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15APRIL 1998
ISSN 0266 - 44 88 Vol. XVII No. 4 15 APRIL 1998
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CONTENTS
Mass Arrests Condemned O3
Signal for Talks O4 "Foreign Intervention" O5 UNP'S internal Woes O5 On the Battlefront O6 Religious Business 07
Tribute to Charles Abeysekera 09 The Challenge for the People 11
Ethnic Conflict and Media 12 Whither the Peace Process 13 Complexities of the Crisis 16
BJP Regime and Tamil Campaign21 Nuclear Bombs and Missiles 26
Friendless Muslims 27 Namboodiripad - A Tribute 29 Classified 3O
须
NE
%
There has been demnation of intel criminate mass arre longing to the islan nity, running into in Sri Lanka’s capi its suburbs during March. Though m been released wit being taken into c so-called investig Scale and Sustained ercise is unpreceder organisations and T Parliament have c arrests as arbitrary unwarranted and u At least 5,000 Ta during the last week sive round-ups by the capital amidst l curity forces were tire Tamil communi their inability to ap vent the real culpri violent bomb atta LTTE suicide squa As the arrests ci ernment stepped in ing tide of criticism tice to the Tamil com at the alter of securi Attorney General structions on 2 Apri to end the mass arr ate effect which cal lief to a beleaguere However, by th was given, much o already been done a Tamils were picked residential areas, h “It’s Safer to liv led Jaffna than dem because here, it seen just to have a Tamil ior Tamil journalist. Around 2,000 T. Suburb of Wattale police vehicles in
 
 

TAMIL TIMES 3
ZA
EWS REVIEW
须
/
RESTSINCOLOMBOCONDEMNED
widespread connsified and indissts of persons bed's Tamil commuseveral thousands, tal, Colombo, and the last week of ost of them have nin days of them ustody following lation, the sheer nature of the exited. Human rights amil Members of condemned these 7, discriminatory, njustified. mils were arrested
· of March in massecurity forces in proar that the sepunishing the enity to cover up for prehend and prets who engage in cks allegedly by ds. ontinued, the govto stem the growagainst the injusmunity as a whole ty and the island's issued strict inl to security forces ests with immedime has a huge red people. e time that order f the damage had s more than 5,000 up at random from otels and lodges. e in army controlocratic Colombo, hs as if it is a crime name," said a sen
amils living in the were shoved into the first of the
searches last week. Next, government forces targeted the suburbs of Delhiwela and Mount Lavinia, taking back with them nearly 1,500 people.
In yet another round-up, at least 1,500 Tamils living in transit lodges in Pettah, in the heart of the capital, were herded to the nearest police station for interrogation. As most of those who stay in these lodges are Tamil youth who have recently arrived from north-east Lanka, they are looked upon with greater suspicion than older residents.
In most instances of these crackdowns the arrested had to suffer long waits in inclement conditions.
In addition what has deeply concerned and perturbed many has been over the manner in which Hindu temples are subjected by the Defence forces through search operations and Hindu priests being arrested without any consideration for their religious position. The recent arrest and detention at the Maradana police station of the Chief Priest of the Captain's Garden Hindu Temple in Colombo along with his family and the similar arrest and detention of the Chief Priest of the Hindu temple at Slave Island Temple are being cited as cases in point.
The service personnel were also being accused of being disrespectful enough not to heed to the request made by the Chief Priest to remove their shoes, when they entered the sacred sanctity of Captain's Gardens Temple. Even though the Chief Priest pointed out to army personnel that this law was normally followed even by the President visiting the temple, army officials chose to ignore it arrogantly. Instances of these kind are being cited as examples of the difference between precept and practice in the context of the government's oft repeated assertion that all religions practised in the country should be

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4 TAMIL TIMES
treated equally since Sri Lanka is a multi-religious country.
“The mass arrests and detentions and indiscriminate and arbitrary treatment of Tamils within the city of Colombo has caused un precedented anger and pain of mind," Neelan Thiruchelvam, Member of Parliament of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), said in parliament recently.
"It has been estimated that within the last few days there were about 5,000 lawful residents of the city who were rounded up...and detained despite their production of valid documents to authenticate their legitimate presence within the city," he said during a monthly debate on extending emergency regulations.
The TULF also has made an official complaint to the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka against the mass arrests. "We made our SubmisSions to the Commission and they have agreed to take certain measures after they finish deliberations,” Thiruchelvam told the press.
Police sources sought to justify the recent wave of cordon search and arrest operations as being necessitated by recent suicide bomb attacks in Colombo and other areas allegedly by the LTTE, and receipt of information by them of the penetration into the capital city by several suicide squads allegedly belong to the LTTE. “We understand the security concerns but there is absolutely no need for thousands of people to be taken to police stations for questioning and detention there.” Thiruchel vam added.
"Emergency rule compromises the rule of law, but we are alarmed and disturbed that even the minimum safeguards contained in the law are being violated with impunity,” Thiruchelvam Said.
“We have received innumerable complaints of cruel, callous and insensitive treatment of persons of all age groups, including women,” he Said.
The TULF has demanded a debate in the Parliament on arbitrary arrest and harassment of Tamils under the guise of security and if it is not granted, they threatened to bring a no-confidence motion against State Minister of Defence Anu ruddha Ratwatte. Furthermore they also decided unanimously at Yesterday's Central Committee meeting that, the
LTTE’S contributio tal for the settlemer sis.
Signals fo
There has been lation following r ments by the Unit (UNP) leader that ment of Sri Lanka mals from the LTT pared to commenci The governmen that neither it has nor has it received the LTTE that it wa mence talks. In fact men in their mos statement have sai ment of Sri Lanka war and engage in LTTE had achieved on the military fro insists on foreign government has rul Such mediation.
However, the Wickremasinghe, te March that the Tam willing to enter i "There have been indications that th gers) won't be ave their strategy is I do masinghe Said.
“The signal ha government,” he received some si longer a matter f That's the matter f to decide,' Wickrer out elaborating on to what kind of sig received.
Denying knowl by the LTTE to in Justice and Cons Minister Gamini P "Signal is a very v as I know there há Despite signa ready to talk, Wic fighting in the nort for a highway col government-held through Kilinochc the Jaffna peninsul tensify. “LTTE is f The losses are very the Sri Lanka arn losses in any othel tion,' he added.

SAPR1998
n is absolutely viht of the Ethnic cri
r TalkS ?
a flurry of specuecent press stateed National Party he and the govern
had received sigE that it was pree talks. t of Sri Lanka says
made any moves any 'signals' from is prepared to comthe LTTE spokest recent reported d that the governwould only end its talks only after the i parity of strength nt. The LTTE also mediation, but the ed out any role for
UNF leader, Ranil old reporters on 26 hil Tigers might be nto negotiations. various signals and ley (the Tamil Tirse to talks. What n't know,” Wickre
s also gone to the said. "I have also gnal. But it is no or me to decide. or the government masinghe said withfrom whom and as nals he himself had
edge of any moves itiate negotiations, titutional Affairs eiris told reporters, ague word. As far as been nothing.” ls the LTTE was skremasinghe said hern Wanni region nnecting from the Vavuniya town hi further north to a was likely to inighting every inch. high. I don't think ny has taken such one single operaWickremasinghe
pointed out the army had been bogged down for nearly a year in its attempt to capture the highway. Referring to the military operation Jayasikuru (Sure Victory) which began 13 May last year, he said "One year is very long in modern warfare." Wickeremasinghe, who does not normally fail to pontificate on all other matters as to what the government should do, said it was for the ruling People's Alliance government to decide whether it wanted to continue fighting or lift a ban on the LTTE and talk to them. He himself did not express any view as to whether the government should stop fighting with LTTE, lift its proscription and negotiate with its leaders. The government officially outlawed the LTTE in January last after blaming the group for a blast at Sri Lanka's holiest Buddhist shrine in the central town of Kandy which killed 16 people.
Wickeremasinghe said the government had lost a golden opportunity to create a consensus with the UNP over how to bring the war to an end. "We agreed to a bi-partisan arrangement. I think the government could have built on it. There was goodwill which no government has had from the opposition earlier," he said.
The UNP leader's expression of his desire to build a bi-partisan consensus and put the blame on the government for the failure to reach such a consensus is viewed with cynicism by discerning political commentators in Colombo particularly after the UNP's outright rejection of the government's devolution proposals. Having frustrated the efforts of the government to reach a consensus in the Parliamentary Select Committee for nearly three years, the UNP has come up late in the day with counter-proposals which are regarded as a diminution of even the devolution of powers currently provided under the 13th amendment to the Constitution. With such proposals, how the UNP leader hopes to entice the LTTE to give up fighting and reach a political solution to the ethnic conflict is something beyond comprehension, a commentator said.
In the meantime, the LTTE has indicated that it would be prepared to engage in talks with the government with third party mediation. The “Uthayan' newspaper published from northern Jaffna reported that

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15APRIL 1998
some prominent LTTE figures Tamil Chelvam, Vithuran, Sutha and including Anton Balasingham, who had been the primary spokesman for the LTTE for a number of years, had conveyed the LTTE's position to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaffna, Thomas Savundaranayagam, who was on a pastoral visit to the LTTE controlled areas in the northern Wanni region during the first week this month. The Bishop had emphasised on the dire necessity to end the war and bring about peace. The LTTE's political wing leaders had told the Bishop that the government was utilising its socalled devolution package to weaken the struggle for Tamil independence and pointed out that in any event there was no consensus between the government and opposition parties with regard to a political settlement. The government's military aims against the LTTE were failing, they had told the Bishop.
What is also apparent from this newspaper report is that Anton Balasingham has again re-emerged in public as spokesman for the LTTE following months of persistent reports that either he had been sidelined and put under house arrest by the LTTE leader or that he was incapacitated by serious illness.
“Foreign Intervention”
The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardon, accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, is to visit Colombo on 18 April, as part of his trip to other South Asian countries to review preparations for the forthcoming visit of President Clinton to the region. Richardson, the senior most U.S. official to visit Sri Lanka since a 1972 visit by the then Secretary of State William Rogers. The previous U.S. Secretary of State to visit Sri Lanka was John Foster Dulles, who went there in 1956 and visited his grandmother's grave in northern Jaffna (OWI).
Richardson is to have wide-ranging talks with the government and is also expected to meet leaders of opposition parties, including Tamil parties, and address a news conference in Colombo.
Also to visit Colombo in the near future is the British Deputy Secretary
of State for Fore wealth Affairs, D. is said to be intere bi-partisan appr government and til which was previc his predecessor Li The visits of Fachette to Colom driven certain sec mbo media into a about alleged "fo in the internal affa trying to force the ter into a cease-fi with the LTTE. Th press are normall and against the g lution proposals a interrupted contir without any sort ( Without givin, thousands who are war, the "Devaina' torially said, "The losing their militar and their last maj is also under siege rally jump for an some respite to r again. It seems th opportunity thank intervention in the bassador to the UN British Deputy Sec wealth Affairs, De US Deputy Secre Inderfurth, The pu to Sri Lanka is to S tween the governm These mediators that a cease-fire S before any peace t cisely what the LT said that the LT asked by them to litical package pre ernment. We all kn ever does that, it any attraction to is because they n so badly. So man had unilaterally v after achieving regroup and const and no soothsay predict the same o well. Even our de had to bear the bi actions in the p against a cease- Í these foreigners our affairs ?'

TAM TIMES 5
ign and Common2rrick Fachette. He sted in reviving the bach between the he opposition UNP fusly promoted by am Fox.
Richardson and bo Would appear to tions of the Colostate of paranoia reign intervention' irs of Sri Lanka by government to enre and negotiations nese sections of the y anti-government overnment's devond also for the unluation of the war of negotiations. g a thought to the being killed in this (8 April 1998) edi - Tigers are rapidly y might in the North or base Mankulam . So they will natuopportunity to earn agroup themselves ey are getting this is to some foreign form of US AmN, Bill Richardson, retary on Commonrrick Fachette, and tary of State Karl rpose of their visit start peace talks bement and the LTTE. are of the opinion hould be declared alks and this is preTE needs now. It is TE has also been recognise the posented by the govow that if the LTTE is not because of he package, but it eed the cease-fire y times the Tigers iolated cease-fires heir objective to lidate themselves, r is necessary to utcome this time as :fence chiefs, who unt of such idiotic ast, are strongly ire. .... What has got to intervene in
UNP's Internal Problems
The United National Party (UNP), Sri Lanka's main opposition party, has ended its month-long boycott of parliament amidst quite a number of internal problems. The UNP had launched the boycott on March 3 to protest what it said was an erosion of democratic values in the country.
As the UNP returns to Parliament, the issue of one of its high-ranking and influential Member of Parliament of the party, the former Minister, Wijeyapala Mendis, is continuing to haunt the party and its leadership. It is causing grave problems of creditability for the party's campaign against alleged corruption by ruling party politicians.
The former Minister has been found guilty by a Special Commission of benefiting from fraudulent land transactions while the UNP was in power, and the Commission has recommended that his civic rights be deprived. A motion is presently before parliament to implement that recommendation which, if passed, would mean that he would be expelled from parliament, cease to be an MP and lose his civic rights for a period of seven years.
The UNP leadership would like Mendis to resign his seat voluntarily before the motion is taken up for debate in the parliament, but he has refused to do so. Some sections of the party which are thoroughly embarrassed by Mendis's refusal to resign are accusing the leadership of softpeddling the issue because of the power that Mendis wields in the party and outside. It is not insignificant that despite the findings of guilt by the Special Commission, Mendis continues to remain the Chief National Organiser of the UNP.
As for Mendis himself, he recently told his supporters in his Katana constituency that he would definitely not resign from the Parliament since he had not committed any crime to necessitate it and insisted that UNP leader Ranil Wickramasinghe is also aware of his position. Some in the UNP doubt his claim of innocence when Mendis himself has given in writing to the Special Commission which did the investigation an undertaking agreeing to reverse the land deal of which he was accused of thereby in

Page 6
6 TAM TIMES
directly admitting his guilt.
It is also said that when Mendis met his party leader, he had insisted firmly that just because some members of the Party and certain outsiders wanted his resignation, he was not willing to oblige and accept defeat so easily and withdraw.
Mr. Mendis is also said to have challenged the Party leadership to convene a meeting of the UNP Parliamentary Group and allow him to explain matters to them and take a vote on his resignation. He has offered to resign immediately if the majority votes in favour of it. Those UNP MPs who want him to resign are said to be agreeable to give him a chance to explain his position at a UNP Parliamentary group meeting, but this is said to be very unlikely to take place as the party leadership feels thatsuch a confrontation will create a serious split in the parliamentary group itself.
The Battle of the “Opportunists'
In recent weeks the country witnessed a rather unseemly quarrel between two leading figures in the UNP. Ronnie De Mel and Anura Bandaranaike have been engaged in a verbal dual abusing each other in disparaging terms. Both have accused each other of opportunist and improper conduct. As for opportunism, Ronnie de Mel could any day beat Anura by several lengths.
Anura crossed over to the UNP from the SLFP founded by his father who himself crossed over from the UNP to lead his new party in the 1950s. Anura joining the UNP had very little do with policy or politics. Not that he loved the UNP more, but because he lo ved his elder Sister Chandrika less who beat him to the leadership of the SLFP and thereafter became President.
As for Ronnie, he was in his earliest political incarnation a leading member of Philip Gunawardene's Mahajana Exsath Peramuna, then he joined the SLFP under the leadership of Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike and thereafter he joined the UNP to become the longest Serving Finance Minister in President J R Jayawardene. Subsequently he fell out with Premadasa who was later to become President and joined the SLFP. Then he went into self-imposed exile for a
few years, mostly Following the assa dent Premadasa and yake, Ronnie return ter Ranil Wickrema leader.
What provoke match between th mystery. It was Ron lic first with the Anura and his far naikes had engag transfer of hundred contravention of t Law which was ena when it was in powe had in his possessic of to prove his alle ing that he and his given their enormou to the state and causes, Ronnie in : intemperate encoun day Times corresp Peiris, is reported to trouble is that Anu are slaves like those the Ilangaratnes anc bowed their heads a Mel and my type ar ing dankuda (cruml the table.'
Anura hit back of downright oppoi ble-dealing against alleged that he was President Kumaratu to the IPA and beco her cabinet. It is tru time in the recent had met the Presiden and offered his Sup ernment's devoluti fairness to him, it m Ronnie strongly sup Sri Lanka Accord ir Gamini Dissanayak President Jayawarde Prime MiniSter Pren Athulathmudali wer to scuttle it even af However, now that tacked the Bandarai whole of improprie gone to the extent c SLFP and its erstw hopes that he has c into the Kumaratur have evaporated.
It had been rum was aiming to conti ing Provincial Coun ing to become the (

iving in London. sination of Presi
Gamini Dissanaed to the UNP afsinghe became its
d the slanging two remains a nie who went pubaccusation that nily of Bandaraed in fraudulent of acres land in he Land Reform cted by the SLFP r claiming that he n copies of deeds gation. Proclaimfamily had freely s wealth and land ) ther charitable rather terse and ter with the Sunyondent, Roshan have said, "The ra thinks that we in the SLFP, like Maitripalas who ways.... I am a de e not used to eatbs) that fall from
with accusations tunism and douRonnie and even cosying up with nga to cross over me a Minister in that there was a past that Ronnie it more than once port for the govon proposals. In ust be noted that ported the Indo
1987 along with 2 and stood with ne when the then nadasa and Lalith trying their best er it was signed.
Ronnie had atlaike family as a y and fraud and f denigrating the hile leaders, any f being inducted ga cabinet must
oured that Anura st the forthcomil elections aimhief Minister of
15APR1998
the Western Province which includes the capital Colombo. It was from this high profile position as Chief Minister that Chandrika had graduated politically first to become Prime Minister and later President. It is said Some of those in the UNP leadership did not want Anura to become Chief Minister fearing that he become uncontrollable and even challenge the incumbent for the UNP leadership.
Some see Ronnie's outburst against Anura as part of a campaign to cut him and his ambitions to size, and in this context Ranil Wickremasinghe's relative silence as the verbal dual between the two stalwarts of the UNP escalated is seen as very significant. In fact in an interview Anura had with the Sinhala weekly, "Irida Lankadeepa", he indirectly criticised the UNP leader by saying that his clash with Ronnie De Mel got aggravated to the level of a serious crisis because of faults in the UNP party leadership, adding that when Ronnie made insulting statements about him, no one in the party leadership ever bothered to contradict them or set matters straight. What is seen as more significant is the UNP leader's announcement that Karu Jayasuriya, the present Mayor of Colombo, would be the party's candidate for the Western Provincial Council Chief Minister's post in the forthcoming election.
Another rumour that is in currency is that the post of Prime Minister may soon fall vacant due to the advanced age of Mrs. S Bandaranaike who is said to be very anxious that the political split in the family should be bridged, particularly between her second daughter Chandrika and her only son Anura both of whom have engaged in unseemly and vitriolic personal attacks on each other in public. It is said that the mother would like Anura to rejoin the SLFP and see him Succeed as Prime Minister. While it is considered that Chandrika will, tooth and nail, fight against this move, the UNP leadership may fear that this is a likely scenario and therefore has already decided to sideline Anura.
On the Battlefront
The Sri Lankan government's longest military offensive, Jayasikuru, against the Tamil Tigers entered its twelfth month on 13 April without any sign of securing the land route from

Page 7
5APRIL 1998
Vavuniya to northern Jaffna which was the initial objective of the operation when it was launched on 13 May 1997.
Since the thousands of Sri Lankan troops backed by warplanes, tanks and artillery have attempted to wrest control of a northern highway that cuts across the Wanni heartland most which has been under the control of the Tamil Tigers.
The initial optimism in military and government circles of a quick success in subduing the Tigers and Securing the highway has vanished into thin air amidst unprecedented casualties. The Tigers while putting up heavy resistance have also suffered tremendous casualties. The operation has turned into a protracted war of attrition and some have dubbed it as the battle for the highway of death.
Some government politicians have comforted themselves by saying that normally guerrilla wars don't finish on a fixed like a conventional war which would end on a particular day with the surrender of one party and victory for the other. But the fact is one is not talking about the end of the war, but the battle for the highway that has dragged on for nearly a year.
The problem for the military is that it does not have enough men to deploy in newly-taken areas. Though there was a rush to join the army after the successful operation in taking over of Jaffna in late 1995, since then there is hardly any one volunteering to be recruited. In addition a high rate of desertion has also added to the military’s woes. Several amnesties in the past have yielded little and the number of deserters is estimated at between 12,000-15,000, according to military officials say.
While no one knows the numerical strength of the LTTE, according to the army commander, the LTTE's strength had been reduced in recent years from a probable high of about 15,000 fighters to some 6,000 cadres adding that the Tigers still had enough firepower to retain their ability to hit the security forces with mortars and artillery at frequent intervals. Though the State Minister of defence goes often to the war front himself to boost the morale of soldiers, and promised that the capture of Mankulam would be completed and the land route to Jaffna would be
opened before the year (14 April), stuck in the same p ister made the pr has elapsed sinc capture Mankulam metres away.
It is said that are baffled and co vival ability of th inability to open t after 11 months Jaffna was captu forces boasted ab broken the back b What has been ev. that the Tigers h my's offensive d months is that th Tigers is still intac
Today in the and Killinochchi main battle centr LTTE is also launc rilla attacks in th where they have tory and even pen where they are eng attacks on soldier
Operation Jay the longest single military has so f terms of casualtie destroyed, and th has proved to be t It is learnt that spending RS. 1.4 and up to now a to lion has been spé addition to Rs. 1.0 maments being stroyed.
Religious
Ven. Madhu thero of the Sinhal was seen running vehicles owned by ne SS men in the these days. He spread the sacred dha, but to buy p as part of a busin organisation knc Weera Wildhana F In competition w owned Paddy M. venerable monk paddy from fal Sinhala-Buddhi others), who are l these days, at a hi

TAMIL TIMES 7
inhala-Hindu New he forces are still ace when the Minimise. One month
their attempt to which is just 7 kilo
he Defence chiefs nfused by the sur2 Tigers and their he land route even f fighting. When red, the Defence out how they had one of the Tigers. dent from the way ld resisted the aruring past several backbone of the
it. Wanni, Mankulam have become the 2s. Meanwhile the hing sporadic guere eastern province gained more terrietrating into Jaffna (aged in hit and run S.
Sicker is not only operation that the ar undertaken. In s, weapons lost or le money spent, it he most expensive. he govt has been million every day, tal of RS 4,320 millint to finance it in )0 million worth areither lost or de
Business
uwawe Sobhitha a Commission fame around in luxury
a millionaire busiPolonnaruwa area was not there to word of Lord Budaddy from farmers, ss run by a certain wn as the Sinhala oundation(SWWF). th the governmentrketing Board, the as offering to buy mers (only from t farmers and not arvesting their crop gher price than they
would otherwise get. There was of a catch in the monk's offer. To receive the higher price, the farmers should become members of SSWF which is an extremist Sinhala-Buddhist outfit in which the monk plays a leading role. Rev. Sobitha who once defined a true Buddhist monk as a person who has given up all wealth and worldly pleasures was certainly not acting in terms of his own definition. The paddy was being bought at Rs. 9.00 a kilo from the farmers, later to be sold to the CWE for Rs. 9.50 a kilo. This is business without pleasure but with profit indeed!
One must not be unduly unfair to Sobitha. Profit was not his only motive. The SWWF has been in the forefront of the campaign against the government's devolution proposals aimed at settling the ethnic conflict. By offering a slightly higher price for their paddy, provided the farmers become members of the Foundation, the intention of Sobitha and his associates is to rope in literally thousands of farmers into their organisation with a view to mobilising them into a powerful political campaign against the government.
Minister of Post, Telecommunication, Information and Media, Mangala Samaraweera described the Sinhala Commission report as charter for treachery thereby incurring the wrath of Sobitha and other highly placed monks who demanded a public apology from the Minister. Unless the Minister grovelled and apologised, Sobitha threatened to go round the country visiting temples and breaking coconuts to invoke devine anger against the Minister who continued to remain unrepentant.
Minister Samaraweera at a recent press conference said with reference to Sobitha's recent priestly business venture stated: "In the Polonnaruwa district, where a mix of Muslims and Tamils live with Sinhalese, the communal organisation “Sinhala Weera Widhana Foundation' headed by Ven. Maduluwawe Sobhitha thero, is buying paddy only from Sinhalese farmers. He is also given a Pajero Jeep by two private sector organisations for this purpose. These Buddhist Bhikkus, who should only be concerned about teaching the Buddhist philosophy and practising the doctrine, have taken to such acts that makes me ashamed of being a Bud

Page 8
8 TAMIL TIMES
dhist'. One wonders whether Sobitha is going to break more coconuts to invoke devine wrath against the Minister.
Priestly Objection
It Seems Ven. Rambukwelle Sri Wipassi thero, chief prelate of Malwatte chapter, in response to a government proposal to enlist foreign, including Indian, assistance in the restoration of the Dalada Maligawa, the temple of Buddha's tooth relic, has reportedly stated that he was vehemently against using foreign assistance and imported material to reconstruct the devastated Dalada Temple in Kandy. The chief prelate of Asgiriya chapter Channananda Palipanne thero is also reported to have expressed his dissatisfaction about the government's proposal.
The priestly objection has come in the context of the government's proposal too seek Sri Lanka help from India and Germany to restore the Dalada Maligawa. It is said that the entrance, outer wall, roof and some other parts of the temple sustained extensive damage due to the explosion. According to the Commissioner of the Archaeological Department, the moonstone and other portions of immense artistic, archaeological and cultural value were also destroyed by the explosion.
His department was doing all it could to restore all sections destroyed in the explosion. Photographs of the damaged parts had been presented to Indian Director General of Archaeology Professor Ravo for advice. Assistance had similarly been sought from Germany.
When in actual fact what is all about Dalada Maligawa is imported and foreign, one cannot understand the objection to the proposal to renovate the damaged Temple with foreign help. Prince Sidhartha, who later became the Buddha and gave birth to Buddhism, was certainly not a Sinhalese, not even a Sri Lankan. He was an Indian. If what is reputedly located in the sanctum sanctorum of the Dalada Maligawa is reall his tooth, then the relic itself must have been imported from India where he died. The tooth relic of the Buddha was taken in the 16th century to Kandy where in 1590 AD a two-storey temple was built by King Wimaladharma
Suriya I and later Narendra Sinha. T the distinctive g roofed octagonal which the Kings ac jects was added in by none other tha aSSumed the Sinh; Wickrema Rajasir sumed the Kandya betrayed by the K the British who arr him back to his hol
LTTE Pres Ban I Following prote organisations, the S ment has agreed to exclude journalists ecuted under a lav with the LTTE. F Lakshman Kadirgar "It is going to be a clude journalists get ing to them( Tigers In January, the mally outlawed Lil Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for a bomb attack a gawa, a Buddhist town of Kandy. The son who communi decision or declarat made by the LTTE, would be liable to between seven and The ban had ra journalists, who LTTE press statemer London offices an their reports, that th ecuted under the la said the notificatio amended to en sur could continue to w The ban notific cludes various orga in humanitarian w fected areas.
CLARKE ( TO BE KN Science fiction Clarke said 8 April assured he could be ingham Palace, Lo cleared of child ab "I am delighted
 

enlarged by King he Pattiruppuwa, old and copperstructure from ldressed their subthe 19th century n an Indian who lese name of Sri ghe when he asin throne. He was andyan chiefs to 2sted and deported meland, India.
is Reports
ifted sts from journalist iri Lankan governan amendment to from being prosV banning contact Foreign Minister nar said on 4 April, mended. It will exting faxes and talkי.(
government forberation Tigers of after blaming them t the Dalada Malishrine in the hill 2 ban said any percated any "order, ion or exhortation' or on their behalf imprisonment for 15 years. ised fears among regularly receive hts from the LTTE's d include them in hey could be prosW. But Kadirgamar in was now being e that journalists vork freely.
ation already exInisations engaged ork in the war af
CLEARED NIGHTED
writer Arthur C | that he had been knighted at Buckhdon, after he was use allegations. ,' he said from his
15APRIL 1998
home in the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo. “I hope to come over to London later this year. This is the final accolade.'
Sir Arthur, 80, said he had received the news in a fax from his lawyers in London, who had made telephone contact with Palace officials.
The news came after Sri Lanka police said they had found no evidence to support allegations in a British newspaper that the author of 2001: A Space Odyssey was a paedophile.
The strenuously-denied allegations led him to postpone his investiture ceremony, due to take place during the visit to Sri Lanka by the Prince of Wales in February, to avoid embarrassing the royal visitor.
"Having always had a particular dislike for paedophiles, few charges could be more revolting to me than to be classed as one. However, as I have already Said, the allegations are wholly denied," Clarke said at the time the newspaper report appeared.
The British-born writer, who has lived in Sri Lanka since 1956, said: "My lawyers said the Palace had confirmed that as the investiture was postponed at my request, it could go ahead at the Palace. "I have to let them know when I can come. I would come at any time, but it depends on my health, which is erratic at the moment.'
Of the allegation that he had paid for sex with young boys, made in the Sunday Mirror, London, days before the Prince's visit, he said: "It caused me a lot of annoyance, though I was never worried.'
Sri Lanka’s Deputy Inspector General of Police M S M Nizam, said that they were "satisfied that he has not violated any Sri Lankan laws or committed any crime'.
Human Rights
Subcommission
Two Sri Lankans have been elected to a subcommission of the Geneva-based U.N. Commission on Human Rights for a four-year term.
Former Principal of the Ceylon Law College and prominent lawyer R K W Gunasekera was elected as a full member of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and well-known human rights activist and university don, Dr Deepika Udugama as an alternate member.

Page 9
SAPRIL 1998
CHARLES ABEYSE
ri Lanka has lost another of her proud sons with the passing away of Mr. Charles Abeysekera on Friday, April 3, 1998. His demise at the crucial time when his continued contribution is so desperately needed to help in pulling the country out of the dangerous rut it has been pushed into by opportunistic leaders is very unfortunate. Given the alarming trends in the decline in Social values and in the neglect of social justice and human rights in Sri Lanka, it is frightening to imagine what the future holds for all Sri Lankans, when humanitarians of the calibre of Charles Abeysekera are no longer with us to expose and condemn the injustices of those wielding power.
Although Abeysekera is best known to many Lankans for his dedicated work as a committed defender human and fundamental rights in Sri Lanka, he also excelled as an efficient and dedicated civil servant. As a public servant, he served admirably under various governments and eventually retired as the Chairman of the Steel Corporation in 1977. He was specially chosen by the then United Front government to lead the corporation when it was experiencing managerial problems. Whatever task that was assigned to him, he was known for accomplishing it without confronting anyone, working in harmony with others as a humble officer carrying out his assigned responsibilities. Although his later work in non-governmental organisations occasionally compelled him to disagree with the authorities in the State apparatus, he was tactful but firm in dealing with them.
After his retirement from government service, he organised the Social Scientists' Association (SSA) in which many notable academics and social scientists collaborated with him. Its contribution during that time helped to satisfy a much desired need of academics and others interested in studying the causes of the social problems in Sri Lanka. The issues discussed at various meetings and seminars organised by the SSA were helpful for understanding the real causes of many social, economic and politi
cal problems. It w of one of these s Abeysekera, at w of this tribute pi "The Financial, S Gaps in the Op came to know in ened thinking and ties of Abeyseker place after the 1' Tamil opinion w nistic towards all litical parties to th loss of confiden governance that nation against the up succinctly il mood and thinkir munity at that tin ration was the si of the Tamils to policies of the S feel insecure ar words, tone and he articulated hi sincere understar for the anguish o well suited for th present Governm the Official Lang a post he held years along with
etS.
The selection as a member of th in April 1995 an was also in recog thetic views on t Tamils. If not Sinhalese leader. Charles Abeyse. among the min would have the ( in the viability c to crisis that fact He was the P ment for InterEquality (MIRJ) death. He also p in the Civil Ri Human Rights TI founder of the A Rights, based ir ute paid by the rights organisat national to Mr. condolence mes people all over
 

TAM TIMES 9
RA
as during the course 2minars presided by hich the first writer esented a paper on ocial and Economic en Economy" and imately the enlightthe admirable qualia. This seminar took }83 anti-Tamil riots, as strongly antagoSouthern-based pole extent of complete ce in the system of permitted discrimiTamils. He summed 1 one sentence the g of the Tamil comhe : the cry for sepapontaneous reaction the discriminatory tate that made them ld vulnerable. The the manner in which s view revealed his lding of the reasons f the Tamils. He was e appointment by the ment as Chairman of guages Commission, during the last few 1 his other commit
of Mr. Abeysekera e team to visit Jaffna i talk with the LTTE Inition of his sympahe grievances of the for broad-minded in the likes of Mr. cera, hardly anyone ority communities onfidence to believe f a political solution s Sri Lanka.
esident of the MoveRacial Justice and ) at the time of his layed a leading role hts Movement and ask Force. He was a ia Forum for Human Bangkok. The tribworld famous human on, Amnesty InterAbeysekera in their age conveyed to the he world is a testi
mony of his dedicated work as a defender of human rights over a long period.
Amnesty international stated: "In the year in which Amnesty International is celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is very sad to lose this champion of human rights who has dedicated so much of his life to the promotion of human rights as indivisible and universal.
The Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality (MIRJE), became one of the oldest and leading organisations in Sri Lanka that consistently worked for, as its name indicates, justice, equality and ethnic harmony that inhabit the island. Functioning under its founding President Fr. Paul Caspersz during its first few years, the document entitled “Ten Days of Terror' authored by a delegation of the MIRJE that visited Jaffna in the aftermath of the burning of the Jaffna Public Library in May 1981 graphically describes the widespread violence let loose by a rampaging battalion of security service personnel. Abeysekera later succeeded Fr. Caspersz as President and continued the work of MIRJE with tireless and unwavering commitment until his dying day. Whether in the field of human rights or in his academic career as a social scientist, his work was rooted in a passion for social justice. He was a sharp observer of political developments in the country and his contributions to the defence of human rights have been tremendous. Many will mourn the death of a great human being."
Abeysekera was also a ardent defender of media freedom and freedom of expression. His talent as a writer became public knowledge after his retirement. He was a leading art critic and a writer on culture, human rights and current affairs. Recognising the sectarian bias and self-censorship that characterised the national print media in Sri Lanka which sought to mould public opinion in the image of its proprietors and editors, through the MIRJE, it was Abeysekera who was primarily instrumental in launching of the Sinhala weekly journal Yukthiya, the columns of which have been used in campaign for negotiated and just political solution to the ethnic crisis. Under his leadership, MIRJE has also been funding the publication of a Tamil weekly journal

Page 10
10 TAMIL TIMES
"Sarinihar'. He has also been the founder co-editor with Jayadeva Uyangoda of "Pravada' (Alternative View), a scholarly journal concerned with contemporary political, social, economic and literary issues in Sri Lanka. He has also contributed several articles on civil rights and social issues to other journals published in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka and its people have already benefited from the historic contribution made by Abeysekera and institutions with which he was associated and this contribution has to be judged in its historical context.
The post-1956 period witnessed the onward march of the ideology of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism which was seeking to impose its hegemonic domination. Those were the days when the Eksath Bikkhu Peramuna, Baudha Jathika Bala we gaya, the Sinhala Bala Mandalaya, the K M P Rajaratnes, the L H Mettanandas, the P de S Kularatnes, the N Q Diases, the FR Jayasuriyas, and their ilk were in a position of such uncontrollable power and influence that they could force the main political parties to adopt the policies they demanded. The forces these organisations and individuals represented could make and unmake governments. These forces had assumed an autonomy of their own outside the framework of established political parties. The result was that the two major political parties at that time discarded even their pretence of being national parties representing all the different ethnic communities inhabiting the country and adopted policies and practices demanded by these forces which in short wanted to convert Sri Lanka into Sinhala-Buddhist theocratic state.
What was lamentable was that even the left political parties, having adopted the parliamentary road, could not resist these reactionary forces and gradually began to surrender their previously adopted progressive positions. This was the situation in the 1960s and 1970s when Tamil militancy and separatism began to emerge and the ethnic conflict began to escalate. The political party establishment, whether of the right or left, having become prisoners of the powerful forces outside, did not have even the space or capacity to debate the fundamental causes of the emerging and escalating crisis.
It is in this cor the mid-1970s, th, began to intellectl forces representing dhist chauvinist id political party estal formation of orga Civil Rights Mover tist Association, C and Religion, Mo Racial Justice and E Institute, the Intern Ethnic Studies etc tions, in which m academics, social S personalities, trade rights activists and political parties in t pacity participated centre of a concer ing campaign of it confronting the fo Buddhist ideology. lication and circula number of Well rese books and papers ( myths and mysticis. concepts that chari Buddhist ideolog concepts of multi-el culturalism, and ad ated political solut conflict became th these organisation aim, frequent publi ings and debates w parts of the countr
If political partie the SLFP, which pr incapacitated to a because they had b outside reactionary Buddhist chauvin 1980s and now in t come reconciled w cating devolution gional autonomy, kinds and degrees, be to the credit of t bution made by pe sekera and others sations with whic to which reference the previous parag some belonging to of extremist sectar today in Sri Lank, advocating that Sin only official langu tation Tamils shou citizenship and vot the Provincial Cou) under the Indo-Sri

15APRIL 1998
text, beginning in ut the real debate ally confront the the Sinhala-Bud:ology outside the lishment with the hisations like the ment, Social Scienentre for Society vement for Interquality, the Marga ational Centre for These organisaany intellectuals, cientists, religious unionists, human even members of heir individual ca, became the epited and unrelentileological debate orces of SinhalaProduction, pubion of a countless arched and argued leconstructing the m of the imagined acterised Sinhalay, promoting the hnicity and multivocating a negotiion to the ethnic le central task of S. With the same c seminars, meet'ere held in many
y. S like the UNP and eviously had been ct independently ecome captives of forces of Sinhalaism, in the late he 1990s have beith policies advoof power and realbeit of varying
that must Surely he historic contriirsons like Abeyincluding organithey associated has been made in raph. Apart from the lunatic fringe ian organisations, there is no one hala should be the ige, that the planld to deprived of ing rights, or that ncil system set up Lanka Accord of
July 1987 should be abolished. In fact, the current debate has shifted to a different and a higher level - whether there should be more powers that should be devolved and greater autonomy should be given to the regions including the Tamil regions. That even the Sinhala Commission, in their recent report, accept the devolution of powers under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution while opposing any further extension as proposed under the present government's proposals is indicative of the shift in the level of debate.
Abeysekera will be missed immensely by all who were close to him and knew his efforts to protect the rights of all the citizens of Sri Lanka. He firmly believed in the equality of all the people, regardless of ethnic, religious, caste and class differences. He was a father figure and a paragon to many academics, old and young. The institutions founded by him are the legacy that he has left for the present and future generations of human rights defenders and researchers in Social Sciences.
The most fitting way to remember him is to continue the work that he started with great determination to ensure social justice and equal rights to all citizens and to safeguard these principles as well as their fundamental rights as members of a free society at all times. His efforts must not be allowed to fail, although he is no longer with us. The amiable, kindly, unassuming, self-effacing, mild-mannered, and ever friendly Charlie, as he has been fondly addressed by his many friends, will be remembered for a long time.
- Dr. S. Narapalasingam
and P Rajanayagam
A Tribute
"In the year in which Amnesty International is celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is very sad to lose this champion of human rights who has dedicated so much of his life to the promotion of human rights as indivisible and universal.
"Both his role as the Chairman of the Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality, one of the leading and oldest human rights organisations in Sri Lanka, and his academic career were rooted in a passion for social justice.
He was a sharp observer of political developments in the country and his contributions to the defence of human rights have been tremendous.

Page 11
15APR1998
THE CHALLENGES THATF : SINHALA AND TAMIL COM
By Charles Abeysekera
olitical relations between the Sinhala and Tamil ethnic groups have been based upto now on concepts of a majority and a minority. And the concept of a majoritarian democracy has been used to impose on the minority a set of discriminatory practices that denied them their democratic rights. I do not wish to dwell upon all these aspects but mention should be made of the primacy given to Buddhism and to Sinhala, the religion and language of the majority and to the process of State-aided colonisation which had the effect of diluting the population in areas of Tamil majority. These discriminatory practices continued despite Tamil protests which were peaceful and within constitutional bounds; however, the situation deteriorated, with pogroms and riots in which the Tamils were the victims, to the point where they were forced to conclude that the Sri Lankan State was no longer able or willing to assure them security of life and property. This in turn led to the demand for a separate State and the resort to arms to achieve that objective.
It is this kind of relationship which the (devolution) proposals now seek to replace with a new relationship which rejects the notions of majoritarianism and puts in its place the idea of equality between the ethnic groups. It recognises the collective rights of the Tamil ethnic group by recognising their right to autonomy and selfgovernance in the areas predominantly inhabited by them. It also creates the political mechanisms necessary to ensure the exercise of these rights. It is in this sense that I assert that the proposals presented by the government are a radical restructuring of political relations between the ethnic groups living in this country.
This change poses enormous problems and challenges, albeit different in nature, before both the Sinhala and Tamil communities. Let me take the Sinhala community first.
Most Sinhalese have always been
prepared to accep Zen and his right leges and benefit basis of equality
zens. This is acce right. But it does ceptance of right joyed by them a an identity that i Sinhalese. There
to accept their la gion on a basis of to very odd situa the provisions of tution that declar.
Mr. Charles A
lution proposa
ment were an published in Worker, 2nd & (October) und Qualitative C
ka's Politics.
official language a an official langua is greatest when ing the right of T ernance in their a This positior vocal Sinhala nati cept that our socie the geographical island, has alway now a Sinhala-Bl that it is the duty serve that partic society. They argi Buddhist is tolera that non-Sinhala persons can live of that society as hing to affect or acteristic. The de autonomy or for seen as definitely character of this
 
 
 
 

TAMIL TIMES 11
ACE MUNITIES
the Tamil as a citio enjoy all the priviof citizenship on a with Sinhalese citioted as an individual not lead to the acthat should be en
a community with different from the is thus a reluctance nguage or their reliequality. This leads tions, for example, the current Consti2 that Sinhala is the
beysekera passed 1998. This ex
om an article he riginaldraft devos of the govern
ounced. It was the Christian & 3rd Qrs. 1995 er the title A ange in Sri Lan
nd that Tamil is also ge. The reluctance t comes to acceptamils to self-gov
CaS.
is articulated by onalists in the conty, contained within boundaries of the s been and is even Iddhist society and of the State to preular nature of our e that the Sinhalait of difference and and non-Buddhist within the confines ong as they do notarm its basic charmand for regional a separate State is altering the basic ociety. The slogan
that is now being advanced against the proposals, that they would lead to a "break-up of the country" derives its political and emotional strength from this attitude.
This concept also has a political corollary. The essentially SinhalaBuddhist nature of the society can only be maintained by a unitary State, that is a State with a single legislature, a single executive and a single judiciary. The often unspoken argument here is that such a State will always be controlled by the SinhalaBuddhist majority and will serve its interests. The commitment to a unitary State is often supported by historical and emotional arguments, even to a position of ludicrousness when it is falsely asserted that Sri Lanka has been a unitary State from the time of Dutugemunu. But the reality of the argument for a unitary State is based on maintaining the dominance of Sinhala-Buddhists over the Sri Lankan polity.
This attitude is also politically blind in that it ignores developments over the past two centuries that have totally altered the population composition, the economy, society and culture of our land. These developments require a matching change in our political relationships and structures. This is what the proposals seek to achieve.
This then is the challenge before the Sinhalese community. Is it mature enough to realise the current realities, both within and outside the boundaries of the country, and to work towards a political structure that accords with those realities? It has now a chance to make these changes, if it does not, then we may well be faced with interminable war ending in Bosnian type of situation.
Let me now turn to the challenges facing the Tamil community. I traced earlier in this note the route by which disputes over political power grew to the point of an armed insurgency and the demand for a separate State. It is unarguable that it was the coercive power exerted by the Tamil armed groups in the first instance and specifically by the LTTE over the last ten years that moved the Sri Lankan State to a position where it is ready to change its very nature and to make a public offer of an effective devolution of power. The question that can (continued on next page)

Page 12
12 TAMIL TIMES
The Ethnic Conflict and the Role of Journalis
Jehan Perera Media Director, National Peace Council
he government's decision to exclude journalists from the LTTE ban will be welcomed by the media, and also by all who believe in the possibility of a negotiated end to the war. While the Sri Lankan media can be charged with not having lived upto its full peacemaking potential, sections of it comprise the most liberal and perceptive elements of Sri Lankan Society.
The ability to see and report the different points of view is absolutely essential to the possibility of peacefully ending an increasingly desperate situation.
Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar statement on the issue implies that under the amended provisions of the law, journalists would have the right to actively seek out the LTTE and talk to them. There can be no peace in the country without talking to the LTTE. Journalists can pave the way, which the government can follow. Although not generally thought about in this manner, jour
nalists are really co who spend much C scribing and interpre individuals and gro Journalists can mediators in the foll both begin by analy They have to report the facts accuratel them into a context. and mediators shou inclination to take can provide a forun exchange of views a ties in conflict a ch views. They both parties to the conflic stereotypes and re They both can also toring by reporting breach of agreement Creative approac cast and print medi audience in unders sons behind differe held by the groups helping the prospe
(Continued from page ll)
be asked now, the question that could not have been asked before these proposals, is: Is coercion still necessary to realise their objectives or can they be better obtained through other means, specifically negotiations with the government?
This question is very important for the Tamil community. Political parties and groups claiming to represent the Tamils, with the sole exception of the LTTE, have generally accepted the proposals and are in negotiation with the government over the details of the proposals. The LTTE has virtually rejected the proposals and the path of negotiation.
I agree that there is a dilemma facing the Tamil community. What guarantee is there that these proposals will be fully implemented if the coercive power of the LTTE is either vanquished or withdrawn? This is a doubt that is fully justified when one takes into consideration the past history of
agreements and pa settle this problem. must weigh these di changed political co ture of the present even the credibility They must then dec ing the risk of enter tions is more prefer ending miseries of w The LTTE has of prepared to conside native to Eelam. It I native for discussion fore seriously consi gotiations are more realisation of Tamil tions within a unite the further applica should take into acc attitudes may harder lead to protracted w These then are th ing both ethnic gro ture of Sri Lanka w maturity with which are faced.

15APRIL 1998
tS
nflict specialists, f their time deting behaviors of ps in conflict. be compared to owing way. They sing the conflict. the facts and get 7, while putting Both journalists ld restrain their ides. They both h for debate and nd give the parance to air their 2an educate the st by challenging framing issues. engage in moniadherence to, or tS. hes by the broada can assist the landing the rea:nt perspectives involved, thus cts for conflict
cts designed to But the Tamils oubts against the nditions, the nagovernment and of the President. ide whether taking into negotiaable than the un
7a. ten said that it is r a serious alterhow has an alter. It should thereder whether nelikely to lead the political aspirad Sri Lanka than ion of force. It punt the fact that in the south and
a. e challenges facups. And the full depend on the these challenges O
resolution. Unfortunately, the mainstream media has been forced into an unhelpful role in reporting the Sri Lankan conflict. A part of the reason for this has been the government's media policy over the past couple of years that prevents journalists from going over into the conflict zones and reporting the situation at first hand. At present in Sri Lanka the situation is that all roads and means of transport to the conflict zones are blocked off by the armed forces who will not let persons through unless they have clearance. It is difficult for independent journalists to obtain that clear
AICC.
SUPERFICIAL COVERAGE
In recent months, more journalists have gained access to the north-east. But this is generally to areas in which the government has established its control, such as Jaffna. On the other hand, journalists are only permitted to go into the conflict Zones, such as the Wanni, in a group. They are sent on whistle-stop visits for a few hours, where they do not have the time to really get to know what people are thinking and what the situation really is. What the media prints or broadcasts as news from the front are generally handouts of the Sri Lankan defence ministry. These will necessarily give a one sided picture of the preVailing situation.
It is ironic therefore that the average Sri Lankan television viewer is able to see live coverage of wars in other countries but not his or her own. It appears that the Sri Lankan defence authorities have learned the lesson of media control from the US-led censorship of the Gulf War. The United States learned from the Vietnam War how an independent media could catalyse opposition to war by highlighting the human costs. In the Gulf War, on the other hand, by carefully managing the news, and obtaining the concurrence of the major Western media organisations in this strategy, the US-led coalition was able to generate a very high level of public support for the war.
The same pattern can be discerned in Sri Lanka. Of course, there are some major differences. The Gulf War was over in a few days. So it was relatively easy to keep the media under control during that short period,
(continued on next page )

Page 13
SAPR1998
(Continued from page 12)
and to feed the general population with Sunshine stories by focussing on the hi-tech aspects of the war. But in the case of the Sri Lankan conflict, the war has been dragging on for over 15 years, and in the past two years it has been steadily escalating with no end in sight. It is therefore difficult for the defence authorities to continue to give sunshine stories, when the war is never ending, and when the level of army casualties is So high.
Besides, there is a counter-productive aspect to the government's media policy. It weakens one of the two prongs of the government's strategy with regard to its war against the LTTE. The effective news control on the war situation, and the human costs of the war, may serve to safeguard the military prong of the government's strategy. But it diminishes the appeal of the government's political reform prong. If people, for instance, knew of the human costs of the war, and the sufferings of the soldiers and civilians, and saw it in their bedrooms while watching television, they might be more inclined to accept the government's political package meant to satisfy Tamil aspirations for autonomy.
RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM
The situation would be equally bad if not worse in rebel controlled territory, where information about developments in the outside world is virtually non-existent. The people in the Wanni, for instance, receive their information almost totally from the LTTE. It is not particularly surprising that a group of activists from the Wanni who visited Colombo believed that it was not possible to organise opposition to the war in the South. They are unaware of the change in the mood of the people in the south, which has enabled peace organisations to get together large numbers of people on a peace platform which calls for an immediate end to the war, and for unconditional negotiations between the government and LTTE with parity of dignity.
In Sri Lanka we are still far from this ideal of responsible reporting in which both sides of the picture are accuratedly depicted. In general, journalists identify themselves with the position of an ethnic group. So we have the Sinhalese-owned newspa
ver the past
erable discu
place among cal analysts and m lic on the ongoing on the ways of re aim of securing la Lanka. It is widi through military n, sis cannot be resol solution, which is the ethnic groups Lanka is to remain try. The countries t ter war in which lost their lives an worth of assets c succeed in achievi essary for directing on fighting pover and social depriva divided states. In these fronts posec internal peace and cessitated the diver resources for stren curity forces to th’
pers giving mor hardline Sinhales versa with the Tam pers. What then h readership of the n one-sided news wh up emotions and n that their side is ri and the other wro able.
Journalists who ute to being part the conflict are pl. situation. They me balanced accounts they are covering witnes sing the north-east, but th their media orgar give them that fre country like Sri L. the media field rela nalists will be nat go against the con fore, taking advant ment’s special offe enter into dialogu would require a ne part of the media c.

TAMIL TIMES 13
i PGGE FOGGSS
By Dr.S.Narapalasingam
few years, considssions have taken politicians, politiambers of the pubethnic conflict and solving it with the sting peace in Sri ly accepted that eans alone the crived and a political
acceptable to all is needed if Sri as one united counhat split after a bittens of thousands d several billions estroyed did not ng the peace necfully their efforts ty, unemployment tions within their deed, failures on | a great threat to in many cases nesion of their scarce gthening their sewart possible civil
2 prominence to e views and vice hil-owned newspaappens is that the wspaper gets only ich tends to whip Lakes them believe ght and reasonable ng and unreason
) wish to contribof the solution to ced in a difficult y wish to present of the issues that , especially after realities in the management of isations may not edom. In a small nka, with jobs in ively limited, jourrally reluctant to pany line. Therenge of the governr to journalists to with the LTTE, w openness on the impanies. O
disturbances. Thus a vicious circle of poverty, social unrest and high proportion of public spending on defence came to be established in many nations that split after a violent struggle.
A viable political solution and lasting peace are no doubt inseparable goals but the processes of achieving them are not identical, Nor are the time-frames for achieving them the same. The belief that there is only one common process for achieving both and that once the former is achieved the latter will automatically happen is not necessarily true. In the present article, an attempt is made to expose this misconception and explore ways to achieve the goals, taking into consideration the political realities and the developments that have led to the distrust of the minority communities in any unitary system of government that gives the overriding powers to the centre on matters affecting their safety, security, regional identity and general welfare.
The prospect of the proscribed LTTE accepting a political solution along the lines agreeable to all the main political parties representing the majority and minority communities is bleak as long as the LTTE is not willing to modify its goal of an independent State for the Tamils in the NorthEast. But many seem to believe that once the LTTE is weakened militarily, a political solution within the framework of a united Sri Lanka that is acceptable to all the main political parties will compel the Tamil Tigers to give up their armed struggle.
In this postulate, there are two vital questions which must be considered. How far the LTTE should be weakened for its leadership to give up for good its demand for full independence? And whether the LTTE could be weakened militarily to this degree in the near future? Se veral deadlines set in the past to marginalise the LTTE militarily passed without any apparent impact on its military capabilities not only as a guerrilla movement but also as a conventional fighting force. The Strategy to weaken its influence over the people

Page 14
14 TAM TIMES
in the North-East has not been purposefully pursued, despite the claim of the Government that this is what its aim is. This dereliction is unfortunate since there were no impediments for the Government to have taken suitable measures under the existing constitutional provisions. In terms of national costs and benefits evaluated in relation to the common goals of the main political parties, namely, achieving ethnic unity and peace, this strategy would have yielded high dividends relative to what have been achieved so far through the costly war to weaken the LTTE militarily.
Given the firm stand of the two main political parties in the Government and the opposition to keep Sri Lanka as one united country without giving any room that would endanger its territorial integrity at any future time, a negotiated permanent settlement with the LTTE, if it does not compromise on its stand on a separate state, is most unlikely. The fact that both sides have incurred enormous losses as a result of fighting for or defending their diverse positions is also a factor that has hardened their attitudes. In fact, this is also one of the many adverse consequences of the brutal war. For every combatant killed or disabled for life, there may be at least about 20 to 30 of his or her relatives and close friends who will be hostile to the side responsible for the act. It is believed that the main reason for young Tamil men and women to join the LTTE and especially become "Black Tigers' prepared to commit suicide, is their own personal experience of maltreatment or the brutal killing or torture of a close relative or friend by the security forces.
Another factor that should not be ignored here is that there is no external pressure to settle the conflict in Sri Lanka, as in the case of former Yugoslavia where the six-nation Contact Group comprising America, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and Italy has played the main role in trying to bring peace to the Balkan region. These six Western powers with their mediation and threats ended the war in Bosnia. The Dayton accord itself would not have been possible by other means. President Slobodan Milosevic, who built his career on stirring up ethnic tension in the Serbian province of Kosovo was warned not to try a policing Solution but to find a political
solution that gives for Kosovo through Albanian majority group warned the fi in Belgrade on Marc its insistence that th internal matter) that arms embargo on ently comprising S negro) would be il removes its special Kosovo and start the Albanian leade deadline of 4 weeks ing was given on M absurd for any one move in the case C flict in Sri Lanka, as ing geo-political ne ern powers to inter Adjacent Indi edged regional pov get involved direct conflict again after : perience resulting casualties (reporte. lost their lives and 2 injured) incurred ( Keeping' operation Lanka and eventual latter without comp. Indian Governme. have spent over Rs. failed efforts in co Indo-Sri Lanka accC with the life of one isters, Mr. Rajiv Ga its involvement in t flict. Although any by India in the eth ruled out, it will be dia’s endorsement final solution for other reasons.
Despite rais among some expat the BJP-led minor any other governm is unlikely to Supp a separate state for All major players political solution work of a united S the minor Tamil na the PMK and MI emotive support to separate state. Thi influence on India ing Sri Lanka’s uni tegrity.
The consider Sympathy towarc Tamils has been (

15 APR1998
reater autonomy lialogue with the ere. The contact leral government 9, 1998 (despite 2 conflict was an a comprehensive ugoslavia (presrbia and Monteposed, unless it Serb forces from egotiations with S there. The new with further warnarch 25. It will be D expect a similar f the ethnic conthere is no pressed for the West
WeIne , a, the acknowler is unlikely to ly in settling the ts humiliating exfrom the heavy ily 1155 soldiers 984 were severely luring its "Peace s in North-East Sri withdrawal of the Leting its task. The nt is reported to 50 billion on their nnection with the ird. India also paid of her Prime Minndhi as a result of he Sri Lankan conirect involvement hic crisis has been prudent to get Inand support for a geopolitical and
d expectations iate Tamil circles, ty Government or ent in New Delhi Prt the creation of he Lankan Tamils. here will favour a within the framei Lanka, although onalist parties like MK may provide the demand for a will not have any S Stan Ce On enSury and territorial in
ble international the Sri Lankan insiderably eroded
in recent years particularly after the departure of the Indian forces. Their concern for the Tamils in Sri Lanka at the present time is limited to the prevention of violations of human rights, including the displacement of people from their habitats. The carrying out violent bomb attacks in which scores of civilians are wantonly killed and maimed and public property is destroyed has also attracted widespread international condemnation. There are the Tamil adventurists in safe havens, who are expressing the view that the Lankan Tamils have the might to defy world opinion and hence the war for separation should proceed until the declared goal of Tamil Eelam is achieved. They must be under the illlusion that the vast majority of the Tamils despite all the losses they have suffered are in this warring mood risk. ing their future for the sake of record
ing the heroism of Tamil warriors in
modern history.
Peace Processes
The prospect of reaching a political solution at present seems to quite bleak. However, an effective political solution that has wide acceptance is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for lasting peace. In the present situation in Sri Lanka to have durable peace two peace processes are required. While achieving peace is an urgent process that may extend beyond the process of finding a political Solution, keeping the peace is a continual process. With regard to the former, it will have to focus on reconciliation and the speedy implementation of confidence building measures. These should aim at repairing the damage and harm done in the past to inter-communal harmony. In fact, this will help to create a favourable atmosphere for reaching a political solution acceptable to the minorities. Any laxity with regard to the latter can render useless all the efforts made to achieve peace. Even under a reformed political system, sound policies alone by themselves cannot guarantee peace, unless these are vigorously implemented. Sincere efforts are needed to implement them for achieving and keeping the peace.
Had the process of peace keeping been taken seriously through the active implementation of crucial provisions in the constitution and ap

Page 15
15APRIL 1998
proved policies, the demand for changing the unitary form of government would not have arisen. The perception among many members of the minority ethnic groups that governments have deliberately ignored the implementation of certain constitutional provisions and policies helpful to them has not changed. Mr. T.D.S.A. Dissanayake in his book, "War or Peace in Sri Lanka' (volume II) has given an example of such failures by pointing out that Tamil language as prescribed in the constitution has not yet been given its rightful place in the day-to-day functioning of the nation. According to the present constitution both Sinhala and Tamil are official languages, while English is the link languagê.
The vast majority of Tamils have yet to accept that the government of Sri Lanka is also their government and not solely that of the majority community. The many opportunities for the government to convince them that this is not the case have been missed by default. Moreover, the hostile method used by some security personnel to Search for "terrorists' among the Tamil civilians has not helped to dispel this opinion. Importantly, the senseless way decrees issued under the Emergency Regulations and Prevention of Terrorism Act are applied does not help in ousting racial prejudice. It is not illogical to conclude that this helps the separatists and not in building a united nation,
The administrative system in Sri Lanka has also contributed significantly to the present crisis, mainly due to its politicisation by successive governments in order to make it serve the interest of the ruling party and their leaders and supporters. For the same reason, the police force has also been made an agent of the party in power. Incompetence, corruption and violations of established codes and conduct within the force as in the case of the rest of the public service have been overlooked because of this compulsion.
The era when the police force was considered by the people as the keepers of the peace and the upholders of the law is now history. It is widely known that politicians who wield power do bring influence to bear on the police and many police personnel look forward to this patronage for their
career advancemen evidence to ackn progress, prosperi main prerequisites to the rule of law a cient administrati whether or not the ance is fully demc has no meaning wil is blatantly violat representatives of sacred duty, amon hold it.
If the administ not improved to b cient, cost-effective ing all the people i the declared polici regardless of which this will hurt not c also in the end the ernments. What is on many occasions ble incidents happ barrassments to reaucratic red ta blamed and no mé taken thereafter to penings in the futu ticians, despite causes of the eth tional problems ha terest in removing been less talk and sistent with the de tions of party leade not have been dri predicament.
The ethnic con owed the dangerou emerged over the tually will be a fo peace in Sri Lanka between the ruling jects, the millions people, whose ar modest compared rich aspiring to bec luctance of the ma with their enormou join forces so as t biased, anti-social tices in the admini tributed to their c continue the reven tational politics, di ness of the terrible done to the count vancement of the nars and writings past mistakes of L: so far not had any the attitudes of th

AMİL TIMES 15
it. There is enough owledge that for ity and peace, the are the adherence nd honest and effiion, regardless of system of governcratic. Democracy hen the rule of law ed by the elected the people, whose g others, is to up
rative machinery is become more effi2 and swift in servin accordance with es of governments, 1 party is in power, nly the people but popularity of govastonishing is that when Some terrien that cause emgovernments, bupe or lethargy is aningful action is prevent such hapre. Influential poli(nowing the real nic and other nawe shown little ing them. Had there more deeds conclared good intenrs, Sri Lanka would ven to the present
flict has overshadLS division that has years, which evenrmidable threat to a. This is the gulf class and the Subof the powerless nbitions are very with those of the ome richer. The rein political parties is lust for power to ) get rid of all the and immoral pracstration can be atommon desire to geful and confronespite their awareharm that will be ry and to the adpoor people. Semion the lessons of ankan leaders have effect on changing eir Successors.
Without a radical change away from the partisan and confrontational politics originating from the macho culture towards more responsible and consultative politics, there is little hope for peace and a better future for the vast majority of Sri Lankans, regardless of their ethnic origin. The ability of the opposition to obstruct the government from doing any noble deed has been enhanced by the PR system of selecting the MPs. If the main role of the opposition remains as the obstruction of the government in its efforts to resolve the burning issues affecting the people, then the present PR system helps in playing this role very effectively. After the first (Soulbury) constitution, the task of drafting constitutions has been the prerogative of the party or parties in power. They had the required two-thirds majority in Parliament to adopt their own drafts. The many obnoxious provisions in the Second (1978) Republican constitution were motivated by the desire of the ruling party and lts leaders to remain and continue in power and keep their political opponents at bay. The aspirations of the minority Tamils were also ignored in the drafting exercise. The consequences of these shortcomings are at the heart of the present political crises - confrontational politics and the unresolved ethnic problem.
Moving Forward
The holding of local government elections in January this year has revived hope among many Tamils in the areas brought under government's control that a civilian administration would address their day-to-day problems. If for lack of funds and other support from the Government the elected bodies are unable to discharge their public duties even within the limited powers assigned to them then the people's hope will be dashed again. Priority at the present time must obviously be on rehabilitation and reconstruction works and the restoration of the supply of essential services.
The Swedish government has allocated Rs. 188 million this year for rehabilitation work in Jaffna PeninSula. Other aid donors have also pledged financial Support for such activities. It is important that the local administration in the area functions actively to facilitate the execu

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16 TAMIL TIMES
tion of projects even by international agencies operating in Sri Lanka. Without an effective civilian administration, this would be virtually an impossible task. Since the people will back wholeheartedly programmes and projects that are designed to provide immediate relief, they will punish any saboteurs. As explained above, there are no short cuts here and the effective way to start the peace process is through the vigorous implementation of urgent projects and policies that will first restore trust in the efforts of the Government to unite the divided people. If the Government pursues this approach vigorously, while not abandoning its efforts to reach a political solution people will be convinced that lasting peace is mot a dream but a reality. At the same time the political and other obstructionists of its peace efforts will be censured by the people.
A major objective of the Sudu Nelum Movement, which has 146 branches throughout the country is said to be to educate the people, particularly the youths on the imperative to remove the deep rooted mistrust existing between different communities and bring them closer for living in harmony. The task of educating the people along this line cannot succeed in the context of the confrontational politics seen now, unless it is carried out under the collective guidance of civic leaders from all the communities, whose integrity has not been tainted in any way. The Civil Rights Movement, the National Peace Council and other organisations committed to peace and justice, must become a single mass movement to compel the political leaders to take the measures to build trust between communities and to agree on the reforms to the present constitution that will help in achieving the peace goal.
The objectives of the Sudu Nelum Movement and the various projects envisaged for implementation are unquestionably praiseworthy, but unfortunately the ambitious movement has fallen victim to the politics of confrontation because of the patronage of the Government. The positive contribution that the Government can make towards realising this noble objective is to facilitate the co-operative efforts of independent peace, civil rights and Social activist movements without getting directly involved in
IEN OF
defining cha Aီးဇိုရိုးမျိုး Stage nic conflict is mination displayed seeking a decisiv the military front. I mitment to war al military activity di state as well as by hardly another pa the world at the m mination is such til cle happens, the w tinue for some yea Against such a tion guaranteeing ditions for peace : would require the ing out of the foll ԱTeS:
(i) Termination between the stat through an agreem (ii) A political nature of ethnicitying and its satisfac tion.
However, given of the conflict, ac goals would be exc The post-April 199: flict has been chara relenting propensit lence. Violence has ther violence; it h; the belief, equally s ties to the conflict, come in the battle adversary's military fective, might hav on the inner politic
flict settlement pro
the operations. As of good faith, Gove frain from convertin troversial bill pass allows it to do pre the pretext of "prov parency and acco ensured under existi lations applicable to ganisations. In the any group Seeking popular support wi the peace process.

15 APRIL 1998
FYING THE COMPLEXTIES THE CRISIS IN SRI LANKA
Jayadeva Uyangoda
racteristic of the of Sri Lanka’s eththe extreme deterby both parties in breakthrough on n terms of the comld intensity of the monstrated by the the LTTE, there is allel anywhere in ment. Their deterhat, unless a miraar is likely to conrS to COme.
backdrop, a soluhe minimum conand reconstruction successful worklowing two meas
of the present war e and the LTTE ent between them. agreement on the based power shartory implementa
the present nature hieving these two seedingly difficult. 5 phase of the concterised by an uny to escalate vionot only bred furas also reinforced hared by both parhat a decisive outfield, making the capabilities inef2 a direct bearing ll logic of the concess. Maintaining
a demonstration rnment should reg into law the coned recently, that cisely this under en' fraud. Transntability can be ng rules and reguall registered orabove approach, power through l not try to stall O
a purity in offensive capabilities, gaining control of new or lost territory and inflicting on the adversary maximum possible human and material losses have thus become immediate strategic objectives of both the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE. There is no evidence presently available to suggest that the two parties have reached, or are even likely to enter in the period ahead, a stage of "hurting stalemate', however much the present stage of the war may have hurt the parties themselves as well as the civilian communities.
Understandably, the implications of such a reading of the Sri Lankan conflict are quite devastating. On the other hand, a false optimism on the capacity of the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE to arrive at a mutually acceptable compromise would also be equally calamitous. In discussions on the conflict in Sri Lanka, particularly among peace constituencies, specific peculiarities are seldom acknowledged. One would be that the conflict has moved far from the causes that originally produced it; rather, it is the consequences that carry the conflict forward. The consequences of the fourteen year war have been so overwhelming that some influential forces in both Sinhala and Tamil Polities appear to believe that the continuation of the war would be less of an evil than a settlement. The fear of a settlement-compromise seen as both evil and politically immoral - felt by direct as well as indirect parties to the conflict has thus become an active psychological factor in Sri Lanka's crisis. And this to some extent defines the typicality as well as the intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis.
Impediments to a Settlement
Armed conflicts are usually not settled with ease, and ethnic conflicts within a nation-state are particularly predisposed to lasting over a long period. This is because contemporary ethnic conflicts are not settled through ethnic solutions alone; rather, their solutions are inexorably linked to how the distribution of state power

Page 17
15 APR1998
would be re-organised. A solution to an ethnic question like the one in Sri Lanka would invariably presuppose that the state enters a new phase in its formation and evolution. Unlike in revolutionary conflicts, any solution in Sri Lanka, if it is to be worked out rationally, has to be a compromise concerning state power, and not a winner-takes-all situation because the conflict does not seem to end in victory for one party and capitulation of the other.
Overcoming impediments to a settlement is the greatest challenge confronting advocates of a negotiated peace in Sri Lanka. Negotiating peace between the state and the Tamil nationalist rebels appears to be as difficult and unrealistic as visualising the least feasible of the scenarios: negotiated separation. It is perhaps a peculiar case where peace may never be achieved by means of a negotiated compromise, unless the conditions for continuous reproduction of war are effectively managed. The paradox here is the absence of a force powerful enough to prevail on the two parties to change the conditions that makes the war rational, necessary and morally justified. Therefore, however bitter and unpleasant it may seem. it needs to be recognised that, at this historical moment, a thickpall of darkness has settled on the crisis. This darkness is not the making of this or that individual; it is a structural darkness, born of the historical moment. Looking at this darkness stoically, we ought to think that history does not unfold itself in the gloom alone; as Hannah Arendt would have said, it is in the darkness that a little flicker of light can survive and shine brighter.
First, then, about the momentary darkness. Concerning the nature of the political settlement, there has been no dialogue whatsoever between the two sides, although "talks' have been held even as recently as 1994-1995. Governments in Colombo have from time to time developed their own political proposals and the system of Regional Councils proposed by the PA Government is the latest and the most far reaching of them all. However, the political process has so far been a one-sided affair, with no responses or proposals emanating from the LTTE. whose publicly stated position has been that an alternative to a separate state would be consid
ered and indeed t burden of formul native on the Co. There is no ci litical package p government wou own criteria for ment. A probable likely to be based the LTTE might
(i) The Packa, tem of enhanced applicable to all pr This does not re ficity of the ethn fore does not met litical aspirations Based on the “Thi LTTE’S Own fram its that a solutio status of Tamils & This notion of se translated into co ples, would requ and administrati teed to the Tamil to those granted ti The notion of as tion/federalism m the likely position (ii) The soluti Package to the di unit of devolutio) provinces amount a position strongl nationalist parties sistent demand by parliamentary Ta Northern and Ea they are administ at present, should manent basis as a The government the setting up of the Muslim popul province as well a Sinhala majority A the Eastern provi likely that the LI its long-held non-negotiabilit North-East merge (iii) Being an tional document, meration of pow by the proposed and of relations and the regions, virtually no room its own inputs. Th the reasons to al age is a unilater out in every detail

TAMIL TIMES 17
hey have placed the ating such an alterombo government. ertainty that the porepared by the PA d meet the LTTE's in acceptable settleLTTE response is on three issues that ind unacceptable: ge lays down a sysdevolution, equally ovinces in Sri Lanka. cognise the specilic issue and therest the legitimate poof the Tamil people. mpu principles”, the ework formula posh should ensure the is a separate nation. parate nationhood, )nstitutional princiire greater political ve powers guaranregion as compared o Sinhalese regions. ymmetrical devoluight approximate to
Of the LTTE. on proposed in the ifficult issue of the n in the North-East s to the rejection of y held by all Tamil . It has been a conmilitant as well as mil parties that the stern provinces, as ratively constituted be merged on a perDamil linguistic unit. proposals envisage a political unit for ation in the Eastern s the excising of the Ampara district from nce. It is highly unTE would abandon position on the y of the issue of
. elaborate constituwith detailed enuars to be exercised Regional Councils between the centre the Package leaves or the LTTE to make a LTTE will have all gue that the Packul proposal worked by the government.
From the psychological perspective of a nationalist guerilla organisation. the LTTE may very well be reluctant to accept a solution formulated in detail by the "enemy'. Nationalist guerrillas usually prefer winning a settlement through direct action (negotiations, pressure, manipulation, threats etc) to merely accepting one in the designing of which they have had no say at all.
The Military Dimension
Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict has repeatedly demonstrated one peculiar characteristic throughout the past fourteen years: the sheer capacity of the war for intense re-escalation. Although it may have appeared on some occasions that the parties would reconsider the continuation of a military course of action, such "intervals' have been followed by wars greater in scale, intensity and human cost. It is not incorrect to conclude that the military process has assumed a considerable measure of autonomy from the political process. The two sides have also demonstrated a distinct resilience even in the face of Substantial military reverses in both human and material terms. At least in the military sense, the conflict does not seem to have yet reached a stage of exhaustion, although the political process appears to he running the risk of reaching such a stage.
The termination, or at least the deescalation of Such an intense military conflict, characterised by its enormous capacity to reproduce itself is the most challenging goal of conflict settlement in Sri Lanka. Past experience has been that temporary cessations of hostilities have been effective to a limited extent, yet they have been fundamentally fragile. Once hostilities resumed, there ensues a tota breakdown of communication between the two parties; this has been the regular pattern. In such instances, the parties, despite the political rhetoric of returning to talks, have consistently accorded primacy to a military course of action in shaping the political process.
Challenges for the Political Process
As noted earlier, Sri Lanka's conflict is at a stage where both parties await the outcome of the military campaign before taking tangible steps

Page 18
18 TAMIL TIMES
towards political negotiations. During the early stages of the conflict, the position shared by both sides was to negotiate from a position of military strength. What this effectively meant was that each party viewed any commitment to negotiations as an admission of its own military weakness. The position of military strength also meant in quite simple terms one party's ability to deliver a crushing military blow on the other so that the adversary would not have any option but to compromise at the negotiation table. But this scenario has not worked at all, because both parties suffered, yet withstood, serious military setbacks. Given the capacity of the two sides to recover quickly from setbacks on the battle front, it is difficult to envisage a situation where one party would gain a decisive military victory over the other in a manner that could propel the political process over the military option.
Assuming that ground conditions might change in favour of political negotiations, the question that needs to be immediately addressed concerns the basic framework of a settlement which could provide a positive start
ing point for the ty jointly towards a co things stand today, an easy exercise, p of the mutually exclu comes to which the ently appear to col LTTE, a negotiated be unacceptable unl confederation arrar passing the preser Eastern provinces; power in other prov be their concern. In type settlement, the insist on a separate North-East So that th of politically autono tionhood could be extremely difficult t ation where a Color could agree to such ther would such as ceptable to most c community. A Colo could perhaps agree tion arrangement or greater political ir South, and perhaps ( fall.
A solution accept
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15 APRIL 1998
'o sides to work hmon ground. As his would not be recisely because sive political out
two sides presmitted. For the settlement would ss it results in a gement, encomt Northern and he devolution of inces would not a confederationLTTE is likely to egislature for the eir national ideal )mous Tamil naconcretised. It is ) envisage a situmbo Government a proposal. - neiettlement be acf the Sinhalese mbo government
to a confederaly at the risk of stability in the )f its own down
able to Tamil na
tionalist forces may not necessarily be acceptable to Sinhala nationalist forces and the Sinhalese masses in general. This constitutes the profound dilemma which peace-seekers in Sri Lanka will have to confront. This dilemma also represents yet another dimension of the intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis. Conflict resolution and peace-making through compromise in situations of heightened ethnic conflict within a nation-state are infinitely more complex and more difficult of resolution than classbased political conflicts or inter-state conflicts. Class-based conflicts for state power, especially when they have a socialist ideological base, can have a greater potential for compromise, because power-sharing along class lines is less likely to generate passionate resistance from classes that exercise political power. Or else, for class-based political movements, it is acutely difficult, in the contemporary historical circumstances, to sustain an armed struggle without confronting the dilemma of self-destruction at the hands of the state, unless the latter is a positively rotten entity. The Sri Lankan experience of
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15 APRIL 1998
the Janatha Vimukthi Peramauna (JVP - People's Liberation Front) of 1971 and 1987-89 illustrates the self-destructive possibility of class-based insurgent movements while the experience of NDLF of El Salvador demonstrates the compromising potential of more socialist-oriented rebellions.
This is perhaps the opportune moment to discuss some of the complexities of compromise-making involving minority nationalist insurgencies within the nation-state, as demonstrated in the Sri Lankan case. Extreme nationalists, both minoritarian and majoritarian, are hardly prepared for compromise. The reason is obvious. The immediate political goal of extreme minoritarian nationalists is usually defined in maximalist terms a separate state, as in the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka - and this typically evokes extreme and passionate resistance from majoritarian nationalists. Maximalist minority nationalism provokes extreme responses from the state as well, because no ruling class can tolerate the dismemberment of the state which it governs. This makes compromise doubly difficult, because the compromise has to be made at two levels, among nationalists of the two sides and between two projects of state power.
Incomplete Shift Towards a Compromise
Developments since 1987, meanwhile, point to some movement towards compromise, although no lasting outcome has yet set in. This change has occurred at three levels. Firstly, with Tamil nationalism experiencing a significant transition from within, a number of Tamil militant groups have begun to re-define the political goal of Tamil nationalism in federalist terms, thereby retreating from the original position of a separate State. This has left the LTTE as the sole Tamil nationalist force to advocate and struggle towards separate sovereignty. But the significance of this change need not be overstated, because of the hegemony that the LTTE commands over the politics of Sri Lankan Tamils, living in Sri Lanka as well as abroad. The Second is the space opened up within the Sri Lankan state for political and constitutional reforms, moving away from the unitary state model. While India’s political and diplomatic intervention in Sri
Lanka 1987 com ruling class - or l to accommodate mandsby reformi tures in an idio power, the stati demonstrated a d further political re this capacity is r. litical dynamics ( is discussed else Third is the shift lic opinion in fav compromise. The munity is extrem port, even morally new state in Sri L. ously repeated government and work towards an The thorough quences of the strategy of totally means in condu further reduced t proach of equidis the international c tor and the gove to consider furth ally won for it th pathy of internat implications can dictory: internat isolation might c seek a compromis of international tion, the LTTE mi compromise.
International Me Feasibility and P
Calling for a in an armed conf is a cry of desper mediation can har than a desire for Since conflict rest work in real life i conflict party mi the course of the by calling for, f tional mediation, winning back, int can very well be such a call. Rec in the battlefielc rary respite, can objective of a m dermining the le ponent’s propag party A might ha as stridently op resolution of the

TAM TIMES 19
pelled the Sinhalese cast a section of it - Tamil political deg the political struc(n of devolution of ; has consistently efinite capacity for forms. The fact that strained by the pof Sinhalese society where in this paper. of international pubour of a negotiated
international com2ly unlikely to supl, the setting up of a anka; their continuposition is that the
the LTTE should 'gotiated settlement. ly negative conseLTTE's outmoded
relying on military Icting polities have he space for an aptance on the part of ommunity. This fac'rnment's readiness er reform has actule support and symional opinion. The perhaps be contraional coercion and ompel the LTTE to e; or else in the face coercion and isolaght totally reject any
diation: roblems mediated settlement ict, in its pure form, ation. But, a call for fe implications other conflict settlement. olution models rarely n their purest form, a ght want to change conflict in its favour or example, internaEstablishing of, or arnational legitimacy the political goal of overing lost ground , through a tempoe another short term ediation move. Ungitimacy of the opunda – for example, ve portrayed party B Josed to a peaceful conflict - can also
be on the list of short-term political objectives of a mediation call. Incidentally, all these three 'theoretical' possibilities have been present in the Sri Lankai context.
It is therefore absolutely essential for anyone committed to peacemaking to make a clear distinction between (i) mediation, (ii) calls for mediation; and (ii) mediated settlement. Mediation per se is not likely to result in a peace-making settlement, if parties to the conflict do not have the will to work towards genuine conflict resolution. Mediation, if it does not lead to a settlement, is always liable to be manipulated and abused, and it may even re-escalate the dimensions of the conflict. A fundamental precaution which any one advocating mediation should learn, at least in the light of the Sri Lankan conflict, is that the parties to the conflict operate on a highly self-centric matrix of morality. They are not babies who can be persuaded by moralistic preaching of elders or lay priests: they are hard-hearted and calculating bargainers. For them, mediation is not an idealistic option; nor is it a morally binding precept. The reason is quite simple: at the heart of Sri Lanka’s conflict is the question of state power. This simple fact makes mediation an infinitely complex exercise,
Mediation and the Common Ground
Mediation, as a Strategy of conflict resolution, is grounded on a fundamentally important assumption; the eventual desire of conflicting parties to accommodate and accept a common ground worked out by a third party. It is a strategic fallacy to believe that a mediator can take the conflicting parties by hand to a common ground, carved out by the mediator herself. The mediator can perhaps push the parties to a common ground, only if the parties have the desire and political commitment to seek a common ground. That pre-supposes a significant change of the dynamics of the conflict as well as a deep-seated political realisation that a common ground is a political necessity. This is one meaning of Zartman's concept of 'conflict ripeness', a situation where unilateral Solutions are blocked and joint solutions become conceivable. "The ripeness realisation may’ also emanate from a realistic political assessment of global, regional,

Page 20
20 AMIL TIMES
country situations that makes settlement historically feasible.
A common ground among adversaries, after a period of intense conflict based on mutually-unacceptable goals, would also mean a decisive retreat from the "original position'. This retreat from the original position is one that can rarely be imposed from outside. If the retreat is to be meaningful, lasting and credible, it has to come along with a rational choice of compromise. A common ground among adversaries, by definition, is a rational choice of compromise. The commonness in a common ground emanates from a realisation of at least the need to work with the enemy in seeking a mutually acceptable and of course new outcome, fundamentally different from the outcome associated with the original position. Seeking a common ground, as Simha Flapan once said in the context of Israeli-PLO peace prospects, is recognition of the enemy as a potential ally.'
Mediation is a Process
There is a belief, often expressed by believers of mediation in the Sri Lankan conflict, that third party mediation can quickly and dramatically bring the conflict to an end. One can sympathise with this belief while recognising its thoroughly idealistic underpinnings. Mediation is not a surgical intervention, as it may be in the case of a decisive military intervention. Rather it is a stage in conflict transformation. The notion of “conflict ripeness' to some extent implies this essential dimension of conflict transformation. The notion of conflict ripeness presupposes that the conflict may not be resolved by the subjective wishes of its victims or onlookers; for resolution, a conflict should have already produced the dynamics of its transformation. It is in the presence of such transformatory dynamics that mediation can find productive space.
A question that needs to be asked at this stage is: why should a mediator get herself involved in bringing to an end a seemingly hopeless conflict like the one in Sri Lanka? What are the mediator's motives in conflict resolution? Would a mediator have the resolve, determination and will to suffer setbacks, frustrations and disappointments in the face of an indeterminate, arduous and difficult
process of bring ing parties toget Many advoc. Sri Lanka’s ethn believe that outs diators have an bringing this cor altruistic model i text has compet articulated from LTTE and the LTTE's belief a international con obligation to en Tamil communit tus of nationhc commitment of diator should em cal commitment determination of The government, to believe that S honest attempt a litical aspiratior community shoul flict in order to m that political off These are ex little actual relev diation in Sri La likely that altrui humanitarian, m the international ate in Sri Lanka. pelling motive, would not have b tracted as it was in the final an intervention. The geo-political inte a stronger basis tervene with lon and with an aw involved. Is Sri L enough for a “pe ternational med believed in some When media as a Strategy of armed conflicts, that the mediator sider; and (ii) an casionally, the n of states, SAAR wealth, has alsc cussion. Meanw of countries hav Services to play the Sri Lankan c identification a mediator can be a the possibility conflict perceiv

15 APRIL 1998
ng the two conflicther? tes of mediation in ic conflict appear to ide, third party mealtruistic motive in flict to an end. This n the Sri Lankan coning expectations, as time to time by the government. The pears to be that the munity has a moral able the Sri Lankan y to achieve the staod. Therefore, the an international meanate from a politito the right of selfan oppressed nation. meanwhile, appears ince it has made an t meeting Tamil pols, the international d mediate in the conlake the LTTE accept 2. pectations that have ance to conflict meInka. It is highly unstic, or even purely otives would compel community to mediIf altruism is a comthe Bosnian conflict een as painfully proConflict mediation, alysis, is conflict 'refore, economic or 'rests would provide for a mediator to ing term commitment areness of the risks anka a site attractive ace rush among iniators, as presently
quarters'? tion is talked about resolving internal it is usually assumed should be (i) an outinfluential state. Ocotion of a grouping C or the Commonfigured in the disnile, quite a number e also offered their a mediatory role in )nflict. However, the nd selection of the complex issue, given pf one party to the ng the mediator us
partial to the adversary, or even liable to be influenced by the adversary. A clear case of this nature occurred in 1995 when the Sri Lankan government had made arrangements to obtain the services of a French mediator, at a time when the talks between the government and the LTTE were reaching a crisis point. Quite apart from the question of timing involved in that mediatory effort, the LTTE objected to that particular mediator on the ground that he was partial towards the government. The point the LTTE rạised would interest students of mediation: when a mediator is selected, the selection process should involve both parties to the conflict. And indeed, when the process of mediator-selection leaves room for objections, there is also the likelihood of a party to the conflict using that incomplete process as an excuse to withdraw from negotiations.
There is yet another meaning of the collectiveness of the mediation process. Chris Mitchell has recently drawn attention to the difficulties associated with the role of a single intermediary actor in complex conflict situations. Mitchell suggests that "such a complex process might be more effective if it were contributed to by a number of intermediary parties rather than carried out by a single entity.” In this “mediation-as-process' model, mediation is a treated as a complex exercise to which "many entities might contribute, simultaneously or consecutively, rather than as the behaviour of a single, intermediatory actor.”
In the Sri Lankan context, the single-mediator model may face a somewhat unique problem. If the mediator is a particular country such as USA, UK, Australia, Canada, or Norway, Sinhalese nationalist forces are likely to oppose such a selection on the ground that these countries have a hidden agenda to favour the LTTE or Tamils in the negotiation process and in the outcome. The fact that many Tamil expatriates live in these countries where the LTTE has also been quite active has made Sinhala nationalists quite suspicious of their mediation motives.
To return to Mitchell's mediationas-process model, it recognises different functional stages that can fruitfully be looked after by a number of mediators. Mitchell has identified thir

Page 21
15APRIL 1998
teen roles for mediators in a complex conflict situation. They are explorer, convener, disengager, unifier, enskiller, envisioner, guarantor, facilitator, legitimiser, enhancer, monitor, enforcer, and reconciler. The functions implied in these roles need not to be compartmentalised, or performed by thirteen different mediatory actors. In practice, there can be collapsing of two or more of the functions in this inventory of roles. The important point, though, is that a consortium of mediators might provide greater opportunities for conflict de-escalation in Sri Lanka than the involvement of a single mediator.
Reflections on the Political Culture Now it is time to turn to another theme, "the salience of political culture." No political culture would evolve, or shape itself, in isolation from society's deeply felt crisis experiences. Since the early eighties, the every day experience in Sri Lanka has centred on violence, destruction, hatred and moral commitment to enmity. An overbearing sense of uncertainty and anxiety prevails in society which is translated into violence as well as fear of violence. Engulfed in so much violence, Sri Lanka is not a normal society; it is a shell-shocked society where reason and considered judgement in ethnic politics has given way to the politics of anxieties. When extremist positions of a few receive newspaper headlines and moderation is condemned or ridiculed, there is no reason to find other yardsticks to measure the degree to which the basics of the democratic political culture are incapacitated.
I have argued in this paper that in Sri Lanka, reconstruction of the state, its structural alteration, is a paramount necessity for conflict settlement. In an ideal-typical situation, this would necessitate a futuristic political vision of an ethnically heterogenous political association called the state, a Vision that should be shared by the three main ethnic groups. Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. Such a shared vision still remains a distant possibility. Perhaps, the idea of sharing political power, particularly among the ethnic groups, has been the least accepted, and of course the most resisted, approach in Sri Lankan politics. The resistance to sharing of State power has been emphatically seen as
a virtue among th political cadres (S Tamil), and to a c among the masse cratic political cult Lanka has been Sc ated, Strangely ( power sharing on t nicity. In this soci and domesticatic institutions and curred in Such a presupposed to se tional interests. Th raison d'etre ofma as well as minorit
One key proble rary Sri Lanka is th defences against et politics. The pos State has destroy fences in its own these defences in building of a new p can accept and ye ity in politics. But, problem: there is n historically capable
NEWB ONTAM
he installatio
Hindu Natio
Janatha Party tal seat of power predictably evokec in neighbouring note of the fact t political parties a BJP Tiger propaga the new governm and asserted that Policy towards the issue in general an ticular is inevitabl ter this viewpoint fears Sri Lankan Lakshman Kadirg first foreign dign Delhi, meet with t obtain assurances be no tilt in favo Sinhala Buddhist gues are strugglin, phenomenon whe dentials of the Ind

TAMIL TIMES 21
e elites and ethnoinhalese as well as onsiderable extent s too. The demoure with which Sri intimately associnough, excludes he principle of ethety, indigenisation on of democratic practices has ocway that they are rve exclusive secis is the discursive joritarian unitarism arian separatism.
em with contempoe absence of Strong hnic exclusivity in t-colonial nationed all those destyle. Re-building variably involves political culture that t transcend ethnic, there is a massive o political ideology 2 of providing such
a vision. At least in Sri Lanka's case, there have been only two ideological strands that were capable of providing conceptual underpinnings for a non-ethnicised political order, Marxism and liberal humanism. With the historical decline of Marxism as well as liberal humanism, Sri Lanka's problem has become infinitely complex. We don’t have theoretical categories to envision the future politics. And in this historical predicament, Sri Lankans can find solace in the fact that they are not alone.
The realisation of this predicament will hopefully lead us to our next task; imagining new forms of political association to replace the present historical form of the nation-state. This, nothing less, is the real task of re-construction.
To conclude in one sentence, let us re-imagine the Sri Lankan state before reforming or reconstructing it. This task, one may emphasise, remains totally outside the will and capacity of the parties involved in the present conflict. O
PREGIMEANDTSIMPACT ||LINATIONALISTAMPAGN
By D B S.Jeyaraj
n of the right wing nalist Bharatheeya
in the governmenin New Delhi has a mixed response Sri Lanka. Taking hat LTTE friendly 'e aligned with the andists have hailed ent optimistically a change in Indian 2 Sri Lankan Tamil d the LTTE in pare. In a bid to coun
and allay Sinhala
foreign Minister armar has been the itary to visit New he BJP leaders and that there would pur of the Tigers. chauvinist ideolog to cope with this re the secular creian State is in seri
ous danger of becoming a theocracy very much on the lines of the foremost place given to Buddhism in Sri Lanka.
The fact that for the first time in post Independence India a non- secular outfit and its appendages have been able to form a government that has at least for the time being stood the test of a confidence vote in the Lok Sabha has very serious implications for India and all her neighbours in the South Asian region. In the first place the development indicates that the BJP with its brand of Hindu Nationalist policies described as Hindutwa has come to stay for the next two or three decades at least as a powerful political force in India. The party which had only two seats in 1985 has now got 178 seats and together with a motley group of pre and post polls allies cobbled together a fragile government. Even if this government does not last long it is clear that the

Page 22
22 TAMIL TIMES
BJP is very much here to stay. In that context it is very likely that notwithstanding its protestations to the contrary the party will strive to implement its 'Hindutwa' agenda as far as possible in the future. Against this backdrop it is quite timely to examine the short and long term implications of the rise of the BJP for Sri Lanka.
As far as the short term implications are concerned the immediate question obviously is whether current Indian policy towards Sri Lanka particularly in the context of the Ethnic crisis will undergo drastic changes. The Indo-Lanka accord, the IPKF-LTTE conflict, the fall of the Indian installed EPRLF administration in North-East Sri Lanka, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in India, the advent of Chandrika Kumaratunga as Sri Lankan President, the collapse of peace talks and resumption of conflict in Sri Lanka, the promulgation of the Gujral Doctrine that espouses clear and definite non-involvement in neighbourhood internal politics etc are all factors that have affected Indo-Lanka relations.
Hands-off Policy
Gone are the mid-eighties when India deliberately adopted a sympathetic line towards the Sri Lankan Tamils and attempted to bring about a political settlement ensuring maximum devolution within a united Sri Lanka. Today India having burnt her fingers in her benevolently interventionist phase is seemingly adopting a hands off policy. India still stands for a political settlement of the conflict within a united Sri Lanka but will not involve herself in any activity in pursuit of that goal. India has not displayed in recent times any interest to act as facilitator or mediator in the Sri Lankan conflict.
Instead what has been happening in is a perceived Indian tilt against the LTTE in favour of the Colombo government. In this India is no different from various Western Nations that have also been adopting the same pro-government, anti - LTTE stand. This perspective evolved mainly as a result of the collapse of governmentLTTE talks, the unilateral resumption of hostilities by the LTTE and the efforts of the Kumaratunga administration in trying to usher in a devolution package. In the case of India greater compulsions such as the defiance of
the LTTE in fight killing of Rajiv C have also played The end resu banned the LTTE on a low key bas lombo in counte public opinion p Nadu is no longe ive of the LTTE. dict of the death posed on 26 accus der trial for exam major outcry in severity of the s the complication LTTE Chief Velup been proclaimed an Indian Tribun Again an unf this has been th of India towards Lankan Tamils. T Tamil point ofvie course and the pe by a Tiger prism ation. Although t legitimate aspirat kan Tamils are y the consequenc on-going war co their grievances receive adequate ability to distingu and "Tiger issues ation. In the after and the significar tor no Congress dian government interest in the T the BJP governm has certainly le. least that a shift i take place.
Expecting Chang From an LTTE seemingly valid ing such a chang ons have been { controlled med These hopes a premises. The friendly parties lil Dravida Munr (MDMK) of Vaik Katchi (PMK) ol Samatha Party of and the Shiv Ser etc are part of t dependent on th Vaiko has named Prabakharan. Rar

15APRIL 1998
ing the IPKF and the Gandhi on Indian soil
a part.
ilt is that India has E and is also helping is the efforts of Coring it. Also Indian articularly in Tamil r stridently supportThe recent harsh verpenalty being imsed in the Rajiv murple did not provoke a the state despite the entence. Adding to s is the fact that the billai Prabakharan has as a wanted man by al.
ortunate corollary of e virtual disinterest the plight of the Sri he articulation of the w through LTTE disrceiving of the same has created this situhe fundamental and ions of the Sri Lanet to be realised and es imposed by the intinues to increase their plight is yet to cognisance. The inish between “Tamil” S has led to this situmath of Rajiv's death nce of the Sonia facled or supported Inhas evinced any real amil problem. Thus ent assuming office d to speculation at n Indian policy may
ge of Policy
5 viewpoint there are reasons for expectge. These expectati2xpressed in LTTE ia outlets abroad. re based on three first is that LTTE ke the Marumalarchy letra Kazg agham o, Pattaligal Makkal Dr Ramadoss, The George Fernandes, la of Bal Thackeray he new government e support of allies. il his first grandson nadoss has time and
again declared his support for the LTTE and dared the Indian government to arrest him. Fernandes defied an order by the Indian Home minister last year and Staged a convention expressing solidarity with the Eelam Tamils at his Delhi residence. Thackeray has the Tiger as his emblem and publicly stated his admiration for Prabakharan in glowing terms. The second is that the ALL India Anna Munnetra Kazgagham (AIADMK) led by Jayalalitha Jayaram with 18 seats is the second largest party in the combine. Furthermore Jayalalitha has the nine seats of her allies too at her disposal. This enhances her bargaining power with the BJP and she has already demonstrated that she is capable of extracting her pound of flesh. Although the AIADMK has been viewed as anti-LTTE recent initiatives undertaken by people like Nedumaran and Veeramani seem to have converted the AIADMK leader. There is now a possibility that Jayalalitha may have changed her attitude towards it. If so she with her bargaining clout could pressurise the BJP into taking a favourable line towards the LTTE seems to be the LTTE hope. The third premise is that a new dispensation professing a Hindu nationalist ideology is in the New Delhi saddle for the first time. Although the LTTE follows a Secular form of Tamil nationalism it would not be averse to its supporters within and without Sri Lanka to play the "Hindu Tamil' card. The past years have seen the Tamil problem being perceived only as an ethno-linguistic issue. This has necessarily confined support for the Tamil cause in India to Tamil Nadu and Tamilians alone. But exploiting the Tamil Hindu factor at a time when a Hindu nationalist force is in power is a new approach. Utilising the fact that the majority of Tamils in Sri Lanka are Hindu or that the majority of Hindus are Tamil and seeking to project it as "Hindu suffering' is a tactic, the political potential of which is yet to be realised in India. Besides the LTTE too has a hobson's choice as neither the Congress, nor the left parties would consort with it.
In this Situation the LTTE oriented hope seems to be that there would be a perceptible shift in Indian policy. Overtly it would hope for India to suspend its military assistance to Sri Lanka. For instance the Indian Navy

Page 23
5APRIL 1998
has captured two LTTE ships and helped the Sri Lankan Navy destroy another arms ship. It would like India to revoke the ban on it or at least let it lapse quietly without renewing it. The LTTE would also like a climate to be created where its supporters in Tamil Nadu could function actively and openly in espousing political support. Covertly it would like a situation where the Tigers could use Tamil Nadu clandestinely as a procurement source of food, medicine, fuel and equipment.
It is fear of such a possibility however remote it may be that has impelled Foreign Minister Kadirgamar to undertake a swift visit to New Delhi. He was the first special envoy from a foreign country to visit New Delhi after the new government took office. Kadirgamar met with Premier Vajpayee, Home Minister Advani. Power Minister from Tamil Nadu Kumaramangalam, Former Prime Minister Gujral, Congress Chief, Sonia Gandhi and former Central Government minister for Industries Murasoli Maran of the DMK. A significant act of ommision was not meeting with George Fernandes the minister of defence and acknowledged partisan of the LTTE.
Indian Assurances
As a result of these meetings Kadirgamar was able to obtain assurances that the BJP government vould not support violence or separatism in Sri Lanka. Reiterating an election manifesto pledge Vajpayee Stated that the BJP stood for the political accommodation of the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils in within the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. These bland assurances are quite consistent with India's public position on Sri Lanka. Even at a time when India was training and arming Tamil militants on Indian soil the public position of New Delhi was that refugees were being looked after. Also even if the BJP had a hidden and hostille agenda towards Sri Lanka that party was not going to explicitly admit that. In that context the wide publicity given in the State media to the promises elicited by Kadirgamar suggest that the intention of the visit was to allay Sinhala paranoia and gain internal political mileage rather than achieve anything significant with India.
The BJP tha gether a flimsy m cerned with politic likely to make a shifts in the realin until it settles in possible. Any pr from this stance c tated by urgent pc erted by its Tamil parties like the A. MDMK have not rection so far. Tl concerned with o the political spoils on behalf of the wishful thinking c ers certain factor any positive India are also worthy o
First and forer ality of the India Tamil Nadu situat into account. Unli Sri Lankan Tamil gathering issue. It issue. Any party maran’s that har likely to be reject of MDMIK and Ra alised the disadva a pro-LTTE line frained from touc during the electio these circumstanc litical compulsion ties to exert any the BJP to act sp. the LTTE.
Secondly even ements succeed in take steps in favou countervailing fac against it. Whate by LTTE support nying the fact tha has held the LTTI Rajiv Gandhi's : LTTE leader Vell has been indicted ing primarily invc nation conspiracy claimed as a wan fact that Sonia grudge against th this is now at the gress and that the be a force in In would always b against any BJP 1 LTTE overtly or ( sition spearhead Congress would

TAM TIMES 23
has cobbled toajority is now conal survival. It is not ly decisive policy n of foreign policy as comfortably as emature deviation an only be necessilitical pressure exNadu allies. Those (ADMK, PMK and moved in that dihey too seen more ptaining a share of rather than agitate LTTE. Despite the f LTTE sympathisthat circumscribe un tilt in its favour f consideration. most the current ren, particularly the ion has to be taken ike the eighties the issue is not a vote has become a nonlike that of Nedups on the LTTE is ed by voters. Vaiko madoss of PMK reintages of plugging and pointedly rehing on Sri Lanka n campaign. Under ces there is no poon any of these parurgent pressure on eedily on behalf of
if the pro-LTTE elgetting the BJP to |r of the LTTE other tors would militate ver position taken ers there is no det an Indian tribunal E as being guilty of assassination. The upillai Prabakharan
in absentia as belved in the assassi
and has been proted man. Given the Gandhi nursing a e LTTE account of e helm of the Conparty continues to dian politics there e a public outcry move to support the covertly. This oppoed by a Sonia led act as a constraint
on the BJP in helping the LTTE.
Public Opinion
Furthermore Indian public opinion will not allow such a change. Although some sections in Tamil Nadu are still pro-LTTE the bulk of those sections are in essence from the powerless' strata in terms of caste and class. This is very evident among influential opinion makers. On the Other hand a substantial segment of the "Powerful' Indians in terms of caste and class are vehemently opposed to the LTTE. Almost all top people among the media are bitterly estranged from the Tigers. As such one can easily predict that any efforts by the BJP in the direction of the LTTE will be heavily criticised and squashed by these elements.
In addition to this there is the Indian bureaucracy particularly those sections of the South Block who determine foreign relations. These officials have their own idea of what is good for India. Given the past history of dealing with the LTTE they are still opposed to renewing contact with the Tigers again. Governments may come and go but generally the input provided by these sections maintain a continuity of policy. This is more evident when a weak interdependent government takes over at the centre. The BJP is one of that kind. Besides Vajpayee himself did not rock the boat when Foreign minster under Morarji Desai from 1977 to 80. It is he who is foreign minister now.
Another factor that may dampen Tiger supporter enthusiasm is the emergence of anti-LTTE personalities from Tamil Nadu within BJP government folds. There is the irrepressible Subramaniam Swamy who has already raised the issue of George Fernandes being unsuitable for the Defence Minister post because of his LTTE affiliations. Tiger baiter Valappady Ramamurthy is a Cabinet minister. He is a Rajiv loyalist whose party is named Tamil Nadu Rajiv Congress. Rangarajan Kumaramangalam the BJP cabinet minister from Tamil Nadu too was a Rajiv loyalist when in the Congress. Already he has gone on record in a meeting with Kadirgamar that there was absolutely no chance of a realignment with the LTTE. So any moves by the pro-LTTE faction will be definitely countered by these anti-LTTE elements.

Page 24
24 TAMIL TIMES
It must also be noted that while the anti-LTTE sections are vociferously articulate about their hostility towards the Tigers those pro-LTTE sections are maintaining a deafening silence. This again indicates that there is very little chance of conflict breaking out openly between pro and anti LTTE elements on this issue. Even if that does happen those supporting the LTTE would be necessarily defensive and are therefore likely to be overwhelmed by those against the Tigers.
The only decisive factor that could be beneficial to the Tigers is the dynamic and determined Jayalalitha herself. If she decided to throw in her lot with the LTTE openly and exerts pressure on their behalf then there is a strong possibility of a change in the scenario. If she pushes then the BJP too will be constrained to fall in line. The anti-LTTE elements too may reluctantly toe her line or at least not oppose it. But whatever the efforts of Nedumaran she does not seem interested in that option at least for now. Her immediate priority seems to be that of getting out of her legal tangles and also getting the DMK
government dis not seem visible litical benefit to
her to actively su Also she may r bridges complete gress. She can il with the BJP by she can always s Congress if and
Prospect of Real In Such a sce seem to be any p( term that there wo shift in India in The BJP governi along with its pr: least for the time of support exten this score may dr prospects right in be the benefic about-turn by Indi not deter Tamils LTTE supporters New Delhi for re this trend continu a possibility of a II overall policy tow long term under )
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missed. There does any immediate poer that would impel pport the LTTE now. ot like to burn her y with Sonia's Concrease her leverage demonstrating that rike a deal with the when necessary.
praisal
nario there does not issibility in the short uld be a major policy avour of the LTTE. ment is likely to go decessors on this at being. The quality ded to Colombo on op. But there are no Dw for the LTTE to iary of a drastic a. This however will regardless of being or not looking up to lief and Succour. If es however there is eappraisal of India's ards Sri Lanka in the Bharatheeya Janatha
15 APRIL 1998
Partyrule. If this materialises in concrete form then there could be new developments. The most important of these could be the transformation of Tamil nationalism from that of being ethno linguistic to that of being ethno religious.
A noteworthy aspect of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism has been the virtual absence or non-presence of a religious component. Unlike the role of Buddhism in Sinhala nationalist consciousness Tamil nationalism of the post Independence era has been essentially non-religious and secular. The religious revival movements of Anagarika Dharmapala and Arumuga Navalar in the pre-Independent period did not strike a parallel course after Independence. Tamil nationalism in the early years of Independence was basically responding and reacting to Sinhala nationalism. That it has over the passage of time assumed virulent proportions that blur distinctions between the oppressed and oppressor is another matter. But unlike 'Sinhala Buddhism Tamil nationalism was never dominantly "Hindu Tamil'. Having a committed Christian SJV Chelvanayagam as its chief pro
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15APR1998
ponent from 1947 to 1977 the course of Tamil nationalism was clearly charted along non-religious secular lines.
This Tamil nationalist tradition continued even after armed Tamil militancy took over the nationalist struggle. Instead of a religious dimension most of the movements used revolutionary leftist rhetoric in their discourse. Even the ultra nationalist LTTE continued with the non- religious nationalist tradition after becoming the dominant Tamil entity due to a variety of reasons. Before the unfortunate developments of 1990 the LTTE had cadres from the Hindu, Christian and Islamic faiths in their fold. Even after the Muslims were estranged and expelled, the Christian component both Protestant and Catholic increased in the LTTE.
Relatively progressive sections of the Christian clergy have identified themselves with the Tamil struggle. Some continue to do so. Others have paid the Supreme price. A few have been incarcerated too in the past. Later as the oppressive conditions imposed on the fishing communities of Tamil coastal areas increased a large number of youths from these areas joined the LTTE in large numbers. The greater part of these sections were Catholic. There is also a significantly large proportion of Christians among expatriate supporters of the LTTE. Adding to this was the secular outlook of many LTTE leaders including Prabakharan despite being a devout Hindu in private.
Secular Tradition
Thus the LTTE due to subjective and objective conditions continued to espouse the Tamil secular nationalist tradition. A little known story is about how Some Tamil Nadu BJP members were rebuffed by Prabakharan in the mid-eighties. The BJP delegation had requested Prabakharan to change the emphasis of the struggle from that of a ethnic based one into that of a religious based one. Projecting the struggle on Tamil ethnic lines alone would restrict support from India to Indian Tamils alone. If, however, it was projected as a Hindu struggle support could be mobilised in the rest of India including North India, it was pointed out. The BJP also said that they would begin publicising the sufferings of the Hindus by
spotlighting the d ples in the War.
Prabakharan p down. He stressed history of the Ta ethno nationalistic Apart from Hindu churches too wer This was because "Tamil places of Hindu or Christial had a very strong nent among its ca ers. If the Tigers to that of the Hi these sections w sioned. DissensioI the movement wo Also the LTTE vis was that of a secul ing shot Prabakha his only Son wa Anthony in memor and trusted Lieut comalee who hap man Catholic. Th Nadu BJPhas rema LTTE.
Despite this p opments indicate 1 Hindu Nationalist) ing a demonstrat Tamils of Sri Lank derantly Hindu. H much in recent tim Tamils are of a f hopes for relief fr that context India source of hope in litical developme emerging as a go tive many Tamil H hoping for succout gious affinity. Eve would not mind th intervention ensu tlement.
All this time th never been viewed Now a new line of to grow. This ter flourish in the fu would be on appé sentiments and he on a religious bas Tamils in Sri Lan another way the in Sri Lanka are T political struggle jected in religious in the long run t and content of Tar the secular into t

TAML TIMES 25
estruction of tem
litely turned them that the nature and mil struggle Was
and not religious.
temples Christian being damaged. hese were seen as
worship and not l. The LTTE itself Christian compodres and supportchanged the focus ndu religion then 'ould be disilluwould set in and uld be weakened. on of Tamil Eelam ar state. As a partan pointed out that s named Charles y of his best friend enant from Trinpened to be a Roereafter the Tamil lined aloof from the
ast, current develhat the rise of the BJP in India is havlive effect on the a who are preponIaving suffered so hes the beleaguered rame of mind that om any quarter. In has always been a spite of recent pontS. With the BJP vernmental alternaindus are naturally on grounds of reliin Christian Tamils is as long as Indian res a peaceful set
2 Tamil struggle has in religious terms. thought has begun dency is bound to ure. The emphasis aling to the Hindu ping for solidarity is. The bulk of the (a are Hindus or in majority of Hindus mils. Therefore the
here can be proterms. This would ansform the scope lil nationalism from lat of a Hindu Na
tionalist one. The fact that the support potential of Hindu' India has never been tapped on those lines could make this proposition attractive to even secular nationalists. The Indian government being Hindu Nationalist would encourage this development.
Sign of Change
The signs of this future trend are quite visible. A north-east based association has sent a memorandum with details about nearly a thousand Hindu temples being damaged over the past years in this war. Colombo based Hindu associations have met with the Indian High Commissioner and related their woes. Petitions and appeals have been sent to the new BJP government outlining the problems faced by Tamils including that of arbitrary detention of Hindu brahmin priests and their family members. Many Hindu organisations have quickly sent congratulatory messages to the BJP government. The Sri Lankan chapter of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad has in its message deliberately highlighted the fact that 99% of the Hindus in Sri Lanka are Tamil. This trend of identifying on a Hindu basis is likely to increase with the passage of time.
It is an indisputable fact that the Tamils of Sri Lanka are being subject to severe hardship due to the conflict. Despite the professed sincerity of Chandrika Kumaratunga the reality is that Tamil aspirations are yet to be fulfilled. On the Other hand Tamil grievances are mounting quantitatively and qualitatively on a daily basis. The inhuman arrests, detention and interrogation of thousands of Tamils in Colombo only on the basis that they are Tamils is but one nefarious example. In this situation like drowning persons clutching even at straws the Indian BJP Hindu option is eagerly welcomed.
Secondly the Tamil Nadu situation too has changed. The form of Tamil nationalism articulated through the Dravidian ideology has waned. The Non-brahmin caste vote bank is fragmented. Karunanidhi and the DMK have let the Sri Lankan Tamil cause down badly. A newly emerging reality in Tamil Nadu is the evolution of a Hindu consciousness that is eclipsing the dravidian ethos. The BJP has come to stay. At least now

Page 26
26 TAMIL TIMES
some Tamil parties having some interest in the Sri Lankan Tamils are tied up with it as opposed to the DMK that has completely abandoned the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka. So in one way the Tamils of Sri Lanka have no valid Indian option other than to woo the BJP through playing the Hindu card.
The long term implications if the secular credentials of the Tamil Struggle were to change on religious lines which might bring about its fragmentation. Likewise India too faces dangers of a different sort when dissension emerges as a result of "Hindutwa'. But few have such a perspective. It is the present and now that matters. So this religious trend is likely to become larger and more intense in Scope in the years to come. Tamil nationalism would be transformed.
The LTTE may not actively encourage this at the start. But it will not oppose it either. It could covertly promote it as a tactic. Depending upon its utility value it could adopt this as a comprehensive strategy in the future. If this were to become a reality, the question is whether the present support that the LTTE receives from the Catholic and Christian sections among the Tamils would continue or not.
If and when this happens the Sinhala Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka would face new insecurities. The earlier majority-minority complex of the Sinhalese seeing themselves as a minority of fifteen million against a Tamil majority of sixty million in the South Asian region would be aggrawated once the secular nature of India dissolves into that of a stridently Hindu nationalist one and Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism transforms into Hindu nationalism then Sinhala fears would increase. In the new religious environment the Sinhala Buddhists would be a smaller minority against seven hundred and fifty-five million Hindus. The irony is that the Sinhala Buddhist nationalists who are determined to convert Sri Lanka into a Buddhist theocracy have no moral right to criticise the BJP enterprise of “Hindutwa”.
The real danger in the long term to the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka is the potential rise and growth of a "unification' movement on both sides of the Palk straits on the basis of 'Hindutwa. The Indian elite has al
FIGHTI
AND
he BJP is on paity which words, rightl number of generals majors who had re. few weeks before th ing forward to this The BJP, after gett lead the new gover tre, managed to ge minister George Fe: Gandhian and left monger, to assert til not fight shy of ind option if there is a speaking out, Wh George was doing act: firstly, he wa: BJP's stated positi manifesto and the n by the BJP and its p post-post electoral he was repudiating stiff opposition to t forms of nuclear w continent.
It takes enorm such a stand. And took that stand way he wrote a pamp doublespeak of In took pride in annou dian peaceful nucle took place in the Rajasthan. George, ing an incredible rai Mrs Gandhi's gove to ridicule her lan peace which had in than Buddha. The
ways been against
separatism because similar tendencies i religious dimensi change all that. If th flict continues to danger of Hindu n. ing transnational || become a reality. check to this wou resolution of the cu that alas seems to one. Thus the rise very likely to trans tionalist struggle ir years to come.

15APRIL 1998
NG SHY NUCLEAR BOMBS
DEFENSIVE MISSILES
Ramesh Gopalakrishman
e Indian political never minces its y or wrongly. A
and colonels and joined the party a le polls were look
loud declaration. ing the chance to niment at the cent its new defence rnandes, the once:-socialist peacehat that “We shall ucting the nuclear need for it'. By ich is his forte,
a double, subtle s adhering to the on in its election lational agenda set re-, post- and now
allies; secondly, his own legacy of he existence of all eapons in the sub
ous guts to take George, the hero, back in 1974 when hlet against the dira Gandhi who incing the first Inarexplosion which
desert sands of who was then leadlway strike against ernment, was able guage of nuclear voked none-othercode for the Suc
Sri Lankan Tamil
it could trigger of n, Tamil Nadu. The on however will he Sri Lankan condrag on then the ationalism assumproportions could The only effective ld be the speedy rrent conflict. But, be a never ending of the BJP Seems form the Tamil naSri Lanka in the
O
cessful outcome of the explosion went thus: "The Buddha has smiled'. The enlightened smile of the Tataghata was being used to legitimise the terror and threat of nuclear explosion, pointed out a wry-similing George, who was to spend the horrific months of Mrs Gandhi's Emergency in underground and in jails.
But the Fernandes of 1998 is a changed man altogether, though he dresses and smiles and gets energised the same way. There are social and political causes still dear to his heart, but he has come a long way. After all, nine years ago, he had been a minister along with Dr Raja Ramanna, the father of India's verypeaceful nuclear explosion-cumAdvaitic Vedantin-cum-piano virtuoso, in the National Front government led by Mr V P Singh.
For Mahatma Gandhi, the bomb was the abhorrent symbol of the evil side of Western civilisation. Auswitschz and Hiroshima had confirmed the Mahatma's apocalyptic vision of the direction of Western polity. For George, who never tires of publishing excerpts from Gandhi, the bomb is no longer abhorrent; he confesses that he is just shy talking about the bomb and he'd like not to fight shy of talking and having the bomb. One step ahead, it is evident that the shyness is not with the likes of Fernaindes, but with the bomb itself. Yes, the bomb was earlier peaceful, now it is just shy; shy enough not to caress or rub the wrong side of the United States which plays equidistant with India and Pakistan.
India's shy bombs might well be the nice answer for Pakistan's latest quiet-and-peaceful Ghauri missiles. Yes, Pakistanos Nawaz Sharif Mian, while delivering a lecture at the National Defence College on April 6, went on to announce the successful testfiring of the Hatf-V or Ghauri surfaceto-surface missile, with a range of 1,500 km and payload of 700 kilos. According to Pakistan, the test-firing was peaceful, because it was only a defensive act in the wake of the new Indian government's national agenda of not fighting shy of nuclear weapons.

Page 27
15APRIL 1998
Well, the Indian media was confused. Was the test done entirely on Pakistani soil? Of course, the news was that the missile rose to a distance of 350 km before hitting its target 1,100 km away. But did the test take place after an air-sea-alert There was no way of knowing that. Fernandes and prime minister Atal Vajpayee discounted any threat from the Ghauri, but Fernandes hinted that the Pakistani missile programme would have had some help from China. According to Fernandes, China was the mother of this missile. Chinese missiles placed in Tibet have been targetting India for decades, he recalled. Well, bombs and missiles hitherto had fathers, now it's the contribution of this great socialist to emphasise the motherliness of those who make them. Well, if those who make bombs and missiles are motherly, the weapons themselves can't be far behind. This explains why Fernandes went on to state that India's Prithvi and Agni missiles would "take care' of the security interest angle. Such motherly weapons indeed.
Fathers and mothers will have to give way to the child. That is nature's way. The latest child of the BJP-led government is the National Security Council, as stated expressly in the national agenda. Yeah, the Indian NSC - the mirror image body of its Pakistani, and possibly US", counterparts - is being born. The NSC will undertake India's first-ever strategic defence review and a Task Force has been set up by Vajpayee himself for working out the constitution, role and function of the NSC. The Task Force has three members - former defence minister K C Pant who switched over to the BJP from the Congress(I) a few weeks before the elections, BJP leader Jaswant Singh, a former army man and a Vajpayee confidante and Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, director of the Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses who'll also act as convenor of the Task Force. The Task Force will not fight shy of submitting its report soon and the NSC will have a peaceful and nice birth within a month, well before the outlays for defence expenditure in the Indian budget are to be hiked substantially, never to be brought down again.
Well, the poor of India and Pakistan, shall have poorer roads, Schools
MU
"The philosoph probably all people is a superior religi the whole Indian stroy all obstacles to EVR in August 19. On a tip-off a the spot, thorough gage of the 40-mem Women, and also turned out they we grims from neigh world has turned up the Muslims in Tan around six per cen tion. Every Muslim Suspect these days, if they are indiscri harassed. Only no c ing openly, that the Pakistan. That is sc But the fact rei series of blasts and shocking rise in the ist activities, have Muslim population Stream.
No doubt the N maintained a separa Christians and othel stubbornly refused the mainstream or their world view be tarian than that of th attracted the Dalits numbers and alway mixture of awe an never have things state as today wher tally friendless, an complaint of huma lost in the rising d strong action again It is not perhap coincidence that a should start running land at a time whe nomenon is wreakil society.
While Jayalalit avowedly Dravidia ing repudiation of
and hospitals an
employment chal afford to dream c nice shy bombs siles.

TAMILTMES 27
LIMS, FRIENDLESS NTAML, NADU?
T N Gopalan
ly of Islam suits most of the world If Islam n it should take over people, it should deachieve it..."-Periyar 31. police party reached ly searched the bagbergroup, all of them Interrogated them. It re all Haj-bound pilpouring Kerala. The )side down indeed for nil Nadu, constituting t of the total populal, man or woman, is a and no tears are shed minately arrested and )ne is, as yet, Suggesty all be repatriated to ome mercy perhaps. mains that the recent murders, thanks to a Islamic fundamentalalienated the entire from the Hindu main
Muslims have always te identity. Unlike the minorities, they have to be integrated into pe self-effacing. And ing much more egalihe Hindus', they have into their fold in large s been viewed with a d apprehension. But reached such a sorry e they are almost tod where any kind of un rights violation is in of the demand for st the terrorists.
s all that an uncanny nti-Muslim feelings high in the Dravidian the Jayalalitha pheng havoc on the Tamil
ha as the head of an n party is a resoundche Dravidian move
d perhaps no new ces at all, but can f play gadgets like and peaceful mis
O
ment, all that it is supposed to stand for, the alienation of the Muslims from the essentially non-Brahmin Tamil society is a body blow to the Dravidian movement which has always boasted of its special relationship with the minorities, the Muslims especially.
"The period 1925-35 (which saw the first wave of conversions to Islam by the lower caste Hindus) incidentally coincides with the period when the Self-Respect movement, which was itself founded in 1925, was indulging in its virulent campaign. These conversions were made possible to a great extent by the constant exhortations of the Self-Respect movement to embrace Islam... the increasing activity and mobilisation of the Muslim proselytising association Isha-at-ul-Islam started in December 1929, might also have been prompted largely by the Self-Respect movement's campaign... the leaders spoke in public meetings not only against Brahmins, Hindu gods and the caste system, but also about the grandeur of Islam and the necessity foruntouchablesto convert to Islam and to obtain equality and liberty." That is from J B More's "The Political Evolution of Muslims in Tamil Nadu and Madras (1930-47).'
The identity of the Muslims with the movement was so complete at one stage, during the initial days that is, that the Muslim leaders could blithely badmouth the Hindu gods and customs from the Self Respect platforms.
In fact such perverseness could be said to have led to a Hindu communal backlash in the state. That is a different story though. The point is that in this land of Periyar EVR the Muslims are viewed with suspicion, if not outright hostility.
The unrestrained police zoolum on the Muslims of Coimbatore in December last year in which more than 20 persons were either shot dead, burnt alive or butchered to death in a most gruesome fashion, and properties worth crores were looted and destroyed was perhaps a watershed in the Hindu-Muslim relationship in the state. What struck this correspondent most when he visited the textile city in western Tamil Nadu was that there was not a single Hindu soul among those interviewed to shed a tear for the badly affected muslims.

Page 28
28 TAM TIMES
It was a terrifying attack never before seen in Tamil Nadu history. At one stage the Karunanidhi government found it unable to control the rioting policemen and had to bring in the army.
But at the end of it all it was shocking to find the typical man on the street implicitly justifying the carnage. "Well whatever happened to the innocent among the Muslims is perhaps regrettable. But then they all asked for it. You cannot allow organisations like the Al Ummah to get away with it all. They have been holding the local police to ransom by their violent means, intimidating them with deadly weapons. Well, If the Muslims cannot rein in their own boys, they will have to face the music.' Then there were blasts in trains on 6 December, on the fifth anniversary of the Babri masjid demolition and the more horrendous, multiple explosions on the eve of the Lok Sabha elections to coincide with the visit of the BJP president LK Advani, leading to further hardening of the Hindu sentiments and perhaps the debacle of the DMK-TMC front too.
As has been observed earlier in these columns the Islamic fundamentalists have been striking terror in the minds of the rest of the society for some years now, executing a series of assassinations of some key Sangh Parivaar functionaries and
activists besides the t ing mainly uninvolvi ter the state police la ckdown, in the afte blasts, a Hindu Mul hacked to death in has been monotonou cache of explosives, them in the state ca dreds of Muslim rounded up. There i state of panic, unclair out alarms and any man or woman bein possible designs in a A matter of gre. none of the score of Al Ummah feel any they have done and before the police clos haps the innocent H in the Kovai blasts. do? You don't expe without wreaking rev ties committed again they say audaciously persons when they courts for remand ex And their lea S A Basha, screams ( threatens the magistr court halls with dire and his men are not re
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SAPRIL 1998
omb explosions killd civilians. Well afunched a severe cramath of the March nani professor was Aadurai. The police sly unearthing huge more than 300 kg of pital itself and hunfouths have been actually a general ned baggage sending unfamiliar Muslim suspected of worst ny locality. ter concern is that youth cadres of the emorse about what were planning to do ed in on them. “Perindus suffered a lot ... but what can we ct us to keep quiet renge for the atrocist us by the police," to the waiting pressare brought to the tension. der, the dreaded but abuses and even ates right inside the consequences if he leased on bail forth
with. Well he or his disciples do not get the bail sought, on the other hand they manage to leave a bad taste in the mouth of the judiciary besides making the people at large even angrier over their antics. It is in such circumstances Jaya-lalitha is in hysterics over the deteriorating law and order and is pressing the Vajpayee government to forth with dismiss the DMK regime. "They had sought to destroy Tamil Nadu by encouraging the Tigers in 1989-91 and now through the Islamic fundamentalists,” she says with evident relish.
After some initial hesitation Karunanidhi has swung into action and has directed his administration to root out the Islamic fundamentalists by all means, at all costs. Even the pro-BJP north Indian English newspapers concede that Karunanidhi is doing his best to restore law and order.
For his part Prime Minister Vajpayee has declared time and again that he would not invoke Article 356 of the Constitution and dismiss the DMK government, making the lady profoundly unhappy.
The dismissal might or might not come. Everybody though is on tenterhooks, not knowing where and when the terrorists will strike next. Another serial blasts on the Coimbatore scale, the DMK (continued on next page)
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Page 29
15 APRIL 1998
EMS: HISTORYASSU ORSUBJECTASHIST
Ramesh Gopalakrishnan
ery few failed to realise that EMS Namboodiripad, the Marxist veteran of South Asia, had kept his date with history: on the very day the BJP-led coalition government was administered oath of office in Delhi, he had breathed his last at a private hospital in distant Trivandrum, having written his daily quota of articles for Desabhimani, the Malayalam Marxist paper which he had founded six decades ago by selling his ancestral and feudal property in Malabar region.
That was EMS, probably the tallest of Marxist leaders of India. Most Marxists never tire of stressing the point that it is history and circumstances which make Man. At least in the case of EMS, this is not true: happily so, since it was he who made history possible. Elankulam Manakkal Sankaran Namboodiripad led a quintessentially rebellious youth life in an orthodox Namboodiri Brahmin family. And he died at a ripe old age of 90 while preparing for the next round of battle against the Bharatiya Janata Party, that complete perversion of In
(Continued from page 28) will have lost all its moral right to continue in office. As a human rights activist observed in disgust the other day, 2One wonders whether a la Prabhakaran these fundamentalists are going all out to destabilise afriendly regime, whata hostile Jaya back in power in order to effectively widen the communal divide with all the disastrous consequences that such a course could entail. Already some of them are telling their Muslim brethren, "We told you that the Hindu administration, even the Hindu people in general, will be fair to us. Let us fight for our rights courageously. Otherwise we will be wiped out...'
These are times when the Hindu-tva plank, backed as it is by a fawning media, is gaining ever wider acceptance. The foolhardy, misguided Muslim boys and girls (yes, one finds some women activists too these days) play into the hands of the Hindu communalists. O
dian philosophy a I must mentio was with EMS wa an impetuous teen uted, among colleg settes containing SI Jayaprakash Na against the Emerge Gandhi. It was a p to the pages of hi both JP and EMS the Congress Soc. functioned as the le the Congress in the rience of Emergenc ing how EMS could as his compatriots were swiftly put int. that EMS used a co egies to keep aliv against the Emerge the CPI chief minis would not arrest hi My second enc was personal, havi Bangalore in the m was introduced as lectual to him by a University profe spoke in a condes young hothead like mediate liking in f read and write and me this same ques came down to Mad decade. He was c why structuralism nism would attract who had an abiding in Advaita Vedanta Advaitim, but in h was a descent from and Demons to th beings. And I reto of Gods and Demol cant to millions in Our quiet bante CPI(M) conference when he relinquish general secretary. DI he used to tell me

TAM TIMES 29
BECT ORY)
ld culture. 1 my first contact back in 1976. As iger, I had distribemates, audio casbeeches of the late ayan and EMS ncy of Mrs Indira leasure to go back story to learn that had been part of alist Party which ft vanguard within 1930s. The expey left me wonderl evade arrest even like A K Gopalan ) jail. Later, I learnt mbination of strate a public debate incy in Kerala and ter Achuta Menon m ounter with EMS ng taken place in id-eighties when I an extremist intelJawaharlal Nehru sor. EMS never cending tone to a o me, took an iminding out what I never failed to ask tion whenever he as during the next urious to find out and post-modersomeone like me interest, like him, . He too was an is words, his life the world of Gods at of real human ted that the world is was still signifithe subcontinent
continued till the at Madras in 1992 d the post of party uring these years, hat my drift away
from Marxism would soon be complete. But it was I who found him at the receiving end at the time of the dramatic collapse of the Eastern bloc and later, the Soviet Union. These and other shocks were simply powerless against the strength of his Marxist convictions, as I was soon to find myself beside him in the interpretation of the BJP-Sangh Parivar's terrible demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya. It is true that we were way apart in interpreting Marxism, but were together ingrasping the significance of Such an act like the Masjid demolition and the consequent rise of the BJP.
Kunju, as the EMS the child was called in Elamkulam, once wept when the hut of an untouchable was demolished to make way for a road to his tharavad (ancestral house) in Perinthalamana taluk of Malappuram district. Having lost his father in an early age, young Kunju was given rigorous training at home in Sanskrit and later Malayalam, Hindi and English. Kunju managed to convince his mother that he has to go to a nearby school which fully opened him out to other castes and communities. At the school, he got closer to the legendary V T and M B Bhattathiripads and launched a journal, Unninamboothiri, against the feudal system "to make human beings out of the Namboodiris'. As a teenager, he occupied positions in the Yogakshema Sabha and campaigned for liberating Namboodiri women from oppressive rituals. For all his endeavours including taking the initiative for the first widow re-marriage of the community in 1931, the Namboodiris got him ostracised. EMS must have got amused when some left extremist leaders started accusing him of being Brahminical in the late seventies and eighties
As a student of history in Trichur, Sankaran was clearly drawn by Mahatma Gandhi and he left the college. His professor lamented that his best student had left but had an inkling of what Sankaran was to become when he said "Sankaran will make history'. Having joined the Congress, Sankaran came under the fold of Jawaharlal Nehru, who, thirty years later as prime minister, was to dismiss the first elected communist government in the world led by none other than

Page 30
30 TAM TIMES
EMS of Kerala
Sankaran had met P Krishna Pillai and other socialist leaders in various jails and this led to a leftwing criticism of Gandhi's Strategies and tactics vis-a-vis feudalism. Along with Acharya Narendra Deva, JP and A K Gopalan, EMS went on to found the Congress Socialist Party in 1936 advocating a left line within the Congress during those heady years. Sankaran's understanding of land relations in South Asia came to the fore in 1939, when he, as a legislator, wrote a dissenting note, rather a thesis, in favour of tenancy rights. This very understanding led him to declare, as chief minister of Kerala in 1958, that the state police would not interfere in the resolution of land disputes in favour of tenants. This was one of the reasons for his government getting dismissed by Jawaharlal Nehru.
Sankaran was forced to spend the few years during the second world war in underground as the British became Suspicious of the communists and decided to come down hard on them. While some communists resurfaced by going along with the antifascist line and Suspended the anticolonial stir, EMS could not do so as the British government was still suspicious of him. This was a turning point in his life, as he completely gave up the last of the Namboodiri vestiges, namely his food habits. Living with ordinary farmers and fishermen, he ate fish and meat and became part of their life. Somewhere in his writings, he describes himself as the adopted Son of the working classes The dawn of independence gave him no respite as the Congress government decided to ban the Communist
Party in the wak uprising and the tion put forth by th In 1957, EMS first elected com] in the world, attr; attention. This wa given the fact tha then following th insurrection in oth Cuba. EMS rewr programme in Indi; ticipation in goverı innovative step. what is possible a der the given disp willing to try, exp from the experier government took reforms and educat entire edifice of the he was rewarded These steps laid t the policies to be f future governments activists were to p Social reform as w popular science in seventies and eight The sixties wit period, with the left ing into three princ went along with the ing the CPI’s stand Indian ruling classe dian war. EMS” line ment of the bord China and Pakista wrath of the Indi especially the medi propelled by the N bring further proble was the first comn ticulated participati The extremist left
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of the Telangana hesis of insurreclate BT Ranadive. vent on to lead the unist government cting international a stupendous feat, communists were
different path of r places including te the communist including init parance: an extremely )uite aware as to nd what is not unnsation, EMS was eriment and learn ce. The Steps his in reshaping land ion had shaken the Kerala society and
with dismissal he foundation for ollowed by all the in Kerala. The left lay a great part in ell as literacy and hovements of the ies in Kerala. nessed a different movement fissuripal streams. EMS CPI(M) condemn
of supporting the
es in the Sino- Inof peaceful settleer disputes with n earned him the un establishment, a. The later break Taxalbaris was to ms for EMS who unist to have arn in government.
wanted to bring
15APR1998
about immediate revolution and this had created problems for the CPI(M), especially in West Bengal and Kerala where it was part of the ruling fronts for a while.
As general secretary of the CPI(M) during 1977-92, EMS sought to practice a balancing act between governance and social change. This was reflected on the field at West Bengal, where the CPI(M) became the principal political party and entrenched itself in governance through radical land reforms. It was period of trial and consolidation for the communists and EMS theoretical grasp of going for "inclusive alliances' of broad masses of people brought substantial results for the party which found itself supporting the government at the centre (led by V P Singh from outside during 1989-91, just be. fore EMS was to relinquish his post. EMS was a keen historian and polemicist. Apart from pamphlets, EMS had written more than 75 books in Malayalam and 15 in English, mainly on the Indian independence struggle, Gandhi and Nehru, social history of India, especially Kerala and on literature. His writings on literature, however, occasionally brought protests from even left-leaning writers like OV VIjayan who saw in it attempts to sub
ordinate art to ideology and defend
the indefensible in communism: dictatorship and erasure of history. And with this the question can be posed whether EMS saw history as a proletarian or mass subject which would achieve the Marxist utopia or he, as a subject, constitutes a type of contemporary history of the subcontient. The myth of the former is over, and probably, the latter is true. O
NTERNATIONAL
RoAspEcAss
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Page 31
15 APRIL 1998
CLASSIFIED ADS
iš First 20 words E10. each word 60p charge for Box No. 23. (Vat 17 1/2% extra). Prepayment essent.
The Advertisement Manager, Tani Times Ltd, PO Box 121,
Sutton, Surrey SM13TDs. Phone of 81-644 0972 FAx: 0181-24 255
MATRIMONIAL
Tamil parents seek British educated professional person for their attractive daughter (British born), 27, educated and qualified in medical profession in UK. Send photo, full details.: İM 10 1 1 C/o Tamil Times.
Hindu Tamil parents seek attractive bride for handsome Computer Consultant son, vegetarian, 31, 5'11". Send horoscope details. M 1012 c/o Tamil Times.
Sister seeks Hindu partner for brother, 29, Accountant Working in London. Send horoscope, details M 1016 c/o Tamil Tines,
Jaffna Hindu parents seek bride in UK, 20-26, for their son, UK qualified British citizen, graduate engineer, 29, 6, in good employment. Prefer professionally qualified bride. Send horoscope, details. M 1017 C/O arril Times.
Mother seeks professional partner, 31-39, non-smoker, for attractive working daughter, UK resident, to match her in Wit, Commitment and financial security. Send horoscope, CdetaisS. M í Of 8 C/O Tarnil Tirnes.
Jaffna Hindu mother seeks attractive bride for SOn, M.SC., 5'4", in early forties, teetotaler, holding professional, responsible position in Europe. Send horoscope, details. M 1019 C/o Tamil Times.
Jaffna Hindu parents seek groom for only daughter, B.Com., Management Trainee, Colombo, 27, 53-1/2, gOOd looking. Professionally qualified person or student about to complete education Welcome. Please send horoscope, full details. IM 1020 C/o Tamil Times.
Sister seeks bride for brother,
Ph.D. Engineer, 33, 5'11”, nonsmoker, in good employment in London. Send details. M
1021 C/O armi irnes.
Jaffna Hindu parents seek reasonably educated vegetarian bride for accountancy finalist son, 25. Send horoscope, details. M 1022 C/o Tamil Times.
Jaffna Hindu parents seek educated bride for British born son, 30, 62", computer graduate employed in bank. Send horoscope, details. M 1023 C/o
Tarnis TinneS.
WEDDING BELLS
We congratulate the following couples on their recent Weddings.
Jegamuraleetharan son of Mr. A. V. Panchadoharam and
late Mrs. POOrana) Panchadcharam of Jeganpavanam' Meesalai
West, Meesalai, Jaffna and Vijayamalar daughter of the late Mr. Vaithilingam and Mrs. P Vaithilingam of " Vijay a p a van a m ', Pungudutheevu 4, Jaffna on 28.3.98 at Highgate Murugan Temple, London N65BA.
Kirupananthan son of late Mr. Kanthapillay and Mrs. Kanthapillay of Neervely Centre, Neervely, Jaffna and Bharathie daughter of late Mr. S. Balasubramanier and Mrs. K. Balasubramanier of Uyarapulam, Anaicododai, Jaffna. On 30.3.98 at Harrow Teacher Centre, Wealdstone, Middx. UK.
Ganeshkumar son of late Mr. Kunaratnam Nadarajah and Mrs. Yogaranee Nadarajah of 1 Fountainhead Road, Apt 2014, North York, Ontario M3J 1 K6, Canada and Paheerathy daughter of late Mr. Murugesu Thambiah and Mrs. Rajapoopathy Thambiah of 2
 

TAMIL TIMES 31
Hadden Way, Greenford, Middx. UB6 ODH on 1.4.98 at Rhodes Memorial Commonwealth Centre,
Bishop Stortford, Herts.
Somasundaram Son of Mr. and Mrs Ayyakannu Desigar of Manipay, Jafna and Chithra daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Satkunananthan of 9A Revel Road, Kingston, Surrey on 5.4.98 at The Guildford Civic Centre, Guildford, Surrey.
Sarvesvaran son of Dr. S. and Mrs. T. Navaratnam of 5 Windy Hill, Hutton, Brentwood, Essex CM13 2HP and Vaani daughfer Of Dr. S. and Mr.S. R. Gnanalingham of 20 Wensley Drive, Withington, Manchester M20 3DD or 10.498 af Thurrock Civic Hall, Grays, Essex.
Rajeev son of Mahinda and
Indra Malalgoda of 96 Celeborn Street, South Woodham Ferrers, Essex
CM37AF and Saloni daughter of Vinay and Bala Sharma of 2 Grove Road, Edgware, Middx., HA8 7NW on 12.4.98 at Bushey Golf and Country Club, High Street, Bushey, HertS.
OBITUARY
Mr. Arumugam Ponnampalam (Papa), beloved husband of the late Annammah, loving father of Mrs. Tha Varnafar Kulasingam (Canada), Tha vapalasingam, Jeyaraj (both of UK), Mrs. P a t h m a n a a r Sivapathasundram (Jaffna) and Rajasingam (UK); fatherin-law of the late Kulasingam, Mrs. Vageswari Thavapalasingam, Mrs. Kaushalya Jeyaraj, the late Sivapathasundram and Mrs. Mangaiyakarasi Rajasingarn; grandfa
ther of Thavaraj, Pathmaraj, Kullaraj, Sri Kanth, Angela, Manjula, Pravin, Pramila, Sivarooban, Tharshan and Navin; great-grandfather of Gobinath and Mangalanath passed away peacefully at the age of 98 on 31st March 1998 in Cheam, UK.
The funeral rites were performed at home on 6th April and the cremation took place at North-East Surrey Crematorium following a speech by Mr. N. S. Kandiah and a prayer by Mr. Sri Ranghan, both close friends of Papa for many years. The members of the family Wish to thank all relatives and friends who attended the funeral, sent messages of sympathy and assisted them in several ways during the period of great sorrow. - 119 Mulgrave Road, Cheam, Sutton, Surrey SM26JU, UK. Tel: 0181 642 O870.
IN MEMORAM
in cherished memory of Mr. Chinnathampy Rasiah on the fourth anniversary of his passing way on 24.04.94.
Deep in our hearts you will always stay Loved and remembered every day.
Greatly loved, deeply missed and always remembered by his sorrowing wife Gunamany, beloved children Rajan and Rajini, loving daughter-in-law Janaki, Son-in-law Lakshman, grandchildren Thabojan, Prashanth and Sulakshan, Sister-in-law, nephews and nieces.
O 14 Greenbriar Avenue, Wheelers Hill, Melbourne, Vic. 3150, Australia.
O 3818 Campolindo Drive, Moraga, 94556 California, USA.

Page 32
15 APRIL 1998
IN MEMORAM Ctd
In everloving memory of Mr. Velupillai Nadarajah, formerly Director, Ceylon School of Social Work, son of late Mr. &
Mrs. Velupillai of Chetty Street, Nallur, Sri Lanka, Sonin-law of the late Mr. K. Muthulingam and Mrs. Muthulingam of Tellipallai, Sri Lanka On the Seventh anniVersary of his passing away on 4.4.91.
Sadly missed and fondly remembered by his beloved wife Muthu Ambikai; daughterDr. Sakunthala, Son Dr. Ravindran, Son-in-lav Dr. Suresh Thayalan; daughter-inlaw Meera, grandchildren Arjun, Nisha and Athiya. - 1 1 Baronia Croft, Highwoods,
Colchester, Essex CO45EF
In loving memory of Mr. Visvalingan Sivasubramaniam, Principal Emeritus Skanda Varodaya College, Chunnakam on the second anniversary of his passing away on 26.4.96.
Sadly missed and fondly remembered by his beloved wife Sironmany, children Dr. S i V a na n d a r a j a h, Sivagnanasunderam, Dr. Sivapalan, Sivathasan, Sivaratnan, Sivananoharan
and Sivaloshanadevi; son-inlaw Thavarajah; daughters-inlaw Manimehaladevi, Anandhi,
Yogeswary, Kamaladevy, Supathiradevi and Devahi; grandchildren Sutharshan, Priyatharshini, Suseenthiran, Suhanthan, Sutharshika, Suloshan, Suthaharan, Sulakshan, Arooran,
Gajamohana, Gajaharan and Vaishna. - 135A Sudbury Avenue, Wembley, Middx. AO 6A MW, Tel: Of 81 3835 O477.
In loving memory of Mrs. Grace Nagaratnam Rasiah of Varuththalai-Vilan and llavalai; beloved Wife of the late Mr. M.A. RaSiah (Former Headmaster) on the First Anniversary of her passing away on 5th April 1997.
With fondest thoughts and prayers from her family - 40 Hillingdon Road, Kingswood, Watford, Herts. WD2 6JG.
In loving memory of our belo Ved
- 識
Amma
Арра Leelawathy Saravanamuttu
ilan kanathan ilan kanathan
BOrr. 24.08.32 BOrr, 31 10.22 Rest: 28.04.96 Rest: 18.02.94
You are greatly missed forever And are in the thoughts of All your family and friends.
Fondly remembered and sadly missed by your ever-loving daughter Umila, son-in-law Kuha, grand daughters Shobi and Ranji. - 58 Ringwood, South Bretton, Peterborough PE39S. Tel: O1733 262.760.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

TAMILTIMES 32
IN MEMORAM
Pradeep Jeganathan (Born: 01.12.64) (Died: 31.03.97)
One year ago today You were cruelly taken away. Now there is only bitterness Desperation and loneliness. For us we bemoan your loss It is hard to bear this CrOSS. Never a day begins or ends Without a thought of you. Hopes and dreams for you we had All were shattered and left us sad. Sweet memories of you none can steal The pain in our hearts only God can heal.
Affectionately remembered and profoundly missed by his parents, sister, brothers, brother-in-law, sisters-in-law, nephews, niece, uncles, aunts and Cousins.
FORTHCOMING EVENTS May 1 Sashdi.
May 3 Feast of St. Philip & St. James.
May 4 Feast of Martyrs of England & Wales.
May 7 Ekathasi.
May 8 Pirathosam; Feast of Our Lady of the Sacred Heart.
May 11 Full Moon.
May 13 Feast of Our Lady of the Fatima.
May 14 Feast of St. Matthias. May 16 Feast of St. Brenden. May 18 Feast of St. John I.
May 20 Feast of St. Bernadine.
May 22 Ekathasi; Feast of St. Rita.
May 23 Sanipirathosan. May 25 Arnavasai; Karthigai.
May 26 Feast of St. Philip Neri.
May 27 Feast of St. Augustine.
ANCHORAGE
Residential Care Home for Elderly Regd. with LONDON BOROUGH OF CROYDON
May 29 Sathurthi. May 31 Sashdi; Whit Sunday.
June 7 Association of Sri Lankan Catholics in UK organises Feast of St. Anthony of Padua at Saints Michael & Martin's Catholic Church, 94 Bath Road, Hounslow, Middx. Holy Rosary at 2pm followed by concelebrated Holy Mass. Refreshments in Parish Hall, Tel 0976.519 714
At the Bhavan Centre, 4A Castletown Road, London W14 9HQ. Te: O171 381 3O86/4608.
May 3 6.00pm Karnatic Vocal by Lalgudi Lalitha Krishan from India. May 28, 30 & 31 Lalitha Srinivasan of "Nupura”, Bangalore conducts Bharatanatyam workshop. May 31 6.00pm Bharatanatyam by Artistes of Nupura School, India, along with their Guru Lalitha Srinivasan.
Member of NATIONAL CARE HOME ASSOCATION
30 WOODSTOCK ROAD, CROYDONCRO 1JR
Situated in an elite residential area close to Whitgift Shopping Centre, BR Station and Bus Routes Providing long or short term care in a homely atmosphere Double and Single rooms with different views, some with en-suites. for further details please Tel: O181 667 O093

Page 33
15 APR1998
SCOT Makes Progress
The Standing Committee of Tamil Speaking People (SCOT) has received feedback and newspaper reports regarding the implementation of several projects of relief and rehabilitation approved during the period September to November 1997.
The following were approved during the period December 1997 to February 1998
O Jaffna University Hospital Development fund: £ 1200 for the payment of allowances to medical students to undertake basic clinical work to ease Work load due to shortage of staff.
O University Scholarship Fund: £ 1000 to Batticaloa University and £ 2000 to Jaffna University. These amounts were donated by well-wishers and set up in memory of their loved ones to help disadvantaged students.
O Sri Lanka Red Cross Society, Jaffna Branch: £2500 to facilitate primary health care in Maruthankerny, Irupalai, Karanvai, Udupiddy and Neervely, which are areas without access to any medical facility. This project is co-funded by the League of Friends of the University of Jaffna. (LOFՍՍ).
O Peoples' Welfare Organisation, Kopay: £800 to purchase sewing machines and typewriters to train youth in the respective skills to gain employment.
SCOT receives several more requests for very useful projects, finds its resources extremely limited and appeals for help. Those interested, please write to Project Officer, SCOT, 107 Coleman Court, Kimber Road, London SW18 4PB or telephone O181 87O 9897.
Amutha Vanee’s Veena
Arangetram
The Veena Arangetram of Amuthavanee, daughter of Mr. & Mrs. Anpananthar of Shelly Avenue, Manor Park, London E12 and pupil of Guru Smt Rudrani Balakrishnan took place on 6th September 1997 at The Broadway Theatre, Barking,
Essex before a distin musicians and music Guest was Sangeeth KP Sivanandam, fc Faculty of Fine Arts, a and the Guests of F. Venthan Thiru Pon Dr. V.G. Santhosam. 7 were compered by Mr. and the accompanyir Muthu Sivarajah on Arunsalann Gananath, Sri Kandiah Sith, Morsing.
The Chief Guest in h Annuthavanee on her of all the swaras with three hours without pause. He complime appeared to be a mance rather than hoped that she would Concerts in the future a Vidushaki.
ChelVathamk - An Appr
Chelvathamby Aruc away in Colombo on the age of seventy Thambasitty, Puloly W Was a Public Officer a and Telecommunicati Lanka. At the time 1982, he was a Reg Officer in the Departm
Right through his wo Chelvathamby Aruchu Concerned about the C ety, He was not merel rendered valuable Se ment of the downtrOC leged. This is reflected ing and after his publi
During his public se, Union activist and w Postal Clerical Serv Trade Union activitie, able service towards possesed - the worki ment, he returned tO Thambasitty to re-es his roots. There age social service by hum
The most notable a rendered towards th dispossessed in Tha Language tutoring. F conducted English Lé of charge for the ch who were mostly p addressed as Aruch
lage folk, particularly
Annidst a number C round Point Pedro he ing free tuition which dren of the poor villa tion of his selfless offered him fees Wh. down. Some of thern
 
 
 
 

TAM TIMES 33
lished gathering of lovers. The Chief Kalanidhi Thanjai mer Dean of the namalai University onour were innisai untharalingam and he evening's events MVimal Sockanathan g artistes were Sri Miruthangam, Sri in on Ghatan and mparanathan on
s speech applauded excellent rendering treat ease for nearly any hesitation or inted her On What Irofessional perforin arangetram. He perform many more nd become a Veena
by Aruchuna eciation
huna, who passed ebruary 16, 1998 at
three hailed from est, Point Pedro. He atta Ched to the POSt on Department, Sri of his retirement in tional Administrative ent.
rking and retired life, na Was humble and fispossessed in soci/ Concerned, but has rvice for the betterden and underprivil in his activities dur2 service.
vice he was a Trade as President of the ce Union. Through S he rendered valuThe Welfare Of the di Sng class. After retirehis native village of ablish the links with in he continued his ble ways and means.
nd noble Service he betterment of the basitty was English pr several years he nguage classes free ldren of the village, bor. He was fondy na Appa” by the vilChildrer).
fee levying tutories 2 was a person offerwas a gift to the chilers. As an appreciaervice, some pupils h he politely turned pleaded that at least
that he should accept a small sum as a token of their appreciation, but he continued to refuse material gratitude from his (mostly poor) pupils. He was the living testimony of a selfless social volunteer. His humbleness was further demonstraed by his shunning publicity.
Once his service as an English Language teacher was sought on a monthly remuneration which he refused and said, "I have the moral satisfaction that I have tutored several pupils to obtain a credit pass in English Language in the G.C.E. O/L examination". It was this moral satisfaction that he was after and not any material benefit or cheap publicity.
There were times when his noble attitude of selflessness conflicted with the interests of some of his near and dear Ones. However he has not been vengeful and treated with kindness those Who had been unkind to him. Though he hailed from a semi-feudal family, his eternal link was with the man in the street. This was reflected in the way he died, which took place when he collapsed and passed away on a street in Wela Watte in ColombO.
The most fitting tribute one can make to this unsung social volunteer is not an appreciation of this kind, but to follow his footsteps and render selfless service towards the betterment of the dispossessed of our native soil.
Muttukrishna Sarvananthan.
Appointment in Canada
Mr. Siva Sivaramalingam of Scarborough has been appointed a member of the Council of the College of Chiropodists of Ontario for three years by the Lieutenant Governor of the Executive Council of Ontario.
Mr. Sivaramalingam is a Vice President of the Ontario Senior Tamils' Centre, Vice President for Society for the Aid of Ceylon Tamils and a member of the Board of Directors of Canada Ceylon Tamils Chamber of Commerce.
Federation of Saiva (Hindu) Temples UK The above Federation which was recently inaugurated is organising a Saiva Conference on the 11th and 12th of July 1998 at the Lewisham Theatre, Rushey Green, Catford, London SE6. Saiva Educationists, Aatheena Karthaas fronn Tarmil Nadu, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Europe are expected to take part in this conference.
Further details Could be obtained from the various temples, Tamil Schools and Tamil Organisations.
A.T.S. Ratmasingham N. Satchithananthan Chairman Secretary

Page 34
34 AM, TIMES
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