uctural dimensions of conflict in Sri Lanka and the ent to which they have changed since 2000. Section 4 ovides an in depth analysis of the dynamics of conflict d peace in the last five years. It explores how the peace ocess has shaped and been affected by security and litical dynamics in the North-East and South. Section xamines international actors' engagement with the ace process, focusing in particular on the role of velopment donors. Section 6 outlines the principal nclusions and implications of the foregoing analysis
donor policy and practice.
biah, (1986), Wilson (2000).
)son, and Thangarajah (2005), Nadarajah (2005).

Page 24


Page 25
2. Overview of Key Events since 2
Summary: The period under study is divided into four phase to the ceasefire: in a context of an enduring military stalemat Front wins elections in December 2001. 2. Ceasefire and peace and the UNF government and LTTE embark on six roun instability: Talks become deadlocked; the LTTE suspends its Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). This sparks off ap won by an SLFP-JVP coalition. The combination of politic elections that leads to growing violence in the East, means 4. The post tsunami response: Negotiations between the gover political dynamics of the peace process. In June, after alm Structure (P-TOMS) is agreed, but its implementation is hel
2.1 THE RUN UPTO THE CEASEFIRE (JANUARY in
2000-FEBRUARY 2002) Fu
be
In the context of an enduring military stalemate, lor President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and GCC
LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan, in February 2000, an request Norwegian government assistance in facilitating str; peace talks. However, there is no let up in the fighting. Lal After Prabakharan promises in his annual martyr's day tha
speech of November 1999 to re-conquer Jaffna, a new issu offensive begins in May 2000. Significant military gains are made by LTTE including the taking of the Six strategically important Elephant Pass military base. The fol LTTE advance on Jaffna is only halted after Mi international military support to the government from trig India, Pakistan, and China. Τη
en On December 21, 2000, the LTTE announces a one- ref month unilateral ceasefire that is extended month by the month until April 24, 2001, after which fighting thir resumes. On June 24, 2001, the LTTE launches an Vi
attack on Sri Lanka's only international airport. This has eig significant military, economic, and political impacts. The tha LTTE, having gained military parity, feels that it is now De
3 The PA is a coalition of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and a few smaller parties: t
Equal Society Party.
 

19 Overview of Key Events Since 2000
2000
as (see Annex 1 for a detailed timeline of events): 1. Run up e and declining economic conditions, the United National : talks: a ceasefire agreement (CFA) is signed within a month ds of peace talks. 3. The breakdown of talks and political participation and subsequently submits a proposal for an olitical crisis in the South, leading to elections in April 2004 al instability in the South and an LTTE split prior to the that the prospects for resuming peace talks appear remote. hment and LTTE about a post tsunami response mirror the ost half a year, a Post-Tsunami Operational Management ld up by the Supreme Court.
a strong position to enter political negotiations. rthermore, the People's Alliance (PA) government gins to realize that the "war for peace" strategy is no ger sustainable, having to contend with a shrinking onomy, rising desertion rates, and growing domestic d international dissatisfaction with the government's ategy. Norwegian special envoy Erik Solheim visits Sri nka twice in May to discuss the possibilities of a truce ut fails to materialize due to disagreement over the ues of LTTE de-proscription.
crossovers of Muslim members of parliament (MPs), lowing the President's decision to sack Rauff Hakeem, inister of Trade, Commerce and Muslim Affairs, gers a No Confidence motion from the opposition. e President retaliates by declaring a state of ergency, prorogues parliament, and schedules a erendum for a redrafting of the constitution that in : end is never held. A new government is formed ough an alliance between the PA and the Janatha mukthi Peramuna (JVP), but another crossover of ht PAMPs leads again to a No Confidence motion it the government loses. Elections are scheduled for cember 5.
he Communist Party, the Democratic United National Front, and the Lanka

Page 26
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 20
Despite the imposed curfew and attempts to annul elections on the allegation of violent intimidation, Wickremesinghe's United National Front (UNF)
triumphs on an agenda of peace and economic
prosperity.
22 THE CEASEFIRE AND PEACE TALKS (FEBRUARY2002 - APRIL 2003)
Within a month after Ranil Wickremesinghe came power, the government and the LTTE agree on a or month ceasefire, starting on December 24, 2001. C the February 22, the Norwegian facilitators broker : ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the two parties. agreement constitutes a cessation of offensive milita operations, restoration of normalcy, and the creatio the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), made staff from the five Nordic countries, reporting to th Norwegian government. The mission is given the di task of monitoring ceasefire violations and resolving truce related disputes at the lowest possible level.
The UNF government and the LTTE engage in six rounds of peace talks. These constitute the fifth set peace talks to have occurred between the GoSL and LTTE since the outbreak of conflict in 1983. The
government lifts the ban on the LTTE, enabling di
4 The UNF was a coalition of the United National Party and the C the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). Both CWC and UPF repr
5 The following five rounds of talks were held:
1. September 16-18, 2002: Sattahip Naval Base, Chonburi, TI 2. October 31-November 3, 2002: Rose Garden Hotel, Nakho 3. December 2-5, 2002: Radisson SAS Plaza Hotel, Oslo, Nor 4. January 6-9, 2003: Rose Garden Hotel, Nakhorn Pathom, T 5. February 7-8, 2003: Norwegian Embassy, Nordic Embassy 6. March 18-21, 2003, Prince Hotel, Hakone, Japan
A further round of talks cum donor pledging Conference was sch
in the peace process. The meeting in Tokyo was held nonetheles
6 The previous peace negotiations were: the Thimpu talks, 1985
involving direct negotiations between the Premadasa-led UNPres led PA government and the LTTE. Many of the people who were important exceptions being Prabakharan, Kumaratunga and Bala
This was viewed as a significant shift in the LTTE's position from
 

the
Ranil
Ο
e
The
n of up of
ual
the
CCt
negotiations with the rebel movement. With the "Oslo
Communiqué," the outcome of the third rounds of
talks, held in the Norwegian capital, the parties agree to explore a federal solution to the conflict.”
The restoration of normalcy agreed upon in the CFA includes the cessation of harassment, intimidation, extortion or abduction of civilians, lifting of checkpoints, vacation of public buildings by armed forces, re-opening of roads and railways, lifting of economic restrictions, and (to a large extent) fishing bans. Some headway is made on these issues in the months after the signing of the CFA. The A9 road from Vavuniya to Jaffna, crossing though the LTTE controlled Vanni, is opened to the public and the train to Batticaloa resumes service for the first time in years. Checkpoints in Colombo and the North-East are taken down. Reconstruction activities, supported by the
تخدير
international community, are scaled up. However, CFA clauses on restoration of normalcy continue to be breached including the harassment, abduction, child recruitment, extortion, and political killings by the LTTE in the North-East. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction grows about the slow pace of reconstruction in the North-East, the persistence of army-occupied high security zones, and continued restrictions on fishing and agriculture.
bylon Worker's Congress (CWC), the Upcountry People's Front (UPF) and some members of esent upcountry Tamils.
hailand
rn Pathom, Thailand
Way hailand
Complex, Berlin, Germany
eduled in Tokyo in June 2003, but prior to the event, the LTTE suspended its participation is, but with the Tigers absent, only the Sri Lankan government and donors participated.
and the indo Lanka Accord, 1987, both facilitated by India; the Colombo talks of 1989/90 gime and the LTTE; and most recently talks in Jaffna 1994-1995, between the Kumaratungainvolved in these negotiations on both the Sinhalese and Tamil sides have died, with the
singham.
separatism to "self determination."

Page 27
Peace talks continue with broad international support. Int In the run up to the planned sixth round of talks, three La co-chairs are assigned in addition to Norway: the th European Union, Japan, and the United States. The pro talks scheduled in Japan are to be a pledging conference LT for post-conflict reconstruction funds. On June 9, 2003 Ea the Tokyo declaration outlines a $4.5 billion be reconstruction package and goes onto state that:
"assistance by the donor community must be closely
linked to substantial and parallel progress in the peace Pr process toward fulfilment of the objectives agreed upon 3 by the parties in Oslo." However, the LTTE did not th
attend the conference and were not involved in the eff drafting of the declaration. Ot
is
s IPA 23 THE BREAKDOWN OFTALKS AND Fré INSTABILITY (APRIL 2003 - DECEMBER 2004) W
go
On April 21, 2003, the LTTE decides to "suspend its ра participation in the negotiations" (Tamilnet, 2003). In OUL
the letter to the Prime Minister, the movement spells out sm three basic reasons for its decision. The first reason is the co: decision of the government to "marginalize" the LTTE pa in approaching the international community for tal economic assistance. Particularly grieving was the donor
meeting in preparation of the Tokyo conference held in Pri Washington, D.C., a place the LTTE could not go given the
the movement's proscription as a terrorist organization M in the United States. The second reason is the failure of inc the government forces to vacate civilian premises, and Pr: the High Security Zone (HSZ) north of Jaffna in dis particular. Finally, the LTTE argues that the Poverty hic Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) "Regaining Sri Ea Lanka," failed to acknowledge and address the "unique wa conditions of devastation prevailing in the northeast" fo1 (Tamilnet, 2003).
W Despite its suspension from the talks, the LTTE So
reaffirms its commitment to a political resolution of the the conflict and presents its own plans for an interim tal administration on October 31, 2003. The proposed
8 Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka." www.pe:
 
 

21 Overview of Key Events Since 2000
terim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) respects Sri nka's sovereignty and unity, but implies autonomy for 2 North-East in almost all aspects of life. It has no ovisions on the military dimensions and suggests an TE dominated administration to govern the Northst for a period of five years, after which elections will
held.
he ISGA triggers a strong reaction in the South. esident Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga once ain moves to declare a state of emergency, takes over 2 ministries of Defence, Finance, and State Media, ectively paralysing Wickremesinghe's administration. n February 7, she dissolves parliament. A snap election scheduled for April 2004. The president's party, the
aligns with the JVP to form the United People's eedom Alliance (UPFA). On April 8, 2004, ickremesinghe's United National Front (UNF) vernment falls, winning only 82 out of 225 rliamentary seats. The UPFA does not gain an tright majority, but its 105 seats and the support of taller parties enable the president to form a fragile alition government. The government, and the JVP in
rticular, takes a more critical stance toward the peace ks. The ISGA proposal is rejected out of hand.
ior to the general election, the LTTE faces a split in e movement. Eastern leader, Vinayagamoorthi uralitharan, alias Colonel Karuna, announces an lependent course for the eastern cadres of the LTTE. abhakran retaliates with military force. Karuna solves around five thousand cadres and goes into ling. Already affected by Tamil-Muslim tensions, the st becomes increasingly volatile, affected by guerrilla rfare and political killings. Harassment, extortion, and iced recruitment of civilians appear to be pervasive.
ith the fracturing of politics in the North-East and the uth, and the consequent lack of "settlement stability," ere appears to be little prospect of resuming peace ks in the immediate future.
aCeinsrilanke.org.

Page 28
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 22
2.4 TSUNAMIAND P-TOMS (DECEMBER2004,
SEPTEMBER 2005)
On December 26, 2004, a tsunami hits Sri Lanka, causing massive human, physical, economic, and social damage. It kills over 30,000 people, displaces over half million people, and destroys the livelihoods of over 200,000 persons. The total damage due to loss of asset and output is estimated to exceed US$1.5 billion.
In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, the peace process and other political issues move to the background, as the humanitarian response takes priorit Despite initial hopes that the tsunami would re-energi, the peace process, it has the effect of deepening politic fault lines and resentment. Killings continue and the violence intensifies after the death of Kaushalyan, LTT political leader in the East, in February.
Almost half a year after the tsunami, on June 24, the government and the LTTE reach agreement over a join Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P- TOMS) that is intended to facilitate a fair distribution of tsunami aid. In response to P-TOMS, the JVP leave the government coalition. Muslim politicians are also very critical of it. Implementation is further delayed by Supreme Court ruling about its legality. A final decisio is postponed. On August 12, Lakshman Kadirgamart (Tamil) Sri Lankan Foreign Minister is assassinated by sniper in Colombo. In spite of denials by the LTTE, th GoSL states that it has evidence that the LTTE are responsible. In a context of growing tensions, the Norwegians unsuccessfully attempt to facilitate an agreement between the two sides to resume face-to-fac bilateral talks to review the terms of the ceasefire and how compliance can be improved.
Preparations for presidential elections, to be held in November, begin following a Supreme Court ruling on August 26 that President Kumaratunga's second six-ye term began when she was re-elected in December 1999 and should end by December 2005.

On September 26 the EU announces that its member states will no longer receive LTTE delegations because of the Foreign Minister's assassination.

Page 29
3. Conflict Structures
Summary: In this section the structural dimensions of conflic political, economic, and social factors. It is argued that the ci sustenance of violent conflict - including the nature of the policy, uneven development patterns, and competing nation: many respects the "peace" that followed the signing of the C to conflict resolution. On the other hand, there have been sig and international levels. These include the global "war on te contexts, and Sri Lanka's integration into a dynamic and incr helped create the preconditions for peace negotiations.
31 INTRODUCTION 3.2
In the following section we briefly revisit the structural 3.2 dimensions of violent conflict in Sri Lanka that were
outlined in some detail in SCA1. It is argued that in Th spite of the CFA and peace negotiations, the structural Wa dimensions of the conflict within Sri Lanka remain La relatively stable. There has been no "seismic shift" in the "tectonic plates" underpinning conflict in Sri Lanka. chá However, there has been a significant change in the 2 external context at both the regional and international exi levels. This helped create the preconditions for peace ра:
talks, but did not lead to a radical reordering of political
forces inside the country, which in our view is necessary Fir
for the achievement of sustainable peace. Se Sri In SCA1 the security, political, economic, and social tO dimensions of conflict were examined in depth. Our SOU analysis below explores the extent to which there have SCC been shifts in any one or combination of these areas ref since 2000. inc fig
org
me!
shc
U.
prς
 

23 Conflict Structures
tin Sri Lanka are examined. These are divided into security, onstellation of factors that contributed to the outbreak and
state, its political culture, the institutional framework of alisms - remains largely unaffected by the peace process. In A has had the effect of freezing the structural impediments nificant changes in the external context at both the regional irror," growing international engagement in "post conflict" easingly assertive wider Asian region. These factors together
STRUCTURALDIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA
.1 Security
Lough sometimes caricatured as an "introverted" civil r, the international and regional dimensions of the Sri nkan conflict have become more evident and arguably ore influential since SCA1. Three inter-related areas of ange in the external context can be identified. These ly best be understood as an intensification of presting trends rather than a complete break with the
St.
st, the launch of a "global war on terror" after ptember 11, 2001 has had important ramifications in Lanka as elsewhere. In global terms, it is a bad time be a non-state military actor. Instability in the global uth is seen to endanger the domestic or "homeland urity" concerns of core northern powers. This is lected in a range of inter-connected measures luding U.S. military support for front line states hting "terrorism," the proscription of "terrorist" ganizations, and efforts to "strangle" the trans-national tworks that fund non state military groups. Though it ould be noted that LTTE proscription by the U.S. and K. governments and several unilateral ceasefires :ceded 9/11, it is clear that the change in the

Page 30
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 24
international climate has "impressed upon the LTTE tl importance of being and appearing to be on the right side of this global ideological and military divide. Essentially, September 11 impacted on the LTTE's political psyche and its room for manoeuvre internationally in respect of funds, legitimacy, and acquisition of weapons." (Saravanamuttu, 2003:131).
Second, since the early 1990s there has been growing and increasingly robust international intervention in zones of instability in the global south. Arguably, this has marked a shift in the center of gravity in international relations from states toward individuals - manifest for example in the U.N. Agenda for Peace of 1992 and, more recently, the "Responsibility to Protect agenda (ICISS, 2001). The erosion of sovereignty is linked to a lowering of Western inhibitions to interven in other people's wars. In SCA1 it was argued that international actors accepted India's pre-eminence in t region and were reluctant to invest diplomatically and politically in Sri Lanka. Though India continues to be the most influential external actor, international intere and involvement has grown. The internationalization c peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, therefore, reflects a broade trend in international relations. Arguably, Sri Lanka represents one of the more recent experiments in libera peacebuilding." Such experiments have involved increasingly expansive and complex multi-mandate responses, leading to a reworking of the relationship between politics, security, and development (Duffield, 2001). Development and humanitarian assistance for example, particularly since 9/11, is seen as a strategic tool for the promotion of security.
Third, there has arguably been a trend toward regionalization as well as internationalization. India's hegemony in the region is a point of continuity. However, Sri Lanka is also located in a dynamic,
9 See also the report of the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Gl
1O "Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous social experiment in social political and economic Organization into War-shattered states in Orde liberalization" (Paris, 1997: 56).
11 On the government side defence spending did not come down signifi

e
he
confident, and increasingly assertive wider Asian region. The response of Asian governments to international offers of tsunami relief is illustrative of their growing confidence and determination to define their own development paths. Sri Lanka's liberalization policies have forced it to negotiate its relationship not only to globalization, but also to regionalization. The geopolitical concerns and economic interests of a number of Asian countries in addition to India need to be considered from Pakistan to Thailand and China to Japan. When this trend is combined with a more robust, interventionist international response, there is clearly the potential for tensions between Asian countries and between Western and regional powers over the kind of peace that is seen to be desirable.
The shifts in the external environment outlined above have helped create the preconditions for peace talks by affecting the calculus of domestic actors and their relative capacities. However, they have not led to a dramatic shift in the structural sources of insecurity within Sri Lanka. The CFA effectively froze the pre-existing security environment. The key sources of insecurity mapped out in SCA1 remain: both sides have used the CFA agreement to re-arm and strengthen their military capabilities' - as they have done during pervious ceasefires (Philipson, 1999; Bose, 2002); the means of violence continues to be decentralized and in certain areas, fragmented; the continued presence of HSZs in the North-East; the continued endemic insecurity in the country as a whole, but particularly in the East.
Though the CFA did have important effects on the security environment, including the removal of road blocks and the opening of borders between the North and the South, these do not signify structural or transformative changes. This is likely to remain the case in the absence of a peace settlement.
lobal Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) and literature in response to it. .
engineering - an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, 2r to control civil conflict in other words, pacification through political and economic
cantly as a result of the cessation of hostilities (Kelegama, 2004:7).

Page 31
3.22 Political Se
or
SCA1 conceptualized conflict in Sri Lanka as a crisis of Si the state rather than an "ethnic conflict." This is not to pr
deny the ethnically patterned nature of conflict in Sri ра Lanka and the processes through which governance, wi development, and social relations have become po increasingly ethnicized. But a focus on the nature of the in state and the quality of governance in Sri Lanka ZO generates insights about the inter-relations between ро
different forms of militarized violence in the North-East go and the South. Societal discontents are seldom sufficient ha
to trigger widespread conflict until they penetrate the Sir state itself (Cliffe and Luckham, 1999:35). Violent 2. conflict is therefore rooted in the "pathologies" of the ide state, and notably in its failure to institutionalize of democratic politics. As argued later, the crisis in €Ո: governance also impedes the search for a solution. The peace process has exposed a continuing crisis in the fo1
identity, legitimacy, and policies of the state, which was ро highlighted in SCA1. For the purpose of this report, five fol
points appear to be salient: res
First, the state remains exceedingly centralized and Th clientalistic. This, as discussed later, has impeded th reconstruction efforts in the North-East and the ali response to the tsunami, both of which have had a bel negative impact on the peace process. Because of its cri
excessive centralization, the state continues to be seen as dy the primary source of largess and protection.' State inc patronage is tied up with an ideology of supporting and tal protecting the paddy producing small holder farmer. As dis
argued later, the UNP government lost the 2004 CO elections primarily because it neglected this core dis constituency in the South. Sri Lankan politics is highly et personalized and political power is derived from wi patronage rather than performance (Dunham and Sh Jayasuriya, 1998). This is mirrored also in the grς centralized and clientalistic nature of civil society and grc the deeply entrenched partisan nature of the media. ex
res
12 For instance, recent studies of youth in Sri Lanka reveal a continuing preoccupa is still seen as the primary source of redress for their grievances (Hettige, 2004)
 

25 Conflict Structures
cond, democracy and intolerant nationalism have been ganically linked (Snyder, 2000, Spencer, 2004). hhalese political elites have historically indulged in a ocess of "ethnic outbidding" in which mainstream rties sought to corral the Sinhalese vote by competing th each other on an anti-minority stance. Two litical zones emerged: a zone of permanent opposition the North where Tamil parties predominated and a ne of competition in the South where mostly Sinhala liticians fought for votes that would get them close to vernment (Spencer, 2004:2). Democratic energies ve translated into national chauvinist sentiments. Inhala nationalism has been hegemonic since the 1950s d this had led to reactive cycles of Tamil nationalist 2ntification (Rampton and Welikala, 2005). In spite a proportional representation (PR) system that abled minorities to get a voice for the first time in ainstream politics, the bargaining process for the rmation of a coalition is usually not on the basis of licies, but much more for securing patronage that lows access to state power (Bastian, 2005:4). The ult has been unstable coalition governments.
hird, violent challenges to the state have emerged from e periphery, driven by a sense of exclusion and enation. Extreme Tamil and Sinhala nationalisms have come the vehicles through which the periphery tiques and challenges the centre. This core-periphery namic, though it is about the distribution of power, come, land, education, language, and the like has cen an ethnic form. Ethnic divisions have tended to able class politics: "In a fundamental sense, mmunalism is about economic opportunities and tribution, but it shifts class issues to a terrain of no-nationalism and heritage, thereby displacing class th ethnicity at the ideological level," (Zackariya and anmugaratnam, 1997:11). War has hardened interoup boundaries, but this does not mean that intrapup or intra-periphery divisions have disappeared. As plored further below, these divisions are likely to urface in the transition from war to peace.
tion with state power. For youth in both the North and the South, the state .

Page 32
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 26
Fourth, though the state is centralized, it is also fragmented and it has become more so during the cou of the conflict. A form of partial or layered sovereignti (Spencer, 2004) has emerged and the tensions around these competing systems of governance have been exposed during the course of the peace process. For instance, the assumption that political leaders could "deliver" and speak on the behalf of clearly defined constituencies in both the North-East and the South F proven to be wrong. The complex negotiations and hybrid mechanisms connected to international reconstruction programs and tsunami relief are similar the result of having to deal with contested systems of governance operating in the different parts of the country. m "-
Fifth, there are pressures on the state from above as we as from below. Globalization and the growing involvement of international actors in Sri Lanka (of which the peace process is symptomatic) have contributed to shifts in the distribution of sovereignty, Transnational engagement, therefore, interacts with an plays a role in shaping the nature of domestic
governance.
3.23 Economic
SCA1 highlighted the complex relationships between state bias, liberalization, uneven development patterns the politics of exclusion, and ethnic scapegoating (see also Herring 2001). Sri Lanka has a vulnerable agro export and garment export oriented economy that is susceptible to world price fluctuations. Economic liberalization provided some of the motivation and means for civil war. It provided enormous scope for re seeking and cronyism and heightened inequalities (Herring, 2001). In this sense, international financial
13 "lin Naeagama in 2000 residents expressed loss of faith in state n: corruption. Despite the relief and enthusiasm generated by the cease reflect, persist into the present." (Gamburd, 2004:165).
14 Unemployment rates according to area areas follows-North, 13 per fourteen is as follows-Tamil areas, 35.6 percent male, 32 percentf

Se
2S
lt
institutions (IFIs) supported liberalization and privatization programs provided opportunities for "greed," while creating material conditions that generated widespread "grievances."
Since 2000, these tensions have continued to grow due to a combination of the effects of globalization, specific government policies, and the continued impacts of war. Although growth figures of 4 percent and 5.9 percent were achieved in 2002 and 2003 respectively, this was highly concentrated. By 2004, fifty per cent of Sri Lanka's GDP was produced in the Western Province. Government policies such as the UNF government's reform program (see below) have played a role in accentuating the uneven effects of globalization. Research in the South suggests a deep and widespread dissatisfaction with government economic policies that have persisted since the ceasefire.'
Although reconstruction aid for the North-East has grown since the CFA, much of it has been trapped in the politics of the peace process. Therefore, there has been limited large-scale investment in the war-affected areas of the North-East, and levels of chronic poverty are higher here than in other parts of the country. There are higher unemployment rates in the North-East than the rest of the country and also a higher youth bulge in Tamil areas." The structural disparity between development processes in the North-East and the South remains a significant feature of the Sri Lankan political and economic landscape.
The political economy of the conflict did not suddenly change with the CFA. Although economic agendas were never pre-eminent, compared to many other civil wars, significant vested interests were generated by the conflict, which were outlined in SCA1. To a large extent the new "peace time" arrangements have enabled the
arratives, frustration over employment opportunities, and cynicism about government 2-fire, these attitudes, as well as the social, political, and economic situations that they
cent; East, 15.9 percent, rest of the COuntry, 8 percent. The ratio of the population under emale, southernareas, 22 perCent male, 302 perCentfemale.

Page 33
continued pursuit of these interests including Ο
government weapons contracts, LTTE taxation, and W diaspora funding. Clearly, until there is a political 2 settlement, the transition from war economy to peace ab economy is likely to be attenuated. The longer the "no 2 war-no peace" situation continues, the more deeply Ta embedded the vested interests are likely to become. de of sh
3.24 Social
War is the result of and creates a particular kind of 3. political economy. It is also sustained by an emotional economy. Like the war economy, this emotional T economy is likely to persist well after the signing of a pe ceasefire agreement, and if persistently mobilized by te political entrepreneurs, may endanger the transition to U peace. Evidently, the discourse of victimhood, ethnic CO scapegoating, and competing nationalisms cannot be de turned on and off like a tap. The "binary moral Sta frameworks" (Fuglerud, 1999:180) of extreme sig nationalism have permeated the body politic and the ins wider society: "War is not a detour; it has become the Τ path taken, a fully embedded part of the social ex formation" (Winslow and Woost, 2004:12). မျို
t Ethnicity and religion provide the ideological and fac symbolic repertoires that make violence possible. Yet, of paradoxically, both the LTTE and JVP recruit youth Se( from similar social backgrounds - low caste, rural, C Swabasha educated - with similar sets of grievances. St
ful As argued in SCA1, Sri Lanka suffers from a "politics of ef anxiety" and possibly these anxieties have been CO
sharpened by the peace process. Discourses are deployed by political entrepreneurs, particularly during peace negotiations, to divert attention from internal contradictions within their own constituency and legitimize certain power claims. (Korf, 2004:162). The
15 "...having been born and socialized in ethno-linguistically segregated Communit as well as Sinhalese youth do not readily recognize the Commonality of their pred One in the North (LTTE) and the other in the South (JVP). Their respective politic
 

27 Conflict Structures
le of Buddhism as a mobilizing framework has been ell documented (see Tambiah, 1992), but Islamic dicalization has been less covered. Muslim anxieties out the peace process appear to be driving a growing dicalization, which strikingly resembles the growth of lmil nationalism in the 1970s. This is covered in more tail later; however, the development of this new facet the "emotional economy" may represent a structural ift in the conflict.
3 CONCLUSIONS ON CONFLICT STRUCTURES
hough this report focuses on the last five years, this riod cannot be understood without reference to longcm historical processes. An examination of the lderlying roots of conflict perhaps leads to the inclusion that there is a high degree of path pendency, particularly with regard to the nature of the ite and relations of governance. There has not been a gnificant change in the political culture and the stitutional framework of policy (Dunham, 2004:346). he southern polity continues to be structured to a large tent around political patronage. Therefore, our alysis of the structural sources of conflict suggests that ere has been limited movement in the constellation of ctors that contributed to the outbreak and sustenance violent conflict. As will be argued in the following ctions, the "peace" that followed the signing of the FA has not had a transformational impact on the uctural dimensions of conflict. In fact, we will go rther to argue that it may perversely have had the ect of "freezing" the structural impediments to nflict resolution.
ies and educated in similarly segregated schools, the disadvantaged Tamil licament. Hence they identify with two divergent socio-political movements, al projects tend to be antithetical to each other" (Hettige, 2004:128).

Page 34


Page 35
4. Conflict Dynamics
Summary: This section is concerned with the contemporary into four key areas. First, it provides an overview and ar assumptions and strategies of the two principal actors. Seco and the dynamics of securitylinsecurity. Third, it exploreshov and within the Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim polities. Fourth dynamics are analyzed. It is argued that the peace process w adequately appreciate or address the inter- and intra-group dy actors, inflaming competing nationalisms and creating n. heightened rather than mitigated these tensions. The current rather than "post conflict." There is currently a negative equ war, nor can they make the necessary sacrifices to move towa
4.1 INTRODUCTION ebb
tW( In the following section our focus moves from the inti origins or structural dimensions of conflict to its hav contemporary dynamics. Three points should be CO
emphasized before we do this. First, what produces war prc may be different from what reproduces it. Therefore, the but process and practice of violent conflict are important, as lea well as its underlying causes. Conflict is sustained by an (Lu emergent sociology and economy of war. This can be res shaped by specific policies or contingent events - for eng example, the Sinhala Only Act or the tsunami - that can rea create conditions under which certain kinds of group
formation take place and particular grievances occur. Th Conflict itself transforms these conditions and in Sri pee Lanka, constitutional and political reforms that might Th have been sufficient to protect rights and satisfy the dyı political aspirations of Tamils two or three decades ago prC may no longer be adequate (Cliffe and Luckham, 2000). issu
- -- -- sta Second, as this current period of no-war, no-peace O] demonstrates, there is no clear and categorical CO distinction between war and "non-war." For instance, the
the outbreak of war in Sri Lanka was preceded by high thi levels of political and societal violence. The conflict tall
 
 

29 Conflict Dynamics
dynamics of conflict and peace in Sri Lanka. It is divided
alysis of the peace process, focusing on the underlying hd, it examines the interactions between the peace process w"no war-no peace" has shaped political dynamics between , the effects of the tsunami on conflict ånd peacebuilding as shaped by a bipolar model of the conflict that failed to namics. "Peace" has had a disorienting effect on the various ew anxieties among excluded groups. The tsunami has situation may best be characterized as a "pause in conflict" ilibrium or stalemate, since neither side wishes a return to rd a transformative (rather than limited) peace.
ped and flowed at different levels of intensity for over ) decades, with periods of high intensity conflict erspersed with periods of relative calm. Wars never e clear beginnings and endings. In other "post war" ntexts, the structures and systems through which war duces and reproduces itself do not just wither away, t usually persist into "peace time" conditions. Conflict ves baleful legacies that make peace difficult to build 1ckham, 2004:488). Sri Lanka is no different in this pect - though perhaps the initial optimism gendered by the CFA blinded many to these harsh
lities.
ird, the current negotiations constitute the fifth set of ce talks since the outbreak of Eelam War I in 1983. ese negotiations both reflect and affect the evolving namics of conflict. Each failure to reach a settlement pelled the conflict to incorporate more and more les until the future of the state became the issue at ke (Philipson, 1999:11). The history of broken and n-implemented agreements has undermined the nfidence and trust of both sides, which itself impedes : search for a solution. Philipson (1999) argues that s can partly be attributed to the focus of previous ks on product rather than process:

Page 36
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 30
"This focus on finding the right form of words f the final agreement not only ignores the processes that help to create the climate and support for negotiations, it also excludes parties, sometimes k parties, from any ownership or responsibility for t resulting document" (Philipson, 1999:15).
Warmaking and peacemaking are conceptualized in th report as processes that evolve, mutate, and are reflectio of and influence underlying structures. We must also distinguish between peace talks and the peace process. Although talks broke down in April 2003 and have be suspended since then, the peace process continues. Th ceasefire arrangement has held; both sides continue to communicate with one another directly or indirectly o a range of peace related issues, and Norway is still actively involved as a facilitator. A change in these conditions would signal an end to the peace process.
Finally, it is important to briefly clarify our use of terminology in this report. Peacemaking is defined as political, diplomatic, and sometimes military interventions directed at bringing warring parties to agreement. Peacebuilding is defined as the promotion c institutional and socioeconomic measures at the local, national, or international levels to address underlying causes of conflict. For the purpose of this study, Track One diplomacy is defined as official negotiations between political and military elites, in other words "t down" efforts at peacemaking. Track Two is defined as non-official mediation, which may be between civil society actors, as well as "behind the scenes" communication between political elites. Track Three is defined as humanitarian and development assistance, which may or may not have explicit peacebuilding objectives but has an effect upon the context in which peace negotiations take place. In practice these tracks a closely inter-linked and merge into one another."
For instance "track one and a half" is sometimes mentioned in the S official diplomacy and broader non official confidence building.
17 Norway was first formally invited as a facilitator in 2000 during the k previous peace negotiations, talks were preceded by informal Comm victory, there was extensive "back channel" Communication between

Dr.
is
S
e
f
Op
re
Development interventions may span Tracks Two and Three and also seek to influence Track One. In Sri Lanka, as elsewhere, reflecting perhaps the growing convergence between development and security, aid has been seen as a mechanism that can directly influence the Track One process through the application of peace conditionalities.
We will draw upon the commonly used distinction between conflict management and conflict transformation, arguing that the former tends to focus only on conflict dynamics - sometimes referred to as "conflict dampening" - while the later is concerned with changing the structural causes of violent conflict. This is what we mean in the report when we refer to a transformative approach to peacemaking and peacebuilding.
42 THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE
4.2.1 An Overview of the Peace Process; From "War for Peace' to "Development for Peace"?
The nature of the "end game," or the circumstances through which the fighting is ended or reduced has an important impact upon the subsequent pattern of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Both the GoSL and LTTE came to the conclusion that their political goals could not be achieved at that point in time through military means. In the terminology of Zartman (2000), a "hurting stalemate" had been reached and, arguably, the conflict was "ripe" for a negotiated settlement."
On the GoSL side, the UNP had campaigned on a peace negotiation ticket and indeed since 1994, inauguration of a peace process has become "one of the first celebrative tasks of new regimes" (Uyangoda, 2003b; 15). There were pressing economic reasons for
ri Lankan context and relates to peacemaking efforts that OCCupy the terrain between
cumaratunga-led PA administration, while the "war for peace" was still raging. As with hunications. Judging by the speed of events following the UNF government's election
LTTE and Wickremesinghe before they came to power.

Page 37
bringing the war to an end. Sri Lanka's economy Th suffered severe setbacks in 2000-2001 including ac continuing drought, rapid decline in foreign investment fac due to war, collapse of the tourist industry," and Set continuing macro-economic mismanagement (Bastian, inc 2005). The government realized that the continuation of org the "war for peace" would have pushed the economy to rul
a state of collapse. 216C thir The reasons why the LTTE entered negotiations are W harder to determine given the opaque nature of the the organization. One theory (from the LTTE's critics) is We they entered negotiations as a strategic ploy to re-arm Ms. and reorganize themselves. Another is that after 9/11, bas the global environment for non-state military actors vio changed and ultimately forced the LTTE to pursue a the political trajectory - though this does not explain the pol LTTE's unilateral ceasefire declared in November 2000 im following a series of military victories. While the war coι against terrorism may not have affected the LTTE's the behavior in a deterministic way, it is likely that it of influenced their strategic calculations. They may also have been influenced by the changing regional context - Th the support provided by Pakistan and India to the ар! government when the LTTE threatened to recapture fol Jaffna indicates that neither regional nor international (a)
actors were sympathetic to their separatist political project. Uyangoda (2003b) argues that internal factors were also important. "The continuing deprivations and
(b)
material suffering of their own civilian population should have been a compelling reason for the LTTE to (c) re-think their military strategy, despite the spectacular
military gains made in 1999-2001" (Uyangoda, 2003b:19). סn 1nt
Se(
18 The LTTE attack on Katunayake international Airport on July 24, 2001 had impo Lloyds of London imposed war zone insurance rates on both the airport and plummeted (Winslow and Woost, 2004: 1).
19 A fundamental disagreement between the PA government and LTTE during the 1 LTTE and the single stage approach advocated by the government. The two stage that Would Contribute to "normalization," followed by substantive negotiations O issues should be dealt with from the beginning as part of a single package (see
 

31 Conflict Dynamics
is fundamental contradiction between military success
its human-political cost may have been another tor pressing the LTTE to seek a negotiated tlement. The first theory is not necessarily ompatible with the others - seeking to re-arm and reanize during a strategic lull in the conflict does not e out the possibility that the LTTE were (and perhaps ) serious about peace negotiations. Maintaining the eat of war is a commonly used negotiation tactic. hen they came to the negotiation table, the LTTE saw 'mselves as having military parity with the GoSL and re insistent that this translated into political parity. intaining this relationship of equity was for them a sic precondition for negotiations - the shift from lence to politics cannot be justified to themselves and ir constituency if it undermines their military and litical standing. Finally, one should not discount the portance of Prabakharan's psychology as a ntributory factor. Possibly, the LTTE leader came to : negotiation table because he wants to enjoy the fruits victory during his lifetime.
e UNF government unlike the SLFP' had a phased
proach to peace negotiations, which involved the
lowing steps:
A ceasefire agreement and initiation of talks with the Norwegians invited as "facilitators"
"Normalization" leading to the creation of a peace dividend
Negotiation on core political issues
w the UNP strategy was implemented in practice is efly outlined below. A more detailed analysis of ernational engagement in the peace process follows in ction Five.
rtant political and economic repercussions. In the aftermath of the attack, the ports. Immediately after the attack, tourism and foreign investment
994-1995 negotiations was over the two stage approach advocated by the approach involved first addressing the humanitarian consequences of War n core issues. The PA government, on the other hand, argued that the Core Uyangoda, 2003b).

Page 38
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 32
4.22 implementation of the Peace Process
Stopping the Violence'. Ceasefire Arrangements
The CFA was signed in February 2002. It formaliz and made bilateral the informal and unilateral ceas maintained by the government and LTTE since December 2001 (Uyangoda, 2003b:21). To some e this replicated earlier patterns of military de-escalat that had preceded previous rounds of peace talks. B two respects, the UNIF strategy represented a radica departure from earlier governments. First, the CFA accepted that a rebel group was in control of part o country, which was legitimized by the government signing an agreement with it. This was somethingt had never happened before. Some critics argued the CFA violated constitutional provisions, as the Prim Minister had no constitutional authority to sign an agreement pertaining to war. Furthermore, it repres a violation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA (Uyangoda, 2003b: 22). Second, the invitation oft Norwegians as "facilitators," and the establishment the SLMM as ceasefire monitors represented a significant shift in the position of the Sri Lankan ru class, moving away from the established historical ti of the Indo-centric nature of external involvement ( these issues (Bastian, 2005: 8). On the other hand, Wickremesinghe was extremely careful to court bot India and the U.S. to provide informal security guarantees, in order to bolster the government's position.
The Economics of Peace'': Normalization and the Peu Dividend
Article 2 of the CFA was concerned with measures 1 restore normalcy. As Uyangoda (2003b) notes, ther convincing arguments for such a step-by-step appro A single stage approach that focuses only on rootca ignores the dynamics of conflict reproduction,
20 For instance, legislation was introduced in 2002 allowing foreign the positive effect of attracting foreign investment, it also heigh for the poor.
 

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ion
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highlighted above. Arguably, to get to the underlying : causes, one first has to address the consequences and the factors that sustain violent conflict. The economic lever was used heavily by the UNF government (Kelegama, 2004). They hoped that economic development would help "blunt the secessionist impulse" (Saravanamuttu, 2003: 138) by providing an immediate peace dividend that would lead to a coalition against the war and weaken support for the LTTE (Kelegama, 2004). The idea was to lock the LTTE into the cessation of hostilities, through a combination of international third party diplomatic support and finance (the so-called international security net).
For the UNF government, support for the peace process was also closely entwined with its economic reform agenda. The Prime Minister realized that to get "economic take-off," he had to solve the secessionist conflict, or at least create a negative peace to clear away the impediments to economic growth. The strategy was as much about "peace for development" as "development for peace." Some even go as far as to argue that the peace process was the means and not the end (Bastian 2005). The government's reform program was spelled out clearly in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) "Regaining Sri Lanka." The aim was to accelerate liberalization in order to achieve a 10 percent growth rate. The reform program consisted of reducing i government bureaucracy, privatization, and changing { labor laws (ibid). At an aggregate level, this strategy appeared to be working with growth rates going from negative growth in 2001 to 4 percent and 4.9 percent in 2002 and 2003 respectively. Tourism picked up; at the end of 2002 the Colombo Stock Exchange closed the calendar year some 31 percent higher than the start of the year, and Foreign Direct Investment rose from $82 million in 2001 to $300 million in 2003. In spite of positive changes at the macro level, the benefits were unevenly spread, with the Western province growing at a far faster rate than other parts of the country."
Iers to own land, which induced a minireal estate boom in the southwest. While this had tened uneven development patterns and the perception that the government did not care

Page 39
The reforms program played a significant role in do undermining any potential "feel good" factor related to of
the peace process. The inability of the government to di deliver to its core constituency in the South, who had ch voted for it in the expectation of an economic dividend, thi was to cost them the elections. The UNP werent N concerned with the poor and that's why they lost (aid di donor). "Disaffection on the economic front combined po with anxiety over the peace process proved to be a (b. combustible situation" (Saravanamuttu, 2003: 138). th Grievances were partly about a "lack" of development, ар but also about a certain type of development that was th perceived in rural areas of the South to benefit only 20 Colombo-7 elite. Economic hardships, the perception of government corruption, and concerns about their W handling of the peace process - particularly their appeasement of the LTTE' and the "over- ad
internationalization" of negotiations - led to a search for th: alternatives and contributed to the resurgence of the JVP g (see below). These problems were compounded by the absence of a government peace advocacy strategy - for
instance they had nothing like the PA government's T Sudu Nelum (white lotus) peace campaign of 1994/1995, to reach out to the southern electorate. In In the main, this task was left to the piecemeal initiatives of th: civil society groups. pr:
e
In the North-East there was a similar story of a limited asi and unevenly distributed peace dividend. Undoubtedly, rel the CFA had a number of positive impacts on the lives eC and livelihoods of those living in the North-East - the WC new mobility that came with the opening of the A9, the co ending of the economic blockade, the step change in O
21 For instance, the government allowing the LTTE to import radio equipment duty themselves contributed to a growing feeling in the South that the UNF were in perception of increased international involvement in the peace process. The ex that "there are certain thresholds beyond which no Sinhalese leader can be full
22. Whether this peace dividend was as limited, as some Commentators have clain Lakshman (2005). They found that the GDP of the Northern Province grew by an during the pre-CFA period; in eastern Province it increased by 10.1 percent (COm percent (compared to -0.2 percent in the pre-CFA period). They go on to argue from 3.9 percent per annum in the pre-CFA period to 5 percent per annum int realized collectively by these three provinces.
 

33 Conflict Dynamics
nor supported reconstruction programs, and the surge diaspora funding all contributed to a limited peace vidend.” However, though there were objective anges in material conditions, these did not meet up to e expectations generated by the CFA in either the orth-East or the South. In the North-East, the peace vidend was limited by a combination of the LTTE (tax licies, nature of the administration), the government ureaucratic delays and state bias), and aid donors emselves (institutional short-comings, a toolkit proach, and funding getting trapped in the politics of e peace negotiations) (Kelegama, 2004; Bastian,
05).
ith hindsight, there could never be complete ormalization" until the core political issues were dressed. The circumscribed version of "normality" at emerged as a result of the CFA contributed to a owing sense of frustration in the North-East.
he Politics of Peace: Negotiations on Core Issues
the initial rounds of peace talks it became evident at both the LTTE and the UNF shared a limited and agmatic conception of peace. It entailed political gagement to achieve what was possible and leaving de contentious and intractable issues, such as state form and power-sharing (Uyangoda, 2003b;25). The onomistic assumption that rapid economic growth ould be a more effective antidote to the "ethnic nflict" than debating constitutional issues was based
the idea that economics could override political
f free created a strong reaction in the Sinhalese press. The ISGA proposals danger of "selling out" the Country - something that was heightened by the perience of Wickremesinghe reinforces the point made by Dixit, (2004: xiii) ly responsive to Tamil aspirations, if he or she desires to stay in power."
ned, has recently been challenged by research conducted by Abeyratne and average of 12.6 percent during the post-CFA period compared to 34 percent pared to 4.6 percent in the pre-CFA period); in North-Central Province by 8.2 that the increase in the average GDP growth rate of Sri Lanka as a whole he post-CFA period was largely due to the exceptionally high growth rates

Page 40
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 34
imperatives. But it proved impossible to address th challenges of reconstruction and development with touching on questions of governance. Who decidec the development priorities, the budget for reconstruction, and the implementation of projects These questions go directly to the core issues of coi legitimacy, and representation. The language of "normalization" and "interim arrangements" could disguise the different perspectives of the two parties the nature of the transition and ultimately, the natu the end goal. Arguably, it was not possible to circumnavigate the pivotal core of the conflict ord with it indirectly (CPA, 2005). Ultimately, the six rounds of peace talks were reduced to the single iss the ISGA and the question of LTTE hegemony in North-East (Kelegama, 2005:27). More fundament this takes us back to the core Tamil demands enunc in the Thimpu principles.” Although in the Oslo declaration both parties stated a willingness to expl federal solution, subsequent discussions on the ISG exposed divergent bottom lines about governance arrangements.
The core dilemma in relation to the step-by-step approach was whether a limited peace agenda could ultimately to transformative peace. To what extent such pragmatic, bilateral negotiations lead to the transformation of the northern and southern politie Human rights groups expressed concern that the C. and negotiation process merely legitimized the LTT "totalitarian rule" in the North-East, while the UN abandoned its responsibilities to the people in these
23 These are (1) recognition of Tamils as a nation, (2) recognition citizenship and fundamental rights of all Tamils (Lewer and Willi
2 it was argued by Some informants that Indian Concerns about the to an illiberal LTTE regime in the North-East, prompted them to (
25 in an assessment of six rounds of peace talks, Balasingham (20 on to note that, "Based on a military power balance or strategic The possible resumption of the negotiating process rests square
2 indicators of this included increased recruitment, belligerent sta 2004, Prabakharan spoke of resuming the freedom struggle ifth as simply a way of keeping Tamil society on a war footing or a felt that the LTTE were preparing for a "limited war" involving st
 

e
(Uyangoda, 2003b;22). A limited peace agenda may OUlt ultimately lead to an illiberal peace.” It required both
on time and stability to take on a transformational agenda
through a step-by-step approach. In practice, these were absent, due to the President's role and the destructive
ntrol, impact of the media, which tended to be hostile to any
perceived concessions: "Any moves toward peace were hOt seen as a concession to fear" (UNF government official). s on Arguably, the strategy might have worked if the UNF ure of government had been stronger and had more time.
eal
43 SECURITY DYNAMICS
ue of the In this section the dynamics of security and insecurity ally, are briefly examined, before moving on to a more had extensive treatment of the political dynamics of conflict
and peace. Given its sensitive nature, reliable Ore a information is scarce in this area, but some of the salient A developments can be outlined.
First, the consensus among those interviewed is that
neither side is ready to go back to war. In the history of
war and peace in Sri Lanka, it is unprecedented for the l lead ceasefire to outlive the peace talks. There have been plenty of opportunities for escalation, but both sides have shown restraint. Evidently, when there is the political will to do so, both the Sri Lankan armed forces FA (SLAF) and the LTTE are able to exert discipline over TE's their troops and cadres. At the end of 2004 there were
could
F concerns that the LTTE was preparing for a military
operation,” but the tsunami probably decreased the
of a Tamil homeland, (3) right to self determination, and (4) recognition of the right to iam (2002: 488).
e Over-internationalization of the peace process and the potential for a step by step to lead :ourt the JVP in order to destabilize the UNF government.
04) states that their Only substantial achievement was the Ceasefire Agreement. He goes : equilibrium, the Ceasefire Agreement is of paramount importance to peace in Sri Lanka. ly on the foundation of the Ceasefire Agreement" (Balasingham, 2004:465).
itements by the LTTE, and a poster campaign. In his Mahaveerar speech of November 27, e government continued with delaying tactics on the peace process. Some interpreted this negotiating tactic to keep the GoSL and the international community on their toes. Others rategic strikes in the North and/or East.

Page 41
likelihood of an escalation in the conflict, since it P affected the military capabilities of both sides as well as O
the public acceptability of a resumption of violence.” CO
C Second, the CFA and peace process have frozen the CC security dynamic rather than transformed it. The pα
balance of power has broadly remained the same, though th each side continues to test the other while attempting to
build up its military capacities - either to strengthen O their position at the negotiating table or prepare for the ad possible outbreak of hostilities. The peace talks were CX unconditional and not based upon decommissioning of 20
weapons by either party. As a part of the talks, the Sub- in
Committee on Military De-Escalation (SMD) was 2C created,' but in parallel to that, both sides have in reinforced their military capabilities - to some extent CU] there is a Cold War dynamic of "retaliatory In rearmament," reflecting the lack of trust between the th two sides.” T
ge
A key plank in Wickremesinghe's strategy was to gain W informal security guarantees from the U.S.' and India - ki including a possible Indo-Sri Lanka Defence Pact - so as be to reduce its exposure in the event of a breakdown in the w
ceasefire. Post 9/11, the security interests of the U.S., gr India, and the GoSL have converged around an "anti th terrorism" agenda. India has particular concerns about vi the LTTE's sea tigers and the recent "discovery" of their L. air power. The government has sought international di support in a range of areas to strengthen the military ai capabilities of its 175,000 strong armed forces. This has a included intelligence sharing (India and the U.S.), La training (India, Pakistan, U.S., and U.K.), concessional th arm sales (U.S.), and procurement (Israel, China, pC
27 For example, it has been reported that the LTTE military base at Mullativu was
exaggerated. The army were reported to have lost 62 soldiers, 15 sailors, with
28 Along with a Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilita
29 ftis reported in Balasingham (2004:429) that on the last afternoon of the sixth
Overview of the peace process, argued that while substantial progress had been and security fronts.
30 Two visits were made to the U.S. in September and October/November, 2002 in - an ACQuisition and Cross Servicing Agreement was under consideration-andt industry (Kelegama, 2005:25).
 

35 | Conflict Dynamics
kistan, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Czech Republic). ne of the main facets of the war economy has been brruption in military procurement, and the CFA has ot affected the underlying incentives that fuel this onomy. It is run by large conglomerates that buy olitical room for maneuver through their donations to e election funds of either party.
in the LTTE side, the CFA does not appear to have lversely affected their arms procurement system. For ample, Karuna revealed in an interview in March )04, that 12 shiploads of military equipment had come
during the period 2002 - 2003 (cited in Kelegama, )05:28). Maintaining a military balance is an nportant part of the LTTE's self-perception. They are irrently thought to have between 18-22,000 cadres. nmediately following the CFA, the LTTE expanded eir sphere of influence into cleared areas of the East. he permeability of borders enabled a broadening of the 'ographical scope of fund raising (Bush, 2002). There as growing extortion, human rights abuses, dnapping, and recruitment in the East, possibly :cause the Eastern command was trying to build up its archest (ibid). The disarming of other Tamil militant oups - one of the conditions of the ceasefire - aided e LTTE's efforts to concentrate both the means of olence and the means of extortion and predation. TE rearmament and recruitment campaigns, the scovery of their airstrip in Iranamudu with light rcraft capabilities, and the perception of government peasement raised concerns - particularly among the Sri unkan military, the southern electorate, and India - that e ceasefire arrangements risked altering the balance of wer in the LTTE's favor. In short, there was a fear
S badly affected, though initial claims of 2,400 cadres dying were probably 87 missing.
tion (SIHRN) and a Sub-Committee on Political issues (SP).
round of peace talks, Vidar Helgesen from the Norwegian delegation, in an
made On the political level, this had not been matched on the humanitarian
Order to gain U.S. backing for the peace process, to strengthen defence ties O obtain a bilateral free trade agreement to support the ready-made garment

Page 42
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 36
that the UNP confused engaging the LTTE with empowering them (Keenan, 2005).
Although the CFA de-escalated conflict dynamics, til is still a strong continuity between the wartime and peacetime behavior of the belligerents. To borrow V. Clausewitz's famous dictum that "war is the continuation of politics by other means," in the case Sri Lanka one might argue that "peace" has seen the continuation of war by other means. The security ar political dynamics are intimately connected. Each rc of peace talks, for example, has been accompanied b security incidents.' The LTTE in particular have repeatedly probed and tested the SLAF, either throu direct attacks” or by mobilizing its proxies to organi hartels and demonstrations. On the one hand, the L have used the issue of the HSZs to put pressure on 1 SLAF while the government has done the same with regard to LTTE camps in the East. Security incident tend to occur when the political stakes are greatest, they may be provoked to raise the political pressure key actors. As explored below, the East has become principal arena for what might be described as a "shadow war" that involves high levels of violence i. context of a shaky ceasefire. As one interviewee described it, the East is a huge pouder keg.
Third, the longer the CFA has gone on, the more in group tensions have risen to the surface to inflect an complicate bipolar conflict dynamics. The uneasy
cohabitation between the President and Prime Mini manifests itself in tensions between the armed forces the administration.” The three heads of the Sri Lanl armed forces were appointed by the President and th loyalty was arguably toward her. There was also a fet among the SLAF that Wickremesinghe had neglecte
31 For example, there was a major incident at Sea On March 10, just
11 cadres died.
32 For example, in April 2004, the LTTE abducted soldiers while they
33 As Balasingham (2004: 424) notes, in relation to the incidentat se
and functioning under the authority of the President...The real po little authority over the armed forces."
 

here
O
TTE the
O
ΟΙ
n the
tal
Ster
and
heir eling
the military and lost its support. Some interviewees also
felt that agrowingJVP influence within the armed
forces contributed to a sense of disillusionment with the UNF government. The SLAF, therefore, felt that it had lost out as a result of the CFA and the appeasement strategy had gone too far. In some quarters there may have been a sense of relief when the President stepped in to take over the three ministries. :
The most significant shift in conflict dynamics since the CFA has been the emergence in April 2004 of the Eastern breakaway faction of the LTTE, the so-called Karuna group. The Northern command chose to deal with the issue in a decisive military fashion. After fighting south of the Verugal River (North of Batticaloa), Karuna demobilized around 5,000 cadres, leaving him with a core of a few hundred. However, in July 2004 the Karuna faction fought back with repeated bombings and assassinations in the Batticaloa area. They have maintained a physical presence in the East through active cadres and camps located in the border area between the Batticaloa and the Polonnaruwa District. The LTTE no longer have a free run of the East. The Karuna faction's targeting of LTTE leaders, members, and supporters means that it is no longer possible for the LTTE to impose its normal political authority on the population, including taxation, recruitment, and political education. The killing of Kaushalyan, LTTE political head for Batticaloa and Ampara on February 7, 2005 set off a spate of killings, not just in numbers but also in terms of the widening range of victims (CPA, 2005:9). The Karuna issue has introduced a new dynamic that is not covered in the current CFA. Other militarized groups do not fall under the regime of the CFA, yet it is erroneous to simply treat them as proxies of the two main actors. In recent months there has been
before the sixth round of talks in which an LTTE ship was sunk by the Sri Lankan navy and
also fired into government-controlled areas in Madnidpura, Trincomalee.
a on March 10, 2004: "The naval high Command, in my assessment, was acting on its own wer was vested with the executive President, and Wickremesinghe and his ministers had

Page 43
a significant increase in extra judicial killings of 4.4 individuals associated with the LTTE, the Karuna faction, and other Tamil political groups. Although
there is no conclusive proof, it is widely believed that Pe Karuna is supported by elements within the SLAF who in are using the faction as a proxy to weaken the LTTE. de
- oC
The East has become the epicentre of the post ceasefire an "shadow war." The LTTE are attempting to consolidate du
their presence in Trincomalee and slowly reassert As themselves in Batticaloa. A full-scale counter insurgency no campaign is being conducted under the guise of a hei ceasefire (UTHR, 2005). It is in the East where violence pal is most decentralized and unpredictable with the
overlapping security regimes. Political violence has also become entwined with other sources of conflict, such as tensions over land between Tamils and Muslims. Some informants felt that levels of insecurity are greater now
than they were during the war. Trincomalee, at the time
of writing, is a particular pressure point that is partly related to the Karuna issue and also to a growing JVP presence in the district. Attacks in Trincomalee suggest that there are increased attempts to test the limits of the CFA and gain the upper hand on the ground.
Finally, as mentioned in SCA1, violent conflict is not confined to the North-East but is an island-wide phenomenon. The "shadow war"going on between
LTTE and military intelligence, for example, is being
fought in the South as well as the North-East, shown by the killing of Lieutenant Colonel Nizam Muthaliff, a - high-ranking officer in military intelligence, in Colombo Lil
on May 31. The problem of 50,000 army deserters in act
the South is an ongoing source of insecurity and Th connects to other forms of criminal and domestic for
violence (Smith, 2003). dir
* These include EPDPEPRLFV), PLOTE, and TELO.
35 This is not a new phenomenon. The LTTE have exploited peace processes in the the island. It is thought that the LTTE are establishing operational cells and C. unfettered access (Rand, 2004).
36 As Bush argues, "often the Outbreak of inter-ethnic violence is preceded not
relations. Subgroups are important units of analysis" (Bush, 2003: 10).
 
 
 

37 Conflict Dynamics
, POLITICAL DYNAMICS: FRAGMENTATION
AND THE PEACE PROCESS
ace processes can be understood as "moments of truth" politics, in which the new rules of the game are cided. They raise the political stakes as different groups key with one another for a position at the table. Inter d intra-group tensions" are likely to be heightened ring these periods of intensified political engagement. the Indo Lanka Accord shows, peace processes may t lead to stability or consensus, but rather to a ightening of tensions and perversely, further conflict - rticularly when groups with the power to spoil feel sy have been excluded.
Figure 4.1
ke the Indo-Lanka Accord, these latest peace talks have ed as a "lightening rod" for wider societal tensions. ley have accentuated pre-existing fault lines and helped ge new ones. Negotiations have exposed the multimensional nature of conflict in Sri Lanka - we are not
past when government security was relaxed to infiltrate southern parts of Onducting target reconnaissance in areas where it was previously denied
by a deterioration of inter group relations, but by changes in intra group

Page 44
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 38
dealing with a clearly defined bipolar conflict, but complex and mutating conflict system involving a of inter-connected and multi-level conflicts.
The fault lines that have been exposed or even cre by the peace process have horizontal and vertical dimensions. Whereas the former involves inter an intra-group relationships, the latter are about the linkages between different levels in society. Fig 4.1 illustrates some of the key horizontal relationships centre of which is an ethnically patterned core-per dynamic (e.g. government-LTTE). However, there also intra-core (e.g. SLFP-UNP), intra-periphery ( LTTE-Karuna), and inter-periphery (e.g. LTTEMuslim) fault lines that are constantly changing a impacting upon the overall conflict system.
The peace negotiations have affected the vertical relationships between different levels of society. Th peace process has generated a politics of anxiety in there is a heightened pressure on leaders to deliver their constituencies, which questioned their legitin For instance, sections of the Muslim and Sinhalest communities, particularly the youth, have become increasingly radicalized and consequently critical C mainstream leadership.
In the following sections we explore in greater det new forms of conflict and collaboration that have evolved in response to the peace process. It is reco that one should be careful not to interpret all poli and societal changes through the lens of the peace process. Many factors predate peace talks and have own dynamics. However, it is clear that the peace negotiations have been a dominant factor in the p landscape during the period being studied.
We now examine in turn Sinhalese, Tamil, and M politics, and their current dynamics and influence the peace process. We have chosen to divide our al in this way because of the ethnically patterned nat Sri Lankan politics, but it is recognized that the
situation is far more complicated than this divisio
along ethnic lines implies.
37 For example, the defection of SLMCMPs in 2000 ended up bril
 

with a welter
ated
d
at the iphery
e.g.
nd
c which
tO
macy.
ail the
gnized tical
: their
olitical
uslim
Over nalysis ure of
44.1 Sinhalese Politics
Mainstream Politics
As already highlighted, "pathologies" of the state are partly a cause and partly a consequence of the conflict. The state failed to institutionalize democratic politics, and as the last five years show, this has led to a system of governance and a political dynamic in the South that impedes the search for a solution to the conflict. A complex combination of structural, institutional, and contingent factors have created this dynamic and a political analysis of the South needs to be based on an appreciation of both the "causes" (the nature of the state and system of governance) and the "causers" (the behavior, choices, and policies of political elites). This is a dialectic relationship in the sense that structures shape the choices of individuals, but these individuals in turn have agency and through their policies influence the underlying structures.
Historically, Sri Lankan politics have been dominated by a bipolar party system. Particularly, when there was a first past the post electoral system, the party in power tended to be more moderate while the party in opposition was more nationalistic. There has been a long history of opportunistic opposition to attempts to solve the conflict, from UNP opposition to BandaranaikaChelvanayakam Pact, to the recent successful attempt by the SLFP to derail the UNF government led peace process. This dynamic also makes the party in power more risk averse. As one interviewee commented, "No one wants to go doun in history as the betrayer of their race and religion."
However, the introduction of the proportional representation (PR) system in 1978 by the Jayawardene government had a significant impact on the dynamics of inter-party politics in the South. As one would expect, it has amplified the voice and influence of the minorities and their respective parties. They now have the potential to be "king makers," by tipping the balance in favor of one of the mainstream parties.” The introduction of the PR system has also had two important effects on the
nging down the PA government.

Page 45
potential for peacemaking and peacebuilding. First, it will has contributed to a change in the nature of the poy contest between the SLFP and the UNP. Arguably, the pea dynamic has shifted from one of ethnic outbidding to lon
one involving a battle for the center ground. As wit discussed below, the nationalist "baton" has been O handed over to the JVP and JHU (Rampton and O Welikala, 2005). On most of the key political and pol
economic issues, there has been a growing convergence cor between the two main parties. This is reflected also in thi
the changing thinking of the SLFP and UNP on sys solutions to the "ethnic conflict." Both want a
negotiated solution and recognize the need to reform Τη the state, based on some form of devolution or a (semi) De federal model. Both parties have won elections ΟΠ campaigning on a "peace ticket."' Surveys show that co there is considerable popular support for peaceful Op resolution of the conflict.’ This transformation is leg
therefore based on hard-headed calculation rather than 0. ideological commitment. Both parties understand that col they must play to the middle ground and "peace" has bo{
increasingly become a vote winner. However, the Mi competitive inter-party dynamic has not changed. ар There have been few indications over the last five years the that a bipartisan approach is likely to emerge on the in peace process. Cre
Wi The second effect of the PR system is the less positive as one of instable coalition politics. The bargaining bas process, as already mentioned, is concerned with det
patronage rather than politics and many believe it has contributed to the growing corruption of the political in process. Therefore, the PR system has had paradoxical na
effects on the search for peace in Sri Lanka. On one the hand, it has acted as a brake on a process of ethnic UN outbidding and contributed to both parties greater SL.
3. The 1999 Presidential elections was the first time that both leaders campaigned
39 For instance, a study conducted in 2004 by the Center for Policy Alternatives on that 72 percent regarded the "no-war, no-peace" situation unsatisfactory and solution. The majority of the population is in favor of decentralization or evenfe oppose asymmetric federalism (autonomy for the North-East) and amnesty for w
40 There is a long history of failed attempts to forge this bipartisan approach, for ir
 

39 Conflict Dynamics
lingness to explore a negotiated settlement when in wer. But on the other hand, as this latest round of ice talks shows, it has not produced the stability and gevity of government required to follow through h the negotiations. Perversely, PR has produced fre moderate mainstream parties, while encouraging fre communalist minority parties. Furthermore, a litical settlement requires state reform and thus 1stitutional change, but achieving the necessary two rds majority in parliament is less likely under the PR
te.
e political landscape in the aftermath of the cember 2001 general elections was an unfamiliar e. While the hybrid Constitution of 1978 nceptually contemplates the possibility of positional parties controlling the executive and islative branches, this was the first time this, in fact, curred (Rampton and Welikala, 2005). But habitation, in theory, could have been a positive ost for the peace process if the President and Prime nister had been prepared to entertain a bipartisan proach. But given the history of animosity between : two and the zero sum nature of Sri Lankan politics which neither party can conceive of sharing the dit, this was unlikely to happen in practice.“ ckremesinghe's strategy was to treat the President as poiler and keep her away from the peace process, ed on the assumption that the public opinion would er her proroguing parliament.
addition to the inter-party dimensions of instream southern politics, it is important to look at : intra-party dynamics. Compared to the SLFP the NP's internal organization is far more effective. The FP can be characterized as semi feudal in terms of
On a peace ticket.
Knowledge Attitudes and Perceptions (KAP) of the peace process showed agreed that the government and the LTTE should negotiate a permanent leralism and ethnic representation in parliament. Meanwhile, most people lar crimes, but even here, support seems to be on the rise (CPA, 2004).
stance the Fox Agreement of 1996.

Page 46
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 40
their leadership and organization base and, arguab showed in their haphazard approach to the negotia of 1994-1995. On the other hand, the pragmatism organization of the UNP appeared to be a factor i relative success of the most recent peace talks. Hoy Wickremesinghe made little effort to communicat strategy with the wider public or consult with the President - in spite of the fact that his tenuous pov base demanded an approach that involved reachin to diverse political constituencies. As one interview commented, "[H]e thought he was President when h Prime Minister: "Ultimately, the radical reform pro his perceived appeasement of the LTTE, and his dependence on the international community playe the hands of nationalists.
It has been argued by some commentators that the President stepped in at the time she did precisely because she feared that Wickremesinghe's strategy working. If this was the case, it conforms to a histo pattern in which neither party wants the other to the credit for finding a solution to the conflict. Th SLFP-JVP coalition had briefly been tested in 200 this was the first time that the JVP had a significar direct handle on the levers of power. Clearly, this v pragmatic alliance and there was no real ideologica bond between the President and JVP"
With the UNF handing over power to the UPFA, peace process entered a new phase and negotiation could not simply be picked up where they were lef The cast of characters" and, consequently, the dyn are different, although the underlying issues are
in fact, at the time of writing, the relationship between the Pre for the first time publicly that she believed her husband had be
42 Reflecting on this and previous peace talks, it is striking how Wickremesinghe all stamped their own idiosyncratic personalit advantage to the government when it comes to negotiations - t electoral cycles.
43 For instance, the UPFA government's budget for 2005 was a po measures, Such as the promise of employment for 40,000 gradu be a different matter. In substantive terms, the UPFA has been
' A German system that combines elements of first past the post
 

ly, this
ations n and in the
Wever, e his
Wer
g out
Wee be uvas
gram,
dinto
WaSt.
oric
e 0, but ht and
W2S2
the
toff.
amics
essentially the same. First, the President is more acutely aware of the importance of reaching out to the southern electorate and - unlike Wickremesinghe - has a "common touch." In some respects, she is more trusted in the South and consequently is in a better position to "deliver" a southern consensus regarding a peace settlement. Second, the UPFA is less outwardly oriented than the last government. It sees a limited and discrete international role in the peace process, unlike the more expansive role subscribed to it by the previous regime. Third, the President has a more state centric approach to negotiations, a stronger focus on core political issues, and a reluctance to recognize political parity with the LTTE. The UNF, arguably, had little idea of an end goal, and this led to growing concern that a pragmatic approach focusing only on process could easily be manipulated and inadvertently encourage de facto separation. Fourth, the President has limited room for, maneuver at first because of the fragile alliance with the JVP and later because her backing in parliament shrank to a minority. Fifth, there are significant tensions and conflicts within the SLFP notably between the President and the Prime Minister, which may contribute to ongoing deadlock on the peace process. Finally, there is the potential "wildcard" of constitutional reform on the political horizon. The UPFA manifesto asked the people for the mandate to abolish the executive presidency and to reform the PR system." The former is tied up with the President's desire to remain in politics after 2005, when her second and final term of office comes to an end. To effect these changes will require a "constitutional
sident and the JVP had reached an all time low, with the President in an interview stating en killed as a result of a joint plot between the JVP and UNP,
personalities have shaped the process and the outcomes. Premadasa, Kumuratunga, and ties and styles on the talks. To some extent, the LTTE, as a non democratic party, are at an hey have more room formaneuver, greater institutional memory, and are not constrained by
pulist budget that aimed to satisfy most strata of society (Sarvananthan, 2004:19). Populist ates, played well to the southern electorate, althoughkeeping to these promises is likely to forced to follow similar economic policies to the previous government.
with PR is one of the options being discussed.

Page 47
revolution," undertaken for partisan purposes As
(Welikala, 2004:8). Whether this is likely to happen or cha not can be debated, but in relation to the peace process tho it adds an extra layer of uncertainty to political dynamics 19 in the South. Given this environment, the LTTE may fro
feel its best strategy is to play a waiting game in the elit hope that they will be able to deal with a more stable, to UNP-led government after the next elections. O
三 萎 COU In opposition, the UNP has so far chosen to adopt a left low-key, non-confrontational strategy. Whether this CC signifies the emergence of a bipartisan approach, or
merely a strategic pause in inter-party "hostilities," it is Th too early to tell. U
Ilat
its
Nationalist Politics sup
OVе JVP Ess Sinhala nationalism has always been a key ingredient of “
the island's conflict, though it has changed vessels over " time. The UNP, the SLFP, smaller Sinhala parties, JV) people's movements, and the Buddhist clergy have all rela played a role in propagating an ethno-nationalist JV) discourse. Two processes underpin the most recent at reordering of nationalist forces: first, the re-emergence of ele the JVP as a political force and second, in parallel the has two mainstream parties adopting a more moderate as : stance with regard to the "national question." As a 11 result, the Sinhalese nationalist vote has migrated to the fou JVP and to a more limited extent the JHU. - -
5 The Constitution of 1978 requires for its repeal and replacement a two third
referendum. Since only a single party can obtain a two third majority under the P mandate, a constituent assembly should be called in order to ratify the changes
46 There has been no major criticism of the President's dealings with the LTTE and as one informant argued, "They can't spoil IP-TOMS! What would they do whent become more vocal in their criticism of the government, particularly in the econo
7 For more extensive discussion on the background and politics of the JVP see Ral
48 The 1971 insurrection ended with about 20,000 deaths of its group's members 50,000 deaths of JVP members and sympathisers (Uyangoda, 2003c:38).
49 The JVP has also experienced significant successes in local government elections
 

41 Conflict Dynamics
Sinhala nationalism changes "vessels," it inevitably inges its form. As Rampton and Welikala (2005) argue, ugh Sinhala nationalism has been hegemonic since the 50s, its position in Sri Lankan politics has changedm originally being a discourse through which political es at the center related to and mobilized the periphery, becoming a vehicle for counter elite political vements that emerge from the "marshlands and Intryside." The JVP has therefore "taken up the slack" by the mainstream parties in their move toward the terground during the 1990s (ibid).
e JVP ideology, though it is not immutable and changing, has always operated in the interstices of ionalism, Buddhism, and Marxism. But, increasingly, ideological commitment to nationalism and growing port base among the Buddhist clergy have ‘rshadowed and diluted its commitment to Marxism. entially, the JVP mobilize around a discourse of lusion and resistance." Following armed insurgencies 1971 and 1987-1989 and its brutal suppression," the P has shown a remarkable ability to revive itself in a utively brief time span (Uyangoda, 2003c:38). The P has re-emerged as the main voice of Sinhala ionalism and become a significant "third force" in ctoral politics. From the mid-1990s, the movement grown with every election, with the 2004 elections a highpoint: it became the main partner of the SLFP the UPFA coalition, with 39 parliamentary seats and ir ministerial posts.' Although its growth preceded 2002 ceasefire, the break through of 2004 can at st partly be attributed to the peace process. First, the
majority in parliament and subsequently the Consent of the people at a R system, the UPFA has proposed that on the basis of the general election to the Constitution (Welikala, 2004:7).
the peace process. Neither was there any opposition to P-TOMS, though hey come to power?"However, since the signing of P-TOMS, the UNPhave mic sphere.
mpton (2003) and Rampton and Welikala, (2005)
and the second "patriotic" insurrection resulted in the region of 40,000 to
, having captured 220 seats and also 80 provincial Council seats in 2004.

Page 48
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000 - 2005 | 42
JVP became the instrument for the Sinhala protest to the peace process, with both the SLFP and the advocating some form of political solution (though varying degrees of concessions). It is probable that JVP benefited from anxieties generated by the peac process, particularly the perceived appeasement of LTTE, leading to the belief that the JVP could act restraint on the mainstream parties. Second, the President, after a short-lived alliance with the JVP i 2000, had no choice in 2004 but to ally with the J order to form a coalition government.
The JVP is, arguably, no longer an "anti-systemic" and its political trajectory has been characterized in recent years by the pursuit of state power. "The JV trajectory of political engagement has shifted from radical oppositionist formation to an ally of a rulin party" (Uyangoda, 2003c:60). Though the JVP has
made the transition from violence to politics with remarkable success, it still retains many of its earlier characteristics that mark it out from other mainstre and minority parties in Sri Lanka. To some extent, continues to function as an opposition party while power. There is remarkable parallel between the LT and JVP in terms of their nationalist ideology, mod organization, and attitude to mainstream politics - though the chief difference is that the LTTE remai primarily military organization. As a result of their engagement with mainstream democratic politics, t groups face new contradictions and internal tensior Like the LTTE, the JVP has a puritanical reputatio abstinence, commitment, and self-sacrifice in pursu its goals. Again like the LTTE, there is a "whole discourse of betrayal that brooks no in-betweens in confrontations with what has become the business, professionalization of mainstream politics" (Rampt 2003:168-169). Unlike the mainstream parties that characterized by vertical, clientalistic relationships, lose organizational structures, the JVP has remained
50 The JVP has a classic Bolshevik cellular structure built around 1
20,000 party members (Rampton and Welikala, 2005).
51 The PNM is, to all intents and purposes, a limb of the JVP. Its rol
branches in France and the U.K. (Rampton and Welikala, 2005).

voice
extremely centralized and hierarchical movement. 50 The JNP party has a massive number of active or standby
with volunteers and avails of a number of (proxy) civil society the
organizations, the most significant one being the ed
Patriotic National Movement (PNM). 51 Unlike the old che
left political parties in Sri Lanka, the JVP has managed as a
to capture as its core constituency the rural peasantry.
But it is also successfully extending its support base into in
semi-urbanized and middle class constituencies reflected VP in in its rise in union politics. Geographically, it has
extended its influence, particularly in the East. Many
believe the JVP has a growing support base within the party,
Sri Lankan armed forces. With the tsunami response,
the JVP demonstrated a capacity to mobilize thousands P's
of volunteers with an efficiency that easily outruns the state machinery at various levels. Long before the government responded, the JVP had reached out to a large number of people along almost the entire coastline
with temporary camps and small-scale assistance. The JVP skillfully positioned itself so that it could critique
the government but avoid taking any blame as a it still
member of the administration. -- insi TE The JVP is a strong opponent of separation or even
autonomy of the North-East. The state, according to the
JVP, should be a strong and centralized entity. Devolution ns a
merely weakens the state and the citizen becomes
vulnerable (Uyangoda, 2003c:62). Therefore, the JVP poth
finds it very difficult to engage with the LTTE. First, its as.
strong support of the unitary state leaves little room for n for
accommodation on federalism. Second, its own history as ait of
a militant organization that has entered the democratic
mainstream means that it can take the moral high ground their
in relation to the LTTE. As far as the JVP are concerned, the
it is unacceptable that the LTTE should be rewarded for
their military accomplishments by gaining concessions in are
the peace talks, without demanding them to denounce
the armed struggle and become a democratic movement. dan
In line with this point, the JVP has strongly criticized.the
cam
on,
and
the principle of "democratic centralism," among its 1,000 to 2,000 full-time organizers and
le is to reach out to wider socio-political forces; in addition to its offices in Sri Lanka, it has

Page 49
continuing human rights violations committed by the 2
LTTE. 2
Another key aspect of the JVP nationalist discourse, (th
which is important in relation to the peace process, is its critique of globalization and international involvement T in Sri Lanka. Norwegian facilitation, the work of foreign an
(often Christian) NGOs, critical donor governments, ha and international financial institutions like the World Ω Bank and the ADB are all considered to be an te encroachment on national sovereignty. Drawing on its non-elitist identity and the ability of its volunteer network to work alongside the common people, the Π party takes the moral high ground as the guardian of C Sinhala interests in a threatening world. O
ΠΠ.
The UPFA was hardly a "coalition of the willing." It was a pragmatic alliance based upon electoral arithmetic" JV and the exigencies of power. The 2004 elections marked un both the defeat of the UNP's limited peace agenda, and di the significant gains made by radical nationalist be opposition (JVP) over the moderate opposition (PA). M The JVP's emergence as a third force has changed the traditional dynamic of Sri Lankan coalition politics, in which the minority parties are ascribed a limited role
while the main party sets out the political course. Unlike Th other minority parties, the JVP has an agenda for power rai and, in the long run, aims to take over from the SLFP as pa the main challenger to the UNP. Therefore, the JVP was an always going to demand a significant role for itself in W setting government policy. At the very least, it viewed its of role as within government, protecting national interests that are threatened by elite politicians, the LTTE, and iss
the international community. pc νί The eventual departure of the JVP reminds us of the is
central importance of the "ethnic question" to the JVP and fo its discourse. For over a year - much longer than many
52 in fact, in 2004, the PAJVP together gained less votes than in 2001, though they (77 seats) and 9.1 percent (16 seats) of the votes respectively (46.4 percent and (105 seats) of the votes. Therefore, the UPFA got a lower percentage of votes, b through which seats are allocated on the basis of elected districts, with bonuss
53 For instance, attempts by India to broker relationships with the Communist Pa
position onfederalism.
 
 

43 Conflict Dynamics
alysts had expected - the party went along with the PA d compromised on sensitive political issues. In the end, it is not economic policies, but concessions to the LTTE
rough PTOMS) that caused them to leave the coalition.
here is limited evidence to date of a more moderate d compromising JVP emerging.” However, tensions ve begun to arise between the more radical and oderate elements within the party. Essentially, the nsion boils down to the question of how the party can aintain its radical appeal while increasingly becoming a ainstream political party. It is possible to maintain its ode of maximalist radical politics or will it lose its tting edge? As Uyangoda notes, "the more it focuses
'national issues, the greater is the compulsion for the ovement to pay less attention to local-community ecific issues" (Uyangoda, 2003c:61). The more the TP attempts to broaden its electoral base, it potentially ldermines its position as a party speaking for the possessed. As one interviewee noted, "We're ginning to see a battle between what is left of arxism within the JVP and 'traditional' Sri Lankan litics... the doctrinaire positions are shifting toward litical expediency."
he JVP decision to withdraw from government may ise expectations about a renewed radicalism among rt of the constituency. A more balanced position nong the leadership may create a rift with the party orkers and cadres. In 1987-1989 the extreme violence
the JVP was attributed by some to young, disciplined cadres and the nationalist and polarizing jue of the Indo-Lanka accords (Rampton, 2003). The otential for "storm troop activism," in which subaltern olence overspills party controls (Uyangoda, 2003c:54) perhaps not so great today, but arguably the conditions r this may be building up in the East (see below).
won more parliamentary seats. In 2001, the PA and the JVP won37.3 percent 93 seats in total). In 2004, the UPFA (PA and JVP together) won 45.6 percent Uta higher number of seats in parliament. This has to do with the PR system seats for the party that wins the most votes, as well as a national list.
rty of India, so far, appear to have had little impact in relation to the JVP's

Page 50
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 || 44
On the other hand, to view the JVP only as an oppor of peace is unhelpful. Arguably, a more open, election oriented JVP is a positive development in terms of th relative stability of the Southern polity" The JVP hav significant constituency and perhaps more than most other political parties, they are serious about social jus and have helped set the political agenda on good governance, focusing on corruption and the abuse of power (Uyangoda, 2003c:63). The JVP arguably, hav legitimate role to play in Sri Lankan politics. If they
9. There is some evidence to suggest that the JVP's political beha instance, the JVP unlike the mainstream parties, responded to th the provincial level.
55 However, the use of religion to legitimize political power in SriL height in the second century B.C. when experiences with Hindu ir
The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact (1956), the Senanayake Kumaratunga's "Devolution Package" (1997), to name the mos Dharmadasa (1999).
 

sentially dithere i
tical activism itical of the
ent transform themselves into a "conventional" political party,
- that would imply a structural shift in Sri Lanka's post
independence history from a bipolar to a tri-polar system.
rea. It would also raise questions about whether the JVP could
simultaneously maintain its position as the third party
tice and continue as the main guardian of Sinhala
nationalism. This partly depends upon the role of other ultra nationalist groups, which we briefly turn to now.
rior has been shaped through their involvement in the various levels of government. For e West Provincial Council crisis earlier in the year through the appropriate machinery at
anka goes back further than this. According to de Silva (1977:37-38), it reached an early vaders radicalized Sri Lanka Buddhists.
-Chelvanayagam Pact (1965), the Thimpu talks (1985), the Indo-Lankan Accord (1987), t salient examples, all met fierce criticism from Buddhist groups. See among others

Page 51
JHU and the Sangha
Buddhism has historically been closely entwined with Sinhala nationalism. There is a long Sinhalese tradition of using religion to legitimate political power (Winslow, 1995). The Mahavamsa and the historic role of the Sinhalese Buddhists, as Bhumiputra ("sons of the soil") to guard the sacred land are at the core of the ethnonationalist discourse (De Silva and Bartholomeusz 2001). As outlined in Box 4.1, however, this discourse has always been a strong political force, and has manifested itself in different ways through different political actors.
Given the diversity of actors, there is no such thing as the Buddhist perception of, or response to, the peace process. However, it is striking that the fiercest critics of the talks drew heavily on Buddhist-nationalist discourse. Initially, the Mahanayakes, the Buddhist headmen, granted the peace process the benefit of the doubt (Sinhaya 2005). They actively advocated peace and leading monks took an accommodative stance with regard to Tamil autonomy. Within months, however, the Mahanayakas reoriented their position and voiced their fear that the peace process would boil down to "the establishment of Eelam rather than achieving real peace" (Sinhaya 2005). Contrary to convention, they made a joint political statement arguing against a lifting of the ban on the LTTE and against any kind of (con)federalism orinterim administration (Sinhaya 2005).
The peace process prompted a dynamic within the Sangha, in which an accommodative leadership is constrained by an increasingly radicalized constituency - this is mirrored also in the leadership dynamics of the Tamil and Muslim polities. "The 'soft' response of the Mahanayakas to the peace process was strongly challenged by other sections of the Sangha, mainly comprising of younger and more radically minded monks" (Frydenlund 2005: 21). The decision of certain
57 Ravana is an exception in this regard.
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45 Conflict Dynamics
ahanayakas to support the IP-TOMS was also met thanger. Insiders argue that a vast majority of monks e critical of any concessions to the "terrorists" and ject any policies that are perceived to weaken the litary state. (Ibid.: 21) In an attempt to prevent a ivision of the country," active groups of educated onks acted alongside the Nikaya hierarchy and accused e Mahanayakas of indifference. Much of the protest as also directed at Norwegian interference with Sri Inka, as well as the involvement of other international tors, most prominently Christian NGOs. Meanwhile, ere have also been minor Buddhist initiatives in favor
the peace process, and there seem to be opportunities support these endeavors (Frydenlund 2005;34).
he critical Buddhist stance on the peace process is rticularly clear in the Sinhalese media. Editorial views nd to portray the "Tamil homeland" as a colonial instruct, devolution as an encroachment on the 1ddhist heritage, and reduce the LTTE to "terrorists." hese perceptions are shared both by politically partisan nhala papers, such as the Lanka, as well as by ainstream Sinhala papers, such as Divaina, unkadeepa, and Lakbima (Nadarajah 2005).” uddhist nationalism was at the core of widespread itorial protest against the UNF regime, more so than her popular themes, such as the elitist nature of the rty and alleged corruption.
isentment toward the peace process contributed to the hergence of radical and explicitly Buddhist political rties. Building on a range of religious and societal ovements, Sinhala Urumaya (meaning "Sinhala ritage") was founded in 2000. For the 2004 elections fused with the Jathika Sangha Sammelanaya to form e Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). The JHU is run by Iddhist monks and has a largely middle class instituency (Rampton and Welikala 2005). It enjoys ly limited support from a segment of the Sangha and ough it unexpectedly gained support in the 2004 :ctions from disaffected urban, ex-UNP supporters, it

Page 52
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 || 46
is likely to be a transient political force. However, it become clear that there is electoral space in the Buddhist-nationalist wing and, as long as that is so, different actors will fill the gap. The messenger may change, but radical political force is likely to remain.
4.42 Tamil Politics
The LTTE
More than two decades of war in Sri Lanka has prod a situation of contested and overlapping sovereignties involving a separate system of protection and provisio the North-East, which has increasingly assumed state characteristics. One can perhaps best understand the LTTE as a non state actor attempting to become a st actor - in many respects they appear to think and act a state. For the LTTE, the peace process has involved re-balancing of strategies and tactics. But it should n seen as a complete break with the past in the sense th the armed struggle continues, only with a stronger emphasis now placed on the political sphere.” The ceasefire has, in some respects, solidified the de facto and, in the eyes of the LTTE and their supporters, h moved them closer toward a de jure state. On the oth hand, the CFA has also thrown up new challenges to authority and legitimacy of the LTTE.
A central goal to the LTTE's state building strategy been to extract political and economic resources fron both the international and Sri Lankan state system. . has involved "capturing" the state machinery in ords draw upon its resources and reflected legitimacy. Thị has continued alongside a violent liberation struggle has involved fighting an external enemy, the brutal
suppression of internal dissent, and the promotion o discourse that glorifies struggle and sacrifice. Howev
58 The critical Buddhist underCurrent toward the peace process ofte in the East, for example, has led to a popular and political reacti that the religious layer of ethno-nationalism must not be ignored.
59 To illustrate the point that warmaking and peacemaking may bet "peace" banner as part of a continuous attempt to internationalis

has
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-like
ate
like
ot be
lat
State
լer
the
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:ľ tO
is
that
fa
er,
in peacetime, sustaining this monolithic discourse may prove to be more difficult. The ceasefire has brought out in sharp relief the LTTE's Janus-headed character. On one hand, there is their military face, demonstrated in their continued testing of the SLAF, re-armament and the violent removal of dissenting voices within the Tamil polity. On the other hand, there is the political face, which is manifest in their ongoing search for international and domestic legitimacy. In the following section we explore how the LTTE has adapted to the new challenges presented by the no war-no peace environment. These can be divided into three areas of primary concern to the LTTE, both in wartime and peacetime - war making and concentrating the means of violence, political consolidation, and resource extraction.
The LTTE in the Post-CFA Environment
藝 Security challenges: Karuna and Eastern Regionalism
The LTTE is primarily a military organization that emerged through violent struggle and, to an extent, depends upon the following ideology: "If there's no struggle there is no liberation movement" (interviewee, Jaffna). Unlike a number of other militarized non-state actors such as Hamas or the IRA, their political wing has historically remained underdeveloped and subservient to the military wing. The LTTE has maintained a very clear sequential agenda. A resolution of the conflict with the government and a settlement for the North-East take precedence. Intra-northeastern issues, like the position of the Muslims or transformation of the movement itself, will be a secondary matter and will not take place until the peace process proves to be irreversible. As one informant noted, "Liberation movements won't commit to transformation until they are confident about a settlement."
h becomes apparent through seemingly minor incidents. The erection of Buddhist statues On time and again. Fierce debates in parliament, mass protest and LTTE hartals indicate
wo sides of the same coin for the LTTE, throughout the 1990s they campaigned under the 2 their cause, while simultaneously pursuing the armed struggle.

Page 53
During the CFA, the LTTE has sought to maintain a fo balance of power in relation to the SLAF. Apart from the le. Cold War with government forces, the LTTE has
continued to suppress internal challenges. The CFA W helped them concentrate the means of violence, as one 1ha of its conditions was the disarming of other Tamil aS militant groups such as the EPDP. However, the id emergence of the Karuna faction was a significant Se:
challenge to their "war" on the home front. In itself, the te defection of LTTE cadres and (potential) fissures in the PC movement are not a new phenomenon." The difference in
with Karuna is that he survived and exposed a sensitive B nerve in the movement: the historic division between br the North and the East. 6
re:
Karuna is seen by many as a ruthless military leader and su opportunist rather than a strong advocate for eastern ba regionalism." A number of factors may have contributed co to the split beyond the political agenda of eastern th autonomy, including financial irregularities," indiscipline toward women, and tensions between the T military and political wings (Philipson and Thangarajah in 2005). Nevertheless, Karuna's break away, ultimately, in had the effect of reviving a long-standing political and ΠΥ) socio-economic divide between the North and the East. There is a historic resentment among the Batticaloa Tamils that they have been dominated by Jaffna Tamils, in
which is also reflected within the structures of the LTTE. It is widely perceived that the LTTE recruits most heavily from the East," while the major battles are bc
s
60 Kittu and Mahataya were salient examples of high-ranking cadres with a stron leadership. Both, however, were violently suppressed before any serious revolt
61 Arguably, he has now become a "brand name" (Jeyaraj, 2005) attracting Suppo to guidance and direction, it is alleged, from the Sri Lankan military intelligenc
62 it is claimed that the Eastern command enjoyed relative financial auton mismanagement and/or a perception of growing autonomy from the Wanni may
63 Something that is reflected in the prevalence of easterners in LTTE war Cemete
As an illustration of this, in 1986, when an LTTE-TELO feud broke out in Jaffna, area for a meeting and issued a joint statement that the problems of the Ea
differently. But the LTTE, Jaffna Ordered two Batticaloa Commanders of Jaffna
65 The LTTE has operated in public offices in eleven Countries under four front Committee (WTCC), the United Tamil Organization (UTO), and the Tamil Coordi
 

47 Conflict Dynamics
ught for territory in the North and the movement's ldership is dominated by Jaffna Tamils."
hether eastern regionalism outweighs Tamil tionalism among the Batticaloa Tamils is hard to sess. There are multiple and competing layers of entity and most Tamils would not consider the two ntiments to be mutually exclusive. Given the rule of rror exercised by both Karuna and the Vanni faction, ople have little voice or autonomy. Many have been timidated or killed. Despite the sympathy for a Itticaloa agenda, many people criticize the timing. The eak away jeopardizes the Tamil cause in the peace gotiations. "Karuna said the right thing, for the wrong asons, at the wrong time," one informant said, mmarizing the common view. If the LTTE were to go |ck to war, Karuna's alignment with the security forces uld affect his standing with the Tamil community in e East (Jeyaraj, 2005).
he Karuna issue has had wider ramifications and has fluenced intra-Tamil diaspora relations. The LTTE have,
recent months, reshuffled key personnel in their overseas issions' in order to reassert their control over the diaspora ld prevent a wider split from developing. How it has fected their military capability is unclear, though evidently
the immediate term it has limited their room for aneuver in the East. There must also be concerns within e LTTE that important intelligence has been shared :tween the Karuna faction and the armed forces.
g support base both within and outside the movement who clashed with the
Could come about (Philipson and Thangarjah, 2005).
rt from a range of anti-LTTE groups including ENDLF and PLOTE, in addition
8.
omy with regard to tax collection and military procurement. Financial
have contributed to emergence of the split.
ries.
the LTTE Batticaloa leader called together all the paramilitary leaders in the st were different from those in the North and should therefore be treated
origin to attack TELO members in the East (Bush 2003:69).
s: the Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC), the World Tamil Coordinating ating Group (TCG) (Gunaratna, 2003:204).

Page 54
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 || 48
Faced with a revival of eastern regionalism, the resp of the Vanni-based LTTE illustrates the movement's difficulties in dealing with diverging views. The LT leadership resisted attempts by civil society leaders t mediate. There was no room for eastern autonomy within the movement and once Karuna broke away, movement resorted to violent repression. This respo follows a historic pattern of violently suppressing alternative politico-military formations within the T polity. The extensive list of ceasefire violations bears testimony to this. Almost 95 percent of the LTTE violations are acts against civilians, with child recruitment” constituting more than half the total violations. Abduction of adults and harassment are t next biggest categories (SLMM website). The LTTE eastern campaign aims to flush out opponents inclu EPDP, PLOTE, EPRLF, and military informants. Targets have also been pursued to Colombo and Jaf In the three months leading up to the time of writir arrests had been made in relation to any of the killir in the East. Somewhat ironically, given their own re. of violations, the LTTE now demands that the government bring "paramilitaries" under control, as required under the CFA.
66 1981 census, which is considered the latest reliable count.
67 By February 2004, more than 1,250 child soldiers in LTTE camps (,
 
 

onse Political Challenges: Consolidation and the Search for
S Legitimacy TE O Tilly's (1985) characterization of early states as
protection rackets, to some extent, resonates with the the evolving dynamics of governance in the North-East. In
the context of a limited state presence and an ongoing
nse civil war, predatory networks for taxation, extortion, and
ail protection competed with or even replaced the agencies
of the state. Paramilitary groups come to run the bare, coercive functions of the state primarily through open violence (Uyangoda, 2003b). The LTTE established itself through concentrating the means of coercion and
h violent processes of primitive accumulation. Arguably,
ne they are now on the cusp of a transition to a more
5 advanced stage of statebuilding that involves political
ding consolidation and developing more legitimate bases of
authority and representation. There have been three
a.
strands to the LTTE's project of political consolidation 89 and internal and external legitimization. These have
ngs involved building its political control of the North-East cord (other Tamil parties, Muslims, civil society), seeking to
influence southern politics (TNA, SLFP, UNP, JVP), and finally engaging with international politics (international community, Tamil diaspora). How the
Asiatimes, ibid).

Page 55
three strands have been influenced by the dynamics of oft
the CFA is briefly examined below. the
bel Politics of the North-East: Political consolidation in the of c North-East has involved attempts to build up the ideo "shadow state," consolidating control over Tamil CO political groupings, reaching a détente with the O
Muslims, and extending control over Tamil civil society. pea These objectives may not always be consistent with one mo another. First, the LTTE is increasingly predisposed to
appear and to act like a state.” The construction of Th prestigious buildings in Kilinochchi is only one sign of Tar the evolution of a parallel system of state power, cha including military, police," judiciary, public the administration, and revenue-raising structures. While rela one can debate the extent to which some of these institutions are real rather than virtual, and the fact that cor the "shadow administration" relies almost entirely on the Be fECS
continued operation of the state bureaucracy,' the CFA period has enabled the LTTE to further formalize and Aft extend the reach of their state-like structures. Moreover, 9 it has enabled them to extend their informal control of Prc the state bureaucracy into government held areas as well. ass
Th Second, the CFA has influenced intra-Tamil political the dynamics by shifting the balance of power decidedly in TU the LTTE's favor. The CFA had the effect of legitimizing the LTTE at the expense of other Tamil groupings. It also the gave the LTTE the strategic advantage of being able to f engage in political activities in government-controlled ΟΙ areas. Political offices were subsequently set up in Jaffna, ten Colombo, and the East. This was followed by the creation of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), with the dual the objective of unifying Tamil political groupings - like the shc All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), the Tamil Eelam Di Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam People's iso Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), and members 12
68 For example, the goals of winning over the Muslims On One hand, while rega reconcile. Securing its military position (by crushing Karuna) was also not condu
69 This pre-dates the ceasefire, and the LTTE built up an extensive parallel adminis
70 According to Sarvanathan (2004), there are 17 LTTE police stations in the Vanni,
7. For instance, the military, police, and revenue arms are clearly far more "real"t
state bureaucracy.
72 Their single parliamentary seat became a reliable one for President Kumaratul
secure ministerial posts in the Cabinet.
 

49 Conflict Dynamics
he Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) - and using new alliance to influence the politics of the South (see ow). The TNA represent, in many respects, a coalition :onvenience, given the diverse backgrounds and ologies of the constituent parts. With a limited sensus around a short-term agenda - the restoration of malcy in the North-East and the commencement of ce talks - the LTTE have used the TNA largely as a
uthpiece in parliament.
e Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) and the mil United National Alliance (TULF) pose the main illenge to LTTE hegemony in the long run, although TULF does not do this openly. Both parties are tively weak in the North-East. The EPDP has a 1stituency in Jaffna, mainly on the island of Delft. ing a party cum militia, the party had been able to ist the armed strength of the LTTE up until the CFA.’ er the CFA, the EPDP like other Tamil militias, was (uired to disarm and came to rely on the weak otection of the armed forces and systematic LTTE aults have taken their toll among the party's members. e JVP has had exploratory talks with the EPDP, whom y see as a political counter weight to the LTTE. The JLF is the oldest, most established Tamil party and has tronger base of popular support than the EPDP. It is : leading member of the Tamil National Alliance. The mation of the TNA and its support for the LTTE mporarily led to dissension within the TULF. In the d, the majority of TULF parliamentarians supported : TNA and its premise that Tamil political parties ould unite behind the LTTE during the peace process. ssident TULF President Anandasangaree was left as an lated anti-LTTE voice and has been effectively urginalized within the party.
ining confidence of the eastern Tamils on the other, may not be easy to
Icive to the aim of Controlling the civilian population in the East.
trative structure in Jaffna between 1990-1995.
One in Batticaloa and One in Trincomalee.
han the public administration, which in no way acts as a substitute for the
nga's People's Alliance and EPDP leader Douglas Devananda managed to =

Page 56
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 50
Third, Tamil-Muslim relations have undergone a number of critical developments since the signing of CFA (see also Section 4.4.3). The LTTE objected to separate Muslim delegation at the peace talks, but simultaneously opened a diplomatic front toward th Muslim leadership. Some three months after the CF came into being, Prabhakaran signed an agreement v SLMC leader Rauff Hakeem. Through the agreemer the Tigers acknowledged the injustice done to the Muslims, allowed displaced Muslims from LTTE controlled areas to access their land, and promised t consult the Muslims on key issues that concern then During his visits to the East, Tamilchelvan also met Muslim leaders and, more recently, the TRO provid some support to Muslim tsunami victims. The appointment of Kaushalyan as Karuna's successor m also be interpreted as a sign of this new détente, in t sense that the former had a more moderate stance in relation to the Muslims compared to his predecessor However, both Muslims and Tamils still have fears t each will act as a spoiler in relation to their respectiv political projects. The LTTE strategy of negotiating directly with Muslim representative at the grass root may have the objective of further fracturing and undermining the Muslim leadership. Just as the wid peace process has sparked off anxieties among excluc groups, agreements between the LTTE and Muslim representatives reverberate among the wider Tamil a Muslim communities. For instance, just two month after the Prabhakaran-Hakeem agreement, 11 peopl were killed and many more injured as a result of a w of Tamil-Muslim riots.
73 Hakeemand Thamilchelvan met in June 2002 to agree to Setup a Karikalan subsequently announced that the LTTE would talk to al an LTTE tactic to negotiate directly with the grassroots and under
74 Immediately after the CFA, peace seminars, inter-ethnic dialogue not be mistaken for a sign that political space has grown, howev whereas it used to be Outside. Nonetheless, these activities may
75 For instance, the PonguTamil Celebrations in Jaffna were a powe
76 The two universities (Batticaloa and Jaffna), for example, have remaining Critical minds. Throughout the war and the Ceasefire, Center of Tamil nationalism and LTTE activism, while the Eastern distance from the LTTE. The wave of killings and intimidation aro

Fourth, like the JVP in its previous incarnation, the the LTTE's project of political consolidation extends into al the social sphere:
"Bringing the public sphere under total control, with no space for deliberative politics, was a major strategic objective of JVP violence in 1987-1989. vith The LTTE carries on these politics in Sri Lanka's
Á
lt, Tamil society with great passion and commitment"
(Uyangoda, 2003c:54).
D Its control of NGOs and other civil society actors, again,
l, goes back a long way. However, the CFA and the
with Karuna issue have influenced this dynamic. In some
ed respects it has opened up spaces for civil society' and in
others it has closed them. It has enabled the LTTE to
ау strengthen its grip in government-controlled areas.” In
he addition, the Karuna issue had the effect of dramatically
decreasing the political space for autonomous civil society thought and action." This particularly applies to hat the East, where the Tamil population increasingly feel e forced to take sides. This is combined with an ongoing
LTTE strategy of keeping society on a war footing, using S hartals, demonstrations, and security incidents to
periodically raise the political temperature and prevent er dissent from emerging. The LTTE has also expanded its led media operations since the CFA, including a new FM station and a satellite channel, both broadcasting from hd Kilinochchi (Nadarajah, 2005). Based on current trends, s the LTTE's policy of political consolidation is moving e the North-East toward an illiberal peace rather than a ave democratic peace.
special LTTE-SLMC joint Committee to monitor the full implementation of MOU. However, parties representing Muslim interest, not just the SLMC (Bush, 2003). Many see this as mine the Credibility of the Muslim leadership.
, exchange visits, and peace Committees became quite Common. These activities should er. They are merely a result of the fact that peace is now within the liberation discourse, have a lasting impact on people's attitudes and perceptions.
ful example of the LTTE's ability to mobilize the population behind a nationalist discourse.
both been badly affected, having witnessed the death or departure of some of the last the universities have continued to be powerful political actors, with Jaffna University a University had a strong Cultural focus On the eastern Concerns and attempted to keep its ind Batticaloa have assured the silence of Eastern University for SOme time.

Page 57
Southern politics: To understand how the LTTE engages inte
with the South, it is important to appreciate the IN( leadership's obsession with the idea that they will not be nee the next generation of leaders to be taken for a ride by the
the southern elite. They will not allow the South to play bee a divide and rule strategy and this is one reason why the 200 Karuna issue is so important to them. What appears to scal be LTTE paranoia is therefore based upon a particular Par; perspective regarding history and experience. It also stems mai from an awareness of the considerable dangers and costs rep of peace - the LTTE must be seen to deliver to their 2W2 constituency in the North-East’ and the Tamil diaspora. gov
ver To a great extent, the LTTE are thinking like a state and inc their ISGA proposal indicates that they demand rath executive powers and jurisdiction in line with the U.N
Palestinian Authority. While the ISGA represented a
maximalist proposal, key informants who were involved Ho in the peace talks felt that it was genuinely an opening poli gambit in what was expected to be a protracted tOS bargaining process. The LTTE were, according to these det informants, surprised and shocked not to get a response has
from the UNF government. On the other hand, the IT. LTTE must have been aware of the effects of such a LT proposal on the southern electorate. Talks on the P- exр TOMS, as already mentioned, reproduced the same type Thi of dynamics because they relate to questions of арр legitimacy and the control of resources. the
With peace talks stalled, the LTTE's main channel of Sос influence on the politics of the South is through its 22 Wel TNA MPs. While they clearly speak for the LTTE, one
might speculate on whether this could lead to a more Th substantive involvement in democratic politics on the racl part of the LTTE in the future. The MPs can potentially ext have a disproportionate influence, given the unstable dat: nature of coalition governments in the South. socii (Sc.
International politics: The LTTE has always drawn upon
and
the political and financial resources of international
StUl
actors and networks. During the 1990s, for example,
77
78
Tamilchelvan, for instance, has been reported to have said in an interview that to deliver on his promises to the people.
This includes computer databases with extensive personal information of potenti in the homeland. All LTTE fund Collectors have access to personal information of

51 | Conflict Dynamics
rnational organizations including the U.N. and GOs played a critical role in meeting the welfare ds of the population and cushioning the impacts of economic embargo. The Tamil diaspora have also n central to their state building strategy (Gunaratna, 13). However, the peace process enabled the LTTE to e up its international image-building campaign. allel to the talks, the movement traveled across inland Europe and other parts of the world, resenting the Tamil cause. The LTTE are keenly re of the legitimizing effects of interacting with the ernmental and inter-governmental system. They are
sensitive to where power lies, and appear to be reasingly focusing their attention on the head office, er than country level offices of bodies such as the N. or the EU.
w the post 9/11 environment affected the LTTE's itical relationship with the Tamil diaspora is difficult ay. According to Gunaratna (2003:214), "the new armination of host states to target terrorist financing significantly curtailed diaspora support for the TE," and he goes on to argue that this explains the TE's desire to sue for peace. However, this does not lain the LTTE's unilateral ceasefires before 9/11. is is an area requiring further research, though it does lear likely that the LTTE felt increasing pressure from diaspora to explore a political settlement after 9/11.
io-economic Challenges: Resource Extraction, Wealth, and
fare
e LTTE has also acted like a state (and protection ket) in terms of their extraction of internal and arnal resources. Like a state, they have relied upon a collection for taxation purposes' and to make iety more "legible" and, therefore, more governable ott, 1998). Precise figures are difficult to ascertain
those available are of questionable validity. One ly of LTTE finances found that the LTTE's annual
Ie could not go back to Jaffna in the Current situation as he was notable
al supporters including details of their family members both overseas and the Tamils living in their area.

Page 58
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 52
revenue reached $100 million, of which $60 million w generated from overseas” (Gunaratna, 2003:210). As mentioned above, it is unclear to what extent 9/11 affected the capacity of the LTTE to generate resource through the diaspora. However, if it did have an adver effect, this would help explain the intensification of internal resource extraction post CFA."
The LTTE tax regime has been in operation since at least 1990, so it was not an outcome of the CFA. But reach has been extended into government held areas, and taxes that were once levied clandestinely are now extracted more openly and systematically (Sarvanantha 2003:4)." Farmers, fishermen, and small businesses all have to pay taxes and this is passed onto customers in the North-East in the form of higher prices. There is also an array of indirect taxes; for instance, goods passing through LTTE territory to Jaffna are taxed at rates ranging from 5 percent to 25 percent. All vehicle in LTTE territory pay a vehicle registration tax and passengers traveling to Jaffna are subject to a unit tax c Rs.350 per person. Businesses and individuals are routinely asked to contribute to LTTE coffers, while th sale of property in Jaffna is subject to taxation.
The LTTE's vision of self-sufficient, rural-based development is similar to that of the JVP: "The LTTE economic policies such as self reliance, control of markets etc., smacks of economic nationalism" (Sarvananthan, 2003:12). Although the opening up of the A9 road will mean opening up the North-East to t forces of globalization, the LTTE are to a large extent running a cartel economy. In fact, the LTTE monopolization of the northern economy has intensifi
79. Of this later figure, 90 percent was used for military procurement and was generated through Solicited grants, trade, investments, and bus LTTE's annual income to be $82 million (Fair, 2004:31).
8O Interestingly, Gunaratna (2003) argues that LTTE funds dropped drama
any figures.
81 This occurs both in LTTE controlled areas (where some 15 percent of
82 For instance, there were recently imposed monopolies on essential g to the peninsula. It is estimated that around 10 million Rs per day art On the A9 (Sarvananthan, 2003). However, given the extremely low average contributed only 3 percent to the national GDP annually (Sar
88 TRO is an international NGO with its headquarters in Australia andf
It has public Overseas offices in fifteen COuntries in North American

as since the CFA, resulting in a rise in the cost of living in
the north." More lucrative perhaps, has been LTTE investments in the southern economy. Many Tamils are s investing, for instance, in real estate and business in
Colombo that can generate higher returns than the North-East. For the LTTE, this serves the dual function of raising revenue and intelligence gathering. Therefore, over the years the LTTE has increasingly systematized and institutionalized its systems of predation, extortion, and taxation. One might speculate, particularly during this no war-no peace environment, that these economic interests may, for certain factions within the LTTE, increasingly become an end rather than a means.
SC
its
Ո»
In spite of its state-like pretensions, the primary source of entitlements for the population of the North-East remains the Sri Lankan state, which is supplemented by the efforts of international and national aid agencies. This is one of the reasons why negotiations around Sub Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North-East (SIHRN) were so critical for the LTTE. It was envisaged as the de facto development authority for the North-East, with economic self-determination being the precursor to de jure political autonomy (Sriskandarajah, 2003). The growth of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization y (TRO), o particularly since the tsunami, has been a
significant development and is itself part of the LTTE's drive toward internal and external legitimacy. The TRO enables the Tigers to overcome restrictions in accessing he international funding, to engage directly and openly
with aid agencies, and to serve their constituencies in the East. Finally, the TRO provides a way of linking in diaspora support to Tamil welfare issues.
16
the rest for managing LTTE offices and events; 50 percent of the international revenue sinesses (Gunaratna, 2003:210). Another study by the Rand Foundation estimates the
tically during the peace talks of 1990 and 1994 though he does not say why or provide
the Tamil population lives), in the rest of the Country and among the diaspora.
|OOds like wheat flour and cement. This was followed by an LTTE ban on gold imports 2 generated through various taxes and tariffs on vehicles, goods, and people traveling tax base of the North and East-between 1990 and 2000, the northern province on vananthan, 2003) - one should keep local taxation in perspective.
ield offices in the North and East, including a huge newly opened Center in Killinochi. and Continental Europe, Africa and Asia (Gunaratna, 2003).

Page 59
Radicalization in the Upcountry Alt
O In the past twenty years, there has been a discernable eth radicalization of hill country politics. The emergence of the the Upcountry People's Front (UPF) is the clearest St. manifestation of this process. Although the UPF has ро expressed sympathy with the Eelam struggle, the hill ро
country remains largely detached from the peace process. co
Box 4.3 summarizes some of the key upcountry political
developments that preceded the peace process.
84
85
In this section, hill Country and upcountry are used interchangeably to describe plantation workers often settled down in close proximity to newly cleared Sir importance after the war broke out.
In Bindunuwewa, Some 25 Tamil detainees were hacked to death inside the bou
 

53 Conflict Dynamics
hough the grievances of the upcountry Tamils have
tled to armed rebellion, the region has experienced nic violence in the recent past, as demonstrated by : Bindunuwewa atrocity. The combination of uctural disadvantage, a growing sense of grievance, a litical vanguard (educated youth), and a strong set of litical demands (through the UPF) may become a mbustible cocktail in the future.
famils of nineteenth century Indian origin. Being "late arrivals," the former hala Colonization villages. These border areas have become of strategic
ndaries of their rehabilitation camp in October 2000 by Sinhalese villagers.

Page 60
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 54
The UPF moved the upcountry Tamils' political agenda from the traditional CWC focus on welfare and economic rights toward a more radical set of demands focusing on social justice and political right The party embraces the notion of homeland and demands self-determination for the upcountry Tamils As with the Muslims, there is an emerging nationalist discourse, which has involved the gradual amplification of radical voices that criticize the moderate leadership. Sri Lanka's "secondary" minorities have learned both from their own experience and from the northeastern Tamils that moderate voices are rarely listened to in the southern polity. The peace process has reinforced this perception. The UPF has sought to strengthen ties with the LTTE, while advocating solutions to the unique difficulties of their community. The ceasefire period enabled the UPF to have more open contacts with the LTTE. The CWC, meanwhile, is engaged in a fine balancing act, attempting to avoid simultaneously alienating both the PA and the TNA (and thus the LTTE), and its own constituencies.
The peace process amplified pre-existing trends by strengthening the group consciousness of hill country Tamils with their own specific interests and grievance and deepening the political differences between the CWC and UPF. While the former allied with the UPFA, the UPF has remained loyal to the UNP. In th short term, hill country issues are unlikely to have a fundamental impact on the peace process. But in the longer term, deprivation and nationalism in the upcountry may generate a political force to be reckoned with, in either the pursuit of war or peace.
86 For example, the CWC publicly demanded that the ISGA be taken ser
the ISGAWas the raison d'être of the UPFA Coalition.
87 Mr. Ashraff died in a helicopter Crash on September 16, 2000. Many
88 Mrs. Ashraff joined the Opposition, while Hakeem sided with the UNF
position. Most of Hakeem's SLMC took to the opposition ranks; Ashraf necessary to form a majority.

S,
44.3 Muslim Politics
As outlined in Box 4.4, the Muslims have always been a heterogeneous and politically divided group. With the creation and rise of the SLMC in the 1980s, Muslim politics developed its own separate platform and agenda. But with the death of its founding father, M.H.M. Ashraff, in 2000 and the subsequent power struggle between his wife Ferial Ashraff (who created the National Unity Alliance-NUA) and Rauff Hakeem (who came to lead the SLMC), the numerous internal divisions were exposed. The Muslims were confronted with the peace process at a time of internal conflict and contested leadership. Though Ferial Ashraf and Hakeem have avoided open confrontation on issues regarding the peace talks, they have persistently taken seats on opposite sides of the parliamentary floor."
The peace process has had two key effects on Muslim politics. First it raised the political stakes, which accentuated competition and pre-existing fault lines within the Muslim polity. Second, it affected the relationship between the Muslim leadership and their constituencies. Having mandated the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) to protect Muslim interests, people in the war-affected areas (and in the southeast in particular) had high expectations. The gap between the more pragmatic approach of the leadership and the more hard line and radical position of their constituencies has grown during the course of the peace process.
iously when it joined the UPFA coalition, but it was clear to many that opposition to
people suspect foul play.
When the talks broke down and the UPFA removed the UNF, the two leaders switched 's NUA helped the PA-JVPalliance to get the desperately needed parliamentary seats

Page 61
The Peace Process and Muslim Divisions the
Mt According to one interviewee in the East, throughout pea the war, the Muslims "chose national politics," while OCC
89
90
These figures are based on the 1981 Census, which is still considered to be the
Interviews in the East revealed a pronounced tendency to stereotype the "othe relative growth of the Muslim population. On the other hand, some Muslim infor to Wage War.
 

55 Conflict Dynamics
it a later stage, the Malays (3.8 perc nt came to Sri
olonies: Java, Malacca, and Somalia. All groups are entrated last (as well as in Colombo and in the d Colo ħree groups r distinct and ethnic is throughout Sri is
riots in Gampaha in 1915, the Muslim communities men married Sinhala and Tamilw ies became socio-economically interdo phic concentration and the fact that they became a
engage in trade and services. 家
uu caused deep-seated S. Many Tamils, on the other hand, blame the Muslims it armed forces when the Tamils were struggling for schools granted by Muslim politi who engaged
Tamils "chose a liberation struggle." Successive
Islim politicians had taken part in war- and cetime government coalitions, and the Muslims cupied a considerable number of administrative
most reliable.
ir." Tamils feared the perceived radicalization of Islamists and the steady mants argued that Tamils were poor and marginalized because they chose

Page 62
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 56
posts.” With the signing of the CFA and the commencement of talks, existing political differen within the Muslim polity became more acute. The LTTE engaged in direct talks with the state on the basis of its military might, while the Muslims end on the margins.
The Muslims feared domination by the LTTE and becoming a "community of political and social slav the North-East (Mohideen 2001:26). Earlier experi with peace talks, most notably with the Indo-Lanka agreement, had left a bad memory.” Eastern Muslir particular, demanded an independent seat at the negotiation table, pointing to their separate ethnic identity, their homeland, and their inherent right to determination. The new SLMC leader, Rauff Hak became one of the four government delegates at the talks. However, many Muslims interpreted this as a tokenism, with Hakeem providing the UNF with legitimacy, but failing to defend the interests of his constituency. The Hakeem-Prabhakaran agreement similarly distrusted. Although viewed at the time as political success by Hakeem,' it made little differen the situation on the ground for Muslims, who cont to face restrictions and violence. Popular distrust of Hakeem reached a climax when he was called back the Oslo talks in December 2002 and suspended as SLMC leader. Though he managed to stay in office room for maneuver was limited." Ferial Ashraf ran similar difficulties in relation to the signing of the P-TOMS agreement. She found it increasingly diffi to maintain popular confidence and counter the perception that she was being manipulated.
9. The North-East Provincial Council (NEPC) being a notorious exce
92 Muslims believe President J.R. Jayawardene had imposed the elections, President Premadasa dissolved the Council in 1991 aft The accord invited the IPKF and left the Muslims Vulnerable to a
93 Among others, it recognized the Muslims as a separate group, fr.
Muslims to return to their lands.
94 Among eastern Muslims, anger against Hakeem was further fue the right political and diplomatic skills, but he's not a son of Our
95 Following the introduction of the PR system, the two mainstre
bargaining power.
 
 

The Muslim demand for a separate delegation to the
CCS peace process - and later the negotiations on P-TOMS
was pressing, but Muslim politicians failed to make a very strong case to the government - though there was
ed up Protest it was rarely with one voice. The creation of a
joint Muslim Peace Secretariat represented a significant step toward developing a common and consistent Muslim position. Whether the secretariat will gather enough resources and political momentum to forge a meaningful Muslim alliance remains to be seen. The diametric opposition of NUA and the SLMC on key
issues like P-TOMS indicates that the secretariat still has
eS 1
ence
ms, in a long way to go.
self- The Peace Process and Muslim Radicalization cem,
Sri Lanka's smaller political parties - all of who are ethnically oriented - differ in the way they have taken up their role as political kingmaker. Some of the minority parties (like the JVP and the TNA) have tended to take W2S harder positions. On the other hand, the Muslims (like a. the CWC) tend to bargain over a relatively minor set of . issues without demanding a major reorientation of
national policies, thus making them attractive coalition
partners. The difference between the CWC and the Muslims, in turn, is that the former makes their
from decisions en bloc, while Muslim politicians make their
t deals individually or in sub-groups. During the latter
1S
stage of the war, this strategy provided the Muslims with into relative benefits. However, when their very future was
tabled at the peace talks, the northeastern Muslims cult demanded a more robust bargaining position that would
prevent subjugation to LTTE rule and secure Muslim autonomy.
ption.
North-East merger and the NEPC on them. Though the SLMC participated in the NEPC er it had declared independence and appointed the members, none of whom were Muslim. ttacks and atrocities, perpetrated or connived by the Indian forces.
2ed them from LTTE taxes, promised to Consult them on issues affecting them, and allowed
led by the fact that (unlike Ashraff) he is not from eastern Sri Lanka. "Rauff Hakeem has soil," according to One Muslim respondent.
eam parties rely on them for a parliamentary majority. This gives small parties greater :

Page 63
The peace process thus catalyzed a new set of demands
from the Muslims, particularly in the East, where they are most populous. The pragmatism that prevailed during the war gave way to a revival of the plea for autonomy. This was reinforced by widespread disappointment about the limited peace dividend after the ceasefire. The resulting gap between Muslim political
s leaders and their constituencies poses a major challenge.
"We have left room for the youth to lose faith in us," Ferial Ashraf acknowledged. "The risk of youth being alienated is great." Radicalism among Muslim youth and the strong political viewpoints put forward by societal leaders, such as mosque leaders and university staff, have created a strong Muslim-nationalist discourse.
The
Dec
Uni
autC in th
200 debe hom polit
ΠΟΥ the the
96 lin fact, the KAP survey showed that "A Muslim majority (51 percent) supported th
9 Previous debates on the de-merging of the North and East also revealed differ Northern and Eastern Provinces in 1987. Being the biggest population group in the to "political slaves" (Mohideen 2001:26) in the joined North-East Province (with 0
 
 

57 Conflict Dynamics
clearest manifestation of this discourse is the Oluvil
laration, named after the town of the Southeastern versity, where thousands gathered to demand an nomous political unit and respect for Muslim rights he rest of the country (Ismail, Abdullah, and Fazil 5). The feasibility of such a political unit is open to ite (see Box 4.5). Nonetheless, there is a growing logeneity among eastern Muslims, and the room for tical bargaining seems to be minimal. The fact that e of the Muslim politicians in Colombo reacted to Declaration illustrates the political distance between people (in the East) and their political leaders.
e Creation of an LTTE ISGA" (CPA 2004:22).
ences. The Muslims from the East strongly criticize the merging of the East (38 percent, according to some accounts), the Muslims are reduced nly 18 percent).

Page 64
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 58
There is a striking resemblance between the rise of Muslim nationalism and the emergence of both Sinhalese and Tamil communalism in earlier times. Quite like the Tamils in the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim politicians are faced with youth radicalizati shrinking space for compromise, limited political options to satisfy their clientele, and an increasingly strong threat of violent escalation. The language an demands put forward by nationalist leaders are also similar.” As one SLMC member commented: "We' push the democratic way as much as possible, but i fail, what are we going to tell the youth? They may resort to violence." There does not seem to be any significant organized military strength among the Muslims, but the June 2002 clashes in Muthur, Batticaloa, and Valaichennai, in which Muslim you (particularly those from the Southeastern University played a key role, are just one illustration of the lim control of the Muslim leadership.
4.5 THETSUNAMIAND PEACE/ CONFLICT
DYNAMICS
The tsunami, as already mentioned, had profound
humanitarian and development costs. The devastati was widespread and all three groups were affected,
though the (primarily Muslim and Tamil) populati the Amparai and Mullaitivu Districts were worst hi (Frerks and Klem 2005). Although natural disasters in a sense "non discriminatory," war-affected count have higher pre-existing levels of vulnerability, whil distribution of vulnerability tends to be geographic
concentrated in the areas most affected by violence.
Initially, the tsunami seemed to have a "conflict
dampening" effect, in a context of growing politica military tensions. As mentioned earlier, the militar) capabilities of both sides appeared to have been aff
98 Both the phrasing and the Contents of the Oluvil Declaration art in the run up to the war. It declared that the struggle for an inc the Tamil Nation in this Country" (TULF1976).
99 This initiative has led to high profile claims of fraud and govern

Ol,
fwe
の
ited
On
ons of
26
ries e the ally
and
r
‘cted,
decreasing the likelihood of a swift return to war in the near future. On the ground, the tsunami also appeared to stimulate social energy, with high levels of intercommunity and even inter-LTTE/SLAF collaboration (ibid). The highly charged political stalemate around the peace process was temporally put to one side, and there appeared to be a window of opportunity to rebuild trust between the two parties. It was hoped that, like many other naturals disasters, the tsunami would have a "social compacting" effect and potentially act as a catalyst for
the peace process.
However, "normal politics" did not remain suspended for long. Though the tsunami itself did bring people together, the response reflected and accentuated preexisting tensions. Politics returned with a vengeance and with it, the potential for renewed conflict. Like the peace process itself, the tsunami response heightened the political and economic stakes, acting as a lightening rod for wider tensions and grievances.
The tsunami response reflected the underlying pathologies of the state and the competing systems of governance in Sri Lanka. Each party saw the tsunami as an opportunity to strengthen their legitimacy through the control and distribution of resources. The response in the South reflected the overly centralized, but fractured and patrimonial, nature of the state. The President set up a supra-centralized coordination mechanism for relief, while southern politicians managed to safeguard considerable assets for their constituencies, including the Prime Minister's "Helping Hambantota" initiative.” The government response to the North and East was unsurprisingly slower and more limited. Moreover, various Muslim ministers and MPs, some of whom had ministerial positions, were less effective in gaining a share of the spoils for their electoral base in the East.
very similar to the Vaddukoddai Resolution of 1976. This resolution is seen as a key step ependent Tamil Eelam had become "inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of
ment misappropriation Of m0ney.

Page 65
In addition to the challenge of delivering immediate relief, the government struggled with the infrastructure and legislation required for longer term rehabilitation and resettlement. The persistent lack of clarity about the coastal buffer zone (constraining reconstruction close to the sea) was a case in point. The exact size of this zone (100 meters, 200 meters, or even more) and the related conditions remained unclear for months, thus hampering people's attempts to rebuild their lives.
The state's response compared unfavorably with that of its two main challengers, the LTTE and the JVP. Both mobilized a large number of people to deliver humanitarian relief in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. The hierarchical organizational structures of the JVP and LTTE (in contrast to the mainstream parties) were well suited to the demands of a large-scale relief operation. TRO, as the principal humanitarian arm of the LTTE, benefited from a huge influx of diaspora funding, enabling it to orchestrate a significant response in the North and East, including Muslim areas in Ampara. Likewise, the JVP in addition to its activities in the South through the Relief Services Force, worked with Muslim and Tamil communities in the East. Although in many respects such initiatives were blatantly opportunistic, they served to reinforce the perception that the state was slow, cumbersome, and biased. The tsunami response has probably had the effect of further de-legitimizing the state and entrenching the positions of anti/non-state actors. As explored further in Section 5, the international response runs the danger of accentuating this process, with the response of the state machinery being dwarfed by international aid from diaspora and official donor sources.
The uneven distributional effects of aid have exacerbated a range of ethnic, political, and social tensions. The tsunami response has become increasingly ethnicized. While the Tamils felt excluded - even obstructed - by the government, there was the perception in the South that communities in the North-East were receiving a disproportionate amount of assistance. The Muslims felt
left
affe
bec
geo,
tes
and
is es higil Mu
inh:
Cast
CCO
Anc disp
rep
ΠOt pac
poli
CO2:
leve
Ο
han
Ho
upc Stru
Me bec
adn
and
tSu1
neg 200
the:
pro PT
reg Sep
 

59 Conflict Dynamics
out by both parties, though they were the worst cted community. Moreover, tsunami relief has ome entwined with localized tensions related to graphical location, land, and caste. There have been sions between "affected" communities on the coast
"non-affected" communities in the hinterland. This specially salient, given the caste divide involved. The nest land owning castes (Goyigama for the Sinhalese, kkuvar and Vellala among the Tamils) tend to abit the interior and perceive a historic bias toward coastal communities (among others, the fishermen es), who have benefited from the investment and
nomic support in coastal areas.
other source of tension has been between the conflict placed and tsunami displaced. Many of the war cted communities in the North-East have been catedly displaced over the last two decades and yet do qualify for the "five star" relief and rehabilitation kages being offered to the tsunami displaced. Under current conditions - with heightened ethnic and itical tensions and a strong military presence in stal areas - small incidents can escalate into higher ls of violence. Perceived forms of land colonization eligious activities - like placing Buddha statues or ding out Bibles - have generated anger and distrust.
pes, expectations, and fears were increasingly pinned on the Post Tsunami Operational Management ucture (P-TOMS) - formerly called the Joint chanism (JM). Politically and symbolically, it has ome a totemic issue. Essentially, P-TOMS is an ninistrative structure through which the government
the LTTE can jointly receive and coordinate foreign nami funds. After more than five months of otiations, an agreement was finally signed in June 5, though at great cost to the government, who lost ir majority in parliament after the JVP withdrew in test. At the time of writing, implementation of OMS has been delayed by a Supreme Court decision arding its legality. A final decision is to be made on tember 12. Meanwhile, the UNP has been following

Page 66
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 60
a policy of tacit bipartisanship, while there have be strong protests from the JVP (and the JHU and a section of Bikkus), who have always opposed it, an from sections of the Muslim polity" who feel they not been given sufficient voice in the process.
Although both the government and LTTE from the outset sought to make negotiations over P-TOMS d from the peace process, many hoped that progress of former would re-energize the latter. Over time, the t were drawn closer together, to the extent that negoti over P-TOMS almost exactly mirrored the dynamics the peace process. Talks around P-TOMS ultimately boiled down to the question of governance, just as si rounds of peace talks were reduced in the end to the single issue of an interim administration. Is the soutl polity prepared to cede a level of control, resources a consequently legitimacy to the LTTE? Or is this, as JVP and JHU argued, a step toward the realization c ISGA2"There were ongoing tensions throughout th negotiations about the bilateral nature of the process particularly in relation to the limited role of the Mus and the exclusion of other Tamil groups. Because th LTTE felt increasingly insecure, particularly followin killing of Kaushalyan, they demanded that the government dismantle all paramilitary groups." On other hand, India insisted that other Tamil groups b represented. The longer talks continued, the more th Norwegians were drawn into an active mediatory rol Though the interests of India remained crucial, as signified by the President's meeting to brief Prime Minister Singh immediately following the Developm Forum in Kandy, Kumaratunga finally gave unequiv backing for P-TOMS.
1OO Although Ferial Ashraff appeared to accept the absence of a Mus the fragile unity of NUA. Hakeem, in opposition, rejected them
10. According to the JVP. PTOMS is a "bridge built to move to inter
102. On Feb 14, Balasingham told Solheim at a meeting in London th
disarming paramilitaries working alongside its armed forces and no war, no peace" Asiatimes Online, March 3, 2005).

istinct n the
WO
ations
of
e
nd the of the
ilims
g the
the
|e
lent
P-TOMS has come to epitomize the challenges and opportunities in advancing the peace process on the basis of a political consensus:
"(T)he overarching significance of the joint mechanism has oscillated between its importance in response to the post tsunamihumanitarian imperative and the pre tsunamichallenge of advancing the peace process by the two main actors concerned - the GoSL and the LTTE. In both cases, the ultimate terms of reference are the political interests of these two key political actors" (CPA, 2005:14).
To some extent, because P-TOMS has been delayed so long it has lost its practical significance. The major donors pledged their funding unconditionally and ways and means will be found on the ground to deliver assistance to the North-East with or without PTOMS. However, it clearly still has huge symbolic value. Ultimately, post tsunami reconstruction and the peace process will come face to face with the unfinished business of peacebuilding and the two will have to be reconciled (Loganathan, 2005:10). Failure to implement P-TOMS may not mean the end of the peace process, but will nevertheless undermine it and raise questions about the ability of the two sides to reach a negotiated settlement. If the government does not "even want to compromise on a temporary issue (like the joint mechanism), how can we expect a structural solution from them?" (Tamil civil society member in the East).
:lim delegation to the P-TOMSnegotiations, the departure of One Muslim minister revealed 2chanism outright.
m administration and from there to separate Tamil Eelam" (cited in Manoharan, 2005:10).
at the GoSL had to take steps to restore confidence in the peace process, in particular by to establish a joint mechanism with the LTTE for post tsunami aidizzadeen, "In Sri Lanka,

Page 67
4.6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURESCENARIOS vio
4.6.1 Conclusions wit
1st The current situation may therefore be best Fig characterized as a "pause in conflict" rather than "post CO conflict." In the above section we focused on the peace wh process and its impact on the internal dynamics of pe.
Figure 4.2
Sinhalese Periphery
Upcountry Periphery
 
 
 
 
 

61 Conflict Dynamics
lent conflict (the international dimensions are dealt h in Section 5) and mapping out the complex set of 2r and intra-group relationships that are outlined in
4.2. This takes us well beyond a bipolar model of the flict. Two key points can be drawn from the analysis, ich have significant implications for peacemaking and cebuilding.
Muslim Periphery
Tamil Periphery

Page 68
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 62
First, there is the question of where one draws the boundaries around "the conflict" and how inclusive/exclusive the peace process should be. We attempted in our analysis to move beyond a bipola "ethnic" model toward a more systemic understand of the conflict. The state has been the starting poin our analysis, and we have argued that a core/periph state/anti-state dynamic has been at the heart of bo the LTTE and the JVP struggles." In the past two decades, we have seen the radicalization of other peripheries, most notably the Muslims and upcoun Tamils. Logically, in order to take the violence out Lankan politics, the peace process focused on the t principal armed groups, the GoSL and the LTTE. However, it proved impossible to address this dyna in isolation from other key "intra-core (UNP-SLFP "inter-periphery" (Tamil-Muslim), and "intra-perip (LTTE and Karuna faction) relationships. Peace negotiations raised the political stakes and acted as lightening rod for a range of other political and soc tensions. The relations within and between groups being altered fundamentally: "the dynamics that ap to have enabled the signing of the Ceasefire Agreen (such as financial constraints and military stalemate quite different from the intra-group issues that nee. be addressed if the CFA is to move toward a sustair peace process" (Bush, 2003: 176). Therefore, "peac has had a disorientating effect on the various actors inflaming competing nationalisms, and creating nei anxieties among excluded groups. In some respects, conflict has mutated into a complex set of tri-polar conflicts in both the North (Muslim, LTTE, and Karuna) and the South (UNP SLFP and JVP). Thi dynamic is not altogether new and, arguably, there many commonalities in terms of the constellation c forces at the time of the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accords. Clearly, peace negotiations cannot simultaneously t. all the inter-connected conflicts described above. Attempting to do so is likely to place too much stra an already pressurized Track One process. But neith
103 The difference being that whereas the LTTE's objective was to tu
 

have
ling it for
ery,
try of Sri
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can they be sidelined and ignored. The central challenge is how to build an inclusive peace process that incorporates and addresses the inter-connected sources of conflict, without overloading it. As explored later, building inclusion does not necessarily mean pinning everything onto the Track One negotiations.
Second, there is the question of whether and how a limited peace can lead to a transformative peace - which necessarily involves tackling the underlying structural dimensions of conflict. The peace process itself has become an important dynamic in the conflict. Arguably, there is a central paradox in that the dynamics generated by the peace process play a role in freezing or even exacerbating the structural factors underpinning the conflict. The core question here is about the relationship between structures and dynamics and how the peace process can and should tackle both what produces war and what reproduces the conditions of war. There is clearly a need to think about both and how they interrelate. In 1994 - 1995, there was a focus on product rather than process, which has been described as a "big bang" approach. On the other hand, the UNP-LTTE talks, perhaps over-compensating for past failures, focused on "normalization," but failed to adequately address the underlying structural issues. Also, the UNF government's attempt to simultaneously negotiate peace while negotiating globalization through its reform program, introduced two major changes simultaneously that were too much for the southern polity (Uyangoda, 2003a). Arguably, the negotiations suffered from the lack of a clear road map, or a transformational agenda, which made it easier for spoilers to undermine confidence in the peace process.
In relation to these questions of inclusion and transformation, it appears that processes, institutions, and individuals at the meso level play a pivotal role. Political parties, the press, provincial government, civil society organizations, and the like all operate in this
Irn the periphery into a "core," the JVP aimed to take Control of the COre.

Page 69
mid-level terrain and may be used by either conflict spoilers or peacemakers. Conflict entrepreneurs have, arguably, been more successful in co-opting such actors and institutions, so that they have become "neuralgia" points, inflaming inter and intra-group grievances. Perhaps this battle for the middle ground is one of the keys to advancing the peace process, as a stronger focus in this area by peacemakers could have mitigated the anxieties created by"closed door" negotiations.
4.6.2 Future Scenarios
It is not possible to predict how the new dynamics created by the peace process itself will play themselves out in the future. Violence (and peace) involves too many unanticipated consequences. However, it is possible to map out three different (but overlapping) medium-term scenarios based on the above analysis.
Touard Positive Peace
This is based on the assumption that the current "Cold War" (or "Cold Peace") can be transformed over time into sustainable peace. At the time of writing, it appears that neither side wants to go back to war, though we do not have the requisite settlement stability to find a solution. There have been numerous opportunities for conflict escalation, but the peace process has managed to survive significant challenges including changes of government, the Karuna defection, the tsunami, and the stalling of P-TOMS.
A critical question is whether interim solutions, like PTOMS, can create enough confidence and impetus among the parties both to allow structural changes and to enable abroader set of actors (the Muslims, the Sinhala opposition, and so on) to be included. Much depends on whether there is sufficient stability in the southern polity and, in particular, on the role of the JVP For this scenario to occur, one could envisage a bi-party strategic alliance in relation to the peace process.
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63 Conflict Dynamics
ugh based on history this may be unlikely, the tacit cy of bipartisanship in relation to P-TOMS is a tive sign. Another possibility would be for one of the ies to have a dominant position with control over n the presidency and the PM's office. This would require a coalition that does not depend on onents of the peace process and/or a strategy for ging them onside. Whether such a Jayawardene-like roach could work with regard to peace remains to be 1. Evidently, a "big bang" peace deal could provoke or political and popular protests.
ative Equilibrium
s might be characterized as the "Cypress scenario" h both sides locked into a negative equilibrium. This lario is based on the assumption that a limited peace
not lead, at least in the medium term, to a sformative peace. Essentially, there are stronger entives for the status quo than for structural change. uably, there has been a shift from a "hurting emate" to a plain stalemate. A strange kind of malcy or negative equilibrium prevails in which the parties gain significant benefits. The LTTE have led from CFA both economically and politically (and haps militarily). In the South, peace of a sort has ken out that does not demand the sacrifices required a meaningful settlement. International actors have red a critical role in preventing a return to hostilities. Irt from the direct role of the SLMM, the security rantees and indirect pressures applied by India and U.S. have probably helped prevent the LTTE from Irning to their bunkers. It is, however, a very fragile ilibrium. The LTTE will not settle for the current ation if there is an ongoing challenge to their emony in the East and if this scenario edges them er to a unilateral declarations of de facto statehood,
may lead to a violent reaction in the southern polity.

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 64
Resumption of War
The possibility of war is always inherent in the curr situation and we have not reached the point of irreversibility in the peace process. Arguably, the pai war helped set in motion the peace process, but nov the "pain of peace" that may be pushing the two sic back to war. In other words, as dissatisfaction about lack of a peace dividend in the North-East and perc intransigence of the other side grows, there has beer gradual shift from "war weariness" to "peace wearin There are a number of commonalities between the current situation and the time of Indo-Lankan Acco which was the catalyst for another round of violence
conflict in both the North-East and the South.
An "accidental war" (minor incidents escalating into escalation) can never be ruled out, but given the abi of the two parties to avert escalations of violence so this does not seem likely. One may also speculate ab a "limited war" (a short, location-specific battle) but our view, such a conflict would not remain limited f long. Sri Lankan peace processes have usually ended with a rapid and conscious resumption of violence. the government hanging in the balance the LTTE m wait to see what's in store for them, but if P-TOMS to materialize and if in the eyes of the LTTE government intransigence continues, war may becon the more attractive option.
Such a scenario would likely be very bloody. Followi recent re-armament and recruitment, we may expect return to levels of violence characteristic of the "war peace" period of the PA government. Though the L) is aware of international repugnance for terrorist stri (like the attack on the Temple of the Tooth or the Central Bank), this may still involve targeting of sensitive places in the South. The response of other (potentially) armed actors, like Karuna and the Musl in the East, is more difficult to predict, but if infight among non-state groups resumes in the East, the humanitarian consequences would be tremendous.
 

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Page 71
5. International Engagement
Summary: The peace process in Sri Lanka has become hig! security guarantees, ceasefire monitoring, facilitation humanitarian/development assistance. This section is divid support for ceasefire monitoring and Tracks One and Two fac and development assistance in relation to the dynamics of the is argued first that international intervention played an impor also preventing a return to war. But it has not had a tra highlighted in the previous section, there is scope for internat can be incorporated more substantively into the peace proce influence conflict dynamics through the application of peace is argued that for peace conditionalities to have a significan process and a reorientation of the overall framework for aid the peacebuilding impacts of development assistance.
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5.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
ENGAGEMENT WITH PEACE AND CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA
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In this section our focus moves onto the international dimensions of conflict and the peace process. SCA1 stated that "Sri Lanka does not represent an attractive site for a peace rush amongst international mediators at the present moment. The acceptance of the Indo-centric character of the sub-continent has served to limit political attention or intervention" (Goodhand, 2001:52). This is no longer the case. Robust international support for the peace process in Sri Lanka reflects wider global trends. In the post-Cold War era there has been a re-working of global governance. Previous inhibitions about interceding in conflict and security issues have been shed. Aid and conflict resolution discourses have been successively re-invented to legitimize a variety of external interventionist strategies. This is labelled by Mark Duffield (2001) as the "liberal peace," which can be summarized as "an ideological mix of neo-liberal concepts of democracy,
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104 This is also connected to northern concerns about international migration. In Sri
the return of refugees from Europe. There has frequently been a premature en "normal" (Philipson, 1999:26).
105 The first generation being economic conditionalities and the second generation I

| 65 | International Engagement
aly internationalized. This has taken the form of external of peace negotiations (Tracks One and Two), and ed into two parts. The first part examines international ilitation. The second part explores the role of humanitarian : peace process and the structural dimensions of conflict. It tant role in creating the preconditions for negotiations and
nsformational effect on domestic political processes. As tional actors to consider how inclusion and transformation ss. Second, development actors have attempted to directly conditionalities and the generation of a peace dividend. It it and positive impact there must be a robust Track One in Sri Lanka. The absence of these two conditions limited
rket sovereignty and conflict resolution that ermine contemporary strategies of intervention" ugh and Cooper, 2004: 6).
Lanka represents one of a number of contemporary periments in liberal peacebuilding. Though each
text is different, these experiments share some nmon characteristics. First, they are justified in terms che central tenets of the "liberal peace" of market
ereignty and democracy. Second, they involve multindate responses, bringing together military, diplomatic, -elopment, and humanitarian actors. Third, they are
racterized by new institutional arrangements, involving nplex sub-contracting relationships between state, vate, and voluntary sector organizations. Fourth, there
been a convergence of development and security ncerns. Underdevelopment is seen to be dangerous and development and humanitarian assistance are reasingly viewed as strategic tools for conflict nagement, something that has been characterized as
"securitization" of aid (Duffield, 2001). 104 A third neration 105 of aid conditionality emerged as awareness
Lanka, for instance, development assistance is linked to the drive toward thusiasm among the international community to declare the situation as
being political conditionalities.

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 66
grew about the links between conflict and developm Peace was added to economic and political reforms, further condition to be placed on aid. Peace conditio - the use of formal performance criteria and informal policy dialogue to encourage the implementation of accords and the consolidation of peace - has increasir been applied to aid in conflict affected countries (Bo 2002a: 1025).
To a large extent, the above features capture contemporary characteristics of international intervention in Sri Lanka. They pre-dated the peace process, but have become more apparent during the UNF regime that actively internationalized the proc The government was also a driving force behind th demand for greater coherence and harmonization o
Figure 5.1: International interests and Policies in Si
Diplomacy Security Trade a Xას. investma
丝|下 Political - Regional security - investme 德 suren - Counter terrorism opportunit Wa - - - - ië | united siri || -Trans-national o : tra
Lanka criminality, money ations 器 laundering, drugs, 圭 arms Smuggling
- Track One - SLMM - Foreign ಝೂ' - Antiterrorism {{!!! :
orway aSUCS nVeStrmen Track TWO - Military K 용 initiatives assistan се, sector sup
training, and - Military finance equipment
|- SAARC |agreement
106
For example, in Bosnia donors have attempted to linkaid to prote
of people displaced by "ethnic cleansing" to return to their home
107
Clearly these stated interests are not the Only drivers of interna
peacemaker, high development assistance budgets), socio-econd in a COuntry, institutions tend to strengthen themselves rather th
 

et. international engagement. On the other hand, the S a southern nationalist reaction to what was seen as inality excessive internationalization and the compromising of
national sovereignty, shows the sensitivities around this peace issue. The state is under pressure from two directions - ngly from above by international actors and from below by усе, non state or anti state actors. The peace process has heightened these tensions and, to a large extent, its success depends upon how the state is able to manage these competing pressures - and also how sensitive international actors are to them.
In SCA1 the various interests and policies of the CCSS. international community were summarized in matrix e form. This has been updated in Fig. 5.1 below: f
ri Lanka"
nd immigration Human Rights Aid ent and refugees int - Refugees and - Respect for - Humanitarian relief ies | returneeS imagi and Poverty eradication dino - Human .
g traffickin humanitarian law - Promotion of
g democracy and good
governance
|- Immigration - Election - (Tsunami) relief and
agreements monitoring reconstruction aid t ಇಂಗ್ಲber - Support for - Development
COՈtTOIS NG0s programs through port Legal k -Legal services, government
3T8WOKS- security forces, - promotion of good - Bilateral LTTE governance agree"e" - Advocacy by UN, - Support for tS ICRC, and NGOs. NGOs/civil society
action of human rights, cooperation with the international war Crimes tribunal, and the right
S.
itional policy. Also important are factors such as international prestige (e.g. Norway as a
omic or political dogmas (e.g. neo-liberalism), and
lan phase Out).
institutional interests (once established

Page 73
To an extent, the underlying interests and concerns of gre
international actors are similar to what they were in pu: 2000. For most donor countries, the Sri Lankan conflict Lal is accorded a low priority and, as shown in Fig. 5.1, VWal! there are many reasons for international engagement to with Sri Lanka other than building peace. However, a reg major change since 2000 is that the largely rhetorical the commitment to peace and security had become, by abc 2003, a substantial practical commitment, reflected in a Foi range of different policies and programs to address or dol ameliorate conflict. What caused this shift in policy Set toward Sri Lanka? International actors' dissatisfaction op|
with the PA government's "war for peace" was clearly a sto factor that led to a reluctance to take risks and make "d political or financial investments in the country. At the ecc Donor Forum in Paris in December 2000, donors were int
outspoken about the failure of the government to Cre promote peace in any meaningful way (Burke and eng Mulakala, 2005). The PA government maintained its tha position that the conflict was an internal matter and pe discouraged unsolicited engagement from the op international community (ibid. 9). Various push and 20 pull factors induced a shift in international policies see toward Sri Lanka. First, LTTE military victories in 2000 ma raised the specter of defacto partition that had clear Pai implications for regional stability and separatist causes 2SS elsewhere around the world. Second, 9/11 meant that hav non-state military actors were increasingly viewed as a
threat to global security." Even though the LTTE has Th never taken an anti-U.S. stance, their involvement in the pol transnational shadow economy inevitably attracted int
108 For instance, in a Reuters report of June 4, 2005 it was reported: "Both India anc
seeking to build up an air force, the Sri Lankan government said after a state Manmohan Singh voiced 'concern,' while U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza R ministry officials, the Sri Lankan government said. 'Particular concern was expre and Sri Lanka said in a joint statementissued late on Friday, a day after the two the possibility of suicide air attacks by the Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam (LTTE 2005 "India, U.S. worry Sri Lanka rebels seeking airforce."
109 Sri Lanka has been known to be a transit point for arms, narcotics, and "terrorists
110 Strictly speaking there is no "international community." There are only internation values and common convictions (Weiss, 2001:423). In this study the term is use governmental organizations that have an influence on peace and security. These national interests. But they are also, as Weiss (2001) argues, operational actors w right or the Wrong thing.
 
 

67 International Engagement
ater international concern post 9/11.o These two sh factors probably induced a reappraisal of the Sri nkan conflict by international and regional players - it s no longer seen as a minor conflict that could be left burn itself out, since it had the potential to affect ional and global stability. Third, for the first time in : history of the conflict, the two main parties agreed out the need for external facilitation or mediation. urth, international actors made the assessment that mestic conditions were conducive for a negotiated tlement, and therefore Sri Lanka provided the portunity for an internationally supported success
ry in liberal peacebuilding. Fifth, the election of a onor-friendly" UNF government with a proclaimed nomic reform agenda, helped mobilize support from ernational aid donors. These final three "pull factors" ated positive incentives for international actors to resage with Sri Lanka. However, it is important to note it incentives have been altered by the suspension of ice talks and the change of government. The timism - even bullishness - of Western governments in 03/4 has been replaced by a more sceptical, wait-and
attitude. Some talk about "principled exit," while iny feel that the prospects of durable peace are slim. ticularly since the tsunami and the influx of financial istance, there is a feeling that international actors can ve limited leverage on domestic decisions makers.
ough one should not gloss over differences in the licies and practices of the various members of the ernational community," the UNF government
the United States are Concerned about reports that Tamil Tiger rebels are visit to India by President Chandrika Kumaratunga. Indian Prime Minister ice 'took serious note' during a separate briefing in Washington by foreign ssed Over the illegal acquisition of air capability,' the governments of India South Asian leaders met in New Delhi. Sri Lankan officials also discussed E) during talks with U.S. security officials in Washington," Reuters, June 4,
s." The U.S. and India, in particular, have maintained a quiet watch on this.
al institutions (Reiff, 2002:326), since the word "community" implies shared d to include the broad range of intergovernmental, governmental, and non institutions are arenas in which member states make decisions and pursue itha semi-independent identity capable of making choices and of doing the

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 | 68
positively encouraged the harmonization of internat engagement and the development of common frameworks. Compared to most other experiments i liberal peacebuilding, there appeared to be an unusu strong degree of consensus between the internationa community and the GoSL about the political and economic framework for intervention. However, as explored further below, in practice the language of "coherence" could not mask the tensions experience
Box 5.1: International Stakeholders in the Peace
Norway. Norway has been involved as a facilitatorsi it. Norway hastwo comparative advantages as a faci importantly, also to India." It is viewed as a non-threa as a peacemaker. For instance Solheim, Special Envo
India: As the dominant power in the region, India
protagonistand even spoiler. India's position is summ solution is found has to be within the framework of unity and integrity, a logic which India applies to its o Also, it is commonly assumed that India will not tolera the Union of India itself. India will not involve itself di the final outcome of the peace process. India proscr not deal with them directly. There has been growing trade, and aid. The interest and involvement of Tamil with groups such as the MDMK (a political party in T.
US: The U.S. is one of the four co-chairs of the peac Asia compared to India and Pakistan. 关 proscribed in 1999. However, the peace process and brought Sri Lankato unusual prominence on the U.S. for the Millennium Challenge Account, suggest an on itself closely to the position of the Indians and GoSLl it plays the role of "bad cop", by applying pressure on recruitment, and human rights, while providing secur
111 According to Dixit (2004:394), India's High Commissioner to Sri Lan linkages with the Sinhalese or Tamils." However, it should also be being "pro-Tamil" because of the small but vocal Tamil diasporair
112 The Indian position is characterized by Lewer and Williams (2002) case), no to mediation unless both sides request it, and no to Tam
113 "In the context of the failure of the Indian mediatory effort in the
Sri Lanka in the near future" (Dixit, 2004:397).
11. Over 60 million ethnic Tamils live in TamilNadu. Events in Sri La militants have used this southern state as a rear base during va displaced Tamils (Samarasinghe, 2003:80).
 
 
 

ional a range of levels including those between domestic and
international actors, within the international community
and between different policy arenas. ally
It is beyond the scope of this report to examine in depth
the motivations and policies of various international
actors with an interest and involvement in the peace
process. However, in Box 5.1 we provide a short d at summary of some of the key international players:
rocess
ce 1999 and is committed to this role so long as both sides request itator of the peace process. First, it is a ଶ୍ରେଞ୍ଚି tening and neutral intermediary. Seco y to Sri Lanka, was himself involved in the Oslo peace process. has played numerous roles in the past, from power mediator to arized by Dixit (2004:30) as follows:"The Indianviewis Bonstitutional arrangements which preserves Sri Lan wn violent separatist movements in different parts of the country." te a model of devolution orfederalism that is mor ۔۔۔۔ rectly in mediation," but expects to have a significar ince on ibed the LTTE following the assassination iv Gandhi and does Cooperation between India and the GoSL on security intell
gence, fe connections
ka, 1985-1989, "Norway had the advantage of not having any emotional, political, or ethnic noted that Norway has at various times been perceived by nationalist Sinhalese groups as the Country.
as "four no's" - no military intervention, no military assistance (though this is no longer the il Eelam.
980s and 1990s, India would not take any active and direct part in the mediatory efforts in
nka are watched closely by the population and political leaders (see Wilson, 2000). Tamil ious phases of the conflict, while by the late 1980s it was a place of refuge for 125,000

Page 75
Box 5.1: Continued
签 ir and the largest aid donor to Sri Historically, Japan's relationship with Sri Lanka has been prim. Envoy Akashi and their assumption of a co-chair position signif development assistance was to be more closely allied to the poli the test cases of this new strategy. India probably has concerns a as well as economic muscles in Sri Lanka. 三ー
Other Asian countries: Pakistan is the other South Asian country primary concernis to counterbalance the influence of India. It p thought to be non state links between Pakistan and Muslim grou East and Southeast Asian countries have developed economic Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, and Singapore. -
Multi-lateral actors: The EU is another co-chair, it is not a signific of its "good cop' role in relation to the LTTE to counterbalance thi are peacebuilding, migration, democracy, and human rights. Ho receive official LTTE delegations following Foreign Minister Lal prepared to use "sticks" and not just "carrots" to induce the LTT largestfunders, does notattempt touse this leverage in the politic and development role. India and the two parties to the conflictha
Bilateral donors: Bilateral donors' influence on conflict and pea interests, spheres of engagement, and funding levels. Thou disproportionate influence because of historic ties and their m trade. A number of the other small bilaterals including Denmark, -2 இ cing policy debates and being prepared
Therefore, though the "liberal peace" thesis nicely ins captures the broad contours of international engagement rea in Sri Lanka, it masks significant differences between the We various international players. Two broad dividing lines
can be identified that are relevant to debates on peace Sec and conflict. First, there is the division between Asian the and Western actors. Traditionally, the former have been pla more concerned with geo-strategic and trade objectives,
while the later have a menu of concerns including bac human rights, democratization, and liberalization. IT Though somewhat of a caricature, this difference ар]
between Asian and Western donors is certainly perceived oth by the Sri Lankans themselves.' In the South, for de
15 See Jayatilleka (2005:12).
116 The JVP and JHU, for instance, view India (and the U.S. to a lesser extent) as a r
117 This broadly corresponds to the U.S. emphasis on "hard" power and the Europear
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

69. International Engagement
a, is a significant political and economic actor rily an economic one. But the appointment of Special ed a rection in Japan's foreign policy, in which ical project of peacebuilding. Sri Lanka and Aceh were bout another Asian power attempting to flexits political
thought to have geo-political interests in Sri Lanka. Its rovides military assistance to the GoSL. There are also is in the East (also with Iran and the Middle East). Other and trading interests with Sri Lanka, including China,
ant donor, but plays an important political role interms a position of India and the U.S. its main policy concerns wever, the EU's decision on September 26, 2005 not to shman Kadirgamar's assassination suggests that it is E to change its behavior. The ADB, though one of the alarena. The U.N. also restricts itself to a reconstruction vehistorically resisted offers of U.N. mediation.
be dynamics varies according to historic ties, strategic gh the U.K. is a relatively small donor, they have orms of engagement including diplomacy and the Netherlands, and Sweden have played an to engage with LTTE. ప్తి
tance, there is currently (partly for instrumental sons') a greater openness to Indian rather than 'stern involvement in the peace process.
:ond, where countries locate themselves in relation to : "war on terror" influences the kind of role they can y to support the peace process. As illustrated in Box and explored further below, a kind of "good cop, | cop” role has emerged by default, in relation to the TE.'Those supporting astrong anti terrorist line ply the "stick" of sanctions and condemnation, while ters dangle the carrot of international legitimacy and relopment aid. The extent to which this division has
neans of disciplining and weakening the LTTE.
preference for "soft" power.

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 || 70
helped or hindered the peace process is discussed f below. The following sections have been divided in peacemaking and peacebuilding with development assistance being seen to primarily occupy the seco1 sphere. However, it is acknowledged that in practi these divisions may not be so clear-cut.
5.2 PEACEMAKING
5.2.1 CFA and the Role of the SLMM
The CFA was a bilateral agreement between the government and the LTTE." It made provisions, a request of the two parties for formation of the Sri L Monitoring Mission. The SLMM was given the du mandate of reporting on truce violations and addre issues (at the lowest possible level) related to ceasefi violations. The SLMM did not have a peacekeeping mandate nor the means to enforce compliance with terms of the CFA. In this sense, the SLMM is fundamentally different from the Indian Peace Kee Force (IPKF), whose mandate was armed peace enforcement.' Yet in terms of achieving its core m of helping support the ceasefire arrangements overt three years, it has been more successful than the IPl Nevertheless, there have been numerous flaws, man which are inherent to the ceasefire arrangements.
First, there is arguably a contradiction, at least in the eye, of having Norway act as both a facilitator of the talks and a watchdog for the ceasefire." While these two separate processes and, in Norway's eyes, there is distinction between the SLMM and the Norway-faci peace talks, the two are frequently conflated in the Sc In retrospect, it might have been simpler to nominat different country to head up the SLMM.
118. There was no involvement by international actors.
119. As Bose (2002:631) notes, the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement
stated objective of ending the civil War.
120 Though SLMM staff come from the Nordic Countries (Iceland, mission established a head office in Colombo and six district off (LMCs) were setup along with each field office. In these LMCs
121 The purchasing of some $150 million worth of arms in Iran just
 
 

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Second, there is a tension between the two principal tasks of the SLMM. Its reporting role - not only to the Norwegians and the parties, but also to the wider publicdemands a level of transparency. Even though the monitors cannot enforce compliance, one might expect them to be able to exert leverage by "naming and shaming" in the event of violations. On the other hand, their conflict mediation role demands a low key and pragmatic approach. It is normally easier to bring about de-escalation without extensive press and public involvement.
Third, there is some controversys debate over whether the CFA favors one side or the other. The Agreement is based on the premise that a "hurting stalemate" compelled both sides to commence negotiations and the ceasefire depends upon maintaining a military balance. Some feel it has been "over-balanced" in favor of the LTTE by, for instance, excluding the SLMM missions in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu (Loganathan, 2004:4). On the other hand, the ceasefire arguably favors the Sri Lanka Armed Forces on the issue of rearmament. If both sides rearm this does not necessarily indicate an intention to return to war. However, if this occurs asymmetrically, the CFA is likely to come under increasing strain. Rearmament is not forbidden by the agreement as long as the forward defence lines remain intact. Hence, the government can strengthen its military position unimpeded and has done so." The CFA does not forbid the LTTE to purchase arms and equipment, but it may not transport them through government territory. Given that it is encircled by such areas, it must violate the truce to maintain its military capability.
t(and the IPKF as one of the instruments for enforcing it) completely failed in achieving their
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland), the head of mission is a Norwegian citizen. The ices and One liaison office in Kilinochchi. With both tasks in mind, local monitoring Committees , both LTTE and government representatives took a seat.
after the tsunamidisaster was a salient example that upset both donors and the LTTE.

Page 77
Fourth, the SLMM has a limited mandate and capacity pre for information collection. "No-war, no-peace" has aC created a permissive environment for human rights Mu abuses and criminality. This is compounded by the Cre limited policing capacities in the North-East. Because alle the majority of ceasefire incidents involved Tamil on six Tamil violence, which is not included in the CFA and the does not affect the LTTE-SLAF military balance, the գա SLMM has not become involved. It is not the role of the Th SLMM to act as a policeman for the North-East, but att arguably a stronger mandate to carry out investigations so could have played a role in counteracting the culture of bul impunity.' The CFA states that the government should disarm "paramilitary" groups. This left EPDP as an easy Th (unarmed and poorly protected) prey for the LTTE. bec More problematic for the ceasefire was the emergence of sol Karuna. Not being a signatory to the truce, Karuna was No not bound to the agreement and consequently his activities fell outside the mandate of the SLMM. There have been over 3,000 ceasefire violations, an average of around three per day. This undermines the credibility of both the CFA and the SLMM. Over 90 percent of these acts were committed by the LTTE, leading to the perception in the South that the CFA merely gave the LTTE "a license to shoot." It was felt that the LTTE were using the truce to strengthen and expand their military positions, the camp in Manirasakulam, close to Trincomalee, being a salient example. The SLMM was perceived to be merely legitimizing such actions.
Qu On the other hand, the SLMM's lack of "sticks" may the facilitate cooperation between the parties, as they regard thi the mission less as a threat than an opportunity to eq improve their own image and credibility (Samset, CF 2004b:24). The mission did successfully defuse several col incidents that could have escalated without the presence ina of the SLMM. One incident, which highlights the acute tak
122 Ona positive note, we have never had so much systematic public information ab
123 Numerous press statements and speeches were made by the (deputy) foreign mini
website, trying to defend the SLMM’s position. But they were faced with a publi impression that it has some influence over the two parties, in spite of evidence t other hand, it could be open about the limits of its influence on the two parties, and 2004b).

71 International Engagement
issures being placed on the SLMM, was the attack lsinking of a Chinese-owned trawler off the coast of laitivu on March 20, 2003, which killed seven wmen. This occurred only one week after the navy :gedly sank an LTTE "merchant" vessel, during the th round of talks in Tokyo. Most people attributed : trawler incident to the LTTE, though when estioned by the SLMM, they denied involvement. is left the SLMM with no option other than to ribute the incident to an "unknown third party." By doing, it helped prevent the incident from escalating, t perhaps at the cost to its credibility in the South.'
ere are concerns that managing the ceasefire has come an end in itself, reducing the incentive to find a ution and consolidating an illiberal peace in the rth-East:
"The two sides have accorded the CFA almost totemic status and there is no intention to jettison it. There is no intention either to proactively manage it to cultivate its peace building potential in terms of advancing the peace process and negotiations. It is almost as if the management of the ceasefire is about testing and expanding the limits of the permissible under it, with the exercise. of requisite restraint when such challenges threaten the No War component of the No War/No Peace status quo" (CPA, 2005:15).
lestions are consequently raised about renegotiating : CFA and the SLMM's mandate within it, though s course of action risks destabilizing the current uilibrium. There appears to be a consensus that the A should not be tampered with lest this leads to its lapse (Loganathan, 2004:3). In spite of its dequacies, the ceasefire has held and the SLMM can e some of the credit for this, even though at times it
Out child recruitment and other LTTE offenses.
ster, the ambassador and Special Envoy Erik Solheim and through the SLMM ic relations dilemma. On One hand, the SLMM could attempt to Convey the ) the Contrary - thus risking loss of Confidence in its performance. Or on the in which case losing credibility in relation to its mandate. (Samset: 2004a

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 | 72
appears to have had more of a symbolic than a prac role. If the SLMM did not exist in its present form there would clearly be a continuing role for such a to provide a reliable channel for communication an negotiation. Therefore, the SLMM has been a succ but flawed experiment in ceasefire monitoring. Ali consensus-based mandate with modest goals, worki through unarmed extra-regional monitors has prov be relatively successful. Nevertheless, neither the SI nor the CFA appear to be particularly robust at the of writing, with growing insecurity and violations, particularly in the East.' Within the SLMM framework, a stronger mandate (more means for investigation), better public diplomacy (toward the South), and more persistent naming and shaming c LTTE could possibly have improved the operation.
5.2.2 Track One Peace Negotiations
The most significant difference between the current process and its predecessors has been the prominent played by the international community. The UNF government's strategy was characterized by almost to reliance on Norway to steer the process and faith in international "security net" to bail them out if thing went wrong (Loganathan, 2004:1). The entire architecture of the peace process was built around he international engagement, including international se guarantees, the SLMM, Norwegian facilitation of Tr One negotiations, the co-chair system,' internation funding, support for Track Two initiatives, and the d reconstruction package. The UFPA, though perhaps less enthusiasm than the UNF government, has broa continued with the same strategy.
In theory, more robust international engagement sh have positive effects in relation to the causes of hos and domestic capacities for conflict resolution. The
124 According to the security forces, more than 80 people were kille
number of violations has been 2,837 (Balathinsinghala, 2005).
125 These are the EU, the U.S., Japan, and Norway.
 

tical
body
assful
mited
ng
in to
time
of the
peace role
hould tility
0C
difficult the individual case, the greater the need for more forceful and sustained international action (Stedman, 2001). Both sides realized as far back as 1999, when backdoor discussions with Norway began, that external support was required to break the deadlock. To what extent has international engagement in the peace process opened up the space for conflict resolution and transformation? Arguably, one of the lessons from the latest peace process is that international actors have played a significant role in keeping space open, but they have not had a transformative effect on the roots of hostility and creating political will for peacebuilding, although in many respects it is too early to be too conclusive.
Unlike many other internationally supported peace processes, in Sri Lanka, a bilateral (rather than multilateral) approach has been pursued. From the very beginning, the Norwegians declared that their initiative had two limited objectives - a long-term ceasefire and direct bilateral negotiations between the LTTE and GoSL. They assiduously disclaimed any intention of suggesting constitutional formula or proposals for a political solution (Dixit, 2004). The choice of Norway and its low key and limited agenda made sense in several respects. First, as already mentioned, Norway was seen as an acceptable, non-threatening mediator by the two protagonists and India. Second, given the historical sensitivities around foreign intervention and sovereignty, a low profile approach was vital. Third, a bilateral negotiation model involving a small number of key actors was peculiarly suited both to Sri Lankan politics and the challenge of engaging with a non-state actor like the LTTE. It has become a truism to state that successful peace processes depend upon strong inter-personal relationships between protagonists and mediators. Nevertheless, this is particularly the case in Sri Lanka, given the personalized nature of party politics, and perhaps most importantly the nature of the LTTE.
d in the last five months, a rapid increase Compared to 390 in the last three years. The total

Page 79
Clearly, the world-view and organizational culture of dile
guerrilla organizations are very different from those of talk states. The Norwegian mediation style, which involved "mi building long-term, trusting relationships with key CO
individuals, appeared to be the most appropriate in
relation to the LTTE.' Fourth, given the precarious
balance of political forces in the South, it was imperative An that the Norwegians were not seen to be driving the Perl process. A limited agenda in which their role was and primarily one of creating political space for talks made bas eminent sense at the time.
the Although Norway played the primary mediation role in but terms of Track One, other international actors was performed key supporting (and sometimes perhaps wid spoiling) roles. Both protagonists had different be incentives for engaging with international actors. For the pop GoSL, the international community reduced their talk military, political, and economic exposure by providing whi security guarantees, diplomatic support, and economic stak assistance.' For the LTTE, international actors helped stak address the problem of asymmetry. In wartime, and asymmetry favors the guerrilla group - as Kissinger Pta argued, a guerrilla group wins if it doesn't lose, while the a bi conventional army loses if it doesn't win (cited in Wh Philipson, 1999:56). However, asymmetry in is d negotiations tends to favor the government, because of tWO their access to international bodies and experts and the ope support of a sophisticated political network not available stak to guerrilla groups (ibid). Therefore for the LTTE, their gan engagement with international actors has always been diff tied up with the search for legitimacy and political parity aCC with the GoSL. of h
What lessons can be drawn from international diff engagement in peacemaking? It is less easy to identify 'ನ್ನು
2DO
clear lessons than to map out areas of tension and
126
127
128
It has been reported, for example, that the good Working relationship between Ba
Different international actors were sought to provide different elements of the mediation, Japan funding, etc.
Nor was there a normative framework or set of principles like the Mitchell Principle the various parties.

73 International Engagement
'mmas that were progressively exposed by the peace s. These are presented below, not necessarily as stakes" made by international actors, but as tradictions inherent in many peace processes.
Inclusive Versus Exclusive Approach
haps the most common criticism of the peace process l, by extension, the Norwegian's role is that it was ed on a bipolar model of the conflict. Understandably, CFA focused on the two main armed protagonists, this set the pattern for the subsequent peace talks. It perceived by many that the strategy of the two sides, h Norwegian support, was to forge an elite pact, hind the backs" of other stakeholders and the wider ulation. Because there was no "road map" for peace s, the nature of the end goal was always unclear, ch created anxieties among external and internal (eholders.' Arguably, the exclusion of key (eholders such as the president, the Muslims, the JVP other Tamil parties, provoked spoiler behavior. The ce process thus tended to marginalize any challenge to nary model of the conflict.
ether Norway can in any sense be "blamed" for this ebatable, since they were following the lead of the
main protagonists. It can plausibly be argued that ning up the peace talks earlier to a widergroup of (eholders would have been destabilizing. According to he theory logic, the more parties to a game, the more icult it is to reach and maintain a mutually eptable solution. On the other hand, with the benefit indsight, three things might have been done erently. First, a better public relations strategy would e gone some way toward addressing wider anxieties ut negotiations conducted behind closed doors.
lasingham and Solheim has been an important factor in the peace talks.
safety net - the U.S. and India providing security guarantees, Norway
ls in Northern Ireland that Could be used as leverage to guide and discipline

Page 80
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 74
Second, more thought could have been given from th outset about including important stakeholders and limiting the negative effects of the various spoilers. T would not necessarily have meant giving everyone as at the table, but thinking creatively about how differ voices could be captured and represented.'Third, Norway might have done more to build a wider infrastructure for the peace process (see below). Mor "backdoor" contacts could have been developed over time to provide a safety net for the Track One talks. Overall, the peace process was perhaps too dependen a few key personalities."
LTTE Accommodation, Rights, and Justice
It is commonly assumed that in the "post conflict moment," human rights and democratic principles m be incorporated into the new institutional arrangeme in the interests of a sustainable peace (Ferdinands et: 2004). However, in the aftermath of a violent conflic raw power rather than democratic principles tends to shape the political and security landscape. As with ot peace processes, in Sri Lanka there was a constant tension between the imperatives of conflict managem and human rights concerns. To some extent, human rights principles were incorporated within the CFA a subsequent peace talks. However, unlike a number of other peace processes, like El Salvador for example, t belligerents did not sign a separate human rights agreement.' The UNF government's policy of LTT accommodation, in many respects, sent a signal to th international community to go easy on human rights issues. There was almost a policy of keeping the LTT the negotiating table at any cost, in order to prevent
129 For instance as one interviewee argued, One COuld have Several pa
130 The same also applies to the P-TOMS negotiations as ultimately it
131 lan Martin, former Secretary General of Amnesty International, wa
he was in the process of doing this.
132 it also created an impression of international bias in the sense tha According to UTHR (2005:16) "If Sinhalese nationlists are margina dynamic that has already provoked a Sinhalese backlash against th

ՈG them from returning to the bunkers. As one
international aid worker noted: "To an extent the Tamils
his have been sacrificed for the peace process - they don't
eat have any of the basic rights like freedom of speech and
ent freedom of assembly". Solheim's statement that the
Karuna issue was an "internal matter" for the NorthEast (UTHR, 2005:16) reinforces the impression that
2 the international community is prepared to trade
stability for an illiberal peace in the North-East. Evidently, there were differences between the various
t on international actors, with the U.S. being more vocal on
human rights issues for instance, but neither a policy of accommodation nor one of open condemnation had any impact on LTTE behavior and human rights abuses. A policy of accommodation and an over reliance on the international security net may have worked contrary to the project of constructive engagement on the political
huSt intS and constitutional fronts (Loganathan, 2004). al, By seeming to accommodate and legitimize the LTTE, it, the international community ran the risk of further h undermining the credibility of the UNF government to which it was linked in the eyes of the southern electorate.' It also increased Indian concerns that the lCÍt .
internationally supported peace process was further d empowering the separatist ambitions of the LTTE.
he Over-internationalization?
E After the signing of the CFA, there was a significant լՇ international "peace rush." For instance, 30 Colombo
based foreign diplomats visited Jaffna in late March 2002 E at alone (Bush, 2002:21). Peacemaking and peacebuilding
thus became a crowded field, after being alonely pursuit
rallel "small table" discussions that mightfeed into the track One process.
depended upon the determination of President Kumaratunga to push it through.
Stasked with the role of drawing up a human rights agreement, but talks Collapsed while
international actors Condemned Sinhala nationalism while Condoning Tamil nationalism.
lized while the LTTE is rewarded and feted in European capitals, it sets up a destructive e peace process, and is likely to further fan the flames of Sinahelese extremism."

Page 81
for most of the preceding decade. Initially, this appeared to be a positive development. India was happy not to play a direct role so long as it was kept informed.' Wickremesinghe traveled all over the world to muster support for the government's position, having notable success with the U.S. administration. The LTTE meanwhile had to restrict their search for legitimacy largely to continental Europe, due to the ban imposed on them in the U.S., the U.K., India, and elsewhere, but they achieved some success in meeting government officials and thus gaining an audience for their views and concerns.
However, from the Washington conference onward, there was a growing perception that the peace process had changed from being internationally supported to internationally driven. Washington was a critical turning point because, in the eyes of the LTTE, it challenged the central principle of political parity. Tokyo reinforced the growing perception that the peace process had become over-internationalized - in the words of Balasingham (2004:434) there was "excessive involvement from the international custodians of peace." As discussed below, the LTTE felt that donor conditionalities were primarily aimed at "disciplining" them. It was in the context of the sixth round of peace talks that the term "international security trap" was coined: "As a non state actor caught up in the intrigue ridden network of the international state system, the LTTE was compelled to act to free itself from the overpowering forces of containment" (Balasingham, 2004:434).
In many respects, the earlier dynamics of the IndoLanka accord repeated themselves. There was a feeling that domestic actors no longer had control of the process, leading to a backlash in the South as well as a reaction from the LTTE. Furthermore, India - particularly with Japan beginning to flex its political as well as its economic muscles - felt that their influence had become increasingly diluted. Some have argued that India should have been more integral to the architecture of the peace process, for instance as one of the co
cha and
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133 ACCOrding to Dixit (2004), the Norwegians acknowledged the relevance of Indian ir
134 in other peace processes regional actors have frequently played a pivotal role. For inste
 

75 International Engagement
irs.' Therefore, the processes of conflict formation
transformation have become highly 'rnationalized. There is a danger that it will remain in
realm and, as a result, the parties may end up ressing international opinion rather than each other ganathan, 2005:5).
Limitations of International Engagement. Who's luencing Who?
e of the chief lessons from Sri Lanka is that even in there appears to be a positive constellation of itical forces, international actors cannot simply ineer peace - ultimately the traditional tools of lomacy may have limited traction over domestic state
non-state actors. (The structural impediments to ce are not amenable to external micro management.) rnational pressure counted for little when it came to LTTE's withdrawal from the peace talks, the sident's dismissal of the UNF government, or the 's role in relation to P-TOMS. In spite of repeated 'rnal efforts over the years to forge a bipartisan roach to the conflict - from Fox to Solheim - this
remains an elusive goal.
an extent, the story is less about how international cemakers influence domestic actors, than how the 2r use the former to pursue their particular political jects. As the Norwegians themselves have nowledged, there is a danger that an "honest broker" sed as a "peace alibi" while the parties continue the flict (Sjoberg, 2003:10). Both sides have used rnational actors for their own purpose. The UNF ernment drew upon the carrots and sticks of rnational actors to enmesh the LTTE in the so called urity trap." The LTTE have similarly drawn upon r links with international actors to build their timacy and maintain political parity with the GoSL.
nfluence and kept them fully informed.
ince, Kenya was a Critical actor in Supporting the Sudanese peace Settlement.

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 76
The JVP's call for stronger Indian intervention is ba upon the calculation that they will play a role in dil the Norwegian's influence and neutralize the LTTE
Finally, the experience of Indian efforts at peacemak is instructional in terms of recognizing the limitatio external intervention. India aggressively pursued a
settlement between 1983 and 1989. Although they knowledgeable about the details of Sri Lankan polit and the local sensitivities and had direct channels, t still failed (Philipson, 1999; Bose, 2002; Dixit, 200
5.2.3 Track TWO Initiatives
Track Two processes normally take place outside the public realm. Dialogue occurs in "safe spaces" betw. primary and secondary political actors and is strictly confidential.' For that reason, it is impossible to gi complete overview of Track Two activities, let alone make judgements about their impacts. Nevertheless backdoor talks helped initiate the peace process and played a vital role in maintaining communication si the suspension of negotiations. Arguably, the longes of the current peace process compared to previous c is partly attributable to the development of a more robust Track Two process. This has become more apparent during the course of the peace talks. Initia the supporting role of Track Two was perhaps insufficiently recognized. The Peace Secretariats pla relatively passive role and attention was focused on facilitating the official negotiations. This intensified pressure and expectations around the Track One pr The lack of a broader "architecture" for the peace negotiations or a "catchment area" for the Track O1 process was commented upon by several interviewe Some felt that if there had been more robust back channels, the problems of Washington and Tokyo in have been averted. However, the fact that there stil
135 The CPA KAP survey conducted in June 2005 found that only 9.8 47.5 percent of this group wanted India to take over this role. On still felt that Norway was the most suitable Country to be the ch
136 According to one informant involved in track two mediation, the in a personal capacity, while in the case of the former they are
 
 

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peace process is partly due to Track Two initiatives like "One Text" (which evolved after the breakdown of talks), and the ongoing involvement of several specialist organizations including the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), the Foundation for Co-Existence (FCE), and Initiative for Political and Conflict Transformation (INPACT). Such interventions are built upon an analysis that recognizes that political actors are the "main drivers of change" in Sri Lankan society, that initiatives targeting the meso level are strategically important, and providing additional options for engagement in the peace process is particularly important for non-state actors.
Much work has focused on parliamentarians and political parties. Aware of the need to create change both between the two main belligerents as well as within these actors, various NGOs tried to create a platform for engagement among a wider range of political actors, including political parties and foreign stakeholders. Some of these efforts aimed at identifying or creating consensus around sub-issues relevant to the peace talks. By taking the discussion to a more technical and thus less political level, progress may be made.
Some activities supported key actors with technical and intellectual support in formulating positions. Assistance given to the LTTE in formulating the ISGA proposal is a key example here. The establishment of the Muslim Peace Secretariat is another. The Roadmap initiative is an example of a project that tried to provide the political leadership at large with out-of-the-box inspiration about solutions. Within this and other exercises, various academics and NGOs created documents and discussions on key political issues and sensible ways of going about them. Allegedly, this could move the debate beyond the level of positional bargaining. The
percent of Sinhalese wanted Norway to Continue as key facilitator of the peace process. the other hand 66.5 percent of the Sri Lankan Tamils and 62.2 percent of upcountry Tamils ef facilitator.
rimary difference between tracks One and two is that in the latter, participants may speak urely the representatives of their Own side.

Page 83
facilitation of exposure visits of the LTTE, But parliamentarians, and government representatives served Lar the same purpose. A familiarization with other conflicts dep (like Ireland), as well as solution models (like Swiss an federalism) was hoped to have a positive impact on the pric willingness and ability of key persons to find a solution.
Track Two ideally serves as a backchannel or safety net Wi for Track One. Discussions at a lower level may be used For
to generate options or test ideas. Successes can ple subsequently be upgraded to Track One. Observers 200 argue that the Oslo Declaration - the high point of the am talks, if there ever was one - was a result of previous in 2 discussions at a lower level. Vice versa, a gridlock on to 3 seemingly insolvable issues or a complete breakdown at con Track One may result in a devolvement to Track Two. per This happened after the suspension of talks, when imp dialogue continued between the key actors as well as pari with a wider range of political stakeholders. per
In sum, the overall success and failure of Track Two efforts cannot be assessed here, but the track was relevant at all the
stages of the peace process. It nurtured consensus (e.g. the fun Oslo Declaration), provided inputs (e.g. ISGA), included whi a wider range of actors (to some extent compensating for B. the narrowness of the Norwegian approach), and served as
l a pressure valve after the talks broke down.
the 5.3 DEVELOPMENTASSISTANCE AND t PEACEBUILDING နမှူး 531 Background mil
tra SCA1 identified the following categories of aid actors in hi
WΠ.
Sri Lanka - multi-laterals, bilaterals, NGOs, and
ICRC/IFRC, who provide support in three key areas - The development assistance to the state, development larg assistance through NGOs, and humanitarian assistance incl to the North-East. Donor assistance to Sri Lanka during pov the 1990s amounted to roughly seven percent of GDP. Stre
137 it is also important to note that the UNF government was not in a position to re expenditure - and this made the government more dependent on foreign aid f 2004:15).
 

77 International Engagement
: by 2001, this had declined to only two percent. Sri ka is therefore not, according to any criteria, an aid endent country. However, the peace process has had impact on both the magnitude of funding and the orities of international donors.'
ten the UNF government came into power, ckremesinghe created a Special Committee on eign Aid that was able to raise $995 million in dges, close to its target of $1 billion (Kelegama, 4). According to Central Bank data, the total ount of aid received increased from Rs. 17.2 million 2002 to Rs. 61.2 million in 2003, an increase of close 350 percent (Bastian, 2005). The share of cessional loans in foreign debt increased from 97 cent to 98 percent. By mid 2003, aid utilization had roved from 11 percent in 2001 to about 20 percent, tly as the Prime Minister himself had taken a sonal interest in this issue. The proportion of grants lid flows increased from 33.8 percent in 2000 to 41.2 cent in 2003 (Bastian, 2005:24). The high point of UNF's strategy to attract significant international ding was the Tokyo conference of June 2003, at ich $45 billion was pledged by international donors.
predictably, there were major differences between iges and disbursements - only $1 billion of the iged assistance was utilized in 2003, largely due to cohabitation crisis. Moreover, Sri Lanka continued be overwhelmingly dependent on three donors, these ng Japan, $292 million (27.5 percent), the World k, $244 million (23 percent), and the ADB $196 lion (18.5 percent). The tsunami has subsequently sformed the funding environment, the effects of chare discussed in more detail below.
2 key priority areas of international donors have tely remained the same as they were in 2000. These ude economic reform and development, governance, erty alleviation, private sector support, civil society ngthening, support to the peace process,
duce defence expenditure - defence Constituted the single largest public or its peace and reconstruction projects (Shanmugaratnam and Stokke,

Page 84
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 || 78
reconstruction, relief, and interventions in the field c human rights. Sectorally, about 45 percent of the for aid goes to economic infrastructure, 30 percent to so sectors, 15 percent to production and 10 percent to other activities.'
Since the primary interests of the largest three donor continue to be the promotion of a liberal economy, t lion's share of funding still tends to go on developm programs with the government in the South. Howev there has been some readjusting of priorities in the li of developments around the peace process. These include increased support for humanitarian and reconstruction activities in the North-East (and mor recently throughout the country as a result of the tsunami), civil society initiatives in general and specifically for programs and projects that are though have a direct or indirect impact on the peace process.
5:32 Donors and the "New Aid Agenda"
The development enterprise has, until recently, been largely agnostic toward matters of conflict and insect (Uvin, 2002:5). As SCA1 argued, in Sri Lanka them donors tended to work "around" conflict, treating it "negative externality" to be avoided. Peace and confl. issues were viewed as political concerns, and so beyo the mandate of development actors. Although a smal group of bilateral donors had begun to develop amo explicit focus on conflict issues (working "on" confli this represented a minority position. Admittedly, a consensus of sorts did emerge during the late 1990s about the key elements of a peace promotion strateg among aid donors. These included addressing root causes, improving human rights, balancing overall development, and preparing for post war reconstruct (Ofstad, 2001). However, on the whole, donors were risk averse and "even a modest re-orientation of the ; program was easily considered a political action in a
138 These figures apply to 2002 and 2003. www.oecd.org
139 As Claire Short, the then Secretary of State for DFID said, for dor and flexible responses from donors (cited in Sriskandarajah, 2003

eign
cial
he
ont
Cf,
ght
it to
urity lajor
aS a
ict
ion
aid very
sensitive and politicized environment" (ibid:172). "Peace," like "human rights," was to an extent viewed as a taboo subject for international actors. A government that was prosecuting a "war for peace" and treated the conflict as an internal issue, always resisted efforts by international agencies to promote peace through their aid programs. This view was to a large extent shared by the LTTE who made it clear that international NGOs attempts to promote reconciliation and peacebuilding in the North-East were not welcome.
The coming to power of the UNF government opened the way for a "radical" new agenda for development that involved drawing a more explicit link between aid and security. After 2002, donors have arguably begun to calibrate their policies and programs according to conflict and peace dynamics within Sri Lanka. To This has manifest itself in a number of ways including: the growing investment of major donors such as the World Bank and the ADB in the reconstruction of the NorthEast; donor pledges at Tokyo, which were tied to peace and human rights conditionalities; the increased use of tools and frameworks, such as the SCA and peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) methodologies; the deployment of conflict advisors; investment in internal capacity building on conflict issues by donors; and the evolution of coordination arrangements such as the Donor Working Group on the Peace Process.
Donors' efforts to influence conflict and peace dynamics can broadly be divided into three areas of engagement. First, applying peace conditionalities to reconstruction and development aid. Second, dealing with the consequences of conflict. Third, addressing the underlying causes of conflict. These approaches might be characterized as the "three Cs." The first two are primarily concerned with conflict dynamics and the third with conflict structures. They are dealt with in turn below.
hors this cannot be business as usual. The peace process is dynamic and demands rapid

Page 85
Applying Peace Conditionalities ref
c The Tokyo conference in July 2003 represented the high ger tide mark (or low point, depending on one's CCC perspective") in the internationalization of the peace Ser process and the convergence of aid and security pe. concerns. $4.5 billion was pledged overall by aid Pe
donors." The three largest pledges came from Japan, the ref
ADB, and the World Bank. The linkage between these irrt funds and the peace process was articulated in paragraph the 18 of the Tokyo Conference Declaration: "Assistance by
ΟΥ
the donor community must be closely linked to རྒྱུ་ substantial and parallel progress toward fulfilment of the the
objectives agreed upon by the parties in Oslo." hea Conditions that were to be equally applied to both "Sc
parties were then spelled out in greater detail, including ali compliance with the CFA, Muslim participation in talks,
promotion and protection of human rights, gender Th equity, and progress toward a final political settlement.' tall It is important to note that donors perceived this as a OOI "positive conditionality" - in other words a reward for LT "good behavior," with positive peace creating pu: opportunities for increased investment and spending, (en rather than the application of negative conditions on int assistance." W2
- SCEC The declaration was the culmination of a process set in wit motion by the UNF government and backed by tO
international donors. It marked a point of convergence for wi international and domestic actors, both of whom were dec operating within an ideological framework of the liberal the peace. The UNF government's priority was its economic
140 The LTTE argued that Tokyo represented the "excessive internationalization" oft
141 Twenty percent in the form of grants and the remainder as COncessional loans. In
average aid level of around $750 million per year.
142 For a more detailed analysis of donor policies and Tokyo, see Burke and Mulaka
143 SeeUvin (1999), who distinguishes between "conditional incentives" and "condi
144 The Washington event was held in April 2003. Though it was intended as a low
by the LTTE.
145 lin spite of pressure applied up until the last minute by the GoSL, Norway, and J
146 The U.S. also pushed strongly for the inclusion of Conditionalities, believing it w
 

79 international Engagement
orm program, and the CFA and peace process were a ans to achieve this. They helped the government erate significant external funding for revival of the nomy and sent the correct signals to investors. In a se, Japan and others were financially underwriting the ice process. Donors were happy to go along with this. ice provided the opportunity to push through radical orms, a form of shock therapy that would lead to :versible economic and political changes. Donors, refore, aligned themselves very closely to the UNF. vernment. Some say donors aligned themselves too sely and too uncritically: "[T]hey tended to fool 'mselves - they were hearing a language they liked to ur" (aid official). As another aid donor candidly stated, ome donors didn't serve the country very well by gning themselves so closely to the UNP"
e Tokyo conference occurred three months after peace ks had broken down. It was the second of two donor nferences" to occur without the participation of the TE.' Arguably, this was a case of international actors shing ahead with their own time frames and agendas couraged by the UNF government), without taking o account the changed ground situation. The GoSL s involved in the final drafting of the Declaration," ing it as a way of applying pressure on the LTTE, hout unduly affecting their reform agenda. According Burke and Mulakala (2005), "The GoSL left Tokyo h their pockets full, donors left Tokyo locked into a claration that they were ill prepared to implement, and : LTTE were simply left out." Arguably, in Tokyo, the
he peace process (Balasingham, 2004: 434).
total, this amounted to about $1.25 billion per year, compared to Sri Lanka's
la,(2005).
tional disincentives" applied by aid donors in situations of Conflict.
profile preparatory meeting for Tokyo, it was not interpreted in these terms
apan to persuade the LTTE to attend.
as necessary to push the LTTE harder On human rights issues.

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 80
donors overplayed their hand, and this had perverse impacts on the peace process. Both the government an donors had an inflated view of the importance of economic levers. They also miscalculated the impacts t a policy of perceived conditionalities would have on be the LTTE and the southern electorate.
The LTTE felt that the Washington and Tokyo conferences undermined the basic principle of parity. Conditionalities were perceived to be a one-sided exercise that aimed to discipline the LTTE rather tha the government. Dangling the carrot of aid in front c the LTTE meant little to them unless there were meaningful interim governance arrangements in plac enable them to decide how resources were used and allocated. In the LTTE's view, Washington and Toky were symptomatic of an internationalization process reduced them to a junior partner with little or no for power. In the journey from Paris 2000 to Tokyo 200: the largest donors had made a 180 degree turn in the views about aid and conflict - from viewing aid as technical input that could be separated from political processes to a central part of the conflict dynamic. O of the chief lessons from Tokyo is that donors put thi development "cart," before the governance and powe sharing "horse" - the former remained rooted to the because there were few tangible signs of movement fr the latter." For the LTTE, reconstruction was inseparably linked to their political demand for an interim administration for the North-East (Shanmugaratnam and Stokke, 2004:13).
Tokyo was illustrative of donors' instinctive institutio bias toward working with governmental actors. Most donors are novices when it comes to dealing with non state actors, and this was reflected in the mixed messa they gave out in their interactions with LTTE. On on hand, the LTTE were courted by numerous donor governments and Kilinochchi became, as one intervie
147 See Srikandarajah, (2003); Shanmugaratnam and Stokke (2004) for
148 it should be noted that Operational agencies working in the North prepared to work directly with TRO while UNHCR did not have any

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put it, "the hub of diplomatic activity in South Asia." LTTE delegations were also welcomed in the Chancelleries of Europe in the belief that a combination of international exposure and legitimization would support their political transformation. On the ground, donors were able to work out pragmatic working relationships involving the LTTE and the GoSL. During the initial stages of peace talks, when LTTE-government
relations were still cordial, hybrid working mechanisms
evolved in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the North-East." Therefore, in some respects, there has been an unprecedented level of international engagement with a non-state actor. But ultimately, as Washington and Tokyo demonstrated, donors feel more comfortable (and by definition of their mandate) working with state rather than non-state actors.
Tokyo also had an impact on perceptions of the peace process in the South. It reinforced the belief, particularly among Sinhala nationalists, that growing international involvement in the peace process was compromising national sovereignty. It provided ballast for the antiWestern nationalist discourse in which international actors are seen to be a threat to Sri Lanka's political and territorial identity. This was amplified by the donor community's decision to align itself so closely with a liberalizing, reform-minded UNF government. Although in their own minds, donors may have thought they were doing the "right thing" by attempting to shore up the peace process, many perceived them to be getting too closely involved in party politics in order to pursue their own agenda. Clearly, this is as much about perception as any objective reality. It is not the case that all donors have subscribed to a more "radical" approach. To a large extent, the likes of the ADB and Japan have continued to take a technocratic and apolitical stance. As one interviewee commented, "Japan's approach is just to have a long term relationship with whoever is in power"
a more extensive discussion of this issue.
-East varied greatly in their level of engagement with LTTE. For example, UNICEF was direct relationship.

Page 87
(aid donor). Even if there is a greater willingness to work on conflict issues at the country level, this is not necessarily reflected in policies and strategies at the head-quarters level. As one interviewee stated, "Conflict sensitivity hasn't permeated the boards of the multilaterals" (aid donor).
Since Tokyo, the fracturing of the peace process and the southern backlash against international actors" appears to have had a sobering effect on donors. The mood has shifted. As one ex-government official noted, the international community has been "numbed into silence." Donors have, to some extent, reverted to the pattern of behavior prevalent at the time of the last SCA. The fact that the government has not come out in support of donors in response to attacks on them by nationalist politicians and the press, leaves them feeling exposed. This, in turn, encourages risk averse and selfpolicing forms of behavior. The radical position has not altogether died, but it has become more muted. The Donor Working Group continues to play a role in keeping debates about conflict sensitivity alive. But there is now more scepticism about the potential for financial (dis)incentives to influence the behavior of political actors. In some cases, donors are reassessing their position in the country, feeling that the current constellation of political forces precludes any positive role for them in either development or peacebuilding terms.
Dealing with the Consequences of Conflict
While reconstruction and development funding got caught in the politics of the peace process, there was a political consensus around the need to prioritize humanitarian concerns. Dealing with the consequences
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149 Manifest, for example, in the attack on the World Bank Director, the proposed Ant
Select Committee On NGOs.
150 The annual costs of government dry rations in 1998 amounted to $60 million, arO
(Ofstad, 2002).
15. A number of donor supported needs assessments were Conducted including The
for Peace May, 2002 and the ADB, U.N. and the World Bank jointly sponsored A.
released in April, 2003.
 
 

81 International Engagement
he conflict was a central plank of the phased roach to conflict resolution as highlighted earlier.
wever, it is important to note that this issue was ng addressed, though to a more limited degree, before CFA. Humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance e provided by NGOs, the U.N., and the ernment' throughout the 1990s, although this did prevent the continued socio-economic decline of the th-East relative to the South. Prior to the CFA, some he larger multilateral donors such as the World Bank
the ADB had begun to recognize the need to late programs in the North-East rather than simply t for a peace settlement. The World Bank supported tree R's" program was initiated while the war was still g on and subsequently picked up by the UNF ernment after the CFA - although it lacked the tical support to build upon the momentum created Es initial stages ofimplementation.
hough humanitarian provision preceded the CFA, its tical profile suddenly grew as a result of the peace s. At the second round of negotiations the -Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and abilitation Needs in the North-East (SIHRN) was up with a secretariat in the North-East. Three brity areas were identified - resettling and abilitating internally displaced persons (IDPs), bilitating war-affected women and children, and viding livelihoods for war affected people in the th-East.' The Oslo donor conference of November 2 provided a platform to launch the appeal for or funds for the North-East, and $70 million was ially pledged. Also proposed was a North-East onstruction Fund (NERF) with the World Bank to as the custodian. Donor assistance that flowed in
i-Conversion Bill, JVP attacks on NGOs and the forthcoming Parliamentary
und double the humanitarian assistance for that year from foreign donors
Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission to Sri Lanka Creating Dividends Ssessment of Needs in the Conflict Affected Areas of the NE, which was

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 82
since 2002 contributed to the rehabilitation in the
North-East.' The big difference with the pre-CFA
period was that now the multi-laterals such as the W Bank and the ADB were investing significant resouri into the North-East for reconstruction. For example, ADB's Northeast Coastal Community Development Project involved a $26 million four-year loan targeti three Eastern provinces. Also in contrast with the AI previous practice, it aimed to mitigate tensions betw. the three communities by being as inclusive as possil
However, in spite of these achievements on the groun the normalization process ran into political and legal difficulties. SIHRN lacked the legal status to receive a disburse funds and there were no clear procedures regarding its relationship to government line ministrie and other institutions dealing with development. Whi the role of SIHRN was unclear, there was no chance ( institutionalizing NERF, although the World Bank we willing to take on the role of custodian and had signe letter of intent with SIHRN on February 28, 2003. Again, the crux of the issue was related to the questio whether there could be "normalization" without addressing the underlying political questions. In the South, it was debated whether SIHRN (or later PTOMS) could have a recognized legal status without changing the constitution. Interim measures were resi as they were viewed as a step toward self-determinatio and separation.
Humanitarian issues became increasingly politicized. During the 1990s, NGOs and the U.N. deployed a narrative of neutrality to create a sort of humanitaria "no-man's land", bolstered by international humanitarian law (Wickramasinghe, 2001). Howeve the pretence of a "no man's land" was more difficult sustain, first when the LTTE were directly involved: second when "humanitarianism" included reconstruction and development oriented activities.
152 45 km, of the A9 highway, 238 kms. of small roads, 108 irrigation funds (Kelegama, 2004:4). There was a five-fold increase in ricep
153 it should be noted that there were also LTTEHSZs in the North-Ea

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issue of high security zones (HSZs) highlighted the impossibility of somehow placing humanitarian issues in an isolation ward, so they were "quarantined" from political pressures. The problem of IDPs in the NorthEast was recognized as a pressing humanitarian concern. However army-controlled HSZs,' particularly in the Jaffna peninsula where 18 percent of the land is army occupied, prevented many IDPs from returning to their homes. The LTTE raised this as a humanitarian issue, while the government framed it as a security issue (Nadarajah, 2005). In reality, the impasse could never be wholly addressed without a political settlement.
Discussion around humanitarian issues and normalization revealed differing conceptions of rights. The government and, to an extent, donors wished to contain discussions within the SIHRN framework to a limited view of basic rights or humanitarian rights. On the other hand, the LTTE linked humanitarian concerns to the most fundamental right of self-determination: "The Tamil struggle is not for mere survival, it's also for development" (interviewee, Jaffna). A rights discourse was also used instrumentally by the government, to mobilize international support and to apply pressure on the LTTE about child recruitment and internal
democracy.
Addressing the Causes of Conflict
The "third C" is concerned with the indirect or direct effects of aid policies and programs on the underlying structural dimensions of conflict. Paradoxically, it may be in the areas where donors do not have an explicit focus on conflict that they have the greatest impact on transformative peace in Sri Lanka. In other words, conflict sensitive development programs in areas such as governance, economic development, and poverty eradication may be more influential in the long run than
tanks, 156 Wells, 55 Schools, 25 health facilities, and 32,735 IDP families received donor roduction in the North-East due to increased cultivation (ibid:4).
st, though they did not cover such an extensive area as the government Controlled Zones.

Page 89
attempts to influence conflict dynamics through peace conditional or peace-focused aid. We briefly examine selected areas of donor engagement below, which are judged to have had an effect on the underlying roots of violent conflict.
Goverтатсе
As highlighted earlier, we have conceptualized the conflict as a crisis of the state. The root cause of problems currently being experienced - such as uneven development patterns, an ethnicized education system, a lack of minority voice in the political process - can be traced back to the political culture and quality of governance in Sri Lanka. Donor policies have, intentionally or unintentionally, had a profound effect on the state and the quality of governance in Sri Lanka - in spite of one donor's exasperated comment: "I don't think anything the donors say matters in this country." What donors say clearly does matter, though the interviewee is right in the sense that donors cannot engineer political change by forcing or persuading domestic actors to simply do as they say.
Flawed governance is not only the result of internal political processes and opportunistic politicians - domestic governance interacts with global governance and the nature of this interaction may decide whether an authority crisis stabilizes or erupts into conflict. There is a growing body of literature that highlights the links between bad governance, development, and conflict (Duffield, 2001, Moore, 2000; Herring, 2001; Bastian, 2003). The authority crisis of the Sri Lankan state has external and internal dimensions - as mentioned earlier, the state is pressurized from above and below by international and domestic actors, and these two sets of tensions are inter-related. International pressures for a particular system of governance - involving a small, market friendly, enabling state - produces a counter reaction from both the Sinhala and Tamil polities, as marginalized groups feel threatened and demand a strong, protective, and re-distributive state. Although the
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83 International Engagement
TE and JVP are poles apart in many respects, their courses overlap in terms of their notions of a strong 'elopmental state.
one accepts that international models of governance y be part of the problem, then there is clearly a need rethink these models. Arguably, since SCA1, donors 'e made more progress in sensitizing their poverty and nomic development programs to conflict dynamics in they have in the area of governance. Some donors, h as Japan, tend to steer clear of governance gether. Others, such as USAID, have a strong focus this area, though arguably based on an ideal type del of Western liberal democracy. Few donors are pared to consider a transformative approach unless it ncides with their version of a liberal state (Burke and lakala, 2005). Donors frequently bemoan the lack of omestic constituency for change in relation to the posed solutions to the conflict such as ‘entralization, political reform, and multi-ethnic resentation. This may be true, but there is also a ited constituency for change within the donor mmunity in the sense of exploring alternative models governance. Overall, just as peace conditionalities 'e had limited purchase, the same can be said about itical conditionalities.
is is not to dismiss all donor-supported efforts in the a of governance or to underestimate the magnitude of
dilemmas and problems faced. Nor is this an ument for "freezing" existing governance relations. t there may be a need to engage more explicitly with tually existing" politics in Sri Lanka, rather than iding it through engagement with a sanitized version civil society or a technocratic approach to civil service orm. A logical starting point would be to have a logue with local actors - including the "unlikehded" - about which principles of governance Ltions in Sri Lanka are conducive for conflict
olution and which are not.
ere are, however, positive examples of engagement by
nors and NGOs that may over time lead to

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 | 84
incremental changes in the quality of governance in Lanka. These include work with MPs and political pal (including exposure visits and exchanges), support for governmental and non-governmental human rights bodies, introduction of ideas on decentralization and federalism, and support in sensitive areas like the judic and security sector.' Some of the more successful initiatives have perhaps been at the local and provincia level, and there maybe scope to do more in this area. Donors have perhaps played a role, either directly or indirectly, by supporting NGOs, in influencing debate on governance. Federalism is now, for instance, part of
mainstream political discourse and international actors
can take some of the credit for this.
Civil Society
Three analytical points should be born in mind wher examining civil society in Sri Lanka. First, NGOs are only one of a variety of associational forms - includin political parties, trade unions, cooperatives, professio) associations, religious groups, and sports clubs - that constitute civil society. Second, civil society is also a political arena, a site of contestation and struggle whe contradictory social forces play themselves out. Third one cannot assume a clear boundary between civil society and state. Exactly where civil society stops anc the state begins in Sri Lanka is not clear. For instance the country's network of cooperatives is essentially an extension of the state and lacks autonomy. In Sri Lan as elsewhere, the relationship between state and civil society is a dialectical one. The identity of one is a function of the integrity and independence of the oth though the relationship has often been asymmetrical,
154 Sida and some of the Swedish political parties and German politica
implemented programs in the East to strengthen the capacities of authority (pradeshya Sabha, urban Council, and municipal Council)
155 The most recent examples of this is murder of Tamil journalist, Siv
into the "manure of the motherland" in May 2005.
156 "The institutional fabric to keep armed Conflict within bounds Overth

Sri
ties
the
Ler,
state attempts at controlled to the partisan politicization of civil society (Saravanamuttu, 1999). Conversely, the state became vulnerable to encroachment by certain elements in civil society and the coercive apparatus of the state become instruments of the controlling classes (ibid). Civil society exhibits and mirrors many of the flaws of the Sri Lankan state - it is both highly centralized and segmented, being made of up vertical patron client relations.
As noted in SCA1, civil society has been as much part of the problem as the potential solution to conflict in Sri Lanka. However, the fact that civil society does have a political role to play is illustrated by the fact that its leaders are so regularly attacked by conflict spoilers.' Many feel that the peace process has not been sufficiently inclusive and would like to see a more significant role carved out for civil society. A number of different but interlinked and overlapping roles can be ascribed to civil society actors, which may have an influence on the peace process. These include: a peace constituency that can create a pressure for change from
'If one understands power to be decentered and
below. circulating, then collective action from citizens may act both as a brake on opportunistic elites and as a driver for transformative change; a commentator that provides voice to citizens and can influence conflict and peace discourses; an educator that increases awareness among citizens about the peace process and the key political debates on federalism, power sharing, etc.; a relationship broker or networker that forges alliances between individuals, groups, and levels in society in order to support a progressive political agenda; a policy advocate, which is a role that a number of Colombo based NGOs have performed very effectively in recent years. The prominence given to constitutional reform, minority
foundations, for instance, have worked closely with Sri Lanka political parties. GTZ has )cal government. The Asia Foundation is also working Ongovernance issues at the local
vel.
'aram, and the letter sent to a number of civil society leaders threatening to turn them
a longer term sometimes emerges from below as well as from above" (Richards, 2005:14).

Page 91
rights, and decentralization in mainstream political debates can at least partly be attributed to their efforts; a watchdog or whistle blower, particularly on human rights issues and the climate of impunity produced by war and bad governance; a service provider of humanitarian or development programs; an arena for reconciliation - violent conflict in Sri Lanka cannot be resolved through political reforms alone. It must also be accompanied by changes in the "emotional economy." Civil society is an arena in which reconciliation can and should be promoted.
Historically, civil society's impact on peacebuilding processes has been modest and ephemeral. Some of the more significant examples of civil society peacebuilding include: the ongoing (though waxing and waning) role of the women's movement during the 1980s and 1990s, civil society support for the PA government's election on a peace ticket in 1994, and the same government's Sudu Nelum campaign in 1995-1996. One of the main lessons to be drawn from the above cases is that civil society actors can generate "social energy" that may open up political spaces for peacebuilding. But, if the structural conditions are not conducive, the effects are likely to be transitory. Civil society actors tend to follow the key political trends rather than create them.
Another lesson relates to the way that donors have engaged with civil society. Donor support for civil society has, arguably, been based upon some false assumptions. First, that civil society can be conceptualized as an intrinsically benign and apolitical space. Second, that it is separate from, and in some ways superior to, the state. Third, that it is composed primarily of NGOs who are necessarily more flexible, efficient, and responsive in delivering services than the state. Fourth, that it can act as a principal driver of change or at least a political counter-weight to the state. To an extent, the above points have become a standard critique of donors in relationship with civil society anywhere - yet these assumptions still tend to shape donor behavior in Sri Lanka.
Paradoxically, international engagement with civil society
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85 International Engagement
never been as great as it is now, particularly in the area eacebuilding, with new NGO actors such as the ghof Foundation, INPACT, and FCE and the ansion of established players such as CPA and the ional Peace Council, and yet civil society appears to be repolarized than it has ever been. Civil society anizations opposed to the peace process have come to foreground during the course of the peace otiations. Political entrepreneurs have capitalized on the ieties and grievances that the peace process generated, ch have been stirred up even further by the nationalist s (Nadarajah, 2005). Arguably, peace skeptics have n much more effective than the peace advocates in shing out to societal groups. Donors perhaps restimated the influence and outreach of Colomboed civil society peace advocates: "There was an Imption that civil society leaders could sell peace like y were selling soap" (Sri Lankan analyst, Colombo).
uably, if peacebuilding is a priority for donors, then tegies for civil society support need to change. This uld mean shifting the focus from funding civil society
service delivery mechanism toward promoting a re politically active and autonomous civil society or that goes beyond elite, Colombo-based NGOs. It familiar refrain outside of Colombo to hear donors ng criticized for never moving outside the "charmed le" of like-minded organizations. This has been ognized by donors themselves and programs have n developed that attempt to reach out beyond the ual suspects." Some donors have actively sought tnerships with organizations that better fit the classic inition of civil society than NGOs - for example, rate voluntary and civic organizations, professional
membership organizations, research and academic itutions, media collectives, labor unions, and iness associations and chambers of commerce (Burke
Mulakala, 2005). Their success in forming tnerships has been mixed, partly because civil society anizations are more responsive and accountable to ir members, and their activities are not easily ojectized", whereas NGOs are more responsive and in e with the international agencies that fund them. It

Page 92
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 86
is clear that internationals, whose partnerships often depend on funding relationships, find it difficult to reach out to non-NGOs that don't want their money the "unlike-minded" in civil society who disagree with their values. Yet it is precisely in conflict situations tha such associations, which are more socially embedded t NGOs, tend to be the main drivers of change.'
Poverty and the Reform Agenda
In Sri Lanka, economic reform has become more or synonymous with a pro-development agenda (Dunha 2004:339). This has been the line pushed by the IFIs and it is one that has been largely accepted by both t SLFP and UNP. Violent conflict has not induced any substantive rethinking of the macroeconomic model currently being promoted. In an article reviewing economic policies in Sri Lanka since 1977, David Dunham argues that, essentially, the focus has been c "getting the policies right," but with very little thoug about "getting the politics right"; "the solutions prescribed have often seemed more a statement of received wisdom than a result of a broad-based analy, of the local context" (Dunham, 2004:347).
The UNF government was certainly not the only reg to promote liberalization and macroeconomic reform this has been a feature of economic policies since 19, although often reforms have been resisted or diluted accompanied by populist measures to make them mc palatable. A Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP was initiated under the PA regime in March 2001 an subsequently renegotiated under the UNF governme However, unlike the former government, the UNF h strong ideological commitment to reforms and was
determined to push them through quickly. The resul their reform program included taking away Samurdh (poverty alleviation scheme) from 300,000 recipients curtailing fertilizer subsidies, revision of electricity
charges, introduction of a pricing system on petrol, a
157 As an example of this, women's groups in Colombo have played a parliament, it was blocked by JVP politicians. This reaction might

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restructuring the public sector. The Prime Minister also proposed to privatize the People's Bank, which even some of the mainstream donors recognized would have extremely negative impacts on the lives of the poor. In the main, these reforms were done by "stealth," and there was very little public consultation. The same could also be said about the preparation of key policy documents such as "Regaining Sri Lanka."
True enough, both government and donors in their policy statements made a strong commitment to poverty eradication. The IMF approved a Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) and Extended Fund Facility in April 2003 that runs until 2006. The World Bank stepped up its activities with a key target of halving poverty by 2015. To date, it has committed $2.7 billion in loans and grants to support 98 different projects while the ADB loans have totalled $2.7 billion. Yet, the PRSP was based on a trickle down model and involved very little consultation. These shortcomings were also commented upon in the North-East, and in April 2003 Anton Balasingham stated that "Regaining Sri Lanka totally ignored the North-East and concentrated on the South, while the PRSP failed to address the poverty of the North-East as distinct from the rest of the country" (cited in Shanmugaratnam and Stokke, 2004:12).
Discussions between the GoSL, the LTTE, and donors on "normalization" in the North-East revealed tensions over different conceptions of development. While the LTTE in various statements had paid lip service to a development vision that involved an open economy, their practices were extremely statist. Donor agencies working in the North-East found the LTTE's taxation system, tendering processes, and hierarchical system of control at odds with their principles and standard operating procedures. For the government and IFIs, normalization involved opening up the North-East to the forces of globalization. The North-East had been shielded for more than two decades from the effects of liberalization and structural adjustment. For the IFIs the
n important role in lobbying for a domestic violence bill. However, when it went through have been predicted, but the women's groups had not spoken to the JVP on this issue.

Page 93
"transition from war to peace was actually a transition from a state of pre-structural adjustment toward one of structural adjustment" (Shanmugaratnam and Stokke, 2004:14). Yet this kind of "adjustment" ran the risk of undermining human security in the North-East - how, for instance, was a Tamil farmer with high production costs and reliant on lift irrigation meant to compete with cultivators growing onions in southern Sri Lanka or chillies in south India?
As already mentioned, austerity measures in the South that involved cutting back on poverty related expenditure produced a blow back effect. In spite of the evidence that that shock therapy and a growth-first model are politically destabilizing, donors do not appear to have changed their thinking on this matter. The expected U.S. Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) funding, a new global development assistance mechanism of the U.S. government, is also focused on stimulating economic growth as a poverty reduction strategy. Its planned grant assistance takes a government-led, project-based approach. Project formulation does not appear to be conflict
sensitive or adequately take into account the need for balanced assistance to the North-East and South.
54 THETSUNAMIAND INTERNATIONAL
ASSISTANCE
The tsunami caused a dramatic change in Sri Lanka's aid landscape. Before the tsunami, as a middle-income country, Sri Lanka's aid budget was declining and a number of donors were planning to down-size or withdraw. The tsunami has had the effect of dramatically increasing the country's aid budget and ensuring donors' continued involvement. Donor assistance includes debt relief amounting to $500 million for 2004-2005 and three billion U.S. dollars of reconstruction aid pledged at the Development Forum held in Kandy in May 2005.
De
dev
158 The Red Cross alone has an annual budget of approximately $400 million. CA Consortium for Humanitarian Agencies, 348 new agencies were registered in Sri
159 Tsunamiaid also emboldened the government to make new arms purchases from

87 International Engagement
thermore, around $1 billion worth of assistance is ng channelled through NGOs.' This funding will e short-term and long-term consequences. In the rt term, it buys the government room for maneuver t is guaranteed between $800 million to $1.5 billion ually over the next five years. The tsunami became, the government, an excuse for putting off difficult isions about the peace process or the reform nda.' The same criticism could also be applied to hors - as one funder commented in relation to the velopment Forum meeting, "None of the donor cussion was focused on the underlying structural les and the major proportion of the country that's affected by the tsunami." Aid conditionality, in tion to the peace process, is no longer tenable given magnitude of unconditional assistance that has ved into the country since the tsunami. The danger t "overaiding" will have negative long-term impacts the quality of governance in Sri Lanka is also a real '. The problem of "unearned income" strengthening rimonial systems and undermining social contracts
been highlighted in many other contexts (cf. Moore, )0). Moreover, the highly visible nature of the arnational response has produced an anti-Western klash in the South - reproducing in many respects dynamic prompted by the perceived over arnationalization of the peace process in 2003. The ceived malpractices of NGOs generated significant pular criticism. Reported attempts of conversions by ristian aid agencies reinvigorated the debate on antiversion measures. The JVP and affiliated movements ted an anti-NGO campaign with posters and eches across the country.
ny donors saw the tsunami as a window of Jortunity to break through the persistent gridlock in peace process. In some respects, the Tokyo claration was reborn as a set of guiding principles eloped by donors for tsunami relief. In this way
●
RE International's budget has quadrupled for the year. According to the
Lanka immediately after the tsunami.
Iran and Pakistan.

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 | 88
tsunami aid was intended not only to address the
tsunami damage itself, but also structural issues like st centralization, exclusion, unfair distribution of resour and corruption. It was also hoped that PTOMS wou create an opening for resuming peace talks, though at time of writing it is unclear whether this will be the c
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
One of the most salient changes in the political lands since 2000 has been the "internationalization" of peacebuilding. Robust support for the peace process reflects wider global trends. Sri Lanka represents one number of contemporary experiments in liberal peacebuilding, characterized by integrated, multi-mar responses involving a new division of labor between political and development actors. The entire architect of the peace process was built around heavy internatic involvement that helped create the pre-conditions for peace negotiations. But internationalization did not le to a transformation of domestic political conditions, which is necessary for a settlement.
By any standards, this latest round of peace talks has been more successful than its predecessors and it is unprecedented in Sri Lanka for the ceasefire to outli the peace talks. International support, particularly fr the Norwegians, for ceasefire monitoring and Track negotiations has been a critical factor in preventing: return to war and keeping the dialogue going. Perha such an approach, however, created a "peace alibi" w the two parties continued to conduct a shadow war one another. A bilateral and exclusive negotiation m that tended to prioritize conflict management over transformation may have contributed to the current impasse. It has become increasingly apparent that it not possible to circumvent the core political issues through an incremental approach. "Normalization," through the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, facilitated by a joint LTT government delivery mechanism proved impossible without a broader political settlement.
 
 

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Furthermore, there was a growing perception that the peace process had become overly internationalized, inflaming public opinion in the South and North-East. This was at least partly related to the changing role of development donors. There has been a blurring of the traditional distinction between the conflict resolution and the economic aspects of peacebuilding. Donors, by applying peace conditionalities and promoting a peace dividend in the North-East, attempted to directly influence conflict and peace dynamics. Arguably, this new division of labor did not work, because the diplomats were too timid and the donors too bullish. To an extent, this was a case of putting the development cart before the political horse - economic imperatives were never likely to override political and strategic interests in a conflict that is primarily about governance and the nature of the state. Peace conditionalities had limited leverage in a context in which donors continue with other forms of political and economic conditionalities that may themselves be inimical to peace. One of the key lessons from Sri Lanka is that peace conditionalities cannot merely be an "add on" to existing practice - donors need to rethink how they approach their core areas of business particularly in relation to governance, economic reform, and poverty.

Page 95
6. Conclusions and Implications
6.1 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
tim has
par
The
The current peace process generated expectations and, initially, optimism about the prospects for sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.160 However, at the time of writing, much of this optimism has dissipated. Current trends suggest the continuation of an uneasy stalemate or perhaps even a return to war. Neither the underlying
If o structural conditions, nor current conflict dynamics suggest a positive trend toward transformational peace. More than two decades of violent conflict have had a
pre corrosive effect on the Sri Lankan polity and society. It has
arra contributed to processes of political fragmentation and
also institutional decay, which in turn undermines the capacity
for of domestic actors to find a solution to the conflict.
app We have argued that the peace process itself has been limited by, and further exposed, these structural
inte impediments. Limited peace has not led to transformative peace, and negotiations have become a lightning rod for
wider political and societal tensions. A number of preconditions can be identified that are necessary for a
реа sustainable transition from war to peace in Sri Lanka:
• Robust ceasefire arrangements that are upheld,
respected by all parties, and reflect political realities Gir on the ground.
Sri A level of stability and consensus in the southern
реа polity that includes a bipartisan agreement on the
this strategy and end goal of the peace process.
per: A strategy of constructive engagement with peace
in S skeptics.
A significant and stable constituency for peace
star among the southern electorate. Arrangements that ensure that the interests of the
resi
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this
dor
oft pol
Bot
160
For instance, a study entitled "Securing Peace. An Action Strategy for Sri Lanka" are promising." Though it does go on to state that "the hard-won gains of the last leadership and increased engagement by the international community" (Barnicle

89 | Conclusions and Implications
various political and social groupings in the NorthEast are protected and incorporated into future institutional arrangements. Third party support for negotiations. Robust, coherent, and sustained international support for peacebuilding.
one compares Sri Lanka now with the situation at the ne of the last round of peace talks in 1994-1995, there
clearly been progress in relation to some of these conditions. For instance, there is a ceasefire angement, though it needs strengthening. There is p a stronger consensus in the South about the need
a negotiated settlement (though a bipartisan proach has yet to emerge). There is continued third
ty support for negotiations and significant ernational involvement in peace-related activities. erefore, the trends are by no means all negative, ticularly if one takes a longer term, historical spective. At the time of writing, the key threat to ce appears to be the "shadow war" in the East, and s constitutes the most immediate challenge for mestic and international actors.
Fen the current constellation of political forces within
Lanka, how can international actors best support cebuilding processes? Before attempting to address a question, it is important to put their role in spective. The last five years reinforce the point made SCA1 that international actors must maintain a sense proportion about their capacity to engineer complex itical and social changes. By themselves, they do not -t wars and neither do they bring them to an end. ch the GoSL and the LTTE have long experience of sting efforts by the international community to
written in June 2004 concluded that "the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka t year could be lost without courageous choices by the Sri Lankan political
et al, 2004:32).

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 90
"discipline" them. On the other hand, just because donors cannot micro manage political change, this d not mean they are irrelevant. The history of international intervention in Sri Lanka indicates that external policies and pressures may have a significant impact (positive or negative) on domestic actors' calculations and on wider structural conditions. Mu depends upon timing and whether there is a significa constituency for change within the country. Influenc has been greatest when the agendas of international actors are paired with like-minded reformist governments. Though political and social change cani be simply engineered - either by international or domestic actors - the overall direction of change can E influenced. As previously mentioned, international ac have played an important role in creating the preconditions for peace negotiations and preventing a return to war. There is also scope to amplify the effect their sticks and carrots and apply them collectively in more optimal way. Based on the above analysis, a nun of overarching principles for international engagemen peacemaking and peacebuilding can be identified.
Political Commitment and Long-term Engagement
Within the donor community there is growing frustration about the lack of progress in the peace process. There are also concerns about anti-Western feelings and many donors feel exposed and unsuppor by domestic actors. Some talk about a "principled ex There is a danger of Sri Lanka falling back into a degenerative cycle of violence if international suppor the peace process wanes. International actors need to keep their nerve and remain engaged in one form or another. This is not an argument for blithely continu as before, but international actors must be sensitive t the fact that a scaling down in presence or funding a this point in time will be interpreted by many domes actors as a sign of waning political commitment. Current events should be placed within a historical framework and strategies developed accordingly. It is early to talk about success or failure, even though the short to medium term trends may be negative.
 

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Shared Analysis
SCAs 1 and 2 are part of the process of developing improved, shared analysis. So has been the work with the Donor Working Group and efforts to jointly monitor conflict trends. There are a number of formal and informal, international and national groupings. Compared to many other countries affected by violent
conflict, international agencies have access to high quality data and analysis. Since SCA1, donors have developed their internal capacities in this area and improved significantly. However SCA2 has revealed continuing problems in the extent to which analysis is shared (there are pockets of expertise, but knowledge tends to be fragmented and too dependent on the "usual suspects") and also the extent to which analysis is updated and current. This report demonstrates the need for "fine-grained" analysis, in order to better understand and influence conflict dynamics. For donors, this means developing more disaggregated forms of analysis, particularly at the sub-regional and intra-group levels.
Transformative Approach
To state that sustainable peace depends on tackling the underlying causes of conflict has become something of a truism in the conflict transformation literature. But, at times, international actors appear to have lost sight of this because of short-term, pragmatic imperatives. A transformative perspective has to be incorporated into the thinking and strategies of all international actors - whether they are involved in tsunami aid, Track One negotiations, or development projects in the South. Moreover, a transformative approach means more than merely pressurizing the LTTE for change. The same principles have to be applied to all actors, who must be held accountable to international norms.
The challenge is not about maintaining the status quo, but changing it. Clearly, this is risky, but not acting, or not challenging the status quo also brings its own risks. It is important to distinguish between peacemakers and peacebuilders - whereas the former have been in our

Page 97
view too timid about applying pressure for transformative change, international donors, particularly some of the smaller bilaterals have been quite radical and transformative in their approach. Arguably, diplomats have been too timid and donors too bullish - the former under-rating their political leverage and the latter overrating their economic purchase on the key actors.
Inclusivity
This study has discussed the limitations of a bipolar approach and the anxieties this created among actors who felt excluded. An inclusive approach does not necessarily mean getting everyone around the same table at the same time. But it does mean thinking more carefully about the inter and intra-group divisions highlighted in this report and also the vertical divisions between leaders and their constituencies. Inclusivity needs to be mainstreamed - it may involve lots of "small table" discussions, widening out civil society participation, focusing more on the mid-level actors, or strengthening activities at the regional and local levels. Support for Track Two initiatives appears to be particularly important in this regard.
Сотрlететtarity
Although there has been an unusual level of harmonization of efforts in Sri Lanka, international actors inevitably have different conceptions of, and strategies for, contributing to peace. To a large extent harmonization has crystallized around a liberal, Western notion of what a peace process should look like. There is a need to rethink the current consensus on harmonization. This is not working in practice, nor does it lead to the most optimal division of labor within the international community. There should be a shift in emphasis away from harmonization toward strategic complementarity. On occasion this happens, more by default than design, but on the whole there is a pretence of common goals and approaches and a practice of muddling through with frequent discordance between
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91 Conclusions and implications
ors and interventions. There is scope to think more tively about the interfaces between diplomatic, elopment, humanitarian, and human rights actors, so : the distinctive approaches of each reinforce and nplement (rather than undercut) one another. The le applies to complementarity between different ors, for instance the "good cop"-"bad cop" roles of
EU and European bilaterals complementing those of U.S. and India.
guably, Western donor countries have not been ficiently aware of, or responsive to, the sensibilities of an countries that have a political and/or economic ke in the country. Clearly, there is no single Asian spective, just as there is no single Western position on
conflict. But it is clear there were, and continues to concerns from Asian actors about the extremely stern-centric approach to the search for peace. This a number of implications including listening more what Asian actors have to say about the conflict, orporating their concerns into emergent analysis and tegy and, in so doing, 'de-Westernizing international cebuilding.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACEMAKING
is report has focused on the role of aid donors rather in other international actors directly involved in the ce process. However, it is not possible to draw a clear 2 between peacemaking and the role of international stance, particularly since the two have been sciously merged during the course of the peace cess. From traditionally being the "junior partner" in er-state relations, international aid assumed, arguably,
pre-eminent role with regard to the peace process. is "economization" of peacebuilding was based on, in
view, the mistaken assumption that economic entives could override political imperatives. One of lessons from the last three years is that the political ck should be preeminent - development may mplement political negotiations, but it cannot take
lead. In the words of one interviewee, "There should

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 92
be less emphasis on international donor politics than international politics." The impacts of development actors on peacebuilding processes depends largely on what is happening or not happening to the Track On negotiations - rather than vice versa.
Based upon the above analysis, a number of implicati can be identified for international actors involved in peacemaking:
First, maintaining a ceasefire arrangement that ensure the containment of war is an absolute precondition f the continuation of a peace process. On the other hal a sole focus on the CFA may not contribute to transformative peace and risks decreasing the motivat to negotiate by freezing the conflict at a point that le one party better off. Though the CFA has held, it has come under increasing strain due to LTTE violations and the emergence of the Karuna faction. The truce negotiated in a different context, leading some to question its continuing relevance in the new political
dispensation. Although there are fears that renegotiat
the CFA and the SLMM's mandate risks de-stabilizin the current equilibrium, the ceasefire in its current fo may not survive given the level of pressure being plac upon it. There may be a need to consider extending scope of the CFA to cover the full range of military actors and strengthen its human rights component. I parallel, the SLMM's mandate and capacities may ne to be revisited with a view to improving its means of investigation, better public diplomacy, and boosted operational capacity, particularly in the East.
Second, more thought can be given to developing a transformative approach to peacemaking. Some argui that the third party model should change from one o facilitation to power mediation. This would have implications for the identity and mandate of the thir party. Options include (a) strengthening the bilateral model with a more robust and upgraded role for the Norwegians, (b) multilateralization that might involv stronger role for the U.N. or EU, or (c) regionalizati with a more explicit and central role for India.

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Whichever approach is adopted, in our view, a pragmatic/realist and elite centered approach has been too limiting. A transformative approach is complex and risky since it involves the reconstitution of the Sri Lankan state and the democratization and pluralization of politics in the North-East. Interim processes can help institutionalize the political engagement, but not if they merely freeze the status quo - they must have conditions or benchmarks attached to them that show progress toward a transformative agenda. For instance, both sides could have been pushed harder on questions of human rights, transitional justice, and reconciliation. The peace process has not been sufficiently anchored in a clear set of principles for engagement as, for instance, with the Mitchell principles in Northern Ireland.
Third, a more inclusive approach to conflict resolution could be developed. It is possible to map out a number of areas in which one could expand the scope of the (Tracks One and Two) negotiations:
O The need to include both mainstream-parties in negotiations is a clear lesson from the UNF-led peace process. The two parties command the confidence of 60 percent of the electorate, potentially a formidable constituency for peace. A bipartisan approach is therefore a sine qua non for peacemaking. Although this has been elusive in practice, at the very least pressure and inducements could be applied to help develop a tacit agreement that the party in opposition will not play a spoiling role.
O An adequate formula for including Muslim
representatives in the peace process needs to be found that goes beyond merely including a Muslim delegate in the government representation.
o Ways need to be found to engage with the "unlike
minded," including nationalist groups such as the JVP and JHU. Ignoring or attempting to exclude such groups has not worked and, arguably, they have some legitimate concerns. Engagement could mean building contacts through the Track Two and Three processes.

Page 99
O Strengthening and supporting Track Two activities
appears to be critical, particularly at a time when formal negotiations have broken down. In the current context, Track Two constitutes in many respects the backbone of the peace process. Actors and institutions at the meso level can play a pivotal role. In the past they have acted as "neuralgia" points, inflaming grievances and anxieties. But with the right kind of support, mid level actors could become key strategic nodes in the peacebuilding process.
O Although there is a significant peace constituency in
Sri Lanka, its impacts are attenuated by its fragmented nature, lack of information, and distance from the levers of power. There is scope to strengthen work in this area through, for instance, more strategic engagement with the media, particularly the vernacular press. The same can be said in relation to the Sri Lankan diaspora and the domestic business community.
o P-TOMS perhaps provides an opportunity to
develop and test a more inclusive approach by, for example, ensuring Eastern representation in the district and regional committees and helping develop institutional mechanisms at the local level
that include all stakeholders.
Fourth, there should be a shift in emphasis away from harmonization toward strategic complementarity. There is scope to think more creatively about the interfaces between diplomatic, development, humanitarian, and human rights actors, so the distinctive approaches of each reinforce and complement (rather than undercut) one another. The same also applies to complementarity between countries. The Anglo-Saxon and European approaches could be developed more strategically. The U.S. because of its proscription of LTTE is not seen as a neutral interlocutor in relation to peace negotiations. But its strong involvement in the peace process has probably acted as a brake on both sides going back to war. The EU and its member states have typically been more open to engagement with LTTE and offer the potential carrot of legitimacy and resources. The
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93 Conclusions and Implications
blem in the past has tended to be when different ors give contradictory messages and either the GoSL he LTTE, exploit these tensions between the various arnational positions. Furthermore, the synergies and cages between Tracks One, Two, and Three could be ther strengthened, as the One Text initiative is rently attempting to do.
h, given the perception in Sri Lanka that international ors increasingly transgress national sovereignty, and the larkable shift in the southern position on India, there
need to explore ways of amplifying the peacebuilding 2 of India. One possible option is for India to become ther co-chair, though they may not wish to take on
role. However, there is still scope for India's uence to be amplified in other ways including in the ck Two process or other spheres such as trade and aid, ich is already significant.
IMPLICATIONS FORAID DONORS
lonors are to work more effectively "in" or "on" flict in Sri Lanka, they must develop a more realistic assment of their role and impacts. As highlighted in previous section, aid actors, by attempting to stand the same ground as the diplomats, are not playing to ir comparative advantages. Aid is too blunt an trument to influence the short-term dynamics and entive systems of conflict and peace. It is more likely have an influence on the medium to longer-term tors underpinning violent conflict. This suggests that donors should extend their time frames. Long-term nds rather than short-term indicators are better asures of progress on peace and development.
more conflict sensitive approach involves not only ending time frames but also deepening one's derstanding of, and engagement with, the socioitical context. Working on conflict means being licitly political. But this begs the question of what e of politics aid donors should be concerned with and k to influence. This study indicates that international nors do have an influence on political and economic

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 94
trends in Sri Lanka, but they have limited traction or the short-term calculations of political elites. Becomi "more political" should not mean becoming more partisan, as the donor community was perceived to b relation to the UNF government. But it could mean being more explicitly committed to a transformative approach. This would involve developing a more expl theory of change and the links between this and conf greater attention to governance and the institutional framework within which aid is delivered, and a strong analysis of trends and the "drivers of change.”
A number of more specific implications for aid dono are outlined below, drawing upon the framework oft "three C's" introduced in Section 5 of conditionalitie consequences, and causes:
6.3.1 Peace Conditionalities and Conflict
The peace conditionalities applied by development donors at Tokyo did not have the desired outcomes f several reasons. First, conditionalities were based on a inflated view of aid's value to the key parties. Econon incentives were never likely to override political and security concerns. Therefore, conditionalities lacked t traction they might have had in a more economically driven conflict. Second, donor perceptions of the Tok indictors and their impact differed from those of othe stakeholders. For most donors, the Tokyo Declaration implied that with peace would come increased prospé and opportunities for aid. Most local stakeholders perceived this linkage as "no aid unless peace," a misinterpretation that led to considerable ambiguity policy and practice (Burke and Mulakala, 2005). Thi the potential leverage of aid was undermined by the divergent positions of the various donors. On the wh the larger and more influential donors such as Japan : the ADB were more reticent to attach political or conflict related conditions to assistance. The smaller bilateral donors who took a more radical position hac limited leverage, as in relative and absolute terms the financial contribution was small. Fourth, there prove

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be a reluctance to actually implement the Tokyo Declaration (largely due to its ambiguity). Fifth, the potential leverage of aid has been further diminished by the influx of tsunami funding. In practice, the debate on conditionalities has no relevance to the post tsunami context. The threat of withholding aid has no leverage whatsoever in an environment that is completely "overaided." Given this new reality, the debate must shift toward thinking about positive conditions on aid and gaining influence through policy dialogue, rather than through threatened withdrawal or withholding of aid. Support for P-TOMS represents the most salient shortterm opportunity for doing this.
63.2 Consequences of Conflict
Addressing the humanitarian consequences of the war was one of the key strands in the CFA. It was both an important goal in its own right and also a vehicle for developing trust between the two sides that would facilitate more substantive negotiations on core issues. In a sense, it was viewed as a form of shallow peacebuilding that could evolve into a deeper form of engagement.
In spite of the failures of SIHRN, there is still scope to substantially scale up international assistance to the North-East to address the consequences of war. Although aid has increased, a significant proportion was caught up in the politics of the peace process. Dealing with the consequences of war can help create opportunities to address underlying causes. For instance, working on practical issues that affect both the NorthEast and South, such as missing persons as a result of conflict, may help build North-South links and contribute toward reconciliation. Practical programs dealing with common issues such as the problems of the conflict-displaced and tsunami-displaced can also have transformative elements built into them. On the ground, pragmatic institutional arrangements have emerged between LTTE, the GoSL, and international donors in terms of delivering tsunami and reconstruction-related aid.
These could be formalized with a view to developing

Page 101
interim institutional arrangements that are inclusive and, if not formally democratic, allow different voices to be heard.
6.3.3 Causes of Conflict
For many donors, working "on" conflict has meant reorienting activities so they have a direct focus on the peace process. This, as already highlighted, had a number of perverse effects - it resulted in inflated expectations about what aid could achieve, led to funding being caught up in the peace process and contributed to a backlash in the South against "neo-imperial" donors. The evidence suggests that donors ventured too far outside their core area of competence. Peace conditionalities may have limited traction when the broader framework of aid conditionalities remains unchanged - especially when some of these conditions may be inimical to peacebuilding. Arguably, donors in the long term can have a more significant impact on the causes of conflict by focusing on their core areas of business, including poverty, governance, and economic development.
In SCA1 it was argued that the smaller bilateral donors could probably have a greater impact on peace and conflict dynamics by influencing the "big three" donors -Japan, the World Bank, and the ADB - who were working around conflict. To some extent, these efforts may have contributed to the changing stance of the World Bank and to a lesser extent the ADB. However, Japan and (to some extent) the World Bank and the ADB still tend to follow an orthodox approach, which if not conflict blind is at least conflict neutral.
The toolbox that donors have at their disposal is quite limited, though in recent years the ambitions of aid actors have grown enormously. To a great extent, the challenge remains similar to the one outlined in SCA1 of "doing things differently rather than doing different things." The following are some of the areas in which donors might do things differently:
Although hardly an original conclusion, donors need to re-think the blueprint model of governance and economic development that has been prescribed to Sri
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95 Conclusions and Implications
ka in common with many other countries in isition or emerging from conflict. The UNF ernment, supported by international donors, saw the ce process as an opportunity for "shock therapy" - owing the same rationale as aid donors in transition texts elsewhere, that radical reforms would meet ited resistance during a period of rapid change. As cribed above, this was not the case in practice and a mber of lessons emerge from this experience:
Attempting to force through two major structural changes (negotiating a peace settlement and implementing radical reforms) simultaneously created unmanageable tensions within the polity.
More thought needs to be given to the mix and sequencing of such reforms.
Ameliorative measures need to be taken that may not be "efficient" in economic terms, but may be more politically and socially expedient.
repeatedly emphasized in this report, at the heart of conflict is the question of the state and the quality of ernance in Sri Lanka. It is clear that an "ideal type" del of governance is not appropriate in any context,
particularly not in a conflictual one. Conflict is |ted to competing notions of the state. None of the courses around the state in Sri Lanka come close to neo-liberal version of a small enabling state. In the rth-East, the discourse is around a separate or highly erated state, while in the South it is largely concerned h a strong, unitary state that has a protective and istributive role. In both cases, however, the state is ced at the center of the development vision. In many pects, this is quite an Asian view of the developmental ie and there appears to be scope for international hors to think more carefully about the Asian erience of statebuilding and development and to mine how these models apply to the case of Sri Lanka.
hough the relationship between conflict and poverty :ontested, complex, and multi-directional, there is ficient research and analysis on Sri Lanka to suggest it poverty is a significant variable in the generation of evance and violent conflict. Yet the UNF's Poverty duction Strategy Paper (PRSP) "Regaining Sri Lanka"

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 96
involved limited public consultation and, overall, was based on a trickle down model of development. Development donors, in spite of their agreed focus ol poverty, were unable or unwilling to challenge the government on the distributional effects of its policie Somewhat paradoxically, there is a convergence betwc the proclaimed poverty eradication agendas of development donors and the JVP. This could constitu the basis for a more productive dialogue between the two. The need for a stronger focus on poverty and th distributional effects of assistance, which was emphasized in SCA1, still holds good. To a great exte donors apply conflict sensitive frameworks to their w in the North-East, but ignore them when it comes to the South. In terms of doing things differently, donol should consider placing a stronger emphasis on safety nets and social protection and targeting "pockets of poverty." This necessarily involves going beyond noti of horizontal inequalities based only on ethnicity. Donors must be more cognizant of the role that intra group, as well as inter-group, divisions have played in generating the politics of anxiety and exclusion descri in this report.
Another finding from SCA1 that still applies today is donors' rather patchy engagement with civil society. Donors' support for a Colombo-centric group of like minded actors has become a familiar refrain in aid circles. Getting beyond the "charmed circle" of dono friendly organizations is still a challenge, even though donors have experimented with new arrangements. O alternative is to provide more serious large-scale framework funding for civil society initiatives that is locally managed and has the expressed purpose of developing a peace constituency rather than service delivery mechanisms for donor projects.
Donors, like elsewhere, tend to engage primarily with the "like-minded." Yet in situations of conflict it is th "unlike-minded" who are often the key drivers of change. One can debate who is a "spoiler” or "unlikeminded” (and this category may change over time), b it is clear that the donor community has found it problematic engaging with groups like LTTE, the JV) the Sangha, and the National Patriotic Movement (NPM). Since they are influential stakeholders in the

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peace process with major constituencies, if donors do not engage with them, their analysis and influence on conflict and peace dynamics are likely to be circumscribed. If donors are serious about engagement, however, this should not just be conducted with the intention of transforming them into the more "likeminded." A serious dialogue would have to involve the possibility that donors would also be prepared to change their positions and mind sets.
Finally, it is widely recognized that large injections of funding have the potential to adversely affect both the short-term conflict dynamics and long-term causes of conflict. A conflict sensitive approach must involve the accountable and balanced distribution of resources with the participation of affected populations. Support for a coordinated approach through P-TOMS should be prioritized. There is also scope to encourage regional collaboration in relation to disaster preparedness and response.
In conclusion, Sri Lanka has been a flawed, though certainly not failed, experiment in liberal peacebuilding. A heavily internationalized peace process has been a mixed blessing. It has played an important role in preventing a return to war, but it has also had perverse effects that contributed to the current no war-no peace equilibrium. This, however, is not an argument for reduced international involvement. Domestic political actors cannot take the risks required to build peace without sustained and sensitive international backing. We have argued that a different mix and balance of diplomatic, political, security, and economic measures can help create an enabling environment for the peace process. International aid has an important, though supplementary, role in creating these conditions. A key change since 2000 has been the realization that it is no longer tenable to pretend that foreign aid can be divorced from questions of war and peace in Sri Lanka.

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Page 111
Appendix 1: Basic Timeline (Janua
The timeline below captures some of the most important event where the first Strategic Conflict Assessment left off. 161 It has b elections were held, the LTTE and the government negotiated : reconstruction and rehabilitation in the North-East began, the go back to war, the LTTE faced a major split when its eastern t organization taking hundreds of cadre with him, political violen the East, the JVP emerged as a third force in the politics of the in a fragile governing coalition between the SLFP and JVP at t characterized as a situation of "no war, no peace.".
1. RUN-UP TO THE CEASEFIRE (JANUARY 2000 - FEBRUA
January 5, 2000: Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickre stopped outside his office. A month earlier, Presid
while campaigning before the presidential election regular occurrence in Colombo in 2000. February 16, 2000: President Chandrika Bandara Prabhakaran invite the Norwegian government to parties to the conflict and act as a go-between. April 22, 2000: The LTTE recaptures Elephant P. peninsula.
May 2000: Following the capture of Elephant Pas Inroads are made and the LTTE reaches the outsk a determined army fight-back with emergency mi June 7, 2000: A suicide bomber kills the Ministe August 18, 2000: President Kumaratunga dissolve September 16, 2000: Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
Many suspect foul play despite the official explana weather. His death results in a power struggle bet leadership of the SLMC. Hakeem emerges as the October 10, 2000: Parliamentary elections result i Alliance. The JVP captures 10 seats and is represe
161
Timelines have a natural bias toward specific events. Enduring or less tangible pr an overview. Also, there is a bias toward events that attract international attent are crucial to specific constituencies only, like developments within the Sangha,

| 105 | Appendixes
y 2000 - September 2005)
s and trends that took place since January 2000, -een a turbulent five years. Three parliamentary a ceasefire, the peace process commenced, LTTE pulled out of peace talks but said it would not
military commander Karuna Anam broke from the nce and inter- and intra-ethnic tensions increased in South, a long process of political jockeying resulted nie center, and the peace process came to a stand-still,
„RY 2002) emanayake is the target of a suicide bomber who is Lent Kumaratunga was injured in a suicide bombing a held on December 21, 1999. Suicide attacks are a
naike Kumaratunga and LTTE leader Vellupillai facilitate backchannel dialogue between the two
ass, army complex at the gateway to the Jaffna
s, the LTTE attempts to regain the Jaffna peninsula. cirts of Jaffna town, but further gains are prevented by litary assistance from India, Pakistan, and China. r of Industries C.V.Gooneratne. Es parliament at the end of its natural six-year term.
leader M.H.M. Ashraff dies in a helicopter crash. ation of mechanical failure complicated by bad -ween his wife Ferial Ashraff and Rauf Hakeem for
new Leader. in a weak coalition led by the President's People's ented in parliament for the first time.
ocesses may be equally or more important, but are easily excluded in such ion (like security issues, elections, and the peace process). Factors which intra-party politics, or regional issues may unfortunately be neglected.

Page 112
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 106
October 25, 2000: Sinhalese villagers st Province, housing Tamil detainees. They center. The camp guards and local polic colluding with the attackers.
November 27, 2000: LTTE leader Prab speech.
December 21, 2000: LTTE declares a o April 24, 2001.
February28, 2001: The UK proscribes t
June 20, 2001: The President sacks Cab with five SLMC colleagues. The opposit The president responds by proroguing p July 23, 2001: The LTTE strikes at the and four civilian aircraft. The impact ol mark the first year that Sri Lanka's econ September 6, 2001: The ruling People's government sworn in on September 13. September 11, 2001: Terrorist attacks th the Pentagon usher in a new era of glob: States, becomes the dominant theme of
October 9, 2001: Eight MPs from the S Alliance, cross over to the opposition U Confidence motion and the President is
December 5, 2001: The UNP wins the e Minister, forms a government with the with the President.
2. THE CEASEFIREAND PEACETALKS (FEBR
February 22, 2002: The new government fragile, lasts until today. The Sri Lanka M
Throughout 2002: A process of normali A9 highway to and from Jaffna is re-ope restrictions on the transport of commod 23) and reconstruction and rehabilitatio
NGOs.
April 15, 2002: Rauf Hakeem and Velu intention to improve Tamill-Muslim rela peace talks that affect the Muslim comm their lands, particularly in the East.

orm a rehabilitation camp in Bindunuwewa, in the Central r hack and club to death 24 Tamil prisoners and set fire to the e do nothing to prevent the killings and are suspected of
hakaran calls for unconditional talks in his annual martyr's day
ne-month unilateral ceasefire that is extended monthly up to
he LTTE.
inet Minister Rauff Hakeem who crosses over to the opposition tion wins a No Confidence motion against the government. arliament.
international airport in Katunayake, destroying eight military n Sri Lanka's economy and image is significant. 2001 will omy shrinks.
Alliance and the JVP sign a pact and form a new short-lived
at destroy the World Trade Center in New York and damage al insecurity. The "global war on terror," led by the United
international security and politics.
ri Lanka Freedom Party, the largest party in the People's nited National Party. Again, the opposition wins a No
forced to dissolve parliament and call for fresh elections.
:lection. Its leader Ranil Wickremesinghe becomes Prime help of minority parties, and enters into a fragile "cohabitation"
UARY 2002 - APRIL 2003)
t and the LTTE declare a ceasefire which, although increasingly sonitoring Mission is established to monitor the truce.
zation in the North-East begins following the ceasefire. The :ned in April, many displaced people return to the North, most lities to the North are lifted, fishing restrictions are eased (May in projects commence by the government and international
pillai Prabhakaran sign an agreement spelling out their tions and consult one another on issues that come up in the hunity. The agreement allows Muslim farmers to return to

Page 113
May 16, 2002: Tamil civilians protest against the for the internally displaced to return to their hom areas around major military installations as well a LTTE agitation over the HSZs would increase ov
May 28, 2002: Prime Minister Wickremesinghe a ethnic conflict in a speech to the European Parlia
May 2002: The East experiences its first wave of Summer 2002: PM Wickremesinghe visits India,
international support for the nascent peace proces on August 14, both parties agree in Oslo on ther lifts the ban on the LTTE paving the way for dire Batticaloa, Valaichennai, and Muthur jeopardize t September 16-18, 2002: The first round of six pe
October 9, 2002: Seven people die in a clash betv Akkaraipattu. Violence becomes a common phen
October 2002: Insurgent SLMC members boycot
government that Muslim interests will be protecte
October 31 - November 3, 2002: During the secc committees are established to manage the normal becomes the LTTE representative to the Sub-com
November 25, 2002: Donors pledge support to th
December 2-5, 2002: The third round of peace ta federal system of government as the basis for a sol
January 6-9, 2003: The fourth round of peace tall February 7-8, 2003: The fifth round of talks is he
March 20, 2003: A Chinese trawler is sunk of the killed. The LTTE is suspect but deny involvemen attributes the incident to an unnamed third party. March 21, 2003: The sixth and final round of pe to strengthen the SLMM and reiterate their comn
Throughout 2003: The Sinhala press and opposit Wickremesinghe's conduct of the peace process, a LTTE.
April 14, 2003: In the run-up to the Tokyo dono1
discuss the Sri Lankan peace process and donor su listed as a terrorist organization in the U.S.

107 Appendixes
high security zones in Jaffna and demand permission les within the Zones. HSZs include large buffer s road junctions, schools, and hospitals. Civilian and er the next two years.
dvocates devolution as part of a solution to the
ment,
ceasefire violations.
the United States, and other countries to secure ss. Preparations for direct talks in Thailand begin and modalities for talks. On September 4, the government
:ct negotiations. Violent Tamil-Muslim clashes in
he Prabhakaran-Hakeem agreement.
ace talks is held in Thailand.
veen the Special Task Force and the LTTE in omenon in the East.
it parliament and demand assurances from the
:d in the talks with the LTTE.
ond round of peace talks in Thailand, three subization process in the North-East. Colonel Karuna mittee on De-escalation and Normalisation.
he peace process during an aid conference in Oslo.
lks is held in Oslo. Both parties agree to explore a ution to the conflict (Oslo Communiqué).
ks is held in Thailand.
ld in Berlin.
: Mullaitivu coast and seven of its crew members are t. The SLMM, after investigating the incident,
ice talks is held in Hakone, Japan. Both parties agree nitment to a federal solution to the ethnic conflict.
ion parties are increasingly critical of Prime Minister ccusing him of being too accommodative toward the
: conference, a pre-meeting is held in Washington tO upport. The LTTE cannot attend because they are

Page 114
Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 108
3. THE BREAKDOWN OFTALKS AND INSTA
April 21, 2003: The LTTE suspend the excluded from the Washington meeting zones, and the government's economic June 9, 2003: Donors pledge approxima conference, but their statement is interp peace process. The LTTE boycotts the r forward a framework for reaching a solu
August 2003: Tamil-Muslim conflict in
October 31, 2003: Following lengthy di diaspora, the LTTE presents its proposa
November 4, 2003: President Kumaratu ministries (responsible for defence, law any possibility of peace talks resuming a country's security and sovereignty are at decision and conduct business as usual,
November 14, 2004: Norwegian media country's political crisis is resolved.
November 2003 to January 2004: Repe break the political impasse and arrive at
February 7, 2004: The President dissol
Throughout 2004: Norwegian, Japanese resumption of peace talks. The LTTE tr
March 4, 2004: Eastern LTTE military to send troops to the North and breaks :
March 26, 2004: The LTTE launches a Batticaloa District. Overwhelmed, Karl insurgent campaign against the LTTE ir April 2, 2004: Parliamentary elections a Alliance, comprised of the SLFP and JV forms a government with the help of sm April 6, 2004: The President appoints Kumaratunga's first choice for PM was who was elected to Parliament from the because of his larger base of popular sup April 15, 2004: In the aftermath of the
there are reports of re-recruitment by th
Summer 2004: Discussions between the

BILITY (APRIL 2003 - DECEMBER 2004)
ir participation in the peace talks on the grounds that they were , the government is unwilling to compromise on high security plans fail to meet the needs of people in the North-East.
ately $4.5 billion in development assistance at the Tokyo 'reted by some as linking aid disbursements to progress in the meeting on the grounds that the government has not put Ltion to the ethnic conflict.
the East escalates.
eliberations, including consultations with experts in the Tamil for an Interim Self Governing Authority for the North-East.
Inga declares a state of emergency, takes over three key and order, and media), and prorogues parliament precluding round the ISGA proposal. The President declares that the risk. The Prime Minister refuses to accept the President's precipitating a political crisis.
tors state that Sri Lanka's peace process is on hold until the
ated efforts by advisors to the President and Prime Minister to a power-sharing arrangement fail.
ves Parliament and calls a snap election.
, and EU representatives try unsuccessfully to broker a avels to Western countries to muster support for its cause.
commander Colonel Karuna Aman refuses Prabhakaran's order away from the LTTE.
military quick strike against Karuna's strong-hold in northern una disbands his cadre, goes into hiding, and begins an 1 Batticaloa and Amparai.
re held resulting in a victory for the United People's Freedom P, which captures 105 seats to the UNP's 82. The UPFA aller parties including the JHU and EPDP Mahinda Rajapakse as Prime Minister. Apparently President her close confidante Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, national list. The President ultimately opts for Rajapakse port, particularly in the South where the JVP is also strong.
Karuna split, the LTTE frees a batch of 220 child soldiers but e LTTE and, later, the Karuna faction.
UNP and the President about power sharing fail but the UNP

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announces its support for the President's efforts alliance with the JVP Donors struggle to make to progress of the peace process becomes a com principles of different donors, the difficulty of d about a speedy solution.
June 1, 2004: The co-chairs to the peace proces parties must resume negotiations to prevent int parts of the world.
July 7, 2004: An assassination attempt against E Colombo fails but kills four security staff and in
October 4, 2004: The President inaugurates the Reconciliation (NACPR), a forum for the gover from elected representatives and civil society an Fall 2004: The government and LTTE trade cha peace talks. The LTTE insists on the ISGA pro
to discuss interim measures in the context of a f
December 18, 2004: President expresses confide process following critical comments by co-chair
TSUNAMIAND THE JOINTMECHANISM (DECEM
December 26, 2004: A tsunami hits Sri Lanka, damage in coastal areas of the North, East, and financial aid arrives, making coordination and d
January 6-8, 2005: U.N. Secretary General Kofi the government prevents him from going to LT
January 13, 2005: The U.N. accuses the LTTE (April 5), UNICEF announces that they have c
January 2005: The government and the LTTE providing tsunami relief and recovery assistance. February 8, 2005: Kaushalyan, the LTTE's poli government territory. The government denies a March 10, 2005: The government claims to hav concerns about an LTTE air strike capability. April 5, 2005: An SLMM monitor is injured wi Trincomalee.
April 29. 2005: Tamilnet editor Dharmaretnam unknown assailants.
May 16, 2005: At the donor forum in Kandy, d

109 Appendixes
to revive the peace process while criticizing her party's good on their commitments made in Tokyo. Tying aid blicated knot involving the strategic interests and
efining and measuring progress, and general scepticism
(EU, Japan, Norway, and the U.S.) state that both 'rnational attention and support from shifting to other
PDP leader Douglas Devananda at his office in jures others. The LTTE denies involvement.
National Advisory Council for Peace and nment to discuss and seek input on the peace process i religious leaders.
urges about who is to blame for the failure to resume posal as the basis for talks while the government wants inal political settlement.
'nce that she can keep the JVP in line over the peace is the EU, Japan, and the U.S.
MBER 2004-SEPTEMBER 2005)
causing tremendous loss of life and comprehensive South. Large amounts of international assistance and elivery difficult.
Annan visits Sri Lanka to inspect tsunami damage but TE-controlled areas.
of recruiting child soldiers in the tsunami camps. Later onfirmed at least 106 cases.
begin discussions to set up a joint mechanism for
tical leader in the East, is killed while moving through ly involvement. e discovered an LTTE air strip in the Vanni, creating
hen the LTTE opens fire on a navy boat close to
Sivaram is abducted and killed in Colombo by
onors pledge over $3 billion dollars for tsunami aid.

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Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005 110
The President reiterates her commitmen resolution of the ethnic conflict.
June 10, 2005: Protests against the joint gas to disperse demonstrating monks at
June 16, 2005: The JVP leaves the UPF, demand to drop the idea of a joint mech on other matters, thus averting another
June 24, 2005: The government and the Operational Management Structure (P-1 government representatives on regional a influence the allocation of tsunami aid it doest not adequately safeguard Muslim i
June 26, 2005: Some 40 LTTE cadres, i. ambush close to Welikanda when travell forces.
June 30, 2005: In response to the Welik representatives when travelling through g may cause a breakdown of the ceasefire,
July 11, 2005: The government initially government areas but eventually agrees to case by case basis.
August 12, 2005: Foreign Minister Laksh Colombo residence. The LTTE denies in
August 26, 2005: The Supreme Court in elections must be held by December 200
September 9, 2005: Addressing the U.N LTTE has not moved away from terroris. their continued recruitment of child sold Kofi Annan stresses the need for peace in
September 26, 2005: The EU announce organization. The EU bans all official tr. explicitly blaming the LTTE, the assassin statement. The LTTE initiates a campai

110 Appendixes
t to a joint mechanism with the LTTE and a peaceful
tsunami mechanism gather momentum. The police use tear the President's residence.
A coalition following Kumaratunga's refusal to meet their anism. The JVP continues to support the SLFP in parliament political crisis and election.
LTTE sign a joint mechanism called the Post-Tsunami OMS). This grants the LTTE along with Muslim and ind district committees the opportunity to participate in and h the North-East. The SLMC protests that the mechanism
terestS.
ncluding the political head of Ampara, narrowly escape an ing through government territory escorted by government
unda attack, the LTTE demands protection for its political
government controlled areas. Government failure to respond the LTTE threatens.
denies responsibility for safeguarding LTTE travel in o provide protection provided the SLMM is present and on a
lman Kadirgamar is assassinated by a sniper at his private volvement.
n response to a case filed by the JHU rules that presidential 5.
. General Assembly, President Kumaratunga states that the
m as is evidenced by the recent killing of the Foreign Minister,
iers, and killing of political rivals. U.N. Secretary General
Sri Lanka.
s that it is considering listing the LTTE as a terrorist vel by LTTE representatives to member states. Though not ation of the Foreign Minister is strongly condemned in the gn urging the EU to reconsider their stance.

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Appendix II: The P-TOMS Mechani
THETSUNAMIME
High-Level Committee (SMT)
* Decides on general policies
* Voting by consensus (any party can pull the plug)
* The chair rotates.
Regional Committee (SS MMM TTTTT)
* Decides on allocation of
money
* Voting (bottom line): a veto
requires four out often votes. This means both TS and TM can push through a decision, but no decision can be made against the will of the LTTE.
* The LTTE chairs, while S and
Mare deputy chairs.
Six District Committees (Representation varies per district)
* Generate, collect and submit
proposals to the Regional
Committee for funding.
* District Committees exist for
the six districts covered by P-TOMS: Ampara, Batticaloa, Jafna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu
and Trincomalee.
 
 
 

111 Appendixes
ism
ECHANISM
External involvement
Donors
* All money allocated
through P-TOMS is donor money. This Regional Fund has a multi-lateral custodian.
* Both bilateral and
multilateral donors have one observer in the HLC. and in the RC.
Accountant
P-TOMS has an
independent accountant
NOTES: * P-TOMS stands for Post
Tsunami Operational Management Structure. * Representation: S=Sinhala, T=Tamil, and M=Muslim. * The Regional Committee
strives for consensus and decides with a simple majority otherwise. When the votes are equal, the chair (LTTE) may decide. When at least two member object, however, a seven member majority (in practice expectably: ST or MT)
is required.

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u arachchi, Dominic Sansoni, and
Gemunu Amarasinghe