கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Tamil Times 1987.08

Page 1
Tamil
T)
Wolume W No. 10 SSNO2
A Sri Lankan sailor struck Rajiv Gandhi with the butt of his rifle as the Indian Prime Minister was reviewing a guard of honour.
Where ist
 
 

85p
|ES
66-4488 August 1987
Prime MİTİSfer Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayavvardene signing the historic agreement.
otiators?
he Minister of "National Security"?

Page 2
2TAß,MMILTIMES
TAMILTIMES
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TAMIL TIMESLTD
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LOTO W 1390EAN LE Kingdom
Published monthly by A.T
CONTENTS
Editorial. 2
Iпсd0-Sri Lanka Agге ептепt.............. 4
TULF President Declares............. 5 Opposition Pa rties Stir .6 Colombos Chronicle of
Prabhakaran Interviewed on the ACCOrd ............................................... 8
EROSLeader, Balakumar On the ACCOrd ............................................... 9
Counting the Cost of Peace.,... 10
Lalith's WieWS On GandhiJa ya Wardene Pact, July 1987 ....... 11
Media Reports ............................... 12
Sinhala Perceptions of the ACCOrd........................................ 15
G.P.. the Architect of the Accord. 17
Sinha lese Resistance, NOW
Jaya Wardene's Worry..................... 20
Tamil Aspirations and the
Rajiw-J. R. Peace Accord .............. 21
Other Opinion.................................. 23
Letters to the Editor..................... 24
Classified Ads....... is 26
Wiews Expressed by contributors arent necessarily those of the editor or the publishers.
The publishers assure no responsibility for regturn of LunsolicitegdrTaLJ Escripts. photographs and artwork.
Prinited BW Clarendon Printers Ltd. Beaconsfield, Buckinghartshire.
GIVIN
IT IS A LON a “Long Marc Tung's) from th Chelvanayakam
957 to the Gl Agreement of 29,
„War II, Mary's Viti i dred I'i rusi reduced to a fel reach feal irs dersrin Sri Larka litt 'E hvorse barrering νίοίεη σε με ηγετι Sir Thala Prahs afir Party's Galle Far against the Sinh: 1956. The years S liffered Hill ikke orgart is ea Sir Wral and corri rrit ger Srї Lanka'speас The caralogue a as beer r reports arid recogn ise inter riar dager cies. 7 1los. If Isle Tr ir tro subject surre Ihren be relegate Irudiari Tarraio pla, second class sul 1νίτι τίτε ημιενηε
This of Eela firs corrir o I. Fr rior (gains the Sir Y Prif 5 I rare re terror. (Pryor, fs) {{ke Lily (7 Igor le FI se r's, T. blợ[Jtỉied bưf they Mr. Rajiv Ga Jaya variere P peace accord (2 Telegraph of 30 whilst er couragi parıders 14'herhı “ргеппаtuге реа I The Guardia ιται "peace
re'. We The 30 July, colle observed: "for da 7 FC Carl Eiff); besti hope, for bi μroία ηgει τητι η
conclsior". raised too high ? last? Are Pe Cer be deceived ag are aris il-wered ir signed ber weert Preside Jaya 1" The (ICCore of

AUGUST 1987
NG PEACE A CHANCE
JOURNEY, in fact :h” (as Mao Tse le Banda Tanaiko – Pact of 26 July, IIndhi-Jiayu Wi:AT (de Ine July, 1987.
rfly of more that I I sers I's Liv rha, sarid ifieri ir arlot, the Tarrils of * Nered a even i sice the grim "a redd o'r fler 77 by" τη Με Τιτητή Εστία ΓγΤ 'e' protest saryagrılıcı ula (Only Act ir 7 W rze "If 95 lege reda sig ekwiale ce of polars (o prograph lise ocidal acts agains I είίμι Τανηi Cίίίζει 5.
is crite (1777 brl Ital ecolled in relia τη νες τιgατία 15 Εν rario rial li li rrari talThe finistake belief is collee colled 21ler. They Would di fo helotry, as the fra tarior workers, or jects for Criers) *Firing of the Act. apper. The Tarri ils fi protested ir a d For-vale 7 riigiSir Willa strafeo. TWle sported with State Ig v pre [lev decide'' Irr rs agair si fleir Freir leady Here" rerozairiedriboločl. Preside. 1'e yo ki' sig led sa 9 July). The Daily July in an editorial "g the peace process g'r rhire . ("Corri is Ce"". Derek Brc) 1Y'VI n of 30 July thiriks ty have conte too Financial Times of "tting of the accord | ίς αμίς, ή αρίίτν les, II. 11', ''re "iriging Sri Larks oody eth Pic s trife to Are hopes being VWill ir (fle accord) αίη ήίΙΙ 11 ινί νται Liri? Oir questions part in the accord Mr. Y is rtlee. i'r lly" / 987 is fror ar yr
in serial affair. It is fi of act between the leaders of the ris's firior ccj r 7 7 7 7 1 II r I ir ie's, Tic Te' rrrr s a re guar teed by the Gover tent of la Ilia. Tley Cor 7:8 til Leo IV ir teory (I- tio / 2 al agreerler'! II (beto k1'eev 1 1 1 Aoo o l'ereigy se res. By" ar "targer ye'yi , Iridia 77 v Prilitary cor 7 ringer Ty i'r ffe Tar777' Fior77eland er stre r/restafety of "le Ta ( 77 il people of VC rri'r el 77 eus Srī Līki. Tie ir preseice o provide a ser se of secriyo Taril people” iri the Sinhar la Provinces.
Tail is rio recognised as a official liftgage. The Northeri (Ind Er stery. Pr. 1" y ces tre recogn lised as ""a reas of historical habitarior of Sri Luki I T Yli-peukiig Peoplex'. To crchieve this, rivers of Tayyii) blood have been spilled. The folver of our your I'hı has been de Stroyed for a generation arid Fiore, We salute or heroes. Every Tar 77 il livlio has faller in is the courted a martyr.
The Garrd/r-Jaya warderie Agreerrienir las no confronted al oir problems. Ouestions relating ro er 77 ployrimer 2 r, edicarior 7 tard dadır PT issicur7 foi riversities la 1'e still fy Eye LLELGGLS LLLLLLL ELLLGGGGELLL LLLLGL LLGLEL LLG to be retrained to accept that Sri La rikt is a multi-ethnic state. Te Sir Thala-dormira red brea cracy awd tilitary fit list respect the Tamil factor in Sri Lanka. They should Pror, of theiro Wr, oraz the orders of Sir 7 la la polificiar Is, disobey (le s". roser δ. Με την ι (gree Fre it.
The prohler of Fiational recoStruction arid rehabilitatior of the | 77 il v Caricor is core of er corrors proportions. We list receive S pp) Cort Car Til Issistar. Ce srov 77 filgiving states. These strates vis? LLLLLLLLlSlEL LLGLLaLlL LLLL LLLLGLLLLL LLLLLL Lankais recessary for the Yecturity of the il terrarional systery),
The Tarr il people can be trusted to rise so Isle (ICCcsis) 7 ers Freske sie es
se dW ar y lling av ed everything they are offered. The airl-gilers reed to take cerca llar a el reacles is destivario. India's way of providing relief to our people in their grave lor of Crisis cabe a exaple for states i Villing to Core to our assistice. We are oil it the starting Foir II () / ( 71 coller sy r g jo rrey. We vreeg Croft 1771 irr7ierz I (Frd gedicirriroer7. We la 1'e to cor 7 startly look cover or slo leders s'est 11'e ye o v'erriak er by the forces of evil.
Let it not be a case of one step forward and two steps backward.

Page 3
AJG JST 1987
Colombo's Chronicle O
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Page 4
8TAMITMES
PRABHAKARAN BEFORE AND AF می
OBJECTIONS
Q. What was your initial objection to the accord? Will you be endorsing this agreement?
A. This agreement was totally unacceptable to us. It is called an Indo-Sri Lankan friendship agreement, but it deals with the Tamil ethnic question. And it was drafted without consulting the Tamil representatives. So, we had rejected it.
Q. Has your attitude to the agreement changed after meeting Rajiv?
A. Last night, we had a one and a half hour long discussion with the prime minister and we have reconsidered our objections to the accord because Mr. Gandhi took serious note of our reservations.
Q. What were the specific reservations that you raised and what was Mr. Gandhi's response?
A. We raised the point about the referendum. But Mr. Gandhi pointed out that there were several clauses with regard to the referendum as for instance that it can be delayed at the discretion of the President and that the displaced Tamil refugees will have to be rehabilitated first. So all this will take time and he told its not to take it too seriously as India would handle it. As to our main objection about disarming, Mr. Gandhi understood our problems and practical difficulties - it took us 12 years to build this organisation and it just can't be dismantled in 72 hours. He appreciated the fact that the procedural elements and time factor posed serious problems. Basically we have laid down two suggestions for our disarming - one that the Sri Lankan army withdraws their camps in the north and east and second that a working arrangement is made on ground that would ensure the safety and security of the Tamils. Unless the working arrangement is established the question of disarming doesn't arise. We pointed out to Rajiv Gandhi that we are the protective force for the Tamils and if this protective force is removed then the Tamils are vulnerable to an indisciplined army. Mr. Gandhi said he'd raise our suggestions with Mr. Jayawardene. I've also said that I must go back to Jaffna for consultations with my area commanders and assure them and the Tamil people about the accord paving the way for a political solution.
Q. So if an Indian peace-keeping force is sent in, the LTTE ceases to be a military organisation. It would be the end of the Tamil armed struggle.
A. The disarming cannot take place immediately. There are so manythings that need to be done first. We will take decisions about our future strategy later.
Q. So your position is not fundamentally different from the other groups.
A. We can't be compared. The other groups have no problems about disarming because the LTTE has disarmed them. I think the difference is that India has realised that without the LTTE the accord won't work - that's why they took the decision to consult us albeit at the eleventh hour. See, earlier Indian officials came, read out an agreement asking us to sign it. That was unacceptable. The door to consultations had been closed but Mr. Gandhi opened it and took a serious note of our reservations. That has brought about the fundamental change in our attitude to the accord in the last 24 hours. Our
ultimate objective is t freedom of our people.
Q. It was being said in II the LTTE had unofficia but that, as you have ta you were registering a to
A. I am a man of princip and faith of my people. we had unofficially agre lie.
Q. Don't you think this of the Tamil resistance.
A. The objective of the a Tamil resistance. We car the objective will beach wait and see.
Q. What will be LTTE's A. It's for the people to di
WECHANGED our stand after Rajiv Gandhi took serious note of our objections to the proposed referendum and grounds for our disarming.
THE OBJECTIONABI
Q. What exactly are t objectionable in the acco
A. It is being said that th principles which we enu been met. It is not so. homeland. Certain S introduced in the agree reaching implications. Northern and Eastern defined as the area of " Tamil-speaking people. hitherto lived in this te ethnic groups'. In one justifies the illegal Sinh east for the last four deca to this? Secondly, we a nation of people. Tamils the ethnic groups. It ig constitute a separate nati Thirdly, the merger Eastern provinces is tem interin. The President on the referendum. Foul the committee monitori be appointed by the Pr from the Eastern provin at all. And the outcom based on a simple and r Due to the aggressive and Muslims together f population.
But the most crucial rejecting this agreeme: giving up our arms.

At ЈGUST 1987
INTERVIEWED TER THE ACCORD
o ensure security and
udian official circles that ly agreed to the accord ken a stand on Eelam, ken protest.
les. Il also have the trust If anyone had said that 'ed to this accord, it's a
accord signals the end
ccord is to put an end to it say at this point when lieved. We will have to
role now?
ecide.
ل
LE CLAUSES
he issue that you find rd
ree of the four cardinal 1ciated at Thimpu have Take the question of entences have been 'ment which have farFor example, the provinces have been historical habitation of . . who have at all times 'rritory with the other stroke, the agreement ala colonisation in the des. How can we agree re not recognised as a are described as one of nores the fact that we onality. of the Northern and porary, conditional and as the power to decide of the five members of ng the referendum will sident and the fifth is ce. There are no Tamils 2 of the referendum is of two-thirds majority. olonisation, Sinhalese orm ó0 per cent of the
point on which we are nt is the point about his is tantamount to
surrender and not return of arms under a mutual agreement. There are 200 army camps in the North and East - What happens to our people if we surrender our arms? Once we are disarmed, the Tamil armed resistance will be brought to an end. It is only because of our armed struggle that the Tamils have been saved from total annihilation. We are the only deterrent force - if this deterrent force is removed, our people become defenceless.
NEW DELHIS POSITION
Q. If you had all these objections, why did you agree to come to Delhi?
A. If we had been shown this agreement in Jaffna, we wouldn't have come to India at all. It is only when we came here that we found that India and Sri Lanka had already come to an agreement, which I am now supposed to
WEMMLL nof lay down arms tillan
arrangement for the Tamils' safety is Worked out and the army camps in the north and east dismantled.
endorse. It was a calculated plan to persuade me to come so as to give the impression that I am a party to it.
Q. But didn't Puri brief you on this agreement whenhe met you in Jaffna?
A. He told us that Jayawardene had come up with a 'wonderful package' and that he had agreed to merge the North with East, that Tamil would be an official language and that they had agreed to the question of homeland - he didn't use that word. He said that land settlement and law and order would be with the provincial council. Puri also said 'the December 19 proposals should be thrown into the dustbin'. He made it amply clear that he was talking about an altogether new set of proposals. And I was asked to come to Delhi to meet Rajiv to pave way for a solution. It was shortly before we boarded the helicopter that Puri referred to some agreement that I must sign. I stopped and told him that if I have to sign an agreement to give up Eelam then don't take me to India. Puri assured us that "we won't pressure you. It is up to you to decide what you want'.
Q. But India has made it clear that it will not support Eelam.
A. See, until a satisfactory agreement has been worked out, we will have Eelam as a fundamental principle. We have now been told that once we endorse this agreement there won't be any more talks regarding the actual powers devolved to the administrative unit. Puri said that the powers to be devolved have already been
continued opposite

Page 5
AUGUST 1987
EROS LEADER, Ba on the Accord
THE HINDU: What is the position of EROS on the la ving down ofarms?
A: 'We do not welco happy over it. But w through this accord stooges of Americ (Israel’s) Mossad — w one enemy and has fighters - are shown in the Indian Ocea welcome the accoI plans.'
Mr. Balakumar: "First of all, I must say we rather welcome the Indian peace-keeping force. We have already instructed our cadres to -help the peace-keeping force to maintain peace in our areas. We can assure you that our cadres will not hamper the efforts of the Indian peacekeeping force. We don't have objections to handing over our weapons to the Indian peacekeeping force. But we would like the Government of India to understand some of our difficulties and problems.'
Q: What are the difficulties?
A: “It is not a very easy task to convince our cadres to hand over the weapons immediately. The main reason is that for over 10 years we have used these weapons. It is a psychological bondage and it gives a kind of security to our cadres and people. That is why I said it is very difficult to convince our cadres to hand over weapons without creating a conducive climate.'
Ratification needed: "Anyhow, I must clear one thing. We are not crazy after arms. We did not take to arms just for the sake of arms. Arms do not mean power to us. We did not aim at power by using the arms. To speak the truth. we use arms as tools to achieve our political goal. Actually, our position is that the Sri Lankan Parliament should ratify the Rajiv GandhiJayawardene accord: We need a time span to convince our cadres and give them some kind of confidence that the Sri Lankan Parliament has ratified the accord. But anyhow, the Indian peace-keeping force has moved in and we are discussing (the situation) with our cadres. We hope we can come to a solution.'
Plantation worke why we do not we founded in 1975 on protecting the plant part and parcel of th feel that any solutic Tamil ethnic probler to the Tamil plant unfortunately the ac of the problems of either been put forw
'So we have alrea the Government o' continue our struggle Lankan Governme) Lankan Governmer have toresort to othe
Sinhala colonisati the referendum in th about the referendu about the Sinhalese place in the last December 19, 1986 there was a clause electorate (from th now, they are linkin Eastern) provinces. sur - 'Our fear is th
| HIG
Q: Are you happy or unhappy with the accord?
PRABHAKARAN ON THE ACCORD How was continued from page 8 agreementine discussed by TULF's Natwar Singh and ܫ ܢ : ” Chidambaram in June 1986. In fact, against that Many of the
provincial council bill I had written a letter to MGR expressing my objection to it. Now, if in this agreement further problems crop up it will 'be discussed by India and Sri Lanka and not th
Tamils.
Q. Why do you think Jayawardene conceded the major Tamil demands? A. India's pressure on Sri Lanka was mounting, as evidenced by the air-dropping mission. At the same time, with this agreement that seeks to disarm us, Sri Lanka could achieve two goals - 'consolidate the newly captured areas . . in Vadamarachi and put an end to the Tamil armed resistance. This agreement is favourable to Sri Lanka, not us.
Q. Can you survive without India's or MGR's support.
A. The question doesn't arise. As per this accord, the Sri Lankan Army has to remain within the barracks. If they come out, India has to intervene - they have to fight the Sri Lankan -Army, not us. s . ہو۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔۔۔
Q. What do you think will happen now?
A. I don't think the accord will bring lasting
f ' ' ' ' '...' * ' . pe. By courtesy of INDIA TODAY, August 15, 1987
guiding principl available from th endeavours Of llr But there wa departure and politically at th Minister Rajiv departure from Which had atte parties to the narr0W the und Cation gap, and peaceful, politic Offices' role he since 1983.
The change promoterto par direct involvem underwriting its and in cooperat cannot possibly qualitative ser difference to w This reflected a taken by the Pri

lakumar
ؤ ،
○
me the accord or feel fully e are not opposing it. But , foreign forces and the an imperialism such as hich is humanity's number killed many Palestinian he exit. American designs in are also blocked. We d on implementing the
's ignored: The reasons lcome it are: EROS was the fundamental plank of lation Tamils. They form e Tamil nationality. So, we on or accord to solve the n should include a solution ation workers also. But cord is not like that. None the plantation Tamils has ard or Solved. dy expressed our views to f India that we have to : in political forms if the Sri nt allows us. If the Sri it does not allow us, we rforms ofstruggle.”
n: 'The second reason is e East. We are not worried lm. We are more worried colonisation that has taken four decades. When the proposals were mooted, to delink the Amparai e Eastern province). But g these two (Northern and
at for 's the sake of the .
3AMLTIMES 9
referendum, they can use the Sinhalese majority in these areas to vote against the merger. When the BandaranaikeChelvanayagam pact was agreed upon in 1957, they agreed to stop all colonisation from 1957. Unfortunately, the pact was abrogated. Amparai district was carved out in the East in 1963. In 1970, Amparai electorate and Seruwila electorate (in Trincomalee) were carved out. “We fear that the Sinhalese state-aided colonisation is going to be legalised through this referendum. So, we appeal to the Government of India to look into this matter. It can take a cut-off year, say 1957. In the referendum, these people who came in after 1957, should not vote.'
Peace-keeping force welcome: These are the apprehensions and reservations we have in our mind. Anyhow, this is an agreement between two Governments. We feel India is our friend in the longer perspective. We don't believe that the problem will be totally solved through this agreement. So we will try to cooperate with the Government of India and we will not obstruct India's peace initiatives. Anyway, we must thank the Government of India for sending the peace-keeping force to our areas. It will, ať least, stop the suffering of the people who have suffered for so many years at the hands of th Sri Lankan security forces.” .ن
Q.: There are reports that there is tension in thë plantation areas at Tala wekele . . .
A: These incidents justify our stand. The Sinhalese chauvinists look at the plantation Tamils as part of the Tamil-speaking people. So the Sinhalese chauvinists will give big trouble to the plantation Tamils problem and commit atrocities. That is why we say that without solving the plantation Tamils problem you cannot have a permanent solution on the island. We cannot allow the plantation Tamils to suffer or get killed for the peace and wellbeing of the Tamils in the North and East. This problem will continue and EROS will struggle.
(By courtesy of the Hindu (IE) August 8, 1987)
H GRADE INPUT
the Indo-Sri Lanka gotiated and clinched?
ideas, and certainly the es for a Settlement, Were le previous "good offices"
dia. s one very major point of this had to be cleared le very top – by Prime Gandhi. This was a the role of "good offices" mpted to bring the two ethnic dispute together, erstanding and Communito make them negotiate a al settlement. This 'good ld for most of the period
of India's role - from tyto the settlement with a ent in guaranteeing and structure and framework ing in its implementationbe over-estimated in a nse. lt made all the hat appeared intractable. a major political decision me Minister, that became
Office input into the exercise was highgrade during this sensitive period. High
a Cabinet decision and very quickly, statepolicy.
By all accounts and by every test of performance, the professional Foreign
Commissioner J. N. Dixit played a leading role in building on the sound basis identified, in tying up the details, in getting over or round obstacles, and in getting the agreement in place, ready to sign, by July 29.
Foreign Secretary K. P. S. Menon and his Colleagues, working closely with the Prime Minister's office, provided solid encouragement and support to Dixit's endeavours and also the important element of professional coordination.
This bold but close-to-the-ground professional input, which has hardly been reported in the media in any substantive sense, forms a real contrast to the highflying, compromising and eventually very negative role played by Romesh Bhandari when he was Foreign Secretary and even:
thereafter, in shaping India's policy towards the Tamil question in Sri Lanka.
M N.R.
Courtesy of Frontline, 8-21 August, 1987

Page 6
10 TAMILTIMES
countiNG THE cost OF
Gains and Losses (from our Madras Corresp
GAINS
1. The Tamil people now have an opportunity of resuming their peaceful occupations - farming, cultivating, fishing, trading, and employment, if ату. 2. Tamil youth can attend schools and üniversities. 3. The Tamils can, if they so desire, reenter the political process.
4. Tamil is now an official language,
5. The Northern and Eastern provinces have been recognised by two heads of state (the Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka) as the traditional territories of the Tamilspeaking peoples.
6. The Northern and Eastern provinces are now merged as one single unit, though a referendum in the Eastern province at the end of one year will determine whether the Eastern province wishes to withdraw from the merger.
7. Tamil lives are safe and secure with the presence of the Indian Army, not only in the two Tamil provinces but also in the seven Sinhala provinces.
8. The hated Home Guard responsible for the wanton murders, rapes of Tamil people and brutalities will be disbanded.
9. Pakistan's nefarious role is
cancelled out. The Services responsible against the Tamils leave. lsraeli milita! probably be given sin our traditional enemi to flight.
OSSES
1. Our separate sov Tamil Eelam Will hav storage fora while.
2. It has not been กา Sixth Amendment wh Tamils of their rel Parliament Will be with
3. The barbaric secur put into barracks, so Task Force led by Ra But their hated prese when the best thing v to have these death sc from the Tamil areas.
4. The Prevention of remains on the statute brought into opera ruthless Sinhala dictat
5. No specific arrange for the inspection o Boosa-Belsen camp.
6. The boys and girls have not been guaran andsafe passage to th
7. The huge and enor
Mr. Gandhi Explains the Accord Benefits to the Tamils, at Madras
THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, said the rece Indo-Sri Lankan agreement would bring about the much-n Sri Lanka, especially in the Tamil areas, and appealed to ev India and in Sri Lanka, to do whatever he could for the imp
the accord.
Describing the agreement as 'unprecedented in the history of the world, at least in this country', the Prime Minister said it had brought peace and tranquility, secured justice to the Tamil minority, and provided autonomy approximately like that of an Indian State to the Tamils. It safeguards the Tamils identity, their language and their culture', he said, addressing a mammoth public meeting on the Marina here.
The meeting, organised jointly by the Tamil Nadu Congress (I) Committee and the AIADMK to celebrate the signing of the agreement, was also addressed by the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran.
The Prime Minister devoted his entire 55-minute speech to the accord and explained that the agreement represented an immense advance over what had been asked for by the Tamils in "Annexure C' in 1983 and contained major concessions
- without
made by the Sri Lanka the Tamils demands a sentiments.
"Every reasonable ( met and this is the tim stop the violence and st time to start building',
Mr. Gandhi paida ha the people of Tau particularly to Mr. M.
whose help agreement would not ha Cautioning about the interested in frustratin the Prime Minister said both sides should no become pawns in the forces. They should n break the peace and pro
Problems getting solve Mr. Gandhi said it w,
years ago, on July 15,

AUGUST 1987
EACE
ondent)
Keeni Meen j for state terror Vill be asked to y advisers will ilar orders, Thus as have been put
'ereign state of 9 to go into cold
de Clear that the ich deprived the presentatives in
drawn.
ity forces will be
will the Special vi Jayawardene. hce Will continue would have been Juads withdrawn
errorism Act still book and can be tion again by Ο S.
ment was made f the Nazi-style
in Boosa-Belsen teed anamnesty eir homes.
mous problem of
and its
Meeting
ntly-concluded eeded peace to eryone, both in lementation of
n Government on und for the Tamil
lemand had been e to stop fighting, op the conflict; it is he declared. Endsome tribute to mil Nadu, and G. Ramachandran , he said, the ve been possible. forces which were g the agreement, the extremistS on t be allowed to hands of these ot be allowed to voke retaliation.
d
as a little over two 1985, speaking on
discrimination and gross mistreatment of Tamils in recruitment to the public sector and the universities remains unresolved; it is discrimination on these two matters that triggered the civil war.
8. The devolution of powers to provincial councils and their constitution remain the gravest problem. Without a proper demarcation of powers where the Colombo Government will not be permitted to interfere with, modify or veto provincial legislation, the councils will not be viable these matters will have to be clarified and negotiated upon.
9. More importantly, the Tamil people will need to be assured that an independent judiciary will examine questions of constitutional significance that affect the Tamil people. Provision needs to be made for the Chief Minister of the Tamil homeland and his Board of Ministers to have the right to submit names to the President for appointment to the Supreme Court. At least onethird of the judges should be from the Tamil and Muslim Communities. When Constitutional issues are judged, a percentage of Supreme Court judges must be from among the Tamil and Muslim judges.
10. A Commission for the payment of Compensation must be set up. Every Tamil person who has suffered loss of life and property must have his damages assessed. Due restitution should be made from the foreign aid that will become available for reconstruction of the Tamil areas.
the same platform, he had stated there could be only a peaceful solution to the problems of Sri Lanka. Now, he was there again today, and was happy to say that the problems in Sri Lanka were getting solved, and peace had come through patient negotiations and complex discussions and, most of all, through persuasion. During the last four years they were all worried and upset at the way things were taking place in Sri Lanka on account of the ethnic conflict. Many innocent people were killed by bomb explosions, aerial bombing, etc. Lakhs were made homeless and 1.5 lakhs of people had come to Tamil Nadu as refugees. “Now we have created a condition for an end of the violence, for an end of the needless suffering and for an end of all discrimination,' he said.
Now the Tamils in Sri Lanka will continue to live as they lived there for hundreds of years as honoured and respected citizens enjoying all political and civic rights on a footing of equality with all other Sri Lankans'.
“The Sri Lankan Government has given us Several assurances that it will not take advantage of the disarming of the militants. Before I wanted Sri Lanka to sign the agreement I talked with the militants and the more moderate Tamils in
continued on page 11

Page 7
AUGUST 1987
Colombo's Chronicle C
NOSOONER HAD the word got out that an Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord was near completion than trouble began brewing in the island state during the weekend of July 25-26. The first of the opposition demonstrations took place on July 27 in Amparai district of the Eastern province, where some 3,500 Sinhalese demonstrated before police managed to control the agitators. .
Angry protests erupted in Colombo itself the next day, leading to a 24-hour curfew in the capital. Opposition leader and former prime minister Mrs. Bandaranaike led a sit-down protest in central Colombo and Buddhist Sinhalese monks led some 5,000 people in demonstrations. At least three buildings, including a government ministry and a building housing state-owned newspaper offices, were set on fire and scores of buses, trucks and cars were
JA YA WARDENE: the compromiser.
gutted. Police oper began throwing sto a rampage. At leas and some 120 injure The authorities b peace accord woul on July 29, extende whole country. On some 10,000 peop monks in saffron , capital's southern C the city centre in a The crowd broke wire barricades an and tear gas for ne police fired at then people. Just about carrying Rajiv Gar Colombo airport. were whisked to helicopter amid hea
Prine Minister and Agriculture Mir - who have oppose absent from the National Security lathmudali remain Operations Comm, and-order situation Meanwhile, anc 1,000 was seen na the north headed f group of 500 stude a university campu of Colombo towai were dispersed by p Even as blackfia - those who coul picked up dustbins protest against the accord, demonstra reported from othe, burned four buses houses Sri Lank shrine. Violence all Matara in the South
IN JANUARY 1986, President Jayawardene - who was in an expansive mood at his residence during a long interview I did With him for THE HINDU - asked about Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran and his lieutenant S. Ramachandran, and their specific roles in India's 'good offices' role in helping find a political solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic Conflict.
Among other things, he wanted to know what Panruti' stood for, since he sometimes found it affixed in the Indian press to S. Ramachandran's name. My answers to the President's questions are less important than the fact that he asked questions which related to the political details and nuances of India's policy exercise.
On July 29, 1987, Jayawardene had the opportunity to meet Tamil Nadu's Food Minister S. Ramachandran in Colombo.
Tamil Nadu Contribut
MGR's key lieutena Tamil question - who patient and key role between the Gov approach and the s Prabhakaran on the the agreement and immediately follow, member of the Offic ассотрапied Priте to Colombo. And the quickly acknowledg his being there.
'You are the keyn have told S. R introduced the Tami wife, saying: "He is and this is his first V. Ramachandrain: “Yť more Visits to Sri Lan, this your last Visit.'
Courtesy of Front

FAMILFIMES
of Crisis
ed fire after the crowd les at them and went on ' 19 people were killed d.
2nt on ensuring that the d be signed as planned l the curfew to cover the the morning of July 29, le, including Buddhist obes, gathered on the utskirts to march on to lefiance of the curfew. hrough police barbedd faced baton charges arly two hours, before 1, injuring at least five that time the air-craft ldhi was landing at the Gandhi and his party the city centre by vy security. Ranasinghe Premadasa lister Gamini Jayasuriya d the peace pact - were welcoming ceremony. Minister Lalith Athul2d behind in the Joint and to oversee the law
ther crowd of about rching from the city to or the airport. A third its were marching from in the northern suburb rds the city centre but olice teargas.
gs went up in the capital a not find black flags to show their anger - to signing of the peace tions and violence were r towns. Demonstrators in Kandy, the city that Ta’s holiest Buddhist so erupted in Galle and
Gandhi's journey to Colombo was preceded by hectic last-minute consultations between Indian officials and the leaders of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the largest of the separatist groups. Four other rebel groups supported the agreement, but the LTTE persisted in continuing its opposition.
On the night of July 28, V. Prabhakaran, the head of the LTTE, met Gandhi for 90 minutes and Gandhi is known to have given him some assurances which were not made public. Indian officials said that as a result of the meeting, Prabhakaran felt that the Sri Lankan Tamil interests would be protected. On his part, Prabhakaran issued a statement after the meeting in New Delhi that the LTTE was now satisfied that Gandhi understood its fears and aspirations. However, the LTTE statement did not go as far as endorsing the pact. ܛܰܪܝ
By courtesy of Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 August 1987
GANWIDHI: the underWriter.
tion
it on the Sri Lankan played a strenuously in narrowing the gap 2rnment of India's tand of LTTE leader eve of the signing of also in the period ng this - was a ial delegation which Minister Rajiv Gandhi Sri Lankan President ld the significance of
an,' he is reported to amachandran. He Wadu Minister to his unior Ramachandran Sit'. He told Panruti' u must make many (a. Please don't make N.R. ine', 8-21 August, 1987
TAMIL REFUGEES
END FAST
in a statement handed over to the Home Office on August 10, by Mr. Martin Barber, Director of the British Refugee Council, all 51 asylum seekers declare,
'We have come to Britain to seek asylum and to stay with our relatives living in this country during the troubles in Sri Lanka. Since our arrival we have been detained and forcibly separated from our families. Many of us have been detained for more than eight months. Now we are kept on a ship floating in Harwich Harbour. This treatment has cost us unimaginable suffering and distress. We have protested against this inhuman treatment by undertaking a fast which we began on August 1, This action has successfully brought our plight to the attention of the British public. We have received innumerable messages of support for which we give thanks.'

Page 8
8 TAMILTIMES
PRABHAKARAN BEFORE AND AFT
OBJECTIONS
Q. What was your initial objection to the accord? Will you be endorsing this agreement?
A. This agreement was totally unacceptable to us. It is called an Indo-Sri Lankan friendship agreement, but it deals with the Tamil ethnic question. And it was drafted without consulting the Tamil representatives. So, we had rejected it.
Q. Has your attitude to the agreement changed
after meeting Rajiv?
A. Last night, we had a one and a half hour long discussion with the prime minister and we have reconsidered our objections to the accord because Mr. Gandhi took serious note of our reservations.
Q. What were the specific reservations that you raised and what was Mr. Gandhi's response?
A. We raised the point about the referendum. But Mr. Gandhi pointed out that there were several clauses with regard to the referendum as for instance that it can be delayed at the discretion of the President and that the displaced Tamil refugees will have to be rehabilitated first. So all this will take time and he told us not to take it too seriously as India would handle it. As to our main objection about disarming, Mr. Gandhi understood our problems and practical difficulties - it took us 12 years to build this organisation and it just can't be dismantled in 72 hours. He appreciated the fact that the procedural elements and time factor posed serious problems, Basically we have laid down tvo suggestions for Our disarming - one that the Sri Lankan army withdraws their camps in the north and east and second that a working arrangement is made on ground that would ensure the safety and security of the Tamils. Unless the working arrangement is established the question of disarming doesn't arise. We pointed out to Rajiv Gandhi that we are the protective force for the Tamils and if this protective force is removed then the Tamils are vulnerable to an indisciplined army. Mr. Gandhi said he'd raise our suggestions with Mr. Jaya kwardene. I've also said that I must go back to Jaffna for consultations with my area commanders and assure them and the Tamil people about the accord paving the way for a political solution.
Q. So if an Indian peace-keeping force is sent in, the LTTE ceases to be a military organisation. It would be the end of the Tamil armed struggle.
A. The disarming cannot take place immediately. There are so manythings that need to be done first. We will take decisions about our future strategy later.
Q. So your position is not fundamentally different from the other groups.
A. We can't be compared. The other groups have no problems about disarming because the LTTE has disarmed them. I think the difference is that India has realised that without the LTTE the accord won't work - that's why they took the decision to consult us albeit at the eleventh hour. See, earlier Indian officials came, read out an agreement asking us to sign it. That was unacceptable. The door to consultations had been closed but Mr. Gandhi opened it and took a serious note of our reservations. That has brought about the fundamental change in our attitude to the accord in the last 24 hours. Our
ultimate objective is to e freedom of our people.
Q. It was being said in India the LTTE had unofficially but that, as you have take you were registering a token
A. I am a man of principles, and faith of my people. If a we had unofficially agreed lie. t
Q. Don't you think this ac of the Tamil resistance.
A. The objective of the acco, Tamil resistance. We can't si the objective will be achiev wait and see.
Q. What will be LTTE's role A. It's for the people to decid
WE CHANGED our stand after Rajiv Gandhi took serious note of our objections to the proposed referendum and grounds for Our disarming.
THE OBJECTIONABLE
Q. What exactly are the i objectionable in the accord?
A. It is being said that three principles which we enuncia been met. It is not so. Ta homeland. Certain sente introduced in the agreeme reaching implications. F Northern and Eastern pro defined as the area of 'hist Tamil-speaking people. . . . hitherto lived in this territ ethnic groups'. In one stro justifies the illegal Sinhala east for the last four decades to this? Secondly, we are r nation of people. Tamils are the ethnic groups. It ignor constitute a separate national
Thirdly, the merger of Eastern provinces is tempora interim. The President has 1 on the referendum. Four of the committee monitoring t be appointed by the Presid from the Eastern province. T at all. And the outcome of based on a simple and not t Due to the aggressive colo and Muslims together form population.
But the most crucial poin rejecting this agreement i giving up our arms. This

AUGUST 1987
INTERVIEWED
ER THE ACCORD
asure security and
n official circles that greed to the accord
a stand on Eelam, protest.
I also have the trust nyone had said that o this accord, it's a
ord signals the end
d is to put an end to ly at this point when 2d. We will have to
now?
B。
CLAUSES
ssue that you find
of the four cardinal fed at Thimpu have ke the question of 'nces have been
surrender and not return of arms under a mutual agreement. There are 200 army camps in the North and East - What happens to our people if we surrender our arms? Once we are disarmed, the Tamil armed resistance will be brought to an end. It is only because of our armed struggle that the Tamils have been saved from total annihilation. We are the only deterrent force - if this deterrent force is removed, our people become defenceless.
NEW DELHI’s POSITION
Q. If you had all these objections, why did you agreeto come to Delhi?
A. If we had been shown this agreement in Jaffna, we wouldn't have come to India at all. It is only when we came here that we found that India and Sri Lanka had already come to an agreement,
which I am now supposed to
IMWIE WILL mot lay down arms tillan атапgeтeтt for the Tamils' safety is worked out and the army camps in the north and east dismantled.
endorse. It was a calculated plan to persuade me to come so as to give the impression that I am a party to it.
Q. But didn't Puri brief you on this agreement when he met you in Jaffna?
A. He told us that Jayawardene had come up with a 'wonderful package' and that he had
it which have far- agreed to merge the North with East, that Tamil
or example, the
vinces have been Drical habitation of 'ho have at all times pry with the other ke, the agreement colonisation in the How can we agree ot recognised as a described as one of is the fact that we ty. ܀ the Northern and ry, conditionaland he power to decide he five members of he referendum will nt and the fifth is here are no Tamils the referendum is wo-thirds majority. 1isation, Sinhalese 60 per cent of the
t om which we are the point about is tantamount to
would be an official language and that they had agreed to the question of homeland - he didn't use that word. He said that land settlement and law and order would be with the provincial council. Puri also said "the December 19 proposals should be thrown into the dustbin'. He made it amply clear that he was talking about an altogether new set of proposals, And I was asked to come to Delhi to meet Rajiv to pave way for a solution. It was shortly before we boarded the helicopter that Puri referred to some agreement that I must sign. I stopped and told him that if I have to sign an agreement to give up Eelam then don’t take me to India. Puri assured us that "we won't pressure you. It is up to you to decide what you want'.
Q. But India has made it clear that it will not support Eelam.
A. See, until a satisfactory agreement has been worked out, we will have Eelam as a fundamental principle. We have now been told that once we endorse this agreement there won't be any more talks regarding the actual powers devolved to the administrative unit. Puri said that the powers to be devolved have already been
continued opposite

Page 9
AUGUST 1987
EROS LEADER, Ba on the Accord
THE HINDU: What is the position of EROS on the la ving down ofarms?
A: 'We do not welco happy over it. But w through this accord stooges of Americ (Israel’s) Mossad — w one enemy and has fighters - are shown in the Indian Ocea welcome the accoI plans.'
Mr. Balakumar: "First of all, I must say we rather welcome the Indian peace-keeping force. We have already instructed our cadres to -help the peace-keeping force to maintain peace in our areas. We can assure you that our cadres will not hamper the efforts of the Indian peacekeeping force. We don't have objections to handing over our weapons to the Indian peacekeeping force. But we would like the Government of India to understand some of our difficulties and problems.'
Q: What are the difficulties?
A: “It is not a very easy task to convince our cadres to hand over the weapons immediately. The main reason is that for over 10 years we have used these weapons. It is a psychological bondage and it gives a kind of security to our cadres and people. That is why I said it is very difficult to convince our cadres to hand over weapons without creating a conducive climate.'
Ratification needed: "Anyhow, I must clear one thing. We are not crazy after arms. We did not take to arms just for the sake of arms. Arms do not mean power to us. We did not aim at power by using the arms. To speak the truth. we use arms as tools to achieve our political goal. Actually, our position is that the Sri Lankan Parliament should ratify the Rajiv GandhiJayawardene accord: We need a time span to convince our cadres and give them some kind of confidence that the Sri Lankan Parliament has ratified the accord. But anyhow, the Indian peace-keeping force has moved in and we are discussing (the situation) with our cadres. We hope we can come to a solution.'
Plantation worke why we do not we founded in 1975 on protecting the plant part and parcel of th feel that any solutic Tamil ethnic probler to the Tamil plant unfortunately the ac of the problems of either been put forw
'So we have alrea the Government o' continue our struggle Lankan Governme) Lankan Governmer have toresort to othe
Sinhala colonisati the referendum in th about the referendu about the Sinhalese place in the last December 19, 1986 there was a clause electorate (from th now, they are linkin Eastern) provinces. sur - 'Our fear is th
| HIG
Q: Are you happy or unhappy with the accord?
PRABHAKARAN ON THE ACCORD How was continued from page 8 agreementine discussed by TULF's Natwar Singh and ܫ ܢ : ” Chidambaram in June 1986. In fact, against that Many of the
provincial council bill I had written a letter to MGR expressing my objection to it. Now, if in this agreement further problems crop up it will 'be discussed by India and Sri Lanka and not th
Tamils.
Q. Why do you think Jayawardene conceded the major Tamil demands? A. India's pressure on Sri Lanka was mounting, as evidenced by the air-dropping mission. At the same time, with this agreement that seeks to disarm us, Sri Lanka could achieve two goals - 'consolidate the newly captured areas . . in Vadamarachi and put an end to the Tamil armed resistance. This agreement is favourable to Sri Lanka, not us.
Q. Can you survive without India's or MGR's support.
A. The question doesn't arise. As per this accord, the Sri Lankan Army has to remain within the barracks. If they come out, India has to intervene - they have to fight the Sri Lankan -Army, not us. s . ہو۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔۔۔
Q. What do you think will happen now?
A. I don't think the accord will bring lasting
f ' ' ' ' '...' * ' . pe. By courtesy of INDIA TODAY, August 15, 1987
guiding principl available from th endeavours Of llr But there wa departure and politically at th Minister Rajiv departure from Which had atte parties to the narr0W the und Cation gap, and peaceful, politic Offices' role he since 1983.
The change promoterto par direct involvem underwriting its and in cooperat cannot possibly qualitative ser difference to w This reflected a taken by the Pri

Page 10
10 TAMITMES
COUNTING THE COST OF
Gains and Losses (from our Madras Corresp.
GANS
1. The Tamil people now have an opportunity of resuming their peaceful occupations - farming, cultivating, fishing, trading, and employment, if ату. 2. Tamil youth can attend schools and universities.
3. The Tamils can, if they so desire, reenter the political process.
4. Tamil is now an official language.
5. The Northern and Eastern provinces have been recognised by two heads of state (the Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka) as the traditional territories of the Tamilspeaking peoples.
6. The Northern and Eastern provinces are now merged as one single unit, though a referendum in the Eastern province at the end of one year will determine Whether the Eastern province wishes to withdraw from the merger.
7. Tamil lives are safe and secure with the presence of the Indian Army, not only in the two Tamil provinces but also in the seven Sinhala provinces.
8. The hated Home Guard responsible for the wanton murders, rapes of Tamil people and brutalities will be disbanded.
9. Pakistan's nefarious role is
cancelled out. The Services responsible against the Tamils leave. Israeli milita, probably be given sin Our traditional enemi to flight.
LOSSES
1. Our separate so Tamil Eelam will hav storage for a while.
2. It has not been má Sixth Amendment wi Tamils of their re. Parliament will be wit,
3. The barbaric secu. put into barracks, SC Task Force led by Ré But their hated prese when the best thing to have these deaths from the Tamil areas.
4. The Prevention of remains on the statute brought into oper, ruthless Sinhala dicta
5. No specific arrang for the inspection c Boosa-Belsen camp.
6. The boys and girls have not been guarar and safe passage to th
7. The huge and enor
Mr. Gandhi Explains the Accord Benefits to the Tamils, at Madras
THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, said the rece Indo-Sri Lankan agreement would bring about the much-r Sri Lanka, especially in the Tamil areas, and appealed to ev India and in Sri Lanka, to do whatever he could for the im
the accord.
Describing the agreement as 'unprecedented in the history of the world, at least in this country, the Prime Minister said it had brought peace and tranquility, secured justice to the Tamil minority, and provided autonomy approximately like that of an Indian State to the Tamils. It safeguards the Tamils identity, their language and their culture, he said, addressing a mammoth public meeting on the Marina here.
The meeting, organised jointly by the Tamil Nadu Congress (I) Committee and the AIADMK to celebrate the signing of the agreement, was also addressed by the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran.
The Prime Minister devoted his entire 55-minute speech to the accord and explained that the agreement represented an immense advance over what had been asked for by the Tamils in “Annexure C'' in 1983 and contained major concessions
made by the Sri Lanka the Tamils' demands sentiments.
“Every reasonable met and this is the tim stop the violence and st time to start building',
Mr. Gandhi paid a h. the people of Ta particularly to Mr. M. without whose help agreement would not ha Cautioning about the interested in frustratin the Prime Minister Saic both sides should no become pawns in th forces. They should r break the peace and pro
Problems getting solve Mr. Gandhi said it w years ago, on July 15,

AUGUST 1987
PEACE
pondent)
2 Keeni Meeni for state terror will be asked to ry advisers Will nilar Orders. Thus es have been put
vereign state of 'e to go into cold
ade clear that the hich deprived the presentatives in hdra Wn.
rity forces will be will the Special vi Jayavvardene. nce Will continue Would have been quads withdrawn
Terrorism Act still 2 book and can be ation again by fOfS.
enment Vvas made of the Nazi-style
in Boosa-Belsen teed an amnesty eir homes,
mous problem of
discrimination and gross mistreatment of Tamils in recruitment to the public sector and the universities remains unresolved; it is discrimination on these two matters that triggered the civil war,
8. The devolution of powers to provincial Councils and their constitution remain the gravest problem. Without a proper demarcation of powers where the Colombo Government will not be permitted to interfere with, modify or veto provincial legislation, the councils will not be viable, these matters will have to be clarified and negotiated upon.
9. More importantly, the Tamil people will need to be assured that an independent judiciary will examine questions of constitutional significance that affect the Tamil people. Provision needs to be made for the Chief Minister of the Tamil homeland and his Board of Ministers to have the right to submit names to the President for appointment to the Supreme Court. At least onethird of the judges should be from the Tamil and Muslim communities. When constitutional issues are judged, a percentage of Supreme Court judges must be from among the Tamil and Muslim judges.
10. A Commission for the payment o Compensation musi be set up. Every Tamil person who has suffered loss of life and property must have his damages assessed. Due restitution should be made from the foreign aid that will become available for reconstruction of the Tamil areas.
and its Meeting
2ntly-concluded
needed peace to veryone, both in plementation of
an Government on and for the Tamil
demand had been he to stop fighting, op the conflict: it is he declared. andsome tribute to mil Nadu, and G. Ramachandran ), he said, the ave been possible.
forces which were ng the agreement, the extremists on ot be allowed to e hands of these not be allowed to
voke retaliation.
2d as a little over two 1985, speaking on
the same platform, he had stated there could be only a peaceful solution to the problems of Sri Lanka. Now, he was there again today, and was happy to say that the problems in Sri Lanka were getting solved, and peace had come through patient negotiations and complex discussions and, most of all, through persuasion. During the last four years they were all worried and upset at the way things were taking place in Sri Lanka on account of the ethnic conflict. Many innocent people were killed by bomb explosions, aerial bombing, etc. Lakhs were made homeless and 1.5 lakhs of people had come to Tamil Nadu as refugees. “Now we have created a condition for an end of the violence, for an end of the needless suffering and for an end of all discrimination,' he said.
Now the Tamils in Sri Lanka will continue to live as they lived there for hundreds of years as honoured and respected citizens enjoying all political and civic rights on a footing of equality with all other Sri Lankans'.
The Sri Lankan Government has given us Several assurances that it will not take advantage of the disarming of the militants. Before I wanted Sri Lanka to Sign the agreement I talked with the militants and the more moderate Tamils in
continued on page 11

Page 11
AUGUST 1987
LALITH ATHULATHMU GAWDHI-JAYA MWARDEM
In an interview with Ka
Q: Let's talk about some of the details of the offer. Is is true that in the first three points of the document containing your government's latest offer to the Tamil separatists, your government has accepted that the Tamils constitute a ''distinct identity' and are the “preponderant ethnic community' to have "an historical association' with the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka?
A: It is similar to what was done in Canada in a recent agreement between Prime Minister Mulroney and the Premier of Quebec Province. What is recognised is what is actually factual, which is that the Tamil-speaking people have historically lived in the northern and eastern provinces. That is an historical statement, which frankly, if it had been proposed earlier, I for one would have accepted without question. What was proposed earlier was the acceptance of the Tamils as a nationality, which has a number of other consequences. But here a correct set of facts, which I suppose will help the Tamil people to feel more secure, is recognised.
Q: Does the document also recognise that the Tamils have a distinct identity?
A: I think there is an acceptance of the fact that they are a distinct identity, which nobody ever denied.
Q: Are you not then more or less accepting the Tamil definition of themselves as a "nation' with a distinct “homeland' without using those emotive and controversial terms?
A: Well, I don't think so. I think it is a proper, honourable compromise which accepts the facts as they are on the ground.
Q: I am told the document also describes Sri Lanka as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural country and not as a Sinhala-Buddhist country with other national minorities. Is that true, and do you see the change in definition assignificant?
A: If you go back to my speeches during the riots of July-August, 1983, you will see that they refer to Sri Lanka as a multilingual, multi-ethnic, multi-religious Society. You will find the exact wording which I used in the document today. For me that definition is not significant. . .
Q: Will you go on record with the specific terms of the offer?
A: Let's first look at the political part of the document, which enbodies the Sri Lankan government's latest offer. The northern and eastern provinces as presently constituted will have one provincial council, one governor, one chief minister,
one board of minist on or before Dece, before December 3 referendum in the e question of wheth eastern province wi for themselves or w will then be . . .
Then there is the military content hostilities, handing armed separatist withdrawal of the a, of the newer bases e peninsula to the operation bases. Th its pre-May 26, 198 and east. That will b laid down by the sep
Q: So the demilit groups will precede army to its pre-May A: Immediately p immediately prior, process, but innea handed over the nee to exist, and norm
reslie.
Then, to return to there are the India, the part which refer Coastal waters, the c Sri Lanka, the rem India, and other su means that India co, the whole of Sri thing.
Q: If an agreeme reached, will i governments of Sr
Mr. Gandhi
Accord and
continued from page 10
Sri Lanka. I had con fighters for justice Lanka. The militan and they agreed wi we have signed. Th everything that the have demanded, S Lanka, and, in fact the initial demand Tamils',
“Under the agre one-third of the Sri be made a single Tamils will have a will have regional a to the State Gover represents an imme has been asked fo Annexure C' in

TAMILTIMES 11
DALIS VIEWS ON THE VE PACT OF JULY 1987
ran Thapar, in Colombo
ers. That will be set up nber 31, 1987. On or 1, 1988 there will be a astern province on the er the people of the ant a separate council vant to remain as they
military content. The is the cessation of over of arms by the roups, and then the rmed forces from some stablished in the Jaffna pre-Vadamarachchi earmy will withdraw to 7 positions in the north e after the weapons are aratists.
arisation of the Tamil the withdrawal of the 26 bases?
rior. We are talking of
We see it as one liately the weapons are d for those bases ceases Il police functions will
the details of the offer, n obligations. There is is to joint patrols of the ones between India and oval of separatists from ch things, which really mes down on the side of Lanka to enforce this
nt along these lines is be between the i Lanka and India or
between your government and the various Tamil groups? - st A: It is going to be an agreement between the government of India and the government of Sri Lanka.
Q: Will there be an amnesty for the Tamil guerrilla-group members? And if so, of what sort will that amnesty be?
A: We are proposing the most broadbased amnesty possible.
Q: What does that mean? Can even Mr. Prabhakaran, the leader of the biggest, guerrilla organisation, the Tamil Tigers, return and take up normal civilian life? A: Yes, why not? We would love him to join the mainstream of politics. Anything he does for the ballot will be allowed.
Q: Is it true that the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, might visit Sri Lanka some time within the next two weeks to sign an agreement?
A: Absolutely. This Wednesday afternoon. He will be here for two days. And the cessation of hostilities will start on Thursday or Friday. And by Saturday of next week, the arms will begin to be delivered and by Monday of the following week, everything else will be enforced. And the week after that Parliament will be presented with the bill.
Q: So are you saying that in 13 days from: today the whole settlement will be operational?
A: Yes, if it goes like this.
Courtesy of The Independent 25 July, 1987
Explains the its Benefits
**
hsultations with all the
and equality in Sri tS had all understood, th the agreement that is agreement Secured e Sri Lankan Tamilis hort of breaking Sri , it goes well beyond s of the Sri Lankan
ement, approximately Lankan territory will
province, where the
clear majority. They
utonomy, comparable nments in India. This nse advance on what or by the Tamils in 1983. It represents
major concessions made by the Sri Lankan Government. ,
“A stage has been set for a national reconciliation and we must do everything we can to assist in this task, in the process of reconciliation and rebuilding. There is nothing further to be gained by more violence and more killing'. w
“There should be no sympathy now tor anyone who acts against this agreement because anyone acting against this agreement will be acting against the interests of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Some of the militant groups have been a little. apprehensive, perhaps a little worried about their personal security. They were also worried how they will fit into the future set-up. But I have reassured them that the agreement covers both the aspects very effectively and we will see that security and involvement in this rebuilding process is there for everyone in northern Sri Lanka, Mr. Gandhi said.
By courtesy of The Hindu (IE) August 8, 1987.
ܕܪ

Page 12
12 TAM TIMES
The Leader of the main Tamil militant group, Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran, was yesterday flown in an Indian helicopter, from his hideout in Jaffna to New Delhi where he is expected to meet the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, this weekend.
(Financial Times, 25 July, 1987)
* 兴
President Jayawardene said on Saturday that, under the agreement, Tamil guerrillas would have to hand over their weapons within 72 hours to a government representative while troops would be confined to barracks. There would be one regional council in the Northern and Eastern provinces, and elections Would be held before December 31 - but the east would have an opportunity in a year's time at a referendum to decide if it wanted to continue
the association.
He said that only 40 per cent of the Eastern province population are Tamils, with 33 per cent being Muslims and the other 27 percent Sinhalese. He said that a majority Would oppose the merger, "Then what do we gain by this temporary merger?" he asked the 1,200-strong executive committee of his United National Party on Saturday, and answered: 'The end of the terrorist movement'
Which has so far cost 6,000 lives,
(The Times, 27 July, 1987)
-3- 米 兴
The Indian government has imposed a news blackOut On its talks here with Tamil separatists on Colombo's proposals to end the Sri Lankan Crisis. It is not even known if Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister, has met Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the most influential guerrilla group, the Tamil Tigers. Mr. Gandhi said at the weekend that he thought the Sri Lankan proposals were a big advance, but advised caution: "Too much news is coming out of Sri Lanka. Let's wait and see."
(The Independent, 27 July, 1987)
} 并 许
India's Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, is likely to use threats if necessary to persuade Tamil guerrillas to sign an agreement seen as a prelude to a settlement to the four-year crisis in Sri Lanka, according to the Sri Lankan Minister of National Security.
The leader of the main rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, was quoted yesterday as saying prospects were dim for signing the pact on Wednesday, Velupillai Prabhakaran said the proposals were unsatisfactory and would have to be improved. The group had earlier expressedgeneral williпgness to accept the peасе agreement. The Sri Lankan Minister, Lalith Athulathmudali, said Mr. Gandhi would take a hard line. "As yet I'm not sure about the attitude of Prabhakaran," Mr. Athulathmudali said. "Mr. Gandhi called him to Delhi. And there are grounds for some hope. He will be told: "Yes, Mr. Prabhakaran, lam the Prime Minister of India. I am meeting you. Fine. What have you got to say? Yes, I
have taken it down. This is the agreement I have,
come to with Sri Lanka. Would you like to sign?"
Mr. Athulathmudali said that if the rebel leader refused to sign, "he will be told: There is a door there, and there Will be people Waiting there to receive you, - and he would be sent to jail as a recognised terrorist, with the Indians enforcing the law. He said a senior Indian diplomat had told Mr. Prabhakaran in Jaffna: "We are keen to end this mess, Sri Lanka has made an offer, many Tamils are prepared to accept this... India just cannot
dilly-dally. We are not ask agree or not; we are telling y! going ahead and we are on ti the consequences."
(The Inde
斧 k,塔”。
The key element of the plan their Semi-autonomous hom Northern and Eastern pro eastern population is Only
Gandhi is putting pressure on been sustained by Indian
expected to sign two separat Tamil rebels and the Sri Lanka
Crowds in restrain attacking police after demonst and baton-charged.
In Ampara in Sri Lanka's E gas was used yesterday to about 2000 Sinhalese proti Buddhist monks. Severalpeo first outburst of Sinhalese pro Ampara, a predominantly Sinl a SCene Of Communal Violen C In Colombo, about 3,000 Bud yesterday afternoon at Kelan renowned Centre of Buddh later marched to Kelaniya vowed to frustrate the Leaflets distributed at the 'm proposed agreement as a "se Tamils" and 'a Surrender to
(Financ
※ 兴
Sri Lanka's Prime Minist Premadasa, who is oppose expressed his reservations a session, called for a natic urged President Jayawards Gandhi to delay his visit.
(The Daily Te
兴 兴
Outside the state officia Minister, Mr. Ramasinghe Pr. of Buddhism, the majority r reminder that the second m in the island is opposed to th not know last night whether greet his Indian counterpart. signal a disastrous split in party, which has long cham supremacy of the Sinhaleser
Mr. Gandhi said yesterda ahead with plans to sign the Jayawardene today desp Tamils. Hetold leaders of op Delhi that the rejection of th Tamil militant group, the Lib Eelam, had in no way change

AUGUST 1987
ng you whether you pu. If you don't, we are leir side so you'll take
pendent, 27 July, 1987)
兴
is to give the Tamils land by merging the vinces although the One-third Tamil. Mr. the Tamils, who have support, and he is 2 agreements with the In Government.
Buddhist monks from 'ators were tear-gassed
:astern province, tear disperse a crowd of estors, including 300 ple were injured in the test against the plans. halese town, has been e since the mid-1950s. dhist monks gathered iya University, once a ist scholarship. They temple, where they Government's plans. 2eting denounced the Il-Out to the separatist dia." alTimes, 28 July 1987)
兴
er, Mr. r d to the peace plan, ta special ministerial inal referendum and ine to persuade Mr.
legraph, 29 July, 1987)
兴
home of the Prime madasa, only the flag eligion, flew in mute )st powerful politician e accord. Officials did Mr. Premadasa would Failure to do so would the Sri Lankan ruling pioned the rights and hajority. ly that he was going accord with President ite opposition from }osition parties in New e accord by the main ration Tigers of Tamil d his plans. The leader
of the Tamil Tigers, Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran, described the accord as "a betrayal by India". He said his group would not adhere to the proposed 17-point peace plan which includes an immediate ceasefire between Sri Lankan forces and Tamil militants in Colombo's Northern province.
(The Guardian, 29July, 1987)
Asked the reason for the rioting, Mr. Jayawardene said: "The reason? Ignorance,"
(International Herald Tribune, 30 July, 1987)
兴 兴 兴 Athulathmudali's position is, typically, more subtle and equivocal. He has long argued for a political solution, and simultaneously for a strong stand against terrorism. Similarly, he has now chosen neither to condemn the peace act Outright nor to turn up at the elaborate ceremonies yesterday.
(The Guardian, 30 July, 1987)
景 兴 米 The threat of Indian military intervention is essential to the cause of peace in Sri Lanka.
(The Daily Telegraph, 30 July, 1987)
景 兴 兴 The leader of the Opposition, Mr. Anura Bandaranaike, in a letter to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, said: "The people of Sri Lanka are vehemently opposed to the accord you are going to sign today. Hardly 24 hours ago 20 people were brutally massacred by the police and hundreds injured. They were peacefully demonstrating against the proposed accord. "What you are about to do today is the greatest betrayal of my Country".
(The Times, 30 July, 1987)
关 兴 兴 Four key ministers failed to attend the ceremonies yesterday, fuelling speculation about a split in the Cabinet. They included the Prime Minister, Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa, and the National Security Minister, Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali,
(The Guardian, 30 July, 1987)
兴 许 in the past, when it had been approached to beef up the Sri Lankan military, the Administration declined in order to discourage the Jayawardene Government from going down the military road to solve the Tamil problem. The Sri Lankan national
f. Y ;
security chief, Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali, has left
Washington empty handed on several occasions.
(The Guardian, 31 July, 1987)
兴 兴 兴
Mr. Ramasinghe Premadasa, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, is firmly opposed to the agreement and refused to attend official functions when Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, came to Colombo to sign it. Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali, the Minister of National Security, threatened to resign when he discovered the deal called initially for the withdrawal of his troops from areas they had captured after heavy fighting in May and June.
(The Times, 31 July, 1987) ६४ continued opposite

Page 13
AUGUST 1987
"I don't know how long the troops will stay at this stage," said the Indian High Commissioner, Jyotindra Nath Dixit. "We have come in. There are tasks to be fulfilled to the mutual satisfaction of
both governments."
(International Herald Tribune, 31 July 1987)
米 兴 兴
asked if Sri Lanka could change its mind about the desirability of the presence of Indian troops on its soil, Mr. Dixit said: "When you come to something jointly, you can't change your mind unilaterally. There has been a meeting of the minds so far, why should it change?
(International Herald Tribune, 31 July, 1987)
충 米 米
The United States yesterday confirmed that it would provide military aid in the form of transport aircraft as part of an international package in Connection with the Sri Lankan peace plan.
(The Guardian, 31 July, 1987)
५९ ti : ※ 兴 兴
Animediate problem is to repair the damage, estimated at 3bn rupees (f64m), to the transport system, buses, roads, rail tracks and coaches caused by last Week's riots.
(FinancialTimes, 31 July, 1987)
* 兴 兴
DELH: Mr. Gandhi returned to Delhi yesterday apparently unconcerned by the attack on him, (Our Correspondent Writes).
"Can't you see I am not hurt?" he asked a crowd of about 600 waiting to welcome him at the airport. "Do you want me to take off my clothes?" Among those waiting for his arrival were the newly elected President Venkataraman, most of the Cabinet, leading Congress () members and several hundred of the party's youth wing. On the Indian Airlines jet home, Mr. Gandhi gave his version of the attack to reporters. "When I was inspecting the guard of honour, and as walked past one person, saw through the corner of my eye some movement," he
Mr. Gandhi indicates where he was hit on the shoulder by a Sri Lankan member of a guard of honour.
said. "Then I saw a man reverse his rifle at me." He said he ducked as 'a reflex action' and the man "missed my head, and the brunt of the blow came on my shoulder below the left ear".
in Delhi, the Lok Sabha (Assembly) condemned the incident as "a dastardly attack on the precious life" of the Prime Minister. The Speaker, Mr. Balram Jakhar, told the House that "we are relieved to see his safe return; we convey our best wishes and prayers for his long life in the service of the nation'. (The Times, 31 July 1987)
兴 兴 兴
The Prime Minister (Mr. Gandhi) suffered bruises and abrasions to his neck and shoulder, but was otherwise unharmed. Mani Dixit, India's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, said: "It... shows the state of involuted tension in Sri Lanka today that a man who comes and offers them a reasonable peace package is attacked."
(The Independent, 31 July, 1987)
Mr. Gandhi told the
"The marriage had tak
of a particular party."
The Tamil Wadu C Ramachandran, who Of the Prime Ministe nearly three hours. A Nadu Food Minister Mr. Ramachandran C plane to exercise his I with the LTTE leg Prabhakaran.
Also in the capital Tamil groups inclut General, Mr. A. Amirth of the EROS, EPRLF a told the LTTE leaders views (especially the requirement to lay Minister and get back
兴
Tamil Extremists in S peninsula are refusing .. to India's peace-ke Prab hakaran, their lea where he has been Gandhi, Indian Prime officials. (Fin
兴
Mr. de Mel said Mr. A
because the attack or by a Sri Lankan sailo security.“ There hada. and order during two lanka which police ha the army moved in. interests of the Count go. Unless he does, accord. (The Fin
兴
"We are very happy. E (the local euphemism achieving something, coastal town of Point believe the Governme up their guns." (
兴
The Sri Lankan army, the flat countryside. Ti airlifted to Colombo in which brought their re. Many will start a new riot-scarred streets of At Palaly, the Sri closely with the Indiar numbers it. The nation, Ranatunga, gently r yesterday who was commanding this coul said. There is basic u that.'
He went on to agr Singh that each unit h there was no convent

Ipper house of parliament: 2n place without the Consent
he Guardian, 1 August, 1987)
* 兴 vÃ ካ
hief Minister, Mr, M. G. ew in today at the insistence r met Mr. Prabhakaran for fr. S. Ramachandran, Tamil Ind Mr. Dixit, were present. ame here by a special lAF moral authority and influence dership, particularly, Mr.
were leaders of the other ling the TULF Secretaryalingam and representatives id TELO. Mr. Ramachandran that he would convey their ir apprehensions about the down arms) to the Prime Othern,
(The Hindu, 1 August, 1983
景 关
Sri Lanka's Northern Jaffna to hand Over their weapons eping force until Mr. V. der, returns from New Delhi holding talks with Mr. Rajiv
Minister, and government ancial Times, 1 August 1987)
옷 출
thulathmudali should resign Mr. Gandhi on Wednesday had been a 'total lapse of lso been a breakdown of law days of rioting in south Sri ld not been able to quell till Mr. de Mel said: 'In the ry, Mr. Athulathmudali must he will sabotage the peace ancial Times, 1 August, 1987)
奖
ut it is because of the boys for the Tigers) that we are said a man in the battered Pedro. "But we still don't nt, the boys should not give he Guardian, 1 August 1987)
并 兴
meanwhile, is fading from vo thousand men have been he same Indian transporters placements to the peninsula. peace-keeping duty in the he capital. ankan army is cooperating contingent which now outní chief of staff, General Cyril minded visiting reporters boss. "As general officer try I direct operations," he lderstanding between us On
2e with lieutenant-General ld its own commander, that pnal ladder of command for
TAMILTIMES 13
both forces, and that there was "utmost cooperation." (The Guardian, 1 August, 1987)
兴 兴 兴
A Sri Lankan Government MP was shot dead by Sinhalese rioters yesterday as Indian troops prepared to assist with the handing Over of arms by Tamil guerrillas under the peace accord signed this week. The shooting of Mr. Jinadasa Weerasinghe happened in his constituency of Tangalle, where mobs also attacked houses belonging to government workers in violent Sinhalese protests against the proposed merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island.
The Times, 1 August, 1987
兴 并 兴
Giving details of the proposals, Mr. Jayawardene fold the UNP committee that the Provincial Council for the Northern and Eastern provinces would have 52 members - 27 from the North and 25 from the East. The Chief Minister would be from the party which won the largest number of seats in elections. Mr. Jayawardene had denied that any of the Government's military bases in the North and East will be removed. The Government will retain the power to remove the Chief Minister of the combined Tamil region's ruling council "if the need arose'. The proposed agreement also provides for the "repatriation from Sri Lanka to India of over 200,000 Tamils of Indian origin and the return to Sri Lanka of 125,000 Tamil refugees. The UNP endorsed the plan after Mr. Jayawardene and senior Ministers gave the details,
(The Hindu, 1 August, 1987)
兴 兴 兴
The President is regarded locally as a political colossus and his skill as a tactician is highly regarded. Many had expected him to use his Prime Minister's opposition to the settlement terms as an excuse for backing off. In the past he has been able to project himself as both in favour of a political solution and against Concessions to the Tamils. This time however it seems that he is prepared to ride out the storm. He has the parliamentary power to dominate the political opposition and the willingness to outwit the Buddhist clergy. Perhaps at the age of 80 this is the memorial he wishes to leave behind. (Sunday Telegraph, 2August, 1987)
米 兴 兴
Since he won't cooperate, Prabhakaran languishes as a virtual prisoner at the hotel in New Delhi where he was brought from his hideout in Jaffna a week ago. According to one report, his incoming telephone calls are monitored, and he is refused access to journalists,
Because of his treatment, the response of the Jaffna Tamils to the indian Army presence has been tepid and even hostile at times. Certainly, they have not been accorded the kind of treatment normally reserved for liberating armies. If the Indian soldiers expected the sort of reception they got from what is now Bangladesh 16 years ago they must be sorely disappointed. The Jeep of Maj.-Gen. Harkirat Singh, who commands the Indian forces in Sri Lanka, was rocked by an angry mob demanding the return of Prabhakaran. Just normal mob tendency, said the general, who managed to extricate himself without resorting to gunfire.
(The Observer, 2 August, 1987)
兴 兴 兴
The peace agreement to end the island's civil war, which Rajiv Gandhi and Junius Jayawardene, the Sri Lankan president, signed last Wednesday, had been secretly prepared by the chairmen of the two Countries' Cricket boards. Gamini Dissanayake, who is also Sri Lanka's land minister, and K. D. Salve, who has high contacts in Delhi, worked out the details in India and London Over the past few months. (Sunday Times, 2 August, 1987)
continued overleaf

Page 14
14TAMILTIMES
continued from page 13
The main street of this prosperous coastal town (Panadura) appears to have been hit by dozens of highly selective miniature tornadoes. For a long stretch, every telephone pole has been uprooted; elsewhere service stations and buses have been burnt Out. But this destruction was an act of man rather than God. lts perpetrators have scrawled political slogans on every available wall and stretched banners across the highway. This was the work of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or People's Revolutionary Party - an outlawed Sinhalese Marxist group. The message is one of outright hostility to last week's Tamil peace agreement and the Sri Lankan government
last Friday, a government MP was murdered south of Panadura by opponents of the agreement And Mervyn Cooray, the MP for Panadura district, was confronted last week by a mob of 1,500 demanding that he refuse to ratify the agreement when Parliament votes On it later this month. "I was warned of their arrival by my villagers, who gathered together and protected me," he told The Independent
The rally was organised by a left-wing former MP for the district, but according to Mr. Cooray, it included Buddhist priests, JVP activists and other members of left-wing organisations. After failing to convince him to change his vote, the protesters went On the rampage, burning down the old Council Office and wrecking schools and other government buildings. (The Independent, 3 August, 1987)
డి$ 兴 兴
The Indian President broke with protocol to rush to the airport to embrace Rajiv and he was given a standing ovation in parliament.
(Sunday Times, 3 August, 1987)
3- 兴 兴
Mr. Prabhakaran did not say anything on the surrender of arms. But Mr. W. Balakumar, leader of an allied group, said: "Mr. Prabhakaran and I feel We should not antagonise the Indian peace force, and that there should not be any more difficulties about surrendering arms.'
(The Times, 3 August, 1987)
곳 兴 长
Mr. de Mel, an ambitious man, called for the removal of Mr. Athulathmudali, his bitter rival on the intellectual wing of the party, for failing to control the security situation.
)1987 ,The Guardian, 3 August( ܀
* 兴 옷
The Tamil Tigers yesterday made the first significant breach in the Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord by refusing to hand over their arms by the deadline. But the leader of the rebel group, Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran, last night raised hopes of a belated breakthrough When he said he would make his decision known on the "modalities' of the handover this evening at his headquarters in Jaffna town. The two governments had little option but to extend the deadline by 72 hours.
(The Guardian, 4 August, 1987)
米 % 讹
AWestern military attache said he understood that a garrison of two battalions of Sri Lankan troops would be kept in the area. He said he expected the Indian forces to remain in Sri Lanka for 18 months to two years, and to provide security for elections to the government of the autonomous region.
(International Herald Tribune,5August, 1987)
兴波 兴 兴
The only other regular officer at the rally was the British military attache from Colombo, Colonel Peter Cameron. Sporting a green beret and
MEDIA REPORT
Smoking a cheroot, he said occurred to me a month ago that today I would be liste addressing this huge rally on
(The Indepe
兴 长
As the leaders of one of the guerrilla armies melted aw under arms, Crowd Control were mobbed. So, too, was th were sent from the field of CE and laughter. Everyone hope war. But it certainly did noten (The Gu,
光 兴
"The Tamil detainees om hung former Sealink car ferry dropped their demands to st they want to go home.
As the 49 hunger strikers their protest to a "lie-in" they in sheets and blankets and | the floor of the lounge of t centre for suspected illegal moored at Harwich. The Tam food for five days, threater hunger strike "to the dea released immediately.
(The Daily Tele
兴 兴
Many of the weapons relinq were broken and rusty, Unit reported from Palaly, "This is Major General Deprinder Sin lndian force. Dilip Yogi, a le Tigers of Tamil Eelam, hande to a senior Sri Lankan offic
Mr. Yogi (left) handing over a Attygalle (right), while Maj. Ge looks on at a ceremony at Palaly
symbolising the group's Com accord.
General Sepala Attygal Ministry of Defence, put his acknowledge the surrender document authorising amn
political prisoners.
(The International Herald 7
So far, so good. There resentments and significal Sri lanka's President Juni India's Prime Minister, Raji peace agreement at the et Gandhi was beaten with a rif a Sri Lankan guard of honot country.
But, against the odds, thi and Some members of the separatist groups are now I of weapons on the instructic

YAtjGUST . 1987
"it would not have in my wildest dreams ning to Prabhakaran Sri Lanka territory." ndent,5 August, 1987)
米
World's most deadly Iy for their last night }roke down and they epress, whose lorries lebration With cheers s it was the end of a d in defeat.
ardian, 5August 1987)
光
er strike om board the Earl Willian have ay in Britain and say
; yesterday extended wrapped themselves efused to move from he floating detention immigrants, which is its, who have refused led to continue their th" unless they are
graph, 6 August, 1987)
兴
lished on Wednesday 2d Press International a token gesture, 'said gh, commander of the ader of the liberation dover a single pistol 2er at the ceremony,
mauser pistol to Gen.
n. Singh scentre of two) airfield.
liance with the peace
e, secretary to the and on the weapon to and gave Mr. Yogi a esty for rebels and
ribune, 6August 1987)
兴
ave been riots and it loss of life since is Jaya wardene, and Gandhi, signed their ld of last month. Mr. 'e butt by a member of r when he visited the
agreement has held most militant Tamil anding in truck-loads ns, albeit reluctant, of
their leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. This is a remarkable and unexpected achievement and both Mr. Gandhi and President Jayawardene deserve Credit. (The Independent, 6 August, 1987)
శ్య Mr. S. Thondaman, the Minister for Rural Industrial Development, summed up the situation succinctly in an interview with The Times yesterday: "There are reservations, but we have been presented with a fait accompli. Those opposed to the majority decision will just have to learn to live with it." Asked whether the accord Constituted a lasting solution, he said: "The referendum may be a source of irritation, but it is a solution for the time being."
(The Times, 6 August, 1987)
兴 兴 州
That the Ters and the smaller fighting groups are leaving the field undefeated was acknowledged yesterday with the first release of Tamil guerrilla suspects from detention camps in the south of the island as part of Mr. Gandhi's deal. There are problems about this. When the released detainees arrive home they will bring back memories of the treatment they received when they were arrested. And it will provide a chance of Confirmation of the fate of the Tamils allegedly missing. With that said there is now an atmosphere of Optimism.
(The Guardian, 7 August 1987)
兴 9- 兴
Preparations were underway yesterday for the release of hundreds of political detainees and suspected terrorists from the notorious Boosa camp in southern Sri Lanka. Government officials said 800 release orders had been signed, and the first batch of 500 men could be freed today. They would be returned to their homes in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka when sea transport could be arranged... released as part of the general amnesty agreed by the Government in its peace pact with India.
(The Guardian, 7 August, 1987)
兴 * 兴
Asked at a news conference last week why he had not made those concessions before, Jayawardene drew gasps when he replied, "Lack of courage on my part, lack of intelligence on my part, lack of foresighton my part." (The Times, 10August 1987)
景 兴 兴
Moderate Tamils say they are willing to give the plan a try. "We have the opportunity to work out a deal with the Muslims and win the referendum's passage," says Neelan Tiruchelvam, a leading Tamil moderate. 'We have a chance for success.' That's more than Sri Lanka had just a few short Weeksago. (Newsweek, 10 August, 1987)
兴 兴 용
The SLFP argues that the accord was "hatched under a veil of secrecy and signed in haste under a nationwide curfew followed by tight press censorship, a ban on meetings and a military presence which prevents people affected by it from expressing their views publicly." The party has expressed very strong opposition to the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces provided under the agreement saying that the Sinhalese and
continued on page20

Page 15
AUGUST 1987.
Sinhala Perceptions of the
by D. S. S. Mayadunne
Born in 1936 at Delgoda in the Kalutara District of Sri at first in the village school, and later on a Governme Taxila Central College, Horana and at Royal Colle
Has been a teacher for a few months and a transla years under the Government. Was a part-time m. original editorial staff of the radical Sinhala newspa
in the aftermath of the 1971 insurrection he was arr in custody for two years. As a remand prisoner he w a number of places including the Jaffna prison, t Hammanheil off the Jaffna peninsula and at Akka
Has been a Sinhala writer and freelance journalistf Among his published works are translations of To of Ivan Ilyich', a collection of short stories by Ant and an introduction to Einstein's theory of relativit
Theory of Relativity?".
CONDEMNATION of the sailor Rohan de Silva's attack on Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was nearly unanimous (nearly, and not entirely, because there were very rare
instances of approval). Sympathy for the
youthful Prime Minister, too, was almost universal. But all that did not dispel the
misgivings in the people's minds about the.
Accord.
For many Sinhalese, something long
feared has happened. For them, the Accord.
means a division of the country or something very close to it. Echoing what the Government's own media had been saying up to the very eve of the Accord, these people say that this linking of the North and the East is equivalent to granting Eelam.
As to be expected, very few have read the text of the Accord, although it was given wide publicity by the newspapers.
In the prevailing confusion in the minds of a large number of ordinary Sinhalese men and wormen the dominant Sentiments appear to be fear and distrust, as shown in
the following repr made by three differ
*If Prabhakaran col well in the North by will he not capture given power as the 'Will not the Tami North and the East of the country become refugees lik 'What is inevitab entrenched in the N in the course of country and have and the Sinhalese w minority."
Of course these entirety of Sinha fairly popular view is it will stop all the ul expenditure. But government do it be
There are also tho should be fought to
t is good back home the expre faces oft soldiers of Army, as th
airlift fro
peninsu Colombo terms of Jayawar
aC
(Daily |

TAM IL TIMES 15
Accord
anka. Educated it scholarship at je, Colombo.
tor for many ember of the per'Aththa”
ested and was as detained in he island of rayankulam.
or alongtime. lstoy's "Death on Chekhov v: 'What is the
-
esentative statements ent persons:
|ıldi estabolish himself so operating from India, :he whole island if he is Chief Minister?' Ils operating from the drive the Sinhalese out compelling them to ke the Palestinians?'
le is that the Tamils orth and the East will time, capture the his a tea-based economy . vill gradually become a
do not represent the la opinion. Another - 'The Accord is good. nnecessary killings and why could not the fore all those deaths?' se who say that the War a finish because it has
already caused thousands of deaths,
The young woman who said the following expressed a point of view not confined to her alone:
"We cannot deny the rights of the Tamil people. Further, Prabhakaran, after all, is a Sri Lankan. Why could not the government work out the same arrangement with him without Indian
participation? The Indian participation can later turn Sri Lanka into a province of India.'
However, there are also those who see no harm at all to Sinhala interests in the provisions of the Accord, like the middle grade public servant who said:
"This is the best solution in the present situation. But the Tamils have gained hardly anything for their sacrifices. Unfortunately Prabhakaran is motivated by nationalism which is a despicable creed.'
Among such people there is a grudging respect for Prabhakaran who is seen as a man who has stood up not only to the government of Sri Lanka but also that of India.
Amidst this welter of views there is also the one which expresses serious doubt about President Jayawardene's will to implement the Accord, and says that he might go back on his commitment and try to double cross India.
The stationing of Indian troops on Sri Lankan soil has also caused concern among some sections, notably among young people including students. When will India withdraw them or will she keep them here permanently? is not India dictating to us what to do with our territory and our ports? isn't she dictating our foreign policy for us?
In spite of all this the sense of relief felt by the people is more widespread than appears on the surface. The fond father of a girl killed by the Pettah bomb blast said: 'If they had done this earlier my daughter wouldn't have had to die ". The possible salary increase for public servants and the prospect of travelling about without fear, too, are not lost sight of
o be getting , seems to be ssion on the hese yоитg the Sri Lankan ey wait foran n the Jaffna Ila back to and home, in the Gandhidene peace cord.
Jews, August 7, 1987)

Page 16
6 FAMILTIMES
The Plight of the Earl William Tamils
TAMILS REJECT OFFE) FREE FLIGHTS HOW
THE 45 TAMIL REFUGEES on hunger strike on the Earl William floating detention centre, rejected the Government's offer of free flights to Sri Lanka.
The offer was made by Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, after a spokesman for the Tamils indicated recently that they were ready to go home,
The Tamils were interviewed individually by immigration officers. A Home Office spokesman said afterwards: 'None
indicated their desire to But our offer still stands,
The Home Office cor were on hunger strike, The spokesman said tha. was seriously ill, altho that one was suffering another from gastritis a said their medical cor closely monitored.
Jessica Morris, of th Council, said reports tha. to go back to Sri misinterpreted. She saic that some would eventu but not until the situat stable.'
The Council and the i Kingdom Immigration have made strong pro Office about condition former car ferry.
Gandhi Attacked by Sri Lan Sailor in Guard of Honou
MR. RAJVGANDHI was the victin of a dramatic parade ground attack by a Sri Lankan sailor standing in a guard of honour for the Indian Prime Minister outside the President's palace in Colombo.
"I ducked and the rifle butt hit me on my left shoulder blade,' Mr. Gandhi told cheering members of Parliament when he arrived back in New Delhi. He added that he had seen the raised rifle butt out of the corner of his eye just as he had passed the first line of the inter-service guard of honour. a u ex
Sri Lanka's President Junius Jayawardene
publicly apologised to people of India for the as address to the nation, h sorrow' atrioting by the majority against the pea end Sri Lanka's ethnic Co
"I express my regret Minister of india, Mrs. C children, and the Govel of India, for the insult C President added.
Hundreds of Congres: India's Parliament anc thronged the Palam air Delhi, to give Mr. Gandh
FIGHT FOR PRESIDENTIAL SUCC
Laith to Alter Gandhi's
The London based ECONOMIST of August 8,
THE RULING UNITED NATIONAL PARTY was itself divided. Some members of the cabinet accused the national security minister, Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali, of making grave mistakes during the riots in Colombo. They cited two specific blunders: about 2,000 policemen had been sent away to keep order at a festival in Kandy; and, after letting huge crowds assemble in Colombo, the police maddened them by using tear gas (foreign reporters who had to scramble over walls to escape the fumes confirm this version of events.)
By July 29, the president had virtually taken Over control of security operations himself, and was relying heavily on his finance minister, Mr. Ronnie de Mel, a supporter of the agreement and a bitter rival of the security minister. After a sailor in a Sri Lankan guard of honour struck
Mr. Gandhi with his rifle b Mel publicly demanded resignation.
The security minister an Mr. Ranasinghe Premadas to support the president ( Both have their eyes On 1 election. In that electio months' time, it is almost Opposition candidate will ( Order to appeal to cha Lanka's Sinhalese majority Some think the ruling p its sails accordingly. Mr. already increased his Sinhalese, who see hi opponent of the pact disappointed: he has st

AUGUST 1987
R OF ME
return to Sri Lanka.
respasses
firmed fhat als 45 aking only liquids. none of the Tamils ugh he confirmed from dizziness and nd mild nausea. He dition was being
e British Refugee the Tamils wanted Lanka had been d: 'It is true to say ally like to go home, on in Sri Lanka is
dependent United
Advisory Service tests to the Horne s on the ship, a
kan *
r
Wr. Gandhi and the sault. In a televised e expressed 'deep e island's Sinha lese ce pact designed to Inflict.
s also to the Prime Gandhi and the two rnment and people ffered to him,' the
s party members of l their supporters -base outside New a hero's welcome.
(PEACE ACCORD
Wgłvełłurg
PROPOSED MERGER OF NORTH AND EASTERN PROVINCES
IIIIIIIIIIIII
SINHALESE NOW MAN THREAT IN SRI LANKA
PRESIDENT JUNIUS JA YA WARDENE declared in an address to the nation: 'Terrorism is now confined to the south.' He appealed to everyone to help stamp it out. M
Extremist Sinhalese nationalism is a real threat to the government and the peace accord, say diplomatic sources.
A Colombo newspaper, the Daily News, argued that xenophobic racist attitudes by the Sinhalese majority led to the alienation of the Tanils,
”We Who Condemn Hitler's Herrenvolk theory; we who condemn South Africa's apartheid; must not erect any narrow, exclusive Brahminism of our own, 'it states,
ESSION:
PaCet
writes:
It on July 30, Mr. de Mr. Athulathmudali's
d the prime minister, a, had signally failed Iver his peace pact. he next presidential I, due in about 18 :ertain that the main enounce the pact in uvinists among Sri
arty will have to trim Athulathmudali has popularity among m as an outright (They might be ggested that if he
became president he would seek to alter its terms rather than scrap it.)
His elevation to the presidency would cut short the political ambitions of Mr. de Met. The finance minister, who is long on service but short on magnetism, might choose to hitch his wagon to a rising young star, Mr. Gamini Dissanayake, the minister for lands, who was largely responsible for negotiating the peace pact.
The fact that Mr. Jayawardene is already 80 may not deter him from seeking to retain the presidency himself. Some people think he is counting on the prospect that the proposed merger of the Northern and Eastern provincesa central element in the accord - will be annulled when it is submitted to a referendum next year.
The Eastern province, where the Tamils are in a minority, may well vote against the merger if its Muslim inhabitants side with the Sinhalese.
The president might then be able to base his campaign for re-election on the claim that he had both tamed the Tigers and wriggled Out of the merger.

Page 17
AUGUST 1987
G.P., the Archite
The President's House in Colombo had originally been the private residence of the last Dutch Governor Johan Gerard
van Angelbeak, and formed the nucleus of
the Fort of Colombo. It is an architectural treasure, gracefully designed with polished canewood ceilings and its floors covered by a mosaic of tiles. Seventeenth century shell patterned Dutch chests, wooden cabinets, ebony sofas and centretables adorn the reception areas and the Conference room.
On July 29, a row of distinguished Indian politicians and senior bureaucrats stood nervously in the Conference room awaiting the arrival of the two heads of Government. They included Union Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao. Mr. Natwar Singh looking solemn in their formal sharwanis, and Mr. P. Chidambaran. Mr. S. Ramachandran and Mr. G. Moopanar clad more informally in their spotless white vershties. All of them had played their part in the complex and tortuous negotiations which preceded the formal understanding. Also present was Dinesh Singh, the former Foreign Minister whose fleeting visit to Colombo apparently stalled a military offensive on the Northern peninsula. There was, however, one person who played a decisive role in defining the framework of the accord who was conspicuous by his absence.
Parthasarathy's role in 1983
In August 1983 the Sri Lankan President accepted Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's offer of good offices to facilitate a political solution. This was an important watershed in Indo-Sri Lankan relations and the search for a special envoy to Sri Lanka to undertake the delicate and complex mediatory efforts was intensified. There were three criterias that had been articulated within the higher reaches of the Government for this position which was highly prized within the political and bureaucratic establishment. Firstly, the negotiator must be a skilled diplomat who is sensitive to the geo-politics of the region. Secondly, he must be a lawyer capable of coping with Byzantine complexities of Sri Lanka's constitution. and the riddles in carving out an autonomous region within an unitary State. Thirdly, he had to understand the domestic politics of India and be capable of commanding the confidence of political opinion within Tamil Nadu, which had expressed solidarity for the predicament of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. G. Parthasarathy clearly met all of this criteria, given his legal training and distinguished diplomatic career spanning several decades.
Gopalaswamy Parthasarathy had other advantages. He enjoyed total access to and the complete confidence of the then Prime Minister of India, and was frequently consulted on sensitive issues of both foreign and domestic policy. He was
Gopa aswamy Pa asa
thus able to symbo concern of the Gove highest levels. A l that Gopalaswamy Sri Lanka and ł friendship and link over the years with class western educa He had led a cri Presidency College against Such stalwa the Oxford Blue Lankan cricket in til Oxbridge associa Coomaraswamy. t servant : Pieter Kue of the Sri Lankan contemporary of galam, both of who the Cambridge U known the political Wickremasinghe, Lake House forma adviser to political United National Pa
by Neelan
Gopalaswamy grasped the compl pitfalls in the tasks events of July 1 polarised the two prospects of ethnic dismal. Each comm the problem had embedded in thei that there was littl which he could familiarise himsel contemporary p( developments, and and attitudes of t Sinhala and Tamil perceptions were to work on the cons communities and th
Gopalaswamy Pi

TAMILTIMES 17.
I rathy
lise the authority and rnment of India at the esser known fact was Parthasarathy knows nad forged personal ages which had grown the incestuous middle |ted elite in Colombo. cket team from the in Madras, and played rts as F. C. de Saram, who dominated Sri he post-war years. His tes, included Raju he international civil neman, the President Communist Party (a Mohan Kumaramanom were Presidents of nion). He had also power broker Esmond who had controlled ny years, and was close leadership within the
rty.
Tiruchelvam
Parthasarathy soon exities and the many ahead. The traumatic 983 had so deeply ommunities, that the reconciliation seemed unity's perceptions of
become so deeply r respective psyches, e common-ground on
work. He had to
f with the history, olitical events and with the personalities he key actors on the sides. Above all, if ) be altered, he had to ciousness of the two eir leadership. rthasarathy's first few
ct of the Accord?
visits were directed towards familiarising himself with the key political actors on the Sinhala side. He briefed himself on the background of the senior and more influential cabinet ministers, and opposition leaders. He then met them individually and listened patiently to their perceptions, fears, anxieties and obsessions. He consulted with the widest cross section of Sinhala opinion, including Gamini Iriyagolle, the President of the Buddhist Theosophical Society, and the Venerable Walpola Rahula, the scholarmonk who was the Secretary-General of the Supreme Council of the Maha Sangha. Although some of their views were emotionally charged they were invariably deferential to the stoic patriarch. He brushed aside small discourtesies with his characteristic humility and good humour. A youthful opposition leader had insisted that G. Parthasarathy call on him, and conform strictly to the norms of protocol. G. Parthasarathy cheerfully complied, but his measure of the man had diminished. He realised that the vanities and personality quirks of the key actors were as important as their substantive beliefs.
He moved more easily with the old Left, such as the Trotskyite leaders - Dr. Colvin R. de Silva and Mr. Bernard Soyza, and his old friend Pieter Kueneman. He had immediate empathy for their secular outlook, and instinctive response to the aspirations of national minorities.
، ... Talks with Tamils
On the Tamil side, he soon became the focal point of their anguish and hopes. He was generous with his time: he met with innumerable delegations of expatriate groups, he met personally with leaders of the different militant organisations. * -
He advised them, admonished them and constantly pushed them to explore and recognise the limits of their political options. Struggle and negotiate was his response to those who obstinately adopted fundamentalist positions on even. the process of negotiation. His task was a difficult one. While he frequently counselled restraint, he was distressed by the escalating violence and the incalculable suffering of the ordinary people. He was moved by the sense of deprivation and passion which underscored the sacrifice of the youth. He often had little more than sympathy to offer to those who complained of the excesses of the State, the gross and persistent violations of human rights. Denied legal or political redress the Tamil mood soon turned to despair. -
G. Parthasarathy inevitably developed a special relationship with the TULF leadership. He engaged them intellectually, while remaining emotionally detached. He questioned the conceptual underpinnings of their political demands. Concepts such as 'self determination',
continued overleaf

Page 18
18TAMILITMES
crfiri e frupgg877 'Tilditional homelands were probled in depth 5) that they could clarify and refine their own thoughts. He pointed to the CI (Tacicli 15 et Wee1 a 1 approach which cliphasised all to Italus regions fi 31' 11:11 i II al T1 miliorities als chaillei ir 1 hic ("W" pripis als before the All Partics Conference in 1981) and that which se ough t fcdcral cor quasi-federal forms of : devolution within a democratic polity. Each arrangement pre-supposed distinct constitutional Todels which were not easily recocilable. He drew on his iITn The 11 se political and diplomatic cxperience to claw comparisons with the Incgi-bitiations (31), Kashmir. Mizoram ail dd the Wietnamese liberation struggle. Il le Counselled that the TiIImil negotilting [picosi lil bl sho Luld be guidel buy in Lier Inally Consis I e III principles. and I het on the cxpediency of the IIIIlent,
AITITexure C-Parthasarathy's Scherne
C). P:Erth:15:1I'; 11 hy's subislam Live contrili Lili_ 1 W Els i 1 ilegitial ling the set of |propis als for devolutioill of power to I'egional councils, more popularly known as Annexure "C", He completed this cxcrcise within a span of four months froit Agust 1983 to December 1983, wer si : '', Lorill TT-Latings i 1 ibi Tıbı kırıld Ney, lDelhi with Prcsident Jayaward cinc. He h'i 34ıgılı 1 T4'ı bL:T :ill the Skills of tı Consummitte Incgotiator in media ting between the Tamil political leadership und the la ya Wardeile (i overnmen I. He « Iskcd the TlJl LF 1 « i foriTmulate : scheme of Ll:','i plution which woulçi all shirt of the ultimate de Tand of a separate State. While bei Ing respons i V e I o Lheir aspirations, The initial lift envisaged El Jilich if States. iam e vertly federal ar raill gerime it with the major it reais i of & Cacic- ecalcit hic clevele op Ternt. educatior il Tıl Cult Lırıl policy çtlik li ılıd ke!!lement and law and Order heig devolved to the States, G, Parthasarathy reasoncil thal the substance of the Tamilderlands would |need Is the W, ven intico al schleimhe, Willicou 1 the cimitive content or the terminology which could trigger off Sinhala resistance, The sch. The Was Te for Illulated all T. S. Illi is 1: Which WLL || lck 14 i Wilceilge The Limity, si vereignty and territorill integrity of Sri Lanka. The LLLLLL LL LLLLLLLaaLS S L LEa LLaaLLL LatLaLaLLLH LLL Regills, Besides the shiring of power het weer the centre and the regions. Provision Was Inilde til Lnsure that Tamils ejo y el II adquille, inol proportionale. slıali'e it ||he recruit Tell 16, 1 hic i rimeç! fi rices. Ille Filice a Il llic: public service. PII this.L.I.Lilly felt that the TIII its suld Tc''ci tij shı:ITC power al Ille ceinire, if they L SaS LL0 LLL LLa LLLLLLLaLLLL LL SLLLaLLL id: ',' çeli pirT1-T11,
President Jay Iwardelle readily concelled Taily of the elements of the scheme. It the unit of clevolution remained in Iractable, The Goverilitielt w aus, wycidade i til The Initi ol 1 hat the district should be the häsic Lirit is clevolutio11. Ind L' ''' i proposilt Crini district & withina Privitc.: t} c Intine into larger unis was
C. Elsitlered L.K.) r: Tarıil deliltıIlls, G. Wis reclii Ig Ih PCISLlals' : puWes strategy was callet. Illake a direct : Jayawardene, an Jayawardene at the in the evening on to in the coTT|på ny of M, ione other. The Cas. displassionately pr result in än lugimę: re:S bLı Tüc:5, T:ırılıils; ollereid a package: See II i Takıble basic island," tired ar 1 | 2 x Elai List ci presentatic is with skilled list less, a Which he had its |Ill', As the rei delegation descend iron staircase at th G.P. observed reiss Thandaman is 70. bl ik il lis eigl 1is, i T : yiti ble Ill”,
1 WWCT, III:ailed tact Tullowed the :dge: xT) Privilial Councils.
The legisti Läller dLIring Ja, Ne W. Diclhi Il I). mobilised the supp. րresel11 [ht: tast: it region. G.P. s devot llä he evei enicä. The T1 Leting || 1:1 || IF facilitate i fill i qi | La 31 t'II til Lis, is3, LIL S. la: He could [nikot erotico He, however, agre. A III e XLIT: "(" will ÇI LIlcils (i Provinci | L'ALTshı III WILL||, ! d'Hill the case I. All-Party Collier. I'te Yiew tect the propi | 1 || I || sk cd (i. zilkli. P. Fes indiced Wils. It all agreeing were required.
The All-Party C It was a ticipated Yould IIII 1lle hä: (c) Inferee Ice. si I I In Ilmi ATIch th:1 tille (L'Ilfo I The opportunity I đTÖund the pr{1|}{15ã|8 On The contrar pri ved to be d participal Ts rejected r: fused III even fo. ATidst mounting er Jr: I lisätie imik. Bild: oppi sition parties. e listirici'l itself frontı denied IIIv responkih Every lila 1 T. Lati.

AUGUST 1987
ici : ccTLossill ! » ... began to feel that he limits of his will A new negotiating for. He decided to ppeal to President arranged to see President's House late abuu August 6, 1983 II. S. Thurida Than and for a larger unit was scited, "I would lation of power and would need to be of proposals which alternative to their ayawarde: seened 1. He listeneci tu the Liit com Therit, Hic 1 it wäs Il cleial T rted any of the points :ting ended and the 2d down the wrought : President's House. uringly "I am 75, Mr. it the old mail upstairs Age must take its Mr, Ilya Wlrill:11:. enigmatic. He had in Argul Timents aldvancesl. Illing. In the Tlation of
or of Merger yawardenes visil lo :cembcr 1983. Ci. 1°. rt of Mrs. Gandhi to is a single linguistic için tçı detail wis suçlı Lured I ensure I hit Ico right ambience [Ĉ} rank discussi. Il of the ya wird:1: l'11 LirTed. lis base of support. :ɩl tɩ b ) :: Impir II Tmisc:, ull confic: regibni ial limits... Thic " la mil 1. Wewe T. be free! Tc r Illerger before the : 1çe. Jaya wirdLIL osills at tlı e Aslı Çok P. "where do I sign", benevolently that his "Il t 1 ml Imx) sigħ fi t t I r ii: s
пference (1984)
| thilt. Annex II* *(' sis if the All-Party ned im Janu:1ry 198-4 "ence would IT vide
furբu il cւ inst11st1s
". Ille (« Ils:ru:Ince isastrolls, and its
AYIllexure "(" : 1 ! :Luis & II i Is, ci te 1%, iticism from Sinhalli list groups and some 'Til till (Gy','TIL 17 et
AnnexUTC "C" and ility for its contents, Wis, kel to Wid
serius discussion of subst: Ilce. Il meetings were adjourned at the slightest pretext. The Conference clTagged III. cildlessly amidst scalating violence : Ict the continuing excess.cs of the security forces. The Tamil gTotups beca Inc cxasperated, but G.P. counselled caution and encouraged the In tɩ b rcm nihil with the Conference. Finally, in DeccIlher 1984. the Government presented proposals in a highly at tenuated form for a limited scheme of power sharing which sell far short of Taimil cxpectations. The AllParty Conference was Wound up on Deliber 21, 1984,
In early 1985 there were new diplomatic initiatives with New Delhi, actively pursuing a policy of improving its bilateral relations with its neighbours. These policy initiatives coincided with attempts to question (i.P.'s role in the negotiating pruccss, Twili factors contribut cd tim Wiards this trend. Firstly, the Tamil political |leade Islı ip hald becç birle incre: si Ingly dependent on G. P. fu guidancc and advice on its political «trategies, Their frequent consultations with (i, P, Were widely publicises in the Indian and Sri Lankan press, and begia Il to progressively, alter Sinhalil perceptico.Ils of his rile. Selcığını xilly, G.P. sığını hecaltıc yulnerable til hurgau Lratic and Political intrigue in New Delhi and it was Whispered in Colombo That a chi sistent ca TTpaign to discredit his role would prove effective,
G.P. was deeply pained by these intrigues, and his Tole Was progressively eclipsed. He remained. however, the institutional memory within South Block In Sri Lanka. Tid its 1: tinal || Lestis T1, His absence proved costly in terms of the quality cof at tention that was de Vitel te 3 the complexitics of Sri Lanka's ethnic ciri flict. Decision making process within New Delhi, and the process of negotiations sufleTCclaset back With tragic LUnsequences for Sri Linkil.
The Fukuro Offhg 1987Accord
It is still unclear whether the recent accord would hiring about a genuine reconcilialilor belwccn the two coIIImunitics. It is however a comprehensive ag Ticc Ilmcnt a mixi envisages | Tcdcfilli Licor 1 of the Sri Lankan polity. The dramatic 1 Llr of events resulting in a formal agreement between the two governments, and a peace-keeping force would probably have outstripped ever G.P.'s expectations of India's good olices Tole. Many comparisons have been made between A II nexu Tc "C" and ılıc subsequen 1 proposals made since 1983, It has heen aaaLLaaLLLL LLL LLLLHtLLLLLLL SS LLLLLLtLLLL general principles, while the later drafts contained detailed arrangements. Whatever he the merits of those comparisons. Ilıcrc can Hic litt le clubt that I much if the :ri:«di: f, 1r li:4 y'ii 1 g! (bu t. tl1c ci.h:15ti T Lu I ib[1:ıl fundations of a multi-ethmic polity musi go to G. Parihasa rathy.
() er efforts were vir dari bir importarr, lur (i.P.'y rejle in definirg the basic iderry Holtfelt fire integral ro fire McCord Wars clearly lirë derisi "e parë,

Page 19
AUGUST 1987
make it work.
Mae S/?:fi:
1. The Tamil politicians who had the foresight to lay the foundation for this Solution before the 1970's,
2. The various Tamil groups who accelerated the process of settler Therit after that.
3, Tamils who sacrificed their lives and property in achieving this Sattle IThert. 4. Tamils who andur Ed härd and difficult times in their homeland.
5. Tamils living abroad who helped in Turrier Luis Way5.
6. The Indian Governments including Tari 7 i Wadu ČGo we r r ) r77 e 7 f, for concluding the agreement.
7. The Sri Lankan Gowerment for realising, even at this stage, the merits of ending 'the military solution,"
For the Tails.
1. It is not a time to discuss or claim as to which political party or group di 11 ore Cress.
TAMILs IN ExILE sAI
The agreement signed by the Indian Prime Minister, N and the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayawardene ( in Colombo gives a sigh of relief and much expecta Tamils. This agreement will go down in history as solving ethnic crises. It is the duty of all concerned to it
2. No political parl" automatic right to people's will is exe a LI to no rino LIs gowler I 3. Tamils expect t
and concerned am and go to the polls.
4. Mo leed at this ti and change tha idec to consolidate the e.
For the Sir Walesa:
1. After the initial fl. a realistic basis, the they have mot lost ar
2. When the agre mented thay will
country as a whole of politica || stabil economic recovery.
It is ric Vy the duty f3 | 77 dkÈ tifs, Jr 774 and to build a реасеfU/ алсї есоло Larka ir This "urity LL,
LATESTAMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPOF
A Probe On Tami TC
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL has urged Sri Lanka to investigate reports that several hundred Tamils have been tortured and a Innost 500 hawe disappeared after being arrested by Government Security Forces in the last two and a half years.
"The London - biascid human righ 1s fganisation said it has sworn statements. often from witnesses, detailing 216 cases of young Tai Tmil T1 en Who disappeared after being seized in Sri Lanka's Eastern province by members of a special police |ask,-fi 1rce: Ca)Im1 11:In. t. y LIIıi L,
This is in addition the F2 Talhills the Nobel peace-prize-winning organisation described as missing in a report last September.
We have strong reason to believe that many of the disappeared have been tortureld. SixIThe clying als 1 result. Ind thal others hii v Le been slico I al fitcr a TT:st. their t' lies l'uing isposed of in Secret." AIIII'sty said in a hews Tcp T1,
HELICOPTER TRAINING The report cites testimony from former prisoners who said their hands were ticd behind their hacks with a nylon rope that Wils then used to suspend them from a Leiling heim, They were then Healen.
sometimes with hea was called "helic pil
It also qLlotc. saying chilli powd sensitive parts if Were fcrcccll [II i Ihlhä burning chillies. O saying they hal bei bodies of victims special task force.
AIT Testy said as Lirikiri (i ve III1 Tesponse to its replc 272 missing Tamils, lice 1 : lil L. li cl I Iiily 7 cises listicci, II
TWA) peuple wers W IS Ticle, si: i Çin another was found forces, Annesty si List year's Tir Gvernment 1 » inquiry into the lis:
li cc Il t rl | Regist detenti - Ims.
'Ntili si Ali
Tecuitendati 18 äTI, II, i stes hävi Ilık: TecLir TÜncu k fL I Liric.''
f{r',

TAMILTIMES 19
LUTE
Tr. Rajiv Gandhi n July 29, 1987, ion among the a model Way of nplement it and
of group has the go werni Luntil the rcisod in the new -tח:tודחו
e educated, able ng the to rally
The to experiment logical sel-up bLII xisting.
Tore, if wiewed to y wil|| reällise that nythig. estant is implereëlise that the will gain in terms ity, peace and
fã Sri Lankar S 3. Sf3ff /TTE If Werk Offically state, Tfca Wystryrgy Sri fra diversity" sak
TREOUESTS:
Orture
tcd iri. Il reJigis. ii 1 Whä I :T t 1";ıirni I1 g."'
for Iller prisoners as it was smeared in heir bodies, or they le che il crid fu Ilncs Of thers were quoted as Il forced Llı bull Til till: illegedly shot by the
far as it knows the Sri ent did nothing in rt last year describing "So far we have only Ille l:11e (il four of th: 2 report said. : fouild il pris011, l’Ile an army camp Hпi dead. shot by security ki. turged the Sri Lankan lai Liich is I impartial || 2: rinccs :: Il circi ! ' ry of a TTests Ilk!
Ines Ly II tic TI 1: li u mill's 1 als bocc 1 i Triple III el led 3:1 || k || 1 || Te Welt is disappearances in
rio, i tu for Tito, čif of "
Jaffa"5. Siwa 1 TETh polo, de Clared sanctuary by the Sri Lankan Army but bombed from the air On May 27, , ,
NEELAN TRUCHELWAMI has been {
: $1 гт қ., i * 1 : 11 1 ady cite for
hill. It Tights ind sci ill justice in Sri Linki, He 11:15 bi : : il i El T e T - viewed by
very Inajur newspaper 111 cl hews-Illgilai Tic iI) WLTI
Europe, North AITerica, Eastern Europe Ind in Asia. including the Middle East. He has also been featured in several televisit I programmes in the United Kingdom, Switzerland. Italy, The Netherlands, West Germany. Australia and the United STales. He his beel reput: eilly interviewed for radio by the B.,B,C... the (Canadir1 BTV:llcasti Ing Triti. Il :: Ill the Australian Broadcasting Cispiratin, He has authored se veral b4 14 liks änd articles. In any of which have als) appeared in the Tamii and Sinhala press. He is completing a book titled, "ETHNIC CON FLICT IN SRI LANKA". which Will Soon appear in translation in Tamil and Sinhala,
LLLL EHGGLS LtLLL CCCGLLLLLLL L CCCOL 0 TLLLLL LL 1'il forri Parr (ffsrf; bork.

Page 20
20TAMILTIMES
Sinhalese resistance now
After years of civil warfare, President Jayawardene of Sri Lanka is optimistic that his landmark agreement with India will survive initial opposition and provide a lasting solution to the Tamil separatist conflict.
In his first interview since signing the controversial accord with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jayawardene told The Times he believed that a 7,000-strong Indian peacekeeping force could be withdrawn within two weeks - and, in any event, long before provincial elections scheduled to be held by the end of the year.
He made it clear he did not wish his island's Eastern province to be part of a semi-autonomous Tamil 'homeland' in the northern Jaffna region, and did not expect any 'intelligent opposition' to the compromise settlement.
The President believed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam would honour the agreement and hand over all their weapons. Indian troops were in Sri Lanka only to enforce the ceasefire and
to supervise the surrender of arms.
Thereafter, their task would be over and they would be asked to leave.
The President said he would wish the Indians to leave by August 20. "If there is a complete cessation of hostilities, then we don't want any troops.'" Under the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, elections
are to be held by December 31 for a
single council to administer Northern and Eastern provinces for a year.
The Eastern province, where Sinhalese and Muslims out-number Tamils, would then have an opportunity, via a referendum, to opt out of the arrangement. Mr. Jayawardene said he intended to appoint an interim
administration for the two regions
principally o
within a few days, comprised of government agents. He added that some people, who had previously opposed the Government but were now coming into 'the mainstream of politics', might also be brought in.
Asked whether militants of the Tamil Tigers would be included, he replied: 'Yes' - all of them.'" However, the
President was opposed to the long
term linkage of the two provinces. 'I have no particular objection, but think
it.'
the accord from within his Cabinet and
ruling parliamentary group, and
expected to submit the legislation to Parliament by the end of September or early October. 'You can't be in the
Cabinet and keep on opposing the
chairman of the Cabinet, but I don't
the Sinhalese and Muslims don't want
Mr. Jayawardene said he was confident of overcoming opposition to
think anyone will lea vote with me. That Bi unanimously.
The President saic worry now was th “Sinha lese terrorists" the country, where Vimukthi Peramuna, a wing group, has bee wave of gun and fireofficials. However, he serious as the proble north. 'I think we quickly. represent th Government represe have to accept t| otherwise they'll be lo
He confirmed th frigates off Colombc response to fears of a Government. ''The various threats of a members of the Gc member of Parliame been shot and killed, their houses have beer
President Jayawardene: ac that India is the dominant po
Mr. Jayawardene always under perso fndo-Sri Lanka accor position 'more dang Sri Lanka had to acce the dominant power C he denied charges surrendered Sri Lanka pledging not to allow used for military pl country in a manne India's interests. 'In powerful nation in th Either must go to sor which don't want t accept that fact.'

AUGUST 1987
/Jayawardene's Worry
ve. They will all II will be passed
that his main he violence of in the South of the Janatha clandestine leftin blamed for a bomb attacks on said: 'It is not as m we had in the will get over it e Sinhalese. My nts them. They he settlement, cked up.' at two Indian ) were sent in evolt against his re have been assassination of overnment, one nt has already , and several of n destroyed.'
Jð: ' ܢܔ
వక్షః ※ స్థ ళ
s
ceptance of the fact Iwer in the region.
said he was nal threats. The d had made his erous'. He said pt that India was of the region, but
that he had n sovereignty by v its ports to be urposes by any r prejudicial to dia is the most e Indian Ocean. ne bigger power, o do, or must
Asked about the ports issue, he said: 'You can only, if I may say so, take away from my independence by laws, not by words. There is nothing that we are doing there without discussions."
Mr. Jayawardene was disappointed by the American response to his request for military assistance, which he said was small. V
'America won't lift a finger to help me without asking India. ... they realise that India is the guardian of this part of the world for democracy, they're quite happy with that.' He "did not trust a single power', but he had faith in Mr. Gandhi. 'You never know with these big powers, they chop and change, you can't trust anybody. India is the same, but I am friendly with Rajiv Gandhi and
trust him.' s But he criticised India's past actions in providing the Tamil guerrillas with arms supplies, and dropping food on the Jaffna peninsula. “I am for nonviolence. believe in Gandhian philosophy, I am more Gandhian than any Indian, more than Rajiv Gandhi. would not do some of the things he has done and said. I wouldn't have tried to invade Sri Lanka. I wouldn't have dropped the foodstuffs. That was a foolish and impetuous act."
Courtesy of The Times, August 8, 1987
MEDAREPORTS
continued from page 14
Muslims of the Eastern province, who together
Outnumber the Tamils there, will be at the mercy of
a Tamil terrorist-dominated administration.
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1987)
\
The Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, H. N. Dixit - nicknamed ironically in Sinhalese intellectual circles "the Indian viceroy'- has said that indian troops will remain in Sri Lanka as provided under the accord, only as long as Colombo wishes... On board the frigates there are thought to be troops who could be quickly landed in an emergency. Dixit, who was actively involved in forging the accord, candidly told newsmen that 'there are enough men on board to protect me if I amattacked."
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1987)

Page 21
AUGUST 1987
TAV
ASPIR
THE RAJIV-J.
THE RECENT PEACE ACCORD signed by the Indian P.
Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayaw welcomed with a sigh of relief by most Sri Lankan world. It certainly broke the chain of violence, killings, creation of a mass-scale refugee problem. The long te Accord depends on whether the underlying causes o Lanka have been penetrated adequately.
Withoutgoing too far back into history, one can point to certain landmarks within the past forty years. Even before the departure of the British there were symptoms of suspicions and manoeuvrings whereby the political and economic base of the Tamils in the island was being undermined by the majority Sinhalese community. This became clear when the Citizenship laws were passed depriving a large section of the plantation workers, imainly Tamils, of their democratic rights. This death-blow to the political sharing of power by the Tamils which was supposed to have been guaranteed by the Soulbury constitution under which the British granted independence to Ceylon, created the lankai Thami Arasu Kadchi (popularly known as the Federal Party). Successive Sinhala-dominated governments implemented schemes mainly aimed at colonising the traditional Tamil homelands with Sinha lese thus reducing the Tamils to minority areas. | Traditionally the Tamils depended on government employment for their livelihood. This was denied by the emergence of full scale Sinhala nationalism as evidenced by the passing in 1956 of an Act making Sinhala the only official language. Peaceful protests by the Tamils sparked off large scale violence by some Sinhalese elements against the life and property of uninvolved Tamils living amongst them. The deprivation of job opportunities and promotion prospects for the Tamils in Government and in the private sector undermined the vulnerable economic base of the Tamils in the island.
The 'standardisation of University admissions', by which the number of places available for Tamil students in the Universities was reduced drastically and the lack of opportunities for Tamil youths to progress either in education or in employment made them disillusioned to such an extent that they threw themselves into the struggle for self-determination proposed by the Tamil political leadership. The insensitive manner in which the Sri Lankan Government handled this issue provoked further violence which culminated in mass scale destruction, in 1983, of life and property of Tamils living in the south of the island.
The Tami || resistance mOvement
attempted to unif opinion irrespecti distinctions and C which put its recognition of the as a distinct nat nition of their right right of self-dete democratic rights Tamils. These den the well-conside economic surviva island could not and fancies of governments.
By Dr. S. N
The question
juncture is whethe potential to contai aspirations for ecc would wish to thi not just a damp clo fire, but is the forward for both C. the island with dig Provincial Admir capital and other provide develop without undue
Centre, is a nece
s
“想 BRI
bet

TAMILTIMES 2.
ATIONS AND
R. PEACE ACCORD'
rime Minister Rajiv. Vardene has been Tamils all over the starvation and the rrn outconne of this f the conflict in Sri
y all shades of Tamil ve of class and other arried on a struggle
demand for the ! Tamils of Sri Lanka ionality, the recogtto a homeland, their armination and full for the Pantation hands Were based om red fact that the | Of the Tamils in the pe left to the whims
Sinhaa-dominated
Vavaratnam
one asks at this er the Accord has the in and Confirm Tamil nomic stability. One nk that this Accord is oth on a smouldering beginning of a way ommunities to live in nity. Freedom to the histration to attract investments SO as to ment opportunities, restrictions by the essary pre-requisite,
We would hope that India, along with other countries, contributes and encourages investments and development of the devastated areas.
Both the Indian and Sri Lankan. governments may feel that with the; recent amendments to the Citizenship. laws and with arrangements for repatriation to India of those not successful in their quest for Sri Lankan, citizenship, the problems of the Plantation Tamils in Sri Lanka are solved. Obtaining citizenship is only an aid to economic emancipation. The need for the upliftment of the life-style of the plantation workers who continue to live in most appalling conditions should always be kept in the forefront by the Tamil representatives and activists.
Some of the major demands of the
Tamils of Sri Lanka would appear to:
have been met, at least on paper, in the historic Accord signed by Rajiv and J. R. What matters more is not what is on paper, rather what is implemented and how it is implemented. The Accord has the potential to generate cordiality between the communities and peaceful development of all geographical areas in the island. Where it might fail is if the implementation is undertaken in a half-hearted manner: without commitment by the Sinhala, government. One cannot fail to: recognise the fact that the Accord affects the whole of Sri Lanka and that India, the regional power, as a party to the Accord would be interested and capable of seeing that it is, implemented in its true spirit.
FL Y TISH AIRWAYS |
ween Europe and Sri Lanka
Via LONDON
For special fares: LEN EXPRESS TRAVELLIMITED,
155, NOTTING HILL GATE, LONDON, W11 3LM
Telephone: O1-2213498 - - Telex: 8953287 - GleneXG so
AA

Page 22
22 TAM TIMES
Spotlight on Lalith Athulath
LALITH AS HE IS POPULARLY KNOWN, is, in conventional Wisdom, an acceptable candidate for the position of President of Sri Lanka. He is a towering giant, intellectually, in the use of language (public Speaking) and socially indestructible. Laith's father, D. D. Athulathmudali, from the Low Country Sinhalese Buddhist Goigamas, was a member of the State Council under the Donoughmore Constitution. His mother is Kandyan and his Wife, a Ms. de Saram, is in Some way connected to President Jayawardene's family.
He could not have had a better education: Royal College, Colombo, Oxford University and a barrister of Gray's inn. At Oxford he served as Secretary of the Oxford Union and than crowned his career by being elected its President. For a time, Laith was lecturer in international Law at the University of Singapore. Then he came back to Sri Lanka to practise law and enter politics. What better credentials?
Why then did laith risk becoming unpopular With a sizeable section of his electorate, the Tamils of Sri Lanka? Perhaps a school day encounter with Nirmalingam (a son of the late C. Thiagalingam, 0.C.)? lalith contested Nirmalingam for the post of Secretary of the Royal College Senior literary Association and lost. Was he even then communal? His school mates Will knoW.
Or he knows which side his bread is buttered, the Sinhala Buddhists (the SBs). And he is finely tuned politically. He maintains good relations
with the Sri Lankan Fret international stage, he ha London and Washington, th "may not be taken at his W distrust of Lalith will upstage
What has laith done position of President of Sri L He entered Parliament for : 1977. He was not a provens Trade and Commerce. Buth to President Jayawardene.
Then came the crisis of J to accept the position of Security. From then began laith desperately hoped t This eluded him. If the gamb would have been the conter, of Dutu Gemunu. lnsteac became targets for the Taj faced increasing criticism Parliamentary Group.
His colleagues in the Cab theетотоusтilitary exper Fears and doubts surfact elites as to whether Sri L lebanonised. Lalith becan Tamil demonology. He has everlasting opposition of the Lalith was overtaken by changing military scene. negotiated with Mr. Raj perhaps, his knowledge. Fo boasting, Laith had to eat
A BLOOMSBURY VIEW ON CE
LEONARD WOOLF: A FEDERAL SC FOR THE ETHNIC SITUATIO
(Memorandum - November 1938)
IN 1938 WOOLF suggested a method of solving Ceylon's ethnic problem, namely, the possibility of ensuring a large measure of devolution or even of introducing a federal System on the Swiss model.
The indigenous Tamil minorities, he wrote, are concentrated in the extreme north and east of the island. The Kandyan Sinhalese, who are in many ways very different from the Low Country Sinhalese, form a homogeneous Sinhalese block in the centre of the island.
At least four cantons on the Swiss model could, he noted, be created: i.e., the Low Country Sinhalese Provinces, the Kandyan Sinhalese Provinces, the Tamil Northern Province and the Tamil Province; and it might even be possible to create a fifth canton out of the area where the immigrant Indian Tamils form the majority of the population on tea estates.
The objection that Ceylon and its sub-divisions are too small for Such a system, did not, in his view, hold water. Woolf compared Switzerland with Ceylon. Ceylon, he stated, is about 10,000 sq. miles greater than
Eastern
that of Switzerland; t of Ceylon is roughly that of Switzerland 4,0 Swiss federal system to Ceylon the smallest be the Eastern Provin 200,000 population; i the Small est can population of about 1 largest about 700,000. The SvviSS fede system has proved e successful under c very similar to those i the co-existence i democratic state of co very different size, sh uished from one ano
language and religion.
Thus the German-sp with a population occupy the numerica the Sinhalese, the Fre Swiss with 824,000, Tamils and the lta Swiss with 284,000 Moormen,
The democratic federal system in Woolf concluded, has
the legitimate minorit

AUGUST 1987
muda li
dom Party. On the
s a good image, in ough in New Delhi he Ord. But New Delhi's him among the SBs.
to merit the uneasy anka? Not very much. the first time only in uccess as Minister of e has been very close
uly 1983. He rushed in Minister of National the downward slope. or a military victory. le had succeeded, he nporary reincarnation l, the Sinhala army mil Resistance. Lalith from the Government
inet were appalled by iditure. 2d among the Sinhala anka Was becoming ne incorporated into probably earned the
Tamil electorate. events on the everA deal had been iv Gandhi, without, r all his Verbiage and humble pie when the
妾安
Indian Prime Minister signed the peace accord With President Jayawardene. Why had the expert on international law not been consulted? Instead a home-grown K.G.B. (Kandyan Goigama Buddhist), the urban Gamini Dissanayake, risked his political career but proved successful in terminating a horrible and counter-productive War of attrition. Lalith and Prime Minister Premadasa are sulking. But they cannot any longer outdo Mrs. Bandaranaike in their Sinhala Buddhist populism.
Ironically, sections of the British press, whilst reporting on Lalith's discomfiture, are guessing that Lalith will be relieved of National Security and be made Minister of National Reconstruction.
They say, charity begins at home. So Lalith will have to spend time in reconstructing his lost
image.
Auld Acquaintance
EYILON
)LUTION N
ne population 5,300,000 and DOO,000. If the were adpated canton would De With Over a n Switzerland ton has a 4,000 and the
ral cantonal xtraordinarily ircumstances n Ceylon, i.e., n a single mmunities of arply distingther by race,
peaking Swiss of 2,750,000 position of inch-speaking
that of the lian-speaking
that of the
canton and
Switzerland, safeguarded lies interests.
BOOK REVIEW
Gopal Gandhi's novel Novel
GOPAL GANDHI'S (First Secretary, Assistant High Commission of India, Kandy, 1978-82), Saragam: A Novel of Refuge (Affiliated East West Press Private Ltd., New Delhi 1981) is a rich contribution to English language literature on Sri Lanka.
A 'Foreword' by Smt. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay encapsulates the feelings of the author translated into the intelligence of words and capturing the plight of a nearly forgotten people - the so-called Indian Tamil plantation workers also referred to as 'stateless'- a component of the Tamil nation in Sri Lanka deprived of their address in 1948 and 1949 consequent on legislation enacted by the blossoming Sinhala Buddhist State, The Grand Old Lady of India states 'reading this book was a rare experience'.
Gandhi has Converted his administrative experience (during 1978-82) of the plantation workers' painful uncertain feeling of the unknown but damning future into a language which, as Smt. Kamaladevi writes, 'no artist could do Mvith a swarm of brushes anda multitude of colours', it is the story of Valliamma typical of the drudgery and struggle for life of the so-called Indian Tamils. The administrator as writer and novelist was conscious of and had sensitivity for the downtrodden Tamil people of Sri Lanka's plantations. Priced at 40 Indian rupees, the author wrestles with our human consciousness. It must be read.

Page 23
AUGUST 1987
make it work.
We Select:
1. The Tamil politicians who had the foresight to lay the foundation for this Solution before the 1970's.
2. The various Tamil groups who accelerated the process of settlement after that.
3. Tamils who sacrificed their lives and property in achieving this settlement.
4. Tamils who endured hard and difficult times in their homeland.
5. Tamils living abroad who helped in numerous ways.
6. The Indian Government (including Tamil Nadu Government) for concluding the agreement,
7. The Sri Lankan Government for realising, even at this stage, the merits of ending 'the military solution.'
For the Tamils:
1. it is not a time to discuss or claim as to which political party or group did more or less.
I TAMILS IN EXILE SAL
The agreement signed by the Indian Prime Minister, M and the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayawardene o in Colombo gives a sigh of relief and much expectat Tamils. This agreement will go down in history as a solving ethnic crises. It is the duty of all concerned to in
2. No political party automatic right to
people's will is exel autonomous goverr
3. Tamils expect th and concerned amc and go to the polls.
4. No need at this til and change the ideo to Consolidate the ex
For the Sinhalese:
1. Aftertheinitia fu a realistic basis, the they have not lost an
2. When the agree mented they will
country as a whole \ of political stabil economic recovery.
it is now the duty to make this unique and to build a pt peaceful and econol Lanka in this 'unity
up.
LATESTAMMINESTYIWTERNATIONAL REPOR
A Probe On Tamil To
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL has urged Sri Lanka to investigate reports that several hundred Tamils have been tortured and almost 500 have disappeared after being arrested by Government Security Forces in the last two and a half years.
The London-based human rights organisation said it has sworn Statements, often from witnesses, detailing 216 cases of young Tamil men, who disappeared after being seized in Sri Lanka's Eastern province by members of a special police task-force commando unit.
This is in addition to the 272 Tamils the Nobel peace-prize-winning organisation described as missing in a report last September.
We have strong reason to believe that many of the 'disappeared have been tortured, some dying as a result, and that others have been shot after arrest, their bodies being disposed of in secret, Amnesty said in a news report.
HELICOPTER TRAINING r The report cites testimony from former prisoners who said their hands were tied behind their backs with a nylon rope that was then used to suspend them from a ceiling beam. They were then beaten,
Sometimes with heat was called helicopte It also quoted f saying chilli powde sensitive parts of til were forced to inhal burning chillies. Oti saying they had bee bodies of victims a special task force.
Amnesty said as f Lankan Governme response to its repor 272 missing Tamils. been able to clarify t 272 cases listed, the Two people were was released from another was found d forces, Amnesty said
Last year's report Government to la inquiry into the disap a central registr detentions.
“None of Amn recommendations ha and no steps have b
the recurrence of
future.
(Colin

FAMILTNES 19
UTE
r. Rajiv Gandhi n July 29, 1987, ion among the model way of nplement it and
or group has the govern until the cised in the new ment.
e educated, able ng them to rally
me to experiment logical set-up but cisting.
rore, if viewed on y will realise that ything.
ement is implerealise that the will gain in terms ity, peace and
of all Sri Lankans settlement work olitically stable, mically strong Sri in diversity' set
TEOUESTS:
porture
ed iron rods, in what rtraining.”
ormer prisoners as ær Was Smeared on heir bodies, or they le the acrid fumes of hers were quoted as n forced to burn the legedly shot by the
ar as it knows the Sri nt did nothing in it last year describing “So far we have only he fate of four of the report said.
found in prison, one an army camp and lead, shot by security
urged the Sri Lankan lunch an impartial pearances and create y of arrests and
esty International's as been implemented een taken to prevent
disappearances in
tesy of The Times of India')
Jaffna's Sivan Temple, declared a sanctuary by the Sri Lankan Army but bombed from the air on May 27...
NEELAN TRUCHELVAM has been a c on S is tent advocate for human rights and social justice in Sri Lanka. He has been intervi e w e de b y every major newspaper and news-magazine in Western Europe, North ッ.2× America, Eastern Europe and in Asia, including the Middle East. He has also been featured in several television programmes in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Italy, The Netherlands, West Germany, Australia and the United States. He has been repeatedly interviewed for radio by the B.B.C., the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. He has authored several books and articles, many of which have also appeared in the Tamil and Sinhala press. He is completing a book titled, “ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA, which will soon appear in translation in Tamil and Sinhala.
The article which appears on pages 1 7 and 18 will form part of this book.

Page 24
20TAMLTIMES
Sinhalese resistance now
After years of civil warfare, President Jayawardene of Sri Lanka is optimistic that his landmark agreement with India will survive initial opposition and provide a lasting solution to the Tamil separatist conflict.
In his first interview since signing the controversial accord with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, ; Mr. Jayawardene told The Times he believed that a 7,000-strong Indian peacekeeping force could be withdrawn within two weeks - and, in any event, long before provincial elections scheduled to be held by the end of the year.
He made it clear he did not wish his island's Eastern province to be part of a
semi-autonomous Tamil "homeland". in the northern Jaffna region, and did not expect any "intelligent opposition'
to the compromise settlement.
The President believed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam would honour the agreement and hand over all their weapons. Indian troops were in Sri Lanka only to enforce the ceasefire and
to supervise the surrender of arms. Thereafter, their task would be over
and they would be asked to leave.
The President Said he would wish the
Indians to leave by August 20. "If there is a complete cessation of hostilities, then we don't want any troops.'" Under.
the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, elections are to be held by December 31 for a single council to administer Northern and Eastern provinces for a year.
The Eastern province, where Sinhalese and Muslims out-number Tamils, would then have an opportunity, via a referendum, to opt out of the arrangement. Mr. Jayawardene said he intended to appoint an interim administration for the two regions within a few days, principally comprised of government agents. He added that some people, who had previously opposed the Government but were now coming into 'the mainstream of politics', might also be brought in.
Asked whether militants of the Tamil Tigers would be included, he replied: 'Yes - all of them.'" However, the President was opposed to the longterm linkage of the two provinces. '
have no particular objection, but think the Sinhalese and Muslims don't want
it.'
Mr. Jayawardene said he was
confident of overcoming opposition to
the accord from within his Cabinet and ruling parliamentary group, Yexpected to submit the legislation to Parliament by the end of September or early October, 'You can't be in the Cabinet and keep on opposing the chairman of the Cabinet, but I don't
and
think anyone will lea Vote with me. That Bi unanimously.
The President Said Worry now was th 'Sinhalese terrorists' the country, where Vimukthi Peramuna, a wing group, has bee wave of gun and fire-b officials. However, he serious as the probler north. 'I think we v quickly. I represent thi Government represer have to accept th otherwise they'll be loc He confirmed tha frigates off Colombo response to fears of ar. Government. ''Ther
various threats of a members of the Go member of Parliame been shot and killed, their houses have been
President Jayawardene: acc that India is the dominant pov
Mr. Jayawardene always under person Indo-Sri Lanka accord position 'more dange Sri Lanka had to accep the dominant power of he denied charges Surrendered Sri Lankar pledging not to allow used for military pu country in a manner India's interests. 'Ind powerful nation in the Either | must go to som which I don't want tc accept that fact.'

AUGUST 987
'Jayawardene's Worry
e. They will all will be passed
that his main e violence of in the South of the Janatha clandestine lefth blamed for a omb attacks on aid: 'It is not as h we had in the vill get over it 2 Sinhalese. My its them. They e settlement,
ked up.“ it two Indian were sent i
avolt against his
e have been ssassination of vernment, one nt has already. and several of destroyed.'
...
ལས་མས་ཁག་བས་ 變楚楚慧 . :-ണ്ടു. 戀 %,%%ళ 霧
eptance of the fact ter in the region.
said he was a threats. The had made his rous". He said t that India was the region, but that he had sovereignty by its ports to be poses by any prejudicial to a is the most Indian Ocean. a bigger power, do, or must
Asked about the ports issue, he said: 'You can only, if I may say so, take away from my independence by laws, not by words. There is nothing that we are doing there without discussions."
Mr. Jayawardene was disappointed by the American response to his request for military assistance, which he said was small.
"America won't lift a finger to help me without asking India... they realise that India is the guardian of this part of the world for democracy, they're quite happy with that.' He 'did not trust a single power', but he had faith in Mr. Gandhi. 'You never know with these big powers, they chop and change, you
can't trust anybody. India is the same, but I am friendly with Rajiv Gandhi and
trust him.'
But he criticised India's past actions in providing the Tamil guerrillas with arms supplies, and dropping food on the Jaffna peninsula. “I am for nonviolence. believe in Gandhian philosophy. I am more Gandhian than any Indian, more than Rajiv Gandhi.
would not do some of the things he has
done and said. I wouldn't have tried to invade Sri Lanka. I wouldn't have dropped the foodstuffs. That was a foolish and impetuous act.'
Courtesy of The Times, August 8, 1987
MEDIA REPORTS
continued from page 14
Muslims of the Eastern province, who together
Outnumber the Tamils there, will be at the mercy of
a Tamilterrorist-dominated administration.
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1987)
\
The Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, H. N. Dixit - nicknamed ironically in Sinhalese intellectual circles "the Indian viceroy"- has said that Indian troops will remain in Sri Lanka as provided under the accord, only as long as Colombo wishes... On board the frigates there are thought to be troops who could be quickly landed in an emergency. Dixit, who was actively involved in forging the accord, candidly told newsmen that "there are enough men on board to protect me if amattacked."
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1987)

Page 25
AUGUS 987
TAM
ASPI
THE RAJIV-J
THE RECENT PEACEACCORD signed by the Indian F
Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President J. R. Jaya" welcomed with a sigh of relief by most Sri Lankan world. It certainly broke the chain of violence, killings creation of a mass-scale refugee problem. The long te Accord depends on whether the underlying causes Lanka have been penetrated adequately.
Withoutgoing too far back into history, one can point to certain landmarks within the past forty years. Even before the departure of the British there were symptoms of suspicions and manoeuvrings whereby the political and economic base of the Tamils in the island was being undermined by the majority Sinhalese community. This became clear when the Citizenship laws were passed depriving a large section of the plantation workers, mainly Tamils, of their democratic rights. This death-blow to the political sharing of power by the Tamils which was supposed to have been guaranteed by the Soulbury constitution under which the British granted independence to Ceylon, created the llankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (popularly known as the Federal Party). Successive Sinhala-dominated governments implemented schemes mainly aimed at colonising the traditional Tamil homelands with Sinhalese thus reducing the Tamils to minority areas.
Traditionally the Tamils depended on government employment for their livelihood. This was denied by the emergence of full scale Sinhala nationalism as evidenced by the passing in 1956 of an Act making Sinhala the only official language. Peaceful protests by the Tamils sparked off large scale violence by some Sinhalese elements against the life and property of uninvolved Tamils living amongst them. The deprivation of job opportunities and promotion prospects for the Tamils in Government and in the private sector undermined
the vulnerable economic base of the
Tamils in the island.
The 'standardisation of University admissions', by which the number of places available for Tamil students in the Universities was reduced drastically and the lack of opportunities for
Tamil youths to progress either in education or in employment made
them disillusioned to such an extent that they threw themselves into the struggle for self-determination proposed by the Tamil political leadership. The insensitive manner in which the Sri Lankan Government handled this issue provoked further violence which culminated in mass scale destruction,
in 1983, of life and property of Tamils
living in the south of the island.
The Tamil resistance movement
attempted to uni opinion irrespect distinctions and
which put its recognition of th as a distinct na nition of their righ right of self-de democratic right Tamils. These de the well-consid economic surviv island could not and fancies of
governments.
By Dr. S.
The question juncture is wheth potential to conta aspirations for ec would wish to th not just a damp c fire, but is the forward for both the island with d' Provincial Adm capital and othe provide develo without undue Centre, is a ne
-
BR
bei

TAMLTMES21
ATIONS AND R. PEACE ACCORD
time Minister Rajiv /ardene has been famils all over the starvation and the rm outcome of this f the conflict in Sri
y all shades of Tamil ve of class and other arried on a struggle
demand for the ? Tamils of Sri Lanka tionality, the recogtto a homeland, their ermination and full S for the Plantation mands were basedon red fact that the of the Tamils in the be left to the whims
Sinhala-dominated
Navaratnam
one asks at this er the ACCord has the in and confirm Tamil :onomic stability. One ink that this Accord is loth on a smouldering beginning of a way Communities to live in gnity. Freedom to the inistration to attract investments So as to oment opportunities, restrictions by the cessary pre-requisite.
We would hope that India, along with other countries, contributes: and encourages investments and development of the devastated areas.
Both the Indian and Sri Lankan governments may feel that with the recent amendments to the Citizenship laws and with arrangements for repatriation to India of those not. successful in their quest for Sri Lankan citizenship, the problems of the Plantation Tamils in Sri Lanka are solved. Obtaining citizenship is only an aid to economic emancipation. The need for the upliftment of the life-style. of the plantation workers who continue to live in most appalling conditions should always be kept in the forefront by the Tamil representatives and
activists.
Some of the major demands of the Tamils of Sri Lanka would appear to: have been met, at least on paper, in the historic Accord signed by Rajiv and J.R. What matters more is not what is on paper, rather what is implemented and how it is implemented. The Accord has the potential to generate cordiality between the communities and peaceful development of all geographical areas in the island. Where it might fail is if the implementation is undertaken in a half-hearted manner without commitment by the Sinhala government. One cannot fail to recognise the fact that the Accord affects the whole of Sri Lanka and that India, the regional power, as a party to the Accord would be interested and capable of seeing that it is implemented in its true spirit.
& FLY − TSH AIRWAYS
ween Europe and Sri Lanka
Via LONDON
For special fares: GLEN EXPRESS TRAVELLIMITED, 155, NOTTING HILL GATE, LONDON, W11 3LM
Telephone: 01-2213498 Telex: 8953287 - Glenex G
TA

Page 26
22TAMLTIMES
Spotlight On Lalith Athulath
LALITH AS HE IS POPULARLY KNOWN, is, in conventional wisdom, an acceptable candidate for the position of President of Sri Lanka. He is a towering giant, intellectually, in the use of language (public speaking) and socially indestructible. Laith's father, D. D. Athulathmudali, from the Low Country Sinhalese Buddhist Goigamas, was a member of the State Council under the Donoughmore Constitution. His mother is Kandyan and his wife, a Ms. de Saram, is in some way connected to President Jayawardene's family.
He could not have had a better education. Royal College, Colombo, Oxford University and a barrister of Gray's Inn. At Oxford he served as Secretary of the Oxford Union and then crowned his career by being elected its President. For a time, Laith was lecturer in International law at the University of Singapore. Then he came back to Sri Lanka to practise law and enter politics. What better Credentials?
Why then did Lalith risk becoming unpopular with a sizeable section of his electorate, the Tamils of Sri Lanka? Perhaps a school day encounter with Nirmalingam (a son of the late C. Thiagalingam, 0.0)? laith contested Nirmalingam for the post of Secretary of the Royal College Senior literary Association and lost. Was he even then communal? His school mates will know.
Or he knows which side his bread is buttered, the Sinhala Buddhists (the SBs). And he is finely tuned politically. He maintains good relations
with the Sri Lankan Fr6 international stage, he h London and Washington, t may not be taken at his v distrust of laith will upstag
What has Lalith done position of President of Sri He entered Parliament foi 1977. He was nota proven, Trade and Commerce. But to President Jayawardene.
Then came the crisis of to accept the position of Security. From then began Lalith desperately hoped This eluded him. If the gam. would have been the conte of Dutu Gemunu. lnstea became targets for the Ta faced increasing criticism Parliamentary Group.
His colleagues in the Cal the enormous military expe, Fears and doubts surfac elites as to whether Sri Lebanonised. Lalith beca Tamil demonology. He has everlasting opposition ofth Lalith was overtaken by :changing military scene. 'negotiated with Mr. Ra. perhaps, his knowledge. FC boasting, laith had to eat
A BLOOMSBURY VIEW ON Cl
LEONARD WOOLF: A FEDERAL S( FOR THE ETHNIC SITUATIO
(Memorandum - November 1938)
IN 1938 WOOLF suggested a method of solving Ceylon's ethnic problem, namely, the possibility of ensuring a large measure of devolution or even of introducing a federal system on the Swiss model.
The indigenous Tamil minorities, he wrote, are concentrated in the
extreme north and east of the
island. The Kandyan Sinha lese, who are in many ways very different from the Low Country Sinhalese, form a homogeneous Sinhalese block in the centre of the island.
At least four cantons on the Swiss
model could, he noted, be created: i.e., the Low Country Sinhalese
Provinces, the Kandyan Sinhalese Provinces,
the Tamil Northern Province and the Tamil Eastern Province; and it might even be possible to create a fifth canton out of the area where the immigrant Indian Tamils form the majority of
the population on tea estates.
The objection that Ceylon and its sub-divisions are too small for such a system, did not, in his view, hold water. Woolf compared Switzerland
with Ceylon. Ceylon, he stated, is
about 10,000 sq. miles greater than
that of Switzerland; til of Ceylon is roughly that of Switzerland 4, Swiss federal system to Ceylon the smallest be the Eastern Provin 200,000 population; i the small est can population of about 1 largest about 700,000. The Svviss fede system has proved e successful under C very similar to those i the co-existence democratic state of co
i very different size, sh
uished from one anc language and religion Thus the German-st with a population occupy the numerica the Sinha lese, the Fre Swiss with 824,000, Tamils and the Ita Swiss with 284,000 MOOrmen.
The democratic federal system in Woolf Concluded, has the legitimate minori

AUGUS I 1987
muda li
2dom Party. On the
is a g00d image, in ough in New Delhi he Ord. But New Delhi's 2 him among the SBs.
to merit the uneasy anka? Not very much. the first time only in 'uccess as Minister of e has been very close
uly 1983. He rushed in Minister of National the downward slope. or a military victory, le had succeeded, he mporary reincarnation l, the Sinhala army mil Resistance. Lalith from the Government
inet were appalled by
diture. adamong the Sinhala anka was becoming ne incorporated into probably earned the
Tamil electorate. events On the everA deal had been iv Gandhi, without, Ir all his verbiage and humble pie when the
Indian Prime Minister signed the peace accord with President Jayawardene. Why had the expert on international law not been consulted? Instead a home-grown K.G.B. (Kandyan Goigama Buddhist), the urban Gamini Dissanayake, risked his political career but proved successful in terminating a horrible and counter-productive war of attrition. Lalith and Prime Minister Premadasa are suiking. But they cannot any longer outdo Mrs. Bandaranaike in their Sinhala Buddhist populism.
ironically, sections of the British press, whilst reporting on Lalith's discomfiture, are guessing that Lalith will be relieved of National Security and be made Minister of National Reconstruction.
They say, charity begins at home. So Lalith will have to spend time in reconstructing his lost
image.
Auld Acquaintance
EYLOW
)LUTION N
he population 5,300,000 and )00,000. If the were adpated canton would xe with Overa n Switzerland ton has a 4,000 and the
al cantonal xtraordinarily ircumstances n Ceylon, i.e., n a single mmunities of arply distingther by race,
eaking Swiss of 2,750,000 | position of nch-speaking
that of the lian-speaking
that of the
canton and Switzerland, safeguarded
les interests.
BOOK REVIEW
Gopal Gandhi's novel Novel
GOPAL GANDHI'S (First Secretary, Assistant High Commission of India, Kandy, 1978-82), Saragam: A Novel of Refuge (Affiliated East West Press Private Ltd., New Delhi 1981) is a rich contribution to English language literature on Sri Lanka.
A 'Foreword' by Smt. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay encapsulates the feelings of the author translated into the intelligence of words and capturing the plight of a nearly forgotten people - the so-called Indian Tamil plantation workers also referred to as 'stateless' - a component of the Tamil nation in Sri Lanka deprived of their address in 1948 and 1949 consequent on legislation enacted by the blossoming Sinhala Buddhist State, The Grand Old Lady of India states 'reading this book was a rare experience'.
Gandhi has converted his administrative experience (during 1978-82) of the plantation workers' painful uncertain feeling of the unknown but damning future into a language which, as Smt. Kamaladevi writes, 'no artist could do with a swarm of brushes and a multitude of colours'. It is the story of Valliamma typical of the drudgery and struggle for life of the so-called Indian Tamils. The administrator as writer and novelist was conscious of and had sensitivity for the downtrodden Tamil people of Sri Lanka's plantations. Priced at 40 Indian rupees, the author wrestles with Our human consciousness. It must be read.

Page 27
AljGUST i 1987
TAMIL ARTS WORKSHOP
presents
and her disciple
SRKALA NA RASMAN
at a Bharata Natya recital
Accompanists
Vocal: R. Visweswaran; Nattuvangam & Vocal: K. Rajasekharan; Mirudangam: C. P. Arumugam; Flute: A.V. Unnikrishnan
SUNDAY, 6 SEPTEMBER, 1987 Conway Hall, Red Lion Square, London WC1 Doors open 7 p.m. for 7.30 p.m.
For tickets, please call:
01-4514785; 01-9045939; 01-2912679
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22 Pinew Mo Northu.
WE6
Te:06
Pupils put om a show
gy
CHILDREN took provide entertail speech day.
Pupils from the School, based in G performance of sing Saturday, July 18.
The youngsters, ag were presented with Bertram Farmer, pic College, Cambridge.
Prof. Farmer hanc excellence to more tha school in Mansell Roa
 
 
 

TAMITMES27
An Evening of Electrifying Performances
n
DANCE, MUSIC & DRAMA
(InAid of Herts Tamil School)
Venue: Brent Town Hall, Forty Lane,
WEMBLEY, Middlesex.
Date: 31st August, 1987 (Bank Holiday Monday)
Time: 6 p.m.
kr. Premier of a Unique Play
k Hilarious Non-Stop Laughter
k Produced & Directed by Manoharan
dr The Magnetic Voice of Shagul Hameed
(Malaysia's Answer to Jesudasan)
# Exhilarating Bharatha Natya Recitals
DO NOT MISS THIS RARE OPPORTUNITY
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Page 28
28TAMILTIMES
The LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran with Mr. Kittu, former Jaffna commander of the LTTE at Madras airport before they left for Delhi to meet the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi.
*壶】
t. Gen. Depinder Singh, Gос-in-с, Southern Command, who is overseeing the Indian peace-keeping in Sri Lanka, with Brig. G.H. de Silva, the Commander of the Sri Lankan security forces,
 
 
 
 
 

- HSJSASLLLLLS SAqS q SASqLS qHSL ASAqq S L0LSLLALAq SHSHHHHSS ۲مrs،۰۰۰ن بویه ~ v ~«*«X7»:-1ksws - ». ...v.w, ...,,,»» m.-*“.x. r.: , . - AUGUST '1987
Tamil guerrilla leader Ajit AMahayatta (second left) refused to surrender his weapons
under the Indian-backed peace pact, when requested by Indian General Harkirat Singh (right).
SSSSSSSSSSSSS
A Tamil prisoner (right), about to be freed in southern Sri Lanka, embracing a comrade not yet released.
fami fighters walk through the would surrender their arms.
Indian troops in Sri Lanka to enforce the Peace Accord.