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H تبين 1 1 : إن أتت الة T
January-Dec. Published De
 

リエ条エ
V MWilson DWARD

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THE C HISTORICAL ANI PUBLICATI
S.ARASARATNAM, B.A. (Ceylon),
University of Now England, Armi
R. K. W. GOONESEKERE, LL.B. (C.
Ceylon Law College.
H.A.I. GOONETILEKE, B.A., Dip,
Librarian, Cliversity of Ceylon,
H.A.D.E. S. GUNASEKERA, B.A. presently Secretary, Ministry of
L. S. PERERA, B.A.,Ph.D. (Ceylon), foi
of Ceylon, Colombo.
RALPH PIERIS, B.A. (Ceylon), Bis fessor of Sociology, University of
FK. M. DIE SILWA, B, A, (Ceylon, Ph.D University of Ceylon, Poradeniya.
AJ TEYARATNAM WILSON, B-A (Ա: Science and Chairшап, Departime! BгшвwittE, Canada.
The Ceylon Journal of Hitorical Indi Ceylon HistoricaRT di Social Stuclius Publi The months of Publication arā LIRumilly June to guberberg.
The Journalis intérêl to LovEr ths political science, law, archaeology, history ங்ாthropology, The ArticlஇWI relate:றுகள்
Articles, books for review, editor addressed tri K.M. de Silva, Departim СеуӀоп.
Back number 3, Wolls, WII to X and na pricos. Wols. I, III and W(first series) ar IWRITSE till FavailablB
Remittппces should be made pay Social Studies. Rates of subscripti. Twenty U.S. Five dollars, Single C cents. A trade discount of 20% is at from foreign countrisi Instbg Tiña des hy spīs starirīgo 25 stad
ஆhe Brofரேடிங்ஹdyyேர
 

YLON SOCIAL STUDIES
NS BOARD
D. (Lond), Professor of History le, N.S.W. Australia.
on, B.C.L. (Oxford), formerly Principal,
i tond), Dip, Lib (Madra), F.E.A. eրբdeniya
)Il{ MIS. Econ, Ph.D. (LotionםCel)
anning and Employment. imerly Professor of History, University
... - Econ-, PhD- Londl.), formerly ProCeylon, Peradeniya editor
(Lond). Professor of Ceylon History, Managing Editor.
iyon), Ph.D. (Lond). Professor of Political it of Political Science, University of New
social studies is published twic by The atiuns Haard Whitli við constituted in 1953. December, and copies will ban post-free entire range of the social sa gonomis, * gongTրբlly, Scialigy. social psychology and nıly, but. Dadot exclusively. to Ceylon. all and business communications should be
of History, University Park, Peradeniya
a III ere availablët publication
grt Vol.
copies of Volurice LILLET
e out of printi a fe"
bet Tille Ceylon Journal of Historical and in (inclusive of postage): Annuall-Rus opies-Rupees Ten U.S. Two dollars fifty ved to bookSellers in Ceylon. All payments ternational money order cheques with thirt election his 9. direct to the Board

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THE CEY JOURNAL OF E
AND
SOCIAL S.
NEW SERIES
vol. IV January-Decem (Published Decen
Managing K. M. DE
THE CEYLON JOURNAL
SOCIAL
takes pleasure in acknowledgi publication of this special is
Professor Thomas J. Condon, D
of New Brunswicks
Professor Ainslee Embree, Sout University in the City of N
Professor W.C.D. Pacey. Viceof New Brunswick and
professor W. Howard Wrigg Institutes Columbia Univer
mí
printed at The Colombo AP The Ceylon Historical and Social St
15441ーl

ČLON HISTORICAL
TUDIES
begay74 Nos. I 1 & 2
ეხer 1975)
Editor SILVA
OF HISTORICAL AND STUDIES ng financial assistance for the
sue from: ean Faculty of Arts, University
hern Asian Institute, Columbia ew Yorks President (Academic), University
ins, Director, Southern Asian sity in the City of New York.
ecaries' Co., Ltd., Colombo, for dies Publications Board, Peradeniya.

Page 4
THE C JOURNAL OF HISTORIC1
NEW SERIES January-De Vol. IV (Published D.
C O NI "
K. M. DE SILVA Sri Lan
K. M. DE SILVA The Tr A Revie
C. R. DE SILVA and leader
vIJAYA SAMARAWEERA Interpr
VIJAYA SAMARAWEERA The Ro
AJEYARATNAM VILSON The Fu
A. JEYARATINAM WILSON Sri La
Continu
K. M. DE SILVA Nationa
H. M. GUNASEKERA The Ecc
KITSIRI MALALGODA Buddhis
Lanka.
K. M. DE SILVA Hinduis
Sri Lan
FR. PAUL CASPERSZ, s.J. The RC
Buddhis
DONALD E. SMITH The Di
Sri Lanll
DONALD R. SNODGRASS Sri Lank T1 wenty
CHARLES S. BLACKTON The M:
Sri Lank HOWARD WRIGGINS Probler
CALVIN WOODWARD The Pa pective:
K. M. DE SILVA, From C.
A. JEYARATNAM WILSON, C. A. WOODWARD, W. HOWARD WRGGINS

EYLON L AND SOCIAL STUDIES
cember 1974
cember 1975) Nos, 1 & 2
ENTS
Page ka in 1948 A * ● . . . 1
ansfer of Power in Sri Lankaw of British Perspectives . . ... 8
ship Perspectives 1948-1915: an
etive Essay As P. 20
le of the Bureaucracy . . ... 31
ure of Parliamentary Government 40
inka’s Foreign Policy-Change and |ity - O 0 W . . 52
lism and its Impact . . 62
onomy of Sri Lanka 1948-73 - . . . 73
m in Post-Independence Sri
O · · 93
m and Islam in Post-Independence ka 0 e. w . . 98
ble of Sri Lanka Christians in a t Majority System 8. A . 104
lectic of Religion and Politics in Ca e o e ... 111
a's Economic Development During -five years of Independence ... , 119 trxists and the Ultra-Marxists of a Since Independence . . ... 126
hs of Communalism in South Asia 134
ty System in Comparative PersAn Assessment . . AO ... 144
ylon (1948) To Sri Lanka (1975) ... 154

Page 5
CONTRIE
The Editors:
K. M. de Silva, Professor of Ceylon Peradeniya; Smuts Visiting Fellow
University, 1968-9. Publications inclu nizations in Ceylon, 1840-55 (Londor University of Ceylon, History of Ceylo and contributor Sri Lanka, A Survey (
A. Jeyaratnam Wilson formerly Profe Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, presently Pr. Political Science, University of New B Scholar, London School of Economics,
University of Leicester, 1964; Resear and Simon Research Fellow at Ma include Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-73
an Emergent State: The Ceylon General
Calvin Woodward Associate Professor New Brunswick. Apart from a number he has published The Growth of a Pa Press, Providence, Rhode Island, 1969)
W. Howard Wriggins Professor of Poli Asian Centre at Columbia University; h of Advanced International Studies at W Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton,
1967); and editor (with J. F. Guyot) ; the Future of Southern Asia (Columbia,
Charles S. Blackton Russell Colgate Pro New York; Fulbright Lecturer at the I of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, 1963-4; Visiti He has published a number of articles
Lanka, and is at present working on a si
Fr. Paul Caspersz, S.J. was formerly E
C. R. de Silva Ph.D. (London) Senior Lanka, Peradeniya. Postgraduate Rese and African Studies, University of Lonc 1970-1, 1975-6. Publications include (Colombo, 1972).

BUTORS
History at the University of Sri Lanka, in Commonwealth Studies, Cambridge de Social Policy and Missionary Organ, 1965); editor and contributor the in, Vol. III (Colombo, 1973); and editor London, 1976, forthcoming).
ssor of Political Science, University of ofessor and Chairman, Department of. runswick, Canada; Leverhulme Research 1955; Research Fellow in Politics at the ch Associate, McGill University 1971, inchester University, 1972. Publications (London, 1974) and Electoral Politics ina Elections of May 1970 (Cambridge, 1975).
of Political Science at the University of of articles on the politics of Sri Lanka, rty System in Ceylon (Brown University
itical Science and Director of the South (as taught at Yale, Vassar, and the School Washington. Publications include Ceylon, 1960); The Rulers Imperative (Columbia and contributor Population, Politics and
1973).
ofessor of History at Colgate University, Department of History at the University ing Fellow at Peradeniya 1971-and 1974. on the recent history and politics of Sri tudy of Sri Lanka in the 1920's.
Principal, St. Aloysious College, Galle.
Lecturer in History, University of Sri arch Scholar at the School of Oriental ion, 1964; Gulbenkian Research Fellow, The Portuguese in Ceylon, 1617-1638.

Page 6
H. M. Gunasekera Ph.D. (California) Sri Lanka, Peradeniya; has contribute is the joint author of a University-le a part from other publications.
K. Malalgoda D.Phil. (Oxon) formerl Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, now lecturer New Zealand. Rhodes Scholar at Oxf on Sri Lanka, and his doctoral disser change in Buddhism in nineteenth cent by the University of California press lat
Vijaya Samaraweera D.Phil. (Oxon), fo of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya; Beit Senior contributed several chapters to the U Vol. III, and Sri Lanka, A Survey.
D. E. Smith Professor of Political Sci publications include India as a Secular Religion and Politics in Burma (Prince South Asian Politics and Religion (Princ lopment (Boston, 1970); editor Religion, A Source Book (New York, 1971) and edi Modernization (Yale University Press, 1
D. R. Snodgrass linstitute Fellow of Development; has taught at Yale and economic adviser in Malaysia, Indone tions include Ceylon. An Export. Econo Illinois, 1966).

Lecturer in Economics, University of chapters to Sri Lanka, A Survey, and 1 text book on Economics in Sinhala,
Lecturer in Sociology, University of in Sociology, University of Auckland, rd; has published a number of articles tion Sociological aspects of revival and y Ceylon is scheduled for publication r this year.
rmerly Lecturer in History, University Research Fellow at Oxford, 1968; has liversity of Ceylon, History of Ceylon
ince at the University of Pennsylvania; State (Princeton University Press, 1965) ton, 1966) and editor and contributor eton, 1966); Religion and Political DevePolitics and Social Change in the World: tor and contributor Religion and Political 974).
the Harvard Institute for lnternational
Harvard; and served as consultant and sia, Algeria, Iran and Jamaica. Publicamy in Transition (Richard D. Irwin Inc,

Page 7
SRI LANK
K. M.
A perceptive observer watching the c the Second World War would have b situation in Sri Lanka and in the rest of Sc be expected that the transfer of power in turmoil, but the violence that raged over was on a scale which few but the most pes of Indian independence was marred by ma scale unparalleled in world history in time massacres and migrations in Eastern Indi. verge of calamitous civil war. In Burma turmoil and conflict. Aung San the youthf did not live to see the signing of the treaty and Burma on 17 October 1947 which g assassinated along with a group of his clos war which at one stage seemed India's inev device of partition, Burma was not so fort the very first week of the existence of the 1
Sri Lanka in 1948 was, in contrast, against the contemporary catastrophes in in South Asia, the industrial disputes an paled into utter insignificance in the scale in Sri Lanka was smooth and peaceful. M divisions and bitterness which were tearing in South Asia. Within a few months of inc table political issues in the country--the energies of its politicians and the British t early nineteen twenties seemed on the we balam who had led the Tamils in their p State Council in 1934 became a member government the bulk of the leadership a doing he helped convert the government political opinion in the country.
1. On this see A. Campbell-Johnson, Miss Divide and Quit (London, 1962); F. T
15441-2

A IN 1948 E SILVA
llapse of European empires in Asia after en struck by the contrast between the uth Asia including Burma. It could hardly he Indian subcontinent would be free of British India on the eve of independence simistic couid have anticipated. The dawn ssacres and migrations in the Punjab on a of peace. There was a similar extension of . a. The sub-continent seemed to be on the coo the situaticn was equally fraught with ll leader of Burma's independence struggle (which he had negotiated) between Britain ranted Burma her independence; he was est associates on 19 June 1947. If the civil itable fate was avoided through the drastic nate. There civil war erupted almost from Lew Burmese republic.
in oasis of stability, peace and order. Set the rest of the former British possessions d the general strike of the years 1945-47 of violence involved. The transfer of power ore importantly one saw very little of the at the recent independence of the countries ependence in 1948 one of the most intracTamil problem-which had absorbed, the emselves to an inordinate degree since the 7 to amicable settlement. G. G. Ponnamlitical campaigns since his entry into the of the Cabinet bringing with him into the d members of the Tamil Congress. In so into very much a consensus of moderate
in with Mountbatten (London, 1951); P. Moon. ker, While Memory Serves (London, 1950).

Page 8
2 K. M., DE
The final phase in the transfer of pow Senanayake. There are two noteworthy Britain on this issue. Firstly, he was guided evolution to Dominion Status on the an White Dominions. In insisting that Domil of policy, and that this should be attaine sition to the British, he placed himself in di Ceylon National Congress in 1942 (in resp. becoming increasingly influential within it Status should be the goal of Sri Lanka's the British withdrawal the British empire existed would have ended, and that the p encouraging. A profound suspicion of Inc policy. Accordingly it was as a policy of r years of independence when it was not vacuum in South Asia that he viewed the negotiated by Whitehall as a prelude to t
It was in his internal policy that he l and his moderate views. The guiding pri as a multi-racial democracy; and his com ideal of a secular state in which the lines be lously demarcated. Here again he place influential current of opinion which view Sinhalese and Buddhist in character, and v be fashioned to accommodate a far-reach to build a new Sri Lanka on traditiona this was a rejection of the concept of a m secular state.
D. S. Senanayake, in contrast, was s merely a matter of political realism but als for generous concessions to the minoritie political stability in a plural society such transfer of power. An analysis of his resp. anxieties on Sri Lanka's development as a than is available in a very brief introduct attention, briefly, to at least three points
Firstly, there were the guarantees minorities, incorporated in the Soulbur borrowed from provisions in the Minister introduced on D. S. Senanayake's initiativ to the minorities. In retrospect it would received adequate protection in the Sou stitutional guarantees against discriminat to them largely because of the trust an

SILVA
er had begun under the leadership of D. S. points of interest in his negotiations with | by a strong belief in ordered constitutional alogy of constitutional development in the nion Status should remain the prime object 'd in association with rather than in oppoirect opposition to the views adopted by the onse to the younger policy makers who were t) that independence rather than Dominion development. Secondly he feared that with in Asia in the familiar form in which it had olitical prospects in Asia would be hardly lia was the dominant strand in his external e-insurance for the country during the early impossible that there might be a political agreements on Defence and External Affairs he grant of Dominion Status to Sri Lanka.
eft the impress of his dominant personality inciples were: the conception of Sri Lanka mitment to the maintenance of the Liberal :tween state power and religion were scrupur i himself in opposition to an increasingly ed the Sri Lanka polity as being essentially which urged that government policies should ning transformation of the island's politics l, ideal, Sinhala-Buddhist lines. Implicit in ulti-racial polity, as well as the concept of a
ensitive to minority anxieties. This was not to sprang from a deep conviction of the need S, ethnic, communal and religious, to ensure
as Sri Lanka in the vital last phase in the onse to the political implications of minority in independent state needs much more space ory chapter such as this. One needs to draw
of interest.
against legislation discriminating against y Constitution. These guarantees had been s' Draft Constitution of 1944 which had been te as a gesture of generosity and re-aSSuaCe seem that the rights of minorities had not lbury Constitution, but in 1946-7 the conory legislation seemed sufficiently reassuring confidence they had in D. S. Senanayake.

Page 9
SRI LANK
Secondly, there was the initiative he to This was designed to make a fresh start i moderate opinion in national politics; it resentative of the majority community but His own standing in the country was suf the majority, but there is no doubt that it thened by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s de From the beginning it had the enthusia Christian minority, and the Muslims who to the Tamils in their political campaigns with the new party. When the Tamil Co 1948 the equilibrium of political force establish was stabilised at a level which h Congress did not lose its separate identit away from it into a stubborn but, at that Indian community, consisting in the mair there were special reasons for that, for the without roots in the country. The decisio on that account. To the extent that he shal majority of Sinhalese politicians with reg Indian plantation workers in the Sri Lank unrestricted rights to the franchise-his fawed.
Thirdly, D. S. Senanayake thwarted al state, and the principle of the religious n. to the extent that in 1948, despite some prestigious and influential position enjoye no evidence of the religious turmoil and li surface in 1956.
If the political leadership in S1i Lanka fer of power, they seemed oblivious to t process so bland as to be virtually imperc last British governor of the island becam independence. Next there was the notable legal instruments which conferred indep process in other parts of South Asia-f for Burma, a specially negotiated treaty; All this seemed to suggest a qualitative di that was being achieved when no meaning by Britain or accepted by Sri Lanka's lea and later, in the Cabinet. There was also
2. Independence did not carry the lingeri to Britain which Dominion. Status, at t of membership of the Commonwealth nion Status was in fact complete indep of a world-wide Commonwealth.

IN 1948 3
k in forming the United National Party. politics in the direction of a consensus of was to be a political party necessarily reptthe same time acceptable to the minorities. cient guarantee of its being acceptable to ; position among the Sinhalese was strengision to bring in his Sinhala Maha Sabha. stic approval of the small but influential had in the past given substantial support at last broke away and sought association gress crossed over to the government in
which D. S. Senanayake had sought to : found acceptable, even though the Tamil and despite the fact that a section broke time, seemingly futile opposition. Only the of plantation workers, were left out. But y were regarded as an unassimilated group to leave them out was deliberately taken ed the attitudes and prejudices of the great ard to the Indian question,-the status of a polity, and more specifically to deny them conception of a multi-racial polity was
lefforts to abandon the concept of a secular putrality of the state. He succeeded in this
Buddhist displeasure over the continued d by the Christians, there seemed little or inguistic conflicts that were to burst to the
took pride in the smoothness of the transhe political perils involved in making the reptible to those not directly involved. The e the island's first Governor-General after : difference between the constitutional and endence on Sri Lanka, and the cognate or India and Pakistan, Acts of Parliament; for Sri Lanka, a mere Order-in-Council. liference in the nature of the independence gful difference in status was either intended dels, in the Board of Ministers first of all, the fact that the constitution under which
g connotation of constitutional subordination his time, appeared to have. India's acceptance went a long way to demonstrate that Domiendence with the advantages of membership

Page 10
4 K... M. C
the new Dominion began its political exi the autochthonous constitution drafted Assembly. Once again there was an eleme new constitution of Sri Lanka was basica by his advisers in 1944- and approved su to suit the needs of the changed circumstan few and not very substantial or significal and External Affairs negotiated prior to t of credibility to the argument that the in flawed. The Agreements themselves were re on full sovereignty in external affairs; m clauses not divulged or a secret treaty ever an independent nation. Events were to p without foundation in fact, and certainly th by Sri Lanka in 1947-8, but until 1956-7 critics of the UNP and the constitution.
Thus the real worth of D. S. Senanayal the means adopted for the attainment of it as robust and as dramatic as they mighth decorous and peaceful processes of const had deprived themselves, perhaps consciol numerous chances they had of making a m nationalism. Left-wing critics of the gove pendence achieved in 1947-8 was 'spuriou they kept hurling at the government evok of the political nation than merely the le experience seemed to provide a more emot by which power had been transferred in above (as Sri Lanka) was regarded as be nationalism than if it has been won after
AS regards the economy, much more mood of the day was singularly sober an There were, on the contrary, high hopes fo: assets were not unimpressive: though the compared with that in other countries in Sc ment of Sri Lanka was the largest landhol 3.25 million acres of land (the bulk of th provision of roads and electricity to be ren competent, and the island was well equip above all, there were the largesterling bala
Nevertheless the economic legacy left guous, and perhaps even more so, than th that foreign income which “directly or indi income began to fall rapidly' while there \

E SILVA
stence was of British origin in contrast to for the Indian Republic by a Constituent int of exaggeration in the criticism, for the ally the one drafted for D. S. Senanayake bsequently by the State Council-modified ces of 1946-7. And these modifications were ht. Above all the Ageements on Defence he transfer of power helped to give an air dependence conferred on Sri Lanka was 'garded as badges of inferiority, and checks oreover fears were expressed about secret more detimental to the island's status as brove that these fears and suspicions were at no secret undertakings had been given suspicion persisted and could be used by
ce's achievement came to be denied because dependence under his leadership were not ave been. By laying so much stress cn the itutional agitation the Board of Ministers usly, of the opportunities of exploring the ore emotionaland vigorous commitment to rnment were able to argue that the indes'. The gibe of "fake' independence which ed a positive response from a wider circle ft wing alone, largely because the Indian ionally satisfying example than the process Sri Lanka-independence granted from ing much less satisfying to the spirit of prolonged strife and untiring sacrifice.
so than with the political structure, the d realistic though not unduly pessimistic. economic achievement. For the country's population was increasing rapidly, it was uth Asia, well fed and literate; the governler in the country, controlling no less than is land was waste forest and required the lered productive); the administration was bed with social and economic overheads; nces accumulated during the war.
behind by the British was just as ambie political. The crux of the problem was rectly constituted the bulk of the national was a rise in the cost of imports. This was

Page 11
SRI LANKA
reflected in the country's balance of paymen surplus in 1945 to a heavy deficit in 1947 foreign trade, an authoritative contempt economic indices could be more significar and a march towards greater poverty and
D. S. Senanayake's government inh dependent principally on three crops, tea ( most important) rubber and coconut. The that the revenue from these exports was Sul economic conditions. This was quite apa firms-largely British-had a dominant co1 ally tea and rubber, and in the export of pl.
One of the most striking features of of an industrial sector independent of the export, and the engineering and mechanic theless there had been since 1931, and m Second World War, some state sponsored to be of more than marginal significance, made. Private enterprise was reluctant to er offirm support from the government. Tho country cannot “depend on agriculture alk are aiming at fo our rapidly increasing p almost religious faith among the intellige for Sri Lanka's economic problems.
Traditional agriculture-subsistence plantation sector in productivity due to t factors. Sri Lanka could not produce rice bulk of the country's requirements in ice and accounted for more than half the impo
Looking ahead in the years after indi its hopes on the achievement of self-suffi "...increased production particularly in the "Will be givena place of supreme importa The principal means of achieving this objec Zone, the heartland of the ancient irrigati enterprise one discerned too the search for in Sources of legitimacy of Sri Lanka's rulers
All in all, there was no great empha nomic structure inherited from the British period of British rule, and the process of in
3. B. B. Das Gupta, A Short Economic Sury 4. Quoted in H. M. Oliver, Economic Opit
Press, Durham N. C., 1957), p. 50.

A IN 1948 5
it which fell consistantly from “a handsome
. For a country which practically lives by
orary economic survey pointed out, 'no
it. It represented a fall in national income
insecurity'.
herited an undiversified export economy which in terms of export earnings was the : weakness of the economy lay in the fact bject to wide fluctuations, a reflex of world rt from the fact that foreign commercial atrolling position in the plantations, especiantation products.
this economic structure was the absence processing of tea, rubber and coconut for all requirements of these processes. Neverpre particularly since the outbreak of the industrial ventures. None of these proved and on the whole little progress had been mbark on industrial ventures in the absence ugh the new government declared that the one to provide the minimum standard we eople' this was merely lip-service to the intsia in industrialisation as the panacea
farming-lagged far behind the efficient he long-term impact of a multiplicity of needed to feed a growing population: the and subsididary foodstuffs was imported rtS.
ependence the Senanayake regime placed ciency in rice and subsidiary food-stuffs; matter of homegrown food', it declared, ance in the policy of the Government...' :tive was the rapid development of the dry on civilization of Sri Lanka. Thus in this ispiration fom the past and the traditional
sis on fa1-reaching changes in the eco. This latter had taken firm root in the troducing changes in it was more difficult
ey of Ceylon (Colombo, 1949). tion and Policy in Ceylon (Duke University

Page 12
6 K. M.
than it seemed, while any hope of disman politics. For "the export of estate produc large part of them, to be fed and clothed... and its potential for expansion was, if no And it was also true that the political lee changes in an economic system with whi result was that in the economic structule, on the maintenance of the status quo.
There were other problems as well, a the rapidity with which population was e on the country's affairs warned the count the fact that the island's rate of natural astonishing rate of about 3.3. per cent per a “that this is the fundamental problem oft
In the general elections of 1947 left-w cular gains, and held between themselves of the elected seats. Earlier they had orga in the general strike of 1947. These strikes tions of solidarity of the working class and strikes were as much political demonstrat the main demands was the rejection of the S by these strikes served the purpose of unde two concepts of nationalism. The 'modea the 'radicals'-in the sense of the left-win to deplive them of it. They had taken a and they dismissed the grant of indepen. between the Imperial power and their plia order in the guise of independence.
Though the Board of Ministers had bee and in particular, the general strike of 19 Marxists, they soon realized that the chal lessly exaggerated, and that they were by : stability. While the social order was unt urban working class and white collar wo and D. S. Senanayake sought to meet the socio-economic policy which assumed if governing elite and the peasantry, at lea tionship between two conservative social this policy was proving to be increasingl schemes of the Donoughmore era were co: the challenge of the Marxist left. Sri Lau
5. W.I. Jennings, The Economy of Ceylon ( 6. ibid., p. 4.

SILVA
ing it was beyond the realms of practical enabled the people of Sri Lanka), or a ''. Besides the system itself was still viable undiminished, at least reasonably good. ership of the day was reluctant to make their own interests were identified. The as in the political, there was an emphasis
ld of these much the most important was panding. A knowledgeable commentator y in 1949 of the economic implications of increase of population had reached "the num'. "There can be no doubt' he added Le economy of (Sri Lanka)..." -
ing parties made substantial if not spectaand their fellow-travellers about a fouth hised a series of major strikes culminating had been the most noteworthy demonstrawhite collar workers up to that time. The ions as they were trades disputes-one of oulbury Constitution. The strife generated :Ilining the difference in approach between tes” had come inco their inheritance, and g-had demonstrated their determination stand against the Soulbury Constitution, lence in February 1948 as a cynical deal ht agents in Sri Lanka to preserve the old
n constrained to treat the strikes of 1945-47, 7 as a serious bid foi political power by enge from the left wing had been needo means a threat to the country's political 21 increasing pressure from a politicized kers, the peasantry was a stable element left wing challenge by the operation of a not an identity of interests between the ; a potentially harmonious working relaroups. In the early years of independence
successful. Secondly, the social welfare inued beyond 1947 as a means of blunting a, poor though she was, enjoyed a much
U.P., 2nd ed., 1951) p. 40.

Page 13
SRI LANKA
higher standard of living than India, Pakis seemed adequate to maintain the Welfare n accustomed in the last years of British rule absorbed 56.1% of the government's resou nineteen twenties has been a mere 16.4%. costs of these welfare measures were an unsu and one which “added a dimension of weakr was its dependence on the vagaries of a wor
Ironically, however, neither of the pr Senanayake, nor its left-wing critics-shc outrage and indignation of the Buddhists a tices suffered by their religion under weste than to religion, and the resentment was physician, the Sinhala school master and regards religion it was the withdrawal of procedence and prestige that was resented. ] and linguistic issues were gathering momen ful for the existing social and political setto tear the country apart within a decade of both the U.N.P. and its left-wing critics.
7. L. A. Wickremeratne, The Emergence of a (ed.) The University of Ceylon. History of
CRITICAL AC THE UNIVERSITY OF CEYL WOLUME
“. . . as authoritative and definiti is likely to have for a long time'.
“. . . an excellent piece of editors. tion by all concerned.
Professor S. Arasaratnam in Mc
“From many points of view... the considerably more advanced than t his Colleagues in the Editorial Board : have done excellent work.'

IN 1948 7
tan and Burma and the national finances heasures to which the country had grown . In 1947 the total expenditure on welfare rces; the corresponding figure for the late it was not yet evident that the burgeoning Ipportable burden for a developing country less to an economy whose principal feature, ld market.'
otagonists-the government led by D. S. owed much understanding of the sense of it what they regarded as the historic injusrn rule. The affront was to culture no less felt even more strongly by the ayurvedic the notary than by the bhikkhus. And as the traditional patronage and consequent Beneath the surface these religious, cultural tum and developing into a force too powerup to accommodate or absorb. They were ; of 1948 and accomplish the discomfiture
Welfare Policy, 1931-1948, in K. M. de Silva Ceylon (Colombo, 1973).
SCLAIM FOR ON HISTORY OF CEYLON.
THREE
ve a history of Modern Ceylon as one
hip, a remarkable effort at co-ordina
ldern Ceylon Studies.
2 standards reached in Volume 3 are
nose in Volume I... K. M. de Silva, and his co-contributors to this volume
Тіте8 Literary Supplement.

Page 14
I
THE TRANSFER OF PO' REVIEW OF BRII
K. M. D
The adoption of the main reccmmen on Sri Lanka's constitutional evolution by of the great constitutional barrier toward as the Durham Report had accolerated thi In both cases while the change was seen to tion was envisaged in reaching the accept in terms of internal affairs and a considerab Agitation for the reform of the Donoughl the very inception of the new constitution: years 1931-37 would seem to indicate that especially the representatives of the Sinhale from semi-responsible status to self-govern the permanent officials at Whitehall could Guiana and most recently and pic minent ment had led not to responsible governm breakdown and a reversion, if only tempor
A review of the agitation in the 1930 would indicate that there were three mai was the pressure for the establishment of a mingter model in place of the central featu experiment of Executive Committees. The of the dyarchical aspect of the Donoughmo of State and the transfer of their powers to tion of the Governor's powers.
When these claims first emerged the it was too early to consider changes of so f for reform continued nevertheless they
1. For a discussion of these problems see th of the Transfer of Power' in ed. K. M. of Ceylon, Vol. III (Colombo, 1973) pp.4 K. M. de Silva, “The History and Politic
8

WER IN SRI LANKA–A SH PERSPECTIVES
SILVA
dations of the Donoughmore Commission the Colonial Office amounted to a crossing s self-government in much the same way process as regards the White Dominions. be decisive a considerable period of transi2d goal, and self-government was defined le sphere of imperial interests was assumed. more Constitution emerged virtually from all structure in 1931. The experience of the while the Ministerial group in Sri Lanka, se, believed in the inevitablility of progress ment on the model of the White Dominions, point to the examples of Jamaica, British ly Malta, where semi-responsible governlent but to political crisis, constitutional arily, to colonial status.
's for constitutional reform in Sri Lanka a demands: of these the most important Cabinet form of government on the Westre of the Donoughmore system, the novel others were: a demand for the abolition re scheme by the elimination of the Officers elected Ministers; and a substantial reduc
colonial Office took up the position that ar-reaching a character. When the pressure made no serious effort to accommodate
author's chapter. "The History and Politics de Silva, The University of Ceylon, History 39-533. This chapter will be cited hereafter as
of the Transfer of Power'.

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THE TRANSFER OF P(
these demands. Far from countenancing a r. Whitehall endeavoured to strengthen the maintenance of a European element in th to the Governor's powers. There was also a of the minorities and much was made of th had not received the endorsement of minor
冰
This present essay seeks to review thi of Whitehall on the one hand and the g in Colombo on the other-on the compl Lanka. In any analysis of the political p chronology is of crucial importance. The events in the transfer of power in Sri Lank, came in 1937-9 with Sir Andrew Caldecc MacDonald as Secretary of State. These and unorthodox minds to bear on the prob The initiative in these was taken by Calc of many reverses and discouragements ena in 1942-3.
Within a few months of his arrival in after a careful review of the political situat the Executive Committee system and its rep government. Inherent in this was an accep trative duties performed by Officers of Sta certain special subjects over which the ( On all these the Governor's views were in co On one significant point his considered vie' that the advance towards a further stag need to be accompanied, as a temporary m tial reduction of the Governor's reserve po
On the crucial issue of minority righ political fissures radiate from the vexed ( he firmly rejected communal representatio a line of argument the cogency of which bc critics could appreciate even if neither gi advised that a new Committee should be in the State Council and to ensure the 1 minorities. On this Re-delimination Comi
2. ibid. 3. This extract is from Caldecott's confide. MacDonald, 28 October 1939. It is cit
letter of 23 December 1941 to Gent (a 54-1980. File:5554.1/Part I.

WER IN SR LANKA 9
iuction for the Governor's reserve powers, 1. They were equally intransigent on the higher bureaucracy as an essential prop very perceptible sensitivity to the anxieties fact that the demands of the State Council y leaders and spokesmen.”
事
British perspectives and attitudes-those overnor and his (largely British) advisers x issues of the transfer of power in Sri ocesses involved in the transfer of power starting point of a clear understanding of is a realization of the break-through that tt as Governor of Ceylon and Malcolm women of liberal instincts brought fresh lems of constitutional reform in the island. ecott whose sustained efforts in the face bled a consolidation of this breakthrough
Ceylon as Governor in late 1936, Caldecott ion came out in favour of the abolition of lacement by the orthodox form of Cabinet ptance of the need to allocate the administe to elected Ministers except in regard to governor would retain personal control. informity to those of the Ministerial group. ws were in opposition to theirs: he believed e in semi-responsible government would easure, by an increase instead of a substanWECTS.
its he took up the position that "all our (uestion of minority representation', but 1 on a mathematical formula of any mind, th the Ministerial group and their minority oup were completely satisfied with it. hie set up in order to create additional seats aturn of more members belonging to the littee, as he called it, he placed most of his
tial despatch of 28 October 1939 to Malcolm i by him in his "personal and most secret's senior Colonial Office civil servant) in C.O

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10 K. M. C
hopes for a settlement of the question of n
ting it for over four years. Curiously, he ( served by the appointment from Whiteha
lines of the Donoughmore Commission, problems of the island and to recommend r
Caldecott's views of constitutional endorsement in 1938-9; more importantly cott's proposals were introduced in the without modification after long discussion.
had been successfully negotiated by Caldec
The formulation of a constitution on be a time-consuming matter, for the Color cautious in these matters. Very soon the C British energies to the exclusion of quest colonies. At first however it did not seem ponement of reforms in Sri Lanka since t all parties concerned, on the nature of the elections scheduled for 1940 were put off f Lord Lloyd, the new Secretary of State foi 1940, was the need for time in which to tal tutional reform, the franchise and delimi interpreted in Sri Lanka to mean that W active consideration on data already befor still believed that reforms would be introd
But British policy had begun to cha sensed this, though the Ministers were ul that a change of policy was in the offing MacDonald, much to Caldecott's surpris delimination which Caldecott had always proposals. Instead MacDonald suggested of Ministers and other leaders-presumab tiate a settlement of existing differences At this stage Caldecott was under incr European community in Sri Lanka, and action against trade unionists in the plant the plantations, and the planting communi hostile to all political activity in the islanc pean-owned Times of Ceylon they sought t
4. Caldecott to Gent, 23 December 1941, o
5. See, C.O. 54/975 File 55569/6: The Fou n.d. (but probably early June 1940) spo G. P. Bolster, (a British planter in Sri 1940; J. D. Aitken, to Lord Lloyd, Sec (on behalf of a committee appointed b 1940.) See also, Colonel T. Y. Wrigh 1951) pp. 160-169.

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inority rights, and he persisted in advocaid not believe that any purpose would be of a Constitutional Commission on the to review the political and constitutional eforms.
reform received Malcolm MacDonald's . a series of resolutions embodying CaldeState Council in 1939 and were adopted Thus a consensus on constitutional reform
tt in 1939.
the basis of this consensus was bound to
lial Office of the 1930's was deliberate and
utbreak of war in Europe began to absorb
ions such as constitutional reform in the
as though the War Would lead to a post
nere was considerabile agreement, between
reforms to be initiated. When the general or two years the reason given officially by r the Colonies, in a despatch dated 12 June ke careful decisions om problems of constitation of constituencies. This decision was Whitehall would have these matters under e it. Even at the end of 1940 the Ministers luced shortly.
ange by the beginning of 1940. Caldecott naware of any change. The first indication had come as early as 26 January 1940 when e, rejected the idea of a Committee of Retreated as crucially important to his reforms that a Governor's Conference of the Board ly minority leaders-be convened to negobetween the Sinhalese and the minorities. Basing pressure from another source--the more especially the planters-to take firm ation areas. There was a spate of strikes on ty, rattled and frightened, were increasingly i; and with the active support of the Euroo exploit the extraordinary situation caused
p. cit. r Point Memorandum of the Ceylon Loyalists, nsored by "J.B.K.’ and The Times of Ceylon; Lanka) to A. T. Lennox-Boyd M.P. 4 June retary of State for the Colonies, 8 June 1940 y the "Comrades of the Great War' on 4 June t, Ceylon in My Time, 1889-1949 (Colombo,

Page 17
hit. RANSFER OF P.
by the outbreak of war to embarrass Cald was not as vigilant as he ought to be te Whitehall fortunately could distinguish betw outbursts. But the point is that the Europ within the island itself. And very soon a p minority grievances and fears and to thwa Caldecott himself. On 16 March 1940 the out the case for a Royal Commission on diately taken up by the minorities. The Mi and much more favourable to Caldecott's But the fact remained that yet another p minorities had emerged and one which was progress in Sri Lanka. It afforded a meas argued that constitutional reform in Sri La rivalries to the great detriment of the islan
Britain's energies were now concentra tutional problems of a small Asian colony Office was not represented in Churchill's V with Malcolm MacDonald's departure fr there were three short tenures of the Secre that date and 24 November 1942 when C office till August 1945. All the Secretaries Conservatives (as was Stanley himself): Lo Lord Moyne till 23 February 1942, and V bury) till 24 November 1942.
For Caldecott it was no matter for s Lloyd sent him a confidential despatch stat the constitutional problems of the island divulged to the Ministers, much less publ the hope that Whitehall could be persu Even at this stage the Ministers and other Ofice was unnecessarily delaying a decis the data. The Governor realised fhat ther ference or a Commission from these sol do was to get Whitehall to implement thi re-open consideration of his proposal of MacDonald's rejection of this-somethin 1940 was a disappointing reverse for Ca As late as 28 June 1941 he suggested the lines set out in his despatches for detail arguments and pleas made little impressi an official announcement-in December 1 reform was postponed till after the war, a and made the subject of further consultat

WER IN SR LANKA l
cott by making out to Whitehall that he be about potential threats to civil order. eet í easonable criticism and these hysterical an community was not without influence olitical campaign began designed to exploit rt the reformers among whom was placed
Times of Ceylon in a leading article set constitutional reform and this was immehisters were wary of any such Commission roposal for a Re-delimination Committee. oint of divergence between them and the to cloud the whole issue of constitutional ure of support to those in Whitehall who nka would inevitably exacerbate communal l's war effort.
ited on the war in Europe and the constitook very low priority in this. The Colonial War Cabinet. And to make matters worse, om the Colonial Office on 13 May 1940, taryship of State for the Colonies between Oliver Stanley took over and remained in of State during this period were coalition rd Lloyd, 13 May 1940 to 1 February 1942; iscount Cranborne (the Marquess of Salis
urprise, when on 18 December 1940, Lord ing the impracticability of further examining ill after the war. This was not immediately ished. Instead Caldecott played for time in aded to make a more generous response. Sinhalese spokesmen felt that the Colonial ion on a matter on which 1 possessed all e was no support for a Constitutional ConIrces in the colony. What he attempted to proposals decided upon in 1938-9, and to a Committee of Re-delimitation. (Though g which he had earlier accepted-in January decott, he persisted in his advocacy of it) drafting of an Order-in-Council along the 2d consideration by the Cabinet. But these in on Whitehall. Eventually Caldecott made 41-to the State Council that constitutional d that the position would be further examined on by means of a Committee or Conference.

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12 K. M. I.
This declaration was tantamount to a reform. It was clearly a disappointment f as was customary with them with a poli press for a more generous gesture from E
Caldecott now watched the consensu patiently put together in 1938-9 dissolve ir on local politics. At the beginning of 1942 ential-of the nationalist movement were 1938-9, and had set out Dominion Status a Turks who were increasingly influential wit Dominion Status for the more emotion: It needed all D. S. Senanayake's personal up against this current of opinion, and to i tional evolution should be Dominion Statu than in opposition to British. Caldecott W. Status for Ceylon, arguing that "... it is obs of Dominion Status are either not unders people who should know better....'
Soon Japan's entry into the war and thi initially, began to have their impact on the of Ministers. The Governor reported that every other consideration out of mind, and emergency services and preventing panic Mountbatten's South East Asian Con the island was once again of vital stia Japanese power, and to a lesser extent she the U.S.S.R. via the Persiam Gulf. Caldecot to Whitehall that in this situation a mor constitutional reform than that issued in the goodwill and co-operation of the Boa hearted participation of Sri Lanka in the and the cogency of his arguments had the it politic to issue a fresh declaration on con
The main point in this new pronoun declaration that the objectives of constitu possible development of self-governing ins Wealth partnership having regard both to larger interests of the Commonwealth on ultimately depend'.8 This statement was co tional terms...' to have the desired effect. I. not be published in the form in which it was
Caldecott to Gent, 23 December 1941, op ibid.
C.O. 54/980. File 55541/5. Secret Cabi entitled The Ceylon Constitution and pre Secretary of State for the Colonies, para on The Ceylon Constitution, 27 March 1

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n indefinite postponement of constitutional or the Board of Ministers but they reacted te note of disagreement and continued to Britain.
is on constitutional reform which he had 1 the face of world events and their impact the moderate wing-by far the most influ; no longer bound by the compromise of as their objective. Within a year the Young hin the Ceylon National Congress spurned ally satisfying concept of independence. prestige and tenacity of purpose to stand insist that the goal of Sri Lanka's constituis, to be attained in association with rather as not enthusiastic at all about Dominion ious that the implications and obligations tood or are being deliberately ignored by
a string of spectacular successes she achieved thinking of both Whitehall and the Board in the island these developments 'thrust everybody had plenty to do in organizing '...' When in 1942 the headquarters of amand was established at Peradeniya, tegic importance, for the destiucuion of was a vital element in the supply line to it drove home the point in his despatches e convincing and forthlight statement on December 1941 was called for to retain rd of Ministers and to secure the wholewar effort. The pressure from Caldecott ir effect and the War Cabinet considered stitutional reform in the island.
cement made in December 1942 was the tional evolution would be the "... fullest titutions in Ceylon within the Commonthe single interest of the island and the which the island's security and prosperity Luched in "... far too indefinite and cundideed the Ministers urged that it should sent to them. They were supported in this
. cit.
let Paper W.P. (43) 129 of 27 March 1943, ented to the War Cabinet by Oliver Stanley, ಸ್ಟ್ರೀHerefer, Stanley, Secret Cabinet paper

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THE TRANSFER OF
by Caldecott, and the Commander-in-C very serious view of what may happen if i to meet the desires and aspirations of the expected immediate and progressive loss coupled with the deflection of now model lism and the demand for the right of seces
At the same time, Caldecott and La document, setting out a declaration of p for Whitehall approval as a substitute for enunciated in this statement were eventua in the island on 26 May 1943, using muc document sent home by Caldecott and Layt
A comparison of the two declaration May 1943 is very revealing. In both no h war. But the second definitely committed after the war. Wher the first declaration h development of self-governing institutions offered “full responsibility for governmen administration'. The only matters to be defence “while of course, the proposals di constitutionally, Ceylon while not attain much in the position now (1943) occupied
One of the reasons that impelled Whit goals of constitutional reform along the line the fear of losing minority co-operation in effective reply: “It must be realised', he are just as keen to be released from White their disagreement with the latter is solely i and share of Government appointments, & essential characteristics of the administra
In urging the War Cabinet to give its decott and Layton, Oliver Stanley gave difficult to prevent a very serious deterio go as far as this', especially because of 't strategical base and as the source of es cular'. Secondly, the Ministers had wo "with great goodwill and perhaps, an une natural thing for them to compare the defi
9. ibid., see also Caldecott "personal and s
and 17 February 1943.
10. Stanley, Secret Cabinet paperon The Ce 11. Caldecott's "personal and secret' despat 12. Stanley, Secret Cabinet paperon The Ce

POWER IN SRI LANKA 13
hief Sir Geoffrey Layton who took “...a t is not possible, by some new declaration
more moderate elements in Ceylon. They of co-operation and decrease of war-effort, rate opinion towards intransigent nationasion”.o
yton sent home a very carefully drafted olicy on constitutional reform in Ceylon that sent in December 1941. The principles illy endorsed by Whitehall and published h the same phraseology contained in the
O.
s, that of December 1942, and that of 26 ope is held out of any changes during the Great Britain to a far-reaching reform eld out the promise of “the fullest possible within the Commonwealth', the second t under the Crown in all matters of civil reserved would be external relations and not include the right of secession. Thus ing full Dominion Status, would be very
by Southern Rhodesia'.
ehall to resist any precise definition of the }s suggested by Caldecott and Layton was the war effort. To this Caldecott had an declared "that the minority communities hall apron strings as the majority, and that in regard to the allocation of Council seats (c. i.e. in regard to machinery and not the tion which all agree to keep national'.
support to the proposals set out by Calfour reasons. 12 Firstly, that it would be ration in Ceylon's war effort "unless we he vital importance of Ceylon, both as a sential war materials, rubber in partiorked an admittedly 'difficult constitution xpected degree of success. It would be a inite promises made to India, where, with
ecret" despatches to Stanley, 27 January 1943
ylon Constitution, 27 March 1943, op. cit. ch to Stanley, 17 February 1943. ylon Constitution, 27. March 1943. op. cit.

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14 K. M.
all respect to India's war effort, the politi co-operative, with the indefinite hopes held have thrown themselves heart and soul in lead to the argument that more can be ob making trouble than by methods of co-op the declaration would encourage Sinhales lement with the minorities and "to a rea with India'. And finally he pointed out th 1942, "when we come after the war to a d offer a great deal, if not all, of what is ni declaration. Weshall, however, have lost tl the declaration now, and proposals which
tion, may by that time fall far short of the
He set out, as against these, "the ver proposals are accepted'. There was, first "The only definite safeguard, for the var approval by three-fourths of the State Co sion of constitutional reform would exa we might risklosing the co-operation oft received the expressed assurance of the that they do not share this fear....'. Secc for the first time complete financial resp. financial and economic problems of Ceylc the questions relating to British commer this the declaration made “no specific sa Ceylon. It is difficult to insert this in view contain no such provision. Nor is there a interests; but India would not be without
"Although in our judgement all moi be satisfied with assurances on the lines v mean that there will not be such measure C from any concessions less than what is as in a confidential telegram to Stanley. Th was as sensible as it was accurate. Thou fell short of Dominion Status (which D. he aimed at), and far short of the goal o Congress advocated) the Board of Min. preferred to accept this offer as one furt of the country and as the basis of further r
The first task that confronted D. S. titution on the basis of the conditions la and the clarification of this given on 1
13. For this declaration and clarification

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cal element at least has been largely non
out to Ceylon, where the elected members to war production. This comparison may tained from His Majesty's Government by eration'. Thirdly there was the hope that e politicians to turn their minds to a settistic appreciation of their future relations at even under the declaration of December iscussion of this question, we shall have to ow contained in the Governor's proposed he goodwill which we should gain by making today, it is believed, will stabilise the situamajority view'.
y real difficulties which will arise if (these fall, the crucial issue of minority rights. ious minorities lies in the requirement of uncil. Stanley had feared that the discuscerbate the communal position and that he minorities in the war effort, but he had : Commander-in-Chief and the Governor ondly, a popular government "will assume onsibility just at a time when the post-War bn may be most acute'. There were, finally, cial interests in the island. With regard to feguard for British commercial interests in of the fact that the promises made to India ny definite safeguard for Indian ccmmercial bargaining power for this purpose'.
ierate political opinion would in actuality, which we propose, this does not, of course f expressed disappointment as is inseparable ced for“. So Caidecott on 17 February 1943 is assessment of the situation in the island gh the proposals outlined on 26 May 1943 S. Senanayake had set forth as the objective findependence (which the Ceylon National sters under D. S. Senanayakes leadership er stage in the constitutional advancement egotiations.
Senanayake was to formulate a draft consd down in the declaration of 26 May 1943 July 1943.13 The requirement that such a
see, Sessional Paper XVII of 1943.

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THE TRANSFER OF PC
draft constitution needed to win the app1 of the State Council 14 practically ensured t national consensus on constitutional ref Whitehall in 1943 was that a constitutio of the declaration of 26 May 1943 would
or conference' once victory over the AX
A final draft of the Minister's const copies were forwarded to Whitehall. The immediate consideration of their scheme C tions made an early decision a vital necessit
t
Whitehall's response to these pressu Oliver Stanley announced in the House of sion would be appointed to visit Ceylon, t prepared by the Board of Ministers, but als of expressing their views. The Ministers to of reference of the proposed Commission rests, including the minority communities tional reform in Ceylon'. They argued that from the terms of the Declaration of 26 Ma would be sufficiently protected by the stil the members of the State Council for the :
The Ministers' protests were of no av mission were not changed when the appo. announced on 20 September 1944.
The Ministers resolved upon an offic not collaborate with the Commission but and allowed their own scheme to speak tiously "withdrawn' their scheme.1
In the meantime, D. S. Senanayake ) First, an official boycott of the Commiss was anxious to be in London in time for t was favourable he would ask for more, unsatisfactory he would repudiate it, and laration of 1943 which the British Governr gesture Whitehall readily consented to e to visit London. The latter left for Londo see the shattering electoral defect of the (
سسسسسسسصيص*
14. Excluding the Speaker (or any other pr 15. For further discussion of these issuess
of the Transfer of Power'.
16. ibid. 17. On D. S. Senanayake's role in these n and Politics of the Transfer of Power'.

WER IN SRI LANKA 15
oval of three-quarters of all the members hat it would have to be nothing less than a orm. One of the undertakings given by 1 formulated in accordance with the terms be examined by "a suitable commission is powers had been achieved.
itution was ready by February 1944 and
Board of Ministers began to press for an in the grounds that urgent local considera
y.
t 水
"es led to considerable misunderstanding. Commons on 9 July 1944 that a Commiso examine not only the draft constitution ) to afford minority groups the opportunity ok objection to the extension of the terms to cover consultations with “various inte, concerned with the subject of constituthis amounted to a fundamental departure y 1943; and it was urged that the minorities pulation of a three-fourths majority of all adoption of the draft constitution.
ail, and the terms of reference of the Cocmintment of the Soulbury Commission was
ial boycott of the Commission. They did "left the various groups to give evidence for itself' even though they had ostenta
had decided on his own course of action. ion. Once the Commission left Ceylon he he publication of their report. If the report or Dominion Status, in fact, but if it was refuse to be any longer bound by the Decent itself had discarded. In a conciliatory xtend an invitation to D. S. Senanayake 1 in early July 1945, but arrived in time to 'onservatives..17
siding officer) and the three Officers of State. e, K. M. de Silva, "The History and Politics
gotiations, see K. M. de Silva, "The History

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6 K. M.
The defeat of the Conservatives pos Dominion Status to Sri Lanka. With the Senanayake had been given a proof copy it was clear that the Commission had ir Ministers' Draft Constitution. There wer but none of any real substance. More imp during the period of the Soulbury Comr impact on the Commission's thinking.
In the Soulbury Report the limits on in the Minister's draft were elaborated up kable in practice. D. S. Senanayake seized in his case for the immediate grant of I stage envisaged in the Soulbury Report. Til for he converted G. Hall, the new Secreta of view and he succeeded in extracting fro) grant of Dominion Status. But Hall was no not agree to this. For the Labour Gover the empire were India (including Burma) an from these to the solution of less importan
Though D. S. Semana yake returned di diate grant of Dominion Status had not b{ at this stage was not the minority problems in the transfer of power in the Indiam em satisfactory perspective to the problems t now in the offing. Moreover, before his ret sion-problems relating to citizenship, the as falling within the ambit of the Ceylong tution.
The publication of the Soulbury Report the decisions of the British government ( clarifying the point that though there wa Status, it was merely postponed pending t tion. All this undoubtedly served to strer Lanka. The State Council on 8-9 Novemb tance of the White Paper on Constitutiona
Caldecott had left the island when the His last few months in office had been espe that Caldecott and his Chief Secretary, Sir the unilateral extension of the terms of tl constitutional problems in 1944. Drayton viewed as the too rapid transition to re had his reservations about Dominion Sta. he would have actively opposed it.

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poned rather than hastened the grant of publication of the Soulbury Report (D. S.
if it shortly after his arrival in London) fact endorsed the main principles of the : adjustments and modifications no doubt ortantly the minorities' political campaign hission's visit to the island had had little
Ceylon's external sovereignity laid down iom in a manner which made them unworon this and made it one of the main themes )ominion Status without the intermediate he case he made seemed convincing enough ry of State for the Colonies, to his point m the latter an oral promise of the immediate t persuasive enough, and the Cabinet would nment the priorities in the dissolution of d Palestine, and they would not be diverted it problems.
sappointed that his demand for the immexen conceded, yet the fact that the obstacle ! in Ceylon but the complex issues involved pire gave an entirely new and much more hat confronted him. Dominion Status was urn home he had obtained one vital concesColonial Office agreed, were to be treated overnment's powers under the new Consti
was followed by a White Paper embodying on the new constitution for Ceylon, and to be no immediate grant of Dominion he successful working of the new constitugthen D. S. Senanayake's position in Sri r 1945 endorsed his motion for the accep| Reform by 51 votes to 3. .
final phase in the transfer of power began. 2ially unhappy. D. S. Senanayake believed Robert Drayton had been responsible for e Commission sent to review the island's scarcely concealed his dismay at what he ponsible government. Caldecott himself us for Ceylon, but it is doubtful whether

Page 23
THE TRANSFER OF E
The new Governor, Sir Henry Mon the Colonial Office, with first hand experie titutional reform in Ceylon. At any rate different under the new constitution fr scheme; his powers were more akin to th ning dominion. His primary function was sition in the island, and at a time when to a drastically altered world situation.
奉
With a Labour government in power surrender of empire. In retrospect it wo weariness and weakness. The Second Wor ning of nationalism in the Asian colonies, Revolution. No quality of statecraft cou British public opinion have tolerated a re these colonies.
At the same time the surrender of e 'appropriate fulfilment', 'a meritoriou and not a humiliating defeat comparable w The evolution of the old British empire to be regarded as a process leading inevitab modernised but without loss of structura seem to be a disingenuous interpretation in 1947-8.
At that time despite the transfer of pc Great Britain would not necessarily quit as an imperial power. Once again a world the situation seemed superficially to be n 1919.
It could be seriously urged in 1947 tha Asia will be needed to replace the dying F region during the experiments on which t may be to break with their past, one thing i and that is peace; to reform themselves need to be undisturbed in their own house.
This passage redolent with trusteesh struck a responsive chord at the Colonial Whitehall. Men like D. S. Senanayake ir the same views both before and after the
18. G. S. Graham. Tides of Empire (Montrt
19. Ibid
20. G. Wint, The British in Asia (London,
see the unsigned article on "The Domini in the December 1947 issue (No. 149) of
15441-3

WERIN SRI LANKA 17
k Mason Moore came to the island from ce of its thinking on the problems of conshis position as Governor was significantly m Caldecott's under the Donoughmore se of a Governor-General in a self-govero preside over an awkward period of tranBritain was seeking to accommodate itself
本
Britain had begun the process of post-war uld seem that this was a consequence of d Wa: had stimulated an explosive awake
in some respects reminiscent of the French ld havid stemmed these forces. Nor would sort to force to prolong her control over
mpire in South Asia could be viewed as s enlargement of the Commonwealth', ith the loss of the thirteen colonies in 1783. owards autonomy and equality could well ly to a Commonwealth reconstructed and l identity. A generation later this would of historical necessity. But it was not so
wer in India British publicists argued that Asia, that she still had a vital role to play war had been won, and for a brief period it very different from what it had been in
t: "A new defence arrangement for South mpire, and to shelter the countries of the hey are beginning. However anxious they in their past they cannot afford to renounce
'adically and by their own volition, they
9220
ip (at best) and patronage would have Office. Nor was this attitude confined to
Ceylon gave public expression to much final transfer of power had been effected.
al and London, 1972)
947) pp. 162-3. For a variation on this.theme
on of Ceylon' by a correspondent in Colombo The RoundTable pp. 455-59.

Page 24
8 K. M. I.
Indeed questions relating to defence completion of the process of transfering p D. S. Senanayake wanted was Dominion the cautious phrases of the British gov in other words, to reach this goal without and without the intervening period envis was in February 1947 that he sent a per Arthur Creech Jones through the island'. be reconsidered. He followed this up by s. sentative to negotiate with the Colonial O reached London independence for India Cabinet on 20 February 1947. With the d grant of independence to Burma the way
During the negotiations the Colonial problem; the higher bureaucracy, the guarantee that the Secretary of State wol they were fairly treated; and finally, qu The first two were easily settled. Indeed the basis of the safeguards incorporated first i and then embodied with extensions in the 1946-7; the second problem did not pos problem of completing the transfer of pow defence and external affairs and on these between government and opposition in Bri
O. E. Goonetilleke who handled the ne it was ungracious and unfair to delay the g had played a full part in the war effort th when independence had been granted to I to Burma whose leaders had collaborated v by Creech Jones.
There was also a realisation that an Dominion Status was a matter of political ciates who were soon to face a general ele lenge from Marxist groups was anticipated was provided by prolonged labour unres
21. See, K. M. de Silva, "The History and the three books by Sir Charles Jeffries: Th Chap. 8. "Ceylon Crosses the Line', (London, 1963); and "O.E.G.' A Biograp 1969). 22. For these negotiations and Goonetileke
pp. 81-97.

E SILVA
and external affairs were crucial to the ower in Ceylon in the years 1946-8.21 What Status earlier than had been implied by irnment's statements of policy in 1945-6, experience of working the new constitution aged by the Colonial Office in 1945-6. It sonal letter to the new Secretary of State governor, urging that the matter should inding Sir Oliver Goonetileke as his reprefice on these questions. When Goonetileke had already been resolved by the British ecision on the partition of India, and the seemed clear for independence for Ceylon.
Office raised three questions: the minority Ceylon Civil Service, and the implied uld look after their interests and see that estions of defence and external affairs. : minority question had been settled on the n the Ministers' draft constitution of 1944 2 new constitution drafted for Ceylon in e any serious difficulties. Essentially the rer in Ceylon was viewed as a problem of there was very little difference of opinion tain.
gotiations on behalf of Ceylon urged that rant of full independence to Ceylon which rough the decision of her political leaders ndia whose leaders had been neutral, and iith the Japanese.This point was conceded
announcement of the immediate grant of survival for D. S. Senanayake and his assoction in the island in which a strong chalThe evidence for this latter consideration
which culminated in a general strike in
Politics of the Transfer of Power". See also 2 Transfer of Power (London, 1960), especially p. 57-69; Ceylon: The Patik to Independence ty of Sir Oliver Ernest Goonetilleke, (London,
s contribution see, Jeffries, O.E.G. Chap. 6,

Page 25
THE TRANSFER OF P.
the years 1946-7. These strikes were not w demands advanced was a rejection of th in 1947.
The transfer of power would be com on defence, external affairs and the publi The first two were immeasurably more in were conscious of the island's strategic pos to defend herself; and they realised that th bling block in the final transfer of power. British government to contemplate the in willing to "sign agreements on defence a in the House of Commons on 18 July 19 and the Ceylon government which would were a “condition precedent to the grant c Commonwealth”. D. S. Semanayake was ta cable or coercive about these agreements interest of the two parties. On these matt was substantial identity of views between these agreements were subjected to sever ment in Ceylon, especially but not exclusiv
It would appear that in the final phi
associated in the talks had attempted to a representative of the Board of Trade su dealing with British trade and investmen quite unexpectedly raised the question of st island when it became a Dominion. Both
tilleke, and it is evident that there was no Oliver Stanley had outlined the case agains the Colonial Office did not need to be remini politicians were exceptionally sensitive, a1 himself.
One last point. Sri Lanka's attainme.
by the Colonial Office as a "a special ca: justified by its "size, its economic strength Since 1931 it had in fact had a form of pc responsibility for the conduct of its affai Ministers answerable to that Parliament. fulfilling these conditions. If Ceylon was th were the views of Sir Charles Jeffries, Depu Office, one of the senior officials deeply inv independence. These were men who, in 1948 in South Asia British activity there would 1 ending in night'. .
23. See, Stanley, Secret Cabinet paper on Th 24. Jeffries, The Transfer of Power, p. 12.

OWER IN SRI LANKA 19
tithout political motivation and one of the e Soulbury Constitution to be introduced
leted with the signing of three agreements c service, between the two Governments. mportant than the third. Ceylonese leaders sition in the Indian Ocean and her inability is strategic weakness was the crucial stumD. S. Senanayake, to make it easier for the immediate grant of Dominion Status, was ind external affairs'. Creech Jones stated 947 that these agreements between Britain assume office under the new constitution of fully responsible status within the British o point out that there was nothing irrevo, and that they were based on the mutual ers of defence and external affairs, there D. S. Senanayake and Whitehall. But 2 criticism both within and outside Parliarely from Marxist groups.
ase of the megotiations Whitehall officials raise two other controversial issues. First, ggested the inclusion of special provisions ts in Ceylon. Secondly, the India Office afeguards for Indian nationals living in the proposals were firmly rejected by Goonesupport from the Colonial Office for them. st the first in 1943,28 and as for the second, ied that it was a matter on which Ceylonese ld none more so than D. S. Senanayake
nt of independence in 1948 was regarded se”, and its claim to self-government was , its advanced state of social organization. litical constitution which placed the main rs on an elected Parliament (sic) and on No other colony seemed to be in sight of le forerunner, it had a long start". These ty Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial 'olved in the negotiations over Sri Lanka's , believed that despite the transfer of power 1ot be "a mere afterglow following Sunset,
e Ceylon Constitution, 27 March 1943, op. cit.

Page 26
LEADERSHIP PERSP AN INTERPR
C. R. DE SILVA. and VIJ
The study is intended to evaluate the e of the political, administrative and profes: twenty five years that followed the attair Much of the raw material for this essay was by the authors with twenty leaders of varyin The evidence thus obtained was checked wit
A major difficulty that had to be faced impossible to discuss every shade of opin other hand the use of terms such as "left v was bound to be vague and misleading. It the major political parties such as the U. Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The Marxist divided on personal and ideological ground to be treated as one bloc, as was also the ca. and Sri Lanka Tamil interests. However, t ones not only because party postures ch: leadership level the apparent ideological d a common middle and upper class socio-eco education and life-style, throughout the pe
2
The survival of the constitution inh decades, a striking record of continuity ar from colonial rule after the Second World that the people of the island and their polit the beginning. But this is far from the truth was conditioned by the need to compromi conflicting, forces: the constitution had well as to the political leaders who formed the State Council. Moreover underlying all for independent Sri Lanka, there lay the not be a lasting product. In the years sino but there was also an understandable reluc bend their minds to the task of revising

III
ECTIVES 1948-1975: ETIVE ESSAY
AYA SAMARAWEERA
ktent to which the hopes, beliefs and plans ional elites of Sri Lanka changed in the ment of political independence in 1948. obtained in personal interviews conducted gideological and communal backgrounds. h reference to contemporary publications.
was one of categorization. It was obviously ion in an article of short length. On the ving or "right wing without qualification was therefore decided to use the names of nited National Party (UNP) and the Sri left, though frequently and acrimoniously s was found to have sufficient in common se with the representatives of Indian Tamil hese categorizations are but approximate inged with time but also because at the iversity was to some extent balanced by nomic background and a common western riod under Survey.
rited at independence for well over two long the Afro-Asian states which emerged War, created the widespread impression cal leaders were firmly wedded to it from The making of the constitution of 1947 e with and accommodate diverse, indeed be acceptable to the British rulers as he membership of the national legislature, the discussions centred on a ccnstitution ssumption that the final outcome would independence this view was strengthened ance among the political leaders to firmly he constitution.

Page 27
LEADERSHP PERSPEC
Given the ideological differences four dence, it is no surprise that the constituti by all those in politics. The Marxist Left rej did not permit it to accept a constitutiona of the country. The Marxist leaders, event and joined hands with Centrist SLFP to f attacks on the constitution and repeatedly a which would give expression to the true w hand they did not take what would have be to enter the political arena created by the they did and with this they tacitly approve extra-parliamentary agitational techniques, rejected as the means of gaining state pow but it was eminently attractive on pragm
The Marxist Left was not alone in til disparate group of individuals, mainly f vehement in the condemnation of the const considerations but by the inadequacy of social groups against the possible dominat these critics were seduced by the prospect c gence. With few exceptions, however, they again by what they deemed to be the fail keep their part of the bargain, to refrain interests of the minorities. This process of and then breaking off as they lost confi familiar feature in the politics of Sri Lank began to be more cohesive as time went of 1947 became increasingly ambivalent a unlikely defenders of the constitution. It that some of the provisions in the constitu provided for the benefit of the minorities w wielded state power. Thus, for example Commission and that of the second cham entrenched clause in the constitution, secti diluted safeguard, consequently assumed bulwark, mainly through action in court them as injurious legislation conceived b proved to be less than effective in protec However, mainly because of the entrenche sanctity, the Tamil leaderhip became inci in the final analysis it was this leadership defenders.
The attitude towards the constitution dence was understandable enough. Since

TTVES 1948-1975 21
ld among the political leaders at indepenpn of 1947 was not unanimously endorsed acted it out of hand: its ideological premises l document enacted by the colonial rulers hose who abandoned revolutionary fervour orm governments, were consistent in their dvocated the adoption of a new constitution vill of the people of the land. On the other an undoubtedly the radical stand of refusing new constitutional framework. Participate d the parliamentary system of government; though not quite forgotten, were implicitly er. This course of action had its dilemmas atic grounds.
he rejection of the constitution of 1947; a rom the Tamil community, were equally itution. They were not moved by ideological the safeguards provided for the minority ion of the majority, the Sinhalese. Some of of sharing power and gave up their intransiwere soon pushed into the opposite camp ure on the part of the Sinhalese leaders to
from adopting legislation harmful to the joining hands with the Sinhalese for a time dence in their partners, was to become a a in the coming years. The Tamil leadership by and its attitude towards the constitution hd eventually it turned out to be among the became clear to the Tamil political leaders Ltion which they looked upon as safeguards vere easily nulified in practice by those who , the effectiveness of the Public Service ber, the Senate, were gradually eroded. The on 29 (2), which was initially seen only as a a new importance and it became their s of law, against what was interpreted by y the Sinhalese. The constitution of 1947 cting the interests of the minority groups. d clause, which soon took an unanticipated easingly attracted to the constitution and which turned out to be one of its strongest
of those who came into power at indepenthe new constitution was largely based on

Page 28
22 C. R. DE SILVA AND
the draft constitution prepared by the Boar of enactment, they could justly look upon
were not attached to it by reascins of ser weight of constitutional authorities behir imposed no constraints upcn the indepenc constitution-making-a phrase which took was to them only a window-dressing which in the nation's history. Not that they were of the UNP leaders, wedded though they
the value of a bicameral legislature, at leas Again, the entrenched clause of 29 (2), inc a sop to the minorities, to allay their fears lature in the adoption of the new constitut stumbling block to progressive legislation.
the constitution was a failure in practice. them cautious in calling for a unilateral r energetically to the demands for the draft familiar and the results of their political a a sharp institutional change might result in a
In practical terms, there was a formida the constitutional necessity of obtaining tw revision of the constitution. On several oc of the House of Representatives were appoin but it was always a safe assumption that in party support for amendments, unless the this background, the coming into power in than two-thirds of the legislature was si only the legislative backing necessary bl afresh. It is arguable that most of the sociali in the new constitution which was brought in the sense that all the major political prair to them formally or at the very least, begur cularly true of the "Principles of State Pol. enough of the extent to which the different had achieved a broad consensus of view ol neither the Right nor the Left any longer making. There were of course those who wer and collectivist idelogy presented by the g but they proved to be surprisingly few in ni the understanding that opposition to this i popular thinking in the island evident for c.
Greater disquiet was expressed about tution. The authoritarian bias was seen in given to the legislative branch of the gover)

WIJAYA SAMARAWIEERA
of Ministers in 1944, whatever the process it as a product of their own labours. They timent alone. They pointed out, with the d them, that in practice the constitution ence of the young nation; authochtonous wide currency about two decades laterwas not needed at this particular juncture blind to the faults of the constitution. Some were to the Westminister model, doubted in the way it was structured in Sri Lanka. orporated in the constitution primarily as and to win their crucial votes in the legision, was seen by others as somewhat of a Nevertheless, they could hardly claim that Moreover instinct, if not experience, made evision of the constitution or responding ing of a new document for the old was ctivities was somewhat predictable while ll of them losing their political prominence.
ble obstacle to fresh constitution-making, o-thirds of the votes in parliament for the casions over the years select committees ted to consider constitutional amendments o government would be able to draw allse were of an innocuous nature. Given 1970 of a government supported by more gnificant. The government possessed not ut also a signal determination to start st and populist strands of thought reflected into force in 1972 were non-controversial, Lies in the country had by then subscribed to pay lip service to them. This is partiicy incorporated in it. This is reflection
shades of political opinion in Sri Lanka the basis for principles of public policy
held to dogmatic positions about policy epublicly suspicious about the egalitarian overnment through the new constitution umber and they seemed to have come to leology would be to oppose the drift of ver a decade or so.
he authoritarian bent of the new constits non-justiciable clauses, in the primacy ment, in its incorporation of emergency

Page 29
LEADERSHIP PERSE
powers formally contained in ordinary le the role of the judicature in the process o structure of the government it erected. document argued that the new constitutio or another of its clauses but in its entirety the paramountcy of the legislature, they
feature in the constitution. There was one provisions relating to the place of Sinhal to incorporate in the new constitution co
Where the constitution was rejected, e which tended to view things from a narro because of a fundamental disagreement a of the provision made at the insistence of the period of life of the parliament the undertaken in a decorous manner with all but the political background which form constitution-makers, the emergency creat distinct element of unreality to it, which to exploit to tarnish the image of propri
The curious mixture of ideology and ways in the politics of independent Sri La perspective relating to foreign policy-m
The ideological gulf between the Mar at independence. The Marxists, at this tiu looked askance at the foreign policy ado the British. The closetiesestablished with til in the defence treaties-and the distinct b affairs administration was to the Left su: mentality of those who guided the destin decried association with the west but the to what precise policy should govern rel international affairs in terms of class stu best-the Marxist leaders in general displ states but a distinct group among them, place their full faith on the Soviet Union. I Russia had been a crucial factor in the origi pre-independence period, the split between Communists, understandably, championed national affairs until the disaffection betwe in local Left politics. Both the Trotskyites a the pro-Russian and the pro-Chinese, gra

ECTIVES 1948-1975 23
gislation, in the changes brought about in government and, to a lesser extent, in the n defence, those who conceived the new 1 should not be judged on the basis of one and in any case if authoritarianism meant were mot hesitant at all in enshrining this further important area of controversy: the se as the official language and the failure ncessions to the demands of the Tamils.
xcepting in the case of the Tamil leadership wly communalistic perspective, it was not bout the form it should take but because government members for the extension of in existing. The constitution-making was the trappings necessary to give it legitimacy ed a backdrop to the deliberations of the 2d by the April 1971 revolt, introduced a the critics of the government did not fail
ety.
pragmatism evident in so many different nka, was amply reflected in the leadership laking.
xist Left and the UNP was patently clear me particularly hamstrung by dogmatism, pted by those who inherited power form he former rulers of the country-epitomized ias displayed towards the West in foreign ficient evidence of the lingering colonial y of the new nation. The left strenuously e were differences of opinion within it as ations with the communist bloc. Viewing uggle-here they were at their articulate yed a sympathy towards the Communist the Trotskyites, were less than willing to ldeed, the question of the attitude towards nal split of the unified Left in the immediate the Trotskyites and the Communists. The the Soviet Union and its causes in interan Russia and China began to be reflected nd the Communists of the two persuasions, lually tended to abandon their dogmatic

Page 30
24 C. R. DE SILVA ANC
stands in relation to international proble alignment as the key ideology of the Th non-alignment a viable and dynamic polic Lanka but neither the pro-Russian group to abandon their respective tilts toward
To the UNP, there was never a stri concerned; its attitude was consciously m geo-political situation of the country, in p expansionist India, and the inadequacy c factors which weighed heavily in the min decision to seek the aid of the West in def the West in international affairs. On a diff of a democratic way of life and an econo new leaders to the West. Yet again, there some of the leaders displayed towards Mi without the country. Finally, it is alsowo) to many of the new states which emerged residual antagonism towards the former ) the new leaders-indeed, the whole process without strain altogether, had encouraged at leadership level.
The Right and Centre like the Marxi acceptance of non-alignment as the doctri policy administration. To those who belie close ties with the West and the steering c in world politics was necessarily a pragma the pragmatic conservatives opt for associ all the more attractive. The close friendshi cular, would inevitably draw Sri Lanka in between the West and the Communist sta then she could stand outside any conflicts: -the chosen model of those who believed Europe. Pragmatic considerations were b , phical arguments and the political leaders platforms were able to give a special twi of Buddhist teachings. w
The role of the bureaucracy in the sc loomed large in the political rhetoric of dominated leadership perspectives in relati independence: whether the bureaucracy c implement government policy and to what
control.

) VIJAYA SAMARAWEERA
ems, especially with the surfacing of nonird World. The Marxist leaders found in y for a small, defenceless country like Sri nor the pro-Chinese could be persuaded s their mentor states.
ct ideology as far as foreign policy was houlded by pragmatic considerations. The articular the close proximity to a possibly of the indigenous defence forces were the ds of the pragmatic conservatives in their ence matters and associate in general with erent plane, there was the common sharing mic philosophy which bound Sri Lanka's was the intense dislike, indeed fear, which arxism and the Marxists, both within and rth stressing that in Sri Lanka, in contrast from colonial status, there was no strong rulers either among the people or among of transfer of power, though not conducted a mutual trust between the two parties
st Left, gradually gravitated towards the ne which should form the key to foreign ved in non-alignment, the removal of the f a middle path between the power blocs tic choice. The very factors which made atic n with the West made non-alignment p with the West, defence treaties in partio any major conflict which might develop tes. If Sri Lanka remained non-aligned, and wars, very much the way Switzerland in non-alignment-acted over the years in uttressed gradually by reasoned philosowho advocated non-alignment in local st to these arguments by using the idiom
ocio-political process of the country has Sri Lanka. Two related questions have on to the bureaucracy in the years since could be implicitly trusted to effectively extent it should be subjected to political

Page 31
LEADERSHP PERSPE
The complexion of the bureaucracy i was almost completely indigenised and the not last long and thus the bureaucracy w relating to colour. This of course did not leaders as an institution devoid of bias towa and the long-maintained traditions of th particularly vulnerable to charges of holdi interests of the young nation. These charg was also the occasional non-Marxist critic that the Civil Servants and their political mi ideals and this made the Civil Service all t) leaders. The UNP which formed the first the Civil Service personnel all that congeni which relations between them were severe Civil Service as an institution unworthy it as a professionalized body, they were ca. control and direction over it through the em as a tool of the government rather than a Service against "political influences'.
It is arguable that with the abolition of the administrative service and the recrui ground, from among the swabasha-educate should have died down. It did not and ind reason for this is to be found in the grac independence but widely canvassed only i be subjected to political control: the argu manned by the culturally alienated formed With the rapid growth of the public service duties which were brought under its aegi into positions which made them more dis public expectations, they could not play bureaucratic process became more cumbel increasingly inefficient as well. All these fac advocated political control of the bureauc. point of view of the Left, the case for po prevalent standards of the bureaucrats but -and Sri Lanka does not lack this variet control of the bureaucracy did not stem frc enhanced opportunities of patronage whic public service was after all by far the lar increasing involvement of the state in the was bound to reach even higher figures. Wh: for the advocacy of this view as the fact ti the whole spectrum of it, accept it as axi

TIVES 1948-1975 2S
herited at independence is important. It
ew expatriate officials who remained, did
is able to function free of controversies
mean that it was accepted by all political
ds the former rulers. For one, the structure
: elite cadre, the Civil Service, made it
g out to values alien and inimical to the s came from the Marxist Left but there
The logic of the Marxist rhetoric had it
sters drew emotional impetus from shared
le more suspicious in the eyes of the Left governments did not find the attitudes of al and indeed many were the occasions in y strained. Though they did not see the of acceptance and did not interfere with eful enough to assume greater and closer loyment of the Public Service Commission llowing it full scope to defend the Civil
of the Civil Service, broadening the base tment of personnel from a different backd, the strong criticism of the bureaucracy eed, if at all, the criticism intensified. The iual acceptance of the idea, touted since n the 1960s, that the bureaucracy should ment that the administrative service was the rationale and not so much the reason. ; and with the increasingly new and varied , the administrative officials were forced tant from the public: whatever were the any longer the paternalistic role. The some over the years and to many critics tors were effectively utilised by those who racy to bolster their arguments. From the litical control did not rest entirely on the , also on Marxist teachings. To the cynic among its leaders-the call for political many of these reasons but on the greatly h it would provide to the politicians: the gest employer in the island and with the economy, the number of public servants it is crucial now is not so much the reasons at all shades of political opinion, in fact matic.

Page 32
26 C. R. DE SILVA AND
On economic policy the ideological UNP was sharp and clear in 1948. The l needed for economic advance and hoped private sector. From time to time som vention. The first post-independence reg such as cement and steel, and the produ state owned. Nevertheless, the UNP le: performance of wartime and post-war st to invest in such ventures. It preferred cottage industries which were expected areas and to develop import-substitutio situation when the developed countries we economies there were difficulties in obtai
The UNP in fact placed greater fa sector, particularly in the expansion of pi food shortage experienced during world was threefold. Firstly the cultivated area in the relatively depopulated dry-zone. Si provide additional land in proximity to extension scheme was to popularize bet seed and the use of fertilizer. In relation pursued. Purchase of foreign owned pla there was no desire to make radical ch of increased taxation and higher custom were considered by far the better policy
The Marxist leaders were sharply cr them to advocate a much greater degree much more detailed and comprehensive Six Year Plan. They were in favour of a nationalization of many of the public utili sised the need for a rapid programme of in ventures. Such a policy was viewed not o economic dependence on the West but a economic development. Indeed, the Marxist such as steel was a prerequisite of the mc the other hand, they were more inclined substitution ventures as projects of marg
The Left leadership also followed trac less value in their development strategy L their interest in the field was keel enough land reform. To the Left leadership land re

VIJAYA SAMARAWEERA
(V
cleavage between the Marxist Left and the JNP aimed at building up the infra-structure that this would stimulate investment by the 2 lip service was paid to greater state interime for example held that basic industries iction of the 'necessities of life' should be idership was rather inhibited by the poor ate factories and generally proved reluctant to place greater trust on the expansion of to abate seasonal unemployment in rural n ventures. Moreover, in the context of a re busy trying to rebuild their war-shattered ning capital goods and foreign expertise.
ith in the development of the agricultural addy cultivation, a faith strengthened by the war II. The UNP food production strategy was to be increased by peasant colonization econdly, village expansion schemes were to existing settlements. Finally an agricultural ter cultivation methods, better varieties of to the plantations a less active policy was ntations by nationals was encouraged but langes in the form of ownership. The use duties to siphon off some of the surplus
f
itical of these policies. Their ideology led of state intervention in the economy and a planning than was evidenced by the UNP
state monopoly of foreign trade and the ty services. The Left leadership also emphadustrialization spearheaded by government nly as a means of ridding the island of its lso as a necessary foundation of modern Left held that the development of industries odernization of the agricultural sector. On to scoff at cottage industries and import ginal value.
litional Marxist norms and gave relatively o agricultural development. Nevertheless, to deplore the UNP's lack of interest in -form and more effective agricultural credit

Page 33
LEADERSHIP PERSP
for the small holder were methods of ens social justice. The Marxists also propose state plantations.
The persistence of slow growth, a r. and worsening terms of trade in the twen very different persuasions re-examine their also limited the options available and i between the Right and the Left as to wh The UNP, for instance, acquiesed in sta trade. The Marxists meanwhile came to trialization was not feasible and acknowle minor labour intensive industries in the a scarcity of investment capital. A similar sphere of paddy cultivation. The UNP ha of the "Green revolution' of the 1960's h agro-industries. The Marxists too faced w caused by the unprecedented rise in the co came to accept agriculture as one secto with relatively low requirements of foreign to the plantations the divergence of view Government of 1970 began a take-over c acres in extent. In October 1975 the san owned-estates with the support of all po
The acrimonious debate relating to ec sharply contrasted with the bipartisan sup is true that the UNP leadership which hac policies in the years before independence implications. Indeed, there was a minority the continuation of wartime food subsidi costs of education. Nevertheless there was welfare measures and a widespread convi able to pay for them.
Of all welfare services the least ques provision of free medical care. The success era had convinced most leaders that healtl education was viewed as a means of soci system which provided free tuition from th regarded by all sections of the leadership as of opportunity. The third major item in the on rice. The subsidy had originally been consumers in Sri Lanka so that they would Although the steadily rising price of rice a

CTIVES 1948-1975 27
ing both enhanced production and greater to nationalize estates and to run them as
ing population, increasing unemployment y five years that followed made leaders of views. The deteriorating economic situation many respects narrowed the differences it short term measures should be adopted. e control of basic industries and of foreign ealise that a speedy programme of induslged the value of cottage industries and of context of substantial unemployment and convergence of views may be seen in the ving come under the influence of the ideal ad begun to advocate the development of ith increasing foreign exchange difficulties st of food and petroleum in world markets r which has substantial growth-potential exchange for expansion. Even in relation 's became less apparent. The Centre Left if all individually owned estates over fifty he government nationalised all company litical parties including the U.N.P.
'onomic policies at independence could be ort received by social welfare measures. It had the experience of implementing such were more keenly aware of their financial in the party who had serious doubts about as and who anxiously watched the rising
general agreement on the desirability of tion that the country was and would be
ioned were perhaps those relating to the ful antimalaria campaign of the previous -care was a worthwhile investment. Since all mobility, the expansion of the school lowest classes to the University was also a desirable step towards a greater equality social welfare programme was the subsidy lesigned to ensure a stable low price for 1e protected from world-price fluctuations. broad made the subsidised rice ration an

Page 34
28 C. R. DE SILVA ANL
increasingly heavy burden on the Treasu publicly criticise the subsidy in the years ir it was an attempt to remove the rice sub Dudley Senanayake as Prime Minister iu
Twenty years later attitudes had chang came to realize that welfare measures and same scarce resources and that social We in fact draining the economic strength of welfare services were so obviously unpop to disguise cuts in welfare structures or a affluent groups and the less developed ar rest. Thus, in 1966, the UNP government the halved ration free of charge instead of Left rivals totally deprived income tax pay once more for all others. The emphasis o of preventive medicine reflects an attempt t at a lower cost. Similarly the enforcemen to institutions of higher education could students in educationally backward areas a extra expenditure in those areas less urge to the Universities have been virtually fro: cation reduced from 13 to 11 years.
Both Centre-Left Coalition and the U retrenchments by the other side to their e evidence of a fundamental divergence of question.
In a plural society it was perhaps in for privilege and position among differen ment of independence. Yet perhaps because and their common educational and clas various communities in Sri Lanka foresa to arise in the first two decades after 194 themselves on avoiding the communal s of power in the neighbouring sub-conti
The relation between the two major the Tamils-illustrates this adequately. D lighted eras of conflict and the more rec times neither group envisaged a deterio island. The UNP it is true made a sharp the north and east of the island who hac recent Indian Tamil immigrants who hac

VIJAYA SAMARAVEERA
y, no political leader was bold enough to
mediately following independence. Indeed
idy that directly led to the resignation of
1953.
ed sharply. Most sections of the leadership development investment competed for the fare, however desirable it might seem, was he country. The problem was that cuts in ular. The leadership therefore, either tried rranged them in such a way that the least as would not be as badly affected as the reduced the rice ration by half but gave at a subsidised price. In 1973 their Centre ers of free rice while halving the free ration n the development of rural hospitals and o provide a more complete health coverage t of a "district quota' system of admission well be viewed as an attempt to provide in advantage over the others, thus rendering nt. Since 1964 the annual total admission zen and the duration of pre-university edu
NP are not above exploiting social welfare lectoral advantage but there appears little policy between the two groups on this
W
evitable that conflicts of and competition groups would intensify with the achieve: of the euphoria generated by independence
background, none of the leaders of the w the intensity of the conflicts that were ... Indeed most leaders were congratulating crife that had accompanied the transfer lent.
thno-linguistic groups-the Sinhalese and espite historical traditions that had highent competition for privileges in colonial 'ation of Sinhala-Tamil relations in the istinction between the "Ceylon Tamils' of settled there centuries ago and the more
arrived in the nineteenth and twentieth

Page 35
LEADERSHIP PERS
centuries to supply labour for plantation as fellow countrymen, they tended to reg who threatened to out-number the Sinha The Indian Tamil family connections w region and the remittance of money to Ir that the group had no abiding interest ir to remove their franchise as a first step a some 800,000 persons to India. It is possib in the 1948 election merely strengthene opposed this policy but failed to find in among the Sinhalese.
More significant, the majority of the the dis-franchisement measure with any long carefully distinguished themselves group. Their lead in educational attainm obtain a disproportionate share of post and to virtually dominate the key profes early cabinets had one or two of their 1 often rely on Tamil Permanent Secretati leadership, moreover, had some faith in t just a few years before independence ha and Tamil rather than Sinhalese alone wi The Indian Tamils were thus largely isola bereft of political rights since 1949, were and the forlorn hope of a change of hea
A change of heart did occur amon twenty-five years but not in the directi for. Sinhalese was declared the sole off Buddhism, the religion of the majority of in the Constitution of 1972. Most Sinha similar measures as justifiable in a land wi a clear majority of the population. Signifi opposed some of these measures at one ti by pressure from rank and file to change
The Ceylon Tamil leadership was m policy and not for emotional reasons a involved a sharp drop of employment op Tamils. The application of media-wise quota’ system of admissions to most in entry to the professions. The failure of autonomy at least for the Tamil majority a feeling of being discriminated against, among the highest reaches of the Tan

PECTIVES 1948-1975 29
is. While readily acknowledging the former ard the latter group as unwelcome intruders ese in some oftheir traditional homelands. ith South India, travel to and from that dia were adduced as reasons which proved the island. The UNP, therefore, proposed ind to finally repatriate the whole group of le that Indian support for Marxist candidates i their resolve. The Marxist Left strongly nuch support for their stand on this issue
Ceylon Tamil leadership too did not oppose great persistence or vigour. They had for from the more backward Indian Tamil ent under British rule had enabled them to s in the higher reaches of the bureaucracy sions of law, medicine and engineering. All "epresentatives and Sinhalese Ministers did es for advice on policy. The Ceylon Tamil he assuarance of the Sinhalese leaders who d decided in the Legislature that Sinhalese ould replace English as the State Language. ted and their leaders, guiding a community forced to fall back on trade union strength rt among the Sinhalese.
g the Sinhalese leadership during the next on that the Indian Tamil leadersip hoped icial language of the country in 1956 and the Sinhalese, was accorded a special place ese leaders came to defend these and other nere the Sinhalese and the Buddhists formed cantly although many of the Marxist leaders me or the other they were eventually forced
their positions.
ost incensed at the change in the language lone, for state policy relating to language portunities in the public sector for Ceylon standardization of rmarks' and a "district stitutes of higher education restricted their a sustained campaign for greater regional areas of the north and east combined with has encouraged seperatist tendencies even il leadership.

Page 36
30 x C. R. DE SILVA AND V
The Indian Tamils, having had few though no less bitter. Their campaign for p between the governments of India and Sri of the community would be repatriated to ship. The leadership was forced to accept th their concern had veered more towards t of the estate worker population had led employment. The takeover of some estat Sinhalese had threatened the livelihood of Numbers of Indian street dwellers began Indian Tamil leadership strongly felt that provision of several welfare facilities such a in Sinhalese majority areas they see no and seperatist schemes urged by the Cey
By and large it can be asserted that twenty-five years after independence, even quoted. Hostility between the Buddhists decreased after the state take-over of priva other hand Sinhalese-Tamil relations have sentiment has been kindled in the 1970's education during the regime of a Muslim N and Kandyan Sinhalese appear more fragil tion that competition among communal gr would remain for a long time to come.
CRITICAL A THE UNIVERSITY OF CEYL
VOLUME
“What is remarkable is not me) cerned set to work but also the uni whole. . .
The greatest achievement of this tion to historical writing on Sri Lank
Professor Kenneth Ballhatchet in

(JAYA SAMARAWEERA
}r hopes were perhaps less disappointed olitical rights was undermined by agreements Lanka which determined that a proportion India and the rest gradually granted citizene agreement in principle. By 1973, however, he economic sector. The natural increase o considerable unemployment and unders and their redistribution among landless an increasing proportion of Indian Tamils.
to appear in most highland towns. The heir community had been by-passed in the S state health and education services. Living
solution for their plight in the federal 'lon Tamils.
communal relations have worsened in the
though examples to the contrary can be
and the Roman Catholics for example te and missionary schools in 1961. On the appreciably worsened. Some anti-Muslim by charges of favouritism in the sphere of Minister and relations between low-country e than before. There is increasing recognioups for economic and political advantage
CCLAIM FOR
ON HISTORY OF CEYLON
THREE
cly the speed with which all confying assumptions which inform the
volume is. . . in setting a new direc
yy
. . . .
he South Asian Review.

Page 37
I
THE ROLE OF TH
VIJAYA SAM
The public service in Sri Lanka has b of literature in the recent past. Much of to an examination of the colonial roots oft arrangements. Less has been said of the rc process of the country-indeed, there has cracy placed within the context of the de' in power. The present essay is in no way ceived far less ambitiously, to survey briel considered if the role of the bureaucracy is to be properly evaluated.
The key question which has been deb bureaucracy could be effectively used to real people. If this question is asked from a rep unhesitatingly in the negative. Indeed, ti unsympathetic to the aspirations of innovation is widely held and the term bur
1. Of the many writings concerned with th to the following: R. N. Kearney, “C. R. Braibanti (ed.), Asian Bureaucratic S. dition: (Duke University Press, Durham Administration in Ceylon', in S. S. Hsued East Asia,(International Institute of Adm W. A. Wisva Warnapala, Civil Service Colombo 1974). For a discussion of the service see, V. Samaraweera, “The Adin de Silva (ed.), Sri Lanka, A Survey Affairs, Hamburg). forthcoming.
2. A recent report on Sri Lanka by a missic placed great emphasis on the role of th mental goals. See, Matching Employm ramme of Action for Ceylon, Report, ch. 10. The role of the bureaucracy in rather perfunctorily in C. R. Hensma (Colombo: Community Institute Pamphl The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), (Cori discusses in some detail the place of th island.
3. The present essay draws heavily on the of interviews with administrative offic remain anonymous.

V
E BUREAUCRACY
ARAWEERA
een the focal point of a considerable body this literature, however, has been devoted he service and to an analysis of its structural le of the bureaucracy in the socio-political yet to be a full length study of the bureauvelopmental goals sought by governments intended to fill this void; it has been conly the principal factors which need to be in the socio-political process of Sri Lanka
ated for long in the island is whether the ise the aspirations of a politically awakened resentative politician, the answer would be he view that the bureaucracy is innately the people and utterly incapable of eaucracy used in this context has acquired
ese aspects, particular reference could be made bylon: The Contemporary Bureaucracy', in vstems Emergent from the British Imperial TraN. C. 1960), pp. 485-549; A. J. Wilson, “Public (ed.) Public Administration in South and South nistrative Sciences, Brussels 1962), pp. 199-240; Administration in Ceylon, (Government Press, 2 more recent changes introduced in the public ministration and the Judicial System”, in K. M.
(London, C. Hurst, for Institute of Asian
in organised by the International Labour Office 3 bureaucracy in the achievement of developent Opportunities and Expectations: A ProgInternational Labour Office, Geneva 1971), !he socio-political process has been examined h (ed.), The Public Service and the People, sts no 3, 1963), and R. N. Kearney, in his recent ell University Press, Ithaca & London 1973), : bureaucracy in the political process of the
material collected by the writer on the basis als but for obvious reasons the Sources will

Page 38
32 VIJAYA SAM
a derogatory meaning. In the years imm this was placed on the nature of the struct which the nation inherited: an institution 'colonial functions” of maintaining orde insensitive to the changing needs of the adı development and social welfare. Whateve factor to note is that it generated a mo rationale for re-structuring of the bureauc sion of inquiry put it, there was "the need of its so-called colonial attitudes and to 1 effect to the will of the people through the of bureaucratic reform were undertaken a abolition of the Civil Service and the esta Administrative Service and the ending of of the village administration to the central of the bureaucracy were not abated and the people or not continued. Why?
The structural changes brought abol creation of a broad-based unified admi applauded. Care was taken, so it was an and unsatisfactory features of the old Ci service but evidence accumulated since sure, the elite cadre is now recruited fro background which is certainly more repres a rump of the old Civil Service might ren characterised, as it was once, as the "last b swabasha-educated now dominate the servi still a lamentable lack of commitment to thi and in fact the inevitable question has bec an institution possesses inherent qualities fashion so that they become alienated from is no doubt that "Red-tapism' and centralis cracy, preventing it from innovating and d Much more important is the contention by the norms of the abolished Civil Servic to the needs of contemporary times. Thus reliance placed on the administrative ge: position still held by examinations in th
4. See, the speeches at successive parliamer as reported in the Parliamentary Debate become almost ritualistic occasions for
5: Report of the Salaries and Cadres Com
p. 10. *
6. Cf. H. Abhayavardhana, et al., The RC Institute Pamphlets, Colombo) : no. 2

ARAWEBERA
ediately after independence the blame for ure and the complexion of the bureaucracy built up during colonial times to perform r and collecting revenue was necessarily ministration, especially relating to economic 'r the validity of this view, the important vement towards reform and provided the racy: as a government appointed commisto reorganise the Public Service, to rid it make it a dynamic organization for giving ; elected representatives'. Several measures nd among them were crucial steps like the blishment of the Ceylon (later Sri Lanka) the Headmen System and the assimilation administrative structure, but the criticisms the debate whether the bureaucracy serves
ut in the public service in 1963 with the histrative service were almost universally nounced at that time, that the obnoxious vil Service were not duplicated in the new then casts doubts about it. To be m a much broader social background, a entative of the wider society in the island; lain but the higher bureaucracy cannot be astion of the English educated elite. The ce but to a great many observers there is cause of the public within the bureaucracy in posed as to whether the bureaucracy as which moulds the recruits in a particular the public they are required to serve. There ed control continues to inhibit the bureauealing in a flexible manner with the public. hat the new bureaucracy is still governed , norms which are insensitive and inimical
to take but two examples, the continued eralist in the service and the prominent recruitment of officials have been often
tary debates on the annual Appropriation Bills (Hansard) volumes. The budget debates have political attacks on the bureaucracy.
mission, 1958-61, Sessional Paper III of 1961,
* Western Educated Elite, (Community

Page 39
THE ROLE OF THE
o A
decried... Equally importantly, the new adı with the effects of what could be describe was so structured that there would be mobil recruitment, from among young universit. was made for the absorption of personnel that this would pave the way for an integra public service, while eliminating a primary not belc ng to the Civil Service. But, a situa the direct recruits and others emerged with now accused of assuming the elitist posture personnel. -
The basic problem seems to lie in the minds of the public as well as amiying the bureaucracy should play in the administrat people or of the government, assuming of c the government (defined here as a group coincide? This is more than a merely rhet the bureaucrat exists cannot be doubted. As is at different times looked upon by the p
“(a) a perverse God who must be pri (b) a recalcitrant ass that must be di (c) a privileged snob, impossible to (d) a lazy hound, impossible to brin (e) (occasionally) a hardwerked, un best under difficult circumstances
It is arguable that the bureaucrat in Sri he never functioned in 'cold anonymity'. Th servants. The role they were required to pla capital not only by the very nature of the sti even by the people whom they were ruling, the national politicians increasingly assumin were made to curb the powers which the ci to the status of more regular administrators that the old image lingered on among the
7. The division between the direct recruits : membership of the two principle trade un Administrative Service. The Sri Lanka Ad by the direct recruits and is acknowledged and the Sri Lanka Administrative Servic membership and has been agitating cause:
8. Annon., 'The Public Servant : A Self-Pol The Public Service and the People, pp. 38-4
9. See the revealing memoir, Leonard Woo 1904-1914. (Hogarth Press, London) : 1
15441-4

BUREAUCRACY 33
ministrative service seems to be afflicted i as a split-personality. The new service ity within the whole public service-direct graduates, was retained but provision from the lower rungs-and it was hoped tion of the lower and higher strata of the :ause of discontent among those who did irn soon arose where a division between in he service and the direct recruits are which once characterised the Civil Service
fact that there is still confusion in the bu'eaucrats as to what precise role the is vn. Is hic bureaucrat a “servant” of the ourse that the interests of the people and wielding state power) do mot invariably orical question. That multiple images of one Public Servant wrote, a bureaucrat ublic as:
pitiated
riven get the better of g to book, and
derpaid and harassed official doing his
8
Lanka was always a highlyarble figure; is was certainly true of the colonial civil y, especially at the centres away from the ucture of the administration but perhaps was that of a "benevolent despot'. With g control of the administration, attempts vil servants wielded and transform them but there is sufficient evidence to conclude people, not only during the late colonial ,
und others is mostevident in the respective ions formed by the members of the Sri Lanka ministrative Service Association is dominated to represent the interests of the direct recruits Union draws heavily on the others for its which favour this group.
trait and a Self-Criticismo, in Hensman (ed.), 8. This is indeed a most revealing essay.
f, Growing: An Autobiography of the Years 961.

Page 40
34 VJAYA SA
times but also after independence. It is 1 conflicted with and ran counter to the d without the bureaucracy. For one, with the the work of the bureaucrats expanded a subjects. This and structural changes bro the complexity which arose with the se centralised departments which radiated f distance between the bureaucrat and the p between them developed. This was perhaps officials took over from the purely manage officials introduced a new dimension into the public, for problems and tension cro technical man. Of equal importance in t growth of trade unionism in tine public s and pliant 'servant' of the public and the ge relating either to his career or his politi endeavoured to advance in a determined
The bureaucrats have been often ac public service, as a number of studies have tional value in thc island' but over the las of the activities of the state and the notice greater demands have been made for opi the only realistic avenue of employment o pool. The recruitment of either ill-equip place, hardly the type of persons, it coul of vocation; and, as an official commi true), "there is no special incentive to ot effort under the present conditions (and) i is neither enterprising nor dynamic in th
10. Here the case of much revered H. R. Fr in the State Council after his retirement For the post independent period see, V Administration in Ceylon', in Hensman ( See also the two novels by Leel Guna sakayo, Maharagama: 1961), and A Maharagama: 1963), which deal with t the peasants towards the bureaucracy. at the time he wrote these novels. 1. See, Bradman Weerakoon, "Role of the
Agrarian Situation: A District Point no. 7, mimeographed paper, pp. 2-4 Expectations, pp. 158-9. 12. See, R. H. Kearney, Trade Unions an
Press Los Angeles), 1971. 13. See for example, B. Ryan, "Status, Ach Asian Studies, XX (1961), 463-66, an Employment and Expectations: A Prog (International Labour Office, Geneva) 14. Report of the Committee on Adminis p. 17, quoted in Kearney, The Politics

MARAWE ERA
o surprise that in time to come this image evelopments which took place within and government entering new areas of activity, pace and encompassed hitherto untouched ight about at the district level, in particular tting up of numerous agencies of highly rom the capital, tended to place a greater ublic and a sharply impersonal relationship more so in areas where specialised technical rial officer and in fact entry of the technical the relations between the bureaucrats and oped up between the administrator and the he changing nature of the relationship is the ervice: the bureaucrat is no longer a silent overnment; he has his own distinct interests. cal convictions, and these interests he has | fashion.
cused of lack of a sense of occasion. The shown, has always held a very high occupait decade and half or so, with the expansion able contraction of the private sector, even bortunities in the administration as almost pen to the rapidly growing national labour ped or over-qualified personnel has taken ld be argued, who would develop a sense ttee reported in 1966 (and this still holds he in the Public Service to make a special t is hardly surprising that the public service is context'. Moreover, until recently, by
'eeman who for long represented Anuradhapura as the Government Agent there could be cited. . A. J. Senaratinc, “Some Aspects of Provincial ed.), The Public Service and the People, pp. 91-6. sekera, Pethsama (the Petition), (Saman Prakathsana (the Signature), (Saman Prakasakayo. he problems of the peasants and the attitudes of Gunasekera was a member of the Civil Service
2 Administrators in the Context of a Changing of View', Ceylon Studies Seminar, 1973 series, and Matching Employment Opportunities and
di Politics in Ceylon, , (University of California
hievement and Education in Ceylon', Journal of
di “Attitudes of Undergraduates’, in Matching
gramme of Action for Ceylon, Technical Papers,
} : pp. 147-51.
strative Reforms, Sessional Paper IX of 1966,
of Ceylon, p. 77.

Page 41
THE ROLE OF TH
and large the administrative officials wer a knowledge of new management tools.
extent with the establishment in 1966 of by the government. But, it is doubtful perhaps too sophisticated) tools in adm bureaucrat, one who is deeply committ despite efforts on the part of some heads o to prevent disruption of operations; inc action has been taken as yet, that regula has helped to produce that classic figure Moreover, there is still a lack of awarene of the bureaucrats of the purpose and ac This is indeed a formidable problem and
The public service has been described of the island but its performance, by equalled that of the less modern sectors. agent in administration: no personality co who made a crucial breakthrough in the Equally, as it has been often pointed out, has died; the occasional novelist there m the study of the islands' history and soci recent past. The bureaucracy has been two decades-it is interesting to note the fiction writing with the "alienated' bure hardly an exaggeration to say that it is i are from politicians (it is noteworthy tha from a bureaucratic background); the ref serves only to embitter the public servic there and perhaps are to a certain exten bureaucracy has totally failed. The Sal: which made perhaps the most exhaustive that it cannot be 'said to have failed the pe played during traumatic events like the co: tion amply demonastrated (in the latter its value.
5. For the work of this institution sce, Th Administrative Training Division, Ge 16. Kearney, "Ceylon: The Contemporary
cratic Systems, p. 503. 17. On Brayne see, V. K. Samaraweera, "La
in K. M. de Silva (ed.), University of 1973) pp. 450-1. 18. See, for example, Gunadasa Amarase Printers, Gampaha, 1964) and Henr Dehiwela, 1964). 19. Sessional Paper III of 1961, p. 11. 20. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 76.

E BUREAUCRACY 3S
e not provided opportunities of acquiring This has been remedied to a considerable the Academy of Administrative Studies whether a mere knowledge of new (and nistration would turn out a new type of ed. For one, transferability still persists, f departments to retain experienced officials reasingly it has been realised, though O r transfer of officials between departments , Jack of all trades and master of none. ss and understanding among the generality |ivities of particular governments in power.
deserves separate examination.
as the most modern (or westernized) sector all accounts, has in no way matched or It has failed to function as an innovating mparable to, say, C. V. Brayne, the official land policy in the 1930s", has emerged. the old civil service tradition of scholarship Light be but no substantial contribution to ety has come from the public service in the subjected to heavy criticism over the last 2mergence of a whole new genre of Sinhala aucrat as the central theme- and it is in a beleagured state. The strongest attacks t in Sri Lanka fewer politicians have come beated warnings that ill-considered criticism have not been heeded. The criticisms are t justifiable but it cannot be said that the tries and Cadres Commission of 1958-61. study of the public service yet, commented ople it serves' and the role the bureaucracy mmunal riots of 1958 and thc 1971 insurreccase to some who were strongly sceptical)
Academy of Administrative Studies (Colombo: heral Treasury, n.d.) Bureaucracy', in Braibanti (ed.), Asian Bureau
ld Policy and Peasant Colonization, 1914-1948, Ceylon, History of Ceylon, Vol. III (Colombo,
kera’s novel, Gandhabba Apadanaya (Sarasavi y Jayasena's play, Janelaya (window), (n.p.,
See also below, note 31,

Page 42
36 - VJAYA SA
It is quite evident that the bureaucracy ting role some observers felt it should play change. A senior bureaucrat wrote recen calalytic function is being performed more the administrators work consists largely ir new, of smoothing over the transition an some kind of equilibrium'. This is an ir other bureaucrats would subscribe and cer accept it. In fact, what has occurred is to the background in favour of the the bureaucracy by the politicians, tr Lanka. The public service, so the m intended, should be insulated from p adopted, the setting up of an autonomc with the recruitment and control of the p checking overt interference in the public s complained of the burden' of 'extraneou reduced to a mere "rubber stamp' of the wis Service Commission was abolished by the hardly bemoaned-and a much more reali of ministers being vested with the authorit, of the public servants,
The argument that the bureaucracy is bascd primarily on the strongly held view implacable oppositicil to those who wield general principle from a neo-Maxian stan servants, so it is argued-it has also assu) widely held that in the immediate post inc United National Party formed the gove masters were "connected not only in mann when another government came into powe) xion, it had to face the hostility of the bu dismissed but it is worth noting that the re the bureaucracy were far from smooth all established that in the case of every govern
21. Weerakoon, “The Role of the Administr Situation', Ceylon Studies Seminar, 1973 22. Annual Report of the Public Service Co p. I 1. It is worth recalling here that t Donoughmore Constitution encouraged trators by the legislators. See, Wisva Wai 23. S. D. Saparamadu, introduction to Le Ceylon Historical Journal, IX (1959/60) and the people, p. 65. 24. Interview with M. Rajendra by C. R. de de Silva for allowing me the use of thi

ARAWERERA
neither relished nor cared for the innovaand it does not now act as a catalyst of ly that "in the modern situation. ... the and more by political authorities and that the functions of linking the old with the in a general sense keeping the system in age to which perhaps a large number of ainly the politicians would unreaservedly not only the retreat of the bureaucrat politician but also a domination of end always seen in independent Sri akers of the island's first constitution olitical interference. The device they us Public Service Commission charged ublic servants, never really succeeded in ervice-as early as 1950 the Commission s influences'-' and in fact it was soon hes of the politicians in power. The Public 1972 constitution-its passing away was stic position now exists with the cabinet y for recruitment and disciplinary control
should be subjected to political control that the bureaucracy inherently generates State power. Whild this view is stated as a dpoint-there cannot be "neutral' public med a particular perspective. It has been lependence period, in the years when the rnment, bureaucrats and their political r and ideals but also in kinship' and that in 1956 with a different political complereaucracy. This view cannot be entirely ations between the UNP government and he time. On the other hand, it could be ment which has been formed in the island,
ation in the Context of a Changing Agrarian series, no 7, pp. 1-2. mmission 1950, Sessional Paper XVI of 1951, ne pre-independent administration under the irect interference in the work of the adminisnapala, Civil Service Administration, pp. 75ff. nard Woolf, "Diaries in Ceylon, 1908-1911, p. xxii; Hensman (ed.), The Public Service
Silva, 6 May 1974. I am grateful to Dr. C. R.
material.

Page 43
THE ROLE OF TH
there has been a significant group of off who had close kinship and other social tie; it is perhaps more realistic to look at this rather than as an actual state of affairs v
All major political parties in the isla be subjected to direct political control, t The more extreme position, taken by the is that the higher bureaucracy, at least thos positions, should display a positive comm Some extent the problem of functioning thr by this government by bringing in outsic with decidedly clear commitments to the public service has proceeded unabated du to which it has taken place could be perl recent developments. Firstly, there is the (government) parliamentary members-des -in matters relating to appointment, tr. of public servants. It is relevant to note exercise of the authority of the cabinet in excluded from the purview of courts of la now rests was perhaps best Summed up b. is the right to (determine) promotion and p it is not the Permanent Secretary who det . . . . (These decisions) tend to lie in the there'. Secondly, there is the appointment each of the twenty-two administrative distr. controland direction to the administrative v Authorities are chosen and appointed by th ment) parliamentary members who (gener administrative district.
The politicisation of the public serv discontent. With considerable justificatio yet to see a government in power with a clear set of policy-goals. Many of the g coalitions of political parties with differi lot of the bureaucrat has been difficult ind is taken into consideration, it could be s There are often clashes between the Politi members of the district, and in such ca. ill-afford to antagonise any member of p
25. See, Janice Jiggins, Family and Caste
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1973, Unive 26. Section 106 (6) of The Constitution of S
Sri Lanka, 1972. 27. Quoted in Kearney, The Politics of Cey 28. See, Sun, 4 March 1974, for one repor

BUREAUCRACY 37
rials belonging to the higher bureaucracy with the politicians in control. Therefore, asoning as a rationale for political control hich prevailed.
d now accept that the bureaucracy should lough they differ on the degree desirable. Jnited Front Government formed in 1970, : officials who are in influential and sensitive tment to the policy-goals desired by it. To ough unsympathetic officials was overcome e personnel or promoting junior officials key positions. The politicisation of the ring the last decade or so and the extent laps measured by the examination of two institutionalised acceptance of letters of cribed by some as 'uhe political certificate' ansfer, dismissal and disciplinary control ; here that under the 1972 constitution, relation to the public service is specifically w.6 Where the fortunes of the bureaucrats y a public servant: "Power lies where there reference. In our system of administration, ermines promotions and other preferences. political sector and naturally power lies since late 1973 of Political Authorities in icts in the island to give immediate political work carried on within them. These Political Le Prime Minister from among the (governally) have constituencies in the particular
ice has obviously generated tension and it could be argued that the island has cohesive ideology or well constructed and overnments in the recent past have been ng ideologies and within this context the ed. If the role of the Political Authorities nown that similar problems have arisen. 'al Authority and the other parliamentary es the plight of the bureaucrat, who can rliament, is unenviable. It is also worth
in the Politics of the Sinhalese, 1947-1971 rsity of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya). ri Lanka (Ceylon), Colombo: Government of
on, p. 80. ed instance of a clash.

Page 44
38 VJAYA SAM
examining, what changes have taken place developments. Quite obviously the politic would be a primary determinant at every the Secretaries of the Ministries (prior to 1 on their relationship with their ministers; could become powerful figures in the de have been cited where, despite the politicisa virtually run the ministries because of some ministers. Situation could still arisc. could pursue their own personal or partic taken by the government in general. At th at the district level of the Government Ager are there of Government Agents completely tion to the Political Authorities as well as powers they were originally entrusted wit Agents have been subjected to additional institutions and other regional interests, u trative structure, could be quoted as exar who, it was asserted in the past, escaped political interference in their work in rec pressures upon them, it is no surprise that making either fight shy of the responsibil consensus, which means weak or unworka and clear-cut decisions.
With the politicisation of the publi political observers have begun to speak 'MP's Raj' in the island. The politicisatic position in more than one sense. The occ public sector carried stemmed from, apa which it provided but this factor no longer and increasingly so in the recent years, the higher echelons of the administratioi whom the new wielders of state power cou appointment to a high office by one gov been at times considered an adequate re officials. The present Minister of Public mistakes made in this fashion but it is would take place. In fact, the evidence
29. Permanent Secretaries, as administrati of favouritism towards either their fel were made in parliament in 1962 that t Defence and External Affairs favoured See, R. N. Kearney and R. L. Harris, "B of Commonwealth Political Studies, 30. See, The Tribune, 27 Oct. 1973, edito 31. See, the Minister's tribute to the perform ment Agents who had been transferre was formed, in House of Representativ cols. 582-3.

ARAWEERA
in the decision-making process with these 'al picture which prevails in the country level of decision-making. The position of 972, Permanent Secretaries) would depend those who relish exploiting opportunities !cision-making process-indeed examples tion which has taken place, the Secretaries the relinquishment of their powers by , as it occurred earlier, where Secretaries ularistic interests regardless of the stance e next important level of decision-making, ts, much the same could be said. Examples surrendering their initiative in administra
of those who have retained much of the h. Unlike at the centre, the Government forms of pressure. The local government neasily articulated to the central adminismples. Reportedly even technical officials, political presures, have been subjected to cent years. With diverse and conflicting officials entrusted with powers of decisionlity or work towards the achievement of ble compromises, rather than taking firm
C service increasingly taking place some ominously of the creation of a veritable n has placed the bureaucrat in a vulnerable :upational value which employment in the rt from other factors, the relative security seems to be relevant. Over the last dedade, with every change of government those in have been replaced with personnel upon ld place confidence and trust. Indeed, mere rnment, though based only on merit, has ason to refrain from reposing trust upon Administration has publicly acknowledged doubtful whether a reversal of this trend seem to indicate that this trend would be
fe heads of ministries, have often been accused low caste or family members. Thus, allegation he then Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of members of his karava caste within his ministry. ureaucracy and Environment in Ceylon, Journal I (1963-64), 260.
tial. ܗ lance during the 1971 insurgency of two Governon "punishment' after the U. F. Government is, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 94 (1971/2),

Page 45
THE ROLE OF THE
strengthened and that Sri Lanka would er by moving away from the British traditio service, at least in the case of the higher a
The public service has been politicisco also had to function at the same time wi described as pressures from the old order p are ethnic, caste and kinship pressures. T most explosive and disruptive of the influe subjected. It was popularly held by the Sir the public service was dominated at indep late 1950s saw a distinct bias against thes promotion of public servants. The resister in the administration by the Tamils gener that the Sinhalese-Buddhists dominate the seem to have been entirely erased. The min have in the recent years made repeated all service and it cannot be said that these Sinhalese politicians, are without foundatio traditionally depend largely upon governn has had considerable implications on the on the political plane.
That there are kinship and caste pr widely acknowledged.88 Kinship and cast of mobilising channels of advancement whi There is sufficient evidence to indicate, for 6 to a less priviledged caste reaches a positior he is required to play the role of the pat for mobility. Caste has also acted in a n arouses. Thus, a parliamentary member, S caste faced, declared that "the feeling am will not get any public office, that they art appointments of even police constables'. in the matter of recruitment and promoti difficult to document each such instance. I tend to eclipse political pressures, for ind find opportunities in the public service be pervasive role in the society in Sri Lanl
It has been often announced by nati universalistic criteria govern the composi an assertion which deserves little creden would mirror the values dominant in the
32. See, A Memorandum on Discrimination
Jurists by the Tamil United Front of Ceyl
33. See, the recent study by Janice Jiggins, F
1947-1971.
34. Quoted in Kearney, "Ceylon: The C
Asian Burea scratic Systems, p. 505.

BUREAUCRACY 39
irely adopt the American 'spoils' system of a completely professionalised public pointments.
, a relatively new development, but it has hin a framework in which what could be }rsisted. Of these of particular significance he ethnic pressure has been perhaps the nces to which the public service has been halese-Buddhist majority community that indence by Tamils and Christians and the : groups in the matter of recruitment and ce to the switch-over to Sinhala language ited further hostility. There is little doubt public service now but prejudice does not ority social groups, especially the Tamils', :gations of bias against them in the public allegations, though simply dismissed by n. Moreover, given the fact that the Tamils ment employment for their livelihood, this I relations between the two social groups
essures operating in the public service is * afiliations are looked upon as the means are the chosen medium is the public service. xample, that where an individual belonging of power and influence in the bureaucracy, ron, creating and enhancing opportunities 2gative way, by the prejudices and bias it peaking of the discrimination a particular ong the poeple of that caste (is) that they not being trcated equally in a matter like 8 Family ties have always been important on of public servants, though it would be has been even argued that family loyalties viduals with opposing political sympathies :ause family "obligation' plays a peculiarly
а.
onal leaders, with considerable pride, that ion of the public service, but clearly this is ‘e. It was inevitable that the bureaucracy socio-political process in the island.
Submitted to The International Commission of n, Jaffna: St. Joseph's Catholic Press, 1973. mily and Caste in the Politics of the Sinhalese,
(temporary Bureaucracy, in Braibanti (ed.),

Page 46
v
THE FUTURE OF
GOVER
A. JEYARATN
General Questions
After more than twenty five years of conflict-ridden plural society challenged forces, the question as to Parliament's app way, it will not be out of place to ask wheth
The answer to these questions lies ir intended for. Did those who agitated for i wish it to be a genus of its own transform model? Part of the anwser lies in the fa unable to provide a local alternative spr Whilst in the neighbouring subcontinent may sing the virtues of village governmen a nationalist effort in Sri Lanka to adapt th the ganisabha, into an effective instrumer words Parliament in the Ceylonese setting which is responsible a cabinet of ministers Elections to this legislative body take place that places a premium on area, Sparse pop vatism. We have deliberately preferred th or any other form. Therein lie clues to th
It is questionable whether the prere parliamentary government exist.
An elastic aconomy that can absorbs the liberal system of social welfare that ha
1. For an instructive essay on the subject, si Village Court' in The Ceylon Journal of pp. 138-154.
Sections 40 to 44 of the 1947 Constitutio) Sections 76 to 81 of the Republican Cor.
4.
2

PARLIAMENTARY NMENT
IAM WILSON
its working in our stagnant economy and rom many sides by extra-parliamentary ropriateness is most relevant. Put another her Parliament has in fact been a failure.
our inquiry into what Parliament was t seek to imitate Westminster or did they ed into a Ceylonese version of the foreign ct that the opponents of Parliament are ung from the genius of our own people. sayaparakash Narayan and those like him t (panchayati raj), there is no evidence of e historical council of village adjudication, ut of contemporary government. In other g is just another term for a legislature to under the leadership of the Prime Minister. : within a system of electoral demarcation ulation and therefore ruralism and conserle cabinet system to the presidential type e answer to our question.
uisites for the successful functioning of
cial discontent is not available. Although s been built into the system is so onerous
2e R. K. W. Goonesekera, “The Eclipse of the Historical and Social Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2,
h. These have been more or less reproduced in stitution of May 1972.
)

Page 47
THE FUTURE OF PARLIA
that governments find it increasingly bul that might otherwise have endangered th
The relative cultural homogeneity th Britain is absent. But the Sinhalese Buddh in limited ways the militancy and rigidity of extremists. This tolerance helps produce demands of minority groups. In this way, e from gaining the upper hand. But the fac consideration and does not in all situatic
Agreement on the fundamentals of th of such agreement that made the Unite 1947-1952 intolerant of the main oppositic parties, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (CP), and vice versa. With the rise of S. W Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) as the election of 1952, a measure of acquiescen Since then the SLFP and UNP and their res Marxists, have worked the state apparat commitment to constitutional governmen essential details of what are considered fin tion that tinese could be resolved within th forces no doubt seek to challenge the effi its validity. The most serious challenges coup d'etat by right wing officers in the ar and, in April 1971, from the Marxist Ja Liberation Front). But these very challen to correct administrative and social deficie Parliament. Following 1962 a far-reachin the police was effected. After April 197 left-centred United Front (UF) coalition a number of important land reforms. The as well from the Tamil Federal Party (F on occasion even from the UNP and the S ever helped to clear the air and have a within Parliament.
3. Until 1950, the LSSP was splintered inti later took the name, Bolshevik Sama Sa the two groups was healed and a merger
4. See Chapter 6, “Challenges to the Politic The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) ( H. A. I. Goonetileke, The April 1971 (July 1973) (Louvain, C.R.S.R., 1973)

ENTARY GOVERNMENT 41
lensome, it does help to cushion shocks 2 foundations of the state.
at preceded Parliamentary democracy in st ethos of tolerance does help overcome Sinhalese language and Sinhalese Buddhist an atmosphere for accommodating the (treme elements on both sides are inhibited of Buddhist tolerance is only a marginal ns act as a moderating factor.
e state is very necessary. It is the absence i National Party (UNP) governments of in which comprised the traditional Marxist (LSSP) and the pro-Soviet Communist /. R. D. Bandaranaike’s social democratic major oppositional force after the general. ze resulted between the two major parties. pective partners, inclusive of the traditional us on the understanding that there is a t. There are wide areas of conflict on the damentals but there lies always the assumpe existing framework. Extra-parliamentary cacy of Parliament and even to question came from the unsuccessful attempt at a med forces and the police in January 1962 nata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, People’s ges have in effect helped in various ways ncies that otherwise could have hindered g reorganisation of the armed forces and 1, Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike’s SLFP-led . government responded by putting through 're have been extra-parliamentary protests P), the Marxist-oriented trade unions and LFP when in opposition. These have howother times produced necessary changes
the Bolshevik Lenininist Party of India which maja Party, and itself. In 1950 the rift between occurred. Further splits followed this merger.
!al Order" (pp. 192-227) in Robert N. Kearney, thaca, Cornell University Press, 1973) and Insurrection in Ceylon: A Select Bibliography

Page 48
42 A. JEYARATIN
A predominantly two party or bi-po cxperienced and is willing to nominate a go ture is conducive to the proper functioni Ceylonese electorate had experience of nin to become increasingly literate with free between 70 to 80 per cent). Up to 1956, Sr dominance” pattern.* But signs of this ero the 1952 general election, when the SLFP c After the general election of 1956, with the c naike's SLFP-led coalition, the Mahajana United Front), what might be called a coa from March 1960, when the political scene S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the electors ha with elected governments with clear ma
The Imitation of Westminster
At independence, a conscious effort w Commons. Not only were British conventio but the privileges and practices of the Ho Constitution. Mr. Speaker until 1970 and e of his counterpart in Westminster and cont on British parliamentary procedure, Erskir for rulings and as guides to the work of th
5. For further information see Rajni Kothai
Survey, 4 (December 1964), pp. 161-73 Dissent: Their Inter-relations in the India1 1, (August 1966), pp. 451-466.
6. See my “Oppositional Politics in Ceylon
Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 54-69. For a detailed The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon ( Also his, "Sri Lanka's Electoral Experienc Affairs, Winter 1974-75, pp. 455-471.
7. For example Section 4 (2) of the 1947 Co. and functions vested in His Majesty or the visions of this Order and of any other law far as may be in accordance with the constit of similar powers, authorities and functions
8. For example Section 27 (1) of the 1947
immunities and powers' of Senators and should not "exceed those for the time bei of Parliament of the United Kingdom or o or less approximated to those of the Brit
9. After the general election of May 1970, M his party affiliations unlike his predecessor elected to the office. However Mr. Speak conduct of proceedings in the National S traditions of the British Speaker.

AM WILSON
lar system with an electorate which is vernment and not merely return a legislang of Parliament. During 1931-70, the 2 general elections, the electorate tending education (the literacy rate has ranged i Lanka seemed to follow the "one-party iing away were already evident following 'merged as a credible oppositional force. efeat of the UNP by S.W. R.D. BandaraEksath Peramuna (MEP, the People's itional two party system emerged. Apart ; was confused after he assassination of ve rejected incumbents and replaced them jorities.
as made to imitate the British House of ns incorporated in the 1947 Constitution? use of Commons were made part of the ven after o was more or less a can bon copy inues to rely on the accepted authorities c May and Gilbert Campion, as sources e House.
i, The Congress System in India, Asian and W. H. Morris-Jones, "Dominance and in Party System,' Government and Opposition,
(1967-1968)' in Government and Opposition,
overall analysis, see Calvin A. Woodward, Providence, Brown University Press, 1969). se: From Personal to Party Politics,' Pacific
Institution stated that "all powers, authorities 2. Governor-General shall, subject to the proy for the time being in force, be exercised as utional conventions applicable to the exercise in the United Kingdom by His Majesty....'
Constitution in referring to the "privileges, Members of Parliament specified that there ng held or enjoyed by the Common House f its Members'. In actual practice they more ish House of Commons.
(r. Speaker declared that he would maintain s who renounced them as soon as they were er continues to maintain impartiality in the tate Assembly in accordance with the best

Page 49
THE FUTURE OF PARLIAM
Even after the “revolution of 1956' 1 quote from Dicey, Anson, Berriedale Ke S. A. de Smith to sustain opposing posit
Till 1956, and even for some years a in the House was English.
What was more the physical arrang circular under the earlier constitution were of Commons with Government and Opp The objective of course was to encourage a
Until its abolition in 1971 the Senat style, generally inactive when the conserv social democratic SLFP ruled. When it tenc of Mrs. Bandaranaike's SLFP-led UF ir However there was never any agreement at the time of independence. The island's This was clearly evidenced in the debates for a constitution providing for full respor for a Constitution that the Board of Min of the strikingly British impositions brol
The Republican Constitution of May of Westminster, although there are, of power is concentrated in the unicamer however, power emanates from the Prime same kind of cabinet dictatorship that R now by implication and otherwise con situation. The National State Assembly si House of Commons and its mambers h MP rather than MNSA and are legally
10. See S. A. de Smith, The New Connoy
1964) pp. 77-105.
11. Sessional Paper XIV of 1944, also ref
Ministers.
12. See his How Britain is Governed (Lond of the Prime Minister (London, Allen
13. Section 37 (2) of the Republican Con
previous legislative body, the House the National State Assembly otherwis of Representatives followed very closely Section 38 (1) states that “the privil State Assembly and of its Members sha tatives' until the Assembly otherwi.
14. Note Section 29 of the Republican Co
State Assembly shall be designated

ENTARY GOVERNMENT 43
hembers on both sides of the House often ith, Jennings, Laski, Eugene Forsey and ions on consitutional controversies."
ter that, the principal language of debate
ements of the House which were semialtered so as to resemble the British House psition facing each other across the floor. confrontation of two great parties.
e played its role in true House of Lords tive UNP was in office and even when the led to become obstreperous after the victory 1970, it was legislated out of existence. on the question of a second chamber, even bolitical leaders did not want the insitution. in the State Council on the Sri Lanka Bill sible government, and in the Draft Scheme isters submitted to Whitehall. It was one ught via the Soulbury Constitution.
y 1972 is in its essentials once more a copy course, differences in detail. In theory all 'al National State Assembly. In practice, Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers. The amsay Muir alleged existed in Britain' is stitutionally enshrined in the Sri Lankan till adheres to the procedures of the British ave deliberately preferred the abbreviation referred to in this way.'
a wealth and its Constitutions (London, Stevens,
erred to as the Draft Scheme of the Board of
on, 1930). Also Humphrey Berkeley, The Power
and Unwin Ltd., 1968).
stitution states that the Standing Orders of the of Representatives, will continue in force until e provides. The Standing Orders of the House those of the British House of Commons. Further, eges, immunities and powers of the National ll be the same as those of the House of Represense provides.
institution states that “Members of the National Members of Parliament'.

Page 50
44 A. JEYARAT
Legislative Activity v
Parliament has been utilized by su legislative programme. Many of Parliame versial, a great deal beneficial, some pre numerous ways, Parliament successfully c for the expression of dissent and instilled and social groups.
Legislation especially in the econon undermine faith in Parliament. The natio) and insurance, the enactment of the paddy to a limited extent Tamil-as the languages the provision of numerous welfare services and on incomes have, in several ways, sati. wise have sought relief via a substitute 1
On the other hand the public security activity, disfranchising the resident India press have encumbered the exercise of der particular, has been a restricting influenc tims of emergency, is vested with an ex
However neither too much credit no Parliament. Most legislative activity eman liamentary majority has seldom tampered the margin, on issues concerning severe cuts ment parliamentary group rebacted ad
On the debit side
Parliament was not intended to be a So still notwithstanding the many political since independence. Efforts at reform in because the political parties (the tradition: Tamils) involved do not have enough wei, Lack of interest among the publicas well-t
unions and professional associations, soc and the intelligentsia in general.
Only recently, after 1970, has one in agitate for a reform in the system of represe But this has been mainly due to the several since 1956. That party, when defeated, obt lature despite the very large number of vo the very system of representation it had de opponents from effective political partici Constitution have retained the very same p. an advantage to the SLFP. Efforts by

NAM WILSON
:cessive goverriments to implement their It's legislative measures have been contromature and others overdue. However in ontained discontent, provided opportunities measure of confidence among the ethnic
Lic and social sectors muted attempts to Lalization of omnibustransport, the ports lands act, the adoption of Sinhalese - and of administration, the takeover of schools, , the ceilings on land and house ownership fied dis* ident sections which might othermodel or by violence.
act, and legislation restricting trade union 1 Tamil population and controlling the hocratic rights. The public security act, in e on Parliament in that the executive, in cess of power.
or excessive blame can be attached to ates from the cabinet. The cabinet's parwith the work of government. Only at on the welfare services, has the governversely.
true mirror of the nation and it remains and Social changes that have taken place his area have not been successful partly l Left and the principal ethnic group, the ht to compel attention. Partly, there is a he white and blue collar workers, the trade al institutions, the press, the unversities
ajor political party, the UNP, begun to ltation, even of parliamentary government. defeats it has suffered at general elections Lins a low percentage of seats in the legises it polls. Thus it is now forced to reject igned earlier in efforts to keep its Marxist ation. However the framers of thè 1972 )visions because these now seem to present le Trotskyist Minister of Constitutional

Page 51
THE FUTURE OF PARLIA
Affairs, Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, to correct was being framed were thwarted. Another tion of electorates was being contemplat. despite the presence of the traditional L SLFP combined to agree to limit the tot Assembly. An increase in seats based on
meant more urban constituencies-areas
This basis of representation distorts is that, following the disfranchisement of confers an excess of representation on the Lanka. The Kandyan Sinhalese districts st ment, although they are the least touched b The minority ethnic groups-the Ceylon to benefit no longer have an advantage. urban areas remain under-represented. A approximate to the principle of one ma
The traditional Left despised the sy Parliament only as a platform from whic the public. With the rise of the Bandara its stance to one of support for these socia could utilise the latte’s political organisa power-an exercise in which they have,
Thc principal ethnic group, the Ceylo despite the slight advantages it conferred Parliament because of their inability to 1 to extra-parliamentary forms of protes campaigns etc. An important section of Tamil Federal Party began to demand a p north and east linked to the rest of Sri La That organization has now changed its po to the general election of May 1970, the Ta divisions among Sinhalese political groupi After May 1970, and sepecially after thi of May 1972, they seem to have conclude their grievances.
15. For further details see my Electoral Po Election of May 1970 (Cambridge, at Electoral Framework'.
16. For example see Walter Schwarz, "Sri of his interview with the Tamil United Guardian, 8 March 1975.

(ENTARY GOVERNMENT 45
the imbalance when the 1972 Constitution Lttempt in late 1974 when a fresh demarcad proved just as futile. On this occasion, ft in the UF government, the UNP and al number of seats in the National State he distribution of population would have where the Left is usually stronger.
he political picture considerably. Its effect he Indian Tamil population in 1948-49, it
rural and sparsely populated parts of Sri and to gain most from the present arrange7 modernizing or radical political influences. and Indian Tamils-whom it was intended The low country Sinhalese as well as the is a result, there is not even an attempt to in one vote.
stem from 1947 to 1952 and looked on h to present its views and to reach out to naikes and their SLFP, the Left switched al democrats in the ultimate hope that they ation as a vehicle to arrive at the seats of
in part, succeeded.
W
in Tamils, jibbed at the system at the start, i on them. Increasing disillusionment with make themselves felt have made them turn t-satyagrahas, hartals, civil disobedience he Ceylon Tamils organizing through the rotected Tamil homeland in the contiguous nka under a federal system of government. sition and wants a separate Tamil state. Up mil Federalists tried to exploit parliamentary ngs for the advancement of their objectives. enactment of the Republican Constitution that Parliament cannot or will not redress
'itics in an Emergent State. The Ceylon General the University Press, 1975), Chapter 3, "The
Lanka Ripe for Explosion' containing the text Front leader, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam in The

Page 52
46 A. JEYARATI
For various reasons the low co overmuch against the excessive representa parts. The conservatives among them see i against socialist directions. Many of the lo for reform could result in the Tamils (Cey tageous position over the Sinhalese in ge) urgency among the low country Sinhalest the political and bureaucratic levels is still
The young in Sri Lanka consitutute ro eighteen year olds were enfranchised in 1 elections of 1965 and 1970. But they too rea felt at the centres of power. Neither the c for the representation of the youth elemer years of age. Parliamentary candidates put ceably belong to the youth category. governments to pay attention to their pri to the violence unleashed by the JVP insur evidence of a rejection of Parliament by a
Remedial Measures
From 1947 to 1956, Parliament was lai and the affluent. Despite the bias towards t of the traditional Marxists, LSSP, BLPI,(l election, there were neither "villagers nor v The UNP had their country squires and the men and the odd full-time man. This patter election right up tỏ that of May 1970. It is
17. Note G. Uswatte-Aratchi in his careful a Ceylon: Their Economic and Social B. Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (197 there is a major concentration of Low C Matara) have since independence (1948) political leaders and the permanent home that this stretch of country is “more w (p. 301). He further states that the Ceyl of high-level bureaucrats' (p. 301).
18. They are under nineteen years of age. F.
fourteen.
9. see my Electoral Politics in an Emergent S
20. See W. Howard Wriggins and C. H. S.
(Ceylon)' in W. Howard Wrigins and and the Future of South Asia, (New York, and Nazli Choucri, Population Dynamic D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), pp.
2. see W. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dil Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 10 of a Party System in Ceylon (Providenc

NAM WILSON
untry Sinhalese have not protested tion of their Kandyan Sinhalese countern the Kandyan Sinhalese a useful bastion w country Sinhalese fear that an agitation lon and Indian) obtaining a more advanheral. But more importantly, there is no : because they believe that leadership at vested in their hands.17
ughly 52 per cent of the population.lo The 60 and exercised the vote at the general lised their inability to make their presence abinet of 1965 nor that of 1970 provided t-most cabinet ministers beingover forty up by rival political parties did not notiFailure on the part of Parliament and oblems contributed in a measurable way ‘rection of April 1971--the first tangible in organized political movement.
gely the preserve of the English-educated he rural areas and the unexpected success ater BSP) and the CP at the 1947 general workers in the House of Representatives.' Marxists their intellectuals, professional n was repeated at every successive general rue that there has been some, but insigni
ld balanced study, “University Admissions in ackground and Employment Expectations', . 4), argues that four important districts where ountry Sinhalese (Kalutara, Galle, Colombo, "been the source of strength of the major of the senior bureaucracy' (p. 300). He adds esternized and politically more influential' In Tamil district of Jaffna is also "the home
rty per cent of the total population is under
ate, op. cit., Chapter 5, “The Candidates'.
Jayawardene, "Youth Protest in Sri Lanka fames F. Guyot (editors) Population, Politics Columbia University Press, 1973) pp. 318-350 s and International Violence (Massachusetts, 146-148, 172, 184.
inmas of a New Nation (Princeton, N. J. 4-149 and Calvin A. Woodward, The Growth ', Brown University Press, 1969).

Page 53
THE FUTURE oF PARLI:
ficant, dilution of the party parliamentary But by and large, both the UNP and the of country squires. And their urban pro The traditional Left and the Tamil parties tage of professional men in Parliament, h
Nor did legislation enacted in 1959, elections and to reduce the election exp. political parties help in any measurable w new political parties seeking entry for th This was indeed the declared intention. the UNP had enjoyed till that time, imp Marxist allies and reduced the reliance of groups which would otherwise have finance rewards and payments in various form
However the SLFP and the traditi were aware of the continuing exclusiven opening its membership in any meanin groupings. At first therefore the SLFP a or district councils as a way of bringing During 1965-68, the UNP too became com of both parties could not proceed to im because of its connotations of federalism feared that these councils would be the federal goals, often identified with sepat of the Tamil Federal Party.
In their 1968 Common Programme, a scheme for popular participation in go development councils, people's committee tees in state offices. These were establish SLFP, LSSP and CP in 1971. The Mar: press the government towards further soci of success either in this direction or even of daily government.
The institution of District Political A ber 1973 has introduced a measure of de this, the Prime Minister appoints as Dis but more often a deputy minister and at each of the island's twenty-two administ
22. For more details see Administration R for 69/70. (Colombo, Government Pri.

MENTARY GOVERNMENT 47
contingents with 'the men of the people." LFP continue to have a large component. fessionals indeed wield a larger influence. for their part have a much higher percenardly any farmers, peasants or workers.
1964 and 1970 designed to democratize 2nditure of parliamentary candidates and ay the poor candidate, the poor parties or e first time into the parliamentary arena. If anything, it minimized the advantages roved the prospects of the SLFP and its the SLFP on vested interests and pressure d them and exacted from their governments
LS.
onal Marxists, despite the many changes ess of Parliament and the difficulties of gful way to the lower income and social ivocated decentralised provincial, regional g the administration closer to the people. mitted to this principle. But the governments plement any proposals for decentralisation 1. Sinhalese pressure groups and interests first steps towards the achievement of the atism, of the Ceylon Tamils, particularly
the SLFP and its Marxist allies presented vernment to be effected through divisional s, employees' councils and advisory commit2d by the United Front government of the lists hoped that these could be utilised to alism. However there is little or no evidence of increased popular interest in the business
thorities by Prime Ministerial fiat in Octo‘entralisation at the political level. Under rict Political Authority, a cabinet minister times a senior government backbencher to ative districts. This Authority is responsible
port of the Government Agent, Badulla District ter, 1971).

Page 54
48 A. JEYARAT
for coordinating the activities and program disbursing funds for medium and small sizec and representations that the public make a and the local Member of Parliament as well of persuading the Political Authority in th take, defer or negate action on matters th can disorganise coordinated overall natio bend to parochial demands. This, it is saic Prime Minister's Coordinating Secretariat responsible. But the sum effect is 'direct district level'8 an unhealthy developme ways a rival to Parliament. Its protagonist that “the group associated with the Distric purposes at the district level is far more aspirations than any counterpart group in of Parliament'.2
Whilst these reforms have, to a limi that Parliament hitherto exercised on the also been made to bring the institution cl Parliament's proceedings broadcast was re administratively feasible proposition for th the other hand there has becn, since 1956 a a switchover to the national languages, Sin of debate and discussion. Its effect has b: copies of Hansard whenever important de
Suggested Changes
There are at least four identifiable s arises. The fifth, the Sri Lanka Freedom Pa by the enactment of the Republican Con S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike had earlier ciri a nostalgia for the executive committee for the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931-1 Opposition as well as their respective bac this dispensation. It was his view that the s
f
23. W. A. wiswa Warnapala, “Sri Lanka in 19
Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 156.
24. From an unpublished manuscript by B. S.
System in Transition: Some Reflections Lanka (Ceylon).
25. Address on “Democracy in Asian Count New Delhi on 4 December 1957 reproduct ment and the People: A Collection of Speec Honourable S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike (C especially, pp. 51-52. The Prime Minister we gave that up. I was personally again defects, but I thought they could be rer

NAM wiLSON
mes of government departments as well as developmental work. In this way demands t ministerial level in Colombo are reduced as local interests have greater opportunities Leir respective districts of the necessity to at concern them. However the institution nal development because it will have to l, can be remedied to some extent by the to which these Authorities are in theory (political) control over administration at nt. Nevertheless the institution is in some , a higher rung career civil servant argues t Political Authority for decision-making representative of the people and their Colombo with the exception, of course,
ted degree, encroached on the influence decision-making processes, attempts have oser to the people. The proposal to have jected on the score that this was not an he Ceylon Broadcasting Corporation. On ind to a more complete extent since 1960, halese and Tamil, as the principal media een to increase measurably the sales of bates take place in the legislature.
ources from which demand for reform rty, has presumably achieved its objective stitution of May 1972. Its late leader, ticised the cabinet system and expressed n of government that had prevailed under 47. He felt that both Government and k-benchers shared executive work under ystem de-emphasised party controversy.95
13 : A Test for both the Rulers and the Ruled',
Vijeweera entitled “A Colonial Administrative on Current Administrative Reforms in Sri
ies' to the Indian Council of World Affairs, d in Department of Information, The Governtes made by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, the olombo, Government Press, 1959) pp. 44-53 stated on that occasion that "unfortunately t giving that system up. There were certain edied within the system'.

Page 55
THE FUTURE OF PARLI.
On another occasion he advocated the Sw executive (the Federal Council) had a res the Donogh more Constitution. He was referendum on the gound that it 'not onl for the principle of democracy, but imple cracy".2 The Prime Minister, for variou the British form of government.
It is opan to question whether a revise oran adaptation of the Swiss type could ha growth that was needed at the time that seem more suited to stable societies wit of economic prosperity. Hence Bandara either in the Joint Select Committee of constitution or among the framers of th
The United National Party has voice of the new Constitution-in particular t the system of representation. That party type of government after the model oftl President will be elected directly by the 1 will ensure that the actual votes it polls at a authority. Its other suggestion is to int provincial level. Each of the island's nine tituency returning the number of represer basis of assigning seats in terms of area seats in actual proportion to the votes implement these proposals if it is succes
The traditional Left had earlier thou communist model, the LSSP being ena the CP was committed to the Soviet exa Parliament and the instrument of partic objectives. The Trotskyist Minister of Cc point a few months before the UF was ele must, if the UF was to implement its soci and not consensus.' The policy appear by Mrs. Gandhi's late communist cabin stated elsewhere, the Left had attempt system but failed.
26. see text of the memorandum submitte
to the Joint Select Committee of Parliai in particular, p. 77.
27. op. cit.
28. For further details see text of the Mini
in Ceylon Daily News, 14 December
29. see Satindra Singh, Communists in Co Publishing House, 1973) especially Ch: and Chapter 14, "Postscript', pp.
1544-5

MENTARY GOVERNMENT 49
ss type, perhaps because it collegial plural mblance to the Board of Ministers under lso in favour of combining this with the provides a broader and more stable base (ments more fully the very spirit of demos reasons, expressed strong opposition to
version of the Donoughmore Constitution ve accomplished the taskofrapideconomic this change was proposed. These systems small populations enjoying an optimum naike's proposal did not find acceptance Parliament appointed to revise the then : Republican Constitution of May 1972.
d strong objections to some of the features hose relating to the political executive and ppears to prefer now a presidential-cabinet he French Fifth Republic. A Gaullist style people. This is one way by which the UNP general clection are translated into political rodice proportional representation at the provinces will form a multi-member constatives which it is entitled to on the present and population. This would give the UNP it polls. The party will in all probability sful at the next general election.
ght in terms of a government based on the noured more by Yugoslav practices while nple. Now the trend appears to be to utilise patory democracy to achieve their socialist institutional Affairs articulated such a viewcted to office when he stated that Parliament list policies, be characterised "by leadership to parallel somewhat the thesis put forward t minister, Mohan Kumaramangalam. As di to effect changes in the representational
by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in January 1959 ent to Revise the Constitution, op.cit., pp. 73-77,
ter's address to the UF's Sociali st study Circle 1969.
gress: Kumaramangalam’s Thesis (Delhi, D. K. pter 13, "What are the Lessons for the Future' )-92.

Page 56
50 A. JEYARAT
The Tamils, both Ceylon and Indian, tituencies restructured so as to provide ther representation. They have not been succes section of Ceylon Tamils supported the Tai Tamil homeland in the north and east of C Repeated failure has now led this section sovereign state. Some observers raise the c verge of "nation-breaking'.
There are those who are weary of th and demand the overthrow of Parliamet Fernando states that the insurrectionist JV party within the parliamentary system". F. G. Bailey has called "a rival political "rejects the old political game and all the goes on to assert that "the elite model of pc by a counter-model'. He does not howe except to pose the view that the JVP will into Parliament. A reasonable assumption a Maoist-style political system. This howe what the traditional Marxists will want if
Conclusion
Ever since its inception observers hav could survive, given the contracting econo it to the local environment. The traditional "revolution round the corner”. There hav be tampered with at general elections, tha power as an excuse to cancel elections, Parliament or at the polls will not give up have experienced the imminence of militar insurrection.
However the attention of the public is to the parliamentary order by a vigilant C party press while the national press was a when various kinds of legislation were en and criticism that provided strength to th and disasters that it was exposed to.
Nevertheless the question arises as to There is continuing evidence of an excessiv arm of the state to suppress opposition an
30. “Elite Politics in the New States: The C . . . Affairs, Fall 1973, pp. 361-383.
31. Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Anthrop

NAM WLSON
would also want the demarcation of consnadequate if not additional parliamentary sful so far. On the other hand a sizeable mil Federal Party's demand for a protected eylon with a regional Parliament in Jaffna.
of Ceylon Tamils to ask for a separate Iuestion as to whether we are now on the
2 game of "parliamentary musical chairs' it and its elitist power structure. Tissa P does “not represent yet another political 30 He argues that they constitute what structure'81 which he (Fernando) insists subtle rules that go to support it. He litics has for the first time been challenged ver articulate what this counter-model is refuse to be "bourgeoisified' or be lured is that the JVP, if successful, will opt for ver is not likely to be very different from they themselves had the opportunity.
e raised the question whether Parliament (mic situation and the obstacles to adapting Left uttered cassandra-like warnings of a 'e always been fears that ballot boxes will ut unrest will be fomented by the party in and that governments suffering defeat in office. From time to time political leaders y dictatorship as well as confronted armed
constantly being focussed on these threats opposition. There is also an overly critical ctive and vigorous in its criticism till 1973 acted to control it. And it is this vigilance e system and helped it avoid the mishaps
whether the system can last any longer. e reliance on the military and semi-military ld public opinion. Growing unemployment
ase of Post-Independence Sri Lanka”, Pacific
pilogy of Politics (Toronto, 1969), pp. 15-16.

Page 57
THE FUTURE OF PARL
and economic hardship are exploited b failure to achieve national unity has brou The island is consequently in a permane will for some length of time have to be su. of foreign aid. The dangers of collapse expected calamity has not yet occurre
A shift to socialist directions, such cndeavours to effect, could contain socia by the uncertainties and limited amounts of having to face elections in the near fu the economic problem satisfactorily even it likely that a grand national coalition seriously mooted from time to time, wo could reduce the costs to the polity of
The shrinking westernized elite, in taxation and the difficulties of finding rev have either taken to migration or live of its memb3rs opportunistically adapt th crisis that they face makes them incap: orders and those aspiring to upward transmitter of western values. But the si
Parliamentis therefore likely to face it election. If the United National Party is r. within the democratic framework, by e from friendly powers-a task in which i of office, 1965-1970. If the present gover the way to use Parliament as a rubber cease to be the instrument of consensus
32. This article was written in early 1
occurred.

MENTARY GovERNMENT 51
political parties to stimulate unrest. The tenthusiastic support to separatist parties. ly contingent state of disequilibrium and ained by armed force and liberal injections began to be really felt from 1956 but the
as the present United Front government discontent for awhile. But it is hamstrung fforeign aid it receives and by the prospect re. It is doubtful whether it could handle if it were absolved from elections. Nor is which included the rival Opposition, as is ld improve matters substantially, though it excessive and divisive contention.
reasingly impoverished by the burdens of arding outlets for its talents and enterprise, n constant frustration. Alternatively many 2mselves to the changing political order. The ble of attracting to their ranks the lower ocial mobility. This elite still acts as the tuation will not last for long.
ts most serious crisis afte1 the next parliament 2turned, it will seek to improve the situation, ndeavouring to obtain economic assistance t was not entirely successful in its last term ment renews its mandate, it will go all along stamp for its policies.32That institution will that it has hitherto been.
75 before the split between the SLFP and LSSP

Page 58
V
SRI LANKA’S FOREIGN E CONTIN
A. JEYARATN
General Considerations
For a thorough examination of Sri La to examine the environment in which the manifested in the orientations and actions of their behaviour and lastly an investigati Sri Lanka and foreign powers. Such an an offoreign policy pursued by Sri Lankan gov conservative and socialist, in the years s
Our view is that there is a line of cont however, depending very much on the per has been a tendency towards emphasis, de-er that is also determined by the objective situation.
The question of foreign policy orient the independence movement in the coun literature and public statements abound w especially in the areas of economic and c attention paid to the external environment. Whitehall insisted on external affairs an Prime Minister. Presumably it was hope (Pakistan), Nehru (India), D. S. Senanaya
* The author is grateful to Drs. Thomas Al Wriggins for helpful comments and use 1. See K. J. Holsti, International Politics:
N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, second 2. see Peter J. Boyce's instructive article,
Journal, pp. 141-161. 3. There are some comments and hopes
Nehru's An Autobiography (London, Job as the author himself declares in the tit on recent events in India'; pp. 573-59: they are essentially tangential to the who sovereign state, more the reflections of a even the kind of interest that Nehru dis

I
POLICY - CHANGE AND NUITY*
IAM WILSON
nkan foreign policy, it becomes necessary
state operates, foreign policy outputs as of responsible statesmen, an explanation on of the patterns of interaction between alysis will encompass effectively the gamut Brnments of different political complexions, ince independence.
inuity in foreign policy. At varying points sonality of the proponent of action, there mphasis, sometimes indifference-behaviour factors of the domestic and international
ation seldom bothered the nationalists of tries of South and Southeast Asia. Their ith plans to remedy the domestic situation onstitutional development. There was little Consequently when power was transferred, di defence being invested in the office of d that the men who took power, Jinnah ke (Sri Lanka) and Tunku Abdul Rahman
len Levy, Calvin A. Woodward and W. Howard ful criticisms. A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, 2dition).
Foreign offices and new states', International
2xpressed in the closing pages of Jawaharlal in Lane the Bodley Head, reprinted 1947), but le page, it is an autobiography *with musings i and 599-611 are particularly interesting, but le question of the foreign policy of a potential
sentimental liberal. Mr. Gandhi did not have played.

Page 59
SRI LANKA's
(Malaya), not having defined foreign polic not merely maintain the Commonwealth ci of British interests in the new environme. been amply justified. Today many many changes and shifts to more radical polici exception of Pakistan maintain their Col form of relationship after its decision to c
Our position vis-a-vis Sri Lanka is t but this has been on a stable continuum of power blocs. The endresultis that the syste1 patterns and the forms of interaction av powers leaves Sri Lanka's Prime Minister, continuum of action available, that is, non ment as an intermediary or concilator v line of thought may be challenged given Ministers as different as D. S. Senanayake Bandaranaike (Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike (SLFP) but more obvious in the synthesis of these s most astute of Prime Ministers, Dudley as Prime Minister (1965-1970).
The Sri Lankan System
Sri Lanka is an island specialising in coconuts and rubber in that order, and precious stones and the development of to of rubber is in the control of British
The export of industrial goods has : of the raw material component has to co sation of much needed valuable foreig
Trade is not adequately diversified, (tea) and the Peoples' Republic of China is from the latter country. Over the year. trade but essentially the pattern of British
Fluctuations in export prices and ir serious difficulties in the island's balanc maintains a generoussystemofsocial servi« welfare state. Lack of hard currency con international banking agencies and fore
The presence of a sizeable Tamilming Indian Tamil labour works in the midla This Indian Tamil population roughly ar tion, is in the control of two strong trade u

DREIGN POLICY 53
goals, and being western-oriented, would nnection but also guarantee the protection t of independence. The trust reposed has ears after independence, despite political s, all the countries concerned, with the imonwealth ties. Even Pakistan retains a uit in 1971 over Bangladesh.
hat over the years there has been change non-involvement in the politics of the rival h, the outputs, the explanation for behaviour ailable with neighbors as well as friendly little option but to operate along the only involvement but at the same time involvehen such action becomes necessary. This the kinds of personalities involved, Prime (United National Party, UNP), S. W. R. D.
SLFP), Sir John Kotelawala (UNP) and the similarities are there and are rendered eemingly different policies effected by the Senanayake, especially in his fourth phase
the export of three primary products, tea, in recent times in the export of gems and urism. Most of the tea and a fair proportion capital.
till to become an established fact as most me from abroad and this involves the utili
exchange.
nost exports going to the United Kingdom (rubber) while the principal import of rice there has been some diversification of this and Chinese domination of trade continues.
creases in the price of food imports cause } of payments. What is more, Sri Lanka 2s and is the classic example of the insolvent pels the island’s governments to depend on gn states for credit accommodation.
ity is a relevantfactor in political behaviour. di and sourthern tea and rubber plantations. Jounts to ten per cent of the island’s populaions, the more powerful of which maintains

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54 A, JEYARATI
political connections with neighbouring Tamil Federal Party (FP), the principal i tented indigenous Ceylon Tamils who for
While influential sections of Sinhalese as the equivalent of a Sudeten German in India and therefore averitable fifth column, Ceylon Tamil minority. The Ceylon Tami parts of the island inclusive of the coast flank on the Indian side.
The Ceylon Tamils are dissatisfied w. ment’s language policy which they believ language. The Indian Tamils until rece) been deprived of voting and citizenship
949.7
The island is strategically situated in t Achilles heel and in its location may be Cuba and the United States. '
It stands at the junction of important added importance when the Suez Canal is r Madagascar and Djakarta, Trincomalee ! harbours.
On the nuclear map too, Sri Lanka is for nuclear submarines to find shelter in th which almost hugs the natural harbour c lieto the south of the island are also a vant want to fire missiles on targets in both th of China. Such a convergence of strateg common ideological foe is not readily avi
Foreign Policy Outputs-Orientations and
The proximity to India which is comp discontented Ceylon and Indian Tamilming the major Sinhalese political parties desp
atterS.
4. The more powerful Ceylon Workers' Cor ship. Thondaman is politically conserva 5. Tanil political parties opposed to the Ur have united to form a Tamil United Fro FP, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam. The CWC
6. For further information see my Politics 1974), Chapter 2, “Problems in a Plur
7. Note under agreements signed between
agreed that India would take back 600,0 would grant citizenship to 375,000 (with extending beyond fifteen years.

NAM WILSON
India. This union has close ties with the strument of political action of the disconn some eleven percent of the population.
opinion regard the Indian Tamil population hinority vis-a-vis a potentially expansionist there is as much to fear from the indigenous ls reside mainly in the northern and eastern
line. This coast line is the most exposed
ith the present United Front (UF) govern2 provides undue primacy to the Sinhalese ht times were a stateless minority having rights by legislation enacted in 1948 and
erms of India's defence. It could be India's compared to Eire and wartime Britain or
sea routes and for this reason will acquire eopened. In the vast expanse of sea between provides one of the few excellent natural
well placed. Besides affording opportunity e deep canyon that lies in the Bay of Bengal f Trincomalee in the north, the seas that age point to nuclear submarines that would e Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic ic location for a dual purpose against a ilable elsewhere on the globe.
Actions
punded by the complicated presence of the ority produces a similarity in policy among ite the differences they have on domestic
gress (CWC) is under S. Thondaman’s leadertive and is in touch with New Delhi. ited Front Government's policies on language ht (TUF). Its leader is the leader of the Tamil is now a member of the TUF. in Sri Lanka 1947-1973 (London, Macmillan ul Society”, pp. 15-59. ndia and Sri Lanka in 1964 and 1974, it was 100 of the Indian Tamils and that Sri Lanka their natural increase) over a phased period

Page 61
SRI LANKA’s )
Both D. S. Senanayake (UNP) and S the Commonwealth connection. The form relationship with Britain and membership could ensure some protection against a the latter did not clearly articulate his policy of imposing Sinhalese as the only cultural and economic threats from ne also reported to have once stated that h departed the shores of Sri Lanka.
However while D. S. Senanayake a mutual defence agreement which include in the island, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike abrogate the defence agreement. This me: in the event of attack. Mrs. Sirima Banda agreement remains intact. Perhaps there available at very short notice in the event a nearby RAF base in the island of Gal Anglo-American communications centre a more both S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike a Sri Lanka within the Commonwealth, a complete agreement.
However while the UNP Prime Minis and Sir John Kotelawala) had for vario with the Government of India, the SLFP and Sirima Bandaranaike) developed cl Bandaranaike, as Prime Minister, warned rs ot a pan-Tamil movement that could while Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike's UF go Parliament travelling abroad to post (Madras state). Somewhere in the Sinha that in the not too distant future, Tamil separatist party, declare itself a sovereigns territorial designs over at least north a
The fear of India is reinforced by c going back through history which accoul Tamil minority along the northern and discontented refusing to co-operate wit
8. see Lucy M. Jacob, Sri Lanka From Publishing House, 1973), p. 31. Dhir the Bandaranaikes (1956-65): A Polit Also, Sir Ivor Jennings, "The Commo p. 138.
جون 9. Parliamentary Debates (House of Re

REGN POLICY 55 .
W. R. D. Bandaranaike (SLFP) maintained r was explicit when he stated that a special in a wider club such as the Commonwealth possibly future aggressive India. Though ar of Indian expansion, he defended his fficial language on the grounds of possible ghbouring South India.o Bandaranaike is would not rest satisfied till the last Indian
d his UNP successors preferred to have a the provision of military bases for Britain had these bases removed. But he did not nt that Sri Lanka could still rely on Britain ranaike herself has insisted that the defence s the belief that these bases could be made of attack by a hostile power. There is now 1 (Maldives), and furthermore there is the t Diego Garcia, also close at handi. Furtheld Mrs. Bandaranaike believed in keeping matter on which their UNP rivals are in
ters (D. S. Senanayake, Dudley Senanayake is reasons a kind of aims length friendship Prime Ministers (S.W. R. D. Bandaranaike oser ties. But still and all, S. W. R. D. his fellow Sinhalese countrymen of the dangetraddle Sri Lanka, South India and Malaya vernmenthas required Tamil FP members of bond that they will not visit Tamil Nadu ese political mind there is the lurking fear Nadu could well, under the leadership of a tate and that this sovereign state will harbour ld east Sri Lanka.
ther factors. There is a record of invasions ts for the presence of the indigenous Ceylon astern coastline. This minority is politically
Sinhalese dominated governments except
Dominion to Republic (New Delhi, National dra M. Prasad, Ceylon's Foreign Policy under al Analysis (Chand & Co., New Delhi, 1973) wealth in Asia', International Affairs, Vol. 32,
*esentatives), Vol. 23, column 684,

Page 62
S6 A. JEYARAT
at occasional intervals. Both in 1947, on the grant of military bases to Britain was the Ceylon Tamils, the All Ceylon Tamil ( laid claim to the stratégically based harbo Tamil-speaking area of east Sri Lanka. the Sinhalese political elite point to th Hyderabad, Kashmir and Goa as a foretas Tamil separatism derives encouragement fr India to the emergence of Bangladesh as the affairs of Cyprus and Turkish support Sections of Ceylon Tamil opinion feel tha of South India willcome to the assistance of warrant it.
Despite all the professions of friend nevertheless looked on that country as : Pakistan was looked on as a counterbalan remarked in private conversation that S1 People's Republic of China in the event dwindled after the Bangladesh episode w to the assistance of Pakistan.
Thus there is little difference betweer SLFP governments towards India since
There is secondly the view that Sri Lar nation in the context of the prevailing glo
Much has been said and made of S. W neutralism, a policy which was sometimes ambivalence in condemining Soviet interve. Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike’s attempts at : point of active involvement in selected a against Israel, condemnation of South Afri extended to a number of communist regir their tendency to be obliquenly, and at t
Mrs. Bandaranaike has also actively should be declared a nuclear free zone. W her position has been rendered nugatory an active Soviet naval presence in the ind littoral state in this area.
10. As told to the writer by a very close f
11. For further details see S. U. Kodikara, '' (1948-1966)' in South Asian Studies, Wo "Ceylon and the Hungarian Events', p. condemn Soviet intervention, at the U. the Soviet action. Finally Ceylon reverted

NAM WILSON
he eve of independence, and in 1956 when
cancelled, the principal political party of congress in 1947 and the Tamil FP in 1956 our of Trincomalee which is located in the Furthermore some influential members of 2 examples of the Indian occupation of e of what could happen to Sri Lanka. And om the support given by the Government of a new state. Similarly Turkish interest in for a separate Turkish Cypriot state make t India or the conjectured sovereign state the Tamils of Ceylon should circumstances
ship with India, SLFP governments have a potential aggressor. Hence undivided ce to India. And a leading SLFP minister i Lanka would seek assistance from the of an Indian attack. Such hopes have hen the People's Republic declined to go
the policies followed by both UNP and independence. -
ka should remain a non-aligned or neutral bal patterns of conflict.
V. R. D. Bandaranaike’s concept of dynamic open to criticism because of Sri Lanka's htion in Hungary during his premiership.il stretching tilis dynamic neutralism to the reas--such as Support for the Arab cause ca and the recognition her UF government nes in Southeast Asia-were criticised for imcs, overtly anti-West.
canvassed the view that the Indian Ocean hile there has been some support for this, by the Indo-Soviet pact of 1970. There is ian Ocean today and India is the largest
riend of the Minister concerned.
Ceylon's Relations with Communist Countries l. 2, No. 1 (July 1967) especially the section p. 18-121. At first Ceylon was reluctant to N. General Assembly. Then Ceylon deplored to her earlier position of "passive neutralism'.

Page 63
SRI LANKA’s FC
The fact that the original protagonis first Prime Minister, D. S. Senanayake (1 this arises from the fact that the conserv the local oppositional Marxist parties. Par in an easterly direction and as S. U. Kod was not surprising that UNP Prime Mir negative attitude towards communist co Soviet Union was until 1955 vetoing Sri United Nations. Nevertheless it was the go with other Asian states, condemned in 1 Republic of Indonesia. The same governm of Asia-in January 1950-not only to rec also, at the same time, to sever diplomat in Taiwan. This policy of noninvolvemen D. S. Senanayake in a speech he made ove Prime Minister emphasised that in inter follow the middle path and not entangle it of the rival blocs.l. If anything this was i statesman had articulated a definite guid
However, UNP governments during consistently refused to establish diplomati But again the reason was to be seen in There was the suspicion that the local Mar: ... if communist embassies were establish apprehensions and J. C. Kundra theret despite its proclaimed neutralism, took of 1949.14
Nonetheless the policy laid down by D sors, Dudley Senanayake (1952-1953) an government of the former was responsibl the People's Republic of China in 1952. relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia his affirmed opposition to communism, cle in 1955, Sir John Kotelawala declared t bloc or participate in ideological warfar SEATO. Notwithstanding his markedly a
12. loc. cit., p. 106.
13. see the text of D. S. Senanayake's speec of Moderation as a Path to Peace' in Tl
14. see his Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54:
(Groningen, J. B. Wolters, 1955), p. 5
15. For further details see his An Asian P. Also see his "Ceylon as Switzerland-in

REIGN POLICY 57
of nonalignment and neutralism was the )47-1952), tends to be overlooked. Partly tive Senanayake was in competition with ly this was a phase of Soviet expansionism kara has remarked, “in such a context, it isters should have adopted a completely untries.'12 To make matters worse, the Lanka's application for admission to the fernment of D. S. Senanayake which, along 948 the Dutch police action against the ent was one of the first among the nations ognise the People's Republic of China but ic relations with the Kuomintang regime t in Cold War issues was underscored by the BBC in London in January 1951. The lational politics he wished his country to self in the power and ideological conflicts indeed the very first time that a Ceylonese 2 line on foreign policy.
their first phase in office, 1947 to 1956, c or cultural links with communist states. the fear of communism during this time. kists would obtain various forms of support 2d in Colombo. India too had similar ore argues that Nehru's foreign policy, pro-western orientation up to the end
.S. Senanayake was followed byhis succesdi Sir John Kotelawala (1953-1956). The 2 for the rubber-rice trade agreement with The latter's government established trade in 1955 and with Rumania in 1956. Despite arly manifested at the Bandung Conference hat Sri Lanka would not join any power e. And he did not take Sri Lanka into ti-communist stances, the Chinese Foreign
h delivered over the BBC on “the Middle Way e Ceylon Historical Journal, Vol. 5, p. 114.
A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc 2.
ime Minister's Story (London, Harrap, 1956). Asia', New Commonwealth, Vol. 29, p. 316.

Page 64
S8 . . A. JEYARAT
Minister at the tim2, Chou En-lai, invited t meeting to pay an official visit to China. defeated at the general election held next
However during the regime of Sir Jo that Sri Lanka would find its way into the But the ex-Prime Minister, Dudley Sena Senanayake resolutely opposed possible at "international entanglements''.o
As Prime Minister of a 'National Govg pursued the same policy of noninvolvemer West laid down by his father, D. S. Sen the U.S. presence in South Vietnam, the Smitn regime in Rinodesia 1° and South Afr Prime Minister was strongly supportive of Organization. And nis government maintai to receive aid from, the Soviet Union and closer relations with the two leading comm as ambassadors to the Soviet Union anc
Thirdly, Prime Ministers seek global blocs will look to tinem as mediators, conci cautioning exhortations. D. S. Senanayake wnose views Were given careful considera Jonn Kotelawala's attempts at Winning the cvidenced in mis utterances at international December 1954; Bandung, April 1955). Bu being a "Switzerland of tne tast' and Co. very much in line Witn the principles of no ciated by nis successor, S. W. R. D. Bandara looked on the World stage in a similar wa that Sri Lanka had a role to play in the Uni the weak and tne strong would be able to rei live long enough to spell out this role. B greater opportunities of intervening, activ good offices on such complicated issues a and Bangladesh. But such activity was n
16. Lucy M. Jacob, op. cit, p. 55. 17. Ceylon Daily News, 5 June 1966. 18. Ibid., 3 September 1966 and 10 Septen 19. Lucy M. Jacob, op. cit., p. 52.
20. From his Address to the United Natio 22 November 1956. For the full text, se and the People: A Collection of Speech Honourable S. W. R. D. Bandaranalike (C

AM WILSON
e Prime Minister just before the Bandung his did not work out as Kotelawala was ear (April 1956).
hn Kotelawala there was a genuine fear Anglo-American bloc by entering SEATO. ayake and his influential cousin, R. G. empts to have Sri Lanka involved in any
rnment' in 1965-1970, Dudley Senanayake t whilst maintaining friendly ties with the anayake. His government was critical of American bombing of North Vietnam, the ica's control over South West Africa. The China's admission to the United Nations ned friendly relations with, and continued 'nina. As evidence of his desire to establish unist states, he appointed former Marxists
China.
recognition in the belief that rival power liators or will take them seriously in their was one of the Commonwealth Statesman tion at Commonwealth conferences. Sir plaudits of the anti-communist World Was conferences (Colombo, April 1954; Bogor, the also articulated his view of Sri Lanka. Lombo a “Geneva of the Orient”, 19 a view nalignment and dynamic neutralism enunnaike. Moreover S. W. R. D. Bandaranalike y as Sir John Kotelawala did. He opined ted Nations in a joint endeavour "in which ndera usefulservice'.'He did not however it his wife, Mrs Sirima Bandaranaike had 2ly in international affairs by offering her the Congo, Cyprus, the Indo-China war different from the role set out to itself
ber 1966.
s General Assembly on "The New Asia', on : Department of Information, The Government is made by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, the olombo, Government Press, 1959), pp. 20-32.

Page 65
SRI LANKA’s
by the "National Government of Dudle September 1966, that Government in de Organisation stated that "the contribution the solution of international problems ha significant nature' adding that it was pre its special position in the world toda
Explanations
There are two strands of nationalism
while time other being strongly indígenous. ground. But Wnile time former leans more on cause Witn time mom-aligned mations. Uver til for a o-partisan Ioreign policy to evolve Britain and Unina for trading purposes an of separatast forces among tine Veylon a inspiration and mas nope oli succour from from an electorally induential Muslim Support the Arab cause against lisrael.
At times UNP governments have tenc governments someynat to tne leit but tne to tne centre. În tnis way Prime Ministers from their extreme wings to commit the is otmer. However otner 1mportant motivation interest nave led Ceylolese governments agaumst possible aggression. 'nus tne fea internal cinallenges to tine established orde to look elsewhere fortne secul ity that the is -mainly a question of finances. Likewise Weat oyal governments since independe for a mutual security system among the Asia, and the appeal for military assistanc oftne nomaligned states during the JVP ( April 1971 are manifestations of the rea there been any real attempt at a complete power blocs.
There is further a realization that a But an attempt is made to make a virt moral force of Buddhism that is Sri Lank of international conduct. Hence the adv dynamic neutralism etc. In this way Sri I degree of international recognition.
21. Ceylon Daily News, 1 September 1966.

FOREIGN POLICY 59
7 Senanayake during the phase 1965-70. In fining its position in the United Nations of smaller and non-aligned nations towards in recent years been progressively of a
ared "to play the role commensurate with "°ን 21
un Sri Lanka, one which is western-oriented Both strands frequently meet on common the West, the latter tends to make common he years however there has been a tendency largely conditioned by (1) dependence on di credit accommodation, (2) the presence hd Indian Tamil minority which look for Índia, (3) fear uf India and (4) pressure minority which compels governments to
led to move a little to the right and SLFP ; persistent trend has been to move nearer nave been successful in resisting pressures sland to the side of one power bloc or the is such as the anxiety to protect the national to look to diverse sources for insurance r of aggression from a foreign foe or of r have obliged Ceylonese Prime Ministers land itself is unable to generate from within the rellance on Britalin and the Commonnce, the taik ofjoining SEATO, the search nonaligned states of South and Southeast e to the West, the Soviet Union and some People's Liberation Front) insurrection of lization of weakness. But at no time has involvement with one or other of the rival
minor power cannot achieve a great deal. ue of smallness as well as to elevate the a's special legacy into a guiding principle 'ocacy of moderation, the middle path, anka's statesmen have obtained a certain

Page 66
60 A EYARATN
Conclusion
The objective in foreign policy is not services such as are undertaken by the ( Switzerland. Nor is there anxiety to conver of the Republic of Singapore despite the di economic development. The Buddhist ethic and the Buddhist ethos militates aginst an el and Singapore. Profit and tourism no do is not wholly engrossed in achieving only
The aim is to have Sri Lanka recognis of positive neutralism. This does give her st international stage-a useful booster in do belief that a small state strategically situal has a role to play,
The differences in foreign policy betwe reflect to some extent their competitiveness stressed earlier, is a quantitative rather th except one, namely Marxism, the two pa what extent will they deviate in the pursu continuum already set out for them by prede are effected only in so far as these are cc has never been any serious attempt on the independence for economic or political
There can be honest doubts as to whe troversy relating to Marxism. The issue is support-and in this instance Marxist ele UNIP. But if S. W. R. D. Bandaranaikc’s of the SLFP in their electoral pacts and Trotskyists, then the objective is obvious what to this social democratic statesman v treated for that reason as political outca that there would be an "explosion' if "yc way to deal with it, he said, was to leave would become "less extreme' and 'with systems would gradually even out and me though his UNP adversaries alleged that role of an Alexander Kerensky, they th when at the general elections of 1965 an 'father of Marxism' in Sri Lanka, Phil
22, see text of "interview with Ceylon's Pt U.S. News and World Report, 20 April
23. see my Electoral Politics in an Energer 1970, (Cambridge, at the University Pr

AM WILSON
to imitate the Red Cross state performing Covernment and public organisations of t the island into a business state so typical re need for foreign investments to promote
inhibits such a search for excessive profit picurean tourism characteristic of Bangkok ubt are prevalent motivations but society these objectives.
ed as a nonaligned state following a policy atesmen the opportunity to posture on the mestic politics. But there is also a genuine ted, as Sri Lanka is in the global context,
en the two major parties (UNP and SLFP) in domestic politics. But the distinction, as han a qualitative one. On most questions, rties are at one. The only question is to it of the national interest from the broad termined circumstances. Even the deviations onsonant with the national interest. There : part of either party to barter the island's
ga1n. s
ther there are even differences on the cona local one, that of mobilising maximum :ctoral backing-to keep out the powerful views are the index to the current attitude united fronts with the Communists and ty one of socialising into the body politic, vere political deviants who were also being stes. In April 1956, Bandarainaike stated ou tried to dam up communism'. The best it free to expand, arguing that in the end it the capitalist world moving left, the two et at a democratic socialist centle'.' Even the Marxists were anticipating him in the emselves (the UNP) followed his example d 1970 they made common cause with the ip Gunawardene.*
time Minister, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike' in
1956, p. 61.
at State: The Ceylon General Election of May ess,) 1975.

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SRI LANKA’s Fo
Trade, aid and defence are the prime three matters the two major parties are, objectives. These considerations obvious outside world. The issue is to what extent sh of action. The answer lies in our original p) tances compel policy to move along a give positively neutralist, Buddhistic middle pat narrow course with very little room for
24. The talk of Sir John Kotelawala taking As he himself insisted, he had an "ope wanted Sri Lanka to be a "Switzerlandcommitted Sri Lanka in the way it was domestic forces would have ubliged him to join SEATO.

REIGN POLICY 61
considerations in foreign policy. On these in varying forms, striving for the same ly cause a degree of dependence on the ould this dependence compromise freedom oposition that the predetermined circumsin continuum. To this extent the strategic, h state is obliged to pursue a predictably
OCWTC,
Sri Lanka into SEATO was highly exaggerated. 1 mind' on the question. At the same time he n-Asia'. It is very doubtful that he would have illeged he was planning to do. At the same time to take a more politic course had he attempted

Page 68
V |
NATIONALISM A
K. M.
Of the distinctive features of the Sri most remarkable is the prominent role pl the wider theme of nationalist agitation. " vative' are some of the terms used to describ Each of these has its uses. What is common reform as the major goal of political e
At every stage the "constitutionalist agitation through the prosaic techniques negotiation; there was at the same time techniques such as "non-co-operation', 'boyc Secondly, there was a firm belief in the poss with loyalty to Britain on the assumption inherently incompatible. In the decade aft emphasis on the Commonwealth connectic and the maintenance of the link with the in striking contrast to the republican status third feature was their vision of the goal
territorial nationalism without any specia any ethnic group, or any section of an et state. In this comprehensive all-island focu multi-racial polity they were at one with til and forties. Indeed the Marxist version
1. For discussion of nationalism in Sri l teenth century origins of nationalism i Ceylon Vol. III, K. M. de Silva (ed) (Co nationalist movements in the early history and politics of the transfer of formism, nationalism and protest in leadership'. Ceylon Studies Seminar 19 resistance movements: the Kandyan r in Ceylon. Ceylon Studies Seminar 1970 nalism and political development in Ce pp. 62-84, 99-114; and 197-206.
The present essay is based largely on th
6

ND ITS IMPACT
DE SILVA
Lanka variant of Asian nationalism the ayed by the 'reform' movement within Constitutionalist, 'moderate and consere the reformers and their political attitudes. to them all is an emphasis on constitutional ndeavour.
s' had demonstrated a commitment to of memorial and deputation and formal
a pronounced distaste for agitational cott' and for a politicization of the masses. ibility of reconciling 'Ceylonese' patriotism that these were complementary and not er independence this took the form of an on, and Defence Agreements with Britain, British Crown-Ceylon was a monarchy s which India and Pakistan opted for. The of political endeavour-the concept of a l, much less, exclusive association with hnic group, in brief a multi-ethnic nation s, and in the emphasis on the concept of a heir Marxist critics of the nineteen thirties was much more comprehensive because it
Lanka see particularly, K. M. de Silva, “Ninen Ceylon in, University of Ceylon, History of iombo, 1973) pp. 249-261 ; amb “The reform and twentieth century. ibid., pp. 381–407; “The power' ibid., pp. 489-533. M. W. Roberts, ReBritish Ceylon: The roots and ingredients of )74, No. 4; and 'Variations on the theme of bellion of 1817-18 and latter day nationalism 12, No. 10. See also, Sir Ivor Jennings, Natioylon in The Ceylon Historical Journal, Vol. 3,
ese articles.
2

Page 69
NATIONALISM
encompassed the Indian plantation worke liberal of the “constitutionalists' were wi Sri Lanka polity. Fourthly, Sri Lanka wa indigenous people in a territorial concept c lists' and their Marxist critics saw eye
In the years after independence one of was with the need to establish a sense of and under D. S. Senanayake's leadershi communal differences to the common g institutions and strengthening the founda the establishment of an equilibrium of et many vears it seemed as though these polic powerful forces were at work to upset th harmony gave wav before the stresses rele religion. This shift was consistent with th a common basis of agreement, the nume the power structure. Thus the Sinhalese-l assert its national dominance. The first ca polity, of a Ceylonese nationalism, and
. One of the common assumptions a Lanka is that there were two distinct phase about communal reconciliation and harmc if not radical and essentially disruptive dividing line is 1955-6. But any realistic as years after independence must begin by di phase was deceptive and that it had its ro going back to the last quarter of the ni
In Sri Lanka as in many parts of A be traced back to programmes of religio missionary enterprise. Religious revival preceded and inspired political nationalis rejection of the West. This first phase in the last three decades of the nineteent sentiment was primarily religious in outlo values-political overtones in it were visil in the first two decades of the twentieth movement. These activities were concent revivalism and temperance agitation dem of nationalist activity as it emerged aft
Nevertheless it is remarkable that which affected not merely the elite but t impact on the formal political activity of tieth century. Efforts were made to est

ND ITs IMPACT 63
is as well, a group which not even the most lling to regard as an integral element of a is to be a securlar state, embracing all the f citizenship. In this too the "constitutionao eye.
he major pre-occupations of the government
Ceylonese nationalism on territorial lies, ) political leaders aimed at subordinating oal of fostering parliamentary democratic tions of nationhood. The primary aim was nic forces within a multi-racial polity. For lies had succeeded, but beneath the surface e equilibrium; ideals of reconciliation and :ased by the divisive forces of language and e essence of party politics in which, given :rically larger group could peacefully alter Buddhist majority, long dormant, began to sualities were the concepts of a multi-racial of a secular state.
bout the evolution of nationalism in Sri s in it, one liberal, 'moderate and concerned nv in a plural society, and the other populist of communal and religious harmony. The sessment of nationalism in the island in the smonstrating that any novelty in this second ots in earlier phases of nationalist awakening leteenth century.
sia the origins of modern nationalism can is revivalism which were a reaction against -a Buddhist revival, more specificallym providing as it did an ideal basis for the the emergence of nationalism would cover h century. Whilst the incipient fiationalist ok and content-a re-assertion of Buddhist le quite early and became more pronounced century with the growth of the temperance 'ated in the low-country and there religious. onstrated many of the characteristic features er 1955-6.
movement as powerful as this, and one le people at large should have had so little the elite in the first two decades of the twenblish an ideological link between religious

Page 70
64 K. M.
revival and political nationalism, most inc the political implications and potential of among the first to advocate swaraj, but nationalism and the advocacy of radical evoked little sympathy from the effective “nationalist' and “constitutionalist' ali
Though men like Dharmapala resp( intelligently to the challenges of the first d in political issues went almost by defaul seldom understood the complexities of the in the British Liberal tradition they place course of time, of a Sri Lanka version of ment and the transfer of a substantial m representatives of the people of the count of Sri Lanka, many of whom conscious political attitudes, tended to regard the 'cc as the nationalist movement in the islar brand of politics associated with the agit heritage associated with it and the Sint
This brand of militant Buddhist nati the riots of 1915, and for over a general appear to lie in the field of politics rather or Buddhist activity. There was a mood o and the distrust of enthusiasm which was over into the sphere of religious activity as the most prominent of the leaders kept approach to the religious problems of the mapala's. They set the pace in Buddhist Jayatilaka's retirement from active politic death-he died on 31 December 1925-1 Buddhist leader).
In the nineteen thirties, with the intr the first (1931-1935) and the second (1936in the reformed Legislative Council of 1 of a popular electorate. Buddhist pressure process to influence elected State Council new political awareness, and by the v politics there were political groups who so ing the traditional cultural and religiou most notable of these groups was S. W.
2. Despite F. R. Senanayake's key role dearth of published material on his c few brief newspaper articles. '

DE SILVA
tably by Anagarika Dharmapala. He saw the forces that were emerging, and he was the blend of religious enthusiasm, militant social reform which Dharmapala stood for political leadership of the national elite, ke. w
onded more positively and perhaps more ecade of the twentieth century, the initiative ft to the "constitutionalists'. These latter nationalist movement of their day. Steeped 'd their hopes on the establishment, in the the British system of parliamentary governeasure of political authority to the elected .ry. For many years students of the politics ly or unconsciously reflected these same nstitutionalists' and their political activities ld, and they chose to disregard the virile ation for Buddhist revival and the cultural nala language.
onalism receded into the background after tion thereafter. The reasons for this would than in any decline of interest in Buddhism f restraint and excessive caution in politics, one ofits most notable characteristics spilled well. F. R. Senanayake' and D.B. Jayatilaka a tight rein on religious enthusiasm. Their ir day was in every way a contrast to Dharactivity from about 1918, up to the time of s in 1942 (with F. R. Senanayake's untimely D. B. Jayatilaka emerged as the undisputed
bduction of universal suffrage, politicians of 1947) State Council, unlike their predecessors he 1920's, became subject to the pressures groups could now work through the electo al lors. Sinhala Buddhists were awakening to a 2ry nature of democratic "parliamentary' ght to build a political programme emphasisS patterns associated with Buddhism. The R. D. Bandaranaike’s Sinhala Maha Sabha.
in the politics of the 1920's there is a surprising areer apart from a pamphlet in Sinhalese, and a

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NATIONALISM
There could be few doubts about the vi political force, or of the validity of its appea divisive effect on a plural society such as S in the Board of Ministers from giving the enthusiasm. The Sinhala Maha Sabha that was not essentially Buddhist or Sinh took issue with the Ceylon National Co political entity. For the Ceylon National its political policy. But the Sinhala Mal it and was not reluctant to give public e of a "Ceylonese' political entity.
The government still prided itself o had become politic to underline a sense o political leadership of the day attached t and the apparatus of political democrac disinclined to yield to pressure from thi as the Sinhala Maha Sabha and the All of D. B. Jayatilaka was crucial in this. F and religious affairs gave him added prestig excessive zeal and enthusiasm, and to cu with D. S. Senanayake he successfully po militant Buddhist movement urging the es tional Sinhala-Buddhist lines, and those v the liberal ideal of a secular state in which were carefully demarcated. (The Marxist: unresponsive to this brand of nationalisi It required D. B. Jayatilaka's retirement thereafter) to open the way for a new gen were members of the Sinhala Maha Sabha Their impact on the life of the country with the formation of the Sri Lanka Freed to the western educated elite and the equ established in 1948 and seemingly conso followed upon the death of D. S. Se
The Sinhala-educated intelligentsia to them by the pervasive dominance of Though they were not without influence been able to exert any influence on a nati unjustly excluded by the western educate with their numbers. More importantly t latter to speak for the villagers. By extens had taken an unfair share of power
pportunities.
15441-6

No TS MPACT 6S
ability of religio-cultural nationalism as a to a democraticelectorate,butits potentially riLanka's deterred the moderate leadership ir support to such a programme with any 'ould not conceive of a Ceylonese polity ala in orientation; and, in the late 1930's it ngress on the question of a "Ceylonese' Congress this was an essential element in a Sabha had always been sceptical about (pression to its doubts about the viability
n its neutrality in religious affairs, but it
special obligation towards Buddhism. The
o western concepts of secular government
y, would not go beyond this. They were
2 more vociferous Buddhist groups such
Ceylon Buddhist Congress. The influence
His dual role of elder statesman in political
ge in both spheres, which he used to dampen
rb what he regarded as extremism. Along ostponed an open confrontation between a tablishment of a Sri Lanka polity on tradiwho were committed to the maintenance of the lines between state power and religion s too, at this stage, remained dogmatically m, often dismissing it as mere chauvinism) from active politics (and his death shortly eration of militant activists many of whom to take control of the Buddhist movement. became noticeable after independence, and pm Party there emerged a mounting hostility ilibrium of political forces which had been lidated in 1952 in the general election that lamayake.
found that rewarding careers were closed English as the language of administration. in the villages they had seldom in the past onal scale, and they felt that they had been di elite from a share of power commensurate hey felt that they were better able than the ion they also felt that the Tamil community by virtue of their superior educational

Page 72
66 K. M.
In addition they felt that in its spi culture associated with it were not receivil culminated in the Buddha Jayanthi year, 2500th anniversary of the attainment of report by a prestigious non-government cc lities), on the deplorable state of Buddh they charged that the value of indepen ruling elite was completely dominated estranged from their national history
" , " If religious fervour was the prime det was its sharp cutting edge. Indeed the two interwined that it was impossible to treat and strengthen the Sinhala language stem fell into decay in Sri Lanka, its valuable with it. What occurred at this time was a nationalism-language became the basis o nationalism of Central Europe of the mic of nationalism affected both the Sinhala
The consequences of the transforma the concept of a multi-racial polity ceas Sinhala, the words for nation, race, and a multi-racial or multi-communal nation ( mind. The emphasis on Sri Lanka as the popular appeal compared with which th meaningless abstraction.
Secondly, the abandonment of the co by laying stress on the western concept of from the clear numerical superiority of time the focus continued to be an all-i consciously or unconsciously treated as be The minorities, and in particular the Ceylo that Sinhala nationalism was interchangeal
Similarly the association of Buddhi reduction of Christian influence especiall abandonment of the concept of a multi-r for the declaration of Buddhism as the stat in both the major parties, the S.L.F.P. and
3. For a succint analysis of linguistic nat see Sir Lewis, Namier, Vanished Suprema (Peregrine Books, rondon 1962).

DE SILVA
itual home Theravada Buddhism and the ng sufficient support or respect. These fears the world wide celebration in 1956 of the airvana by the Buddha. At that time too a ommission (consisting of Buddhist personaism in Sri Lanka heightened these fearsidence was vitiated by the fact that the by an alien outlook, and values and and culture. - .
erminant of change, the language question -Buddhism and Sinhala-were so closely either in isolation. The anxiety to preserve med partly at least from the fear that if it religious and cultural tradition would die profoundly significant transformation of f nationalism on the lines of the linguistic l-nineteenth century. This metamorphasis
and Tamil populations.
tion may be outlined as follows: Firstly, 2d to be politically viable any longer. In people are practically synonymous, and or state is incomprehensible to the popular land of the Sinhalese carried an emotional te concept of a multiracial polity was a
Incept of a multi-racial polity was justified a democratic sanction deriving its validity the Sinhala-speaking group. At the same sland one, and Sinhala nationalism was ing identical with a Sri Lanka nationalism. in Tamils refused to endorse the assumption ple with the larger Sri Lanka nationalism.
sm with the state, and the simultaneous y after 1960 were integral features of the acial polity. There was increasing pressure e religion, but this the political leaderships the U.N.P., were able to resist. However,
tionalism in mid-nineteenth century Europe, cies. See the essay on “Nationality and Liberty."

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NATIONALISM AN
with the adoption of a republican constituti of the Constitution laid it down that: "Th dhism the foremost place and accordingly and foster Buddhism while assuring to a 18 (1) (d)'. Sri Lanka had ceased to be a had not become a theocratic state which B it to be.
Thirdly, linguistic nationalism was a elitist constitutionalism of the early yea more especially the rural masses-had en could political activity be confined to the its seeming novelty at the time it first app the recent past, and especially in the tempe twentieth century when a similar mixture national culture had captured the imaginat in the rural areas of the low country, and the Tamil areas. In the nineteen fifties the deeper.
One of the notable consequences of thi was the setback it gave the Marxist move Marxism had continued the process of p( A. E. Goonasinha had pioneered in the ( been conscious of the inter-connection b struggle for national independence, and in pace of national regeneration. Marxist tho of secularism in the island's politics. The Sec their activities and halting the progress th the first elections to the House of Represel potent challenge to the government of the this status of the alternative government the which was thwarted by the emergence o form it took in the mid-nineteen fifties. W ment, they watched the gains of the past become much more limited. They found to tic nationalism had an appeal which cut a deep a response from the Sinhala working c Sinhala educated elite. The cosmopolitan ou advocacy of a multi-racial secular polity I and they were compelled to compromise substantial political benefits. From the po were reduced to the status of an appendage
Though the Buddhist movement was had no strong opposition to the adoption

D TS MPACT 67
in in 1972 the position changed. Chapter II Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Budit shall be the duty of the state to protect l religions the rights granted by Section secular state pure and simple, even if it uddhist pressure groups would have liked
populist nationalism, in contrast to the 's after independence. The masses-and erted the political arena, and no longer
elite. This linguistic nationalism despite eared in the mid 1950's, had its roots in rance movement of the early years of the of religious fervour and commitment to ion of the Sinhalaese people, particularly in the towns in all parts of the island save cale was wider, and the appeal somewhat
is emergence of Sinhala Buddhist populism ment. By the end of the nineteen thirties oliticizing the urban working class which arly nineteen twenties. They had always etween social problems and the political so doing they had helped accelerate the ught had served to strengthen the forces ond World War had the effect of disrupting ey had made, but with independence and ntatives in 1947, they emerged as the most day, if not a credible alternative to it. To y always aspired and it was this aspiration flinguistic nationalism and the populist lith the emergence of the language movedisappear, and the prospects of the future their dismay and discomfiture, that linguis:ross class interests, and that it evoked as lass as it did among the peasantry and the tlook of the Marxists and their enlightened roved to be profoundly disadvantageous, on these issues, without, however, any sition of the alternative government they of the populist Sri Lanka Freedom Party.
generally hostile to Marxist ideology, it of a socialist programme. Since plantation

Page 74
68 K. M.
enterprise, nascent industry and the island talists, and the minorities were dispropor capitalist class, Buddhist pressure groups the blance in favour of the majority gro trade and industry could be justified on the of foreigners and the minorities. The Sinh was not averse to socialism so long as its The result was that the populist Sri Lanka a commitment to a hazy socialism with an the indigenous capitalist class-the Sinhal
We now turn to the last of the cons linguistic nationalism among the Sinhalese of such far-reaching importance in the isl separate treatment.
In the last decade of the nineteenth cent there was a remarkable contrast between attitudes: the former were far ahead in nationalist ideas then emerging in the India till the early 1920's. During this period the but aspired to equality with the Sinhalese as as indeed their enfranchised segment was un
It was in the early 1920's that the basici of Tamil politics-their relationship with polity-were dramatised in the careers of dominated the politics of the island at this chalam and Ponnambalam Ramanathano as regards their aspirations for the people harmonious association between the Sinha nation-building, for mutual trust and respc in the struggle for a common goal of swar associates in the building up (and eventu polity.
Ramanathan, in contrast, emphasised Tamils, of a Tamil nationalism to be foste if necessary in opposition to Sinhala nation nary and idealistic than his brother. For hi had to be accepted as a fact, and on that ba interest of the Tamils by emphasising the British rule this would mean unabashed c

E SILVA
's trade were dominated by foreign capitionately influential within the indigenous viewed socialism as a means of redressing up. Every extension of state control over ground that it helped curtail the influence ala Buddhist section of the capitalist class own economic interests were not affected. Freedom Party has been able to reconcile advocacy of the interests of a section of a Buddhist segment of it.
equences of the emergence of a populist -its effects on the Tamil question. It is and's contemporary history that it needs
ury and in the early years of the twentieth, Tamils and the Sinhalese in their political political consciousness and receptivity to sub-continent. This lead they maintained y did not regard themselves as a minority, one of two majority groups in the island der the restricted franchisethenprevailing.
ssues involved in the fundamental problem the Sinhalese within the larger Sri Lanka
two distinguished Tamil politicians who time, the brothers Ponnambalam ArunaTheir careers afford a study in contrast of this country: Arunachalam stood for lese and Tamils in nationalist politics and onsive co-ordination of sectional interests j. He viewed the Sinhalese and Tamils as ally in the government) of a multi-racial
the virtues of a separate identity for the red in collaboration with the British and halism. Ramanathan was much less visiom, the numerical inferiority of the Tamils Lsis it was imperative to protect the special air distinctive communal identity. Under collaboration with the inperial power in

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NATIONALISM
return for the protection of minority in special if not privileged status as the pri power by the British. G. G. Ponnambal forties was the reductio ad absurdum oft two basic considerations: the emphasis ol divergent from, if not positively hostile t rejection, tacit or explicit of Arunachala Ceylonese or Sri Lanka nationalism. Th this, for the events of the mid-nineteen fifti themselves the concept of a Ceylonese na the compelling attractions of Sinhalese na disenchantment with the Congress servedt responsive co-operation between the Sinha by the Tamils of an essentially subordinate inferiority, and that their status in a Ceylc tham that of a junior partner.
One important feature needs to be e of a linguistic, religious and cultural sep concept of nationalism lacked coherence language that provided the sharp cutting This was the Federal Party's great contril draw attention to the possession of a Tal independent Tamil kingdom (which survive of the seventeenth), they also emphasised nationhood. In 1951 at the first nationa claimed that "the Tamil speaking peopl from that of the Sinhalese by every "separate historical past' of the Tar tinctiveness. While the Sinhalese regard preferred to look upon it as a state-nati particular by the British. This view has b Party as well as by other Ceylon Tamils : their claim for a measure of regional aut Federal structure, to the more recent em
With the change of government in 1 was quickly translated into a growing clam of the language settlement arrived at i immediately aroused, tensions grew extre into race riots. To assuage the feelings c introduced legislation to permit the "rea Though the bill was approved by Parliam mentation were not passed till 1966.
If the race riots of the mineteen fif linguistic nationalism in a plural society, t.

ND ITS IMPACT 69
cerests and rights, and an insistence on a e of acceptance of the eventual transfer of m's "Fifty-Fifty' campaign of the nineteen is process of political activity. There were Tamil nationalism as something essentially ), Sinhalese nationalism; and secondly, the m’s concept of a multi-racial polity and a re was a hard-headed pragmatism in all s were to demonstrate that for the Sinhalese ionalism could hardly hold its own against tionalism. Besides, Arunachalam's eventual ) underline the fact that, for many Sinhalese, lese and Tamils pre-supposed the acceptance position merely by virtue of their numerical nese polity could seldom be anything more
mphasised. At this time, for all their talk larateness from the Sinhalese, the Tamils' and cohesion. As with the Sinhalese, it was edge of a new national self-consciousness. ution to Tamil politics. Not only did they mill territorial unit, and the memory of an di from the thirteen century to the beginning the role of language as the determinant of l convention of the Federal Party it was e in Ceylon constituted a nation distinct fundamental test of nationhood”-the nils and their linguistic unity and disSri Lanka as a nation state, the Tamils on created by western imperialism, and in een consistently emphasised by the Federal in recent years, and it is the foundation of onomy (ranging from a unit or units in a phasis on a separate Tamil state).
256 the power of the Sinhala intelligentsia our for "Sinhala only', and the demolition In 1944-6. The fears of the Tamils were mely high and erupted in 1956 and 1958 if the Tamils, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike sonable use of Tamil' in administration. ent, the regulations necessary for its impli
ies underlined the combustible nature of here were more ominous long-term dangers

Page 76
70 , K. M.
as well. The fact is that the Sinhalese, thou lation of the island, nevertheless have a n Sinhalese (who number about 9 million) feel Tamil speakers in Sri Lanka and present Within Sri Lanka the Sinhalese outnumb but they are in turn outnumbered by n peoples of South Asia.
Historical tradition, cultural distinct of the two countries from each other, and Lanka the Tamils of the North and the themselves with the Tamils of Tamilnad. possibility. Ironically enough, worsening ré and the deep sense of grievance engender of the language compromise of 1944-6 has more attractive if not yet politically viable decline in power of the Indian National C of the DMK more conscious of the rights in expressing concern about these. The as it has potential for transformation into sc Sinhalese are thus in danger of becoming
There is also the question of the relat Tamil speaking plantation workers in the language. Once again a closer associatio pressure. But it was only in 1972 that the solidated into joint political activity in v main trade-union cnim political party of th to work together in the newly formed T. of the Federal Party leader, S. J. V. Che
For decades the plantation worker an unassimilable minority living in their plar population. But the question of their franc of deep controversy for a generation therea have been defined with elaborate care eli who came to be classified as "stateless' tho ted with India in 1964 and 1974 have all Most will be repatriated to India, but a li and permanent residents of Sri Lanka, th plantation workers recognized as Sri La
It is the Kandyan Sinhalese who feel r in their midst. They have taken the lead in t for the grant of citizenship to the latter; o! converts among the low-country Sinhales

E SILVA
gh an overwhelming majority of the popuhinority complex vis-a-vis the Tamils. The over-shadowed by the more than 50 million -day Tamilnadu their nearest neighbours. er the Tamils by more than three to one; early six to one by the Tamil speaking
ions and geography separate the Tamils in the early years of independence in Sri East showed little inclination to identify u. Nevertheless the Sinhalese feared this lations between the Sinhalese and Tamils, ed among the latter by the abandonment tended to make the link with Tamilnadu ... This trend has been strengthened by the Songress in Tamilnadu and the emergence of Tamils in South Asia and less inhibited sociation is still fitful and tentative, but mething more cohesive. The fears of the
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
ions between the Ceylon Tamils, and the 2 island. The only link between them is has emerged in the face of Sinhalese growing solidarity between them was conwhich the Ceylon Workers Congress, the e plantation workers, pledged themselves amil United Front under the leadership lvanayakam.
s were regarded as transients, and as station ghettos isolated from the indigenous hise came up in 1927 and remained amatter fter. Their rights to permanent citizenship minating the claims of the bulk of them ugh resident in Sri Lanka. Treaties negotiabut settled this question of statelessness. mited number will be accepted as citizens uus conferring a new legitimacy on those nka citizens.
most threatened by the plantation workers he insistence on rigid rules and regulations n this issue the Kandyans have found easy e. Indeed it was the common campaign

Page 77
NATIONALISM
against liberal citizenship rights to Indian p to the Donoughmore Commission, whicl Kandyans together after a period of estran cions about the low-country Sinhalese d Kandyan claim for a federal political st Commission and in 1944 before the Soult mot.
In the first half of the nineteenth ce political problem that confronted the Bri to the British petered out in the two or t rebellion' of 1848, and disappeared for 6 policy the British converted the Kandya loyalists. The Kandyan problem in the s by an aristocratic leadership had ceased to of British rule.
Between the 1880's and the attainme took satisfaction in a new role, that of ass to the reform and nationalist movements of the low country. The leaders of Kandya for the political aspirations of these mov when not positively hostile. The traditio mot against the British but against the “co memory of Kandyan resistance and of the Sinhalese kingdom persisted, to provide looking "reformers' and those among th a genuine "nationalist' movement basin
There were many reasons why the F umbrella and offered collaboration in r being met. The most important of these, it ones. Though the Kandyan region was th fewer benefits from this process of economi themselves than to any other group amo claim that they had suffered greatly fron midst, though somewhat exaggerated, is n land, and fears about a potential political were the two most important aspects oft community seeking redress for these grieva and conservative in outlook.
It was after independence that Kandy to make itself felt. By 1956 a new leaders found a natural home in the SLFP. Curi in the SLFP reached a peak after the

N TS IMPACT 71
ntation workers, conducted in opposition
brought the low-country Sinhalese and ement. Not that Kandyan fears and suspiominance ever completely subsided. The icture in 1927 before the Donoughmore ury Commission was proof that they had
ntury Kandyan resistance was the major ish in Sri Lanka. But Kandyan resistance hree decades after the suppression of the ver thereafter. By a deliberate change of nS from a suspect group into a bloc of 2nse of a 'traditional' nationalism guided Ke a serious threat to the continued stability
nt of independence the Kandyans mostly Dciates of the British, and a counterweight dominated by the western educated elite in opinion seldom showed much sympathy ements. They stood aloof and suspicious in of Kandyan "resistance' was invoked 1stitutionalist' leadership. Nevertheless the Kandyan Kingdom as the last independent Some inspiration for the more forward e latter who came to form the nucleus of ; itself on Sinhalese tradition.
andyans took shelter under the colonial . :turn for certain minimum requirements would appear, were the basically economic e main centre of the plantation industry, development had accrued to the Kandyans g the peoples of the island. Indeed their the development of plantations in their it entirely without merit. Grievances about threat from the Indian plantation workers is. They were a self-proclaimed backward ces. Their leadership remained aristocratic
n influence on Sinhala nationalism began ip had emerged. Populist in outlook they isly, though, when the Kandyan influence 960's, it was under a more traditional

Page 78
72 K. M.
aristocratic leadership. But aristocratic conservatism. On the contrary it was rec ideology.
There are three points of significance of nationalism. Firstly, Kandyan pressures ment of policy on the questions relating to times these pressures have developed vehen The rigid tests devised for Sri Lanka citize of the Indian plantation labour from the the Sinhalese population in the Kandyan in Parliament. (With the delimitation of population had 44% of the seats). Secon has served to radicalise land policy in genera on plantations in areas where population assumed the form of a passionate search fo Kandyan influence has been basically ant development given the animosity of the Ka who have dominated economic activity i country Sinhalese, Indians, Moors or E in the indigenous capitalist class, and this n tion of aristocratic leadership and sociali
It would be evident from this brief ess: of a myriad shapes and forms. Just as it ha of a century, it could be confidently predi the future would be this infinite changability nue to be at once cohesive and disruptive
There will be those who, despite all t exclusive rights of the brand of nationalism of nationalism proper. And they will insist tive and less than comprehensive. But it v there are as many versions of nationalism a tautly -there are as many roads to nation
4. This influence has been especially strong 1975, the President of the Republic of Prime Minister, the Chief Justice and the (

E SILVA
resuscitation did not mean a return of ptive to populist pressures and socialist
in the Kandyan influence on the growth were the guiding influence in the developIndian plantation labour in Sri Lanka. At ently and unabashedly racialist overtones. ship have eliminated a substantial portion voters' lists. This had the effect of giving reas a disproportionate share of the seats 959, the Kandyans with just 26% of the ily, in the 1970's the Kandyan influence and to imposestate control and ownership pressure is severe. These initiatives have r a redress of historic grievances. Thirdly, -capitalist in outlook, an understandable indyans towards the enterprising outsiders in their regions-whether they were locropeans. There are very few Kandyans o doubt has facilitated the easy reconciliast ideology.
ay that nationalism in Sri Lanka is a thing skept changing over the last three quarters cted that the one point of consistency in r. And the impact of nationalism will conti
A. Ma
he evidence to the contrary, insist on the they advocate or adhere to, to the status that all other varieties are spurious, defecwould be more realistic to remember that s there are of souialism, and-more imporalism as there are nowadays to socialism.
since 1970. It is a point worth noting that in Sri Lanka, the Prime Minister, the Deputy governor of the Central Bank are all Kandyans.

Page 79
V THE ECONOMY OF
H. M. G.
L. MAJOR DEVELOPM
Three major developments character formance of the economy to a remarkable the foreign exchange crisis; and, the increa:
(a) Population Growth
During the period under review, Sri much so, that the country has been descI population explosion'. The population to 12.7 million in 1971, growing at an a population upsurge has been due to the ju a modernised death rate'. The crude di in 1945 to 10.7 per thousand in 1953 due la continued to decline further during the re; in 1971, because of the improvement and cc birth rate which was 39.7 per thousand i in 1971. The slower decline of the latter l and a consequent high growth rate of
I am grateful to Mr. N. Balakrishnan fo) The responsibility for any errors that m
1. Gavin W. Jones and S. Selvaratnam, . of Ceylon. p. 20, (Colombo, Hansa Pul
2. Department of Census and Statistics,
Lanka. Colombo, 1973.
3. Mrs. Joan Robinson, "Economic possib
Colombo, Planning Secretariat, 1959,
4. Administration Report of the Registrar C and Statistics. The Pocket Book, op. c
5. Since early 1960s however, the crude b per thousand in 1961-63 to 29.6 per til have been the continuation of an earlier decline in marital fertility among wome of family planning activity in Sri Lankac voluntary association and since 1965 b exactly to what extent these activities h # rate (vide, U.N.-UNESCO-WHO, 1971).

II
SRI LANKA I948-73*
"NASEKERA
NTS OF THE PERIOD
sing this period, which influenced the perdegree were: the rapid population growth; ing role of the government in the economy.
Lanka's population increased rapidly. So ibed as the “example par excellence of... almost doubled from 6' 6 million in 1946 nnual average rate of 23 per cent. This xtaposition of a "primitive birth rate with eath rate, halved from 215 per thousand rgely to a successful anti-malaria campaign, st of the period reaching 76 per thousand untrywide diffusion of health services.' The in 1947, had declined to 300 per thousand 2d to a widening gap between the two rates population.
his comments on an earlier draft of this paper. ay remain is, however, entirely mine.
Population Growth and Economic Development lishers, 1971).
Statistical Pocket Book of the Republic of Sri
(lities of Ceylon' Papers by Visiting Economists. p. 39
eneral. Colombo, 1965; Department of Census t.
rth rate has declined faster, dropping from 35 ousand in 1970-72. The main reasons for this trend of the postponement of marriage, and the over 25 years. There has been a certain amount uring this period, carried out earlier by a private the government. It is difficult, however, to say ave been responsible for the drop in the crude Family Planning Evaluation Mission to Ceylon
3

Page 80
74. H. M. G.
A major outcome of the demograph additions to the population of young de Their proportion in the population rose 1963 and was 39 per cent in 1971. This situ to the economy which, in turn, led to a si to improve the average living standards increasing its productive capacity. The adv these years was also felt in the sphere of g payments because of the government's co welfare expenditures disbursed mainly o economy's heavy dependence on imports The strain on the economy due to fast I because of the spread of the "revolution ( of the economy.
One of the major problems causing inc emerged during this period was unemplo scale unemployment was due to the conti and the inertia of the economy in the face the years went by, increasing numbers wer the delayed effects of the high birth rates The average annual addition to the labour 1946-53 had increased to about 10,000 in ment opportunities however, did not expan seen from the high rates of unemploymen to the I.L.O. Survey of 1959, the unemplo of 10.5 per cent of the labour force or 34 per cent of the labour force or 450,000 pe Survey of 1968 estimated unemployment
6. For a discussion of these implications a growth rates vide Jones and SelvaratnaI
7. The country has been aware of the exist the late fifties. The Ten Year Plan (195. providing employment to growing num one of the major targets of the Five study by two major international organ Employment and Unemployment in Ceylc ployment Opportunities and Expectation, (Geneva 1971).
8. ILO Matching Employment . . . op. cit.,
9. S. Selvaratnam, "Impact of population Lanka' Report of the National Managem Colombo, 1972, p. 30.
10. ILO "A Survey of Unemployment an Labour Review 38, March 1963, pp. 24

NASE KERA
c trends of this period was the large scale bendents in the age group of 0-15 years. rom 37 per cent in 1946 to 42 per cent in ation resulted in a high dependency burden >vere curtailment of the economy's ability of the population and divert resources to }rse impact of the demographic pressures of overnment fiscal operations and balance of mmitment to a policy of large scale social in a per capita basis and because of the for most of its essential consumer goods. opulation growth was particularly strong of rising expectations' and the sluggishness
'reasing and serious national concern which yment.? "The emergence of chronic largeast between the fast growth of population of adverse trends in the world market'. As e added to the country's labour force when in the past began to work themselves out. force which was around 54,000 in the period the period 1963-71. The economy's employd sufficiently to provide full employment, as t recorded by various estimates. According yment rate ranged between a 'low' estimate 0,000 persons and a "high' estimate of 128 rsons. Nine years later, the Labour Force as 450,000 persons or 11.0 per cent of the
ld of the possible gains from lower population in op.cit.
ence of a serious unemployment problem since 2-68) was prepared from the point of view of bers. Solving the unemployment problem was Year Plan (1972-76), and was the subject of isations in recent years (vide Peter J. Richards n (Paris OECD 1971), and ILO, Matching Em
5: A Programme of Action for Ceylon. 2 vols. .
p. 17.
Growth on Employment and Training in Sri ent Seminar on Population and Family Planning
i Underemployment in Ceylon' Internationa 7.257. ܢ

Page 81
E ECONOMY OF
labour force. A higher figure of 546,000 was given by the Socio-Economic Survey of Census and Statistics.1 More recently, cent of the labour force has been given (1973) of the Central Bank of Ceylon. 13 A indicate a significant increase in the rate c carefully. The estimates, excepting two, a of different definitions given to the term u estimates-the ILO 'low' estimate of 19 indicate only a small rise of the unemploy cent over the decade 1959-68.14 Perhaps in n faster due to the greater contrast betweel nating economy. At any rate, even if the l but hovered around 10-11 per cent of the l: sidered as quite high by any reasonable s
A disturbing feature of Sri Lanka's has been its heavy concentration among th Economic Survey of 1969/70, a proportio unemployed belonged to the age category for this category was 35 · 6 per cent of its the rate for the country's labour force as rate of unemployment among the educati over 27 per cent of the total number un level or higher educational qualifications middle grade (about 8-9 years) schooling. tional category of the labour force showe level of education. Thus, for the no schooli polyment rates were 8 per cent and 15 ] school and G.C.E. ordinary level categoi respectively.15 Hence, in the words of the had been educated, the greater the likelih The above figures may be deceptively hig to the labour force get their first jobs and tional qualifications. It is quite likely how
1. As quoted in Jones and Selvaratnam, o 12. Department of Census and Statistics: P
of Ceylon 1969-70. (Colombo, 1971). 3. Central Bank of Ceylon, The Determin Lanka 1973. Colombo, 1974. Other ( period are: The Consumer Finance Surv tion Census of 1963 (8.0-10.8%) and th 14. According to Richards these figures call in the rate of unemployment'. He sho two major groups-educated women a 15. ILO, Matching Employment. op. cit. 16. Ibid., p. 28.

RI LANKA 1948-73 78
persons or 14 per cent of the labour force of 1969/70 conducted by the Department a still higher estimate 743,000 or 18 · 1 per by the Labour Force Participation Survey lthough at first sight these figures seem to funemployment, they must be interpreted 'e not strictly comparable, mainly because nemployment.The two strictly comparable 9 and the Labour Force Survey of 1968ment rate from 10* 5 per cent to 11 * 0 per lore recent years the rate may have increased fast increasing labour force and the stagnemployment rate did not increase rapidly abour force, such a rate in itself can be contandard.
unemployment problem during these years e young age groups. According to the Sociohas high as 83 per cent of the total number of 18-24 years. The rate of unemployment labour force, which was almost three times whole. Even more disturbing was the high 'd youth. As reported in the above survey, amployed had obtained the GCE ordinary , while another 45 per cent had received The unemployment rate within each educad a tendency to be positively related to the ng and primary school categories, the unemper cent respectively while for the middle ies they were 39 per cent and 63 per cent : I.L.O. mission, "the more a young person lood that he or she will be unemployed'16. h because of the delay before new entrants because of possible exaggeration of educaever, that even after allowance is made for
2. cit., p. 174 (The Survey is unpublished). eliminary Report on the Socio-Economic Survey
ants of Labour Force Participation Rates in Sri stimates of unemployment available for this eys of 1963 (13.8%) and of 1973 (24%); Populaa Rural Employment Survey of 1964 (12.5%). not be "interpreted as showing a large increase ved that unemployment was rising only among d estate labour. (Richards op. cit, p. 63). Table 8, p. 28.

Page 82
76 E. M. G.
such possibilities, the unemployment rat would remain high. This situation could p; collar jobs. By 1970 there were "far too fe school with qualifications which only a fe this type of employment almost autom
(b) The Foreign Exchange Crisis
A major constraint on the growth of and a half has been the acute foreign exc has been cripplingly severe because of the for most of its capital goods, raw materi period 1972-73, despite stringent import c was 18 per cent. Almost half the imports per cent consisted of raw materials and ca gross domestic capital formation in these of heavy dependence on imports was true the period under review, no serious proble country's commodity terms of trade was b the import requirements for industrial sixties however, due to a chronic scarcity c starved of essential imports resulting in a and in the tempo of economic activity.
From 1957 through 1970 there has bee except for a small surplus in 1965. The su have been achieved by means of severe imp not reflect an improvement in the underl
The main factor behind this state of im What occurred in this respect may be seen
Since the mid-fifties, the merchandise e: trend. At best it has been constant. This situ in export prices because the export quant the other hand, the value of imports has incre after tended to remain at a high level. Tabl in the first half of this period has been due to in the later years it has remained high be balance in the sixties and afterwards has bet of the country's terms of trade. The comn 144 in the years 1957-60 to 81 in the period
17. Ibid., p. 16, Note however, the follow pp. 13-14) "Unemployment is heavily co, less, the picture of the open unemploye mark as many of the open unmployed a unreasonable job ambitions'.
18. Central Bank of Ceylon: Annual Repor

NASEKERA
s among the educated young age groups rtly be attributed to the scarcity of whitew white-collar jobs to satisfy those leaving w years earlier would have obtained them tically'.17
ri Lanka's economy during the last decade hange scarcity. Its effect on the economy economy's heavy dependence on imports als, and essential consumer goods. In the ontrols, the ratio of imports to the GNP consisted of essential food items while 44 pital goods. The latter's ratio to the total ears was 44 per cent. Although this kind of the economy even in the early years of im was faced on account of it because the etter, population pressure less severe, and purposes more limited. Since the early f foreign exchange, the economy has been fall in the living standards of the people
in a basic deficit in the balance of payments urpluses witnessed in the years after 1970 ort and exchange controls and, as such, do ying basic disequilibrium.
balance has been an adverse trade balance.
from Table 1.
kport income has not shown any increasing ation has obviously been due to a decline ity has shown a tendency to increase. On ased in the first half of this period and theree shows that the rise in the import value an increase in the quantity of imports while cause of escalating prices. Thus the trade n mainly due to a significant deterioration iodity terms of trade index declined from 1969-72. The export earnings were badly
ng observation made by Richards (op. cit, centrated in the young age groups. Nevertheas wanting white-collar jobs is wide off the e not particularly well educated and have no
1973.

Page 83
TE ECONOMY OF
hit by the fall in the prices of tea and rul contributed about 70 per cent of the merc average f.o.b. price of a pound of tea drop 1954-58 to 1969-73. Similarly, the price of cents over the same period.
TAB
Value, quantity and price of merch
Exports
Value Quantity Period (million Price SDR)(a) Index Index(l
1949-52 .. 322 74. 117 1953-56 . . 370 82 126 1957-60 . . 364 83 121 196-64 . . 375 96 10 1965-68 . . 364 101 109 1969-72 .. 317 99 117
Source
(a) Since the par value of the US D. are expressed in terms of the SI
(b) These indices have been prepare may somewhat overestimate the le in November 1967.
The government has tried to overcon by various ways. Import and exchange co the past decade and a half. Through thes been restricted to the import of most esse an inflow of private long term capital, the tance mainly in the form of long term an have resulted in a growing burden of deb eut of both long term and short term loa Rs. 33 million or 1 · 6 per cent of all foreig Rs. 1157 million or 41 per cent of all fo1
The government has continued to ri for a general devaluation of the rupee as a living standards of the low income groups. tion. This came as a result of the dual exc and continued to date. Under this arran (of 65 per cent now) is adopted for cer
19. Central Bank of Ceylon: Annual Repo
20. Although there was a devaluation in Nov Kingdom's devaluation of the pound st Sri Lanka's balance of payments dise Lanka's mbst important trading partn

RI LANKA 1948-73 77
ber-the two commodities which together handise export earnings of this period. The ped from 63 to 41 SDR cents in the period a pound of rubber fell from 30 to 19 SDR
LE 1
andise exports and imports 1949-72
Imports Terms of Trade
Value Quantity (naillion Price |) SDR)(a) Index Index(b)
286 86 82 144 320 97 86 147 393 126 86 144 359 06 87 128 365 101 106 103 380 97 146 81
: Central Bank of Ceylon, Annual Reports.
ollar has changed in recent years, these values ) R units of the IMF.
d in terms of Rupee prices. Hence the indices vel ofprices after the devaluation of the Rupee
ne the balance of paviments disequilibrium bntrols were imposed and have existed for e controls the use of foreign exchange has ntial goods and services. In the absence of government has made use of foreign assisd short term loans. These loans, however, t servicing. Interest and repayment arising ls have increased significantly from a mere in exchange earnings in 1961 to a staggering eign exchange earnings in 1973.19
sist the repeated demands from the IMF corrective measure, for fear of a fall in the There has however, been apartial devaluahange rate system introduced in May 1968, sement, an exchange rate with a premium ain imports not directly connected to the
"S. ember 1967 it was prompted more by the United erling at that time than by a desire to correct uilibrium, because United Kingdom was Sri 賞。

Page 84
78 H. M. GU
consumption pattern of the masses and fo the lower official exchange rate is adopted
While it is true that the foreign exchang ration of the country's commodity terms o lack of far sighted policies aimed at making cies. For example, the batter opportunities purpose of diversifying Sri Lanka's exports been taking place in the last decade or so cxport oriented and less import intensive. independence, the country's export base 1948-the heavy concentration on the th and coconut. In 1948-49 these three items export earnings. In 1971-72 the proportio
(c) The Role of the Government
During the quarter century under revi its control and influence over the ownership in the economy increased considerably.'" not only through an ever expanding budget tion ofeconomic enterprises, direct contro
A crude measure of the size of the gov of government expenditure to the GNP. This to 34 per cent in 1970-71. In absolute terr nearly sevenfold from Rs. 593 million to R from Rs. 85 to Rs. 311.
This rapid expansion was due mainly to from Rs. 433 million to Rs. 3,095 million their share of total expenditures from 73 pe rose from Rs. 157 million to Rs. 800 millior 26 to- 20 per centoo Most of the current ex
21. W. M. Tilekaratne: “How the FEEC Sc Industry, (Colombo, Industrial Developme Problem of a Multiple Currency System ir to Sri Lanka' Staff Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, .
In 1973 there was a significant change. Th exports fell to 79 per cent due to a sharp ir and to a lesser extent due to a fall in coc been due to the special incentives given b "non-traditional' items has also been giv is too early to say whether a definite brea of Sri Lanka's exports.
23. The term "government" here means onl
local government.
24. Central Bank of Ceylon. Annual Repor 25. Central Bank of Ceylon : op, cit,
2
2.

NASEKERA
r certain 'non-traditional' exports while
for all other exports and imports.'
'e crisis has been due, largely, to a deteriof trade, it has also partly been due to the the economy more resilient to such exigenin the carly fifties were not used for the Even the industrial development that has has not been properly planned to make it Consequently, after a quarter century of has hardly changed from what it was in ree primary commodities of tea, rubber contributed 90 per cent of merchandise n was almost the same.”
aw, the size of the government sector and ), allocation, and distribution of resources. This increasing role came to be exercised but also through the ownership and operals, and economic planning.
rnment sector in the economy is the ratio ratio increased from 21 per cent in 1947-48 ms, the government expenditure increased s. 3,975 million and on a per capita basis
the current expenditures which increased over this period resulting also in a rise in r cent to 78 per cent. Capital expenditures but their proportion in the total fell from penditures of this period went into social
heme came to be Introduced'. Research and nt Board, 1970); Dayapala Wijewardana: “The a Developing Economy with special reference April 1973. Colombo, Central Bank of Ceylon.
e share of these products in total merchandise crease in minor exports-particularly of gems nut exports. The increase in gem exports has y the State to such trade. The export of other 2n such encouragement lately. Nevertheless, it kthrough has been made in the diversification
the central government and hence excludes
S.

Page 85
TE ECONOMY OF ;
services and transfers to the private househ of free education and free health Services to on public debt-came to 55-63 per cent wh came to 45-52 per cent of current expend provided on a per capita basis, rapid pop substantial rise in the level of these expe
The heavy emphasis of government e. outcome of strong socio-political press the political decision making process cons on universal adult suffrage and where thi poverty and trade unions were strong, it w; to win or retain political power came to
Mounting current expenditures not on more of its available resources into immedia in inflationary budgets.” This was becaus face of the government's commitment to expenditure rose sevenfold from Rs. 593 revenue increased only fivefold from Rs. above period, resulting in persistent and which was Rs. 222 million or 15 per cent of to Rs. 936 million or 27 per cent of expen financial largely by borrowing from the bal Bank, they led to an increase in the country import policy with little or no import rest draining away the country's foreign assets.
26. Ibid.
27. On the basis of "two arbitrary "poverty
and USS 75 (in 1971 prices) 33.0 per cel population lived under poverty conditic Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Pro September 1974, p. 5, IMF and World
28. See Donald R. Snodgrass, Ceylon: An {!}: Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1966). Ma
974).
29. "Unwilling or unable for political reaso designed to hold down the price of food. would invite political disturbances and e effect, to pump money into the econom into the Poverty of Nations, 3 vols. (New
30. The composition of government revenue cularly after 1960. Due to import restric which contributed over half the revenue Their contribution was around 30 per cen 'tic indirect taxes had increased from a me mainly due to the Turnover Tax introd had increased from 22. to 25 per cent however, remained more of less constant to have increased more or less at the sam taxes on wealth and "nonearned' inco activity and inflation. w

SRI LANKA 1948-73 79
olds. Thus, social services-consisting mainly the public, and transfers excluding interest ile social services and food subsidies alone iture. Since most of these measures were ulation growth of this period resulted in a nditures.
Kpenditures on social welfare has been thc res. In the context of a system where isted of a Parliamentary democracy based mass of the voters lived on the verge of as inevitable that the political parties seeking stress policies of this nature.”
ly prevented the government from devoting itely productive investment but also resulted e of the lag in government revenue in the expand expenditures. While government million to Rs. 3,975 million, government 601 million to Rs. 2,815 million over the ever widening budget deficits. The deficit f total expenditure in 1957-58 had increased diture in 1970-71. Since these deficits were nking system, particularly, from the Central 's money supply. In the early years of liberal rictions, this expansionary policy led to the Since early sixties however, when stringent
ines of annual per capita incomes of U.S. S50 nt and 63.5 per cent respectively of Sri Lanka’s ons in 1969. (Montek S. Ahluwalia, “Income blem' Finance and Development Vo. II, No. 31 Bank Group, Washington D.C.
Export Economy in Transition (Homewood, rga Institute, Welfare and Growth (Colombo,
ns to cut welfare expenditures including those -any attempt to cut the subsidized rice ration lectoral defeat-the government continued, in r” Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry
York, Pantheon, 1968), Vol. I, p. 356.
changed significantly during these years, partitions and falling export prices, customs duties in the fifties declined in relative importance. t in the 1970-71 fiscal year. The share of domesre 6 per centin 1948-49 to 24 per cent in 1971-72 uced in the early sixties. Non-tax revenue also over these years. The share of direct taxes around 16 per cent. Although these taxes seem rate with the GNP, there was a case for higher mes in view of increasing domestic industrial

Page 86
80 H. M. GU
import controls came into being, its impact The Colombo Consumers' Cost of Living from 103.5 in 1960 to 165. 4 in 1973.
The government's role in the econom by the crude measure of the ratio of its e. ratio partially excludes the expenditures by the government in increasing numbers Public Corporations. These activities resulte private enterprises or from entirely new ve government which held power in the early by the government in commercial activitic with its heavy bias towards private enterpi radical change. The voting into power of D. Bandaranaike this year marked the be privileged classes of the society were able to ment policies.o Hence the government has in the economy since this year. Soon a country's bus transport service and the C new government industrial enterprises to leather products, caustic soda and chlol and hardboard. This trend was cont Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike (1960-64 and ment nationalised insurance and banki petroleum. More government Corporations of activities pertaining to the production an financing of such activities and also related 1956-73 the number of government Corpo invested in these corporations stood at RS
Another dimension in which the govern were the regulatory measures, which had a these measures there were, firstly, those rel vices. In order to ensure a fair distributio increasingly scarce over these years the gov regulation in place of the free market me was hit by an acute shortage of foreign exc exchange controls were imposed and excl
31. This index, however, grossly underestima economy, because of several major weal only the Colombo working class group items of expenditure are subsidised by th been revised to take account of possible (
32. For a discussion of the Socio-political
during these years see: Myrdal, op. cit., sections 1-3.

NASEKERA
has been mainly one of domestic inflation. Index (1952=100) registered an increase
y increased far beyond what is indicated penditure to the GNP. For example, the f the commercial enterprises undertaken luring this period through the medium of either from the nationalisation of existing ntures. Under the United National Party 'ears of independence, direct participation s was kept to a minimum in accordance ise. Since 1956 however, there has been a he People's United Front led by S. W. R. ginning of a trend under which the less have an increased influence over governplayed an increasingly interventionist role fter assuming power, it nationalised the olombo harbour. It also started several produce items such as sugar, plywood, ine, cotton yarn, ilmenite, bricks, tiles, inued further under the regimes of 1970-). In the early sixties her governng businesses, and the distribution of were launched to undertake a wide variety d distribution of goods and services, to the o the export-import trade. Over the period rations increased to 84. The total capital , 5,624 million in 1973.
ment influence over the economy increased significant impact on the economy. Among ating to the distribution of goods and sern of essential commodities which became 2rnment adopted a policy of rationing by hanism. For example, when the country hange in the late fifties, strict import and lange came to be rationed for essential
es the extent of inflation that prevailed in the nesses built into it. Most notably, it covers of consumers. Even here, some of the major government. Moreover, its weights have not hanges in recent years.
forces at work behind the economic scene Vol. I, pp. 343-360; Marga Institute, op.cit.,

Page 87
THE ECONOMY OF
purposes on the basis of a system of licens of imports and essential goods domestic operatives and authorised dealers. There exchange frauds, black marketeering an controls. Nevertheless, in the context of c of the people, these regulations have bene in pursuance ofthe policy of greater equal the earlier policy of socialisation of the
other measures in recent years. The Lanc to restrict individual ownership of land b and 50 acres for highland. Under this Act of privately held land and given a part and co-operative farms and to the Stat scheme has however, been devised to ens acquired land. This measure, despite its
long standing need for land I eforms in Si this direction in 1958 by the enactment of to the fixing of maximum land rent payab security oftenure to such farmers.' Anoth tion of income and wealth was the ceili limited the maximum number of holises
provision for surplus houses to be purch same year brought all houses under rent co 1972 the government introduced a ceiling sable income, requiring the excess incom fund.' A capital levy was also introd
While for the most part government p in a variety of haphazard ways, some atte With an increasing realisation of the nee was an increasing progress made in the r ment in Sri Lanka started with hardly ar for such activity. By the early sixties ho had been set up. In 1965 a separate Minis separate departments in charge of Fore.
33. Central Bank of Ceylon: Annual Report on the Economy of Ceylon (Unpublish detailed account of the working of the
34. Agrarian Research and Training Ins
(Colombo, 1974), p. 155.
35. This Act was amended in 1974 to inclu 36. This income ceiling has since then been r
37. An exhaustive study of Sri Lanka's p of employment, is found in Birgen Moll in Developing Countries with Special (Sri Lanka). Scandinavian Institute of holm 1972.
S44

SRI LANKA 1948-73 81 .
ng.* On the domestic front, the distribution lly produced came to be entrusted to cohave been problems of smuggling, foreign corruption usually associated with such erall scarcities and poverty of the majority ited large sections of the society. Secondly ty in the distribution of income and wealth, means of production was supplemented by Reform Law of 1972 for example, sought fixing a ceiling of 25 acres for paddy land the government has acquired 559,377 acres f it over to landless individuals, collective ; Plantations Corporation.' No systematic ure efficient long term development of the imitations, has fulfilled to some extent the i Lanka. Although an attempt was made in he Paddy Lands Bill, its purpose was limited le by tenant farmers and to granting greater er measuire falling into the area ofredistribung on House Property Law of 1973 which an individual could own to two, and made ased by tenants while the Rent Act of the bntrol with substantial reductions in rent. In of Rs. 24,000 per year on individual dispo2 to be contributed to a compulsory savings lced in 1972.
articipation in economic activities took place ‘mpt was also made at economic planning.8 di for planned economic development, there hachinery of planning. Independent governy administrative machinery specially set lap wever, a Department of Economic Planning try of Planning and Economic Affails with gn Aid and Plan Implementation, was set
J. G. G. Motha: The Impact of Import Policies 2d) Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford, 1971, gives a se controls.
itute: New Settlement Schemes in Sri Lanka
ile tenancy on highlands too under its purview. ised to Rs.30,000 per year with effect from 1975.
anning efforts, especially from the point of view r: Employment Approaches to Economic Planning Reference to Development Planning of Ceylon Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 9, Stock

Page 88
82 A. M. G.
up under the direct supervision of the Pri nating Committee on Economic Question seventies, regional planning offices were
Implementation was raised to the status o Ministry of Planning began a system of the first time, an input output table fol
The actual achievements of planning Plan (1959-68)38 which was the first plann in Sri Lanka, was never implemented assassination of S. W. R. D. Bandara Programme (1962-64)39 drawn up by the g not be fully implemented because the Parl government's loss of a vote of no confidenc National Party (1965-70), the emphasis w grammes in a few strategic areas of the ei The cornerstone of this government's d launched for the purpose of making Sri I foods. This emphasis was due not only to culture over industry but also due to t and because of the possibility of finding a p scarcity through import substitution in foo( in the output of rice, chillies, onions and pc problems of the country continued to wo expectation to win the General Elections the Food Drive.
A five year development plan (The F implemented by the United Front gover came into power in 1970. It was aim in urgent need of attention at this time. large scale unemployment and poverty am development strategy centred around pea Other important aspects of the plan were of the tourist industry and the emphasis on The plan's main targets were a growth rate c unemployment from 14 to 7 per cent.
38. National Planning Council: The Ten
39. The Department of National Planning:
1962.
40. Moller: op. cit, p. 238.
41. Gamani Corea “Economic Planning, Th Ceylon'' in Wilfred L. David (ed.) Public Essays in Honour of Ursula Hicks, (Londol
42. Ministry of Planning and Employment:

VIJNASEKERA
me Minister himself. A Cabinet Co-Ordis was also formed at this time. In the early also set up and the Department of Plan f a separate Ministry. In the late sixties, the project evaluation and also prepared, for
the economy.
were however, quite modest. The Ten Year ing document of a serious nature prepared due to political turmoil following the naike. The Three Year Implementation overnment of Mrs. Bandaranaike too could iament was dissolved in 1964 following the ce. During the second regime of the United as on the implementation of selective proconomy rather than on a long term plan. evelopment strategy was its Food Drive, anka self-sufficient in rice and subsidiary the UNP's traditional preference for agrihe acute scarcity of food in these years artial solution to the acute foreign exchange 1. Statistical data indicate a marked increase statoes. Nevertheless, the overalleconomic rsen. The government failed to realise its of 1970 on the strength of the success of
ive Year Plan, 1972-76) was prepared and 'nment led by Mrs. Bandaranaike which led at three main problems which were , namely, the foreign exchange problem, ong the mass of the population. Hence its sant agriculture and agro-based industry. , the diversification of exports, expansion labour intensive techniques of production. f 6.0 per cent per annum and the reduction
^Yer Pa 1959.
The Short-Term Implementation Programme,
e Green Revolution and the "Food Drive' in Finance, Planning and Economic Development: & Basingstoke, McMillan, 1973) pp. 273-303.
The Five Year Plan, Colombo, 1971.

Page 89
THE ECONOMY O
In the two years 1972-73 the actual pe targets. The average growth rate was only in 1973 and unemployment appeared to h; ever, it must be pointed out that its suc alia by the crippling imcrease of import pri realignments, and the fuel crisis of 1973. 150 in 1971 to 209 in 1973. Export earnin expenditures to raise resources for the pla mentary Group.
Looking back, the planning efforts of
actors, mainly the lack of continuity of { for plan implementation. Frequent chang sonnel has led to the discontinuity of plans machinery created under the colonial regir try's political control, was clearly inadec plans, because of its inefficiency, red tape Above all, there was no commitment by th of economic development. Perhaps, in th elements of politics, creed, caste, and lang about such a unity of purpose.
Although the domains of the public clearly demarcated, planning activity ac economy. Hence, even as the role of the given to the private sector through fiscal in tax holidays and indefinite loss carry ov invited from time to time on the basis of to say however, to what extent these conc of the private sector. As pointed out by some of these concessions may even have captive market due to import controls.
43. Central Bank of Ceylon: Annual Repo! 44. Ibid.
45. In December 1974, the Five Year Plan c
programme of investment.
46. In order to "transform the existing b something better' and to achieve "an e ultimately in everything else too' a ne Political Authority was set up in late 19 Districts of the island a District Politic of the National State Assembly being a power to make and execute decisions rel a block sum of money was given to it by the articles in the Ceylon Observer Magaz
47. Report of the Taxation Inquiry Commiss 48. Ibid., p. 47.

SRI LANKA 1948-73 83
formance of the economy fell short of the
3. 1 per cent.** A food crisis developed ve increased. In fairness to the Plan, howessful implementation was thwarted inter es due to world market scarcities, currency import price index (1967-100) rose from gs stagnated too. A move to reduce welfare in was rejected by the Government. Parlia
Sri Lanka seem to have failed due to several fert and the lack of a suitable machinery s in government and of high ranking perand programmes. The existing bureaucratic he for the purpose of centralising the counuate for the successful implementation of and alienation from the common people.' !e nation as a whole to a given programme e plural society of Sri Lanka, the divisive uage may have been too powerful to bring
sector and the private sector were never icepted the basic framework of a mixed government expanded, encouragement was centives such as generous capital allowances er benefits." Foreign investment too was certain terms and conditions. It is difficult :essions were responsible for the expansion he Taxation Inquiry Commission of 1967. : been superfluous in view of the prevalent Further, it has been shown that the recent
1973.
me to be abandoned and replaced by a crash
lreaucracy ridden administrative system into :onomic breakthrough in food production and administrative device known as the District 3. Under this, in each of the 22 Administrative 1 Authority was established with a member pointed as its head. The Authority was given ted to government activity of the district, and the central government for this purpose. (Vide ne Edition, 2nd, 9th and 16th December 1973).
on. Sessional Paper No. X-1968, Part II.

Page 90
84 H. M. G.
import substitution in industry in Sri Lai
wealth among a few families. If at all,
has been inadequate not so much due to to the uncertainty of its future in the econc present consumption vis-a-vis future cc
... ECONOMIC GROWT)
(a) Growth
Sri Lanka's GNP at constant prices inc million in the period 1950-60. This work of 4.6 per cent. Allowing for a populatio the per capita GNP increased at the rate of rupees to 633 rupees. Since the commodity to the country, the real national income b{ Rs. 4,510 million to Rs. 6,699 million and from Rs. 587 to Rs. 677.
During the period 1961-73, the GN million to Rs. 10,383 million. 5. This yields per cent. Since the population growth rate f GNP per capita increased at the rate of 1.8 unfavourable to Sri Lanka in these years increased only from Rs. 6,274 million to R capita rose from Rs. 617 to Rs. 700.
Table II summarises the trends in the ( two periods. As the table shows, the differe in a change in their relative importance in t sector's growth rate has lagged behind tho GNP has declined from 49.8 to 44.7 per ci 32.6 per cent in the period 1961-73. The ind Manufacturing, Construction and Electr. growth rate which has resulted in an increa
49. N. M. Perera, Minister of Finance: The
Bureau, Colombo. In this budget speech survey conducted on the total investmer is over Rs. 1 million, it has been found th as much as Rs. 205 million is held by only (for five years) companies he said "In all the capital investment, in some cases amo (p. 35). 50. It will be noted that the discussion in this 1950-60 and 1961-73. The reason is main is reliable and comparable, extending ove division is appropriate too, because the one preceding because of the emergenc development, and several other develop
51. Data from Snodgrass, op. cit. 52. Data from the Central Bank of Ceylc

NASEKERA
ka has led to an undue concentration of he private sector's role in the economy he insufficiency of fiscal incentives as due my and the economy's heavy bias towards nsumption.
AND RESOURCE USE0
reased from Rs. 4,003 million to Rs. 6,269 out to an annual compound growth rate 1 growth rate of 2.7 per cent per annum, 1.9 per cent, per annum. It rose from 521 terms of trade were in general favourable haved more favourably. It increased from with it per capita national inccme rose
at constant prices rose from Rs. 6,425 an annual compound growth rate of 4.1 or this period was 2.3 per cent per annum, per cent. The terms of trade however, were Consequently, the real national income s. 9,212 million. Real national income per
lifferent sectors of the economy over these nt sectors grew at different rates, resulting he economy. In particular, the agricultural se of others. Consequently, its share in the ent in the period 1950-60 and from 40.7 to ustrial sector (i.e. Minning and Quarrying city, Gas and Water) showed a higher se in its share of contribution to the GNP
3udget Speech 1975, Government Publications Dr. Perera pointed out, ". . . . . . In a recent t in the industrial sector where capitalisation at out of a total investment of Rs. 275 million 11 family groups'. Referring to the tax holiday but one the profits for the five years exceeded inting to between 300 & 500 per cent of capital”
section is given in terms of two sub periodsy the lack of a continuous series of data which the entire quarter century under review. The jeriod after 1960 was really different from the of a "closed' economy, domestic industrial ments largely unknown in the earlier period.
th: Annual Reports.

Page 91
THE ECONOMY OF Sl
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I LANKA 1948-73
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Page 92
86 H. M., GU
from 11. 6 to 15.5 per cent in the earlier p latter period. The Service Sector (i. e. Tra and Retail Trade, Banking; Insurance; Public Administration and Defence; and :
Agricultural Sector.--This sector rem to the GNP and the most important sourc slow growth rate it recorded over these particularly in terms of employment. Thes force of the economy directly employed 52.9 per cent in 1963 and 50.4 per cent
The low growth rate recorded by the due to the sluggishness of plantation agric to its stagnation and the faster growth rate mainly-paddy cultivation-the share co, total agricultural output declined steadil 1950-60 and was only 31 per cent in 1973. terms of employment. Direct employment from 29 to 25 per cent of the total gainf years under review.
Although both demand and supply fa tion agriculture, the demand side seems ti is because the two most important indus adversely affected by continuing erosion c the face of generally increasing output. Te 316 million pounds in 1950-51 to 497 mi of a pound of tea fell from Rs. 3.30 in 1: production of tea did not fall correspondi last few years there has been a drop in the a decline in output. In 1973, due to a fall short of her quota fixed under the Agre on tea..
The rubber industry too has been hit b of rubber declined steadily from Rs. 1.65 i. years too, except for 1969, it remained lic
53. Department of Census and Statistics:
Pocketbook 1973. The above figures ma in the definitions of sectors, adopted in 54. Snodgrass: op. cit, p. 128, table 63. C
р. 28. 55. Since 1966 except for 1968, however te 56. Starting with the Mauritius Tea Agreeme scheme among major tea produces of the tural Organisation. Each country partici
for each year vide P. C. Bansil, Cey'lo, Roi & Sons, 1971) pp. 194-195.

NASEKEIRA
eriod and from 16.4 to 21.4 per cent in the nsport, Storage and Commerce, Wholesale ind Real Estate, Ownership of Dwellings: services) also increased its share.
ained the single most important cortributor ; of cmployment in the economy despite the years. Its dominant position was reflected hare of the total gainfully employed labour by this sector was 52.6 per cent in 1946, in 1971.58
agricultural sector (see table II) was mainly ulture (i.e. Tea, Rubber, and Coconut). Due of the rest of the agricultural sector, due to intributed by plantation agriculture to the y from 74 to 51 per cent in the period This declinic however, was less marked in in the plantations sector had declined only ul employment over f he entire twenty five
ctors have led to the slow growth in plantao have had the more deterrent effect. This tries of this sector-tea and rubbel-were of prices during most part of this period in a production increased by 60 per cent from llion pounds in 1965-66. The f.o.b. price 955 to Rs. 2.22 in 1967. Since the cost of ngly, the profit margins have sagged. In the rate of fertiliser use in tea plantations and in production, Sri Lanka's tea exports fell sement of the Inter-Governmental Group
by falling prices. The fo.b. price of a pound n 1960 to 97 cents in 1967. In the subsequent ow before bouncing back to the 1960 level
census Reports 1946, 1963, and the Statistical y not be strictly comparable due to differences
the census reports.
entral Bank of Ceylon: Annual Report 1973,
production has shown a declining tendency.
nt of 1969 there has been a tea supply restriction world under the aegis of the Food and Agriculpating in the scheme is given a quota of supply 1 Agriculture: A Perspective (Delhi Dhanpat

Page 93
THE ECONOMY OF
in 1973. The output of rubber which fluct prices rose steadily from 96,000 tons in rubber replanting scheme started by the
- The behaviour of the coconut indust problem has been mainly one of an inela not shown any definite increasing trend, thi Production, however, increased only verys only by 20 percent from 2,248 million nuts. Rapid increase in the domestic consump stagnant supply led to a rapid decline in the commodity. This share dropped from 1971-73. The acreage under coconut incre 1,152,428 acres over the period 1946 to yield per acre too has increased only ver the industry were the slow breeding of Research Institute, the shortage of capital under utilisation offertiliser.o These prob unlike tea and rubber, the coconut indu, almost 70 per cent of the holdings being
During the period under consideration industry in several ways, the most signific based on cash subsidies and fertiliser subs it is mainly this replanting scheme which declining prices. The tea replanting schel but has not yet begun to yield benefits on has been too slow. The tea industry has b tion scheme begun in 1966 and by a tax
The most noteworthy change that o these years was the rapid increase in pa form of activity in peasant agriculture. Pe during the growth of plantations and was to receive increasing attention from the come to occupy a significant place in th the rise in paddy production, its shar sector has increased from 26 to 69 pe
57. The price of natural rubber shot up in
synthetic rubber being adversely affect Annual Report 1973, p. 233).
58. Department of Census and Statistics:
Pocket Book, op. cit.
59. I.L.O. Matching Employment. . . . . . ор. 60. Census of Agriculture, op. cit.
61. Central Bank of Ceylon, Annual Repo! 62. Snodgrass: op. cit., p. The Central B:

RI LANKA 1948-73 87
lated in the fifties in response to fluctuating 1961 to 157,000 in 1970 due mainly to a
government.
ry has been somewhat different. Here the stic supply. Although coconut prices have y seem to have been favourable in general. lowly. The average annual output increased in 1951-53 to 2,697 million nuts in 1971-72. tion of this commodity in contrast to its the share of exports in the total output of 56 per cent in 1955-57 to 36 per cent in ased only by 6 per cent from 1,070,942 to 1962 and then remained constant. The y slowly. Some of the problems affecting new varieties of coconuts by the Coconut and poor extension services and the chronic lems have been particularly severe because, stry is mainly a small holders' industryowned by small holders.'
, the government tried to help the plantation cant of which were its replanting schemes idies to the producers. In the case of rubber
has saved it from possible disaster due to me seems to have progressed satisfactorily a significant scale. For coconut, the scheme een further assisted by a factory modernisa
1ebate scheme.'
ccurred within the agricultural sector over ddy production, which is the predominant asant agriculture which had been neglected relatively unimportant even in 1948, came government in subsequent years and has e economy in recent years. Due mainly to e of the total output in the agricultural ir cent over the period 1950-73. Paddy
the world market in 1973 due to the supply of bd by the oil crisis (Central Bank of Ceylon. Census of Agriculture 1952, Part III, Table I;
cit., p. 63.
f. unk of Ceylon: Annual Report 1973.

Page 94
88. H. M. G.
production increased by 160 per cent fror growing at 8 per cent per annum over the vested increased from 1,027,000 acres to acre rose from 29 to 46 bushels over this p has made it possible for Sri Lanka to red per cent of total consumption over the pe of population."
The steady progress of paddy product modern sectors of the economy' is quite re a peasant activity. Most of this progress directed towards the rejuvenation of the extension of the area under paddy cultiv peasant colonisation Schemes. Since the S had been exhausted (the acreage under c cent in this period) it became necessary to acreage under cultivation in uhisa: ea increas 1968 the number of colonists settled in th the acreage newly brought under paddy wa vation were accompanied by policies of in scheme for paddy has existed since 1948. an extension service, a fertiliser subsidy yielding varieties of paddy have also been ir earlier sought to help tenant farmers by security of tenure.
In addition to paddy, the production o. particularly after 1960 when their imports The quantity index of highland crops (l pointed out previously, Sri Lanka becam chillies during these years, although short weather conditions and other difficulti
63. Department of Census and Statistics: St 64. Ibid.
65. Department of Information Samajavaad tute, Co-operative System of Small Farm 1971, p. 92.
66. The growth rate of plantation agriculture example production of tea industry consi of the most efficient industries of the w per annum in the period 1950-51 to 19
67. Bansil : op. cit.
The following observation illustrates the vation after independence : “The increa dence is illustrated by the fact that the ex 400,000 in the 84 year period from . . . in the 20 year period between 1946 and 1 1967, p. 20.
68. Department of Census and Statistics: 1

TNASEKERA
in 25 million bushels to 65 million bushels, period 1952-53 to 1971-72.o The area har647,000 acres while the average yield per eriod.' The rapid increase in paddy output ce its rice imports from 50 per cent to 28 riod 1955 to 1970 despite rapid growth of
ion at a rate unsurpassed even by the most markable in view of the fact that it is mainly can be attributed to government policies peasant sector. One such policy was the ation by means of irrigation projects and upply of cultivable land in the Wet Zone ultivation here increased only by 0.4 per open up new lands in the Dry Zone. The (ed by 41 per cent over this period. By mid e Dry Zone had increased to 80,000 while s 200,000. The policies of extensive cultitensive cultivation too. A guaranteed price Peasant farmers have been supplied with and also with credit facilities. New high troduced. The Paddy Lands Act mentioned fixing maximum rents and guaranteeing
f a variety of subsidiary foods also increased were either restricted or banned altogether. 962=100) increased to 161 in 1970. As e self sufficient in potatoes, onions and ages occurred now and then due to adverse
S.
atiscal Abstract, Statistical Pocket Books 1973.
ee Gamana, (Colombo, 1958) p. 9, Marga Instier Credit in Sri Lanka, (Sinhala Translation)
fell far short of that of paddy production. For sting mostly of large estates (described as "one prld' (Bansil op. cit., p. 186) grew at only 4% 65-66.
high degree of interest shown in paddy cultised interest in paddy cultivation after indepentent of paddy land increased by approximately
1862 to . . . 1946, and by a further 400,000 }66", Report of the Land Utilisation Committee,
he Pocket Book, ... op. cit.

Page 95
THE ECONOMY OF S
These, undoubtedly, were significant a to be done for making domestic agricul increasing the living standards of the peas the majority of peasants still live Qn the economic Survey of 1969-70, the per capita was less than Rs. 400 per year.' The sam unemployment in the rural areas was 15 p. the total number unemployed in the whole over, a large number of families in the rura size of cultivation plots are other constrail Census of Agriculture 1962, 41 per cent o cent of land under such holdings consiste has probably worsened since then because increased more slowly than the growth of population per acre of cultivable land inc persons in 1969. There is also an acute sho and credit. Scant attention has been paid to husbandry in general, which are necessary base.
A vigorous policy directed towards r necessary not only for alleviating poverty for reducing the pressure on the balance of of import substitution in all essential fo agriculture particularly in the Dry Zone is ratios of the peasant colonizations schemes funds have been sunk in the past.
Industrial Sector.-The high growth due to the progress made in manufacturin contributed 90-95 per cent of industrial pro output of these two sectors increased from prices, with the sectors' share in the GNI Employment increased from 359,724 to 3 cent of total employment in the econor
69. socio-Economic Survey-op. cit. 70. In 1957, 54% of rural families were in de
34% of average annual family income. of Rural Indebtedness Ceylon 1957, Ta 71. Department of Census and Statistics. Ce 72. Jones & Selvaratnam, op. cit., p. 193. 73. A good example in this respect was the ( Inquiry which made an exhaustive study have revealed some striking fatures to makers in the future. The first is the p ment of the Gall Oya Project”. Report Sessional Paper No. 1, 1970, p. 240.
74. Department of Census and Statistics

RI LANKA 1948-73 89
chievements. Nevertheless, much remained ure a dynamic sector capable of rapidly ants. Despite the progress recorded so far, erge of poverty. According to, the Socioincome of 46 per cent of rural households e survey indicated that while the rate of er cent of its labour force, 69 per cent of island, belonged to the rural sector. Moreareas are in debt." Landlessness and small its faced by the peasants. According to the prepared paddy holdings covering 17 per i of plots under one acre.' This situation : the cultivable land in the rural areas has rural population and the density of such reased from 1.34 persons in 1946 to 2.02 rtage of other inputs such as water, fertiliser activities such as dairy farming and animal for a more diversified peasant agricultural
apid development of the peasant sector is among the mass of the population but also payments through a successful programme odstuffs. Raising productivity in peasant also necessary to raise the low benefit-cost in which vast amounts of scarce investment
rate seen in this sector was almost wholly
g and construction-the two sectors which
duction. In the period 1950-60 the combined
Rs. 433 million to Rs. 870 million at current
P rising from 1 1 per cent to 14.6 per cent.
98,930 persons or 12 per cent to 12.4 per ny.
bt while the average debt per family was about Department of Census and Statistics. Survey ble 2.
nsus of Agriculture 1962. Vol. III, Table IV.
3al Oya Colonization Scheme. A committee of of this scheme reported “Our detailed findings which close attention must be paid by policy oor benefit cost ratio of the colonization elleof the Gal Oya Project Evaluation Committee.
-Census Reports.

Page 96
Qt) H. M. GUN
The manufacturing sector, however, w period were mainly of small scale, and assoc included, handloom textiles, coir, oil and soap, cement, and electricity. The index in 1954 to 135 in 1959 (1952=100)."
The growth of a large industrial sectic existence of a free trade policy and a poli government, the latter being true in the first of payments problem until late in the dec factured goods were imported.
In the period 1961-73 the value adde from Rs. 1015 million to Rs. 1933 million, tion to the GNP increased from 15.8 to 1. 398,930 to 459,800 persons or from 12.4 to force in the economy. During this period buoyant due to two factors. Firstly, the st early sixties, gave rise to a captive mal the demand for scarce imports, local im behind the protective wall of import contro sity of these industries was not a barrier t goods could be imported under these regu Secondly, since 1956 the government has en lisation in which the government sector itse up heavy industry. We have already referr were begun after 1956. It would suffice her had set up 25 Industrial Corporations. Th from Rs. 92 million in 1956 to Rs. 2,414 mi Rs. 50 million to Rs. 1,074 million at curr
There were however, several drawback of this period. Firstly, it was heavily bias goods. Secondly, industrial activity was hig tries catered almost exclusively to the loca little or no help in enhancing the econon they were highly capital intensive, becaus helped little to solve the unemployment pri
75. Snodgrass: op. cit., Neil Dias Karumaratn tial in Sri Lanka (Colombo, Industrial D 76. Department of Census and Statistics. o. 77. This does not of course mean that they ha scarcity. On the contrary, as the years we duce at capacity levels due to insufficie Central Bank of Ceylon : Annual Rep. 78. Central Bank of Ceylon: Annual Reports,
ment vide Neil Dias. Karunaratne. ATe in Sri Lanka, the articles by Karunatillak in Research and Industry, op. cit,

ASEKERA
as small in this period. Industries of this lated mostly with the primary sector. They milling, plumbago mining, rubber goods of industrial production rose from 92.4
r seems to have been discouraged by the cy of non-participation in industry by the half of the fifties. As there was no balance ade, the country's requirements of manu
in manufacturing and construction rose at constant prices. The share of contribu8.6 per cent. Employment increased from 15.7 per cent of the total employed labour manufacturing activity became increasingly ringent import controls in existence since ket for manufactured goods. To meet port substitution industries mushroomed ls and high tarifs. The high import inteno them because raw materials and capital lations, some even at tariff concessions." barked on a deliberate policy of industrialf assumed the sole responsibility of setting ed to the state economic enterprises that e to mention that by 1973 the government e total investment of these ventures rose llion in 1973 with gross output rising from ent prices.”o
;s in the pattern of industrial development ed towards the manufacture of consumer hly import intensive. Thirdly, these indusmarket as a result of which they were of ly's foreign exchange earnings. Fourthly, e of which the manufacturing sector has oblem of the economy. Industrial progress
ë. Techno-Economic Survey of Industrial Potenbevelopment Board of Ceylon, 1973).
. cit. l no difficulties on account of foreign exchange nt by they found it difficult to expand or pront availability of imported inputs. (see, The orts). For a survey of Sri Lanka's industrial developchno-Economic Survey of Industrial Potential e, Kanesalingam, Divatia, and Jayawardena

Page 97
THE EconoMY OF s
of this period has suffered from a lack of ment. Even the government run corporati matic management and only a handful of th cially viable role.
Service Sector.-A relatively high gi particularly after 1961. The most notewort. Insurance and the Wholesale and Retail Tra spread rapidly after 1960 with the establish ment to cater specially to the rural sector an of domestic agriculture and import substitu helpful for the progress of banking busines foreign trade and plantation sectors concentration.'
(b) Resource Use
During most of the years under consic economy's use of resources to exceed the tence of a recurrent balance of payment del consumption and investment increased, th high level throughout. Thus in the period Rs. 5,929 million whereas the GNP at cu million to Rs. 6,476 million. Consumptio to a 55 per cent increase in the GNP. Gro from Rs. 382 million to Rs. 785 million. I investment was financed by thc inflow of for example, the rate of investment in the estic saving was only 9 per cent of the G increased from Rs. 5,838 million to Rs. 14 GNP at current market prices increased million or by 151 per cent." Gross Dome. million to Rs. 2,630 million with slight GNP however, it did not show a rising t. levels in the years 1968-70. For the perio, capital formation in the economy was 16. saving rate was only 13.5 per cent, foreig Sri Lanka's domestic investment througi
... SOCIA
In contrast to the disappointing perf usual tests of economic efficiency and grow progress was made on the front of social w which though not in all respects comprehen
79. Central Bank of Ceylon: Annual Repo! 80. Vide, supra, discussion on foreign excha 81. Snodgrass: op. cit, Table A-2.
82. I.L.O. : Matching Employment . . . op. c.

LANKA 1948-73 9.
lanning and co-ordination by the governins lacked advanced planning and system have so far been able to play a commer
owth rate was seen in this sector too ly expansion was seen in the Banking and le sectors. Banking activity in the economy ment of the People's Bank by the governi the co-operative societies. The expansion tion activity in industry were particularly aid trade and for their extension beyond which were their traditional areas of
eration there has been a tendency for the
amount generated, as shown by the exis
icit since 1957. Although both aggregate
le former continued to remain at a very
1950-60, it rose from Rs. 3,615 million to rrent market prices rose from Rs. 4,171
n had increased by 64 per cent in contrast
ss Domestic Capital Formation increased
in the later years, however, a part of this foreign resources. In the period 1959-60 economy was 13.5 per cent while dom
NP. In the period 1961-73, consumption ,246 million or by 144 per cent while the from Rs. 6,696 million to Rs. 6,816 stic Capital formation rose from Rs. 1,102
occasional fluctuations. As a ratio to the rend although it reached somewhat high d 1961-73 as a whole the average rate of 0 per cent. Since the average domestic in resources continued to finance a part of hout these years.
WELFARE
ormance of the economy in terms of the th rate of the GNP per capita, remarkable elfare during this period. "A health service sive, was unusually so by Asian standards'
fS. Inge crisis.
f.

Page 98
92 H. M. Gt
created by the state resulted in a remarkab dard of the population. The crude death ra to 7.5 per thousand in 1970. The infant II thousand live births in the same period. M to 1.2 per thousand live births.o The aver 43.9 years to 64.8 years for males and fro1 the period 1946 to 1967.' A comparable ad too. Due to a system of free education pro through the university there was a rapid all classes of the population, particularly t The literacy rate increased from 37.8 to : the proportion of population with secon 30.4 per cento
Other social welfare measures introd included large scale subsidies and price co subsidy in particular, although it has bee and an economically vulnerable' measure shment of the recipients at least in calorie in some other less developed countrics. D to workers and a policy of progressive i made in the sphere of income redistributio distribution declined from 0.50 in 1953 and to a recent study of 18 countries by a Wo share of the lowest 40 per cent of income re. was 8.0 per cent per annum. This rate wa among the 18 countries studied.
These achievements have indeed been c a sense of social justice but have also helpe socio-political system. Furthermor c, in pr education and free health facilities, they laic of the economy's stock of human capital. no doubt be necessary, at least from the p perhaps on a more selective basis to help public. It should be stressed however, that I sity on humanitarian grounds should blind least an equal emphasis on a sound progra economy. In the past these welfare measure the game of politics by merely tinkering wi trast between the expectations of the peo economy's ability to fulfill such expectation of economic development designed to trans to be an urgent necessity.
83. Administration Report of the Registrar 84. Department of Census and Statistics: Po 85. Department of Census and Statistics: Ce 86. I.L.O., op. cit. 87. Central Bank of Ceylon: Survey of Sri La 88. Ahluwalia : op. cit., pp. 5-6.

NASEKIERA
le improvement in the average health stane declined from 21.5 per thousand in 1945 hortality rate dropped from 140 to 51 per aternal mortality rate declined from 16.5 age life expectancy at birth increased from n 41.8 years to 66.9 years for females over vance was made in the sphere of education ided by the government from kindergarten xpansion of educational opportunities to he vast majority of the low income group. 32.6 per cent in the period 1946—69 while dary school education rose from 9.8 to
uced by the government over these years introls, pensions and poor relief. The rice n "an expensive way of helping the poor , has led to the improvement in the nouris and to the prevention of starvation seen Je to a deliberate policy of Wage increases ncome taxation, significant progress was 1. The Gini Concentration ratio of income 0.49 in 1963 to 0.41 in 1973. According irld Bank group, the growth rate of income ceivers in Sri Lanka for the period 1963-70 is the fourth highest for this income group
commendable. They have not only fulfilled i to maintain the stability of the country's oviding an extensive programme of free a strong basis for the long run increase Their continuation into the future would oint of view of view of social justice, but only the really needy groups among the either these achievements nor their necesthe policy makers from the need for at imme of diversifying and developing the s may have enabled the politicians to play th economic planring. But now the conple for higher living standards and the s is so great that a sustained programme form the whole economic structure seems
-General, op. cit. 2ket Book, op. cit.
sus 1946, Socio-Economic Survey. op. cit.
nka's Consumer Finances, 1973, p. 62.

Page 99
IX
BUDDHISM IN POST-IND
KTSIRI N
The Buddhist "revival of the ninete development into a mass nationalist mo independence that Buddhism in fact ent towards national independence, as has f Secular one organised by leaders belongi agitations were focussed mainly on reforn for the manner in which Buddhism enter dence years, one has to take into consid religion derived as a result of changes whic the colonial and post-colonial periods it i IEICeS.
The Buddhist revival of the nineteent colonial order-an order which differed Buddhist kingdoms. In place of the int authority which had prevailed under tradit of the two. The persistence of Buddhist prac on voluntary efforts rather than on state colonial predecessors, professed a policy c qualified or attenuated it was in actual pr it allowed the free operation of voluntal Such freedom (which was not available i and without indeed a separation of politi the formation of new and autonomous 1 and in particular non-goyigama fraterni time.
As in the formation of new monast Christian missionaries, voluntary efforts organising these associations, the Budd ones that they opposed. "If you ask ho advised them, “I point you to your great their large and wealthy Bible, Tract, Su the tremendous agencies they support to

(I)
EPENDENCE, SRI LANKA
MALALGODA
enth century apparently had potential for vement, but it was only in the years after ered the political arena. The movement requently been noted, was an elitist and ng to several religions, and their political ls of the constitution. In trying to account ed the political arena in the post-Indepeneration the vitality and strength that this h occurred under colonial rule, but between s possible to discern some significant diffe
h century was very much a product of the
radically from the traditional Sinhaleseerdependence of Buddhism and political ional kingdoms there was now a separation tices and organizations, therefore, depended patronage. The British, in contrast to their if religious liberty, and this policy, however actice, nonetheless had significance in that y efforts to promote Buddhism. Without n the Portuguese and early Dutch times) cal and religious (Buddhist) establishments monastic fraternities in the low countrylies-would have been impossible at the
ic fraternities so in the campaign against and associations played a vital role. In hists consciously followed the Christian v we should organise our forces', Olcott enemy, Christianity, and bid you look at nday School, and Missionary Societieskeep alive and spread their religion. We
3

Page 100
94 KITTSIRI M
must form similar societies, and make our their managers'.
There were, to be sure, many Buddhi colonial government for the maintenance ( lised by the lack of it, or who complaine actively working against Buddhism. But til these arguments. Olcott repeatedly asked colonial government to support their religi selves. His one-time colleague and represe "The English Government never yet interf dencies. The English people would not tol it; the Queen would not tolerate it; if an outside his authority, without the sanction interfere to me, and I shall deal with them'
Thus voluntary self-help, in a backgr part of the government, was the means nineteenth century, and changes in social colonial rule provided the social base of th fraternities was preceded or accompaniec goyigama castes, and the new social strata lists and the like) which had come into bein; introduced under British rule supplied the dhist Theosophical Society, Maha Bodhi Associations. The nature and aims of the laymen were more capable of handling ther therefore, that Olcott stressed the necessity men of business their managers',
The emergence of the lay intelligents monks from some of their traditional posi defined by the lay leadership in a narrov own position as leaders of Buddhist orga the level of ideology this was perhaps a 1 century British liberalism; and at the lev avoided-after the temperance agitation an tations with colonialauthorities who were c In the early part of the twentieth century Jayatilaka and W. A. de Silva who gaine necessary to try to keep their two major religion-separated from each other. A sim
1. Old Diary Leaves, Iv (1882-1892) (Madra
The Buddhist, 16 January 1891.
3. K. M. de Silva, "The Formation and C Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Si

ALALGODA
most practical and honest men of business
sts who expected direct support from the f their religion, or who remained demorathat the government or its agents were e Theosophists remained unimpressed by Buddhists how and why they expected the in if they were not keen to support it themntative in Sri Lanka, J. B. Daly, asserted: red with the religion of any of its depenrate it; the parliament would not tolerate Agent or an official tries to do so, he acts of Government. Leave those who want to 2
ound of formal religious neutrality on the with which Buddhism was revived in the stratification which had occurred under le revival. The formation of new monastic by the upward mobility of some non(entrepreneurs, lawyers, teachers, journagas a result of economic and social changes leadership of associations such as the BudSociety and the Young Men's Buddhist se associations were such that westernised in than were the monks. It was no accident, of making "our most practical and honest
sia necessarily implied a displacement of tions of leadership. The role of monk was v 'religious' sense, and they defined their nisations too in a non-political sense. At result of their commitment to nineteenth vel of practical politics they deliberately ld the communal riots of 1915-confrononsistently suspicious of mass movements. t there were Buddhist leaders like D. B. di prominence in politics, but they felt it spheres of public activity-politics and ilar stance was maintained by D. S. Sena
s, 1931), p. 120.
haracter of the Ceylon National Congress', tudies, X (January-December 1967) 72-74.

Page 101
BUddSM N POS-IN)
nayake, who soon after independence, fi concessions to Buddhists. He was also major target for the latters' attacks.
But already in D. S. Senanayake, one from the pre-colonial past and traditional to restore irrigation works (Minneriya, Ka etc.) and, at a less official and more person gana) in Raja Rata. Though Senanayake but a short step from there-in view of th had resorted to in order to gain legitimac to Buddhist activities; and not long after fact made on the occasion of the prepa Jayanthi. The formal proposal to celeb) initiative and participation of the governm Dudley Senanayake, and was accepted by wala. The Lanka Bauddha Mandalaya wa 1954 to organise and direct the Buddha . ambitious and costly programme of act 1956-1957 as well as well beyond it. Since and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party have p dhism as one of their major aims, and eacl failing to practise it. Thus post-Independ from the principles of the separation of pc neutrality of the government.
This convergence of Buddhism and p problem of identity of an independent new such as Sri Lanka the identification of the produced problems regarding the position natural desire to win the support of the m a privileged position for Buddhism just as the minorities that drove the Buddhist le the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress-to ag Open competition between different religio their own interests, within a broad framew government taking a stand of formal neu teenth century, and although the Buddhis
4. Donald E. Smith, "The Sinhalese Bud South Asian Politics and Religion (Princ 1966), pp. 456-457. 5. Walpola Rahula, Bhikshuvage Urumaya
On these, see Edmund Leach, "Buddhis and Ceylon”, Daedalus, 102 (1973) 34. 7, H. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemma, Princeton, New Jersey, 1960) pp. 171-174

DEPENDENCE, SRI LANKA 95
rmly resisted growing demands for special a strong critic of political monks', and a
is able to discern the search for inspiration sources of legitimacy-in his grand schemes thagama, Minipe and Parakrama Samudra al level, a major Buddhist shrine (Mahiyanhimself was not inclined to take it, it was eage-old practices that kings of Sri Lanka y and popularity'--to extend state support Senanayake's death such extension was in rations for the celebration of the Buddha rate the Buddha Jayanthi with the active lent came from the then ex-prime Minister, (he government headed by Sir John Kotelais appointed by the government in October Jayanthi activities, and it embarked on an ivities continuing into the Jayanthi year that time both the United National Party broclaimed protecting and supporting Budn has at different times accused the other of lence politics clearly indicates a departure olitics and religion and the formal religious
olitics has been viewed as a solution to the nation, though in a multi-religious society nation with the majority group necessarily of the minorities. It was in fact the all too ajority that induced politicians to promise it was the frustrations of competition with :adership-as represented in particular by itate for special concessions to Buddhists. us groups, to protect and if possible extend ork of "free enterprise in religion (with the trality) had prevailed since the late nine:s, through organisations such as the Bud
dhist Revolution', in Donald E. Smith (Ed.) eton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,
, 2nd ed. (Colombo, 1948), pp. viii-xi.
in the Post-colonial Political Order in Burma
of a New Nation (Princeton University Frcss,

Page 102
96. KTSR M
dhist Theosophical Society, had made sig were not entirely in a position to congrat for instance, Christians continued to hold number of schools under their managem received from the government for the main service, business and professions, Buddhist to their numbers in the population. Thei at length in documents like the report of til was that the competition between different one but had always been heavily biased a was state intervention in place of "free en solution would have appealed very much were entirely willing to accept the challenge concerned with building voluntary and au which would be strong enough to compet politicians so among Buddhist lay leaders strategies between the colonial and post-c
A similar change was also noticeable derived no satisfaction out of having been colonial authorities but also by the Buddh a narrow "religious' role. Walpola Rahu of the Monk) which was published just b of the debate over "political monks' was a favour of the varied social roles-as teac cians, advisers to laymen, peace-makers, had played in the course of the history of recapture the lost social supremacy. Rahu "political monk'; he viewed the rise of "p a process as the emergence of grantha-dhi sand-dhura or the vocation of meditation)
The new attitudes and aspirations fol Among the monks, over and above then nities which had multiplied since the nin mainly on the basis of ascriptive criteria su new organisations like the Eksath Bhikks and Eksath Bhikshu Peramuna (United and caste boundaries and followed the id political associations and interest-groups. of Christian organisations and practices was followed by new organisations of a Ceylon Buddhist Congress, the Bauddha
The activities of these new organisati immediate past been by and large kept

ALALGODA
nificant progress in this competition, they
late themselves. In the field of education,
their supremacy with regard to both the
ent and the amount of grants that they
tenance of those schools; and in the public
remained under-represented in proportion
r explanation of this situation-elaborated
he Buddhist Committee of Inquiry (1956)-
religious groups had never been an 'open
gainst Buddhists, and their solution to it
terprise'. Neither the explanation nor the to early leaders like Olcott or Daly who
of competition and who were primarily
tonomous organisations among Buddhists e with the Christian ones. Thus, as among , one notices a difference in attitudes and olonial times.
among a sizable section of monks. They kept in the background not merely by the ist lay leadership who had assigned to them la's Bhikshuvage Urumaya ("The Heritage efore independence and at the early stages forceful rejection of this restricted role in hers, scholars, literary men, artists, physiagitators and patriots, etc.-that monks Sri Lanka. The aspiration, clearly, was to la not merely had no objections to the term olitical monks' as significant and desirable ra (vocation of books, as against the vidar
in the early history of Buddhism.
Indexpression in new organisationalforms. more traditional nikāyas or monastic fratereteenth century making their recruitments uch as caste and locality, there now emerged hu Mandalaya (United Council of Monks) Front of Monks) which cut across nikidya iom and tactics of Colombo-based national Similarly among laymen the early emulation -as was explicitly advocated by Olcottdistinctly more political character-the All Jatika Balavegaya, etc.
ons helped to bring together what had in the w separate; politics and religion on the hand,

Page 103
BUDDHSM IN POST-N
and the lay leadership of those element dence years a prominence which it had lac
This prominence, however, did not ne organisations in the long run. On the co the Buddhist leadership itself had agita voluntary organisations and institution: decades. The nationalisation of schools li Buddhist Theosophical Society, and the of their independent power, influence and a few years of the elevation of Vidyoday, i status, monks lost control over these ins to have very little continuity with their p and education, as in other spheres lik inevitably resulted in greater power being politician and the bureaucrat and a corre independent of centralised control. Had Buddha Sasana Commission of 1959 (wh body with wide powers over the order of cation of disputes, dismissals from the o participation in social and political activit teries, and publications on Buddhism) b tion and bureaucratisation would have g
8. For an account of the controversy ove
"The Political Monks and Monastic 500-508. Rather ironically the Sasana from the Ramanya and Amarapura N Nikaya. Historically, the Siyam Nik and had also sought centralised cont other Nikayas was possible, inter alia to regulate the affairs of the order in
544-8

EPENDENCE SRI LANKA 97
that gave Buddhism in the post-Indepenked in the earlier decades.
:essarily entail greater strength for Buddhist itrary, government intervention, for which ed, gradually undermined the strength of which had been developed over several d to the extinction of organisations like the uddhist leadership thereby lost a good deal patronage in the field of education. Within 1 and Vidyalankara Pirivenas to university itutions and the two new universities came ast except merely in their names. In religion the economic, government intervention concentrated in the hands of the professional sponding decrease in initiative and activity the controversial recommendations of the ich included the creation of an incorporated monks in such areas as recruitment, adjudirder, residence and education, employment, tes, collection of funds and building of monaseen implemented, the process of centralisaone very much further.
ar the Sasana Commission, see Donald E. Smith, · Reform 'in Donald E. Smith (Ed.), op. cit, pp. Commission met with qualified or full support ikayas and sustained opposition from the Siyam iya has had close links with secular authorities 'ol of the order of monks while the origin of the precisely because there was no central authority colonial times.

Page 104
IX
HINDUISM AND ISLAM
SRI L.
K. M.
The interaction between religion anc tieth century Sri Lanka was sustained til and indeed gathered momentum since in religious forces has been far-reaching and majority is in firm control in most spheres the ethnic minorities-Hinduism and Isla. points need special mention: there has bee ation in the relations between Buddhism the former and Hinduism. NeverthelessHindu rivalry has been much less signific Sinhalese and the Tamils than ethnicity anc contrast to the situation in pre-independe was often defined largely in terms of the dee communities. The political aspects of the Tamils are reviewed elsewhere in this vol limited to a brief analysis of the interactic religious facet of the complex theme of nationalisms-and the interaction of the Si
Hind The recovery of Hinduism from the p tianity had begun a whole generation earli duism was in a more advantageous positi missionary encroachment in that it was pos of Hinduism in India. Nevertheless in the matter even later-the missionary organiz its environs than in most other parts of the
* Very few published works of any subst Sri Lanka have appeared recently. Thi in Ceylon (Colombo 1957) is still the on subject, while there has not been a singl t I am greatly indebted to my colleague D ing material for this section of the preser

(2)
N POST-INDEPENDENCE ANKA” ". .
)E SILVA
politics, a notable feature of early twen- . roughout the agitation for independence dependence. Its impact on the balance of deeply significant. The Sinhalese-Buddhist of life, and the position of the religions of m-must be reviewed in this context. Two in much less of an atmosphere of confrontand Islam in recent times than between -and this is the second point-Buddhist'ant as a point of contention between the language. In this sense it affords a striking ince British India where "communalism' p-rooted hostility to each other of religious confrontation between the Sinhalese and ume, and in this chapter our concern is bn between Buddhism and Hinduism-the the tension between Sinhalese and Tamil inhalese and the adherents of Islam.
uismit
ervasive pressures of an aggressive Chriser than that of Buddhism. In a sense Hinon from the point of view of resistance to sible to draw on the tremendous resources irst half of the 19th century-and for that ations were much stronger in Jaffna ahd sland.
ance or quality on the minority religions of
Revd. James Cartman's work on Hinduism y monograph of any substantial value on the monograph or book on Islam in Sri Lanka. , S. Pathmanathan for all his help in gather
chapter.
98

Page 105
HINDUSM AND ISLAM N PO
The leadership in the Hindu recovery lar and the structure of Hindu society in to a remarkable extentin its strength and fl; in his programme of revival were: a con Christianity, and secondly to preserve the
In opposition to the Christian missic of the country he built up a network of secular education. His work in this sphere Hindu leaders of the nineteenth and early mambalam Ramanathan. The Saiva Par and the Hindu College Board of Manag í 50 schools (both primary and secondar) over by the state in the early 1960's.
The preservation of the orthodox for tion and restoration of Hindu temples, an in both of which Navalar was the pioneer.
Hinduism had suffered much greater Buddhism, and nearly all the Hindu temp had been destroyed by the Portuguese ar were in a state of decay and delapidation ir of Sri Lanka, unlike those in India, are of 1 resources for their maintenance, due part and re-establishment of the temples-ofte was not followed by a restoration of the colonial times. The rehabilitation of Hin porary Sri Lanka and is a prominent feat
Among the Hindus the village or lo be the centre of cultural activity with the and cultural event of the year. While in r the cinema has tended to become a rival temples, the increasing popularity of the temples has undoubtedly helped to sustai minent centre of cultural activity in the H
Hindus in Sri Lanka today are, with t in Colombo, Saivites belonging to the Sic nant in South India. Perhaps Navalar's gr duism was the publication of a large nu. helped substantially in preserving the idea primarily, and India as well. Some of the religious instruction in schools.
1. Despite the massive contribution made there has been very little by way of sch

ST-INDEPENDENCE SRI LANKA 99.
in Sri Lanka was given by Arumuga Navacontemporary Sri Lanka bears his imprint aws alike. The two main points of emphasis cern to prevent conversions of Hindus to orthodox form of Saivism.
nary groups entrenched in the Tamil areas Hindu schools for imparting religious and was consolidated and expanded by eminent twentieth century, most notably Sir Ponpillana Sabhai (established by Navalar) ement eventually administered more than i). The large majority of these were taken
m of Saivism had two aspects: the renovad the publication of Saivite religious texts,
damage at the hands of Christianity than bles in the Jaffna peninsula and the littoral ld the Dutch, and those that had survived the nineteenth century. The Hindu temples modest proportions and have rather slender ly at least to the fact that the renovation in financed by wealthy Sri Lanka Tamilslands that had belonged to them in predu temples has been continued in contemure in Hindu life in all parts of the island.
cal temple has been and still continues to annual festival the most notable religious ecent times secular entertainment such as attraction to the cultural activities of the practice of holding wedding ceremonies in in the position of the temples as the predoindu villages.
he exception of a few North Indian traders dhantha school of Saivism which is domi2atest contribution to the recovery of Hinmber of Saivite religious texts which have ls and heritage of the Hindus in Sri Lanka se publications are still in use as texts for
by Navalar to the Hindu revival in Sri Lanka larly work on the man and his career,

Page 106
100 K., M.
There have been no new developm in Sri Lanka Hinduism in recent times.
The crucial flaw in Navalar's workindependence-—-was that he was not a socia which he led strengthened orthodoxy and caste system, which unlike its Sinhalese co but a religious one as well, and untouc Sinhalese was very much a problem in H the Hindus are the equivalent of the go latter they are not a thin upper crust, bu the Hindus. They have used the sanctic caste privileges at the expense of those Largely because the Harijan communitie caste and did not have any organization bargaining for their rights, the potential, not emerge still after independence, and a
The attitude of the Buddhist Sinhales valent. Religious sentiment should have d tional links between the two religions in S sive factor, ethnic politics was. After 195 tility between the Sinhalese and the Tam opinion (especially international opinion) a for justice was vitiated by the orthccox conditions of the Harijans. Sinhalese p attention to the social evils of untouch Tamils.
There has been a positive improvem times but it would be unfair to attribute for that concern was never disinterested Tamil political leadership itself that a m suffered by the Harijans was initiated, and dhist activists interested themselves in th made since 1955: cafes and restaurants i entry to Harijans; and more importan efforts at resistance-one by one the large Nevertheless there are still some areas in Harijan campaign for equality have not
.2. On the caste structure in the Tamil are
in Jaffna' in ed. E. R. Leach, Aspects Pakistan. Cambridge Papers in Social 3. The Feieral Party's first convention i. "the regeneration and unification of the of all foms of social inequalities and wherever it exists'. quoted in R. N.K. tics of Ceylon (Duke University Press,

DE SILVA
ents or controversies in doctrinal matters
and this became evident in the years after l reformer. The Hindu revivalist movement did little to soften the rigours of the Hindu unterpart had not merely a social sanction, hability virtually non-existent among the indu society in Jaffna. The vellatlas among vigama among the Sinhalese, and like the t a substantial section if not a majority of ns of Saivite orthodoxy to maintain their in the lower rungs of the caste heirarchy. s were themselves divided on the basis of to mobilise their resources effectively for if not latent, tensions in this situation did after the mid-nineteen fifties.
:e to the Hindus has been essentially ambilrawn them together because of the tradiri Lanka society. lfreligion was nota divi5 there was always an undercurrent of hosls. When the latter sought to rouse public gainst the Sinhalese majority their campaign Hindu resistance to the amelioration of the oliticians and Buddhist activists diverted ability to the great embarrassment of the
2nt in the position of the Harijans in recent this to Sinhalese solicitude on their behalf,
It was largely owing to the efforts of the vement for the removal of the disabilities i long before Sinhalese politicians and Bude problem. Substantial progress has been in urban areas (particularly) have permitted tly-despite occasional and well-publicised
temples have opened their doors to them. which the temple entry movement and the succeeded.
as of the north Sri Lanka see, M. Banks, "Caste of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North-West Anthropology No. 2 (1960) pp. 61-77.
1951 had a list of basic aims which included Tamil-speaking people of Ceylon by the removal njustices, in particular that of untoughability2arney, Communalism and language in the polil967),p.100.

Page 107
HINDUISM AND ISLAM IN POS
Isl:
In contrast to Hinduism and Christian relations with the Buddhist Sinhalese botl region. In the latter region Muslims had b hostility of the Portuguese and the harras integrated into Kandyan society though and cultural identity. In the early years of Sri Lanka improved quite considerably a
group.
In the nineteenth century, like the faced the challenge of Protestant Christian the former the Muslims were notable for ; of Christianity. The resistance to conver the nineteenth century but the survival of sense at the expense of the social and eco the education provided in the schools was among the Muslims of Sri Lanka an attitu community) of rejecting it because of the culture om İslam. Besides education was n tian in content, and for that reason they of their children even if it meant sacrificing cation brought. This manifestation of the regrettable consequences, and by the third enlightened Muslim leaders were profol. sunk in ignorance and apathy, parochial i
The arresting of the decline in vitality ciated for long with the "charisma' of A who jolted them out of their conservative the foresight and tactical skill of a local M by profession and social worker by inclina to the point of accepting the need for a c. Sidde Lebbe saw the supreme importance ( of his community. The revitalising process the first half of the twentieth Century.
Like every other ethnic and religious themselves called upon to define their attitu The Sinhalese-Muslim riots of 1915 had and this strengthened the trend towards in any case, quite strong among the Musli
4. Arabi Pasha, the leader of the abortive
in 1882 spent 19 years of his life (from 5. For discussion of the riots of 1915 and 1 in Ceylon: A Symposium'. Journal of A,

r-INDEPENDENCE SRI LANKA 101
an
hity, Islam has had a record of harmonious h in the coastal areas and in the Kandyan een afforded a refuge against the Vigorous sment of the Dutch. There they had been they retained, nevertheless, their religious British rule the position of the Muslims of ld they became in many ways a privileged
Buddhists and Hindus, the Muslims too ity, but to a much greater extent than both a refusal to succumb to the blandishments sion to Christianity persisted throughout Islam in Sri Lanka had been secured in a nomic advancement of the Muslims. Since primarily an English education there was ide (natural to a conservative and cohesive presumed danger of the impact of a foreign. ot only in English but also largely Chriswere not prepared to endanger the faith g the material benefits that an English eduir zeal for their alcestral faith had rather quarter of the nineteenth century the Indie indly disturbed to find their community in outlook and grossly materialistic.
of the Muslim community has been assorabi Pasha' an Egyptian exiled to Ceylon, seclusion. But much more important were uslim leader-M. C. Siddi Lebbe a lawyer tion-who brought the Muslim community hange of outlook. Like Arumuga Navalar, f education as a means to the regeneration initiated during this phase continued during
group in the country the Muslims found de to the agitation for the transfer of power. been a traumatic experience for the latter, collaboration with the British which was, m leaders. There were occasional misgivings
uprising against the Western powers in Egypt 1883 to 1901) as an exile in Sri Lanka. Eheir historical significance see, "The 1915 Riots sian Studies XXIX (2) 1970 pp. 219-266.

Page 108
102 K. M.
about this policy such as, for instance, afte movement in India had its repercussions but the local version of it never develop had in India and the Sri Lanka Muslims di of association with the imperial power. the Muslims formed part of a phalanx of accepted the need for collaboration with t consolidation of the rights of minorities ast It was not till the early nineteen forties of Muslims broke away from them to supp campaigns for independence.
This policy of co-operation with the by the Muslims after independence as wel part a contrast to the Hindus and Tamils in for the agitation for a federal political s among the most vociferous critics of such a
What they have attempted to do is tc tinctive cultural identity. They have soug two distinct fields: the consolidation and Muslims; and in education. Here again, and it was a trend which began from the earlies
The Muslim Marriage and Divorce Re from 1937) set up a system of domestic judges (quazis) and explicitly recognized the and the same process may be observed in 1 tate Succession and Wakfs Ordinance of nance relating to Muslim charitable trust Mosques and Charitable Trusts or Wakfs was repealed by the Muslim Marriage and which enhanced the powers of the quazis v respect of marriages and divorces, and the of the parties concerned. The Wakfs Act department with a purely Muslim Executiv have been preserved under the Republican
rt was in education that the greatest ga so after 1956. The list of concessions wo government Training Colleges have been in government schools as a language to M. ted by the Ministry of Education and pa right (till 1974) to pursue their studies ir Sinhalese, Tamil or English-a privilege in
6. A Muslim movement to preserve the Tui

DE SILVA
the First World War when the Khilafat among the Muslims in Sri Lanka as well, 2d the positively anti-British tone that it not turn away from the traditional policy indeed, throughout the next two decades
minorities under Tamil leadership which he British in return for the protection and he price for accepting the transfer of power. the eve of the transfer of power that the ort the Sinhalese leaders in their political
government of the day has been pursued t. And in this too they weic, for the most general. There was no support from them ructure; on the contrary they have been ΠOVE. /
safeguard, sustain and advance their disht and obtained state support for this in recognition of the personal laws of the more especially with regard to the former t years of British rule.
gistration Ordinance 27 of 1929 (operative relations courts presided over by Muslim : pure Muslim law of marriage and divorce; espect of inheritance, in the Muslim Intes1931. The provision of the latter Ordiis (Wakfs) was superseded by the Muslim Act 51 of 1956, while the Ordinance of 1929 Divorce Act 13 of 1951 (operative frcm 1954) who were given an exclusive jurisdiction in 2 status and mutual rights and obligations of 1956 established a separate government e Board. The personal law of the Muslims Constitution of Sri Lanka.
ins have been made, and this was especially bn by the Muslims is remarkable. Special set up for the Muslims. Arabic is taught uslim pupils by qualified moulavis, appoinid by the state. Muslim children had the any one of the three language mediato other group in the country enjoyed. A
kish khalifah (caliph).
N.

Page 109
HINDUSM AND ISLAM IN POS
new category of government Muslim sch recognition of the cultural individuality of language is the home language of the great practice had been to categorise schools o them and the Muslims formed part of the new Muslim' schools the sessions and V requirements of the Muslim population. T schools, it must be emphasised, vitiates the which has been the declared policy of the go
The concessions made to the Muslim at least in recognition of the fact that they l; groups in Sri Lanka in education. Thus scn justified as a temporary measure, even t were, as we have seen, largely self-inflicted identity has no doubt been strengthened by of Education for over eight years in the pe some Sinhalese politicians have not been d to build up the Muslims as a counterweig checks and balances which is an intrinsic a plural society-divide et impera. This has lims, in striking contrast to the Tamils, hav contesting seats to Parliament in competiti national political parties. Instead their p with and as adjuncts of the latter. The re numerically much smaller than the Tamils than their numbers warrant.
One of the benefits they have won thr pro-Arab and anti-Israeli tilt in Sri Lanka' with the ideological commitments of the S ficant that they have succeeded in obtaining in foreign policy, in contrast to the Tamil nections and interests, real or alleged, havi dhist majority. These achievements are a tr. leadership and the restraint and moderati of their objectives. But their greatest tests 1 prestige and influence that will devolve up gence and the unprecedented financial stre

r-INDEPENDENCE SRI LANKA 103
ools has been established apparently in Muslims as distinct from the Tamils whose majority of Sri Lanka Muslims. The usual in the basis of language of instruction in Tamil-speaking school population. In the acations are determined by the special he establishment and expansion of these principle of non-sectarian state education vernment since 1960. s
community have been introduced partly agged behind the other ethnic and religious le special assistance frcm the state may be hough the handicaps they suffered from . But the sensitivity to the special Muslim the fact that a Muslim has been Minister :riod 1960 to 1974. And more importantly isinclined to use the resources of the state ht to the Tamil community in a game of element in the process of government in been facilitated by the fact that the Muse no distinct political parties of their own ion with, if not in opposition to, the main olitical organizations work in association sult is that the Muslim minority though have greater bargaining powers electorally
ough their electoral influence is the strong s foreign policy. Ns doubt this fits in Well LFP and its left-wing allies, but it is signig"national' support for sectional interests , and Roman Catholics whose foreign conmade them suspect to the Sinhalese Budbute to the political acumen of the Muslim on they have demonstrated in the pursuit e ahead of them, in handling the increasing on them in the context of the Arab resurgth of the oil-producing states,

Page 110
IX
THE ROLE OF SRI L A BUDDHIST M1
FR. PAUL C
It has often been felt by sociologists o groups in terms of sociological categories of religion have, by the very nature of wil logical analysis. How far it eludes such Lanka the difficulties are compounded bec and traditions; these difficulties must be that is here attempted.
Furthermore, it would seem rash a group so heterogeneous as the Christial ion, in social status or class, language, cast For there would be as many roles as the Indeed, to the extent that each Christi. whole array of other social actors, there tians. The brief analysis here attempted, t
The generalisation may be stated in that the role of Christians until about a confirm the specific identity and distinct only in regard to all other religious group difficult the former, and even illogical th recent years the role is being increasingly in terms of the achievement of a nationa
"The sociologist studies religion as on study will often lead him to analyze i are relevant to the social situation, and consequences, and the manner in which None of this will ever enable him to j Peter L. Berger, "Religious Institution duction (New York: John Wiley, 1967)
2. As such, the documentary support off
sometimes merely indicated.
3. Within the Christian group itself, there times, for sub-group specificity, e.g. an groups.

. (3)
ANKA CHRISTIANS IN AJORITY SYSTEM
ASPERSZ, SJ.
f religion that it is unfair to analyze religious for the obvious reason that essential aspects hat religion proposes to be, to elude socioanalysis only religionists can tell. In Sri :ause of the diversity of religious experiences borne in mind in the course of the analysis
nd presumptuous to explain the role of a ls in Sri Lanka-in denominational affiliate, direction and degree of politicalization. re have been, are, and will be, Christians. an acts out his Christian status vis-a-vis a are as many role-sets as there are Chrisherefore, is only a generalization.”
the form of two clear hypotheses: first,
decade ago was to achieve, preserve and less of the minority Christian group.' not s but also in regard to the nation (however le latter, enterprise); second, that in very viewed as an outward and adaptive one socio-cultural equilibrium by means of the
of many socially significant phenomena. This detail religious propositions, insofar as they will try to understand their social causes and they relate to the institutional fabric of society. udge these propositions on their own merits”. 数 N. J. Smelser, ed., Sociology: An Intro}. 3.34.
everal assertions is often mot produced and is
have been strong pressures at least until recent ong the Catholics vis-a-vis all other Christian
4.

Page 111
THE ROLE OF SRI LA
fostering of creative inter-action, on the or in a situation of accepted religious pluralis of secularism and Marxist socialism.
Role is the behaviour enactment con Christian group is that of a minority in a the majority. In the system the percentage Buddhists 67.4, Hindus 17.6, Muslims 7.1 though the fact does not appear to have Christian group-that the percentage of C census of 1946 when it was 9.1. In 1953 it the 1971 census it showed a further decrea
One explanation of the decrease is pr present writer has not been able to secure grants, but it is his impression that the Ch than proportionately represented in it (for proportionately dissatisfied with the ongoir nion Status): in the census of 1971 the Burg were only 44,250 or 0.3 per cent of the pop
A second explanation of the decrease are urban and their literacy and level of e are higher than in other religious groups: education seem to have outweighed the c births, though, in the absence of figures, it factor has been the use of contraceptive de directives) or abstention resulting from th (itself a result of the greater influence of other religous groups).
It was earlier suggested that the role in terms of its minority identity. In the soc often been found that they manifest a fierce group in the face of threats, real or imagir Within the Christian group in Sri Lanka ened by the presence within it of a large alinguistic minority in the social system. Th reason to pressurize for a hands-off the Ch Christians, the other, because they were T on the efficiency of the Christian schools Tamils to them.
In the first decade and a half after D essentially a continuance of the role as it Christian Church in Portuguese times. It i
4. Census of Population 1971, Preliminary R.

KA CHRISTIANS 105
e hand, of the four main religious groups mand, on the other, with the ideologies
equent upon a status. The status of the social system in which the Buddhists are of Catholics is 6.9, other Christians 0.8, , and all others 0.1." It is significantbeen noticed by, still less perturbed, the hristians has steadily decreased since the was 9.0, in 1963 it recorded 8.3, While in se of 0.6, registering only 7.7 per cent.
bably the emigration of Christians. The the religious distribution of postwar emiristians, especially the Burghers, are more the reason that they have been more than g changes in the social system since Domihers who are nearly 100 per cent Christian Bulation.
is that more than a third of the Christians lucation proportionately to their numbers the pressures of urban living, literacy and lassic Catholic resistance to limitation of is not possible to say whether the limiting vices (in opposition to official ecclesiastical Le rationalization of procreative processes western culture on the Christian-than on
of Christians until the 60s was conceived iological studies of minority groups it has desire to protect the cohesiveness of the lary, of being taken over by the majority. this minority consciousness was strengthpercentage of Tamils, who are themselves e Tamil Christians, therefore, had a double ristians' attitude: one, because they were amils. This sheds light, incidentally, both in Tamil areas and on the loyalty of the
ominion Status the role of Christians was was played since the establishment of the s all too facile to criticize this role in the
elease No. 1.

Page 112
106 FR. PAUL
light of the perceptions of a later period. means fair, dubious or foul-the predom Europeans, was to protect their faith frc when religion was so deeply imbedded in s shable from it, the Church set about the ( the Ceylonese who adopted the Christian f other religious groups and from the rest of
The dream of the formalization of cu people was still far-off in all parts of the w building of a specific Christian culture in Don Peter cites a letter of 1622 about the J
"It is built in Corinthian style, and i facade is magnificent, and if it is not t in the whole of India'.
The style of all these early stone inst we know, western, and was in sharp cont styles of architecture. Added to the influenc tion-fostered by the early and the late names and surnames, western music, west course be contended that similar cultura existing religious groups inter-distinguish strange about the quest for the specificity was unique, however, was that this fou began to distinguish itself not merely fro separately but from the three of them take1 Ceylonese; this one Western, Portuguese, an
Brought into the country as a new wa ners, led for four centuries by foreigners foreign rulers or, in later days, by local cle: Church succeeded in establishing not just a a western cultural uniquemess. The weste advantage to the Christians when the coun As late as 6 January 1887 at a ceremony in rchy of Ceylon, Archbishop Bonjean pro with acclamations to the Pope, to the Carc ardi (Apostolic Delegate to the East Ind clergy and people joined'. The imperial g a show of loyalty. In 1948 it was no longe Instead, a directive from the Archibishop ex
5. W. L. A. Don Peter, Studies in Ceylon C.
1963, p. 45.
6. The Ceylon Catholic Messenger, 5 Januar

CASPERSZ
When the first converts were made-by hinant concern of the pastors, who were m the influence of other faiths. At a time ecular culture as to be wholly indistinguistablishment of an alternative culture for aith. The search for separate identity from the nation had begun.
ulture through widespread schools for the orld and therefore the first attempts at the Lanka were through the medium of stone. esuit Church in Colombo:
is well proportioned and handsome. The he best, it will certainly be the second best
ruments of culturalization was, so far as rast to the Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim ce of architecture was the gradual introducSchools-of Western languages, western ern dress and habits of eating. It may of l specificity had already made the three able, and hence that there was nothing and distinctness of a fourth group. What rth group by its Western character soon m each of the three existing groups taken together. The other three were Eastern, di later Dutch or British.
y of life for all takers by the white foreigsometimes of the same nationality as the rgy trained by the foreigners, the Christian , cultural uniqueness for the Christians but nized and westernizing culture was a social try was under the western imperial power. Colombo constituting the Catholic hieranounced "an eloquent allocution ending linal Prefect of Propaganda, to Mgr. Agliies) and to Queen Victoria, in which the overnment could not but take note of such r possible to acclaim the foreign overlord, horted Catholics to decorate their houses,
hurch History (Colombo: The Catholic Press)
y 1947, p. 4.

Page 113
TEE ROLE OF SRI LA
churches and schools during the Independ Papal Flag and the National Flag'. Even i sought to maintain the old cultural specific
It could be objected that the westeri minority among them-those in the upper Colombo and a few other towns and spok tians continued to live according to the c received the water of baptism. Even as la that the social distribution of Catholics intermediate classes 28 per cent, lower cla not call the tune during the long period of State and Church, society was hierarchi pressures of the Christian upper classes we fication of Christians. Indeed, when numb was introduced in 1931, it did not take ver new role to be sought.
If the western character of the specific tensions between them and other religious as a whole, the pro-status quo character c exercised an autocratic control over the ra a charge of dubious loyalty in the minds o The challenge came first from the nationalis
There is probably in all religious instit fear of disturbing the existing order. The o the religious institution has learnt to live the institution is old, highly organized, well Christian institution-the pressures to cons dence, the editorial in The Ceylon Catholic unequivocal:
Let our Independence then be m order which it is beyond the right o new Government stand the supren which it can violate only at its own
Catholics to the political progress o' desideratum”."
According to the accepted interpret religion is concerned with the ordering of some ultimate right order. During the
7, ibid., 1 February 1948, p. 4.
8. Francois Houtart, Summary of the Surv
Quest No. 43), p. 32.
9. The Ceylon Catholic Messenger, 18 Jan 10, e.g. the interpretations of Durkheim, V

NKA CHRISTIANS - 107
2nce Week, prominence being given to the in independent Ceylon the Church leaders ity.
lization of the Christians affected only a
social and income brackets, who lived in 2 English-and that the majority of Chrisulture of their forefathers even after they to as 1970 the Houtart Survey estimated was as follows: upper classes 4 per cent, Sses 68 per cent.* Numbers, however, did the Search for Christian identity. In both cally constituted and thus the dominant re felt all down the line of the social strativers began to tell after universal franchise y long for the role to be questioned and a
cultural identity of the Christians caused
groups and between them and the nation f the group (certainly of its leaders who nk and file) made the Christians liable to fall those who challenged the status qио. its, then from the socialists.
utions an inbuilt conservat ism, an inherent rder may not be the ideal one, but at least with it and hence fears its change. When financed, centralized-as in the case of the serve are enhanced. On the eve of indepen: Messenger could hardly have been more
arked by conformity with the established f mere mortals to alter for distub; let our Le test-that offidelity to the moral law peril. And let the chief contribution of the the country be the realization of this great
ations of its phenomenological reality, human life in society in accordance with colonial and post-independence periods.
y of the Catholic Church in Ceylon (Colombo:
Lary 1948. "eber, Mircea Eliade, Berger, van der Leeuw.

Page 114
k
108 FR : PAU
the Christian Church defended order, but ness of the order. The concept of order is defended it. The concept of the rightness the Church was uncritical about it.
The concern of the Church over its s groups and the nation was so over-riding t at a courageous solution of the contradict contradictions were present first for dete of the integration of social classes and ca: urban Christians. Christian parish priests role as a socially catalytic one, nor did th nificant to secure conditions of elementary tion in the Christian record of non-initiati Social Justice Movement started in Colom but "this was a group that was basically re and foreign exploitation.' Peter Pillai in singly uncomfortable with the social and oriented political groups: it was also a pe tician of the Christian group.
The concept of the role in terms of an by the Church in the field of education in was opposed because it would break the E Christian managements and thus expos Buddhist and secularist cultures. Swaba better taught, was a characteristic of the their chief advantage to the children of th over of schools was violently opposed bec. go the last bulwarks of the identity of Ch structure Houtart sees the validation of system resting on religion. The present wr or the unintended consequence of the Chi or its intended consequence was the ac By fulfilling it the Church certainly opened urban working-class and lower middle-cla educational reforms mentioned were a si tional opportunity, but over a wider range or was unwilling to see-until the middle
11. Tissa Balasuriya, "The Catholic App
yodaya (Kandy), No. 18, August 1974,
12. In a wide-ranging study, Religion and I cf. esp. pp. 212-216, 265-297, Francoi: documentary evidence.
13. ibid.

CASPERSZ
made insufficient assessment of the rightmore static than dynamic, and the Church of order is more dynamic than static, and
pecific identity vis-a-vis the other religious at the Church made no significant attempt ons within the Christian group itself. These tion and then for resolution in the fields tes within the group, of the rural with the and vicars in rural areas did not see their e chaplains on the estates do anything sighumanity for the estate labour. An excepon of social change would probably be the bo in the late 30s by the Peter Pillai group formist within the framework of capitalism his later years showed himself to be increaeducational policies of the more peopleriod during which he was the chief theore
identity search explains the position taken the contemporary period.' Free education bonds that bound the better schools to the e Christian children to the influence of sha was opposed because more English, : urban Christian schools and constituted he affluent non-Christian patrons. The takeuse it was felt that with the schools would ristians in the nation. In the Christian school a socio-political order by an educational iter would consider this the latent function istian school system. Its manifest function hievement and consolidation of identity. avenues of upward social mobility to many is Christian families. That the three major milar move towards a levelling of educathe majority of Christian leaders did not of the last decade.
'oach to Religio-Cultural Integration', Sat
5
leology in Sri Lanka (Bangalore: TPI, 1974), Houtart presents and evaluates the relevant

Page 115
THE ROLE OF SR LA
The change in the perception of the ro factors. The exogenous factors were first all over the world. “Vastly improved cond of the mass communication media, the spr tional standards for increasing numbers of emergence of youth culture, the appearanc it impossible for Lanka not to be a societ greatest single factor promoting change W
The endogenous factors were chiefly government after 1931, the expansion of ed progress, the dissemination of Marxist idea socialist development of the country. In th their role as being that of initiators of cha changes in secular society.
The Houtart Survey, seeking a gener themselves in their national social context (responding out of a sample of 1500 persc the six Catholic dioceses, concluded to tv The first, accounting for more than half and forward one, "characterized by a hope social changes'. The second, accounting f a static and conservative one. The remair direction.
In Christian circles much is sometimes nurtured a generation of the elite which l colonial regime. That the British were lar middle-class leaders together-regardless viduals divided according to religion, roc the result of the Christian schools where t ever, even apart from the fact that some educational background to be rather an heard that it was precisely this background masses. The Church played its part in the form them again-without the aid of the sc been removed from Church control-to reformed Christian elite will still have a us
ബത്തി
4. Paul Caspersz, “Sri Lanka: A Society i
1972, p. 339. 15. cf. especially “The Pasitoral Constituti Walter M. Abbott, ed, The Documen The “Declaration on the Relationship (ibid) is, however, much less satisfactor 16. Opinions and Attitudes of Catholics in C
Socio-Religieuses, mimeograph, 1970),

NKA CHRISTIANS 109
le of Christians was stimulated by several
those inducing change in secular society itions of travel and transport, the growth ead of conflicting ideologies, rising educapeople, higher levels of consumption, the 'e of a third world: all these factors make cy in transition'. Within the Church the as the Vatican Council, 1963-1965.5
the growth of popular participation in ucation through schools and the electoral as and the evolution of a strategy for the e earlier period the Christians did not see Linge. Now they were forced to follow the
alized picture as to how Catholics situate , from its valid interviews of 1361 persons ns) selected from 50 parishes situated in vo tendencies in the Catholic population. the Catholic population, was a dynamic : in the future and by an acceptation of the or about a quarter of the population, was ling quarter had no convictions in either
made of the fact that the Christian schools ed the country to independence from the gely able to talk to a group of upper and of the fact that the group contained indit language and caste-was, it is alleged, hese leaders were educated together. Howelitist leaders experienced their Christian embarrassment, the charge is sometimes that served to distance the elite from the formation of the elite. Its role now is to chools which have now almost completely work alongside and with the people. A 2ful role to play in the present phase of the
Transition', Impact (Manila), 7:10, October
on on the Church in the Modern World' it ts of Vatican II (London: Chapman. 1966), of the Church to Non-Christian Religiogs' V. ಕ್ಲ Part II (Louvain: Centre de Recherches p. e م?

Page 116
10 * FR. PAUL
country's development. Part of this role is to The conditions for the successful fulfilmer Zarina Bhatty:
“Contributions that a minority com on how well it can redefine its disti are in harmony with the changing e
The greater contact which the Christian g the West, and its greater assimilation of t the group-can now lead it, if it is joine change, to contribute vitally to the rational socio-economic structure. If Sri Lanka, lil new technological era, Christians will per groups both to understand and to adjust tic
Will Herberg's thesis that the three testants, Catholics, Jews-are equi-legil indeed of American society, is well knowl long enough to seek to be an equi-legiti character. With the Buddhists, Hindus and society Christians should seek to hammer out which it will not be possible to achi inhabitants of the country probably desire.
7. zarina Bhaility “The Role of Minorities (Bangalore), 20:4, December 1973, p. 7

a CASPERSZ
understand what the country now requires. it of the role have been well expressed by
munity will make would therefore depend inctiveness and mould it into forms which nvironment and have a creative context".
roup had and still has with the culture of hat culture-once a source of suspicion of d to the sympathetic perception of social ization and modernization of the country's ke the rest of the world, is moving into a haps be better placed than other religious
the demands of the new era.
main religious groups in America-Proimate expressions of American religion, n. Christians in Sri Lanka have been there mate expression of the country's life and Muslims and all who are concerned about out a national equilibrium of culture witheve the type of nation which most of the
in Indian Development, Religion and Society

Page 117
THE DIALECTIC OF R)
IN SRI
DONALD
In this article propose to sketch in b in the twenty-seven years since independe has attracted a substantial amount of resea makes the inclusion of extensive factua therefore possible to devote primary atte interpretation.
The comparative study of religion a some seeming patadoxes. On one hand,
ecularization of the polity has been takin On the other hand, religion has been a politics, in some cases attacking directly the with the concept of a modern polity. Ho relate to each other?
A THEORETICA
The process of secularization in relati plex phenomenon, and it is possible to d aspects of the process:
1. Polity-separation secularization refe and religion and the denial of the reili of secularization involves government's re and defender of the faith, and the reject legitimacy.
1. See particularly: Heinz Bechert, Budd Metzner Verlag, 1966); the chapters on and C. D. S. Siriwardane in Donald E. (Princeton University Press, 1966); G and Political Change in Ceylon', and Modernisation in Ceylon', both in Mo
These two themes are considered in t Middle East, North Africa, and Latin Political Modernization (Yale University
2.
1

S.
ELIGION AND POLITICS
LANKA
E. SMITH
road strokes the political role of Buddhism nce. The subject is a fascinating one which rch over the past decade, and this literature l detail in this essay unnecessary. It is ntion to the development of a scheme of
nd politics in developing areas points up it is clear that a multifaceted process of g place since the early nineteenth century. bowerful factor in the emergence of mass 2 secular values and assumptions associated w do these apparently opposing processes
L FRAMEWORK
on to the political system is itself a comistinguish analytically at least four major
rs to the institutional separation of polity gious identity of the polity. This aspect jection of its traditional role as promoter ion of religious ideas as the basis of its
ismus, Staat und Gesellschaft, vol. 1 (Alfred Ceylon by D. E. Smith, A. Jeyaratnam Wilson Smith, ed. South Asian Politics and Religion, nanath Obeyesekere, "Religious Symbolism 1. U. Kodikara, 'Communalism and Political ern Ceylon Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1970.
Le context of South and Southeast Asia, the America in D. E. Smith, ed., Religion and Press, 1974),

Page 118
112 OONALD
2. Polity-expansion secularization invo into areas of society formerly regulated by diction into areas of education, law, econ religious norms and structures in the tradi
3. Political-culture secularization refers with the polity; secular notions of politic. and the meaning of politics replace tradi many people.
4. Political-process secularization is th of religious leaders, religious interest grou issues; and also the weakening of religiou consequence of participation in the politic ence of religious political parties and/or t both be manifestations of political-process
Much could be said about the inter secularization, but we cannot pursue the (polity-separation and polity-expansion se lemented by modernizing governmental two aspects (political-culture and politi numerous factors not leadily subject to gi
The importance of religion in the pi its contrality in the traditional culture o in the traditional setup, religion is a mas of religious symbols can make politics me of mass politicization. Once mass politi pattern, the religious factor tends to dec offers its own rewards, which are likely
"crutch" of religion becomes unnecessary
in which the masses are now involved, alt politically relevant from time to time.
The notion of dialectic-thesis, antitt relationship between phases which occu useful way of viewing this twenty-sevenhistory. To my mind, the growth of mass of the most significant changes in Ceylo useful in explaining the relationship of re. from Secular Elite Politics to Religious M
'3. These four definitions, and a fifth not
in ibid., p. 8.

E. SMTH
ives the expansion of the political system
religion. The polity thus extends its jurisomic activity, etc., which were subject to ional system.
to the transformation of values associated 1 community, the legitimacy of the polity, ional religious notions in the thinking of
: decline in political saliency and influence ps, religious political parties, and religious is identity and ideology of the actors as a al process. For example, the waning influheir increasingly secular orientation would
secularizationo
relationships among these four aspects of point het e except to note that the first two cularization) are largely initiated and impelites, foreign or native, while the latter cal-piocess secularization) are related to overnmental policy and control.
blitics of developing societies is related to f the masses. Stated in its simplest terms, s phenomenon, politics is not; but the use aningful to the masses, it can be the vehicle cal participation becomes an established line. Politics generates its own values and to be political, social, and economic; the
to the maintenance of the political process.
hough isolated religious issues may become
lesis, synthesis-posits a dynamic, causative in sequence. I propose it here only as a 'ear span of independent Ceylon's political Xolitical participation must be reckoned one since 1948, and the notion of dialectic is igion to this process. The dialectic proceeds ass Politics to Secular Mass Politics.
relevant to the case of Sri Lanka, are found

Page 119
THE DIALECTC O RELIGION
1 Secular Elite Politics
It is hardly necessary to add that, althou this is a general interpretive scheme and 1 and the beginning of another. Let us no data,
SECULARTZATION UNI The secularizing impact of British rule over such a long period, that it required c in 1948 even to imagine how different life doms of the past. The richness and antic preserved in the Mahavamsa and in the a and Polonnaruwa, but it was no longer re
Prince Vijaya, grandson of a lion and day the Lord Buddha passed away, but in place where his religion would be establis king of the gods. The fusion of Buddhis evidence as early as the second century liberate the northern part of the island f "Not for kingdom, but for Buddhism'. certain relics conferred legitimacy on Sinh offered the whole kingdom to the sacred was to protect and promote the faith; he responsible for overseeing its discipline which had survived innumerable political 1815.
9-س-15441

AND POLITICS IN SRI LANKA 113
ular
SS itics
N
>2 Religious Mass Politics
1gh there are some notable turning-points, lo precise dates mark the end of one phase w proceed to fill in some of the historical
DER BRITISH RULE ; on Ceylon was so profound, and sustained onsiderable effort fo1 the Buddhist layman had been in the traditional Sinhalese kingtuity of the Buddhist tradition was there, rchitecture and sculpture of Anuradhapura garded as politically relevant.
a princess, landed in Lanka on the precise ot before he had designated it the chosen hed, entrusting it to the protection of the m and Sinhalese national identity was in B.C. when King Dutthagamani fought to om Hindu Tamil invaders: his battle cry: Coronation rituals and the possession of alese rulers, and they in turn ceremonially ooth relic. The chief function of the king was chief patron of the Sangha as well as The traditional religio-political system, upheavals previously, came to an end in

Page 120
14 DONALD
The British government pledged in th protection of Buddhism, even while contin of England. But the overwhelming fact is th had played a major iegitimizing and integr: The bureaucratic colonial structure which t zation, purposes, and spirit, and had no or Christianity. Vestiges remained, but the had clearly begun.
Polity-expansion secularization procee codes and courts, and legislation with fa such as the abɔlition of rajakariya. Of cri of governmental responsibility in the area state-aided missionary schools with their the monastery schools in which Buddhist Dhamma and the skills of literacy through
SECULAR ELIT
As it developed, the most prestigious s utilized English as the exclusive medium admission to university either in Ceylon way into government service or the profess wealth but most from humbler social circ Hindu Tamil and other communities, but was remarkably homogeneous in terms of it of England was deep." The Christians, a m tantial number of leading families to the eli as well as the religious association of the to create the high prestige of Christianity in
The English educated elite of Sinhalese singly cut off from the culture of the masse of several generations of certain Sinhalese fa nominal Buddhists this was a vestige whic Anglicized lifestyle.
As we have noted, British rule prod society in terms of polity-separation and pc educational system produced impressive secularization as the secular values of Bri cracy were absorbed by the elite. The proc never went bayond the urban westernized el among the rural masses. By and large, tradit supreme in the village.
4. On the impact of western education, see M nization: the Case of Sinhalese Buddhis

E. SMTR
e Kandyan Convention to continue royal ing its official connection with the Church at the traditional system, in which religion ting role in the state, had come to an end. he British erected was secular in its organiessential connection to either Buddhism process of polity separation secularization
ded with the extension of secular legal '-reaching effects on the social structure, tical importance was the great expansion of education, as government schools and essentially western curriculum displaced monks had instructed the young in the out Sinhalese history.
E POLTICS
ector of this system of western education of instruction and prepared students for or England, after which they made their ions. Some came from families of landed umstances, from Sinhalese Buddhist and the English-educated elite which evolved 's values, for the common cultural imprint inority of 9 per cent, contributed a subste, and Christian dominance in education rulers and of western culture, combined Ceylon.
background in particular became increas. English was literally the mother tongue milies, and while they might have remained h bore little relationship to their highly
uced fundamental changes in Ceylonese lity expansion secularization. Its English results also in terms of political-culture ish liberalism and parliamentary demoess was very incomplete, however, for it ite to produce a transformation of values ional religious and caste values remained
tichael M. Ames, “Westernization or Modern', Social Compass, vol. 20, no. 2, 1973.

Page 121
TE DALECTIC OF RELIGION A
Politics was a monopoly of the Englis the British government was a moderate o tion in an expanding economy in Ceylon, institutions were among the factors whic brand of politics. Ceylonese nationalism mobilization, non-violent and violent c India over a period of three decades. Re: suffrage in 1931 did not make Ceylonese the most part the politicians dealt not wi (landlords, caste and village leaders, etc.) v for patronage.
Independence dawned in 1948, the C Flag was raised to the stirring toll of drum on without marked change, and would ci cardinal rule of the game, namely, that nc spectators.
RELIGIOUS M.
The more sensitive intellectuals of by their image if not identity as brown renascent Asia, it was uncomfortable to most like the displaced foreign rulers in : tedly, had the new governm2ntal elite succ sion (a most difficult assignment in any pc have been postponed for some years. As S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike led to his de and the founding of the Sri Lanka Freedo
The political genius of Bandaranaik ternized cultural image over a period of in the creation of a political program base national identity. In short, he embraced population; he appealed directly to the ru the sole official language, and to restore and society. It was a populist appeal sac
past.
Bandaranaike’s overwhelming victor the conflict involved only the westernize But the situation was immeasurably co and communal grievances provided much movement. For various reasons, the C.
5. See Marshall R. Singer, The Emerging “Elite Politics in the New States: The Affairs, vol. 46, no. 3, 1973.
6. See Robert N. Kearney, Communalisi
University Press, 1967).

TID POLITICS IN SRI LANKA 15
l educated class, and their posture vis-a-vis le. Law degrees from England, participaand faith in the progress of parliamentary h inclined the elite toward a conservative was a very mild affair, without the mass nflict, and massive arrests which shook markably, even the institution of universal politics less a monopoly of the elite. For th the masses, but with the local notables tho could deliver blocs of votes in exchange
Jnion Jack was hauled down and the Lion is. But the era of Secular Elite Politics went ontinue as long as all players observed the thing be done to make participants out of
ASS POLITICS
the western educated elite were troubled Englishman. In an age of nationalism, of claim one's place in the sun as the class all the former British Empire. But undoub:eeded in maintaining a high degree of cohelitical system), the dramatic changes would it turned out, the frustrated aspirations of -parture from D. S. Senanayake's cabinet om Party.
2 lay in his systematic rejection of the wesyears, in religion, language, and dress, and :d on the supremacy of a Sinhalese Buddhist the cultural symbols of the majority of the iral masses. He promised to make Sinhalese Buddhism to its "rightful place' in state ralized by reference to a glorious Buddhist
y in 1956 might perhaps have happened if d elite and the Sinhalese Buddhist masses. implicated by majority-minority conflicts of the emotional power of Bandaranaike's ylon Tamils and the Christians had both
Elite, (M.I.T. Press, 1964); and Tissa Fernando, Case of Post-Independence Sri Lanka', Pacific
n and Language in the Politics of Ceylon (Duke

Page 122
16 DONALI
done far better in the educational and would have predicted. The All-Ceylon The Betrayal of Buddhism, interpreted th on the part of British imperialism to re nity to a markedly inferior position. Th nationalism identified several enemies: a minorities, and British imperialism.
The organized role of the bhikkhus innovation in Ceylon politics. Though st accorded the greatest deference by indivi steady erosion under foreign rule of its regulation and political influence. This tra overthrow a system which had made it in political activism was clearly contrary to V Bandaranaike’s clerical allies, the United khita, waged a vigorous and effective by virtue of his position as chief priest of siderable wealth, some of which he diverted of the SLFP he was a member of Bandara the power behind the throne. He and hi leadership did in fact wield great power afi supra-cabinet. The political monks prove Sinhala Only, opposed the search for co factor of some importance in the blood daranaike and Buddharakkhita became loc behind the scenes. Bandaranaike was kille was convicted as the arch-conspirator of
Communal issues continited to be im Sirimavo Bandaranaike, particularly in th 1961, which ended Christian dominance symbolic act was the replacement of an A by a staunch Buddhist, William Gopallaw: By 1964 most of the grievances of the Sinh minority domination of certain departme come to an end.
Mrs. Bandaranaike's formation of a LSSP in 1964, however, alienated the more alike. Monks played an important part in t of the UNP which won a plurality. The r of the Federal Party, pledged itself to the Tamil occupied a cabinet post for the first t

D. E. SMITH
economic competition than their numbers Buddhist Congress, in its famous report, lese facts as part of a sustained conspiracy legate Buddhism and the Buddhist commuus a post-independence Sinhalese Buddhist westernized elite, religious and linguistic
(Buddhist monks) was another dramatic till endowed with high social prestige and dual laymen, the sangha had witnessed the once impressive prerogatives of societal ditional religious elite had every reason to (creasingly irrelevant, although the monks'. "inaya requirements of monastic discipline. Monks Front led by Rev. M. Buddharakcampaign on his behalf. Buddharakkhita. f the Kelaniya Temple, had access to conto the political campaign. As vicepresident naike's inner circle, and he saw himself as s colleagues in the United Monks Front er the 1956 victory, constituting a kind of d to be the most aggressive advocates of impromises with the Tamils, and were a y Sinhalese-Tamil clash's of 1958. Banked in a personal feud and power struggle by a monk in 1959, and Buddharakkhita he assassination plot.
portant in the first administration of Mrs. e nationalization of the aided schools in in the field of education. An important glican Christian, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, , as Governor General of Ceylon in 1962. alese Buddhists had been attended to, and its of the civil and military services had
coalition government with the Marxist onservative Buddhists, monks and laymen e 1965 elections, predominantly on behalf w government, formed with the support estoration of communal harmony, and a me since 1956.

Page 123
THE DIALECTIC OF RELIGION
SECULAR M
The UNP had learned a lot since 195 mental Sinhalese Buddhist identity. Pri pledged to restore Buddhism to its anci Specific measure which was enacted substit as public holidays.
The government focussed primary a had been mounting over the previous deca with several of them. As the 1970 election relative improvement in the economy only ranks of the educated unemployed. The of instruction and the great expansion o to create equality of opportunity and aid fall more graduates than the economy co
Mrs. Bandaranaike and the SLFP m. growing economic problems. Allied with won a decisive victory in 1970 and formed of Finance. The 1971 insurrection, which the island as no other event since indep had already decided that the leftists in slowly, and that the solution to Ceylon's e
The Ceylonese electorate today is amazing 80 percent of qualified voters p politics toward economic issues, which h means the emergence of Secular Mass Po adopted in 1972 declares: “The Republi foremost place and accordingly it shall be Buddhism....' It is ironic that this symbo after its real political victory, and at a into the background by economics.
We have earlier in this article provid expansion, and political-culture secularize to this latest period right up to the pres political-process secularization, the declini gious leaders, religious interest groups, re and also the weakening of religious iden quence of participation in the political pro
It would be foolish to attempt any lol of political Buddhism in Sri Lanka seems
CaSOS:

AND POLITICS IN SRI LANKA 17
ASS POLITICS
, and it was anxious to establish its fundahe Minister Dudley Senanayake therefore :nt glory and strengthen the Sangha. One uted the Buddhist sabbath days for Sundays
ttention on the economic problems which de, and made creditable progress in dealing approached, however, it appeared that the served to underline the plight of the growing doption of Sinhalese and Tamil as media f university education after 1956, designed the disadvantaged majority, had produced uld absorb.
oved steadily leftward in response to these the LSSP and the Communist Party she a leftist government with a Marxist minister shook the government and the people of endence, was led by young Marxists who power were opportunists and moving too conomic problems lay in violent revolution.
largely literate and highly politicized; an articipate in elections. The gravitation of as meant a significant swing leftward, also litics in Sri Lanka. The Constitution finally c of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the : the duty of the State to protect and foster lic victory of Buddhism came fifteen years ime when religion is clearly being pushed
ed illustrations of polity-separation, politytion in the history of Sri Lanka. It is only 2nt that we can apply the fourth category: : in political saliency and influence of reliigious political parties, and religious issues; ;ity and ideology of the actors as a conse
C6:SS.
g-range predictions, but a major resurgence unlikely in the near future for the following

Page 124
118 м DONALO
1. The Sinhalese Buddhist majority social, economic and political life. It was t like status in various respects which gene to its most important symbolic system, Bt
2. Buddha statues have spring up in r ment of Buddhism has been achieved in goals have been articulated by influential contains no ideology of a comprehensive sa, in Libya. A movement of religio-political without clear objectives.
3. As argued above, the centrality of t a deep impression at all levels of society. T to be prolonged, and an increasingly literat to regard all religious issues in politics a generated by growing economic ills may l but even when this takes the form of comn per se will play the important role in politic

E. S.M.
is now in firm control of most areas of he anomoly of this community's minorityated much of the emotional commitment uddhism.
many public places, the symbolic enthronethe Constitution, and no important new Buddhist leaders. Buddhism, unlike Islam cral society such as still inspires a Quaddafi resurgence cannot prosper or even survive
he economic crisis in Sri Lanka has made he country's economic problems are likely e and politicized electorate may well come s so many red herrings. The frustrations ead to an increase in inter-group conflict, hunal conflict it is unlikely that Buddhism sit once did.

Page 125
vų
لہ
SRI LANKA’S ECONOMIC TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
DONALD R
introduction
The first quarter-century of Ceylon for economic achievement, based on wh a literate, well-fed population; a compete industries which had amassed large Stel coconut products to the wartime Allies; V structure. lt seems a fair judgment that ac Production has grown slowly and foreign { during most of the period. Ever-worsenin mile against which all development effort has seen some notable achievements-ins lation, lessening interpersonal income in Yet the increasing emphasis on averting a tically, rather than buying it abroad wit represents a lowering of the sights of ec the past 25 years have been for the Ceylon
Ceylonese economic development in subperiods of roughly equal length. In 1 economy so as to cope with a new and le: satisfy the social demands of a politically the era was the failure to correct the wors This omission forced severe restrictions beginning in 1961. In the 1960-73 era, th perennial foreign exchange crisis. The ec shortages, grew much less rapidly-but thi improve substantially.
Development in 1948-60
The 1948-60 experience and its histol where. This was a period of significant,
1. Donald R. Snodgrass, Ceylon: An Expo
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966).
11

KI
DEVELOPMENT DURING
OF INDEPENDENCE
SNODGRAss
ese independence began with high hopes at then appeared to be enormous assets: ht public administration; prosperous export ling balances supplying tea, rubber, and well-developed econc mic and social infrahievement has fallen short of these hopes. Xchange has been in critically short supply goverpopulation has constituted a treads must struggle. It is true that the period preading social services to the entire popuequality, and increasing food production. food crisis by growing more food domesh the earnings of viable export industries onomic policy which reveals how difficult ese economy.
1948-73 can usefully be divided into two 948-60 Ceylon failed to realign its export Ss favorable set of factor growth rates and articulate populace. The critical event of ening foreign exchange position after 1955 on imports and other foreign payments. » nation struggled to escape ficm a nowoncmy, everywhere constrained by import 2 position of the lowest income groups did
ical background have been analyzed elseif unsustainable, economic growth. Real
rt Economy in Transition (Homewood, Illinois:
9

Page 126
120 ۔ DONALD R.
Gross National Product rose by about 90 a small improvement in the barter terms of real Gross National Income practically dc two and a half million souls to the popula Private consumption per head (valued in 1948 and Rs. 516 in 1960. Private consump payments which consistently exceeded ta the government.* Public consumption ou competing regimes broadened the covera services. The average Ceylonese of 1960 was part of 1948. But adequate provision had 1 vement after 1960.
ln the long run, what did not happe1 what did. To sustain moderate growth. af earnings be plowed back into investment consumption claimed most of these flows v 10% of GNP until 1956, even then advanc were achieved in paddy production (whic but progress in refurbishing existing expor in either agriculture or industry was far mc changed little as population grew and, a worsened rapidly.
In 1956-60 moderate downturn of expc was juxtaposed on rapid increases in impo policy. External assets dropped from Rs. 1 million four years later. No government c political life by taking the unpalatable m tide, so by the time the problem was finall, exchange had fallento a crisis level.
The main immediate effect of populatio and public consumption needs, diminishin
2. See the Appendix for the numbers upor
1948-73 are based.
Snodgrass, pp. 272-73.
4. According to my national accounts estin
1950-55 period when gross fixed capital when it briefly touched 11%. Estimates (cf. Snodigrass, pp. 240-43) give higher ra
5. Export prices fell only 12% from 1955 pe slightly. But import volume rose 35% b Ceylon, Annual Report of the Monetary 1973, Colombo, 1974, Tables 50 and 51.
3.

SNODGRASS
% (equivalent to 5.5% per annum); with trade between the end years of the period, ubled. Despite the addition of more than tion, living standards did rise significantly. 959 prices) can be reckoned at Rs. 376 in ion was supported by government transfer x and other payments by households to lays more than doubled in real terms, as ge of education, health, and other social thus distinctly better off than his counternot been made for maintaining this impro
1 in 1948-60 may be more important than er 1960 would have required that export in other sectors of the economy. Instead while investment generally remained below ing only to 13% by 1960. Major increases h doubled between 1947-49 and 1959-61) t industries or diversifying into new areas remodest. So the structure of production fter 1955, the foreign exchange problem
»rt prices (from an historically high level) rt volume financed by expansionary fiscal 275 million at the end of 1956 to Rs. 541 )f that turbulent period dared to risk its easures which could have stemmed the 7 tackled, in early 1961, supply of foreign
in growth in 1948-60 was to push up private the investible surplus. The employment
which all estimates of economic growth in
ates (Snodgrass, p. 269) the only year in the formation exceeded 10% of GNP was 1953, of the Department of Census and Statistics tios because they underestimate GNP.
k to 1958 trough, after which they recovered etween 1955 and 1960. See Central Bank of oard to the Minister of Finance for the Year

Page 127
SRI LANKA's ECONOMIC DEVELOP)
problem began to command attention ol worsening situation.o V
Income distribution changed little ( and 1963, the years for which survey da decile of income recipients did decline, b rose, leaving overall pretax inequality un disparities probably did occur as a result
Development in 1960-73
The years since 1960 have seen much The growth rate of real GNP dipped bel crisis necessitated frequent international which all luxuries, and then increasing qu purged. Gross foreign assets nevertheless ( lower export prices contributed to Ceyl strengthened, even exceeding the 1955 bc commodity prices. The Dudley Senanaya net official loan receipts averaging Rs. 2( payments lags, aid receipts reached even
Offsetting these increased means of increases in import prices, resulting from devaluations. Whereas import prices had all in 1951-60), the rise in 1960-73 was a star in 1973, as a result of world grain shortage: leum exporters. Imports had to be restric as they had been in the early 1960's; the lowest level since 1949.10 Thus it is not su private consumption, and even public cc 1960-73.
With the capacity to import so sevel means of earning or saving more foreign { than it had been in 1943-60. Yet progress ; part because export industries and import-s to be heavily dependent on imported inter.
6. See "A Survey of Employment, Unemp International Labour Review, March 196 the labor force to be unemployed, with 29.0% in urban areas unable to find 40 h 7. Central Bank of Ceylon, Survey of C Survey of Ceylon's Consumer Finances 1 8. Official foreign debt soared from Rs. 29
end-1973. Central Bank, Annual Report
9. Ibid., Table 47. 10. Ibid., Table 51.

ENT DURING TWENTY.FIVE YEARS 12
ly after a 1959 sample survey indicated a .
uring this period-at least between 1953 a are available." The share of the highest ut those of the deciles just below the top hanged. Considerable levelling of welfare of broadened government social programs.
lower economic growth than those before. w 4%. The permanent foreign exchange borrowing to finance an import bill from antities of more essential gods had been ontinued to slip away until 1972. Generally on's woes through 1968, at which prices om level during the 1973 upset of world ke regime of 1965-70 was able to obtain }0 million in 1966-70 (perhaps because of igher levels in 1971-72).9
import finance, however, were dramatic rising world prices and successive rupee risen by only 46% in 1948-60 (and not at tling 152%. Much of this increase occurred s and the withholding of supplies by petroted almost as severely in the early 1970's import volume index for 1973 sto cd at its Irprising that per capita levels of income, )nsumption increased only marginally in
ely constrained, the necessity to develop xchange was even more urgent in 1960-73 along either line continued to be slow-in ubstituting industries themselves continued mediate and capital goods. Rubber output
loyment, and Underemployment in Ceylon', 3, pp. 247-57. The Survey showed 10.5% of 45.4% of those employed in rural areas and ours of work per week on a year-round basis.
avlon's Consumer Finances, Colombo, 1954; 963, Colombo, 1964.
4 million at end-1960 to Rs. 2,795 million at 973, Table 38.

Page 128
122 DONALD
did go up on the strength of the replanti in the face of stagnating, price-inelastic from other producers. Coconut output co no apparent trend. Real value added averaging only 5.3% a year. Tourism add economic restructuring proceeded so slow more about growing her own food. Fortu output by another 50%, after the doublin stuffs also increased, so food supplies ge population. Indeed, nutrition seems to two decades before: average daily calori while consumption of fruit, vegetables, eg
In 1960-73 the full force of populatic lation between 15 and 65 years of agefrom about five and a quarter million to the available statistics and difficulties of i of labour supply during this period far outr by the slowly growing economy. By any and bounds. Estimated open unemployme in 1969/70, to a staggering figure of 793, definition, undoubtedly increased. And lal for women, declined as "discouraged wo for employment. As a result of its long-sta tion through the university level, Ceylon a growing global phenomenon of educated
While Ceylon found it difficult to in substantially equalize income distributio and spending units has been cut sharply; t while those of the bottom eight haverisen. redistributing tax and benefit programs.
11. Central Bank Annual Reports for 1968 ( 12. Based on food balance sheets for 1952 Pocket Book of the Republic of Sri Lank, Printing, 1973, p. 57). 13. "A Survey of Employment...'; Interna Opportunities and Expectations. A Prog and Central Bank, Annual Report for 19 14. Declining participation rates through 196 in his Employment and Unemployment in and Development, 1971, pp. 49-53. Da (Statistical Pocket Book 1973, pp. 10A crude indicator is the falling ratio of ployment to total population ages 15. censuses: 58.2% in 1953, 55.6% in 1963, 15. See Central Bank, Annual Report for
and Economic Commission for Asia ar Wealth in Ceylon', Bangkok, mimeogr: in Income Distribution in Sri Lanka'. No. 1, (April 1974) pp. 1-23. 16. See Lal Jayawardene, "Sri Lanka', in with Growth, London: Oxford Universil

SNODGRASS
g campaign but tea production levelled of orld demand and increasing competition tinued to fluctuate from year to year with manufacturing grew by fits and starts, da tiny elementofdynamism, but in general that Ceylon was forced to think more and ately it did prove possible to raise paddy of 1948-60. Production of subsidiary fooderally remained adequate for the growing ave improved scnewhat as compaled to intake rose from about 2,000 to 2,200, s, and milk all increased.'
h growth hit the labour market. The popuroughly, the working age range-soared seven and a half million. Despite gaps in nterpretation, it is evident that the growth an the demand for labour being generated
2asure, labour surplus increased by leaps ht climbed from 370,000 in 1959, to 550,000 000 in 1973. Underemployment, by any »our force participation rates particularly kers' abandoned the unrewarding search inding commitment to extensive free educalso became an outstanding example of the unemployment.
crease income per head in 1960-73, it did n. Since 1963 inequality among earners he shares of the top two deciles have fallen Further progress was also made in welfareThus, despite the slow growth of mean
p. 39) and 1973 (Table 5). -53 (Snodgrass, p. 321) and 1971 (Statistical 1973, Colombo: Department of Government
tional Labour Office, Matching Employment ramme of Action for Ceylon, Geneva, 1971 ; 3, pp. 11-12. 3 were found for some groups by P. J. Richards Ceylon, Paris: Organization for Co-operation a from a 10% sample of 1971 census returns 1, 25) suggest subsequent further declines. persons whose usual economic status is em54 which is shown in successive population 50.7% in 1971. 973 pp. 10-11; also Richards, pp. 149-70, the Far East, "Distribution of Income and phed, 1972. H.N. S. Karunatilake "Changes :entral Bank of Ceylon, Staff Studies, vol. 4,
Hollis Chenery and associates, Redistribution
Press, 1974, pp. 273-79.

Page 129
SRI LANKA's ECONOMIC DEVELOPM
income, low-income families did see impro is an achievement which many faster-grow
Conclusion
Until the recent shift of focus from head to income distribution and the redres ded as a laggard in development. Now, how economists is recasting her as a success b ments." The issue is only partly one of patterns of development are sustainable thi
We have noted that cconomic growth of most social advances. The major imp made before 1960, when government outla Thereafter, social development's share of singly difficult even to maintain the newly development criteria by which performal are reduction of income inequality and 1 We need to ask how these improvements nable in the future.
It appears that higher payments to p cers were the major factor raising the ear in turn originated in efforts to grow more fic This reallocation of resources and slanti certainly be expected to reduce inequality the absolute incomes of the poor substar in the longer run, however, is questionable
Over time, raising the incomes of any in national income. Raising national inc away from paddy production and other in turn requires export earnings and ca) will restructure the economy. It is this t. saving and investment rates still low and problems worse than ever, prospects f dim. Until some way is found to make sustained social progress, Sri Lanka will sc of a direct approach to problems of social
17. The Chenery and associates volume cit
'revisionist' view.
18. Snodgrass, pp. 269, 388-89; Central B 19. See Jayawardene op cit.
20. Jayawardene estimates (p. 278) that r lowest four deciles of households rost of 35% for all households. I cannot (based on official data) that real GNI p. consumption by 20%, and real public ci
21. When population growth is allowed f even for maintaining existing income pe Population and Economic Development 1972) for an analysis of the economic c
22. For a similar view, see Arun Shourie Affairs, January 1973, pp. 340-52.

MENT DURING TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 123
}vements in their material well-toeing. This ing economies cannot claim.
economic growth measured by GNP per sal of poverty, Sri Lanka was widely regarever, a "revisionist' school of development ecause of her social development achieve|alues; there is also the question of what ough time.
slowed after 1960. The same can be said provements in education and health were is for social programs rose to 8% of GNP.18 GNP slowly declined as it became increa-won standards of service. The only social hce in 1960-73 exceeded that of 1948-60 ises in the absolute inccmes of the poor. came about and whether they are sustai
addy planters and other small scale produned incomes of the poor in 1963-73; these bod in view of the foreign exchange shortage. ng of incentives toward subsistence could . Over the 1963-73 decade it also increased tially. Whether it can continue to do so
substantial part of society requires growth ome requires a relative shift of resources relatively low productivity uses. And this pital inflows to finance investments which hat was not achieved in 1948-73, and with the foreign exchange and overpopulation pr achieving it in the near future appear the economy grow fast enough to finance rve as a better illustration of the limitations equity than of its benefits.
ed in the preceding note consistently takes the
ank, Annual Report for 1973, Tables 8 and 36.
ea income and social benefits received by the by 58% in 1963-73, compared to an average reconcile these figures with my own estimates er head rose by only 10% in 1963-73, real private onsumption by 10%.
or, GNI growth becomes a necessary condition r head. See Gavin W. Jones and S. Selvaratnam, in Ceylon. (Hansa Puhlishers, Ltd., Colombo, osts of population growth.
, "Growth, Poverty and Inequalities", Foreign

Page 130
124 IONALD R
APP
Extimates of Econom
1948
Population (000) 7,24
GNP at factor cost (Rs. millions)
In current prices 3,00 Deflator (1959 = 100) 90...' In 1959 prices y 3,30 Real GNP per capita (Rs.) 45.
GNI at factor cost (Rs. millions)
In current prices 3,00 Defator (1959=100) 93. In 1959 prices 3,214 Real GNI per capita (Rs.) 444
Private consumption (Rs. millions)
In current prices 2,400 Defator (1959=100) 8. In 1959 prices 2,727 Real private consumption per
capita (Rs...) 37
Public consumption (Rs. millions)
In current prices 30 Deflator (1959-100) 9 In 1959 prices 313 Public consumption per capita (Rs.) 4:
Source Notes:
Population: See Snodgrass, p. 307; Statistica
Report for 1973, p. 12.
Current price estimates: 1960 and 1973 figur (pp. 37, 42) and 1973 (Tables 4, 8), resp (see Snodgrass, p. 240), raised slightly Bank data.
Deflators: 1960 and 1973 deflatos for GNP GNP and GN deflators based on Snod trends; private consumption deflated by p. 397, and Central Bank Annual Repo! 1960 and 1973 deflated by central gover Bank Annual Report for 1973, Table 60), implied in Snodgrass, pp. 269, 271.
Real estimates: GNP and G NI in 1960 and
1968 (pp. 39-40) and 1973 (Tables 5 and note.

R. SNODGRASS
ENDIX
ic Growth, 1948-73
Growth rate (%) 1960 1973 1948-60 1960-73 1948-73
4 9,896 13,251 2, 6 2.3 2.4
) 6,287 15,155 6.4 7.0 6.7 7 100.0 46.0 7 6,289 10,383 5.5 3.9 4.7
7 636 784 2.8 1.6 2.2
) 6,287 15,155 6.4 7.0 6.7 3. 98.6 164.5
6,278 9,212 5.7 3.0 4.3
634 695 3.0 0.7 18
) 5,020 12,203 6.3 7.1 6.7
98.3 1572 7 5,107 7,763 5.4 3.3 4.3
5 S16 586 2.7 1.0 1.8
) 911 2,043 9.7 6.4 8.0
100 142
B 911 1439 9.3 3.. 6 6.3
3.
92 O9 6.5 1.3 3.8
il Pocket Book ..., p. 9; Central Bank Annual
as from Central Bank Annual Reports for 1968 pectively; 1948 estimates from an earlier series to improve comparability with later Central
and GNI implied in Central Bank data: 1948 grass, p. 398, and other data on 1948-50 price Colombo consumer price index (see Snodgrass, rt for 1973, Table 54); public consumption for ment employees wage rate index (see Central and for 1948 deflated by 1950-59 price relative
1973 from Cential Bank Annual Reports for 5); all others deflated as described in preceding

Page 131
SRI LANKA's ECONOMIC DEVELOPM
Indicators of Social D
Literacy of population age 10 and over (% of to
1953
Male . . a s 80.7 Female a 55.5 Both sexes O. O. 69.0
Source: Statistical Pocket Boo
Life expectancy at birth
1946
Male . . O AB 43.9 Female a A. 41.6
Source: Ibid., p. 17.
Vital statistics
per 1,000
Births D 1945 a 35.9 2 1950 s 39.7 1955 0. a 37.3 1. 1960 8 36.6 1963 - O as a 34.1 1968 0 0 A 4 32.0 1972 O 29.5
11971
Source: Ibid., p. 19.
Health facilities (per 100,000 of population)
Hospital beds
1948 . . e. 260 1960 . . 8 w 294 1972 . . 288
Sources: Economic and Social Development c 1955, p. 99; Statistical Abstract of Ceylon 1 Book 1973, p. 32. All data refer to governme
Distribution of income among income recipients
% of total income accruing to: 1953 Top 10% s so 42.49 Next 10% 14.6 Next 20% 18.33 Next 20% 12.02 Bottom 40% . . 13.00 Gini concentration ratio .490
Source: Central Bank, Annual Repart for 1973, p.
decile shares.

ENT DURING TWENTY-FVE YEARS 125
evelopment, 1948-73 .
al)
1963 1971
85.6 85.2 67.3 78.1 76.9 70.7 : 1973, p. 9.
1953 1962 1967
58.8 61.9 64.8 57.5 61.4 66.9
of population per, 1,000 live births
Natural Maternal Infant paths Increase deaths deaths 1.5 14.4 16.5 139.7 2.4 27.3 5.6 81.6 0.8 26.5 4.1 71.5 8.6 28.0 3.0 56.8 8.5 25.6 2.4 55.8 7.9 24.1 1.8 50.2 8.0 21.5 1.2 45.1
Doctors Nurses
9.5 3.1 12.3 34.2 15.7 38.1
f Ceylon (A Survey) 1926-1954, Colombo, 961, Colombo, 1961, p. 75; Statistical Pocket nt institutions only.
1963 1973 39.24 29.98 16.01 15.91 20.44 23.21. 12.37 15.85 11.94 15.05
.491 .402
10. Gini concentration ratios calculated from

Page 132
Χ
THE MARXISTS AND TH SRI LANKA SINCE
CHARLES S.
The Marxists Parties in Sri Lanka’s Politic
The politics of Ceylon since indepenc mentary system, reinforced by a traditio Hinduism. In this climate of security and parties functioned led by able leaders, w democracy against legislative or executive parties has been slight, and only older m (L.S.S.P.) ever languished in imperialist for the little known crime of "revolution
Marxist leadership has come typical low country Sinhalese stock, private sch their Marxism in the seminars of British : over in their later practices of politics
Marxist politicians after 1947 confro struggle. -
(l) The choice between parliament
to gain national power.
(2) The issue of Marxist unity bet
(3) Frequent secessions by left-wing
(4) The alternatives within parliam
as a minor element of the Op
partners) with the semi-Marxis shaping government policies.
1. Works on Marxist Parties of Ceylon inc of Ceylon', in P. Brass, and M. Fran Mass., 1973:) Calvin A. Woodward, G R.I. 1969;) W. Howard, Wriggins, Ceyl 1960:) George J. Lerski, Origins of Ti 1968;) Leslie Goonewardene, Short Hist 1960;) Hector Abhayavardhana, *Cail munity, Cọlombo, No. 4, 1963; Charles of Comminism, Jan.-Feb., 1973.

I
E ULTRA MARXISTS OF
E INDEPENDENCE S.
BLACKTON
S
lence evolved within a British-style patliain of tolerance rooted in Buddhism and semi-consensus, several respected Marxist who have at times defended parliamentary threats. The revolutionary record of these nembers of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party jails and then only during World War II ary defeatism'.
ly from the older elites of wealth, caste. ools and university degrees. Some learned scholars. A certain Fabian restraint carried
nted five chronic problems in the political
ary and revolutionary strategy in the effort
ween the LSSP and the Communist Party
splinter groups.
tent, of maintaining Marxist independence position, or of collaborating (as minority t Sri Lanka Freedom Party as a means of
:lude: Robert N. Kearney, “The Marxist Parties da, Radical Politics in South Asia, (Cambridge, rowth of a Party System in Ceylon, (Providence, on, Dilemmas of a New Nation, (Princeton, N.J., rotskyism in Ceylon.... 1935-42, (Stanford, Calif., ory of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, (Colombo, tegories of Left. Thinking in Ceylon', in ComS. Blackton, "Sri Lanka's Marxists", Problems
26

Page 133
THE MARXISTS AND THE ULTRA MARXIST
(5) Increasing the Marxist voter-b dominately rural, Buddhist socie
At the first meeting of the Ceylon Parl Marxists, sporting red ties, and led by The best organized parties in Ceylon th strike, they included in addition to the L S. A. Wickremasinghe) a small Bolshevik which had broken from the LSSP in 1945.
Turning points in modern Marxist History
In the twenty years that followed, th series of turning points in the national ex parties seized their first opportunity to Minister Dudley Senanayake, acting on attempted to reduce the crippling burden Marxist unions were mobilized to stage Turbulent dampnstrations following the l causing fatalities and leading to fateful po
The resignation of the moderate Sena conservative cousin, Sir John Kotelawala of Marxists. But it laid the grounds for a Sinhala speaking economically under rev teachers, ayurvedic physicians and local electoral victory of the Mahajina Eksath and non-alignment in international affail communist world. This was the first gover
Cooperation between the MEP and th support' terminated in 1959. Periodic ren MEP's successor) reflected the aim of mode based, progressive party. This combined w Party (UNP) and, following the abortive A dictatorship.
A major attempt to reforge left unity dena's following (now called MEP) joined t Left Front (ULF). The demons of divisive
2. The voters of Sri Lanka have been c. percentage of the popular vote declined the 1970 General Election. See Kearne Franda, op. cit., 405.
3. While sources on the history of events
scholars including Wriggins, Kearney are valuable.
4. Philip Gunawardena, and P. H. William

s oF sRI LANKA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 127
se while maintaining rapport with a prety.
ament after the 1947 election, only eighteen Dr. N. M. Perera (LSSP) took their seats. eir prestige enlarged by the 1947 general SSP and the Communist party (led by Dr. Leninist group (Dr. Colvin R. de Silvas)
e evolution of Marxism was shaped by a perience. In 1952, the Marxist opposition ake politics into the streets, when Prime advice of an International Bank mission of the rice subsidy. As public protests rose
a one-day mass work stoppage (hartal), lartal prompted police to fire on crowds litical repercussions.
nayake, to be replaced by his formidably , ushered in a period of severe repression virtual voters' revolution of the Buddhist warded village elites: bhikkhus, schoolofficials. This materialized in 1956 in the Peramuna. Socialism became respectable 's opened the way for relations with the nment to award cabinet posts to Marxists.'
LSSP ended in 1957 and the CP's "critical ewals of this alliance with the SLFP (the rate Marxists to seek alliances with a massith fear of a return of the United National rmy coup in 1962, of threats of right-wing
took place in 1963 when Philip Gunawarhe LSSP and CP in establishing the United ess haunted this compact from the outset.
insistently non-Marxist. The Marxist parties from the 20.5% of 1947 to a nadir of 13.0 in ", "Marxist Parties of Ceylon" in Brass and
since independence are limited, the works of and Lerski, and Woodward, (see Note 1)
de Silva.

Page 134
28 CHARLES S.
Left-wing Communists broke away decl: principles. Almost simultaneously the UL ween the Soviet Union and the Peoples R. N. Shanmugathasan section of the Ceylor in 1964 Dr. Perera encouraged by the joi Bala Tampoe (Ceylon Mercantile Union the most crucial step in Marxist politics si
The LSSP “purist”, Edmund Samar; the LSSP moderates were denounced as fakers', and the Fourth (Trotskyist) Int the Sama Samajists because they had allied the SLFP, the allocation of three cabine right-wing which joined the UNP in Oppo Coalition in Dacember, 1964, on an opposi
In the 1965 Ganeral Election, a cons the sangha's fear of Marxism influenced but only Philip Gunawardena of the sma having boxed the political compass, was ousted left-wing Marxists, however, continu politics, cultivating dissatisfied young ra
The United Front Coalition
Although “centrist” Sama Samajists d into the alliance, and questioned whether th in Mrs. Bandaranaike's following had socia the SLFP orbit while reciprocally radicalizi in platform and rhetoric became a progress its aim of joining the Coalition and some the birth of the United Front (UF) Coali years (1965-1970), the UF developed lines of the Buddhists, and primacy for the Sinh made a serious effort to form ties with Bu rity. Some leaders attended festivals and with SLFP policies and the ideas of the lat gained powerful posts in the shadow cabine
While left wing Marxists condemned liamentarianism', N. M. Perera and S. A. V could be advanced through such peaceful
5. According to an article of Roshan Peir Llangaratne, and Bala Tampoe, of the C part in the arrangements.
6. Comments of Wilfred Perera, in Young kody eventually abandoned the LSSP-R Samajist Party.

BLACKTON
iring that the ULF compromised basic F was shaken by the ideological war betpublic of China, leading to fission by the Trades Union Federation (CTUF). Then ut efforts of T. B. Ilangaratne (SLFP) and ), negotiated an alliance with the SLFP, lce 19475
kkody, seceded to form a sprinter group "golden brains' who had become "left ernational withdrew its recognition from themselves with a bourgeois party. Within t posts to Marxists was anathema to the sition, and helped defeat the SLFP-LSSP tion motion leading to a General Election.
2rvative victory, economic discontent and
the results. The LSSP and CP survived, iller Marxist faction won a seat, and he, allied with the conservative UNP. The led active below the level of parliamentary dicals.
emanded that the Communists be brought le "Leftward moving progressive elements' list aims, the LSSP was drawn further into ng that party's program, so that the SLFP ive-socialist party. In 1967 the CP achieved LSSP-R elements were recruited. This was tion. During the UNP Government's five
of attack based on socialism, resurgence alese majority. In the sixties UF Marxist ildhism-the religion of the Sinhalese majooffered dina. This symbolized adjustment S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. In return they
the parties for *their capitulation to parlickremasinghe insisted that mass interests olitical means as long as an open demo
, Ceylon Daily News, March 2, 1973, T. B. bylon Mercantile Union played an important
Socialist, III, no. 4, October, 1965. Samarakto create the miniscule Revolutionary Sama

Page 135
THE MARXISTS AND THE ULTRA MARXST
ratic situation continued to exist. Eventl and the LSSP-SLFP over the 1968 Czech which the CP viewed as "the mainstrea forces in Ceylon'."
Emergence of Ultra-Marxism
But a serious, little noticed dissent v of Marxism far from parliament was dev Disenchanted youth, enemployed or dis share their grievences.
Ultra-Marxism of the young was a wid and life-style between the western-educate speaking peasant majority. This group, ex lation explosions in Asia, faced rising ec SLFP Governments to generate jobs and a welfare state had been cumulatively unsuc from disfunctionally trained B.A.'s to re. pered by anger. In such an exploitable clim sities came forward with stirring solutior revolutionary ideas politicized many espec sity students. Through these youths in th vatism of village Ceylon was eroded and a lism created.
University students in the early sixti and study groups where they were told tha gned for privileged youth, that after ach jobs' for them, and that the corridors to Ceylonese of wealth and high caste.
Gradually, however, some of the yo promises of politicians and the dead-end Marxist parties which had imperceptabl critics began to blame them for the slow r
7. Cited in Kearney, loc. cit., p. 430.
8. Recent work of H. A. I. Goonetileke,
Bibliography (July, 1973) Louvaine, B sis. It is invaluable. Factual and interpr Warnapala, April Revolt in Ceylo, No. 3, March, 1972; S., Arasaratnam Pacific Affairs, 45, No. 3, Fall, 1972; Liberation Front and the Revolution t ping Area Studies, No. 23, McGill Univ. "Sri Lanka's Marxists', Problems of C
9. It has been suggested that population i Kurunegala areas where insurgent act See Howard Wriggins, and Frank Ce rection in Sri Lanka, May 1971 (Mimeo
15441一10

OF SRI LANKA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 129
e embarassment of a rift between the CP slovak crisis did not break the Coalition n of the anti-imperialist and progressive
rith this view was rising. Another nucleus eloping, partly from left-splinter groups. advantageously employed, had begun to
espread response to the gap in opportunity i elites of wealth and caste and the Sinhalabanding in one of the most extreme popunomic inequities. Attempts by UNP and the revenues and productivity to maintain cessful. But among frustrated youth ranging lundant farm labourers, despair was temlate Marxist students at schools and univer. ls. Marxism had become respectable, and ;ially the new rural element among univer. he sixties, some of the traditional consern appetite for simplified confiscatory socia
es joined campus CP and LSSP societies it the dated curricula they studied was desiieving the B.A., there would be few"desk job security were closed except to young
uthful anger caused by this gap between realities began to be directed against the y merged with the establishment. Young ate of progress towards socialism; for their
he April 1971 Insurrection in Ceylon A Select algium, contains 346 items dealing with the crietative reports include: Politicus (W.A. Wiswa l, Asian Survey, Berkeley, California, 12, , “The Ceylon Insurrection of April, 1971", A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "Ceylon: The People's hat failed', Reprint Series, Center for Develorsity, Montreal, Quebec; Charles S. Blackton, pmmunism, Jan.-Feb., 1973, Washington D.C.
ncrease was especially high in the Kegalle and vity was intense during the 1971 insurgency. , Demographic Change and the Youth Insurgraphed) 54. −

Page 136
130 CHARLES S.
growing associations with bourgeoise po to the exclusion of revolutionary alternativ of left-wing purists off into political limbc leaders began to appear as here cocktail co than to revolutionary objectives. Viewed below the prosperous circle of "Sravasti' at goyigama, karāva and salāgama M.P.s, tinguishable from the non-Marxist elites.
This criticism was exaggerated, but the error of ignoring trends among the for radical action. The oversight speeded t the discussion-group level to secret, rev gatherings, young dissenters seem to hav UF governments were incapable of fulfillin trated the inadequacy of the parliamentar return to revolutionary means to build a groups affected by these ideas in the mid-si (JVP) or Peoples Liberation Front, "a cl cell-system'.
The genesis of the JVP and its clima of 1971 are public knowledge. What will interaction of the new Ultra Left with the the traumatic experience of the 1971 upris
Interactions of The new left with the establi
This was uniquely a revolt of youth, o mately national proportions of caste memb played some part. Some leaders were midc the devotees of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaik unemployed or deprived youth from the bering thousands in campus branches of (only some 200 are thought to have serv literate products of free state education. The dating from 1956, from the UNP, and fron Marxist lectures had taught them to beli achieved.
The revolt was aimed against the Go' opportunism and compromise. It failed in the narrow base of the movement did not ir category over the age of 35, because of su nalism, because of massive foreign aid, bec because the mass of Ceylonese rejected it, b.

BLACKTON
litical power and parliamentary methods es, and for allowing repeated fragmentation . Admired in the early sixties, UF Marxist ommunists, more given to social democracy
by young people without prospects, far ld amiable inter-party associations among
the Marxist leaders were almost indis
Marxist leaders in this period committed young and underestimating their potential he transition of the youth movement from olutionary conspiracy. In those obscure concluded that (a) the UNP, SLFP and g their campaign promises, (b) this demonsy system and therefore (c) Marxists must better society. The most influential of the ixties was the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna andestine ultra-left group organized in a
in unsuccessful insurgency in the spring be treated here is an examination of the established Marxist parties subsequent to ing.
shed Marxists
f Sinhalese Buddhist origins and approxiership, though, locally, inter-caste conflicts leclass or from village elites, the sons of 2. The followers were largely lowerclass, lower-middleclass. Undergraduates-numthe JVP proved to be summer soldiers
ed as fighting men). But most JVP were ir common grievance was that the promises n the United Front had not materialized. eve bourgeois programs never would be
vernment, the elites, and the Marxism of more than the military aspects because clude labor unions or many adults of any rviving conservatism and populist natioause of poor planning and fuzzy thinking, ecause it was premature.

Page 137
THE MARXSTS AND THE ULTRA MARXIST
The eruption of the Ultra-Left was n nese history. The rebels of 71 would pa aspects, vagueness of precept and plans, : stated clearer than any party manifesto reliant Sri Lanka on egalitarian lines. The in the na me of the future poor of Sri Lan
Marxist Parties and the Constitution of 19
While parliamentary democracy sur safeguards did not live through the legisla the Ceylon Parliament, as a constituent new constitution. Through twenty-two mo gency and its repression by the resurgent R. de Silva shepherded the measure to it majority dominating the Navarangahala. constitution establishing the Republic of parliamentary Marxists, most active in i was the baginning of real independence a for Buddhist-Nationalists.
But while the way was opened for me jists supported (limitations on income a to oversee local and regional affairs, for ex quent legislation such as the Criminal Ju seriously disturbed and even disrupted the
So events after 1970 raised questions politics in Sri Lanka. Economic crisis h; chronic threats of ethno-linguistic, class-c unsolved concerns of all factions. Within Marxist parties faced transformed and int through both the past and present of Ceyl
The Dilemmas of Marxism in Sri Lanka
One problem had its origins in the soc party leaders and their past commitment Accustomed to employ Fabian socialist policies had usually been more ecumeni brought them advantages and power in and narrow voter-base. They gained a nat opportunity to advance socialist measures doubted that alliance with the Sri Lanka the cause of Communism. Yet the LSSP ar. active in the UF, despite the concern of st lation might be used against them if the S. from the Government.

i of SRI LANKA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 31
vertheless the watershed of modern Ceylortly shape the future. Despite adolescent ind disregard for individual rights, the JVP he call for united action to build a selfdeprived youth may intuitively have acted
ca. r
72
rived the insurgercy of 1971, scme of is tion passed since 1972. Beginning in 1970, assembly, debated the components for a nths, bridging the period of the JVP insurArmed Forces and police of Ceylon, Colvin s inevitable acceptance by the massive UF It was promulgated on May 22, 1972. The Sri Lanka was a victory for the Ceylonese its formulation. For them May 22, 1972 s the electoral revolution of 1956 had been
asures most Communists and Sama Samahd property-holdings, Janatha committees ample), some of the most important subsestice Commission Act, and the Press Act, Left.
about the future of meaningful democratic ampered the new national programs. The aste and ideological disu nity remained the his complex political setting, the country's erelated problems, the strands of which run onese Marxism.
ial and educational background of Marxist
to multi-party parliamentary democracy. rather than revolutionaly methcds, their cal than their rhetoric, a condition which :ommensurate with their small numbers onal podium, vast press coverage, and the and to radicalize the SLFP. Some Marxists reedom Party would permanently advance d the Keuneman group in the CP remained me that post-1972 press arid security legis.FP decided to exclude the Marxist parties

Page 138
132 CHARLES S.
This uncertainty pointed up a second their ties with the still partly bourgeois themselves the wrath of the left-radicals at to violent social revolution. Social and ger aggravated this conflict into a most seric Whereas in the early 'sixties most undergr. many students in the years since despaired political leaders, and turned to Marxismhad a tiger by the tail. If they moved leftw they threatened their vital link with the ma confirmed the charges of purists and young dilemma were implicit in the endorsement cated (a) mass political participation anc Overt clashes between CP elements, and int persistence of this difficulty.
United or fissiparous, parliamentary another major problem. This was their ina villages. Peasant Sinhalese had been mob the 1956 electoral campaign. The influenc assassination in 1959, became an almost r few Marxists dared to challenge his memo Bandaranaike, to lead the populist, semi-so Sri Lanka, though some of its youth joine while according a substantial minority of it National Party.
Buddhism, the faith of the majority,
under the new constitution at the special
the United Front, presented the Marxists, a pretation, tactics and strategy. Was the M which Marxism could cooperate to the mut Christianity and the Western Imperialism? form of antimaterialism, increasingly irr technology? Or was it, Buddhism, perhaps power?
Since the revival of the 19th Century, among the Sinhalese of all classes. Buddhis than had many other creeds. Recent renew individual empirical investigation-and grc new life model suggested that Buddhism wo Buddhism has had within it progressive fe and pragmatic bhikkhus have been trained i tional modes of progress, there has been leading members of the LSSP and CP. Thi public homage at the Dalada Maligawa ma

BLACKTON
l, related dilemma. By choosing to retain SLFP, Marxist politicians brought upon hd "purists' who admitted no alternative erational cleavages of the past decade had bus danger to the major Marxist parties. aduates belonged to campus LSSP groups, of victory for socialism under UF Marxist Leninism or Maoism. So the old Marxists ards to preserve Marxist unity in Sri Lanka ass-based SLFP. But if they stood pat they activists. The continuing afflictions of this by UF Marxists of legislation which advoi (b) strong measures against subversion. ernal dissent within the LSSP indicated the
or insurrectionary, the Marxists faced bility to gain large political support in the ilized to the blue banner of the SLFP in ce of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike after his eligious force among rural Buddhists, and ry or the right of his widow, Mrs. Sirimavo icialist SLFP. It is noteworthy that peasant d the JVP, generally supported the SLFP s votes to the conservative-Liberal United
which was singled out for special status insistence of the majority SLFP within as atheists with difficult questions of interiddle Path a congruent philosophy with ual advantage of both, against capitalism, Was it, on the other hand, an obsolescent elevant in an era of modernization and the lion in the Marxist's path to political
Buddhist influence had grown stronger sm had shown more adaptability to change ed interest in the Kalama Sutta-stressing owing Buddhist interest in the need for a ould be able to adapt to new social forms. orces. Though many of the most political in Western countries, and favour constitu
some rapport between the sangha and e fact that such leaders occasionally paid y have reflected residual cradle reverence

Page 139
THE MARXISTS AND THE ULTRA MARXIS'
for the religion of their young days. By parties had advanced their political fortul bers of the UF to legislate an eventualso
Yet clearly, Buddhism has been a national politics. The Siyam Nikaya, large marked anti communist views and after influence in UF policy formation, and ag power in the hands of the UF Coalition
The events of 1971 suggested a third and Marxism in Sri Lanka. The resistanc nantly Buddhist JVP was significant. T principles of Buddhism, and some novic took up arms against the Government. II and Buddhist appeal among contempora of an enormous vacuum, which Marxism might be seen in the move by some CP in force” in the national society. The majori clung to their hard won power and lev with the SLFP and the Buddhist majorit responses to Buddhism may pose the deel
Conclusion
If the events of 1971 bonded the Ke to the U.F., post-insurgency legislation to move into periodic bouts of opposition to the ideological left resumed even if battle.
Though the most severe criticism of ists, the latterrealized,as they watched the revolutionary opportunity was being w, had taken place. After the uprising, Ma coalition with the SLFP, (b) independent under less favourable conditions, or (c) of the JVP against a state power far gr rarely discussed, relationship between M The sangha, hostile towards Marxism i after the Constitution of 1972. With the as targets for both Marxists and Buddh to come into eventual confrontation with future.
A long period of cultural civility at insurgency of the Ultra Marxists. The of Emergencies became confirmed. Thes climaxed in tragedy. And the enlarged in along with increased centralization of p turned Sri Lanka into an almost typical"
544.1-0

oF SRI LANKA SINCE INDEPENDENCB 133
oining forces with the SLFP, the Marxist es, and worked with SLFP Buddhist memialist state for Sri Lanka. ܫ
ajor force for Marxists to reckon with in t of Sri Lanka's religious orders, had shown (970 again begun to warn against Marxist inst legislation which seemed to centralize
perspective on the interaction of Buddhism e of rural Buddhist society to the predomihe insurgent JVP flouted the non violent is and a few bhikkhus of higher ordination this reflected a loss of religious dynamism ry youth, the result would be the creation would seek to occupy. An indication of this embers to leave the UF and form a "third ty of political Marxists, on the other hand, erage, by remaining shoulder to shoulder y. On balance, the question of the parties' best dilemma for the Marxists of Sri Lanka.
uneman Communists and the LSSP closer caused the majority (Wickremasinghe) CP . Marxists remained disunited, and secession the revolutionary alternative had died in
he JVP came from the establishment Marxarmed forces smash the insurgents, that a asted, and that fratricide among the Left rxist alternatives narrowed: (a) continued opposition in the National State Assembly esort to revolution perhaps with the heirs eater than existed in 1971. The important, arxism and Buddhism remained uncertain. 1965, began to show this tendency again decline of capitalism, and Christian culture sts, Marxism and Buddhism seemed likely one another for the shaping of Sri Lanka's
ld British style in politics ended with the increasing tendency towards proclamation piralling series of undergraduate strikes had fluence of the police and the armed forces, ower, and chronic economic problems had leveloping nation'.

Page 140
XI
PROBLEMS OF COMMUN
HowARD W
In South Asia, men and women grou basis of many loyalties, but they mainly id regional, ethno-linguistic, religious, caste "communal' grounds for solidarity in the b sentiments' deriving from the givens of soc which can be the focus of intense loyalty. TI sive group action against others. They ma defensive solidarity against such assaults wh of socio-political status, for political influer
To explore these communal difference: in loca differences. Rather, we Seek to idei ship will have to be applied if these differer
weakness.
It has long been assumed that these co in the least modern areas of South Asia. Y South Asia lead one to Wonder whether t societies become more urbanized. Indeed, it the communal mixing that goes along with may become all the more important, as ethnic politics in the United States of the I in Scotland, Wales or Quebec.
Regardless of whether communal diffe ced by economic and class differentiations,i sons between problems ofcommunalism sin of several other states in South and Southe
We shall first compare the numerical religious groups in four former British terri a number of areas of public life where C problems to regional leaders. The contrast
--------
1. C. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution'
Free Press, 1963) pp. 108-109.

III
ALISM IN SOUTH ASIA
RIGGINS
lp themselves for political action on the lentify with one another politically along and clan lines. These we shall consider broad sense. Geertz calls them "primordial ial existence. They are sources of identity they often are the take off base for agglesy be the single most important source of here competition is acute for a larger share ice or for very scarce economic resources.
s as is done here is not to find satisfaction ntify areas where creative political leaderces are not to become sources of national
ommunal affinities are to be found mainly ret communal outbursts in many cities of hese identifications are likely to erode as may be that with lapid urbanization and economic growth, communal awareness eems to be the case with contemporary e-emergence of regional sub-nationalisms
ences are bound to diminish, to be replat may be helpful to make some comparice Independence in Sri Lanka with those ast Asia.
batterns of different ethno-linguistic and ories. We shall then consider analytically
ommunal differences are posing difficult ng approaches the different regimes have
in his Old Societies and States (Glencoe,

Page 141
PROBLEMS OF COMMUNA
adopted in efforts to cope with the probler themselves exacerbated, will then be discus: the dynamics of continued communal aws
The Numbers: In the case of Sri Lan Communal structure is the numerical prepc prising some 71 percent of the populatio resident in the island for over a thousandy concentrated in the North and Northeast in business and public service throughout the cent of the population, located mainly alo The Indian Tamils form roughly 10 percent, they were effectively disenfranchised shortl are being repatriated each year to India; a Lanka citizenship and are beginning to el way via the franchise.
The pattern in Sinhalese areas has be differentiation between low-country and up of foreign rule in the low-country while th more of their semi-feudal social characteri has diminished since Independence but in differences remain a live issue. Each group and its promoters in offices and other pl Jobs, land reform policies and resource allo of the two has done best in any particular tions.
Present-day Pakistan's ethnic and c. Nearly 70 percent speak Punjabi, the bulk Punjab plains. Their preponderance is con civilian bureaucracy and army. Sindhi, the by some 14 percent, located mainly in th Karachicity. Urdu, the official language of p 16 percent, though it represents the moth whom are concentrated in the Karachi are: tainous frontier separating Pakistan from 9 percent of the people. These last pose asp elite in neighbouring Afghanistan is also c. ground and its spokesman are dissatisfied wi
2. Statistical Abstract (Government of Cey
3. For careful, succinct descriptions of thes Ceylon: A Divided Nation (O.U.P., 1963 in the Politics of Ceylon (Duke Universi Politics, in Sri Lanka (London, MacMilla
4. Census of Pakistan, 1961. (Governmen
Vol. 3.

Lism. IN souTH ASIA 13S
ns they inherited and, in some cases, have sed along with a few generalizations about areness and contention.
ka, the outstanding characteristic of the pnderance of the Sinhalese majority, comn. The Ceylon Tamils, for the most part 'ears, numbel roughly 11 percent. Though many fill important roles in the professions, island. The Moors represent some 6 perng the coasts and in major coastal towns. Isolated on the estates in the hill country
y after Independence. A number of them smaller number are annually receiving Sri hter political life once again in a limited
en complicated by a significant historical -country Sinhalese resulting from centuries e Kandyans, isolated in the hills, retained stics. In some respects this distinctiveness political life "up-country'-"low-country' has its spokesman within the major parties aces where opportunities may be found. cations are anxiously scanned to see which political episode or period between elec
ommunal structure is somewhat similar. of them concentrated in the rich irrigated firmed by their important positions in the second mother tongue language, is spoken e rural and town areas of Sindh and in artitioned Pakistan is spoken by a reported er tongue of only 9 percent, over half of a. Pushtu is the language along the mounIran and Afghanistan, spoken by roughly ecial problem to Islamabad. The governing omposed of Pushtu ethno-linguistic backth the Durand Line frontier drawn between
ʻlon] 1967-8, pp. 32-33.
e and other differentiations, see B. H. Farmer, ; R. N. Kearney, Communalism and Language
ty Press, 1967). Aiso A. Jeyaratnam Wilson,
n, 1974), Chapter 2.
of Pakistan Statement 7-B, Section IV-46

Page 142
136 - HowAR)
Afghanistan and British India in 1893. through calls for Pushtunistan (or Pakh of Pushtu-speakers which could only be
Of course, prior to 1971 and the sep tiation was between Bengali-speakers in West'. The former represented in fact a Pakistan. Many communal difficulties co ration, including nearly all the issues ide
In Sri Lanka, the ethno-linguistic speakers is reinforced by the parallel clea Hindus. Differences between the Christial and Tamil Hindus on the other have also had access to education and to opportun frained for or, during the colonial period, tration along the western coast gave them tical, legal, administrative and business religion encompasses all the communiti over the proper nature of the Islamic sta to time has been the target of public host
In Malaysia, communal divisions lead Chinese and Indians, with Indigenes in Sa and “others' 2 percent. While in Sri Lan more decisively than does the majority c( Malaysia, the balance between the two m pensable to the well-being of the other. Tc "emergency" in the early 1950's, and the national origins gives the latter an adv, strength confirms. Yet the greater organiza wealth of the Chinese community gives t role in public affairs than they have as yet by the fact that religious cleavages paral are Muslims and the Chinese are Buddhi
As is to be expected, India's commun been a multi-lingual and highly differenti
5. For a careful discussion of the backgro Integration (Columbia University Pre: 6. The most recent outbreak occurred in
to this differentiation, see L. Binder, California Press, 1961). 7. Government of Malaysia, Census 1970, 8. Cynthia Enloe discussed this in MultiCenter for South and South East Asia
Rabushka, op. cit., pp. 28-31.

WRGGNS
they periodically stimulate dissatisfaction, unistan), a proposed independent country calized at the expense of Pakistan.
ration of Bangladesh, the sharpest differenthe "East Wing' and those others in "the majority of the total population of "old' tributed to preparing the ground for sepantified below.
lifferentiation between Sinhala-and Tamilage between Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil is on the one hand and Sinhalese Buddhists generated jealousies, for the former often ties which the other communities were not often were not invited to fill. Their concenatone time a disproportionate role in poliife. In the new Pakistan, by contrast, one es, though there are persisting differences te and the Ahamayadia minority from time ility.
to a 44-36-11 percent split between Malays
bah and Sarawak representing another 8 % ka the Sinhalese preponderate numerically ommunity in any of the other countries, in ajor communities is such that each is indisbe sure, some Chinese were involved in the Walays’ claim to represent truly indigenous antage of legitimacy which its numerical tional energy, higher skill leveland superior heir activities a sense of deserving a larger obtained. The problem is not made easier lel ethno-linguistic differences, for Malays t|Confucians.
l pattein is more complex. India has always ted society, yet numerical proportions are
und, see R. Jahan, Pakistan, Failure of National s, 1972).
sune 1974. For a discussion of the background eligion and Politics in Pakistan (University of
thnic Politics: The Rise of Malaysia (Berkeley, Studies. Monograph No. 2, mimeo; see also

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PROBLMS OF COMM
important in India as well. The Hindis total population at most, while the next speakers in the east, Marathi speakers in the south, represent no more than 7.5-8 p the balance." In such a pluralist setting th would be likely to induce a good deal o reformation of political coalitions directe influence policy.
In sum, it is possible that the mere patt in any one polity will help define how lead munal problems. But numbers in themsel for communal relations, for different leade in quite different ways. Before looking b would be well to identify more precisely ar a ces have posed problems to leaders and thi
State Organization: First in promine Morris-Jones puts it, has been the problem
At Independence, the sub-continent
organized on the basis of Muslim-Hind two decades of Independence, India's lea a number of different states along linguistic federation in response to linguistic commu) have had to be partitioned in order that have "their own' states within the Federa sures and the federal structure and politi aspire to the degree of preponderance the the Punjabis are accused of seeking in P. gain full national attention at any one tim could become crystallized around one co 1970 and 1971, a development making acco elements all the more difficult.'
Linguistic-communal pressures have changes in Pakistan. The most dramatic Pakistan partition was the break-away c setting up of two separate national states
9. R. Kothari, Politics in India (Boston, profound analysis of pluralism and na article of that title in Journal of Inter 10. From Census of India, 1961 as reportec
11. In Government and Politics in India (L
1971, 280 pp.), Chap. 2.
12. For a discussion of this perspective in 1
of Scarcity : Public Pressures and Pol and conclusion.

NALISM IN souTH ASIA 137
eakers, account for only 30 percent of the four largest language groups, the Bengali he west, and Telegu and Tamil-speakers in rcent apiece. Many other groups make up : very multiplication of innumenable groups group negotiating, a fluid formation and d toward group self defence and efforts to
ern of size and distribution of communities ers are likely to approach their own comTes are clearly not a sufficient explanation 's have approached their cleavage problem Iriefly at these contrasting approaches, it eas of public life where communal differeneir polities.
nce, in the idiom of modern politics as ofstate organization."
was partitioned and two separate states differences. Thereafter, during the first ders reluctantly redrew frontiers between clines, altering the structure of the Indian nal pressures. More recently, several states more ethno-linguistic communities could tion. The very multiplicity of group prescal process mean that no one group can Sinhalese have achieved in Sri Lanka and ikistan. Moreover, since no one issue can 2, it is highly unlikely that all public forces mmunal issue, as occurred in Pakistan in mmodation between contending communal
forced far more drastic organizational "reorganization' since the original Indoif Bengal from Pakistan in 1971 and the where one had existed before. How Bengali
Little Brown, 1970), p. 322. For a subtle and tional integration in India see Ainslee Embree's lational Affairs Vol. 27, No. 1, 1973.
Lin Kothari, op. cit., p. 324. ondon, Hutchinson University Library, 3rd ed.
elation to India see, Myron Weiner. The Politics tical Response in India. (Chicago, 1962) passim

Page 144
138 - HOWARD
aspirations for independence grew so int early enthusiastic proponents of Pakistal such a reorganization had occurred, it has in the area, though it is likely that differen clusions. ܫ .
In the former West Pakistan, succes appropriate political structure suggest hov may still be there. Right after Independen provinces and a number of smaller territori in 1955, the four provinces were consolida tration and improve the West wing's ability While this appeared to satisfy the leaders intolerable to the principal minority comm of Ayub's successors was to abolish "One particularity by re-establishing four major p and administrative structure.'
Malaysia, too, had to undergo major : taining a tolerable ethno-linguistic balanc as to whether to include Singapore in Ma of Singapore been added, the Chinese would Sabah and Sarawak, non-Chinese in com Malaysia in the name of ethnic balance, ar Singapore, orought in at the same time, s This reduced Malay fears that the more dy gain preponderance. But the Chinese fo confirming their conviction that the Malay political preponderance. w
In Sri Lanka, there have been insister for the kind offederated structure that now these aspirations were closely paralleled federal constitution put forward at the tir 1929/30. But no post-Independence gove undertake the structural changes such a res After all, the Sinhalese argue, Sri Lanka i. (about the size of an Indian district). Fed unforeseeable political difficulties. As the make Sinhalese the sole official language Tamil leaders have pressed all the harder
13. For an interesting discussion of Sindhi a Malik, "Problems of Regionalism in P. 14. For a discussion of the politicization of Politics of Belonging : Political Change i. 15. K. M. de Silva, (ed.) The University of
of Ceylon Press Board, 1973) pp. 402-3

WRGGINS
inse when Bengalis had been among the deserves much study in itself. But once
become an object lesson for other leaders statesmen will draw contrary policy con
sive-and alternating-efforts to find an intractable regional communal problems re, West Pakistan was organized into four es in the mountainous north. Subsequently, ed into "One Unit to centralize administo bargain with the majoritarian Bengalis. lip in Karachi and then Islamabad, it was unities. As a result, one of the first steps snit” and again defer to ethnic and regional rovinces within a formally federal political
state reorganization in the name of maine. In the early 1960's the question arose laya. Had the largely Chinese population have become a real majority. Accordingly, position, were added to peninsular West ld together are known as East Malaysia." subsequently was ejected from Malaysia. namic political leaders of Singapore would ind themselves numerically downgraded, majority was determined to maintain its
it demands by Ceylon Tamil spokesmen, obtains in India and Malaysia, Ironically y appeals by up-country Sinhalese for a ne of the Donoughmore consultations in rnment in Sri Lanka has been willing to ponse to ethnic imbalance would require. very small, with only 13 million people ral structures imply costly overheads and Sinhalese have pressed their campaign to and Buddhism the state religion, Ceylon or the kind of cultural and administrative
nd other regionalisms in Pakistan, see Hafeez
kistan”, forthcoming.
East Malaysia see, Dr. Margeret Roff's The
Sabah and Sarawak (O.U.P., 1974).
ceylon, History of Ceylon Vol. III (University

Page 145
PROBLEMS OF COMMU
autonomy a federalarrangementwould allo In turn, the very demands the Tamils haven to the anxieties of the more distrustful Tamils are really trying to partition the intensifies their worries. This matter, t circle.
Communal differences have generate
Language Competition: Debates ove recognized as official have been intense an been at the core of political contention, a sequent communal riots in 1958. “Urdu o doubts in the minds of Bengalis about the of the original Pakistan. In the new Pakista broke out in Sindh over the proper scope f nized Urdu. In Malaysia, the question o passion than any other single issue since 30 percent of the population centred in the language have precipitated intense politi guage areas in the South, but also in speaking areas of the north.
In all these instances, language is tho only the individual's mode of contact wi and expression of his culture, distinguishin In a highly status-conscious part of the W. reflects on his own location in the society means for communicating-and evoking - sive consolidating that sense of solidarity in political systems where the ascriptive g effectivecollectiveaction."
Language skills are of critical econon whichever language was designated as th language of public administration. Jobs in above ohers for their security, high status a
16. For an authoritative and balanced an: A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, “The Tamil Fec monwealth Political Studies July 1966 ( National Development and the Politic South East Asia in the Modern World Hamburg, 1972, pp. 151-164.
17. For a discussion see S. U. Kodikara, in Ceylon', Modern Ceylon Studies Vol
18. Enloe on Malaysia, op. cit., p. 25.
19. For a further discussion of the import approach to political life in South Asia Nation (Princeton University Press, 196

ALSM IN SOUTH ASA 139
w. Some even havecalled forindependence. made for a federal solution have contributed among the Sinhalese, who fear that the country. The Bangladesh experience only herefore, represents a thoroughly vicious
d other familiar issues.
r which language or languages shall be d pro tracted. In some instances, they have s in Sri Lanka in the 1956 election and subnly' was one of the first issues that raised representative character of the government n, as recently as 1973, language disturbances or Sindhi in addition to the officially recogf the official language has evoked more the “emergency'. In India, efforts of the Gangetic Plain to make Hindi the national cal protests, particularly in Dravidian lan
Marathi, Bengali and other non-Hindi
ught to be the key to many values. It is not th his social world. Language is the source g him and his kind from all those "others'. orld, the position accorded to his language 's status structure. Language is the crucial -a shared group awareness. lt is the adheindispensable for exerting political leverage roup remains the most important basis for
nic significance as well. In all four polities e "Official Language' usually became the the public service tended to be preferred and opportunities for income. Accordingly,
alysis of Tamil claims and political tactics see leral Party in Ceylon Politics'. Journal of ConVol. IV No. 2) pp. 117-37; and his “Ethnicity, al Process in Ceylon'', in B. Grossman, (ed). Vol. 33 Schriften des Institute für Asienkunde,
“Communalism and Political Modernization . 1, No. 1, January 1970.
ance of language to the individual and group , see the author's Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Ü0), pp. 242-3.

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140 OWARD
when a language is made the "Official Lang for whom that language is their mother system, then, becomes of critical importar of education determines quite decisively t dren. The extended debates and resulting have, in their turn, played back into the co consciousness and competitiveness.
It should be pointed out that while consolidated by these processes, separatin status, caste or other hierarchical cleavag likely to become less acute. Traditional vi suspicions tend to diminish in the more status leaders seek to mobilize numerica several hitherto socially distant caste grou tunes, what have up till now been quasi secularized and lose their hitherto unchange ture may be ignored in the face of imm from the inclusive, national or big-city vi seen from the village, rural district or town may emerge within each language group, Political distances in an unprecedented solic
Economic Dimensions of Communalist been important to economic life. At Indep parts of the economy, particular ethno-ling own specific economic activities.
In Malaysia, for example, during the to man the newer economicenterprises intin in the towns and cities. The Malays, by c. peasant pursuits while a few of their elite v British bureaucracy. In India, the Marwa tually industrialists. Middle class educated sented in the public services, Gujeratisintext economic tasks deriving from traditional c
To be sure, these are oversimplified st with which economic roles are seen as reflec economic competition and stratifications these, in turn, intensify economic tensions.
20. I am indebted to Margeret Roff for sugg the discussion of Malaysia. For details s ground, William R. Roff, The Origins of versity Press, 1967).
21. For qualification of this argument as it
pp. 21-23 on “economic stratification an and Rural Development in Malaysia (Berk

WREGGINS
guage' great career advantages go to those tongue. The language used in the school ce to ambitious parents, for the language he range of opportunity open to their childecisions regarding language of instruction ommunal situation, intensifying group self
: the ethno-linguistic cleavages are being g the linguistic group from another, ancient es within these linguistic communities are llage-against-village or district-vis.-district inclusive ethno-linguistic strife. As high illy significant lower-status groups or as ps ally together to press their political for-sacred hierarchical relationships become eable character. The inherited status Struc2diate political imperatives. Accordingly, ew, communalism may be devisive. But perspectives, newer, larger combinations bridging hitherto unbridgeable social or larity.
n: Communal differentiations have also endence, it could be argued that in most guistic groups tended to specialize in their
colonial era, immigrant Chinese came to mining, rubber plantations and commerce ontrast, preferred to continue traditional were recruited into the lower rungs of the ris were traders, entrepreneurs and evenTamils and Bengalis were heavily repreile manufacture. Many castes still perform ste roles, particularly in rural areas.
tereotypes, but they do suggest the ease iting communal differences. In such cases,
often intensify communal hostilities as
gestions at this point, as well as elsewhere in see Rabushka, op. cit, p. 24; and for backMalay Nationalism (New Haven, Yale Uni
applies to Malaysia, see, C. Enloe, op. cit, d ethnicity"; see also, G. Ness, Bureaucracy eley, 1967), p., 46.

Page 147
PROBLEMS OF COMM
Migration: Communal awareness ha the past five years, for example, there ha the further migration of non-Marathi spe Other "sons of the soil' movements seek "their' preserves.” In Pakistan's Sindh, influx of Urdu-speaking refugees from U. recently, the immigration of Punjabis int Biharis from Bangladesh is even more in the dry zone lying between areas now inh Tamils in the north has become an increa:
Caste Communalism: In India, caste but is one of the main sources of politic other communal issues are also important without an awareness of the intense com group tries to improve its relative standir tiered hierarchy of sub-castes which has traditional four-fold varna distinctions de
In Sri Lanka, too, caste stratificatior tant, though they have been less consp candidates are about to be chosen. Howe among the vahumpura, batgam, duriiva majority goyigama caste played a part ir was notentirely accidental that the leader community.
Leadership Strategies: Space does no four governments have handled their ma: to distinguish policy design from actual be quickly noted.
In both Sri Lanka and Malaysia, g reasonably responsive to the sensitivities a
22. For a discussion of migration in Indi
Political Consequences of Interstate op. cit., Chapter 6.
23. B. H. Farmer, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
24. For a thoughtful discussion, see the wo their The Modernity of Tradition (196' caste Associations'. Pacific Affairs, M Somjee, “Caste and the Decline of Pol Review, LXVII (3), September, 1973.
25. For details see the work of Bryce Rya Press, 1953) and Janice Jiggins, Famil 1971 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation a more detailed analysis of the youtl wardane, “Youth Protest in Sri Lank and the future of Southern Asia (Colul Wiswa Warmapala (Politicus) “The Ap (Vol. XII, No. 3) pp. 259-274.
544l- li

NALSM. N. SOUT ASA 141
generated resistance to migration. During 'e been increasing protests in India against ukers into Bombay or Bengalis into Assam. to prevent "outsiders' from migrating into here have been protests against the earlier P. in India at the time of partition and more scarce irrigated land. Hostility to settling ense. In Sri Lanka, newly irrigated land in bited by Sinhalese in the south and Ceylon ingly contentious apple of discord.'
plays only a small part at the federal level, lenergy in the states, where language and , Indeed, state politics cannot be understood petition between sub-castes orjatis, as each g vis-a-vis others closest to it in the manyfar more reality in political life than the ar to Indologists.'
is remain socially and economically imporcuous in political life except when party ver, in the 1971 youth rebellion, resentment and radhd caste communities against the motivating that youthful uprising, and it ship came mainly from the thrusting karava
t permit a detailed discussion of how these ny communal problems. It is often difficult historical results. But certain contrasts can
overnments began with moderate policies nd aspirations of the minority communities.
y
a and reactions to it see, M. Weiner, “SocioMigration in India'. in Wriggins and Guyot,
rk of Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolph, particularly ) and Rudolph, "The Political Role of India's urch 1960. A different view is argued by A. H. itical Homogeneity'. American Political Science
, Caste in Modern Ceylon (Rutgers University and Caste in the Politics of the Sinhalese, 1947University of Ceylon, Peradeniya, 1973). For uprising, see H. Wriggins, and C. H. S. Jaya'in Wriggins and Guyot, Population, Politics hbia, 1973) Chap. 10. Compare this analysis with il Revolt in Ceylon', Asian Survey March 1972

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142 OWARD
In Sri Lanka by the 1950's, however, gove sense of grievance and the aspirations of Tamil minority's position rapidly eroded Malay majority came to play an increasingl of the younger, more ambitious among the adroit political bargaining between the col Party led to mutually acceptable arrang allocations until late in the 1960's. By 196 have broken down when the election oft Parliament was suspended for nearly two tening to spokesmen of all ethnic groups resumed only after all had agreed that col of political debate and agitation.
So long as spokesmen for each ethn following, as wasthecase in Sri Lanka und his son Dudley, and in Malaysia with th and his counterpartin the Chinese commun to construct a more inclusive political fol leaders arose within each community to cha transcended communal differences, aspir religion, job defense, etc. the best ways of helped them to undercut the position of among the communities up till then. T politicalstrategies aspiring leaders were te
To be sure, competitive politics was r communal consciousness. Growing literacy past periods of strife, economic growth w in close working and living proximity all unlikely that the intensity of communal, either of the countries under consideratior resist the temptation to play on these sensi restraint of the activists in Malaysia's n substantial government intimidation rem restraint, can the grievances of the more 1 voiced in the political process?'
In undivided Pakistan, once the langu though confusing period of representativ considerable attention in the capital. Subs of the Ayub regime, Bengali grievances
26. I am indebted to Margaret Roff for this
27. For more details see, H. Wriggins, "In
of Ceylon'. American Political Science and R. N. Kearney, op. cit., C. Enloe, op

WRGGNS
'nments became far more attentive to the the majority Sinhalese, and the Ceylon
In Malaysia, too, the aspirations of the f important role at the expense of the hopes Chinese. In contrast to Sri Lanka, however, mponents of the multi-communal Alliance ements for jobs, education and resource 9, this convenient arrangement seemed to hat year precipitated acute ethnic rioting. years. The outburst had seemed So threathat party and parliamentary activity was mmunal issues were not the proper subject
ic group were assured of their respective er D. S. Senanayake and, for a time, under ne Tunku Abdul Rahman for the Malays ity, moderation made it possible for leaders, lowing from both communities. But when illenge the moderate men who hitherto had ing politicians found issues of language, arousing a popular following. Such issues those who had worked out compromises hus, communal conflict resulted from the mpted to use in their own rise to influence.
not the sole explanation for this intensified ", a vernacular education which often recalls nich mixes hitherto separated communities so make their contribution. But it seems antagonisms would have been as great in had aspiring political leaders been able to tive issues. Whether the agreed mutual selfumerous parties will persist without very ains to be seen. And where there is such numerous populist elements be adequately
Lage issue was dealt with, there was a brief e politics, when Bengali interests received equently, and particularly in the latter days grew in intensity, mainly because limited
point.
pediments to Unity in New Nations: the case Review (Vol. LV No. 2, June 1961, pp. 313-321; . cit., preface.

Page 149
PROBLEMS OF COMMU
political processes did not provide suffici even though by then Bengal was receiving resources than had been the case before Pakistan responds to communal sentimen of political leadership as on the formal in the summer of 1974 were more prom constant attention.
Those of us who know the 'comm Detroit or London cannot point the finger the steps taken today and during the next fi generations as wise, timely and duly con tituent groups, long-run best interests hel

NALISM IN SOU ASIA 143
ent representation for Bengali spokesmen, ; a substantially larger share of investment . How the federal structure in the "new' t will depend as much on the skill and style
allocation of resources. Electoral events ising. India's communal problems require
unal' problems of New York, Chicago, in praise or blame. One can only hope that ve years will be looked back upon by future sidered, with each country's and its consdi in view.

Page 150
Χ
THIE PARTY COMPARATIVE PERSPEC
CALVIN W
The history of political parties in Sri party system has been in operation for le: if one relates its origin to the parties and a under the Donoughmore Constitution. On tically, of essaying an assessment of an en evolvement of the party system has surel it may change dramatically, its growth mayl destructive event. It may be, in short, too so terize or assess it.
The problem posed by this is compo of political parties themselves. The present this by Sigmund Neumann and Maurice I did much to advance the study of modern are highly adaptive and responsive organ by, the environment in which they act. Id in their internal and external relations, a be captured analytically in a moment of ti their future is predictable with scarcely a example, would have thought it possible and J. R. Jayawardene would, within twel a party would emerge and wrest power f United National Party became in its ear natural in the life of parties.
The assessment of the party system of tations which the nature of party and the
1. “Why Study Political Parties?" and “To ties”, in Sigmund Neumann (ed.), Moa Press, Chicago, 1956, pp. 1-6, 395-421.
2. Political Parties. Their Organization an
Co., Ltd. London, 1954.
3. The opportunistic bent of political pa Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis,
1

V
SYSTEM IN TIVE AN ASSESSMENT
OODWARD
Lanka is a comparatively short one. The is than thirty years, or a little over forty ssociations which formed and were active e may well question the propriety, analytity of such shallow historical depth. The f not yet reached final form; in character yeaborted or it may fall victim to a systemon in the life of the party system to charac
unded by the inherently dynamic quality : generation of scholars was made alert to Duverger the pioneering efforts of whom political parties. Seen in their light, parties isms, shaping, and in turn being shaped .eologically and organizationally, parties, re persistently changing units. They can me, their biographies can be recorded, but modicum of certainty. Who in 1947, for that the parties of Philip Gunawardena nty years, combine in a coalition, or that rom a parent-party so entrenched as the y years? Such, however, are experiences
? Sri Lanka must be respectful of the limibrevity of the Ceylonese party experience
»ward a Comparative Study of Political Par'ern Political Parties, University of Chicago
a Activity in the Modern State Nethuen and
rties is strongly argued by S. J. Eldersveld,
Rand McNally and Co., Chicago, 1964.
44

Page 151
THE PARTY SYSTEM IN COMPARAT
impose. Mindful of this, there are nevert should proceed with an attempt to assess in Sri Lanka. First, the years since indepen period in the growth of the Sri Lankan party system of today and that of 1947 is b may in fact be uniquely remarkable. Seco a crucial variable. As has been mentioned nally. Analytically, the assessment of the ( from that which might be done on more est: depth. The similarity is explicitly confirme of the growth of British parties. “It mus "that the party system of the present gene On the contrary, he argued, the British part
The evolvement of the British party s liamentary system of government. The g were essential to the viability of British d to be manifest in the political developmer the democracy established at independenc political achievement. Election campaigns has peacefully been passed from incumber been an articulate and productive forum, an in the world, has reflected the depth of put parliamentary democracy. To say this is no extension of states of emergency, the con and other more or less severe challenges w cratic system over the years. The evidence with reason refer is considerable. There is : and informed opinion which considers th and volatile. Few would deny that this po brium" as A. Jeyaratnam Wilson has said,' to the political order described by Robert not be missed: that is, that the Ceylonese di problems which, the common fare of the ne failure of the democratic experiment.
The vitality of parliamentary democr system, directly relate to major changes undergone. Initially, the form of the party
4. For a history and analysis of the develop
The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon, 5. Party Politics: The Growth of Parties, (Can 6. Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973, (Mac
1974). The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), (Corn 8. Neumann suggested in 1956 that the
could well be the secret of a successful rule'. op. cit, p. 420.
7.

WE PERSPECTIVE AN ASSESSMENT 145
eless at least two good reasons why one the formative period of the party system lence comprise an eventful and productive arty system.' The difference between the oth vivid and essential; the progress made ld, the element of time is not in all ways all parties and their systems evolve etereylonese party experience is not different blished party systems of greater historical by Sir Ivor Jennings, in his careful study t not be assumed,' Sir Ivor concluded, 'ation is in its final and permanent form'. y system "... is in perpetual evolution...'
ystem transpired in alliance with the par'owth and development of both systems mocracy. A similar relationship appears it of Sri Lanka. The durability evinced by is undoubtedly Sri Lanka's most notable have been competitive and orderly, power it to rival party coalitions, parliament has d voter turnout, which is among the highest blic support for both the party system and t to ignore the frequent proclamation and himunal discord and riot, the insurrection hich have tested the strength of the demo: to which the sceptic and the cynic could also a good body of thoughtful scholarly e Ceylonese polity to be both vulnerable lity exists in a state of "dangerous equiliand surely it faces the kinds of challenges Kearney. But the essential point should :mocracy has so far managed to deal with w states, have elsewhere eventuated in the
cy, the enduring viability of the political which parties and the party system have system was of patent fairly typical of new
ment of the party system till 1965 see my book Brown University Press, Providence, 1969).
(bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1961), p. 2. Millan Press, Ltd., London and Basingstoke,
ill University Press, Ithaca and London, 1973). "development of a responsible party system transition from colonialism to political self

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states emerging from colonial custody. C. and exercised by the dominant forces par Too often, however, the custodians of the lithic power or to disintegrate under th strains of government. Both of these tende after independence when, what I should that which existed from 1948 to 1956, was party system and the contemporary one,th cracy, form the content of this paper.
The First Party System
The configuration of the first party sy. it was composed raised serious doubts ab extant. The formation of the United Nat provided for eight years were, of cours: S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, for one, was between the foundation of the UNP and cracy. The UNP gave Ceylon, he said, "the particularly at the beginning of a new e another side. Ominous was the fact, and ) UNP contained in its ranks almost all t and S2cond Parliaments. Referring to the Bandaranaike said that in Parliament ther opposition parties are those which, owing democracy or the parliamentary system as
The revolutionary design and objectiv was manifest. Colvin R. de Silva proudly a he said, "there are three revolutionary pa Lanka Sama Samaja Party, the Commun Party of India. Tae linkage of these partie ments was also an admission proudly in their lack of confidence in the new politic UNP to manage it democratically. "We s the possibilities of a Parliamentary regi remained sceptical participants in the pa cating revolutionary goals and means, and for any exigency that might develop.
The remainder of the Opposition in nalist parties and a number of independ
9. House of Representatives, Debates, Vol.
10. Speeches and Writings, (Government Pre 11. House of Representatives, Debates, Vol. 12. Ibid., col. 195.

WOODWARD
mmon to that was the sovereignty assumed ticipant in the struggle for independence. new order tended either to assume a mono* pressure of internecine discord and the ncies were at work in Sri Lanka in the years ike to refer to as "the first party system', in operation. A comparison between that erelevance of both to the survival of demo
stem and the nature of the parties of which but the survivability of the democracy then ional Party and the strong government it 2, positive-even essential-achievements. well aware of the symbiotic relationship the stability of the early Ceylonese demostability of government which was needed ra of freedom.' The coin, however, had 3andaranaike was cognizant of it, that the he liberal, democratic forces in the First ; party situation as it existed before 1951, e was "only one party, as all the important to their Marxist beliefs, have no faith in we understand those terms.'
e of leading opposition parties at this time cknowledged the fact. "In the Opposition' rties”. He was refering, of course, to the ist Party and his own Bolshevik-Leninist s to international and revolutionary movemade. Moreover, these parties announced al system, particularly their distrust of the uffer no lillusions”, De Silva said, “about me'.' Over these years, Marxist parties rliamentary drama, their leadership advotheir militant membership kept mobilized
t the First Parliament consisted of commu2nts. Neither the Ceylon Indian Congress
X, col. 698. iss, Colombo, 1963), p. 138.
I, col. 365,

Page 153
TE PARTY SYSTEM N COMPARATV
nor the Ceylon Tamil bloc led by S. J. V. dence and both had little faith in the democ Opposition to balance the Government wa fact that it was numerically weak and divid alemants fought so bitterly among thems foran anti-Government stand. Co-operati as difficult to realize as was a workable Goverment and Opposition.'
The potential for alternative governm Lanka Freedom Party in 1951 was dampen the UNP was returned in the election of 19 of the Ceylon Indian Congress as a result c in effect disfranchised Indian Tamils. Aft party trend appeared to be leading inevital toward the institutionalization of a monol some minds by certain actions taken by th be motivated by an urge to entrench itselfi this fear was expressed perhaps exaggera have been unfair in regard to the charges fo Nonetheless, the UNP placed no more tru it. It exploited the political profit of an Op internationalist,communalist and commun vigil against what it alleged to be revolu parties. Bandaranaike was prone to interp purposelyself-serving. The UNPleadershi to protect democracy, resorted to variou methods to keep themselves in power".'
The victory of the Mahajana Eksath power to that new force by the UNP, tend the UNP in its early years. Rare is the pi assume power absolutely. There were ins' and defects, but the Ceylonese democracy in and the initial period of UNP rule. Neve System comprise a politically tense period etween poles of dictatorship and revolut usefully produce a balancing effect that p mortal confrontation. The fear, quite obvi be pulled apart from two different direct. the fact that there was no viable non-re the SLFP organized a coalition, voters ha in the Government without, at the same ti
13. See A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "Oppositior and Opposition, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 54-6
14. Bandaranaike, op. cit, p. 153.

E PERSPECTIVE AN ASSESSMENT 147
Chelvanayakam “rejoiced' over indepenracy of the new system. The ability of the ls, in any case, seriously impaired by the ed. Often in these early years, Opposition alves that rarely could unity be achieved on between parties of the Opposition was relationship in Parliament between the
ent afforded by the formation of the Sri ed by the "dictatorial majority' by which 52: a majority enhanced by the wreckage of the enactment of citizenship laws which er the election of 1952 especially, a one bly, as it was elsewhere among new states ithic party system. This was confirmed in e UNP which appeared, or was alleged, to revocably in power. The rhetoric by which sted the case. Similarly, the UNP may or which it indicted oppositional elements. st in the Opposition than did the latter in position it considered to be anti Buddhist, ist. Moreover, ittooksteps andmaintained tionary preparations initiated by Marxișt fret this guardianship of the UNP as being p, he said, "... under the pretext of the need s undemocratic and even anti-democratic
Peramuna in 1956, the smooth transfer of to belie certain of the charges made against arty which, having the means, hesitates to tances to regret, and many were the faults may forever be beholden to the Senanayakes rtheless, the eight years of the first party ... The party system was precariously poised ion. While opposing tendencies may often ulls to the centre, they may also induce a ously, was that the first party system might ions. The fear was made especially real by volutionary alternative to the UNP. Until d no means to express a loss of confidence me, undermining the parliamentary system.
9.
al Politics in Ceylon (1947-1968)', Government

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The importance of the MEP triumph was voters had confidence and which in turn w
The stress of two potentially fatalte fact that the popular underpinning of pai and undeveloped. Parliament was not a m voters were concerned, primarily becaus effectively functioning as intermediaries b tutions. Parties were largely notable-del voters through a myriad of personal infl constituency were committed personally personalistic as electors cast ballotsforloc affiliation. Personal trust in a candidate, took priority over questions of policy, is decided policy in caucus, cabinet or cc Voters.
Parties were meaningful political u1 where they were used to service the ambit ceable components, in this vital way, of th duced the permanent alignments needed They were instrumental, as well, in inducin notable, by making that position unprofit;
Parties thus performed useful services in Sri Lanka. What they did not do, howeve than their success, mark distinct this early were the sociological defects of parties dur linked to parties and the parliamentary neither had meaning to voters and neither
econdly, the notable-determined nature
of public opinion. This, of course, affec was not until later, however, that the UN 1956 was directly attributable to the fact t people. There was substance to the charge then that the UNP appeared to assume a "I
The negative aspects of the first party bias of this predominatly UNP era helped liamentary democracy. Moreover, it ens democratic politics.' Importantly, the str dissuaded revolutionary parties from purs
15. House of Representatives, Debates, Vol.
16. W. Howard Wriggins, speaking of the
that the Ceylonese had "...managed ma orderly government'. Ceylon: Dilemmas Princeton, 1960), p. 458.

WOODWARO
that it brought to power a party in which as committed to parliamentary democracy.
ndencies was made more disturbing by the liament and the party system was tenuous leaningful institution so far as the mass of e the parties which managed it were not 2tween the people and their political instiermined units linked organizationally to lence structures which at the level of the o party candidates. Voting behaviour was all notables with little regard for their party for a variety of mainly ascriptive reasons, sues or platforms. For their part, parties puncil without serious consultation with
hits, however, at the level of Parliament ions of elected notables. They were servie parliamentary system, because they proto make the parliamentary system work. g the decline of the politically independent ble to the political careerist.
during this initial period of party growth r, is equally important. Their failures, more phase of party development. Most serious ing this period. Voters were only indirectly alignments they formed. Because of this, 2njoyed a substructure of popular support. of parties kept them aloof from currents ted most deeply the governing party. It NP came to understand that its defeat in hat it had lost touch with the pulse of the that N. M. Perera made in 1948. He said Divine Right to rule'.'
system can be exaggerated. The custodial politics to adapt to the mechanics of parured order and an orderly transition to ength evinced by the UNP may well have ing an ideologically chosen path.
I, col. 60.
irst ten years of independence, wrote in 1960
ny intricate problems in a decade of relatively of a New Nation, (Princeton University Press,

Page 155
THE PARTY SYSTEM IN COMPARAT
The Contemporary Party System
The contrast between the contempo sharp. Comparatively it reflects the extent by the party system since its origin nearly modify its present character, the conten three principal qualities: (1) its bipolarity, city to effect alternative government, and governs the spectrum of parties effectively
The form of the party system is, of the fact that one party is no longer domi. numerically in the surface structure of t in 1951. Appearances to the contrary, thi important areas of its operation. In the fi uency level are predominantly biparty. In and excepting that of March 1960 when pc ray, the percentage of the vote taken by th tituency exceeded 90% of the vote.o7 Equ involved in these biparty contests were ass rty coalitions or ententes that have done
In Parliament, the organizing princip has not consistently produced a stable biGovernment and Opposition has often bee Marxist and communalist parties to op Since 1956, however, parliamentary powe tical coalitions which in constituencies ef electoral pattern is thus replicated in parli ximate a workable, though erosive, Go' and the SLFP, of course, are the kingpins about which smaller,sometimes satellite, and parliamentary coalitions. These coali for alternative government which the pai that every election since 1956 has returned of the incumbent, strongly suggests that th nalized.
There are several critical dates and capacity. There is first, quite clearly, the election of 1956. Above all, it demonstrate The election of July 1960 proved that the that its political base of power went deep upon the personal charisma of its founder. some opinion, at least, considered it to be of the UNP in the election of 1960 equall
17. Woodward, op. cit, p. 250.

VE PERSPECTIVE: AN ASSESSMENT 149
rary party system and its predecessor is and essentiality of the growth experienced thirty years ago. While further growth may porary party system is distinguished by structurally and functionally, (2) its capa(3) the centrality of political view which I engaged in the political process.
course, obviously multiparty. Except for nant, there has been no significant change he party system since the SLFP emerged 2 party system has become bipolar in two rst place, election contests at the constitevery election, beginning with that of 1956. litical forces multiplied and were in disarhe first two candidates in almost every cons. ally important is the fact that candidates ociated with one or the other of the two pafairly regular battle at elections since 1956.
le inherited from the Westminister model party division. A clear distinction between in blurred by the tactical preference of some perate, at times, in parliamentary limbo. has pivoted about the two principal polifect biparty election contests. The biparty ament in alignments which form or approvernment-Opposition division. The UNP of the biparty pattern. They are the cores parties gravitate to produce both electoral tions are, in turn, the key to the capacity ty system has come to assume. The fact to power a party or coalition rival to that is capacity has, in fact, become institutio
events that mark the development of this
success of the SLFP-led coalition in the d the possibility of alternative government. SLFP was not an ephemeral phenomenon; er and that it was not solely dependent Its survival was at issue a year earlier when finished as a mass party. The re-emergence y proved its vitality to sceptics and others

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alike. More important perhaps, was its ret demonstrated its ability to forge elector as that put together by the SLFP. Implic these parties is the improvement in relati no-contest pacts, the delegation of cabine and the workability of coalition governm cooperation which generally were lacking
The construction of these coalitions components of the party system have all t tions, a centrist political view. The party generally supportive ofparliamentary den the UNP and the SLFP, mobilize a masss cal, politically liberal, moderately sociali neither eventuates in fundamental change has helped pull formerly radical and rev pressures and opportunities natural to revolutionary parties of the first party sys ning coalitions and indicate, by their pla The original Marxist parties have been e to amputate their recalcitrant, revolutiona an inner tension that long disturbed the explicit adoption, finally, of a parliamen east, their security within the parliamen at the polls of the revolutionary elemen un-responsiveness of public opinion to a r questions. Their regular defeat is one m. mentary democracy.
The underpinning of the contemporary that of its predicassor. Intense political useful changes on the part of parties and th In the first place, they have become co All parties have developed increasingly link tham directly with voters. Ideologic taken with an ear to voter demands and place of votes. The intimacy that has devel in the strong party-orientation of the Ca derations stillweigh in elections, the deci platforms and the issues they raise. These their power to elect and defeat governm have underscored public support for the
18. This is the thesis of my article, "Sri L Party Politics', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Electoral Politi Press, 1975).

WOODWARD
urn to power in 1965 when it, in addition, all coalitions as impressive and expedient t in the construction of coalitions by both ons among all parties. The conclusion of t posts among intensely ambitious leaders ents evince the kind of sophistication and
in the first party system.
has been facilitated by the fact that durable ended to adopt, at least on important quesI system now operates within a consensus Locracy. The two pivots of the party system,
ocial base along similar, though not identi
st and traditionalist, lines. The election of . The "coalition-draw' of these two parties folutionary parties toward the centre. The politics have, over the years, modified the em. All of them have now served in goverEforms and action, support for the system. ncouraged, at no little expense and effort, ry sections. This has, for one thing, released external relations of these parties. Their tary orientation acknowledges, at the vely
tary system. At the same time, the fatality ts purged from these parties manifests the evolutionary solution of political and social pre measure of popular support for parlia
7 party system is also deeper and firmer than competition has compelled systematically ese havehelpeditosolidify their foundations. nsumer-oriented, socially determined units. sophisticated formal organizations that al questions and policy decisions are now latforms are devised to sell in the marketoped between parties and voters is reflected ylonese electorate. While personal consisive factor now appears to be parties, their developments, the fact that voters have felt ents and thereby influence policy directly, party and parliamentary system.
anka's Electoral Experience: From Personal to , No. 4 (Winter 1974-75), pp. 455-471. See also cs in an Emergent State, (Cambridge University

Page 157
THE PARTY SYSTEM N COMPARAT
The inability of new parties to take footing on which the established party sy is composed of the same parties today a The disorder that followed the break-up various leaders of that coalition to founc single durable party. Some short-lived pe permit their absorption by, larger, mor parties, the precipitous decline in voter : dates, suggests that most elements of put durable parties to articulate and represel which the contemporary party system i. give it, as well, the aura and appearance c did not convincingly convey this important
The strengths of the contemporary weaknesses of the earlier one. Obviously of its own and is confronted by serious ch most of these is the consumr-orientatior quite frankly, might not only outbid each which go bayond the capacity of the socić well reflect one instance of this. Certainly down in the spiraling inflation of promis election of 1956. The fear is that the impel a vitality needed arrestation or reduction (
Parties also, especially their coalitio fellows. The SLFP, in particular, is pulled dation withits Marxist partners, and the c which the party originally emerged. Give SLFP has been returned, this inner tensi The UNP has often been so decimated a SLFP has come from within itself. In this and Opposition. This is an oddity, but it is UNP has consistently enjoyed greater s by the small number of seats it sometimes July 1960 and especially that of 1970. The the conservative side of the SLFP may th of the public will which results from the s and the electoral system itself.
The mold of other Sinhalese partie SLFP. The cohesion of the UNP, however, It is pulled within, not so much by ideolc leaders seeking a surer road to power tha tical ebbtide. Traditional Marxist parties within and among themselves. As the Lab of its evolution, the LSSP, MEP and CPh

IVE PERSPECTIVE AN ASSESSMENT 151
root is further evidence of the firm popular stem rests. Substantially, the party system s in 1951 after the formation of the SLFP. of the MEP, and the consequent effort by their own parties failed to give birth to a rsonality parties later saw fit to join, or to e established parties. This failure of new support for politically independent candiblic opinion are content with the faculty of ht their interests. The traditionalist garb in s clothed, its use of indigenous language, of a peoples' servant. The first party system image.
party system developed in response to the 1, the present party system has deficiencies allenges which it is obliged to master. Forewhich governs party competition. Parties, other for votes, but also develop demands ty to satisfy. The insurrection of 1971 may it counsels caution and, if possible, a slowes that parties have been making since the ratives of party competition will not permit of promises to voters.
ins, still tend to be collections of odd bedbetween two wings, one seeking accommoother pulling toward the parent-UNP from n the overwhelming majorities by which the on might not be all together a bad thing. it the polls that the prime restraint on the sense, the party acts as both Government nonetheless systemically useful because the upport among voters than that suggested wins, most notably in the elections of 1956, ; empathy that exists between the UNP and erefore help compensate for the distortion pecial circumstances of electoral coalitions
s has hardened more than has that of the is challenged every time its fortunes decline. !gical wings, but by ambitious factions and in that provided by the UNP during a poliappear to have settled major differences our Party did in Great Britain in the course ave gradually deradicalized. Differences of

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152 CALVIN W
opinion excite debatein both parties andir tions of tactics and policy. Inner-party te trast between the mundane needs and orien goals of the party intelligensia. This may b The British Labour Party has still not caln
The position of forces potentially dist over the years. Importantly, they have b system, or at worst, cast to the less damagir parties, however, are still operative, thoug selves only marginal public support. Th depends on the ability ofestablished par emanating from their constituencies. Out. "purists' of LSSP schisms and the recentl remain at the fringe awaiting the failure stronger now than in the first party system one of parliamentary democracy, it gives ca. party system. In the less legitimate one bey party system by using potentially system however, served in a Government and, if c averse to serving in one again in the futu FP has been instrumental in maintaining Tamils and the Sinhalese through the nexu tary activity, like the politically-motivated system,-supportive than damaging. Such t mentary majorities of the real power at the in Parliament may be an inaccurate expre parliamentary tactics, may provide a usef correct a parliamentary imbalance, or to k not to go beyond the delicate consensus or carefully built.
Questions of a communalist nature a have valid grounds pose problems for thi divisions have been more intense since 195 have found need to cater to the interests of has its communalist bent, though much o ments for conduct alleged to be arrogant, linations. Now that the capacity for alten the validity of rhetorical criticism can be opinion and a verdict rendered at the pol bitter exchanges can damage public confic ments can be induced to engage in irrespol Similarily, parties may be led to promise'
19. While it is too early to evaluate fully its tional change seems definitely to have

OODWARD
ernal alignments form and divide on quession, to some degree, stems from the conation of party followers and the visionary a strain endemic to working class parties. led a similar debate in its own ranks.
Irbing to the system has radically changed ten ostracized from the established party g periphery of that system. Revolutionary they have been able to attach to theme marginality of that support, however ies to remain responsive to the demand, ast parties, such as the CP (Peking), the r proscribed Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, of the established party system. The FP, l, exists in two worlds. In the legitimate utious, calculated support to the Sinhalese 'ond parliament, it threatens the Sinhalese -disturbing devices and strategies. It has, onditions can be made right, may not be re. Despite its periodic withdrawal, the ; a political association between Ceylon s of the party system. Its extra-parliamenstrikes of Marxist parties, may be more behaviour can often serve to warn parliadisposal of a party whose minority status ssion of its true political strength. Extraul mechanism, available to all parties, to eep the party system mindful of the need which the Ceylonese democracy has been
nd a political rhetoric whose content may : contemporary party system. Communal 6, and formerly inter-communalist parties the majority community. Political rhetoric it, as before, is directed against Governarbitrary, or indicative of dictatorial incnative government is ensured,' however, affectively assessed in the court of public s. The fear, of course, is that persistently ence in the party system or that Governsible conduct in defense of their position. impossible dreams' to convince voters of
affect on the party system, the recent constitustrengthened the position of Governments.

Page 159
THE PARTY SYSTEM IN COMPARAT
the insincerity or aloofness of an incumber is the special burden borne by the contemy
The contemporary party system and heritage of particularly Ceylonese gift. Ace The growth manifest in the contrast bet systems, however, is provocative. The part cies, such as Great Britain, the United Sta a comparable level of growth. The princip was effectuated more expeditiously in Sri L capacity of the Canadian party system to confirmed until thirty years after Confed directed by Sir John A. MacDJnald, wh almost unbroken political sway nationally an opposition party founded under Tho president from the Federalist Party elever took another twenty four years to dislodg office and to consolidate the biparty patte government was slow to take root in Great initiated modern party development. Betw "Liberal supremacy', the Conservative F Robert Peel from 1841 to 1846. Equally a of the two great parties remained embry organization grew at a more rapid pace t democracy.
The Ceylonese party system, of coul experience from which to draw and on v SLFP, quite specifically, looked for examp the United States. Similar tutors and mode architects in all the new states, yet in perh System worked as well as that of Sri Lank exceptional. “Asian politics are caught in 1966; “they can neither get along well wit them'. It is to the credit of the Ceylones describe the first quarter century of party e
20. "Party Systems and National Develop Myron Weiner (eds), Political Parties an Press, Princeton, 1966), p. 369.

VE PERSPECTIVE AN ASSESSMENT 153
trival. This danger, more now than before, Jorary party system.
the one from which it descended, share a rtain historical continuity is to be expected. ween the early and contemporary party y systems of longer established democrates and Canada, took more years to attain le of alternative government, for example, anka than in these older democracies. The author alternative government was not vration. The impressive electoral machine ich fathered Confederation in 1867, held f from 1854 to 1896. In the United States, mas Jefferson appropriated the office of years after the union was established. It ge the Jeffersonian Republicans from that rn since extant. The process of alternative Britain following the Great Reform which ween 1830 and 1875, the years of the great arty realized office only once, under Sir irresting is the fact that the central offices onic until the 1870's. In Sri Lanka, party han it did in the mother of parliamentary
rse, had over a century of modern party which to model itself. The UNP and the le to the mass parties of Great Britain and ls, however, invited the emulation of party laps none of them save Israel has a party a. In Asia, certainly, the Ceylonese case is a profound dilemma', Lucien Pye noted in [h political parties nor work well without separty system that neither of these poles xperience.
ment in Asia”, in Joseph La Polambara and d Political Development, (Princeton University

Page 160
Χ
FROM CEYLON (1948)
K. M. DE SILVA, A. C. A. WoODWARD, W
This study of Sri Lanka in its socio a microcosm for the examination and an: in South and Southeast Asia. There are, inc the fact of smallness. But transitions and the dynamics of change in Sri Lanka hav states”, “states at risk” and “nations in di places. The essayists in this volume have att panied independence and the rapid chang five odd years thereafter.
Aquarterof a century is a useful poir What is distinct in the case of Sri Lanka is strains and stresses, have taken place with system has functioned despite restrictions We cannot say that this has been the case w tan, Burma, Malaysia and in recent time; the stability that underlies rapid change has in store. But to look back on twenty fit ments holding together an ethnic mosaic th while containing social discontent withins the new states of post-World War II can la loom ahead these are no meam accomplis
Howard Wriggins places the Sri Lank when he compares the island's multi-ethnic countries. In many ways his essay sets the on related problems. Very rightly, Wriggi are not the proprietary monopolies of only
The notable tranquility that preceded a craft and diplomacy so reminiscent of Cavc independence, the farseeing nature of Briti independence are set out in K. M. de Silva'
1S4

V
TO SRI LANKA (I975)
EYARATNAM WILSON, V. HOWARD WRIGGINS
-economic and political aspects provides alysis of other similar or related societies doubt, differences arising especially from upheavals are in process all around and e their analogues in the “broken backed angerous equilibrium' in near and distant empted to portray the stability that accom es that followed in its wake in the twenty
ht to look back as well as to look forward. that the processes of change, with all their in an orderly framework. The democratic placed on it by hardpressed governments. with the neighbouring states-India, Pakiss Bangladesh. We cannot be certain that will last. There are many "ifs' the future ve years of peaceful evolution, of governhat has within it sources of disintegration, afe bounds, are achievements that few of ly claim do. Despite many difficulties that hments.
a situation in the context of South Asia c problems with those of the neighbouring pace for the rest of us who have written ns concludes that “communal” situations South Asian states.
und accompanied the transfer ofpower, the pur, Garibaldi and Mazzinithat “induced'' sh diplomacy in easing the way to orderly s contributions on the subject.

Page 161
FROM CEYLoN (1948)
Questions naturally arise concerning
of independence were dealt with. The erro not altogether unsatisfactory. The probl society are commented on by Kitsiri Mal Sri Lanka'), Donald E. Smith ("The Dialec and K. M. de Silva ("Hinduism and Islam the thorny question of Christians and priv Role of Sri Lanka Christians in a Buddh Tamils and separatism is dealt with in K.
and its Impact"). Many of the essays refer tially. It is crucial to the problem of Sri Lal as a single national entity. The future has area. C. R. de Silva and V. K. Samarawee 1973: An Interpretive Essay' pull these p to provide an overall perspective while th looked at by K. M. de Silva in his "Natior "nationalism in Sri Lanka is a thing of a point of consistency in the future', perver concludes with paradoxical yet sustainable of nationalism will continue to be at once c.
Social welfarism is a byword in local centres on this local problem while religior entre of political dynamism. It is notwitho en who guided the island's destinies in it yake and Solomon West Ridgeway Dias conservative of environments. Don Stephen in Whitehall to obtain independence with minority ethnic and religious groups wi majority system. Solomon Bandaranaike w to liberalism drew rural masses into poli Sinhalese Buddhist "revolution' steered it In the hands of an extremist leader, Sri Lanl from Biafra, Bangladesh or Cyprus. Dudley old and the not so old, the heir to his fathe much of Solomon Bandaranaike’s pragm has accomplished the unusual feat of accor kyists and Moscow Communists) within Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Under her pre are being put through by her United Frol arena for debate and for shaping the maj Barring India, it cannot be said with any ci has had statesmen who have been so simila of twenty five years-a kind of continuity a

To sRI LANKA (1975) 155
how the opportunities and responsibilities rs are stark but the accomplishments are ems of a multi-religious and polyethnic algoda ("Buddhism in Post-lindependence tic of Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka'), in Post-Independence Sri Lanka'), while illege is examined by Paul Caspersz ("The ist Majority System“). The issue of the M. de Silva’s contribution (“Nationalism to the Tamil question directly or tangennka's unity as well as Sri Lanka's survival many question marks in this uncertain ca, in their "Leadership Perspectives 1948erplexing questions together in an effort e divisive trends of a plural society are alism and its impact'. As he points out, myriad shapes and forms' that its "one sely, it its "infinite changeability' and he propositions to the effect that “the impact ohesive and disruptive'.
politics and the conflict between parties l, race, and caste are, as well, close to the ut significance that the two leading statesis formative phase, Don Stephen SenanaBandaranaike both came from the most Senanayake inspired adequate confidence
goodwill and thereafter to reconcile the thin the national fabric of a Buddhist vith his western outlook and commitment tical participation and while evoking the within the safe confines of national unity. ka's situation might have been no different | Senanayake provided the synthesis of the r's policies and the eclectic who adopted atism. Mrs. Bandaranaike, for her part, mmodating the traditional marxists (Trotsthe parameters of her social democratic miership, left of centre socialist policies ht government utilising Parliament as the prity votes required to attain these goals. brtainty that any other South Asian polity rand yet so different within a limited span nd change.

Page 162
156 K. M. DE SILVA, A. JEYARATNAMwILS
During the years of independence, "revolution' of the mid 1950's, Caylon's involvement and discrimination than the Asian state. At each election they rejectedt tion be given a chance to rule, since those to deal with economic, political or other is: to gain a majority. A major issue for the f ticized rural population can be sufficientl beyonda singleterminoffice.
The dynamics of political confrontal by Calvin Woodward in his "The Party Assessmant'. Impressed by the rapid de compares the Caylonese experience favou of the established democracies during th Wilson draws attention to the change and ( its ups and downs, now becoma common further examines the question of the syste. m2ntary Government'. He concludes that conditioned by the results of the next ele guess that the trend will be increasingly aut
How does a system so fluid and yets assesses the situation in his interpretatio) framework was maintained much as it 1956, when the floodgates were breachec distance and a lack of sympathy-characte service have given way to flexibility, fear indecision, responsiveness to political pre: Blame for this partly lies on political le: decisions. Consequently, as Samaraweera and selection through the competitive pro of favouritism under the old order. Butj in the post-1956 phase-race, caste, rel choice of administrators. The change, as "inevitable' in that "the bureaucracy cou political process in the island'. One can or appropriate balance. Sri Lanka in this res. and Malaysia. But will these states be ab that Sri Lanka's bureaucracy has respond
nextricably intertwined with bureauc The plight of an export-import economy post-1956 phase and struggling to sust are analysed by H. M. Gunasekera 1948-1973'. Based on extensive statisti takes the whole period in one sweg

)N, C. A. WOODwARD, w. HOWARD wRIGGINS
and particularly after the Bandaranaike rural population showed greater political ; rural population in any other Southern he incumbents and insisted that the Opposiwho had been in control had not been able sues in a way to satisfy enough of the people uture will be how such an awakened, poli"satisfied' to permit continuity of a regime
ion, of bi-polarity in politics is examined
System in Comparative Perspective: An 'elopment of the party system, Woodward rably to that of other new states and that 2 early years of party politics. Jeyaratnam :ontinuity in foreign policy that has, despite ground between the major parties. Wilson m's durability in his "The Future of Parliat the form that Parliament will take will be :ctions. Whatever the outcome, it is a safe horitarian.
o stable sustain itself. V. K. Samaraweera n of “The Role of Bureaucracy'. The steel had been in pre-independence times until 1. Thenceforth, impersonality, inflexibility ristics of the old British trained higher civil of political authority inducing bureaucratic 3sure accompanied by a foreboding apathy. idership that draws back from taking firm states, a spoils system has replaced merit cess. Not that there was a complete absence obbery and nepotism have become endemic igion and politics directly influencing the Samaraweera very rightly points out, was ld mirror the values dominant in the socioly hope that there will be a return to a more pect may fall short of the standards of India le to adapt and change in the effective way ed to social and political upheaval?
racy and politics is the state of the economy. seeking to switch to light industries in the in itself on expanding paddy cultivation in his "Economic Changes in Sri Lanka cal data covering many years Snodgrass p. A productive, dynamic economy is

Page 163
FROM CEYLoN (1948)
vital to sustain orderly political change, w rule. Despite his references to the optimi Snodgrass has his own misgivings of the f still low and the foreign exchange and ot Shodgrass argues that this prospacts of rai indeed is one of the most critical dilemmas future. Failure to solve the economic prob Again this is a problem that faces otherstate Malaysia has successfully kept her popul; been supported by its export-import econc Bangalash appars to be overwhalmcd by
gives heran advantage.
However, it is the parsisting failure ti problem that will in all probability change coming years. New groups are making t solutions are projected by a radically dife rejects Parliament and all the paraphernali from the conventional forces which culd v3 coalition is already evident. To compound the Tamils is gathering strength. This politic tional parties to lay aside the problems of issues only some years ago. The problems does from the majority youth sector of th Backtonin his "The Marxists and the Ultra N Blackton concludes that a long pariod of coded with the insurgency of the Ultra-Ma
It is not easy to conjecture what the f dence, Cylon could not have b3en a safer b: accompanied by Soma turmoil have occur is that daspite the turmoil, change has b: the exception being the Tamils. The year landmarks that heralded change, som:tim: But underpinning these has ban a founda variables, there are a numb3r of possibilities intervention nation-breaking revolutiona or sporadic violence. But this is little diff in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma and the last twenty-five years a certain level o in itself is a claim to achievement.

To sRI LANKA (1975) 157
hether under democratic or authoritarian
stic pronouncements of other economists uture. "With saving and investment rates erpopulation problems worse than ever, sing national income "appear dim'. This that Sri Lanka faces now and in the near len spells political and national disaster. s in the neighbouring area as well. Whereas tion within some limits that thus far have my, India's problems are staggering while
humb=rs... ln contrast, Sri Lanka's Smallness
grapple successfully with the economic the course of Sri Lanka's politics in the hemselves more articulate, revolutionary rent type of leadership that despises and a that goes with it. The expected reaction try well combine in a single grand national matters, the separatist movement among all threat in a sense has obliged the conveninter-ethnic rivalries-exploitable political posed by a new leadership, coming as it e population, are investigated by Charles Marxists of Sri Lanka since independence. cultural civility and British style politics rxists.
uture holds in store. In 1948, at indepenre t, the model colony. But sweeping changes red since then. The one significant factor, en accepted by those affected adversely, s 1948, 1956, and 1970 are in this respect is peaceful, on other occasions turbulent, tion of solidity. Given however the many -the abandonment of Parliament, foreign ry situations accompanied by endemic erent from what has already taken place Malaysia. Sri Lanka can be proud that in f stability has accompanied change. That

Page 164


Page 165
HE INVERSITY OF CEY
WOLUM
"From many points of vicW, the stand more adwälnced han those in Wolume 1 Editorial Board, and his co-contributors
"What is remarkable is not merely thics but also the unifying assumptions whichi
The greatest achievement of this wo historical Writing on Sri Lanka,"
Pros:55 UT. KEII
"No one writing about Ceylon's affairs if AILhough eleven-different authors have c an admirable coherence of structure, scq detail, and consistency of style unusuallins
The editors are to be congratulated bcatiүсүok"".
ProfeEECr HC wEId Wrigis
"Ascricus dificulty in carrying om re5eal the lack of up-to-date sources of historica improves the situation.
This is an impressive work, disting and full of new laterial. It could stand as orbicwichied by Delphic Lutteranccs franci
Professor Chaules Bla
"... as authoritative and definitive a histor for a long time.
an excellent piece of editorship, a
conceTitled..."
Professor
The University of Ceylon, History of Cey 19th century to 1948, Edited by K.M. de Sil
All inquirics from The Assistant Regist Per Eidcniya, Sri Larkg;CT Lakic House: Bol elsewhere E5, CO or US$12.50.
 

ON, HISTORY OF CEYLoN
THREE
lds reached in Wolume 3 are considerably ...K. M. de Silva, his colleagues on the o this Wolumchave donc cxcellent WCIk".
The Tril Literary Spplement
eed with which all concerned set to work |fo 11 the Wiltölc,
Lincis ... in Sctting a new direction to
eth Ealhatchct in the South Asian Review
rom now on can dio without this- volume. ontributcd chaptes, ... the volumc has |ctice of thought and event, discriminating uchenterplies.
on an unusually successful piece of colla
in The Ceylon Jarirral of Historical arid Social Studies
"ch relaticdito modern Sri-Lanka has bicchi 1 reference. This solid history substantially
ished by expertress and sober reflection a ma del for histolian 5 beguilcd by jargon, imputers",
kton in The Arrericari. Historical Reyes
y of modeIn Ceylon as oncis likely to hawe
remarkable effort at co-ordination by all
S. Arasarantnam in Moder Fi Ceylon Studies
lon, Wol. III, From the beginning of the wa,Colcimbo Apothecaries' C.J., Ltd., 1973,
ar. Academic, University of Sri Lanka, okshop, Colombo. R5 (0- in Sri Lanka;

Page 166
THE c
Jour NAL OF HISTORICA
NEW SERIES Jantrary-Decen Wol. IV = (Published Dec.
cont
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A.JEYARATNAM WILSON. The Fut A. JEYARATNAM WILSON - Sri Lank:
K. M. DE SILWA
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KITSIRIMALALGODA Buddhis K.M. DESLVA El Hinduis ॥ Lanka
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DONALD R. SNODGRÄSSÄ Sri La Twenty
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EYLON : LAND SOCIAL STUDIES aber 1974 = embe- 1975) ENTIS :
a in 1948
No. 1 : Ell:-
1sfer of Powerin Sri Lanka-fA Review = -
iPerspectives 1943-975: an InterEssay
cifth Bureaucracy
uire of Pārliamentary Goverficin
lism allis Impact nomy of Sri Lankai 94357 || m in Post-Independence Sri Lanka
mand Islam in Post-Independence Siri
Elof Sri Lalliñka Christian 5 莺 蟲 Ru Systern
lectic of Religion and Politics in
担
를 ikas Economica Pelvelogrtzen La Puring === ive years of Independence
rists and the Ultra-Marsists FS acendependence: sofComunism E South Asiä
ty System in Comparative Perspective:
ylion (1948) to Sri Lanka: