கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Tamil Times 1995.12

Page 1
Wo XIW No.12 ISSN 0266-4488 15 DEC:
E. 一皇 Displaced: A Tamil refugee bringing her sick child to a
k Battle for Jaffna - Only
a Temporary Setback - LTTE leader
k The Language of and Bloodletting
Coloning Attico
es :
* The EScalating War
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

ANNUAL SUSCIRT Unes
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הזדהה במחים
Negotiated Son Tarang Political & Military Objectives of the Jaffna Offensive
NIET TEITE
A Tamil Nadu Wakes Up
on Lankan Tamil issue

Page 2
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Page 3
15 OECEMBER 1995
do not agree with a word
of What you say, but tl |
defend to the death your ight to say it.
– Voltaire,
ISSN 0266-4488
VOXIV NO.12 15 DECEMBER 1995
Published by
TAMIL TIMES TD P.Ο. ΒOX 121 SUTTON, SURREY SM13TD UNITED KINGOOM
Phone: 0181-644 O972 Fax: 0181-241 4557
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CONTENTS
NeWS Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Battle of Jaffna - Only a Temporary Setback. . . . . . . . . . . .4 Govt. Still Committed to a Negotiated Solution. . . . . . . . . . . 6 Muted Celebration Marks "Capture of Jaffna'. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Only Substantial Devolution Will Convince Tamils. . . . . . . • • • • • • v 13 The Escalating War. . . . . . . . . . . 15 Political & Military Objective of Govt. 's Jaffna Offensive. . . . . . . 16
Sri Lanka Unlikely to see Peace in Near Future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Sub-Continental Scene. . . . . . . . 22 The Language of Belonging & Bloodletting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Book Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Calm before the absence of the usu government force northern Sri Lar matter for worry security circles in first week of Dece 'capture' of Jaff forces, there appea lull on the milita Riviresa' formally December and sin army nor the LTT major attacks on north.
A military spok relative calm acros ern areas meant th were getting ready jor. “This silence b good. They have regain credibility v by losing Jaffna. T ing for some mas lated military post jor or spectacular, Meanwhile secul sified in Colombo a fears of revenge at Parliament's publi on the order of the ity reasons. The pc the people to be looking persons or carrying out a thc vehicles going to embattled Northea is also reported to creation of secul state-run electroni and other sensitive
Police carrying routinely check re key road are cord checks have been ment offices and ir port, the port and capital. Houses, lo even work places a and searched for and in this proces living in Colomb victims of harass and detention.
Some Tamil sou the lack of any mi the Tigers in rece: the fact the Tigers their hands in se resettlement of th been evacuated f Wanni areas.
As Colombo rem cipation of the L analyst said, "It ma but it will certainly
 
 
 
 
 

TAM TIMES 3
Storm? : Even an al fighting between and the LTTE in ka seems to be a and concern among Colombo. Since the mber and after the na by government irs to be an unusual y front. "Operation came to an end on 2 ce then neither the E has launched any
each other in the
esman said that the s the island's northlatthe Tamil Tigers r for something maby the LTTE is not to do something to which they have lost hey must be preparsive attack on isos or something ma
he said.
rity has been intennd its suburbs amid tacks by the Tigers. c gallery was closed Speaker for securlice have requested wary of 'suspicious packages' and are brough check of all Colombo from the st. The government be considering the ity zones around c media institutions
establishments.
automatic weapons sident's papers and oned off. Stringent initiated at governstallations, the airentry points to the lges and hotels and re constantly raided
suspected "Tigers' s the Tamil people ) are often made ment, intimidation
ces speculated that itary operations by ht days was due to
have a full job on king to assist the e people who have 'om Jaffna to the
ains tense in antiTTE backlash, an y not happen soon,
happen. When the
EWS REVIEW
Tigers strike, they make it count for something.
Evacuation of Civilians: No one anticipated that the LTTE would encourage the evacuation of the civilian population from Jaffna in the face of the military offensive.
Was the evacuation of civilians enmass from Jaffna ever a part of the LTTE's military strategy? It would seem that they had no such plan and were taken aback by the quick and determined advance by the troops despite suffering heavy casualties. The Tigers did not encourage the people to leave so long as the troops remained at Pun na laika d du van, som e 1 0 kilometres from Jaffna town. However, when the troops advanced from Sirupiddy to Neerveli and then towards Kopay, alarm bells must have rung - had the troops gone from Kopay juction through Kaithady and based themselves at Navatkuli, the path to Thenmaradchi would have been blocked. Therefore, the moment the troops crossed Neerveli, the Tigers decided to evacuate the people before the path to Thenmaradchi was blocked.
“Eelanatham’ published from Kilinochchi has given an explanation as to why the Tigers asked the people to leave Jaffna: “We are engaged in fighting to resist the army's advance towards Jaffna. In this situation to protect our people from mass destruction it became necessary to evacuate them. In the present situation, the evacuation of the people is a historic duty. That duty has been accomplished by the Tigers. Because of this step, the people might have faced some difficulties. However, this step was inevitable. It is our responsibility to ensure that there is no obstacle to our counterattack and the people do not become victims of mass destruction.'
As if to underline that the evacuation of the people is not going to be temporary, most of the remaining civillian infrastructures also have been shifted. The Jaffna University has been shifted to Chavakachcheri Hindu College and to Kilinochchi, Jaffna Teaching Hospital to Manthikai in Point Pedro, branches of the Hatton National Bank, Commercial Bank and the Bank of Ceylon to Manthikai, Nelliady, Chavakachcheri, Meesdalai and Point Pedro. A statement from LTTE's London office stated that the Tigers have set up and opened a Bank of Tamil Eelam'. New account holders
Continued on page 9

Page 4
4 TAMIL TIMES
The Battle of Jaffna A Temporary Seth — V. Pirabhakä
The following is the text of the Martyr's Day M November by Mr. V. Pirabhakaran, the leader of t
Today is Martyr's Day, a sacred day in which we cherish the memory of our heroes who have sacrificed their precious lives for the cause of the freedom of our nation. Our martyrs have died for the liberation of this land so that our people could live in our land with freedom, dignity and security.
This is our land, the land in which we were born, grew and live, the land which bears the foot prints of our forefathers, the land in which our culture and history are rooted. Our martyrs have died for the objective that this land should belong to us. They have died for the cause of liberating this land from the shackles of alien domination and transforming it into an independent sovereign nation.
In the sacred war of liberating our homeland our heroes have made supreme sacrifices which cannot be described in words. Extraordinary deeds never before happened in the history of the world have taken place in this land, for the freedom of this land. The ideal dream, the spiritual yearning of those thousands of martyrs who have created this heroic legend will be actualised one day.
Today the war of aggression against our land by the enemy has reached a phenomenal scale. Having mobilised all its military power and having utilised all its national resources, the enemy has launched a massive invasion on the Jaffna soil. Our traditional land of ancient historical glory is being systematically destroyed by the enemy's firepower. The intense shelling that rains down unabatingly has wiped out the face of Jaffna. The fundamental objective of this war of aggression is to destroy the economic resources and the cultural heritage of Jaffna thereby uprooting the national life of the people. .
This war is not, as the government claims, against the LTTE. This war is against the Tamil people, against the Tamil Nation. The objective of this war is to destroy the Tamil Nation. This racist war of
Sinhala chauvini tory. It has been birth of the LTTE Chandrika's fath ka's government expression to th strategic objectiv annihilate the n the Tamils by di and property ar
eSOUCeS.
Wearing a pe: tending that she peaceful resoluti Chandrika was Sinhala people a assumed politic; taken the reins c a drama of peac extended our ha seeking a peace Tamil National ote the peace pr the prisoners of goodwill. During tions we neither gent conditions ) We requested C. ment to lift the and the restrict and to create con We requested t alleviate the sufi who have been sı difficulties witho of life. But Chan was not prepare these meagre c talks prolonged f period of six mot important fact - government was peace nor in a pe the conflict. Si given to miliary out the negotiat apparent to us t regime was se the military opti The monumen the invasion ha: Jaffna amply illu military objecti ment. The stra encirclement an densely populat Tamil homeland

15o LUUMBER 1995
- Only ack
2
ssage dated 27 le LTTE.
m has a long hisoing on before the . It was started by r. Now, Chandri
has given total s racist war. The of this war is to tional identity of stroying their life d their land and
ce mask and prewas committed to a on of this conflict, able to cheat the nd the world and al power. Having fpower she staged e negotiations. We ands of friendship ful solution to the Juestion. To promocess, we released war as a gesture of the peace negotiaput forward strinnor rigid demands. handrika's governeconomic embargo
ions on travelling
litions of normalcy. he government to ering of our people ubjected to extreme ut the basic needs lrika's government d to concede even incessions. As the uitlessly for over a ths we realised an
that Chandrika's
not interested in aceful resolution of nce primacy was concerns throughons it became very hat the Chandrika iously considering
.
tal scale in which been launched on strates the politicoe of the governJegy aims at the
occupation of the d vital area of the and to proclaim to
the world that Jaffna society is "liberated'. But this strategy of Chandrika's government has turned out to be a disaster since the people of Jaffna city and Valigamam region evacuated the area before the encirclement by the army. This massive exodus has demonstrated the fact that the people of Jaffna, in a unanimous stand, have expressed their opposition to the government war effort and absurd reasons attributed to it. This mass exodus has impressed upon the Sinhala Nation and the world that the people and the LTTE could not be separated. Therefore, the Chandrika regime has failed to achieve the political objective behind the Jaffna offensive.
We are relieved that our people have safely escaped from the military siege and the political trap behind it, yet we are deeply sad about the enormous suffering and pain they are subjected to as a consequence of this mass displacement. It distressed us deeply that our people have had to vacate their traditional villages where they lived for centuries and leave their houses, lands and property and become destitutes. Yet, we consider such tragic experience and suffering as a tremendous contribution by our people to the cause of national emancipation. This mass exodus proclaims to the world that our people are determined to live as free beings with self-dignity and that they are prepared to face any form of suffering to be independent rather than subjecting themselves to the domination of the aggressor.
The Sinhala military devils may hoist victory flags in depopulated Jaffna which has been reduced to rubble. The Sinhala chauvinistic gangs in the South may light crackers in jubilation assuming that they have captured the kingdom of Jaff. na. Chandrika may send peace signals believing that military hegemony has been achieved. In these circumstances we wish to make it absolutely clear that as long as the Sinhala army is occupying Jaffna the doors for peace will be firmly closed. The LTTE will not participate in the peace negotiations imposed at the point of a gun subjecting itself to military pressure. This is the message we wish to address to the Chandrika regime. It will be nothing other than political stupidity if the Chandrika government thinks that it can bring about peace and political settlement by occupying Jaffna and uprooting hundreds

Page 5
15 DECEMBER 1 yis
of thousands of people. The invasion of Jaffna is a gigantic historical blunder made by Chandrika's regime. As a consequence of this act the Colombo government has closed all avenues for peace and plunged the entire island into grave conflictual situation.
There is absolutely no truth in claims made by the government controlled media that the LTTE has suffered heavy casualties and that it has been weakened by the offensive on Jaffna. In the battle of Jaffna, we have neither suffered heavy casualties nor been weakened. It is the armed forces that have suffered more casualties than the LTTE.
We have fought efficiently within our capability against huge military formations with formidable manpower and firepower which advanced along a geographic terrain advantageous to them. Though we fought under extremely difficult and dangerous conditions we did not suffer heavy casualties. Neither our manpower nor our military structure is affected in anyway. The army's stategy to entice us into a conventional war to destroy our manpower did not work. In the battle of Jaffna we faced a set-back. It is a temporary set-back. We faced serious set-back during the Indian military occupation. But we were not defeated. In the end, it was the Indian army which faced defeat. Therefore, today's set-back will turn out to be a victory tomorrow.
Sri Lankan army has overstretched its feet on the Jaffna soil. It is not a difficult task to conquer territories by mobilising large formations of troops. But it will be a difficult task to hold the territories captured. This is the historical reality faced by the aggressive armies all over the world. The Sri Lankan army will soon learn this historical truth.
The Sri Lankan state is attempting to determine the political destiny of the Tamils on the basis of military power. It assumes that it can impose an inadequate solution on the Tamils by military hegemony and territorial aggression. Such a military solution underlies Chandrika's conception of 'war for peace'. Any Tamil with self-dignity will not accept such a solution. To frustrate this government's scheme and to advance our liberation struggle, we are left with only one alternative. We have to strengthen our military structure and intensify our struggle. It is only by strengthening the milit
ary power the determine their is only by stren ary power we co ity, we could gair we could return t
ne.
The task of bu power of the Tau come the ineviti cessity today. Th survival of the Nation has been cessity to struggl young generatior escape from this this call of history task will endang our Nation. The the younger gen liberation movem
“How lo
As the Sri Lank, uvrap up its offen LTTE’s Interna General Secretar kar, uvas confide eJafna uvould no back to the rebel Raman Nanda i telephone, Pari charged that Inc proxy var agains
How serious as you if Jaffna falls?
I don't see it a For the Sri Lank be a tactical adva the Jaffna penins tion is, how long territory. In doing to lose the easter very contested a hand, the govern tive is to kill mo sympathisers, ar tuals. But they ca people have fled f army. All the go was to kill civilia: bardments and a far as winning thi of the people is also it's a total fa
How long will it Jafna?
We are there. there. The gover be resisted every can say is, the g stay there for a limited number o deploy there inde

TAMIL TIMES 5
Tamils could freely political destiny. It gthening our milituld live with securour lost territories; o our homes as free
ilding the military mil Nation has beable historical neis is crucial for the amil Nation. Our
forced into a nee for survival. The ! of Tamils cannot national duty, from '. Any delay in this er the existence of efore, I call upon ration to join our ent without delay.
The earlier the youth join our move
ment the quicker we can achieve the
objectives of our struggle.
We call for the support and solidarity of the world Tamil community at this critical time when we are faced with a genocidal war all alone without any external assistance. We appeal to the people of Tamil Eelam living abroad to champion the cause of our struggle and assist us in all possible ways.
On this sacred day when we remember our martyrs who have sacrificed their lives for national freedom and attained historical immortality, let us pledge to commit ourselves to the cause for which thousands of our freedom fighters laid down their lives.'
ing can they hold Jaffna”
an Army sought to 'sive on Jaffna, the tional Committee y, Lauvrence Thila"nt that the fall of it be a serious setoutfit. Speaking to in London over the s-based Thilakar dia uvas uvaging a 't the Tamils.
Setback will it be for
s a setback for us. an military it will ntage, getting into ula. But the quescan they hold the ; so, they are going h area and that's a rea. On the other ment’s other objecre LTTE fighters, tists and intellecnnot do that as the rom the advancing 'ernment achieved ns by aerial bomtillery shelling. As hearts and minds concerned in that lure.
take you to reclaim
We will always be nment troops will inch. And what I overnment cannot ong time with the troops that it can initely.
Given the LTTE's recent setbacks, what kind of rethinking has been going on among the top leadership?
As a guerrilla organisation we have to continue with the guerrilla resistance as long as the Sri Lankan Army is in our areas and as long as they continue with the aggression and attacks on civilians.
Some time back, a ceasefire was broken off then there were indications that talks could begin.
I think the government shoud behave in good faith, which is not there. There are indications of a genocidal attack on the civilian population. I want all people, not only organisations like the UN, UNHCR and other international aid and media organisations, to be allowed into the area. Some kind of a genuine move must be undertaken by the government rather than merely paying lip service. On the ground, the government is doing everything contrary to what it says. The troops must withdraw to their earlier positions; people should be allowed to go back to those areas and the government should allow food and other things to reach them.
Are you concerned that under the present circumstances in Sri Lanka, Tamils may feel more inclined towards other Tamil parties?
These parties are on the payroll of the government. Even among these parties there are differences of opinion. For example, one party is working closely with the Sri Lankan
Continued on page 6

Page 6
6 TAM TIMES
“GOVt. Stil COmmi to a Negotiated Sol
- President Kumar
President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga ansuve tions on the offensive against the LTTE and the Governme settlement of the ethnic problem in an interview with C Observer of 26 November. This is a slightly abridged text
Question: Many people are wondering how it is that an army that was in difficulty for so many years has suddenly been so successful and transformed the military strategic situation in its favour in So short a time. After all, they are the same troops and the same generals. What do you think brought about the change?
Answer: I think it is clear political direction. One should not blame the army for the difficulties it went through in the past. Our forces had learnt their lessons and they knew what had to be done and what could be done. But they did not have the proper political direction. In the past they were under the direction of a corrupt regime and a discredited regime which had no clear vision of a solution to the ethnic problem. Our Government is implementing a political solution to the problem, not a military solution.
Our peace initiative has given us credibility in the eyes of all communities in the country and in the eyes of the world. With that confi
dence we have be decisive action to de of peace. Under the Deputy Defence M Anuruddha Ratwat operating with a ne and discipline. He h role in ensuring th military effort. Col. nothing to stand in efforts to provide w forces need. Given soldiers have done battlefield, our office the front. The succe tions is due to the ( and tireless work commanders and t entire world is watch march of our troops Q: The security have weakened the does this mean that Will now think pur pursuing a military S door open for negoti fain Conditions ?
A: We have mac
O continued from page 5
armed forces. The other party, EPDP, is working with the government. These people — after having served their use - may be thrown into the dustbin (by the government).
The LTTE denies responsibility for Rajiv Gandhi's killing. How do you explain India's indifferent attitude toWards the LTTE and a decline in support in Tamil Nadu?
India from the start wanted to manipulate things by setting up various groups and trying to impose a solution. India never wanted to recognise our right to selfdetermination. This is the basic problem. The Indian government is very secretly waging a kind of proxy war against us. It has some inner fear that the people in Tamil Nadu will react if it does so openly and there will be a backlash. India also
feels that if our determination is r the people of Tami react. That is the India working again gle. We have the p cide, we have a rig self-determination. Tamil Nadu, they fa lem. The situation i quite different from want India to treat lems differently, in pective. There is cooperation anc friendship between Centre as well as tl ment. (We have s earlier). India and can decide on their C instead waging a pro the Sri Lankan gove people of Tamil Nad down.
(Courtesy: Outloo,

T|5 UECEMIBER T995
tited ution atunga
red seυεται αιμesnt's attitude to the olombo's Sunday of the interview.
an able to take feat the enemies leadership of my inister, Colonel te, our forces are w determination as played a vital e success of our Ratwatte allows his way in his hat the security our backing, our wonders. In the ers have led from ess of the operacareful planning of our military heir staff. The hing the forward
force operations
LT TE militarily, the Government ly in terms of Olution Or is the ations under Cer
le it very clear
right to selfecognised, then Nadu will also main reason for 1st us, our strugroblem of genoht to assert for In the case of ce nosuch probn Tamil Nadu is
Sri Lanka. We these two proba diferent persa possibility of renewal of the LTTE, the he state governen cooperation he LTTE, they wn. But India is xy war through rnment, and the u are feeling let
2, 6.2.95).
that we recognise the fact that even if we defeat the LTTE totally, the problem is not over. There has to be a negotiated political solution.
O: But will you have a dialogue with the LTTE?
A: I have said earlier that we are ready for a dialogue under certain conditions that we will put forward in good time. We have indicated these conditions previously. We will be open to the LTTE to come forward to discuss with us, but only under very strict, well defined conditions. One condition is the laying down of arms, at least symbolically. A second condition is the beginning of political negotiations within a limited, specified time and, a third condition must be a commitment to the concluding of negotiations also within a specified time, either way.
O: Moves to resolve the national question in Sri Lanka took a long time coming and came about largely due to the application of countervailing military force by the Tamil nationalist movement. The country's political institutions, as well as the national political leadership, have shown in the past an inability to produce a solution. Moves to devolve power came about only after the pressure of the separatist insurgency, The pressure of the separatist insurgency has now been weakened, but do our political institutions have the capacity and will to continue with the devolution process without that pressure?
A: Yes, our Government does.
Q: But does the Sri Lankan political establishment, as a whole, have the capacity and the will to go ahead with the radical reform that is required and, indeed, that you have put forward in the package"?
A: Yes, I think so, I believe so.
Q: I am talking of the opposition parties as well.
A: Well even, if they don't, I think we are strong enough to carry it through.
Q: The devolution proposals are before the country at a time, right now, when the intensified war situation has noticeably changed the public mood. In the South, the success of the security forces offensive has seen a greater focus on military action. What kind of public response do you anticipate with regard to the devolution initiative?
A: I think that the people realie that, just as we are able to win the

Page 7
15 DECEMBER 1995
war, in order to successfully resolve the ethnic conflict, we must have a political solution. The majority of our people have clearly indicated that they have understood that success in the war does not mean that we have succeeded in overcoming the overall problem. Success in war means the military defeat of the LTTE. But success in war will not bring permanent peace until there is a political solution to the problems of the Tamil people. There must be a definite political solution if we are to definitely have peace.
Q: if the military successes have changed the public mood in the South is there a danger that there will be backsliding on the radical reforms proposed in the devolution package?
A: I don't think so. There will be some noise from the chauvinist groups who have suddenly come out of their hiding places, not having lifted a finger to help in this war which they have been promoting all the time. They have sent their sons abroad to study and to live overseas. They have not contributed five cents to the war efforts neither in money nor in work. Now they are raising their heads on the backs of the soldiers who have committed themselves so courageously and who have sacrificed their lives, and on our backs as we risk our own lives to solve this problem and bring peace. These chauvinist groups will make some noise. But I don't believe the people will be fooled by them, because the people know who they are.
Q: Have any foreign governments made any proposals for third party mediation? What is the Government response to such overtures?
A: There have been no specific offers, only general offers to help. At the moment foreign mediation is not on the cards. The international community has immense confidence in the peace initiative of the Government and our ability to carry it through.
Q: What is the Government going to do about the lange population of people who have been forcibly displaced by the LTTE in the Peninsula?
A: We are taking all measures to provide them with food, medicines, shelter and other immediate needs. We are doing this knowing full well that the LTTE is also grabbing some of these supplies as they have always been doing. When Operation Riveresa was launched we asked people to stay in their homes and
assured them that V them. We have mad to look after the p re-captured area. B the LTTE suddenly the people out of th civilians who have
south have told us forced the people ou LTTE is quite read the civilian popula sacrifice the civilia maintain their powe
Pompo
Q: Will you be taki the displaced people
A: That is indee doing. We want the back to the safety their homes. We a everything possible they can settle int lives in Jaffna and a have personally sup ting up of the minis which is now in reac restore civil adminis tore public utilities, ity, roads, distribu and also the reconst ings and other faci already set up a ne newly cleared area which is now servir around Jaffna. We schools and univers)
We are deeply co displaced population everything possible back as fast as p homes. We cannot a ruthlessly pushed LTTE. The interna ity has indicated it our humanitarian m assured the Govern) that is needed. In fa ent American hum ists I met in New recent visit asked 1 managed to change better in such a shon was that we had thi do what had to be d
The LTTE is doin internationally, but succeeded in persu ernment to support first time our emba active. We send the and they issue bul correct information tion here.
O: There has been with the completiol offensive and the tak

ve will look after le arrangements opulation in the ut as you know, acted to force ese areas. Many made their way
how the LTTE it of Jaffna. The y to manipulate tion. They will uns in order to
e.
sity
ng action to bring back to Jaffna?
d what we are peopleto come and comfort of ure going to do to ensure that io their normal all other areas. I pervised the setterial task force liness to quickly stration and ressuch as electriction of supplies ruction of buildlities. We have aw hospital in a outside Palaly ng cleared areas will re-start the ity. incerned for the and we will do to bring them ossible to their allow them to be around by the tional communts confidence in easures and has ment of any help ct some prominan rights activYork during my me how we had things for the rt time. My reply e political will to lone. g much lobbying , they have not ading any govt them. For the ssies abroad are em daily reports letins providing about the situa
speculation that Of the Current cing of Jaffna, the
TAMIL TIMES 7
Government will go for snap elections. Do you have any such intention?
A: We have no such intention. The people have given us a mandate to fulfil within our tenure in power. We intend to serve our full term and fulfil that mandate.
Q: Certainly a year of Kumaratunga presidency has been refreshingly different from the pomposity and authoritarianism of past presidencies. But still, some people, at least, will be asking whether it will be the start of a further year of an executive political office which your government had promised to abolish within months. Do you still intend to abolish the executive presidency?
A: We gave a promise to the people and we will fulfil that promise. We mean what we say. We intend to bring constitutional amendments to affect this as early as possible. We have given this assurance repeatedly. These amendments will include both the abolition of the executive presidency as well as the devolution package. As soon as they go through the Parliamentary Select Committee process, we will present the entire set of amendments. They are under discussion at the moment at the select committee level.
Q: So you will bring amendments at the same time to implement both presidency reform as well as the devolution package?
A: Well, they are both amendments to the Constitution.
Q: You do not envisage an entirely new Constitution as Such?
A: No. There will be fairly exten
sive amendments to the present Constitution.
Q: Will Sri Lanka Continue to remain a Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka" or will there be a change of nomenclature?
A: That is left for the Select Committee to decide. Those are details as far as we are concerned.
Q: The 1996 budget was an unexpectedly "light' budget - that is, it did not place too many new economic burdens on ordinary people, as many had feared because of the military expenditures. Is there a possibility that the burdens, such as price increases, will come gradually in the coming months?
A: Not necessarily, unless there are unforeseen circumstances. We
Continued on page 18

Page 8
8 TAM TIMES
Muted Celebration N "Capture' of Jaffr
from Rita Sebastian, Colombo
They brought the war into your sitting room with the daily video clips on state television. You heard the gunfire and saw the blood. But you were witness to only one side of the war story, except when occasionally you saw the bodies of Tigers killed in battle. It was a war tailor made for the generals. There were no witnesses. The media was barred from the battlefront.
Fortyeight days later it seemed all over. Jaffna was "captured' and the national flag hoisted in the city centre. The military had insisted in the run-up to the 'capture' that there would be no official flag hoisting. It was dismissed as media hype. There was nothing to celebrate because so many lives had been lost, they said.
But others in the defence establishment thought otherwise. It was for the armed forces their hour of glory and there had to be some tangible manifestation of that. The backdrop to the ceremonies, the destroyed and damaged building was a telling cameo of that war ravaged land. In Colombo, the celebration
was muted. The spill onto the road racial tensions. T that exploded we between.
But banners ac and walls plaster paying tribute to P. ka Kumaratunga, fence deputy Colon watte said it all. A the kissing the h garlands for Miı made him the ha “Riviresa”.
The hoisting of was followed in President's addres The single thread her speech was 'c people'. 'We have right of all peoples ties to live in brot united Sri Lanka.
She listed her g tories as the suppo Sinhalese and the to her peace prog complete solidarity ethnic groups like
continued from page 7
have formulated a budget emphasising on incentives for economic development - something no government has done in the past in the context of war.
Q: In this new atmosphere of relative media freedom, both the Government and society as a whole, seem to be finding it difficult to adjust to the ather, unbridled behaviour of the media, especially the private sector media. Some sections of the media are making use of their new-found freedom to strongly criticise the government for anything they perceive as an error. How do you view this development? Do you regard it as an abuse of freedom ordo you consider it as some thing which politicians and society must put up with as part of the growth of democracy?
A: No, I think media freedom means that the media has every right to criticise the Government and individual members of the Government - including the President.
The only thing i. Some instances o freedom in which been published or b as they criticise ac evidence, even if t. different view from ernment, they ha what they want. express views diffe the Government, t to say what they v But when they then we have th action within the have all the freedo we also have the courts and take thi ble action to obta that is what I am
But we don't thi take measures media's right to p want. That is not tics. We want to and the freedom we ask is that jo their freedom with al responsibility.

15 DECEMBER 1995
larkS
2
uphoria did not s, or exacerbate he fire crackers e few and far
oss city streets ed with posters esident Chandrisoldiers and deel Anurudha Ratld in parliament, ugging and the lister Ratwatte Pro of operation
the national flag Colombo by the s to the nation. running through ine country, one reconquered the of all communiherhood within a
overnment's vicrt of the majority
minority Tamils ramme, and the y of the smaller the Muslims, and
s that there are f misuse of this outright lies have roadcast. As long cording to factual hey hold a totally that of the Govfe a right to say Even when they rent from that of hey have a right rant.
concoct things e right to take law. They can m they want. But freedom to go to maximum possiin redress. And loing. k that we should to restrict the ublish what they our style of polibuild democracy f expression. All |rnalists exercise a sense of nation
Sri Lanka's changed image internationally.
But there was a note that jarred during the 'victory' celebrations at the Presidential Secretariat, President Kumaratunga's commitment to a fair and just deal for all communities went by the board when the Tamil translation of her speech came from somewhere in the background, hardly audible because of the 'chatter' of a hundred voices within the Secretariat. Promises will seem so empty unless President Kumaratunga sees to it that not only is justice done but seen to be done as well.
The incident was particularly unfortunate because the Tamils already feeling hurt and humiliated' over the word "capture”, the terminology used for the dislodging of the Tigers from Jaffna saw the very negation of what the President was promising.
And also quite intriguing was the reference to Jaffna as “Yapa patuna” the ancient Sinhalese name for the city. There was no need to resurrect something from the dim past, not in this instance.
The battle for Jaffna took heavy toll of both life and property. Official statistics put the death toll at around 500 security personnel, most of them soldiers, killed and over 1,000 wounded. The Tiger casualties were estimated at over 1500 killed and hundreds more injured. The Tigers of course have disputed government figures.
That was the tragedy of newsmen being barred from the war zone. They were left with hardly any choice in reporting the war. There were the daily defence ministry press releases, and from the London offices of the Tigers came their side of the story.
And with the local media virtually crippled by a censorship on military related issues, truth became one of the main casualties.
And since the war is not over, and the theatre of operations already moved to the eastern province, the defence establishment that did not ban newsmen from travelling east could now put strictures on travel to the east as well.
Although President Kumaratunga said, "We must not crow over our military victories. Let us fill our hearts with humaneness, for all wars however savage they may be must be won by human dialogue' there are still those who feel that the gun is the ultimate weapon.

Page 9
15 DECEMBER 1995
continued from page 3
are joining the Bank in large numbers, the statement added.
Foolish Act? :An army spokesman described the evacuation of civilians from the Jaffna area as LTTE's "biggest foolish act' because it left the field wide open for soldiers to engage the LTTE upfront without having to worry about any possible heavy civilian casualties. One factor which had always prevented the army from launching major operations against the LTTE in Jaffna was the fear of causing massive civilians casualties because they always operated under the protection of a 'civilian human shield', military spokesman Brigadier Sarath Munasingh he said.
"Many people believed that capturing Jaffna would cost a lot of civilian lives or that the LTTE would use civilians as a human shield as they had done in the past. But for whatever reason, the LTTE forced the civilians to move out and we were able to capture LTTE controlled areas without causing civilian casualties,' Munasinghe said.
Reaction of Non-LTTE Tamil Parties: To be charitable, the reaction of the non-LTTE Tamil parties and groups who by and large operate from Colombo is ambivalent, opportunist and self-contradictory.
On the one hand they articulate the belief that President Mrs. Kumaratunga is genuine in her efforts to solve the ethnic problem; the LTTE should not have unilaterally broken the peace process and resumed armed hostilities; and that the Tigers have not been and are not interested in any negotiated settlement and their sole intention is to seek a separate state in which they would be the only ones to wield power. On the other hand, these Tamil parties are apprehensive about government forces militarily confronting the Tigers in a serious and sustained manner which inevitably result in Tamil civilian casualties. They also entertain the fear that if government forces succeed in militarily subjugating the Tigers, then Sinhala chauvinist forces in the south would become emboldened and prevent the Chandrika administration from implementing the political package substantial devolution of powers which has been offered.
Therefore, unable to politically or militarily confront the Tigers and incapable of playing a decisive role in the developing political or military situation, as a matter of ritualistic exercise these parties call for ceasefire and negotiations with Tigers. Some cynics
say that these par treatment the Tige to them in physical leaders and bannir ating in the Tamil east, secretly hope Tigers would be a ernment forces. reasons they have ritual of making p ments which serv purpose. Recruitment: It is LTTE has comme recruitment drive a people to join as 'Voice of Tigers' ra large numbers of Jaffna university and from other sec tion were joining the fall of the ci continue its war attacks on gover military may enter Vadamaradchi afte city. The only way attack is to increas this is possible onl men and women ov LTTE. Those yout the displaced pe should join the mo' ly,” the leader of til the LTTE Mr. T. reported to have Thenmaradchi iI according to the ra
"The displaced pe that the situation mal in a few days. the increase in t Tigers that the situ Therefore it is in people to increase Tigers. The displ immediately join their several thout broadcast on the L
“Everyday hund joining the LTTE in the struggle motherland. Yeste the oath of allegia School teachers, h and even men wit ing up for militar LTTE', a statemen from the LTTE's h don said.
The LTTE's op reportedly been sh from where leade) though the loca Pirabhakaran is ( remains unknown, weaponry and lo have been shifted is believed that thi to establish almost

TAM TIMES 9
ies, because of the rs have meted out y eliminating their g them from operareas of the northand pray that the nnihilated by govBut for political to indulge in this latitudinous state: little meaningful
reported that the nced an intensive mong the displaced Tiger cadres. The dio announced that students, including students, teachers tions of the populahe LTTE. "Despite y, the LTTE will
through guerrilla ment forces. The Thenmaradchi and r capturing Jaffna we could resist this e our strength and if all those young er 14 years join the h who are among ople from Jaffna vement immediatehe political wing of amil Chelvan was told a meeting in late November dio. ople must not think will return to norIt is to the extent of he strength of the lation will improve.
the hands of the the strength of the aced youth should the movement in ands, a statement TTE radio said.
reds of youth are anks to participate to liberate their day 50 youths took hce in Vanni alone. gh school students h families are signy service with the t dated 6 December 2adquarters in Lon
rational base has ifted to Kilinochchi ship is functioning tion from which irecting operations Most of the LTTE's gistical equipment o the Wanni, and it Tigers are seeking a parallel adminis
tration in these areas as they did in Jaffna.
The Wanni areas north of Vavuniya have been under Tiger control for years, particularly after the Indian Peace Keeping (IPKF) departed in March 1990. Even when the IPKF took military control of Jaffna, Mannar and other northern areas, the Tigers had their operational bases in the eastern parts of Wanni including Mullaitivu.
Though the Tiger leadership and the bulk of its cadres have got out of the Valikamam and the areas around Jaffna town, it is thought the Tigers in small groups would continue to remain or enter from outside and mount guerrilla attacks upon the army within the captured areas. The aim would be to prevent the forces from consolidating and expanding their control throughout the peninsula.
Tigers in the East: Military analysts and journalists who have visited the eastern province of Sri Lanka are of the view that the LTTE has vastly increased in strength and brought more areas under its control after the government moved a considerable number of troops from the east to bolster up its offensive in the north.
In interviews to foreign journalists, Sivagnanam Karikalan, the Tiger leader in the east, said that their cadres would defend Jaffna to the last man and that their suicide squads were waiting to exact a heavy price from the army. They may capture it, but we will make them pay dearly. Even if they capture Jaffna, we will take it back, he said from his operational base located in Batticaloa across the lagoon from the town.
Asked whether the LTTE would ask for or accept a ceasefire if offered, Karikalan said that it would not happen. The government would have to first return land captured by the army in the recent offensive and rehabilitate the tens of thousands of people displaced. He accused the government of offering talks on the one hand and trying to use the military to force a solution on the Tamils. "The government wants to use the military to subdue the Tamils and then thrust a solution on us. That we will not accept, he said.
Conceding that the Tigers had not officially responded to the government's political package, he said. "We have still not received the proposals. Without the LTTE's consent, there cannot be any settlement. But if they want a military solution, we are ready for it. We are ready for a full-scale war.'
Continued on page 10

Page 10
10 TAMIL TIMES
Continued from page 9
Karakalan denied that the Tigers were responsible for the recent string of massacres of Sinhalese civilians in the east of the country which have attracted widespread international condemnation. He suggested that progovernment Tamil groups might have been responsible. But Father Harry Miller from Batticaloa said that the Tigers were capable of any brutality. "They are outlaws, they recognise no laws except their own, and they will do whatever they need to do to get whatever they think they can get. They do not observe anybody's laws but their οννη.
Army Recruitment: The Sri Lankan military recently launched a mass campaign to recruit an additional 10,000 soldiers to its ranks. Brigadier Ananda Weerasekera, Director of Training, said that additional troops were needed to fight the LTTE more effectively and to consolidate and stabilise the army's presence in the captured areas.
The cabinet recently decided to amend service procedures in the military to enable the government to continue to keep in service, senior army officers who reach normal retirement age, for an unspecified number of years. The reason for this measure is said to be that the military are in short supply of experienced senior officials many of whom have been killed in action or assassinations in recent years.
The government also has decided to grant amnesty to all military personnel who had deserted or been absent without leave from the service provided they returned to work on or before 15 December this year.
Plight of Refugees: There aren't enough buildings, either public or private, to accommodate the refugee population either in the Vadamaradchi and Thenmaradchi areas or the Kilinochchi and Wanni areas to which they have gone. Most of them are in makeshift camps without basic sanitary facilities. The rural Kilinochchi district which has permanent population of more than 100,000 is now flooded with the influx of people from the peninsula. 'Kilinochchi is now full of people. Day and night there is movement all round. The refugees first register themselves and then seek temporary shelter. They are looking here, there and everywhere for the next meal. They go in search of relatives and friends. Some are looking for small houses to rent. Lots of people are looking for cadjans and timber to erect small huts. A pair of cadjans is sold for Rs.20. Those who do not have money
are compelled to c. Kilinochchi a kilo kind is Rs.125 an Rs.75. Essential g able in shops. A m. and dhal is servec Even children an are tre at e d in (Veerakesari, 26.1 situation during November, the pr people with the fu following weeks in WO'Se.
The people who aged to leave Jaffn ing areas and move adchi and Thenm again being asked Wanni areas. Ther movement of thous these areas seeking lagoon at Kilali to land to Kilinochchi In spite of the v imposed to preve. areas under the co many and mostly \ or friends have gone country. Many mor through Vavuniya island, particularly adjoining areas. T have managed to that the LTTE has all Tamils between 35 leaving the area trol; and others are varying sums of mo tion for leaving.
They also say tha age to reach Thandi niya in the army cor view to going to severe hardship by intensive questionin ple are made to wai days until they obt form of 'sponsorship names and address would be residing Colombo. In many from Colombo are c to Vavuniya to obta the authorities for t. and kin to be able to One person said, 'A who could have walk their heads erect, t duced to the positio for “passes” from eit LTTE’s rehabili Tamil Refugee Orga put in charge of set refugees who are sa predesignated plots provised sheds have and asbestos sheet buildings in Jaffna across the lagoon to the refugee shelters
Uramn

mp under trees. At f vegetable of any
a cake of soap is ods are not availture of cooked rice in refugee camps.
pregnant women o differently.' .95). If this was the the last week of sent plight of the ther influx in the ust be immensely
were first encoura town and adjoininto the Vadamararadchi areas are to move into the 2 has been a daily ands of people from to cross the Jaffna go into the mainand Wanni areas. arious restrictions ht people leaving ntrol of the LTTE, who have relations to the south of the e are seeking to go to the south of the to Colombo and hose Tamils who go to Colombo say imposed a ban on the ages of 10 and s under their conrequired to pay up ney as a precondi
ut those who mankulam near Vavutrolled area with a Dolombo also face being subjected to g and search. Peo; for at least three ain details in the letters' containing es at which they once they reach cases, relatives ompelled to travel in clearance from Leir displaced kith ravel to Colombo. once proud people ed anywhere with ley are today reof having to beg her side.' ation unit, the lisation, has been ling the arriving to be directed to fland where imeen erected. Zinc ripped off from have been taken provide cover for
15 DECEMBER 1995
The LTTE has announced that each family of the displaced people from Jaffna and moved into the Wanni areas would be allocated a parcel of land and provided money for cultivation.
There is inadequate facilities to meet the medical needs of the refugees in all places to which they have moved. For example, in the OPD of the Govt. hospital in Chavakachcheri, hundreds and hundreds of people stand daily in queues to be treated. There are neither beds nor space in the hospital to accommodate the patients. Temporary sheds have been erected in the adjoining compound to admit some of the patients with serious illness. There is an acute shortage of medical supplies. Some of the doctors and other medical staff who left Jaffna hospital are reported to be working here.
Serious shortage of food supplies of all kinds is common to all areas and people are said to be surviving on half a pound of bread and kanchi each day.
The government has allowed the UNHCR, ICRC, FORUT OXFAM, CARE, WORL, VISION and a few other international organisations to provide much needed assistance to the refugees. A central warehouse has been set up at the government Vavuniya Secretariat from where relief assistance is reported to be channelled. The Tamil daily, Veerakesari, has reported that the UNHCR has set up a warehouse at Kilinochchi for the receipt and stocking of food, medical and other supplies needed for the displaced people and that the government has allowed the despatch of lorry loads of supplies to this warehouse.
The Commissioner General for Essential Services and Secretary to the Rehabilitation Ministry Mr. M.N. Junaid told pressmen that the vessel Lanka Kalyani left Colombo on 29 November carrying an unprecedented 10,000 tons of food and other essential supplies to Jaffna. In the past the highest ever quantity sent did not exceed 9,000 tons. With the exodus of people from Jaffna, the population there had been reduced to 170,000 and in fact we should have sent a smaller quantity than usual," he added.
In the meantime a statement from the ICRC office in Colombo said that, though the ICRC had shifted its Jaffna office and operations to Point Pedro some weeks earlier, the safety zone around the Jaffna Teaching Hospital was continuing to be maintained and that they would proceed there when the need arose for them to carry out their humanitarian tasks.
Foreign Reaction: The European Parliament, in a recent resolution, ex

Page 11
15 DECEMB 1995
pressed deep concern at the plight of the civilian population in northern Sri Lanka displaced by the current hostilities and called upon the European Union and its Member States "to support relief operations both through the relevant NGOs and through direct assistance to the govenment in its efforts to aid the refugees.'
The resolution while welcoming the government's peace proposals which "contain wide-ranging constitutional reforms, including more extensive devolution to the provinces and a merger of restructured north and east provinces, which have a wide spectrum of democratic political opinion including parties representative of the Tamil minority', called upon the Sri Lankan government “to ensure that the civil rights of the Tamil population are respected and that the perpetrators of any abuses are prosecuted.
Condemning the recruitment of children to the ranks of the LTTE, and noting that the administration imposed by the LTTE over the Jaffna peninsula had been based on force rather than on any popular legitimacy, the resolution called upon its member states to closely monitor LTTE offices operating in their territory to ensure that LTTE agents respected the law and took no part in intimidatory terrorist activity.
Call for Calm and Stern Action: As the 'capture' of Jaffna by the army became imminent, there were fears that extremist elements in the south who in July 1983 unleashed an orgy of anti-Tamil violence would make a similar attempt not only to inflict violence against Tamils but also thereby embarrass the government.
However, government and opposition parties including many nongovernmental organisations closed ranks and made public statements exhorting people to ensure that any orchestrated outbreak of violence against Tamils living in the south was prevented. The ruling party at a special meeting of its parliamentary group called for shoot-on-sight orders to be given to the police and security forces if unruly mobs tried to create violence under the guise of celebrating the entry of the army into Jaffna. A Defence Ministry statement said that all police divisions had been instructed to bring any unruly or violent behaviour under control with the sternest of measures.
State Minister for Defence, Col. Anuruddha Ratwatte warned that pseudo-patriots and card-board heroes who incited violence or attacked Tamil civilians would be rounded up and packed off to the frontlines in Jaffna to
fight the Tigers. Th United National Par its MPs, Provincial C its branch members themselves to ensur was perpetrated ol south. Most religiou
nisations also appeal
remain calm and no acts of violence.
In an address to November, Preside atunga said that the ated the enemies of thought to be invir stress that the end of mean peace. WE hav rule in the North. W the people of the Non nistration of the Sri ment means the e terror and the daw prosperous life. We h grievances of the mil which had prevailec ence. We must ne solution. Only then true peace for us an
“I request every ci our victory calmly ar war effort was not a lians but against a terrorists who do no must in no way h community by word instructed the secul deal severely with al public who uses this intimidate any mem. community or to in violence.'
Thondaman’s Tribut ter and leader of the Congress, S. Thond bute to the President her address to the na the President Mr. T wish to express m appreciation at th manner in which addresed by Your E. hortation for calm wi concern shown for t the Tamil communi received by all. It is that Your Excellenc the implications tha the tortuous militar embattled area. I wo address to the natic message to all the and harmony are pr the government. Ith clear that disregard be met with sterr emptive warning C unprecedented and Your Excellency's sentiments you hav reaffirmation of y(

TAMIL TIMES 11
2 main opposition ty called upon all Councillors and all to actively engage e that no violence h Tamils in the s and other orgaed to the people to t to resort to any
the nation on 23 nt Mrs. Kumar2 troops had “defepeace' who were ncible. "I wish to this war does not e to establish civil e have to convince rth that the admiLankan governhd of the evil of in of a free and ave to resolve the nority community l since independgotiate a lasting could we ensure d our children.
tizen to celebrate hd peacefully. The gainst Tamil civiruthless group of t want peace. We arass the Tamil or deed. I have rity personnel to ny member of the
critical period to ber of the Tamil cite any form of
te: Cabinet Minis2 Ceylon Workers aman paid a triwhen reacting to tion. In a letter to hondaman said, I y deep sense of se statesmanlike the nation was xcellency. The exas reassuring. The he sensitivities of ty has been well heartening to note y is fully alive to t could flow from 7 operations in an uld consider your n as conveying a people that peace iority concerns of as also been made of the law would action. A pref this nature is his is a tribute to foresight... The e expressed are a ur dedication to
safeguard the Tamils and inspire confidence.' Govt. Moves in Jaffna: In the wake of the 'capture' of Jaffna town and the areas of Valikamam by the security forces, the government appears to be taking steps to restore some form of civil administration in those areas.
As many as 1,500 policemen, including 61 officers, are reported to being enlisted with a view to restoring civilian administration. Police stations are to be set up in various places in addition to the presently existing ones at Kankesanthurai and Kayts.
In a further bid to re-establish the civilian administration and bring back the people who had been evacuated, plans are reported to be afoot to undertake reconstruction works relating to public buildings, roads and restore public transport.
President Mrs. Kumaratunga made a startling disclosure to the media recently that the bulk of the Rs.350 million sent to the northern Jaffna peninsula monthly to pay government employees, teachers and pensioners was channelled into the coffers of the LTTE. The former government did not find out to whom they were paying these monies, except that it was sent to the Government Agents who were controlled body and soul by the Tigers,' she said.
For 13 years, the government was paying Tiger cadres, not government servants, accusing the former government of not only providing the Tigers with arms (to fight the IPKF), but funding them and feeding them. So was it surprising that they should be described by the foreign media as the most organised guerrilla group in the world?', she asked.
And it is the payments due to government employees, teachers and pensioners that would be used to bring people back to Jaffna, for the government has decreed that those entitled to these monies collect their dues from the Administrative Secretary in Jaffna.
The President also offered talks with the Tigers and an amnesty and safety for them provided the LTTE lay down their arms and end violence. "I invite all members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to lay down arms and end violence. The government will offer you an amnesty and your safety, the President said. She also appealed to those displaced and now camped outside the Jaffna peninsula to return to their homes. Although some of you may have agreed to accept the authority of a terrorist regime, you may have had no other alternative previously.
Continued on page 26

Page 12
12 TAMIL TIMES
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Page 13
15 DECEMBER 1995
"Only Substantial Devc Will COnVinceTami
- TULF Lea
by Lakshman Gunasekara
The entry of government forces into Jaffna city does not mean the end of the ethnic conflict, points out Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) President M. Sivasithamparam. Neither does the dislodging of the LTTE from Jaffna greatly diminish the military punch of the Tigers, he argues. Stressing the need for political reform, the veteran Tamil leader indicated that quick moves to legislate devolution would enable the TULF to campaign for the Government's package among the Tamil people. We are still pinning our faith on the President's commitment to a political solution,' he said in an interview on Friday.
Ouestion: The Sri Lankan State actually began implementing devolution as a solution to the problems of minorities, only after, and because of the military pressure by the Tamil separatist rebel movement. The recent armed forces offensive against the LTTE has caused a weakening of that military pressure on the State. Does the Sri Lankan political establishment have the will to pursue devolution without this pressure?
Answer: I don't agree that devolution was the result of military pressure by the Tamils on the State. The first proposals for any devolution was as early as the Donoughmore Constitution. Subsequently, the principle of devolution was inherent in the BandaranaikeChelvanayakam Pact and the Dudley-Chelvanayakam Pact. There was no military pressure at that point of time. Of course, subsequently, the fact that the youth had taken to arms, certainly was a factor which compelled the Sinhala government to come out with proposals for devolution. We do not know how far the military pressure of the LTTE has been weakened by what has happened in Jaffna. But the President has repeatedly said that she is keen to solve the ethnic problem. It was as a solution to the ethnic problem that she put forward the devolution proposals. She has, since then, also been saying that she is keen to have those proposals in legal form and to have them im
plemented. I do n weakening of the of the LTTE will her mind.
O. But is the Pre COmmitment to dev There seems to be among the Sinhale, the government of that there may benc more political reforn
A: If any Sinhale they are gravely n try of troops into end of the strife. N beginning of a poli if the Sinhalese th: entry of troops into problem is solved making a very ver This could even c between the Ta Sinhalese even mo pened in the past.
Q: Do you think stream Sinhala pan Alliance and the Un ty, Will co-operate political reform?
A: As far as the they have already p proposals, and I ta were drawn up wit at least, the leade) Many ministers ha dorsed the proposa the President on . assume that the P with implementing by presenting them the Parliamentary tee, and therafter, and the country. As is concerned, they h the proposals. What is that while they devolution of powe wait till the legal for by the Government what to do. I feel th made to believe tha that is both the ' Muslims, are in
proposals, they will
fore rejecting the pr if they do so they v the support of the II time. I am sure the

TAMIL TIMES 13
olution ls'
der
bt think that any military strength make her change
Sident's individual olution adequate? growing sentiment Se, subsequent to ensive's success, ) need to have any n.
se feels that way, histaken. The enJaffna is not the Nor is it even the tical solution. So, ink that with the Jaffna the ethnic , then they are y grave mistake.
lamage relations
amils and the re than has hap
that both mainties, the People's ited National Parin implementing
PA is concerned, ut forward these ake it that they h the consent of, ship of the PA. ave publicly enls presented by August 3. So, I A will go ahead these proposals in legal form to Select Committhe Parliament far as the UNP ave not rejected they are saying are not against , they want to m is put forward before deciding at if the UNP is 5 the minorities, amils and the avour of these think twice beoposals, because ill be forfeiting hinorities for all UNP leadership
may be also keen to project an image of being fair to the minorities.
Q: The LTTE has already rejected peace talks. What are the prospects for any talks in the future?
A: One cannot say exactly what the LTTE's thinking is. If we look at such movements in the world, whetherit is the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the Irish Republican Army or the African National Congress, you will see that at some point of time, they have come to the negotiating table. But the Tamil people must be convinced that the Government is serious and sincere about implementing the proposals of August 3. If that happens, I feel that the LTTE may come for talks.
O: What can be done about the large population pushed out of Jaffna city by the LTTE?
A: I don't know whether it is correct to describe the exodus of people from Jaffna as being the result of their being "pushed out by the LTTE. There may have been a certain amount of coercion by the LTTE. But there is also no denying the fact that the Tamil people had legitimate fears of danger to themselves, judging by the action of the military in the past in both the North and the East. So, that motivation was also there for the exodus, quite apart from any coercion by the LTTE.
Q: Do you think that if the fighting dies down, at least in the Peninsula area, the displaced population might begin to come back?
A: If there is a ceasefire, and if the Tamil people are satisfied that the Government is indeed putting forward a political solution, the people who have moved out might move back.
O: I was looking at the difficult conditions on the ground and the natural desire of people to go back where they were living; that even if there is no ceasefire all-island, if the fighting dies down in the North (although it may flare up in the East), this might be an opportunity for those who want to go back to their homes, and businesses and fields?
A: I say once again that the Tamil people who are displaced today must be satisfied that the Government is serious and sincere about a political settlement. The people will naturally wonder whether there is any use in going back and risking undergoing again the kind of suffering they have undergone in the past
Continued on page 14

Page 14
14 TAMIL TIMES
Continued from page 13
because of the conflict. So, whatever the Government may do about the fighting, it must be coupled with a satisfactory progress on the political front.
O: But the ordinary people who are displaced are not necessarily that politically mobilised to want to remain in their current Condition. If there is a situation of relative Calm, at least in the Valikanan sector, and if there is an impressive programme of rehabitation, reconstruction, and restoring of civilian administration, might there not be a spontaneous desire by the people to go back, irrespective of the long term political prospects. How will the TULF approach that kind of development?
A: The Tamil people know what they want. They want a political solution. They did not go through all these years of suffering without coming to this realisation. So, whatever other attractions the Government might offer, unless the people are satisfied that there is also going to be a political solution, I am doubtful whether the Tamil people who have been displaced will move back.
O: The virtual dismantling of the semi-State structure run by the LTTE in the Valikaman sector and the weakening of their political hegemony in that area, leaves a kind of political vacuum there. What are the prospects of the non-LTTE Tamil political organisations resuming activity there?
A: Speaking for the TULF: we will certainly not resume unless there is a political solution. When we start political work, what are we to tell the Tamil people? What we must be able to tell the Tamils is: "Here is a political solution, now let us make it work'. We must be able to at least say that. Otherwise, there is no point in our going and doing politics in Jaffna.
O: Doesn't the TULF then run the risk of leaving room for the younger, former Tamil militant groups like the PLOTE, TELO and even EPDP, who might take the opportunity to go there and build their Constituencies?
A: They have tried that in the past and not succeeded. If they go into Jaffna without a political solution, the Tamil people won't go along with them. Given a political solution, everyone will be ready to go and work.
O: But a political solution could take time - if not years, at least many months. Till then, do the displaced
people in the North they are?
A: The ultimate rent matter. But evidence that th moving in that di move in that dire place the legisla devolution proposa liamentary Select the people will k something substal
O: Does it mean that kind of denOn. the part of the Gov will be ready to gi civilian political lev
A: That depends the devolution pa any dilution of p any going back on been promised, th TULF will not be a
programme.
Q: As far as the do you find them Settlement?
A: They are a
Have
Bangladesh has b human trafficker young women and countries, a study
The study, condu tary organization, dren Rights Forum that more than 40 dren are smuggled every month, mair the Persian Gulf, f from prostitution t racing jockeys.
The BCRF study ficking and Sale' sa traffickers were vance with a sect Security Forces of and Pakistan. In the police rescued fishing trawler tr kathi in southern cyclonic storm in earlier this mont pounded the trawl traffickers. The tra ly headed for India
In another incic 12 women and ch station near Dhak they have held foul that was planning 12 to Pakistan thr

15 DECEMBER 1995
have to remain as
solution is a diffe
t there must be e Government is irection. The first ction would be to tive form of the als before the ParCommittee. Then now that here is ntial.
then that if there is Stration of intent On ernment, the TULF ve leadership at a el in Jaffna? s on the content of ckage. If there is owers, if there is what has already hen of course the party to any such
proposals go today, a good basis for a
good basis for a
settlement. There are a few very important matters to be settled, but certainly it is a basis for a settlement. One matter still to be finalised is the unit of devolution.
Q: lí, in the coming months, despite hostilities, perhaps in the East, the Government does place devolution legislation in Parliament, acceptable legislation that is, will the TULF cooperate by providing civilian political leadership in the North?
A: It is not a question of leadership. What matters is whether the Tamil people accept the proposals. If the package is a reasonable one which we can accept, the LTTE will campaign among the Tamil people that they should accept it. But it should be a reasonable set of proposals which must include the unit of devolution. We are still pinning our faith on President Kumaratunga on the basis of what she presented on August 3. I must emphasise that both sides, the Government and the LTTE, must seriously consider a ceasefire.
(Courtesy: Sunday Observer).
1 for Human Traffickers
ecome a haven for
's smuggling out children to foreign
has revealed.
ucted by the volun
Bangladesh Chil(BCRF), has found 0 women and chilout of Bangladesh hly to Pakistan and
Dr purposes ranging o serving as camel
7 titled Child Traf. aid that “the human working in connition of the Border Bangladesh, India the latest incident, 62 children from a apped near JhalaBangladesh in the the Bay of Bengal h. The police imler and arrested 15 awler was reported
.
lent, police rescued ildren from a ferry ka. The police said members of a gang to smuggle out the ough India.
The police said a woman member of the gang admitted that she was a permanent resident of Pakistan who often came to Bangladesh in connection with the human trade. She said Pakistani agents were willing to pay 100,000 taka (about $2,500) for a child.
The study said Bangladeshi boys and girls were comparatively cheap to buy. It was for this reason that international traffickers had chosen Bangladesh as the source for the "human trade'. -
In most cases, the study said, children and women were procured from persons known to the traffickers. Various tactics were used by the traffickers. One common tactic was the promise of marriage with a job and a better life.
Quoting Bangladeshi prostitutes arrested in Karachi last year, the study said they were brought to Calcutta through Benapole and then taken to Karachi via Amritsar. They crossed the borders on foot at night. Inside India and Pakistan, they travelled by train', it said.
The study said that 12 Bangladeshi boys, who were rescued in Bombay in 1993 while heading for Dubai to be used as jockeys in camel races, were repatriated to Bangladesh last month.

Page 15
15 DECEMBER 1995
The Escalating W
by Adele Ann Balasingham
The stage is set for decisive battles in the Jaffna Peninsula. Ironically this unprecedented military confrontation between two armies represents a face to face showdown between two seemingly incompatible ideological and political positions. On the one side the battlehardened and furiously determined guerrilla units of the LTTE are poised to defend their traditional and political stronghold. On the other side, the modernised conventional army of the Sri Lanka state is equally as determined to wrest control of the LTTE territory and administration and to militarily impose its authority over the entire area. This extremely tense military situation is the climax of months of military posturing by the state forces prior to this final showdown for military and political supremacy in the region.
The current escalation of the ground war in the densely populated Jaffna Peninsula is the ultimate unfolding of the government's strategy to solve the ethnic conflict. For the government, the successful prosecution of the war in the Tamil heartland, is, quite clearly, the pillar on which political measures to finalhy solve the ethnic conflict are seen to rest. Col. Ratwatte, the Deputy Minister of Defence and darling of the chauvinist elements in the south, has stated just that. In very frequent recent statements of thanks to donors of the State's National Defence Fund he has repeatedly and consistently expressed the view that the prosecution of the war to its conclusion is the primary objective of the government at the moment and nothing will deflect it from its course. He further elaborated that only when the war is concluded will political programmes be formulated and implemented.
It would be easy and simple to dismiss Col. Ratwatte’s statements as placatory words to dogmatic opponents of any form of devolution to the Tamils. But the frequency and obvious confidence with which he enunciates his bellicose statements lead to different conclusions. Col. Ratwatte is not only Deputy to the President on defence matters but is increasingly seen as the Minister of War. As a top ranking Minister in the government he is obviously a key formulator of policy and his
views must thereft tion of the Preside sophisticated For President articula Col. Ratwatte’s co posed the hypocris ident's dual approa LTTE and peace f ple. Her military s of its political pre repeated slogans ( and her “white lot simply icing on t. War in the northe lian casualties - ar tion when the wal honest articulation ment’s conception a solution to the eth Nevertheless, de of the government one of the most i ters, the President full marks for her deception. While t northeast have ne that the governme) the military soluti atunga's articulat approach of war al expressions of conc people caught up mesmerised the chanted the intern ity. By throwing ideas into the sou discussion and deba has engaged the p controversy and flected the attentic tion away from t horror of the war The image of a raised and holdin symbol of peace, ha the imagination of stunned their thoug silence on the majo: her slogan "war fo buting further to th sion of peace among in the south is the on reporting new, government news relating to the war thrown a woolly b people cushioning effects of war, not ol but the nightmare the people of the no The internationa has been lured into fold and appears to ignore the war in t

AMIL TIMES 15
re have the sancit. But unlike the h in which the es her strategy, nments have exbehind the Presch of war for the 1r the Tamil peolution is stripped ensions. Her oft f “war for peace' is movement are he military cake ust – despite civid a political soluends is a more of the governund strategy for a nic conflict. spite the expose s real strategy by nfluential Minishas to be given efforts in political he people in the ver been in doubt nt is committed to on, Mrs. Kumarion of the dual nd peace and her ern for the Tamil in the war has south and enational communa set of political thern arena for ate the President 20ple in a heated successfully dein of the populahe gravity and in the northeast. President, hand g the Buddhist s further swayed the people and ht processes into contradiction of r peace’. Contriis collective illust the population total censorship - other than on all matters Censorship has lanket over the them from the hly on their lives, and tragedy of rtheast.
community too the President's have chosen to he north and its
catastrophic effects on the lives of the civilian population. A crucial player in this deceptive art of political duplicity and hypocrisy is the Foreign Minister Mr. Kadirgamar. Mr. Kadirgamar, a Tamil, allows himself to be used to promote the interests of the Sinhala state. On October 2nd, while the Sri Lankan military forces were engaged in a major military push Operation Thunder Strike - into the Jaffna Peninsula the "Honourable' Minister was addressing the United Nations and informing the representatives of the world's nations of the government's sincere efforts and commitment to peace. While the military apparatus was, day and night, raining down artillery shells on residential areas, killing and maiming the young and the old, the sick and the healthy, the rich and the poor uprooting and destroying their livelihoods in seconds; while tanks blasted homes and buildings to pieces and bulldozers razed villages, crops and trees and piled up fertile soil into security bunds, Mr. Kadirgamar had the audacity to step onto the podium at the United Nations, address the international audience and lament the government's concern for the civilian population, its concern for food supplies, its concern for children in war and its concern for human rights.
Whether or not the international community will break out of its illusion regarding the Sri Lanka government is a question which only time will answer. In the meantime the lived experiences of the people of the northeast are more consistent with Col. Ratwatte’s statement than anything the President has ever presented. The people are being subjected to war and the political proposals have never been officially presented to the North. In other words, despite all the statements about political packages and solutions, nothing of that nature has reached the north and the strategy of war as a solution to the conflict is in the full throes of implementation.
Tragically, however, the government’s military option has little chance of either ending the war or solving the conflict. Even in the hypothetical event of a military takeover of the Peninsula the war will not end and political solution will not therefore be implemented according to Col. Ratwatte’s scheme of things. On the other hand also, strategies for capturing territory,
Continued on page 16

Page 16
16 TAM TIMES
Continued from page 15 militarily weakening the LTTE and then opening a dialogue from a position of strength is not constructive thinking either.
Although it appears that the immediate military objective of the State forces is to take control of the Jaffna Peninsula the possibility of realising such a task is also open to question. There are many contingencies that could derail the plan. The bottom line is therefore, the capture of large areas of territory and to militarily weaken the LTTE by engaging them in combat and inflicting heavy losses. Having achieved these proposed military objectives the government probably entertains the Idea that a chastened and damaged LTTE will be like putty in their hands and be more disposed to political negotiations and
decisions. Such a lt parlous. One does professor in psych stand that a wea movement that ha of territory and a p horrendous acts
oppression by a g( not be constrained dialogue with their is required is new fresh input of cons solve this ethnic c ernment of Mrs. must surely realise day by day contribu further to the crea for the prolongatic and even sharper c the State and Tal trary to what the S shocking physical on the civilian p(
Political and Military Ob Of the GOVt’s Jaffna Ofi
by D. Sivaram
How will the fall of Jaffna town determine the general course of the conflict in Sri Lanka? To understand this in the correct perspective one has to examine some of the things which the government hoped to achieve by undertaking the largest military offensive in the Eelam Wars. It will also throw some light on how the Liberation Tigers are going to fashion their political and military response to the government's concerted attack on what they (the Tigers) have always perceived as their traditional stronghold.
The military planners of the government hoped to achieve the following objectives in launching the Jaffna operation. These objectives were political as well as military. Firstly, the series of operations aimed at retaking the peninsula which began with "Leap Forward' was intended to demonstrate to the international community that the de facto separate state which the LTTE had established in the north is not militarily tenable. The government was quite alarmed that the lifting of the stringent regulations on travelling to the Tiger held areas of the north during the peace talks had given rise to much publicity for the de facto state run by the LTTE in the peninsula. Journalists, peace makers and Sinhala intellectuals were coming back from Jaffna with re
ports of how the cessfully forging a in the north. A g diplomats who wer fact finding mission have been somewh the structures of civ established by the the government wa secretly concerned talks were helping the much needed p with the internati for ultimately leg facto state ofTham. ing it de jure. The si imposed on travelt since the beginnin Two had prevente western diplomati Colombo that wer vately keen to vi securing permissio territory. The denia an American diplor despite insistent ambassador under ment is a case i pointed out by som who handled the mi that granting si would set a preced ultimately impinge sovereignty.
Needless to say become a major a the Indian govern lhi’s policy on the S

15 DECEMBER 1995
ine of thinking is not need to be a hology to underkened liberation s lost large areas eople subjected to of cruelty and overnment would to engage in a tormentor. What thinking and a structive ideas to onflict. The gov, Kumaratunga that the war is, uting further and tion of conditions n of the conflict livisions between mil people. ConState believes the traumas inflicted opulation during
military operations and the gross violation of the people's human dignity are not matters that can be soothed away or forgotten after a military takeover and control of the people, but will remain as tender scars, easily broken down to expose deep, painful wounds.
In theory and practice, the current strategy of Mrs. Kumaratunga's government, which aims at subjugating the Tamil people and destroying the LTTE will be counterproductive. War begets war and repression will lead to determined resistance. Time is still available for the Colombo government to find radical alternatives for a resolution of the conflict before plunging the country into an abyss of prolonged war and endless violence.
(Courtesy of Inside Report, Jaff na, October 1995).
bjective enSiVe
Tigers were sucnew nation state roup of western ht to Jaffna on a also appeared to hat impressed by ril administration
LTTE. In short is beginning to be
that the peace the Tigers gain olitical credibility onal community itimising the de illeelam and makevere restrictions o the north which g of Eelam War d sections of the c community in e openly or priisit Jaffna from n to enter Tiger ll of permission to nat in early 1994 appeals by the the UNP governn point. It was le senior officials atter at that time uch permission lent which could
on the country's
this had already ea of concern for ment as well. DeSri Lankan Tamil
question, as succinctly enunciated by J.N. Dixit in 1989, has long been underpinnned by the principle that an independent Tamil state in the island would ultimately constitute a threat to its security, unity and integrity. Senior Indian policy making bureaucrats still tend to believe that the state of Tamil Nadu which has the longest history of secessionism in the Indian subcontinent may be affected by the emergence of a sovereign Tamil state across the narrow Palk Strait or even by the prospect of such a state being established in the Tamil dominated regions of Sri Lanka.
The government in Colombo was quite aware of Delhi's concerns. It was therefore quite sure that it would have the tacit but crucial and substantial support it needed from India for achieving the main political objective of the series of military operations which was aimed at bringing Jaffna under its control again. So, while Colombo needed the Jaffna offensive to demonstrate to the world that LTTE's de facto state was militarily untenable, Delhi, it may be said, needed its successful completion to strongly impress upon its own Tamil population among whom the secessionists sentiment was showing signs of rearing its head again, that the dream of a sovereign Tamil state was nothing but a dangerous folly. The Indian attitude is one of the main reasons why the government was prepared to go ahead with the offensive despite the strong reservations expressed by some of its best professional commanders about its suc

Page 17
15 DECEMBER 1995
cess. It must be pointed out here that many of the problems outlined by those commanders still remain quite valid and may determine the ultimate outcome of the military effort in the north. (Of these A.M.U. Seniveratne who was the Overall Operations Commander at the time was relegated to the volunteer force and Devinda Kalupahana one of the brilliant strategists of the Sri Lankan army who was Director of Planning at that time was packed off to Batticaloa).
The corollary to the first objective, of course, was the blow the fall of Jaffna town could deal to the morale of the Tamil community as a whole, inevitably impacting, it was assumed, on the support base of the Tigers both in Sri Lanka and abroad. It has been asserted by many and sundry military strategists for many years since the beginning of Eelam War Two that the Tamil population would lose faith in the Tigers if they could not prevent the fall of Jaffna this in turn, they said, would lead to the rapid shrinking of the LTTE's recruitment grounds and expatriate support - two key elements of Prabhakaran's staying power.
The second objective - though necessarily not in this order - was the destruction of the LTTE's revenue base which has generally been considered essential to sustaining the LTTE's large military and administrative structures. The Liberation Tigers constitute a major military challenge to the Sri Lankan security forces not because, as many tend to believe and assert, they are a very ruthless guerrilla force but because they have been able to efficiently mobilise vast resourcesto set up and run their military organisation like a conventional army. The LTTE's main revenue base was of course Jaffna. It had a dense population and a thriving economy - an indispensable revenue base for generating the resources needed for sustaining a large military and administrative system. It appeared at that time the Tigers were winning the Eelam war on another front by establishing and running a bureacracy which comprised a large number of paid civilians and which was fast replacing the government's own civil administration in the peninsula and many parts of the northern province. The capture of Jaffna it was hoped, would lead to a sudden and irreplaceable loss of crucial resources required to maintain
the LTTE's conve poweer and admin
ity. This in turn,
proponents of this v the Tigers to an 'a force confined to a able low intensity plausibility of this o much been in qu beginning in view o the part of the civil the peninsula to from areas captur When people thus area and settle - permanently - in territory they would conditions stabilise, though diminished of displacement an property.
The third objecti "technical'one aime a major tactical al advantage faced by peninsula since th Eelam War Two. T this: the army had and operate in the II from the Palaly, Karainagar on on Elephant Pass and on the other. The bases, though locat other, could link up sea. Even minor required arrangem evitably tied down c air power to logis example troops fron leave to Anuradha ferried to Karaina KKS to reach the F be flown to the Rushing reinforcem of major Tiger thre significant problem with great concern commanders who Pooneryn and Man The problem, it wa surmounted only b three areas by la could be establishe ing three strategi peninsula proper w appeared to be fir. control. These poin Ponnalai causeway and c) Pannai caus
These places, in had to be brought be linked up saf with the Palaly bas accomplished this cost, it was said, t den on the army w and help it tremen trate its resources

TAMIL TIMES 17
htional military strative capabilccording to the ew, could reduce verage' guerrilla heaply manage
situation. The bjective has very stion from the the tendency on an population in esert en maSSe d by the army. move out of an
temporarily or Tiger controlled constitute, once a revenue base, n size as a result d destruction of
ve was a purely d at overcoming ld logistical disthe army in the le beginning of he problem was to defend itself peninsula mainly Kayts, and the e side and the Pooneryn camps former set of ed close to each only by air and military efforts ents which inrucial naval and tical work. For n Kayts going on pura had to be gar and then to 'alaly air base to ir destination. ents in the face tats also posed a . This was noted by the northern reported on the lathivu debacles. s clear, could be y connecting the hd. This linking d only by secur2 points on the hich at that time mly under Tiger ts were - a) The ", b) Aralithurai еway. the army's view, under control and lly and securely e. Once the army at whatever the he logistical burould ease greatly dously to concenon offensive op
erations into other Tiger held areas of the peninsula.
The fourth objectiv is one that the army had tried to achieve on many occasions in the past with little success except in the battle for Elephant Pass in 1991. It arises from a long standing belief among western military strategists that an enemy would concentrate his critical military strength and resources in one place and thereby expose them to easy destruction (an effort which otherwise might be drawn in space and time) if something considered strategically crucial - a town, a line of supply, a stretch of coast etc., - to him is substantially and really threatened. The success of a war among other things is chiefly determined by the destruction or neutralisation of the enemy's military assets. Therefore it was hoped that an army operation to take Jaffna town would compel the LTTE for both political and military reasons to pour a sizeable and crucial portion of its military assets into a concerted defence effort. This, some planners assumed, would help the army with its superior artillery and airpower, destroy Tiger manpower and arsenall with ease in one place and within a short time. This did no doubt work to some extent, but not to the extent of dealing a decisive blow to the backbone of the Tiger military machine.

Page 18
18 TAMIL TIMES
Confronting AntiHypocrisy and Hys
by Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
The military offensive is bringing a particular type of politics to the fore which will restrict rather than expand political space for conflict resolution. It is jingoistic in character, laced with paranoia and viruperative in its expression. It hits all the populist notes of sovereignty, patriotism and popular prejudice to conjure up an image of an island besieged by unfriendly foreign foes determined to deny it the satisfaction of solving its own problems.
Reading the press, one could run away with the impression that there is to quote a favoured phrase, an 'alternative government' in this country which is made up of 'alien' non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They, with their local lackeys and quislings, have an independent agenda that is decidedly unfriendly to the majority Sinhalese community of this island.
Indeed they are unfriendly to the extent that they could be a Trojan Horse, a veritable Fifth Column planted to operate on behalf of the LTTE terrorists. The legitimate government of the land must bring this alternative government to heel. They must be held strictly accountable for their actions and finances and not allowed a wide latitude to besmirch the good name of our country, especially in this hour of military success.
Unless they behave they will face the righteous anger of our bureaucrats and our people and the experience will be extremely unpleasant. Once here, we have the capacity to thrash them into cramped rooms if necessary, where they can hatch their ville plans in discomfort, chastened if not chastised by spontaneous expressions of democratic wrath and red-blooded patriotism.
As we all know this has happened already. The NGO Forum had to scurry to and fro pursued by ardent patriots before it could meet. There were Sri Lankans with solid credentials in the human rights, civil and political rights movement who were harassed as foreign agents and as traitors to this land in this populist blood sport. Alleged subversion of our land was put paid to by blatant thuggery and intimidation. What
was the purpose are the consequer
According to NGOs are guilty c humanitarian cri. order to halt the obtain more funds the basis of these
The latter relat ward deceit - they in business and w about exploiting opportunity to do case are immate) bonanza. Their b gooders' are there need/greed for c NGOs as carrion' not been missed tractors.
I do not know a of the entire NG cast aspersions on provide them wit health as far as concerned. My a number of them h doubt that they sincere and that ti thesis” is sheer na exaggeration of th ing the humanita north, in the conte who was and is i lutely accurate on is a humanitariar large number of suffering and the guarantee that the the ability and reso that suffering, so later. We need the
As for the politi NGOs in wanting sive and prevent Tigers, what is the this? Beyond wal relief, what is the entirety of the NG Tiger sympathizers pect them to be perform their job stand by principle rather than parties
My fear is that t NGOs is an indica ment of forces that dened by the offen the political space f

15 DECEMBER 1995
NGO teria
behind it and what nces?
our patriots, the fexaggerating the sis in the north in offensive and to for themselves on inflated figures.
es to straight fort need cash to stay ill not think twice g any available so. The facts of the rial. A crisis is a Iona fides as “doby sullied by their ash. This is the
thesis, which has by their local de
bout the finances O community to their integrity or h a clean bill of their finances are ssociation with a as left me with no are honest and he 'shoddy carrion stiness. As for the he figures regardrian crisis in the xt of the offensive mpartial or absothis score? There crisis in that a Sri Lankans are re is no absolute 2 government has ources to alleviate oner rather than ir help. cal agenda of the to halt the offenthe defeat of the real evidence for hting to provide evidence that the O community are s? One cannot expartisan and yet . They have to s and by people s to the conflict. he attack on the tion of an alignhas been embolsive to eliminate or the devolution
package. They are not in a generous mood, have never understood ethnic conflict and appear to be pathologically incapable of transcending the bonds of majoritarian democracy that has created our current crisis.
Moreover, they really operate from the simplistic premise that we have a terrorist problem and once the LTTE has been dealt with militarily, there is no need for a political settlement. In effect, their point is that there is no discrimination and therefore no need to go further than the institutions and processes already in existence.
According to the editorial of this newspaper last week the NGOs are guilty of propagating the myth that Sinhala Buddhists were killing Tamil Hindus and of broadcasting a distorted image of the Tamil struggle for a homeland. Consequently the world has not been told that the true homeland of the Tamils was in South India which has 60 million such people.
Those Tamils who overflowed here about a thousand years ago, have always enjoyed a status similar to the indigenous people of this country, the Sinhalese.
What is politically worrying about this is that these people who have rushed to defend the offensive from being halted before it succeeds, are at variance with the government who ordered that offensive, on the role of the LTTE in conflict resolution and a solution to the ethnic conflict. The Government has not categorically ruled out a role for the LTTE in the future and the President has emphasized that the offensive is not a substitute for devolution and a political solution, for what she still sees as an ethnic problem. She we badly need to restore a sense of perspective on what is happening in our nation and state building enterprise before extremism is allowed to wreck it beyond redemption.
As this column has argued, by its primary reliance upon military force for conflict resolution, the Government has raised unreal expectations of its capability in this regard. The offensive is not the end and it could well be the beginning of a further phase of prolonged and tortuous conflict. The Government needs to be especially wary that it does not fall prey or captive to forces that do not share its long-term perspective on this conflict, but rather are fervently opposed to it. The President must be careful, not to allow those who not so long ago were accusing

Page 19
15 DECEMBER 1995
her of selling out this country because of her vision of a democratic and pluralist Sri Lanka, to shrink the political space she requires to achieve that goal.
As for NGOs, it is high time that it was accepted that they are part of the architecture of an interdependent world and that they exist because states cannot and in some cases will no longer perform the tasks they were originally intended for. Rather than a conspiracy, NGOs
are a necessity in states at various ti from being protect to predators. They with their own peo unable to satisfac their enjoyment of
This is why NGC being and will con sary. Moreover, th has provided eno for political partie ments and in the
Sri Lanka Unlikely t Peace in the Near F
by M.R. Narayan Swamy
The outbreak of Eelam War III on April 19 did not come as a surprise to most Sri Lanka watchers. But it stunned many who had expected the high-pitched peace offensive launched by President Chandrika Kumaratunga after she had assumed office to act as a kind of guarantee against further conflict in the blood-soaked island nation.
Although Kumaratunga is now dismissed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as “bloodthirsty' and a "flesh-eating vulture', there is little doubt that she was concerned about the plight of Tamils and keen for a negotiated settlement of the dragging ethnic conflict.
Kumaratunga and her late husband, Vijaya, a film star turned politician who was assassinated by the JVP in February 1988, were among the few Sinhalese who dared to defy Sinhala chauvinism and speak sympathetically about the Tamils and even the militants in the mid-80s.
With such credentials, her peace efforts generated widespread hope and enthusiasm among the mass of Tamils, including those in Jaffna, which the LTTE administers as a de facto independent homeland.
No wonder the Tigers resumed a dialogue with Colombo, after the previous one dragged on for 14 months during the regime of President Ranasinghe Premadasa. The question is, though, why did the LTTE start fighting again.
The LTTE has its share of grievances. It now says that Kumaratunga was never sincere about peace, that she was secretly preparing for war while pretending to talk
peace, that she hac another cunning Si and that her conde pillai Prabhakaran as a megalomania organization as a r that she never tru
In such an atmos ask, can there be the absence of trus settlement?
While the deep plagues Sri Lanka by Kumaratunga, believe that she ha when she decided talks with the Ti decision to partly r on a wide variety the LTTE-held nor liking of the Lanl Sinhala-Buddhist advocated that the militarily crushed
Some people tl assassination of p. date Gamil Dissa LTTE would force negotiations. She that she was comr by talking to the L said, could never b
If the cessation continued the cri primarily gone ti The resumption of contrary, has enol her political standi
The LTTE's stu the Lankan Nav Force since April the militants were and meticulously The government h unprepared, and a

TAMIL TIMES 19
a world in which times, have moved ors and providers have been at war ple and have been torily provide for
the good life.
Ds have come into tinue to be necesle work of NGOs ugh ammunition s against govern
fight for rights.
The hypocrisy and hysteria of the anti-NGO forces has to be confronted. It is quite simply dangerous and part and parcel of our national crisis.
The President and the Government have their work cut out for them in fashioning a political coalition for power-sharing.
The sooner they commence this exercise the better or else they will find that their room for manoeuvre is very tightly restricted.
O See UtUre
proved to be just nhala chauvinist, mination of Velu, the LTTE chief, ac and the rebel mafia only proved sted the Tigers.
sphere, the Tigers any trust, and in it any worthwhile
thnic divide that cannot be erased it is difficult to da secret agenda to go for peace gers. Indeed, her elax the embargo of goods going to th was not to the kan military and hardliners, who Tigers should be before any talks.
hought that the residential candianayake by the her to call off the was cautioned nitting a blunder TTE, which, some e trusted. of hostilities had dit would have ) Kumaratunga. hostilities, on the mously damaged Ing. nning attacks on , Army and Air only proves that the ones secretly Ireparing for war. as been shown as ccording to some
circles, probably unfit to fight. It is little wonder that the LTTE, not Colombo, has faced international flak over the renewed fighting.
From its modest birth in 1976, when it was a ragtag group, the LTTE has had an astounding growth. Doubtless it is the most well-armed and most fanatical insurgent group in the world today.
The group probably did not have more than 50 full-timers in July 1983, when its annihilation of an army patrol near the University of Jaffna triggered countrywide killings of Tamils, focusing internationall attention for the first time on the Tamil ethnic conflict.
Within four years, thanks partly to the covert assistance from New Delhi to Tamil guerrilla groups, the LTTE ballooned numerically and qualititatively, and was able to take on the Indian Army in Sri Lanka's northeast. After suffering serious reverses at the hands of the Indian troops, the LTTE showed remarkable political intelligence by shaking hands with an obliging Premadasa which insured the exit of the Indians.
Today Prabhakaran's group controls one-third of Sri Lanka's land area (including almost the whole of the north), two-thirds of its winding coastline and runs a de facto government in Jaffna (with its own police, courts, jails, radio station, visa system and inteligence wing).
The LTTE's fighting strength is believed to be 10,000-strong, and although it is desperately looking for more recruits, this is enough to bog down the Sri Lankan army in Jaffna indefinitely. While LTTE guerrillas still indulge in sneak attacks, they now also launch brigade-strength offensives.
With all this, what could Prabhakaran have gained by agreeing to a permanent truce and settlement with Colombo
Continued on page 20

Page 20
20 TAM TIMES
continued from page 19
To his credit, he has never wavered from his commitment to the concept of Eelam, an independent homeland comprising the sprawling northeast. This steadfastness continued despite intense Indian government pressures when he was based in Madras for almost four years until January 1987.
But Prabhakaran refused to budge, and went on to destroy other Tamil groups like the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization when he felt they might side with New Delhi and agree to a compromise.
Indian External Affairs Ministry officials who dealt with him during that period maintain that the supremo was never enthusiastic about giving up fighting, although he tried to cloud his feelings at times.
The LTTE has rightly or wrongly come to believe that Eelam can be achieved. After almost two decades, the goal seems possible. A perusal of LTTE literature shows that the Tigers are supremely confident on this SCOre,
Talks are useful to the LTTE only if they suit its interests. It has no faith in Sri Lankan politicians. No tangible solution, it thinks, is possible within the framework of united Sri Lanka.
That is why Prabhakaran refused to see then President Junius Jayewardene when Indian authorities flew him to Bangalore from Madras in November 1986 during the summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
That is why the LTTE refused to tone down its demands when New Delhi arranged the first direct contact between Tamil militant groups and the Sri Lankan government in the summer of 1985 at Thimpu, Bhutan.
Both times, Rajiv Gandhi was upset with Prabhakaran. Only in the face of India's determination to go ahead with an accord with Sri Lanka in July 1987 did Prabhakaran appear to relent. The appearance, however, quickly faded away. And once the Indian army quit Sri Lanka, the LTTE saw no point in continuing its bonhomie with Colombo. The LTTE will do anything it thinks necessary for the sake of Eelam, regardless of the consequences. It is bothered about its goal, not about international opinion.
Prabhakaran has mastered the art of coming out of the tightest
corners. When his ter in 1987 as S marched on Jaffr with India. When began to breathe did a perfect about up to Colombo.
Everyone thou karan would be i India-Sri Lanka A and the Indian ar. na. Today the Acc
And just as P. seemed isolated in his decision to res April, his roving, sary, Lawrence T a cozy meeting in Timothy Carney, Secretary of State Affairs. It was thi tact between the II Administration. T Lanka is that th ground for Colom The maximum th do for the LTTE omy. But the Tig about autonomy. lieve that Sri Lan nations, Sinhala that the two natio
AN INDI
Sri L
Going by news
Lankan Army a enter Jaffna city. a sense of deja vu Army had captur having flattened ( the next phase w was 1987; our Tar were busy burnin ment offices, atta tions and post off signalling their s Sri Lankan Tamil
The question
would happen in Jaffna were to f South Block anc were unveiling while the "omnip tending to listenpar for the cours community said: ".

15 DECEMBER 1995
s men faced disasri Lankan troops na, he played ball the Indian army down his neck, he t-face and warmed
ght that Prabhaisolated when the Accord was signed my landed in Jafford is dead.
"abhakaran again ternationally over sume fighting last Paris-based emishilagar, managed Washington with Deputy Assistant 2 for South Asian e first oficial conTTE and the U.S. he problem in Sri ere is no meeting bo and the LTTE. e government can is to grant autongers care nothing
They firmly beka comprises two
and Tamil, and ns cannot co-exist.
Autonomy and however much Kumaratunga or anyone else could be able to grant would mean the acceptance of a united Sri Lanka. This is anathema to the Tigers. After having travelled so far, Prabhakaran is unlikely to retreat.
Rajiv Gandhi and Premadasa thought they could bring around the LTTE. But the group is not looking for power sharing; it wants absolute power, and that, too, as an independent, sovereign nation.
It seems convinced that it can keep on fighting until Sri Lanka capitulates. Its stunning attacks in Colombo, including the assassinations of leaders like Amrithalingam, Premadasa, Wijeratine and Athulathmudali, point to its dangerous strange hold on the capital.
And as the LTTE advances towards its goal with an unmatched ferociousness, Sri Lanka seems to be faltering. Even if Lankan troops manage to capture Jaffna, the Tigers would take to the jungles to carry on what they do best-fighting a classic guerrilla war.
Sri Lanka is unlikely to see peace in the near future. How the war will end is something perhaps no one can predict today.
AN MILITARY PERSPECTIVE
anka’s Last Chance
for Peace
by General K. Sundari
reports, the Sri ppears all set to I am overcome by u. The Sri Lankan ed Vadamaratchi, but much of it, and as to be Jaffna. It mils in Tamil Nadu. g Central governcking railway staices and generally olidarity with the Ls. then was: 'What Tamil Nadu if al?' We were in the “omniscient' their assessments otents' were prethis was generally 2. The intelligence Once the Sri Lank
anforces launch their attack against Jaffna, it will fall in 20 days and with more destruction than in Vadamaratchi; the reaction from Tamil Nadu will be cataclysmic, and we may need to deploy four Indian army divisions to maintain law and order in Tamil Nadu'.
Junior ministers did chair these discussions but the viewpoint of the absentee big boss was articulated by the mouthpiece, generally a bureaucrat, who was at that time acknowledged as the reigning oracle. “We believe that we have to do something and cannot stand by and watch. We can either barge in and help develop a Cyprus-like "solution" by establishing a virtual Eelam or “persuade” Sri Lankan President Jayewardene to give the Tamils a fair deal. What ought we to do?”

Page 21
15 DECEMBER 1995
The signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord; the despatch of Indian troops to the Jaffna peninsula; the brief honeymoon with the LTTE, their perfidy, the subsequent fighting and capture of Jaffna city; the defeated Tiger licking its wounds in the jungles; the return of normalcy to Jaffna city and the peninsula; the holding of elections; President Premadasa secretly “treating with the LTTE, offering them succour and demanding the recall of the IPKFall this is recent history and need not be recounted here in any detail.
The fall of Jaffna city to the Sri Lankan forces now would also have a profound geopolitical and psychological effect on the situation. What are these likely to be? What is the probable upshot? Much is going to depend on the statesmanship that President Chandrika Kumaratunga displays and the wisdom with which her government acts. There need be no doubt that the mass of the Tamil civil population is sick and tired of the war and would like an honourable peace with generously granted autonomy in the north and the east.
It is equally clear that the LTTE leadership is unsure of itself about handling peace unless it is on the basis of an Eelam that it can run dictatorially on its own terms. It would, therefore, prefer to continue the war, however fair, generous and honest Kumaratunga's offer of autonomy might be. Nonetheless, the key will not be the attitude of the LTTE, but that of the Tamil people. Will they return to Jaffna and help in the return to normalcy once the battle for Jaffna is over? Will they be able to resist the threats of the LTTE as they did after the Indian liberation of Jaffna?
The psychological effect of the fall of Jaffna is bound to make the Sinhalese right wing, including the Buddhist clergy, believe that there is little requirement now for the grant of any autonomy to the Tamils. They may also come to believe that a hardlinesolution can be rammed down the throat of the "defeated' party. Even moderate Tamils, who constitute the bulk of the population, are bound to be dismayed at the loss of Jaffna owing to hurt pride and the fear that the Sri Lankan Government might impose a hardline peace.
The LTTE, meanwhile, will continue the war in a different manner. They will keep insurgency alive and fight a rural guerrilla war from their jungle bases, along with urban acts
of terrorism in northern and e the control of th forces and possi On the politic exploit the a right-wing back ing the Tamils
with the Sri Li This propagand be assisted by
vengeance agai laborators amor tion. The LTTE in other parts o capitalise on sto abuse by the S forces in the lib no doubt that st on reality and m and manufactur
Still, there ar ences between the Tamil popul that which exist ago, when the ducted operation na, some civilia their homes so a the crossfire. Ho stayed in Jaffna church compo Army did its be areas with artil The population play of the India there was no their impartialit for confidence. TI vastly different.
The LTTE, by aganda, compell population to e portrayed this i sign of Tamil st citizens of Jaffn come homeless under Sri Lanka their military. T population could accusing the Sri indiscriminate and mortaring 0 This, I believe, blunder on the The propaganda national arena, be a pyrrhic vic on the ground h of the Sri Lanka its heavier sup The constraints lian population been removed.
One of the arg LTTE to secure is the plea that their positions

TAMIL TIMES 21
Jaffna and other astern towns under e Sri Lankan armed bly Colombo as well. l plane, they will ticipated Sinhala ash in propagandisnto not cooperating nkan Government. a will, undoubtedly, acts of terror and st the so-called colg the Tamil populaund its sympathisers the world will also ties of human-rights ri Lankan security rated areas. I have me would be based uch on exaggerated ed data.
e some basic differhe situation - and ation - in 1987 and ;s now. Eight years Indian Army conns for clearing Jaffins did indeed flee s not to get killed in wever, most of them itself in temple and unds. The Indian est not to hit these lery or mortar fire. believed in the fair an troops - at least :ause for doubting y - and this made 'oday, the picture is
coercion and proped the bulk of the vacuate Jaffna. It nternationally as a olidarity where the a would rather berefugees than live an rule imposed by he evacuation of the also be exploited by Lankan military of bombing, shelling finnocent civilians. is a major tactical part of the LTTE. victory in the interif there is one, will tory. The situation as turned in favour n armed forces with porting fire power. that a resident civiwould impose have
uments used by the civilian evacuation hey have to defend by shooting in all
directions and that civilians would be in grave danger. This has worked in favour of the attacker rather than the defender. The absence of a civilian population, that needs to be looked after by the attacking forces whilst still fighting the battle, has decreased the strain on the Sri Lankan Army, simplified matters and permitted them to concentrate on the LTTE, with no holds barred.
It is almost certain that the population of Jaffna will return after the fighting has died down. The Sri Lankans have re-established their authority in the town and the LTTE has not open presence. This will indeed play a decisive part in the return of normalcy. The population would perhaps by more resentful of the Sri Lankan forces than the LTTE for their forced evacuation and the resultant privations. However, there would be a realisation that Sri Lankan fire did not directly cause the death of too many people. If the forces behave with restraint and treat the Tamil population fairly, the fear and resentment - built up over decades of civil war - will begin to fade.
The cooperation of the people, their attitude towards Sri Lankan authority and their defiance of LTTE diktats would depend upon the generosity of Sri Lankan policy after the organised 'conventional defence' of the LTTE ceases and the guerrilla phase begins. A generous, fair and clearly set out political offer to the Tamils, along with firm counter-insurgency action against the LTTE guerrillas, could, I believe, win back the hearts and minds of the Tamils. Can the Government of Sri Lanka take such a decision and make it stick in the face of opposition from Sinhala chauvinists? Will the opposition parties in Sri Lanka desist from politicising the issue and fanning Sinhala fanaticism?
Assuming that all these difficulties are surmounted and a really good and fair offer made, will the Tamils believe in the honesty of purpose of the Sri Lankan Government? Will international or regional guarantees be required? If so, what forms should these take? These are issues to be discussed in the days to come, and a lot will depend upon the answers. There is absolutely no doubt that the fall of Jaffna will present another opportunity, perhaps the last, to the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil people for an honourable negotiated settle
Continued on page 22

Page 22
Z2 AMIL TIMES
Election Commission
Rao's Poll Move in Ka
by T.N. Gopalan
They asked for azaadi (freedom). This man would offer only autonomy. "How much?" they wanted to know. "Well, sky is the limit, he promised, but finally delivered something so pitifully small that the azaadi-seekers were outraged.
All that he gained in the process was that his image of a hopeless ditherer now stood transformed to that of an unreliable negotiator.
Such then is the story of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's attempts to extricate a mascot from out of the Kashmir tangle only to come a cropper.
The nation seems to be living through some tragic times when unscrupulous manipulators pass for great statesmen, and finally it is the people who pay heavily for it all.
Professing to sort out the Kashmir mess and also fulfil the aspirations of the agitating Kashmiris, Mr. Rao announced from Ouagadougou, the capital of the African republic of Burkina Faso, that elections would be held to the Jammu and Kashmir state legislative assembly in December next and that the Indira GandhiSheikh Abdullah Accord of February 1975 would be implemented.
The elected representatives of the J & K people could then sit down for talks with the Centre on the modalities of implementing the accord.
Continued from page 21
ment to bring this long-drawn-out civil war to an end. Failure to grasp this chance will not only mean calamity in Sri Lanka but also impact adversely on the region. I believe that India should do all it can to facilitate a settlement, and it is in a unique position to reassure the Tamil people regarding the good faith of the Sri Lankan Government. Will our opposition parties desist from politicising the issue? Will the political parties of Tamil Nadu desist from supporting the LTTE? These again are crucial questions, and the track record of our political parties has thus far been dismal in this regard. One can only hope that a statesman-like approach will be adopted this time round by all parties.
(Courtesy: India Today, 30.11.95).
Well, if they so wi could call himsel (Prime Minister).
Apart from his co aborogate Art.370 by enjoys some special cisely on which gro va brigade is dem article be repealed thing in the Ouag enthuse any self-r miri and everyone anything in the v with contempt.
Not even Mr. S. son of Sheikh Al whom the Indian ho the situation in the and with whom M prolonged consultat ing up with his pack anything to do with He is demanding of the pre-1953 sta ment between his Jawharlal Nehru th by which provision constitution did nic apply to J & K, approval by the sta the state governme with all residuary p tion, confining cent defence, communica nal affairs.
Incidentally the ment was suppose enshrined in Art.37 tion. Rao then w theory the validity would not impleme implementing Art effect be going b Gandhi-Sheikh Abd (Many legislati enacted between 19 which the autonom remorselessly dilut away).
Without the res pre-1953 status th Farooq's National going to stick its participate in any el it clear.
Farooq’s own crec resentative of the open to question, ar self chose to cry off, exercise threatened

15 DECEMBER 1995
Blocks Shmir
nt the new CM Wazir-e-Azam
mmitment not to which Kashmir privileges - preinds the Hindutanding that the - there was nodougou offer to especting Kashwho counted for alley rejected it
heikh Abdullah, bdullah and on opes of salvaging valley still lies r. Rao had held ions before com:age, would have
it. the restoration tus - the agreefather and Mr. he previous year s of the Indian bt automatically but subject to te assembly and nt was invested lowers of legislaaljurisdiction to tions and exter
July 1952 agreed to have been 0 of the constituould uphold in of the article but it it in practice - ,.370 would in yond the Mrs. ullah Accord.
ons had been 52 and 1975 by y of J & K was ed and whittled
toration of the re was no way Conference was
neck out and actions, he made
tibility as a repKashmiris was d when he himhe very election
to degenerate
into a total farce.
However, the Election Commission saved the day for all concerned by refusing hold elections on the ground that conditions in the valley were far from conducive.
The EC's authority to take such a momentous decision has already been questioned in the supreme court.
The Rao government, for its part, swallowing its dismay, has reiterated its determination to further 'consolidate the situation, reduce the room for doubts on whether the atmosphere was conducive and thus restore the democratic process and institutions in the state'.
However, no force in the valley, barring of course Farooq himself, is prepared to allow any elections to be held there under the present circumstances lest they would give some kind of a legitimacy to New Delhi's rule.
Fulminated JKLF leader Yasin Malik, "We will see to it that no Kashmiri goes to vote and we will go to any extent to see that this farcical election is rendered null and void. . . we want azaadi - total freedom, freedom from both India and Pakistan...'.
Putting the issue even more succinctly, Mr. Syed Ali Shah Geelani, acting chairman of the All Party Hurriyat Conference, (APHF), said, "The security forces can herd people into polling booths and force them to vote. But this will not be a permanent solution. . . All we are demanding is that you ask the awam (masses) what they want. We will accept their verdict whatever it be. We know that neither our gun nor that of the security forces to solve the issue...But we have no other option left...'.
Evidently Rao's idea was to force an election down the throats of the unwilling Kashmiris a la Punjab, steeling himself against possible devastating attacks from the militants and even wholesale boycott and thereafter bargain for peace with the elected representatives, however fraudulent the elections might prove to be.
If such a strategy could not work in Punjab, why not in Kashmir too, he should have thought.
So far so good. But then the timing of it all is easily suspect. No one in his senses could have mooted elections in Kashmir during a freezing winter.
How the government was propos

Page 23
15 DECEMBER 1995
ing to counter the challenge of the various militant groups, the Pak designs - Pakistan could increase tension on the border, tying up the Indian forces - and possible non-cooperation of the state government employees and so on it was never made clear.
Without a broadly acceptable package, genuinely democratic elections cannot be held in J & K. But apparently Mr. Rao's hope was that the very act of holding elections could prove a feather in his cap and could endear him to the masses, well in time for the next general elections.
It looked like the PM was prepared to subject the already harried Kashmiris to large-scale carnage in his cynical pursuit of electoral fortunes. As leading analyst K. Subrahmanyam put it, "In essence, the election preparations have all the complexities of a major military operation. The J & K elections are likely to be the costliest elections both in terms of per vote expenditure and even aggregate expenditure.'
More than most it was Mr. Farooq Abdullah who felt terribly let down. The very man who had squandered away his father's legacy and who paved the way for the virtual liquidation of the democratic processes and who played a no less significant role than the wooden-headed rulers from New Delhi in effectively alienating the Kashmiris from the rest of the Indian Union, was pulled out of his self-imposed exile in London, and the centre seemed to offer him some straw to clutch at and redeem himself in the public eye.
But Mr. Rao in the event could not muster up enough courage to offer a reasonable package which Farooq could in turn try and sell in the valley. But then it was not to be.
By itself the 1975 Accord was not all that bad. It did reiterate the primacy of Art.370 and empowered the J & K government to decide to review the laws made by the parliament or extended to the state after 1953 on any matter related to the concurrent list.
However neither Farooq the father nor the son seriously pursued such an option, and now it is widely perceived as a manifestation of Indian imperialism since the then ageing Sheikh had been arm-twisted into signing on the dotted lines by Mrs. Gandhi.
And these are days when roundthe-clock vigil has to be kept by the
Indian army to grave from being
Under such would have beens of the Indian go Farooq something on. While New been hoping to Assam, perhaps a parallel would be are the people strong is the milit
A number of ducted in the vall show that the seceding from th whatever the col fundamentalist se for merging with few are for remair Union. For all the country, the Kas more comfortable ethos than with t intolerance and se guing Pakistan. T ism is considered syncretic and te traditions in the miris refused to and had actually
Tam On L
It is not yet a storn it was much mor leaves stirring.
At last the leade shook themselves deep slumber and hour bandh on No the continuing kill the sufferings o thousands of displ also demanding th tervene in the cris to the misery of Tamils.
The response ol very heartening a total. Transport se pled and both pri" ment establishmen day. Even the ai rescheduled the flig that no plane Meenampakkam d period.
The southern rai tion got mud on it maintain its servic

AML TIMES 23
prevent Sheikh's desecrated.
circumstances it ensible on the part vernment to offer concrete to work Delhi might have do a Punjab or more appropriate Jaffna. So much alienated and so ancy. opinion polls con2y recently clearly Cashmiris are for le Indian Union, nsequences. Some ctions are pitching Pakistan but very hing within Indian ills afflicting this hmiriat would be with the Indian he fundamentalist Ictarian strife plaThe Kashmir sufone of the most olerant religious world. The Kashgo with Pakistan resisted invasion
by the latter, it may be recalled here.
Blunders committed ever since the time of Jawaharlal Nehru - did he not go back on his agreement with Sheikh and arrest him barely a year later on mere apprehensions that the latter was planning secession - have contributed to a situation wherein India has become thoroughly discredited and come to be seen as an oppressor nation.
The cost of keeping a subjugated and humiliated people as a part of the country is becoming increasingly prohibitive. As noted writer and human rights activist from Jammu, Mr. Balraj Puri, observes, “The cost would be in terms of suppression of the democratic character of the Indian state, its secular and moral basis, the civilizational values of the nations as well as its international prestige.'
"An intelligent and rational ethnic policy is necessary for a country like India not only to deal with fissiparous tendencies within but also as a source of inspiration and cultural influence for its neighbours', says Puri.
il Nadu Wakes Up ankan Tami ISSUue
by T.N. Gopalan, Madras
in in the state. But e than a case of
ers of Tamil Nadu
out of their long,
| organised a 12v. 30 protesting at ings in Jaffna and f hundreds and aced civilians and (at the Centre inis and put an end
the Sri Lankan
f the people was hd the bandh was rvices were cripvate and governits declared a holirport authorities ghts for the day so arrived or left luring the bandh
lway administras face, seeking to es, but was finally
forced to cry off in the face of a determined opposition.
The successful bandh which passed off peacefully was a personal triumph for DMK leader M. Karunanidhi for it was he who was behind the call and succeeded in making even his political foes including Chief Minister Jayalalitha fall in line.
The event attracted nationwide publicity and put the Lankan issue back on the agenda of the state. The last time the state had witnessed a bandh in support of the Lankan Tamils was in July 1990 when Karunanidhi was in power.
After the Rajiv assassination and after Jayalalitha became Chief Minister this was the first time that a bandh was organised in solidarity with the island Tamils.
An interesting aspect about the bandh was that nowhere was a single slogan raised or a poster
Continued on page 24

Page 24
24 TAMIL TIMES
Continued from page 23 pasted hailing the LTTE or Prabhakaran. Everywhere the stress was only on the sufferings of the Jaffna Tamils in general. There were not even voices supporting the call for a separate Tamil Eelam — and this despite the fact that most of the nationalist organisations are composed of avowed Prabhakaran supporters.
That was because those who organised the demonstrations knew that hailing Prabhakaran would be inviting trouble, besides the people at large might not appreciate such a stance. Anyway the choreographer, Mr. Karunanidhi, was not willing to push for any pro-Tiger line. Put pressure on the centre and make it intervene in the crisis was his refrain throughout.
The one politician who revels in the role of an uncompromising Eelamist and Tiger-cheer-leader, V. Gopalasamy was completely overshadowed by the crafty erstwhile boss. He could not bring out his cadres on to the streets on the bandh day evidently because DMK men were already out in strength, picketing railway stations and so on. He had to content himself with issuing some rabble-rousing statements.
In many places the refugees were even allowed to take out processions denouncing Chandrika.
Enthused by the overwhelming response to the bandh, the Tamil nationalist organisations are said to be planning to further intensify the agitation and Karunanidhi himself is reportedly not averse to such
OWeS.
If the sufferings in the Jaffna peninsula increase and no steps for a political solution are initiated, the temperature in the state could go up and the Lankan tangle could even become an election issue.
The Sri Lankan media Minister and cabinet spokesman Mr. Dharmasiri Senanayake is reported to have described the bandh as an "ill-informed' exercise and regretted that the political parties here were 'acting on a false premise'.
As Mr. S. Guhan, a retired IAS official and who has acted as advisor to the Karunanidhi regime, told this correspondent, “the ethnic ties are too strong to be sundered by some mishaps or tragedies. As reports of problems in Jaffna keep filtering in, political parties would definitely shed their inhibitions and take the matter to the streets...it would be
difficult for the ( such developments
O Meantime ir ments the southe marred by serious the dalits (the unto intermediate cast Thevars, a very mi whose stocks are C the Jayalalitha reg
Sasikala, though by origin and hails district, is said to promoting the caus a kindred sect - in instance the two c budiyars, another i
Nasre
Controversial Bar Taslima Nasreen, Germany from Islan wrath in her countr an Indian visa.
Nasreen, who ap) the Berlin office of th in Germany last mc granted for the time in Germany on a fel
The sources said was referred to th New Delhi which against acceding ta being. One source II between being “deni being granted' a v being. Privileged sou explained that the "legitimate concerns a visa' in view o communities.' The munities was appa describe Muslims w could disapprove of
Nasreen had to le August last year f her life from ortho in Bangladesh whi her for propagating independent lifestyl ly objected to one ol (Shame), in Bengal cally portrayed the Hindus in her count Hindu groups in In disputed Babri mo Ayodhya in Uttar ber 1992.
Nasreen has be. India, a country sh partly to meet w friends, expected to ladesh. News repo was denied an earl January that she n Embassy in Stockh.
Although there w

Pentre to ignore
other developrn districts are conflicts between uchables) and the es, notably the litant community n the rise unde
ime.
herself a kallar from Thanjavur ) be assiduously e of the Thevars, fact it was at her astes and agamintermediate com
15 DECEMBER 1995
munity, have been banded together and are to be called officially the Mukkulathor, a honorific generally made much by the Thevars only.
The Pallars, the dalit segment inhabiting the south, are locking horns fiercely with the Thevars and the administration has been seen to be siding with the latter, resulting in police action against dalit hamlets.
Chief Minister Jayalalitha is said to be caught in a cleft stick, as it were, unable to either protect the dalits or rein in the Thevars or at least her confidante. The situation seems to have ominous portents for the polity.
em Denied Indian visa
gladeshi author who is hiding in nic fundamentalist y, has been denied
plied for a visa at he Indian Embassy onth, has not been being. Nasreen is lowship.
her visa request e government in
in turn advised ) it for the time made a distinction ed' a visa and “not risa for the time urces in New Delhi
government had over granting her f 'sensitivities of reference to comarently meant to ho, it was feared, her presence.
ave her country in ollowing threats to dox Islamic groups o sharply rebuked a "libertarian' and le. They particularf her novels, Laija' li that sympatheti
plight of minority ryafternationalist dia demolished the sque structure in Pradesh in Decem
en eager to visit he is said to love', ith relatives and i come from Bangrts have said she ier visa request in made to the Indian olm, Sweden.
yas no official com
ment in New Delhi over nonissue of a visa to her, some political sources said Nasreen's visit ahead of India's general elections sometime early next year is fraught with political consequences.”
In that sense she is in the same boat as Salman Rushdie, one source said, describing how the two writers in the midst of violent controversies because of their books could disturb political equations in India.
But government sources played down the denial saying "it is a routine matter. Governments have their own reasons which need not necessarily be spurred by politics. There are reasons of law and order too.”
There has been little popular reaction to the reported denial. Even the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had earlier criticized fundmentalists for hounding Nasreen, has not reacted. Nasreen said last year that she disapproved of Hindu fundamentalists as much as she disapproves of Islamic clerics in Bangladesh.
Past Copies of Tamil Times
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Page 25
15 DECEMBER 1995
The Language of Bel and Bloodlettin
by Ram Manikkalingam
The language of belonging lends itself to bloodletting. The rhetoric of nationalism favours war, and that of war, nationalism.
On April 19, Tamil nationalists easily justified the Tigers' violation of the ceasefire and rejection of negotiations. And today, Operation Riviresa, the Sri Lankan Army's largest offensive in the North, runs the risk of giving Sinhala nationalists a new lease of life.
Tamil extremists rejoiced at the collapse of the ceasefire on April 19. They resorted to perverse justifications of Tiger intransigence. Food was not sent to the North, they claimed, while the Tigers took the fresh stocks and released the old ones to the Tamil people. Take away the Pooneryn army base, they called while the Tigers purchased SAM missiles in the international arms bazaar. Let us strut around with our AKs in the East, they clamoured, as the Tigers recruited hundreds of children and took them North.
Tamil extremists were emboldened by the string of Tiger successes. Two ships were sunk and two Avro transport planes were downed in a week. A series of camps were attacked and destroyed in the East. A separate Tamil Eelam, they thought, was around the corner. Tamil extremists cheered in Toronto, London and Paris. But Tamils in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa did not.
They knew better. From bitter experience they braced themselves for the inevitable and inexorable government military response. They also knew that the Tigers would flee and they would be the first victims of war, whether as refugees, the injured or the dead.
Operation Riviresa was launched on October 17. The Army has reached the outskirts of Jaffna. The Tigers retreated and took the people with them. Having boasted that “Eelam” was around the corner, the Tigers now have to admit they are no closer to it than they have ever been. The Tamil extremists are hard-pressed. Having justified war as a complement to negotiations on April 19, they need to backtrack and call for peace. They have short memories.
In the eupho ceasefire victorie however big a st the Sri Lankan been able to resp one. Unfortunat Operation Rivire of that reality.
If the Tamil ex nationalism justi 19, the rhetoric O Operation Rivire: Sinhala nationali
Operation Rivi mature rejoicing military victory Sinhala extremis come more and n past two weeks. F scent of victory i are going after the cated a just pea These Sinhala from as acute a amnesia as thei parts.
In September 1 the war was ove recaptured the E that a political permanently shel an all-out milita they had defeate ignored the Tami were not defeate still remained.
The Eastern off the war. It only s new phase. And solution was ignor no less bloody thal They are about t mistake. The Si Society, The Soci Sri Lanka and a nisations with sin perked up with Jaffna. They ar. military victories them evade their
Their position i is a Sinhala coun dilutes this by pol its multi-ethnic n intensify their can proposals.
Sinhala extrem ed to the margin tics by the Sin Sinhala extremis was debunked a

TAMILTIMES 25
Onging 9
Iria of the posts, they forgot that ick the Tigers use,
state has always ond with a bigger ely, it has taken sa to remind them
tremist rhetoric of fied war on April f war surrounding sa is giving rise to S.
esa has led to preabout a permanent . The baying of t hounds has behore audible in the Emboldened by the n the North, they pse who have advoce in the South. extremists suffer case of political r Tamil counter
990, they thought r once the Army ast. They decided solution could be ved as they sought y one. Imagining l the Tigers, they ls. But the Tigers d and the Tamils
ensive did not end et the stage for a since a political ed, this phase was the previous one. ) repeat the same nhala Protection ety for a Unitary nost of other orgamilar names have the offensive in excited by the that may help political failures.
s clear. Sri Lanka iry and devolution tically recognising ature. So they will npaign against the
ists were dispatchi of Southern polihala people. The t political current ld its representa
tives defeated in the parliamentary elections in August 1994. With the rise in nationalism that inevitably accompanies the rhetoric of war, they have hit upon Operation Riviresa as their chance to re-entel the mainstream.
But President Kumaratunga effectively put an end to this in a hard-hitting interview on November 23. Chandrika Kumaratunga rejected Sinhala extremist praise for carrying out Operation Riviresa: "They did not help us pursue peace, nor have they lifted a finger to help us wage war.'
She reiterated the People's Alliance's strategy: "They (Sinhala extremists) do not accept the presence of a Tamil problem. . . and we (the People's Alliance) do'.
The previous day, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Col. Anuruddha Ratwatte, took on Sinhala extremists as well. Calling for communal harmony in the South, he threatened that "pseudo patriots who incite communal violence (against Tamils) will be rounded up and sent to the front to fight the enemy.'
These interviews were timed to ensure communal peace in the aftermath of the recapture of Jaffna or bomb attacks by Tigers against civilian targets in Colombo. They were also designed to distance politically the PA Government from Sinhala nationalism and relegate the extremists to the margins of Southern politics, whence they come.
Finally, they signalled a government shift from the rhetoric of war that has been dominating Sri Lanka for the past two months to the rhetoric of politics necessary to pursue constitutional reform.
President Kumaratunga's commitment to constitutionalise radical proposals for regional autonomy is the only bulwark betwen a democratic multi-ethnic Sri Lanka and permanent war. She needs to initiate a political offensive against Sinhala extremism close on the heels of her military one against Tamil extremism. She should brook no delay in pursuing the political proposals to their conclusion: a new federal Constitution for Sri Lanka.
Only the language of national reconciliation that will accompany such an effort can heal the wounds caused by war and pave the way for a permanent peасе.
Nationalism is about the political
Continued on page 26

Page 26
26 TAMILTIMES
Continued from page 25
protection of one's cultural community. War is about men killing men, women and children. If protecting one's cultural identity is the end, pursuing peace ought to be no less valid a means than waging war. But the tragedy is that for Sinhala and Tamil nationalism it still is not. In Sri Lanka, the language of belonging continues to lend itself to bloodletting.
Ram Manikkalingam is with the Department of Political Science, Massachusets institute of Tech
nology.
Continued from p Today you have b reme opportunity the bondage of int. There is no need sacrifice their lives your children can l peace as noble cit
she added.
Government pla
Jaffna peninsula i of electricity, reco aged buildings and to get the 1,000-b Hospital back to o Attempt to Enslav LTTE summarily
dent's offer accusin of trying to enslav
SCIENCE AND SUPERS
The Milk Hoa When the Faith Held People
by Sukumar Muralidharan
A miracle wrought in stone and milk. A nation held in thrall for a whole day.
Stone takes a variety of sizes and shapes. Some of these, conditioned over centuries in the crucible of nature, display a regular crystalline or granular structure. These variants, which are amenable to a degree of polish, lend themselves to several practical applications, one among which is the sculpting of idols. Stone idols often constitute the centrepiece of ritualised religious observances in different social milieus.
Milk - a lightfluid, chemically inactive under normal circumstances - is the basic element in the nutrition of new-born mammals. Those of a fastidious disposition might insist that milk is not a homogeneous liquid, but an emulsion, or a fine blend of fluids and particulate matter.
Pour milk over a stone object and it trickles off-that is the law of nature. There is no known physical law by which milk can permeate the tight crystalline structure of stone in ambient conditions.
On September 21, idols from the Shaivite pantheon - notably of Ganesha, but also of other deities such as Nandi and Parvati - were reported to be imbibing the fluid in copious quantities. The word probably went out from the national capital - there is yet no firm identification of the place where reports about this preternatural phenomenon started. Before noon that day, the rumour had gone around the
globe. Telephone
enquiries from acr the miracle manife And in temples a throngs of devotees a votive offering of
The evidence oft dismissed out of h sensory experience mislead, but whe large population, tl easily repudiated. I many people unde came away convin of Ganesha were in that day. It is suffic large number wer the moral pressur community to ac credible manner, that it did indeed of the inexplicable.
The difficulty is posed to the dom phenomenon lend routine explanatio obey the gravitatio - the only apparen the phenomenon tension creates a Plunge a narrow fluid and in appar law of gravity, flu rise above its level body. A wick in ar same principle, cre for a slow-burning mundane phenor draped in the aura

age 11
en offered the supo free yourself from lerance and terror. or your children to any more. You and vein dignity and in zens of Sri Lanka,”
is for the battered cluded restoration nstruction of damthe top priority was d Jaffna Teaching eration.
e: Predictably the rejected the Presing her government the Tamil people.
15 DECEMBER 1995
A statement from the LTTE's London office said that the government's sole aim was to bring back the people to army controlled areas and enslave them by trying to bring them under its own control. "To defeat the scheme of the government, the LTTE advises the displaced people to proceed to the Vanni mainland. By doing this the Tamils are gaining liberty. . .and a prosperous future.'
The Paris-based international spokesman for the LTTE, Mr. Lawrence Thilakar, said that the refugees would not return to Jaffna camps south of lagoon and live under army occupation. "The LTTE is supplying free boats, bus transport and medical Continued on page 29
| in Thrial
lines buzzed with oss the world about sting itself in India. cross the country, queued up to make "milk.
he senses cannot be land. One person's s could conceivably n shared across a hey are not quite so t is immaterial how rtook the trial and :ed that stone idols deed imbibing milk ient to know that a e. That would put e on the scientific count for it in a or else to concede belong to the realm
that when transain of science, the y itself to a fairly n. Fluid flow must hal pull of the earth t exception is when known as surface capillary action. ube into a body of int violation of the ld in the tube will in the surrounding oil lamp obeys the iting the conditions flame. It is a fairly enon, but when of novelty it is one
that can cause a transient sense of wonderment.
This explanation was indeed proferred midway through the day of the “miracle'. But it won few takers among the faithful. The crowds continued to grow at various shrines across the country. The earlier rumour, that the spectacle would only last till 1 p.m., was revised as the day wore on. The miracle was given till 6 p.m. to run its course. But wonderstruck crowds continued to mill around idols till late in the night, partaking of the ephemeral wonder. It was close to midnight when temple priests forcibly shut the door on the miracle. The deities presumably had had their fill of the votive offerings. And so too, seemingly, had the priests gained enough by way of material offerings.
The scientific explanation advanced on the day of the miracle was premised upon the axiomatic acceptance that the force of gravity must finally triumph. Whatever the optical impression conveyed by the forces of surface tension, the milk ultimately had to trickle along the contours of the idol and form a pool at its base. Beyond a point, the accumulation of milk would have punctured the illusion of a miracle.
The scientists who intervened on the day of the miracle obviously considered this a self-evident proposition. But they did not bargain for the camouflage options that were avail
able to the perpetrators of the milk
hoax. The typical pattern in Delhi was to periodically shower the idols with flowers and rose petals which would drop to the floor, covering over the accumulation of milk. and every so often, a devotee would, in a mood of extreme ardour, pour a substantial quantity of milk over the idol in ceremonial drenching, or abhishekam.
Since it was nobody's case that the milk offered as abhishekam would be

Page 27
15 DECEMBER 1995
imbibed, there was little lost in conceding that it was accumulating on the floor. Once on the ground, it served the important function of concealment, blending homogeneously with the dietary offerings of milk. Idols are normally situated in well-drained sites, since ceremonial bathing is a frequent ellement of Hindu ritual. In time, the milk would have flowed out of the vicinity.
The mood of the moment was such that only a rigorous material audit of the amount of milk offered and the quantity flowing down to the pedestal of the idol could have established that the miracle was founded on rather watery premises. An escape hatch was always open - the true men of faith could argue that the milk accumulating at the base of the idol was not commensurate with the quantum offered.
Science and faith seldom blend without friction. Observation, control and replication constitute the foundations of scientific experimentation. The psychosis of a miracle is founded upon mass illusion and the prior specification of a narrow domain of applicability in space and time. September 21 was the day vouchsafed for the miracle. It was the day when millions, under the moral pressure to conform, willed themselves into believing that stone idols were drinking milk. On any other day, the believers might have been willing to attribute the same phenomenon to the force of surface tension. But so too would they insist that there was a difference of both magnitude and kind between the two. While no milk gathered at the pedestal of the idol on September 21, it was quite clearly doing so on all subsequent days.
Certain of the other preconditions of the miracle were of a fairly transparent nature. It was claimed, for example, that the idols would only take in raw milk. Once boiled, the fluid would not conform to the demands of the divine palate. As with much else that day, this piece of wisdom was again attributed to a direct transcendental intervention. But, for the sceptics, the considerations were altogether unambiguous. Once boiled, the fat content in milk crystallises out as a creamy layer. And an offering of boiled milk could conceivably contain some amount of cream, which would adhere most inconveniently to the surface of the idol.
After all the subterfuge, the ultinate weapon in the armoury of the cabal that perpetrated the hoax was that of faith. Some who went as sceptics came away as believers. Some who went as believers came away unconvinced, their ears resonating with the
murmurs of assem the shallowness of defining example the mob psycholog to conform or bear branded unworthy tion.
What precisely h September 21? Th new network of sured that the wo corners of the coun a context of ideolo of moral categori world of growing rumour fell on the credulity. Finally took over and the into a global phenc
The key element mystery would be impetus for wha greatest mass hoa ever seen. Enquir maruku of the l Association seem t first sparks were lit evening of Septem ing, he says, a gro temple town made that deities from t would drink milk Shortly afterwards from the town. The the rumour, Sanall were the same who a few days prior to tion in support of C beleaguered politi part-time godman.
This, suggests E indicates that th hatched by Chand sperate attempt to in his political fort gans that were rais Delhi ashram on S credence to this vie
There are other Chandra Swami's ing credit was no r thought. To these Vishwa Hindu Pari would like to port September 21 as a tion of divine grace
Giriraj Kishore, tionary was among The "milk miracle', that the dawn of nation was immine tury, he insisted, w Hindu faith. But in effusions, Giriraj Ki conceal his irritatio mi's claim to the miracle.
Other observers : the entire hoax at t

TAMIL TIMES 27
led devotees about heir belief. It was a of the operation of 7. Each person had the odium of being
of divine benedic
appened that day of e efficiency of the ommunication enrd reached remote try in good time. In gical vulnerability, es collapsing in a complexity, the ertile soil of human mob psychology matter snowballed
eO. in unravelling the to trace the initial t is perhaps the x the country has tes by Sanal Edaindian Rationalist o suggest that the in Hardwar on the ber 20. That evenup of sadhus in the an announcement he Shaivite family the following day. , milk disappeared sadhus who set off Edamaruku insists, had come to Delhi join a demonstrahandra Swami, the cal operator and
:damaruku, clearly e milk hoax was ra Swami in a dearrest the decline unes. And the slosed in the godman's September 21 lends ewpoint. s who insist that undue haste in takmore than an afterranks belong the shad (VHP), which aray the events of genuine manifesta
a senior WHIP functhe most effusive. he claimed, proved
a genuine Hindu ent. The next cen"ould belong to the
the midst of these ishore could hardly n at Chandra Swaauthorship of the
are inclined to lay he doorstep of the
VHP. The CPI(M) Polit Bureau, for instance, saw the event as an orchestrated build-up to the VHP's ritualistic Ekatmata Yatras, which are scheduled to climax during the Dasara observances, and kick-start the BJP's campaign for the next general elections. And by all accounts, the VHP's network of influence is sufficiently widely dispersed for it to start off a mass hysteria on this scale.
Statements of some sobriety and responsibility came from unexpected quarters. Orissa Chief Minister J.B. Patnaik was among the first to debunk the rumours and call for an inquiry into the channels of their propagation. The Union Home Ministry similarly took a serious view of the event, seeing it as the precursor to another phase of communal mobilisation and adventurist politics. In its rapidity of diffusion, the event highlighted how the politics of rumour still retains a certain potency. This is something that the Home Ministry had been made unpleasantly aware of in June 1994, when totally unfounded reports of President Shankar Dayal Sharma's demise swept the country alongside a variety of hypothesis on why the news was being kept under wraps. The official enquiry into that episode, conducted by the Intelligence Bureau, is yet to reach a definitive conclusion.
The official media did its bit to clear the air. Doordarshan's Hindi news digest on September 21 provided an ocular debunking of the miracle, with telling footage of a shoe-smith feeding milk to his tripod. The spectacle had been organised by scientists of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), who have since devoted considerable energy to the popular diffusion of the material basis of the supposed miracle.
But with all the hysteria having subsided, troublesome images do linger. Lawyers from Delhi's trial court have threatened the CSIR scientists with legal action for allegedly causing grievous hurt to the sentiments of the religious majority. A young woman lawyer from Patna, who undertook the job of demystifying the hoax with great avidity, has faced intimidation from the local unit of the VHP, which insists that it will visit the fate of Bangladeshi writer Taslima Nasreen on her. Those who would like to stand by rationality and fairplay in public life might view the milk hoax as a passing aberration. But it could well turn out to be one episode in the resurgence of the new politics of religiosity.
(Courtesy of Frontline, October 20, 1995).

Page 28
28 TAMIL TIMES
BOOK REVIEW
Sri Lanka Tamils Ethnicity and iden
Edited by Chelvadurai Manogaran and Brya Published in 1994 in the USA & UK By Westview
Review by Dr. Narapalasingam
All the contributors, who are well known for their expertise in the relevant fields, deserve to be praised for their in-depth research and painstaking work that have gone into the preparation of the different but related studies and the compilation of this volume. The need for such an integrated approach to analyze first all aspects pertaining to the distinct ethnic identity of Sri Lanka's Tamils and then their legitimate demand for liberation from central rule, hitherto, dictated by Sinhala nationalism has been perceived for a long time. The publication of this volume has gone a long way towards filling this lacuna.
The reader will be impressed by the enormous statistics compiled, analyzed and used by the contributors to show objectively the discrimination experienced by the Tamils in all matters that affected their status as equal citizens, security, welfare and traditional right to preserve for all future generations of Tamils that part of the island which they regard as their homeland. The real fear of losing their distinctive identity and culture, which had withstood the intrusions of alien cultures and social customs under 3 different colonial regimes for nearly 4 centuries was felt after Ceylon became an independent nation. The relentless actions of institutionalizing and legitimizing the exceptional dominance of the majority community in the state and polity, facilitated by all the unitary constitutions of Sri Lanka and which finally led to the demand for a separate state by the Sri Lankan Tamils are described lucidly. The reasons for their dissent to have intensified from passive resistance to armed conflict are also explained clearly. The authors have also referred explicitly to the numerous sources of information they have used in their studies for the benefit of the discerning readers. Their courage to say what is right rather than what is appealable is also seen from the revelation of those findings which can be construed to hurt the Tamil pride or expose some myths.
The introduction written by Bryan Pfaffenberger gives an excellent overview of the book's contributions. The
concise account Liberation Tige (LTTE) covers t early part of 199 to some other co not cover in any ments after 1990, a serious deficie usefulness of the political events after the August crucial to the issu need for further
A key theme C the common tenc backwards either of Sinhalese trad ing group identit, caste conscious vers see the origil ism in the des ancient Pali texts leaders like Dutth led the Tamil in righteous rule to regard, he cites t Gunawardene in written that ther stood with the T. ugamani. This claims the writer, as the prototypi Sinhala language and the Sinhales itself as represen against the Tami only a struggle group of Tamils ( unrighteous rule militancy which entrenched caste neither the 'low Nalavars thems caste Vellalars c to be "Tamils'. T. are said to have in a part of south that of the Wella.
Sinnappah Ar Sri Lankaʼs Ta Rule, is an app the other studie logically and st major historical sented the socia mic life of Sri L the rule of Tam followed by the
 

15 DECEMBER 1995
ity n Pfaffenberger. Press. Pages 241.
of the rise of the 's of Tamil Eelam he period until the 3. This is in contrast ntributions which do detail the developThis is, however, not hcy to diminish the pook. In any case, the of 1994 before and general elections are es addressed and the work is obvious.
f the introduction is ency to read history in the interpretation itions or in recognizy as practised by the Tamils. Many obserh of Sinhala nationalscriptions given in of the heroic feats of ugamani, who expelvaders and restored the island. In this he work of R.A.L.H. which the latter had were Sinhalese who amils against Dutthegend is (mis)read, to portray the leader cal defender of the , the Buddhist faith, e race and the war ative of the struggle ethnic group. It was against a particular onsidered then to be s. Until the rise of dismantled the well barriers in Jaffna, caste Pallars and lves nor the "high' insidered the former Le low caste Tamils heir ancestral origin India different from
S.
Isaratnam's study on nils: Under Colonial 'opriate precursor to in the book. Chronoccinctly covering all events, he has pre, cultural and econonkan Tamils, during l kings in the North uccessive rule of the
Portuguese, Dutch and finally British colonial masters. His presentation will captivate the interest of the reader and is an invaluable reference material. As admitted, the history of the Tamils in the Jaffna peninsula is more comprehensive than that of Tamils in Batticaloa. The author has explained how the Tamils in the North and East evolved as separate socio-economic communities. Although the Tamils in the peninsula had strong cultural and economic ties with south Indian in the 17th and 18th centuries and to a lesser extent later, the Jaffna society had evolved differently from that in present Tamil Nadu. The various factors that contributed to the change from mainly an agricultural but yet selfreliant economy to one dependent mainly on remittances from outside Jaffna, after the advent of British rule, can be discerned from this study. The reader should not ignore here the terrain that separated the peninsula from the rest of the island, economic conditions and the size of the population at that time. Under the Portuguese and Dutch rulers, the Tamilspeaking territories of the north and east maintained their administrative separation from the rest of the island. It was the British, who brought all territories in the island under one central administration.
Dagmar-Hellmann Rajanayagam explains in her study titled "Tamils and the Meaning of History', how the Sri Lankan Tamils perceive their history and how they use it. She has also drawn attention to the differences between the Sinhalese and the Tamil perception of history. To the Sinhalese their history is the history of Sri Lanka. One cannot disagree with the author on her assertion that historical events in Sri Lanka had been written with different motives, which did not promote national unity and peaceful coexistence between ethnic communities but ethnic strife. The controversies mentioned by her relating to the history of the people of Sri Lanka as written and interpreted by different scholars will continue unabatedly until eternity. It seems noncontroversial to give emphasis to scientific data available in censuses and other similar sources to substantiate the various claims of the Tamils. Here too, as Amita Shastri points out, one must be careful as questionable methodology has been used by some contemporary Sinhalese historians to refute the Tamil claim that large parts of the Eastern Province are part of Tamils traditional homelands.
Both Chelvadurai Manogaran and Amita Shastri have used census data to show beyond any doubt the designs

Page 29
15 DECEMBER 1995
of the successive governments to change the demographic pattern of the Eastern Province in favour of the Sinhalese by settling Sinhalese families in the Tamil areas through various colonisation schemes funded and executed by the State. The findings of the empirical analyses are also presented strikingly using relevant diagrams.
They have dealt with the consequences of successive government’s colonisation policies to the long-term future of the Tamils in the North-East region; the former in great details, while the latter has examined them from the economic perspective. All the major development programmes implemented by successive governments benefitted mainly the Sinhalese leaving the Tamils to concentrate on the poorer and more arid areas and to depend largely on their own resources. The unfair balance of power was further exacerbated against them in the interests of social peace in the Sinhalese areas and promoting Sinhala nationalism.
The age - old and common est strategy known to 'divide and rule' a group that has the potential to defy the supreme authority of the ruling class, has also been used by the governments of Sri Lanka at various times to prevent the emergence of the collective identity of Tamils as a single ethnic group. Amita Shastri draws attention to the consistent attempts of the centre "to delink the Muslims of the Eastern Province from the Tamil autonomist demand through concrete material enticements to pro-centrist positions. The rigid caste system that divided the Tamils in Jaffna and the lack of sufficient integration of the Jaffna and Batticaloa Tamils were made to unite all Sri Lankan Tamils in the North and East, irrespective of their caste, religion and area so as to confront the powerful pro-Sinhala polity in its persistent effort to marginalize the Tamils. The relevant studies in this book also emphasize the importance of this unity, essential to wield political power in dealing with any government in Sri Lanka at all times even under a federal system of government.
Amita Shastri's observations on the emergence of Eelam as an economically viable concept are brief but yet provide the rationale for the insistence of the Tamils to unify the Northern province and part of the Eastern province into a single unit. The topography, population trends and importantly the productive potential of these regions, especially that of Trincomalee must be considered to understand this determination.
Jeyaratnam Wilson's study on -
The Colombo Man and the Battical Identities and the Party - discusses the Tamil leaders Jaffna and Battical the island since 1 the political leade Tamils, the evolu Jaffna leadership a Batticaloa leadersh the developments trimental to Tami seen from the chr tions provided by tions are advance First, the credit for Federal Party and S.J.V. Chelvanaya Sri Lankan Tamr emerged as the Colombo Man’ in ec tenuous links with caloa.
The study on c caste conflict in Jal fenberger gives the guilt, if he or she The new generati find it hard to be untouchability and caste existed in J read this book. Ti cerning the degra draconian ways the ated the 'low' cast and Nalavars - a vented upward mob the Jaffna society legally, numerous tions on them will of any reader. One the analogy betwe tory practices of the described in the stu Sinhalese-domina which hurt the p Tamil community. the Vellalars who tested first agains tion which made citizens. Bryan Pfaffenberg fact that although which initiated t Tamil unity succee electorate united be ethnic confrontatio face of unity inte smouldered. It was the LTTE with it socialism and the methods not only to al and social obje assert its position liberator of the Tar in liberating the This observation te canon of liberation dwide that in si powerless group is

, the Jaffna Man, pa Man: Regional Rise of the Federal the role played by based in Colombo, loa in the politics of 917. Starting from ership of Colombo ution of Colombond later the Jaffnahip, in the wake of that emerged deinterests, can be onological descriphim. Two observad by the writer. this unity is to the its revered leader gam. Second, “the hil diaspora' has 2quivalent of "the onomic terms with Jaffna or Batti
aste relations and ffna by Bryan Pfafreader a feeling of nas roots in Jaffna. on of Tamils may lieve that slavery, apartheid based on affna, unless they ne disclosures conded, inhuman and e Vellallars had tree Tamils — Pallars ind how they prebility of the latter in by enforcing extrasumptuary restricstir the conscience cannot fail to notice en the discriminapowerful Vellalars dy and those of the ted governments, olitically powerless
Ironically, it was vehemently prot state discriminathem second class
er, highlights the the Federal Party he campaign for ded in creating an hind the politics of n, beneath the surr-caste animosities ; the ascendance of ts commitment to use of coercive achieve the politicctives but also to as the ultimate nils that succeeded low caste Tamils. inds to support the movements worltuations where a
unduly oppressed
TAM TIMES 29
by the might of another exceedingly
powerful group or the state as in this case, only militant confrontation is effective. The reader may ponder about the validity of the belief that the end justifies the means
Dagmar-Hellman Rajanayagam in her study - The "Groups' and the Rise of Militant Secessionism - comes to the conclusion that the commitment of the LTTE to a political system based on one party rule and socialist ideology, will preclude the acceptance of a federal system based on democratic tradi
tions. .
This view apparently is not shared
by others as can be discerned from the concluding chapter written by Jeyaratnam Wilson and Chelvadurai Manogaran. They believe that the LTTE can be drawn into the political mainstream by finding a suitable alternative for an independent sovereign Tamil Eelam. They have also recognized the imperative to work out the details of an acceptable system of governance with representatives of the LTTE. In this regard, LTTE leader's BBC interview broadcast in March 1993, not dismissing outright a federal scheme, which is referred to in the introduction to the book is relevant.
This informative book is indispensable to all interested in understanding the Tamil revolt in Sri Lanka. It is also invaluable as a reference book on Sri Lanka's Tamils.
Continued from page 26
supplies. We have gaven them land to cultivate and land to erect cottages. Allready various institutions have been established and we hope to set up businesses, he added. Alleging that government forces were trying to starve the people into returning home, Mr. Thilakar said, "It would be like jumping out of the frying pan into the
fire,
Due to the appeal made to the
displaced persons by the LTTE, large numbers are daily flocking to the Vanni mainland. The Walikamam residents who had recently come to Thenmaratchi have welcomed the advice of the LTTE. There is no safety or prosperity in the land-starved Thenmaratchi area. The open lands of the Wanni are there for settlement. Fertile and quite healthy, the settlers have plenty of land to choose from. The travel facilities offered by the LTTE helps them immensely, a statement dated 6 December from the LTTE headquarters in London said.
It would, therefore, seem clear that the Tigers would resist any move on the part of the people to move back to Jaffna even if the government were to reconstruct Jaffna and offer attractive facilities for their return to their orginall homes.

Page 30
30 TAMIL TIMES
CASSFED ADS
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amil Times Ltd. PO Box 121,
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MATRIMIONAL Jan Tam Hindu a Unit seeks partner for niece, 33, slim, fair, 5'4", graduate. Send horoscope, details. M 820 C/o Tamil Times.
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Jaffna Tamil Catholic mother seeks doctor or other professionally qualified bride, 25-35 for son, 38, US citizen, executive in major American bank. Religion immaterial. Indian Tamil considered. M 823 c/O Tamil Times.
WEDDING BELLS
We congratulate the following couple on their recent wedding. Nihaldaran son of Mr. & Mrs. P. Nadarajah of 64 Temple Lane, Kokuvil East, Kokuvil, Sri Lanka and Lingeswari daughter of Dr. & Mrs. V. Ramadas Of 11 Kathleen Avenue, Alperton, Wembley, Middx., on 1.12.95 at Sri Murugan Temple, East Ham, London E12.
OBITUARIES
Mrs. Ratnambiga Sambasivam of Vaddukoddai East, Teacher, beloved wife of Mr. Sambasivam, Research Officer, Dept. of Fisheries, Sri Lanka; loving mother of Gaithiri, Sharmini, Subo and late
Somanath, daughter of the late Mr. & Mrs. Karthigasu (Maniam) of "Chithamparam, Vaddu-East, Vaddukoddai; daughter-in-law of the late Mr. & Mrs. Somasundaram of Sithankerny, sister of Jogeesvaran (UK), Rajeswaran (Singapore), Gnanesvaran (Canada) and Indradevi (UK), sister-in-law of Sothinalar, Sridevy, Vasanthy and Srikantharajah; niece of late Mr. S. Navaratnam, lnspector of Schools, Moolai and Mrs. Navaratnam (UK), passed away peасеfully on 12. 11.95 and funeral took place at her residence in Vaddukoddai.
Members of the family wish to thank all friends and relatives who extended their sympathy and support. - 6 Newby Drive, Ipswich. Tel: O1473273798/22 Lapstone Gardens, Kenton, Harrow. Tel: 0181 909 1713.
Mr. V.K. Mylvaganam of Mal. lakam, Sri Lanka; beloved husband of Annapoorani; loving father of Kandiah, Sivagnanasundaram, Sangarappillai, Thilllainadesan, Kirupendiran, Selvaranee, Sivamany, late Ponmany; father-in-law Ol Josephine, Saratha, Push. раvathy, Kитaras wату, Theivendiran, Nanda ana Chandrika, grandfather of Menaka, Surekah, Sureign, Sangeetha, Pathumanapan, Senth o oran, A ing aran, Piriyatharishini, Kasturi, Suganthini, Rajani, Ganendiran, Gajanthan and Mayuresan expired on 29. 11.95 at Sarasalai, ChaVakachcheri and was Cremated On 30th November. - 105 Essex Road, Leyton, London E10 6EG. Tel 0181 9258463.
Kandiah Kumaravelu of Cha vakachcheri, (retired Chie Accountant, irrigation Depart ment, Sri Lanka); beloved hus band of Bhagavathy, loving father of Saroja; brother-in-law of Nagaratnam Sivakolunthi and Nagendram Thanabala Singam; uncle of Yogavath) (Chavakachcheri), Sundhar alingam (B.B.C. Madras) Sunthara vathanan (USA) grand uncle of Dr. A. Vasanthy (Medical Faculty, Jaffna Uni versity), Vathsala Vijayakuma
 
 

15 DECEMBER 1995
(Colombo), Subh a dra - Sanchayan (USA), Sumish, Santhish (USA), Thatha of Mithula, Senthan and Seyon pased a way in Colombo. Cremation took place at Kanatte on Thursday, 7th December '95. - 29 Hamers Avenue, Wellawatte, Colombo 6.
Mr. Vettiveliu Dhevadhasan, Retired Authorised Officer, Jaff. na Municipal Council, born 2006, 1942, beloved husband of Thavamanidevi, Pharmacist, Teaching Hospital, Jaffna; loving father of Konesakumar (London), Hamsha and Revathy, son of late Mr. & Mrs. Vetivelu of Tholpuram; son-inlaw of the late Mr. Sabaratnam and Mrs. Sabaratnam of Vaddukoddai, brother of Mrs. Kamaleswari Parinpanathan, Mrs. Chandreswari Ratnasingham, Venkadeswarathasan (Easan) and Mrs. Rajeswari Sabaratnam passed away in Chavakachcheri on 3rd DeCember 1995 and was Crenated on 5th December. - 72 Standard Road, Hounslow, MiddX. TMV4 7AS. Tel 0181 23O4962.
andra Ragupathy Teacher), beloved wife of Ragupathy (STH), loving mother of late Maya, mother in law of Arun, daughter of late V. Ariacutty & Mrs. Ariacutty (Colombo), sister of Jayendran (Germany), Indra (Colombo),
Mahendran (UK), late Vicknes
waran, Rabindran (UK), late
Subathra, sister in law of Christine (Germany), late
Mahadeva, Dr. Maheswary
(UK), Erin (UK), Somasundar
am (Nallur), Gnanam Rama
nathan (Colombo), late Mahen
dran, passed away on 26 November 1995 and was Crenated on 3 December 1995, at South London Crematorium,
Streatham. Husband & the members of the family thank all the relatives and friends who attended the funeral and sent floral tributes, messages of sympathy and assisted them in various ways. - 262 Wricklemarsh Road, Blackheath, LOndon SE3 8DMV. Tel: O181 856 6859.
IN MEMORAM
First Death Anniversary
ln loving memory of Mr. Vellichorpilai Joseph (Nalayan) on the first anniversary of his passing away on 30th December 1994 in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.
Sadly missed and fondly remembered by his wife Annammah; children Anand, Jean, Basil and Emil and their spouses, grandchildren and relatives. - 17339 - 85 Avenue, Edmonton, Alberta T5T OP7
In fond memory of Mrs. Rasamma Balasingam on the first anniversary of her passing away on 4th December 1994.
Sadly missed and lovingly remembered by her children, relatives and friends.

Page 31
15 DECEMBER 1995
FORTHCOMING EVENTS
Jan. 6 7.00pm J.S.S.A. (U.K.)
organises Fund Raising Dinner
January 1 Kaarthikai; Feast of Mary, Mother of God.
Jan. 3 Pirathosam.
Jan. 5 Thiruvembavai ends; Full Moon.
Jan. 6 Feast of Epiphany;
with light music by 'Geetha Vani' Music Group in Aid of Displaced Tamil Refugees in Sri Lanka at Walthamstow Assembly Hall, Forest Road, London E17. Tel: 018 f 743 8289/.399 7848/241 5881.
LLLLLLLLSLLLLLSLLLLLSLLLMLLLLAALLLLLSLLLLLLLAL
AUSTRALIAN NEWSLETTER
Protest Against Sri Lankan Army Offensive: Thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils held a long vigil - from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. - at Burwood Park, Sydney to protest against the Sri Lankan army offensive in Jaffna and to remember those who had lost their frves in the war. At mid-day, several speakers including Australian politicians Mrs. AMary Easson, Federal M.P. and Mr. Paul Zammit, State M. P. for Strathfield addressed the gathering. Mrs. Easson said that she would take up the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the Federal Parliament. Hindu, Catholic and Christian prayers were also conducted. After nightfall those present held lighted candles and sang Songs of prayer for the Tamils of Jaffna. The entire park was a sea of lighted candles.
A bucket was passed around during the day to collect funds for the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (T.R.O.). More than S4,000 was collected that day. The collection campaign was continued through the Tamil Radio Programs in Sydney and over S40,000 has been Collected for the T.R.O. National Heroes' Day was celebrated on 9th December at Burwood Girls' High School, Sydney and a dinner to collect funds for the T.R.O. Will be held On 17th December.
Lalgudi Jayaraman in Sydney: Carnatic music lovers enjoyed a rare treat on 5th November when the famous violinist Sri Lalgudi G. Jayaraman visited Sydney. The Wallace Theatre of the University of Sydney was packed that evening. Sri Jayaraman, his son Sri Krishnan and daughter Smt Vijayalaxmi played the violin to the delight of the audience. They were accompanied by the famous miruthangist Sri Karaikudi R. Mani. The audience were enthralled during the three hour recital and the artistes were given a spontaneous standing ovation at the end.
Medical Awards: The medical journal Australian Doctor' awards every year to doctors who have made a significant contribution in the field of community service. This year twenty doctors were selected from the Whole of Australia and were presented with awards at a glittering cerenonial dinner at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Sydney on 1st December.
The twenty doctors and their spouses were present and many of them had come from places as far away as Perth. Two of the award winners were Dr. A. BalaSubragranian of Sydney and Dr. V. Kulaendran of Perth. They were probably the first
annis to win this award.
The Tamil Senior Cl incorporated in New inaugurated in 1991 t 300. The association reCreational and welfa bers who are mostly grated to Australia it their lives. The Taf Benevolent Society
association and ope, Death Donation Fund
The association in relief to poor and so persons, raises fu Causes. In October Food Fair to raise fur tion of persons disp| Offensive in North S. realised amounted which $1,250 was d Rehabilitation Organi of the displaced per allocated to be forwa rishna Mission, Batti purpose.
Book Launch
"Nenjil Nilaiththa Ner the veteran journalis Murugapoopathy was tion held in Moorabbir, bin, Victoria on 28. 1 large gathering of well uished literati. Mr. M On the editorial staff Tamil Daily "Virakesa Australia in 1987. T. aCCount of the author, prominent writers who The author is a prolific is his fourth publicatio
Mrs. Palam Luxman function and made the
The book priced at from the author at Craigeburn, Victoria 3 (O3) 9305 6246.
Dr. G.R. - Pioneer C - An App
Dr. G.R. Handy fona too, called George Re reigning monarchs ol by medical students was indeed regal in a doctor is defined as t par excellence.
in the old medical : er/demonstrator in p genial Professor Ellit Koch as junior demor
 
 
 

TAMILTIMES 31
Jan. 145.30pm. "Tamil Concrn' presents Cultural Evening for Fund Raising to provide Humanitarian Aid for displaced Tamil Refugees in Sri Lanka at Battersea Town Hall, Lavender Hill, London SW1 1 5TF. Tel: 0181 458 4204 (Krishna), O956
262684 (Venthan).
Jan. 15 Thai Pongal.
Jan. 16 Eekathasi; Feast of St. Jose Vaz.
Jan. 18 Pirathosam. Jan. 20 Amavasai Jan. 23 Sathurthi. Jan. 29 Kaarthikai Jan. 31 Eekathasi.
LLLLLL LLL LLL LLLLLiLLLSLLLLLSLLLLLSLLLLLL
tizens' Association South Wales and as a membership of Caters to the Social, tre needs Ofits memthose who had nithe latter years of mil Senior Citizens" is affiliated to the rates a self funded
for its members.
addition to providing cially disadvantaged nods for charitable
'95, it organised a nds for the rehabilitaaced by the military ri Lanka. The profits to over S2,000, of onated to the Tamil sation for the needs sons and $500 was rded to the PamakCaloa for the Sane
in Melbourne
jankal' authored by and Writer Mr. L.
launched at a funcTown Hall, Moorab0.95, attended by a | wishers and distingurugapoopathy was
of the Sri Lankan ri' and emigrated to he book is a vivid s experience with 12 are no longer living. Writer and this book
.
an presided over the 2 keynote speech.
A$7.50 is available 170 Hothlyn Drive, O64, Australia. Te:
Handy ardiologist reciation
lly and appropriately x (Georges were the Britain and Ceylon) of six decades ago ppearance. The word eacher, cum clinician
school he was lecturhysiology under the Son, with Dr. A.C.E. Strator. Prof. ElliSOn,
the architect of the physiology department took on the teaching of the physiology of the special senses, reproductive system and histology and biochemistry together with practical physiology, biochemistry and histology.
The more clinical oriented aspects of physiology, circulatory, respiratory and the central nervous systems were part of the syllabus apportioned to Dr. Handy. The lecture theatre with a seating capacity for 100 had only 30 students comprising both senior and junior students; they were thus close to the lecturer's table usually mounted with experiments for demonstration during the lecture. The theatre was semi-circular, with well padded walls and floors.
The latter was to dampen the noise generated by the drone of the exhaust fans and the stamping on the floor by students. The lecture started at 3.00 p.m. The students would gather at the venue at about 2.45p.m. and take down verbatim a summary of the day's lecture put on the blackboard. This included line drawings, sketches and graphs in chalk. When the lecture starts the lights are dimmed so that the epidiascope pictures and lantern slides would be better seen.
From start to finish, for 60 minutes (not more, not less) Dr. Handy would hold forth, explaining the nuances of physiology- the science of the process of life without a scrap of paper before him. His lectures on the central nervous system were the climax of his teaching art. The basic anatomical pathways in the central nervous system were lucidly explained and the recapitulation of the numerous eponymous centres, nuclei and tracts were his forte.
Some of these were projected on the epidiascope preferentially because colour slides technology was still to be born. I possess some of these drawings to date and find there is little to add to then even today. He would trace the sensory input from the peripheral skin, joint, muscle and viscera to their termination in the Central nervous system and trace the path of the outgoing commands to the effector cell or organ with extreme facility and clarity that the student felt that he was actually travelling in those pathways.
In the practical classes his skill in demonstrating experiments, helping the student to set up experiments were masterly. The experiments involved nerve-muscle preparation and heart, studying the effects of drugs, electrical stimulation and ligatures on the heart. All experiments had to be recorded on a rotating Smoked drun in the form of a graph. He would advise, monitor and criticise each student's efforts individually.

Page 32
32 TAM TIMES
This kind of tutoring (not spoon feeding) of the student went on in the biochemistry and histology practicals. In the latter the student had to stain and mount 100 slides. The technique was so good that some of the slides made nearly 60 years ago are still in good condition. Pari passu with his teaching chores he was himself a student preparing for the London MBBS as a prelude to sitting the MD London and the MRCP (Lond.) He would diligently attend the embryology lectures by Prof. W.C. Osman Hill, another master in teaching technique and a superb embryologist and comparative anatomist.
As years rolled by he went to England for his higher studies, a little delayed by the war. On his return he held various posts as physician. As resident physician, General Hospital, Colombo he had to be in charge of the blood transfusion services during very turbulent times for transfusion therapy. He had to do a Herculean task with crude instrumentation and technology that was in its infancy. As visiting physician he blossomed into a versatile and much sought after clinician with a special bent for cardiology.
The spark that was in him for teaching was kindled into a flaming passion for teaching clinical medicine. His bedside teaching and ward classes were popular and eager students would form a close ring round him much like a rugger Scrum. Equally, his bedside manner won him many affectionate patients from all over this country.
That is not all. He participated in the meetings of the Clinical Society of the General Hospital, Colombo - primarily meant for medical students, the Ceylon Medical Association, College of Physicians of Ceylon, the Ceylon Academy of Postgraduate Medicine, all of which he was president. He also pioneered cardiology in Sri Lanka and was the founder president of the Sri Lanka Heart ASSOCiation.
in addition, he took an active part in all the social activities of all the medical associations and one must recall the signal service he did in maintaining the annual medical dance as the dance secretary. He showed unflagging interest in this great social event which not only shone as the dance of the year but also netted income for the Association.
Without sophisticated audio-visual teaching aids and without press button devices to scan the body for disease, he taught and doctored in a manner that is difficult to emulate at present. All his pupils, I am sure, adore him for his sincerity of purpose and his dedicated devotion to work and will be delighted to learn that in his name a ward is being donated to the Cardiology Unit of the General Hospital, Colombo. Well done dear Sir,
P. Sivasubramaniam.
Contributions are invited from those interested in the ward in his name. Donations are payable to Jaycey Trust Services (Pvt) Ltd., for G. R. Handy Trust, c/o Julius & Creasy, Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank Building, P.O. Box 154, Colombo 1.
Mylvaganam || - An Ap
it is one year since t late Mylvaganam F respected and gre Jaffna. It was very shocking. He was came. Though it w pected, he died pea USA, surrounded and friends.
! consider myse been closely asso friend and colleague century. Our frien after he left for Br. Australia. I met hit 1954 when he joine Alma Mater - Jaffn was then a youngs Madras University, B.Sc. degree offen and Zoology. While lege he obtained his from the University serving Jaffna Cent capacities as Sсіє Master, Staff Advis Union and Science the Specialist GC Training College as integrated Science. Lanka as teacher a lspent most of our SCience text books grades (Grades 6 ti Param was hins his own, he has Chemistry and Biol Level and Advanc books, though eminently readabl trated. The topics v tion and scholarly were readily acc widely used throug Paran was a tru siasm for the moth of instruction motiv, leisure hours to til Literature in Tami the transition of S English to Tamil. H ated by illustrious á minded educationis na and Professor His Contribution extended beyond t He Chaired the Exa ern Province Scie tion (NPSTA) that tests and conducte dreds of schools to ing. Later, as Presi the first to Convene project on fresh w The Hydro Biolog organised a histori Ce Exhibition f0 m tions of the EduCa Lanka. He served Chemistry and Bot anced and Ordinar It is said that tea made. Param was

15 DECEMBER
Paramananthan preciation
he passing away of the aramananthan, a well at Science Master of sudden and severely only 64 when the call as untimely and unexcefully in New Jersey, y his family, relatives
lf privileged to have 2iated with him as a for over a quarter of a lship continued even nei and I migrated to n for the first time in d the tutorial staff of his a Central College. He Cience graduate of the having obtained his ng Chemistry, Botany at Jaffna Central Col; Diploma in Education / Of Sri Lanka. After ral College in different ince Teacher, House er to Advanced Level Association, he joined }vernment Teacher's lecturer in Biology and During his stay in Sri nd lecturer, Param and off duty hours in writing in Tamil for the middle o 8). elf a prolific writer. On written text books in ogy for G.C.E. Ordinary ed Level Classes. His 2xam-oriented, were e and profusely illusvere dealt with imaginainsight. All his books epted, approved and h the country.
2 nationalist. His enthuer tongue as a medium ated him to Sacrifice his le Creation of Science . His books facilitated Cience education from is efforts were apprecicademics and national ts like Cyril PonnaperuEliezer.
to Science education le publication of books. m Council of the NorthCe Teachers Associadrew up "New Type" d examinations in hunpromote Science learndent of NPSTA he was an on-going research ater biology known as ical Survey'. He also Jaffna Schools Scienark centenay celebra'ion Department of Sri as Chief Examiner in iny for the G.C.E. AdvLevel examinations. chers are born and not by taste and tempera
ment a 'Guru’ and also professionally qualified to function as a Science Master. The lack of adequate promotion mechanisms in Sri Lanka for teaching excellence made him seek greener pastures where excellence would be recognised and rewarded. The Sultanate of Brunei offered him a teaching post in 1977 and he continued to serve in Brunei till his death. There in addition to class work he was much involved in the co-curricular and extra-curricular activities of the school. His appointment at Royal Children's School earned him the direct attention and appreciation of the hierarchy.
Param was a man of exemplary character, a genius and genial personality anda gentleman to the full sense of the word. His popularity among his students, both past and present, was almost charismatic. He had a genuine interest in education and a true Concern for his students and others dear and near to him. He was an intellectual humanist who lived up to the Tamil ideal.
"The learned for more learning yearn and pray As they see others enjoy what they themselves enjoy'. (Kural 399).
There is always a devoted and understanding lady behind the success of a man. Mrs. Kiruba Paramananthan, herself an experienced teacher and an Emeritus Vice Principal of Vembadi Girls High School provided all the encouragement. assistance and a peaceful home conducive to Param's academic and professionall achievements.
The Good Lord in his mercy has blessed Param and Kiruba in many ways. Their children - 2 daughters and a son, have completed their education, are employed and well settled in life. On his first death anniversary we join Kiruba, daughters Geetha and Sumi, son Chithiran and their families in thanking the Almighty for the life and services of our beloved Param.
N.S, Ratnasingham,
Emeritus Principal, Jaffna Central College.
Nupura Kendra Presents Dance Extravaganza
Nupura Kendra School of Dance in Britain has been associated with dance presentations of high quality. The credit goes to Smt Subthra Sivadasan, who instills in her students a disciplined training, a devotion to the art and a sense of responsibility to the audience.
The shows presented by Smit Subathra - a student of Smt Balasundari Prathalingam and Adayar Laxmanan - are anxiously awaited every year and are always stagec in aid of a historic Hindu Temple. This year's performance was in aid of Mamanga Pillaiar Temple in Batticaloa in Sn Lanka and was appropriately titled "Mamanga Pillaiar". The show went on board at the Ashcroft Theatre in Croydon The programme opened with a Mallarianc the audience was thrilled to see the Pillaiar Deity carried shoulder high in procession

Page 33
IMMIGRATION, ASYLUM, NATIO
CAUS FOR FRIENDLY
N
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SOLICTORS
UNDERS ANDING GAADVICE
O8-478 5797
EMERGENCIES MOBILE 0836 546429
1ST FLOOR, 28 LFORD LANE, ILFORD, ESSE
ALSO: e LANDLORD o WELFARE/ a MATRIMON o POLICE STA o PERSONAL
by eight young dancers. (It is recalled that in an earlier performance a chariot (Ther) decorated with flowers was pulled by tiny-tots to depict the story of the Chariot Festival at the Koneswaram Temple in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka.
Mallari was quickly followed by Varnam, Keerthanam and a Dance Drama - Ganesha Roopam — depicting how Pillaiar got an elephant head. After the Thillana was presented a Folk Dance. The Bangara Dance, from the Punjab, extremely popular in Asian gatherings in the U.K. was a happy choice for a Folk Dance. This item was an instant hit particularly with the teenagers.
Two Dance Dramas - Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs and Sivakamiyin Sabatham - a complicated story of love, valour, courage and the might of an ancient Tamil Kingdom. Here again the dancers gave life to a Tamil Classic by the quality of their performance.
A scene from "Snow White & the Dwarfs
Mr. Wimal Sockanathan, who compered the show in English and Tamil in his melodious voice in flowery language explaining each item emphasising the religious significance, richly deserves high compliment.
A total of approximately 60 dancers went on stage and it is extremely difficult to pin point any particular dancer for special mention, as all exhibited a very high standard of professional training.
The show is not without faults and cannot escape criticism. The excellent show was marred by very poor lighting arrangements. The audience and the stage were left in total darkness for about 15-30 seconds at the commencement of each item while the performance was already on. The orchestra was seen fumbling with scripts in total darkness. It is
hoped that these s avoided in the perfo is being eagerly aw
Bharatha Of Bart from
Nineteen year old, Nijmegen, Netherla Natyam arangetr. Museum Hall, The iS a Student of Sm under whom he haC
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

NALITY & CRIMINAL SOLICTORS ܠ
- TENANT ISSUES IOUSING AL ISSUES ION ADVICE NJURY CAMS
捡
X | G | 2LE
hortcomings could be rrnance in 1996 which aited.
Karthika.
Arangetram
Netherlands
Bart Jacobs, born in nds had his Bharatha am at the Tropical lague on 22.11.95. He Maduri Jeganmohan, studied for 4% years.
The repertoire consisted of the traditional items of a classical Bharatha Natya arangetram.
The highlight of the programme was the Shiva Thandawam in Revatha Ragam which Bart performed to a number of rhythmic variations. He was also able to perform the Karanas with ease due to the training he has had in Martial Arts.
Bart is at present reading for a degree in Economics at the University of Nijmegan. The accompanying artistes were Nathuvangam. Smt Maduri Jeganmohan, Vocal: Smt Ambika Thamotheram, Mirdangam: Sri S.V. Giridaran, Violin: Smt Komala Ramalingam, and Flute. Smt Usha Ramesh.
Russian Girl Excels in Indian Dance
Natalia daughter of Dr. and Mrs. Volodin of Moscow was fascinated by Indian Music and Dance from her Childhood. When She was fourteen, she was fortunate to come under the tutelage of the versatile Guru Saradha Raguraman, an exponent of the Kalakshetra style of dancing.
After intensive training for five years, she had her arangetram at the Cultural Centre Muzenhof in the Village, Leiderdorp on 11th November in the presence of a large gathering. She excelled in the Varnam in Devamanohari raga and the Thillana in Vali raga was performed with exquisite

Page 34
34 TAMILTIMES
grace. It is a dream come true for young Natalia, who will now impart her knowledge to children in Moscow.
She was ably assisted by the following accompanists - Nathuvangam. Saradha Raguraman, Vocal Ambika Thamotheram, Mirdangam: S. V. Giridara, Violin: Komala Ramalingam, Flute: Usha Ramesh and Thambura: Stien Nowack.
Natalia's father Dr. Volodin is a famous scientist who is the author of many books on "Low Temperature Physics.
Professor Suriyakumaran Awarded United Nations Environment Prize
Professor Canaganayagam Suriyakumaran of Sri Lanka and the team of Dr. Norman Myers of UK and Dr. Peter Raven of USA have been awarded the 1995 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Sasakawa Environment Prize for their outstanding contributions to the protection and management of the environment. Dr. Misael Pastrana Borrero, Chairman of the Selection Committee and former President of Colombia said, 'lin this 50th Anniversary year of the United Nations, it is most appropriate that this prestigious Prize be given to three individuals from different Corners of the World. The committee wanted to demonstrate that individuals in both developing and developed countries are working in tandem to safeguard our planet.'
Professor Suriyaku the Centre for Regior dies (CRDS) in Sri Professor at the Lond mics is a pioneer in th for shaping the nature en VirOnmental Challe responsible for the
multi-sectoralism with agothat environmeni dimension of all sectic
For more than Suriyakumaran has environmental Cause steps in getting the Bank to institutional and provided concre
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15 DECEMBER 1995
maran, Chairman of al Development StuLanka and a visiting On School of Econo
of our responses to nges. He is greatly
new perception of his observation long ' is nota sector, but a Drs. "
30 years, Professor given his best to the . He initiated the first
Asian Development ise the environment te eCOnOrnic models
for environment/development cost and benefit systems. He fostered and encouraged the involvement of NGOs within the wider context of their societies, and has also played a key role in promoting global environmental programmes in the United Nations system. For his outstanding services to Asia, he was honoured by the King of Thailand as a Knight Commander of the Most Noble Order of the Crown.
The UNEP Sasakawa Environmental Prize, worth US$ 200,000 is considered one of the most prestigious environmental awards in the World.
鲁塞鲁塞鲁塞鲁塞鲁
Tamil Times wishes all its readers, contributors and wellwishers a very Merry Christmas and a prosperous New Year.
鲁塞鲁
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