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A HISTORY OF THE UPCOUNTRY TAMIL PEOPLE
S. NadeSan
A NANDALALA PUBLICATION
SRI LANKA 1993

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First Published 1993
ISBN 955-92S2-00-3
C) SITHAMPERAM NADESAN
Printed in Sri Lanka
BY RANCO PRINTERS AND PUBLISHERS LTD.
COLOMBO 3.

Dedicated
The memory of my mother, the late Kamachi Ammal, who in my childhood days, taught me to love the plantation workers and the Sinhalese rural folks in the villages around Syston Estate, Kandy, where we lived until the end of World War II.

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Publisher's Note
Explaining the nature of the birth of Capital, Marx wrote that if money had come into this world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek, capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.
In a way, so does tea.
Perhaps, in relation to tea, the expropriation of the labouring poor and the corresponding transformation of their means of production into capital, did not take place in terms of "enclosures", as was the case in England. It may be that the expropriation assumed different forms in the Case of Plantation economies.
Yet, the content seems to be the very same - Violence.

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It is through Marx that we learn the capabilities of the British in creating famines. He records that between the year 1769 and 1770 the British had manufactured a famine in India by buying up all the rice and refusing to sell it again except at a fabulous price. In the province of Orissa alone, in the year of 1866, over a million people had died of hunger, the reason being the exclusive trade monopoly of the British.
Quoting one of the lists laid before Parliament by the East India Company, Marx shows how the Company was able to enrich itself by 6,000,000 pounds between the years 1757 and 1766 by way of gifts alone from the Indians.
The gradual decomposition of the pre-existing system, coupled with the combined systems of Ryotwary and torture, set the stage for a new process of forced migration of the rural poor.
Mr.Nadesan lucidly proceeds to record the violence which had accompanied the birth of the Plantation system and the subsequent violence which continues to persist upto the present day. We may note that the persistence of violence against labour has been a mojor strategic aspect of preserving and maintaining the Plantation economy.
The infamous Citizenship Act, the repatriation process and the related laws, the Agreements between Indian and Sri Lankan Governments on plantation labour, the carnages that took place between 1977 - 1983 (particularly the pogrom of 1981 which was notably Confined to Certain specific plantation areas) - all these events and process need to be viewed in that light.
The author also records the birth and evolution of the revolt OCCurred within the plantation system, a revolt which could have easily identified itself with the struggles of other expropriated classes of this country, if not for the prejudices of the pettibourgeois, which class, at many instances displayed an element of social chauvinism in a somewhat Veild form posing as "economic" and "market" theories as well as "fifth-Columnist" approaches which have attempted in a profoundly erroneous manner to explain the crisis of the plantation economy.

It is in this context it has become imperative to present before other expropriated classes of this Country, the true account of the people's history of the Tamil people of the plantations.
It is to the credit of Mr. Nadesan that he provides us a fair account of the history of the plantation system as a whole. His presentation of this history seems to differ in essence from many other studies on this subject, perhaps due to the fact that the different classes of our society have different perspectives and approaches towards the plantation system.
When Mr. Nadesan completed this notable work, he brought to Our attention his desire to publish it with the support of the Sweat of the expropriated labour of the plantation system and the rest of the country rather than with the blessings of any outside funders.
Hence, Our Commitment.
Many debts of gratitude have been incurred by us in the course of publishing this text.
We are grateful to Mr. P.Suthanthiraraj, Mr.K.K.Kumara, Ms.Shamini and many others for the help they gave us in numerous ways including the time-consuming task of checking references and reading proofs. Our thanks are also due to Messers. S.Satgunarajah who handled page lay-out and laser print-outs, and S.Sugumar who handled the Computer feeding.
We are particularly thankful to Messers. S.Sivapiragasam and C.Rathakrishnan, without whose initiative, involvement and encouragement, this work would have never been published by us.
L.Jothikumar on behalf of Nandalala Publishers Hatton, Sri Lanka.

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PREFACE
Aspiring to write a history of the Indians in Sri lanka, the majority of whom were plantation workers, I had gathered newspaper clippings and notes from various libraries beginning with the British Museum Reading Room. But unfortunately, most of these collections were destroyed by arsonists during the communal violence of July 1983. Though this greatly disheartened me, the aspiration to Write the historylingered on.
Some years later, lamenting the absence of a comprehensive history of the Indians, Tamil writers, who had gathered at a meeting in Kandy, proposed that should undertake the task of Writing such a history. Though they persuaded me to believe that I was the "proper man" for this task, I knew that without resources for research and the necessary facilities to do the actual writing - both of which lacked - such a task was indeed beyond me.
However, in 1987, Fr. Paul Caspersz allowed me the use of Satyodaya's compact little library in Kandy for this purpose and I wish to express my gratitude for his kind gesture and also

thank him for some valuable suggestions he made after reading through most of the original drafts. It took me three years to complete my work since had to research at the Sri Lanka National Archives and other libraries and also engage myself actively in trade union work.
I am grateful to Dr. Kumari Jayawardena for reading through all
but the last three chapters of the book and for her over-all comments which greatly encouraged me. My special thanks
are due to Ms. Elizabeth Harris for reading through most of the
drafts and for the useful suggestions she made. I must also express my appreciation to my friends who encouraged me in
my writings especially by lending me some useful books. Of
course, I am greatly indebted to the authors of the books and
the sources mentioned in the bibliography.
I have endeavored to write a realistic history of the Indians, whose leaders and intellectuals are increasingly using the nomenclature - Up-Country Tamils - thus drawing a distinction not only from the indigenous Tamils in Sri Lanka but also from the Tamils in India. And, I am very grateful to my friend L.Jothikumar and his colleagues for undertaking the task of publishing my work.
My thanks are also due to Mr. N. Vijayaratnam and Staff of Messrs Ranco Printers and Publishers Limited for their co-operation in bringing out this publication.
It is my sincere hope that this work would contribute in a small way to fulfil a long-felt need of a comprehensive history of Sri Lanka's Indians.
S. Nadesan Matakuliya Colombo August 1992

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The plantation workers, who were the most opposed and exploited group of workers, in the island had many forms of resistance before the emergence of trade unionism in that sector, in the 1930's. Although much has been written on the economics of the plantation sector in Sri Lanka, there is no record of the struggles of plantation workers whose labour contributed so much to the economy. Mr.S.Nadesan's book on history of the exploitation of these workers and their battles for economic and political rights is the first study of its kind and is a pioneer contribution to a people's history of Sri Lanka.
Nadesan's deep knowledge of the struggles of plantation labour arises from his long participation in the trade union and political movements in the plantations. This valuable book should be read by all those interested in the recent history of our Country. The plantation peoples' militant and courageous actions to achieve a better life, has been well documented by Mr.Nadesan and will be an important source book for both the general reader and the specialist. The book should be translated into Tamil and Sinhala and also issued in popular form so that the Tamil and Sinhala people be made aware of the contribution of the plantation workers to the fight for economic justice and social change in Sri Lanka.
Dr. Kumari Jayawardena Colombo, 1993

Abbrreviations
A.C.E.W.U. A.P.C. A.R.
B.C. C.A.R. C.D.M.K. C.E.E.F. C.E.S.U. C.F.L. C.F.T.U. C.C. C.I.W.F. C.J.H.S.S. C.L.U. C.M.U. C.N.C. C.O. C.O.L. C.P. C.P.W.U. O.T.U.P. C.W.C. D.J.V. D.M.K. D.P.A. D.P.L.F. E.F.C. E.P.F. F.P. I.C.F.T.U.
I.G. . J.C.P.T.U. J.E.D.B. J.P.T.U.C. J.S.S. J.V.P. L.E.W.U.
All Ceylon Estate Workers Union All Party Conference Administration Report Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact Ceylon Administration Report Ceylon Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Ceylon Estate Employeres Federation Ceylon Estate Staffs Union Ceylon Federation of Labour Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions Ceylon Indian Congress Ceylon Indian Workers' Federation Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies Ceylon Labour Union Ceylon Mercantile Union Ceylon National Congress Colonial Office
Cost of Living
Communist Party Ceylon Plantation Workers Union Ceylon Trade Union Federation Ceylon Workers Congress Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Democratic Peoples' Alliance Democratic Peoples' Liberation Front Employers Federation of Ceylon Employees' Providend Fund Federal Party international Confederation of Free Trade Union
Inspector General of Police Joint Committee of Plantation Trade Unions Janatha Estates Development Board Joint Plantation Trade union Committee Janatha Sevaka Sangamaya Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Lanka Estate Workers Union

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L.J.E.W.U. L.S.S.P. L.T.T.E. M.E.P. M.I.R.U.E. N.A.D.S.A.
N.S.S.P. N.U.W. P.A.C. P.R.U. P.T.A.
S.A.A.R.C.
S.I.D.A. S.L.A. S.L.F.P. S.L.I.T.U.F.
S.L.M.P. S.L.N.A. S.P. Τ.Ο. T.R.R.O. T.U.L.F. U.A.R. U.L.F. U.F.
U.N.C.E.F.
U.N.P. U.P.W.U. U.S.A. W.F.T.U.
Lanka Jathika Estate Workers Union Lanka Sama SAmaja Party Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Mahajana Eksath Peramuna Movement of Inter Racial Justice and Equality National Agricultural Diversification and Settlement Authority Nava Sama Samaja Party National Union of Workers Planters Association of Ceylon Plantation Restructuring Unit Prevention of Terrorism (Special Provisions) Act South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Swedish International Development Authority Special Living Allowance Sri Lanka Freedom Party Sri Lanka Independent Federation Sri Lanka Mahajana Party Sri Lanka National Archives Sessional Paper (All Ceylon) Tamil Congress Tamil Refugees Rehabilitation Organisation Tamil United liberation Front United Arab Republic
United Left Front United Front United Nations Educational Fund United National Party United Plantation Workers Union United Socialist Alliance World Federation of Trade Unions
Trade Union
Interantional Children's

Contents
Sri Lanka and the British
British Rule in India and the Creation of the Indian Market
The Coffee Plantations and Recruitment of Indian Labour
Progress of the Plantation Economy and the Immigrant Workers
Organised immigration and Indian People's Protest Against the Cooly Trade
Constitutional Reforms, Franchise and Plantation Workers
The Great Awakening
Trade Unions and the Revolt against the Planters' Raj
Repatriation, Disabilities and the Indo-Ceylon Problem
15
28
49
63
83
108
121

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10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Independence and the Citizenship Acts
The Stateless Million
A Divided People
United Front Government and the Plight of Plantation
Workers
Plantation Workers' Struggles from 1945 to 1973
Jayewardene Regime: Communal Riots and Up-Country Tamils
Estate Schools - Their Problems and Progress
Joint Strikes of Plantation Workers
Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections
Conclusion
Appendix Index
145
159
183
211
237
251
283
307
325
348
352 361

Chapter
SRI LANKAAND THE BRITISH
The Portuguese were the first Europeans to invade the island. Under Don Lorenzo de Almeida, son of the Portuguese Viceroy of India, they entered Galle in 1505, and by the end of the 16th century, became rulers of the maritime provinces including Jaffna. But in 1658, the Portuguese lost to the more powerful Dutch. The Dutch, after consolidating their position in the coastal maritime areas, made futile military raids on the Kandyan Kingdom, which functioned independently in the central mountainous region. Their

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2 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
rule lasted for nearly 150 years, and in 1796, they surrendered their territories to an expedition sent out by Lord Hobart, the British Governor of the Presidency of Madras.
Unlike the Portuguese and the Dutch, who were chiefly interested in the spice trade, the English had their eyes on the strategic Trincomalee harbour which served them as an excellent naval base to defend their possessions in India and the Far East. The maritime provinces of Sri Lanka were at first attached to the Madras Presidency and were administered by the English East India Company. A most oppressive system of trade was imposed upon the people and the collection of revenue was under the charge of Robert Andrews of the Madras Civil Service. In 1802, however, the control of the East India Company was abolished and Sri Lanka became a crown colony under the Colonial Office. Frederick North (1798 - 1805) was appointed the first British Governor of Sri Lanka.
The British Governors, aided by some treacherous native chiefs, made several attempts to conquer the Kandyan Kingdom lodged securely in the hill country. But the king, Kannusamy of South Indian descent, who was acclaimed as Sri Wickrama Rajasinghe, repelled the attackers successfully with guerilla tactics for a number of years. However, in 1815, Governor Robert Brownrigg's (1812-1820) forces occupied Kandy, the hill capital, and held the king a prisoner at Vellore fort in Madras.
On the departure of Governor Robert Brownrigg in February 1820, Edward Barnes took over the government of the Colony as Lieutenant Governor. To consolidate the British position, especially in the Kandyan region, Barnes built a military road connecting Colombo with Kandy.
The Plantations
During Dutch rule, spices such as cinnamon and pepper were cultivated. And coffee had been grown by the peasants in small holdings as a supplimentary cash crop to their cultivation of rice. The Dutch, however, dissuaded large-scale cultivation of coffee in view of their production in Java. On the other hand, the British Governor Barnes, encouraged the establishment of coffee

Sri Lanka and the9 British 3
plantations, and the cultivation of this 'bitter berry' was to constitute the chief industry for over half a century. In those days coffee was king in the European market, and many administrative officials aspired to own a coffee estate. Sir James Emerson Tennent, Colonial Secretary from 1845 to 1850, writes:
The moment was rendered propitious by a concurrence of favourable circumstances; the use of coffee had been largely increased in the United Kingdom by the remission of one half the import duty in 1825 - a measure under the impetus of which the consumption nearly doubled itself within three years, and went on augmenting till it outstripped the powers of production in the West Indies, and raised the value of coffee to such a pitch that the produce of India and Ceylon came into rapid demand at highly remunerative prices.'
The British capitalists had amassed capital by the most despicable means and from diverse Sources. One of the Chief Sources of their capital accumulation was the plunder and undisguised loot of India. Marx writes:
But the coasting trade of India and between the islands, as well as the internal trade were the monopoly of the higher employees of the company. The monopolies of salt, opium, betel and other commodities were inexhaustible mines of wealth. The employers themselves fixed the price and plundered at will the unhappy Hindus. The Governor General took part in this private traffic. His favourites received contracts under conditions whereby they, cleverer than the alchemists, made gold out of nothing. Great fortunes sprung up like mushrooms in a day, primitive accumulation went on without the advance of a shilling. The trial of Warren Hastings swarms with such cases.’
it will be seen elsewhere in this volume that quite a number of coffee planters were, in fact, former officials of the East India Company. It would, therefore, not be an exaggeration to say that India had also contributed to the capital investments in Sri Lanka. Through India and other exploitative ventures, the British capitalists had gained capital sufficient to realize their dreams of establishing coffee estates in Sri Lanka, but, without land and labour, capital would only rot in their coffers.
Land
The major portion of the hill country then was clad in evergreen forests. This region formed a fourth of the island's area of about 25,000 square miles. Many rivers naturally had their sources in the

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4. A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
hill country. The soil was rich and the climate suitable for the development of the plantation industry. In 1825, Governor Barnes established a coffee plantation at his own estate at Gannoruwa adjoining the present Botanical Gardens at Peradeniya. Soon thereafter adventurers and civil servants of the British Colonial administration poured greedily into the Kandyan region.
Land was taken over by the Crown under the Crown Land Ordinance of 1840 and the Waste Land Ordinance of 1897. The British administrators declared that all lands other than those for which clear titles of ownership could be shown belonged to the crown. The poor Sinhalese peasants could hardly fulfill this monstrous condition. Administrative officials had no qualms in making gifts of land to themselves or buying at nominal costs. Tennent writes that in 1836, " nearly four thousand acres of mountain forests were felled and planted, and in an incredibly short time the sale of crown lands exceeded forty thousand acres per annum." Between 1834 and 1843 an area of 247,128 acres of the so-called Crown land was bought up. One individual alone appropriated 30,825 acres at 5 shillings each. In this way the colonial capitalists took the land, fixed a price on it and bought the very same land, an ingenious method of stealing other people's lands
Yet, it would be wrong to contend that as a result of the development of the coffee industry the Sinhalese peasantry, especially the Kandyan peasants, had to face a shortage of land for their agricultural pursuits. The historian, K.M. De Silva, writes:
To what extent did land sales of plantations act as a constraint on peasant agriculture? If one were to confine one's answer to the coffee era proper, and the Kandyan area and especially the Central Province, it would appear that there was an adequate supply of land in the periphery of the villages for the potential cultivation needs of the immediate future. The population of the Central Province in the mid 1850s has been estimated at 150,000 and on this computation the peasants of the Central Province had quite adequate resources of land for paddy cultivation and for chenas' during the coffee era, i.e., c. 1830 to c. 1880, despite the fact that the population more than doubled in the same period and despite the conversion of at least 50,000 acres of chena into 'native' coffee. Nor must it be forgotten that much of the expansion of cultivation in coffee in the years from 1860 to 1880 was away from the Central Province, into Uva and Sabragamuwa where vast unbroken tracks of virgin forests (as in Haputale and the wilderness of the Peak) in mountainous regions, with little or no population, were brought into cultivation.'

Sri Lanka and the British 5
Newton Gunasinghe, who examined the rural sector in Sri Lanka, based on a study of villages in Kandyan area in the light of Gramsci’s concept of extreme social disintegration, Writes:
Much has been written on the disastrous impact that the expansion of plantations had on the Kandyan peasantry. Undoubtedly, the plantations contributed to peasant pauperization. One however should not lose sight of the simultaneous reproduction of the peasant economy. The plantations occupied the waste land bordering the villages and the hilltops. But the village itself consisting of residential compounds, gardens and paddy plots was not acquired by the plantations. Herein lies the crucial distinction between the European enclosure movements and the expansion of the plantations in the Kandyan region. The enclosure movement did not merely disrupt peasant production; it got rid of it entirely by the simple means of integrating the farm into a large production unit and evicting the tenant cultivator. No such mass scale eviction of peasants from the paddy lands they cultivated occurred in the Kandyan region... In the village itself the peasant continued his production in progressively worsening conditions within the web of archaic relations.
Labour
abour was not easy to obtain for clearing the virgin jungles and planting the highlands with coffee. It was a tough problem even for those early enthusiastic planters. The total population of the island, according to the census of 1827, was no more than a million and the overwhelming majority of the people lived in the villages. They remained bound to their traditional occupation of rice cultivation and Cottage industries. The Kandyan Sinhalese villagers especially were largely self sufficient and they cultivated 'chenas' out of the great forests around them as and when it pleased them.
The initial attempts to draw upon Sinhalese labour for the plantations ended in futility. The Low-country Sinhalese labour introduced into the Kandyan districts was found to be both costly and undependable. In 1833 the Colebrook Commissioners recommended the abolition of compulsory labour known as 'rajakariya', but even this act did not release the labour required for the coffee plantations. These circumstances compelled the British planters to abandon their efforts to recruit indigenous labour for the plantation industry and turn to other sources of labour.
Time was when boys in their teens were rounded up in the streets of London to work in the tobacco plantations of Virginia,

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USA. The Spanish conquistadors in South America used to grab vast territories as estates and often seize with them the resident American Indians as labourers. These practices were, of course, out of the question in the 19th century; more subtle methods of meeting capitalist requirements became necessary.
The revolts of the Negro slaves in the West indies had finally led to the abolition of slavery in the British colonies in 1833, and so there was no possibility of bringing in African labour. The recruitment of Chinese labour was considered but was given up as impracticable. In this gloomy situation, India was the one source that came to fulfil the labour requirements of the plantations in Sri Lanka.
NOTES
Sir James Emerson Tennent, Ceylon, Colombo: Tisara Press, 1977, Vol.II, p.732, Karl Marx, Capital, Moscow, 1977, Vol.II, p.704.
Tennent, Vol.II, p.734
Ferguson's Directory, Colombo, 1938, p.1175 'Chenas' are lands cultivated with cereals by slash and burn methods. KM.De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981, p.295. Newton Gunesinghe "Agrarian relations, in the Kandyan Countryside in Relation to the Concept of Extreme Social Disintegration',Social Science Review, No.l., Sept. 1979, pp.18 - 19.
7

Chapter.
BRITISH RULE IN INDA AND THE CREATION OF THE INDIAN LABOUR MARKET
There is a widely held belief that India has always been a land of poverty, and that was the chief reason for millions of Indians emigrating to other countries seeking employment during the 19th and the early part of the 20th centuries. In Sri Lanka, even some scholars have been influenced by this. But, as we shall see, such conceptions are not in keeping with historical facts.

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Not far from Sri Lanka lay India, and for all her backwardness, she was by no means poor. India was known for her fabulous wealth-gold, spices, silk and cotton goods only three centuries ago. It was to reach this El Dorado that the Portuguese and the Spanish sailors strained every effort to discover an open sea route to india, for they were determined to break the monopoly of the Eastern trade then held by the Turks and the Arabs. And, in 1498, The portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama successfully rounded the Cape of Good Hope - then the "Cape of Storms" - and reached Calicut on the Western Coast of India.
Though the Portuguese discovered a new route to India, it was Britain that finally subjugated this ancient land twenty times its size. India had its Achilles heel - a feudal society in decay. The British East India Company (founded in 1600), the most notorious of all great chartered companies, began to control the destiny of India. It was only in 1858, by a special edict of Queen Victoria, that the East India Company was dissolved and its functions were handed over to the Crown. It is useful to know the developments in India that eventually led to the creation of a gigantic labour market, next in importance only to Africa, and the migration of millions of her peoples to foreign lands.
The Plunder of India
A number of trading stations were established by the East India Company along the coast. For a hundred years the East India company was no more than a ruthless business agency; fattening on the profits it reaped, it developed into a giant monopoly.
With the death of Aurangazeb in 1707 the Mughal power fell into decay, and India lapsed into a state of confusion and anarchy. The inevitable break-up of the old order of society took place, but the evolution of society from feudalism to capitalism was interrupted by the aggressive East India Company.
England had so little to offer for the goods she took from the East. India had no use for woollen goods, England's chief industry then, and therefore England had to pay back in gold and silver. England's trade with India, therefore, meant a great drain

British Rule in Indle and Croatlon of indian Labour Market 9
on her gold and silver, and the system of mercantile capitalism would not reconcile itself with this kind of trade. Methods other than fair trading had to be found. The Company, in fact, began to extract goods paying little or nothing for them. Marx wrote: "During the whole course of the 18th century the treasures transported from India to England were gained much less by comparatively insignificant commerce, than by the direct exploitation of that country, and by the colossal fortunes they extorted and transmitted to England."
The historian D.D. Kosambi Writes:
The country had an immense feudal and pre-feudal accumulation of wealth which did not turn directly into modern capital. A great deal was expropriated by the British in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Only when it reached England did it bring about the great industrial revolution in that country and become converted into modern capital in the strict sense of the term by being tied to mechanized production. The change increased the drain upon India's resources because the administration and military establishment steadily became heavier. The money disbursed as pensions, dividends and interest went mostly to England. Moreover India's raw materials were paid for at the conqueror's price.
In England great inventions were made and the industrial revolution was being achieved largely on the plunder of India. On the other hand Indian industries were seriously Crippled. Marx Wrote:
The hand-loom and the spinning wheel, producing their regular myriads of spinners and weavers were the pivots of the structure of that society. From immemorial times, Europe received the admirable textures of Indian labour, sending in return for them her precious metals.... It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand-loom and destroyed the spinning-wheel. England began with driving the Indian cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hindustan and in the end inundated the very mother country of cotton with соttons.*
By the middle of the 19" century, a country that exported manufactured goods was now exporting raw material - cotton. India was being transformed into a gigantic market for England's industrial products.

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10 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
Taxes and Tortures
The peasants had been traditionally paying in taxes to the state only a proportion - one-sixth to one-third - of their actual produce, but the British authorities fixed taxes on the land itself. The introduction of the Zamindari and Ryotwari systems of taxation and land tenure by the British brought untold hardships to the Indian peasants. Under the Ryotwari system, which was introduced in the Presidency of Madras in 1818, "The Indian peasant, the ryot, formerly a member of the village community, was turned into a tenant of government land. The ryot was obliged to pay rent-tax for his holding to the East India Company. if the ryot could not pay his high rent he lost the right to the land. Gradually the ryots' land fell into the possession of profiteers and usurers."“
The Madras Board of Revenue in their memorandum of 1818 commenting on the Ryotwari system stated: "... we find them, the British unintentionally dissolving ancient ties, the ancient usages which united the republic of each Hindu Village, and by a kind of agrarian law newly assessing and parcelling out the lands which from time immemorial had belonged to the Village Community collectively.... professing to limit their demand to each field, but in fact, by establishing such limit, an unattainable maximum, assessing the Ryot at discretion, and like the Mussalman Government which preceded them, binding the Ryot by force to the plough, compelling him to till land acknowledged to be over- assessed, dragging him back to it if he absconded, deferring their demand upon him until his crop came to maturity, then taking from him all that could be obtained, and leaving him nothing but his bullocks and seed grain, nay, perhaps obliged to supply him even with these, in order to renew his melancholy task of cultivating, not for himself, but for them."
Under the Ryotwari system the British Government was the paramount landlord and rents and taxes were fixed arbitrarily. The taxes were collected by the tahsildar - an institution in itself that combined the functions of the revenue officer and the police. The tahsildar was the ruthless tool of the British oppressors, and his very sight struck terror into the hearts of the Indian peasants. Taxes were squeezed out of the impoverished peasants by the most inhuman methods.

British Rule in India and Croatlon of Indian Labour Market 11
The "general existence of torture for revenue purposes" was revealed in the report of the Torture Commission at Madras. One of the complainants before the Torture Commission stated "Last year, as our peasanum (principal paddy or rice Crops) failed for want of rain, we were unable to pay as usual. When the jamabandi was made we claimed a remission on account of the losses, according to the terms of the agreement entered into in 1837, by us, when Mr Eden was our collector. As this remission was not allowed, we refused to take our puttahs. The tahsildar then commenced to compel us to pay with great severity, from the month of June to August. and others were placed in charge of persons who used to take us in the sun. There we were made to stoop and stones were put on our backs and we were kept in the burning sand. After 8 o'clock, we were let to go to our rice. Such ill-treatment was continued during three months, during which time we sometimes went to give our petitions to the collector who refused to take them. We took these petitions and appealed to the Sessions Court, who transmitted them to the collector where we got no justice. In the month of September a notice was served upon us, and twenty five days after, our property was distrained, and afterward Sold. Besides what have mentioned Our Women were also ill-treated; the kittee was put upon their breasts."
An Indian Christian told the Commission that "when an European or native regiment passes through, all the ryots are pressed to bring in provision, etc. for nothing, and should any one of them ask for the price of the articles, they are severely tortured". Quoting these excerpts from the Report of the "Torture Commission at Madras", Marx proved irrefutably "the universal existence of torture as a financial institution of British India".
Breakdown of Indian Agriculture and the Creation of the Indian Labour Market
On the break down of agriculture in India Marx wrote: "there have been in Asia, generally, from immemorial times but three departments of Government: that of finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of war or the plunder of the exterior and finally the Department of Public Works... Now the British in East India,

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12 s A History of the Up-Country Tamils
accepted from their predecessors the departments of finance and of war, but they have neglected entirely that of public Works. Hence the deterioration of agriculture which is not capable of being conducted on the British principles of free competition, of laissez-faire and laissez-aller."
Though the British completely neglected the development of agriculture it was to land that most people had inevitably to turn. The people of all classes wee Compelled to depend directly or indirectly on a long neglected agriculture. On top of this, the peasants of India had to satisfy the boundless greed of British Colonialists. It was no wonder then that famine and epidemics were the order of the day. In the second half of the 19" century alone, there were 24 famines and some 20 millions lost their lives. Queen Victoria became Empress of India in 1877 and, about this time, a terrible famine swept through Madras, the once rich and prosperous area. "But it may be doubted whether the tragedy of 1876-8 did not surpass all previous calamities of the sort. Of the 200,000 sq. miles affected more than a third fell within Madras, where the famine is charged with causing the death of nearly 4 million people....."
Drought, famine and debt drove the Indian peasantry to the wall. They fast became landless or land-short - they were being expropriated en-masse. Even in southern India the poverty of the peasants was not due to the sun but rather due to the oppression and merciless exploitation of the people by the British Colonialists. Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras (1820-27), who admired the loveliness of Thirupathoor (Tamil Nadu) saying that "There is nothing to be compared to it in England, nor what you will think high praise in Scotland," stated categorically: "They owe their poverty to the Government, neither to their idleness nor the sun." We need not go deeply into the agrarian crisis in India. Suffice it to say that British rule in India had incidentally created a mass of dispossessed people who had little or nothing other than their labour power to sell. India was transformed into a great labour market second only to the African Continent. India gave her valuable goods, prostrated herself as the biggest market the world had known, and then she had to yield her sons and daughters to become cannon-fodder for avaricious capitalists in foreign lands. Millions of Indians were compelled to emigrate to the various colonies of the British empire. And today we find peoples of Indian origin constituting a considerable part of the

British Rule in India and Croation of Indian Labour Market 13
populations of many countries such as Sri Lanka, British Guyana, Trinidad, South Africa, Mauritius, Malaysia and Fiji.
NOTES
Karl Marx, New-York Daily Tribune, 11 July 1853, see Marx and Engels, On Colonialism (Second Impression) Moscow, p 51 ܖ 2 D.D.Kosambi, The Culture and Civilisation of Ancient India in Historical
Outline (Fourth Impression), New Delhi, 1976, pp 6-7
3 Marx and Engels, On Colonialism, pp.35 - 36
4 Ibid p.353
5 Quoted by R.P.Dutt, India Today, Bombay 1949, p. 220
6 Cited by Marx in 'Investigations of Tortures in India' published in the New-York Daily Tribune, 17 Sept. 1857, see Marx and Engels, On Coloniaiism, p.154
7 Ibid
8 bid
9 The Cambridge History of the British Empire (The Indian Empire), p.269
10 Quoted in The Hindu, 27 May 1961

Page 18

Chapter w
THE COFFEE PLANTATIONS AND RECRUITMENT OF INDIAN LABOUR
Sri Lanka is separated from the sub-continent only by a short stretch of sea - the Palk Straits - measuring 22 miles between Talaimannar on the North Western coast of Sri Lanka and Dhanuskodi on the South Eastern tip of India. This proximity to India played a significant role in the whole system of migration into Sri Lanka, as it had done throughout the ages.

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16 A history of the Up-Country Tamils
Unable to secure local labour for public works in the island, Governor North (1798 - 1805) had already during his regime imported gangs of labourers from South India, and "this Cost about 30,000 Pounds annually". Later, in 1821, a batch of Indian workers were brought as a semi-military unit known as the "Pioneer Force". They were skilled and semi-skilled men organized in divisions under the direct control of the military authorities, who were in charge of public works then. Sir Edward Jackson, the Commissioner on immigration, writes :
The construction of roads, bridges and irrigation works in the state of the country as it then was, and in jungle or marsh and deserted or unhealthy areas, was almost as much disliked by the members of the Pioneer Force as by the local inhabitants. To the labour of this force many of the chief public works in the island are due. These include the roads from Colombo to Kandy, Kandy to Trincomalee, Colombo to Galle and many others; the bridges at Gampola, Katugastota and Kalutara and the Victoria and others, several sections of the railway and some tanks and the Puttalam and Kalutara canals. '
However, large-scale immigration of Indians into the island in the 19th century followed closely the growth and development of the plantation industry. When the plantation areas extended, the immigration stream expanded but, if the industry experienced a crisis, then the immigration stream began to shrink. This was the general pattern we observe in the relationship between the plantations and the immigration of Indian labour.
The Coffee Plantations
Governor Barnes promoted the planting of coffee since this was not only a profitable field of investment for the planters but also Served to Swell the revenue of the state. Barnes first came to Ceylon in 1819. After a tour of the country he declared "what Ceylon needed was, first roads, second roads; third roads". His vigorous programme of Constructing roads proved advantageous not only in a military sense to break the inaccessibility of the Kandyan region but also in the facilitation of communication and transport between the hill country and the port of Colombo. The construction of roads was of great importance to the growth and development of the plantation industry.

Coffee Plantations and Recriutment of Indian Labour 17
first systematic coffee estate - Sinhapitiya, near Gampola was atni tod by George Bird in 1824. Bird had been a cavalry officer a cit friend of Governor Barnes, who had granted him the land for "litting pursuits". Barnes himself established a coffee estate allod "Rajah Tottum", near the Royal Botanical Gardens at I'll deniya in 1825. Significantly, even as Barnes opened up his it to he abolished the export duty on coffee and, in 1827, he
spended the land tax on Coffee plantations.
With these initial advantages the Coffee industry began to lovelop. Soon there followed other favourable circumstances as far as Ceylon's coffee industry was concerned. Slavery was it)(blished in the British Colonies in 1833 and the Slaves, Once mancipated, refused to serve as plantation labour. This led to a "orious shortage of labour in the West Indies and a fall in the xport of coffee to England. In 1835 England reduced the duty on Coylon coffee. Two years later, Robert Boyd Tytler arrived in the island with the experience in coffee cultivation he had gathered in Jamaica. All these factors favoured the growth of the coffee plantations in Ceylon.
No reliable statistics are available of the area under Coffee plantation in the early period. But we can have some idea of its development by the sales of crown land, and the production of coffee. In 1834 only 49 acres of crown land had been sold while in 1840 the Sales exceeded 40,000 acres.
The Sales of Crown lands between 1837 and 1845 Were as follows:
Year Acres Sold
1837 3,661 acres 1838 10,401 " 1839 9,570 " 1840 42,841 " 184 78,685 " 1842 48,533 " 1843 58,336 " 1844 20,415 " 1845 19,062 "
The average production of coffee between 1831 and 1835 was 24,069 CWts but, within a decade, it had increased fivefold and the average for 1841-1845 was 121,559 cwts.

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18 A history of the Up-Country Tamil People
Tennent wrote that few colonial pursuits present attractions superior to these exhibited in Ceylon, either as to actual enjoyment or reasonable returns for investment. The coffee industry experienced a boom in the mid 1840s and Tennent said:
The coffee mania was at its climax in 1845. The Governor and the Council, the Military and the Judges, the Clergy and one half of the Civil Servants penetrated the hills, and became purchasers of crown lands. The East India Company's officers crowded to Ceylon to invest their savings and capitalists from England arrived by every packet.'
Recruitment of Indian Labour
This wild rush for crown lands was accompanied by frantic efforts to import labour from India. Governor Barnes had been serving as Commander-in-Chief in India before he took over the administration of Ceylon and was, therefore, well acquainted with the conditions then obtaining in India. He recruited immigrant labourers to work in his own plantation at Peradeniya. Nevertheless, it was Col. H.C. Byrde (2nd) who claimed himself to be the first man to have imported Indian labour to serve on the coffee plantations in Ceylon. He declared: "I might take some credit to myself for having been the first to introduce or import Indian coolies to work on a Coffee Estate in Ceylon; but that this was dictated by self interest. My conductor at Black Forest was a man from Trincomalee half Tamil and half Sinhalese, and I sent him to Trincomalee, to obtain the services of a Tamil to go over the coast, to bring some coolies. My Sinhalese friends from Gampola having in the season their own to attend to, my coast messenger in due course returned with 14 men from South India, which formed the nucleus of the gang which supplied the Black Forest in after years, with 200 to 300 labourers, the descendants of whom have followed the fortunes of the Byrde family for the last 50 years." However, it can be said that systematic recruitment of Indian labour began only in 1839, and in that year 2432 labourers arrived in Ceylon.
The journey from South India to Ceylon was long and perilous. The majority of the immigrants crossed the ocean by little rice boats - 'dhonies' - from Dhanuskodi in India to Talaimannar in Ceylon. Some made their journey to Colombo by sea from Tuticorin and other South Indian ports. There were no roads from

CoMo Plantatlons and Recrutnevnt of lndlan Labour 19
ty coast to the interior and the trek from Talaimannar ran through lck malaria-infested jungles with reptiles and wild beasts such As olephants, bears and leopards prowling about freely. The route to Kandy lay through Anuradhapura, Dambulla and Matale. Some In villgrants turned southwards to Arippu and proceeded along the coast to Puttalam and reached Kandy via Kurunegala. Either way they had to walk 100 to 200 miles to reach the estates located in the central highlands. Therefore, comparatively few women arrived in the early period. At the beginning the immigrants came in gangs of 25 to 30 and each had its own leader to guide it to the estate. It took between 15 to 30 days for them to reach their destinations. 'Since the greater part of the route lay through uninhabited territory, the immigrants had to provide themselves with their immediate and basic needs. There were no stores or sheds to provide even temporary shelter along the route. The immigrants had to undergo untold suffering throughout the journey and hundreds of them perished all along the dangerous route. Those who managed to reach the coffee estates were often exhausted from fatigue and starvation.
The conditions prevailing in the estates were no less trying. The climate of the hill country contrasted unfavourably as far as the immigrants were concerned, for they were used to a hot sun. This whole region was covered with dense jungle. The atmosphere was humid, the rainfall heavy and the temperature was low, especially in the Dimbulla and Nuwara Eliya districts. Many workers, unable to acclimatize themselves to the new environment, lost their lives.
Tennent Writes:
The lowland Singhalese have a horror of the cold in these elevated situations, and still more of the rain... It is difficult to tempt them to the hills, and even the Malabar coolies shrink with apprehension from the chills of Neuera-elia (sic). To provide labour for these mountain roads the Government retain in their pay a body of Caffres as pioneers, the remnant of a force which was originally incorporated by the Portuguese, who introduced them from their African settlements at Mozambique.”
No dwelling houses worthy of human habitation were provided to them by their employers. Little huts roofed with mana grass or Cadians housed the labourers. There was ceaseless toil in the estates from dawn to dusk and this led to disease and death for the immigrant workers. News of these grave hardships and deaths

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20 A history of the Up-Country Tamil People
reached India through the immigrants returning to their village homes in India and blocked the easy flow of labour for the plantations in Ceylon. This caused great concern among the planters but they were determined to overcome the difficulties that Confronted them.
The First Labour Law
It was in 1841 that Ordinance No.5 was enacted by the colonial government "for the better regulation of Servants, Labourers and Journeymen Artificers under Contracts for Hire and Service, and their Employers."
Michael Roberts Writes:
All verbal and written contracts or agreements in the case of any menial or domestic Servant or Labourer' were to be deemed monthly engagements. If a labourer refused to work, deserted or otherwise misbehaved himself, the District Court could forfeit all his remaining wages and could in addition imprison him for a maximum period of three months, with or without hard labour. Labourers could bring complaints against their masters for non-payment of wages, breach of contract or misconduct. If found guilty, masters could be charged with all arrears and fined ten pounds, and if defaulting, imprisoned for a maximum of three months. Such were the main provisions of the law.'
Though the provisions of this Ordinance appear non-discriminatory between labourers and employers in that the punishments for failure to abide by them are similar, in reality, it almost always favoured the estate employers. Referring to the Ordinance "regulating the intercourse and relation between Master and Servant", Tennent writes that "the semi-civilized cooly, unaware of its existence, ignorant of his own rights, or apprehensive of still further annoyance, failed in any one instance to appeal to it for protection or to call on the local magistrate for assistance. His disposition and habit was to suffer in silence, and when at last hopeless of redress, he makes no complaint, but goes back to India in disappointment resolved himself and prepared to warn his companions to return no more to Ceylon."
Not that justice would have been meted out to the immigrant workers if they had sought the intervention of the courts to redress their grievances. The stark reality was that the majority of the leading Civil Servants, including the Governor, the Chief

Cof Plantafions and Recruitment of Indian Labour 21,
Jntico and a number of District Judges had become Coffee estate wwI nors. George Ackland, a coffee planter, in his evidence before (British) Parliamentary Committee on Ceylon showed that on rt Pigle day in 1840, the following Civil Servants had bought .275 acres of land in the Ambagamuwa District (Central, l'ovince):*
The Rt.Hon. J.S.Mackenzie, Governor 1,120 Acres
to Hon. W.O.Carr (Puisne Justice) and apt. T.Skinner (Commissioner of Roads) 862 "
P.Norris (Surveyor-General) and others 762 "
(, Turnour (Government Agent, Central
"rovince and at that time Acting
olonial Secretary) 2,217 "
.Wright (District Judge, Kandy) and
G.Bird 1,751 "
Sir Arbuthnot (Commander of the Forces) and Capt. Winslow (A.D.C.) 855 "
T.Oswin (District Judge) 545 "
G.R. Buller (later, Government Agent, Contral Province) 764. "
Capt. Layard and others 2,264 "
P.E. Wodehouse (Government Agent and Assistant Colonial Secretary) 2,135 "
13,275
K.M. de Silva writes:
The Chief Justice, Sir Anthony Oliphant, owned a coffee plantation (at Nuwara Eliya ) as did the Archdeacon of Colombo, the Rev. J.M.S Glennie, who owned 1,976 acres of land at Pussellawa. 'o
In these circumstances, therefore, the Labour Law did not help to ameliorate conditions for the immigrant workers; there was, in fact, no reduction in disease and death on the plantations. Tennent, in his evidence before the (British) Parliamentary

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22 A history of the Up-Country Tamils
Committee on Ceylon, exposed the real situation prevailing in the estates. K.M. de Silva says that "Tennent commented that the labourers lived in grossly overCrowed and insanitary huts on the estates. Wages were not punctually paid, and were frequently months in arrears, or even with-held altogether. When the labourers complained against this, they were 'silenced by blows and personal restraint." Little or no notice was taken of the sick; they were sometimes driven off to die on the roadside. Those who died were buried without inquest or inquiry. Those who died On the roadside were buried by the police."
K.M. de Silva writes:
In its issue of 1 October, 1849, The Colombo Observer estimated that in the years from 1841 to 1848, about 70,000 or 25 percent of the Indian immigrants to Ceylon had died in the island of various causes, the arrivals in Ceylon had been 265,467 men, 5,155 women and 2,250 children, while departures had been only 129,360 men, 2,639 women and 1,519 children; leaving about half the immigrants unaccounted for. The Colombo Observer calculated that assuming the number of these immigrants remaining in Ceylon at around 50,000, there would still have been between 70,000 and 90,000 deaths. They were inclined to accept the lower figure in order to allow as wide a margin of error as possible."o
The Kangany System of Recruitment
To facilitate the smooth running of the plantations, the employers evolved the notorious kangany system. This served the twin functions of recruitment of fresh labour and the retention of the Workers On the estates.
The kangany system was essentially patriarchal and took into Consideration the immediate economic and Social circumstances of the immigrants leaving their villages in India. The recruiting agent was called the kangany - a significant term in Tamil, meaning, one who keeps an eye on the labourers. Under this system the planter advanced a sum of money and sent a trusted worker with a dominant personality to India.
The kangany went to his village and got down to the task. of recruiting labour for his employer in Ceylon. He painted a rosy picture of the wealth and prosperity that awaited them in the plantations. These honeyed words kindled great hopes in the hearts of the poor peasants who were ground down by an

Cof Plantations and Recruitment of Indian Labour 23
inhuman system of land tenure imposed by British rule. Here was a chance, they imagined, to earn enough to pay off the taxes, redeem their mortgaged small holdings or to buy plots of land for farming.
The kangany advanced sufficient money to prospective immigrants to clear their outstanding debts. The recruits therefore became obliged to the kangany but then they hoped to clear the debt to the kangany and return to their homes with some savings. "Every cooly, it will therefore be seen, begins his life in Ceylon more or less in debt."
The kangany bought rice and food-stuffs for the recruits and "looked after them" throughout the journey to the estate. He rarely spent enough on the basic requirements of his recruits. In order to satisfy his employer's urgent need for labour and, in an effort to save as much money as possible for himself, the kangany pressed on the immigrants to proceed as fast as they possibly could. This led to great distress among them, and those who could not keep pace with the main gang were left behind. The sick and the starved often died on the road. It was years later that cooly patrols were engaged to pick up the sick and the exhausted and clear the road of the corpses if they had been spared by Vultures and jackals.
Under the kangany system the worker did not quit the estate for three main reasons. Firstly, he was indebted to the kangany and, therefore, to the estate. Secondly, he felt obliged to the kangany for the opportunity afforded him to better his prospects. And thirdly, no planter would employ him without reference to his previous employer. The kangany himself was not free since he too was indebted and obliged to the employer for the privileges he enjoyed. This kind of chain slavery helped the plantations to run smoothly.
An immigrant worker who desired to leave an estate due to unbearable conditions or because of better prospects elsewhere could do so only through the medium known as the tundu'. A "tundu' was a written statement by an employer that he was prepared to discharge a worker on payment. On the 'tundu' being accepted by another employer and the debt discharged the Worker is transferred from One estate to another.
There were two classes of kanganies; the head kangany and the "sillarai" or sub-kangany. The former had many gangs of workers, each of which was under a sub-kangany. Since the

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24 A history of the Up-Country Tarpils
employers were obsessed with a fear of a shortage of labour, they did not pay a proper wage to the kanganies. The head kangany was paid only a token salary, and his main income was dependent upon the total number of heads that turned up for work. He was paid "head money" that is 1 1/2 to 2 cents per head per day for every worker that worked. The sub-kangany received in addition to his "name" - a day's pay - what is called "pence money" at the rate of 3 to 4 cents a day for every worker of his gang, who turned out to work."
This was an ideal system of engaging labour as far as the plantation interests were concerned. It had a distinct advantage over the indenture system which was in Vogue in the case of many British colonies other than Sri Lanka and Malaya, which drew upon the Indian labour market. Unlike the indenture system where "the employer was under legal obligation to provide fixed wages, free housing, medical attendance and other amenities", the kangany system was free from any such obligations. An indentured labourer was bound to serve his master for a fixed period of time and he was not free to quit his employer until that time expired. In the Kangany system there was no such apparent danger to the workers' freedom. Yet, as previously mentioned, the workers were tethered to the estate by less visible means.
The Ceylon planters could also absolve themselves of all direct responsibility for the welfare of the workers; it was the kangany's business, they pretended, since they were "his men". Such an impression was cast in the public mind, that for all the appalling misery and death amongst the plantation workers, the accusing finger would be directed at the kangany and not at the planter. It is for these substantial advantages that the employers in Ceylon preferred the kangany system to all other modes of recruiting and retaining labour.
NOTES
1 H.A.J.Hulugalle, British Governors of Ceylon, Colombo, 1963, p.
22. w
2 Sir Edward Jackson, Report of a Commission on Immigrantion into Ceylon Colombo, 1938, p.13 (Note: since the publication of this Report many changes have taken place).

O
12
13 4 15 16 17
CoMo Plantatlons and Recriutment of lindian Labour 25
J. Ferguson, Pioneers of the Planting Enterprises in Ceylon (2nd series)'as supplied by Col. H C Byrde (2nd) in 1895 to J.Ferguson, Colombo, 1898, p.6. Tennent, Ceylon, Vol. II, p.734.
Ibid, p.739.
Ibid, p.735. J. Ferguson, Pioneers of the Planting Enterprises in Ceylon (2nd series), p.9. C.Kondappi, Indians Overseas, New Delhi, 1951, p.30. Tennent, Ceylon, Vol. II, p.759. Michael Roberts,"The Master-Servant Laws of 1841 and 1860's and Immigrant Labour in Ceylon" CJHSS, 8(1 - 2) Jan - Dec 1965, pp.24-25. SLNA, 5/34, Tennent to Grey, despatch 6 of 21 April 1847. K.M. de Silva, Social Policy and Missionary Organizations in Ceylon 1840 - 1855, London, Longmans, 1965, p.297.
Ibid, p.298.
Ibid, p.247.
Ibid, p.299. Ceylon Labour Commission Report - SP 8 of 1908. Ibid, p.9.

Page 24

Chapter
PROGRESS OF THE PLANTATION ECONOMY AND THE MIMGRANT WORKERS
Though the Portuguese and the Dutch had occupied the maritime provinces of Sri Lanka for nearly three centuries, and there was much trade, the structure of society was essentially feudal. Vanden Driesen Writes:

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28 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
No fundamental changes were immediately wrought even when British power was
extended to cover the entire island in 1815, and as late as the end of the third decade of
the 19th century, Ceylon's economy was in the basic sense still overwhelmingly feudal in
yttre.
He states further:
Into this came the plantation, with the suddenness of a revolution, Bringing with it new modes of economic behaviour and a host of concepts foreign to the prevailing economic system, it ate quickly into the foundations of the existing structure. Capitalism had arrived, and it is with its advent that the island's modern economic history takes its start. A virile commercial agriculture soon displaced in importance the old pursuits of the people and within the short space of a few years, coffee had made itself responsible for almost a third of the government's income.
Thus the plantation economy came to co-exist with the traditional subsistence agriculture. Asoka Bandarage writes:
The production of cash crops for the world market transformed Ceylon into a classic case of an export-propelled economy closely tied to the world capitalist economy. The superimposition of the profit-maximizing, foreign-owned, land-and-labour-intensive coffee plantations upon the largely self-sufficient village economy brought forth a veritable social revolution on the island. Its effects on precolonial land tenure and social stratification were among the most revolutionary. The impact of this estate revolution extended beyond the regions where plantations were physically present and beyond the narrowly economic influences.
She states further that "The year 1833 is a commonly accepted landmark in the history of the island. The Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms which provided the juridico-political framework for capitalist agricultural development in Ceylon were introduced that year..."
However, S.B.D.'de Silva says that "the categorization of plantations as a modern/developed/capitalist form of production has been due to their more obvious economic attributes: exchange relations (involving wage labour and market orientation), the generation of a surplus, the large scale operations and finally, the use of capital in production." And he contends that "the notion that the plantations constitute a capitalist sector derives basically from the failure to distinguish between forms of capital investment,"
Elucidating his views de Silva writes:

Plantation Economy and immigrant Workers 29
(apitalism in the metropolis extended its sway overseas, harnessing for its own use pre-capitalist formations and relations. It implanted African slavery in the New World, making the slave trade a branch of capitalist commerce and slave labour the basis of ommodity production. The same system, with further modifications, was later adopted as indentured labour for plantation agriculture in Asia. The resulting mode was a fusion of commodity production for a long-distance market with precapitalist technology and a semi-free labour force.”
Writing about the role of slavery in the development of capitalism Marx says:
W
The Negro slave was a forced agricultural worker, compelled to toil for his bare keep. Slavery was an important economic element in the building of world capitalism - both in its original primitive accumulation of capital and in the later expansion of agricultures and the industries.
Marx Writes:
Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton, without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that gave the colonies their value; it is the colonies that created world trade that is the pre-condition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance. Slavery, because it is an economic category, has always existed among the institutions of the peoples. Modern nations have been able only to disguise slavery in their own countries, but they have imposed it without disguise upon the new world.”
In a note to the German edition of Marx's "Poverty of Philosophy", published in 1885, Engels writes: "This was perfectly correct for the year 1847." Incidentally, Marx referred to "the slavery of the proletariat" as "indirect slavery" or "slavery in disguise". Hence the internationally famous slogan: "Workers of the world unite, you have only your chains to lose".
The Indian immigrant workers on the coffee plantations were driven like slaves and compelled to toil from dawn to dusk. Their wages could hardly buy the barest necessities of life, and they lived in such hovels, says Engels, as were livable only for a "physically degenerate race, robbed of all humanity, degraded, reduced morally and physically to bestiality".' Nevertheless, it was on the basis of the maximum exploitation of the Indian immigrant workers that the plantation economy flourished and capitalism developed in the island.

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30 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
The First Coffee Crisis
The progress of the plantation economy, however, is punctuated with economic crisis. Since Sri Lanka's economy was linked up with Britain's, every economic crisis in Britain profoundly affected the economic stability of Sri Lanka.
In 1845 Britain was afflicted with a severe economic Crisis and the market for Sri Lanka's Coffee crashed. The financial Crisis hit the nascent coffee industry and drove many a proprietary planter out of his wits. Estate after estate ceased working. Tennent Writes:
The financial explosion of 1845 in Great Britain extended its destructive influence to Ceylon, remittances ceased, prices fell, credit failed, and the first announcement of the subsidence of turmoil, was the doom of protection, and the withdrawal of the distinctive duty, which had so long screened British plantations from competition with the coffee of Java and Brazil,'
"Estates were forced into the market, and madly sold off for a twentieth part of the outlay incurred in farming them." "The most reliable report has it that one-tenth of the plantations originally opened were abandoned during this period. Narangalla Estate, near Badulla, which had costed 10,000 Sterling Pounds was sold for 350 Sterling Pounds".'
The economic crisis for the planters was followed by a political crisis for the Colonial government. To overcome the financial difficulties, consequent to the coffee slump in 1845-46, the Colonial government, on the orders of Lord Grey, Secretary of State for the Colonies, imposed taxes on bullock-carts, boats, shops, guns and dogs. Furthermore, the government required every inhabitant to contribute six days' work annually for the repair and construction of roads or else pay a commutation-tax of 3 shillings. Dissatisfied with various developments and unable to tolerate these taxes, the people rose up against foreign domination. At Matale, in the Central Province, the enraged people burnt and Sacked government houses. Since a few estates (bungalows) were attacked, the planters fled abandoning both the estates and their employees. The Governor, Viscount Torrington, grew panicky and proclaimed Martial Law. The people of Matale, who opposed the colonial troops, lost many a patriot's life. The

Plantation Economy and immigrant Workers 31
British administrators were ruthless in crushing the people's revolt against Colonial oppression.
It was feared that, due to the disturbances, the immigrant workers would panic and flee the plantations. On the contrary, as stated by L.S.D. Dunuwille, the Superintendent of Police, Kandy, "During the times of the rebellion (of 1848) understood, the Coolies on the estates behaved with great courage and protected their masters' property".' He further said: "In no instance did a newly arrived coolie tell me that others had been prevented from Coming over by the fear of the disturbed state of the country. Fewer Coolies than usual came over last year but in no instance was the insurrection mentioned as a cause of their not coming".
Referring to the shortage of labour in a number of estates Torrington wrote to Grey:
I have abundant proof to show that the coolies were obliged to leave estates in many instances because they could not get their wages paid, that they suffered the greatest hardships in consequence and the Police Courts and the Courts of Requests were besieged by the coolies. Gangs of coolies came to the Court of the Police Magistrate of Kandy praying redress and stating that they had not received their wages for six months. 7
In this period a problem arose as a result of the application by the Government of India of Act No 14 of 1839, which placed an embargo on labour emigration from India. The Colonial government in Ceylon requested the Indian government to lift the ban on the emigration of Indian labour to Ceylon. The negotiations between the two governments led to the enactment of Ordinance No.3 of 1847 which prohibited Indian labourers in the island from entering into contracts to serve in countries such as Malaya and Fiji. Consequently, the Indian government lifted the ban as far as it related to Ceylon, on the ground that "the island of Ceylon, geographically, historically, and socially considered, was analogous to countries subjected to the East India Company."
Tennent on Immigrant Labour
In 1846 there was an acute shortage of labour in the plantations. Vanden Driesen writes: "From 1846, Indian immigrant labour, discouraged by the hard conditions under which they were obliged to travel, by the ill-treatment often met with on estates, and by

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32 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
frequent non-payment of wages began to come over to Ceylon in lessening numbers. Wages which before 1846 had averaged 18s per month, rose as a result to 20s and above, between 1846 and 1849." And he quotes the figures given in Table 4.1:
Table 4.1
Immigration Returns'
Year Total arrivals
1845 73,401 1846 42,317 1847 46,140 1848 32,172 1849 29,430
(Figures for Northern Province only - entries of other ports not available)
Vanden Driesen's observations are reflected in a contemporary source. Tennent, who acted as Lt. Governor of Ceylon for a short time, in his famous despatch of 21 April 1847 to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, held that the drop in the immigration was due to negligence and ill-treatment of labourers by the planters. His expression of concern is an example of an administrator who realized the need for improvement and made a number of recommendations.
Tennent wrote to Lord Grey: "Sir Colin Campbell (earlier Governor) caused a Circular to be addressed to those officers calling for full details as to what had fallen under their notice regarding the personal treatment of the coolies and the observance of good faith in relation to them. That circular I enclose for your Lordship's perusal, in order to show that the information sought was not to be supplied on hearsay or supposition but drawn from records of the courts, capable of being sustained in every particular by substantial proofs. It is my duty to submit to Your Lordship the replies, and I do so with Considerable pain; as they expose a state of things which cannot fail to excite Your lively dissatisfaction".
These replies were included in Tennent's despatch. W. Morris Assistant Government Agent, Kurunegala, in his findings

Plantation Economy and immigrant Workers 33
had stated: "The Malabar coolies arriving in the Central Province by the Puttalam road are cleanly and healthily in appearance, they are seldom if ever found sick on the road nor admitted into hospitals at Kurunegala. When returning to their country they are invariably dirty, their clothes old and usually in rags. The slovenly rugged appearance of the return coolies is in strong contrast to the cleanly and healthy looking new-comers - and whilst on the march, the latter are close and compact, the former straggling-the strong and healthy in the van, the weak and sickly in the rear, a (lang of 100 sometimes extending a distance of several miles. The tick at first attempt to keep up with their companions, but gradually drop off."
J.S.Colepepper, the Superintendent of Police, Kandy, submitted that "the coolies were generally poor when they arrived, but in a healthy and working condition." A. Walker, Police Magistrate, Kandy, had replied that "most of the gangs arrived in a healthy condition."
Thus Tennent showed to the Secretary of State that the deplorable condition of the coolies returning to India was a result of the harsh treatment and the severe Conditions of life on the plantations. He stated: "The duty of the Government will presume have been fully discharged by the adoption of every precaution to facilitate the arrival of the coolies in the colony; to expedite their journey by safe and healthy roads, to protect them from violence or ill-treatment by the way, to provide them with shelter when weary and with medical care and every requisite comfort when Overtaken by illness; to afford them the protection of the law when defrauded or abused; to insist on their humane and becoming treatment when employed on the estates, and to ensure to them every security in returning to their own country with the earnings of their labour."
Tennent further stated that: "These are the duties which are obligatory on the Colonial Government towards them as temporary residents under its protection." He made a number of recommendations including the appointment of Protectors of immigrant workers and he said that "the Protector should likewise be required to check the returns made of the number of coolies on each estate, by the books and checkrolls of the Agents and Superintendents. The appointment and function of such an officer will no doubt be unpopular, but they are considered necessary by the ignorance and helplessness of those whom it would be his

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34 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
duty to protect."
Tennent, in fact, advocated the desirability of a permanent labour force and he called upon the authorities to provide "such encouragement as may induce the Indian labourers to settle permanently in Ceylon", and castigated the planters for their failure to ensure such encouragement. He stated: "... yet not withstanding that the planters were thus thrown back upon their own resources for a supply of foreign labour and that the Malabar coolies were the only force on whom they could rely, sufficient care has not been uniformly exhibited to ensure their comfort on the estates, to erect healthy and suitable dwellings for their shelter or to provide rice and other necessities for their support, when located at a distance from Bazaars. When attacked by disease they were sometimes driven off to die instead of being tended by medical advisers or conveyed to the Hospital of the Government, their wages instead of being punctually paid Were frequently allowed to be months in arrears, or irritation silenced by blows and personal restraint."'
In order to ensure a perennial supply of labour to the plantations, Tennent made two recommendations to Lord Grey. The first was to induce the immigrant labourers to settle on the estates by providing them with plots of land for home gardens and rearing cattle and poultry. The second was an elaborate scheme to settle Indians in the then sparsely populated Northern Province (now the North Central Province) to serve the twin purposes of growing rice and freeing the country from depending on imports for this staple and to supply labour for the plantations whenever necessary. While the former proposal was not favoured by the planters, the latter which would have had far reaching consequences, was not accepted by the Secretary of State. However, Tennent's exposure of the planter's wanton neglect of the immigrant workers and the failure to pay their wages stand as a record of his concern for the Workers.
On the question of the non-payment of wages, Governor Torrington in a despatch to Lord Grey drew his attention to the "disheartening effect upon the coolies of having been kept months in arrear of wages due to them..... In the period of ten months ending in March 1848, there had been 2584 complaints by immigrant labourers (about non-payment of wages) at the District Court of Kandy alone." Though the government failed to compel the planters to pay their wages, it made it somewhat easier for the

Plantation Economy and immigrant Workers 35
workers to appeal to the courts for redress. Workers "suing for their wages were permitted at the various courts of requests without having to pay the necessary stamp fees.... " The courts had no authority to seize the property of an estate owner who was absent from Ceylon and "Torrington amended the law to enable the courts to do so. It was also enacted... that the labourer's claims for wages should have priority over any other charge On the estates".
It is important to note that Governors Campbell and Torrington and the Colonial Secretary Tennent, who expressed concern for the plight of the immigrant workers, were the exceptional few among colonial administrators who did not own coffee plantations.
Founding of the Planters' Association and Transport Problems
Consequent to the economic crisis and the 1848 disturbances, the government followed a policy of cutting down on expenditure and saving revenue. Acting on orders from England, Governor Sir George Anderson, who succeeded Torrington in 1850, resorted to retrenchment on public Works, which action was strongly resented not only by the planters but even by the official members of the Legislative Council, whose interests were in common with those of the planters and European merchants. The government, in practice, called a halt to the development of the transport and Communication system causing grave Concern among the planters.
In this situation the planters agitated to set up an organization "that would be able to speak authoritatively on their behalf" and to pressurize the government to support their cause. On the initiative of George Wall, about 100 coffee planters met in Kandy on 17 February 1854 and, under the chairmanship of Captain Keith Jolly, founded the Planters' Association of Ceylon. Originally a Captain in the Mercantile Marine of the East India Company, after being pensioned off, Jolly had joined the firm of Messrs George Wall & Co., merchants of Kandy, as a planting partner in 1853. Soon official recognition came to the Planters'

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36 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
Association and George Wall was nominated to the Legislative Council in 1857.
As an organized body the planters became seriously concerned with improving transport facilities for their produce. The primary means of transport was the bullock-cart and the conveyance of coffee from the hill country estates to the sea-port was cumbersome and expensive. According to an estimate in 1845, the number of bullock-carts that passed between Kandy and Colombo was 79,000 annually. The iron rimmed thin wheels of the heavily loaded carts damaged the best of roads in a short time. During torrential rains and consequent floods these vehicles jogged along with great difficulty. The price of rice carried by the carts returning from Colombo rose by half its original cost.
"The roads throughout the Central Province were in a bad state and especially that between Pussellawa and Nuwara Eliya. Coffee sent by that route cost 14 shillings per cwt, and being, often, six weeks upon the road, was subject to deterioration from long exposure to weather," observed Governor Sir George Ward (1855-1860). In fact it took as much time and money to carry the produce from the plantations to Colombo, a distance of 100 to 200. miles, as to transport it 15,000 miles round the Cape.
At about this time Brazil was making arrangements for the introduction of railways to move its coffee from the interior to the Coast, and the urgent necessity to modernize Ceylon's transport system could no longer be overlooked. In his report to the Colonial Office, Governor Ward stressed that Ceylon "would cease to exist as a coffee producing colony" in the face of competition from Brazil and Java if railways were not introduced immediately. This idea had been, in fact, mooted as early as 1845 but the economic crisis that followed compelled its abandonment. It must be noted that "it was the Planters themselves who had gone to Sir Henry Ward in 1856 and asked to be taxed in order that the railway might become a reality". The centenary publication of the Planters' Association of Ceylon records: "For eleven years all produce exported from Ceylon had been subject to a voluntary tax of 2 1/2 per cent. Thus 450,000 Sterling Pounds i.e., almost a quarter of the cost of construction, was paid by proprietors of agricultural lands throughout the Island". Work started in 1858 and the first sod of the Colombo terminal was turned by Governor Ward with great jubilation.

Plantation Economy and immigrant Workers 37
There was a break in the project, however, but the private contractor W. F. Faviel completed the main line from Colombo to Kandy in 1867. From Kandy the railway was extended to other towns in the hill country - Nawalapitiya 1874, Matale 1880, Nanu Oya 1885, Bandarawela 1894. The main plantation towns were thus linked to Colombo. Soon railway reached the important coastal towns, such as Matara in the South, 1895, and Jaffna in the North in 1905. Another line, but a narrow gauge, radiated from Colombo to Ratnapura. Later, in 1914, an extension of the northern line reached Talaimannar which was connected by a ferry Service with Dhanuskodi, the terminus of the South Indian Railway. Trincomalee and Batticaloa on the Eastern coast were also connected by rail with the capital city.
The introduction of railways had great significance for the economic and social development of the country. It was doubtless of direct assistance to the planting interests; their goods could be transported quickly, safely and at low costs. Vanden Driesen writes: "The fingers of railroad reached out to bring within their grasp the larger part of the coffee growing regions, giving planters the advantage they had hoped for particularly in the matter of transport costs, which fell rapidly by between 60 to 75 per cent."
The effect upon the people was no less significant. The train took only 4 1/2 hours to cover the distance of 74 1/2 miles from Colombo to Kandy whereas a man took four days to do the same journey. It also facilitated the quick movement of goods from One area to another and thus contributed to the standardization of prices of commodities. Thus it broke at once the isolation and seclusion of the rural areas.
Two years after the completion of the Colombo - Kandy railway line, the Suez Canal, then called the "life line of the British Empire," was opened. This brought Europe closer by thousands of miles and revolutionized East-West trade and commerce. The first cargo of coffee was despatched from Colombo to London via . the Suez Canal on March 12, 1870.
Life on the Plantations
The Coming of the railways and the success of the coffee enterprise made a tremendous impression on the London market.

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38 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
Various types of people were attracted by these developments in Ceylon. The Friend-in-Need Society (Colombo) reported in 1869: "Men who are either dissatisfied with their position elsewhere, or in consequence of their misdeeds or of any other cause have lost their situations, hearing that a railway has recently been opened in Ceylon, and that a very large number of persons are employed as Superintendents in coffee estates in the interior, and as clerks in the merchants' offices in Colombo, take it for granted that if they can only succeed in procuring a passage to Some port in Ceylon, they will have no difficulty in procuring a livelihood.... The class alluded to are the strangers and European strangers, who are constantly flocking into the island in search of employment".
With a modern transport system and an economy which was again expanding, it seemed that the golden era for the planters had come to stay for ever. In 1869 there were 176,000 acres of coffee (apart from native plantations) and "the return from the land in full bearing averaged over 5 cwt, an acre, a return which should, under favourable circumstances, give a profit of from 7 to 10 Pounds an acre, or from twenty to twenty five per cent on the capital invested. Nothing could be brighter than the prospects of the colony and its main enterprise in 1869" wrote Ferguson. With the boom in the coffee prices investors continued to be attracted to the island. "Younger sons with a capital, present and prospective, of a few thousand pounds, educated at public schools, and many of them university men, found an opening in life on Ceylon plantations far more congenial than that of the Australian bush or the backwoods of Canada. Of course, Some of them did not succeed as planters, as they probably would not have succeeded at anything in the colonies".
Indeed the life of a planter had become most interesting and enviable. On the plantations old houses were being replaced by spacious bungalows with modern comforts. Since the majority of the planters were either bachelors or men who did not bring in their wives, those comfortable bungalows were often empty and dull, on the other hand, Some of them never allowed buxom lasses in the estates to slip out of their grips it was not uncommon for planters to enter into liaison with beautiful women from the villages, some of whom were employed as Ayah's (house maids) in the bungalows.
Estate life, however, was monotonous for many a planter. With the passage of time clubs and rest houses had come to be

Plantation Economy and Immigrant Workers 39
built in the plantation towns. And on Sundays, when the planters gathered, liquor flowed freely and the rest houses and clubs in the up-country vibrated with their revelry and merry making.
In striking contrast the plantation workers - the basic creators of this vibrant era for the British capitalists - lived in shaggy wattle and daub huts with thatched roofs. Ventilation was poor and insecure wooden doors were hinged on Ox-hides. Rats, cockroaches, scorpions and other vermin lived in the Cracks and holes in the walls. Yet, it was in these little hovels that whole families of workers had to cook, sleep and live their miserable lives. No latrines were provided for the workers and, therefore, during wet weather, the atmosphere around these so- called houses was most foul. In other words, little had changed since Tennent's observations. In economic Crisis Or boom their situation was the same.
The wages paid to immigrant workers were extremely low. The wage rates were decided by the planters and the rate during the 1870s varied between 33-37 Cents for men and between 25-29 cents for women. "In the early 1880s the rates declined to 33 for men and 25 for women and remained virtually static thereafter during the succeeding 30 years".
During periods of depression or when there was excess labour, the employers limited the number of work days to 3 to 4 per week thus reducing the total monthly earnings and causing grave difficulties for the workers. Wages were not paid in cash; part of the wages was paid in the form of rice and foodstuffs. The import of rice from India was monopolized by the Chetties. "The Coffee planter found in the rice merchant, who was usually a Chetty, a source from which he could obtain the labourers' requirements of rice on credit to be repaid after he received his earnings from coffee..." Had the workers been free to purchase rice from the local merchants this would have not only prevented the planter-Octopus from controlling another important aspect of their lives but would have incidentally helped the Sinhalese peasants to increase their production of rice.
Wages were paid irregularly - once in a few months - at the convenience of the estate proprietors. Again little had changed since the 1840s. Wesumperuma writes: "The widely accepted practice in the period (i.e. 1880-1910) was for the planters to pay their labourers four times a year, in quarterly payments, but always retaining in arrears with the employer the balance wages of the

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labourers for a period of three months. This meant that the wages due to the labourers for the months from January to March were paid at the end of June. Besides, the balance wages were not paid direct to the labourers but to the kangany. He in turn deducted what the labourers owed him and the shop-keeper and handed over the balance to the labourer. This method continued up to 1890, for it was believed that it gave the employer a hold over his labourers".'
The Colonial government, in its own interests, attempted to provide relief to the workers in regard to their wages but these attempts were shunned by the planters. Governor Sir Arthur Gordon (1883-1890), who had come after his governorship in Mauritius, persistently moved to ensure regular payment of wages to workers. In a despatch to the Colonial Office he wrote: "...if his wages for any one month can be withheld from him for nearly six months, at the end of that time he is deeply in debt to the kangany and the Bazaar. His only chance of discharging these debts is by working on in the service of the estate for his pay, he takes further advances which bind him to the estate yet more closely and he can hardly be deemed a free monthly servant".
Gordon wanted to put an end to the irregularity in the payments of wages to workers and free the workers from being overwhelmed by debt. In a despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies he contended: "If a labourer be indeed a monthly servant he should be paid his monthly wages. If he is to be indentured for a longer period, the law should not adopt the fiction that he is a voluntary monthly servant voluntarily re-engaging from month to month".
Gordon was supported by the Colonial Office which was concerned with the scandalous situation in the plantations in regard to the payment of wages to the workers. These developments and the need to maintain an uninterrupted supply of labour fron India led to the enactment of the Estate Labour (Indian) Ordinance No 13 of 1889. Section 6 of the Ordinance reads:
1 It shall be the duty of every employer to pay all wages agreed upon or earned by the labourers in his employment in any month on or before the tenth day of the following month.

Plantation Economy and immigrant Workers 41
2 Where the wages are payable at a daily rate, the monthly wages shall be computed according to the number of days on which the labourer was able and willing to Work and actually demanded employment, whether the employer was or not able to provide him with work...."
Defaulters were liable to a fine of Rs 50/=. In reality, for a century the planters failed to adhere to the provisions of this Ordinance, and the provisions of Section 6 (2) have not been implemented to this day.
The food available to the workers was not only poor in nourishment but was generally unwholesome. Often they had to be satisfied with rice, "rasam'and dhal curry. Meat was beyond their means and the fish they could get was decomposed and unfit even for cats and dogs. Dr H.Dickman, Colonial Surgeon, Central Province, wrote: "An inferior kind of fish is prepared in a particular manner expressly for the Kandy Market, for the use of estate labourers. This fish is not cured with mercurate of soda, but immersed for a time in sea water collected in pits on the Sea-shore. Fish thus prepared soon undergoes decomposition, and becomes unfit for use. Large quantities of such fish are exposed for sale in the markets".
Malaria, diarrhoea, dysentery and a host of gastric complications were, therefore, common ailments of the workers. The Principal Medical Officer and Inspector General of Hospitals reported in 1870 that the "Malabar patients are almost equal to all other races put together, and the mortality among them is exactly double that of all the other races". He further stated: "In Kandy and Matale the Police cases show a marked heavier death rate than that of estate Coolies. This is to be accounted for from the fact of so many coolies being found perishing on the road side around Matale, from hunger and disease".' The report indicated that "while the mortality among the general sick poor of Ceylon - that is to say, from all classes of natives who ordinarily seek treatment when they first fell ill - is only 8 per cent.... the mortality ofestate coolies is 20.5 per cent".o
So many thousands died that the government was forced to bring in legislation for the provision of medical facilities for the Workers. Despite objections from the planters, Governor Gregory pushed through Ordinance No 14 of 1872 "to provide for the medical requirements of the coffee districts". Nevertheless, the

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high death rate among estate workers could not be arrested by such a measure. Most employers contemptuously ignored the existence of the Ordinance let alone its implementation. And the Medical report, 1890, sang the usual refrain: "The total death rate among the estate labourers alone was 20.01 per cent and that of mixed races was 10.53 per cent".
The alarming death rate of the immigrant workers led the government to appoint the District Hospitals Mortality Commission which published its report in 1893. A realistic picture of the situation can be had from the evidence given by Dr Griffin, a medical practitioner with two decades of experience in the plantations, before the Commission. He said: "My opinion is that what perhaps swells the mortality is coolies who have been here several months in Ceylon - not the newly arrived - they were not ill when they came".
Continuing his evidence Dr Griffin said: "I think that long hours of work without food prevents a great many arrivals from developing into strong labourers. I do not think long hours perhaps 10 or 11 hours - without food is likely to be anything but prejudicial to a cooly who arrives physically not in a strong state. As a rule he goes from 5 in the morning to 6 in the evening without food, while the kanganies, 9 out of 10 - in fact all from my experience - take their 10 o'clock feed showing that they like it".
Even sick workers were compelled to work. Dr Griffin stated: "The coolies are sent to work against their will. A coolie must get rice, and if he does not work he does not get rice," i.e further said: "When they cannot do any work, and when they are a burden to their friends they are often sent to die - for 30 cents". And he categorically proposed: "You must have dispensaries and I think they should be made compulsory".
The planters absolved themselves of any responsibility for this dreadful state of affairs by stating that the workers were themselves to blame. They argued that the workers' frugal habits and their failure to seek medical aid in time Were the chief Causes for the appalling death rate on the estates. The truth was that adequate medical facilities were not provided on the estates. Even Ayurvedic physicians were not available; in fact, the village physicians were often prevented from entering the estates since the planters considered such entry as an intrusion into their private domain. Sick people were sometimes driven out of the estates on charges of idleness to die on the roads or in the neighbouring

Plantation Economy and immigrant Workers 43
towns. To the employers this most primitive method of doing away with the sick was more economical than establishing even elementary health services for the workers. They were, of Course, confident that they could replenish such losses by recruiting a fresh stock of young and healthy men from India.
Government hospitals were difficult to be reached - they were generally 10 to 30 miles away from the estates. And there were no palanquins, bullock-carts, horse carriages or donkeys to bear the sick workers to them. These modes of conveyance were a luxury reserved exclusively for the planter-sahibs. In these Conditions it was no wonder that when herbal deCOctions failed to restore their health the illiterate workers pinned their faith on magic, quackery and the Hindu deities. Incantations to the Kodangi' man and sacrifices of cock-birds to the lower gods of the Hindu pantheon were common tribal practices on the estates. Some of these practices are prevalent to this day.
The Fali of King Coffee
Since the fate of the immigrant workers was intimately linked with the plantation industry it has become imperative to follow the growth and development of cash crops in the island.
In 1869 the plantation industry was visited by the coffee blight - Hemileia Vastratrix. Orange spots appeared on the coffee plants; the fungus began its fatal attack from under the green, glossy leaves. Dr G.H.Thwaites, Director of the Royal Botanical Gardens at Peradeniya (1849-1880), warned that this was a tenacious fungus and that the planters would do well to abandon their dependence on coffee and devote their energies to the cultivation of other crops.
Most planters would not believe their eyes, and since there was no immediate fall in production, they refused to heed the persistent warnings of Dr Thwaites. But in a short time, estate after estate was affected, and luxuriant plantations were soon transformed into vast shrublands. Dr Thwaites observed: "The rapidity with which this coffee leaf disease has spread throughout the coffee districts of the island has been perfectly marvelous, and it is probable that not a single estate had quite escaped".

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Though the yield began to drop the price of coffee continued to be good; in fact, it rose by over fifty per cent due to a great demand in Europe and America. And new areas - the upland valleys in Dimbuila, Dickoya and the Adams Peak range - were brought under cultivation. Within a decade following 1869, over 400,000 acres of Crown land were sold for over a million Sterling and a fourth of this area was planted with coffee".
With the opening of new plantations there was a heavy influx of immigrant labour. The number of immigrants entering the island reached unprecedented figures in the years 1876 - 78. Another factor that contributed to this immigration deluge was the terrible famine that raged in Madras during this time, which affected no less than 70,000 square miles.
But the blight kept on attacking the coffee plants relentlessly, and the golden era of King Coffee was fast approaching its doom. Exports of coffee declined rapidly; in 1883 it dropped to 305,702 cwts. Estate after estate lay idle. And, when the famous Oriental Bank, which did business by lending its capital freely on planting produce, closed its doors in 1884, nowhere was the shock more widely or acutely felt than in Ceylon. Unable to bear the destruction of their coffee plantations, 400 of the 1700 European planters left the island. Workers suddenly found themselves unpaid and unwanted, and tens of thousands of them began their weary trek back to India. Immigration dropped sharply in 1879 and Continued to decline during the next five years as shown in the following Table:
Table 4.2
Year Arrival Departures Excess or Deficit
1876 164,797 91960 72,837 1877 167,196 88,609 78,587 1878 101,093 91,188 9,905 1879 76,897 80,750 3,853 1880 45,600 73,683 -28,083 188 50,275 56,28 -5,853 1882 50,907 57,820 - 6,913 1883 39,204 52,962 13,758 1884 45,777 50,085 -4,308 1885 47,794 48,863 -1,069
Source : Administration Report 1890, Part IV. p. F2

Plantation Economy and immigrant Workers 45
Planting of Tea and Rubber
A Wave of anxiety over the future of the plantation industry swept through the island, but the gloomy atmosphere soon vanished for the planters turned their attention to the cultivation of new crops. The plantation economy had come to stay and there was no turning back of its wheels. While most of the planters replanted their estates with the new crop, cinchona, from which quinine was extracted, Some started to Cultivate tea. In 1883 there were SOme 60,000 acres planted with cinchona but competition in the world market prevented its further development. On the other hand, tea planting was a grand success. The climatic Conditions, in fact, were more suitable for tea than for coffee, tea was able to flourish at any elevation above sea level, especially in the Central hills.
China tea had been introduced into the island in 1824 and the Assam variety in 1839, but these early efforts failed to yield permanent results, and sufficient interest was not evinced in their cultivation for a long time. In 1867, however, a Scotsman named James Taylor, known as the "Father of Ceylon's Tea Industry", Commenced the Cultivation of tea. On a Commercial Scale On Loollcondera estate, Deltota, not far from Kandy. Encouraged by the then Governor, Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon, more and more planters commenced the planting of tea on their fields. In 1875 there were only about 1,000 acres of tea, but thereafter, the growth was phenomenal as the following figures would indicate:
Year ACreage
1875 1,080
1880 9,274
1890 220,000 1900 384,000 1910 385,775 1920 404,500 1930 478,000
Source : Ferguson's Ceylon Directory 1938
Another new crop, rubber, was experimented with by Henry. Wickam utilizing seeds collected from the Amazon and obtained

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46 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
through the Kew Gardens. In 1900 there were only a few hundred acres planted with rubber but the evolution of the motor industry gave an impetus to its rapid progress. In 1905 the area of rubber was 25,000 acres. Within the next five years the area extended to 188,000 and in 1920 there were 397,000 acres of rubber.
Tea and rubber soon became the chief commercial crops of Sri Lanka. With the rapid development of these new crops the demand for labour grew even more than in the coffee days. Coffee required a small permanent labour force just sufficient to keep the estate free from Weeds, run a cattle farm for milk and manure, and undertake other routine tasks. The crop was seasonal- Once or twice a year - and, therefore, only during the harvesting periods was a large labour force needed. On the other hand, tea required constant care and attention. Consequently, nearly all the year round, work was available - plucking, pruning, manuring, Weeding, forking etc. Therefore, a large and regular labour force was indispensable to the cultivation of tea.
Women made excellent tea pluckers; their nimble fingers were considered ideal for plucking the tender tea shoots - two leaves and a bud. Larger numbers of women were, therefore, lured into the estates and this led to the large - scale founding of families and permanent settlement of Indian Tamils in the island.
NOTES
1.
I.H.Vanden Driesen, "Some Trends in the Economic History of Ceylon in the Modern Period, "CJHSS, 3 (1), Jan-June 1960, p.2.
2. Ibid
3. Asoka Bandarage, Colonialism in Sri Lanka, Berlin,1983,p.13
4. Ibid p.14
5. S.B.D. de Silva, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, London, 1982,
p.449.
6. Ibid, p.464.
7. Ibid, p.476.
8. See William Z. Foster, Outline History of the World Trade Union Movement,
New York, 1956, p 30.
9. Karl Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, Moscow, 1978, p.104
10. Ibid.
11. Frederick Engels quoted by Foster, op.cit., p.31.
12. Tennent, Ceylon, Vol.2, Colombo, 1977, p.735.
13. Ibid.
14. Planters Association of Ceylon, 1854-1954, Colombo, p.4.
1S. SLNA CO 54/258, despatch 52, 13.4.1849, Encl. 9, Torrington to Grey.

16. 17. 18.
19. 20. 21.
22. 23.
26. 27.
29
31.
32. 33.
35.
37.
39.
40. 41. 42. 43.
45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. S2. 53. S4. 55.
Plantation Economy and immigrant Workers 47
bid.
SLNA 5/36, despatch 52 Misc., 13.4.1849, Torrington to Grey. Vanden Driesen, "Coffee Cultivation in Ceylon" (1),CHS, III (1), July 1953, p53.
bid.
SLNA, CO 6 of 21.4.1847, Tennent to Grey. C O 54/235, 21 April 1848 - Tennent to Grey, quoted by Vanden Driesen in "Indian Immigration to Ceylon, The First Phase C. 1840 - 1855" - A Comment, CJHSS, 7 (2), July - Dec 1964, p.220.
Ibid.
SLNA, 5/34 Pt, CO despatch 7 of 214,1847, Tennent to Grer
Ibid.
Ibid.
SLNA 5/34, despatch 6 of 21-4 1847, Tennent to Grey,
bid. K.M. de Silva,"Indian Immigration to Ceylon - The First Phase (c 1840 - 1855)"CJHSS, 4(1), Jan-Jun 1961, p.129. Planters' Association of Ceylon (1854 - 1954), op.cit. p.5. Fr S.G.Perera, History of Ceylon, p.163. Speeches and Minutes of Sir Henry George Ward (1855 - 60), Government Printers, 1864, p.63.
J. Ferguson, Ceylon in 1893, p.117. Planters Association of Ceylon (1854 - 1954), op.cit. p 14.
Ibid. Vanden Driesen "Some Trends in the Economic History of Ceylon in the Modern Period",CJHSS 3(1),Jan - Jun 1960, p.11. The Twenty Fourth Report of the Friend-in-Need Society, Colombo, 1869, p.5.
J. Ferguson, Ceylon in 1893, p.66.
Ibid, p.113. D.Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers in Sri Lanka, Colombo, 1986, pp.145 - 146
Ibid, p.165.
Ibid, pp.193 - 194.
Quoted by Wesuperuma, p.203.
D. Wesuperuma, p. 204. Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, Colombo, 1958, Ch 133. Ceylon Administration Report - 1870, p.385.
Ibid, p.367
Ibid.
Ibid, p.368.
Ceylon Administration Report - 1870, Part IV, p.A17. District Hospitals Mortality Commission, SP2 of 1893, p.45
Ibid.
Ibid, p.46.
SPXXXIV - 1879, p.4.
J. Ferguson, op.cit., p.69.
Ibid, p.27.

Page 35

Chapter
ORGANIZED IMMIGRATION AND INDIAN PEOPLE'S PROTEST AGAINST THE COOLY TRADE
We have seen in the preceding chapter the rise and fall of King Coffee and growth of the tea and rubber industries. Hundreds of thousands of Indian workers poured into the island to serve on the plantations, and yet it seemed that the demand of the planters for Indian labour was insatiable. The planters as well as the

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50 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
government realized only too well that, but for the perennial flow of these workers, the entire edifice of their Planters' Raj would be endangered. They had devised various schemes of immigration. From the beginning of the coffee plantations to the end of the 19th century the recruitment of Indian labour was done by individuals. But, in 1904, the planters and the government, in collaboration, organized the Ceylon Labour Commission whose function it was to recruit labour for the plantations and the government departments that were in need of such labour. Later, in 1923, the third and the last phase of the immigration system came when the Colonial government in Sri Lanka began to deal directly with the Government of india.
Before we deal with the changes that took place in immigration procedure in the twentieth century, it is worth taking a detailed look at the transport conditions that prevailed during the latter part of the nineteenth century although this has been touched upon before. The immigrants followed two principal routes: one via Mannar and the North Road and the other via Tuticorin and Colombo. To take the Tuticorin - Colombo route first: "This has always been extensively used by native traders, house-servants and the horse-keepers, and by a certain portion of coolies on their vay to Rakvana, Kolonna Korale and Moravak Korale coffee estates." After the opening of the railway from Madurai to Tuticorin "it has been adopted by a considerable number of immigrants proceeding to other districts".
The route via Mannar and the North road, however, Served as the most important path for the immigrants until the end of the 19th century. So many perished along this route that this should have been more appropriately called the"Death Road".
The ports of shipping and landing in the 1860s were Pesalai during the South West monsoon and Vengalle during the North-East monsoon. From the ports the immigrants followed the Mannar- Medawachchiya road,into the central road at Medawachchiya and by Mihintale and Dambulla, they reached Kandy. The distance from Pesalaito Kandy was 156 1/2 miles and the journey would occupy on an average six days. From Kandy the immigrants had to walk long distances to reach the coffee estates Some of which were located a hundred miles away from this central town. Describing the North route, Dr H. Dickman, Colonial Surgeon, Central Province, wrote:

SOUTH INDIAN DISTRICTS FROM WHICH LABOUR WAS RECRUITED FOR PALNTATIONS IN SRI LANKA
Adadura i
0 000 800 North Road
O Labout rest ing sheds
Ra i 1 ways
Tri ciri ngpo y-1` ~4ON=
Nagapa t t i namn
THE NORTH ROAD
Spoint Pedro
ᏙᏗ
"a
Ti ri ppane
سیم تک کPolgaha
Nawa lapitiya
8 a du 11 a O C)
CNuvar, Eh iya O
Nanuoy a
Courtesy: DWesumperuma

Page 37
SOUTH INDIAN DISTRICTS FROM WHICH LABOUR WAS RECRUITED FOR PALNTATIONS IN SRI LANKA
r. حى. لا * a.1 ۰۰صر؛
Α ሶ‛
Vs
Sou TH I NDIA "صس
་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་ ۰ ص ٫۷۰هٔ
o a MYSORE
S. CANARA Madras
* ص لا Հյ-է »COCRಣ್ಣ .vʻNov, N N. ܓ:
N Pond â cherry
e Ns. A
tayawaraa
Tri gehinopoliy est 梦斋
cÓCHIN '\.! クイ TANORE
سكهم “سمعہ ہے ء صے ہY
がつ 傘タ
CAesvaram
t Dbanuakodi *SPesana1
●_化 2 ta) TINNEvEtiy" "గ్గ్కి
".を
*
o SO 100 11 les SR LANKA
傘
w a
•ኚ° .. : • * 曾
Major abour Recrui ting Districts
inor Labour
Recruiting Districts
Rai 1ways
Courtesy ; D.Wesumperuma
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Organised immigration & Indian Peoples Protest against Cooly Trade 51
The presence of exhaustive jungles and marshes influence the climate of the interior considerably. In the neighbourhood of Kandy, towards the North, is found an immense desert country wholly depopulated, known and described by the Sinhalese as Palu, where the sun's rays seldom penetrate the thick vegetation, where the products of decomposition are found in an accumulated form, and where the soil, from these causes, may be said to exhale noxious gases. In addition, there are extensive pools and marshes saturated with organic matter, and streams in a state of neglect. Through these jungles an immense immigration population estimated at 140,000 men, women and children, continually pass and repass, and for whom no conservancy arrangements are to be found... The vicinity
ofstreams wide and deep during the rains, and shallow in the dry weather (the condition
3.
of many of our mountain streams) is thought to be highly malarious. vu
In addition to these natural disadvantages the North road was infected with bandits who robbed the poor immigrants of their meagre possessions and savings. A most interesting Comment on the immigrants' march was made by Phillips.A.Templer, Assistant Government Agent, Mannar District. He stated that the immigrant "is hustled about and bullied all along the road; and that the chances are very much in favour of his dying long before his destination can be reached. What may have been the case in the days when his bones were said to whiten the Central road, I do not know".
Infectious diseases such as cholera and smallpox attacked the immigrants and took a heavy toll of their lives. When cholera broke out among a large contingent of immigrants in 1867, 453 of the 639 cases in Anuradhapura and Mannar died. Though stricken with the dreaded disease, the immigrants walked on, and all through the journey the contagion claimed new victims not only in their midst but also amongst the villagers in the North bordering the route. W.C. Twynam, Government Agent, Jaffna, in his statement to the Cholera Commission, in 1867, said that "the disease prevailed chiefly in villages or close to the roads followed by the immigrants". He stated pathetically: "Village after village has died out..., or has been so reduced that only one or two families remain, and the country for some distance on each side of the Mannar - Medawachchiya road in the Mannar District is fast becoming a desert".
The sailing vessels employed by the Government of Ceylon, that transported the immigrants, were not free from the epidemic either. The planters were not at all unaware of this scandalous situation but they turned a blind eye to the suffering and loss of lives among the immigrants. This is clear from the evidence given by S.S.Saunders, the Chairman of the Planters'

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52 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
Association, before the Coolie Immigration Commission of 1877. The President of the Commission asked Saunders: "Were you not aware that the vessels arriving in the early part of the year were so over-crowded that the coolies were so penned in that they could not move even for Calls of nature, and the decks were in Some instances covered with their excreta?" Saunders answered: "I had heard that such was reported". When Saunders was asked by the President of the Commission: "When cholera was prevalent and cases arose of the bodies of persons dying of cholera being washed ashore from immigrant vessels, were you not consulted on the necessity for those regulations?". The answer was: "I do not think so".
The Coolie Immigration Commission described the sailing vessels as follows: "The principal mode of transport is in small native vessels the majority of which are unfit to carry passengers. The holds of these vessels contain ballast consisting principally of sand on which the coolies, especially the women and children lie; it becomes polluted by vomit, excreta etc., and is seldom changed at the end of each voyage. These small vessels are also defective in ventilation, and in rough weather when the hatches have to be closed, the air between the decks becomes most foul". Nevertheless, these notorious vessels were the cheapest modes of transporting tens of thousands of people between India and Sri Lanka, and so the British capitalists had no desire to improve them for quite a long time.
This was not all. All along the route the immigrants were subjected to extortion and blackmail by various elements - the Captains of Sailing vessels, the police, government officials and bandits. In India "the police and others fine them and levy blackmail openly. They make them pay a certain sum before they are allowed to pass the Police Station". W.C. Twynam, Government Agent, Jaffna, in fact, "caught some of them red handed in the act, and had them punished at Trinchnopoly." The Coolie Immigration Commission found that blackmail was levied not only in India but also in Ceylon "by peons and hospital attendants". Extra charges were made for immigrants using government vessels. Where the fare was only 25 cents, a rupee had been elicited. Punnyappan Kangany of Trichinopoly stated before the Commission: "I brought 400 men this year, and every one of them paid one rupee or one rupee and twenty five cents".' This was at Devipattam. Elphinstone, a planter, said:

Organised immigration & Indian Peoples Protest against Cooly Trade 53
I think they would prefer the Tuticorin route, if they were not so awfully chiselled by the Captains of these vessels. My kanganies complain very much of this, they force them in the middle of the sea to subscribe to their churches even.'
To overcome these manifold evils, attendant upon the immigrants on their journey, the Coolie Immigration Commission merely recommended that inspections be conducted by European officers.
Plague and the Immigrants
Bubonic Plague struck Bombay in 1896. The fortunate absence of this dreaded disease in the Madras Presidency comforted the planters, whose requirements of labour were reaching a new high with the rapid development of the tea industry. However, there was the imminent danger of the plague striking at the very source of their labour. The Governor, Sir West Ridgeway, therefore, was compelled to appoint a Plague Committee to advise the government against the "introduction to Ceylon of the Plague".
On the recommendation of the Plague Committee the Paumban - Mannar route was discarded and the North road was closed in 1899. Consequently, the direct passage by steamer from Tuticorin to Colombo was favoured. On arrival the immigrants were taken to Ragama Camp, eight miles from Colombo, where infected persons were quarantined while others were free to proceed to their destinations.
Precautions were taken at Tuticorin and every passenger had to obtain a certificate from a Special Medical Officer. A number of ordinary travellers were detained for 15 days. How no such precautionary measures were enforced in the ca N estate workers. They were at liberty to obtain their Colombo, without any reference whatsoever to t Por MediCa Officer, from the Agent of the British India. eang, Navigation Company on the mere statement of a gany, that hey "estate Coolies". By this "open door" połCyf toestąerwòirkếr, thት government was holding the healtsof p'b ople'of Sri arka, lo *グ jeopardy. " . و به عنه "
It was evident that even the Bubonic Plague Commissio had no desire to screen the estate workers, against "plague refugees" who might infiltrate into this country. The Plage
'' تمام “

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54 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
Commission's remarks are indeed significant: "Obstruction of the source of the labour supply would have been a calamity only second in its destructive consequences to the plague itself"."
The Ceylon Labour Commission
The first decade of the twentieth century saw not only the progress of the already established tea plantations but also witnessed the remarkable development of the rubber industry, as before mentioned. The price of rubber, which was about 2 Rs. per Ib in 1901, rose by more than a hundred per cent within the next five years and for a time it fetched as much as 12 Rs. a 1b. Thousands of acres were acquired by European Companies and planted with rubber.
There was thus an increasing demand for labour. In fact, the planting interests as well as the government were most perturbed when they found large numbers of Indian workers proceeding to Burma and the Straits Settlements about this time. The Planters' Association, which never really reconciled itself with the closure of the North road, adopted a resolution in 1904, calling for the immediate establishment of a Recruiting Agency in India.
Governor Henry A. Blake, in his despatch dated 3rd August 1904, to A. Lyttelton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, pointed Out that the Commission would be of Service to the Public Works Department, irrigation Department, the Ceylon Government Railway, and any other government departments requiring labour".' He further stated that the "contribution desired from thegovernment by the Planters' Association would be at the rate of Rs. 11,000/- per annum or 25 per cent of the total estimated cost for two years". On approval from Lyttelton, the Ceylon Labour Commission under a former planter, Norman Rowsell, as Commissioner, was established at Trichinopoly in India on 1 September 1904.'
Under this new Scheme tin tickets Were issued to the immigrants for identification. Kondappi described the tin ticket System thus: "It is practically an adoption of the system of Value Payable Post, the coolie being the 'package' to be delivered. His address was contained on a small tin disc punched with a letter, to denote his district, and two numbers, one denoting the number

Organised immigration & Indian Peoples Protest against Cooly Trade 55
of the estate in the official register of the estates, and the other a serial number to denote the particular number assigned to each labourer. This system kept down the advances and facilitated cheap and expeditious immigration"." The kanganies were compelled to pay the advances to them in the presence of the Commissioner's Agents. Every recruit then "signed a promissory note in favour of the kangany while the latter gave one for the full
amount in favour of the Commissioner".
D.Wesumperuma Writes:
The essence of the system was the assumption by the Government of the responsibility of conveying the immigrant labourers from the Government Immigration Camp at Tataparai in South India to the railway station nearest to the plantation of their destination. The expenses involved in the transportation of the labourers were initially incurred by the Government and were subsequently recovered from the planters, who in turn debited the cost to the labourers.'
The immediate success of the Ceylon Labour Commission was assured since a serious drought had affected parts of Madras. The Ceylon Labour Commissioner, Norman Rowsell, waxed with joy over the failure of the monsoon rains in India. He reported: "Field works are at a standstill in a great many places, and there is no doubt that this year should be an exceptionally good one for recruiting labour, with every prospect of a great reduction of advances".' However, Rowsell did not find it always so easy to attract labour to Sri Lanka and his agents and peons had to travel extensively to have "the system of recruiting known far and wide". They distributed hand-bills advertising what a wonderful way of life awaited them in Sri Lanka. Eleven thousand such hand-bills Were distributed in three months. "The advantages of life and work on Ceylon estates are brought prominently before likely recruits and use is made of literature and magic lantern exhibitions for this purpose"."
it is interesting to note that the Ceylon Labour Commissioner also served as a master watchdog in India for the Ceylon planters. In certain circumstances, the immigrant workers, unable to work off their debts to the estate and unable to endure the iron grip of the employer, sought their freedom by bolting from the estate. As soon as this was discovered, the planters charged them in the courts for "bolting", "desertion" etc. As though they were outlaws, warrants were issued against them and rewards

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56 A History of the Up-Country Tamils
were publicly offered for their arrest and every means was used to track them down, to hound them out. When a bolter was caught, he had to undergo one month's imprisonment which served to break the rebellious spirit in the worker. After the imprisonment, he was not free, he was taken straight to the estate, which, in reality, was no less than an open prison for life. Fearing such a sad fate, some workers, after bolting, travelled incognito in boats to their village homes in India, little realizing that they could still be caught by the long arm of the planter. Norman Rowsell reported in 1905 from the Labour Commission based in Trichinopoly in India: "Several bolters have been searched for and found... and we shall greatly assist Superintendents in recovering their coolies or amounts due to them."
At the beginning of the First World War, while the government and the planters were still seriously concerned with maintaining a regular supply of immigrant labour, they were confronted with an unexpected problem that arose from the war. Though the theatre of direct conflict was in Europe, the British in Sri Lanka were not left in peace by the German navy. Since tea and rubber Were essential commodities for the War, the German militarists attempted to cut off the source which kept the supply of labour flowing to the plantations. In other words, they tried to prevent Indian labour arriving in the island. This was evident in the attacks on the ship S S Zira which was then engaged in transporting immigrant workers. The attacks were conducted in August 1914 by the German naval vessel, Emden, and "interrupted the sailings of the Zira very frequently." The Emden sunk or immobilised so many British ships and was so elusive that it has become a common Word in usage in the Sinhalese and Tamil languages -" Emden means a cunning and crookish person.
The Indo-Ceylon Railway and the Mandapam Camp
On 24 February 1914 the new Indo-Ceylon Railway (Dhanuskodi to Talaimannar) was inaugurated by the Governors of Ceylon and Madras. At first a temporary camp was built near Mandapam station, and within a week the camp began to function.

Organised immigration & Indian Peoples Protest against Cooly Trade 57
On 02 March the first arrivals entered the camp and, after nine days' detention, left for Ceylon.
The authorities felt that this camp had two main defects: (1) there was no water in the immediate vicinity and (2) the railway ran right through the middle of the site. Apart from the noise and the smoke emitted by railway engines, there was the distinct possibility of the public peering into the real conditions prevailing at this slave camp. Therefore, a new plot of 246 acres was acquired for the establishment of a permanent camp. In june 1914, the Ceylon Public Works Department took over all works from the South Indian Railway and applied themselves to erecting a permanent camp at Mandapam.
The Mandapam Camp, indeed, was an elaborate arrangement. It had 15 sheds to accommodate 2,200 immigrant workers. Each shed had its own latrine, bathing well and kitchen. There were also eight sheds for 1,000 miscellaneous passengers. The feeding of the immigrants was done by M/s Spencer & Co., of Madras. Rice and vegetable curry were served on tin plates. The Ceylon Labour Commission had an agency in the Camp itself and "it accepted back all coolies who failed to proceed to Ceylon and arranged for their being returned to their villages."
When the camp authorities finished with the disinfecting procedure, the immigrants were escorted to Dhanuskodi where they were packed like cattle in the ferry steamer bound for Talaimannar. The camp was a "great success and 90,273 of the total 152,057 passengers passed through it within the year."
H. Gordon Cran, the Superintendent of the camp, devised a methodical system of administration. However, this very systematic collection of workers caused much resentment among the people of Madras. Here was a foreign agency, pitched on Indian soil, selecting Workers to slave in the plantations of Sri Lanka. Though the government of India acquiesced in this sordid business, the Indian people protested all along against this practice. Even the District Collectors could not but voice their indignation at this new form of slave trade. The Collector of Tinnevely District sent a letter of protest on 31 March 1904 to the government of Madras: "I have once again to protest.... Detention is made not for the local but for imperial and World wide needs, and it would be an undoubted hardship to compel a small Municipality to pay the cost of a detention camp for which it has

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58 A History of the Up-Country Tamils
no desire or need, but which is forced upon it in the interest of others."
The Quarantine Camp, however, became a permanent feature of the immigration scheme. A later report observed that Dr. Van Langenburg, Superintendent of the Camp in 1917, "has by his tact and experience been able to remove any feeling of irritation which has been arOused in Certain circles in Madras On the first institution of the system."
Indian People's Protest Against the Cooly Trade
During World War I there was considerable agitation in India by leading politicians against the entire system of emigration. In Madras there was growing opposition to the emigration of the socalled free labour to Ceylon and Malaya. One of the most active agitators was Saminathan, the editor of Indian Emigrant, a monthly journal. Indeed he visited Ceylon in 1916, and organized a public meeting in Colombo. This meeting was presided over by Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam who, after introducing Saminathan to the audience, said:
But in modern times emigration is the result rather of the poverty and hunger of India, which drives hundreds of thousands across the seas to seek a bare subsistence in strange lands. Ceylon, being the nearest to India, naturally attracts the bulk of emigration.
The masses of the people are steeped in such poverty and misery as to be forced to seek relief in emigration. The cooly's lot is not an enviable one. Being poor, ignorant and helpless, he is unable to protect himself against the cupidity and tyranny of unscrupulous recruiters and employers...But even when no indentured labour is permitted, but only so called free labour as in Ceylon and to some extent in the Federated MalayStates, there are many hardships and evils calling urgently for redress.'
In his speech Saminthan stated "how the existing organizations protected the interests of the capitalists and employers and how urgently necessary it was to provide similar protection to the labouring classes". N.H.M. Bowden, the Acting Labour Commissioner in Trichinopoly, says that the European papers in Colombo did not report this meeting. It was the Indian Emigrant that had carried the full report:

Organised immigration & Indian Peoples Protest against Cooly Trade 59
Far different, however, is the lot of the poor Indian Cooly who nevertheless contributes to the building up of the Empire. He never develops into a colonist. No fortune ever comes his way, and he has no voice in the management of his own concerns, let alone arranging matters for the state. The only institutions he helps to raise after long years of toil and moil are the house of detention, the Vagrants' Home, and the home for Incurables. His existence is cribbed, cabined, and bounded by Mandapam at one end, and the Morgue at the other. His career on any plantation is one long travail, and between weeping and weeding he consumes his days, becoming as much a part of the estate as the loam under the trees or the lichen on the hill-side. Lured from his village with specious promises of a bee line to fortune, the first thing he realizes on yielding to the temptation is being dumped down in the middle of a dismal Camp, with a tin ticket round his neck, and a sleek Kangany on his back.' *
Making reference to the "Anti-Recruiting Agitation" in Madras, Bowden Writes:
I have several times referred to the efforts made by a certain class in India to induce the Madras Government to interfere with the recruiting of coolies to Ceylon. Questions have been asked in the Legislative Council by non-official members and the Government in their reply to these questions practically said that there were abuses in connection with free emigration, but that they had no power to interfere as the matter is a concern of the Supreme Government of India. I do not think that these agitators will be content with this reply, and they will probably continue to do all in their power to bring emigration to Ceylon under restriction.'
Mahatma Gandhi had returned to India with his experience of struggles for the rights of the Indian community in South Africa (1906-1914). In 1916 Gandhi addressed a series of public meetings against the indenture system of emigration. The kangany system of emigration too stood condemned by the people of India.
Lord Chelmsford, the then Viceroy of India, was flooded with memorials, many of them organised by women's organisations. A memorandum signed by leading politicians, including Pandit Malaviya, Srinivasa Sastri and Bhupendra Nath Basu, had been addressed to the Viceroy. Referring to the kangany system they "declared that no such alternative system (to indenture) is practicable". Sapru (later Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru) condemned the system of emigration to Sri Lanka and Malaya. Citing the case of a 'organized cooly' who received forty stripes on his back, Sapru said: "In reality the freedom of the labourer in these colonies is a delusion. He can be punished in a criminal court for purely labour offenses."
It was about this time in 1917 that the Madras Government published a Report on Indian Labour Emigration to Ceylon and

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60 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
Malaya... by N.E.Marjoribanks and A.K.G. Ahmed Tambi Marakkayar. These two Madras officials were highly critical of the kangany system which kept the labourer in perpetual dept. Tinker says:
Indeed, the Government of India has been sitting on the comments of the Madras Government upon the enquiry by Marjoribanks and Ahmed Tambi Marakkayar. The Madras Government acknowledged the weight of Indian opinion against coolie emigration, under conditions which necessarily involve the social and moral degradation of the Indian labourer.'
Whilst World War I was still in progress, the Government of India issued an Order under the Indian Defence Act restricting free recruitment of labour in India. This Order, in So far as it related to the Government of Madras, stipulated that "no unskilled labour. shall be allowed to leave this Presidency of Madras without a permit." After the war, and with Mahatma Gandhi launching the first Satyagraha campaign against British rule in 1919, the Indian people's independence movement was conducted with a new vigour, and this led the Indian National Congress to evince greater Concern for Indian immigrant workers in the colonies. The Congress sent Rev. C.F. Andrews to Sri Lanka to report upon the conditions under which Indian workers were employed. Pressured by public opinion, the Government of India passed the Indian Emigration Act No. 7 of 1922, which imposed new terms and Conditions upon emigration, including the right of inspection by an Agent of the Indian government of the living conditions of the immigrant workers wherever they were employed.
The Sri Lanka government, however much it disliked these conditions, was compelled to take legislative action "to give legal force to the conditions laid down by the Indian Government, and, in particular to provide for the establishment and administration of the Common Fund". Ordinance No. 1 of 1923 was passed and this provided for the appointment of a Controller of Indian immigrant Labour and for his department's expenses to be met by an "Immigration Fund'. W. E. Wait was appointed Controller and an Advisory Board of Indian Immigrant Labour was set up. One of the members of the Board was E.G. Adamaly, the Indian Member of the Legislative Council.
The surplus of the Tin Ticket Fund, the fees recovered from the employers under the provision of the Ceylon Ordinance and special contributions voted by the Legislative Council contributed to the Fund. The Immigration Fund came into

Organised immigration & Indian Peoples Protest against Cooly Trade 61
operation on 1 October 1923 and, on the same day, S. Renganathan assumed duties at Kandy as the Agent of the Government of India in Sri Lanka.
17
18
19
20 21 22 23 24
裘
28 29
NOTES
Coolie Immigration Commission Report, S.P. 8 of 1877, p. V.
bid.
Ceylon Administration Report,-1870, pp. 378-379.
Ibid, p. 102 Cholera Commission Report, S.P. 28 of 1867, p. 156.
Ibid
Coolie Immigration Commission Report, op.cit., p. 7. Ibid, p. V.
Ibid, p. 5.
Ibid, p. 41.
Ibid, p. 46. Bubonic Plague Commission Report, S.P. 13 of 1897, p. 327. S.P. 8 of 1908, p. 1.
bid.
C. Kondappi, Indians Overseas, p. 32. D.Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers in Sri Lanka, Colombo, 1986, pp. 67-68. Report of Ceylon Labour Commissioner, 13 Jan 1905, S.P. 8 of 1908. S.E.N. Nicholas, Planters Hand Book, Colombo, 1906, p. 58. Ceylon Labour Commission Report from Trichinopoly, 13 June 1905, S.P. 8 of 1908, p. 5. Ceylon Administration Report, p. N11.
Ibid, p. N7.
S.P., 14 of 1906, p. P2. Ceylon Administration Report- 1922, p. 05. Ceylon Labour Commission, Monthly Review, Trichinopoly, Vol. II, No. 7, July 1916, pp. 356 - 357.
Ibid, pp. 358 - 359
Ibid, pp. 354 - 355 Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery, London, 1974, p 351. Ibid, p. 357. Report of the Controller of Indian Immigrant Labour, 1923, p.R3.

Page 43

Chapter
6
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, FRANCHISE AND PLANTATION WORKERS
During the First World War (1914-18), when Britain was engaged in a bitter struggle against Germany, many politicians in Sri Lanka thought that this was the most opportune moment to press ahead with their agitation for constitutional reforms. Young lawyers and other radicals, including A.E.Goonesinha, dissatisfied with the docility of the then political leaders, founded the Young Lanka League with the objective of national independence, on 2 March 1915, a significant date since it was on that day a century earlier

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64 The History of the Up-Country Tamils
that the flickering flame of freedom of the Kandyan Kingdom was snuffed out by the British colonialists.
In May 1915, the Sinhala-Muslim riots broke out. The disturbances began when the Muslims took strong objection to a procession of Buddhists on Vesak Day, with their traditional flutes and drums, in front of their mosque in Kandy. As a result of assaults and stone-throwing, the mosque was damaged, and pandemonium broke out. Communal passions were roused to fever pitch, and with rumours of violence against Buddhist temples spreading like wild fire, there was a wave of riots in many areas resulting in several deaths. The violence was directed against the Muslim community and there was large-scale looting of Muslim shops, especially those belonging to Coast Moors, who were recent immigrants from the Malabar coast in South India, engaged as petty traders in the towns and in the rural areas. But during the riots the Indian Tamils were not touched; in fact some Indian Tamils gave refuge to a number of Muslim families and protected them from violence.
The Governor, Sir Robert Chalmers, rather belatedly, declared martial law and brought in Indian troops to quell the riots. In the name of law and order many crimes were committed. "The leading Buddhist political and temperance Workers were detained, and many Buddhists were shot or imprisoned after trials of court martial. During the period of martial law the troops and police along with British planters and civil servants, unleashed a punitive campaign of terror." The communal riots and the consequent dampening of the enthusiasm of the national radical forces and the rise of the 'constitutionalists' to the foreground restrained political agitation for some time.
The end of the World War saw not only the defeat and Collapse of the German empire but also Britain greatly weakened and the emergence of the United States, which entered the war only in 1917, as the richest nation in the world. The myth of the invincibility of the British empire had been shattered and, especially for the Asian people, the World was no longer the same as before the war, since the Russian revolution of November 1917, under the leadership of Lenin, had smashed the Tsarist empire and ushered in the first socialist state in human history. These world-shaking events inspired all peoples languishing under the imperialist yoke, throughout the world, in their struggle for freedom.

Constitutional Reforms, Franchise & Plantation Workers 65
After the war, the people of India, which had supplied over a million men and a hundred million pounds outright to Britain's imperialist war, expectantly waited for meaningful constitutional reforms. All that they got were the notorious "Rowlatt Bills". Jawaharlal Nehru says: "these Bills gave great powers to the government and the police to arrest and keep without trial... any person they disapproved of or suspected." All the leaders of India condemned them as the "Black Bills". Mahatma Gandhi organized a hartal - a stoppage of all business activities - on 6 April 1919. Nehru commented: "it was the first all-India demonstration of the kind, and it was a wonderfully impressive one, in which all kinds of people and communities joined."
The response of the masses was magnificent, but the hartal did not remain non-violent in all areas. at Amritsar, in the Punjab, events took a serious turn leading to the killing of some Englishmen, and martial law was declared. On April 13, General Dyer gave orders to his battalion to fire at an unarmed crowd of protesters in an enclosed area in Jallianwala Bagh, and in this massacre 379 people were killed while thousands were Wounded. What was even more of an outrage than this barbarous act to the people of India, was the showering of plaudits by the British imperialists on General Dyer in addition to giving him a purse of Sterling 20,000 in appreciation of his 'deeds'.
The wrath of the people of India had been kindled, and there was hatred against the British regime all over the country. To assuage the feelings of bitterness and resentment within the people, the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitutional Reforms were proclaimed in December 1919. Dissatisfied with the reforms, Gandhi inaugurated a Satyagraha-non-Cooperation movement - On 1 August 1920. Later, in December 1921, the Indian Congress boycotted the visit of the Prince of Wales to India. Congress leaders and thousands of activists were arrested. But, when there was an attack on a police station, the Congress, on Gandhi's advice, suspended the non-cooperation movement, since such use of violence did not accord with his conception of non-violent methods. These developments in neighbouring India had a profound effect on the politically conscious sections of the people of Sri Lanka, especially on the young radicals. K.M. de Silva writes: "The impact on Sri Lanka of Montagu's pronouncement on India's political evolution and his visit there was apparent at once in the 'constitutionalists' redefining the goals of political advancement as

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they envisaged them; but it was more important in that it broke down opposition to the creation of a larger political organization than any which existed." There was a two-way communication between the leaders of the Indian National MOVerment and SOme of the Sri Lankan political activists. Among many others, M.A. Arulanandan (1918), A.E. Goonesinha (1925, 1927) had attended political conferences in India, while much acclaimed visits were made to Sri Lanka by B.G. Tilak (1919), Mrs Sarojini Naidu (1922), Moulana Saukat Ali (1924), Mahatma Gandhi (1927), Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya (1931, 1937), Satyamurthi (1937), Jawaharlal Nehru (1931, 1939), A.K. Gopalan and Jeevanandam (1939).
Despite these influences from the sub-continent, there was not even a remotely comparable political movement for national independence in Sri Lanka. At the end of the war many political leaders reverently paid their homage to the king for the victory over Germany and expressed their unswerving loyalty to the British Crown. Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam, the most distinguished public figure of the time, was indeed the only outstanding exception. Arunachalam, who retired from government service in 1913, was essentially a radical. In his address in 1917, to the Ceylon National Association, Arunachalam asserted that Ceylon was "practically under benevolent despotism wielded by a Governor who (was) responsible only to Downing Street and (who) exercised his powers through a bureaucracy predominantly European," " and made a case for self-government.
In May 1917, under Arunachalam's inspiration, the Ceylon Reform League was founded "to secure political reforms". A joint conference of the Ceylon Reform League and the Ceylon National Association called for "the realization of responsible government in the country" and wanted reforms "more liberal than those deemed necessary for India". In a confidential despatch, the Governor suggested that some reform would have to be granted "since the infection of political reform from India has reached Ceylon... it would be difficult to give adequate reasons for refusing some political advancement to Ceylon." The long felt need of the agitators for constitutional reforms was finally realized in December 1919, when the various political organizations came together to form the Ceylon National Congress under the leadership of Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam. In 1920, Arunachalam castigated Some of the Congress leaders for their having "little trust in the masses of the people and regarding them as only fit subjects for

Constitutional Reforms, Franchise & Plantation Workers 67
a parental despotism". It was only the Young Lanka League that agreed with such sentiments.
Although the Congress, in 1919, put forward its demands for constitutional reform, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, after considering Governor Sir William Manning's report thereon, merely caused an Order in Council to be enacted reconstituting the Legislative Council to have 14 official and 23 unofficial members under the presidency of the Governor.
Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam severely criticized Governor Manning. Making reference to the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in India, he said: "Brigadier-General Manning has no faith in these ideals and aims.... Nor has he the saving grace of sympathy with our people. His Majesty the King, when he visited India as Prince of Wales, noted with his wonderful insight the lack of sympathy between the rulers and the ruled and publicly impressed on British officials the need for cultivating sympathy. These words have borne fruit in India but apparently never reached the ears of Brigadier-General Manning. He is chary of cultivating friendly relations with Ceylonese, and reactionaries and sycophants have made use of him for their own purpose."
The Congress rejected the new reforms on the premise that they, in fact, increased the Governor's powers arid imposed restrictions on the rights of the people's representatives. However, James Peiris, who was now President of the Ceylon National Congress, after a compromise negotiation with the Governor agreed to implement the 1920 reforms, and assured to "cooperate and work harmoniously with government".
Two years later, the new Congress President, H.J.C. Pereira, "declared, "We do not say independence, we never claimed it... our aim is to become Britishers in the broad sense of the word," to which the infuriated Young Lanka members shouted 'No, No". The bitterness of the feeling against the moderates can be seen from some of the personal invective used in the Young Lanka', in which the Congress were called "political scarecrows... who were pawning the "sacred liberties of the land". And, when the Prince of Wales visited Ceylon in 1922, the Young Lanka members protested against his visit and condemned the Ceylonese moderates. "They contrasted the Indians, who 'refused to join in the mockery with the Ceylonese who in their silk suits, frock coats, top hats, gowns and Brussels lace' lavished attention on the Prince at Queen's House, the races and golf links."

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Subsequently, on the question of territorial representation, Arunachalam differed from the leadership of the Congress and broke away from the very organization he helped to found. Later, in 1923, prominent Kandyan members of the Congress formed the Kandyan National Assembly and called for a federal state with regional autonomy for the Kandyans.
The Donoughmore Commission and the Franchise Guestion
In 1927 a Commission, led by the Earl of Donoughmore, arrived in Ceylon to examine and report on the reforms to the Constitution. "The Commissioners came with certain specific axioms in mind as to what Constituted established democratic institutions; the principle of equality of opportunity and the right of every man to vote, and the regressive nature of communal representation. They noted the 'great gulf between the rural worker and the Westernised classes of Colombo', and Considered that universal suffrage would be the only way to prevent 'placing an oligarchy in power without any guarantee that the interests of the remainder of the people would be consulted by those in authority."
Over all questions relating to reforms, franchise became the most fundamental question, and the attitudes of the political leaders on this issue were keenly watched by the working class and other oppressed sections of all communities in Sri Lanka. On this vital issue, the Ceylon National Congress deputation, led by its president E.W. Perera, in its oral evidence before the Commission, opposed any substantial extension of the franchise and said that it should be limited to the then existing qualification of an income of Rs. 50 a month. The Congress contended that if the right to vote was given to men earning less than Rs. 50 a month, the result would be to produce voters "of whom a great proportion would not use responsibility in the exercise of the vote."' The real reason for the Congress leaders' objection was the fear that the extension of the franchise to the masses would inevitably lead to an erosion of their privileges in society.
The Jaffna Tamil leaders were against universal suffrage even more vociferously than the Congress leaders. Apart from their

Constitutional Reforms, Franchise & Plantation Workers 69
privileges being affected they felt that this would undermine their traditional positions of superiority over the people of lower castes in the caste-ridden social structure in Jaffna. Above all they, quite realistically, feared that adult franchise would lead to Sinhalese dominance, in terms of Seats, Over the minorities.
The arch-Conservative leader, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, opposed the Suffrage proposals in every possible way. Jane Russel says that, "the franchise proposal especially apalled and outraged him. He denounced as 'an utter stupidity the proposal to "transfer political power to a dangerous mob' and made one last Supreme effort to prevent the inevitable by embarking on a futile trip to lobby the Colonial Office. This turned out to be his swan song as he died shortly after his return to Ceylon."
In sharp contrast, the Ceylon Labour Union, led by the dynamic trade union leader A.E. Goonesinha, stood boldly for suffrage for all men and women, including those in the plantations. it must be noted that this was the only organisation that advocated Votes for Women on the same basis as for men. "Just as illiterate labourers were sufficiently intelligent to exercise their vote," Goonesinha declared, "the women too could be expected to act with responsibility in exercising the vote." In the same spirit he unequivocally supported the franchise rights of Indian estate workers. "Several legislators from the minority communities - who were at the time supporters of the Labour Party - also warned of the dangers of racism. These included Natesa Aiyar and A. Mahadeva, who stated: "the Labour Party says... we want the Indians and we want them on equal terms with the Ceylonese."
In July 1928, the Donoughmore Commission published its report on the Ceylon Constitution. The Commission made far-reaching proposals, the chief of which were the introduction of adult franchise, the abolition of communal representation in the Legislature and the transfer of considerable "control over the internal affairs of the island" to representatives elected by the people. The Donoughmore Commissioners recommended the Creation of a State Council comprising a majority of members elected by the people. Until 1931, only four per cent of the population enjoyed the right to vote, but the Commission proposed that suffrage be extended to all men over twenty-one years of age and to all women over thirty, who had resided in the

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island for a minimum period of five years. And income or property and literacy dualifications were to be abolished. With regard to the Ceylon indians, the Commission wanted the abolition of the two Indian seats in the Legislative Council and proposed a wider franchise, which would lead to some degree of democratic representation of the interests of plantation workers in the Legislature. The Commission stated: "There are at present about 700,000 of these people in the island, a large number of these immigrant labourers - said to be from 40 per cent to 50 per cent - may be regarded as permanent residents of Ceylon, and that a substantial number of the estate Workers have actually been born in the Country. At present only kanganies, and some of the coolies who work in the government or municipal service have the necessary income qualification to vote at elections for the Legislative Council. We believe that... even when there is a necessary five years' residential qualification, a considerable number of these people will become entitled to a voice in the election of a territorial representative, and in that way should be able to secure, perhaps, a more effective expression of their grievances and difficulties in the Legislative Council than under the present arrangement."
The reasons for this wide franchise envisaged by the Donoughmore Commissioners need not baffle us. It was directly related to the growing consciousness and power especially of the urban Workers. In the 1920s, there was much unrest amongst the urban Workers and there were a number of strikes Such as the month-long strike of railway workers in 1923 and that of the harbour workers in 1927, led by the Ceylon Labour Union. Kumari Jayawardena Writes: "The new union, under the leadership of a radical like A.E. Goonesinha, enabled the Colombo working class to forcefully assert itself as a class for the first time by making a spectacular show of strength and bringing the economic life of Colombo to a standstill."
T.L. Williers (the European Urban Member of the Legislative Council) unambiguously states the reasons for his support for the extension of the franchise. Obsessed by strikes and underground activities of the workers, this far-sighted European stated: "Why I strongly advocate the giving of the vote on manhood suffrage is this: "If the vote is given you can leave these people to proceed on Constitutional lines rather than on unconstitutional lines as a body set apart, with which we have nothing whatever to do. It is with a

Constitutional Reforms, Franchise & Plantation Workers 71
view to securing the adoption of constitutional methods by these men, in order that they can voice opinions and bring their opinions into the midst of the Council that I am personally an advocate of manhood suffrage throughout the colony."
Opposition to Estate Workers' Franchise
A storm of protest burst forth against the proposals regarding suffrage for Indian estate workers as soon as the Donoughmore Commissioners left the shores of island. Planters, feudal landlords and bourgeois nationalists and all types of Sinhala chauvinists Cried out in opposition.
On the question of franchise, Michael Roberts writes: "The Ceylon National Congress rapidly adjusted its position on this point and accepted the proposal with good grace.... But the Congress had considerable misgivings about the extension of the vote to the Indian Tamils.... "The Indian menace' became a catch phrase in the island's political vocabulary from about this time."
Prior to the publication of the Donoughmore Commission Report, the Ceylon National Congress had at every annual session adopted that the franchise for Ceylonese and Ceylon Indians "was to be identical". But now this body began to develop a new attitude towards immigrant labour. Natesa Aiyer, A. Mahadeva and other workers' leaders were shocked at this sudden vote-face.
it could not be said that the Ceylon Indian, in any way, harmed Ceylon's struggle for freedom or that he had voted in a Communal or sectarian manner. No member dared to challenge Aiyer in the Legislative Council when he declared:
We fought side by side with Ceylonese for the political advancement of this country. Even in Council, although we belong to the minority communities, we have always voted with the Congress people and not with the officials or any other minority community. 9
On the contrary, a Sinhalese leader, C.E.V. Corea (Colombo North), true to his conscience stated: "As regards this question of hatred towards the Indians, I personally am under a debt of gratitude towards the Indian community in Colombo. During the general elections of 1924, Sir, the Indian Community in Colombo North rallied round me to a man, and am then repaying their trust in me with black ingratitude?"

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In September 1928 a debate started in the Legislative Council on the subject of franchise for the plantation workers. Reading the Hansard reports of the speeches one cannot but feel that the Council, but for a few exceptions, was an extraordinary conglomeration of the leading hypocrites in the island. The European colonialists were so concerned with the welfare of the Sinhalese people, whom they still held in subjugation, that they Could not reconcile themselves with the extension of franchise to Indian estate WOrkerS.
As for the aristocrats and local capitalists they were so much opposed to the granting of franchise to the undomiciled foreigners that they bitterly opposed the five-year residential qualification proposed by Donoughmore, and fought for a reduction of this period to one year. They loved the country so wholeheartedly that they clamoured for the extension of franchise to European planters, capitalists and Indian merchants and moneylenders while they stood totally against votes for the estate workers born and bred here in the island. Long speeches calculated to rouse communal hatred against the people of Indian origin were made in the Legislative Council. They incidentally revealed the true nature of the patriotism evinced by the so-called national leaders. P.B. Rambukwella (Central Province, Rural) stated: "We... who just a hundred years ago handed over the country and ourselves to be better governed and better protectedwe sincerely feel that if the proposed recommendations are carried into effect, the result will be not only the transference of administration of the country from the British and Ceylonese hands to the Indians, but Ceylon becoming eventually part of India." With reference to money lenders, he said: "They make all the money they can and get back to their homes as soon as possible. It is unthinkable that we should confer on people of that type political rights given to members of the permanent population. In the same breath Rambukwella argued against the enfranchisement of Workers permanently settled in the island. He declared that the estate labourer would think himself a bigger manthan the Mudalali (capitalist) when he finds that the Mudalali has to beg for his vote. D.S. Senanayake said: "In short, we do not want to be pawns in the hands of politicians of India."
The Indian bogey was the commonest and cheapest platform for every politician bankrupt of ideas and truly patriotic deeds. Some argued that it would be harmful to the Indian

Constitutional Reforms, Franchise & Plantation Workers 73
community to confer the vote on the estate worker. C.W.W. Kannangara (Southern Province) stated: "It is not in the interests of the Indian community itself, Sir, that this immigrant cooly should be given the vote. His vote can be manipulated by the people who have such control over him that even the Agent of the Indian government cannot do anything for this man." The measure to extend the franchise was said to be "socialistic". Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan felt that educational advance should precede general enfranchisement. Ramanathan's proposals would have adversely affected the Kandyan Sinhalese, the Muslims and the Ceylon Indians whilst the Ceylon Tamils other than the scheduled castes would have benefited greatly.
Many of these so-called patriots, who campaigned against franchise for the permanently settled immigrant workers and their descendants, did not show any such opposition to the richer class of Indians. Rambukwella, for instance, declared: "I for One, have no objection to giving equal political rights to those who want to reside here permanently, who have acquired permanent rights...." It must be noted that this Kandyan aristocrat would gladly have handed the votes to the Indian capitalist who intended to settle down permanently, but not to the Indian Worker who was born and bred in the island, or permanently settled on the estates with no home elsewhere in the world. By "permanent rights", a landlord himself, he meant property, most probably immovable land holdings. D.S. Senanayake thought that the franchise should be given "to persons whose interests are in Ceylon." Like Rambukwella he too believed that only the wealthy Indians deserved the vote.
The Agent of the Government of India in Ceylon figured prominently in the debate. A.F. Molamure (Kegalle) wanted to grant the vote to this Agent of the British Raj in India. Molamure said: "Is it not fair and right that people like him should have a vote if they have been in the island for a year?....I am sorry I cannot bring in that category a large number of Indian Coolies who are now in the island."'
if these leaders genuinely desired to keep out from franchise "birds of passage," "money lenders," and other parasitic foreigners, the Donoughmore proposals offered them the best opportunity. In fact, the Commissioners had denied franchise to this class of people precisely because they had no "abiding interest" in the island, or had not yet developed it. They conceived that this

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right should be conferred on Indians who had settled in the island at least for a minimum period of five years. They specifically avoided a literacy test, for this would have precluded the enfranchisement of a large section of the Working masses. Such a test would have proved disastrous to the estate Workers because of the extremely poor educational facilities available to them.
However, Molamure and his colleagues, apparently motivated by interests other than those they themselves professed, proposed an amendment to the Donoughmore Commission's proposals, on the vital question of franchise. They suggested, in addition to the five year's residential qualification, a literacy test for "non-Ceylonese British subjects."
In sharp contrast, as Kumari Jayawardena says, A.E. Goonesinha, who was at the height of his power as Colombo's trade union leader, supported the franchise rights of Indian workers. In 1928 Goonesinha chaired a meeting of the Gandhi Sangham in Price Park and came out in favour of Indian Worker's rights, condemning the policies of the Sinhalese leaders. He declared:
A few plutocrats spoke of the Indians as being a menace to the Sinhalese workmen. What had these conscientious patriotic plutocrats done... for their workmen in their times of trouble and hardships? Instead of helping their poor fellow countrymen, the plutocrats. had expended their energies in driving out the poor villager from his plot of land. Now these men had developed a sense of patriotism. What was the reason for this solicitude? It was the same plutocrats who went before the Special Commission and opposed... the grant of universal suffrage. Having failed in their scheme they now talk of depriving Indians in Ceylon of the right to vote (Ceylon Daily News, 10 September 1928).2
Franchise for Foreign Capitalists.
We have seen the tremendous efforts made by a number of Sinhalese political leaders to deny the vote to the estate workers of Indian origin. Had they stopped at that they would have, at least, given an impression of being strong nationalists to the Ceylonese, especially to the Sinhalese people. But they did not; they were extremely anxious to confer franchise upon a new class of people who were essentially exploiters and who had no interest whatever in the welfare of the people of Ceylon. Alternative qualifications were prescribed for enfranchisement and these were that: "the applicant to be registered as a voter should

Constitutional Reforms, Franchise & Plantation Workers 75
t have resided in the island for a period of one year,
2 be possessed of immovable property to the value
Of RS. 500.
3 or be in receipt of an income of Rs. 50 per month,
4. and be able to read and Write one of the languages of the
island e.g. English, Sinhala or Tamil.
The Indian estate workers were in no position to fulfil the second and third conditions; only a minority of them could meet the fourth condition. They owned not an inch of land, nor any other form of property except their meager personal belongings, and their. average wage was no more than Rs. 12 per month. Certainly the alternative provisions were not meant for them. But they opened the door to the colonial planters, European businessmen and Indian merchants - in fact, all those who lived on the back of the plantation workers and exploited the country exclusively for their OWn enrichment.
The Planters' Association and the European Associations, whose members invariably belonged to the "floating" category of the population, had called for a reduction of the five-year residential period proposed by the Donoughmore Commission. And so in deference to their wishes and interests, the great leaders of the nation had brought down the qualifying period to one year, thus enabling the Europeans to enjoy the right to franchise. Unlike D. S. Senanayake and others, Molamure had no desire to hide their real motives with a tirade against the Indian workers. He stated in the Legislative Council: "The reason why I brought that in is that there are a large number of people in the European community who would get disfranchised by the five years' residential qualification; and also feel that there are a large number of Indians who came to this Island who though they may be disfranchised would come in under the alternative."
Making reference to such politicians in the Legislative Council Natesa Aiyar said: "They want the labourer to work but do not want to give him the opportunity to speak through a member because if that is done the employers would hear some truths against themselves from their own employees." To achieve this inglorious end many Sinhalese leaders played into British hands. They chose the path of subservience to imperialism, and reduced Ceylonese patriotism into a commodity to be measured in terms of anti-Indian demagogy. This was a glaring contrast to the

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patriotic deeds of Keppitipola, who led the rebellion against British rule in 1818.
The Mysterious Hand of British Imperialism
What was not obvious was the fact that the mysterious hand of British imperialism was at work all the time. Leopold Amery was the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the time. Following the announcement of personnel of the Royal Commission of Ceylon Reforms in July 1927, Amery appointed Sir Herbert James Stanley as Governor of Ceylon on 29 August 1927. Sir Hugh Clifford, who had assumed duties as Governor only in November 1925, was recalled even before his full term of office expired.
The new Governor Herbert Stanley had an interesting background. He had been Governor in Northern Rhodesia from 1924 to 1927. Before that he was Imperial Secretary in South Africa for six years. Long before that, from 1910 to 1913, he had served as Private Secretary to the Governor General, South Africa. Stanley's interests were not limited to serving merely the British empire;he had his hands deep in the mines of South Africa. He Was a director of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd., Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd., and other companies. -
Stanley knew that segregation and apartheid helped European capitalists reap super-profits just as the Jim Crow System (restriction of negroes) brought extra incomes over and above normal profits to the American capitalists. Not only that, Stanley also had intimate knowledge of the Art of divide and rule; it was simple to rule a people once they were divided into races and tribes, whites and blacks, natives and Asiatics etc. The South Africa with which Stanley was so closely connected, was a white man's kingdom where the African negro people were driven into slavery. Even as Adolf Hitler was writing his Mein Kampf (1924), in which he condemned democracy and expressed hatred and fear of the Jews, the Dutch and the English settlers fought an election from which the indigenous African people and the "Asiatics" were excluded. Dr D.F. Malan had introduced the Areas Reservation Bill which contained a section entitled "Registration of

Constitutional Reforms, Franchise & Plantation Workers 77
Asiatics". The notorious Colour Bar Act had come into existence in 1925.
Stanley had his scouting and training in this racist Union of South Africa before he became Governor of Ceylon. Regarding franchise for the Indian estate workers he stated at once: "No one who had experience of the disturbing effects of "Indian questions' in certain parts of Africa could contemplate the emergence of Such a question as a political issue in Ceylon.... Exception is taken to their wholesale territorial enfranchisement not because they are Indians, but because they are not regarded as Ceylonese, and because their numbers and their Concentration in Certain areas are such as to constitute a potential menace to the local predominance of the Ceylonese vote."
This was his opinion notwithstanding his own recognition of an important reality: "Nor should it be overlooked that many of the labourers classified as Indians were born in Ceylon and have never lived elsewhere."
The Donoughmore Commission's reforms, if implemented, would have undoubtedly had significant consequences. Once communal electorates were abolished and almost universal suffrage introduced there was the distinct possibility of the evolution of political parties based on economic lines. But these hopes were not to be realized for British imperialism took away through Governor Stanley what it offered through the medium of the Donoughmore Commissioners.
Stanley set himself in opposition to the reforms suggested by the Donoughmore Commission and laid down his own recommendations in a despatch (2 June 1928) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He stated that the Sinhalese preferred a wide franchise and tendered his explanations for this. He said: "... in the Legislative Council, as now constituted, the communally elected representatives could, if they voted solidly with the territorially elected Tamils, place the representatives of Sinhalese territorial constituencies in a minority of the elected membership. It is intelligible, therefore, that the Sinhalese, as a community should deprecate any attempt to preserve communal representation." At the same time he categorically denied the existence or formation of an anti-Sinhalese alliance. He wrote: "Voting has not, in fact, proceeded on these lines, and there is little prospect of future divisions in which the issue Would be defined as between the Sinhalese and the rest."

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Of the Ceylon Tamils' position, he said: "They would always be assured of Some Constituencies in the Northern and Eastern portions of the island but the ratio of those constituencies to the others would presumably be smaller under the new constitution than the ratio fixed in 1923, and the Tamils would lose, in addition, their present communal constituency in the Western Province. They are apprehensive, unduly perhaps but genuinely, of Sinhalese political dominance."
For the Muslim and Burgher minorities he forebode: "if to the Ceylon Tamils communal representation is of interest mainly as a counterpoise to the numerical preponderance of the Sinhalese, to the Muslims and Burghers it presents itself almost as their only assured safeguard against the risk of political subversion.' He contended that any wide extension of franchise would be likely in itself to prove more favourable to the numerically larger than the numerically smaller communities.
Thus Governor Stanley sought to inculcate into every community a sense of danger from the rest of the population. His activities were chiefly directed towards sowing discord among the communities in order to ensure British hegemony over the island. He invited leaders of the various communities for private talks and treated them to a dose of his theory for their self preservation. In a message, he conveyed that "he would be ready to afford an opportunity to the Unofficial Members to meet him either in a body or if they should prefer it, by a small but representative delegation, on the understanding that the conversation which might take place would be confidential."
Finally, he attacked the five years' residential qualification for franchise proposed by Donoughmore and demanded a reduction of the period. He argued:"Tightly drawn the constitutional provision by which it would be expressed would disfranchise very many Europeans and some Ceylonese on grounds of the prescribed maximum number of months." He then made an alternative proposal based on literacy and property or income. And he stated that "this would provide for practically all European residents of British nationality and for a number of British Indians engaged in commerce or in professional work."
it must be noted that the Governor's proposals were approved by none other than Sydney Webb of Fabian Society fame, who was the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Ramsay MacDonald's government in Britain. Thus the original arrangement

Constitutional Reforms, Franchise & Plantation Workers 79
as proclaimed by the Donoughmore Commission underwent a change by the disenfranchisement of a considerable section of the Indian Tamils through the introduction of the Ceylon (State Council Elections) Order in Council of 1931. So Stanley's manoeuvres won the day, and only 100,574 Indians were registered as voters for the general elections in 1931, whereas under the Donoughmore Proposals some 300,000 estate workers would have been entitled to the vote. There was practically no difference between Stanley and Molamure on this question. The Governor's despatch on the Donoughmore Report was at once a statement of achievements on behalf of Colonialism and a precursor of the future alliance between Ceylon's compradors and the British imperialists. Stanley returned "to his beloved South Africa as High Commissioner for the United Kingdom; and in 1935 he was appointed Governor of Southern Rhodesia."
The 1931 General Elections
In the 1931 general elections to the State Council only two Indian Tamils were elected - S.P. Vythilingam (Talawakelle) and Peri Sunderam (Hatton), and the latter managed to become the Minister of Labour, Industry and Commerce. This indeed was due to certain fortuitous circumstances. Greatly influenced by the speeches of Mrs Kamaladevi Chattopadyaya and Sarojini Naidu, who visited Jaffna in April 1931 and explained why the Indian National Congress boycotted the Indian elections, the Jaffna Youth Congress attempted to imitate the Indian National leaders. Raising the slogan of "immediate swaraj", the Youth Congress organised a boycott campaign which resulted in many Jaffna leaders not contesting the elections to the first State Council in 1931. Despite the 'Jaffna boycott' it was not easy for Peri Sunderam to get elected as a Minister. Jane Russel writes: "Professor Suntheralingam, a Ceylon Tamil Mathematics Professor at the University College, Colombo, had realised early in 1928 that the committee system as formulated by the Donoughmore Commissioners was open to considerable manipulation during elections and a well organised faction could so arrange as to place themselves in power... Suntheralingam was at that time something of a Sinhophile. There is evidence to suggest that Senanayake and D.B.

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Jayatilaka tried to put Suntheralingam's theoretical idea into practice at the 1931 committee elections. Their faction was small, however, and could not Control all the Committee votes... Peri Sunderam, the Indian Tamil Minister of Labour, referred to this in the state Council in 1932: "Despite the most organized efforts of a certain section to capture the Ministerial seats, and in spite of the best mathematical calculations, that object of the Congress caucus had been defeated."
Before we conclude this chapter we have to refer to the manner in which the Indian estate workers exercised their votes in the Constituencies other than Talawakelle and Hatton at the 1931 general elections. In the up-Country Constituencies, wherever there were large bodies of Indian Tamil voters, Sinhalese, Ceylon Tamils and even Europeans contested along with Indian Tamil candidates. A. Fellows Gordon, an English tea planter, was elected to the Bandarawela seat and caused much surprise in political circles.
Having closely watched the election campaign, Natesa Aiyar, who had been an Indian Member of the Legislative Council until 1931, Commented: "It should be said to the Credit of the Ceylon Indian that he is less communally minded than the Sinhalese. In Badulla, Indians voted for a low-country Sinhalese as against an Indian. In Nuwara Eliya, Indians voted for a Sinhalese as against an Indian. In Bandarawela, the Indians voted for a Sinhalese as against an European, his employer."
Notes
1.
Kumari Jayawardena, The Rise of the Labour Movement in Ceylon Duke University Press,North Carolina 1972, p. 164. Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History, New Delhi, 1984, p. 714. K.M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, New Delhi, 1981, p. 386. Quoted in Kumari Jayawardena, op. cit, p. 195.
Ibid p. 196. Quoted in H.A.J. Hulugalle, British Governors of Ceylon, Colombo: Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd., 1963, pp. 168-169.
Ibid p. 170.
Quoted in Kumari Jayawardena. op, cit, p. 233.
Ibid, p. 232.
10 Jane Russel, Communal Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution,
Colombo, 1982, p. 16.

11 12 13
14
15 16 17 18
19
21 22
26
27
29
31 32
41 42 43
45
Constitutional Reforms, Franchise & Plantation Workers
Kumari Jayawardena, op. cit., p. 265. Jane Russel, op. cit. p. 18.
Universal Franchise 1931 -1981, The Sri Lankan Experience, ed. K.M. de
Silva, Department of Information, Colombo, 1981, p. 72.
See Kumari.Jayawardena, Ethnic and Class Conflict in Sri Lanka, Colombo,
1986. p. 61. Report of the Donoughmore Commission, 1928, pp. 72-73.
Kumari Jayawardena, The Rise of the Labour Movement in Ceylon, p. 245
Hansard, Vol. III, 1928, col. 1682.
Ceylon National Congress ed. Michael Roberts, Colombo, 1977, Vol. I, p.
cxiii. Hansard Vol. III, 1928, col. 1697. Ibid, col. 1783.
Ibid, col. 1669.
Ibid, col. 1670.
Ibid, col. 1799.
Ibid, col. 1804.
Ibid, col. 1670.
Ibid, col. 1799.
Ibid, col. 1629.
Cited by Kumari Jayawardena, Ethnic and Class Conflict in Sri Lanka, p.
62.
Hansard Vol. III, 1928, Col. 1629.
Ibid.
Ibid, col. 1700. Adam and Charles Black, Who's Who, London, 1952. Victor Perlo, American Imperialism, New York, 1951, p. 84. P.S. Joshi, Verdict on South Africa, Bombay, 1945, p. 116. S.P. XXXIV of 1929, p. 13.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 9.
Ibid, p. 10.
Ibid, p. 9.
S.P. XXXIV of 1929, p. 10.
Ibid, p. 8.
Ibid, p. 14.
Hulugalle, op.cit. p. 184.
See Jane Russel, op. cit. p. 53.
K. Natesa Aiyar, Indo-Ceylon Crisis, Hatton, Ceylon, 1941 p. 24.

Page 53

Chapter -
THE GREAT AWAKENING
Though the planters had banded themselves together into a powerful organization called the Planters' Association of Ceylon as early as in 1854, it took a whole century for even the rudiments of organization to appear amongst the plantation workers. From the time Bird and Barnes started the plantation industry in the 1820s until the collapse of coffee, there was an ebb and flow of migration of labourers between India and Ceylon. This very movement militated against the immigrants striking permanent roots in the island. However, with the development of tea in the 1870s, and later of rubber, large numbers of Indians began to settle permanently on the estates.

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As the years wore on, people who were Working on the estates visited India, if at all, only infrequently. Longer stays away from their villages naturally weakened and, in course of time, severed their economic and Social links with India. On the other side too time wrought inexorable changes. Neglected homes were lived in by relatives or ruined. Rice fields were seized either by the government authorities in lieu of taxes or by creditors, cultivated by neighbours or turned into wastelands. Thus, after a prolonged period of absence from their original homes in India, many immigrants had little or nothing to return to.
In 1929 N.J. Luddington, the Controller of Indian immigrant Labour, estimated the Indians in Ceylon to be 900,000. He commented in his report: "Of the Indian estate population of 740,130 people, 242,161 were men, 232,996 were women, and 264,973 were children. The practical equality in the numbers of the sexes is a very satisfactory feature, as it indicates the well known fact that family life is almost universal amongst adult Indian estate labourers in Ceylon."
This contrasted sharply with the position of other Indians, especially those engaged in the money-lending, textile, food-stuff and other trades. A considerable number of Indians in the towns, with the exception of municipal employees, led lives secluded from their families and often visited their homes in India. On the other hand, only about 15 per cent of the estate workers revisited India in 1929. Luddington found that "thirty to forty per cent of the estate labour force has permanently severed residential connection with India and an appreciable percentage of Indian estate labourers permanently resident in Ceylon were born in Ceylon."
Sir Edward Jackson, who was appointed as a one-man Commissioner by the pan-Sinhalese Board of Ministers in 1936 "to inquire into and report generally on the immigration of workers...into Ceylon from India" found that "some proportion, Originally immigrants, have severed their connection with India and have become permanently settled in Ceylon. Other Indians have lived and Worked in Ceylon for so many years that in spite of periodical visits to India... it would be strange to regard them as immigrants in the ordinary sense of the term." And he states in his report that the Planters' Association estimated that between 80 and 90 percent of the total labour population was permanently settled in Ceylon.

The Great Awakening 85
in this situation, where the majority of the Indian residents on the estates were leading settled lives, it was but natural that they should react to the environment in which they lived and to the problems of life about them in Ceylon. The plantation workers began therefore to show resistance to oppression wherever it Came from.
Yet, the emergence of trade union organizations in the plantation sector had to await a number of developments, such as the abolition of the obnoxious Tundu system, the enactment of the Minimum Wages Ordinance, the granting of the right to vote Consequent to the Donoughmore Commission recommendations and the extension of educational facilities.
Abolition of Tundu System
Advances were paid to the workers under the Tundu system and they were held in subjugation to the planters. There was a great deal of opposition in India to this notorious system. A warning was sounded by "a leading Liberal", Govindaraghava Iyer, in his address to the National Liberal Federation in December 1920, when he said: "If ever India becomes lost to Britain and the British Empire, it will not be so much on account of questions of internal administration... but on this question of the treatment of Indians in the Colonies."
The Madras Government recommended an investigation of the problem of debt imposed upon the estate workers in Ceylon and called for the devising of "a mechanism for writing off old debts and preventing the accumulation of new ones". The Government of India failed to respond to the recommendation from Madras. But the Colonial Office inquired from the governments of Ceylon and Malaya "whether the penal provisions in their labour legislation might not be abolished. The Ceylon Government replied that 600,000 Indians were working on the estates: of these 4,409 had been charged with labour offences the previous year, and 1,500 were convicted".
Public agitation in India finally led to the abolition of the indenture system of emigration in 1920. Tinker writes:

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On 20 January 1921, one year after indenture had legally been abolished the Viceroy telegraphed the Secretary of State to acquaint him with the terms of the proposed bill (which sought to ensure full equality in the countries which imported them). It was designed, not only to apply to sugar colonies, but to lay down a general policy for emigration anywhere, including Ceylon and Malaya. The underlying principle was that where Indians were denied equal rights their emigration would be prohibited. Labourers would be allowed to emigrate only where equal rights were permitted or even encouraged.
it was indeed the Indian Government's threat to ban emigration to Ceylon, if measures were not adopted to alleviate the debt situation of the plantation workers, that eventually led the government of Ceylon to enact the Tundu Prohibition Ordinance No.43 of 1921. The Ordinance formally freed the workers from the burden of debts and prescribed a maximum of two years' imprisonment and a penalty of Rs 20,000 for anyone attempting to revive the notorious Tundu system. According to the terms of the Ordinance some 4,000,000 sterling were Cancelled. Though, in practice, the employers and the kanganies rigorously collected the advances before the Ordinance came into force, the legal abolition of the Tundu had far-reaching consequences. It precluded new recruits from commencing work with a load of debt on their heads. The Ordinance undermined the right of the planters and the kanganies to recover their loans to the workers by resorting to court proceedings. The most significant effect was that no longer could the workers be convicted and thrown into the rotten jails merely because they failed to repay the employers the oft-bloated loans.
Minimum Wages Ordinance
Already in 1922 the Standing Emigration Committee in India made a study of the wage rates prevailing in the plantations of Ceylon. Examined by this Committee, "which met under the chairmanship of Rao Bahadur B.N. Sarma at Simla on June 19-21, 1922, Major Scoble Nicholson furnished the following statistics of the wages..."

The Great Awakening 87
Tea Rubber
Cents Cents
Men 38 36 Women 26 25 Children 19 18
In 1925, under pressure from the Government of India, the Ceylon Government appointed a committee to conduct an inquiry into the family budget of the plantation workers. The Director of Statistics L.J.B.Turner, who was a member of this committee, drew up three budgets called "Roneo Budgets", in consultation with the Agent of the Government of India, S. Renganathan. The plantation sector was divided into three zones based on the elevation of the estates - Up-country, Mid-country and Low-country- hence the three budgets.
For about a century the planters had arbitrarily fixed wage rates for their workers and even in the 1920s, they were not prepared for any changes in the status quo. The planters therefore mounted a massive campaign against the government's move to fix minimum wages. The British planters wildly accused the Government of India of attempting to exercise dictatorial authority over them. However, the Governor of Ceylon warned them that they were "up against a very difficult question and must fall in line with the views of India". The Ceylonese politicians, who showed no real concern even for the welfare of the indigenous Workers in the urban areas, also raised their voice against any such minimum wage legislation for plantation workers. Despite these obstacles the government enacted the Minimum Wages (Indian Labour) Ordinance in December 1927.
it must be noted that while the controversy raged over the minimurn wage question, the prices of tea and rubber, which had suffered as a result of the 1920-21 economic crisis, had largely recovered. The average price of a pound of tea had risen from 35 cents in 1920 to Rs 1.04 in 1924, and the rubber market was enjoying boom prices with the USA buying heavily. Fantastic profits were being made - some estates declaring 100 per cent dividends. In 1926, E.C.E. Elliot and F.J. Whitehead stated "that the Capital invested in tea property may be computed at 27,000,000 sterling on which it is possible that a return of at least

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5,000,000 sterling was earned in 1924, or just about 18%. Some up-country estates could show very much better results."
The planters worked hard to shelve the minimum wages question, though the prices of tea and rubber had greatly recovered. Despite their opposition, Wages Boards were set up under the Ordinance and the following rates of Wages were proposed:"
Men Women Children
Cents Cents Cents
Up-Country 54 43 32 Mid-Country 52 41 31 Low-Country 50 40 30
Under the Ordinance any worker who performed over nine hours of work a day (including one hour for the mid-day meal) was entitled to overtime rates. It was also stipulated that no employer shall employ for work any child below the age of ten. Every employer was required to exhibit a notice in Tamil on a board indicating the rates of wages applicable to his estate. A penalty was prescribed for any employer who failed to pay the minimum rates fixed under this Ordinance. These wage rates came into operation on the opening day of 1929.
We need hardly compare these rates with those obtaining in Colombo harbour where workers earned Rs 1.50 to Rs 3.50 a day. However, this was the first time that minimum wages were fixed in Ceylon and Wages Boards were set up. This is of special significance since it was only in 1928 that the ILO adopted Convention No. 26 pertaining to minimum wage fixing machinery.
Natesa Aiyar - Pioneer of Plantation Trade Unions
One of the most striking developments of the 1920s was the militant action of the urban workers to better their living and working conditions as mentioned in the previous chapter. It needs to be noted that considerable sections of workers in the Railways

The Great Awakening 89
and in the Harbour were of Indian origin. During this period Goonesinha was assisted by some Indian lawyers and other Tamil radicals, and he had links with the Indian national movement. The importance of A.E. Goonesinha as a political figure developed after the 1923 strike and in this connection the continuing influence of the Indian nationalist movement should be mentioned. The COntact between Goonesinha and the Indian nationalist movement Was further strengthened when he attended the sessions of the Indian National Congress in 1925 and 1927. When Mahatma Gandhi visited Ceylon in 1927 the Ceylon Labour Union organized a mass meeting of some 30,000 workers in his honour, and Goonesinha presented him with a donation of Rs. 2,500 ''. However, Goonesinha had no interest whatsoever in organizing the immigrant workers in the plantations. Here was a huge mass of workers numbering over half a million which, if organized, would serve as a source of tremendous strength for the trade union and working class movement in Sri Lanka.
On the plantations the first people, other than the planters, to organize themselves were those occupying an intermediary position between the employers and the Workers. The Estate Staff's Association of Ceylon was formed on 29 August 1920, and the All Ceylon Head Kanganies' Association was established in 1921. These associations generally enjoyed the patronage of the European planters.
The estate workers, however, were faced with great barriers at every stage of their struggle to organize themselves; no other section of the working class of Ceylon was confronted with comparable obstacles. The estates were sacred territories not to be blemished by any intruder agitator. There was the "Protection of Produce Ordinance No. 38 of 1917" hanging like the Sword of Damocles over any outsider entering the estates. According to Section 3 of this Ordinance any person "found loitering or lurking about in a plantation was liable to imprisonment for a period of six weeks and a fine of Rs. 25".
The task of raising the consciousness of these oppressed and segregated workers came to be fulfilled by an Indian Brahmin, K. Natesa Aiyer, previously mentioned. Aiyar hailed from Tanjore district in Tamil Nadu in India and had been inspired by the Indian national movement for independence. In 1920 he became the editor of Thesa Nesan, whose proprietors M.A. Arulanandan and Dr. E.V. Ratnam were executive members of the Ceylon National

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Congress. Aiyar was also the publisher of the Citizen, edited by Lawrie Muttukrishna. He was a prolific writer, and his article on the visit of the Prince of Wales to India and Ceylon in 1922 drew the attention of the police. Another article entitled "British Take Notice" forewarning the impending collapse of the British empire was considered "highly seditious" by the police authorities."
In 1921 Aiyar came in contact with an Indian lawyer, D.M.Manilal, who had arrived in Ceylon after having been virtually repatriated in 1920 for fomenting strikes amongst Indian immigrant workers in the sugar plantations in Fiji. Earlier, in 1907, on the advice of Gandhi, Manilal had worked in Mauritius where he had espoused the cause of the Indian indentured labourers and challenged the authorities. Manilal had established links with "the group of Tamil nationalists and radicals who ran the Thesa Nesan and the Citizen". His activities in the island were closely watched by the colonial government. The government, fearing that Manilal Would expose the abominable conditions under which the Indian immigrants worked on the plantations, promptly deported him. However, within his short period of stay in the island, he had inspired many a radical politician including Natesa Aiyar to fight for the oppressed and the down-trodden workers. For many years Aiyar Continued to publish in his journals, articles written by Manilal on various subjects including "Mixed Marriages" and "Conditions of Indians in Aden".
Aiyar was elected to the Legislative Council on 8 December 1925 as the Second Member to represent the Indian Community. He spoke on behalf of the plantation workers for better wages and against the discrimination of the people of Indian origin. He fought relentlessly against the British planters and the kangany system for nearly three decades and became the target of bitter attacks by the European planters. His exposure of the inhuman conditions prevailing in the plantations made the planters so furious that they bought copies of his book - The Planters' Raj - and burnt them. They also financed a weekly Tamil paper, the Oolian, directed against Aiyar. It is said that Aiyar in contravention of the trespass regulations, disguised as an assistant to an Indian (Nadar) cloth merchant, visited the workers in their line rooms and exhorted them to rise up against the planters' Raj. As soon as the Minimum Wages Ordinance was passed he wrote a booklet in Tamil explaining its provisions and calling upon the workers to be vigilant against any failure on the part of the estate

The Great Awakening 9.
superintendents to abide by them.
Through Aiyar's paper Desa Bakthan, which he described as a "Nationalist Tamil News Paper", he gave a clarion call to arouse the immigrant workers from their century-long slumber. In bold letters he wrote:
Wake up O Indian Workers
If not now, you will neverl
If there is a God, He will be with the poor
Hold meetings - take decisions
Strengthen your Representative's handl
While agitating through his papers and pamphlets against the Planters' Raj he worked in collaboration with Goonesinha in the militant struggles of the urban workers led by the Ceylon Labour Union. Kumari Jayawardena writes: "Natesa Aiyar's first experience of active trade-union work was through his association with Goonesinha. During the harbour strike of 1927 led by the Ceylon Labour Union, Natesa Aiyar persuaded workers who had been brought from India to refuse to work; he raised questions in the Legislative Council about the strike and, together with Goonesinha, Collected funds for the strikers from the merchants of Colombo. Another link between Natesa Aiyar and urban labour was his membership in Goonesinha's Ceylon Labour Union, becoming its Vice President for a short period."
However, Aiyar's association with Goonesinha did not last long. When the world economic crisis hit Ceylon in 1929, the working class had to bear the brunt of the burden of the crisis. Goonesinha's efforts to halt the decline in workers' living standards proved impotent. Instead of launching the organized workers into action against the employers and the British authorities, Goonesinha began a virulent campaign against the Indian Workers as a way out of his debacle. This led to a rift between Natesa Aiyar and Goonesinha. And "when Aiyar alleged that Goonesinha was anti-Indian, Goonesinha denied it and promptly expelled him from the Labour Union."
Writing on the subject of Goonesinha's anti-Indianism, the historian, E.F.C. Ludowyk, states:

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... he saw too, at a later stage, that he could provide a sharper edge to his organization by giving it a communal and racial character. In the early days of his activities he had been ready to speak for all urban workers; he was supported by a few Indian lawyers. He withdrew from that position however and in the early 30s repudiated any interest in, or concern for, the large group of Indian immigrants employed in industry. The working class associated with him... was not above a touch of national socialism with its contempt for lesser breeds.'
Aiyar began to attack Goonesinha in devastating terms with cartoons in bold headlines in his papers. Wefind in Desa Bakthan of 9 January 1929:
Balance Sheet Of 1928 - GOOneSinha DOrail What happened to our money?
Economic Crisis and Natesa Aiyar's Trade Union
As we have indicated earlier the Minimum Wages Ordinance of 1927 came into operation on 1 January 1929. Unfortunately for the plantation workers, the very same year there occurred the world economic crisis which interfered with the implementation of the wage rates stipulated under the Ordinance.
The United States stock market Crashed in 1929, and capitalist countries including Britain Collapsed. Production sank by 50 percent and thousands of banks failed; millions of workers became unemployed and in Britain the unemployment figure shot up to three million. Every country, except the socialist USSR, was hit by this economic tornado.
Ceylon's economy was based on commercial crops - tea and rubber - and the world market for these products came tumbling down. Unemployment, retrenchment, wage cuts and consequent destitution all followed the great depression. The immigrant workers moreover were faced with repatriation, as though India was not seized by the very same catastrophe.
The planters, who had vehemently opposed the fixing of minimum wage rates, quickly moved into action and called for a

The Great Awakening : 93
reduction in the rates. In May 1931 the planters introduced the following wage rates.
Men Women Children
Cents Cents Cents
Up-country 49 39 29 Mid-country 47 37 28 Low-country 45 36 27
Though the employers passed the burden of the economic crisis on to the workers by repeatedly slashing their wages, in reality, many plantation companies not only escaped from incurring serious losses but even realized considerable profits. Writing about the profits made by the tea estate companies in a sample study, N. Ramachandran of the Central Bank states: "All companies reduced their f.o.b. costs in 1932, and the average declined to 8.7d. per ib: this was effected principally through wage reductions. Consequently, all but three of the 27 companies were able to show a profit during 1931 - 33. Indeed 10 companies made more than the minimum of economic return for this period of 4.3% after tax; only one company, however, obtained more than a 10% net return. In view of the intensity of the depression in most agricultural industries, the tea companies did reasonably well on the whole." His study had further shown that "the Up-Country producers of high-quality tea, who constituted the majority of companies...had not been in any serious difficulties, even in the trough of the depression, they could have held their own in conditions of free competition".
It was during the depression years that Natesa Aiyar founded the first trade union among the plantation workers - the All Ceylon Estate Labour Federation in 1931 with its head-quarters in Hatton. In May 1931 a meeting of 5,000 workers was held in Hatton, and resolutions were adopted protesting against Wage Cuts.
When such protests had no effect, Aiyar seems not to have thought of launching strikes to arrest any further deterioration in the living standard of the plantation workers. Indeed, he Organized a novel form of protest against wage cuts and retrenchment. According to C.V. Velupillai, a trade union leader and Member of Parliament for Talawakalle (1947-1952), Aiyar

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urged the immigrant workers to quit the estates en masse. "In 1933 an exodus started from all over the plantations - men and women in their thousands left the Wretched line rooms and gathered at the railway station at Hatton. A serious situation arose since the estates were becoming empty fast, and train services became dislocated. Government officials and railway officers rushed to Hatton, rather, to Aiyar at Hatton. Soon the situation was brought under control and the workers returned to their estates".
in his Report for 1933, H.L. Dowbiggin, the Inspector General of Police, records: "In May large numbers of estate labourers who had been misled by an agitator congregated at Hatton and demanded free repatriation by the police. This has been abolished from May. They refused to return to the estates and a disturbance became imminent but was averted by the able handling of the situation by the Government Agent and the Police". The agitator referred to was Natesa Aiyar.
Aiyar's policy of non-co-operation with the employers could not prevent further wage cuts. As a form of protest it was negative and impractical. Aiyar's Labour Federation was not geared to performing the functions of a modern trade union. Some of its objectives were similar to those of a welfare society; they called upon the workers to refrain from drinking and indebtedness and to improve their living conditions by being thrifty. As such the Federation's activities were limited to redressing Workers' grievances by means of petitions and indulging in propaganda Work through publications and mass meetings.
By May 1933, the wage rates were slashed to:
Men Women Children Cents Cents Cents
Up-country 41 33 25 Mid-country 37 30 21 Low-country 35 28 20
The Agent of the Government of India could not stop the wage reductions. In fact, the Agent and the Board of Indian immigration

The Great Awakening 95
agreed to the reductions. The Minister of Labour, Peri Sundaram, who went to the State Council with the support of the estate workers, went even further to assist the employers by introducing repatriation schemes to meet the situation. Despite these betrayals, the workers continued to resist the wage-reductions, but the government met this by offering "free repatriation to all labourers on tea estates who might be discontented with the new rates. 26,883 labourers were thus repatriated".
Aiyar despised the role played by Peri Sundaram as Minister in the wage reductions and he did not mince words in castigating him during the election campaign for the State Council in 1936. He said: "Throw out this man who cut your wages." Aiyar was elected to the Hatton constituency with a comfortable majority. S.P. Vythilingam was re-elected to represent Talawakelle and .X. Pereira became a nominated member of the State Council.
Emergence of the Left Movement and the Bracegirdle Episode
One of the leading figures to feature on the left movement in Sri Lanka was Dr S.A. Wickramasinghe. After his studies, he had returned from London where he had associated himself with the anti-imperialist League, and established contacts with Marxists such as R. Palme Dutt, an Indian who was a leading member of the British Communist Party, Harry Politt and Saklatwala, and Krishna Menon who was campaigning for India's independence among the British people.
In the 1931 general elections, Dr Wickramasinghe was elected to represent the Morawaka constituency in the first State Council though not formally as a Marxist. He was a great orator and raised his voice against British Colonialism and for the upliftment of the down-trodden workers and the rural masses. He played a significant role in the struggle for a number of measures including those relating to workmen's compensation, maternity benefits, and the abolition of child slavery.
Soon Dr Wickramasinghe was joined by a number of others including Philip Gunawardena, Dr Colvin R. de Silva, Dr N.M. Perera and Leslie Gunawardena, who had returned from

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America and British universities with radical ideas. Other young men such as M.G. Mendis, T. Duraisingham and K. Ramanathan, who were associated with the workers' movement, also joined this band of radicals.
Their activities culminated in the founding of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party in December 1935 with Dr Colvin R. de Silva as its President. This new political party fielded four candidates at the general elections held in 1936 but only Philip Gunawardena and Dr N.M. Perera Succeeded in the elections. Dr Wickramasinghe could not succeed in the face of the reactionary forces arraigned against him. −
It was by no means easy even for the two Sama Samajist candidates to win their seats - in fact they had to conduct massive campaigns against feudal reactionaries as well as the European and native planters. Dr Perera, who won the Ruwanwella seat - mainly a rubber plantation area - stated in the State Council: "Not a single planter supported me ... I was not allowed to visit estates. Definite instructions were sent Out that the estate labour vote must strictly support my opponent. I am not complaining one bit. It was my business to canvass Indian votes and get what I could and it was the business of my opponentsto get what they could."
The very same year saw the arrival of Bracegirdle whose activities amongst the plantation workers were to rouse the antagonism of the European planters. Mark Anthony Lester Bracegirdle, an English immigrant in Australia, arrived unobtrusively in Colombo in March 1936. He had been an art student in Sydney and, according to the Australian police, "an active member of the Young Communist League." Bracegirdle went to learn tea planting at Relugas Estate, Madulkelle, under Thomas, the estate superintendent, but before the year was out Thomas offered him a hundred rupees and a ticket back to Australia, His passage had been booked on a boat sailing on 24 November 1936. But he refused to leave Ceylon as directed by his superintendent. What was the urgency for the superintendent to compel the young man "with a charming smile" to quit the island? Thomas's letter to P.N. Banks, Deputy Inspector General of Police, provided the explanation.The letter read:
I have found out that Bracegirdle whilst here carried out an active campaign amongst my labour force.'

The Great Awakening 97
In reality the workers of Relugas Estate had defied the superintendent's orders - they had refused to be mere cogs in his wheel. Thomas had dismissed five workers to assert his authority over the workers. But this old remedy failed to produce the desired effect. On the contrary, it boomeranged on the superintendent, for fifty workers quit the estate instead of the five dismissed, and undermined his prestige and authority. This was a shocking experience for Thomas - he felt his little Planter's Raj shaken to its very foundations.
Thomas complained to the police that there was "general slackness, pruners would not work, they were impertinent". He charged that Bracegirdle was "communistic" and was directly responsible for the trouble. He wanted the police to pack him off to Australia immediately. But Banks told him that that was not possible "as long as he was not destitute". Thomas became furious and suggested to Banks that "something might be evolved that will give you a hold over him".
Bracegirdle had come in contact with the leaders of the LSSP. According to Dr N M Perera he was with them from November 1936... right up to May 1938, "He was a member of our party and had addressed a number of meetings." He had also built close links with Natesa Aiyar and had attended meetings of plantation workers at Hatton and other Up-Country towns. This drew the attention of the police. Aiyar said in the State Council: "The inspector of Police asked what a European was doing with me, and I told him he was going to be the future Secretary of the Labour Federation and he was going to organize labour."
Bracegirdle addressed a gathering of 2,000 plantation workers at Nawalapitiya, and it was his speech there that led the government authorities to take serious action against him. This meeting had been presided over by Dr N.M. Perera, and was of special significance since KamaladeviOhattopadyaya of the radical wing of the Indian National Congress also addressed it. He said:
Comrades, Mrs Kamaladevi Chattopadyaya has pointed out to you how you poor labourers are being mercilessly exploited... you see those white hills there - you see those white bungalows (he pointed in the direction of some estate bungalows), there the whites live in all luxury. They suck your blood...they are parasites...I know the secrets of the planters. I was employed in one of the estates... I came here as I heard it was a rich country, so it is. But all the riches have gone into the pockets of my countrymen, the white men.....

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They have come here to exploit the poor labourers and squeeze the life-blood out of them. By distributing rice to the poor labourers they make more profit., I know of an estate which made the highest for the year under the rice account. They enjoy all comforts. You have no meals. You starve. He pays the rice profit to the club to settle his drink bill. Do you know what amount he pays to the club on his drink bill? It is enough to keep a hundred families out of starvation. You have only to work 9 hours. but you know on every estate, the rule is that you must work for 12 hours. But the planter will not pay you for the extra 3 hours. There are several illegal acts the planters commit on the estates. Do not be afraid. Don't fear the planters.'
The Police Officer, who covered the meeting, had noted in his diary that "this was the meeting at which the feelings of the labourers rose to a high pitch. Labourers were heard to remark that Mr Bracegirdle has correctly said that they should not allow planters to break labour laws and that they must in future not take things lying down."
Only three months before this meeting, 25,000 Tamil-speaking Indian immigrant workers had struck in Malaya and paralysed the rubber industry there. The Ceylon Observer (25.3.1937) splashed this piece of news and warned the planters of the danger that lay ahead. The implication was that the immigrant workers in Ceylon might follow their brethren in Malaya and launch a strike in the plantations. The planters panicked and stepped up their action against Bracegirdle. Ferguson, acting for Police Deputy Banks, sought to utilize the Order-in-Council of 1896 for the expulsion of Bracegirdle. In a statement to the Governor he said:
It is clearly dangerous to allow a European youth of this type to remain in Ceylon stirring up feelings of dissatisfaction against employers of labour and against the British government, and I recommend that he be deported from Ceylon at the first opportunity.
ACCordingly the Governor issued an order (under the Order-inCouncil of 1896) calling upon Bracegirdle to quit the island of Ceylon on or before 6.00 pm on 24 April 1937. The timing of the order for deportation was such that it could not be successfully challenged in the courts for lack of time. With the active support of the LSSP, Bracegirdle decided to defy the order and went into hiding. The steamer had to leave without him to the amazement of the public, police and newspaper reporters. This order was branded the "Slave Proclamation" and at the May Day rally held at Price Park, Colombo, the following resolution was adopted:

The Great Awakening 99
Workers of Ceylon on May Day assembled here to condemn the arbitrary action of Governor Stubbs in ordering Comrade Bracegirdle to quit Ceylon, demand the immediate recall of Governor Stubbs and withdrawal of the Order on Bracegirdle, and call upon the people to make a united struggle for the repeal of the despotic "Slave Proclamation" under which the real leaders of the masses can be removed from the country.'
There was widespread protest in the country and this matter led to a protracted debate in the State Council. The Member for Matale, B.H. Aluvihare, moved a motion (seconded by Natesa Aiyar) of censure against the then acting Minister of Home Affairs, (Batuwantudawe). But Batuwantudawe denied any knowledge of the Order until the motion was Submitted in the Council. When the Chief Secretary Weddeburn assumed full responsibility for the order, a serious cleavage occurred between the pan-Sinhala Board of Ministers and the three British Officers of State, and the shrewd Minister of Agriculture, D.S. Senanayake, publicly condemned the action of the Chief Secretary.
The debate on Bracegirdle came to a conclusion with Philip's speech. Lersky writes: "The censure motion that the deportation order be rescinded and that the 1896 law be repealed was carried with only seven votes of descent, six of them being those of the nominated members and the remaining one that of independent-minded G.G. Ponnambalam".
However, the police authorities were determined to get Bracegirdle into their net by any means - fair or foul. Banks wrote:
So long as Bracegirdle remains at large it will be a reflection on the capabilities of the police. Bracegirdle must be seized and placed on board of an out-going steamer. More important still, watch must be kept on the more dangerous indigenous agitation. If the law does not provide effective means of dealing with seditionists such as these the law must be amended promptly and effectively."
Realistically appraising the situation, Dr Perera stated in the State Council that "the planters are more influential than we are to admit.... He (Bracegirdle) became an undesirable only when he was going to tell the whole country, the masses, the Workers, the Indian Workers, the truth about the planters," and asked "what guarantee is there that other British subjects in Ceylon will not be deported in that way?"'
On 5 May a mass meeting was held at Galle Face Green in Colombo. The leaders of the LSSP and many politicians, including S.W. R.D. Bandaranaike, Natesa Aiyar and George E. de Silva, addressed the meeting. And, when suddenly Bracegirdle

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appeared on the stage, the people rapturously chanted: "Bracegirdle must stay! Down with Slave Proclamation!"
Yet, in utter contempt of public opinion and in total disregard of the wish of the State Council, the police arrested Bracegirdle at the LSSP headquarters on 7 May on a warrant issued by the Governor. The party acted quickly and an appeal was brought for a writ of habeas corpus before the Chief Justice of Ceylon, Sir Sydney Abraham, on the IGP. The writ was issued and another boat sailed for Australia without Bracegirdle. A memorable legal battle for safeguarding civil liberty was fought on 10 May 1937 by the eminent lawyer, H.V.P. Perera. In the end, the Chief Justice and two other Supreme Court Judges held that the Governor's order was illegal and that the Order in Council operated "only in times of emergency". It was a grand political victory for the LSSP and Bracegirdle was released on 18 May. However, a special commission headed by the Chief Justice to inquire into the Bracegirdle affair held with the authorities.
Bracegirdle had already left for England, but before he left he had warned of the dangers confronting Sri Lanka's working class movement. He had witnessed the reactionary forces driving a wedge between the Sinhalese and Tamil workers. Ultra-nationalism on the part of many Sinhalese politicians and rank communalism on the part of some Tamil leaders were, in effect, aiding not the common people but their oppressors - the colonial rulers. At a meeting in Colombo he exhorted:
The capitalists and imperialists here are trying to split the workers of Lanka into two different camps and put one against the otherio
Half a century of the labour movement in multi-ethnic Sri Lanka has shown the wisdom in Bracegirdle's Words. Here was an young Australian planter who exposed the oppression of the workers by the European planters and was compelled to quit the island. In his denunciation of British exploitation of the plantation workers, Bracegirdle exhibited the real spirit of proletarian internationalism.

The Great Awakening 101
Educational and Social Progress
Another aspect relevant to the ability of the plantation Workers to organize themselves was the standard of education available to them. It was only at the beginning of the 20th century that any interest was shown in the education of children of immigrant Workers. Whatever education was available in the estates Was conducted by the kanganies in the so-called line-room Schoois. The planters generally considered education not only Superfluousto estate children but even harmful to the smooth running of their plantations since they feared that once workers were educated they would seek employment outside the plantations.
Paradoxically enough, while the colonial government as well as the planting community in general evinced no interest in the education of estate children, it was a former planter, A.G.H. Wise, who took the initiative in spotlighting the lack of educational facilities for the children of immigrant workers. He read a paper on 7 December 1903 on "Education in Ceylon - A place for estate school" at a meeting of the East India Association in London, with Sir Leppel Griffin in the chair. Wise rejected the planters' Contention that the labourers themselves would resent the establishment of schools on the ground that their children's earnings would be lost to them if they attended schools. He stated that on Some estates the Workers On their Own had started schools and that they would welcome systematic schooling for their children."
Most planters and even Some government educationists contended that child labour added to the income of the poor families. But then it does so at great cost in that it inhibits children from acquiring skills and impairs their health. In fact, employment of children interferes with the bargaining power of the workers and aggravates the exploitation of the entire labour force.
In January 1904, Alfred Lyttleton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote to Sir Henry A. Blake, the Governor of Ceylon, enclosing a memorial he had received from the East India Association in London. The memorial signed by the Association's Chairman, Leppel Griffin, and Secretary C.W. Arathon, read: "That the immigrant Tamils number nearly half a million, and that fresh legislation in respect to the education of the Tamil children is urgently required". And the memorialist called upon the Secretary

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to invite the attention of the Government of Ceylon to the desirability of raising this most deserving class from their present condition of ignorance, by the establishment, at an early date, of schools on every estate throughout the planting districts of Ceylon, at which primary vernacular education should be procurable at suitable hours by all Tamil children of school-going age."
Consequently, S.M. Burrows, a former Director of Public Instruction, was appointed to study and report on the education of estate children. He reported that "the Indian population employed on about 1857 estates amounted to 406,821 and that the number of boys of school-going age (6 to 12) was about 25,000. There were 43 registered schools of which 2 were government, 5 were private and 36 were under missionary management." He further stated: "The number of children being educated at these schools is 1,765, according to the returns for 1903, and of these, 1,598 were boys. The enormous majority of these boys do not get beyond the second standard."
The Burrows report also explained the type of education that best Suited the estate children:
The question of intellectual aspirations may be dismissed as irrelevant under the circumstances. It is, on the other hand, advisable that the cooly should be able to write his name and recognize signatures, to read and write simple sentences in his mother tongue, and to do such arithmetic as is implied in the very simple accounts that come into his daily life - e.g. his pay and his personal expenses.... By putting into honest and energetic practice the lessons so learnt he may rise in life, he may save and invest money and become a kangany or kanakapule.
On 21 January 1905, the government appointed a Commission under the chairmanships of Herbert Wace to inquire into and report on elementary education in Ceylon. The Commission was also directed to report on "the education of the children of Tamil Coolies employed on estates".
On the basis of the returns for December 1904, the Commission found that the number of estates was 1,353, and that the number of children of school-going age was estimated at 23,690 boys and 22,510 girls. He noted that the total number of schools was 359 (2 government, 58 aided and 299 unaided). Of the unaided schools, 120 were held in rooms or buildings provided by estates while 179 were held in line-rooms.
it must be noted that the Wace Commission stated that "There are grave reasons for not enforcing, for the present at any

The Great Awakening v, 103
rate, any rigorous system of compulsory school attendance during fixed hours.... It can hardly be expected that planters as a rule, would or could allow the day's work to be curtailed without a reduction of pay." And, in fact, the Commission feared that education of estate children "would tend to divert the labour supply to other markets"."
Despite such views, the Commission recommended that "the Ordinance, which provides for compulsory education in other parts of the island, should contain provision that the Superintendent of the estate should... satisfy the Director of Public Instruction that he had provided, set apart, or assigned a room, building or part of a building suitable for use for the purpose of instruction and that instruction was being imparted therein." It also recommended the Governor should be empowered to construct schools on estates and recover the cost from employers who failed to comply with government requirements.
The Wace Commission's recommendations were followed by the first legislation requiring employers to provide schools for estate children - the Rural Schools Ordinance No. 8 of 1907. One of the clauses pertaining to estate schools read: "It should be the duty of the Superintendent of every estate to provide for the vernacular education of the children of the labourers employed in the estate between the ages of six and ten, and to set apart and keep in repair a suitable school room."
However, educational facilities remained poor until the enactment of the Education Ordinance No. 1 of 1920. Section 34(1) of the Ordinance provided for compulsory attendance at schools by prescribing punishment for parents who failed to send their children to Schools. Furthermore, under the Ordinance, employers or teachers, who violated its provisions, would be guilty of an offence and be liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding Rs. 20 or to imprisonment of either description for a period not exceeding one month.
In 1937 the total number of registered schools rose to 729 from 653 in September 1936, and the total number of estate children of school-going age was 75,292 (males 43,773, females 31,519) of whom, 42,163 were attending school. In other words, 56 percent of the estate children were attending school."
Then came Ordinance No. 31 of 1939 and this generally followed the earlier Ordinance. Under the Ordinance, the superintendent was required not merely to provide for vernacular

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education, but to make provision as may be prescribed for the education of children. The amendment enabled the Director of Education to require the teaching of English in schools. However, the Director did nothing to broaden the curriculum beyond vernacular education in reading, Writing and arithmetic and the estate schools continued to stagnate. Even the Minister of Education, C.W.W. Kannangara, showed little interest in improving the standard of education of the children of estate WOrkers who, by their toil, made a significant contribution to the government's
Veue.
However, with all these limitations, it is remarkable that a considerable section of a new generation in the plantations became literate. Some of them, especially the sons of kanganies, landowners and Indian businessmen entered English medium Schools in the towns; a few of them had their education in prestigious Christian colleges such as Trinity, St. Sylvester's and St. Anthony's in Kandy. To cater to these students, in January 1935, P.T. Rajan assisted by R. Govindasamy founded the Indian Students' Hostel, renamed Asoka Students Hostel, in Kandy.
Meanwhile, the Indian people's independence movement, led by Mahatma Gandhi, was reaching new heights. Gandhi's march in 1930 to Dandi to break the British salt monopoly, his Sustained Campaigns against Caste oppression and the civil disobedience movement directed against British rule in India - all made big news in the Tamil newspapers, especially in the newly established Virakesari. And when Jawaharlal Nehru, on holiday in the island in 1931, visited up-country plantations towns, he inspired great hopes in the hearts of the immigrant workers. The 1930s also saw the Works of the great Tamil nationalist poet Subramanya Barathiyar (1882 - 1921) and Tamil magazines pouring in from Madras.
Against this backdrop and with the estate workers' participation in the general elections of 1931 and 1936, a new Confidence was growing among the Ceylon Indians. Natesa Aiyar's agitation against the planter's Raj and kangany system and the Bracegirdle episode helped in no small measure to raise the political and social consciousness of the plantation workers. Young Workers walked defiantly with slippers on their feet, read newspapers openly and used umbrellas instead of the outmoded 'cumbili'. These simple activities had been forbidden for estate workers just two decades before. The plantation workers were

The Great Awakening 105
craving for radical changes, and we shall trace in chapter 8, the development of modern Trade Union and their militant struggles in the late 1930S.
11
12 13 14 1S 16 17
18 19
20 21 22
28 29
31 32 33
Notes
Administrative Report- Controller of Indian Immigrant Labour 1929, p. 13. Ibid, p. 7. w See SP III of 1938 - Sir Edward Jackson's Report. Cited by Hugh Tinker in A New System of Slavery, London, 1974, p. 367. Ibid, p. 357.
Ibid, p. 367. H. Chattopadhyaya, Indians in Sri Lanka, Calcutta, 1969, p. 57. Ibid, p. 59. E.C.E. Elliot and F.J. Whitehead, Tea Planting in Ceylon, Colombo, 1926, p. X1. Administrative Report - Controller of Indian Immigrant Labour, 1929 p. 24. Kumari Jayawardana, The Rise of the Labour Movement in Ceylon, pp. 260-261.
Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, Colombo, 1958, Vol. 1, p. 365. Jayawardana, op. cit. p. 341.
SLNA, Desa Bakuhan, 5 January 1927.
Jayawardana, op. cit. p. 341.
Ibid, p. 342. E.F.C. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, p. 152.
SLNA, Desa Bakahan, 9 January 1927. N. Ramachandran, Foreign Plantation Investment in Ceylon 1889-1938, Colombo, Central Bank of Ceylon, 1963, p. 54.
Ibid, p. 60. C.V. Velupillai, article on Natesa Aiyar, Thinakaran, 14 September 1958. Administrative Report - Inspector General of Police for 1933, p. A 31. Administrative Report - Controller of Labour for 1933, p.O. 18. Ibid, p.O 14.
Hansard, 1939, col. 1833.
SP XVIII of 1938, part I, P.V.
Ibid, Production 2.
Ibid, p. 395.
Hansard, 1938, Vol. III, col. 4074.
Ibid, 1937, Vol. I, Jan-June, col. 955. See Hansard, 1938, Vol. III, col. 4052-53.
SP. XVIII of 1938, p. 400.
bid. Cited by George Jan Lersky in Origins of Trotskyism in Ceylon, California Stanford University, 1968, p. 126.

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37
39
41 42 43
45
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Ibid, p. 134. Extract from Times of Ceylon, 5 May 1937, see SP XVIII of 1938. Hansard, 1937, col 974-75.
Lersky, op. cit, p. 136.
See SPSVIII of 1938, p. 399.
SP IV of 1905, p. 1.
bid.
Ibid, p. 5.
bid.
Ibid, p. 11. J.E. Jayasuriya, Educational Policies and Progress, Colombond, p. 351. Administrative Report for 1937, Director of Education, p.A 56.

Chapter
TRADE UNIONS AND THE REVOLT AGAINST THE PLANTERS’ RAJ
The strikes of urban workers in the 1920s had already made the Colonial authorities initiate legislation to regulate the activities of trade unions. Dr Drummond Shiels, who was a member of the Donoughmore Commission, had indicated at a session of the

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Colonial Office Conference held in London in 1930 the need for recognition of trade unions. He expressed the hope that
Colonial Governments would view with sympathy the increasing tendency for promotion of organizations of workers. There was an increasing restlessness and discontent with conditions... and the wisest policy was to guide this restlessness wherever it exists whether it be economic or political, into constitutional channels. It was much more satisfactory also, for a government to be able to deal with organized bodies than with irresponsible individuals.'
The Colonial Office, in a circular despatch dated 17 September 1930, on the subject of trade unions, stated that there was
a danger that without sympathetic supervision and guidance, organizations of labourers without experience of combination of disaffected persons by whom their activities may be diverted to improper and mischievous ends.
Accordingly, a Bill entitled "An Ordinance to provide for the Registration and Control of Trade Unions" was introduced in the State Council in 1933. Since this Bill sought to make the registration of trade unions compulsory and any strikes by unregistered unions illegal, Dr S.A. Wickramasinghe, strongly supported by A.E. Goonasingha, bitterly opposed the Bill. Dr Wickramasinghe stated that the Bill would stifle the development of the trade union movement and called for the repeal of the provisions inimical to the independent functioning of the trade unions. However, despite these objections, after a protracted debate, the Bill was approved in 1935.
Soon, the Trade Union Ordinance No. 14 of 1935 came into operation. Since the motive of the Ordinance was suspect in the eyes of the workers' leaders, the employees' trade unions were reluctant to register themselves under the Ordinance. It was the Employers' Federation of Ceylon which was the first to register. The All-Ceylon Head Kanganies Association, with 648 members, was also registered at the end of 1937. The Ceylon Indian Workers' Federation, led by K. Natesa Aiyar, came to be registered only on 19 January 1940 though it had been functioning for some time. Similarly, the All-Ceylon Estate Workers' Union, led by the LSSP, obtained registration on 22 June 1940. And on 25 June 1940, the Ceylon Indian Congress Labour Union, which was to grow into one of the largest trade unions in the country, was established.

Trade Unions and the Revolt 109
By the second half of the 1930s, the country had recovered from the effects of the economic depression. The world market prices for tea and rubber had showed a marked improvement. The price of tea rose from 42 cents a pound in 1932 to 76 cents in 1937. In the same period rubber prices shot up from 12 cents to 49 cents a pound. The unemployment problem was receding. Another factor that needs to be taken into account is the Severe restriction on emigration imposed by the Government of Madras in 1938 even before the Government of India banned emigration to Ceylon in 1939. These developments facilitated the workers to demand boldly better terms and higher wages to meet the rise in the cost of living.
In this situation, workers were keen to join trade union organizations. In fact the plantation workers' anxiety to form unions was so striking that the Controller of Labour, Gimson, wrote: "The idea of association was a dominant One in the minds of the labourers...this belief had led to the acceptance of almost any leadership promising the rectification of grievances however trivial, which in the past would have been ignored but the eradication of which is demanded on the threat of a strike." Referring to the year 1939 Gimson stated:
The most important feature of the year is the manifestation of widespread unrest among estate labourers.... Prior to 1939 few associations had shown any prominence. The Ceylon Labour Federation founded by Mr Natesa Aiyar, has developed an organization which has its agents on almost every estate up-country, with offices in Hatton, Nuwara Eliya and Badulla. The CIC (Ceylon Indian Congress)... is gaining considerable influence throughout the planting districts. The Estate Workers' Union with its head-quarters in Kandy, has been formed under the auspices of the Sama Samaja Party and has come into prominence of late.
The mood of the plantation workers to launch strikes and to put an end to their unbridled exploitation can be gauged from the report of the Controller of Labour. Gimson wrote that incidents "such as a slight change in the mode of issue of rice, high handed action On the part of the subordinate staff, refusal to recognize an association" were sufficient to spark off a strike. The workers displayed unbreakable solidarity and great courage during their strike action. According to Gimson, "The strength of the bond of the union is so pronounced that the demands of even a few are backed by the efforts of all and little, if any, tendency is apparent of factions among the strikers." They also showed commendable

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patience when employers induced and, in fact, used in some instances Sinhalese village labour as blacklegs to break up their strikes. This was and, even today, is one of the commonest methods of intimidation employed against strikes in the plantations. The employers have always been quick to exploit the nationality differences within the working class movement in Ceylon. However, there have been many instances of cooperation and understanding between the two nationalities - Sinhalese and Tamil - which often produced significant victories for the workers.
Kotiyagala Strike - a Landmark
One of the memorable strikes was conducted by the workers at Kotiyagala Estate, Bogawantalawa - at an elevation of 5,000 feet up in the tea country. The workers called upon the Superintendent to grant them permission to form a society whose objects were "the prohibition of the use of alcoholic liquor, gambling, etc". The European employer stubbornly refused permission even when the objects of the proposed association were limited to social questions. The Workers persisted in their demand, and about a thousand workers - half of them women - struck work on 17 April 1939.
The Superintendent threatened the active workers with dismissal and summoned the police for action. Undaunted by these threats and provocative acts, the men and women held to their demand steadfastly until they achieved their goal. The strike was settled by the intervention of the Labour Department, and the Workers returned to work after winning the right to join and form a trade union. The solidarity of the workers shocked the planters and amazed Gimson who commented that "the first Strike On Kotiyagala estate in Bogawantalawa is a landmark in the history of the Indian labour in this country."
In 1939 there were 18 strikes in the plantations while there were only four in other working class sectors. Gimson records: "The most important feature of the year is the manifestation of widespread unrest among estate labourers. In the past estate labourers ventilated their feelings by sending petitions. There were few signs that the Tamil labourer who had in the course of more than a Century of employment shown himself docile, amenable to

Trade Unions and the Revolt 111
discipline and a good worker, was as yet reacting to the forces of labour consciousness."
The strength of the rising tide of revolt against subservience can be better understood from police circulars in this regard. P.N. Banks, the Inspector General of Police, issued a special circular on 13 August 1939 to members of his department. The circular read: "Of late various influences have been at WOrk which has made estate labour politically minded, and consequently, there are many labourers who feel discontented with their present conditions of life and work. Threats of sit-down Strikes have been made. There are instances where the superintendents of estates have given certain agitators notice and had to obtain an order from the court to eject them when they refused to quit. It is necessary, therefore, that the police should know exactly what policy should be followed." The Assistant Superintendent of Police, Central Province, Robins defined in precise terms the policy to be followed to deal with the "Strike Fever". His instructions to the police officers were:
It is essential that all ranks not only know by heart their firing orders but also that they can appreciate the application of these.... It is still more essential now that all ranks do their utmost to collect information of unrest, agitation and impending trouble both on estates and in villages. I strongly advise the use of reliable plain clothes men with warrant tickets pr the purpose in already disturbed areas, eg., Hewaheta, Galaha, Nawalapitiya, Agras.
Mooloya Estate Shooting
Within five months of Banks' special circular, practical demonstration of the British colonial government's inhuman and monstrous policy to deal with "Estate Labour Unrest" was witnessed. This policy was executed at Mooloya Estate, Hewaheta
- 30 miles from Kandy.
The overwhelming majority of the workers on the estate were Indian Tamils but there were also a number of Sinhalese Workers. Led by the All-Ceylon Estate Workers' Union, over 1,400 workers asserted their right to form their union on the estate, and later demanded a wage increase and better housing conditions. The estate school teacher Jeganathan was an active organizer for the union led by the LSSP.

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Objecting to the teacher's activities, W.E. Sparling, proprietormanager of the estate, ordered Jeganathan to quit his line-room and violently opposed the Workers' demands. This angered the Workers and, in protest against Sparling's action, a section of the workers went on strike on 1 January 1940.
ASP Robins quickly arrested Velusamy, Secretary of the union, for trespassing into the estate and "inciting the workers to strike". This provoked the workers and the partial strike developed into a full scale strike and the tea factory ceased to function for the first time since it had been built. The LSSP leaders encouraged the workers in their struggle.
It was in this situation that the State Council Member for Nuwara Eliya, E.W. Abeygunasekera, Went out of his way to help the police to break the strike. His telegram assuring support to Robins read: "At the instance of the Communist Party several hundreds of coolies of Mooloya estate are on strike... timely action should be taken.... I am Willing to render all assistance to you all."?
The reaction of the workers to the three pronged attack from the planter, the police and the State Council Member was indeed one of defiance. In a leaflet, printed one side in Sinhala and the other in Tamil, the workers explained their struggle thus:
The bold labour strike...for what? It is for an increase of 16 cents in the wages. The superintendent got alarmed when he saw the Sinhalese and Tamil brothers standing shoulder to shoulder... and thought of bringing dozens of armed police from Kandy and sending the labourers to work by frightening them. The strikers were not afraid of the police and the guns but stood their ground ten times more courageously than before. Finding that they have not succeeded in their aim the police have arrested P. Velusamy. The labourers of Mooloya estate - Tamil and Sinhalese - through their striking work exclaim with joy that they will put down the pride of power and acts of injustice and become victorious.
The high morale and militancy of the workers alarmed the police no less than the employer. When all attempts to break the strike failed, the authorities became desperate. Robins proceeded to the estate with a large police party armed with seven carbines and seventy rounds of ammunition. When the workers refused to be intimidated, a policeman D.G. Suraweera, shot down a worker by the name of Govindan. This dastardly act of murder of an unarmed Worker provoked indignation throughout the country.
The subject was raised in the State Council by Dr N.M. Perera and Philip Gunawardana and found a ready response. Public opinion

Trade Unions and the Revolt 113
and pressure from the State Council compelled the government to appoint a Commission to inquire into the tragic incident. Dr Colvin R. de Silva, a leader of the LSSP, appeared for the widow of Govindan and effectively exposed the combined role of the police and the employers of the plantation raj. The shooting, it is clear from the evidence placed before the Commission, did not frighten away the Mooloya estate workers. A twelve year old boy Ramiah, an eyewitness to the incident, testified:
Govindan dropped dead and the policeman ran to his car and escaped from the wrath of the workers.'
Once again, as in the Bracegirdle case, the Mooloya incident led to a constitutional Crisis. Since a Commission was at Work it was decided that the legal proceedings against the workers bfe suspended till the inquiry was completed. Accordingly, D.B. Jayatilaka, the Minister of Home Affairs, instructed the IGP to agree to the postponement of legal proceedings once the Counsel for the workers asked for it in the courts. What transpired in the courts was a different story, and the Minister was in for a surprise from his British Subordinates. When the defence Counsel moved for a postponement as already arranged, the police officer objected to it. Consequently, seven of the workers were convicted and sent to prison on terms of six months each while the union secretary, Velusamy, received a three-months' sentence.
When explanation was called for by the Minister, the IGP put a counter question and asked him what authority the Minister had "to interfere with the judiciary". And, when the Minister demanded that the GP be dismissed for insubordination, the Governor stood in support of the IGP. This led to the biggest constitutional crisis during the entire period of the Donoughmore Constitution, and to the resignation of the entire Board of Ministers. However, it did not take much time for a compromise formula to be worked out between the Governor and the Ministers, which led to the withdrawal of the resignations and the resumption of government business as usual.
In the Mooloya incident, the Commissioner's verdict was that "the shooting of Govindan cannot be justified in law". But, no action was taken against the police authorities, and Sergeant Suraweera, who shot Govindan dead, went scot-free. This then was British justice in reality. When the vital interests of British

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imperialism were threatened, the Colonial authorities had no compunction in abandoning all the principles of justice they themselves proclaimed. In other words there had been a brazen violation of justice.
The behaviour of the Board of Ministers, many of whom were University educated men, must be noted. At a time when poor and semi-literate Ramasamy had the courage to stand up against British authoritarianism and domination, men with wealth and social standing spinelessly succumbed to the dictates of British imperialism. Who indeed was servile now? Ramasamy or the pan- Sinhala Board of Ministers?
The strike wave then spread to estates in Uva Province. Led by the LSSP, the highest point in the struggle was reached at Wewesse estate where the Workers set up their own elected council. The militancy of the workers was so overwhelming that the superintendent of the estate agreed to act in Consultation with the Workers' Council. An armed police party that went to the estate to restore law and order was indeed disarmed by the workers, and "On the Orders of the workers' Council the rifles were returned to the policemen on their furnishing a signed receipt." This development alarmed the planters and the government officials. It was only when floods, following monsoon rains, cut off the area, thus preventing any assistance to Sustain the struggle of the workers, that the police succeeded in breaking up the strike by "a literal armed invasion, followed by a rule of terror which compelled scores of workers to seek refuge in the jungle for several days."
British Plutocrats and the Revolt of the Workers
The British plutocrats in the colonies were so powerful that Lord Stanmore (the former Sir Arthur Gordon) declared: "Where the employers of labour form, as they do in most of the coolieemploying colonies, the whole of the upper class of Society, and influence every other class, it requires a very great deal of courage... to stand up against that influence."

Trade Unions and the Revolt 115
The Bracegirdle episode and the Mooloya strike are testimony to this reality. Dr N.M. Perera said on the Bracegirdle affair in the State Council: "The planters are more powerful than we do admit." For the Mooloya tragedy Dr Perera blamed not only the Inspector General of Police but also the Governor for his complicity in unleashing state terrorism against the plantation workers. He said, in the State Council: "It is alright when you have labour disputes down South - in the factories at WellaWatte mills - it does not matter. But it is a vital matter for Imperial interests to suppress trouble in the up-country areas.... Mr Banks has already issued an order that if there is any dispute Up-country police must immediately go and support the planters... at every step Mr Banks has been in consultation with the Governor in the Mooloya incident. On 10 January when this man (Govindan) was shot myself wanted to phone up Mr Banks and inquire about the position. For 3 hours I could not get at him. He was with the Governor...That is very significant..."
Already in 1937 Natesa Aiyar brought to the notice of the State Council how much the police authorities were under the control of the colonial planters. He said: "Sir, there is one great evil in the planting areas, and that is, there is nothing the police are not prepared to do for the planters up-country. The JPUMs (Justice of the Peace and Unofficial Magistrates) practically control the police, and they are prepared to bring any case the employers wish."
But all the terrorism and intimidatory methods resorted to by the British colonialists could not impede the march of the plantation workers. An article on labour conditions in Ceylon read: "Discipline on estates used to be admirably maintained; Contentment presided over the lines and the coolies were happy and free. Then unrest began to manifest itself among coolies in India, and emissaries started making pilgrimages to this country to SOW seeds of discord. The planters kept these at bay as far as possible but occasionally their vigilance was overcome by excessive Cunning. The muster ground was closed to these undesirable visitors but they could not be shut out of the bazaars and here it was that the mischief was done."
Col. T.Y. Wright, nominated as European Member of the Legislative Council in 1920, writing of the situation in the plantations, said: "There were several disloyal politicians at the

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beginning of the war and other people as well were inciting labourers on estates."
in fact the situation in the plantations became so hot for the planters that they held a meeting in Kandy and decided to send a memorial to the Secretary of State appealing to him to take action to stop the "rot" from spreading in the plantations. The following is the text of the memorial:
To the Right Honourable Lord Lloyd His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies
My Lord,
The Committee appointed by a meeting of Comrades of the Great War and their supporters in Kandy, Ceylon, on 4th June 1940, beg to state the following facts and make the following submissions and requests:-
f The complete loosening of the reigns of government by the laissez-faire attitude of those in authority in the government in the past three years has allowed the Communist Party of Ceylon to stir up strife and disaffection among His Majesty's contented subjects until the Labour unrest which commenced in April 1939 has, since the commencement of hostilities, reached a critical and alarming stage.
2 The following are only a few of the instances of the labour trouble which has been stirred up among contented labourers since the war started.
● January 10th - A major riot on Mooloya estate when the police were called in and after having their car damaged had fo fire and kill one man in Self-defence.
b April - Seven hundred excited and rioting labourers armed with clubs and Sticks on Ramboda estate. The Superintendent was stoned and hit with a stone.
C April - On Weilai Oya Group, the labourers rioted and injured
an estate Conductor.
d May - Strife occurred in two lots of labourers on Nasely estate.
Five of the injured were admitted into hospital.
e May - There were serious troubles on Needwood estate and the police were attacked, one being seriously injured and others less seriously.
f May - in a riot at Wewelhena estate a large number were injured, as many as 40 being removed to hospital.

Trade Unions and the Revolt 117
9. May - The Kangany of Uda Radella estate was injured and
removed to hospital.
ክ May - The police were assaulted by armed labourers on Wewesse estate and the Superintendent was asked to leave the estate as the police would not be responsible for his safety or that of his wife.
May - The Superintendent of St Andrews estate was assaulted by labourers and both his arms were injured - one arm being fractured.
V
How the trouble is increasing will be seen from the above instances, and it needs no imagination to see that a far more serious state of affairs is likely to occur in the near future if strong action is not taken immediately by the government.
I am, My Lord, Your Obedient Servant, (signed) Chairman. Colombo 8th June, 1940.
Unable to contain the unrest in the entire plantation sector, the Minister of Labour, Industry and Commerce, conferred on 9 May and on 15 July 1940, with the representatives of:
The Planters' Association of Ceylon, The Ceylon Estates Proprietary Association, The Ceylon Association in London, The Ceylon Indian Congress Labour Union (CICLU), The Ceylon Indian Workers' Federation (CIWF) and The All Ceylon Estate Workers' Union (ACEWU).
This led to the signing of the Collective Agreement, called the Seven Point Agreement between the employers' organizations and the plantation trade unions. G.S. Motha (CICLU), Natesa Aiyar (CIWF) and Vernon Gunasekara (ACEWU) signed the agreement on behalf of the plantation workers' trade unions. The terms of the agreement were:
Recognition of the workers' right to unionize, and the wish of parties to negotiate with the representatives on any demand." Where no settlement could be arrived at, the Department of Labour "had the right to intervene and settle disputes by conciliation and arbitration.'

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This Agreement laid down a procedure for the settlement of disputes between estate management and the unions.
Despite the agreement, the employers Continued to dismiss active workers and eject them from their line-rooms. The Controller of Labour commented: "Some superintendents tended to regard this right as one inherent in an employer and one which could be exercised unchallenged by Government, by the trade unions or by the workers themselves." The Ceylon Indian Congress lamented, in its Report for 1941, that "While the Seven-Point Agreement almost completely saved the employers from the occurrence of lightning strikes, it damaged the workers' movement."
In June 1940 the LSSP leaders - Dr N.M. Perera, Philip Gunawardena, Dr Colvin R. de Silva and Edmund Samarakkody were arrested and interned under the Defence Regulations and the party went underground. This development cut short the revolutionary tendencies manifest in the struggle of the plantation WOrkers.
With the Collective Agreement and the arrest of the LSSP leaders the strike wave began to ebb, and the Controller of Labour states in his Report for 1940:
It is a matter of surmise as to which of the two factors was responsible for this improvement of the labour situation. In the first place, some of the leaders of the trade union, who had been particularly associated with violence and disorder, were interned under the Defence of the Realm Regulations. The second feature, regarded in some circles as equally important, was the conclusion of the agreement now known as the Seven-Point Agreement.
Notes
1
Cited by V. Sarvaloganayagam, Trade Unions in Sri Lanka, Academy of Administrative Studies, Colombo, 1973, p. 8-9. Ibid.
AR Controller of Labour, 1939, p. 40. Ibid, p. 0-9.
bid
Ibid, p. 0-10.
Ibid, p. 0-9.
Ibid, p. 0-10.
Ibid, p. 0-9.
SP, XV - 1940, p. 16.
1
O

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22
23
Trade Unions and the Rewolf 119
Ibid, p. 17.
Ibid, p. 8.
Ibid, pp. 9-10.
Ibid, p. 29. See Lersky, Origin of Trotskyism in Ceylon, pp. 222-223. Cited by Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery, p. 309. Cited by Lersky, op. cit. p. 221. Hansard 1937, Vol. I, Jan - June, Col. 955. See Col. T.Y. Wright, Ceylon in My Time, Colombo, 1951, p.106. Ibid, p. 163.
Ibid, pp. 163-164. w P. Navaratne, Collective Agreements in Sri Lanka, Colombo 1987, pp. 2426.
AR, Controller of Labour, 1940, p. 7. Ceylon Indian Congress Report, 1940-41, Colombo, p. 24.

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Chapter
REPATRIATION, DISABILITIES AND THE INDO-CEYLON PROBLEM
Even as the British Colonialists transformed India into a source of raw materials and a gigantic market for their manufactures, the British planters made it both a reservoir of cheap labour and a dumping ground for senile or discarded labour unwanted in the Colonies. This was especially so in relation to the colonies in close proximity to the Indian subcontinent. Old and unemployed workers did not return to India in the twentieth century as naturally

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as they did in the nineteenth. They preferred to stay on and perish on the plantations. In this situation it was no longer so easy for the employers to get rid of unwanted or "rebel" labourers. The planters, therefore, devised their own schemes to compel such labour to be repatriated to India.
Destitutes and the House of Detention
Elderly workers, who had been robbed of the best years of their lives, found it impossible to live on the estates. These unwanted people became destitutes and begged their way into the towns, and many of the up-country towns were crowded with such paupers. As time went on, Colombo city, too, was affected. To solve this problem a Commission on the Homeless Vagrants was appointed in 1906, and this led to the establishment of the House of Detention which served as a repatriation transit depot.
One midnight, in February 1906, the capital city was subjected to a sudden and unprecedented raid; people in the streets in certain areas were combed out and inspected. The operation was conducted under the direction of W. Marshall Philip, the city's Medical Officer of Health. By 3 a.m. the whole operation Was Over, and the facts Collected formed the basis of the first census of vagrants in Colombo. 675 vagrants were counted out and all except 12 were found to be Indian immigrants.
Philip reported to the Chairman of the Municipal Council: "There is a large population of homeless vagrants almost entirely immigrant Tamils brought over from India as estate coolies, and who were either discharged as physically unfit, and after being dumped by their kanganies in Colombo were left sick, penniless and helpless to fend for themselves, or in some cases they admitted having deserted from the estates."
Of their fate the Medical Officer wrote: "What little money they make is frequently stolen from them at night. In their ill nourished condition they are ill able to withstand the exposure to rain and wind and filth, and rapidly fall victims to respiratory, diarrhoea and other diseases. When no longer able to beg, these unfortunates find their way into the hospitals, where they overcrowd the pauper wards and die in large numbers."

Repatriation....and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 123
The Commission on Homeless Vagrants in Colomboproposed "the establishment of Houses of Detention", and accordingly, a House of Detention was established in Colombo and through this the immigrants were repatriated under Ordinances 5 and 12 of 1907. On being certified by a Magistrate that an indigent immigrant was a vagrant he could be deported to India. Pauperized old workers and even others were rounded up in the towns and repatriated by the police through this House. In keeping with the functions of this institution, it would have been more appropriate to call the House of Detention the House of Disposal.
Consequent to the economic crisis following World War I and the growing slump in the world rubber market, thousands of workers were laid off, and they were repatriated under the "Rubber Scheme". The Controller of Indian Immigrant Labour stated that when "cases of labourers, actually on estates, who became incapable of earning their living are reported... immediate arrangements are made for their repatriation together with their
families."
Repatriation figures for five years from 1924 were:
1924 571 1925 1851 1926 - 2,442 1927 ... 2,302 1928 3,491
Source : Administration Reports, Controller of Indian Immigrant Labour, 1924-1928
With the onset of the world economic depression more Workers were repatriated under various schemes. Repatriation figures for 10 years from 1929 were:
1929 . 3, 183 1935 . 6,252 1930 7,462 1936 . 5,396 1931 .. 15,707 1937 10,322 1932 .. 14,338 1938 . 3,004 1933 .. 42,343 1939 .. 2,975 1934 .. 2,304
Source : Administration Report, Commissioner of Labour, 1954, p. F99

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The immigrant workers were the first to be "fired" and the "rebels" among them were confronted with immediate repatriation. Hunger and misery stalked the immigrant workers in a number of districts. The Sinhalese peasants in the villages in the Kegalle, Kurunegala and Kandy districts too were driven to grave hardships. And, when a malaria epidemic swept these areas, the ill-nourished people both in the villages and in the estates died in their thousands. The epidemic carried away over 100,000 lives in 1934 - 35.
It was in this distressing situation that the Suriya Mal Movement, under the chairmanship of Doreen Wickremasinghe, played an important role in organizing relief work in the severely affected areas. Dr S.A. Wickremasinghe, Dr N.M. Perera, Philip Gunawardene, Dr Colvin R de Silva and other leftists engaged themselves in distributing food and medicine to the impoverished people. Dr S.A. Wickremasinghe, though acclaimed as a 'people's doctor', was charged by D.B. Jayatilaka in the State Council for giving the people "quinine mixed with politics", while Dr Perera was affectionately called "Parippu Mahattya" for distributing 'dhal'(lentils) to the people. Dr Perera's service to the people was to stand in good stead when he later contested the Ruwanwella constituency in the State Council elections in 1936.
Despite the mounting unemployment problem confronting the country, the employers went on madly with their recruitment of labour in India. 42,343 labourers were repatriated to India in 1933' but during the same year 32,898 were recruited into the island. This anachronism is typical of the British authorities supported by Ceylonese Ministers in the Colonial government.
Senanayake and the Special Committee on Immigration
Following the enactment of Act No. 1 of 1923 the responsibility for the maintenance of the immigration stream devolved upon the Government of Ceylon. This led to much criticism, and the government appointed a Special Committee to report on the immigration of Indian labour.

Repatriation....and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 125
The Committee, in its report published in 1926, held that "the cost of recruitment of assisted Indian immigrant labour should fall entirely on the employers thereof and that they should contribute to the Immigration Fund in proportion to the number of assisted Indian labourers employed by the government."
D.S. Senanayake was also a member of this committee. In a note of dissent, he said: "Unless special steps are taken this Country will soon be swamped by Indian immigrants, mainly unskilled labourers. This free influx from the adjoining mainland must necessarily affect adversely not only the rates of pay and the prospects of employment of indigenous labour but even of the needed labourers themselves."
Whatever the merits of this argument, let us consider the inevitable policy that must flow from this analysis. We would naturally have expected Senanayake to fight for a total ban on immigration to save the island being "swamped". He did nothing of the kind. On the contrary, he went all-out to appreciate the planters' need for such labour in the tea and rubber plantations. In the same dissenting note he records: "these industries require a certain amount of immigrant labour, without which their ordinary work of maintenance or of development cannot be done." He further said: "but for the protection and control of the immigrant labour undertaken by the Ceylon Government the planting industries will not have the required labour force." As for Senanayake's fears about wage rates of Sinhalese workers being "adversely affected" due to immigrants coming in, all that he had to do was to compel the government to enforce a system of minimum wages. This, of course, he never did.
It was Natesa Aiyar who exposed Senanayake's pretensions of fears of the island being "swamped" by immigrant labour. Soon after Senanayake's note of dissent on the subject, Aiyar moved in the Legislative Council that "the recruitment of labourers must be temporarily stopped", though on the premise that the estate line-rooms were unfit for human habitation. Like the European planting interests, Senanayake too opposed this motion. Recalling this incident during the debate on the Donoughmore proposals in 1928, Aiyar declared: "Then all the people who now fear Indian labourers flooding the country voted against this resolution."

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Conflict of Interests
The serious unemployment problem and the impoverishment of the people that followed the great depression, and the growing conflict between the Indian businessmen and the nascent Sinhalese bourgeois interests, exacerbated relations between the Sinhalese and the Ceylon Indians. There were many underlying causes for such a development.
Following the trail blazed by the immigrant labourers, Indian traders belonging to various communities had entered the island. They included not only Kerala Moors, Tuticorin merchants, Nadars and Nattukottai Chettiars from Tamil Nadu but also Borahs, Memons and Sindhis from Western India, who came to be engaged in the import trade in foodstuffs, textiles and other consumer goods. It was indeed difficult for the rising Sinhalese businessmen to compete with powerful Indian trading groups, and this situation gave rise to bitterness and resentment against the Indians.
One of the major irritants, in the 1930s, was the dominant role played by the Nattukottai chettiars as private financiers in the island. The Ceylon Banking Commission appointed in 1934, under the chairmanship of an Indian banking expert, Sir Sarobji Pochanawala, noted: "Their business in money is so well known and vast that their name is synonymous with private banking." Their business tentacles were so widespread that the Commission observed: "While walking through the streets of Colombo, Negombo, Kandy or any other big town in Ceylon, one cannot fail to be attracted by the name-board of a chettiar with various letters of the alphabet preceding his name."'
Foreign banks readily extended credit facilities to European enterprises and businessmen but were wary to offer such facilities to Ceylonese traders and agriculturists. It was the Nattukottai Chettiars who came to fill this gap in the banking system; they functioned as a kind of local banker, though in reality, they served as middlemen for the foreign banks operating in the Country. Just as in Rangoon, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Port Louis, the Chettiars lived secluded but not settled lives. However, unlike the officials in the European banks, they were easily accessible to Ceylonese borrowers.

Repatriation....and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 127
From the memoranda submitted and the evidence given before the Banking Commission, and the Commission's report, we can understand the reactions of the non-British business and agricultural interests. The Indian Mercantile Chamber of Ceylon, in its memorandum signed by its Secretary, H.M. Desai, commented: "the one regrettable feature in this has been that these finances, instead of directly flowing into trade channels has largely been made available through the medium of the Nattukottai chettiars." R. Sri Pathmanathan, Chairman, Low-Country Products Association of Ceylon, in his evidence before the Commission said: "Our complaint is that the banks instead of lending chettiars, and the chettiars again lending to Ceylonese estate owners, should have advanced our people and thus saved them the middleman's charge. Our people have been paying interest at 15 per cent and over whereas chettiars get money from the banks at 7-8 per cent." Another witness, E.W. Silva, lamented: "Their rate of interest was very high and they were foreclosing their mortgages when the depression came with the inevitable result. that many a property has been sold, and in the absence of bidders, the chettiars themselves became Owners. These eventualities Could have been avoided had a real measure of Credit facilities been offered to the Ceylonese by foreign banks as they offered to Europeans."
The Ceylon Nattukottai Chettiars Association in its memorandum to the Banking Commission stated: "There are at present 556 chettiar firms doing business in Ceylon and the total amount of money invested by them in Ceylon may be taken as 10 crores of rupees (Rs 100 million), which includes about 50,000 acres of land owned by them in several parts of Ceylon."
During the depression many a Ceylonese, who had borrowed from the Chettiars, found himself unable to clear his debt. The Chettiars promptly "began to call in their loans and foreclose on their mortgages thereby reducing many Ceylonese businessmen and agriculturists to bankruptcy. The period 1920 to 1935 saw a spate of Chettiar litigation in Ceylon ...." The activities of the Chettiars drove many Ceylonese capitalists, aristocrats and boutique-keepers of all communities to the wall, and much resentment walled up against them.
The Chettiars were also indirectly linked to the indebtedness of the plantation workers. It was T.L.R. Chandran, the Agent of the Government of India in Ceylon, who brought the

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dire plight of the immigrant estate workers to the notice of the Banking Commission at this time. He said: "The most distressing feature in the life of the Tamil estate labourer in Ceylon is his perennial indebtedness...the labourer, finding no means by which he could raise money on easy terms, has perforce to go to his kangany or the pawn-broker and borrow under usurious rates of interest." The Chettiars lent money to kanganies from whom workers took loans. The Banking Commission found that "only a small number of the labourers could save anything."
Yet, one of the commonest and most baseless charges proffered against the immigrant workers was that they were sending large sums of money to their relatives in India. Chandran observed: "If the labourers did send money to India, they borrowed it from the kanganies to whom 75 per cent of them were indebted."
In 1934, the total amount of money remitted to India by immigrant estate workers was Rs 1,400,677." And it must be noted that the Indian labour population that year was 688,000 and, therefore, "the average annual remittance per head was normally very small, Rs. 2-3, for instance, in 1934." In striking contrast to the paltry remittances made by some plantation workers of money earned by their blood, sweat and tears, the same year saw the Indian businessmen sending to India Rs 5,081,902. Out of the above-mentioned remittances of the Indian traders and businessmen, the lion's share could be claimed by the Nattukkottai Chettiarso
In the credit arrangements, craftily devised by the British bankers, we can observe a symbiotic relationship between the foreign banks and the Nattukottai Chettiars, whereby both thrived on the backs of the Ceylonese people. And, when the Ceylonese borrower lost his lands or suffered reversals in his business ventures - often the result of having to meet heavy interest payments - they blamed the Chettiars, that is, the Indian, and not the European bankers. While Chettiars were repatriating profits realized by their usurious activities to India, the British capitalists were siphoning out to their metropolis several millions of rupees annually on the basis of the ruthless exploitation of the plantation workers and the country's resources. Yet, it is amazing that Senanayake and demagogic Sinhalese politicians, who cried hoarse against the Indian immigrant workers and did everything in their power to deprive them of their franchise, did not even utter

Repatriation....and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 129
a word of protest against the British capitalists.
Bankrupt politicians and frustrated trade union leaders, who, in one way or another, played the despicable role of lackeys to the Colonial rulers - all began to indulge in a Concerted campaign of anti-Indian propaganda. Expressions such as "Indian menace", "Indian epidemic", "Indians swamping the Sinhalese", became their main slogans. Those Sinhalese leaders who used national chauvinism as an instrument to boost their prestige among the Sinhalese masses, concentrated their vituperative attacks not so much against the Indian business and bourgeois interests but against the poor Indian plantation workers and the Malayalee workers in Colombo.
The noteworthy exceptions were the Sama Samajist leaders who, inspired by Marxist philosophy, stood for the ideals of proletarian internationalism. In fact, during this period, Sinhalese left leaders such as Dr S.A. Wickremasinghe, Dr. N.M. Perera, Philip Gunawardene and others stood unswervingly for the fundamental rights of the Indian plantation workers. In this chapter we shall follow their distinct role in defence of the plantation workers' rights.
Sinhalese political leaders in the government began to adopt a number of discriminatory measures such as the Land Development Ordinance of 1935, and the Village Communities (Amendment) Bill introduced in the State Council in 1937. They also took drastic action to restrict the franchise rights enjoyed by the Ceylon Indians under the Donoughmore Constitution and to Compulsorily retire Indians employed in government service in Ceylon.
Land Development Ordinance
Let us take the Land Development Ordinance No.19 of 1935 which sought to limit the sale of crown lands to people with a "Ceylon domicile of origin". This would hardly affect the Europeans. Apart from many of them possessing the so-called "domicile of origin" qualification, there was a vital reason for this Ordinance not worrying the Europeans. For it must be noted that already, in 1935, 482,500 acres of land had been planted with tea and 537,000 acres with rubber, which meant that the greater part of

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land suitable for these Crops had been utilized even before the Ordinance came to be enacted. The best plantations, especially the tea estates in the hill country, were owned by the European Companies.
On the other hand, this specious piece of legislation would Certainly have no effect upon the Indian plantation workers for, as workers, they possessed no wealth of any kind whatever and, unlike the rich Indians, they could not and did not aspire to own any land. Dr S.A. Wickremasinghe stated in the State Council: "There are 600,000 of them in the estates, but not one of them possesses an inch of land. Over 300,000 of the labourers have completely lost their Indian connection. They are not strictly speaking Indian immigrant labour."
However, bourgeois Sinhalese politicians presented such pieces of legislation to the Sinhalese masses as a panacea for their landlessness and impoverishment. It was so much easier for these Sinhalese leaders to attack a minority community - in this instance, the Ceylon Indians - than to fight against the British colonial rulers and the European planters who, in fact, owned all the rich plantation lands.
Village Communities (Amendment) Ordinance
The Village Committee franchise became one of the most Controversial issues and led to an acrimonious debate in the State Council. The Village Committee constituted the lowest unit of local government in Ceylon, and Ordinance No. 13 of 1889 debarred Europeans, Burghers and Indian labourers from participating in it on the ground that they did not form an organic part of the village Community and that they did not pay village taxes. When the 1889 Ordinance was amended in 1924, the provisions excluding the categories of persons referred to above were retained.
However, in 1937, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, the Minister of Local Administration, brought an amendment to the 1924 Ordinance imposing an acreage tax on estates that lay within the village areas and granting village franchise to European and Burghers. The amendment sought to exclude only the Indian estate labourers from village committee franchise. This blatant

Repatriation....and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 131
discrimination against the Indian labourers aroused protest not only from Indian Members of the State Council, Indian organizations and the Agent of the government of India but also from progressive Sinhalese politicians, notably from the LSSP leaders.
Dr N.M. Perera concentrated his attack on the Board of Ministers. He said: "They have no objection to enfranchising European planters. Those who have property who exploit the people in the true sense of the word are enfranchised. But when it comes to the poor labourer who has not the fortune to possess land, he is not enfranchised....This bogey of swamping is entirely imaginary and has been created by a handful of people... the interests of the Indian labourers and the vast mass of peasants and workers in this country are the same. The fight is against the capitalist class, whether they are Indians or Ceylonese."
In spite of these protests the amending Bill itself was passed with an amendment depriving all estate labourers (irrespective of race) from village community franchise. Thus the Village Communities (Amendment) Ordinance of 1938 denied franchise not only to Indians but also to Sinhalese workers resident on the estates.
The Franchise Question
As we have noted in the chapter on constitutional reforms, the Sinhalese Ministers, led by D.S. Senanayake, continuously sought to restrict the franchise of Ceylon Indians, especially Indian estate workers; and Governor Sir Andrew Caldecott brought the axe down on their franchise. In 1940, the procedure for the revision of electoral registers was tightened and the Registering Officers were instructed to examine orally every person of Indian origin before registering his or her name in the electoral register. Due to the undemocratic and restrictive policy of the government, the number of registered Indian voters fell from 225,000 in 1939 to 168,000 in 1943, while the general electorate increased from 1 1/2 million in 1931 to 2,635,000 in 1940.
One of the most vociferous chauvinist politicians who indulged in anti-Indian xenophobia, was the Minister of Local Administration, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who founded the Sinhala

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Maha Sabha in 1937. Referring to him, Dr N.M. Perera stated:
I can only say, Sir, that the Hon. Minister of Local Administration is utterly unaware of the conditions that exist in areas spoken of by him; he is utterly unaware of the experience of hon. members living in up-country areas, where, as a matter of fact, as a result of restriction a large proportion of the Indian population who had the franchise were disfranchised. Those are actual facts that can be verified tomorrow. Speaking from my own experience, I may say that in my area itself there are not less than 10,000 to 12,000 Indians. But you will be surprised to hear, Sir, that although it was said that, that rule was loosely applied, the actual number enfranchised is less than 2,000 Indians.'
Natesa Aiyar gave an example of how the voters lists were prepared. He said: "Let me take the Hatton electorate. In this area the total population is 138,000. Of this the Indian estate population is 113,493 and only 48,744 have been registered as voters. Out of a population of 25,407 Sinhalese nearly 15,348 have been registered. 40 per cent of the Indians and 60 percent of the Sinhalese have been registered."'
What difficulties the Indian plantation workers had to undergo to get themselves registered as voters can be understood from the statement made by Col. T.Y. Wright, a prominent planter and a Member of the Legislative Council for many years. He Writes: "Under the new Constitution it was made most difficult for the estate labourers to get a vote in the elections. It must be remembered that very many of these Indian labourers were born in Ceylon, and had never been to India. I myself applied to the Government Agent as many Tamil coolies on the estate of which was in charge wished to become Ceylonese. sent in a list and was requested to postpone the applications for a few months as the Government Agent was extremely busy. Eventually I got a notice to say that all these coolies should go to the police station, which there and back was 10 miles away, and they would be interrogated. To anyone knowing the Tamil cooly, a police station would be the very last place they would visit... wrote and told the Government Agent, I did not think they would go, and that they might have trusted one who had been in the State Council and a Justice of the Peace for the Island to interrogate them instead of a policeman. This controversy has led to an antagonistic feeling between Ceylon and Indian governments."
The Legal Secretary, in his Report on the Revision of Electoral Registers for 1940, observed that "there are 12 districts in which decreases of Over 1,000 have occurred, such decreases

Repatriation...and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 133
aggregating 29,562: of these 12 districts 8 are districts in which the number of Indian voters is large: the decrease in these 8 districts aggregated 24,138."
Name of Electoral Decrease in the Total Number District Of Names. As a Result of 1940
Revision
Colombo Centra 14,008 Dumbara 1,286 Gampola 1,812 Hatton 5,158 Talavakelle 3,338 Nuwara Eliya 2,299 Bandarawela 2,928 Badulla 3,309
Source: Revision of Electoral Registers (1940) Report by Legal
Secretary, SPVI of 1940, pp. 3 - 4.
Sinhala Chauvinism and Retirement of Indian Workers
The position of the Indians continued to deteriorate. Some Sinhalese leaders expressed grave misgivings about the registration of Indian estate and urban labour, and raised the anti-Indian cry. Michael Roberts writes: "On the public platform these contentions were often retailed in violently anti-Indian and chauvinist tones. Distortions and half-truths were widely utilized and no doubt remained unquestioned within the audience they were aimed at. These techniques were associated with the expression of deep-rooted fears and a hoary old demonology:
unless we stem the tide of this growing domination of Indians in Ceylon in our economic and political life, our extinction as a Ceylonese nation is inevitable, concluded Senanayake in a typical instance."
Roberts comments: "The central premise behind these arguments was their insistence that the Indian labourers had "no permanent

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interest in the country. It was a premise and a line of policy that was shared by Goonesinha's Labour Party, Bandaranaike's Sinhala Maha Sabha, and most Ministers and State Councillors."
Since the unemployment problem persisted, some of the Sinhalese leaders, including some trade unionists, began a campaign for the repatriation of Indian immigrant workers in the public service and in the urban establishments. A.E. Goonesinha, the erstwhile leader of the urban Workers in the 1920s, now became the champion fighter' for the Sinhalese workers; he called upon the government to repatriate the Malayalees, and his Sinhala paper - the Viraya issued a Call to support the Campaign to boycott the Malayalees and to unite as Sinhalese.'
In this atmosphere charged with heightened anti-Indian propaganda, in June 1939, the Ceylon government took the drastic action of dismissing 2,517 (out of a total of 6,624) Indian daily-paid employees in government employment. The Retirement Officer States:
The retirement scheme was evolved at the suggestion of the Minister of Communication and Works (J.L. Kotelawala) who is responsible for the majority of the large labour employing departments...' W
The Birth of the Ceylon Indian Congress
Meanwhile, in India, the Indian National Congress had scored significant victories in the general elections held in 1937. And, in a number of provinces, including Madras, Congress ministries had been set up. This kindled great hopes in the minds of the Indians, whom the British had exported to the far-flung colonies of her empire. Indian leaders - Gandhi, Nehru, Sarojini Naidu, Rajagopalachari, Subhas Chandra Bose - became adulated figures for the OverSeas Indians. Since Sinhala national chauvinism and anti-Indianism were raising their monstrous heads, the assurances of the Indian Congress leaders to secure just treatment for overseas Indians all the more appealed to them. The Indian traders, merchants and Chettiars hailed the Congress victory and hoped to improve their own positions with its assistance.
The Ceylon Government's decision to dismiss more Indians from employment, on 1 August 1939, came to them as a shock. In their anxiety, a joint letter by 17 Indian associations was

Repatriation....and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 135
despatched on 23 June to the General Secretary of the All India Congress Committee. In response to this letter, Jawaharlal Nehru, on behalf of the Indian Congress, arrived in Ceylon. He had discussions with the Board of Ministers, especially on the issue of the retirement of daily-paid Indian employees. The discussion ended in futility and Nehru commented:
From the national point of view it was racial discrimination. From the labour point of view it was acting in a manner which even the International Labour Office (ILO) objected to in similar circumstances.'
The Ceylon Indian leaders were flabbergasted by Pandit Nehru's failure, but they looked to him for guidance. It was under his influence that discussions were held at De Fonseka Place in Colombo, and on 25 July, the Ceylon Indian Congress was formed. Diverse organizations, often based on caste, such as the Baratha Seva Sangam, Nadar Mahajana Sangam, Pandiya Velalar Sangam and Harijana Seva Sangam came together within the Congress umbrella.
The most noteworthy feature about the Ceylon Indian Congress (CIC) was the character of its leadership. Letchumanan Chettiar became its first President, while A. Aziz and H.M. Desai were its Joint Secretaries. The Treasurer was D.M. Vora. All these men had little direct interest in the Indian plantation workers; they were really Indian financiers or connected with business in Ceylon. This factor was to vitiate the social and political development of Ceylon Indian Workers for decades.
Inspired by the grandeur of the Indian national movement for independence, large numbers of middle class Indians, including shop assistants, joined the Ceylon Indian Congress. The mass of the plantation workers, however, showed no such enthusiasm for the Congress. They continued to be under the influence of Natesa Aiyar and the LSSP leaders. The Congress high command was not at all happy about their tendency to follow the LSSP - a political party that preached the revolutionary philosophy of class struggle for "the emancipation of the workers and peasants from imperialist and capitalist exploitation."
Initial efforts to draw workers into the Congress indeed produced poor results - it was apparently not enough to dangle Gandhi and Nehru before the plantation workers to induce them to join it. Workers were anxious to have their labour disputes with

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their employers settled, their rights protected, and their living conditions improved. The attempts of the Congress to assist these workers were singularly without success for the employers refused to discuss labour problems with any but a registered trade union. Without much ado, the Congress leadership, therefore, formed the Ceylon Indian Congress Labour Union (CICLU) on 25 June 1940. Young men from the plantations - an intelligentsia had sprouted in the late 1930s mainly from the kanganies' sons, who had had their English education in the Christian schools and colleges in the towns - joined the CICLU with enthusiastic fervour to advance the cause of the plantation workers. Men like G.R. Motha, K Rajalingam, S. Somasunderam, C.V. Velupillai, S.M. Subbiah, V.K. Vellayan, were drawn into it. Soon workers thronged to the CIC Labour union like bees to their hive, and by 1941, its membership swelled to 95,609; in fact, they constituted the majority of the 130,895 members in the CIC that year. Yet, it must be noted that the President of the CIC automatically became the President of the CIC Labour Union, and every branch office in the districts came under the influence of local Congress leaders who were often merchants, boutique-keepers or petit bourgeois elements.
The CIC later became the Ceylon Democratic Congress while the CIC Labour Union was transformed into the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC). In succeeding chapters we shall follow the development of the Ceylon Workers Congress, which was to emerge as the largest single trade union in the country.
India Bans Emigration
The unemployment and consequent repatriation of immigrant workers, following the chronic depression, had already caused serious apprehension in India. In February 1938, the Government of Madras issued special instructions to its village headmento limit the granting of assisted passages to labourers who had previously been employed or closely related to those in employment in Ceylon. During 1938, the Indian Emigration Act of 1922 was amended by the insertion of Section 30A, which empowered the Central Government to prohibit any unskilled worker from
"departing out of India." And it must be noted that no recruiting

Repatriation....and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 137
licenses were, therefore, issued that year. Finally, the great uncertainty of employment and the discriminatory treatment of Indians in Ceylon led the Government of India to ban the emigration of unskilled labour to Ceylon on 1 August 1939. Thus, over a century of emigration from India came to an end on the eve of World War II. In the entire history of Ceylon this was the first time that an effective restriction was placed on emigration of Indians into the island.
The ban was welcomed by the people of Ceylon, especially the left leaders and by the permanently settled workers w of Indian origin. The Controller of Labour, Gimson, however, regretted that "the estate Labour market thus lost that facility of adjustment of supply and demand". The blocking of the hitherto free passage across the Palk Strait greatly worried the planters and they made persistent efforts to get the ban lifted. The Controller of Labour trotted out his last argument for its removal. He said:
In the interests of the Sinhalese, apart from many other considerations, the free movement of labour between India and Ceylon should be restored.’
Indo-Ceylon Problem
The War made it imperative for Ceylon to negotiate a trade agreement with India. But, the relations between the two countries had been seriously strained. However, at the request of the Ceylon government, a conference of the representatives of the two Countries was held in November 1940, in New Delhi, as a preliminary to an examination of trade relations between them.
The representatives of the governments of India and Ceylon were:
India Ceylon
Hon. Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai Hon. D.S. Senanayake Hon. Sir Ramaswamy Mudialiyar Hon. H. J. Huseharr Sir Alan Lloyd Hon. S.W.R. D. Bandaranaike G.S. Bozman Hon. G.C. S. Corea G.T. Rutherford F.C. Gimson A. Witto Pa D.H. Balfour S. Dutt M.H. Kantawela
L.J. Seneviratne

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(i.X. Pereira, the nominated Indian Member of the State Council, who was in Delhi on behalf of the Ceylon Indian Congress, of course, did not participate in this conference.)
The subjects for discussion included: franchise, restrictions on Indian rights, control of immigration into Ceylon and dismissal of daily-paid Indian labourers.
At the outset itself Sir Girja said: "For us the most important question of all is the status of Indians in Ceylon." Senanayake then stated: "If it is a question of Indians becoming Ceylonese it is only a small number that can be absorbed into our country." And quoting Bowden, the Emigration Commissioner, Senanayake said that the Indians "had their interests in India", and that they "make frequent visits to India". However, he explained: "If a choice has to be made, let the individual choose which country he wants to be a citizen of - whether India or Ceylon." Bajpai countered by asking: "Would that not depend on what the definition of citizen is?" And he added: "With regard to the question of visits to India, Ceylon is just across the southernmost district of Madras. The Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders retain associations with Great Britain. They visit the UK. If that criteria were to apply, nobody would be able to retain Ceylon citizenship."
No understanding on the status of Indians in Ceylon could be reached. And, when Corea, the Minister of Labour, Industry and Commerce, broached the trade question, Ramaswamy Mudaliyar, India's Commerce Minister, said: "As a satisfactory Solution on the Outstanding question is not possible...it is hardly possible to have any trade talks."
The talks failed. However, in response to an invitation from the Ceylon government, discussions were resumed in September 1941, in Colombo. At this gonference Ceylon's delegation was once again led by Senanayake while the Indian side was headed by Bajpai.
The Ceylon delegation reported that it "approached the problems" with a proposition that:
a. Ceylon has the right to determine the composition of her
population, and
b. It is admitted that there is a body of Indians in Ceylon who, by birth and by long association, have so identified themselves with the affairs of this country that their

Repatriation....and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 139
interests are no different from those of the indigenous population."
Senanayake reiterated his earlier position and said: "Still our position is such that the number of Indians who are settled in this country has to be reduced." But, in stark contrast to the intransigent positions taken up by both sides at the Delhi conference, agreement was reached between the two delegations "on all subjects discussed." "It is agreed", stated their joint report, "that there shall be no differential treatment between Indians Who possess a Ceylon domicile of origin or choice or a certificate of permanent settlement and other members of the permanent population".'
However, the agreement was not ratified by the government of India. The Ceylon Indian Congress and the Indian Mercantile Chamber of Ceylon were severely critical of the terms agreed upon. It was feared that the agreement would have "divided the Indian population into numerous categories with varying degrees of disabilities..." The problem of the status of Ceylon Indians, therefore, remained unsettled, and discussions Were not resumed until after World War I ended.
Second World War and Indian Plantation Workers
We have seen how the Sinhala chauvinist and ultra-nationalist leaders used every argument in their amour to deny franchise rights, and imposed various disabilities upon the Indian plantation Workers. One of their oft-repeated arguments was that they were "birds of passage" and that their interests were in India. Now we shall observe how the Indian workers reacted during the Second World War in contrast to other sections of the people in the island.
The Japanese imperialist forces, which began their attack against the allied forces in Pearl Harbour in December 1941, had occupied all Malaya by January 1942. Meanwhile, in Burma, other Japanese troops were approaching Rangoon. It was in this dangerous situation that, on 5 March 1942, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton was appointed Commander in Chief of the British forces in the island. In fact, he enjoyed dictatorial powers. He was rather

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critical of Governor Caldecott and the Board of Ministers about the lack of preparation to meet Japanese attacks on Ceylon. Layton said that "except for the big guns on the Galle Face, the defence of Ceylon was practically non-existent." Having witnessed the reverse suffered by the British forces in Malaya, Layton "arranged to send European women and children out of the island."
On Easter Sunday, 5 April 1942, some 80 Japanese dive-bombers raided Colombo and destroyed 19 British fighters. Later they bombed and sunk two famous British Cruisers - Dorsetshire and Cornwall. This violent attack by the rapidly advancing Japanese forces and the heavy casualties inflicted on the British war machine defending the island caused panic in the capital city. Many shops, hotels and other establishments in Colombo were closed, and people of all communities were fleeing the city.
Large numbers of Indian Chettiars and other Indians in business establishments took the next available boat to India While many Sinhalese businessmen fled to their villages or other sanctuaries inland. Colombo became a deserted city.
The Government of Ceylon feared that the immigrant plantation workers too might make a bee line for India, and it despatched its officers under the Ministry of Labour to the plantations to prevent any exodus such as had OCCurred in Colombo. The Deputy Controller of Labour, M. Rajanayagam, assisted by a plantation trade union leader, C.V. Velupillai, visited a number of estates in the up-country and exhorted the Workers not to leave the country. When they questioned the workers whether they intended to quit the island, their reply was indeed categorical and revealing: "No, our forefathers lie buried under the tea bushes; we will not leave the plantations."
In fact, the Labour Ministry officials' exhortations requesting them not to leave the island seemed ridiculous to the Indian plantation workers. The precautions were utterly unnecessary, for British impotence in the face of the rapidly advancing Japanese forces towards Assam and Ceylon caused no fear in the hearts of these workers as it did in the business Circles in Colombo and On the British themselves. In fact the Indian workers on Systen Estate, Kandy, and the Sinhalese peasants in the neighbouring villages were jointly planning the future of the estate. On this estate, as indeed on many estates, the European Superintendent had packed his goods and was ready to quit the

Repatriation....and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 141
island in case the Japanese attacks proved really serious.
During the war, the tea and rubber industries felt a growing demand for labour, and the estate worker had become a precious commodity. His toil "despite food difficulties and rise in the cost of living" made employers reap record crops and high profits. The Controller of Labour stated that "compared with his means and resources the estate labourer has made Substantial contributions to the Ceylon Government War Purposes Fund and the fund created by a Ceylon newspaper for the provision of aircraft."
Appeal for Fresh Labour
Meanwhile, in November 1942, the rubber industry ran short of 20,000 tappers, and the Planters' Association of Ceylon, therefore, wanted the Indian government to be persuaded to allow "Palaial" (workers who had previously been in Ceylon) to return to the estates. And, on 8 December 1942, the Governor despatched the following telegram to India:
Adequacy of supply of labour is under urgent consideration of the Board of Ministers with special reference to production of rubber. In these circumstances Board of Ministers has asked me whether the government of India would consider special recruitment of labour to meet war emergency."
By January 1943, there had grown also a demand for more WOrkers on the tea estates, and the Governor called for "30,000 additional adult labourers" to be recruited from India.
To these desperate appeals for labour, on behalf of the Government of India, G.S. Bozman, who it will be remembered was one of India's representatives at the New Delhi Conference on Indo Ceylon Relations, addressed a letter, dated 18 January 1943, . to Sir D.B. Jayatilaka:
You will remember the discussion which took place in Mr Aney's house on 16.1.43. Mr Aney suggested that before reaching a decision on the supply of additional labour now required by Ceylon for rubber estates we shall attempt to determine the main principles in accordance with which a settlement of immigration and status problems should be negotiated. You said that if we put concrete proposals before you, you would give them your closest consideration.'

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And, as requested by Sir Baron Jayatilaka, Bozman had enclosed a Draft Statement of "concrete proposals" for settlement of the status of the people of Indian origin long settled in the island.
There was no progress on this question and, fortunately for the workers, the attempt of the Governor of Ceylon and the Board of Ministers to import fresh labour from India did not materialize. The Indian Government, pressured by the Indian National Congress, refused to lift the ban on emigration.
From the foregoing it is clear that the planters, the Governor and the Board of Ministers had no fixed policy in regard to India's ban on emigration. When Work was short they wanted excess Indian labour to leave for India, but when there arose a demand, they wanted freely to draw upon labour from India. In fact, most planters had not an iota of concern either for the welfare of Ceylon or for the plantation workers; their object was simply profits.
Notes
1 SPXLIX of 1906 Report on Homeless Vagrants, p. 14.
2 bid.
3 Administration Report, Controller of Indian Immigrant Labour, 1924. pp
5
4. Administration Report, Controller of Labour, 1933, p. 014
5 Ibid, p. 010
6 SP 12 of 1926, p. 9.
7 Ibid, p. 8.
8 bid.
9 Hansard, 1928, Vol. III, col. 1700
10 SPXXII, 1934 - Ceylon Banking Commission Report, Vol. I, para. 169, p.40
11 Ibid, Vol. II, p. 146.
12 Ibid, p. 372. 13 Ibid, p. 356 14 Ibid, p. 66
15 W.S. Weerasooriya, The Nattukottai Chettiar (Merchant Bankers in Ceylon),
Colombo: (Tisara Prakasakayo), 1973, p. 128.
16 Ceylon Banking Commission Report, Vol. II, p. 69.
17 Ibid, p. 93.
18 T.L.R. Chandran, quoted by H.P. Chattopadyaya in Indians in Sri Lanka,
p. 54.
19 H.P. Chattopadyaya, op. cit. p. 55
20 Ibid, p. 54 21 Ibid, p. 47

22 23 24
26 27 28 29
3. 32
33
35
37
39 40 41 42 43
45
46 47 48 49
Repatriation....and the Indo-Ceylon Problem 143
Ibid, p. 148
Hansard, 1934, col. 3190.
Hansard, 1937, col. 4150.
Soulbury Commission Report, p. 54.
Hansard, Sept.-Dec., 1937, col. 4149. Natesa Aiyar, Indo-Ceylon Crisis, p. 24. Col. T.Y. Wright Ceylon in My Time, 1889-1949, Colombo, 1959, p. 107 SP VIII of 1941, p. 2. See Introduction Michael Roberts (ed), Ceylon National congress, Colombo, 1977, Vol. I, p. cxv-cxvi.
Ibid, p. cxv. Kumari Jayawardana, Ethnic and Class Conflicts in Sri Lanka, Colombo, 1986, p. 44.
SP, XVIII of 1940, p. 3. Cited by H.M. Desai In Citizen or Outcast, Colombo, 1946, p. 64. Ceylon Indian Congress Report, 1941, p 3. AR, Controller of Labour, 1938, p. 033 AR, Controller of Labour, 1940, p. 09. Indo Ceylon Relations Exploratory Conference On Proceedings of Meetings, SP IX of 1941, p. 9.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 56.
SP XXVIII of 1941, p. 3.
Ibid, p. 88.
H.A.J. Hulugalle, British Governors of Ceylon, p. 196.
bid.
Winston Churchill, Second World War, Vol. IV, p. 157. Hansard, Vol. 6, 1949-50, col. 687. Administration Report - Controller of Labour 1942, p. 09. SP III of 1943, Document No. 11.
Ibid, Document No. 15.

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Chapter
10
INDEPENDENCE AND THE CITIZENSHIP ACTS
The struggle for independence had gone on, in various forms, from the time this island country was transformed into a colony. After the First World War it assumed great vigour. But, it was only at the end of the Second World War that the broad masses of the people were drawn into the struggle for freedom. Sri Lanka's

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independence became possible in the new World situation that emerged out of the War.
The Second World War was brought to a victorious conclusion in 1945. Fascism, the main spearhead of reaction, had been defeated by the united struggle of the democratic peoples of the world. The price of freedom from fascist oppression cost the world 50 million dead, many millions more wounded, and the destruction of incalculable property. While the fascist powers - Germany, Italy and Japan - were defeated, the imperialist powers - France, Holland and Belgium - in fact, all except the United States of America - were severely weakened. Though Britain was one of the victorious powers its empire was shaken. Despite the loss of 20 million people, the Soviet Union emerged from the war as a world power with tremendous influence.
In Europe, great revolutionary mass movements in the early post- war period set up what Were known as "peoples democracies" in a number of countries including Eastern Germany, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In Asia, China, with its 600 millions, liberated itself from the shackles of imperialism and feudal oppression. In the colonial countries of Asia, the liberation movements took giant strides forward; this was especially so in India, Vietnam, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Korea and other Countries.
Britain and Her Colonies
The war-weary British people, conscious of the new developments in the world arena at the end of the dreadful war, not only replaced the Tory government headed by Winston Churchill in mid-1945 by a Labour government led by Clement Attlee, but indicated that they were in no mood to send their sons to resurrect the disintegrating British Empire. But the old hierarchy of Empire builders sought to re-establish imperialist rule even in countries such as Burma, Malaya and Singapore from which they had fled ignominiously, abandoning the peoples of these countries defenseless against the onslaught of the Japanese imperialist forces. However, with the changes in the balance of forces in the world, nothing could stifle the mighty liberation movements in India, Burma, Vietnam, Indonesia and other colonial Countries.

independence and the Chizenship Acts 147
In connection with the Indian people's independence movement, Dutt says: "The extent of the national revolt following the war made it impossible for imperialism to govern in the old way. After protracted negotiations, first through the Cabinet Mission in 1946, and then through Lord Mountbatten as Viceroy in 1947, a new basis of political settlement was reached by which India was partitioned and the Dominions of India and Pakistan were established." And he cites British Labour Prime Minister C.R. Attlee's speech at the Labour Party Conference in June 1946, where he declared: "We ask for others the freedom We ask for ourselves. We proclaim this freedom, but we do more than proclaim it. We seek to put into effect: Witness India."
Independence Movement in Sri Lanka
It must be noted that unlike in India, where there were mass movements led by the Indian National Congress such as the "Quit India" movement of 1942 and the hartals and satyagrahas called by Gandhi, in Sri Lanka the Ceylon National Congress leaders were too apathetic to draw the masses into action for independence, and limited their struggles to pious appeals to the British government and various manoeuvres for Dominion Status. The British government appointed a Commission, under the chairmanship of Lord Soulbury in regard to Constitutional Reforms, and the Commission's report was published in September 1945. The Colonial Office proposed a new Constitution "as a foundation upon which may be built a future Dominion of Ceylon." Though D.S. Senanayake and his cabal of ministers at first boycotted the Commission but finally accepted these proposals, the left parties - the Communist party and the Lanka Sama Samaja party - launched a protest campaign against the proposed Soulbury Constitution and demanded political independence.
A spate of strikes developed in the country culminating in the famous general strike of 1947. Workers affiliated to the Ceylon Trade Union Federation and the Ceylon Federation df Labour struck work in pursuance of a number of demands including political independence. The strike was jointly conducted by the CP and the LSSP and, for the first time, the employees of the public sector joined the private sector workers in the strike.

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The government met the strike with violent repression and, on 5 June, the police fired on a demonstration killing Kandasamy, a government clerk, in the hope of beating down the militant struggle of the workers for better life and freedom. Nearly 100,000 people marched in Kandasamy's funeral procession the next day in protest against the government's brutal action against the Strikers. Pieter Keuneman Writes that "the armed forces Were also affected and, on 7 June, a mutiny broke out at the RASC camp at Kirilapone."
In the face of repression the strike failed, and it was called off on 19 June, exactly a month after it started. However, the might of the workers in united action had been demonstrated to the colonial government and to the Board of Ministers. The general strike was the signal of the dawn of Ceylon's freedom even as the 1946 rising of the naval ratings in Bombay, Karachi and Madras, was for India's independence.
Though both workers in Colombo and in the plantations had shown their dissatisfaction with the Soulbury reforms, the government made preparations to hold a general election under the Soulbury Constitution in September 1947. The cabinet government, proposed by the Soulbury Commission, had to have a party system for its proper functioning. The bourgeoisie in Ceylon had long failed to establish political parties based on clear Cut economic lines. The Ceylonese bourgeoisie was dispersed in the various Communal and sectarian organizations - a reflection of the fact that the country was inhabited by a heterogeneous population. The Ceylon National Congress and the Sinhala Maha Sabha were organizations essentially of the Sinhalese capitalists and landowners. Similarly, the Muslim League and the Tamil Congress were controlled by Muslim and Jaffna Tamil capitalists respectively. In as much as these two organizations had arisen from among the Muslim and Jaffna Tamil minority communities, they tended to voice for whole peoples, thereby blurring whatever class antagonisms that may have developed in these minorities.
Hence leading members of the State Council hastily formed the United National Party (UNP)in 1946. Sir Ivor Jennings, their constitutional guide, said: "It was able to gather within its fold the Ceylon National Congress, the Sinhala Maha Sabha and the Muslim League but those organization were not formally dissolved. It also had most of the right-wing elements, including the Commercial interests of 'the Fort' in Colombo, the landowners of

independence and the Citizenship Acts 149
the provinces, and even (though with some reluctance) the planters." These disparate organizations had come together to present a united front against the progressive forces at the elections.
As far as the left was concerned there was a glut of political parties. The trouble was that there were too many of them. Towards the end of 1939, Serious differences had arisen in the Lanka Sama Samaja Party formed in 1935. One section advocated the theories of Leon Trotsky, and was vehemently critical of the Communist International, while the other, equally strongly, defended Joseph Stalin and the Comintern. Finding it impossible to reconcile the differences, Dr S.A. Wickremasinghe and his colleagues formed the United Socialist Party in 1940. When this was banned, they formed the Communist Party of Ceylon on 3 July 1943. At the end of the war, another group of the LSSP, led by Dr Colvin R. de Silva, formed the Bolshevik Leninist Party. Therefore,during the elections there were three prominent left-wing parties.
The hotly contested elections resulted in the UNP winning only 42 seats of the 95 elected seats in a House of 101. Despite the utter confusion inevitable in the conflicting claims to Marxism/Leninism, the three left-wing parties won 18 seats. Sir Ivor Jennings wrote that
each of the Marxist parties received substantial support in the areas where a little education (though not much) was available to ordinary people, and also from those Indian labourers on the estates....The result was that there was almost a solid block of communist seats from Wellawatte (a lower middle-class suburb of Colombo) to Matara in the far south.'
The Ceylon Indian Congress won six seats in the Up-Country plantation electorates. Two independent Tamil candidates, including a Congress supporter, won at Bandarawela and at Alutnuwara.
D.S. Senanayake, the leader of the UNP, was able to form a government with the help of the 6 nominated members and the independents, many of whom wanted to get the maximum personal benefits for the money they had invested in the elections. The opposition basically consisted of the three Marxist parties, supported by the Ceylon Indian Congress with its 7 members, and some independents.

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The following Ceylon Indian Congress candidates were elected:
K. Rajalingam - Nawalapitiya G. R. Motha - Maskeliya C.V. Velupilai - Talawakelle S. Thondaman - Nuwara Eliya S.M. Subbiah - Badulla K. Kumaravelu - Kotagala
D. Ramanujam (Independent) won the Autnuwara seat where the Ceylon Indians constituted only 21% of the population of the electorate. His success was possible only because of a serious division amongst the Sinhalese voters. K.V. Nadarajah (Independent) won the Bandarawela seat. A. Aziz was elected member for Maskeliya in 1950 at the by-election held consequent to Motha’s death.
Dominion Status
The general strike and the general elections had shown that the UNP did not enjoy among the people the support hoped for by British imperialism. In this situation the left parties constituted a formidable force. This tended to expedite the granting of independence to Ceylon. In November 1947 D.S. Senanayake signed "Defence Agreements" with Britain giving her facilities including "the use of naval and air bases in Ceylon".
The basic features of these agreements were:
1. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon will give to each other such military assistance for security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide....
2. The Government of Ceylon will grant to the Government of the United Kingdom all the necessary facilities for the objects mentioned in Article 1 as may be mutually agreed...
The naval and air bases, ports, military establishments and telecommunication facilities are to be provided by Ceylon but used by the United Kingdom forces.

independence and the Citizenship Acts 151
H.A.J. Hulugalle writes that "the agreements were signed in Colombo on 11 November 1947, by Sir Henry More on behalf of the United Kingdom, and by D.S. Senanayake on behalf of Ceylon." The independence Bill was passed by the British parliament before the year ended. Supporting this Bill in the House of Lords on 5 December, Lord Soulbury stated: "With such great interest as we have in each other's prosperity...and with leaders of proved experience, I feel that Ceylon can face the future under the happiest auspices. This is a historic occasion. It is a landmark in the development of the evolution of the British Empire, and it brings another step nearer what I believe to be the ultimate aim of British statesmanship - the fusion of Empire and Commonwealth."
On 4 February 1948, Ceylon was proclaimed independent. Like India and Pakistan, she too Continued to remain in the British Commonwealth. In his tribute to D.S. Senanayake, J.R. Jayewardene wrote that the British "trusted him to such an extent that when the war was over they were prepared to hand over Ceylon's Freedom on a platter to him and his lieutenant, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke." The collaboration of these leaders with Britain was so complete that they could be depended upon to safeguard British interests in the island. Yet, the strategic importance of the island was so great and the lack of people's support for the UNP so evident that Britain would not take any risks. Hence, the Defence Agreements were signed prior to the granting of Dominion Status to Ceylon.
Citizenship Acts
At the time of independence all the people, including Ceylon Indians, were British subjects. The Soulbury Commission had left the question of citizenship within the jurisdiction of independent Ceylon. D.S. Senanayake visited London in July 1945, on an invitation Wangled from Whitehall, to press for Dominion Status "without the intermediary stage envisaged in the Soulbury Report" but he had to return a disappointed man. However, before his return home, he had obtained one vital concession - "problems relating to citizenship, the Colonial Office agreed, were to be

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treated as falling within the ambit of the Sri Lanka government’s powers under the new constitution."
Towards the end of December 1947, Senanayake had discussions with Jawaharlal Nehru in Delhi in regard to the citizenship of Indians long resident in the island. in the following months a series of letters and telegrams were exchanged between the two Prime Ministers. Nehru was still communicating anxiously with D.S. Senanayake when the Citizenship Act No.18 of 1948 was passed on 20 August in the Ceylon Parliament. In presenting the Bill on citizenship D.S. Senanayake made a laconic speech and said: "It is quite a simple Bill, but a very important Bill.... it is necessary that we should have our own citizenship laws."
Under the provisions of the Ceylon Citizenship Act and "with effect from the appointed date, (15 November 1948) a person shall be or become entitled to the status of a citizen of Ceylon in one of the following ways only:
2.a. by right of descent as provided by this Act;
b. by virtue of registration as provided by this Act or by any other Act authorizing the grant of such status by registration in any special case of specified description
A person born in Ceylon before the appointed day (15 November 1948) shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by descent if his father was born in Ceylon or both his paternal grandfather and paternal great grandfather were born in Ceylon. A person born outside Ceylon before the appointed date is a citizen of Ceylon by descent if both his father and paternal grandfather were born in Ceylon or his paternal grandfather and paternal great grandfather were born in Ceylon. A person born in Ceylon after the appointed day is a citizen of Ceylon by descent if his father was then a citizen of Ceylon while if he was born outside Ceylon his birth should have been registered with the appropriate official.
On the basis of the above provisions the Citizenship Act conferred citizenship by descent on the Sinhalese, Ceylon Tamils, Muslims, Malays and Burghers but, in effect, denied citizenship to the people of recent Indian origin. In fact, the provisions of the Act were so rigid that even some of the indigenous people belonging to the minority communities found it difficult to adduce the necessary proof for being accepted as citizens by descent.

independence and the Citizenship Acts 153
Commenting on the Act, Pieter Keuneman, the CP leader, stated in parliament:
The production of birth certificates is not an easy matter... there are no birth certificates available to poorer people. Many of them do not bother to keep certificates, and in the case of older persons, there are no certificates available because it was only in the early part of the 20th century that the registration of births became compulsory. Luckily nobody has asked me to prove that I am a citizen of Ceylon, but I certainly could not do that by producing my father's birth certificate because my late father was born before registration of births took place." Referring to Dudley Senanayake, a former Prime Minister and the then Leader of the Opposition, he said: "I do not know whether the Leader of the Opposition would ever be able to prove that he is a citizen of Ceylon according to the formal requirements under the law.'
It must be noted that some improvements in the registration procedures came only with the Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance No. 1 of 1895. The University History of Ceylon reads: "It was however evident that even after 1895 there was under registration of births."
Under the Citizenship Act an applicant for registration must
a. be of full age and of sound mind; and
b. possess one of the following qualifications:
i. is a person whose mother is or was a citizen of
Ceylon by descent...or ii. is the husband, wife, widow or widower of a citizen by descent or registration and has been resident for one year; or iii. is a person who ceased to be a citizen by descent upon acquiring citizenship in another Country in which he has been resident and has renounced that citizenship; and
C. is, and intends to continue to be, ordinarily resident in
Ceylon.
In addition, citizenship may be granted to 25 persons for distinguished service in the professions or in industry or agriculture.

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it was, therefore, no wonder that under the Act very few Ceylon Indians could obtain Ceylon citizenship.
Ther; came the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act No. 3 of 1949. This Act was said to have been specially designed to enable people of Indian and Pakistani Origin to acquire citizenship. The Act related to the residents of Indian and Pakistani origin who had been in Ceylon for a minimum period before 1 January 1946, and have continued in uninterrupted residence since. The minimum period was 7 years for married and 10 for unmarried persons.
in addition they must have other qualifications such as assured income, the residence of the family, freedom from disabilities to observe the laws of Ceylon (eg. polygamy) etc. The applicants under the Act must not only satisfy the authorities in regard to the foregoing qualifications but also prove that they were of Indian origin.
Even before the fate of a million people of Indian origin could be decided under the Citizenship Acts there came the Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Amendment Act No. 48 of 1949. This was the most undemocratic Act ever passed in Ceylon's parliament. In one stroke, it disfranchised the entire people of Indian origin. The members elected by these people could continue to sit in the House of Representatives until it was dissolved, but their electors overnight became nonentities.
Another piece of legislation in this connection was the immigrants and Emigrants Act No. 20 of 1948, which came into force in November 1949. This provided not only for controlling the entry of non-citizens into the island but also "for removing from Ceylon undesirable persons who are not citizens of Ceylon".
These Acts "have completely changed the political picture," wrote I.D.S. Weerawardana. "They have for all practical purposes denied the vote to the preponderant majority of Ceylon Indians. They have had the objective effect of making it most difficult for the working class estate population among them to obtain citizenship rights."
The UNP leaders presented these Acts as measures to drive out the Ceylon Indian employees and secure employment for the Ceylonese. They shed crocodile tears particularly for the Kandyan peasantry. They were strongly supported by the European employers. Speaking on the Ceylon Citizenship Bill of 1948 Major J.W. Oldfield (Appointed Member) stated "that for the

Independence and the Citizenship Acts 155
protection of this country, those people who have the true welfare of Lanka at heart, this Bill is essential". He said further:
Under ordinary conditions which prevailed some years ago, this Bill would have been considered a gross violation of the liberty of the subject, but, Sir conditions are such today that it is essential that this power should be given to the hands of the government. 3
In contrast to this, the left parties and many members of parliament, including T.B. Subasinghe, Wilmot A. Perera and T.B. Illangaratne, opposed the undemocratic measures. Dr N.M. Perera, the leader of the LSSP, declared: "In no country in the world are they so restrictive with regard to citizenship." He said:"people whose forefathers laid down their lives, and whose bones lie buried here, apparently for the prosperity of the capitalist elements in this country. All those people will be excluded. Is it just and fair?"
Dr.Colvin R. de Silva said that Ceylon Citizenship Bill was presented to the country as "a means of doing justice to the Kandyan peasantry". But he said:
The Kandyan peasantry will find in the course of their future history that their road to the land lies not through the counter-position of their interests with those of the workers on the plantations, but in the establishment of an alliance between the two against their common exploiters".' Exposing the UNP's real motives for bringing the Bill Dr de Silva said: "It is to defend the political interests of this particular ruling reactionary clique that this Bill is designed in this way because too many times in the Up-country, allies of the Hon. Prime Minister have been rejected by the electorate because the workers predominate over apeasantry."
The working of the Citizenship Act was to prove that the UNP was not against the rich Indians and Pakistanis. It was only the rich who could provide the documentary and oral evidence called for by the Citizenship registration officers. And if they failed to get citizenship, as many did, they had the necessary funds to challenge the adverse verdicts of the citizenship officers in the courts. The big Indian and Pakistani merchants and capitalists Could also have the means to become distinguished citizens. Pieter Keuneman, speaking in parliament, said: "that all those people who could not fulfil even a single condition of the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act - the Hebtulabhoys, the Adamjees, the Moosajees, the Victorias, the Lukmanjees - all of them are on a par with citizens by descent. All the big merchants

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who have been given honorary citizenship by the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister are on the general register."
The Acts depriving the people of Indian Origin, especially the plantation workers, was a blow at the working class movement in Ceylon. The danger was not fully realized by many who wished the workers well. I.D.S. Weerawardana observed:
Their main significance is not merely their discriminating nature against a minority community. They are pieces of legislation discriminating against a social class. They are, in their effect, more against the working class than against the Indians as such. To that extent the present policy smacks of political discrimination in addition to communal discrimination.'
Ever since the general elections the UNP was desperately looking for opportunities to entrench itself in the seat of government. The progressive forces, though split into a number of political parties, presented a formidable opposition. The Ceylon Indian Congress members of parliament sat in the opposition. At the elections plantation workers had supported anti-UNP candidates. Sir Ivor Jennings stated:
Speaking generally, however, the election was not fought on communal lines. The Indians voted solidly for the candidates of the Ceylon Indian Congress, and where there were no such candidates in areas where the Indian vote was strong, as in the Sabaragamuwa, they generally supported left-wing candidates.9
In this connection the elections in Kandy were notable. In 1948 a by-election became inevitable since the earlier election was proved to have been conducted unfairly. The UNP candidate Fred E. de Silva was defeated by T.B. langaratne, a victim of the 1947 general strike, who was strongly supported by the Ceylon Indians. But, this election too was declared unfair and another by - election was held in 1949. The UNP candidate was once again defeated, but this time, by his rival's wife Mrs Tamara Ilangaratne. The Ceylon Indians voted solidly for her with tremendous enthusiasm. The successive defeats in the hill capital - Kandy - infuriated the UNP leaders. This was one of the main reasons why the government deprived the Ceylon Indians of their franchise. At the elections the plantation workers had supported Anti-UNP candidates. If people would not vote for the UNP, then they should not vote for anyone else either - in fact, they do

independence and the Citizenship Acts 157
not deserve the right to vote. Such was the logic of the party in power. A. Ratnayake, a cabinet minister, said: "if the Indians by their conduct and by their attitude show us that they are our real friends... then we shall be confident. So long as we do not feel so, we will have to make legislation somewhat restrictive." The majority of the Ceylon Indians, being plantation workers, were not inclined to become "real friends" of the UNP.
The legislative enactments discriminating againstanational minority - the Ceylon Indians - were, in fact, a flagrant violation of the United Nations' "Universal Declaration of Human Rights". Article 15 of the Human Rights Charter reads: (1) "Everyone has the right to a nationality"; (2) "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality". The citizenship laws, by denying citizenship as well as franchise to the overwhelming majority of the Ceylon Indians, made them a community apart from the rest of the population. Their right to elect representatives to parliament and to local government bodies, their right to employment in all Services, to education, to freedom of travel and to a host of basic rights and freedoms had been denied to them. A whole community, with some half a million workers amongst them, had become segregated and unfree. In reality this was another form of apartheid - a Sri Lankan variety of the barbaric 'apartheid" practiced in South Africa.
These developments tended to aggravate relations between the Sinhalese and the Ceylon Indians. The larger consequences were the depiction of India as a threat to independent Ceylon and the justification, therefore, of the Defence Agreements with Britain. Britain, on the other hand, was painted as the true friend and ally of Sri Lanka and it was stressed that the people ought to be grateful to be allowed shelter under the British imperialist umbrella.
Notes
1 See R. Palme Dutt, India Today, 2 Pieter Keuneman, Sri Lanka and Victory over Fascism, Colombo, 1985, p.
77. Sir Ivor Jennings, The Constitution of Ceylon, 1951, pp. 125-126. Íbid, pp. 127 - 128.
Ibid, p. 247. Quoted by Hulugalle in Governors of Ceylon, p. 205.
:

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O 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 8 19 20
A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
J.R. Jayawardene MP, D.S. Senanayake - a Tribute", Ceylon Daily News, 22 March 1961. K.M. de Silva, The Transfer of Power in Sri Lanka', in Michael Roberts (ed), Collective Identities, Nationalisms and Protests in Modern Sri Lanka, Colombo, Marga Institute, 1979, p. 431. See Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, revised (1956), Vol. II, Chapter 349. Quoted by H.P. Chattopadhyaya in Indians in Sri Lanka, pp. 227 - 228 K.M. de Silva (ed), University History of Ceylon, Vol.III, pp. 287-288 I.D.S. Weerawardena, The Minorities and the Citizenship Act', in Historical Journal of Ceylon, 1(3) Jan. 1952, p. 248. Hansard, 1948, Vol. 4, col. 1948.
Ibid, col. 1701.
Ibid, Vol. 5, 1948, col. 455.
Ibid 1948 - 49, Vol.5, col. 463
Ibid, 9 July, 1954, col. 208.
I.D.S. Weerawardena, op. cit. p. 248.
Sir Ivor Jennings, op. cit. p. 49.
Hansard, 1948, Vol. 4, col. 1775.

Chapter
11
THE STATELESS MILLION
The Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act No. 3 of 1949 though described as "an Act to make provision for granting the status of a citizen of Ceylon by registration to Indians and Pakistanis who have the qualification of past residence in Ceylon for a certain minimum period", was no less restrictive than the Citizenship Act of 1948. The Act came into force on 5 August

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1949, and all applications were required to be submitted within a period of two years from that date to a Commissioner appointed for that purpose. After investigation the Commissioner had the discretion to allow or reject an application. In case of rejection under Section 16 of the Act, the applicant was entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court which, after due consideration of the circumstances, may direct the Commissioner to allow his application. The most shocking and ridiculous provision was that even if the Commissioner made an order allowing the application it could be objected to by any member of the public and such member was entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Commissioner's Order.
Taking into consideration the complex and often involved conditions and the complicated procedures to obtain Ceylon citizenship under the Act, the Ceylon Indian Congress first decided. to boycott the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act at its annual sessions held in 1949, and urged the people of Indian origin to be firm and "not barter away their rights". However, on 21 May 1950, the Congress Committee "after arguments had been canvassed to the point of bitterness" resolved to give the Act a trial. This decision had been taken due to the opportunism of the Congress leadership and the pressure from the richer class of Indians, who were desperately in need of Ceylon citizenship for business purposes, in view of the Ceylonisation policy initiated by the government. It must be noted that "even under the restricted Indian and Pakistani Law all the Indian members of Parliament had acquired Ceylon citizenship, but the bulk of the people of Indian origin had remained without citizenship or franchise".
The application forms were in English, and it was impossible for the Indians, especially the plantation workers, to fill them in without outside assistance. Altogether 237,034 applications were submitted on behalf of some 825,000 persons under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act. The majority of the applicants were assisted by Congress representatives. There were then 950,000 Ceylon Indians amounting to about 10 per cent of the population of Ceylon.
General Elections (1952) and Sathyagraha
In March 1952, D S Senanayake, the first Prime Minister of

The Stafeless Million 161
independent Ceylon, passed away, and his son Dudley Senanayake succeeded him as Prime Minister. Soon there followed general elections in May 1952. The ruling party, the UNP, called it a fight for democracy against the threat of totalitarianism, which was a reference to the Marxist parties such as the LSSP and CP. This was the first general election to be held after the Citizenship Acts had been enacted. The Indians constituted 1/10th of the total population of Ceylon and were taken into consideration in demarcating constituencies although the majority of them had been deprived of their right to vote. A mere 8,000 persons of Indian origin were eligible to exercise their franchise, and this represented about 1/20th of the Ceylon Indians who enjoyed franchise rights in the 1947 general elections.
In protest against the exclusion of the overwhelming majority of Ceylon Indians from their right to franchise and the right to participate in the general elections in May 1952, the Ceylon Indian Congress launched a satyagraha campaign, in Gandhian style, on 28 April under the leadership of S. Thondaman, A.Aziz and K. Rajalingam. Congress volunteers began fasting in batches before the Prime Minister's office "to focus attention on the plight of the now stateless and voteless Indian settlers in Ceylon". A Jaffna Tamil teacher, P. Kandiah, participated, while a Kandyan Sinhalese, Abeykoon, also joined the campaign on 4 May. W. Dahanayake MP was the only MP who paid a visit to the Satyagrahis.
Over 6,000 persons participated in this campaign, but the government went all out to suppress even the communiques issued by the Congress leadership, and news editors overworked themselves by twisting and turning news reports from the PTT and Reuter. It was the Indian papers, notably the Hindu, that reported this campaign without fabricating the news.
The satyagraha campaign, however, did not deter the government from going ahead with the general elections in May 1952. The UNP emerged as the most powerful party with 54 Seats in parliament Compared to 42 in the general elections held in 1947. The Citizenship Acts, making the Ceylon Indian workers dumb toilers to sustain Ceylon's economy, not only denied any representation of the Ceylon Indian Congress in parliament but also Weakened the strength of the progressive forces. From 18 seats, the left parties - LSSP, CP and VLSSP - were reduced to 13.

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it must be mentioned that while the satyagraha campaign was still in progress, Dudley Senanayake made a proprietary planter and former State Council Member, S.P. Vythilingam, an appointed Member of Parliament to keep up a facade of representation for Ceylon Indians in Parliament.
It was on 16 September that the CIC suspended its satyagraha movement on a vague assurance from the Prime Minister that the Department for the Registration of Persons of Indian Origin would expedite the disposal of applications for Ceylon citizenship. As shown by subsequent developments, the whole satyagraha campaign was indeed a futile exercise that merely served to divert the bitter feelings of the plantation workers against the UNP government's legislative acts depriving them of their fundamental rights.
Meanwhile, the registration of citizens by the Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani residents was proceeding at a snail's pace. Applications were being rejected on the slightest pretext, and the situation became so distressing that the leader of the Communist Party, Pieter Keuneman, raised the issue in parliament. He asked: "Are you administering the law from the point of view of seeing that every person who is entitled under the law to be registered is registered, or are you administering it from the point of view of excluding as many as possible... even those who by normal and legal tests can be held to fulfil the requirements of the law?"
1953 August Hartal and the Ceylon Workers' Congress
The government, on the advice of the World Bank, raised the price of rationed rice from 25 to 70 cents a measure, and increased the bus and tram fares. The trade unions and the opposition parties, including the CP, LSSP and SLFP (led by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who had quit the UNP in 1951), protested against the government's sudden price hike. By 1950, the CIC Labour Union had been re-named the Ceylon Workers' Congress, and the Congress too joined this protest.
The Action Committee, including representatives of the above-mentioned parties and trade union organizations,

The Stafeless Million 163
unanimously decided to launch a hartal (a mass stoppage of Work) on 12 August 1953 against the government's action. Pieter Keuneman, M.G. Mendis, Dr N.M. Perera and Dr Colvin R. de Silva were the foremost leaders of this great struggle. The hartal, organized under the leadership of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and the Communist Party, led to a mighty stoppage of work in Colombo, and tremendous mass support for the hartal came from both town and country.
However, though SLFP leader Bandaranaike addressed the joint protest meetings, he "declined to let his party get involved in this hartal." Furthermore, the leadership of the Ceylon Workers' Congress had, at the last minute, developed Cold feet and Overruled its executive Committee's decision to strike in the plantations. Despite this betrayal by the Congress leaders, thousands of estate workers belonging to left unions in a number of plantation districts, such as Matugama and Kegalle, went on strike.
Since the CWC then was the largest single trade union in the country, enjoying mass membership in the tea and rubber plantations, a strike action would have paralysed the plantation industry and shaken the economic base of the country. But, unfortunately, the CWC leadership missed this golden opportunity to lead the plantation workers into militant action against the UNP government which had robbed them of their citizenship and franchise rights. Such an action would have also led to solidarity between the segregated plantation workers and the urban Sinhalese workers in the country.
The government met the hartal with brutal repression. A state of emergency was declared and a curfew was rigorously enforced. As a result of police firing, nine persons lost their lives and several people were injured.
The hartal, however, was a triumph for the people led by the progressive parties and had far-reaching political repercussions. The government was compelled to bring down the price of rice. Within two months of the hartal, Dudley Senanayake resigned and Sir John Kotelawela was appointed Prime Minister of Ceylon.

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Nehru-Kotelawela Pact
During the premiership of Dudley Senanayake there were discussions on the Indian question between him and C.C. Desai, the Indian High Commissioner in Ceylon. In June 1953, negotiations on the citizenship question took place between Senanayake and Nehru in London, where both Prime Ministers had gone to attend the coronation of Queen Elizabeth Il. The talks proceeded on the following proposals made by the Ceylonese Prime Minister:
1. Of an estimated 950,000 Ceylon Indians in 1953, 400,000 were to registered as Ceylon citizens under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act,
2. A maximum of 250,000 to be granted Permanent Residence Permits and their status to be determined after 10 years. The government of India to grant Indian citizenship for those who applied for it,
3. The rest, numbering 300,000 to be accepted as Indian citizens and Compulsorily repatriated over a period of time,
4. All these steps to form an integral scheme of settlement of
the Indo-Ceylon problem.
The broad understanding reached in London soon broke down. It was said that Nehru wished the first two categories to be in the region of 700,000 and that he could not agree to compulsory repatriation of the rest. In India it was believed that the Government of Ceylon failed to honour the assurance given by Senanayake to Nehru.
The new Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawela, a brash and Overbearing man, boldly took up this vexed question, undeterred by the failure of his predecessors. On 16 January 1954, Sir John, assisted by Cabinet Minister Sir Oliver Goonetileke, began discussions with Nehru in New Delhi and concluded an agreement. For the first time in 14 years of communications and conferences between the two countries, Ceylon and India reached an agreement that was ratified by their respective governments.

The Stafeless Million 165
The main provisions of this agreement were:
Illicit immigration
1. Both governments to suppress illicit immigration between
the two Countries, 2. Government of Ceylon "to undertake the preparation of
a register of all adult residents who are not already on the electoral register". Any Tamil speaking person "not so registered to be an illicit immigrant", and "the Indian High Commissioner will extend all facilities" for his or her deportation,
3. Government of Ceylon may proceed with the Immigrants and Emigrants Amendment Bill which throws on the accused the onus of proof that he is not an illicit immigrant; but before any person is prosecuted, the Government of Ceylon will give an opportunity to the indian High Commissioner to satisfy himself that a prima facie case exists for such prosecution, the final decision being that of the Government of Ceylon.
Citizenship
4. The registration of citizens under the Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act will be expedited and every endeavour will be made to complete the disposal of pending applications within two years.
5. All persons registered under this Act may be placed on a separate electoral register... This arrangement will last for a period of only ten years. In constituencies where the number of registered citizen voters is not likely to exceed 250, they shall be put on the national register'.
6. Citizens whose names are placed in a separate electoral register will be entitled to elect a certain number of members to the House of Representatives, the number being determined after consultation with the Prime Minister of India. The Government of Ceylon expect to Complete their action in this respect before the present Parliament is dissolved in 1957.
7. In regard to those persons not so registered, it would be
open to them to register themselves as Indian citizens,

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if they so choose, at the office of the Indian High Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution of India. It is noted that Ceylon proposes to offer special inducements to encourage such registration. The Government of India will offer administrative and similar facilities to all persons of Indian origin to register themselves as Indian citizens under the Constitution of India, if they so choose. 8. Both Prime Ministers are desirous of continuing the present practice of close consultation between the two Governments in matters affecting their mutual interests.' The agreement naturally drew different comments from various quarters. Sir John, who was "determined to succeed where his predecessors had failed", said that it "was not a final settlement but marked the beginning of a definite advance towards that end". Nehru later described in the Lok Sabha that the Pact "Was not a solution but an understanding as to how to proceed about this matter in order to reach a solution".
The Ceylonese press was generally favourable. However, the Virakesari was extremely critical of the establishment of a separate electorate for Indians who were admitted to Ceylonese citizenship. The Parliamentary Opposition in Ceylon, with the exception of C. Suntharalingam, voted against the ratification of the agreement. The Ceylon Indian Congress reluctantly "accepted the agreement as it stood"."
The Nehru-Kotelawela Agreement had given undue prominence to the menace of illicit immigration from across the Palk Strait. The main problem of citizenship for Ceylon Indians was relegated to the second part of the Agreement. Unlike the Dudley Senanayake proposals, which were committed to a numerical form of Settlement in the London talks, Sir John cautiously avoided any reference to a maximum number which would be admitted to Ceylonese citizenship. Already, even before his departure from New Delhi, when the press asked why the earlier London figure of 6.5 lakhs (Ceylon Indians to be accepted as Ceylon citizens) was abandoned, Sir John said: "There is a law to be administered. It is a sieve and the people have to pass through it. Only then would the number eligible for Ceylon citizenship be known. It might be four lakhs, two lakhs or six lakhs"."

The Stafeless Million 167
A dynamic but controversial role had been played in promoting the agreement by C.C. Desai, the then Indian High Commissioner in Colombo. Desai was a close friend of Sir John. They had been students in England, and Nehru "hoped that a way would be found for the complicated problem by Mr Desai's skilful diplomacy.": Commenting on the agreement Desai said: "We have simply taken the Ceylon government on trust. If they want to be fair, they can do so. If they do not want to be fair, any amount of iegal documents cannot make them do so."
Indian correspondents reporting the settlement reached between the two Prime Ministers were indeed sceptical. Expressing apprehension about the possibility of the Ceylon authorities making use of the many loopholes in the agreement to expel Indian settlers from the island, one of the commentators WrOte:
Finally, Mr. Nehru was out-manned and out-manoeuvred. He was one against three, since Mr C.C. Desai was well known to be on the other side. Mr Nehru could not wage a battle against the combined persuasion of Sir John, Sir Oliver Goonetileke and C.C.Desai". Quoting this, P.Ramaswamy (formerly staff correspondent in New Delhi of the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon) says that this commentator "failed to appreciate that Nehru wanted an agreement and Mr Desai, like a true civil servant, made it possible."o
In the process of implementation, the aforesaid agreed proposals ran into troubled waters. On 1 March, the government of Ceylon suspended the Temporary Residence Permits (TRPs) and the issuing of Identity Certificates to people of Indian origin. In May, a ban on the employment of non-citizens was proposed by the government. The government took advantage of every loophole in the Agreement. The provision for inducements "was stretched to unimaginable limits with steps like withdrawal of ration cards, denial of employment, stopping of pensions etc, to force Indians to go to the Indian High Commission and opt for registration as Indian nationals." Hundreds of those, whose travel or residents permits had expired, were arrested as "illicit immigrants", derogatorily termed "kalla thonies", and thrown into a detention camp for eventual deportation.
While the Indian High Commission registered applicants for citizenship in the spirit of the Nehru-Kotelawela Agreement, the Ceylon government adopted a policy of rejecting merely on technical grounds thousands of applications for Ceylon citizenship.

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Misinterpreting Clause 7 of the Agreement, the government of Ceylon contended that all those not admitted to Ceylonese citizenship would be ipso facto treated as Indian citizens and were liable to repatriation to India. It was not prepared to recognize them as stateless persons: the government of India rejected such a Contention.
Desai, the Indian High Commissioner, became disillusioned, and called the Ceylon government's adoption of the various manoeuvres "a violation of the letter and the spirit" of the Delhi Agreement. Three months after the Agreement was signed, Desai visited New Delhi to report "on the manner in which the agreement was being abused by the Ceylon authorities". Having been the man who mooted the idea of talks between Nehru and Kotelawela, Desai was bitter about the trend of developments and told the press in Delhi: "He who laughs last laughs best." As soon as he returned to Colombo, he began to execute Counter-measures against the Ceylon authorities. And, on 1 June, the government of India refused recognition of Estate lodentification Certificates as travel documents and blocked the free entry of estate Workers into India.
An interesting and knowledgeable statement on the "Indo-Ceylon Pact and Stateless Persons" was made by the then Senator and eminent lawyer, S. Nadesan, QC., early in October 1954. He said:
The events of the past few weeks have shown that there is general dissatisfaction over the way in which the Indo-Ceylon Pact has been implemented. While the Ceylon Indians are perturbed at the large number of applications for citizenship which have been rejected ever since the Pact was signed.... the leaders of the Government party have been charging the Indian Government with having broken the Pact. Some of our Parliamentarians have even thought it necessary to level personal attacks on the High Commissioner of India.
Before the Indo-Ceylon Pact of 1954 was ratified the Commissioner and his Deputies, who held the necessary inquiries, applied very stringent tests often disqualifying persons who had made a single remittance to India or who had gone on a short visit to India or persons who were unable to prove the place of residence of a child for a short period. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, 40 to 50 percent of the persons, in respect of whom inquiries were held, were registered as citizens.
Today barely 5 to 15 per cent survive the rigorous tests which are imposed and the technical objections which are entertained notwithstanding the express provision of the Act that technicalities should as far as possible be disregarded.'

The Safeless Million 169
One of the most ridiculous requirements under the Act was that a Ceylon Indian must prove that he was an Indian. People who had lived in the island for many generations and had lost all connections with India, would find it impossible to fulfil this Condition. Nadesan records that "there have been a number of rejections on the ground that the applicant had not strictly proved that he was an Indian or Pakistani resident," and says "that this was a matter which could easily be decided by finding out the nature of his work in Ceylon." He then asks the question: "if it is not possible for the Commissioner to hold on the evidence that a person is an Indian resident, then one wonders how the High Commissioner for India can be expected to treat a rejected applicant as an Indian national?"
On the creation of a stateless class, Nadesan argues: "Merely because a Commissioner has rejected the application it does not mean that the applicant, who has made Ceylon his home, becomes a citizen of India. He has been deprived of his undoubted right to Ceylon Citizenship by an oppressive and inhuman administration of the law. He thus becomes a stateless person. It will thus be apparent that a stateless class is bound to be the result of the way in which the Act is being administered. This stateless class is of our own creation and not that of the High Commissioner for India. The Cabinet Sub-Committee considered that they could solve this problem of stateless persons by refusing to give employment and rations to persons who are not either Ceylon or Indian citizens. In other words, the suggested remedy is to coerce Ceylon Indians... to apply for Indian citizenship." And he asks the appropriate question: "Under these circumstances, can India be blamed if they refuse to admit such a person to Indian citizenship?"
Concluding his statement Nadesan says: "In view of the facts disclosed above, it will be imprudent on our part to carry on a tirade against Hindia and its High Commissioner or threaten to take our case to the UNO as we do not have much of a case... The Indo-Ceylon Pact was entered into with the best of intentions by the Premiers of both countries.... If it has failed to solve our problem it is because of reactionary forces in this country, who have not scrupled to subvert the provisions of our law to serve
sectional interests"."

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The Second Agreement
By the end of September 1954 it was indeed clear that the Pact had failed, and to solve the consequent impasse, Sir John Kotelawela, with Dudley Senanayake and S.W. R.D. Bandaranaike, flew to New Delhi in October 1954. The Conference was held On October 9 and 10, but this time, "no doubt on Mr Desai's counselling in New Delhi", the Ceylon delegation could not make much headway. Their demand that those who were not recognized as Ceylon citizens should automatically be accepted as Indian nationals was rejected unequivocally.
After their discussions with Nehru the main terms agreed upon were:
1. Indian High Commissioner in Ceylon to grant facilities to those who, with the necessary qualifications, wished to register themselves as Indian citizens.
2. Ceylon Government to simplify and dispose of the
applications for Ceylon citizenship as agreed earlier.
3. Ceylon Government to issue loentity Certificates for travel to those whose citizenship applications were still pending.
4. Ceylon Government to permit Indians employed in Ceylon
(who might become Indian citizens) to continue in employment until the age of 55."
Commenting upon these developments Sir John Kotelawela said: "After considerable discussions we arrived at a compromise which satisfied both parties. The Nehru-Kotelawela Pact was put back on the track again. But we did not solve the fundamental problem of the stateless who would not qualify for Ceylon citizenship. Nehru refused to accept the principle of such persons being recognized as Indian nationals."
At this point, it is important to take cognizance of the views expressed on the stateless question by V.L.B. Mendis, a distinguished former career diplomat who has served as High Commissioner to Canada and the United Kingdom, and Director General of Ceylon's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mendis writes:
Indo-Ceylon relations during this period were paradoxical. Although ut was closer than ever before because of the joint initiative in foreign policy, the Indo-Ceylon problem in the sense of the citizenship issue deteriorated and engendered bad feelings. The problem

The Stateless Million 17
now turned on the very thorny issue of the stateless. This was to Sri Lanka a totally unexpected development which had been overlooked in its thinking and calculations. The Sri Lanka authorities, as Mr Dudley Senanayake admitted, had proceeded on the one track theory that all Indians in Sri Lanka who would not qualify for Sri Lanka citizenship under its acts were ipso facto Indian nationals repatriable to India. This proved to be a fool's paradise indeed when India not incorrectly took up the position that these persons had in turn to qualify under the Indian citizenship laws of India itself to be granted its citizenship. The result is that it left the island physically saddled with a very large number who fell between two stools and were deemed not only stateless but in fact the responsibility of Sri Lanka. This was the heart of the problem and while there is room to argue about India's good faith and suggest that this was a trap, still its position legally was defensible.'
The implementation of the second agreement had to face many obstacles. The Commissioner for Registration continued to reject applications for Ceylon citizenship on flimsy grounds. This led to much frustration amongst the permanently settled people of Indian origin and to criticism from India. On the other hand, various unfounded allegations were made against the Indian High Commissioner Desai, who was accused of obstructing people from registering as indian nationals. In 1954, of the 8,163 persons of Indian origin who applied, 5,618 were accepted as Indian nationals and 2,545 were pending scrutiny. Quoting these very same figures, Kodikara comments:
These figures might suggest that the Indian authorities in Colombo were in fact registering as Indian nationals the majority of those Indians in Ceylon who applied for such status. But there are strong presumptions against such a conclusion; the indications are that the Indian High Commission in Colombo, and other spokesmen for Indian interests in Ceylon tually discouraged applications for Indian nationality from Indian residents in Ceylon.
Whatever may be Kodikara's presumptions, the all too elementary fact is that 69 per cent, that is the majority, of the applicants had been accepted by the Indian High Commission as Indian nationals. But, as far as the applications for Ceylon citizenship were concerned, this was not the case. From January to November 1954, only 6,636 persons, who applied for citizenship, had been granted Ceylon citizenship, while the cases of 41,548 persons were rejected.' This would mean that the Ceylon Government had rejected 86 per cent of the applications for citizenship.
The Commissioner for the Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents, H.E. Tennekoon, records:

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A Survey of the statistical position as at December 31, 1954, revealed that of a total of 237,034 applications received from those claiming Ceylon citizenship, 132,619 applications have been fully investigated. Of the investigated applications 9,672 applications have been accepted. The number of individuals registered as Ceylon citizens was 33,012.'
From the above figures it would be apparent that of the total number investigated 93 per cent of the applications for Ceylon citizenship had been rejected. The arbitrary and almost wholesale rejection of applications by the Ceylon Government outraged C.C. Desai, the man who mooted the Nehru-Kotelawela talks, and he began to resort to retaliatory measures.
Whatever might have been the spirit in which Sir John Kotelawela signed the Agreement with Nehru, the real underlying intention had been to reduce to the minimum the number of Ceylon citizens among the people of Indian origin. In an article entitled "Indo-Ceylon Problem (A Flashback)" in the Ceylon Daily News of 15 September 1964, the former Civil Servant and indefatigable politician, C. Suntharalingam, reveals:
At the second conference ex-Premier Dudley Senanayake and subsequent Premier S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike took part. Agreements without dissent were reached and signed by the heads of both Governments. I received by post verbatim records of both the conferences, found them most amusing on the Ceylon side and very instructive on the Indian.
I have also heard it said that after the second agreement was signed, and the Indian Premier and his officers had withdrawn from the conference chamber, Premier Kotelawela, who had forgotten the saying that 'walls have ears, was overheard to utter words to this effect: "We have now got Nehru's signature, we can squeeze the last Indian out of Ceylon'.
The agreements have proved to be just scraps of paper, they seem to have been so intended by Premier Kotelawela.
Separate Representation Act
Meanwhile, in accordance with the provisions of the NehruKotelawela pact, the Ceylon Government took legislative action to provide representation in Parliament for the people who had been registered as Ceylon citizens. In July 1954, the Ceylon Constitution (Special Provisions) Act No. 35 was enacted and the number of Members of Parliament was thereby increased from 101

The Stafeless Million 173
to 105. The four additional members were to represent an islandwide Indian and Pakistani electoral district Constituted under the Indian and Pakistani (Parliamentary Representation) Act No.36 of 1954.
According to a clause in the Agreement, the number of Representatives "was to be determined after consultation with the Prime Minister of India", but the Ceylon Government did no such consultation. In any case, the provisions under this Act could not be implemented, and Ceylon Indians continued to languish without elected representation in Parliament until 1977.
By early 1956 it was abundantly clear that the Nehru-Kotelawela Agreement had reached a stalemate, in April that year, Sir John decided to hold an early general election, which resulted in the UNP winning only 8 seats and suffering an ignominious defeat. A new coalition called the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) - People's United Front - headed by the SLFP leader S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike with 'Sinhala only' and Buddhist slogans, was swept into power with 51 seats in Parliament.
The new Prime Minister, Bandaranaike, did not consider India as an unfriendly power. His attitude to Britain, especially to her air and naval military bases at Katunayake and Trincomalee in Ceylon, was very different to that of the UNP government. In fact, he took over these bases from British control and sought to eliminate the limitations on Ceylon's sovereignty.
On the Indo-Ceylon problem, the SLFP, the most dominant party in the MEP coalition, had its disagreements with the policy followed by the UNP. In a policy statement, the SLFP held that "it seems to us that the wisest course would be to abrogate the (Nehru-Kotelawela) pact by friendly discussion, to go on with the registering of Indians who have applied for our citizenship, and when that task is completed to take up the question of those who have failed to obtain our citizenship with India on a fresh basis." And on the problem of illicit immigration from India, which Sir John and the newspapers had blown up to Himalayan proportions, Bandaranaike declared in Parliament "these alarmist talks of illicit immigrants pouring into this country are just not true. There may be a certain number that come but that is a number that could be dealt with."

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Bandaranaike Repe als Separate Representation Act
By far the most important contribution Bandaranaike made in regard to the Ceylon Indians was his action to repeal the discriminatory Act relating to separate representation in parliament for those people of Indian origin, who had acquired Ceylon citizenship by registration. Speaking in parliament on the Act providing for separate representation for Ceylon Indians, he said: "The question arose whether we should proceed to hold elections under that Act or whether we should bring all these people into the general voters' list. I think the entire Cabinet was of the opinion that it was anomalous to separate citizens this way, and the Cabinet was not at all satisfied with the arrangements urged by the previous government for this step."
Disassociating himself from the Nehru-Kotelawela Agreement he said: "I was no party to the original pact at all. opposed it on the floor of this House." And he emphasized: "Indeed opposed this provision for having these people on a separate electorallist." Supporting Bandaranaike, Pieter Keuneman said:
They are citizens of Ceylon who have satisfied the rigorous requirements of the citizenship Act, these camels have got through the eye of the needle. But once they are citizens of Ceylon what justification is there for treating them differently from the other citizens of Ceylon? Why should we treat these people like second grade citizens?,
Exposing the ulterior motives behind Kotelawela's separate Representation Act, Keuneman said:
Let me say that this was introduced not to solve the Indian problem in this country or to give any relief to the million-odd people of Indian origin... but for the purpose of a bluff directed for foreign consumption, to prove to persons abroad that we are giving some representation to the Indians. The real intention was to hide the fact there were 1 million-odd persons without any votes or any hope of getting votes.... Let the people see the problem in all its nakedness; let the problem be known to the whole world.’
The Separate Representation Act was finally repealed.

The Stafeless Million 175
Citizenship Question and the Relationship Between Indian and Jaffna Tamils
it was the citizenship question that brought out clearly the different attitudes of the Tamil Congress and the Federal party towards the Ceylon Indians. While the TC leader, G.G. Ponnambalam, supported D.S. Senanayake government's citizenship laws, the FP leader, S.J.V.Chelvanayagam opposed the discriminatory provisions against the Indians. The FP's concern for citizenship rights for the Indians assumed greater significance after the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956 came into operation. The "Sinhala Only" Act, in one stroke threatened, if not undermined, the principal avenues of employment in the professions and in the government services hitherto open to the Ceylon Tamils. At its convention held in August 1956 the FP adopted the following resolutions on the citizenship and language issues:
1. The repeal of the present citizenship laws and the enactment in their place of laws recognizing the right to full citizenship... for all persons who have made this country their home.
2. The restoration of the Tamil language to its rightful place enjoying the absolute parity of status with Sinhala as an official language of the country.
Though the Ceylon Indians were mainly concerned with the citizenship question, it would be wrong to assume that they were totally unconcerned with the language controversy - after all their mother tongue was also Tamil. Therefore, we shall refer briefly to the relationship between the Jaffna Tamils and the Indians and deal with the FP campaign relating to the language issue, which led to the tragic incidents at Bogowantalawa in the Up-country.
Relations between the Jaffna Tamils and the Ceylon Indian Tamils have not been all that cordial for various reasons. One of the most important was that the majority of these semi-literate people, derogatorily called 'coolies', worked on the plantations for low wages, while the average Jaffna man, met with in the Upcountry, was English-educated and worked either in government service or as a staff member in the plantations. On the estates,

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staff members generally cooperated with the Superintendents and often came into Conflict with the Workers.
Relations became seriously strained when the conservative Tamil Congress leader G.G. Ponnambalam, with six Tamil MPs, joined the UNP government in 1949. For a mere portfolio in the Cabinet, he supported Senanayake in passing the Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Amendment Act No. 48 of 1949, which robbed the Ceylon Indians of their franchise. This open betrayal of the Ceylon Indians by the Tamil Congress leaders naturally engendered a feeling of distrust towards the Jaffna people. It was at this juncture that S.J.V. Chelvanayagam and C.Vanniasingham resigned from the Tamil Congress and founded the Federal party which emerged as a major political force winning ten seats in the 1956 general election. At the time he resigned, with prophetic foresight, Chelvanayagam declared: "Today it is the Indian Tamils. Tomorrow, it will be the Ceylon Tamils who will be axed."
It is indeed appropriate here to record the comments on the behaviour of the Sinhalese and, more especially, of the Ceylon Tamils towards the Ceylon Indians, so aptly made by S.J. Tambiah. He writes:
It is a blot on the Sinhalese conscience that considerations of electoral arithmetic have denied the Indian Tamils, large numbers of whom have been in the island for several generations, the rights of citizenship and enfranchisement - a blot all the more dark because for many decades now it is this exploited segment of the population that has made the greatest contribution to the island's economy via the tea industry, which earns the greater part of the island's export earnings. But the Sinhalese are not alone in this disgrace. The indigenous Sri Lankan Tamils concentrated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces for quite other reasons of a social nature have traditionally looked down upon the plantation labour as of low caste and/or tribal status, and have not until very recently made an effort to include them within the framework and goals of their politics. The Indian Tamils, therefore, physically and socially removed from Sri Lankan Tamils and united by a common economic condition, have formed their own labour unions, generated their own leadership and made their own political deals with the Sinhalese majority government.'
Writing about an important facet of Tamil collective identity, Satchi Ponnambalam says: "Owing to centuries of an insular linguistic and cultural way of life and a shared historical experience, the Sri Lankan Tamils possess and assert an identity distinct and separate from both the Tamils of South India and the Indian Tamils. They also pride themselves on speaking 'pure' Tamil, in contrast to Madras (South Indian) Tamil, which is heavily laden with Telugu

The Stafeless Million 177
and Malayalam words. With the plantation Tamils, the Sri Lankan Tamils had no connection whatsoever until recent times, and then it was a tenuous political link at leadership level. This link led most of the Tamil bourgeois MPs to join in the campaign of the Sinhalese political class, soon after independence, to deprive working-class plantation Tamils of their Sri Lankan citizenship and franchise."
With the enactment of the "Sinhala Only" Act and consequent problems for Ceylon Tamils, including employment in the government services, the Jaffna politicians began to recognize that the Tamil plantation workers constituted a tremendous source of potential strength and endeavoured to utilize this force to advance the cause of the Tamil minorities. Unlike the Tamil Congress, the Federal Party leaders made serious attempts to draw the plantation workers into their struggles. Early in 1957, the FP launched a campaign for state recognition of the Tamil language and autonomy for Tamil areas under a federal Constitution. And, when the FP announced that it would conduct a satyagraha campaign in mid 1957, Prime Minister Bandaranaike came out with proposals for "the reasonable use of Tamil".
In April Bandaranaike declared: "The House and the country know that it has always been the policy of the Government party that, although the circumstances of the situation were such that the Sinhala language had to be declared the official language of this country, there was no intention in fact to cause any undue hardship or injustice to those whose language is other than Sinhala in the implementation of the Act. I wish also to point out that the government party prior to the elections in their manifesto gave the assurance that while it was their intention to make Sinhala the official language of the country, reasonable use of Tamil too will be given."
Following this statement a series of discussions were held between the Prime Minister and the FP leader. These resulted in the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact, popularly called the B-C pact, signed on 26 July 1957. Regarding the question of citizenship for Ceylon Indians and the revision of the Citizenship Act, "the representatives of the Federal Party put forward their views to the Prime Minister and pressed for an early settlement. The Prime Minister indicated that this problem would receive early consideration." On the use of Tamil "it was agreed that the

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proposed legislation should contain a recognition of Tamil as the language of a national minority of Ceylon..."
The pact encountered almost immediate opposition from opportunist politicians as well from Buddhist militants. The UNP stalwart, J.R. Jayewardene, who could not get elected in the 1956 general election, led his infamous march to Kandy in December 1957 to invoke the blessings of the gods against the B-C pact. Succumbing to these pressures, the Prime Minister took no action to implement the pact.
Meanwhile, in December, the government introduced the Sinhala character "Sri" in place of the English letters hitherto used on number plates on motor vehicles. By this time, a feeling of frustration had set in among the Tamil people and the FP leaders were growing impatient as a result of the delay in implementing the Pact. Chelvanayagam chose this particular time to launch an anti-Sri campaign in Jaffna by tarring the "Sri" character on the number plates of motor vehicles. Incidentally, both Sinhala and Tamil "Sri" characters are of Sanskrit origin, and even some educated people of both communities would find it difficult to produce an instant "Sri". Action in Jaffna only suited the interests of the sectarian forces in the South and bands of Sinhalese extremists started a rather aggressive campaign, obliterating Tamil letters on the Ceylon Transport Board (CTB) buses, name boards in government departments, roads and shops.
The effacing of Tamil name boards in Up-country towns by Sinhalese hooligans aroused considerable concern amongst the estate workers. Almost spontaneously, on 30 March 1958, a CTB bus on its way to Bogawantalawa town was stopped by some estate workers who attempted to tar-brush its number plate. After some argument the driver had turned the bus and driven back to Hatton. Later the workers had gathered at Bogo town. The police had got unduly excited and fired into the crowd. Two workers - A. Francis and M. lyavoo fell dead.
News of the police shooting swiftly spread across the green hills, and the enraged workers went on a rampage destroying bridges and telephone lines, and blocking the Bogo - Hatton road with boulders and trees. For about two days Communication was disrupted and no vehicle could pass through. The Sinhalese shop-keepers (most of them from the Low-country) who, despite their dependence on these workers for their profits, often displayed an air of racial superiority over them, had grown

The Stafeless Million 179
panicky and appealed for police protection. The police had clamped down a curfew, and called for army assistance to restore order in the area.
A battalion of the Ceylon Army arrived and a column of soldiers, armoured cars, military vehicles, followed by cars and buses, took ten hours to cover a distance of eight miles to reach Bogo town. Abdul Aziz, leader of the Democratic Workers' Congress, with his colleagues (including the author), Walked slowly watching every step as the army cleared the roadblocks and laid temporary make-do bridges along the road. Suddenly, the army convoy and all vehicles came to a halt, and tension began to mount when a Sinhalese man's dead body was found on the road. An excited mob had stoned him to death, we learnt. The moment the Sinhalese driver behind us had become aware of this, he got alarmed, shoved his passengers on to the road and dashed back to Hatton. The soldiers carried the corpse onto a truck and moved on.
While women workers were seen defiantly looking at the convoy, we noted that the men were on hill tops amidst tea bushes but, of course, beyond rifle range. However, thousands of workers had gathered at the funeral grounds to pay homage to their fallen comrades. During the funeral orations, the trade union leaders, though angry against the trigger-happy Up-Country policemen, helped defuse a rather explosive situation. And when Aziz and the author returned at night, we were informed at Norwood that the CWC leader Thondaman's car had been stoned by communal elements on its way back to Hatton.
This episode shows how the language controversy had its repercussions in the Up-Country.
Assassination of Bandaranaike and the Stateless Problem
Sustained opposition from the UNP and militant Sinhala Buddhist groups led to the abrogation of the B-C Pact. Preoccupied with internal problems and rising ethnic conflicts, Bandaranaike hardly had time to address himself to the Indo-Ceylon problem.
The MEP coalition, through which he rose to power, began to crumble as a result of the intense struggle within the

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Cabinet over Philip Gunawardana's radical land reform measure - the Paddy Lands Bill - and the LSSP-led strikes. In this deteriorating situation, a conspiracy was hatched by a powerful Buddhist priest, Buddharakita, and another bhikku, Somarama, through which Bandaranaike was assassinated on 26 September 1959.
In the meantime, developments in regard to the registration of citizens under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Acts, had dashed whatever hopes that had been inspired at the time of the second Agreement reached between Nehru and Kotelawela. While complaining time and again that the Indian High Commission was refusing to register applicants for Indian citizenship, the Ceylon authorities resorted to large-scale rejection of applications for citizenship. By 1961, after seven years of the agreement, only 131,572 persons of Indian origin had been granted Ceylon citizenship.
In this Context it would be of interest to note the impressions of Y.D.Gundavia, who served as the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo from 1957 to 1960. He says:
Negotiations between the two countries had been stalemated before I got to Ceylon in April 1957....These so-called Indian estate labourers were, almost ninety percent of them, properly domiciled in Ceylon, by any standards. They could not, therefore, qualify for Indian citizenship under Article 8 of the Constitution. They obviously wanted to live in the estates and continue in employment as they had done over two or three generations. Few who, for their own domestic reasons, wanted to return to India, came to the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo or the office of the Deputy High Commissioner in Kandy, opting for Indian citizenship under Article 8, and we registered them as Indian citizens. The bulk of the estate labour, born in Ceylon as they were, qualified for citizenship under Ceylon laws. But it was a practice to turn down every application for Ceylon citizenship of these migrant labourers and their families on the slightest evidence of the applicant having maintained any contact with India....There were provisions for appeal against these executive Orders which rejected applications for Ceylon citizenship more or less out of hand. One had to give full marks to the Ceylon judiciary. In eighty-two per cent of the cases that went into appeal before the judiciary, the appeal was allowed. But this only meant the case being reverted to the executive for consideration. It was not a simple matter for an estate labourer in the Kandyan hills and beyond to come to Colombo to file an appeal. The appeals were possible in barely seven per cent of the cases turned down by executive authorities.
All this had a singular effect on the one time emigrant population on the estates. Ceylon maintained, with no legitimacy, that whosoever was not a Ceylon citizen was an Indian citizen, a foreigner as far as they were concerned. In effect, so many hundred thousands were not Indian citizens under Indian laws and, if they were not recognized at any given moment in time as Ceylon citizens, they were stateless persons....'

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By the early 1960s the operation of the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act and the manner of implementation of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement led to a million people of Indian origin being rendered stateless. In the following chapter we shall see how the Indo-Ceylon problem was 'settled'.
l
:
10 11 12 13 14 15
16 17 18 19
20 21
22 23 24
26 27 28 29
Notes
The Ceylon Indian Congress Report 1949 - 50, p. 2. See Abdul Aziz, 75th Birthday Felicitation Volume, Colombo DWC 1986, p. 90.
Congress News, Vol. I, No. 3, 19 May 1952, P. 9. Hansard Vol. 12, col. 2333, 6 August 1952. K.M. de Silva, History of Sri Lanka, p. 499. Sir John Kotelawela, An Asian Prime Ministers' Story, London, 1956, p. 105.
Ibid, pp. 108 - 110. Quoted by Chattopadhyaya in Indians in Sri Lanka, p. 235. S.U. Kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations since Independence, op. cit. p. 127. Ibid.
P. Ramaswamy, New Delhi and Sri Lanka, Delhi, 1987, p. 54.
Ibid, p. 55.
Ibid.
Ibid. Senator S. Nadesan, "The Indo-Ceylon Pact and Stateless Persons". The Times of Ceylon, 5 Oct. 1954.
Ibid.
bid.
Ibid. Sir John Kotelawela, op.cit. p. 111 (Also see article by Sulkhibir Choudury, Foreign Affairs Reports - Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, Nov 1956.)
Ibid, p. 111. V.L.B. Mendis, Foreign Relations of Sri Lanka, Colombo: Tisara Press, 1983, pp. 419 - 420.
The Hindu, 17 April 1955.
S.U. Kodikara, op. cit, pp. 129 - 130.
See Chattopadhyaya, op. cit, p. 243. A.R., Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents, 1954, p. X3. I.D.S. Weerawardana, Ceylon General Elections 1956, Colombo, 1960, p 58. Quoted by S.U. Kodikara, op. cit. p. 159.
Hansard, Vol. 33, col. 2483.
Ibid, col. 2630, 6 Jan. 1959.

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31 32 33
A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
S.J.Tambiah, Sri Lanka - Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, Chicago, 1986, p. 67. Satchi Ponnambalam, Sri Lanka and Tamil Liberation Struggle, p. 32. Ibid, quoted in p. 109. See. P. Ramaswamy, op. cit. pp. 58 - 59

Chapter
12
A DIVIDED PEOPLE
During the interregnum that followed Bandaranaike's death W. Dahanayake became Prime Minister. Consequent to the general election in March 1960, when the SLFP languished for want of an able leader, Dudley Senanayake assumed office as Prime Minister of an unstable government. Soon the country had to face another general election in July 1960.
in the July general election once again the language issue played a prominent part and many a Sinhalese politician promised to implement the Sinhala Only Act rigorously.
V

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Ms. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, now leading the SLFP, promised to follow "Bandaranaike policies" and usher in an era of "Bandaranaike Socialism". But she was shrewd enough to avoid a situation that arose in the March 1960 election where, due to lack of understanding between the anti-UNP parties, the SLFP could win only 46 of the 145 elected seats in the reformed legislature. On the one hand, she had assured the Federal Party through her emissaries that she would grant the rights of the Tamil people on the basis of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakampact, and it was on this assurance that the FP gave its votes to defeat the throne speech of Dudley Senanayake's administration." On the other hand, she reached no-contest pacts with the LSSP and the CP. With these tactical arrangements and riding a wave of sympathy for her as Bandaranaike's widow, the SLFP emerged as the most powerful party in the House of Representatives, winning 75 seats, and Ms Bandaranaike shot up to prominence as the first woman prime minister in the world.
The Tamil people (except in the North and the East) in general and the Indian plantation workers in particular, led by their trade unions, supported the SLFP and the left parties in the election. Ms. Bandaranaike appointed the CWC leader S.Thondaman, as a Member of Parliament.
However, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government, abandoning the assurances her party had given to the Federal Party before the elections, passed the Language of the Courts Act in January 1961 and began to enforce rigorously the Official Language Act. In this situation, the FP leaders requested the government to postpone their implementation and also called for relief to Tamil public servants who were not proficient in Sinhala. This request, of course, was ignored by the government. Unable to tolerate any longer the government move to ride roughshod over the fundamental rights of the Tamil speaking people, the FP, led by its charismatic leader, S.J.V.Chelvanayagam, launched a Satyagraha campaign in January 1961.
Federal Party's Satyagraha Campaign and the Up-country Tamil People
The satyagraha movement gathered momentum and despite

A Divided People 185
violent reaction from the police, the campaign received extensive public support throughout the Northern and Eastern provinces. Just before the campaign started Chelvanayagam and his colleagues had consulted with the CWC leader S.Thondaman and DWC leader A. Aziz. Some FP leaders also had discussions with other groupings in the up-country. In fact, a discussion was held at Thangarajah's residence at Bullers Road, in Colombo. M.Sivasithambaram and Dr. Ponniah (FP), K. Rajalingam (CWC), the author and Rozario Fernando (CPWU) and Allancheliyan (Ceylon Dravida Munnetra Kazlagam-CDMK) participated in the discussion. Sir Kandiah Vaithiyanathan, a Ceylon Tamil - former civil servanttoo was present. Finally it was agreed that the organizations in the Up-country would take action in solidarity with the satyagraha campaign. Meanwhile a number of Up-country Tamil youth induced by the CDMK were participating in batches in the satyagraha Campaign in Jaffna.
The CWC leaders who called upon their members to prepare for a prolonged major strike in April, declared a strike.
On behalf of the CPWU the author too called upon all plantation workers to strike for the common cause of language rights of the Tamil speaking people. The government reacted quickly by publishing a Gazette notification on 17 April, which declared work in the plantations as an essential Service. Notwithstanding this threat, on 25 April the plantation workers launched their strike and the Up-Country tea plantations were totally paralysed. But, the irony of it was that this major strike started and ended on the same day since Thondaman got Cold feet and called off the strike even before it could have had any effect upon the government.
It was said that the then Governor General, Sir Oliver Goonatileke, a shrewd politician and a faithful friend of British imperialism, summoned the CWC leader and without mincing words, told him that properties owned by trade union leaders would be seized by the government if he did not stop "the damn strike". Having known Sir Oliver and his ways while he served as Ceylon's High Commissioner in London, the author could well imagine the words he as Governor General would have used on this occasion. Thondaman Succumbed to the threats of the government and without much ado called off the strike. Thondaman's somersault provoked the workers and in some districts they attacked CWC offices.

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Writing on this subject Professor A.Jeyaratnam Wilson, son-in-law of S.J.V.Chelvanayagam, say in his book The Break-Up of Sri Lanka .
The Indian Tamil leaders did not act forcefully on this occasion for a number of reCSOPS.
The author who has been engaged in the plantation trade union movement for over three decades can state categorically that these leaders seldom 'acted forcefully despite being leaders of the largest single trade union in the country and operating in the vital sector of economy. One of the reasons Professor Wilson adduces is that "The government had laid emergency plans to seize the plantations... a move from which the plantation workers could well have emerged as losers". This is a fallacious argument. Firstly, a dependent capitalist government reigning in Colombo would not and indeed dare not take over the plantations owned by British and other companies. Secondly the bargaining power of the workers does not depend on the type of ownership of the plantations; it depends on the unity, strength and the leadership of their trade union. In fact, the government never even Contemplated any such ill-advised move ; it merely put the pressure on Thondaman the boss of the CWC. And that was enough to end the strike.
However, the Prime Minister, abandoning the assurance she had given to the FP before and in the course of the election Campaign, began to enforce rigorously the Sinhala Only Act, and passed the Language of the Courts Act making the courts conduct business in Sinhala throughout the island. This angered the Tamil people, and the FP launched a massive civil disobedience Campaign. Some of the plantation trade unions, for the first time, called upon their workers to strike in solidarity with this struggle. A state of emergency was declared, all the Federal Party MPs Were arrested, and the armed forces were engaged to crush this mass movement in April 1961.
Sino-Indian Dispute and Ms. Bandaranaike’s attitude to India
While Ms Bandaranaike's action aggravated relations between the

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Sinhalese and the Tamils, her role in the Sino-Indian dispute caused some strain in the country's relations with India. Two great Asian countries - India and China - which, despite their different political orientations followed a path of cooperation in the 1950s, had become parties to an unwarranted war over desolate and largely uninhabited territory in the Himalayas in 1962. However, in November 1962, the border war came to an abrupt end consequent to China's unilateral declaration of a ceasefire. Apart from the severe casualties India suffered, its image as a leader of the non-aligned movement was marred in the course of this war. The only positive development was that the Sino-Indian war led to the submergence of fissiparous tendencies that were so manifest in India and paved the way for that country with many nations and nationalities to emerge as a more united and integrated nation. C.N. Annadurai, the charismatic leader of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), abandoned his call for an independent separate state for the people of Tamil Nadu.
These developments in the international scene brought Ms. Bandaranaike to the foreground. Even before she started a move on the long-standing but now intractable Indo-Ceylon problem, it devolved upon her to play a role in the border dispute between these two Asian giants. President Nasser of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a friend of India, mooted the idea of convening a conference of Afro-Asian countries to discuss the ceasefire between the two countries. Ms Bandaranaike was only too glad to play host to such a conference. A non-aligned mini-summit representing Ceylon (as Chairman), UAR, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia and Burma met in Colombo in December. AS a sequel, the Ceylon Prime Minister was called upon to visit the two countries and convey the formula that had been evolved at the mini-Summit to stabilize the ceasefire and resolve the border dispute through a negotiated settlement. Ms Bandaranaike shuttled between New Delhi and Peking (now Beijing) carrying messages to and fro. Though this role did not lead to any significant results, it certainly helped her gain an international image which was to stand in good stead when she made her moves to deal with the Indo-Ceylon problem later. In the course of her acting as an intermediary in the Sino-Indian dispute, it was Chou-En-lai who achieved an advantageous position for China in the South Asian region. A maritime agreement was concluded by

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Ceylon with China conferring reciprocal, most favoured treatment
in relation to Sea-borne traffic.
How Indian Premier Nehru viewed Ms Bandaranaike's role
has been poignantly portrayed by P. Ramaswamy as follows:
In his final years, Mr Nehru suffered a series of shocks... though Ms Bandaranaike's policies came closer to those of India, it became apparent that Sri Lanka had become more and more emphatic on the point that her interests did not coincide with those of India. When the Chinese betrayal dealt him the final frontal blow, Mr Nehru felt mortified by what looked like Sri Lanka leading an opinion which was totally indifferent to Indian sensibilities, brushing aside the basic question of where the responsibility lay for all the trouble. Lots of evidence has been coming of what Mr Nehru must have known privately about Ms Bandaranaike's drift towards China while claiming to mediate' on behalf of the Colombo powers between China and India when she headed the government in Colombo after 1960. Mr Nehru had gone all the way to support the mediation move and extend unreserved cooperation to her.’
SLFP - LSSP Government
Meanwhile, on the domestic Scene, internal dissensions within the SLFP, a deteriorating financial situation and a discontented working class led by the left parties, were beginning to tell upon the stability of the government. It was in this situation that the left parties - the LSSP, CP and the MEP - closed their ranks and formed the United Left Front (ULF) on 12 August 1963 at a meeting held in commemoration of the 1953 hartal. The ULF was looked upon as the alternative to the reactionary pro-imperialist UNP and the capitalist SLFP. The Joint Committee of Trade Union Organizations, led by the ULF formulated and campaigned for a set of 21 demands on behalf of the working class as a whole.
Ms Bandaranaike, sensing the danger arising from this Front, moved surreptitiously to break up the ULF. In June 1964 she succeeded, and re-shuffled her government allocating three portfolios to the LSSP, with Dr N.M. Perera as the new Minister of Finance. On the one hand, this resulted in some leading members quitting the LSSP describing the party's coalescing with the SLFP as a betrayal of the working class while, on the other, it caused much resentment among rightist elements in the SLFP led by C.P. de Silva.

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Sirima-Shastri Pact
It was under the SLFP - LSSP government that agreement was reached between Ceylon and India on the citizenship question. By 1964, Ceylon had granted citizenship to only 134,188 persons, and the bulk of the applications for citizenship had been rejected. As a result, as We have stated earlier, a million people had become stateless, and the Indo-Ceylon problem needed a solution. In May, Jawaharlal Nehru died, and Lal Bahadur Shastri, a diminutive and meek Gandhian, assumed office as Prime Minister of India. Having suffered a severe debacle in the border war with China, India was keen to eradicate all major irritants in bilateral relations with her neighbours. Unlike Nehru, who was aware of the intricacies involved in the Indo-Ceylon problem and the attitudes of Ceylon's leaders, Shastri had no such advantage; he was anxious to mend relations with neighbouring countries. As far as Ms Bandaranaike was concerned, she realistically appraised the situation and decided to commence negotiations with Shastri for a favourable settlement of the Indo-Ceylon problem in order to enhance her prestige among the Sinhalese masses and strengthen her unstable government.
In September 1964, India's Minister of External Affairs, Sardar Swaran Singh, came to Colombo for preliminary discussions with the Ceylon authorities on the Indo-Ceylon problem. During this period newspapers carried articles not merely on Ceylon Indians and the Indo-Ceylon problem but also on overseas Indians in Malaya and Burma. References were made to the expulsion of Indians and their mass exodus from Burma. And, by implication, some Ceylonese writers and commentators held that similar action against Indians in Ceylon would be justified.
It is, therefore, appropriate that we understand the happenings in Burma in the context of developments in that Country. Consequent to a coup d'etat in Burma, in 1962, the Burma Socialist Programme Party, led by General Ne Win, nationalized industry, transport, domestic and foreign trade. This led to the break-up of the control of the economy by overseas Chinese and Indians. A process of eliminating the menace of the money-lending chettiars and the exploitation of the peasants by

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Indian and other foreign landlords had been initiated, and this eventually led to their having to quit Burma.
Consequent to alarming reports about the plight of Indians in Burma, the Indian External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, visited Burma. On his return to New Delhi, when he was asked whether the question of nationalization of property should be referred to the United Nations, Singh said categorically: "Nationalization was a measure any government might adopt in the interest of its economy." Expressing satisfaction with the Socialist programme of Burma, Singh maintained in the Lok Sabah that "there was no discrimination against Indians as the nationalization regulations applied to all non-Burmans."
it must be noted "that even in Burma, where nationalization has forced foreigners out of the country, the government welcomes foreigners belonging to the working class. The Burmese government has realized the contribution of this class and has been anxious to grant special concession to them."
In preparation for talks with Shastri, Ms Bandaranaike consulted with the then opposition leader Dudley Senanayake. The Indian Prime Minister discussed the problem with Kamaraj, a prominent Congress leader of Madras State. The Indo-Ceylon conference began in New Delhi on 24 October 1964, and the discussions had to be extended since a settlement could not be reached.
Ms. Bandaranaike, while in the process of negotiation, used every possible opportunity to exert pressure on Shastri. Addressing the Indo-Ceylon Friendship Association in Delhi on 26th evening, "Ms Bandaranaike declared that if her present mission to Delhi succeeded it would prove to the world that the friendship between our two countries is genuine." "The world, Ms Bandaranaike said was waiting for the outcome of these vital talks for evidence of genuineness of this friendship." The Hindu commented: "With only two more days left for the talks and the two countries determined to reach some kind of agreement, concrete proposals are expected to emerge soon."
The special correspondent of the Ceylon Daily News sent the most interesting report to reveal the nature of the talks. Reporting from New Delhi, he wrote:
Tough bargaining, the toughest senior diplomats have ever witnessed, is now going on in

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the luxurious suites of the fabulous Rashtrabathi Bhavan, the President's Palace. He (Shastri) would like to give more but he has to render an account to Kamaraj, Krishnamachari, Ramiah and Bakthawathsalam who are looking over his shoulder. In fact, since the bidding began on Saturday, he has been showing his eagerness to accommodate Ceylon by revising his offer from 300,000 to 525,000 in stages. But Prime Minister Ms Bandaranaike wants more. She insists that it should be 550,000 at least. For her part she is prepared to go up to a maximum of 300 000
Eventually, both leaders began a game of numbers. Shastri, in his anxiety to reach a settlement, overlooked the inexorable fact that he was dealing with the fate of a million human beings who had been deliberately deprived of their fundamental rights and that, unlike the Chettiars and other Indian landlords in Burma Who exploited the peasants in that country, the overwhelming majority of the Ceylon Indians were plantation workers - the most exploited section of Ceylon's working class. A press round-up at the Conclusion of the talks ran: "What went on behind the Scenes was not clear, but it would appear that this public appeal (Ms Bandaranaike's) at a crucial juncture had its effect. The agreement was signed the next day. The curtain thus fell on the historic conference, the Ceylon delegation flying off to Colombo with the jackpot.“
After haggling over numbers for six days the two Prime Ministers reached agreement on 30 October 1964. Of an estimated 975,000 stateless people, India was prepared to accept 525,000 people with their natural increase, while Ceylon agreed to grant citizenship to 300,000 persons along with their natural increase. The fate of the remaining 150,000 people was to be decided later by the two governments. It was agreed that Indians to be expatriated (not repatriated as stated deliberately by government authorities) to India would be allowed to continue in employment till they reached 55 years of age or until they Voluntarily left the island. They were entitled to take with them assets amounting to a minimum of Rs 4,000 per family. The agreement, often referred to as the Sirima-Shastripact, was to be implemented within a period of 15 years; the "repatriation" to India and the grant of Ceylon citizenship were to keep pace with each other. These were the main points of the Indo-Ceylon agreement.'
In a country that produced the immortal mathematician Ramanujan, Shastri, the statesman, was beaten well and truly in the numerical game by stateswoman, Ms Bandaranaike. On

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India's military operations against Chinese forces Indian Brigadier Dalvi wrote a book entitled Himalayan Blunder, but subsequent events were to show, yet another Himalayan blunder was committed by India - this time by Shastri during the Delhi talks on the Indo-Ceylon problem.'
Reactions to the Sirima-Shastri Pact
Quite naturally, the press in Ceylon (with the exception of Virakesari) hailed Ms Bandaranaike, and the signing of the Sirima-Shastri pact was acclaimed "as the greatest diplomatic achievement of the Sirimavo Bandaranaike administration." There was a warm welcome with bouquets being showered upon her and Buddhist bhikkus chanting 'pirith', and an atmosphere of euphoria enveloped the Katunayake airport. Addressing the MPs present, a smiling Ms Bandaranalike declared:
Now that I have fulfilled the major part of the responsibility entrusted to me by the people, I have no regrets even if I have to go home.'
Indeed, this statement was portentous as we shall soon see. Opposition leaders in India, including J.B. Kiripalani and C. Rajagopalachari, were most critical of the agreement. Rajagopalachari, an elder rightist statesman, asked:
Why should a million children and grand children born in Ceylon and who had gone there from South India and settled down in the plantations be disentitled to be citizens of Ceylon?" And he insisted that this question be referred to the United Nations as it involved "a question of human rights.
Mostlndian papers expressed astonishment at the outcome of the talks. The Hindu of Madras commented: "Indian opinion would be inclined to feel that much of the 'giving has been done on the Indian side. That out of a stateless population of 975,000, the government of India should have agreed to the phased repatriation of as many as 525,000 will come as a rude shock to many in India who have felt that the bulk of these people are legitimately entitled to Ceylon citizenship".'
Let us now note the comments made by plantation trade unions, which were never consulted by either government before

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an agreement that had a direct hearing on the fate of the people they represented.
The CWC executive Committee, in a statement said:
While welcoming the determined effort on the part of the two governments to reach a full settlement, the committee views with grave concern the incomplete nature of the agreement and the arbitrary manner in which the number to be repatriated and absorbed have been fixed.'
A. Aziz, President of the Democratic Workers' Congress, stated:
The defects in the agreement provide evidence that those who were responsible for the agreement did not treat this problem as a human one but in an effort to solve a political tangle regarded the people concerned as a commodity rather than human beings.'
S. Nadesan, President of the United Plantation Workers 'Union, said:
The Indo-Ceylon issue is a human problem and, therefore, cannot be justly solved by treating it as a mere problem of numbers. All those people, especially the plantation workers, who have made this country their permanent home, must be entitled to their fundamental rights."
S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, the leader of the FP, commented:
It is a sad fate that awaits the majority of the 525,000 persons who are to be bodily shifted from one country to another without their consent."
Scarcely had the ink in the agreement gone dry when, on 2 November, the Sun let the cat out of the bag with a news item under the headline "Protective Clause to Safeguard Kandyans." The Sun's news read:
There is a protective clause in the Bandaranaike-Shastri Pact which will make the Kandyans happy. The 300,000 persons Ceylon will absorb will remain second class citizens of our country for several years.... This is one of the points Ms Bandaranaike scored in the hard bargaining in the Indian capital. Those persons of Indian origin, through an amendment to the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act or through special legislation will be granted Ceylon citizenship without the Right to Vote (emphasis not the author's).'
Not Content with that, it further said: In contrast, the 525,000 Indians who are to have Indian citizenship will have full Indian citizenship."

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Presentation of Agreement before Parliament
On 10 November 1964. Ms Bandaranaike made her first Official statement in the Senate on the Indo-Ceylon Agreement. Explaining its main features she said that this agreement marked an advance on the 1954 Nehru-Kotelawela agreements in the following respects:
a. the Indian government recognized its obligation to persons of Indian origin in Ceylon by undertaking to confer Indian citizenship on those who are to be repatriated and by accepting the principle of Compulsory repatriation;
b. no inducements are to be paid nor need repatriation be
necessarily held up until a person attains the age of 55;
C. the concept of statelessness will not bedevil the solution,
of this problem."
Elaborating on the measures intended for the benefit of the Ceylonese people, she announced that
a bill to control the acquisition of land by non-Ceylonese" had already been introduced in parliament and that another "to control the employment of non-Ceylonese" would also be introduced shortly.'
When the Sirima-Shastri pact was thus presented in parliament, with these embellishments and proposals, it was hailed by all the main political parties except the Federal Party. T. Ratnakara later wrote: "Those who favoured the pact stated that the pact, when implemented, would solve the Indian issue once and for all. In fact that intrepid Sinhala fighter and patriot who was thrown out of many political alliances due to his intransigent attitude towards the Indian question, Mr R.G. Senanayake, for once, welcomed the pact and, in fact, joined the SLFP on this issue."
Resurrection of the Separate Electoral Register
Then Suddenly Ms Bandaranaike dropped the bombshell that

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all people of Indian origin who have attained Ceylon citizenship... should be placed on
a separate electoral register.' But she stated that this question was not discussed at New Delhi as this is a matter solely for the determination by our sovereign parliamento
It was contended that even Prime Minister Nehru had agreed, according to the pact he himself had signed with Kotelawela, to place the Indians who obtained Ceylon citizenship, on a separate register "in view of the fact that the bulk of the citizens do not speak the language of the area in which they reside." In the first instance, this clause in the Nehru-Kotelawela pact was indeed discriminatory and smacked of Apartheid - the policy of racial segregation, which stands condemned by the World community, secondly, it was based on the erroneous premise that all Ceylon citizens speak only one language - Sinhala. In a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country like Ceylon such a premise was untenable. Even in the Up-country areas, where the Ceylon Indians live predominantly, there is a considerable population of Ceylon Moors (Muslims) whose mother tongue is Tamil, though most of them can speak Sinhala as well. There are the Ceylon Tamils, whose language is Tamil, and there are also the English-speaking Burghers - most of whom live in the towns. In this multi-linguistic environment a knowledge of Sinhala as a condition for conferring citizenship rights is indeed unjust and discriminatory.
However, many Sinhalese leaders have expressed the view that Sinhala be taught as a Compulsory language for estate children. A J Wilson writes:
The view was advanced by many Sinhalese political leaders and Sinhalese educationists that Sinhalese should be made the compulsory medium of instruction in all estate schools. In 1962, seven of the twenty members of the National Education Commission including its Chairman recommended that Sinhalese should be made the medium of instruction for the Indian Tamil population in the plantations as a means of integrating the estate population with the indigenous population surrounding them." They argued that the Sinhala language should assume the same role as the English language in the United States in the acculturation process of immigrant population. Two years later, Ms Bandaranaike's government in a White Paper (1964) put forward the proposal "that all estate schools should be taken over by the state and that the medium of instruction in them should be the official language - Sinhala.'
Overlooking their own traditional history, as told by the Mahavamsa, that the Sinhalese themselves immigrated in 543 BC into the island inhabited by Yakhas and Nagas, they point to the

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United States, which incidentally is the best example of a country that has achieved' total assimilation'. It is, of course, true that the United States of America has come to be called the melting pot of ethnic communities. Yet, it is a fact that American citizenship was not based on the condition that an immigrant should have a basic knowledge of English.
According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, some 30 million newcomers from Europe, including the Balkans, Poland and Russia, flooded into the United States from 1860 to 1920. It says: "Most were non-English, non-protestant and markedly different in culture and language from the earlier Americans. The immigrants established their own neighbourhoods and rapidly developed ethnic societies, clubs, newspapers and theatres; and their living areas became distinctive Cultural and Social enclaves Within the larger society." And yet it must be noted that "the immigrants, however separate, in large part were not denied access to the mainstreams of U.S. life." It further reads: "As the ethnics became more vocal in the late 20th century, the public became aware of the problems and concerns of the urban minorities and stopped dismissing them as merely 'racist' or 'uneducated'. Ethnic groups began to be included in the planning and administration of social welfare programs of government or foundations, and an ethnic identity was no longer looked upon as somehow un-American and
vaguely shameful. It had become legitimate to be 'ethnic'."
Relations between the Sinhalese and the Ceylon Indians
On the language question it should be noted that all plantation trade unions have in general advocated that Tamil children be taught Sinhala in addition to their mother-tongue. Addressing a Ceylon Plantation Workers' Union rally in 1962 at Hatton - the heart of the Up-country plantations - presided over by the author as president of that Union, Pieter Keuneman said: "While all children in those (estate) schools should be taught in their mother-tongue, it would be advisable for the non-Sinhalese children to learn Sinhala as a second language thereby helping to end the isolation which imperialism has sought to impose on the Workers on estates." A resolution adopted in this connection called

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upon the government to take over all estate schools and integrate them in the national system of education, and unambiguously "urged that Sinhalese children on the estates should be taught in Sinhala and Tamil children in Tamil." And it "recommended in the interest of national unity that Tamil children be taught Sinhala as a compulsory second language".
In fact, by the 1960s, large sections of Ceylon Indians especially in the mid and low-country areas, were conversant in Sinhala. Thousands of them had, in fact, been educated through the Sinhala medium and many could not even read Tamil- the language of their parents and forefathers. There are also thousands of people born of mixed parents - Ceylon Indians and Sinhalese - some of whose mother tongue is Sinhala. Ironically enough, most of these people are also stateless.
It is true, as many Sinhalese politicians and Sociologists have held, that the estate Indians have not lent themselves to be absorbed into the dominant Sinhalese culture. As we have stated in previous chapters, it was the British colonialists, for their own planting interests, who resorted to various measures to prevent free association between the estate Indians and the Sinhalese rural masses. In 1948, the UNP government, led by D.S. Senanayake aggravated the situation by de-citizenising and disfranchising them, thus segregating these people from the mainstream of political life in the country. Yet, however rigid the system was, people in the estates Could not be kept as though in a concentration camp. Communication and inter-course between estate Indians and the Sinhalese people had grown considerably especially in the past half a century but these actually began from the time the immigrants began to lead settled lives. Nearly 200,000 Sinhalese are Working in the plantation sector and many of them reside in the estate line-rooms. It is natural that, in Course of time, economic and Social links begin to sprout and grow between these peoples.
One of the traditional ties between estate Indians and the Sinhalese people is in relation to religion. Though most Sinhalese are Buddhists they are often worshippers of Hindu gods and goddesses. Urmila Phadnis writes: "it is noteworthy that the gods and Spirits - the Gods of the Four Quarters, the various Brahmas and Nagas who are often referred to in Pali texts are ascribed a minor position in the Sinhalese rituals. Instead, gods like Vishnu, Skanda, Pathini and Natha, most of whom are worshipped by

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similar names in Hindu mythology, play a far more significant role in the Sinhalese pantheon".
On the estates and the nearby towns, Hindu religious functions and rituals are attended by Buddhists; thousands of people of all communities participate in the "Theru' (Chariot) festival devoted to goddess Muthumariat Matale. Many thousands of Up-Country Tamils visit the Maligawa Temple in Kandy, which houses the Sacred Tooth-relic of the Lord Buddha, and participate in the famous colourful Perahera festival held annually. The Sinhala and Tamil New Year, common to both communities, is Celebrated by the exchange of gifts of sweets between them.
There are also other Socio-economic fields in which a considerable degree of contact and cooperation has developed between them. In some areas, during the rice harvesting season, it is not uncommon to find estate workers working in the village paddy fields. Often Sinhalese tea small-holders engage skilled estate Tamil Workers to perform tasks such as pruning tea bushes. During Weddings and funerals, too, people from both communities in estates and villages come together. It must also be noted that inter-marriages between the estate and village folk are more common than among the city dwellers. Buying and selling Vegetables are Common OCCurrences where Sinhalese and Tamils are brought together. There is also the village booth selling toddy or illicit liquor which draws the workers into village areas in the evenings. Thus any observer cannot fail to notice the diverse links that exist between the Sinhalese and the Indians in the plantation area.S.
In the light of these affinities, the proposal for a separate electoral register for Ceylon Indians would not only have affected the trend towards closer cooperation if not integration of the two Communities, but Could also have led to antagonistic situations in a heterogeneous social environment.
Separate Register Unjustified
It must be recalled that the separate electoral arrangement, envisaged under the Nehru-Kotelawela Agreement of 1954, was limited to a period often years. And it is well to bear in mind that under a clause in that Agreement, all registered citizens amounting

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to less than 250 in any electorate, notwithstanding the language stipulation, were to be enrolled on the general electoral register.
As we have pointed out earlier, it was Ms Bandaranaike's late husband who, during his premiership, repealed the Separate Representation Act on the ground that it was discriminatory against the Ceylon Indians and, therefore, undesirable. In fact, some 50,000 Ceylon citizens of Indian origin were placed on the general electoral register. Thanks to S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, they participated in the 1960 March and July general elections and most of them, led by their trade unions, supported the SLFP and the left parties.
Paying scant respect to these developments, Ms Bandaranaike, herself a Kandyan aristocrat, went to great lengths and haughtily argued how good her proposal Would be not only for the Kandyans but also for the Ceylon Indians. She said:
When they (Ceylon Indians) are on a separate register, it will be possible for them to select their representatives. This arrangement will also safeguard the political interests of the indigenous people.'
But the Prime Minister had never Consulted the trade unions representing the Ceylon Indian Workers even when she came to propose a separate electoral register for them. Her objective was to deprive the plantation workers of their voice in parliament on the basis of equality and to exclude them from the mainstream of Ceylon's body politic.
Ms. Bandaranaike's proposal was nothing new, either to Ceylon or the world. Apartheid - racial segregation - had been practiced by the reactionary South African white regime against the coloured, Asian and indigenous African black people for a long time. This policy came to be condemned by the international Community, which forced South Africa to quit the Commonwealth in 1961. In many countries, with multi-national communities, there has been occasional social discrimination but not legal segregation. It was in 1964, as a result of the great struggles conducted by the Afro-Americans and the democratic forces, led by the mass civil rights movement leader, Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., that the Civil Rights Act was passed in the USA. This Act attempted to gain for black people a share in economic and political pOWer by incorporating "provisions against discrimination in Voting, education and the use of public utilities."

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It was in this rapidly changing world of 1964 that Ms Bandaranaike had the impudence to propose the retrogressive separate electoral register for Ceylon Indians. If such a discriminatory proposal had crept into the legislature under whatever pretext, then segregation of Indians from the rest of the population would have become a permanent feature which would have accentuated divisive tendencies, increased the possibility of ethnic conflicts between the two communities and endangered the unity of Sri Lanka.
Naturally, there was a storm of protest in India against Ms Bandaranaike's proposal which had violated, in letter and spirit, the terms of the Sirima-Shastri Pact. India's Minister of External Affairs, Swaran Singh said in the Lok Sabah: "No mention of such a proposal was made by the Ceylon delegation at the Delhi talks". The Hindu in its editorial commented: "The Ceylon Government's proposal to place those granted Ceylon citizenship in a separate register was so clearly a violation of the spirit of the Agreement that by itself it could wreck it all."
Indian government officials were indeed surprised at the Volte face of Ms Bandaranaike. Reference Was made to the violation of the understanding reached between the two Prime Ministers in October 1964. In a letter to the Ceylon Prime Minister, Shastri wrote:
Despite the heavy burdens falling on us under the agreement, the agreement's main attraction for us was the consideration that those accepted as Ceylon citizens would become full-fledged Ceylon citizens and join the mainstream of Ceylon's civil life. The announcement of Ceylon Government's intention would, however, mean that Ceylon citizens of Indian origin would be inassimilable with the rest of the population unlike other Ceylon citizens, entitled to influence only a very limited spectrum of Ceylon's political life. The lesson of history in many lands is that where a religious or ethnic group has been placed apart from the rest of the people and brought on to a separate electoral roll, not only has assimilation become so difficult but separation has been intensified giving rise to disunity and conflict. We ourselves have had a sad experience of this in the past.
During the talks in Delhi, the question as to whether persons accepted as Ceylon citizens would be placed on a separate or common electoral roll was not discussed."
Fall of Ms. Bandaranaike’s Government
Before Ms Bandaranaike could implement her controversial proposal for a separate electoral register, her government was

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faced with a serious crisis. The government's decision to go ahead with the proposal to nationalize the Lake House group of newspapers caused much apprehension, especially among the conservative elements. The UNP, led by Dudley Senanayake, protesting that the freedom of the press was in grave peril, mobilized all forces that opposed the SLFP - LSSP coalition against the proposal. On 3 December 1964, C.P. de Silva, deputy head of the government, with thirteen of his followers, crossed the floor and voted against the throne speech which contained the controversial proposal. The government led by Ms Bandaranaike, in its attempt to gag the Lake House press, was defeated by 74 votes to 73, and thus paved the way for a general election in 1965. Two LSSP MPs who had splintered from their party the year before, also voted to bring down the government. At the time the House divided, S Thondaman, the CWC leader and appointed MP, appeared like the cat on the wall, fence-sitting, as he was reluctant to commit himself publicly - he was neutral.
Notwithstanding this development, in pursuance of the Sirima-Shastri Pact, India's Commonwealth Secretary, C.S. Jha, had discussions in Colombo from 15 to 19 December 1964 with a delegation led by N.O. Dias, Ceylon's Secretary for Foreign Affairs. if registered citizens were to be enrolled in a separate register, Jha said: "They would be relegated to the status of only second class or inferior citizens". However, it was decided to set up a Joint Committee, consisting of one representative each of Ceylon and India, to sort out any differences that might arise and to ensure the the proper implementation of the Pact. It was also agreed that 35,000 people would be 'repatriated' annually to India while Ceylon would grant citizenship to 20,000 people of Indian origin.
Dudley Senanayake's "National"Government
In preparation for the general election in March 1965, the leader of the UNP, Dudley Senanayake, concluded a secret agreement with the FP leader, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, and combined with diverse political parties, some of which were notorious for their Sinhala chauvinism. Some of the Tamil leaders indulged in utterances which Smacked of Tamil chauvinism. The CWC, which had been in opposition to the UNP ever since the Citizenship Act was

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enacted in 1948, belatedly supported Senanayake's Coalition. On the other hand, the SLFP entered into no-contest pacts with the LSSP and the CP. The election results were inconclusive since no single political party by itself had won sufficient number of seats to form a government. The much boasted Sirima-Shastri pact could not carry Ms Bandaranaike to victory at the polls. Despite the rhetoric that a victory of the UNP would jeopardize the implementation of the Pact, the SLFP managed to secure only 41 seats. It is important to note that some of the left leaders, who had been indefatigable champions of the rights of the Ceylon Indian plantation workers for nearly three decades, abandoned their Marxist position on the national question and brazenly indulged in base communal propaganda during their election campaign. The UNP, having won only 66 seats, managed to form a so-called "National" government with Dudley Senanayake as Prime Minister. But the UNP had to join forces with a disparate group of parties including, on the one hand, the Sinhala anti-Indian parties such as the Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party, the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna and the Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna led by K.M.P. Rajaratne and, on the other, Indian and Ceylon Tamil organizations such as the Ceylon Workers' Congress, the Tamil Congress and the Federal Party which espoused the cause of the minorities. In this situation Premier Dudley Senanayake was in an unenviable position having to rock between these two groups holding contradictory views on the nationality problem. In addition he had to face a fairly powerful combined opposition of the SLFP, LSSP and CP. As a result he had to be wary of every step he took, especially on the sensitive citizenship issue. However, in recognition of the support of the CWC for the UNP at the elections, Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake made the CWC leader S. Thondaman and A. Annamalai nominated MPs, while R. Jesudasan was made a Senator.
In the course of the election campaign, despite great odds, the left plantation trade unions and the Democratic Worker's Congress (DWC) supported the SLFP, LSSP and CP. However, the total number of Ceylon Indian voters in the Up-Country was limited as a result of the operation of the Citizenship Acts and, therefore, except in the Nuwara Eliya and Maskeliya electorates, their impact could not but be marginal. Yet, the debacle the SLFP and LSSP suffered at the polls was unfairly attributed to the failure of the Tamil plantation voters to support their candidates. Critical of

A Divided People 203
such a contention the DWC president, A. Aziz, said in an interview
to the Ceylon Daily News of 26 May 1965 that the LSSP leader Dr. N.M. Perera himself would have lost his seat but for the backing and support that the
Indian plantation workers gave him at Yatiyantota. He contended "that in at least nine constituencies in the plantation areas, the balance was tilted by plantation workers in favour of the coalition". He said: "The position in the Uva and Sabaragamuwa provinces would debunk their own theory that wherever there were minority voters, the UNP carried the seats. In Uva, where the percentage of the minority population is larger in four constituencies than in others, the seats in those constituencies were taken by the SLFP, while in Sabaragamuwa the six electorates in which the percentage of minority votes is comparatively high were also captured by the SLFP. Further, in most of the constituencies won by the UNP in these two Provinces the percentage of majority Community Voters is higher than the percentage of minority population." And he asked the question: "Does this not prove that the voting went on party lines?" In a counter-charge Aziz said:" they should also consider whether some of their unwarranted observations during the election campaign had contributed to the defeat of the Coalition in the election." However, a realistic analysis of the election results would reveal that larger sections of plantation workers, especially in the central province, did not support the SLFP. How could they? The Sirima-Shastri Pact and the proposed separate register for Indians stood like the Damocles Sword Over their heads. Inthis situation it is to the eternal Credit of the Tamil leaders of the left trade unions, Such as the United Plantation Workers' Union and the Lanka Estate Workers' Union, that they stood with their parties - the CP and the LSSP - in the election campaign, which resulted in considerable sections of plantation workers voting for anti-UNP candidates. Otherwise, they would have certainly suffered even greater set-backs.
Tamil Language Regulations and Opposition Parties
Though S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike caused the enactment of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act in 1958 for the use of the Tamil

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language in education and for certain administrative purposes in the Tamil-speaking northern and eastern provinces, regulations necessary for its implementation were not passed by parliament. It was the coalition government headed by Prime Minister, Dudley Senanayake, that enacted in 1966 the Tamil Regulations which provided for the use of Tamil in the Tamil-speaking provinces. The SLFP and other opposition parties not only protested against this but organized a hartal on 8 January 1966. They made the most preposterous allegations against Senanayake's government saying that it was handing over the northern and eastern provinces to S.J.V. Chelvanayagam and to his Federal Party.
This propaganda campaign was conducted at a time when the FP never called for a separate Tamil state. The Ceylon Drawida Munnetra Kazagam, which was led by A. llanchelian, and which stood for 'safeguarding the right and welfare of all the Drawidians who have made Ceylon their motherland', too never supported such a 'sectarian cause'. Yet, the opposition parties, including the SLFP launched a hartal in Colombo against the Regulations which would only grant limited use of the Tamil language. The author, being a member of the CP, vehemently protested against the CP for its pandering to Sinhala chauvinism and voted in the central committee against this opportunistic and un-Marxist stand on the nationalities question. And it was on this issue that the lawyer Motilal Nehru, now a President's Counsel, resigned from the CP and later joined the Tamil Congress headed by G.G. Ponnambalam Jr.
Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) Act
Since it was on this Act that the fate of a million stateless people depended we have to consider it in some detail. Though the Governor General in his address to parliament had stated that the government would resume negotiations with the Indian government to overcome the difficulties "which have arisen in regard to the implementation of the Indo-Ceylon Pact of 1964", nothing was done on the subject for some time. It was only in December 1966 that the Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) Bill was introduced in parliament. One of the most obnoxious

A Divided People 205
sections of the Bill was the investment of absolute and irrevocable powers in the Minister to grant or refuse citizenship to an applicant. The right of appeal to the judiciary against the decision of the Minister was specifically excluded. Yet, the opposition leaders contended that the Bill did not Conform to the requirements of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement. It was said that the grant of citizenship was not kept in conformity with the 4:7 ratio in relation to repatriation to India. The opposition also contended that since India agreed to a numerical formula the Indian government was under obligation to absorb the 525,000 persons and that automatically meant that it had accepted Compulsory repatriation. However, the opposition parties did not propose a separate electoral register for registered Ceylon citizens of Indian origin; surprisingly enough Ms Bandaranaike did not even raise this controversial issue.
Justifying the government's stand of linking the grant of citizenship to the grant of Indian citizenship by the Indian government, instead of to actual repatriation, Prime Minister Senanayake held that large-scale repatriation would be an unbearable burden on the available foreign exchange resources. He explained:
There are certain practical problems that have to be taken into consideration. The first of these is the financial capacity of the country to meet the foreign exchange involved in the transfer of assets... It is a condition of the Agreement that the ceiling should not be reduced below Rs 4,000/- (per family). On the basis of these averages involvement may be as much as Rs 420 million in foreign exchange. The capacity of Ceylon to meet a repatriation of assets of this magnitude in the form of foreign exchange is a matter that requires very serious consideration." Clearing up misinterpretations and doubts on the question of repatriation of persons who obtain Indian citizenship, he said: "Though the grant of Ceylon citizenship on the ratio is not directly tied to repatriation and is tied to the recognition by the Indian government of such a person as an Indian citizen, the provision exists for a person so recognized to be repatriated.'
Citizenship Question and the Buddhist Hierarchy
The Buddhist hierarchy, from time to time, made statements and declaimed against the granting of even-limited rights on language and citizenship of the Tamil speaking minorities. However, in an extraordinary statement on the citizenship issue in May 1965, to the press, Rev. Amunugama Rajaguru Sri Vipassi Mahanayaka

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Thero of the Malwatte Chapter, stated
we must not abandon the path of Maithriya, the more so, because we are dealing with the unfortunate Indian labourer. The Sirima-Shastri Pact was a definite advance on the previous one, due to a possibility that 525,000 must go back. This is only a possibility. If it fails to work it can lead to worse complications, the worst being the worsening of Indo-Ceylon relations. This possibility is all the more remote as these Indians are expected to consent to return to places from which they have been forcibly insulated for a number of years, and therefore have either lost touch with or have not even an inkling of the conditions prevailing in those places. How can we expect them to consent blindly to go to places they may not have set eyes on as yet?
However, when the Implementation Bill was submitted to parliament, once again, the old fears and prejudices were kindled by both the Buddhist clergy and the Sinhala chauvinists, and there was a call for a separate electoral register for Ceylon citizens of Indian origin. All kinds of fears, including that relating to representation in parliament of Kandyan areas, were raised by the Mahanayake Thero of the Malwatte Chapter in a letter to the Prime Minister.
On 15 May 1967 Prime Minister Senanayake replied to the Mahanayake Thero of the Malwatte Chapter. On the question of a separate electoral register and representation in parliament for Ceylon citizens of Indian origin, he said that
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike changed the legislation (providing for separate representation in Parliament) on the ground that it was unfair to people of Indian origin who became Ceylon citizens and would create two classes of citizens.
In regard to fears of representation of Kandyans in parliament he said:
I am aware of the genuine fears the Kandyan people can have regarding their own position, should sufficient precautions not be taken to ensure that representation in parliament from the Kandyan areas. And he explained. As you know, even now minority representation is safeguarded without infringing the rights of the majority by such devices as multi-member constituencies. This may be a possibility. It is further possible to create special estate electorates, whereby the rights of the indigenous people will be safeguarded. Possibly an answer may be a combination of these two methods.... I can assure Your Venerable Self that I shall give the most careful consideration as to how, while conceding to the minorities their rights, the rights of the majority can be protected, and I am certain that the solution will be satisfactory to all parties.'
Yet, the Sinhala chauvinist forces and even some of the left-wing leaders opposed the Bill. The Api-Sinhala (We-Sinhalese)

A Divided People 2O7
movement organized a mass rally in May to protest against the passing of the Bill. In the face of such opposition and despite all kinds of unfounded allegations, the Bill, "after a marathon 15-hour session, was adopted on 5 June 1967 with 67 for and 33 against". Paradoxically enough, the die-hard anti-Indians such as K.M.P. Rajaratne and once-upon-a-time Marxists like Philip Gunawardena voted for the Bill. And, with the Governor General's assent, it became an Act of Parliament On 20 June 1967.
Citizenship Applications Under the Act
On 1 May 1968 the Ceylon government and the Indian High Commission in Colombo called for applications for citizenship of either country. It was announced that applications under the Act would be entertained for a period of two years up to 30 April 1970. In response 625,000 persons applied for Ceylon citizenship while about 400,000 persons opted for India. Thus it became evident that there was a wide gap between the wishes of the stateless people and their arbitrary division between the two governments. These figures also indicated that the total number of stateless people was in the region of 1,025,000; the increase must be attributed to the natural increase from 1964 to 1970 when the last applications were submitted.
The two governments set up the necessary machinery for implementing the Indo-Ceylon Agreement. Even though the Ceylon government passed the enabling Act only in 1967, the Indian High Commission, as a goodwill gesture, had started early to grant citizenship under Article 8 of the Indian Constitution. The number of persons granted citizenship under the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 1964, up to the end of 1969 was 61,231. Of this number 13,245 had already left for India. By May 1970 about 72,000 had been admitted to Indian citizenship. The Ceylon government granted citizenship to 7,316 persons up to May 1970.
As we have seen, the Sirima-Shastri Pact had divided the million stateless people between Sri Lanka and India. With the operation of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) Act thousands of people who had become Indian citizens left for India in the hope of a better and secure life in the country of their forefathers.

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Expatriation of Indians began as a trickle but turned into an exodus after the United Front government, led by Ms Sirimavo Bandaranaike, came to power in 1970.
Notes
1 K.M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, p. 526.
2 P. Ramaswamy, New Delhi and Sri Lanka, New Delhi, 1987, p. 170.
3 Marco Polo, "Burma's Solution to Her Indian Problem"Asia Week - Times
of Ceylon, 21 Sept. 1964.
4. Ibid.
S The Hindu, 27 Oct. 1964.
6 Quoted by P. Ramaswamy, op. cit. p. 66.
7 The Hindu, 27 Oct. 1964.
8 Ceylon Daily News, 30 Oct. 1964.
9 Quoted by P. Ramaswamy, op. cit. p. 66-67.
10 For details see Sirima-Shastri Pact.
11 The Stateless problem dragged on for over 25 years with grave consequences for the people concerned though Shastri believed that he had solved the problem.
12 V.L.B. Mendis, "International Relations, Facets of Development in Independent Sri Lanka" Ronnie de Mel Felicitation Volume, eds. W. Rasaputra et. al, Colombo, 1986, p. 29.
13 Ceylon Daily News, 31 Oct. 1964.
14 Quoted by Lalith Kumar in India and Sri Lanka, p. 55.
15 Ceylon Daily News, 2 Nov. 1964.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ceylon Daily News, 31 Oct. 1964.
Sun, 2 Nov. 1964.
20 Ibid.
21 Ceylon Daily News, 12 Nov. 1964.
22 Ibid.
23 T. Ratnakara, "Indo-ceylon Agreement and Citizenship Issue", Ceylon Daily
News, 20 April 1967.
24 Ceylon Daily News, 12 Nov. 1964.
25 bid.
26 Sir John Kotelawela, An Asian Prime Minister's Story, p. 109.
27 A.J. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1973, p. 42.
28 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 29, pp. 176-177.
29 The Times of Ceylon, 18 June 1962.
30 Urmila Phadnis, Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka, New Delhi, 1976, pp.
20-21.
3. Ceylon Daily News, 12 Nov. 1964.

32 33
3S
37
A Divided People 209
Ibid., 24 Nov. 1964.
The Hindu, 22 Dec. 1964. "Secret' letter published in Indian Express, 2 March 1967; See Lalith Kumar, p. 55.
Ceylon Daily News, 11 June 1967.
Ibid, 20 July 1965.
Ibid, 15 May 1967.

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Chapter
13
UNITED FRONT GOVERNMENT AND THE PLIGHT OF PLANTATION WORKERS
In June 1968, the SLFP and the two Left parties - the LSSP and the CP-formed the United Front and pledged to implement a twenty-five-point programme if returned to power. On the vital question of citizenship it stated that the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 1964 would "be fully implemented in letter and spirit".

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At the general election of May 1970, the United Front (UF) scored a landslide victory winning 115 seats in a House of 157. In this election the Democratic Workers' Congress (DWC) and the left trade unions, such as the United Plantation Workers' Union and the Lanka Estate Workers' Union, supported the UF candidates. The DWC leader, Abdul Aziz, became a nominated MP. The new Prime Minister Ms Sirimavo Bandaranaike assigned three portfolios to the LSSP, including Finance (Dr N.M. Perera) and plantation Industries and Constitutional Affairs (Dr Colvin R. de Silva). Pieter Keuneman (CP) became Minister of Housing and Construction.
One of the first decisions of Ms Bandaranaike's government was to grant diplomatic recognition to the German Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On the other hand, diplomatic relations with lsrael were severed. At the Lusaka conference of Non-Aligned Nations held in September 1970, Ms Bandaranaike reiterated her earlier proposal to declare the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace.
These progressive actions inforeign relations were quickly followed by the government's initiative in an attempt to build a popular base among the Working masses. The government in its Throne Speech in June 1970 had pledged: "A comprehensive charter of workers' rights will be enforced. This will include the revision of labour laws, provision of security of employment, the acceptance of the principle of equal pay for equal work, the abolition of discrimination due to the medium of instruction, Compulsory recognition of trade unions by employers, bonus payments, increase of EPF contributions; welfare services, etc." To realize these laudable objectives the Minister of Labour appointed a Committee in July to draw up a charter of workers' rights. Trade Union leaders, especially of the left-oriented unions, Worked with great enthusiasm and submitted their proposals for a Workers' charter to the Minister. Contrary to their expectations, the charter never saw the light of day.
It was on the initiative of Dr Colvin R. de Silva, who became the Minister of Plantation Industries, that the Trade Union Representatives (Entry into Estates) Act was enacted in 1970. For the first time, in the history of the plantations, representatives of trade unions were legally entitled to visit estates to meet Workers and to hold meetings on the estates without having to obtain

Gowommont & The Plight of Plantation Workers 213
permission from the estate superintendents. The other important Act was the Estate Quarters (Special Provision) Act No. 2 of 1971. Once a worker was dismissed from his employment, he could be ejected from the line room. And he had no right of residence in his line room after the termination of his service even during the pendency of his application to a Labour Tribunal against such termination. Under this Act he had a right to occupy the quarters; it was only a decree of a competent court which could eject a workman from his line-room or quarters. This right could not be modified or denied to the workman by any agreement. Yet another piece of legislation which assumed great importance, especially in view of the transfer of estates from one employer to another, was the Termination of Employment of Workers (Special Provisions) Act, which prohibited retrenchment of workers without the employer obtaining prior sanction of the Commissioner of Labour. As we shall see in this chapter most of these progressive legislative enactments were often disregarded with impunity by the employers in both private and public sectors or undermined by government regulations and practices.
The JVP and Tamil Minorities
The failure of the United Front government, to take meaningful steps quickly to translate the rhetoric of socialism into social and economic action and the impatience of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) (People's Liberation Front) led to an armed insurrection in April 1971. The JVP, led by Rohana Wijeweera, had its origin in a left group that was expelled from the Communist Party (Peking Wing) in 1966. This new party "was essentially a Sinhala Party" consisting mainly of unemployed Sinhala educated youth, who aspired for a revolutionary change in the existing social and economic system. Describing the JVP's ideology, Keerawela says:
Theirs was not a strict Marxist-Leninist ideology but an eclectic mixture consisting of various elements of Stalinism, Maoism, Castroism, Guevarism...but strangely it was not essentially an ideology of the working class.’
The JVP's indoctrination classes included One on "Indian expansionism", the domination by Indian capitalist monopolies of

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trade and business in the region. The Tamil plantation worker was viewed as "an instrument of Indian expansionism", while the urban working class was said to be "influenced by revisionist politics".
The JVP youth launched an armed attack on 93 police stations on 5 April 1971 in an attempt to capture state power. Within a week in the face of these attacks, the police had to abandon 43 police stations and the insurgents established control over a number of police areas especially in the South. Unable to meet this sudden challenge, Ms Bandaranaike's government sought urgent military assistance from Britain, India and other Countries. Indeed, the assistance of the Indian air force, too, played a part in defeating the JVP's insurrection.
For all the sacrifice and extraordinary heroism of thousands of young people, the JVP's attempt to capture power at the time it did finally turned out to be a misadventure in the "struggle for socialism". After a self-critical analysis of their past activities, the JVP "accepted that the Tamil people were a nation, that they were subject to oppression by the majority, that they were entitled to the right of self-determination even to the point of secession... it believed that the problem of the Tamil nation could only be solved within the framework of a socialist Sri Lanka. It had in the interim, no plan of action as regards this question.... It resulted, however, in some activity among Sri Lankan and plantation Tamils and the involvement of some Tamils in JVP activities. Tamils also appeared in the lists of candidates put forward by JVP for district council and municipal elections..." Later, the JVP organized a trade union even in the plantations - the All Ceylon Estate Workers Federation. However, "the party has again given in to the rising tide of Sinhala chauvinism."
Republican Constitution
The UF government did away with the Soulbury Constitution and, in May 1972, introduced a new constitution promulgating Ceylon a Republic of Sri Lanka and vesting state power in a National State Assembly (a unicameral legislature). On the vital question of language, Sinhala was declared the official language, while the use of Tamil was to be "in accordance with the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958". When the demand of the

Government & The Plight of Plantation Workers 215
Federal Party for recognition of Sinhala and Tamil as the official languages and the languages of the courts was not accepted by the government, it had withdrawn from the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly which was set up to draft the new constitution. Under Article 6 (Chapter II), Buddhism was given "the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster Buddhism...." For the first time the constitution became non-secular. The constitutional document did away with the entrenched Section 29 of the Soulbury Constitution providing for minority safeguards, and this became a matter of serious concern to all linguistic and religious minorities.
Section 29 reads:
1 Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, Parliament shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the island;
2 No Such law Shall -
a. prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion, or
b make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions are not made liable.
it must be noted that this much talked-of Section 29 did not prevent parliament from passing the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 and the Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Amendment Act No. 48 of 1949 discriminating against a minority community - the Ceylon Indians. When these Acts were challenged on the basis of Section 29, the District Judge of Kegalle, M. Sivagnanasundaram, held that they were invalid on the ground that they sought to deprive members of the Indian community of their franchise. "The Supreme Court, however, in Mudanayake V Sivagnanasundaram (53 N.L.R. 25, 1952) quashed the decision on the ground that the Acts in question were clear and unambiguous, that the disqualification of a large number of Indians in Ceylon was not the necessary legal effect of the disputed Acts, and that the disqualifications in question would disqualify members of any other community in like manner as it would disqualify Indians. An

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appeal was taken to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which, however, held with the Supreme Court."
Chapter VI dealing with fundamental rights made a clear distinction between persons and citizens. While article 18 declared that (a) "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law" and (b) "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or security of person except in accordance with the law", sub-sections (c) to () entitled only citizens to various rights including rights to freedom from arrest and imprisonment except in accordance with the law and the right to freedom of religion, of peaceful assembly, and "freedom of movement and of choosing his residence within Sri Lanka". Article 67 provided that "no law of the National State Assembly shall deprive a citizen by descent of the status of a citizen of Sri Lanka". This simply meant that a citizen by registration could be deprived of his citizenship. And Section 68 read that "no person shall be qualified to be an elector at an election of members of the National State Assembly... (a) if he is not a citizen of Sri Lanka".
From the aforesaid provisions of the Republican Constitution it is clear that a million people of Indian origin, most of them workers, would suffer flagrant discrimination in regard to their fundamental rights.
Nationalization of the Plantations.
Though the LSSP and CP had from their inception propagated the need for nationalization of the tea and rubber plantations owned by British Companies, it had not been included as an issue in the common programme formulated by the three parties of the United Front and no action was taken on this vital question. Indeed it devolved upon Hector Kobbekaduwa, the SLFP Minister of Agriculture and Lands, to nationalize the plantations, but only after the JVP insurrection.
Although the JVP insurrectionists did not articulate a clearly defined agrarian programme for implementation, their popular cry was "Agrarian reform', and they said that when they captured power "they would uproot the plantations and diversify with other crops, such as manioc, battala etc". The April revolt had opened the eyes of the government to the urgent need for

Government & The Plight of Plantation Workers 217
action on the agrarian question. The landed aristocracy, in fact, became greatly alarmed and was prepared to make Some concessions in the hope of appeasing the rural youth which had risen up in arms against the state.
Speaking in parliament on the question of nationalization of the plantations, Kobbekaduwa stated: "Figures would reveal that 5600 families of this country owned 1.2 million acres of land, and I am glad to state to this House that through the operation of this law we were able to take over 550,000 acres for the use of the peasants and youth of this country."
There were 396 estates covering 415,508 acres owned by public companies -87 sterling and 145 rupee Companies. It must be noted that in the post-war period a number of sterling companies sold their estates and reduced their operations in the island. A large number of Ceylonese of all communities - Sinhalese, Ceylon Tamils, Ceylon Indians, Muslims and Burghers - had become estate owners. As for the Ceylon Indians, many kanganies or their sons, businessmen and small holders had bought lands often fragmented from large company-owned estates. Like the Kotelawelas and Senanayakes, Thondamans and Vythilingams too had become estate proprietors. The Ceylon Tamil Congress leader, G.G. Ponnambalam, owned Waga estate, the Federal Party leader S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, owned Pettiyagala estate at Balangoda, and the Ceylon Workers' Congress president, S. Thondaman was in possession of a number of estates, including Wawendon group at Ramboda.
Under the Land Reform Law No. 1 of 1972, all plantation lands over 50 acres owned by individuals were taken over and wested in the Land Reform Commission Constituted under the provisions of this law. The lands thus acquired were placed under Various institutions and managements such as the Up-country Estates Development Board (USAWASAMA), the Janatha Estate Development Board (JEDB)and Co-operative Societies and the State Plantations Corporation (SPC) established in 1958. Of the 563,400 acres taken over, only 19,558 acres, ie. 3.5 per cent, were distributed to the peasants in the villages."
The manner of nationalization and the running of these estates raised many duestions. if the intention of MS Bandaranaike's government was to liberate the country from the stranglehold of its economy by British monopoly companies and Agency Houses, priority should have been given to the take-Over

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of the estates controlled by foreign companies. The government was reluctant to nationalize the foreign-owned plantations as it feared adverse reaction from the British government, as well as from British monopolies which played a vital role in the tea trade. Instead of dealing with the domination of British financial interests first, Kobbekaduwa went for the Ceylonese-owned estates in order "to break the power of the tea, rubber and coconut land owners who have always been ardent campaigners for the UNP".
In fact, the government took over some lands even before this law came into operation. "Certain estates belonging to owners of Indian origin in Gampola and Nawalapitiya areas were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act ostensibly for village expansion but in reality as an act of retaliation for their support of the UNP at the 1970 general election."
In the actual exercise of take-over of the estates in the Upcountry, the plantation workers of Indian origin were subjected to abuse and humiliatory treatment by bureaucratic officials and agents of SLFP Members of Parliament. Hundreds of estate staff members were compelled to quit their quarters instantly, some even before their children could return from schools in the nearby towns. Some MPs led demonstrations of Sinhalese village folks into the estates shouting anti-Indian slogans. Sinhalese hooligans assaulted innocent Workers. The author Was aware of a Buddhist priest occupying Galphele estate bungalow, formerly lived in by an European superintendent, and threatening to evict all Indian Workers. Kobbekaduwa's men, in quixotic fashion, went for the mercilessly exploited Workers rather than for the exploiters. Life became a nightmare for the workers in many nationalised estates.
A Sinhalese planter Malinga Gunaratna writes:
It was common to hear in Up-country political processions, the of repeated slogan of Ape Kaduwa - Kobbekaduwa’ (Our Sword-Kobbekaduwa).
Not only were the workers insecure but there was real danger of the estates being ruined by political interference. He writes further:
This was the first time that the country saw the most naked abuse of power in the name of nationalization. Most of the newly appointed Project Managers, Clerks, etc, were selected because of their closeness to politicians.
The estates obtained by the Agricultural Ministry "were handed

Government & The Plight of Plantation Workers 219
over to the JEDB whose all-powerful general manager was Asoka Gopallawa, a close relation of Minister Kobbekaduwa, and son of the Governor General". The estates served as veritable little goldmines producing the golden tips not only for the sons of almost bankrupt aristocrats, who had become superintendents but also for some government MPs. Mismanagement and barefaced corruption were the order of the day, and nationalization, which inspired so much hope for the workers, in practice meant insecurity, injustice, unemployment and eviction from their line rooms. Unlike the experienced superintendents, some of the new managers were not only ignorant of running the estates but did not have any knowledge of the labour laws relating to the rights of the workers. They were openly hostile to the trade unions and refused to entertain any representation on behalf of the workers. They raised strong objections to the Labour Officers intervening in industrial disputes.
The denial of employment, instant dismissals of workers, the denial of earned wages and a host of problems had to be settled and settled quickly. The trade unions themselves could not tolerate any longer the abuse of labour. "To hell with Bandaranaike Socialism," Some of us had to declare. On the initiative of the author, trade unions, including the Ceylon Workers Congress which was allied to the UNP, decided to meet Minister Kobbekaduwa. But the Minister first refused. After tremendous efforts, the Labour Commissioner, Lakshman de Mel, arranged for our delegation to meet Kobbekaduwa. All the leading plantation trade unions were present at this memorable meeting with the man who nationalized the plantations. The first thing Kobbekaduwa said was that it was the JVP insurrection that had impelled him to effect the land reform and that unions should not interfere. As arranged earlier by the trade unionists, the SLFP trade union leader began almost reverently to put forward the grievances of the Workers and the trade unions to the Minister. Without even waiting to hear our submissions, Kobbekaduwa, obviously obsessed with the image of Thondaman, shouted: "I am not prepared to be dictated to by trade union bosses", and said "If you don't like you can get out." The first man to dash out of the conference room was V.S. Rajah, Secretary of the Lanka Estate Workers' Union, of which Minister N.M. Perera was president. The Labour Commissioner appeared even more disappointed than SOme of US.

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Food Crisis and Starvation in the Plantations
in October 1973, the government announced changes in the prices of rice, flour and sugar with a view to limiting the increase in the food subsidy bill. The issue of free rice was reduced from one to half a measure. The abandonment of the Welfare-oriented fiscal policy, the cut in the rationed foodstuffs and the steep rise in the price of rice in the open market told heavily upon the livelihood of the people. The plantation workers were seriously affected during the food crisis. Starvation was common especially in the Up-country, and workers were compelled not only to pawn their jewellery but even sell their silver and aluminium utensils to keep the wolf from the door. Many mothers died of starvation. Unfortunately, most left party leaders in the UF government feigned ignorance of the starvation and death stalking the plantations, and even the Minister of Plantation Industries, Dr Colvin R. de Silva, did nothing to relieve the situation.
Focus on Plight of Plantation Workers
it was in September 1973 that an English Television team headed by Michael Gillard quietly arrived in the island. When he met the author, he explained his mission to make a film about the appalling conditions of plantation workers. Gillard and his crew visited a number of plantations, including Galaha estate owned by Brooke Bond. They took films of the living conditions of workers and interviewed workers, medical officers and management personnel in the plantations.
Since Ms Bandaranaike's government, no less than the British companies, would have shunned the exposure of the real living conditions of these workers, Gillard's men had to work with extreme caution. Any information leak of their clandestine activity would have resulted in their being bundled out of the country by the first available plane to London. The author assisted Gillard in the hope that such exposure through a film would eventually lead to an improvement in the workers' conditions of life. When the programme entitled The Cost of a Cup of Tea was put out in London in the World in Action series by Grenada Television, it

Gowomment & The Plight of Plantation Workers 221
aroused serious public disquiet among the British people, who were drinking some 70,000 million "cuppas" a year. The film stirred the conscience of the British people who were until then unaware of the plight of plantation workers in Ceylon, known as "Lipton's Tea Gardens." The exposure caused shock waves not only among the British owners of tea plantations in the island but even among the bosses of the Ceylon Estates Employers' Federation. The government, including Dr Colvin R. de Silva, the Minister of Plantation industries, was angry that Gillard's TV men had hoodwinked the vigilance of estate superintendents, the CID and the customs authorities at the Katunayake airport. Criticising the TV programme in parliament Dr de Silva said: "There is frankly what amounts to a dirty conspiracy going on between even a television company and a major union here - I will not mention names though I can mention them - where in fact mid-night visits had been secretly done to get at what are alleged to be facts in order to make an onslaught, a war on us".' (See Chapter 14 for the CWC - UPWU strike in December 1973 for a monthly wage for plantation workers).
Following the British Television team, Ms Edith Bond came to conduct a "War on Want' investigation into Sri Lanka's tea industry and the plight of estate workers. Her investigations were published in London under the title "The State of Tea" in March 1974. She found that "a tea picker could hope to earn Rs 117.04 a month at the basic rate," and Confirmed that "this is well below the previously stated poverty line...." And she writes: "On the contrary... superintendents are paid approximately Rs 2,000/- to Rs 3,000/- per month, have large bungalows, an average of three or four servants and cars provided by the estates." On the role of British companies in the island's tea industry she writes: "Altogether, about 30 per cent of Sri Lanka's tea is grown on estates with British connections. Although Brooke Bond grows only one per cent of Sri Lanka's tea, it exports over a third. For the year ending June 1972, Brooke Bond Liebig, on all its operations, made a profit of Sterling 14.3 million which included Sterling 228,000 from its Sri Lankan operations. In 1973 Brooke Bond increased its overall profit by an extra Sterling 4 million."
When Grenada Television put out another programme on 24 March 1975, it caused a furore in Britain, and the British government became so concerned that it promptly directed the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) delegation (due to attend the

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Colombo IPU Conference) "to investigate into the conditions of workers on British-owned tea estates". The delegation headed by W.T. Williams, QC, MP, examined the conditions on British owned tea plantations and published its findings. Members of the delegation visited each of the four British-owned tea estates referred to in the "World in Action" television programme. Delmar and Elkaduwa estates came in for special screening and Comment in their reports. Though they expressed concern about the manner in which the subject was presented in the TV show, they agreed that "the programme attempts to draw public attention to a serious human problem..." In regard to the shortage of food the delegation reported that "... the isolated situation of many estates and the failure of most estates to obtain additional ration items.... have resulted in a deterioration of the nutritional State of the estate workers and their families relative to the rural population generally." The report further reads: "This was confirmed by Dr L.V.R. Fernando, Medical Director of the Planters Association Estates Health Scheme, who as early as April 1974 had drawn the attention of all Concerned to "a marked increase in the number of deaths occurring on estates in recent months," and stated that "the conclusion that the increased number of deaths is due to gross malnutrition is inescapable."
Nationalization - Second Phase
It was against this background, when the sterling company estates were becoming an embarrassment for Britain, that the second phase of nationalization programme came to be implemented. By this time the LSSP Ministers, including Dr Colvin R. de Silva, the Minister of Plantation Industries, had been expelled from the government. The Land Reform (Amendment) Law No 39 of 1975 was passed in the National State Assembly (Parliament) on 14 October 1975. Under this law 417,957 acres consisting of 237,592 acres of tea, 194,835 acres of rubber, 6,406 acres of coconut and 79,124 acres of other crops, were taken over. The bulk of these lands are in the mid-country districts of Kegalle, Ratnapura, Kandy, Nuwara Eliya and Badulla. Thus, altogether 63 per cent of the tea lands, 32 per cent of the rubber and 10 per cent of the coconut lands in the Country were vested in the Land Reform Commission.

Government & The Plight of Plantation Workers 223
The nationalization of the estates did not lead to any immediate retaliation either from the sterling companies or from the British government. The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, had already agreed with Ms Bandaranaike to the take-over of the British plantation companies. In fact, Kobbekaduwa, while introducing the Amendment in Parliament, thanked the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, Smedley,"for the realistic understanding of our point of view".
As a result of mismanagement and corruption, there was a sharp decline in tea production. In 1976 tea output fell from 477 million to 433 million pounds and consequently tea exports fell by 6 per cent compared to 1975, at a time when world tea prices had risen by 16 per cent. Despite the compensation agreed upon and the understanding shown by Britain,
One reason for the fall in exports was that the take-over of the British company-owned tea estates led to a sharp drop, amounting almost to a boycott, of Ceylon tea in the UK market. The handful of firms controlling the tea marketing in the UK switched from. Ceylon tea to Kenyan and Indian teas.'
Nationalization and Eviction of Indian Workers
As a result of the UF government's - particularly the Agriculture Ministry's - policy of blatant discrimination against Tamil workers, they were confronted with two main problems consequent to nationalization. Firstly, distribution of land to the villagers and the ill-conceived diversion projects led to a depression of employment opportunities in the estate sector and eventual displacement of resident labour. Secondly, the induction of village labour into the estates, which already suffered from excess labour, resulted in underemployment and reduction in monthly earnings. Referring to post-reform estates a medical officer writes:
Our detailed investigations of the sociological aspects of estate labour admitted to my ward have shown that though they may have not been asked to leave the estates, they are not given work, which is now given to the villager. The estate labour continues to live on the estates at night and try to find work in the towns or beg on the streets by day.'
The situation became worse when the government by Gazette No. 185/60 published the Emergency (Preservation of Public Order on

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Estates) Regulation No. 3 of 1975. This empowered the Chairman of the Land Reform Commission to evict a resident Worker if in his opinion it was considered necessary for the preservation of public order on any estate. This draconian regulation took precedence over the protection afforded to workers under legislation specifically introduced by the United Front government.
Referring to redistribution of estate lands to villagers, Nimal Fernando Writes:
... redistribution of tea and rubber estate land particularly in regions such as Badulla, Nuwara Eliya, Kandy and Kegalle would have led to displacement of resident labour who were on such land. There were few instances such as the redistribution of Choisy and Balapokuna estates where entire estates were allocated among villagers for political considerations displacing resident workers on these estates. Allocation of estate lands to National Agricultural Diversification and Settlement Authority (NADSA) too had a similar effect on resident labour employment on certain estates. 7
The NADSA project alone covered 26,000 acres and was assisted by the World Bank. Such grandiose but ill-conceived projects resulted in thousands of acres of once lush tea gardens being transformed into shrublands useful neither to the plantation workers nor to the Sinhalese peasants.
Kobbekaduwa's Desperate Measures and Workers' Protest
By 1976 the unemployment problem had reached massive proportions and there were nearly a million people unemployed in the rural sector. In this situation, Kobbekaduwa, who, during his tenure of office as Minister of Agriculture, failed to find jobs for the rural youth, attempted to solve the unemployment problem by dislodging Indian workers from estates and settling in them Sinhalese from the rural areas. As We shall See, the estates taken over for this purpose were some of the productive estates high up in the hills at an elevation of 3000 to 5000 feet above M.S.L. There were no paddy fields even in the valleys in this mountainous region. In any case, expelling Indian Workers and settling Sinhalese peasants on the estates was indeed a criminal policy of robbing Peter to pay Paul. In fact, evicting Indian workers and planting Sinhalese colonists was effected with the deliberate

Government & The Plight of Plantation Workers 225
motive of altering the ethnic composition in areas such as Nuwara Eliya, which district has the largest concentration of Indians in the island.
The vicious and discriminatory policy pursued by the government against Indian workers was evident in a number of instances. In Choisy estate, Punduloya, the authorities distributed estate land to Sinhalese villagers and ordered all Indian Workers to quit the estate by mid-December 1976. The workers protested and those who had obtained Sri Lanka citizenship, applied for land allocations. The authorities not only rejected their applications but retaliated by cutting off the supply of foodstuffs and shutting down the Tamil school. The workers found it impossible to resist, and were eventually driven into destitution.
Protesting against such inhuman actions of the government, plantation trade unions launched a strike at the end of April 1977. To resolve this industrial dispute the Labour Commissioner convened a conference on 11 May and the authorities agreed that in the alienation of estates there would be "no eviction of Workers from their homes," and that there would be "no discrimination between Sinhalese village residents and Sri Lanka citizens Working on estates in the selection for the allocation of such land."
However, on the very same day, instigated by Agricultural Ministry officials and project managers, thugs armed with swords and knives went on a rampage in Devon estate (Talawakelle) and Sanquhar estate (Pussellawa), assaulting workers and looting their homes. The police, instead of arresting the marauders, turned their guns on the Workers in Devon estate, and a young worker named Sivanoo Letchuman Was killed.
On 17 May, hooligans armed with guns, bombs and petrol sprayers attacked the Indian workers on Delta estate (Pussellawa), looted and burnt their line-rooms. Their belongings, including the much treasured citizenship certificates and EPF records were all turned to ashes. Many workers were seriously injured and 150 families were badly affected."
On this subject M.C. Sansoni, the one-man Commissioner appointed by the President to inquire into the 1977 communal riots, writes: "
I would also refer...to the considerable turmoil that existed in certain tea plantation areas in the first half of 1977, after the nationalization of estates, particularly in the Gampola,

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Pusselawa and Kotmale districts. Tamil citizens by descent or registration were ignored, and Sinhalese peasants were preferred when estate land was alienated and re-allocated. The Tamil estate workers in several estates were thrown out of them. Their displacement in a heartless manner was followed by the shooting of workers on Devon Estate, and looting, arson and physical violence on Sanquhar and Delta Estates, in a wave of communal terrorism.'
He says further:
Evidence was given by Mr M.K. Suppiah, Industrial Relations Officer of the Ceylon Workers Congress, who spoke about estate workers on Choisy and Balapokuna Estates in Punduluoya having been chased out by a gang of men who called themselves a People's Committee, and were led by a Member of Parliament. The same lawless proceedings took place on Darty, Mulgama and Orion estates in Gampola.
On the question of the failure of the police to take timely action, Sansoni Writes: "Mr Shanmugam, S. P., Kandy, at that time, spoke of two incidents of violence on Delta and Sanquhar estates in May 1977. It was elicited from him that despite early warnings given to the police, that attacks were imminent, no action was taken to maintain order and prevent breaches of the peace."
in their anxiety to ensure victory at the next general election, especially for the Prime Minister's son, Anura Bandaranaike, the SLFP leaders planned to distribute 7,000 acres of the choicest tea lands in Nuwara Eliya to the Sinhalese villagers. Not only did the workers, led by their trade unions, revolt against Kobbekaduwa's desperate measures but even the estate superintendents, supported by their staff members, rose in protest against them. In fact, on 24 May 1977, the planters, for the first time in the long history of the Ceylon Planters' Society, conducted a demonstration in Colombo in protest against the SLFP government's attempt to alienate productive tea estates in the country. Veteran commentator, Gamini Navaratne, wrote in the Weekend: "The Periya Dorais and Sinna Dorais were in town on Tuesday....They were here to fight for their rights - and their lives. More, they were here to fight for you and me. For a situation has developed on the tea plantations after nationalization that can, if mishandled, spell economic ruin for Sri Lanka."
The plantation trade unions had unequivocally indicated that they were not against the distribution of lands to landless Sinhalese peasants but were certainly opposed to the discriminatory manner in which this was being done, without any Consideration whatever for the Indian workers who, unable to find

Government & The Plight of Plantation Workers 227
homes or employment outside the estate sector, would be turned into destitutes in the process. The revolt in the plantations finally compelled the government to suspend the alienation of tea lands in Nuwara Eliya. In utter frustration, indignant Agricultural Minister Kobbedaduwa, declared: "Thondaman has been dancing a little too much of late... if he does not stop his activities I am afraid stern action will have to be taken by the government to acquire the limited 52 acres left for him and deport him from this country." While such vituperative statements loaded with racialist overtones helped boost Thondaman's image among the Ceylon Indians, they incidentally had the effect of turning the Kandyan aristocrat, Kobbekaduwa, into a hero among the Sinhalese
aSSeS.
Internal Migration of Indians
Already in the 1960s, subsequent to the 1958 racial riots, during which Tamils in Badulla were subjected to barbaric attacks, their shops and houses burnt by Sinhalese goondas, hundreds of Indians moved to Batticaloa in the Eastern Province, seeking safer areas to live in. Middle class Indians began to buy properties, or managed to cultivate jungle lands. And this internal migration that started with groups of people going to the north and east was to grow into a stream with the onset of periodic pogroms against the Tamil people in the Up-Country.
As we have seen, consequent to nationalization of the plantations, new factors of a socio-economic-political nature came to influence the migration of workers away from the Upcountry. The harassment and displacement of workers made them move northwards to places such as Vavuniya, Kilinochchi and Mannar. Thousands of them went to work on farms cultivating cash crops, such as onions, potatoes and chillies, which found a lucrative market in the south due to a policy of import restrictions followed by Ms Bandaranaike's government. During harvesting seasons, hundreds of workers made a bee-line also to the sugar cane plantations in Kantalai, seeking temporary employment. There Were no labour laws operating in these areas and they had to work long hours under exacting requirements. Farm owners, who realized comfortable margins of profits on the produce, paid them

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poor wages; labour contractors too exploited them mercilessly. In course of time, however, especially after the racial riots in August 1977, thousands of Indians moved to these northern areas With their families and established their own farms on jungle lands. In their endeavours, they were often assisted by the indigenous Tamils, influenced by the Federal Party which was engaged in a bitter struggle against the discriminatory policy of the government in regard to the rights of the Tamil community.
Even some of those who got away from perilous situations in the up-country estates were not left in peace; they were hunted down by the government. The vengeful nature of Kobbekaduwa is evident from the way he used his long arm to dislodge Indians who had gone to Tamil areas seeking some kind of sanctuary for them to settle down. K.M. de Silva writes:
The insecurity of their position was demonstrated in 1973 when about 400 displaced plantation workers, all citizens of Sri Lanka, moved into the Eastern Province with the encouragement of Tamil politicians there. The government's reaction - once more it was the Minister of Agriculture and Lands who provided the leadership in this - was swift and decisive. The full rigor of emergency legislation was used to evict the squatters. This was clearly discriminatory since the Eastern Province in recent times had accommodated thಂಟನ್ಡdಃ of Sinhalese squatters, whose land-holdings have been regularized by the state."
Migration to India
Already in 1971, the UF government had amended the Implementation Act. According to the provisions of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement implementation (Amendment) Act No. 43 of 1971, four persons would be granted Ceylon citizenship only after seven had been repatriated to India. It must be noted that neither the quota system nor the demand for completed repatriation is mentioned in the 1964 Agreement. The original text merely reads that "the grant of Ceylon citizenship... and the process of repatriation... shall as far as possible, keep pace with each other." This new condition had the effect of unduly delaying the grant of Ceylon citizenship to those who sought such citizenship. This Amendment Act was disliked by most plantation trade unions, and it drew angry protests from M. Kalyanasundaram, a leader of the Communist Party of India, and Era Chezhiyan of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu.

Government & The Plight of Plantation Workers 229
Ms. Bandaranaike not only wanted an increase in the number repatriated annually but also appealed to India to re-open the register in the Indian High Commission, which had been closed in April 1970 when the two-year time period allowed for making applications to either Ceylon or India expired. When the Indian Prime Minister, Ms Indira Gandhi, visited the island in April 1973, she agreed to absorb a progressively increasing number of repatriates but refused to re-open the register at the Indian Embassy since this could have been used by the Ceylon government to reject applications for citizenship in order to compel the rejected applicants to apply for Indian citizenship.
At about this time the author was in New Delhi in Order to participate in a conference of Asian Trade Unions organized on the initiative of All India Trade Union congress. This conference was ceremonially inaugurated by the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs.Indra Gandhi. Later I was afforded an opportunity to discus with the Indian prime Minister the problem of the stateless people of indian origin in Ceylon. Indeed Mrs.Gandhi showed a keen interest on this subject.
Referring to the Sirima-Shastri pact of 1964, the author explained to her that Shastri had blundered since, unlike her father Jawaharlal Nehru, he was not even vaguely aware of the real motive of the then Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mrs. Sirima bandaranaike. Shastri had overlooked the fact that he was dealing with the fate of a million human beings whose fundamental rights have been robbed by the government of Ceylon through the Ceylon citizenship Act of 1948. Mrs.Gandhi asked me whether we did not protest against the pact, told her that most of the plantation trade union leaders including me protested against the inhuman provisions of the agrement. However, the CWC leader, S.Thondaman, the M.P nominated by Mrs. Bandaranaike, did not publicly record any serious objection to the pact. Surprisingly, he did not resign his nominated seat despite the fact that she failed to consult him before signing the Sirima-Shastri Pact.
It was later in 1980, sent a printed copy of a 'memorandum on Stateless People in Sri Lanka, drafted by me and signed by 10 left-oriented plantation trade unions and addressed to J.R. Jayewardene, President of Sri Lanka, to the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs.Indira Gandhi. Subsequently, on the instructions from the Foreign Ministry in Delhi, I was invited to the Indian High Commission, and a diplomat indicated to me that the

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government of India appreciated our contention that "the Agreements between India and Sri Lanka failed to solve the stateless problem," and that it took note of our appeal to President Jayewardene to take "pragmatic steps to resolve the stateless problem once and for all."
It was when Ms Bandaranaike paid a visit to New Delhi in January 1974 that the question of the residue of 150,000 stateless persons that had not been covered by the Sirima-Shastri Pact of 1964, was taken up for discussion with Ms Gandhi. Both Prime Ministers agreed to accept an equal number ie. 75,000 persons. Thus, together with the 525,000 under the Sirima-Shastri Pact, India agreed to accommodate 600,000 stateless persons. It was also agreed to extend the period of implementation of the original Agreement by two years - up to 30 October 1981.
The Sirima-Shastri Pact, the large-scale rejection of citizenship applications by the Sri Lankan government, the nationalization of estates and consequent eviction of Workers from some estates, the violence directed against the Indian workers and the general degradation of life on the estates, all had the effect of driving these workers to India. The majority of them, though living in an island-country, had never set their eyes upon the Indian Ocean. They had been generally confined to their estates and their mobility had been limited to the nearby towns; considerable numbers might have made pilgrimage tours to the Hindu temple at Kataragama in the south or visited the hill capital to see the Kandy Perahera. Of necessity, a large number of them would have visited the Indian High Commission in Kandy. That was about all.
There were many factors tending to pull these workers to the sub- continent. In their perception India was a great country led by the Nehru family, and Tamil Nadu under the DMK had made significant progress. In any case it seemed life in that country would not be worse than they had experienced in the island. The Indian High Commission gave publicity in the newspapers to the various rehabilitation programmes and the facilities available to the migrants. A press release in July 1967 elaborated on the various Schemes for rehabilitation and "announced that the Madras Government had allotted about 3,000 acres of government land in the Nilgiris for plantations." The governments of Kerala, Karnataka and Andra Pradesh agreed to employ the migrants in coffee and rubber plantations. Once they reached India, special facilities,

Government & The Plight of Plantation Workers 231
including cash loans for building houses and setting up business
establishments, were to be extended to them. The High
Commission would issue a Repatriation Card to the head of each
family "to ensure easy identification and with a view to giving.
prompt attention to the particular needs of the repatriates."
The Indian government announced the following
rehabilitation assistance to repatriates:
1. Employment in government, tea, rubber and state-owned
farm corporations.
2. Employment in spinning and sugar mills.
3. Settlement in land Colonies.
4. Loans for land Cultivation.
5. Business loans of Rs 5,000/- per family for
self-employment.
6. Loans for house-building - Rs 6,000/- in cities and Rs
3,000/- in rural areas.
Attractive illustrated booklets were published in English and Tamil and the Tamil Booklets were distributed widely among the estate workers. However, despite these pull factors most workers, who had become Indian nationals, like Hamlet, could not make up their minds. "To go or not to go" was the question they were brooding OWe.
Even after a decision was made, people only reluctantly, often pressured by one or more push factors, left for India. Already, in 1971, the amendment to the implementation Act had made the employment of a temporary residence permit (TRP) overstay an offence. And in May 1975, estate superintendents were wested with power to discontinue overstays from employment.... The repatriates had to overcome many practical problems before their departure. They had to obtain their Employees' Provident Fund and other statutory payments due to them from their employers. Roy Muthaya says:
The problems of winding-up in Sri Lanka before being repatriated to India are so immense that a large number of would-be repatriates are unable to cope with these problems in the time available. In extreme cases these people have no alternative but to go underground. By this means they hope to gain a little more time to sort out their problems. In the meantime they are hunted down like criminals by the authorities. They become fugitives in their own land where they and their forefathers were born."
Tamil workers generally have their extremely limited assets in gold

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ornaments. "In times of emergency they pawn their gold jewellery to raise money... When the person who has pawned his jewellery also happens to be a repatriate, the pawn broker adopts various devices to cheat the repatriate of his jewellery. When a repatriate defaults in the redeeming of the jewellery and also overstays, the pawn broker himself informs the authorities and personally sees to the deportation of the repatriate."
Thus, "those who avoid repatriation for one reason or another live in fear of being apprehended by the authorities and deported forcibly to India. Before deportation they have to suffer all the ignominies suffered by common criminals in this country. There is the hunt, the chase and finally the arrest. After the arrest, the would-be repatriates are hand-cuffed and taken to the camp for illegal immigrants at Slave Island (in Colombo) and are forcibly deported to India."'
One of the nerve-wrecking problems faced by some estate Workers was how to take with them their children who worked as domestic servants in middle class bungalows in Colombo and Other towns. Often their masters did not like to release these poorly-paid and mercilessly exploited boys and girls, and sometimes the workers had to leave the country without their children.
During Ms Bandaranaike's premiership there was large-scale "repatriation" to India, and the grant of Sri Lankan citizenship showed a marked increase as the following figures indicate:
Table 13.1
Repatriated Granted Sri Lankan to India citizenship
1970 8,733 7,468 1971 21,867 13,696 1972 27,575 16,107 1973 33,175 18,960 1974 35,141 20,074 1975 18,511 10,591 1976 33,321 19,034 1977 28,388 16,220
(Source: Department of Registration of Persons of Indian Origin)

Government & The Plight of Plantation Workers 233
After a few years of repatriation, workers were beginning to show greater reluctance to proceed to India. A realistic picture of life in India began to emerge; people began to narrate stories of how hundreds of repatriates died of disease and hunger in that Vast Country. Newspaper reporters and delegations of NonGovernment Organizations travelled with repatriates and published pathetic stories of the numerous difficulties that confronted them.
In this study we do not propose to examine the living and working conditions of the repatriates in India. That would be another story.’ All that we can do here is to give a glimpse of their fate in India.
Ceylon Indians - Foreigners in Tamil Nadu
A Report on the Survey of Repatriates from Sri Lanka published in Madras (1980) states that 1,900 repatriate families had been settled in the tea plantations in 1,800 hectares in the Nilgiris. Some 234 families had been found employment in rubber plantations in Kanyakumari district. Hundreds of families had been settled in Karnataka, Andra Pradesh and Kerala. In these non-Tamil areas these people were unhappy due to poor housing conditions and the language barrier, with no Tamil schools for their children.
The repatriates "are not sure of the way of life and the mode of earnings. They are strangers to the land. The customs, culture and habits are yet to be imbibed by them...Though they are called persons of Indian origin, most of them have no knowledge of India. Even their spoken Tamil is peculiar to Tamilians in Tamil Nadu. Very common words like kerosene oil, chillies are not familiar to them. It is necessary to acquaint the repatriates with Indian languages, places, people, Way of living etc., at the threshold itself before they commence life in this country."
In regard to those migrants 'settled' in India, the Report says: "Even the persons already repatriated and rehabilitated have not been resettled with contentment. The social disability, physical hardship and mental agony have been undergone by them for no fault of their own." And it categorically states: "The repatriation we are witnessing today is definitely compulsory repatriation. The number of persons who are branded as 'overstays' and deported to India was estimated to be 75,000 by the Sunday Observer in its
Y

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issue dated 21 November 1976. The exact number actually deported is not made known to the public. It should have crossed one lakh since 1976 to the present day." In conclusion, the Report reads: "Though the government of India have assumed the responsibility for the rehabilitation of repatriates from Sri Lanka, due to the peculiar nature of the problem, the net result is disappointing, in spite of the vast sums of money spent on various rehabilitation programmes."
Despite the unfavourable environment for the migrants in India the exodus continued unabated until 1984, as the following figures indicate:
Table 13.2
Migration under Indo-Ceylon Agreement 1978-85 (persons who left Sri Lanka)
YEAR NUMBER
1978 20,281. 1979 15,942. 1980 17,735. 1981 16,713 1982 18,214. 1983 14,329. 1984 20,133. 1985 154.
Total number of Adults who left the Island as at 31 December 1984 336,980.
Total number of Children born after
30.10.1964 who left the Island 123,823.
Total number of persons who
left the Island 460,803.
(Source : lmmigration and Emigration Department, Economic and Social
Statistics, Vol. X, Dec 1987, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, p. 13)

Government & The Plight of Plantation Workers 235
By the 1980s the situation in India had grown much worse for the migrants. Kenneth Peiris, who travelled to India with some migrants, poignantly records in the Weekend of 16 October 1983 their woes along the journey and the environment available for these people for their rehabilitation in India.
He writes movingly of their feelings as they part company at Talaimannar pier with their friends and loved ones who, unlike them, had chosen to remain in the island:
Just before they enter the customs hall, all hell breaks loose. It is possible that some of these gruff looking men have never cried in their lives.
In Madras, Peiris interviewed Daniel Gunanithi, the Director of Rehabilitation of the government of Tamil Nadu. And Gunanithi said categorically: "It is not possible to give all these people jobs in tea estates as those areas are full now. Still the cry is for them to be sent to tea estates or rubber plantations." With regard to those who had taken business loans from the Indian government, he had stated: "In no time they lose all that money and are on the Streets trying to make a living under very pathetic conditions." Kenneth Peiris concludes his article by posing the question:
Are all these repatriates paying for somebody else's sins?
Notes
1. See Seventh Parliament of Ceylon - 1970, Colombo: Lake House, p. 178. 2 G.B. Keerawella, "The JVP and the 1971 Uprising", Social Science Review,
2. 1980, Colombo, p. 45. 3 Kumari Jayawardena, Ethnic and Class Conflicts in Sri Lanka, Centre for
Social Analysis, Colombo, 1986, p. 120. 4. A.J. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka 1947 - 1973, London, 1974, p. 207. S The Constitution of Sri Lanka - 1972, see pp. 11 and 28. 6 Hansard, 10 October 1975. 7 Central Bank of Ceylon - Review of the Economy 1975, Colombo, 1981, p.
26. 8 Satchi Ponnambalam, Dependent Capitalism in Crisis, London 1981. p. 117.
9 Malinga H. Gunaratna, The Plantation Raj, Colombo, 1980, p. 46. 10 Quoted in Sri Lanka Tea Estates, London. Department of Trade (UK),
1975, p. 18. 1. Edith M. Bond, The State of Tea, London, 1974, p. 7. 12 bid, p. 11.
13 Sri Lanka Tea Estates, op.cit. London, p. 12.

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14 15 16
17 18 19
26
27
29
31
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bid.
Satchi Ponnambalam, op. cit, pp. 120-121. Quoted by Nimal A. Fernando, "Land reform and the Plantation sector - Effects on Employment and Income", paper presented at SLFI Seminar, Colombo 14 - 16 Dec 1982, p. 13.
Ibid., p. 17.
Tribune, 4 June 1977, p. 6.
Tribune, 18 June 1972, p. 10. Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Incidents which Took Place Between 13th August and 15th September, - SP No. VII of 1980, p.269.
bid.
Weekend, 29 May 1977, reproduced in Tribune 4 June 1977, p. 9. The Sun, 20 May 1977, reproduced in "Tribune 4 June 1977, p. 9. K.M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi Ethnic Societies, Sri Lanka 1880-1985, London, 1986, pp. 279-280. See A Report on the Survey of Repatriates from Sri Lanka 1980 Madras Centre for Research on New International Economic Order, p. 7. Roy Muthaya, Repatriation of Tamil People of Indian Origin, Paper read At MIRJE Seminar at YMCA, Colombo, p. 29.
Ibid, p. 30. For further understanding of their life in India, see Yvonne Fries and Thomas Bibin’s The Undesirable, Calcutta, 1984. A Report on the Survey of Repatriates from Sri Lanka 1980, op. cit. p. 51. Ibid., p. 67. Kenneth Peiris, "Novel Surroundings - A New Life and Fresh Responsibilities", Weekend, Colombo, 16 Oct 1983.

Chapter
14
PLANTATION WORKERS STRUGGLES FROM 1945 TO 1973
At the end of the war in 1945 the British military installations that had been established in the island by the South East Asia Command, were dismantled and this led to the retrenchment of thousands of workers. Unemployment, inflationary pressures and the rise in the cost of living began to cause grave difficulties for the workers and this gave rise to a number of strikes led by the trade unions. In this the Ceylon Trade Union Federation (CTUF)

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played an important role particularly in the harbour and in the tea and rubber-packing industries in Colombo. As a result the unions affiliated to the CTUF won "14 days annual leave, 7 paid holidays, free mid-day meals, free teas, medical leave and payment of gratuity in addition to wage increases."
Knavesmire Struggle
At the same time, unemployment and landlessness in the rural areas became serious problems. In 1946 the government acquired 400 acres of Knavesmire estate, Kegalle, for the settlement of landless Sinhalese labourers, and ordered the long-resident Indian workers to quit the estate without any attempt to rehabilitate them elsewhere. When the workers refused to quit they were charged in the court for "criminal trespass", and this became a serious issue for the Up-country Tamil people. The Ceylon Indian Congress Labour Union (CICLU) protested against the government's action and rose in defence of the workers by organising a hartal in Kegalle, Kelani Valley and Hatton areas in which 125,000 workers participated. Later the union pursued the case in the Privy Council in London, which held that the charge of criminal trespass" could not be maintained since the workers were legally resident on the estate. But the estate management took up the position that it had no voice in the government's action against the workers. The Ceylon Estate Employers Federation (CEEF), founded in 1944, abrogated the Seven Point Agreement on the pretext that the hartal conducted by the CICLU was a politically motivated action.
Joint Strikes
With this development the working conditions in the plantations deteriorated. In protest against the harsh treatment of plantation workers, the Ceylon Plantation Workers Union (CPWU), established in 1944 on the initiative of M.G. Mendis and K. Ramanathan, launched a number of Strikes. Some of these strikes, such as the adventurist strike at Gasnawa estate, Kegalle,

Plantation Workers' Struggles ... 1945 - 1973 239
where the workers attacked the Superintendent and hoisted the red flag over the factory, for all the heroism of the workers, proved counter productive. The government, led by D.S. Senanayake, took the side of the employers and removed the Rubber Growing and Manufacturing Trade from the operation of the Wages Board, thus endangering the guaranteed minimum wage for the Workers. On the initiative of the CPWU, the plantation trade unions then launched a one-day token strike against the government's drastic action. The CICLU too participated in the strike on 22 July 1949, and the government was compelled to restore the Rubber Wages Board early in 1950. However, the militant activities of the CPWU were looked upon as a potential threat to the estate employers, and the CEEF withdrew recognition of the union in May 1950. The history of the CFTU says: "The Federation and their members refused to have any dealings with the CPWU... and the membership declined."
The crisis in the rubber industry continued and, with the price of rubber hitting a new low in the world market after a temporary boom during the Korean war (1950 - 51), the Minister of Labour once again threatened to do away with the Wages Board. This time the CTUF and other progressive forces called upon the government to sell rubber to the People's Republic of China, which had been established in 1949 under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, instead of depending on the US monopoly firms which had depressed the world market price for rubber. It was to save the rubber industry from ruin and to ensure a regular supply of the much needed rice that the Dudley Senanayake government signed along-term agreement with China in December 1952, though its anti-communist posture prevented it from establishing diplomatic links with that great country. Under the "rice-rubber' agreement China agreed to buy annually 50,000 metric tons of rubber and supply 270,000 tons of rice to Ceylon. The rubber price "guaranteed by China was 40 per cent higher than prices obtaining in the West."
In 1951, the CEEF signed a "Thirteen Point Agreement' with the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) - the CICLU had been renamed the CWC in 1950. This agreement prescribed the procedure to be followed by the parties concerned with regard to termination of employment and the settlement of disputes under the aegis of the Labour Department. However, the agreement

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could not prevent arbitrary dismissal of workers and the employers resorting to wage reductions. In tune with the demand of the employers, the Wages Board for Tea Growing and Manufacturing Trade decided to cut the wage rates of the workers. In protest against this arbitrary decision the CTUF, the CWC and the Ceylon Federation of Labour (CFL), led by the LSSP, jointly issued a call for a general strike in the plantations. The strike on 7 January 1953 was the biggest in the history of the trade union movement in Sri Lanka up to that time. Some 300,000 workers participated, and the strike was so powerful that the Wages Board withdrew the Wage Cut.
The following table 14.1 shows the massive participation of plantation workers in the strikes during this period compared to Workers in other Sectors:
Table 14.1 Strikes
Plantations Others
Year Nfber Number of Number of Number Number of Number of
of workers Man-days of Workers Man-dayз
Strikes i WoWed Lost Strike9 involved Lost
1948 7 15,259 31,880 89 39,237 250,866 1947 s3 11,849 199,657 52 43,485 544,174 1943 33 23,100 49,938 20 1065 2,497 1949 ses 477,412 881340 28 2,874 14,576 1950 然2 22,808 85,837 28 5,471 22,617 1951 s 306,091 521,040 35 6,726 17,484 1952 38 5,355 9,414 39 6,168 46,990 1953 33 363,600 430,586 54, 14,482 31,998
Source: Ceylon Labour Gazette, Dec. 1954, p. 487.
The CWC Split and the Diyagama Strike
In 1955 differences arose in the leadership of the CWC. While one faction of the CWC was led by S. Thondaman, the other was under the influence of A. Aziz, a founder member of the CC. Personality problems and the CWC's international affiliations were the main factors that led to this cleavage. The CWC had, in fact, become an affiliate of the International Confederation of FreeTrade Unions (ICFTU). Thondaman writes: "I was instrumental for the

Plantation Workers' Struggles ... 1945 - 1973 24
CWC joining the ICFTU in 1953...". On the other hand Aziz and some of his colleagues tended to move towards the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) founded in 1945, which embraced the unions of socialist lands and many Capitalist and developing countries.
The differences between Aziz's and Thondaman's factions became irreconcilable, and Aziz together with his colleagues, C.V. Velupillai and S.M. Subbiah, K.G.S. Nair and P. Devaraj, the present State Minister for Hindu Religious Cultural Affairs, founded the Democratic Workers' Congress (DWC) in January 1956. Following this, many thousands of workers quit the CWC and joined the DWC. The employers watched this development with disfavour, and the CEEF refused to accord recognition to this new. union - the DWC.
The DWC, led by Aziz as President, launched a strike at Diyagama estate, Agrapatana, in May 1956, which turned out to be a struggle for recognition of the union. Although 2,000 workers participated, the European Superintendent refused to yield. The Labour Department failed to resolve the dispute. In order to maintain a monopoly position as the main trade union amongst the plantation workers of Indian origin, the CWC leaders, in effect, played the role of lackeys to the estate employers, who were determined to deny recognition to the new union.
The author, who had been specially invited by the DWC leaders to assist in Conducting the strike, also addressed a number of meetings together with Aziz and Velupillai at Diyagama and other estates. Despite great odds - eight Workers had been arrested by the police - the morale of the strikers was high. After a week, the Superintendent called for police intervention to break the strike, and a posse of armed policemen entered Diyagama East division. When about a hundred DWC members gathered on a hill to dissuade 30 workers belonging to the rival union from serving as blacklegs, the police fired, and a young worker, Abraham Singho, fell dead with a bullet in his head. When this tragic news spread, thousands of workers poured into the arena. of the shooting. The enraged workers broke up bridges, and the policemen became literally imprisoned within the estate. The European Superintendent had fled from the estate under cover of darkness. Soon Talawakelle town was seething with tension as the Sinhala chauvinist businessmen spread the rumour that a Sinhalese worker had been sacrificed by the Indians for "their own

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cause". It must be remembered that this was the first major strike since the ascension to power of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike as Prime Minister a month earlier, riding the crest of a wave of the chauvinistic "Sinhala only" slogan.
The situation was critical, and the only way to sustain the morale of the strikers was to strengthen the strike. Despite some well-intentioned supporters of the DWC warning the author of being arrested for any attempt to extend the strike in an atmosphere of communal tension, the author, guided by the veteran trade union leader, C.V. Velupillai, called upon all DWC members to continue the strike. Some 60,000 workers, including thousands of CWC members, whose sympathy had been aroused as a result of police shootings, responded.
Prime Minister Bandaranaike, keen to avert a major confrontation in the plantation sector, quickly summoned a conference of plantation trade unions, the CEEF and the Commissioner of Labour. Aziz, Velupillai, Thondaman and Dr Colvin R. de Silva, leader of the Lanka Estate Workers' Union (LEWU), were present. With a sense of urgency, Bandaranaike said: "Gentlemen, here is a trade union calling for recognition, thousands of Workers are On Strike and We Cannot allow Such a situation to continue." And peremptorily he had exhorted: "The Democratic Workers Congress -- it is a legitimate trade union; surely there cannot be any difficulty in recognizing the DWC", and concluded the conference with a public statement to this effect. The author anxiously awaiting the outcome of the conference at the DWC office at Talawakelle was suddenly called to the telephone. Bandaranaike's voice rang clear: "Mr Nadesan, the DWC has been accorded recognition - now you can call off the strike". Later a jubilant Aziz arrived at Diyagama estate.
Some 30,000 workers had gathered at the funeral grounds decked with red and white flags. Unable to face the wrath of the workers, the policemen had vanished into thin air. Aziz, Dr de Silva and others addressed the vast crowd. No such gathering had been witnessed in the plantations either before or since Abraham Singho's funeral to pay homage to a worker who had sacrificed his life for the cause of the working class.

Plantation Workers' Struggles. 1945 - 1973 243
DWC Splits
The DWC grew rapidly and emerged as the most dynamic union in the plantation sector. However, dissatisfied with the individualism and the personality cult of Aziz and in its anxiety to join a radical organization, the left-oriented faction led by S. Nadesan and P. Devaraj broke away from the DWC in 1959 and resurrected the CPWU. Consequently, about 40,000 workers, most of them under the influence of C.V. Velupillai and S.M. Subbiah, together with Rozario Fernando, E.T. Moorthy, O.A. Ramiah, S. Mariappa and P.P. Kandiah joined this union. With the infusion of this massive membership the CPWU rose phoenix-like from a decade of obscurity.
The CPWU, under the leadership of the Communist Party, was viewed as a threat not only by the estate employers but also by the leaders of both the DWC and the CWC. It was in this situation that Aziz and Thondaman, who had been bitter foes since 1955, buried the hatchet and decided to come together. "At the beginning of 1960 certain intermediaries tried to reconcile the two wings of the old Ceylon Workers' Congress; the CWC and DWC merged under a new Ceylon Workers' Congress".
Unfortunately, due to the short-comings and bureaucratic tendencies in the self-appointed leadership of the CPWU (N. Sanmugathasan, the General Secretary of the CTUF, had been arbitrarily appointed as the General Secretary of the CPWU), Subbiah and Velupillai became disillusioned and left the union.' Both of them reluctantly rejoined the CWC but Velupillai later found himself a niche in the leadership of the National Union of Workers (NUW), which had been founded by V.K. Vellayan, a former Secretary of the CWC, who had become dissatisfied with Thondaman's leadership since he had not been given one of the two nominated seats in parliament that had been offered to the CWC by Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake in 1965.
Pressured by Rozario Fernando, A. Ramiah, P. Devaraj, the author and the workers following them, the CPWU sessions were held at Hatton in 1962, where the author and Sanmugathasan were elected as president and secretary respectively of the union. However, when a split occurred in the Communist Party in late 1963, Consequent to ideological differences between Moscow and

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Peking, the CPWU membership largely came under the control of Sanmugathasan who had shot up to prominence as the leader of the CP (Peking Wing). Unable to reconcile with this development, the author and his colleagues founded at Matale, in early 1964, the United Plantation Workers' Union. The Office bearers of the union were S. Nadesan (President), S. Amirtham (Secretary) and R.S. Baskaran (Treasurer). With some changes it was subsequently affiliated to the newly formed Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions (CFTU) led by the CP (Moscow Wing).
In the meantime, differences had arisen between Aziz and Thondaman once again and, in April 1962, the "combined organization' broke up into the DWC and the CWC.
Strike for Special Living Allowance of Rs 17.50
In 1957 the cost of living index was found to be thoroughly unrealistic since it had been designed to measure changes in the cost of living of an average family in Colombo city and was based on weights that had not been revised since 1952 despite substantial changes in the pattern of consumption of the working class. The public service trade unions, therefore, agitated for a wage increase for the workers. The government, led by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, agreed to grant an interim allowance called the Special Living Allowance (SLA) of Rs 17.50 a month to the workers in the public sector. In May 1959, through a Collective Agreement between the Employers Federation of Ceylon and the left trade unions, workers in the tea and rubber export trades too became entitled to the SLA. And, in 1965, the Ceylon Estate Staffs Union through a Collective Agreement got the SLA of Rs 17.50 for staff members.
However, the SLA was denied to the plantation workers. All plantation trade unions agitated for the SLA of Rs 17.50, including the CWC, whose leader Thondaman was a member of parliament nominated by Premier Dudley Senanayake. In this situation, instead of attempting to unite the unions on this common demand, A. Aziz called out his DWC members to strike on 13 June 1966. Dr N.M. Perera, as president of the Lanka Estate Workers' Union, and the author as president of the United Plantation

Plantation Workers' Struggles. 1945 - 1973 245
workers' union, in a joint statement, called upon the workers to launch into action. On the other hand, the CWC, which together with the CPWU led by Sanmugathasan (CPPeking) was a member of the United Committee of Ceylon Trade Unions, failed to implement its much publicized threat to strike. Despite this betrayal by the CWC leaders many thousands of workers carried On the strike for the SLA of Rs 17.50 for three weeks, but the strike Could no longer be sustained.
Dr. Perera publicly criticized Aziz for his unilateral declaration of the strike, and Condemned Thondaman for his betrayal of the Workers. He said: "This struggle has again exposed the reactionary role of Mr Thondaman. He has been on the side of the capitalist class against the militant estate workers fighting for their just rights. No doubt, as a reward, the government and the employers would try to boost him up by making a small concession to the estate workers at the request of Mr Thondaman."
Just as Dr Perera predicted, the CWC signed the Collective Agreement No 3 of 1967 with the Ceylon Estate Employees Federation, which granted a paltry wage increase of 10 cents a day and "check off" facility, which did away with the outmoded system of direct collections of membership dues from the Workers by allowing union membership dues to be deducted from the workers' pay and remitted to the union."
Strike for a Monthly Wage - December 1973
With the coming into power of the United Front government of the SLFP, LSSP and CP, led by Ms. Sirimavo Bandaranaike in May 1970, the attitude of the Employers' Federation of Ceylon (EFC) towards the urban workers underwent a marked change. The EFC agreed to conduct negotiations with the trade unions particularly with those led by the three ruling political parties, and collective agreements were concluded between the EFC and the unions affiliated to the CFTU, CFL and the SLITUF. For instance, workers in unions affiliated to the CFTU, in the tea export establishments such as Brooke Bond and Liptons were granted a consolidated monthly wage of Rs. 180 and a cost of living allowance at the rate of Rs. 2 for every point increase in the COL index.

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However, in the plantation sector, where, consequent to the Land Reform Law of 1972, the government agencies controlled about half a million acres of plantation lands, there was no improvement whatever in the living conditions of the workers. Not only had the basic wage of the workers remained largely static from 1955 but there was a drastic fall in the total monthly earnings as a result of a reduction of work-days from six to four days per week. The situation became worse when in 1973 the government announced significant changes in the rationing scheme and increased the price of essential foodstuffs. The free ration of rice was reduced from one to half a measure and the price of the second measure was raised from Rs. 1 to Rs. 1.60; wheat flour was rationed for the first time and its price went up from 33 to 70 cents a pound, and the sugar ration was reduced from 2 pounds to 3/4 of a pound.
A survey conducted in 1973 by the Central Bank revealed that the Indians, "with 90 per cent of their income receivers in the estate sector" constituted the lowest income earning community in the country.
Table 14.2
Average Dispersion of income for Two Months by CommunityAll Island
Community No. of Incorne Mean income Median income
Receivers for 2 Months for 2 Months
RS. RS.
Kandiyan
Sinhalese 1,889 422 376
Low-country
Sinhalese 3,009 520 424
Ceylon Tamils 789 470 385
Indian Tamils 1, 155 225 180
Moors and Malays 442 670 470
Others (Burghers, Europeans and V other minorities) 42 982 633
All Communities 7,326 455 360
Source : Survey of Sri Lanka's Consumer Finances - 1973, Central Bank of Ceylon, p. 83.

Plantation Workers' Struggles. 1945 - 1973 247
The Survey comments:
The median income was the lowest for Indian Tamils. All communities except Indian Tamils have a median income above the median for all communities. The median income for Indian Tamils is half that for all communities.
With the sharp rise in the prices of all items consequent to the international energy crisis in 1973, the living conditions of the plantation workers deteriorated leading to a food-crisis and starvation especially in the up-country tea plantations. The CP newspaper, Aththa, in its editorial of 8 November 1973, wrote:
The worst affected by the food restriction are the workers and those who suffer most are the estate workers. The villagers have food substitutes that are grown in rural areas to meet their food requirement at least to some extent. The urban worker has access to supplementary food items coming from villages even though they have to pay high prices. That itself is not sufficient for them. But in the estate areas even these little items are not available. Estate workers have no other way of finding extra food. They must also live. They are also human beings. It is therefore important that the government pays consideration to these workers.'
It was in this situation that the Joint Committee of Plantation Trade Unions (JCPTU), consisting of unions led by the political parties of the United Front Government and some independent unions, pressed the government to grant a monthly wage instead of remunerating the wage of a plantation worker on the basis of a daily rate. The JCPTU had earlier submitted the demand for a guaranteed monthly Wage for plantation Workers to the government and the Ceylon Estate Employers' Federation. It called for a monthly wage of Rs 142.90 on the following basis:
Rs. 30 days' wages at Rs 3.18 a day 95.40
One rupee increase per day given to other Workers 30.00
Special Living Allowance granted to other workers 17.50
Total 142.90

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The JCPTU conducted a vigorous campaign, including one-day token strikes in pursuance of this demand. In response, on 2 November 1973, Ms Bandaranaike held a Conference of trade unions (CWC was not invited) at Temple Trees - the Prime Minister's official residence. As Convener of the JCPTU, the author presented the case of the workers to the Prime Minister, and concluded by saying that the plantation workers were the only section of the working class that toiled in the sun and the rain and brought in about 80 per cent of the foreign exchange earnings of the country. The Prime Minister appeared sympathetic. But Dr de Silva, the Minister for Plantation Industries, talked of the enormous financial implications involved in granting a monthly wage to some 700,000 workers. The Prime Minister then directed the Sectoral Committee for Finance, headed by Finance Minister Dr Perera, to make a study and make suitable recommendations on this question.
Since the authorities took no action, the Joint Committee unions met and resolved to launch a general strike if the government failed to take any meaningful action by the end of November. Meanwhile, early in December, Thondaman declared that the CWC would strike on 18 December 1973. While other unions in the Joint Committee hesitated, the author announced, in keeping with the mandate given to him, that the UPWU would strike on the same day. This announcement alerted an otherwise inert government, and Dr de Silva hastily summoned all plantation trade unions by telegram for a conference at his Ministry of plantation Industries. At the conference held on 14 December, he explained that the monthly wage question was under Consideration, and therefore, the Strike threat should be withdrawn. But, after the CWC had left, the Minister expressed surprise that the UPWU - a CP-led union - had also declared a strike. He then haughtily threatened to use the armed forces to break the proposed strike. The author refused to be intimidated but finally agreed to postpone the strike on a Written assurance from the Prime Minister to the effect that the government would give serious consideration to the workers' common demand of a monthly Wage. The Minister agreed to tender such an assurance to the author within three days.
The promised assurance from the Prime Minister never Came. Despite being president of a union (UPWU), led by a breakaway section of the CP headed by Housing Minister Pieter

Plantation Workers' Struggles. 1945 - 1973 249
Keuneman, some of the author's union Colleagues and the author felt that even if the demand for a monthly wage could not be realized, a strike was necessary to prevent the managers of government controlled estates and other employers from riding rough-shod over the plantation workers. And so the UPWU launched the strike on 18 December, just as the CWC did, and there was instant response from the Workers especially in the Up-Country.
Hundreds of thousands of Workers went on strike, and an angry Finance Minister, Dr Perera, who was president of the LEWU which too demanded a monthly wage, declared that in no Country in the world were plantation workers paid a monthly wage, and condemned the strike. Attempts were made by the government and some of the pro-government union bosses to intimidate especially the UPWU leaders and undermine the strike. In the face of sustained pressure, including physical threats, the author's colleagues and the author made a lightning tour of the Up-Country and campaigned vigorously to strengthen the strike. The campaign gathered so much momentum that even members of Aziz's union (DWC) and Dr Perera's union (LEWU) joined the strike. Sarath Muttettuwegama MP, who (together with the CP leader Dr Wickremasinghe MP) had withdrawn from the UF government in 1972, also publicly called upon his newly founded Plantation industries Workers' Union members to join the strike. And, despite severe opposition from the government, the strike continued beyond the week originally planned for.
However, on the tenth day the CWC unilaterally called off the strike, and in the circumstances the UPWU suspended the strike. The token general strike had demonstrated to the government that the plantation workers would not for long tolerate the discriminatory wage policy pursued against them. The workers were so solidly united in the struggle that the authorities dared not victimize any single worker for participating in the strike. However, the leaders of the UPWU including the author who conducted the strike, became victims of the union's then political leadership. The strike was considered by some so-called "honest Communists" as an embarrassment to Pieter Keuneman Who Was a Minister in Ms Bandaranaiake's Cabinet, and we were compelled to resign from our elected posts. This led to a serious decline of the union. But it must be noted that the government responded to this major strike by declaring that the estate employers should

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offer "a minimum of 108 days work within a period of six months", ie., an average of 18 days a month.
11 12 13
Notes
T. Duraisingham, CFTU and the Working Class Movement, Colombo, 1966, p 16.
Planters' Association of Ceylon 1854 - 1954, Colombo, 1954, p. 39. Ibid., p. 39.
T. Duraisingham, op. cit. pp. 23 - 24. S.U.Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka, Delhi, 1982, p. 61. P. Navaratne, Collective Agreements in Sri Lanka, Colombo 1987, pp. 26 - 27.
S.Thondaman, My Life and Times, Colombo, 1988, p. 218. As reported to the author by C.V. Velupillai, who attended this conference with A. Aziz. Abdul Aziz - 75th Birthday Felicitation Volume, Colombo, 1986. The assurance given by the CP leaders - Dr S.A.Wicramasinghe, Pieter Keuneman and N. Sanmugathasan to the author and P.Devaraj at General's House (MP's holiday resort at Nuwara Eliya) in mid-1959 prior to the split in the DWC, that a session of the CPWU would be held within three months of the split and that C.V. Velupillai and S.M. Subbiah would be elected as president and secretary of the CPWU, was not honoured. Times of Ceylon, 29 July 1966.
Central Bank Report, 1973, Aththa, 8 November 1973, cited by Rachel Kurian, State, Capital and. Labour in the Plantation Industry in Sri Lanka 1834 - 1984 (unpublished thesis), India, 1989, p. 277.

Chapter
15
JAYEWARDENE REGIME: COMIMUNAL RIOTS AND UP.-COUNTRY TAMILS
As a result of the adoption of the Republican Constitution in 1972, which had extended by two years the life of parliament elected for a five-year term, the general elections were held only in July 1977. The unemployment problem, the scarcity and the high cost of essential goods, the mismanagement of public Corporations and

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the emergency that lasted for 2,000 days had resulted in a mounting opposition to the SLFP. Making maximum use of this state of affairs the UNP promised in its manifesto "food for the hungry", "land for the landless" and "employment for the youth", and proposed to implement a "democratic socialist" programme. Equally attractive was its programme for the minority Tamils.
Manifestos of Political Parties and the Tamil Question
The Ceylon Tamil people's demand for a separate state for Eelam had become so pronounced that the UNP declared its policy on this question rather elaborately. The manifesto stated: "The United National Party accepts the position that there are numerous problems confronting the Tamil-speaking people. The lack of a solution to their problems has made the Tamil-speaking people support even a movement for the creation of a separate state. In the interest of national integration and unity so necessary for the economic development of the whole country, the party feels such problems should be solved without loss of time. The party, when it comes to power, will take all possible steps to remedy their grievances in such fields as education, colonization, use of Tamil language and employment in the public and semi-public corporations."
This categorical statement was directed at the Tamil-speaking people in general and particularly at the Ceylon Tamils living outside the Northern and Eastern provinces. In contrast to this statement of the UNP, the SLFP's manifesto under the heading "National Unity" merely said that "a National Consultative Committee consisting of representatives of every ethnic group in the country would be established to advise the government on ethnic, linguistic, economic, social and cultural questions of a national nature".
The United Left Front, formed by the CP and the LSSP, declared under the heading - "National Minorities":
While retaining the unitary character of the state, the principle of regional autonomy will be applied within the general national framework of District Councils...Tamil will be declared a national language, in terms of the constitution, without prejudice

Communal Riots and Up-Country Tamils 253
to the status of Sinhala as the official language of the Country. Discrimination in education or employment on the basis of race, religion or caste will be prohibited. Incitement of racial or religious hatred will be declared a penal offence.
The Ceylon Tamils largely fought the general elections as representatives of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). It was when all efforts to win their rights failed (BandaranaikeChevanayagam Pact, 1957, and the Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayagam Agreement, 1965, were not implemented) that the Federal Party, the Tamil Congress and the Ceylon Workers' Congress (not a political party) formed the Tamil United Front in 1972 with a triumvirate of presidents, namely, Chelvanayakam, Ponnambalam and Thondaman. And in 1976 this Front was renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which advanced the call for a "Free, Sovereign, Socialist state of Tamil Eelam," but with a proviso that the CWC would not be a party to the call for a separate state. The TULF, in its election manifesto, stated that "the Tamil nation must take the decision to establish its sovereignty in its homeland on the basis of its right to
self-determination".
1977 Elections and the Sri Lankan Indians
According to the Delimitation Commission Report "about 257,000 persons had obtained citizenship under all three Acts up to 1971 and this number increased to about 320,000 in 1975". But due to the discriminative procedures adopted by the Department of Elections thousands of registered citizens eligible to vote were not registered in the electoral register. Nevertheless, they enjoyed marginal importance in influencing the victory or defeat of the two main parties - the UNP and SLFP - in many up-country electorates. Though the UNP manifesto said nothing on the vital stateless problem, Thondaman rather belatedly called upon the Sri Lankan Indians to support the UNP. As a result of the harassment and suffering the Tamil plantation workers had had to endure under Ms Sirima Bandaranaike's regime, it needed no special effort to mobilize the estate votes in favour of the UNP. Consequent to the death of both Chelvanayagam and Ponnambalam, Thondaman emerged as the sole president of the TULF. Thus Thondaman was

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president of the TULF which called for a separate state while being president of the CWC which opposed the division of the country. Such a position was not favourable to the Ceylon Tamils, on the other hand, it was detrimental to the interests of Sri Lankan Indians who began to call themselves Up-country Tamils as distinct from the Ceylon Tamils.
Landslide Victory for UNP
The UNP, by ably exploiting the discontent among the underprivileged masses and making empty promises to the minorities, gained an unprecedented victory at the general elections held in July 1977. It won 139 seats in a reformed House of 168 members while the SLFP was reduced to a mere 8 seats in parliament. The TULF, with 18 MPs, emerged as the main opposition party in parliament. Both the LSSP and CP failed to win a single seat and, for the first time in three decades, they were unrepresented in parliament. The CWC leader, S. Thondaman, was elected third member of the Nuwara Eliya-Maskeliya multi-member electorate.
An extensive comment in the Tribune on Thondaman's election reads:
This electorate has about 64,000 registered voters about 22,000 of whom are registered citizens of recent Indian origin. There are about 2,000 Ceylon Tamils and about 3,000 Muslims (also Tamil speaking). This leaves 37,000 Sinhalese. Each voter had three votes. UNP's Gamini Dissanayake top scored with 65,903. To the surprise of many people Anura Bandaranaike had come second with 48,776 and Thondaman was third with a rather poor 35,743. In an earlier issue, Tribune has indicated that after the "rescue" operations launched by Gamini post Delta, Sanquhar and Devon, many Indian voters wanted to take out insurance for the safety of their person and property by tying up with the UNP. In all plantation districts, inquiries reveal estate Indian voters have voted UNP ... Such voters preferred the UNP even to the LSSP which they had learnt to identify with the atrocities of the land and plantations' policies of the SLFP.
As a token of appreciation of CWC's role in the general elections the new Prime Minister, J.R. Jayewardene, caused the appointment of its stalwarts A. Annamalai as Director of Janawasama and R. Jesudasan, Director of the Udarata Co-operative Estates Development Board.

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1977 Communal Riots
As mentioned, the TULF with 18 seats became the second largest party in parliament. While the UNP leader, J.R. Jayewardene became Prime Minister, the Opposition in parliament came to be led by the TULF leader, A.Amirthalingam. Satchi Ponnambalam COrnmentS:
This at once turned the parliamentary confrontation between government and opposition into one between a Sinhalese government and a Tamil opposition. This was a disaster for Tamil politics. Any position taken up by the opposition was interpreted as coming from a party that stood for the division of the country. In his naivety, however, Amirthalingam seemed to be delighted with his new role as leader of the Opposition. This was in a parliament where the opposition was totally ineffectual and the government party Commanded a five-sixth majority.
The government, in its policy statement on the Tamil question made in parliament on 4 August 1977, stated that it would "summon an All-Party Conference to resolve this problem and implement its decisions". With this policy statement it seemed that the Jayewardene government was really serious in resolving the grievances of the Tamil people. However, within two weeks the situation changed dramatically and a major communal riot broke out in mid-August.
The progression of events began when the police burnt down the Jaffna market, following an incident on 13 August at a carnival held at St Patrick's College where two policemen had been injured when they had attempted to enter the carnival without tickets. The government turned a blind eye to this police violence and this inaction on the part of the government authorities was construed by Sinhala chauvinists as license to unleash mob-violence against the innocent Tamil people. Fired by wild rumours, a wave of barbaric attacks on Tamil people spread in the Central and Southern parts of the island and soon engulfed the whole country. Yet, Jayewardene hesitated to declare a state of emergency and failed to deal with the marauders.
it was the Up-Country Tamil people, especially the plantation workers, who had to face the brunt of this white terror. Shops were looted by thugs. Men were attacked with knives and Swords. A number of people were killed and many women gang

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raped. The general anti-Indian policy pursued by successive governments led unruly elements and organized goondas to believe that their violence was indeed legitimate and such a belief was strengthened by the direct or indirect participation of some UNP and SLFP politicians infomenting the attacks. The reluctance of the police authorities to arrest those indulging in violence against the Tamil people only helped the looters and the murderers. On the estates, when the workers were attacked and their line-rooms set ablaze, thosands of them fled. Often estate superintendents were indifferent to armed Sinhalese gangs entering the estates and indulging in an orgy of violence.
C.JannoCone, SJ, an eye-witness, wrote:
What astonished me in some of these cases was the unconcern of the superintendents and the stunning lethargy of the police. It looked as if the curfew meant for harmless people to stay quiet at home so that the looters could have the field all to themselves. "There is no danger, one superintendent said, ostrich like, absolutely no danger'. No special watchers are needed. The army is not required if the labourers do not provoke others or harbour any outsider...' And then he was surprised that all the labourers without a single exception demanded to leave his estate for India, Vavuniya or any other estate as soon as the modicum of clam was restored in the country.'
However, it must be stated that there were scores of instances where Sinhalese people not only provided refuge in their homes for the victims of the communal riots but also, risking danger to their own lives, protected them from Sinhalese thugs. Kandy and Matale were some of the worst affected districts in the Up-country. On arrival at Matale from Colombo on 17 August, the author found many Tamil homes looted and burnt. The house in which I lived was attacked the next day at midnight with stones - the windows were shattered but no further damage was done. The first people to visit our house at dawn were my Sinhalese friends who were seriously concerned about our safety.
Since the police either condoned the dastardly actions of the thugs or were ineffective in safeguarding the Tamil people, an Air Force unit took charge of the area. I had a discussion with the officer-in-charge and explained the urgent need for swift action. Indeed the Sinhalese officer not only appeared to be sympathetic but did take vigorous action without which more people would have lost their homes and their lives. At that stage the Air Force personnel had not been infected with anti-Tamil phobia.

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Thousands of men, Women and children, many of them terrorstricken, poured into the refugee camps at Matale from the estates. Often these people had lost everything they possessed. Many had been hiding amongst the tea-bushes, Cocoa-trees or in jungles for days and nights. Hindu temples, churches, mosques and schools were instantly transformed into refugee camps with hardly any facilities to meet such a contingency. Volunteer doctors and nurses attended to the injured and the sick while voluntary organizations offered much needed food and clothing. 4.
A week after the violence had begun, the Indian High commissioner in Sri Lanka, Gurbachan Singh, visited some of the refugee Centres at kandy and Matale. At Muthu-Mariamman Temple at Matale, there were some 7,000 refugees and, as the helicopter was circling to land, I could sense the tense and taut faces brightening up with hope. On the request of the committee looking after the refugees, I acted as a spokesman for an estimated 13,000 refugees in the town. At the temple office we apprised the High commissioner of the sad plight of the Tamil people in the area and the general desire of the refugees to proceed to India. Gurbachan Singh said that india could not possibly take all the refugees but assured: "Certainly we can help the Indian passport holders to go to India". Further he said "That can hardly solve your problems. But We can bring this situation to the notice of the Sri Lankan government and impress upon the Prime Minister the need for protection to return to their homes and live in security. The next day, when Thondaman landed by helicopter, the temple refugees booed at him shouting: "You asked us to vote for the UNP and this is our fate. You can travel by helicopter with armed guards but we cannot even walk on the roads".
Describing the situation in Kandy, the Minister of Agriculture and Lands, E. Senanayake, said in parliament: "I come from a city where Tamils, Muslims, Sinhalese, Burghers and Malays have lived in amity over a century. But, if you come to Kandy and see today what has happened... you will think that we have gone back to the dark ages. Tamil girls have been raped."
On the behaviour of the police, Prime Minister J.R. Jayewardene said: "We know very well that throughout the island in some cases they stood while houses were looted... Complaints were made to me. "What are you doing' 'What are the police doing"? So that is an illness... Some of the police people

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have got used to being not police officers but party members"." Yet it is shocking to note the reaction of the CWC to the violence directed against the Tamil people. Instead of condemning the government for its failure to halt the barbaric attacks and the wanton destruction of their homes, the CWC statement, in fact, sympathized with the Jayewardene government. It read: "it is more than tragic that the new government that was swept into power with an absolute majority by the popular vote of the people should have been allowed to be held to ransom by the coterie of unlawful. elements".'
Having witnessed the lack of serious action by the government authorities to arrest the perpetrators of violence, large numbers of shop-keepers, middle-class elements and workers, especially the CWC estate leaders, pressured the Congress leadership to devise arrangements for their departure to India. A number of trade union leaders and union representatives were in fact engaged in frantic efforts to quit the country leaving their flock to their fate. A meeting of the CWC was held under the chairmanship of S.Thondaman and adopted the following resolution on 25 September 1977.
The Executive Council and the National Council of the Ceylon Workers Congress calls upon the governments of Sri Lanka and India as parties to the Indo-Ceylon Pact to review the whole situation stemming from the recent disturbances in Sri Lanka in the background of their magnitude and gravity and afford the people of Indian origin the right to choose the place of their resettlement irrespective of citizenship status.'
The resolution, in effect, called upon the Indian government to take not only all those who had opted for india but also those who had obtained Ceylon citizenship under the Indo-Ceylon Agreement implementation Act of 1967. Obviously, the CWC had no clearly defined policy on the citizenship rights of the people concerned. In fact, its policies were often determined by questions of expediency.
Unable to proceed to India and fearing to return to their homes, hundreds of Up-country Tamils trekked to Vavuniya, Kilinochchi and Mannar in the Northern Province. Humanitarian organizations assisted these displaced people to settle on jungle lands in the North. However, the majority of these unfortunate people Went back to their homes and line-rooms on the estates.

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Sansoni Commission Report
Public agitation compelled the government to appoint a Presidential Commission to inquire into the August violence and submit a report. After an exhaustive inquiry, the one-man commissioner M.C.Sansoni, a retired Supreme Court Judge came to the conclusion that the "cry for Eelam" raised by the TULF was the main cause of the communal disturbances. As a result he declared : "Therefore, the first measure I will recommend, to prevent a recurrence of the disturbances is that this claim be abandoned"."
The conclusion by Sansoni that "the cry for Eelam" was the main cause for the Communal disturbances is far from Correct. Firstly the TULF projected the call for a separate state of Tamil Eelam only at its convention held at Vaddukottai in May 1976 as a panacea for the multifarious problems confronting the Tamil people. Yet, communal riots had exploded in 1956, 1958 and in 1961, and the Tamil people had been subjected to violent attacks long before the cry for a separate Tamil state was raised. While terror still reigned in the country the TULF leader Amirthalingam told parliament :
For over the last 30 years the leaders of the Tamil community have tried desperately to live in peace and harmony, to live as brithers with the sinhalese people. The Hon. Prime Minister has told us that the people are saying, 'If you want to fight let there be a fight : If it is peace let there be peace'. I say, on behalf of the Tamil people, that we are a most peaceful people. We want peace but not peace at any cost.'
Secondly, though the CWC dissociated itself from that part of the TULF resolution that called for a separate state, it was the UpCountry Tamils who were the main victims of the communal violence. Sansoni's conclusion was all the more untenable since not a single trade union in the plantations had called for or lent Support to the call for an independent state of Tamil Eelam. Ironically, the majority of the Up-country Tamils had voted for the UNP, and in many instances, they were sure that they were attacked by the members of the very party that they had Supported.
Despite Thondaman playing a significant role in helping the UNP to win a number of seats in the UP-country and since racism had become institutionalized within the UNP, the

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chauvinists took the first opportunity that arose after the UNP's victory at the general elections to keep the Tamils in their place. Writing under the title "Class Formation and Communalism" Kumari Jayawardena says :
Communalism was also prevalent among the Sinhalese petty traders, rural small producers, and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, who believed that they had little chance of rising in the economic and political spectrum. Ideological support for such views was provided by the Sinhalese intelligentsia and Buddhist monks, who were keenly aware of the decline and suppression of traditional culture that had occurred under the impact of alien culture... The Sinhalese Buddhists, who felt economically hemmed-in, politically oppressed and culturally deprived were to find succour in racist myths and legends and, in their search for identity, were to express violence against religious. minorities. In the Sri Lankan context, there did not develop a strong national-minded bourgeoisie which might have taken a secular based united stand against imperialism; what came into being was a weak class of capitalists who, together with small producers in the urban and rural areas, espoused the retrograde ideology of communalism...'
The anti-Tamil pogroms of 1981 and 1983 against the Tamil minorities erupted after the government ushered in a new constitution in 1978. The CWC leader, S.Thondaman (who was still a leader of the TULF) and K.W. Devenayagam, a minister belonging to the Tamil community in the Eastern Province, had served as members of the select committee appointed by the government "to consider the revision of the constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka".
J.R. Jayewardene and the pro-UNP Tamil leaders claimed that the new constitution of the second Republic had granted many rights to the Tamil minorities. Therefore we shall briefly examine the new Constitution of 1978 before We deal With the pogroms unleashed against the Tamil people in 1981 and in 1983.
1978 CONSTITUTION
The entire political system based on the Westminster model was transformed by the introduction of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in September 1978. It had been contrived basically by J.R. Jayewardene. The constitution provided for an executive president who, in practice, would enjoy almost dictatorial powers. In reality, the system turned out to be neither democratic nor Socialist in character. A.J.Wilson Writes:

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The showcase of democracy is there for all the world to see - fundamental rights, language concessions to the principal minority, the Tamils (Sri Lankan and Indian), an independent judiciary, the ombudsman, a functional separation of powers and fairly permanent roadblocks to stop any movement towards dictatorship". 16
Under the constitution the President, elected by the people for a six-year term, became the head of the state, of the government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Though J.R. Jayewardene was not elected by the people as President of the Republic, he had already, like Napoleon who could not wait for the Pope to crown him Emperor of France, donned the mantle of a President on 4 February 1978, by an amendment to the 1972 constitution, the architect of which was Dr.Colvin R de Silva.
In the heterogeneous society obtaining in Sri Lanka, the constitution seemingly sought to provide for the rights of the minorities and religious groups. Article 18 read: "The Official Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala", while Article 19 read: "The National languages of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala and Tamil". On the question foreligious rights Article 9 stated: "The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1)(e)." In regard to citizenship Article 26(1) read: "There shall be one status of citizenship known as the status of a citizen of Sri Lanka. (2) A citizen of Sri Lanka shall for all perposes be described only as a 'citizen of Sri Lanka', whether such person became entitled to citizenship by descent or by virtue of registration in accordance with the law relating to citizenship".
Though the 1978 constitution did away with the distinction between a citizen by descent and a citizen by registration and provided for a single status of citizenship, these two categories of citizens do not enjoy equal rights. The constitution through Article 26(4) continues to maintain certain discriminatory clauses against citizens by registration. In regard to loss of citizenship Article 26(4) read: "No citizen of Sri Lanka shall be deprived of his status of a citizen of Sri Lanka, except under and by virtue of the provisions of sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Citizenship Act provided that provisions of sections 23 and 24 of that Act shall also be applicable to a person who became entitled to the status of a citizen of Sri Lanka by virtue of registration under the provisions of Sections 11, 12 or 13 of that Act".

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What then are the provisions of sections 23 and 24 of the notorious Ceylon Citizenship Act? Section 23 of the Citizenship Act reads: "A person who is a citizen by registration shall cease to be a citizen of Ceylon if that person resides outside Ceylon for five consecutive years or more" for purely personal reasons. Section 24(g) of the Act, which is even more explicit, reads: "Where the Minister is satisfied that a person who is a citizen of Ceylon by registration... has so conducted himself that his continuance as a citizen of Ceylon is detrimental to the interests of Ceylon, the Minister may by order declare that such person shall cease to be such a citizen, and thereupon the person in respect of whom the order is made shall cease to be a citizen of Ceylon by registration." This is the most obnoxious section which can be utilized by the government to deprive a registered citizen of his citizenship. The logical implication of sub-section (g) is that any registered citizen who happens to be a member of an opposition political party or a left trade union is in real danger of losing his or her citizenship.
In other words the equality conceded by Article 26(1) and (2) is completely nullified by Section 4 of the same Article in the constitution. No person who believes in justice and equality can deny that these latter provisions in the constitution lie like a Sword of Damocles over the heads of a million people who became registered citizens under the various Acts and those who would be citizens under the most recent Act in 1988.
In chapter Ill of the constitution dealing with fundamental rights, Article 14(2), which purported to extend various rights of freedoms to the stateless people of Indian origin for a period of ten years, was of no use to them. For instance Article 14(1) reads: "Every citizen is entitled to the freedom of movement and of choosing his residence within Sri Lanka." As we shall see Tamil plantation workers were not allowed to live in peace let alone enjoy residential rights even in areas where they had to migrate consequent to communal rights in the Up-country. Unlike the citizens, none of the stateless persons was able to obtain a passport to travel even to the middle-eastern countries for employment purposes. This much boasted article 14(2) had been included by the architects of the constitution to continue to deny these people their citizenship rights and keep them as voteless toilers. A.J.Wilson writes: "The fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution except for a few articles are subject to a variety of

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limitations which can be justifiable."
Thondaman becomes Minister
With the euphoria generated by constitutional provisions on citizenship and the so-called extension of fundamental freedoms to the stateless people, for a decade, S. Thondaman became Minister of Rural Industrial Development - the first Indian Tamil Cabinet Minister in independent Sri Lanka.
President Jayewardene brought Thondaman into the cabinet for a number of reasons: he was the leader of the largest single trade union -the CWC- and could swing large numbers of Up-country Tamil voters in support of the UNP. This move would drive a wedge in the opposition led by the TULF and negate any possibility of collaboration of the Up-country Tamils with the growing militant Tamil political movements in the North. It would also prevent the CWC from getting involved in any struggle that the left trade unions might launch on behalf of the plantation WOrkers.
Despite the fact that half a million people of Indian origin remained stateless and the government continued a policy of discrimination against the plantation workers, the CWC report for 1979-81 claimed: Many disabilities that the plantation workers Suffered for decades have been dismantled Since Mr Thondaman entered the Cabinet. Among those are the repeal of the Local Bodies Election Ordinance which ever Since its enaction had debarred plantation Workers from participating in local body polls even if they had the right to do so in parliamentary elections."
In August 1979 Thondaman haughtily declared at a meeting at Nawalapitiya that the government was determined to preserve communalamity and Stern action would be taken against the communal tub thumpers". And he added that "the minorities must get rid of their sense of fear for there is no cause for it. The days of discrimination are becoming a memory of the past."
Within two months of this statement, Thondaman's Own union member V. Palanivel was shot, allegedly by the security guard at Rajawela Group. The worker died at the Kandy General Hospital. When the young worker was seriously injured the estate Superintendent refused to transport him to the hospital, but he had

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gone out of his way to provide a vehicle for the guard to get away. This tragic incident occurred on an estate managed by NADSA of which the General Secretary of the CWC, M.S. Sellasamy, functioned as a director.
Though Thondaman painted a wonderful picture of the government, discrimination against the plantation workers continued unabated Thondaman himself complained to the Minister of Plantation industries "that a large number of estate Workers who were entitled to free rations had their token cards withdrawn by the Food Department on incorrect figures of income of these workers furnished by the estate managements," and that they had been kept out of the Food Stamps scheme.
Prevention of Terrorism Act
It was under the new constitution that, in July 1979, the government repealed the Proscribing of Liberation Tigers Law and brought in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act. Under this draconian Act a person could be detained incommunicado and without trial for 18 months. The act Smacked of the notorious South African Terrorism Act, and Virginia A. Leary of the International Commission of Jurists writes: "Many of the provisions of the Sri Lankan Act are equally contrary to accepted principles of the Rule of Law".
Since the Terrorism Act was mainly directed against the Tamil militants in the North, sufficient opposition was not mobilized against this monstrous Act even by the democratic forces in the South. Satchi Ponnambalam comments: "By the 1979 law, the Jayewardene government abdicated civil government of the Tamil people and substituted police and military rule over a historically law-abiding and peaceful people. It abrogated all legal and Constitutional safeguards with regard to arrest, detention, protection against self-incrimination and retrospective criminality".
Anti-Tamil Riots of August 1981
The communal violence unleashed against the Tamil people in

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August 1981 was largely confined to areas where the Sinhalese population predominated over a dispersed minority - the Indian Tamils. Therefore, it becomes necessary to understand the position occupied by the Indians in these areas. Being a small ethnic minority and by virtue of a wide demographic distribution they were not found in concentration except in the Nuwara Eliya district in the Central Province.
In 1981, of a total population of 14.85 million, 74 per cent. were Sinhalese, while 12.6 per cent were Sri Lanka Tamils. The Moors formed 7.1 per cent while the indian Tamils constituted 5.6 per cent of the population. It must be noted that by 1971 the proportion of the Indian Tamils had fallen from 12 per cent in 1953 to 9.4 per cent of the population.
The following table 15.1 shows the position of Indian Tamils in relation to the total population in the districts where they had settled in large numbers:
Table 15.1
Indian Tamils Percentage of Indian
Tamils Nuwara Eliya 257,478 42.7 Badulla 129,498 20.2 Ratnapura 84,740 10.6 Kandy 98,436 9.4 Matale 24,912 7.0 Kegalle 45,752 6.7 Kalutava 33,659 4.1 Moneragala 8,859 3.2 Matara 13,875 2.2 Galle 11,056 1.4
Source: Sri Lanka Census of Population and Housing 1981
This situation, where the Indian Tamils did not predominate in any district, made them all the more vulnerable in times of communal Crisis.
Even before a major communal riot erupted in the plantation areas in August 1981, a series of violent acts had occurred in Jaffna. In June, the magnificent Public Library,

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housing some 95,000 volumes, had been set on fire "by thugs from outside while the security forces did nothing to stop the arson". lan Goonetileke, Sri Lanka's famous bibliographer, commented that "the complete destruction...of the splendid Jaffna Public Library is the most wounding to the sensibility of our brethren in the North, and must outrage the human feelings of every person in the land, whatever his political, racial or religious persuasion".
In July, consequent to a campaign of vilification against opposition leader A. Amirthalingam, a motion of no confidence was moved against him. The motion was passed with "121 to nil with two abstentions". The CWC leader and Minister Thondaman courageously abstained. The other abstainee, Shelton Ranaraja, being a member of the UNP and Deputy Minister of Justice, even more courageously refused to vote for the motion; indeed he defied the tyranny of the majority in his party.
Terror Against Defenseless Workers
At the end of July, isolated acts of violence occurred at Amparai with burning of shops and attacks on Tamil people. Starting from Badulla and Bandarawela, the violence, with unprecedented virulence, spread to the towns and the plantations in the Sabaragamuwa province. A report by the Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality (MIRJE) reads: "The five days of commando styled gang attacks in Ratnapura on 12 August, and on successive days thereafter in Pelmadulla, Kahawatte, Rakwana and finally Balangoda, brought in their train deaths and destruction to the impoverished Indian Tamil estate workers scattered among 40 estates in the whole district of Ratnapura. Their line dwellings were set ablaze and their belongings destroyed, as thousands fled for the safety of their lives, either to the several refugee camps set up in schools and churches or to the adjoining jungles. The numbers affected have been estimated to be in the region of 30 - 40 thousand. A large number of refugees had later to be evacuated to the main Hindu Temple in Colombo, to be under the care of the indefatigable organizers of the TRRO (Tamil Refugees
Rehabilitation Organization)".

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Despite all this terror the Tamil people did not retaliate - not a single Sinhalese was killed. Yet, the government authorities did nothing to stop the wanton destruction of people and property. In fact, a policeman had led an attack on the refugees at St Anne's Church at Kahawatte. The terror was so unbridled that the editorial in the Sun under the title "Stop this Havoc" read:
The latest reports show that goondas have also started to run amok and that there is widespread looting and pillage...since August 1977 we have witnessed many wanton racial murders. Except to declare a State of Emergency here and Emergency there, what has the government done to round up the mischief makers, nay murderers, and wipe out this menace from the face of Lanka? The first duty of any Government is to ensure the safety of its citizens. Judged by that yardstick we regret to have to record that the present administration stands naked. We ask the Government to act fast and use all means at its command to stifle racial dissension and impeach all those responsible for inflaming racial hatred in our midst. Mother Lanka is in travail and demands it.”
When the author's colleague R.S. Baskaran and the author visited Ratnapura on 17 August, we saw many Tamil shops and houses burnt and clouds of smoke rising from some buildings. At our union office at Ratnapura we were told, in muffled tones of course, that the violence against the Tamil people had been organized and led by members of the party in power. We learnt that even the refugees in some church buildings had been attacked by thugs.
On our arrival at Balangoda at noon, after passing through road blocks set up by the army, we saw shops set ablaze by gangsters. Tamil people were running desperately seeking some sanctuary. Our union branch officials and some CP Members were engaged in escorting terror-stricken workers from the estates to refugee centres organized in church buildings. Fr. Pio Ciampa, an italian Jesuit priest, who had rendered commendable service to the down-trodden plantation workers in this area, was fully engaged in assisting the refugees.
it was the CP member A. William, the present General. Secretary of the UPWU and a Provincial Council member for Ratnapura district, who, apprehending danger to our lives on Our journey to Haputale, accompanied us for several miles, since an army officer strictly warned us of the danger ahead. As we proceeded we saw a Tamil shop being set on fire but we were helpless. We drove on after learning that the shop-keeper had fled before the thugs came for his shop - that was some consolation indeed

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Haputale town was tense - Tamil shops were closed. We met many trade unionists and discussed ways and means of preventing gangsters entering the plantations. It was on the 17th evening that the government declared a State of Emergency - almost a week after violence had flared up in the Ratnapura area. When we reached Hatton we learnt that thousands of refugees from the Balangoda area were pouring into Bogowantalawa, a small town lodged amongst a sea of tea bushes. The next morning at this place we saw hundreds of men, women and children at the Hindu temple. Almost all of them had come with nothing but the clothes they were wearing. Many of them had walked 20 to 40 miles through jungle paths and were exhausted and hungry. The trade unions quickly organized assistance for these unfortunate people. However, the most moving and noteworthy assistance was extended to them by the estate workers. People, whom they had never seen before, were welcomed with open arms into their dingy line rooms; thousands of refugees were thus accommodated in the estates around Bogowanitalawa.
Meanwhile, many thousands of refugees from the Ratnapura area had been housed in Hindu temple halls in Colombo and were looked after by the TRRO. The author accompanied by M. Kalyanasundaram, a leader of the Communist Party of India and a Member of the Indian Parliament, visited the refugees at Bambalapitiya Temple buildings.
On the initiative of the author, the JPTUC held an emergency meeting in Colombo and addressed a joint letter to President Jayewardene calling upon the government to appoint an impartial commission to investigate the violence unleashed against the Tamil people and pay compensation to all victims of the violence. A delegation of the Joint Committee led by the author met the High Commissioner for India, Thomas Abraham. and requested him to expedite arrangements for those refugees who possessed Indian citizenship to travel to India. The High Commissioner informed the delegation that he had drawn the attention of the government to the deplorable situation caused by the violence and assured us that he would arrange for the Indian passport holders to proceed to India. The Hindu reported: The Indian High Commissioner Mr Thomas Abraham called on the Foreign Office to convey his government's concern over reports of attacks on Indian Tamils in different estates. Mr Abraham said,

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most of these refugees held Sri Lankan passports. He was helpless in the matter. He could seek protection for Indian passport holders only.’
The atrocities Committed by Organized gangs against the innocent and unarmed Tamil plantation workers were so brazen and barbaric that even President Jayewardene was moved to state publicly that he was ashamed to be the leader of the UNP. He and the Prime Minister, R. Premadasa, toured the Ratnapura. district on 3 September and attempted to assuage the feelings of the victims. Addressing the UNP Executive Committee meeting the next day President Jayewardene said:
I speak more in sorrow than in anger. Recent events throughout the island - North, Centre and South - show that the religions we profess do not seem to influence for the good of some of our people. I regret that some members of my party have spoken in Parliament and outside, words that encourage violence and the murders, rapes and arson that have been committed.
How many of our party leaders throughout the country have spoken against the recent acts of violence?... I must have reasons to be proud of the party of which I am leader. If I cannot, it is better for me to retire from the leadership of this party and let those, who believe that the harming of innocent people and property that has happened recently is the way to solve the problem that face this multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-caste society, take over the leadership of the party.'
This statement was quickly followed by the expulsion of the MP for Panadura, Dr Neville Fernando, The MP for Ratnapura, G.V. Punchinilame, was removed from his post of Deputy Minister of Regional Development. Laudable action one might Say. But, it must be noted that Punchinilame was rehabilitated even before some of the victims of this violence. He was sworn in by none other than President Jayewardene himself, paradoxically enough as Deputy Minister of State Plantations on 7 April 1983.
Communal Violence and Thondaman's Behaviour
The national council of the CWC met under the chairmanship of S. Thondaman and, in a statement, lamented that "these acts of unbridled terrorism which, for the second time in four years rendered a community of dignified hard working people

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refugees.... have brought into sharper relief the stark realities that they are by no means secure and safe in particular areas of the country".
In Tamil Nadu, the DMK and Opposition leader M. Karunanidhi, planned a mass protest demonstration opposite the Sri Lankan Deputy High Commissioner's office in Madras against the atrocities perpetrated on the Tamils and against the gruesome murder of an Indian pilgrim, S. Dhanapathy, at Kataragama where he had gone to pay homage to the Hindu god Murugan.
In this tragic situation what was most shocking, particularly to the Indian Tamil people, was the behaviour of S. Thondaman. He, who claimed to be the undisputed leader of the people of Indian origin, never visited any of the areas afflicted by the violence. On the other hand, Thondaman, who was impotent to restrain some of his cabinet colleagues who, like the Nazis against the Jews, were churning out an ideology of hatred against the Tamils, flew to Delhi and called upon the Indian people to exercise moderation in their condemnation of the atrocities against the Tamils in Sri Lanka. At Trichinopoly in South India, he said that his government took full responsibility for the safety of Sri Lankan Indians and would pay compensation to all those affected in the recent disturbances....and there was no need for the Indian President or the Indian Prime Minister to visit the island in Search of a solution." And he called upon the people in Tamil Nadu to abandon the One-day hartal organized by all political parties there against the violence in Sri Lanka. Quite naturally Thondaman's call was met with derision in Tamil Nadu. In fact, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, M.G. Ramachandran, reacted sharply and asked what Thondaman, as a Minister and leader of Tamil workers, had doneto protect the estate workers. Though Karunanidhi was arrested, 15 September was observed throughout Tamil Nadu as a day of mass protest against the atrocities committed on the Tamils in Sri Lanka.
In this situation Thondaman conjured up a new idea. Attempting to exploit the intense feeling of sympathy in India for the Sri Lankan Tamils he called upon the Tamil Nadu people (55 million) to contribute at the rate of 25 cents per head towards a fund to rehabilitate the victims of the anti-Tamil pogrom. This was indeed shocking since no goondas had come from across the Palk Strait and attacked the Tamil people in Ratnapura. In fact, it was his government party men who were the villains, and this was

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stated by no less a person than President Jayewardene himself.
It is interesting to note that Minster Thondaman and President Jayewardene held almost indentical views on India's concern for the victims of the anti-Tamil program in August 1981. Jayewardene abhored any interference from India while Thondaman was opposed even to strong protest demonstrations in Tamil Nadu against the violence in Sri Lanka.
Following the communal violence, the editor of India Today, S. Venkat Narayan, visited Ratnapura. The police arrested Narayan but released him after confiscating the photographs he had taken of the "ruins' - Tamil people's burnt-out shops and houses - in the area. In an interview with President Jayewardene, Narayan told him that this violence "has caused anxiety in India where there was a heated discussion in Parliament". The President's reaction to this Was:
I can understand the anxiety of India... But I feel the Indian Government should not show undue anxiety. In Sri Lanka it can be misunderstood. We do not like interference in our affairs and I feel our government is liberal, democratic and as humane as the Indian government or any government in the world. There's nothing they can teach us or anybody can teach us about how to govern a country.'
How far the Jayewardene government was democratic and humane soon became evident. Instead of paying compensation to the victims of violence and meting out punishment to those who organized and indulged in the murder, arson and rape, the government passed an Indemnity Act in 1982 granting immunity to ministers and public servants for their action "with a view to restoring law and order". And the Indemnity (Amendment) Act No. 6 of 1988 offered immunity to them for such actions from August 1977 to December 1988.
Presidential Election and the Referendum
Before we come to the 1983 July violence it will be useful to understand the way the Up-Country Tamils voted in the Presidential election. We shall therefore deal briefly with the Presidential election and the Referendum Conducted in October and December 1982 respectively.

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Though the Presidential election was scheduled for late 1983, the government by a surprise move advanced the election to October 1982. The opposition forces were not only in disarray but were in a predicament over the choice of a suitable common candidate. As a result of the imposition of civic disabilities on Ms Sirimavo Bandaranaike in October 1980, she could not be chosen as a candidate. Due to internal dissensions and squabbles within the SLFP, it was only on the eve of nomination day that Hector Kobbekaduwa of the SLFP came to be recognized as the common candidate. Kobbekaduwa emerged as the only formidable candidate against the incumbent President Jayewardene. The Communist Party came out strongly in support of Kobbekaduwa. Already by mid-September, President Jayewardene himself had started his campaign to woo the plantation voters. Addressing a meeting of the Ceylon Planters' Society he shed crocodile tears for the plight of the plantation workers. He said:
What have we done for these people? How far have we been helpful in raising their living standards? What is their state of education? The answers to these questions make me
very unhappy.
The plantation workers are yet to enjoy the full fundamental rights. In education, living standards and civic rights, they are the lowest in our society.... What is the reason for such a state of affairs to exist in a people who have been in this country for the last 150 years. They are the people of this country. But their life is full of suffering. Somewhere we have done some wrong.
This statement is at once a realistic portrayal of the conditions of the plantation workers and an indictment on Jayewardene's government. What had President Jayewardene, who was the Minster in charge of the two agencies - SPC and JEDB - that controlled the bulk of the plantations, done for five years to raise the living standards of these workers? Precious little or nothing. However, Thondaman and his colleagues interpreted this very statement to show how deeply the President was concerned about the welfare of the plantation workers and called upon them to support him at the Presidential election.
In this situation the SLFP's presidential candidate, Hector Kobbekaduwa, sought the support of the left-oriented trade unions. Recalling the misdeeds committed against the estate workers in the process of implementation of the Land Reform laws initiated by him when he was minister, the unions insisted that Kobbekaduwa

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should give an undertaking to meet the urgent demands of the workers if he desired their support. And a five-point Agreement was signed between Kobbekaduwa and the unions on 24 September at the SLFP head-quarters. These demands included "the settlement of the stateless problem once and for all in consultation with the plantation trade unions".
The Presidential election was held On 20 October 1982. The incumbent President Jayewardene won the election securing approximately 3.5 million votes, while Kobbekaduwa obtained about 2.5 million votes. The only Tamil candidate, G.G. Ponnambalam, leader of the Tamil Congress, realized only 174,000 votes. The TULF had boycotted the election - an unwise action reminiscent of the boycott of the first State Council election in 1931 by Ceylon Tamils on the initiative of the Jaffna Youth Congress.
While Thondaman and the CWC claimed that the estate voters had responded to their call and that Jayewardene won because of their support, the SLFP and the LSSP held that Kobbekaduwa lost since they failed to vote for him. Indeed, both. these claims are fallacious since Jayewardene's lead over his main rival was a million votes whereas the total Up-country Tamil Votes, including those in the estates, amounted to only about 200,000. The estate workers largely voted according to the instructions given by their unions. Since the CWC and the LJEWU were large unions, the majority of the estate Workers supported Jayewardene, while a minority of them, led by the left unions, did vote for Kobbekaduwa at the presidential election.
Even before the tamashas following the election victory died down, President Jayewardene announced that the government had decided to hold a referendum to put off the general elections due in 1983 for six more years. Being a shrewd and calculating politician, he knew very well that if general elections were held on the basis of the proportional representation system he himself had designed, the government party could not get a two-thirds minority let alone the five-sixths majority it then enjoyed. So he went for what was most advantageous to him - the referendum. But a reason had to be invented. The President made the fantastic allegation that "Naxalites' in the SLFP had hatched a Conspiracy to assassinate him, his cabinet ministers and even the chiefs of staff and unleash an orgy of terror. He said that a referendum would be held in the interests of democracy. Hitler,

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once he was appointed Chancellor of Germany, used the referendum device to make himself the most despicable dictator the world had known.
Apart from the referendum being no substitute for a general election, it denied over a million young people their right to exercise their votes for the first time at a general election, until the year 1989. It also deprived thousands of Indians who had obtained citizenship of their right to participate in a general election. Yet, the CWC leader Thondaman supported the President in his manipulation to prolong the life of parliament and, in effect, helped the government to practically disfranchise them for another six years. Thondaman wooed the Tamils by saying: "I am always prepared to act on their behalf because I am convinced that I can persuade the government to do what is right and just for the Tamil speaking people within the quickest possible time".
The referendum, held under a state of emergency on 22 December, was certainly not free and fair. Opposition printing presses were shut down and many opposition politicians were arrested. There was mass impersonation and intimidation at the polling booths. It was declared that the majority (54.7 per cent). had voted for the lamp, the symbol of those who said 'Yes' to a second term of office for the UNP government. The lamp winning over the pot, the symbol of those who were opposed, ironically signified the extinguishing of democracy in Sri Lanka. Jayewardene's manoeuvres proved once again the truth of Lord Acton's famous statement: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power, corrupts absolutely".
The Holocaust - July 1983
At noon on Sunday 24 July 1983, a Sinhalese newspaper reporter brought the shocking news that 13 Sinhalese soldiers had been ambushed and killed by the Tamil militants in Jaffna and that the army ran amok and retaliated by killing some 40 Tamil civilians. He also informed us that the bodies were being flown to Colombo. This news spelt imminent danger to all Tamils and, therefore, we telephoned all our Tamil friends and warned them of the imminent danger to them but, of course, few of them took the warnings Seriously.

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By evening thousands of people had gathered at Kanatte, the city's main cemetery, not far from the President's private residence. It was reported that the dead men's bodies were demanded by relatives contrary to the state funeral planned by the government authorities. The crowd became boisterous and they began a rampage by attacking Tamil people and shops at Borella. Many Tamils were killed and their shops and homes looted and set ablaze.
The next morning's (Monday) newspapers published in bold headlines reports of the killing of the 13 soldiers in Jaffna. The reports were slanted and provocative. By noon our Sinhalese friends brought eye-witness stories of how men, women and children were being burnt alive or hacked to death. It was indeed clear that the much feared holocaust against the Tamil people had begun in all its fury. Though danger was lurking all around us, we stayed on for three more days at the office and, after a short spell of refuge at the C P office at Borella, entered Thurstan College camp where the number of reguees had swelled to some 6,000.
L. Piyadasa, the author of Sri Lanka - the Holocaust and After Writes:
The job was done in Colombo and its suburbs within a matter of hours - much of it between 10am and 2pm when the curfew began, but the action continued all afternoon and evening, as the army was involved - by about lo'clock it looked as though there had been an air raid. We have to consider what people noticed about the men who led the action. In Kelaniya, Industries Minister Cyril Mathw's gangs were identified as the ones at work. The General Secretary of the government union, the Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS) was identified as the leader of gangs which wrought destruction and death all over Colombo and especially in Wellawatte. In the Pettah ( the bazaar area, where 442 shops were destroyed and murders committed) the commander was the son of Aloysius Mudalali, the Prime Minister's right-hand man. The thugs who worked regularly for the leaders of the UNP, and in some cases uniformed military personnel and police, were seen leading the attack. They used vehicles of the Sri Lanka Transport Board (Minister in charge, M H Mohamed) and other government departments and state corporations Trucks of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation oil refinery came from many miles away bringing the men who destroyed so much of Wellawatte. There is much evidence of this sort.’
On Thursday evening (28th July) President Jayewardene broke his long and invidious silence. We anxiously listened to the speech on the radio, but to our dismay he expressed no sympathy for the victims of violence. Referring to the death of the 13 soldiers the President said: "Because of this violence by the terrorists the

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Sinhalese people themselves have reacted". Referring to the TULF, he said that the cabinet had decided to bring in legislation "to prevent from entering the legislature if they belong to a party that seeks to divide the nation". And he exhorted: "I cannot See, and my government cannot see, any other way we can appease the natural desire and request of the Sinhalese people to prevent the country being divided". In effect, the President's speech, instead of condemning the perpetrators of violence, tended to justify their barbaric activities. The next morning saw a fresh flare-up of the violence, and more Tamils were Killed.
Meanwhile, consequent to the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi's telephone conversation with President Jayewardene, India's Foreign Minister, Narasimha Rao had arrived in colombo. Rao helicoptered over the ravaged city, parts of which were still burning. He had later reported to the Lok Sabha: "I impressed upon the President and his colleagues the intensity of concern felt in India and the anxiety that the clashes as well as the sufferings might persist or even might grow".
Many Up-country towns including Nuwara Eliya, Nawalapitiya, Kandy, Matale and Badulla had been affected by communal attacks - some of them seriously after the President's notorious speech on 28th July. An eye-witness account of what happened at Nuwara Eliya on 29th July reads:
These people (some well-known rowdies) went out immediately well equipped with petrol, iron rods and other kinds of weapons, and tried to attack two Tamil priests in town. They managed to escape. Without having succeeded they moved on - another mob joined up with the first one. They laid a ring of petrol around a Tamil shop which was then burnt. They were supported in this by the army who supplied them with 2 gallons of petrol. During the day nearly ail Tamil owned shops were burnt. Mrs Herath Ranasinghe ordered the army to disperse the looters - but it was already too late. The Member of Parliament was banished from town under a hail of insults. Tamil people who still walked the streets were beaten by the soldiers. The fire brigade which stood waiting was hindered by the army and the Sinhalese mob in doing its job. Shops which had not been burnt by the mob were set fire to by the army. Around noon Nuwara Eliya was like a sea of flames.
Thereafter the mob attacked the house of Tamil UN P organiser Jayaratnam. All doors were locked from the otside, the mob tried to lay a ring of fire around the house. This failed since the owner, who possessed a gun, defended himself from inside the house. One of the Sinhalese attackers was killd by a shot. Shouting "Terrorists kill Sinhalese" the mob dragged the dead man to the hospital. The news of his death was spread like lightening. 200 people, including a number of soldiers, came back to the house to set it

Communal Riots and Up-Country Tamils 277
on fire. A small girl running out of the house was caught by the crowd who pushed her back into the burning house, 13 relatives were burnt along with her.'
At Nawalapitiya, Tamil shops and houses had been attacked on 27 July. A few had died and many injured, but most people had escaped and taken refuge in churches, mosques and Convents. The author was informed that many lives had been saved and much damage avoided as a result of precautionary measures initiated by a group of left-oriented Sinhalese. However, on Friday 29 July, a wave of violence swept over Nawalapitiya and its suburbs. At Meepitiya, Tamil people fleeing their homes were called upon to gather at one house ostensibly for their safety. That became the first house to be attacked at night by organized thugs. When the refugees "gathered there scattered in all directions, that house and almost every other house in that area was damaged and burnt". People became aware of such ruses and found their way to the Good Shepherd Convent at Nawalapitiya, which at one stage accommodated some 4,000 refugees.
The most incredible news came on 30th evening. In a special broadcast the radio announced that three left parties - C P, N S S P and J. V P - had been proscribed. They "were suspected of being behind the organized violence".' It was preposterous to charge the C P and N S S P of communal violence: in fact, these parties were really engaged in assisting Tamil people during the violence; even the JVP had nothing to do with it.
V
The Holocaust and the CWC
The CWC and its leader Thondaman once again proved their bankruptcy in being driven into a state of helplessness. Their being a constituent part of the UNP government and their oftrepeated adulation of President Jayewardene was of no avail to the Up-country Tamils when the avalanche of communal attacks descended upon them. Thondaman, in his usual refrain, lamented: "Once again the community of Tamil speaking people of Indian origin also have been made victims of a savage form of violence rendering thousands without homes, reducing them to the rags that they are now in as destitutes. It is more than unfortunate that

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these elements of disaster, these squads of goondas and rabble have been allowed to parade the streets freely causing havoc and inflicting misery of such proportions with impunity." In a statement he said: "Even before the riots began in Colombo, the attack on the Tamil settlers in the Mannar, Vavuniya and Trincomalee areas had been set in motion. It is significant that communal violence on a large scale commenced with the burning of the huts of settlers in Trincomalee. they were uprooted from their homes in the early hours of the morning of 23rd July, bundled and brought against their will to Nuwara Eliya and Hatton and left as destitutes". Referring to the government's ingratitude the CWC stated: "In the backdrop of recurring waves of violence, the CWC points out that these acts of savagery, discrimination and displacement have been practiced in spite of the unstinted cooperation that the CWC has extended to the government and the wholehearted support the people of Indian Origin gave during the Presidential election and the referendum, that no compensation has been paid to date to the victims of the earlier violence, and none of those responsible have been punished". Abandoning their earlier stand during the 1981 August violence in relation to the Indian government, when Thondaman was critical of India's concern for the victims of violence, now they were appealing to India for assistance. The CWC resolved "to discuss with the government of India the present predicament of the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka and request India to open its doors to all people of Indian origin, be they citizens of Sri Lanka or stateless to enter and settle down in India if they so desire within six months..." In fact, the CWC Secretary, M S Sellasamy, met the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M G Ramachandran, in September 1983, in this connection."
Scapegoats for the Holocaust
Despite incontrovertible evidence that forces connected with the government party - the UN P - in fact were responsible for the July holocaust against the Tamils as mentioned earlier, the government proscribed the CP, NSSP and the JVP on the false allegation that they had been involved in the violence. Sarath Muttetuwagama, the CP Member of parliament, not only defended

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the CP from such allegations but exposed the ulterior motives of the government. He declared in parliament: "The allegation that is being made against us is a deliberate and despicable lie..." Describing the government's accusation against the CP as a conspiracy, he said that "this is a deliberate attempt to throw the whole blame for what happened on us, to use it internationally and nationally." And he said: "There are people - very powerful people - who would like to manipulate certain situations and there are obvious SCapegoats. The Soviet Union is an obvious scapegoat...Just because these things happened, and just because the government also delayed and failed to take certain steps, therefore, the blame must be put on somebody else. Everybody knows, Sir, the houses and areas that were attacked, that CTB buses came with thugs...The State apparatus was used".
Since the Tamil people, with a 100,000 regugees amongst them, had undergone the most horrifying and traumatic experience in all their lives, Minister Thondaman Could not remain dumb in parliament if he wanted to retain some degree of Credibility as a Tamil leader. He said:
It is very unfortunate that we are now trying to appease people who have been doing criminal acts...The government must give protection. This is not the first time we have suffered. In 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983. Today the whole country is on fire. People are lying. Hundreds of thausands of Tamils are suffering but the Daily News the
government organ, writes about dumb friends. They are interested in cruelty to animals. We are reduced to that hopeless position.'
However, no action was taken against the Organisers of the violence. But the government passed the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution requiring all Members of Parliament to Swear an oath against advocating separation. Thus all MPs of the TULF were kept out of parliament.
it was the Island that reacted sharply to the holocaust and, in its editorial on 5 August, stated:
The avaiable statistics alone are enough of a condemnation which the whole country has to bear and for which there might never be any sufficient act of national penance. Statistics do not normally bleed, but these figures put out by the authorities reek from end to end of that intolerance and hate which transformed men into beasts during the last week.
In a chapter entitled 'The Racist Gospel' according to

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Mathew'Piyadasa Writes:
A close and comprehensive analysis of the July pogroms in their context points to only one conclusion. And it is this: far from there being the spontaneous actions of the Sinhalese masses inflamed by any attacks on sinhalese, they are a part of a strategy for driving out from their work places, schools and residential communities hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankans who were Tamils - a strategy carefully planned, organized and carried out by the dominant faction in the UN P. We know they were not the patriotic action of Sri Lankans against those who threatened the country."
Notes
1 Parliament of Sri Lanka, Colombo: Lake House, 1977, p. 262.
Ibid, p. 282.
Ibid, p. 311.
Ibid, p. 301.
Ibid, p. 51.
Tribune, 23 July 1977, p. 6.
Satchi Ponnambalam, Sri Lanka and Tamil Liberation Struggle,
p. 194.
8 C. Jannocons S.J., "Our Week of Terror", Satyodaya Bulletin,
November 1977, Kandy, p. 7.
9 Hansard, 23 August 1977, Vol. 23, No. 5, col. 713-714.
10 Ibid, 7 Oct 1977, Vol. 23, No. 13, col. 1610.
11 Congress News, 1 Sept. 1977, p. 1.
12 Ibid, Oct 1977, p. 1.
13 M.C. Sansoni, Presidential Commission Report, SP VII of
1980, p. 266. 14 Hansard, 23 Aug 1977, Vol. 23 No. 5, col. 792. 15 Kumari Jayawardena, Class Formation and Communalism, Sri Lanka -
Racism and the Authoritarian State, London, 1984, pp. 61-62. 16 A.J. Wilson, The Gaullist System in Asia - The Constitution of Sri Lanka
1978, London, 1980, p. xiv. 17 Ibid, p. 104. 18 CWC Report of Activities 1979-81, reproduced in CWC Report 1982-1984,
p. 10. 19 Congress News, 30 Aug 1979, p. 7. 20 Ibid, 15 Nov 1979, p. 1. 21 Ibid, p. 4. 22 Virginia A. Leary, Ethnic Conflict and Violence in Sri Lanka:Report of a Mission to Sri Lanka in July-August 1981 on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists, New York, 1981, p. 48. Satchi Ponnambalam, op. cit. p. 202. Quoted, 1981 - Year of Racial Violence, Colombo, MIRJE 1983, p. 8. Ibid, p. 31.

27 28 29
31 32 33
Communal Riots and Up-Country Tamils 281
"Stop this Havoc," Sun, 12 Aug 1981, cited in Tribune, 22 Aug 1981, p. 4.
The Hindu, 18 Aug 1981.
Ceylon Daily News, 5 Sep 1981. Parliament of Sri Lanka, Lake House, 1986, p. 257. Congress News, 1 Oct 1981, p. 2.
Ceylon Daily News, 5 Sept 1981.
Ibid, 9 Sept 1981.
India Today, Vol. VI, No 17, 1 - 15 Sept 1981, p. 18. Congress News, 15 Sept 1982, p. 4. Agreement between Hector Kobbekaduwa, SLFP Presidential candidate and the following unions: United Plantation Workers Union, Democratic Workers' Congress, Lanka General Services Union, Ceylon Plantation Workers' Union and Sri Lanka Independent Estate Workers' Congress - signed on 24 Sept 1982.
Congress News, 1 - 15 Dec 1982, p. 1. L. Piyadasa, Sri Lanka: The Holocaust and After, London, 1984, pp. 80–81. Sun, 29 July 1983.
Daily News, 5 Aug 1983. Sri Lanka - Paradise in Ruins - Anti-Tamil Riots in July - August 1983, Kassel, West Germany, Centre of Sri Lanka Co-ordination, 1983, pp. 12-13 Prime Minister's speech in Parliament - Hansard, 4 Aug 1983, col. 1286. Daily News, 3 Aug 1983.
Island, 17 Aug 1983.
Ibid.
Sun, 30 Sept 1983.
Hansard, 4 Aug 1983, col. 1325, 1328, and 1335.
Ibid, col. 1353.
L. Piyadasa, op. cit. p. 110.

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Chapter
16
ESTATE SCHOOLS - THEIR PROBLEMSAND PROGRESS
Though estate schools had made considerable progress in the 1930s they continued to suffer from neglect by the planters and discriminatory treatment by the government. No serious attempt was made by the Ministry of Education even to implement the provisions laid down in the legislative enactments purported to improve the school facilities available to estate children. The

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deprivation of citizenship rights and the policy of segregation pursued against the people of Indian origin for nearly three decades by successive governments, even after independence, were the main factors that contributed to their being denied equality of opportunity in the field of education.
it was in 1943 that the Report of the Special Committee on Education, headed by the then Minister of Education, C.W.W. Kannangara, was published. The report, known as the Kannangara Report, stated: "The Ceylon University (No. 20 of 1942) fused the University College and the Medical College. Technical training is given in the Ceylon Technical College under the direct Control of the Executive Committee of Education. There are 125 industrial schools operated by the Department of Commerce and Industries and Agricultural schools operated by the Department of Agriculture. Pirivenas and schools of oriental studies are in Colombo and Jaffna. There is also the Law College. Ceylon thus has a complete educational system from the Primary school to the University."
The Report recommended that education be made free in all government schools. It declared that "education in a democratic country should be free at all stages. Talents and ability are not confined to any social class or group, and any social system must provide for their emergence by the provision of equal educational opportunities. We are of opinion that free education must come first and foremost." And the Kannangara Report stated: "We contemplate generally that the cost of education from the Kindergarten up to and including the University shall be a charge on the State..."
But the Financial Secretary, H.J. Huxham, expressed serious concern over the financial implications of the free education scheme and said that the proposal would involve "expenditure on a scale which this government cannot easily afford". However, the government finally adopted the free education scheme proposed by the Kannangara Report. Despite all the talk of providing free education to the under-privileged, sections of the people, it must be noted that the Kannangara Report did not have a single word for the education of the children of the poor plantation workers whose toil that created the revenue with which the free education scheme came to be implemented. On 30 May 1944, opening the debate in the State Council on the recommendations based on his report, Kannangara merely said

Estafe Schools - Their problems and progress 285
that the question of education in estate schools has been dropped for the present. Kannangara's deliberate plan to keep the estate children away from the benefits of the free education scheme need not surprise us since he was one of the Sinhalese leaders who stood in opposition to the extension of franchise to Indian estate workers during the debate on the Donoughmore proposals for universal suffrage in the Legislative Council.
Though Kannangara "dropped" the estate schools, the Indian Member 1.X. Pereira, on behalf of S.P.Vythilingam, moved an amendment in the State Council to the list of recommendations to the effect that all estate Schools shall be converted into primary state Schools and shall form part of the system of national education. The amendment was seconded by B.H. Aluwihare but in the hope that in these schools Sinhalese will be made compulsory. On 5 June 1945, the amendment was accepted without a division. But, in fact, it was never implemented. While the free education scheme came as a boon to the poor folk in the urban and the rural areas and benefited even the affluent classes to pursue their children's education free of charge in government schools, the majority of the plantation workers' children were relegated to languish in a state of illiteracy. It is of interest to note that, despite all the euphoria generated by the much publicized free education scheme, C.W.W. Kannangara was defeated at the general election in 1947.
The government failed to make any serious efforts to compel the estate managements to abide by the provisions of Ordinance No 26 of 1947. It was also lax in the enforcement of the provisions stipulated in the Ordinance. Under Section 8 the owner of an estate, with over 27 children of school- going age, whose parents were resident in the estate, was required "to set apart on the estate premises Consisting of:
a. a building which conformed to such standard as might be prescribed for educating the children on the estate, who were required to attend School.
b. a habitable house for a married head teacher, and

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C. an area of uncultivated land not less than one acre Suitable as a School playground and partly as a School garden."
The 1947 Ordinance also incorporated the provision that, if an estate owner failed to provide the above requirements despite due notice, the Director of Education was entitled to take the necessary action to provide them, and recover the expenses from the estate as a debt to the Crown. Section 8 of the Ordinance furthermore empowered the Director of Education "to enter, inspect or occupy any premises on the estate" for the education of the children.
Under Section 10 of Ordinance No. 5 of 1951, the Director of Education had the right to take legal action against the estate owner or superintendent who defaulted and have him fined. These provisions provided by the legislature to compel the superintendents to improve the educational facilities available to children were not availed of by the government. Gnanamuthu writes: "Altogether 24 estate schools were taken over by the state between 1951 and 1954, after which, on representation made by planting interests, the legal requirement to provide building and land was administratively relaxed." And the UNP government's attitude on the paramount question of take-over of estate schools can be gauged from Education Minister M.D. Banda's statement in parliament on 16 August 1954. He said:
I shall gradually take over estate schools. Such estate schools as are ready and about which we have given notice we have taken. I do not want to grab wholesale all the estate schools. It is not possible to take them over all at once... If all the schools are taken over, I think the cost will be about Rs. 12 million or Rs. 15 million, therefore, the process of taking over estate schools will have to be guarded.”
Difficulties Confronting Estate Children
In 1956, the Ministry of Education made subtle moves threatening the very existence of some Tamil schools. The Ministry divided Tamil medium schools into Tamil majority schools and Muslim schools, in accordance with the relative strength of the children of the two communities. Gnanamuthu says:

Estafo Schools - Their problems and progress 287
It was subsequently ruled that in their schools the head should be one who professes the faith of the majority of the students. In the calculation of the majority the children of the stateless are not taken into account. This has resulted in several Tamil medium schools being converted into Muslim schools such as St. Mary's Kumara Vidyalaya, Nawalapitiya.'
One of the nerve-racking problems the Indian Tamil parents had to face was the difficulty in getting admission for their children to government schools located in the towns in the plantation areas. Once again, the citizenship issue was used to deprive Tamil children of their right to pursue their education at higher levels. In 1962, under the SLFP government, it became 'normal' for school principals to demand Ceylon citizenship certificates from estate children before their admission to Schools. In this connection, it would be of interest to take note of a copy of a letter sent by an Education Officer to a headmaster of a School:
My No U PD/7098
The Headmaster, B/Passara T.M.S. Passara.
Admission of Children to Bo/Passara T.M.S.
Please do not admit the foilowing categories of children in view of the overcrowding at your school
1. Children under the 6th standard and above who come from estate Schools,
2. Children in standard 6 and above who are not citizens of Ceylon,
3. Children who have other Tamil schools or Tamil streams closer to their homes.
(Sgd) B P M Semanayakeo Education Officer, Bandarawela, A.D.E. (Uva) 2. 12.62
Since a million people of Indian origin had been rendered stateless as a result of the citizenship laws, very few Indians could produce citizenship certificates for admission of their children to government schools.
It was the redoubtable W. Dahanayake who realistically portrayed the relegation of estate children to a world of ignorance

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and illiteracy. Speaking in parliament on 18 April 1962 with reference to the Report of the Committee on Non-School-Going Children, he said:
According to this report, there were (in 1958) 284,000 children between the ages of 5 and 14 on the estates. Of them, 125,000 were attending school and 132,000 were not attending any school at all. 53 percent of the children in the estates were attending school while 47 percent were not attending school at all. Of the 53 percent who were attending school the majority of them were in the 900 odd schools. They do not teach beyond standard V, and even up to standard V there is no properly organized kindergarten. In most of the schools what is taught is only three Rupees. Many of these schools are without adequate furniture. Teachers are not qualified and they are very poorly paid. So from every point of view we have to bow our heads in shame when we think of the way in which we are treating estate children in regard to education. Originally, the education of estate children was considered to be the duty of estate management. Later on, the UNP Government recognized the principle that the education of estate children should be the responsibility of the state. However, neither the UNP Government nor the SLFP Government that succeeded it was able to give these children a square deal.'
it must be noted that W. Dahanayake was no ordinary MP. Dahanayake, who began life as a schoolmaster at St. Aloysious College, Galle, held the post of Minister of Education from 1956 to 1959 in the MEP government led by Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. Consequent to the assassination of Bandaranalike, he was vaulted to the position of Prime Minister for six months. The question arises as to why such a man who publicly expressed concern for the plight of plantation workers' children failed to do justice to their education. The only reason that can be adduced is that for all his outburst of sympathy for the estate children he too, as Minister of Education, influenced by the chauvinistic intellectual and cultural climate that pervaded among large sections of the Sinhalese, followed a policy of discrimination against estate children. But, unlike most politicians, he was bold enough to say what he felt in parliament.
As stated by W. Dahanayake, the estate teachers were ill dualified and poorly paid. Of the 1,115 estate school teachers in 1958, as many as 927 were uncertificated; only 79 teachers had undergone some training, as indicated in the following table:

Estate Schools - Their problems and progress 289
Table 16.1
Classification of Teachers in Estate Number of
Schools,as in 1958. Teachers
Trained first class Teacher 11 Trained second class Teacher 56 Trained provisional Teacher 12 Certified first class Teacher 17 Certified Second class Teacher 16 Certified third class Teacher 31 Third class Service Certificated teacher 06 Drawing certified Teacher O3 Third class provisionally certified Teacher O7 Uncertificated Teacher 927 Madras-trained Teacher 29
ΤΟΤΑ - 1,115
it is clear that the estate schools did not attract qualified and trained teachers. The lot of these estate teachers was unenviable. They had to teach a large number of children in poorly built schools which lacked adequate furniture and other necessary infrastructure. Often their quarters did not have electricity and proper sanitary facilities. There was the psychological factor which, in the estate environment, cannot be ignored. Although teachers were generally held in high esteem by the children and their worker-parents, often they had to bend low before the planter-bosses. Such an environment was hardly conducive to attract upright and qualified teachers into the estate schools.
On the question of salaries paid to estate teachers during the period 1947 to 1976, Gnanamuthu writes:
The prescribed basic salary varies between Rs. 35 and Rs. 45 per mensem for teachers in single session schools, with a dearness allowance of 30 per cent of the basic salary. However, since 1950 estates in the membership of the CEEF have adopted a scheme which enabled teachers in their schools to draw better salaries than what they would be entitled to by law. The scheme was amended from time to time, and single-session and double-session teachers are able today to earn maximum salaries of about Rs. 240 and Rs. 310 per month respectively... Salaries of teachers have been reduced on some of the estates which were taken over during the first phase of land reform in 1972.'

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Jayasuriya Commission and Estate Education
The National Education Commission, also called the Jayasuriya Commission, published its report in 1962. The Commission recommended that the estate schools should be taken over by the government not in order to improve them and provide better educational facilities for children but with the declared objective of integrating the estate population with the indigenous population surrounding them." In fact, through the compulsory introduction of Sinhala as the medium of instruction in estate schools, the Commission wanted to Sinhalasise the Indian Tamil people. Jayasuriya Writes:
The role of the Sinhalese language in the acculturation process is regarded as analogous to the role of the English language in acculturation of immigrants to Britain, Australia and the U.S.A., for example. It is stressed that the children of the immigrant estate workers and the children of the indigenous population in the villages surrounding the estates must be educated as one in the same schools, if they are to develop into a cohesive community.'
He further says that: "... all estate children entering school for the first time were to be admitted to local Schools and educated through the Sinhalese Medium alongside the children of the local population." According to this recommendation the estate owners were required to make a contribution of Rs. 100/= per acre over a period of five years after which the government would bear the responsibility for the education of estate children.
However, these recommendations were made not by a majority but by a minority of the members of the Commission. Jayasuriya Comments: "opinion in the Jayasuriya Commission was sharply divided on the issue of estate schools, and apparently the recommendation in the body of the Report was that of only seven members, though the Commission consisted of twenty." It must be noted that the Jayasuriya Commission wanted to first Sinhalisise the Indian Tamil children ironically enough with financial assistance for 5 years from the estate managements, that is, with the money earned from the toil of the estate workers themselves
Once again, in 1964, the White paper on Education proposed that all estate schools should be taken over and run as

Estate Schools - Their problems and progress 291
basic schools with the official language-Sinhala as the medium of instruction. We have commented elsewhere in this Volume On the attempt by Sinhala politicians to Sinhalisise the Indian Tamils and rejected as untenable the grounds for such acculturation in the context of the social environment obtaining in Sri Lanka.
Meanwhile, with free education there was a tremendous upsurge in the field of education. J.E. Jayasuriya says that the years 1939 to 1968 were a period of stirring change in relation to all levels of education. The University of Ceylon established in 1942 was churning out graduates by the hundreds in the various disciplines. Referring to estate schools Jayasuriya writes: "Successive Ministers of Education have chosen to turn a blind eye to the provisions of the 1947 Ordinance in so far as they relate to the education of estate children." From time to time Various Education Ministers have talked of taking over estate schools but here ends the melancholy tale of how one government after another toyed unbecomingly with the problem of education of a sizable population of children, about 80,000 in number in 1965, the last year for which statistics are available.' Thus the deliberate neglect of the education of estate children by the government and other factors led to a sharp decline in the number of estate schools as the following table shows:
Table 16.2
YEAR NO. OF REGISTERED NO. OF CHILDREN
ESTATE SCHOOLS ATTENDING SCHOOLS
1949 997 56,168 1950 915 61502 1951 942 60,924 1952 935 59,554 1953 938 62,667 1954 899 66,280 1955 891 67,110 1956 884 69,918 1957 881 73,047
1958 879 75,000

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Table 16.2 (continued)
YEAR NO. OF REGISTERED NO OF CHILDREN
ESTATE SCHOOLS ATTENDING SCHOOLS
1959 875 77,687 1960 874 78,733 1961 873 80,148 1962 873 80, 193 1963 80,853 1964 859 81695 1965 852 79,911
The main Cause for the drastic reduction in the number of estateschools from 997 in 1949 to 852 in 1965 was the sale of large estates, especially British Company-owned plantations from about the end of World War II. Local entrepreneurs bought these estates, fragmented and sold them to petty capitalists. This process set in motion a number of developments. The greedy new land owners had no interest in maintaining the schools, many of which were transformed into tea weighing sheds while some of the teacher's quarters were used to accommodate watchers. Most of the new estate owners indulged in super exploitation of the Workers and did not conform to the minimum wage rates stipulated by the Wages Boards and the Department of Labour. Employment opportunities in the plantations began to shrink and this led to the migration of thousands of workers to India. The other significant factor that led to large-scale migration of Indian Tamils either to India or to the North and East from the plantation areas, was the recurrent Communal riots such as the One that was unleashed against the Tamils in 1958. Thus the fragmentation of large plantations and migration of workers led to the closure of many Schools.

Estate Schools - Their problems and progress 293
The United Front Government and the Estate Schools
When negotiations began between the SLFP the LSSP and the CP in 1968 with the objective of forming an United Front with a common programme, the author pressured the CP Leader Pieter Keuneman, to insist On the inclusion of the take Over of estate schools in the United Front's manifesto. As a result the United Front of the SLFP, LSSP and the CP declared in their joint manifesto that the "estate Schools will be taken Over and incorporated in the state system of education".
After victory at the July 1970 election, Prime Minister Ms. Bandaranaike appointed Badiudin Mahamud (SLFP) as Minister of Education and B.Y. Tudawe (CP) as Deputy Minister. But contrary to the declaration in the UF Manifesto and the assurance given in the Throne speech, the Education Ministry failed to take action on the estate schools. Perturbed by the inaction on the part of the Ministry, the author convened a meeting of plantation trade unions, including the CWC which was in the opposition, and submitted a memorandum to the Minister urging him to honour the pledge given in the UF manifesto. The Minister then brought an Indian Tamil Teacher, R. R. Sivalingam, into the ministry ostensibly to make the necessary preparations for the take-over of the estate schools. But suddenly the Ministry announced that only 38 Schools would be taken over on the ground that only these Schools fulfilled the necessary requirements such as adequate land and buildings. This indeed came as a shock to the unions. A delegation led by the author interviewed Minister Mahmud and appraised him of the fact that 304 schools largely satisfied the minimum requirements and that, therefore, they should be taken Over as a first step. The Minister finally agreed to takeover these 304 Schools "before the end of December 1971". However, no action was taken on this question. R. R. Sivalingam writes that "A draft Bill known as the Estate Schools (Special Provision) Bill was also proposed but it was never presented to the Cabinet for approval".' No further action was taken on this question and the Draft Bill remained a dead letter.
One of the commonest arguments trotted out by the Minister and his officials for the inability to take over the estate

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schools was that the estate managements refused to set apart sufficient land area and adequate buildings for the schools. Indeed it was the duty of the Ministry to compel the management to provide them in accordance with the provisions in the Ordinance relating to estate schools. How hollow the Ministry's argument was can be seen when you realise that even when half a million acres of plantation lands were taken over by the state under the Land Reform Law in 1972, the Schools located on these lands were not taken over by the Education Ministry. Furthermore, even when some estate owners called upon the Ministry to take over the schools situated on their estates, the Ministry showed no interest whatsoever in taking them over. Edith Bond writes:
Sri Lanka has a free education system but on the estate the companies are responsible for providing schooling. Very few teachers on the estates are qualified, and the curriculum is hopelessly inadequate and out of date... Some estate owners including Brooke Bond Liebig have asked the government to take over the responsibility for estate schooling but, so far, no practical steps have been taken to absorb this private sector into state system.'
it was in this situation, as a way out of the impasse, Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, the Minister of Plantation Industry convened a conference of all plantation trade unions on 14 June 1973. The Minister said that "it will be difficult to take over all the 800 Schools and that too will not be worthwhile because the number attending will be around 100 for each school. He suggested that the trade unions should get together and decide on about 100 schools centrally situated to be taken over and developed".' And he assured that he would "obtain the necessary funds, buildings, furniture, equipment, staff etc., on a priority basis." The Secretary to the Ministry of Plantation Industry, Doric de Souza, records in his minutes of the Conference that "S. Nadesan lamented that the UF Government has so far done nothing to improve the lot of estate schools although they have reminded the Education Ministry by way of joint memorandums and interviews. He said the colonial system of education still prevailed... and that they insisted that at least 304 schools should be taken over for development, which the Minister agreed to implement before the end of 1971 ... but nothing has been done to make them think that the Ministry was sincere or serious".
However, Minister de Silva wanted the trade unions to Select about 100 centrally placed schools so that they could be

Estate Schools - Their problems and progress 295
taken over and developed. The trade union representatives, in their anxiety to induce the government to take over the schools, reluctantly agreed to this proposal. A Special Committee comprising S. Nadesan (UPWU), V.S. Rajah (LEWU), M. Jayaram (DWC), C.V. Velupillai (NUW) and S. Renganathan (CWC) was appointed to select the schools. The Education Ministry provided the necessary information about the estate schools including the number of children attending each school. Tremendous efforts were made by a few unions to collect relevant data about the schools from estate workers' leaders. After a laborious study of the location and Conditions of Some 800 Schools, the unions selected 165 centrally placed schools for "the immediate take-over and development." When we handed over a list of these schools to Minister Colvin R. de Silva he not only expressed his appreciation for our efforts and co-operation but promised to meet the Education Minister and take prompt action to take over these schools and bring them under the national system of education. But, once again, no action was taken and the efforts of the trade unions to select the Schools turned out to be a futile exercise.
In September 1975 the government passed the Land Reform (Amendment) Law and nationalized all foreign Company-owned estates. With the enaction of this law all large plantations came directly under the control of the state. Now the Education Minister could not trot out old arguments such as lack of sufficient land for his not taking over the estate schools. Yet, it is a sad commentary that the benefits of state ownership of the plantations did not automatically lead to the state management of estate Schools.
Meanwhile, teachers were recruited for Tamil Schools in the Up- country towns. During the process of recruitment the Deputy Minister of Education B.Y. Tudawe was indeed very co-operative and, on the author's recommendation, about fifty educated young men and women - all Up-country Tamils - were appointed to schools in the towns such as Matale, Kandy and Haputale. Tudawe also took action to provide science facilities to Schools such as Saraswathy Maha Vidyalaya at Pussellawa, whose principal, S. Marimuthu took a keen interest in improving that school, and helped upgrade the Mandandawela Tamil school at Matale as a Maha Vidyalaya.

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Take-over of Estate Schools
Though Education Minister Mohamed was reluctant to take over the estate schools, events led him to initiate the process of their being brought under the state. Developments in the first half of 1977, Such as the violent Communal attacks On the Workers at Delta and Sanduar estates at Pussellawa, and the police shooting at Devon estate in Talawakele, engendered bitter feelings against the SLFP government. This led to massive protest strikes by all plantation trade unions. It was in order to assuage the feelings of the Indian workers and in the hope of winning their support for the SLFP at the general election in July 1977 that the government finally decided to take-over the estate schools. Minister Mohamed, who had lost all credibility among the Indian Tamils, made a number of statements to the newspapers on this question. The Tamil dailies - Virakesari and Thinakaran - reported that the Minister had issued instructions to his officials to take-Over the estate schools. Different versions of his statement appeared in different papers. While the Virakesari reported that 400 schools would be taken over, the Ceylon Daily News of 16 May stated that "412 estate schools would be integrated this week into the national. system of education." From reports, including that by the Director of Education it can be stated that 377 estate Were taken Over and "vested in the government." However opportunistic this action might be, it was not merely a long-delayed fulfillment of a pledge Ms. Bandaranaike's government had given in the throne speech in 1970 but it was perhaps the most commendable act during her tenure of office as Prime Minister since it initiated the process that put an end to the segregation of the Indians in the plantations from the national system of education.
However, the take-Over of these Schools failed to win the confidence of even the anti-UNP elements amongst the Indians. In the July, general election, the UNP led by J.R. Jayewardene, swept into power. The Indian Tamils largely supported the UNP. Here it would be interesting to note the observation made by Fr Pio Ciampa, who had watched the voting pattern of the Tamil Workers as well as the reaction of a Section of the Sinhalese to their manner of voting. He writes: "Their decisive new votes had contributed to the victory of the UNP in the 8 electorates of

Estate Schools - Their problems and progress 297
Ratnapura district. Because of that, here and there, they were assaulted and a few of the Tamil schools were burnt down. On the walls of one of the estate Tamil Schools burnt down One read in big letters:
We will come back in 1983.o
Estate Schools and Volunteer Teachers
As Sri Lanka is one of the poorest countries in the World, with a largely stagnant economy, unemployment has been a Constant scourge in society. Young people of all communities scrambled for jobs especially to fill employment vacancies in the public. service. With the vesting of estate schools in the government, educated Tamil youth from the North and East poured into the Upcountry seeking teaching posts in these schools. The Consequent competition for jobs as teachers strained the relations between the Ceylon Tamils and the Indian Tamils.
In December 1977, several vacancies OCCurred in the Up-Country estate schools when over 100 teachers were selected for training. In March 1978, some 100 educated young people from Maskeliya-Nuwara Eliya electorate volunteered to fill these vacancies "on the understanding with the Education Department that at the time when permanent appointments were made they would receive the first preference." All these volunteer teachers were not only qualified but also possessed Sri Lanka citizenship. They performed their duties without remuneration but their services came to an end in January 1979.
Consequently, they made representation to the Ministry of Education and S. Thondaman, Minister of Rural Industrial Development, seeking employment. And applications were made by them to the Department of Education. But "to their surprise, instead of calling them for interview, the Nuwara Eliya Education Officer interviewed youth from the North and East and appointed 86 new teachers from among these recruits." This discriminatory action of the Ministry of Education caused grave concern not only among the Up-Country Tamil Youth but also among the plantation trade unions and Voluntary organizations functioning in the

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Up-country. And the enraged volunteer teachers "in desperation performed sathyagraha outside the Ceylon Workers Congress in Hatton on the 6th and 7th June." In this situation a dozen trade unions and voluntary organizations protested against the discriminatory action of the authorities to the Minister of Education and the two Cabinet Ministers - S. Thondaman and Gamini Dissanayake, both of whom were elected MPs from the Maskeliya-Nuwara Eliya electorate.
Proposal to Hand Estate Schools Back to Superintendents
AS we have noted it was because education Suffered under the planters' raj that the trade unions, especially of the left, campaigned for and eventually succeeded in pressuring Ms. Bandaranaike's government to take over some 377 schools in June 1977. The rate of literacy prevailing about this time in the plantation areas can be seen from the following table which shows that the Estate sector recorded significantly lower literacy rates compared to the Urban and Rural sectors.
Table 16.3
Literacy rate classified by Sex-Sectors and all lsland
Sector Urban Rural Estate All-Island Male 92.95 91.60 79.32 90.86 Female 88.72 83.17 52.13 81.94 Total 90.69 87.26 65.60 86.24
SOUC8) : Report on Consumer Finances of
Socio-Economic Survey 978/79, Part | Table II
Even before the impact of the take-over of the 377 estate schools could be felt, a serious attempt was made by the education, in

Estate Schools - Their problems and progress 299
Collaboration with Minister Thondaman, to hand Over the estate schools back to the superintendents. But this was being done in the name of "development of the whole community." The Sunday Observer Carried the news:
Integration According to Five-year Plan Estate Schools Under Superintendents:
The administration of estate Schools will be handed back to the managers or superintendents of estates under a five-year plan which seeks to integrate this hitherto neglected sector of education into the national education- system. With the take-over of the estate schools their administration passed into the hands of the Regional Directors of the Education. But government is now of opinion that "as leaders of the plantation community", Managers or Superintendents of estates are the best equipped to guide the estate schools, a spokesman of the Education Ministry said."
The Ceylon Daily News reported that P.B. Ratnayake, Additional Director General of Education, said that estate schools. had the same Curriculum as other Schools ... but would also perform an additional function as centres of community education".
The same report stated that "Rural Industrial Development Minister S. Thondaman said the scheme to develop the estate School was formulated with his concurrence and approval. He said he was in full agreement with the development scheme. P.B. Ratnayake declared that the educational problems of the estate areas differed widely from those of other regions. He said that "the plantation community was a closely knit community, and in such a situation the school aims at educating the community. Otherwise, the whole investment on estate school development Would be a mere waste." Asserting that "the life in the estate revolved round the superintendent" and that "his services could be made use to develop the schools," he declared that "unlike in all other schools where the Principals are appointed as Chairman of School Development Councils in the estate schools the superintendent would function as Chairman and the Principal as Secretary of the Council".

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Thus the Jayewardene government proposed to reverse the process of estate school take-over initiated by Ms. Bandaranaike's government. It must be recalled that when the schools were taken over, their administration came directly under the Regional Directors of Education. The government's new decision was really a sharp reversal of the progress already made in estate children's education; it was, in fact, a diabolical attempt to bring the estate schools under the planters' Raj to be run as in the colonial period. But this thoroughly retrograde step was supported by none other than CWC boss Thondaman. At a conference held at Bandarawela, Thondaman said that "the government is very anxious to integrate the estate population with the rest of the country". And he requested the President to stop the take over of estate schools as the schools taken over by the earlier government (SLFP) had deteriorated. Under the new system the local planters will be managers of these schools, he said. This most reactionary decision would have led not to integration of communities but back to segregation of the Indian estate people from the rest of the population in the field of education.
On this vital issue a number of trade unions jointly submitted a memorandum on 17 October 1979 to President Jayewardene, protesting against this retrogressive decision. And, in November 1979, a number of trade unions and some voluntary organizations, unanimously adopted the following resolution:
We view with grave concern the recent decision of the government to call upon superintendents of estates to manage estate schools situated in their areas ... We, therefore, protest at this act of discrimination in the International year of the Childagainst the estate child".”
Subsequently, a deputation of the Joint Plantation Trade Union Committee, comprising leaders of eight unions, including A. Aziz (DWC), S. Nadesan (UPWU), Rozario Fernando (CPWU) and S. Ramanathan (LEWU), met President Jayewardene and expressed -their disapproval of the government's decision to place the estate schools once again under the charge of the planters." These freests,finally resulted in the Education Ministry shelving its avdqeisigQn, g de-nationalize th estate Schools.

Estate Schools - Their problems and progress 301
Progress Despite Problems
Despite all kinds of obstacles the non-government trade unions, as constituted in the JPTUC, continued their agitation for the take-over of the remaining estate schools. It was indeed on the eve of the general strike of the urban based trade unions in July, 1980, that the government announced that the rest of the estate schools would be taken over. The Ceylon Daily News of 14 July 1980 reported that "366 estate schools with 598 teachers would be taken over in the final phase ... In all 770 schools Would come into the state educational structure with 1198 teachers".
Though the majority of estate schools had been brought under the Education Ministry by 1980, the facilities for education remained poor compared to those available in other Schools. Addressing a meeting of principals of Tamil and Muslim schools at Bandarawela, Premaratne of the Department of Education said: "Education in the plantation schools, taken over by the government is reported to be in a deplorable state ... even the biscuits are not being distributed among the children properly. Certain teachers in the plantation schools, often report late and close earlier than Schedule. There are Several other teachers who perform their private work during school hours".
It must be stated that merely because Thondaman and his CWC supported the Jayewardene regime, the government was not prepared to allocate extra funds to raise the standard of education in the estate schools. Angela Little says that the alliance between the government and the CWC has not in fact led to increases in spending on estate education by the Ministry of Education. And she records: "Although the education and health standards of the people in the Country as a whole are high, those of the people who work in the plantations to generate the revenue which helps sustain those welfare policies are very low. People inside the plantations are the means to the ends of the people outside the plantations". ❖%P፪❖ ۔
An appraisal report on estate education says: "Many School buildings were in state of disrepair with inadequate facilities. Access to secondary and vocational education was very unfavourable." The report giving the real situation reads:

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In 1984, there were 558 plantation schools with 63,389 pupils, 46% of whom were girls ... Of the teachers in the schools 78% are permanent and government paid but 22% are volunteers, who are paid small wages by voluntary organizations and estate parents... the number of teachers was only 1148 and in reality the overwhelming majority of these schools did not have sufficient number of teachers. 34
The following table illustrates the position relating to the teachers in the plantation districts.
Table 16.4
No. Educational TOta NO. Of Additional
Districts Teachers available Teachers
required
01. Homagama 07 21 O2. Kurunegala 03 O7 O3. Matara O3 29 04. Matale 42 110 O5. Kegalle 75 248 06. Galle 10 21 O7. Ratnapura 154 353 O8. Kalutava 54 171 09. Kandy 112 341 10. Bandarawela 308 675 11. Nuwara Eliya 380 1295
ΤΟΤΑ 1148 3271
Source: Plantation Schools Unit (Draft Five Year Programme of Teacher Requirements in Plantation Schools), PSEDP, SIDA, Ministry of Education, 1986.
The table shows the serious shortage of teachers in the estate Schools, especially in the Nuwara Eliya district. The other relevant factor is the duality of teachers available in these schools, which is shown in the following table:

Estate Schools - Their problems and progress 303
Table 16.5
Plantation School Teachers by Educational Background.
Tamil trained 332 GCE (O/L) Tami 1617 G C E (O/L) Sinhala 90 English 22 Others 87
1148
Source : PSEDP, SIDA & Ministry of Education Publication.
This same report says that the Ministry of Education had identified the following five main problems in the estate education- sector:
1. POOr infrastructure
2. A majority of unqualified and incompetent teachers
3 Lack of commitment and inspiration on the part of
teachers
4. Inaccessibility to secondary education, and
5. High drop-out rates.
Of these, the most important factor seems to be the supply of qualified teachers imbued with a devotion to the cause of education of estate children. "At present, many plantation Schools can hardly be said to function as schools at all, in terms of minimal requirements of pedagogic adequacy ... Teacher absenteeism is a major problem. In the small (1 - or 2-teacher) schools, absenteeism often means that school is suspended." The other problem rather peculiar to the estate schools is the absence of teachers during and after the ethnic conflicts in the plantation areas. Consequent to communal riots of 1983 many teachers. especially those from the North and East, left their schools and failed to return even after normalcy had been restored. Thinakaran in its editorial commented: "After the July 1983 riots many teachers abandoned their Schools and did not return. No new teachers were appointed to fill these vacancies, and, as a result, education of estate children suffered".

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Yet, within a decade of the take-Over of estate Schools in 1977, despite difficulties especially to find the necessary funds for development, it can truly be said that education in the estate sector has made significant progress. Since the take-over the responsibility to provide the funds for the construction and maintenance of the school buildings and the physical infrastructure had devolved upon the Ministry of Education and the District Decentralized budgets. Indeed the historic joint strike of plantation workers in April 1984 had the impact of warning the government authorities not to relapse into a state of indifference to education of estate children. Angela Little writes:
The interest of government is also clear from the establishment in 1984 of a Presidential Secretariat Group comprising representatives from the plantation corporations and the Ministry of Education which was set up to examine issues in estate education. Although no union interests were represented in the group, by 1985 cabinet had approved a recommendation by the Education Minister for a Five Year Development Plan for the development of the education system in the plantation sector.'
As we have indicated, estate children, even if they were bright and aspired for higher education, could not fulfil their aspirationswithout outside assistance. Assistance though in a small way, was provided from the Ceylon Estate Workers' Education Fund instituted in 1947 on the initiative taken by M.S. Aney, the Representative of the Government of India in Ceylon. Writing in 1984 on contribution made by this Fund, T. Venkatachar, the Indian diplomat and the then secretary of this Trust, says: "The Trust has awarded 300 scholarships so far to the children of estate workers. These scholarships have enabled students to complete their degree courses in various disciplines such as Medicine, Engineering, Business Administration, Commerce, Law, Science and Arts". The trust is entirely voluntary and the Government of India too makes regular donation to the trust fund.
In recent years, foreign agencies and international Organizations have granted assistance supplementary to government sources to enhance the educational facilities available to estate children. The Swedish international Development Authority (SIDA) has made a significant contribution especially in the educational regions of Bandarawela and Badulla. SIDA assisted 44 estate schools in the Bandarawela region under the Badulla integrated Rural Development Project. UNICEF has extended aid to a number of schools with buildings, equipment,

Estate Schools - Their problems and progress 305
water and sanitary facilities, in five educational regions. The Federal Republic of Germany has funded a Teacher Training College at Kotagala and has also assisted 11 primary Schools. Under the Nuwara Eliya Integrated Rural Development- Project the Dutch government has helped improve some 50 estate schools.
Despite these developments a recent socio-economic report reads: As indicated in most educational indicators, the Estate Sector was notably more backward than the Urban and Rural Sectors in educational attainments. Almost 41 per cent in this had not had any schooling in 1987 as compared to comparative figures of Rural Sector. In the Urban Sector 56 per cent had progressed beyond primary education as compared to 43 per cent in the Rural Sector and only 13 per cent in the Estate Sector.'
Notes
Report of the Special Committee on Education - SP XXIV, 1943. p. 21.
2 Ibid, pp. 64-65.
3 Hansard (State Council), 30 May 1944.
4. Ibid, 1 June 1945.
5 Legislative Enactments of Ceylon (Revised Edn) 1956, Vol. 7, Part VI Estate
Schools.
6 G.A. Gnanamuthu, Education and the Indian Plantation Worker in Sri
Lanka, Colombo, 1977, p. 61.
7 Hansard Vol. 19 of 1954-55, 16 August 1954, col. 1766.
8 Gnanamuthu, op. cit, p. 61.
9 Ibid, p. 65.
10 Hansard, Vol. 46 No. 23, 1962, col. 4575
11 bid.
12 Gnanamuthu, op. cit, p. 49.
13 J.E. Jayasuriya, Education in Ceylon - Before and After Independence,
Colombo, 1969, p. 132.
14 bid.
15 bid.
16 Chattopadhyaya, Indians in Sri Lanka, p. 188-189.
17 R.R. Sivalingam "End of the Estate School", Sun 5 August 1980,
18 Edith Bond, A War on Want Investigation into Sri Lanka Tea Industry,
March 1974.
19 See minutes of the Estate Schools Take-Over Conference issued by Doric de
Souza, Secretary Ministry of Plantation Industry, 20 June 1973,
20 Ibid.
21 Fr Pio Ciampa, "For Justice and Development", Tribune, 19 July 1980, p.
2S,

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23
26 27
A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
See printed joint statement by trade unions and voluntary organizations under the title "Volunteer Teachers Betrayed", Hatton, 11 July 1979.
bid.
Sunday Observer, 30 Sept. 1979.
Ceylon Daily News, 10 Nov. 1979.
Ibid.
Daily Mirror, 29 Oct. 1979.
Ibid. Joint letter dated 5 November 1979 Addressed to Minister of Education from Hatton.
A. Aziz, "Estate Schools", Tea Worker, May 1980.
Weekend, 15 Nov. 1981.
Angela Little, see Daily News, 25 July 1985. Angela Little "Education and Change in Plantations, The Case of Sri Lanka", IDS Bulletin, April 1987 Vol. 18 No. 2, Sussex, p. 34. Bertil Oder - Jan Langlo, Plantation Schools Education programme (Appraisal Report 1987-1990), pp. 2-3, 26-3-1986,
Thinakaran 2 Feb. 1986.
Angela Little, Ceylon Daily News, 25 July 1985. T. Venkatachar, "Ceylon Estate Workers' Education Trust", Ceylon Daily News, 15 Aug. 1984. PSEDP Published by SIDA and Ministry of Education, pp. 10-11. Socio-economic Achievements of Sri Lanka, 1990, Central Bank, p. 12.

Chapter
17
JOINT STRIKES OF PLANTATION WORKERS
In the absence of an exclusive political party to espouse the cause of the Up-country Tamil people, it devolved upon the trade unions to play a significant role in the struggle to better the conditions of the plantation workers and defend their political rights. Before we deal with the recent joint strikes of plantation Workers it would be useful to have some understanding of the UNP government's attitude towards workers' struggles.

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It was only in the 1960s that the two leading political parties, the UNP and SLFP, made any serious effort to organise their own trade unions. Whenever the UNP was in power it had to often confront the might of the working class organized and led by the CP and LSSP. To a lesser extent, the SLFP (while in power) too had to reckon with such opposition from the left parties wheneverthese did not work in collaboration with it. It was mainly to overcome such confrontations that the two major political parties established their own trade unions. On the initiative of J.R. Jayewardene, the UNP founded the Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS) and the Lanka Jathika Estate Workers' Union (LJEWU) while the SLFP established the Sri Lanka independent Trade Union Federation (SLITUF). A distinct feature of these trade unions was the tendency for them to grow rapidly with state patronage whenever their sponsoring party was in power and decline equally rapidly once it was thrown out of office.
UNP Trade Unions
When J. R. Jayewardene became Prime Minister in 1977 the UNP unions were beefed up and, with government patronage, they made every effort to weaken and oust the left trade unions from positions of influence among workers in industrial establishments, and particularly in the State Corporations. For the first time, organized violence came to be used as a means to intimidate active trade unionists sponsored by opposition political parties. Gananath Obeyesekera writes:
The most disturbing trend in the institutionalization of violence occurred in the massive election victory of the UNP (the present ruling party) in 1977, in its relations to the trade union known as the Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (National Workers' Organization) hereafter referred to as JSS ... Today the JSS is the single largest trade union in the country and has an effective say in the working of government offices and corporations ... jobs in the working class sector were increasingly given to members of this lumpen proletariat who swelled the ranks of the pro-UNP unions. Soon members of other unions were intimidated and forced to join it. The JSS was without a working class ideology; its leadership owed personal allegiance to party bosses ... Furthermore, the JSS was provided with an ideology. The precarious identity of marginal people was thus given a new reality and meaning, a political and nationalist ideology. The nature of this ideology was spell 'o' / ' 'heir president, Mathew, in a speech in Parliament on August

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4th, 1983, soon after the recent riots, Mathew's thesis was that we should adopt the Malaysian example as set out by Mahathir Bin Mohammed in his book, The Malay Dilemma.’
The JSS developed into a large and powerful trade union and it has been invariably used to blunt the activities of the opposition unions with the objective of destabilising them. When trade unions. belonging to the opposition political parties conducted a picketing campaign on 5 June 1980 in defence of living standards and democratic rights, a government-sponsored union retaliated by a Counter-picketing line. And a worker, D. Somapala, was killed when a gang of thugs organized by the JSS drove up in government vehicles and attacked peaceful pickets with bombs. and stones. Intimidation and organized thuggery were inducted into the labour movement, and the era of legitimate trade unionism was beginning to fade. For any degree of success in their struggle, therefore, it became imperative for the opposition trade unions to take into account not only the obnoxious Essential Public Services Law but also the dangerous new trend that had arisen in the Working-class movement.
1980 July Strike
The urban-based Joint Committee of Trade Union Organizations (JCTUO), Comprising a number of trade union federations and unions, held a successful Convention on 28 March 1980 at Sugathadasa Stadium in Colombo. Subsequently, there emerged a Consensus amongst these unions to launch a general strike in the latter part of 1980 on a number of workers' demands. Meanwhile, the sudden strike in July at the Ratmalana Railway Workshop for the re-instatement of a dozen workers had the effect of pushing the trade unions into early action. The Joint Committee convened by L.W. Panidtha, General Secretary of the CFTU, met. several times between 9 and 14 July but there was no unanimity for an early general strike. While some unions, especially those led by the NSSP, were vociferous in their demand for an immediate strike, the Ceylon Mercantile Union, led by its Secretary Bala Tampoe, wanted time to consider the question at a meeting of its executive committee. However, the majority of the

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unions declared they would launch a general strike on 18 July with a monthly wage increase of Rs. 300/= as their main demand. If only a realistic appraisal had been made of the situation it would have been clear how weak and disunited the opposition trade unions were; indeed, the strike was doomed to fail from the beginning.
The opposition plantation trade unions met under the chairmanship of S. Nadesan and unanimously decided not to join this ill-timed, poorly prepared and unscientific strike. Nadesan said that it would be suicidal, especially for the plantation Workers, to strike at that juncture.
The extent to which the government was prepared to use its repressive machinery became evident when the trade unions launched the general strike. The government proclaimed a state of emergency on 17 July and declared that those who failed to report for work on the 18th "would be deemed to have vacated their posts". It used the mass media - the radio and the newspapers - to build a psychosis of fear aimed at undermining the strike. Many trade union offices were sealed and some trade union leaders were arrested by the police authorities. According to the Prime Minister's statement in parliament, only 40,000 workers had joined the strike. The strike fizzled out, but the workers could not return to work. The government was adamant and refused to re-instate the workers. This action of the government was unprecedented in the history of Sri Lanka's labour movement: not even the British colonial government resorted to such drastic dismissals of workers for merely participating in a strike. It was only after relentless efforts by the trade unions, opposition political parties and humanitarian organizations that the majority of those who participated in the strike were re-employed. Thousands of Workers, however, Continued to languish in misery without jobs for years.
An interesting comment on the ill-fated strike was made by S.P. Amarasingham in the Tribune of 26 July 1980. He writes:
Was the sudden strike at the Ratmalana Railway Workshop for re-instatement of a dozen workers justified without prior negotiations? Was it a good strategy to tag on a demand for an all round salary increase of Rs. 300/- a month in a bid to widen the strike? Was it poor under-standing of the situation that led some trade unions to escalate the strike, or were they under the miasma of the ultra-left misconception of 'spontaneity' - that workers suffering from the back lash of increased prices would rush into strike action for higher wages? Did some of the trade unions also feel that they could bring unity to the

Joint Strikes of Plantation Workers 311.
trade union (left) movement under a militant trade union strike? Furthermore, did the government over-react and use the sledge hammer to crush a gnat? Should the government not seriously consider revision of all salaries on the basis of a national wage structure?
Strikes of Plantation Workers
The open economic policy pursued by the UNP government and the rise in the price of essential goods had led to an unprecedented increase in the cost of living (COL). The COL index had risen from 204.2 in July 1977 to 418.1 in July 1982. The government withdrew the subsidies on rice, sugar, milk powder and kerosene and introduced the food stamp Scheme in September 1979. The majority of the plantation workers were deprived of their ration books on the false presumption that their earnings exceeded Rs. 300/- a month. With inadequate wages for the workers to meet the soaring cost of living, there was chronic undernutrition in the estates. "The Overall chronic undernutrition prevalence in the village rural sector is 30.8% as against 62.4% in the estate sector".
In the budget for 1981, the Finance Minister granted a wage increase of Rs. 70/= per month to all government employees. But this wage increase was not extended to the plantation workers. Efforts made to obtain this increase through the Wages Board for the Tea Growing and Manufacturing Trade Were not successful. Therefore, the author Convened a Conference of plantation trade unions to discuss and evolve a way out of the impasse. The 14 unions which attended the conference held in July 1981, constituted themselves as the Joint Plantation Trade Union Committee (JPTUC), and decided to launch a token strike on 18 August 1981 in pursuance of this demand. The unions mounted a vigorous campaign in the plantations.
On the other hand, the pro-government unions - the CWC and the LJEWU Condemned the strike as unwarranted and untimely. Two of the JPTUC unions - the LEWU and the CPSU - withdrew on the eve of the strike saying that the time was unfavourable due to communal disturbances in Ratnapura. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the JPTUC went ahead with the proposed strike. Despite the government declaring a state of emergency the previous day, the token strike on 18 August was a

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grand success; even large sections of workers belonging to the pro-government unions had joined the strike. In fact, consequent to the token strike, the government through the Wages Board granted a wage increase of Rs. 2/- per day to the workers.
The Finance Minister, in his budget for 1982, announced a wage increase of Rs. 45/- a month and an allowance of Rs. 2/- for every point increase in the COL index to the employees in the government sector. Once again the government discriminated against the plantation workers; these wage increases were not extended to them.
Unlike the CWC leader, S. Thondaman, who merely made statements especially in the Tamil newspapers to the effect that he was negotiating with President Jayewardene, the JPTUC protested against the blatant discrimination of plantation workers and decided to launch a two-day token strike on 11 and 12 May 1982 in pursuance of four demands including the extension of all budgetary wage increases to the plantation Workers.
Fourteen unions, including the Ceylon Estate Staff's Union which had presented a set of demands to their employers, prepared for the strike. As the campaign gathered momentum the National Union Workers (NUW) decided to join the strike. The Ceylon Mercantile Union, led by Bala Tampoe, called upon its members in the JEDB and the SLSPC offices to strike in solidarity with the plantation workers. But the leaders of the CWC were busy, specially in Hatton, Nuwara Eliya and Badulla areas, campaigning against the strike. In many estates they supported the superintendents who attempted to intimidate the workers by threatening to dismiss all strikers.
The efforts of the government and its stooge unions to depict the proposed strike as politically motivated proved futile in the face of Tamil and Sinhalese leaders of the Joint Committee unions debunking such propaganda as false, especially through the Aththa and other Sinhala newspapers. In fact, the lsland of 10 May wrote in its editorial:
The spectre of a work stoppage looms over the country's tea and rubber industry. The payment of monthly wage and equal pay for men and women have been among the main demands of plantation trade unions for some time.
Historically, the payment of a daily wage to estate workers was justified on the basis that wages had to be linked to output in the plantation sector. Though this argument was valid in the formative stage of the industry the time has perhaps come to consider whether

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some type offixed wage should not be paid monthly to estate workers.
The plantation workers responded to the JPTUC's call in a magnificent manner and about 400,000 workers, including the majority of the workers in the pro-government unions, participated in the strike on 11 and 12 May. It must be noted that staff members joining the strike helped paralyse all large estates and made it an outstanding success. The island of 13 May commented that the "two-day strike called by 14 member Joint Committee of Plantation Trade Unions resulted in atriangular claim. of success on Tuesday." But when the CWC Secretary, Sellasamy, and the LJEWU Secretary issued Curt press statements challenging the fact that nearly half a million workers participated in the strike, they boomeranged on them since Dinapathy published police reports of the strike giving figures of strikers, estate by estate, in the various plantation districts.
One commentator from Hatton Wrote in the Christian Worker.
The token strike proved to be a historic one and demonstrated the emergence of a deeper unity among plantation workers and estate staff than ever experienced before. The objective situation of oppression and exploitation in the plantation areas obviously provoked this massive response to the strike by both workers and staff. Despite the fact that the major trade union membership of the plantation workers is claimed by two government controlled trade unions, it is noteworthy and of deep political significance that thousands of such workers chose to ignore the orders received from Colombo and joined in this common struggle with their brothers and sisters in the plantations. It is estimated that in areas such as Kandy, Dickoya, Dimbula, Uva, Kalutara and Galle the response from plantation workers and staff to the strike was about 80%... there was an intensive propaganda effort by the Ceylon Workers Congress in the days preceding the token strike in order to dissuade workers from going on strike. This effort largely failed.'
General Strike of 1984
A motion proposed by the DWC leader, A. Aziz and supported by S. Nadesan, for an allowance of Rs. 2/- for every point increase in the cost of living index (COL) had been debated in the Wages Board for Tea Growing and Manufacturing Trade. Since the plantation workers are paid on the basis of a daily rate, the motion called for 11 cents per day per point for 18 days' work a month. The employer's representatives opposed the motion. However, on a proposal made by a member nominated by the Labour Minister,

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a compromise formula was put forward to the effect that, instead of 11 cents, 6 cents be paid from the COL index figure 418. The motion was passed on 18 February 1983 in the Wages Board by a majority of two. However, another meeting of the Board to ratify this decision was never convened by the Commissioner of Labour. This was in violation of the ILO convention No. 131 concerning wage fixing machinery. As a result, the decision has not been implemented to this day.
in the budget for 1983 the government granted a wage increase of Rs. 100/= to its employees out this too was not paid to the plantation workers. The 1983 July holocaust, which had built up a deep sense of bitterness among the Up-Country Tamils, and the discriminatory policy in regard to wage increases were leading to a feeling of resentment against the government amongst the plantation workers. Taking note of this situation, the author, on behalf of the JPTUC, convened a conference of plantation trade unions, which unanimously decided to resort to trade union action in pursuance of the following demands:
1. An allowance of Rs. 2/= a month for every point increase
in the COL index,
2. A wage increase of Rs. 100/= a month,
3. A guaranteed monthly wage to plantation Workers and
4 Equal wage for men and women workers.
The JPTUC addressed a joint letter signed by 15 trade unions, including the CWC, to President Jayewardene on 23 November 1983 informing him of their decision. And the JPTUC mounted a well organized campaign to focus the attention of the workers upon these demands and prepare them for a strike. As the campaign gained momentum, the CWC and the LJEWU led by Minister Gamini Dissanayake suddenly announced on 19 March 1984 that they would launch a general strike for wage demands from 1 April. The JPTUC too declared a strike from 2 April. The strategy of the two pro- government unions was to exploit the intense feeling of the workers for a strike, quickly reach a settlement with the government and publicise the resulting wage increase as their "own great achievements". But this strategy was not to succeed.
Experience had shown that the policy of "divide and rule" could not succeed in weakening let alone smashing the strikes

Joint Strikes of Plantation Workers 315
conducted by the JPTUC and, therefore, the government sought to avoid a major strike in the plantations by granting some of the workers' demands but through its own union - the LJEWU led by Minister Gamini Dissanayake. Since the CWC leader, S. Thondaman, was away in India it was presumed that the situation was ideal for Such a manoeuvre.
President Jayewardene, who was the Minister in charge of the JEDB and SLSPC, had discussions with Gamini Dissanayake and announced a wage increase of Rs. 2.50 per day and equal wage for men and women workers. Hailing this as an unique victory for Gamini Dissanayake, the LJEWU pulled out of the proposed strike. The CWC had been left out in the cold and denied a share of the kudos. Though this piqued the pride of the CWC leaders, they could not take any action as Thondaman had still not returned from India.
It was only on 1 April that the CWC's executive committee met under the chairmanship of S. Thondaman and decided to strike. On the same day, the JPTUC reaffirmed its earlier decision to strike. The situation was ideal for a general strike since the flush of tea was exceptionally good, and tea was fetching record prices in the world market - the price of tea ranged from Rs. 60 to Rs. 150 a kilogram. The response of the workers was splendid and, in fact, many thousands had struck work on 1 April itself. Half a million workers, including the majority of the LJEWU went on strike. In the plantation districts of Hatton, Maskeliya, Talawakelle, Agrapatana, Nuwara Eliya, Rangala, Haputale and Badulla, the strike was a near hundred per cent success. Almost all tea factories in the Up-country were closed, and it can truly be said that the heart of the tea plantations ceased to throb, Thondaman later wrote:
What had triggered the strike was the fact that the administrators who were in charge of the dispute had (no doubt on the advice of the LJEWU) made a unilateral declaration that a new increased interim wage package would come to force on April 1 ... But the impact of this declaration had the opposite effect. The workers were incensed that the Government had tried to bypass the unions with a small increase and thus abort the strike. The workers were angry that instead of arriving at a consensus settlement through
discussions with the unions, government had tried to resolve the dispute with a unilateral dikata.”
Once the strike began, the government, using the mass media, declared that the strike was unwarranted since a wage increase

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and equal wage for equal work had already been granted. President Jayewardene said that the work stoppage would cost the Country Rs. 60 million a day, but stated categorically that there would be no negotiations with the unions unless the workers first returned to work." Such threats could not deter the strikers; anticipating such a contingency, the JPTUC despatched a threemember group to visit the plantation areas to strengthen the strike.
The Island, in its editorial of 3 April, wrote:
The plantation workers' strike is no April Fool joke. Beginning from the first of April the workers in Sri Lanka's tea plantations have begun a strike to press for some of their long standing demands, the chief of which is that they are deprived of the cost of living and other allowances such as the salary increases by the successive budgets. The striking workers belong to the Minister Thondaman's Ceylon Workers Congress as well as the Joint Plantation Trade Union Committee headed by Mr. S. Nadesan and are estimated to number around 600,000,
If any section of the working class deserves a better deal, it is the worker on the estates and, therefore, the government would do well to begin negotiations with the representatives of the plantation trade unions early before an economy, already under siege, is not crippled further by the debilitating effects of inaction in a vital area of the national economy.
While the Island, Virakesari and Aththa expressed sympathy for the strike, Some newspapers attributed ulterior motives to the strike, making use of the fact that the majority of the plantation workers happened to be Tamil workers. One newspaper said, in its editorial, that the strike was an extension of the activity of the Tamil militants in the North to paralyse the economy. All such cheap and mischievous propaganda were foiled by the correct tactics adopted by the JPTUC - Sinhalese leaders of the Joint Committee unions made public statements justifying the general strike. The urban based trade union organizations such as the Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions, the Sri Lanka Independent Trade Unions Federation, the United Federation of Labour and the Ceylon Mercantile Union expressed solidarity with the strike.
On 5 April the Minister of Plantation industries, Montague Jayawickrema held discussions with the unions. S. Thondaman and M.S. Sellasamy (CWC), S. Nadesan, Alawi Moulana and Rozario Fernando representing the JPTUC, Dr Colvin R. de Silva (LEWU), C.V. Velupillai (NUW), Gamini Dissanayake (LJEWU), the Chairman of the JEDB and SLSPC, the Commissioner of Labour,

Joint Strikes of Plantation Workers 317
G. Weerakoon and C. Shanmugam (Treasury) were present at this conference. Minister Jayawickrema stated that the country faced grave danger to its economy and called upon the unions to call off the strike. The unions refused to budge, and finally it was decided that a three-member delegation consisting of S. Thondaman, Dr Colvin R. de Silva and S. Nadesan should meet President Jayewardene.
The delegation met the President at noon and appraised him of the workers' demands, and finally agreed to call off the strike if the COL allowance and a price wage supplement Were conceded as an interim measure. The President gave a patient hearing and it was indicated that his views would be conveyed to the unions in the afternoon.
However, when the unions met Minister Jayawickrema in the afternoon he said that the President would appoint a special Committee to consider the workers' demands and that he wanted the unions to call off the strike unconditionally. To this effect the Presidential Secretary, S.L.M. Marikar and the CWC officials prepared a draft statement. At this stage S. Nadesan indicated to Thondaman that the JPTUC could not sign such a statement to call off the strike. Thondaman readily agreed, and the discussion with Minister Jayawickrema was adjourned.
The striking unions' representatives met separately at the CWC office to find a way out of the impasse. It was decided to continue the strike, and Thondaman was empowered by the unions to discuss with the President and evolve a favourable Settlement of the Strike.
Meanwhile, estate superintendents threatened the strikers that they would not be issued with their foodstuffs and that their earned wages for March together with festival advances would not be paid unless they returned to work. In the face of such inhuman threats to undermine the strike the JPTUC leaders toured the plantations and exhorted the workers to strengthen the strike. The CWC leader Thondaman paid a whirlwind visit to the Up-country and vigorously campaigned to keep up the morale of the Workers. Thondaman, Nadesan and J. Maliyagoda jointly addressed a meeting of estate leaders at the CWC office in Kandy. The workers showed a spirited response, and they continued the strike undaunted by various threats.
On 10 April, President Jayewardene held a discussion with Thondaman (GaminiDissanayaketoo was present), and conceded

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an additional wage increase of Rs. 2/- per day. A male tea worker's daily wage rose from Rs. 18.01 to Rs. 23.75, while that of a rubber worker went up from Rs. 19.76 to Rs. 23.90. Thus, with equal pay for men and women, a female tea Worker's daily wage (which was Rs. 15.01) rose by 58 per cent while that of a male rose by 38 percent. The President also declared that workers Would be offered 6 days' work per week and agreed to appoint a committee to examine the other demands and submit a report by end of May 1984.
The CWC and JPTUC called off their general strike. The plantation workers rejoiced at this victory, and thus ended the historic general strike in the plantations. What was most commendable about Thondaman in this particular strike was his determination to launch the general strike despite his being a member of the Cabinet of Ministers. This was in sharp contrast to the anti-working class attitude adopted by some left Ministers towards workers' strikes during the period of the United Front government.
The Timing of the Strike
Some trade union leaders felt that the strike at that juncture may lead to communal clashes in the plantation areas. However, I felt that there was no better opportunity to conduct a general strike in the plantations for the following reasons:
1. The flush of tea was exceptionally good due to substantial
rains in March.
2. Tea was fetching record prices in the world market - the price of tea ranged from Rs. 60/- to Rs. 150/- a kilogram.
3. The CWC, led by Cabinet Minister S. Thondaman, had
been left out in the cold by President Jayewardene. He had discussions only with the LJEWU. The CWC, therefore, had decided to strike.
4. The relentless campaign of the JPTUC for wage demands had compelled even the LJEWU to declare a strike though it later withdrew from the strike. As such the plantation Workers were in a mood to strike.

Joint Strikes of Plantation Workers 319
5. The International Conference of the Pacific Area Travel Association (PATA) was in session in Colombo and any drastic action by the Government against the poor plantation workers would lead to adverse publicity in the world press and mass media. If communal violence was unleashed against the Tamil people it would ring the death knell of the tourist industry, already in serious crisis following the 1983 July disturbances. Furthermore, any such attacks would, in fact, induce the Up-Country workers to continue the strike with greater determination.
6. The strike was to be launched not only by the CWC but also by the JPTUC in which there were a number of union's led by Sinhalese leaders. We were confident that the urban trade union organizations would express their solidarity with the plantation workers' strike.
7. Since the government was engaged in the fight against the Tamil militants in the north, it could not afford to allow the strike of half a million workers to continue for too long.
8. We were confident that the CWC and the JPTUC unions could pull out nearly half a million workers on strike and paralyse the heart of the tea plantations in the Up-Country. in such an event, the government dared not resort to repressive measures using the army and the police, who can neither pluck tea nor tap rubber trees; nor could they dare to compel the workers to work.
1988 Strike for Wage increase
In the budget for 1988, the government announced a wage increase for its employees and raised the minimum monthly salary to Rs. 1,250/= for the lowest paid category of workers. But no wage increase was granted to the plantation workers. The JPTUC not only protested against the discriminatory policy pursued by the government but decided to conduct a one-day token strike on 1 February 1988 for a monthly wage of Rs. 1,250/= and COL allowance for all plantation workers. The pro-government unions, especially the CWC, opposed the strike. In fact, while the JPTUC leaders campaigned for the strike, especially in the Hatton region,

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the CWC leaders were vigorously engaged in undermining the strike. The CWC secretary M.S. Sellasamy, issued a statement in the Tamil dailies that the workers should refrain from the strike and that the CWC was in the process of negotiation with the JEDB and the SLSPC for a wage increase. His statement was ignored even by his own union members.
The JPTUC recorded its protest against the Labour Minister, P.C. imbulana, for his failure to conduct talks with JPTUC, and launched the token strike on 1 February 1988. Some 400,000 workers participated in this strike and the government could not ignore such a massive strike conducted by the JPTUC. Before the end of February, the government granted a wage increase of Rs. 5/= a day.
Privatization of the Plantations and the Joint Strike
In the 1980's the UNP Government declared that it was following a policy of "Open Market Economy", and advocated privatization of public enterprises in the name of efficiency and increased production. The Government passed the Conversion of Public Corporation or Government Owned Business Undertakings into Public Companies Act No. 23 of 1987. In practice, this kind of public companies can be created within a few hours of the Cabinet of Ministers deciding to do so. As soon as this has been done the business and property of the Corporation or Board rests absolutely in the company.
In 1989 the Presidential Committee on privatization, appointed by President Premadasa, identified 24 public Corporations for privatization. And the clamour for de-nationalisation of the plantations managed by the two state agencies - SLSPC and JEDB began in all earnest. Numerous articles and statements appeared in the newspapers to the effect that these two corporations were incurring huge losses and that the only way to resurrect the plantation industry was by transferring the management of the plantations to the private SectOr.
In 1990 production of tea reached its peak with 233 million kgs and Sri Lanka emerged as the leading world exporter eclipsing

Joint Strikes of Plantation Workers 321
India, the biggest tea producing country in the world. Yet, the performance of the tea industry was indeed poor Compared to other countries. A report in the Sunday Times of 21 April 1991 states: "Our yield per hectare is only about 60 per cent of India as a whole and about half of South India. African Countries ... have higher yields than ours. Compared to our yield of 1100 kg per hectare, Kenya has a yield of about 1800 kg per hectare and Malawi 2000. Since yields have a direct relationship with costs of production, our poor yields imply higher cost of production ... "In the last decade (1980-89) the Corporations recorded losses in tea - in eight of the ten years, the exceptions being 1983 and 1984. The poor progress in the plantations is the result of a multiplicity of factors the more pronounced and significant being poor management of state owned estates".
Despite the Treasury and Plantation Ministry officials lamenting that the two corporations had become white elephants the Government, in utter disregard to the viability of the industry, continued to collect millions of rupees as Ad Valorem sale tax and Cesses. From January to May 1990 the Government collected Rs. 755.8 million as Ad Valorem tax. Cesses were Collected for SOme specific purposes and these amounted to Rs. 810 million in 1989. The Report of the Taxation Commission (Sessional Paper 1 of 1991) comments: "These cesses are a burden on the producers and, in the case of Export Development Board cess, on the Consumer as Well".
It was the Contention of the JPTUC unions that "if mismanagement, corruption and waste are eliminated and the plantation industry is liberated from the burdensome Ad Valorem Tax and cess collections the plantation industry can breath freely". In mid 1991 it was reported that leading companies like Hayleys Group, Aitken Spence and Carson and Cumberbatch were interested in taking management contracts for the estates which the government was offering to the private sector. Mahanama writes: "The positive response is not surprising given the fact that the tea, rubber and coconut plantations are a goldmine for those who will dare to take up the challenges". And raising the question why the multi-nationals such as Aitken Spence and Carsons should be interested in estates that were officially declared to be in the red the author wrote: "A deeper study of the functioning of the JEDB and SLSPC would reveal that the majority

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of the estates, especially in the up-country, are making substantial profits. The big companies are only too well aware of this reality".'
The government's attempts to privatize the state-owned plantations were opposed by the opposition political parties and by the unions in the JPTUC. Unlike the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), which unconditionally supported privatization, the JPTUC refused to agree that privatization was the panacea for the losses and other problems that confronted the two state-owned agencies. And the JPTUC called upon the government to have a discussion with the trade unions since the government's move on this vital subject directly concerned the lives of 400,000 workers who were engaged in the plantations managed by the JEDB and the SLSPC. The government ignored this request and instead permitted unknown persons to enter the estates in September 1991 to Survey the lands.
Attempts by the JPTUC failed to halt this surreptitious move. it was in the situation that the Lanka Jathika Estate Workers Union, the JPTUC and two other plantation unions consisting of estate staff members and executive officers, jointly addressed a letter to President Premadasa on 25th October 1991 that they "would be left with no alternative but resort to direct trade union action" if a discussion on the subject was not granted within 14 days.
it was then that the Secretary to the Treasury, R. Paskaralingam, who was the Chairman of the Committee for Restructuring the Plantations convened a conference of the JPTUC unions at "Sausiripaya" on 9th November 1991. The JPTUC presented to him a list of nine proposals. Thereafter, Rupa Karunatillake, Minister of Plantation Industries, Convened the JPTUC on 15th November for a discussion where the Joint Committee placed similar proposals and stressed on the urgent need for signing a Collective Agreement between the trade unions and the private Companies that would take control of the plantations. The Minister readily agreed with the proposal for a Collective Agreement incorporating the rights of the workers and the trade unions. The Minister's promises were spelled out in the Ministry Secretary R.S. Jayaratne's letter dated 20th November 1991 to the JPTUC. However, the Minister's assurance that he would initiate "a process leading to the signing of a Collective

Joint Strikes of Plantation Workers 323,
Agreement between the trade unions and the individual management companies", was not kept. Meanwhile, in June 1992, 449 estates with a total of 189,500 hectares of land controlled by the JEDB and SLSPC were handed over to 22 private companies. But the people as well as the trade unions, especially the JPTUC unions, were kept in the dark. Like the midnight thief the companies grabbed the plantations.
Subsequent to the estates coming under the private company managements, norms and tasks were increased and these led to a number of strikes, some of them spontaneous. These strikes involved thousands of workers belonging to different unions including the CWC and the LJEWU. These developments led the JPTUC to inform the Minister of Plantation Industries of their decision to conduct a one-day token strike of plantation workers in pursuance of five demands including the call for the signing of a Collective Agreement. The JPTUC then launched the token strike on 26th August 1992. Over 300,000 workers, including members of the government controlled unions responded to the JPTUC's call. Attempts by the CWC leaders using the mass media including the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation to foil the strike proved futile.
It was consequent to this successful strike that the Plantation Restructuring Unit called the JPTUC for a discussion on 3rd October and assured that the causes for the industrial unrest inthe plantations would be removed. S. Nadesan, Convener of the JPTUC, stressed the urgent need for a Collective Agreement between the trade unions and the private companies that had taken over the management of the plantations. However no action was taken by the government authorities to fulfil the assurances given by them.
Notes
1 Gananath Obeysekera, "Political Violence and Future of Demo- cracy",
Lanka Guardian, Vol. 7 (6), 15 July, p. 14. 2 Ibid, Vol. 7 (7), 1 Aug 1984; (for details of Mohammed's policy as given by
Mathew see Hansard, 4 August 1983, cols. 1320-1325. Quoted from Forward in Tribune, 28 June 1980, p. 4. Hansard, Vol. II, No. 1, 24 July 1980, col. 50.
5 Economic Review, March, 1982, p. 72.

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The JPTUC comprised the following unions which signed the joint letter to President Jayawardene on 23 July 1981: United Plantation Workers' Union, Ceylon Plantation Workers Union, Lanka General Services Union,United Lanka Estate Workers Union, Democratic Workers Congress, New Red Flag Plantation Workers' Union, Agricultural and Planta-tion Workers' Congress, Estate Services Union, Lanka Estate Workers' Union, Sri Lanka Desha Vimukthi Viplavakari Sangamaya, Ceylon Plantation Services Union, Ilankai Thozhilalar Kazhagam, Rajaye Podhu Sevaka Sangamaya.
See Dinapathy, 12-16 May 1982. Christian Worker, 1982 Second Quarter, Colombo, p. 37. S.Thondaman, My Life and Times, Colombo, 1987, p. 172. Sun, 4 April 1984. w. Mahanama, And now Perestroika for the Plantations', The Island, 30 June. 1991. S.Nadesan, 'Peoplisation of the Plantations and the Trade Unions, The Island, 14 Nov.1991.

Chapter
18
STRUGGLE FOR CITIZENSHIP
RIGHTS AND ELECTIONS
The stateless problem continued to cause anxiety among the people of Indian origin. The number of applications that were disposed of by the Department for the Registration of Persons of Indian Origin showed a sharp fall. While the number disposed of was 11,581 in 1976 it had fallen to 5,220 in 1980. And half a million people continued to remain stateless. A number of trade unions as well as humanitarian organizations expressed concern

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over the plight of the stateless people. Even left political parties, which had long strayed away from their earlier position on the rights of national minorities, now began to espouse their cause.
By 1980, the CPSL's policy towards the minorities had undergone a change from the opportunistic policies followed for about two decades on the rights of Tamil minorities. The resolution adopted by the CPSL at its 10th Congress in 1978 reads:
In order to restore confidence among the national minorities our Party should make Known its selfcritical acceptance of certain errors and shortcomings in its work in this field. In particular, we would accept our failure to fight consistently and energetically against discrimination that minority communities experience.... in regard to the events of 8th January 1966, our anxiety to bring down the UNP - FP 'Hath Hawla' government of that time led us go to impermissible length of sponsoring a struggle whose objective result was to deepen communal disharmony,'
On the stateless problem, the political thesis adopted by the 11th Congress of the CPSL in March 1980 stated:
The fundamental question of the Up-country Tamils, the majority of whom are plantation workers, remains that of statelessness and exclusion from the country's democratic process. Neither the Citizenship Acts of the UNP nor the 1964 Indo-Ceylon Pact negotiated by the SLFP government... has solved the problem of statelessness. Still five lakhs of persons remain as 'stateless'. This Congress demands that decisive action is taken now to solve the problem of statelessness fully and forever.’
On the initiative of the author, ten left-oriented plantation trade unions addressed a "Memorandum on Stateless People in Sri Lanka" to President J.R. Jayewardene on 8 April, 1980. The memorandum pointed out that "the Agreements between Sri Lanka and India have failed to solve the stateless problem", and called upon him "to take immediate and pragmatic steps to resolve the stateless problem". Copies of the memorandum were sent to the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. In March 1982 the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Narasiraka Rao stated in the Rajya Sabha. å:ಞ್ಞ if the repatriation agreements was 17 years andvëreypjed 2 30 October 1981. After the grant of Indian and Sri Lankan citizenship tö persöns rered with the respective Governments as on 30 October 1981, theddisilst gain a balance number of tateless persons. Government of India are
in touch with the Gerryient 以„Srt Lanka in respect of this residual problem of
~ہ۔۔ یہ

Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 327
statelessness and are confident that a comprehensive resolution of the question will be achieved bearing in mind the desires of the persons concerned.'
However, no action was taken by the government of Sri Lanka on this question. It was only at the All Party Conference held in 1984 that the stateless problem came to be discussed. On 20 March, at a plenary session, the President announced that "consensus has been reached" on the stateless question. It was said that the Maha Sangha (Buddhist Clergy) stated as follows:
We should not have a category of persons who call themselves Indian. This can easily. be achieved by sending back those who have to be sent to India as stated in S-S Pact and giving citizenship to the rest. Even though the numbers may be a little more the Supreme Sangha Council declares that the Council is not opposed to their being given citizenship in order to arrive at a solution to this problem. There have been no contrary views expressed.
Despite the fact that unanimity had been reached at the All Party Conference to resolve the stateless problem, the government failed to act. In 1985, when the TULF and the Eelam National Liberation Front raised this question at the talks held at Thimpu, in the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan, H.W. Jayewardene, the leader of the Sri Lanka government's delegation, refused to discuss the matter saying that he did not "acknowledge the right or status of any persons present here to represent or negotiate on behalf of all Tamils living in Sri Lanka". However, he said that the government had already made its announcement on this question at the All Party Conference.
By January 1986, while India had granted citizenship to 421,207 accountable persons, the Sri Lanka government had granted citizenship to only 197,535 accountable persons. Thus, 356,258 plus their natural increase constituted the stateless population.
Meanwhile, India refused to take some 84,000 people of Indian Origin who had been granted Indian citizenship under the Indo-Ceylon Agreements. India contended that facilities reserved for the repatriates in Tamil Nadu had been utilized by 100,000 Jaffna Tamil refugees, and that until they returned to Sri Lanka the repatriates could not be taken.
It must be noted that President Jayewardene restored Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike's civic rights by a special decree on 1

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January 1986. This was indeed portentous for the long suffering stateless people.
United Campaign for Citizenship Rights
It was in this background that the CWC declared on 3 January to conduct a prayer campaign from 14 January (Hindu Pongal festival day) to 15 April (Hindu and Sinhala New Year day) with the object of settling the stateless problem. If only prayers could have won citizenship rights Thondaman need not have waited for nearly four decades; he could have launched a prayer campaign at the time when the notorious Ceylon Citizenship Act was enacted in 1948 or Soon after. In an interview with N. Ram, ASSistant Editor of the Hindu, he himself admitted the futility of prayers to attain citizenship rights. Referring to his prayer campaign in June 1985 he said: "A three-day prayer meeting was fixed. It was held all over the plantation areas and nobody took serious notice of it".' Despite this sad experience, Thondaman wanted to launch a prayer campaign, and the CWC Secretary Sellasamy wrote to other plantation trade unions calling for their support. The JPTUC considered Sellasamy's letter appealing to the unions of the JPTUC for support for the prayer campaign, and decided to launch a strike and conduct a united struggle for citizenship rights.
On the 7th, Thondamandiscussed the citizenship question with the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and impressed upon him the need to de-link the issue of Indian repatriates from the problem of Jaffna Tamil refugees who had taken shelter in Tamil Nadu. Meanwhile, negotiations had begun between the governments of Sri Lanka and India to settle the stateless problem. After he returned to Colombo, on the 11th Thondaman met National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, who was conducting the negotiations on behalf of President Jayewardene. On behalf of the government of India, the Indian High Commissioner, J.N. Dixit, participated in this discussion. lt transpired that "the President had already given an assurance that the balance 94,000 stateless persons would also be given
citizenship".'

Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 329
The next day, Thondaman entered the ultra-modern Navaloka private hospital ostensibly for a medical check-up. When the author met him at the hospital, Thondaman expressed his frustration that the government had dragged on the stateless problem far too long, and said that only an "all-out action" can settle the question. The author assured Thondaman that the JPTUC would launch into joint action as announced earlier.
With the Indian government agreeing to take the Indian repatriates without linking this issue with the Jaffna Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu, understanding was reached between the government of Sri Lanka and India to resolve the stateless problem. The Sri Lanka government agreed to grant citizenship to 469,000 persons altogether (i.e. 375,000 plus 94,000) within a period of 18 months, while India consented to grant citizenship to all the 506,000 persons, who had opted for India, within six to eight months. And, even before the prayer campaign of the CWC and the JPTUC's strike actually started, the government publicly announced on 15 January that it was settling the stateless problem by granting citizenship to an additional 94,000 persons.
Though the CWC claimed that this was its greatest victory Thondaman was not too happy. The Jayewardene government, of which he was a Cabinet Minister, failed to Consult him when it finally reached agreement with India. Surprisingly, it was the Indian High Commissioner Dixit, who informed him of the agreement. Making reference to this, Thondaman told Ram of the Hindu: "The government of India was already given the draft and they had consented. They (India) should have consulted us anyway. It was nice of them to have told me about this, when my government was not even prepared to...".
The SLFP raised a storm of protest against the government. In a statement Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike said: "The SLFP is deeply perturbed by the government communique of 15.01.86 that Sri Lanka is to absorb a further 94,000 persons of Indian origin...". She claimed that the Indo-Ceylon Agreements she had signed with Shastri (1964) and with Mrs. Indira Gandhi (1974) had settled the problem of statelessness." And she contended that "the number that had to be repatriated is 600,000 not 506,000 and the number to be given Sri Lanka citizenship is 375,000 not 469,000."
Referring to this statement in a press release, the Indian High Commissioner stated:

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As far as points raised concerning number of stateless persons to be given Indian citizenship is concerned it is emphasized, and all concerned should remember that Indo-Sri Lankan agreements on the subject are predicated on the principles of voluntariness. Neither Indian nor Sri Lankan citizenship was expected to be imposed on stateless persons in Sri Lanka, keeping in mind the principles of justice and fair play, conferment of citizenship of one country or the other was to be in response to voluntary applications."
Defending the agreement, President Jayewardene said:
There should be human feeling. So we negotiated with the Indian government, and undertook to take over half of this group of people. They would take the other half Whatever one might say, this decision cannot be changed. Would they not be chasing them into the terrorist fold?'
In this connection the author, as President of UPWU, made a statement to the Virakesari which was tabled in Parliament by the then Prime Minister, R. Premadasa. He referred to the agreement signed between the SLFP's Presidential candidate, Hector Kobbekaduwa, and some estate unions on 24 September 1982, to the effect that, if elected, he would consult the unions and evolve a lasting Solution to the stateless problem. And he asked why Kobbekaduwa signed such an agreement if, in fact, Mrs. Bandaranaike had already settled this problem."
Even before parliament debated the Bill, on the basis of the agreement between the two countries, tension was brewing in the up-Country. On 26 January 1986 two Indian workers were attacked at Talawakelle town and they were taken to the Lindula hospital. The CWC organizer, P. Chandrasekaran, while travelling to see the injured workers, was badly assaulted by Sinhalese thugs and was admitted to the same hospital." The next day Some Tamil shops were looted and torched. Thousands of estate WOrkers Went on a protest strike. The situation deteriorated and a 36-hour curfew was imposed in the area.
The Island of 30 January wrote in its editorial: "In the wake of the CWC's prayer campaign and the government's decision to grant citizenship to the stateless... the government has been Compelled to clamp down a curfew in seven police divisions of the Central Province following the outbreak of sporadic violence. Following these incidents unrest has also broken out on estates and plantation workers have gone on strike..." And the editorial said: "The plantation workers have been living for decades among the Sinhalese people in the hill country, and it will

Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 331
be an act of opportunism to whip up feelings against them at this time."
When violence was unleashed against the Up-Country Tamils the plantation workers for the first time, retaliated thus putting an end to the stigma of a docile community. As a result of racial violence a number of people lost their lives, many shops and houses belonging to both Tamils and Sinhalese were burnt down. The Christian Worker reported: "By 4th February there were 2500 Tamil refugees and 500 Sinhala refugees in refugee camps in Hatton and 380 Sinhala refugees at Bogawantalawa."
During the debate on the Bill to grant citizenship to an additional 94,000 stateless persons, the SLFP and MEP vehemently opposed the Bill but their MPs were not present in the House when the votes were counted. Nor was the CWC leader S. Thondaman present. Commenting on his absence, Leader of the Opposition, Anura Bandaranaike, said later in parliament:
Last time when citizenship was given to your 94,000 stateless people you absented yourself, and you left all your UNP colleagues to carry the baby for you while you were holidaying in Bangladesh.'
Supported by the only opposition MP representing the CPSL Sarath Mutettuwegama, the Bill was passed on 31 January.
In the light of these developments it would be a travesty of the truth for anyone to claim that Thondaman's prayer campaign solved the stateless problem. As we have observed, the prayer campaign never got off the ground. Various factors, and above all, the real possibility of a major strike in the plantations led by the CWC and the JPTUC unions, compelled the government to negotiate a new agreement with India and enact the Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons Act No. 5 of 1986.
Indeed it was this reality that impelled Anura Bandaranaike to taunt Thondaman in parliament:
You always say that you have very good relations with the President. How is that you could not convince the President to grant citizenship to 94,000. without flexing your muscles?'
Exposing Thondaman's self-acclaim he said:

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Having got what you wanted you proceed to plant a paid advertisement in the newspapers saying "the CWC prayer campaign succeeds.'
Despite the appointment of a Cabinet Sub-Committee, which included Minister Thondaman, to monitor the implementation of the Act and the re-organization of the office of the Commissioner for the Registration of Persons of Indian Origin, the government failed to settle the stateless problem. Up to the end of October. 1988 the Commissioner had granted citizenship to only 237,151 (countable) persons whereas he should have granted citizenship altogether to 469,000 persons under the Act.
The number of persons (countables) granted citizenship from 01.01.1986 to 31.10.1988 is 39,276. Therefore, the number remaining to be granted citizenship of Sri Lanka (countables) is 231849°
In this situation, a new factor came to influence the citizenship issue. President Jayewardene, in his wisdom, decided to hold the Presidential election. On 19 December 1988. In its anxiety to win over the Indian Tamil people's support for the UNP's presidential candidate - R. Premadasa - the government brought a new Bill to resolve the stateless problem in parliament. Moving the Bill the Minister of National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali, said "As the government has resolved to solve the problem of statelessness and as the matter cannot be prolonged indefinitely, it was decided to introduce a new Bill in Parliament which is this one enabling the conferment of citizenship to the balance stateless persons." Supporting this Bill the CP Member, D.E.W. Gunasekhera, said:
Whatever the motive that made the government bring this piece of legislation, we welcome it because it makes the most discriminating unjust and inhuman piece of legislation ineffective from now onwards. We welcome the Bill because we have fought for the basic rights of the plantation workers... I would remind the House that this section of the population is really an asset to the country. Through their sweat, tears and blood they have not only enriched the wealth of this country but have also contributed to find foreign exchange to meet the payment of capital and interest annually - Rs. 17,000 million.'
it must be noted that On this Occasion too the SLFP Members were not present in parliament but the party tacitly supported the Bill. Tabling a statement in the Aththa by Anura Bandaranaike, in Parliament, Athulathmudali said: "So although the opposition is not here there is no difficulty. From this statement it is obvious that the SLFP supports this Bill and think we can pass this Bill

Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 333
without any kind of controversial discussion." Thus the Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons (Special Provisions) Act No. 39 of 1988 was enacted on 11 November. This Act purported to complete the granting of citizenship altogether to 469,000 (countable) persons and put an end to the stateless problem. Section 2 of the Act reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law every
person who a. is of Indian Origin lawfully resident in Sri Lanka; b. is stateless, and C. is not within 506,000 persons referred to in the Grant of
Stateless Persons Act No. 5 of 1986, who have applied to the Indian High Commission for the Grant of Indian Citizenship and children born to them after 30 October, 1964.
shall have status of a citizen of Sri Lanka from the date of commencement of the Act and shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges to which other citizens of Sri Lanka are entitled to by law.
Section 4(1) of the Act says that any stateless person who does not come within the 506,000 who had applied for Indian Citizenship "may if he so desires, apply to the Commissioner for a certificate of citizenship "and the Commissioner shall issue a certificate within 60 days of the receipt of such application by him." And section 4(4) declares that "no person shall require the production of a certificate referred to in section (1) for any purpose and an affidavit shall be accepted as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein."
This Act too was not free from drawbacks. In the first instance, hundreds of people who applied to the Commissioner for citizenship certificates did not receive them within the stipulated period of 60 days. Some have not received the certificates even after four years. Secondly, many stateless persons found it difficult to get an affidavit attested by a Justice of Peace (JP) for the simple reason that any JP could refuse to attest the affidavit saying that he was not sure whether the applicant was not one of the 506,000 who had applied for Indian citizenship. And, even if affidavits Could be adduced, they are often not accepted as sufficient proof of citizenship by the public or even by government

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கொழுழ்
வரை தி* w
334 A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
authorities. In fact, there have been many instances where officials of the Department of Elections have called for citizenship certificates or affidavits as proof to register their names in the electoral register since, under the constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka, only citizens are qualified to be electors. Thus thousands of Indian Tamils have been deprived of their fundamental right to franchise and their right to participate in elections. The Joint Plantation Trade Union Committee, comprising 13 unions, therefore submitted a Memorandum on Discrimination against Sri Lankan Citizens of People of Indian Origin' to President R. Premadasa on 30 May 1990 calling upon him "to repeal all discriminatory laws, regulations and administrative diktats on citizenship against the lawfully resident people of Indian origin... and to devise a simple provision to the effect that all persons legally resident in Sri Lanka, other than the foreign nationals, are citizens of Sri Lanka."'
Elections
Even before the Presidential election the government held the Provincial Council elections in 1988. The concept of Provincial Councils arose from the Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord signed in Colombo on 29 July 1987 by President Jayewardene and the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. Unlike the Indo-Lanka agreements of 1964, 1974 and 1986, on the problem of citizenship rights for the people of Indian origin, the accord of 1987 was mainly concerned with putting an end to the civil war raging in the Country between the Security forces and the Tamil militant organizations in the North and East. The peace accord was based on the recognition that
SLanka is multi-ethnic and miltilingual plural society and that each ethnic group
க்hala incluist identity which has to be carefully nurtured.
Since the prgvisions of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord envisage
Country, slee one df the clauses in the accord is directly
"concerned trhe people of Indian origin, it becomes necessary
" sigfica far-reaching changes in the political system of the
ՅՈ
a Gastopke ಜೃgಳೋ of the accord.
a . A
 
 

Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 335
Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord
in the wake of the 1983 July communal violence, India came to be involved in working out a political solution to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. When President Jayewardene's brother H.W. Jayewardene had discussions with the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, he had stated "that the Sri Lankan Government was willing to consider proposals which would give the Tamil minority their due share in the affairs of the country within the framework of a united Sri Lanka." Mrs. Gandhi responded by appointing G. Parthasarathy as her Special Envoy to Sri Lanka for mediatory efforts between the Sri Lankan government and the TULF.
Parathasarathy's discussions with President Jayewardene and the TULF leaders within a span of four months from August to December 1983, resulted in the formulation of a set of proposals, popularly known as Annexure C. The proposals in Annexure C centered on the creation of regional councils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka.
Though President Jayewardene agreed that the proposals in Annexure C would constitute the basis of negotiations, the All Party Conference (APC) that met in 1984 failed to give any serious consideration to them. The SLFP opposed the proposals, and, as the Conference went on, Annexure C was abandoned. The APC dragged on for seven months without any positive results. The situation was causing anxiety not only among the progressive and democratic forces, which hoped for a settlement of the escalating ethnic crisis, but also within the Indian government itself.
G.K. Reddy, the Hindu columnist, wrote:
The Sri Lanka government has been making some grievous mistakes in assessing the Indian mood and in proceeding on the assumption that it would not intervene. It has been ignoring the fact that there is a limit to India's tolerance... the new PM of India, like his mother, cannot afford to play ostrich and pretend that the Sri Lankan crisis does not exist or that it is of no concern to this government. He has to face it because India has a vital interest in a peaceful settlement of the ethnic tangle and any prolonged civil strife in this neighbouring country is detrimental to India's own interest.
Reddy's warnings went unheeded in Sri Lankan government circles. The government was prepared to consider only limited schemes of devolution of power. ར ,

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Meanwhile, the civil war continued in the North and East with increased intensity. When President Jayewardene met the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, at the summit meeting of South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) at Bangalore in November 1986, the ethnic problem was discussed. Soon the Indian Minister of State, Natwar Singh, and P. Chidambaram had discussions in Colombo and a new package of proposals known as the December 19 proposals was evolved. These proposals basically
involve the formation of a new Eastern Province by excising Sinhala majority areas (Amparai Electoral District) from the existing Eastern Province, and creation of two Tamil Provincial Councils in the Northern and the re-constituted Eastern Province.
The proposals had the support of the Sri Lankan President. "However, soon after the return of the Ministers, the Sri Lankan government expressed reservations and resiled from December 19 position".
In January 1987 the government imposed an economic blockade on the Jaffna Peninsula, and life was coming to a standstill in Jaffna. With fuel cut off, transport services were Coming to a grinding halt. It appeared that the government was going back to a military option. Patrice Claude writing in Le Monde in May described President Jayewardene as
this man who moved his Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka as close as possible to the West, who says he is ready to sign tomorrow a treaty of friendship and co-operation with the United States' adding ironically on the lines of India's 1971 Treaty with the Soviet Union.
And Claude says: "Speaking to a group of six journalists, he condemned India's policy towards Sri Lanka: "It is not in keeping with the legacy of its past. May be it's a Hitlerian policy - HITLERIAN - but it is certainly not Gandhian’... 'No country in the world is helping us... They all talk of democracy and not one helps ours."
At the end of April the Saturday Review reported that the militants had used mortar shells and rocket launchers "against the Security Forces, which resulted in the death of a number of Soldiers." It was also reported that Sri Lanka's Air Force bombers and helicopters strafed various parts of Jaffna. Publishing the December 19 proposals on its front page, the Saturday Review

Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 337
wrote: "The Tamil militant groups, led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) also now appear to be willing to consider these proposals as a basis for further talks."
However, there was no further progress. On the contrary, the situation in Jaffna deteriorated. There Was "a severe food shortage in the Peninsula and the Assistant Food Controller said that unless the situation is eased, people may be compelled to die of starvation."
At the end of May the government launched 'Operation Liberation' to liberate Jaffna from the control of the militants. On 4 June India reacted by launching 'Operation Poomalai' - Indian Air Force transport planes dropped food supplies over the Jaffna peninsula. The Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, defended the air-drop by saying: "It was India's response to a situation that demanded humanitarian relief." He rejected the suggestion that this action "had damaged India's image in the neighbourhood or in the rest of the world. Nor had it affected India's mediatory role."
These developments led to a dramatic change in the government's attitude. Consequent to discussions between the two governments, Indian ships unloaded foodstuffs and medicines for the people in the North. President Jayewardene defended the government's acceptance of Indian food aid to Jaffna saying: "Do not look a gift horse in the mouth." The government presented new proposals to India to resolve the ethnic conflict. The Indian High Commission had been turned into a hive of activity - Indian diplomats were flying in and out of Colombo. An Indian Air Force helicopter carried the LTTE leader, V. Prabhakaran to Delhi on 24 July. On 29 July the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and President Jayewardene, signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in Colombo "to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka".
There were violent protests in Colombo against the agreement. The two leading Ministers - Prime Minister R. Premadasa and National Security Minister, Lalith Athulathmudali, boycotted the ceremonial signing of the accord in Colombo. Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike and her SLFP vehemently opposed the agreement. The JVP stood in violent opposition: in fact, an attempt to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi was made while he was inspecting the Sri Lankan guard of honour just before he left the airport at Katunayake. On the other hand, Prabhakaran too did

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not fully support the accord. He said at a press conference in Jaffna on 5 August:
This is an understanding between both governments to which we are not a party.'
The left parties and human rights organizations welcomed the Indo-Sri Lanka accord as a way out of the ethnic conflict that had been raging in the country for a decade.
The agreement desires "to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka," while "acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society consisting, inter alia of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers". The main point of the agreement relates to the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Para 2.2 reads:
the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit having one Provincial Council.
Para 2.3 says: "There will be a referendum... to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether (a) the Eastern Province should remain linked With the Northern Province as One administrative unit or (b) the Eastern Province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial Council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers".
With reference to the Indian repatriates it must be noted that the accord links their repatriation to the Jaffna Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu. Para 2.16(d) reads:
The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident here, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
Provincia Council Elections
One of the positive developments of the accord was the unit of devolution of power from the centre to the provinces. The 13th Amendment to the constitution in September 1987 paved the way for the establishment of Provincial Councils in the island. The Provincial Councils Election Act No. 2 was enacted in January,

Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 339
1988 and the Provincial Councils were elected on the proportional representation system of elections. Under this system the elector first gives his vote to a party of his choice and then expresses his preferences for up to three different candidates nominated by that party.
The Provincial Council Elections, other than in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, were held between 28 April and 9 June 1988. Meanwhile, just a few weeks prior to the election, the CPSL, LSSP, NSSP and the Sri Lanka Mahajana Peramuna, (SLMP), formed by Vijaya Kumaranatunga and his wife Chandrika (daughter of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike), had constituted themselves as the United Socialist Alliance (USA). While the USA supported the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and was preparing to, participate in the Provincial Council elections the SLFP, led by Mrs. Bandaranaike, opposed and boycotted them. The JVP and its affiliate Deshapremi.Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV) not merely opposed the elections but threatened both candidates and voters with dire consequences. The elections came to be held in an atmosphere of violence and terror. In fact, despite security precautions "at least 22 candidates were shot dead before election day."
The Provincial Council elections were of special significance for the ethnic minorities. Since elections were held on a district basis, a minority community concentrated in a district Could, if it supported a single party, ensure the victory of one or more seats in the Provincial Council. However, the Up-country Tamils did not contest the elections under a single banner. The CWC candidates Contested on the UNP list, while the left or opposition nominees came forward on the USA list. In the absence of the SLFP in the arena, the main Contenders in the provincial council elections were the UNP and the USA.
The UNP won 211 seats in the 7 provinces where elections were held. Despite armed terror unleashed by the JVP-DJV Combine against candidates and voters, the USA romped home with 139 seats. However, it must be clearly understood that but for the SLFP's boycott, the USA would certainly not have been able to put up such an impressive show.
As already pointed out, these elections were held in an atmosphere of violence and intimidation and large sections of plantation Workers especially in Uva province, could not cast their votes. Commenting on the Provincial Council Elections the Commissioner of Elections, Chandrananda de Silva, writes :

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There were allegations of election malpractices here. Instructionists forced a low poll by violent means. Counter measures taken by the defence authorities added further confusion. Some of the direct attempts made by even candidates to forcibly stuff ballot papers at the poll, where police officers on duty turned a blind eye, created further confusion. Howeversatisfactory were the arrangements made to conduct this poll, yet by way of commission and omission, some planned attempts had been made to rig the poll. The freedom of the elector was exposed to more and more risks in view of growing violence. Candidates and their agents had to be armed to protect them from such violence.
Indian Tamil voters played an important role in the UNP's victory in the Central and Uva provinces. 12 CWC nominees were elected - 7 in the Central, 2 each in the Western and Uva Provinces and 1 in the Sabaragamuwa province. Three of them, including M.S. Sellasamy, who contested in the Colombo district were made Ministers in the Western, Central and Uva Provincial Councils. Three Up-country Tamils who contested on the USA list namely, P.V. Kandiah and O.A.Ramiah from the Central Province and S. Rasiah from the Sabaragamuwa Province were also elected.
Presidential Election - 1988
The Presidential election was Conducted on 19 December 1988 in an atmosphere of violence. The JVP and the LTTE boycotted the election. On election day 20 polling stations were attacked and it was reported that 10 persons lost their lives. Of a total of 9.4 million voters only about 5.1 million - that is about 55% went to polls to elect a successor to President J.R. Jayewardene.
There were three Contestants at this election. The UNP selected Prime Minister R. Premadasa as its presidential candidate. Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike was the SLFP's candidate. And the SLMP's Ossie Abeygunasekara was the last to enter the fray. The UNP had chosen its candidate wisely. On the one hand, Premadasa rose from humble origin in the low country and, therefore, could be easily projected as the man of the common masses fighting a battle against the Kandyan aristocrat, Mrs. Bandaranaike. On the other, since Premadasa too opposed the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike would not be able to score a point over him on that count among the Sinhalese voters. Furthermore, Premadasa, himself no mean tactician,

Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 341
conjured up a novel idea - the 'Janasaviya' programme. Under this much publicized poverty alleviation scheme, he promised a package of Rs. 2,500 a month to every family. This served as a special attraction to the poor masses who were more Concerned with their bread and butter than with high politics.
Well before the election, Mrs. Bandaranaike made a concerted effort to forge a broad united front of the opposition political parties, so that a single candidate could be promoted for the entire opposition. Though widespread anti-government sentiments prevailed in the country such a front could not be realized. What Mrs. Bandaranaike finally achieved was the formation of a weak Democratic People's Alliance (DPA) of five parties including two small Tamil based political parties - the All Ceylon Tamil Congress and the Democratic Workers Congress. On the ethnic question, the manifesto of the DPA stood for the devolution of power. It declared that
there shall be a predominantly Tamil unit comprising of What is the Combined Northern and Eastern Provinces but excluding the area covered by the Muslim unit.
On the citizenship issue the manifesto stated that:
i. There shall be an immediate implementation of Acts of
Parliament relevant to citizenship,
ii. All disabilities that exist in law for citizens of Sri Lanka by
registration shall be removed.*
On the language question, the manifesto assured to make both Sinhala and Tamil official languages while English would be made "a national language." Thus, despite the opportunistic tendencies of the SLFP such as its last minute Overtures to the JVP and the LTTE, the DPA manifesto had incorporated a number of progressive declarations on the rights of ethnic minorities and on the rights of workers. However, due to lack of credibility their impact on the voters was negligible.
The SLMP candidate Ossie Abeygunasekara's only qualification was that he had performed extraordinarily well at the Provincial Council elections in Gampaha District. His candidature Caused unnecessary confusion among the opposition forces. The

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Sectarian policies pursued by the left parties eventually pushed them to support him. In the up-country, the CWC extended its support to the UNP candidate. As we have stated, the government made a shrewd move to Woo the Up-Country Tamils by enacting a new Citizenship Act on 11 November, purporting to solve the stateless problem by granting citizenship to all stateless people who had not applied for Indian citizenship.
The result of the presidential election as announced by the Election Commissioner was:
R. PremadaSa 2,569,199 50.43% Sirimavo Bandaranaike 2,289,860 44.95% Ossie Abeygunasekara 235,719 4.63% Total polled 5,186,233 55.32% Rejected votes 91,445 1.76% Majority 279,331
Registered voters 9,375,742
Thus it would be clear that Ranasinghe Premadasa, Sri Lanka's second elected Executive President, won "an unprecedentedly difficult election." There was strong support for Premadasa especially from the Up-Country Tamils. In the Nuwara-Eliya district polling was high with 80% voter turn out. In this district Premadasa received 112,135 votes i.e. 62.5% Whereas Mrs. Bandaranaike received only 64,907 votes i.e. 36%.*
General Election - 1989
As stated in the previous chapter, the Jayewardene government, by resorting to the dubious device of a Referendum held in December 1982, postponed by six years the general election that should have been held in 1983. As a result, the National State Assembly, elected to office on 21st July 1977 and transformed into. a parliament in 1978, obtained an extended lease of life up to August 1989. Commenting on the Referendum held on 22 December 1982, the Commissioner of Elections, Chandrananda de Silva, writes:

Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 343
The blatant violations of both the rules and conventions at this Referendum generates further anxiety on possible misplacement of this device as a constitutional mechanism. Hence, the provision for the postponement of any election by recourse to a Referendum, has no moral base. It seems only to provide an opportunity to seek a manipulative advantage to those who can wield it.'
it was in December 1988 that President Jayewardene dissolved the Eighth and the longest Parliament of Sri Lanka, and this paved the way for holding the general election on 15 February 1989. At this election the registered electorate had risen to nearly 9.4 million, of whom nearly 2.7 million were due to vote for the first time at a parliamentary general election.
While large numbers of Indians became eligible to vote, thousands of them, who had obtained citizenship under the recently enacted citizenship laws, could not participate in the election since their names had not been registered in the electoral register.
The system of voting adopted at the general election was the same as for the Provincial Council elections in 1988. To qualify for recognition, a political party was required to obtain a minimum percentage of the valid votes in one or more electoral areas. The cut-off point for the general election was fixed at 5 per cent. It was also decided that the new parliament would be composed of 196 elected members and an additional 29 members nominated in proportion to the national total of votes obtained by each party or group.
Unlike at the Presidential election, nearly 6 million people, i.e. 64 per cent of the electors, went to the polls to exercise their democratic right to elect their representatives to parliament, despite violent explosion of bombs of the JVP and the LTTE's call for a boycott of the elections in the North and East. The UNP won 110 seats in the district lists and 15 in the national list making a total of 125 seats. The SLFP won 58 and 9 respectively. The TULF obtained 10 while the SLMC won 4 seats. An Independent Group in Jaffna won 10 seats while the USA managed to get 3 seats in parliament.
The general election kindled great hopes in the Up-country Tamil people who had been deprived of their right to adequate representation in parliament for nearly four decades. Some 30 Up-Country Tamils, under various parties or groups contested at this election. The CWC fielded eight candidates on the UNP list - seven in the Up-country and one in Colombo. However, on

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nomination day the CWC organizer at Talawakelle, P. Chandrasekaran came to Contest the election On the Democratic People's Liberation Front (DPLF) list, led by Uma Maheswaran, and there was pandemonium in the CWC leadership. On the eve of the election, Thondaman called upon his flock to cast two votes for the CWC nominees in the UNP list and one for any other UNP candidate, hoping for reciprocity. This tactic of Thondaman boomeranged on the CWC since all its candidates lost in the Upcountry. In the Nuwara-Eliya district the UNP gathered four seats but there was none for the CWC. On the other hand, it helped to boost the votes for the real UNP candidates; GaminiDissanayake, who contested in Nuwara Eliya, secured the highest percentage of votes anyone polled in this general election. He obtained 73,790 votes i.e., 67 percent of his party's votes. The only consolation for the CWC was that its Secretary, M.S. Sellasamy, managed to win in the Colombo district on the UNP list.
A number of Up-Country Tamils also contested in the Nuwara Eliya district under other political parties - 3 (USA), 7 (DPLF), 1 (SLFP), and 4 under the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress. All of them fared badly. The NUW Financial Secretary, P. Perumal (USA), received only 2,581 votes. Though P. Chandrasekaran (DPLF) received only 1,364 votes, the DPLF, which had no trade union base in the plantations, scored 10,409 votes in the Nuwara Eliya district.' Though the CWC failed to win a single seat it must be noted that its candidates received substantial numbers of votes, for example M. Sivalingam obtained 23,882 votes.
Thus the general election of 1989 ended without any elected representation in parliament for the Up-country Tamil people. However, S. Thondaman and P.P. Devaraj entered parliament on the UNP's national list. While Thondaman was made the Minister of Textiles and Rural Industrial Development, Devaraj became State Minister for Hindu Cultural Affairs.
In an interview to the island on 26 February 1989 a dejected Thondaman stated that the CWC candidates suffered because of Chandrasekaran and the Jaffna teachers in the estate Schools. This is far from Correct. The basic reason for the failure of the CWC to win seats in the Up-Country was their total alliance. with the UNP in a general election which was conducted under the preferential system of voting. However, consequent to the expulsion of a number of MPs from the UNP in September 1991 for their involvement in an impeachment motion against President

Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 345
Premadasa, two CWC candidates were able to become MPs on the basis of the magnitude of preferences they had received at the general election. These two were: M. Sivalingam (Nuwara Eliya) and V. Sennan (Badulla).
The general election too was marred by violence. There had been 150 murders during the 48 hours preceding the poll. The Commissioner of Elections records in his report on this general election:
The most alarming feature is the continuing trend of lawlessness on the day of the poll. The need to collect one's own preferences would have aggravated it. Law enforcement authorities may have failed. But the larger share of blame and responsibility has to be accepted by recognized political parties to which some of the marauders belonged. One begins to wonder whether institutionalized thuggery is an essential component of a political campaign.'
Local Government Elections
The elections to Local Authorities comprising 10 Municipal Councils, Urban Councils and 194 Pradeshiya Sabhas were held in 19 districts (excluding the Northern and Eastern Provinces) on 11 May 1991. By this time there had been a significant increase in the number of Indian Tamil voters. The UNP-CWC-ELJP alliance. polled 52.43 percent of the votes in the 17 districts "whilst the SLFP averaged 38 percent going up to over 40 percent taking into account the areas the party Contested as an independent group with its alliance partners."
Once again there was no electoral agreement between the opposition parties but alliances were hastily patched up between the SLFP and other parties in many areas. On the other hand the CWC, having learnt a lesson from the debacle it suffered in the 1989 general election, reached agreement with the UNP and contested Ambeganuwa and Nuwara Eliya Pradeshiya Sabhas under its own symbol - the cockerel. In these areas the UNP candidates went to the polls under the CWC symbol. In other areas, the CWC supported the UNP and contested under its symbol - the elephant. The CWC scored significant victories in these two Pradeshiya Sabhas by securing 29 Out of a total of 46 seats. It won also a number of seats in the Municipal, Urban Councils and other Pradeshiya Sabhas in the up-country.

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:
29
31
32 33
35
37
A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
Notes
What Communists Propose, Colombo, 1978. p. 48. Political Thesis - 11th National Congress of CPSL, Colombo, 1980, p. 16. Memorandum on Stateless People in Sri Lanka, Colombo, Pragathi Printers, 1986, p. 3. Yvone Fries and Thomas Bibin - quoted in The Undesirables Calcutta, 1984. p.43.
Hansard Vol. 40 No. 1, 20 Feb. 1986, col. 23.
Ibid col. 31.
Voice of the Voiceless, March 1986, p. 6
Sunday Observer 5 Jan 1986.
Daily News 2 Jan 1986. S.Thondaman interviewed by N. Ram of the Hindu reproduced in The Island, 30th Jan 1986.
The Island- 12 Jan 1986.
Thondaman interviewed by N. Ram, op. cit.
The Island, 26 Jan 1986.
Ibid.
Ibid.
bid 27 Jan 1986.
Daily News 20 Jan 1986. Hansard Vol. 40 No. 7, 20 March 1986, cols. 709–710 (For English text see Sunday Observer 23 March 1986).
VirakeSari 28 Jan 1986.
Christian Worker, 1st Quarter, 1986, p. 44. Hansard 20 Feb 1986 col. 190.
Ibid 6 March 1986, col. 511.
bidi col. 510.
bidi 9 Nov 1988 col. 2116.
Ibid, col. 2117.
Ibid, col. 2128.
See Appendix for Memorandum Anonymous - The Sri Lankan Conflict - "An Indian Perception", Lanka Guardian 1 June 1987, p. 15.
Ibid, pp. 15-16.
Lanka Guardian 15 June 1987, p. 17. Patrice Claude, "Old Man beset by beset by chaos", Guardian Weekly, London, 10 May 1987 (Vol. 136 No. 19), p. 11. Saturday Review 25 April 1987, p. 1.
Ibid, 20 June 1987.
Ibid, 4 July 1987.
Ibid, 18 July 1987.
Ibid, 25 July 1987.
Ibid, 8 Aug 1987.
9th Parliament of Sri Lanka, Lake House, 1991, p. 17.

39
40 41 42 43
Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Elections 347
Report of the Commissioner of Elections on the Ninth Parliamentary General Election of Sri Lanka held on 15.05.1989, p. 215.
Ibid, p. 513.
Ibid, p. 287.
The Sunday Times, 19 May 1991.
Congress News, June-July, 1991, p. 16.

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COnclusion
It is well over a century and a half since the first batch of Indian immigrant labour was brought into the island to work on the plantations. Immigration of such labour came to an end in 1939 when the government of India imposed a ban on the emigration of unskilled labour to Ceylon. By the 1930's, consequent to the severance of economic and social links with their original homes in India, the majority of the Indians, especially in the plantations, had become permanently settled in the Island.
Initially it was indeed the efforts of the Government of India, no doubt as a result of pressure from India's National leaders, that helped the eradication of the more oppressive features in the employment of Indian labour in the plantations. The granting of franchise rights, though in a limited manner, to the Indians in 1931, consequent to the Donoughmore Commission's recommendations, made the toiling masses in the plantations realise their own importance. Needless to say the energising role played by K. Natesa Aiyar in founding the first Workers' trade union under the labour laws. The propaganda campaigns unleashed against the British planters and the militant strikes led by L.S.S. P. leaders in the plantations such as the Mooloya strike in 1940 had the effect of developing a new consciousness amongst the workers.
This developing phase reached a climax at the general elections held in 1947 under the Soulbury Constitution. While the Ceylon Indians voted solidly for the C.I.C candidates in the Up-Country electorates they supported candidates of the left parties such as the L.S.S.P. and the C.P. in other electorates. The C.I.C. secured 7 seats while the left parties won 18. The U.N. P. leaders and Prime Minister D.S.Senanayake brought the axe down and enacted the notorious Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948. This Act, in one foul stroke, rendered statelgess a million people. Thus the U.N.P. Government and subsequent Governments basically pursued a policy of political segregation against the Ceylon Indians.
The Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) Act of 1967 based on the Sirima-Shastri Pact of 1964 failed to fully solve the stateless problem. Meanwhile, some half a million Indians migrated to India. While some went voluntarily, others were made to quit the country of their adoption by various pressures including the pogroms unleashed against the Tamil people. Consequent to the activities of the Tamil militants in the North the ferry service between India and Sri Lanka was

A History of the Up-Country Tamil People
suspended in 1984, and some 84,000 so-called repatriates who had obtained Indian passports could not proceed to India. Many of those, who had opted for India in 1970, have died. And the children, who had no say in their parents' choice, have no desire to settle in India which for all intents and purposes is an alient country. This is a major human problem that cries for a satisfactory solution.
It was in 1986, while the civil war was raging in the North and East, the C.W.C. and the J. P.T.U.C. Unions launched a campaign to resolve the vexed stateless problem. This led to the Government reaching an agreement with India and enacting the Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons Act of 1986, which incidentally, was to grant citizenship to an additional 94,000 stateless persons and settle the stateless problem within one and half years. However, the Government took no interest to implement this Act. It was just before the presidential election in December 1988 and in order to win the support of the plantation workers that the Government enacted the Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons (Special Provisions) Act. This Act declared that all those who did not come within the 506,000 persons who had applied for Indian citizenship under the 1967 Act, "shall have the status of a citizen of Sri Lanka".
As indicated above all the citizenship Acts contain provisions that are discriminatory against registered citizens. Although the 1978 Constitution seemingly abolished the distinction between citizens by descent and citizens by registration and provided for a single status of citizenship the discriminatory provisions against citizens by registration were retained through Article 26(4) of the constitution. A.J.Wilson, who had a hand in the final draft of the Constitution, writes that "Section 18 of subsection 3 of the constitution validated all existing laws even if they were inconsistent with the rights listed in subsection 11. In other words legislation such as relating to Ceylonese Citizenship which draws a distinction between citizens by descent and citizens by registration and discriminates against the latter, in certain matters was validated". Thus the Sri Lanka citizens of Indian origin have been relegated to the position of 2nd class citizens.
This indeed is the real situation despite all co-operation the C.W.C., led by Minister S.Thondaman, has extended to the U.N.P., for nearly three decades. It is only sustained and united struggle c the Up-country Tamil people that can help
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repeal all the discriminatory provisions in the citizenship laws and in the Constitution and ensure equal rights for these people. Such a development would enable the Up-Country
Tamil people to play their due role in the mainstream of political life and contribute to national integration while preserving their identity as a national minority.
As far as employment is concerned the plantations provide a major avenue of employment for the Ceylon Indian workers. With the Ministry of Education taking over the estate schools and with enhanced educational facilities available to estate children, educated plantation youths are seeking employment outside the plantation sector. Already large numbers of them are engaged in the teaching profession. It is indeed imperative that the Up-country youths are provided with opportunities for vocational training and technical education.
Since the privatization of the Government owned plantations in 1992, their has been underemployment and a deterioration in the standard of living of plantation workers. The Government has failed to fulfil its promise given to the unions that it would enable workers to Own their houses and garden plots thus preventing the liberation of the plantation workers from the position of captive labour.
it must be realised that the plantation crops do not Constitute the mainstay of the economy as they did two decades ago. Already in 1978 the export duties on these contributed only 40% of the total tax revenue of the Government. In December 1992 all export duties on these crops were abolished and this change marked the cessation of the financial link between plantation economy and the Government. This may well lead to Government's total lack of responsibility for welfare of the plantation workers.
No doubt, the abolition of export taxation is a welcome measure especially for the 22 private Companies that have taken over the plantations. However, there is danger that most of these companies, imbued with the motive of quick and maximum profits, may, on the one hand, neglect the welfare of the workers and on the other run-down the plantations. Therefore, it is imperative that the Government takes concerted efforts to ensure the development of the plantation industry as a major source of foreign exchange earnings and an avenue for the employment of a large section of the working class of Sri Lanka.

A History of the Up-Country Tamil People 351
Finally, it must be stated that time has come for UpCountry Tamil workers to realise that total dependence on the plantations for their livelihood may endanger their future prospects and development. Alternative sources of employment and income have to be generated to ensure their Wellbeing and progress.

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APPENDIX
A MILLION PEOPLE Second Class Citizens
MEMORANDUM ON DISCRIMINATIONAGAINST
SRI LANKAN CITIZENS OF PEOPLE OF INDIAN ORIGIN
Submitted to
His Excellency R. Premadasa, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
by
S. Nadesan On behalf of The Joint Plantation Trade Union Committee

Appendix
MEMORANDUMON DISCRIMINATIONAGAINST .
SRI LANKAN CITIZENS OF PEOPLE OF INDIAN ORIGIN
The grant of Citizenship to stateless persons (Special provisions) Act No. 39 of 1988, at long last, attempts to solve the vexed problem of statelessness. Section 2 of the Act declares, in effect, that all stateless persons who had not applied for indian citizenship "shall have the status of citizen of Sri Lanka with effect from the date of commencement of this Act" i.e. from 11th November 1988.
However, in practice, many stateless persons have found it difficult to obtain the certificates of citizenship as described in section 4(1) of the Act which reads as follows :- any person who does not come within the 506,000 persons who had applied for Indian citizenship "could apply, if he so desires, to the Commissioner for a certificate of citizenship ..." and the Commissioner "shall issue a certificate within 60 days of the receipt of such application by him." We have to bring to your Excellency's notice that many applicants have not received citizenship certificates within the stipulated period of 60 days. Section 4(a) reads that "no person shall require the production of a certificate referred to in section (1) for any purpose and an affidavit shall be accepted as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein".
In the first instance, many stateless persons have found it difficult or even impossible to get an affidavit attested by a Justice of Peace (J.P) for the simple reason that any J.P could refuse to attest saying that he was not sure whether the applicant for citizenship really was not one of the 506,000 persons who had applied for Indian citizenship.
Even if affidavits could be produced they are not considered or accepted as sufficient proof of Sri lankan citizenship for official purposes by public or even by the government authorities. The commissioner of elections, who registers people as possessing the right to vote, calls for citizenship certificates ( or affidavits in that connection) as proof of citizenship to register their names in the electoral register. This has deprived tens of thousands of applicants from obtaining their right to franchise and,
353

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Appendie
therefore, their fundamental right to participate in the general and other elections (electoral process). In other words, in reality, the various citizenship laws have made the people of Indian origin, second class citizens since a large proportion of them are, once again in effect and in truth, turned into a voteless mass.
Article 89 of the 1978 constitution reads: "No person shall be qualified to be an elector at an election of President, or of the member of the parliament, or to vote at any referendum if he is subject to any of the following disqualification namely (a)" if he is not a citizen of Sri Lanka." And the registration of Electors act No. 44 of 1980 says: "No person shall be qualified to have his name entered in any register of electors for any electoral district in any year if such a person is subject to any of the disqualifications specified in Article 89 of the Constitution ..."
Thus, even if people are citizens under the 1988 Grant of citizenship to stateless persons (Special Provisions) Act, the Assistant Commissioner insists on citizenship certificates to register the people of Indian origin in the electoral register. The relevant question is why should only people of Indian origin be called upon to produce citizenship certificates and affidavits for official purposes whereas the Sinhalese, Sri lankan Tamils, Moors, Malays and Burghers are not required to produce proof of Sri lankan citizenship. Therein lies the discrimination and inequality.
It is an undeniable fact that all the legal provisions relating to citizenship are discriminatory against a national minority - the Up-country Tamils. They are not only in violation of the Universal Declaration of human rights but also in violation of Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the government of Sri Lanka ratified on Wesak Day, 27th May 1980. Article 25 reads :
"Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity:
a。 To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.
b. To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electorS.

Appendix
C. To have access, in general terms of equality, to public
service in the country."
it is our considered opinion that so long as the Ceylon Citizenship Act no. 18 of 1948 remains in the statue book of Sri Lanka the stateless problem will not be fully solved.
We wish to bring to your Excellency's notice that the Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948, by its provisions, churns out stateless persons and per- petuates inequality between citizens by descent and citizens by registration.
Section 4(1) of the Act reads: "Subject to the other provisions of this part, a person born in Ceylon before the appointed date - ie. 15 November 1948, shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by descent (a) if his father was born in Ceylon."
it logically follows, therefore, that a person born before 15 november 1948 and is unable to produce his fathers's birth certificate would not be considered a citizen of Ceylon by descent.
Section 5(1) reads that a person born in Ceylon on or after the appointed date ie. 15 November 1948, shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by descent if at the time of his birth his father was a citizen of Ceylon. Since this very citizenship Act made nearly a million people of indian origin stateless on that fateful day (15-11-1948) and all their children born after this date ipso-facto fall into the category of stateless persons as their fathers were not Ceylon citizens on that date. It must be noted that while section 4(1) requires a person's father's birth certificate, Section 5(1) requires that a person's father should have been a citizen of Ceylon on 15.11.1948 for him to be a citizen of Ceylon by descent. Consequently, all those people who became stateless on 15 November 1948 would be producing generations of stateless children.
These provisions were made applicable to only the Sri Lankan Indian community and, therefore discri- minatory against a particular national minority. Since the majority of this community are workers they are also discriminatory against a section of the working class of Sri Lanka. If these provisions were made applicable to the majority community - the Sinhalese people, thousands of them, including some of their leaders such as the first Prime Minister of independent Ceylon, D.S. Senanayake, and his son Dudley Senanayake who followed him as Prime Minister,
355

Page 190
356
Appendlх
would not have been legally citizens of Ceylon.
Now we wish to draw your Excellency's attention to the discrimination between citizens by descent and the citizens by registration under the citizenship act of 1948. On the vital question of the liabi-lity of a citizen to lose his citizenship, Sections 19 to 22 of the Act relate to the circumstances under which a citizen is liable to lose his citizenship status. but in the case of citizens by registration, some additional circumstances have been enumerated through Sections 23 and 24 of the Act under which a registered citizen could be deprived of his citizenship. Section 23 reads that "a person who is a citizen by registration shall cease to be a citizen of Ceylon if that person resides outside Ceylon for five consecutive years or more "on unauthorized or on personal grounds. And section 24(1) reads : "Where the Minister is satisfied that a person who is a citizen of Ceylon by registration :
a. has been convicted of an offence under this Act; Or
b. has been convicted of any offence under chapter VI of
the Penal Code; or
C. was registered as a citizen by means of fraud, false representation of the concealment of material circumstances or by mistake; or
d. has, within five years after the date of registration as a citizen of Ceylon, been sentenced in any Court to imprisonment for a period of twelve months or more; Or
8. has, since that date of his becoming a citizen by registration, been for a period of not less than two years ordinarily resident in a foreign country of which he was a national, or a citizen at any time prior to that date, and has not maintained Substantial Connection with Ceylon; or
f. has taken an oath or affirmation of, or made
declaration of allegiance to a foreign country; or
9. has so Conducted himself that his Continuance as a citizen of Ceylon is detrimental to the interests of Ceylon, the

Appendix
Minister may by order declare that such person shall cease to be such a citizen of Ceylon by registration."
The aforesaid is indeed the most obnoxious and discriminatory section of all that can be utilized by the government to deprive a registered citizen of his citizenship. It must be noted that under sub-section (g) of section 24 of the Act, any registered citizen who happens to be a member of an opposition political party is in real danger of losing his citizenship. At the discretion of a Minister a registered citizen could be deprived of his citizenship if the Minister is dissatisfied with his conduct and considers it detrimental to the interests of the Country. It must be borne in mind that every political party in power functions on the axiom that its interests are in fact coincidental with the interests of the country.
We wish to point out that 1978 constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has failed to guarantee equality between citizens by descent and citizens by registration despite the incorporation of Article 26(1) of the Consti-tution which declares that "there shall be One status of citizenship known as the status of a citizen of Sri Lanka."
In reality, a citizen by registration suffers discrimination and disabilities in a number of ways. Let us take the most
important question of the liability of a citizen to lose his
citizenship. In regard to loss of citizenship Article 26(4) of the Constitution states that "No citizen of Sri Lanka shall be deprived of his status of a citizen of Sri Lanka, except under and in virtue of the provisions of sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Citizenship Act provided that provisions of Section 23 and 24 of that Act shall also be applicable to a person who became entitled to the status of a citizen of Sri Lanka by virtue of registration."
As we have indicated above, Section 23 and 24 of the Citizenship Act are discriminatory, and Article 26 of the Constitution, Subjecting only citizens by registration to them, retains the in-equality between citizens by descent and citizens by registration. In other words despite Article 26(1) of the Constitution, the 1978 Constitution perpetuates inequality in regard to the rights enjoyed by the two categories of citizens. In other words, the equality seemingly ensured by Article 26(1) and (2) is totally nullified by Article 26(4) of the Constitution.
The latest legislation to resolve the stateless problem - ie.
357

Page 191
358
Apрөтdix
the Grant of Citizenship to state-less persons (Special Provisions) Act of 1988 has introduced a new category of citizens under Section 4 of this Act, that may be termed citizens by affidavit. Those who come to be citizens under this Act too would be liable under Section 3(1)(a) to lose or be deprived of their citizenship in the same manner as citizens by registration.
Thus there are legally three types of citizens in Sri Lanka, ie. citizens by descent, citizens by registration and citizens by affidavit. The last two categories of citizens are liable to lose or be deprived of their citizenship under the provisions of Section 23 and 24 of the Citizenship Act. Furthermore, the Minister concerned can cancel the citizenship of a registered citizen when he finds a citizen guilty of an offence under the latest Act.
Consequently the overwhelming majority of the people of Indian origin has been made 2nd class citizens. The relegation of nearly a million people to an inferior status of citizenship, in fact, is a violation of Article 25 of the International covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Sri Lanka is the only country in the world that has 5 laws relating to citizenship. They are :
1. Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948.
2. The indian and Pakistani (Residents) Citizenship Act
No. 3 of 1949.
3. Grant of Citizenship of Stateless Persons Act No. 5 of
1986.
4. Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons (Special
provisions) Act No. 39 of 1988.
5. Indo-Ceylon Agreements implementation Act of 1967.
With five laws on the subject of citizenship, the stateless problem has not been fully solved. Like under the Pass Laws devised by the racist white regime in South Africa where all non-whites such as the Bantus (all Blacks are termed Bantas), Coloured and the Indians have to carry passes, the people of indian origin have got to carry citizenship certificates or citizenship by affidavit papers.

Appendix 359
In the name of justice and equality, we call upon your Excellency, to repeal all the discriminatory laws, regulations and administrative diktats on citizenship against the lawfully resident people of indian origin, and expunge from the body politic of Sri Lanka, all practices that segregate the Up-Country Tamil people from the rest of the population. We call upon the government to devise a simple provision to the effect that all persons legally resident in Sri Lanka, other than the foreign nationals, are citizens of Sri Lanka. This is indeed the one and the only way to foster integration and national unity in this beautiful island of ours.
S. Nadesan United Plantation Workers Union
R. Santhiramohan Ceylon Plantation Workers (Red Flag) Union
T.Aiyadurai
National Union of Workers
J.Maliyagoda
Lanka General Services Union
R.Shanmugam Agricultural & Plantation Workers Congress
N.Shanmugathasan New Red Flag Plantation Workers Union
Dr.S. Ratnapriya United Lanka Estate Workers union
S. Michael Joseph Up-Country Workers Front
S.A.Sundararaj Sri Lanka Desha Vimukthi Plantation Workers Union
P. Chandrasena Sri Lanka Nidhas Sevaka Sangamaya (Plantation Sector)

Page 192
360 Apрөтdix
V.L.Pereira Workers and Peasants Liberation Front
Dr.Vijaya Kumar
anka Estate Workers Union
D. Bamunusingha People's Labour Congress
S. Nadessan
Convener, Joint Plantation Trade Union Committee, 71, Malay Street
Colombo 2.
30th May, 1990.

Abrahamsingho, 241 Abraham, Sir Sydney, 100 Abraham Thomas, 268 Adamalay, E.G., 60 Aitken Spence, 321 All-CEylon Estate Labour
Federation, 93 All-Ceylon Estate Workers
Union, 108 All-Ceylon Head Kanganies
Assn., 89, 108 All-India Trade Union
Congress (AITUC), 229 All-Party Conference (1984)
327, 335 Aluwihare, B.H., 285 Amarasingham, S.P., 310 American Indians, 6 Amery Leopold, 76 Amirthalingam, A., 255,
259, 266 Amirtham, S., 244 Anderson, Governor Sir George, 35 Andrews, Rev.C.F., 60 Andrews, Robert, 2 Aney, M.S., 304 Annadurai, C.N. (D.M.K).,
187 Annamalai, A., 202, 254 Annexure C, 335 Apartheid-racial segregation,
157, 195, 199 , Arunachalam, Sir Pon mam
balam, 66, 67, 68 Asoka Students Hostel, 104 Attlee, Clement, 146, 147 Aththa, 312 Athlulathmudali, Lalith,
328, 332, 337 Aurangazeb, 8 Aziz, Abdul, 135, 161, 179,
185, 193, 241, 244, 313
Bakthawathsalam, 191
Bajpai, Sir Girja Shankar, 137,
138
Banda, M.D., 286
Bandarage, Asoka, 28
Bandaranaike, Anura, 331,
332
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam
Pact (1957), 177
INDEX
Bandaranalike, Mrs.Sirimavo, 184, 189, 190, 192, 199, 200, 229, 230, 296, 329, 339, 342 Bandaranaike, S.W. R.D., 99, 130, 131, 137, 170, 173, 180 Banks, P.N., 96, 115 Barathiyar, Subramanya, 104
Barnes, Governor Edward,
2, 16, 17 Baskaran, R.S., 224, 248,
267 Batuwantudawe, 99 Bird, George, 17 Bogawantalawa shooting,
178, 179 Bond, Ms. Edith, 221, 294 Bowden, N.H.M., 58 Bracegirdle, M.A.Lester,
96 - 100 Broke Bond, 22 Brownrigg, Governor Robert, 2 Buddha 198 Byrde (2nd), Col.H.C., 18
Caldecott, Governor Sir Andrew, 131, 140 Ceylon banking Commission,
126 Ceylon Democratic Congress,
136 Ceylon Daily News, 190 Ceylon Dravida Munetra Kzhagam (C.D.M.K.), 185, 204 Ceylon Estate Employers
Federation (C.E.E.F.), 238, 239, 247 Ceylon Estate Staffs Union (C.E.S.U.), 244, 312 Ceylon Federation of Labour,
147, 240 Ceylon Federation of Trade
Unions (C.F.T.U.), 246, 349 Ceylon Labour Union, 69, 70 Ceylon Indian Congress, 134,
135, 139, 149, 160, 166

Page 193
Ceylon Indian Congress
Labour Union (C.I.C.L.U.), 108, 136, 238 Ceylon Indian Workers Federation, 108 Ceylon Mercantile Union
(C.M.U.), 309 Ceylon National Congress, 66,
67, 68, 147 Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Amendment Act (1949), 154 Ceylon Plantation Workers
Union (C.P.W.U.), 185, 328 Ceylon Planters Society,
226, 272 Ceylon Trade Union Federation (C.T.U.F.), 147, 237, 239 Ceylon Workers Congress (C.W.C.), 136, 193,229, 239, 242, 258, 311, 314, 343, 345 Chalmers, Governor Sir
Robert, 64 Chandran, T.L.R., 128 Chandrasekharam, P., 330,
344 Chattopadhyaya, Kamala
deví, 66, 79, 97 Chelmsford, Lord, 59 Chelvanayagam, S.J.V., 175,
193, 201, 217 Chetties, 39 Chettiars: see under Nattu
Kottai Chettiars Chidambaram, P., 336 Cholera Commission, 51 Chou-en-Lai, 187 Christain Worker, 313, 331 Churchill, Winston, 146 Ciampa, Fr. Pio, 267, 296 Citizenship: Ceylon Citizen
ship Act of 1948, 152, 153, 155; Indian Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949, 159, 160; IndoCeylon Agreement (Implementation) Act of 1967, 207; Grant of Citizenship to stateless persons Act of 1986, 331; Grant of Ctitzenship to Stateless Persons (Special provisions) Act of 1988,
333; Discremination Against Citizens of Indian Origin in registering as voters, 334; Inequality in Citizenship rights - see Appendix Cluade, Patrice, 336 Clifford, Governor Sir Hugh,
76 Coffee Palntations, 16, 30, 43 Colebrooke Commission, 5 Collective Agreements:
Seven Point Agreement (1940), 117; Thirteen point Agreement (1951), 239 Agreement No. 3 of 1967, 245 Communist Party, 147, 149,
162, 184, 204, 254, 326 Constitution (1978), 260-262 Coolie Immigration Commis
sion (1877), 52, 53 Corea, C.E.W., 71 Corea, G.C.S., 137 Cran, Gordon, 57
da Gama, Vasco, 18 Dahanayake, W., 161, 183,
287 December 19 Proposals, 336 Delta Estate, 225 de Mel, Lakshman, 219 Democratic Peoples' Allia
nce (D.P.A.), 341 Democratic Peoples Libera
tion Front (D.P.L.F.), 344 Democratic Workers Congress,
241, 242, 243, 313 Desa Bakthan, 91 Desai, C.C., 164, 167, l68,
171 Desai, H.M., 127, 135 Devraj, P., 241, 243, 344 Devon Estate, 225 Dias, N.O., 201
Dickman, Dr.I., 41, 50-51 Dissanayake, Gamini, 254,
313, 317, 337, 344 de Silva, Chandrananda, 339
340, 342 de Silva, Dr.Colvin R., 95,
155, 212, 22, 248, 295, 317 de Silva, K.M., 4, 21, 22, 65,
228

de Silva, S.B.D., 28 de Souza, Doric, 294 Dixit, J.N. 328, 329 Donoughmore Commission,
68, 69, 77, 79 Dowbiggin, H.L., 94 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
(D.M.K.), 187, 228 Dutt, R.Palme, 147 Dyer, General, 65
Elliot, E.C.E. 87 Emden, 56 Emigration-India bans,
109 Employees Provident Fund
(E.P.F.), 231 Engels, Fredric, 29 English East India Company,
2, 3, 8 Estate Labour (Indian) Ord.,
(1889), 40, 41 Estate Schools, 283, 288;
fall in no. of schools, 292; teachers, 289; State take-over.(June 1977), Volunteer teachers, 297-298 attempt to integrate schools under Superintendents, 299
Federal Party (F.P.), 177 Ferguson, J., 38 Fernando, Dr.L.V.R., 222, 300 Fernando, Rozario., 185, 243 Fiji, 13, 31, 90 Franchise, 68, 131 Friend-in-need Society
(1869), 38
Gandhi, Mrs. Indira, 229, 230,
276, 326, 335 Gandhi, mahatma, 59, 60, 65,
89 Gandhi, Rajiv, 328, 334, 336,
337 General Strike (1984), 313,
314, 315-318 Gillard, Michael, 220 Gimson, 109 Gnanamuthu, G.A., 286, 287,
289 Goonasinha, A.E., 63, 69,
108, 134
Goonetileke, Sir Oliver, 164,
18S Gopalan, A.K., 66 Gordon, Governor Sir Arthur,
40, 45 Gordon, A.Fellows, 80 Government of India Act of
1839, 37 Govindasamy, P., 104 Grant of Citizenship to State
less Persons Act (1986), 331 Grant of Citizenship to State
less Persons (Special Provisions) Act 1988, 333 Gregory, Governor, 41 Grenada Television (London),
220, 221 Grey, Lord, 31, 34 Griffin, Dr., 42 Griffin, Leppel, 101 Gunasekhara, D.E.W., 332 Gunasekhara, Vernon, 117 Gunasinghe, Newton, 5 Gunawardena, Leslie, 95 Gunawardena, Philip, 95, 124 Gunadevia, Y.D., 180
Hartal (1953) and C.W.C.,
162-163 Hayleys Group, 321 Hitler, Adolf, 76, 273 Hobart, Lord, 2 Holocaust (1983 July), 274; and C.W.C., 277-278 House of Detention, 123 Hulugalle, H.A.J., 151
Ilancheliyan, A., 185, 204 Elangaratne, T.B., 156 Illicit Immigration, 165 Immigrants & Emigrants Act
(1948), 154, 155 Immigrants fund, 60 Indian Air Force, 337 Indian Emigrant, 58, 59 Indian High Commission,
207, 330 Indians and Jaffna Tamils, 175 Indian and Pakistani (Resid
ents) Citizenship Act (1949), 154, 159, 180

Page 194
Indians and the Sinhalese,
196 - 198 Indian Peoples' Protest against
Cooly Trade, 58 Indo-Ceylon Agreement Implementation Act (1967), 204, 205, 207 Indo-Ceylon Problem, 137,
189 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord,
(1987), 334, 337
Jackson, Sir Edward, 84 Jaffna Youth Congress, 79 Jallianwala Bagh, 65 'Janassaviya' Programme, 341 Janatha Estates Development
Board (J.E.D.B.), 217 Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(J.V.P.) and Tamil Minorities, 213, 337, 339 Jannecone, C, S.J., 256 Japanese bombing of Ceylon
and Indian plantation workers, 139, 140 Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya
(J.S.S.), 308, 309 Jayaratne, R.S., 322 Jayasuriya, J.E., 290 ; Jayasuriya Commission,
290, 291 Jayawardena, Kumari, 70,
74, 91, 260 Jayawickrema, Montague,
317 Jayewardene, J.R., 151, 178, 229, 254, 257, 261, 269, 272, 276, 300, 317, 330, 332, 334, 336, 337, 343 Jeevanandam, 66 Jenmings, Sir Ivor, 148, 149,
1S6 Jesudasan, R., 254 Jha, C.S., 201 Joint Committee of Plantation Trade Unions (J.C.P.T.U.), 247, 248 Joint Plantation Trade Union
Committee (J.P.T.U.C.), 268, 301, 311, 313, 314, 315, 318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 329, 334 Jolly, Captain Keith, 35
Kalyanasundaram, M.,
228, 268 Kamraj, 190 Kandasamy, 148 Kandiah, P.V, 340 Kangany System, 22-24 Kannangara, C.W.W., 73,
104, 284, 285 Karunanithi, M., 270 Karunatileka, Rupa, 332 Keeravella, 213 Kepitipola, 76 Keuneman, Pieter, 148, 153,
162, 174, 212, 249 King Jr., Rev. Martin Luther,
199 Knavesmire Struggle, 238 Kobbekaduwa, Hector, 216, 217, 218, 219, 224, 226, 273 Kodikara, S.U., 171 Kosambi, D.D., 9 Kotiyagala Strike, 110 Kumaranatunga, Chandrika,
339 Kumaranatunga, Vijaya, 339 Kumaravelu, K., 150
Labour Party, 134 Land Development Ord, 129 Land Reform Commission, 217 Land Reform Law (1972), 217;
(Amendment) 1975, 222 Lanka Estate Workers' Union
(L.E.W.U.), 219, 311 Lanka Jathika Estate Workers' Union (L.J.E.W.U.), 337,343 Lanka Sama Samaja Party
(L.S.S.P.), 96, 99, 108, 111, 114, 147, 149, 161, 163, 188, 254 Layton, Admiral Sir Geoffrey,
139, 140 Leary, Professor Virginia A,
264 Lersky, George Jan, 99 Letchumanan Chettiar, 135 Letchumanan, Sivanoo, 225 Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (L.T.T.E.), 337, 343 Little, Angela, 301 Luddington, N.J., 84 Ludowyk, E.F.C., 91-92

Lyttleton, Alfred, 54, 101
Mahadeva, A., 69 Mahavamsa, 195 Maheswaran, Uma, 344 Malaviya, Pandit, 59 Malayalees, 134 Maliyagoda, J., 317 Mandapam Camp, 57 Manilal, D.M., 90 Manning, Governor Sir
William, 67 Mariappa, S., 243 Marikar, S.L.M., 317 Marimuthu, S., 295 Marjoribanks, N.E., 60 Marx, Karl, 3, 9, 11-12, 29 Memorandum on Discrimination against Citizens of Indian Origin, see appendix, Memorandum on Stateless
People, 229, 326 Mendis, M.G., 96, 163, 238 Mendis, V.L.B., 170 Menon, Krishna, 95 Migration of Indians, 228-232,
234 Minimum Wages Ordinance,
85, 86 Molamure, A.F., 73, 74, 75 Mooloya Strike, 111-113 More, Sir Henry, 151 Moulana, Alawi, 316 Mountbatten, Lord, (Viceroy
of India), 147 Muthaya, Roy, 231 Muttettuwagama, Sarath, 249,
278, 331
Nadarajah, K.V., 150 Nadesan, S., Q.C., 168-169,
313 Nadesan, S., 193, 199, 204, 243, 244, 294, 295, 300, 310, 313, 317, 323 NADSA, 224, 264 Naidu, Sarojini, 66, 134 Nair, K.G., 241 Napoleon, 261 Nasser (President U.A.R.), 187 Natesa Aiyar, K., 69, 75, 80, 89-91, 92,94, 95, 97,115, 117, 125, 132
Nationalisation and eviction of Indian Workers, 223 - 224, 225 Nationalisation of Plantations,
216, 217 National Union of Workers
(N.U.W.), 243, 312 Nattukottai Chettiars, 126;
Association, 129 Negro Slaves, 6, 29 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 65, 134,
135, 152 Nehru - Kotelawela Pact, 164
166, 188, 189, 195 Nehru, Motilal, 204 Ne Win, General, (Burma),
189 North, Governor Frederick, 2 North Road, 50, 51, 53
Obeysekhera, Gananath, 308 Oldfield, Mojor J.W., 154 'Operation Liberation', 337 'Operation Poomalai', 337
Panditha, L.W., 309 Parthasarathy, G., 335 Paskaralingam, R., 322 Peiris, Kenneth, 235 Peoples Republic of China,
239 Pereira, I.X., 95, 285 Perera, Dr.N.M., 95, 96, 97,
99, 115, 124, 131, 132, 203, 212, 244, 249 Perera, Wilmot A, 155 Peri-Sundaram, 79, 80 Phadmis, Urmila, 197 Piyadasa, L., 269, 330, 337,
340 Plague Commission, 54 Plague and Immigrants, 53 Planters Assn. of Ceylon,
35, 141 Pochanawala, Sir Sarobji, 126 Ponnambalam, G.G., 175,
176, 217 Ponnambalam, Jr., G.G., 204 Ponnambalam, Sachi, 176,
255, 264 Prabhakaran, V., 337 Premadasa, R., 269, 330,
337, 340

Page 195
Prevention of Terrorism Act,
264
Privatisation of Plantations,
320
Provincial Councils, 338, 339
Rajah, V.S., 219, 295 Rajalingam, K., 136, 161 Rajan, PT., 104 Rajanayagam, M., 140 Ram, N., 328 Ramachandran, M.G., 270,
278 Ramanathan, Sir Ponnambalam,
69, 73 Ramanathan, S., (L.E.W.U.),
300 Ramanujam, D., 150 Ramaswamy Mudaliyar, 137,
138 Rambukwella, P.B., 72 Ramiah, O.A., 243, 340 Ranarajah, Shelton, 266 Rao, Narasimha, 276, 326 Ratnayake, A., 157 Reddy, G.K., 335 Rehabilitation, 230, 231, 235 Renganathan, S., 61, 87 Renganathan, S, (C.W.C.),
295 Ridgeway, Governor Sir West,
5
Repatriation; see migration Republican Constitution
(1972), 214, 215 Roberts, Michael, 20, 71,
133 Roneo Budgets, 87 Rowsell, Norman, 55 Rubber, 45 Russel, Jane, 69, 79
Saminathan, 58 Sanmugathasan, N., 243 Sansoni, M.C., 225, 226, 259 Sanquar Estate, 225 Sapru Tej Bahadur, 59 Saturday Reveiw, 336 Satyagraha : led by Ceylon
Indian Congress, 160- 161; led by Federal Party, 184, 185 Satyamoorthy, 66
Saunders, S.S., 51, 52 Sellasamy, M.S., 278, 313,
320, 328, 340 Senanayake, Dudley, 161, 162, 183, 184, 201, 203, 204, 206, 244 Senanayake, E.L., 257 Senanayake, D.S., 73, 99, 125, 137, 147, 149, 150, 151, 175 Sennan, V., 345 Seperate Representation Act, 172 - 173; Repealed, 174 Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 189,
190 Shiels, Dr.Drummond, 107 - 108 Sinhala Maha Sabha, 132, 148 Sinhala Chauvinism, 133, 134,
207 Sinhala-Muslim Riots (1915),
64 Singh, Gurbachan, 257 Singh, Sardar Swaran, 189,
190 Sino-Indian Dispute, 186-187 Sirima-Shastri Pact, 189, 191,
192, 201 Sivagnanasundaram, M., 215 Sivalingam, M., 345 Sivalingam, R.R., 293 Smedley, 223 Somasundaram, S., 136 Soorya Mal Movement, 124 Soulbury, Lord, 147, 151 Stanley, Governor Sir Herbert,
76, 77-78 Stanmore, Lord., 114 State Plantations Corporation
(S.P.C.), 217 Subasinghe, T.B., 155 Subbiah, S.M., 136, 156, 243 Swedish International Development Authority (S.I.D.A.), 304 Systen Estate, 140
Tambiah, S.J., 176
Tamil Congress, 148
Tamil Refugees Rehabilitation Orgaisation (T.R.R.O.), 266
Tamil United Liberation Front (T.U.L.F.), 253, 257, 327, 337, 343

Tampoe, Bala, 309, 312 Taylor, James, 45 Taxes and Tortures in India, 10 Tea, 45 Templer, Phillips, A., 51 Temporary Residence Permit
(T.R.P.), 167 Tennent, Sir James Emerson,
3, 4, 18, 19, 20, 31 - 35 Termination of Employment
Act, 213 The Hindu, 192, 200 The Island, 279, 312, 316,
330 Thinakaran, 296, 303 Thirteen-Point Agreement,
239 Thondaman, S., 150, 161, 179, 185, 217, 229, 244, 253, 263, 266, 270, 274, 279, 317, 326, 329 Thwaites, Dr. G.H., 43 Tilak, B.G., 66 Tinker, Hugh, 60, 85-86 Tin Ticket Fund, 60 Torrington, Governor Viscount,
30 - 31 Trade Union Ordinance (1935),
108 Trade Union Representative
Entry into Estates Act, 213 Tundu System, 85 Twynam, W.C., 51, 52 Tytler, Robert Boyd, 17
United Front Government,
212
United National Party
(U.N.P.), 148
United Plantation Workers Union (U.P.W.U.), 212, 248, 249
United Socialist Alliance
(U.S.A.), 339, 343
Up-country Tamil People,
254, 343
Vanden Driesen, 27 - 28,
31, 32 Vanniasingham, C., 176 Vellayan, V.K., 136, 243 Velupillai, C.V., 136, 140,
150, 243, 295, 316 Velusamy, 112 Venkatachar, T., 304 Venkatanarayan, S., 271 Victoria, Queen, 8, 12 Village Committee, (Amend
ment) Ord., 130 Villiers, T.L., 70 Virakesari, 104, 192, 302 Vora, D.M., 135 Vythilingam, S.P., 79, 95,
285
Wace, Herbert, 102, 103 Wages, 39;
Wages boards, 88; Wage cuts, 93, 94; Strikes against wage cuts,
239 - 240; strikes for wage increases; by J.P.T.U.C. (1981) 311, (1982) 312-313; general strike (1984), C.W.C. and J.P.T.U.C., 315-318, J.P.T.U.C. (1988), 320 Wall, George, 35, 36 Ward, Governor Sir Henry, 36 Webb, Sydney, 78 Weerakoon, G., 317 Weerawardena, I.D.S., 154,
156 Wesumperuma, Dr.D., 39, 55 Wickremasinghe, Doreen, 124 Wickremasinghe, Dr.S.A., 95,
108, 24, 30 William, A., 267 Williams, W.T., Q.C., M.P.,
222 Wilson, Harold, 223 Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam, 186,
195, 260, 261 Wise, A.G.H., 101

Page 196


Page 197

יוון רון קרון בשם או חוו הור.
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הסחורון ושחיפשו פנה לשוחח באירוע.
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Page 198
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Dr. Kirilari Jaya VardeITa