

HSZ issue can be solved

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Back from peace to pieces

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A woman refugee and her family who returned from the Vanni recently to their land in Kumburupiddy, north of Trincomalee

pic by S. Gurunathan.

## HSZ issue wont stall talks

By Staff correspondent

The peace process won't be stalled by differences over the high security zones in Jaffna. The LTTE remains committed to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict through negotiations regardless of the efforts by the opposition to undermine the credibility of the process in the eyes of the Sinhala public, political sources close to the LTTE told Northeastern Herald.

"The President and the JVP and sections of the media in the south are trying to skew the real issue. They want to convince the Sinhala people and the world that this is a purely military question", they added.

A LTTE official meanwhile dismissed the Sri Lankan army's argument that it's strategic camps in the peninsula would become vulnerable to infiltration by the LTTE if civilians are permitted to resettle in their homes close to military installations.

"There were no civilians near any of the main Sri Lanka army camps we overran in the Vanni and

Jaffna in 1999-2000. There were no civilian dwellings anywhere close to the perimeter of the sprawling Elephant Pass base. The area around it was devoid of human settlements for more than 12 years. Yet we overran the base. It shows that we do not depend on civilian settlements around a Sri Lanka army camp for our military purposes", the official said.

"Therefore it is obvious that the campaign by the PA leadership and the JVP against helping displaced families in Jaffna go back to their homes and to restart their lives is deliberately aimed at fomenting acrimony in Sri Lanka army ranks against the UNF government", he observed.

"However, the canard spread by PA/JVP that HSZ issue is being taken up by us with a purely military motive and as a pretext to go back to war will soon be nailed", the LTTE official said.

He said the question of resettlement would be studied and addressed in detail once the facts re-

garding mass displacements of civilians to make room for high security zones in Jaffna are gathered.

"The LTTE cannot be indifferent to the predicament of the people who want to leave the refugee camps where they have been languishing in dire conditions for more than a decade. It is our duty to ensure their security in terms of food and shelter.

"We cannot abdicate our responsibility towards our people for the sake allaying baseless concerns about disturbing the balance of power between the two sides in the north", the Tiger official said.

Tamil National Alliance politicians and several civil society groups in Jaffna say that they would continue to agitate for the resettling the thousands of internally displaced families in their towns and villages which lie in the high security zones of the Sri Lanka army in the peninsula.

Downsizing or closing any of the HSZ's in Jaffna will tilt the balance of forces in favour of the LTTE, according to the army and the SLMM.

The army says that the Tigers are putting pressure on the UNF to shrink or close the HSZs in Jaffna so that they can move their anti-aircraft guns within range of all military flights to the peninsula in the event of war breaking out again.

The perimeter of the Palay-Kankesanthurai base was expanded to prevent the LTTE from firing missiles and anti-aircraft guns to interdict its lifeline to the north, according to the military.

### Plans to downsize Army

In Sri Lanka, defense officials say the country plans to restructure its military if a peace process with Tamil rebels takes hold.

Defense Minister Tilak Marapane said a review committee has begun looking at ways to cut defense expenditure while maintaining security.

Defense spending has accounted for more than five percent of the country's gross domestic spending, and was one of the factors blamed for dragging down the economy in recent years.

Mr. Marapane said plans to

reconstruct the security sector are being made as changes take place in what he calls the national security landscape.

The Sri Lankan army began fighting Tamil rebels in 1983, when they launched their struggle for a separate homeland for the Tamil minority community in the north and east of the country.

But a peace process that began last year has raised hopes of ending the conflict. In December both sides agreed to consider a federal form of government that would allow autonomy for Tamil dominated areas. -VOA



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## Eye scans unlock the future

*By Kevin Anderson*

Password cracking programs can break a lot of easily guessed phrases in less than a minute.

And heightened security of airports, borders and sensitive facilities is the focus of a world newly awakened to the threat of global terrorism.

Countries and companies want security that is harder to fool than systems that rely on passwords and Personal Identification Numbers (Pin).

Enter biometrics. The highly hyped technology relies on physical unique characteristics such as fingerprints, facial patterns or the pattern of the iris in the eye to make sure users are who they say they are.

### Rush of interest

"September 11 brought the biometric marketplace and their technologies to the forefront," said Richard Ouaknine, with the International Biometric Group.

"Everyone realised globally that there is a greater need for improved security and additional methods of security aside from traditional passwords, tokens and so forth," he added.

Biometrics is an industry in its infancy, worth between \$240m to \$400m, according to Brian Rutenbur, senior vice president and equity research analyst of Morgan Keegan & Company.

Following the attacks of 11 September, stocks in biometrics companies rose 130%, he said.

Both the US and UK Governments are exploring biometrics as a way to increase security of computer systems, as well as at airports, military facilities and government offices.

The Home Office in the UK is looking into systems that speed passage through immigration.

Biometric locks even guard the offices of US Vice President Dick Cheney.

### Eye IDs

The public will soon be seeing biometrics systems at airports and in enhanced travel documents that the US Government is requiring by 2004.

EyeTicket's JetStream system, which uses the pattern of the iris in the eye for identification, was part of a test programme at London's Heathrow Airport.

The hope is that the system will speed passage of overseas visitors through immigration, cutting the time for processing from an average of 10 minutes to 10 seconds.

Biometrics company Safflink has a fingerprint recognition system coupled with a proximity sensor.

Computer users sign-in to their computers by scanning their fingers. Once they step away from their terminal, the system automatically locks the computer down.

### Competition

Right now, it is a battle not only between rival companies but also rival technologies.

Fingerprint, facial recognition and fingerprint scanning are just a few technologies vying for government funding.

Iris scanning advocates say that their system is difficult to trick because of the complexity of the iris.

They say that the system can even detect false iris patterns printed on contact lenses because of visual artefacts left by the inkjet technology used to print such lenses.

But privacy advocates question the accuracy of various biometric technologies and have voiced concerns about the how information linked to biometric identifiers will be used.

Some people have been resistant to fingerprint scanning as it is associated with criminal activity.

Facial scanning got a black eye when it was used without alerting game goers at the Superbowl, the championship game of the National Football League in the US.

But biometrics boosters say that Americans are now willing to trade some of their privacy for increased security - s

# The main features of federalism

*By Claude Bélanger*

1. Two levels of government created and protected by the Constitution, with sovereignty stemming neither from above, nor from below, but distributed between the two, in some fashion by the Constitution.

2. Neither level of government is entirely subordinated to the other; each has powers and these are guaranteed by the Constitution.

3. Supremacy rests in the Constitution. Formal changes in the relative position, or powers, of each level of government cannot be achieved by one level alone, but are subjected to some form of mutual consent; the method for effecting such changes (amendments) is outlined in the Constitution.

4. Both levels of government enact legislation affecting the same citizens; the central government enacts laws in certain fields for the whole (or possibly part) of the country; the provincial government enacts legislation on other subjects for the residents of their respective provinces.

5. The legislation of the provincial government can only apply to the people of their province. Provincial law does not have the power of extraterritoriality.

6. Overlapping of jurisdiction (so-called "grey areas") is inevitable within a federal system. When such overlapping exists, there is a need to determine, in the Constitution, which of the two levels of legislation shall prevail if the

laws are found in contradiction.

7. Federal constitutions must be, at least, partly written so that the allocation of fields of jurisdiction is made clear and guaranteed. Such constitutions are also said to be rigid since, for the most part, it would require more than a simple majority of the legislatures to change it.

8. Jurisdictional disputes between the two levels of government are decided upon formally by a Supreme or Constitutional court. Such a Court finds its existence guaranteed in the Constitution. Ordinarily, such a court is also beyond the control of any one level of government.

9. Disputes may also be resolved by bypassing the court system if the two levels of government so desire; the issues can be resolved politically or administratively through processes and institutions of intergovernmental co-operation.

10. The interests of the member-states in a federation are not only protected by a formal distribution of power, guaranteed by the constitution, but, as well, by some form of local representation in the institutions of the central government. In Canada, this is done in the Senate and, to a lesser extent, in the distribution of federal cabinet positions. Where local interest is not well represented in the institutions and processes of the central government, the role of the provincial governments, to carry out that task, is that much more emphasised and important.

11. Each level of government is not only allocated a list of fields of jurisdiction but, as well, given autonomous revenue sources to finance its operations. A government without revenues of its own, would not really be a sovereign entity.

12. Each of the two levels of government has substantially complete governing institutions with power to modify these unilaterally.

13. Federal countries, especially lately, have developed elaborate structures and devices of intergovernmental co-operation, blurring increasingly the division of powers that should separate them. In the process they have multiplied "grey areas" and rendered it difficult for citizens to determine who is responsible precisely for what... Such intergovernmental bodies, frequently working in the background, away from the scrutiny of the public, have lessened the control which citizens wish to have over the system.

14. Some federations, such as Canada, have developed, through the existence of the central government, an elaborate system through which the wealthy regions contribute substantially for the support of the less fortunate parts of the country. In Canada's case, this is done through the equalization payments and shared costs programmes.

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## Search continues for fisherman rammed by Navy in Jaffna

The fisherman who went missing in the northern sea off Thondamanaru coast when a Sri Lanka Navy craft rammed his fishing boat on Monday night has not been traced till Thursday evening. Eight fishing boats were used to search from early morning till the evening Thursday, but the search was called off without success and will continue Friday, civilian sources said.

The two fishermen of Kerudavil who were injured in this incident and are now warded in the Palaly army hospital would be transferred to the Jaffna Teaching Hospital Friday with the permission of the Jaffna magistrate court, according to a message received from the Sri Lanka Army by the victims' rela-

tives. The SLN personnel stationed at Kankesanthurai (KKS) harbour, sources said, handed over the damaged boat to the KKS Police.

An SLN Dvora-gunboat rammed a fishing boat around 7 p.m. Monday night off the coast of Thondamanaru. Two fishermen, Sinnathamby Sothilingam (50) and his son Kandeepan (20) of Kerudavil were wounded and another 32-year-old Ponnann Gnaneswaran was reported missing when the boat capsized in the midsea, Vadamarachchi Fisheries Co-operative Societies Federation sources said.

The wounded were taken to Sri Lanka Army (SLA) hospital in Palaly, fisheries sources said.

On representation made by the

Jaffna regional co-ordinator of the Human Rights of Commission of Sri Lanka to the Sri Lanka Navy following a complaint by the affected parties, the SLN permitted eight boats to search for the missing fisherman, sources said.

Meanwhile, two fishermen reported to be missing in northern waters off the Polikandy coast in the Vadamarachchi area returned to the shore near Mathagal in the Valigamam area Thursday. Fellow fishermen rescued them while their boat was adrift in mid-sea due to engine trouble, fisheries sources said. Earlier report said their boat also was rammed by an SLN craft Monday night.



# Wayward Arguments to Scuttle the Peace Process

By Bertram Bastiampillai

It looks as if it is easier to wage a violent conflict than reach a peace settlement to end discord between different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Antagonistic forces opposed to the reconciliation of divided communities have sprung up every time peace is proposed. It happened in 1957, again in the mid nineteen sixties, then when J.R. Jayawardene designed a settlement and when the present President tried to effect an understanding with the militant belligerents. Suddenly, a number of professed extremist nationalist patriots though not really representative of the land or peoples provoke alarm and hysteria about the country splintering apart.

Actually, it is almost impossible to conclude that Sri Lanka was one unified country before the British did so in 1818. There had no doubt been strong rulers like Dutugemunu, Vijayabahu I, Parakramabahu I, but these rulers who claimed island wide suzerainty were few and far between and the unification they had effected was quite different from the centralized unified rule that the British imposed. It is inaccurate to argue that power sharing between the Centre and other areas, between a Sinhalese majority administration and Tamil or Muslim regional administrations entails a division of the island. Often those who oppose power sharing are

*There are press conferences addressed by the members of the opposition arousing alarm, quibbling about the discussions on peace, and asking that which can never be done to be done.*

*If an enemy is defeated, disarming the enemy may be likely. But when two war weary groups discuss ways and means to attend positively to the initial grievances that had caused discord and rebellion it is ludicrous to ask one party to disarm before the terms of the peace had even been seriously outlined.*

merely provoking fears which are baseless and unfounded. They sponsor lost causes.

Now according to the local media even Sri Lanka's big and friendly neighbour, India is said to have expressed fears of power sharing in the island. According to local news reports the threat India foresees is that a broadcasting station in the northern region might be used to spread incitement in neighbouring southern Tamilnadu which uses the language of Sri Lanka's northern Tamils. It is unimaginable that the Sri Lankan Central Government would allow a radio station to be carelessly misused and that too in a manner that could cause harm to the relations with a state of a friendly neighbour.

The local press furthermore implied that India did not take kindly to aid given by Japan. This appears illogical and incredible. Sri Lanka from the days of J.R. Jayawardene's appeal on behalf of Japan had been friendly and close to Japan in its relations. Moreover, Sri Lanka needs so much assistance to see the peace process end in success and to execute the much needed relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction following the destruction the conflict wrought and in addition retarded development which should now be hastened. Sri Lanka needs not only aid from Japan but from several other countries. There is a need for India to appreciate this predicament.

The irony of the situation is

that whenever a government in office endeavours to settle the conflict that had for long been Sri Lanka's curse then the opposition opposes the exercise and labours to scuttle it. This had been an unending bane in the island's record. Likewise, now too the opposition does everything possible to wreck the chances of a peaceful settlement of the strife. Three members of the opposition visit India merely to point out to the government there the perils that peace can pose to India. A highly exaggerated, tendentious account is portrayed full of fictional threats to India that the peace settlement will mean to the neighbouring subcontinent. It is only in Sri Lanka that the opposition visits diplomats solely to subvert a long overdue constructive effort taken by the government in power to restore peace and stability in the island, by soliciting help from diplomats of other lands. The peace process is an internal matter exclusively.

There are press conferences addressed by the members of the opposition arousing alarm, quibbling about the discussions on peace, and asking that which can never be done to be done. If an enemy is defeated, disarming the enemy may be likely. But when two war weary groups discuss ways and means to attend positively to the initial grievances that had caused discord and rebellion it is ludicrous to ask one party to disarm before the terms of the peace had even

been seriously outlined. A hostile group that had tenaciously waged a conflict at great cost is not so foolish or naïve as to lay down arms and come to talk peace in an abject state of craven and passive pleading. Such an expectation is a ridiculous mirage, and underestimates the intelligence of the negotiating parties.

It was obvious to those within and outside Sri Lanka that the conflict in Sri Lanka was interminably dragging out consuming time and money. Also, it was evident to observers that a multi communal country was being subjected to majoritarian dominance leaving the numerically lesser communities discriminated against, and thereby marginalized. Those who could not stride the corridors of power were rendered impotent in administration, neglected and indifferently treated.

Even legislation enacted to correct partiality in governmental management was in practice meaningless as for instance the acceptance of Tamil as a national language meant nothing to Tamils in administration. Capricious or futile obstacles to peace can contribute only to a prolongation of a meaningless and no win, unending conflict. Eventually, the communities can only be disillusioned and a country that is consisting of divided communities, bitter and with no faith or hope only may be there as a residue.

## Internet marks twentieth birthday

From its early days as a pet project in the Department of Defense to its infamous time nestled under Al Gore's wing, the history of the Internet is littered with dozens of so-called birthdays.

Some historians claim the Internet was born in 1961, when Dr. Leonard Kleinrock first published a paper on packet-switching technology at MIT.

Others cite 1969, when the Department of Defense commissioned the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, known as ARPANET, to research a communication and command network that could withstand a nuclear attack.

The 1970s boast a slew of what could be pegged essential Internet milestones, including the advent of e-mail and the

splintering off of ARPANET from military experiment to public resource.

But perhaps the most famous of the lot is the acclaimed Jan. 1, 1983, switch from Network Control Protocol to Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol.

The transition from NCP to TCP/IP may not have been the sexiest moment in Internet history, but it was a key transition that paved the way for today's Internet.

Call it one small switch for man, but one giant switch for mankind.com.

Protocols are communication standards that allow computers to speak to one another over a network. Just as English speakers of different dialects and accents can often understand one

another, protocols provide a lingua franca for all the different kinds of computers that hook into the Internet.

Until that fateful moment 20 years ago, the fewer than 1,000 computers that connected to ARPANET used the primitive Network Control Protocol, which was useful for the small community despite some limitations.

"NCP was sufficient to allow some Internetting to take place," said Kleinrock, now a computer science professor at UCLA. "It was not an elegant solution, but it was a sufficient solution."

"They saw a more general approach was needed."

Indeed, as ARPANET continued its exponential growth into the 1980s, the project's administrators realized they would need a new protocol to accommodate

the much larger and more complicated network they foresaw as the Internet's future.

Vint Cerf, who is credited with co-designing the TCP/IP protocol with Robert Kahn, said, "It was designed to be future-proof and to run on any communication system."

The switch was "tremendously important," according to Rhonda Hauben, co-author of *Nitizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet*.

"It was critical because there was an understanding that the Internet would be made up of lots of different networks," Hauben said. "Somehow the Internet infrastructure had to be managed in a way to accommodate a variety of entities."

But despite the need to take ARPANET to the next level, the

decision to switch to TCP/IP was controversial.

Like the current Windows versus Linux debate, there were factions of the community that wanted to adopt different standards, most notably the Open Systems Interconnection protocol.

"A lot of people in the community — even though we had given them six months' to a year's notice — they didn't really take it seriously," Kahn said.

"We had to jam it down their throats," Cerf said.

It was worth the jamming, Hauben said.

"They had the vision," she said. "They understood that this was going to be something substantial, and that's what they provided for in a very special way." (Google)



# STATE and POLICY

By Adrian Wijemanne

1. Ever since the dawn of independence a strong state has been regarded as fundamental for the welfare and prosperity of the Sri Lankan Republic's citizens. That view has survived the extremely bloody history of independent Sri Lanka. All the trouble there has been is attributed to the state's enemies. How is it that an institution with such a benevolent *raison d'être* has engendered so much bitterness and enmity as to provoke two extremely bloody uprisings by Sinhala youths who have paid for their ideals with their lives and by the Tamil nation which has made even greater sacrifices in fighting a long war of independence and secession against the state? Is there something fundamentally wrong with the state of Sri Lanka?

2. The state of Sri Lanka is fashioned on conventional lines common throughout the world. It has a legislature (in Sri Lanka an unicameral Parliament), an executive (a Government with a Cabinet of Ministers) and a Judiciary (with original, revisionary and final jurisdiction). It has the three armed forces of army, navy and air force and a central bank which regulates the issue of the currency. All the world's states are thus equipped, yet only a tiny minority of them have anything remotely comparable to the bloody record of Sri Lanka in the last fifty years.

3. Many thinkers who have pondered this conundrum have come up with institutional scapegoats at whose door the discontents that have wreaked such havoc should be laid. Until very recently the President has blamed the constitution. Others have blamed the party system for the country's ills. Yet others have voiced dark suspicions of the machinations of foreign institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (a favourite whipping boy in many other countries as well). Currently the JVP's bete noire is the *Royal Norwegian Government's ambassador in Colombo, Mr. John Westborg*. In short, *anyone but ourselves*. The Sinhala people are the victims of the malice and bloody-mindedness of others. This is so deeply embedded in the Sinhala national psyche that questioning it is like casting aspersions on motherhood.

The state as neutral instrument

4. The near-worship of the state has blinded many people to the fact that it is but an instrument for the attainment of many purposes fashioned outside itself. The state is operated by people at different levels and its performance is vitally affected by the characteristics and competence and motivations of such people. In short the state

*In the very first year of independence one of the world's earliest attempts at ethnic cleansing by legislative means - the disenfranchisement and deportation to India of Tamil plantation labour - was touted as greatly beneficial to the Sinhala youths who could take over the plantation jobs thus vacated. It failed utterly. Not only did the first major policy of the newly independent government of Sri Lanka earn the lasting enmity of India and the affected workers, even worse, it began a legislative course which was immune to any consideration of adverse effects on the non-Sinhala elements of the population.*

functions in accordance with the policies of the people who have acquired the power to operate it. Those policies are not the product of the constitution or of outside institutions; they are the products of the people who, through their political parties, have captured the right to operate the state. So, then, does not the trouble lie with the political parties and the whole system of party politics? Political parties, just like the state, are inert institutions which are brought to life by their members and reflect their members' thinking. Political parties do not prescribe policies for their members; it is the other way round. It is the members of political parties who generate and project the policies of the party. In short, in democratic governance the element of personal responsibility for policy is inescapable. The goodness or badness of the policies on which the state functions is attributable directly to the thinking of individuals who wield power in the country. For whatever has gone wrong there is nobody to blame but ourselves. Democracy does not provide an escape route via scapegoats or weasel words. We have to reflect upon our own responsibility and the sooner and deeper we do so, the sooner and more complete will our salvation come.

5. It is the policies of our rulers that have brought about the disasters heaped upon our heads. From the very beginning of independence hopes were raised in young hearts which had not the remotest possibility of fulfilment. In the very first year of independence one of the world's earliest attempts at ethnic cleansing by legislative means - the disenfranchisement and deportation to India of Tamil plantation labour - was touted as greatly beneficial to the Sinhala youths who could take over the plantation jobs thus vacated. It failed utterly. Not only did the first major policy of the newly independent government of Sri Lanka earn the lasting enmity of India and the affected workers, even worse, it began a legislative course which was immune to any consideration of adverse effects on the non-Sinhala elements of the population. The instances of such legislation and

the rapidity with which they followed are too numerous to recount here. Every policy that raised the hopes of Sinhala youths at the expense of others proved a failure engendering bitterness among the disappointed and anger and resentment among those discriminated against. Mistaken policies earned the worst of both worlds.

6. The pot boiled over first among the Sinhala youths. The cavalier treatment they were accorded when failed policies were questioned led to fury against the entire political culture that had conspired to cheat them and use their votes for personal aggrandisement. Even worse, military force was resorted to very early to suppress the expressions of discontent by the Tamil people against the discrimination being practised against them. The policies of those in power were stoking a conflagration entirely beyond their comprehension. The rest, as they say, is history. It is the history of policy failure on a massive scale.

7. This tragedy is compounded by the baleful fact that there is little or no recognition of the magnitude of policy failure both in the Sinhala political class as well as among the rest of the Sinhala people. There is little or no understanding that policies which are able to survive must needs be fashioned so as to secure the consent of the governed across the entire spectrum of the population. Policy formulation is inhibited by ethnic considerations. The poison reaches even unto the judicial field. Sinhala witnesses cannot be found to give evidence against Sinhala accused who are charged with offences against Tamils. Massacres of Tamils on remand within prisons carried out by the prison population itself cannot be judicially pursued for lack of witnesses willing to testify against offenders of their own race. Sinhala juries bring not guilty findings against the weight of evidence where the accused is Sinhala and the victim is Tamil. In the large arena of public administration discrimination against Tamils on a multitude of fronts barely merits public mention. The elected representatives of the Sinhala people faithfully

reflect the thinking behind such actions. It is just whistling in the wind to expect radical policy transformation from them.

And so to the future

8. Since the commencement of the Peace Talks there is intense speculation among the Sinhala people as to how their state will emerge from the final settlement. A large majority hopes that the familiar single all-island state in its present unitary form will survive. For others this is a forlorn hope and they are preparing themselves for a radical change, not knowing what it will be. The latest speculation, after the third round of talks in Oslo, is about the federal spectre. To some, federalism in any form is anathema; others are relieved that it preempts the even worse ogre of a confederation. All these speculations concern themselves about the form and structure of the future state. Not one voice is to be heard about the policies that any future state will be directed to apply. Policies are the sum and substance of governance. It is in the arena of policy that we have gone so grievously wrong and it is in that arena that our salvation has to be wrought. It is not the form of the state that matters. It is the nature and content of our policies that will determine our future. No word has been uttered about our policies in the future for we have failed dismally to understand that it is our policies that have brought us to such grief and exacted such a terrible price from the Tamil people.

9. Policies are the result of peoples' thinking. They are born in our hearts and minds. They are shaped by our education, our experience and above all, by our morality. If we seek to benefit ourselves at the expense of others it is a failure of morality and it will end, invariably, in grief rather than triumph. Our 55-year history since independence is living proof of that sequence. If we convince ourselves that, since we are the majority ethnic group, we can decide for ourselves what is good for us, and others less numerous must conform whether they like it or not, we will build animosities against ourselves which will lead eventually to armed resistance, escalating into

open warfare and final calamitous military defeat. Once again our 55-year history since independence is living proof of that evolution. If we believe that our numerical superiority justifies the imprint of our culture on public institutions, thus downgrading the culture of others with a different culture, we will be stoking the fires of secession. Once again our 55-year history since independence is living proof of that result. If we assert that we have the right to judge the legitimacy of the political aspirations and activities of others and may legislate against and attempt by military force to suppress what is unpalatable to us, we will discover to our cost how counter-productive such presumptuousness is. Once again our 55-year history since independence provides the evidence. If we put our faith in military force as the means of holding the state together we display an abysmal ignorance of what makes modern states cohesive, stable entities. Once again our 55-year history since independence shows the futility of such thinking. It is the widespread prevalence of such thinking within the Sinhala body politic which produced the flawed policies which resulted in Sri Lanka becoming a prime example of a "failed state." Every one of these assumptions and the policies to which they have given birth must needs be abandoned root and branch if the "Peace Process" is to live up to its name.

10. Any state, whether it be a single all-island unitary state or a federal state encompassing the whole island, will only reproduce the woeful results of the last fifty five years if the same old failed policies are pursued. With uncanny prescience Mr. V. Pirabhakaran has asked for fundamental changes in the attitudes and pronouncements of the Sinhala people as a necessary precursor to consideration of the nature of a state which could vouchsafe both nations the possibility of good-neighbourly relations and, eventually, the inestimable blessings of a just and lasting peace. The changes have to be on the Sinhala side, for it is we who have consistently got the moral balance wrong in every salient aspect of governance. What is needed now is such self examination by the Sinhala people and their leaders, indeed, by the whole Sinhala political class. It needs to be undertaken in every arena of public life - in our religious institutions, in the academic world which will influence avant garde thinking for the rest of the century, within all the political parties and within every home in which peace for our people is prized. We need a catharsis before we should even think of a state.



# Exposing the NGO racket

by Saubhagya Shah

The last two decades have seen the proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) across the underdeveloped world. Since the development enterprise involves the exclusion of the third world masses, civil society's inclusion takes the form of partnerships with NGOs as "apolitical" and "responsible" representatives of disenfranchised people. In many small countries, they have, as "genuine representatives" of civil society, acquired a quasi autonomous status, the larger among them being treated practically on par with the state, particularly by multilateral aid organisations. It is only recently that the activities of these development organisations have attracted critical scrutiny, and some of these studies see NGOs as purveyors of donor country agendas and various other formulae that pass by the name of international consensus. The historian, Akira Iriye, for instance, argues that more than any other US enterprise in the 20th century, NGOs have shaped the "American Century" by transporting the core American values of association, civic culture and democracy to the rest of the world. While Iriye's conclusions on the origins and forms of NGOs are debatable, his recognition of the growing significance of NGOs in modulating the North-South relations is incontestable. NGOs have become crucial agents in sustaining the rhetoric on democracy, development, civil society, human rights and good governance around the world. These dominant discourses become powerful lubricants facilitating the day-to-day interaction between the donors and the recipients.

Nepal's own experience and transformation in the past decades is intelligible only against the backdrop of this transnational flow of ideas and agendas.

As in many third world countries, the relationship between the Nepali state and NGOs is often uneasy and contentious. The tension emerges primarily from the fact that both the government and the non-government sectors often compete with the same donors for funds. Having been the sole conduit for Western development aid until the relatively recent advent of NGOs, the government sees the latter as a rival in times of shrinking resources. The growing trend among donor countries to channel development funds through NGOs, coupled with the numerous structural adjustment requirements of the Fund-Bank, has led to a scaling down or even complete termination of many government-run services and programmes, even as NGO operations are on the rise.

It is misleading to think of the structure of NGOs and their mode of functioning as being very different from the large centralised and routinised structure of state. Given the growing ability of the

NGOs to plan, generate data, create subjectivities and produce other state-like effects in the "Age of Globalisation", anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot, argues that NGOs and multilateral organisations are "state-like institutions". The NGO world is an alternative bureaucracy with its own hierarchies structured along the lines of nationality, class, gender, caste and race. Janus-faced, the non-government mimics rather than denies the government.

Even as NGOs in Nepal have imbibed the quintessential 'jagiray' (a typical government employee mindset) attitude and adopted the hierarchy, bureaucracy and power structure of the government, civil servants have begun aspiring to the higher pay and perks of the NGO sector. The significant differences in remunerations and resources available to development NGO employees has been a cause of envy and resentment among government employees. Ironically, as NGOs come to resemble and behave like government bureaucracies, the strident calls for a rollback of the state and the end of state sovereignty have become familiar, both as observations of facts and moral imperative in the interconnected discourses of free market, NGOs and globalisation.

However, the hasty announcement of the economic and political obsolescence of the nation-state obscures the fact that "globalisation" is a highly discriminating historical process that rewards some regions at the cost of others. The false equivalence implied in the celebration of globalisation masks the cold reality. Whereas many third world states have seen a rapid decline in autonomy, other states have accumulated the sovereign surplus to the extent that destinies of other nations can still be unilaterally effected. Despite the various promises of globalisation, international civil society, peace dividends and the new world order, the basic imbalances of interstate relations and possibilities have hardly altered since the end of the cold war.

During the Panchayat period some degree of regulation and supervision was maintained by the Nepali state over NGOs through the office known as the Social Services National Coordination Council (SSNCC). With the advent of the multiparty system in 1990, however, NGOs have been deregulated and the purview of SSNCC (now known as the Social Service Council) much reduced. While NGOs managed to free their operations from local authority following the 1990 political changes, their dependence on donors states for programmes and funding remains intact. Even radical advocates of NGO autonomy have tended to ignore this vital contradiction.

While civil servants resent the impunity with which NGOs can today operate largely outside of state purview, the NGO world has its own list of complaints against the Nepali government, ranging from inefficiency to corruption. A degree of malevolence may also be attributed to the political and therefore biased state when it opposes the supposedly apolitical and neutral NGOs and "civil society". In the words of anthropologist William Fisher, NGOs are idealised as "disinterested apolitical participants in a field of otherwise implicated players". Indeed, claims of efficiency and political neutrality constitute the moral high ground of NGO intervention. The underlying tension between the government and the development establishment was brought to the fore at the official celebration, held in January 2001, of the 50th anniversary of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) involvement in Nepal. At the function attended by late King Birendra and the prime minister, the US ambassador thought fit to admonish the government and political parties to deliver on democracy, facilitate development, and to end corruption and misgovernance. Despite the public furore kicked up by what was seen as undue interference in Nepal's internal affairs, the government chose to maintain a diplomatic silence on the episode.

Through a choice of forum and form, the US envoy, in one speech, unified the ideologically powerful discourses of governance: development and democracy, leaving no sovereign space for a regime that depends on the West's democratic certification to sustain its own claims to rule. Earlier, in 2000, during a serious power tussle within the ruling Nepali Congress Party, the World Bank had expressed extreme "concern" when the elected prime minister changed his finance minister.

Even though the government and the new finance minister reaffirmed their commitment to the ongoing economic reforms mandated by international financial institutions, the World Bank warned about the threat to the market economy from such a change in personnel. The Bank's intervention was locally interpreted as an attempt to strengthen one faction of the party against the other.

The two examples from Kathmandu illustrate the new fusion of diplomacy, democracy, development and civil society as a potent foreign policy instrument in managing the global South. The asymmetry of the global order creates an ironic third world condition where one takes one's ethics from the money-lender and democratic exhortations from the most undemocratic of institutions. These opportunities for intervention sustain historian Geir Lundestad's observation that the "American century" is basically an "empire by invitation". Many of these nation-states find themselves facing a novel assault from two inter-related global processes. The "globalisation" of capital, culture and politics chips away at the political, economic and cultural manoeuvrability of these governments, while NGOs and other non-state actors usurp the

welfare and other service delivery functions of governments. Thus, traditional internal and external challenges facing vulnerable states such as Nepal are compounded now by new assaults.

Even though development NGOs are invariably presented as non-political, in reality they achieve a series of political effects in different spheres of society and government. The process of NGO development has the potential to undermine local regimes by creating alternative centres of resources and authority beyond the purview of the state. Nepali officials often complain of the lack of coordination between the government and various NGO programmes and within NGOs themselves as well. Charges of religious proselytisation under the pretext of development have also ruffled the sensibilities of a "Hindu state". NGO claims of efficiency and flexibility are beginning to be questioned on several counts. It is apparent that uncoordinated programmes from a multiplicity of actors often leads to duplication in some areas and a total absence elsewhere. A large part of the cost effectiveness and flexibility of NGO delivery rests on labour practices identified by geographer David Harvey with the dispersal of late capitalist production practices in the third world so as to maximise regional labour cost differentials. By hiring temporary, short-term and casual staff bereft of job security, pension or other benefits, employers can maintain a "lean and flexible" work force. Claims of NGO efficiency aside, serious cases of misappropriations – a practice usually associated with the government – have also been reported about the development establishment in Nepal's Auditor General's report.

The relationship of the NGOs with various political formations in Nepal is similarly complex. The Maoist guerrillas who have been waging a bloody campaign in the rural hinterland have on occasion accused the NGOs of working as imperialist stooges to divert the rural masses from real contradictions and struggles. In some areas, Maoists are said to have asked NGOs to hand over their budget to the party. On the other hand, parliamentary political parties engaged in electoral politics negotiate with NGOs for resources, programmes and employment for their constituencies. As such, NGO pretensions of transcending politics and profit appear quite untenable.

One cannot talk about NGOs in Nepal outside of the development discourse: if one is the delivery, the other is the package. Hence the use of the term "development NGO". Under the tutelage of erstwhile colonial powers, development became the rallying cry of the modernising state in the 1950s and this project has ridden many horses to reach its yet elusive destination. After the experiment with and failures of various approaches, development NGOs were ushered into Nepal in the 1980s to deliver "develop-

ment", thereby effectively ending state monopoly on development and external relations. The government and its opposition – the "non-government" – for the first time came to stand as structural equivalents in relation to global donors. It is this equivalence that provokes so much collusion and competition between the Nepali state and non-governmental organisations.

What started as an NGO trickle in the 1980s turned into a tide in the 1990s and later. The growth in the number of NGOs in Nepal has been phenomenal – over 11,000 NGOs had been registered by the year 2000 compared to only a few hundred that existed in 1990. NGOs have become so ubiquitous of late that their pervasiveness has become the other distinguishing feature of a third world condition where per capita NGO distribution is inversely related to per capita income. In the absence of an effective monitoring agency, it is impossible to estimate how much foreign money is injected into these NGOs and how that budget is spent. A rough estimate, however, is that NGO funding compares favourably with the government's annual budget of approximately USD one billion (roughly 50 percent of that budget is provided by foreign loans and assistance).

The exponential growth in the number of NGOs has been matched by the range of issues they are currently engaged in. They work not only in traditional sectors such as education, agriculture, irrigation, forestry, drinking water, health and nutrition but also in newer arenas like environment, income generation, gender mainstreaming, trafficking of women and girls, micro-credit, democracy strengthening, human rights and AIDS. As the NGO system continuously reinvents itself to fit the ever fickle funding priorities of the donors, "civil society", "transparency" and "good governance" have become the cutting edge of NGO discourse since the late 1990s. The built-in obsolescence of the NGO mode of development has given rise to a unique form of development entrepreneurship that has to keep up with the shifting fads of funding.

Analytically and historically, the NGOs created or used by the development industry in Nepal must also be distinguished from the traditional community institutions such as guthi, parma, dhikur and non-profit organisations such as Paropakar Sanstha and other initiatives that mobilise resources and work for community improvement, service delivery and charity. Such efforts are motivated by a sense of community, self-help or the transcendental values of dharma. In the NGO-sponsored din of civil society, these sustainable roots of social engagements have largely been eclipsed in the public consciousness.



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## Federalism: LTTE has to deliver the goods

The peace process should be carried forward regardless of stumbling blocks, which may crop up from time to time.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe recognised this at the outset of the peace talks. By handling the peace talks in a professional, bona fides manner, he and his team have achieved much.

The world's most efficient and feared non-state military formation has given up its demand for a separate state.

The UNF's approach has achieved what 20 years of military coercion by the Sri Lankan and Indian armies could not bring about.

But sections of the media and many opposition politicians in the south are shouting hoarse that the UNF has conceded too much to the LTTE under the ceasefire agreement in return for little.

The LTTE said it is giving up the demand for a separate state when it has acquired unprecedented military power; not when it was virtually fighting with its back to the wall. This has to be grasped clearly by the detractors of the peace process. There is a tendency among many politicians and analysts to foolishly believe and argue that the Tigers did so because the US led war on terror had brought about unprecedented pressure on them to compromise.

In giving up the goal of Eelam, the Tigers have been put on the dock in the court of Tamil opinion. They have to show the Tamil people that in settling for federalism, they will get a deal worth the lives of 17000 fighters and more than 60000 civilians in the northeast.

The LTTE too has concerns about its constituency as much as the UNF has worries about retaining the goodwill of the Sinhala masses for the peace process.

What can the LTTE show the Tamil people after giving up the demand for a separate state?

The Tigers cannot ignore the fate of the TULF, EPRLF, PLOTE, EROS, ENDLF and the TELO. The TULF asked a mandate from the Tamil people in the northeast for establishing the separate sovereign state of Tamil Eelam at the general elections of 1977. They got the mandate, went to Parliament and began negotiations for regional autonomy, giving up their demand and struggle for the separate state.

Four years later they had nothing to show the Tamils but a phoney system of decentralisation of power called the regional development councils. The EPRLF, EROS, PLOTE, TELO and the ENDLF gave up their demand for the separate state in 1987, declaring to the Tamils that the Indo-Lanka Accord offered a viable alternative.

Even after fourteen long years they were nowhere close to delivering the so-called viable alternative to Eelam they had promised to find through peaceful means, by joining the democratic mainstream.

We agree with the Prime Minister that the peace process is long and arduous. But the Sinhala polity should not assume that it can do another fourteen years on the LTTE.

The Tamil people in the northeast have been urging the Sinhala political leadership to respect their legitimate political aspirations and rights for 53 years but got nothing concrete. The LTTE can ill afford to add to make the wait longer.

# HSZ issue can be solved

By D. Sivaram

The high security zones of the Sri Lanka army in Jaffna have become a major stumbling block in the peace process. Some analysts and newsmen have even ventured to suggest that the current deadlock over the issue of the HSZ could derail the talks and that the LTTE would go back to war. They argue that the Tigers are following a predictable path in this regard.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's opponents are asserting that the demand to resettle displaced people in their villages and towns in Jaffna's high security zones is an insidious ruse by the LTTE to weaken the army's grip on the northeast, a basis for the demand that the army should leave Jaffna and eventually all of the northeast.

That pulling out or downsizing the HSZs located in the midst of towns and villages in Jaffna poses a serious threat to the army's hold on the north is a concern shared by everyone across the Sinhala nationalist spectrum - from the suave liberal democrats to the shrill atavists.

Politically the HSZ crisis is a welcome development for the PA, which believes this could be the UNF's Achilles' heel - that the LTTE would sooner or later go back to war as it has done in the past and then the blame for military setbacks could be placed on Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's doorstep.

The matter has been further compounded by the SLMM's stand linking the HSZs to the balance of forces in the northeast. There cannot be any doubt as to the fact that the balance of forces between the LTTE and the SLA is the foundation on which the ceasefire stands. The peace process was possible in the first place because of this strategic parity.

Downsizing or closing any of the HSZ's in Jaffna will tilt the balance of forces in favour of the LTTE, according to the army and the SLMM.

The army thinks that the Tigers are putting pressure on the UNF to shrink or close the HSZs in Jaffna so that they can move their anti aircraft guns within range of all military flights to the peninsula in the event of war breaking out again. The army says that the perimeter of the Palay-Kankesanthurai base was expanded to prevent the LTTE from firing missiles and anti aircraft guns to interdict its lifeline to the north.

In this context the UNF government has considered two things - one is its responsibility towards the thousands of families displaced by the HSZs in Jaffna and the other is to ensure that the strategic parity is not affected in the process of helping the displaced resettle in their homes. This is a dilemma.

President Kumaratunga, the army and now the SLMM are arguing that these two matters cannot be addressed together; that one cannot be done without affecting the other adversely.

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This is false.

Modern military science offers many means to maintain the army's strategic advantage in Jaffna even without the current HSZs.

The UNF and the SLA can draw up schemes for resettlement of the displaced in HSZs in Jaffna, which can be designed to preserve the military edge over the Tigers in the peninsula.

The army's arguments against resettling refugees in their villages and towns close to its camps by dismantling the high security zones is curious.

In the east, it wants to be surrounded by people. It wants to remain encamped among people despite constant accusations that the SLA is using these civilians as human shields.

Those who assert that the army should not quit hospitals, temples, schools, libraries etc., in Tamil villages and towns say that the military, by being in the midst of people in a village centre, will have better access to intelligence. This is plain nonsense.

It is euphemism for saying that if you are in the midst of a densely populated village or towns, you know when the LTTE is going to attack you. Dogs will bark. People will leave their homes round your camp, informants will do their duty etc.,

The excuse of the intelligence advantage holds no water in the context of the LTTE's conventional military power. The army knew since December 1999 that the LTTE was tightening the noose round the Elephant Pass camp but it could not stop it from falling.

Therefore, if the LTTE, in making preparations for an assault on a camp in the midst of a village or town, tells people living around it to leave the area, there would be little intelligence advantage to be gained by the army from the knowledge in fending off the attack because conventional infantry manoeuvres and area weapons

such as artillery and heavy mortars would be involved in the siege and/or offensive.

The intelligence advantage of being encamped in the midst of a population is certainly useful when the threat is mainly from sneak attacks by guerrillas from the hinterland.

But clearly, the threat to camps said to be compromised by article of the MOU is from conventional infantry formations and area weapons, which make nought of early intelligence warnings about impending attacks. (It was clear as daylight to the army from mid December 1999 that the LTTE was tightening the noose around Elephant Pass; yet the base fell in April 2000)

Therefore when one peels off the so-called strategic justifications for having camps in the middle of villages and towns, in schools, libraries, homes etc. the stark truth is that innocent civilians are made to be the human shield that guarantees the army's safety.

While this is the case in the east, the SLA does not want any civilian close to some of its high security zones in Jaffna.

The assertion that LTTE could move anti aircraft weapons close to landing zones if refugees are allowed to resettle in their villages and towns in the HSZ's is baseless.

The army can easily design a strategy to preclude such an eventuality in areas of resettlement.

There are high security zones in Batticaloa too although these have not led to displacement of people on the scale that we see in Jaffna.

Let us consider the case of the district, to examine the military wisdom of locating high security zones in villages and towns from which civilians were forced out.

To militarily dominate Batticaloa, one has to control the main entry points from the district's western hinterland to its coastal belt where most of its towns and main villages are located. There are thirteen such entry points. One has to also control the Main Supply Route to the district - the Pollannaruwa-Valaichenai-Batticaloa Road.

The army occupies schools, temples, libraries, homes and public buildings in the midst of the villages of Kommaturai, Morakkoddanchenai and Kinnaiyadi, all north of Batticaloa.

In the case of Kommaturai, Morakkoddanchenai and Kinnaiyadi, the army can dominate and/or control the entry points from the western hinterland even if it does not have camps in the middle of the villages.

Camps outside or by these villages would actually take the military closer to the target zone

Cont. on page 7



# From peace back to pieces

By Prof. K. Sivathamby

Two thousand and two (2002) showed all the promise for being a turning point in contemporary Sri Lankan history, in that, it not only saw the signs of settling the national question of the country in a well planned manner acceptable to the parties of the conflict, but also saw the giving-in in the Sri Lankan Tamils demand for a separate State, which has been the main plank of its politics since 1976.

One need not repeat the events but the other side of the coin namely the slowly building up of opposition to the move towards peace by Sinhala based Partisan Politics demands that we restate what have been achieved in 2002. The year 2002 saw the cessation of a twenty-year-old war, which sapped the energy of the country. It also moved step by step towards de-escalation and normalization carefully worked out with the help of a Thirty Party. More importantly the Sinhala and Tamil negotiators agreed not to leave out the Muslims from the settlement and the processes towards it. One should not minimize the significance of this aspect because the tradition in this country has been since 1956 to use one minority against the other. This time that did not take place.

There was an over-riding fact of the Sinhala people at large endorsing the Government initiatives by not responding yet to any of the moves and maneuvers to nullify the efforts towards peace. Had they shown even a slight indication to hear more of the anti-negotiations protest those sources would have taken those indications and pressed further. A war weary nation does not want a war again. That in short, is the peoples response whether Sinhala or Tamil.

But some of the Sinhala media especially of the Print Medium writing in both Sinhala and English have not been happy either about the negotiations or about the negotiators.

At the beginning, immediately after the MoU the refrain was, can

**This column wishes to highlight those omissions and inadequacies, which have led to neglect and an alienation of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The writer is not for creating further divisions, but earnestly hopes to heal those already there.**

*Today there is much talk about "THE RATTA PAVADIMA" (A Sinhala term for SELL OUT of the country) to the American Interest. It is true that we should not sell out Sri Lanka to any one but the question is, should we not think about that problem which enables the global Super Powers to put their foot into our soil. Is it not the duty on the part of this country and sons of this soil – the Boomy Puthraas to see that, we do not provide an occasion or an excuse to enable them to interfere in our country. The question is what is the answer given to the question of the role of Sri Lankan Tamil as a group in the governance of this country.*

the LTTE be trusted. Some of the Print Media publicized the so called violations of the MoU more than the agreements reached at the Thailand talks. But the caravan, we thought, was moving on, but of late the sea has been getting rougher and rougher to make this journey towards peace virtually impossible. The currents and crosscurrents are becoming too many and now the whirlpools of these currents, which make anything, caught up within them going round and round, struggling to keep the boats afloat.

The State permission given to the LTTE for an FM Broadcast which was originally done to demonstrate the government's earnestness for peace has now been blown, out of proportion to indicate that this FM Broadcast which was permitted on condition that it communicates peace and healthy ethnic interaction to be a regional threat. The action of a Section of the Sanga was against all political vinaya (rules of conduct). It is staggering to see how a community of Bikkus which is so scrupulously careful about the rules of the social and personal conducts of its members has not responded to an act for style in terms of political protocol.

The December 20<sup>th</sup> fire incident

at the Old Town Hall in the centre of Pettah was reported as an open violation by one of the parties to the MoU. Some papers did not only carry that as a story, but followed it up with editorials. The tragedy of the event was overlooked and open insinuations were being made. The proper way would have been to raise it up as a substantive issue of the level of the Monitors if they were convinced of the story they had published. The police report of the fire is yet to come. And now the focus of attention is on the High Security Zones over which there is divergence of opinion between the military and the LTTE. The point at issue is not one of the rightness of the position of either the military or the LTTE. The question at issue is trying to make a matter of discussion at the level of one of the Committees instituted for going into the details of the problems as the position of the government itself. Personally, I am for open discussions, for I believe in achieving peace in this country not through back doors nor by any counterfeit moves. To achieve lasting peace, we need frankness. Even brutal frankness if it is intended to bring about real peace.

What is lacking in these criti-

cisms is that they do not underline the search for genuine peace.

As one reads this, one gets the impression that these are efforts meant to wreck the peace efforts and not to help them by bringing about the needy questions.

The political currents are of course seen very visibly. Parliamentary opposition to the government demands the rallying of all the anti-governments forces within the parliament. This means that the PA and the JVP have got to come together. The JVP is no more a small party. It has 15 members and is very open in its hostility to the present negotiation. So if the UNF is to be defeated, a PA – JVP working partnership should be worked out. The agenda at the parliamentary political level is becoming clear. The recent conference of the Community Party strikes a different note. It now openly speaks about the right of self determination of the Sri Lankan Tamil and argues for both Regional Autonomy and "Unitary State". Without going deep into the question of how the Regional Autonomy could be adjusted within a Unitary State, one is relieved to see that it speaks of the right of self determination of the Sri Lankan Tamils without the right of secession. Internal self-determination, a terminology accepted by both the government and the LTTE is, I am told is exactly this – (perhaps this is intended as a concession to the 40 years of association with the SLFP. Also this seems to be a way of marrying "EKHIYA" with "EKSATH"! the dominant political jargon in Sinhala about the "Unity" and "United" Sri Lanka).

More importantly the CPSL has also issued another document declaring its position on the Language. It is none other than the speech delivered by the late P. Kandiah in the House of Representatives in 1956 when he spoke against the Sinhala Only Bill. In it P. Kandiah strongly affirmed the position of the party in accepting the Sinhala & Tamil as the Official Languages of the Country. As one welcomes this return to Marxism in real earnest, one is really struck by the boldness of the re-

cent statement that, CP & LSSP will walk out of the PA if there is going to be a JVP-PA alliance. This is definitely an important development. Numerically of course, this is not going to matter much in the parliament, but the lines are getting drawn fairly and clearly. It is at this point that one remembers with sadness how the previous agreements were torn into pieces. The 1959 B-C Pact, the 1966 Duddley-Chelvanayagam Pact, the 1981 District Development Committee Plan and ultimately the

Post 13<sup>th</sup> amendment maneuvers that led Varatharaja Perumal to threaten with an intended declaration of independence.

I think it was the late Dr. N.M. Perera who commented on some of the moves towards the language rights of the Tamils as too little, too late, but the trend now seems to be at least from the point of view of some of the Press, not even any little, at any time.

Today there is much talk about "THE RATTA PAVADIMA" (A Sinhala term for SELL OUT of the country) to the American Interest. It is true that we should not sell out Sri Lanka to any one but the question is, should we not think about that problem which enables the global Super Powers to put their foot into our soil. Is it not the duty on the

part of this country and sons of this soil – the Boomy Puthraas to see that, we do not provide an occasion or an excuse to enable them to interfere in our country. The question is what is the answer given to the question of the role of Sri Lankan Tamil as a group in the governance of this country. If we keep this sore open and unattended, then, we are exposing ourselves for all sorts of infections. At least one thing is certain, Sri Lankan Tamils do not believe in giving away their Sri Lankan Identity – They are Tamils and Sri Lankans. They do not want to be taken as Tamils living in Sri Lanka, but Sri Lankans who are Tamils as much as Sri Lankans who are Sinhalese and Sri Lankans who are Muslims.

## HSZ issue...

Cont. from page 6

through which the Tigers make crossings.

We should note here that the Indian army's brigade headquarters for Batticaloa was on the northern outskirts of the town in Manresa, a large property of the Catholic church, at quite a safe distance from civilian settlements there. The SLA brigade however is in a prime part of the Batticaloa town, occupying the Municipal Council, government quarters and encompassing the Kachcheri, public library and the local esplanade.

The Kommathurai and Morakkoddanchenai SLA camps

straddle the main Batticaloa-Valaichenai road, which runs through the centre of the two villages. The Police occupies the Valaichenai junction and its environs and a unit of the army's National Guard Battalion is encamped at the Navalady junction. Both block the road. Traffic is diverted through detours.

Is it absolutely necessary to block the road by encamping in the middle of a village or town or completely encompass a junction to control the MSR?

Controlling the MSR means two things – ensuring the unimpeded flow of military traffic and denying the road to any militar-

ily significant LTTE mobility.

Both depend on the army's ability to interdict LTTE crossings from the hinterland by dominating all the entry points and by patrolling the road. If, as a result, the LTTE cannot achieve a significant concentration of forces at any point along the MSR to interdict it then army's objective is achieved.

The point is that the army can do this without blocking the MSR and encamping in the middle of a village or occupying a busy junction and its environs.

The LTTE controls the road in the hinterland that runs parallel to the MSR. But it has no military presence at all anywhere close to

this road, although it is the main artery for its internal communications. The same can be said about the A9 through the LTTE controlled Vanni. But in the short distance between the Vavuniya and Omanthai two army camps block the A9. None of the main interior roads in the LTTE controlled Vanni or in those areas of the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts are blocked by the LTTE to ensure unhindered flow of its military.

And more importantly LTTE troops are not encamped across the A9 in Puliyankulam Junction, Kanakarayankulam town, Mankulam Junction, Murikandy or

Kilinochchi, taking over private and public property for setting their defences. They did not do so even when Op. Jeya Sikurui was rolling full steam ahead on the A9. Yet, they defended the A9 and continued to assert their dominance over it after they recaptured it most of it from the army in 1999.

Quite clearly, the army can find ways of maintaining strategic advantage in the peninsula even if it has to allow civilians to resettle in their villages and towns in the high security zones.

In grappling with this, the UNF government has to realise that its primary responsibility is towards its citizens.



# Knowledge and ethnicity in narrating Sri Lanka's conflict

By Madhura Rasanayagam

The principals of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, constitute a normative paradigm referred to by all sides in the conflict when evaluating events through a particular reading of the conflict. In particular, evidence of human rights violations and deviations from the norms and principles of democracy have become increasingly important in the strategies used by both sides to discredit or support a particular narrative of the conflict. This became particularly important in the post-1995 era when the government regained control of the Jaffna peninsula and attempted to restore 'normalcy to the area.' The events surrounding the military capture of the peninsula and the conditions of life following the resumption of government control came to be seen as an important test for the government's claim that it could run a just and neutral state responsive to the needs of all ethnic communities on the island. The Tamil nationalists rejected this claim and argued that despite the government's lip service to the norms of liberalism it would not be able to sustain the structures of a truly liberal state because of its own commitment to the ideology of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. Examples of the LTTE's deviation from the norms of liberalism became metonyms for the government's claim that the organisation was ideologically opposed to the principles of liberalism whilst examples of the government's deviation were used by the Tamil nationalists as metonyms for the state's continuing commitment to the ideology of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. Information and its interpretation became key components of the political struggle.

The production of information on the war has had to observe epistemological standards that can be derived from the principles of liberalism. Different epistemological standards and tools can be derived from the two interpretations of liberalism as doctrine and project. The epistemological standards of liberalism as political doctrine refer to the individual, both as object and consumer of information as a rational and autonomous being. Information must therefore meet the journalistic standards of impartial objectivity: events must be accurately described from a position that is indifferent to the partial claims of participants in the event. However, when information is produced within the paradigm of liberalism as a political project, the tools of sociological and psychological analysis can also be deployed to evaluate society from a standpoint committed to the norms of liberalism. The production of information goes beyond the positivist reporting of observed events to the sociological and psychological analysis used by Kaldor and Ignatieff in their explanation of ethnic nationalism. Within liberalism as a political

project, ethnic nationalists and populations that are part of ethnic conflicts become the objects of study. In contrast, knowledge produced within the paradigm of liberalism as a political doctrine takes both the consumers of the knowledge and the objects of knowledge as rational, autonomous individuals. Therefore, when knowledge is produced within the paradigm of liberalism as a political doctrine, analysis and evaluation is limited by the need to remain within the boundaries of actual, verifiable events. This combination of criteria has been used differently by two sources of information, the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) and the TamilNet to promote a particular narrative of the conflict.

The University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) was set up by a group of Tamil academics who were teaching at Jaffna University in the late 1980's, during the period of the Indian intervention in the island. Following the murder of the group's founding member, Dr. Rajani Thiranigama by the LTTE in late 1989, most of the group's members left Jaffna and continued to work from Colombo. The aim of the group is "to challenge the external and internal terror engulfing the Tamil community as a whole through making the perpetrators accountable, and to create space for humanising the social and political spheres relating to the life of our community." The UTHR(J)'s reports document human rights violations and other developments in the North-eastern areas of the island from a position that is committed to the realisation of liberal values both within the Tamil community and by the Sri Lankan state in its treatment of all citizens, including the Tamils. The UTHR(J)'s reports documented "human rights violations by all forces in order to bring about general awareness and to make violators accountable," that would stimulate a climate of awareness necessary "for both internal regeneration and to make a success of living in one plural nation."

The UTHR(J) produces regular bulletins and reports that document incidents of human rights violations in the conflict zones whilst also providing summaries of developments in those areas. The organisation, currently resident in Colombo, gets its information through informal 'civil society networks'. The scarcity of information on the Northeast became particularly acute after the commencement of the military operation in April 1995 when the government imposed restrictions on journalists wanting to travel to the conflict areas. In this situation of scarcity the information provided by the UTHR(J) became key in evaluating the claims of the competing narratives. The reports view developments within Tamil society, although sometimes Sri Lankan society as a whole is considered, through the lens of the UTHR(J)'s commitment to a politics that is free from 'narrow nationalistic' ideology, be it Sinhalese or Tamil, and committed to the creation of a pluralist Sri Lankan

state. For example in its appraisal of the Jaffna situation in June 1997, when the Government policy of restoring normalcy to the peninsula was still being pursued, the UTHR(J) argued that it was important to go beneath surface events and "read the political tendencies at work to discern what the future portends for the people, and the role it offers them as responsible agents."

Developments and incidents are therefore always read against the background of realising a political solution that would restore agency to the Tamils and humanise their political and social lives. The standpoint from which the UTHR(J) produces information therefore combines three interrelated elements that contribute in different ways to its legitimacy as a source of information. The first source of epistemological legitimacy derives from the form in which the information is presented. Intricate detail is presented in the form of both primary source material and informal secondary source material: incidents are reported in such a way as to be empirically verifiable. The information is also balanced in the sense that violations committed by both the Sri Lankan security forces and the LTTE are reported. For example a report published in August 1996 detailing the Sri Lankan's state's attempt to establish normalcy on the Jaffna peninsula following its capture from the LTTE provided information on human rights violations by both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan security forces.

"In the Thenmaratchy (Chavakacheri) Division there have been at least 20 recorded homicides since the Army's takeover in April, with the Army implicated in more than 80% of them. Routine torture of detainees includes some of the worst practices recorded in the annals of the Sri Lankan Army....Quite independently, the LTTE was doing its own thing to enforce a regime of terror in one of its most dreadful aspects-through selective assassination. A poignant instance is the killing on the streets of a middle-aged mother, Sivayogini Patkunamanikkam. Her only known crime was that she was among those who defied the LTTE's order to vacate Jaffna on 30th October 1995, and was cordial towards the security forces."

However the UTHR(J)'s claim to legitimacy in providing unbiased and accurate information exists alongside its explicit commitment to reforming the Tamil community, from a position that is within the community, into an open and democratic society that can realise the potential of its people. The UTHR(J) sees itself as part of this effort: "our own initiatives up to now may in a small way contribute this process."<sup>1</sup> As a report published in 1998 states, "our interest has, moreover, always been that of laying bare the deeper social undercurrents leading to violations, apart from chronicling individual violations themselves."<sup>2</sup> Thus a combination of epistemological standards that included straightforward claims to provide accurate information and evaluative

analysis from within the Tamil community on its progress towards a particular type of society, positioned the UTHR(J) as a key source of both accurate information on conditions within Tamil society and an authentic Tamil source that could morally evaluate the competing claims made by the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.

From its standpoint as an agency able to evaluate the legitimacy of political actors, the LTTE is understood "as a group is rooted in narrow nationalist ideology bent on asserting its dominance through internal terror." The LTTE represents an obstacle to the transformation of Tamil society: "The LTTE must be politically defeated for the Tamils to find space to reassert their will for life with dignity." In its assessment of the Sri Lankan government, the group recognises that while there are serious concerns on the continuing use of torture and disappearances, "the reality is that a good deal has at least temporarily changed for the better under the present government." It also argued that under the present People's Alliance government there was "more space to mobilise on human rights issues with less fear of repercussions." The Sri Lankan government's human rights record in Jaffna is also compared favourably with that of the LTTE: "Compared with the 300 to 400 who disappeared after the Army takeover, there were thousands who disappeared under LTTE rule." Human rights violations committed by the armed forces are therefore understood as lapses from the "general rule," that "discipline has continued to hold."

In producing knowledge on the conditions of life in the Tamil areas the UTHR(J) went beyond the factual and verifiable recording of human rights violations and used its position within the Tamil community to evaluate political mood and interpret behaviour. Sometimes this is the simple reporting of what exists: "among the class of people who are socially conscious and have a sober political outlook, the rejection of the LTTE is overwhelming." However, the analysis also uses the tools of sociological and psychological analysis to reject surface phenomena. In explaining the 'pro LTTE' slant taken by "the elite of administrators, clergy, businessmen and intellectuals who were favoured by the LTTE," the UTHR(J) resorts to the motivations of material interest and guilt: "they need to justify their past services to a very oppressive LTTE regime, and it is moreover the LTTE which for its own purposes welded them together and gave them the position of influence they command today."<sup>3</sup> The UTHR(J)'s position within society also enables it to detect opinion that is missed because of the 'totalitarian control,' exercised by the LTTE through its 'organic surveillance,' of Tamil society. Contrary to the views that are passed off as Tamil opinion, a large segment of opinion believes that: "the government's political package

with its shortcomings must be viewed positively and implemented expeditiously, the military presence in Jaffna must be accepted as the inevitable outcome of Tamil politics."<sup>4</sup> Whilst the UTHR(J)'s position within Tamil society provides it with access to views that would otherwise be hidden, its commitment to creating an open, humane and democratic society also allows it to evaluate Tamil opinion. For example, the Tamil approval that followed the LTTE's shooting down of a Puccaro bomber was described as part of general Tamil ambivalence to the war: "we have always maintained, that though explicable, it is a narrow, unhealthy and suicidal ambivalence of a de-politicised people."

The UTHR(J) explains its own motivations and position as arising from the LTTE's totalitarian control of Tamil civil society: "as members of the Tamil community, this situation presented us with a particular obligation to contest this authoritarian ethos."<sup>5</sup> The UTHR(J) uses its membership of the Tamil community to contest the authoritarian ethos by exposing views and incidents not covered by the intimidated Tamil media. Whilst reflecting the opinion of ignored sections within the Tamil community, the UTHR(J) is also engaged in the task of reforming Tamil society from within, much like Thiruchelvam, engaged in a critical dialogue with his own community.

When the UTHR(J)'s reports are quoted by the international and local press, they are identified as either Tamil or from Jaffna. This is also how President Kumaratunga understood the UTHR(J) when she referred to them as a group of totally neutral and independent Tamil teachers who were appreciative of her government's efforts. The UTHR(J)'s identity as a Tamil organisation associated with the University of Jaffna means that its opposition to the LTTE is taken out of the context of the war and understood purely as an ideological challenge to the LTTE. Their Tamil identity precludes the possibility that they are engaged in the government's partisan use of human rights and they are seen purely as an authentic challenge to the LTTE from within the Tamil community. Although the UTHR(J) itself admits that its reports have been 'selectively appropriated by the State,' the attraction of using its reports in this partisan manner rests on its identity.

(Excerpted from a study on Liberalism and nationalism by the author)

1 UTHR(J), *Living Through Jaffna's Sultry Sunset* found at <http://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport10.htm>

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 UTHR(J), *Jaffna: The contest between man and the beast within*, August 1996

5 UTHR(J) *Living Through Jaffna's Sultry Sunset*



# Bougainville Peace Agreement

by Raveen S Nathan

## History of the conflict

Bougainville is a large island that is on the northeast corner of PNG Main Island. It culturally and politically belongs to the smaller Solomon Islands group to the south of it. Due to the quark of colonial history, its custody ended up with the fledgling postcolonial government of PNG.

Postcolonial PNG government inherited not just the Island but also a potential problem in the form of a large mining contract awarded to Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) by the Australian colonial authorities. "BCL was 56 per cent owned by the Australian subsidiary Conzinc Rio Tinto, Australia (CRA) which is a subsidiary of the multinational mining company, RTZ". The PNG Government held about 20 per cent of its shares. BCL generated about A\$6.2 billion in sales for the first 16 years of its existence and in doing so, "it had become the largest single source of revenue available to the PNG Government after Australian aid. Taxes from BCL alone accounted for 16 per cent of PNG's budget".

The great mine of Panguna, in the Crown Prince Ranges of central Bougainville was administered by 'white' Australian émigrés who lived a comfortable life style in the provincial capital of Arawa. Compared to the almost primitive and subsistence life style of the indigenous people, the living standards of the émigrés and the imported labor force called as 'red skins' by the locals from neighboring PNG was a study in contrast.

Further the Indigenous people, especially those belonging to the Nasioi language group of Central Bougainville had lost sacred and productive land to the huge open pit mine which was growing bigger each day.

## Melanesian Roots

Most indigenous Bougainvilleans were matriarchal. Mothers passed land to their children from generation to generation. This was the most sacred and fundamental practice that was broken by the huge open pit mine. The native Melanesians had over a period of time assimilated the Polynesian seafarers that had eventually settled in lands as far as New Zealand, Tahiti and Hawaii. Their commercial, cultural and sometimes historic political ties were with the other islands of the Solomon's group, which were navigable by simple rafts.

## The pivotal moment

Although a national consciousness as Bougainvilleans was missing at the time of initial European contact, further interactions with American Catholic missionaries known as the 'Marists' and others had slowly instilled a sense of cohesiveness amongst the varied groups.

But the huge open pit mine changed all that. It was the single most event, that precipitated the civil war and now the BPA. The

rights to the open pit mine was granted on land to which neither the Australian nor the PNG government paid any respect to modes of traditional ownership. Compensation was next to nothing and it was breaking apart the very fabric of Nasios nation. It made mothers unable to pass their traditional lands to their future generations thus breaking the spiritual connection between generations and their sacred land.

Not just the Nasios Nation but the rest of the Bougainvilleans too viewed the vast operations as an infringement on their fundamental rights. Further the riches gleaned from the mine was only reaching the Australian managers: their imported PNG workers and the coffers of the PNG budget. The locals were completely left out of the deal.

## The Civil war

"In the end, there was no final burst of gunfire, no mad rush of expatriates to the airport but through a mixture of deception and disobedience, Bougainville, in the first half of 1990, slipped from PNG's control. The mine was officially mothballed on 7 January 1990 but early negotiations led in March 1990 to a cease-fire being declared. The army quit as agreed, but then a decision by the Commissioner of Police and Controller of the State of Emergency, Paul Tohian, to withdraw the last thin line of ordinary officers on the ground, left Papua New Guinea without a single government official, politician or member of the security forces on the island."

Not just the huge copper mine the entire island and its entire infrastructure was with in the control of BRA.

## The Blockade

But just like in Sri Lanka the PNG government attempted to subdue the local population by using a brutal blockade. "All air and sea transport was halted. The blockade, which was enforced by Australian-donated patrol boats, largely succeeded. Only the water border with Solomon Islands remained open. As medical supplies dried up and emergency evacuations became impossible, the blockade became responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians - many more than died as a result of the fighting."

## Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)

Unlike in Sri Lanka, "On 17 May 1990, the Independent Republic of Bougainville was declared amid a day of celebrations, marches and speeches led by the self-proclaimed President, Francis Ona who announced that the 'longstanding wish of the Bougainville people to become a separate nation' had finally been granted. 'From today Bougainville shall be forever a sovereign, democratic and independent nation.' Port Moresby cut the islands last remaining telecommunications shortly after the announcement. The interim government, announced by Ona, included the former Premier Joseph Kabui as Minister of Justice and Sam Kauona as Minister for Defence".

*But just like in Sri Lanka the PNG government attempted to subdue the local population by using a brutal blockade. "All air and sea transport was halted. The blockade, which was enforced by Australian-donated patrol boats, largely succeeded. Only the water border with Solomon Islands remained open. As medical supplies dried up and emergency evacuations became impossible, the blockade became responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians - many more than died as a result of the fighting."*

But unlike the LTTE in Sri Lanka, which runs an efficient civil-military bureaucracy in regions under its control the BRA, were not at all prepared for their new role of maintaining law and order in the new de facto state.

## Internal Carnage

Similar to government controlled Tamil regions in Sri Lanka, Bougainvillean groups sponsored by the PNG and those purportedly working for or against the BRA indulged in mass mayhem of mass murders, assassinations, wholesale disappearances and rapes. "Bougainvilleans, whether resentful of a clansman's prominence or coveting another's land, whether wishing to avenge the death of an antecedent or the despoiling of a female relative leapt into the lawless vacuum of civil strife, maiming and killing their own."

## Australia's role

Another chilling aspect of the similarity between Sri Lanka and Bougainville was the unrestrained use of helicopter gunshots to strafe civilians by the PNG defense forces. Australia provided the Gunships free of cost. Many people fled to the bush just to escape the strafing from air. This was apart from the Australian supplied patrol boats used in the brutal naval blockade.

As India has lost credibility amongst Sri Lankans Tamils as well as some sections of the Sinhalese as a viable peace maker in Sri Lanka, Australia too had soured its relationship with the indigenous Bougainvilleans. This opened the doors for others to play the role of the peacemaker namely New Zealand.

## Chan's "war for peace"

Just like the Sri Lankan president Mdm. Chandrika Badaranike-Kumarantunga (CBK) followed a dual strategy aptly called as "war for peace". The interestingly named Julius Chan who became a Prime Minister in 1994 pursued a dual strategy of war and peace. This dual strategy only prolonged the misery and further exposed the inability of the PNG government to come up with a coherent policy to control Bougainville and defeat the BRA comprehensively. All his attempts lead to defeat and eventually a process of peace talks began in New Zealand.

"In the second half of 1997, two rounds of talks held at the Burnham

Military Camp near Christchurch, New Zealand, were to break the deadlock in the decade-long Bougainville conflict. The Burnham talks occurred after five failed peace accords and two-failed cease-fire agreements. Joseph Kabui, then leader of the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG), described the outcome of these talks saying:

"Contained in the Burnham Declaration is the most powerful of all democratic notions, that the people themselves will have the final say on the outcome of our work. Just as the discussions by our officials have brought us together here, our discussion together must get us back to Bougainville and back to a situation which places the decision back into the hands of the people"

The path to the final peace agreement was torturous and it has three pillars. They are as follows;

## Autonomy

"The Agreement provides for arrangements for an autonomous Bougainville Government operating under a home-grown Bougainville Constitution with a right to assume increasing control over a wide range of powers, functions, personnel and resources on the basis of guarantees contained in the National Constitution.

## Referendum

The agreement provides for the right, guaranteed in the National Constitution, for a referendum among Bougainvilleans' on Bougainville's future political status.

The choices available in the referendum will include a separate independence for Bougainville.

The referendum will be held no sooner than ten years, and in any case no later than fifteen years, after the election of the autonomous Bougainville Government.

The actual date of the referendum will be set taking account of standards of good governance and the implementation of the weapons disposal plan.

The outcome of the referendum will be subject to ratification (final decision making authority) of the National Parliament.

A decision on the final fate of the weapons should be taken within four and a half months of the constitutional amendments coming into effect."

The leaders decided that the best future political arrangements for

Bougainville should be based on two things: a guaranteed but deferred referendum on independence; and high autonomy for Bougainville before the referendum. The reasons for choosing these political arrangements included:

Autonomy gives Bougainville power to deal with Basic Grievances - Bougainville will control land, mining, forestry, environment, foreign investment and culture; . Deferring the referendum keeps open the independence question, and also allows time for reconciliation and development of consensus among people divided on that issue; . Autonomy and deferred referendum together allows us to build up the economy and build up administrative capacity until a final decision on independence is made.

The Bougainville Peace Agreement has been negotiated over 23 meetings with the PNG from June 1999 to August 2001. In the Agreement, PNG has agreed to change the National Constitution to guarantee the following things: Autonomy - a very high level of autonomy, under which Bougainville can:

Choose its name and government structures in its own Constitution. Gradually take on most powers and functions of government. Build up its own revenue through taxes as its economy grows, and until then get financial support from the National Government and donors. Establish separate Bougainville courts, public service, police and CIS.

2. Referendum - a referendum for Bougainvilleans on independence for Bougainville.

Deferred for at least 10 years but for no more than 15 years after autonomy begins. The vote in the referendum will be subject to a final decision by the PNG Parliament. The constitutional arrangements for Bougainville will be protected from change by the PNG Parliament - they will only be changed if Bougainville agrees.

The Peace Agreement also provides for disposal of weapons by the BRA and the BRF, and for withdrawal of remaining PNGDF and Police Riot Squads. The PMG and the United Nations have been asked to stay in Bougainville to help with weapons disposal. These things will be part of wider 'demilitarisation' of Bougainville, which is also intended to deal with causes of conflict. For the presence of opposing military organisations and high-powered weapons has contributed to conflict and insecurity in Bougainville. Demilitarisation also includes:

Strong restrictions on future deployment to Bougainville of the PNGDF and Police Riot Squads; . Bougainville Police not to have anything like a heavily armed Riot Squad; . Commitment by all groups - including BRA and BRF - to working through the autonomous Bougainville Government.

After the amendments are passed, the success of the Agreement will depend on the efforts of Bougainville to implement it properly.



# Psychological Effects of Air Operations Against Deployed Forces

## Experience in Past Wars

History demonstrates that air operations can produce significant, even decisive, psychological effects on the morale and battlefield behavior of deployed forces. Air attacks can severely reduce an enemy's capability to prosecute a war by (1) causing enemy troops to desert, defect, surrender, or flee the battlefield and (2) dissuading troops from manning their weapons and otherwise carrying out their military duties.

Large-scale desertions and surrenders may be difficult to achieve because of the effective morale-building and control mechanisms that sometimes exist within military units and because of the individual soldier's attitudes and fears, including the soldier's concern that his desertion or surrender attempt will fail and that he will be captured by his own forces or killed by one side or the other in the process—fear of execution, torture, or other mistreatment by his captors.

Fear that his surrender or desertion will cause reprisals to be taken against his family, or against himself if he is eventually repatriated.

Confidence in his combat leaders and loyalty to his immediate comrades and his country.

Belief in the cause he is fighting for and prospects for victory.

This study analyzed five periods during the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf conflicts in which the testimony of former enemy personnel provides insights about the battlefield conditions that seem to produce or fail to produce the collapse of resistance and large-scale surrenders and desertions among enemy deployed forces:

September-December 1950 in Korea, when North Korean resistance collapsed and the vast majority of North Korean prisoners were taken.

April-June 1951 in Korea, when Chinese resistance significantly weakened and units surrendered *en masse*.

December 1951-July 1953 in Korea, when no breakdowns in communist resistance occurred and when few North Korean and Chinese troops surrendered or deserted.

1963-1972 in Vietnam, when communist resistance never faltered decisively and when only a small number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) main force troops defected or surrendered.

January 17-February 28, 1991, in the KTO, when the morale of the Iraqi deployed forces collapsed and vast numbers of Iraqi troops deserted home or surrendered.

Conditions That Did Not Necessarily Lead to Large-Scale Surrender and Desertion. Some conditions clearly contributed to poor enemy morale but not necessarily to large-scale surrenders and desertions.

**Initial Morale.** While the status of enemy morale at the beginning of a conflict can importantly determine the pace and scale of enemy demoralization once the fighting be-

gins, initial morale is not a sufficient explanation for why troops surrender or desert in large numbers in some conflict situations, while in others they do not.

Differences in starting morale help to explain why the Iraqi forces collapsed so completely and why the cohesion of the VC main force and NVA units fighting in South Vietnam held up for so long. Starting morale, however, does not explain the collapse of North Korean forces in fall 1950 or the collapse of Chinese communist units in spring 1951. Both the North Korean and the Chinese troops possessed high morale when they first entered the fighting.

**Casualties.** While high casualties undoubtedly demoralize enemy troops, the number of enemy forces killed does not necessarily correlate with the number of enemy surrenders and deserters. The Gulf conflict, which produced the smallest number of enemy killed both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the number of forces deployed, produced the largest number of deserters and prisoners. In contrast, the Vietnam War, which saw the largest number of enemy killed, produced only a small number of NVA and VC main force prisoners and defectors.

Even though North Korean and Chinese communist units—when on the attack—continued to take significant casualties during the last year and one-half of the Korean War, very few Chinese or North Koreans surrendered or deserted to UN forces.

**Intensity and Quality of PSYOP.** The intensity of the PSYOP in the various conflicts also does not explain the difference in the number of surrenders and deserters. Allied PSYOP in Vietnam, which involved the dissemination of an estimated 50 billion leaflets, were more intensive than those in Korea and Iraq. Yet no decisive erosion in enemy resistance occurred in Vietnam. The PSYOP effort was least intensive in the Gulf War, yet massive numbers of Iraqi troops deserted and surrendered.

Neither does the quality of the PSYOP seem to explain the difference. While the Coalition's PSYOP campaign against the Iraqi forces deployed in the KTO appears to have been particularly well designed and executed, the allied PSYOP in Korea and Vietnam were also competent operations, particularly with respect to offering assurances of good treatment to prisoners and deserters.

**Conditions That Consistently Produced Large-Scale Surrender and Desertion.** This examination of the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf wars suggests three conditions that have consistently produced a catastrophic disintegration of enemy resistance and large numbers of enemy surrenders and deserters.

**Sustained, Effective Air and Other Attacks.** The Gulf and Korean cases demonstrate that sustained air attacks on deployed forces can prompt and facilitate large-scale enemy surrenders and desertions by (1) demoralizing enemy soldiers and giving them a reason to surrender or desert, (2) degrading the enemy combat

leader's capability to reconstitute troop morale, and (3) providing the troops with the opportunity to surrender or desert. The communist forces that were routed in Korea in fall 1950 and spring 1951 and the Iraqi units that disintegrated in the KTO in February 1991 all had been subjected to sustained allied military attacks prior to their collapse.

In the conflict situations in which enemy troops were not subjected to sustained, effective attacks, their resistance did not collapse, and they did not surrender and desert *en masse*. The last 20 months of the Korean War produced few North Korean and Chinese surrenders or desertions, largely because the communist troops, except for the brief periods when they were on the offensive, were usually well protected by an elaborate system of bunkers, trenches, and tunnels that was largely impregnable to air and artillery attack.

Communist forces in Vietnam were rarely subjected to sustained air, artillery, or other military attack. Communist commanders largely retained the initiative about where and when their units would fight, and as a consequence the communist forces were able, for the most part, to control their own combat exposure and casualties.

Most communist units fought only a few times a year, perhaps once or twice every six months, and then only briefly. After engagements with allied forces, communist troops withdrew to rear areas, where they could evade further air attacks by frequently changing locations and remaining under the protective cover of the triple-canopied rain forest.

**Resulting Food Shortage.** A second condition that seems to have prompted the collapse of enemy resistance and large-scale surrenders is the food shortage resulting from sustained and effective bombing of enemy lines of communication (LOCs) and supply vehicles. Many of the enemy forces that collapsed in Korea in fall 1950 and spring 1951 and in the Gulf in early 1991 suffered from severe shortages of food. Prisoners and deserters in both conflicts cited food shortages as a leading reason for low morale in their units.

In combat situations in which food was adequate, unit cohesion did not disintegrate and few troops surrendered. Once the battle lines in Korea had stabilized in late 1951, communist troops began to get adequate food. While some VC and NVA units experienced temporary food shortages, the abundance of food sources throughout South Vietnam enabled communist troops to enjoy adequate food rations in most areas nearly all the time.

**Timely Ground Attacks to Exploit Collapsing Morale.** Ground offensives to exploit the deterioration of enemy morale have proved to be the final condition common to the situations in which collapsing enemy resistance has led to large-scale surrenders.

The erosion of North Korean morale that occurred as a result of sustained UN air and other attacks in summer 1950 was exploited in Sep-

tember 1950 by the Inchon landing and the UN breakout from the Pusan perimeter. Similarly, the serious deterioration in Chinese fighting will that existed prior to the defeat of the Chinese offensive in May 1951 was exploited by a major UN counterattack.

In the case of the Iraqi forces in the KTO, the Coalition's 100-hour ground offensive in February 1991 exploited the widespread demoralization of Iraqi ground troops that had resulted from the Coalition air campaign.

The Vietnam War saw little, if any, battlefield exploitation of enemy defeats or losses of morale. Once U.S. forces had found and fixed the enemy, they usually relied on air and artillery rather than ground forces to finish him. Even when U.S. troops attempted to close with the enemy, the jungle terrain usually made it extremely difficult to prevent his escape. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units rarely closed with enemy forces and virtually never attempted to pursue retreating enemy troops.

As a result, communist units mauled by friendly air attacks and defeated in battle were invariably able to withdraw to rear areas where they could rest, refit, and rebuild their morale.

## Lessons for U.S. Commanders

This analysis of the psychological effects of air and other military operations against deployed forces in the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf wars suggests the following implications for U.S. theater, air component and other commanders:

**Emphasize Psychological Aspects in Training, Planning, and Operations.** To exploit fully the potential of U.S. military operations against deployed enemy forces, U.S. commanders will need to devote increased attention to the psychological dimensions of warfare in the planning and conduct of their operations. The psychological effect of combat operations applies especially to sustained air and artillery attacks, which have proved capable of decisively undermining the cohesion and fighting will of enemy ground forces. As the Korean and Gulf wars have demonstrated, enemy demoralization opens the way for rapid and low-cost battlefield victories.

The recognition that military operations produce the decisive psychological effects does not lessen the importance of PSYOP, which exploits and reinforces the psychological effects created by military pressure. PSYOP cost little and can be a significant force multiplier.

**Adopt an Overall Campaign Strategy That Promotes Psychologically Effective Attack.** The war-fighting commander should adopt an overall campaign strategy that will force enemy ground units to react in a manner that will expose them to prolonged and psychologically effective aerial and other attack. To erode decisively an enemy's will to fight, friendly aircraft may have to attack over a period of several weeks or more. The air operations and ground fight-

ing that preceded the collapse of enemy forces in Korea in 1950 and 1951 lasted several months; the air campaign that so demoralized Iraqi troops in the KTO lasted 38 days.

**Make Demoralization an Air Campaign Objective.** In past conflicts, the psychological effects of air operations have been largely unplanned and unanticipated. Air campaigns should be designed to maximize the psychological, as well as the physical, effects of airpower. To ensure that adequate attention will be given to psychological effects,

The air component commander should make the destruction of enemy morale a priority air campaign objective.

Personnel expert in psychological effects should be included on air campaign planning staffs.

**Integrate PSYOP with Air Attacks Against Deployed Forces.** Air planners should work closely with their PSYOP counterparts to integrate and coordinate military operations and PSYOP messages. Such close coordination was sometimes lacking in the Gulf War. Air attacks can enhance the credibility and receptivity of PSYOP messages. PSYOP can be used to solidify and exploit perceptions created by air attacks. PSYOP messages help to break down two key barriers to surrender and desertion: (1) enemy concerns about how to surrender or desert safely and (2) enemy fears about treatment after capture.

**Know Enemy Psychological Strengths and Vulnerabilities.** Because information from former enemy personnel is so vital to the assessment of the effects of military operations on enemy morale and to the design and evaluation of PSYOP messages, war-fighting commanders must ensure that enemy motivation and morale receive high priority in prisoner and deserter interrogations.

The Air Force should develop a cohort of PSYOP specialists and psychologically oriented intelligence specialists, including trained interrogators, to work with Army personnel in conducting and evaluating prisoner and deserter interrogations, in designing PSYOP messages, and in assessing the psychological impact of air and other military operations.

**Begin Psychological Conditioning in Peacetime.** The Air Force and other U.S. military services have two principal reasons for advertising their capabilities to potential adversaries during peacetime: to deter the would-be aggressors from attacking U.S. interests and to begin the psychological softening of the potential adversaries in the event war does occur. For the Air Force, much of this advertising will be a natural by-product of air shows and peacetime training and deployment exercises. These and other opportunities should be used where appropriate to demonstrate the superior capabilities of technologically advanced U.S. aircraft and weapon systems.



# Behind the Axis of Evil

We do not lack communication, on the contrary we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present-Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari

Global efforts to combat terrorism, and there in the need for the developed industrialized nations to play a leading role are more of a necessity today than ever. In an increasingly globalizing and interdependent world like ours the success of combating transnational terrorism hinges on well-coordinated efforts by the states, irrespective of their past and present foreign policy record. In this regard, I have little quarrel with the need for bills such as Homeland Security Bill and increasing role of the state in providing national security.

Two of the main impediments for the success of anti-terrorist measures today are the mass media representations of terrorism and counter terrorism and inconsistencies and contradictions of the foreign policies of the developed countries.

Particularly after September 11th, the media in both Western and Non-western countries have got even more ethnocentric and racist. There is hardly any difference between the representations of Muslims and the Europeans in popular media in the Western and Islamic countries, respectively. These media representations galvanize the popular stereotypes and have heightened fear and insecurity of one community of the other. Diversity of opinions within the Western and non-Western world about the actions of their respective governments is suppressed in ways detrimental to the development of a cosmopolitan and tolerant world polity. Ironically, the post cold war world order expected to be multicultural and diverse one is now being simplified into what one author referred to as two conflicting blocks i.e. 'Mcworld' and 'Jihad.'

It is somewhat naïve to say that reasons for the media parochialism are simply responses to the horrendous terrorist activities.

All major media corporations are owned by a few corporations that control the political processes locally as well as globally. Some of these corporations have major stakes in the countries placed on the axis of evil. Today, no one can get elected to or survive in the public office without the blessings of the corporate-patronized media. Just before the elections, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair made a special trip to Australia to meet Rupert Murdoch to ensure that he will not proceed with the proposal by Tory's to limit the concentration of media in the hands of a few, which was a major reason for

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conservative right wing Murdoch who controls over 50% global media services to support the Labor.

Media stories are filtered through corporate filters so that issues and answers are framed according to the interests of corporate interests. The commercial interests determine length, context, and timing of the media stories. Increasingly, non-mainstream media services have gone bankrupt, co-opted by corporate interests or available only through expensive cable channels or aired at times when the public is least prepared to watch them. Corporations have even set-up special institutions to monitor and suppress the media services who air programs conflicting with corporate interests. For all practical purposes liberal media is dead.

Making matters worse, now the citizens-turned-consumers have neither the interest nor the time to unpack and critically evaluate the simplistic media representation of issues. They want quick and easy explanations and solutions to the issues, in the same way they place a high value on products from supermarkets that simplify their usage irrespective of how they are produced and where they come from. It is the ability to maintain increasing levels of consumption, hence the ability to pay off the debt that functions as the bottom upon which the media representations of political issues are evaluated. Simply, critical thinking has no market value!

Despite the enhanced capacity of the technology to disseminate information and the availability of information via Internet, society at large is experiencing ignorance and disinterest in knowing the complexities of the world surrounding it. Ironically, in countries such as the U.S. where there is still a broad freedom of expression and availability of information; the public is ignorant about the world outside of them and is more vulnerable to how it is represented by the popular media. So politicians who can simplify the issues and offer solutions that are both aggressive and sensational often as

spokespersons for the military are more attractive to the voters than those who force them to think and assume some personal responsibility for the issues facing them.

Such media representations create several obstacles for success in combating terrorism. First, the parochial media representations increase the popular support base, either active or silent, for terrorists, at a time when success of gathering information and effective surveillance of terrorist activities depends on popular support.

Secondly, the presence of an ignorant public places society in danger of national security measures to combat terrorism being exploited by the politico-business interests groups whose interests are detrimental to the long term goal of combating terrorism. This is an important issue in the present context where the sovereignty of the state is entirely lost to corporate interests and the latter is progressively taking control over the national security to further their corporate interests. This is achieved first by misleading the public about the more real reasons for terrorism, and secondly, by commer-

of the states. By creating the illusion that history of the world began after September 11th, these media representations also distort the experienced reality of the relationship between capitalism and democracy, particularly in the Western countries.

In the history of capitalism democracy has always taken the back seat and has been suppressed in the name of progress—more so today more than ever before. Western governments have tolerated and even materially supported the suppression of democratic freedoms when it is necessary to safeguard their own economic and political interests, far more frequently and gruesomely than those now crusading against the terrorists. The economic prosperity that sustains the democratic freedoms in the West would not have been possible if not for the denial of both economic prosperity and democratic freedoms for the majority of the poor in the Third World countries and without patronizing those oil-rich authoritarian and militaristic regimes.

Take a few examples from the recent past about the Western countries relationship with the non-western world particularly with respect to human rights, nuclear weapons and terrorism. In 1985, Ronald Reagan called Osama bin Laden "the moral equivalent of America's founding fathers." Much of al-Qaeda evolved within the CIA sponsored training camps in Pakistan. Pakistan's military regimes have always been an ally of the US since the Cold War. Just after the September 11th attack, the Judicial Watch, a Washington DC based non-profit advocacy group, protested against President Bush Sr. having investments in Carlyle Investment Groups, a group in which bin Laden's family is a partner. Indeed, one cannot hold the entire

and its support of intransigent Islamic fundamentalist regimes, the US backed the Taliban until about 1997 and stopped its criticism and attacks shortly before September 11th. Appeals by many human rights advocacy groups to prevent the destruction of the ancient Buddhist Statues and oppression of women were ignored by the U.S. governments and other governments in the West. Neither these governments nor U.N. pursued any aggressive policy against the Taliban involvement in cultural genocide and human rights abuses as they now do against Iraq and others soon would be placed in the axis of evil.

The Taliban was not anti-modern and anti-western in the strict sense. They were actively involved in seeking ways to use their strategic geopolitical location to attract the Western Oil industry with the mediation of the US State Department. For about five years, the Taliban played one oil company against another. About, nine oil companies pursued another strategy of paying off one warlord against another with the blessings of their respective governments. The negotiations between the Taliban and the oil corporations amounted to billions of dollars involving practically every major oil corporation in the world.

As the Taliban appeared to be consolidating their hold over the greater part of Afghanistan with the help of authoritarian interpretation of Islam, the West and their oil companies became hopeful that the Taliban will create the political stability needed to construct the oil pipeline. Subsequently, the Taliban changed its mind over the \$2 billion gas pipe line and \$2.5 billion oil pipe line contracts signed with the American oil company Unocal to transport oil between Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, and began to work closely with Bridal, an Argentinean oil company. The change of Taliban policies coincided with the threat of terrorism operating from Afghanistan. Thereafter, Western governments began to share the concerns of the human rights groups protests against the human right abuses by the Taliban.

Saudi Arabia is a family/clan monarchy in possession of the world's largest oil reserves (with Iraq coming in second). Its governance is based on one of the draconian interpretation of the Sharia law. At the same time Saudi is also the friendliest regime of the Western Oil corporations in the region. It gets preferential treatment by the West despite its horrendous record of human rights violations according to Western standards. In 1980, the US

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cializing the national security measures.

The media representations of the terrorism and counter terrorism have simplified the world into good and evil, in ways unhelpful to combating terrorism. These representations suppress and silence the critical voicing of the inconsistencies and contradictions of the foreign policies

Bin Landen family responsible for the terror of Bin Laden. However, it is fair to say that the business interests of the politicians would have influenced the neglect of now highly revealed warnings about terror attacks on September 11th

Despite the voices in the US protesting against the Taliban's violation of democratic freedoms





More than ten thousand head of cattle were abandoned 12 years ago by the people of Thiriyai, a large Tamil farming village north of Trinco. The cattle now roam wild in the area. A paddy field cultivated by Thiriyai returnees (right)

## Behind...

government authorized export licenses worth \$5 million under category OA82C, which includes the use of thumb cuffs, leg irons, and shackles. By and large, oil rich countries are the largest customers of defense products from the West.

Despite the overwhelming evidence of Saudi Arabia as the home of a large number of September 11<sup>th</sup> hijackers and is now under investigation for funneling money for terrorists, it continue to receive preferential treatment in the Western crusade against terrorism.

The massacre of Christian minority in Pakistan is completely ignored by the West given its alliance with the military control government in Pakistan. It is well known that the Taliban and al Quida training centers were located in Pakistan and some of them were sponsored by the SIS with the support of the CIA. The India government was not under any pressure from the West when its Hindu fundamentalist ideology was partly responsible for the riots in Gujarat. It was not until September 11<sup>th</sup>, the West began to exert constructive pressure on both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to work a negotiated settlement for the ethnic crisis, despite their brutal record of human rights violations.

For years, the Western governments ignored calls for assistance by various minority-resistance groups within the Islamic and non-Islamic world fighting against their repressive governments, unless these governments acted against the corporate interests of the West.

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No one denies the suppression of democratic freedoms—when they are measured by Western standards—in Iran, Iraq and Libya. No civilized government should tolerate the horrendous human rights abuses by Hussain and extend any assistance for its continuity, as he is capable of using any means for his survival.

At the same time, compared to many of the West-friendly Islamic nations, Iraq, Libya and Iran consist of highly educated and politically active citizens enjoying more secular democratic freedoms, despite the fact that Islam is the dominant ideology of the state. The Bible Society is allowed to function in Iraq and a number of Christians are in high ranking positions of the government, Christian minorities enjoy relative freedom of worship. Col. Quadaffi, on several occasions, held conferences in order to promote unity between Islam and Christianity. Fewer restrictions exist for women to participate in public life and politics. The improvements in social and economic standards in Libya by far outnumber those in Pakistan. In terms of the training sites and popular support base for terrorism, Libya is less of a threat compared to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

An important characteristic of those countries that are likely to be a target of the counter-terror-

ism is that they have the largest oil and gas reserves next to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. Political ideologies and the public policies of the former states aspire to take control of the oil industry away from foreign corporations. Their desire for the right of economic and political self-determination was threatening to the Western countries and to West-friendly undemocratic monarchies and authoritarian nations. In fact, Iraq and Libya have brutally suppressed the Islamic fundamentalist movements that were against progressive social reforms consistent with the ideals of western democracy. Countries like Saudi Arabia considered Libya and Iraq and those states propagating a more secular and socialistic ideology of Islam as heretics.

I do not claim that these radical Islamic countries have been entirely genuine in their advocacy for secularism and socialism, but they are more likely to be successful in achieving political and economic independence in ways more dangerous to the interests of Western corporations and those West-friendly Islamic states that are still under family and clan rule.

During the Cold war, the West backed any group that was anti-Communist and threatened the interests of their petroleum and defense industries. In 1953, the CIA backed the fall of the popularly elected Iranian government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq, who was demanding



that the Anglo American Oil Company share more of its profits from Iran. The government was overthrown and the monarchy under Shah was established, which permitted the International Private Oil Consortium to control 40% of Iran's oil. At this point, Iran became the largest buyer of weapons from the West. The Iran-Contra scandal and the hostage crisis explains the real interests of the West in dealing with the Islamic world.

China has received the US's most favored nation trading status despite its continuing poor record of human rights violations. New investments in Burma are banned, while no sanctions against China are even contemplated. The issue of Tibet is completely ignored by the West. Clinton doctrine in China was that 'be patient, expanded trade will lead to democratic reforms.'

The testing of nuclear weapons by India, China, and France is tolerated and supported by various Western Corporations, even after September 11<sup>th</sup>, the Western corporations continue to provide the assistance for these nuclear plants.

While the "possibility" of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction has led to a economic embargo that has already killed 500,000 Iraqis every month—including 5,300 children—due to disease and hunger. Iraq estimates those killed to account for 7.5 percent of the population and its economic infrastructure has been destroyed for over ten years.

Indeed, Saddam Hussein is primarily responsible for the sufferings of the Iraqi people. It is a minority rule held by brute force. However, during the Iran-Iraq war, was a close friend of the West. The Western companies sponsored his entire war machinery. Until the invasion of Kuwait, the West tolerated Saddam's brutal record of gassing the Kurds and exterminating his opposition. That Saddam and his supporters have extravagant lifestyles when millions of Muslims within Iraq and around the world are suffering from abject poverty was never a concern of the Western media.