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Irgery Perhann \ | |
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STUDIES IN COLONIAL LEGISLATuRES EDITED BY MARGERY PERHAM
VOLUME V
THE LEGISLATURES
OF CEYLON
by
S. NAMASIVAYAM

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Colonial and Comparative Studies
edited by Margery Perham
★
Studies in Colonial Legislatures
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE councIL I6o6-1945 by Martin Wight. 1946
11. THE GOLD COAST LEG ISLATIVE COUN CIL
by Martin Wight. 1947
II. THE NORTHERN RHODESIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
by J. W. Davidson. 1948
Iv. THE NIGERIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
by Joan Wheare. I949
The Economics of a Tropical Dependency
VOL. I. THE NATIVE ECONOMIES OF NGERIA
by Daryll Forde and Richenda Scott. 1946.
VOL. I. MINING COMMERCE AND FINANCE IN NIGERIA
by P. A. Bower, A.J. Brown, C. Leubuscher, J. Mars and
Alan Pim. 1948
THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA
by Margery Perham. 1948

THE LEGISLATURES OF CEYLON
I928 - I948
by S. NAMASIVAYAM, M.A., B.Litt. (Oxon)
of Lincoln's Inn, barrister-at-law
Published under the auspices of Nuffield College.
by FABER & FABER LIMITED 24 Russell Square London

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First published in mcmli by Faber and Faber Limited 24 Russell Square, London W.C.I Printed in Great Britain by Latimer Trend & Co Ltd Plymouth All rights reserved
Nuffield College was founded to promote research into modern political and economic questions. As a college it has no opinions and the responsibility for those expressed in this book rests entirely upon the individual writer.

“I trust I shall be pardoned for making a remark which has often pressed itself upon me: the peculiar circumstances of Ceylon, both physical and moral, seem to point it out to the British Government as the fittest spot in our Eastern Dominions in which to plant the germ of European civilization, whence we may not unreasonably hope that it will spread over the whole of these vast territories.
Charles H. Cameron, January 1832.
vii

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EDITOR'S PREFACE
his series, which is listed opposite the title-page, was begun under the auspices of Nuffield College. The earlier studies were financed from a grant made by the Trustees of the Higher Studies Fund of Oxford University to the College, which set up a small committee to administer colonial research and publication, and entrusted me with its direction. This grant has now been spent, and the present author, who is Assistant Legal Draftsman to the Ceylon Government, carried out this work as an independent student under my direction.
The main purpose of the series is to describe the constitutional development of the British colonial empire through studies of selected representative colonies. Each study finds its central theme in the legislature as the place where the shifting balance of imperial authority and colonial self-assertion marks the evolution of self-government. Mr. Wight's historical volume, with its editorial preface, was planned as an introduction to the whole series as there is much that is common, both in tradition and forms, to all the Crown Colonies which it has not been necessary to repeatin each volume.
There need be no surprise that Ceylon is included in a series upon Colonial constitutions. She merits, indeed, pride of place in it as the first non-European colony to attain Dominion status and the phases of this attainment are the theme of the present volume. Ceylon has not only this honourable constitutional primacy: she is also the first far-Eastern country to be included in this series. The other three studies of legislatures have been written upon colonies in tropical Africa and this excursion to Asia takes us into a very different historical and constitutional climate. In Ceylon we have peoples belonging to world religions, drawing for hundreds of years before the Christian era upon the ancient civiliza- . tions of the east and then passing for some four and a half centuries under European government, the last one hundred and fifty years of which was the period of British rule. Thus, when the determinationto attainfullselfogovernment came to Ceylon, hier people
1.

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Χ EDITOR'S PREFACE
had a long-established and stable structure, with native and foreign civilizations deeply interlaid, upon which to base their independence.
There is another and most satisfying aspect of Ceylon's development. In a world which displays so much unreason and violence, Ceylon has graduated into independence without disorder and with the minimum of political conflict. This is a great tribute, not only to the honesty of British professions but still more, perhaps, to the political maturity and intelligence of the Ceylonese leaders. These leaders are rightly proud not only of the status which they have gained but of the dignified manner ofits attainment, and our author reflects this pride in his book. The Prime Minister, Mr. Senanayake said, on 4th February 1949, the first anniversary of Ceylon's independence, that when Ceylon received her freedom after five hundred years of foreign domination some could not or would not grasp its full significance. They were incapable of imagining that a small country could gain her independence without suffering and even bloodshed, but he believed that the doubters were now convinced of their error.’ Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, High Commissioner for Ceylon, in a recent speech in London, emphasized the high degree of self-government possessed by his people even before the 1948 constitution, and added, “Therefore to students of the development of self-government in other parts of the British Empire, I would commend a study of the administration of Ceylon'.
These are very general points: closer study will reveal others of special constitutional interest. Ceylon would have provided a classic example of the gradual progress through the successive and increasingly liberal versions of Crown Colony government but for the interruption of a unique experiment in which her British tutors abandoned their usual loyalty to precedent. This was the so-called Donoughmore Constitution in which the attempt was made to break away from the frustrating stage of colonial government which confronts an immovable imperial executive with an irresponsible local “opposition'. Lord Durham had diagnosed its weaknesses early in the nineteenth century but British Governments had failed to find for the non-European colonies any alterUnited Empire, March/April, 1950. p. 91.

EDITOR'S PREFACE X
native to this difficult stage on the road to self-government. It has been generally assumed that this bold experimentin Ceylon was a failure: it certainly had obvious defects, but no constitution could have satisfied a people pressing on towards complete self-government. Our author has some interesting points to make in defence of this constitution, and its experiment in the use of a committee system may still, if reformed in the light of Ceylon's experience, supply precedents of value in bringing inexperienced legislatures to an understanding of modern administration and the problems ofits political control.
Another interesting and most encouraging feature of Ceyloh's constitutional development has been the happy solution so far of the minority problem, which has retarded the development and injured the fulfilment of self-government in other dependent territories. It is of special interest that Mr. Namasivayam is not only the first Asiatic contributor to this series and the first who belongs to the country under investigation but that, as a Tamil, he is also a member of one of its minority groups. He has much to say of the way in which the communal method of representation was first used and then boldly and, as far as we can yet see, successfully thrown aside, but nothing is more encouraging than the fact that Mr.Namasivayam can write upon this subject in the spirit which finds expression in these pages.
We may notice here that he found his main difficulty in writing at once for Ceylonese and for British readers arid it was, of course, impossible in a purely constitutional study to sketch for the latter the social and political background of the island. On the other hand, his final arguments to prove that Ceylon's Dominion status is no whit inferior to that of the other Dominions may strike British readers, who take this equality for granted, as over-elaborate. But the author considered it necessary to remove the last suspicions of his fellow-countrymen and these pages do, at least, give a full exposition of the new status from the standpoint of those who have recently acquired it and may convince any stilldoubting foreign reader of its reality.
The author raises at the end one question of fundamental interest which often troubles British observers of imperial affairs. This is the suitability of British institutions to non-British peỏples with

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Χii ( EDITOR'S PREFACE
the deep differences in their past history and present society. Mr. Namasivayam gives a very reasonable answer to this question. But the reader will be impressed also with the strength and completeness with which the Ceylonese themselves have demanded the British model. Rejecting any development of the special forms invented for them under the Donoughmore experiment, they have adopted to the full the structure of the British constitution. British experts have advised upon drafting and procedure, and many of the forms and ceremonies of the House of Commons have been adopted. The bond thus created between the two Parliaments receivedits overtsign in the visit to the Ceylon House of Representatives of a delegation from the House of Commons, taking with them the giftofa Speaker's chair and a mace. For the future it will be interesting to see how the constitution of Ceylon and other countries which have substantially taken over the British model at one moment in its development will themselves continue with that development in their own environment. They will, of course, fill the outward forms with the content of their own political character under the play of local events and conditions.
There may, however, be some continuing constitutional influence from Ceylon's political relationships with the rest of the Commonwealth and especially with Britain herself. For Ceylon these have started in the happiest way. This is largely because the island has thrown up a statesman who has not only given the leadership which has inspired and guided the movement to independence but whose wise, reconciling mind has won the confidence of the minorities and measured the mutual advantages of close friendship between Ceylon and her former rulers. “I cannot think', said Mr. Senanayake, in the debate upon the attainment of independence, 'of a better and safer friend for Ceylon than Great Britain. On the British side, Lord Soulbury, the Chairman of the Commission which, in close contact with the Ceylonese leaders, drew up the constitution and who, at Ceylon's own request, is the first Governor-General, paid this tribute to the Prime Minister: “Throughout his tenure of office as Leader of the State Council he has displayed all those qualities of judgment, patience, tolerance and good humour that go to make a great political leader. He is a Sinhalese who, as Leader of the Council, has never thought of

EDITOR'S PREFACE xiii
himself as a Sinhalese representative. He has gained the trust of all the communities in the island to a degree unprecedented in its history, and in guiding the fortunes of his country to the full and complete self-government which it will shortly attain as a member of the British Commonwealth ofNations, no one has played a more important or noble part than he.'
It is surely the fairest test of political maturity that a people can produce a leader of the stature of Ceylon's Prime Minister, with a ministry capable of supporting him, and a majority of the people which is prepared to accept his leadership under the institutions of representative democracy. In the study of colonial government the technical constitutional side of the process has an interest and an importance which are the justification for this series. But the institutional phases draw their energy and meaning from the human and political realities behind them. In the difficult task which confronts British governments in deciding at what moment. to cede the power which their precedessors took into their hands over the peoples in the Commonwealth, the decision, expressed though it must be in constitutional principles, depends upon these realities and above allupon the leading personalitiesinvolved in the events. This transfer of power has always, even in the old British colonies, taken the form of a constitutional struggle, the colonial “Now! being answered year after year with the imperial "Not yet!' In spite of the dignity and restraint which marked Ceylon's progress to independence, the implication of the story, as told here, is that power has to be wrested from a grudging ruler. This is part of the truth since imperial power is seldom taken for wholly altruistic reasons and was certainly not so taken in Ceylon in 1796, while in the course of time many interests, national and private, grow roots which are hard to pull up. But in the latest stages of the transfer of power, when metropolitan rulers have accepted its necessity, the reasons for delay may be based largely, if not entirely, upon the interests of good government in the dependency, insofar as foreign rulers can discern them. Unfortunately, as there can be no exact standards of judgment and certainly none that are accepted by both parties, these are obliged to oppose each other with diverse constitutional speculations. In addition, the colonial
United Empire, November/December 1947, p. 287

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xiv EDITOR'S PREFACE
leaders are taught by their political instinct or their study of history that national unity and party discipline are most easily developed in an atmosphere of conflict. This conflict, moreover, in recent imperial history is generally between two groups of different cultures, languages and probably in large measure, religions. Not only national but legitimate personal gains are the stake for the leaders who are impatient to grasp both in their own lifetime. In all these circumstances itis hardly surprising that the final stages of colonial emancipation are marked by a tension that may degenerate into confusion and disorder. The utmost possible harmony in the transfer is, however, advantageous to both sides, but especially, perhaps, to the dependency which may thus bespared an initiation into lawlessness and into all the delusions of political extremism. The conditions that combined to elevate this processin Ceyloninto
a model act of emancipation cannot wholly be reproduced elsewhere. Yet, in the many colonial enfranchisements that will take place in the coming years, there may be much not only to be admired but also to be learned by the imperial government and by aspiring colonies from the fortunate constitutional experience of Ceylon.
MARGERYPERHAM JNuffield College,
Oxford.
May І95о

AUTHOR'S PREFACE
ittle justification is needed for a constitutional study on Ceylon. The constitutional experiments in that country during the last twenty-five years have from time to time provided front-page news, and politicians, colonial administrators and students have watched the most recent political changes there with interest and admiration.The fact that there is no serious work on this topic has been commented upon by Mr. Martin Wight in his Preface to the introductory volume of this series, and although it is understood that there are now some students working on different aspects of this subject, it will remain for some time yet a relatively virgin field, providing material for numerous works.
The first draft of this survey was prepared as a thesis for a research degree at Oxford. In rewriting it for publication I have tried to meet the criticism of my editor and other English readers of the manuscript, that I have taken too much local knowledge for granted. As a result of this some of the information and comments may be regarded by my Ceylonese readers as commonplace, but they will probably pardon me when they remember that this survey is intended for British and other nonCeylonese readers as well.
My chief sources were the local Hansards. Since Ceylon had during the last three decades three legislative assemblies, these reports consisted of the records of the proceedings of the Legislative Council, the State Council and the present bicameral Parliament. In addition to these, as the footnotes will show, I have used other official authorities, such as command papers and sessional papers of the Government of Ceylon. Further, I have used a number of secondary authorities, and information obtained from informal discussions with councillors, Officers of State, civil servants in the Colonial Office and numerous friends. In the last part of this work a short summary of the present constitution of Ceylon is given. As Ceylon is now a Dominion, some may inquire whether such a summary is appropriate in XV

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xvi AUTHOR'S PREFACE
a work forming part of a series of studies dealing with colonial legislatures. The Editor has already referred to this question. I would emphasize, however, for my own part that, since this study is an essay in political evolution, it could hardly be complete without some reference to the stage now reached in the progress of the island, particularly as that stage distinctly marks the end of one phase and the beginning of another. Further, the main features of the present constitution were intended to be a part of one which was technically of crown colony status, and which was brought into operation at the end of 1947 and was in being for a few months. All the important institutions and authorities that made up that short-lived constitution, such as the bicameral legislature, the cabinet, parliamentary and permanent secretaries, and an independent Public Service Commission, are continued under the present constitution, the only important difference between the two constitutions being the absence in the present one of certain limitations, the last vestiges of imperial control, on the powers of the Ceylon government and legislature. Finally, this study is intended to be a contribution to the understanding of the Ceylon of to-day and this will be best achieved by a constitutional survey which concludes with some mention of the present.
Although Iama member of the Ceylon public service, this work consists of my personal opinions on the matters discussed and is not an expression of any government or official point of view. In closing, I wish to express my special thanks to Miss Perham, the editor of this series. The idea of writing this work emanated from her, and from the time when we first discussed the plan of this survey in her book-lined study in Bardwell Road, Oxford, to its final conclusion, she actively helped me with advice, criticism and ideas. She has been the most patient of editors and the kindest of critics. She also placed at my disposal her unrivalled knowledge of colonial constitutions and development, which enabled me to put my subject in its proper background and to see Ceylon as a part of wider developments in the Commonwealth. Of the less pleasant tasks in connection with this work which she had to undertake was that of making last-minute corrections and checking final proofs, an obligation

AUTHOR's PREFACE xvii
cast on her by reason of my residence outside-England, and this task, too, she ungrudgingly performed. My debt to her is immeasurable.
Two others willingly gave me the benefit of their special knowledge of certain matters. These were Sir Drummond Shiels and Professor K. C. Wheare. The former provided me with valuable information which enabled me to understand better the Donoughmore recommendations, while the latter clarified greatly my ideas about the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, and the much-criticized agreements between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Ceylon relating to defence and external affairs. I wish, also, to thank here the library staffs of Rhodes House, the Colonial Office and the Royal Empire Society for their constant helpfulness and courtesy.
S. NAMASIVAYAM
Colombo. I4th March 1950

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CONTENTS
EDITOR’s PREFACE
AUTHOR's PREFACE
ABBREVIATED REFERENCEs
I. INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL
The country The Legislative Council up to 1931
II. THE PosITION of THE GovERNoR IN THE
DoNo UGHMORE CoNSTITUTION
Formal and non-controversial powers
The Governor and the Public Service
Executive powers and the Governor's powers
of ratification
Legislative powers
Four Governors
III. THE STATE CoUNCIL : CoM PosITION
The franchise Representation The candidates The councillors
IV. THE STATE CouncIL: PoweRs, DUTIES AND
PROCEDURE Executive powers and duties Legislative powers and duties Procedure
V. MINISTERs, OFFICIALS AND EXECUTIvE
CoMMITTEEs The Ministers The Officers of State The Public Services Commission
XKK
29. ვo* 3I
34 37 44
50 50
68 ნ9
73 73 75 79

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XX CONTENTS
The Public Service The Executive Committee System Two Ministers
VI. AssessMENT OF THE DoNouGHMORE
CoNsTITUTION
VII. AGITATION FOR THE REFoRM of THE
DoNOUGHMORE CoNSTITUTION Agitation up to I939 Agitation during the period 1939-47
VIII. THE CoNSTITUTION oF I 948
The Governor-General The Parliament The House of Representatives The Senate The Legislative Powers of Parliament The Cabinet The Public Service Commission Defence and external affairs
IX. CoNCLUSION
APPENDICEs
INDEx
page 92 95 IO5
II6 II6
I 2O
I29 I3I I32 133 I39 І4O I50 I53 I54
I73
I79

ABBREVIATED REFERENCES
Cmd. I8og =Correspondence relating to the further revision of the Constitution of Ceylon, 1923.
Cmd. 3I3 I =Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution I 928 (Donoughmore Report).
Cmd. 3419 =Correspondence regarding the Con
W stitution of Ceylon, 1929.
Cmd. 59to =Correspondence relating to the Con
stitution of Ceylon, 1938.
Cmd. 6677 = Report of the Comrhission on Con-.
stitutional Reform, I945 (Soulbury
Report).
Cmd. 66go =The White Paper on Constitutional
Reform issued by His Majesty's Government, I945.
Cmd. 7257 =Proposals for conferring O. Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations.
1920 Order in Council =The Ceylon (Legislative Council)
Order in Council, Ig2O.
1923 Order in Council =The Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1923, as amended by the Ceylon (Legislative Council) Amendment Order in Council, I924.
193I.Order in Council =The Ceylon (State Council) Order
in Council, I 93 II.
Dom. Cons. =The Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, as last amended by the Ceylon Independence Order in Council, 1947.
xxi

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xxii ABBREVIATED REFERENCES
Letters Patent =Letters Patent constituting the Office of Governor and Commander-inChief of the Island of Ceylon and its Dependencies, dated the 22nd of April 193I.
Royal Instructions =Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Island of Ceylon and its Dependencies, dated the 22nd of
April I 93 II.
Deb. Leg. Co. =Debates in the Legislative Council of
Ceylon.
Hansard =Debates in the State Council of
Ceylon.
Deb. H. of R. -Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, Ceylon.
Deb. Senate =Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Cey
lon.
H.C. Deb. 5s =House of Commons Debates, 5th
Series.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL
eylon's constitutional evolution during the years
1928 to 1948, the subject of this study, is an impor
tant episode in the story of imperial rélationships. It
affords one of the best illustrations of the transition by peaceful negotiation from crown colony government to Dominion Status. During these years the nature and powers of the country's legislature changed considerably. Unlike most other colonies which had throughout this period substantially. the same legislative assembly, Ceylon had three assemblies, first a Legislative Council, of the usual crown colony type, with limited powers, then a State Council-of semi-responsible status and lastly a sovereign Parliament. It is the purpose of this work to survey the nature and working of these legislatures against the background of other constitutional and political developments. Before such a constitutional study can be made, it is necessary to know something of the country, its people and resources, and of the chief political changes of the British period up to the inauguration of the Donoughmore constitution in 1931. It will be the object of this chapter to give some account of these.
TE COUNTRY
Ceylon is a pear-shaped island of notable charm and beauty, situated slightly north of the equator and south-east of India, and separated from that vast sub-continent by the narrow Palks Strait, a shallow sea some forty miles across. This nearness to India has affected considerably the course of her history as it has opened her to the influence of currents of thought and feeling from that great country and has furnished her ruling dynasties; unfortunately she had to pay for these by frequent inva

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2 INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL
sions, which greatly damaged her material civilization. The extreme length of the island from north to southis 270 miles and its greatest width is 140 miles. The area of the country is 25,332 square miles, about one-half of that of England, five-sixths of that of Ireland, and one-sixtieth of that of India. She has two ports of great commercial and strategic importance, Colombo and Trincomalee.
The population of the country has increased considerably during the last hundred years. While in 1834 Ceylon's population was I, I67,7oo, it had risen according to the census of 1946, to 6,658,999.”
Ceylon, to employ a useful current expression, has a plural society consisting of several different races. The chief of these are the Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors, Burghers and Europeans. The Sinhalese are a people of Aryan stock who originally came from India about the sixth century B.C. They are divided to-day into low country and Kandyan Sinhalese, a distinction that has probably grown out of environment and history. While the former constituted the bulk of the population in the coastal areas, the latter occupy chiefly the interior provinces of the country. The low country Sinhalese are generally better educated and more progressive than the Kandyans, since they live in those areas that were more open to outside influence, while the Kandyans occupied the less accessible parts of the country. The Tamils in Ceylon are of Dravidian stock and, like the Sinhalese, came Over from India, though at a much later date. They are descended from the Tamil invaders who accompanied south Indian kings and chieftains in their periodic invasions of Ceylon. As a result of these invasions Tamil rule was established in the northern and eastern parts of the country which are still more or less exclusively peopled by the Tamils. In addition to these Ceylon Tamils, who are now historically and socially a
It should be noted that low country and Kandyan Sinhaiese occupy other parts of the country as well. If the distribution of these communities is considered geographically it can be said that the low country Sinhalese constitute the bulk of the population in the Western and Southern Provinces and in a portion of the North-western Province while the Kandyans inhabit the Central, Uva and Sabaragamuwa Provinces and the remaining part of the North-western Province.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL 3
part of the community, there are the Indian Tamils who chiefly consist of a fluctuating labour population with ties both in India and Ceylon. The Moors, too, are divided into Ceylon and Indian Moors, both of whom are descendants of Arab traders, the former of Arab traders settled in Ceylon, the latter of such traders resident in India. Like their ancestors they are mostly engaged in trade. The Burghers, the descendants of the Dutch, who continued to remain in Ceylon after the British occupation, are a small but influential community that has played a determining part in the political and professional life of the country. In addition to these races, there are the Veddas, a very small race who are considered to be the aborigines of the country and the Malays, the descendants of the troops brought by the Dutch from Java.
The numbers of the various races in the country, according to the 1946 census, were as follows:
Sinhalese (low country and Kandyan) 4,637,ooo
Ceylon Tamils 826,ooo Indian Tamils 682,ooo Ceylon Moors and Malays 393,000 Other Indians, including Indian Moors 69,000 Burghers, Eurasians, Euro-Ceylonese 36,000 Europeans 5,000 Others II,000
These figures will show that the Sinhalese constitute the most numerous community while the Tamils are the principal minority. They are important in that they have been used by the ና various communities in their disputes on the question of representation. In addition to these racial differences, there are also linguistic and religious differences between various sections of the country. The Sinhalese are mostly Buddhists, the Tamils mainly Hindus, while the Moors and Malays ae Moslems.
The classification of the people of the country in terms of religion, according to the 1946 census, was as follows:

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4 INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL
Buddhists 4,288,Ooo Hindus I,326,ooo Christians 6o6,ooo Muslims 433,000 Others 5,OOO
This table of figures show that the Buddhists constitute the most numerous religious group in the land.
Three languages are spoken in the country: Sinhalese, Tamil, and English. The majority of the people speak Sinhalese while a substantial minority မျိုး၏ Tamil. In 1946 it was reckoned that 696 per cent of the population was Sinhalese-speaking, while 286 per cent was Tamil-speaking. Tamil is spoken almost exclusively in the northern and eastern parts of the country which are occupied by the Ceylon Tamils and in the Central, Uva and Sabaragamuwa Provinces where it is spoken by "the Indian Tamil estate workers, while Sinhalese is spoken throughout the rest of the island. A considerable number in Colombo, the capital, and in the larger towns are bilingual, speaking both Sinhalese and Tamil, a consequence of association and social intercourse between the Sinhalese who are permanently resident in those parts and the Tamils who have been drawn by the greater opportunities provided for employment and business in these areas. In 1946 it was estimated that 4OO,Ooo could speak English, but a large number of these only know a smattering of the language. The official language of the country up to now has been English, but the national awakening and newly won political freedom have given rise to a systematic agitation for the greater use of the vernaculars for governmental purposes. In 1946 it was reckoned that 53 per cent of the people were literate in one of the three languages of the country," a relatively high figure, as the standard of literacy in India, as well as in a number of British colonies, is much lower.
The country's wealth and economic position has ímproved The numbers specified in the two tables are to the nearest thousand. * Report of the Select Committee of the State Council on 'Sinhalese and Tamil as Qficial Languages', Ceylon Sessional Paper, XXII of I946, p. 9,
para. 2o.
o Ibid., p. 1o, para 23.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORrCAL 5
considerably during the last century and a half. The national wealth is derived largely from the country's staple products which are tea, rubber, coconut, cinnamon, cacao and plumbago. Of these products tea and rubber bring the most money into the country. In 1946 the value of the tea exported from Ceylon was Rs. 379,oooooo and of rubber Rs.220,000,ooo. Although the value of coconuts and coconut products exported from the country is much smaller than the value of tea and rubber exported, coconut has been the chief mainstay not only of the native capitalist but also of the villager, as almost all the coconut plantations in the country are in native hands. The tea and rubber planatations were opened out in the last century chiefly with British capital and Ceylonese and Indian labour, and even to-day the majority of the tea and rubber estates are owned by British. In 1946, it was reckoned that 8o per cent of the tea estates and 6o per cent of the rubber estates were in. British ownership. In consequence of the political changes of the last few years and the gradual transfer of power from British to Ceylonese hands, some of these estates are passing into native hands. K
The country, however, is far from being self-sufficient. It is dependent on foreign imports for food and clothing. In 1947, Ceylonimported rice to the value of Rs. 135,ooo,ooo, curry-stuffs cost her Rs.28,000,000, and cotton piece-goods Rs. IOO,OOO.oOo." One of the chief problems of the island's legislators to-day is, therefore, to make the country less dependent on foreign lands, particularly India and Britain, for the necessities of life. 1 Ceylon is more prosperous than most of the other lands in south-east Asia. The gross national income in 1947 was Rs.282 per head per annum which was greater than the corresponding income for the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, China, Malaya and Burma. The considerable economic progress she has made since the beginnings of the British connection can be gathered from the fact that while in 1834 her annual income
The Ceylon lear Book, 1948, see diagram No. 7, facing p. 47 and p. 58. * Post-War Development Proposals, Ig46, p. 2. o Deb. H. of R., vol III, No. I 6, column Io4o.
Ibid., No. 16, column Io31.

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6 INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL
was Rs.3,779,520, her estimated revenue for I948-9, according to the budget speech of the Minister of Finance, was Rs.535,000,000. Similarly, her annual expenditure has increased from Rs.3,348,35o in 1834 to an estimated expenditure of Rs.530,ooo, Ooo for 1948-9. Her general financial and economic position is sound; her national debt has, in recent years, been less than one year's revenue.
Local government is conducted by a hierarchy of authorities ranging from numerous tiny village committees to a few municipalities concerned with the local administration of the more prosperous and highly developed areas of the country. In addition to these, there are the urban councils and town councils. All these authorities consist of persons elected by the residents of the area. The chief interests of these local authorities are sanitation, and public health, and they supervise the general well-being of their areas. From a constitutional point of view they are useful in that they provide a valuable school of political experience for their representatives, who, having learnt their first lessons in legislation and administration in local government, turn to the consideration of the problems of the national government.
Although the country has adopted British institutions of government, as these pages will show, the way of life of the majority of the people is what it was centuries ago. They generally wear the same clothes, eat the same food, observe the same festivals, and speak in their vernacular tongues, as their ancestors did under the native kings. In spite of nearly 150 years of British rule, the customs and ways of life of the West have only affected a small section of the people consisting chiefly of the professional and official classes. Yet the people to-day, as will be seen later, are in one respect strongly influenced by Western example. Institutionally they are more familiar now with the democratic institutions of the West than with any, ancient forms of autocracy. But these institutions should not be made
These figures are approximate and are based on the figures given by Mr. J. R. Jayawardene, the Minister of Finance, when introducing the Appropriation Bill for I 948-9. Deb. H. of R., I 948, vol. III, No. I 6, column Io66. '

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORicAL 7
the channel through which native customs and observances are undermined. The people are what they are by reason of these customs and observances, and with the realization of political freedom these will be strengthened and others revived. The influence of the West, however, has been useful in many respects. It has enabled the country to benefit by developments in other parts of the world, particularly by the scientific achievements of the age and it has also helped to dissolve much ignorance and superstition. One of the chief problems before the country's legislators to-day is, therefore, to prevent excessive national enthusiasm from shutting but Western influence altogether and to preserve the best traditions of the West that have already influenced the country.
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL UP To I93I
The British rule of Ceylon began with her control of the maritime provinces in 1796. Before this the island was ruled for centuries by Sinhalese and Tamil kings under a type of absolute government, which during certain periods conformed to the pattern of enlightened despotism current in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, while at other times it degenerated into downright tyranny. The principal achievements of native rule were the establishment of the Buddhist and Hindu religions, the latter in the northern and eastern parts of the island and the former in other extensive areas of the country, and the building of large irrigation works which contributed to the prosperity and contentment of the people as a whole. The most prosperous periods in the history of the country before the advent of the European powers were the first century B.C. and the second, fifth, ninth and twelfth centuries A.D., and it was during these periods that the great tanks, temples and palaces, the remains of which still evoke enthusiastic praise from the admiring foreigner, were constructed.
The first Europeans to gain a foothold in Ceylon were the Portuguese who, making use of the weakness of the country due to civil strife and periodic Indian invasions, gained control of the coastal provinces. They retained suzerainty over these provinces for a period of 130 years from the beginning of the sixteenth

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8 INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL
century. Their legacy to Ceylon was the Roman Catholic faith which even to-day has within its fold the greatest number of Christians in the country. They were replaced in their control over the maritime provinces by the Dutch whose rule over these areas lasted some 140 years. Their chief contribution to the country was the introduction of Roman-Dutch law, theprinciples of which still largely permeate the legal system of the island.
The British when they took over the maritime provinces from the Dutch attempted at first to govern these territories from Madras as a part of their south Indian dominions. But, after a period of unsuccessful rule by the East India Company, the British Government decided to administer its territory in the island as a separate unit, under a form of crown colony government which came into existence in 1802. Naturally, the form of government that was established was one of the more authori“tarian forms of crown colony government, and under it legislative, executive and judicial powers were vested and concentrated in the Governor. To advise him in the exercise of these powers, he had an advisory council consisting of not more than five officials, whose advice he was not compelled to follow. The personnel of this Council during the first years of its existence consisted of the Chief Justice, the Officer Commanding the Troops, the Principal Secretary to the Government and two other officials nominated by the Governor. The Governor had the power to suspend or dismiss a member, while a member who disagreed with the Governor had the right of entering a protest in the minutes of the Council. This form of crown colony government was not unique for during the first quarter of the last century, a number of other British colonies such as Trinidad, Mauritius, St. Lucia and Sierra Leone were governed in a similar way.
The rule of the Governor and Advisory Council up to 1815 applied to the maritime provinces only. The Portuguese and the Dutch had never been able to secure a footing in the Kandyan Provinces of the island and throughout their rule Kandyan kings and chieftains continued to govern over those areas. The British who in 1796 succeeded to the Dutch interest, at first, therefore, controlled only the coastal areas but in 1815, as a

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL 9
result of civil strife and clashes between the king and his chiefs in the Kandyan provinces, they dethroned him, banished him, to south India and obtained suzerainty over Kandyan territory. Originally Kandyan territory was administered by the British Government as a separate unit, but in 1833 it was brought under the general common administration.
The last king, Sri Vickrama Rajasinha, although native born, was of South Indian origin, belonging to the Nayakkar dynasty. As this dynasty had only recently established itself in Ceylon, the dethronement of the king and the establishment of British rule did not evoke any deep distress. Moreover, as the suzerainty of this dynasty had been limited to Kandyan territory, it had little hold over the affections of the people outside that territory. Even in Kandyan land the tyranny and atrocities of Sri Vickrama Rajasinha left him in the last months of his rule with hardly any following. There was no earlier royal line with any real claim to the affections of the people, for since the thirteenth century A.D. Ceylon, like heptarchic Britain, was divided into little areas with kinglets over them; no ruler had a nationwide allegiance and dynasties were overturned in rapid succession. Thus it was that the Sinhalese people made little effort, apart from the localized and ill-advised revolt of 1848, to reestablish a local dynasty. The only associations the Sinhalese people have to-day with their last king are the small pensions that are doled out by the Ceylon Government to his descendants in south India.
The rule of the Governor and Advisory Council was replaced in 1833, as a result of some of the recommendations of the Colebrooke Commission, by government by the Governor and Legislative and Executive Councils. The Legislative Council was to consist of nine officials and six unofficials, all the unofficial members being nominated by the Governor. It was provided also that one-half of the unofficial members could be natives. In the selection of the native members, the Governor had recourse to racial representation, nominating one low country Sinhalese, one Burgher, and one Tamil. In this way at this early date there was introduced, with unfortunate results
King: I798-1815.

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Io INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL
tO Ceylon politics, the problem of communal representation, which for many years checked constitutional advancement and embittered political relationships between the communities. The early Governors when they adopted this method of selection did not realize that they were creating a source of friction between the communities, for recruitment on a racial basis was certainly for that period the most sensible and natural way of providing for native representation in a plural society.
The Executive Council consisted of some of the principal officials in the country and throughout the nineteenth century consisted exclusively of Englishmen.
In the sixties of the last century there was considerable agitation on the part of the unofficial group of the Legislative Council, led by the European members who were selected from , the commercial and planting interests, about military expenditure and the larger question of the control of the Legislative Council over the budget and finance. In 1863 there were disagreements between the Governor and the official members of the Legislative Council on the one hand and the unofficials on the other over this question; and an amendment of George Wall, an unofficial European member who belonged to the mercantile community, to the reply to the Governor's opening address, was passed. These replies, as was often the case in the early days of the history of colonial legislative bodies, were vapid, they contained the customary formulae of fulsome adulation and hardly received any substantial alteration in the course of the discussion in the Council. But on this occasion the following spirited amendment to the Council's customary reply was moved: “That this Council desire to record their dissatisfaction and discontent that revenues have been exacted for several years so far behind the requirements of public service and so much larger than could be devoted to public purposes, and they further complain that whilst revenues have been so abundant, the efficiency of nearly every public department has been seriously impaired by the parsimonious policy of Government.’
J. R. Weinman: Our Legislature, p. 35. This work consists of a series of articles which originally appeared in the Ceylon Daily News.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORiCAL II
The passage of what amounted to a vote of censure, proposed by an unofficial, through a Council with an official majority, was an extraordinary, if not a unique, event in this period. Admittedly, on that occasion the officials had not been present in full strength; but the Government had learnt a lesson and for a long time afterwards took special care to see that a majority of official members were always present when contentious matters were being discussed.
The disputes between the Government and the unofficial members of the Council continued during the next few years. In 1864, when the Governor with the help of the votes of the official majority, and in the face of unanimous unofficial opposition, secured the passage of an Ordinance providing out of Ceylon revenue for military expenditure, all the unofficial members of the Council, led by George Wall, resigned. The significance of this bloc resignation lay in its dramatic rather than in its far-reaching effects. Such an event had probably never occurred before in any colonial legislature after the collapse of the first British Empire; but it was not a gesture that could be expected to be repeated in view of the lack of unity among the unofficial members. In Ceylon, however, for a time the opposition was carried on. It spread outside the country through the newly formed political association, the Ceylon League, one of the chief objects of which was agitation for an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council that would prevent the passage of Ordinances against the popular will of the unofficial members.
The agitation of this period arose rather from sectional interest than from an emerging nationalism, as one of the principal motives for it was the diversion of revenue from military expenditure to expenditure on the extension and improvement of the system of roads in the planting districts of the island, a service which at that time was of most use to the European interests in the country.
Apart from this agitation the Ceylonese political life of the nineteenth century was devoid of incident, and the only significant constitutional change in the last three decades of that century was the addition in 1889 of two more unofficial members to
C

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the Legislative Council, chosen to represent the Kandyan and Moor communities.
Throughout a large part of the nineteenth century, the unofficial opposition was guided by the European members. Their opposition was not at all times altruistic, yet many of these members had a genuine feeling for the natives and often attempted to secure benefits for them. Among these were David Wilson and R. A. Bosanquet who represented European interests generally (as distinct from the European representatives of the mercantile and planting communities), R. B. Downalland T.N. Christie, the representatives of the planting community, and G. B. Leechman who represented commercial interests. Upon various occasions one or other of these men moved motions, asked questions or criticized government policy in regard to such matters as the maintenance of a pure supply of water in (Colombo, the control of disease in general and epidemics in particular, an enlightened policy relating to the education of the natives, irrigation and the exercise of the free vote in the case of official members.' Nor did the European unofficials give up the espousal of native claims and national interests as soon as they found that native leaders were able to fight their own battles in the Council. Thus in the early years of this century, J. Ferguson (in a motion which lapsed for the want of a seconder) moved for the appointment of a second representative for the low country Sinhalese, and J. N. Campbell advocated unofficial representation in the Executive Council.
From the strictly constitutional point of view, the debate on the question whether official members should be allowed the free exercise of their votes was significant. In the face of the official majority, unofficial members in Council soon began to feel that it was impossible for them to secure the passage of important motions against government and official opposition.
These men were members of the Ceylon Legislative Council at one time or another during the seventies and eighties of the last century.
* Deb. Leg. Co. (I&74-5), session, p. 29.
Deb. Leg. Co. (1874-5) session, pp. 72-4. Deb. Leg. Co. (I883-4) session, pp. 52-4. Deb. Leg. Co. (1884-5) session, pp. 68-70. Deb. Leg. Co. (I 889-90) session, pp. 76-93.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL 13
They based their case partly on certain early despatches of Secretaries of State which to them seemed to suggest that the Imperial Government permitted such voting. The government arguments on this question were ably put forward by the Governor of the time, Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon, in the course of this debate. According to him, there was no real restriction imposed on the officials in regard to the use of their votes. The Governor, he stated, never really gave any prior direction to the officials on how they were to use their votes. He, however, added that if they used their votes against the government, it was likely that he might be forced to ask them to resign their seats in the legislature, a form of constitutional blackmail. He also likened the position of the officials to that of the employees of a company or an estate, liable to be dismissed if the interests of the company or estate were disregarded. But the government's most forceful argument on this question was its dificulty in running the government if there was no solidarity in its ranks. In a constitution run on principles different from those upon which cabinet government was based, the absence of a united front among the officials in the Council would make strong government impossible and any form of government difficult. This was not a problem peculiar to Ceylon as it came up for consideration in nearly every country with an official majority. As late as 1938 and 1940, this matter was debated in the Gold Coast Legislative Council and express permission was given on occasions for official members to use their votes freely according to their conscience.”
One of the principal grievances of the unofficial members in the Legislative Council in the second half of the last century and the early years of this one was the inadequacy of information at their disposal whenever they were called upon to determine public questions in the Council. They frequently demanded information and more information. They badgered officials in Council with questions and with insistence upon detailed replies. When full answers were not speedily given they felt, sometimes unfairly, that the government was concealing
Sir A. H. Gordon, Governor of Ceylon, 1883-go. * M. Wight: The Gold Coast Legislative Council, pp. 8o-I.

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useful material. The officials from their point of view were often of opinion, sometimes rightly, that the information called for was not relevant. They further complained that it was difficult to collect, and placed additional burdens on their already overworked shoulders.
Upon one typical occasion, Mr. (later Sir) P. Ramanathan pursued the then Colonial Secretary, Sir Hugh Clifford, for details first of the number of toddy taverns’, then for their districts and finally for the villages in which they had been set up. When the Colonial Secretary failed to answer the last point, the questioner indignantly condemned him thus:
“If my honourable friend says that he himself does not know what the localities are where the taverns are to be established, I say, sir, that it is a confession that is appalling in its character. He, the mouthpiece of the Government-he, the person who is charged with this Excise reform, and who is under a promise to the people of Ceylon to do what is just and proper confesses publicly, without seeing the enormity of that confession, that he does not know what the localities are where the taverns are going to be established....”
The Colonial Secretary, a master of words and repartee, answered that it was no more part of his business to know every village where a tavern was established than to know the name of every star that shines in the heavens, or the number of the pebbles on the beach.
The real difficulty that gave rise to verbal battles such as these was one inherent in the constitution itself. It arose from the absence of unofficial members in the Executive Council. Had even a few unofficial members sat in the Executive Council and participated in the executive business of government, there would have been little need for the unofficials to badger the officials on the floor of the Legislative Council. Information could have been quite easily procured in the calmer atmosphere of the Executive Council and the readiness with which information would have been given would have dispelled much of the
For full particulars about Sir Hugh Clifford, see below, p. 23. * Deb. Leg. Co. (1912-13) session, pp. 213-2.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL 15
suspicion which coloured the minds of unofficial critics. Moreover, their participation in executive government would have made their criticism of official acts more informed and constructive. The unofficial councillors, if they were also members of the Executive Council, would have been a very useful link between the officials and unofficials and would have helped to interpret government policy to their colleagues and to the country in general. Further, the need for secrecy on grounds of national emergency, public policy or imperial interest would have been accepted by unofficial members, if they had known that at least some of their number, whom they could trust, were the repositories of official confidence and contributed towards the formation of goverrent decisions. But there was, for a long time, no native representation in the Executive Council and even after Ceylonese were admitted, it was not possible for a person to be a member of both Councils at the same time.
The central figure in the nineteenth-century Legislative Council of Ceylon was the Governor. It has been rightly said that he was the keystone of the government arch. He was throughout this period and right into the twenties of this century the President and Speaker of the Council. He was at first also the government's chief spokesman, and Council records of the last century would show how actively he participated in the debates of the Council. There was some justification for the Governor being Speaker of the Council for it was thought that his presence there would enable him to understand fully the views of the unofficial members. His customary presence in the Council was not a feature of the Ceylon legislature only: in the Gold Coast, in Northern Rhodesia and in many other colonies he continued as President and government spokesman in the Council, long after he ceased to exercise these functions in the Ceylon Legislative Council. In Ceylon, however, it was decided early that the Governor's active intervention in debates sometimes resulted in undignified altercations between impetuous Governors and critical unofficials and lowered the prestige of his office. Hence it was that by the constitutional
M. Wight: The Gold Coast Legislative Council, pp. 59-62. J. W. Davidson: Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, pp. 35-6 and p. 139.

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changes of 1923 his place as customary presiding officer of the Council was taken by an elected Vice-President who was to be the Speaker of the Council. This measure has since been taken in several other colonies.
A fair number of the early Governors of Ceylon, unlike their successors of a later day, were soldiers. This was not unexpected, as the early years of British rule constituted a period of uncertainty when military power had to be kept in reserve in case of sudden revolt. It was only about the middle of the last century, after imperial power in the country had been consolidated and the government had turned its attention to the development of the island and the establishment of a civil administration on western lines, that the Governor and other servants of the Crown sent from abroad began to be increasingly recruited from the civil service.
The Governor's two chief lieutenants in the Council were the Colonial Secretary and the Queen's Advocate, later designated the Attorney General. The Governor at first overshadowed these officers but later, in keeping with his position as head of . the government and presiding officer of the Council, he receded into the background to play a more impartial role in the deliberations of the Council, leaving the Colonial Secretary to be the chief advocate of the government case. The Queen's Advocate, as the government's legal adviser, played a prominent part when legislation was being discussed in Council. During the constitutional crisis of the sixties of the last century, Sir Richard Morgan, the Queen's Advocate of the time, by his personality and capacity, was looked upon as the government's chief spokesman in the Legislative Council.
The last years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth century saw considerable economic prosperity in the island, and the rise of a prosperous native middle class educated on English lines and anxious to secure a larger share in the government. The leaders of this class naturally started an agitation for the reform of the constitution and from then onwards the champions of constitutional advance in the island were native and not, as in the sixties and seventies of the last century, European.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL 17
This agitation was expressed in the first decade of this century through political associations which advocated reform and which sent memoranda to the Secretary of State for the Colonies asking for a change of the constitution. Of these memoranda, the most famous was that prepared by Mr. (later Sir) James Peiris and dated 12th December 1908; and of the newly formed associations, the best known was the Ceylon National Association. The principal demands of those who advocated reform were the following. They wanted election to be substituted for nomination in the selection of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council. They demandod that these members should be elected for territorial constituencies. They also wanted some representation in the Executive Council for unofficial members of the Legislative Council.
The British Government's reaction was the characteristic one of a partial response to political pressure and at the next change in the constitution, which took place in 19Io, these constitutional demands were, though only to a very limited extent, satisfied. Under the Royal Instructions of 19Io the Legislative Council was to consist of eleven official and ten unofficial members of whom only four were to be elected. These four were the two European and Burgher members and the new member for what came to be called the 'educated Ceylonese seat. The electors for that seat were drawn from the whole island and from every community, irrespective of territorial or racial distinction, and had to satisfy a higheducational qualification. The other six unofficial members were to be nominated on a racial basis, two for the low country Sinhalese, two for the Tamils, one for the Kandyans and one for the Muslims. The real significance of these changes in the composition of the Legislative Council from the Ceylon point of view was that there was now introduced for the first time in the history of the Council the principle of direct election. These changes had also considerable importance for the colonial empire as a whole, for by these changes Ceylon became the first colony in which there was elected non-European representation.
The popular agitation continued and gained a great impetus
M. Wight: Development of the Legislative Council, p. 78.

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aS a result of the first world war. Two new political associations, the Ceylon Reform League in 1917 and the Ceylon National Congress in 1919, were formed for propagating and sponsoring the reform programme; further reform memoranda were submitted to the Secretary of State and reform deputations from Ceylon interviewed him. A great attempt was made during the period 1917-2I to show the British Government that the movement for reform was national and not partisan; but after a short period of co-operation, differences between the Sinhalese and Tamil leaders on the question of representation caused the two communities to drift apart, the former to continue chiefly through the Ceylon National Congress, their agitation for exclusive territorial representation and some executive responsibility, the latter to agitate through their own organizations for further communal representation.
It is important to note that the political agitation of this period was strictly peaceful and constitutional. This is well illustrated by the fact that even the Ceylon National Congress, an intensely nationalist organization, proclaimed in Article I of its constitution that it aimed at securing for the people of Ceylon responsible government and the status of a self-governing member of the British Empire by constitutional methods’.
The next important constitutional change occurred in 1920, when by the Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1920, the Legislative Council was again re-constituted. Under this Order in Council the Legislative Council was to consist of fourteen officials and twenty-three unofficial members, sixteen of whom were from the outset to be elected. Although this constitution was in existence only for a very short time it had considerable significance for it provided for the first time an unofficial majority in the Council. This constitution naturally did not satisfy the Ceylon National Congress and other organizations agitating for reform: their programme of reform included a Legislative Council consisting offorty-five members, of whom twenty-eight were to be elected on a territorial basis; a Speaker elected by the Council to preside over its deliberations; a widened franchise and an Executive Council, one-half of which The Handbook of the Ceylon National Congress, 1928. Appendix H,

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORPCAL 19
was recruited from the elected members of the Legislative Council.
A further change was effected in 1923. Under the Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1923, the composition of the Legislative Council was again altered. It was now to consist of twelve officials and thirty-seven unofficials. Twenty-three of these unofficials were to be elected as members of territorial constituencies, while eleven were to be elected as members for specially created communal electorates, the remaining three being nominated, This Order in Council also provided for a member elected by the Council to.preside at its meetings in place of the earlier system under which the Governor had presided over the deliberations of the Council, a right for which there had been agitation for several years.
This Order in Council continued the Governor's power of certification, under which he could declare certain matters to be of paramount importance and legislate upon them. This power, had also been provided for in the Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1920. This constitutional device was intended to act in the same way as an official majority in the Council since it was likely from 1920 onwards that provisions and votes which appeared to be essential to the Governor might be rejected by the Council.
All the unofficial members of the Legislative Council, together with the Colonial Secretary, the Controller of Revenue and the Colonial Treasurer constituted the finance committee of the Legislative Council, a body that met in camera primarily for the examination of the budget and the various supplementary estimates. In considering these financial proposals, it had the power to consult and question heads of departments who were in the first instance responsible for the preparation of them. Its powers of criticism offinancial proposals enabled it in the course of time to secure considerable influence.
The planning, direction and execution of policy remained in the hands of the Governor and Executive Council. The character of this Council had not changed very much since its creation in 1833, although since that time, by reason of the changes described above, the composition of the Legislative Council had

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altered considerably. The Executive Council continued to remain a predominantly official body and even the unofficial members recruited into it had to give up their seats in the Legislative Council before they could function as executive councillors. In Ceylon, as in other Crown colonies, there was at first no intention of developing the Executive Council into a cabinet; that transformation could only come as the climax of many other constitutional developments.
In the last few paragraphs a picture of the chief institutions of central government in existence during the period 1924-31 has been given. In the succeeding pages of this chapter an attempt will be made to comment on the working of these institutions, and to show those defects, which eventually resulted in their replacement by an entirely different set of institutil OinS.
The chief significance of the Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1923, was that it brought into being for the first time in Ceylon a Legislative Council which was a 'representative legislature' within the meaning of section I of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865; that is, a legislative body, of which not less than one-half were elected by the inhabitants of the country.
One of the great virtues of the constitution in existence in the years immediately preceding the Donoughmore Constitution was that it provided opportunities for the political training of unofficial members. Their work both in the finance committee of the Legislative Council, and in select committees of that Council, enabled them to gain considerable political and administrative experience. It is true that such committees were in existence prior to 1924, but the power which the Council acquired by virtue of its elected majority enabled it to secure larger powers of criticism and action within these committees.
The chief feature, however, of this constitution was 'the divorce of power from responsibility, a characteristic which has been inherent in colonial constitutions and which Lord Durham discovered as early as the thirties of the last century to be one of the great problems of the Canadian political life of the time. Under
' Cmd. 313 I, p. 8.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL 21
the constitution, the Legislative Council had very extensive powers of discussion and criticism. It could initiate and pass legislation on a multiplicity of topics. The only limitations were the King's power of disallowance exercised through the Secretary of State; the requirement in the Royal Instructions that the Governor should not give his assent to certain Bills, and the Governor's power of reserving his assent. As against these powers, it should be noted that the Legislative Council had not been given any real control over policy or administrative action since executive decision remained in the hands of the Governor and the Executive Council. There was unfortunately no COňnection at all between the Executive and Legislative Councils as those elected legislative councillors who were selected for the Executive Council had to give up their seats in the Legislative Council on appointment. This absence of executive responsibility engendered sometimes in the minds of legislative councillors feelings of impotence and at other times feelings of irresponsibility. If the Legislative Council suffered from a lack of executive power, the Governor and Executive Council found themselves often in the unenviable position of not being able to carry out their decisions for want of support, financial and otherwise, from the Legislative Council. This lack of co-ordination between the Legislature and the Executive placed the government in the position of having to choose between policies of compromise, vaccillation, or active opposition resulting in deadlock. This defect was realized in Whitehall and attempts were made to lessen the evil consequences. But it is very doubtful whether, in spite of its obvious weaknesses, the stage of constitutional development where a colony has a representative legislature with no executive responsibility can be avoided. It appears to be an almost inevitable stage in colonial evolution since no other halfway house appears to be possible for colonies that are being trained for parliamentary government but are not yet quite ready for full responsibility.
As a result of their work in committees, legislative councillors became too much interested in small problems of administration and detail and tended, according to some observers, to interfere excessively in administrative matters. There was also

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2. feeling that legislative councillors in the finance committee were hard on heads of departments who appeared before them, and that their criticism of these officers was carping and unfair. It was felt that such criticism, as well as administrative interference, was undermining the public service. It was thought in some quarters that the balance of power had shifted from the Executive Council to the finance committee in consequence of the latter's control over supplies, and that the Governor tended to consult this committee even more than the Executive Council. Some critics further thought that legislative councillors were sacrificing their larger legislative duties.
It was probably in consequence of these defects and of public criticism of them that the Donoughmore Commissioners, of whom more will be said later, concluded that the constitution in existence at the beginning of 1928 had proved to be "an unqualified failure'.
Sir Herbert Stanley, who was Governor of Ceylon during the years 1927 to 1931, answered in some measure these criticisms in his dispatch to the Secretary of State dated 2nd June 1929. He was of opinion that the critics of the constitution had overstressed their case. He felt that the relations between members of the finance committee and heads of department were not as bad as they had been made out to be. He disagreed with the criticism that the Executive Council was being consulted during this period less than it had been before, and illustrated this fact by showing that the number of occasions when important matters were referred to and decided upon by the Executive Council was greater during the years 1923-8 than it had been in the five years immediately preceding. He further mentioned that in recent months a definite effort had been made by the unofficial members to work the constitution in co-operation with the Governor and Executive Council. He finally concluded that “the operation of the present Constitution has proved a qualified success rather than an unqualified failure', but in spite of this 'qualified success', he agreed with the critics that a reform of the constitution was essential.
The agitation for reform of this constitution came primarily
| 1 Cmd. 313І, p. 28. * Cmd. 34 I9, p. 5.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL 23
from two quarters. It was assailed by the executive government headed by Sir Hugh Clifford, the Governor of the colony during the years 1925 to 1927, who found it very difficult to exercise executive responsibility without adequate support from the Legislative Council. In the face of the opposition of the elected majority of the Legislative Council, the only method by which the Governor could enact unpopular measures which he considered of paramount importance to the public interest was by the use of his powers of certification; but the Governor was against the use of these powers with their tendency to result in political crises. His difficulties in working the constitution forced him to suggest to the Secretary of State that he should send a Commission to report on its working and to suggest necessary reforms.
Some have wondered how it was that two. Governors, one immediately following the other, should hold different opinions on the working of the same constitution. This is not so surprising if one remembers that Sir Hugh Clifford had worked in Ceylon much earlier under very different conditions, having been Colonial Secretary during the years 1907-12. During this earlier period, those difficulties of government which had led Sir Hugh as Governor to condemn the constitution wholesale, were nonexistentin view of the dominant official and nominated majority in the Legislative Council and its very limited powers. It is probable that Sir Hugh allowed his knowledge of the working of the earlier constitution to colour his decisions in regard to the operation of the later one. He possibly could not forget that he had the power and was therefore able to pull up and frustrate, during his tenure as Colonial Secretary, many unofficial members whom the government during the later period could not control. Times had changed and there had been a substantial transfer of power by the Imperial Government. The experience and prejudices of an earlier age could not trouble Sir Herbert Stanley as he had never served before in Ceylon. The Ceylon that he knew was a Ceylon with a legislature, having a large majority of elected members, and with considerable powers of criticism. Hence it was that he was able to work better with the Legislative Council than Sir Hugh, and did not regard every

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24 INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL
criticism of the government by the Council as a sign of the breakdown of the constitution.
This constitution had been attacked also by the educated Ceylonese from the time of its inauguration on the ground that it fell far short of their demands. They continued their agitation for greater executive responsibility and the extension of territorial representation through political associations like the Ceylon National Congress. They welcomed the appointment of a Commission and decided to place their case before it.
It was because of this twofold agitation that a Commission, consisting of the Earl of Donoughmore, Sir Matthew Nathan, Sir Geoffrey Butler and Dr. (later Sir) Drummond Shiels, was appointed on 6th August 1927. By talent and training they were specially suited for their task. The Earl of Donoughmore, who was Chairman had considerable parliamentary experience, having been Under-Secretary of State for War and Chairman of Committees of the House of Lords. Sir Matthew Nathan had first-hand knowledge of colonial administration, having held more than one colonial governorship. Sir Geoffrey Butler was a Cambridge don, a Member of Parliament, and an expert on the procedure of the League of Nations, while Dr. (later Sir) Drummond Shiels had been a member of the Edinburgh Town Council and was a Labour Member of Parliament with Fabian views. Their terms of reference were as follows:
To visit Ceylon and report on the working of the existing Constitution and on any difficulties of administration which may have arisen in connection with it; to consider any proposals for the revision of the Constitution that may be put forward, and to report what, if any, amendments of the Order in Council now in force should be made.
The Commissioners arrived in Ceylon on 13th November 1927; they returned to England after making their inquiries on 4th February 1928, and their report was submitted to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in July 1928.
The recommendations of the Donoughmore Commissioners
' Cmd. 313, p. 3.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL 25
were at first discussed in the Legislative Council as a series of separate motions. When some of these motions relating..to the fundamentals of the recommended constitution were rejected by the Legislative Council, the Secretary of State, through the Governor, informed the Council that “the recommendations must be regarded as a whole', and that while he would no doubt accept modifications in detail, he would "not be willing to accept any amendments in principle which would destroy the balance of the scheme'. The recommendations were then discussed as a whole and accepted, the voting being nineteen for the recommendations and seventeen against. The voting in this debate was significant for many reasons. An entirely new constitutional scheme affecting the whole island was adopted by a very small majority. It is surprising that the British Government did not stipulate some requirement as to the strength of the majority, for instance a three-fourths majority, as it did when it made its famous declaration relating to reforms in 1943. As it has often been said that the European population in the country through their members consistently opposed the grant of further responsibility to the people of the land, it should be noted that all the unofficial European members voted in favour of these recommendations. The division, when analysed, may give the appearance of a communal division as there were only two members of the majority community amongst those who voted for rejection: against this, however, it should be remarked that all the Tamil minority members and the Muslim members who spoke and voted against their acceptance stated during the debate that they were doing so because they disapproved strongly of certain fundamental features of the scheme, such as the powers of the Governor, the grant of adult suffrage, and the Executive Committee system, and not for communal reasons.
This debate on the Donoughmore recommendations was important from another point of view. It showed that the method of approach of even those who disapproved of these reforms was the customary method of constitutional agitation. Sir P. Ramanathan, the leader of the unofficial members,
' Cmd. 34 Ig, p. I6. * For actual voting, Deb. Leg. Co., I929, vol. III, p. 823.

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26 INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL
stated, on 5th December 1929 in the course of the debate on these recommendations as follows:
“I say, sir, that if all these circumstances are brought to the attention of the Secretary of State . . . he, I think, will lend his ear to our representations and do what is right to the country. We do not want to adopt the procedure that is being adopted in India. We are very peaceful. . . . But in India that is not the case. In India they are a long-suffering people, and they are now prepared to passively resist the Government of the country in ways which will astonish the British officials.
The Donoughmore recommendations, as amended by certain proposals of the Secretary of State, were soon embodied in legal form and the constitution itself inaugurated in 1931. The principal documents that made up this constitution were, according to custom, prerogative and not statutory instruments, that is, Orders in Council, Letters Patent, and Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the Governor. They were the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931, the Ceylon (State Council Elections) Order in Council, 1931, the Letters Patent constituting the office of the Governor, dated 22nd April 1931, and the Royal Instructions of the same date.
Before leaving this introductory sketch of the chief constitutional events of the period prior to the inauguration of the Donoughmore constitution, it may be of interest to give some account of the most outstanding figure among the unofficial councillors of this period. It is very rarely, if at all, that you find in the history of any parliamentary assembly, above all, in a colonial legislature, a member whose association with such an assembly covers a period of fifty years. Sir P. Ramanathan, a Tamilofgreat ability, of whom something has been said already, had at the time of his death served in the Council for half a century. He came from a family that had provided a number of members to the Council: his uncle, his two brothers and his nephew were at various times members of the Council. He was at first a nominated member of council but as soon as the prin
Deb. Leg. Co., I929, vol. III, p. I 669.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AND HISTORICAL 27
ciple of election was introduced he reappeared there as an clected member, chosen to represent the educated Ceylonese. He was a vigilant critic of government, and, during a period when criticism required some courage, he labelled governmental acts on the floor of the house as acts of misgovernment. Together with a few other unofficials, he was ceaseless in the pursuit of information for the purpose of ventilating grievances.
Although a Tamil, Ramanathan championed the cause of the Sinhalese, particularly in 1915, when there were riots in Ceylon consequent on a clash between the Sinhalese and the Muslims, over the question that Buddhist processions should move silently when they pass before certain mosques in Kandy and Gampola. Although the disturbances were really local in character and covered a very short period, their significance was exaggerated by the government which was sufficiently. alarmed to declare martial law. During this period it was open to the Tamils, particularly their leaders, to foment further trouble between the Sinhalese and the Muslims for the purpose of securing political concessions. It would also have been quite easy for the Tamil leaders to undermine the position of the Sinhalese in the eyes of the British Government, as it at first misjudged the scope of the disturbances, even thinking at one time that these occurrences were part of a systematic attempt made by the Sinhalese to wrest political freedom from the mother country when she was involved in a world war. Far from the Tamils making political capital of the episode, their leaders and particularly Mr. P. Ramanathan, as he then was, sponsored the cause of the Sinhalese with the government; made representations for the release of Sinhalese leaders who had been thrown into prison for alleged complicity with these incidents, and successfully demanded a full investigation of the causes for the outbreak and spread of the riots, and of the manner in which order was re-established in the country by the government. It was in respect of this last matter that Ramanathan performed one of his greatest services to the country. Both in Council and outside he regularly criticized the government measures for controlling the riots and restoring order, for, as was admitted later, many of these were unnecessary and too rigorous, and a number of inno
d

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cent men were unfairly imprisoned or suffered in other ways at the hands of the government.
Ramanathan was a lawyer by profession, and an educationist by choice. As a lawyer, at a time when high office was not generally open to the Ceylonese, he held the important office of Solicitor-General. As an educationist, he was the founder of two schools in the northern Province, one for boys, and the other for girls, and always took a very active interest when educational policy was discussed in the Legislative Council. He was a man of profound culture, equally versed in the philosophies of the East and West, and a speaker of great distinction both in English and in his native Tamil. He was the author of a commentary on St. John. His reputation as a spiritual leader and as an eloquent speaker led to his being invited on a lecture tour of America, and during this tour he won a large number of eager disciples who appeared through him to have seen a glimpse of the holy grail and regarded him, therefore, ever afterwards as their master. In Council he appeared garbed in the attire of an Indian prince, wearing gold-embroidered turban and long silkeoat, and his handsome presence and colourful clothes gave a touch of distinction to the proceedings of the house. As has happened to many before him, in his last years he was considered by the younger public men as a reactionary. Nurtured as he was in the political attitudes of the nineteenth century, he was not affected by the constitutional and economic developments of a later day, and viewed changes like adult suf. frage, and state ownership with deep suspicion. However, his contribution to the country's political advancement was great, and though he did not live to see the new Dominion of Ceylon, he contributed largely towards its making.

CHAPTER II
POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR IN THE DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION
his survey of the Donoughmore constitution will begin with a study of the position and powers of the Governor. But to appreciate the true significance of his place, it is necessary to give here a short description of the framework within which he worked. To advise him in legislation and administration, there was a legislative assembly termed the State Council, with legislative and executive functions, consisting of members elected, on the basis of adult suffrage, for territorial constituencies. Its executive functions were exercised through a number of Executive Committees into which, immediately after a general election, the State Council divided itself. The Chairmen of these Executive Committees, who were selected by the Committees themselves, were the country's ministers, and the minister and the members of his Committee were the persons responsible for the determination of the matters assigned to that Committee. The whole field of government, with a few exceptions such as external affairs, defence, law and finance, was under the control of these ministers and their Committees.
The excepted matters were in the charge of three important officials: the Chief Secretary, the Legal Secretary, and the Financial Secretary, members of the public service who sat also in the Council, and were directly responsible for these matters to the Governor and not to the ministers or the Council. These three officers and the Chairmen of the Executive Committees constituted the Board of Ministers which, apart from the Governor, was the principal executive authority in the country, but this Board, unlike the British cabinet, did not consist of men
A comprehensive account of the Donoughmore constitution appears in the succeeding chapters.
29

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ვo THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR
holding similar political views, nor was it collectively responsible to the Council or the country. The principal political advances, represented by this constitution, were the introduction of universal adult suffrage, the abolition of communal representation, and the transfer of a large field of executive responsibility to the elected representatives of the country.
Although, under this constitution, the Governor did not occupy the dominant place which a governor holds in a typical crown colony constitution, he still had considerable power and influence. Moreover, in strict legal theory right down to the end of 1947 the “Government’ meant the “Governor, and though, when this definition first appeared in an Ordinance in 1901, the country's constitutional position may have approximated to it, the definition was certainly an anachronism during th period of the Donoughmore constitution.
His powers, functions and duties during this period were specified and elaborated in the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931, the Letters Patent constituting the office of the Governor, dated 22nd April 1931, and the Royal Instructions of the same date. In dealing with these matters, it is convenient to consider first his formal and ceremonial duties as well as his less controversial powers and later to examine at length those powers about which there was constant dispute between the Imperial government and the Ceylon legislature.
FORMAL AND NON - CONTROVERSIAL, POWERS
The Governor was the representative of His Majesty the King, but his representative powers were not quite analogous to those of a Viceroy, as they were limited by the terms of his commission and he did not represent the King generally. His salary was C8,OOO a year, the highest salary for this office in any British colony: it was expressly provided for in the constitution
See Section 2 of Interpretation Ordinance, No. 21 of 1901, in Legislative Enactments (Revised Edition), Ig38, vol. I, p. 1 I.
* The Governor's position as representative of the King was clarified in a series of letters exchanged between Sir Graeme Thomson, Governor of . Ceylon (1931-3) and Mr. (later Sir) A. F. Molamure, Speaker of the State Councils in November and December 1932, and the general conclusion was that stated above, 1933 Hansard, vol. II, pp. 5 and 6,

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR 3 I
and did not, therefore, come up for annual discussion with other votes. Under the Letters Patent constituting the pffice of the Governor, he was required to keep and use the public seal, make grants of such land as might lawfully be disposed of by the Crown, and exercise in consultation with the Legal Secretary the prerogative of pardon. Under this constitution he was also, technically speaking, the Commander-in-Chief of the island and its dependencies, although military functions were left entirely in the control of the military authorities. Further, in consultation with the Chief Secretary, he also gontrolled the external affairs of the country in the interests of the British Commonwealth as a whole.
Among his minor duties were a number of social and ceremonial obligations. He was called upon to lay the foundation stones of public buildings, open schools, hold levees on ceremonial occasions like the King's birthday and make important announcements on days of rejoicing and at times of crises. His importance as a social figure progressively lessened during this period, a natural tendency in view of the decrease in his powers consequent upon the granting of this constitution; and in the course of time elected ministers increasingly performed social duties which in earlier days were carried out by the Governor.
THE GOVERNOR AND THE PUBf IC SERVICE
One of the Governor's most essential duties was the control of the public service. Its position was carefully safeguarded under the constitution. Article 86 of 1931 of the Order in Council declared that the 'appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal, and disciplinary control of public officers shall be vested in the Governor, subject to any Instructions given under His Majesty's Sign Manual and Signet or through the Secretary of State'. It also provided that the Governor could, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, delegate to heads of departments his powers over public servants drawing salaries not exceeding a specified sum. Article 87 of the Order in Council provided that “no Bill, motion, resolution or vote affecting any officer in the public service at the date of the commencement of this Order and involving any alteration in his salary,

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allowances or conditions of service . . . should be introduced into the Council without the sanction of the Governor'. This provisión was strengthened by the requirement in the lastmentioned article that any such alteration which would be to the prejudice of such public servants as well as of public servants appointed after that date, whose appointment was subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, should not take effect until it was approved by the Secretary of State. In addition, by Article 88 of the Order in Council, public officers appointed prior to 17th July 1928, the date of the publication of the Donoughmore report, and public officers appointed between that date and 12th December 1929, the date of the acceptance of the Donoughmore recommendations by the Ceylon Legislative Council, were given the option to retire on very favourable terms, the former being able to exercise their option at any time, and the latter within five years. Furthermore, the Governor under paragraph IV (I) (3) of the Royal Instructions was prohibited except under certain special limited circumstances from giving his assent to a Bill whereby the rights and privileges of public servants may be prejudiced'.
This privileged position of the public service, protected as it was by the Governor and the Secretary of State, was a source of constant friction between the Ceylon State Council and the executive government represented by the Governor and the three Officers of State. This irritation in the minds of the councillors developed out of the feeling that an important sphere of legislative and executive activity was being kept away from them and not from any deliberate desire to criticize public servants or give them "a dressing down. The whole question of their special position under the constitution was periodically brought up whenever the vote relating to the passages of European officers and their families and the vote relating to the holiday warrants of public servants were placed before the State Council. The Council consistently rejected these votes and the Governor had to use his special powers of certification to enable these privileges to be enjoyed. Their position under the constitution and their special relation to the Governor were well summed up by Sir Graeme Tyrrell, one of the Officers of

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR 33
State, in his speech on the Appropriation Bill of 1936-7. He pointed out that
“. . . under the Order in Council the control of the Public Services is vested in His Excellency the Governor. It is not vested in the Council and it is not vested in the Executive Committee. . . . The officer responsible to His Excellency the Governor for the administration of the Public Services is the Chief Secretary. . . . The Council and Executive Committees under the Constitution are not primarily and directly responsible for the details of administration"of the Public Services. I do not wish for a moment to imply or to be thought to say that this House has no right to express its opinion on any matter of public importance, on grievous complaints or gross abuses in whatever part of the Public Services they occur. They are, of course, subjects on which it is open to any honourable member to raise questions either by special motion, by question or in any other way. But, sir, the fact remains that the House has not under the Constitution a decisive voice in any of these matters.'
The officials were placed in this special position as a result of representations made to the Donoughmore Commissioners by an influential section of the public service that its members feared that their conditions of service might be capriciously and frequently altered at the instance of the Council, and that such alteration would seriously affect the morale as well as the efficiency of its members. The right of retirement on favourable conditions was provided for the older public servants on the ground that they could not have visualized the changed constitutional set-up when they joined the service, and that they had not contracted to work under elected ministers. This right was chiefly exercised by the European public servant and it is to the credit of the public service as a whole that a substantial section continued to work within the new framework. Those who remained co-operated loyally with the elected ministers and the councillors in the discharge of their duties in the Executive Committees, regarding difficulties as merely the teething
Hansard for 1936, vol. II, p. 1521.

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troubles of an infant constitution. Concrete proof that their loyalty and work were appreciated by the State Council was given when in 1946 the Council agreed to substantial increases in the salaries of various sections of the public service.
EXECUTIVE POWERS AND THE GovERNoR's PoweR of
RATIFICATION
Under the Donoughmore Constitution, the Executive Council disappeared and the function of giving advice to the Governor on policy, executive action and the larger matters of administration devolved on the elected ministers and the Officers of State. In the conduct of the matters specially left in the charge of the Officers of State, which were centred on the public service, defence, external affairs, law and finance, they were directly responsible to the Governor. In regard to all other matters, the Governor's powers were only indirect and supervisory, the direct control of these matters being with the seven ministers and the Executive Committees. Thus the Governor from being the principal authority for the whole field of policy, executive action and administration, became under this constitution directly responsible for a small and limited group of matters. In short, his ten spheres of direct influence were reduced to three and in the words of one of the country's earlier ministers, Ceylon had achieved 'seven-tenths of Swaraj'.
Under the 1931. Order in Council, a detailed procedure was to be followed before the decision of an Executive Committee could be translated into a direction by a minister to a departmental head. This procedure included the approval of the decision by the State Council and ratification by the Governor, ex
This procedure was set out in article 45 (I) which ran as follows: “When the decision of an Executive Committee requires that any direction shall be given to any Government department concerned with subjects or functions in the Committee's charge, every such direction shall be conveyed to the head of such department by the Minister, or in writing by the Clerk to the Committee by direction of the Minister but, save as provided by this article and by article 48, no such direction shall be given until the approval of such decision by the Council and the ratification of the same by the Governor shall have been received by the Minister in accordance with the provisions hereafter contained.'

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR 35
cept under certain limited circumstances. The whole scope of this Article, particularly the part played by the Goyernor's previous ratification in giving validity to a direction to a departmental head, came up in the discussions in the State Council over what came to be popularly called the “Mooloya Inci- , dent'.
The facts of this incident were simple. It arose out of the shooting of an Indian labourer by a policeman, who had gone with some other members of the police force, to an estate to quell certain disturbances there. This incident gave rise to a number of prosecutions in the Kandy Police Court. The State Council appointed a Commission to inquire into the whole affair. As it was thought that these cases should not be decided during the pendency of the Commission's inquiry, the Minister of Home Affairs directed the Inspector-General of Police to give instructions to the police officers conducting these prosecutions that they should not actively oppose any applications for postponement of these cases. The Inspector-General of Police refused to carry out this order, and it was said in defence of his action that this decision had neither been authorized by the Executive Committee of Home Affairs, nor received the previous ratification of the Governor, that is to say, that the procedure prescribed by Article 45 had not been observed. The Governor himself upheld the action of the Inspector-General. This incident resulted in the resignation on 27th February 194o of the entire Board of Ministers.
This was considered by many as the biggest crisis of the constitution. One of the chief reasons for the resignation was the dif. ference of opinion between the ministers and Governor in regard to the application of the article. The Governor's view at first was that if an order (not a mere request) was given to a departmental head, a strict adherence to the letter of Article 45 was necessary, particularly if the order related to the administration of justice or to the execution of statutory duties by public officers. The view of the ministers was, however, that as Article 45 had never been strictly observed in practice, it had become more or less a convention for ministers to give orders to departmental heads without securing either the prior authorization of

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the Executive Committee or the previous ratification of the Governor. In support of their position the ministers urged that action had never been taken under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 45 for the purpose of specifying the decisions for which prior approval and ratification were necessary and those decisions for which such approval and ratification were unnecessary. This divergence was put with great force by Sir D. B. Jayatilake, the leader of the State Council at the time, on 5th March 194o, on the motion condemning the Governor's ruling in upholding the action of the Inspector-General in this matter.
“In actual practice, to a very large extent we have reduced Article 45 to a dead letter of the law. I have issued instructions on behalf of my Ministry thousands of times without any reference to the Council, without getting the prior ratification of the Governor. I believe it is the same case with my fellow ex-Ministers. Are these practices, these conventions that have grown out of sheer necessity and which have helped us to work the Constitution so far for the good of the country, to be rejected to-day? Are we going to be bound by the letter of the law óf Article 45? That is the position which the Governor has taken and that is the position which we will not agree to. This Constitution is not only not workable but is not worth working if that position is upheld.'
This constitutional crisis was settled by the Governor agreeing to the appointment of a select committee for the purpose of advising on the decisions that should or should not require previous approval and ratification by the Council and Governor, and on his agreeing to the continuance of the existing practice until some understanding was reached.
Another important power vested in the Governor was that of taking over a government department, whenever he considered a state of emergency had arisen. This power, however, does not appear to have been exercised during this period.
Among his duties in relation to the State Council were those of addressing the Council on important occasions; dissolving Council and making certain appointments. Thus, the Gover
Hansard, 1940, vol. I, p. 49.

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR 37
nor addressed the State Council at the opening of its sessions shortly after the general election, when he outlined some of the more pressing problems before the country and, to give another instance, on 19th February 1942, after the occupation of Singapore by the Japanese, when he desired to win fuller public co-operation for the British war effort, it was to the Council that he made his declaration. The law in regard to dissolution, was sit out in Articles I 8, 19 and 69 of the I93I Order in Council. Under these the Governor had the power to dissolve the Council at any time by Proclamation and he was compelled to dissolve it “at the expiration of 4 years from the completion of the last preceding general election if it shall not sooner have been dissolved. He was also required to dissolve the Council, if it rejected the whole of any annual appropriation bill, or if, in his opinion, by reason of the decision of the Council upon any financial matter or upon any motion expressly directed to test the confidence of the Council in the Board of Ministers, it was evident that the Board no longer retained the confidence of the Council. It was the Governor who appointed the Officers of State, and the nominated members and transformed by appointment the elected Chairmen of Committees into ministers.
The Governor was entitled to receive the agenda and minutes of the proceedings of the Council and of the Executive Committees, copies of every document other than petitions presented to the Council, and any official document or report which he might require a minister to transmit to him.
LEGISLATEVE POWERS
The Governor's legislative powers constituted an important part of his activities and were the chiefsource offriction between him and the Council.
Ordinances were enacted by the Governor with the advice and consent of the State Council (Article 72), and such Ordinances did not take effect until he gave his assent (Article 74). He had the power also to reserve bills for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure (Article 77). These were the powers which
Articles 72, 74 and 77-8o referred to on this page are articles of the 1931 Order in Council.

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the Governor had under earlier Orders in Council. But in view of the increased powers which had devolved on the new legislative assembly, the State Council, the following additional powers were conferred on the Governor. He was given the power to attach to his assent to a law the condition that it be withheld from operation for a period not exceeding six months (Article 78). In addition to the powers authorized under earlier constitutions he possessed that of referring back to the Council for further consideration any bill, with amendments proposed by him (Article 79), and that of requiring that any bill which in his opinion involved an important question of principle should not be presented to him for his assent until it was passed by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Council, excluding the Officers of State and the Speaker or other presiding member (Article 8o).
The Governor was required under the Royal Instructions not to give his assent, except under very limited circumstances, to certain classes of bills. This veto existed under the earlier constitution by virtue of the Royal Instructions of 1920, but the classes of bills to which it was attached were considerably enlarged. This veto was attached to the following new classes of bills, that is, to bills- -
(I) whereby the rights and privileges of public servants may be prejudiced,
(2) whereby in the opinion of the Governor the financial stability of the island may be endangered,
(3) relating to questions of defence or public security, or any matter affecting naval, military, or air forces or volunteer corps or the control of aerial navigation or aircraft or the transport or means of communication of naval, military or air forces,
(4) relating to or affecting trade outside the island, or docks, harbours, shipping, or any lands, buildings, or other matters of naval, military, or aerial interest or imperial conCern,
(5) whereby persons of any particular community or religion were made liable to any disabilities or restrictions to

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR 39
which persons of other communities or religions were not also subjected or made liable, or were granted advantages not extended to persons of other communities or religions,
(6) the principle of which has evoked serious opposition by any racial, religious, or other minority, and which in the opinion of the Governor is likely to involve oppression or unfairness to any such minority,
(7) relating to or affecting the administration of justice in the island.
It is not difficult to see why certain of these new categories came to be included. Their inclusion is a natural consequence of some of the changes brought about by the Donoughmore Constitution. Mention has already been made of the fact that, in the years immediately prior to the inauguration of this constitution, an influential section of the public service feared that legislative councillors would use their powers of financial control to alter the conditions of employment of the service. Hence, as indicated in an earlier page, oertain representatives of the public service argued for safeguards before the Donoughmore Commissioners. The veto attached to bills relating to the public service was one of the safeguards created as a consequence of this agitation. The veto attached to bills relating to religious and racial minorities resulted from the abolition of communal representation, one of the chief changes introduced by the Donoughmore constitution. Communal representation had been a feature of the Ceylon Legislative Council almost from the time it was first established, and its sudden replacement by wholesale territorial representation made some safeguards necessary to allay minority fears.
The chief legislative power of the Governor under the Donoughmore constitution was the power he had of enacting laws himself in certain limited circumstances. This power was
These new classes of bills along with the classes of bills to which this veto was already attached are specified in paragraph iv. of the Royal Instructions, dated 22nd April 193I. For the classes of bills to which the veto was attached under the Royal Instructions for 1920, see Appendix A,

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popularly termed the power of certification and came into being with the appearance of the unofficial majority. It was included in both the Ceylon (Legislative Council) Orders in Council of 1920 and 1923. An analysis of these two Orders in Council and the 1931. Order in Council from this point of view will show that there has been a progressive enlargement of the Governor's power of certification. The chief difference between the provisions relating to certification in the 1920 Order in Council and the corresponding provisions in the 1923 Order in Council was that while in the former Order in Council the Governor alone had the power to declare that a bill, clause or vote was of paramount importance, in the latter enactment this declaration could be made by him or by an ex officio member of the Council acting by his authority and on his instructions.
1. The power of certification is embodied in article 52 of the 1920 Orderin Council and the relevant provisions run as follows:
52 (1) If the Governor is of the opinion that the passing of any Bill, or any clause of it, or of any amendment to any such Bill, or of any resolution or vote, is of paramount importance to the public interest, he may declare such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution or vote to be of paramount importance.
"(2) In any such case only the votes of the ex officio Members and Nominated Official Members shall be recorded, and any such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution or vote shall be deemed to have been passed by the Council if a majority of the votes of such ex officio Members and Nominated Official Members are recorded in favour of any such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution or vote.
The power of certification in the 1923 Order in Council is embodied in Article LIV, and the relevant provisions run as follows:
LIV (1) If the Governor is of opinion that the passing of any Bill or of any clause of it, or of any amendment to any such Bill, or of any resolution, or vote, is of paramount importance to the public interest, he may declare such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution or vote to be of paramount importance. Such declaration may be made by the Governor or by an ex officio Member of the Council acting by the authority and on the instructions of the Governor either before or after the votes of the Members aré taken.
"(2) In any such case only the votes of the ex officio Members and Nominated Official Members shall be taken into consideration, and any such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution, or vote shall be deemed to have been passed by the Council if a majority of the votes of such ex officio Members and Nominated Official Members are recorded in favour of any such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution or vote.'
For the relevant provisions of Article 22 of the 1931. Order in Council, see Appendix B.

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR 4.
Another distinction was that, while the earlier Order in Council provided that only the votes of the ex officio and nominated official members were to be recorded for this purpose, the 1923 Order in Council, while stipulating that these votes only were to be taken into consideration, did not prohibit the nominated unofficial members and elected members from exercising their vote, a change of no practical, but of some psychological, importance. The differences, however, between these two Orders in Council and the 1931. Order in Council in regard to this matter were far more substantial and significant. Firstly, the circumstances in respect of which this power could be used were considerably increased. While the circumstances in which this power could be exercised in the two earlier Orders in Council which in the opinion of the Governor were defined as those of paramount importance to the public interest, the 1931. Order in Council at the outset provided that in addition to the aforesaid circumstances it could be exercised if the Governor considered that the legislation or vote in question was “essential to give effect to the provisions of this Order. Thus we can see that step by step, as more constitutional rights passed to the representatives of the people, the imperial government felt that it was necessary that there should be a corresponding increase in the restrictive powers held in reserve by the Governor. In 1937, by the Ceylon (State Council) Amendment Order in Council, I937, these powers were still further enlarged to include also the interests of public order, public faith, or other essentials of good government. Another important distinction between the earlier powers of certification and the power of certification in force from 1931 onwards was that, while in the former case the enactment in question was deemed to have been passed by the Council after the voting was recorded, in the latter case at the outset it took effect immediately after the declaration, and from 1937 onwards it could be enacted either forthwith or at any time after one month. The practical effect of this distinction was that while in the former case the controversial provisions took effect after a full discussion in the Council, in the latter they might come into force after a limited and imperfect discussion there. That this change was a setback was soon realized
●

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42 THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR
by the State Council and Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike expressed the general views of the Council in this matter when on 2 Ist June 1932, speaking on Mr. E. W. Perera’s motions for the reform of the constitution he said:
Under the previous Order in Council by which the Legislative Council of I924 was inaugurated the power was exercised after full discussion in the House, and it was exercised in this method. Some official on behalf of the Government was entitled to declare that the matter was of paramountimportance, whereupon the only effect was that the votes only of the official members were counted. The result was a foregone conclusion. But that provision has been done away with under the present Article 22 of the Order in Council, and now at any stage an Officer of State is entitled on behalf of His Excellency the Governor to declare a matter of paramount importance without the necessity of taking a vote at all. That means that the right is exercised before a full discussion takes place; and a full discussion of a measure with a view to airing out for what they are worth the opinions and views of the majority of the House is not permitted. Therefore, I submit that Article 22 as it exists at present is really worse than the corresponding article of the previous Order in Council which permitted at least a full discussion in the House before the votes had been taken.'
Even a casual scrutiny of this account of the powers of certification will show that there were significant differences between the original powers of certification appearing in the 1931 Order in Council, and the later powers introduced by the amending Order in Council of 1937. One important distinction has already been referred to, namely the enlargement of the scope of the circumstances in which the power was to be exer
1 Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was Member for Veyangoda in the first State Council. He was Minister of Local Administration during the period 1936-47, and in the coalition cabinet of to-day he holds the portfolio of Health and Local Government. ۔
Hansard, 1932, vol. II, p. 1507.

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR 43
cised. The other great change was that, while originally the act of certification had to be made while the Council was sitting at one of its meetings, it could from 1937 be effected by a mere message addressed to the Clerk of the State Council and need not be expressly read or declared in the Council as before; in other words certification could be given effect to independently of the Council, if necessary. This change was the result of a series of actions taken by the Council to prevent the exercise of this power by a technical use of its procedure. On three occasions in 1937, it prevented the certification of a vote relating to increases in the salaries of certain police officers, by moving motions of adjournment. If this practice had been continued, every act of certification could have been indefinitely postponed, for as soon as the declaration relating to certification was to be made, a member could move an adjournment motion and have the matter shelved. The State Council naturally attacked vigorously these changes, regarding such legislation as legislation by chit’ independently and over and above the heads of the Council.
Although the powers of certification were strengthened, these powers were not often used. During the period when the Donoughmore constitution was in force, they were used for the enactment of certain provisions of the Income Tax (Amendment) Bill, 1932, and for the passing of the temporary levy on salaries of the Public Servants Enabling Bill, 1932, and of some supplementary estimates relating to passages, holiday warrants and the salaries of certain European officers. In spite of the fact that these powers were seldom exercised, their existence was a sort of constitutional irritant, derogatory to the prestige of a self-conscious legislature which had large powers.
From the standpoint of general colonial constitutional law, this power of certification was a reserve power of a different character" from the Governor's other reserve powers. Its two principal features when viewed thus, were, firstly, that it was not a power of legislating by decree but a method of compelling the enactment of a law that had been previously brought before and considered by the legislature; and secondly that it was a power of enactment, that is a positive power and, therefore,
E.

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44 THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR
quite unlike the negative powers of disallowance and refusal of assent.
In this connection it should be noted that the position of the Governor became altered in 1942 with the appointment of a separate Commander-in-Chief. This appointment, the consequence of the second world war and the great importance of Ceylon in the war operations against Japan, resulted in the Governor's subordination to the newly appointed Commanderin-Chief, Ceylon. This dignitary, however, in practice consulted the Governor and the ministers in the exercise of his civil functions. One other war-time effect was the part played by the Governor in the framing of defence regulations. These regulations were made by the Governor under the British Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts, 1939 and 1940, which were applied to Ceylon by an Imperial Order in Council, but in the making of these regulations the Governor usually consulted the appropriate minister and he, in turn, his Executive Committee. Thus, although there was a great increase in the control of civil affairs for the more effective prosecution of the war, the civil administration was never taken over by the military authorities, who left the conduct of that administration to the civil authorities headed by the Governor and the ministers.
FOUR GOVERNORS
During the period 1931 to 1947, when the Donoughmore constitution was in force, Ceylon had four Governors, Sir Graeme Thomson (I93 I-3), Sir Edward Stubbs (I933-7), Sir Andrew Caldecott (1937-44), and Sir Henry Moore. Unlike the Governors of an earlier period who were recruited from the military, they were from the civil service. They belonged to the same class, the upper middle class, and were educated in one or other of the major public schools and at Oxford or Cambridge. They were inspired by the best traditions of their social group, and carried with them to Ceylon, as well as to the other colonies in which they served, the spirit of culture, the
M. Wight: Development of the Legislative Council, p. 1 o'7. s Direction issued by His Majesty's Government to His Excellency, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton; Ceylon Sessional Paper III of 1942.

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR 45
ideals of service, the faith in the empire and the desire to convey the best of their civilization to distant lands. They, together with some of the other senior European officials who served in Ceylon, were affected also by the weaknesses of their class, for on occasions they displayed a pertinacity of purpose which was sometimes inexpedient, a lack of adaptability in changing conditions, and a tendency to sacrifice the spirit for the letter.
Three of these four Governors had served previously in Ceylon, both Thomson and Stubbs having held the office of Colonial Secretary of Ceylon some years before they came as governors. Thomson’s period of office as Colonial Secretary coverėd the years 1919-22 which were years of depression. Stubbs was Colonial Secretary during the period 1913-19, and his tenure of office included the unfortunate episode of the riots, and the first world war; and accordingly in the public mind he was identified, in some cases unfairly, with many of the less popular acts of government. Sir Henry Moore held various offices in th Ceylon Civil Service during the years I9 IO to 1922.
In the case of both Thomson and Stubbs, it is more than likely that their earlier periods of service in Ceylon under totally different conditions coloured their decisions and affected their conduct as governors. Although a number of years had separated their two periods of service, they would have been less than human if the influences and prejudices of the earlier time did not even subconsciously determine their later actions. In addition to this, Thomson, who had been popular as Colonial Secretary, was a very sick man during his period of governorship in Ceylon, and the trade depression made his task in Ceylon very difficult. Moreover, he had to work an entirely new constitution which had only just then been launched, one totally different from anything to which he had been accustomed either in Ceylon or in any other colony. It is extremely difficult to work a new written constitution until conventions and precedents have grown up. It is therefore not surprising that his period as governor was a very uneasy one, marked by frequent constitutional crises, and culminating in a resolution, moved in the State Council in March 1933, demanding his recall. Being the Governor who was first really faced with the task of working the

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46 THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR
Donoughmore constitution, he had to tackle its inherent problems. The right of certification, as referred to earlier, had been widened and strengthened with the transfer of powers in other directions, and Thomson had naturally to exercise it in certain circumstances. The certification by the Governor of the votes relating to passages of European officials and holiday warrants, which gradually became a feature of the proceedings of the council, was first exercised by him; and although later in consequence of frequent usage it began to be taken as a matter of course, at the time at which he made use of it, he was severely attacked both in and out of Council and accused of subverting the constitution. Another measure which he certified, the temporary levy on salaries of the Public Servants Enabling Bill, 1932, was introduced as a result of the trade depression; in normal times a Governor would not have had to experience the unpopular task of certifying such a measure. He was also faced with the problem of receiving requests from political leaders for further reform of the constitution. It was not surprising that such leaders, when they saw it working, should agitate for the removal of its defects. But it was difficult for a Governor in the early years of the working of a constitution to recommend its reform, especially when he knew that a Commission sent by the mother country had only recently laid down the principles on which the colony was to be governed and would not at such an early stage consider the possibility of any constitutional changes. Stubbs, too, was faced with similar constitutional difficulties. He also had the unpleasant and unpopular task of having to certify the votes relating to passages and holiday warrants, and of receiving requests for the reform of the constitution.
Of these four governors, Sir Andrew Caldecott's tenure of office was the longest. This was due to the outbreak of the second world war. It was during his governorship that there occurred the resignation of the entire Board of Ministers, reckoned by many as the chief constitutional crisis of the period, and it arose as we have seen, out of a too literal interpretation of the provisions of the constitution by the Governor and his official advisers and a neglect of the constitutional usages of the preceding years.
* Ρp. 39-4-3

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR 47
Apart from this constitutional crisis and certain disagreements with the ministers and the members of Council, particularly over the question of the reform of the constitution, Sir Andrew was generally able to work harmoniously with the ်းနှီး leaders. The problems that he had to face were made more complicated and delicate by the outbreak of the second world war and the creation of the new and separate office of Commanderin-Chief. He was able from the time of the creation of this office to be a useful link between the ministers and the other elected representatives of the people on the one hand, and the Commander-in-Chief and the military authorities on the other, and one of his chief services was that he was partly responsible for securing the wholehearted co-operation of the civil administration in the war effort without the serious sacrifice of civil liberties. He contributed towards the replacement of the unwieldly Executive Committee system which was a feature of thë Donoughmore constitution, by a cabinet of the British type, for in his Reforms Despatch of 1938 and in other statements to the Secretary of State he backed strongly the demand of the native ministers for a cabinet form of government. Although at first averse from any serious reduction in the powers of the Governor, his close association with the Board of Ministers during the war and their proven loyalty throughout led him in the course of time to back some of the chief ministerial demands for substantial constitutional reforms, and there is no doubt that his subsequent sympathy with national aspirations contributed much to the country's realization of full responsible government to-day.
Being an author of some distinction, and influenced by new developments in letters, he departed in his official publications from the customary dull style associated with such writing, and his despatches and minutes were written in informal and vigorous language. Among his hobbies were painting and music. He had a genuine feeling for the people and the country, partly caused by the personal memories associated with his stay, the marriage of a daughter, and the death of his first wife.
Unlike some of the other governors, he soon realized that in Ceylon the substantial transfer of power into native hands had made his office very different from that of a governor in the

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other colonies. One of his first public declarations in Ceylon was an expression of his views as to the part a Governor should play in a colony having a semi-responsible government and his words might well be taken as a text by other governors called upon to play a similar role:
“The period of Governorship is a mirror in time wherein the people of the state see reflected their own expression, attitudes and actions, and although he may help in its composition, nevertheless the beauty and symmetry of the scene must depend on the posture and gesture of every single figure in the foreground and background. . . . As Governor under your constitution I shall endeavour to the best of my judgment and ability to promote the good name, sound credit, clear conscience and peace of Ceylon. In the certainty that the Officers and Ministers of State and members of the State Council and ofevery local government body in the island have an identical purpose, I look forward to taking my part in the team shoulder to shoulder in that common progress towards the common goal.
Sir Henry Moore, who succeeded him and was the first to hold the new title of Governor-General, had an easier task than some of the earlier governors. Before his arrival there had been a definite statement of policy, the 1943 declaration of the Imperial Government, which could be used for his guidance in connection with his relations with other authorities. After 1943 there was little possibility of confusion as to the intentions of the Imperial Government in regard to the future constitutional status of the country, and a governor could work with the full realization that that government had agreed to his performing an indirect and secondary role in the constitution. Both as Governor under the Donoughmore constitution during the years 1944-7, and as Governor-General, Sir Henry was popular. His knowledge of the country and of the people, arising out of his earlier stay, has helped him considerably in his duties.
To sum up, the most striking constitutional development in the Governor's position was the great decrease of his executive powers. This diminution naturally gave rise to certain compen

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR 49
satory safeguards, such as the increase in the classes of bills to which the Governor's veto could be applied, and the strengthening of his powers of certification, but these safeguards were intended only to be used very occasionally when some fundamental issue was at stake. This decrease in his powers meant a significant constitutional advance in the direction of self-government.

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CHAPTER III
THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION
he most powerful institution of government under the Donoughmore constitution was the State Council which had legislative as well as executive powers and functions. In considering the constitution it is useful to deal first with all matters relating to the composition of this council including the nature of the franchise and the question of representation, and to examine subsequently the council's powers and duties; this sequence will be followed in the suc
ceeding pages.
THE FRANCHISE
The most significant constitutional advance brought about by the recommendations of the Donoughmore Commissioners was the alteration in the character of the franchise. Under the Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1923, as amended by the Ceylon (Legislative Council) Amendment Order in Council, 1924, it was limited, exercisable by males of not less than 21 years of age, able to read and write English, Sinhalese or Tamil, possessed of residence and property qualifications, and not suffering from any mental disability or criminal antecedents. The property qualification consisted of the possession of an annual income of not less than Rs.6oo, or the ownership of immovable property of the value of not less than Rs. 1,500, or the occupation of premises the annual value of which was not less than Rs.400 in a town and Rs.200 elsewhere. This qualification coupled with the literacy qualification referred to earlier, contributed towards the exclusion of a considerable number of the adult population of the country, owing to the general poverty and illiteracy of the people. This state of affairs was completely changed in 1931, when, without any intermediate stages, universal male and female suffrage were introduced.
XXVI of the 1923 Order in Council. 50

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 5 I
The events leading up to this change were interesting. This great advance was secured without any ardent advocacy by the politically conscious Ceylonese. The Ceylon National Congress which had been in the vanguard of the struggle for constitutional reform, according to the Commissioners 'expressed themselves as desiring no extension of the present franchise'. The leaders of the Tamil community, too, were against any radical and bold extension of the franchise, and many thought with Sir P. Ramanathan, the oldest member of the Legislative Council and the unquestioned leader of the Tamils at the time, that universal suffrage would mean-'the transfer of the political power of such electors to a dangerous mob who may be easily misled by schemers and speculators bent on selfish ends’.” The only political organization that strongly advocated universal suffrage was the Ceylon Labour Union which at that time had neither the standing nor the influence of bodies like the National Congress.
It is interesting to speculate as to what reasons influenced the Commissioners to make this far-reaching recommendation since many colonial administrators and experts are stillagainst recommending any extension of the franchise until the general standard of literacy and education in a country has been raised. This last consideration is an important one as it is closely linked up with the grant of greater powers of self-government. It has been argued that such powers should not be given to a colonial legislature unless that legislature is elected on a popular franchise, for otherwise such powers would be exercised by a narrow oligarchy in its own interests. But if extensions of the franchise are to be dependent on the standard of education in the country, the grant of greater power to colonial legislatures could be indefinitely postponed. The case for the extension of the franchise in Ceylon will thus be useful to other colonial people in their demands for greater responsibility in government.
Cmd. 3131, p. 82. This view of the Congress was later modified.
* Memorandum on the recommendations of the Donoughmore Commissioners appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to report upon the Reform of the existing Constitution of the Government of Ceylon (1924-3o), 1930, by Sir P. Ramanathan, Preface, p. ii.

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There were several reasons which influenced the Commis'sioners. They felt that the extension of the franchise would hasten the passing of very necessary social and industrial legislation and in the fairer and greater distribution throughout the country of amenities like schools, hospitals, dispensaries and roads. They believed that the grant of a larger measure of self. government without a corresponding extension of the franchise would result in the passing of power to a limited class and also that large electorates were less likely to be substantially affected by corruption, manipulation and bargaining than Smaller ones. They argued that adult Suffrage contributed to the political education of the people. Another reason that influenced their decision was their belief that education and literacy were no certain tests of political ability or sagacity, and that often the illiterate tiller of the soil or the untutored estate labourer had more horse sense' and a shrewder judgment of political affairs' and of character than the literate clerk or city dweller. Apart from these general considerations, a number of specific considerations based on Ceylon conditions influenced them. They felt that the property qualifications of the time excluded from the franchise those who most needed assistance from the state, such as the depressed classes and those belonging to the lower castes in the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. The extension of the franchise so as to include such persons would necessarily contribute to their material improvement. The difficulty in assessing the real income of the small agricultural holder, who constituted the bulk of the population, was another determining factor. The inadequacy of the educational machinery of the day, and the possibility that such machinery would not for a long time yet be extended to enable the whole country to have free elementary education, made the continuance of the literacy test difficult. Moreover, the unsatisfactory nature and faulty working of the existing literacy test did not encourage them to repeat this measure.
The recommendations of the Donoughmore Commissioners in regard to suffrage were modified in one respect. It was felt, particularly by the Sinhalese leaders, that if the Commissioners'
' Cmd. 3 I3 I, pp. 83-7.

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 53
proposals relating to residence were applied without qualification the vote would extend to persons who did not have a real and substantial interest in Ceylon, and would result in the swamping of the Sinhalese vote in the 'up-country districts by a floating Indian population. The unqualified recommendation of the Commissioners that residence should be five years, inclusive of a period of six months, within the period of eighteen months, immediately prior to the preparation of the appropriate electoral register, was altered by the Secretary of State, on advice received from Sir Herbert Stanley, the Governor of Ceylon at the time, by the introduction in the case of undomiciled persons of either a joint literacy and property qualification or a qualification derived from what came to be known as a 'certificate of permanent settlement. This alteration was a frequent source of friction between the Ceylonese Board of Ministers and the Indian leaders in Ceylon.
The provisions relating to franchise in the 1931 constitution were embodied in Articles 7-9 of the Ceylon (State Council Elections) Order in Council, I931. Under those provisions any person not disqualified by certain disabilities, like minority, insanity or criminal antecedents, is qualified to have his name entered in a register of voters if he is domiciled in Ceylon or if he is qualified in accordance with Article 8 or Article 9 of this Order, provided that, except in the case of persons possessing Ceylon domicile of origin, domicile shall not be deemed to have been acquired for the purpose of qualifying for registration as a voter by any person who has not resided in Ceylon for a total period of, or exceeding, five years'. Articles 8 and 9 provided for the joint literacy and property qualification and the qualification based on the 'certificate of permanent settlement referred to earlier. The certificate was procurable upon the prospective voter satisfying an authorized officer that he has been continously resident in Ceylon for a period of not less than five years and upon his making a declaration before such officer that he was permanently settled in Ceylon or was residing in the island with intent to settle there. The effect of such a certificate was that a holder would not be entitled to claim any rights or privileges
' Cmd. 34 I9, p. 28, para. 35, and p. 52, para. Io.

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which under the law of Ceylon were not common to all British subjects resident there. The changes embodied in these provisions méant the abolition of the earlier literacy and property qualifications and the grant of the vote to women on the same terms as men. They resulted, therefore, in an immediate extension of the electorate. The electorate increased from 204,997 voters in 1924 to over one and a half million in 1931, the year of the first general elections under the Donoughmore constitution. By 1936, the year of the second general elections, the number of registered voters had risen to about two and a half millions and in 194o the number of registered voters was reckoned to be 2,635,ooo.
This change in the nature of the franchise was also a very great event in the story of the colonial empire, for Ceylon became in consequence the first British crown colony to have universal adult suffrage. Even to-day there are very few colonies having this franchise: Jamaica obtained it in 1944, and Trinidad in I945. Nor was it introduced into India under the Government of India Act, 1935; the elections for the Provincial legislatures were conducted upon a limited property franchise which, though less restrictive than the previous franchise for elections to those legislatures, fell far short of the universal suffrage of the I931. Constitution.
In assessing the importance of these franchise changes the great advance made by the grant of the vote to women on the same terms as men should be remarked. This right, like the new right acquired by the large majority of the male voters, was secured without active agitation on the part of most of those eventually enfranchised. Indeed, the champions of female suffrage in Ceylon, who belonged exclusively to the class of well-todo Ceylon women, when advocating their cause before the Commissioners, made it clear that they were quite willing to accept high literacy and property qualifications if the principle
The Commissioners recommended the higher age qualification of 3o years for women but this was subsequently altered by the Secretary of State on the advice of the Governor, Sir Herbert Stanley: Cmd. 313 I, p. 89 and Cmd. 34 I9, p. 22, para. 35, and p. 52, para. I I.
* These figures taken from Cmd, 6677, p. 54, para. Igo.

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 55
of female suffrage was conceded. Another interesting feature of this change was that it was secured without any intermediate stages. In most countries before female franchise on terms of absolute equality was obtained a period was decreed in which the women's qualifications were more restrictive than those of men. This occurred even in Britain where, when the principle was first acknowledged, women were required to have a higher age qualification than men. While the women in Ceylon acquired this right in 1931, the women of Britain, in spite of their superior education, obtained the vote on equal terms as men only as late as 1928. It should further be observed that although women in Ceylon obtained the vote later than did the women of Jamaica, Trinidad, Burma and certain provinces of British India, the female franchise in Ceylon after 1931 was far wider than it was in any of those countries. Under the Government of India Act, I935, women had generally to possess property or literacy qualifications or be the wives or widows of men with property qualifications. In Jamaica until 1944 and in Trinidad until 1946, women had the right to vote only if they had certain property qualifications: considering the general poverty of the non-European population in those two colonies, this right could not be enjoyed by the large majority of the women of those colonies. In Trinidad, in addition, women had for some time to possess a higher age qualification before they could exercise their right to vote. In Bermuda female suffrage was introduced as late as I944 and even then on a restricted property basis. In sum, Ceylon was the first British crown colony, with a predominantly coloured or non-European population, where women had the vote, without having to satisfy property or literacy qualifications, and on the same terms as men.
One of the results of the introduction of universal suffrage was the change in the method of voting. In place of the practice of putting a cross against the name of the chosen candidate, a method had to be evolved to enable the vast numbers of illiterate voters who were unable to read the names of the candidates to exercise their votes. To meet this difficulty, the coloured ballot box system was devised and employed for the two general
' Cmd. 3r 3, p. 88.

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56 THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION
elections held under the Donoughmore constitution. According to this system a colour was assigned to a candidate on nomination day, and the voter was expected when exercising his vote to insert his ballot paper in the ballot box bearing the colour of the candidate of his choice. From the voters' point of view, this method was very simple and opportunities for error almost negligible. Another advantage of this method was that it resulted in the expeditious counting of votes, as almost the only cause for the rejection of a ballot paper would be the absence of the official mark. But the coloured ballot box system was attacked in many responsible quarters. It was felt that certain colours like white and yellow were capable of being exploited in a predominantly Buddhist electorate as these colours had a religious significance; it was difficult, moreover, to distinguish between some colours. This system also necessitated a large le ber of ballot boxes which returning officers found both difficult and expensive to transport. The device has now been replaced and ballot papers have been printed with symbols.
The probable apathy of the voter has been urged as an argument against the grant of universal Suffrage. But the results of the two general elections to the State Council belie this argument. The number of voters who recorded their votes in the I 93 I elections was 7o8,318, representing 57-96 per cent of the total electorate. The number in the 1936 elections was I, I 46,683 out of an electorate of 2,o96,654, respresenting thus 54-69 per cent of the total electorate. If voting in constituencies and electoral districts is taken as an index of electoral interest, it is interesting to note that in the 1936 elections in the Panadura electoral district 758 percent of the voters on the register voted, this being the area where the greatest number of voters exercised their votes, whereas Bibile, with a percentage of 2777, was the constituency where the smallest number of voters polled. The proper significance of these figures will be appreciated when they are compared with the election figures of other coun
Report of F. C. Gimson on the General Election to the State Council of 1936; Ceylon Sessional Paper, VIII of 1937, p. 13.
* Ibid., pp. I2 and 13.
* Ibid., pp. Io and I II.

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 57
tries. In the British general elections of 1931, and 1935, sevenninths or 7777 per cent of the registered voters of the contested constituencies polled while in the British general election of 1945, 73 per cent of the electorate exercised their votes. In the British general elections of 1945, the constituency which achieved the highest percentage of votes reached 84 per cent of the electorate, while the lowest percentage was 67 per cent.” In India in the first elections for the Provincial Legislatures under the Government of India Act, I935, the number of votes polled was 54 per cent of the total electorate, the franchise in this case being a limited one based among other things on a property qualification. In Jamaica, in the elections for the House of Representatives in 1944, which were the first elections held in that country on the basis of adult suffrage, 58.7 per cent of the total registered electorate polled. In Trinidad the 1946 elections for the Legislative Council, again the first elections with adult suffrage, 52.89 per cent of the total electorate exercised their votes. The fact that the British figures were higher than the Ceylon figures was only to be expected, in view of Britain's long tradition of compulsory elementary education and her well-organized party machinery. The Ceylon figures are particularly significant when they are compared with the Indian figures, as the Indian Provincial elections were fought on a limited franchise, and as the Indian National Congress carried on a vigorous campaign during the elections. The West Indian elections are, however, a much better guide, and it should be noted, that the Ceylon percentage compares favourably with the figures for these two colonies. These elections in Ceylon, Jamaica and Trinidad provide evidence that the socalled illiterate masses are not at election times as indifferent to the larger political issues and the more important political personalities as some make them out to be: they can be awakened
For the Ig3I British elections, see Whitaker for 1935, p. 264; for the 1935 British elections see Whitaker for Ig36, p. 28o.
* The British General Election of 1945 by R. B. McCallum and A. Readman, I947, p. 258.
India: A Re-Statement, by Sir R. Coupland, Ig45, p. 153.
Handbook of famaica, 1946, by W. A. Cover, p. 3I.
Government of Trinidad and Tobago, by C. Reis, 1947, p. 320.

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to their own interests to the extent of exercising their votes in favour of the candidates of their choice. It seems that the grant of adult suffrage need not be postponed on the ground of the possible political apathy of the greaterpart of the new electorate.
REPRESENTATION
Another far-reaching recommendation of the Donoughmore Commissioners, which was embodied in the Ig3I Order in Council was the abolition of communal representation. The revolutionary character of this change will be appreciated only if it is remembered that it marked the reversal of a policy that had evolved from the early days of the British connection, when the nominated native members were selected on racial lines. Racial representation had subsequently been supplemented by territorial and corporate representation, the last form of representation taking the form of representation through the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, an important commercial association, and through the Low Country Products Association, an association of influential native planters. In a despatch, dated IIth January 1923, of the Duke of Devonshire, the Secretary of State for the colonies, to Governor Sir William Manning, the British Government gave the following reason for the need for communal representation in Ceylon:
“I am in accord with the opinion expressed by you that, in view of existing conditions and of the grouping of population in the Colony, representation must for an indefinite period of time be in fact communal, whatever the arrangement of constituencies may be. . . . It appears to me to be clearly established that in Ceylon the organization of society is communal, and that if this fact is not clearly expressed, one of the essential considerations on which my decision must be based might be obscured.'
The 1920 Order in Council provided for the election of two representatives, one by the members of Ceylon Chamber of Commerce and the other by the members of the Low Country Products Association, while the 1923 Order in Council provided for the election of the representative of the Chamber of Commerce.
* Cmd. I8og, p. 34, para. 2.

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 59
Provision was made for communal representation in the 1920 and I923 Orders in Council. From the thirties of the last century to 1931, the minorities were very well represented in the Legislative Council; throughout the last century, indeed, the native minorities had equal representation with the low country Sinhalese. The Ceylon Tamil representation was at first equal to that of the low country Sinhalese and was subsequently in the proportion of 1:2, except for a short period during the operation of the 1920 Order in Council. The Donoughmore Commissioners, however, found that the existence of communal seats instead of resolving communal difficulties merely aggravated them and tended to postpone the development of real unity in the country. In a passage of great distinction, which communal leaders throughout the world would do well to study, they summed up the situation as follows:
“In surveying the position in Ceylon we have come unhesitatingly to the conclusion that communal representation is, as it were, a canker on the body politic, eating deeper and deeper into the vital energies of the people, breeding selfinterest, suspicion, and animosity, poisoning the new growth of political consciousness, and effectively preventing the development of a national or corporate spirit ... there can be no hope of binding together the diverse elements of the population in a realization of their common kinship and an acknowledgement of common obligations to the country of which they are all citizens so long as the system of communal representation, with all its disintegrating influences, remains a distinctive feature of the Constitution.'
They accordingly recommended the abolition of communal representation, and the establishment of a State Council consisting of sixty-five members elected on the basis of territorial representation, certain nominated members up to a maximum of twelve to make the Council “more generally representative of
Articles 5, 17, 18, 19, 20, 26-9, of the 1920 Order in Council, and Articles VII, XIX, XXVIII, XXIX, XXXI, XXXII of the I923 Order in Council.
* Cmd. 3I3 I, p. 39.
F

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6o THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION
national interests, and three Officers of State. This recommendation was accepted by the Secretary of State subject to the modification that the numbers of the elected and nominated members were to be reduced to fifty and eight respectively; and it was embodied in its altered form in Article 7 of the 1931 Order in Council. One concrete effect of this change was to upset the carefully adjusted balance of the communities in the legislature. In the last Legislative Council, the total number of members of the minority communities there exceeded the total number of members of the majority community, and, as referred to earlier, the number of Ceylon Tamil members to Sinhalese was in the ratio of 1:2. With this change, the number of Sinhalese members in the legislature far exceeded the total number of members belonging to all the minority communities and the ratio of Ceylon Tamils to Sinhalese became altered to I:5. If population is taken as the basis of representation, the most significant feature, therefore, of the system of representation in existence prior to 1931 was the over-representation of the minorities, particularly the Europeans, in the legislature.
The importance of the abolition of communal representation cannot be exaggerated, for while in other parts of the Empire, for instance in India under the Government of India Act, I935, the Imperial Government was continuing its policy ofperpetuating communal safeguards, it had accepted for Ceylon the direct opposite of that policy. It is interesting, therefore, to inquire whether the consequences of this bold experiment have been to increase or decrease communal feeling in the country.
The chief minority leaders in the State Council at one time or another during the period (193 I-47) vigorously stated that communal feeling had definitely increased as a result of the changed form of representation, and if these statements were the only source of evidence the conclusion, without doubt, would be that communal relationships deteriorated after 1931. Thus, for
* Cmd. 313I, p. Io I. o Cmd. 34:19, pp. 52-3, para. 12.
This generalization applies quite accurately to the entire period prior to 1931 except for the years 1920-3 which were governed by the 1920 Order in
Council which increased considerably the number of seats available for the Sinhaleşe.

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 6I
instance, Sir A. Mahadeval on 8th November 1935, on the second reading of 'An Ordinance to amend the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931 stated as follows:
'Sir, those who recollect the history of the reform agitation in Ceylon are conversant with one fact, one disturbing and unpleasant fact, when the year 1917 is compared with the present year, that is, that the great harmony that prevailed amongst all the communities of the island at that time, and that led to a more or less united demand for the further reform of the Constitution, is entirely absent to-day.. . . Sir, just to show again in what manner these very proposals were once received in this House, I have to refer to the debate that took place over the Ministers' memorandum. Then you had the unique spectacle which had never before been witnessed in the whole history of the island; after a hundred years of the existence of Legislative Councils, in the first State Councilyou you had a division in which all the members of the minority communities voted together, and the members of one community alone voted on the other side, and neither side was able to attract to its ranks a single member from any other community.'
To give another illustration, Mr. G. A. H. Wille, a nominated member of the State Council, on 12th May 1939, in the course of a debate on the Governor's recommendations on reforms, stated as follows:
“Well, sir, I would appeal to the Hon. leader of the House and others who have been in the public life of the country and ask them whether they knew of communal tension existing at the time the Donoughmore Commissioners came here to the degree in which it exists now. When they came here there
Sir A. Mahadeva is a Ceylon Tamil. He was the member for the Jaffna constituency in the State Council, and entered the Board of Ministers in I942. It is believed that his subsequent views on the minority problem were rather different from those expressed above. He was knighted in 1949 and appointed High Commissioner for Ceylon in India in that year.
* Hansard for 1935, vol. III, pp. 4255, 4257-8.
Mr. G. A. H. Wille was a member of the Burgher community, another minority community in the island.

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was very little embittered competition for seats, very little discussion about communal representation. But these Donoughmore Commissioners after writing their bombastic words thought that they had introduced a sort of millennium; they imagined that the Tamils and the Sinhalese would march to the goal of Swaraj arm in arm! But what really is the position to-day? I ask whether there was ever a time when the representatives of the two communities stood so far apart, at least on the question of communal representation.’
Certain alleged acts of.legislative and administrative discrimination have also been urged to show that communal feeling increased after 1931. The following Ordinances have been given as illustrations of discriminatory legislation: the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance, 1931, the Anuradhapura Preservation Ordinance, I942, the Fisheries Ordinance, No. 24, of Ig4o, and the Omnibus Services licensing Ordinance, No. 47 of 1942. The first-mentioned Ordinance has been criticized as being discriminatory legislation in favour of the Sinhalese Buddhists; the second as being prejudicial to the Tamil and Muslim minorities resident in the historic city of Anuradhapura; and the last two Ordinances as being discriminatory against the European and Indian minorities. An elaborate argument, based on the distribution of social services, medical and educational, on the apportionment of public revenue on material amenities like roads and irrigation works, and on the allocation of public appointments, has been developed by certain minority leaders to show that there has been greater discrimination against the minorities after I93I than before. A comparison of the voting in the Legislature before and after 193I has also been used to show the increase in communal tension. It has been urged that the voting after 193I has been consistently on communal lines; and as illustrations of this fact the voting on 15th November 1933, on the motion for the acceptance of the reform proposals of the ministers, embodied in their memorandum of 21st April 1933,
Hansard for 1939, vol. II, p. 15Io.
* Hansard for 1933, vol. III, p. 2716. In the voting on this motion, all the
majority community members voted on one side, and all the members of the minority communities, except one who declined to vote, voted on the other.

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 6ვ
and the voting on 27th July 1937 on Mr. A. Ratnayaka's motion questioning the Speaker's ruling in the matter of the time when a declaration relating to certification can bé made, have been given. In order to show that this feeling has intensified, minority leaders have pointed to the deliberate formation of the pan-Sinhalese homogeneous Board of Ministers, composed only of persons belonging to the majority Sinhalese community, and they urge that this feeling strongly exists because Sinhalese leaders have still no chance of being selected as representatives of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and Tamil leaders of being chosen for the Southern Province. The results of the 1947 elections to the House of Representatives have until recently been used to prove that the Tamils, the principal minority in the island, are very communally conscious. In these elections seven out of the thirteen Ceylon Tamil candidates elected belonged to the all Ceylon Tamil Congress, a communal political organization that had consistently urged the increase of communal safeguards on the ground of increasing Sinhalese domination. The other six won their seats as independent candidates, while none of the Tamil candidates put forward by the United National Party, a non-communal political organization, got a seat.
A fair judgment on the state of communal feeling during the period in question cannot be reached without weighing certain other considerations. The Soulbury Commissioners, an impartial tribunal, carefully analysed the case against the majority community based on alleged acts of legislative, executive and administrative discrimination; and their conclusion on this aspect of the matter which was as follows, merits quotation:
A careful review of the evidence submitted to us provided no substantial indication of a general policy on the part of the Government of Ceylon of discrimination against minority communities.’
Hansard for 1937, vol. II, pp. 1789-go. In the voting on this motion, all the majority community members except one voted on one side and all the members of the minority communities except one voted on the other.
Cmd. 6677, p. 5o. For the reasons that led the Commissioners to reach the aforesaid conclusion, see, ibid, chapter VIII.

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If illustrations of communal voting can be given from the period in question, so also can illustrations of non-communal voting be given. In fact a careful study of the voting lists of the State Council will show that voting on non-communal lines was far more numerous than communal voting. Thus the voting on such important matters as the censure motion of Mr. B. H. Aluvihare on the Board of Ministers for not taking adequate civil defence precautions during the height of the war crisis in I942, and the even more important amendment to that motion moved by Mr. G. G. Ponnambalam, the free education proposals, the Sri Lanka Bill; the motion to accept the constitution embodied in the White Paper of 31st October 1945, and the new salaries proposals for public servants, were on noncommunal lines. These matters, unlike many others that came up for decision in the State Council, were questions on which minority members could well have exploited the communal issue and voted on racial lines, but they allowed other considerations to determine their voting. Of these matters, the most significant was the debate on the motion of the leader of the House to accept the constitution embodied in the White Paper of 31st October 1945: in fact this debate might well be considered as the most important debate of the State Council during the period of the Donoughmore constitution. If the minority representatives had a substantial sense of grievance and a real fear of majority domination, this would have been the occasion for voting as a homogeneous racial group. The Ceylon Tamil, Muslim and European representatives of the State Council present at the time of the division voted, however, along with the representatives of the majority community for the acceptance of this constitution, the voting being fifty-one against three, the three
Hansard for Ig42, vol. I, p. 318.
Hansard for 1945. These proposals took the form of a large number of separate recommendations and accordingly the divisions on the recommendations appear scattered in the Ig45 debates.
Hansard for Ig45, vol. I, column II g8 for decision on second reading of this Bill which was carried without a division; Hansard for 1945, Vol. I, column 2066, for voting on third reading of Bill.
Hansard for Ig45, vol. II, column 7 Io2.
5 Hansard for Ig46, vol. I, column I568.

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 65
dissentients being two Indian members and one member of the majority community. This division should be contrasted with that which resulted in the acceptance of the recommendations of the Donoughmore Commissioners. On that occasion the great majority of the representatives of the minority communities in the Council voted for the rejection of these recommendations while almost all the Sinhalese representatives voted for their acceptance; and although these representatives of the minority communities stated in all sincerity in the course of that debate that they were voting against the recommendations for nonracial reasons, it was natural that, their action should be ascribed to communal feeling.
With regard to the formation of the homogeneous Board of Ministers, Sir D. B. Jayatilaka, the Vice-President of that Board, explained that it was so constituted to meet the opposition of leaders of the minority communities to any change in the method of selection of ministers. These leaders did not desire any change as they felt that the existing method of selection of ministers by members of the various Executive Committees gave the minorities a good chance of finding representation in the Board of Ministers. The formation of the homogeneous Board of Ministers, he stated, was to demonstrate to the minorities that even under the existing system of selection, there would be no guarantee that the minorities would find such representation. The Board was also so formed, he added, to meet an earlier objection of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that amendments of the constitution were not possible because of a lack of unanimity in the Board of Ministers. These reasons are interesting and important as they show that there may have been very good noncommunal reasons for the constitution of the much-criticized pan-Sinhalese homogeneous Board of Ministers.
Probably the most significant argument that has been urged to prove a substantial reduction in communal consciousness in the political life of the country is the division in the ranks of the Tamil Congress, until quite recently the chief communal organization in the country. Its members fought the 1947 elections on the communal issue and were able, by whipping up
' Cmd, 6677, p. Ig.

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racial feeling, to defeat all the Tamil candidates put up by the non-communal United National Party. In September 1948, some of the Tamil Congress members including its leader at the time of the 1947 general elections, Mr. G. G. Ponnambalam, agreed to co-operate with the Government which consisted mainly of persons belonging to the United National Party, and Mr. Ponnambalam took the portfolio of Industries in that Government.
It should be remembered that the general relationships between the communities particularly in the social sphere were very amicable throughout this period, there being even some inter-marriage between persons of different communities. There are certain common places of pilgrimage in the island like Kataragama and Adam's Peak where Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims worship together, and these common shrines have assisted in fostering respect and cordiality between the communities. The youth of the country does not appear to have been affected at all by communal politics, and university students in Ceylon, as in the British universities, are keenly interested in sport, drama, and art, and, if concerned with politics, prefer socialist or Marxist ideology to the theories of Rosenberg, and a balanced economy to balanced representation.
The relations between the communities, unlike those in India and Palestine, never took, during these years, the form of a militant crusade. They were not characterized by any bloodshed and not marked by any great bitterness. The issue in Ceylon was a purely political issue and was never mixed up with religion and was contested on strictly constitutional lines, the methods being agitation in the press and through political organizations; by means of debates in the State Council; negotiations between leaders; despatch of memoranda to the Secretary of State for the Colonies; and interviews with him as well as with leading members of the House of Commons. It should also be noted that the communal question did not come into being in 1931 with the abolition of communal representation. It had been in existence for many years and was, particularly during the period 1920-3, a source of great friction between the

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 67
majority and minority communities. It came to the fore and became especially vocal whenever the question of the reform of the constitution was being considered, a frequent occurrence throughout the years 1931-47. 4
This analysis will show that the charge that communalism increased as a result of the abolition of communal representation in 193I has not been proved. There is no doubt that during this period the minorities were communally conscious, and at times even communally fervent; but it cannot be said in the face of the above evidence that communalism had substantially increased. In fact the unexpected success of the various leftist groups in the country in the 1947 elections for the new House of Representatives, and the stress laid in the new Parliament by the various party leaders on economic and social issues, seem to indicate that the communal problem has receded to the background as a political issue of importance. It is more than likely that one contributory factor in this change of political emphasis was the abolition of communal representation in 1931, and although the beneficial results of this significant change have taken fairly long to manifest themselves, its importance cannot be exaggerated.
The question has been sometimes asked why the method of solving the communal problem adopted in Ceylon, that is, by abolishing communal representation, was not adopted in other parts of His Majesty's dominions where racial differences exist. Could it not have been tried with success in India, Malaya and Kenya? The answer to that question is difficult and would demand too long an examination of the circumstances in these countries. But the opinion may be offered that the totally different conditions of those lands made it impossible even to consider this method of reconciliation. Both in India and in Malaya, the numbers of the chief minority community were fairly large, the Muslims in India amounting to a little less than a third of the whole population, while in Malaya (with Singapore), the Chinese, according to the 1947 census, totalled 2,6Io,397 out of a population of 5,818,435. Finrther, according to this census, the number of Chinese in Malaya, inclusive of Singapore, slightly exceeded that of the Malays. Economically,

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too, the Muslims in India, the Chinese in Malaya and the Europeans in Kenya are very powerful. This is particularly so in Kenya," where the superior educational attainments of the Europeans and their long tradition of power will prevent any simple solution of the communal problem. Apart from considerations such as these, religious and cultural differences between the Hindus and the Muslims gave the Indian problem a fanaticism which only a desperate remedy like partition could solve.
Ceylon, however, was fortunate that such considerations did not complicate her communal problem. If numbers are considered, the Ceylon Tamils, the chief and most powerful minority community in the island amounted in December 1941, when communal fever was at its height, to 697,032 in a total population of 6,061,336. Their economic resources were inferior to those of the Sinhalese, while the religious, cultural and social distinctions between the Sinhalese and the Tamils were neither deep-seated nor fundamental. Although the Sinhalese were largely Buddhists there were a number of Christians among them, as there were also among the Ceylon and Indian Tamils. Further, Buddhism being an offshoot of Hinduism, there were close connections between the two religions, and none of that deep philosophical antithesis that divided Hinduism and Islam in India.
Although the abolition of communal representation could not have helped in countries like India, Malaya or Kenya, this method may usefully be tried in British possessions where the communal issue is not complicated by a numerous, economically powerful minority fired with a crusading zeal. Thus the writer suggests that this solution might help to bridge the racial divisions of some of the West Indian colonies, such as British Guiana and Trinidad.
CANDIDATES
Under the 1923 Order in Council a person to be eligible for
election as a member of the Legislative Council was obliged, in
addition to the qualifications of a voter, to be 25 years of age or ' Cmd. 6677, p. 14o,

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 69
over, able to speak, read and write English and possess a higher property qualification than a voter. Under the 1931. Order in Council, the qualifications were considerably reduced: the age qualification was altered to 21 years; the property qualification disappeared (although a candidate was obliged to deposit on or before nomination day a deposit of Rs. 1,OOO which was to be returned in case a specified number of votes was cast for him), and the disqualification based on sex was removed, thus enabling Ceylon women for the first time during British rule to become members of the legislature.” A candidate's qualifications under the 1931 constitution differed from those of a voter in that he was subject to a literacy qualification which did not apply to a voter and he could be registered as a voter and resident anywhere in the island (not necessarily in the constituency which he was contesting) while a voter had to be registered and resident in the area in respect of which he would be exercising his vote.
COUNCILL ORS
The membership of the British House of Commons has been analysed on the basis of occupation at various times during recent years, with a view to ascertaining the extent to which certain aspects of the cultural background of a country’s legislators affect the quality of her legislation. An analysis of the House of Commons in 1945 on that basis shows that the largest occupational group in the House consisted of “workers inclusive of clerical workers, while the next most numerous group consisted of lawyers (both barristers and solicitors). Next in order came the business interest and after that the teachers. An analysis of the two State Councils on this basis shows that the lawyers constituted the most numerous class while the landed interest, consisting of planters and estate owners, was the next
1 Article XV of the I 923 Order in Council.
* Articles 8 and 9 of the 1931 Order in Council and Article 26 of the Ceylon State Council (Elections) Order in Council, 1931.
There were in 1945 in the House of Commons 157 workers, 74 barristers, 19 solicitors, 8I business men and 61 teachers. These figures were taken from The British General Election for 1945, by R. M. McCallum and A. Readman,
I947, p. 273.

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7o THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION
most numerous group, with business and commerce Occupying the third place. In 1931 in the first State Council, there were 22 lawyers, 13 persons representing the landed interest, and 7 persons belonging to the business and commercial classes, while in 1936 in the second State Council, the corresponding figures were 24, 14, and 9, respectively. The skilful advocacy of political issues, and the general high standard of debating in Council were obvious direct consequences from the fact that the lawyers constituted the most numerous class in the Council. The predominance of the lawyers and the landed interest in the Ceylon State Council was not an exceptional feature as these classes have played a significant part in many colonial legislatures. In this respect, Ceylon and a number of other colonies were only following English constitutional development, for these were the classes which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries wrested important political rights for the English people. Having secured political equality and equality before the law, their influence began to wane, with the increasing importance of economic issues and the struggle for economic equality, and today, therefore, as is shown by the figures given above, their
* It is possible that if these figures were worked out by another, his numbers might be slightly different, but the general conclusion that the most numerous occupational groups in the two Councils were the legal, the landed interest, and the business and commercial, in the order specified, would remain valid. Differences of opinion as to the correct figures are due to the fact that certain councillors fall readily into more than one group. Thus most of the lawyers have large interests in land and obtain a considerable portion of their income from agriculture and, therefore, some of those whom I have classified as lawyers might as well have been described as belonging to the landed interest. This is true in regard to other occupational groups as well, for instance, no serious student will place Sir H. L. de Mel, one of the members of the first State Council, as a lawyer, although he was qualified as one, as his chief occupation for a great part of his life was business. Similarly, no one would classify Mr. D. S. Senanayake, the leader of the second State Council and the first Premier of Ceylon, as a miner', although in moving the acceptance of the constitution embodied in the White Paper of 31st October 1945, he proudly announced to the House that he was a miner like Mr. Hall, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies (Hansard for 1945, vol.II, p.6918). The test applied by me for the purpose was the popular one, namely, classification on the basis of popular estimation. If a person was popularly regarded as falling into a particular occupation, for instance, business, I have classified him thus.

THE STATE COUNCIL: COMPOSITION 7.
earlier dominating place in British political life has been taken by the workers. It is possible that the colonies and Ceylon, will also go through a similar phase of constitutional development. In the constitutional struggle with the mother country, in the conflict to achieve political equality and self-government, the legal and landed classes are bound to play a great part; but once the goal of Dominion Status is achieved, their dominating place in politics may be taken by the representatives of the workers, for the central problem of politics then will be economic welfare and not constitutional rights. s KR No study of the membership of the Ceylon Legislature woul be complete without remarking that, following the grant to women of the franchise and of eligibility for election on the same basis as men, there were two women members in the first State Council during a portion ofits duration and one female member in the second State Council.
One interesting feature of the Ceylon State Council borrowed from British practice was the payment of members. As the basis for the payment was that it should merely cover the out-ofpocket expenses of the members, it is called an allowance and not a salary. Public men, it is said, should not try to benefit out of public funds for their work in the country's cause, but it is added that they should also not unduly suffer in its interest. Further, the absence of some sort of remuneration might keep out deserving men with no private means. The allowance amounted to Rs.500 (C37 approximately) per month; this cannot, when the cost of living in the country is considered, be regarded as anything more than covering the barest expenses of the councillors. In fact the calls on the private income of councillors are heavy and to many of them the political life is a serious financial loss. In some of the other colonies, however, it does not appear to be very onerous or expensive, and Mr. Wight has recently described the life of an unofficial legislative councillor in the Gold Coast as a holiday with handsome pay. Members are also given the added privilege of travelling free on the railway, a government undertaking, to and from their constituencies. Ministers of State were paid a salary of Rs.1,5oo M. Wight: The Gold Coast Legislative Council, p. 59.

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(CI 15 approximately) a month, and their monthly remuneration is designated as such since their duties are full-time and onerous. It should be noted that one of the Governors of Ceylon in a despatch to the Secretary of State in 1938 stated that “the allowances of no fewer than fourteen out of the fifty elected members were under seizure by Court ... that such a state of affairs detracts from the prestige of the Council and from public confidence in its personnel, and recommended that provision should be made that no membershall occupy his seat while his allowance is under seizure, and that if it be under seizure at any day posterior by three months or more to its first seizure the seat shall be held vacated and a successor elected. Effect, however, has still not been given to this recommendation.
A charge was made against the State Council that some of its members were çorrupt and guilty of taking bribes. It is to the credit of the State Council that it met this charge by demanding the appointment of an impartial tribunal to go into this matter and the Commissioner who was appointed for the purposestated in his report that the total number of councillors in respect of whom suggestions of taking bribes were made was nineteen, and that of these he was able to identify that only eight received gratifications that they should not have taken, and three of these eight were European members whose guilt was purely technical. The Commissioner concluded that the charge that was made had been exaggerated."
To conclude, it can be said that the State Council was a fair microcosm of the country, representative of most of the interests in the land except the workers, both agricultural and industrial. These, moreover, had their champions in the Council, recruited from the intelligentsia, but these classes were not directly represented by their own men as in the British House of Commons. The councillors in general were men with a substantial stake in the country, most of them having fairly considerable interests in land, and a little more than one-half of them belonged to one of the professions'.
Governor's despatch of 13th June 1938 and despatch of Secretary of State dated Ioth November 1938 regarding the Ceylon Constitution: Ceylon Sessional Paper, XXVIII of 19:38, p. 5.
* Report of the Bribery Commission; Ceylon Sessional Paper, XII of 1943, p. 6.

CHAPTER IV
THE STATE COUNCIL; POWERS, DUTIES AND PROCEDURE
he State Council was a subordinate legislature created by Order in Council, a prerogative instrument, and its constitution was accordingly alterable in the samie way by an Order in Council. In the matter of its duration, to which some reference was made earlier, it was provided that it had to be dissolved upon or after the expiration of four years from the completion of the last preceding general election unless dissolved earlier for reasons "špecified in the 193I Order in Council. That Order in Council clarified the position further by providing also that the 'date upon which the Council may be dissolved. . . shall not be earlier than the expiration of four years, nor later than the expiration of five years from the completion of the last preceding general election.
EXECUTIVE POWERS AND DUTIES
One of the great problems of governmentin Ceylon has been the attempt to effect proper and adequate supervision of administration by the legislature, as many of the more important decisions are administrative or quasi-administrative. In Britain this supervision has not been very effective and the customary methods in the British House of Commons of inquiring into an administrative matter or of ventilating an administrative grievance are by addressing questions to the appropriate minister during “question time', or by drawing attention to the subject on a motion for adjournmentor during the proceedingsinthe Committee of Supply. But these methods are inadequate as the time available is insufficient and as the larger part of this very limited time is taken up by discussions on matters of policy. Hence much thought is being given to this problem in Britain and suggestions for secur
See above, p. 37. 73

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74 POWERS, DUTIES AND PROCEDURE
ing more effective legislative control over administration through a reorganization of the standing and select committee systems of the House of Commons have been made.
The Donoughmore Commissioners realized this difficulty of present-day government and in their recommendations included a proposal for solving it. They proposed the idea of a legislature meeting in executive as well as in legislative session and also their much-criticized scheme of executive committees of which more will be said later. These recommendations were enacted and the Ceylon Legislature, the State Council, met in executive as well as in legislative session. In executive session, the Council considered matters of administration and for this purpose a definite procedure was observed. Administrative matters were hammered out in the appropriate Committee, and the recommendations of the Committee were embodied in a report, which was presented to the Council for discussion by the appropriate minister. In the Council these reports were discussed and it could approve or reject them or refer them with comments for the further re-consideration of the Committee. The recomendations embodied in these reports could not take effect until they were approved by the Council and ratified by the Governor.
There has been some doubt whether the Ceylon State Council ever met in executive session but a study of the Ceylon Hansards will show that they frequently did so, particularly in the early years of the State Council, and carefully followed the procedure specified above. Thus, for instance, on IIth August 1931, the Council in executive session approved the report of the Executive Committee of Education in regard to the appointment of a Committee for the coining of appropriate Sinhalese equivalents of new terms coming into existence in consequence of the in
Special Report from the Select Committee on Procedure on Public Business, 1931, pp. 153-5, and Third Report from the Select Committee on Procedure on Public Business, I946, p. 355 paras. 53-9.
* Cmd. 313 I, p. 47, and pp. 53-4.
The writer, who had a number of informal conversations with some members of the State Council (including certain members of the Board of Ministers) on this matter, was informed by them that the State Council did frequently meet in executive session and that the procedure envisaged was followed.

POWERS, DUTIES AND PROCEDURE 75
auguration of the new constitution. The entire Council in executive session also considered the reports of the Executive Committee of Labour, Industry and Commerce on the question of the discontinuance of the reports of the Director of Statistics relating to agricultural statistics, the appointment of an Industrial Research and Development Committee and of a Social Services Commission, and the report of the Executive Committee of Communications and Works on railway reorganization. The Council in executive session, rejected the report relating to agricultural statistics, accepted the proposals relating to the appointment of ar. Industrial Research and Development Committee and a Social Services Commission, and approved all the recommendations embodied in the report of the Executive Committee of Communications and Works re| lating to railway organization, except one which was re-submitted for the further consideration of that Committee. The working of this system was fairly satisfactory in the Ceylon State Council, which was a relatively small body without the extensive and varied functions of a self-governing legislature. It is extremely doubtful whether it would be of any use in a country with a legislature consisting of 500 to IOOo members, which has periodically to deal with important and urgent problems of foreign policy, defence and economic welfare. In Ceylon it provided a novel and convenient way of securing a fairly effective control of administrative matters by the Council and it might with success beincluded in colonial legislatures of small size and limited functions.
LEGISLATIVE POWERS AND DUTIES
The State Council performed its legislative functions in legislative session. It had very extensive powers “to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the island’ (Article
Hansard for 1931, vol. I, pp. I I I-16.
Ibid., pp. 267-72.
Hansard for 1933, vol. III, pp. 2233-4o.
Hansard for 1944, vol. I, pp. 51-64 and 225-36.
Hansard for 1938, vol. I, pp. 147-54, 177-97, 199-206, 330-1, 52 I-55, 6O4-I4 866-8o, 883-904.
G

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72). Some of the principal limitations on its legislative competence have already been discussed. These were the Governor's powers of reservation, Ofrefusal of assent to certain classes of bills, of certification, of postponing the operation of bills and of their reference backfor further consideration by the Council. In addition to these limitations, there was the King's power of disallowance exercised through the Secretary of State (Article 75); the inability of the State Council to pass extra-territorial legislation; its inability to amend the constitution as set out in the 193I Order in Council or any other law of the United Kingdom, existing or future, in so far as it was also the law of Ceylon; and the application of the Colonial Laws Validity Act to its legislation. Further there was also the reserve power of legislation by the King in Council (Article 72), which, together with the Governor's powers of certification, enabled the Imperial Government to enact legislation which had been rejected by the State Council. Furthermore, it had restricted powers of legislationin regard to the public service, a fact which has already been touched upon. These limitations were substantially theoretical as the reserve powers were very seldom used and the other limitations were of little practical value. However, their presence was irksome and irritating and resulted, whenever they were used, in constitutional crises. Something has already been said of the power of certification. Its significance from the point of view of the position and powers of the State Council cannot be exaggerated. As its exercise was in the discretion of the Governor and could not be contested, the Council felt that it was a very great limitation on its powers. This aspect of the question was realized by the Councillors early, and their attitude in regard to it was well summed up by Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, on 21st June 1932, in the course of a debate in Council on certain motions relating to the reform of the constitution:
"How, sir, the leave passage allowance can be considered to be a matter of paramount importance under any conceivable definition I really fail to see. The existence of any power
The Articles referred to in this page of the chapter are Articles of the 1931. 9rder in Council.

POWERS, DUTIES AND PROCEDURE 77
that can be so extended or that is so elastic as to be capable of being stretched to cover any possible case when the Governor wants to put through any enactment or provision to which the Council objects, I say, reduces the power of this Council to an absolute nullity.’
The King's power of legislating by Order in Council whenever it "may appear necessary for the peace, order and good government of the island' was, like the power of certification, both a discretionary power and a positive power of enactment, and as such, although it was used only once during the period 1931-47 in open defiance of the wishes of the State Council, was intensely disliked. This power was used for the enactment of the Ceylon Importation of Textiles (Quotas) Order in Council, 1934, and shortly afterwards the whole scope of this power and its legality were canvassed by the Council.
The degree of responsibility and power in a colonial legislature can be tested by examining its control over finance. A great part of the time of the Ceylon State Council was taken up by discussions about finance, that is, over the annual Appropriation Bill and supplementary estimates. The Ceylon Legislative Council had very considerable powers of criticism and control over finance, particularly in the finance committee; but it had neither the power of helping in the preparation of the estimates nor of initiating financial measures in Council.
Under the I931 Constitution, these deficiencies were made good. The members of the State Council, as members of the various Executive Committees, were responsible, with the assistance of the appropriate departmental heads, for the initial preparation of the annual and supplementary estimates. These estimates were then considered collectively by the Board of Hansard for Ig32, vol. II, p. 15Io. v For the debate on the State Council's motion of protest, against the
enactment of this Order, which was unanimously passed on 8th August
1934, see Hansard for 1934, vol. II, pp. 1393-8, I 402-30, 1433-74.
See above, pp. 19-22. 4 Clause I of the Statement of Administration Procedure prescribed for
the transaction of business with which Executive Committees are concerned,
set out in a Notification and published in the Ceylon Government Gazette No.
7,858 of 5th June 1931.

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Ministers (Article 56) and, after they had been approved by the Board, were introduced in the Council in the case of the budget by the leader of the house, and in the case of supplementary estimates by the appropriate minister or Officer of State. These estimates were then scrutinized by the Council and approved, rejected or reduced. Thus it would be seen that the Council had considerable control over finance and this was certainly a very great advance from the position as it had been in 1923, as the Council had secured control over both the preparation and the introduction of financial measures. Thus, after the Ig3I Order in Council, Ceylon had for the first time what may be called a national budget prepared by its own representatives and introduced by a native elected minister.
The financial control of the State Council was, however, limited in certain respects. There were limitations arising out of the privileged position of the public service and the Governor's powers of certification, matters to which some reference has already been made. Financial measures affecting certain classes of public servants could not be introduced in Council without the sanction of the Governor, nor could any such measure, if it affected these persons prejudicially, come into operation until it had been approved by the Secretary of State (Article 87). The Governor could also certify certain votes that had been rejected by the Council. This power was used occasionally to provide certain public servants with salaries, allowances and privileges like passages and holiday warrants which the Council had refused to approve, and its use was justified on the ground that these provisions were necessary to give effect to the provisions of the 1931. Order in Council. A further limitation was imposed by the requirement that, if the payment of public money was authorized by the 193I Order in Council or by any other law in force in the island, other than the Annual Appropriation Ordinance, it was lawful for the Financial Secretary with the permission of the Governor to make such payment, and to accept a charge upon his accounts for it (Article 61).
In considering the question of the financial control of the Council, it should be noted that the budget was the only matter in regard to which under the Donoughmore constitution there

POWERS, DUTIES AND PROCEDURE 79
was collective responsibility, and accordingly the Order in Council provided that, if the budget was rejected, the Gpvernor was obliged to dissolve the Council (Article 69). This contingency, however, never occurred.
PROCEDURE
The procedure of the State Council was governed by Standing Orders which were based on the Standing Orders, practices and usages of the British House of Commons. While a considerable part of the procedure of the House of Commons consists of unwritten practices and usages which are the legacy of the past, nearly the whole of the procedure of the State Council was governed by express Standing Orders. Thus, whereas in Britain the procedure in the House of Commons that every member should address his observations to the Speaker, the practice of 'catching the Speaker's eye', and the convention that no member should refer to any other member by name are not embodied in any Standing Order, in Ceylon they are enacted in this way. The Ceylon Standing Orders 53 and 63 relating to questions and amendments do not find their written counterparts inBritain.
At first, unless the Council otherwise decided, it met at 2.30 p.m. from Tuesdays to Fridays on alternate ended its sitting not later than 7.30 p.m. In 1942 by Emergency Standing Orders the time for opening of the Council's business was altered to 2 p.m. on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays and to Io a.m. on Fridays. It was also then provided that the Speaker was to adjourn the Council without question put at 6 p.m. on the first three days and at 5 p.m. on Fridays.
The order in which business was to be transacted was specified in Standing Order 35, and underit formal matters and matters of little importance like the taking of oaths by new members, the readirig of messages from the Governor, the tabling of
* Paragraphs (II), (IV), and (VII) of Standing Order I I 6 of the State Council.
Standing Orders 23-5 of the State Council.
Emergency Standing Order 2 passed by the State Council on 24th March I942.

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8o POWERS, DUTIES AND PROCEDURE
papers, the giving of notices of motions and the asking of questions, were taken up before the principal business of the day.
The principal business of the State Council may be listed as follows:
(1) The consideration of the Annual Appropriation Bill and Supplementary Estimates.
(2) Motions by ministers for allocation of loan funds. (3) Government bills. (4) March Resolutions and other motions by ministers on behalf of Executive Committees. V−
(5) Motions to approve regulations.”
In the transaction of business, until 1942, the Board of Ministers had no priority; this was in contrast with the British House of Commons where, from the beginning of the century, government business had precedence over all other business. The only ground on which the Board could force a discussion of important government business was urgency. This feature of State Council procedure was probably a consequence of the Executive Committee system, of which more will be said later, under which every councillor was a part of the government and acted directly in administration and legislation. With the outbreak of the second world war and the need for speedy action, the Standing Orders were altered to give government business precedence over other business, and by Emergency Standing Order 6 it was provided that government business should have precedence on every day except Wednesday and even on that day if the Council so decided.
In contrast with the House of Commons, the majority of
March resolutions were resolutions moved for the purpose of providing payment for non-Ceylonese Officers, who were temporarily employed by the Ceylon Government, because there were no suitable Ceylonese officers available, pending the training of such officers. These resolutions took their name from the fact that the principle involved in them was first publicly recognized on 1st March 1933, when a series of resolutions relating to the Ceylonization of the public service and the terms and conditions on which non-Ceylonese were hereafter to be appointed were adopted by the Council.
* “Emergency procedure of the State Council by Dr. (now Sir) Ivor Jennings in University of Ceylon Review of April 1943, p. 15.
Standing Order 38 of the State Council.

POWERS, DUTIES AND PROCEDURE 8.
members of the State Council were present at debates. The quorum, except for reading a Governor's message under Article 22, and for adjournments, was 20. The language of business in the Council was English and although attempts were made at different stages to allow the use of the vernaculars for debates, the motions for this purpose did not take effect, as the twothirds majority stipulated by the 193I Order in Council for a motion of this nature was not secured. Most of the members wore European clothes. There were no real parties in the British sense in the Council and the government and the opposition were not seated, as in the House of Commons, facing each other with a middle gangway between; the seating in Council was arranged in semicircular fashion, the ministers and Officers of State taking the centre of the chamber.
One interesting feature of State Council procedure derived from English practice was the method of putting"certain amendments to the House. If a number of amendments were moved and one or more of them took the form of omitting certain words and inserting for them others, the question that was put was that the words to be left out do stand part, and if it was accepted, the other amendments became automatically rejected. Although this method of putting the question might confuse some members, it had the advantage, in case the answer to the question was in the affirmative, of determining also the fate of the other amendments proposed."
Finally, it may be recorded that, generally speaking, the members of the State Council observed carefully the rules of debate and decorum, and did not attempt to obstruct the proceedings of the Council. There were never ugly scenes in the house and although members vigorously criticized each other in their speeches, their criticism did not descend to personal or vulgar abuse. Outside the Council the relations between the members, including those in political opposition, were very cordial. The long duration of the second State Council, which sat
Article 25 of the 1931. Order in Council and Standing Order 26. * Standing Order Ios of the State Council. * G. Campion: An Introduction to the Procedure of the House of Commons, 1947.
p. 50.

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for eleven years, its term being periodically extended by reason of war emergencies, assisted in fostering these friendly relationships, and by the time of its dissolution councillors had begun to regard each other as members of a club. The Council was housed in beautiful stone buildings facing the sea, equipped with restaurant and library, and situated by the side of the Secretariat where the ministers and principal government departments were housed.

CHAPTER V
MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES
THE MINISTERS
he method of selection of ministers under the 1931 Order in Council was different from that followed in Britain. They were chosen as follows: at the first meeting after a general election, the Council selected by secret ballot from among its members seven Executive Committees, each consisting of as nearly as possible an equal number of members, and each of these Committees in turn chose, also by secret ballot, one of its members to be its Chairman. In order to become a minister this Chairman had further to be appointed by the Governor who was not obliged as a matter of course to appoint the choice of the Committee. No Governor, however, at any time refused to appoint the choice of the Executive Committee as minister. A member of the Executive Committee was disqualified for appointment as a minister if he happened to be a director of a company having any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in a government contract and a minister, as soon as he became a director of such a company, was obliged to vacate his office as a minister. Each minister had a secretary who was appointed by the Governor in consultation with the minister, and this secretary was also the clerk to the Committee of which the minister was Chairman. The minister was expected to exercise all the powers and discharge all the functions of his Executive Committee during the period between the dissolution of the State Council and the next election of Executive Committees and ministers, and his appointment could be terminated by the Governor upon an address presented to him by the Council.
Thus, under the Donoughmore constitution, Ceylon had seven elected ministers; but these ministers, because of their
83

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method of selection, did not constitute a homogeneous group having the same or similar political opinions like the customary British cabinet. Their function was not to carry out some part of a consistent, co-ordinated cabinet policy but to act as rapporteurs of the decisions of the Executive Committees. Accordingly, in the two State Councils ministers were often found speaking and voting on opposite sides. For instance, on the motion of Sir D. B. Jayatilaka that the report of the Executive Committee of Home Affairs on internal security be accepted, the mover, who was the leader of the house, spoke and voted for the motion, while the other ministers present on that occasion voted against the motion. Similarly, on the motion of Mr. (later Sir) A. Mahadeva, Minister of Home Affairs, for the establishment of a state-owned distillery, two ministers voted on one side, and two on the other, while one declined to vote. To give one further illustration, ministers vigorously spoke and voted on opposite sides during the debates in 1944 and I945 on the recommendations relating to the reform of the educational system of the island. -
The relationship which exists between the British cabinet and the House of Commons necessitates the resignation of the ministers when important measures introduced and supported by them are rejected by the House: this did not apply to Ceylon. It has already been pointed out that this practice applied only to the rejection of the budget' and there was nothing in the constitution to compel resignation or dissolution of the Council when measures supported by all the ministers present at the voting were rejected by the Council. Thus, measures that had received the support of all the ministers were often rejected by the Council which continued sitting after such rejection. In illustration of this feature, the following instances, a few among many, may be noted. On 27th January 1932 the second reading of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill was moved by Sir D. B. Jayatilaka, the leader of the House, and received
Hansard for Ig4o, vol. I, pp. 286-324, 33 I-52, 362-79. Hansard for 1944, vol. II, pp. 2579-89, 2909-39.
Hansards for Ig44 and 1945.
See above, p. 79.

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES 85
the support of all the ministers: it was rejected by the Council but this resulted neither in the resignation of the ministers O in the dissolution of the Council. Similarly, the rejection on 9th March 1932 of a motion by Sir D. B. Jayatilaka relating to the personnel of a Salaries Commission, and in December 1933 of the Mosquitoes Bill, which had similar ministerial support, did not result in the resignation of the ministers. Again, in 1940, the second reading of the bill relating to the registration and licensing of industries was rejected on 20th February but was not followed by the resignation of the Board of Ministers, although all the ministers present at the voting were in support of the bill. Although this feature will appear to those who are accustomed to the practices of British cabinet government to be strange and something to be strongly condemned, it was not unconstitutional and was, indeed, the natural corollary of the peculiar executive system that was introduced into Ceylon by the I931. Order in Council.
The two most sensational constitutional crises during the period of the Donoughmore constitution, the celebrated 'Bracegirdle affair and the “Mooloya incident, turned largely, on the position of ministers and their relations with heads of departments. Reference has already been made to the constitutional and political implications of the Mooloya incident. The 'Bracegirdle affair arose out of an order issued by the Governor for the deportation of a young Australian who was alleged to have fomented labour unrest among estate workers. This Order ofdeportation was issued under the authority ofan old Orderin Council of 1896 and on the advice of the Chief Secretary. The constitutional implications of this affair were threefold. Firstly, from the point of view of the State Council, it seemed to suggest that an Officer of State was trying to encroach on one of the functions of an elected minister, the Minister of Home Affairs. Secondly, it involved the question of the extent to which an out-of-date Order in Council could be validly used for execuHansard for Ig32, vol. I, p. 283. * Hansard for 1932, vol. II, p. 826.
Hansard for Ig33, vol. III, p. 312o.
Hansard for 1940, vol. I, p. 408. See above, pp. 35, 36.

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tive and administrative action by the Governor without the advice of the ministers or in the face of popular opposition. Thirdly, it involved the relations between ministers and heads of departments. The second of these implications is not important. In regard to the first, the matter at issue was whether 'deportation was an 'external affair, coming within the particular purview of the Chief Secretary, or whether it was a function of the Minister of Home Affairs who would in that case be the appropriate constitutional adviser of the Governor upon the issue of a deportation order. Action was taken on the ground that "deportation was "an external affair and advice in regard to the issue of this order was accordingly given by the Chief Secretary, action which was later strongly attacked in the State Council. In regard to the third point, there was a constitutional issue as to what action could be taken by a minister against a departmental head in whom he had lost confidence. It would be difficult for a minister to work with such an officer; but in view of the special position of public officers under the constitution, they could neither be dismissed, nor could disciplinary action against them be taken, by the minister alone, for these matters were vested in the Governor by Article 86 of the 1931. Order in Council.
The "ministers have in the preceding paragraphs been considered as a collection of individuals. But for certain purposes and in certain respects they met as a group; and an attempt was made, probably with an eye to the future, to encourage, within the limitations of the constitution, a group consciousness. Finance was a matter in respect of which the ministers had to meet as a group, for it was provided by Articles 56 and 57 of the I931. Order in Council that the annual estimates for revenue and expenditure for the island were to be prepared by the Board of Ministers in consultation with the Financial Secretary, and that no money vote was to be introduced in the council without the prior approval of the Board. As most acts of government could not be implemented without money the ministers were compelled periodically to meet together.
The ministers acting as a group together with the three Officers of State constituted the Board of Ministers (Article 5o

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES 87
(1)). The Chairman of the Board was the Chief Secretary and its Vice-Chairman was elected by the Board from among the ministers (Article 5o (3)). The Vice-Chairman was the representative of the Board in Council and was styled the leader of the State Council (Article 51). Meetings of the Board were summoned by the Chief Secretary who was obliged to summon a meeting whenever the Vice-Chairman so requested him (Article 53 (1)). The quorum for a meeting of the Board was three, exclusive of the Officers of State (Article 53 (2)). The Board also had the power to require heads of departments to attend its meetings and to give any assistance to the Board that it might require (Article 54). Although these Officers of State could freely participate in the discussions in the Board they were not entitled to vote on a question submitted to it (Article 50 (2)). {ኮ
The Board was enlarged during the continuance of the second world war by the addition to its membership of the Commander-in-Chief, the Service Chiefs and the Civil Defence Commissioner; and this enlarged body, known as the War Council, controlled the entire sphere of civil executive action throughout the war period.
THE OFFICERS OF STATE
The three Officers of State were the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Legal Secretary. Of these three the Chief Secretary was the most important, being the Chairman of the Board of Ministers while, under certain circumstances, he also deputized for the Governor. But his powers were far less than those of the old Colonial Secretary who was the principal adviser to the Governor over the whole field of executive and administrative action. Under the Donoughmore constitution, he shared with nine others, including seven elected ministers, the privilege of giving advice to the Governor. Nor could he exercise as the Colonial Secretary had under the old constitution, a direct supervision over the entire field of executive activity as
The Articles referred to in this page are Articles of the 1931. Order in Council.
* Paragraph X of the letters patent,

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he shared this task with nine others, principally the seven ministerS. Certain reserved subjects, chief among them defence, external affairs, and the administration of the public service, became under the 1931. Order in Council the matters over which he had control and for which he was directly responsible to the Governor.
The other two officers, as their titles signify, were directly concerned with law and finance. The Legal Secretary was obliged, among other duties, to prepare a report setting out the objects and reasons of every bill passed by the Council, for transmission to the Secretary of State. He was also directly responsible for giving legal advice to the Government in respect of certain matters and also for the administration of justice. The Financial Secretary was responsible, among other duties, for the preparation of a statement, for submission to the State Council, on the financial implications of estimates or votes coming before it. Among the departments for which he was responsible, were the Treasury, the Customs and the Income Tax Department. M
The salaries of these three officers were specified in the 1931 Order in Council, C3,Ooo a year for the Chief Secretary and (2,Ooo a year each for the Legal Secretary and the Financial Secretary and, as in the case of the Governor's salary, these sums were charged upon the public revenue and other funds of the island (Article 9I). These salaries could not be altered except by an amendment of the Order in Council and formed, therefore, another target for attack by the State Council.
The duties of these three officers were 'advisory rather than “executive'. This was particularly so in respect of those functions that had been placed under the direct control of the ministers; though it was intended that they should even administer the departments under their direct control “with the primary object of assisting and not of hampering their Ceylonese colleagues'. In the actual working of the constitution, however, the frankly expressed view of their Ceylonese col
Paragraph XII of the Royal Instructions. * Cmd. 3 I 31, p. 67. * Cmd. 313 I, p. 67,

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES 89
leagues was that instead of co-operating with them the Officers of State often acted in opposition to their wishes. In the State Council from the very outset, both councillors and ministers referred to the open "tug-of-war that was waged in the Board of Ministers between the elected ministers and the Officers of State. As illustration, they referred to instances when the Financial Secretary commented adversely on budget proposals in his written 'Observations' on them to Council, attacked them in open Council or advised against the passing of estimates sponsored by the elected ministers: they also brought up the refusal of the Chief Secretary to assign particular officers to ministers who especially asked for them. The ministers naturally viewed the Financial Secretary's opposition to their financial measures as active disloyalty towards them because the budget was the one matter on which there was collective responsibility. They also felt and rightly felt that continual friction between them and the Officers of State in the Board seriously impaired the efficient working of government. Their view was put by Mr. D. S. Senanayake in the course of a debate on the reform of the constitution when he said that “what has actually happened is that the Officers of State have succeeded in keeping us at bay with the result that we are having arguments and quarrels and very often our legitimate work suffers. This state of affairs is not at all satisfactory. This view of the ministers was supported wholeheartedly by the rest of the Council; and the opinion of the back-benchers on this matter was summarized by Mr. G. C. S. Corea on Ioth October 1935, also in the course
Hansard for 1932, vol. III, p. 2348.
* Hansard for 1935, vol. III, p. 3597-6o for acting Financial Secretary's speech on this matter, and pp. 365-2 for Mr. D. S. Senanayake's comments on that speech.
Hansard for 1932, vol. I, pp. 228-9, p. IoI7; Supplementary Estimates for the University expenses of a forestry student and for the de Soysa Lyingin home which were approved by the ministers and opposed by the Financial Secretary in his 'observations'. -
Hansard for 1934, vol. II, p. 22O6.
Hansard for 1933, vol. III, p. 2578.
Mr. G. C. S. Corea was an ordinary member of the State Council in 1935. In 1936, in the second State Council, he was elected as Minister of Labour, Industry and Commerce.

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of a speech on the reform of the constitution. He complained that
{
"... there had been occasions during the lifetime of the Council when it became apparent that the discharge of its responsibility was hampered by the presence of the Officers of State. Anyone, even if he only cursorily glanced through the pages of the Hansard, would find many instances of the difficulties the Ministers have had to experience, more especially in connection with the financial policy, purely owing to the existence in that Board of Officers of State. ... I think, sir, he concluded it is impossible to carry on efficiently the government of this country with the Officers of State. We are therefore definitely of opinion that their continuance cannot be allowed any longer. . . .'
Thus, throughout this period, there was a constant and general desire on the part of the Council to secure the abolition of these offices. From their point of view their position in Council was unenviable. They were placed in direct control of certain reserved subjects, which were bound to bring them, and did bring them, into conflict with a legislature of considerable power which was kicking against its remaining limitations. One of the chief sources of friction was the public service. The administration of most of the functions of government came with the departments concerned under the ministers and their Executive Committees; but questions relating to the appointment, promotion, transfer and dismissal of public servants as well as their conditions of service came under the direct supervision of the Governor and the Officers of State. Ministers in want of certain officers specially suited for the performance of particular duties were sometimes informed by the Chief Secretary that they were unable to have these officers in view of the general exigencies of the service. Again, ministers found that certain estimates and votes necessary for the effective prosecution of their duties, which were supported by them, were attacked by the Financial Secretary on general financial grounds. All these accordingly became sources of dispute.
Hansard for 1935, vol. III, pp. 3840-I.

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES '91
The position of the Officers of State was the more difficult because throughout almost the entire period of the operation of the Donoughmore constitution they were English. Although in the latter part of this period a Ceylonese had the good fortune to be permanently appointed as Financial Secretary, and a few others acted from time to time in the office of Legal Secretary, these offices were generally regarded by the councillors as centres of imperial influence and as special preserves retained for members of the imperial race. This was unfortunate, for a native Officer of State would certainly have received more sympathy and less criticism from the councillors.
These difficulties were inherent in the constitution and without its drastic alteration, it would not have been possible to resolve them. Further, the Officers of State and heads of departments at first found it a little difficult to adjust themselves to the new order of things, as precedents borrowed from the era of an earlier crown colony government were out of place in the Ceylon of the Donoughmore period. With the evolution of fresh precedents suitable for a new constitution, with the narrowing and greater definition of the sources of friction, and because of the State Council's prior knowledge that a certain practice would invariably be followed in some matters, it was possible in the course of time for a fairly harmonious relationship to be established between the imperial and local elements in the government.
THE PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION
Before leaving the subject of the Officers of State a word should be said of their position upon this institution. The 1931 Order in Council provided in Article 89 for a Commission to advise the Governor in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Article 86 of that Order in Council. These powers
In the first years of the working of the Donoughmore constitution the incidents connected with and relating to the certification of the votes concerning the passages of public officers and their families, and holiday warrants gave rise to constitutional crises of first-rate importance. But later on, due to the yearly rejection of these votes by the State Council and their yearly certification by the Governor, the Council and the Governor came to regard each other's actions as a matter of course.
H

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related to the appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of public servants. This Commission was to consist of the Chief Secretary as Chairman and such other persons in the public service as the Governor would appoint. The Governor appointed the other two Officers of State also as members of this Commission, and throughout the period of the Donoughmore constitution this Commission consisted of the three Officers of State. In the exercise of their functions they were concerned with public officers drawing a salary, in the case of old entrants, of not less than Rs.3,2Oo a year, and in the case of new entrants of not less than Rs.2,6oo a year. Public Officers drawing less than the specified salaries came under the control of their departmental heads. In the exercise of their functions in regard to appointments, the Commission occasionally disagreed with the Executive Committees which were also given the power of recommending for certain appointments. This dual power of recommending for appointments held by the Commission and the Committees was unfortunate as disagreement over an appointment sometimes resulted in the suitability of the person appointed being re-canvassed in public, with damaging results to the efficiency of the public service.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE
No constitutional survey such as this will be complete without some reference to the public service. Its chief feature during this period was its progressive Ceylonization. Agitation for such Ceylonization dated back to the beginning of the century, and was one of the principal matters espoused by the Ceylon National Congress, the political body that had been formed in 1919 for advocating constitutional reform. There were many reasons for this agitation. Educated Ceylonese naturally resented the holding of most of the higher posts in the public service by Englishmen as this meant that they were denied a number of offices for which they would otherwise have been eligible.
Old entrants or non-new entrants according to the designation given by the Ceylon Treasury consisted generally of public officers appointed before 24th April 1933, and new entrants were such officers appointed after that date.

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES 93
They also felt that they were excluded from these posts because they were considered intellectually inferior to recruits from abroad, a slur on national prestige which the politically conscious Ceylonese would not accept. They further, very naturally, felt that capable Ceylonese with permanent associations and abiding interests in the land would be more useful to the country than the English members of the public service who were mere birds of passage. Ceylonese politicians also viewed with suspicion English members of the service, regarding them as a safeguard retained on purpose by the British Government for the conservation ofimperial interests.These feelings were natural in the first two decades of this century, as the country was experiencing the first real pangs of the national awakening. This agitation was continued during the period of the Donoughmore constitution in the State Council by a number of councillors. Chief among these was Mr.D.S. Senanayake, and some mention is made in a later page of his contribution to this cause.
In fairness to the British Government it should be stated that it responded to this agitation. Even as early as 1831, in the report of the Colebrooke Commission, the first of the great Commissions appointed by His Majesty's Government to enquire into conditions in Ceylon, it was stated that “the public service should be freely open to all classes of persons according to their qualifications; the exclusive principle of the civil service should be relaxed, and means of education held out to the natives whereby they may in time qualify themselves for holding some of the higher appointments. In 1928, in the report of the Donoughmore Commission, this earlier recommendation was reiterated and elaborated, although by then a considerable number of Ceylonese had entered the public service. The Commissioners in the last-mentioned report stated that “the ideal aimed at is the ultimate staffing of the Ceylon Services by Ceylonese . . . that with this object in view there should be a progressive increase in the number of posts assigned to Ceylonese candidates, and a corresponding decrease in the number of posts filled by the appointment of candidates from outside Ceylon. By 1928 the British Government had already agreed
' Cmd. 3 I3 I, p. 137.

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94. MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES
to the recruitment of an equal number of Ceylonese and Europeans into the civil service.
Agitation by the Ceylonese and the good sense of the British Government were two factors which contributed towards the Ceylonization of the services. A third consideration, too, helped this process. Although the salaries paid to the members of the higher ranks of the public service were always fair, they were often inadequate, in the case of officers recruited from abroad, who were obliged, in addition to running an expensive establishment in Geylon, to send periodic remittances to relatives in the United Kingdom and to provide for the education of their children abroad. The changes in the constitution brought about by the Donoughmore and Soulbury recommendations provided very favourable conditions of retirement for certain classes of public officers. They were able to retire on enhanced pensions, and such retirement at a comparatively early age enabled many to secure other profitable employment, which meant for the English civil servant employment nearer home. A number of English public servants who retired were moved by these financial considerations and they did not, as is sometimes thought, retire because they disliked working under native ministers or because they disapproved of the recent constitutional changes. Economics not politics governed their decision.
In 1949, the public service was almost exclusively Ceylonese and the following figures taken from the civil service will illustrate the extent of this transformation. In 1881, the Ceylon civil service was composed of 84 Europeans and 7 Ceylonese, that is, 8.33 per cent of the service was Ceylonese. In 1925 a little over 33:33 per cent of the service was Ceylonese, while in I 94o 64 per cent of the service was Ceylonese. The percentage of Ceylonese in the public service (including the civil service) in 1949 was over 90 per cent and in a year or two there will, probably, be not a single Englishman in permanent employment under Government. On the other hand, the Ceylon Government is freely
L. A. Mills: Ceylon under British Rule, p. 92.
* The percentages for Ig25 and I94o have been gathered from the civil lists for those years. The civil list is a publication prepared by the Ceylon Government Press and provides a list of all the officers in the higher grades of the public service.

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES 95.
employingto-day non-Ceylonese technical experience on a temporary basis and, like all sensible governments, it is anxious tO secure the services of the best men. Such recruitment is no longer resented for the selection is made by a Ceylonese Government unaffected by imperial considerations and not by an English Governor or by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
In closing, this tribute must be paid to the English members of the public service. To the performance of their tasks they brought to bear a very high sense of duty, rectitude and fairness. Some of them had a genuine interest in the lot of the native peasantry. One of their number, Mr. H. R. Freeman, was sin. cerely loved by the villagers of the North Central Province, in whose welfare he had been deeply interested as a civil servant, and his well-merited popularity was such that after his retirement, he was elected to the Legislative Council to represent that province and to both State Councils to represent a constituency there, in preference to native candidates. In the last twentyfive years Englishmen had to work under trying conditions in the face of vigorous and sometimes unfair criticism from politicians, which they could not answer, but in spite of these difficulties they ungrudgingly gave their best to the country. If in the exercise of their duties they could not be animated by the native's love for his own land, they were moved by the etually compelling motive of not letting their own country down, a spirit which they had acquired from their education and traditil OmS.
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SYSTEM
One of the chief changes effected by the recommendations of the Donoughmore Commissioners was the introduction of the Executive Committee system. Throughout the period under review it came in for huch harsh criticism and it finds no place in the Ceylon constitution of to-day. As it is no longer a part of the constitution, many have concluded that this novel device WS 2 unqualified failure as an instrument of government. Before a final verdict can be given, the system itself should be analysed and a balance struck between its virtues and defects.
We have seen in considering the ministers that the Council

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was to elect by secret ballot from among its members seven Executive Committees, each Committee containing as nearly as possible an equal number of members (Article 34). The details relating to the manner of election were specified in Standing Order IO of the Council, each councillor except the Speaker and the Officers of State having for the purpose the power of nominating three persons for each Committee. It was further provided that no councillor could be elected to more than one Committee, while Standing Order Io also stipulated that if the numbers constituting a Committee could not be equal, the number of each particular Committee should be determined by the Council. In fact, during the period of the Donoughmore constitution, the majority of Committees had a membership of eight, while the minimum membership was six and the maximum nine. Article 34 further provided that the Officers of State could not be elected as members of a Committee, but the Chief Secretary, under Article 43, was entitled to attend any Executive Committee meeting and address it though he had no voting rights at such meeting. Vacancies occurring in any Committee after the first election of the Committees in each new Council were to be filled according to Standing Order II of the Council in such manner as the Speaker determined, while transfers from one Committee to another required the approval of the Council expressed by resolution. The quorum for an Executive Committee was three, in addition to the Chairman of the Committee (Article 4 I (3)). Each Committee was summoned by the Clerk to the Committee either by the direction of the Chairman or at the request of any three of its members.
The constitution provided for the following seven Executive Committees:
Articles 32 and 34 (1) of the 1931 Order in Council read with the First Schedule to the Order in Council. The Donoughmore Commissioners did not recommend the creation of a Committee of Labour, Industry and Commerce, some of the functions that were finally given to that Committee being assigned by them to the Committee of Home Affairs. They recommended the creation of a separate Committee of Public Works but this recommendation was not carried out. Instead, this proposed Committee was merged with the Committee of Communications and under the constitution there was a single Committee of Communication and Works. Cmd. 313 I, pp. 49-50.

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES 97.
(1) Home Affairs. (2) Agriculture and Lands. (3) Local Administration. (4) Health. (5) Labour, Industry and Commerce. (6) Education. (7) Communications and Works.
The list set out below specifies the more important subjects and functions assigned to the various Committees:
Home Affairs
Police. Prisons. Excise.
Agriculture and Lands
Agriculture. Crown Land. Irrigation. Food Control (from 1942).
Local Administration
Matters relating to various local authorities such as municipalities, urban councils and village committees.
Motor transport.
Mines.
Mineralogy.
Fisheries.
Health
Medical and Sanitary Services.
The subjects specified are not an exhaustive list. They constitute some of the more important subjects assigned to the various Committees. The original list of subjects assigned to the Committee was a short one and appeared in the First Schedule to the 193I Order in Council. But Article 32 (2) of that Order in Council enabled the amendment of the schedule by the inclusion of new subjects, and the council has periodically used that power for such inclusion.

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Labour, Industry and Commerce
Industrial and Social Welfare. Trade. S. Commerce.
Companies. Registrations of Documents. Collection of Statistics. ,
Education
Control of primary and secondary education.
Communication and Works
Public Works.
Railways. Electrical Undertakings. Civil Aviation.
Ports. Postal and Telegraph Services.
The chief function of each Executive Committee was the general supervision and control of the departments concerned with the subjects assigned to it (Article 39 (1)). In the exercise of this function the Committee was responsible for the initial preparation of the annual and supplementary estimates relating to the departments under its control; for the consideration of suggested legislative measures falling within its scope; for making recommendations for certain appointments; and for the consideration of other executive and administrative matters relating to the departments in its charge.
A number of reasons were given for the establishment of this novel experiment based on the committee system which was a feature of English Local Government. It was stated both by the Commissioners and by the Secretary of State for the Colonies that certain native peculiarities made it necessary for the creation of a system in Ceylon which was different from the conventional cabinet pattern. The Commissioners discovered in the island, particularly among her politicians, a capacity for administration and administrative detail which they felt should be stimulated. They felt also that the absence of parties rendered

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES 99
the introduction of the cabinet form of government difficult, while they desired further to evolve a system which would soothe communal feeling in the country by enabling minority representatives to participate in government. That the last two considerations were the two chief motives that influenced the Imperial Government when they introduced this system was made clear by the Secretary of State for the Colonies himself, who said in I929:
“I propose to adopt the recommendation of the Special Commission for the administration of the island under a system of Executive Committees with Chairmen holding the position of Ministers. The scheme is a novel one and its adoption is admittedly in the nature of an experiment. At the same time, I think it is, in essence, well adapted to meet the special difficulties of Ceylon where, as the Special Commission points out, there is not only no immediate prospect of the appearance of a party system but also the danger of the formation of groups based on racial or religious differences. The scheme proposed, while allowing due weight to the majority, will nevertheless secure that in all questions of administration the views of any important section will be able to secure a hearing.'
Other general considerations suggested the creation of a system different from customary political usage. Certain experts in the theory of government had for some time been commenting adversely on certain features of the British form of cabinet government. This form of government, as it had been worked throughout this century in Britain, had transformed the position of the ordinary private member in Parliament into a cipher. The members of the party in power too often acted as automata directed by the party whips. Further, Parliament had not the time to control and did not control administration, although in the twentieth century state administrative matters covered an increasingly large field of political activity. In making new constitutions there has sometimes been an attempt to devise methods which would rehabilitate the position of the private
Cmd. 34:19, p. 53, para. 13.

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member and also give the legislature a fair control over administration and administrative orders. Considerations of this kind lay behind the introduction of the Executive Committee system in Ceylon.
In actual practice it was soon found that the system did enable both members of minority communities and intelligent and hardworking back-benchers to have a considerable share in determining legislation and administration. In Committees generally consisting of eight members a few minority representatives or a few of the less prominent private members were able to influence governmental action to a far greater extent than their numbers would have led us to expect. For instance, in the second State Council, minority representatives like Mr. G. G. Ponnambalam, conscientious back-benchers like the radical members, Dr. N. M. Perera, Mr. D. P. R. Gunawardene and Mr. W. Dahanayake, were able to participate usefully in the work of government which they would not have been able to do under the cabinet system. Throughout the period of the Donoughmore constitution this system received the commendation of back-benchers and minority representatives while during the early stages of its existence it was considered to be working satisfactorily by influential members of the majority community themselves. One of the practical advantages of the system which was proved in the course of its working was that it substituted for the single minister of the cabinet form of government, a ministry in commission which brought several minds to bear upon each question. It was also found that the delay resulting from discussions in Committee was sometimes a healthy
In 1939 on the debate on the reform of the constitution, Mr. R. Sri Pathmanathan, a Ceylon Tamil and member at the time for MannarMullaitivu in the second State Council, strongly commended the Executive Committee system; Hansard for 1939, vol. II, pp. 829-34. In the same debate Dr. N. M. Perera, too, strongly supported this system. Hansard for 1939, vol. II, pp. 2393-4o2; 24 I 8-3o.
* Sir D. B. Jayatilaka, leader of the State Council at the time, Hon. D. S. Senanayake, Minister for Agriculture at the time, Mr. (later Hon.) S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, member for Veyangoda at the time, spoke favourably of the working of Executive Committee system in the course of a debate in 1932 on the reform of the constitution: Hansard for 1932,
vol. II, pp. I 835-8, I 847-9, p. I 762.

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES O
check on hasty legislation, a very necessary safeguard in a unicameral assembly. The system was also useful as a school of political education. Every elected member saw in the Executive Committees to some extent how the government worked and this knowledge will no doubt be useful to those members of the old State Council who have found a place in the Government under the new constitution. It was, moreover, in this way, that very far-reaching social reforms were effected of which more will be said later. If this system had been substantially a failure, the record of achievement of this period must have been considerably less. In spite of its defects the system worked for seventeen years without serious deadlocks and carried Ceylon successfully through a very critical war period. Furthermore, the system, with its opportunities for thrashing out administrative matters in the Executive Committees and for the subsequent discussion by the Councilin executive session of the administrative decisions of the Committees, gave the legislature considerable control over administration. Finally, the minorities seemed to be satisfied with the system. Frequently throughout the period they supported its continuance for they discovered that it gave them a bargaining value and an influence quite disproportionate to their numbers. In short, the actual working of the system appeared, in certain respects, to have justified the hopes of its creators.
In certain other respects, however, the system confirmed the worst fears of its early critics. As was expected, it made for considerable delay. Instead of administrative matters being determined, as under the British system, by a civil servant and, in the case of important questions, also by the minister in charge of the policy of the department; such matters under the Committee system were dealt with by a body of seven to nine persons. This consumed time particularly as these Committees often concerned themselves with little questions of detail such as the issue of a liquor or a butcher's licence or the appointment of a headman, questions which could have been determined more usefully, impartially and rapidly by an administrative officer.
Nor was co-ordination or effective planning made any easier. Executive Committees overlapped and even, at times,

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pursued contradictory policies, and this although their Chairmen constituted the Board of Ministers. These features were inherent in the system itself, for collective responsibility was legally required only in respect of the budget, and even this artificial responsibility was, according to some, unjustifiable as the responsibility for the initial preparation of the estimates of a department was in the charge of the Executive Committee in control of that department, and was not the joint work of the Board of Ministers. In other words, there was neither uniformity nor unity and unlike the British cabinet, the Board of Ministers was unable to pursue a consistent and pre-determined policy.
Another important defect brought out in the actual working of the system, was that responsibility had become “fugacious and 'centrifugal'. It was possible for the various authorities that made up the government to shift the responsibility from one to another. If the Board of Ministers as a collective body was attacked on any matter it could with ample justification point out that it was not responsible for the action in question and demand that the minister in charge be called to account. That minister in turn could state that he was personally not responsible for the decision and that in fact in the Committee he had stoutly opposed it. Individual members of the Committee, too, could disclaim all action and, finally, unlike the British cabinet, an Executive Committee could not be made to resign for irresponsible action by an unfavourable vote in open Council.
It was possible also for one Executive Committee to check the work of another. Thus, for example, the Committee of Communications and Works, which had control over the Public Works Department, had to execute duties for all the Committees and could hold up the work of a Committee or influence its policy by deciding what work to perform or what to leave undone. g
The power which the Executive Committees had of recommendation for certain appointments has been severely criticized. As this power has been considered in certain quarters
Governor's dispatch dated 13th June 1938, and the Secretary of State's dispatch, dated Ioth November 1938, regarding the Ceylon Constitution, published in Ceylon Sessional Paper, XXVIII of 1938, pp. 6 and I4.

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES Io3
as one of the worst features of the Executive Committee system, it is useful at this stage to examine the nature of this power and the manner of its exercise. Under the Ceyloh Public Service Regulations, the head of a department desirous of filling a vacant post was required to forward his choice to the Secretary of the Public Service Commission, and in case the post was in a department over which an Executive Committee had general control this recommendation was transmitted by him for the consideration of that Committee. The Committee had the power to disagree with it and to make its own selection which was then sent to the Secretary of the Commission. The Commission then considered the various recommendations and made its own decision, which might or might not be the same as that of the Committee. The Commission's recommendation would be made to the Governor who had, in the case of appointments not requiring the sanction of the Secretary of State, the final authority in the matter. In the case of appointments requiring the sanction of the Secretary of State, the Governor's power was also one of recommendation and it was possible for the Secretary of State to select some other candidate for appointment."
This rather complicated and elaborate procedure in regard to appointments has been criticized strongly by many, including some councillors. One of the chief criticisms urged against this system was that it tended to introduce political considerations into the question of appointments by giving opportunities for
Regulations 7 and 9 of the Public Service Regulations published in Ceylon Government Gazette No. 7,865 of June 3oth 1931.
* Regulation 13, ibid.
Regulations 24, 25 and 27, ibid.
Regulation I4, ibid.
Mr. Francis de Zoysa (member for Balapitiya for a part of the duration of the second State Council) moved on I oth February 1937 the motion that in the opinion of the House appointments of Public Servants should in no case be referred to Executive Committees and Public Service Regulations Nos. 13 and 27 in the Ceylon Government Manual Procedure and any other relevant law or procedure should be accordingly amended'. This motion was rejected on the next day but in the course of the debate some of those in favour of the motion urged certain of the arguments given above. For debate on this motion see Hansard for 1936, vol. III, pp. 3253-5, and Hansard for 1937, vol. I, pp. 278-94, 298-330,

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political pressure of members by their constituents. It also, since their recommendations were sometimes different, tended to provide a source offriction between the Officers of State who constituted the Commission and the Governor on the one hand and the councillors on the other. Some councillors attacked this power on the basis that it was an illusory one, their responsibility being only that of recommendation, the ultimate authority being in the hands of the Governor or the Secretary of State. In any case there was a strong feeling that the interposition of Executive Committees in the matter of appointments was an unnecessary and embarrassing stage in the procedure.
As this power of appointment was not an integral part of the Executive Committee system, it would have worked better and received less criticism, had the Committees not been burdened with this doubtful task. The general success or failure of the system should, therefore, not be judged by any criticisms that have been made on this score. If the system is included in any future colonial constitution of this type it would be better not to assign this power to the Committees.
These difficulties and defects were soon realized by responsible persons like the ministers and some of the governors of the period who, for the reasons given, strongly advocated the replacement of the Executive Committee system by some form of cabinet government.
The above survey would show that if a balance is struck between its virtues and its defects, the system cannot be wholly condemned, and a fair judgment would be the comment of a Governor of Ceylon on another constitution that the operation of the system was “a qualified success rather than an unqualified failure'.
A comprehensive statement of the views of the second Board of Ministers on the Executive Committee system appeared in their Memorandum to the Governor dated 19th March 1937, which constituted the larger part of the Ceylon Sessional Paper entitled “Correspondence between the Ministers and the Governor regarding the Ceylon Constitution, March-May 1937': XI of I937. For a similar criticism of the system by a Governor of Ceylon, see Sir Andrew Caldecott's despatch to the Secretary of State dated 13th June 1938 and published in Ceylon Sessional paper XXVIII of 1938. Most
of the defects summarized above were cogently set out in that memorandum and despatch,

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES tos
TWO MINISTERS
Before concluding this account of the institutions of government that went to make up the Donoughmore constitution, it is useful to say something of the two Ceylonese public men that, were most closely concerned with their working. These were Sir D. B. Jayatilaka and Mr. D. S. Senanayake. They were both Sinhalese Buddhists and were actively associated with the movement for the reform of the constitution from the time of the inauguration of the Ceylon National Congress, the political organization created to agitate for Dominion Status. Both of them in the early days of their politieal life were keenly interested in the temperance movement. They also suffered during the troublous days of the riots a period of life in prison, always a sure passportin a colonial country to the affections of the people. They had an intense love for their country, a pride in her past, and hoped, like the majority of others of their generation, to achieve their political objectives by strictly constitutional methods.
Sir D. B. Jayatilaka came from a poor family and had his early education in a pirivena or temple school, where he had a good grounding in Sinhalese and Buddhist philosophy. He completed his education by spending a few years in one of the better secondary schools of the island, and later in life, in middle age, he spent a number of terms at Oxford, graduating in oriental languages. During his stay in England, he also qualified as a barrister, although he never actively practised that profession, aS teaching, Buddhist education, and politics always remained his chief interests. He was recognized as a Sinhalese scholar of eminence, and when it was decided to have an official dictionary in that language, he was chosen as its first editor. He worked actively also for a Buddhist renaissance.
By 1931, the year when the Donoughmore constitution was brought into operation, his period of political apprenticeship was over. Before that year, he had been a President of the Ceylon National Congress, a member of the Legislative Council, and also its Vice-President and Speaker. He had already begun to be regarded as a sort of elder statesman.
See above, p. 27.

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His political pre-eminence was recognized when, after the first general elections under the Donoughmore constitution, he was appointed as Minister of Home Affairs, and also chosen as the leader of the State Council and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Ministers. He held these offices from 1931 to 1942 when he gave up active political life for the more dignified but less arduous duties of the Ceylon Government Representative in India. Belonging to a generation of public men whose politics were influenced by nineteenth-century British Liberalism, he preferred gradual agitation and moderate criticism, as methods of securing political concessions from the British Government, to the revolutionary propaganda and precipitate action advocated by the younger public men of the country. Like all elder statesmen, in the last years of his political life, he was regarded as somewhat of a reactionary by the younger politicians. As Minister of Home Affairs, his conduct and policy came into question both during the Bracegirdle and Mooloya crises, to which reference has already been made, and it was then stated by the younger and more hot-headed councillors that he was permitting Officers of State to encroach upon his powers as minister, and that his control over heads of departments, for instance, the Inspector-General of Police, was weak and his policy with regard to that department vacillating.
He was a fluent speaker both in Sinhalese and in English, and his oratory in English was of the type of Gladstone and Churchill rather than that of Baldwin or Attlee.
Although he did not live to see Ceylon achieve full responsible government, he contributed largely towards its realization. At the time of his death, his personality was aptly summed up by one of his younger colleagues in Council as a “happy blend of Eastern culture and Western poise'.
Unlike Sir D. B. Jayatilaka, Mr. D. S. Senanayake was a scion of a well-to-do family. He was educated at the local Harrow, St. Thomas's College, an Anglican school, and during his schooldays it is said that he played the part of the truant schoolboy, preferring cricket, in which he excelled, and the
See above, pp. 35, 36; 85, 86. * Hansard for 1944, vol. I, p. 904.

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES Io
open air to books or debating. In his early manhood, he keenly interested himself in agriculture and cultivation, and, unlike many another proprietor of large estates in the island, he did not, during these years, play the part of the absentee landlord, for it is reported that every palm in a portion of one of his large estates was literally planted by him. During this period he acquainted himself with the needs and interests of the villager which he later put into good use as Minister of Agriculture. At first he was not very interested in politics but the example and influence of his two brothers, F. R. and D. C. Senanayake, particularly the former, a large-hearted philanthrophist and a keen advocate of Dominion Status for Ceylon, made him turn his attentions from parochial to national needs.
Like Jayatilaka, he was a member of the Legislative Council, but in that Council he was overshadowed by others who had far greater experience than himself in the art and practice of politics. During this period he preferred to remain in the background, studying quietly the chief political needs of the country, and interesting himself when agricultural topics, of which he had first-hand knowledge, were discussed. •
In 1931, he was elected to the State Council. He was member of both the State Councils and Minister of Agriculture from 1931 to 1947. At first few thought that he would take Jayatilaka’s place as the chiefpublic man in the country on the latter’s retirement from active political life, but his common sense, his quiet confidence, deep sincerity and moderation made the country before long realize that he was Jayatilaka's rightful successor. Even before the latter assumed his high diplomatic duties, there were many who regarded Senanayake as the real determining influence in the country's politics. In 1942, he became the leader of the State Council and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Ministers.
As member of the State Council, one of his chief interests was the Ceylonization of the public services. He was intensely national and felt that there was no public duty that a Ceylonese could not perform with the same efficiency as a British officer: he also believed that there were for most offices a sufficient number of Ceylonese with adequate qualifications and that there was no

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need to import European officers. As a result of his agitation, the principle was established that European officers would only be introduced in exceptional circumstances and that when they were brought in, they were to be employed on agreement for a term of years and on the understanding that they were to train suitable Ceylonese to take their place. As Minister of Agriculture, he laid the foundations of very useful schemes of village expansion and colonization, under which the landless villager was given public land, stock and the instruments of production on easy terms for development, and of irrigation, and reclamation of land. ※。
As a public speaker and a debater, he was inferior to both Ramanathan and Jayatilaka and his speeches neither had the distinction of those of Ramanathan nor the ornate flamboyance of those of Jayatilaka. Nor did he have their gift of repartee. He had, however, a way of winning the confidence of the house by a directness and the use of a simple colloquial style which was both persuasive and telling. Being neither trained to politics like some of his younger colleagues, nor belonging to the professional or official classes, he lacked the subtlety of the professional politician but he had other gifts which were important in the art of government, such as a clear knowledge of his objectives, a pertinacity of purpose, a burning sincerity, a vast industry, and the capacity to choose the right officers and to get the most out of them.
Although by their achievements covering almost a century, a host of others paved the way towards Ceylon's present status, it was principally his negotiations both with the Imperial Government and with leaders of the minority communities during the period 1943 to 1947 that were the immediate cause of the country's realization in 1948 of full responsible government, During these negotiations he was firm with the Imperial Government and tactful with minority leaders. He was able to show that government that the capacity of the country's leaders and of the professional and official classes, her economic stability, and her loyalty to democratic rather than revolutionary prin
See above page 8o, footnote ; and below, p. 112. See above, pp. 26-28.

MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND COMMITTEES 1og
ciples, justified the grant of full responsible government. He was, therefore, the chief architect of Dominion Status during that period. O
In 1947, he became Ceylon's first premier and, at the date of writing this book, still holds this position. His chief preoccupation now is internal reconstruction. He is a moderate in politics and symbolizes the forces in the country striving to conserve the best traditions of the past. He is, however, considered a reactionary by a section of the youth of the country who want drastic and radical changes. In any sober reckoning he will be regarded as having served his country well. e

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CHAPTER VI
ASSESSMENT OF THE DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION
s the 1931. Order in Council which embodied the legal framework of the Donoughmore constitution has now been repealed, and certain of the features of that constitution, including the much-criticized Executive Committee system, have been superseded, there are many who have concluded that the constitution was an unmitigated failure. It is the purpose of this chapter to answer this charge by specifying some of its virtues, and by considering how far any of the features of that constitution have been continued in the constitution of to-day and whether it had any lessons for the future and for other colonies.
The principal changes embodied in the Donoughmore constitution were the introduction of universal adult suffrage, the abolition of communal representation, the transference of a large measure of ministerial, executive and administrative responsibility to the elected representatives of the people, and the establishment of the Executive Committee system. Of these all but the last have been continued and, therefore, one must conclude that many of its chief features have stood the test of time.
Although the Executive Committee system which was an important feature of the constitution has been replaced, some experts still regard it as a useful constitutional device. They are attempting to discover the reasons for its failure in Ceylon and to use it if possible in a modified form in other colonies. A recent Royal Commission on West Indian problems considered the Ceylon Executive Committee system and recommended an adapted version in the form of consultative committees for some of the West Indian colonies. In making the recommendation, the Commission stated that it realized that the system as it existed in Ceylon was defective but that a modified committee system
IO

THE DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION III
deprived of exccutive functions and powers over appointments and vested with advisory duties would go far towards solving some of the chief problems of government of to-day. The Commission added that such a system would enable the legislature to have a fair control over administrative matters, give unofficial elected members a very necessary practical experience in the art of government, help to shorten speeches in open Council and enable heads of departments satisfactorily to answer criticisms and explain their actions which they are unable to do to-day under the customary parliamentary system of government. A modified committee system in the form of advisory committees is now being tried in British Guiana and Jamaica and although there are very important differences between those committees and the Executive Committees in Ceylon, there is no doubt that the inspiration for the establishment of committees in those colonies was found in the Ceylon Executive Committee system.
In spite of these advances, the constitution fell short of Dominion Status, for before this status could be achieved the legislature had to be given certain powers which the Imperial Government was not prepared to confer. Reference has already been made to these limitations on the legislative competence of the State Council. Chief among these were the legal inequalities which the Statute of Westminster removed in the case of the Dominions but which throughout this period attached to Ceylon, and the powers of the King in Council, the Secretary of State and the Governor in matters of legislation. In additions this constitution was short of Dominion Status, as Ceylon', position in international relations was still that of a crown colony. Its relations with other foreign powers were conducted by Britain and it had neither the capacity to have separate representation at international conferences nor the power to contract treaties with other foreign states independently of the mother country. As a corollary to these limitations, it naturally did not have the power to secede nor declare itself neutral in a war in which
West India Royal Commission Report. Cmd. 66o7, pp. 375-6. * See above, pp. 76, 77.
Statute of Westminster, 1931 (22: Geo. 5, c. 4).

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I I 2 THE DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION
Britain was involved, although these are considered very necessary attributes of Dominion Status to-day.
Constitutions must be judged by their records. One of the principal characteristics of this period was the Ceylonization of the public services and for this the Board of Ministers and the State Council which were established under the 1931 constitution were largely responsible. The consequence of this development was that the arrangement in operation at the time of the arrival of the Donoughmore Commissioners, whereby an equal number of Ceylonese and Europeans were to be recruited each year into the civil service, ceased to function shortly after the inauguration of that constitution, and by the close of the period the recruitment of Europeans to that service was abandoned altogether. The principle was also soon established as a result of the agitation of the elected representatives of the people that non-Ceylonese recruitment into the public services was to be very exceptional and only permitted in the absence of suitable Ceylonese for the vacancies in question, and then upon a temporary basis and upon terms and conditions to be determined in each case by resolution of the State Council. This position was acknowledged by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in November 1932, and was given legislative effect by the passing of a series of resolutions in the State Council on Ist March 1933. Since that time the State Council has had complete control over non-Ceylonese appointments into the public service, as the terms and conditions on which such appointments were to be made had to be decided by the Council, and whenever what came to be called a March Resolution' was introduced in the Council for the purpose, it closely examined the necessity for such appointments.
Its record of achievement in the sphere of social amelioration was spectacular. Expenditure on social services like education, health, unemployment, and poor relief was considerably
Despatch of Secretary of State, No. 62o dated 14th November 1932, published in Ceylon Sessional Paper entitled “Correspondence arising out of the Reports of the Salaries and Cadres Commission and certain resolutions of the State Council passed on 1st March 1933, XXIII of 1933, p. 4.
* Hansard for I933, vol. I, pp. 432-3.
See, above p. 8o, note I.

THE DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION II3
increased by the large-scale extension of those services. To give a few figures, the expenditure on education rose from twelve million rupees in 1931 to thirty-four million rupees in 1945, while the number of Government vernacular schools increased from II,395 in I 93 I to 2,455 in I944 and the corresponding figures for assisted vernacular schools were 2,246 and 2,814. A system of school meals was introduced for children during this period and the expenditure on this service rose from a quarter of a million rupees in 1937 to three and three-quarter million rupees in 1944. Similarly the expenditure on hospitals increased from about ten million rupees in the period prior to I93I to fifteen million rupees about 1944, the latter sum being exclusive of capital outlay on new buildings and improvements. The expenditure on poor relief rose from Rs. 127,525 in 1932 to Rs. 1,209,340 in the estimates for I944-5 while the expenditure on unemployment relief changed from Rs.207,692 in 1932-3 to RS. 674,914 in 1941–2.“
Comprehensive measures of social and industrial legislation were also introduced covering such a variety of matters as trade unions, workmen's compensation, maternity benefits, wage-determination by wages boards, and factories. There were many additional achievements which the constitution made possible and the State Council effected. Among them were the introduction of income tax and a tax on excess profits; the establishment of public utility concerns such as the State Mortgage Bank; the Bank of Ceylon and the Agricultural and Industrial Credit Corporation for the purpose of providing general banking and credit facilities for the small man; the modernization of local government law by the re-enactment of earlier Ordinances relating to urban councils and village communities; with alterations necessitated by changed circumstances; the creation of a new local authority; the town council; the regulation of motor transport; the establishment of a university and the starting and development of large-scale irrigation, agricultural, and colonization schemes.
To summarize the record of achievement of the State Council
' Cmd. 6677, p. 34, para. Io6, p. I 53. o Cmd.6677, p. 35, para. 109.
* Ibid., p. 36, paras. I, I2 and I 3.

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a 14 THE DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION
in the social sphere, one might say with Sir D. B. Jayatilaka, the first Leader of the State Council that: “As a matter of fact, is it an exaggeration to say that during the last nine years the State Council has done much more for the betterment of the country than was done in the previous ninety years? This record of social progress certainly justified the hopes of the Donoughmore Commissioners that the grant of universal suffrage would result in laying the foundations of an extensive scheme of social services for the island. Although the electorate itself did not ask for these benefits, the fact that candidates wanted the support of every voter, and councillors had to carry out election pledges necessitated the distribution of social benefits of value to the largest section of the electorate consisting of the poverty-stricken and illiterate. The constitution itself with its executive committees and its procedure for the whole Council to meet in executive session provided opportunities for every member to secure some share out of the pork barrel' for his constituents.
This constitution was the framework within which the agitation for its reform was carried on. Throughout the period (193I47), motions were moved and debated enthusiastically for this purpose in the State Council, memoranda were prepared and despatched by the Board of Ministers to the Secretary of State, and discussions and negotiations were carried on between the leaders of the majority and minority communities and also between the Governor and those leaders. It was, above all, the manner in which this constitution was worked in spite of its defects, that showed to the Imperial Government the capacity of the leaders and the people for self-government.
It should further be remembered that the constitution proved workable and was worked without causing serious deadlocks for sixteen years. This period included three or four years of a world war when the country was used as a base of offence and defence against powerful enemies. During these critical years Qf war, the civil affairs of the country were almost exclusively left by the military authorities in the hands of the Board of Ministers, and the ministers constituting the Board consulted their Executive Committees and the council observing, except at times of serious
Hansard for I940, vol. I, pp. 489-90.

THE DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION II.5.
emergency, the normal procedure laid down by the constitution. A constitution that can carry a country successfully through a period of war can never be described as unworkable."
This constitution was never intended to be a lasting one. No practical constitution-maker in recent times has ever thought of evolving a constitution for a country which was to last for all time. Framers of constitutions for colonies, above all, know that their constitutions are usually to be temporary stages in constitutional development. This was so in the case of the Donoughmore constitution too, for it was intended to be an intermediate stage between a colonial government characterized by a representative legislature with negligible executive powers and Dominion Status. Those parts of the constitution that have been most attacked, the Board of Ministers and the Executive Committee system, were intended to be a school of ministerial responsibility and political instruction and it carinot be said that these hopes of the planners of the constitution were not fulfilled.
If these considerations are kept in mind, judgment on the Donoughmore constitution will be less harsh than that of some recent critics. History may well rank this constitution far higher than contemporary observers, as it embodied bolder, more novel and far-reaching changes than any other Ceylonese constitution of the British period, including the constitution now in operation. For a final assessment of the Donoughmore Constitution one can do no better than quote the tribute of Mr. Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who in moving the second reading of the Ceylon Independence Bill in the House of Commons spoke as follows:
It is only necessary for me to mention the work of the Donoughmore Commission and the bold steps taken in the Constitution which emerged from that inquiry. It was an experiment in adult suffrage and in responsible democracy, and it contributed much to the political maturity and drive for effective democracy of the people of Ceylon. The system established by that Constitution worked for fifteen years without serious political trouble, and it stood the strain of a world war.'
ʻ 444 H.C. Deb. 5s column I 478,

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CHAPTER VI
AGITATION FOR THE REFORM OF THE DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION
AGITATION UP To I939
hroughout the period when this constitution was in operation, there was continual agitation for its reform. The agitation for reform came from different quarters and in certain cases began as soon as it was known that the recommendations of the Donoughmore Commissioners were to be carried out. When those recommendations were being considered there was an influential body of opinion against their acceptance on the ground that the constitution envisaged fell short of full responsible government: this body of opinion continued agitating after the constitution came into force, and with the passage of time gained in strength and numbers. The minorities, too, were disappointed as their earlier privileged position in the matter of representation was upset. Others soon joined the ranks of the critics of the constitution and among these were some who had accepted the constitution with a view to giving it a fair trial but were disappointed with its actual working.
The real movement for the reform of this constitution started with the so-called “Perera Resolutions which were moved by Mr. E. W. Perera, a private member, in July 1932 and dealt, among other questions, with the Governor's powers, the alleged dyarchy in the Board of Ministers and the Executive Committee system. Six of the seven resolutions moved by Mr. E. W. Perera on that occasion were passed by the State Council while the seventh, dealing with the reform of the Executive Committee system was rejected. In the course of the debate on these motions, Mr. Perera stated that: “We have to fight not with the carnal weapon but with the sword of public opinion and con
See above, pp. 58-6o. II6

REFORM OF DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION 117.
stitutional agitation,' thus laying down quite early in the story of this agitation the policy that was to be consistently followed for securing the reform of the constitution.
The 'Perera Resolutions' initiated a series of discussions between the ministers and the Governor which covered the period from I933 to the dissolution of the State Council at the beginning of I936. The ministers set out their position in two memoranda of 21st April 1933 and 28th July 1933. The chief alterations in the constitution which they advocated in these memoranda were the abolition of the three Officers of State, the reduction of the special powers efthe Governor, the altera tion of the method of election of ministers, the reconstitution of the Public Services Commission, the removal of the limitations on the Council's control over finance, and the amendment of the constitution to secure a greater control over the Public Service. On the question of the method of the election of ministers, they were not unanimous. The two ministers in the first Board, who belonged to the minority communities, did not want a change to the cabinet form of government because they felt that persons belonging to their communities had a greater chance of finding places in the Board of Ministers under the Executive Committee system than under the cabinet form of government. The proposals set out in their memorandum of 21st April 1933 were discussed in the State Council and accepted by a large majority on 15th November 1933. The most significant feature of this debate was that it provided one of the best illustrations for the period 1931-47 of a communal discussion in Council and a communal division. This period also saw the introduction of a bill by Mr. G. C. S. Corea“ to give effect to the “Perera Resolutions' which was subsequently withdrawn and the passage oftwo
Hansard for 1932, vol. I, pp. 1625-6. The memorandum of the ministers of 28th July 1933 was substantially the same as the memorandum of 21st April 1933, and was an attempt to reconcile certain differences between the Perera Resolutions and the position taken up by the ministers on the question of the election of the ministers.
See above, p. 62. Mr. G. C. S. Corea was the member for Chilaw during the period 193145. He was Minister for Labour, Industry and Commerce in the second State Council, but at the time he moved the Bill in question he was a private member.

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resolutions recommending the sending of deputations to England to interview the Secretary of State for a discussion of the question of reform of the constitution. In speaking on the first of the two motions relating to the sending of a deputation to the Secretary of State, Mr. E. A. P. Wijeratne, the mover, stated: By this proposal, I would like to say, Mr. Speaker, that we shall be taking perhaps the final step in the work of conciliatory constitutional agitation that we have been engaged in,' a comment which gives a further illustration of the method that was being adopted to achieve the reform of the constitution.
The position of two Governors of Ceylon during this period, Sir Graeme Thomson and Sir Edward Stubbs, and of the Secretary of State was that there should be no substantial alteration of the constitution at this stage. They took up this position. for three reasons. There was no unanimity in the country on the question of reform because of the opposition of the minorities to the reform proposals of the ministers. They did not wish to see any reduction in the powers of the Governor and the Secretary of State. Finally, they felt that the constitution should be given a longer trial. The Secretary of State for these reasons among others refused to receive a deputation from Ceylon for the purpose of discussing this matter. There was some justification for the argument based on minority disapproval: the two ministers belonging to the minority communities dissented from the ministers' memorandum referred to earlier on the question of the mode of election of ministers; the minorities as a whole manifested their disagreement from these proposals for reform by voting as a body against the ministers' memorandum of April 1933; and the Tamil and Muslim minorities sent to the Secretary of State a joint statement of their views on the general question of reform on 8th June 1935, which clearly showed that they were averse to changes on the lines proposed by the ministers.
The next stage in this agitation was reached after the second general election under the Donoughmore constitution, with the
Hansard for 1933, vol. II. p. 2177. Mr. Wijeratne was member for Kegalla in the first State Council and was selected in 1948 as Minister of Home Affairs and Rural Reconstruction.
g

REFORM OF DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION 119
submission to the Governor by the new Board of Ministers of their memorandum on reform dated 19th March 1937. For this memorandum the ministers had the support of the entire Board and thought, therefore, that the absence ofunanimityin the Board on the question of constitutional reform, one of the arguments urged against previous proposals of reform by the Secretary of State, would no longer be used against them. In fact, according to Sir D. B. Jayatilaka, the Vice-Chairman of that Board, it was deliberately constituted to exclude minority representatives and others who held views opposed to the views of the leaders of the majority community on the question of reforms in order to meet that argument. The Secretary of State was, however, not convinced by the unanimous support which this memorandum had received from the Board of Ministers, as he discovered that this support was not an expression of the opinion on this matter of the minorities who were opposed to some of the more important proposals of the Board, and particularly to their suggestions as to the method of election of the ministers. The chief difference between this memorandum and the memorandum of I933 was that while in the former the ministers strongly advocated the replacement of the Executive Committee system by the cabinet form of government, in the latter there was no proposal for the abolition of the committee system. In other respects the proposals embodied in the three memoranda were much the same.
In 1938 as a result of a request from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Andrew Caldecott, Governor of Ceylon, went over the whole question of constitutional reform in the island very carefully with representatives of the majority and minority communities and prepared a “Reforms Despatch' embodying his considered conclusions on that question which was sent to the Secretary of State. The common characteristic between the ministers' memorandum of March 1937 and the despatch was that both edocuments advocated the substitution of cabinet government for the committee system. But agreement seemed to
Cmd. 6677, p. 19, para. 58.
* Correspondence between the Ministers and the Governor regarding the Ceylon Constitution, March-May 1937; Ceylon Sessional Paper XI of 1937.
This “Reforms Despatch published in Cmd. 59Io.

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stop there for over important issues like the special powers of the Governor, the future of the Officers of State and the composition of the Public Services Commission, the views of the ministers and the Governor differed strongly. The Governor desired that his existing powers should be retained, notwithstanding the fact that the chief inspiration of the reform movement was derived from the urge to make the Governor's powers under the constitution negligible. This despatch was debated in the State Council in 1939 but most of the proposals set out in it were vigorously attacked and rejected by the councillors.
AGITATION DURING THE PERIOD I939-47
The next stage in this agitation was reached in 194o when the question of whether the life of the Council was to be continued came up for decision as a result of the outbreak and possible long continuance of the second world war. As this question was mixed up with the question of whether or not the next elections were to be contested under a new constitution, a matter which the Imperial Government felt could not be adequately dealt with in the immediate future, it was decided to postpone the elections for two years, in the hope of reaching in the interval some decision on the constitutional issues.
But the continuance of the war, its increasing seriousness, and its extension to the East meant that a comprehensive study of the question of the reform of the constitution would not be possible within the prescribed two years. But a further postponement, without an official and definite declaration from the Imperial Government as to its attitude to this question, might have resulted in a constitutional crisis, and accordingly the declaration of 194I of the Secretary of State was made. This declaration which was communicated by the Governor to the Board of Ministers on Ist September 1941 ranas follows:
His Majesty's Government have had under further consideration the question of constitutional reform in Ceylon. The urgency and importance of reform of the constitution are fully recognized by His Majesty's Government; but before taking decisions upon the present proposals for reform, con

REFORM OF DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION 2 .
cerning which there has been so little unanimity but which are of such importance to the well-being of Ceylon, His Majesty's Government would desire that the position be further examined and made the subject of further consultation by means of a Commission or Conference. The Board of Ministers will appreciate that this cannot be arranged under war conditions, but the matter will be taken up with the least possible delay after the war.’
The ministers, the Council and the country in general were very disappointed with this declaration. In spite of the fact that the reform agitation had been dragging on for years, there was no specific statement about Ceylon's future constitutional status in this declaration. The course of the second world war, the reasons for Britain's participation in it, and the whole-hearted assistance given by Ceylon to the Allied war effort, had led the country's politicians to hope that the declaration would contain a definite promise of substantial constitutional advances. This hope and the fact that the reform agitation had changed during the past few years from a movement for certain amendments in the 1931. Order in Council to a demand for Dominion Status made their disappointment even greater. The absence of any time limit within which these matters were to be decided, and the stipulation that the whole question would have to be re-examined by a commission or conference also disappointed greatly the ministers and the Council. Their view was that the constitutional problem had been closely considered both from their point of view and from Britain's standpoint during the last few years and that nothing would be gained by such a re-examination. They also felt that the postponement of the constitutional inquiry till after the war meant an indefinite postponement because in 194I there appeared to be very little prospect of an early conclusion of the war. This declaration meant also the further postponement of the elections, a matter which the ministers were not anxious to place before the country as it might be interpreted as an attempt by them to cling to office. O
The entrance of Japan into the war in December 194I and her spectacular successes in the Far East which made Ceylon a

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front-rank bastion of defence brought matters in the country to a head and on I oth February 1942 a message of the Secretary of State further postponing the date of the holding of the general elections was communicated to the Council. This message resulted in a motion of no-confidence in the ministers being moved in the Council, as there was the feeling among a certain section that the continued failure to secure amendments in the constitution was due to the vacillating policy of the ministers. The motion of no-confidence was, however, rejected by the Council by a large majority. In spite of the 1941 declaration, and the postponement of the elections, the agitation for reform was continued and when it was heard that a mission led by Sir Stafford Cripps was coming over to India to inquire into the Indian problem, the State Council, on 26th March 1942, passed a resolution requesting him either to visit Ceylon and investigate her constitutional problems or receive a delegation in India for the purpose. But Sir Stafford was unable to visit Ceylon at this time.
The strategic importance of Ceylon with the fall of Singapore in 1942 and the imperative need to keep her loyalin a deteriorating world situation forced Britain, on representations made by the Governor and the ministers, to make a more specific declaration about her attitude towards Ceylon's future constitutional status. In these circumstances the momentous declaration of May 1943 was made. This declaration was important, as there was disagreement about its interpretation between the Ceylon ministers and the Imperial Government and because it was the framework within which both the Ministers and the Soulbury Commissioners worked when they evolved their schemes for Ceylon's future constitution.
The portions of the 1943 declaration that are important for the purposes of this chapter are as follows:
(1) The post-war re-examination of the reform of the Ceylon Constitution, to which His Majesty's Government stands pledged, will be directed towards the grant to Ceylon by Order of His Majesty in Council, of full responsible Government under the Crown in all matters of internal civil

REFORM OF DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION 123
administration. . . . (7) The framing of a Constitution in accordance with the terms of this declaration will require such examination of detail and such precision of definition as cannot be brought to bear so long as the whole of the energies of the Service and other Departments of His Majesty's Government must remain focused on the successful prosecution of the war. His Majesty's Government will, however, once victory is achieved, proceed to examine by suitable Commission or Conference such detailed proposals as the Ministers may in the meantime have been able to formulate in the way of a complete constitutional scheme, 'subject to the clear understanding that acceptance by His Majesty's Government of any proposals will depend: ッ
First, upon His Majesty's Government being satisfied that they are in full compliance with the preceding portions of this Statement.
Secondly, upon their subsequent approval by threequarters of all Members of the State Council of Ceylon, excluding the Officers of State and the Speaker or other presiding officer. . . .'
This declaration was a great advance on the declaration of I94I. In it was embodied, in contrast with the earlier declaration, a definite pledge about the country's future constitutional status, which according to this later declaration was “full responsible Government under the Crown in all matters of internal civil administration. In further contrast with the earlier declaration, it was positive in character in that it assigned to the ministers the specific duty of formulating a constitutional scheme subject to the various limitations set out in the declaration.
Finally, according to the view of the ministers, which was subsequently not supported by the Imperial Government, the
1 389 H.C. Deb. 5s. columns I 555-57. These limitations were firstly the control of the Imperial Government over matters of defence and foreign affairs and secondly certain special powers of the Governor which included powers of positive enactment in some matters and the power to reserve bills relating to certain subjects.
K

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work of the proposed commission was limited to an examination of their constitutional scheme.
Before proceeding to prepare the constitutional scheme referred to in the 1943 declaration, the ministers placed before the Secretary of State their interpretations of that declaration and received a reply from him that there was nothing in those interpretations which was “essentially irreconcilable with the conditions laid down in the I943 declaration. In view of this statement the ministers prepared a draft constitution which was transmitted to the Secretary of State in 1944 and soon afterwards pressed for an imrhediate consideration of this draft, stating that certain urgent local circumstances, including the prospect of a general election in 1945, demanded a decision on this question far earlier than the conclusion of the war as stipulated in the 194I and 1943 declarations. In view of persistent pressure by the ministers, the Secretary of State stated on 5th July 1944 that the Imperial Government had decided to appoint a commission which was to come over to Ceylon at the end of the year to examine the ministers' draft constitution as well as consult and interrogate other interests in the country such as the representatives of the minority communities. This last statement was regarded by the ministers as a violation of the Ig43 declaration as their view was that according to that declaration the intended commission was to examine and decide upon their draft constitution only and that the declaration did not provide for any consultation of minority interests. They urged in support of their view the consideration, to which some reference has already been made, that previous to the preparation of their draft constitution, they had presented for elucidation by the Imperial Government certain interpretations of the declaration and had received from the Secretary of State himself the assurance that there was nothing inconsistent between those interpretations and the declaration. In fact a close scrutiny of that declaration would show that there was considerable justification for the position taken up by the ministers: there was
This constitution was published in the Ceylon Sessional Paper entitled The Reform of the Constitution, XIV of 1944.
* 4oI, H.C. Deb. 5s. column I I43.

REFORM OF DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION 125
no express reference at all in the declaration providing for the commission or conference to consult minority interests,also. The vicw taken up by the Imperial Government, however, was that the 1943 declaration should be read along with the 1941 declaration and that the latter declaration while providing for consultation by commission, did not limit the powers of investigation of the commission. It was also stated on its behalf that the absence of a provision relating to consultation with such interests in the I943 declaration should not be taken as precluding such consultation. Further, it was stated that the procedure adopted by the ministers in preparing their draft without conferring with the minorities justified the proposal that these interests should be consulted and questioned by the commission. These arguments would show that, if the 1943 declaration was to be taken at its face value, the view of the ministers thaf the statement of 5th July 1944 was inconsistent with the 1943 declaration was the more correct. That this was the sounder view was indirectly admitted by the Soulbury Commissioners themselves when they stated in their report, when commenting on this matter, that 'little progress can be made in public affairs by strict adherence to the letter of documents and complete neglect of the spirit of compromise'. From the point of view of general expediency, however, it was extremely wise for the commissioners to have consulted the minority interests. This was particularly so as their final recommendations substantially endorsed the proposals of the ministers and, had the commissioners not given the minorities a hearing, it would have been stated that a verdict had been given against them without their case being heard. As the ministers felt that they had been let down by the Imperial Government in this matter, they withdrew their constitution and decided that thęy would neither officially nor as a body give evidence before the proposed commission.
The agitation was continued and in November 1944 the State Council accepted a resolution directing the ministers “to introduce forthwith a bill providing for a constitution ofa recognized
'Appointment of Soulbury Commission, by Dr. (now Sir) Ivor Jennings in University of Ceylon Review, vol III, No. 2, p. 17.
” Cmd. 6677, p. 31, para. 9 I.

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Dominion type for a Sri Lanka'. The ministers' bill which was popularly known as the Sri Lanka Bill, giving effect to this resolution was passed by a large majority in March 1945.”
A commission consisting of Lord Soulbury, Sir J. F. Rees and Mr. (now Sir) F. J. Burrows was appointed in late 1944 in pursuance of the statement of 5th July 1944. The members of this commission, like the members of the earlier Donoughmore Commission, were particularly qualified for the task of framing a constitution. Lord Soulbury had a distinguished parliamentary and ministerial record: he had been Minister for Pensions, First Commissioner of Works and President of the Board of Education. Sir J. F. Rees, like a member of the earlier commission, was a university don; while Mr. (now Sir) F. J. Burrows was a Labour Member of Parliament, with a first-hand knowledge of working-class conditions and trade union organization. They arrived in Ceylon in December 1944, and returned to England, after interviewing various deputations representative of all shades of opinion in the country, in April 1945.
The ministers as a body did not give evidence before the commission but their draft constitution, with an explanatory memorandum, was published as a sessional paper and was of great assistance to the commissioners in framing their recommendations. These were presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in September 1945. A White Paper setting out the proposed constitution for Ceylon, which was based on the Soulbury recommendations, was issued in October 1945 and the question of the acceptance of this constitution was debated in the State Council and accepted by a very large majority in November 1945. The Order in Council providing the legal framework of this constitution was issued in May 1946.
But the leaders of the country, encouraged by the declarations made by the British Government about Dominion Status and independence for India and Burma, agitated for full Dominion Status and on 18th June 1947, as a result of this further agita
Hansard for 1944, vol. II, p. 2707. * Hansard for 1945, vol. I, column 2066.
Reform of the Constitution: Ceylon Sessional Paper XIV of 1944. 4 Cmd. 66go.

REFORM OF DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION 127
tion, a declaration was made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Parliament that as soon as necessary agreements had been negotiated and concluded on terms satisfactory to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Ceylon, immediate steps would be taken to confer upon Ceylon full responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations. On IIth November 1947, shortly after the formation of the cabinet under the new constitution, these agreements were signed and soon afterwards the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, became law, thus completing the legal structure of the new Dominion of Ceylon.
These facts will show that Ceylon's progress from semiresponsible government to Dominion Status has been comparatively peaceful. During the same period in India and Burma the constitutional struggle was characterized by civil disobedience, arrests, communal riots, acts of terrorism, sabotage, fifth column activity, and collaboration with the enemy. No such acts marred Ceylon's progress towards Dominion Status. As in the period I907-31 the agitation for reform was continued on strictly constitutional and peaceful lines. Even at times when the relations between the Imperial Government and the State Council were most strained, the leaders in Ceylon preferred to express their dissatisfaction by constitutional methods, by moving, for instance, a motion of protest in the State Council against the actions of the Secretary of State as they did when the Ceylon (State Council) Amendment Order in Council, 1937, was issued, or a motion condemning the Governor which took place when he upheld the actions of the Inspector-General of Police in the course of the Mooloya crisis, or at worst by the elected ministers resigning as happened in February 1940 over that same crisis. The pressure was exerted chiefly by the passing of reform resolutions in the Council, discussions between Governors and leaders of majority and minority communities, the preparation and publication of memoranda and reform despatches by Governors and ministers, agitation for the purpose of sending deputations to the Secretary of State to place
Hansard for 1938, vol. I, p. 74. * Hansard for 1940, vol. I, p. 488.

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Ceylon's case directly before the Imperial Government, and the introduction and discussion of bills embodying the proposed constitutional reforms. Agitation in the State Council and through official sources was repeated in the two chief newspapers in Ceylon, the Ceylon Daily News and The Times of Ceylon, and by political organizations like the Ceylon National Congress and the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress. In short, one might say with Sir Henry Moore a Governor of Ceylon that: “It is a matter for profound satisfaction that Ceylon has reached its goal of freedom without strife or bloodshed along the path of peaceful negotiation.'
Sir Henry Moore was the Governor of Ceylon up to 4th February 1948
and subsequently the first Governor-General of the new Dominion of
Ceylon.
o Deb H. of R., 1947, vol. I, No. 4, col. 3o.

CHAPTER VIII
THE CONSTITUTION OF 948
Yhe constitution that came into operation on 4th February 1948 was immediately preceded by the shortlived constitution which gave effect to the decisions embodied in the White Paper of October 1945. This latter constitution was based on the recommendations of the Soulbury Commissioners which were in turn substantially derived from the ministers' draft constitutional scheme of I944. This constitution as a stage on the road to self-government was a great advance on the Donoughmore constitution and was in this respect even ahead of the constitution envisaged by the Soulbury recommendations. It went further than the Ponoughmore constitution, principally because the powers and functions of the Governor were considerably less than under the Donoughmore constitution. Under the constitution that was superseded in February 1948, the Governor's powers of reservation were considerably narrower than under the Donoughmore constitution. While under the latter constitution the Governor could reserve any bill and was compelled to reserve bills amending the constitution, under the former there were only seven classes of bills in respect of which the Governor could exercise his powers of reservation. A number of other powers which the Governor had under the earlier constitution also ceased to exist under the later one. Thus under the later constitution, the Governor did not have the power to enact laws himself in the interests of public order, public faith, the essentials of good government or to give effect to the constitution itself. Three provisions in the 1931. Order in Council did not appear in the later constitution: those which gave the Governor the power to postpone the operation of a bill to refer back a bill for the further consideration of the Council together with any amendments that he may con
See abdve, p. 124 and note in that page.
I 29

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(Section 5 of the Dom. Cons.) The Governor had already been deprived of most of his powers in connection with the legislature and legislation. Of his remaining powers only two of any importance remained: his power to reserve bills and his powers in regard to summoning, proroguing and dissolving the legislature. With the conferment of Dominion Status, the provisions relating to the reservation of bills were abolished but the constitution provided that the Governor-General was the authority to summon, prorogue, or dissolve Parliament (Section I5). The constitution also gave the power to the Governor-General to make certain appointments. The most important of these appointments were: the Senators; six members of the House of Representatives to represent interests that have not been represented or have been inadequately represented; members of the Delimitation Commission; members of the Judicial Service Commissioh other than its Chairman who was the Chief Justice, and the members of the Public Service Commission (Sections Io, II, 40 (2), 53 and 58). In making these appointments the Governor-General would consult the Prime Minister. The constitution also provided that the Governor-General should appoint the cabinet (Section 46), but in making cabinet appointments he was governed by the British conventions of cabinet government which meant that he was obliged to appoint as his prime minister the leader of the party that had the greatest following in Parliament and, as his other cabinet ministers, persons selected for the purpose by the prime minister. All these changes can aptly be summarized by saying that in place of a Governor who represented the Government of the United Kingdom as well as His Majesty the King, there was now a Governor-General who represented His Majesty alone.
In place of the unicameral legislature of the Donoughmore constitution, the Dominion constitution of Ceylon provided for a bicameral legislature consisting of a House of Representatives and a Senate.
See above, pp. I29, I 3O.
* The sections referred to in this page and the succeeding pages are sections of the Dom. Cons.
The Independence of Ceylon: Ceylon Sessional Paper XXII of 1947, p. 7, para. I3.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 133
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Under the constitution the number of members of the House of Representatives could vary. It provided that this House was to 'consist of the members elected by the electors of the several electoral districts constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Order (Section II); but the number of electoral districts was not fixed, as that constitution made provision for the periodic division of provinces into districts after each general census, the number being determined by population, a fluctuating quantity, and by area (Sections 40 and 4I). As there was a general census in 1946, it was possible to specify in the constitution itself the number of members of the first House of Representatives; and it provided that there were to be ninety-five members elected for territorial constituencies and six members appointed by the GovernorGeneral to represent interests that had not been represented or were inadequately represented (Section 74). Although communal representation which had been abolished under the I93I constitution was not restored, some indirect concessions were made to minority feeling by the increase in the total number of seats (as compared with the number of seats in the legislature under the Donoughmore constitution), by the provision of an extra seat for each I,ooo square miles of territory (Section 4I (2)), by the creation of multi-member constituencies (Section 4 I (5)), and by the power given to the Delimitation Commission that where there was in any area of a province a substantial concentration of persons united by a community of interests, whether racial, religious or otherwise, but differing in one or more of these respects from the majority of the inhabitants of that area, it could divide that province to give representation to those interests (Section 41 (4)). The chief principles underlying these concessions were derived from the minister's draft constitutional scheme of 1944. The ministers believed that For number of seats under the 1931 Constitution, see above, p. 6o. Reform of the Constitution: Ceylon Sessional Paper XIV of 1944, pp. 4-5, paras. 5-9; p. I2, Articles I 3-I8.
* These proposals relating to representation were supported by all the
ministers of that time except Mr. (later Sir) A. Mahadeva, the only member of a minority community in the Board.

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their proposals relating to representation which were embodied in their scheme would result in the election of fifty-eight Sinhalese representatives and thirty-seven minority representatives. These minority representatives, according to the ministers, would be distributed as follows: Ceylon Tamils, fifteen; Indian Tamils, fourteen; Muslims eight. The All-Ceylon Tamil Congress, a communal organization that protested strongly against those proposals, surmised that they would result in securing at most only twenty-nine seats for the minorities. The 1947 elections proved that their guess was almost correct for twenty-seven minority representatives gained seats in these elections, their distribution being thirteen Ceylon Tamils, seven Indian Tamils, six Muslims and one Burgher.
The franchise remained substantially the same as it was under the Donoughmore constitution. The manner of voting was, however, altered för in place of the coloured ballot box system there wạs substituted a method of voting"by which each voter was given a ballot paper printed with the symbols assigned to the candidates on nomination day and the voter was expected to place a mark against the candidate of his choice. This method was a stage halfway between the coloured ballot box system and the method in use in most European countries where voters exercise their votes by marking a ballot paper printed only with the names of the candidates. This latter system was not as yet fully suitable for Ceylon as a large number of the voters was still unable to read the names of candidates on ballót papers and wanted some other visual means of identifying the candidates of their choice. The working of this system in the Ig47 elections proved successful and although it was feared that marking ballot papers would result in a fair number of rejected votes, the percentage of such votes in the elections was only 2:25.
The number of voters who polled in the eighty-eight contested electoral districts were 1,705,369, being 56.2 per cent of the
Cmd. 6677, p. 73, para. 27o.
* For some of the reasons that contributed towards this change see above, p. 56. .
Report of the First Parliamentary General Election, 1947: Ceylon Sessional Paper VI of 1948, p. 5.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I35
electorate. This percentage was slightly less than that for the 1931 elections and slightly more than that for the 1936 elections. The largest percentage of votes polled in the course of these elections was 775 per cent for the Matugama constituency, and the smallest was 35.8 per cent for the Bingiriya constituency; these figures were better than the highest and the lowest percentages for the 1936 elections. Their significance lies in the fact that voters, the large majority of whom were illiterate, have proved by exercising their votes that they are alive to their public obligations."
In considering these elections one'should note that one of the features was the large number of election petitions filed against successful candidates. The number of such petitions was nineteen, whereas during the last fifty years there have only been thirty-six election petitions in Britain and none of these relates to the period after 1930. Moreover, since the number of constituencies in the United Kingdom is a little more than six times that of Ceylon, the conclusion will be that the number for Ceylon is very large. It will appear that corrupt and illegal practices, which are the chief reasons for election petitions, are far more prevalent in the conduct of elections in Ceylon than they are for the British House of Commons. A number of reasons may be assigned for this. The absence of well-organized parties in the country has been given as the cause for the excessive number of election petitions, for a developed party system restricts the opportunities for the sort of individual or smallscale bargaining characteristic of Ceylon elections. Further, under that system, the vote is given for the party rather than for
Report on the First Parliamentary General Election, 1947: Ceylon Sessional Paper VI of 1948, p. 6.
* See above, p. 56.
Report on the First Parliamentary General Election, 1947: Ceylon Sessional Paper VI of 1948, p. 6.
See above, p. 56.
See above, pp. 57, 58.
Report on First Parliamentary Election, 1947: Ceylon Sessional Paper VI, І948, p. 7.
This information was obtained from Mr. E. A. Fellowes, second Clerk Assistant to the House of Commons and it was extracted from the Journals of the House.

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the individual, and personal influence coupled with corrupt practice cannot therefore substantially affect the issue. It seems that before the vote can be used satisfactorily by the entire electorate there must be a long tradition about its proper use. Some account should, however, be given to the fact that some of these petitions are based on very flimsy evidence, and as such a number of them have been unsuccessful. This last consideration arises out of the inability of the unsuccessful candidates to take defeat gracefully, in marked contrast with Britain where the capacity to take failure in good spirit is a long-established tradition derived at least in part from the code governing sport. In this connection it should also be remembered that British elections were equally, or even more, corrupt in the eighteenth century. It is possible that with the passage of time and with the imposition of heavier penalties for corrupt and illegal practices the number of election petitions will considerably decrease.
The provisions relating to qualifications and disqualifications for membership of the House of Representatives were different in certain minor respects from those governing membership of the State Council. Thus the knowledge of English, which had been a necessary qualification for the election of a State Councillor, was not a qualification for election to the House of Représentatives, this change appropriately recognizing the national awakening in the country. The disqualification relating to the holding of government contracts was tightened up, while the scope of the disqualification in regard to imprisonment was widened by the inclusion of a specified period after the expiry of the sentence within the period of disqualification in spite of an express resolution of the State Council against this alteration. An entirely new disqualification, rendering ineligible for membership persons who had been proved to have accepted bribes that had been offered to influence their actions as members of the legislature, was also included.' 1 Cf. Article 9 (d) of the I93I Order in Council with Section 13 (3) (c) and (d) of the Dom. Cons.
* Cf. Article 9 (f) of the 1931. Order in Council with Section 13 (3) (f) of the 1946 Order in Council.
Hansard for 1947, column 1486. Article 13 (3) (k) of the Dom. WCons.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I 37
This disqualification was introduted through the desire to keep out of the legislature persons whose reputations had been tarnished and was probably the sequel to the appointment and findings of the Bribery Commission of 1943. Otherwise, the qualifications for membership were substantially the same as they were under the Donoughmore constitution.
A feature of the general elections of 1947 was that they were the first to be fought on party lines. There was no encouragement of the growth of the party system in Ceylon. Neither the 1923 Order in Council, which did not provide for an executive authority consisting of elected ministers, nor the 1931 Order in Council, which provided for the peculiar executive committee system allowed the formation of a cabinet of the British type. Of the numerous parties or groups that putforward candidates for those elections, none could be said to have had a corporate existence or an organization akin to the British parties. Two, however, of these Ceylon parties could claim an existence that dated back over five years. These were the Lanka Sama Samajist Party, consisting of a group of persons holding extreme leftist views, which had two representatives in the second State Council, and the Ceylon Labour Party which went back to preDonoughmore days.
The party that secured the largest number of represertatives in the lower house was the United National Party, an organization that came into being when it was foreseen that the Imperial Government would give the country a constitution embodying the principles of British cabinet government. In October I947, the United National Party had forty-two seats in the new House of Representatives. In addition to the Lanka Sama Samajist Party, there were two other parties with pronounced leftist views, the Bolshevist-Leninist Party consisting of persons who may be described as the Ceylon Trotskyists, and the Ceylon Communist Party which borrowed its principles and derived its
This party has altered its designation since the general elections of 1947 to Bolshevist Sama Samajaya Party, because its leaders felt that a title which incorporated the Sinhalese expression “Sama Samajaya” had greater meaning and significance and richer connotation in an oriental country than the earlier name.

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inspiration from the official Communist Party in Russia. These three leftist parties to the surprise of many were able to secure eighteen seats in the House of Representatives but, in spite of the talent of some of their number, their significance as an opposition group is diminished by the fact that these three parties cannot unite and have allowed differences, which appear to the detached observer academic and theoretical, to keep them apart. It is useful to observe here that the political programmes of these leftist parties had little meaning to the greater part of the electorate and that the success of their leaders in these elections was largely due to their personal qualities and the popularity of their friends and relations in various constituencies. In this connection, it should be noted that the Ceylon House of Representatives is the first legislature in which Trotskyite adherents have found representation. Of the other parties, the Ceylon Tamil Congress and the Ceylon Indian Congress, two communal organizations secured seven and six seats respectively, and the Ceylon Labour Party one seat. In addition to these parties or groups, a number of candidates came forward as independent candidates and twenty-one such candidates were elected. According to one authority of eminence who analysed these elections their most significant feature was “the slaughter of the independents. His figures show that no less than one hundred and ninety-six candidates contested constituencies as independents: of these, one hundred and four lost their deposits and only twenty-two were elected. The view of that authority is that the failure of the independents is a healthy sign as it shows that policy is becoming more important than personality and this portends well for the growth of a party system.
In considering the character of the new House of Representatives it is useful to note, that like the two State Councils, it is a predominantly bourgeois house and, although there are in it a fair proportion of leftist members, nearly all of them belong to the middle class.
Dr. (now Sir) Ivor Jennings in an article on "the House of Representatives' in the Ceylon Daily News of 14th October 1947. The number of Independents, according to the fournal of the Parliaments of the Empire, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (October 947), p. 679, was 2I.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 139
The duration of the House of Representatives is to be five years, unless Parliament, should be dissolved sooner (Section
I II (5) ).
SENATE
Although the Donoughmore Commissioners thought that the establishment of a second chamber was inexpedient, the Soulbury Commissioners recommended its creation. Among the reasons which they gave for this recommendation were the desire to harness for public purposes the services ofeminent and mature persons who would otherwise not undertake political activity because of their aversion from entering it by the way of the rough and tumble of a parliamentary election. There was also the view that a second chamber was a useful minority safeguard, the need for a cheek against hasty legislation, and also the fact that there were second chambers in all the self-governing members of the British Empire and in most of the large states of the world. They were very much exercised, as were the Donoughmore Commissioners, with the method of its composition and finally, after considering the suitability of various systems, they decided in favour of a chamber on the model of the Burmese Senate of the 1937 constitution, that is, a House, one-half of which was elected and the other half nominated. The Ceylon Senate, according to the constitution, was to consist of thirty members, fifteen of whom were to be elected by the members of the House of Representatives by single transferable vote and the remainder to be appointed by the Governor-General (Sections 9 and Io). In regard to the appointed members, it was provided that the Governor-General in making his selections should 'endeavour to appoint persons whom he is satisfied have rendered distinguished public service or are persons of eminence in professional, commercial, industrial or agricultural life, including education, law, medicine, science, engineering and banking' (Section Io (3)). A person to be a senator is obliged to satisfy all the qualifications neces
' Cmd. 33 I, pp. 38-4o. * Cmd. 6677, pp. 78-9.

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sary for membership of the House of Representatives and to be in addition not less than 35 years of age (Section 13 (2)).
The constitution provided that the Senate was to be a permanent body and that the term of office of a senator was not to be affected by reason of a dissolution of Parliament (Section 8 (2)). It further provided that one-third of the senators were to retire every second year (Section 8 (3)).
Its powers were even narrower than those of the British House of Lords: in the case of money bills, the Ceylon Senate could merely delay, such bills for one month (Section 33), and in the case of other bills, it could exercise a suspensive veto of not more than one year (Section 34), as opposed to the then existing veto of two years to the British House of Lords. The power of this House was further limited by the definition given to a money bill which was narrower than the definition of such a bill embodied in the Parliament Act of 1911 (Section 3I).
As mentioned earlier, the Ceylon Senate was one of the novel features of the new constitution. This device had not been incorporated in any previous constitution. As the question of a second chamber was a very controversial issue, the ministers in their draft constitution of 1944 left the matter open to be decided by the single-chamber assembly which they expressly provided for. The Soulbury Commissioners, however, decided in favour of an upper house. In the matter of its constitution and composition it is superior to many other colonial second chambers, as it is a balanced institution, built on the dual principles of nomination and election, but its powers are so limited that it may be doubted whether it is likely to play a very effective part.
LEGIS LATIVE POWERS OF PARLIAMENT
The legislative powers of the Ceylon Parliament were derived from the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946 (as amended by subsequent Orders in Council), and the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament. This Order in Council provided that, subject to its provisions, the Parliament in Ceylon was to have the power to
1 I I Geo. 6, ch. 7.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I4I
make laws for the peace, order and good government of the island (Section 29 (I)). We have seen that many of the earlier limitations on the capacity of the Ceylon Legislature, especially those represented by the Governor's powers, were removed when the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, was first promulgated. Even after Dominion Status was achieved certain minor limitations were continued as religious, minority and financial safeguards. These restrictions could, however, be removed by virtue of the power of amending this Order in Council which was expressly provided for in the Order itself, the only requirement being the general stipulation for all amendments that they should receive the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of the House of Representatives (Section 29 (4)). The Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, should be regarded as the island's charter of legislative freedom, as it removed all those vital limitations which had in the past restricted the competence and capacity of the country's various legislatures. ' عر
This Act was carefully scrutinized by the members of the British Parliament during its passage there' and by the members of the Ceylon Parliament where a Government motion relating to the attainment of independence was discussed and accepted. In the Ceylon Parliament the position was taken up by the various opposition parties or groups that this Act did not confer complete legislative competence to the Ceylon Parliament and that the powers of that Parliament were less extensive than those of some of the other Dominions such as the Dominions of India and Pakistan. As there is considerable uneasiness in certain quarters as to the implications of this Act, and it is of the greatest importance to dispel such suspicions, an attempt is made here to examine its significance and to make a close comparison between that Act on the one hand and the
See above, pp. 129, 130. * Sections 29 (2) and 39 of Dom. Cons., for the relevant provisions of these sections see Appendix C.
For debate on the vital second reading of the Bill in the House of Commons, see 444 H.C. Deb. 55, columns I 477-524. e
* Deb. H. of R., I 947, vol. I, Nos. 8-Io, columns 437-74o; Deb. Sønate, I947, columns I6-295, 302-4oo.

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Statute of Westminster, 1931, and the Indian Independence Act, I947, on the other.
If a comparison is made with the Statute of Westminster, the following principal differences will be observed:
(a) The long title of one Act differs from that of the other. (b) While the English Act has a preamble, there is no preamble to the Ceylon Act.
(c) While the English Act refers to Dominions', the Ceylon Act merely refers to Ceylon. W
(d) The dates of operation of the two Acts are different. (e) The phraseology of the provisions in the two Acts relating to extra-territorial powers is not the same.
(f) There are a number of provisions in each Act which do not appear in the other.
In regard to the first two differences, they arise out of the circumstances and events that brought about the two Acts. The earlier Act, as the long title and preamble suggest, gave effect to certain decisions reached at imperial conferences where it was decided that some of these decisions were to be given legislative effect by being embodied in a statute. The long title of the Ceylon Act enshrines the significant words of the now famous declaration made in the British House of Commons on I8th June 1947 which declared that as soon as the necessary agreements had been negotiated and concluded on terms satisfactory to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Ceylon, immediate steps would be taken to confer upon Ceylon full responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations. This announcement was one of the final stages in Ceylon's journey towards self-government. As these differences do not appear
22 Geo. 5, C.4. محم
* Io and II Geo. 6, ch. 3o. The new republican status of India will not necessitate a change in the substance of this argument. The fact that there were differences between the Indian and Ceylon Acts at the time they were enacted will be the subject of criticism always and used to show the limitations in the Ceylon Act. Although by reason of India's new status, the Indian Act will cease to have its earlier significance as the charter of legislative freedom of India's legislature, it will continue to operate in relation to Pakistan.
Hence the thesis elaborated in the following pages will always remain a valid answer to all critics.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I43
in the substantive portions of the Acts which are the sections, they are of little legal significance. Since the phraseology of the sections is quite clear, the preamble and titles are not evėnuseful for the purpose of interpreting the other portions of the Acts. The third difference, too, is of no validity from the point of view of legislative competence. The use of the expression "Dominion in the Statute of Westminster is not an attempt to confer any special constitutional status on a particular territory. As Section I of that Act will show, it is merely a draftsman's convenient device by definition to avoid repeating a long expression Consisting of the names and numbers of territories tỏ which the Act refers. Such an expedient was unnecessary in the case of the later Act as it referred only to Ceylon.
The fourth difference is also of no importance from this point of view. Its significance lay in the fact that thę first Act was to take effect as soon as it was enacted while the later Act was to come into operation on a date subsequent to its enactment.
The difference in phraseology in regard to the provisions relating to the extra-territorial operation of legislation does not subtract any power from the Ceylon Parliament. While the provision in the English statute is declaratory, the corresponding provision in the Ceylon Act confers powers and this distinction is probably the result of history for most of the powers embodied in the Statute of Westminster were customary powers of long standing and the Statute merely declared the law and usage.
In regard to the additional provisions which are included in the earlier Act, it should be noted that these provisions are of particular application to the special circumstances of certain Dominions and are of no relevance at all to Ceylon. These pro
Section 3 of the Statute of Westminster runs as follows: "It is hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament of a Dominion has full power to make laws having extra-territorial operation.'
* Paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the Ceylon Act which embodies this power runs as follows: “The Parliament of Ceylon shall have full power to make laws having extra-territorial operation.
Sections 7-1o of the Statute of Westminster are the additional provisions and relate to the federal systems in Canada and Australia, the Constitution Acts of Australia and New Zealand and the question of the adoption of the principal sections of the Act by Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland.

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visions have nothing to do with general questions relating to legislative powers. In respect of the extra provisions appearing in the Ceylon Independence Act, their significance lies in the fact that far from having any restrictive value, they contribute towards Dominion Status by making certain necessary amendments in other legislation applicable to Ceylon or by enabling these to be made. Further, Section I (2) of the Ceylon Independence Act, which is another additional provision, by stating that from the appointed day His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall have no responsibility for the government of Ceylon', is a declaration of independence. Furthermore, Section 3 of the Ceylon Act which deals with the divorce of persons having United Kingdom domicile, has no restrictive or limiting effect.
If the Ceylon Act is compared with the Indian Independence Act, the following are some of the important differences that may be noted. It is useful in this connection to see whether an argument based on these differences can be urged to prove that the scope of the Ceylon Parliament is narrower than the Legislature of the Dominion of India or Pakistan. The relevant provisions of the Indian Act appear in Section 6.
These differences are:
(1) The absence in the Indian Act of a provision similar to the provision set outin Paragraph I (I) of the First Schedule to the Ceylon Act, declaring the inapplicability to Ceylon of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865.
(2) The slightly different phraseology between Section 6 (2) of the Indian Act and the corresponding provisions of the Ceylon Act.
(3) The requirement in Section 6 (4) of the Indian Act that no Act of the British Parliament is to extend to either of the two Dominions until such Act is extended thereto by a law of the legislature of the appropriate Dominion, which is different from the requirement laid down in Section I (I) of the Ceylon Act, the Ceylon counterpart of the said Section
6 (4).
See sections 2 and 4 of the Ceylon Independence Act.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I45
The first of these differences is not surprising as British India was not a 'colony within the meaning of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865.
Much has been made of the second of these differences by the critics of the Ceylon Act, and it is, therefore, useful here to consider at some length the real legal implications of the provisions in question and to inquire whether the minor difference in phraseology between these provisions substantially affects the powers of the three legislatures concerned.
Section 6 (2) of the Indian Act runs as follows:
“No law and no provision of any law made by the Legisla- w ture of either of the new Dominions shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of this or any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Legislature of each Dominion include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as it is part of the Law of the Dominion.
The corresponding provision of the Ceylon Act appears in Paragraph I (2) of the First Schedule to that Act and its wording is as follows:
“No law and no provision of any law made after the appointed day by the Parliament of Ceylon shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Parliament of Ceylon shall include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of Ceylon.
Even a careful comparison between these two sections will show that the only difference between them is a verbal one, for while in the first section specified here there is an express reference to “the provisions of this or any existing or future Act of the
Section I of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865.

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Parliament of the United Kingdom', in the second section, the reference is only to the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom', the phrase of this' being omitted from the Ceylon provision. It has been argued, therefore, that the power of amendment in the Indian Act is wider than the power of amendment in the Ceylon Act as the former Act expressly provides for the amendment of this Act (that is the Indian Independence Act itself) and of existing and future Acts of the British Parliament, while the latter provides only for the amendment of existing and future Acts. If these provisions are considered as isolated provisions, out of their context, there is considerable justification for this view. But no legal provision should be considered as self-contained but should be read together with the other provisions of which it is a part and also with an understanding of the intentions of the legislators as well as the political and legal background in which it was framed. If this provision of the Ceylon Act is thus considered, it will be seen that in effect there is in the Ceylon Act the power of amending its own provisions. Throughout the preceding twenty-five years of the British connection to 4th February 1948, the date on which the Ceylon Independence Act came into operation, the legislative powers of the Ceylon legislative assembly (irrespective of whether it was the Legislative Council, the State Council or the Parliament), were limited by the following important restrictions which operated during this period to a greater or lesser degree depending on the measure of self-rule the country possessed at the time:
(1) The Governor's power of reserving bills for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure.
(2) The Governor's power to certify certain bills. (3) The King's power to legislate by Order in Council. (4) The restrictive clauses of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865.
(5) The royal power of disallowing bills.
In addition to these, the Governor had, as we have seen, during the period of the Donoughmore constitution, the powers of Sections 2 and 3 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I47
postponing the operation of a bill, of referring back a bill to the State Council for further consideration, and of requiring, in certain cases before he gave his assent, that the bill should have a two-thirds majority in its favour. Further, while that constitution was inforce, the State Council's power to legislate in regard to the public service was limited, as the rights and privileges of that service could not be affected without the sanction of the Governor and in a considerable number of cases without the approval of the Secretary of State. Thus it would have been possible by the exercise of one or other of these powers, depend ing of course on the circumstances of the case, to prevent or impede the passage into law of a bill which the Imperial Government considered undesirable.
The Ceylon Independence Order in Council 1947, which came into operation on 4th February 1948, did away with the Governor's remaining powers of reservation. The Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, which also came into operation on the same date, by providing that the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, was no longer to apply to Ceylon, removed this further obstacle on the legislative competence of the Ceylon legislature. The royal power of disallowance had for all practical purposes disappeared earlier. The other powers of the Governor and the Secretary of State referred to in the last paragraph had disappeared with the enactment of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946. Save for the prohibition against the enactment of discriminatory religious or minority legislation, the passage into law of any bill, including a bill amending the Independence Act itself, if it had the approval of the requisite majority in Parliament, could, therefore, now no longer be prevented. The capacity to amend the Ceylon Independence Act is, therefore, derived from the absence of all limitations on the legislative competence of the Ceylon legislature and not from any express
See above, pp. 31, 32 and p. 38.
* Sections 29 and 39 of the Dom. Cons. and see above, p. 141, and below, Appendix C. The royal power of disallowance only continued as a financial safeguard, but, as indicated earlier, the minority and financial safeguards imposed in the constitution can themselves be abolished if two-thirds of the total number of members of the House of Representatives is in favour of such abolition.

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power included in a statutory enactment. Nevertheless, in the result, there is no difference in respect of this matter between the Ceylon Parliament on the one hand and the Indian and Pakistan legislatures on the other, in spite of the minor verbal difference between the Ceylon and Indian Independence Acts.
The last of these differences is the consequence of Ceylon adopting in the matter of the extension of British legislation to the country the principles set out in Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster, while the Dominions of India and Pakistan preferred to follow the procedure specified for South Africa in Section 2 of the Status of the Union Act, 1934. The position in the case of Ceylon, as in the case of Canada or Australia, is that a new British Act will not extend to Ceylon “unless it is expressly declared in that Act that Ceylon has requested, and consented to the enactment thereof.” The requirement in India, however, is that such an Act will not extend to either of the two Dominions “unless it is extended thereto by a law of the legislature of the Dominion'. This divergence in procedure between various parts of the British Commonwealth arose out of the uneasiness of South Africa as to the political and legal implications of Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster. South Africa felt that this section created a sort of legal inequality and desired in some way to rid herself of the inequality. She believed with justification that a British Act passed after the said Statute which referred to South Africa would extend to her, even if the request and consent mentioned in Section 4 of that Statute was not obtained and a reference to that effect not made in the Act. In support of this view was urged the principle, derived from the theory of the sovereignty of Parliament, that a later British law, though it may contain provisions inconsistent with an earlier one, must prevail over the earlier one. In applying this principle to the interpretation of the Section 4, South Africa found that a later British Act which did not comply with the requirements of that section in regard to the declaration relating to request and consent would be regarded as an amendment of it, and would
1 Νο. 69 of I934. * Section 1 (I) of the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947. * Section 6 (4) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I49
be considered as extending to her, notwithtsanding the failure to conform to those requirements. This view caused her to introduce the procedure set out in Section 2 of the Status of the Union Act which was later also incorporated in the Indian Act, probably on representation made by the Indian leaders. It is held by some that even these provisions in the Status of the Union Act and the Indian Independence Act do not cure the legal defects inherent in Section 4 of the Statute. There are some, however, in Ceylon who would have preferred the Ceylon procedure in regard to this matter to have been based on the provision in Section 6 (4) of the Indian Independence Act rather than on Section 4 of the Statute. Whether a provision based on the Section 6 (4) is necessary or would be useful is extremely doubtful. The claim for it arises out of fears and suspicions of the Imperial Government which are to-day unfounded and not in keeping with the spirit that gave birth to the Statute as well as the Indian and Ceylon Independence Acts. However, if the Ceylon Government wants such a change it can be easily effected by reason of the power which her Parliament now has of amending the Ceylon Independence Act.
The preceding analysis will show that there are a number of minor differences between the Ceylon Independence Act, the Statute of Westminster and the Indian Independence Act. Much has been made of these differences by the opposition parties in the Ceylon Parliament. Although these differences do not place Ceylon constitutionally in a lesser position than any of the other Dominions, they are viewed by some with uneasiness. If this
Although the Indian provision in regard to this matter is the same as the provision in the Status of the Union Act, the legal position in India may be regarded as being different from that of South Africa as the Indian provision is embodied in a United Kingdom Statute while the procedure and requirements for South Africa are embodied in an Act of the Union Parliament. According to one view, before a British Act can extend to South Africa the requirements of both the Statute of Westminster and the Status of the Union Act must be complied with. If this view is adopted, the procedure for India is far simpler than that for South Africa. For an admirable account of the difficulties which resulted in the enactment of section 2 of the Status of the Union Act and the extent to which that section can be regarded as resolving these difficulties see K. C. Wheare: Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status, 1947, Third Edition, pp. 153-7 and 243-7.

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body of opinion becomes large it may be useful to remove these differences, and Ceylon with the legislative powers she has today has the capacity to do so. The Ceylon Government, therefore, ifit so desires, can repeal the Ceylon Independence Act and enact her legislative charter embodying all the rights and privileges which she wants, based, if that is the Government’s wish, on the relevant provisions of the Status of the Union Act and of the the Indian Independence Act.
In addition to these, Ceylon derived from the Act the important right of seeession. In the course of the debate in the Ceylon Parliament on the motion relating to the attainment of independence, great anxiety was shown by the leaders of the various opposition parties that in spite of the Act Ceylon had not acquired this right. All that need be said here is that Ceylon's position in regard to this matter is the same as the position of the other Dominions. Legally their right to secede flows from such enactments as the Statute of Westminster, the Status of the Union Act and the Indian Independence Act. In none of these documents is there an express reference to secession and, therefore, the fact that the Ceylon Act too does not expressly refer to this right should not be regarded as a legal bar on her right to secede. In the writer's opinion this right is derived from the legislative sovereignty of the various Dominion legislatures, including the Ceylon Parliament. As there is to-day no legislative or legal limitation restricting the competence of the Ceylon Parliament, it can if it so thinks fit, enact legislation giving effect to the desire to secede.
Finally it should be observed that the Ceylon Independence Act confers the same powers and has the same significance as the relevant portions of the Statute of Westminster and the Indian Independence Act, 1947, in spite of the minor differences in phraseology between the three Acts. In fact the Act has placed the Ceylon Parliament in the matter of powers in the same position as the legislatures of the other Dominions.
CABINET
One of the most outstanding features of the Dominion constitution of Ceylon is that it includes a cabinet of the British

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I5 I
type. In this respect the constitution of to-day differs greatly from the Donoughmore constitution, for the latter constitution, as has been seen, provided for a Board of Ministers and an Executive Committee system, which were based on principles that were the very opposite of the principles on which cabinet government rested.
Among the reasons that contributed towards the establishment of cabinet government were the weaknesses inherent in the Donoughmore constitution, particularly those arising out of the constitution, powers and nature of the Board of Ministers and the Executive Committees. Another reason for this important change was the mistaken belief in the minds of the ministers when they were called upon to frame a constitution in terms of the Ig43 declaration that the constitution, to conform to that declaration, should be the British form of cabinct government. This misapprehension was due to the fact that paragraph (I) of that declaration stated that the Imperial Government was pledged towards the grant of full responsible government under the Crown in all matters of internal civil administration, and in the minds of the ministers who were asked to frame the constitution, “full responsible government represented some form of cabinet government, though it was probable that the intention of the Secretary of State when he made that declaration was to announce the grant in the near future of a large increase of self-government.
Following the practice in a number of self-governing colonies, but in striking divergence from the British example, the principles governing the Ceylon cabinet were set out in a written enactment, in this case an Order in Council. It was provided that the cabinet of ministers was to be appointed by the Governor-General, and thạt it was to be 'charged with the general direction and control of the government of the island' (Section 46 (1)). It was also provided in the same section that the cabinet was to be collectively responsible to Parliament, a feature which the Board of Ministers lacked in all matters except finance. The Prime Minister was to be in charge of defence and external affairs in addition to his other duties (Section 46 (4)). There were to be Parliamentary Secretaries appointed by the Gover

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nor-General who were to assist the ministers and represent them in one of the houses if the minister happens to be a member of the other. Their real significance lay in the fact that they were to be a sort of recruiting ground for ministers. In addition, the constitution provided that not less than two ministers, of whom one was to be the Minister of Justice, were to be members of the Senate. One of the very likely consequences of the establishment of cabinet government in Ceylon will be the relegation of the private member to the background. This change will be a significant one' for Ceylon as in the past, particularly in the period of the Donoughmore constitution, members of the legislature were reckoned primarily in their individual and personal capacities and not as members of any party. Another less important but more immediate and concrete effect is that the government and the opposition parties now sit, following the British practice, facing each other with a g; gway between and the seating will not be as before in semi-ci; cular fashion.
One of the radical changes brought about by the introduction of this form of government was the complete change in the method of control of the departments. In place of the system in operation under the Donoughmore constitution, where a number of departments were grouped under an Executive Committee, there was substituted the system under which a Permanent Secretary appointed by the Governor-General was to exercise supervision over the departments in his charge, subject to the direction and control of his minister (Section 51 (2)).
The first cabinet under the new constitution was a coalition offourteen ministers consisting chiefly of members of the United National Party, together with two Independents. In addition to these the Government included originally ten Parliamentary Secretaries of whom seven belonged to the United National Party, one to the Labour Party, one was an Independent, and one a nominated member.
Dr. (later Sir) Ivor Jennings: Comments on the Constitution, 1947, p. 15. This publication consisted of a collection of his articles to the Ceylon Daily JNews, on different aspects of the Soulbury constitution.
* Section 48 of the Dom. Cons.
The figures and the other comments relating to the Government refer to the position in October 1947. There have been minor changes since then.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I53
If the first cabinet is analysed on a communal basis it will be seen that there were in it eleven Sinhalese members including Kandyan Sinhalese, two Ceylon Tamil members' and one Muslim member. If an analysis of the Parliamentary Secretaries is made in the same way, it will be seen that there were six Sinhalese, one Ceylon Tamil, two Muslims and one Burgher among them. Thus, if it is remembered that cabinet government was operating and that this system is not easily reconciled with the representation of interests holding views different from the views of the majority party, it mast be admitted that the representation given to the minorities in the government WaS fairly adequate. The only large minority that was left unrepresented were the Indian Tamil minority, and it is possible that none of the Indian Tamil members of the lower House wished to join a government consisting chiefly of persons belonging to the United National Party.
PUBLIC SERVICE coMMIssion, ETC.
The new constitution put an end to the long-drawn-out friction over the public service. Indeed, one of the most satisfactory features of the present constitution of Ceylon are the arrangements that have been made in regard to public service appointments. These arrangements are a great advance on the system in opcration under the Donoughmore constitution under which there were too many authorities connected with the making of these appointments and the criticism could be levelled that political considerations were taken into account. The present constitution makes provision for an independent and impartial Public Scrvice Commission consisting of members without any political associations at all. Under it, the Commission is to "consist of three persons, appointed by the Governor-General, one at least of whom shall be a person who has not, at any time during the period offive years immediately preceding, held any public office or judicial office' (Section 58 (1)). Senators and other Members of Parliament while continuing as such are prohibited from being members of the commission (Section 58 (2)).
For method of appointment of public servants under Donoughmore constitution, see above, pp. 91, 92, Io2-IO4.

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Their duties are specified as the appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of public officers (Section 6o).
One great change in the position of the public service brought about by the new constitution is its removal from the custody of the Governor and Secretary of State who under the earlier constitution were responsible for safeguarding its privileges and conditions of service. The provisions of the Donoughmore constitution, by virtue of which the Governor and Secretary of State protected its interests, were clearly out of place in view of the country's changed constitutional status and were therefore omitted from the new constitution.
Provisions giving the power to certain classes of public officers to retire under favourable conditions, similar to those embodied in the I93I constitution were included in the new constitution (Section 63), because it was felt that those officers had contracted to work under different conditions, and should be given the option to leave the service without substantial loss to themselves now that those conditions had been altered. An assurance was also given to certain classes of public officers in service on 4th February 1948, the date when Ceylon became a Dominion, that their conditions of service would as far as possible remain unchanged.
DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
The greatest advance brought about by these onstitutional changes was the transference of these two subjects from imperial control to that of the Governor-General and his native ministers. The relations that were to subsist between Ceylon and Britain in regard to these two important spheres of activity were specified in the Defence Agreement of I Ith November 1947, and the External Affairs Agreement of the same date. These two agreements were subjected to a very close scrutiny in England in the course of the debate in the House of Commons on the second reading of the Ceylon Independence Bill,
Articles 86 and 87 of the 1931. Order in Council. * Paragraph 2 of the Public Officers' Agreement dated 11th November
I947、
The text of these agreements are set out in Cmd. 7257.

"THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 155
1947, and in Ceylon during the discussions in Parliament on the independence motion.
Thc chief arguments urged against those two documents were that by virtue of them Ceylon's interests had been subordinated to Britain and that her freedom of action had been effectively fett cred. In considering this criticism, one should remember that every agreement, including agreements between independent powers, restricts during the pendency of the agreements the capacity of those powers to pursue an independent policy; the important questions are whether, and how easily, these agreements can be terminated. There is nothing in those documents which prevent their repudiation at any time and, unlike agreements which are really restrictive in character, there is no time period specified in them during which they are to be in force. In fact the characteristic feature of the defence agreement, which has been the most criticized of the agreements, is its tenuous and lax provisions. Thus it provides in Article I that the British and the Ceylon Governments will give to each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide’, and it further lays down in that Article that the British Government may base such naval and air forces and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as may be required for these purposes, and as may be mutually agreed. It also states in Article 2 that the Ceylon Government will grant to the British Government 'all the necessary facilities for the objects mentioned in Article I as may be mutually agreed'. In fact its basis is mutual and enlightened self-interest. Among the matters arising out of it which have created uneasiness in Ceylon are the belief that certain bases, including Trincomalee, have already been given Over to Britain and that there may be other secret agreements about which no public disclosure had been made. In regard to these matters, the statement made by Mr. D. S. Senanayake, Ceylon's first Prime Minister, during the course of the debate in
* 444 H.C. Deb. 5s, columns I 477-524; Deb. H. of R., 1947, vol. II, Nos.
8-IO, columns 437-74o; Deb. Senate, 1947, vol. I, Columns 16I-295,302-4oo.
* For complete text of the Defence Agreement, see Cmd. 7257, pp. 2 and 3.
M

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the House of Representatives, on the independence motion already referred to, is important. In moving that motion on Ist December 1947 he stated: “The Defence Agreements give us what we want. There are no secret agreements or informal undertakings.”1 In his reply, closing that debate on 3rd December 1947, he further stated as follows:
There is no question of giving bases to anyone. There was a question of bases being found in Ceylon, but I was certainly mOt prepared to grant any. What I felt was that if at any time we wanted the assistance of England for purposes of defence we should be able to get that assistance by agreement, and if it became necessary for that purpose to get their aeroplanes we should give them aerodromes. There is no question of any bases being given to her. They were only to be given when it became necessary, and after entering into an agreement. . . . The only agreement we have entered into is one enabling us to come to some agreement in the future.'
All doubts and uncertainty in regard to these questions should be dispelled in view of this frank public declaration by the head of the country's government and her chief representative in the negotiations relating to this agreement. In considering the nature of this agreement it should be borne in mind that the Union of South Africa contracted with Britain in 1921 in regard to the defence of Simonstown, ag undertaking which, as late as April 1937, was reaffirmed by Mr. O. Pirow on behalf of South Africa; that the Irish Free State entered into certain undertakings relating to harbour and other facilities with the United Kingdom which were embodied in the Articles of Agreement for a treaty between the two powers, and in two Acts passed by the United Kingdom Parliament (the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, and the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922); and that Great Britain has also an agreement relating to defence with Burma. Both South Africa and the Free State have often loudly proclaimed their capacity for independent action, and the latter power exercised that right
Deb. H. of R., 1947, vol. I, No. 8, column 445. * Deb. H. of R., 1947, vol. I, No, Io, columns 732-3.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I57
when, in spite of the promise, enshrined in the above-mentioned agreement and Acts, of affording to His Majesty's Imperial Forces "in time of war or strained relations with a foreign power such harbour and other facilities as the British Government may require... she remained neutral throughout the second world war, and Britain respected her neutrality. Ceylon's position in regard to this matter is, indeed, much freer than was that of Eire, whose undertakings relating to naval defence were, in addition, cmbodied in two imperial statutes, and it was expressly provided in one of them, the Irish Free State Censtitution Act, 1922, that if any provision is enacted which is repugnant to the said Articles of Agreement which included those undertakings, that provision should to the extent of its repugnancy be void and inoperative. Further, the agreement with Burma is an undertaking that is to subsist between two independent powers. In fact this agreement does not place Ceylon in a position which is in any way inferior to the other Dominions.
It is necessary in this connection to consider also Ceylon's position in international affairs. This position was to a large extent defined in the External Affairs Agreement between Britain and Ceylon. In that agreement it was stated that: “In regard to external affairs generally, and in particular to the communication of information and consultation, the Government of the United Kingdom will, in relation to Ceylon, observe the principles and practice now observed by the Members of the Commonwealth, and the Ceylon Government will for its part observe these same principles and practice. The position relating to the country's representation in foreign countries was also defined in that agreement: Ceylon was to be represented in foreign countries by her own representatives or by British representatives if the Ceylon Government so desired. In regard to representation between Ceylon and Britain, there was to be an exchange of High Commissioners; and Great Britain was to help her to secure independent membership of the United Nations Organization, orofany specialized international agency
Paragraph 2 of the External Affairs Agreement, see Cmd. 7257, p. 3. * Paragraph 4, ibid. Paragraph 3, ibid.

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п 58 THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948
as described in Article 57 of the United Nations Charter. ConCrete effect to some of these provisions was given when the representatives of the British and Indian Governments in Ceylon ceased to be described as representatives and began to be called High Commissioners, and when America decided to establish an embassy in Ceylon and Ceylon to appoint an ambassador in the United States. These two embassies have now been established.
The country's earlier position of inferiority in international affairs, whereby at international conferences Ceylon was represented by the United Kingdom delegation, has been altered, and to-day it is possible for the Ceylon Government to have its own independent and separate delegation at such conferences. In fact, even before Ceylon formally became a Dominion, the country had been recognized for international purposes as a separate entity. Thus, when the Preparatory Committee of the International Trade Conference at Geneva in 1947 was conducting negotiations for the mutual reduction of tariffs and tariff preferences, Ceylon's representatives were considered as an independent delegation, and a member of the delegation signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the result of those negotiations, as an independent signatory. Further, when the preliminary arrangements for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment to be held at Havana were being made at Lake Success in the summer of I947, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Organization passed on Ist August 1947 the significant resolution set out below, which indicated the island's enhanced and improved position in international affairs. That resolution ran as follows:
“The Economic and Social Council having noted that it became clear during the negotiations which have taken place in Geneva during the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee that Burma, Ceylon and Southern Rhodesia, although under the sovereignty of a member of the United Nations, possessfull autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations, and that the Preparatory Committee
Paragraph 5, ibid.

"I'll E CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I59
considers that such separate customs territories should be invitcd to participate in the work of the Conference.
"Resolves that invitations should be sent thröugh the Government of the United Kingdom, to the Governments of Burma, Ceylon and Southern Rhodesia to participate in the work of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employmcnt.”
As a result of this resolution Ceylon was represented at the Conference on Trade and Employment at Havana throughout its session by a delegation which was separate and independent of the United Kingdom. It should be noted that when the Conference started its proceedings Ceylon was not formally a Dominion. The Final Act of that Conference was signed, however, on 24th March 1948, after Ceylon had acquired Dominion Status, a member of the delegation signing it as an independent and separatc signatory. Thus it will be seen that in this respect too the country's position was in no way inferior to that of any other Dominion.
Recently, Russia challenged Ceylon's right to be a separate member of the United Nations Organization on the ground that hcr status was short of that of a Dominion. The British Government which is the best judge of that status openly declared, in this connection, that Ceylon's status was in no way inferior to that of any other Dominion, and that it had, therefore, equal right to scparate membership of that organization. This position was strongly supported by a number of other members of the United Nations Organization, including America, the Nctherlands, France and the Scandinavian countries. It is evident that the Soviet attitude, in this respect, is not a matter of constitutional status, but is caused by Russian power politics and the desire to exclude from that organization a potential ally of America and the Western democratic powers.
Apart from Britain's open avowal of Ceylon's equal status with the other Dominions at various international gatherings,
Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Geneva, August 1947, Part II Enclosure 2.

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she has acknowledged the country's position by consistently con, sulting her, along with the other Dominions, during recent months on important Commonwealth matters. Ceylon was represented by her Prime Minister, Mr. D. S. Senanayake, at the important conference of Dominion Premiers held in April 1949, to consider the constitutional issues arising from India's decision to adopt a republican form of constitution. Ceylon's participation in that conference should reassure doubters that there is no inferiority of status between her and the other Dominions.
The significance of this conference cannot be exaggerated. In a few Dominions and in some of the more advanced colonies, there have been groups who have considered the position of the King in the Commonwealth and the question of allegiance to the Crown as derogatory to national prestige. This attitude became especially important when the decision was taken to give complete self-government to certain Asiatic possessions, as in those possessions attachment to the British Crown was less of a reality than in the white Dominions and may again develop significance in the future when the decision is taken to give full responsible government to any of the African colonies.
This problem first really came into existence in connection with Ireland. In Southern Ireland, the British Government was confronted with people who always considered themselves as having a culture which was profoundly different from that of the English. Further, the unfortunate story of Anglo-Irish relations accentuated the national pride of the inhabitants of Southern Ireland, who accordingly wished to make their ties with England as tenuous as possible. Thus, about 1921, Irish oliticians evolved the concept of 'external association, which attempted to reconcile national prestige with the advantages of the British connection. According to its advocates, the state in question was to be recognized as sovereign, the mother country was to renounce all claims to governor legislate for that state, and the state was to be an external associate of the Commonwealth. Among the consequences of this form of status are the
For a good account of what "external association' stands for, see 'Interpretatipn of Eire's relationship with British Commonwealth of Nations', by N. Manserghin International Affairs, vol. XXIV, No. 1, January 1948, pp. 1-18.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 6I
substitution of reciprocal citizenship for British nationality, the replaccmcnt of the oath of allegiance to the King by an oath of loyalty to the state, and the creation of a new head of the state, an electcd President. In other words, in respect of states externally associated the present link between the various parts of the Commonwealth, the Crown, will cease to exist and the connection will be ties of self-interestlinking up such states with the Commonwealth in a more or less permanent association for the pursuit of a concerted foreign policy in the mutual interest of the cntirc association.
Although some sections of opinion in certain Dominions toyed with the idea of 'external association', no Dominion gave practical cffect to it. The sentiments that gave birth to this idea came to the forefront again in 1947 when the decision to grant Dom
inion Status to India, Pakistan, and Ceylon was taken and the Indian leaders in particular turned their attention towards a solution which would reconcile the claims of Indian nationalism with the practical advantages of the British connection. The result was thc solution reached at the conference of Premiers held in April 1949, which was formulated in the following significant declaration published for the information of the world on 28th April 1949:
The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, whose countries are united as Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations with a common allegiance to the Crown, which is also the symbol of their free association, have considered thc impending constitutional changes in India.
"The Government of India have informed the other Governments of the Commonwealth of the intention of the Indian People that under' the new constitution which is about to be adopted lindia shall become a sovereign independent Republic. The Government of India have, however, declared and affirmed India's desire to continue her full Membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of the King as thc symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the head of the Commonwealth.

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b2 THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948
The Governments of the other countries of the Commonwealth, the basis of whose membership of the Commonwealth is net hereby changed, accept and recognize India's continuing membership in accordance with the terms of this declaration.
Accordingly the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon hereby declare that they remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-operating in the pursuiț of peace, liberty and progress.”
The chief consequences of this declaration, in so far as India is concerned, is as follows: The King ceases to be the head of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary in India. Allegiance to the Crown disappears, and an elected president takes the King's place as head of the state. India in every other way possesses ful membership of the Commonwealth.
The solution provided by this declaration has certain features which appear in 'external association, but it envisages a closer relationship than 'external association', one which should help to maintain unity within the Commonwealth. It is accordingly a better solution to this problem than the dubious one of 'external association.
It is difficult to speculate to-day whether India's republican status will, in course of time, alter her relations with the other members of the Commonwealth and whether as a result of this she will enjoy less practical benefits than the other members. It is possible that such a change may occur though the declaration itself visualizes the enjoyment of the same membership rights as the other members of the Commonwealth. In such an event a large and potentially rich country like India might not be affected to the same extent as a small state like Ceylon.
The present Government in Ceylon has affirmed its desire to continue the existing relationship with the other members of the Commonwealth. It is very probable that for a considerable length of time this relationship will not be altered and Ceylon will nöt seek a republican status.
In assessing the significance of these changes, one should

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1948 I63
obscrve that it was in respect of defence and external affairs that thc advance from the semi-responsible status of the Donoughmore constitution was most marked, for in spite of the many legal limitations inherent in that constitution, the country had a considerable amount of practical control under it overinternal affairs. Military matters and strategy, however, under the 1931 Order in Council, were the special preserves of the Imperial Government, and the elected ministers had no real powers over them. The possession of Dominion Status to-day means that the control over these final spheres of imperial influence have now bc.cn transferred and that the elected representatives of the pcople arc in complete charge of every aspect of the nation's internal and external affairs.

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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
he preceding survey may suggest that Ceylon secured Dominion Status in the face of opposition from the British Government. During the period of agitation many hard things were said of His Majesty's Government, and politicians carried away by the fever of extreme nationalism openly declared the bad faith of that Government and doubted whether any hope could be placedon its utterances. Now, however, we know that there was a response to Ceylonese agitation in the United Kingdom which, manifesting itself hesitantly at first, took the shape in the last six or seven years of co-operation.
This response showed itself in different ways. The British Government appointed Commissions to inquire into the political situation and recommend constitutional changes. Members oftheHouse of Commons who were sympathetic with Ceylonese aspirations periodically and consistently asked questions from the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the floor of the House regarding the measures he was taking to improve Ceylon's constitutional status. Declarations were made by His Majesty's Government relating to the country's political future while that Government at intervals put into operation constitutions embodying political advances.
As early as January 1832, in the report of Charles H. Cameron, one of the members of the Colebrooke Commission, which was appointed by the British Government to investigate conditions in Ceylon, it was stated “that the peculiar circumstances of Ceylon, both physical and moral, seem to point it out to the British Government as the fittest spot in our Eastern Dominions in which to plant the germ of European civilization, whence we may not unreasonably hope that it will hereafter spread over the whole of those vast territories'. This observation, in the light of recent events, seems almost prophetic
v I64

CONCLUSION I65
and may well be regarded by historians as the principle that guided British policy in Ceylon. From 1918 onwards many members of the British House of Commons who were friends of Ceylon frequently drew the attention of the Government of the day to Ceylon's fitncss for further political advances. Foremost among these, during the twenties of this century, was Col. Josiah C. Wedgewood, Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme.
Mention has already been made of the appointment of the Donoughmore and Soulbury Commissions, the recommendations of thosc Commissions and the constitutions that resulted from thosc rccommendations. Those constitutions, as has been scc.n, brought the country nearer to its goal of Dominion Status. Among the possibilities that confronted the Donoughmore Commission was that of "turning the clock back', for it was felt by some that a return to the old form of Crown Çolony Government would solve many of the country's legislative and executive difficulties. In regard to this matter the Commissioners made this bold and forthright utterance:
"Apart from the well-recognized difficulty of taking back power once given, it would not seem the policy of justice or statcsmanship to have recourse to such a step, unless or until the inhabitants of Ceylon had manifestly failed to avail themselves of a chance of successfully managing their own affairs under conditions, which, unlike those at present obtaining, gave them a fair opportunity of doing so with success. The other method of redressing the balance lies in going forward rather than backward, in giving responsibility as well às power. This is certainly the course which the British people would prefer and we are glad to be able to recommend it.'
Moreover, considering the work of this Commission, it must be remembered that in certain matters its recommendations went much further than the demands of the educated Ceylonese: it recommended the grant of adult male and female suffrage without any restrictions whatsoever, although no responsible section in the country really wanted such a vast extension of the franchisc.
' Cmd. 313 I, p. 3o.

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I66 CONCLUSION
Doubters as to the sincerity of British intentions during the last six or seven years would do well to consider the following significant statement in the 1943 declaration, to which some reference has already been made:
His Majesty's Government stands pledged ... towards the grant to Ceylon . . . of full responsible Government under the Crown in all matters of internal civil administration.
It should further be noted that both the Donoughmore and Soulbury constitutions were never considered to be permanent solutions to the constitutional problems of the island. On 18th June 1947, when the declaration relating to the grant of Dominion Status for Ceylon was made in the House of Lords, Lord Donoughmore frankly avowed that he and his fellow Commissioners in 1928 regarded their recommendations in the nature of an 'educative settlement' and not as a 'final settlement of the political questions in the country. This was equally true of the Soulbury constitution.
The following statement of George Hall, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the House of Commons on 3 Ist October 1945, when he pledged the British Government to give effect to the recommendations of the Soulbury Commission, is a frank Government pronouncement on this matter:
*As I have indicated, His Majesty's Government have decided to offer the people of Ceylon a constitution on the general lines proposed by the Soulbury Commission, with some modifications which are indicated in the White Paper, and are anxious that Ceylon should continue to advance towards Dominion Status. His Majesty's Government propose, therefore, to press forward to the achievement of that objective guided by practical experience which the constitution now offered will afford.
Probably the best illustration of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government in this respect was its final act when
' Cmd. 6677, p. 27. * I 48 H.L., 5th Series, columns 991-2. * 4I 5 H.C. Deb. 5s, columns 43 I -2.

CONCLUSION 167
it promised, on 18th June 1947, the grant of Dominion Status to Ceylon as soon as certain agreements had been reached betwccn the two governments, although the Soulbury constitution, which was originally intended to be in operation for some years, had not even been brought into force. Within a few months of this promise, Ceylon achieved its much-desired goal of Dominion Status. w
In considering the British contribution, one should remember that the policy of sympathy towards Ceylonese political aspirations was incither the monopoly nor the exclusive prerogative of any particular British political party. The Colebrooke Commission was appointed by the Conservatives and its recommendations were given effect to by the Liberals. The Donoughmore Commission was appointed by the Conservatives and the decision to give effect to its recommendations was taken by the Labour Party. The I943 declaration, embodying the promise of responsible government in all internal matters as well as the appointment of the Soulbury Commission was made by a Coalition Government with a Conservative bias, but the constitution, framed on the recommendations of that Commission, was brought into operation by a Labour Government. Finally, the declaration of 18th June 1947, already referred to, was made by the Labour Government. In this matter Britain has shown a remarkable consistency and continuity of policy.
The period that has been surveyed in the preceding chapters was one crowded with constitutional changes of far-reaching importance. The political progress of the island in those years was far greater than that during the previous one hundred and twenty-five years of British rule. In those decades the country may be said to have had three constitutions: the constitution governed by the 1923 Order in Council, the Donoughmore constitution and the Dominion constitution of to-day. Each of these were marked by characteristic features and was typical of a stage of British colonial development. The chief peculiarity of the first was its irresponsible legislature. In the
In making this generalization, the short-lived constitutional arrangements that operated during the period October 1947 to 4th February 1948 have not beèn taken into account.

Page 96
68 CONCLUSION
second were embodied significant changes in the character of the franchise, the system of representation, and the nature and powers of the executive. The third was characterized by that equality of status which is one of the principal attributes of Dominion constitutions. In fact the second of these constitutions was a very great advance on the first, while the third, by removing the remaining limitations, placed the country's government in complete charge of every aspect of its domestic and external affairs. In short, the principal constitutional development of the period was the progressive improvement of Ceylon's political Status. s
Of all the Ceylon constitutions of the era of British rule, the constitution that will be placed highest, in the writer's view, by the constitutional historian and the expert in political institutions was that in existence in the years 1931-47, as it enshrined certain new and daring changes which have stood the test of time and produced beneficial results. Those changes were the alterations in the character of the franchise to include every adult male and female, the replacementofa system ofrepresentation consisting of a combination of the territorial, communal and corporate principles by a system which was exclusively territorial, and the transference of a considerable measure of executive responsibility to native ministers. The first and last of these changes are only now being hesitatingly applied to a number of colonies and this will show how revolutionary theşe innovations were when they were introduced in Ceylon as early as 1931. Further, the altered system of representation neither intensified communal feeling in the country as seen in an earlier chapter, nor had the unfortunate consequences of other forms of representation which incorporated communal principles. The successful operation of these changes throughout a period of sixteen years was a constitutional development of the greatest significance, and accordingly they were embodied in the new constitution.
The new constitution, however, was devoidofanyinteresting or novel characteristics such as these. It is worth remarking, however, that the following were the main differences. It provided
See above, pp. 58-68.

CONCLUSION 1.69
for a cabinet based on the British principles of cabinet government, and a second chamber. It was also marked by the absence of the reserve powers of the Governor and the Secretary of State, centres of imperial influence, and the removal of the limitations on legislative competence imposed by the application of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865. The only feature that will be of any interest to the student of political institutions is its second chamber, but in view of the very limited powers of that chamber, it is extremely doubtful whether it will be of much use or occupy an important place in the political life of the country. Substantially, this constitution conforms to the normal Domiinion type, which itselfis modelled on the customary and timehonoured principles of British parliamentary government. This, however, is not to the discredit of the framers of Ceylon's present constitution, for their task was a far simpler one than that of the Donoughmore Commissioners.
Some critics of the constitutional developments of this period have wondered why these three constitutions were built on principles derived from Western or more particularly from British political ideas. They have speculated on the general question whether constitutions based on such principles are suited to conditions in Eastern countries and whether they will respond to the political genius of oriental peoples. They have inquired whether it would not have been wiser to have devised constitutions for these countries incorporating principles and expedients taken from their own past than to have established there institutions modelled on British practice. These speculations and doubts are based on certain mistaken beliefs and on an underestimate of the difficulties. The important issues are whether there are any institutions of the past that can be re-created and whether those will be suited to the altered conditions of the time. There is vry little précise information in existence to-day about the nature of past institutions. From what can be gathered from oral tradition transmitted through the ages and described in ancient chronicles, thc principal institution of central government during the heyday of Sinhalese rule was kingship, at best highly contralized enlighton d monarchical rule with the assistance of priestly and princely advisers and, at worst, yınadul

Page 97
17o CONCLUSION
terated tyranny. Before such rule could be re-established it would be necessary to discover some popular dynasty with support throughout the country. The history of the island under her own kings makes this impossible as periodic invasion resulted in the establishment of successive dynasties in the country and the localization of these dynasties in certain areas. Any attempt to resuscitate them would only result in numerous pretenders coming forward and would probably cause civil war.
It is surely obvious that such a form of government is completely out of place to-day. It cannot be argued that this form is better suited now to the native peculiarities of the people than some other type of government. The people and their leaders are more conversant to-day with the principles of representative democracy than with any ancient form of monarchy. Centuries separate the institutions of the British period from the historic institutions of the ancient past. During the last seventyfive years the people of Ceylon have become increasingly familiar with the elective principle and the institutions of parliamentary democracy, through participation in the working of local government institutions such as village committees, municipalities and urban councils. The leaders of the country in the period under review were, by reason of the British connection, heirs to a Western tradition and educated on Western lines: they were more accustomed to the workings of British institutions of government than of any earlier native forms. Furthermore, the only institution of antiquity that has been paked on is the gansabhawa or village council, consisting of representatives chosen by certain village areas, which looked after the affairs of a limited locality and of which the village committee of to-day is an adaptation. In short, it must be accepted that the institutions best suited to the native genius of the people to-day are the Western institutions of parliamentary government.
The constitutional developments that have been reviewed in the preceding chapters culminated in Dominion Status, the goal of the leaders of yesterday. This goal was achieved, as has been shown, through peaceful agitation, and the fact that every political advance throughout the last century and a half was secured in this way should be considered as the one persistent

CONCLUSION I7 I
constitutional characteristic of the period of British rule. With the realization of this goal, the fundamental constitutional problcm of yestcrday, the wresting of political rights from the Impcrial Government, has been settled.
What, then, are the political issues of to-day and to-morrow? From now onwards political debate in Ceylon will centre almost certainly upon domestic matters. Self-government can be regardcd as both a beginning as well as ara end. The latter aspect is the more obvious one and most British colonies strive towards it. Once it has been achieved it can be the beginning of a movement of intensive internal reconstruction and domestic reform. In Ceylon to-day material and social amenities are unequally distributed, and, therefore, one of the most pressing problems in thc country is their more equitable distribution. It is hoped that the political freedom secured by the new constitution will be uscd to see that the benefits of self-government are fairly spread throughout the country and enjoyed by every inhabitant, irrespective of differences of class, creed, caste, wealth or education.

Page 98

APPENDIX A
CTASSIES OF BILLS TO WHICH THE GOVERNORS VE'' () WAS ATTACHED UNDER ARTICLE XIII ()F THE ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS OF I92o
I. Any bill for the divorce of persons joined together in holy matrimony. بی
2. Any bill whereby any grant of land or money, or other donation or gratuity, may be made to himself.
3. Any bill affecting the currency of the island, or relating to the issue of banknotes.
4. Any bill cstablishing any banking association, or amending or altering the constitution, powers, or privileges of any banking association.
5. Any bill imposing differential duties. 6. Any bill the provisions of which shall appear inconsistent with obligations imposed upon His Majesty...by treaty.
7. Any bill interfering with the discipline or control of His Majesty's Forces by land, sea or air.
8. Any bill of any extraordinary nature and importance, whereby thc royal prerogative, or the rights and property of British subjects not residing in the island, or the trade and shipping of the United Kingdom and its Dependencies may be prejudiced.
9. Any bill whereby persons not of European birth or desccnt may be subjected or made liable to any disabilities or restrictions to which persons of European birth or descent are not also subject.cd or made liable.
Io. Any bill containing provisions to which the royal assent has been once refused, or which have been disallowed by His Majesty (subject to certain reservations).
Paragraph () of this list was omitted from the list of Bills to which the Governor's veto was attached under the Royal Instructions of 1931.
I73

Page 99
APPENDIX B
The relevant provisions of the original Article 22 of the 1931 Order in Council were as follows:
*22 (I) If the Governor shall consider that it is of paramount importance to the public interest, or essential to give effect to any of the provisions of this Order, that any Bill, motion, resolution or vote" which the Council is empowered to pass, in the exercise of either its legislative or its executive functions, should have effect, then in such case notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Order or of any Standing Orders made under this Order:
“(a) It shall be lawful for any Officer of State, acting by the authority and under the instructions of the Governor, to propose any such Bill, motion, resolution or vote to the Council and the same shall have priority over all other business of the Council.
(b) The Governor may declare that any such Bill or any such motion, resolution, or vote is of paramount importance or is essential to give effect to the provisions of this Order, and thereupon such Bill, part of a Bill, motion, resolution, or vote shall have effect as if it had been passed by the Council. Such declaration may be made by the Governor by message addressed to the Speaker or by an Officer of State, acting by the authority and on instructions of the Governor, either before or after the votes of the members have been taken.
"(2) . . . .
The relevant provisions of Article 22 as embodied in the Ceylon (State Council) Amendment Order in Council, 1937, were as follows:
“22 (II) If the Governor shall consider that it is necessary in the interests of public order, public faith, or other essentials of good government, or to give effect to any of the
I74

APPENDIX B I75
provisions of this Order, that provision should be made by legislation, then in such case, notwithstanding any bf the provisions of this Order or of any Standing Orders made under this Ordcr, hic may, by message to the State Council addressed to thc Clerk of the State Council at the State Council Chamber cxplain the circumstances which in his opinion render legislation necessary, and either:
'(a) Enact forthwith as a Governor's Ordinance, a Bill containing such provisions as he may consider necessary.
'(b) Or attach to his message a draft of the Bill which he
considers necessary.
(2) A message from the Governor under this Article shall be read to the Council by the Speaker or, in the absence of the Spcaker, by the other person required by this Order to preside, at the next meeting of the Council held after the reccipt of such message at the State Council Chamber.
(3) Where the Governor takes such action as is mentioned in paragraph (b) of the preceding clause, he may at any time after a period of one month reckoned from the date upon which he signed the message, enact, as a Governor's Ordinance, the Bill proposed by him to the State Council either in the form of the draft attached to the message or with such amcndments as he deems necessary, but before doing so he shall consider any address which may have been presented to him within the said period by the State Council with reference to the Bill or to amendments suggested to be made thcrein.
(4) . . . .
(5) A message from the Governor under this Article shall notwithstanding any provisions of this Order or of any Standing Orders made. under this Order, have priority over all othcr busincss of the Council and shall be effective for the purposes of this Article on delivery thereof at the State Council Chamber whether or not it shall be read to the Council as hercinbefore provided.'

Page 100
APPENDIX C
The provisions of Section 29 (2) are as follows:
"No such law shall
(a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion; ΟΥ
(b) make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions are not made liable; or
(c) confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons of other communities or religions; or
(d) alter the constitution of any religious body except with the consent of the governing authority of that body: Provided that, in any case where a religious body is incorporated by law, no such alteration shall be made except at the request of the governing authority of that body. The relevant provision of Section 39 are as follows:
39 (I) Any law which has been assented to by the Governor-General and which appears to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
(a) to alter, to the injury of the stock-holder, any of the provisions relating to any Ceylon Government stock specified in the Second Schedule to this Order; or
(b) to involve a departure from the original contract in respect of any of the said stock may be disallowed by His Majesty through a Secretary of State.
The stock specified in the aforesaid Schedule are the follow9. g Ceylon Government 5 per cent inscribed stock (1960-70) Ceylon Government 43 per cent inscribed stock (1965) Ceylon Government 32 per cent inscribed stock (1954-9) Ceylon Government 3 per cent inscribed stock (1959) Ceylon Government 3 per cent inscribed stock (1959-64)
176

INDEX
Adjournment moved to prevent cer
tification, 43 Advisory Council, 8-9 Agricultural and Industrial Credit
Corporation, I 13 Agriculture and Lands Executive
Committce, 97 - Minister of, Io7, Io8 Allowance to State Council mem
1-2 ל , איזי)b Aluviharc, B. H., 64 Ambassador, Ceylon's first appoint
ment of, 158 Anuradhapura Preservation Ordin
ance (1942), 62 Appropriation Bills, 33, 37, 77, 8o
Ballot boxes, coloured, 56, 134 - papers contain symbols, 56,
134 Bandaranaike, Hon. Mr. S.W. R. D.,
42; on certification, 76-7 Banking, 173 Bank of Ceylon, I I3 Bascs, agreement on, I 55-8 Board of Ministers; see Ministers Bolshevist Sama Samajaya Party, I37-8; formerly Bolshevist Leninist Party, 137 n. A. Bosanquet, R. A., I 2 'Bracegirdle affair', 85-6, Io6 Bribery, 72, 135-7 Britain, honesty of policy towards
Ceylon, x, I 64-7 British Emergency Powers (Defence)
Acts (1939-40), 44 Buddhists, 3-4, 27, 56, 66, Io5 Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance
(1931), 62 Budget debates, 6 and n., Io, 77-9,
84, 89 Burghers, 2, 3, 9, 6 I, 134, 153 Burrows, Sir F.J., 126 Butler, Sin, G., 24
Cabinet, Ceylon's first, analysis of, I52-3; none in Donoughmore Constitution, 98-Ioo, IO4, II7, I 37; of interim constitution, xvi, I27; memorandum of 1937 ignores, I 19; in 1948 constitution, 132, 150-3, 169 Caldecott, Sir A.f35-6, 36-7, 44-8, 72; his “Reforms Despatch, Io4 n., II9 and n., I2O Cameron, C. H., v, I64 Campbell, J. N., I2 Candidates, qualifications for (Leg. Co.), 68; (State Co.), 69; (H. of R.), I 36-7 • Census of 1946, I33 Certification, Governor's power of, originates in I920, 19, 40, 40 a.; continued in 1923, 19, 40, 42; increased in I 93 II, 4o-3, I 74; further increased in 1937, 42-6, 49, I 74-5; Sir H. Clifford loth to use, 23; a constant cause of friction, 32, 43, 46,63, 76-8, 9 I n., II I I, I 46; motion questioning (1937), 63; Sir G. Thomson's use of, 45-6 Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, 58
and n. Ceylon Daily News, Ion., 128, 138 n. Ceylon Independence Act (1947), xvii, 127, 13o; compared with Indian Ind. Act, 14 I-5o; compared with Statute of Westminster, 1423; I43 n.; debated in H. of ComαλOnS, I54 5. - Indian Congress, 138 Ceylonization of Public Services, 92
5, по7—8, I п2. Ceylon Labour Party, I37-8
Union, 5 I League, I I National Association, I7
Congress, I8, 24, 51, 92, Ιοδ, I 28
I77

Page 101
178
Reform League, 18
Ceylon "Year Book (1948), 5 n.
Chief Secretary, Office of, 29, 32,33,
85, 87, 89,90, 92
Christians, 4
Christie, T. N., I2 Clifford, Sir Hugh, 14; suggested
commission on constitution, 23 Civil Defence, censure motion on, 64
Commissioner, 8.7 Colebrooke Commission, 9, 93, 164,
167 Colombo water supply, s2 Colonial Laws Validity Act (1865),
20, 144-7, 169 - Secretary, office of, I6, 19,87-8
Treasurer, 19 Commander-in-Chief, separate ap
pointed, 44, 47, 87 Communal questiosis, Governor's
power of veto on, 39 Communal, representation, xi, I2, I7-9; abolition of 30, 39, IIo, II. 6, 133, 168; discussed, 58-68; and first cabinet, I53 Communications and Works, Exe
cutive Committee on, 75, 97, IO2 Conservative Party, I.67 Constitution of I948, xv-xvi, 129I 63, I 68-7 II ; cabinet appointments in, I32; part of cabinet in, I5O-3, 169; concessions to minorities, 133; defence and external affairs, powers under, I54-63; franchise, 134; Government stock provisions, I76;Governor-General, powers of in, 131-2; House of Representatives in, I33-9; multimember constituencies, 133; Public Service Commission under, I53-4; religion and communities provisions, I76; part of senate in, I32, I39-40, I69; senators in, I32 — interim, xvi, I 29, I 67 n.
reform, agitation for, 22-6, 467, 6I, II6-28, I64; Sir A. Caldecott and, 46-7; debate on (1933), 89; Sir D. B. Jayatilaka and, Io5; peaceful in Ceylon, 26, II4, II 6
INDEX
8, I 27-8; A. D. Senanayake yon,
89, Io5. Corea, G. C. S., 89-9o, 89 n. his
Bill to reform the constitution,
II 7-8, 11.7 n. Corporate representation, 58 Creech-Jones, Rt. Hon., II I 5, 127 Criminal Procedure Code (Amend
ment) Bill, 84 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 122 Crown, III; power of disallowance,
21, 76, 146-7, I47 n. Currency, I73
Dahanayake, W., Ioo Declaration of 1941, I2O-I, 124 - I943, 48, 122-6, I3o n., 15I,
I66-7
I947, I42 Defence and external affairs, agreements on, xvii, 13 I, I54-8; Prime Minister responsible for, I 5 II; Soulbury recommendations on, 3o, I 63; transferred to Gov.- General and ministers, 154-63
Regulations, 44 veto on Bills, 173 Delimitation Commission, 133 De Mel, Sir H. L., 7on. Deposits, election, 69, I38 De Zoysa, F., Io3 n. Differential duties, 173 Disallowance, royal powers of, 21,
76, I46-7, I.47 n. Dissolution, law re, 37 Distillery, state owned, motion on,
84 V Divorce, Ceylon Act, section on,
I44; Bills for, I73 Dominion Premiers'
(1949), I60-2
Status for Ceylon, attained, I27, 13 I-2, I4 I, 158, I61, 17o; confers full military and strategic powers, I63; demand for, 12 I, I 25-7; Donoughmore Constitution a step towards the attainment of, Io9; not narrower than that of other dominions, 143-4;
Conference

INDEX
power of neutrality necessary to, I 2; F. R. Senanayake advocates, Io'7; statement of I945 promises, 166-7 Donoughmore Commission, criticizes constitution, 22; on communal representation, 59; composition of, 24; Mr. Creech-Jones on, I 15; debate on its recommendations, 24-6, II, 6; and executive meetings, 74; public servants' evidence before, 39; on public service, 93-4; recommendations of, 24-6, 32, 5 I -4, 6 I-2, II, 6; recommendations, narrow majority for, 25, 65; Sir P. Ramanathan's Memorandum on, 5 II; and a second chamber, I39; on 'turning the clock back', 165. Donoughmore Constitution, x-xii, xvii, 9I n., I65-7; abolished communal representation, 39, I I 6; adult suffrage in, 29-30, 165, I.68; agitation for reform of, I 16-28; assessment of, I Io-5, II, 68; no cabinetinBoard of Ministers, 151; s departments grouped under Executive Committees, 152; elections
under, 54-7, Io6; and Executive
Committees, 25, 47, 95-Io4; financial control under, 77-9; Governor in, 29-49, 147; the Governors during, 44-9; inauguration of, 26; interim constitution an advance on, 129; an intermediate stage, I 15, 166; legal limitations, 163; ministers' partin, 83-7; officers of state, 130; public service appointments under, I53; representation, 58-68; social progress under, II 24; special position of public service, 33; State Council's powerful part in, 50-82; years preceding, 20
Earl of, 24 Downall, R. B., II 2 Devonshire, Duke of, 58 Durham, Lord, x, 20
East India Company, 8
I79
“Educated Ceylonese seat, 17 Education, executive committee on, 74, 97; free, 64; native. I 2; progress of, I I3 Election, to House of Representatives (1947), I34-9; to Leg. Co., I7-9; petitions, I35; statistics, 567,I34一5· Elections, corrupt practices in, 1357; wartime postponement of, I2O2 Estimates, supplementary, 77, 78, 8o, 89; executive committees pre"pare, 98 European descent, bills concerning
people of, 173 Excess profits tax, II3 Executive Committees, chairmen become ministers, 65, 83-4, IoI; clash with Public Services Commission, 92; constitution of, 96; election of, g6; functions of, 97; method of appointment to, 83; “Perera Resolution” on, II, 6; power of appointments, IO2-4; reports considered by State Council, 745; working of 95-IO4
Committee System, Donoughmore recommendations and, xi, 25, 47, 74, I IO-I, II, 7, II, 9; lack ofresponsibility in, Io2; as a political school, Io II; reçommended for W. Indians, IIo-I
Council, composition of, Io, I9; has no control of Public Services, 33; disappearance of, 34; early history of, 9; loses power to Finance Committee, 22; no native representation on, 15; official nature of, 19-20; retains executive power, 2 I; Sir Herbert Stanley on, 22; unofficial representation on, I5 External affairs; see Defence
Agreement (1947),' xvii, I31, 154-9 'external association, 161-2 Extra-territorial legislation, 76
operation of legislation. I43 and n.

Page 102
I8o
Ferguson, J., I2 Finance Committee of Leg. Co., 19,
20, 22, Financial Secretary, 29, 32, 86, 87,
88-9, 90, 9 Fisheries Ordinance (194o), 62 Franchise, literacy qualifications, 5o, 52, 53, 54; property qualifications, 5o, 52, 53, 54; residential qualifications, 53; under 1931 tonstitution, 5o, 53; widening of the, 5o8; wider demanded, I8 Freeman, H. R., 95 »
Gimson, F. C., 56 n. Goonetilleke, Sir O., x Gordon, Sir Arthur Hamilton, I3 Governor, address of amendment to (1863), Io; addresses State Council, 36-7; appoints chairmen as ministers, 83; appoints Officers of State, 37; authority over appointments, Iog-4; certification, powers of, I9, 23, 32, 40-3, 40 n., 46, 49, 63, 76-8, 91 n., III, II2, I46, I74-5; Chief Secretary deputizes for, 8.7; decrease of executive powers, 48; delaying power of, 38; early powers of, 8; formal powers of, 3o; legislative powers of, 3744; lessened powers of, 132; office changed by transfer of power, 47-8; Ordinances, 13o; part in framing defence regulations, 44; position of in 19th century, I5-6; power of ratification, 34-7; 34 n.; power of referring back, power of reservation, 129, 146-7; power to reserve bills, 132; powers of 19, 2 II, 25, 29-49, I I 6-7, I 2o, I4 I ; power to take over a Gov't. department,36; power of veto, 38-9, 49, 76; prerogative of pardon, 3I; control of public service, 31-4, 154; ratifies State Council recommendations, 74; refusal of assent, 44; replaced by Gov.-General, 31-2; reserve powers of, 43, 169; salary of, 30; often a soldier, I6;
INDEX
sphere of influence reduced, 29, 34; State Council resolution demands recall (1933), 45; veto of, details of bills, 173; veto on grants to himself, 173
Governor-General, appoints 15 senators, I 39-4o; appoints ParliamentarySecretaries, 152-3;powers and functions of, 13 I-2; represents His Majesty, 132; salary of, I31.
Gunawardene, D. P. R., Ioo
Hall, Rt. Hon. George, 7o n., I, 26,
I66 Health, Executive Committee, 97;
matters, 2, II 2-4 High Commissioners, exchanged
with Great Britain, 157-8 Hinduism, 3-4, 66, 68 Holiday warrants, 32, 43, 46, 78,
9 I n. Home Affairs, Executive Committee of, 84, 97; Minister of, 35, 85, 86, Io6, II8 n. House of Commons, Ceylon Independence Bill debate in, 154-5; and Ceylon reforms, 66; control over administration, 73; forms and ceremonies in Ceylon House of Representatives, xii; occupations of members, 69 and n., 7o-2; procedure, 79-8I, 84-5, 99; questions on Ceylon in, I 65 - Lords, powers compared with
those of Senate, I4o
Representatives, xii, 63, 141; bourgeois character of, 138-9; passes Ceylon Independence Act, I4I-2; composition and powers of, I33-9; disqualifications from, I 367; duration of 139; elect 15 senators, 139; Gov.-General appoints members to, 132-3, 39-40; Independent Members, I38; 1947 agreements debated in, I54-6; I947 elections, 67; partiesin, I37-9
Importation of Textiles (Quotas)

INDEX
Order in Council (1934), 77 and îl. Income Tax (Amendment) Bill
(1932), 43, II3 Indcpcndent candidates, 138 India, 6o, 67; republican status of, 142 n.; becomes sovereign independent republic, 16I-2; suffrage compared with that of Ceylon, 54一5 Indian Independence Act, 141-5o Indians, 7, 53; members of State
Council, 65 Industrial Research and Develop
ment Committee, 75 Industry, registration and licensing
of, 85 International Affairs, Ceylon's posi
tion in, I57–63 - Trade Conference, 158 Intermarriage, 66 Irrigation, 12
Jayatilaka, Sir D. B., I oo n.; on Article 45,36; career, Io5-8; Ceylon Govt. Representative in India, Io6; on Executive Committee System, IoI; on homogeneous Board of Ministers, 65; Leader of
State Council, 84, Io6, I 14; mo
tions moved by, 84-5; his oratory, Io6; Speaker of Leg. Co., Io5; vice-chairman of Board of Ministers, I I9 Jayawardene, J. R., 6 n. Jennings, Sir Ivor, 8o, 125 n., 138
n. I52 n. Justice, Minister of, 152
Kandy, 27
communities, 12, f/ Kandyan Provinces, 8-9
Kingship in Ceylon, 9, 169-70
Labour, Industry and Commerce, Executive Committee of, 75, 96 n., 97, 98; Minister of 89 n., II7 n.
Party, British, on Ceylon re
forms, 167
I8I
- Ceylonese, in first coalition, 152-3 e Language bar disappears, 136 Languages, 4 () Lanka Sama Samajist Party, I37 Lanka, Sri, bill, 64 AP Layton, Admiral Sir Geoffrey, 44 n. Leechman, G. B., I2 - Legal Secretary, 29, 31, 32, 87, 88 Legislaťive Council, I, I 67-8; Burgher members, 17; communal representation, xi, I2, I 7-9; debates Donoughmore recommendations, "24-6; early history of, 9; elected Vice - President, 16; European members of, I7; finance committee of, Ig, 20, 22; the Governor and, 15-6; members accused of interference, 21; minority representation, 59-6o; native members of, 9; outstanding members, I2 and n.; power but not responsibility, 20-1; racial representation on, 9; reconstruction (I9 Io), 17; (I92o), II 8; (II 923), I 9; records of, xv; becomies a representative legislature, 20; select committees of, 2o, 74 n.; territorial constituencies demanded, I7; unofficial majority on, 4o; unofficial members, II-2, 4O. Letters Patent (II 93 I), 3o Liberal Party, part in Ceylon re
forms, 167 Literacy, 4, 5o-I, 69, 134 Local Government, 6, II 3, 17o; Exe
cutive Committee of, 97 Low Country Products Association,
58 and n.
Mahadeva, Sir A., 61 and n., 84,
I33 n. Malays, 3 Manning, Sir William, 58 “March resolutions”, 8o and n., II 2 Members, ex officio, 4o-II, 4o n. Mercantile representatives, 12 Military expenditure, Io, f1 .. Ministers, Board of, constitution of.

Page 103
182
29-3o, 86-7; board of, not a cabinet, 30, 84, Io2, 151; board of, Pan-Sinhalese, 63, 65; board of, resigration of (I940), 35-6, 46,53; censure motion on, 64; disqualification ef, 83; their draft constitution, I 25-6, 129, 130 n., 133-4, I33 n., I5 I; duty of formulating new constitution, 123-4; election of, 33, II 7-8; memoranda to Governor, 6 I, Io4 n., I 14, II 7-9; powers of, 83, 86; no resignation of when defeated, 84-5; secretaries of 83; vote om different sides, 84,
IO2 Minorities, approve of Committee System, Ioo-I, II, 7; communally Conscious, 67; Constitution of I948 and, I33 and n., 134, I41, 147; in constitutional reform, I27; disappointed at abolition of communal representation, I I6; no discrimination against, 63; oppose Ministers' Memorandum, II 7-9, I 25; problem of, xi; representation in first cabinet, I53; represented in Leg. Co., 59-6o; D. S. Senanayake's negotiations with, Io8; Soulbury Commission consults, 63, 124-5; Tamils, chief of the, 3, 59-60; vote against Donoughmore recommendations, 65; did not always vote unanimously, 64 Malamure, Sir A. F., 3on. Monarchy, impossibility of revival in
Ceylon, Iyo
• Mooloya Incident, 35-6, 85, Io6,
127 Moore, Sir Henry, 44-5, 48-9; first Gov.-General of Ceylon, I28 ns; on peaceful negotiations, 128 Moors, 2, 3, 12 Morgan, Sir Richard, 16 Mosquitoes Bill, 85 Muslims, 3-4; clash with Sinhalese, 27; and communal feeling, 62,668;dissent from Minister's Recommendation, III 8; in first cabinet,
INDEX
153; in House of Representatives, 134; on Leg. Co., I7; vote against Donoughmore recommendations, 25; vote for 1945 Constitution, 64
Nathan, Sir Matthew, 24 Nominated members, 59-6o
Officers, of State, appointed, 6o; appointed by Governor, 37; chiefly English, 9 II ; criticism of, 88-9I, II 7, 12o; directly responsible to Governor, 34; friction with councillors, Io4, Io6; position of, 34, 87-91; powers of, 13o; salaries of,
Official Languages, Select Com
mittee on, 4 n.
members in Leg. Co., 9, I2
Omnibus Services Licensing Ordin
ance (I942), 62
Orders in Council, 33, 85, 87, 13o (I920), 4Oمس I 4 وO Il۰ 1 58 وlو59 و ه 6on. (1923), 19, 20, 40-I, 40 n., 5o, 59, 69 m., I 37, I 67-8; (II 93 III) 26, ვO–8, 58, 6o, 73, 76, 78, 8I, 85, 96, I Io, I 2 Ι, I3ο, I37, I63, I 74-5; (II 937) 4 I-2, 5o, I 27, I 74
5; (1946) 130, 140-1, I47; (1947) I3 I, I4O-5O
Parliament (Ceylon), xvi, its laws repugnant to law of England not inoperative, I 45-6; legislative powers of, I4O-50; power to amend Ceylon Independence Act, I 49-5o; records of, xv Parliamentary Secretaries, xvi, I 53 Parties, groweh of, I 35-9 Passages of European officers and families, 32, 43,46, 76-7, 78, 9I n. Pathmanathan, R. Sri, Ioo n. Peiris, Sir James, I7 Perera, E. W., 42, on reform of the Donoughmore Constitution, II 6-8
Dr. N. M., IOC, and n. Perham, Miss M., xvi-xvii Police and the Mooloya Incident,

INDEX
35; officers, salaries of, 43 Political issues, future, I71 Ponnambalam, G. G., 64, 66, Ioo Portuguese, 7-8 Post-War Development Proposals, 5 and
I1. Prime Minister (Ceylon), consulted on appointment of Gov.-General, I31; consulted by Gov.-General on appointment, 132; responsible for defence and external affairs, 15I Private members, future of, 152 Public Servants, Governor's power of veto on legislation concerning, 38; holiday warrants of, 32, 43, 46, 78, 9 I n.; pensions of 94; retirement of I54; right of retirement, 33; salaries of, 43, 64, 78,
94 - Enabling Bill (1932), 43, 46 Public Services, cause offriction, go; Ceylonization of 92-5, Io/-8, II2; guarantee to (1948), 154; Governor's control of, 31-4; privileged position of criticized, 323; State Council agrees to increased salaries, 34; State Council legislation restricted, 76, 147 Services Commission, Iog, I 20; under Donoughmore Constitution, 153-4, 154 n.; indedependent, xvi; in I948 constitution, 151-2, 153-4; reconstruction of, I 17
Queen's Advocate, 16
Railway re-organization, 75 Rajasinha, Sri Vickrama, 9 Ramanathan, Sir P., 14; appreciation of 26-8; opposes universal suffrage, 51; on peaceful representation, 26; supports Sinhalese, 27; as Solicitor-General, 28; a Tamil, 27 Ratification, 9overnor's power of,
34-7, 34 n. . Ratnayaka A., 63
9I-2,
I8ვ
Rees, Sir J. F., 126 Reforms Despatch (1938), 47, II9
and n., I2O O Revenue, Controller of, 19 Roman Catholics, 8 Royal prerogative, veto op bills on,
I73 Royal Instructions (19 Io), I7; (1920)
38, I 73; (II 93 I), 3o, 39 n., I 73 n. Rural Reconstruction, Minister of,
II.8 n. Russia, challenges Ceylon's right to be'a separate member of U.N.O.,
•159
Salaries, of Governor and GovGeneral, 131; of Officers of State, 88; of public servants, 43, 46, 64, 78, 94. ,
- Commission, 85, I II 2
Secession, right of, 150
Secretary of State of Colonies various holders of office, alters Donoughmore recommendations, 26, 53; on Board of Ministers, 65; Declaration of 1941, I2O-I, I24; Declaration of Ig43, I22-6, 13on., I5I, I66-7; Declaration of I947, I42; despatch of Sir Andrew
Caldecott to, 47; on executive committee system, 99; message of 1942, I22; powers of, 31-2, 78, Io3, III I I, I 54, I 69; projected deputations to, I 18, 127; reform memoranda submitted to, 18, 14
Select Committees of Leg. Co., 20,
74 n.
Senanyake, D.C., Ioy
F. R., Io7
- D. S., 7on., Io5; career, xiii-xiii,
, Io6-9; Ceylon’s first premier, I og; on independence, x; in debate on Officers of State, 89 and n.; on Defence Agreements, 155-6; at Dominion Premier's Conference, I6o; on Dominion status, Io8; on friendship with Britain, xii; leader of State Council, xiii-xiii, Io7; member of Leg. Co., Io7; Missister

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184 INDEX
of Agriculture, Io8; on the public services, 93; a Sinhalese, xiii-xiii; Lord Soulbury on, xiii-xiii; as a speaker, Io8 Senate, in 1948 Constitution, 132, 139-40; powers and composition of, 139-40; qualifications for membership, 139-40; two ministers to be members of, 152 Senators, appointed by Gov.-General, 132, à 39-4o; not members of Public Service Commission, I53 p Shiels, Sir Drummond, xvii, 24 Sinhalese, xii-xiii, 2-4, 9, 18, 62; Buddhists, 62,68, Io5; Christians, 68; clash with Muslims, 27; in first cabinet, 153; Kandyan, 2 and n., 153; low country, 2 and n., 12, 17, 59; on Leg. Co., 9, 6o and n.; on the franchise, 52-3; representatives on State Council, 65 Social Services Commission, 75 Soulbury Commission, 94, 165-7; composition of, 126; decide on Second Chamber, 139-40; duties of, I 23-5; not a final settlement, I66 and n.; on minority communities, 63 and n.; recommendations of, 13o, 166; Report published, I3on.; White Paper (1945), 129ვo, I 66 - Lord, 126; first Gov.-General, xii; on Mr. Senanayake, xiii-xiii Speaker, of the Council, I5; election of demanded, 18–9; Governor's message to, I 74-5; of the House of Commons, 79 Stanley, Sir Herbert, 53, 54 n.; on
constitution, 22, 23-4, 25 State Council, achievements of. I 124; addressed by Governor, 36-7; 7; amendment procedure, 81; annual rejection of certain votes, 9I n.; attack on salaries, 88; communal discussion in, I I 7; communal voting in, 63 n., 64-5; composition of, 50–72; control ovër administration, 73-5; debate
on memorandum of ministers, 117 and n.; debates "Reforms despatch', 12o; debate on Soulbury recommendations, 126; duration of 73; duties of, 75-9; eligibility for, 68-9; excepted matters in, 29; executive committee of 29; executive sessions, 73-5, 74 n.; finance, control of over, 77-9, I 17; free travel for members, 71; functions of, 29-30; general elections to, 73; good behaviour in, 81-2; Governor's ordinances in, 175; leader of, 87; legislative powers, 75-9; limitations on, I I II ; members accused of taking bribes, 72; and Mooloya Incident, 35-6; motion for constitutional reform, I I4; motion of protest (1937), 127; no confidence, I22; no extra-territorial legislation, 76; no parties in, 8I; occupational analysis of members, 69-7o, 7o n.; passe'' resolutions on deputations to England, I 18; payment of members, 7 1-2; and “Perera Resolutions', II6; powers of, 73-9; procedure, 79-8o; protests against certification changes, 43; public service and, 32, I 47; quorum, 8 II; recommended by Donoughmore Commission, 59-6o; records of, xv; resolution demands Governor's recall, 45; Mr. Senanyake as leader of, xii-xiii; Standing Orders of, 79-8o; three-quarter majority for new constitution stipulated, I 23; two-thirds majority Article, 38; White Paper, 126; women eligible for, 6.9 State Mortgage Bank, I 13 Statistics, Director of, 75 Status of the Union Act (1934),
I48–9, 149 n. Statute of Westminster (1931), III,
I42-3, 143 n., I 48-50 Stock, Ceylon Goveryment, 176 Stubbs, Sir Edward, 44-5, 118 Suffrage, female, 165

INDEX
-- universal adult, granted, 3o, 5o--8, I Io, I 4-5, II, 68; apathy argument, 56-7; minorities disprove of, 25, 5 I ; Sir P. Ramanathan's views on, 28, 5 I
Tamil Congress, 63, 65-6, 128, 134,
Iვ8
aun, Tamils, xi, 2, 4; attitude to reforms,
I 8, 25, 5 I, II, 8; in first cabinet, I53; candidates, 66; Ceylon, 2-3, 4, 59, 64, 68, I34; on communal representation, 62, 68; Indian, 3, 68, 134, 153; on Leg. Co., 9, 17, 6o; lower caste, 52; oppose universal suffrage, 5I; vote against Donoughmore recommendations, 25 Temperance movement, Io5 Territorial representation, I.8, 24,
58, I68 Thomson, Sir Graeme, 3o n., 44-6,
II.8 Times of Ceylon, 128 “Toddy taverns”, I.4 Trincomalee, I55 Trotskyists in House of Representa
tives, I 37-8 Tyrrell, Sir Graeme, 32-3
United Empire, xiii-xiii
National Party, 63, 66, 137, I52 P
185
University, establishment of, 1 13
U.N.O. Ceylon's independent mem
bership of, 157-6o
Unofficial member on Leg. Co., 9, Io, II; efforts to work constitution, 22; election of demanded, 17; inadequacy of information, 13-4; lack of unity, II; obtain majority on Leg. Co., 18, 40; opposition,
I2, ...
Vernacular,
debates, 81
Veto, Governor's power of, 38-9,
49, 76
attempts to use in
Wall, George, Io, I I War Council, 87 Wedgewood, Col. J. C., I65 Weinman,J. Re,, I o n. Westminster, Statute of (1931), III,
I42-3, 143 n., 148-50 Wheare, Prof. K. C., xvii, 149 n. White Paper (1945), 64, 7on. Wight, Martin, ix, xv, 13 m., 44 m.,
7I n. .. Wijeratne, E. A. P., I 18 and n. Wille, G. A. H., 6 and n. Wilson, David, I 2 Women, eligible for State Council, 69, 71; enfranchisement of, 54-5, 54 n., I65 World War, First, 45; Second, 44,
46, 47, 64, 87, II 4-5, 120-9,

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