கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Tamil Times 2003.02

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წ. 333333 253
VOL XXIII No.2 ISSN 0266-4488
LTTE female cadre wearing controversial belt (Top le LTTE child soldier (top right); JWP protestma
 
 

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5 FBRUARY 2003
“I do not agree with a word of what you say, but I'll defend to the death your right to say it.”
-Voltaire
ISSN 0266 - 44 88 V0. XXIII N0. 2 15 FEBRUARY 2003
Published by: TAMIL TIMES LTD PO Box l 21, Sutton, Surrey SM13TD United Kingdom Phone: 020 - 8644 0972 Fax: 020 - 8241 4557
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manuscripts, photographs or artwork.
The Ceasefire Anniversary O3
Fifth round of talks
A year after ceasefire
US on hard choices
Democratising Human Rights 15
A journey to peace 22
Jaffna Public Library 23
Federal Constitution 25
Clash over belts 27
3 Tigers in blast 28 impeding economic revival 30
Classified 37
The (
There have be brutal armed ethni 29 July 1987, a c. Keeping Force or Commencement O 9 October 1987. T talks between the Continued until the came into effect. days with the res ment forces on 1 ( Chandrika Kumar agreement came i 18 April 1995 with harbour. Strangel just two months a maximum period c fighting was just t in this backdrc ary 2002 between its first anniversar parties must be c« For the first tin ence of a continuC resulting from the tions were in orde organinsing many emony at the cou public exhibitions manifested the pe and a truly enduri All the indicati ing to all commu process to procee been the areas of worst and therefo ess is most evidet it is to be note progress being m dimension of the to be Welcomed. Secretary Genera rights issues relat for discussion at 1 man rights activiti tiation process at training of LTTE c tarian law training During theset action plan forch action plan will inc ment. The LTTE has agreed to a paigns aimed at,
It is unfortuna involving the viola over not only the between the Gov with the assistanc Somehow Succee process at risk. T serious violations hartals, demonstr between the part process.
 
 

TAMLTIMES3
ceasefire Anniversary
!en previous ceasefire agreements during the protracted and c conflict in Sri Lanka. Following the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of easefire came into effect with the arrival of the Indian Peace the following day. The ceasefire came to an end with the F the military confrontation between the LTTE and the IPKF on hat ceasefire lasted just two months and 10 days. During the Premadasa Government and the LTTE in 1989-90 the fighting 2 departure of the IPKF on 31 March 1990 when a ceasefire hat ceasefire broke down, again just after two months and 10 umption of armed hostilities between the LTTE and govern) June 1990. Following commencement of talks between the atunga Government and the LTTE in late 1994, a ceasefire nto effect on 8 January 1995 which came to an abrupt end on he LTTE sinking two navy gunboats anchored in the Trincomlee y coincidental as it might seem, that ceasefire too had lasted and 10 days. Judged by past experience, it looked as if the luring which the warring parties could restrain themselves from No months and 10 days. op, the fact that the ceasefire agreement signed on 22 Februthe Government and the LTTE had lasted a year and reached y must the regarded as an achievement itself, and for this both pngratulated. ne in two decades, a people beleaguered by the tragic experius war have been able to experience a period of relative calm absence of fighting between the parties. Therefore, celebra}r, and the Government led the way to mark the occasion by events including the lighting "lamps of peace' at a public cerIntry's Independence Square. Many intercultural events and were held in several parts of the country. All these events ople's hope, faith and expectation that the ceasefire will last ng peace will return. ons are that the overwhelming majority of the people belongnities do not want a return to war and they want the peace ld to a successful conclusion. The main theatre of war having the Northeast of the island, it is there the people suffered the re the desire and wish for the continuation of the peace procՈt. ld that the fifth round of peace talks in Berlin indicated further ade. That the parties have agreed to address the human rights peace process and the issue of recruitment of child soldiers is he international Human Rights Adviser, Mr. lan Martin (former of Amnesty International), is to draw up a roadmap for human ing to the peace process. The draft roadmap will be prepared he next round talks in March and will include Substantive hues and commitments to be implemented throughout the negond effective mechanisms for the monitoring of human rights cadres and Government officials in human rights and humani
of police and prison officers. alks, the LTTE also agreed to work with UNICEF to draw up an ldren affected by the armed conflict in the northeast. Such an :lude an intensified effort by the LTTE to stop underage recruitrestated its pledge to bring the practice to an end. The LTTE complete cessation of recruitment of, and recruitment campersons under 18 years of age. te that in the run up to the first anniversary certain incidents ation of the ceasefire agreement occurred that cast a shadow anniversary celebrations, but also the fifth round of peace talks ernment and the LTTE in Berlin. To the credit of the parties, :e of the international Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, they have ied in managing these disputes without putting the entire peace he parties must recognise that highly publicised incidents of of the ceasefire agreement accompanied by orchestrated ations and protest marches will not only damage the relations es but also undermine public confidence in the entire peace

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4 AML TIMES
PEACE TALE FFTHROUN
he fifth round of direct talks between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government was held in Berlin on 7-8 February. The duration of the round has been shortened to enable the LTTE to complete internal consultations before the next stage of the peace process, according to a Norwegian statement.
"At the fifth session, the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE plan to focus discussions on their ongoing efforts to accelerate immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation activities. The parties also intend to begin consultations on matters relating to human rights, with the participation of Mr. Ian Martin as a resource person on the subject. As at the previous sessions, the Government of Norway will be present as the facilitator to the peace process, at the request of both parties,” a statement issued prior to the talks by the Norwegian embassy had said.
The parties agreed to change the venue for the upcoming negotiations from Thailand to Europe at the request of Mr. Anton Balasingham, chief negotiator of the LTTE, who will travel to the talks from his residence in London,' the statement said.
The Government delegation for the Berlin talks consisted of Ministers Mr.G.L. Peiris, Milinda Morogoda and Rauff Hakim, Secretary to the Ministry of Defence Mr. Austin Fernando and Mr. Bernard Gunatillake, Director of Sri Lanka's Peace Secretariat
The LTTE's delegations comprised Mr. Anton Balasingham, the LTTE's Chief Negotiator, his wife, Mrs Adele Balasingham, Mr. S. P. Tamilselvan, the head of the LTTE's political wing, and Colonel Karuna, Special Commander Batticaloa-Amparai.
Present at the discussions was also Mr. Ian Martin, a former head of Amnesty International, who was to advice the delegates on the human rights dimension of the peace process.
Before the talks it was announced that they were to comprise three sessions. The first would consider the re
port from the Sub C mediate Humanitaria tion Needs in the (SIHRN). The deleg discuss "security ma humanitarian and dev matters including th internally displaced
At the second S sides would discuss" and an "informal disc rights.” At the third egates were expected ters raised in the firs necessary,” and abou ture discussions.
It was also anno Astrid Heiberg, a pro try at the University C broad experience in humanitarian advoca pointed for the sub-c. der issues.’ A Norw Foreign Affairs press the request of the G Lanka and the Libe Tamil Eelam (LTTE) pointed Dr. Astrid advisor to the Sub-Co der Issues. Dr. Heibe at the first meeting of tee to be held in Mar the peace process est Committee to ensure clusion of gender is: process.” Dr. Astrid broad experience wi human rights and hu cacy from Norway ar For several years she in University co-op Norway and Sri Lal volvement of leading Colombo, Jaffna and Even as the dele Berlin for the talks, it
three LTTE Sea Tig
ted suicide by blowi having set fire a tra smuggling arms whi dicted by the Sri La ernment and LTTE
issued a joint statem

15FEBRUARY 2003
SS: ND
ommittee on Imn and RehabilitaNorth and East gates would also tters' and "other relopment related e resettlement of persons (IDPs)."
essions, the two political matters,' :ussion on human sessions, the delto discuss "matit two sittings, as It subjects for fu
unced that, "Dr. fessor of psychiaof Oslo, who has a human rights and acy has been apIommittee on genegian Ministry of release said, "At overnment of Sri -ration Tigers of , Norway has apN. Heiberg as an ommittee on Genrg will be present the Sub-Commitch. The parties to ablished the Sub: the effective insues in the peace N. Heiberg has th gender issues, manitarian advold internationally. has been involved eration between nka, with the ing academics from
Batticaloa. gates gathered in was reported that ers' had commitng themselves up wler suspected of eh had been internkan Navy. Govdelegates quickly lent that the inci
dent would not affect the peace talks. The statement said, "Due to an apparent communication failure between the LTTE naval commander and the cadres on board one vessel, the crew members were not informed of the agreed (inspections) procedure, and the cadre set fire to the vessel and took their own lives. In cooperation with the SLMM (Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission), the parties will review existing procedures in order to avoid similar incidents in the future.'
Press Release
At the conclusion of the Berlin talks, a Norwegian embassy press release said that the Government and the LTTE negotiators had agreed to work out safeguards to prevent sea incidents such as the one off Delft in northern Sri Lanka from happening in the future, agreed to establish three committees in Eastern Province to address local land and other issues, agreed to request Mr Ian Martin to prepare for discussion a roadmap of human rights issues. LTTE also agreed to work with UNICEF on an action plan that would include an intensified effort by the LTTE to stop underage recruitment.
Full text of the Norwegian press release said:
“The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) held the fifth and shortened session of peace talks at the Norwegian Embassy in Berlin on 7-8 February 2003. The discussions focused on complex issues in a spirit of cooperation and conciliation.
The parties expressed their concern about the situation at sea and their strong commitment to ensure that an incident such as the one which resulted in the tragic loss of three lives on a Sea Tiger vessel near the Delft islands on 7 February 2003 does not recur. Recognising the gravity of the consequences of incidents of this kind, the parties agreed that a meeting will be held soon between the GOSL, LTTE and Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), to work out effective safeguards.
The parties reviewed progress reports on the work of the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN). Both parties underscored the urgent need to commence

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řŘEARY ZOO3
humanitarian and rehabilitation activities in the north and east. The parties reported that the agreement on World Bank custodianship of the Northeast Reconstruction Fund (NERF) is close to finalisation and will be signed within the next week. The parties once again appealed to the international community to make funds rapidly available for immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation needs in the north and east.
The parties reported that the implementation of the Action Plan for Accelerated Resettlement in the Jaffna district (ARP) is ahead of schedule. The seven Assessment Teams, comprising representatives from the GOSL, LTTE and UNHCR, have completed preliminary needs assessments and are identifying the activities required to facilitate resettlement. The parties also reported that the concept papers approved at the previous meeting of SIHRN on 15 - 16 January have been developed into proposals for concrete projects that can be approved and begun immediately. As requested by SIHRN at the last meeting, the report on the return of displaced Muslims in the Northern Province has been submitted for their consideration.
The parties agreed to establish three committees, one in each district of the Eastern Province, to address land issues and other areas of mutual concern. The committees will consist of six representatives of the Muslim population and six representatives of the LTTE. The work of the committees will start immediately. Similar committees will be appointed to address such issues relating to other communities as and when required.
Following a thorough discussion of human rights, the parties agreed to ask their international Human Rights Adviser, Mr. Ian Martin, to draw up a roadmap for human rights issues relating to the peace process. The draft roadmap will be prepared for discussion in the sixth session of talks in Japan in March and will include substantive human rights activities and commitments to be implemented throughout the negotiation process effective mechanisms for the monitoring of human rights training of LTTE cadres and GOSL officials in human rights and humanitarian law training of police and prison officers.
Both parties agreed that children living in the north east of Sri Lanka have been the most seriously affected
by the war between LTTE. UNICEF esti 900 000 children in of whom have been Many of these child malnutrition, poorh cation facilities, co ment, loss of parent land mines. The LT work with UNICEF tion plan for childr armed conflict in th an action plan will fied effort by the LT age recruitment. The pledge to bring the The action plan will review mechanism agreed to a comple cruitment of, and paignsaimedat, pers ofage. In this cont handed over 350 ( joined the organisat tion with their parent plan will also includ sistance, includin schooling, vocationa ment facilitation, ar chosocial care, with of the government.
The parties intel discussion on the fist eral structure at the I noted that the LTTE action to setup a Pol mittee with a view depth issues pertail structures of powerThe parties confi session of peace tal on 18-2 March 200 the seventh session April-2 May 2003.” Mr Anton Balasi conference held at th fifth round of peace the LTTE has been due to recruitmento 18 years of age to spite of orders to reg Tiger leader Velupil refrain from recruit children. The situat serious that in order ation the LTTE has f ofaction with assista and a detailed repor conference, . Balasi The LTTE and t work out a joint p child recruitment o ment by the LTTE

TAMILTIESS
the GOSL and the mates that there are the northeast, all seriously affected. ren are faced with ealth care and eduntinued displaces and families, and TE has agreed to to draw up an acen affected by the he northeast. Such include an intensiTE to stop under2 LTTE restated its practice to an end. include a credible . The LTTE has te cessation of rerecruitment camsons under 18 years ext, the LTTE has hildren who had ion, for reunificaSorguardians. The e rehabilitation asg provisions for l training, employnd health and psythe active support
nd to commence a cal aspects of a fednext session. It was E has already taken itical Affairs Comto addressing in ning to alternative sharing.
irmed that the sixth ks will take place )3 in Japan and that will be held on 29
ngham, told a press le conclusion ofthe that the image of damaged severely fchildren less than he organisation in gional leaders from llai Prabakharan to ment ofunder aged ion has become so to control the situormulated a course ince: from UNICEF t was tabled at the ngham said.
he UNICEF would rogramme to stop r voluntary enlistE. LTTE’S Anton
Balasingham said the decision was conveyed to the Sri government delegation on the first day of the fifth session of talks as it was known that the government delegation was awaiting an assurance from the Tigers on the issue of child recruitment. Balasingham said that, according to the program, the LTTE, the UNICEF and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization(TRO) would start vocational training centres in the North East and their work would be overseen by top officials. He claimed some parents sent their children to join the LTTE due to poverty but LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran would advise his regional leaders to refer such children to the training centres. Dr. Balasingham also said the list of 350 names of children submitted by the SLMM had been looked into and it was found that a majority of them were not under 18 years. He said the LTTE would issue a statement giving details of them to the government and the UNICEF soon.
Rejecting the suggestion that the incident in the seas off the Delft island confirmed that the Tigers were indulging arms smuggling while being engaged in peace talks, Balasingham, said that in the LTTE's Sea Tiger force there were many fishing trawlers and all of them were fitted with 23mm cannons and in one such trawler that went fishing, the engine had stalled and another trawler had come to take it ashore and then the Navy had moved into take both trawlers into custody, when the LTTE cadres threatened to commitsuicide and
only then the Monitors had moved in.
Prof. G.L. Pieris expressing his views about the incident said that this should never have happened, and if the incident affected the peace talks even a little, then the responsibility should be taken by the relevant parties. It is better if lessons were learnt and ensured that such incidents are not repeated. Prof. Pieris also said that in the next few days, the government, the LTTE and the SLMM would hold a special meeting to find out reasons for the incident and steps which should be taken to ensure no repetition in the future, and the LTTE had expressed its total cooperation for it.
Prof. Pieris said that both parties agreed to include matters in relation to apolitical solution in the agenda for the sixth round of peace talks to be held in Japan.

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6 TAM TIMES
The Peace Proc A Year After Ceas
Jehan Perera
ne of the most positive developments of recent times has been the Japanese decision toget more involved in purposefully nurturing the Sri Lankan peace process rather than only funding the country's development efforts. Media reports that the Japanese government had provided financial assistance to an LTTE secretariat led to media speculating as to the impact on relations with India. However, the Japanese government was swift to point out that what it had funded was actually the joint government-LTTE appointed secretariat of the Sub-Committee on immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs based in the Wanni.
There is a continuing belief within Sri Lanka that the Indian government is loath to see outside powers expanding their influence in its neighbourhood. It is likely that the Sri Lankan government would have informed the relevant Indian authorities about the Japanese initiative prior to its acceptance. India is Sri Lanka's closest neighbour and has legitimate interests as the regional superpower.
From a Sri Lankan perspective, the greater involvement of the Japanese government in the peace process is to be welcomed. Sri Lanka's foremost need is to resolve its ethnic conflict without any more violence. Japan is by far the country's largest aid donor and it can easily contribute even more should it be properly motivated to do so. When the LTTE made its own decision to seek Japanese financial assistance to equip its peace secretariat, it would have done so with the full knowledge that it was taking a decision that it could not lightly reverse. A country of Japan's peaceful and democratic standing cannot explain to its taxpayers that it gave money to an organisation that went back to war. In accepting the funding, the LTTE has made yet another international commitment to the peace process. And Japan has taken on a responsibility to ensure that the
peace process is as
It has been a Lankan peace proce tant gestures by the ently downplayed sections of the Sinha ion instead of resor tive course of seeki words. One of th throughs of the pres was the public ann LTTE's chief negot peace talks that the prepared to settle for The international m. lysts viewed this st the basic parameters gotiated settlement r
Critical view
However, locally the response to Dr ham's pronounceme during the Oslo talk: more qualified manı inted critically to the statement by the Nor that stated that the L kan government ha explore a federal solu not equivalent to a one. The continuing LTTE's words and pertaining to the hum on the ground, mak line of argument. Th tors and top leadersh denied child recruitm any longer, but it is verbally accepted th constitutes a plural democracy should p ground the Muslims parties find themselv The doubt that is disjuncture between and deeds pertains to peace process. Thos basis of what is h ground have doub LTTE's sincerity to a compromise settle
 
 
 

15FEBRUARY 2003
CCCSS.
eature of the Sri s that very imporLTTE are consistind trivialised by anationalistopining to the alternang to hold it to its biggest breakent peace process uncement by the ator at the current LTTE would be a federal solution. dia and most anaitement as setting within which a nemay be found.
" in Sri Lank itself, Anton Balasingnt on federalism s was viewed in a ner. Analysts poitext of the official wegian facilitators TTE and Sri Land agreed only to tion, and this was ctually accepting gap between the deeds, especially an rights situation is this a plausible e LTTE negotiaip has repeatedly entis taking place . They have also at the north-east society in which evail, but on the and rival Tamil es oppressed. fanned out of the he LTTE's words its sincerity in the 2 who go on the ppening on the s regarding the ctually negotiate ment on the lines
of generally accepted federal models. The Presidential spokesman's comments that the LTTE has recruited an additional 10,000 cadre since the commencement of the ceasefire agreement and thereby vastly increased its manpower strength, coupled with the findings of the international monitors about continuing child recruitment, give credence to these apprehensions.
The reports of those who have visited those parts of the north and east where child recruitment is taking place and people are being harassed and intimidated into paying LTTE taxes are gloomy in the extreme. However, those who have also had the opportunity of having face-to-face interactions with the top leadership of the LTTE tend to come away with a different perception. Members of international fact finding missions and aid donors, as well as organisations working directly with the top leadership of the LTTE depict a more optimistic situation in which the LTTE is indeed committed to the peace process.
The question is to explain this disparity between the ground reality and the impressions given by the LTTE's top leadership. The LTTE's concern is undoubtedly to maintain its monopoly of control over the territories it has already acquired though military means. It is also seeking to exert its influence over the rest of the north and east in which the government's security forces are present. While trying to maximise its control on the ground at the present time, the LTTE's request for funding to its peace secretariat suggests that it is also seeking to re-orient its cadre away from war to peace time duties. This is likely to be an uphill task for the LTTE, with severe capacity problems standing in the way of such a reorientation programme.
International delegations and others visiting the LTTE's Wanni headquarters speak of the bottlenecks they face with very few personnel who have the linguistic and technical backgrounds to engage with those from outside. As an organisation that waged a guerrilla war for over twenty years the LTTE has only a handful of cadre who are able to speak in English and have a background in human rights and political education. Further the LTTE's mistrust of outsiders has made them reluc

Page 7
SFEBRUARY 2003
tant to bring in even Tamil expatriates to be the new leaders or even to be advisors for likely fear of losing control. Lack of capacity
The problem that the LTTE is facing on account of its inadequate capacity to retransform itselfpolitically needs to be appreciated at this time. Even if the LTTE leadership has the will they do not have the capacity. But they need to develop their capacity to respect human rights and political rights on a priority basis as a foundation for a democratic society. This is a problem that the government also faces in a different area. The slowness and lack of visible progress of the rehabilitation and development programme of the government in the north-east is making the people there have their own doubts about the government's commitment and sincerity to uplift the conditions of the people of the north and east.
The observations made by Parliamentary opposition leader Mahinda Rajapakse upon returning from a visit to Jaffna recently needs to be taken seriously in this regard. He spoke of the lack of development in that part of the country. While it is a damning indictment on Sri lank politics that it took so long for a leader of the opposition to visit Sri Lanka's second largest city and meet its people, it is a case of better late than never. Mahinda Rajapakse’s indictment of the government was equally strong. He said that the government had appointed a plethora of Ministers and set up agencies to deal with the rehabilitation and development of the North. Despite several Ministers going to Jaffna with great fanfare and making all sorts of promises, very little change had taken place on the ground.
When the government Ministers go to Jaffna and make promises they certainly mean them. They see the immensity of the destruction, the poverty of the people and their hopes for a peaceful and normal future. Therefore the Ministers want to do something positive for the people Their failure to deliver on their promises is not due to deliberate ill will or deception but is because they do not possess the capacity to implement their promises. The government, as much as the LTTE, needs to strengthen its capacities to implenent its promises to ensure peace and
prosperity to the east.
As in every s deavour there is a to their words. Th civil society and th munity is to be su quests for capacity ing watchdogs of The Japanese offe LTTE peace secret in this light. The agree to demobilis and to permit inter of this fact would the international making effort.
Ensuring self-det to all communiti
For the first tir, dependence Day celebrated not onl ate pomp and pags the sense of securi ple’s participation last several years had become virtua few day due to thi The LTTE attack ( Toothin Kandy jus celebration of inde February 4 a spec for an LTTE attac This year, how fire agreement pro' ble, and the gove forces behavingw gree of discipline the celebrations t style.
Independence ( the day on which S the right to self nearly four and a lonial servitude. Il Sinhalese-majority try this positive se
However, in parts of the coun Batticaloa and the celebrations. On were asked to hoi priorto the comme war in 1983, many intellectuals amon nity described Feb day when they exc by the British for Sinhalese majority

TAMILTIMES 7
people of the north
here of human enneed to hold parties e role of the media, e international compportive of such rebuilding, while bethe peace process. of assistance to the ariat needs to be seen day that the LTTE e their child soldiers national verification pe a turning point of ly-mediated peace
ermination
S he in many years Inon February 4 was y with the appropriantry, but also with ty that ensures peoin the event. In the Independence Day lly an unofficial cure threats to security. on the Temple of the it prior to the 50-year pendence there made ial day to watch out k. ever, with the ceaseving to be highly staernment and LTTE ith a remarkable detowards each other, ook place in grand
lay was celebrated as Sri Lankans received letermination after half centuries of co3y and large in the parts of the counntiment prevailed.
he Tamil-majority |ry, such as Jaffna, Wannithere were no he contrary people st black flags. Even ncement of the civil political leaders and g the Tamil commuruary 4, 1948 as the hanged colonial rule similar rule by the These negative sen
timents about Independence Day prevail to this day.
The weekend media reported that school children from Jaffna who were expected to travel down to Colombo for the Independence Day celebrations had been prevented from doing so by an organisation called the Independent Students Consortium.
The principals of those Jaffna schools that were expected to send their school children to Colombo had reportedly been told that the government was trying to create a false impression that the people of the north and east were celebrating Independence Day when, in fact, they were not. The young activists had said that the independence granted in 1948 could not be considered as independence given to the Tamil people.
Negative Sentiments
On Independence Day 55 years ago the British colonial rulers transferred power to democratically elected leaders of Sri Lanka. The top leadership of the country to whom the power of governance was thus transferred comprised Sinhalese. This was inevitable considering that the great majority of people in the country were Sinhalese. But there were two problems in this transition that inexorably led to escalating ethnic conflict and eventual civil war. The first problem was that the British left behind a form of government in which all power was concentrated in a single political institution called Parliament that was based in Colombo. This concentration of power in a single institution made the constitution a unitary one. It also enabled the Sinhalese leadership in the country to wield that power unilaterally regardless of protests by leaders of the other much smaller communities. A preferable situation would have been for the British to have created a federal constitution in which one set of powers was vested in the central Parliament and another set of powers was vested in regional parliaments. This would have ensured that the Tamils who were a majority in the north and east could have enjoyed a measure of self determination in those parts of the country. But this was not to be. The second problem was that the Sinhalese and Tamil political leaders were unable to negotiate mutually acceptable solu

Page 8
8 TAMILTIMES
tions that would have been fair and just to all communities. It must not be forgotten that when it came to the citizenship laws that effectively disenfranchised the Tamils of recent Indian origin, there were Tamil leaders who gave it their assent.
Many years later, having observed the operation of the independent country in its first 15 years, the architect of the country's first post-independence constitution, Lord Soulbury, wrote an introduction to B.H. Farmer’s book prophetically titled “Ceylon: A nation divided." (1963) in which he began, "A Commission of which I had the honour to be the Chairman, was appointed by the British government in 1944, to examine and discuss proposals for the constitutional reform of Ceylon.” Lord Soulbury went on to say, "Needless to say the consequences have been a bitter disappointment to myself and my fellow Commissioners.' Federal solution
The rise of Tamil militancy was an outcome of political mismanagement coupled with an inappropriate structure of government. It led to a Tamil consen
sus on the Thimpu that claimed the T. endowed with the mination in their tu comprising the Nc provinces. Fortur twenty years of ble is now a growing eral solution. This ( apowerful boost du of government-L Oslo in November ties publicly agree eral solution within The government : acceptance of a fec a united Sri Lanka the legitimacy of the Sri Lankan con faith prevails in thi suit of a political s year of Sri Lanka' key has been founc lution to the nation ognising that them have territorial b have a right to self of a sense of parti ernance of a part of
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principles of 1985 mils to be a nation right of self deteraditional homeland rthern and Eastern ately, after nearly ody civil war there onsensus on a fedonsensus was given ring the third round TE peace talks in last year. Both pard to explore a feda united Sri Lanka. ind LTTE's public eral solution within signifies an end to thnic separatism in text so long as good government's purolution. In the 55th s independence, the l to a permanent soall question. It is recinority communities ases in which they determination. Out cipating in the govSri Lanka, they will
feel a sense of being co-equals with the majority community in the larger whole.
While the success of the ceasefire agreement has been to stop the war and bring the LTTE into the framework of mainstream governance, the greater challenge of the peace process will be to evolve a permanent political solution that meets the aspirations of all the communities living in the island. By virtue of its focus on the government and LTTE, the ceasefire agreement has tended to leave out other important actors on the national scene. These include the President, the opposition political parties and the Muslim community who feel that their interests are not being secured in the course of the current peace process.
There was a massive demonstration recently by Muslims in the east, with some estimates going beyond 60,000. The demonstrators called for the recognition of a Muslim homeland in the north and east, and of their own right to self determination. This cry is a reflection of their apprehension that they will be cut out of the peace deal being
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struck between the leaders of the Sinhalese and Tamils. The government's priority desire to accommodate the LTTE in the peace process means that it will not be so keen to press for the rights of the Muslim people when they clash with Sinhalese or Tamil (or LTTE) interests. The apprehension of the Muslim population is that neither the government nor the LTTE would look after their interests.
The recognition of homelands or areas of traditional habitation has been viewed in the past as threatening to the country's territorial integrity and as paving the way to ethnic separatism. Sri Lankans need to get past this old way of thinking. One of the specific demands emanating from the Muslim community in the east is for a Muslim majority area of political autonomy. Even if this territory is small, its recognition is important to the Muslims. It would symbolically and psychologically make them co-equals along with the Sinhalese and Tamils as equal constituent partners in the Sri Lankan polity. The right of self determination is for all communities. And its institutionalisation in a new constitutional framework will be a day of celebration for all Sri Lankan people. Strengthened international monitoring needed
Three incidents that took place back to back in which government and LTTE forces have clashed in the space often days cast an ominous shadow over the peace process. First was the apprehension of an LTTE vessel carrying weapons at sea. This was in violation of the ceasefire agreement that forbids the two sides from transporting military equipment into territory controlled by the other. The fact that such arms shipments were taking place had been suspected since the beginning of the ceasefire. This time the evidence was out in the open dueto the international monitors of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission being on the scene.
But this incident, by itself, did not threaten the ceasefire. Both the navy and the LTTE acted with caution not to further escalate the situation. The navy did not forcefully attempt to board the apprehended LTTE vessel on its own, but acted in concert with the international monitors.
The LTTE cadre would have been
ordered by their shore to destroy t evidence, but not Three LTTE cadre result. But an arme two sides was kept The second ii lighted the tension ess occurred a few group of LTTE cad cadre, entered gov territory in Jaffna ceasefire agreemen to do so, providing and out of uniform. res were wearing 1 that distinguish the vilians. The army', the belts led to a phy both the LTTE cadr portive of them hac The third inc Muhamalai check separates LTTE c from government-c Jaffna. A soldier wl from government I no-man's zone area side had been shot was because the L defence as they cla wanted to teach th under investigatio likely to further sou the two sides at the The question is dents will lead to a the ceasefire. Ther which major and in to the breakdown o The breakdown October 1987 Occ Lanka army apprel res caught ferrying tried to take them to breakdown of a cea June 1990 when an harassment of a civi LTTE rapidly escal war. The last occ ceasefire broke do April 1995.
LTTE strategy
The damage to national image and cause by the last b cannot be underesti the LTTE leadersh ing that they will

| AMLTIMES 9
high command on hemselves and the to harm the navy. lost their lives as a clash between the at a safe distance. cident that highin the peace procdays later when a e, including women ernment-controlled According to the : they are permitted they are unarmed But the women cadhe trademark belts m from ordinary ciefforts to remove 'sical clash in which es and civilians sup
been injured. ident was at the point area which ontrolled territory ontrolled territory in ho had crossed over ines into either the or onto the LTTE dead. Whether this TTE acted in selfim or because they e army a lesson is h. This incident is r relations between ground level. whether these incitotal breakdown of 2 are precedents in hinor incidents led fceasefires.
that took place in Irred when the Sri hended LTTE cadweapons at sea and Colombo. Another sefire took place in alleged incident of ian working for the ated into full-scale asion on which a wn totally was in
the LTTE's interto the larger Tamil reakdown in 1995 mated. This is why p has been repeatlot be the ones to
break this ceasefire. Instead of crudely breaking the ceasefire and losing international credibility once again, the LTTE's strategy appears to be to expand their formal and informal control over the north and east at the ground level, without reverting to warfare.
In the Wanni a fortnight ago, the LTTE's administrative head assured a visiting group of civic activists that the LTTE would not re-start the war. In Dusseldorf, the LTTE’s chief negotiator further elaborated the LTTE's rationale for not being the ones to break the ceasefire. He said that the LTTE wished to expose the Sinhalese polity as being the ones unable to agree to negotiate a just solution. But while these words are being said at the top levels and internationally, the reality at the ground level continues to be different.
In Jaffna which we also visited there were mixed messages about the future. There were civic leaders who complained of continuing efforts by the LTTE to recruit school children into their ranks. LTTE cadres were reportedly going to schools and private tutories and insisting on addressing the children. Their message was simple, but no different from that of Dr Balasingham’s in Dusseldorf. It was that the Sinhala government would fail to deliver anything substantial for Tamils as in the past, and therefore war would take place. Further, the LTTE cadres reportedly say that when the next war comes Jaffna will be taken by them within 72 hours.
But despite these disturbing accounts about the LTTE's apparent preparations for war, the people of Jaffna seemed to have faith in the prospects for peace. They do not see the LTTE's efforts to build up its power and numbers as necessarily leading to war. One sign of hope was the evidence of people investing their personal funds in rebuilding their homes. But it is not as if Jaffna is undergoing a construction boom. There is no governmentsponsored rebuilding or new buildings being put up by the private sector. Such rebuilding as is happening in Jaffna at this time is small scale, personally funded, and is taking place without fanfare. In fact it was not even visible to the road, taking place behind cadjan fences and inside homes. The people,

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of course, wish bigger developments to take place and bring them the economic dividends of peace. It is not only the government's inefficiency and disregard that is blocking those improvements. The LTTE's attitude towards activities by others who might get credit in the eyes of the people and its policy of taxation also act as deterrents to economic progress.
Neutral umpire
The example of private investment
in housing, however, reveals that people who are living in the midst of the LTTE are reasonably confident about the prospects of peace. If not, they would not be investing their hard earned savings in brick and mortar that might be blown away by the bombs of renewed war.
But this does not also mean that the people are happy at what the LTTE is doing. There were complaints that the government was not doing anything to stop the LTTE from taxing them. They were also not happy about the growing presence of the LTTE in Jaffna, which
made it difficult f themselves without trouble.
The micro leve dividual household the peace process i likely macro level government and L1 benefiting from the ess and they bothne they need a renew The government ni in the whole countr foreign and domes alone can solve t problem and raise the country. The present peace proc order to make furth into those areas of that they could not r government contro The logic of in lations strongly su tween the governm likely. But the dang of situations spiral As the LTTE beco
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r them to express fear of getting into
calculation of inin the stability of confirmed by the calculation of the TE. Both sides are present peace proced peace more than d war at this time. :eds peace to exist y in order to attract tic investment that he unemployment living standards in LTTE needs the ‘ess to continue in er political inroads the north and east militarily wrest from l. terest-based calcuggests that war beent and LTTE is not er will always exist ling out of control. mes more and more
dominant in the north and east, it is likely that there will be more and more stand off situations on the ground that involve government soldiers and LTTE cadres. The task of resolving these confrontations cannot be left to the troops on the ground. In situations of heightened emotion they cannot be expected to make decisions that lead to peaceful accommodations and wise compromises. The most realistic solution is to strengthen the role of the international monitors.
Following the incident at sea the SLMM has taken a decision not to directly investigate LTTE vessels. This is understandable. In the last incident, the monitors had to jump off the LTTE vessel after it had been set alight and before it exploded.
It is entirely understandable that the SLMM should not wish to endanger the lives of its monitors. But if the ceasefire is to be safeguarded in the longer term, and many more lives are to be saved, it is important that a neutral authority is ever present and ready to make a wise ruling and be a credible
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witness. A year after ceasefire
Several celebrations of the first anniversary of the ceasefire agreement took place in Colombo on February 22. The main event, which was organised by the government, involved the lighting of lamps at a public ceremony held at Independence Square. As part of its celebration of the day, the government sent out directives to state institutions and schools to organise their own lamp lighting ceremonies in their premises. Widespread media coverage ensured that these celebrations reached into the homes and hearths of most of the people. The light of the lamps was meant to symbolise the hope that the ceasefire would be a lasting one.
The second event took place at the open-air auditorium of Colombo's main park. It brought in a strata of society that is normally untouched by the vicissitudes of life in the country. Youngsters from elite backgrounds and going to international schools organised a peace concert at Viharamahadevi Park. Some of the country's best known singers and bands rent the air with the sound of music till the wee hours of the morning The organisers charged a hefty entrance fee, with the proceeds going to deprived schools in the north and east. The third event was an exhibition of photographs under the theme of "A Year of Life" and sought to represent life before and after the ceasefire. It was held at the National Art Gallery and was organised by the National Peace Council. This three-day exhibition was supplemented by a cultural show at the New Town Hall that was organised in association with the National Youth Services Council and the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Refugees. The presence of the outgoing Norwegian ambassador Jon Westborg as a guest ofhonour was a token oftheimportant role played by his country in the success of the peace process.
If people not involved in those celebrations had been asked, the vast majority would have expressed their fullest support for the ceasefire agreement. All public opinion polls conducted so far have revealed that 80 to 90 percent of people are in favour of the ceasefire agreement. These same surveys also show that most of them have reservations about some of the terms of the
agreement and how mented. But virtua except for members cal organisations, w end and war to res the economy is not tial riches to the m peace dividend ol bomb blasts is too to disregard in their and benefit. Justifications
It can be reasona the peace dividend ple living in the no greater than that to outside it. The wal north and east.
The vast majori killings took place areas outside then of the north and eas a harsh economic even medicines ar. were restricted item of the ceasefire a nomic embargo ha lifted. Due to the p loss of their home north and east con more worse off thal outside of the north are also a lot better were during the ye It is in this conti hartals and shut dov parts of the north a panied the one yea where in the count cally examined.
The ostensible protests was that the remain very burde they are in no mooc time. A consortiu agencies in Jaffna to this effect and jo However, they also gitimate concern th dents in recent tim Lankan military and be a destabilising process.
The three inci month in which an I apprehended with i suicide, the clashes soldiers and LTTE worn by LTTE wo shooting dead of a

TAM TIMES 11
r it is being implelly none of them, of extremist politi'ant the ceasefire to ume. Even though yielding its potenisses of people, the f being safe from valuable for people calculations of cost
bly be deduced that accruing to the peorth and east is even ) the people living was fought in the
ty of bombings and there and not in the orth and east. Most it were subjected to embargo in which ld sanitary clothes is. With the signing greement the ecois been completely ast destruction and s the people of the htinue to be much in their counterparts and east. But they off than what they ars of war.
ext that black flags, wn of normal life in nd east that accomr celebrations elsery need to be criti
rationale for those people's problems some to them and to celebrate at this m of humanitarian issued a statement ined in the protests. expressed their leat the violent incies between the Sri LTTE forces could factor in the peace
dents in the past TTE arms boat was ts crew committing between Sri Lankan , cadres over belts men cadre and the Sri Lankan soldier
who went beyond army lines are signs of a fraying at the edges. This apprehension is revealed in the statement of the NGO community in Jaffna. It serves to justify the LTTE remaining in a state of high alert in case of a breakdown of the ceasefire agreement.
The other ground of complaint highlighted in the NGO statement is the slowness of the relief and rehabilitation process in the north and east. The inability or unwillingness of the government to speed up this process and to enable the people to return to normal lives gives rise to a valid concern.
There is certainly a dearth of both human and financial resources for the government to deploy. But the government's slowness can be used to justify the LTTE's need to remain strong as they are the only ones with the power to compel the government to deliver on its to the Tamil people.
But despite the continuing difficulties of life in the north and east, the fact remains that life there is vastly better than what it was before the signing of the ceasefire agreement. The natural inclination of people would be to celebrate the anniversary of any substantial improvement in their lives. The ending of war for a year is of the highest importance to people.
The absence of public celebration of the one year of ceasefire appears to stem more from the LTTE's needs rather than from those of the people. The LTTE's refusal to permit the opening of the Jaffna public library earlier this month could be cited as an example. After a year of ceasefire the LTTE's agenda dominates the life of the people of the north and east.
During this past year the LTTE has been continuing to buildup its strength using the resources of the people of the north and east. Perhaps to make up for the reduced flow of funding from the expatriate Tamil community, it is taxing the Tamil people of the north and east very heavily and recruiting their children even forcibly. It is therefore necessary for the LTTE to use every opportunity to justify what might otherwise, in normal times, be publicly seen and denounced as anti-people
eaSCS. Four challenges
The contrasting publicly displayed attitudes to the one year of ceasefire in

Page 12
12 TAMILTIMES
the north and east and the rest of the country reveals the four challenges that lie ahead as the country enters the second year of ceasefire. The first is to shift from a mentality of war to that of peace. The readiness to utilise war as a means of attaining political objectives has not been totally discredited in the country. The very large demonstration organised by the JVP against the ceasefire agreement two days prior to the one year celebrations shows that pro-war sentiment exists in sections of the polity.
The second challenge is for the government to find a way out of the practice of partisan politics in relation to the ethnic conflict. The government must find a way to win over the mainstream opposition to the peace process. Achieving a bipartisan approach to the ethnic conflict has been a long standing need in the country and a long standing goal of civic organisations. Business organisations in particular need to strengthen their initiatives in this regard instead of being satisfied that their efforts contributed to the signing of the ceasefire agreement.
The third challenge for mainstream society is to change its mindset from Colombo-centred thinking to regionalbased thinking. This is necessary to pave the way for a change of the constit-ution and governing structures from a unitary one to a federal one. The setti-ng up of joint government-LTTE institutions to decide on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the north and east is a positive step in this direction. The government members of these bodies should be prepared to take speedy decisions, together with the LTTE, so long as those decisions are in the interests of the people of the north and east. The fourth challenge is for the LTTE to change its militaristic approach to power and progress towards a democratic approach.
This would require that the LTTE embarks upon a course of re-education for its cadres so that they do not order the people about and impose their views upon them. Getting the people to put up black flags, close their shops and stay indoors on the first anniversary of the signing of the ceasefire agreement is not the way to win the hearts and minds of people, whether in the north and east or elsewhere. The people in the south need to feel that there is goodwill and cooperation coming from the north-east. O
US for Go
The following are ex U.S Secretary ofSta at the Center of Stra 14 February:
Given these pric important to start toc Sri Lanka with a base should the United St cant attention andre ka, especially at a ti such overwhelming ests? Should the UI role in this peace pri Now, I believe 1 that the United States And there are many tions as to why. Th opportunity, of end and years of destruc a multiethnic demo direct bilateral sens ready a solid expo States and has the ps and the right reform nificant trade partini is the push of danger out far too often, ter1 erygenerally willino own or stay neatly w look at them as sor lem.
I have no doubt perts Tezi (Schaffer this audience could swers to my baseli when taken togeth may even add up to fication. But the pri answers do not reall strategic impetus fo or for other nations ka’s immediate neig larly in a time of uncertainty. It woul a truly convincing the terms of stricts For me, the bot stance is simple. should be playing a other nations, com. and financial resou

15 FEBRUARY 2003
On “Hard Choices Vernment and LTTE
Richard Armitage
cerpts from the keynote address by Richard Armitage, Deputy te at a conference on "Sri Lanka. Prospects for Peace" held tegic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D. Con
rities, I think it is lay’s discussion on line question: why ates invest signifiSources to Sri Lanme when we have competing internited States play a Ocess?
he right answer is should play a role. o credible explanahere is the pull of ing years of death tion and bolstering cracy. In the more e, Sri Lanka is alrter to the United otential with peace Ls to become a siger. And then there . As we have found "or and human mistebb away on their rithin borders if we neone else's prob
that the many exhas assembled in provide more anne questions. And er, these answers a compelling justiblem is that these y constitute a clear r the United States outside of Sri Lanhborhood, particuwar and economic d be tough to make case by sticking to elf-interest. tom line in this inThe United States role, in concert with mitting our human rces to settling this
conflict because it can be done. And because it's the right thing to do. Because the parties to the conflict appear to be ready to reach a resolution, more so than at any other time in the past twenty years. And because it may well be that it is a resolution that can only be reached with the help of multilateral resources, both moral and material. Indeed, this may be a key moment, when an infusion of such international support can add momentum to the peace process, helping to stop 20 years of abject human suffering and to smooth the ripples of grief and terror that have spread from this tiny island nation through the region and even around the world. This may be the moment when international support can help to spring this country into prominence as a recovering victim of conflict, terrorism, and human rights abuses, but also as a respected participant in the global community. And while I wouldn't want to oversell Sri Lanka as a model - this brew of caste, class, religion and race has its own unique flavor - perhaps this is a nation with lessons to offer the world about how to move from despair to hope, from intractable conflict to workable concord, and, indeed, about how the international community can engage and support such conflict resolution.
So, with your permission, I'll share with you a few thoughts about the direction I see Sri Lanka heading in, and the more promising developments as well as the more problematic challenges, and how I believe the United States and the international community can most usefully participate.
Sadly, I have had the chance to see the costs of warup close. Last Summer, I traveled to the Jaffna Peninsula. We first flew over the area in a helicopter and saw below us a blasted landscape,

Page 13
is FEBRUARY 2003
pockmarked with thousands of bomb craters and shell craters. For me, that view reminded me strongly of my time in the service in Vietnam. I really don't think I've seen anything quite like it since. And I'm talking both about the physical devastation and the sense of futility that was unmistakable on the ground.
We ventured into one of the cities that had been largely destroyed, where people were nonetheless starting to return, trying to reclaim lives many may have hardly remembered. Today, some 300,000 internally displaced people have returned to the northern and eastern parts of the country, even though these areas lack sanitation, clean water, and other basic amenities. This is, to some extent, a demonstration ofconfidence in the current cease-fire, but it also confirms something else I saw when I was there. We spoke with a cross-section of Tamil society in the area and the mixture of hope and wariness in their words was an unmistakable reminder that in Jaffna, and across Sri Lanka, a whole generation has grown up knowing little other than war, but is now ready for a change.
It was clear to me at the time that the solution had to start there, in the shattered people and bombed-out villages, in the universal longing for a better life. Because while it is clearly taking a firm decision from the parties to this fight to be partners and to act in the interests of peace, it is also going to take a commitment from all the people of Sri Lanka - Muslims and Buddhists, Christians and Hindus, Sinhalese and Tamils - from all parts of the country, if agreements made around the negotiating table are going to take hold on the ground.
Now, the challenge for the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE is going to be taking that universal longing and that national commitment and giving people tangible signs of progress and a way to participate in the process. I think they have done a good job to date. First, they have set a powerful foundation. Keeping to the cease-fire
for the past year has the public to reach fidence. And it is ci ties continue to h cease-fire. From n loss of confidence be extraordinarily
December was The negotiators issu ment that called fc termination based o within a united Sri ated a shared visio the state, and dealt v ments that destroy negotiated solution round of talks, wh last week in Berli turned to concrete it ian relief and huma the LTTE's pledge ment.
To me, this is al Indeed, two years : have believed so n so quickly. But to so taken to date have l And so the negotiat critical stage, a pc sides will have to si stay the course as difficult issues and mises.
Although the a arms-laden trawlerd of negotiations and by its LTTE crew able for failing to d also called into qu commitment to the is going to have to difficult stepsto del mains committed to The Tigers need to tions and condition: - and future negotia arms supply. Logica this is going to in issues themselves. mination, within the Sri Lanka, is not go with separate armie ferent parts of the matter, the LTTE h
WWW.Sriar

TAMILTIMES 13
as I noted, allowed basic level ofconitical that both parnor and keep this
y point of view, a
at this point would evastating.
also a watershed. ed a commonstater “internal self-den a federal structure Lanka,” which cren for the future of with many disagree2d past efforts at a And in this latest ich just concluded n, the negotiators ssues of humanitarin rights, including o end child recruit
Every encouraging. ago, no one would iuch could happen me extent, the steps been the easy ones. ions have entered a int at which both how the courage to they address more make real compro
pprehension of an uring the last round the self immolation were most remarkerail peace talks, it estion the LTTE's brocess. The LTTE take a number of monstrate that it reapolitical solution. honor the restricthat the cease-fire tions - set on their lly, down the road, lude disarmament internal self-deterframework of one ng to be consistent and navies for dif. country. For that is often pledged to
stop the recruitment of child soldiers, but this time, they will have to prove they can carry through and will carry through on the pledge. The LTTE will also have to respect the rights of Muslims and Sinhalese living in areas under its control. And if the Tigers really want to join Sri Lanka's democratic society on a federal basis, they will also have to accept pluralism within the Tamil community.
Finally, the United States government is encouraged by the vision of the LTTE as a genuine political entity. But for that to happen, we believe the LTTE must publicly and unequivocally renounce terrorism and prove that its days of violence are over. The US will never accept the tactics of terror, regardless of any legitimate Tamil aspirations. But if the LTTE can move beyond the terror tactics of the past and make a convincing case through its conduct and its actual actions that it is committed to a political solution and to peace, the United States will certainly consider removing the LTTE from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as well as any other terrorism-related designations.
At the same time, the Government of Sri Lanka must institute reforms that address the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people. This means allowing Tamils the simple right to stay in their own homes and to pursue a living, such as fishing in coastal waters, without prejudice or harassment. But it also means protecting the full range of human rights for all the people of Sri Lanka. In particular, the burden will be on the government, military and civilian officials alike, to prove that they can accord these rights to residents of the northern and the eastern parts of the nation, including the refugees returning to the area. And that they will hold officials accountable for their conduct. The government obviously also must tackle key economic reforms. Because ultimately, the people of Sri Lanka, not just Tamils but also the Muslim and Sinhalese communities, particularly in the south, will judge the
kans.co.uk

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14 TAMILTIMES
efficacy of the peace process by how it affects their livelihood.
Reaching this vision of prosperity will require a strong and sustained commitment from the Government of Sri Lanka. We should all give due credit to President Kumaratunga.
She knew this was the only answer for her country long ago. And her peace plan of 1995 was an important precursor to the progress we see now. Of course today, we owe much of that progress to the Government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, who continues to take bold steps in the direction of peace. But it is clear that if Sri Lanka is to continue moving forward, the Government must move together as one. No individual, no single political party can carry this burden alone. This must be a concerted effort by the President, the Prime Minister, and the parties.
There are those in Sri Lanka who remain skeptical, and truthfully, many come to their doubts honestly. The President, for one, is understandably
cautious. But she also has unusual.
moral authority when it comes to one of the most difficult challenges facing both the government and the LTTE. As the head of state and inheritor of a powerful political dynasty, she is in a unique position to speak on behalf of everyone who serves or who has served in the government and to ask that those who committed atrocities in the past be forgiven. But she is also a victim of this conflict. She has not only lost loved ones to the violence but will personally bear the scars for the rest of her life. And so her forgiveness of those who have caused her pain is equally important.
In such a close community, every
one of the 65,000 li two decades is a bur whole society will deed, perhaps it is to forgiveness, but the p must somehow find ward. This may be th challenge. It will re. justice that falls sol retribution and impu absolutely necessary to reconcile with the the future. I believe tunga must play a spi part in this search foi onciliation.
These are treme But these are also la the political will ofth something that must within Sri Lanka. Tl Norway does deserv dit for catalyzing thi ushering the parties table. And the No1 even more credit fo further.
Today, Sri Lanki manitarian needs, a term reconstruction, reintegration needs. ample, that there 700,000 landmines i that alone is a nearl challenge. Yet this i the government and show progress and people to participate do this right away if is to attract the kind it requires. But the s these needs are simpl ka's means in the ne is one reason intern so absolutely critica
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ves lost in the last len of memory the nave to carry. Ino much to ask for eople of Sri Lanka way to move forle most significant uire a concept of mewhere between nity, which will be if the country is past and reclaim President Kumararitually significant r truth and for rec
ndous challenges. rgely questions of eparties involved, come largely from he Government of e tremendous crespolitical will and to the negotiating wegians deserve br going one step
a has pressing hus well as longerrehabilitation, and Consider, for exare an estimated n the country, and y insurmountable s precisely where the LTTE need to ways for ordinary And they have to the peace process of public backing cale and scope of y beyond Sri Lan'ar term. And that ational support is
at this time.
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15FEBRUARY 2003
In November, Norway hosted a conference to orchestrate this international support, and where the Norwegians led and where they lead, we, the United States, are delighted to follow.
I was pleased to attend on behalf of the United States and to pledge $8 million in support of programs that meet immediate humanitarian needs, as well as a little over $1 million for de-mining. In June, it is my intention to return for the follow-on meeting of donors, which Japan has graciously agreed to host. And at that time, I believe, with a certain assurance, that I will be able to announce significant further assistance to Sri Lanka for both humanitarian and economic aid.
Of course, such international involvement will come at a cost for Sri Lanka. The price tag for sustaining such interest will beprogress – a clear demonstration that all parties to the negotiations have the determination to see this through. As I said at the outset, the fundamental attraction for this outpouring of international interest and certainly for my nation, is that we are not dealing in fantasy but firmly in the art of the possible. By June, both the government, all elements of the government, and the LTTE will need to have made some hard choices and compromises that demonstrate the political will to proceed if they want to meet their ambitions for international support.
Of course, Sri Lanka is hardly the only nation that struggles in the shadow of looming ethnic, racial and religious divides. From Kosovo to Kabul, there are places all over the world that are engaged in a similar fight, many of which have far less going for them in terms of physical infrastructure, in terms of human resources, and in terms of the institutions of democracy. And as Ambassador Schaffer recently wrote, there are other nations, from Northern Ireland to South Africa, that have already dealt with such challenges with some measure of success. From my point of view, and from my government's point of view, it is reasonable to hope that Sri Lanka will not only be able to add to the legacy of optimism of such past success but will also be able
to build a model for peace and pros
perity in a multifaceted society." O

Page 15
is FEBRUARY 2003
Democratising Human
and Strengthening Pe
ri Lanka's Historic Chi
Dr.Alan Keenan
(Paper presented at a Seminar organized by the Centre for
Berghof Road Map Workshop on 13 Februa
hroughout the last quarter of
2002 and into the first months of
2003, the frequency and volume of complaints of human rights violations, together with worries about their possible impact on the peace process between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, have been increasing. Specificallegations by various parties, as well official findings by the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission, have been made against the LTTE. In addition to various technical violations of the ceasefire agreement, there have been complaints, and much evidence, of forced recruitment of child soldiers, forced "contributions' to LTTE finances, economic pressure and violent attacks on Muslims on the east coast, and the harassment, assassination, abduction, and involuntary "disappearance" of members of Tamil political parties opposed to the LTTE. The Government, in turn, has been found guilty of ceasefire violations, and accused of rights violations of its own, ranging from the continued occupation by the security forces of temples, schools, and private homes, the deadly shootings of Tamil protestors by police, the failure of police to stop Sinhala attacks on Tamil demonstrators in Trincomalee, the failure to adequately investigate such police actions and inactions, and the continued detention of scores of Tamils under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act. Allegations have also been made that various Muslim, Sinhala, and Tamil groups, some perhaps with links to government security forces, have been fomenting ethnic violence and carrying out abductions and extortion
be blamed on the LTTE.
Positive sign
The announcement at the conclu
son of the Berlin session of peace talks
that the Sri Lankan government and the
LTTE have asked set of human rights to help direct furth a negotiated settlen considered a posi hope that such a d new commitment parties and their No to make human ri integral part of the ess. Constituting a abide by certain gu their political cond ment of the willir LTTE and the gove to an independently human rights sta Lankan civil societ opportunity for furt of Sri Lankan polit given that respect standards doesn'tc. ther the Sri Lankan it will be up to loc ganizations, hopefi international suppo of this new opportu engagement and su citizens and civil insure that any rig is agreed upon actu a tangible different ordinary Sri Lanka power of the State What progress has front so far, one ci has come largely a growing publicity human rights and ( by both parties.
As we lookahe ciety can and shou human rights issues peace process, th learned from reflec perience in Sri Lan the ceasefire has s consistent pronou
 
 
 

olicy Alternatives/ y 20037
an Martin to draft a standards, designed :r progress towards ent, must surely be ive sign. One can cision expresses a by the negotiating rwegian facilitators ghts protections an official peace procpublic promise to iding principles for uct, the announcegness of both the rnment to be bound y formulated set of ndard offers Sri y a rare window of her democratization ical life. However,
for human rights pme naturally to eistate or the LTTE, al civil society orilly with effective t, to make the most nity. Only serious stained pressure by ociety groups can its framework that illy begins to make e in the ways that ns experience the and of the LTTE. been made on this in plausibly argue, a reaction to the nd pressure about easefire violations
d to what civil soi be doing to give greater role in the re is much to be ing on recent exa. The past year of en numerous and ements from al
TAM TIMES 15
most all corners of civil society to the effect that the respect of basic human rights is essential to lasting peace. Meanwhile some planning has been done for various forms of civil society peace and human rights monitoring in the near future. Yet very few concrete or coordinated actions have been taken - or even forceful statements made - in response to specific violations of those rights or to the underlying structures that make them possible. There continues to be great reluctance throughout Sri Lankan civil society to translate the general commitment to human rights norms into effective action in defense of rights.
Resistance to defense of rights
In what follows, I will briefly examine what might explain such resistance and what it might tell us about the basic relationship between "human rights" and "conflict resolution” or "peace building.” I will be arguing the perhaps obvious point that the difficulties that Sri Lankan civil society has had in making forceful and effective interventions in defense of basic human rights over the past year has much to do with the nature and history of the conflicts that have produced human rights violations in the first place. The dynamic of reciprocal polarization and lack of trust within "civil society" must itself be reversed if effective interventions are to be possible. For this to become more likely, I will argue, it would be helpful to adopt a more explicitly democratic conception of human rights. By emphasizing the ways in which Sri Lankans of all communities have a shared experience of being subject to unaccountable power, discourses of human rights can simultaneously act as tools of conflict resolution, thus helping to lay the ground work for crossethnic solidarity and mobilization around everyone's shared interest in democratization.
Speaking out about human rights violations and unaccountable power is, of course, never an easy or pleasant task in any society. In a country that has experienced three decades of violent conflict, in which independent political voices and civil society organizations have been deliberately targeted for elimination, speaking up in defense of rights can often be a dangerous act. The

Page 16
16 TAM TIMES
murders over the last few years of Kumar Ponnambalam, Neelan Thiruchelvam, and the journalist Mylvaganam Nimalrajan - all of them human rights activists in their different ways - testify to this fact. More specific to our topic today, there has been the general anxiety expressed by many supporters of the peace process - across all ethnicities and of all political persuasions - that pressing too hard on human rights violations, especially those attributed to the LTTE, risks weakening the peace process. In addition, many people clearly fear being branded a "spoiler," or unprincipled opponent of the peace process, if they were to point out a failure to respect human rights by either of the parties to the negotiations. Allegations of human rights violations, especially when they are lodged against the LTTE, and regardless of whether those making the claims are Sinhalese, Muslim, or Tamil, are frequently dismissed as merely weapons of partisan political warfare, rather than genuine expressions of concern or ethical commitment. For some Sinhalese political
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activists and civil s addition, worries ab lack of credibility claim to be concern of Tamils have kept ing up forcefully abo LTTE directed agai Many have chos of Tamil civil societ the Catholic Church such issues. Unfortu tance has ceded a l discourse of “humi cisely those elemer compromises and necessary to a lasti i.e., the so-called “s
Among many Tamils, in turn, the been an often expres that the primary - pe human rights defenc state power, rather th entities like the LTT macy this argument becomes less persu LTTE’S State-like ch hind such positions,
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ociety leaders, in out their possible Is Sinhalese who d about the rights them from speakut violations by the st fellow Tamils. en to let elements y - e.g., leaders of -take the lead on nately, such relucrge portion of the un rights” to prets opposed to the accommodations ng and just peace: boilers.' politically active re has in the past sed public position rhaps sole - job of lers is to challenge an that of non-state E. Whatever legitimight have had, it asive the more the laracter grows. Be, though, there ex
ist more substantial ideological and psychological issues at work. To the extent that they see the political struggle of the LTTE as just, many Tamils - and even some Sinhalese - are reluctant to criticize the LTTE for fear of giving their opponents rhetorical ammunition and thus reducing their bargaining power vis-a-vis the Sinhala dominated State. Others, while expressingregret about LTTE rights violations, nonetheless see them as necessary tactics, without which the Tamil people's rights could not be secured. Following what is perhaps a universal psychological pattern, this defense of the LTTE is reinforced by the absence of any widespread acknowledgment among Sinhalese of the terrible violations of human rights and humanitarian law by government security forces, and by the lack of effective efforts by the Sinhala dominated state to hold those who have committed and ordered such actions accountable under the law. The most egregious recent example of this failure was the acquittal this past November by an all-Sinhala jury of the sol
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Page 17
15 FEBRUARY 2003
diers accused in the Maylanthennai massacre case - a case that took ten years to come to trial!
What human rights?
But what exactly are human rights? Debates that seem to be between those in favor of giving a central role to "human rights issues' in the peace process and those opposed to such a role, can sometimes also be understood as debates over the best or most appropriate definition of human rights, or over which kind or set of rights are most in need of protection. To make sense of today's debates over rights violations and the proper role of human rights issues in the peace process, then, one must be aware of the different philosophical conceptions of human rightsand of how they should best be protected - that are at work in political discourse. "Human rights” are notoriously difficult to define and often effectively refer to whatever one feels is necessary to human dignity or to treatment as an equal human being. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw out of the contemporary debates over human rights and the peace process three major lines of argument, which, depending on one's dominant political principles, and at times one's partisan allegiances, give emphasis to different strands of the larger (if rather fractious) family of human rights. (It is worth noting here that for the sake of simplification and time I am leaving out of consideration an entire other category, that of socioeconomic rights. While such rights do not play a direct role in contemporary debates over the role human rights in Sri Lanka's peace process, they are nonetheless bound up in Sri Lanka's conflicts in essential, but complicated, ways.)
The first of these approaches emphasizes the collection of liberal civil and political rights, These include, for instance, the right to life, the right against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, the right to due process of the law, freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly. Such "negative' rights antach to the individual and either protect against encroachment by the state or other groups into a "space' considered as belonging entirely to the individual, or else guarantee the tools for individuals to be active citizens and
political participar been the violatio) rights that have be the LTTE (and, pr by critics of the go The second ma rights evoked in co concerns those rig that often come l' humanitarian law: i gees to shelter, fo against attack, and return to their prop vided with the bas ture necessary to a land free of mines driven, schools w with medicines a rights, while endor the conflict, are strongly today by demands for a spe malcy" for the milli lives have been di of war.
Finally, there is tal right that the LT struggling for from right of "self-dete Tamil people. Th previous sets of r manitarian or civi taches notto indivi the Tamil "people' the right of the Ta tion,” to rule thems free from interfer from other commu gue that it was in p of gross violation vidual rights - tol opportunity - by su governments' that standing belief an that neither indivic rights are sufficien freedom and equal perspective, Tamil just a minority, an tion as such. This guarantee the fund right to have an ec in one's own gov been denied in p majoritarian chara Lankan political sy pragmatic reasons protection. (For oth of the Tamil nation moral respect, rooi

ts. It has generally of these sorts of in cited by critics of or to the ceasefire, vernment).
lor strand of human ntemporary debates hts to basic dignity nder international .e., the right of refuod, and protection today, their right to erties and to be proic social infrastrucdecent existence - , roads that can be ith roofs, hospitals ld doctors. These sed by all parties to emphasized most the LTTE in their edy “return to norons of people’s who srupted by decades
the most fundamenTE says it has been h its beginning: the rmination' for the is right, unlike the ights, whether hul and political, atdual Tamils, but to as a whole. It is mil people, or ʻnaelves as they see fit, 2nce or oppression nities. One can arart the long history s of Tamils” indiife, property, equal ccessive Sri Lankan reinforced the longhong many Tamils lual nor "minority" t to guarantee their dignity. From this s are a nation, not d deserve recogni
is in part so as to amental democratic ual and active role rnance (which has actice due to the :teristics of the Sri stem), as well as for of collective selfers, the recognition is a matter of basic ed in a a particular
TAMILMES 17
belief about Tamil "nationness" and an attachment to what is taken to be an essential collective identity.)
Conflict resolution and human rights - the link
It might seem to some that the existence of these differentuses and conceptions of "human rights' render it a hopelessly ambiguous and contestable term, without much use or purchase in situations like Sri Lanka's present one. In what follows, I want briefly to suggest otherwise. Indeed, one can make a strong case that at least in Sri Lanka's case today, conflict resolution and human rights - of all varieties - are two sides of the same coin. More specifically, I want to suggest that a more fully democratic conception of rights can help show us at least part of the way out of our present impasse over rights and peace.
The first step in the way out, I would suggest, is for human rights advocates frustrated with the lack of action on violations by the LTTE to recognize that from the perspective of the LTTE and their supporters, their struggle is a human rights struggle. Thus, while it is indisputable that the LTTE has violated the first set of civil and political rights, LTTE officials and supporters can plausibly - if incompletely-argue that they are in fact committed to human rights. Indeed, they are fighting for nothing else but the achievement of these rights, whether through a state of Tamil Eelam or through some form of federalism.
However, the issue can't simply be left there. For central to the appeal of the Tamil nationalist struggle and to the goal of "self-determination, is a demo craticideal: the ideal of the Tamil people ruling themselves, governing their own affairs, freed from Sinhala domination. For that struggle to be a truly democratic struggle that leads to a democratic outcome, however not all means are permissible. The collective rights of the Tamil people don't trump or do away with individual rights; in fact, they actually need those rights in order to make (democratic) sense. Certain basic civil and political rights have to be respected even for the collective right of self-determination to be internally consistent. (I am bracketing for now the exceedingly complex issue of

Page 18
18 TAM TIMES
how to integrate the democratic rights to "self-determination" of other groups within any area to be ruled by "the Tamil nation. ”This question, especially with respect to the rights of Muslims in the Eastern Province, is of crucialpractical and theoretical importance, but is beyond the scope this paper)
Central to the democratic ideal is the idea that the powers given to political representatives and office holders are l) given only on trust and are 2) never given completely. Instead, they must be supplemented by the people's active involvement in their own governance, monitoring, challenging, advising, and ultimately, when necessary, replacing those who temporarily make use of the people's power. A democratic, or democratized, conception of human rights, then, would include: 1) the right of individuals to organize themselves and to act politically, independent of and even in opposition to the governmentorto quasi-governmental powers; 2) the right to hold those in power and the institutions of the state accountable, both making sure that the wishes and interests of the majority and
of the common good a preventing abuses o cesses of power; and liberal rights necess: these general democ rights of speech anc political association, O etc... In short, the e preservation of indep citizen power are del cratic politics.
By violating the b democracy, the LTTl power and intimidati nents - while perhaps fensible in a time of w liberation struggle int. tory. Yet while the L ponents will tend to r different conceptions it is important that denial of rights that b and other militant gro not be forgotten. Any language of human undermine the LTTE edging this history is sistent.
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SFEBRUARY 2003
ire respected, and frights and ex3) all the specific ary to achieving ratic rights: i.e., publication, of fbodily integrity, stablishment and endent spaces for finitive of demo
asic principles of E’s monopoly on on of their oppotheoretically devar - renders their ernally contradicTTE and their opnake reference to of human rights, the violence and rought the LTTE ups into existence tone who uses the rights merely to without acknowlalso being incon
Human rights and the peace process
Thus, when considering the relationship between human rights and the peace process, it is important to emphasize the perhaps obvious point that human rights violations have always been at the heart of Sri Lanka's violent conflicts, giving them energy and propelling them forward. As a direct legacy of British colonial rule (in itself perhaps the most fundamental crime against human rights of all), there was a slow accumulation of violations of Tamils' collective and individual rights from almost the beginning of Sri Lanka's political "independence." (It is important to remember, though, that severe human rights violations in Sri Lanka have never been limited to violence and oppression of Tamils - the rights of individual Sinhalese, and of whole classes of poor and "lower' caste Sinhalese, have also been violated by the state and non-state agents in brutal and systematic ways.) Violation of Tamils' democratic rights moved from the disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousand of so-called "Indian' Tamils,
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is FEBRUARY 2003
to the denial of equal opportunity resulting from “Sinhala Only" and *standardization" ofuniversity admissions policies, and ran through various incidents of state-permitted and ultimately state-sponsored violence against Tamils, culminating in the events of July 1983. After "1983"there came the massive violations of basic human and humanitarian rights during the war, as well as in the name of “security.” Virtually unrestricted powers given to the "security" forces by the PTA and by Emergency Regulations not only led to great suffering and uncounted violations of rights, they also helped produce the very “terrorism” and violent militancy they were officially designed to curb. (And once again, the years of uprising and counter-insurgency from 1987-1990 showed that such violations weren't directed only at Tamils.)
Indeed, the decades of war, LTTE violence, and the State's counter-terrorism, produced an explosion of rights violations from all sides, which have further divided Sri Lankan society and politics in multiple ways. What the basics of conflict resolution theory - or simple common sense - tell us is that the choice of violence as a form of resistance - particularly in the brutal and no-holds barred form it has taken among Tamil militant groups - produces its own rights violations that often help fuel and maintain the conflict in multiple ways. In the case of Sri Lanka, such violence has generated specific grievances around which the anger and intransigence of many Sinhalese (and, it seems, increasing numbers of Muslims) can coalesce. I am thinking here, for example, of the Central Bank bombing, the bombing of the Temple of the Tooth, the 1990 LTTE killings of Muslim worshippers in mosques in Kattankudy and Eravur and the murders of possibly hundreds of Sinhala policemen that same year. Such violence has made it easier for Sinhalese and Muslims to avoid confronting the violence and injustice done in their own name by their often selfanpointed “representatives.” Such vio. . . Se has also silenced, often through killing, the more accommodating voices among Tamils interested in trying to create bridges with those Sinhalese and Muslims committed to a democratic settlement for all.
From this persp make a convincing sustaining the mor process requiress interventions by ci zens” groups. Suc necessary precis power of so-called ing claims that are accurate, one can course of human moral and political control of such fo among the tasks of a political solution of a federal mode waysofisolatingha In particular, it is LTTE violations anti-accomodatic Sinhala and Muslin lar, effective huma would help reduce scenario that some in which human rig LTTE deepen Sinhalese and/or M extent that it becc achieve consensus litical parties - or ag lim leaders - in fi Such a failure wou legitimacy to an L peace process and the demand for Eel
For human rig criticisms to be effe must not be one-sid important to contro Lankan security fo as to prevent the l only strengthen th lief of many Tamil tection they have i and unfettered LT separate state. In tl ings of Tamil pro Task Force officers in Kanchirankuda i ticularly disturbing - made most forcef sity Teachers for H Information Bullet police in Trincoma ted Sinhala violen and indirectly to t citizens. Perhaps ec been the lack of t official investigat dents. The report i

TAMILTIMES 19
active, then, one can pragmatic case that entum of the peace rong human rights vil society and citih interventions are :ly to weaken the "spoilers": by makmore balanced and elp remove the disrights, with all its legitimacy, from the ces. Indeed, chief those committed to based on some kind is to figure out a irdliners on all sides. crucial to prevent from empowering nist positions by h groups. In particun rights monitoring the likelihood of a have worried about, hts violations by the suspicion among Muslims to such an omes impossible to among Sinhala pogreement from Musvor of federalism. ld then give greater TTE exit from the a possible return to a. hts pressures and ctive, however, they ed. It is thus equally land reform the Sri rces and police, so cind of abuses that : long-standing bes that the only pros through an armed TE and ultimately a is context, the killtestors by Special outside their camp 1 Octoberwere paras were the reports ully by the Univeriman Rights in their in No. 29 - that the lee aided and abet:e, leading directly he deaths of Tamil ually disturbing has ansparency of the ons into the incito the Kanchiran
kuda shootings by the Committee headed by retired Air Force Vice Marshall Harry Goonetilleke remains secret to this day. Any investigations that might have been made into the role of the police in the violence in Trincomalee have also not been made public. There is, finally, the continued existence of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which only awaits the failure of the peace process for it to be reactivated, with all the damage to civil and political rights - especially for Tamils - that it brings with it. Just as pressure must be brought to bear on the LTTE to respect democratic principles and the rights of all those in areas over which it wields influence, so too the Sri Lankan state must be challenged to let go of its most draconian and anti-democratic powers. Unfortunately, other than from organizations reluctant to make public criticisms of the LTTE, there has been very little public agitation by civil society groups on any of these issues.
The challenge
Human rights violations committed by all sides have thus helped to close down the space for mutual understanding and agreement across ethnic and ideological divisions, even among those whose dedication to human rights and democracy are otherwise unquestionable. The challenge for proponents of human rights and democracy, then, is to produce discourses and practices of human rights that address violations from all sides and help initiate a process of de-escalation and trust-building, independent of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan State, that can expand democratic space for all Sri Lankans.
To build this kind of middle ground, however, will require pressurizing the government not only with respect to specific abuses - past, present, or future - committed by the police or armed forces. It also requires that the government and the entire Sinhala-dominated political establishment begin to do the work of making Sri Lanka a more democratic nation in which all its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or language, receive equal treatment and have equal opportunities. This would require, to begin with, renewed efforts around language rights and hiring and educational policies of the sort that the PA government promised to

Page 20
20 TAMILTIMES
undertake in its early, more multi-cultural, years. Pressing for these sorts of reforms - for example, finally ensuring in practice, not just on paper, that Tamil-speaking people are able to lodge police complaints and receive government notices in Tamil, and not just in Sinhala - would seem a role tailor-made for President Kumaratunga and the PA, allowing them to redeem their best promises, and with it some of their political honor.
As part of this, the government and Sinhala parties must be strongly encouraged to initiate and support processes that address the legacy ofinequality and suffering experienced by Tamils and other historically marginalized groups. Right now the peace process has very little to do with processes of reconciliation or collective reflection on the suffering undergone and wrongs done to the members of the different groups that make up Sri Lanka. Indeed, as I have gone about my research on human rights issues in Sri Lanka over the past three years, I am repeatedly struck by how little knowledge or recognition there is among even well-educated Sinhala people of the historical grievances of Tamil people. This is in part a result of the decades of censorship of the war and of politically sensitive news, of the Sinhala-centric nature of the country's history curricula, and of the lack of direct and obvious costs of war for most Sinhalese, especially those in the opinion-making, politically influential classes. Yet it is clearly also in part a result of the violence and terror sowed by the LTTE. We can witness the same tragic process as it gains momentum in Israel and Palestine, whereby the use of terror as a political weapon de-legitimates the collective grievances of a people and allows their historical experience of injustice and suffering to be forgotten or repressed. My basic point, then, is that human rights discourse and practice can and needs to be understood as a tool of constructive conflict management, in
formed bybasic con resolution principle and trust building. human rights advo processes of collec criticism, within an ties, that can offer i sons for Sri Lanka's ways of preventing escalation, or re-po approach, I am Sug low for the democr rights politics, wher ethnic communitie human rights princ expanding democra out the country and fective practices of respect to all forms whatever organizati to be in charge.
The agreement b government to sign ently developed hu work offers a uniq getting these pro There is now an op seized and expand to recede and old themselves.
Recommendations In conclusion, I six specific recomn civil society could n opportunity:
1. While the in nity can and should both politically anc ergy, moral legitir force of human righ only come from selves. Itis importa issues not be so b committees, and shops - that theylo moral force, and 1 central question ol power can be mac man rights issues : to the formal and in
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15 FEBRUARY 2003
mon sense conflict of de-escalation The challenge for ates is to initiate ive reflection and across communisight into the reapitter divisions and urther wrongs, rearization. Such an gesting, would altization of human by members of all
would transform ples into tools for tic space throughforestablishing ef|ccountability with of political power, on or party happens
y the LTTE and the on to an independman rights frameue opportunity for cesses underway. ening that must be 'd before it begins patterns re-assert
would like to offer hendations for how lake the most of this
ernational commusupport such work, materially, the ennacy, and political ts interventions can Sri Lankans themnt that human rights ureaucratized - by eports, and workse their political and cave untouched the how undemocratic e accountable. Humustn't only be left titutionalized chan
nels of the government, the LTTE, and international donors: Sri Lankans of all ethnicities know only too well not to place their trust in formal legal channels. And the experience of Bosnia, Rwanda, Palestine and Cambodia should also teach Sri Lankans not to place excessive trust in the expertise and good intentions of "the international community.” The democratization of human rights will thus require that Sri Lankan civil society organizations also learn how to hold the international donors accountable for their actions.
2. One of the strange and difficult aspects of the peace process and the extended "interim" process it has brought with it is the fact that large portions of Sri Lankan law and their attendant bureaucracies have effectively been suspended. We see one, less worrisome form of this development in the way in which the various committees and subcommittees of the government, the LTTE, and donors are taking over previously governmental functions. More worrisome is how this effects fundamental civil and political rights: the uncertainty and quiet struggles over jurisdiction between LTTE and governmental police and court systems have placed residents of the north and east in very difficult situations, not knowing to whom to report problems or violations, or what the actual relationships are between the SLMM, the police, the army, LTTE political and military structures, and the two competing court systems. This has disturbing long term implications, especially given the fact that even under less confusing situations neither the State nor the LTTE has been terribly good about respecting people's rights. (Particularly worrisome to many has been the apparent refusal of the Sri Lankan police to pursue complaints and evidence against LTTE cadres for fear of disrupting the peace process or violating the ceasefire.) Any system of human rights monitoring that might emerge from Ian
/EL oNLY) )-SRI LANKA
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-SOUTH INDIA -SINGAPORE

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Martin's human rights framework must devise ways of clarifying the relationships between the various systems and agencies involved and establishing clear lines of accountability. Otherwise, the present interim period threatens to ratify Sri Lanka's patterns of impunity and thus confirm Sri Lankans' deepening cynicism about the rule of law.
3. On a related point, any system of human rights monitoring must make it a priority to establish a system for the effective protection of witnesses and complainants. This has long been a central problem for anyone, Muslim, Tamil, Burgher, or Sinhala, seeking to challenge the impunity with which those in power - whether politicians, police, or militants - are able to commit crimes and human rights abuses. People must be made to feel that it is safe - or at least safer than it is now - to make complaints or testify about human rights violations. Without guarantees of protection, even the best designed system of monitoring will be of little use. Addressing the problem is a task for which the international community, with its greater resources and distance from the site of the conflicts, would seem ideally suited. Perhaps arrangements for temporarily removing witnesses and complainants from the country, or a system of internationally monitored safe houses, could be negotiated by international donors. Establishing something along these lines will be a test of the real commitment of foreign donors, and of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, to the principles ofthe rule oflaw and accountabil
1ty.
4. As a compa any monitoring sys auspices of the off I would urge the f mittee of concerne would commit ther out regularly and s human rights issu whenever and whe Composed of a cri known Sri Lanka backgrounds and fr suasions, together who know the Sr well, the aim woul the general endors of human rights pro appeals and interve lations by any si again, would be b space within which hold those in pow their actions. If th intellectual and eth to assert this demo begin to establish a Sri Lankans could
5. It is importar such interventions propriate tone anc than moralistically tions and anyone w out against them - tendency of much h ing, both in Sri Lal the guiding spirit interventions shoul ernment and the L relevant groups) a own professed der commitments. Wi about the structura
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nion and support to tem setup under the icial peace process, ormation of a comd Sri Lankans who mselves to speaking strongly on specific ues and incidents, rever they happen. oss-section of wellins, from all ethnic "om all political perwith internationals i Lankan situation ld be to move from ements of the value otections to specific ntions in case of viode. The aim, once egin to expand the n people are able to er accountable for ose in positions of ical authority begin cratic right, it might precedent that other begin to follow.
it, however, that any be made in an api language. Rather denouncing violatho refuses to speak as is the unfortunate human rights reportinka and elsewhere - of any civil society d be to hold the govTTE (and any other ccountable to their mocratic ideals and ithout being naive l nature of Sri Lanka's human rights violations, or hiding the true seriousness of the challenges faced, human rights interventions should nonetheless resist the temptation to address the LTTE or the Sri Lankan police and military as if they are irredeemably anti-democratic and opposed to human rights.
With respect to the LTTE in particular, it is important to explore the possibility that the continuing violations of rights attributed to their cadres are due at least in part to the organization's lack of political experience and expertise. While continuing to hold the LTTE as a whole accountable for the actions of all its members, and demanding concrete actions - not just promises - that demonstrate its commitment to democratization, it is not implausible that “human rights capacity building” projects and trainings could begin to make a difference in their behavior. A less moralistic approach towards the LTTE would also have the possible benefit of increasing the space in which human rights claims can be articulated by Tamils without them seeming quite so direct a challenge to LTTE.
6. Finally, I offer one closing suggestion for making human rights discourse in Sri Lanka less partisan and less moralistic, and thereby opening up greater space for cross-ethnic coalitions in defense of human rights and democracy. I would suggest that the various anti-LTTE Tamil political parties - including the EPDP - would do well to begin a process of internal self-criticism, in which they acknowledge, and ultimately apologize for, their own antidemocratic and violent excesses, especially when armed and supported by previous Sri Lankan governments. I would also urge the Sinhala politicians and military who armed them and exploited their existence to accept their responsibility for the crimes committed and anti-democratic legacy left in their wake. Only then will their justified criticisms of LTTE attempts to close down any existing space for political alternatives, or even dissent, be able to heard clearly - and not simply dismissed as hypocrisy, motivated only by the desire to regain lost political power. More generally speaking, whatever human rights framework emerges from the official peace process would be wise to include some process for collective reflection within individual parties and organizations, and within particular ethnic communities. Only then will better relations across communities begin to be possible.

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22 TAMILTIMES
Rev Fr. Paul Caspersz SJ
hat the whole country has reason to celebrate today is that we have successfully concluded the first mile. How many miles more to reach journey' end? No one knows. Barring those who grow rich on the legal and illegal gains of the arms industry, everyone hopes that the Ceasefire will soon be followed by a lasting peace, honourable to all sides.
Some may say that it was not today, but yesterday, that the mile was completed. For it was on 21 February last year that Velupillai Prabhakaran signed in the Wanni his letter of consent to the Ceasefire Agreement and gave it to the Norwegian Ambassador to be transmitted to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
It was on the evening of yesterday, twelve months ago, that the Prime Minister met the President, gave her the filnal version of the Ceasefire Agreement and told her that on the next day be would himself proceed to the Wanni to do what Prabhakaran had done the previous day.
In fact, however, the Ceasefire has lasted not twelve, but nearly fourteen, months. For it was on the eve of Christmas of the previous year that the LTTE declared a unilateral Ceasefire in order to show their willingness to initiate serious peace negotiations with the Government. The LTTE did observe the ceasefire in the two months following Christmas. So the Prime Minister was able to move forward confidently on 22 February 2002 to sign the Agreement in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding.
The Ceasefire held. In the twenty years that preceded it there had been three Eelam Wars. Many died on both sides in the fighting. Many others were maimed for life. There had been attacks on the Dalada Maligawa, on the Katunayake airforce base and the international airport, on the Central Bank, several prominent political leaders and a former President were assassinated and an attempt was made to kill the present President.
The figure of 6. as the number wh the hostilities. I bel restimate. We do n of Tamil militants of violence and wi the exact number c All over the c army and police ch riers, arrests, deter tension. With the C ceased. The check ers were removed." phere of relaxed f years of anxiety ar was the happiest in have been reports Agreement but the disturb the climate ness that the Cea brought.
Yet it must be r Ceasefire Agreem to stop the fires cau the dispute.
The Ceasefire Peace Agreement. an Agreement to P Peace Agreement. The Governm of peace: security the rights of all the linguistic groups i opment and prosp have their own c the right to live ii consider Tamil ho preserve and dev guage and cultur tive autonomy an There will hav sion before arrivil just and honoura alese and the Ta and Eastern Pro' duty to give due perhaps also to th should not forget plantations also own culture, thei portunities.
It is therefor cussions in Thai
 

15 FEBRUARY 2003
000 has been cited lost their lives in eve this is an undetknow the number who died as a result r, nor do we know f the disappeared. ountry there were ckpoints, road bartions and continual easefire the killings oints and the barrihere was an atmosreedom after many d fear. Vesak 2002 twenty years. There of violations of the se did not seriously of cheerful hopefulsefire Agreement
emembered that the ent is an Agreement ised by both sides to
Agreement is not a Or, it may be called repare the Way fora
nt has its own ideas of life and property, ethnic, religious and the country, devel:rity. The Tigers too nceptions of peace: safety in what they melands, the right to slop their own lan, the right to effecself-determination. to be much discusgat a solution that is le to all. The Sinhils of the Northern inces have also the lace to the Muslims, : Burghers, and they hat the Tamils of the ave a right to their dignity, to equal op
time that in the disnd, Germany or Ja
pan the voice of the plantation Tamils should also be heard. I have often felt that the plantation Tamils have an important role to play in the current situation. On the one hand, they tell the Tigers that separation is not a feasible solution. On the other hand, they tell the Government that the grievances of the Tamil people of the North and East - recognized as legitimate by both UNP and SLFP - need to be redressed, lest the violence escalate into the plantations with consequences that will make all the previous violence seem like children playing with fire crackers.
The Ceasefire Agreement prepared the road to peace but the road will be a long one. In her letter to the Prime Minister of 28 February last year, the resident lamented that the final version of the Ceasefire Agreement was shown to her too late.
Thus, she said, a valuable opportunity was lost "or you and me to discuss the Agreement thoroughly... thereby forging a consensus between the two major political parties in the country.'. But it was on the rock of this bipartisan consensus that all previous efforts to solve the problem floundered; the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Agreement, the Dudley-Chelvanayagam Agreement, the Declaration on the Cessation of Hostilities of January 1995 followed by the draft Constitution of 2001. From the standpoint of a solution to our inter-ethnic problem, the division of the Sinhalese polity into two mutually adverse parties in the 1950s has been the greatest disaster that has befallen our country.
Therefore as we today record with joy the successful conclusion of the first year of the Ceasefire Agreement, we look forward to the second year with hope but not without apprehension.
There are those who still - without volunteering themselves or their children to the front lines - advocate a solution through war. As for the LTTE, we have to ask how prepared they are for democratic sharing of power not only with the Sinhalese people but also with non-LTTE groups in the North. If the military solution through the Sri Lanka Armed Forces is as much a solution doomed to futility as the military solution of the Tigers, the way ahead is only through a negotiated settlement. The task of the New Year that begins today is to take resolute steps forward towards such a negotiated settlement.

Page 23
15 FEBRUARY 2003
Tigers Torpedo Ope of Jaffna Public Lib
D. B. S. Jeyaraj
"As is well known, the destruction of the Jaffna public library an act of vandalism unheard of in Sri Lanka's modern histor stature the library enjoyed in the whole of Asia, as a well-sp and culture, the torching of the library could have been consia wantonly undermining the educational heritage of not only the but of that of a sizeable section of humanity. For, most litera part of the world were united with the Tamil people in that suffering and loss. The reconstruction of the Jaffna public lib the Sri Lankan state could be looked upon as a profound acto an attempt at rectifying a grave wrong which had been visited the north.... We also call on the southern public to shower the people of the north by helping to re-equip and restore it to its fo reconstructed Jaffna public library, when the people of the
accept this hand of goodwill."
- Daily News editorial of
Of the many acts of violence perpetrated against the Tamils of Sri Lanka priorto the July 1983 pogrom, the gutting of the Jaffna public library was perhaps the single incident that had the most profound impact on ethnic relations in the country. The Jaffna library was the best of its kind in the region and was interwoven with the life of many a Tamil. Anyone with the rudiments of literacy in Jaffna had availed himself or herself of the library in one way or the other at some stage of life. Moreover, the deliberate destruction was perceived as a well-conceived assault on Tamil culture and civilisation.
Fount of knowledge
The prime mover behind the original Jaffna library project was Rev. Fr. Long, rector of St. Patrick's College, Jaffna. The foundation stone was laid when Sam Sabapathy was Jaffna mayor in 1950. It was ceremonially opened in 1959 when Alfred Duraiappah was Jaffna mayor. It boasted of more than 97,000 books and hundreds of vintage ola manuscripts. A reputed Tamil scholar and Catholic priest, Rev. Fr. David - proficient in 26 languages - died of shock when hearing about the library's fate. Such was the bond between true seekers of wisdom and the fount of knowledge.
The Jaffna library was not attacked as a single act of violence. It was one
of the many targets lence and arson. The ment Council electio then. The Tamil U Front (TULF) held a ing at Nachimarkov 1981. Gunmen belc ple’s Liberation Org Eelam (PLOTE) le waran shot four po two Sinhala and tw blood. Two died anc later. It was sus Nagalingam Man Thasan was respons Hundreds of extr of them reservists h; Jaffna for electio housed at the Dura the vicinity of the lib went bersek. After I store and imbibing i mob” went on the ra ofbuildings and veh and set on fire. T TULF party office. Eela Naadu newsp house and jeep of the Vettrivelu Yogeswa the library.
These barbaria down the library bui books. Bonfires we pers” brought load : and threw them in werealsoseendanci

ning rary
| 22 years ago was y. Considering the ring of knowledge ered an attempt at people of the north, te sections in this earing moment of rary, therefore, by frectification. It is upon the people of ir goodwill on the rmerstanding, the north are ready to
February 14, 2003
in an orgy of vio: District Developn campaign was on Jnited Liberation propaganda meetilady on May 31, Inging to the Peoganisation of Tamil d by Uma Maheslicemen on duty - o Tamil - in cold a third some days )ected then that ickathasan alias ible for it. a policemen, many ad been brought to n duty and were appah Stadium in rary. Many of them ansacking a liquor ts stock the police mpage. A number icles were attacked nese included the the Jaffna based per premises, the In Jaffna TULF MP ran, and of course
ns in khaki burnt ldings and also the 'e lit and the "copfter load of books the flames. They ng and singing lust
TAMILIMES 23
ily while the Goddess Saraswati was being symbolically immolated. The Jaffna Police DIG then was "Brute' Mahendran. He was powerless to stop the destruction and was seen crying by ascribe. More than 175 policemen were charge sheeted later for departmental inquiry into the incident, but few were punished. The scholar and poet Nuhman wrote a moving poem on the incident evoking powerful imagery. He sang then that Lord Buddha himselfwas cremated in the library fire.
Different Sinhala dominated governments recognised that the Jaffna library torching was an indelible blot on the collective consciousness of humanity and tried to make amends. Even J. R. Jayewardene launched a President's Fund for its resurrection. Reconstruction was undertaken in stages and the first phase was opened in June 1984. Appapillai Amirthalingam, though out of parliament, was the chief guest at the function. In 1985, much of the reconstructed building was shattered in a mysterious explosion attributed to rogue elements in the security forces. Later artillery shelling into Jaffna town from Jaffna Fort premises was intensified. The area around the Fort got deserted. The library reconstruction project was shelved. A substitute library functioned in Nallur. Reconstruction
Chandrika Kumaratunga became President in 1994 and reached out to the Tamils. One such meaningful gesture was the reconstruction of the library. Significant amounts of money were allocated out of the President's Fund. The White Lotus Movement spearheaded by Mangala Samaraweera also launched an islandwide 'brick and book' project for the Jaffna library. Other Jaffna District MPs also provided some money. Douglas Devananda in his brief tenure as minister allocated some finances out of Rehabilitation Ministry funds. This was followed by his successor Jayalath Jayawardena.
The National Library Services Board was also involved in the reconstruction project. Former Peradeniya University librarian Ian Goonetilleke and another renowned library scientist, Kamaldeen were actively engaged in the conceptual planning. Several Sri Lankans of eminent stature who had no direct links to Jaffna donated their valu

Page 24
24 TAMILTIMES
able collections to the library. Pieter Keuneman and Mervyn Casie Chetty being two noteworthy examples. Several foreign missions and non-governmental organisations also contributed books and cash.
Looked forward to event
It was amid such circumstances that the formal re-opening of the Jaffna library was looked forward to. Rs. 120 million had been spent for re-construction. Nearly 90% of the basic infrastructure was ready. What remained to be constructed was an additional wing housing a restaurant, elevators, air-conditioning and inter-com facilities. A further Rs. 25 million was required for this.
In the meantime, the Jaffna Municipal Council headed by the TULF was scheduled for dissolution on February 17. It was already on a year's extension. The 23-member Council comprised nine TULF, six PLOTE, eight EPDP and two EPRLF members. The Mayor was Sellan Kandaian, a member of the so called depressed caste community. Earlier, two TULF Jaffna Mayors (Sarojini Yogeswaran and Pon. Sivapalan) and a prospective Mayoral candidate (Pon. Mathimugarajah) had been assassinated on different occasions by the LTTE. Nadarajah Raviraj functioned as Mayor till being elected to parliament in December 2001. Thereafter, Kandaian took over and to his credit administered the Council well.
With his tenure of office coming to an end, Mayor Kandaian desired very much to formally open the library while in office. He was supported in this by all Jaffna MMCs regardless of party af. filiations. Knowing the emotional significance and political symbolism of the Jaffna library, every MMC wanted to go out basking in the reflected glory of the re-opening. The United National Front (UNF) government was also willing to cooperate. So a date was set. It was February 14 or Valentine's Day. The Council was expected to breathe its last three days later. At least two Ministers Karu Jayasuriya and Jayalath Jayawardena were to attend the function. In a rare display of cross-party unity, the Council unanimously resolved that veteran Tamil leader and TULF President, Veerasingham
Anandasangari sh guest.
Opposition by ves It was at this s arose. Several Tam the TULF became green-eyed monst Anandasangari ar going to reap all th servative reactionar able with Kandaian background. Apa TULF”ers dissatisfi gari were also oppc sins of Julius Cae: knives separately these elements wit too became united The intention w mal re-opening of cuse proffered was construction to be c library was to be open on February be open to the publ ary 20 on account ( to be completed. T! advanced as stated reasons. This and additional work ha utilised as reason opening.
The Mayor ar pointed out that de was an on-going p ther progress woul days to come. The brary would be dec uled. It seemed cle aian was determin the opening despite Council too backe
Tigers to the scer It was at this s entered the scene. gence of interests rate elements opp and the LTTE. TI ment transforme strengthened the ha ing forces. The L their own reason opening.
Despite the ov LTTE and the sub by the Tamil Natio the Jaffna Munic Mayor Kandaian l

15FEBRUARY 2003
ould be the chief
ed interests age that problems politicians outside afflicted with the r. It was felt that d the TULF were kudos. Some cones were uncomfortbecause of his caste t from this, some ed with Anandasansed. Like the assasjar who drew their and struck jointly, h different motives in purpose. as to scuttle the forthe library. The exthat there was more ompleted. While the officially declared 14, it was going to ic only from Februof some minor work he opening had been earlier for political the fact that some ad to be done were s for deferring the
di TULF stalwarts veloping the library roject and that furd be recorded in the y insisted that the lilared open as schedar that Mayor Kanded to go ahead with this opposition. The
him unitedly.
e
tage that the Tigers There was a converbetween the dispaosed to the opening le LTTE's involvethe situation and nds of the anti-openTTE apparently had s for opposing the
rall hegemony of the servient role played nal Alliance (TNA), ipal Council under ad maintained some
degree of independence. It was the Jaffna Municipal Council that first passed an unanimous resolution condemning the Tigers for imposing taxes. Besides, the very fact that the Jaffna Municipal Council had - despite LTTE assassinations of Mayors - survived as a functional entity, was by itself a source of irritation. The library opening would be seen as a jewel in the Jaffna Municipal Council crown. The Tigers also resented the relatively 'independent' Anandasangari getting the limelight. There was also the fact that the library opening would herald a sense of normalcy. Despite the insistence on "normalcy by the LTTE, it was in Tiger interests to thwart normalcy as far as possible.
Initially, the LTTE kept itself in the background and instigated its frontorganisations like the International Tamil Students Union and the consortium of Jaffna public organisations to spearhead the opposition. Despite the campaign, Mayor Kandaian backed by the Municipal Council held his ground. In a bid to diffuse tension, the Mayor also extended an invitation to Jaffna's LTTE Political Commissar Illambaranthi to participate as guest of honour along with Anandasangarias chief guest. The LTTE only redoubled its efforts to scuttle the opening. The Tiger fronts announced a Jaffna-wide hartal and protest demonstration for February 14. Anonymous leaflets threatening a “rathakkalari” (bloodbath) were distributed.
Postponed indefinitely
Mayor Kandaian though intimidated remained unrelenting still. On February 12, two LTTE representatives from the Wanni - Solomon and Cyril along with Jaffna student activist Gajendran called on the Jaffna Mayor and warned him not to go ahead with the opening. On the 12th night, some "unknown persons tied up the library watchers and absconded with all the keys and some other valuables. This in turn brought about a very large number of police and army personnel to occupy the library premises on the grounds of security.
On February 13, TELOJaffna District Parliamentarian M. K. Sivajilingam called on the Mayor and "advised
(continued on next page)

Page 25
15 FEBRUARY 2003
A Federal Constit for Sri Lanka A farce, Fraud Or
Dr. Oswald B. Firth OM Director, Centre for Society and Religi
"Under a federal system of governance there will be self-rule This is the system that prevails in America, Australia, South Africa and Canada. The federal system of governance that is found in Switzerland is perhaps the best model suited for Sri Lanka. Self-rule should be the norm in every part of Sri Lanka There would be many who would oppose this view. But once this opposition dies down, it is evident that some form of self-rule is bound to emerge."
- S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, 26th July 1926, Ceylon Morning Leader
Question of sincerity and trust
A pervasive exuberance greeted the Cease-fire Agreement that brought to an end a protracted and intractable war that had bled the country of its precious human lives and economic resources for close upon two decades. Paradoxically, the speed with which the peace process is traversing irreversible distances along the fast track towards a federal form of power-sharing is causing grave concerns among people. Is this concern more because they are confronted with reports of child abductions, extortion and smuggling of arms by the LTTE, not to speak of innumer
able other transgr. it is said to be gu. thatwhile High Se resettlement of di receiving high pro third round of pea In Thailand, w dia publicity is la the leading actors “Peace Deal”, a vei over rather braze that could make th exercise in decepti In the meantim ment and the LTT their stock of arms batants into their outfits. This appar gotiating peace whi is painfully
disturbing. As laxed feelings gen fire begin to want scepticism as to wh licized negotiati Nathom Pathom showpieces of cri inveigle the interna release the much-n nomic survival. At 1 the LTTE strategica to a separate state
(Continued from page 24)
him to abandon the opening. TELO is not represented in the Jaffna Municipal Council. An increasingly worried Kandaian was conferring with some MMCs when Jaffna's Tiger Political Chief Illambaranthi made an unannounced entrance. Soon, Mayor Kandaian and Illambaranthi were engaged in confidential discussions behind closed doors. The Mayor was strongly urged by Illambaranthi to postpone the opening.
Thereafter, Kandaian summoned the Council for an emergency meeting
and informed them cluding the ulti Illambaranthi. The the seriousness of cided unanimously the library openin, indefinitely. In a di test, the Mayor ar to tender their res It was a symbol amounting to the Council's swansor
gers were concer ceeded in torpedoi opening.

TAMELTIMES 25
tion
Fact?
issions of the MoU, lty of? The irony is curity Zones and the placed persons are file attention in the :e negotiations here maximum mevishly showered on who are crafting a of silence is drawn nly outrageous acts le entire processan O. le, both the governE are replenishing and recruiting comrespective military ent duplicity of nele preparing for war
he euphoric and rerated by the cease2, there is growing ether the much-pubons in Sattahip, und Oslo are mere sis management to tional community to eded funds for ecohe ground level, has lly delayed its claim in order to placate
of the situation inmatum issued by Council recognised he situation and denot to go ahead with g. It was postponed monstration of prodi Council resolved gnations en masse. c act of defiance Jaffna Municipal g. As far as the Tiled, they had sucng the Jaffna library
those countries sympathetic to its struggle, while in the interim agreeing to federalism which guarantees internal self-determination, regional autonomy and self-rule prior to eventual secession? If this is the underlying reality that sees to elude us, has not the much touted peace process succumbed to highly romanticized euphoria? In simple jargon, are we not being taken for another ride to an unknown destination?
How genuine is the conversion?
What appears on the surface is that the LTTE has undergone a process of conversion and transformation in its military and political ideology and strategies. It has agreed to negotiate instead of engaging in war, and has retreated from secession to federalism. But what are the motivating factors for such a change? - one would query. When the LTTE declared a cease-fire, they had acquired unprecedented military power and were not retreating. Unlike many rebel groups in the world fighting for independence, they had set up certain parallel administrative and judicial structures to regulate civilian life in a separate state. But were they now foregoing this objective for internal self-determination in the form of federalism only as an interim arrangement?
Having anointed itself as "the sole representative of the Tamil people' the LTTE has now to accommodate itself to the political agenda in which elements of democracy, pluralism and human rights to satisfy the national and international peace lobby, are high on the cards. It may turn out to be an uphill task for the LTTE to convince the Tamil people in general and the LTTE cadre in particular that the type offederalism to which it will agree goes beyond what Chelvanayagam had proposed in the late 1950s? Otherwise, how could the LTTE account for and justify the death, destruction and relentless suffering people in the North and East have had to undergo for a good part of their life in their quest for the elusive Eelam which hopefully is not to be? Therefore, would federalism be a satisfactory trade-off for the sacrifices made thus far by the Tamil people whom the LTTE claim to represent? Has "federalism' suddenly become the only viable alternative to Eelam?

Page 26
26 TAMILTIMES
Nominal federalism?
Even more important, what guarantees are there that Mr. Prabhakaran will not move in the direction of a de facto secession, while de jure remaining linked to the central government within the framework of a redrafted Constitution which will be referred to as "federal'? Is it not an institutionalized epithet that can have a whole range of meanings since it has not been adequately defined? These are the grey areas that remain ambiguous, and they are being used by President Chandrika Kumaratunga, some chauvinist ellements in the PA, the JVP and other extremist political elements to influence the minds of people in the South against the current peace process branded as a 'sell out to the LTTE. But what is the form of federalism that will not only motivate the LTTE to positively relinquish its demand for a separate state but also assuage the fears of the people in the South that there will be no territorial bifurcation of the country. In order to create such a healthy climate the LTTE should be ready to opt for 'cooperative federalism' with checks and balances and institutional shock absorb
ers which will si discussions, com solutions while violence and the
This is the leaders and the it focusing their att uting their share rather than leavi to the propagand Thailand across less the governm negotiation poli thorough scrutin tique of propos combined with c. tions to resolve term, demanding things go wrong tive of any posit
Prevailing scept Detractors c have raised the i exclusively in a 1 as the LTTE, wh will nor the op democratic polit stroyed almost e ing democratic
The Secretary, London Tamil Centre,
LONDON TA
Tamil Language
Please apply in writing to:
(Registered Cha
* WACANCIESkYACANCIES* WACANCIE
The London Tamil Centre is of Tamil Language and Cultural for its academic excelence. We con Carnatic vocal music, Flute, Mirut as Well as Tamil Language (up
To maintain the high standard and also to Cope with
· A Flute at Bharatha Na
Candidates will be of graduate('Sangeetha Vidwar Remuneration package will be Comm
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كص
253 East Lane, Wembley, Middx. HAO 3NN
 
 
 

15FEBRUARY 2003
ject all problems to promise and rational jecting all forms of hreat of secession. rea where religious elligentsia should be ntion on and contribo the peace process, g the entire process blitzemanating from ur TV channels. Unent's and the LTTE's ics are subjected to ' and an in-depth crid federal structures, vil society’s intervenhe crisis in the long accountability when would become aborve results.
icism
f the peace process sue of investing trust militarized entity such ich has never had the portunity to practise ics. Instead, it has devery vestige of existstructures which in
cluded the elimination of all political parties and activists in the North that claimed allegiance to democratic norms and practices. They included the much lamented Neelan Tiruchelvam, A. Amirthalingam and a galaxy of other leading Tamil political leaders who became the victims of the LTTE hatchet men, all because they advocated a pluralism in this multi-ethnic polity of ours. Therefore, scepticism about the LTTE's capacity for a political transformation in the direction of democracy is well founded. The LTTE may argue that prevailing military conditions provided little space for democratic alternatives, but that stance is losing credibility now that the UNF Government has gone a long way in providing a political culture that will ensure democratic institutions and processes to function without any let or hindrance once a Federal Constitution becomes a fiat accompli.
While those in the South may still harbour reasonable doubts as to the LTTE's intentions to enter the democratic process, it is the responsibility of the South to interact with the Tamil people in order to provide them with
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Page 27
15 FEBRUARY 2003
the necessary political space without war and violence that would ensure that the LTTE continues to engage in serious political negotiations with the government which will provide the needed ambience for democratic alternatives to emerge. This is where a more abiding relationship between the religious and civic leaders of the North and South, despite barriers of language and other socio-cultural differences, are vital if they, as responsible agents of civil society, are to contri-bute to the creation of that political space for democratic institutions to emerge and flourish within a federal structure.
The role of civil society As things are, there is compelling evidence to show that both the government and the LTTE consider themselves to be the sole agents of conflict resolution. This myopic outlook has not only led to polarizing the government, the LTTE and the peace-oriented NGOs into one camp, while the President, the JVP and a few extreme elements in the PA have distanced themselves from the peace process to the extent that they have unwittingly earned the sobriquet as "peace-spoilers'. Whereas people's participation should have been nursed and nurtured in support of the peace process, they are now being drawn into either "pro-peace' or “anti-peace' camps.
The fact, however, is that everyone wants peace. Thus, while peace agreements negotiated and signed by leaders of the two sides are important, they cannot guarantee a lasting, fruitful and sustainable peace, whether in the form of a federal government or otherwise, without the solid participation of the people both of the North as well as the South. If these opposing parties are not drawn into the peace process as one coordinated and integrated unit, we may have an “absence of war' but not an absence of internal conflicts or the presence of conditions that make war unnecessary. It is only when such a broad framework of unstincted cooperation is in place that there will be a win-win situation that guarantees a sustainable peace with justice and fairplay to all communities in this much-beleaguered country.
The writer is the Editor of Social Jusrice, the monthly journal published by the Centre for Society and Religion.
Cla Prov
16 February: Tel dent on 12 February Jaffna peninsula thre into major crisis threa peace process. The i dispute over the be women cadres of the claimed they wore m LTTE said they wort ter the women weref belts crowds staged a a riot squad from the allegedly attacked th
The developing ated incidents led to among the governme wegian facilitators. Monitoring Mission. SLMM Deputy c land told the press tl gotiator Anton Balas touch with Minister over the incident and to bring the situation In a bid to settle fully Jaffna Army ( Fonseka met Jaffna L leader C. Ilamparath chief Ole Brondum hours of talks. Durir army admitted it had fire agreement by c squad to deal with SLMM said.
Thearmyalso sai fully remove these from female cadres : the same time the LT female cadres would The army said th female cadres with su not forcefully remo otherhand would con SLMM.
This type of bel SLMM some time ag the LTTE female cac der the ceasefire agre of one party is not al the area controlled b The incident occ ary at around 10.00 junction when Sri La pted to remove milit by eight female cadr ral hundred people ] scene and were prote cident when SLMM SLMM spokesman

TAML TES
sh OVer Bets yokes Protests
nsion over an inciin Manipay in the atened to spill over atening the ongoing ncident involved a lts worn by eight : LTTE. The Army ilitary belts, but the 2 civilian belts. Aforced to remove the massive protest and police and the Army e crowd. tension and associa flurry of meetings int, LTTE, the Norand the Sri Lanka
hief Hagrup Haukhat LTTE chief neingham had been in Milinda Moragoda agreed to take steps under control. the dispute peaceCommander Sarath (TTE political wing i and SLMM Jaffna for three and a half ng this meeting the violated the ceaseleploying the riotthe situation, the
dit would not forcemilitary type belts in the future and at TE assured that the not wear such belts. at if they observed chbelts, they would e them but on the nplain about it to the
has been ruled by o, as being a part of ire uniformand unement the uniforms lowed to be worn in y the other party.
urred on 12 Februam at the Manipay inkan soldiers attemary type belts worn es. Soon after sevehad gathered at the sting against the inmonitors arrived, Teitur Torkelsson
said.
He said that at 12.05 pm the army and police used anti-riot squads to disperse the crowd and at that time there were SLMM monitors on the scene who observed the anti-riot squad attacking at least five innocent people with long sticks.
It is clear that the anti-riot squad was carrying out an attack and according to the ceasefire agreement it was a hostile act against the people and it was a violation of the agreement, Mr. Torkelsson said.
The SLMM Jaffna chief said that during the meeting the LTTE denied that its female cadres were wearing the military type belt, which had resulted in the incident leading to a clash.
The monitors in Jaffna noted that they did not see the female cadres wearing any military belts when they arrived, and on the other hand they were seen wearing civilian type belts. LTTE sources said that the Tiger political office in Jaffna had complained of the incident to the SLMM and noted that there was tension in the area with shops being closed. They said the army had attacked the people and in the melee an EPDP office also had been stoned.
The LTTE condemned the attack on their unarmed female cadres in Manipay by Sri Lankan soldiers and warned that such incidents would "seriously jeopardize" the Norwegian peace process.
"We condemn this brutal attack on our cadres and members of the public by the Sri Lanka Army in the strongest terms," Mr. Anton Balasingham, Chief Negotiator and political advisor to the LTTE said. Describing the incident as "an intolerable provocation,” Mr. Balasingham said "the peace talks with the Sri Lankan government will undoubtedly be seriously jeopardized if such incidents continue.'
"This deliberate attack on our cadres and the subsequent violence against civilians is a severe blow to Tamil public confidence in the peace process which has been weakened by the military's refusal to honour key aspects of the ceasefire agreement,” he said further.
To prevent future incidents of this nature, the LTTE and the Government agreed to allow women LTTE cadres to wear any civilian type belts when entering and staying in government control

Page 28
28 TAMILTIMES
led areas, a press release issued on 16 February by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) said.
The press statement further said "there is now an urgent need for a modern, well trained police force in order to gradually normalise the situation in the Government controlled areas in the North and East of Sri Lanka.'
“Using military forces to maintain law and order can be justified during times of war, but is highly likely to lead to unnecessary violence and increased tensions during times of peace,' the SLMM statement said.
Full text of the SLMM statement titled "Military Uniform Type of belts worn by LTTE Cadres - Manipay Incident" stated:
"To avoid future clashes between the forces of the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), over LTTE cadres using military uniform type of belts in Government controlled areas the following interim arrangements have been made by Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and accepted by both parties:
LTTE cadres wearing military uniform type of belts, will voluntarily remove such belts before entering into Government controlled areas and will not wear them while staying in Government controlled areas. LTTE cadres that do not follow this procedure will be denied access to Government controlled areas. If LTTE cadres do not follow this procedure, the forces of the Government of Sri Lanka will immediately call for SLMM assistance. Such provision is also given to the LTTE. SLMM monitors will, on the spot, rule the situation and advise both parties to comply strictly with the abovementioned procedure. It should be made very clear that these arrangements apply for military uniform type of belts only. Consequently, LTTE cadres may wear any type of civilian belts when entering and staying in Government controlled territory.
A clash over LTTE cadres wearing military uniform type of belts, took place between Government forces and LTTE cadres at Manippayin Jaffna peninsula on Wednesday 12th of February. SLMM ruled on the 16th of January that such belts were a part of the LTTE female cadre uniform. Therefore it can be considered a violation when LTTE cadres wear them in Government controlled areas. The decision of the Government forces to forcefully remove the military uniform type of belts from the LTTE cadres on the scene clearly created tensions which lead to a demonstration led by LTTE. An anti-riot squad was deployed
n 6 Februar
LTTE COm
blew up the ing an inspection the Sri Lanka M (SLMM). A joint the government o LTTE on the Sam February an incid vessel near the Del the tragic loss of th
tion leading up tot
by the Government crowd. SLMM Mon nessed members of ing and beating inn nothing to do with These actions of the hostile acts against such, constitute a c cle 2.1 of the Cease states: *The Partie with internationall tile acts against th including such acts tion, abduction, e ment.”
SLMM urges a and all LTTE cadre discipline and to with each other at a ation of SLMM th gent need for a mo lice force in order ize the situation in trolled areas in the Lanka. Using milit law and order cal times of war, but i to unnecessary vi tensions during tin
In spite of num during the Ceasef doubt that the Gov and the LTTE lea strong dedication ment to the long c SLMM is of the o the parties overco difficulties, they st and gain more co ability to move fo peace.”
 

15FEBRUARY 2003
Sea Tigers
in boat bas
7, three cadres of the mitted suicide and their trawler followby the Monitors of onitoring Mission, statement issued by Sri Lanka and the e day stated, "On 7 ent on a Sea Tiger ft islands resulted in ree lives. The situahe incident had been
forces to disperse the itors on the scene witthis riot squad attackocent people that had this demonstration. 2 anti-riot squad were the population and as lear violation of artifire Agreement which s shall in accordance aw abstain from hosa civilian population, as torture, intimidaxtortion and harass
lil Government forces s to show restraint and avoid confrontations l times. It is the evaluat there is now an urdern, well trained poto gradually normalthe Government conNorth and East of Sri ary forces to maintain be justified during highly likely to lead lence and increased hes of peace.
rous violent incidents re period, there is no ernment of Sri Lanka lership have shown a or a negotiated settleonflict between them. binion that every time me one more of those rengthen the ceasefire nfidence in their own rward to a permanent
O
discussed between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on 6 February. On the evening of the same day, the parties agreed on a procedure to resolve the matter by asking the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to conduct an inspection of the vessels involved to clarify the situation. Due to an apparent communication failure between the LTTE naval commander and the cadres on board one vessel, the crew members were not informed of the agreed procedure, and the cadresset fire to the vessel and took their own lives. In co-operation with the SLMM, the parties will review existing procedures in order to avoid similar incidents in the future. The ongoing session of peace talks will continue as scheduled.” The three Tigers who committed suicide in this incident have been identified as Sea Tiger Major Aatalone or Suthan (Krishnaswamy Satheeswaran of Chavakachcheri), Sea Tiger Captain Pothikai Thevan (Sivagnanasundaramoorthy Thayaparan, Puloly South) and Sea Tiger Captain Anton or Oorvannan (Rasiah Kugathas, Ariyalai).
The international Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) issued a statement setting out in detail the sequence of events that led to the incident at sea off Delft islind.
According to the SLMM statement, round 14.00 on February 6th the SLMM was requested to assist the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) that had intercepted a trawler being towed by a speedboat with a LTTE crew on board, south of Delft Island off the Northwest coast of Sri Lanka. One SLMM Monitor arrived on the scene. The trawler's engine was not working and it was anchored. The Captain on board the LTTE speedboat stated that both boats belonged to the LTTE and the trawler was being towed to the shore by the speedboat since its engine had broken down while fishing. The LTTE crews threatened to

Page 29
15 FEBRUARY 2003
commit suicide if the SLN would attempt to inspect their boats, but welcomed inspections by SLMM. The speedboat had 12 persons onboard, was open and without a wheelhouse and was easily inspected. After SLMM’s inspection, the speedboat was declared clean and was allowed by SLN to leave the area. Another SLMM monitor arrived on the scene to provide asistance.in dealing with the situation. The trawler was approached in the dark, with the searchlight on the SLN vessel lighting up the scene. The SLMM Monitors stated that now, one SLN officer would go onboard to inspect the trawler along with the two SLMM Monitors. The LTTE crew threatened to put the trawler on fire and again threatened to commit suicide if SLN would take part in the inspection. The SLN vessel, with the SLMM Monitors on board, subsequently withdrew from the trawler.
"On Thursday evening the Head of SLMM was in direct contact with the Peace delegations of the Government off Sri Lanka and the LTTE in Berlin and ordered the Monitors to wait for further instructions. The Government peace delegation accepted that SLMM would be allowed to inspect the trawler on their own and the LTTE peace delegation agreed on that solution. A condition for this solution was that it would not set any precedence for future inspections. This agreement was relayed to the Monitors on board the SLN vessel at 01.15 early morning of Friday 7th.
At 07.00 hours in the morning of Friday, February 7th, the two SLMM Monitors boarded the trawler to do the full inspection. Their Tamil interpreter stayed on the SLN vessel lying alongside the trawler and translated the discussions between the SLMM Monitors and the three members of the LTTE trawler crew. The Monitors stated that they were doing this inspection according to an agreement made by the both Peace delegations in Berlin.
The trawler was thoroughly inspected. Dry and clean fishing nets were on the front deck but no fish or signs of fishing activities were noted on board. By measuring the compartments on the trawler, the Monitors realized that a hidden compartment of approximately one meter length and as wide as the trawler, was below deck. One monitor went into the fish-hold where he removed a new wooden panel with new nails and thus broke through a false wall into a hidden compartment below deck. In this compartment the following items were stored:
a) 1X23 MM Gun barrel (built at
Anti-Aircraft), b) 1 nism for the 23MM plete steel mountin d) Several hundre ammunition in a metal boxes, e) Sev of AK47 assault ri sealed metal conta "The gun barrel were wrapped in cle and plastic sheeting The steel mounting is designed to be b with bolts. The L. wastowing the traw bedding for the ty mounting found on other hand, the sp fixed tripod usable gun. In addition to above, 3X hand gr boat; one found in two handed over to tors by the LTTE { photographed both scene and the abov The Monitors state these items was a c cease fire agreen SLMM Monitors pu in a box and hande vessel as a safety p At 09.00 the H informed both Pe Berlin about the f When asked for su SLMM suggested The trawler shoul nearest port by the S confiscate the mili do their own inspe (3) SLMM should the three LTTE c; them in a SLMM v controlled territory SLMM was to be by the Peace deleg their decision was Around 11.00 of Delft was get weather was worst to rain. It was ag SLMM Monitors at rge of the SLN ves: conditions, the traw closer to the island ( Monitors stayed on LTTE cadres and st stay with them all would not be hand One LTTE crew n Monitors in cutting at 11.30 the SLN trawler in the direc
Around 12.00 sel stopped 4.4Na

TAM TIMES 29
X Complete Mecha
Barrell, c) lXComfor the 23MM gun, rounds of 23MM lastic barrel and 2 eral hundred rounds le ammunition in a
le. and the mechanism an cotton cloth bags fitting these items. for the 23MM gun olted on a flat deck TE speedboat that 'ler didnot have any pe of gun and steel the trawler. On the eedboat only had a for a light machine he items mentioned enades were on the the wheelhouse and ) the SLMM Monicrew. The Monitors LTTE boats on the 'e mentioned items. :d that transporting lear violation of the ment (CFA). The ut the hand grenades d it over to the SLN recaution. lead of SLMM had ace Delegations in indings of SLMM. iggestions, Head of the following: (1) d be towed to the SLN; (2) SLN would tary equipment and ction of the trawler be responsible for adres and transport rehicle to the LTTE . This suggestion of discussed promptly ations in Berlin and awaited. hours the sea south ting more rough, 2ning and it started greed between the hd the officer in chasel, that due to these tler should be towed fDelft. The SLMM the trawler with the ated that they would the time and they ed over to the SLN. hember assisted the the anchor line and started towing the :tion of Delft. hours the SLN vestical miles south of
Delft and relayed a message from LTTE in Kilinochchi via SLMM in Jaffna and SLN KKS Naval base that the LTTE crew should contact their Headquarters via radio. At 12.05 one of the LTTE crew members got in contact with his Headquarters through the radio on board the trawler and had a 15 minutes conversation. The SLMM Monitors overheard the Tamil conversation. They could not understand it, but the communications through the radio were both loud and clear. Around 12.20 the radio conversation was over. Just before the conversation was finished one LTTE crew member went to the back of the trawler. Just as the conversation was over, a second crew member already had a bottle and a lighter in his hands inside the wheelhouse. One monitor took the lighter from him and threw it into the sea.
At the same moment the SLMM Monitors saw that all the back of the trawler was already on fire. Then the Monitors ran to the front of the trawler and jumped into the sea. The Monitors were in the sea for 10-15 minutes until they were picked up by the SLN vessel. According to the SLN personnel and the SLMM interpreter on board the SLN vessel, the LTTE crew members took their own lives while the Monitors were in the sea. The Head of SLMM informed the Peace delegations in Berlin about this a few minutes later. The SLN vessel stayed on the scene for approximately 2 1/2 hours with the Monitors on board and then headed to KKS naval base in Jaffna when the Monitors left. Two SLN vessels were left on the scene with the trawler still burning.
During an incident in the same area in July 2002 two SLMM Monitors were held against their will on a LTTE trawler, while it escaped a SLN vessel. After that, the SLMM decided, that as a general rule, SLMM Monitors would not board LTTE boats except for monitoring inspections done by SLN and during pre-arranged Sea Movements of LTTE agreed by the Government of Sri Lanka.
SLMM did not follow this rule during the events South of Delft, in order to defuse the situation created when the LTTE crew threatened to commit Suicide. It should be underlined that the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE leadership agreed that SLMM would inspect the LTTE trawler south of Delft and that this arrangement was an exeption from the general rule that SLN should inspect LTTE boats with SLMM only monitoring the inspection.

Page 30
30 AMILTIMES
What Impedes Economic in North-East Sri Lan
Muttukrishna Sarvananthano
Introduction
The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) lifted the economic embargo on the rebel held areas of the North&East (N&E) province on January 15, 2002. The economic embargo was in effect since 1990 and covered over 60 consumer goods including fuel, food, and medicine. Some goods were totally prohibited from entering the rebel held areas of the N&E province and some had quantitative restrictions. The economic embargo created an informal market for these prohibited and restricted supplies of goods in the rebel held territory, which is almost 30% of the total land mass of Sri Lanka.
The economic embargo made the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels to play a dominant role in the management of the economy in the territory under their jurisdiction. This in effect created a dual economic system in the country. Whilst the rest of Sri Lanka pursues a private sector led liberal market economic model, the LTTE held territory has been pursuing a command economic model in the past 12 years. Some of the salient features of such a command economy were severe shortage of essential and other consumer goods, rationing, hyperinflation, and LTTE run transport, trade and productive enterprises.
Atlongilast, the economic embargo was unilaterally withdrawn by the GOSL with effect from January 15, 2002. It is now one year since the lifting of the economic embargo. The objective of this paper is two folds; one is to highlight the implications of the lifting of the economic embargo on the economy of the N&E province. The second is to identify the factors that inhibited economic revival in the N&E province in the past year, since the lifting of the economic embargo.
After the lifting of the economic embargo inJanuary 2002 the economy of the N&E province got further impetus with the opening of the A9 highway on April 08, 2002. The A9 highway is the major road linking the North
ern Province with try, which was cle to Jaffna for vehicu fic for about 12 yi to remember that the economic emb laterally by the GC the A9 for vehicul fic was an outcom dum of Understan between the GOS. February 2002 as a tation by the Norw The withdrawal o bargo and the oper way have resulted of the N&E econo the country. There (except arms & a sives, remote co escopes, and pent the rest of the coun areas and vice vers the GOSL has wit ment to obtain a pa of civilians to and areas, the LTTE : system, albeit a li what was in operat movement of civil LTTE held areas is The two-way flov the LTTE held are: losers.
The free flow c of the country ( items) to the LT gainers and losers ers in the LTTE h jor gainers and t LTTE held areas On the positives goods from the ra the LTTE held art prices of such goo consumers. Howe' goods are still hig to be due to the ta On the negatives goods from the r the LTTE held are the local producer lar goods. Many l

15FEBRUARY 2003
Revival ka?"
he rest of the counsed from Vavuniya lar and civilian trafars. It is important while the lifting of argo was done uni)SL, the opening of ar and civilian trafe of the Memoranding (MoU) signed and the LTTE in I result of the faciliegian government.
the economic emling of the A9 highin the reintegration my with the rest of is free flow of goods mmunition, explontrol devices, telorch batteries) from try to the LTTE held a. However, though hdrawn the requiress for the movement from the LTTE held still operates a pass ess stringent one to ion before. Thus, the ians to and from the still not totally free. of goods (to/from s) has its gainers and
fgoods from the rest including imported TE held areas has . Thus, the consum>ld areas are the mahe producers in the ure the major losers. de, the free flow of st of the country to as has depressed the is which benefits the er, the prices of such erthan what itought Kation by the LTTE. de, the free flow of st of the country to as has badly affected of the same or simiocal producers in the
LTTE held areas are deprived of their livelihood due to the inflow of cheaper and better quality Sri Lankan made and foreign made goods.
In the same line, the free flow of goods from the LTTE held areas to the rest of the country has gainers and losers. The producers in the LTTE held areas have benefited from the opening of the entire Sri Lankan market to their produce because of higher prices they fetch now. On the other hand, the consumers in the LTTE held areas have lost out because of higher prices they have to pay now. During the time of economic embargo perishable agricultural produce including vegetables, fruits, and fish were very cheap in the LTTE held areas due to over supply. But, the prices of these perishable food items have shot up since the opening of the A9 highway. As a result the consumers in the LTTE held areas are worse off now than before.
In sum, the lifting of the economic embargo and the opening of the A9 highway has costs and benefits to the economy and people of the N&E province. The main challenges in the province are for the local producers (who have lost out due to the influx of goods from other parts of the country) to become competitive or find alternative productive activities, and the local consumers to find means of increasing their income in order to afford to purchase the higher priced local food produce. Unfortunately, alternative productive activities and increasing the income levels of the consumers are slow to come by due to a variety of factors. Although trade between the N&E province and the rest of the country has expanded enormously, not many new productive activities have taken place in the past one year. This has, quite naturally, resulted in disenchantment among the masses. It is important to remember that the present situation is a pause-in-conflict rather than a postconflict situation.
Historically, agriculture was the mainstay of the N&E economy, specifically food crops, cash crops (such as chillies, onions and tobacco), and fisheries. There seems to be fundamental institutional impediments to kick start productive activities in all sectors of the N&E economy. The major objective of this paper is to identify these institutional impediments to economic revival in the N&E province. The process by which these institutional impediments

Page 31
15 FEBRUARY 2003
were identified was through study tours to 6 out of 8 districts in the North&East province (including both the government held and LTTE held territories) in the past 10 months by the author. These study tours entailed meeting government officials (central, provincial and local), LTTE officials, non-governmental officials (local, national, and international), learned people, entrepreneurs, and the general public.
Impediments (i) Sri Lankan side
One of the major institutional impediments isthe high securityzonesimposed by the Sri Lankan armed forces in the N&E province, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula, in line with the MoU. The majority of the Northern Province population lives in the Jaffna peninsula. Almost one-third of the land area of the peninsula (in Valikamam north) is classified as high security zone and barred for civilians, which used to house more than 100,000 people. These people are now displaced and productive activities discontinued. This vast high security zone encompasses some of the most fertile agricultural lands in the peninsula. During the pre-war times the N&E province used to produce a significant proportion of the total requirement of rice, chillies, onions and tobacco of the entire country. Since the beginning of the civil war in 1983 a major proportion of rice, chilli, and onion requirements are imported from abroad.
Moreover, the Sri Lanka army occupies almost half the city centre of Jaffna. It is important to remember that Jaffna is the commercial hub of the N&E province. The occupation of prime commercial properties in the heart of the city is one of the major obstacles to business development in the peninsula. Several hotels and other private and public properties in the city are still occupied by the Sri Lanka army. Ironically, while security barriers and checkpoints in the city of Colombo have been removed since December 2001 the city of Jaffna still resembles a theatre of war.
Further, certain time and geographical restrictions on fishing still exist in the Northern Province, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula, despite some relaxation in the past one year. Fishing is one of the primary economic activities in the N&E province, and during the pre-war times used to account for twoirds of the total fish catches of the
country. However, tions on fishing, Sr a significant import two decades. The ing in Sri Lanka fisherpersons from wan and Thailanc Lankan seas.
The A9 highwa hicular and civiliar hours a day (7.30an days a week. This on Sundays. These other major imped revival in the Nort entrepreneurs in th complain that it tak to arrive from Color is not only becaus access to the highw checking at four Lankan army and th each). The entire offloaded, checked lorries and trailers Sri Lankan army c goods via the A9 it whether banned ite: ported, whereas the primarily for the p These delays in the via the A9 increase of businesses.
The businesses ince are not entitle port/export trade dil nesses in the N&l open Letter of Cred in the province. He the province have to goods from Colomb which increase the t consequently there major hindrance to velopment in the pi The banks in the stringent in the disi to farmers, fisherp{ The collateral reque province seems to b is required in other try. Although many ventured into the N pastone year, the pr to be tapping the sa in the province. Th cess to bank credit of the major imped resurgence in the N Another reason finance for busines: ninsula is that sinci
cut off from the res

TAM TIMES 31
ue to severe restricLanka has become droffish in the past estrictions on fishhave resulted in India, Japan, Taiencroach the Sri
y is opened for vetraffic for only 10 to 5.30pm) and six highway is closed restrictions are anment to economic hern Province. The e Jaffna peninsula es 3 days for goods hbo via the A9. This e of the restricted ay, but also due to points by the Sri e LTTE (two points consignment is and reloaded into at each point. The hecks the flow of order to ascertain ms are being transLTTE checks are urpose of taxation. transport of goods the transaction cost
in the N&E provd to engage in imrectly. That is, busiE province cannot it (LC) at the banks ince, the traders in purchase imported Io-based importers, ransaction cost and tail prices. This is a external trade deovince.
N&E province are pursement of loans rsons, and traders. stedby banks in the e higher than what parts of the counprivate banks have &E province in the mary motive seems lings of the masses us, the lack of acis identified as one ments to economic &E province. for the lack of bank es in the Jaffna pethe peninsula was of the country for
a long time a lot of new businesses established in the past 20 years are unregistered with the GOSL. Most of these unregistered businesses may have wilfully done so in order to avoid paying business taxes to the GOSL, because they do pay tax to the LTTE. In the Northern Province it has been easier to evade government taxes, but not the LTTE taxes. It is extremely difficult to pay taxes to both the government and the LTTE and keep the business afloat. Therefore, most of the new businesses opted to be unregistered and be in the informal economy. This non-registration deprives them of access to bank loans.
(ii) LTTE side
Another major impediment to economic revival in the North&East province is the taxation by the LTTE. The LTTE imposes direct and indirect taxes on the people of the province. The public servants in the province are occasionally asked to contribute a certain percentage of their monthly salary as income tax. For example, occasionally school principals are asked to set aside a certain percentage of the monthly salaries of teachers to pay the LTTE. Sri Lanka is a unique country where public servants do not have to pay income tax (Indian public servants, for example, do), but the Sri Lankan public servants working in the N&E province are illegitimately taxed by the LTTE. The private tutors in the province are taxed as well.
These taxes are not only imposed in LTTE held areas but also in government held areas of the N&E province. The tiger tax regime has been in operation at least since 1990 and is not an outcome of the MoU signed in February 2002. However, until the signing of the MoU these taxes were levied clandestinely in the government held areas of the N&E, but now it is much more open and systematic. This illegitimate imposition of income tax has resulted in the exodus of teachers, medical officers, and other public servants from the province that has depleted and deteriorated the public service in the province.
There is a severe shortage of school/ university teachers and medical officers in the N&E province, because very few Tamil speaking teachers and medical officers (let alone the Sinhalese) are willing to take up posts in the province. During the time of war the fear of prob

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32 TAM TIMES
ability of being killed was the primary reason for the lack of interest in working in the province. However, even af. ter the ceasefire there is not much interest among public servants to work in the N&E primarily because of the fear of the LTTE taxation. It is important to note here that the Sinhala public servants working in the N&E are not taxed, and only the Tamils and Muslims are taxed. Thus, during the past one year LTTE taxes have been the major cause of the failure to improve the quality of public education and health services in the province.
The farmers in the LTTE held territory are also taxed either in cash or in kind. The farmers and fisherpersons are expected to contribute part of their output to the LTTE coffer irrespective of their income level or the size of the household. The taxation of the agriculture sector by the LTTE in the N&E province is again a unique phenomenon because the farmers in other parts of the country are exempt from income taxation. Likewise, small scale manufacturing concerns and service providers are also taxed a percentage of their monthly income. In some parts of the Jaffna peninsula the LTTE has the audacity to demand taxes from businesses backdating from 1996 when the LTTE was forced to withdraw from the peninsula. The direct taxes paid by the farmers, small-scale manufacturers, and service providers are passed on to the customers in the form of higher prices. Hence, the higher prices of goods in the N&E province, even after the lifting of the economic embargo, are mainly due to taxes imposed by the LTTE.
On the issue of tiger taxation it is worth referring to Che Guevara, the icon of guerrillas worldwide:
“The fundamental principle that ought to prevail is that of paying always for all merchandise taken from a friend. This merchandise can consist of crops or of articles from commercial establishments. Many times they will be donated, but at other times the economic conditions of the peasants prevent such donations. There are cases in which the necessities of warfare force the band to take needed food from stores without paying for it, simply because there is no money. In such cases the merchant ought always to be given a bond, a promissory note, something certifies to the debt" (Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare,
Manchester Uni pp.121). "Merch be paid for in c. with bonds, an redeemed at the (Che Guevara, *Ifconditions c taxes can be { should be as ligh all for the small portant to pay detail of relation ant class and t which is an ema Taxes may beca Some cases, ori of the harvest, increase the fo guerrillas (Che pp 122).
In addition to di imposes an array of goods being transpo tory or passing thrc ritory to the Jaffna at rates ranging frc valorem tax). All v. territory are require istration tax. All pa to the Jaffna penins vans via the A9 hig to a unit tax of LK ger. Furthermore, t in the Jaffna penin taxation by the LTT the proceeds of sal the LTTE.
The people an government held province are the mc both the GOSL an them to direct anc Thus, in practise, th province (who are t ones who bear the taxation as these ta. retail prices. In add ing taxes the LTTE tions to their coff Muslim individua from time to time i lombo. Furthermor and individuals in v routinely asked to ger coffer. These : during the time of
The arbitrary r taxes is that no ac sources are shown lic. The taxpayers and for what, the expended. During

A.
15 FEBRUARY 2003
versity Press, 1985, andise that cannot ish will be paid for d these should be first opportunity.” op cited, pp 79)
ontinue to improve, stablished these it as possible, above producer. It is imattention to every is between the peashe guerrilla army, nation of that class. lected in money in n the form of a part which will serve to od supplies' to the Guevara, op cited,
rect taxes the LTTE indirect taxes. The )rted to LTTE terri)ugh the LTTE terpeninsula are taxed »m 5% to 25% (ad ehicles in the LTTE d to pay vehicle regissengers travelling ula in privately run hway are subjected IR 350 per passenhe sale of property sula is subjected to TE.A percentage of e have to be paid to
il businesses in the areas of the N&E )st affected because il the LTTE subject indirect taxation. he consumers of the he majority) are the cost of such dual kes are built into the lition to the foregodemands contribuer from Tamil and Ils and businesses n the N&E and Coe, Tamil businesses arious countries are contribute to the tiare carried on even peace. ature of these tiger counts of these reto the general pubire unaware of how, 6 taX rՇVeդԱeS are the times of war
these taxes may have been justifiable because of the funds required for the war effort. But, what justification is there for this comprehensive and systematic tax regime during the time of peace? These tiger taxes are stifling entrepreneurship in particular and economic revival in general. Needless to say, the tiger taxes are one of the major impediments to economic revival in the N&E province.
According to the author's judgement at least LKR 5 million (50 lakhs) revenue may be earned by the LTTE daily on the A9 highway by way of taxation of passengers and goods. In addition, another LKR 2.5 million (25 lakhs) taxes may be levied per day throughout the N&E province (including at Uyilankulam checkpoint) from people and businesses (both Tamil and Muslim). Therefore, the daily total tax revenue of the LTTE in the N&E could be about LKR 7.5 million (75 lakhs). This translates into annual revenue of LKR 2,340 million (2.34 billion) (312 days X 7.5 million). The LTTE is involved in farming, fishing and several other economic activities as well in the territory under their control. For example, the LTTE is reported to be dominating the fish trade from the Mullaitivu district to Colombo. These productive and entrepreneurial activities yield profits to the LTTE. If we add these profits to their tax revenues the annual domestic income of the LTTE could be at least LKR 3 billion (roughly USD 30 million), which I presume is a very conservative estimate. In addition to this domestic income the LTTE derives income from LTTE run enterprises and tax collected from expatriate individuals and businesses around the world. The revenue mobilised abroad may be used to purchase arms & ammunitions in the international armament markets. Therefore, veshall focus on the domestic revenue. According to the LTTE, the domestic mobilisation of resources during peacetime, through direct and indirect taxes and entrepreneurial activities, are necessary for the upkeep of their cadres. This justification is not convincing, because during the time of war the LTTE managed to maintain their cadres with far less revenue. The opening of the A9 highway and officially undertaking political activities in government control areas of the N&E have provided them a goldmine in terms of tax revenue. Moreover, the different tax rates of the LTTE are very high com

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སྣ། 15 FEBRUARY 2003
pared to the tax rates prevalent in Sri Lanka and that Che Guevara proposes in the Guerrilla Warfare. It seems a mystery where the tiger tax revenue is going, because the LTTE does not seems to be involved in providing public services to the people of the N&E whether in the LTTE held or government held areas. In both these areas it is the Sri Lankan government that is providing public services in education, health, agriculture, irrigation, social services, etc, to the people.
In accordance with the MoU unarmed LTTE cadres are permitted to undertake political work in the government control areas of the N&E. To the best of the author's knowledge the LTTE is mostly involved in only four activities in government control areas of the N&E. They are: (a) recruitment of cadres. (b) collection of taxes. (c) commemorating the martyrs and (d) harassing political opponents. While the first, and third may be legitimate activities the other two are unjustified. Disappointingly, the LTTE is not involved in any community or public service in the government controlled areas despite a huge revenue mobilisation effort. The people of Jaffna could be won over only by improving their livelihoods and not by the above activities. The ordinary masses have suffered enormously during the past two decades of war and wish to get along with their lives in tranquillity and dignity.
A state or a de facto-state entity mobilises resources through taxation not only to maintain its cadres, but more so to provide public services to the population living in the territory under their jurisdiction. The LTTE has failed to provide community or public services to the people whom they claim to solely represent both in the areas under their direct control and in the government held areas (which are under the indirect control of the LTTE). The LTTE has become institutionalised in the N&E province in the past 12 years cultivating thousands of hectares of farmlands, running hundreds of business enterprises, and employing thousands of people. The bulk of the farmlands cultivated by the LTTE were forcibly taken over when the owners of such lands were displaced internally or abroad. Proxies own the bulk of the business enterprises run by the LTTE. A guerrilla army's function is not to cultivate farmlands for commercial purposes (except to feed their own cad
res) or run econom
it would be oppor
Guevara:
“Private prope the war zones For example, e stock not esser nance of a we pass into the and be distrib justly. The rig receive payme used for the so ways to be resp ment will be m Guevara, op ci,
Instead of dist farmlands and dwe and homeless pool ince the LTTE appı erty with no compe way the LTTE has de-facto property province.
The LTTE levie ing transported via the Wanni region ( nochi, Mannar, Mu niya districts) or tl at their checkpoin and Uyilankulam. T points at Puliyanku and goods being tr and the other for pe ing transported to t a third checkpoint people and goods t Mannar district. Th epitomes of ineffic administration. Th overstaffed and sev be seen seated in nothing. The passer natures from 3-4 points of the check try pass. The good centage of the pric voice for purchas Colombo or elsewh ment is a lengthy p tails getting check verified from 3-4 points of the check ple checking demor fidence and suspici its cadres.
In the Jaffna p chosis hasset in d LTTE regime. For nesses in the Jafi hung up two sepa premise; one show

TAM TIMES 33
centerprises. Again une to refer to Che
ty should acquire in its social function. ccess land and livetial for the maintealthy family should ands of the people uted equitably and it of the owners to nt for possessions cial good ought alected, but this payade in bonds” (Che ed, pp79-80).
ibuting abandoned lings to the landless of the N&E provopriates those propnsation paid. In this emerged as a major owner in the N&E
is taxes on goods bethe A9 highway to incompassing Killiillaitivu, and Vavuhe Jaffna peninsula ts in Puliyankulam here are two checklam; one for people ansported to Jaffna :ople and goods behe Wanni. There is at Uyilankulam for being transported to ese checkpoints are iency of the LTTE 2se checkpoints are eraltiger cadres can blastic chairs doing gers have toget sigpersons at various points to get an enare taxed at a pere quoted in the in: of such goods in ere. The tax assessocedure, which ened, rechecked, and persons at various points. This multistrates the non-conn the LTTE has on
ninsula a fear psye to the impending xample, some busina peninsula have ate clocks in their ng the old time and
the other showing new time. Sri Lanka adjusted the time in 1996 (in order to increase the daylight and save energy) by putting the clock forward by 30 minutes. However, most people in the Northern Province did not adhere to this new time mainly on the request of the LTTE. Most households and business premises still follow the old time, which is 30 minutes behind Sri Lanka time.
The issue of having two separate clocks with old and new times is a typical dilemma faced by the businesses in particular and the people in general in Jaffna. This has profound implications for reviving businesses and kick starting the dormant economy of the N&E. Though it is just a matter of half-anhour it reveals the uncertainty among the people as to who is in charge of Jaffna; the GOSL or the LTTE. The people are sure of who is in charge of the Wanni (which is the LTTE), and therefore all follow the old time. On the other hand, in the Jaffna peninsula the government offices/institutions and buses operate according to the new time, but private businesses/institutions, Hindu temples, and households by and large operate according to the old time.
The clearest signal of the fear psychosis of the people of Jaffna is that since the opening of the A9 highway there is an exodus of people from the Jaffna peninsula to other parts of the country (not to Wanni), especially to Colombo. According to the records of the Sri Lanka army checkpoint at Muhamalai (which records each and every person entering and leaving the Jaffna peninsula), during the first 7 months after the opening of the A9 highway there has been a net outflow of about 65,000 people from the Jaffna peninsula. Despite a large influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Wanni and other parts of the country returning to the Jaffna peninsula, the total number of people leaving the peninsula is greater than those entering. What is the cause of this exodus?
The LTTE restricts the movement of people, particularly in the age group of 15-35, from their territory to other parts of the country. Anyone leaving the LTTE territory has to justify her/ his travel and obtain a travel pass. It is particularly difficult for obtaining passes for people in the age group of 15-35 years. Though this pass system is a bit relaxed since the signing of the MoU it is still in operation. A lot of

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people expect that this pass system will be re-imposed in the Jaffna peninsula soon after the LTTE takes control of the peninsula in a matter of time. The anticipated LTTE regime has prompted young people (in particular) to leave the Jaffna peninsula, which is ongoing.
The bulk of the migrants are relatively better educated and skilled; therefore, this migration is further depleting the human capital of the peninsula. Thus, the considerable number of net migration is undermining the human and physical capacity of the peninsula to undertake urgently required rehabilitation and reconstruction work. The dilemma faced by the donor community is that even if necessary finance is available there is insufficient human and physical capacity to absorb such donor assistance.
There also seems to be capital flight from the N&E province to the rest of the country (especially to Colombo) in the past one year, because of demands from the LTTE for contributions to their coffer. The LTTE modus operandi is as follows. They would approach a supposedly wealthy person and demand a certain amount of money. If that person responds by saying that s/he does not have that amount of money, they would show a bank statement of that person and demand the particular sum. This is not an isolated incident, rather a quite common occurrence. Either the LTTE is able to obtain bank balances of customers through the bank staffor they are intercepting bank statements in the post. Either way the banking customers are terrified and as a safety measure transferring their saving/fixed deposit accounts to branches outside the N&E province particularly to Colombo. This is taking place among both personal and business banking customers in the N&E province.
Since about the mid-1980s, as a response to the spate of bank robberies in the N&E province, all the private banks withdrew their operations from the province and only the state banks (Bank of Ceylon, People's Bank, and National Savings Bank) stay put. Even the remaining state banks operated a skeleton service, by which only a part of the deposits by customers were lent to borrowers and no fresh capital was infused to the banking system from their head offices in Colombo. Due to war, displacement and lack of transport facilities the number of actively banking population in the N&E dropped
drastically. As a resu amount of deposits wi fore, as a corollary, th personal and busir dropped drastically.
This practise of 1 banks obtain in depos on in the N&E provi capital flight mentions the reserves that cou tential borrowers. This reason for the lack of support businesses in ince in the pastone yı It is high time th that the type of regim impose in the N&E ( by their recruitment ( tion, harassment of po pass system, and time mining the economi province by creating nomic uncertainty.
The LTTE's judic a deterrent to prospec the LTTE held areas ( ince. The prospective l certain as to whethe commercial laws or would apply to them. mercial dispute in the tory the prospective ir which law court s/he to resolve the dispute Generally, the L. ministration seems to of Sri Lanka's. To LTTE has not setup a ministrative structu LTTE has been usin ing the public serva who are stationed in their control to run a tration. The administ the LTTE is largely public servants of th perienced youths. T idle and inefficient a mostly school dropo an incompetent andf system handle the ta and reconstruction? The police servic sts of maintaining la areas of control. We are 17 LTTE polices ni, l in Batticaloa, alee. It is reported th LTTE police recei daily in the Wanni. minor offences suc land dispute, and p LTTE police also cl

15FEBRUARY 2003
only a limited e made. Therebank lending to SS Customers
hding what the s is still carried ce. Hence, the | above depletes | be lent to pomay be the main bank finance to the N&E prova.
LTTE realises they propose to as demonstrated rive, tax collecitical opponents, setting) is under: revival in the olitical and eco
al system is also tive investors in if the N&E provbusinesses are not ' the Sri Lankan the LTTE laws If there is a comLTTE held terrivestor is not sure should approach
TE’s public adbe worse than that begin with, the n independent adre as such. The g and manipulathts of the GOSL ne territory under parallel adminisrative division of hanned by retired GOSL and inexhe former seems ld the latter seem ts. How can such ail administrative of rehabilitation
of the LTTE boaand order in their are told that there tions in the Wanhd in Trincomt, on average, the e 15 complaints which pertains to as petty thieving, 'sonal fraud. The m that there is no
underworld or gangsters in their territory (Virakesari Illustrated Weekly, 0610-2002).
The author is not surprised at these claims for the following reasons. Firstly, there is hardly any incentive for crime to take place in the Wanni because almost everybody is ultra poor and income inequality is very low. The Wanni is like the plantation sector where absolute poverty is rampant, but income inequality is the lowest in the country. Usually the crime rates are high where income inequality is high. The people of Wanni are at a very lowlevel equilibrium whereby severest form of poverty coexists with very much less income inequality (a la Albania during communist times). Hence, there is no incentive for crime to take place. Secondly, the reason for lower number of complaints received may be due to non-reporting of crimes/offences. This non-reporting in turn may be due to non-confidence in the LTTE police and their judicial system. The claim that there is no underworld or gangsters in the Wanni is understandable because prospective gangsters may have been absorbed into the LTTE.
Therefore, the low crime rate in the Wanni as claimed by the LTTE police does not seem to be a manifestation of their efficiency or control over the population rather it could be a manifestation of lack of confidence in their police and judicial services. The police and judicial services of the LTTE are yet another major impediment to economic revival in the LTTE held areas of the N&E province.
The Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organisation (TEEDO) claims that it is due to their development activities the people of the Wanni were rescued from starvation during the time of economic embargo between 1996 and 2001. This claim seems to be very unconvincing. The people of the Wanni escaped from starvation during the severe economic embargo because of the assistance provided by international relief organisations such as the UNHCR, WFP, Care International, Oxfam, et al, and the GOSL. The role of the TEEDO in cushioning the negative impacts of the economic embargo was marginal, if at all.
Despite huge revenue collection by way of various direct/indirect and ad valorem/unit taxes the LTTE has not embarked on any socio-economic programmes inthe N&E province whether

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15 FEBRUARY 2003
in their own territory or in government controlled territory. Strangely, the LTTE is expecting the GOSL and the external donors to undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction work. In spite of numerous public pronouncements about LTTE's proposed development plans for the N&E province (Thinakural, 23-12-2002, pp6; Uthayan, 2112-2002, pp1; Virakesari, 10-09-2002, 14-12-2002, 17-12-2002) it has not forwarded any rehabilitation and reconstruction plan for the N&E or how it intends to fund such programmes.
In respect of the LTTE policy of harassing political opponents in the N&E it may be useful to reflect on the wisdom of Che Guevara:
".........It is necessary to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution. Terrorism should be considered a valuable tactic when it is used to put to death some noted leader of the oppressing forces well known for his cruelty, his efficiency in repression, or other quality that makes his elimination useful. But the killing of persons of small importance is never advisable.....” (Che Guevara, op cited, pp62-63). “We sincerely believe that terrorism is of negative value, that it by no means produces the desired effects, that it can turn a people against a revolutionary movement......” (Che Guevara, op cited, pp 140).
It is also interesting to note that despite huge collections of tax revenue the LTTE has requested the government for financial assistance to open its peace secretariat in Killinochi. It has also asked for import duty exemption from the Ministry of Finance for the import of FM transmitter and accessories (to run a FM broadcasting service) and a VSAT communication unit, which was reportedly rejected by the Ministry of Finance. In this circumstance, the taxpayers to the LTTE would like to know where the tax monies are going.
The LTTE is in possession of satellite communication for past several years, and therefore the need for another VSAT communication unit (that
too duty-free) rema Are there no more gent needs of the m cation and dialogue requisites for conflict fore, the LTTE's FM ice is timely, but cer exemption obtained Norwegian embassy edging the paramol communication and hope the FM radio b be utilised for the p The most potent we has not been its suici its very effective pi issue of propaganda reflect on a bit of ad from Che Guevara:
"One of the char lutionary prop truth. Little by li masses will be w. vara, op cited, pp ing always the fi ple that truth in bestpolicy” (Che pp.145). “The ra extraordinary However, the ra by the fundame popular propa truth; it is prej truth, small in it a large lie artf (Che Guevara, c
There is also ane the LTTE appropri terials destined for in the Wanni. Goo materials sent by do ter for the returnees replaced with thatc. known that the LT centage of the tende who undertake const ter, roads, rehabilit tanks, etc) in the are trol. Such types of ing place during pea able and a behaviour sole representatives In this background, for the GOSL and t joint custodians oft marked for immed needs and rehabilit in the N&E, becau of both in managi poor.
On December 0 the transport of his

TAMILTIMES 35
ains unexplained. important and urasses? Communiare essential preresolution. Therebroadcasting servtainly not the duty by courtesy of the ... Whilst acknowlunt importance of dialogue we only roadcasting would professed purpose. apon of the LTTE de bombers, rather opaganda. On the it is appropriate to vice for the LTTE
acteristics ofrevoaganda must be tle, inthisway, the pnover” (Che Gue131). "......observIndamental princithe long run is the * Guevara, op cited, tdio is a factor of ітportance........ dio should be ruled ental principle of ganda, which is erable to tell the S dimensions, than ully embellished" p cited, pp 146).
cdotal evidence of ating building mathe returning IDPs d quality building nors to put up shelare reported to be hed huts. It is also TE demands a perr from contractors ruction work (shelation of irrigation as under their conappropriation takcetime is unacceptunbecoming of the of the Tamil nation. it is not advisable he LTTE to be the he donor funds earliate humanitarian ation (and beyond) se the track record ng donor funds is
st the LTTE banned torical and cultural
artefacts from the Jaffna peninsula to the southern parts of the country on the pretext of preserving the symbols of the history and culture of the Tamil nation. Included in this list of banned items are statues/figurines of Hindu religious idols, heirlooms, memorabilia, bronze metalvessels, ola leafmanuscripts, vintage cars, window/doorframes and antique furniture (Virakesari, 01-122002; North Eastern Herald, 06-122002, ppl). Although there is some rationality in banning the commercial exploitation of historical and cultural artefacts, the banning of the transport of vintage cars, window/door frames, and antique furniture are unjustifiable simply because they have nothing to do with the history and culture of the Tamil nation. The vintage cars of Jaffna (Austin A40, Morris Oxford, Morris Minor, etc) are a relic of British colonialism in Sri Lanka. Likewise, window/door frames, and antique furniture found in Jaffna are a relic of Dutch colonialism in Sri Lanka. Hence, to ban the transport of these items in the pretext of preserving the history and culture of the Tamils is absurd. Furthermore, the LTTE seems to be playing the nationalist card as and when it suits their political ends, because the LTTE members (including the ones from the Wanni) don western attire while taking part in the peace negotiations with the GOSL.
The act of banning the transport of above items seems to be a manifestation of economic nationalism practiced by the LTTE ever since 1990. The LTTE's economic policies such as selfreliance control of markets, etc, smacks of economic nationalism. It is high time the LTTE spells out its economic philosophy unambiguously. This is vital for the economic resurgence of the N&E province. The imposition of taxes, prohibitions, etc, in ad hoc manner creates uncertainty among prospective investors in the province. No business can prosper in uncertain conditions and no economy can progress under economic nationalism.
Due to the insular economic policies followed by the LTTE in the past 12 years in the areas undertheir control the majority of the entrepreneurial class has migrated (either voluntarily or involuntarily) from the N&E to the rest of the country (especially to Vavuniya, Colombo and suburbs), particularly the Tamils and Muslims. It is important for the LTTE to create a con

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ducive environment for those who were displaced to re-establish their businesses and invite them to return to their places of origin. Although the LTTE has invited the Muslim traders who were expelled (with just 24 hour notice) from Jaffna and Mannar districts in 1990 to return it was too little too late. The LTTE should go further and pay compensation to these entrepreneurs for the arbitrary and unjust expulsion, because it is the LTTE who ransacked the business premises and homes of the fleeing Muslims. This is the only way to show remorse and instil confidence among the largest minority community in the N&E.
Another group of people the LTTE should encourage to return to their homeland is the Tamil expatriates who had fled the country during the past 20 years. These Tamil expatriates could bring in their skills, knowledge and capital, which are woefully lacking in the N&E. However, these expatriates are accustomed to an entirely new way of life; including freedoms of thought, expression, and movement, which they would expect to enjoy here as well. Therefore, it is the duty of the LTTE to ensure such freedoms should the expatriates decides to return to their homeland. The foreign donors also will be hesitant to put their money where there is no accountability, transparency, and political and economic freedoms.
On the one hand, justifiably, the LTTE is demanding the Sri Lankan armed forces to vacate the private dwellings occupied by them in the N&E province without payment of compensation, particularly in Jaffna. But, on the other hand, the LTTE is occupying deserted private dwellings in Jaffna without payment of compensation. More so, presently the LTTE is inspectingseveral private dwellings in numerous towns and villages in Jaffna to take over. In this respect the predicament of the Jaffna people has not much changed during the current peacetime. Disturbingly, the people of Jaffna are faced with a situation where one tyranny is replaced by another.
Recommendations and Conclusion
The following recommendations are made in order to revive the dormant economy of the N&E after 20 years of civil war:
1. The Sri Lankan armed forces should drastically reduce the size
of the high secu N&E province, Jaffna peninsula not be absolved national security curity was not the period 1990Lankan army w; Palaly base in tl very important f security forcestc dwellings and l province in orde and minds of th also vital to wit the city centre ( to boost busines Remaining restr in the N&zE sh forthwith. The A9 highwa 24-hours a day Further, checkin A9 should be res points (one by th and the other by the present four The traders in th able to engage trade directly. T be able to open the province, Kankesanthurai harbours in the should be deve available for in directly with thi in general, and ticular. For exar India directly anthurai and Po would consider port cost. At the ment is import Point Pedro ha under an Ind Kankesanthurai bounds for col because of a Sr there. The commercia and private) in should be proa businesses and ties with flexib Special circum the N&E warra The LTTE shou ing people in t should ask for businesses for cial services fo The LTTE Sho

15 FEBRUARY 2003
ity zones in the specially in the
This issue canin the pretext of The national sehreatened during 995 when the Sri s confined to the e peninsula. It is or the Sri Lankan vacate all private inds in the N&E to win the hearts : population. It is hdraw fully from f Jaffna in order
|ctions on fishing ould be removed
y should be open 7 days a week. g of goods on the tricted to just two e Sri Lanka Army the LTTE) from points. Le N&E should be in import/export hatis, they should LC at the banks in Besides, the and/or Point Pedro Jaffna peninsula loped and made port/export trade rest of the world with India in parple, imports from to the Kankesnt Pedro harbours ably reduce trans| moment only ce2d directly to the rbour from India ian credit line. harbour is out of mmercial purpose Lanka naval base
banks (both state he N&E province tive in promoting productive activie lending policies. tances such as in ut special services. di refrain from taxe N&E. Instead it sponsorship from ommunity and so
the needy.
uld annually pub
lish the donations/taxes they receive locally and from abroad and how they are expended.
8. The LTTE should dramatically improve their governance — indiscriminate recruitment, harassment of political opponents, occupation of private dwellings without due payment should stop forthwith.
9. The LTTE should desist from undertaking economic activities and running a parallel public administration (including police and judiciary) in their areas of control. They should exclusively concentrate on what they have been doing very successfully in the past two decades; that is, defending the Tamil nation. Fighting a war is hugely different from managing an economy and running a public administrative system. The latter two tasks require completely different skills and knowledge, which the LTTE woefully lacks.
10. In general, the LTTE should drastically reform itself in order to qualify to solely represent the nation of Tamils.
If the two protagonists of the civil war in Sri Lanka, viz. the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces, fail to remove the institutional impediments to economic revival in the North&East province identified in this paper it may be worth exploring the possibility of inviting an United Nations Peacekeeping Force to be stationed in the province for the sake of the wellbeing of the people and the economic prosperity of the Tamil nation of Sri Lanka.
Related writings by the author: 1. "Doing Business in the North&East Province of Sri Lanka: Problems, Opportunities and Challenges', June 2002. "Tigers, Taxes and the Tamils", June 2002.
* A paper presented at a seminar at the University of Jaffna on January 25, 2003. Ó Research Fellow, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not of the ICES. Corrections, comments, and suggestions are welcome to 02, Kynsey Terrace, Colombo-08 or Sarvicaslt.lk

Page 37
15 FEBRUARY 2003
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83.3 辍
Born: 11.12, 1911 Died 31.12.2002 Mr. Saba pathy Chelliah of Mulliyawalai, Mullaitivu, Sri Lanka, beloved husband of Packiam who sadly misses and fondly remembers him; loving father of Nagammah, Siva-rajah (Assistant Director of Education), Thangaluxmy, Dr. (Mrs) Kamalam Subramaniam (Medical Officer, London) and Sinnarajah (Teacher); fatherin-law of Sivarajah (Teacher), Nesarajadevi, Ratnasingham, Subramaniam (British Government National Health Service, London) and Jamuna, grandfather of Ranjana, Sutharsana (Teacher), Sangavai, Kangeiyanan, Kasthuri, Pahinthan, Janarthy, Deluxy and three great grandchildren passed away peacefully at the age of ninety three (93) at his family residence, - Mr. P. & Dr. (Mrs) S. Subramaniam, "ShanmugeSwarar Akam”, 4 Claren don Gardens, Stone, Dartford, Kent DA26EZ. Tel 01322225462.
M & J Den
Experienced Sri Fellowship in Dental Surgery of the F Periodontal, Resto
and Cosmetic Treatment. N Contact: 356 Preston R
Phone: O2O.
 
 
 
 

TAMILTMES 37
IN MEMORAMS
The Tenth Year Remembrance
Mrs Sarojini Devi
Sunthareswaran
(Nee Muthilingasamy) Born: 2006. 1945 Died: 01.02.1993
Sadly missed and remembered with much love and admiration by
Husband, children: SudharShini, Nishan and Romeshan, Mother: Parwathy (Colombo), Brothers: Sivarajah (Croydon), Sivakumar (Houston), Sisters: Arunthathy Pararajasingam (Sydney) and families. - Mrs. S. Peat, 22 Paddick Drive, Lower Early, Reading RG64HH.
First Death Anniversary of late Mr. Suppiah Kanagalingam
Born: 12.01.1922
Died 27.02.2002 In ever loving and precious memory of Mr. Suppiah Kanagalingam, formerly of Ceylon Theatres on the first anniversary of his passing away on
all Surgery lankan Dentists yal College of Surgeons of England tive, Orthodontic
, Private Patients Welcome, ad, Harrow, HA300J
S904- 267S
27th February 2002. Dearly missed and remembered with love and affection by his beloved wife Pavalam, loving children Jayanthi Lingabala, Skanthabalan, Shanmugabalan, Kuhabalan, Suganthi and Amirthi, sons-in-law Balendra, Dr. Sivanesan and Yogeswaran; daughters-in-law Vasuki, lamanthi and Vasanthakumari; grandchildren Karthika, Kavitha, Archana, Vibushna, Myuresh, Kumaresh, Sandra, Robert, Josephine, Kishanie, Nirushan, Shivanthan, Vimalan, Keerthana, Shankari and Gajan, great grandchild Kumaran. - 9 Fosseway, Lichfield, StaffordShire WS14 0AD, Tel: 01543 417 744.
"Loving memories of you are held close to our hearts'
Mr. Chelliah Sivasampu
In loving memory of Mr. Cheliah Sivasampu on the eleventh anniversary of his passing away on 9th March 1992. Sadly missed and fondly remembered by his two sons.- 15 Wolsey Road, Chessington, Surrey KT9 1XG
Jaffna Property
For Sale Prime property in the heart of Jaffna Town suitable for business or domestic venture - 16 LMs. E 88 Clo Tami Times.
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with or without house in Manipay or in the commercial district of Jaffna (Main street, Stanley Road, Hospital Road). Highest price paid. Please reply to email address: foxplay 220hotmail.com

Page 38
38 TAMILTIMES
In Loving Me
Aiyah
C.Subramaniam (Orator) Ninth Year Remembrance
Deeply missed and affectionately remembered
Fifth Death Anniversary Mrs Pakiaratnam Kandiah
In loving memory of Mrs Pakiaratnam Kandiah on the fifth anniversary of her passing away on 3rd February 1998. Fondly remembered and sadly missed by her only sister Mrs Parimalaratnam Thirunavukarasu of Yogarswami's Abode, Colombuthurai, Sri Lanka; children Sivayogaratnam, Sivayoganathan, Sivayogeswary, Sivayogaiswaran and Sivayogan; sons-in-law Varatharajah and Sivathiasan; daughtersin-law Umasakthy, Sivayogi and Amirthavalli; several grandchildren and great grandchildren.-3, New Leasow, Walmley, Sutton Coldfield, Birmingham B76 1YL.
Sixth Death Anniversary
Nothing loved is ever lost Memories last for ever
Sadly missed and lovingly remembered by wife Utaiwan, Children Monti, Manee and Mike, son-in-law Allan, grandSons Nicolas and Colin; 22--1-2-2. mother Rasama nie, Sister Mohandas. K. Samuel Chandra, brothers Indran and (18.1.35 - 4.2.97) Peter and their families.
 
 
 

15FEBRUARY 2003
mory of Our
Amma
Annaratnam Subramaniam First Year Remembrance
by your children, in-laws and grandchildren.
- 29 Mounston Close, Hartlepool TS260LR
Fourth Death Anniversary 10.02.2003
* 愛*
妾
Mrs. Regina. Rajanayagam
Sadly missed and fondly remembered by her beloved husband Rajanayagam, brothers Ratnam, Jesudasan, Anton James and Prince, sister Cecilia Lawrence, brothers-in-law Dr. Arasaratnam and Nadarajah, Sisters-in-law Mrs Anula Arasaratnam, Mrs Parames Selvaratnam and Mrs. Mahes Sivayoganathan, niece Shamini and nephew Anton.
- 13 Arbuthnot Lane, Bexley, Kent DA51EH.
The Fourth Anniversary Mrs Sakthiamma Kanaganayagam
The fourth anniversary of the passing away of Mrs Sakthiатта Катаgaтауаgат, Wife of the late Senator S.R.Kanaganayagam falls on 27th February 2003. She is remembered with deep love and affection by her children, their families, nephews, nieces and a wide Circle of friends.
36 Woodward Avenue, Strathfield, NSW2135, Australia.

Page 39
15 FEBRUARY 2003
In ever lov Thanabalasingham Pararajasingham
భ In ever loving memory of our dearest Aiyah and Amma w tively. We are grateful to God Almighty for blessing us thro Life goes on, but you
Your ever loving children, Son-in-law, daughter-in-law, I - 285 Malden Road, I
Third Year Remembrance Mr. Canagaratnam Balendra
in loving memory of Mr. Canagaratnam Balendra on the third anniversary of his passing away on
18th February 2000.
Sadly missed and fondly remembered by his beloved wife Parameswari; loving daughters Balini, Anushia and Damayanthi; sons-in-law Chelvayogan, Balendran and Sivamohan, grandchildren Gomathie, Meena, Athavan and Anjali.
- 4732 Scenic View Road, Lexington, Kentucky 40514, USA.
Forthcoming Events
Mar 1 Maha Sivaraththiri South London Tamil Welfare Group (SLTWG) Drop in Tel 020 8540 3285, Feast of St. David, Patron of Wales
Mar 2 Arma vasai Mar 4 Feast of St. Casimir Mar 6. Sathurthi Mar 8 Shashti; Feast of St. John of God Mar 9 Karthigai, Feast of St. Francis of Rome Mar 14 Sukka Eekathasi
Mar 15 SLTWG Drop In. Tel: 0208.540 3285
Mar 16 PirathOSarm Mar 17 Full Moon, Feast of St. Patrick, Patron of Ireland. Mar 18 Pankuni Uththiram; Feast of St. Cyril Mar 19 Feast of St. Joseph Mar 21 Sankadakara Sathurthi Mar 23 Feast of St. Turibius Mar 25 Feast of the Annunciation of the Lord, Jesus Christ
 
 
 
 

TAL TIMES 39
ng memory
Sivagamasoundaram Pararajasingham
ho departed this world an year and five years ago respecugh the love and affection of the two great souls for so long.
will always be missed
ephews, nieces, grandchildren and great grandchildren.
New Malden KT3 6AH.
Mar 29 Krishna Eekathasi
Mar 29 PirathoSarn
Please Note
Apr 12 Saturday 11 a.m. Colombuthurai Yoga Swamigal Abhisekham and Guru Poo-jah followed by Prasatham at Sree Ganapathy Temple, 123 Effra Road, London SW 19. All welCOne. At Bhavan Centre, 4A Castletown Road, London W14 9HQ. Tel: 020738130864608 - Website:www.bhavan.net. Mar 1 6 p.m. Maha Sivaratri Celebrations - Devotional Songs, traditional puja and Prasad. All welcome. Mar 165 p.m. Holi Celebration with a mix of Dance, Colour, Costume and Music. Mar 28 to Apr 4 - Karnatic Vocal Music Workshop by Prof. T. V.Gopalakrishnan Mar 30 6 p.m.
Siva Bhumi (Jaffna) Cancer Aid Concert - Karnatic Vocal by Krishni Ramesh - A promising young student at the Bhavan.
WEDDING BELLS
We congratulate the following couples on their recent wedding.
Dr. Sadhish Kumar, Son ofDr. and Mrs Sivananthan of 2330 Bridletown Circle, Unit 2007, Toronto M1 W 3P6, Canada and Dr. Anbu daughter of Mr. P and Mrs. S. SomaSundaram of 48 Claverdale Road, London SVV22DP On St Novernber 2002 at ' The Classic Room, The Paradise Banquet Hall, Concord, Ontario, Canada.
The bride's parents held a well attended reception at Royal Memorial Hall, Norbury, London SW16 on 28th December 2002. They wish to thank all their friends and relatives, who kindly responded to their invitation.

Page 40
40 TAM TIMES
Jeevarani Shanthini, daughter of Mrs Leela Navaratnam and late Dr. Joseph Navaratnam and Anton Gerrard, son of Mr. Wilfred and Mrs. Mary Nacholas on 1st February 2003 at St. Pauls Church, Milagiriya, Galle Road, Colombo 4, Sri Lanka.
Friday the 13th September 2002 was a blessed day for many when the 'good vision of the youth' took to the fore and all the hard efforts of young Suresh culminated into a good day for the needy children of Sri Lanka. It was at the Beck Theatre in Hayes, Middlesex that Suresh Swaminathan took to the stage to perform for the first time in the UK following his arangetram at the New Kathiresan Hall in Colombo, about nine months earlier. This time it was to be a charity event.
On his return from Sri Lanka, having seen the hardship endured by the people, mainly children, in the war-torn homelands, Suresh embarked on a mission with a vision. He wanted to stage this performance to raise funds to assist the needy with the help of his committed parents, Dr. and Mrs. Swaminathan of Radlett. HertfordShire and in association with the Tamil Union of Herts, of which the family has long been active members.
The auditorium was packed to capacity and the stage was treated to some imaginative, simple but charming arrangements. Suresh was presented by his gurus Smt. Pushkala Gopal on Nattuvangam and Sri Unnikrishnan of Mudralaya. They were accompanied by the young and talented vocalist Yadavan, the Miruthangam maestro himself Bavani Shankar, illustrious lindian musicians Sri Ragavaraman (flute) and Sri Bangalore R. Raghuram (violin) and another successful home product Snt Meera Shanthikaram On Veena. Together they were able to produce a marvelous fusion of musical sounds that set the standard for what was to follow.
The repertoire was well balanced and beautifully guided by the compere Divya Krishnamoorthy. It commenced with Vinayaka Sthurthi - a homage to Lord
Suresh's Bharathanatyam wit
Sivaan ujan, son of nathan of 34 Wilc 6153, Western Aus daughter of Mr. & Mrs of 27/2, 5th Lane, CC ruary 2003 at "Liber linn Hotel, Colombo3
Ganesha — which w tle, melodic deliver prompted the firs Panchakam depictin disciple of Lord Shi participant in the An ing maththalam in l mic and swaying at Were beautifully ev This was followed Nrithyopaharam. T. dence of Suresh 'S tion to this fine art dit as he was well able ous rhythmic patter sions with very nea lent sense of rhythn After the interr, formed Kirthanan, lowed by Patham a Thillana - pure danc mic explorations. Tl posed by Suresh's Gopal using the Brahmashiri Kaila Suresh's grandfath Vadivambikai of great confidence again, he was able ing elements of Bha rhythm, abhinayan eloquenty. The d. Stamina were me Suresh's understa the emotions an outstanding.
The programm nal climax of Spee good sense of rhyt appreciative audie, finish at the end of
The Tamil Un 1983, has been in ous organisations of the needy Tami Lanka. The Union' financially benefit disabled people, rehabilitation Cen gee homes and tions. The Union ways, been able ti thousand pounds purposes. With o agement, if the v Suresh is kept ali of the needy will í Well done Sures,
 
 
 

15 FEBRUARY 2003
r. & Mrs. S. SivaStreet, Andross ia and Subathra, . Puwana Chandran mbo 3, con 6th FebBallroom, Holiday
S a real treat, a Subby Yadhavan. That dance Nandhisa Nandhikeswara, the a, who is an eternal nda Nadanan holds hands. The rhythibutes of this dance ked by the dancer. by Jathiswaram and ere was ample eviedication and devoring the performance to dea With the variis and facial expresfootwork and excel
I. mission, Suresh perthen Ashtapadi folnd the exciting finale !e with exciting rhythis Thilana was Conguru Smt. Pushkalla Sanskrit text of sanatha Kurukkal - r- and is dedicated to Munneswaran. With and enjoyment once to grace the fascinatrathanatyam such as S and mudras rather mand of power and with relative ease. ding and portrayal of f compassion were
2 was brought to a fi, fluid movement and m and SureSh held the ze spellbound to a fine in enthralling evening. in of Herts founded in le forefront of the varihampioning the cause speaking people in Sri Charitable efforts have d many initiatives for ucational institutions, ?s, orphanages, refuman rights organisasall along, in its small nusteron average two year for its charitable gratitude and encouron of youngsters like the hopes and spirits ays be burning bright.
Logan Rasiah
Mr. Rajaratam
Thanabalasooriyar
An Appreciation
Mr. Rajaratam Thanabalasooriyar, fondly known as Thanabal by friends and colleagues, born on 10th December 1923 in Vaddukoddai, Srilanka passed away on 2nd January 2003. After his primary education at Jaffna College, Vaddukoddai, he joined St. John's College, Jaffna, when his parents moved to their ancestral home in Nallur behind the famous Kandasamy Temple. He left St. John's College in 1940 and when World War II broke out joined the CGA Battalion of the Ceylon Army and had risen to the rank of Sergeant Major when he was demobilised. Thanabal joined the Ceylon Government Railway as an Under Guard on 1st September 1946 and retired as a Class I, Head Guard after 35 years of loyal and devoted service.
On 27th August 1952, Thanabal marnied Menakai and they were blessed with a daughter and two sons. After retirement he and his wife migrated to UK to join their children and their families. He was a founder member of the Srilanka Railway Past Employees Welfare Association and took a keen interest in its activities till he fell ill in 1999. Even after being confined to a wheelchair, he partook of most of the Social activities of his friends and relatives with the loyal support of his wife and children.
Thanabal was a dedicated social worker and his life was marked by his friendly attitude to those around him. He gave valuable support to all those who approached him for help especially those Tamils displaced from their homes in Srilanka. He was sincere, honest and genuine and bore an unblemished char. acter, a self effacing personality of unassuming manners. Thanabal and Menakai celebrated their golden wedding anniversary in a grand manner on 31st August 2002. I was privileged to take part in these celebrations and spoke as a longstanding friend of Thanabal having studied with him and known him intimately at St. John's College and in the railways where both of us worked.
Thanabal was a loving husband, proud father and affectionate grandfather, who valued friends and friendship and was a good samaritan too. The members of the Srilanka Railway Past Employees Association join my wife and myself in conveying our heartfelt condolences to his loving wife, children and other members of the family and pray that the Almighty would grant them the inner strength to bear this irreparable loss. The large gathering present at his funeral on 5th January was undoubtedly a testimony of the respect, regard and love they had for him.
May his soul rest in peace.
- M. Balas un dram

Page 41
15 FEBRUARY 2003
Mr.C.Viyakespara
An Appreciation
The sudden and untimely passing away of Mr. Canagasabai Viyakesparan, fondly known as Viyakes by family and friends, on 13th December 2002, came as a shock to everyone who knew him. He was born on 29th April 1932 in the village of Allaveddy in Jaffna, the only other sibling being his sister Viyageswari. He had his primary education at Alaveddy Arunothaya School followed by the secondary education at Badulla Uva College, Kalmunai Fatima School and finally at Batticaloa St. Michaels.
Viyakes did his higher education at the Ceylon Technical College, Colombo and qualified in Motor Engineering.
His first employment was at the Trade and Transport department of the Jaffna Cooperative. Soon afterwards he was promoted to the post of Manager and gained a reputation of being a friendly and patient person, well liked by all who came into contact with him. These qualities of
friendships and ass into his life in Englar He married Ne daughter of Mr. & M 24th October 1960 happily in Sandilipa Son Jivit was born. In eeded to London anc ing Automobile Engit ortunity to join Camde this employment enjo and called Neela ano was born in 1963) ov Life in UK was C. roSeiS. With Sheer det age, he was able to cles andestablish hin took a daring step in return with his family quaint his children W. the hope of settling th nessed the entry of short sojourn, he retu
Kumar Shivashanka's
Bharafia Natya Arang
Kumari Shivashankari, student of Smt. Guna vathy Shakespeare had her Bharatha Natya Arangetram on the 5th of October at the Logan Hall, University of London. Her performance was of a very high standard and she held the audience absolutely spellbound from beginning to end, supported by an excellent and renowned team of musicians led by the famous Ara VindakShan from Chennai, other accompanying artists being Shri Balachandar on Mirudangam, Shri Shiva Ganesh on Violin, Pitchaiappah Gnanavarathan on Flute and Kumari Abirami Gnanasambandan on Veena.
The performance commenced with Ganesh Vandanam in praise of Lord
Ganesh in the dynan lowed by Alarippu. Shankari's excellence neat footwork was se Jathis waran in 'Sa While the Shabdam i Misra Chapu beautifu skill in abinaya desc depicting his differen most challenging iten the Varnam "Roopar Raga Adi Tala, c Kalakshetra fame Arundale. Indeed thi was portrayed most S dancer invoking Lorc Salvation as his dev Stunned the audienc ble rhythmic sense, p Charm.
The Second half connenced with the Koothadinar Raga liru Here, she delighted So much SO that the Niththyananthan Shivashankari that S than the COSmic dar dancing in the Golde the Padam in Ragama contrast, a much app Chakra Rajasimhasa cated to Shivashanka Sri Lanka and the a
 
 

TAMILTIMES 41
ociations continued d until the last.
lambal, youngest rs. Sittampalam on ind they were living , when their eldest 1962, Viyages procwhile he was studyleering, had an oppn Libraries. He found yable and Satisfying children (Branavan er to join him. artainly not a bed of 9rmination and COurOverconne all obstaself interestingly he 1969 - this time to ' to Sri Lanka fo acth their roots and in ere. This period witSenthuran. After a rned to the UK, went
back to his former employment and reestablished the family. His interest in furthering the education of his three sons was of paramount importance and he was happy during his retired life that he had made the correct decision to get back to the UK. His sons are now highly qualified professionals and he was justifiably proud Of them.
Besides his inimitable ways and warm smile, he was highly methodical and regularly contacted his old friends and relatives. He always maintained a patient and calm nature and endeavoured to be helpful to them and is badly missed by them. Despite their long stay in the UK, Neela and Viyages successfully maintained their Cultural traditions intact - a rare achievement to their Credit.
Viyages is no more, but fond memories of him will always be with us. Our heartfelt condolences and deepest sympathies go to his loving wife Neela; sons Jivit, Branavan and Senthuran, daughtersin-law and grandchildren who adored him. May his soul rest in perfect peace
S.P.Pathmanathan
ic Raga Natai folThereafter Shivain rhythm, Tala and 2en in the elaborate veri' Rupaka Tala, n Ragamalikai Tala tly demonstrated her ribing Lord Muruga t stages in life. The of the evening was na Joochi" in Thodi horeographed by Smt. Rukmani s demanding piece kilfully by the young Shiva to grant her tee. Shivashankari with her impeccaTre dance, grace and
of the performance eerthanam 'Ananda shabapriya Tala Adi. he audience greatly Guest of Honour Dr paid tribute to he was none other cer Lord Natarajah Hall. The next item likai Adi Tala was a reciated Song 'Shri neShwari' Was dediri's family Temple in dience were totally
captivated by her bhava.
The piece that followed was indeed a treat to the audience as ShivaShankari brilliantly interpreted the miracles performed by Lord Vishnu - with her swift skilful footwork, abinaya and grace together with the expert rendering by the musicians, the ever popular Keerthanam "En Palli Kondeer lyah?” in Ragamalikai Adi Tala. The programme was ably compered by Mr Wimal Sockanathan and the vote of thanks was given by Shivashankari's brother Chenduran.
The Chief Guest Snt. BalaSundari Prathalingam and the Guests of Honour Dr Niththyananthan and Mr Moorthy, former High Commissioner for Sri Lanka in UK paid tribute to the dedication and skill of the young dancer, the Guru, Musicians and Parents. The Arangetram drew to a close with the Thillana, in Parasu Tala Adi, a joyful exuberant dance with sculptural poses and rhythmic footwork. The grand finale in the repertoire was a Bhajan for Lord Bhagawan Shri Sathya Sai in HindOluf Adi Tala - “Dhiriki Dhimiki Dhirn” followed by the Aarthi Bhajan which was performed with pristine sacredness by Shivashankari, which moved the awe stricken audience - Sai devotees to shed tears of joy.
Logan Hall was filled to capacity and the whole programme was greatly enjoyed by the appreciative audience and made it a very special evening for all. Shivashankari's parents Dr and Mrs Shanmuganathan can be very proud of their daughter's achievement.
- Kannan

Page 42
42 AML TIMES
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Page 44
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