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War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka
Overview and Trends 20

War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka
rview and Trends 2006

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The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is an independent, non-pa issues of governance and conflict resolution. Formed in 1996 in the society to the public policy debate is in need of strengthening, CP and advocacy through which public policy is critiqued, alternatives id
The report is based on monitoring and research conducted by the fi is compiled by Dr. Muthukrishna Sarvananthan of the Point Pedro Ins
Address: 24/2 28th Lane, off Flower Road
Colombo 7 Telephone: +94 (11) 2565304/5/6 Fax: +94 (11) 4714460
Web www.cpalanka.org

n independent, non-partisan organization that focuses primarily on . Formed in 1996 in the firm belief that the vital contribution of civil d of strengthening, CPA is committed to programmes of research critiqued, alternatives identified and disseminated.
rch conducted by the five units of the CPA. The economic chapter n of the Point Pedro Institute for Development.
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Centre for Policy Alternatives
Table of Contents
Overview and Trends: 2006 - 2007
Introduction The Rajapaksa Presidency The LTTE The International Community Conclusion
Peace Process
Introduction The success and failure of Peace Talks Peace Process under siege A crisis of violence The shifting balance of power International Community Strategic advantages of a ‘No official war, no peace’
Political outlook
Introduction Strengthening of the President’s position Consolidation of power through peace The political rewards of militarism A broad coalition and a weakened opposition
Governance
Introduction The crisis around the Constitutional Council and the 17th Politicization of the Supreme Court and Deterioration of In Increased Legal Challenges to Human Rights Attacks on INGOs/NGOs The Lack of Accountability and Transparency in the Law-M Conclusion
Human Security
Introduction Targeting of Civilians
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ble of Contents
06 - 2007 1 1 2 3 4 5
6 6 Talks 6 7 8 9 10 cial war, no peace’ 11
13 13 osition 13 eace 14 15 opposition 16
19 19 al Council and the 17th Amendment to the Constitution 19 rt and Deterioration of Independence of Judiciary 20 man Rights 21 22 ansparency in the Law-Making Process 22 23
24 24 24
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Abductions and Disappearances A Human Rights Crisis and Responses to it New Displacement An Emerging Humanitarian Crisis Continuing Slow Progress in Tsunami Reconstruction Conclusion
State of the Economy
Introduction Growth Money Supply Unemployment Inflation Public Finances External Balance-of-Payments Stock Market Economic Governance and Restructuring Budget 2007 Mahinda Chintanaya Economy in the Conflict Region Conclusions and way forward
Public Opinion
Introduction Support is declining yet negotiations still the best option Parties are losing public confidence Mixed perceptions over the benefits of the CFA but no stro Strong support for Foreign Involvement Increased ethnic polarization over human rights issues
State of the Media
Introduction Overview of statements and reports on media freedom Media under fire Diminishing Freedom of Expression A litany of problems
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25 nses to it 26 27 27 ami Reconstruction 29 30
31 31 31 32 32 32 33 33 35 ucturing 35 35 36 37 37
42 42 ns still the best option 42 e 43 its of the CFA but no strong support to abrogate it 44 ment 44 human rights issues 45
46 46 rts on media freedom 46 48 n 49 49
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Overview and Trends: 2006 - 2007
Introduction
The year 2006 registered a qualitative shift in the security situation on the
2002 Cease fire Agreement (CFA). An intensification of hostilities leading to of human rights made Sri Lanka one of the most dangerous places in the w conflict.
The intensification of hostilities sparked by armed provocation included the bombs and an aerial bombing campaign. The sharp increases in human ances, abductions and extortion to forced child conscription. The humani shields and as targets, severe restrictions on the access to civilians by hu distribution of food and medicine, spiraling costs of these essential items persons since April 2006.
Accordingly, a post ceasefire period that had been termed one of No Wa
conflict and further, into open war in the East, in particular. Whilst the CF Sri Lanka (GOSL) or the Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE), the politi founded was decisively altered and the agreement itself therefore rendered
the LTTE Vellupillai Prabhakaran declared in his annual Heroes Day Speec “defunct”.
The deterioration in the security situation can be attributed to the political and the LTTE. Neither side was interested in a regeneration of the peac
2002 CFA – their overarching interests lay in political consolidation, on the the part of the LTTE, the creation of a ground situation that would strengt possible with the Sri Lankan state since it was even more unwilling and presidency to understand, appreciate and accommodate Tamil grievance parties went through the motions of peace talks for the benefit of the inte against each other, their principal objective lay in effecting a new balance o basis for future talks and a peace process in their favour.
The three rounds of talks that took place after much bargaining over the v That they focused on and in the end also collapsed on issues of immedi situation – political killings, child recruitment, paramilitaries, equality of statu A9 highway- as opposed to core political issues and arrangements - interi
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

verview and Trends:
06 - 2007
security situation on the ground from that which had prevailed since the
n of hostilities leading to a grave humanitarian crisis and serious violations ngerous places in the world for civilians caught up in a situation of armed
rovocation included the laying and detonation of claymore mines, suicide arp increases in human rights violations ranged from killings, disappear- nscription. The humanitarian crisis included the use of civilians as human ccess to civilians by humanitarian agencies as well as in the supply and f these essential items as well as internal displacement of over 200,000
termed one of No War / No Peace descended into one of low intensity
articular. Whilst the CFA was not abrogated by either the Government of Eelam (LTTE), the political and military balance of power on which it was itself therefore rendered redundant. One of the signatories, the leader of
ual Heroes Day Speech of November 2006, that the CFA was effectively
tributed to the political interests of the two main protagonists - the GOSL generation of the peace process and talks within the framework of the
l consolidation, on the part of the Mahinda Rajapaksa presidency, and on tion that would strengthen the argument that no political settlement was ven more unwilling and unable under the stewardship of the Rajapaksa odate Tamil grievances and aspirations. Consequently, though the two r the benefit of the international community and to score political points ffecting a new balance of power on the ground in all it dimensions, as the
vour.
h bargaining over the venue– Geneva I & II and in Oslo – confirmed this. d on issues of immediate critical relevance to the cease fire and ground ilitaries, equality of status between the two parties and the opening of the d arrangements - interim or final - constituted a gauge of the diminishing
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strength and viability of the post CFA peace process. This also revealed t tional bargaining than to conflict transformation.
Indeed, at the outset of all these meetings expectations were kept low with terialization of talks hailed as the key indicators of success. (Oslo was an directly engage with a GOSL delegation it had prior knowledge of and yet
own). Geneva I was hailed as a breakthrough on account of it being the since March 2003 when the LTTE unilaterally withdrew. It resulted in a re that it resulted in as much change as it did continuity. It was the only rou this agreement, to rein in paramilitaries and stop political killings was not im to effect a new balance of power on the ground in their favour as the basi ing new life into the post CFA one and in proceeding towards a settlement
An analytical elaboration of these positions with reference to developments
flict transformation process in Sri Lanka in 2007.
The Rajapaksa Presidency
The overarching objective of the Rajapaksa presidency is its consolidatio lishment of its dominance over the Sri Lankan polity. These are perceived
slender victory in the 2005 Presidential election. They are in turn reinforced dency and the President’s ideological moorings. Consequently, revitalizatio proposals for a political settlement is not a priority. Waging a war agains
around which to galvanize popular support and the key issue on which to vious administrations of Ranil Wickremesinghe and Chandrika Bandaranaik
However, the expression of good intent and goodwill towards a revitalizat retain the interest, support and engagement of the international comm
Lanka. At the same time this has to be done in a manner that does not ancing political forces to ensure regime consolidation. The setting up of with a Panel of Experts to come up with a political framework for a settle sensus” in negotiations with the LTTE, as opposed to a clear direction fr articulation thereof, illustrates this. The APRC mechanism serves the ove antagonizing electoral allies such as the JVP and JHU, whilst at the same forces on the ethnic conflict, from the UNP opposition.
The fate of the Majority Report of the Panel of Experts and APRC Chair reconciliation of it with the Minority Report, further illustrates this. The Ma name and Prof Vitharana has reaffirmed it, though in a watered down vers the President has distanced himself from them. The Vitharana report will the APRC to which forum the UNP has submitted its proposals. It is highly emerge will be decisively conditioned by what has happened and is intend successes in Vaharai. It is unlikely that the primacy accorded to the mil Were it to be altered at all, the most likely catalyst for this would be military
Interpreting the Supreme Court decision on the NorthEast merger as dete posed to the process through which it was effected, and ignoring the merger, the President has gone ahead with institutionalizing separate and
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

s. This also revealed the greater commitment of the two parties to posi-
tions were kept low with the agreement to meet in the first place and ma- success. (Oslo was an exception to this because of the LTTE’s refusal to r knowledge of and yet deemed to be of incommensurate status with its
account of it being the first round of peace talks between the two sides rew. It resulted in a reaffirmation of the CFA, though the GOSL insisted uity. It was the only round of talks that yielded an agreement. However, litical killings was not implemented. Both sides seemed to be determined their favour as the basis of a re-designed peace process, than in breath- g towards a settlement on the basis of it.
erence to developments in 2006 will also identify the trajectory of the con-
ency is its consolidation in terms of a legislative majority and the estab- lity. These are perceived political imperatives that stem from Rajapaksa’s
ey are in turn reinforced by the electoral alliances formed to win the presi- onsequently, revitalization of a peace process through the presentation of y. Waging a war against terrorism is. It serves as an unassailable cause
key issue on which to demonstrate a clean break in policy from the pre- Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga.
ill towards a revitalization of the peace process is deemed necessary to f the international community in the pursuit of a negotiated peace in Sri
manner that does not detract from or upset the overall objective of bal- tion. The setting up of an All Party Representatives Committee (APRC) framework for a settlement which would then serve as a “southern con- to a clear direction from the Government as to its policy position and hanism serves the overarching political imperative of neither alienating or JHU, whilst at the same time leaving open the door to more moderate sition.
perts and APRC Chairperson, Minister Professor Vitharana’s attempted illustrates this. The Majority Report traverses a federal course in all but in a watered down version. The fate of all of these documents is unclear; e Vitharana report will be considered by the SLFP and subsequently by ts proposals. It is highly likely though that the proposals that will eventually happened and is intended to happen on the battlefield, following military cy accorded to the military dimension will be altered by policy decision.
r this would be military setback.
rthEast merger as determining the merger to be unconstitutional as op- ted, and ignoring the UNP offer of support for legislation to effect the tionalizing separate and distinct political and administrative arrangements
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for the Northern and Eastern provinces respectively. It is likely therefore t East and the Karuna faction established as primus inter pares in the provin
This would be yet another departure from the Kumaratunga and Wickrem future of the East was to follow a period of merger with the North. The Ra such action is designed to decisively puncture the LTTE pretension of sol
East and strike a mortal blow against the homeland concept that has unite onset of the armed conflict in 1983.
By focusing on weakening the LTTE militarily and by effecting a de -mer stolen the JVP’s “clothes” on conflict resolution. At the same time throug
of UNPers into his Government, he has successfully relieved himself of d mentary majority. There is no discounting the possibility of a general elec before the costs of war make the cost of living too punitive and the LTTE
tained bombing campaign outside of the North and East, make for unprop
Regime consolidation in the short and medium term notwithstanding, the stability that could emerge in 2007, namely the future political course of and the GOSL, and increasing authoritarianism on the part of the Governm
In 2006, there were signs of the populist nature of the Rajapaksa regime a cies were reinforced by the war against terrorism which was provided as gency regulations incorporating the PTA that had been suspended follow “patriotism” targeting non governmental organizations and sections of the lar. The President himself pointed out that there was no grey area in this w
In addition, human rights violations involving the security forces and para child conscription, disappearances and abductions sharply increased an defence ministry came to occupy a pivotal position within Government There was also the violation of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Cons tional Council and the unilateral appointment of commissions for the polic ers.
The weakness of the UNP opposition in parliament given its depleted ran assertiveness in response to political dissent and criticism leveled against already signs of JVP union activity and the threat of strikes. In this respec alism and action taken against the Sri Lanka Transport Board demonstrato harbinger of things to come.
The risks inherent in the relationship with Karuna once ensconced as Ch ability of the GOSL to contain the activities and ambitions of the Karuna fa The degree of strategic congruence between Karuna and the GOSL is like such strategic congruence cannot be taken for granted and indefinitely.
The LTTE
Events in the course of 2006 point to strategic miscalculations on the par on a Rajapaksa presidency adopting a hard line which in turn would justify
the boycott of the Presidential election in the North and thereby facilitated
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

ly. It is likely therefore that Provincial Council elections will be held in the inter pares in the province.
maratunga and Wickremasinghe position whereby a referendum on the r with the North. The Rajapaksa presidency has reversed this. Moreover, LTTE pretension of sole representation of the Tamil people of the North-
concept that has united all Tamil political representation since at least the
by effecting a de -merger of the NorthEast, the President has effectively t the same time through the MOU with the UNP and the mass crossover
lly relieved himself of dependence on the JVP and the UNP for a parlia- sibility of a general election on the heels of military victory in the East and o punitive and the LTTE resort to guerilla warfare in the East and a sus-
East, make for unpropitious circumstances in which to win an election.
rm notwithstanding, there are a number of possible challenges to political ture political course of the JVP, the relationship between Colonel Karuna the part of the Government, in part, in response to them.
the Rajapaksa regime and its potential for authoritarianism. These tenden- hich was provided as the justification for the promulgation of new emer- been suspended following the CFA, and the sustenance of a climate of ns and sections of the media – private media and Tamil media in particu- s no grey area in this war – one was with the Government or against it.
ecurity forces and para- militaries ranging from civilian killings, extortion, s sharply increased and were underpinned by a culture of impunity; the ion within Government with repercussions for democratic governance. mendment to the Constitution through non constitution of the Constitu- mmissions for the police, public service and human rights, amongst oth-
t given its depleted ranks, may well allow space for greater Government riticism leveled against it from outside of the legislative arena. There are f strikes. In this respect, the smashing up of a meeting advocating feder- ort Board demonstrators, both on January 9 2007, could turn out to be a
once ensconced as Chief Minister of the Eastern Province, relate to the bitions of the Karuna faction within bounds the GOSL deems acceptable. a and the GOSL is likely to become clearer in 2007 and it is possible that nted and indefinitely.
calculations on the part of the LTTE. It would seem that they calculated ich in turn would justify a hard line stance on their part. Having enforced
and thereby facilitated the Rajapaksa presidency, the LTTE proceeded to
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engage in armed provocation. This was initially met with restraint and sub nation attempt on the Army Commander Lt Col Sarath Fonseka, with a su
LTTE strategic calculus was a humanitarian intervention by the internatio advantage.
Despite the grave humanitarian and human rights crisis no international int
the future. By raising the stakes the LTTE has had to concede strategic a flicting commensurate damage on the GOSL forces, apart from the fighting Habarana and the sea attack in Galle. In his November 2006 Heroes Day to the closing of the A9 highway and its consequences, that the GOSL has
The question arises as to the LTTE’s ability to launch an offensive and set East in particular and shortcomings in this respect in general, can be tra 2004. By using military force to deal with the defection, the LTTE cemente
chant for retreating into a comfort zone of violence when challenged, as resolution, points in turn to a fundamental challenge for the organization in as its ability to engage constructively in a conflict transformation process
ment with the LTTE to initiate the necessary transformation of the LTTE int It remains to be seen as to whether there will be a shift of strategic orientat
What may transpire though is a determination on the part of the organiza before it accords any consideration to a revitalization of the peace proces
any resumption of negotiations can only be on the basis of a new balance torical record shows that it is unlikely to negotiate from a position of weak warfare in the East, more claymore mines and bombings outside the No though its capabilities may be, its ability to defend in the North and in the V LTTE will look to capitalizing in full on any opportunity presented to it to i lines of what transpired in Muhamalai.
The International Community
Developments throughout 2006 have revealed the limits of international in of the LTTE, international influence and pressure was clearly circumscrib
LTTE as a terrorist organization. In the case of the GOSL, the situation was
The GOSL retained a sensitivity to international opinion regarding the hum continued reiteration of its commitment to talks and rhetorically, the CFA.
in the latter, did not want to bear the responsibility for officially abrogating t ing its provisions in spirit and in letter on a daily basis. This can be explai portance of keeping the international community engaged in a peace proce
Furthermore, GOSL sensitivity to international opinion did not in any way ex on the ground with the attendant humanitarian consequences. As in the e gate 15 egregious cases of human rights violations and the establishment Persons (IIGEP) to observe its investigations, the GOSL engaged in dam
workers – the worst atrocity against humanitarian workers since the Baghd ing itself time against further international censure.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

et with restraint and subsequently, after the LTTE’s unsuccessful assassi- ath Fonseka, with a sustained campaign of aerial bombing. Built into the
ention by the international community, which it believed would be to its
risis no international intervention has been forthcoming or is likely to be in
to concede strategic assets and valuable territory in the East without in- s, apart from the fighting in Muhamalai, the bus bombs in Hikkaduwa and ber 2006 Heroes Day Speech, Mr Prabhakaran concedes with reference ces, that the GOSL has “imprisoned” the Tamil people in their homeland.
h an offensive and set the agenda for peace or war. Their reversal in the t in general, can be traced to their response to the Karuna defection in ction, the LTTE cemented the defection to its detriment. The LTTE’s pen-
e when challenged, as opposed to employing political means of dispute e for the organization into the future with regard to its sustainability as well transformation process. In this respect, the failure of post CFA engage-
rmation of the LTTE into a political organization, was manifested in 2006. hift of strategic orientation and direction in 2007.
the part of the organization to recapture the political and military initiative ion of the peace process. Whilst the GOSL seems firmly convinced that
basis of a new balance of power in its favour; likewise the LTTE. The his- from a position of weakness. Consequently, it is likely to revert to guerilla mbings outside the North and East and political assassination. Limited n the North and in the Vanni should not be underestimated. Therefore the nity presented to it to inflict damage upon the security forces, along the
limits of international influence and leverage on both actors. In the case was clearly circumscribed by increased international proscription of the
GOSL, the situation was arguably more complex.
inion regarding the human rights and humanitarian situation and through d rhetorically, the CFA. The GOSL and indeed the LTTE too, in engaging
for officially abrogating the CFA, although they had no reservation in flout- sis. This can be explained by the belief on both sides in the residual im- gaged in a peace process in Sri Lanka.
on did not in any way extend to limiting or restricting its military operations sequences. As in the example of the Presidential Commission to investi- and the establishment of an Independent International Group of Eminent OSL engaged in damage control in the wake of the murder of 17 ACF
orkers since the Baghdad bombing - and in doing so succeeded in buy-
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There is an element of the GOSL recognizing that there are definite limits no special or vital strategic interest to the key internationals. Accordingly,
lowing it a “lets see what we can get away with” attitude to international o any event restricted to India as the regional power and in this case, it is in effect of the IPKF experience in the late 80s. Indian interest in Sri Lanka t denominated in economic terms. Consequently, high profile political or in it the risks of upsetting and even undermining the growing economic stake
Another dimension that has to be considered is the growing realization wit of the GOSL, that there is greater plurality and therefore more options in r is not restricted or indeed beholden to the conventionally defined wester players including the Chinese, the Pakistanis, Iranians and Russians who without the encumbrance of benchmarks and conditionality.
Into 2007 it is likely that the Indian role will be pivotal as the situation on effectively suspended. The centrality of the Indian role revolves around th and East being a consequence of the Indo- Lanka Accord – and the pre
ment of the conflict. As always it will also be conditioned by the imperati sponse of political actors in Tamil Nadu.
Conclusion
The situation in Sri Lanka into 2007 is very likely to be one of protracted
growing authoritarianism. The GOSL will persist in the project of regime process being of a secondary and instrumental importance. However, it is will be either rejected by the LTTE who will refuse to negotiate from wea August 2000 constitutional proposals which were never presented to the signed for the sole purpose of undercutting their bases of popular support.
Riding high on military successes in the East and with the opposition in dis opt for a general election in the first half of 2007. A delay in availing himse for electoral advantage could be very disadvantageous and result in an exa in response to extra parliamentary dissent and criticism.
In the North and East, the LTTE will be faced with the challenge of demo
armed forces of the Sri Lankan state and of maintaining congruence betw civilians of the North and East. Regaining the initiative in setting the cour ingly, capitalizing on the over confidence and over reach of the security forc
Whilst 2006 was a miserable year for civilians caught up in armed conflic
decisive and irreversible alleviation of their situation. Political actors on the permanent balance of power in their favour outside of a genuine comm transformation through a political settlement.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

there are definite limits to international interest in Sri Lanka – a country of nationals. Accordingly, the GOSL’s room for manouevre is increased, al-
ttitude to international opinion. The option of high profile intervention is in and in this case, it is in turn conditioned by the “once bitten twice shy” n interest in Sri Lanka too has changed in nature. It is being increasingly gh profile political or in the extreme case, military intervention, carries with rowing economic stake.
growing realization with evidence to buttress this conclusion on the part efore more options in respect of the international community. The GOSL ntionally defined western dominated donor community – there are other ians and Russians who are ready and willing to come to its assistance itionality.
tal as the situation on the ground results in Norwegian facilitation being
role revolves around the situation in the East – the merger of the North Accord – and the presentation of GOSL proposals for a political settle-
itioned by the imperatives or lack thereof of coalition politics and the re-
to be one of protracted conflict, oscillating levels of political stability and
the project of regime consolidation with initiatives to revitalize the peace ortance. However, it is likely that any proposals presented by the GOSL to negotiate from weakness or alternatively suffer the same fate as the never presented to the LTTE officially and looked upon by them as de- ses of popular support.
ith the opposition in disarray, there is the possibility that the President will delay in availing himself of the opportunity to capitalize on the prospects ous and result in an exacerbation of populist and authoritarian tendencies ism.
the challenge of demonstrating sustained and feasible resistance to the
aining congruence between its organizational interests and those of the ative in setting the course of peace or war will be its priority and accord- each of the security forces to this end.
ght up in armed conflict, there is little prospect of 2007 offering them a
. Political actors on the other hand could find, yet again, that there is no de of a genuine commitment to and demonstrable capability for, conflict
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Peace Process
Introduction
Over 2006 the delicate balance of the ‘No war / No peace’ situation that h Agreement (CFA) between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the increasingly more unstable. The peace process slid into a crisis of violen current crisis in the peace process is the result of two main factors, namely of the peace process and the high levels of violence. Despite peace talks initial meetings have made the overall process more intractable. Thus, ov
tilted towards the former with the two parties intensifying their military effor advantage over the other.
The success and failure of Peace Talks
The fact that peace talks which can ensure both symbolic and substantive
2006 was remarkable. Over 2005 the prospect of peace talks had dim Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) that had been nego of the tsunami of December 2004. The increasing distrust between the pa
prospects for peace making more contentious and unlikely. Furthermore, t japaksa in November 2005 on a platform opposing the peace process in it ish the likelihood of talks. In December 2005 the crisis of violence furth Armed Forces for which LTTE-front organisations claimed responsibility, th ess, and yet making peace talks all the more necessary. This context of dis sified over 2006. Yet, the parties met twice in 2006 for face-to-face negoti on October 28 and 29. That Geneva I was the first time the parties me pended its participation in peace talks in March 2003 is highly significant. high level of violence and the deterioration of relations is also noteworthy. operation in Muhamalai-Pallai in the week preceding talks and a high level
The first effort at talks in 2006 was a significant success in that the parties lems with the CFA. In effect, Geneva I amounted to ‘a ceasefire within the to suspend violence and to address its major forms. That an agreement w of disputes during the talks was all the more remarkable.3 The agreemen
for specific measures and time frames, making the implementation pro affirmed the commitment of the two sides to the peace process and ma coming to a consensus on the peace process in general rather actually a
parties also agreed to meet in two months. Despite the dramatic drop in v as the violations of the agreements made at Geneva I and the CFA mounte
On the face of it, Geneva I represented a major shift in terms of the two significant compromises by both sides. From the GOSL side it looked lik
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

ace Process
peace’ situation that had been ushered in by the signing of the Ceasefire Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) became id into a crisis of violence and fell short of an officially declared war. The o main factors, namely the paralysis in peace talks that prevents a revival e. Despite peace talks in 2006, the difficulties in progressing beyond the re intractable. Thus, over 2006 the balance between war and peace has
ifying their military efforts and campaigns of violence to secure a strategic
ace Talks
mbolic and substantive progress in a peace process,1 took place at all in
of peace talks had dimmed with the failure to operationalise the Post- MS) that had been negotiated by the GoSL and the LTTE in the aftermath distrust between the parties in a climate of increasing violence made the
unlikely. Furthermore, the election of Presidential candidate Mahinda Ra- the peace process in its existing framework, only served to further dimin- crisis of violence further deepened with a series of attacks against the laimed responsibility, thereby intensifying the crisis within the peace proc- sary. This context of distrust, acrimony and violence continued and inten- for face-to-face negotiations: Geneva I on February 19-20 and Geneva II rst time the parties met with high-level delegations since the LTTE sus- 03 is highly significant.2 That both rounds of talks took place despite the ions is also noteworthy. Geneva II took place despite a significant military g talks and a high level of daily violence.
cess in that the parties were able to reach agreement to tackle the prob- ‘a ceasefire within the Ceasefire’ whereby the parties were able to agree s. That an agreement was reached out of a crisis of violence and in spite rkable.3 The agreement was based more on principles without providing
he implementation process all the more complicated. In essence it re- peace process and made clear that the parties were more interested in eneral rather actually abiding by specific agreements made within it. The
e the dramatic drop in violence,4 the Geneva honeymoon was short-lived a I and the CFA mounted.
ift in terms of the two parties’ positions vis-à-vis the peace process and GOSL side it looked like a complete volte face for a President who had
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campaigned on an electoral platform demanding fundamental changes in t in the Mahinda Chinthanaya and in pre-electoral agreements with Janath
Urumaya (JHU). Like the gradual shifts in position regarding the venue for licly stated positions and demonstrated an ability and a willingness to enga Leader V. Pirabakkaran’s Mahaveera Speech of November 2005, had see “until next year” for the “pragmatic” President to prove himself. The intens ary against the security forces seemed to indicate otherwise. Yet, the LTTE to an agreement in Geneva I.
In 2006, the efforts to address the paralysis in the peace process through tion all the more intractable. The failure to implement the agreements arri the prospects for further talks. “Each side is [was] expecting the other to d ing the other’s commitment to the process. The LTTE in particular made it on the implementation of Geneva I while the GOSL was more willing to go to replicate even the minimal success of Geneva I in terms of securing an violence or a date for the next meeting.. The parties only agreed to avoid l clearly indicating the crisis in the peace process had deepened since Gen Geneva I and the failure of talks thereafter further undermined the even t tween the the two parties and limited options for future negotiations.
The parties seemed increasingly unwilling to use negotiations, direct or ind to 2006 the focus of negotiations went full circle from the CFA to immediat aid management back to the CFA. By Geneva II the parties had fallen bac on the immediate issues and delaying core issues, the Government prefer
eration of core issues. That the Geneva II talks collapsed on the A-9 issu tional bargaining and traditional fall-back positions.7 The Government con sisted on the re-opening the A-9 and refused security guarantees to vesse
It should also be noted that over the year, relations between the two part cusing each other for the violence. Acrimony over issues such as the trans the increasing resistance to any compromise. The principle of parity of sta There were some moments of compromise and good will, as when the G
and Spokesman Daya Master receive treatment at a hospital in Colombo K.A.D. Sarath, serving with the National Child Protection Authority.9 There nels of communication between the Rajapaksa administration and the LT
progress.10
Peace Process under siege
The critical pillars supporting the ‘No War / No Peace’ situation were under parties. The upsurge of violence in particular called into question the viabilit and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). In the period from 2002- GOSL and 3827 against the LTTE.11
A number of changes with regard to the CFA, Norwegian facilitation and t the demands for Norwegian facilitation to be suspended and initial confu retained. A new Norwegian Special Envoy, Hanssen Bauer, was appointed way of a conflict of interest a Swedish General Ulf Henricsson, was appoi
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

ndamental changes in the framework of the peace process, made explicit greements with Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela
regarding the venue for talks,5 the Government compromised on its pub- nd a willingness to engage with the LTTE. The LTTE, as indicated by LTTE vember 2005, had seemingly given the new administration some space- ove himself. The intense campaign of violence over December and Janu- otherwise. Yet, the LTTE also suspended its policy of militarism and came
peace process through talks essentially failed, thereby making the situa- nt the agreements arrived at Geneva I in particular severely undermined expecting the other to demonstrate bona fides on the ground”6 and test- TE in particular made its attendance at the next round of talks contingent was more willing to go ahead with the next round. Geneva II was unable in terms of securing any agreements be it on a temporary moratorium of s only agreed to avoid launching any major offensives against each other, d deepened since Geneva I. The unravelling of the agreement reached in undermined the even the minimal trust and confidence that existed be- ture negotiations.
gotiations, direct or indirect, as a means of dispute resolution. From 2002 m the CFA to immediate normalization issues to interim issues to disaster e parties had fallen back to their traditional positions - the LTTE focussing the Government preferring a broader range of issues including a consid-
llapsed on the A-9 issue showed that the parties were reverting to posi- . The Government continued its unilateral measures whilst the LTTE in- ity guarantees to vessels flying the ICRC flag.
between the two parties became more contentious with both sides ac- issues such as the transport of LTTE cadres was symptomatic of this and principle of parity of status came under repeated attack from the GOSL.8 ood will, as when the Government agreed to let LTTE Media Coordinator
a hospital in Colombo and when the LTTE finally released the policeman, tection Authority.9 There also continued to be rumours of alternate chan- ministration and the LTTE but there were no reports of any substantive
ce’ situation were under increasing threat as a result of the actions of both into question the viability of these pillars – the CFA, Norwegian Facilitation the period from 2002-2006 the SLMM ruled 346 violations against the
wegian facilitation and the SLMM in this period should be noted. Despite ended and initial confusion as to its continuation, the Norwegians were n Bauer, was appointed in March. In the face of accusations against Nor- Henricsson, was appointed as the Head of the SLMM and in addition to
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its primary task of monitoring the CFA the SLMM was tasked with monit Geneva I.12
In the course of 2006 a number of criticisms were levelled against the SLM and statements (be it on the LTTE’s rights to the sea or the Karuna Gro charges of partiality (particularly by the Government and its allies) and m
violence.13 The security threats to the SLMM intensified, as evidenced SLMM’s naval monitors in May14 and the Security forces firing of artillery in tion, including SLMM Head Ulf Henricsson, and residents of Eachilampath SLMM’s safety forced the SLMM to reduce its activities, including suspend closure of its office in Trincomalee. A further challenge was the demand b Union (EU) member states leave the North East within one month on the question in the wake of the EU Ban of the LTTE in May. With the failure of ment on the SLMM issue, the SLMM withdrew its Swedish, Finnish and Da the Government’s opposition to this move.15 In effect this change represe SLMM head Ulricsson asked “Do they want to terminate the CFA?... The The SLMM’s ability to continue functioning will face increasing challenge rate. That the SLMM is monitoring war rather than peace may lead to the all or some of its monitors in the North and East. However, there are little in
Norwegian facilitation was under threat as well. The LTTE’s refusal to eng with regard to the space for Norwegian facilitation. Despite having prior kn gation before travelling to Oslo, the LTTE announced on the day of the talk delegation did not include a high-level of representation. As the Norwegia
“there is at the present time no room for a Norwegian initiative in the peace gians in an “unprecedented move”18 issued 5 fundamental questions to th CFA and the SLMM. While the GOSL responded positively to the question
CFA and the peace process, it was clear that the peace process was at a look set to continue their role.
A crisis of violence
Violence has been a constant theme in the Sri Lankan Process.19 Followin
nificantly intensified.20 Some of the main patterns of violence that strongl violence between the LTTE and the Karuna Group including attacks on ea increased attacks on the security forces intensified in 2006, particularly a tions, including the use of claymore mines on the security forces in the p saw both parties amplifying their efforts to weaken the military capacity o military leaders and constant attacks on military camps and points.
While there was a significant expansion in the scale of the violence, there
tion of particular tools and strategies of war such as aerial bombardment tors of this shift. Aerial bombardment has been used repeatedly both as middle of 2006 the parties demonstrated an increasing willingness to launc development that came in the wake of the Mavil Aru incident in late July w mando raids or attacks aimed merely at crippling military infrastructure to capturing of Sampur by the military forces marked a critical event in the y gain by the armed forces in capturing the LTTE’s Forward Defence Line (F
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

was tasked with monitoring the implementation of agreements made at
levelled against the SLMM. These included criticism over particular rulings sea or the Karuna Group being active in Government-controlled areas), nt and its allies) and miscommunication, threats and even incidents of
nsified, as evidenced most notably by the LTTE’s explicit threat to the rces firing of artillery in the vicinity of a meeting between a SLMM delega- idents of Eachilampathu on July 29. The parties overall disregard for the ities, including suspending its naval monitoring in May and the temporarily nge was the demand by the LTTE that SLMM personnel from European ithin one month on the grounds that the neutrality of the SLMM was in May. With the failure of talks in Oslo in that month to negotiate an agree- wedish, Finnish and Danish personnel over a three month period despite ect this change represented an amendment of an article of the CFA. As inate the CFA?... The CFA is a package, you either take it or leave it.”16 e increasing challenges in 2007 if the violence continues at the current peace may lead to the SLMM questioning its role and to its pulling back owever, there are little indications of this happening yet.
he LTTE’s refusal to engage in face to face talks in Oslo raised questions Despite having prior knowledge of the make-up of the Government dele- d on the day of the talks that it would not participate as the Government tation. As the Norwegian Development Minister, Eric Solheim, remarked,
an initiative in the peace process.”17 It was in this context that the Norwe- amental questions to the GoSL and the LTTE to clarify their stance on the ositively to the questions in sum and the LTTE reiterated its support to the
eace process was at a nadir. Despite the dim prospects, the Norwegians
kan Process.19 Following the Karuna Rebellion of March 2004 it has sig-
of violence that strongly emerged over 2005 intensified over 2006. The including attacks on each other’s military camps redoubled in 2006. The in 2006, particularly after the series of attacks by LTTE-front organisa- security forces in the period December 2005 to January 2006. The year n the military capacity of the other through the elimination of high-profile
ps and points.
e of the violence, there was also a qualitative shift in 2006. The introduc-
s aerial bombardment and the conquest of territory are some key indica- sed repeatedly both as an offensive and defensive measure.21 From the sing willingness to launch full scale military operations. Another significant u incident in late July was the expansion of military operations from com- ilitary infrastructure to full scale operations aimed at seizing territory. The a critical event in the year which was followed by a small but significant orward Defence Line (FDL) in Muhamalai, thereby signalling that even the
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lines of control when the CFA was signed would be dramatically altered th fronts - Eastern Trincomalee, Jaffna and Vaharai - were accompanied by o
tur in Trincomalee and Mandathivu and Kayts in Jaffna by the LTTE.
Over 2006, more violent actors have become involved they have joined th human rights. While the LTTE conducted forced military training for civili
more vulnerable to being targeted, it also blamed some of the violence on Over 2006 the Karuna Group became more active. The group has played of the military with its commando raids on LTTE bases in Batticaloa and East. The group has also become more active in Government-controlled Viduthalai Pulihal (TMVP) political offices and carrying out abductions of allegedly even in Colombo. The group’s involvement in killings and abdu groups close to the Government including the Eelam People’s Democratic been accused of engaging in acts of violence against the Tamil civilian po that of the LTTE, is part of a wider pattern of violence against the civili through the conflict and increasingly over the peace process, especially in rific incidents where civilians were targeted and brutally killed.24 If military continue to be untenable, the dirty war is likely to become dirtier.
The upsurge in violence has pushed the ‘No War / No Peace’ increasingly was characterized as a ‘proxy war’ or a low intensity conflict. Given the sc tions and the sheer volume of fatalities numbering over 3,000, it is clear intensity conflict to an undeclared war in 2006. During December 2005 an unprecedented three figure number. Both sides continued to declare their
tary operations did not amount to war, whilst insisting the other’s actions argued that the Mavil Aru operation was a “limited humanitarian operat controlled territory. The LTTE declared that this would amount to a declara
tary action that both sides would repeat over 2006. The situation on the g disregard for the fundamental principle of the CFA and above all their wil cover of the CFA.
It is an open debate as to why the two parties are engaging in escalating
during the Geneva I “honeymoon” demonstrated their ability to take contr violence resumed thereafter clearly showed a willingness and a determina spective strategic positions. The instrumentality of violence can be underst
declare war and/or as a means to consolidating their military, political and violence through the prism of a security dilemma in which both sides are and defeat only encourages a further widening of that cycle. At the end of are pursuing a military solution and are deliberately ignoring and subverti dents which seem to show a deep desire to hit right at the heart of the op received treatment, the Deputy Secretary General of the GOSL’s Peace Se on August 15, reportedly by the LTTE; a suicide bomber attempted to ass
President, Gothabaya Rajapaksa in December.
The shifting balance of power
The balance of power has dramatically shifted to and fro over the year as Through the campaign of violence against the security forces, the LTTE w
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

dramatically altered through the use of massive force.22 Battles on three ere accompanied by operations to capture strategic points such as Mut-
fna by the LTTE.
lved they have joined the two parties to the conflict in gross violations of ilitary training for civilians in the North and East, thereby making them
ome of the violence on civilian militias whom it claimed to have trained.23 . The group has played a key role in altering the military balance in favour ases in Batticaloa and Amparai making the LTTE more vulnerable in the Government-controlled areas setting up a number of Tamileela Makkal ing out abductions of adults and children particularly in Batticaloa and nt in killings and abductions is part of a wider shift where Tamil armed m People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), as well as the Armed Forces have inst the Tamil civilian population, in particular. State-sponsored terror and lence against the civilian population – a dirty war that was carried out e process, especially in 2006. Over the year there were a number of hor- utally killed.24 If military operations continue to escalate and peace talks ecome dirtier.
No Peace’ increasingly towards war. The situation on the ground in 2005 ity conflict. Given the scale of the violence, in particular the military opera- over 3,000, it is clear that the overall situation has shifted from a low- ring December 2005 and January 2006 monthly figures for fatalities hit an ntinued to declare their commitment to the CFA and stated that their mili-
ting the other’s actions would amount to a declaration of war. The GOSL ed humanitarian operation” in order to re-open the anicut within LTTE- uld amount to a declaration of war. It set a precedent in rationalizing mili-
. The situation on the ground clearly demonstrates the parties’ complete and above all their willingness to extend their use of violence under the
engaging in escalating campaigns of violence. The virtual end to violence
eir ability to take control on the ground. On the other hand, the fact that gness and a determination to use violence as a means to better their re- violence can be understood as either an attempt to push the other side to
eir military, political and overall strategic advantage. It is easy to view the n which both sides are trapped in a cycle of violence where every victory hat cycle. At the end of the day, it is increasingly clear that the two parties ly ignoring and subverting a negotiated settlement. There are single inci- ht at the heart of the opposing side: less than a month after Daya Master of the GOSL’s Peace Secretariat, Kethesh Loganathan, was assassinated mber attempted to assassinate the Defence Secretary and brother of the
r
nd fro over the year as the two sides expanded their military operations. urity forces, the LTTE was in a position of advantage and it was able to
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force the Government to concede its demands for changes in the peace p Government on the other hand was able to secure an advantage through
the capturing of Sampur. In addition to protecting the strategic naval base effort to ‘liberate’ the East. Efforts to wrest control of the East are likely to forces initiated an offensive in Vaharai aimed at forcing the LTTE into little the Government in an advantageous position both on the battlefield and a North and East it is also likely that the Government may also try to further tablishment in the East as well, with the assistance of the Karuna Group.
In the North the battles were intense and bloody with high casualties but o pur was a relatively rapid military operation for the security forces, the ard harai show that military campaigns will not be fast and furious, low-cost vi demonstrate the strength of their Northern defences while the security for and offensive operations. The LTTE made repeated efforts at shifting the b tres including the deadly attack on a military transport point in Digampatta naval base Dakshina in Galle. These were significant gains for the LTTE. Th viduals were only partially successful.25 As the military pressure on the LT nomic targets can be expected in 2007. Other battle fronts are also likely sides try to off-set mounting attacks on existing fronts.
However, the heavy loss of manpower could arguably dampen both side questions as to whether the two sides can meet the manpower, hardware over the long-term. The LTTE in particular faces a critical problem in mai various fronts and in ensuring that it has access to military hardware, give
cargo ships and the international constraints on funding. Though the LTT LTTE- and government-controlled areas in 2005 and 2006, it has a man Government has ensured better recruitment for the security forces, despite
ing dvoras and tanks, which had to be replaced. While there continued to intelligence being provided to the GOSL, it is clear that the international e ment’s version of the international ‘War against Terror.’ Overall, it seems th towards the LTTE at the beginning of the year to a position of advantage fo the increasing perception of the LTTE’s military difficulties, the Government
International Community
The international community has played a significant role in sustaining th high-level of crisis diplomacy - December-January and during the Mavil emerging humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka. Through condemnation of the v talks the key actors, the Co-Chairs of the Peace Process also attempted to tive role, with efforts in September to monitor implementation of a potenti humanitarian situation. Neither, however, of these transpired.26
Both sides are apprehensive of the international fall-out of declaring war. against Terror,’ especially given the EU ban of the LTTE on May 18 and by to curb LTTE front organization fund-raising by a number of countries wh return to declared war tricky. At the same time it would seem that given Throughout the year, the international community increased pressure on engagement in human rights violations and child recruitment in particular
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

changes in the peace process and to come to the negotiating table. The an advantage through the success of military offensives, particularly with
the strategic naval base of Trincomalee, this operation is part of a larger of the East are likely to continue in 2007. In December 2006 the security cing the LTTE into little pockets in the East.The success of this will place on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. Given the de-merger of the t may also try to further transform not just the military but the political es- of the Karuna Group.
ith high casualties but only minor shifts in the lines of control. While Sam- security forces, the arduous campaigns in Mavil Aru, Muhamalai and Va- and furious, low-cost victories for the Government. The LTTE was able to s while the security forces were also able to launch successful defensive efforts at shifting the balance of power through attacks on military cen- ort point in Digampattana, Habaranna which claimed 99 lives and on the t gains for the LTTE. The suicide bomb attacks targeting high profile indi- tary pressure on the LTTE mounts more attacks on soft civilian and eco- tle fronts are also likely to open up, be it the Wanni or Mannar, as the two nts.
ably dampen both sides’ enthusiasm for militarism. There are increasing e manpower, hardware and logistical requirements for military operations critical problem in maintaining lines of communication with its forces on military hardware, given the navy’s successes in hitting suspected LTTE
nding. Though the LTTE conducted military training for Tamil civilians in nd 2006, it has a manpower problem. The successful militarism of the security forces, despite the losses of men and military equipment, includ-
hile there continued to be speculation of covert military assistance and r that the international environment is more friendly towards the Govern- ror.’ Overall, it seems that the military balance definitely shifted from tilting position of advantage for the Government. Propelled by its successes and
ulties, the Government is determined to push ahead.
nt role in sustaining the ‘No War / No Peace’ situation. It engaged in a and during the Mavil Aru crisis in July - while drawing attention to the condemnation of the violence and encouraging the parties to commit to ocess also attempted to revitalize the process by taking up a more proac- ementation of a potential agreement and to send a mission to review the
anspired. 26
ll-out of declaring war. For the LTTE, the international context of a ‘War TTE on May 18 and by Canada on April 10 coupled with increasing efforts umber of countries which host large diaspora populations, has made a would seem that given the loss of legitimacy, the LTTE has little to lose. increased pressure on the LTTE with regarding to its transformation and ecruitment in particular - as highlighted by the Special Adviser to the UN
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Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Alan Rock on his tion against the LTTE has strengthened the GOSL’s political and military ca
the Oslo Communiqué the LTTE, in addition to critiquing the GOSL also c defining the parameters of the final settlement.27 The LTTE has arguably ta time it has been combative and demonstrated that it would not be cowere personnel from EU-member countries.
Over the year, the GOSL has been both pressured and assisted by the int of declaring war as it does not want to isolate key countries and risk polic ternational status. The German Government’s announcement on Decemb until the peace process in the country advances set off warning bells. The ing the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on the human rights and huma defensive footing. The GOSL has, however proved able in deflecting an seen at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in September wh “trouble-spot” along with Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan and faced the prospe while rhetorically the international community has called for an end to viole happening behind the scenes and whether key powers, including India an with regards to putting pressure on the GOSL.29 India has maintained its o efforts by the GOSL to secure its public support. Instead, the Indian Gove gards to the situation of civilians, calling for a bi-partisan approach and the
address the grievances of the Tamil Community and stated that it would n to both pressure the GOSL and placate its political allies in Tamil Nadu. allies such as Japan and China for economic aid and Pakistan for milit members of the Pakistan Ambassador Wali Mohammed’s security convo LTTE and the Ambassador accused Indian Intelligence, indicated, either wa
Strategic advantages of a ‘No official war, no peac
It is not just the primacy and relevance of negotiations as a tool for arriving tion; the divergence of the two sides’ outlines for a final settlement is also tioned the international community’s position that a final settlement had
rhetoric of the GOSL raised doubts as to whether a merged North and Eas tions.
The GOSL attempted to show its commitment to a negotiated settlement
ference to arrive at a Southern consensus. Despite initial problems includin moved ahead with the appointment of a Council of Party Representative majority opinion report at the end of the year. Minister Professor Tissa Vith
three reports which was released. However, it has not been endorsed b ment’s hesitation in endorsing a power-sharing arrangement as the basis the LTTE seems so vulnerable.
The cyclical history of war and peace shows that the swings in military ad
always a military response resulting in a swing in the other direction. Over 2 has been cornered. The LTTE over 2006 called for an end to violence an the use of force against it and the international community’s moves agains
an independent Tamil Eelam in the Mahaveera Speech of 2006 makes c space for the LTTE to maneuver apart from calling for a continuation of t
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

nflict, Alan Rock on his November visit to Sri Lanka. The international ac- political and military campaign in cornering the LTTE. In a statement titled
iquing the GOSL also criticised the international community’s attempts at e LTTE has arguably taken a number of conciliatory steps. At the same it would not be cowered, as seen with its demands regarding the SLMM
and assisted by the international community. Like the LTTE, it is cautious countries and risk policies that would affect its military, economy and in- ouncement on December 24 that it would cease all new aid to Sri Lanka t off warning bells. The statements by leading international actors, includ- uman rights and humanitarian situation have put the Government on a d able in deflecting and off-setting concerted international pressure, as neva in September where Sri Lanka was referred to as an international n and faced the prospect of an EU-sponsored resolution.28 Furthermore, alled for an end to violence and a return to talks, it is unclear as to what is wers, including India and the US, are adopting more ambiguous positions dia has maintained its official policy of non-engagement despite sustained nstead, the Indian Government has opted for voicing its concern with re- rtisan approach and the devolution of power within an united Sri Lanka to
d stated that it would not extend military assistance to Sri Lanka in order l allies in Tamil Nadu.30 Sri Lanka was also able to call upon non-Western and Pakistan for military assistance. The bomb explosion which killed mmed’s security convoy on August 14 for which the GOSL blamed the nce, indicated, either way, an internationalisation of the violence.
o official war, no peace’
ns as a tool for arriving at a settlement to ethnic conflict which is in ques- final settlement is also becoming increasingly clear. While the LTTE ques- a final settlement had to be within an united Sri Lanka, the actions and
merged North and East would be an assumed starting point for negotia-
negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict by initiating an all party con-
initial problems including the boycotts of key political parties, the process of Party Representatives and a Committee of Experts culminating with a ter Professor Tissa Vitharana produced a consensus report based on the
s not been endorsed by the Government, clearly indicating the Govern- angement as the basis of a political settlement, especially at a time when
the swings in military advantage can be fast and far-reaching but there is
e other direction. Over 2007 it will become evident as to how far the LTTE r an end to violence and for peace talks but it found itself hemmed in by munity’s moves against terrorism. The call for support for the struggle for
eech of 2006 makes clear that, as far as the LTTE sees it, there is little for a continuation of the armed struggle. Thus, both sides seem set to
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confirm their respective characterization by the other –on the one hand, a it has made to the Tamil people and is determinedly seeking a bloody m
seeking a separate state and unable to break out of a behaviour pattern of
On balance, in 2006 the behaviour of the parties suggested that they felt fashion or re-create the process and/or unwilling to seek an exit strategy.
sume talks and attend negotiations, probably on account of their preferen tion as opposed to a definitive commitment on their part to either war or low intensity conflict to a ‘no official war, no peace.’ It allows both parties exploring military options. In this respect, the most important purpose th the ‘No War / No Peace’ scenario through sustaining a rhetorical commitm continuing international involvement and interest through the Norwegian fa Thus the strategic ambiguity of the ‘no official war no peace’ allows both p some of the more damaging consequences of war to their respective pos vantages for the international community; a declaration of war would com to aid.
Neither side would have a real interest in shifting out of this. Hence, this sit sides continuing the violence and even engaging in talks without any re faced with a military stalemate . Unless the parties re-align their strategie imperative of a negotiated political settlement, a peace is unlikely.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

er –on the one hand, a centralized state which has broken every promise dly seeking a bloody military solution and on the other, a terrorist group
f a behaviour pattern of violence and abuse.
uggested that they felt trapped by the peace process, were unable to re- seek an exit strategy. However, the parties saw it in their interests to re-
ccount of their preference for the strategic ambiguity of the current situa- ir part to either war or peace. The situation has clearly moved beyond a .’ It allows both parties to go through the motions of peace talks whilst t important purpose the peace talks serve is to maintain the dynamic of ing a rhetorical commitment to the CFA and to negotiations, along with a rough the Norwegian facilitators, the SLMM monitors and the Co-Chairs. o peace’ allows both parties to engage in war without having to deal with r to their respective positions and interests. This situation also has its ad- tion of war would complicate their policy making, especially with regards
t of this. Hence, this situation could well continue over 2007, with the two in talks without any real commitment to a constructive outcome, when re-align their strategies and re-visit the options of compromise and the ace is unlikely.
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Political outlook
Introduction
Despite the lack of a clear parliamentary majority and his reliance on a lo Mahinda Rajapaksa has over the course of the year strengthened his po margin of victory at the Presidential elections and the Government being clearly in a vulnerable position. By the end of the year, however, the min held-alliance that included a majority of political parties in parliament and b tion party the United National Party (UNP). The President has also consolid
centralization of power around the Presidency. Confronted by the dual ch violence, the Government has been able to assert its position vis-à-vis th public compromises it has had to make and the setbacks it has suffered.
Strengthening of the President’s position
Throughout 2006, the Rajapaksa administration has been successful in control over the state. President Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected on No votes above the mark of 50%. The popularity of the President has soared to create a reputation of a concerned and strong leader who holds the inte sole Sinhalese victims of the violence, including those in Kebetigollewa on
to the funeral homes of armed forces personnel killed in the North and Eas ings with the family members of Tamil victims of abductions have also cre sonal interest in critical human issues. That his son, Yoshitha, joined the na
precedented expression of commitment to national unity and integrity..
The populism of the Mahinda Chinthanaya (MC) was put into action throu cant subsidies, particularly in the fuel and fertilizer sectors, and continuin cushion the rising cost of living and the soaring defence costs. A numbe
which have been presented as being inspired by the President, including tional Airport. The JS programme aims at providing comprehensive protec for mainly Sinhala civilians in the border areas. The Weeravila International
project. There is no real rationale for another international airport, especia other more urgent and major infrastructure projects. While the long-term economic and social policies are clearly in question, they have tremendous
The President has also increasingly centralized his power. The President a tary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa, who effectively reduced the position of the cabinet and other key figures includ warts, into that of implementers and advisors. Through circumventing con the Constitutional Council and independent commissions, the President h who owe their position to him. The appointment of P.A. Prematilaka as the
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

litical outlook
and his reliance on a loosely held alliance, the Government of President ar strengthened his position and that of his Government. Given the slim the Government being in the minority in parliament, the President was year, however, the minority Government was able to call upon a loosely ties in parliament and boast of a historic agreement with the main opposi- sident has also consolidated his position through populist policies and the
nfronted by the dual challenges of a peace process and an upsurge in t its position vis-à-vis the LTTE and increase its popularity in spite of the tbacks it has suffered.
nt’s position
as been successful in increasing its popular base and consolidating its sa was elected on November 17, 2005 with a slim majority of 28, 632 e President has soared as he has built on his image as a ‘son of the soil’ ader who holds the interest of the nation above all else. His visits to con- se in Kebetigollewa on the day of the claymore mine blast - June 15- and
ed in the North and East, all helped to strengthen the public regard. Meet- ductions have also created a perception of a President who takes a per- , Yoshitha, joined the navy further strengthened public support, as an un-
unity and integrity..
as put into action through economic and social policies providing signifi- r sectors, and continuing support for social infrastructure, which helped fence costs. A number of programmes and projects have been initiated
he President, including the Jathika Saviya (JS) and the Weeravila Interna- g comprehensive protection in the areas of defence to essential services, Weeravila International Airport however, risks becoming a white elephant
national airport, especially given the economic situation and the need for ts. While the long-term repercussions and sustainability of some these , they have tremendous short-term benefits for the Government.31
power. The President and his inner circle of his brothers, Defence Secre- Basil Rajapaksa, who attend all crucial decision-making meetings, have other key figures including Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and PA stal- ugh circumventing constitutional and parliamentary safeguards including issions, the President has been able to appoint individuals he trusts and P.A. Prematilaka as the Auditor General in October ignoring the provisions
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of the 17th Amendment was the latest in a series of arbitrary appointments verse impact on good governance as the independence and/or the pow
and the Supreme Court have come under increasing threat.33 Within the S elected unanimously as Party President at the Party Convention on June 2 from that position and the threat she posed to her successor thereby minim
Consolidation of power through peace
While the Government proved more successful on the military as opposed areas to consolidate its position. The latter being its overarching objec
even contradictory in the context of peace or war, but taken together em “hawks” and “doves” -for regime consolidation.
On the peace front, President Rajapaksa did not call for a complete reject proach of direct talks with the LTTE and of creating a Southern consensus and the framework of the peace process as it stood, thereby creating a SLFP and the PA the rejection of the P-TOMS Agreement and the stated c
federal system represented a significant and embarrassingly rapid reversal
Over the first quarter of the Presidency, the Government took a number promises on earlier stated positions, including calls for a revision of the CF tion of the Tamil Homelands concept and support for the unitary state. Th
stration reinstated the Norwegians as facilitators after an initial delay in m trying to introduce some changes in the framework of the peace process, take a more active role, the President resorted to reinstating the existing fra
talks became more frantic with the LTTE unleashing a campaign of violen and January 2006 which in turn led to the Government appealing to the ol tries - to put pressure on the LTTE. Arguably there was some continuity a
Mahinda Chinthanya (MC) and Rajapaksa’s election platform. Yet, give agreements with the JVP and the JHU, as well as the MC Manifesto, it ap public position.
The volte face could be understood as a pragmatic shift on the part of a tinuing need to balance opposing interests regarding peace talks and th take pride in being pragmatic, as the willingness to compromise over ide election campaign the left parties had claimed that the JVP and JHU Agree becomes President due to certain “realities” such as the federal solution, measure to win the elections and therefore not indicative of Rajapaksa’s o did seem to pull off a series of compromises in order to make some headw while maintaining his political alliances and expanding his popular base. Co I and II and Oslo Talks – made clear the Government’s willingness to explo significance of Geneva I as the first time that the Government and the LTT suspended its participation in 2003 cannot be underestimated. The Gove volvement - the visit of Sinn Fein Leader Martin McGuinness to Killinochc ternationalisation of the peace process. These moves indicated the under dent’s approach. Consequently, apparent compromise and continuity with
tors through the post Geneva I face saving claim that the CFA had in fac notwithstanding, change was the order of the day.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

f arbitrary appointments in 2006.32 These developments have had an ad- dence and/or the powers of critical institutions including the parliament
ng threat.33 Within the SLFP he has established control by having himself y Convention on June 29. Former President Kumaratunga was dismissed
uccessor thereby minimized.
gh peace
the military as opposed to peace front, it has been able to move in both g its overarching objective, some of these moves appeared ad hoc and
but taken together embody coherence in terms of balancing interests –
all for a complete rejection of the peace process. He called for a dual ap- a Southern consensus, but did question some of the basic assumptions od, thereby creating a strong image of a more hawkish leader. For the ement and the stated commitment to the unitary state over establishing a
rassingly rapid reversal of its position on these two issues.34
nment took a number of policy decisions that signified a series of com- for a revision of the CFA, a review of Norway’s role as facilitator, a rejec- for the unitary state. The shift had begun early as the Rajapaksa admini-
fter an initial delay in making a public announcement to this effect. While of the peace process, including the failed attempt to encourage India to instating the existing framework and re-starting talks. Efforts at re-starting
g a campaign of violence against the security forces in December 2005 ent appealing to the old allies of the peace process – the Western coun- was some continuity as direct talks with the LTTE were both part of the
ion platform. Yet, given the stated ideological position in the electoral the MC Manifesto, it appears that the Government did a volte face on its
c shift on the part of a President who was faced with a crisis and a con- ing peace talks and the peace process. This President also seemed to o compromise over ideological attachments was made clear. During his the JVP and JHU Agreements would become “irrelevant” once Rajapaksa as the federal solution,35 i.e. the espoused ideology was merely a tactical icative of Rajapaksa’s own position on the peace process. The President er to make some headway in the peace process and put it back on track ing his popular base. Commitment to the holding of peace talks – Geneva nt’s willingness to explore solutions to the crisis in the peace process. The overnment and the LTTE engaged in official peace talks since the LTTE’s erestimated. The Government also agreed to increased international in- cGuinness to Killinochchi showing that the Government was open to in- ves indicated the underlying pragmatism and tactical nature of the Presi- mise and continuity with the past was explained by pro- Government ac-
that the CFA had in fact been amended and that the signs of continuity
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It was clear that the Government was going to be much tougher with reg administrations, especially in the wake of the LTTE’s campaign of violence
promises such as on the issue of the venue for talks, also proved recalcit res, matching the LTTE’s obduracy. Despite the increasing unpopularity of there continued to be strong support for negotiations which the Governm Government’s peace efforts. Policy towards the peace process appears t on an underlying ideology and moulded by political pragmatism.
With regards to the second prong of the President’s envisaged peace pro dent was able to demonstrate his commitment to finding a settlement to th the Government’s policies on the peace front. The President held a serie before convening a broader All Party Conference on January 9 aimed at parties in the South as a prelude to commence a direct dialogue with the successive months, the Government established an All Party Representat proposals for the resolution of the ethnic conflict under a broad legal and c and a Committee of Experts to Advise the President on Constitutional re commentators on this process moving forward by December 6, the iden That the Committee produced four different reports37 attests to the rang ethnic group of a majority of members came out in favour of power sharin The basic point of the Majority Report is power sharing. The real test in its
ahead with the peace process on this basis. Steady progress seems unlik tifying who had leaked the Majority Report rather trying to set out its respon
The APRC process does represent a more inclusive process at creating a
conflict. It has yet to prove though, that it is a genuine effort at pushing f demonstrating the Government’s commitment to peace to the internation Southern consensus and Government policy in particular has to be clear
provinces. In 2006, the Supreme Court declared the merger of the North a tal rights case. The Court decision focused on the constitutionality of the complished rather than on the constitutionality of merger per se. Accordin While this temporarily placed the Government in an embarrassing position of the Government delegation for Geneva I and of the APRC Experts Com damental rights application, the Government did not take any substantive Community on this issue, despite the merger being a fundamental aspec has appointed separate governors for the North and East and ignored UN the merger. This indicates along with military developments, that the Gove the merger and its modalities, only at talks in the future.
The political rewards of militarism
Both sides can be blamed for the failure of peace talks over 2006 and the Government has become pro-militaristic and more willing to explore milita cies can be seen as a response to the upsurge of violence it is clear that th
tion as seen with security appointments: the Army Commander Shantha gage with the LTTE was replaced by Major General Sarath Fonseka, while and DIG H.N.G.B. Kottakadeniya were appointed as Senior Defenc respectively.40 Significantly the Government also increased the defence allo from an already high figure of Rs 63 billion to Rs 97 billion, inevitably inte
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

much tougher with regards to the LTTE than either one of the previous ’s campaign of violence. Hence the Government, while making key com-
ks, also proved recalcitrant on issues such as the transport of LTTE cad- reasing unpopularity of the LTTE on account of its campaign of violence, ions which the Government was able to translate into confidence in the ace process appears to be catalysed by context and events, but based pragmatism.
’s envisaged peace process – finding a Southern Consensus - the Presi- nding a settlement to the ethnic conflict and to secure political support for President held a series of bilateral meetings with some political parties n January 9 aimed at “forging a common consensus among all political direct dialogue with the LTTE for arriving at a lasting solution.”36 Over the n All Party Representative Committee which would formulate and submit der a broad legal and constitutional framework within a united Sri Lanka, ent on Constitutional reform. While there was significant scepticism from December 6, the identified date, the Committee prepared its findings. ts attests to the range of opinions on the issue. However that a multi favour of power sharing and jettisoning of the unitary state is significant. aring. The real test in its wake is of the will of the Government in pushing
y progress seems unlikely as the Government spent more energy in iden- ying to set out its response and in distancing itself from the Report.38
e process at creating a Southern consensus on a settlement to the ethnic
uine effort at pushing forward that consensus, rather than an attempt at peace to the international community. An important issue on which the rticular has to be clear is that of the merger of the Northern and Eastern
e merger of the North and East null and void in response to a fundamen- constitutionality of the procedure by which the merger was originally ac- erger per se. Accordingly it threw back the issue into the political realm. embarrassing position as it was in the run-up to Geneva and a member the APRC Experts Committee was in the legal team that made the fun- ot take any substantive measures to address the concerns of the Tamil g a fundamental aspect of Tamil nationalist political demands. Instead it d East and ignored UNP Opposition offers of legislative support to effect opments, that the Government will at most agree to negotiation regarding ture.
rism
talks over 2006 and the escalation of the violence, but it is clear that the willing to explore military solutions.39 While the Government’s early poli- iolence it is clear that there were significant early signs of a hard line posi-
Commander Shantha Kottegoda perceived as being more willing to en- l Sarath Fonseka, while hard-liners such as Major General Janaka Perera ted as Senior Defence Advisor and as Deputy Defence Secretary reased the defence allocation in the budget presented in December 2005 97 billion, inevitably intensifying speculation that the Government was in-
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vesting in a remilitarization program.41 Furthermore, while willing to make c seem as committed on the ground with regards to the implementation of
to the actions of the Karuna Group. 42 Despite a number of reports allegin the Government has maintained that there are no links between the state latter however, has become more openly visible in Government-contro offices.43 While the Government conducted a number of public search ope tinued, raising concerns regarding the non-implementation of the agreeme
From July 2006 onwards the Government intensified military operations. ernment seems to have adopted a policy of unfettered militarism in terms introduction of the Prevention and Prohibition of Terrorism and Specified launching of large scale offensive and defensive military operations. Undo trend intensifying the Government’s militaristic response. Such as the reins PPSTAR following the attempted assassination of the President’s brother a Muhamalai in September showed, however there are signs of military adv and military chiefs all denied knowledge of this operation even though th victories and ironically even the set backs strengthened the position of t Sampur in particular renewed faith in the capabilities of the armed forces defence of the Humanitarian Operation of Mavil Aru and the aerial bomba 61 girls, made clear the Government’s ability to wage a successful public re
The huge human losses at Kebetigollewa, Digapattana and Muhamalai ha ernment. Instead, it seems to have deepened the support for a military so portion of the Sinhala Community. The space for dissent against the war h
hala nationalists groups to prevent gatherings and demonstrations again meetings which came under attack.45 The campaign against NGOs thro saults on NGO gatherings including discussions on federalism, suggest th
increasing intolerant. The Government is doing little to actively prevent th Government’s adoption of more draconian legislation including PPSTAR, linked to national security indicate that the Government is also becoming m wake of the new legislation made clear the Government’s unambiguous p and all people’s organizations. You decide whether you should be with a h is in the majority. You must clearly choose between these two sides.”
A broad coalition and a weakened opposition
In pursuit of the overarching objective of regime consolidation, the Preside his Government. His legislative inheritance in November 2005 required his slim majority of a 117. Both these parties sat on the Opposition benches. ing a politically unassailable position for himself and made considerable without having to resort to a general election. Through savvy courtship a dent succeeded in obtaining the support of an assortment of parties. Follo Congress (CWC) and the President,47 the latter succeeded in securing the
(UPF) into the Government on August 25 in return for cabinet positions. minority parties to join the Government hence the CWC and UPF delaye difficult, given its criticism of the Government’s treatment of the Muslim Co displacement of the Muslims of Muttur and of Pottuvil appears to have h
Leader Rauf Hakeem’s personal security. 49 In addition to courting political
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

, while willing to make compromises at the table, the Government did not the implementation of the Geneva I Agreement, particularly with regards
mber of reports alleging ties between the security forces and the group, links between the state or its armed forces and the Karuna Group. The in Government-controlled areas and receives state protection for its er of public search operations to find the Karuna Group, the attacks con- ntation of the agreement.
ed military operations. From the Mavil Aru operation onwards the Gov- ered militarism in terms of the security measures adopted, including the
rrorism and Specified Terrorist Activities Regulations (PPTSTAR) and the ilitary operations. Undoubtedly, the LTTE’s military actions played to this onse. Such as the reinstatement of many of the terms of the PTA through he President’s brother and Defence Secretary. As the military operation in re signs of military adventurism. It should be noted that the Government eration even though the operation included aerial support.44 The military hened the position of the President and the Government. The victory of es of the armed forces and in the political leadership. The Government’s u and the aerial bombardment of the Camp in Sencholai in August, killing
e a successful public relations battle.
tana and Muhamalai have not created an outpouring of anger at the Gov- support for a military solution, at least temporarily, among a sizeable pro- issent against the war has rapidly shrunk, as seen with the efforts by Sin-
demonstrations against the war, including two National Anti-War Front ign against NGOs through the Parliamentary Select Committee and as- federalism, suggest that there overall socio-political climate is becoming
le to actively prevent the deterioration. On the contrary it seems that the n including PPSTAR,46 and warnings to the media on reportage of issues ent is also becoming much more hard line. The President’s speech in the ment’s unambiguous position “I ask this of all political parties, all media, you should be with a handful of terrorists or with the common man who these two sides.”
ened opposition
nsolidation, the President sought to secure a solid legislative majority for mber 2005 required his Government’s reliance on the JVP and JHU for a e Opposition benches. Within the year, the President succeeded in creat- d made considerable advances in the consolidation of his Government ough savvy courtship and a willingness to expand his cabinet, the Presi- rtment of parties. Following initial tensions between the Ceylon Workers’ ceeded in securing the entry of the CWC and Up-Country People’s Front
for cabinet positions.48 The increasing militarism made it difficult for the CWC and UPF delayed their entry. The SLMC too found it increasingly tment of the Muslim Community. The SLMC position on the violence and ttuvil appears to have had a direct bearing on the withdrawal of SLMC ion to courting political parties, the Government has welcomed the cross
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over of individual MP’s into the cabinet. This has put pressure on politica their parliamentary representation or their independence. This is a stark cho
One of the critical political successes of the Government was the historic sus between the two main political parties in Sri Lanka on key issues facin Government. Together they account for over 60% of the electorate and,
opposition to any agreement between the Government and the political le seen as a vital component for any sustainable peace agreement. The MO desire for addressing national issues than one of maintaining power. For U means of blocking a mass cross over of Reformist M.P’s who were cha Government. The UNP had already lost five parliamentarians, including th Preparedness, Mahinda Samarasinghe and Defence Spokesperson and N Implementation, Keheliya Rambukwella,50 and a number of local council support in parliament as in the case of UNP support for the Budget and partisan approach to the peace process is a key demand of the internatio showing any urgency on this score, it is questionable as to whether the M mass cross over of UNP M.Ps and the unwillingness of Wickremesinghe to
The Government’s success has been due to its ability to maintain multiple survived despite multiple threats. The President failed to secure the JVP’s offset this with the support of the UNP. Negotiations with the parties took maintain the JVP’s support despite the volte face with regards to the peac MOU and even after JVP MP Nandana Gunathilleke left the party in mid- the Government. Despite their public pronouncements against the Govern
their pre-electoral agreements and the MC, neither the JVP nor the JHU w sons for this may be due to the consultative approach the Government a where the JVP and JHU sat through the planning meetings and part of the
tions. Furthermore, these two parties, like the UNP, are apprehensive of f loss of seats if they have to go it alone, as their poor showing at the Loc Government Elections in April, the UPFA won resoundingly, without the sup Government bodies in the first round of elections. With the increasing m Government is following their agenda but at the same time they realise th has been able to block some of the proposed measures, including the re- by unions involved in essential services illegal under the Emergency Regu able to prevent the Government from adopting policies that it opposes.
There seems to be a significant shift in the overall political climate under country that is making it increasingly difficult for any political actor to chal to become more muted. There have been efforts to challenge the current from the main political parties including the SLFP, UNP and the Left (bar th the creation of a Civil Monitoring Committee to monitor abductions and d the attacks on the Anti-War Front Rallies and the assassination of the on
high levels of insecurity. There is clearly a need for a more active opposition nomic and social policies and governance issues, especially the Constitutio
In the North and East, the political climate has rapidly changed with the de tried to mobilize support through Popular Resurgence Meetings and a boy increasing violence, especially the targeting of Tamil civilians by the armed pacts of violence, advantageous to increasing its control. The deteriorat
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

put pressure on political parties, forcing them to choose between losing ence. This is a stark choice the SLMC will face in 2007.
nment was the historic SLFP-UNP Agreement which promised a consen- nka on key issues facing the country and even the possibility of a national of the electorate and, given their history of acting as a spoiler when in
ent and the political leadership of the Tamils, a UNP-SLFP consensus is ce agreement. The MOU, however, seems to have resulted less out of a aintaining power. For UNP Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe the MOU was a t M.P’s who were challenging his leadership and threatening to join the entarians, including the present Minister for Human Rights and Disaster e Spokesperson and Non-Cabinet Minister for Policy Development and umber of local council members. The MOU gave the Government vital ort for the Budget and lent more credibility to the APRC process. A bi- emand of the international community, especially India. With neither party ble as to whether the MOU will survive, especially with the possibility of a s of Wickremesinghe to engage in internal reform within the UNP.
lity to maintain multiple alliances. In particular, its alliance with the JVP has iled to secure the JVP’s entry into the Government, but he was able to
s with the parties took place in parallel. The President even managed to ith regards to the peace process, the Geneva Agreement, the SLFP-UNP ke left the party in mid-September amidst speculation that he would join nts against the Government and charges that the President was violating
r the JVP nor the JHU were willing to take to the streets. Part of the rea- ach the Government appears to take, as seen in the Geneva I process, eetings and part of the consultations at Temple Trees during the negotia-
, are apprehensive of forcing a general election, as they fear a dramatic oor showing at the Local Government Elections indicated. At the Local ndingly, without the support of the JVP and the JHU, 222 of the 266 local With the increasing militarism the two parties are able to claim that the ame time they realise that it is taking the wind out of their sails. The JVP sures, including the re-structuring of the CEB and efforts to make strikes er the Emergency Regulations. It is unclear for how long the JVP will be cies that it opposes.
l political climate under the cover of militarism and the protection of the y political actor to challenge the President. Hence the opposition is likely o challenge the current climate of militarism with political representatives NP and the Left (bar the JVP) joining the Anti-War Front Campaigns and onitor abductions and disappearances in Colombo and its environs. Yet, assassination of the one member of the Committee have made clear the
more active opposition to raise the multiple issues of human rights, eco- specially the Constitutional Council.
dly changed with the deterioration of the security situation. The LTTE that ce Meetings and a boycott of the Presidential elections in 2005 found the il civilians by the armed forces and its allies coupled with the multiple im- control. The deteriorating conditions and the Government’s increasingly
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hawkish approach as seen with the poor implementation of the Geneva A the Mavil Aru military operation and those that followed, were also factors.
However, against the backdrop of increased civilian suffering, forcible milita to shore up its man-power has impacted adversely on the LTTE relations and intimidation by military actors, coupled with the assassination of a se
Colombo, attests to the continuing vulnerability of the Tamil polity to violenc an ironic reversal of roles for an organization that has been the key perpe losses in the East coupled with the increasing presence of the Karuna Grou offices there, have had significant political repercussions for the LTTE’s po ment’s military operations against the LTTE and its tacit support for them hegemony over Batticaloa and Amparai. Following the Government’s ap and East, this is likely to be formalized through provincial elections in the E their increased presence into a popular vote base is an open question. The the competing strategies of the main military-politico actors. They have litt tions being the order of the day.
The Muslims in the North and East continue to be in a vulnerable posit agendas of the various armed groups. Their representation within Govern vention. This has proved to be more useful in addressing the humanitaria On the ground, the community will have to devise a modus vivendi with th lives and livelihoods while their political leadership continues to negotiate w national community for protection.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

ntation of the Geneva Agreement, the de-merger of the North and East,
ed, were also factors.
suffering, forcible military training by the LTTE across the North and East y on the LTTE relationship with the civilian population. The dominance of e assassination of a second TNA M.P in less than a year, 51 N. Raviraj in
he Tamil polity to violence. This has also placed pressures on the L TTE - has been the key perpetrator of violence in the Tamil polity. Their military nce of the Karuna Group including the establishment of its TMVP political sions for the LTTE’s political position in the area. Assisted by the Govern- s tacit support for them, the Karuna Group is well placed to establish its g the Government’s appointment of governors for the de-merged North incial elections in the East. As to how far the Karuna Group can translate s an open question. The Tamil civilian population are thus caught between o actors. They have little if any space for dissent with killings and abduc-
e in a vulnerable position caught between the rival military and political sentation within Government has not acted as a safeguard for crisis pre- ressing the humanitarian consequences of violations arising out of crises. a modus vivendi with the various armed actors in order to safeguard their continues to negotiate with, and appeal to the Government and the inter-
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Governance
Introduction
Several developments in 2006 raised serious concerns about the G governance and the rule of law. The crisis of democratic governance thr failure to re-constitute the Constitutional Council and other 17th Amen addition to this, the crisis of democratic governance and rule of law in th overt politicization of the judiciary and, particularly, the Supreme Court, challenged human rights in the country, the attacks against NGOs and ING
lack of accountability and transparency in the law-making process. These the protection of human rights and the growing culture of impunity witness
The crisis around the Constitutional Council and Constitution
The failure to reconstitute the Constitutional Council and other 17th Ame emplifies the crisis of rule of law and democratic governance in the coun relatively minor dispute relating to which parties in Parliament were entitled
Furthermore he unilaterally appointed members to the National Police Com and the Human Rights Commission in violation of constitutional provision and other positions including the Inspector General of Police were made in in the Constitution.
The crisis in governance and rule of law caused by the Constitutional Cou acerbated with the sudden and unexpected resignations of two senior Sup cial Services Commission (JSC), chaired by the Chief Justice, in early Feb tion by the Chief Justice and appointment by the President of two other JSC, in circumvention of the constitutional process and the requirement currently non-operational Constitutional Council, as he had done with res Public Services Commission, again called into question the Government’s ernance and an independent judiciary.
Furthermore, the circumstances under which the two Supreme Court Jud erosion in the independence of the judiciary. The Judges reportedly indica “unable to work according to their conscience”54 and reportedly indicated signing only before a parliamentary select committee established to inquir gatory committee has been established to date. The response by the Ch itself about his conduct and reflected the present challenge of dealing with
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

overnance
oncerns about the Government’s commitment to principles of good ocratic governance through the course of 2006 was highlighted by the and other 17th Amendment-mandated independent commissions. In ce and rule of law in the country was further evident by the increasingly y, the Supreme Court, the re-invocation of draconian legislations which against NGOs and INGOs as well as passage of legislation signifying the
making process. These, in turn, had implications for the peace process, ture of impunity witnessed during the year.
tutional Council and the 17th Amendment to the
cil and other 17th Amendment-mandated independent commissions ex- governance in the country.52 President Rajapaksa did little to resolve a Parliament were entitled to nominate a member to the 10 member body.
the National Police Commission and National Public Services Commission constitutional provisions. Several appointments to the appellate judiciary l of Police were made in a manner inconsistent with the procedure set out
y the Constitutional Council/17th Amendment controversy was further ex- ations of two senior Supreme Court Judges from the three-member Judi- ief Justice, in early February 2006.53 The subsequent unilateral nomina- President of two other Supreme Court judges to fill the vacancies on the s and the requirement that any such appointments be approved by the s he had done with respect to the National Police Commission and the stion the Government’s commitment to the rule of law, democratic gov-
wo Supreme Court Judges resigned from the JSC further highlighted the udges reportedly indicated that they resigned on grounds that they were nd reportedly indicated their willingness to fully state their reasons for re- ee established to inquire into the JSC crisis.55 However, no such investi- he response by the Chief Justice,56 moreover, raised serious questions hallenge of dealing with a highly politicized judiciary.
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The Government also cited flaws in the 17th Amendment and proposed t ment to propose amendments to the 17th Amendment. The existence of su
implementation of the 17th Amendment. The Centre for Policy Alternatives comings in constitutional provisions is no excuse for non-implementation law was a separate issue.
In the face of seemingly deliberate attempts to undermine key institutions filed in courts throughout 2006 challenging President Rajapaksa’s condu Constitutional Council and unilaterally appointing individuals to serve on th icy Alternatives filed a writ petition before the Court of Appeal requesting th constitute the Constitutional Council as per the provisions of the 17th Amen Court refused leave to proceed in a fundamental rights petition challenging Commission.58 In rejecting the petition, the Supreme Court stated that it vexatious considerations, and directed the Attorney General to consider w tioners for wasting the time of the Court and for abuse of process.59
Similarly, in early June, a petition was filed challenging the President’s unila
sion of Sri Lanka. The Court of Appeal issued notice on the respondents the Human Rights Commission (HRC), requesting them to explain the co issued in respect of an application for a writ of quo warranto filed by the C and statutory authority of the appointments. In their application to the C ment clearly specifies that no appointments to the HRC are to be made b the Constitutional Council. As the appointments were made solely by o presently-non-functioning Constitutional Council, the petitioners contende
to hold office in the HRC.
Politicization of the Supreme Court and Deterio Judiciary
The singular factor marking the deterioration of the rule of law and democr
increasingly overt politicization of the judiciary and, particularly, the Suprem preme Court revisited and finally resolved the Helping Hambantota case fa rights petition against the CID investigation of alleged fraudulent transfers
ordering the police officials conducting the investigation to personally pay their individual liability in violating his fundamental rights.60 The course of t the investigation until after the November 2005 Presidential election, the CID, and finally the judgment in the fundamental rights claim imposing pe serious questions as to the degree to which political expediency influenced
Also in January 2006, a high court trial-at-bar convicted five Sri Lanka Arm fense Minister Anurudha Ratwatte and his two sons, along with eight othe of apparent overwhelming witness testimony, the verdict absolving all but fi tions regarding the credibility of the Sri Lankan judicial system to provide ju the State.
In September 2006, the Supreme Court dealt a further blow to human rig the Sinharasa case.61 On 16th September a five Judge Bench of the Sup the Sri Lankan Government’s accession to the Optional Protocol of the In
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

dment and proposed the establishment of a Select Committee of Parlia- ent. The existence of such flaws was used also as an excuse for the non-
for Policy Alternatives and several other organizations argued that short- or non-implementation and that reform or improvement of a constitution/
ermine key institutions of democratic governance, several petitions were ent Rajapaksa’s conduct in circumventing the 17th Amendment and the dividuals to serve on the independent commissions. The Centre for Pol- of Appeal requesting the court to order the Sri Lankan Government to re- visions of the 17th Amendment of the Constitution.57 In May, the Supreme hts petition challenging the nomination of members to the Public Service me Court stated that it seemed this application was filed for frivolous and y General to consider whether any action was warranted against the peti- use of process.59
ing the President’s unilateral appointments to the Human Rights Commis-
tice on the respondents, the newly appointed chairman and members of them to explain the constitutionality of their appointments. Notice was warranto filed by the Centre for Policy Alternatives, questioning the legal eir application to the Court, the petitioners argued that the 17th Amend- HRC are to be made by the President except on the recommendation of were made solely by order of the President without the approval of the e petitioners contended that the respondents were therefore not entitled
e Court and Deterioration of Independence of
rule of law and democratic governance in Sri Lanka during 2006 was the
, particularly, the Supreme Court. In January 2006, for example, the Su- ng Hambantota case favorably for President Rajapaksa in his fundamental ed fraudulent transfers of tsunami funds into his private bank account, by
ation to personally pay a sum of money to the President as damages for ights.60 The course of this case – the issuance of the stay order blocking residential election, the subsequent retraction of the investigation by the ights claim imposing personal liability against the police officials – raised
l expediency influenced the case.
icted five Sri Lanka Army soldiers while acquitting the former Deputy De- s, along with eight other soldiers, in the Udathalawinne case. In the face erdict absolving all but five members of the military raised profound ques- ial system to provide justice and to restore the confidence of minorities in
rther blow to human rights and rule of law in the country with its ruling in udge Bench of the Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice ruled that tional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
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was inconsistent with the Constitution of Sri Lanka. The Supreme Court practice pronounced on the constitutionality of the accession though this w
parties. The petitioner merely sought a revision of the previous decision o the Human Rights Committee. The Attorney General’s Department objecte to further undermine public confidence, particularly among minorities, in th the judiciary as well as the rest of the Government.
The Supreme Court on 16th October 2006 in a landmark judgment ruled which was part of the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, was null and void ab initi declared illegal a political arrangement that had become a de facto reality o
From a technical legalistic perspective, the Supreme Court’s ruling arguab ner in which the merger was effected was not in accordance with the Co broader political and conflict resolution perspective, however, this judgme
implications on the peace process insofar as, as expressed by political an challenge, 17 years after the merger’s effect and at the height of renewed cal wedge into the ethnic issue during a particularly sensitive time. Finally
larly that of the Chief Justice, during the proceeding again raised question surfaced that intervenient petitioners against the de-merger were snubbe argued also that the judgment went further than required in declaring the m narrower ruling which could have acknowledged the ground realities of the for the resolution of the ethnic conflict.
Increased Legal Challenges to Human Rights
The Emergency Regulations that went into effect nationwide immediately gamar have remained in force through the present. The regulations hav rounding their discriminatory impact inasmuch as they give the police a
search, arrest, detention, and seizure of property, while simultaneously safeguards designed to protect individual rights and liberties. The re-intr posal of bodies without public notification in the current set of Emergency ticular provisions had been removed from the previous set of regulations disposal of bodies of persons who died while in police custody raise the cremate dead bodies and thereby destroy potentially important medical ev completed. This would be particularly problematic in cases of alleged tort
ued enforcement of the Emergency Regulations will continue to place a st the receiving end – the Tamils. The Emergency Regulations have been sum remain in force. It is foreseeable, also, that the emergency regulations wi
by the Parliament indefinitely.
In December 2006, both President Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Wickrem ism Act was to be revived. The legislation had since its introduction in 197 merous human rights abuses while it was operational prior to the Cease-F
tain parts of the PTA would be suspended. Therefore though it was never riod after the signing of the CFA. Its recent reintroduction does not bode w confusion however as to whether the PTA was indeed reactivated as aro
series of new Emergency Regulations titled the Emergency (Prevention a Activities) Regulation No 7 of 2006.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

a. The Supreme Court, controversially and in a departure from its usual accession though this was not canvassed in the case by either of the two
the previous decision of the Supreme Court in the light of the opinion of al’s Department objected to the revision. The judgment could be foreseen among minorities, in the commitment to rule of law and human rights by
ndmark judgment ruled that the merger of the North and East provinces, as null and void ab initio (from its inception).62 In doing so, the judgment ome a de facto reality over the past 17 years.
e Court’s ruling arguably remedied an illegality in the sense that the man- ccordance with the Constitution and not open and transparent. From a e, however, this judgment could be foreseen to have serious detrimental
xpressed by political and legal analysts, Moreover, the timing of the court the height of renewed war, signaled a deliberate attempt to drive a politi- y sensitive time. Finally, the conduct of the Supreme Court, and particu-
g again raised questions as to its independence and non-bias, as reports e-merger were snubbed from putting forth their arguments. It could be uired in declaring the merger null and void ab initio, rather than tailoring a e ground realities of the past 17 years as well as the practical implications
o Human Rights
nationwide immediately after the assassination of Foreign Minister Kadir- t. The regulations have raised and will continue to raise concerns sur- they give the police and state security apparatus expansive powers of
, while simultaneously suspending various concomitant due procedural d liberties. The re-introduction of particular provisions such as the dis- rrent set of Emergency Regulations is particularly troubling as these par- ious set of regulations on May 3, 2000.63 The regulations relating to the olice custody raise the potential for uncontrolled discretion by the DIG to lly important medical evidence before a proper inquest proceeding can be in cases of alleged torture of the deceased while in custody. The contin-
ll continue to place a strain on public sentiment among the community at gulations have been summarily renewed and extended through 2006 and ergency regulations will continue to be renewed and extended unaltered
Prime Minister Wickremanayake announced that the Prevention of Terror- e its introduction in 1979 been viewed as draconian and gave rise to nu- nal prior to the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA). The CFA provided that cer-
re though it was never repealed, it was de facto moribund during the pe- uction does not bode well for human rights in Sri Lanka. There was some eed reactivated as around the same time the President promulgated a
ergency (Prevention and Prohibition of Terrorism and Specified Terrorist
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The main dangers of these regulations were as follows-
Given the past record and the current context of a culture of impun could be used to protect members of the police, armed forces an
terms of the proposed regulations in the discharge of their duties.
Attacks on INGOs/NGOs
This quarter has also witnessed an encroachment by the Sri Lankan State form of accusations and attacks against NGOs and INGOs operating in the staffers of Action Contre Faim (ACF) in August 2006, the threatened exp Frontier (MSF) in October 2006 and accusations against ZOA staff and offi ments must be viewed with the concerted attacks in the state media and ment to investigate NGOs. The terms of reference of the Select Committe tions was NGOs involved in attempts to promote peace and a political so
has seen an unhealthy trend developing within the military and Governme human rights and humanitarian workers to operate in the conflict affected a
Under increasing pressure from the international community and civil socie deterioration in rule of law, the GOSL finally agreed to establish a Preside Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) to investigate the recent country. Given the constraints placed on them by their implementing term tigatory bodies to successfully carry out their mandate and the genuine b dress their findings remains to be seen.
The Lack of Accountability and Transparency in th
The year 2006 witnessed the unveiling of the bill establishing RADA, rais with the President and RADA, including powers over land acquisition, c Governmental organizations as well as designating areas to be classifi disasters.64 Concern on the law making process of Sri Lanka was raised w Bill, and the ambiguity on process followed in drafting and sharing the doc
ency and consultation on drafting of the bill was demonstrated when man not aware of the existence of the bill and were only aware when it was rais key decisions within certain actors without involving other relevant actors Lanka and it seems that the practice is here to stay. Lack of consultation, when there were reports of the existence of yet another bill establishing the such a body is yet to be shared with actors including civil society, it too r process in Sri Lanka, with concern as to the mandate of such an authority
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka
The wide, over-broad language of several of the regulations, which and the autonomy of civil society groups.
The sweeping discretionary power of the Competent Authority ove tions including those committed to human rights, national reconcilia
The composition and legal standing of the Appeals Tribunal, which of powers and is an unconstitutional encroachment into the judicial

ext of a culture of impunity, the wide immunity clause (Regulation 15) that police, armed forces and other persons who take action in good faith in
charge of their duties.
by the Sri Lankan State on the “democratic space” in the country, in the INGOs operating in the North and East, including the assassination of 17 06, the threatened expulsion of six NGOs affiliated with Medecins Sans gainst ZOA staff and offices as recently as January 2007. These develop- in the state media and the appointment of a Select Committee of Parlia- of the Select Committee suggest that the main target of these investiga- eace and a political solution to the island’s ethnic conflict. The last year
military and Government to systematically close the space available for in the conflict affected areas.
mmunity and civil society to address the growing culture of impunity and d to establish a Presidential Commission of Inquiry and the International
investigate the recent upsurge of abductions and assassinations in the their implementing terms of reference, however, the ability of these inves- date and the genuine bona fides of the GOSL in its commitment to ad-
nd Transparency in the Law-Making Process
establishing RADA, raising concerns regarding the broad powers vested over land acquisition, controlling and monitoring foreign and local non- ng areas to be classified as being affected by natural or man made f Sri Lanka was raised with the Bill due to secrecy in the formulation of the ing and sharing the document with other stakeholders. Lack of transpar-
emonstrated when many in the Government as well as RADA itself were aware when it was raised by various civil society. Such a trend of keeping g other relevant actors is nothing new to the law making process in Sri y. Lack of consultation, transparency and inclusivity were raised yet again ther bill establishing the Resettlement Authority. While the Bill establishing ing civil society, it too raises the issue of due process in the law making te of such an authority and content of the bill.
22
Appeals Tribunal, which is a blatant violation of the principle of separation chment into the judicial sphere of Government.
f the regulations, which could curtail legitimate democratic activity, dissent
ompetent Authority over the activities, inter alia of civil society organiza- ights, national reconciliation and also over the media.
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Conclusion
The cumulative effect of the cavalier disregard for the Constitution, the c tions, the continuing politicization of the judiciary – in most constitutional d ian Government and an ineffective legislature – the concerted attacks on c
culture of impunity raises serious concerns about the protection of basic no The weak and fractured opposition and the rise in the influence of the a LTTE, introduce two additional factors that could also contribute to the shr
and dissent. Concerned citizens and the international actors who attach governance should address these disturbing trends and recognize the lin human rights and the pursuit of peace.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

the Constitution, the consequent politicization of key democratic institu- in most constitutional democracies, the last refuge against an authoritar- concerted attacks on civil society and voices of dissent, and the growing
e protection of basic norms of Constitutionalism and democracy in 2007. the influence of the armed forces as they inflict military defeats on the so contribute to the shrinking of democratic space for alternative opinions
nal actors who attach importance to principles of democracy and good s and recognize the linkages between the concerns of governance and
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Human Security
Introduction
As the violence escalated over the course of 2006 into an undeclared wa man rights situation steadily deteriorated. The number of killings, disappea body count amounting to almost the same as the war years. This situatio instances of particular brutality, has increasingly come to resemble a full- also demonstrate a widening culture of impunity. The violence and its impa internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. There were increasing
placement, particular areas of the North and East facing severe shortages nutrition, and new restrictions on access for humanitarian actors. Over th tions, including attacks on IDPs and welfare camps, and on humanitarian
humanitarian space resulted in delays and curtailment of rehabilitation and ing the overall development in the region and compounding the humanitari rated to such an extent that it was compared to that of Dafur and the Midd
Targeting of Civilians
Over 2006 large-scale human rights violations targeting civilians were co types of violations and the brutality of the attacks all indicated a clear pa forces, the LTTE, the Karuna Group and other armed groups such as the the targeting of civilians. A key trend over the year was the increased blu civilians, largely due to the willingness of armed actors to intimidate and means including the LTTE’s forced military training for civilians and the use significant civilian populations. Given the context of a guerilla war and the armed group, all sides were determined to use the situation to their ad shield” was repeatedly used with allegations that the LTTE was using civ was launching attacks from civilian centers so as to encourage attacks on
cused of repeatedly targeting and intimidating civilians, though they claim were acting in self-defence. The incident in Trincomalee on January 3 whe in Allaipiddy where 13 people were killed on May 13 and the killing of 6 yo key incidents where those killed were civilians. They were not engaged in retaliatory violence. Civilians also increasingly found themselves caught in t on the security forces, civilians are sometimes the victims of grenade attac
There was a clear ethnic divide with regard to the violence against civilian
able group subject to harassment and violence, including arrests, abducti increased fears that the violence and its impact would result in ethnic clean mine attack in Kebetigollewa which killed over 60 Sinhalese civilians, or th
of killings and violence resulting in mass displacement of the Tamil Comm market bomb, the communal riots and the subsequent events that followe
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

uman Security
into an undeclared war in the North and East, the humanitarian and hu- ber of killings, disappearances, and abductions increased, with the annual war years. This situation of civilians being targeted and killed, including me to resemble a full-blown war. The repeated and mounting violations he violence and its impact have led to large numbers of people becoming There were increasing signs of a humanitarian crisis with waves of dis-
facing severe shortages of basic services, including reports of rising mal- nitarian actors. Over the year there were a series of humanitarian viola- , and on humanitarian workers and agencies. The noticeable shrinking of
ent of rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives in the North East, affect- ounding the humanitarian crisis. The overall situation in Sri Lanka deterio- t of Dafur and the Middle East.
geting civilians were committed. The numbers of civilians attacked, the all indicated a clear pattern. All the military actors including the security ed groups such as the EPDP, stepped up their activities which included r was the increased blurring of the distinction between combatants and
ctors to intimidate and brutalise the civilian population through multiple for civilians and the use of a variety of tools of war against locations with f a guerilla war and the confusion as to who constituted a member of an he situation to their advantage. Throughout the year the term “human the LTTE was using civilians to protect their military positions and that it o encourage attacks on civilians. The Security Forces have been also ac-
ans, though they claim that those targeted are LTTE agents and that they alee on January 3 where 5 youth were killed in cold blood, the massacre 3 and the killing of 6 youth in Vavuniya on Novermber 18 are some of the ey were not engaged in any military activity and were made the victims of themselves caught in the middle of the violence. For instance, in attacks ictims of grenade attacks or claymore mine explosions.
violence against civilians. Young Tamil males are clearly the most vulner-
cluding arrests, abductions, disappearances and killings. There were also uld result in ethnic cleansing, be it specific incidents such as the claymore inhalese civilians, or the battle for Muttur in early August, or the patterns
ent of the Tamil Community in Trincomalee in the wake of the April 12 uent events that followed. This has had a knock-on effect in terms of eth-
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nic polarization between communities engaged in day-to-day activities an and giving way to tension and violence. Each of these attacks also creates
each community views these attacks as attempts to drive them out.65
Abductions and Disappearances
A large number of disappearances and abductions took place, not just in quency in the Western Province. There were reports of 65 civilians missing
other reports stated that 41 were missing.66 There were also reports of inc geted for abduction and ransom.67 Disappearances and abductions expon loa, Trincomalee and Vavuniya. A further development in 2006 was the ph children in Jaffna, and the East. There were also reports of bodies appea perceived as punitive measures and as a lesson for the rest of the populat were a frequent target of this pattern of violence.69 The suspected involvem killings have raised serious questions regarding state impunity, complicity
man rights. One human rights group claimed “elements in the armed forc ese claims appear to be in a stronger position in the state apparatus si South71, the nature of the killing where some of the bodies were naked
back “memories of the ‘reign of terror’ of the late 1980s.”72
The increase in the number and nature of attacks on academics was also Ratnajeevan Hoole who was appointed Vice Chancellor of the Jaffna Unive the South Eastern University. The abduction of Eastern University Vice C security area in Colombo, following the abduction and release of Dean of th raised concern on the ability of academic institutions to function in the N dranth’s case, state complicity in such abductions. The wave of disappear
Civil Monitoring Committee comprising both Tamil and Sinhalese politicia Commission to probe disappearances headed by retired High Court Jud ures were taken, abductions continued with similar intensity, with little repo
Violence against children was a significant issue in 2006. The security of T to increased levels of killings and attacks, they faced the renewed threat o stepped up their child recruitment campaigns. In the middle of June the K
campaign in areas around Batticaloa Town and Valichennai, which have b It is reported that up to 120 children were taken away in white vans.7 Si issue of child conscription with the visit of Ambassador Alan Rock in Nove highlighting the Government forces complicity in the abductions in the Ea on Ambassador Rock and UN Under-Secretary-General, Special Represe Armed Conflict Dr. Radhika Coomaraswamy. The Government’s inability t also highlighted. This has raised serious questions regarding the state’s c ment or to secure the release of the abductees. Both the LTTE and the Ka ing, while figures demonstrate ongoing child recruitment.75 The abductio education for children afraid to attend school due to the fear of being abd
on the parents of abductees who try to secure their release.
The vulnerability and targeting of children in an armed conflict was blatant injury of a further 120 when the Air Force bombed a camp in Sencholai, M sisted that the children were receiving military training and the LTTE claime
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

day-to-day activities and interactions, making these increasingly difficult se attacks also creates another layer of tension and ethnic polarization as
o drive them out.65
ces
s took place, not just in the North and East but also with increasing fre- s of 65 civilians missing from January to August, 50 in August alone while
were also reports of increasing numbers of Tamil businessmen being tar- and abductions exponentially increased in areas such as Jaffna, Battica- ent in 2006 was the phenomenon of white van abductions of adults and ports of bodies appearing in some of these areas. The abductions were the rest of the population to terrorize them into submission.68 Male youth The suspected involvement of the security forces in such abductions and te impunity, complicity and participation in the abuse of fundamental hu-
ents in the armed forces that favour vigilante actions to promote Sinhal- the state apparatus since the election.”70 With bodies appearing in the the bodies were naked and their hands tied behind their backs, brought
80s.”72
on academics was also a development in 2006, with threats to Professor ellor of the Jaffna University and the attack on Professor Hussein Ismail of stern University Vice Chancellor, Professor S. Raveendranath, in a high nd release of Dean of the Arts Faculty, Eastern University Bala Sugumara, ons to function in the North East and in particular in Professor Raveen- The wave of disappearances in Colombo resulted in the formation of the
and Sinhalese politicians and the appointment of a Special Presidential retired High Court Judge Mahanama Tillakaratna.73 Though such meas- intensity, with little reported progress in investigations.
2006. The security of Tamil children in particular deteriorated. In addition d the renewed threat of abductions as both the LTTE and Karuna faction he middle of June the Karuna Group conducted a 2-day rapid abduction
lichennai, which have become high risk areas for male children above 15. way in white vans.74 Significant international attention was drawn to the
dor Alan Rock in November 2006. Comments made by the Ambassador e abductions in the East by the Karuna Group, resulted in verbal attacks eneral, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Government’s inability to provide concrete evidence to the contrary was regarding the state’s commitment to take action to prevent child recruit- th the LTTE and the Karuna Group continue to deny that they are recruit- itment.75 The abductions have had multiple effects including the loss of to the fear of being abducted and the psychological and economic strain
release.
ed conflict was blatantly exposed in the killing of around 50 girls and the a camp in Sencholai, Mullaitivu on August 14. While the Government in- ing and the LTTE claimed that they were providing medical training for the
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children, it clearly demonstrated the complete disregard for the rights of c matter and the LTTE continuing its training and use of children for violence.
Arrests and detention also increased with Tamil youth becoming frequen dents. For instance, in the wake of the suicide attack against the Army C There are also reports of Tamil youth disappearing after being detained or
instance, 5 Tamil youth who came to Kantale from Muttur were stopped a local villagers in Poddankadu on April 22. The bodies’ of two of these yout In certain cases, protective custody was seen by civilians as the only safe the high risks and the lack of any other option, increasing numbers of c (HRC) Jaffna branch to place them in the safety of prisons.77
A Human Rights Crisis and Responses to it
In 2006 the human rights situation deteriorated to such an extent that it violence but also in terms of its intensity. Civilians could be brutally tortur Vankalai in May, face the barrage of multi-barrel rockets like the communit
like the 61 civilians killed in a claymore attack on a bus in Kebetigollewa in vil in September. There were flagrant and repeated violations of internatio sions of the Geneva Convention Governing Armed Conflict, in particular P the distinction between civilians and combatants (Article 4.1, Protocol II); 16);78 Attacks within or near to hospitals (Article 10 and 11, Protocol II); ants as prisoners of war (Article 5, Protocol II) ;80 Failing to provide facilities Protocol II).81 The continued violations of internationally accepted norms an to military gains over human suffering and the respect for international no proceedings, and the politicization of inquiries as seen with many of the c culture of impunity. The situation was aptly summed up by Philip Alston, stated that the overall efficiency of the policing system, the ambiguity of th contributing towards creating a ‘zone of impunity,’ which in turn was resulti
There was increasing international pressure on the Government to improve killings and other human rights violations. Pressure mounted at the Sep where Sri Lanka found itself on the top of the agenda along with the Mid duced in the course of 2006 to address the deteriorating rights situation Directives and the establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Hu
addressing human rights violations was the President’s pledge to establis was subsequently watered down to a national Commission of Inquiry (CoI) Persons (IIGEP) to investigate and inquire into 15 cases of violations in 20
the IIGEP and establishing a secretariat, the CoI and IIGEP is set to comm again with regard to delays in investigations and inquiries, transparency, and follow up of recommendations, and politicization of investigations a taken, they did not act as a deterrent to new offences and violations. The seeming willingness to compromise on rights and an increasing tolerance security. Against this backdrop, calls by various actors for the creation of a tinue.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

gard for the rights of children. The Government insisted that age did not of children for violence.
outh becoming frequent targets especially in the wake of particular inci- ack against the Army Commander, 97 Tamils were arrested in Colombo. after being detained or stopped for questioning by the armed forces. For
Muttur were stopped and questioned by the armed forces according to es’ of two of these youth were found with gunshot wounds the next day.76 ivilians as the only safe option. For example in the Jaffna Peninsula, given creasing numbers of civilians requested the Human Rights Commission
risons.77
esponses to it
such an extent that it became a crisis, not just in terms of the scale of could be brutally tortured and killed as in the case of a family of four in ckets like the communities of Muttur, Sampur and Vaharai, be massacred
bus in Kebetigollewa in May and be slayed like the 11 labourers in Pottu- violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) enshrined in the provi- Conflict, in particular Protocol II (1977) namely- the non- observance of rticle 4.1, Protocol II); Attacks on places of worship (Article 16, Protocol
and 11, Protocol II); 79 Failing to treat captured and/or injured combat- ailing to provide facilities critical to the survival of a community (Article 14, ally accepted norms and standards further demonstrate the priority given ect for international norms. With the delays in investigations and criminal een with many of the cases in 2006, there was a rapid escalation in the d up by Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur for Extra-Judicial Killings who em, the ambiguity of the role of the military, Karuna and the LTTE were all
hich in turn was resulting in major human rights violations.82
Government to improve its human rights record and to investigate civilian re mounted at the September sitting of the UN Human Rights Council nda along with the Middle East and Sudan. Several initiatives were intro- iorating rights situation including the re-issuing of the 1995 Presidential erial Committee on Human Rights.83 The most notable development in
ent’s pledge to establish an independent international commission. This mission of Inquiry (CoI) and an Independent International Expert Group of cases of violations in 2005/2006. With delays in nominating members to
d IIGEP is set to commence only in February 2007, raising concerns, yet inquiries, transparency, access to all persons and areas, implementation tion of investigations and inquiries.84 Though the above measures were ces and violations. The latter increased. A notable point in 2006 was the an increasing tolerance for the infringement of these rights for the sake of ors for the creation of an international human rights monitoring body con-
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New Displacement
The increase in violence and attacks on civilians and the heightened militar civilians and communities displaced across the North and East, some to th to UNHCR figures there are 215,421 displaced since April 2006, which d
April 2006. The fluctuating numbers of IDPs further demonstrate the dyna number being 242,700 in September. The true nature of displacement and dynamic nature of displacement, with many IDPs living with family and frien
also witnessed increasing numbers fleeing to South India, a dangerous jou sent there are around 16,771 refugees who made the journey in 2006 alo and 68,000 refugees from the old caseloads.
Attention needs to be paid to the distinct forms of displacement, regional ment. For example, fear has led to surges in displacement, usually in the where there was a mass exodus of Sinhala villagers from the outlying villag civilians fleeing Allapiddy and its environs following the massacre and the citing the lack of manpower.86 An indication of the level of fear and insecur dus: the killing of a Muslim bread vendor in a Tamil village Bharathipuram, gar and Azad Nagar fleeing to nearby schools.87
According to UNHCR figures, at present there are 75,024 IDPs in Batticalo Verugal. A large number of these IDPs were from Trincomalee. They were heavy fighting that resulted in the military capture of Sampur. Some of the
following the upsurge of violence from April. This was a recurring trend in placements during the course of the year.
In addition to the use of force and fear in causing displacement, a signific intimidation to prevent displacement. Both the GOSL and the LTTE have
munities from seeking flight: the LTTE in Vaharai and Vergual and the GOS use of coercion by the GOSL to resettle IDPs as seen with the Muslim ID refuge in Kantalai. Questions on whether the return was based on inform were raised, coupled with those on the lack of security guarantees and a Such a stand by the authorities, a key actor in the protection of the rights o stand taken by the Government and the seeming disregard for human righ nicisation of violence there are real fears of similar patterns in the policie changes in demographics and further polarize the ethnic communities.
Beyond the direct suffering caused by violence and displacement, comm With the escalation in violence, the day-to-day existence of communities h and social lives of many communities in the North and East largely caus The lack of mobility, the restriction of services, the shortages and increase portunities have all had far-reaching effects across the North, the East a restrictions on fishing in Jaffna and Mannar during 2006, which affected no depended on the fishing industry.90
An Emerging Humanitarian Crisis
A significant development towards the latter part of 2006 was the shortag the North and East, resulting in malnutrition, possible starvation of people,
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

d the heightened military attacks, resulted in an upsurge in the number of rth and East, some to the West Coast and outside the country. According ce April 2006, which does not include figures on IDPs displaced prior to
r demonstrate the dynamic nature of displacement, with the highest IDPs ure of displacement and number of IDPs is difficult to ascertain due to the ing with family and friends as well as ‘the night time IDPs’. The year 2006
h India, a dangerous journey resulting in several civilian casualties. At pre- the journey in 2006 alone. This is on top of 312,712 conflict-related IDPs
displacement, regional differences, and the reasons behind the displace- acement, usually in the wake of specific attacks as seen in Kebetigollewa s from the outlying villages to Kebetigollewa Town85 and more than 1,500 the massacre and the refusal of the security forces to grant protection, level of fear and insecurity is that a single killing could set off a mass exo- l village Bharathipuram, Muttur led to over 3,000 Muslims from Jinna Na-
75,024 IDPs in Batticaloa with large numbers moving in from Vaharai and rincomalee. They were displaced in August to Vaharai in the wake of the f Sampur. Some of them had already been displaced within Trincomalee
as a recurring trend in 2006 in that civilians were subject to multiple dis-
displacement, a significant concern in 2006 was the use of coercion and SL and the LTTE have been accused of using coercion to prevent com-
d Vergual and the GOSL in Kinniya. 88 There were also concerns over the een with the Muslim IDPs displaced from Muttur who sought temporarily n was based on informed choice and whether it was voluntary in nature curity guarantees and adequate infrastructure for safe return to Muttur.89 protection of the rights of all civilians in Sri Lanka, demonstrates the tough isregard for human rights and humanitarian norms. Coupled with the eth- r patterns in the policies of resettlement, which could lead to significant
thnic communities.
d displacement, communities and families are affected in multiple ways. tence of communities has been severely affected, including the economic and East largely caused by violence, hartals and increased restrictions. shortages and increase in prices of goods, and loss of employment op- s the North, the East and border areas. For instance the Navy imposed 2006, which affected not only fishermen but also others whose livelihoods
risis
f 2006 was the shortages of food, water and medicine in certain areas in le starvation of people, and deaths of civilians due to the lack of essential
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medicines. For instance, the closure of the A9 in August 2006, and the r controlled areas, has resulted in shortages of essential items and money in
turn, civilians in the area face difficulties in affording such items, raising con of certain goods in Jaffna are shown below.91
Item Prices before closing of A9 (S
Rice (1Kg) 35
Flour (1kg) 40
Sugar (1kg) 60
Dhal (1kg) 80
Milk powder (400g) 145
1 Coconut 15
Coconut oil (1litre) 75
1 Egg 6
Tea (1kg) 300
With hostilities increasing, and neither the LTTE nor the Government willin not seem to be an indication that the A9 will be opened in the immediate tions regarding other LTTE controlled areas. In such a context, the trend s gardless of the humanitarian implications. Both parties, especially the St manitarian consequences of their violence.
With the new wave of displacement, there was increasing concern regar Government officials and other agencies, as several incidents demonstra assistance to IDPs and affected communities as seen in Trincomalee, Pe vast amounts of money that were spent and countless programmes initia Government actors dealing with relief and related work post tsunami. With ties there were notable signs of a lack in coordination among relevant acto tion leading to a contestation of figures and delays in providing relief, high vant stakeholders. There were also concerns of the role of the State, which to INGOs and NGOs, preferring to play the role of coordinator.
In the context of assistance to IDPs and affected communities, 2006 also tion of assistance. This factor was highlighted in relation to Muslim IDPs fro in August 2006 where many Muslim groups came together to provide ass taking a back seat and not fully involved in the relief work. The lack of facilit August 2006 needs to be compared with the assistance provided to Sinh December 2006, where a systematic provision of assistance was witnesse
salai and Trincomalee demonstrate the speed with which assistance is pro to Sinhala IDPs. The involvement of political groups in the assistance prog pled with the appointment of a military officer as the Government Agent, o
in humanitarianism, with long term implications for the role of the State in th polarizing of communities.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

ugust 2006, and the restriction of movement to other parts of the LTTE tial items and money in banks and rapid increases in prices of goods. In
such items, raising concern about malnutrition and starvation. The prices
before closing of A9 (SLR) Present prices (SLR)
35 180
40 150
60 400
80 200
145 400
15 90
75 450
6 55
300 800
r the Government willing to give into humanitarian concerns, there does pened in the immediate future or that there will be a relaxation of restric- h a context, the trend seems to be a military victory at whatever cost, re- rties, especially the State, have a clear responsibility in tackling the hu-
creasing concern regarding the lack of preparedness on the part of the ral incidents demonstrated delays and lack of coordination in providing
een in Trincomalee, Pesalai and Kantalai.92 This raises questions on the tless programmes initiated on building capacity of Government and non ork post tsunami. With the large number of IDPs and affected communi- ion among relevant actors, gaps in terms of timely and accurate informa- in providing relief, highlighting the lack of preparedness among the rele- role of the State, which was increasingly turning over basic relief services oordinator.
ommunities, 2006 also witnessed increasing ethnicisation and politiciza- ation to Muslim IDPs from Muttur who arrived in Kantalai and Serunuwara together to provide assistance to the IDPs, with the Government seen as f work. The lack of facilities and organization that the Muslim IDPs faced in tance provided to Sinhala IDPs displaced to Kantalai from Serunuwara in ssistance was witnessed. Incidents in areas such as Kebettigollawa, Pes-
which assistance is provided, with noticeable speed of delivery in relation in the assistance programs, most notably the JVP in Trincomalee93 cou- e Government Agent, only intensified concerns over the political agendas
the role of the State in the provision of relief services, as well as the further
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Welfare camps and other places of refuge came under increasing attack i Selvanayagampura killing one person,94 the shooting of a police constab
Vavuniya,95 the attack on a welfare camp in Vaharai96 and the artillery bom larly, the attack in Pesalai on the Church of Our Lady of Victories where concerns regarding the respect for humanitarian spaces.
A significant development in 2006 was the shrinking of humanitarian spa posed by the Government which impacted programmes and projects un brutal killing of 17 local personnel of Action Contre Le Faim (ACF) in Mutt actors were attacked, raising concerns on the continuation of programme striction faced by humanitarian actors as well as Government regulations restrictions within the North and East and limited travel to LTTE controlled of rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in certain parts in the NorthEas delays and difficulties in obtaining work permits for expatriate staff working already underway and slowed rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. A fu on medical facilities, equipment and personnel, raising concern over the s patients. In addition, there have also been attacks when humanitarian c strikes in Vaharai while UN and ICRC convoys were present in Vaharai. S ian and medical actors, raises a fundamental issue on how actors who are ever increasing violent and insecure environment. There were also increasi
ian actors, which intensified as the situation became internationalized. The of humanitarian agencies and to impose severe restrictions on them esp areas. At the same time it demanded that the international actors step up t
With rising concerns over increased displacement, the speed of assistan also apprehensions regarding the differential treatment of tsunami and co also illustrated in the compensation provided to affected families. The Gov
residents compared to the compensation of Rs100,000 provided by Minis ated acrimony among the Muttur residents, resulting in the Government t areas.
Continuing Slow Progress in Tsunami Reconstruct
In 2006 there were several developments in relation to tsunami reconstr regulations, the introduction of a housing policy and the introduction and Reconstruction and Development Authority (RADA). On the second annive ber 26, only 56% of the houses required had been completed, reconstruction.101 According to RADA statistics, out of the total estimated structed with 47,859 (42%) under construction. Existing problems plaguin land unavailability, disputed beneficiary lists and lack of clarity on the imp progress. With relief and reconstruction work in the North and East, the s to release a breakdown of houses constructed in terms of the provinces like Ampara are particularly poor, especially when compared with Hamba
there were victims who claimed to have lost their houses.102 With the dete tion efforts, international actors have questioned the Government’s comm nami victims,103 implying that the ground situation could have detrimental e wake of delays in housing construction, there was increasing frustration a
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

nder increasing attack including the attack on a UNHCR refugee camp in ing of a police constable providing security at the Poonthotam camp in
i and the artillery bombardment of schools in Muttur and Topur.97 Simi- ady of Victories where about 3,000 people were seeking refuge, raised aces.
ng of humanitarian space, by way of security threats and restrictions im- mmes and projects undertaken by agencies in the North and East. The Le Faim (ACF) in Muttur was one of many incidents where humanitarian tinuation of programmes in a climate of violence.98 Security and other re- overnment regulations pertaining to the obtaining of work permits, travel avel to LTTE controlled areas, are some of the reasons for the curtailment in parts in the NorthEast by several actors. Such restrictions, as well as
expatriate staff working with agencies, affected projects and programmes onstruction efforts. A further development in 2006 was increasing attacks sing concern over the safety and security of medical personnel and their s when humanitarian convoys have been given access, such as the air e present in Vaharai.99 Such developments and threats to both humanitar- on how actors who are perceived to be neutral are able to operate in an here were also increasing tensions between Government and humanitar-
e internationalized. The Government continued to criticize the behaviour strictions on them especially with regards to access to LTTE-controlled ational actors step up their role.
, the speed of assistance and the quality of goods provided, there were ent of tsunami and conflict affected IDPs and communities.100 This was ected families. The Government initially provided only Rs15,000 to Muttur
,000 provided by Minister Fowzie to affected families in Potuvil. This cre- g in the Government topping up the compensation in Muttur and other
Tsunami Reconstruction
ion to tsunami reconstruction, namely the withdrawal of the buffer zone d the introduction and subsequent withdrawal of the Bill to establish the ). On the second anniversary of the tsunami, commemorated on Decem- ad been completed, demonstrating the slow progress in tsunami t of the total estimated 114,069 houses required only 63,469 were con- isting problems plaguing the housing construction programme, including ck of clarity on the implementation of the buffer zone continued to delay e North and East, the situation there is significantly worse. RADA has yet terms of the provinces but it seems that the housing situation in districts compared with Hambantota where more houses were constructed than
ouses.102 With the deteriorating security situation hampering reconstruc- e Government’s commitment to completing permanent housing for tsu- ould have detrimental effects on funding and reconstruction efforts. In the increasing frustration among beneficiaries which was translated into at-
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tacks on I/NGOs by the Government as attested to in comments made b Committee set to look into NGO activities.
Added to the housing problem were claims that poor construction had led Trincomalee and Hunugama, Hambantotoa.105 Criticism of the lack of pla affected communities, as well as sharing of information also plagued rec
relevant authorities.106 The limited consultation and participation of tsunam down bureaucracy which has limited or ignored input from local actors, the the weaknesses in information-sharing were highlighted in the Govern areas.107 The above examples demonstrate the total disregard by author rights of the people. Speedy reconstruction with no regard for quality and been the order of the day. Sadly, RADA’s own phrase ‘Building back bett wards reconstruction, governance and rights issues.
Conclusion
In 2006 there were large-scale human rights and humanitarian violations, precedented and intensifying fears of what the immediate future holds. T medical staff as well as prominent individuals were commonplace, raising tacks. With the ethnic targeting of civilians and various events leading to fu the violence will rise to dangerous levels, fueled and backed by nationalist to the rights and livelihoods of minorities and communities in the North country. With the violence set to continue, the above listed problems from mass displacement to the inadequate response by the state and restrictio into 2007.
With the delays in investigations and inquiries, and the increasing burea there was a growing trend of impunity among Government forces and arm fective deterrent and redress of human rights violations was possible and existed. In 2006 the Government demonstrated seeming disregard for hum
military victory at whatever human cost. Likewise the LTTE. Lastly, the con the lack of disaster preparedness, merely demonstrates the inertia and ine all probability will continue throughout 2007.
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o in comments made by the head of RADA and the Parliamentary Select
or construction had led to completed houses collapsing 104 in Uppuwelli, ticism of the lack of planning, consultation and participation of tsunami
ation also plagued reconstruction efforts, bringing sharp criticism of the
participation of tsunami affected communities, a highly centralized top- ut from local actors, the lack of transparency in the planning process and hlighted in the Government’s introduction of a Buffer Zone in coastal tal disregard by authorities towards good governance principles and the regard for quality and the views of the affected people, appears to have rase ‘Building back better’ is a far cry from the Government’s attitude to-
.
umanitarian violations, with the nature and brutality of attacks being un- mediate future holds. Threats to the security of civilians, IDPs, relief and commonplace, raising concern about state complicity in some of the at- ous events leading to further polarization of communities, there is fear that d backed by nationalist elements. This could lead to an increased threat munities in the North and East with ripple affects in other parts of the ve listed problems from rights violations to the brutal impact of violence, the state and restrictions on the work of humanitarian actors, will persist
d the increasing bureaucratization and politicization of such processes, ernment forces and armed actors, raising concern as to whether any ef- tions was possible and above all, as to whether a will to address them
ming disregard for human rights and humanitarian norms, with priority for
he LTTE. Lastly, the continuing bungling of the tsunami reconstruction and rates the inertia and ineptness within the Government structures, which in
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State of the Economy
Introduction
The macro-economic indicators in 2006 showed strong signs of growth an ing unemployment rate, and strong stock market performance. However, t in terms of rising inflation, negative real interest rate, rising budget deficit, tion of the rupee, and increasing current account deficit and fast depl payments. When analysing the state of the economy it is important to loo any particular point of time. Therefore, this review is based on the trends o
nomic growth, money supply, unemployment, inflation, budget deficit and e (7 year period). These indicators could gauge the health of the economy. T 1–6.
Sri Lanka has been facing the twin problem of the ethnic conflict and the had their ups and downs in this period. In order to deal with dual challenge retained the defence and finance ministerial portfolios, barring 2002-2005, way relationship between the conflict and the economy was evident sinc
times began with severe drought, rising world oil price, and several military year 2000.
Growth
The economy recorded 6% growth in 2005 and is expected to grow by
growth was on declining path during the first three quarters of 2006 (8.3% sides, the fourth quarter 2006 growth is anticipated to be lower; around 6. ing exports, and drop in tourist arrival during the peak tourist season as a
European countries to its citizens in the aftermath of terror attacks in Haba background of decelerating quarterly growth rate, 2007 would be a cha cause of resurgence of the armed conflict and deteriorating security situ payments crisis.
There is a danger of growth rates returning to that of the pre-tsunami per 6% (in real terms) in 2000 nose-dived to (-) 1.5% in 2001, the first-ever n combination of political, economic and other factors110 creating a balance change reserve. With the change of Government in December 2001 led started to pick up posting 4% growth rate in 2002 and 6% in 2003, but d ernment and political and economic uncertainty. 111 A further deceleration of December 2004. The economy rebounded in 2005 and 2006 fuelled b donors boosting the external balance-of-payments and the massive recons
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

ate of the Economy
trong signs of growth and resilience with a rising GDP growth rate, declin- erformance. However, the Sri Lankan economy is showing signs of strain e, rising budget deficit, sharp increase in broad money supply, deprecia- t deficit and fast depleting overall balance in the external balance-of- y it is important to look at the trend over a period of time rather than at s based on the trends of crucial macroeconomic indicators, such as eco-
ion, budget deficit and external balance-of- payments, from 2000 to 2006 ealth of the economy. The trends of these indicators are shown in Graphs
ethnic conflict and the economy in the past quarter century, which have deal with dual challenge successive executive presidents since 1989 have ios, barring 2002-2005, including the incumbent. In recent times the two- nomy was evident since about the year 2000. Economic woes in recent
ice, and several military reversals in the Northern battlefront in and around
expected to grow by about 7% in 2006. However, quarterly economic
quarters of 2006 (8.3%, 7.6% & 7.5% respectively) (see Graph 1).108 Be- to be lower; around 6.5%, due to drop in agricultural production, declin- eak tourist season as a result of adverse travel advisories issued by many
f terror attacks in Habarana and Galle109 (two prime tourist spots). In this 2007 would be a challenging year for economic growth especially be- eteriorating security situation in the country and a potential balance-of-
of the pre-tsunami period. GDP that posted a reasonable growth rate of n 2001, the first-ever negative growth rate since independence, due to a rs 0 creating a balance-of-payments crisis with fast depleting foreign ex- in December 2001 led by the United National Party (UNP), the economy and 6% in 2003, but dropped to 5.4% in the wake of a change in Gov- A further deceleration of economic growth was arrested by the tsunami 05 and 2006 fuelled by the one-year debt moratorium granted by major and the massive reconstruction activities.
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Money Supply
Despite several negative economic indicators in the recent past it is surpris has been on the rise thus far, notwithstanding the deceleration in the quart the GDP growth rate in the past three years (2004-2006) can be partially
during the same period. For example, money supply increased steeply to increased further by 19.6% in 2005 and 21.5% in 2006. Since 2002, th greater than the growth in nominal GDP (see Graph 2). However, it is note
supply and nominal GDP has been widening since the change in Govern have increasingly become a salient feature of SLFP-led administrations.
The fact that growth in money supply is greater than the nominal GDP grow
Thus, the monetary expansion has induced growth in GDP in the past few Upheavals in the financial market (significant depreciation of the rupee and of 2006 are a reflection of the un-sustainability of monetary expansionism by fiscal expansionism during the last three years (2004-2006). Printing of money supply in the market. The belated release of the new Rs.2,000 cur was printed in 2004 but the release was deferred) is one such instance.
Unemployment
With rising growth rates employment rates rise as suggested by the grad 2003, 7.7% in 2005, and 6.2% in 2006 (see Graph 3). This is the main moment. However, since the North & East were excluded in 2006 the unem tion due to widespread and significant job losses as a result of resumption of the year.112 For the period 2000-2006 there was a strong correlation growth rates, barring 2002. The unemployment rate, which was 7.6% in 20 Year 2002 was anomalous because of rising growth rate was coupled wit the labour force survey data included the North & East for the first time sin 2006 does not accurately reflect the national statistics. It is also importan during SLFP-led regimes, because of expansion in public sector employme
Inflation
IInflation has had an inverse relationship with real economic growth betwe growth has pushed up inflation and vice versa. Inflation, in terms of Colom bled from 6.2% in 2000 (GDP 6%) to 14.2% in 2001 (-1.5% GDP). Howeve and 6.3% in 2003 amidst rising GDP growth rates of 4% and 6% respect
clined to 5.4% inflation increased to 7.6%. But 2005 and 2006 has had p rising inflation. That is, GDP grew by 6% in 2005 while inflation increased grow by around 7% in 2006 inflation is almost 14% in 2006 (see Graph 4) economic growth rate (i.e. nominal GDP growth minus inflation) in 2005 an growth coupled with rising inflation was primarily the result of monetary exp
Since inflation has been higher than interest rate, the real interest rate has
tive real interest rate is causing excessive borrowings by both the Govern rowings lead to demand-induced inflation. The Central Bank appears to that it may hamper investment and therefore economic growth. Hence, it
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

recent past it is surprising that the annual GDP growth rate (in real terms) eceleration in the quarterly growth rates during 2006. Gradual increase in -2006) can be partially accounted for by the steep rise in money supply
ly increased steeply to 18.5% in 2004 from 13.8% in 2003. Since then it n 2006. Since 2002, the growth in broad money supply (M2) has been 2). However, it is noteworthy that the gap between the growth in money
the change in Government in 2004. Policies of monetary expansionism -led administrations.
n the nominal GDP growth would indicative that the former fuels the latter.
in GDP in the past few years, which is unsustainable in the medium run. ciation of the rupee and steep rise in inflation) during the last four months monetary expansionism. Monetary expansionism is, in turn, necessitated 2004-2006). Printing of new money is the main mechanism of increasing f the new Rs.2,000 currency note into the money market in 2006 (which s one such instance.
suggested by the gradual decline in unemployment rates from 8.4% in h 3). This is the main positive economic indicator of the country at the luded in 2006 the unemployment rate of 6.2% would be an underestima- s a result of resumption of full scale hostilities, particularly in the latter half s a strong correlation between a rise or fall in unemployment rates and , which was 7.6% in 2000, increased to 7.9% in 2001 and 8.8% in 2002. h rate was coupled with rising unemployment rate. This may be because ast for the first time since around 1990. Thus, the unemployment rate for tics. It is also important to note that unemployment rate has been lower public sector employment, which fuels fiscal expansionism.
economic growth between 2000 and 2004. That is, dip in real economic tion, in terms of Colombo Consumer Price Index (CCPI), more than dou- 1 (-1.5% GDP). However, inflation declined consecutively to 9.6% in 2002 of 4% and 6% respectively. Then in 2004 while the GDP growth rate de-
05 and 2006 has had peculiar experience of rising growth coupled with while inflation increased to 11.6%. Further, while the GDP is expected to in 2006 (see Graph 4). Thus, rate of inflation was double that of the real inus inflation) in 2005 and 2006. This anomalous trend of rising economic e result of monetary expansionism-induced growth alluded to above.113
he real interest rate has been negative in the past two years or so. Nega-
gs by both the Government and the private sector. Such excessive bor- ntral Bank appears to be reluctant to raise the interest rate due to fears omic growth. Hence, it appears that the Government has opted to boost
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economic growth rather than contain inflation. Imposition of additional ta finance the expansionary fiscal outlays fuels inflation because businesses p
of increasing the prices of goods and services. Recently, often quoted reas rise in world crude oil price. However, the import price of crude oil to the to USD.72 per barrel (cost & freight) in July & August 2006 dropped drastic month the point-to-point rate of change in inflation nearly hit 20%, the hig 2006)114. This example again vindicates our argument that fiscal and mone in the past six months.
Public Finances
Fiscal profligacy is a critical problem the Government faces and has bec 2000. The overall budget deficit (total Government revenue minus total G and by 22% in 2001. However, the overall budget deficit was arrested b prudent fiscal management, expanding by only 7% in 2002 and a negligib
deficit shot up by 17% in 2004, 24% in 2005, and 30% in 2006 (see Graph
Since 1988 total Government revenue (tax plus non tax income) has been tures of the Government (total Government expenditure is split between account deficit in the budget shot up since 1994, especially from 2000 on tion of GDP peaked to almost 11% in 2001, and dropped consecutively in again since 2004 to 8.2%, 8.7% & 9.2% in between 2004-2006 (see Grap due to fiscal profligacy of the incumbent Government as reflected in the (Responsibility) Act [FM(R)A] the Government was obliged to reduce the b standing public debt to 85% of the GDP in 2006. Both of these commitme targets has been postponed to 2009. The budget deficit is expected to be
is expected to be about 94% of the GDP in 2006.116
Domestic resource mobilisation is undertaken through the sale of treasury interest rates (well below market rates) to primarily state-owned banks su
Bank, and the Bank of Ceylon (BoC). Another major captive source of defi Provident Fund (EPF) and Employees’ Trust Fund (ETF), which are the pe employees in the custody of the Central Bank. The fact that EPF and ET
(treasury bills & bonds) at below market rates erodes the real value of Government sector employees. That is, the accumulated pensions of t (nominal value minus the inflation over the period of time) at the time of the
Domestic resource mobilisation is costlier than external bilateral and mult
low concessionary interest rates along with a long repayment period (ove payment. In order to generate more public funding the Government is plan nated treasury bills and bonds from this year in order to mobilise foreign e
abroad.117
External Balance-of-Payments
The external balance-of-payments (BoP) has proved a critical problem for BoP reached a crisis state by end 2000 when both the current account an
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

osition of additional taxes and increasing the rates of existing taxes to n because businesses pass on the extra tax burden to consumers byway
ently, often quoted reason by the Government for galloping inflation is the rice of crude oil to the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) that peaked st 2006 dropped drastically to USD.55.5 in November 2006, during which nearly hit 20%, the highest ever recorded in the past seven years (2000- ent that fiscal and monetary expansionism is the primary cause of inflation
ent faces and has become a hallmark of SLFP-led governments since t revenue minus total Government expenditure) shot up by 50% in 2000 t deficit was arrested by the UNP-led regime in 2002 and 2003 through in 2002 and a negligible 0.03% in 2003. Since then, the overall budget
0% in 2006 (see Graph 5).115
tax income) has been inadequate to finance even the recurrent expendi- diture is split between recurrent and capital expenditures). The current especially from 2000 onwards. Moreover, the budget deficit as a propor- ropped consecutively in 2002 (9%) and 2003 (8%), but had started to rise n 2004-2006 (see Graph 5). Budget deficit is anticipated to keep on rising ent as reflected in the budget 2007. In terms of the Fiscal Management obliged to reduce the budget deficit to 5% of the GDP and the total out- oth of these commitments have not been met and the realisation of these deficit is expected to be around 9% and the total outstanding public debt
ugh the sale of treasury bills and bonds, which are sold at artificially low
state-owned banks such as the National Savings Bank (NSB), People’s
r captive source of deficit financing to the Government is the Employees’ (ETF), which are the pension funds of private & semi-Government sector e fact that EPF and ETF almost entirely invest in Government securities
rodes the real value of EPF and ETF contributions by private & semi- mulated pensions of these employees would have negative real value f time) at the time of their retirement.
ternal bilateral and multilateral aid, because the latter is provided at very
repayment period (over 10 years) and a grace period for beginning re- the Government is planning to sell foreign (convertible) currency denomi- er to mobilise foreign exchange from private and individual sources from
ts
d a critical problem for all administrations between 2000 and 2006. The the current account and the overall balance (current plus capital account)
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were in the red. That is, the current account balance was (-) USD.1,066 m lion in 2000 (see Graph 5). This crisis led to the free float of the rupee in
2001 under the enhanced structural adjustment facility. With the IMF lifeli declining deficit in the current account coupled with rising surplus in the deficit was curtailed to (-) USD.71 million the overall balance shot up to US
However, 2004 was once again marked by significant deficits in both the count (-USD.205 million) of the BoP. In 2005, while the current account de balance recorded a surplus of USD.501 million thanks to the debt mor USD.500 million) and significant relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction gr In 2006 (up to end-November) the current account deficit shot up by alm balance dipped drastically by 66% to USD.172 million.118 If no remedial a ance in the BoP would record a deficit in 2007.
Although the total export value in the first eleven months of 2006 has incre riod in 2005) the total import value in the same period has increased by eleven months of 2006 shot up by 34% in comparison to the same p
USD.3,207 million in absolute terms in the first eleven months of 2006. H shot up by 39% in the first eleven months of 2006 (USD.410 million) com abroad increased by 22% in the first eleven months (USD.1,883).119 It sho tourism industry due to the tsunami and therefore the rise in tourism reve industry was badly affected in 2006 as a result of resurgent conflict, whic industries such as the travel, hotel and other related service sectors. Bes increased by 12% to USD.905 million in the first eleven months of 2006 in
Hence, the cumulative total of USD.3,198 million foreign exchange earning ism during the first eleven months of 2006 was insufficient to offset the tra tant to note that the official flows in the first eleven months of 2006 noted (convertible) currency denominated development bonds to Sri Lankans livi lion) and about USD.100 million borrowed by the Government in internati official development assistance by the donor community is far less than the
Recently, the Citi Bank arranged a meeting of private international lenders of Sri Lanka in order to mobilise USD 500 million. However, it is learnt that out of 300 invitees and the Government was able to mobilize only less than national lenders are reluctant to lend to the Government because of the stalled economic reforms. The Government is attempting to woo foreign in bills & bonds in the new year.
Moreover, Sri Lanka received a setback in international money markets be effective from January 01, 2007. Since the suspension of the poverty redu cause of political instability and subsequent change in Government in Apri Sri Lanka. Besides, the present Government is reluctant to accept technica because of accompanied conditionalities. In these circumstances IMF has
dence and would oversee from its office in India.
Besides, Germany has announced that it would not provide any new aid situation. However, given the fact that Germany accounted for only 3.6% plus loans) in 2005, it is not a considerable loss to Sri Lanka. Moreover, a less than 10% of the annual total foreign assistance received by Sri Lanka
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

e was (-) USD.1,066 million and the overall balance was (-) USD.522 mil- e float of the rupee in January 2001 and borrowing from the IMF in May
cility. With the IMF lifeline the BoP improved a lot during 2001-2003, i.e. ith rising surplus in the overall account. Thus, while the current account l balance shot up to USD.502 million in 2003 (see Graph 5).
ant deficits in both the current account (-USD.648 million) and overall ac- the current account deficit remained the same level as in 2004 the overall hanks to the debt moratorium granted by major donors (roughly worth , and reconstruction grants from abroad in the aftermath of the tsunami. t deficit shot up by almost 70% to (-) USD.1,100 million and the overall llion.118 If no remedial action is taken it is highly likely that the overall bal-
onths of 2006 has increased by 8% (compared to the corresponding pe- eriod has increased by almost 16%. Hence, the trade deficit in the first parison to the same period in 2005. Trade deficit was a staggering (-)
ven months of 2006. However, foreign exchange earnings from tourists 6 (USD.410 million) compared to 2005 and net private remittances from s (USD.1,883).119 It should be noted that 2005 was not a normal year for the rise in tourism revenue in 2006 is from a low base. In fact, tourism resurgent conflict, which has multiplier effects in terms of losses to allied d service sectors. Besides, foreign currency inflows to the Government ven months of 2006 in comparison to the corresponding period in 2005.
reign exchange earnings from private remittances, official flows, and tour- ufficient to offset the trade deficit of (-) USD.3,207 million. It is also impor- months of 2006 noted above include proceeds from the sale of foreign onds to Sri Lankans living abroad (reportedly to the tune of USD.500 mil- Government in international capital markets in November.120 That is, the
unity is far less than the external inflows to Government noted above.
te international lenders in Singapore to facilitate credit to the Government owever, it is learnt that only 8 potential lenders turned up for the meeting o mobilize only less than USD.100 million. This indicates that private inter- nment because of the deteriorating security situation in the country and pting to woo foreign investors by selling US dollar denominated treasury
onal money markets because of the closure of the IMF office in Sri Lanka sion of the poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) in late 2003, be- e in Government in April 2004, the IMF has had no lending programme in ctant to accept technical assistance from international financial institutions circumstances IMF has pulled out from the country after 30 years of resi-
t provide any new aid to Sri Lanka due to the fast deteriorating security ccounted for only 3.6% of the total receipt of foreign assistance (grants Sri Lanka. Moreover, all the European countries put together account for e received by Sri Lanka121, and therefore Europe has very little leverage to
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influence the Government. Having said that, several European countries organisations (both international & national) that are largely unaccounted fo
of foreign exchange to the country.
Stock Market
In spite of deteriorating security situation in the North & East and adjoini economic hub of Sri Lanka contributing half the total national output) the s This is primarily due to negative real interest rates in the market, which ma able. Moreover, the stock market in Sri Lanka does not adequately represe
listed in it with a market capitalisation of LKR.145 billion (USD.1.3 billion). in the stock market is only about 5% of the Gross Domestic Product in cu the biggest contributors to the national economy, such as the export gar
Capital market development in Sri Lanka is still in its infancy and hence t garded as a reflection of the health of the overall economy..
Economic Governance and Restructuring
The SLFP-led government that came to power in 2004 not only stalled, ev
privatization undertaken by the preceding UNP-led government of 2002 a the new President in November 2005. The reestablishment of the perpetu the Sri Lanka Transport Board (SLTB) and the Cooperative Wholesale Est of the contributory pension scheme for new public sector employees, the (a private specialised bank) are some of the reversed economic restructu the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) remains stalled due to stiff opposition fr restructuring of the CEB remains unutilized. Privatisation is off the vocabula
The role of the Central Bank in the resurrection of the failed Pramuka Bank tion of a failed private bank falls under the purview of one of the core fun Bank, which has had repercussions in terms of the message the Central B was a restructuring programme of the Central Bank during 2002-2003 in taining financial market stability and price stability (containing inflation throu new President and Governor, the Central Bank seems to be moving towa and a lender of the last resort to the Government in addition to its core cerns regarding corruption in the country at large as indicated by the dip from 78 in 2005 to 84 in 2006.123 There are concerns that the Governm problem, especially in national institutions.
Budget 2007
In brief, the budget 2007 presented to parliament in November 2006 1 is diture increased by 41% and the defence budget increased by 46% co budget did not result in budgetary cuts in the economic (infrastructure) an fact, economic and social sectors have also received steep rise in budget in the context of only around 20% rise in nominal GDP is fiscal profligacy
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al European countries (including Germany) fund lot of non-governmental largely unaccounted for in the foregoing figures, and are a major source
orth & East and adjoining areas as well as in the Western Province (the al national output) the stock market has performed well throughout 2006. in the market, which makes investment in stocks and shares more profit- not adequately represent the economy, because only 242 companies are
illion (USD.1.3 billion).122 The market capitalisation of the listed companies Domestic Product in current market prices in 2006. Furthermore, some of such as the export garments industry, are not listed in the stock market.
its infancy and hence the performance of stock market could not be re- onomy..
estructuring
004 not only stalled, even reversed the ‘progressive’ economic reforms of
government of 2002 and 2003, which has intensified with the election of lishment of the perpetually loss-making state-owned enterprises such as perative Wholesale Establishment (CWE) (partial restoration), cancellation sector employees, the proposed resurrection of the failed Pramuka Bank ed economic restructuring programmes. The critical need to restructure ue to stiff opposition from some trade unions. The ADB credit line for the ation is off the vocabulary of the new President.
he failed Pramuka Bank has raised questions as to whether the resurrec- of one of the core functions, viz. financial sector stability, of the Central message the Central Bank is giving to the financial sector. Further, there k during 2002-2003 in order to go back to core functions such as main- containing inflation through prudent monetary policy). However, under the ems to be moving towards becoming a provider of development finance in addition to its core functions mentioned earlier. There were also con- as indicated by the dip in Sri Lanka’s rank in the Corruption Perception erns that the Government is not taking adequate steps to address the
n November 2006 124 is an expansionary one.125 The overall public expen- t increased by 46% compared to 2006. Therefore, increase in defence nomic (infrastructure) and social (education, health, RRR, etc) sectors. In ed steep rise in budgetary allocation. Over 40% rise in public expenditure GDP is fiscal profligacy. This unprecedented rise in public expenditure is
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going to be largely funded by domestic borrowings, which would crowd ou Huge domestic borrowing by the Government would hamper the developm
expenditures would enormously add to the public debt portfolio and thereb
Mahinda Chintanaya
The main thrust of the Mahinda Chintanaya (MC)126 a ten-year developme along with the budget 2007 in November 2006, is physical infrastructure
spired growth strategy, which is expected to link the local markets with n duce poverty.127 This strategy in not different in content from the Poverty R by the SLFP-led Government of 2000-2001 and the Regaining Sri Lanka ( ment of 2002-2003.
However, the difference between the MC and the PRGS/RSL is in the s structure development projects. While the RSL envisaged heavy reliance but also from private foreign investors), the MC envisages reliance on dom new President is not to succumb to policy advices accompanying externa the context of precarious public finances alluded to above. To the best o nanced massive infrastructure development projects are not financially viab
In the past decade, the erstwhile ten-year (subsequently five-year) rollin trimmed down because of the parlous state of the public finances in the c penditures. The MC is a resurrection of the erstwhile PIP. There is nothing
growth strategy. However, in the Sri Lankan context, public investment d nomic, environmental, and social viability criteria. In contrast, public invest litical considerations. The proposed construction of the second internation district, the home of the incumbent President) some 200 km from Colomb (USD. 159 million) and the proposed new state-owned international airlin (USD.14 million) are just two examples of the politically motivated public in rationality over its location is clearly in question. There is already a domestic
(home of the then Minister of Aviation), which has not become commer Hambantota district is one of the backward districts in the country and the of that historically marginalised district. However, building an international
be undertaken in an impoverished district. On the positive side, bold dec Norachcholai coal power plant, which has been in the pipeline since the lat ronmental and religious lobbies, would go a long way in mitigating the impe
The proposed new state-owned airline in the name of Mihin Air (a budget
Asia) which will be the key airline serving Weerawila will ostensibly provi workers is another example of politically motivated public investment decis for the new airline is to be met by the budget 2007, employees’ providen
the present economic conditions setting up of an airline should not be a p be examples of reckless and questionable public investment decision-mak posed public investment inspired growth strategy envisaged in the Mahind
There is very little (6 pages out of a total of about 240 pages) in the Ma conflict-affected areas. Nevertheless, MC envisages total public investmen
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

, which would crowd out investment funds available for the private sector. ld hamper the development of the capital market. These enhanced public
ebt portfolio and thereby fuel inflation.
a ten-year development framework 2006-2016, presented in parliament s physical infrastructure development (highways, seaports & airports) in-
he local markets with national and international markets and thereby re- tent from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) developed e Regaining Sri Lanka (RSL) strategy developed by the UNP-led Govern-
PRGS/RSL is in the source of funding of the proposed ambitious infra- visaged heavy reliance on external financing (largely from donor partners isages reliance on domestic financing, because the avowed policy of the accompanying external donor funding. It is indeed a big difference given to above. To the best of knowledge of the author largely domestically fi-
s are not financially viable and economically sustainable.
equently five-year) rolling public investment programme (PIP) has been public finances in the country mainly because of heightened defence ex- le PIP. There is nothing inherently wrong with a public investment induced
xt, public investment decisions are not made on rigorous financial, eco- contrast, public investment decisions are largely made on parochial po- f the second international airport of the country in Weerawila (Hambantota e 200 km from Colombo at an estimated total cost of LKR.17,500 million ned international airline at an estimated initial cost of LKR.1,500 million ally motivated public investment decisions. The viability of the airport and re is already a domestic airport in Koggola in the adjoining Matara District
s not become commercially viable.128 There is absolutely no doubt that s in the country and therefore priority should be given to the development uilding an international airport is not an appropriate public investment to
positive side, bold decision by the new President to go ahead with the he pipeline since the late-1970s but was blocked due to protests by envi- ay in mitigating the impending power crisis.
of Mihin Air (a budget airline initially serving the region – South and West
ila will ostensibly provide cheaper air passage to Sri Lankan expatriate public investment decision. The estimated initial cost of LKR.1,500 million 7, employees’ provident and trust funds , and the Ministry of Finance. In
airline should not be a priority of the Government. Both projects seem to vestment decision-making in Sri Lanka and do not bode well for the pro- nvisaged in the Mahinda Chintanaya.
t 240 pages) in the Mahinda Chintanaya about the development of the s total public investment worth LKR. President460,896 million (USD.4,609
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million) during the next ten year period (2007-2016) in the North & East ( pp224). The primary focus would be on physical, economic, and social infr
There is very little explicit commitment to meet the Millennium Develop Infrastructure-led development strategy may crowd out public investmen ernment appears to have replaced the commitment to the MDGs with its o
Economy in the Conflict Region
The economy in the conflict region was slowly but surely sliding back to t the latter half. It is worth remembering that the conflict affected Eastern, N recorded the highest regional growth rates in 2002&2003 compared to th the Northern province recorded 12.6% average annual growth, followed b ince 8.2%, while the western province recorded only 6.2% growth130.
However, past year has witnessed the killing of around 3,500 people (m 250,000 people, and hundreds of thousands of livelihood losses due to fre on fishing, power shedding, transport restrictions, unofficial economic e shortages and black markets as in pre-ceasefire times, particularly in the has skyrocketed in the Jaffna peninsula and the Vanni region in the afterm price of rice and wheat tripled over 2006.
Conclusions and way forward
At the outset of this review we highlighted the twin problem of economy recent history. While the UNP-led governments have historically manage regimes, 133 with regards to being successful at war SLFP-led governments led governments subscribe to Keynesian economic view that public expen
is vital for the welfare of the people. Hence, fiscal profligacy is the norm o penditure outlays and commensurate additional and enhanced taxation a led governments usually practice fiscal prudence whereby public expenditu
are shelved and pruned. However, both these budgetary strategies have b penditure coupled with rise in taxes have fuelled inflation and stifled entre taxes have increased unemployment and resulted in fiscal un-sustainability
Therefore, a middle path of limited public expenditure coupled with reaso tainable fiscal policy.
Unfortunately for Sri Lanka, the two major political parties that have been a have proved to be incapable of managing both the economy and the eth
While the present Government has made significant gains in the battlefield human suffering and rights violations)134 the economic woes seem to be dogmatic policies. The present Government is faced with the similar dilem 1994 which successfully and brutally crushed the JVP-rebellion at a huge nomic reform programme that salvaged the credibility and legitimacy of th international community.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

6) in the North & East (Mahinda Chintanaya: Vision for A New Sri Lanka, conomic, and social infrastructure development like in rest of the country.
he Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the Mahinda Chintanaya. d out public investments in human and social capital. The present Gov- t to the MDGs with its own “Mahinda Chintanaya Goals” (MCGs).129
ion
surely sliding back to the pre-ceasefire times during 2006, particularly in flict affected Eastern, Northern and the adjoining North central provinces &2003 compared to the previous five years. That is, during 2002&2003 nual growth, followed by Eastern province 10.1% and North central prov- ly 6.2% growth130.
round 3,500 people (majority of them civilians), displacement of nearly lihood losses due to frequent and prolonged curfews, hartals, restrictions , unofficial economic embargo131. These have revived the economy of mes, particularly in the North and LTTE-controlled areas132. Cost of living nni region in the aftermath of the closure of the A9 highway. In Jaffna the
d
problem of economy and ethnic conflict confronted by Sri Lanka in its ve historically managed the macro-economy better than the SLFP-led SLFP-led governments have arguably had more success. Usually, SLFP- view that public expenditure will propel growth and strong public sector
profligacy is the norm of SLFP-led regimes. Thus, extravagant public ex- d enhanced taxation are typical of budgets presented. In contrast UNP- hereby public expenditure is curtailed or minimised. Simultaneously, taxes
getary strategies have become unsustainable. While the rise in public ex- flation and stifled entrepreneurship, cuts in public expenditure as well as n fiscal un-sustainability (because of drastic drop in Government revenue).
ture coupled with reasonable taxation has to be pursued towards a sus-
parties that have been alternatively ruling the country since independence e economy and the ethnic conflict successfully in the past two decades.
t gains in the battlefield over the past year (albeit at a huge cost in terms omic woes seem to be piling up as noted above due to outdated and ed with the similar dilemma faced by the UNP-led Government of 1989- JVP-rebellion at a huge human cost and embarked on a successful eco- ility and legitimacy of the Government among the local masses and the
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Similarly, the present Government needs to bury economic fundamentalism rekindle the economy, if it wishes to consolidate and sustain the successes
of living, the point-to-point change in the cost of living index in terms of the ber 2006 compared to the same period in 2005 (primarily due to fiscal a union agitations. A faltering economy will create political unrest in the Sou the continuation of military operations, as in 2001. The economic windfa prospects for 2007 are somewhat bleak. In the Sri Lankan political land times of economic crisis such as 1990-1993 and 2002-2003 periods. He gloom is that the impending crisis may pave way for further economic re
since 2004.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

onomic fundamentalism and undertake far reaching economic reforms to d sustain the successes in the battle against terror. Already galloping cost
ing index in terms of the CCPI hitting almost 20% in November & Decem- primarily due to fiscal and monetary expansionism), has instigated trade
litical unrest in the South and could become the decisive factor deciding . The economic windfall of 2005 has run its course and the economic ri Lankan political landscape economic reforms are undertaken only at 002-2003 periods. Hence, the only consolation at this time of economic for further economic reforms, which has been stalled and even reversed
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War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka
GRAPH 1
GDP Growth Rate 2000 - 2006
9.0
8.0
8
7.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
5.0
5.4
4.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
-1.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1st Q
-1.5
2006 -2.0
GDP Grow th Rate
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2005 http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/AR2005data/Spappendix.pdf & http://www.cbsl.lk
GRAPH 2
Broad Money Supply (M2) & Nominal G
2000 - 2006
22.0
20.0
18.0
16.0
14.0
12.0
13.7 13.0
11.9 11.4
13.2 12.4
13.8 11.3 10.0
2000 2001 2002 2003
Broad Money Supply M 2 Nom
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2005, S http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/AR2005data/Spappendix.pdf & http://www.cbsl.lk

GRAPH 1
P Growth Rate
2000 - 2006
8.3
7.6 7.5
7.0 6.5 6.0 5.4
004 2005 1st Q
2nd Q 2006
2006
nnual Report 2005, Special Statistical Appendix Table 2 df & http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/socio_econ_ind.html (for 2006 data).
GRAPH 2
al Report 2005, Special Statistical Appendix Tables 2 & 7 df & http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/socio_econ_ind.html (for 2006 data).
39 3rd Q 2006
4th Q 2006
2006
GDP Grow th Rate
ply (M2) & Nominal GDP Growth Rates
2000 - 2006
13.2
21.5
12.4
11.3
19.6 18.5
16.6 15.2 13.8
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Supply M 2 Nominal GDP Growth Rate

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Centre for Policy Alternatives
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka
GRAPH 3
Unemployment Rate 2000 - 2006
10
8
7.6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2
Unemployment Rate GD
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2005 http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/AR2005data/Spappendix.pdf & http://www.cbsl.lk
GRAPH 4
Inflation 2000 - 2006
6.2
7.9
8.8
8.4
6
6.0
6.0
4
4.0
2
0
-2
-1.5
16 14
14.2
12 10
9.6 8 6
6.0
6.3 6.0 4
4.0 2 0 -2
2000 2001 -1.5
2002 2003
Annual Average Price Change (CCPI)
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2005 http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/AR2005data/Spappendix.pdf & http://www.cbsl.lk

GRAPH 3
nemployment Rate
2000 - 2006
8.8
8.4 8.3
7.7
6.2
4.0
7.0 6.0
5.4
6.0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
loyment Rate GDP Growth Rate
nnual Report 2005, Special Statistical Appendix Table 1 df & http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/socio_econ_ind.html (for 2006 data).
GRAPH 4
Inflation 2000 - 2006
9.6
6.3
13.7
4.0
11.6
7.6 6.0
5.4
6.0
7.0
002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ce Change (CCPI) Annual GDP Growth Rate
nnual Report 2005, Special Statistical Appendix Table 2 df & http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/socio_econ_ind.html (for 2006 data).
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War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka
GRAPH 5
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2005 http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/AR2005data/Spappendix.pdf & http://www.cbsl.lk
GRAPH 6
Balance of Payments 2000 - 2006
-1,066
Budget Deficit 2000 - 2006
50
50 45 40 35 30 25 20
22
15 10 5
7
0
0 -5
2000 -9.9
2001 -10.8 2002 -10
-8.9
2003
-8.0
-15
Budget Deficit as a percentage of GDP Grow
600 500
502 400 300 200
338 220 100 0 -100 -200
2000 2001 -215
2002 -237
2003
-71
-300 -400 -500 -600
-522
-700 -800 -900 -1,000 -1,100
Current Account Balance Overall (cu
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2005, Special Statistical
http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/AR2005data/Spappendix.pdf & http://www.cbsl.lk

GRAPH 5
Budget Deficit 2000 - 2006
-8.9
nnual Report 2005, Special Statistical Appendix Table 5 df & http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/socio_econ_ind.html (for 2006 data).
GRAPH 6
alance of Payments
2000 - 2006
-237
30
24
17
7
0 002 2003 -8.0 2004 -8.2 2005 -8.7 2006
-9.2
age of GDP Growth of Overall Budget Deficit (%)
502
-205
501
338
172
2002 2003 -71
2004 2005 2006 (upto
Nov)
-648 -650
-1,100
lance Overall (current+capital accounts) Balance
005, Special Statistical Appendix Table 3
df & http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/socio_econ_ind.html (for 2006 data).
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Public Opinion
Introduction
The Peace Confidence Index (PCI), a quarterly survey of the peace pro patterns of public perception during 2006. Public perceptions of the peac to questions regarding the best solution to the ethnic conflict, confiden negotiated settlement, perceptions of third party facilitation, the role of N in 2006. The PCI of 2006 was not conducted in the North and East due ground situation made it difficult to survey the Tamil community even in th
restricted to assessing the opinion of the Sinhala, Muslim and Up coun conducted during the months of February, May, July and November.
The major trend in 2006 was that support for negotiations amongst the military solution increased. Yet, given a range of options presented to resp military operations, a significant majority opted for negotiations alone, s support for a negotiated settlement. Similarly it should be noted that whil for the Norwegians, the SLMM and the CFA continued to decline, this
abrogate the CFA. Support for the peace process and negotiations was no
Support is declining yet negotiations still the best
Despite the many failures of previous efforts at negotiations, the CFA of overwhelming support amongst all ethnic communities for negotiations a question was changed so that people could choose between negotiation the continuation of the prevailing “No War / No Peace” situation. A large m “No war/ No Peace” situation is bad and that a solution should be pursue ethnic groups shared this opinion. The support of the minority communities a military solution.
In the wake of the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa as President and a negotiations amongst the Sinhala community increased by 10 points to negotiations declined by 29 percentage points to 67%. During late Feb outside of North and East believed that “No war / No Peace” is better, reflection of Tamil cynicism regarding the possibility of a meaningful nego violence and the stronger influence of nationalist forces on the Governmen
By May the situation on the ground had dramatically changed with more v suspected LTTE suicide bomber and increasing signs that peace talks significant military victories, a continuation of violence that also targeted S the Government and the ultra nationalist forces, at the end of 2006 60
negotiations were the best solution to the country’s ethnic conflict.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

blic Opinion
urvey of the peace process provided a comprehensive overview of the erceptions of the peace process were assessed according to responses thnic conflict, confidence in the commitment of each protagonist to a facilitation, the role of Norway and the SLMM, and political developments he North and East due to the escalation of violence in those areas. The il community even in the South. Therefore, since May 2006, the PCI was
, Muslim and Up country Tamil communities only. In 2006 the PCI was y and November.
otiations amongst the Sinhala Community declined whilst support for a tions presented to respondents, including negotiations simultaneous with r negotiations alone, suggesting that there continues to be underlying ould be noted that while support levels amongst the Sinhala Community ntinued to decline, this did not necessarily translate into a demand to
nd negotiations was notably high among the minority communities.
tiations still the best option
egotiations, the CFA of 2002 and the peace talks that followed received nities for negotiations at the outset135. By September 2005, the original se between negotiations or a military solution, or whether they preferred ce” situation. A large majority, 87% of Sri Lankans believed the prevailing lution should be pursued through negotiations. It should be noted that all he minority communities was over 95%. Only 6% of Sri Lankans preferred
sa as President and an upsurge in violence by the LTTE, support for eased by 10 points to 95% while in the Tamil community support for 67%. During late February, 12% of the Tamil communities who reside / No Peace” is better, while 17% did not even answer. This could be a y of a meaningful negotiation process in the context of an escalation of ces on the Government.
ly changed with more violence, including an attempted assassination by a signs that peace talks would not resume. Nevertheless, despite some ce that also targeted Sinhala civilians and heavy military propaganda by at the end of 2006 60% of the Sinhala community firmly believed that
ethnic conflict.
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Support for a military solution re-emerged this year. When asked whether t to defeat the LTTE 54.5% of Sinhalese approved. Furthermore the percent
increased from 7.1 % in September 2005 to 13 % in July 2006. Yet, it is overwhelming majority of the Sinhala community, 60.9 % still opt for nego tions with military operations, 25.4% and 8.2 % respectively. What this s for military operations there is a clear preference for negotiations when peo that despite many disturbances, the minority communities stand firm with and half decade old conflict.
Parties are losing public confidence
Confidence in the Government and the LTTE and their commitment to a understanding the nature of public confidence in the peace process. How
despite fluctuations, the majority believe that the Government is commi opposite in the case of the LTTE. A majority of the Tamil community howev peace through negotiations.
The Government: As the PCI findings indicate, the victory of Presid November 17 2005, not only boosted his image but also increased the pu to handling the peace process. An overwhelming majority of the Sinhal
committed to the peace process, representing an increase of 28 percen victory. This was also registered among the minority communities, thoug findings did not suggest that faith in the Government’s capacity to handle Following the February 2006, Geneva talks, this confidence of the Sinha decreased. This could be the result of the Government’s decision to stick serious attacks. As far as the Muslim community was concerned, although commitment to peace through talks, the confidence level was always lowe rise in the confidence of the Up country Tamil community, in the Governme
The LTTE: Sinhala and Tamil community opinions are polarized with reg negotiations. While the Sinhala community overwhelmingly disagrees, a s that the LTTE is committed to peace through negotiations. The disag commitment, reached its peak in September 2005, ironically replicating th beginning of 2006, Sinhala opinion that the LTTE is not committed to a ne to the previous year. Instead of expressing their confidence in the LTTE o
that they were unable to judge whether it is committed to a negotiated se LTTE commitment also dropped at the beginning of the 2006 by 16 perce LTTE is committed to peace through talks increased amongst the Muslim
February.
The improved confidence in the LTTE’s commitment towards a negotiated conducted in May, July and November reveals that Sinahala opinion move LTTE commitment to a negotiated settlement. This trend intensified to rea lations and high profile political killings. The Muslim community was divide commitment to a negotiated settlement and uncertainty as to whether the Country Tamil community however, believes that the LTTE is committed to
prevailed throughout the year except during the month of July. According t while 42% of the Up-Country community feels that the LTTE is committed
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

. When asked whether the Government should expand military operations urthermore the percentage of Sinhalese who support a military option has
in July 2006. Yet, it is significant that when given a range of options an 0.9 % still opt for negotiations rather than a military solution or negotia- spectively. What this seems to suggest is that although there is support r negotiations when people are given a choice. The survey findings show munities stand firm with negotiations as the best way of ending the two
fidence
their commitment to a negotiated settlement is an important indicator in e peace process. However, the pattern over the years from 2002 is that
Government is committed to peace through negotiations and the total Tamil community however retain confidence in the LTTE’ s commitment to
, the victory of President Rajapaksa at the Presidential elections on t also increased the public’s confidence in the government’s commitment majority of the Sinhala community believed that the Government was
increase of 28 percentage points to 80% after the President’s election rity communities, though at a lower figure. Interestingly however, survey nt’s capacity to handle negotiations improved in the first quarter of 2006. confidence of the Sinhala community neither increased nor dramatically ment’s decision to stick to the CFA despite numerous provocations and as concerned, although the majority had confidence in the Government’s e level was always lower than the Sinhalese. There has been no dramatic
unity, in the Government, in this respect during 2006.
are polarized with regard to the LTTE’s commitment to peace through elmingly disagrees, a significant majority of the Tamil community believe egotiations. The disagreement amongst Sri Lankans over the LTTE’s , ironically replicating the pattern of September 2001. Interestingly, at the not committed to a negotiated settlement reduced drastically compared nfidence in the LTTE or their lack thereof, the Sinhala Community stated
itted to a negotiated settlement or not. The Tamil community’s faith in the f the 2006 by 16 percentage points to 50%. However, the belief that the ed amongst the Muslim and Up-Country Tamil communities during late
t towards a negotiated settlement did not survive long. The PCI surveys t Sinahala opinion moved from a position of doubt to a lack of faith in the trend intensified to reach its previous high, against a backdrop LTTE vio- community was divided and swung between a lack of faith in the LTTE’s ainty as to whether the LTTE was committed or not. A majority of the Up- e LTTE is committed to a negotiated settlement. These levels of support
nth of July. According to the July PCI findings, 44% say they are not sure the LTTE is committed to a negotiated settlement.
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Mixed perceptions over the benefits of the CFA abrogate it
When people were asked in February whether the parties should adhere majority of all the communities wanted the CFA to be continued. However, the CFA varied across different ethnic communities. Among all the ethnic believed the least in the benefits of the CFA to them. However, 67% of th ending of killings, freedom of movement and the ending of destruction undeclared war situation, unprecedented violence across the island and g opinion on the benefits of the CFA to them. This negative opinion of the
amongst all the communities. However, the opinion of the Sinhala comm Sinhala Community stated that the CFA was beneficial to them and by N beneficial.
While reiterating their commitment to the CFA, both parties are blatantly w Interestingly, according to the November PCI findings, except the Muslim c not believe that the CFA stands anymore. The Sinhala and Muslim commu
CFA violations that took place throughout the year. However, the Up-Co more than the LTTE of a lack of commitment to the CFA.
With regard to the JVP’s demand to abrogate the CFA, a majority of Nevertheless, 29.2% oppose while 27% support this demand of the JV
(59.5%) and the Muslim (69.7%) communities are opposed to the idea of the efforts of the JVP, JHU and other Sinhala nationalist elements there ha Sinhala public opinion.
Strong support for Foreign Involvement
Even though the Presidential election was fought on key issues of the international intervention in Sri Lanka, a significant majority of the Sri L facilitation to solve the ethnic conflict. However, as the CFA violations international third party facilitation as an essential factor to solve the co noted that throughout the year, over 50% of the Sinhala community b
essential. In contrast to the Sinhala community’s opinion, the Muslim an levels of support for international facilitation even against the backdrop of a
The Norwegian role has been criticized from a number of quarters, includin the JHU, with accusations of partiality towards the LTTE. Norway has bee Over 2006 the low level of approval for Norway which stood at less than 20% by the end of the year. However, it should be noted that satisfaction significantly high amongst the minority communities.
In the context of the increasing unpopularity of Norway, a majority of Sinha When asked about the need for India’s involvement in the Sri Lanka’s pea either it is essential or at least will have a positive impact on the peace p findings, India’s popularity amongst the Tamil Community is not as high as
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

benefits of the CFA but no strong support to
e parties should adhere to the CFA in its current form an overwhelming e continued. However, perceptions of whether they benefited or not from s. Among all the ethnic communities it was the Sinhala community that . However, 67% of them still believe that it is beneficial. People cited the ending of destruction as the most important benefits of the CFA. The across the island and growing impunity has led to people changing their negative opinion of the CFA’s benefits has grown gradually over the year
n of the Sinhala community dramatically shifted. In February 67% of the ficial to them and by November a majority, 52% believed that it was not
h parties are blatantly waging campaigns of violence against each other. gs, except the Muslim community, a majority of the other communities do ala and Muslim communities primarily point their finger at the LTTE for the
r. However, the Up-Country Tamil community accuses the Government CFA.
e CFA, a majority of the Sinhala (43.8%) community had no opinion. this demand of the JVP. However, a majority of the Up-Country Tamil
opposed to the idea of abrogating the CFA. This also shows that despite nalist elements there has not been a dramatic and corresponding shift in
volvement
on key issues of the peace process including the role of Norway and t majority of the Sri Lankans feel the need for international third party as the CFA violations increased, the Sinhala community lost faith in factor to solve the country’s ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, it should be Sinhala community believed that international third party facilitation is
opinion, the Muslim and Up-Country Tamil communities registered high ainst the backdrop of a deteriorating security and human rights situation.
ber of quarters, including Sinhala nationalist groups such as the JVP and LTTE. Norway has been very unpopular amongst the Sinhala community. hich stood at less than one third of the Sinhala community, dropped to noted that satisfaction with the Norwegian role as facilitator was always .
way, a majority of Sinhalese expressed a preference for India over Norway. t in the Sri Lanka’s peace process, a majority of Sri Lankans believe that impact on the peace process. However, according to the February PCI unity is not as high as with the other communities.
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At the beginning of 2006, a significant proportion of Sri Lankans felt tha Nevertheless, there was a divergence of opinion between the majority Sin
the impartiality of SLMM monitoring. In the context of growing CFA vi widened. By November the Sinhala community showed a divided opinion them believed that the SLMM is partial as well as ineffective.
Increased ethnic polarization over human rights is
In addition to the above indicators of public confidence in the peace pro opinion on issues that emerged as politically sensitive during the year. The
insecurity amongst the people and signs of widening ethnic polarization minority communities believe that the Government is responsible for p believes that the Government has done enough to protect human rights
For instance with regard to the reported abductions of Tamil civilians in Co the LTTE responsible while the Up-Country Tamils holds the Govern community has a mixed opinion. Similarly with regard to the recent killing o community believe that it is the LTTE who is responsible while the Up-Cou forces. Amongst the Muslim community, 25.3% say that it is the Governme the majority expressing no opinion. Survey findings also suggest that the ignorance with regard to stating who they believe is responsible for comm
where the identity of the killers is contested and the forces of the state are also reflect fear in expressing their opinion.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

of Sri Lankans felt that the SLMM is essential for the CFA to succeed. etween the majority Sinhala community and the minority communities on
text of growing CFA violations and an undeclared war, this gulf further owed a divided opinion on the need for the SLMM while notably, 60% of effective.
over human rights issues
ence in the peace process, the PCI survey series also assessed public ive during the year. The public reaction to these issues revealed a growing
ning ethnic polarization. In the case of human rights, a majority in the nt is responsible for protecting human rights. The Sinhala community protect human rights while the Up-Country Tamil community does not.
s of Tamil civilians in Colombo, a majority of the Sinhala community holds ils holds the Government forces responsible. However, the Muslim rd to the recent killing of ten Muslims in Pottuvil, a majority of the Sinhala sible while the Up-Country Tamil community believe it is the Government y that it is the Government forces while 18.7% say that it is the LTTE, with s also suggest that the minority communities are more likely to express is responsible for committing particular human rights violations, especially
forces of the state are alleged to be involved. This stated ignorance may
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State of the Media
Introduction
The severe erosion of media freedom in 2006 makes it one the worst year and intimidation of the media. The media in Sri Lanka confront a challengi to conduct their work, there is scant regard for media freedom and the fr assurances by various armed groups, including the Sri Lankan Army, threa increase daily. Civil society organisations such as the Free Media Moveme have repeatedly issued statements, often to no avail, flagging serious con
against journalists and media, including physical and verbal abuse, killing Furthermore, accurate, impartial and responsible journalism is under severe censorship and other constraints, direct and indirect, imposed by the Gove
The suppression of media freedom needs be understood as a part of a w rights and the diminishing prospects for democracy, peace and governan respect to the Rule of Law also contributes in large part to the increasing im society coupled with the imposition of emergency regulations and new an
text wherein the freedom of expression and media freedom are severely c position to that which is considered to be patriotic and in the interest of na carries grave consequences under these new regulations.
The media suffers the brunt of the collapse of democratic governance, un tism and systemic breakdowns in governance, or act as watchdogs of d though the international community (IC) issued a number of statements e
sion of human rights, and international missions to Sri Lanka as well as g flagging Sri Lanka as one of the most dangerous countries in the world change in the mindset of the Government, the LTTE and the Karuna fact spite public pronouncements made by each party, the combined effect o Official Secrets Act (OSA), the lack of a Right to Information framework, a dia that fosters peace and reconciliation is a heady mix that overwhelmed e
Overview of statements and reports on media free
The media in Sri Lanka has repeatedly been challenged, especially over t ence and acting as a watchdog. However, 2006 was an exceedingly diffic key local and international organisations that monitor and speak on behal media freedom in Sri Lanka over the course of the year.136 As noted by Pacific in Journalism in troubled times: The struggle for press freedom in S
The overarching loss of security, coupled with the anxiety of ano ernment not to report critically on their approach to the peace
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

ate of the Media
es it one the worst years on record in terms of both the physical assaults ka confront a challenging situation – journalists find it increasingly difficult dia freedom and the freedom of expression on the ground and despite Sri Lankan Army, threats, harassment and intimidation against the media he Free Media Movement, INFORM and the Centre for Policy Alternatives ail, flagging serious concerns about the increasing intolerance and hatred
nd verbal abuse, killings, abductions, acts of arson and death threats. urnalism is under severe pressure from the coercive and deeply disturbing
t, imposed by the Government, the LTTE and the Karuna faction.
rstood as a part of a wider context of violence and abuse of fundamental y, peace and governance in Sri Lanka in 2006. A growing cynicism with part to the increasing impunity in the country. The shrinking space for civil regulations and new anti-terrorism regulations have contributed to a con-
freedom are severely curtailed. Articulating any opinion beyond or in op- and in the interest of national security, as parochially defined by the State, lations.
ocratic governance, unable to investigate allegations of corruption, nepo- act as watchdogs of democracy, for fear of Government reprisals. Al- umber of statements expressing concern and condemnation of the ero-
Sri Lanka as well as global press freedom and advocacy organisations countries in the world to work as a journalist, there is no demonstrable E and the Karuna faction to secure and strengthen media freedom. De- the combined effect of the new legislation & old regulations such as the formation framework, and the open hostility against conflict sensitive me- mix that overwhelmed efforts to secure media freedom in 2006.
reports on media freedom
nged, especially over the last twenty years, in maintaining its independ- as an exceedingly difficult year to engage in such activities. A number of tor and speak on behalf of media freedom pointed to the deterioration of e year.136 As noted by the International Federation of Journalists Asia- for press freedom in South Asia 2005-2006:
with the anxiety of another outbreak of war and pressure from the Gov- approach to the peace process has resulted in media self-censorship.
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Though the past year was pivotal in energising provincial media less also one in which the continuing erosion of media freedoms
gated any progress.137
Concurring with this observation, the report prepared for the Second Ses INFORM avers;
In the past year or so, as the ethnic conflict has escalated and as ascendance in political arenas and in the media, an unpreceden broadcast against the media and against journalists who cove manner. The space for dissent, or for holding diverse opinions, h
politics and politicians has almost disappeared. The high levels o larisation within the media and among journalists as well. 138
Particularly disturbing was that within this larger erosion of media freedom suffered the brunt of attacks against the media. 139 Over two dozen Ta threatened, severely assaulted or killed over the course of the year. On Ja Trincomalee port employee as well as a journalist was shot dead as he w had published photographs and news reports critical of the army and o newspaper Sudaroli Oli. His photographs of the 5 students killed in Trinc reports that they had been killed by grenades.140 His murder set off warnin tigative journalism and human rights reporting. We stress that the Gove
timely investigations into the murder of media workers and death threats with an end to impunity for these acts.
There have also been attacks on their houses, newspaper offices and print
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka
On May 3, as journalists gathered in Colombo to celebrate Press F the office of the Uthayan newspaper in the Northern city of Jaffna. S Kumar, working in the Circulation Department, were killed. 5 others
The circulation of some Tamil newspapers has been unofficially ba and again in January 2007 the Karuna Group ‘banned’ the circ Batticaloa-Amparai142. Also in October 2006, the Karuna group b “Virakesari”143.
In Jaffna there were increasing death threats against the distribut newspaper vendor Mariathas Manojanraj was killed by a mine that to collect newspapers for distribution. The attack came as death
Tamil-language newspapers.
On August 16, Sathasivam Baskaran, 44, was gunned down in his the temporary lifting of an army curfew to deliver copies of the n
marked vehicle in an area controlled by the Sri Lankan armed force
This was followed by the murder of Sinnathamby Sivamaharajah language Namathu Eelanadu newspaper, who was shot dead on A newspaper Namathu Eelanadu publication was closed.

gising provincial media to support holistic media reform, it was neverthe- sion of media freedoms on account of violence and conflict severely miti-
red for the Second Session of the UN Human Rights Council by FMM &
ict has escalated and as the proponents of a military solution have gained media, an unprecedented level of hate speech are been generated and t journalists who cover the ethnic conflict in a balanced and unbiased ing diverse opinions, has shrunk and the spirit of constructive criticism of
eared. The high levels of polarisation in the society is reflected in the po- rnalists as well. 138
rosion of media freedom and human rights, Tamil journalists in particular Over two dozen Tamil media workers have been abducted, directly urse of the year. On January 24, 2006, Subramaniyam Sugirdharajan, a was shot dead as he waited for a bus to go to work in the morning. He ical of the army and of paramilitary groups active in Trincomalee, in the students killed in Trincomalee on January 2 helped contest the original is murder set off warning bells to other journalists to be cautious in inves- e stress that the Government must conduct complete, transparent and
kers and death threats issued against media workers and their families,
spaper offices and printing presses.
has been unofficially banned in parts of the North East. In October 2006 roup ‘banned’ the circulation of Thinakural, Virakesari and Sudar Oli in 6, the Karuna group burnt 10,000 copies of the Tamil daily newspaper
as gunned down in his Uthayan delivery vehicle after taking advantage of deliver copies of the newspaper. He was shot while driving his clearly-
Sri Lankan armed forces.144
bo to celebrate Press Freedom Day, a group of unidentified men attacked orthern city of Jaffna. Suresh Kumar, the Marketing Manager and Ranjith nt, were killed. 5 others were injured and the office damaged.141
athamby Sivamaharajah, managing director of the Jaffna based Tamil- ho was shot dead on August 21, in Vellippalai. Subsequent to the murder
as closed.
47
ts against the distributors of Tamil-language newspapers. On August 1, as killed by a mine that was set off as he was going to Jaffna on 27 July attack came as death threats are being made against the distributors of

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On September 7 2006, 6 armed men entered the premises of Ut “severe reprisals” if they did not publish a statement urging Jaffna s
Media under fire
The assault on the Tamil media over 2006 was clear:
After the murder of Rohana Kumara, editor of Satana, in 2001 a
every single journalist and media person murdered in Sri Lanka who have been subject to intimidation in one way or the other are bombed, set on fire and attacked are also almost all those engag
environment, when presenting the various views and opinions in T a just and sustainable peace in Sri Lanka, the silencing of the a down the path to sustained discrimination and hostility between t
Accordingly, there is an urgent need to remove all unofficial and military r ensure the safety of the Tamil journalists. However, as the murder of Sin clear, the suppression of the media was not restricted just to the Tamil me mal de Silva was shot dead by an unknown group on 2nd July 2006. He w in Borallasgamuwa, south of Colombo. He was found shot dead three kil out to meet some military operatives, known to him for some time148. Tha nalists, who out of fear for their lives and safety, were essentially gagged f bly, is a chilling reminder of the gravity of the situation facing free media in editors would receive calls to question why particular stories were covere the Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) stated that any news gath with regard to national Security and defense should be subjected to clarific ensure that correct information is published, Telecast or Broadcast. Cond to reconsider their decision to impose a regime of censorship on media a tion in a free and open manner149. In his address to the nation on 6th Dec
media to decide as to whether they were going to support “a handful of majority”, stating that one could not do both150. On the 20th December (News Editor, The Sunday Observer) and Lionel Yodasinghe (Associate Ed the HQ of Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the police and que regulations.151 The President’s speech, the stance of the MCNS and the and anti-terrorism regulations were all extremely negative developments fo regulations have become unofficial censorship and attempts have been regulations. The Government should make a categorical statement that th rights and against journalists.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka
Sections of the Sri Lankan Army, notably the 512 Brigade based in on 6th November 2006 and warned them against publishing any n
also other efforts at intimidation.

red the premises of Uthayan and threatened its editorial committee with atement urging Jaffna students to call off their strike. 146
r:
or of Satana, in 2001 and till the killing of Sampath Lamkal in July 2006,
murdered in Sri Lanka has been a Tamil. The majority of media persons ne way or the other are also Tamil. The media institutions that have been almost all those engaged in publishing and broadcasting in Tamil. In this
views and opinions in Tamil society becomes imperative in the search for , the silencing of the alternate voices in Tamil society represents a slide and hostility between the communities.147
unofficial and military restrictions imposed on Tamil language media and r, as the murder of Sinhalese journalist Lakmal Sampath De Silva made ted just to the Tamil media. On July 2, freelance journalist Sampath Lak- on 2nd July 2006. He was abducted at 5:00 a.m. from his parents' home und shot dead three kilometres from his home. His mother said he went for some time148. That these efforts were successful in intimidating jour- ere essentially gagged from reporting accurately, impartially and responsi- ion facing free media in Sri Lanka. There were reports that journalists and lar stories were covered in the way that they were. In September 2006, ted that any news gathered by your institution through your own sources be subjected to clarification and confirmation from the MCNS in order to st or Broadcast. Condemning this move, the FMM requested the MCNS censorship on media and instead allow for the dissemination of informa- o the nation on 6th December 2006, the President provocatively asked all
support “a handful of terrorists or with the common man who is in the On the 20th December 2006, two senior journalists – Ranga Jayasurya dasinghe (Associate Editor, The Sunday Observer) - were summoned to of the police and questioned under the newly enacted anti-terrorism of the MCNS and the actions of the CID point to the new Emergency gative developments for freedom of expression rights in Sri Lanka. These d attempts have been made to arrest and indict journalists under these orical statement that these new regulations will not be used to curb FOE
48
e 512 Brigade based in Jaffna, summoned the Editors of 3 Jaffna dailies gainst publishing any news critical of the military in Jaffna145. There were

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Diminishing Freedom of Expression
It should be noted that the freedom of expression does not exist in a vacu ment of a healthy democracy. Given the anxiety, fear and severe threats to rights for all citizens, and journalists in particular. However, as noted by
harassment that impacted on media freedom in 2006 but also Sri Lanka’ sions. The Court’s decision with regard to the constitutionality of Sri La ICCPR and the existence of, among other laws, the Official Secrets Act
Amendment to the Constitution needs to be noted. Many more recomme with our commitments under the ICCPR can be found in a report released
It is not only media freedom that suffered in 2006. Freedom of expression a
the Government’s banning of the Hollywood movie The Da Vinci Code, the TV programming imported by local broadcasters and the sealing of two loc national security (both resumed services late-2006 after a protracted lega ironically, faced intimidations and threats even after the final verdict of the istry withdrew the initial censor board approval granted for public screen film by internationally acclaimed film-maker Asoka Handagama, purported Nalaka Gunawardene
In each of these cases, bureaucratic action was preceded by a angry individuals or business rivals. There was no due process, a forced to turn to the courts - which can take months or years to
imposed, are not easily withdrawn, unless ordered by courts.
The lack of due process and the authoritarian bent of the Government wer station, under archaic Societal Good Conduct Act No. 37 of 1966, for “an rial that could corrupt the society, specially [sic] the younger generation.”
result of a parochial interest to reign in media to toe the line with the Go bedeviled efforts to strengthen free media and severely undermined the G of the press156.
A litany of problems
As the IFJ report points out, (i) the declining safety of journalists (ii) the par professionalism (iii) the lack of public service orientation in State media in munity radio are, amongst others, overall indicators of the lack of any prog Government. This in turn fed into the vortex of challenges to media broug porting conflict and peace professionally was rendered near impossible in
into 2007 is cause for serious alarm and calls for urgent measures to secur
It seems that based on existing trends the media will face increasing challe be taken to ensure that media personnel can function in an environment
tions on the media and media freedom are reversed; including unhindere public service media and the Freedom to Information is recognized wit procedures.157
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

ession
does not exist in a vacuum and that to flourish it needs enabling environ- ar and severe threats to journalists, there is a need to secure fundamental However, as noted by the IFJ, it was not only violence, intimidation and
006 but also Sri Lanka’s domestic laws and recent Supreme Court deci- nstitutionality of Sri Lanka’s accession to the Optional Protocol of the he Official Secrets Act of 1995, Press Council Law of 1973 and the 6th
. Many more recommendations to bring Sri Lanka’s domestic laws in line nd in a report released by Frederich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in 2005152.
reedom of expression and cultural production also took heavy blows with
The Da Vinci Code, the imposition of unreasonably high taxes on foreign d the sealing of two local pay-TV (satellite) channels for alleged threats to after a protracted legal battle that refuted allegations against them, and the final verdict of the Supreme Court)153. Furthermore, the Cultural Min- nted for public screening of Aksharaya (Letter of Fire), the latest feature Handagama, purportedly for reasons of sexual impropriety. As noted by
ion was preceded by a short-lived smear campaign by a small group of was no due process, and some affected individuals and companies were take months or years to hear cases - for legal redress. And bans, once
ordered by courts. 154
of the Government were also evident in the banning of the Raja FM radio No. 37 of 1966, for “anti-social and extremely repulsive and vulgar mate- younger generation.”155 Elements of this cultural censorship in 2006, the
oe the line with the Government’s nationalist, majoritarian perspectives, erely undermined the Government’s avowed commitment to the freedom
of journalists (ii) the partisan bias of State media and the resulting lack of tation in State media in particular (iv) the lack of true, independent, com- of the lack of any progressive, reformist media agenda of the incumbent llenges to media brought about by the increasing levels of violence. Re- ered near impossible in 2006. The projection of this situation continuing
gent measures to secure media freedom in Sri Lanka.
ill face increasing challenges over 2007. There is a clear need for steps to tion in an environment free of harassment and targeted violence; restric-
ed; including unhindered access; the state controlled media becomes a ation is recognized with a review of Sri Lanka’s existing legislation and
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Observations and Recommendations
The central challenge in Sri Lanka is to foster professional media, acting with a focus on public interest and peacebuilding; and to train and equip p regard for facts without endangering their personal safety and security. The noted in this regard, recalling those made by the initial report of the Intern Lanka158, a synthesis report by CPA on media reform159 and the FMM / I Human Rights Council:
Practical steps
Realise the potential of new media and citizen journalism in addition to mechanisms that galvanise public support and awareness of human rig
Policy measures
Reverse action already undertaken that restricts press freedom and fre introduce any form of direct or indirect censorship
These recommendations are made in light of their crosscutting nature & im together, they are best positioned to support a context in 2007 wherein inc
will pose significant challenges to peacebuilding and media reform. Over emergency regulations and anti-terrorism regulations that essentially gag f of in drawing up risk assessments and evaluating the impact of initiatives 2007. Noting the central importance of media to a process of peacebuildin strengthening democracy and safeguarding human rights, the challenge media institutions engaged in rights based advocacy, training and aware
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka
A full impact assessment (for instance, content analysis over time) ne supported media reform initiatives. There also needs to be more donor a comprehensive strategic roadmap for media reform in Sri Lanka in co institutions, associations and NGOs.
Allow all media full and unhindered access to any area of the country fr
Ensure that those who attack media workers and outlets are arrested parent and timely investigations into the murder of media workers and their families, with an end to impunity for these acts.
Support the development and strengthening of communications strat challenges of peacebuilding
Review Sri Lanka’s present legislation, regulations, and powers and am dards on press freedom and freedom of expression
Recognise that freedom of information is a fundamental right for everyo
tion law that meets all international standards
Take all necessary steps to turn state-controlled media into broad-bas dia

ndations
essional media, acting impartially & reporting accurately and responsible, nd to train and equip people for carrying out this task with sensitivity and safety and security. The following observations and recommendations are nitial report of the International Fact-Finding and Advocacy Mission to Sri rm 59 and the FMM / INFORM report for the Second Session of the UN
press freedom and freedom of expression and refrain from any moves to ip
crosscutting nature & importance across multiple sectors & actors. Seen text in 2007 wherein increasing attacks against civil society and the media
nd media reform. Overarching considerations, such as the existence of ns that essentially gag free speech and media, are important to take note the impact of initiatives undertaken to support media and civil society in process of peacebuilding, and aware of its role in fostering reconciliation, n rights, the challenge of 2007 for donors is to fully support NGOs and acy, training and awareness raising, through innovative, long-term, pro-
50
t analysis over time) needs to be done collectively by donors who have eeds to be more donor-coordination, in part towards the development of reform in Sri Lanka in collaboration media ministry, various media houses/
nd outlets are arrested and prosecuted and undertake complete, trans- r of media workers and death threats issued against media workers and acts.
journalism in addition to a continued emphasis on mainstream media, as awareness of human rights, democracy and peace.
f communications strategies of NGOs & CSOs to effectively address the
ns, and powers and amend or revoke these in line with international stan- sion
amental right for everyone in society and to enact a Freedom of Informa-
y area of the country from which they may wish to report
media into broad-based public service media, including community me-

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grammatic funding aimed at securing professional media, stronger civil so Lanka.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

media, stronger civil society voices and a more vibrant democracy in Sri
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Endnotes
1 Substantive in addressing and reaching understandings on how to deal w creating the grounds for further agreements and Symbolic in creating mom process on the other.
2 There were mid-level face-to-face negotiations between the GOSL and th insisted that the negotiations were not peace talks
3 The parties argued over a number of issues in Geneva including the size o speak first.
4 The parties also engaged in other confidence building measures such as dalities for the transport of LTTE cadres for talks.
5 The Government’s shift in position in the venue for talks in February from location to Geneva
6 P. Saravanamuttu in Sunday Island, Namini Wijedasa, “Post-mortem of ta page 1
7 (Daily Mirror, Jehan Perera, “Geneva failure calls for new negotiation appro a clear responsibility to deal with the humanitarian consequences of the A- as a result of the growing security situation.
8 There was however a clear shift in this Government’s position for the two remesinghe and Chandrika Banadaranaike Kumaratunga. Like the previous kase re-affirmed the importance of sovereignty and national security but wa frequent reference to the issue of parity of status which the Government inc as a terrorist and non-state actor could not be treated en par with the state ing relations; the Government for instance searched the luggage of the LTT Oslo in March.
9 Daya Master receivc treatment at Apollo Hospital on July 12.
Sarath had been abducted by the LTTE in Kokkupadayan, Mannar on Sep a paedophile. The other two were subsequently released in exchange for L
10 There was speculation that the visit of Sinn Fein Leader Martin McGuinne channel between the LTTE and the GOSL
11 These figures are from February 22 2002 to December 31 2006. The SL is a significant shift from its practice in 2002-5 when it would provide mont
12 The Government reportedly refused to attend the Oslo Talks if the report if the report was submitted during the talks. (The Sunday Times, “No Way t
13 There was an attack on the SLMM parked vehicles in Batticaloa where th
14The LTTE sent a letter to the SLMM on the morning of May 11th warning the last time not to be on board Sri Lankan Naval Vessels until further notic request, we are responsible for the consequences. Please take this as the vessels.” SLMM Naval Monitors were on board Pearl Cruiser II, a ferry carry that came under attack. Through the intervention of the Norwegian facilitat Leader, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Indian help secures safety of Sri Lanka’s ‘Pearl Cru
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

dnotes
dings on how to deal with critical and contentious issues and thereby mbolic in creating momentum for sustaining the dynamics of a peace
tween the GOSL and the LTTE in the wake of the tsunami but both sides
neva including the size of each delegation, protocol regarding who should
ding measures such as the exchange of prisoners and agreeing to mo-
r talks in February from a location in Sri Lanka to Asia to a non-European
asa, “Post-mortem of talks: Analysts look at outcome,” February 26 2006,
r new negotiation approach,” October 31 2006, page 8) The parties had onsequences of the A-9 which the Government had shut from August 11
nt’s position for the two previous administrations under Ranil Wick- tunga. Like the previous Kumaratunga administration President Rajap- national security but was more obdurate. An indication of this was the hich the Government increasingly questioned, demanding that the LTTE ted en par with the state. There were also other indications of deteriorat-
the luggage of the LTTE delegation after they returned from Geneva and
on July 12.
dayan, Mannar on September 9 2005 along with two others in search of ased in exchange for LTTE cadres apprehended by the police in Jaffna.
eader Martin McGuinness was a part of a larger effort to create a new
mber 31 2006. The SLMM does not currently release annual figures. This n it would provide monthly figures.
Oslo Talks if the report was released and threatened to walk out of talks nday Times, “No Way to Treat Oslo”, June 11 2006, page 10)
es in Batticaloa where three jeeps were destroyed on January 13
g of May 11th warning them not to board navy vessels “We urge you for essels until further notice from us. If you chose to ignore our warning and Please take this as the last warning to you to not board Sri Lankan Naval rl Cruiser II, a ferry carrying security personnel from Trincomalee to Jaffna f the Norwegian facilitators an attack on the SLMM was averted (Sunday of Sri Lanka’s ‘Pearl Cruiser,’ May 12 2006)
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15 37 of the 57 monitors were withdrawn, a number of whom were replace served in the SLMM previously.
16 Sunday Times, Shimali Senanayke, “SLMM chief asks whether LTTE wa
17 The Daily Mirror, “An Angry Solheim fires at govt, eu, and the tigers”, Jun
18 The Daily Mirror, “Norway Gives Ultimatum”, June 10 2006, page 1
19 During the period of peace talks between 2002-3 there were a series of tions between the Armed Forces and the LTTE, Tamil-Muslim Communal V including members of EPDP and EPRLF (V) and army intelligence personne of adults for non-payment of ‘taxes’ and other ‘crimes’ by the LTTE.
20 Following the break up of the LTTE in Batticaloa in 2004 there were a se a military clash between the LTTE and the breakaway faction led by ‘Colon als associated with one group or another.
21 Sampur and the LTTE’s airbase near Iranamadu Tank were repeatedly bo
22 There were accusation in the CFA period before 2006 of small shifts in th cused of moving its FDL into no man’s land in Nagarkovil and there was als
23 The claymore attacks in December 2005 and January 2006 were claime Padai. The LTTE claimed that it had provided training to these groups
24 See Chapter on Human Security
25 Both Army Commander Fonseka and Defence Secretary Rajapaksa esc and Senior SSP STF Upul Seneviratne (August 7) were both killed by LTTE
26 The talks in Geneva in October failed so there was no agreement to mon
27 The statement was released on June 9. It traced the history of the ethnic stration.
28 The resolution was not voted on due to the decision by the Council to de Sri Lanka had received wide support from the non-European countries, esp
29 The US for instance expressed reluctance in openly endorsing the EU sp more diplomatic approach of dealing directly with the Government.
30 Indian National Congress President Sonia Gandhi made a statement in M
31 See Chapter on Economic Issues for more detail.
32 There were also concerns raised over the appointment as Prematilaka p lic Finance in the Treasury.
33 See Chapter on Governance for more detail
34 It led to a direct intervention by President Kumaratunga who wrote a lette tember 8 on the repudiation of the P-TOMS Agreement which further high the SLFP. Further, President Kumaratunga in the discussion that followed h Sept 14, said that the agreements signed by Presidential nominee Mahinda the paper they were written on and that the policy of the SLFP was to reso preserving the unitary character of the State.
35 Dew Gunasekera in an interview with the Sunday Leader stated: “We ce these parties, but made our choice looking at the overall political situation o power should fall in line with the reality which is a federal solution” and note tary state proclamation “to collect votes.” He also said that “Definitely, the J after the election.” (Sunday Leader, Wilson Gnanadass, “PM’s MOU irreleva
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

r of whom were replaced by Norwegian and Icelandic personnel who had
asks whether LTTE wants to terminate CFA,” July 9, p.4
eu, and the tigers”, June 10 2006, page 1
10 2006, page 1
there were a series of incidents of violence including sporadic confronta- il-Muslim Communal Violence and political killings of anti-LTTE Tamils y intelligence personnel, and abductions of children for recruitment and es’ by the LTTE.
in 2004 there were a series of incidents of violence in Batticaloa including ay faction led by ‘Colonel Karuna’ and killings and abductions of individu-
Tank were repeatedly bombed from April 2006
2006 of small shifts in the lines of control with the LTTE for instance ac-
rkovil and there was also controversy over LTTE bases in Sampur
uary 2006 were claimed by groups such as Makkal Padai and Sennan g to these groups
ecretary Rajapaksa escaped. Major General Parami Kulatunga (June 26) ere both killed by LTTE suicide bombers in .
s no agreement to monitor.
the history of the ethnic conflict and the policies of the current admini-
ion by the Council to delay a vote on all resolutions until the next session. European countries, especially the Asian and OIC block.
nly endorsing the EU sponsored resolution in Geneva preferring to take a
e Government.
i made a statement in May 2006 to this effect
.
tment as Prematilaka previously held the post of Director General of Pub-
tunga who wrote a letter to the then Prime Minister Rajapaksa on Sep- ment which further highlighted continuing disquiet within the leadership of iscussion that followed her speech to the Asia Society in New York on
ential nominee Mahinda Rajapaksa with the JHU and JVP were not worth f the SLFP was to resolve the conflict through federalism and not by
Leader stated: “We certainly have reservation on the MOUs signed by verall political situation of the country.” He added “those who come into deral solution” and noted that Rajapaksa’s was engaging in making uni- aid that “Definitely, the JHU, JVP agreements would become irrelevant ass, “PM’s MOU irrelevant after election,” October 16, page 20
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36 Government Media Release. Those attending included representatives f position Whip), Dinesh Gunawardene (MEP), Tissa Vitharana (LSSP), Doug Ferial Ashraff (NUA) etc.
37 A majority opinion report, a minority opinion report and two separate diss
38 On December 11 Media Minister Anura Priyadarshana Yapa described a media organisations and groups “ in portraying a draft report to assist the A proposal emanating from the Government to resolve the North-East questi
39 As to whether the subsequent military escalation on the part of the Gove situation and the LTTE’s campaign of violence or of an ideological leaning t Chapter on Peace Process for more detailed discussion.
40 There were also unconfirmed reports that the President had formed a ‘W cabinet,” January 22 2006, page 1)
41 As the TNA M.P. M.K. EElivendran pointed out in parliament “How can y Kelum Bandara and Yohan Perera, “Increased defence allocation irks TNA,
42 The LTTE committed some violations in the Geneva Honeymoon period attributed to the Karuna Group.
43 The most recent being the Human Rights Watch Report, “Complicit in C Recruitment by the Karuna Group,” January 2006
44 According to Defence Columnist Iqbal Athas: The joint operations HQ, w the airforce and the police, tasked to carry out counter terrorist operations shal; Donald Perera were unaware. Even, the National Security Council Ch was in the dark regarding the operation (The Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, S
44 See the Chapter on Governance for a more detailed discussion of the iss
Even, the National Security Council Chaired by President Mahinda Rajapak tion (The Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, October 16 2006).
45 The NAWF meeting in Colombo was attacked by a group of Buddhist m interrupted by protestors who threw eggs and tomatoes on October 19
46 See the Chapter on Governance for a more detailed discussion of the iss
47 In December 2005 there were indications that a Grand Tamil National All TNA, CWC, UPF and WPF. Reports of CWC Leader’s Arumugam Thondam ing one of his homes and attempts at encouraging CWC M.P’s to cross ov
48 Arumugam Thondaman, Leader of the CWC was appointed Minister for velopment, P Chandresekeran leader of the UPF was appointed as Ministe Inequity Eradication, while Muthu Sivalingam of the CWC was appointed as
49 Hakeem had been provided by the Special Police Paramilitary Force, the lims of Pottuvil believed that the STF had assisted in some form the massa on September 10. His security was withdrawn on 21st September.
50 The other three cross-over UNP M.P’s are Rohitha Bogollagama appoint Investment Promotion and WB Ekanayake and Neomal Perera appointed a
51 TNA M.P J. Pararajasingham was killed in Batticaloa in December 2005
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

cluded representatives from the UNP (Mahinda Samarasinghe, Chief Op- Vitharana (LSSP), Douglas Devananada (EPDP), Chandrasekharan (UPF),
rt and two separate dissenting reports.
hana Yapa described as outrageous and a devious attempt by certain raft report to assist the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), as a “ e the North-East question.”
on the part of the Government resulted out of the intractability of the an ideological leaning towards a hawkish approach is debatable. See sion.
sident had formed a ‘War Cabinet’ (Sunday Leader, “Mahinda plans war
parliament “How can you prepare for war and talk peace?” (Daily Mirror, nce allocation irks TNA,” December 13 2005, page 3
va Honeymoon period but a significant number of violations were also
Report, “Complicit in Crime: State Collusion in Abductions and Child
joint operations HQ, which is the unified apparatus of the army, navy, ter terrorist operations and its head, Chief of Defense Staff air Chief Mar- nal Security Council Chaired by President Mahinda Rajapaksa claimed it
y Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, October 16 2006).
iled discussion of the issue
ident Mahinda Rajapaksa claimed it was in the dark regarding the opera- ort, October 16 2006).
a group of Buddhist monks on August 17 and the meeting in Kandy was toes on October 19
iled discussion of the issue
rand Tamil National Alliance would be created bringing together the r’s Arumugam Thondaman’s security being withdrawn, the police search- CWC M.P’s to cross over intensified this tension.
appointed Minister for Youth Empowerment and Socio-Economic De- as appointed as Minister for Building Community Development and Social
CWC was appointed as Deputy Minister of Education.
Paramilitary Force, the STF. Hakeem had publicly stated that the Mus- n some form the massacre of 11 Muslim Youth in Radella Wewa, Potuvil
1st September.
a Bogollagama appointed as Minister of Enterprise Development and mal Perera appointed as Deputy Ministers
loa in December 2005
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52 The 17th Amendment mandates the creation of several independent com vital to the governance of the country. Foremost among these is the Cons sibility of approving appointments to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appe recommending appointments for the other independent commissions esta the Elections Commission, National Police Commission, the Human Rights sion which are meant to ensure the impartiality and accountability in these Council’s three year term expired in March 2005 and it has yet to be re-con sion and the Public Services Commission expired in 2005 and have yet to are contingent on the recommendations of the Constitutional Council. In e Council has had the domino effect of delaying the constitution of the other under the 17th Amendment to the Constitution.
53 The Judicial Services Commission is a 17th Amendment-created indepe as chairperson, and the two most senior sitting judges of the Supreme Cou transfer and disciplinary authority over the minor judiciary and in some case
54 Daily Mirror, “SC Judges may testify before Select Committee: Civic actio February 2006; TamilNet, “Abuse of political power led to Judges resignatio
55 Daily Mirror, “SC Judges may testify before Select Committee: Civic actio February 2006.
56 The Chief Justice responded by issuing a press statement of his own, in against the two Judges (See Daily News, “JSC will continue to serve despi
57 Respondents to the petition included the Prime Minister, Leader of the O the President, Attorney-General, Inspector General of Police, Advisor to the of Parliament representing various parties. The basis of the petition was th failure to constitute the Constitutional Council would result in a breakdown domino effect on the constitutional validity of numerous other independent ommendation of the Constitutional Council.
58 The petitioners said the appointments made by the President bypassing constitutional and therefore their fundamental rights guaranteed by the Con
59 The Sunday Times, “Court rejects petition, calls for action against petitio
60 The Supreme Court had initially issued a stay order blocking the investig vember 2005. When the case returned before the Supreme Court in Janua to the Court that no further investigation would be necessary in light of the the Attorney General certain bank statements which apparently sufficiently While admonishing the respondent parties for conducting an improper and served final judgment on the fundamental rights claim until a later date. “N DSG”, by Chitra Weerarathne, The Island, January 18, 2006. “Court reserv by S.S. Selvanayagam, Daily Mirror, January 30, 2006.
61 In the Sinharasa case, a Tamil suspected LTTE member was arrested in imprisonment under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), in spite of subst the court solely relied in its ruling was coerced through physical and psycho cumstances of the case and court proceedings amounted to a series of vio tion, the Petitioner, Nallaratnam Sinharasa, had made an application to the Court’s “inherent powers”, the findings of the United Nations Human Rights Lankan State responsible for violations of Sinharasa’s human rights in the c viction in 1995. In its judgment the Supreme Court held that the accession declaration by the President of Sri Lanka in 1997 that the Government had tutional and invalid, on the grounds that the treaty conferred a public law rig tive power and therefore was within the realm of Parliament and the people Optional Protocol also amounted to a purported conferment of ‘judicial pow and 4 of the Constitution, which reposed ‘judicial sovereignty’ in the people international treaties entered into by the President or the Government of Sr lation in order to have internal effect.
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

everal independent commissions vested with various oversight functions
ong these is the Constitutional Council, which is vested with the respon- ourt, the Court of Appeal and the Judicial Services Commission, and of dent commissions established under the 17th Amendment, most notably sion, the Human Rights Commission and the Public Services Commis- accountability in these particular fields. The previous Constitutional d it has yet to be re-constituted. Similarly, the National Police Commis-
2005 and have yet to be reconstituted, as their respective appointments stitutional Council. In effect, the failure to re-constitute the Constitutional onstitution of the other important independent commissions mandated
ndment-created independent commission comprised of the Chief Justice, ges of the Supreme Court, and is vested with powers of appointment,
iciary and in some cases the Supreme Court as well.
t Committee: Civic action groups call parliament to probe crisis in JSC”, 9 led to Judges resignations, says State Bar”, 9 February 2006.
t Committee: Civic action groups call parliament to probe crisis in JSC”, 9
tatement of his own, in which he made various negative personal attacks continue to serve despite Judges’ resignations”, 6 February 2006.)
inister, Leader of the Opposition, Speaker of the Parliament, Secretary to of Police, Advisor to the Ministry of Defence, as well as several Members is of the petition was that, as a constitutional lynchpin of governance, the d result in a breakdown of constitutional governance and will have the rous other independent commissions which require the approval or rec-
he President bypassing the Constitutional Council were irregular and un-
guaranteed by the Constitution had been infringed.
or action against petitioners”, by Teles Anandappa, July 2, 2006.
er blocking the investigation until after the Presidential election in No- Supreme Court in January 2006, the Deputy Solicitor General announced ecessary in light of the fact that the President’s counsel had submitted to h apparently sufficiently detailed the allocation of the funds in question. ucting an improper and mala fide investigation, the Supreme Court re- im until a later date. “No further probe into Helping H’tota necessary – 18, 2006. “Court reserves order in ‘Helping Hambantota’ rights petition”, 06.
ember was arrested in 1993 and sentenced in 2000 to thirty-five years t (PTA), in spite of substantial evidence that the confession upon which
gh physical and psychological torture. The UNHRC found that the cir- ounted to a series of violations under the ICCPR.61 In the case in ques- de an application to the Supreme Court to effectuate, on the basis of the
Nations Human Rights Committee at Geneva which found the Sri ’s human rights in the conduct of his initial arrest, prosecution and con- held that the accession to the Optional Protocol and the subsequent at the Government had acceded to the Optional Protocol was unconsti- onferred a public law right which was a purported exercise of the legisla- rliament and the people at a referendum. The Court further held that the nferment of ‘judicial power’ on the Committee in violation of Articles 3 overeignty’ in the people. The Court ruled that, as a dualist legal system,
r the Government of Sri Lanka had to be implemented by domestic legis-
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62 The merger of the North and East provinces that have functioned as two about with the signing of the Indo Lanka peace accord in 1987 and the est Amendment to the Constitution. The temporary merger of the two provinc be validated with a referendum within a year. However the continuing ethn the referendum indefinitely. Since 1988 successive Presidents have extend tions as they were unable to carry out the referendum on the merger which inces by the vote of the people of the two provinces separately.
The Petitioners in the instant case, Jayantha Wijesekera, Mohamed Buhary dents of the Eastern Province, alleged infringement of their fundamental rig by Article 12(1) of the Constitution, as a result of the merger. Ruling in favo the merger constituted a violation of Article 154A(3) of the Constitution, wh for merger of the provinces, as well as section 37(1) (b) of the Provincial Co
63 Regulation 56 of the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Extraordinary 1405/14 of 13 August 2005 states: “(1) The Magistrate shall, Inspector-General of Police, or the Deputy Inspector-General of Police as th Government Medical Officer to forthwith hold a post-mortem examination o it has already been buried, be disinterred; and (b) make an order that at the the dead body be handed over to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police f Police to whom the body is handed over the dead body [sic] to any relation conditions or restrictions as he may deem necessary in the interest of natio vation of public order; Provided, however, that the Deputy Inspector-Gener or for the maintenance or preservation of public order, authorize the taking tion of the dead body in accordance with such steps as he may deem nec
64 As actions by the President carries with it Presidential immunity in accord and balances in place to ensure that the relevant actors do not abuse such directors to RADA. An interesting feature of RADA is that the bill provides v that he may deem fit as Directors of RADA, creating space for appointmen and connections, and further raising concerns of transparency and accoun the modalities within which RADA will work with existing actors. There is no RADA will allow local actors a greater role in reconstruction and developme plans and giving greater responsibility in implementation of projects. The bi whether RADA will be answerable to Parliament or any other actor. It is of g creasing and strengthening the powers of the President, with no oversight of accountability and transparency.
65 the attacks and lack of security guarantees by the Armed Forces is seen tion and Sinhalization; the massacres and killings of Sinhala border villagers lam; attacks on Muslims are in turn seen to be part of the LTTE’s ethnic cle Eelam. The notice on May 29th by a group called the Thamil Eela Thaiyahan of Muttur to vacate the areas within 72 hours reinforced existing fears
66 Statement of Deputy Minister P. Radhakrishnan (UPF (The Nation, Vindya September 3 2006, page 3); Letter from Mano Ganeshan (WPF) and S.B. D failure to Norwegian Embassy (The Nation, Wilson Gnanadass, “Amazing d tember 10 2006, page 10). The Sunday Times, Chris Kamalendran, “Abdu
67 The Sunday Times, Chris Kamalendran, “Abductions unlimited,” Septem
68 two bodies were found in Vavuniya with multiple gun and knife injuries an LTTE. Thinakural, april 21 2006
69 In Jaffna on April 19 3 bodies were found in a three wheeler in Atchuveli camp at Tharavai.
70 University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), “Terrorism, counterterroris Special Report No: 20, April 2 2006
71 a body of an unidentified youth in Preethipura, Wattala on April 5, 3 behe Road and 2 more near Warakatenna Estate, Dehiowita on April 11; a head April 28
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

have functioned as two separate provinces since independence came ord in 1987 and the establishment of provincial councils under the 13th erger of the two provinces to create a single NorthEastern entity was to ver the continuing ethnic conflict in the island has resulted in deferring Presidents have extended the merger through special gazette notifica- m on the merger which was to decide the amalgamation of the two prov- s separately.
kera, Mohamed Buhary and Wasantha Piyatissa, all of whom were resi- of their fundamental rights to the equal protection of the law, guaranteed e merger. Ruling in favor of the Petitioners, the Supreme Court held that ) of the Constitution, which empowers only Parliament to provide by law ) (b) of the Provincial Councils Act 1987.
rovisions and Powers) Regulations No.1 of 2005 published in Gazette 1) The Magistrate shall, upon receipt of the report of the facts by the r-General of Police as the case may be under regulation 55; (a) direct the t-mortem examination of such body and may direct that the dead body if ake an order that at the conclusion of the post-mortem examination that ctor-General of Police for disposal. (2) The Deputy Inspector-General of body [sic] to any relations who may claim the dead body, subject to such ry in the interest of national security of [sic] for the maintenance or preser- eputy Inspector-General of Police may in the interest of national security er, authorize the taking possession of and effecting the burial or crema- s as he may deem necessary in the circumstances.”
ntial immunity in accordance with the Constitution, there are no checks tors do not abuse such broad powers, such as the appointment of the s that the bill provides vast powers to the President to appoint persons
space for appointments based not on merit but on personal favoritism ansparency and accountability. Further, concerns have been raised as to sting actors. There is no mention on this aspect and it is hoped that truction and development efforts, involving them in the formulation of ation of projects. The bill at no point mentions the role of Parliament, and any other actor. It is of grave concern, as the bill is perceived to be in- dent, with no oversight mechanism in place and thereby raising questions
e Armed Forces is seen as part of a larger state project of land coloniza- f Sinhala border villagers are seen as an attempt at expanding Tamil Ee- of the LTTE’s ethnic cleansing program to create a mono-ethnic Tamil e Thamil Eela Thaiyahan Meetpu Padai calling for the Muslim Community rced existing fears
UPF (The Nation, Vindya Amaranayake, “Fifty Tamils abducted in August,” eshan (WPF) and S.B. Dissanayake (UNP) citing abductions and state
nanadass, “Amazing disappearance of businessmen in Colombo,” Sep- is Kamalendran, “Abductions unlimited,” September 24 2006, page 4
ions unlimited,” September 24 2006, page 4
gun and knife injuries and a note warning those giving information to the
ee wheeler in Atchuveli and another 5 bodies were found by the army
errorism, counterterrorism and Challenges to Human Rights Advocacy,”
attala on April 5, 3 beheaded bodies on the Thunmodara Puwakpitiya
ita on April 11; a headless nude body of a young man in Mulleriyawa on
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72 INFORM, Situation Report: April 2006, page 4
73 The Sunday Times, Chris Kamalendran, “Abductions unlimited,” Septem
74 There were reports of recruitment preceding the June spate of abduction Batticaloa Town on May 22nd by a group of men in a double cab (Daily Mirr
75 According to UNICEF figures, there are 194 cases of child recruitment by ing to latest estimates by UNICEF, 1,642 children, of which 667 are still und www.child-soldiers.org
76 Tamilnet, Three Tamil youth killed in Trinco, April 23 2006
77 Presently there are 42 youth in protective custody. TamilNet, 24th Januar
78 On June 19th and July 9th (a poya day) Somawathiya Chaitya came unde LTTE denying the charge.78 Places of worship are also treated as refuges fo nized as such by international law. During the clashes at sea off Pesalalai m Armed assailants fired at the church hurled a grenade through the open wi
79 Suresh Kumar was killed and G.P. Selvakumar was injured when a suspe on May 15th. Both were suspected Karuna Cadres who had been injured in ther, bombing in Killinochchi on the 2nd November killing 5 civilians and dam ing in many patients fleeing. TamilNet 3rd November 2006
80 Two soldiers, Senaratnage Ranjith Priyanatha Herath and Wijeratnage Aj 18th when conducting a clearing operation in Welioya. A few days later the ICRC who in turn handed them over to the Vavuniya Magistrate. The two b been tortured. Island, Dinasena Ratugamage, “LTTE hands over mutilated Mirror, Kurulu Kariyakarawana, “Bodies of two soldiers hand over to Vavun
81 The closure of the anicut at Mavil Aru was an example of a violation of th
82 Daily Mirror, Dharisha Bastians, “LTTE should condemn attacks: denials
83 Chaired by the Minister of Human Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe, and c man Rights, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Justice, Constitutional Affairs, the Att the Police Department and the Secretariat for Co-coordinating the Peace P meet on a regular basis, especially with regard to implementing the decisio monitoring and overseeing function on human rights matters.
84 The killing of 17 local staff members of Action Contre le Faim (ACF) in Mu justice system. The measures taken by the Government on carrying out the of the Trincomalee hospital were threatened, transferring of the inquest from quently retransferring it to Kantalai by the Secreatary to the Ministry of Just hear the inquest raises concern on the impartiality and neutrality of the cas tance of Australian forensic experts, due bureaucratic delays which extend turning to Australia, the bodies were exhumed only in mid October. In addit of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) further raises concern on th with the case.
85 In addition to the claymore attack there were other attacks and the prese flee their homes or seek refuge during the nights in safer areas. For instanc Etanbasgaskada bordering Medawachchiya who had ordered the villagers ports of armed groups operating in villages at night Also an armed group h mailankulama and checked passengers. (Island, Dinasena Rathugamage, “ p.4)
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

ions unlimited,” September 24 2006, page 4
June spate of abductions, like the boy abducted on his way to school in a double cab (Daily Mirror, Senaka de Silva, May 23, p.2)
s of child recruitment by Karuna as at November 2006. Further, Accord- f which 667 are still under 18, within the ranks of the LTTE.
3 2006
y. TamilNet, 24th January 2007
hiya Chaitya came under attack, with the army blaming the LTTE and the lso treated as refuges for civilians during times of conflict and are recog- es at sea off Pesalalai many of the residents sought refuge in the Church. de through the open window killing one woman.
as injured when a suspected LTTE attacked them in Batticaloa Hospital who had been injured in an attack in Welikanda two weeks before. Fur-
illing 5 civilians and damaging the Killinochchi District Hospital and result- r 2006
rath and Wijeratnage Ajith Asokaratne were reported missing on June ya. A few days later the LTTE handed over two bodes of soldiers to the a Magistrate. The two bodies were mutilated suggesting that they had E hands over mutilated bodies of two soldiers to ICRC,” June 2, p.2; Daily iers hand over to Vavuniya police,” June 22, p.3
mple of a violation of this norm.
demn attacks: denials only,” December 8 2005
a Samarasinghe, and comprising senior officials of the Ministries of Hu- titutional Affairs, the Attorney-General’s Department, the Armed Forces, oordinating the Peace Process(SCOPP). This Committee is expected to
plementing the decisions relating to human rights and have a continuing s matters.
ntre le Faim (ACF) in Muttur in early August highlighted major flaws in the ment on carrying out the post mortem when media personal in the vicinity
rring of the inquest from Trincomalee to Anuradhapura, and subse- y to the Ministry of Justice, appointing the magistrate of Anuradhapura to nd neutrality of the case. Though the Government requested the assis- tic delays which extended to November and the Australian experts re-
in mid October. In addition, the refusal of visa to an international observer er raises concern on the measures taken by the Government to interfere
er attacks and the presence of armed groups prompted these villagers to safer areas. For instance it was claimed that there were armed group in ad ordered the villagers to leave by 23/6. In other villages there were re- Also an armed group had stopped a bus between Vavuniya and Maha- nasena Rathugamage, “Armed group orders villagers to leave,” June 21,
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86 More than 1,500 fled Allaipiddy and the surrounding area and arrived in t sheds. The move reportedly followed the Kayts Magistrate Jeyaram Trotsky that they were not able to provide security due to manpower. The Rear Adm Northern Region stated that the residents had left Kayts due their fear of th from Jaffna claimed that some of the displaced were heading to Jaffna oth (Sunday Times, “Kayts civilians fleeing to LTTE areas,” May 19, p.1; Sunda May 19, p.1; Daily News, “Civilians left Kayts due to LTTE threats” May 24, residents trickle in after Govt. assurances,” June 23, p.3)
87 Daily Mirror, Yohan Perera, “Over 3000 Muslims flee their homes,” May 1
88 Protests over police eviction of Muslims’ Daily Mirror, 28th September 20 tember asking all Muslims to leave Muttur, resulted in 600 families fleeing a Kantalai. Though some were able to leave Muttur, others were unable to do forces, buses with Muttur residents being turned back and boat licenses b
89 ‘Government’s IDP relief not enough’- Daily Mirror, 4th September 2006
90 Further, the escalating violence has delayed harvesting in Akkaraipattu w farmers are worried over losses due to this delay.
91 “Jaffna people hit by ever-soaring prices and raging debates over A” Sun
92 For example, the camp in Varothiayanagar Bharati Vidiyalayam consistin were displaced since the 14th of April, had received no Government assista ceived limited assistance from international agencies, it was a few local org mediate health and food assistance. Further, Tamil people displaced from L now residing in Eachchilampathu have yet not received assistance. They ha ters nor sanitation and other facilities. In addition, there was no continuity o at the Church of Our Lady of Victories were only receiving sporadic assista attack on the church. In August, with the influx of Muslim IDPs to Kantalai, over the delay in addressing the needs of the IDPs, the Government slow in relying in International and National Organisations (I/NGOs) to provide esse high-level committees were set up headed by ministers as well as a Specia Ministry of Disaster Relief and the Ministry of Resettlement. Day to day acti tary.
93 The Red Star, a humanitarian arm of the JVP, a Sinhala nationalist politic in Serunuwara, raising with concern on political entities targeting vulnerable
94 Daily Situation Report- Foundation for Co-Existence, 17th May 2006
95 Daily Situation Report- Foundation for Co-existence, 19th June 2006. Th fired at the refugee camp in Devalanda, Padaviy allegedly by the LTTE. 27
96 “Sonobo Children’s Home in Vaharai attacked, 12 children injured – TRO
97 Fact finding report to Kantalai and Serunuwara, www.cpalanka.org
98 Other incidents included the grenade attack against the Non Violent Pea staff member and two local staff98, the grenade attack on the TRO office in member in a mine explosion98 and the abduction of a TRO staff member in various actors to restrict the work of women employed with international an work in the North East, demonstrated by the distribution of hand bills in Ba
99 UNHCR protection report, October 2006
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

ing area and arrived in the Gurunagar area and settled in temporary gistrate Jeyaram Trotsky being told by the security forces on May 19th
anpower. The Rear Admiral Upali Ranaweera, Commander of the Navy’s ayts due their fear of the LTTE not of the security personnel. Residents e heading to Jaffna others to the Wanni s,” May 19, p.1; Sunday Times, “Kayts civilians fleeing to LTTE areas,”
LTTE threats” May 24, p.3; Daily Mirror, Easwaran Rutnam, “Allaipiddy , p.3)
ee their homes,” May 16, p.4
rror, 28th September 2006. With the circulation of a leaflet on 22nd Sep- in 600 families fleeing and seeking refuge in Kinniya and others moving to thers were unable to do so with roads being blocked by Government ck and boat licenses being withdrawn to stop people taking flight by sea.
r, 4 h September 2006
esting in Akkaraipattu where reports state that both Tamil and Muslim
ing debates over A” Sunday Times, 26th November 2006
ti Vidiyalayam consisting of 299 men and 287 female (155 families) who
no Government assistance even three days later. While they had re- s, it was a few local organisations that were most active in providing im- people displaced from LTTE held areas in Muttur following aerial attacks, ived assistance. They have not even been provided with temporary shel- ere was no continuity of assistance as seen in Pesalai where IDPs living eiving sporadic assistance with dry rations and food 11 days after the uslim IDPs to Kantalai, questions of disaster preparedness was raised the Government slow in providing shelter and essential items and largely /NGOs) to provide essential services. This was the case even though ters as well as a Special Relief Centre being created jointly headed by the tlement. Day to day activities were coordinated by the Divisional Secre-
inhala nationalist political party, provided assistance to displaced Muslims ities targeting vulnerable individuals and communities.
nce, 17th May 2006
nce, 19th June 2006. There have been similar attacks of this nature, shots
gedly by the LTTE. 27th June 2006, LankaTruth.
children injured – TRO”- TamilNet, 8th November 2006
ww.cpalanka.org
nst the Non Violent Peace Force office in Muttur injuring an international ck on the TRO office in Jaffna on the 15th of July98,death of a ZOA staff f a TRO staff member in Valaichchenai. There was also targeted efforts by yed with international and national organisations involved in humanitarian ution of hand bills in Batticaloa, Ampara and Trincomalee.
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100 For example, questions were raised as to why Tamil people displaced in received assistance compared to the influx of assistance for the displaced displaced in Kebettigollewa received temporary shelter within a month, whe Trincomalee and Pessalai are still residing in schools and religious buildings provide assistance to the IDPs in Kebettigollawa, with the Government dec in addition to the bag of food items provided by the World Food Programm displaced in Pesalai where there was no continued effort to address the ne the housing given to the tsunami and the conflict affected raises concerns living in temporary shelters more than a decade after being displaced such affected are already residing in permanent houses. There are also concern been raised by the tsunami affected as why Hambantota district has receiv
101 “Tsunami shocker 30% household say kids are school-less”, Sunday Tim
102 DPSG report November 05-Janaury 06, www.cpalanka.org
103 Interview with Mr. Alessandro Pio, Country Director ADB, Sunday Leade
104 RADA meeting, 24th May 2006.
105 For example, in Uppuveli in Trincomalee, the tsunami houses are built o ing boundary walls have collapsed on to another house at the bottom of th people had to move back into tents because the permanent housing given ing in Hunugama in Hambantota. It is of interest that plans drawn up soon gama in the massive Siribopura Housing Scheme to be a model for other a infrastructure development. What is evident now is that due to cheap mate houses are collapsing with the tsunami affected having to move back into t ing to move in to the badly built houses, with authorities having decided to tota police. This is an interesting twist as the construction of houses were m demonstrating ways of political maneuvering that is being used at the pligh multiplied”, Sunday Leader 2nd July 2006
106 Cluster Reports; Report of the Consultation with Tsunami Affected Pers 2nd July 2006, INFORM
107 After much debate the Government did away with the Buffer Zone and Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) 1997
108 http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/socio_econ_ind.html
109 There was a 20% drop in tourist arrivals during the last quarter of 2006 in 2005 (143,700).
110 The factors included severe drought hampering agricultural production, ammunitions from abroad (caused by military setbacks in the North particu camp in April 2000 and the attack on Colombo international airport in July
111 With the change of Government in April 2004 led by the Sri Lanka Freed and reversing the economic reform programme of the previous Governmen the new Government may have all contributed to the drop in growth.
112 The unemployment data in the graph includes North & East province fo force survey could not be undertaken in the strife torn province before 200
113 Once again, the relationship between the political party in power and th
114 http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/socio_econ_ind.html
115 Central bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2005, Special Statistical Appe http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/AR2005data/Spappendix.pdf
116http://www.treasury.gov.lk/BOM/nbd/pdfdocs/nationalsum2007/medium
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

amil people displaced in Trincomalee town have been side lined and not tance for the displaced in Kebethigollewa. This was evident when the
lter within a month, when many in the North East including areas such as s and religious buildings. Additionally, there has been a continued effort to ith the Government deciding to continue the supply of monthly dry rations World Food Programme. This should be compared with the plight of the effort to address the needs of the IDPs nor provide dry rations. Further, fected raises concerns of equity, as many conflict affected IDPs are still
r being displaced such as in areas of Puttalam where as the tsunami There are also concern within the tsunami affected as questions have ntota district has received better assistance.
chool-less”, Sunday Times, 24th December 2006
palanka.org
tor ADB, Sunday Leader 11th June 2006
nami houses are built on a hill and already, the poorly constructed retain-
use at the bottom of the hill. CHA meeting, 11th May 2006. Similarly, rmanent housing given to them are poorly constructed and are collaps- t plans drawn up soon after the tsunami intended areas such as Hunu- o be a model for other areas, with large scale housing construction and
that due to cheap material and the speed at which they were built,
ing to move back into tents. As reported, many in Hunugama are refus- rities having decided to hand over more than 30 houses to the Hamban- uction of houses were meant for the tsunami affected not for police,
being used at the plight of the tsunami affected. “Hungama, a tragedy
Tsunami Affected Persons from Galle, Matara and Hambantota Districts,
ith the Buffer Zone and opted for the set back zones specified in the
he last quarter of 2006 (115,600) compared to the corresponding quarter
agricultural production, rising world oil price, and procurement of arms & cks in the North particularly the overrunning of Elephant Pass military rnational airport in July 2001)
d by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the political instability, stalling he previous Government, and lack of clear economic policy framework by e drop in growth.
orth & East province for 2002-2005 only, because the quarterly labour rn province before 2002 as well as after 2005.
al party in power and the state of key indicators becomes evident.
Special Statistical Appendix Table 5, df
tionalsum2007/mediumtermbudgetaryframework2006-2009.pdf
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117 http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/press-190107a.doc
118 http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/press_100107.doc
119 http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/socio_econ_ind.html
120 http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/Press_261206.doc
121 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2005, Statistical Appendix Ta http://www.cbsl.lk/cbsl/AR2005data/t112-05.pdf
122 http://www.cse.lk/
123 Compiled by Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2
124 http://www.treasury.gov.lk/FPPFM/fpd/pdfdocs/budget2007/BUDGETS
125 It has to be mentioned at the outset that a thorough analysis of the bud to brevity of space.
126http://www.treasury.gov.lk/EPPRM/npd/pdfdocs/budget2007/MahindaC
127 A deeper analysis of the Mahinda Chintanaya is beyond the scope of th
128 The expectation was that the airport would primarily serve the Koggala site is being converted into a star-class hotel.
129 Mahinda Chintanaya: Vision for A New Sri Lanka, viii
130http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/peace2005/Insidepage/PressRelease/W
131 http://www.unhcr.org:80/publ/RSDLEGAL/4590f12a4.pdf
132 More details about economic decline and cost of living rise can be obta Lanka http://pointpedro.org/category/quarterly-economic-reports/
133 In 1956 and 1971 the GDP growth rate was almost zero percent. Furth (-1.5) for the first time. In all the foregoing years it was the SLFP-led govern
134 http://www.unhcr.org:80/publ/RSDLEGAL/4590f12a4.pd
135 Journalism in troubled times: The struggle for press freedom in South A nalists, http://www.ifj-asia.org/page/worldpressfreedomday060503.html
136 Media Freedom and Freedom of Expression: Heading for a crisis in Sri L the UN Human Rights Council by the Free Media Movement (FMM), Sri Lan Documentation Centre, http://freemediasrilanka.org/index.php?action=con
137 The individual cases discussed below were included by Christopher Wa to Hon. Keheliya Rambukwella, the Defence Spokesperson of the Governm Lanka that looked at media freedom in October 2006. A fuller and more de found in the report prepared for the Second Session of the UN Human Rig ment of International Fact-Finding and Advocacy Mission to Sri Lanka, 11 O http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19142)
138 Mission Statement of International Fact-Finding and Advocacy Mission http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19142
139 Mission Statement of International Fact-Finding and Advocacy Mission http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19142
140 http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=20878
141 http://www.ifex.org/da/content/view/full/78617
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

Statistical Appendix Table 112,
tion Perception Index 2006
budget2007/BUDGETSPEECH2007.pdf
ugh analysis of the budget 2007 is beyond the scope of this review due
/budget2007/MahindaChintanaTenYearDevelopmentPlan.pdf
beyond the scope of this review because of lack of space.
arily serve the Koggala free trade area but it has not yet taken off and the
, viii
epage/PressRelease/WebRel/July/WebRel180705_1.asp
f12a4.pdf
f living rise can be obtained from Quarterly Review of the Economy of Sri nomic-reports/
ost zero percent. Further, in 2001 the country recorded negative growth as the SLFP-led governments that was in power.
f12a4.pd
ess freedom in South Asia 2005-2006, International Federation of Jour- domday060503.html
ading for a crisis in Sri Lanka, Note Prepared for the Second Session of ovement (FMM), Sri Lanka with the support of INFORM Human Rights /index.php?action=con_all_full&id=25§ion=news_reports
ded by Christopher Warren, President of the IFJ, in a written submission sperson of the Government, pursuant to an international mission to Sri 06. A fuller and more detailed account of attacks against the media is n of the UN Human Rights Council by FMM & INFORM (Mission State- ission to Sri Lanka, 11 October 2006,
and Advocacy Mission to Sri Lanka, 11 October 2006,
and Advocacy Mission to Sri Lanka, 11 October 2006,
id=20878
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Centre for Policy Alternatives
142 Mission Statement of International Fact-Finding and Advocacy Mission http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19142
143 http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=20202
144 Ibid, http://freemediasrilanka.org/index.php?action=con_all_full&id=25&
145 Ibid
146 Sinhala journalist shot dead in Colombo, http://www.freemediasrilanka.org/index.php?action=con_news_full&id=232
147 http://www.freemediasrilanka.org/index.php?action=con_news_full&id=
148 http://presidentsl.org/data/html/speeches/2006/address_to_the_nation
149 Senior Journalists questioned by Police under new Anti-Terrorism Regu http://freemediasrilanka.org/index.php?action=con_news_full&id=401&sec
150 Full report of the Media Reform Forum, FES Sri Lanka, http://www.fessr
151 An Investigation into the Closure of CBNSat and Implications for Sri Lan for Policy Alternatives, http://www.cpalanka.org/research_papers/CBN_rep
152 The Sri Lankan government's broadcast stranglehold by Nalaka Gunaw http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/columns.asp?parentid=57939
153 Suspension of Raja FM radio channel of Colombo Communication Pvt L http://www.news.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1112&
154 Government deplores attempts to curb media freedom in the North and http://www.news.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1032&
155 The observations and recommendations are noted in this regard, recalli tional Fact-Finding and Advocacy Mission to Sri Lanka, a synthesis report b report for the Second Session of the UN Human Rights Council Governme the North and East http://www.news.lk/index.php?option=com_content&ta – Preliminary observations for synthesis media report, Sanjana Hattotuwa a natives, http://www.cpalanka.org/research_papers/Media_Synthesis_Stud
156 Ibid
157 Work in progress – Preliminary observations for synthesis media report, Centre for Policy Alternatives, http://www.cpalanka.org/research_papers/M
158 Ibid
159 Work in progress – Preliminary observations for synthesis media report, Centre for Policy Alternatives, http://www.cpalanka.org/research_papers/M
War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka

and Advocacy Mission to Sri Lanka, 11 October 2006,
id=20202
ion=con_all_full&id=25§ion=news_reports
=con_news_full&id=232§ion=news
tion=con_news_full&id=328§ion=news
/address_to_the_nation.htm
ew Anti-Terrorism Regulations, FMM, _news_full&id=401§ion=news
Lanka, http://www.fessrilanka.org/pdf/mediareport.pdf
Implications for Sri Lankan Broadcast Media, Ruha Devanesan, Centre earch_papers/CBN_report.pdf
ehold by Nalaka Gunawardene, published on AsiaMedia,
tid=57939
o Communication Pvt Ltd with immediate effect t&task=view&id=1112&Itemid=51ANIT
eedom in the North and East
t&task=view&id=1032&Itemid=51
ed in this regard, recalling those made by the initial report of the Interna- nka, a synthesis report by CPA on media reform and the FMM / INFORM ghts Council Government deplores attempts to curb media freedom in option=com_content&task=view&id=1032&Itemid=51; Work in progress rt, Sanjana Hattotuwa and Radhika Hettiarachchi, Centre for Policy Alter- /Media_Synthesis_Study.pdf
synthesis media report, Sanjana Hattotuwa and Radhika Hettiarachchi, .org/research_papers/Media_Synthesis_Study.pdf
synthesis media report, Sanjana Hattotuwa and Radhika Hettiarachchi, .org/research_papers/Media_Synthesis_Study.pdf
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