கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: For the Sake of a Just and Lasting Peace 2003

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This report was prepare support provided Development with by finan th .
Government through the Development (USAID) Cooperative Agreement N for the "Sri Lanka Peace S expressed herein are thos necessarily reflect the vi International Development

This report was prepared with technical and financial support provided Development with by financing the .
Academy for Educational from the United States Government through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under Associate Award Cooperative Agreement Number 386-A-00-03-00012-00 for the "Sri Lanka Peace Support Project". The opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

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Foreword
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ltimately, the durability of any peace process and the agreements made through it crucially depends on public support and legitimacy. This in turn is a product of the knowledge, attitudes and perceptions people have of the process and agreements made. Hence the survey by Social Indicator (SI) the Survey Unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) a public policy centre focusing on peace and governance through programmes of research and advocacy.
This Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey (KAPS) of the peace process was made possible by the financial assistance of the Academy for Educational Development (AED) and the technical support of William Mishler, Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, US and Steven Finkel, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, US, which CPA-SI gratefully acknowledges. Their collaboration with us has greatly enhanced our capacity building and deepened our understanding of the challenges posed by this crucial dimension of the peace process. It has also augmented our continuing survey programme on public attitudes towards peace and a political settlement, the Peace Confidence Index (PC1), now in its 16th wave as the longest uninterrupted survey on peace in Sri Lanka. Congratulations to Pradeep and the SI team, whose energy, enthusiasm, commitment and expertise have made the KAPS survey a distinctive
and invaluable tool for in Sri Lanka.
CPA -SI sincerely results of the KAPS surv decision making and ad with regard to a political peace in Sri Lanka. We the KAPS survey as be through which the hop the public will be filtered level decision making provide the information n inclusive peace. Likewi KAPS survey as a cata targeted advocacy and i the level of civil society, to understanding and subs overarching objective o political and constitution
The KAPS survey i contribution in fulfillme mandate of advancing de and governance in Sri La it will be the public goo to be, of value and utili who share our mandate.
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Dr. Paikiasothy Sar Executive Director Centre for Policy A

eword
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and invaluable tool for peace building in Sri Lanka.
CPA -SI sincerely hope that the results of the KAPS survey will inform decision making and advocacy efforts with regard to a political settlement and peace in Sri Lanka. We see the value of the KAPS survey as being a channel through which the hopes and fears of the public will be filtered into Track One level decision making and thereby provide the information necessary for an inclusive peace. Likewise, we see the KAPS survey as a catalyst for more targeted advocacy and intervention at the level of civil society, to ensure greater understanding and subscription to the overarching objective of a negotiated political and constitutional settlement.
The KAPS survey is a part of our contribution in fulfillment of CPA -SI's mandate of advancing democratic peace and governance in Sri Lanka. We hope it will be the public good, we intend it to be, of value and utility to all those who share our mandate.
Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu Executive Director Centre for Policy Alternatives
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Acknowledgements
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his report was prepared b at Social Indicator, with te Dr. William Mishler, Un Finkel, University of Virginia; D US; Ms. Gwendolyn G. Bev Washington; and Mr. Kim J. De Lanka.
Additional guidance for KA for this project was provided by which includes: Dr. P. Saravana Loganathan, CPA; Dr. Jehan Per Dr. Selvy Thiruchandran, WERC
Further support, suggestio process was provided by the KA comprise of: Ms. Anberiya Gooneratne, SCOPP; Mr. Dev A Balakrishnan, NPC; Mr. Andres Esmonde, Oxfam GB; Mr. Jo Lakthilaka, Ministry of Const Fernando, SEDEC; Mr. Kingsle
Kim De Ridder Chief of Party Academy for Educational D

owledgements
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his report was prepared by Mr. Pradeep Peiris and his team at Social Indicator, with technical support and inputs from Dr. William Mishler, University of Arizona; Dr. Stephen , University of Virginia; Dr. Jeff Galati, Wellesley College, s. Gwendolyn G. Bevis, Program Associate, AED/ ngton; and Mr. Kim J. DeRidder, Chief of Party, AED/Sri .
dditional guidance for KAP survey design and questionnaire is project was provided by the KAPS Steering Committee, includes: Dr. P. Saravanamuttu, CPA; Mr. Ketheshwaran athan, CPA; Dr. Jehan Perera, National Peace Council and lvy Thiruchandran, WERC.
urther support, suggestions, and input during the survey s was provided by the KAPS Advisory Committee, which rise of: Ms. Anberiya Haniffa, MWRAF; Dr John eratne, SCOPP; Mr. Dev Annand Ramaiah, UNDP; Mr. S. ishnan, NPC; Mr. Andres Wiederkehr, Helvetas; Mr. Phil nde, Oxfam GB; Mr. Joe William, CIDA; Mr. Shiral ilaka, Ministry of Constitutional Affairs; Mr. Rukshan
do, SEDEC; Mr. Kingsley Rodrigo, PAFFREL.
im De Ridder hief of Party cademy for Educational Development

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Contents
Executive Summary 7 Preface 9 Introduction 10 For the Sake of Peace 12 A. Support for Peace Proposals 13
B. Protesting Unfair Peace Proposals 15
C. Peace Agreement Activists and Opponents 16
D. Ethnicity, Region and Political Parties 18 Beyond Ethnicity 20
A. Demographics: 21
B. Ethnic Interaction and Identity: 22
C. Tolerance and Democratic Values 24
D. Political and Civic Engagement 26
E. Support for Government Institutions and Performance 29
F. Perceived Benefits of Peace 31
Within Ethnicity 34
A. Explaining Attitudes Toward Peace: The Sinhala 33
B. Explaining Attitudes Toward Peace: Tamils 38
C. Explaining Attitudes Toward Peace: Up-Country Tamils 40
D. Explaining Attitudes Toward Peace: Muslims 43 Communicating for Peace 44 Summary and Recommendations 48 APPENDIX A: Survey Methods and Que APPENDIX B: Focus Group Report 57 NOTES 79 APPENDIX C: The Survey Instrument
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tents
ary 7
0 Peace 12
5
nents 16
s 18 y 20
y 34
24
6
and Performance 29
he Sinhala 33
amils 38
p-Country Tamils 40
uslims 43 for Peace 44 ecommendations 48 Survey Methods and Questionnaire 54 Focus Group Report 57
The Survey Instrument
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Page 8
Executive Summary
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and lic o understand support underlying for the the dynamics nature, peace negotia- extent, of pub
tions in Sri Lanka, the Knowledge, Atti- tudes and Practices Survey (KAPS) in- terviewed a nationwide probability sample of 2,980 citizens in June 2003. The survey focused on public support for a variety of specific proposals4 that might be included in a final agreement "for the sake of peace" (including federalism, guaranteed minority representation in Parliament, and decommissioning of Lib- eration Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) heavy weapons). It also focused on the willingness of citizens to protest a final agreement that they considered unfair. This report summarizes the analyses of these data, supplemented by the results of a series of Focus Groups Discussions across the country designed to augment the survey results. Among the highlights of the report:
Sri Lankans are divided about the peace process. They are divided about how far they are willing to compromise for the sake of peace, and they are di- vided regarding their readiness to protest a peace agreement they consider to be un- fair.
Most Sri Lankans are willing to make at least some changes in the status quo for the sake of peace, and a substan- tial minority is willing to make multiple changes. Proposals4 to strengthen mi- nority rights receive the broadest support, including a proposal to guarantee pro- portional representation for minorities in parliament. Opinions are divided on fed- eralism, but there is little support for asymmetric federalism, amnesty, or a ro-
tating presidency.
When confront trade-offs in the peac Lankans are remarkably example, while Sri Lank on removing High Secu the decommissioning o weapons, a majority accep als4 when they are tied to
Overall two-t Lankans either embrace m als for peace or indicate to accept (i.e., unwilling nal agreement even if th that it is fair.
Ethnic differen toward the peace proces ably large. The great ma respondents opposes mo als4 while the great majo Up-Country Tamils and port the majority of peac The Sinhala ma is far from monolithic. A nority supports multiple als. A majority of those o proposals are relatively ap not prepared to protest a f ment even if they consid
The Tamil, Up- and Muslim minority co relatively modest deman strongly favor a federal largely reject asymmetri rotating presidency, and
The strongest op peace proposals is concen
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cutive Summary
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tating presidency.
口 When confronted with specific trade-offs in the peace process, Sri Lankans are remarkably accepting. For example, while Sri Lankans are divided on removing High Security Zones and the decommissioning of LTTE heavy weapons, a majority accepts both propos- als when they are tied together.
口 Overall two-thirds of Sri Lankans either embrace multiple propos- als for peace or indicate they are willing to accept (i.e., unwilling to protest) a fi- nal agreement even if they do not think that it is fair.
口 Ethnic differences in attitudes toward the peace process loom predict- ably large. The great majority of Sinhala respondents opposes most peace propos- als while the great majority of Tamils, Up-Country Tamils and Muslims sup- port the majority of peace proposals.
口 The Sinhala majority, however, is far from monolithic. A substantial mi- nority supports multiple peace propos- als. A majority of those opposed to most proposals are relatively apathetic and are not prepared to protest a final peace agree- ment even if they consider it unfair.
口 The Tamil, Up-Country Tamil and Muslim minority communities have relatively modest demands. While they strongly favor a federal solution, they largely reject asymmetric federalism, a rotating presidency, and amnesty.
口 The strongest opposition to the peace proposals is concentrated not in the
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South but in the North Central and North West regions bordering LTTE- controlled territory.
Opposition to the peace pro- posals is strongest in the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), but even here, there is surprising diversity and strong pockets of support.
Government concerns about "selling" a peace agreement to United National Party (UNP) supporters ap- pear exaggerated. Three quarters of party members either support mul- tiple peace proposals or say they will not protest an agreement that includes them.
Support for multiple peace proposals increases decreases with age and income.
Support is greatest among those with the most and least contact with other ethnic groups. Substan- tial ethnic integration facilitates peace, but a little bit of contact is a danger- ous thing.
Those most interested in politics and those most aware of and knowledgeable about the peace pro- cess are substantially more support- ive of multiple proposals.
Support for multiple peace agreements increases with public con- fidence in the Prime Minister and Parliament, but decreases with pub- lic support for the President.
The great majority of citizens expect that a peace agreement will pay important dividends. Those who do are much more likely to support mul- tiple peace proposals.
Sri Lankans, and especially the Sinhala, think that economic ben- efits are the most likely result of peace. However, those who think that peace will bring a reduction in violence, greater personal security and increased
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the North Central and regions bordering LTTE-
rritory.
position to the peace pro- rongest in the Janatha eramuna (JVP) and Sri dom Party (SLFP), but ere is surprising diversity ockets of support.
vernment concerns about ace agreement to United rty (UNP) supporters ap- ated. Three quarters of ers either support mul- roposals or say they will n agreement that includes
port for multiple peace creases decreases with age .
port is greatest among e most and least contact thnic groups. Substan- tegration facilitates peace, it of contact is a danger-
ose most interested in those most aware of and ble about the peace pro- stantially more support-
le proposals.
port for multiple peace ncreases with public con- he Prime Minister and but decreases with pub- or the President.
great majority of citizens peace agreement will pay ividends. Those who do re likely to support mul- roposals.
Lankans, and especially think that economic ben- ost likely result of peace. ose who think that peace reduction in violence, nal security and increased
individual freedoms are much more likely to support multiple proposals for the sake of peace.
口 Sri Lankans rely on television for most of their news, but those who rely more on radio for their news are better informed and more likely to sup- port multiple peace proposals.
口 There are good reasons for op- timism about the demand for peace and the willingness of the public in Sri Lanka to embrace a just and lasting peace agree- ment. There is much that can be done both in the short and long run to in- crease demands for peace and to miti- gate opposition to a final peace agree- ment.

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Preface
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pinion surveys are instruments of empowerment. They provide the means by which the silent majority of the public can express opin- ions on the issues affecting them, thereby informing government and influencing public policy debates. Social Indicator (SI), the polling unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), introduced the Peace Confidence Index (PCI), an Island- wide bi-monthly survey, in order to cap- ture the changes over time in public per- ception of the peace process. Begun in May 2001, PCI has become a credible index for parties who support as well as oppose the current peace process. Im- portantly, PCI methodology is sensitive to current political developments assess- ing both national and ethnic perspectives on the peace process.
While the PCI provides an excel- lent barometer of overall patterns and trends in public support for the peace process, it is limited in the information it can provide with regard to WHO sup- ports and opposes the peace process, both in general and with respect to specific proposals that have been advanced or might be advanced in the negotiations. It also is limited in explaining WHY dif- ferent groups support or oppose differ- ent peace initiatives. In order to build on the PCI and develop an instrument that will provide more detailed informa- tion on the backgrounds, attitudes, and behavior of peace proponents and oppo- nents, SI has undertaken Sri Lanka's first ever Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey (KAPS) on the peace process, with the support of the Academy for Educa- tional Development (AED) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition to
providing a deeper, richer of the peace process in Sr cipal purpose of KAPS capacity of both govern society organizations and understand and better m needs and concerns of t regard to the current pea
The idea underlyin beyond the ethnic and pa in Sri Lanka to identify in a more subtle and nu most ardent supporters o most likely opponents. per reports and the conve typically treat parties and as politically homogeneo is considerable diversity o such groups.
For example, while sition of an opposition p oppose the peace proces even likely, that there are s bers of individuals and groups within the party w peace process and are wil as least some changes in t tus quo if they would con and lasting peace. By id individuals and understa tivations it may be possi ernment to design a pa proposals that can draw political support both ins the party. It also may governmental and non-go ganizations (NGOs) to u tion to develop commu paigns that target specifi provide education about cess that focuses on differ cific interests and concer
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ace
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providing a deeper, richer understanding of the peace process in Sri Lanka, a prin- cipal purpose of KAPS is to build the capacity of both government and civil society organizations and institutions to understand and better meet the interests, needs and concerns of the public with regard to the current peace process.
The idea underlying KAPS is to go beyond the ethnic and partisan divisions in Sri Lanka to identify and understand in a more subtle and nuanced way the most ardent supporters of peace and the most likely opponents. While newspa- per reports and the conventional wisdom typically treat parties and ethnic groups as politically homogeneous, there often is considerable diversity of opinion within such groups.
For example, while the official po- sition of an opposition party may be to oppose the peace process, it is possible, even likely, that there are substantial num- bers of individuals and significant sub- groups within the party who support the peace process and are willing to embrace as least some changes in the political sta- tus quo if they would contribute to a just and lasting peace. By identifying these individuals and understanding their mo- tivations it may be possible for the gov- ernment to design a package of peace proposals that can draw much broader political support both inside and outside the party. It also may be possible for governmental and non-governmental or- ganizations (NGOs) to use this informa- tion to develop communication cam- paigns that target specific audiences and provide education about the peace pro- cess that focuses on different groups' spe- cific interests and concerns.
Opinion surveys are instruments of empowerment. They provide the means by which the silent majority of the public can express their opin- ions on the issues affecting them, thereby informing government and influencing public policy debates.
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Introduction
Additionally, since difficult compromises are inevitable, the achievement of a just and lasting peace will require the concerted efforts of the govern- ment, the LTTE, non- governmental organi- zations (NGOs), and other stakeholders in the process to explain and defend to their supporters both the fairness of the negotia- tion process and the necessity of the com- promises made to achieve an agreement.
T
for Having he citizens a just endured and of Sri lasting two Lanka decades peace. long
of civil war while suffering 65,000 ca- sualties, massive economic disruption, and untold heartache, Sri Lankans today overwhelmingly embrace the current ceasefire and express an abid- ing desire to see a permanent peace agreement negotiated between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Hope, however, although a vital resource, is not sufficient in itself to produce a settlement of this endur- ing conflict. Despite an overwhelm- ing desire for peace, Sri Lankans ex- press many different and often con- flicting opinions regarding the specific elements that should be included in a final agreement. Almost inevitably, the achievement of a permanent peace agreement will require difficult nego- tiations and potentially painful com- promises from all parties on a num- ber of issues involving both funda- mental principles as well as adminis- trative detail. This requires that those at the negotiating table avoid easy ste- reotypes and understand in some depth the attitudes of citizens on all sides of the conflict, what the differ- ent groups hope to achieve in a final peace agreement and, especially, what they are willing to sacrifice to achieve those aspirations. It also requires that negotiators understand what compro- mises citizens are willing to accept in the interest of peace and, just as im- portantly, what fundamental beliefs they are willing to fight to protect.
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duction
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itizens of Sri Lanka long just and lasting peace. ing endured two decades hile suffering 65,000 ca- sive economic disruption, heartache, Sri Lankans helmingly embrace the efire and express an abid- see a permanent peace negotiated between the and the Liberation Tigers am (LTTE).
however, although a vital not sufficient in itself to ettlement of this endur- Despite an overwhelm- r peace, Sri Lankans ex- different and often con- ions regarding the specific t should be included in a ent. Almost inevitably, ent of a permanent peace ill require difficult nego- potentially painful com- m all parties on a num- s involving both funda- ciples as well as adminis- l. This requires that those ating table avoid easy ste- d understand in some titudes of citizens on all conflict, what the differ- ope to achieve in a final ent and, especially, what ing to sacrifice to achieve ions. It also requires that nderstand what compro- s are willing to accept in of peace and, just as im- hat fundamental beliefs ling to fight to protect.
Additionally, since difficult compromises are inevitable, the achievement of a just and lasting peace will require the con- certed efforts of the government, the LTTE, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other stakeholders in the process to explain and defend to their supporters both the fairness of the ne- gotiation process and the necessity of the compromises made to achieve an agree- ment. This requires that stakeholders understand both the underlying values and concerns of their supporters and how best to frame the compromises in the final peace agreement in order to secure the widest possible public sup- port.
In order to better understand Sri Lankan attitudes about the peace pro- cess, Social Indicator, a non-partisan survey research center associated with the Centre for Policy Alternatives in Co- lombo, undertook a nationwide survey of the Knowledge, Attitudes and Prac- tices (KAPS) of Sri Lanka citizens with respect to the peace process. The survey was supported in part by a grant from the United States Agency for Interna- tional Development (USAID) with tech- nical assistance provided by the Acad- emy for Educational Development (AED). The KAP survey, which comple- ments and extends the longer running Peace Confidence Index (PCI)1, was ad- ministered in June 2003.
The KAP survey interviewed a to- tal of 2,980 individuals, face to face, in all government-controlled areas of the country. Minority ethnic group mem- bers were systematically over-sampled,

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and interviews were conducted with 494 Tamil, 439 Up-Country Tamil and 472 Muslims. The resulting sample was sub- sequently weighted to achieve a national probability sample that also insured the availability of sufficient numbers of eth- nic minorities to allow meaningful sub- group analyses. Although restrictions on the administration of the survey pre- vented the conduct of any interviews in areas controlled by the LTTE, analysis of Tamil attitudes toward the peace pro- cess in diverse areas of the country show no significant differences among Tamils living in different areas. Appendix A pro- vides additional details on the survey methodology. Appendix C provides an English version of the survey instrument.
To complement the KAP survey, Social Indicator conducted a series of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) at se- lected locations across the country to clarify a variety of issues that were raised during initial analyses of the KAPS re- sults and to probe several issues in more depth. Specifically, SI conducted FGDs in the areas of Colombo, Galle, Talawakelle, Amparai, Batticaloa, Pollonnaruwa and Jaffna, covering the Sinhala, Tamil, Up-Country Tamil and Muslim communities. The selected ar- eas were those where preliminary analy- sis of the survey showed the most inter- esting, unexpected, or controversial re- sults. Participants for these groups were selected from the KAP survey respondent list using a quota system to ensure the representation of men and women from different age categories. All FGDs were ethnically homogeneous and were mod- erated by a person from the same ethnic community. Dictaphones were used with the approval of participants to supple- ment the notes taken during each session. Appendix B provides a complete report of the Focus Group results.
This report summarizes the results of the KAP survey as augmented by the Focus Group results. The report is not encyclopedic; the survey is far too large and rich to be covered fully in 80 pages. Instead, the report focuses on those as- pects of the survey that most directly
address public opinion a process and the prospects a just and lasting peace. gins by summarizing the Lankan citizens towards cess and especially towar posals that might provid negotiated peace settlem attention focuses on the c zens are willing to make i peace and also on their wi test a settlement they con just or unfair. The rep build a Peace Process Ty guishing between citizen ing and unwilling to con the political status quo in a peace agreement, while ing between those willin to protest an unfair agre pology is then used to exp ics of the peace process b ethnic, territorial, and p ties and differences acros types.
Given that ethnic d large in explaining outlo Sri Lanka, a second secti looks "Beyond Ethnicity," social and attitudinal fa account for different at peace. A third sect Ethnicity," goes further dynamics that account within each of the majo that explain attitudes tow fourth section briefly di dia usage of different se Lankan population in ord who would like to com particular segments of population. A final sec summary and recommen
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address public opinion about the peace process and the prospects for negotiating a just and lasting peace. The report be- gins by summarizing the attitudes of Sri Lankan citizens towards the peace pro- cess and especially towards various pro- posals that might provide a basis for a negotiated peace settlement. Particular attention focuses on the concessions citi- zens are willing to make in the interest of peace and also on their willingness to pro- test a settlement they consider to be un- just or unfair. The report proceeds to build a Peace Process Typology, distin- guishing between citizens who are will- ing and unwilling to consider changes in the political status quo in order to achieve a peace agreement, while also distinguish- ing between those willing and unwilling to protest an unfair agreement. The ty- pology is then used to explore the dynam- ics of the peace process by examining the ethnic, territorial, and partisan similari- ties and differences across the four peace types.
Given that ethnic differences loom large in explaining outlooks on peace in Sri Lanka, a second section of the report looks "Beyond Ethnicity," exploring other social and attitudinal factors that help account for different attitudes toward peace. A third section, "Within Ethnicity," goes further, exploring the dynamics that account for differences within each of the major ethnic groups that explain attitudes towards peace. A fourth section briefly discusses the me- dia usage of different sectors of the Sri Lankan population in order to assist those who would like to communicate with particular segments of the country's population. A final section provides a summary and recommendations.
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For the Sake of Peace
W
Compromise, is ar the is about essence victory by of and loss. contrast, negotia- tion. Twenty years of civil war in Sri Lanka has produced far more losses than victories and arguably has left all parties worse off than the period be- fore hostilities began. Negotiation offers opportunities to achieve a so- lution that will produce net benefits to all segments of society and to the country as a whole.
Compromise in the context of a civil war requires the willingness of
Peace Proposal
Table 1 Sri Lankan Opinions on Specific Peac
Strongly Agree %
The powers of regional governments should be increased, even if those of the government at the center have to be decreased.
20.2
The powers of some regional governments may need to be increased more than others.
8.7
The rights of local minority groups should be protected even if the majority in the area does not agree.
32.4
There should be a rotating Presidency, where the President for one term will be someone from one ethnic group, and the next term by someone from a different ethnic group.
13.8
Each ethnic group should have the right to elect a certain number of members to the Parliament.
23.6
There should be a general amnesty for people who may have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission.
7.8
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he Sake of Peace
W
r is about victory and loss. ompromise, by contrast, the essence of negotia- y years of civil war in Sri roduced far more losses s and arguably has left all e off than the period be- ies began. Negotiation tunities to achieve a so- ill produce net benefits nts of society and to the
whole.
omise in the context of a uires the willingness of
the majority to consider changes to the political status quo that will accommo- date at least some of the most pressing needs of the minority that is challeng- ing that status quo as unfair and unjust. It also requires that the minority be will- ing to compromise at least some of its demands in order to accommodate the most pressing needs of the majority. Indeed, the current peace process began in Sri Lanka with agreement on both sides to accept a cease fire and with the concession by the LTTE to explore a settlement to the conflict within a united Sri Lanka.
Table 1 ions on Specific Peace Proposals 4
Strongly
Agree Agree
Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree
Strongly Disagree % % % % %
20.2 23.5 11.6 23.6 21.0
d
8.7 9.4 14.0 31.4 36.5
ted
32.4 44.9 10.6 6.7 5.4
hnic nt
13.8 10.2 11.0 15.4 49.5
23.6 38.2 12.4 13.1 12.7
may
nt
7.8 17.6 11.4 15.8 47.3

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A. Support for Peace Proposals
To ascertain the extent of public support for changes in the political sta- tus quo that might meet at least some of the LTTE demands for greater au- tonomy, the KAP survey included a bat- tery of questions that asked citizens whether, "for the sake of peace," they would be willing to accept a wide variety of proposals for changes in the political status quo. Some of these proposals, such as the adoption of a federal system, have been explicitly discussed in Sri Lanka and are included in some form either in the proposals by the government, the LTTE, or both. Other proposals, such as am- nesty and reconciliation, while not cur- rently "on the table" in the Sri Lankan negotiations, have been successfully used in other conflicts (South Africa, North- ern Ireland) and offer insights into how far the different groups in Sri Lanka may be willing to go for the sake of peace.
Table 1 reports the percentages of citizens who Strongly Agree, Agree, are undecided (i.e., Neither Agree nor Dis- agree), Disagree, or Strongly Disagree with six proposals of varying specificity including:
* The powers of regional govern- ments should be increased, even if those of the government at the center have to be decreased.
* The powers of some regional governments may need to be increased more than others.
* The rights of local minority groups should be protected even if the majority in the area does not agree.
* There should be a rotating Presi- dency, where the President for one term will be someone from one ethnic group, and the next term someone from a dif- ferent ethnic group.
* Each ethnic group should have the right to elect a certain number of members to the Parliament.
* There should b nesty (that is, freedom prosecution) for people committed illegal pol against civilians during t as they testify in front of commission.
More than three Lankans (77%) agree on eral proposal that (unspe tees should be provided norities in an area even i did not agree. More re 12% disagree. Of cours could be interpreted by T Country Tamils as protec the overall Sinhala major and could be interpreted offering them protection majority that might contr or province in a federal s is a very weak measure of to compromise.
A substantial majo also say that, for the sak are willing to accept som portional representat ethnicity in Sri Lanka's ment. When asked, 62% agree with the statement nic group should have th certain number of mem liament," while only 26 12% are undecided. W posal, if implemented, w minority representation ment, it also would largel Sinhala majority would r tial majority of the seats albeit likely divided amo peting Sinhala political In contrast to the b on minority rights and opinions are more divide mental question of decen to regional government Whereas 44% of respond "the powers of regiona should be increased, even government at the cente creased," an equal perce and 21% do so strongly.
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* There should be a general am- nesty (that is, freedom from criminal prosecution) for people who may have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission.
More than three quarters of Sri Lankans (77%) agree on the most gen- eral proposal that (unspecified) guaran- tees should be provided to protect mi- norities in an area even if the majority did not agree. More remarkably, only 12% disagree. Of course, this question could be interpreted by Tamils and Up- Country Tamils as protecting them from the overall Sinhala majority in Sri Lanka and could be interpreted by Muslims as offering them protections from a Tamil majority that might control a local region or province in a federal system. Thus, it is a very weak measure of the willingness to compromise.
A substantial majority of citizens also say that, for the sake of peace, they are willing to accept some form of pro- portional representation based on ethnicity in Sri Lanka's national Parlia- ment. When asked, 62% of respondents agree with the statement that "each eth- nic group should have the right to elect a certain number of members to the Par- liament," while only 26% disagree and 12% are undecided. While such a pro- posal, if implemented, would guarantee minority representation in the Parlia- ment, it also would largely insure that the Sinhala majority would retain a substan- tial majority of the seats in Parliament, albeit likely divided among several com- peting Sinhala political parties.
In contrast to the broad consensus on minority rights and representation, opinions are more divided on the funda- mental question of decentralizing power to regional governments (see Table 1). Whereas 44% of respondents agree that "the powers of regional governments should be increased, even if those of the government at the center have to be de- creased," an equal percentage disagrees, and 21% do so strongly. Opposition to
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a decentralized or federal structure is even stronger when combined with the suggestion that some regional gov- ernments would be granted greater autonomy than others. Only 18% agreed with the idea known as "asym- metric federalism," whereas 68% op- pose the idea, including 37% who are strongly opposed.
There also is only a limited will- ingness among Sri Lankans to support either a Presidency that rotates among members of different ethnic groups or a general amnesty for war violence. Only 24% of respondents embrace having a "President for one term...from one ethnic group, and the next term...from a different eth- nic group." About the same percent- age endorses "freedom from criminal prosecution for people who may have committed violence during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission." In both cases the percentage opposing the change in the status quo is substan- tially larger.
Two other issues that have been discussed in the context of Sri Lankan peace negotiations are the evacuation of High Security Zones (HSZ) and the decommissioning of LTTE weap- ons, especially their heavy weapons. Typically, LTTE supporters favor evacuation of HSZs while government supporters favor the decommission-
Figure 1- Sri Lankan Opinion on De-commissioning and HSZs
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ed or federal structure is er when combined with n that some regional gov- ould be granted greater han others. Only 18% the idea known as "asym- alism," whereas 68% op- , including 37% who are osed.
lso is only a limited will- ng Sri Lankans to support dency that rotates among different ethnic groups or nesty for war violence. of respondents embrace "President for one one ethnic group, and ...from a different eth- About the same percent- "freedom from criminal for people who may have violence during the war, ey testify in front of an e commission." In both ercentage opposing the e status quo is substan-
her issues that have been the context of Sri Lankan ations are the evacuation urity Zones (HSZ) and issioning of LTTE weap- lly their heavy weapons. TTE supporters favor f HSZs while government avor the decommission-
inion on d HSZs
ing of LTTE weapons. While these two proposals are not necessarily linked to one another in negotiations, it is instruc- tive to consider the tradeoff between them as an indication of the willingness to compromise. Evacuating HSZs and decommissioning LTTE weapons are both highly contentious issues that pro- vide a stern test of the willingness of citi- zens to consider difficult tradeoffs.
Before asking about support for these proposals, the KAP survey asked whether respondents had heard of High Security Zones. In fact, more than a third of Sri Lankans say they have not. Of the 61% who have heard of HSZs, the great majority thinks they are im- portant for national security and should be maintained indefinitely (see Figure 1). This compares to 29% who think that they should be evacuated after conclu- sion of a final peace treaty. Only 4% think they should be evacuated now, before the negotiations begin, and an equal percentage think that they should be evacuated "in the course of the peace negotiations."
To test Sri Lankans' receptivity to compromise, we asked these same citi- zens whether LTTE heavy weapons should be placed under control of an international commission in exchange for the evacuation of HSZs. Overall, 30% of those who have heard of HSZs explicitly embrace a compromise in which LTTE weapons are decommis- sioned "at the same time the govern- ment is forced to evacuate the HSZs." More than twice as many citizens (66%) argue, however, that the LTTE should decommission now, without an immediate quid pro quo, while 4% oppose decommissioning under any circumstances (see Figure 1).
The spirit of compromise, how- ever, is somewhat broader than this suggests. Of the 66% of citizens who insist that the LTTE decommission now, 28% would support the evacu- ation of HSZs after a final peace agreement is signed, and another 2% would be willing to support evacuation of the HSZs sometime

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while negotiations were in progress. Overall, 47% of respondents are 'hardliners,' insisting on the evacuation of HSZs or the immediate decommis- sioning of the LTTE without any con- cessions in return. A slim majority of citizens, however, are willing to counte- nance some form of tradeoff involving HSZs and decommissioning depending on the timing.
Although many citizens who sup- port one of the peace proposals also tend to support one or more additional pro- posals, there nevertheless is substantial variation in support for different propos- als. Many respondents who support fed- eralism oppose asymmetric federalism, and many who support amnesty and rec- onciliation oppose a rotating presidency. Figure 2 reports the percentage of Sri Lankans who favor none, one or more than one of the six proposals.
Overall, 17% of Sri Lankans reject all six peace proposals compared to more than 35% who embrace at least half of the six. 23% of citizens embrace at least one proposal while another quarter em- braces two proposals. While Sri Lankans clearly have yet to forge anything resem- bling a consensus on what, specifically, they are willing to do for peace, it is equally clear that virtually everyone is willing to do something and a great many are willing to do quite a lot. Many also are willing to countenance hard compro- mises at least under some conditions. At minimum this is a first and necessary condition for serious bargaining.
B. Protesting Unfair Peace Proposals
In addition to understanding Sri Lankans' willingness to compromise on issues related to the peace negotiations, it is equally important to understand the extent to which they are willing to fight for what they think is right and fair. The question is not simply whether they would revert to armed conflict to abort a peace agreement that they do not sup- port, but more broadly whether they would actively protest such an agreement.
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To understand the individuals are prepared t agreement they perceive spondents were asked to a with two additional state
* "If there is a pea Sri Lanka that I think is u ticipate in a protest again
* "If there is a pea Sri Lanka that I think is u an organization that is o
As Figure 3 illustra jority of respondents ind would mobilize against an they perceived to be unfai of Sri Lankans "Stron
%
Figure 2 - Sri L
P
50
40
30
20
17
10
0
None At
Figure 3 - Sri L U

To understand the extent to which individuals are prepared to protest a peace agreement they perceive to be unfair, re- spondents were asked to agree or disagree with two additional statements:
* "If there is a peace agreement in Sri Lanka that I think is unfair, I will par- ticipate in a protest against it;" and
* "If there is a peace agreement in Sri Lanka that I think is unfair, I will join an organization that is opposed to it."
As Figure 3 illustrates, a slight ma- jority of respondents indicate that they would mobilize against an agreement that they perceived to be unfair. Overall, 58% of Sri Lankans "Strongly Agree" or
Figure 2 - Sri Lankan Support for Multiple Peace Proposals
50
40
30
23
25
20
17
17
10 10
6
3
0
None At least
Tw o Three Four Five All Six one
Figure 3 - Sri Lankan Protest Potential of an Unfair Agreement
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"Agree" that they would participate in a protest against an unfair agree- ment, while only 29% indicate that they would not. A slightly smaller number of citizens (51%) also say they would join an organization opposing an agreement that they considered unfair, which compares to only 33% of citizens who say they would do nothing and simply live with what- ever agreement results.
Taken together, these results in- dicate that, although there is a strong desire among the people of Sri Lanka for an end to the civil war, significant divisions remain regarding the details of a final peace agreement. Moreover, a clear majority of Sri Lankans is pre- pared to protest any agreement they consider to be unfair.
C.Peace Agreement Activists and Opponents
To understand the dynamics un- derlying Sri Lankan attitudes toward the peace process, a peace process ty- pology was constructed based on the combination of respondents' support for various peace proposals and their willingness to protest a peace agree- ment that they consider unfair. The
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t they would participate against an unfair agree- only 29% indicate that not. A slightly smaller tizens (51%) also say they n organization opposing nt that they considered h compares to only 33% ho say they would do simply live with what- ent results. together, these results in- lthough there is a strong g the people of Sri Lanka the civil war, significant ain regarding the details ce agreement. Moreover, rity of Sri Lankans is pre- test any agreement they be unfair.
reement Activists and
erstand the dynamics un- Lankan attitudes toward ocess, a peace process ty- onstructed based on the of respondents' support eace proposals and their to protest a peace agree- ey consider unfair. The
combination of support for various peace proposals and the willingness to protest an unjust agreement can help identify those individuals and groups most likely to fight for and against changes in the status quo that negotia- tors might consider for the sake of peace. In creating the typology, peace pro- cess supporters are identified as those citizens who support at least two of the five most specific peace proposals that were presented broadly to all citizens. These included the questions on feder- alism, asymmetric federalism, amnesty, a rotating presidency and proportional ethnic representation. They exclude the generic question about protecting the rights of ethnic minorities and the ques- tions about decommissioning and HSZs, since these questions were not asked of the entire sample. Peace pro- cess opponents, in contrast, are those supporting only one of the five propos- als or none at all. Similarly, peace pro- cess activists are identified as any citi- zens who indicated a willingness to pro- test an unfair peace proposal either in- dividually or as part of a group. Peace process passives are those who say they are not likely to protest an unfair agree- ment. By comparing active and passive citizens with supporters and opponents of the peace proposals, four distinct cat- egories are produced as indicated in Table 2.
Peace process oppo- nents, in contrast, are those supporting only one of the five proposals or none at all. Similarly, peace process activists are identified as any citizens who indicated a willing- ness to protest an unfair peace proposal either in- dividually or as part of a group. Peace process passives are those who say they are not likely to pro- test an unfair agreement. By comparing active and passive citizens with sup- porters and opponents of the peace proposals, four distinct categories are produced as indicated in

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Table 2.
Activist Supporters of a peace agree- ment are those who favor at least two of the five peace proposals discussed above and who indicate a willingness to pro- test an unfair agreement. As observed in Figure 4, Activist Supporters constitute slightly more than one quarter (27%) of the Sri Lankan public. Importantly, the average member of this group supports only three of the five proposals. While they favor changes in the status quo as part of the peace process and are willing to protest an agreement they perceive as unfair, the changes they support are lim- ited in number and tend to be the more moderate changes (i.e., federalism and proportional ethnic rep- resentation rather than a rotating presi- dency or asymmetric federalism).
Activist Opponents of the peace agreement are the polar opposites of the Activist Supporters. These are citizens who oppose nearly all of the peace pro- posals and indicate a willingness to pro- test an unfair agreement. Almost as many as the Activist Supporters, Activist Op- ponents constitute 25% of all Sri Lankan citizens. Members of this group take a rather hard line toward the peace pro- cess, supporting almost none of the pro- posals in the index, and indicating a clear willingness to protest any agreement that they perceive as inequitable.
Passive Supporters of a peace agree- ment also favor at least two peace pro- posals but are not willing to protest an unfair agreement either individually or collectively. Overall this is the smallest of the four groups with only 21% of citi- zens. The average Passive Supporter also supports only three of five proposals, typically the more moderate ones.
Passive Opponents of the peace agreement complete the typology and are equal in number to Activist Supporters with 28% of citizens. Members of this group support none or at most one of the peace proposals but express little will- ingness to protest a peace agreement they consider unfair. Although the average member of this group does not support any of the five proposals, their apparent willingness to accept almost any result without protest suggests that they are unlikely to be major obstacles to peace.
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The relatively equal citizens across the four p firms that there is subst ment among Sri Lankan peace process. Citizens garding how far they are promise for the sake of ready they are to fight agreement that they con fair. At the same time, ho sults provide ample reaso about the prospects for pu of a compromise peace ag citizens in Sri Lanka are at least some concession a substantial minority is substantial compromis among the majority of c pose most peace propos minority do not feel st about the matter to prote ment that goes further t prefer. Only a minority o 25% overall, oppose mos als and are willing to pr ment that goes too three-quarters of Sri La multiple proposals or
Figure 5-
Figure 4

The relatively equal distribution of citizens across the four peace types con- firms that there is substantial disagree- ment among Sri Lankans regarding the peace process. Citizens are divided re- garding how far they are willing to com- promise for the sake of peace and how ready they are to fight against a peace agreement that they consider to be un- fair. At the same time, however, these re- sults provide ample reason for optimism about the prospects for public acceptance of a compromise peace agreement. Most citizens in Sri Lanka are willing to make at least some concessions for peace, and a substantial minority is willing to make substantial compromises. Moreover, among the majority of citizens who op- pose most peace proposals, a very large minority do not feel strongly enough about the matter to protest a peace agree- ment that goes further than they would prefer. Only a minority of citizens, about 25% overall, oppose most peace propos- als and are willing to protest an agree- ment that goes too far. Nearly three-quarters of Sri Lankans support multiple proposals or are willing to
Figure 5- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Ethnicity
Figure 4 - Sri Lankan Peace Types
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There also is significant opposition in the Western province, although not to the extent that is present in the North-Central province.
Figure 6- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Prov
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accept them without protest. At mini- mum, this provides peace negotiators significant space for maneuver and compromise.
D. Ethnicity, Region and Political Parties
Analysis of the differences in support for the peace process logically begins with ethnicity. Ethnic divi- sions have divided Sri Lankan society for centuries and provided the pri- mary impetus for the decades-long civil war. It is not surprising in this context that Sri Lanka's principal eth- nic groups hold fundamentally differ- ent perspectives on the peace process. Among Sri Lanka's ethnic minorities, for example, there is near universal support for the peace proposals, with 96% of Tamils, 89% of Up-Country Tamils and 90% of Muslims express- ing support for two or more of the five proposals (see Figure 5). More- over, those who support the peace proposals in these communities have strong feelings about the process and express a clear willingness to protest any agreement they do not think is fair. In all, 67% of Tamils and of Up- Country Tamils and 64% of Muslims are Activist Supporters of the peace process proposals. Most of the rest are Passive Supporters, who may not ac- tively protest an unfair agreement, but certainly add to the moral force in support of the proposals in the peace index. Predictably, there is much less

support without protest. At mini-
within the Sinhala community rovides peace negotiators
for any of the proposals advanced for the pace for maneuver and
sake of peace. A substantial majority .
(64%) of Sinhala opposes virtually all of the peace proposals, and a majority of the opponents are prepared to pro- y, Region and Political
test any agreement considered unfair. The more interesting and surprising finding, however, is the considerable di- is of the differences in
versity within the Sinhala community. he peace process logically
More than a third of all Sinhala support ethnicity. Ethnic divi-
a majority of the five peace proposals and ivided Sri Lankan society
about half of the supporters are prepared s and provided the pri-
to protest an unfair agreement. As a re- us for the decades-long
sult only 32% of all Sinhala are Activist is not surprising in this
Opponents of the peace proposals. The Sri Lanka's principal eth-
rest either support the peace process or old fundamentally differ-
are Passive Opponents (37%), whose op- ives on the peace process.
position cannot easily be mobilized anka's ethnic minorities,
against a final agreement. , there is near universal
Given the uneven distribution of the peace proposals, with
ethnic groups across different regions of ils, 89% of Up-Country
Sri Lanka, reactions to the peace pro- 0% of Muslims express-
cess are likely to vary in different parts for two or more of the
of the country as well. In this regard, ls (see Figure 5). More-
the conventional wisdom holds that who support the peace
opposition to a peace agreement is con- these communities have
centrated in traditional Sinhala strong- gs about the process and
holds, especially toward the southern end ar willingness to protest
of the island. While the evidence from nt they do not think is
the KAP survey in Figure 6 confirms the 7% of Tamils and of Up-
existence of substantial geographical dif- ils and 64% of Muslims
ferences in support for peace, it calls into Supporters of the peace
question the assumption that opposition osals. Most of the rest are
to concessions in the interest of peace is orters, who may not ac-
concentrated in the south. an unfair agreement, but
While there clearly are substantial d to the moral force in
numbers of Activist Opponents in the he proposals in the peace
south, Activist Opponents are even more ctably, there is much less
heavily concentrated in the North-Cen- tral and
Peace Types by Provinces
North-West regions. When com- bined with Passive Op- ponents, al- most three fourths of re- spondents in the North Central prov- ince are op- posed to the current set of proposals. There also is significant op- position in the Western prov- ince, although

Page 20
not to the extent that is present in the North-Central province. In the other areas of the country that have a Sinhala majority, active opposition to the peace proposals is substantial but not sig- nificantly greater than in the country as a whole2.
Predictably, Activist Supporters of the peace proposals are heavily concen- trated in the Northern and, to a lesser extent, in the Eastern provinces. Fully 66% of the population in the north and 50% in the east favor the peace propos- als and are prepared to protest an unfair agreement. In the north, there is virtu- ally no opposition to the peace propos- als; those few who are not Activist Sup- porters are Passive Supporters. In the east, about one third of the population (32%) are opposed to the proposals, but less than half of these are prepared to mobilize against an unfair agreement.
Given that the search for a resolu- tion to ethnic conflict has played such an important role in the political life of the country and has been a principal is- sue dividing government and opposition for many years up to the present day, it is instructive to consider the different out- looks on the peace process of citizens who identify themselves with one of the prin- cipal parties4.
Predictably, Activist Supporters of the peace proposals dominate the minor- ity parties representing Tamil, Up-Coun- try Tamil and Muslim interests. As illus- trated in Figure 7, virtually everyone who identifies with the Tamil United Libera- tion Front (TULF) favors the majority of the five proposals and most of these
Figure 7- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Partisanship
100%
UNP SLFP SLMC TULF CWC JVP Other
Activist Supporter Passive Supporter Passive Opponent Activist Opponent
0
0%
0 3
24
8
0 25
37
37
21
20
12
80%
60%
40%
20%
31
21
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are prepared to protest an sidered to be unfair. Supp proposals also is extreme respondents identifyin Lanka Muslim Congres great majority of whom strongly about this issue mobilize against an unfa
Opposition to the is highest among those i the Janatha Vimukthi P and the Sri Lanka Freedom Almost half of JVP ident 40% of the SLFP identif Opponents. Neverthele prising diversity in these ing even the JVP, whose a staunch opponent of a on peace. In fact, there stituency for the peace p both the JVP and SLFP. A ter of those identifying parties are Activist Suppor proposals and about 15% porters. When combine than 20% of party mem posed the peace agreeme inclined to protest, it a potential constituency in peace agreement is muc conventional wisdom h government worries abo of "selling" a peace agre own supporters appear f data to be exaggerated.
Among people wh the United National Party majority actually favors m proposals, and Activist S the largest group with 31 Although there also is a su (25 Op the tha
6
gov
14
27
33
47
por a p or pro 22
23 78
73
58
29
me the en 9
lati
23 20
ver pea lic beh see

are prepared to protest an agreement con- sidered to be unfair. Support for the peace proposals also is extremely high among respondents identifying with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the great majority of whom feel sufficiently strongly about this issue to be ready to mobilize against an unfair agreement.
Opposition to the peace proposals is highest among those identifying with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Almost half of JVP identifiers and nearly 40% of the SLFP identifiers are Activist Opponents. Nevertheless, there is sur- prising diversity in these parties includ- ing even the JVP, whose reputation is as a staunch opponent of any concessions on peace. In fact, there is a sizable con- stituency for the peace proposals within both the JVP and SLFP. About one quar- ter of those identifying with these two parties are Activist Supporters of the peace proposals and about 15% are Passive Sup- porters. When combined with the more than 20% of party members who op- posed the peace agreements but are dis- inclined to protest, it appears that the potential constituency in opposition to a peace agreement is much less than the conventional wisdom holds. Similarly, government worries about the difficulty of "selling" a peace agreement to their own supporters appear from the survey data to be exaggerated.
Among people who identify with the United National Party (UNP), a slight majority actually favors most of the peace proposals, and Activist Supporters form the largest group with 31% of the total. Although there also is a substantial group
ce Types
(25%) of Activist Opponents within the UNP, the fact that 75% of the government's sup- porters either favor
47
37
a peace agreement or are unlikely to protest an agree-
23
29
ment means that the government enjoys far more 9
12
latitude to maneu-
23 20
ver in the search for peace than its pub-
JVP Other
lic statements and behavior to date Activist Opponent
seem to indicate.
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Beyond Ethnicity
T
he strength and persistence of ethnic cleavages in Sri Lanka are undeniable. There is no doubting that ethnic divisions domi- nate all others nationwide or that par- tisan political differences further di- vide the Sinhala majority. Neverthe- less, the results reported above pro- vide some surprising evidence that contradicts prevailing stereotypes
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T

d Ethnicity
T
rength and persistence of ic cleavages in Sri Lanka ndeniable. There is no at ethnic divisions domi- rs nationwide or that par- al differences further di- hala majority. Neverthe- ults reported above pro- urprising evidence that prevailing stereotypes
both about the size and rigidity of eth- nic, territorial and partisan differences in attitudes toward peace, and about the willingness of different groups to con- sider changes in the political status quo for the sake of peace. Thus, to under- stand the prospects for negotiating a just and lasting peace, it is necessary to go beyond ethnicity and consider, more generally, who supports and opposes a
Table 4

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compromise settlement. Several broad sets of explanations or hypotheses are considered:
A. Support for peace is a function of demographic factors including gender, age, education, and urban/rural resi- dence.
B. Support for peace is a function of the intensity of an individual's ethnic identity and of the extent of his or her contact with other ethnic groups.
C. Support for peace is a function of an individual's political values, includ- ing attitudes toward democracy.
D. Support for peace is a function of the extent of an individual's engage- ment in politics and civil society, includ- ing the peace process.
E. Support for peace is a function of support for the Government, includ- ing trust in government institutions and assessments of its political and economic performance.
F. Support for peace is a function of the benefits expected from peace.
A. Demographics
The search for explanations, beyond ethnicity, of differences in attitudes to- wards the peace process begins with de- mographic differences (see Table 3). Differences in age, sex, education, in- come and urban v. rural residence fre- quently expose individuals to different life experiences that can influence values and behavior in important ways, either by reinforcing or diminishing the social- izing effects of ethnicity.
Contrary to some expectations that women are more committed to peace than men, Sri Lankan men and women express almost identical support for the various proposals advanced for the sake of peace. Overall 47% of both women and men support two or more of the peace proposals. Where men and women
differ, however, is with r greater willingness to p agreement with which th 57% of men compared women are potential pr men are more likely to b Opponents and Activist peace, while women are be Passive Opponents an
There is greater evid fluences attitudes toward 57% of Sri Lankans und years support multiple p this figure falls significan 26-35 year olds, 46% for and 41% for 46-55 year eling off in later years younger citizens are sig likely to protest against a they consider unfair. As year olds are almost twice over 45 years old (37% Peace Activists, while ol much more likely to be nents.
Education's effects tudes are more muted. C the finding that younger c prepared to protest for a p that is fair, those with gre qualifications also expres potential. Differences peace do not vary syste education level, however
To the extent that end to the civil war requ changes in the political not surprising that tho most from the status quo most determined not to sions. Consistent with th a strong but negative relat income and support for posals. Overall, those ea much less likely to sup much more likely to ind ness to protest an agreem unfair. For example, am ing less than Rs1000 pe are Activist Supporters o posals while only 17% a ponents. The percentag
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differ, however, is with regard to men's greater willingness to protest a peace agreement with which they do not agree: 57% of men compared to only 47% of women are potential protesters. Thus, men are more likely to be both Activist Opponents and Activist Supporters of peace, while women are more likely to be Passive Opponents and Supporters.
There is greater evidence that age in- fluences attitudes toward peace. Whereas 57% of Sri Lankans under the age of 26 years support multiple peace proposals, this figure falls significantly to 47% for 26-35 year olds, 46% for 36-45 year olds, and 41% for 46-55 year olds before lev- eling off in later years. Conversely, younger citizens are significantly more likely to protest against a peace proposal they consider unfair. As a result, 15-25 year olds are almost twice as likely as those over 45 years old (37% vs. 21%) to be Peace Activists, while older citizens are much more likely to be Passive Oppo- nents.
Education's effects on peace atti- tudes are more muted. Consistent with the finding that younger citizens are more prepared to protest for a peace agreement that is fair, those with greater educational qualifications also express greater protest potential. Differences in support for peace do not vary systematically with education level, however.
To the extent that negotiating an end to the civil war requires significant changes in the political status quo, it is not surprising that those who benefit most from the status quo are among the most determined not to make conces- sions. Consistent with this view, there is a strong but negative relationship between income and support for the peace pro- posals. Overall, those earning more are much less likely to support peace and much more likely to indicate a willing- ness to protest an agreement considered unfair. For example, among those earn- ing less than Rs1000 per month, 34% are Activist Supporters of the peace pro- posals while only 17% are Activist Op- ponents. The percentage of supporters
Contrary to some expectations that women are more committed to peace than men, Sri Lankan men and women express almost identical support for the various proposals advanced for the sake of peace.
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declines and the percentage of oppo- nents rises steadily up to the income level Rs 7-10,000. At that level only 22% are Activist Supporters whereas 30% are Activist Opponents of the peace proposals. Interestingly, this pattern does not hold among the very wealthiest, those earning more than Rs10,000 per month. Among this relatively small group of individuals, Activist Supporters (24%) and Op- ponents (23%) are in rough balance.
Finally, the evidence also indi- cates that the minority of citizens who live in the largest cities in Sri Lanka are substantially more sympathetic towards the peace proposals than those living in more rural areas. Thus, 54% of rural residents oppose all but one of the peace proposals compared to only 45% of urban residents. Sur- prisingly, rural residents are slightly more willing to protest in support of their views which means that signifi- cantly more are Activist Opponents of peace.
B. Ethnic Interaction and Identity
There are conflicting ideas about the relationship between ethnic inter- action and ethnic conflict. One per-
Figure 8- Sri Lankan Id
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
Weak
Activist Supporter Passive Supporte
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24
0%
28
28
20

the percentage of oppo- teadily up to the income ,000. At that level only ivist Supporters whereas tivist Opponents of the sals. Interestingly, this not hold among the very hose earning more than er month. Among this all group of individuals, porters (24%) and Op- %) are in rough balance.
, the evidence also indi- minority of citizens who rgest cities in Sri Lanka tially more sympathetic peace proposals than n more rural areas. Thus, l residents oppose all but eace proposals compared of urban residents. Sur- ral residents are slightly to protest in support of hich means that signifi- are Activist Opponents
teraction and Identity
re conflicting ideas about hip between ethnic inter- thnic conflict. One per-
Figure 8- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Ethnic Identity
22 24 27
28
27
28
20
Weak Moderate Strong
Passive Supporter Passive Opponent Activist Opponent
spective argues that greater interaction among different ethnic groups reduces stereotypes, increases understanding and empathy, and reduces ethnic tensions and conflict. Another perspective argues exactly the reverse: that higher levels of ethnic interaction create more opportu- nities for conflict, increase friction, and reinforce mutual fears simply by virtue of the proximity of the other group.
To assess the impact of ethnic iden- tification on peace attitudes, respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following three statements:
* Whatever happens to my eth- nic group in Sri Lanka will affect my life.
* My children should only marry a member of the same ethnic group.
* People often treat me differently because of my ethnicity.
An index was constructed from the results, dividing Sri Lankans into three equal categories based on the strength of their ethnic identities. Overall, those who most strongly embrace their ethnic identity are most supportive of the peace proposals but they also are the most likely to protest a peace agreement considered unfair (see Figure 8). Thus,
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20
33
15
28

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33% of the strongest ethnic identifiers are Activist Supporters compared to only 20% of the weakest identifiers. This re- lationship is asymmetric, however. Among peace proposal opponents there is no relationship between ethnic iden- tity and the propensity to protest.
Respondents also were asked about their experiences with various types of discrimination based on ethnicity, reli- gion and political party affiliation. In- terestingly, only 7% of Sri Lankans say they have ever been treated unfairly in education, employment or in dealing with the police because of ethnicity. This compares with 3% who say they have been treated unfairly because of religion but 21% who report unfair treatment based on party allegiance. These figures are a bit misleading, however, because they disguise the fact than only 2% of Sinhala respondents report unfair treat- ment compared to approximately 30% of Tamils and Up-Country Tamils and 20% of Muslims. Of those reporting unfair treatment by ethnicity, however, the overwhelming percentage (88%) sup- ports the peace proposals, and 57% are Activist Supporters. Among those re- porting unfair treatment for any reason, 51% support the peace proposals and 34% are Activist Supporters (see Figure 9).
Figure 9- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Unf
Treatment for Any Reason
To measure ethnic i questions were asked:
* How often do contact with people fro groups: daily, weekly, mo never?
* About how man are members of other many, some, few, none?
Overall, about 40% report that they do not h among other ethnic gro pares to 16% who say t and 13% who say they ha larly, about 30% of citizen have contact with memb nic groups, while 39% say contact. Again, an ind measuring the extent of su The relationship b interactions and attitude is complex. The eviden Figure 10 confirms tha with the strongest and f actions are far and away th supportive of peace, as 62 support peace and 39% a porters. As interaction de centage of peace support ist peace supporters drop Among those with moder about 44% to 51% sup well over half are activi
100%
25
28 80%
60%
30 21
40%
22
17
20%
34 24
0%
Not Treated Unfairly Treated Unfa
Activist Supporter Passive Supporter Passive Opponent
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To measure ethnic interaction, two questions were asked:
* How often do you come into contact with people from other ethnic groups: daily, weekly, monthly, yearly or never?
* About how many of your friends are members of other ethnic groups: many, some, few, none?
Overall, about 40% of Sri Lankans report that they do not have any friends among other ethnic groups. This com- pares to 16% who say they have many, and 13% who say they have some. Simi- larly, about 30% of citizens say they never have contact with members of other eth- nic groups, while 39% say they have daily contact. Again, an index was created measuring the extent of such interactions. The relationship between ethnic interactions and attitudes toward peace is complex. The evidence presented in Figure 10 confirms that those citizens with the strongest and friendliest inter- actions are far and away the most strongly supportive of peace, as 62% of this group support peace and 39% are Activist Sup- porters. As interaction decreases, the per- centage of peace supporters and of activ- ist peace supporters drops precipitously. Among those with moderate interactions, about 44% to 51% support peace and well over half are activists. But among
n Peace Types by Unfair for Any Reason
28
21
17
34
Treated Unfairly
Passive Opponent Activist Opponent
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those with only occasional interac- tions, only 36% support peace and only 19% are Activist Supporters compared to 64% who oppose the peace proposals and 40% who are Activist Opponents. Importantly, however, those who report no inter- actions with other ethnic groups at all are relatively open to making compro- mises for peace: 48% support the peace proposals, and only 36% of sup- porters or opponents care sufficiently to protest an unfair peace agreement. On balance, it appears that a lot of interaction increases the willingness to
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Figure 10- Sri Lankan
Intera
100%
16
80%
40
38 60%
24
40%
26
17 20%
20
0%
None Occasional
Activist Supporter Passiv
Figure 11- Sri Lan Democ
Replace democracy with strong leader 28%
Not perfect, bu othe
28%
19

compromise only occasional interac-
for peace across ethnic 36% support peace and
groups, but a little bit of contact is worse are Activist Supporters
than none at all. o 64% who oppose the sals and 40% who are ponents. Importantly,
C.Tolerance and Democratic ose who report no inter-
Values other ethnic groups at all open to making compro-
The evidence that democratic na- eace: 48% support the
tions rarely go to war against one an- als, and only 36% of sup-
other has led to a widespread belief that ponents care sufficiently
democratic values and principles are in- unfair peace agreement.
imical to war, whether international or , it appears that a lot of
civil. Although there is solid support ncreases the willingness to
for democratic government among the
igure 10- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Ethnic
Interaction
19
15
Occasional Moderate Moderate-High Very High
ctivist Supporter Passive Supporter Passive Opponent Activist Opponent
Democracy always best 44%
Not perfect, but better than others 28%
27
17
27 40
21
29
22
24
23
18
18
26
33
39
Figure 11- Sri Lankan Support for Democracy
ith

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Sinhala public, support for some of the fundamental principles underlying de- mocracy is more tenuous. Regarding democracy per se, 44% of citizens say democracy is always the best form of gov- ernment and another 28% say it is not perfect but is better than any other sys- tem. Another 28% are not quite so sure, and say that sometimes a strong leader must replace democracy. Nevertheless, there is little evidence in Sri Lanka that attitudes toward democracy have much bearing on overall support for peace. Those who think democracy is always best are not significantly different from other citizens in their support for the peace proposals or in their willingness to protest.
Regarding more specific democratic values, 85% agree that the media in Sri Lanka should be completely free to criti- cize the government as they wish, while only 8% disagree (see Table 3). In con- trast, 61% believe that "people should
Table 4
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not have to obey laws w sider unjust," and 88% sa ter to live in an orderly allow people so much fre can become disruptive." there is not evidence that upon support for peace ness to protest.
Political Tolerance moderately high. More p disagree (44% vs. 39% should tolerate political fundamentally different fr opinion. Similarly, mo person who wants to do tions and let the military try should be allowed to in their community (47% the results are somewhat m these questions do not m any specific group, but p in the abstract. When refe specific, support for free considerably. Only 28% son "who believes that [m is inferior ... should

not have to obey laws which they con- sider unjust," and 88% say that "it is bet- ter to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disruptive." Again, however, there is not evidence that these values bear upon support for peace or the willing- ness to protest.
Political Tolerance in Sri Lanka is moderately high. More people agree than disagree (44% vs. 39%) that society should tolerate political views that are fundamentally different from mainstream opinion. Similarly, more agree that a person who wants to do away with elec- tions and let the military run the coun- try should be allowed to make a speech in their community (47% vs. 41%). Yet the results are somewhat mixed given that these questions do not make reference to any specific group, but pertain to groups in the abstract. When references are more specific, support for free speech declines considerably. Only 28% say that a per- son "who believes that [my] ethnic group is inferior ... should be allowed to
Political tolerance in Sri Lanka is moderately high.
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organize a peaceful demonstration..” In addition, 51% believe that "a person who opposes all forms of reli- gion should not be allowed to make a speech in the community." Interest- ingly, however, higher levels of toler- ance are not associated with greater support for the peace agreements. The relationship is weak, but indicates that less tolerant people are slightly more favorable towards peace. How- ever, as might be expected, more tol- erant attitudes are associated with greater passivity and a willingness to accept even an unfair peace agreement without protest.
D. Political and Civic Engagement
Democracy works best when there is a relatively high level of demo- cratic citizenship, including substan- tial levels of political interest, knowl- edge and participation. Political en- gagement not only is important for insuring that the democratic process works well, but also has numerous benefits for the individual citizen. Higher levels of participation increase individuals' political tolerance, reduce their propensity for political violence, and contribute to a stronger sense of commitment and belonging to the
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Figure 12- Sri in P
A
No interest at all 27%
Very little interest 24%

eaceful demonstration..” ition, 51% believe that "a opposes all forms of reli- not be allowed to make a e community." Interest- er, higher levels of toler- t associated with greater the peace agreements. ship is weak, but indicates erant people are slightly ble towards peace. How- t be expected, more tol- des are associated with vity and a willingness to n unfair peace agreement test.
and Civic t
cracy works best when tively high level of demo- ship, including substan- political interest, knowl- rticipation. Political en- ot only is important for t the democratic process but also has numerous the individual citizen. s of participation increase political tolerance, reduce sity for political violence, ute to a stronger sense of t and belonging to the
Figure 12- Sri Lankan Interest in Politics
A great deal of interest
o interest at
9%
all 27%
Some interest 40%
Very little interest 24%
political system, all of which should con- tribute to support for domestic peace.
While students of democracy have long appreciated the importance of po- litical engagement, attention recently has focused more broadly on civic engage- ment. Citizens who are more active in a whole range of social institutions includ- ing religious organizations, unions, pro- fessional associations, and fraternal or- ganizations typically acquire higher lev- els of social capital. This contributes to greater social trust and a greater willing- ness to cooperate with others, both of which are important assets in negotiat- ing peace.
Regarding levels of political in- volvement, only about 10% of Sri Lankans say they have a great deal of interest in politics, although about half say they have at least some interest. By comparison, about 25% say they have very little interest in politics and another quarter say none at all (see Figure 12). Importantly, as is evident in Figure 13, support for peace is strongly related to level of political interest. Nearly 60% of citizens with the most political inter- est are peace supporters, including more than 40% who are Activist Supporters. In contrast, among those with the least interest in politics, approximately 60% oppose the peace proposals, and nearly 25% are Activist Opponents.

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The pattern is not repeated for po- litical participation, however. Overall, about 85% of all respondents claim that they voted in the last national elections, a figure substantially higher than the ac- tual rate. Of those who voted, however, only 45% are peace supporters. Simi- larly when other political activities are considered (including discussing politics, working for a party or political campaign, contacting an elected official, or partici-
Figure 13- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Political Interest
Some interest Very little interest
Activist Supporter Passive Supporter Passive Opponent
Figure 14- Sri Lankan Peace Types by Political Participation
100%
15
80%
23 25
0%
Very Low (or none)
20
24
30
60%
34
32
35
22
40%
29
17
23
25
17
20%
32
Low Moderate High V
Activist Supporter Passive Supporter Passive Opponent Activ
100%
80%
30
28 27
60%
12
21
0%
A great deal of interest
33 17
40%
19
22
20%
41
31
19
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pating in a neighborhoo who are more active in p are modestly more likely peace proposals. Impor those more likely to par tics are much more likel and to protest a peace consider unfair. Indeed, of the most politically ac prepared to protest an un ment compared to only 3

kan Peace Types by al Interest
kan Peace Types by articipation
pating in a neighborhood group), those who are more active in politics, overall, are modestly more likely to oppose the peace proposals. Importantly, however, those more likely to participate in poli- tics are much more likely to be activists and to protest a peace agreement they consider unfair. Indeed, fully two-thirds of the most politically active citizens are prepared to protest an unfair peace agree- ment compared to only 37% of the least
18 27
Very little interest No interest at all
Passive Opponent Activist Opponent
32
28
40 33
22
22
19 21
30
40
22
16
17
17
High Very High
ssive Opponent Activist Opponent
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Figure 15- Sri Lankan Knowledge of the Peace Process
Figure 16 - Sri Lankan Peace Types by Knowledge of the Peace Process
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
Not informed Somew hat informed Very informed
Activist Supporter Passive Supporter Passive Opponent Activist Opponent
active citizens (see Figure 14).
A very similar pattern can be ob- served with regard to political knowl- edge, which appears to be relatively high in Sri Lanka. Indeed, when asked to identify the number of seats in parliament, the largest party in par- liament and the term-length for mem- bers of parliament, fully one-third of all citizens answer at least two of the questions correctly, and more than three quarters answer at least one of them correctly. Predictably, those with higher levels of political knowl- edge are much more likely to be po- litical activists: 58% of those who answer two or more of the questions correctly are prepared to protest an unfair peace agreement, compared to only 38% of those who cannot an- swer any of the questions. Impor- tantly, however, there is little or no
Very informed 5%
Not informed 35%
Somew hat informed 60%
17
24
28
38
0%
27
23
6
15
22
19
51 31
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s (see Figure 14). similar pattern can be ob- egard to political knowl- appears to be relatively Lanka. Indeed, when ntify the number of seats t, the largest party in par- the term-length for mem- ament, fully one-third of nswer at least two of the rrectly, and more than rs answer at least one of tly. Predictably, those levels of political knowl- ch more likely to be po- sts: 58% of those who or more of the questions prepared to protest an agreement, compared to f those who cannot an- the questions. Impor- ver, there is little or no
nowledge of ess
Somew hat informed 60%
ace Types by e Process
28
6
15
51
ery informed
Activist Opponent
relationship between general political knowledge and support for the peace proposals.
In contrast, Sri Lankans say they are much less informed about the peace pro- cess, and this appears to matter a great deal. When asked how informed they felt about the peace process, only 5% said that they were very informed, 60% said they were somewhat informed, and fully a third said they were not informed (see Figure 15). Of the tiny minority who are very informed, more than two-thirds support multiple peace proposals and more than 50% are Activist Supporters. Among those having no knowledge about the peace negotiations, 64% op- pose virtually all of the proposals (see Figure 16). Knowledge about the peace process is among the strongest predic- tors in the survey of Sri Lankans' atti- tudes toward peace.
While political engagement has important effects on peace attitudes, the effects of civic engagement are more muted. For example, most Sri Lankans report that they belong to at least one civic group and a third belong to mul- tiple groups. While group membership appears to have predictable effects on political activism, it does not appear to influence support for peace. Those be- longing to multiple groups are much more likely to be willing to protest an unfair peace agreement, but they are about equally divided in their support and opposition to multiple peace pro- posals.
With regard to social trust, about a quarter of Sri Lankans indicate that they think most citizens can be trusted to treat you fairly, although three fourths say that you have to be very careful when deal- ing with most Sri Lankans. Given that social trust is so low, it is probably reas- suring for the peace process that social trust does not appear to be significantly related to support for the peace propos- als. Predictably, those most trusting of others are significantly more likely to accept a peace agreement, even if it is not fair, and are significantly less likely to resort to protest.

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E. Support for Government Institutions and Performance
Negotiations for peace in Sri Lanka are not occurring in a vacuum. Citizens have had a lifetime of experience with the principal institutions of Sri Lanka's po- litical system and have had abundant opportunities to assess the performance of those institutions, not only with re- spect to the peace process but also more generally in handling other political, eco- nomic and social issues. Of course, gov- ernment decisions almost inevitably pro- duce winners and losers, causing some citizens to have greater confidence and trust in government than others. Given the government's policy of supporting peace negotiations with the LTTE, and its role as chief negotiator, it is quite rea- sonable to expect that citizens' attitudes toward government will color their per- ceptions of the peace process and their willingness to trust the government to negotiate in good faith on their behalf.
To measure trust in political institutions and actors, the KAP survey asked respondents their level of confi- dence in a variety of actors and institu- tions including the President, Prime Min- ister, Parliament, the courts, and the Army. Overall, 56% of citizens indicate
Figure 17- Sri Lankan Trust in Political Instituti
%
100
80
73
60
56
52 52
46
41
39 40
20
0
Army PM President Legal
System
National Government
Local Government
Police
that they had "some" or dence in the Prime Min to less than 29% who sa or "none." Trust in the Pr as high with 52% expres compared to 31% perce little or no confidence. T was in Parliament, whic 30% but distrusted by The Army enjoyed the dence at 73% compared ing confidence in the co 17).
Of those expres in the Prime Minister, 5 peace proposals and 33 Supporters. In contras those with little or no co PM support multiple p Predictably, those trustin are less likely to support posals (47%). Those trus are the most likely to favo however, while those tru are the least supportive o Given the increa flict between the Presid Minister, it is interesting 2003, 56% of citizens sa equal levels of trust in b the remainder, 24% ex trust in the Prime Minis the President. Indicative
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st in Political Institutions
that they had "some" or "a lot" of confi- dence in the Prime Minister, compared to less than 29% who said "not much" or "none." Trust in the President is nearly as high with 52% expressing confidence compared to 31% percent who express little or no confidence. The lowest trust was in Parliament, which is trusted by 30% but distrusted by twice as many. The Army enjoyed the greatest confi- dence at 73% compared to 52% express- ing confidence in the courts (see Figure 17).
Of those expressing confidence in the Prime Minister, 57% support the peace proposals and 33% are Activist Supporters. In contrast, only 35% of those with little or no confidence in the PM support multiple peace proposals. Predictably, those trusting the President are less likely to support the peace pro- posals (47%). Those trusting Parliament are the most likely to favor peace (60%), however, while those trusting the army are the least supportive of peace (45%). Given the increasingly open con- flict between the President and Prime Minister, it is interesting that as of June 2003, 56% of citizens said that they had equal levels of trust in both leaders. Of the remainder, 24% expressed greater trust in the Prime Minister and 20% in the President. Indicative of the tensions
41
39
30
13
al ment
Local Government
Police Parliament Politicians
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between the two top leaders in Sri Lanka, fully two-thirds of those citi- zens expressing greater trust in the Prime Minister support multiple peace proposals including nearly 40% who are Activist Supporters. Con- versely, among those more trusting of the President, 61% oppose the peace proposals and 30% are Activist Op- ponents. Among those who were neutral in June between the President and Prime Minister, 41% favored peace, half of whom were Activist Supporters, and 59% were opposed to peace, including 28% who were Activists.
To obtain a better sense of what people liked or did not like about the government, the KAP survey asked them to evaluate the performance of the government in:
* Improving the economy
* Handling crime
* Dealing with conflict be- tween ethnic groups
* Advancing the peace process Predictably, public attitudes to- ward the performance of government are mixed and vary by area (see Fig- ure 18).
Opinions on the government's
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%
100
80
65
60
42 40
20 20
0
Peace Process Ethn
Figure 18- Sri Lankan E Perfo

two top leaders in Sri two-thirds of those citi- ing greater trust in the ister support multiple sals including nearly 40% tivist Supporters. Con- ng those more trusting of t, 61% oppose the peace d 30% are Activist Op- mong those who were ne between the President Minister, 41% favored of whom were Activist and 59% were opposed cluding 28% who were
ain a better sense of what or did not like about the , the KAP survey asked luate the performance of
ent in:
roving the economy
ndling crime
aling with conflict be- c groups
ancing the peace process ably, public attitudes to- formance of government nd vary by area (see Fig-
ns on the government's
igure 18- Sri Lankan Evaluations of Government
Performance
56
42
38
45
28 20
Process Ethnic Conflict Economy Crime
Positive Negative
34
handling of the economy are divided, with 38% saying the government has done a good or excellent job and 45% saying a poor or very poor job. Assess- ments of government performance on crime were much worse, with those judg- ing the performance as bad outweigh- ing those saying it was good by 56% to 28%. People are less certain how to evaluate the government on ethnic group relations. Nearly a quarter say they don't know. The rest say the government has performed well by a margin of 42% to 34%. Interestingly, public assessments of the government's performance are highest on the issue of peace, where 65% of citizens say the government has done a good or excellent job compared to fewer than 20% who think it has per- formed poorly.
Among those who think the gov- ernment has done a good job on peace, 53% support multiple peace proposals whereas 47% do not. This means that the government receives almost as much approval from peace opponents as peace supporters and suggests that its policy of "pursuing peace but slowly" has had some political success. Leaving aside the question of the government's perfor- mance on peace and examining the other areas, those who rate the government's performance as good are much more likely to support peace by a margin of 60% vs. 40%. Only 30% of those

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A lot of benefits 43%
rating the government's overall perfor- mance as poor support the peace propos- als.
F. Perceived Benefits of Peace
While it is inevitable that the peace negotiations concentrate on the compro- mises or concessions one is willing to make for peace, many recognize that the conclusion of a just and lasting peace will have important benefits both for them-
Figure 19- Sri Lankan Opinions on the Benef
of Peace
Figure 20- Sri Lankan Opinions on who w
Most from Peace
Some benefits
Violence free 40%
society 35%
Not very many 10%
No benefits 7%
Economic stability 37%
Everyone equally 51%
Tamil & Up- Sinhala
country Tamil 8%
19%
Politicians 5%
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selves and for the coun Rationally, those who p dividends resulting from of a peace treaty should b accept the compromi achieve peace.
The KAPS study ask a series of questions abou extent to which a just an would produce dividend
* In your opinion settlement have a lot of Lanka, some benefits,
Mus
1%
Thos by

pinions on the Benefits eace
n Opinions on who will Benefit st from Peace
selves and for the country as a whole. Rationally, those who perceive greater dividends resulting from the conclusion of a peace treaty should be more likely to accept the compromises needed to achieve peace.
The KAPS study asked respondents a series of questions about the nature and extent to which a just and lasting peace would produce dividends including:
* In your opinion will a final peace settlement have a lot of benefits for Sri Lanka, some benefits, not very many
Violence free society 35%
Personal security 14%
Increased
Economic stability
freedoms 14%
37%
Tamil & Up- country Tamil 19%
Politicians 5%
Muslim 1%
Those affected by the war 16%
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benefits, no benefits at all?
* Please rank the following benefits: economic stability, personal security, violence-free society, in- creased individual freedoms.
* Who do you think will ben- efit most from a final peace settlement - Sinhala, Tamil, Up-Country Tamil, Muslim, those affected by war, poli- ticians, everyone equally?
There is virtual consensus in Sri Lanka that peace will bring manifold benefits. As shown in Figure 19, close to a majority of citizens (43%) say that a lasting peace will bring a lot of ben- efits to Sri Lanka and another 40% say it will bring at least some benefits. Only 10% say that peace will bring very few benefits, and even fewer say it will have no benefits at all.
Predictably, those who think a peace agreement will produce the most dividends are most supportive of the peace proposals: 55% of those who say peace will bring lots of divi- dends support the peace proposals and 31% are Activist Supporters. Those who think there will be fewer dividends also tend to think that oth- ers will receive most of those benefits. As a result, only 47% support peace, although 27% are Activist Support- ers. Among those who expect few if
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Figure 21- Sri Lankan Opi Most fro
100%
24 25 80%
60%
21
28
40%
24
20
20%
31
27
0%
A Lot of Benefits Some B
Activist Supporter Passive S

any benefits at all?
benefits, fewer than 40% support ase rank the following
peace. nomic stability, personal
When asked who will benefit most olence-free society, in-
from a final peace settlement, a major- vidual freedoms.
ity of citizens (51%) say that everyone will benefit equally. In comparison, only o do you think will ben-
19% say the Tamils will benefit most, m a final peace settlement
16% say those affected by the war, and mil, Up-Country Tamil,
8% say the majority Sinhalese will en- se affected by war, poli-
joy the greatest benefits (see Figure 20). yone equally?
Those who think everyone will benefit s virtual consensus in Sri
equally are most supportive of the peace eace will bring manifold
proposals: 55% say they support mul- shown in Figure 19, close
tiple proposals and 30% are Activist Sup- of citizens (43%) say that
porters. Conversely, majorities of those ce will bring a lot of ben-
thinking the benefits of peace will go anka and another 40%
mostly to a single group tend to oppose ing at least some benefits.
the peace proposals and frequently are say that peace will bring
Activist Opponents (see Figure 21). efits, and even fewer say
When asked to rank the benefits o benefits at all.
that will result from peace, economic ably, those who think a
benefits tend to be mentioned first ment will produce the
(37%) followed by freedom from vio- nds are most supportive
lence (35%). proposals: 55% of those
Only 17% cite personal security ce will bring lots of divi-
first and only 14% say individual free- ort the peace proposals
doms. Interestingly, however, the least re Activist Supporters.
anticipated benefits are the ones most think there will be fewer
valued by citizens. For example, 62% so tend to think that oth-
of those ranking personal security as the ve most of those benefits.
highest benefit are supporters of the nly 47% support peace,
peace process. So are 54% of those who % are Activist Support-
rank increased freedoms as the most im- those who expect few if
portant dividend or peace. Of those who
re 21- Sri Lankan Opinions on who will Benefit
Most from Peace
25
18
40
28
36
29 20 19
14 27 27
15
Benefits Some Benefits Not Very Many
Benefits
No Benefits at All
porter Passive Supporter Passive Opponent Activist Opponent

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think that a reduction in violence will be the principal peace dividend, 52% favor the peace proposals. But among the larg- est group who think the principal ben- efits of peace will be economic, only 44 percent support the peace proposals.
Although there are predictable dif- ferences in peace attitudes across all cat- egories of explanations, it is apparent from summary Table 5 that four sets of
Table 5 Summary of Social and Political Differences Among with Different Outlooks on the Peace Process.
EXPLANATION
Principle Factors
Activist Supporters
Passive Support
DEMOGRAPHICS
Women/Men Age Income-Rs Urban-Rural
Both equally Youngest Lower More Urban
Women Younger Lowest Most Urb
ETHNICITY
Strength of Id Interaction Grievance
Highest Highest Highest
Lowest Lower Lower
DEMOCRACY
Always Best Tolerance Free Media Different Views
ENGAGEMENT
Political Interest Voted Pol Participation Pol Knowledge Peace Knowledge Group Members Social Trust
GOVT. PERFORM
Trust President Trust PM Trust Parliament Trust Army Perform Peace Perform Other
PEACE DIVIDENDS
Many Dividends Everyone Benefits Economic Benefits Personal Security Violence Benefits
Bold Print Indicates strongest, most discriminating explanations.
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explanations provide par on the issue. These inclu ethnic attitudes and int of political engagement, a government institutions formance, and the natur the peace dividends that pect to result if and whe agreement is implemente
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al Differences Among Sri Lankans
Peace Process.
ist orters
Passive Supporters
Passive Opponents
est er
st est r
Activist Opponents
equally gest r Urban
Women Younger Lowest Most Urban
Women Oldest Highest Rural
Men Older Higher Rural
est est est
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est st er er est er r
st est er
st er est
r r r r
explanations provide particular purchase on the issue. These include the nature of ethnic attitudes and interactions, levels of political engagement, attitudes toward government institutions and policy per- formance, and the nature and extent of the peace dividends that Sri Lankans ex- pect to result if and when a final peace agreement is implemented.
inating explanations.
Lowest Highest Lower Higher
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Not only are the Sinhala far and away the largest and most powerful group, politi- cally, socially and economically, but they also are the most diverse in their
attitudes toward peace.
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Within Ethnicity
W
hile an appreciation of the attitudes and values that divide and distinguish Sri Lanka's several ethnic communities is important for understanding their different perspective on the peace pro- cess, it also is important to understand the differences that exist within the several ethnic groups. This is espe- cially the case with the Sinhala com- munity. Not only are the Sinhala far and away the largest and most pow- erful group, politically, socially and economically, but they also are the most diverse in their attitudes toward peace. Unlike the Tamil, Up-Coun- try Tamil, and Muslim communities, where there is virtual unanimity in the support of the peace process and where differences exist mainly in their willingness to protest an unfair agree- ment, the Sinhala community holds widely disparate ideas not only on whether to protest an unfair agree- ment, but also more fundamentally on the willingness to embrace com- promises that are necessary for the sake of a lasting peace (see Figure 5). Ultimately, a peace agreement will be reached only if the government of the day is convinced that it enjoys suffi- cient support among its constituents to allow it to remain politically viable despite making significant conces- sions to the Tamils and others for the sake of peace.
A. Explaining Attitudes toward Peace: The Sinhalese
As noted previously, a significant majority (64%) of the Sinhala com-
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in Ethnicity
W
ile an appreciation of the ttitudes and values that ivide and distinguish Sri ral ethnic communities is or understanding their spective on the peace pro- important to understand ces that exist within the ic groups. This is espe- se with the Sinhala com- t only are the Sinhala far e largest and most pow- politically, socially and y, but they also are the in their attitudes toward ke the Tamil, Up-Coun- d Muslim communities, is virtual unanimity in the the peace process and nces exist mainly in their o protest an unfair agree- inhala community holds arate ideas not only on protest an unfair agree- lso more fundamentally ngness to embrace com- at are necessary for the ing peace (see Figure 5). a peace agreement will be if the government of the nced that it enjoys suffi- t among its constituents remain politically viable ing significant conces- Tamils and others for the e.
ing Attitudes toward Sinhalese
d previously, a significant %) of the Sinhala com-
munity disapproves of virtually all of the possible peace proposals about which they were asked. Nevertheless, slightly more than a third (36%) are willing to break ranks with the rest of their com- munity and express support for multiple proposals if that is required for peace. When combined with the 34% who are Passive Opponents and who are unlikely to be mobilized in opposition to a peace agreement, this suggests that the govern- ment has considerable latitude to pur- sue compromises in its negotiations for peace. Moreover, to the extent that the government or others can expand sup- port for compromise within the com- munity or at least reduce the 30% of Sinhala who are prepared to protest an unjust peace agreement, the government's opportunities to negotiate a fair and lasting peace will increase pro- portionately.
To simplify the analysis within eth- nic groups, multivariate analyses are used. Although they do not provide as much detail as the bivariate analyses re- ported above in discussing nationwide patterns, they do provide a more con- cise summary and one whose broad pat- terns are easier to grasp and appreciate.
Table 6 presents the results of a multivariate analysis (Multinomial Logit) of Sinhala peace attitudes, sum- marizing the impact of region, partisan- ship, demographic differences, ethnic identity and contact, political values, political engagement, government sup- port, and expected peace benefits. The analysis indicates, in effect, the indepen- dent impact that each of the included

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variables has on peace attitudes while controlling for (i.e., holding constant) the effects of all the other variables. For ex- ample, the first set of rows in Table 6 shows the impact that different provinces have on the peace attitudes of Sinhala citizens when holding all other variables constant. For each province, the num- bers, or "coefficients" in the first column indicate the likelihood of being a Passive Opponent rather an Activist Opponent; the coefficients in the second column
indicate the likelihood of Supporter rather than an nent; and the third colum likelihood of being an Ac rather than an Activist Op bers in boldface are stat cant; the others are not resident of the Eastern an inces and Uva significan Sinhala citizens to be Ac of the peace proposals r sive opponents. Convers
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indicate the likelihood of being a Passive Supporter rather than an Activist Oppo- nent; and the third column indicates the likelihood of being an Activist Supporter rather than an Activist Opponent. Num- bers in boldface are statistically signifi- cant; the others are not. Thus being a resident of the Eastern and Western prov- inces and Uva significantly predisposes Sinhala citizens to be Active Opponents of the peace proposals rather than pas- sive opponents. Conversely, Eastern and
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Despite these general tendencies, however, age is the only demo- graphic variable that has a statistically significant effect on peace attitudes when other factors are controlled for.
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Western province residents are signifi- cantly less likely to be Activist Oppo- nents as compared to Passive support- ers. Finally, Eastern but not Western province Sinhala are significantly less likely to be Activist Opponents and more likely to be Activist supporters. On the whole, these multivariate co- efficients confirm the importance of regional differences within the Sinhala community.
On the whole, these multivari- ate coefficients confirm the impor- tance of regional differences within the Sinhala community. In every re- gion of the country, a majority of Sinhala opposes the majority of the peace proposals presented to them, but the opposition is much more in- tense in the Eastern and North- Cen- tral provinces. Greater opposition to the peace proposals also can be ob- served in the Western province and Uva. The character of this opposi- tion manifests itself differently in the North-Central province, an area that borders territory controlled by the LTTE. Compared to other provinces, the Sinhalese in the North Central province are much more prepared to mobilize against a final agreement that they perceive as unfair. Although there is no region of the country where a majority of Sinhalese supports the peace proposals, there is significantly greater support (less opposition) among those living in the central, southern, and Sabaragamuwa prov- ince.
What makes these geographic differences more interesting and somewhat puzzling is that they appear even after other factors are taken into account. Thus, while demographic characteristics, political engagement, political attitudes, and feelings about other ethnic groups all play a role, they do not fully account for the in- tense opposition that is observed in the North-Central province.
The second set of rows in Table 6 summarizes partisan differences among the Sinhala community and
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vince residents are signifi- kely to be Activist Oppo- pared to Passive support- Eastern but not Western hala are significantly less Activist Opponents and to be Activist supporters. le, these multivariate co- nfirm the importance of rences within the Sinhala
whole, these multivari- nts confirm the impor- ional differences within community. In every re- country, a majority of oses the majority of the sals presented to them, osition is much more in- Eastern and North- Cen- s. Greater opposition to roposals also can be ob- e Western province and haracter of this opposi- ts itself differently in the ral province, an area that itory controlled by the pared to other provinces, e in the North Central much more prepared to inst a final agreement that ve as unfair. Although gion of the country where f Sinhalese supports the sals, there is significantly port (less opposition) e living in the central, d Sabaragamuwa prov-
makes these geographic more interesting and uzzling is that they appear her factors are taken into us, while demographic cs, political engagement, tudes, and feelings about groups all play a role, fully account for the in- ition that is observed in
entral province.
cond set of rows in Table zes partisan differences Sinhala community and
indicates that when we take other fac- tors into account, identification with one of the three major political parties still has an independent effect on Sinhala at- titudes toward the peace process. Predict- ably, Sinhala who most identify with the governing UNP are most supportive and least opposed to the peace proposals; only 36% are Activist Opponents of peace. The JVP has the most Activist Opponents (47%), while the SLFP has the least (28%). At the same time, peace supporters make up 42% of the UNP, 40% of the SLFP and 31% of the JVP. When other factors are controlled for, identifiers with the UNP are more likely to be Activist Supporters than Activist Opponents, but also less likely to Pas- sive Supporters. Identifiers with the SLFP and the JVP are much less likely to be Passive Opponents than Activist Opponents. SLFP identifiers, however, also are the most likely of any group to be Activist Supporters. Taken together, this indicates that peace attitudes and protest potential are partly a function of partisan attachments. Moreover, while political attitudes and values, evaluations of government performance, levels of political engagement, and ethnic atti- tudes and interactions help to explain the intense opposition of the JVP, they cannot fully explain why UNP and SLFP identifiers are more likely to be Activist Supporters for peace.
There are few demographic differ- ences among the Sinhala community related to their support for peace. Activ- ist Opponents of the peace proposals earn slightly higher incomes. Activist Supporters tend to be younger, earn less than the typical Sinhala and are more likely to be students or employed in busi- ness. The distinguishing feature of Pas- sive Supporters and Passive Opponents is that women comprise the majority of both groups while men dominate the activist groups. Despite these general tendencies, however, age is the only de- mographic variable that has a statistically significant effect on peace attitudes when other factors are controlled for.
Within the Sinhala community,

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those who feel the strongest sense of eth- nic identity are the most likely to protest a peace agreement that they consider un- fair. More interesting, however, is that strong ethnic identifiers are significantly more likely to be Activist Supporters than Activist Opponents. Sinhala who feel the least sense of ethnic identity, though, are the least likely to protest and are more likely to be Passive Supporters and Pas- sive Opponents. The same general pat- tern is evident when it comes to Sinhala experiences with various types of societal discrimination or unfair treatment based on ethnicity, religion, and political party attachment. Unlike what was observed in the analysis of all Sri Lankans, how- ever, there is no clear and independent relationship among the Sinhala between the extent of interaction with other eth- nic groups and support for the peace pro- cess.
The Sinhala are no less committed to democracy in principle than other Sri Lankans. The largest percentage (40%) agrees that democracy is always the best form of government and the majority of the rest say that while democracy has problems it is better than any other sys- tem of government. The multivariate analysis indicates, however, that there is only a weak relationship between Sinhala attitudes toward democracy and attitudes toward peace.
While the Sinhala majority appears to hold firmly to the democratic prin- ciple of majority rule, they do not ap- pear as committed to the corollary prin- ciple of minority rights. To the contrary, the Sinhala community appears ambiva- lent about tolerating disparate voices. On the one hand, 86% of Sinhala respon- dents support a free press, but on the other hand, 40% say that society should not have to put up with political views that are out of touch with the country as a whole. Almost 90% also say it is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they be- come disruptive. Further, while 50% of Sinhala would allow a person to make a speech in their community advocating suspension of elections and military rule,
67% would not allow a in their community by so parages Sinhala as an ethn ertheless, the tenuous su Sinhala have for many c principles is only weakly their attitudes toward th tions.
The multivariate a dicate that those Sinhal mally more active in polit willing to protest an unf ment, although they are be Activist Opponents an porters of the peace pr versely, those who are less likely to protest an unf Passive Opponents pred little confidence in their ence politics and have l about or interest in poli belong to few politica groups, and are very u voted in the last nationa participate in electoral po erally. Passive Supporters lar profiles. In contrast, A ers and Opponents bot greater knowledge of and tics, belong to a number ganizations, and are ver participated in electoral porters are even more lik nents to be politically eng the differences are small.
Nationwide in Sri L President and Prime Min stantial public confidenc Minister is somewhat mo all. Among the Sinhala m ticular, the President enjo although the margin i Among Sinhala responden confidence in the Preside only 26% who say they d By comparison, 49% t Minister and 33% do no 23% express greater con President, 16% prefer th ter, and 61% have equa both. Among those wh between the two leaders t ferences in attitudes
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67% would not allow a demonstration in their community by someone who dis- parages Sinhala as an ethnic group. Nev- ertheless, the tenuous support that most Sinhala have for many core democratic principles is only weakly associated with their attitudes toward the peace negotia- tions.
The multivariate analysis does in- dicate that those Sinhala who are nor- mally more active in politics also are more willing to protest an unfair peace agree- ment, although they are equally likely to be Activist Opponents and Activist Sup- porters of the peace proposals. Con- versely, those who are less engaged are less likely to protest an unfair agreement. Passive Opponents predictably express little confidence in their ability to influ- ence politics and have little knowledge about or interest in politics. They also belong to few politically connected groups, and are very unlikely to have voted in the last national elections or to participate in electoral politics more gen- erally. Passive Supporters have very simi- lar profiles. In contrast, Activist Support- ers and Opponents both demonstrate greater knowledge of and interest in poli- tics, belong to a number of political or- ganizations, and are very likely to have participated in electoral politics. Sup- porters are even more likely than Oppo- nents to be politically engaged, although the differences are small.
Nationwide in Sri Lanka, both the President and Prime Minister enjoy sub- stantial public confidence, but the Prime Minister is somewhat more trusted over- all. Among the Sinhala majority, in par- ticular, the President enjoys greater trust, although the margin is quite small. Among Sinhala respondents, 55% express confidence in the President compared to only 26% who say they do not trust her. By comparison, 49% trust the Prime Minister and 33% do not. On balance, 23% express greater confidence in the President, 16% prefer the Prime Minis- ter, and 61% have equal confidence in both. Among those who discriminate between the two leaders there are big dif- ferences in attitudes toward peace.
While the Sinhala majority appears to hold firmly to the democratic prin- ciple of majority rule, they do not appear as commit- ted to the corollary principle of minority rights.
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Although a substantial majority of Sinhala opposes virtually all of the peace proposals about which they were asked, most say that they favor peace and most expect a final peace agreement to produce tangible benefits.
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Among the President's supporters, 68% oppose virtually all of the peace proposals and more than 40% are Activist Opponents. Among those fa- voring the Prime Minister, 45% fa- vor multiple peace proposals and about 20% are Activist Supporters. Presidential supporters also have sig- nificantly higher trust in the army and significantly lower trust in Parliament and in the courts than do supporters of the Prime Minister.
While supporters of the Prime Minister and of Parliament generally give the government higher marks than do the President's supporters with regard to the government's per- formance in handling the economy, crime, the peace negotiations, etc., in absolute terms Sinhala respon- dents give the government very poor performance ratings. Only a third of respondents say the government has done a good job managing the economy and less than a quarter say they have done a good job with crime. In contrast, nearly two thirds say the government has done a good job in the peace process. Those who think the government has handled the peace process well are relatively more in fa- vor of peace than those critical of the government performance. But even among those who rate the govern- ment excellent in these regard, 59% say they oppose peace and more than a quarter are Activists Opponents. Among those who believe that the government has performed poorly, more than 90% oppose the peace pro- posals and more than 40% are Activ- ist Opponents.
More generally, there are rela- tively weak relationships between Sinhala peace attitudes and their ap- proval of the government's perfor- mance. Those Sinhala who believe that the government has performed well in addressing the most important issues facing the country (i.e., the peace process, the economy, crime, ethnic conflict, and human rights vio- lations) are somewhat less likely to be Passive Supporters. Similarly, with
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President's supporters, virtually all of the peace nd more than 40% are onents. Among those fa- rime Minister, 45% fa- le peace proposals and are Activist Supporters. supporters also have sig- gher trust in the army and lower trust in Parliament ourts than do supporters
Minister.
supporters of the Prime of Parliament generally vernment higher marks President's supporters to the government's per- handling the economy, eace negotiations, etc., in ms Sinhala respon- e government very poor ratings. Only a third of say the government has od job managing the d less than a quarter say ne a good job with crime. nearly two thirds say the has done a good job in ocess. Those who think ent has handled the peace are relatively more in fa- than those critical of the performance. But even e who rate the govern- nt in these regard, 59% ose peace and more than e Activists Opponents. se who believe that the has performed poorly, 0% oppose the peace pro- ore than 40% are Activ- ts. enerally, there are rela- relationships between e attitudes and their ap- e government's perfor- ose Sinhala who believe ernment has performed ssing the most important g the country (i.e., the ss, the economy, crime, ct, and human rights vio- omewhat less likely to be porters. Similarly, with
regard to trust in political institutions (i.e., the president, prime minister, Par- liament, etc.), those Sinhala who are less confident in their country's political in- stitutions are significantly more likely to be Passive Opponents of the peace pro- cess.
Although a substantial majority of Sinhala opposes virtually all of the peace proposals about which they were asked, most say that they favor peace and most expect a final peace agreement to pro- duce tangible benefits. In fact 40% of Sinhala respondents say they expect that peace will produce a lot of positive ben- efits, while another 39% say it will pro- duce at least some benefits. Interestingly, the Sinhala are no different from other Sri Lankans with regard to the expected beneficiaries of peace. A majority of Sinhala respondents say that they expect all of the people of Sri Lanka to benefit equally. Fewer than 20% say that most of the benefits will go to those affected most by the war, while an equal percent- age say that the Tamils will benefit most. Only 8% think the Sinhala community will benefit most, but this is higher than any other ethnic group except the Tamils. Regardless of who they think will benefit from peace, a majority of Sinhala still opposes most of the peace proposals. Those who think everyone will benefit equally register the least op- position. While the multivariate results provide some evidence that those who are more optimistic about the benefits of peace also are most supportive of the peace, the differences are generally small and not statistically significant.
When they are asked to rank the specific benefits that peace would pro- duce, Sinhala respondents strongly fo- cus on economic benefits. Second on their list is a reduction in violence, third is personal security and last is increased freedom. In fact 43% rank economic benefits first, and another 34% rank them second. Unfortunately, those ap- preciating the economic benefits of peace are the least willing to support changes in the status quo for peace. While far fewer in number, those who rank per- sonal security or an end to violence more highly also are more likely to support

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the peace proposals.
B. Explaining Attitudes toward Peace: Tamils
While the Sinhala community is substantially divided in their support for the peace proposals as well as whether to protest an agreement they consider un-
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fair, there is virtual un Tamil community regar process. All but a minus Tamils support multipl peace. Differences within munity focus mainly on test an unfair agreement. To help identify w Tamil community are protest a peace agreemen

fair, there is virtual unanimity in the Tamil community regarding the peace process. All but a minuscule number of Tamils support multiple proposals for peace. Differences within the Tamil com- munity focus mainly on whether to pro- test an unfair agreement.
To help identify who within the Tamil community are more likely to protest a peace agreement and in order
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Tamils who have more interest in politics are more likely to be Activist Supporters, while those who have less interest are more likely to be Passive Supporters of peace.
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to better understand their reasons, a multivariate model was constructed in the same way as for the Sinhala community except focusing on the differences between Activist and Pas- sive Supporters of peace. The results, reported in Table 7, show that the willingness of Tamils to protest an unfair peace agreement is fairly simple to explain. Attitudes toward protest depend principally on a few key fac- tors. It is not surprising for example, that those who identify with the TULF are the most likely to be Ac- tivist Supporters of the peace propos- als. They not only support most of the proposals presented to them but indicate a willingness to protest if the resulting peace agreement is not per- ceived as fair. A substantial number of Tamils also identify with the governing UNP. While also support- ing multiple peace proposals, they are a bit more modest in their demands. Importantly, they also are much less willing to protest a peace agreement that contains too many concessions, so the typical Tamil UNP member is a Passive Supporter of peace.
Since the Tamil community is concentrated primarily in the North- ern and Eastern provinces, it is not surprising that geographic differences have little or no relationship to Tamils predispositions to protest. Neither is there any indication that demographic differences have much impact on pro- test potential. Although younger, better-educated Tamils tend to be slightly more activist overall, the dif- ferences are small and not statistically significant3.
Similar to what was observed for the Sinhala, the largest influence on Tamil attitudes toward peace is ethnicity. Tamils who have the stron- gest sense of ethnic identity and who report having experienced the most discrimination and unfair treatment are the most likely to be Activist Sup- porters. In contrast, those who least identify as Tamils and have experi- enced the least discrimination are also the least willing to protest a peace
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derstand their reasons, a model was constructed way as for the Sinhala except focusing on the etween Activist and Pas- ers of peace. The results, Table 7, show that the of Tamils to protest an agreement is fairly simple Attitudes toward protest cipally on a few key fac- t surprising for example, who identify with the he most likely to be Ac- rters of the peace propos- ot only support most of ls presented to them but illingness to protest if the ce agreement is not per- r. A substantial number also identify with the NP. While also support- peace proposals, they are odest in their demands. , they also are much less rotest a peace agreement s too many concessions, l Tamil UNP member is pporter of peace. the Tamil community is primarily in the North- tern provinces, it is not at geographic differences no relationship to Tamils ns to protest. Neither is ication that demographic ave much impact on pro- al. Although younger, ated Tamils tend to be e activist overall, the dif- small and not statistically
to what was observed for the largest influence on udes toward peace is amils who have the stron- ethnic identity and who g experienced the most on and unfair treatment likely to be Activist Sup- contrast, those who least amils and have experi- st discrimination are also lling to protest a peace
agreement that they consider unfair.
The level of support for democracy also has a strong effect on peace attitudes among Tamils, but the relationship is not linear. Tamils who are the most com- mitted to democracy and those who are the least committed are, together, the least likely Tamils to be Activist Support- ers of the peace proposals.
In contrast, those with a moderate commitment to democracy (i.e., who believe that democracy has problems but is better than any other system of gov- ernment), are the most willing to pro- test an unfair agreement. A possible ex- planation of this is that those most sup- portive of democracy also are most will- ing to accept as legitimate the results of a negotiated settlement that is approved by Parliament. Those least supportive of democracy, in contrast, are inclined to accept a peace agreement not because it is legitimate, but simply because they are more politically apathetic.
Among the remaining three sets of explanatory variables, attitudes toward the government and the expected ben- efits from peace have no effect on whether or not a Tamil is willing to pro- test an unfair agreement. Again, this is mostly because there is very little dis- agreement among Tamils with regard to such matters. Tamils overwhelmingly say that peace will bring important divi- dends. They are much more likely to trust the Prime Minister over the Presi- dent, and they are ambivalent about the performance of the government (al- though this varies as between the two political parties).
Most of the political engagement variables also have minimal effects on peace attitudes. The one exception is political interest. Tamils who have more interest in politics are more likely to be Activist Supporters, while those who have less interest are more likely to be Passive Supporters of peace..
C. Explaining Attitudes toward Peace: Up-Country Tamils
Up-Country Tamils exhibit over- whelming support for the peace process.

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As observed for the Tamil community, the main area of disagreement among Up-Country Tamils concerns their will- ingness to protest an unfair agreement (see Figure 5). A distinguishing feature between the two Tamil groups, however, is that Up-Country Tamils are somewhat
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more likely to be Passiv peace whereas Tamils are be Activist Supporters.
Table 8 reports a mu sis of peace attitudes to h variation in peace attitu Up-Country Tamils. The

more likely to be Passive Supporters of peace whereas Tamils are more likely to be Activist Supporters.
Table 8 reports a multivariate analy- sis of peace attitudes to help explain the variation in peace attitudes among the Up-Country Tamils. The first set of rows
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in the table indicates that a willing- ness to protest an unfair agreement varies significantly by geography. Up- Country Tamils who live in Sabaragamuwa are significantly more likely to be Activist Supporters than their counterparts who live in either the Central province or Uva.
The second set of rows indicates
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indicates that a willing- est an unfair agreement cantly by geography. Up- Tamils who live in wa are significantly more Activist Supporters than rparts who live in either province or Uva.
ond set of rows indicates
that partisanship also influences peace attitudes: Up-Country Tamils who feel close to the governing United National Party are much more likely to be Activ- ist Supporters than those who feel close to the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC). The effect of party attachment is much stronger than the effect of ge- ography and ranks as the most impor-

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tant explanatory variable in the mul- tivariate model. A second important ex- planatory variable for Up-Country Tamils is ethnic identity. Similar to what we observed within the Sinhala and Tamil communities, Up-Country Tamils who have the strongest sense of ethnic iden- tity are the most willing to protest an unfair agreement. Those who have a weaker sense of ethnic identity are less likely to protest an unfair agreement and are more likely to be Passive Supporters of peace. None of the demographic vari- ables have much impact among Up- Country Tamils, although younger, bet- ter-educated and relatively wealthier members of the community are modestly more likely to be activists. None of the other ethnic identity or interaction vari- ables have any appreciable effect on peace attitudes among Up-Country Tamils when controlling for all other variables. Nor do support for democratic values, support for the government, or expected peace benefits.
There is some evidence, however, to support the expectation that peace atti- tudes are a function of political engage- ment. Up-Country Tamils who voted in the 2001 national elections and who have more interest in politics are more likely to be Activist Supporters than those who failed to vote and those who have less interest in politics.
D. Explaining Attitudes toward Peace: Muslims
Muslims also overwhelmingly favor a majority of the peace proposals. As with the Tamils and Up-Country Tamils, the main disagreement among the Muslim community concerns their willingness to protest an unfair agreement. Overall, Muslims are somewhat more like the Up- Country Tamils and less like the Tamils in that they tend to be Passive Support- ers of the peace process and somewhat less likely to protest an agreement they consider unfair. To help explain the dif- ferences within the Muslim community, a final multivariate model was estimated (see Table 9). Interestingly, the results of the analysis suggest that differences within the Muslim community have far more important effects on their attitudes
toward peace than obse ther the Tamil or Up-C communities. This is ind ply by the large number variables that are statisti in the model. Beginning differences, Muslims w Western and North-We are much more likely to porters and less likely to porters than Muslims liv Sri Lanka. In part, this i living in the west and no less strongly as Muslims. in the Central and Sabar inces are the most likely Supporters, closely follow ing in the Eastern and provinces. Also in contra nic communities, Muslim ward peace are not apprec by their identity with th munity. Indeed, those w ing experienced discrim likely to be peace activists to be passive. The latter a difference among Musli of discrimination. Tamils try Tamils overwhelmin ethnic minorities fearful tion from Sri Lanka's ethn Sinhala. For many Mu discrimination is as likel interaction with the Tam which is a minority natio stitutes the local majorit North and East.
Politically, Muslims the SLMC are more like that those who support UNP. The latter are equ of the peace proposals bu to protest an unfair peac None of the demog distinguish among Musl ward peace. Nor do at democracy, government p expected peace benefits. P ment, however, has very For Muslims, prior partic toral politics increases sig willingness to protest a ment. In addition, Mu more knowledgeable and in politics are more likel Supporters of multiple p Muslims who rarely par toral politics, have less kn government and politics interest in politics, in co likely to be Passive Supp
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toward peace than observed among ei- ther the Tamil or Up-Country Tamil communities. This is indicated very sim- ply by the large number of explanatory variables that are statistically significant in the model. Beginning with geographic differences, Muslims who live in the Western and North-Western provinces are much more likely to be Passive Sup- porters and less likely to be Activist Sup- porters than Muslims living elsewhere in Sri Lanka. In part, this is because those living in the west and northwest identify less strongly as Muslims. Those who live in the Central and Sabaragamuwa prov- inces are the most likely to be Activist Supporters, closely followed by those liv- ing in the Eastern and North-Central provinces. Also in contrast to other eth- nic communities, Muslims' attitudes to- ward peace are not appreciably influenced by their identity with the Muslim com- munity. Indeed, those who report hav- ing experienced discrimination are less likely to be peace activists and more likely to be passive. The latter may well reflect a difference among Muslims in the source of discrimination. Tamils and Up-Coun- try Tamils overwhelmingly identify as ethnic minorities fearful of discrimina- tion from Sri Lanka's ethnic majority, the Sinhala. For many Muslims, however, discrimination is as likely to result from interaction with the Tamil community, which is a minority nation-wide but con- stitutes the local majority in areas of the North and East.
Politically, Muslims who belong to the SLMC are more likely to be activists that those who support the governing UNP. The latter are equally supportive of the peace proposals but are less willing to protest an unfair peace.
None of the demographic variables distinguish among Muslim attitudes to- ward peace. Nor do attitudes toward democracy, government performance, or expected peace benefits. Political engage- ment, however, has very strong effects. For Muslims, prior participation in elec- toral politics increases significantly their willingness to protest an unfair agree- ment. In addition, Muslims who are more knowledgeable and more interested in politics are more likely to be Activist Supporters of multiple peace proposals. Muslims who rarely participate in elec- toral politics, have less knowledge about government and politics, and have less interest in politics, in contrast, are more likely to be Passive Supporters.
Beginning with geographic differences, Muslims who live in the Western and North-Western provinces are much more likely to be Passive Supporters and less likely to be Activist Supporters than Muslims living elsewhere in Sri Lanka.
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Communicating for Peace
T
his report clearly demonstrates the diversity of Sri Lankan ori entations toward the peace process and the complex set of atti- tudes and beliefs that underlie and support those different attitudes. The report also reinforces the importance of ethnic divisions in the peace pro- cess and of geography in the ethnic equation. In order to facilitate the peace negotiations, it is important that the government and other inter- ested parties make concerted efforts to communicate with these diverse ethnic and geographic communities and to do so in highly targeted and focused ways.
The approach used in the North in an effort to moderate the demands of Activist Supporters of peace must be very different from the appeals used in the South to build support for peace among Passive Opponents or to dampen the intensity of Activist
Figure 22- Sri Lankan Sources for Political News
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unicating for Peace
T
port clearly demonstrates iversity of Sri Lankan ori tions toward the peace the complex set of atti- eliefs that underlie and e different attitudes. The einforces the importance visions in the peace pro- geography in the ethnic n order to facilitate the iations, it is important ernment and other inter- make concerted efforts icate with these diverse eographic communities o in highly targeted and s. proach used in the North o moderate the demands upporters of peace must ent from the appeals used h to build support for g Passive Opponents or the intensity of Activist
Opponents.
The delivery of targeted messages, however, presupposes an understanding of which media different individuals use to obtain their political information and which specific newspapers or radio sta- tions they consider the best, most reli- able sources of information. With this in mind, the KAP survey asked respon- dents a series of questions about their sources of information, both general and specific:
* Generally speaking, through which medium do you get most of your information, newspaper, television, ra- dio, meetings, word of mouth?
* How often would you say you pay attention to news on the radio [read about politics in the newspaper / pay attention to news on the television]? Daily, a few times a week, rarely, never?
* Please indicate the two media [newspaper, or radio / television stations] rces for
you listen to/read/watch most.
Sri Lankans in overwhelming pro- portions say that television is their prin- ciple source of news. Overall 57% get their news from television followed by 18% from newspaper, 18% from radio and less than 10% from other sources (see Figure 22). Unfortunately, as is evi- dent in figure 23, those relying prima- rily on television for news are the least likely to support the peace proposals: 58% of primary television viewers op- pose the peace proposals and 27% are Activist Opponents.
In contrast, among those relying on

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%
radio for most of their news, 53% are peace supporters including 32% Activist Supporters.
Those relying primarily on newspa- pers are similarly inclined: 55% favor peace and 33% are Activist Supporters.
Of course, most citizens likely rely on multiple sources. When asked how frequently they listen to radio, watch tele- vision or read papers, 55% say they lis- ten to radio at least a few times a week,
Figure 23- Sri Lankan Peace Types by News Sources
100%
Television Radio N
Activist Supporter Passive Supporter Passive Opponent
Figure 24- Most Popular Radio Stations in Sri Lan
Political News
100
80
60
40
26
25
20
12 11
5 4 3
0
SLBC Sirasa FM Shri FM Shakthi FM Hiru FM Suriyan
FM
Shah FM B Sin
19
80%
60%
31
40%
20%
0%
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23
20
27
45% read a newspaper at a week, and more than 7 vision at least a few time
As illustrated in Fig dio audience in Sri Lanka among many stations. T to be expected given rad limited range. Only four as much as 10% of the i dience. The largest audi by radio station SBLC, S FM and Shakthi FM. Pr
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28
21

kan Peace Types by Sources
dio Stations in Sri Lanka for
l News
45% read a newspaper at least a few times a week, and more than 75% watch tele- vision at least a few times a week.
As illustrated in Figure 24, the ra- dio audience in Sri Lanka is spread widely among many stations. This of course is to be expected given radio's frequently limited range. Only four stations capture as much as 10% of the island's total au- dience. The largest audience is enjoyed by radio station SBLC, Sirasa FM, Shiri FM and Shakthi FM. Predictably, Table
9
25
8
20
1
22
2 33
dio New spapers
Passive Opponent Activist Opponent
4 3 3 3 2
Suriyan FM
Shah FM BBC
Sinhala
Lakhanda FM
BBC Tamil
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10 illustrates that radio audiences are heavily segmented both by region and by ethnicity. This, of course, is espe- cially the case for the Sinhala who are both the largest and the most dis- persed of the ethnic communities.
Among the Sinhala commu- nity, the radio stations Sirasa FM and SLBC command the most attention overall. Sirasa FM is especially popu- lar in Uva, the Western, Central and Southern Provinces, where approxi- mately one third or more of citizens rely on it as their primary radio news source. SLBC, by contrast, is most popular in the North Western and
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s that radio audiences are ented both by region and This, of course, is espe- e for the Sinhala who are rgest and the most dis- e ethnic communities. ong the Sinhala commu- io stations Sirasa FM and and the most attention sa FM is especially popu- he Western, Central and ovinces, where approxi- third or more of citizens their primary radio news C, by contrast, is most the North Western and
North Central provinces, while the two stations compete for listeners in Sabaragamuwa and the Eastern prov- ince.
Amongst the Tamil community, the dominant radio station by far is Shakthi FM, which claims the listening loyalties of more than 40% of Tamils, including 75% in the Eastern province and 30% in the Northern province. SLBC and BBC Tamil are far behind in second and third place claiming 13% and 10% of Tamil listeners, respectively. The SLBC claims 20% of Tamil listen- ers in the Western province, and 15% in the Northern province, while BBC

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Tamil is listened to by about 20% of Tamils in the Northern province.
Up-Country Tamils get most of their radio news from Suriyan FM and Shakthi FM, with SLBC in third place. Suriyan FM is most popular in the Cen- tral province and Sabaragamuwa, while Shakathi FM is about equally popular in Uva.
Finally, the Muslim community in Sri Lanka gets their radio news prima- rily from Shakathi FM and secondarily from SLBC. The SLBC is strong princi- pally in the Western province, while Shakathi FM dominates among the Mus- lim community elsewhere.
While newspapers are the principal source of news to a minority of citizens, research in other countries indicates that newspapers often provide more in depth news and also are relied upon more by opinion leaders. For the Sinhala com- munity, the newspaper of choice is over- whelmingly Lankadeepa, which claims the attention of nearly one third of all citizens. Divaina claims an additional 15% of readers, with the rest spread out among many other papers, none claim- ing more than about 5% of the reader- ship. Lankadeepa is especially prevalent in the Western, Sabaragamuwa, and Uva provinces, where it claims 40% or more of all Sinhala. Divaina is strongest in Sabaragamuwa, but even there it is in distant second place.
Among Tamils, the leading pa-
per is Virakesari, especia ern province. In the Nor it is overwhelmingly U Country Tamils read Vira while the Muslim com Thinakaran (28%) an (20%). Thinakaran is es lar among Muslims in th ern and Eastern provi Virakesari is most popula lims in the Western prov
Although televisio popular news medium in also the medium that is to target to a specific aud ample, among the Sinha more than half of all citize of their news from Rup about 15% each attendin Swarnavahini, ITN an Moreover, Rupavahini is among the Sinhala in a country, albeit by diffe Swarnavahini is a close Southern and Central pr TV is relatively strong province as well. ITN Sabaragamuwa.
For Tamils, Shakthi especially in the Eastern provinces. Rupavahini is among the Tamils, but do Northern province. Amo try Tamils and Muslim dominates, followed by R
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per is Virakesari, especially in the East- ern province. In the Northern province it is overwhelmingly Udayan. Up- Country Tamils read Virakesa primarily, while the Muslim community reads Thinakaran (28%) and Virakesari (20%). Thinakaran is especially popu- lar among Muslims in the North West- ern and Eastern provinces, whereas Virakesari is most popular among Mus- lims in the Western province.
Although television is the most popular news medium in Sri Lanka, it is also the medium that is most difficult to target to a specific audience. For ex- ample, among the Sinhala community, more than half of all citizens obtain most of their news from Rupavahini, with about 15% each attending primarily to Swarnavahini, ITN and Sirasa TV. Moreover, Rupavahini is most popular among the Sinhala in all parts of the country, albeit by different margins. Swarnavahini is a close second in the Southern and Central provinces; Sirasa TV is relatively strong in the Central province as well. ITN is strongest in Sabaragamuwa.
For Tamils, Shakthi TV dominates especially in the Eastern and Western provinces. Rupavahini is in second place among the Tamils, but dominates in the Northern province. Among Up-Coun- try Tamils and Muslims, Shakthi TV dominates, followed by Rupavahini.
While newspapers are the principal source of news to a minority of citizens, research in other countries indicates that newspapers often provide more in depth news and also are relied upon more by opinion leaders.
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Summary and Recommendatio
T
he achievement of a just and lasting peace agreement end ing Sri Lanka's long and costly civil war depends, inevitably, on the law of supply and demand. A peace agreement depends, importantly, on the proposals supplied by the govern- ment and Tamil leadership, among others, but it also depends impor- tantly, if more subtly, on the demand for peace among diverse sectors of Sri Lankan society. Countries are gov- erned by political elites who are driven by different personal and political agendas, but in democratic regimes, public opinion both constrains and impels the actions of political leaders and the decisions they make.
While Sri Lanka's political elite have a somewhat disappointing record with regard to the 'supply' of creative ideas for peace, the demands for peace from the Sri Lankan public have been both strong and sustained. The results from the Peace Confi- dence Index over the past two years and now from the KAP survey clearly demonstrate that the great majority of citizens want peace, a majority be- lieves that everyone in Sri Lanka will benefit equally from peace, and most are willing to countenance at least some changes in the political status quo for the sake of achieving a just and lasting end to the years of war and devastation.
Nevertheless, the KAP survey clearly demonstrates that many citi- zens are predisposed to accept only modest changes for the sake of peace, and a substantial minority feels strongly enough in this regard to be
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ary and Recommendations
T
chievement of a just and g peace agreement end ri Lanka's long and costly pends, inevitably, on the y and demand. A peace epends, importantly, on s supplied by the govern- amil leadership, among it also depends impor- re subtly, on the demand ong diverse sectors of Sri ety. Countries are gov- itical elites who are driven personal and political t in democratic regimes, ion both constrains and ctions of political leaders sions they make. ile Sri Lanka's political somewhat disappointing regard to the 'supply' of s for peace, the demands m the Sri Lankan public th strong and sustained. from the Peace Confi- over the past two years m the KAP survey clearly that the great majority ant peace, a majority be- eryone in Sri Lanka will lly from peace, and most to countenance at least es in the political status sake of achieving a just end to the years of war ion. ertheless, the KAP survey nstrates that many citi- disposed to accept only ges for the sake of peace, tantial minority feels ugh in this regard to be
willing to protest any peace agreement that goes beyond what they consider to be fair and just. In contrast, while a sub- stantial minority of citizens does support extensive changes for the sake of peace, many of these individuals are relatively apathetic about the issue and are not prepared to protest a peace agreement that they consider unfair.
Importantly, the distribution of attitudes toward peace varies substan- tially and predictably across Sri Lanka's major ethnic communities. Accordingly, Tamils and Up-Country Tamils are most enthusiastic about negotiating peace. They embrace a peace agreement first and foremost to end the violence and secondarily to increase personal security and increase individual freedoms. While they naturally prefer to obtain as many concessions as they can from a peace agreement, there is a remarkable degree of moderation and constraint in the de- mands that they articulate. While strong majorities favor federalism and guaran- teed minority representation in the Sri Lanka Parliament, Tamils are about equally divided on the desirability of amnesty and reconciliation. A substan- tial majority of Tamils does favor a ro- tating Presidency, but there is substan- tial disagreement within the Tamil com- munity about the need for asymmetric federalism. Importantly as well, Tamils indicate a clear willingness to compro- mise on the issues of High Security Zones and LTTE decommissioning. While Tamils would prefer to see the rapid evacuation of HSZs and more gradual decommissioning, a substantial number are willing to negotiate an agreement where the two occur

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simultaneously in some interrelated way.
The LTTE leadership already has indicated a willingness to forgo their ini- tial demand for an independent Tamil state, and the evidence from the KAPS study suggests that Tamils generally hold to a relatively moderate set of demands for peace. At the same time, Tamils and Up-Country Tamils are unwilling to ac- cept "peace at any price." The majority of Tamils express a willingness to protest any peace agreement that is not consid- ered fair.
The Muslim community in Sri Lanka is almost as solidly in favor of a peace agreement as the Tamils and for very similar reasons. They also embrace federalism, a rotating Presidency and the guaranteed representation of ethnic mi- norities in Parliament, albeit usually by smaller majorities. Muslims are some- what more ambivalent about asymmet- ric federalism and amnesty, although they support both on balance, and they ap- pear predisposed to accept a compromise on the decommissioning and evacuation of HSZs. While Muslims indicate a will- ingness to compromise for peace, they are every bit as willing as the Tamils to protest an agreement that is not consid- ered fair.
Sinhala attitudes towards the peace process are much more complex. It is clear, however, that the Sinhala com- munity does not pose the monolithic obstacle to peace that some observers claim. Indeed, a small majority of Sinhala supports the guaranteed repre- sentation of ethnic minorities in Parlia- ment and more than one third support a federal structure. There is no support within the Sinhala community for am- nesty, a rotating Presidency or asymmet- ric federalism. More than one third are supportive, however, of an eventual evacuation of HSZs, and about an equal minority is willing to tie the decommis- sioning of the LTTE to the evacuation of HSZs.
More generally, while about 30% of Sinhala are opposed to virtually all of the peace proposals and are willing to pro- test them, the vast majority of Sinhala either support multiple peace proposals
or at least are willing to willing to protest) an agre ing multiple changes in for the sake of peace.
To an impartial out a direct stake in th KAPS data suggests the e stantial public support in all ethnic communities fo mon denominator" peace includes a federal struct sections of the country eq tee of equitable represent tional Parliament for all and the phased evacuati curity Zones tied closely missioning of LTTE h Although the data do no sue, it also is reasonable t additional provisions gua cal rights and the represe nic minorities within eac ing federal units would acceptance or at least red position to such a propo While public acc an outcome is far from much that can be done ment, by the LTTE, and ested parties to facilitate broadly on these princip to be taken come in tw tions designed to increase for a peace treaty in the b) actions designed to p understanding and empa diverse communities with the longer term.
The most imme fronting Sri Lanka is the a just and lasting peace, tain end to the long and ending political violence sonal security and indiv ensuring the survival an democracy, and providi ment conducive to long investment in all areas Although the KAP surve reasons for optimism abo for peace on the demand certainty that such an ag supplied by Sri Lanka's e demand for such a sufficiently strong as to
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or at least are willing to accept (i.e. un- willing to protest) an agreement contain- ing multiple changes in the status quo for the sake of peace.
To an impartial observer with- out a direct stake in the conflict, the KAPS data suggests the existence of sub- stantial public support in Sri Lanka across all ethnic communities for a "lowest com- mon denominator" peace agreement that includes a federal structure treating all sections of the country equally, a guaran- tee of equitable representation in the na- tional Parliament for all ethnic groups, and the phased evacuation of High Se- curity Zones tied closely to the decom- missioning of LTTE heavy weapons. Although the data do not address the is- sue, it also is reasonable to speculate that additional provisions guaranteeing politi- cal rights and the representation of eth- nic minorities within each of the result- ing federal units would enhance public acceptance or at least reduce public op- position to such a proposal.
While public acceptance of such an outcome is far from certain, there is much that can be done by the govern- ment, by the LTTE, and by other inter- ested parties to facilitate a solution based broadly on these principles. The actions to be taken come in two classes: a) ac- tions designed to increase public support for a peace treaty in the short term, and b) actions designed to promote greater understanding and empathy among the diverse communities within Sri Lanka in the longer term.
The most immediate issue con- fronting Sri Lanka is the achievement of a just and lasting peace, bringing a cer- tain end to the long and costly civil war, ending political violence, increasing per- sonal security and individual freedom, ensuring the survival and expansion of democracy, and providing an environ- ment conducive to long term economic investment in all areas of the country. Although the KAP survey provides good reasons for optimism about the prospects for peace on the demand side, there is no certainty that such an agreement will be supplied by Sri Lanka's elites, nor is the demand for such an agreement sufficiently strong as to compel self-in-
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terested elites to respond to the pub- lic will. While it appears that there is a peace agreement in prospect that is at least minimally acceptable to a majority of Sri Lankans from all eth- nic communities, there is sufficient ambivalence, if not outright opposi- tion, to such an agreement, especially in the Sinhala community, to give comfort and cover to political elites who are not eager to alter the politi- cal status quo. There also are suffi- cient ambitions in the Tamil and Muslim communities for an agree- ment that goes beyond what is mini- mally acceptable to give pause to Tamil leaders who might be willing to compromise.
Information from the KAP sur- vey suggests that there are a number of short-run actions that interested parties in Sri Lanka can take to move public opinion in ways even more conducive to peace. First, the avail- able evidence suggests that most Sri Lankans, by their own admission, are not very informed about the peace negotiations. Only 4% of citizens describe themselves as informed, in- cluding less than 3% of Sinhala re- spondents. While about half of all citizens claim they are somewhat in- formed, the very high level of respon- dents who have never heard of High Security Zones suggests that those self-perception may be a bit self-de- ceptive. The evidence shows, how- ever, that those most informed about the process are the most likely to be peace supporters and especially to be Activist Supporters. Greater knowl- edge and awareness of the peace pro- cess is good in and of itself; in the absence of knowledge, half-truths and stereotypes prevail. Importantly, how- ever, greater knowledge and awareness of the peace process also appears likely to increase public support for the pro- cess and to reduce the level of protest focused on any eventual agreement.
In addition to improving knowledge about the peace process in general, the dissemination of more information about specific proposals
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s to respond to the pub- ile it appears that there is ement in prospect that is imally acceptable to a Sri Lankans from all eth- nities, there is sufficient , if not outright opposi- an agreement, especially ala community, to give cover to political elites eager to alter the politi- o. There also are suffi- ions in the Tamil and munities for an agree- es beyond what is mini- table to give pause to rs who might be willing
ise.
ation from the KAP sur- that there are a number actions that interested i Lanka can take to move ion in ways even more o peace. First, the avail- e suggests that most Sri their own admission, are formed about the peace . Only 4% of citizens mselves as informed, in- than 3% of Sinhala re- While about half of all they are somewhat in- very high level of respon- ave never heard of High nes suggests that those on may be a bit self-de- e evidence shows, how- ose most informed about are the most likely to be rters and especially to be porters. Greater knowl- areness of the peace pro- in and of itself; in the owledge, half-truths and revail. Importantly, how- knowledge and awareness process also appears likely ublic support for the pro- educe the level of protest ny eventual agreement. addition to improving bout the peace process in dissemination of more about specific proposals
on the table would go a long way to re- assure skeptics. For example, although the KAPS data do not show it directly, the KAPS process produced abundant evidence that many citizens equate fed- eralism with the break up of Sri Lanka. They do not comprehend the idea of de- centralized powers within a unified state and have been exposed to little informa- tion on how that might work. Many citizens also fail to appreciate that there are many kinds and degrees of federal- ism. The specific powers that are de- volved to local governments can vary widely among different federal systems, as can the ability of the central govern- ment to veto local policies. In some fed- eral systems, local governments can opt out of central government programs, while in others they cannot. And the taxing and revenue sharing powers of central and local government come in almost limitless varieties. While, cur- rently, Sri Lankans are divided on the question of federalism, this is likely due, in part, to their different understandings of what federalism is and how it works. No doubt Sri Lanka's minority commu- nities overestimate the local powers that federalism would provide, just as the Sinhala majority overestimates the loss of central control that federalism would entail. Greater knowledge of the many varieties of federalism would create both a more reasonable basis for discussion of the issue and a greater understanding of the manifold opportunities to find a compromise version of federalism that is minimally acceptable to a substantial majority.
The KAPS data suggest that the principle of "moderation through greater mutual understanding" would also ap- ply to issues such as amnesty and recon- ciliation, where all sides seem to think that amnesty would benefit mostly the "bad folks on the other side" and not those fellow ethnics who may have com- mitted crimes or violated the civil rights of others during the course of the civil war. Similarly, greater understanding of the specific quid pro quo associated with a peace proposal could enhance its appeal. Citizens who otherwise are op-

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posed to dismantling High Security Zones may develop a more open-minded position on the question when it is linked explicitly to the decommissioning of LTTE heavy weapons. Just as citizens are more willing to embrace a tax hike if they are told the specific benefits that will be paid for by the added revenues, they are likely to be more accepting of the "medicine" of peace when they under- stand that benefits of peace they desire can only be achieved by making impor- tant concessions to others. In short, the benefits that result from any concessions made in a peace agreement must be as visible as the concessions themselves.
Although the great majority of Sri Lankans think that a just and lasting peace will produce important dividends, for many citizens the principal benefits they associate with peace are economic in nature. The evidence indicates, how- ever, that those perceiving only economic benefits are much less likely to accept compromises for peace than those who think peace will bring an end to violence, promote personal security, or increase individual freedoms. With the ceasefire almost two years old, many citizens, es- pecially in the Sinhala community, ap- pear to have lapsed into a false sense of security. They appear to take the quies- cence of the status quo for granted. In this context, there is much to recommend a public education campaign focused on the very real risk of renewed violence, threats to personal security, and limits on civil and political liberties that would result if the peace negotiations were to collapse in stalemate. Indeed, the President's recent suspension of parlia- ment and temporary declaration of emer- gency powers provides a very clear warn- ing that the ceasefire is fragile and re- newed conflict a very real possibility.
More generally, it is important that the citizens of Sri Lanka's different eth- nic communities develop a better under- standing of the peace attitudes of other ethnic groups. It would be terrific, of course, if greater understanding resulted in greater empathy. But even if this does not occur, greater understanding may
help to reduce suspicions viduals are much more l ing to compromise and m in an atmosphere where th others are willing to do t only be helpful for Sri minorities to understa Sinhala support guarante resentation in Parliamen eralism. And it would be for the Sinhala majority the limited nature of the and their willingness to central issues.
In the short run, the to recommend a public paign highlighting the iss at the peace negotiations positions of the disparat scoring the concessions t are willing to make or alr for the sake of a peace conveying the specific b attached to specific com different sides might mak paign would go a long w vincing a majority of th munity to embrace a fede to reduce the willingnes are not convinced to pro of the negotiations. Th should help the minorit better to understand wha what is likely beyond the gotiated settlement. Bot create added pressures elites to be more recept peace negotiations, kno have broad support from section of the country an ity within each of the et ties. Greater public unde peace process and of the different communities wo opportunities for Sri Lan gage in demagoguery in cess, using ignorance to and fear to generate supp peace agenda.
In the longer term, offer good reasons for cau One bit of encouraging in evidence that younger ci
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help to reduce suspicions and fear. Indi- viduals are much more likely to be will- ing to compromise and make concessions in an atmosphere where they perceive that others are willing to do the same. It can only be helpful for Sri Lanka's ethnic minorities to understand how many Sinhala support guarantees of ethnic rep- resentation in Parliament and even fed- eralism. And it would be equally helpful for the Sinhala majority to understand the limited nature of the Tamil demands and their willingness to compromise on central issues.
In the short run, then, there is much to recommend a public awareness cam- paign highlighting the issues on the table at the peace negotiations, explaining the positions of the disparate sides, under- scoring the concessions the "other" sides are willing to make or already have made for the sake of a peace agreement, and conveying the specific benefits that are attached to specific compromises that different sides might make. Such a cam- paign would go a long way toward con- vincing a majority of the Sinhala com- munity to embrace a federal solution and to reduce the willingness of those who are not convinced to protest the results of the negotiations. The strategy also should help the minority communities better to understand what is possible and what is likely beyond their reach in a ne- gotiated settlement. Both results would create added pressures on Sri Lanka's elites to be more receptive to genuine peace negotiations, knowing that they have broad support from a broad cross section of the country and from a major- ity within each of the ethnic communi- ties. Greater public understanding of the peace process and of the positions of the different communities would also reduce opportunities for Sri Lankan elites to en- gage in demagoguery in the peace pro- cess, using ignorance to encourage fear, and fear to generate support for an anti- peace agenda.
In the longer term, the KAPS data offer good reasons for cautious optimism. One bit of encouraging information is the evidence that younger citizens in all eth-
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nic communities are more support- ive of peace and more inclined to take an activist role in support of a fair agreement. Sri Lankans with higher educational qualifications are gener- ally more supportive of peace as well. As younger and more educationally qualified citizens mature and begin to assume leadership roles in society, the hope is that they will hold on to and bring with them into power the greater tolerance and understanding that they currently express. Increas- ing urbanization and greater and more diverse media exposure also ought gradually to erode ethnic hostilities in the long run.
Current trends aside, however, the amelioration of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka requires greater and more genuine integration of the country's several ethnic communities into a multi-ethnic Sri Lanka. This is cliché, to be sure, but its truth is not dimin- ished by its being obvious. The KAP survey shows clearly that a little bit of ethnic interaction is a dangerous thing, promoting suspicion and fear and creating jealousy and resentment. The KAPS data make just as clear, however, that more regular and sus- tained interactions among members of different ethnic groups reduce fears, promote understanding, and facilitate a wide range of interactions, from friendships and social interactions to business partnerships, and even to marriage.
In promoting greater integra- tion, language plays a critical role. The KAPS data demonstrate that those who speak English in addition to their principal language are much more likely to hold positive attitudes toward other ethnic groups. Those who speak another indigenous lan- guage are even more likely to have a positive outlook.
The creation of a genuinely bi- lingual society would, in the long run, do much to reduce the level of ethnic conflict and distrust. But creating
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nities are more support- nd more inclined to take ole in support of a fair Sri Lankans with higher qualifications are gener- pportive of peace as well. and more educationally zens mature and begin to rship roles in society, the they will hold on to and them into power the ance and understanding rrently express. Increas- tion and greater and more ia exposure also ought erode ethnic hostilities in .
t trends aside, however, tion of ethnic conflict in quires greater and more gration of the country's ic communities into a Sri Lanka. This is cliché, ut its truth is not dimin- eing obvious. The KAP s clearly that a little bit of raction is a dangerous oting suspicion and fear jealousy and resentment. data make just as clear, at more regular and sus- actions among members thnic groups reduce fears, erstanding, and facilitate e of interactions, from nd social interactions to rtnerships, and even to
moting greater integra- ge plays a critical role. data demonstrate that peak English in addition cipal language are much to hold positive attitudes r ethnic groups. Those another indigenous lan- en more likely to have a look.
eation of a genuinely bi- ty would, in the long run, reduce the level of ethnic distrust. But creating
such a society will take decades if not generations. In the meantime, govern- ment policies liberalizing and encourag- ing the use of multiple languages in gov- ernment, business, and civil society could begin the process of ethnic inte- gration. The creation of media with genuinely national coverage, broadcast simultaneously in all important ethnic languages, and free from a dominant po- litical orientation could provide an im- portant catalyst to the creation of a pan- ethnic or national culture. The broad- cast of multi-ethnic programming, ex- posing citizens in all areas to the lives and values, hopes and concerns of citi- zens of all groups, could promote un- derstanding and tolerance, especially in more rural and remote areas where day- to-day opportunities for ethnic interac- tions are limited.
Establishing peace and forging a united Sri Lanka would also be greatly facilitated by the combination of greater economic development and greater eq- uity in the distribution of economic goods across society. There is no ques- tion but that severe differences in eco- nomic development and wealth contrib- ute to Sri Lanka's ethnic tensions. Two decades of conflict in Sri Lanka have exacerbated these problems, depressing foreign investment, stifling economic development, and further increasing the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have nots.'
Increased economic development is a prime benefit that many citizens asso- ciate with the negotiation of a just and lasting peace. But many citizens dis- count the promise of economic gains, fearing that most of the benefits of de- velopment will be realized by others and result in few direct benefits to themselves or their region of the country. It is im- portant that citizens be convinced not only that peace will bring prosperity, but that it will bring a significant measure of that new prosperity to them and to people like them. This holds as well for any reconstruction aid that is promised from abroad in support of the peace pro- cess. The plans for the distribution of

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this aid must be developed transparently, and the benefits of this aid must be widely distributed, in a way that is perceived as being fair, especially in those areas that are war ravaged and relatively disadvan- taged.
This is not to suggest that ethnic differences in Sri Lanka need to be blurred or that ethnic cultures should be suppressed. This not only would be un- desirable, but it probably is impossible to achieve and likely would be counter- productive in any case. It is to say, how- ever, that it is important for Sri Lankans of all ethnic identities to develop an overarching, Sri Lankan identity that is separate from, but that complements and augments their ethnic identity.
Horrific though it has been, the civil war has created within Sri Lanka the conditions necessary for restructuring society in order not only to end two de- cades of violence and misery, but also to begin healing centuries of ethnic conflict, intolerance, and discrimination. The im- mediate issue on the table is the negotia- tion of a just and lasting peace, but the
broader issue, in the bac forging of a unified Sri proud of its ethnic divers ted to social justice, politi economic prosperity for survey indicates that the in Sri Lanka on the desir and a remarkable willingn segments of society, to ac compromises for the sak
More can and shoul short run to nourish and public's commitment to willingness to compromi term, the creation of gen institutions and a strong s identification are import the political consequenc ethnic divisions.
The KAPS report d balance, that there are g optimism regarding the Lanka for a just and Whether elites can be pe ply the peace agreement citizens clearly demand r question.
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broader issue, in the background, is the forging of a unified Sri Lankan society, proud of its ethnic diversity but commit- ted to social justice, political equality and economic prosperity for all. The KAP survey indicates that there is consensus in Sri Lanka on the desirability of peace and a remarkable willingness, across most segments of society, to accept reasonable compromises for the sake of peace.
More can and should be done in the short run to nourish and strengthen the public's commitment to peace and its willingness to compromise. In the longer term, the creation of genuinely national institutions and a strong sense of national identification are important for reducing the political consequences of enduring ethnic divisions.
The KAPS report demonstrates, on balance, that there are good reasons for optimism regarding the demand in Sri Lanka for a just and lasting peace. Whether elites can be persuaded to sup- ply the peace agreement that Sri Lanka's citizens clearly demand remains an open question.
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APPENDIX A: Survey Method and Questionnaire
Sampling Procedures T
his study was carried out us ing a lengthy, structured ques tionnaire administered through face-to-face interviews ofamongst a nation-wide sample of 2,980 respondents. The sample in- cludes respondents from all 21 dis- tricts, excluding only those areas in Amparai, Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Jaffna which currently are not under government control. To compensate for these omissions, the areas under government control -- Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee -- were over-sampled, thus ensuring their pro- portionate representation in the sample.
The sampling procedures began at the district level, with 100 initial interviews allocated in each district in accordance with each ethnic group's proportion of the district population. We then over-sampled Tamil, Up- Country Tamil, and Muslim respon- dents within districts in order to ob- tain interviews with 400-500 indi- viduals from each ethnic group. This was done so that we could provide more detailed and robust information about each minority ethnic group's attitudes, opinions, and behaviors than would be possible with samples of smaller size. The final unweighted sample consists of 1575 ethnic Sinhala, 494 Tamil, 439 Up-Coun- try Tamil, and 472 Muslim respon- dents. Because the over-sampling fac- tor for each of the minority ethnic
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NDIX A: Survey Methods uestionnaire
groups was identical for all districts, each rocedures
ethnic sub-sample may be treated as a T
random sample of the particular ethnic tudy was carried out us
group's population in Sri Lanka as a lengthy, structured ques
whole. When the results are presented naire administered
for the overall sample, the data are ce-to-face interviews
weighted to reflect: 1) the true ethnic nation-wide sample of
population within each district; and 2) ndents. The sample in-
the overall size of the district's popula- ndents from all 21 dis-
tion. In this way the overall weighted ding only those areas in
sample provides an accurate representa- tticaloa, Trincomalee and
tion of nation-wide opinions, as well as currently are not under
an accurate reflection of the opinions of control. To compensate
each Sri Lankan ethnic group. issions, the areas under t control -- Ampara, nd Trincomalee -- were , thus ensuring their pro-
Field Work
representation in the
Interviews were obtained within each district by first determining the
pling procedures began ct level, with 100 initial located in each district in with each ethnic group's f the district population. er-sampled Tamil, Up- il, and Muslim respon- districts in order to ob- ws with 400-500 indi- each ethnic group. This that we could provide d and robust information minority ethnic group's pinions, and behaviors be possible with samples ze. The final unweighted sists of 1575 ethnic Tamil, 439 Up-Coun- nd 472 Muslim respon- se the over-sampling fac- of the minority ethnic
number of desired respondents from each ethnic group, following the proce- dures described in the previous para- graph. GNs were then selected at ran- dom within the district, with the goal of obtaining four interviews per GN. The number of required GNs per district was therefore the number of desired inter- views divided by four. Within each GN, interviewers followed a random-walk procedure, beginning at a selected land- mark such as a school or a hospital, and interviewing every second household. At the household level, the Kish sampling procedure was followed in order to en- sure that every individual in that house- hold would be given an equal opportu- nity to be selected to the survey.
A total of 71 experienced field enu- merators from all three communities were deployed for the data collection and care was taken to send an enumerator of

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the same ethnic community as the re- spondent. Of the fieldwork, 10% was back-checked in addition to accompa- nied visits and spot-checks in order to maintain the quality of the data collec- tion. The weighted nation-wide results are subject to a margin of error of +/- 2.1%. When considering the ethnic sub- groups separately, the margin of error is +/- 2.5% for the Sinhala sub-sample, +/- 4.4% for the Tamil sub-sample, +/- 4.7% for the Up-Country Tamil sub-sample, and +/- 4.5% for the Muslim sub-sample.
Various civil society groups and the Government Peace Secretariat were con- sulted in the designing of the question- naire. Prof. William Mishler of the Uni- versity of Arizona and Prof. Steven Finkel of the University of Virginia provided technical assistance throughout the study. Professor Jeff Gulati of Wellesley College provided additional assistance in data analysis and construction of the final re- port.
Sampling Tamils
Constructing a sample of Sri Lankan Tamils was complicated by the fact that a significant segment of the Tamil population lives in territory con- trolled by the LTTE. In previous efforts to administer the Peace Confidence In- dex nationwide, Social Indicator was ap- proached by LTTE officials who re- quested the opportunity to "review" the survey prior to its administration in LTTE-controlled territory. Social Indi- cator has consistently declined to do so,
choosing instead to avo trolled areas because of c tecting the quality and PCI, both real and perce
In addition to conce taining the quality and survey, another reason the not conducted in LTTE conducted the survey wi AED which was operati der a cooperative agreeme U.S. Government policy ing contacts between its cluding contractors, and LTTE. Thus, even if SI h to negotiate with the LT their territory, the terms o tract prevented this.
Obviously, SI woul to have sampled in LTTE ritory, but this was simp To compensate for its in SI over-sampled Tamils controlled areas includin until recently, was unde and still has a substantial Table A-1 compares Tam ward the peace process a districts in which substan Tamil interviews were c apparent from these data are remarkable homogen Overall about two-third Activist Supporters and v remainder are Passive Sup largest districts these perce trivially from a low of 66 high of 69% in Trincom has the highest percent
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choosing instead to avoid LTTE-con- trolled areas because of concerns for pro- tecting the quality and integrity of the PCI, both real and perceived.
In addition to concerns about main- taining the quality and integrity of the survey, another reason the KAP survey was not conducted in LTTE areas was that SI conducted the survey with a grant from AED which was operating, in turn, un- der a cooperative agreement with USAID. U.S. Government policy prohibits know- ing contacts between its employees, in- cluding contractors, and members of the LTTE. Thus, even if SI had been willing to negotiate with the LTTE for access to their territory, the terms of the KAPS con- tract prevented this.
Obviously, SI would have preferred to have sampled in LTTE controlled ter- ritory, but this was simply not possible. To compensate for its inability to do so, SI over-sampled Tamils in government- controlled areas including Jaffna which, until recently, was under LTTE control and still has a substantial LTTE presence. Table A-1 compares Tamil attitudes to- ward the peace process across the several districts in which substantial numbers of Tamil interviews were conducted. As is apparent from these data, Tamil attitudes are remarkable homogenous nationwide. Overall about two-thirds of Tamils are Activist Supporters and virtually all of the remainder are Passive Supporters. For the largest districts these percentages vary only trivially from a low of 66% in Jaffna to a high of 69% in Trincomalee. Puttalam has the highest percentage of Activist
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Supporters at 86% and Colombo has the smallest percentage at 44%, but these percentages are based on a very small number of interviews and are highly volatile. Importantly, the data indicate that there are no statistically significant differences in the peace ty- pology across these six districts.
Table A-2 repeats the analysis but examines differences across prov- inces rather than districts. The results are virtually identical; the differences across provinces are very small and not statistically significant. Finally, Table A-3 examines differences in attitudes toward peace between urban and ru- ral Tamils. Once again, the differ- ences are negligible. No matter where
Tamil Peace Types by Urban Vs. Rural
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in t 86% and Colombo has
Sri Lanka they live, North, East or percentage at 44%, but
West, in urban settings or in rural areas, tages are based on a very
Tamil attitudes toward the peace process er of interviews and are
are virtually indistinguishable. ile. Importantly, the data t there are no statistically
Of course, it is always possible that ifferences in the peace ty-
analyses of interviews conducted in s these six districts.
LTTE-controlled areas might reveal some modest differences relative to A-2 repeats the analysis
Tamils elsewhere, but this is unlikely s differences across prov-
given the evidence at hand. Indeed, any han districts. The results
evidence that Tamil attitudes in LTTE identical; the differences
areas were different from Tamils else- ces are very small and not
where would most likely raise suspicions ignificant. Finally, Table
about the integrity of the interview pro- s differences in attitudes
cedure used in LTTE areas. All of the e between urban and ru-
available evidence suggests that the Tamil Once again, the differ-
sample in the KAPS data provides a fair ligible. No matter where
and accurate representation of Tamil at- titudes toward peace.
n Vs. Rural

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APPENDIX B: Focus Group
Contents Background and Methodology 58 Economy and Peace 59 Information on Peace 61 Peace Dividends 63
Peace and Ethnic Conflicts 67
Compromises 65
Foreign Involvement 69 Proposals 72 Protest Potential 77
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ENDIX B: Focus Group Report
Methodology 58 ace 59 Peace 61
63
c Conflicts 67
5
ent 69
l 77
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58
Background and Methodology
S
ocial Indicator (SI), the polling unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) conducted the first ever Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey (KAPS) on the Sri Lankan Peace Process in order to understand the needs, interests and concerns of the public with regard to the current peace process. This study was strengthened by SI’s bi-monthly Peace Confidence Index (PCI) Survey and provides in-depth information to the Government and the Civil Society Organizations to help strengthen their strategies and sustain the peace process. The preliminary analysis of the KAPS study revealed new and interesting findings and instances that these findings challenged conventional wisdom. Therefore, as was planned from the beginning of the survey, SI conducted a series of FGDs across the country to understand the Grey areas of knowledge and to clarify some of the
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ground and Methodology
S
dicator (SI), the polling f the Centre for Policy atives (CPA) conducted r Knowledge, Attitudes s Survey (KAPS) on the eace Process in order to the needs, interests and the public with regard to eace process. This study ened by SI’s bi-monthly ence Index (PCI) Survey s in-depth information to ent and the Civil Society ns to help strengthen ies and sustain the peace e preliminary analysis of tudy revealed new and ndings and instances that ndings challenged l wisdom. Therefore, as from the beginning of SI conducted a series of oss the country to the Grey areas of nd to clarify some of the
issues that were raised during the ‘Top- Line Results’ presentations.
SI conducted eight FGDs in the areas of Colombo, Galle, Thalavakalle, Amparai, Batticaloa, Pollonnaruwa and Jaffna covering the Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim and Up- Country Tamil communities. The selected areas were those that showed controversial results in the preliminary analysis of the survey. Participants for these groups were selected using the KAP survey respondent list and during the selection process quotas were set in order to capture men and women from different age categories. However, all the groups were ethnically homogeneous and were moderated by a person who belonged to the same ethnic community. Further, Dictaphones were used with the approval of participants, and the persons who assisted the moderator took down their observations. The FGD protocol was developed with assistance from US technical consultants and was used as a guide for the moderator.

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Economy and Peace
P
province the articipants current were from economic of the the North opinion situation Central that is difficult for all alike. People employed in the government sector are particularly dissatisfied with their economic status, as they feel that what they earn is insufficient to support a family. All participants firmly believed that the peace process has in no way contributed to the development of the economy and that there has been no significant change in the economic situation compared to last year. However there was also a belief that there is a certain change in the economy with regard to the goods coming from the North and East as farming has improved in those areas. “Goods such as Bombay Onions and Red onions are coming to the market from the North and East because people in those areas now have the freedom to engage in farming.”
Southern provincial participants had various views about the current economic situation. Some were not satisfied with their economic conditions, while others were not sure what to say. One person stated, “If you take on a personal level there are people who are doing well and people who are finding it difficult to make ends meet, but when you take it generally as a society, I don’t think we are doing well.” However, most of them believed that the economic situation was the same when compared to a year ago since the signing of the cease-fire agreement (CFA), while others believed that the condition has worsened. Most of the participants seemed to want to know what had happened to the money
that was saved from expenditure as a result o They were baffled as to process could cost the cou the war. “The governmen the war cost them about R even if you leave aside Rs. peace process, where is th 1.8 billion?” Most par under the impression th to the savings from expenditures being spe monitoring missions an parties involved in the p
Some participan the peace process and conditions of the coun connected. Neverthele puzzled as to how the ec shown any signs of recov the peace process.
A common senti Western province partic the current economy is matter how much the ea enough to cover the expe of the participants felt tha any improvement in conditions since the sign One participant summed beliefs when he stated stopped in the North, b experienced a reduction in The fact that unemploy rise was seen as anothe factor to the sluggish ec asked if they thought th improved during the past participants agreed that conditions have improve
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nomy and Peace
P
that was saved from the defense expenditure as a result of the cease-fire. They were baffled as to how the peace process could cost the country more than the war. “The government is saying that the war cost them about Rs. 2.8 billion. So even if you leave aside Rs. 1 billion for the peace process, where is the rest of the Rs. 1.8 billion?” Most participants were under the impression that this was due to the savings from the defense expenditures being spent on foreign monitoring missions and various other parties involved in the peace process.
Some participants believed that the peace process and the economic conditions of the country were inter- connected. Nevertheless, many were puzzled as to how the economy has not shown any signs of recovery as a result of the peace process.
A common sentiment among all Western province participants was that the current economy is such, that no matter how much the earnings, it is not enough to cover the expenditures. None of the participants felt that there had been any improvement in the economic conditions since the signing of the CFA. One participant summed up their strong beliefs when he stated “The war has stopped in the North, but we have not experienced a reduction in cost of living.” The fact that unemployment is on the rise was seen as another contributing factor to the sluggish economy. When asked if they thought the economy has improved during the past year, almost all participants agreed that the economic conditions have improved for about 1%
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of the population. “There are so many chances for the rich people in this country to make money. For the poor man, the economy is like falling off the frying pan and into the fire.”
Participants of the Northern province had varying opinions about the current economic situation in the country. Only a handful of people were at least somewhat satisfied with their conditions. Some participants stated that their economic conditions have improved greatly as a result of the recovering transport facilities. “Since the transport has become easier and what is produced here can be sent to the other area, the farmers here are enjoying the benefits of it.” On the other hand, some participants were displeased that the foreign goods flooding the market made it difficult for them to sell their own produce, which are priced at a higher level than the imported goods. Even though there were participants who stated
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ation. “There are so many the rich people in this ake money. For the poor nomy is like falling off the
d into the fire.”
ticipants of the Northern varying opinions about conomic situation in the ly a handful of people somewhat satisfied with ions. Some participants eir economic conditions ed greatly as a result of ing transport facilities. ansport has become easier produced here can be sent area, the farmers here are benefits of it.” On the some participants were that the foreign goods market made it difficult sell their own produce, iced at a higher level than d goods. Even though participants who stated
that they had a low or a moderate economy level, overall the participants were satisfied with their personal economic conditions saying that they somehow manage to balance their income and expenditures.
In contrast to the participants from the Northern province, the people in the Central province were all equally dissatisfied with their current economic conditions. They all confirmed that their income was insufficient to meet their expenses. The rising level of prices of commodities and the fact that a considerable amount of their income has to be spent on educating their children were cited as some of the reasons for their economic hardships. Except for one participant who was experiencing a better economic situation compared to a year ago, all the other participants confirmed that their conditions have deteriorated when compared to a year ago.

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Information on Peace
M
ost the said of North that the they respondents Central closely province followed from
the news regarding the peace process. Newspapers, Television and Radio were the commonly used media of information on the current peace process. People living close to the border villages said that they get information directly from the LTTE cadres, as they are freely moving about in their areas. Even though many people received information through different media, not all of them believed what they saw or heard. Some of them were genuinely interested in getting to know the details of the peace process and some just followed it on and off. Those committed people watched political programs like ‘Kinihira’ and ‘Deshapalana Sathiya’ in the hope of getting to know further details. People who had felt the impact of war were more committed to finding out further details and followed the peace process closely. There was a certain group of people who saw no difference between peace and war. They paid attention to information on the peace process only when a serious event took place as they were more concerned about their economic hardships.
When asked if the respondent’s neighbors and friends were also well informed about the current peace process, some said that there were people who were more informed than them, while a majority said that people known to them didn’t pay much attention to this type of information.
All the Southern province respondents emphasized that as people
following Buddhism the very much. Therefore followed the peace proce
Though they all highly va were cautious about wha TV and printed on th People who had conta personnel said that they what they heard from th in the conflict areas th gathered from the media
Television, newspapers were the co media by Western provin to obtain information process. Most of the parti political programs on TV discussed these matters their family members. T the information was som of participants were w Somehow many belie information would not b the Television as the view with their own eyes. Tho so attentive to news ab process said that their per overshadowed their i national issues.
Eastern provin paid more attention to ne process than the particip provinces. They wer interested about the hap country and actively read watched television new information.
One significant that most of the Tamil re the Eastern province liste
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ormation on Peace
M
following Buddhism they valued peace very much. Therefore, all of them followed the peace process keenly.
Though they all highly valued peace they were cautious about what was shown on TV and printed on the newspapers. People who had contacts with army personnel said that they believed more what they heard from the security forces in the conflict areas than what they gathered from the media.
Television, radio and newspapers were the commonly used media by Western province participants, to obtain information on the peace process. Most of the participants watched political programs on TV and some even discussed these matters at home with their family members. The accuracy of the information was something that a lot of participants were worried about. Somehow many believed that false information would not be broadcast via the Television as the viewers got to see it with their own eyes. Those who were not so attentive to news about the peace process said that their personal problems overshadowed their interest in the national issues.
Eastern province respondents paid more attention to news on the peace process than the participants from other provinces. They were particularly interested about the happenings in the country and actively read newspapers and watched television news to get more information.
One significant difference was that most of the Tamil respondents from the Eastern province listened to the BBC
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news on the radio. Most participants also read a newspaper published by the LTTE, which is circulated only in the Eastern and Northern province. A majority believed what was being broadcast over the media most of the time. However at times they saw a disparity between the local news and the BBC news.
Muslim participants from the Eastern province were also particularly interested in news on the political and current affairs of the country. They too listened to the BBC news but did not believe all the information they received, as they felt that most of the news was reported under political influence. Some of them thought that the media was responsible for many problems between the ethnicities. “Media has created problems among the Muslim and Tamil politicians by misinterpreting speeches made by them.”
The newspaper and radio were the commonly used media by Northern province participants, as many did not rely on TV. People who occasionally watched TV mostly watched Indian channels like
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radio. Most participants newspaper published by which is circulated only n and Northern province. believed what was being er the media most of the ver at times they saw a tween the local news and ws.
slim participants from n province were also interested in news on the d current affairs of the y too listened to the BBC id not believe all the they received, as they felt f the news was reported ical influence. Some of ht that the media was e for many problems ethnicities. “Media has lems among the Muslim il politicians by ng speeches made by them.”
e newspaper and radio mmonly used media by rovince participants, as t rely on TV. People who y watched TV mostly ndian channels like
Durdharshan. Many were interested about the political situation of the country and some focused their attention on the interim administration issue. All of them admitted that certain news items were exaggerated unnecessarily and could not be completely believed.
Just like Northern province participants, the Central province participants too obtained most of their information through the radio and newspapers. Many relied on the BBC news and some said that they obtained information from other people when travelling in the bus. They thought that the information received through all means was not completely reliable, therefore discussed it among one another and got it verified.
The elder participants said that, compared to the earlier generations, people nowadays were more aware of happenings around them and due to their inquisitive nature and analytical minds did not believe everything that was presented to them through different media.

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Peace Dividends
A
Central be ll of some the province participants sort of expected benefits in the there North as an to
outcome of a final peace settlement. ‘Freedom’ was the most commonly expected benefit while several people also expected some development in the country. Many eagerly looked forward to the freedom of movement from one place to another without any fear. Most participants stated that a final peace settlement should result in economic and social development as well as putting an end to conflicts among ethnicities. One participant also expected the underworld and other criminal activities to decrease with a final peace settlement. When asked whom they thought would benefit the most out of a successful peace settlement all the participants stated that everyone would benefit equally. “As fellow countrymen, ethnic problems, party problems are irrelevant. Everyone, as Sri Lankans should get the benefits equally.”
The main benefit expected by the Southern province participants was the reduction in war-related deaths and destruction. Some participants were convinced that if the money spent on the war was spent on developing the economy it would contribute to a reduction in the cost of living.
Keeping in line with the opinions of the participants of other provinces, the Western province participants also expect economic development as a result of a final peace settlement. In addition they expect an increase in job opportunities and looked forward to an improvement in the
education system. On pointed out that a lastin enable all Sri Lankans to e resources of the country e limiting the use to only that area or to a more pow Another participant was regardless of whether th not, there exists a ne management to develop for the citizens to benef the event that a final p does brings about be participants wanted the distributed equally am Lankans.
According to participants from the Ea they had not gained any the past one and a half ye fire agreement (CFA) participants stated that more trouble since the CFA. Almost all agreed the freedom to move fearing for their lives any not experienced any pers far. One person had a m impression, saying tha business has improved were more employmen now. “Earlier, when you w village for odd jobs, you fea would be able to return saf were people who never retu after being assaulted.”
Muslim participants fro province also voiced sim that of Tamil particip Eastern province. They t
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ce Dividends
A
education system. One participant pointed out that a lasting peace would enable all Sri Lankans to enjoy the natural resources of the country equally, without limiting the use to only the residents of that area or to a more powerful minority. Another participant was of the view that, regardless of whether there is peace or not, there exists a need for proper management to develop the country and for the citizens to benefit. However, in the event that a final peace settlement does brings about benefits, all the participants wanted the benefits to be distributed equally amongst all Sri Lankans.
According to some Tamil participants from the Eastern province, they had not gained any benefits during the past one and a half years of the cease- fire agreement (CFA), while some participants stated that they have had more trouble since the signing of the CFA. Almost all agreed that apart from the freedom to move about and not fearing for their lives anymore, they have not experienced any personal benefits so far. One person had a more optimistic impression, saying that the field of business has improved and that there were more employment opportunities now. “Earlier, when you went to a Muslim village for odd jobs, you feared whether you would be able to return safely because there were people who never returned or returned after being assaulted.”
Muslim participants from the Eastern province also voiced similar opinions to that of Tamil participants from the Eastern province. They too believed that
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the most visible benefit from the signing of the CFA was the liberty to travel places without having to get down at every checkpoint and produce the identity cards. One participant said that he had experienced trouble because he lives at the Samanthurai boundary and the Tamil people who come to that area for harvesting rob them of their bicycles and motor cycles. Another voiced out his dissatisfaction: “We are able to cultivate lands, which we were unable to cultivate earlier. But we are not sure whether we can harvest or not. Outwardly it appears as we are living freely. But actually we live under control.”
Participants from the Northern province appeared to be the group that believed that they had benefited the most from the signing of the CFA. They said that transportation had become easier and as a result the availability of goods in the market was high. Since the barricades have been removed and the identity cards are not checked anymore, the participants said that they were now saving a lot of time. A student participant summed up the benefits they have had, when she stated: “Earlier a lot of time was wasted at checkpoints. Now we can save that time and use it for our studies. Earlier the fear of shells was always there but now we can learn in a calm and quiet set up.”
Apart from the common developments the respondents had seen in the area they also believed that business is flourishing. “The peace talks and the Cease-fire has resulted in the foreign aid influx and this has facilitated the development process. Earlier the development was restricted to all other areas in the country except the north and east.” “Peaceful background is there and our lives have become calm and quiet. We have suffered under the Indian army and the Sri Lankan army. But now we don’t have that problem.”
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isible benefit from the e CFA was the liberty to s without having to get very checkpoint and e identity cards. One t said that he had trouble because he lives thurai boundary and the e who come to that area ing rob them of their motor cycles. Another is dissatisfaction: “We are ate lands, which we were ltivate earlier. But we are ther we can harvest or not. t appears as we are living actually we live under
ants from the Northern peared to be the group that they had benefited the signing of the CFA. hat transportation had ier and as a result the f goods in the market was the barricades have been d the identity cards are ked anymore, the said that they were now t of time. A student summed up the benefits had, when she stated: t of time was wasted at Now we can save that time r our studies. Earlier the was always there but now in a calm and quiet set
art from the common ts the respondents had rea they also believed that flourishing. “The peace Cease-fire has resulted in aid influx and this has he development process. evelopment was restricted reas in the country except and east.” “Peaceful is there and our lives have m and quiet. We have r the Indian army and the army. But now we don’t blem.”
“Now all the roads are open and we can go anywhere. Earlier there wasn’t such a situation. If somebody fell ill and couldn’t find the medicine, even though such facilities were available here they were not in a position to come here and take medicine. Now they can.”
In line with the responses of participants from other provinces, the removal of checkpoints, the ability to move around without producing identity cards, being able to travel to any part of the country and not worrying about a sudden imposition of a curfew, were typical advantages pointed out by participants from the Central province. “I had to face many difficulties due to these checkpoints. For instance, earlier the police used to question Tamil people when they went to a shop outside their own area, asking why they couldn’t buy the goods from the shops in their own area. And when we were taking something to Colombo or bringing something from Colombo we had to face much hassle because the police wanted to open all the parcels and check everything.”
Many believed that the peace process is beneficial to any race or ethnic group. They thought that due to the increasing foreign investments that job opportunities are also on the rise. The fact that tourists are not restricted from coming into the Island was seen by many as contributing to the increase in their income. Another respondent said that before the signing of the CFA, they were compelled to dress in a way that didn’t show they were Tamil, when going to religious places like Katharagama. But now they can go wearing their normal, traditional clothes and come back safely. “Earlier we had to obtain a Police report if we wanted to stay even one night in Colombo. If we did not have a police report, sometimes we were taken into custody, just so that the police personnel can get us to bribe them with some money. There are no such problems now.” Another thought that the clear division that existed among the three groups, Sinhala, Up-Country Tamil and Jaffna Tamil was now less because they are free to travel to any area and converse with anyone freely.

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Compromises
M
province willing ost of to the make participants North compromises Central were
in order to achieve a lasting peace, but with certain reservations. They had differing views on what the compromises should be. However all participants agreed that whatever the compromises, they should be made as a nation, not individually. A majority of the participants thought the biggest compromise would be the economic hardships they would have to face in order to ensure the success of the peace process. One participant categorically stated, “Yes, definitely there has to be some sort of a sacrifice, but without giving the land. That means without separating the country we are ready to sacrifice anything”, while another said that if the war begins again, a sacrifice would have to be made in that every person above the age of 18 years would have to join the army.
The Western province participants were a little skeptical about the whole peace process and some even believed that the LTTE would not agree to a lasting peace settlement. One participant firmly believed that they were making compromises even at present and that they should not make any more compromises. Most of the participants agreed that Sinhala people were not so passionate about their ethnicity and that they would make any compromise as long as it resulted in personal benefits.
As opposed to the views of Western province participants, all Southern province participants believed that there were many compromises to be made in order to achieve lasting peace.
As a basic compromise, stated that Sinhala peopl stop looking down at Ta expecting Tamil people unpleasant labor intense stated that there has to b change from both sides participant agreed that b Tamil people would have something for peace. H would be the Sin compromising more, in t in the North, the Nation Flag, the legal system services.
All Tamil partic Eastern province we compromise what they b if the outcome would b addition they stated th support any decisions o by their representatives the actions of the repre justifiable. One particip that the principal conce conduct the peace proces justifiably, not concen should be compromi individual stated that a what could be comprom President and the Prime together.
In contrast wit respondents, some o respondents from the E opposed the idea of makin to achieve a lasting participant vehementl making any sacrifices as difficulties they were pres
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promises
M
As a basic compromise, one participant stated that Sinhala people would have to stop looking down at Tamil people and expecting Tamil people to do all the unpleasant labor intense work. Another stated that there has to be an attitudinal change from both sides, while another participant agreed that both Sinhala and Tamil people would have to compromise something for peace. He believed it would be the Sinhala people compromising more, in terms of the land in the North, the National Anthem and Flag, the legal system and the police services.
All Tamil participants from the Eastern province were willing to compromise what they believed was fair if the outcome would be beneficial. In addition they stated that they would support any decisions or actions taken by their representatives if they thought the actions of the representatives were justifiable. One participant maintained that the principal concern should be to conduct the peace process peacefully and justifiably, not concentrate on what should be compromised. Another individual stated that at the moment what could be compromised was for the President and the Prime Minister to get together.
In contrast with all the other respondents, some of the Muslim respondents from the Eastern province opposed the idea of making compromises to achieve a lasting peace. One participant vehemently objected to making any sacrifices as he felt that the difficulties they were presently facing was
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due to having already made compromises. Apart from this absolute disagreement, there were respondents who were willing to make compromises with certain conditions. “ If a situation arises where all races have to give in, never mind we too can give in. On the contrary if only the Muslims have to give in, then it cannot be done.”
“Rights can neither be given in nor sacrificed.”
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aving already made s. om this absolute t, there were respondents willing to make s with certain conditions. ion arises where all races in, never mind we too can the contrary if only the e to give in, then it cannot
ghts can neither be given ced.”
“Without affecting the basic principles such as self respect, self determination and the motherland, we can give in. For instance we can give in when it comes to income. The process of giving in must come in from all sections.”
Moreover, the Muslim respondents from the Eastern province were not satisfied with the current peace process because Muslims were not involved in the peace talks. They wanted all three communities to be included in the peace process in order to achieve a proper and lasting solution.

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Peace and Ethnic Conflicts
N
orth participants conflicts Central between were province aware different of
ethnic groups and referred to examples such as the incident in Mawanella. Apart from what was reported by the media, they did not have access to further information. Respondents said that some of the conflicts between different ethnic groups were ‘not actions out of love for the ethnicity, but actions out of a desire to create a situation and watch what would happen.’
Nobody thought that conflicts between the Sinhala and Tamil people in their area had worsened after the signing of the cease-fire agreement (CFA). Nevertheless they had heard of minor incidents among different ethnic groups in other areas.
Apart from incidents in Muttur and Mawanella, Southern province respondents were not aware of any other incidents among different ethnic groups and they did not think that there had been any noteworthy incidents since the signing of the CFA.
As opposed to Southern province participants, Western province participants were well informed about incidents between different ethnic groups. They related incidents in Puttalam, Maligawaththa, Ampara, Valachchenai, Muttur, Trincomalee, Batticoloa and Ambalangoda. More than just a conflict between different ethnic groups, they saw these incidents as politically motivated incidents. Even though the CFA was in action some did not see a reduction in violence, while others thought violence between
ethnicities had reduced a CFA. Some believed tha contributed to an incr disruptive activities by M Some were particularly d killings of the Army Int LTTE. Participants said heard of certain inciden where the LTTE had vio but they believed that Army could not take an Prime Minister didn’t all
A greater num participants from the E saw an increase in c between different ethnic signing of the CFA. M primary reason for th violence between the Mu people was related to According to them all started when they began land after the signing of t from these two ethnici about farming when the m in the area also engaged i with the majority in that “The Tamil people who ar the majority is Muslim, ar and the Muslims invade t
Some stated th parties who created ce made individual problem two ethnic groups community problem participant provided a d to the issues: “The ethnic high because the Muslims will be cornered at the
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e and Ethnic Conflicts
N
ethnicities had reduced as a result of the CFA. Some believed that the CFA had contributed to an increase in various disruptive activities by Muslim people. Some were particularly disturbed by the killings of the Army Intelligence by the LTTE. Participants said that they have heard of certain incidents in the North where the LTTE had violated the CFA, but they believed that the Sri Lankan Army could not take any action, as the Prime Minister didn’t allow it.
A greater number of Tamil participants from the Eastern province saw an increase in confrontations between different ethnic groups since the signing of the CFA. Many said the primary reason for this increase in violence between the Muslim and Tamil people was related to paddy fields. According to them all these problems started when they began cultivating the land after the signing of the CFA. People from these two ethnicities had issues about farming when the minority people in the area also engaged in farming along with the majority in that particular area. “The Tamil people who are in areas where the majority is Muslim, are being assaulted and the Muslims invade the land.”
Some stated that at times the parties who created certain conflicts made individual problems between the two ethnic groups to look like community problems. Another participant provided a different insight to the issues: “The ethnic animosity is now high because the Muslims think that they will be cornered at the Peace talks and
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because of that they are also asking for a separate unit.”
Participants said that, if Muslim representatives were involved in the peace talks and if both Muslim and Tamil people understood each other and strove to live in harmony, such issues would be resolved.
Asked if they thought there was a relationship between the peace process and the conflicts among communities, one Muslim participant from the Eastern province said that even though there were three communities in the country only two communities had been involved in the peace talks. According to him, the third party (Muslims) being sidelined from the peace process would only create a conflict situation similar to what existed before, as already 40 Muslim people have disappeared since the signing of the CFA.
Many Northern province participants said that the main reason for conflicts among ethnic groups was political activities. They said that they had heard of incidents in Muttur, Mannar and Mulaithivu, which they said were caused by self-seeking corrupt individuals. According to the respondents, these violent activities were carried out by corrupt individuals, in order to spoil the peace process, as they stand to gain many benefits through a situation of war. Another respondent said: “It can even
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at they are also asking for it.”
ticipants said that, if esentatives were involved talks and if both Muslim eople understood each rove to live in harmony,
ould be resolved.
ed if they thought there nship between the peace the conflicts among ies, one Muslim rom the Eastern province n though there were three s in the country only two s had been involved in ks. According to him, the Muslims) being sidelined ace process would only flict situation similar to d before, as already 40 ople have disappeared ning of the CFA.
ny Northern province said that the main reason among ethnic groups was vities. They said that they f incidents in Muttur, Mulaithivu, which they aused by self-seeking viduals. According to the , these violent activities ied out by corrupt in order to spoil the peace hey stand to gain many ough a situation of war. ondent said: “It can even
be a personal dispute. For instance a dispute between two individuals belonging to two ethnic communities can advance into a conflict between the two ethnic groups.”
A majority of the Central province participants were unable to recall any incidents of violence between ethnic groups after the signing of the CFA. Some had heard about incidents in Watawala, Bindunuwewa and Maskeliya and were also aware of incidents in Valachchenai and Muttur between the Tamil and Muslim communities, but did not know much detail.
Overall however, compared to the participants from other provinces, the participants from the Central province were unaware of the happenings in the country as most of them had not heard of many incidents that had occurred since the signing of the CFA. Central province respondents had the same opinion as the Northern province respondents when they said that many of the conflicts were created by politicians to sabotage the peace process. People had different perspectives about the incidents between ethnic groups. Some thought that there has been an increase in violence since the signing of the CFA while others believed that these incidents have been occurring even before the CFA but due to the problems in the North and East they had gone unnoticed. On the other hand some respondents said that they live peacefully now.

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Foreign Involvement
A
provinces be ll respondents the country considered that across Norway was the most six to
involved in the Sri Lankan peace process. People from different provinces gave different reasons when asked what sort of a role they thought Norway played in the Sri Lankan peace process.
Of the North Central participants, many saw Norway simply as an intermediary between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, while some said that they had heard rumors that Norway was trying to sell arms to the LTTE. Yet another group was particularly unhappy with the way issues are being handled by Norway, saying that if the three ethnicities got together they could have done better than getting foreigners involved.
USA was also considered a country that was actively involved in the Sri Lankan peace process, and the general feeling was that USA got involved only because they themselves felt the impact of terrorism through the 9/11 attacks. Many considered this as a reason why the USA extended their ban on the LTTE. Another respondent said that there is a rumor that Minister Milinda Moragoda and the US president were having a close personal relationship and it was because of this that USA is so closely involved in the peace process. In addition there were respondents who believed that USA wants to establish its dominance the world over and obtain control over the Trincomalee harbor, which is considered important in terms of security and economic activities.
Japan was thou the country that provides aid and the reason for the believed to be because relations that former Jayawardena had with Ja
Norway’s involvem process was not looked by the Southern province they all thought that protecting the LTTE. Th was that both the LTTE Norwegian head of state and that Norway was bia Some also believe th operating with the hid converting non-Catho Catholics. Apart from No Thailand, India, Denma Ireland were other cou believed to be involved process.
USA was though in the peace process for th i.e., to sell their weapons other countries. Some s involved in the Sri Lanka was USA’s way of esta command over the Asian were aware of the increa importance of India an region.
A Southern prov had a very interesting Japan’s involvement sayi tactic of Sri Lankan polit to the Buddhist people showing them that there
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ign Involvement
A
Japan was thought of as being the country that provides Sri Lanka with aid and the reason for their assistance was believed to be because of the cordial relations that former President J. R Jayawardena had with Japan.
Norway’s involvement in the peace process was not looked upon favorably by the Southern province participants as they all thought that Norway was protecting the LTTE. The misperception was that both the LTTE leader and the Norwegian head of state were Catholic and that Norway was biased accordingly. Some also believe that Norway is operating with the hidden agenda of converting non-Catholic people to Catholics. Apart from Norway and USA, Thailand, India, Denmark, Canada and Ireland were other countries that are believed to be involved in the peace process.
USA was thought to be involved in the peace process for their own benefit, i.e., to sell their weapons and to control other countries. Some said that getting involved in the Sri Lankan peace process was USA’s way of establishing their command over the Asian region, as they were aware of the increasing power and importance of India and China in the region.
A Southern province participant had a very interesting perspective on Japan’s involvement saying that it was a tactic of Sri Lankan politicians to appeal to the Buddhist people of Sri Lanka by showing them that there was a Buddhist
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country involved in the peace process other than the Catholic Norwegians.
According to Western province participants, Japan, Thailand, Canada, India, France, USA, Sweden, UK and Switzerland are the countries that are involved in the Sri Lankan peace process. Many respondents believed that Norway’s involvement in the peace process was suspicious, and that they couldn’t be trusted. They also believed that the Norwegians were afraid of the LTTE. As with the other respondents the Western province respondents also saw Japan’s involvement as a positive one, stating that they helped develop the country’s economy. Thailand was also rated positively for providing a venue to hold the peace talks. USA’s involvement came across negatively as here too, people believed that USA was just trying to establish their command over the Asian region. They were said to be operating with the ulterior motive of curtailing India’s dominant position in the Asian region, as India is considered to be the most powerful country in the region closely followed by China.
Foreign involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process was perceived to be beneficial by many Tamil respondents from the Eastern province. “This is a small country and when we find it difficult to take a decision it is good if other countries extend their help” “I think we can have a speedy peace with the intervention of foreign countries.”
“With the intervention of foreign countries the internal conflict and the problems hidden by the authorities were brought to light and if a decision is taken with the assistance of all countries there will be peace definitely.”
Some others supported the foreign involvement as many foreign institutions had helped in constructing houses, providing employment opportunities and
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lved in the peace process he Catholic Norwegians.
ording to Western participants, Japan, anada, India, France, en, UK and Switzerland tries that are involved in an peace process. Many believed that Norway’s t in the peace process was nd that they couldn’t be y also believed that the were afraid of the LTTE. other respondents the ovince respondents also nvolvement as a positive that they helped develop s economy. Thailand was ositively for providing a ld the peace talks. USA’s t came across negatively eople believed that USA ying to establish their over the Asian region. aid to be operating with r motive of curtailing nant position in the Asian ndia is considered to be owerful country in the ly followed by China.
eign involvement in the n peace process was be beneficial by many ndents from the Eastern his is a small country and nd it difficult to take a s good if other countries help”
n have a speedy peace with ion of foreign countries.” ith the intervention of tries the internal conflict oblems hidden by the ere brought to light and if taken with the assistance ries there will be peace
e others supported the lvement as many foreign s had helped in ng houses, providing nt opportunities and
giving loans for self-employment. While foreign intervention was considered good by many, some said that, as there were signs of invasion from countries like America, it would be better to involve them only in certain matters and not in all aspects of the peace process.
Muslim residents in the Eastern province were also aware of the involvement of countries like Japan, USA and India and some said that Iraq and Italy were also involved. Norway’s involvement was seen as both positive and negative. There were some who believed that Norway was involved to bring about a final peace settlement as well as to develop the economic situation in the country. In contrast other respondents believed that Norway has a hidden agenda and is operating according to USA’s wishes. Many participants agreed when one participant expressed his views on USA’s involvement with the LTTE: “Now Muslims are arrested and killed. American war ships are also coming frequently. America wants to suppress Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda group. In the mean time LTTE is trying to inform the USA that Sri Lankan Muslims also have connection with the Al Qaeda group. Therefore we can’t trust Norway and America.” For this reason they wanted countries that the Muslim people could trust, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore and Iraq, to be involved in the Sri Lankan peace process.
One respondent in the Northern province believed that Norway would do their role as intermediaries in the Sri Lankan peace process impartially. Other participants however, viewed Norway’s involvement in the peace process entirely as a way of gaining benefits for themselves. The respondents believed that Norway was saving Sri Lanka from being divided in order to market their goods here. They also believed that Norway was seeking an advantageous point in Naval activities as the country is situated in an advantageous position in the Indian Ocean, and also to gain a good reputation by successfully reaching a

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final peace settlement. USA, India, Japan and Canada were the other countries that were said to be involved in the Sri Lankan peace process.
Yet another group of respondents saw USA’s involvement as being detrimental: “Purpose of America is creating some problem in any country.” “Sometimes America may be intending to use Sri Lanka as a base for its battle against some Muslim countries.”
The respondents also emphasized that the reason for America’s involvement was due to the rapid development of India and China. They believed that America was searching for a center of control to block India’s and China’s development. India’s involvement was said to be because of the Sri Lankan refugees in India as well as of the goods India could market when the transport facilities improve between the two countries.
Japan’s reason for getting involved too, was seen as a tactic to market their goods in this country.
Though the Northern province respondents believed that the problems could not be resolved without a suitable
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mediator, they believ countries should not try t establish themselves in th withdraw when the pe established and a solutio
Central provin rated Norway’s invol favorably. They complem efforts in rescuing the pea it was shaky a few mo signing of the peace agree credited to Norwegian in
The European thought to be intereste process because the ref Lanka living in their cou sent back if a final peac reached. Japan’s reasons f was once again believed t of a platform to market th India’s involvement w refugee problem becomi troublesome for them sincerity was challenged some shared the opinion wanted to strengthen system.

mediator, they believed that these countries should not try to unnecessarily establish themselves in this country, but withdraw when the peace process is established and a solution is reached.
Central province participants rated Norway’s involvement quite favorably. They complemented Norway’s efforts in rescuing the peace process when it was shaky a few months ago. The signing of the peace agreement was solely credited to Norwegian intervention.
The European countries were thought to be interested in the peace process because the refugees from Sri Lanka living in their countries could be sent back if a final peace settlement is reached. Japan’s reasons for involvement was once again believed to be the gaining of a platform to market their goods, while India’s involvement was due to the refugee problem becoming considerably troublesome for them. American’s sincerity was challenged by many and some shared the opinion that they just wanted to strengthen their security system.
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Proposals
T
his chapter explores the attitudes of the public with regard to six different proposals for a final peace settlement.
1. The powers of the regional governments should be increased, even if those of the government at the center have to be decreased.
The general consensus among the participants in the North Central province was that the powers of regional governments should be increased with the central government having sole control over the security forces, the police, the judicial system and the finances. The participants also agreed that, apart from the four mentioned areas, all other powers should be divided amongst the provincial governments. This division of power, they believed, would be beneficial to the minorities in those areas. They were in favor of having a system similar to that in Canada, where the central government takes all the important decisions. However, they were against the regional governments having more power than the central government. One participant emphasized his opposition to such a proposal: “By devolving the power, regional governments will have more power than the central government and different nationals will have all the power they want. If power is given to areas where there are more Tamil people, it’ll be the same as giving them a separate state.”
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sals
T
chapter explores the udes of the public with rd to six different r a final peace settlement.
wers of the regional ts should be increased, e of the government at ave to be decreased.
e general consensus articipants in the North ince was that the powers governments should be th the central government control over the security olice, the judicial system ances. The participants that, apart from the four areas, all other powers divided amongst the vernments. This division hey believed, would be the minorities in those were in favor of having a ilar to that in Canada, entral government takes tant decisions. However, against the regional s having more power than l government. One t emphasized his to such a proposal: “By the power, regional will have more power than overnment and different ll have all the power they er is given to areas where e Tamil people, it’ll be the g them a separate state.”
Two respondents from the Southern province were in favor of the proposal, saying that it would provide the regional governments with the power to do what is necessary. The majority nevertheless agreed to it as long as it would not harm the Sinhala ethnicity and their religion and would not bring about a divided Sri Lanka. One individual, however, was not sure what to make of the proposal and another was against it.
Many Western province participants were skeptical about the proposal saying that it would not work. “I don’t approve of this concept of giving more power to the provincial governments. The parliament of Sri Lanka should keep all the power. Power like education, health, police should be kept here.”
Some people thought such a proposal would be beneficial, as it would enable them to directly approach the regional government with their problems without having to wait till the tasks were performed by the central government. They also believed that it would bring about competition between the regional governments, which would ensure that the public receives better quality services. At the same time they also expected adverse effects from this such as favoritism. While one person thought all provinces should be vested with equal power, another said: “The power should be divided by properly understanding the requirements of the provinces and the people.”
All the Tamil respondents from the Eastern province agreed to the proposal without any conditions, stating

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that the central government looks after the majority and not the minority, which causes communal problems, and that if the regional governments are given more power that would eliminate discrimination and a lot of other problems.All the Muslim participants from the Eastern province agreed to the proposal as well, as they expect it to bring about many benefits for them. They looked forward to the fact that it would allow them to solve their problems in that province itself. One participant said: “This provincial council must be divided into two or a separate unit should be given to Muslims. Security and laws must exist in this unit.”
The entire group from the Northern province was in favor of the proposal because they believed that their demands would be easily accommodated, and that since the local government institutions would be empowered they could obtain whatever they wanted. “What we want is power. Northern and Eastern provinces should be amalgamated while the Tamil-speaking people in those areas are to be given more power. Under those conditions foreign aid can be obtained directly by us.”
The Central province participants anticipated many benefits to arise as a result of such a proposal. When regional governments receive power, the respondents expected the institutions to properly fulfill the needs of the people in that respective region and appropriately utilize the funds allocated to them. One participant, though, disagreed with the proposal: “Without giving all the power to the regional governments, some of the powers are to be retained with the central government, for instance defense. In the decision making process some decision should be taken at the level of the regional government while some other important decisions are to be taken by the central government. That is the way to ensure a peaceful and smooth running of the affairs of the country.”
2. The powers of some regional governments may need to be increased more than others.
The proposal to incr of some regional governm others was rejected by al province participants as th it would be discriminatin all powers to be divided all regions.
While some respon Southern province thou of no harm to give certai power, some thought it further divide in the cou
Education was a m the Western province resp thought it should be uni of the region and the person suggested distr according to the natural particular geographical contributed: “Power shou a basis of need. If a decisi with regard to land, th government should have th It’s fair to divide power b needs but not the power r issues.”
In the case of s actually functioning, province participants wa and the East to be ves powers. They establishe were the people who su from the conflicts, they more power. They wante with more problems to power. “Since the North a problems, more powers ha them. Under the present ci reasonable even if the N provinces are to be given and the rest of the region under the central govern create political probl community that governs (t not have problems and th who are governed (the m ones who have problems.”
Central provin anticipated problems t proposal as they thought a situation where m
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The proposal to increase the powers of some regional governments more than others was rejected by all North Central province participants as they claimed that it would be discriminating. They wanted all powers to be divided equally among all regions.
While some respondents from the Southern province thought it would be of no harm to give certain regions more power, some thought it would create a further divide in the country.
Education was a major concern of the Western province respondents as they thought it should be uniform regardless of the region and the ethnicity. One person suggested distributing power according to the natural resources of the particular geographical area. Another contributed: “Power should be divided on a basis of need. If a decision is to be taken with regard to land, then the central government should have the total authority. It’s fair to divide power based on regional needs but not the power relating to major issues.”
In the case of such a proposal actually functioning, the Northern province participants wanted the North and the East to be vested with more powers. They established that as they were the people who suffered the most from the conflicts, they had to be given more power. They wanted the provinces with more problems to be given more power. “Since the North and East has more problems, more powers have to be given to them. Under the present circumstances it is reasonable even if the North and East provinces are to be given devolved powers and the rest of the regions are to be kept under the central government. This can create political problems, but the community that governs (the majority) does not have problems and those communities who are governed (the minority) are the ones who have problems.”
Central province participants anticipated problems through such a proposal as they thought it could lead to a situation where more financial
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assistance is given to some regions and a lesser amount to other regions. In addition they also believed that the regions having more power would try to dominate the regions with less power. One participant wanted a strong administration, limited to the upcountry, to be established; similar to what the LTTE is demanding for the North and East.
A majority of the Eastern province respondents said that even the most insignificant powers should be shared equally. Echoing the sentiments of the Northern province participants, some of the Tamil respondents wanted the North East province to be given more powers. “Sinhala are the majority in the central government, therefore more powers should be provided to the Tamil who are in the North East.”
With some obviously contrasting statements, all the Muslim respondents from the Eastern province stated that all regions should somehow be provided with equal powers, even though they wanted the regional powers to be increased.
3. T
HE RIGHTS OF LOCAL MINORI
GROUPS SHOULD BE PROTECTED EV IF THE MAJORITY IN THE AREA DOES NO AGREE
.
Regardless of the age, gender, ethnicity, regions, etc., all participants from the North Central, Southern, Western, Eastern and Northern provinces, except those participants from the Central province, agreed that the rights of the local minority groups should be protected even if the majority of the area disagree. Some insisted that belonging to a minority group did not mean that you didn’t have rights and that the majority/minority divide should be discarded.
It is assumed that the reason all respondents agreed to this proposal as they accepted it as a general proposition instead of grasping the deeper meaning of the proposal.
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given to some regions and unt to other regions. In y also believed that the ng more power would try e the regions with less e participant wanted a nistration, limited to the to be established; similar LTTE is demanding for nd East.
ajority of the Eastern pondents said that even ignificant powers should equally. Echoing the f the Northern province s, some of the Tamil wanted the North East be given more powers. the majority in the central , therefore more powers ovided to the Tamil who rth East.” th some obviously g statements, all the ondents from the Eastern ed that all regions should e provided with equal though they wanted the ers to be increased.
OF LOCAL MINORITY
BE PROTECTED EVEN IN THE AREA DOES NOT
ardless of the age, gender, ions, etc., all participants orth Central, Southern, astern and Northern ept those participants from province, agreed that the cal minority groups should even if the majority of the ee. Some insisted that a minority group did not ou didn’t have rights and ajority/minority divide carded.
assumed that the reason ts agreed to this proposal epted it as a general instead of grasping the ing of the proposal.
4. There should be a rotating presidency, where the president for one term will be someone from one ethnic group, and the next term be someone from a different ethnic group.
None of the North Central participants accepted the proposal to have a rotating Presidency. However, a majority specified that the President would have to be elected through a public mandate, regardless of the ethnicity. Some participants, however, maintained that the President would have to be Sinhala as Sri Lanka is a Sinhala country. They eluded the possibility of a President from another ethnicity being appointed through a public mandate, as a majority of the population is Sinhala.
The Southern province respondents were amused at the proposal as they thought that the proposal itself would promote ethnic conflicts. They also stated that the President should be elected through a public mandate and that if Mr. Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader, was elected as President, as long as that is what the majority wants, then it should be accepted. Further, another respondent added: “Ethnicity does not matter as long as the person respects the cultures and the religions of our country.” One participant thought that such a system would be acceptable in a situation of a Non-Executive Presidency, but not with an Executive Presidency.
“This is a Sinhala Buddhist country. If we want to protect the religion and the philosophy, this country has to have a Buddhist person as the leader. It should be ruled by a person who is a Buddhist follower and a Sinhala. This is the only Sinhala country in the whole world.” Apart from the passionate resistance to a rotating Presidency by one Western province participant, the others looked at the proposal doubtfully as they thought it encourages racial discrimination. As long as a person who is elected as President can develop the country and introduce a sense of nationalism and fairness, some

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respondents were willing to compromise on the President’s ethnicity.
Tamil people from the Eastern province had different opinions about this matter. They believed that such a proposal could cause problems, i.e., the elected President would support their own community and that could contribute to ethnic conflicts. Some people fully supported the proposal and yet some others, though they supported it, doubted whether the majority would accept a minority President.
Some Muslim respondents from the Eastern province were excited by the idea of having a Muslim President, while others did not think it was such a good idea. Those who disagreed said that, if a President was elected based on ethnicity, then that President will always favor people belonging to the same ethnicity when allocating foreign aid and funds. The participants came up with an alternate proposal of having a vice president from a minority community.
All participants from the Northern province favored the proposal, stating that it would give all communities an equal chance and allow the problems and grievances of each community to be dealt with by each successive President. Almost all participants of the Central province agreed to this proposal and they accepted it as a proper solution to the injustices committed against a particular ethnic community by a President belonging to another ethnic community. One participant disagreed because he believed that a President belonging to a minority community would create a lot of problems and so the Presidency of the country should be held only by somebody belonging to the majority community.
5. Each ethnic group should have the right to elect a certain number of members to the parliament.
When asked if they would agree to a proposal where each ethnic group would be given the right to elect a certain number of members to the parliament, the common understanding among the Southern province respondents was that
it would not be such a believed that the MPs sh by a majority mandate an system allows the repre ethnicities, it should be le the public doesn’t have to parliament. The Presiden authorities could appoint fill the allocated num Parliament,” was anoth response.
The Western Northern province partic that the existing parliam fulfills the needs of all et
The Tamil and from the Eastern provinc Central province particip if such a proposal was i would be beneficial fo disclosed that if member Parliament based on population of different would ensure sufficient r the parliament to get th They expected the MPs particular community to the task of looking int affecting their communit adequate solutions.
6. There should be a g (that is, freedom fr prosecution)for people committed illegal pol against civilians during as they testify in front of commission.
“Whoever that pers responsible for the incide He does it on behalf of th Therefore he should be f “During the tim three ethnicities have com Therefore all of them sho “Sometimes this type of th to mistakes by the parties some other cases they purposely. Since this has h wartime they can be forgi
These were sentiments expressed by from the North Cen Southern and Northern
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it would not be such a success. They believed that the MPs should be elected by a majority mandate and, as the existing system allows the representation of all ethnicities, it should be left as it is. “Then the public doesn’t have to elect MPs to the parliament. The President or the relevant authorities could appoint certain people to fill the allocated number of seats in Parliament,” was another participant’s response.
The Western province and Northern province participants all stated that the existing parliamentary system fulfills the needs of all ethnicities.
The Tamil and Muslim people from the Eastern province, along with the Central province participants, agreed that if such a proposal was implemented, it would be beneficial for them. They disclosed that if members were elected to Parliament based on a ratio of the population of different communities, it would ensure sufficient representation in the parliament to get their work done. They expected the MPs who represent a particular community to be trusted with the task of looking into the problems affecting their community and providing adequate solutions.
6. There should be a general amnesty (that is, freedom from criminal prosecution)for people who may have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission.
“Whoever that person is, he is not responsible for the incidents individually. He does it on behalf of the organization. Therefore he should be forgiven.”
“During the time of the war, all three ethnicities have committed violence. Therefore all of them should be forgiven.” “Sometimes this type of thing happens due to mistakes by the parties involved and in some other cases they do such things purposely. Since this has happened during wartime they can be forgiven.”
These were the common sentiments expressed by the participants from the North Central, Western, Southern and Northern provinces when
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asked if they thought there should be a general amnesty for people who may have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission.
However, there were people who were willing to forgive on the condition that those who have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war should confess and admit their mistakes and assure that this type of violence would not take place in the future. Asked if the people around them would also be willing to forgive such parties, the participants stated that it is a common phenomenon that at least two out of ten would disagree for any given thing.
In contrast, many participants of the Eastern (Batticoloa and Ampara) and Central provinces thought such offenders should not be pardoned. They believed that even if
(C) Copyright -Social Indicator - December 2003
ÍÍ

thought there should be nesty for people who may itted illegal political inst civilians during the as they testify in front of eace commission. wever, there were people illing to forgive on the that those who have illegal political violence ilians during the war fess and admit their d assure that this type of uld not take place in the
e people around them e willing to forgive such articipants stated that it n phenomenon that at t of ten would disagree n thing.
contrast, many of the Eastern (Batticoloa ) and Central provinces h offenders should not be hey believed that even if
those people were forgiven they would repeat the same mistakes and continually ask for forgiveness. “If we punish them now, they will realize it later.” Some considered these people’s behavior not worthy of pardoning, while others thought that they should be asked to pay compensation for the damages they have caused. “Although such people can be pardoned, who is going to do justice to the people who were killed by them? I think they should not be pardoned even though they may not be committing such offences in the future, since the lives of the victims cannot be valued.”
The general agreement however was to hand over some sort of a punishment to the offenders. One Muslim participant from the Eastern province summed up the views of many when he said, “Under the pretext of war, many injustices such as firing at Mosques and attacking civilians have happened. Can we forgive the action of firing at unarmed civilians engaged in prayers at the mosque? It cannot be forgiven.”

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Protest Potential
A
province they majority would participants join of North an organization said Central that
only if that organization was not having any political affiliations. One participant stated that the decision to join such an organization or participate in a protest depends on which political party the individual supports. “If you voted the current government into power, you might just keep quiet even if you don’t like the peace process.”
Southern province participants said that they would do what the majority does, in such a situation. One respondent stated: “The Prime Minister had said that whatever the decision, it will have to be passed in parliament. If it will be voted against, then what is the point in us going and joining an organization.”
Some of the Western province respondents stated that they would definitely participate in a protest or join an organization, while the majority were worried about the consequences of taking part in such an activity. They were mostly worried about the safety of their family members and were willing to take part in a protest together with other people, but not individually.
Tamil participants from the Eastern province thought their protests would not have any impacts, as they were a minority. The participants also believed that their representatives would know when an unfair process was taking place and that if the representatives showed their dissatisfaction, they, the participants, would support the representatives. Some respondents
replied that if they fe problems were bigger th hand they would participating in such a others said whatever the the personal problem participate. Some felt th sacrificed their lives for LTTE, required unlimite the civilians.
Muslim particip Eastern province voiced opinions, when they said willing to go in even for unfair peace agreement were ignored. Regardless all participants were prep arms and they also sta houses and families wou issues if a war were ahead do whatever possible for the engage myself in the war attention or attend to my When asked if people around them thou manner, one participant r of all, saying, “Any probl me is a problem common will have to cooperate.”
The general agr respondents from the No that if they got a chance against an unfair peace would do so, failing whi campaign against it. T would not hesitate to p protest as long as a majo them. When asked if they in any protests before, som had taken part in strikes “Pongu Thamil”(where ‘one land one people’).
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test Potential
A
replied that if they felt their family problems were bigger than the issues at hand they would refrain from participating in such activities, while others said whatever the magnitude of the personal problem they would participate. Some felt that as the LTTE sacrificed their lives for them, they, the LTTE, required unlimited support from the civilians.
Muslim participants from the Eastern province voiced their passionate opinions, when they said that they were willing to go in even for a war against an unfair peace agreement if their protests were ignored. Regardless of their gender, all participants were prepared to take up arms and they also stated that their houses and families would be secondary issues if a war were ahead of them. “I will do whatever possible for the community and engage myself in the war. I will not pay attention or attend to my family’s needs.”
When asked if all the Muslim people around them thought in the same manner, one participant replied on behalf of all, saying, “Any problem that comes to me is a problem common to all. Hence all will have to cooperate.”
The general agreement among respondents from the North province was that if they got a chance to use the vote against an unfair peace settlement they would do so, failing which, they would campaign against it. They said they would not hesitate to participate in a protest as long as a majority was behind them. When asked if they had taken part in any protests before, some said that they had taken part in strikes at work and in “Pongu Thamil”(where the theme was ‘one land one people’).
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As long as the grounds for protesting was considered reasonable, the Central province respondents said that they wouldn’t mind participating in such an activity. However, they said that they would have to think twice about the outcomes and were worried about their families. A female respondent said that she would not join a protest as she has small children
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long as the grounds for as considered reasonable, rovince respondents said uldn’t mind participating tivity. However, they said uld have to think twice tcomes and were worried r families. A female said that she would not t as she has small children
to look after. Some of the respondents had already taken part in various protest activities. They all agreed that in the event of a final peace agreement having an adverse impact on Upcountry people, they would make the public representatives and the general public aware of it and then peacefully protest against such a solution, before it is finalized.

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Notes
1. The PCI, which has been administered bi-monthly by SI since 2001, provides trend line data on public support for the peace process, while the KAP survey allows for a more in-depth understanding of the politi- cal and social dynamics that underlie the trends.
2.The analysis of political parties is complicated by the fact that only 55% of respondents volunteer a party affiliation when asked; 45% say they do not identify with a party. Overall, party identifiers are slightly more likely to be activists but are no more or less likely to support multiple peace proposals than respondents who do not report a party affiliation.
3.It is important to note that the small size of the Tamil community relative to the Sinhala makes it much more difficult to find statistically significant differences among the Tamils. The same applies in equal measure to Up- country Tamils and Muslims.
4. Refers to the proposals explained in Table I on Page
12.
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es
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KAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
OPINION POLL JUNE 200 CONDUCTED BY SOCIAL INDIC 105, FIFTH LANE, COLOMBO 03, T
SERIAL NO:
HOUSEHOLD NO:
INTERVIEWER: NAME OF INTERVIEWER:
I here by certify that all information provided here is true obtained from the respondent as instructed.
___ Signature of Interviewer
INTERVIEWER: ALL STATEMENTS IN BOLD LETTERING AND SHOULD NOT BE READ OUT TO THE RESPONDENT.
Good morning /afternoon/ evening. My name is __________ Indicator, a research organisation that conducts independen are currently conducting a study to gather public perception economic issues. We would appreciate it if you could spen answer a few questions on this issue.
I hereby assure you that your views expressed will be treated w SUPERVISOR: NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
DATE OF BACK-CHECKING:
STATUS: 1. VALID
2. INVALID 3. SUSPICIOUS
IF INVALID, STATE REASONS:
IF SUSPICIOUS, STATE REASONS:


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___ SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003

NION POLL JUNE 2003 TED BY SOCIAL INDICATOR ANE, COLOMBO 03, TP: 370473
ion provided here is true and accurate and has been
instructed.
IN BOLD LETTERING ARE INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU O THE RESPONDENT.
y name is 

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___ and I represent Social t conducts independent research on social issues. We ather public perceptions and attitudes on various socio- te it if you could spend some of your valuable time to
pressed will be treated with utmost confidentiality.
S:
SONS:
2003 iKAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
KISH GRID
A. Can you please tell me the number of people livi
between the ages of 18 to 65 years?
USE THE KISH GRID TO SELECT YOUR RESP
TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003
HOUSEHOLD NO
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 4 4 1 3 4 3 1 5 1 1 5 3 2 2 6 6 4 1 5 4 1 7 5 2 3 1 7 7 8 2 5 4 1 1 3 9 3 4 6 7 5 8 10 7 10 8 3 2 4
•
MARK THE NUMBER OF THE CHOSEN PERSO
a. Can I speak to _________ (the person chosen through 1. Yes 2. No –
i. Respondent is not willing to give interview (MOV ii. Respondent is not available
IF THE CHOSEN RESPONDENT IS NOT AVAILABLE SE CONDUCT THE INTERVIEW LATER.


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number of people living in this household who are years?
SELECT YOUR RESPONDENT
O
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 3 1 2 3 4 3 1 2 2 1 2 5 3 2 2 4 5 4 1 1 5 4 1 2 6 3 5 3 1 7 7 3 2 6 4 4 1 1 3 5 4 8 7 6 7 5 8 1 9 2 5 8 3 2 4 1 6 1 5
THE CHOSEN PERSON ON THE GRID
e person chosen through the Kish grid) please?
g to give interview (MOVE TO NEXT HOUSEHOLD) ilable
IS NOT AVAILABLE SET AN APPOINTMENT TO TER.
2003 iiKAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
1. I would like to begin by asking you what you think a facing Sri Lanka today. Please rank the following issues (PLEASE ROTATE)
ISSUES a. The Economy b. Crime c. Conflict between different ethnic group d. The peace process in Sri Lanka e. Violation of Human Rights (e.g. Torture
disappearance) f. Others (specify)
I. General Discontents
A. POLICY DISCONTENT
2. I’d like to ask you some questions about conditions in t talk about. For each condition, please tell me whether you (1) improved, (2) is about the same, or (3) is worse today
Conditions
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003
Improved
1
About the sam
2 a. The Economy 1 2 b. Crime 1 2 c. Conflict between
different ethnic groups 1 2 d. The peace process
in Sri Lanka 1 2 e. Violation of Human
Rights (e.g. Torture & disappearance) 1 2
B. DISCONTENT WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMAN
3. Now, for a few of the conditions that I just mentioned, I performance of the government in dealing with it. If the nu “excellent” performance, and the number “5” indicates an would you rate the government’s performance in:
Conditions
Excellent
1
Good
2
Neither good nor poor 3 a. Improving the
Economy? 1 2 3 b. In combating
crime? 1 2 3


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g you what you think are the most important issues nk the following issues from most to least important.
ISSUES RANK
en different ethnic groups
cess in Sri Lanka man Rights (e.g. Torture & ) y)
ons about conditions in the country that people often ease tell me whether you think that the condition has:
e, or (3) is worse today than it was a year ago:
oved
1
About the same
2
Worse
3
Don’t know/ No response 9 1 2 3 9 1 2 3 9
1 2 3 9
1 2 3 9
1 2 3 9
RNMENT PERFORMANCE
s that I just mentioned, I’d like you to rate the overall
dealing with it. If the number “1” indicates a number “5” indicates an “very poor” performance how performance in:
ood
2
Neither good nor poor 3
Poor
4
Very poor
5
Don’t know/ No response 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2003 iiiKAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
c. In dealing with
conflicts between ethnic groups? 1 2 3 d. In furthering the
peace process in Sri Lanka? 1 2 3 e. Prosecuting
violators of human rights? 1 2 3
C. PERSONAL SITUATION AND ECONOMIC PERCE
Now, I would like to get your opinion on some economic s
Conditions
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003
Much better
1
Somewhat better
2
Abou
sam
3 4. About your personal economic situation? What would you say your personal economic situation is compared to a year ago?
1 2 3
5. And how about the
economic power of your ethnic group? What would you say that the economic power of your ethnic group compared to a year ago?
1 2 3
6. Now thinking about the future, what do you expect the economy of Sri Lanka to become in the next twelve months?
1 2 3


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2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
D ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS
ion on some economic situations.
Somewhat better
2
About the
Somewhat
Don’t same
worse
know/ No response 3
4
9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
Much worse
5
2003 ivKAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
II. Political Institutions And The Political Process
7. Please tell me generally whether you have a lot, a little following institutions in Sri Lanka.
Institutions
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003
A lot of confidence
1
Some confidence
2
Neithe confiden nor not confiden 3 a. Your local
governments (MC/UC/PS/ Provincial Council)
1 2 3
b. The national government
1 2 3
c. The President 1 2 3 d. The Prime
Minister
1 2 3
e. Parliament 1 2 3 f. The mass media
1 2 3
g. Religious institutes
1 2 3
h. Community-
Based or Non- Governmental Organizations
1 2 3
i. Courts and
legal system
1 2 3
j. Police 1 2 3 k. Army 1 2 3 l. Trade unions 1 2 3 m. Politicians 1 2 3
8. Sometimes democracy has problems. When this hap democracy is always best. Others say that democracy is any other system, while others say that sometimes demo strong leader. What do you think?
1. Democracy is always best 2. Democracy is not perfect but it is better tha 3. Sometimes democracy must be replaced 4. Don’t know/No response


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The Political Process
er you have a lot, a little, or no confidence in the
Some confidence
2
Don’t know/ No response 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9 2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9 2 3 4 5 9 2 3 4 5 9 2 3 4 5 9
oblems. When this happens, some people say that rs say that democracy is not perfect but it is better than
y that sometimes democracy must be replaced by a ? ays best perfect but it is better than any other system cracy must be replaced by a strong leader
ponse
Neither confident nor not confident 3
Not much confidence
4
No confidence
5
2003 vKAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
9. Please think about corruption in politics, that is where p use public resources/property for their own benefit, or tak in Sri Lanka do you think are corrupt?
1. All politicians 2. Many but not all 3. Only a few 4. No politicians 5. Don’t know/No response
III. Tolerance And Democratic Values
10. Some people say that the media in Sri Lanka should b the government as they wish. Please tell me how strongly this statement?
1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don’t know/No response
11. Some people say that society shouldn’t have to put up fundamentally different from the country as a whole. Pleas agree or disagree with this statement?
1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Somewhat disagree 5. 6. Strongly Don’t know/No disagree
response
12. There are many different opinions about women’s pa system. Generally speaking, do you think that women sho politics than they do now, or should they participate about
1. Should participate more than they do now 2. Should participate less than they do now 3. Should participate about the same as they 4. Don’t know/No response
13. Some people say that most Sri Lankans can be truste others sat that you have to be very careful when dealing w tell me your own view on this?
1. Most people can be trusted 2. Have to be very careful with them 3. Don’t know/No response
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in politics, that is where people in government illegally
their own benefit, or take bribes. How many politicians upt?
ponse
ic Values
dia in Sri Lanka should be completely free to criticize ase tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with
disagree
e
ponse
shouldn’t have to put up with political views that are ountry as a whole. Please tell me how strongly you
ent?
disagree
e
ponse
nions about women’s participation in the political ou think that women should participate more or less in ld they participate about the same as they do now? more than they do now less than they do now about the same as they do now ponse
ri Lankans can be trusted to treat you fairly, while y careful when dealing with most Sri Lankans. Please
e trusted reful with them ponse
2003 viKAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
14. I am going to read out the following statements. Pleas with those statements or not?
Statements
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003
Strongly agree
1
Somewhat agree
2
Neith agree disag
3 a. A person who wants
to do away with elections and let the military run the country should not be allowed to make a speech in your community.
1 2 3
b. Someone who
believes that your ethnic group is inferior to all others should be allowed to organize a peaceful demonstration in your community in order to express their point of view.
1 2 3
c. A person who
opposes all forms of religion should not be allowed to make a speech in your community.
1 2 3
15. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with th
Statements
Strongly agree
1
Somewhat agree
2
Neith agree disag
3 a. Some people think it
is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disruptive
1 2 3


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owing statements. Please tell me whether you agree
Somewhat agree
2
Don’t know/ No response 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
rongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor strongly disagree with the following statements:
Somewhat agree
2
Neither agree nor disagree
3
Somewhat disagree
4
Strongly disagree
5
Neither
Somewhat
Strongly
Don’t agree nor
disagree
disagree
know/ disagree
No response 3
4
5
9
2 3 4 5 9
2003 viiKAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
b. People should not have to obey laws which they consider
1 2 3
unjust
IV. Individual And Group Efficacy In Politics
Now I’d like your opinion on some more general issues. I’m statements, and I’d like you to please tell me the extent to with each one.
Statements
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003
Neith agree disag
3 16. I feel well prepared
for participating in political life
Strongly
Somewhat agree
agree
1
2
1 2 3
17. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on.
1 2 3
18. People like me have
no say in what the government does.
1 2 3
19. If I complained to a
local government official, he or she would pay attention to my concerns
1 2 3
V. Willingness To Engage In Participation
20. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither ag strongly disagree with the following statements
Statements
Neith agree disag
3 a. The only way to influence
what happens in this country is to break the law sometimes
Strongly
Agree agree
1
2
1 2 3


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2 3 4 5 9
Efficacy In Politics
more general issues. I’m going to read a list of ase tell me the extent to which you agree or disagree
Somewhat agree
2
Neither agree nor disagree
3
Somewhat disagree
4
Strongly disagree
5
Don’t know/ No response 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
e In Participation
agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or g statements
ongly ree
1
Agree
2
Neither agree nor disagree
3
Disagree
4
Strongly disagree
5
Don’t know/ No response 9
1 2 3 4 5 9
2003 viiiKAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
b. When one group uses its
power to put down another group, sometimes violence is unavoidable
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003
1 2 3
c. If there is a peace
agreement in Sri Lanka that I think is unfair, I will participate in a protest against it.
1 2 3
d. If there is a peace
agreement in Sri Lanka that I think is unfair, I will join an organization that is opposed to it.
1 2 3
VI. Group Memberships
21. Now I am going to read through a list of groups, and I whether you currently are a member of each group or not
Groups
M Yes a. Religious organization 1 b. A sports or recreation group 1 c. A labor union 1 d. A women’s group 1 e. A community or
neighborhood group
1
f. A business or professional
association
1
VII. Political Knowledge
22. Do you know how long the term of office is for memb he is elected, how many years does he stay in office befo
23. Which political party has the most number of seats in


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__
24. How many seats are there in parliament?
1. 196 2. 200 3. 215 4. 225 5. 250 6. Don’t know/No response


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1 2 3 4 5 9
1 2 3 4 5 9
1 2 3 4 5 9
h a list of groups, and I would like you to tell me ber of each group or not.
ps
Member Yes No ization 1 2 eation group 1 2 1 2 up 1 2 r roup
1 2
rofessional
1 2
erm of office is for members of parliament, that is, after
es he stay in office before the next election?
most number of seats in the parliament? ______
parliament?
ponse
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KAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
VIII. Political Participation
25. Did you vote in the 2001 national elections?
1. Yes 2. No 3. Wasn’t eligible 4. Don’t know/No response
26. I am going to read a list of other kinds of political activ tell me whether you have done it more than once, done it activity in the past five years. Have you . . . . .in the past f READ OUT:
Done it more Activities
than once 1
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003
Done
a. Discussed political issues with
friends, family or co-workers
1
b. Worked for a candidate or party
in an election campaign
1
c. Participated in a neighborhood
or community group
1
d. Contacted an elected official to
ask for a favor or raise an issue
1
e. Taken part in a protest march or demonstration on some national or local issue
1
IX. Political Interest, Media Exposure, Partisans
27. Would you say you have a great deal of interest, som in politics?
1. A great deal of interest 2. Some interest 3. Very little interest 4. No interest at all 5. Don’t know/No response
28. Generally speaking through which medium do you get about politics?
1. Newspaper 2. Television 3. Political meeting 4. College/ University 5. Word of mouth 6. Radio 7. Others (Specify) ____


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onal elections?
ponse
er kinds of political activities besides voting. Please more than once, done it once, or never done each
e you . . . . .in the past five years? ASK FOR EACH.
Done it more than once 1
Done it once
2
Never done
3
Don’t know/ No response 9
1 2 3 9
1 2 3 9
1 2 3 9
1 2 3 9
1 2 3 9
ia Exposure, Partisanship
eat deal of interest, some interest, or very little interest
rest
ponse
hich medium do you get most of your information
__________
2003 x

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KAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
29. How often would you say you pay attention to news on
1. Daily 2. A few times a week 3. Rarely 4. Never
If answer for Q29 is 3 or 4 GO TO Q31
30. Please indicate two radio stations you listen to most o
Radio Stations
Mo ( ANS
SLBC E FM Sun FM Yes FM TNL Classic FM Gold FM Lite Sirasa FM Hiru FM Shri FM Raja FM Lakhadha FM Shakthi FM Suriyan FM Shah FM BBC Sinhala BBC Tamil Others (Specify)
31. How often would you say you read about politics in ne
1. Daily 2. A few times a week 3. Rarely 4. Never
If answer for Q31 is 3 or 4 GO TO Q33
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003

pay attention to news on the radio?
k
GO TO Q31
ions you listen to most often for news?
ions
Rank A. Most popular (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)
B. Second most popular (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY) 01 01 02 02 03 03 04 04 05 05 06 06 07 07 08 08 09 09 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19
read about politics in newspapers?
TO Q33
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KAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
32. Please indicate two newspapers you read most regula
Newspapers
Mo
ANS Lankadeepa Lakbima Divaina Dinamina Irida Lakbima Irida Divaina Irida Lankadeepa Silumina Ravaya Lakjana Lakmina Dinakara Nijabima Lanka Thinakaran Virakesari Thinakkural Sudar Oli Varamanjari Sunday Virakesari Sunday Thinakkural Sunday Sudar Oli Daily News Daily Mirror The Island Sunday Observer Sunday Times Sunday Island Sunday Leader North East Herald Others (Specify)
33. How often would you say you pay attention to news a
1. Daily 2. A few times a week 3. Rarely 4. Never
If answer for Q33 is 3 or 4 GO TO Q35
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003

ers you read most regularly for news?
pers
Rank A. Most frequently read (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)
B. Second most frequently read (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY) 01 01 02 02 03 03 04 04 05 05 06 06 07 07 08 08 09 09 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31
pay attention to news about politics on television?
O TO Q35
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34. Please indicate two television stations you watch mos
Television Stations
Mos c (S ANSW Rupavahini ITN TNL Sirasa TV Swarnavahini MTV ETV Dynavision Shakthi TV Others (Specify)
X. Views On Specific Peace Proposals
35. Would you say you are very informed, somewhat inf the various proposals that are being talked about in regard negotiations between the government and the LTTE?
1. Very informed 2. Somewhat informed 3. Not informed 4. Don’t know/No response
36. For the sake of a peace agreement, please tell me wh agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly d proposals.
Proposals
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003 Strongly agree
1
Agree
2
Neithe agree n disagr
3 a. The powers of regional
governments should be increased, even if those of the government at the center have to be decreased.
1 2 3
b. The powers of some
regional governments may need to be increased more than others.
1 2 3

stations you watch most often for news?
ations
Rank A. Most popular channel (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)
B. Second most popular channel (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY) 01 01 02 02 03 03 04 04 05 05 06 06 07 07 08 08 09 09 10 10
Proposals
informed, somewhat informed, or not informed about ing talked about in regards to the current peace
ent and the LTTE?
d
ponse
ment, please tell me whether you strongly agree, , disagree, or strongly disagree with the following
gly ee
Agree
2
Neither agree nor disagree
3
Disagree
4
Strongly disagree
5
Don’t know/ No response 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
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37. For the sake of a peace agreement, please tell me wh agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly di proposals.
Proposals
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003 Strongly agree
1
Agree
2
Neithe agree n disagr
3 a. The rights of local minority
groups should be protected even if the majority in the area do not agree
1 2 3
b. There should be a rotating
Presidency, where the President for one term will be someone from one ethnic group, and the next term by someone from a different ethnic group
1 2 3
c. Each ethnic group should have the right to elect a certain number of members to the Parliament
1 2 3
d. There should be a general amnesty (that is, freedom from criminal prosecution) for people who may have committed illegal political violence against civilians during the war, so long as they testify in front of an official peace commission
1 2 3
If answer for Q37d is 1 or 2, then GO TO Q38, otherw
38. Who specifically should receive amnesty? (SINGLE A
1. Only LTTE 2. Only Security forces 3. Anyone under orders but not leaders 4. Everyone including leaders 5. No one 6. Don’t know/No response

ment, please tell me whether you strongly agree, , disagree, or strongly disagree with the following
gly ee
Don’t know/ No response 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
en GO TO Q38, otherwise GO TO Q39.
ve amnesty? (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)
es ers but not leaders
leaders
ponse
Agree
2
Neither agree nor disagree
3
Disagree
4
Strongly disagree
5
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XI. Peace Dividends
39. Some people think there will be positive benefits for S peace settlement. Others disagree and think that there wi do you think? In your opinion will a final peace settlement benefits, very few or no benefits at all for Sri Lanka.
1. A lot of benefits for Sri Lanka 2. Some benefits for Sri Lanka 3. Very few benefits for Sri Lanka 4. No benefits at all 5. Don’t know/No response
If answer for Q39 is 4 or 5, then GO TO Q42, otherwis
40. Please rank the following benefits that you think will re settlement?
BENEFITS a. Economic stability b. Personal security c. Violence free society d. Increased individual freedoms e. Others (Specify)
41. Who in Sri Lanka do you think will benefit most from a
1. Sinhala 2. Tamil 3. Up-country Tamil 4. Muslim 5. Those affected by the war 6. Politicians 7. Everyone equally 8. Others (Specify)_____
XII. Foreign Aid
42. As a result of the peace process Sri Lanka receives d rebuild the country. In your opinion who should administer
1. Central government 2. Local/ regional government 3. LTTE 4. Donor organizations 5. Committee comprising of Government and 6. Don’t know/No response 7. Others (Specify)

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_____
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003

e positive benefits for Sri Lanka as a result of a final e and think that there will be few if any benefits. What a final peace settlement have a lot of benefits, some
t all for Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Sri Lanka or Sri Lanka
ponse
GO TO Q42, otherwise GO TO Q40.
efits that you think will result from a final peace
ENEFITS RANK ility rity ociety idual freedoms y)
will benefit most from a final peace settlement?
the war


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_____________
ss Sri Lanka receives donations and foreign aid to n who should administer this foreign aid? nt
ernment
s ising of Government and LTTE members ponse 

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_
2003 xvKAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
43. Which part of the country do you think should receive
1. South 2. North-East 3. Whole country 4. Areas most affected by the war 5. Most underdeveloped areas in general 6. Don’t know/No response 7. Others (Specify)

Page 103
_____
XIII. High Security Zones (HSZs)
44. Have you heard of High Security Zones (HSZs)?
1. Yes 2. No (GO TO Q47)
45. What is your opinion of HSZs, where government forc
1. Important for national security and should b 2. Should be evacuated only after final peace 3. Should be evacuated in the course of the p 4. Should be evacuated now
XIV. De-commissioning
46. When do you think that the LTTE’s heavy weapons sh control of an international commission in exchange for the
1. Now 2. At the same time the government force 3. Should never give up its weapons 4. Don’t know/No response
XV. International Involvement
47. Which of the following countries are most and least in Sri Lanka?
Countries
A. Most involved (SINGLE ANSWER ON Norway 1 Japan 2 USA 3 India 4 Thailand 5 South Africa 6 Germany 7 Other (Specify) 8 Don’t know/No response 9
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003

ou think should receive the funds?
d by the war ed areas in general ponse 

Page 104
_
SZs)
rity Zones (HSZs)?
, where government forces occupy civilian property? nal security and should be maintained ted only after final peace settlement ted in the course of the peace talks ted now
TE’s heavy weapons should be placed under the sion in exchange for the evacuation of HSZs?
e the government forces evacuate the HSZs ive up its weapons response
nt
es are most and least involved in the peace process in
Countries A. Most involved (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)
B. Least involved (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY) 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9
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If answer for A is 9, then GO TO Q50.
48. In your opinion please state your level of satisfaction w involved country?
1. Strongly satisfied 2. Satisfied 3. Dissatisfied 4. Strongly dissatisfied 5. Don’t know/No response
49. People have different opinions on foreign involvement process. Some people say it is an infringement in the inde Others say it can play a useful role but shouldn’t go too fa involvement has been mostly positive for the peace proce following best describes foreign involvement?
1. Infringement in the independence of the co 2. Can play a useful role but shouldn’t go too 3. Their involvement has been mostly positive 4. Don’t know/No response
XVI. Peace Process
50. I am going to read out a list of issues. Please rank th that should be looked into at the peace talks? (PLEASE R
Issues a. Ceasefire agreement enforcement/ adhere b. Human Rights c. High Security Zones d. Reconciliation and Rehabilitation e. Foreign Aid f. Interim Administration g. Federal Structure h. Disarmament
XVII. Ethnic Identity And Ethnic Relations
51. We’d like to ask you some questions now about differ We know this can sometimes be a difficult subject, so jus skip any of the questions. Again, all of your answers will b
Which of the follow groups in Sri Lanka best describes yo
1. Sinhala 2. Tamil 3. Up-country Tamil 4. Muslim 5. Others (Specify)_____
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003


Page 106

GO TO Q50.
our level of satisfaction with the role played by the most
d ponse
on foreign involvement in the Sri Lankan peace infringement in the independence of the country. le but shouldn’t go too far, while others say their
itive for the peace process. In your opinion which of the volvement? independence of the country role but shouldn’t go too far
has been mostly positive for the peace process ponse
f issues. Please rank the first five most important issue eace talks? (PLEASE ROTATE)
Issues Rank ent enforcement/ adherence
s Rehabilitation
tion
nic Relations
estions now about different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. a difficult subject, so just let us know if you’d prefer to all of your answers will be strictly confidential.
Lanka best describes you?
__________
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52. I am now going to read you a list of statements. For e tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, unc strongly disagree.
Statements
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003
Strongly agree
1
Somewhat agree
2
Unce
3 a. People often treat me differently because of my ethnicity
1 2 3
b. Whatever happens to my ethnic group in Sri Lanka, will affect my life
1 2 3
c. My children should
only marry a member from the same ethnic community
1 2 3
53. Now I’m going to ask about each of the major ethnic g to know generally whether you have a good or bad opinio scale, where 1 means excellent and 5 means very bad.
a. Sinhala
1 2 3 4 5
b. Tamil
1 2 3 4 5
c. Up-country Tamil
1 2 3 4 5
d. Muslim
1 2 3 4 5

list of statements. For each of the statements, please e, somewhat agree, uncertain, somewhat disagree or
Somewhat agree
2
Don’t know/ No response 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
2 3 4 5 9
ach of the major ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, and I’d like ve a good or bad opinion of them. Please use the nd 5 means very bad.
5
5
5
5
Uncertain
3
Somewhat disagree
4
Strongly disagree
5
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54. How often you tend to come into contact with people f
1. Daily 2. Once a week or more 3. Once a month or more 4. Once a year or more 5. Rarely/Never
55. About how many of your friends are members of oth
1. Many 2. Some 3. Very few 4. None 5. Don’t know/ No response
56. Now thinking about yourself and your family, have you ever been unfairly treated because of your ethnic, political in any of the following areas?
Areas
A. Ethnicity B. Party Yes No Yes No
a. Education
1 2 1 2
b. Employment
1 2 1 2 c. Dealing with the Police
1 2 1 2
57. Is there a political party in Sri Lanka which you feel clo
1. Yes 2. No [GO TO Q61] 3. No response [GO TO Q61]
58. If yes, which party is that? 1. 2. Bumiputhra CWC
Party (BP)
3. EPDP 4. EPRLF 5. JVP 6. LSSP 7. MEP 8. Nava Vamanshika Peramuna (NVP) 9. PLOTE 10. Sihala Urumaya 11. SLFP 12. SLMC 13. TELO 14. TULF 15. UNP 16. Other (Specify)_
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003


Page 109

nto contact with people from other ethnic groups?
re
re
nds are members of other ethnic groups?
onse
nd your family, have you or members of your family e of your ethnic, political party or religious background
Ethnicity B. Party C. Religion
No Yes No Yes No 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1 2
Lanka which you feel close to?
] O TO Q61]
ty (BP)
ika Peramuna (NVP)
_
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59. Is there any other political party that has ideas close
1. Yes 2. No [GO TO Q61] 3. No response [GO TO Q61]
60. If yes, which party is that?
1. Bumiputhra Party (BP) 2. CWC 3. EPDP 4. EPRLF 5. JVP 6. LSSP 7. MEP 8. Nava Vamanshika Peramuna (NVP) 9. PLOTE 10. Sihala Urumaya 11. SLFP 12. SLMC 13. TELO 14. TULF 15. UNP 16. Other (Specify)_
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003


Page 111

arty that has ideas close to yours?
] O TO Q61]
ty (BP)
ika Peramuna (NVP)
_
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KAPS June 2003 – Final Questionnaire
XVIII. Demographics
61. Sex:
1. Male 2. Female
62. Age:
1. 15 – 25 yrs 4. 46 – 55 yrs 2. 26 – 35 yrs 5. 56 – 65 yrs 3. 36 – 45 yrs 6. 66 yrs and abov
63. Which language do you use the most? (SINGLE ANS
1. Sinhala 2. Tamil 3. English 4. O
64. Which other language, if any, do you speak? [Multiple
1. Sinhala 2. Tamil 3. English 4. O
65. Monthly income of your family from all sources:
1. Less than or equal to Rs. 1000/- 2. Rs. 1001 – Rs. 2000 3. Rs. 2001 – Rs. 3000 4. Rs. 3001 – Rs. 4000 5. Rs. 4001 – Rs. 5000 6. Rs. 5001 – Rs. 6000 7. 8. Rs. Rs. 6001 7001 – – Rs. Rs. 7000 8000 9. Rs. 8001 – Rs. 9000 10. Rs. 9001 – Rs. 10000 11. More than Rs. 10000/- 12. No response
66. Occupation of the respondent (SINGLE CODE ONLY
1. Executives, Managerial and Administrative Professionals
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003
8. Housew
2. Professionals 9. Retired 3. Technicians and Associate Professionals
10. Busine
4. Clerk 11. Self em 5. Travel, Restaurant, Protective Service Workers and Sales Workers
12. Elemen
6. Agricultural and fisheries workers 13. Unempl 7. Students 14. Other

Female
4. 46 – 55 yrs 5. 56 – 65 yrs 6. 66 yrs and above
he most? (SINGLE ANSWER ONLY)
3. English 4. Other _________
do you speak? [Multiple Answers Possible]
3. English 4. Other _________
from all sources: l to Rs. 1000/- 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000 00/-
t (SINGLE CODE ONLY)
rial and 8. Housewife/Househusband
9. Retired Associate 10. Business
11. Self employed Protective Workers
12. Elementary Occupations
workers 13. Unemployed
14. Other
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67. Could you please tell me your educational qualification
1. Cannot read and write 8. Advanc 2. Literate but no formal education 9. Vocatio 3. Up to grade 5 10. Technic 4. Grade 6-9 11. Profess 5. Up to O’ Level 12. Underg 6. O’ Level 13. Gradua 7. Up to Advanced Level
68. When does caste matter in your life? [Multiple Answ
1. In marriage 2. Making friends 3. At work 4. In your neighborhood 5. When voting for a candidate 6. It doesn’t matter at all
69. Religion:
1. Buddhism 2. Hinduism 4. Roman Catholicism 5. Christianity (Non-
70. How often do you attend religious services?
1. Regularly 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4. Never
1. RESPONDENT’S NAME:
2. ADDRESS:
4. PROVINCE
5. DISTR
6. 1. Rural
2. Urban
7. DATE: 8. START TIME:
Thank you very much for you
Copyright©Social Indicator, June 2003

educational qualifications? (SINGLE CODE ONLY)
8. Advanced Level ducation 9. Vocationally trained
10. Technically trained 11. Professional 12. Undergraduate 13. Graduate and above
ur life? [Multiple Answers Possible]
od candidate t all
2. Hinduism 3. Islam 5. Christianity (Non-RC) 6.Other _________
ious services?
3. TEL NO:
5. DISTRICT:
TART TIME: 9. END TIME:
ou very much for your time.
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Social Indicator (SI) is an independent social which conducts polls on socio-economic and p Operating under the Board of Directors of Alternatives (CPA), SI was established in Septem longstanding vacuum for a permanent, profes polling facility in Sri Lanka on social and politic Polling is an instrument of empowerment, a m majority of the public can express their opini them. Our mission is to conduct surveys on k providing a means through which public opi public policy debate.
Published by: Social Indicator Centre for Policy Alternatives 105, 5th Lane, Colombo 3, Sri Lanka.
Tel: +9411 2370472 Em Fax: +9411 2370475 W

an independent social research organisation,
socio-economic and political issues. Board of Directors of the Centre for Policy as established in September 1999, and filled a or a permanent, professional and independent nka on social and political issues. t of empowerment, a means by which the silent can express their opinions on issues affecting to conduct surveys on key social issues, thereby ough which public opinion can influence the
d by: icator r Policy Alternatives Lane,
3, .
11 2370472 Email: cpapoll@diamond.lanka.net 11 2370475 Web: http://www.cpalanka.org