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Tamil
W| W|| NO.E. ISSN O
TIGERS IN
SLLta EET TLLMMLLtaE LLSLakL S SLLLSS LLLLLLO aLaaL LL LaLLL LaLaSS
 
 
 
 

75p
265-44 BB MAY 1989
A video carriera wieldrg Tiger prepare5 focale ,yחנ5Igוח חו וחBלחסa m
Anton Balasingha II & Dilip Yogicial with the Press minutas after They larded.

Page 2
2 TAMIL TIMES
OONTENTS
Peace moves by Premadasa & LTTE. .. 3
ISSN 0266. Talks - The Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. ANNUAL SUBSC
UK/india/Sri Lanka. . Tigers arrive in Colombo S SS SS S L S L S L SSLL SS SS SS S SS S S S SL 5 All other countries.
Premadasa-LT TE Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . 6 Published mon ith rival TAM TIME Will Tigers break bread with rivals...... 9 P.O. BOX
SUTTON, SURREY Human Rights violations. . . . . . . . . . . . 10 UNITED KINC Phone: 01-64
The publishers assume no responsibility for return of unsolicited manuscripts, photographs and artwork.
PROSPECTS
The current negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government are unique for more than one reason. Ever Since the ethnic Conflict escalated into an armed rebellion, India has been involved in one way or another in trying to bridge the gap between an unwilling and unyielding government and the Tamil speaking people whose actual and perceived discrimination and oppression led the Tamil militant groups to resort to armed struggle.
Initially India offered its good offices' and later acted as "mediator' and brought the two parties together for the first time to negotiate at Thimphu in Bhutan in 1985. Subsequent to those ilfated negotiations and until the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in July 1987, it was through and with the help of India that the Tamil groups raised their demands with the government of Sri Lanka. Whatever direct negotiations that have taken place since between the government and the EPRLF-led North-East ProvinCial administration or the EROS did OCCur within the framework of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Although it is said that the Sri Lankan government is keeping New Delhi informed of all developments, the fact is that the LTTE is, for the first time, talking to the government directly. Previous attempted negotiations have been thwarted by the insistence of preconditions before the commencement of negotiations. Again for the first time, the present negotiations are taking place without any preconditions being set by either party thus enabling the discussion of all issues that both parties consider relevant and appropiate to raise. The LTTE has taken up the position that the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement did not meet the aspirations of the Tamil speaking people. Therefore, the assumption is that the LTTE delegation will be raising more fundamental matters that are not covered by the agreement.
Anyone who has been watching the continuing conflict and its tragic consequences for the entire people of Sri Lanka must welcome the present talks and would wish the negotiations to succeed and lead to the restoration of normalcy and peace. Only those individuals and Sections of society, who have developed vested interests in the process of this
 

MAY 1989
CONTENTS
Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4488 ΣPIPTION EROS welcomes talkS . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 器 Non-functioning of Provincial Councils. 17 thly by Indian media reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
TTO
People & Events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
SM1 3 TD Φ DOM Classified Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . 22
4 O972
Views expressed by contributors are mot necessarily those of the editor or the publishers.
FOR PEACE
Conflict Would desire the Continuation of the Conflict to further such interests.
It is true that there has been a great deal of distrust not only between the parties to the present negotiations, but also between the government and the Tamil speaking people who have felt betrayed repeatedly in the past. There is also no doubt that there is a substantial degree of mistrust among the communities, mainly engineered by politicians. In this context, it is essential that the negotiating parties bring to bear a degree of honesty in dealing with each other if the eventual settlement is to bring lasting peace. If either party or both strike a deal for opportunistic reasons, for instance to get rid of the IPKF, and think that they can go back on what they have agreed, they will only bring about a resumption of hostilities and cause further misery to the people.
As the talks proceed, it is well not to ignore certain realities which militate against the possible achievement of peace. On the Tamil side there are those Tamil groups and parties which participated in the North-East Provincial Council elections and the subsequent parliamentary elections. Having kept out of the PC elections, EROS took part in the general elections and won 13 seats. These groups did so in defiance of the LTTE's call for a boycott of both elections. An EPRLF dominated provincial administration has Conne into existence in the North-East. The internecine armed conflicts, particularly between the EPRLF and the LTTE, have escalated since and many are being killed daily. Senior public servants have become helpless and defenCeless victims in this Senseless fratricidal conflict. If the Tamil people are to be spared this bloodletting, it is essential that, even as the LT TEGovt. talks proceed, the LTTE and other Tamil militant groups talk to each other. After years of military conflict between the government and the LTTE resulting in hundreds of casualties on both sides, if both parties are presently negotiating, surely it is not too much for the ordinary Tamil people to expect Tamil groups to talk to each other with the view to bringing an end to fratricidal bloodletting.

Page 3
MAY 1989
C
The very decision of the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to directly talk to each other reflects a major shift of direction by both parties. Discerning political analysts would seem to conclude that the objective situation in which both parties find themselves has driven them to this rather unpredictable course of action. The interest of President Premadasa and the government which demand action to prevent further destabilisation of their hold on power on the one hand, and the political and organisational interests of the LTTE to regain its pre-existing dominance among the Tamil militant groups on the other would appear to have converged in the present context and the factor that has enabled this convergence possible is the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in the island.
The government's expectation that, with the assistance of the IPKF, it could bring the recalcitrant LTTE to heel and make it accept the settlement on the basis of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement did not materialise. The IPKF has been in the country since August 1987 in their thousands. Although dislodged from their previously entrenched position in the north and driven into the Vanni jungles, the LTTE has not been subjugated in spite of the much publicised many military operations conducted by the IPKF.
From the beginning, there was a
groundswell of Sinhala opinion against the presence of the Indian troops not merely because it represented foreign intervention in the island's affairs. Sinhala chauvinist sections have always regarded India as an ally of the Tamils and they felt that their failure to defeat the Tamil militants who had taken arms and keep the Tamils in their place’ was because of Indian support. The presence of the IPKF, in their view, is a concrete manifestation of Indian support for the Tamils. If the Indian factor was removed, the natural strength of the Sinhala numerical majority could be reasserted. The popular resentment against the IPKF presence has been maladroitly exploited by the JVP which has continued with its ruthless and brutal campaign of terror and political assassinations to this day.
Premadasa won his Presidency on the promise that he would ensure the early departure of the IPKF. It was easy to make the promise but he found it difficult to deliver. In the Tamil areas, so long as the LTTE holds out
OOMBONEWSE
Ranns by Chiha ー・マー
PEACE MOVES BY PREMADAS
without being defeat the IPKFis regarde by Sri Lankan secul ically the island's s woefully inadequat rebellious situation against the LTTE
against the JVP in
Premadasas repe were addressed to the LTTE. The JV statement of 16 Ap ising and containe box) and reflected i continue its camp: mands were met i way that these de unless Premadasa are willing to comm
However the LT tively. From the go view, a deal with t tate the early withc and such a develop help to bolster the g of blunting the ct emotional element paign. A deal with enable the govern bulk of its armed the JVP if it contin rebellion.
As for the LT would appear to conclusion that so remained, it could monistic position it northern Tamil ar. sage of time, whi being militarily c IPKF, its rival EP sively entrench itse provincial governm East and the LTTE tional and politic might weaken. Pre vincial arena, the player. In the par EROS (although attending parliame seats in the Februal has enhanced its Even Mr. A. Ami TULF is playing parliament. This is the LTTE which representation' of th people can afford to this context, the dep has become a matt cern for the LTTE.
Despite the fact gambit has put N plomatic and milit has welcomed the visit by the Indian
 
 
 
 
 
 

TAM TNES 3
A 8 LITTE
ted, the presence of d as essential even City chiefs. Numersecurity forces are 2 to deal with the on both fronts - in the north and the south.
lated pleas for talks both the JVP and P's response by its rill was uncompromd six demands (see ts determination to aign unless its den full. There is no mands can be met and his government it political harakiri. TE responded posivernement point of he LTTE will faciliirawal of the IPKF, ment would not only government’s image utting edge of the
in the JVP camthe LTTE will also ment to deploy the forces to deal with lues with its armed
PE, its leadership have reached the long as the IPKF not regain its hegoonce enjoyed in the eas. With the pasle the LTTE was 'onfronted by the RLF could progreslfin the seats of the ent of the NorthE's hold, both emoal, on - the people esently, in the proEPRLF is the main liamentary arena, its MPs are not int) by winning 13 ry general elections political standing. rthalingam of the a visible role in not a prospect that lays claim to 'sole ne Tamiul speaking relish anymore. In parture of the IPKF er of primary con
, that Premadas's ew Delhi in a ditary dilema, India talks. The two-day
Foreign Secretary
S.K. Singh and the Joint Secretary of the External Affairs Ministry dealing with Sri Lanka matters Kudlip Sahadev on the eve of the LTTEgovernment talks cannot be regarded as a mere coincidence. The visit emphasised the continued interest of India in any likely outcome of the talks and Colombo has made it public that it is keeping New Delhi informed of any progress made. On India's behalf it is said that its main aim is to enable the resolution of the conflict in Sri Lanka without negating the positive aspects of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and will encourage the conceding of more Tamil demands that go beyond what the Agreement offered. But at the same time it will not want to be seen as letting down those Tamil groups which cooperated in the implementation of the Agreement, and therefore will seek to achieve an accomodation of all Tamil groups in any eventual settlement.
JVP DEMANDS
1. Totally abrogate the Jayewardene-Gandhi accord which buried the freedom of our nation and made the nation fall prey to Indian imperialism 2. Drive out the Indian invading forces from this country immediately. 3. Annul the Provincial Councils. They are a powerful threat to the unity of our country. their formation was undemocratic. 4. Disarin all paramilitary and auxiliary forces such as the STF, RDF, NAF, NAR and Homeguards. Disband all killer squads such as the Black Cats, Yellow Cats, PRRA and SRRA. They were formed to suppress and assassinate political opponents. Cancel all promotion given to murderers.
5. Cancel the results of the presidential and general elections.
6. Respecting the sovereignty of the people, appoint a Board of Caretakers and hold all elections again, under conditions in which everyone could participate freely and the masses can vote freely.
Despite assertions and misgivings to the contrary, reliable information indicates that India would like an end to the role of the IPKF in Sri Lanka sooner than later. Already it has pulled out several of its battalions comprising several thousand troops. Rajiv Gandhi has already given expression to this view in Parliament. He has also a political reason for pulling out the IPKF before its presence in the island with its continuing high casualty rate and the high cost of its maintenance becomes a major political issue in India itself. India has already spent more than 12 billion Indian rupees ($800million) on maintaining the
Continued on page 5

Page 4
4 TAMIL TIMES
THE PREMADAS THE CHRO
2.4.89
President Premadasa’s much publicised speech inviting the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam for talks.
The government announces a weeklong unilateral cease-fire to commence on 12 April 1989. 1.4.89
LTTE rejects ceasefire. The LTTE statement in the form of an open letter to the President said, "You and your government, and the government of India have declared a unilateral ceasefire with effect from the morning of the 12th of April 1989. But you and your government cannot be unaware that so long as the Indian Army continues to occupy our land, a 'cease-fire' is a meaningless exercise . . . In so far as we are concerned, we view this unilateral one week "cease fire' as an attempt by you and the Indian government to intimidate the Tamil people and the leaders of the Tamil national struggle, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, into submission . . . we wish to tell you straightforwardly that you may go ahead and mortgage the birth-right and freedom of the Sinhala people, but we will not mortgage the birth-right and freedom of the Tamil people to anybody . . . Until the Indian Army of oppression leaves our land, there will be no such thing as a cease-fire. And after they leave, you will come to recognise that in the island of Ceylon there are two nations. And after that, we will need neither war nor cease-fire”. 13.4.89
The government made an open invitation to the LTTE for talks. The government said, "We are pleased to invite the leadership of the LTTE to have talks with the Government on the issues raised by the political wing of the LTTE along with leaders of other political parties if the LTTE so wishes....I hope the LTTE will realise that the desire of the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka is for the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka . . . When a nation is wracked by internal conflicts, only outsiders will reap the benefits.
15.4.89
By a letter addressed to the President, the LTTE agreed to hold talks. "We welcome your invitation to talk to us following our letter to you dated 11.4.89. You have made comments that external forces have been able to secure their own interests because of the internal conflict between us. You will appreciate that we have been consistently opposed to the policy of bringing external forces into the country. We wish to inform you that we are
prepared to accept you to talk to us. We hop make the necessary a facilitate a dialogue".
delivered to the Presid night at his Ambanpol special emisary. Senic cials in Colombo had midnight rendezvous.
16.4.89
President responded acceptance. The messa President's Secretary, to LTTE’s Mr Anton London said, 'Your me dialogue with His Exce. dent of Sri Lanka appreciated. His Exce structed me to request an accredited represent the necessary arrange tate a dialogue any Lanka'.
17.4.89
The LTTE in a comn to the President stated Balasingham had been their accredited rep facilitate a direct dialog LTTE and the Governn
26.4.89
Mr Anton Balasingal Adele, arrived in Colom 512 flight from London the airport, they wer government officials, es the VIP lounge and flo aboard a Sri Lanka A copter.
A joint press release ment and the LTTE sta Balasingham, accredit tive of LTTE and his Colombo this morning. senior government offi by Excellency the Pl Lanka consisting of Mr Secretary to the Presid Attygalle, Secretary to Defence, and Mr Felix he had frank and cor with Mr. Balasinghan The discussions were o nature for the talks a tinued when other lead the LTTE join Mr. Bal
3.5.89
LTTE delegation c members headed by arrived in Colombo to Balasingham for talks ernment. Two helicop Lankan Air Force v along with Mr and M were flown to a desi Nedunkerni in the V: from where Mr Yogi picked up and flown t LTTE delegation inclu

ΜΑΥ 1989
-LTTE TALKs NOLOGY
open invitation that you will rangements to This letter was nt around midresidence by a r security offiarranged this
to the LTTE's ge sent by the KHJ Wijedasa, Balasingham in ssage to have a lency the Presiis very much llency has inrou to nominate ative to discuss ments to faciliwhere in Sri
hunication sent that Mr. Anton h appointed as resentative to ue between the ment.
m and his wife, bo aboard ULS . On arrival at 2 welcomed by scorted through wn to Colombo Air Force Heli
by the governted, "Mr. Anton ed representawife arrived in A delegation of 2ials nominated "esident of Sri KHJ Wijedasa, ent, General DS the Ministry of Dias Abeysingdial discussions this evening. f a preparatory nd will be coning members of asinghamʼ
onsisting of 9 Mr Dilip Yogi join Mr Anton with the govters of the Sri with journalists rs Balasingham gnated spot in avuniya district nd others were o Colombo. The ded five men in
jungle camouflaged uniforms armed with AK-47 rifles and a video cam
eana.
Besides Mr Yogi, the delegation included Mr Moorthy, Mr Lawrence, Mr Lalith, Mr Jude, Mr Uthayan, Mr Deeph, Mr Ducky and Mr Thas. 4.5.89
A joint press statement issued by the government and the LTTE stated: "The LTTE delegation comprising Mr A S Balasingham, Mr Yogartnam Yogi, Mr Paramu Moorthy, Mr Panchadcharam Lawrence and Mrs Adele Balasingham made a courtesy call on His Excellenccy the President at his residence at Sucharitha Mawatha in Colombo at 5.00 pm today. His Excellency said that the first stage of the talks will be with the officials nominated by him to decide on the modalities and identify the issues. Thereafter, he will nominate a team to discuss all the issues.
The President also stressed the need to know the truthfulness of all issues in order to arrive at meaningful solutions. He added that his mandate from the people of Sri Lanka was to restore peace through a process of consultation, compromise and consensus. This was the reason that he extended an open invitation to the LTTE.
The LTTE delegation conveyed to His Excellency the President and the government their appreciation for affording them the opportunity to talk to the President and the goverment direct without any preconditions. The delegation informed His Excellency the President that they have with them all the information regarding the plight and the predicament of Tamil people and that the sufferings of their people should be brought to light. It is only by understanding the fundamental problems of the Tamil people that durable solutions can be found. They emphasised the need for the restoration of peace and normalcy before such solutions could be worked out'.
5.5.89
The first round of formal talks commenced at the luxury Hilton International Hotel between a LTTE delegation of four headed by Mr Anton Balasingham and government officials numbering seven. It was reported that President Premadasa quietly slipped into the Hotel and spent a few minutes as the talks began.
A joint press release stated they discussed wide-ranging issues and problems faced by people of the North and East and identified particular issues for further discussions. It was agreed that both sides would only be responsible for what would appear in the official communiques issued by them, and the public and the media
Continued on page 5

Page 5
MAY 989
*TIGERS’ ARRI
If the speed with which the sudden turn of events leading up to the ongoing Premadsa-LTTE talks left many political analysts dazed, the manner in which the "Tigers' delegation landed in Colombo was sheer unbelievable drama.
First to arrive on the scene was the LTTE's ideological mentor and personal-political advisor to Prabhakaran himself. When Balasingham and his wife landed at Katunayake on 26 April, he was met by senior officials of the government of Sri Lanka, escorted through the VIP lounge and flown by Air Force helicopter to the five star luxury hotel, Hilton International in Colombo.
Following preliminary talks with government officials, two floors of the Hotel were reserved for the exclusive use by the LTTE delegation. Speculation was rife as to how other LTTE negotiators could emerge from their hideouts in the jungles in Vavuniya and join Mr Balasingham in Colombo for the talks to proceed.
Continued from page 3
IPKF, and the current rate of spending is estimated to be Rs.20 million a day. The total casualty figure is in the region of 3950 - 857 killed and 3093 injured. Rajiv Gandhi is to face a general election within the next 12 to 15 months and it is said that he wants the IPKF to return well before the elections. -.
Neither the LTTE nor the government have given any indication about the details of the matters that have come up for discussion. The Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Ranjan Wijeratne, has stoutly denied speculative reports that the LTTE had in advance placed three conditions, namely the departure of the IPKF, dissolution of the NorthEast Provincial Council and postponement of the proposed referendum on the merger of the northern and eastern provinces, for commencement of talks. He asserted that both the invitation by the government and the acceptance by the LTTE for talks were open and without preconditions.
However, reports circulating in the capital indicate that the LTTE has listed 15 issues for discussion which include the withdrawal of the IPKF, freeze on the state-aided Sinhala colonisation in the Tamil areas, abandonment of the proposed referendum and permanent merger of north and east, dissolution of the North-East Provincial Council, granting of a Quebecmodel autonomy for the Tamil areas, and the setting up of an interim administrative counci, as provided in the Dixit-LTTE agreement of September 1987.
Two Air Force rying Balasingan tant Superinten Perera of the mu Intelligence Bure pondents from t took off from Al Colombo around could seem that t that journalists s along.
Having engage them busy in sc counters in Vavı Tigers estimate around 80 had jungles and reac ing a communic vided by ASP I ham established details and clea) ground to land in Nedunkerni.
As the helicc video cameram graphers were th graph the unfol the two helicopte
The bottom lir with the LTTE i madasa should ( substantial than under the Indo-S which the LTTE charter for servil al imperatives di the LTTE will madasa, he has almost insurm Firstly, the pro campaign mobili extremist Sinhal denouncing such the Sinhalese'. traints placed by tion which requ referendum for s of executive an Unless Premada: ing the support opposition partie a referendum wi
One,
Continued from were requested such official con
115.89
Talks betwee isterial level del ment and the t headed by Mr. began in Colom were Defence Minister Mr. Ra tries Minister M he, Higher Ed Sahul Hameed a ter Mr Sirisena

TAMIL TIMES 5
VE IN COLOMBO
helicopters, one carn and his wife, Assisdent of Police Eric uch dreaded National eau and four correshe local newspapers rmy headquarters in
2pm on 3 May. It he LTTE had insisted hould also be brought
d the IPKF and kept ome diversionary enuniya, a contingent of d to be numbering
walked through the
shed Nedunkerni. Us:ation equipment proPerera, Mr. Balasingcontact and was given rance by those on the h a demarcated spot at
opters landed, LTTE an and other photonere to film and photoding events including 2rs from all angles and
he for any settlement s that President Preoffer something more n what was offered Sri Lanka Agreement had denounced as 'a lity”. Although politicctate that a deal with be beneficial to Preto contend with two ountable obstacles. bability of a violent sed by the JVP and a chauvinist sections
a deal as a 'sell out of
Secondly, the conthe present constituires a mandate at a
ubstantial devolution
d legislative powers. a succeeds in obtainof almost all Sinhala s, the outcome of such l not be a favourable
m
page4 to be guided only by Imuniques.
a four-member minegation of the governnree LTTE delegation
Anton Balasingham po. The four ministers and Foreign Affairs njan Wijeratne, IndusRanil Wickremasingucation Minister Mr nd the Housing MinisCooray.
all those who arrived in them. The local journalists had no such luck as they were prohibited from taking any photographic equipment.
Having enjoyed the chocolates and young-coconut drinks provided by the Tigers, the helicopters took off with nine LTTE members, three negotiators, five armed bodyguards and one cameraman who was busy filming all the way to Colombo.
As the helicopter landed in Colombo, the five LTTE bodyguards jumped off with their AK-47 rifles raised and surrounded it revealing the distrust they had of the Sri Lankan security forces. During the preparatory talks, the LTTE had insisted that its armed bodyguards should accompany their negotiators to provide security in spite of the fact that the government has assured 'safe conduct.
The LTTE team is staying at the Hilton International amidst tight security provided by their own men and the Sri Lankan security forces are guarding the entire hotel complex round the clock.
It was reported that the LTTE delegation criticised the role played by the IPKF and contended that it did not function as a peace-keeping force, and submitted details of atrocities committed by the IPKF.
I wish to pay renew my s year two years
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tly cheque draft M.O. in favour Ltd is to the total value of.....
Name .............
(BLOCK (AIAS. Pitta
Address -
Postcode.

Page 6
6 TAMIL TIMES
THE PREMADASA
Preliminary talksbetween the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Premadasa government have begun, as I write this. The surprisingly sharp reactions that the very announcement of the talks evoked on both sides of the Palk Strait, ranging from nervous knee-jerk reactions, to carefully guarded responses by official sources in Delhi, showed that the significance of the development was not lost on anybody. But the fact that the reactions have been mostly either sneering or sceptical points to the heavy odds against which the talks have been initiated. It is whispered in political circles in Colombo that even sections of the Premadasa government might try to undermine the process.
UNI reporting from Colombo said that the sudden willingness of the LTTE for talks with the Sri Lanka government is seen as a ploy to get the Indian forces out of the island. Two Colombo newspapers, THE SUN and THE ISLAND, whose journalistic contribution to the widening of the gulf between the Sinhala and Tamil peoples is well known, saw in it "a trap' laid by the LTTE. Indian journalist Arur Chacko writing to the SUNDAY EXPRESS (23 April) quoted an unknown "knowledgeable observer of the Sri Lankan scene' as saying: 'What on earth are they going to talk about? This is a complete about-turn. They simply have no meeting ground.' The EPRLF held out the theory that the LTTE had agreed to talks because it was weak'. The Eelam People's Democratic Party (in Madras), an offshoot of the EPRLF questioned the motives of Mr Premadasa and the wisdom of the LTTE. The TELO faction in India questioned the exclusive right of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government to determine the fate of the Tamils of Eelam. But the most negative and abrasive reaction came from THE HINDU which in its editorial (21 April) charged the Sri Lankan government with being involved in 'some kind of confused, adventurous exercise”, accused the LTTE of a “very strange turn-around in its well-known intransigent course', and saw "no rationality at all in the drama of uncompromising fighters for Tamil Eelam” repairing to the abode of their “national enemy'. THE HINDU also admonished the “top policy makers in New Delhi’ for not giving "their concentrated attention' to this "new twist in Sri Lanka', warned the Sri Lankan government that it “would do well to play straight with India, and called upon the LTTE to make peace, (not with Mr. Premadasa, but) with the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. In short, THE HINDU was
by S. Sivan
betraying a sense of a uncharacteristic of t tury-old stoic, staid, bringing.
This medley of reac home two truths: all n have been born out preserve the vested respective opinion-g
them obviously sha
agony of the Tamil
desire that peace sh chance. THE HINDU only about its veste Indo-Sri Lanka Ag. commentators are w Indian stake in Sri La Colombo newspapers flecting the habitual
ism. The EPRLF has the continued present the northeast; witho have no leg to stand militant groups (with tion of EROS) are sei of a closed future s arrive at an underst Sri Lankan govern knows, with the pos the Indian governme)
The second home 1 many political observ and Sri Lanka, wer even prepared, to re. itative difference approaches and tem President Jayewarde man at the helm. It the political maturi that, irrespective of w gain anything out oft that it was able ti qualitative differenc with whom it was w ness' and at what p. waves of surprise t announcement of th have been quite unne been sufficient appr political determinant ago, writing in the T January, I commente "Those who believe th election as President has a continuity of the preva tration (and hence welco commentators fondly h. prises in store as til provided of course that тапаges to survive, p
LD夏Se.
And in conclusion. “While it would be p, dict at this stage what Sri Lanka, the exit of Ja centre of the stage has c change to the pouver equ For the first time uve se contending forces, the J

MAY 1989
LTTE DIALOGUE
ayagan
gitation that was
he paper’s cen
Brahminical up
ions has brought egative reactions of the need to interests of the ivers. None of e the enduring people nor their ould be given a J was concerned interest in the reement. Indian orried about the nkan affairs. The were merely reSinhala chauvina life interest in 2e of the IPKF in but that, it will on. Other Tamil the happy excepzed with the fear hould the LTTE anding with the ment (and who sible approval of nt?) truth is that not ers, both in India e either able, or cognise the qualin the political peraments of exine and the new is to the credit of ty of the LTTE hether it hopes to these talks or not, o recognise this e: and to know 'orth ‘doing busioint of time. The hat followed the nese talks would cessary had there eciation of these ts. Four months AMIL TIMES of d:-
at Mr. Premadasa's only brought about iling UNP adminisme, as many Indian ope) may find surhe months go by the new President olitically or other
I said:
resитрtиоиs to prethe future holds for yeuvardene from the ertainly made a sea ation in the country. ze the three hitherto VP in the south, the
LTTE in the northeast, and the president at the centre sharing a common outlook on fundamental issues - the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the continued presence of the IPKF. Difficult as it may seem for all three toget together, given their mutual antagonisms, such a scenario cannot be ruled out, with an unconventional leader like Mr. Premadasa at the helm. Should that happen - improbable things have happened during the past 18 months - Indian policy makers may be compelled to take a second look at their existing attitude towards Prabaharan and the LTTE . . .”
Some part of the above-mentioned scenario is already evolving. Speaking at an Army Commanders' conference on 24 April, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said that India had to think seriously of getting back the bulk of the Indian Peace Keeping Force as soon as practicable. He said any pullout would be done in a manner that the 'gains' achieved by its presence so far would be preserved. This itself is a departure from the fairly agressive positions taken by Delhi official circles in the past. Mr Gandhi went further to say that India had to consider the process of handing over the role of maintaining law and order to the elected local government so that they could protect themselves against any destabilisation that may arise' - which in plain language could mean throwing Perumal to the wolves (or the Tigers)
With a new Foreign Secretary in Delhi, now making his maiden visit to Colombo, and with the not so popular Dixit giving place to a hitherto unknown moustached Lal Menrotra as High Commissioner in Colombo, with the experienced Delhi war-horse Bernard Tilekeratne now presiding over the Colombo Foreign Office, the stage has already been set for fresh moves, fresh intiatives, and hopefully fresh thinking. On Delhi's part, this being election year, there is also a quick need to see a way out of the Sri Lanka stalemate. It is also a vital need because the Congress- government cannot afford to run into any domestic embarassment as a result of any more surprise moves by Mr. Premadasa. While making some appropiate soothing noises to placate Delhi, Mr Premadasa has at the same time been doggedly pursuing his twin objectivesa speedy withdrawal of the IPKF, and the proposed Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two countries, a proposal initiated by Mr. Premadasa and submitted by the Jayewardene government, but cold shouldered by the Indian government at that time. In fact, Indian Foreign Secretary S.K. Singh was scheduled to have talks on the subject in Colombo. All these developments point to one actuality — the

Page 7
MAY 1989
dominoes are begining to fall. The LTTE-Premadasa dialogue, even before it has got underway is triggering off a chain-effect that could presumably bring changes in India's Sri Lankan policy. Call it by any word, brash, bold, or brazen the very unexpectedness of the LTTE move has shown up in contrast the staleness and sterilit that characterised the JayewardenaRajiv Gandhi diplomacy during the post-Accord period.
But what chances are there of the LTTE-Premadasa talks yielding any tangible benefits to the Tamil people?- this is a question that every Tamil will naturally want to ask. Before that, one must disabuse oneself of exaggerated notions about the ambit of the talks. Because the political objective of the LTTE is an independent Tamil homeland, it does not follow that the motive and the nature of the talks will centr around fundamental objectives. It cannot, and it would be naive on anyone's part to expect it. If it were that easy a proposition – to win Tamil Eelam across the table - there cannot be any sense or rationale in waging an armed struggle at tremendous sacrifice of lives. For example, when HINDU correspondent Thomas Abraham reporting from Colombo says (28 April): “Yesterday's talks apparently went off well, and one of the positive indications has been that Mr. Balasingham did not mention the demand for a separate state... ', he was being either naive, or mischievous, or merely articulating his paper's obsession against Tamil
Eelam.
What then could be the justification or explanation for the talks from the Tamil point of view? To answer that question one has to take cognisance of an unhappy reality: the momentum of the Eelam struggle had been pushed back by at least two years as a result of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and Indian military intervention on Eelam soil. To carry forward the Eelam struggle, the ground has to be controlled by forces which stand for that political objective. Two years ago that control existed, but today it is no longer so. We have a powerful, alien military force which has taken physical control of the ground, involved in crushing the Eelam struggle, aided by other indigenous forces which have taken up the Eelam objective in exchange for perks of office and an opportunity for revenge. This situation has to be reversed; and this is well within the parameters of the talks the LTTE was prepared to hold with the Premadasa government. From the Tamil point of view, the land under alien occupation belongs to the future Tamil Eelam, or at least the traditional Tamil homeland. From Mr. Premadasa's angle, it belongs to Sri Lanka. True. That is a matter that has to be sorted out later with the Premadasa government or any other government that rules Col
ombo. But the im that has to be Tamils have a con Premadasa (unlik Jayewardene) — sence should not be dictated by di Premadasa thinks a slur on the sover of which he is he blame him. Th against the IPKF rent. What they friendly presence received the jaw, turned out to be a blame for this can LTTE, as the Ind been doing; it rest clumsy policy-mal sitivity it has di only friendly peop SAARC region!
There is anothe which has a chance or at least freeze President Premad tinuing State-aided Tamil homeland. W otherwise, the Ind has betrayed the Tamils on practic that affect their liv The worst blow has colonisation. In th sence of 100,000 Inc we say with diplom saturating the el breadth of the nor happen that a who Sinhala name of carved out of area: bited by Tamils for Aru, Nayaru, Kok avadi, Kokkutho families driven awa four years ago cont resettlement by (according to the Ac in barracks) under t of the IPKF? The ta Tamils have been 1 two years was to fix of preventing such Indian Governme Lanka Accord and o Keeping (?) Force.' has to be fixed on P sa. Why should th ment be expected territory? The Accor paper. The IPKF is illiterate jawans whi why they are there!' whether as a benefi is the Sri Lanka entire issue of colo lifted out of the dec the Accord, which bo and the Tamils opp treated as a direc between the Sri L and the Tamils, as LTTE, with no apo for violent resistan

TAMIL TIMES 7
mediate, salient fact understood is that mon cause with Mr. e with ex-President that the alien pree there, even if they fferent reasons. Mr. the alien presence is eignty of the country 'ad; and you cannot Tamil grievance is something diffeirst imagined was a (remember how they ans with garlands?) h oppressive one. The not be turned on the ian government has s squarely on its own ting and gross insenplayed towards the le it had in the entire
r important issue of being resolvedi - by talking to asa, that of concolonisation in the Thether intended or o-Sri Lanka accord interests of the ally every matter es and their future. been in the area of e immediate prelian troops (or shall atic grace — 50,000) ntire length and theast, how did it le district with the Weli Oya is being s exclusively inhacenturies - Manal kilai, Thennamarduvai... ? Tamil y by Sinhala forces inue to be refused the same forces cord who should be he indifferent eyes ctical mistake that making these past the responsibility happenings on the nt, the Indo-Sri n the Indian Peace That responsibility resident Premadae Indian Governto preserve Tamil d is only a piece of composed of semio do not even know The affected party, ciary or as a loser, government. The nisation has to be eptive backdrop of oth Mr. Premadasa ose, and has to be it bi-lateral issue anka government represented by the logies being made ce if necessary to
any Sinhala colonisation that itself is perpetrated with violence. And who is better qualified to talk toughly with Mr. Premadasa on this issue than the LTTE, which is the only Tamil force that has at least effectively minimised the continuous robbery of the Tamil people’s land?
A stage comes even in the midst of an armed struggle, when the real enemies may want to talk to each other, and that stage is now. India, as a country, and the Indian people, have never been enemies of the Tamil people. LTTE leader Prabaharan was echoing the sentiments of every Tamil man, woman and child when he said - 'We love India, we love the Indian people'. But if the Rajiv Gandhi government, through its confused approaches, managed to don the robes of an enemy of the Tamils, it certainly has nothing to do with how Tamils yet look upon India. In as much Mahatma Gandhi taught the Indian people to distinguish between British imperialism, Britain as a country, and the British people, it is only the Eelam Tamils who instinctively knew these distinctions, and preserved them when it came to Indian involvement in their affairs. If this clarity of thinking, if these emotional impulses, have brought the LTTE to face the Premadasa government across a table, why should one question motives, pinpoint the chasm between the parties,
or pooh-pooh the possible consequences
of such talks? The very exercise has logic, wisdom, and courage, on its side. To the Tamil people, it even offers HOPE; and any offer of hope has to be welcomed.
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Page 9
MAY 1989
WILL THE TIGERS EBRE OR ATTEMPT TO PU
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are back at the negotiating table. Significantly it will be the first time since the signing of the much disputed July 1987 Indo-Lanka peace accord that the LTTE will be talking to the Sri Lankan government.
President Ranasinghe Premadasa's repeated appeals to the militants, both the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) and the LTTE, seem to have struck a responsive chord in the LTTE psyche.
But how optimistic can one be about the proposed dialogue given the reality of the island's political scenario. The Provincial council elections, one of the main provisions of the Indo-Lanka accord held in 1988 has changed the whole structure of governance in the country. Although the fledgling councils have yet to become functional semi-autonomous bodies, they cannot be wished away by either the LTTE or the JVP. Given that political fact any discussion of the north-east region will have to acknowledge the presence of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) controlled North-East Council.
Two elections after, the north-east election in November 1988 and the Parliamentary poll in February 1989, four Tamil groups, former militants turned democrats have through the electoral process become the representatives of the Tamils. A loose alliance of the EPRLF/TELO and the ENDLF not only control the seventyone member north-east council but also have seven of their members in Parliament. And there is the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) who contested as independents but style themselves as the Eelavar Democratic Front (EDF) who won thirteen seats in Parliament but have yet to take their seats.
EROS General Secretary, Velupillai Balakumar, euphoric over their spectacular win in the February poll voiced the hope that they could play the role of mediator and create the necessary climate for the LTTE to agree to discussions.
EROS's efforts, if any, didn't get off the ground and with intensified IPKF operations in March specially in the Mullaitivu district, you found EROS moving away from its earlier position of mediator. Besides, by now it had met with President Premadasa and expressed what it described as its main concerns in diffusing the tensions and creating an atmosphere of mutual trust between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Two of its main demands was the release of all Tamil political prison
By Rita
ers and the repea ment. The EPRL]] occasional 'going
mentality of thei TELO and the E dragging of the
substantial powe council have dug t fairmess to them i start has been ma provincial admini wisely, men of pro years of admini head the various
If the LTTE ni mainstream polit demands will be North-East Cour EPRLF react tC Although in their the groups except the need for all together to forge a demands, privatel: know only too w bloody feuding b made it the impos
Then of course factor. The LTTE So do the other gn an effective law a takes over in the the region is retl normalcy. Preside self would like the his election pled assumed office of P was still in the co that they left. Un JVP militancy in t hands.
Sri Lankan forc the south cannot. the vacuum in the IPKF were to leav still remains outsi tics. For today the it is the IPKF that their dominating t and reaching the securing a Tamill tical India is of "intransigence' it its military offensi began in October minded in captur ership.
Its offensives h; scope, a “this fa strategy which it lieved would pres drop their arms a cratic processes. other hand is or would fight to the l meet India’s dem down arms as a pr

TAM TIMES · 9
KBREAD WITH RIVALS T THE CLOCK BACK2
ebastian
* : 1 ప్రత్త of the sixth amend
however, given the heir separate ways' fraternal allies the NDLF, and the foot3entre in devolving on the north-east hemselves in. And in must be said that a le however small, in stration. And quite ren ability, with long strative experience Ministries.
ow decides to enter ics one of its first he dissolving of the cil. How will the such a demand? public posturings all the LTTE articulate of them to come consensus on Tamil y some of the groups ell that bitter and etween them have sible dream.
there is the Indian wants the IPKF out. oups but not before nd order machinery north and east and urned to peace and nt Premadasa himIPKF out to honour ge that when he resident if the IPKF untry he would see fortunately for him he south has tied his
es now deployed in be withdrawn to fill north and east if the now and the LTTE le mainstream poliLTTE believes that stands in the way of he north-east region r ultimate goal of elam. However crithat it calls LTTE as at no time since e against the LTTE 1987, been singleng the LTTE lead
ve been limited in
and no further has mistakenly beurise the LTTE to d enter the demohe LTTE on the record that they st man rather than ind that they lay condition to talks.
And while the antagonists to the
conflict fight it out with guns and words, it is the civilian population that faces the greatest hardships and at tremendous cost to themselves and their families.
“We want peace' is the anguished cry of the Tamils, specially in the north, where trapped between the IPKF and the militants they are often the victims of the 'crossfire syndrome.'
Normal life is constantly being disrupted with sudden cordon and search operations and the continuing clashes between the IPKF and the LTTE making it impossible for any significant economic activity.
According to Rehabilitation Ministry sources in Colombo since 1983 over a hundred thousand houses have been destroyed and damaged. In September 1987 a World Bank survey put the infrastructural damage down to 700 million US dollars.
90,000 farming and fishing families have been displaced and their houses destroyed, and 11,000 business establishments damaged or destroyed as well.
A package of assistance to the two categories of persons, those affected and those displaced, was worked out by the Rehabilitaiton Ministry in Colombo last July. According to Ministry figures an estimated 400,000 families have been affected as a result of the conflict.
And there still seems no end in sight. It is into this seemingly unresolvable situation that the Sri Lankan government has now moved in for talks with the LTTE.
What the LTTE will have to take into account is that events have overtaken them. The political equation that held good during the signing of the accord is no longer relevant. The LTTE cannot lay claim to being the only representatives of the Tamils. They could have easily put it to the test at the provincial and parliamentary elections but they chose not to.
EPRLF's K. Padmanabha disputes the LTTE claim labelling it an LTTE illusion they have been trying to foist on the Tamil People.
Whatever role the LTTE would like to assign themselves the clock cannot be put back.
Will the LTTE therefore agree to break bread with their rivals, or will the talks go the way of talks held so many times before.
Where does all this leave the Tamil people?
Continued on page 16

Page 10
10 TAMIL TIMES
UNIVERSITY TEACHERS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS BY STATE & NON-STA
The University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) formed during the latter part of 1988 has published two
;
comprehensive reports relating to incidents involving hu
man rights violations. The Reports, besides documenting a number of individual cases, in its preface and appendices breaks new ground in raising the question of violations not only by the State, but also by non-state entities particularly in the context of contemporary Tamil political realities. Report No.1 (40 pages) released in January 1989 covers the period from July to December 1988, and Report No.2 comprising 66 pages covers the period from January to
March 1989.
While dealing comprehensively with the violations by the security forces (IPKF), in their preface to Report No.1, the
The University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR) was formed during the middle of 1988 in response to a growing need felt throughout the country. Its membership comprises university teachers from all universities. The need for such an organisation was thrust upon the university teachers in the course of views and problems aired at meetings of the Federation of University Teachers' Associations (FUTA). In time it was decided to form the UTHR as an organisation affiliated to FUTA, but independent of it.
It was natural that several leading figures in the UTHR turned out to be long term activists in the FUTA. It was universally admitted that the role of university teachers in this country in upholding human rights was inadequate, if not unheroic. As much as university teachers in the South could be blamed for their unconcern in the face of the militarisation of the state (in response to a political problem in the Tamil areas which developed into an insurgency), the university teachers in the North could equally be blamed for their silence on internal developments which culminated in internecine killings.
It was recognised by the generality of teachers in the South that the meteoric rise of gross human rights violations in the South was a spill-over from the militarisation of the Sri Lank
an state (in response to a problem that
should have been dealt with politically), and the resulting debasement of human psyche (see Appendix 2 for statements issued by the UTHR).
Long history Violations of human rights in the Tamil areas have a long history going back to the 1970s. The problem simmered for some time and came to the boil after the racial violence of 1983. Although university teachers in Jaffna had been familiar with organisations
C
campaigning for human themselves it is unlik would have gone back in this point of time.
The coming together teachers in this country it had in loosening inh and misconceptions was forming the UTHR, an (Jaffna) as an organisat UTHR. That the UTH rives its strength and in being part of the nationa is gratefully acknowledg
The enthusiasm show versity teachers in Jaff UTHR was phenomenal was explained and hae Because of our long ex tions that are still unr South were quickly disp what was a broad const these questions are: should confine ourselv related to the university should go into the dif) community at large? should only deal with vi state(s) or whether west violations independe source?
State violati
It had been generally rights organisations wil active in this region in is mainly violations by are significant. The a for this stand is that t sents the internatio ledged law-enforcing resources, material an far exceeding that of a It is thus the failure deal with problems jus that is the principal st resulting violations. T has much merit in it, is practice of many inter rights organisations. I

ΜΑΥ 1989
HUMAN RIGHTS (Jaffna)
VIOLATIONS TE ORGANASATIONS
THR(Jaffna) poses the fundamental question facing the amil community in the follouving terms: "The premise that one must not criticise those who had ome forward to give their lives in protecting the population gainst the Sri Lankan state, brought in further confusion then internecine killings resulted in the course of militant roups vying for dominance. Large numbers of young men ho had come forward to give their lives for us had become tgitives in our own community, and were being hunted nd killed without knowing why, or what had hit them. 'ad we nothing to say?. In answering this question, the THR(Jaffna) has displayed remarkable intellectual ingrity and moral courage in compiling the tuvo reports, articularly in a situation where the gun-approach to roblems has become the rule...'
rights, left to ely that they to this work at
of university and the effect ibitions, fears a key event in d the UTHRion within the IR(Jaffna) despiration from al organisation ged. yn by the unina towards the , once the idea ld caught on. perience, quesesolved in the osed of here in 2nsus. Some of Whether we es to persons or whether we iculties of the
Whether we olations by the hould deal with ntly of their
OS
held by human nich have been the past that it the state that rgument given he state reprehally acknowauthority with non-material, ny other group. by the state to tly and wisely urce of all the is view, which reflected in the lational human many parts of
the world with which these organisations were initially concerned, the state exercised a virtual monopoly in the violation of human rights. This was true in Eastern Europe and in parts of the world where there were no armed rebel movements. We have no doubt that the work done in this part of the world by human rights organisations the past has brought relief and hope to countless numbers.
In our own context, this approach had some unintended effects. It came to be thought adequate in many quarters to expose the actions of the Sri Lankan state internationally, while little was done to build our own strength as people who stood by certain ideals and standards. In the course of the resulting passivity, the people lost the will and the ability to check both undemocratic and homicidall tendencies in militant groups which became increasingly hard to ignore.
As terror by the Sri Lankan state claimed thousands of lives, people became increasingly passive, finding some relief in the growing military prowess of militant groups and in international campaigns on their behalf. The logic of accepting that people were helpless was that it came to be thought wrong, if not risky, to criticise any action undertaken by militant groups. In time there were those who advocated human rights campaigns, directed against the state, as part of the militant struggle. In observance of human rights day, speakers stressed national rights - namely the demand for the Tamil separate state of Eelam — saying little or nothing of violations against individuals.
Universal values
The premise that one must not criticise those who had come forward to give their lives in protecting th population against the Sri Lankan state, brought in further confusion

Page 11
MAY 1989
when internecine killings resulted in the course of militant groups vying for dominance. Large numbers of our young men who had come forward to give their lives for us had become fugitives in our own community, and were being hunted and killed without knowing why, or what had hit them. Had we nothing to say?
The stated premise meant that one must observe silence and pay homage to the victorious group of the moment, now the 'sole protector' against the Sri Lankan state. Thankfully, such a premise was not universally accepted, and many unarmed civilians gave refuge to fugitives, placing humanity above ideology. The acceptance of such a premise would also have entailed that one must throw away all universal values and pledge oneself to the power of the moment. Thus, when gunpowder changed hands and the new victors asked 'What were you doing when we were attacked?", the question, together with the feelings it reflected, had a note of legitimacy.
Again, the more one looks at the problem, one can hardly ignore the fact that the panorama of human misery comprises all shades of people: Tamil, Sinhalese, Indian; guerilla and soldier. Even those who represent states responsible for some detestable acts raise questions which must be listened to with sympathy. Can one shrug away the killings of policemen who were performing a civil function such as transporting cash between banks, or of soldiers trying to enable passenger trains to run? One cannot but feel some sympathy for a Gurkha or a Sikh soldier who complains that he was told he was coming here to protect the Tamils, and that he has no quarrel with anyone; whereas many people do not seem to like him, while others are shooting at him.
State's principal responsibility Daily, young lives are being snuffed
out. The departe been a friend to so and does certainly that cannot be fi may be that of a c of a soldier.
We do certainly internationally enforcing agencies sponsible for an affairs which dev: can sympathise resentments, we w to go beyond the quent actions mak themselves or for ment can excuse a
Behind the impo the Indian soldier principled cynicis mutual relations and Sri Lankan sta groups. There is conflicting expecta disappointed led to The logic of the military approach lem was that in the classed with armed termination was de doubt that, but for cern, the Sri La showed few inhibiti ing genocide.
We have docume instances where the blind preference approach in dealin problems at the cos tics. Even if one j practices on pragm course of events political price bein military gains. One discredited and disp an forces, the same being applied with effects.
Violations by nc Our experience h
The
The recent spate of human rights violations cannot be understood without some knowledge of the motivations and mutual relations of the various factions that bear arms. India's sponsorship of Tamil militant groups in 1983 and the manner in which the latter were militarised at the expense of political vision has been written about elsewhere. Help given to Tamil militant groups received widespread approval. In consequence of the 1983 racial violence and the subsequent military action by the Sri Lankan state, the Tamil minority was seen as defenceless. This militarisation reflected itself in the ruthless manner in which internal dissent within militant groups was dealt with.
Snares
In early 1985 the out with sensationa how the PLOTE há its own cadres on In sources have give from several tens known, but well several internal ki militant groups.
By the middle of 1 eliminated the TEL Scene and its bid f became evident. Th cadres killed by the upwards. Leading E na told a senior C. figure that its leat had asked the LTT

TAMIL TIMES 11
person may have he, a fiend to others eave behind a void ed. The young life filian, a militant or
hold that states, as ccountable laware principaly reanarchic state of ues life. While we ith some of their ould also ask them e. do their subselife pleasanter for others? No resentresort to depravity. sible tasks faced by is a history of unm that governed etween the Indian es and the militant also a history of tions, which when greater instability. Sri Lankan state’s to the Tamil probend all Tamils were rebels, whose exsired. There is little international connkan government bns against practic
inted a number of IPKF has shown a
for a military g with day to day zt of debasing poliustifies inhumane natic grounds, the suggests a heavy g paid for meagre must ask if having laced the Sri Lankmethods are still
much the same
n-state bodies as also taught us
that the community must develop its ability to stand up for values it holds dear, which alone can guarantee its dignity. This raises certain matters specific to our own situation, consequent to the marginalising of all civilian political groups. We have a situation where the gun approach to problems has become the rule rather than the exception and there is no political impetus to question it. Thus anyone who wishes to question this tendency stands in isolation and cannot reason why university teachers have been cast into the role of questioning violations by non-state organisations. Perhaps in our context, it is only a human rights group that can question this tendency which has now assumed the proportions of an institution.
In presenting this report, we have avoided emphasis on numbers and have tried to show the human significance of each event. We have presented reports of violations which came to our attention, without bias. These reports were compiled by people within the university and by others associated with the university. Accuracy has been ensured, within reasonable limits.
Primarily, we hope that by trying to understand what is happening to this society and to themselves in turn, those responsible for these violations will change their methods and themselves for the better. In addition with the world so interlinked, no event is an isolated event. What happens in this society has a close relation with its interaction with the outside world. By trying to hide what our society really is, we can only deceive ourselves. While exposing what is being done to us, we are also giving an airing to the truth about ourselves. This, we hope, will challenge us to change for the better.
(This is the text of the Preface to Report 1)
of Violence
Indian press came revelations about d killed several of lian soil. Dissident figures varying pwards. Less well uthenticated, are ings within other
86, the LTTE had 'from the militant r sole dominance number of TELO LTTE is put at 90 PRLF men in Jaffizens' Committee rship in Madras leadership for its
terms of cooperation. But no answer had been forthcoming.
Scenes of outrage
It was generally assumed that the LTTE would take on the EPRLF at an opportune moment. In November 1986 the EPRLF confronted the LTTE politically by backing the outcry over the disappeared student Vijithiran. Knowing that the LTTE would respond militarily, the EPRLF was singularly unprepared. By 14th December 1986, the LTTE had taken on the EPRLF. In Jaffna, the EPRLF vacated its camps leaving behind large quantities of weapons. Outside Jaffna, particularly in the Eastern province, fighting between the LTTE and the EPRLF continued sporadically. Perhaps out of

Page 12
12 TAMIL TIMES
deference to a feeling of public horror that events during the LTTE-TELO clash of May, scenes of public outrage were not repeated. But several EPRLF cadres were killed. A number were tortured, particularly for information on hidden weapons.
It is notable that a large number of members of the public, particularly from the lower classes, took great risks in providing shelter and succour for TELO and EPRLF cadres on the run. Many of them are the very same persons who did likewise for LTTE supporters, when they felt hunted af. ter October 1988. The EPRLF, which was then not known for notoriety in dealing with dissent, failed to settle the costly breach between its leader Padmanabha, and the leader of its military wing, Douglas Devananda. This provided the LTTE its opportunity. It was widely felt that the LTTE's actions had seriously weakened the militants. This recieved confirmation when the Sri Lankan armed forces made rapid gains in early 1987. The EPRLF had been becoming increasingly effective in the East in the few months before its disbandment.
At the end of March 1987 the LTTE's Jaffna leader, Kittu, lost a leg in a bomb attack. The attackers were not identified. Widespread speculation remains that the attack was prompted by internal differences. On the following evening, 18 EPRLF prisoners held at the Brown Road LTTE camp were killed. The LTTE described the incident as an escape attempt. The 'Saturday Review, quoting LTTE sources, said that in the few days following Kittu's incident, about 50 prisoners held in LTTE camps were killed. The BBC reported a higher figure.
Feeling of relief From March 1987 the fighting between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE became increasingly vicious. A large number of Tamil civilians fell victim to aerial bombing and shelling by Sri Lankan forces. Over 200 Sinhalese civilians fell victim to two attacks during the course of the week commencing with the Sinhala/Tamil New Year of April 1987. One was a massacre in Kituluttuwa, near Trincomalee. The other was the car-bomb attack in Colombo.
The feeling of relief with which the IPKF was welcomed by Tamil civilians in July 1987 and the subsequent events have been described elsewhere. In the face of an increasingly unfavourable balance of forces, the LTTE chose to shore up its position by making rhetorical claims of exclusiveness. Other militants were branded as traitors, who had in addition become agents of India. The last must be viewed in the light of the LTTE itself having received arms and training from India. Its leader was resident in India until early 1987. Also, facilities in India were crucial for the war
against the Sri Lanka) er, while the LTTE opp al presence of Indian because of the threat
exclusiveness, it kept tional (and more soph from India.
At another level, t successfully carved ou itself through extraor of military prowess al tional acts of violence." lined by the suicidal Black Tigers; the attac turai harbour (22nd A ler's suicide attack on (5th July 1987) and assault of 12th Septem Eastern province, whic 70 militants from othe The last took place ir relaxed atmosphere : Accord. Many of the de pared and unarmed. W acquired an image, its tives in the face of g became more nebulous it also exposed the pol of other forces, particu and Sri Lankan stat could keep up its rep great cost to the civilia too lost the ability to de ly, particularly with
groups.
Traitor & Anti-soci
For the other militar their past political ar lures, an Indian presel expeditious means of themselves. People gen ledged the crucial role militant groups in keep Lankan forces. After t IPKF, the other milital to be redeployed, often ity to IPKF camps. W internecine killings h stead of making a polit win over the people, th ple usually got in deal militant groups was were being blamed fo suffered at the hands o hatred and thirst for ri towards the LTTE t extend to the people w with the LTTE. This v reflected in the attituc after the October off went towards reinforc propaganda claim, tha tants were traitors and ments, once rejected by now making their ap IPKF patronage.
Such a view of the ci even after the EPRI major party representi the North-East provin in November 1988. In ings with EPRLF cadre ple were accused of bei of having stood by idly

n state. Howevosed the physic
forces, in part to its claims of asking for addilisticated) arms
he LTTE quite t an image for dinary displays nd some sensaThis was under
valour of the k on Kankesanpril 1987); Mil
Nelliady camp the surprise ber 1987 in the h left a reported er groups dead. the relatively soon after the ad were unpreWhile the LTTE political objecground realities 3. Nevertheless, itical weakness larly the Indian es. The LTTE utation only at n population. It !al diplomaticalother militant
all elements ht groups, given nd military faince provided an re-establishing herally acknowplayed by other ing back the Sri he arrival of the nt groups began in close proximWithin a month ad started. Inical approach to ne message pe0ings with other that the people r the fate they f the LTTE. The evenge they felt hus seemed to ho were classed view came to be les of the IPKF 2nsive. All this ing the LTTE's t the other milil anti-social elley the people and pearance under
vilians persisted LF became the ng the Tamils in cial government day-to-day deales, ordinary peong pro-LTTE, or while the LTTE
MAY 1989
decimated them in the past. The killing of a large number of LTTE supporters and sympathisers left the feeling that a very crude military approach was being tried, with the complicity of the IPKF.
Perhaps far more serious than blunders of other parties have been the blunders of India, earlier seen as lacking in principle and now seen to be lacking in objective as well. The readiness of India to descend to forms of expediency with apparently no political or moral scruples has left the IPKF with an unenviable task. One must remember that the IPKF was welcomed in July 1987 with almost universal approbation. When Indian officials say that several hundred Indian soldiers died for the Tamils of Ceylon, it undoubtedly makes sense to Indian ears. But given the enormity of civilian suffering in the face of Indian military action, this would sound an insult to the average Tamil, adding salt to the wound.
True, a number of Indian soldiers died trying to maintain services. The life of an Indian soldier here is as tense, unpleasant and hazardous as it is for many ordinnary civilians. But seen from here, the reverses suffered by the Indian army were largely a consequence of a lack of moral and political vision. One does know that many Indian soldiers and officers are often courteous, obliging and do not relish the reputation of their organisation. But faced with a situation, gut instincts seem to take over.
inhumane practices
India has consistently and indignantly denied allegations of torture and inhumane practices by its forces from international organisations, within and outside the country. The existence of such practices are so well known here, that privately many Indian officials would defend them on the grounds of expediency. That is at least a sure sign that they are aware that what they are doing is wrong - something for which India has rightly taken the Sri Lankan government to task in international fora earlier. India would never dare to argue before the world the need for inhumane practices, nor would it defend its use of such practices. Perhaps the fundamental error is that of trying to accomplish a political task without respect for people. Screams and groans from victims, heard by residents near IPKF camps, remain part of our day-to-day reality.
Even if one grants that the IPKF is faced with an incorrigible adversary the question remains: Could a countr such as India, with enormous intellec tual, material and spiritual resources, make a plea to be judged at the same level as that of youngsters, whose experience from their early teens has taught them to rely on little else
Continued on page 13

Page 13
MAY 1989
LETTERS
AN OPEN LETTER TO THE IPKP
"In a matter of weeks, it will be two years since you landed on the shores of our Island. You came with gifts to our people. You came to establish Peace and Justice in this land.
But during these months, you have destroyed hundreds of our homes, decimated the flower of our youth and made thousands widows and orphans. All this you have done to force down the throat of our people'an agreement in which they had no part. You want to coerce our people into a "democratic process’. It is for this democratic process our people fought for more than thirty years by every democratic means open to them. They were humiliated, beaten up, gunned down. Our people had no other choice but to resist violence by violence. You came to see justice done to our people; you have become instruments of oppression in the hands of designing politicians.
Yours is a great country, a superpower in the East. Your military resources are vast. Your bombers, rockets, gun-ships are deadly. You have a soldier for every home in the Northbesides their gun? Would India defend
East Province of suffered much fr do not understan do we understant that you are killi same aspirations sixty years ago? Is violence unleashe es from the cradl
We are a han cannot resist you cannot make our a barrage of ar media. We are th oppression, treacl when the histor written, time wil
ND
The Government congratulated ( stand taken in intimidating acti her knees by d fundamental rigł country and subje ibly drastic and thereof.
Nepal's glowing ing into India's bl. tional thuggery v
Continued from page 12
the practices of some of the worst regimes of the world?
A poignant comment on the current situation comes in a leaflet bearing the title "We ask forgiveness from the people', signed "Those who left the EPRLF. It is addressed to their former comrades. Such crudely stencilled leaflets from the underground remain the only form of free expression. Some excerpts are quoted below in translation:
"...Because conflicts within our organisation could not be settled in a regular manner, many responsible conrades like Davidson, Chelian, Evananda and Das left uvith broken hearts. It is because of the resulting weak state of our organisation that the Tigers attacked us, and not because the People instigated the Tigers'.
"But today you are using your armed might to take revenge on the people who only want peace and democracy. This will only push them once again to the state of accepting that the politics of the Tigers was right. It is not just the former supporters of the Tigers, but even thousands upho supported us will be driven by your present conduct to the side of the Tigers'.
"Instead of trying to show that you
are more democr you are trying to a by showing that than the Tigers. W sed by this".
"Dear leader Co In your thirst fo politics and in yo the EPRLFas an o late it, you used t suitcase in han streets. What are very people for wi up this organisati you accpeted this have no authority "Comrades. Po slogans, red fla, beards cannot al. movement. On the rade who bears a discipline of lovin "Your confoun revenge politics' tics' has belittlec noble sentiments days'
"We appeal to : the EPRLF who even at this eleven the foreigner whi hands will one What then uill be
Text of Appendix University of Teach (Jafna)

TAMIL TIMES 13
the island. We have om your hands. You our people. Neither you. It is not ironic ng us for having the as your fathers had it not tragic that the d on our people com2 of non-violence?
dful of people. We r military might. We voices heard against orchestrated mass a victims of injustice, nery and deceit. But y of these years is record what it has
recorded for centuries, that the power of arms however deadly cannot quench the determined will of a people to die, rather than be deprived of the rights that are the birth right of human beings.
Our goal is nothing but what your great patriots and poets bequeathed to you, and the rest of humanity: "Where the mind is without fear And the head held high Into that haven of Freedom, my Father, Let my country auvake” — Rabindranath Tagore.
A Anandan,
PO Box 15645 Al Ain, UAE.
IAN BLOCKADE OF NEPAL
, of Nepal must be on the courageous the face of India's on to bring Nepal to epriving her of the hts of a land locked :cting her to the posstragic consequences
example in not givatant acts of Internawould no doubt be a
atic than the Tigers, rticulate your politics you are more brutish We are greatly distres
imirade Padman abha. r a rational form of ur desire to build up rganisation to articuo roam Tamil Nadu, d, sleeping on the you doing when the hose benefit you built on, spit upon it? Have line, or is it that you
to speak?” sters uvith beautiful gs and sporting of One run a liberation contrary, every comrms must possess the g the people'. ding 'red flag and vith liberation polil and devalued the you uttered in bygone
you comrades within
ove the people, think th hour. The arms of ch you bear in your day be takеп ашрау.
your state?”
I in Report 1 by the Iers for Human Rights
shining example to India's other neighbours who have unfortunately been falling hopeless victims of the overt and covert operations carried out by India to gain economic, political and strategic control over the entire South Asian Region.
India's ruthless action in Nepal would also hopefully help open the eyes of a large section of the outside world who have unfortunately been viewing India's policies in the region as having "peaceful and protective intentions' in the same way they had initially thought were Hitler's intentions earlier in the century.
In this connection one could recall how the Munich agreement related to Czechoslovakia was erroneously hailed as being the treaty that would lead to "peace in our time', in the same way that the Gandhi-Jayawardhene agreement was believed to have brought about peace and harmony in the South Asian region as opposed to the defacto annexation and increased deaths and destruction that it has actually generated.
Let us hope that the knowledge of the history of German expansionism and the untold deaths and misery resulting therefrom, and of the almost similar situations that has been developing in the Indian sub-continent would hopefully prompt the peaceloving people and anti-hegemonistic countries of the world to help Nepal to withstand pressure to enter into any more unequal treaties with India as her other neighbours have unfortunately been pushed into.
The unequivocal support extended to Nepal in her hour of need by her traditional and other allies would no doubt be appreciated and well remembered by South Asian countries who have been or would soon be subjected to the hegemonistic thrust of the growing Indian Reich.
Bernard Wijedoru
HK ID XC 433386

Page 14
14 TAMIL TIMES
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Page 15
MAY 1989
EROS WELCOMES GOVT-LTTE TALKS
In what he described as one of his last public attempts to explain Tamil aspirations to the Sinhala people, Balakumar leader of EROS appealed to the Sinhalese masses, political parties and groups like the JVP to give the LTTEGovernment talks a chance to succeed without setting out too many conditions and driving the Tigers away.
The failure of the talks would only result in the battle for a separatist state continuing and for other Tamil groups with no alternative but to follow suit, he said in this interview. Excerpts: Q: How do you view the talks? A: I see it as an opportunity to be grasped with both hands by the Sri Lankan government and the Sinhala people including those in the Opposition. In the first place I must say that our group had no involvement in the Tigers' decision to come for talks, as claimed in some newspapers.
The Tigers' move came as a complete surprise to us too, but we welcome it. We believe the offer was made seriously and what we want now is for the Indian and Sri Lankan governments and the Sinhala people to realize this. I feel this is a meeting point for a viable alternative to Eelam and what is urgently needed now is to listen to what the LTTE has to say without raising various objections and so on.
Not all of us agree with everything the LTTE does but they are a factor we cannot ignore in any settlement of this crisis. There is no military solution and all Tamil groups were told by the Indian Premier, Rajiv Gandhi, during the time of the Accord that India would not tolerate a separate state in Sri Lanka.
We appeal to everyone, including the JVP to first start to find out what the LTTE wants, what they are asking. Whatever these conditions are, there should be no criticism that this is only a first step to Eelam, as argued before. Such fears and doubts on the contrary would only lead to Eelam if no thought is given to the reason for our struggle, why we resorted to arms in the first place.
The JVP is asking for the removal of the IPKF, so does the LTTE. These goals can be achieved only if there is better understanding among the Sinhalese of the fears of our people. We have been oppressed for generations, so how can you ask us to show goodwill first Q: What kind of compromise would satisfy the LTTE and the Tamil people? A: Something more than what the present Provincial Councils envisage, a viable alternative to Eelam which will
include the protectio) frame-work for hum velopment and an set-up which will el tion, Q: Among the gra Sinhala people is traditional homelar you react to this?
A: Traditional homel where we have live but we do not say
other person is exclu
In the normal col would welcome plan all people, in keepin mic and social deve areas. What we obje colonisation which st criminals and IRCs ibly. This is an atte new areas forcibly object to this. I have many Sinhala politic
“LITTE’S THE
At their office on Jaffna an EPRLF expressed grave c LTTE's sincerity in the talks with the said it was a move contradictions betwe and Indian Governn Excerpts from the G: Why do you thi denly decided on th A: Their main aim is out and to do away v Councils system. I til an Government als that is why the talk moned so suddenly. Q: Do you think the in trying for a negot A: If they want peac to the Indian Gover are also part of the I They should also ha all Tamil groups, wh to bring real peace. we can ask the IPK
Q: So how does the Current talks? A: We think it is ju don't give much im We know the curre has made the Tige satisfy their cadres are taking other ste caled for these tal morale of their me gone down if they Tigers only wanted ing and dying in

TAM TIMES 15
n of basic rights, a an and social deadequate security Insure our protec
eat fears of the your concept of ds. How would
ands means areas d for generations, this means every ded from them.
urse of events we ned settlement of g with the econolopment of these ct to is the forced ill continues, with being settled forc:mpt to carve out and naturally we explained this to
ians and we would
like the Sinhala people, too, to be aware of this. Sinhala, Tamil, Muslims we are all human beings, we have no animosity or hatred towards anyone.
Q: What steps should be taken for peace in the North and East? Shouldn't the other Tamil groups, too, be involved in the process?
A: Of course, the other groups and the Indians should be involved. But first let us listen to the Tigers. There must be room for groups such as the EPRLF to join the process, for various reasons they opted to lay faith in the Provincial Councils, but their functioning has led to a big credibility gap where the Tamil people are concerned. There is also a lot of emotion over their involvement with the IPKF and the calibre of some of their cadres. There is bound to be some bloodshed because of these enmities even if the Tigers enter the political process, but these can be resolved and a consensus arrived at. But the immediate priority is to include the LTTE in the democratic process and then to work out our differences at a later stage.
SMAIN AMIS TO SEND E IPKF OUT - EPRLF
Clocktower Road, spokesman, Rajan loubts about the oming forward for Government. He to “manipulate the en the Sri Lankan ments'
interview: nk the LTTE sud
e taks? s to send the IPKF with the Provincial hink the Sri Lanko wants this and is have been sum
Tigers are sincere
tiated settlement?
e, they should talk nment, too as they ndo-Lanka accord. ave discussed with ich is the only way It is only then that F to go away.
e EPRLF view the
st for show, so we portance to them. nt IPKF offensive rs very weak. To that their leaders eps also they have ks. Otherwise the mbers would have realized that the to continue fight
their search for
Eelam. The constant living in the jungles, the continued fighting have all contributed to this drop in morale. Their leaders want to show that something else is being done.
They are manipulating the contradictions between the Sri Lankan and Indian Governments on this issue but they should realize they cannot do this at the international level on agreements already signed between countries. Q: But do you welcome this move for negotiations? A: If they come forward democratically by laying down their arms we would welcome it. But we know the Tigers want a dictatorship among the Tamil people; they want sole authority in administration and this we cannot allow. They also can't face the Tamil people. They have put fear into the people and that is how they want to rule. Q: Is it through fear that they have succeeded in crippling civil adminstration? A: Yes, this had badly affected development work and caused suffering among the people which we have tried to alleviate through the Provincial Council. But here again the powers of the Council have yet to be dovolved properly and once this is worked out we can provide a better future for all people. We must first enjoy the fruits of what we have achieved by the establishment of the Councils without continuing to fight.

Page 16
16 TAM TIMES
MAHARAJAPURAM SANTHANAM, the well known Carnatic vocalist gave a benefit concert at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 10th April in aid of the Sangeetha Abivrudhi Sabha. The concert took place under the patronage of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad.
☆ ☆ ☆
SHRIMATH D.K. PATTAMMAL, the celebrated singer of Tamil Nadu who turned seventy in April, maintained her reputation for classical purity when she rendered five “kritis' of the Carnatic musical trinity at Sastry Hall in Madras on April 7.
女 女 女
ARCHANA, the Tamil actress who won the best actress award for her role in Ceylon-born BaluMahendra's film "Veedu" last year, won the coveted honour for the second time this year in a Telugu film 'Dasi'.
女 女 女
MR. V.K. RAMAMURTHY, M.P. has taken over as the Tamil Nadu Congress- chief from Mr. G.K. Moopanar. Mr. Ramamurthy has been a known critic of Mr. Moopanar and a staunch advocate of a Congress- alliance with the AIADMK led by Ms. Jayalalitha.
女 女 女
SANMUGAM KUGATHASAN, of Triyayai, Trincomalee and joint Secretary of the Organisation of Eelam Refugees Rehabilitation (OfERR), Egmore, Madras, was married to Padma Kothandaraman of Thanjavur district, India, at a civil registration in Madras on 10th April. A felicitation lunch was held the same day at Matsya Restaurant, Egmore.
Continued from page 15
We are for all people, Tamil, Sinhala and Muslims, they are all human beings and we want to bring peace to all of them. Q: So why can't you get the civil administration working again without disruption? A: For this the public servants, too, are to be blamed. They seem to enjoy these enforced holidays and the excuse they usually give is that they do not know whether they are working for the Central Government or the Provincial Council. But once the present devolution problems are sorted out we will be in a position to clearly lay down their duties and get them to work for the people.
We also need a strong counterforce to stop the current indiscriminate killing by the LTTE. The police do not co-operate enough in this work, in restoring law and order.
They don't appear to be interested enough, even if their seniors are. We can't expect the IPKF to do these duties, either, so we have to have the Civilian Volunteer Force. They should be able to contain the terror tactics adopted by the LTTE. Q: How weak do you think the LTTE is?
Miruthangam
*1
Gopinathan son of Sri of 261 Bedwell Cresce had his Miruthangam A. at the London Sri Muru E12. The temple was pi the recital was under John Marr.
Gobi on the Miruthan rent to the farrious s. Sivanesan. The other Gobi's Guru Sri Rasiah gist of repute - on the on Morsing, Gobi's grau mugam, who had trave Singapore for this functic Sri Baluji Srivastava on ranne Started with Varr various pieces which ample opportunity to di superb renderings that was quite at ease with gave the impression miruthangist. The parer musicians in their own gratulated on the intere promote another artist family.
A: We know they ar there have also been have forcibly recruit in the Wanni jungle families of CVF me from outlying village other members of the for them.
G: One of the cri against your group i truly represent the Tamils. What do you
A: That is not true results of the Provin tions where we were a a contest. No one car proper election since observers, including abroad who were p remarkable victory, circumstances, and what the Tigers thin know we were duly e Q: How, then, do victory of Balakuma general election? A: He won on the ur he would be able to into the political proc Jaffna thought he co has not happened yet See.
 
 
 

MAY 1989
Arangetram
& Smit Ranganathan nt, Stevenage, Herts rangetram on 22.4.89 gan Temple, London acked to capacity and the patronage of Dr
gaт was accompaninger Smit Sivasakthi
accompanists were Balasri - a miruthan3Gadam, Sri Sivarajah ndfather Sri P. Shanlled all the way from on, on the Ganjira and
the Sitar. The progam and went through provided Gobi with splay his skill in the night. Above all, he his instrument and
of a full fledged its Who are talented right, should be const they had taken to e blosson in their
e very weak, but reports that they ed new members s. They threaten mbers who come es and then force ir families to fight
ticisms leveled s that you do not interests of the say to this? . You know the cial Council elecappointed without say it was not a there were many journalists from resent. It was a considering the we do not care k about this. We lected. you explain the r's group in the
derstanding that bring the Tigers ess. The people of uld do it but this as far as we can
The Institute of Tamil Culture
The institute of Tamil Culture based in Surbton, UK, celebrated its Third Birthday on 23rd April '89 at the Surbiton Assembly Rooms. attended by well over 450 people. The programme included singing, dancing, instrumental music (Veena) and a play performed by children and adult pupils of the lnstitute.
The Chief Guest of the function was Mr. A.T.S. Ratnasingham, Chief Co-ordinator of the Shree Ghanapathy temple, Wimbledon. He spoke of the importance of MotherTongue teaching and the preservation of cultural identity while integrating with the host community.
Classes are conducted every Saturday between 9am and 1pm at the Knollmead Primary School, Tolworth, Surrey. About 60 pupils, children and adults are attending classes in Tamil Language, Vocal music. Veena and Miruthangam and Bharatha Natyam. For further information please contact: KJegatheeswaran, Headmaster-Tel: 01-949 30f2 W. Thayalan, Administrator- Tel: 01-399 7848
international Tamil
Organisation
The above organisation was inaugurated on 17.3.89 and Mr Anton Jones Singarayar, the proprietor of Antons was elected president at a meeting held at its headquarters at 15A St.Johns Road, Wembley, Middx, U.K. It has plans to (a) publish a monthly magazine named Oli' in Tamil and English. The first release will be on 22.7.89 followed by a concert at Copland Community School, Cecil Avenue, Wembley, Middx. (b) open a library for the exclusive use of Tamils living in U.K.
(c) hold four concerts a year to promote Tamil
culture (d) open branches in India, Sri Lanka, Canada, Norway and other places where Tamils reside in large numbers. Those in
terested are requested to get in touch with the
Headquarters Tel:01-9033249
Continued from page 9
If as they profess, the people are their main concern, then the groups have to come together to forge a common leadership get down to the priority issue of rehabilitation and reconstruction of the war-ravaged NorthEast region, and get a normal civilian adminstration functioning. That is what the people need as of now.

Page 17
MAY 1989
ELEMENTS OF IGNORA NON-FUNCTIONING OFF
While there is some publicity given to the difficulty faced by Provincial Councils, the general impression is that they are functioning. In a very formal sense, they are. There were elections; Chief Ministers and others have been appointed; and periodic pronouncements are made of their intended activities.
In actual fact, perhaps none of the Provincial Councils are really functioning. One almost got the impression of a cosmetic process in the setting up of the Southern' Councils with emphasis on the fact that they were a political commitment and must be willy nilly set up. Even the North-East Provincial Council, for whose sake the whole idea, in recent political background, started is struggling to work.
No money, no offices
From the beginning, when the first elections to the Southern Councils were held, the Councils found themselves meeting in hotels, Town Halls, other public places and anywhere else except at the Kachcheris where they should have. They were looking for staff when such staff were already there under the Government Agents and those local Heads of Ministries which had provincial offices. They had no finances worth speaking of provided for them beforehand, when all the provincial finances were already flowing through the Kachcheries and Reggional Officers of the Ministries concerned. Even their functions set out in List I of the Schedule to the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution were not available to them along with their installation, for they were with the G.As and Regional Heads of Offices. The more so in the case of the shared functions under List III. Meanwhile, conferences continued to be held at the Centre to identify these functions.
In a sense all this was due to the fact that neither the Government beginning from 1987, nor the other participants really had a clear idea of what Devolution was (as distinct from decentralisation or de-concentration), having in fact, up to that year, not gone much beyond the idea of District Councils in their thinking.
In other words, when the decision to accept the Provincial Council system was made, there was little intellectual understanding or political awareness of what Regional or Provincial Councils really were. In an article entitled The National Question - District Councils, Development Councils & All That' published in a leading local journal on 1 March 1984, this writer had strongly emphasised the difference between Local Government (Decentralisation) and Devolution, and spelt out
by Prof. C. Sur
clearly the scope a gional Councils in s Strangely, for a present problem Provincial Councils to the ideas of S.W. not of the time of s political exigencies Bandaranaike-Ch. days and the "pre-C solution finding.
As early as the ea anaike had spelt replacement of th cheries and gover elected Regional ( G.As becoming thei
Meaningful
The Councils wo administration of such central functio toms etc. would sim other countries - in be in charge of off the concerned Minis The Scheme was name of ‘effective” di volution), establish ful democracy and ger economic and at the periphery. early for their day decades, as later eve and we found oursel “too little too late' non-functioning Prc
What the Provin in order to start fun cit in what we hav Provincial Councils on four pillars, nam
(a) Secretariat; (b) Staff; (c) Functions; anc (d) Finance. What should hav with the very first Elections - and sho now — was to provi to take over their convert the Govern keeping their ‘ser tact) into Secretarie taries of the Counci all staff of the Ka gional Offices of those in charge of like Customs, Excis List I and List II Councils against being performed b. and Regional Office designate the funds ployed to those two Provincial Council ! Necessary refine
elaboration on futu] of the above can th

TAM TIMES 17
\NCE AND PRETENCE - PROVINCIAL COUNCILS
"iyakumaran
und content of Reuch a context.
m answer to our of non-functioning , we must go back R.D. Bandaranaike, eeking solutions to , but to the preelvanaykam Pact 'ommunal' phase of
arly-1940’s Bandarout a scheme for e (colonial) Kachnment Agents by Councils with the Ir Secretaries.
Devolution
uld take over the the Regions; and ons as Excise, Cusply function - as in different offices to icials appointed by stries at the Centre. conceived in the ecentralisation (dement of a meaningpromotion of stronsocial development His ideas were too 7, by years if not 2nts began to show, ves coming up with antil we now have vincial Councils.
cial Councils need ctioninig are impli'e said so far. The
structure depends Lely,
e been done along Provincial Council ald at least be done de for the Councils area Kachcheries; ment Agents (while vice' conditions in s/Additional Secrels; absorb similarly chcheries and ReMinistries (except Central functions e etc.); Identify the I functions of the functions already y the Kachcheries s of Ministries; and s already being detypes of offices as funds.
ments, or further re expansion of any len wait and follow
conveniently, in the light of experience and needs. Immediately, the foregoing steps would have set the Councils not only going but moving smoothly into taking over Provincial responsibilities. After all, Provincial functions are precisely those performed in the provinces; and these are already there in the Kachcheries and Regional Offices of the Ministries.
One must hope that the above approach will be implemented even at this stage. Else, the Provincial Councils, especially the North-East Council, may cease to provide the answers to the issues for which they were created.
And then, it may once more be "too late'. It is as if there have been elements of ignorance or pretence, or both, in what has happened so far.
JAFFNA GOVT. AGENT
SHOT DEAD
M. Panchalingam, Government Agent for the Jaffna District in northern Sri Lanka, was shot dead by a youth wielding an AK-47 rifle on 1 May at his brother's residence at Nallur. He had 23 bullets pumped into him, 8 in the head.
Mr Panchalingam, accompanied by his family, had been visiting his brother. Three persons had called at the brother's house apparently to make sure he was there and left. Shortly thereafter, a young person entered the house carrying a parcel in his hand. When he was asked to leave the parcel outside before entering the house, the youth pulled out the weapon. Mr Panchalingam fearing that he was going to be the target, jumped out and attempted to run. The gunman chased and shot him several times as the victim ran.
Mr. Panchalingam, aged 55, joined the civil service in 1957. He served in Mannar, Kandy and Vavuniya districts before he was posted as Additional Government Agent, Jaffna in 1979. He was appointed Government Agent in 1984 and served in the Jaffna district during very difficult and troubled times until his murder. Four months ago, he was offered a transfer to Colombo as Additional Secretary to the Ministry of Rehabilitation, but he declined the offer prefering to serve in Jafna.
The LTTE has claimed responsibility for the killing of Mr. Panchalingam. Although he was reputed to have had cordial relations with the LTTE in the past, he had fallen foul of the LTTE in having, as Government Agent, helped in organising the February general elections and for attempting to make his offices function for five days a week.

Page 18
18 TAMIL MES
 

MAY 1989
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Page 19
MAY 1989
LTTE-PREMADASA TALKS
DECCAN HERALD April 26, 1989
A Happy Augury
The Chasm that divides the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is so wide that the talks between them, expected to begin this week, cannot yield quick results. But the mere fact that the two sides whose known positions offer little common ground have agreed to enter into negotiations is a happy augury. President Ranasisnghe Premadasa's administration is deeply committed to the preservations of Sri Lanka's unity as any before it. The LTTE stills swears by the concept of a separate Tamil State of Eelam. What has brought them together is their common - and legitimate - desire to end the Indian military presence in the North-Eastern Province. After nearly two years of warfare by the Indian army units, inducted as a peace-keeping force, peace still eludes the island. What is more, apprehensions of an Indian Vietnam, voiced by critics, are beginning to acquire an air of reality as our jawans, deployed to liquidate the LTTE cadres, are bogged down in a jungle war with an invisible enemy.
Evidently New Delhi has no clue as to how it can pull out the troops without losing face. In his address to army commanders on Monday, the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, spoke of the task of "thinking seriously of getting back the bulk of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force from Sri Lanka as soon as possible while preserving the gains that have been achieved'. This statement raises two questions. Firstly, has the Government come to the conclusion that a total withdrawal is out of question? Secondly, what are the gains which have been achieved and are worth protecting? The basic objective behind the India-Sri Lanka accord was devolution of powers to provincial councils as a means of meeting the political aspirations of the Tamils. Amidst the preoccupation with the military campaign against the LTTE, which at one stage, it was willing to project as the sole representative of the island's Tamils, the Indian establishment neglected to exert itself fully to secure this objective. Now, on Mr. Gandhi's own admission, the quality of devolution remains unsatisfactory. The Tamils of the island may not see the installation in Trincomalee of a provincial government which enjoys New Delhi's patronage as a gain worth protecting.
While the Government of India has formally voiced support for the dialogue between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, it has not done anything to help the cause. It did not even order a cease-fire to coincide with the one ordered by Colombo as a goodwill gesture on the occasion of the Sinhala and Tamil new years. It must adopt a more positive approach to be able to secure legitimate Indian interests.
The Tamils are the lesser of the problems facing Mr. Pramadasa. The Sinhala extremists under the banner of the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna have not responded to his offer of talks. While the JVP persists in its present course, peace must remain a distant prospect.
INDIAN EXPRESS April 26, 1989
AT LAST
The Prime Minister has at last acknowledged the need to withdraw the bulk of the IPKF from Sri Lanka as soon as possible. This marks a welcome departure from official thinking so far on this issue. The fact that under the Indo-Sri Lanka peace agreement the Indian troops were to

TAM TIMES 19
INDIANMEDIA REACTIONS
remain in that country as long as its government desired did not mean that New Delhi had renounced the right to take a decision in this regard on its own. Yet, manner in which the IPKF has so far been deployed and the political provisions envisaged in the agreement have been implemented suggested that the Indian government was virtually proceeding on precisely such an assumption. In fact even the new announcement made by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi may not have been prompted entirely by a thorough reassessment of the earlier policy on which the bilateral pact was based. It is more than likely that pressure from President Premadasa in one form or other has played no small role in the decision to hasten the withdrawal of the IPKF.
As is well known, Mr. Premadasa had viewed with misgivings his predecessor, Mr. Jayewardene's reliance on the IPKF to tame the Tamil Tigers. Even if he had not displayed a striking antipathy towards India, it would have been prudent for New Delhi to plan, right from the outset, a total withdrawal of the IPKF at the earliest possible opprotunity. For the IPKF did not go to the Tamildominated northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka to establish idyllic peace and harmony there. It's severely limited task of overcoming the armed resistance of the Tamil militants to being disarmed under the Indo-Sri Lankan peace pact was soon forgotten. This indeed is why it has found itself in an anomalous situation following the new twist which Mr. Premadasa has now given to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. He clearly wants to strike a deal with the LTTE. Both he and the LTTE leaders apparently give the highest priority to the withdrawal of the IPKF. Speculation is rife in Colombo that the two sides may even try to reach some understanding on the future set-up in the north and the east.
All this has revived long-standing feuds between the Jaffna Tamils. The LTTE has mainly drawn its support from them and the other Tamils in the east, and between the Tamils and the Muslims in these areas. The seriousness of the resultant tension should not be minimised. From New Delhi's point of view, the worst part of this situation is that the IPKF is being increasingly drawn into clashes between rival groups. It, for instance, had to enforce a curfew in Kalmunai, the scene of a communal clash, for four days. And the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister and Minister of State for Defence, Mr. Wijeratne had no compunction in calling upon the IPKF to close the local offices of the EPRLF, ENDLF and TELO. This should be none of the IPKF's business. It is not a police force to be used by the Sri Lankan authorities as they please. If the Indian jawans and officers are not to be the helpless victims of an ethnic free-for-all in Sri Lanka any longer, all of them must be withdrawn without further dithering.
THE HINDU 21 April 1989
A new twist in Sri Lanka
The political reality must be faced that the Premadasa administration in Sri Lanka is engaged in some kind of confused, but active and even adventurous exercise of wriggling out of the core political commitments that are laid down by the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement signed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the then Sri Lankan President, Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, on July 29, 1987. Responding to vague overtures from Colombo, the LTTE has publicly suggested that the two antagonistic Sri Lankan political players - one chauvinistic Sinhala, the

Page 20
20 TAMIL TIMES
other extremist Tamil - have a common interest today in moving India, and its interests and role, out of the arena. This is a very strange turnaround in the LTTE well-known intransigent course and it makes no sense at all except as an indicator or expression of a significantly weakened politico-military position imposed on it by the IPKF's operations over them. Otherwise, there would be no rationality at all in the drama of uncompromising fighters for "Tamil Eelam' repairing to the abode of the "national enemy' in the openly expressed hope of doing a deal at the expense of India and its perfectly legal and legitimate role ensured by a bilateral Agreement which cannot be changed or altered unilaterally. (The slippery slope that the Tigers have travelled in their hunt for “Eelam” can be indicated with reference to two dramatically different political signposts. On August 4, 1987, Mr. V. Prabakaran, the LTTE, chief, told his people: "I do have faith in the straightforwardness of the Indian Prime Minister and I do have faith in his assurances ... We love India. We love the people of India. There is no question of our deploying our arms against Indian soldiers. The soldiers of the Indian Army are taking up the responsibility of safe-guarding and protecting us against our enemy . . . However, I do not think that as a result of this Agreement, there will be a permanent solution to the problem of the Tamils. The time is not very far off when the monster of Sinhala racism will devour this Agreement. On April 11, 1989, the LTTE's Political Committee said in an "open letter' to Mr Premadasa: “You may go ahead and mortagage the birthright of the Sinhala people. But we will not mortgage the rights of the Tamil people to anybody . . . Until the oppressive Indian Army leaves'our land, there will be no such thing as a ceasefire. And after they leave, you will come to recognise that in the island of Ceylon there are two nations. And after that, we will need neither war nor ceasefire.' The concluding note must be recognised as one of the more bizarre policy statments of recent months.
Official India has correctly made it clear that it has no objection to any talking exercise, and indeed wishes it well - provided the aims, objectives and content are in keeping with the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, which must be seen essentially as an instrument for helping the process of ending armed ethnic strife in the island and healing the deep wounds, for providing a decent measure of autonomy or devolution of power to the historically oppressed Tamils within the framework of Sri Lankan unity, and for taking care if India's legitimate and democratic foreign policy interests in the region. But what official India must tell its own people clearly is that it has not been consulted fairly and constructively by Colombo and its concurrence cannot be taken for granted. India's interests certainly call for a reduction of the heavy military burden and for the disengagement of the IPKF on a phased and deliberate basis (within a realistic time frame) but this doesn't mean that the positive result of a yet-to-be completed process can be undone or messed up in the bargain. What New Delhi must make clear to Colombo at this tricky juncture is that the devolution package must be seriously and honestly implemented, that there must be no cheating or shortchanging on the exercise, that the elected Provincial Government led by the EPRLF and defended by the IPKF must be respected and strengthened in the enormous task it faces; that the possibility of any future ethnic strife targeting the Tamils must be credibly ruled out; and that India's strategic concerns relating to the status and future of Trincomalee, the induction of mercenaries and so on in the island must be taken care of, as promised in the Agreement. Part of the challenge is bringing politicomilitary groups like the LTTE into the democratic mainstream and this must be understood to mean, especially in the light of the experience, that there are usually no easy options in historically mishandled situations. The Sri Lankan Government would do well to play straight with India, and the LTTE must realise that, even at this stage, it can come into the democratic mainstream - provided it

MAY 1989
decides strategically to give up arms and the desperate armed struggle, abandons the extremist goal of “Eelam” and makes peace with the civilised objectives of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.
THE STATESMAN April 28, 1989
Colombo scores a point
An unfortunate feature of India's neighbourhood diplomacy is the tendency to underestimate the intelligence and ability of others. If Mr Narasimha Rao's speech to the Lok Sabha on Wednesday suggested that New Delhi may be willing to reconsider its belligerence towards Nepal, the Prime Minister's address to a conference of defence personnel last Monday and the announcement of the Foreign Secretary's visit to Sri Lanka to negotiate the treaty of peace and friendship may be pointers to the fact that President Premadasa has managed to put himself in a favourable bargaining position. Ever since he assumed power last November, President Premadasa has been sounding out New Delhi on the need to reassess bilateral relations. First, Colombo has made it quite clear that it regards the presence of the IPKF as an obstacle to the process of normalization. Secondly, the Sri Lankan President has never gone back on his belief that the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of 1987 is an unequal treaty and ought to be replaced by an agreement that ensures greater reciprocity'.
Unfortunately, neither of the two proposals have met with a favourable Indian response. Against President Premadasa's election pledge that the IPKF ought to return home, New Delhi has replied tersely that there is no question of that happening. Although there has been a token withdrawal of the IPKF since last February's parliamentary election, India's real motives have become apparent with the inspired statement by the Chief Minister of the North-eastern province, Mr. Varadaraja Perumal, that the presence of Indian troops is necesary for the protection of Tamils. That Mr. Perumal's real concern is to ensure that his unrepresentative Government remains in power and is not exposed to LTTTE retaliation is another matter altogether. As for the proposed new treaty that was forwarded to New Delhi earlier this year, it has been gathering dust, and the visit by Mr. S.K. Singh marks a belated bid to assure Colombo that it has not been forgotten. The suggestion that the proposed treaty need not be at the cost of the existing accord is also an indication that New Delhi is looking for ways to inveigle itself out of a difficult predicament.
That the problems have arisen out of the LTTE's unexpected decision to open direct negotiations with Colombo is obvious. Ever since India began utilizing its 'good offices' to resolve the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, it has been wary of all direct negotiations between the Government in Colombo and the Tamil militants. It may be recalled that India has put inordinate pressure on Mr. V. Pirabhakaran, then in Madras, to rebuff the overtures from Mr. Lalith Athuylathmudali to settle directly in late-1986. Obviously, the LTTE does not suffer from any such inhibitions at present, for there is a growing awareness throughout Sri Lanka that unless the IPKF is sent back promptly, the Indian presence on the island might become permanent. Perhaps this is what Mr. Rajiv Gandhi meant when he spoke of preserving the gains of the accord, a possible hint that the EPRLF-run administration will be propped up to act on New Delhi's bidding. Unfortunately, such machinations cannot distract attention from the fact that yet one more of Mr.Gandhi's accords has gone awry. And all because India is loath to recognize the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of others.

Page 21
MAY 1989
PEOPLE 8 EVENTS
A DEBUT FOR TWO - TO REMEMBER. . .
She is only a little girl of ten, Selvi ANUSHA VARATHALINGAM is, but she occupied the stage effortlessly for 2% hours and kept the audience enthralled. As if this were not special enough, the occasion was her arangetram as a Bharatanatyam dancer.
In addition to this, it was also a debut for her Guru Smt. PADMINI GUNASEELAN, who has successfully trained her first student for her first public solo performance
East London has now seen an extremely capable Bharatanatyam teacher and a dedicated student. Anusha's arangetram took place on Sunday the 30th of April at Stratford's majestic civic hall, which was packed to full capacity.
The programme started with obeissance to Lord Ganesha, renover of all obstacles and Lord Nataraja - the Lord of Dance and proceeded onto the more elaborate items including a complete Varnam in Telugu. Although Anusha is very young, her maturity and the rapport with the content and the meaning of the dance was quite remarkable. Her abhinaya was very expressive and full of emotion. This climaxed in the Padams, where she was totally relaxed and clearly enjoyed the art of performing. By continuing to learn and love this art, there is no doubt that this young debutante dancer will become one of the promoters of our cultural heritage here.
Of course, Anusha owes it all to her Guru, Smt. Gunaseelan, who is unique in the UK as one of the few qualified Carnatic musicians and a Bharatanatyam dancer. She gained her Sangeetha Vidwan title from the prestigious Tamil Nadu College of Carnatic Music and obtained her Diploma in Dancing and Nattuvangam from Bharata Choodamani, the dance institute of Padmasri Adyar. K. Lakshman, who himself was a prodigy of Kalakshetra. Smt. Gunaseelan's vocal rendering and Nattuvangam were noteworthy. The enunciation of Jathis in a firm and commanding voice with timing to match on the cymbals, was almost as strong and powerful as the rendering of the traditional Nattuvanars.
The musical ensemble comprising of Smt. Renuka Shriananda as vocalist, Adyar Balu on the Mridangam, Smt. Kalaivani Indrakumar on the violin and Dr Nimairaj on the flute no doubt Contributed to the success of the evening's debut.
Dr (Smit) Manjubhashini Sivanathan.
G.W. Balasingam J Bar Association of S. Club. His helping hands To render any aid h His voice uvas aluvas His words uvere wis. Dear Appa, since yo The ones you loved Try hard to carry on We kneuw you would
Fondly loved and in May 14th by Premail in-law Dr. P. GO Sivanesan, grand C Kaartiga and Sanjey Greenford, Middx, U
Dr. P. Nadarajah, M Zambia Consolidate born 27.7. 1924, pas
He uvas our friend,
Urging us to do wh Never ruffled by pr. In his stride he tool He gave us directio, With a smile and a Bhagwan's teaching Compassion, love a We never lose the ol Even though they a Within the hearts o Their cherished me Үои иvere а тап so Whom we all miss Your everloving wif Daya, Vasuhi, Vana ter-in-law Shanistra grand daughter Ar Avenue, Barnes, L. O1-748 5884.
SA CA for all ★ Weddi yd ChiIdr k Dinne For more
Contact ( (Evenings &
 
 
 

TAMIL TIMES 21
EMORUM
.P.U.M., Vice President, ri Lanka, President Lions
vere aluvays first be could is raised in praise e and good и ијепt aиlay so true
n the way
want us to.
missed on your birthday a, Kumar, Renuka, Sonspalakrishnan, Dr. S. hildren Dharshi, Sashi, - 4 Rose Hill Gardens, .K.
Officer-in-Charge, d Copper Mines, Lusaka, 'sed away 18.5, 1988 philosopher and guide at uvas right oblems big or small
them all n as we needed pat and never a shout is he did follow nd patience throughout
es uve love
re gone
f those who care mory lives on noble and great and will never forget. 2 Saras, children Mano, ia and Vathsala, daughson-in-law Subhas and Ouska. - 7 Clavering ondon SW13 9DX, Tel:
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FORTHCOMING EVENTS
The London Veena Group presents Veena recitals by Arunthathy Srikantha Rajah June 3 7.30pm Longsight Community Hall, Manchester M14 June 17 7.30 pm The Benn Hall, Rugby June 18 7.30pm Trinity Arts Centre, Trinity Street, Gainsborough. June 257.30pm Spring Street Theatre, Hull for details Tel: 01543.2126/672 0603
At Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 4A Castletown Road, London W14 9HQ. Tel: 01-381 3036/ 4608 June 9 7.30 pm Musical concert by Pandit Bhimsen Joshi with musicians from India June 198.00pm Whole night concert of North Indian Classical Music
June 24 6.30 pm Tamil Orphans Trust presents Children's Variety Performance at the Copland Community School, Cecil Avenue, Wembley, Middx, U.K. For further information Tel: 01-422 0012/908 6221/550 7439

Page 22
22 TAMIL TIMES
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HOUSE TO LET Three bed roomed house, two separate reception rooms, could be shared, Standard Road, Hounslow West. Telephone: 01-868 6709.
WEDDING BELS
We congratulate the following couples on their recent marriage. r Amaranath Son of Mr. and Mrs. V.R. Amarasingham, Ibadan Grammar School, Ibadan, Nigeria and Chandrini daughter of Mr. and Mrs. L.B. Tambyrajah, 85 Rakka Road, Chundikuli, Jaffna, Sri Lanka on 22.3.89 at Bible Life Holiness Ministry, Ibadan, Nigeria. Buvanendran son of Mr. and Mrs. Sivapalan, 348 Strucewood Court, Scarborough, Ontario, Canada and Ushananthy daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Yogarajah, 37 Eastcote Road, South Harrow, Middx., U.K. on 1.5.89 at Highgate Murugan Temple, London N6. Rajasingham son of Mr. and Mrs. Rajavailaban, Vidanai Valavoo, Manipay, Sri Lanka and Nirmala daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Samynathan, 30/4 Dharmalingam Avenue, Koddady, Jaffna, Sri Lanka on 6.5.89 at Sri Ghanapathy Temple, London SW19.
Harindran Son of Mr. and A of 64 Temple Road, Kokuv. and Jeyahini daughter of Gnanasoorian, 72 King Ed O E17 Ori 4.5.899 at H Temple, London N6.
Thavendrarajah son of Murugesu, lrupalai, Kopay Janani daughter of Dr & A nathan, 34 Pannankade Lan 15.489 at Hotel inter Conti Sri Lanka.
FUNERAL
S. Sabapathipillai (78), C! Hindu Temple Trust passed Cremation at Golders Gre Hoop Lane, London NM 28.5.89 at 12 noon.
OBITUAR
Mrs Rosebele Ranee Ra Niles beloved wife of Mr. C. (former Supervisor, Jaffn: School), mother of Sugant jini, Suvendrini & Lakshma Jaffra of? 13.4.89.
Arumugam Rajapadchar ann, Sri Lanka, retired beloved husband of Rajes of Vamanadevi, Silojanac cham, Visvapadcham, Ya padcham, Rajinidevi an father in law of Paskaran, manathan, Ganesakum, Pushpa, loving grandf Theepan, Sinthuja, Jeyan passed away on 31.3.89
Tel 01-646 5432.
S. Sabapathy (80) Re Schools, beloved husbar father of Sabanadesan nathan (W. Germany Sabanesan (both of S nayagam, Sabaratnam (b nanawathy (Sri Lanka) Sa Sangarapillai (Sri Lanka Thanaluxmi, Saraswathy, (Jaffna Hospital), Saku lade vi, Mangayarkkar (Karainagar Hindu Colleg Sivamalar passed a W. 12.5.89 at Karainagar, St ton Way, Edmonton, Lon.
 
 
 

Mrs. P. Nadarajah il East, Sri Lanka Mr. and Mrs. K. ward Road, LOnghgate Murugan
Mr & Mrs A Sri Lanka and Mrs S Sanmugae, Colombo. 6 on nental, Colombo,
airman, Brittania away on 17.5.89. en Crematorium, /11 on Sunday,
Y
tmasingham nee „R. Ratnasingham a College Lower hi Virasinghe Ran passed away in
,یس &&
n (7u) oli ChuipurDirector of Works, wari, dearest father devi, Easwarapadrinidevi, Srirangad Rudrapadcham; Gopalan, Kathirgaar, Nanthini and ather of Bobby, hi, Visakan & Hari - Sri PR. PadChann
tired inspector of ld of Sivapackian, (Canada), Saba), Sushi lawathy, Sri Lanka), Sabaoth of U.K.), Sivagbendran (U.K.) and ), father-in-law of Vinayagamoorthy nthaladevi, Viimaasi, Thuraisarmy le), Yasodhara and ay peacefully on i Lanka. - 9 New
on N18 1 JB.
MAY 1989
Murugesapillai Somasundaram (Retired Deputy Director, General Treasury, Sri Lanka), beloved husband of Parasakthy, loving father of Sarojini (Holy Family Convent, Colombo), late Sivakumar, Dr. Sakthikumar (France), Srikumar (State Plantations, Sri lanka), Skandakumar (George Steuarts, Sri Lanka), Sivasakthy (U.S.A.), Shivani and Subodhini; father-in-law of Brigadier Balaretnarajah, Christine (France), Rohini, S. Kanagaratnam (Hong Kong), S.M. Ramanathan (U.S.A.) and G.R. Pathmaraj (Universal Marketing, Sri Lanka); grandfather of Anusha, Arjuna, Brahman, Sabine, Ajanta, Asita, Shivanthi, Mehala, Yuthistran and Prithiviraj expired on 22.4.89 in his residence, 26, Castle Lane, Colombo 4, Sri Lanka.
Dr Nadarajah Vijendran (45) J.P. Ayurvedic Hospital, Kaithady, Sri Lanka Human Rights Activist, popularly known as Puspalingam, son of the late Dr Arasapillai Nadarajah J.P., former Deputy Mayor, Jaffna and the late Mrs E. Nadarajah, former Registrar of Marriages, beloved husband of Vimala, father of Janakan, Jeyanthan, and Jananee, brother of Ganendran (Burton-on-Trent, U.K.) and Mrs Chandra Shanmugalingam (Sri Lanka); sonin-law of Mr. S. Kanagaratnam J. P.U.M. Chairman, S.L.T.B. Northern Region, passed away on 18.4.89 under tragic circumstances in Jaffna - 6 Tideswell Green, New Hall, Burton-on-Trent, U.K. Tel 0283 223626.
IN MEMORIUM
Mrs Ratnadewi Mandalanayagam Chunnakam, Sri Lanka. Born 11.1.1918. Passed away 17.5.89. Your love and affection we shall ever Cherish. Sadly missed and fondly remembered by her children, grandchildren, sons-in-law and daughters-in-law.
Mrs. Grace David Aseervatham BOrr: 29.8. 197 7
Called to rest: 105.89
“BLESSED ARE THE DEAD, WHICH DIE
IN THE LORD
ReU.14:13
Sadly missed and fondly remembered by children, Rev. Arulnathan, SriNathan, Kirubaimalar, Thavamalar, Amirthamalar, Devamalar, and Thiviamalar; sons in law: Joseph, Truman, and Tony; daughters in law: Victoria and Esther, grandchildren, Samuel, Malathy, Kalamohan, Christine, Marcus, Karen, Michelle, Jonathan and Joanna.

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