Page 1
ANTON MUTT
 
 

'UKUMARU
bird
ewardene

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Page 5
THE MILITARY HIS
- An
Major General Al ОВЕ Е BA(OXON) BAR-AT-I
Forev
President J.R.
anazaras 2c
Dehiwela,
in associa
NAVRANG O
19

STORY OF CEYLON Outline
By
nton of;"ttukumaru D ADC AW (GRAY'S INN) idc
Word
Jayewardene
cés (2vt)4á6
Sri Lanka
tion with
NEW DELHI 37

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(c) The author, 1987
All rights Reserved. No part reproduced or transmitted, without permission.
First Published in India, l9. NAVRANG, New Delhi
ISBN 8 7 O3 O46 8
Published by:
Mrs. Nirmal Singal for Navra
Printed by:
Welwish Priňters, i A-27 Narai

t of this publication may be in any form or by any means,
37
ng, RB-7, Inderpuri , New Delhi
na Industrial Area, New Delhi

Page 7
Dedi
This book is dedicated to served with me in the
and in the Reg
Sri La
To the memory of our coll
in their life found their

cation
the Officers and Men who Ceylon Defence Force llar Force of the
hka Army
and
eagues who fought for peace bime and have now eternal peace

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Page 9
Availant Si ملے
1 6th January 1986.
I have knojin Major Gene the author of th is book, as a diplomat and for tend. Now I ha knowns him as a historian. de la tm to be recogn is ed as a ht o ta r m t 1 i ta r h i s t o ry over a pe he h coup ' t e r h a s ea m' ried that d t
Perhaps the o ut a tandt ng 1 ies t n its p t o neering chara at vorks, some of v h t e h I have ra a spects of our wilt tary past. do na its to produce e a compre he ? entire m filt tary history which at tempted. This is in itself
This work ts va lua ble of the modern per tod s t nae In There is no one I know who is this per” i od t h a n t h e a u thor b a 8 so a i a t i on av i t h t h e affairs of which he has hinself contro and Comma der of the Army.
"l'h e thanks of t le publ h is tory are due to the author t n u nder takt ng th t s vork . He h is e camp lle will be followed hope so.
P? ES
 

ka
ra l Anton Mu t t u kumaru, lau) y er, 8 o l d i e r° » ve the plea 8 ure of 'e modes tly makes no
e torian. În outlin ing r i od of 3 5 0 0 year8 | ti по t t от .
value of this work er. There are mar pad, wh toh de a l w i th
What the a u thor , ha e s ve Jork cover ing ouro no o ne ha s h i the roto dan a ceh it e ve me n t .
a li s o for ii t s 8 ta tement depende ne e in 1948.
better qualified to cover e ca u se of h i s pers o na l of it ha t period, to 8 o me i bu ted a 8 Ch, i ef of St a "f"
il a interested in our mili ! « l': for h ii s pub li ce sp i r i tedine s s eaepre 88 e s the hope that
by others. I since rely
مجیسا سمعہ); ,7ހަم,!
so J. R. Jayewardene 'IDENT OF SRI LANKA

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Page 11
Con
List of Марs
laient of Photographs
Acknowledgements
Prologie
PAo
TE E INDI
l. Peaceful Relations
2. Dutugemunu
3. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5t
4. Parakrama Bahu the Great
5. The Decline
RE COO
6. The Portuguese
7. The Dutch
8. The British
9. The Colonial Period in R

tents
AN PROD
3
h invasions 2O
30.
49
2
A PROD
6.
84
98
Detrospect 25

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lO
ll.
l2.
l3.
l4.
lS.
PAR
:: MODER
The creation of the Army The rifties: Communal coi
The Sixties: An Abortive The seventies: Sri Lanka
The Eighties: Ethnic Cond
Retrospect and Prospect
Epilogue
Up-date
Bibliography
Index
Errata

PROD
of Ceylon 39
flict Erupts 53
Coup and its Aftermath l80
Faces Terrorism 87
rontation 97
209

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Map of against
Map of Ceylon.
List of
Ceylon showing Elora.
South India s
Portuguese Fort of C Artillery located at Wo Sebestian.
Layout of British Attac
Soldier
Soldier
Soldier
Soldier
Soldier
List of Ph
of Anuradhapura
of Sitawaka Per
of Polonnaruwa
of Kandyan Peri
of Modern Perio

Maps
Route taken by Duttagamini
howing invasion routes to .
olombo l656 showing Dutch lvendal Hulftsdorf and San
k on Colombo 796.
otographs
Period.
iod.
Period.
Od.
d.

Page 14
Acknowle
This work would be incom me of those who helped so My grateful thanks go to Mr Survey Department who prepar work Mr. Walter Dias who submission to the printers; read the typescripts and provided me with information after my retirement and w statues of soldiers through Work.

dgements
plete without recognition by eadily in this production. , Upali Jayewardene of the ed the maps included in this :yped the entire work before Mr. Clarence Anandappa who )fficers of the Army who on developments in the Army ith the photographs of the history which appear in this

Page 15
PrC
The need for a properly tary affairs in Sri Lanka w my mind when I assumed dut: Army of Independent Ceylon. that there was no recorded ni disappointed to note that, entitled "Ceylon-an accour historical and topographic amount of information on C Sir Emerson Tennent makes reference to military matter
I thought that this there is aeed to ascertain W history makes any worthwhil tory and whether there is where the warrior is recog fined class in Indian societ to be relegated to the backg that there would be merit i our military history in ord the soldier in that histor investigate whether there is history which could contra organisation and handling c Sri Lanka.
So far as the pre-color noted with pleasure that t even though devoted to the pronounced Buddhist slant, would be valuable to the st Ceylon.

logue
' researched history of miliis brought home forcefully to es as Chief of Staff Of the I was disappointed to find lilitary history. I was also even in his monumental work it of the Island: physical, :al" which provides a vast ceylon valuable to scholars, but casual and incidental S.
should be remedied, because rhether the soldier in Ceylon e contribution to that his-- a reason-unlike in India, nised as constituting a dey-for the Ceylonese soldier round. I therefore decided in my undertaking a study of er to ascertain the place of Ye I certainly wished to any element in our military ibute to the traditions, f the Army being created in
ial period was concerned, I he Mahawamsa and Culuwamsa,
history of Ceylon with a have recorded material which udent of military affairs in

Page 16
For the Colonial period are publications which wou material , it would be pro Bolland and the United Kingd assistance could be obtain military historians archivi hers and scholars in general was Prime Minister and Mini Army Commander, with whom nerit in them. Accordingly visit to the UK to attend th ed by the British Chief of I visited Portugal under arr guese Charge d'Affaires in arrangements made by our Amb self a distinguished archiv own arrangements. I was d assistance that would be for
So far as the post-colo felt that my military experi l934, coupled with my int independence military devel good stead in rounding off W
I was too involved in Army and in dealing with mat cropping up to find the ti while I was still in commar the project however when I where I was happy to find of the Asia Foundation was What I needed was books, t rial assistance and even pul friend was, however, una Government of Ceylon approv ment I discovered, Wä arrangement for Foundation Ambassador and indeed, my intention to move the Trea interest in my work. Par owing to preoccupation with therefore proceed with my the foreign service.

I felt that, whilst there d provide excellent source itable to visit Portugal, om, so as to ascertain what ed in those countries from sts, geographers, cartograp, Mr. SWRD Bandarnaike, who ster of Defence when I was I discussed my ideas, saw When I undertook my next e annual conference organisthe Imperial General Staff, angements made by the PortuCeylon and Holland under assador at the Hague, himist. In the UK, I made my elighted with the degree of thcoming. - nial period was concerned, I ence which had commenced in imate connection with postopment, would stand me in that had preceded it.
the running of a developing ters of security which kept me to devote to my history d of the Army I returned to was "enposte" in Pakistan, hat the local representative interested in assisting me. ough the matter of secretalication was discussed. My le to assist me unless the d the project. My Governunwilling to countenance an issistance being given to an Ministry even indicated its ury to terminate Government ly owing to this but largely my work abroad, I did not roject, so long as I was in

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Since my retirement fro been faced with many constra also others in various sphe life. Recently however, rest in our military past work before I forget even th
I realise that any unde what I planned thirty yea capacity at the current stag much less ambitious ventur Will cover the same historit suitably abridged by treatmel Quite obviously, what will b research needed for a serio not therefore merit the de accounts for its being descr:
I am hoping that the unt is, will be of assistance t a properly researched Milita:

the public service, li nave nts, illness for sure but es of activity in community
have become aware of intend I decided to resume my
little I remember now.
taking having the scope of 's ago would be beyond my of my life. I feel that a would be possible. This :al sweep as I had planned, ut only of selected events. beyond me is the extent of ls study. The project will scription of "history" and ibed as an "outline".
illertaking, modest though it D real scholars in producing ry History of Sri Lanka.

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Page 19
Pal
THE INDA

rt I
\N PERIOD

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Page 21
1.
Peaceful Relatior
Given the fact that India establishment of relations betw What could not be predicted wal which, as it happens, were ch the S9 relation S Wa S Bhoweveripea is as It is customary to commenc in Ceylon of Prince Wijaya fı there is merit in referring which Dr. Paul, Peiris has id "Nagadipa and Buddhist retains elementary fact that people liv proximity of Lanka merely, waite Taking, Contact. With the opposi more substantial fact to a which "Long, before the arrival of Wii five recognised is Warams of Si the adoration of , all India. Tł Maha tittha u Munees Wara IT ddomin fishery in Tondeswaram near Mant great bay of Kottiyar and N rai. The situation (of thes ports cannot be the result of probably determined by the EC populations whose religions ( XXTVIII-NYo.22. XX W-MYo. 70. .B5-Thi good cultural relations which India and Ceylon at this stage
ਮE Wijaya (BC 543). I er i EF= - = thrir Ther-initials reference to iP he refers to as the 'conquest".

It
It is
-
| 1
is with India loi n.
III
:
and Ceylon are neighbours, the 'een them would be - predictable. the nature of such relations equered. The first phase of Ceful. e our history, with the arrival to III India. I think E ho We Wert to the pre-Wijayan period to rawn ours attention Hin his Ein Jaffna". – He points to the ing, on Indian soil noting the ld for a capacity to Sail before ite shore. There is is also the FDr. Peiris refers as follows: ayarithere is have been in i Lanka van which Eclaimed and received ley were Tiruketees Wara.In near ating SalaWatta and the Pearl totai Tirukones Waran near the aglules waram III neari Kankesanthue LiS wara ITIS): Clo Serto the Se Il accident = Por: Caprice and WaS oncer I of a Wealthy Lercantile a11ed for attention." RAS-CB, a foregoing is evidence of the existed between the peoples of
of our history. Frio -
॥ エリエ cmff士 f=エis =工ーリ エ王 E
rince Wijaya by Tennent is what of Ceylon. There is no eviden

Page 22
ce, however, of his landing hav rement of "sword, bow, battle-a the Maha wamsa refers was not stage. It was probably necessar discovered that this followers Queen of the local "Rakshas" Wijaya on pain of death, to ir and his followers despatched the ly utilising the weapons of wa must count as the first "milit and perhaps justifies the us Tennent in describing the manne adversaries.
The landing of Wijaya is emphasises the cordial relations South India. After he had sett of Anuradhapura, he was invited rated King. This he refused un found to share his princely ran) Kuweni with whom he had cohabi for this purpose even though s inhabitants. The Mahawamsa rec to the Pandyan King in Madu daughter for the Lankan Prince that, not only would he send hi but that she would also be ac rank. Fr. Gnanapragaser, in hi in Ceylon" says that the total r was six hundred and ninetynine tion to the Princess who would supported by persons of inferi needs in Ceylon. These woul horsekeepers, elephant keepers, slaves. No soldiers are mentic
The bonds between India anc gthened. Quite obviously, the and Noble mixed the Indian a additionally served to mix the as the Sinhala and Tamil peopl that both India and Ceylon want

ing been opposed. The accoutxe, spear and shield" to which therefore necessary at this y at a later stage when Wijaya had been spirited away by the Kuweni, who was forced by estore his men after which he followers of Kuweni, obviousrfare that they carried. This ary" engagement in our history ær of the word "conquest" by r in which Wijaya overcame his
followed by an event which s between him and the rulers of led his people in the environs by his followers to be consectill a suitable spouse had been k and status. Quite obviously, ted, was not a suitable person he was the Queen of the local cords the despatch of a mission rai seeking the hand of his and the response of the King s daughter as Wijaya’s consort, !companied by ladies of noble s "The Beginning of Tamil Rule number sent by the Pandyan King ladies of noble rank in addiespouse Wijaya. They would be or rank to minister to their d include personal servants, charioteers, tradesmen and ned.
Ceylon were thus being strenespousals at the level of King ind the Ceylonese strains and
strains of what has developed e. They served to demonstrate ed good relations between them

Page 23
to subsist, to the degree th together matrimonially, while the nucleus of a new community
Tennent tells us that Wijay able administrator with, howev he achieved by dividing his don he posted his chieftains who wo ing agricultural development. the basis for the production of priority. There is some evid rivalries between the chieftail of fighting but the skirmishes serious) were neither extensive followed was therefore largely rial for special mention in the
Devanaiapiya Tissa (BC 307)
I pass on to the reign of the most momentous part of Ce Buddhist history. The evidenc Mahinda, the son of the great divinely directed in a vision t conversion of Lanka". Ther Mahinda taking the form of an e Devanampiya Tissa and leading th to the top of the mountain at King took aim to release his a himself from elk to human. M teachings of the Buddha to whi and decided to embrace the fai followed the request by the Ki Tree at Magadha under which the request was conveyed to the Emp course for the sapling to be br Sanghamitta, from whom it was and transported with due Anuradhapura. There it was pla into maturity and to become o object of veneration by Buddhis a source of wonder that it ha treated as the world's oldest

at even families were bound collectively, they would form in Ceylon.
ra was proving himself to be an Sr., an agricultural bias. This lain into settlements to which uld be responsible for organisAgriculture is recognisable as
food and therefore was a basic ence of petty and predictable hs, which resulted in a degree (and they were nothing more nor intensive. The era which peaceful and provided no mate
present study.
Devanampiya Tissa which marks eylon's history, certainly her ce of the chroniclers is that It Mauryan Emperor Asoka, was o "depart on a mission for the se is the romantic sequel of ilk on arrival in the Kingdom of he King who was out elk hunting Mihintale, and just when the urrow at the elk, transforming Iahinda then discoursed on the ..ch the King listened intently th preached by Mahinda. There Ling for a sapling from the Bo Buddha sat in meditation. The eror Asoka who arranged in due ought to Lanka by his daughter received by Devanampiya Tissa veneration to the capital inted and has continued to grow ver the centuries not only an ts in Lanka and abroad but also as survived sufficiently to be authenticated tree. The King

Page 24
had by now established his re earned for himself the name b "Beloved of the Gods". . (Maha w
Devanampiya Tissa will un his initiative in setting up D was the Thuparama in Anuradhapu Buddha brought by Mahinda. The ted by the King were in Mihint meeting with Mahinda and in Ma of the Buddha, which comme mc Buddha to Lanka. There is n Dagobas by Devanampiya Tissa followed by his successors, hundred. This is a tradition w We progress into future history
I recognise that there car of the fact that I have devote to the reigns of Wijaya and Dev no apparent relevance in a stu soever their relevance in a ger done so advisedly, however, bec teristic of peaceful relations the first invasion - a period fifty years. Their reigns are setting for the arrival in t people which took place under and spread of Buddhism among t place under Devanampiya Tissa. to examine the military affair people, I judged that these ev
There is however, a resi in the military sphere. Quit country were engaged in the ex the sovereign in the performa This in the case of Wijaya wol ments which he created and wi boundaries between the territo tural work - within them, develo

putation for Buddhist piety and y which posterity acclaims him amsa Ch. 3).
uestionably be remembered for gobas in Sri Lanka. The first tra erected over a relic of the two other major Dagobas erecalle, on the site of the King's hiyangana, over the collar bone rates the first visit of the p doubt that the erection of has resulted in the tradition one of whom alone built five hich will come in for study as
7.
conceivably be some criticism i as much space as I have done anampiya Tissa which would have dy of military affairs, whateral history of Ceylon. I have :ause their reigns were characwhich continued with India till of at least four hundred and important also as providing the his country of the Sinhalese Wijaya and for the introduction he Sinhalese people which took In a study which is designed 's connected with the Sinhalese ents should not be ignored.
iual aspect which has relevance e obviously, the people of the ecution of policies outlined by ance, that is, of "rajakariya". ld involve work on the settleould include the setting up of cy of rival chieftains, agriculpment of water resourcessalad so
6

Page 25
on. In the case of Devanampiya would lie in the service of rel ing of dagobas , preaching há priests. The priorities thus a ing out such cultural and agri them with little time to devc display any latent talent for w ssing this matter, Tennent car comment that there was the "a Sinhalese to bear arms" which
period to take into their pay
as the Mahawamsa calls them) in the interior. (Tennent in Vol
I have been intrigued by tained" by Tennent who gives inc evidence justifying it. One c whether the Sinhalese were ac activity by participation in t chieftains and found wanting. rulers found that their people v farmers in the fields or as that it would be preferable t service. Perhaps, as this studi le to examine further the concll an "ascertained inaptitude" on military service.
It appears clear however th relations which I am examining the Sinhalese rulers on merce such military duties as had t conclusion they had arrived at suitability of the Sinhalese placed in such mercenaries pro reign of Suratissa, two leaders Guttika, rose against him, kill
The peaceful relations bet come to an end. The stage had b. a new phase in Indo-Ceylon rel hostile.

Tissa, what would be involved .gion which included the buildills and dwelling places for ssigned to the people in carrycultural duties must have left te to military activities and arlike capabilities. In discuries it further by adding the ls certained inaptitude of the led the Sinhalese Kings of the a body of Malabars (or Damilos order to protect the coast and
I,Ch. 8).
the user of the word "ascerreason for his conclusion nor can only, therefore, speculate tually tried out for military he skirmishes between rival
Or alternatively, whether the were so suited to employment as builders on construction sites o leave them out of military y progresses, it may be possibision of Tennent that there was
the part of the Sinhalese for
at, in the phase of Indo-Ceylon , reliance was being placed by naries for the performance of o be undertaken, whatever the it independently, regarding the
for such duties. The trust »ved worthless because in the s of the mercenaries, Sena and ed him and assumed sovereignty.
ween Ceylon and India had thus een set for the commencement of ..ations which regrettably were

Page 26
2
Dutuge!
The hostile relations whic the form of repeated incursion taken by inhabitants of South energetic character" prompted Sions. It is interesting to I not come from Northern India Sikhs, Rajputs, Pathans are lo on Lanka as Wijaya had done f Ceylon to India, to which Dr. P a predictable part, whilst the tors which are worth mentioning
According to the "Advanced three distinguished historians Chancellor of the University of lled out among many states, thi Chola, Pandya and Kerala. T Tanjore and Trichnopoly distric vity in the Second Century BC quered Ceylon and many anecdo testify to his strong sense C excelled in trade and learnil Madurai and Tinnevelly. ......." Pandyans lay the Kerala country North Travancore..."
The initial engagement i relations between India and Cey Ceylon and Elara of India a colourful episode in our Milit

TU dUI
h I now propose examining took s into Ceylon territory undersern India whose "restless and them to undertake such incurhote that these incursions did where the great warrior races, cated who might have descended from Orissa. The proximity of aul Peiris has referred, played re are other contributory fac
o
l History of India" compiled by led by Professor Majumdar, Vice
Dacca, "South India was parcee most important of which were he Cholas (who) occupied the its showed great military acti. A Chola Prince, Elara, contes have been preserved which f justice. The Pandyans (who) ng, occupied the districts of Io the north and west of the embracing Malabar, Cochin and
n the long history of hostile lon centres round Dutugemunu of nd provides us with the most ary history.
8

Page 27
EI.a I.a ( B C 205 )
Elara the Chola Prince re of his Illilitary pro We SS by first invasion of Ceylon from shed himself as a Il able ruler apart from his prowess as a ruler, Elara proyed himself which largeness of heart played chara: teri Siti C of Elara was Equal justice at his hands. I of his punishing a snake Which hild. He is Credited in thlo bell poi Sed over his bed, Wh: order to attract his attention Seeking justi CS S E his han i 5 complaining to the King of the the calf of the suppliant cow, OVer the calf. Retribution was S SS LLLLLLLHHS LLLLL LL LL0 LLLLLK K0K0kLLLLLL LLLLLL killel the calf. The Mahla: justice in partially to friend i Infidel and a LS turper.
"The Rajawaliya, by contrast LLLLLaL LLL S HLLLHHaLLLLLLLL LLLLL S LLOOGGLLLLLHLHLL0L Telot in Woll. "The Maha Slant and describes the Ilarine damages a portion of a Thupa his Waggor doing the da III.age. notice, Elara said "Sever Ily he Ehe wheel," whereupOn he was i da Imaged Thupa. This he readi fifteen thou Sand "kahapanas" to that he had di Splacedi. Terriert rior accuracy of the Mahawam 9: character. In Persian history Per Siarl Tornarch Khosro W II whic Elara for accessibility to man Ilium of "Naushirwan the Just". On Elara the accolade "Elara th

ferred to above gawe ewildernice commanding and conducting the India. He thereafter establi
for forty-four years. Quite soldier and his ability as a as a dispenser of justice in l a predominant role. What is that Iran and beast received here is for instance the story had swallowed the young of a chronicles With having had a ich a Suppliant COuld pull in . The story is told of a COW by activa ting the bell and : action of his son in killing by running his chariot wheel swift and the King ordered by the Sarı'e Wheel that had sa refers to his "administering or foe" even though he was an
, represents hill as a desecrawer of temples, as narrated by wa Ilsa gives us a different er in which he by accident, he was Visiting, the yoke of Cn this being brought to his ead also (from the trunk) with invited merely to restore the ly agreed to do, by spending replace the fifteen stones seems to prefer the supeir a Il esti Tlation of Elara" S there is reference to a great had the same reputation as and beast and earned the encoHistory has si Tilarly bestowed e Just".

Page 28
Dutugemunu ( BC l6l)
Having said this about Ella to say that it is Dutugemunu wil in this phase of our military h. sarily because he represents th phase but because of the intril to its importance.
I open with preliminary m family-it is as well to recogni it all started. Firstly, we has Kalyani, Gamani's grand-father, wife's intrigue with his brothe ger dropping a letter meant f intercepted, and of the King or into the sea. The account con sea gods intervened by Causing land. (Mahawamsa Ch. 22).
We then have the romantic with terror that his beautiful ved, causing her to be placed inscription "a King's daughter", In due course the vessel came land of King Kakawansa who fell] her, bestowing on her the nam their son, Gamani , was born, ( "... when he (the Queen's son) ha built up a united kingdom, he w forthrightly..."
There is the equally roman Gamani's birth, apart from gift elephant of the "six tusked r palace and left it un attende Kandula brought it to the Kin elephant to be taken to his sta baby was named "Kandula" after King. The Mahawamsa relates h into being "...foremost in str qualities of courage and swift
O

ra, I think it is appropriate no holds the predominant place istory. I say this, not neceshe Ceylonese component in that nsic value of his contribution
atters connected with Gamani's se that this was his name when fe the account of King Tissa of
discovering evidence of his r, through the latter"s messenor the Queen which the King dering the culprits to be cast tinues by disclosing that the the sea to overflow the King's
sequel of the King, consumed daughter, Devi, would be involin a golden vessel bearing the
which he launched on the sea.
to rest near a vihare in the in love with her and married e Viharadevi. In due course of whom the soothsayers said s vanquished the Damilos, and ill make the doctrine to shine
tic story of how, on the day of :s arriving in seven ships, an ace" brought its calf to the d, until a fisherman called g. The King ordered the baby bles, there to be reared. The the man who brought it to the ow in due course it developed ength, beauty, shape and the ness and of mighty size". . The

Page 29

IER OF PURA PERIODO

Page 30


Page 31
elephant became Gamani's ow) handled. We shall hear mor
As Gamani grew to manho nature of his environment so in him in his bed with his knees not stretch out his limbs, he the Ganga, are the Damilas-hel Ocean. How can I lie with O evidence that, even in adolesce of an a li en r u li ng on the
I now pass on to that ph tres on the manner in which h was consuming him. This falls
The levying of the forces The march to Elara " S Strol The ensuing campaign betwo
I take each of these in tu
The Levying of the Warriors
The Mahavansa gives deta manner in which the ten warri would be created, were chosen.
Sandinitta had the Str
capable of an adversar his victim.
Suranimala had the Stre
Mahasona was known
was seven y when he was

mount which he trained and 2 of Kandula in the future. (Mahawamsa Ch.23)
d he felt the constricting uch, that when his mother saw rawn up and asked why he did replied "...Over there beyond e on this side is the GothaItstretched limbs?" This is nce, Gamani felt the ignominy land he called his own. (Maha Wansa Ch.22).
se in Gamali's life which cene dealt with the ignominy which into three identifiable parts:
to overcome the enemy; Tghold; een the opposing forces.
.
illed information regarding the ors, round whom the main force
ength of ten elephants and was putting his foot on the leg of 7 and tearing the other leg of
ngth of ten elephants.
o tear up young palms when he 2ars old, and great palm trees tel.

Page 32
Gothaimbura
Theraputtabaya
Bharana
Veliusumana
Khanjadeva
Phussadeva
Labh iyavasabha
though of dwa as ten elepha his Six elde ground a fore subdued a Yaki
could hurl stc
four men cou sixteen, he f for him by h inches round
was credited of Gothaimbur
killed hares a manhood, cou bears by dashi
was able to ta
let no other n
would grapple whirl them. I ground.
had excellent shell but it renowned. Hi guided by sou ing or hit a a wagon loade bound togeth udumbara wood or a slab of inches thick.
was endowed would performa a tank.
When each of these warri
Gamani's father,
he appointed th
And when all of them had been as
12

rfish stature, was as strong nts. Stung by the banter of brothers, he razed to the st of Imbara trees. He also
a called Jayasena. V−
ones when he was twelve which ld not lift and when he was elled palms with a club made is father, which was thirty and sixteen cubits long. He with strength superior to that
a.
ls an infant and when grown to ld kill antelopes, elks and .ng them to the ground.
me a Sindhu horse which would han mount him.
big buffaloes by the leg, and ound and hurl them to the
lungs for blowing the conch is as an archer that he is -s arrow would hit its mark hd or by the light of lightnhair. His arrow would pierce with sand and hundred skins er, or a slab of asana or eight to sixteen inches thick iron or copper two to four
with such strength that he the work of ten in working on
ors submitted to the King, em to the service of Gamani. sembled, he charged them with

Page 33
bringing ten others each and wh bled the King ordered the hu. manner. And when they brought to lewy other Warriors till E teIl warriors had been lei ed.
The Mahawa mga also rofor skilled in guiding) elephants sword and also was "Crs d is This of Course, CO'Fer5 hi5 0" It does not co','er the organisa LLLLLL LLLL CLLL LLLLLLLLLL LL0 LLL S reason that such organisation major undertaking by Gamani t LLL L HH L L L L L L L L L L SS LLLLLSS S L L L L L LLLLLL L0S LLLLLL L LL LLLLL S LLLLL LLLL JS L L L L L L LL LTL L L L L L L L have found ways of utilising
Fiors in Eraining the Tien ecs - spears, Swords, Cllr S SS SS SSL LSL uC u L LaLLLLS L L HLL CL Shrer i Slers vha have given capabilities of the ten warr aspects of gearing Gallani's o lay ahead.
Sooner or later Galilani. It he: had set himself, naTlely t reported to have approached hi "giving battle to the Damilios and to the effect that "tho I. is enough". Gallani's rejoinder pOrha POS Lunfili al bo020cia l 1 S 2 IllO father Were a Iları, he would Ilo "woman's apparel" to clothe hill Was also so deep that he left residence in Mayarata. His de "Duttagamani i.e. "Wicked' or . this is how history knows hill f
Tert H.S. Il evvidelce thilat of defying the King and even frustrated by the death of the from his self-i ITposed exile

1ëIl that IlUITiber had beer 1 a5s2IT1= Indred to bring others in like
a thousand he coir Ila Ilded the Ill
-1 E','En thousärld :Jre hundred and
s to the fact that GaПапi was and horses, in bearing) the är Chery. (Mafia wa III Sa C.? - ). wn personal military training. tion and training of the troops Service under him. It stands to
and training IT, Lust hav,FC been a o make his force battleworthy.
the training of arches url der USUI III.a Ila. GāITLI. Ili Tlust doubtle SS the Special talerrits of his te
in the handling of offensive }s of defensive equipment like inals. It is a pity that the such extensive details of the i cors are Sil Sert on the Wital ther troops for the tasks that
Lust have felt equal to the task :c) fight Elara because he i S is father with the intention of ". The King's reply was terso 2gion on this Side of the river Erld actions were hotheadled ard t only did he say that "if ITy 't speak thus" but also ser1t hitti Tself with. His state of anger his father's pala CO2 and took up Teamour led to hi 5 being Called 2ven 'disobedient" Galani". And from noi oriwards,
Duttaga IIlani had any intention if he had it would have beer King. Duttagarnani nov returned to the capital, where he was

Page 34
crowned King. Any intention of at this stage was prevented by war against his brother, Sad capital with his mother the ( return to the capital. The war, eventually, resulting in a
brothers. (Mahawamsa Ch.24).
The reconciliation enablec his plans for attacking Elara. pany Duttagamani but was requir what would today be describe Duttagamani's attacking forces the Mahawamsa puts it, being th les give little detail of this taking but it stands to reason large a force of eleven thousan tion. There is no evidence t fast. On the other hand, the because there was no apparent concludes for the need for su what would be prepared and des area. These would include foo administrative needs, whilst o tion would be paid to supplies and arrows, battle axes, spears of which it is inconceivable obvious military acumen would march from Ruhunu Rata to Raja
The March to Elara's Strongh
The stage was now set f( historic march from the Southe Ceylon. Duttagamani put a rel serve as a royal standard and S followed by his "chariots, t: (Maha wamsa Ch. 25). He first w announced to the "brotherhood." alia, "to bring glory to the de made the request "to give us, t bikkhus who shall go with us, blessing and protection for us
l4

moving against the Tamils even Duttagamani's involvement in a natissa, who having left the ueen and Kandula, refused to as it happened, came to an end reconciliation between the
Duttagamani to press on with His brother was not to accom ed to stay behind and attend to d as the logistic support of - the "work of the harvest" as e foremost duty. The chronicaspect of Duttagamani's underthat the logistic support of as d needed a great deal of attenhat the attacking force moved a pace was leisurely, partly heed for speed and partly, one lpplies en route to supplement patched from Sadhatissa's base ld, medical supplies and other n the operational side, attenof fighting equipment - bows and shields, without a supply that a man of Duttagamani's have undertaken the tedious Rata where Elara ruled.
old
pr what is recognised as the rn to the Northern region of ic into his spear which would et forth with a beat of drums roops and beasts for riders". tent to Tissamaharama where he that his mission was, inter octrine". Having said this, he hat we may treat with honour, since the sight of bikkhus is ". . . The request has a twofold

Page 35
ar a dh an 21ú ha (a see éef')
Am»as9MYa 4ffhavAbu
 

MAP OF CEYLON Showing Route taken by
Duttaganini
aogainst i Elara

Page 36


Page 37
significance - blessing which h a crucial undertaking and prote mean the expectation that Budd forces would be reluctant to included bikkhus. If this inte closes an element of what in pass as psychological Warfare.
result of providing him with fi
The move from TiS Samahara ingle and Duttaga mani therefo: to be made ready", obviously to His chariots (probably pala ng
lithout difficulty. He was wFose inhabitants - Probably Wel East. Weddah's would obviously hic would explicit their knowl direction, till their object: enough, Maiyangana was the n renown - hallowed by Dewanampi commemorate the first visit ol the troops rested and reconnoi places defended by Elara's forc out the structural additions mentioned.
The Campaign between the Opp
It is from Maiya ngana on between the forces of Duttaga first engagement was in the M force commanded by the Damilo The next engagement was agains Imonths and which ended by "cun adversary Inarriage with his Illot of i government. Dutta gama ni Mahaweli Ganga and conquered day. He therefore continued in ming all Elara's outposts unit reated to a place called Wijith across the river.

e Would obviously want for such !ction, which has been taken to hists who were part of Elara's fight against a force which terpretation is Correct it di Smodern military parlance Would Duttagamani's request had the . We hıllıdırced bitkkhillS.
IIa Ilorthward lay through thick re "caused the route in Malaya enable his force, particularly Lui ITS for COITIIT ander S) to Towe passing through Weddah Country re detailed to carry out this be able to provide the scouts edge of the jungle in keeping we was reached. Predictably ext objective because of its ya Tissa's dagoba erected to f the Buddha to Ceylon. Here, tred future Towes and possible es, Whilst Duttagamiani carried to the dagoba which has been
oSing ForC2S
wards that the actual fighting Tlani and Elara coIIIlenced. The aiyangarla region in which the
general Chatta was defeated. st Titthamba which lasted four ning" — Garmani promi Sing to hi. S her and With it the expectation Ilow followed the line of the "seven mighty Damilos" in one
this victorious Tanrıer over Cor i 1 a 11 Elara's Surwi worS retapura, a well-defended fortress

Page 38
The precise point at whi the Mahaveli is obscure. It crossed both the main river therefore, likely to have selec in line with Kalawewa as sugge Short History of Ceylon. Ch.2 current name for Vijithapura Duttagamani's objective. He Magan tota which is marked ill Mendis' "Early History of Duttagamani also probably wait crossed, always using his Crossing.
The fortress at Vijithapu four gates giving access throu Suranimala were detailed to Mahasona, Gotha and Theraputt gates. Kandula, the King's elle attacked the South gate but had hurled redhot balls of fire a The elephant's physician remove elephant's hide, after which K. times folded buffalo hide. He Nandimitta Suranimala Gotha the attack. The weapons used the Mahawamsa are interesting, Mitta a wagon frame, Gotha a co Mahasona a palmyra palm, The with these weapons, the attacke uvercame the Damilos within.
After the assault against months to complete, Duttagaman. slaying the Damilo Giriya a Giritale) (Codrington " Ch. 25) the latter, however, only afte: which came to a successful e battle described by Tennent as matic means". Duttagamani was pura where he decided to pitc preparation for his final engag

h Duttagamani actually crossed s unlikely that he would have and the Amban Oya and he is, ited a point further downstream, sted by Codrington. (Codrington , Kaduruwela is probably the
or Vijithanagara, which was robably looked for a ford and
a map reproduced in Dr. G.C.
Ceylon", suggests itself. ld for the dry season before he archers to cover the actual
ra had a rampart round it with h the rampart. Nandimitta and assault the South gate whilst a attacked at the other three 2phant was with Nandimitta and to retreat when the defenders nd molten pitch on the animal. d the pitch and put balm on the andula was fitted with a seven how returned to the fray whilst and Sona pressed forward into in the attack as described in , Kandula seized a cartwheel, coapalm, Nimala his good sword, taputta his great club. Armed rs rushed into the streets and
Vijithapura, which took four ... marched towards Anuradhapura, t Girilaka (probably today's und the commander at Mahela - an engagement of four months nd after a cunningly planned having been executed by "diplo now at Kahagala near Anuradhah his camp in open ground in ement with Elara.

Page 39
In the meantime, Elara, w mation about Duttagamani's pro his warriors, summoned a Col. ministers and generals, led by ing Duttagamani. For his pa strategy of setting up thirty with an effigy of himself with of a bearer, in order to confu bouts. He himself took his pl his troops, so rounding off as hitherto been devised.
Elara himself mounted on
lied forth with his "charic riders". Dighajantu using his first body of the thirty-two sa dispersed then destroyed the e: victoriously until he had dest with the King in it. Suranima King and, in the duel that ens stage Phus sadeva, probably t conch, on hearing which, howe tered. Elara then turned to r. followed in hot pursuit, utter of drums the admonition "None Outside the South gate, Elara his adversary. He hurled his Duttagamani now urged his mc mount with his tusks, at the Elara. Warrior and beast suc Elara and his mount sank to the
It is at that stage that D his "chariots, troops and beas tion of his victory over Elan join in the funeral rites for his body had fallen" says the M monument and ordain worship. ces of Lanka, when they draw | silence their music because O. that even a Kandyan Prince, though he was, obeyed the behe the tomb of Elara. It is small
l

no obviously had reliable inforwess as a warrior and that df ncil of War, during which his
Dighajantu, decided on attackrt Duttagamani decided on the :wo bodies of his troops, each the royal parasol in the hands se the enemy as to his whereaace with the inner-most body of cunning a deception plan as had
his elephant Mahapabbata, salits, soldiers and beasts for sword and shield, attacked the at up by Duttagamani and having Efigy of the King. He continued royed all the bodies except that: la sprang to the defense of his led, killed Dighajantu. At this :o rally his troops, blew the ver, the forces of Elara scatally his troops and Duttagamani ing simultaneously with a beat but myself shall slay Elara". turned his elephant to confront dart which Duttagamani evaded. iunt Kandula to pierce Elara's same time hurling his dart at ceeded in their onslaught and a ground in mute defeat.
uttagamani, having marched with ts for riders" in the proclamaa, arranged for the people to King Elara. "On this spot where Lahawanasa, "there did he build a And even to this day, the prinlear to this place, are went to this worship". Tennent adds fleeing from defeat and tired est of Duttagamani when passing wonder that the magnanimity of
7

Page 40
Duttagamani towards a fallen approbation of all who have ch hin and Elara. Churchill, who defiance in defeat, magnanimi peace", would have probably Duttagamani's action.
So ends what will unquest: history as its most outstandin conceived in a consuming pati idealistic overtones. It was stic assessment of what had to that enabled the military conce of the fighters; the administ which totalled eleven thousand; obstacles which included a ted fifty miles over mountain; thro rivers; the deliberate rate of not be unduly fatigued; the m plans so as to confuse the enem which would draw out the laten the chivalry of the victor ir original concept, all honour to the battlefield.
Duttagamani's military ca defeat of Elara. The Mahawam. thirtytwo Damilo kings before a Lanka. Raghavan in his "Tamil C conclusion after studying the Paranavitana, that "the thirtyt to vanquish after he overcame Tamil Khastriyas who lingered c regions of South Ceylon". (Rag
Duttagamani was now mastel detach himself from military religious affairs. History re Mirissavatiya Dagoba - in expia chilly before offering it to a Lokapasada or Brazen Palace, sixteen hundred monolithic coll chambers for the use of bikkh
18

foe has received the unstinted ronicled the encounter between called for "resolution in war, y in victory and goodwill in added his own approbation of
onably go down in our military g offensive operation. It was iotic fervour with inevitably. lowever, executed with a reali) be done. It is this realism pt to be successfull-the levying rative support of the troops, the determination to overcome ious march of Some hundred and ugh jungle and across turbulent movement so that troops would easured attention to deception y and the quality of leadership t heroism in the soldiers. If triumph was not part of the the man who thought of it on
mpaigns did not end with his sa speaks of his overpowering assuming full sovereignty over ulture in Ceylon" comes to the views of authorities like Dr. wo kings whom Duttagamani had Elara were the residue of the n in the isolated and secluded havan Ch. 4). *
of all Ceylon and was able to pursuits and devote himself to cords his construction of the tion of his offence in eating a bikkhu and of the magnificent ine stories high, standing on mns and providing a thousand us. History also records his

Page 41
commencement of the constru which he has not fated to fin is something poignant about h unfinished master-piece from hi farewell to his one time comra had in the meantime embraced t supported by my ten warrior: singlehanded, I commence my las is not permitted to me to over his priestly associate comfo exploits in war, that he accept death.
A great warrior had thus d resemblance to Alexander the gr world but stayed his hand whe wished to conquer. Like Alex defeated Darius be buried wit buried Elara with obsequies a mounts which they immortalise Duttagamini's Kandula - A tire also died, bringing to an end fittingly is perpetuated in elic

ction of that exquisite Dagoba sh - the Ruvanvelisaya. There .s insistence on viewing his s death bed and in his words of le in arms, Theraputtabaya, who he priesthood. "In times past, , I engaged in battles; now, t conflict - with death, and it :ome my enemy." It is only when rted him by reference to his ed his peace through inevitable
ied - a warrior who bears some eat who set out to conquer the n he was left with nothing he ander, who decreed that the h royal honours, Duttagamani ppropriate to a King - Both had d - Alexander's Bucephalus and less worker for his faith had
a devotion to religion which quent stone.

Page 42
3
The Second, Third
With the hindsight that or assert that the first invasion three fold significance for Ce that South Indians could in V overthrow the sovereign, spread country and hold power for fi exploits of Duttagamani are an that Ceylon had the capacity to whom to confront the intruder, hundred and fifty miles through alien forces and regain cont. Thirdly, it is clear that, bet 205 and the second in BC lo3 - of hundred years, the Sinhales organise, equip, train and deplc fresh invasions.
The evidence, however, is not take any of these steps and ignominy of more than one invas Duttagamani. What is even mor tainly according to Tennent, th the character of invasions thai effectual resistance from the the description of the Sinhal Elara's forces as un warlike i however, that the forces put i victory were incapable of resis were Sinhalese, Tennent's comm.
2C

and Fifth Invasions
le possesses, it is possible to of Ceylon under Elara, had a ylon. Firstly, it was clear "ade Ceylon without difficulty, the new regime throughout the ifty years. Secondly, if the ything to go by, it is clear marshal sufficient troops with indertake an arduous march of a 1 difficult terrain, subdue the rol over the entire country. ween the first invasion in BC that is to say, during a period se sovereigns had the time to by the troops needed to contain
that the Sinhalese kings did l, therefore, had to suffer the ion commencing a century after e unsatisfactory is that, cer- . nese "invasions partook less of l forays... without meeting any unwarlike Sinhalese". Whether ese who had in fact defeated S arguable. It would appear, nto battle after Duttagamani's iting the invaders and, if they ent is not unjustified. If,

Page 43

O C EY LON

Page 44


Page 45
however, the forces detailed t Splito of the perfidy of Sana i comment is unjustified.
The Second Invasion - Walaga
The Second in Wasion took p. reign of Walagambahu (or Wattag was forced into exile into t Whil s t five T'anil kings usur Credit hic We Wer that he regain then, with the Support of the IT
The Third IInvasion - Gaja bah
The third ilvasion is de SC more predatory than the second. Sion, the Tallil king leading Sinhalese to the Soli (Chola) sequel are interesting. Accord king Gajababhu, sailed to Indi back his captured subjects. AC ever, Gajabahu went to India acc Nila, whom he presented to the army was. On the Soli king Squeezed water from Sand and fr an exhibition of his power. The impressed by this action, IC thQL Sand captives Hut also to own subjects to accompany Gaj reparation. He also allowed C je welled anklets of the Goddes of the four dievalas and the bo during an earlier invasion. (:
Ten Ilent, in a note to to the Soli king says that to Such Wii Sitt for have I bee Raghawan, "... the Sinhalese 1 Gajabahu of the Chola count South Indian historians".

oppose the iIlvaders were in Ind Gutti ka. Eller Certa ri as the
ıbahu (Wattaga mani ) ( BC 104 ||
ace during the undistinguished al Llani aS he iS Elso known) Who e Ti. Ca 11 Intai Il region of Malaya Jed the throIle. It is to his ad his throne from the last of oluntainecers.
ul { AD 113 )
ribed by Tennent as having been
Certainly, during this inwait took away twelve thousand Country. The ai CCourts of the ling to Tennent, the Sinhalese a with an expedition to bring cording to tha Rajavalli, how:ompanied only by a giant named Soli king when asked where his being unimpressed, Gajabahu on the lace which he carried in 2 Soli king iS, Ilo W Sufficiently it only to release the twelve permit twelve thousand of his Abahu to Ceylon, presumably in ia jabahu to take With hin the 5 Pattini, insignia of the gods will relic which had been seized See Codrington's Short History).
is refer CO2 to Gaja bahu "S Visit " Ehe Mahawan sa Takes no reference in able to find any. According to radition of Counter invasion by ry is not generally accepted by

Page 46
What is generally accepte at the inauguration of the ter the Ceran king Sengottavan. visited the Chola king on this men and the treasures mentic Goddess Pattini. The involveme religious matters certainly enr tions between the two countries in this study.
the End of the Mahawansa
I wish to pause at this S the chronicle of the Mahawamsa end with the reign of Mahase military event worthy of recor in Buddhism which induced him t value, including the Brazen Pali convinced of his errors and, renowned Jetavanarama Dagoba forming the tank at Minneriya. final observation in the "Mahawa and much guilt". (Chapter 37)
With the termination of th the Culiuwamsa (or lower Dynast Sulu wa masa as Tennent refers ' opposed to the Pali version) pr. authority provided me up to now
The early period of the Cu. regarding invasions. It record ter notably activities in n Buddhadasa) and to poetry (un relations were fostered throu whilst political relations v during the reign of Mahanama. the celebrated Fa Hian visited
The Fourth Invasion-Dhatusen
What has been described as in AD 433 when the Sinhalese cap
22

is the attendance by Gajabahu ple to the Goddess Kannaki by It is possible that Gajabahu occasion and brought back his ned above connected with the nt of Gajabahu in South Indian ilches the religo-cultural relawhich I have mentioned earlier
tage to refer to the fact that (or Great Dynasty) comes to an an. His reign marks no major i. It coincides with a schism o destroy buildings of Buddhist ace. Later, however, he became in expiation, constructed the . . He is also credited with His chequered life draws the amsa" - "he gathered much merit
he Mahawamsa, the chronicle ot :y) begins. The Culuwamsa (or to it, using the Sinhalese as ovides me henceforth with the
by the Mahawamsa.
uwamsa is free of information s events of a peaceful characyedicine and surgery (under der Kumaradasa). Diplomatic gh envoys being sent to Rome ere also developed with China It was during this reign that Ceylon.
and his Sons-Sigiriya (AD 43
the fourth invasion took place ital came under the control of

Page 47
the Malabars (or Damilos) who twenty-seven years but also c« side the city by erecting for Their success in repeated expe kings to claim that they had
Caruwar and the Crowned head of name for Ceylon (Ilam). Tenn Downes on the "Chera Kingdom o
During the twenty-seven y Ceylon by the invaders, Dhatus time, went into retirement du and when this was ready for a emerged from his retirement, possession of the forts they ha a naval force for the protecti Dhatusena strikes me as having a potential military situation create the instruments which cc rious invaders. I cannot help predecessors indulged in the so: up which has characterised the without necessarily jettisoning matic and political pursuits in have been able to check the tri which led to the fourth invasic
Whether Dhatusena would h vigorous military policy must cruel quirk of fate, he lost hi gruesome outrages in our histol Ka Syapa. Kasyapa, who was boo wife, was jealous of his elder thought that the king would pre superior birth, for the throne Kasyapa endeavoured to find out sures lay. Dhatusena replied ( waters of the Kala wewa, which h. his treasure. This enraged Kas incarcerated and eventually wa have a place in our history if cidal act. There is however ar this time in our military histo
23

not only occupied the city for nsolidated their position outs in areas controlled by them. itions in the region led Chola triumphed over "Madura, Izham, Pandyan"-Izham being the Tamil nt quotes this reference from
India". -X
lar period of the occupation of !na, the King of Ceylon at the ing which he organised an army ction against the invaders, he overcame the Malabars and took d constructed. He also created on of the coast from invasion. had the vision to take stock of
and the organising ability to uld be used against the victomaking the point that, had his it of military and naval build: later stages of his reign, - the medical, cultural, diplo
which they indulged - they may umphant progress of the Cholas
.
have been able to develop his remain obscure because, by a is life through one of the most y, perpetrated by his own son, rn to the king by an inferior brother, Moggalana, because he fer the brother, as a prince of and for the King's treasures. from the King where his trearyptically by pointing to the e himself had created, as being rapa who had the king chained, lled to death. Kasyapa would »nly for this shamefu1, parriother reason for such a place, Y

Page 48
Kasyapa, having killed his to kill his brother also, so claimant for the throne of Moggalana, realising the dang where he made plans to return father's death and secure the t
Sigiriya
Kasyapa, now tormented b found for himself a retreat in hundred feet high with overhang the ground. Its name was Sigir palace for his court and a fort development as a Palace, Sigir: neers who have marvelled at the king's treasures to the summit public chambers for his court family and personal entourage. paintings of ladies which ador ber, which match the treasures
But it is the military as ress that arrests one's attenti Quite obviously the height o sides, making it awesome in asc a strategic value which is arr guards were placed in the cav deal with attackers by showeri they attempted ascent, as well surrounding countryside so as guards of the approach of an at round the fortress to help th around. Around the rock, he es provide barracks for his troo zens. Round the city he ere behind a moat, which would ser ker. The layout for defence given supplies to outlast a pr any attempts of an intruder to
Eighteen years elapsed India to retake his patrimony
2

father, now made arrangements that there would be no rival
his father. The brother, er to himself, fled to India to Lanka in order to avenge his hrone.
7 fear of his brother's wrath, a gigantic, granite rock, four ing sides which rose sheer from iya, and designed to provide a tress for his security. In its ya became the wonder of engiskill of workmen who bore the where he set up his throne, and private apartments for his Artists have raved over the n the walls of a special chamof Ajanta in India.
pects of the sky-hugging forton in a study of this nature.
f the rock and its forbidding ent, have endowed the rock with esting. Kasyapa saw to it that
es set in the rock surface to ing arrows and molten pitch as as lookouts who would scan the to give early warning to the tacker. He cleared the jungle e process of scanning the area tablished the city which should s and amenities for his citicted a massive rampart sited ve as an obstacle to the attacwas therefore outstanding and, otracted siege, he could resist dislodge him.
before Moggalana returned from and throne. He had with him
4、

Page 49
some Malabar soldiers, in ad collected on arrival in Ceylon brother's advance, moved out fo to give battle to his brother. advice of his soothsayers "impossible". He certainly mac One of his generals to take on to him to take charge of the for his defence. In moving forward swamp and, when he turned his e. his men, thinking that their le up in disorder and presented an Moggalana, belying the early p. the Culuwamsa describes, "of other having burst their bonds faced forth to fight the demons satisfaction of slitting his b although there are claims that so deni ed his brother the executioner.
This brought to an end history. The defence of Sigi importance as the outstanding strategy in our military history offensive planning and strategy It is a thousand pities that su acumen in defence should emerge a defenceless parent by his own predictably, it is the latter's it is, that gives Kasyapa his pl
The years following the re duce any great military event v Codrington points out, the affa the 6th, 7th and 8th centurie years), only disclose a successi civil wars" which do nothing to adds that, between 523 AD and twenty-five years, fourteen king cessors. There was the more following the incessant rain of the kings found it necessary
25

ition to local troops he had Kasyapa, on hearing of his ward of his fortress in order He did so in the teeth of the Ithat his mission would be e the mistake of not sending the initial battle, leaving it tress area, which was vital to Kasyapa was confronted with a ephant to seek a firmer route, ader had turned to flee, broke easy target for the forces of omise of a pitched battle, as the two seas falling on each , like the God Sujampati who ;". Moggalana himself had the rother's throat with a dagger, Kasyapa Committed suicide and satisfaction of being his
a remarkable episode in our riya must assume a place of feat of defence planning and perhaps matching the feat of by Duttagamani against Elara. 1ch a superb feat of military from as monstrous an attack. On son as history records. Quite parricidal deed, gruesome as ace in history.
ign of Moggalana did not proforthy of record. Instead, as irs of the Sinhalese kings in s (a period of three hundred on of "murders, rebellions and enrich our history. Tennent 648 AD, a space of hundred & s were murdered by their suctraumatic development that, attacks by invading Damilos,
to move the capital from

Page 50
Anuradhapura to Polonnaruwa. flurry of building activity in and creating tanks around the ly, the focus (if focus there Dhatusena and Kasyapa) was not quality of soldiering in Ceylon
There was, however, an in activity namely, the despatch come to the aid of two Pandyar century, this happened twice. last long because we now have which pressed south to Ruhunu, sed by the mountaineers who invaders.
The Fifth Invasion - Vijayah
At the turn of the century of the millennium, the then ru of his mercenaries whom he co retreat to Ruhunu. This oppor Chola Emperor, Rajarajah I (a succeeded him as Emperor Rajen seize control of most of the Rajarajah then established his possessed for thirty-eight yea) from South India. Dr. G.C. Me Ceylon" in dealing with this i. "...in 1017, for the first ti independent kingdom and beca Empire." Efforts made to expe of abortive risings among th repression by the Cholas.
The picture changed howeve I who was able to dislodge the the following account of \ "...placing numbers of his fol. applying the four methods of the Cholas who were ravaging Ruhunu. (The four methods use "bheda" or division of the ene
2

Inevitably, the move led to a
the form of palaces, dagobas, new capital. Equally inevitabwas, except under Duttagamani, on military activity and the declined.
teresting interlude in military of Sinhalese troops to India to h kings. Within the space of a
This phase, however, did not e evidence of a fresh invasion where however, they were repulwere traditionally hostile to
bahu (AD 100l)
, which coincided with the end ler, Mahinda V, faced a mutiny uld not pay and was forced to tunity was seized by the great ably supported by his son who dra I) to swoop down on Ceylon, country and capture the king. Viceroy at Polonnaruwa which he rs, protected by Tamil soldiers ndis, in his "Early History of nvasion of Ceylon, asserts that ime, Ceylon ceased to be an me a unit of the mighty Chola l the invaders failed, because e Sinhalese, alternating with
dr with the advent of Vijayabahu
invaders. The Culuwamsa gives Jijayabahu's plan of attack. lowers in befitting positions, warriors for the destruction of Rajarata, he took up abode in d by warriors for success were amy, "danda" or offensive war,
6

Page 51
"sama" or friendly negotiation etc.). Initially, Vijayabahu er achieved ultimate success, by a plan. He sent two columns, or the west and the other to att whilst he himself led a third c. combined assault was successful capital occupied by the Viceroy "Vijayarajapura". He ruled for there were no Indian invasions,
Vijayabahu now master of Anuradhapura. He preferred, ho only as his official residence and military capital. The choi tary capital is attributed te proximity to the agricultural in the country, from where it invaders from the north Vijayabahu certainly had to dea One of the last was a revolt of "Velakaran", who declined to p sioned by Chola ill-treatment o Chola domain, where the "Velak prospect of fighting their o evidence of the strong position now the mercenaries had creat Rasanayagam in a publication of Asiatic Society says that the m protect the King's person which ing themselves if evill beset h:
Vijayabahu's death brought to the throne which were not s single contender being able t result, sovereignty was shared country between them. Vijayab, Rajarata and of his three nephe and the other two, Sri Megha between them. The stage Was se to appear and history recognise
2

and "danam" or gifts, bribes countered many reverses but dopting the following tactlcal he to attack Anuradhapura from ack Polonnaruwa from the east, plumn through Mahiyangana. The .., enabling him to recapture the . The capital was now renamed
forty two years, during which
(Culu wamsa Ch. 58).
all Ceylon, was crowned in wever, to treat Polonnaruwa not but also as his administrative ce of Polonnaruwa as the milimore than one factor - its areas and its central position would be possible to deal with and rebels from the south. l with more than one rebellion. his Dravidian mercenaries, the articipate in his plans, occaf his ambassador, to invade the aram" would be faced with the wn kinsfolk. This revolt is in Ceylon's affairs which by ed for themselves. Mudaliyar the Ceylon Branch of the Royal ercenaries claimed the right to they vowed to ensure by killim. (Vide CB RAS Ch. 20).
about problems of succession ettled by the emergence of any to subdue the others. In the | by the parcelling out of the ahu" s son Vickramabahu, took ws, Manabharana took Malayarata and Sri Vallaba shared Ruhunu It for anarchy or a strong ruler s Parakrama Bahu as that ruler.

Page 52
Dr. A.L. Basham of the Ur follows in his monograph entit of Parakrama Bahu II" which w volume "The Polonnaru Wa Per Journal: - "Thus, it was in a mismanaged and oppressed, tha Manabharana (Parakrama Bahu's liant leadership and we must a reminiscent of the legendary F peace and security to Ceylor invasion, tyranny and anarchy" IV 1954 and 1955).
Before I pass on to Parak comment on the period discuss Rajaratnava cari and which T Ch.10), reading as follows: "T kings, extending over eighty s: continual war with the Sinhal. every village in the land...". which are worth examining. T consider to be a characterist kings, namely their shortness. in a space of eighty six years four and a half years per reig of reigns that have lasted on that, even over a longer peri years, from the commencement o the reign of Parakrama Bahu seventy eight kings; which wo just over ten years per reig context of Ceylon History, whic ncy and ability of the ruler ability of the people. It foll not last long, the impact he there are frequent changes of affect the order of things, be ry so far provides evidence c military order. What the Raja of such impact on the civil c element of my reading of wha highlight. The description of rees every village of the lanc

liversity of London comments as led "The background to the rise as published in the Anniversary iod" by the Ceylon Historical country divided against itself, t the son of the old warlord
Éather) by intense energy, brildmit, often by unscrupulousness cautiliya, succeeded in bringing ., after a century and half of (Ceylon Historical Journal Vol.
:Irama Bahu, I wish to refer to a ed above, which is made in the 'ennent quotes. (Tennent : Vol.l hroughout the reign of nineteen ix years, the Malabars kept up a ese till they filled by degrees I think this has two elements he first is reference to what I itic of the reigns of Sinhalese The figures of nineteen kings work out to an average only of n - in fact, there are instances ly one year, or less. One finds ..od of eight hundred forty-nine f the lower dynasty in AD 304 to I in AD ll 53, there have been orks out to an average of only n. This is significant in the ch seems to rest on the efficieand not on the efficiency and Lllows that, if a sovereign does makes is reduced and that, if sovereign, they would adversely they military or civil. Histoof such adverse effects on the ratnavacari asserts is evidence order and consitutes the second t the Rajaratnavacari wishes to : the Malabars "filling by degl" suggests that they had... infil
8.

Page 53
trated the entire administra involving the filling of many p the administration.
Tennent's own comment on t onwards is as interesting as i hand, he contrasts the contrib calls them Gangetic) as "enrich the South Indians (he calls the and defacing". On the other han of the Ceylonese authorities w the military pomp of the invade
The foregoing helps to exp nuing weakness of the Ceylonese the superior capability of his support of his sovereign in ex may possess.

tive structure in the country, sts, including senior ones, in ,
he events in our early history it is distressing. On the one tion of the North Indians (he ng and adorning" with that of n Malabars) as "impowerishing d, he highlights the weakness ho, apparently "fascinated by s", lapsed into subjection.
lain to some degree the contisoldier who was pitted against Indian adversary, without the tracting any latent talent he

Page 54
4
Parakrama Bahu T
Parakrama Bahu is the C Ceylon to whom the descriptio. as one surveys the scene he reason for the accolade.
The Culuwamsa records t birth brought to his father, invitation to his priestly adv of the future of the young pri Lanka, he is able to unite unde the whole of Jambudipa" was th heroic strength of his "foe-cr name of Parakrama Bahu, which
The Culuwamsa has the foll tion for his royal duties, "... like intelligence, he learne teachers, the various accompli of the victor (the Boddha), i. that of Kotalla (the famous mil called Kautiliya and credited Sastra", a tezat on war and pol. song; in the art of driving t above all, in the manipulation weapons, he was past master equivalent of Machiavilli.
His education served to i out from his parental environm "soaring plans" which his extr der possible. These plans were kings in his family - namely,
3

he Great (AD 1153)
inly one of the sovereigns of In "Great" has been accorded and bestrode one understands the
he joy which Parakrama Bahu’s Manabharana, and the king's isers to give him an assessment nce. "Apart from the Island of r one umbrella and to rule even eir view. Having regard to the ushing arm", he was given the means "arm of courage".
lowing reference to the preparawith the help of his lightning d easily and quickly from his shments. In the numerous books in the works on politics as in hister of Chandragupta, who was
with authorship of the 'Artha itics) and others; in dance and he elephant and so forth; and of the bow, the sword and other ...". Kautiliya is the Indian
nstill in him a desire to break ent and seek fulfillment of the aordinary greatness" would ren
to achieve what had eluded the the sole control of Lanka under
O

Page 55
SOLD POLONINAR
 

IER OF UWA PERIOD

Page 56


Page 57
One umbrella. The manner in w tion was to organise and train the contenders for the throne.
Composition, Organisation an
The Ceylon Historical Jour | entitled "The Polonniaruwa Peri 800th anniversary of Parakrama lier in this study quoted from on the background to Parakrama cation. Professor Geiger has entitled "Army and War in medi assess Parakrama Bahu's militar
The two main components of and the militia. The mercent obtained payment for their ser country, were from South I Karnatas. They were a warlike such that they played an impo For instance, they rebelled ag earlier in this study and even himself. He, however, saw in Army.
Perhaps the reason why ho relative unsuitability of the persons dwelling in the countr agriculturists", says Geiger, " their fields and waiting for th demons who might annihilate the not a warlike people" he sa therefore, of no great milita: from Cordiner who finds the military discipline and from the nces of soldiers running away danger.
Strength
So far as the strength of rned, I found the Mahawamsa In
:3)

nich he could achieve his ambilan army capable of subjugating
di Training of the Arшу
nal has sponsored a publication od" in commemoration of the
Bahu's accession. I have eara monograph by Dr. A.L. Basham Bahu contributed to this publi
also contributed a monograph aeval Ceylon" which helps us to y policy.
i the Army were the mercenaries aries, so named because they vice from a king outside their ndia - Damilos, Keiralas and community whose efficiency was rtant part in Ceylon affairs. ainst Vijaya Bahu as mentioned revolted against Parakrama Bahu
them a useful element in his
e found them reliable was the militia which was taken from y. "These persons were really 'who were tilling and watering e harvest, in perpetual fear of
whole work; the Sinhalese were ys, adding "the militia was ry value." Geiger quotes both Sinhalese unable to adapt to } Mahawamsa, which gives insta
when exposed to an unexpected
Parakrama Bahu's army is conceDre precise in setting out the

Page 58
strength of Dutugemunu's army t ing out the strength of Pa] Dutugemunu's army is described whereas Parakrama Bahu's army is as the following figures show:
Damil soldiers in the Distr Rattakara
1000 men each from 5 respec of selected clans in Morya Lambakanna.
Allocated to officials of f districts from Dakkinadesa
Two thousand men each allot twelve districts in the int
1000 men each allotted to 8 already "tested by victory"
Soldiers selected for their strong" physique.
Foreign soldiers such as Ke.
Vyaddas (Veddahs) to whom w issued waht was "fitting"-s) (for fighters), drums (for etc.
Work people who were ordere do work appropriate to them probably by caste, vocation guild.
One concludes that the pre (i.e. 5000 plus 24000 plus 84000) ved "several" or "many" thousand
32

an the Culuwamsa is in setuakrama Bahu" s army. Thus, s being a very precise llll0, described in imprecise terms,
icts of
Many OOO's
ted chiefs
and r
5OOO
rontier to Rajarata. Many LOOO " S
ted to erior 24000
4 officers,
84OOO
"tall and
Several looC)'s
ralas. Several 1000's
ee
pears others)
Many lOOO's
to
ΟΥ
Several 1000's
(Culu wamsa Ch. 69)
cise numbers totalled ll3000
whilst the remainder invols, the total of which Carnot

Page 59
be stated in precise terms. l50000, although one notes the
Organisation
It is reasonable to say th were chosen because of their local troops (militia) were a their clan or guild. This is selection of persons for work weapons, bows, arrows, spears,
There has been speculation into the four main elements of t elephants, horses, chariots and with Codrington that, having r the country, elephants were numbers, except in the case of in battle. Similarly, the use generals and perhaps senior co quins. The army of Parakrama : nised into bodies of skilled f select corps such as the "moo supported by the persons allocat ed by local levies who carried : backs of beasts of burden in the
raining
Parakrama Bahu placed grea his troops for battle. Poten horses were encouraged to carry of their sporting programmes. handling of the sword which the in battle. Swords were of tw Jambudi pa. Parakrama Bahu h Sinhala sword, as being the mor
Others were trained in th they might be called upon to ut: lance, bow and arrow, battle a: would be individual or collecti selected training areas. The "
33

At a guess, this could reach possibility of exaggeration.
at foreign troops (mercenaries) ighting qualities, whilst the llocated duties according to particularly important in the
involving the manufacture of pattle axes, shields and so on.
whether these were organised he traditional army in India - foot soldiers. Geiger agrees 2gard to the wooded nature of unlikely to be used in large the king who rode an elephant of the horse was limited and mmanders travelled in palanBahu, one concludes, was orgaoot soldiers, supplemented by nlight archers". These were :ed to the baggage train handlstores on their backs or on the eir charge.
it emphasis on the training of tial riders of elephants and 7 out their training as a part They were also trained in the by might be called upon to use o kinds, the Sinhala and the imself seemed to prefer the e "terrible" weapon.
e handling of such weapons as ilise in battle - the spear or xe, club and shield. Training .ve which would take place in moonlight archers" were given

Page 60
specialised training. Followin would be weeded out.
The utilisation of weapon tactical situation. At close q equipped with sword, battle axe close support would be those 6 Further back would come the arc necessary troops would be issued protection, whilst leather doub light archers" an elite element
A word is necessary to m drum and flag. All these hav part they play in inter-communi and the drum would be utilised their use for control in moveme conch and the drum had their s. field, for instance, in rally: disarry or in forming them pric flag, rather like the colours usage, was used as a rallying this setting, the umbrella of t may be, had a special significa flag was taken as an admission had a special role in a situati a battle, the conch and drum W whilst the conch, drum and flag victory march of the triumphant vanquished foe.
Preparing for War - Logistic
When war was imminent, arrangements for supplies to food, armaments, medical requir or the civilian population at l mentioned by Geiger for the can ing. They included not only (nitrses) but also medicines arrows carried in a cow horns, of infected water in swampy art ting arrow heads which had pier
3

g training, unsuitable persons
s would be determined by the
uarters, officers and soldiers or club would be deployed. In
2duipped with spear and lance.
hers with bow and arrow. Where
with buffalo hide shields for
lets were issued to the "moon
in the Army.
antion the place of the conch, e significance because of the Lication and control. The conch in wooded country. Apart from ht and inter-communication, the pecial function on the battleing troops that have got into or to a charge or assault. The or guidons in British military point on the battle-field. In he king or general, as the case ince because the capture of the of defeat. The umbrella bearer on of this sort. At the end of ould be used to signal victory became used extensively in the : leader into the capital of the
Parakrama Bahu made special be made available, whether of rements and money, for the army arge. The medical arrangements paign in Ramanna, are interestphysicians and serving women articularly against poisoned
remedies for curing the poison eas and iron pincers for extracced deeply and proved difficult
4.

Page 61
to extract, particularly when
stands to reason that suitable
been made, not only for spet Ra, Illanırlar bout also for all Lili" CiWillian population was concel that the cultiwable areas would necessary, to provide the gra the civilians. (Cult I wansa Ch.7
Parakrama Bahu superimpose two Chief Ministers-one, a Mil Minister of Civil Administrati for the coordination of the lo Civilians.
Preparing for War - Espionag
Geiger describes the mann about a Scertaining the III ilitary the political and financial si he did by espionage. Geiger Cill llwalls a that Parakira Irla Bahu the court of Gajabahu where he SLI, Ch, actio Il Would be too ri Culu Wamsa meant was that Parak the Court to spy out what he ci
Parakrama Bahu certainly d astute" agents in the outlying guises for their work. They fortune tellers, poisoners and ly chosen agents would operate ascertain how they could be wo la Tboitious, or of their nur sing Of being awari Cious. These grc rated by Kautiliya whose work
The Conduct of War
The "four IIleans of succe Culu wamsa are also Tentioned, and the "Artha Sastra" of Kaut: mentioned earlier in this study
3 5

he arrow shaft had broken. It nedical arrangements would have ial expeditions like that to :ary expeditions. So far as the Ted Parakrama Bahu made sure
be adequate by enlargement if in needed by the troops and by 3).
ld on the foregoing arrangements lister of War and the other, a In who Were responsible to him gistic effort for the Army and
e
er in which Parakrama Bahu set power of a hostile king and of tuation in that country. This di SG Counts the Clai TTN i T1 the himself practised espionage at was staying, on the ground that sky. What the author of the :Irama Bahu used his position in :) llld.
eployed a number of "clever and a districts using various diswould operate as Sorcerers and as itinerant Wendors. Specialamong the king's dignitaries to in over by reason of their being a grudge or of being in fear or sups correspond to those enumeas used as a guide.
ss" that are mentioned in the i riter alia, in the "Mahabharata" iliya. These, which have been
comprise the following:

Page 62
Bheda - division of the e Danda - offensive warfare Sama friendly negotiat Danam - gifts or bribes
Together they form part of an or other is used. (Culu wamsa
The tactical picture, as independent salient points. Parakrama Bahu worked out a p locality and time, which was This plan was written down and the strict Order not to Swerv king's instructions. (Cullu wansa the modern issue of order to s' to conform strictly to the orde operation of which they are par
Again, in the (second) cam Bahu jis faced with the determ forces who proclaimed their gu. the mountain wilderness in whic ing up many entrenchments makin and laying down many robbers pa and "open battle" against him. of the tactics described when the Ceylon jungle for guerilla
Geiger illustrates the use in the Culuwamsa (Ch. 66 and enemy (Ch.75).
Geiger also makes mentior important is, of course, the Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, into which are let turrets a fortification of suitable rock for defence. The best known, o been mentioned above in this Vakirigala and Yapahuwa. A til which is constructed when an ar. le for defence against sudden :
3

nenay
ions
Overall strategy, in which one Օհ-58).
painted by Geiger, has its In the war against Rajarata, lan of campaign suited to the modelled on Kautiliya's text. handed out to the officers with se by a hair's breadth from the Ch. 70). This corresponds to ubordinate commanders who have }rs so as not to compromise the
t.
paign against Ruhunu, Parakrama lined resistance of the local erilla intentions by exploiting ch the operation lay "by throwg all known highways impassable ths", so as to halt the enemy
One recognises the importance considering the suitability of
War.
of the ambuscade by references 73) and the outflanking of an
of defended areas. The most fortification of cities like with moat, wall and rampart, nd bastions. A second is the sites which could be developed f course, is Sigiriya which has
study. There are others like hird is the temporary fortress my reaches a position favourabattacks, which could also serve

Page 63
as a base for future operatio Culuu Wamsa (Ch. 72). The fortres of stakes IIlade like Spear pc. Outside this would be driven a size, strong enough to withst: Ween the two rows of Stakes a
were let pitfalls laced with Outside the palisade, tree lo would be Stro wrl a rO11ľnd th.0 a 1 extent. Any tracks in the wi thorins and would hawe pitfalls covered by arrow fire. In the storey structure would be ere rail arrowS at an attacker
bamboo rods would be hurled
mentions fire darts and reeds
The foregoing gives some tactics in the Conduct of War. close study of the military the texts of Kautiliya, froit, which how to outwit his enemies. Stil history have learned from oth from his researches into Kauti xander learned from his tutela Napolean learned from the camp. from Alexander's own Strategi German general staff benefited Witz. Unquestionably, Parakr military campaigns untutored a haps account for his overall bility when faced with a tacti ship which enabled hill to se adwer Sarties.
The Subjugation of Contendel
As stated earlier in this diate royal predecessors Were inders for the crown of Ceylor a IInong them. Thus, his materna. of Rajarata. His father Mani Rata whilst Ruh lum u Rata Wall
3.

ns. This is III, entioned in th2 S takes its outline in a line ints driven into the ground. nother line of stakes of larger and an elephant's charge. Bottrench would be dug into which thorns and sharpened Sticks. gs from the Surrouilding jungle rea two or three bow shots in cinity would be covered with let i Into the III which Would be centre of the fortress a four cted from which archers Would whilst burning sharp pointed from engines. Codrington also Eired and thrown at the enemy.
insight into Parakrama Banu's He is reputed to have made a 2 ses iIn the Mahabharata and the 1 he fashioned his own ideas of ategists and tacticians through lers as Parakrama Bahll learned liya's texts. Before him Alege under Aristotle. After hiITI aigns of Frederick the Great and es. And ir modern tillës, the i froll the writings of Clauseama Bahu did not undertake his ind unprepared. This Would perstrategic a culmen his adaptaCal difficulty and his generalcure ultimate victory over hi5
tis foto the COWI)
s study Parakrama Bahu's i ITLITLëunable to Subiugate other conte 1 and Ceylon Was parcelled out l uncle, Wilckrata Bahu Was King abharana was ruler of Malaya Si Shared between his pater Illal
7

Page 64
uncles, Sri Megha (in the east the southern sector). I found table, based on that in Rasan Dr. G.C Mendis' "Early Histor placing Parakrama Bahu's oppone
Vijaya bahu -- Til la k sunda r i Mitta
(a Kali nga Princess )
Vick rema bahu Rat nava i r Manabhar
Gaja bahu Parak rena Bahu
The Culuwamsa relates how (unite and thereby) make Lan reflects on the fact that Lank collarbone, neckbone, tooth an the token of the footprint of t tree... the Island although not something special." He also r (his own father and his fathe brother were not able to uni concluded that, as the son of frail ties and "must even pay h aspiration and is abiding, ni later passage, the Culuwamsa q "If my extraordinary power shou ing of the Laity and the Order umbrella, then even at the be sees (in anticipation) its fulf taken as a statement of Parakr and intention. (Culuwamsa Ch.
The Acquisition of Maya Rata
The death of Manabharana di Parakrama Bahu" s claims for t because Manabharana's brothe
Vallaba, acquired it. Parakran
3

ern sector) and Sri Vallaba (in the accompanying generalogical yagam's "Ancient Jaffna" and in y of Ceylon" to be of help in ints in his quest for power:-
= a Paridyan Prince Jaya bahu
ana Sri Megha 6ri Valaba Sugala
Ma na bra rasa
Va l l a ba
Parakrama Bahu “in his zeal to
ka happy under one umbrella", a being "the home of the hair, Id alms bowl relics as well as he master and of his sacred Bo: large has always counted for eflects that his three fathers er's brothers) and his mother's te it under one umbrella. He kings, he should avoid human eed to that which is worthy of amely fame..." And again, in a uotes Parakrama Bahu as saying ld be the cause of the furtherby the Union of Lanka under one ginning of the enterprise, one ilment." The foregoing must be ama Bahu's political philosophy 54). -
luring his youth did not advance :he principality of Mayarata, rs, Kirthi Sri Megha and Sri ha Bahu's energies were there

Page 65
fore, directed to the acquisit self. With this in mind he mo Sri Vallaba in Ruhunu where he of Sri Megha. Here he indulge land for his attack on Sri Me charge of his troops and opene uncle's general and evading cap to capture him. He then joi Gajabahu, who was his uncle's e
Whi list Parak rama Bahu Polonnaruwa, which he would ha Rajarata, he intrigued against land for information which wol
COIllE e
Gajabahu came to suspect Bahu fearing the wrath of Gaja with him some of Gujabahu's fo was unwilling to receive Parak sion of his mother, Sri Megha course, Sri Megha died and S. meantime, he succeeded to the t
The foregoing which is b historians particularly Dr. G.C example of the "unscrupulousne in the monograph I have referre of outstanding military skill b mstances and resilience which make up of the strategist.
The Capture of Raja Rata
Parakrama Bahu did not let of Mayarata go to his head al. against Gajabahu without care: his uncles Sri Megha and Sri V. an effort to capture Rajarata superior military resources at knew that the acquisition of M military prowess so as to be c ther preparation. He, theref

on of that territory for himred from the court of his uncle
had been staying, to the court d himself in "spying out" the gha's territory. He now took 2d his account by killing his ture by his uncle's forces sent ned forces with his cousin,
nemy.
stayed with Gajabahu in ave to attack in order to take Gajabahu by "spying out" the ld aid him in the campaign to
his intentions and Parakrama bahu, fled to Mayarata, taking ollowers. At first, Sri Megha rama Bahu but on the intercesagreed to let him stay. In due ri Vallaba having died in the throne of Mayarata.
ased on the narratives of the . Mendis, gives more than One ss" commented on by Dr. Basham ld to above. It is not evidence ut is of adaptability to circu
are valuable ingredients in the
it his success in the acquisition hd to undertake an expedition ful preparation. He knew that allaba had attacked Gajabahu in
and had failed because of the : Gajabahu's disposal. He also ayarata by him did not test his ertain of victory without furore, addressed himself to the
9

Page 66
strengthening of his army, on
cribed above. He also gave att his kingdom" by creating lakes improving irrigation to fields w he created, so as to ensure wa sustain his forces and his pe these preparations, he moved in
In his plan of attack, Paral ordered one of his generals to the mountainous country of Ma attack both from the South and his troops to deal with the ac repulsed. As the move from introduced fresh troops but we Bahu's forces from the West and tact and their combined streng Gajabahu who was made prisoner a Bahu was crowned.
Gajabahu's supporters inc Manabharana, the cousin of bot himself. Manabharana was ruler with Parakrama Bahu. This did making common cause with Gaja Parakrama Bahu who could overcor him for the throne of Ruhun Polonnaruwa ostensibly to ass seize both the city and Gajaba was cast ignominiously into a made himself ruler of Rajarata.
Gajabahu now made overtur assistance. This was forthcomi tions which were that Gajabahu heir and desist from waging w, side of the bargain and resist to aid him in his campaign for
Parakrama Bahu had now to in the meantime fled towards R all attempts by Manabharana to he sought to force. He soon fo
4C

the lines I have already desention to the "improvement of for the storage of water and thich were far from the storage ater for the crops that would ople. Once he had completed
against his enemy.
krama Bahu was circumspect and protect his flank by occupying alaya. His main force would l the West. Gajabahu deployed vance from the West and Was the South advanced, Gajabahu as again repulsed. Parakrama from the South now made conth brough about the defeat of at Polonnaruwa, where Parakrama
w sought the assistance of h Parakrama Bahu and Gajabahüu
of Ruhunu and had an alliance
not deter him, however, from abahu, because he judged that me Gajabahu could easily defeat u. He therefore moved to ist Gajabahu but actually to hu. This he did and Gajabahu dungeon, and Manabharana thus
res to Parakrama Bahu for his ing, subject to certain condishould make Parakrama Bahu his ar on him. Gajabahu kept his ed all requests by Manabharana the control of Rajarata.
deal with Manabharana who had uhunu. Parakrama Bahu blocked cross the Mahaveli Ganga which und, however, that containment

Page 67
of Manabharana was not conquest up a new strategy. Parakrama his force into two parts, one North-west of Ruhunu and attack attack frontally, with th Manabharana sent part of his fo: on his flank but before Para) partial separation of Manabhara deal with a rebellion by Anuradhapura. Manabharana foll by sending a force to Giritalie Anuradhapura by a pincer move East. This plan failed as his and enabled Parakrama Bahu to cl his troops. Manabharana fled t tured his son Sri Vallaba. He Second time.
The Subjugation of Ruhunu
The acquisition of Mayarat made Parakrama Bahu the mos
Manabharana had also died in t Parakrama Bahu's position. It factors had not ended the resi: and yield allegiance to Para krau
What the people of Ruhunu of Sugala, the nother of Manabh rebellion and retreated to the where they proposed to defy Par, ing. Earlier in this study, guerilla fighting in Ruhunu.
Parakrama Bahu made plans of Sugala. Before the plan Parakrama Bahu was confronted which included his mercenar Sinhalese). Their subjugation which he was able to subdue the Bahu free to deal with Sugala. care, as usual, to protect his Sugala's troops. In due cours
4l

it. He therefore, had to think Bahu's plan now was to divide of which would move from the from the rear, whilst he would e rema in der of the force. rce to deal with the diversion krama Bahu could exploit the na's forces, he was forced to his general, Narayana, in owed up this advantage to him, from where he planned to attack ment from the North-east and
North-east army was defeated lose-in on his enemy and defeat o Ruhunu. Parakrama Bahu capwas thereafter crowned king a
a and the conquest of Rajarata t powerful ruler in Ceylon. he meantime and this enhanced transpired however that these stance of the people of Ruhunu Ina Bahu.
did was to flock to the banner arana, under whom they rose in fastness of the mountains from akrama Bahu in guerilla fight
I have given details of the
to capture Udundora, the seat could materialise, however, with a rebellion of his troops ies (Velakaras , Keralas and involved some fighting, after e rebels. This left Parakrama He moved against her, taking flank and joined battle with e the detachment on his flank

Page 68
was able to join the main fo subdued. It was not possible however, because Sugala fled in Bowl relics, whose capture was
His progress was impeded fighters and Parakrama Bahu was gy. He decided to create a div to attack the guerillas from the his main force along the more much fighting in the hilly coun his force joined up and were a troops, capture the capital Udu the relics. With the defeat Bahu became the ruler not On entire country. There were n except for sundry rebellions v quelling and Parakrama Bahu ach set for himself, namely, undis whether from his own countrymer Indian sovereigns.
The campaigns for the cont different in character and in Mayarata on which I have alrea campaign, Parakrama Bahu was C ries. Gajabahu had already der resources he controlled by r uncles, Sri Megha and Sri Vall was clearly a wily operator, as Parakrama Bahu and Gajabahu. shown that in diplomacy, h Manabharana. So far as fighti showed that he was both a ski Parakrama Bahu whose generals overcome Manabharana in a Su strategy conducted largely in c
The compaign for Ruhunu operations which of course a that took place in the Rajarat strated very early on in the mined to exploit to the full t

trce and Sugala's troops were to claim complete victory,
o the hills with the Tooth and
necessary to seal victory.
by the actions of the guerilla
forced to adopt a new strateersion by sending a detachment
west while he continued with direct southward route. After :ry of Ruhunu, the two parts of ble jointly to subdue Sugala’s ndora and secure possession of of Sugala's forces, Parakrama ly of Ruhunu but also of the o challenges to his authority 7hich he had no difficulty in ieved the ambition which he had puted control over the Island, or from invaders sent by South
itrol of Rajarata and Ruhunu are tensity from the campaign for ydy commented. In the Rajarata onfronted by two able adversanonstrated his capacity and the a sisting efforts made by his aba to subdue him. Manabharana
he showed in his dealings with
Parakrama Bahu, however, has e was more than a match for ng was concerned, Manabharana ful and determined opponent to hip, however, enabled him to perior defensive and offensive pen country.
was characterised by guerilla e different from the fighting
country. His opponents demoncampaign that they were deterhe advantages they possessed in

Page 69
operating in mountainous, wood al so bitter because it was ur aunt, Sugala, to avenge the def Parakrama Bahu. Her troops als ing for successive Sinhalese k ders, who had mobilised them in Parakrama Bahu was evidently the troops ranged against him a cient skill and toughness, apar overcome them.
A characteristic of Parakri that he did not position him: fighting troops but preferred forward troops. In this way, h the campaign was going and to sary) his forces in order to re temporarily.
It is as a strategist that his approach to the alternative commencement of an operation. to recognise that he also had situation. This is evident frc able to alter his dispositions confuse and outwit his adversar
Foreign Engagements
Parakrama Bahu's military e stic successes. The Culluwamsa r himself powerful, interfered indulged in, by endeavouring te In the quarrel that ensued, Si treated and even a Sinhalese p. was captured. Lanka was now involvement with Burma would no fronts. Parakrama Bahu was als was not, therefore, disposed to down. He accordingly assemble froce for the purpose of attack by him took five months to comp the needs of the troops commit
43

ed country. The fighting was dertaken by Parakrama Bahu “s at of her son, Manabharana, by o had the experience of fightings, overrun by Damilo invaorder to overcome the Damilos. lot deterred by the quality of und was able to display suffi: from superior generalship, to
ama Bahu on the battlefield was self in the forefront of his to station himself behind the e was better able to judge how leploy (and redeploy, if neces2gain an advantage he had lost
he strikes one when assessing as he wishes to employ at the Having said this, it is as well full control of the tactical om the manner in which , he was on the battlefield, so as to
Ꭹ•
exploits did not end with domelates how the ruler of Burma, with the elephant trade being o make it a Burmese monopoly. nhalese ambassadors were illrincess, en route to Cambodia, rid of the Chola menace and it mean having to fight on two io all powerful in Lanka and he take the Burmese insults lying d a mixed military cum naval ing Burma. The ships designed lete. These were supplied with ted to the Burma expedition -

Page 70
provisions meant to last for a and medicines. In the section rations, I have given details The armada set sail from Trinco but lost some ships en route. in due course where the Ceylone ted several casualties, slew between the two countries, dur ties sent elephants as tribute.
Geiger in his notes on t Burmese chronicles do not bea Culuwamsa regarding the losse Nagaragiri. I think he mention tion by the Culuwamsa on the e note, however, goes on to say scription found in Kurunegala, (Ramanna) and the grant of la Nagaragiri, have been recorded. tion would not have been under grant of land to Nagaragiri in
The Second of Parakrama E place in South India where Parakkama, to the throne of Ma Pandyan King, Kulasekera of Tin Parakrama Bahu for help to w interesting. "If", he declared placed himself under my protec my name of Parakrama be fitti meaning of his name, "arm of C geous arms".
Parakrama Bahu now order take charge of a campaign in Overpowering opposition to his sent against him by Kulasekera his enemy, Parakkama. Lanka progress, during which he erect hood of Ramnad which he named in restoring Parakrama's kin Pandya on the throne. Lankapu continue unabated because he

year at least, weapons of war above, dealing with war prepaof these logistic arrangements. malee in the South-west monsoon The remainder reached Ramanna se general, Nagaragiri, inflicthe king and enforced peace ing which the Burmese authori
his expedition says that the 4r out the claims made by the s inflicted on the Burmese by s this to Counter any exaggeraxploits of Parakrama Bahu. The that, according to a rock inthe campaign against Aramana nd in view of his exploits to It is clear that the inscriptaken unless there had been a recognition of his exploits.
Bahu’s foreign engagements took the right of a Pandyan King, durai was contested by another nevelli. Parakkama appealed to hich the latter's response is , "the distress of him who has tion be not removed, how could g?"- the reference being to the 'ourage" or "possessed of coura
ed his general, Lankapura, to South India. He succeeded in
landing and in subduing forces who had in the meantime killed pura continued his victorious ed a fortress in the neighbourParakramapura. He also succeeded gdom by placing his son, Vira a's successes did not, however, had to ask for reinforcements

Page 71
from o Parakrama Bahu, who sent and additional troops, in order generals joined forces and proc Parakrama Bahu commemorated by Panduvijaya".
The narrative in the Culuw this stage, inducing Geiger to of the campaign, the fate of Ku of other South Indian princes. is interesting. "It is curi (Lankapura's) return to Ceylon i is no record of the distinction Bahu. It is pretty clear that the failure of the expedition a ideal figure of Parakrama Bahu be dimmed by association with II
The answers to Geiger's qu Indian inscriptions which ar entitled "Parakrama Bahu an Nilakanta Sastri, which is publ Volume which I have referred record that Kula sekera appea Rajadirajah for help, who order his soldiers and for the impal of the city gate of Madura. Mendis, this was done.
Parakrama Bahu unwilling plans in South India, now colle Rajadirajah, on hearing of th them by marshalling his own tr Sri Vallaba, the son of Manabh tive at the end of the Ruhunu taken refuge in South India. Sri Vallaba destroyed the fleet bled and so frustrated his plan ced in the situation and took have involved civil war in whi have been ranged against him.

another general, Jagatvijaya, to assist Lankapura. The two eeded to further victory which founding the "splendid village
amsa comes to an abrupt end at pose questions as to the future lasekera and of Lankapura, and
His comment on this situation ous" says Geiger, "that his s not mentioned and that there s bestowed on him by Parakrama the chronicler has concealed after its initial success. The which he has in mind must not isfortune."
estions are available in South e referred to in a monograph d South India" by Professor ..ished in the 800th Anniversary to earlier. The inscriptions led to the then Chola ruler, ed the capture of Lankapura by ing of his head on the railing According to Codrington and
to accept the reverses to his cted forces for a fresh attack. ese plans, decided to counter Oops and placing at their head arana, who had been taken capi
campaign but had escaped and According to Dr. G.C. Mendis, that Parakrama Bahu had assems. Parakrama Bahu now acquiesno further action which would .ch Sri Vallaba would certainly

Page 72
The conclusion drawn fro Sastri is that "though he atta cess in his Pandyan policy, (Pa within strict limits the reper internal economy of Ceylon and and his capacity to keep withi resources unduly, is not the le, among the great rulers of Lank tion C. Hist. J.).
One is inclined to agree is only the truly great that c plans without endeavouring to failed, by undertaking further result in failure. If failure of his generals who had ultim earlier success, with the comb power, even though much of the Bahu's own reputation remains organi sing genius to mount a expedition against the very c decades been the scourge of the
Religious and National Under
I pass on to mention briel and national undertakings attri
On the religious Side, con sies that had undermined bel: before his reign, Parakrama Ba and created a Council for t points". In the erection of D the responsibility of his pred is not associated with the Cr Instead, he created numberless bana-halls, residences for t length and breadth of his doma: I would not avoid reference t stone statues in Polonnaruwa, i that of the Buddha in a lying of ineffable peace in his count tive statue is that of his dis
4 (

m this by Professor Nilakanta ined no shining or stable sucrakrama Bahu) was able to keep cussions of that policy on the this clear knowledge of limits n them, without straining his ast of his claims to be counted a." (800th Anniversary Publica
with the assessment, because it an accept the failure of their restore a situation which has action which might in itself there was, it was the failure ately to deal, whatever their lined might of Chola and Pandya latter had weakened. Parakrama unsullied as one who had the combined naval and military ountries whose troops had for
forces of Lanka.
takings
fly some of the many religious buted to Parakrama Bahu.
sidering the schisms and hereief during the troublous days hu weeded out perverted sects :he resolution of "debatable agobas which traditionally was ecessors, Parakrama Bahu" s name eation of spectacular dagobas. dagobas, statues of the Buddha, he priesthood throughout the in. Having said this, however, o that incomparable group of n which the principal statue is
position bearing an expression enance and in which the supporciple, Ananda, bearing now an

Page 73
expression of indescribable sor away. How the sculptor captur stone that was his medium must whether this group was meant to descended on the country afte reign has started.
As if to complement his wo paid much attention to nation attention to his capital, Pol with ramparts and within whic himself, he built a four thous, lished and adorned. For his libraries, built halls for mu. baths and scattered parks and g
Outside the city, he deve scale to ensure the food requ His policy for water conservat Culuwamsa: "In the realm that apart frcm many strips of count mainly by rain water, but few rivers with permanent flow or many mountains, by thick jungll kingdom is much straitened. even a little water that comes the ocean without being made mind, Parakrama Bahu c ir struc" reservoirs served by dans, lak nels which by skilful gradie) distant fields where the peasa is not merely the Parakrama S also the bewildering network made Parakrama Bahu's contrib ment. It is small wonder tha Bahu to agriculture has served neighbouring India.
Traditionally, the soverei of devotion to religion which attention to agriculture whic Parakrama Bahu did all this in more, because he created the r

row, that his Master has passed 'd the expressions in the Crude remain a mystery. One wonders commemorate the peace that had :r the turmoil with which the
rk for religion, Parakrama Bahu all monuments. He paid special onnaruwa, which he surrounded h he erected a fortress. For and room palace suitably embelpeople, he founded schools and sic and dancing, formed public 'ardens through the city.
loped agriculture on a gigantic irements of a vast population. ion is stated as follows in the is subject to me, there are, try where the harvest flourishes fields which are dependent on on great reservoirs. Also by e, or by widespread swamps, my Truly, in such a country, not from the rain must flow into useful to man." Bearing this in bed an astonishing mosaic of es and tanks Connected to Chanht, took precious water to the nt waited patiently. Today, it amudra that we marvel at, but of reservoir and channel which ution to his nation's developt the o contribution of Parakrama as the model for engineers from
gns of Lanka followed a pattern served their spiritual needs and h served their material needs.
full measure. He, however, did lilitary instrument that enabled
7

Page 74
the country to pass from stri could not achieve his non milij brought was felt both domestic authority, and abroad, where hi coupled with the reputation cri South Indfa, served to halt So reign. ۳ .۰ است .
His greatness is recognise by which history knows him but chroniclers, one of whom th worth quoting:
"...thus was the Island of by this King, whose "maje good deeds, who was fait and whose fame extended moon. . . "
Tennent also quotes the f the Rajavali:
"...Having departed this l. rock in the wilderness
eightyfour thousand mount reign as a King as long as
We certainly have cause t Great, destined to turbulence life, as surely as he earned t. mance of pious and patriotic before passing finally into his

fe to peace, without which he tary successes. The peace he 'ally, with no challenge to his s domestic military reputation, ated by his troops in Burma and rth Indian invasions during his
d not merely by the appellation also by the assessment of the e author of the Maha wamsa, is
Lanka improved and beautified sty is famous in the annals of hful to the religion of Buddha abroad as the light of the
ollowing poetic reference from
ife, he was found on a silver
of the Himalayas, where are
ains of gold and where he will
the world endures. . ."
to remember Parakrama Bahu the during the early part of his
ranquillity through the perfordeeds during his later life,
haven of peace.

Page 75
s
The De
History demonstrates that by a period of decline. The his glory of Parakrama Bahu's reign the power and prestige of her sc
This decline is attributa The first and basic factor w (caused perhaps by the fact that whom the succession would go), was the attitude of his generals another, who projected their po of the contenders, even though th Bahu's widow. A third factor w which had abated in Parakrama E be manifest. A fourth was some namely the power of the Tamil seemed desirous of projecting th
The first of the foreign Parakrama Bahu was launched by tofore from a Chola or Pandya so ly source, namely Kalinga. Kali within what is known as the V demonstrating its power in the included Ceylon. According to twenty-four thousand stron Rajarata, Ruhunu and the Jaff violent and fraught with much Sinhalese, who witnessed the di and much of the irrigation wor effect of this invasion and thi the north which was beginnin Sinhalese kings giving thought
4

:line
period of power is followed tory of this country after the certainly records a decline in vereigns.
ble to more than one factor. as the internecine rivalry, Parakrama Bahu left no son to between his heirs. The second each powerful in some way or wer in support of One or other he chief of them was Parakrama as the incidence of invasions, Bahu's reign, but now began to ething which had lain dormant, kings in the North who now hat power. invasions after the reign of Magha which came, not as hereurce, but from a more northernga is geographically a region i jayanagar Empire which was region which, as it happens, ennent, Magha's force was some which took possession of a region. The occupation was trauma, particularly for the estruction of Buddhist images k done by Parakrama Bahu. The pressure from the Tamils in g to be felt resulted in the :o the security of the existing

Page 76
capital Polonnaruwa and the de tal... Parakrama Bahu III, who w engaged in the effort to push t always considered the possibil therefore, fortified Polonnaru cided to set up the capital at
In 1244, Lanka was subjec source, namely by Malay troop from Malaya. (In parenthesis, to argue that this invasion was being a corruption of "Malabar theless and, even though it wa; of security recurred and it wa capital was removed to Yapahuw when he was defeated by Pandu moved back to Dambadeniya.
Pandu control over Ceylo years, after which Parakrama ruled from Kurunegala as capita kings followed, during whose r tion has been recorded. The la: who ruled from Gampola though C having ruled from Kegalle.
Dr. G.C. Mendis, in his "E the comment that it is probably began to occupy the coastal tc been Tamil occupation in the non Indian invasion (BC 10l) but th Sinhalese kings in the south ce The invasion of Magha referred occupied, left the Tamils feeli of the Sinhalese kings in the Rasanayagam in his "Ancient provided by Arya Chakravarti, not challenged by any King O celebrated Arab traveller on h a matter of interest that, whi draws attention to the referen Sandemain as the then King of that Sandemain has not been ide
5

sirability of moving the capiis a strong ruler and had been e Tamils out of his territory, ity of foreign invasion. He, va but significantly also de
ambadeniya.
ted to an invasion from a new s under a Malay, Chandrabahu,
Mudaliyar Rasanayagam appears
really from India, the "Malay" '). It was an invasion nevers no great success, the problem s a matter of time before the a under Bhuvankanaikebahu, and troops under Arya Chakravarti,
at this stage lasted twenty Bahu III regained control and l, till l325. A series of weak eigns a period of civil commost of them was Parakrama Bahu V odrington also describes him as
arly History of Ceylon" makes at this time that the Tamils wns in west Lanka. There had th from the time of the second e people were kept in check by rtainly until Parakrama Bahu I. to above in which the south was ng stronger, because the power south was waning. Mudaliyar Jaffna" refers to the escort the King of Jaffna, which was f Ceylon, to Ibn Batuta, the is visit to Adam's Peak. It is list discussing this matter, he ze by Marco Polo (in l284) to a ceylon. Rasanayagam points out ntified as a King of Ceylon and

Page 77
concludes that, in all probabil One concludes that Rasanayagam w possibility of the kings of Jafi
Dr. Mendis draw s attent Chakravarti was strong enough and the other military, to engac Vickramabahu III. The King orde was also a Minister, Allegakonar, his security. The C-in-C carrie ly. Tamil power declined there
But the Sinhalese monarch stage namely, from China, whos Wira Alleges wara , who was the declined to accede to the Chine queen and officers were capture to China, although released i reflects the degree to which ti had been reduced.
It was left to Parakrama
He ruled from Kotte which now king was powerful and ruled the north, which he controlled by Sapumal Kumaraya, as his Vicer capital had a twofold purpose. strategic routes to the north ac other it was close to the cil Cinnamon had by now become a má the country. The income from which Parakrama Bahu had set in depredations by invaders and cultivated areas by the kings w fact, the impact on income by e giving effect to his policies v therefore, was being exploited
ty of the country. Its impor Parakrama Bahu VI sent an exper seizure of a Ceylon ship laden chief.

ity, he was a King of Jaffna. ishes to draw attention to the na being known abroad.
ion to the fact that Arya to send two forces, one naval e the forces of the then king, ced his Commander-in-Chief who to deal with these threats to d out this mission successful
after.
y faced a new threat at this e ruler demanded the "Dalada". Sinhalese ruler at the time, ese demand, whereupon he, his d and unceremoniously removed n due course. This incident he capacity of Sinhalese kings
Bahu VI to arrest, the decline.
became the capital. The new
entire country, including the installing his adopted son, by. The selection of Kotte as
On the one hand, it commanded cross the Kelani Ganga on the inamon growing area in Ceylon. ajor element in the economy of the development of agriculture
motion had dwindled both from from the move away from the ho succeeded Parakramņa Bahu. In xpenditure by Parakrama Bahu in tas also being felt. Cinnamon, to ensure the economie stabilitance was demonstrated when lition to retaliate against the with cinnamon by a Vijayanagar

Page 78
Parakrama Bahu continued m rebellions against him which, difficulty. There is no evide throne contributed much to the and the decline that had set il set themselves up in a new bid Lanka. This phase is examine study.
The decline I have mentio things. The first is the obvio Parakrama Bahu's powers, which hands of his puny successors. but no less significant deterio of the successive regimes. The kings to safeguard their capit with a noticeable inexorability had an impact on the order c however, I recognise that, with moved their capitals, not be because they wished to prevent judged as a distinction without however, lies in the fact that leaves the "amour propre" of th choly fact that defeat in batt into account. The fourth is division of Lanka into regions, - Ruhunu, Maya and Pihiti. TI known as the Rajarata that is, the sovereign's prestige came gion. With the move away from tionally had their capitals, Rajarata would inevitably dec. demonstrates that the kings in unable to prevent this developm nce of the initiative which all process which indicated an inev
The Indian Period in Retrosp
I have now come to the e the Indian period in our hist
that characterised it commencec
5

aster in Ceylon notwithstanding however, he subdued without nce that his successors on the development of Ceylon's power continued till the Portuguese to propagate foreign power in d in the next chapter of this
led above is indicative of many us descent from the heights of could not be maintained in the The second is the less obvious ration in the economic capacity third is the incapacity of the als which had to be relocated , which, as I have said earlier of things. Having said this, marginal exceptions, the kings cause they were captured but capture. This may, I grant, be a difference. The difference, a move for the latter reason he king intact - it is a melanle seldom takes "amour propre" the loss of Rajarata. In the there were traditionally three he last in due course became the country of the kings, when to be identified with the rethe area where the kings tradithe significance of the term line. Our history regrettably power at the Crucial time were ent nor did they provide evideOne could reverse the downward itability which was disastrous.
pect
nd of what I have described as .ory. The scourge of invasion
in BC l6l and ended in AD lS05
2

Page 79
- a period, therefore, of one t six years. During that perioc sovereigns passed through our h: out only six of them as having tion to the development of Duttagamani, Gajabahu, Dhatusen the Great and Parakrama Bahu V some way or another to the cr which might have been passed on been content to leave militar without taking steps to create which might, as the decades pas humiliation of defeat at the ha shows that it is the sovereign is perhaps in the fitness of himself the burden of national encomium is his, but with fa relentlessly, his.
I am inclined to think th Duttagamani that the failure co the Damilo invaders should be e tradition or military resources the vision, notwithstanding create an army, the strength arduous march through difficult the heroic quality of facing the to vanquish him. What he achie by a single sovereign because h Duttagamani. But it was pos: eRaulate his feat by cumulative
Various chroniclers have "inaptitude" of the Sinhalese character of the Sinhalese pe accept these assessments as h Admittedly, where persons were mers or on building sites as ar freedom to enlist as soldiers skill and usefulness in the nat engaged, military service woulc is conceivable that i such perso for such service. Having said
5

housand six hundred and sixty, one hundred and sixty-five story. I can, however, single made any worthwhile contribumilitary affairs. They are Vijayabahu II, Parakrama Bahu I all of whom contributed in 2ation of martial traditions
to posterity. The others have 7 initiatives to the invader,
in the country the instrument sed, terminate the tragedy and inds of the alien. Our history
that takes first place. This :hings, because he takes upon ilevelopment. With success, the ilure, opprobium is equally
at it was in the aftermath of mmenced. When he decided that xterminated, he had no military to back him. And yet, he had the advice of his father, to of purpose to undertake an terrain across the country and enemy with only determination aved may not have been repeated istory has a place only for one sible for successive kings to action over the decades.
referred repreatedly to the soldier and the "unwarlike" ople. I find it difficult to being universally applicable. engaged in the fields as fartisans, they would not have the and indeed, depending on their tional work in which they were l not be available to them. It ns would be found "unsuitable" this, one finds that particu

Page 80
larly in Ruhunu, there were p military service. Duttagamani's from Ruhunu and Rajarata. Simi men for action against the Indi: which he had taken refuge n Parakrama Bahu himself found us Malaya in the ranks of his m: soldiers, guides and scouts fro from the technical guilds, wit weapons. We also know from tl 'that the people of Ruhunu were
type operations. It cannot people of Ceylon were univer service. I am fortified in cor following statement by Geige Culuwamsa". "The Sinhalese are like race, but they can hardly cowardly, as they are here dep author of the Culuwansa). Aga proof of a death des pising C times, they were not mere crav material was there and only ne overcome whatever "natural" apt have lacked. And this is what
There must be some reason is that rulers did not last lor organisation and training. I h ness of the reigns of Sinhale handling of no long-term proje army except the traditional wo culture. Again, given the inc rebellions against them and t prone to safeguard their own p of the state and even their ow carried out with outstanding sl
Turning to the security of history of our capitals, its h culpable indifference. Earl Anuradhapura to Polonnaruwa and and its environs suggested t quality about Polonnaruwa. E
5

ersons who were suitable for troops were practically drawn larly, Dhatusena recruited his an invader from the region in amely, the mountain region. e for the people of Ruhunu and litia which included fighting m the Veddah region and others h the skill for fashioning his he description of the fighting e doughty fighters in guerilla pe said, therefore, that the sally unsuited for military ning to this conclusion by the r in the "Introduction to the perhaps not naturally a warbe so cowardly, so senselessly icted (i.e. by Dhammakitti, the inst the Portuguese, they gave 'ourage. In Para krama Bahu 's 'ens..." I think that the basic 2eded to be developed so as to citude for soldiering they may the kings failed to do.
for this. Perhaps one reason ng enough to undertake military ave discussed above the shortse kings which permitted the ct such as the creation of an rk on religious sites and agricidence of murders of rulers, he like, rulers were probably ersonal safety rather than that In personal safety has not been
CCeSS
the state, if one goes by the andling demonstrates an almost 7 on, there was the move from
the development of Polonnaruwa hat there would be a lasting ven Polonnaruwa was, however,

Page 81
fourid 1 unsuitable from a securi melancholy succession of m Dambadeniya, thence to Yapahuwa to Gampola and finally from Gam) over a period of three hundred : the end of Parakrama Bahu" s rei guese arrived in Ceylon), could unsettling effect on the commu security. Clearly security arr and the community probably, spe could be taken for granted.
It has been said that th follow precedent and were un initiative. One can scarcel loyalty to known precedents - cause they served spiritual an find difficult to justify is th dent, namely, hiring mercenarie the country, without considerin domestic availability for this mercenaries were not able to times. If such inability wa willingness to fight their own have had more than One major the reliance on them is inexcus divided loyalty. On that count been on Ceylonese soldiers w. question. On the question of that, whatever preference he m Parakrama Bahu did utilise the part of his militia.
Having said this, one sho for hiring mercenaries may have bility of the Sinhalese people the decrease in population in as a result of disease and othe have made it all the more impe to be available for work on the ding non-availability for milit
5.

ty standpoint and we have the ove s from Polonnaruva to , thence to Kurunegala, thence pola to Kotte. All these moves sixteen years, (from AD ll89 at gn to AD l505 when the Portunot have had anything but an inity, particularly as regards angements had been indifferent !culated at what stage security
he rulers of Ceylon tended to Willing to pursue an unknown y fault the rulers for their religion and agriculture, bed material needs. But what II eir adherence to a third preces to meet the security needs of g the desirability of utilising purpose. One notes that even subdue invading forces at all s really attributable to un
countrymen from India (and we example of such unwillingness), sable, because of the factor of : alone, the choice should have hose loyalty would not be in suitability, we have evidence ight have had for mercenaries, services of his own people as
uld add that one of the causes e been the reduction in availafor military service, caused by the post-Parakrama Bahu period r factors. Such decrease would 3rative for able-bodied persons fields and create a corresponlary service.
5

Page 82
I have speculated whether ced by what seems to be an ir their regimes. Given their dev rulers may have concluded that been the result of some culpab: was now being visited on them. as well informed on the mattel and that I may be misreading escape the feeling that Buddhi may have induced Sinhalese rule the form of successive defeats.
I have asked myself whet criticism of Sinhalese rulers, ced by modern attitudes to secu of an army or other force to de to come and not wait for an em up the force to deal with it. when the First World War came t themselves the responsibilit World War. Security is an i immutable and have been known therefore, known and understood nce of palace guards, known th] tion that the security of the if it is compromised, then, n. jeopardised, but the stability Personal security is thus assi after all only part of the secl If one projects this thought security, the conclusion is wherewithal to protect itself. axiomatic and 20th Century thi the validity of the requirement
In the foregoing recital peaceful relations with India w reign of Devanampiya Tissa wit have characterised as "hostile" hostile incursions into Ceylon incursions were not from Nort described by Tennent as "Gange that they came from South Ind
5

Sinhalese rulers were influenevitability about the fate of otion to Buddhist precepts, the it this inevitability may have ..lity in a previous birth which
I fully realise that I am not I am raising as is desirable
the situation, but I cannot st beliefs that were involved rs to accept the inevitable in
her, in making the foregoing I am not being unduly influenrity which dictate the creation 2al with an emergency which is ergency to occur before setting We are aware of the fact that, zo an end, strategists took upon y of preparing for the Second mperative whose dictates are through the ages and certainly, by our ancestors. The existeroughout history, is an indicasovereign is paramount because, pt only is his personal future of the national order affected. gned to palace guards who are urity organisation of the state. into the sphere of national that the state must have the The requirement is almost nking only serves to establish
, I have contrasted the early hich were experienced up to the th subsequent relations which II . In identifying the source of
I have made it clear that the h India - that is, the region tic". I have, however, stated ia which is composed of Chola,

Page 83
Pandya and Chera (which in Travancore) - that is the regic land of the "Malabars". It is been created that hostile relati South Indian States without ces impression. History records t South Indian kings for the mer in Ceylon. It is obvious that, tions between the kings seeki supplying them had to be good, records that in the lOth Cent military expedition went to So that region. History also rec Great sent a military force tc king, in his confrontation wit King. It follows that, whilst characterised by hostile relati sions that took place from time tranquillity when the kings of with their counterparts in Sout
57

cludes Malabar, Cochin and n described by Tennent as the ossible that an impressions has ons occurred consistently with sation. I wish to correct that hat Sinhalese kings turned to cenaries they wished to employ for this to happen, the relang mercenaries and the kings certainly not hostile. History ury, more than one Ceylonese luth India to assist a king of :ords that Parakrama Bahu the ) assist Parakkama, a Pandyan h Kulasekera, another Pandyan this period in our history was pns coinciding with the incurto time, there were periods of Ceylon had normal relations in India.

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Page 85
Pa
THE COLO

urt 2
NAL PERIOD

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Page 87
6
The Portuguese
If it is true to say, as the people of South India were to sail before they made physi Ceylon, it is equally true to of sea power that facilitated t to this part of the world. The development from our point of Cape of Good Hope by Vasco ( Thereafter Portuguese ships ent of trade. Trade in the region hands of the traditional ene Muslims, from whom the Portug trade. In 1505, a Portuguese Almeida was operating in our wa laden with cargo for the Pe Mediterranean and Portugal. Th during which it was tossed on Learning that they had landed i explore the possiblity of enter elephants, spices and gems, the of the Capital.
The parties which disemba source of irritation to the loc Ceylon's trade and of wonder reported the arrival of the Port
"There is in the harbour people, fair of skin and jackets and hats of iron. and drink blood. They giv gold and silver for one
6

(AD 1500-1658)
Dr. Paul Peiris as serts, that. merely waiting for a capacity cal contact with the people of say that it was the development he movement of European people most important outcome of that view was the rounding of the da Gama in the 15th Century. ered the Indian Ocean in search at the time was partly in the emies of the Portuguese, the nese were anxious to Wrest that : fleet under Don Lourenco de ters in pursuit of Muslim ships rsian Gulf, en route to the e fleet was caught in a storm, the Ceylon coast near Galle. in Ceylon where they desired to ing into trade negotiations for y coasted to Colombo in search
rked were, On the One hand, a al Muslims who had a stake in to the local inhabitants who buguese in the following terms:
of Colombo, a race of comely withal. They don They eat hunks of stone e two or three pieces ot fish or one lime. The

Page 88
report of their cannon is it bursts upon the rock Y (Rajavalisa).
This was the impression unsophisticated minds of the that time that sooner or later, own military prowess against intimidatory.
Phase 1. Involvement of the
The reception of the Portug meet the King, was cordial, v Consenting to a trading settle in Colombo. The presence of : the Muslims who attacked the . doned. It was, however, rebuil lery troops were posted to defe treaty being entered into, whe an annual tribute of cinnamon, elephants, in consideration of to protect his harbours and as It is in this manner that the Ceylon by accident, were able when they were superseded by th
Parakrama Bahu IX was Su brother Wijayabahu VII who die of his succession. It was sett supported by the King of Kandy the Kingdom as follows:
The eldest son, Bhuvaneke,
the seaboard.
The second son, Raigam Ban
The third son, Mayadunne,
lands.
The partition of the king the King of Kandy, because inc
6,

louder than thunder when ogandhara."
cast by the Portuguese on the locals who did not realise at they would have to match their an enemy whose image was so
Portuguese in the Lowlands
uese embassy which was sent to 7ith the King, Parakrama Bahu, ment, or factory, being set up sailors in the factory nettled factory, which had to be abant more substantially and artilnd it. This was followed by a reby the King undertook to pay
jewels set in rubies and ten which the Portuguese undertook ssist him against his enemies. 2 Portuguese, having landed in to secure a foothold till l658 le Dutch.
cceeded on the throne by his without settling the question
tled by a convention of nobles, , Wickremabahu, which divided
to get the capital, Kotte and
dara, to get Raigam Korale.
to get Sita wake and adjacent
iom had obvious advantages for one person succeeded to the
2

Page 89
GOLDI SITTAWAK
 

R OF A PERIOD

Page 90


Page 91
entirety of the Kingdom and t The partition also had the eff rivalry and of involvement of th or other of the disputants.
Bhuvaneke Dharmapala , Vidiya
Mayadunne, the most ambiti not satisfied with the Kingdor allotted to him, and attempted Bhuvaneka who had been named ( well defended town, with lakes with crocodiles. Four passes in by troops assigned for the purpo cted by moats and battlements. Maya dunne to take Kotte and w Portuguese Viceroy was follow ships to help Bhuvaneke, Mayadur
In the meantime, Bhuvaneke military affairs to his son-in and capable soldier, in the expe be a match for the audacious Ma interim conquered the kingdom o given under the partition agree consequence, had strengthened thing daunted, Vidiya Bandara sa battle to Mayadunne on the fron his own Sinhalese soldiers an soldiers. Maya dunne for his Sinhalese force supported by e Malabar force equipped with art better of the engagement and Ma peace which was acceded to, on Tikiri Bandara (later to be the hostage. This engagement is while a Ceylonese ruler sought any opposing king would turn to
An important event t Bhuvanekebahu, being anxious te throne for his grandson, Dharma the King of Portugal in havi
6

Aus boosted his own strength. *ct of generating internecine e Portuguese in support of one
Bandara and Mayadunne
Dus of the three brothers, was of Sitawake which had been to seize Kotte the capital of imperor. Kotte, itself was a round it which were infested to the town were well-defended se. The inner town was proteTwo attempts were made by nen a call for help from the ’ed by the des patch of eleven (ne decided to withdraw.
bahu, now aging, entrusted his -law Vidiya Bandara, a daring ictation that he would prove to yadunne. Mayadunne had in the f Raigam Korale which had been ment to his brother and, as a his military capability. Nollied forth from Kotte to give tier. He had under his command d a detachment of Portuguese part had under his command a lephants and reinforced by a illery. Vidiya Bandara got the ayadunne was forced to sue for his surrendering his young son, ? illustrious Rajasinghe) as a illustrative of the fact that, the support of the Portuguese, the Malabar king for support.
ook pla c e at this stage. secure the succession to his pala, sought the assistance of ng an effigy of the grandson

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"crowned" as Crown Prince, in á advice of the Viceroy in Indi would strengthen Bhuvaneke's pC the Viceroy felt, should be pre of Kotte. The Portuguese King should recognise Dharmapala as Franciscan missionaries entere the conversion of Ceylonese heralded the introduction of C. course, was essentially a Buddh
Under the Sinhalese laws surviving brother, had th Bhuvanekebahu on his death. He tion by Portugal of Dharmapala result of Mayadunne's annoyanc military activity between the those of Mayadunne, they being tuguese and Malabar troops. Wickremabahu, the King of Kan activities and sought the assis
Bhuvanekebahu died a viole killed by an assassin. There great ruler, being "weak, vaci ter" as Fr. S.G. Perera describ were attracted by him personall his association with the Portu inconsistency in his dealings W
Dharmapala now became Kin gent. Portuguese authorities keeping him informed of their Portuguese Fort in Colombo. Th of his harbouring thoughts of s The Viceroy therefore thought him. Vidiya Bandara evaded arre lese and Portuguese soldiers, Bandara, was sent to capture ensuing battle and fled to Don he sought the assistance of th king could assist him, however, lly. Vidiya Bandara was well
6 4

bsentia. This was done on the who argued that this action stion vis-a-vis Mayadunne who, vented from seizing the throne now decreed that his subjects Crown Prince and ensured that il Ceylon in order to undertake to the Catholic faith. This hristianity to Ceylon which of ist Country.
of succession, Mayadunne, the e right of succession to was incensed by the recognias Crown Prince. Largely as a e, there followed a period of forces of Bhuvanekebahu and supported respectively by PorThere was a stage when hdy, felt threatened by these tance of the Portuguese.
2nt death at this stage, being is no evidence that he was a llating and feeble in characpes him. Many of his subjects y but others were displeased by guese who, in turn, found his ith them rather disconcerting.
g, with Vidiya Bandara as re
upset the new regent by not decision to renovate the old e Portuguese also came to know upplanting his son Dharmapala. it would be prudent to arrest est and a mixed force of Sinha
under the command of Tikiri him. Vidiya Bandara lost the dira and thence to Jaffna where e King of Jaffna. Before the Vidiya Bandara died accidentaendowed both in the military

Page 93
sphere as a soldier of great field, as the son-in-law of Mayadunne. He was, however, ir content to wait for success to paid the penalty of those who a
Vidiya Bandara's death weak Dharmapala who also compromis becoming a Catholic, assuming th now call him. His subjects wer their allegiance to him and Mayadunne seized the chance and only Portuguese military assist: Kotte to force Mayadunne to rai
The withdrawal of Mayadun military activity in the KottePortuguese to undertake an e Sangili, who had massacred six region in 544. Attempts made mount a punitive expedition ha hoped that the present was suit A fleet accordingly, set sail troops on board were due to lan of the expedition was, howeve: troops at his disposal totalled the four thousand he expected great had been the corruption, dants of subordinate commanders drawing pay as such. The comm this set back, to press on and of Sangilli, well-defended thc entrenchments. The Portuguese King, who had fled to Kopay. T him to Kopay only to find tha There, Sangili sent ambassador kingdom as fief of Portugal, permission for Portuguese missi gospel in his kingdom. These t leaving his son as hostage. troops laid waste the country attempted to convert the peop ineensed and rose up against
6

promise, and in the political two kings Bhuvanekebahu and upatient for power and was not come to him. He accordingly ttempt to defy fate.
ened the military stability of 2d his political stability by he name of DOn Juan, as we must e disappointed and many altered crossed over to Mayadunne. laid siege to Kotte and it was ance that enabled the forces in se the Siege.
ne brought about a respite in Sitawake, region and enabled the xpedition to Jaffna against hundred Catholics in the Mannar
in the intervening period to id come to nothing, but it was able time for this initiative. from India for Kayts where the d at Columbuthurai. The leader r, mortified to find that the only twelve hundred instead of to find under his command. So
that the servants and depens had been enrolled as soldiers ander decided, notwithstanding he attacked Nallur, the capital bugh it was with bastions and captured the town but not the he invading force now followed it the King had fled to India. s to the Viceroy, offering his the payment of a tribute and onaries to preach the Christian erms were accepted, on Sangili In the meantime, Portuguese , whilst Portuguese clergymen le. The people in turn were the Portuguese, supported by

Page 94
Sangili's troops. The Portugue their ships but, before they se Mannar where they erected a fo would provide a base for fut (The foregoing is based on Ceylon".)
Rajasinghe
This is the stage at whi known as Rajasinghe, the "Lion big way. Given the attention against the Tamil King, Mayadur tune to attack them in the Sout Colombo whilst Rajasinghe unde plan designed to distract Port tions. The initiative was un Malabar force which had been re. and this weakened the attack of
Mayadunne, however, bided were ready, he moved into the a and elephants of war", again w. tives. The Portuguese countere against the Sinhalese forces, W parts, fascines and ditches at tial battle was sanguinary bu nothing if not resourceful, beca with whom he inflicted such a Portuguese to retreat after suf was a significant achievement b Rajasinghe and because of the defeat of European troops by demonstrated that Sinhalese sol with telling effect against an e weapons than their own. One ha: ticated wonder of the Sinhalese Portuguese sailor who ate stone nance, with his performance on own casualties at Mulleriyawa w to exploit his success immedia roup his forces and to move agai so vigorous that the Portugues
66

se now decided to withdraw to i sail for India, they made for rt, in the expectation that it ure operations against Jaffna. or. S.G. Pereira's "History of
ch the son of Mayadunne, now King", entered the stage in a of the Portuguese in the North ne thought the time was opporh. Mayadunne led the attack on rtook the attack on Kotte - a uguese attention in two direcsuccessful largely because a uested was attacked off Mannar Mayadunne.
his time and when his forces ttack once again "with cavalry ith Colombo and Kotte as objeced the attack by an offensive ho were entrenched behind ramMulleriyawa. The ensuing init indecisive. Rajasinghe was ause he mobilised fresh troops, crushing blow as to cause the fering heavy casualties. This because of the extreme youth of fact that it was the first a Sinhaliese general. It also iiers were capable of fighting nemy even with more up-to-date only to contrast he unsophisbeholder, On the beach, of the and drank blood for his sustethe battlefield. Rajasinghe's sere so great that he was unable :ely. What he did was to reginst Kotte where his attack was e were desirous of retreating

Page 95
but were dissuaded by the Sinh Kotte did not go the way of May his plans for besieging Kotte.
The consideration of thes the Portuguese the futility of Kotte and their own establishme ngly decided that Don Juan sh( reduce the Portuguese milita little doubt that his move was who must, therefore, be credite the Portuguese decision to c Colombo.
In the process, Don Juan power, because now he was with out subjects over whom to rule what territory he had. The Po] countrywide objectives becau incapacity, Mayadunne, who mig gaged in an attempt to overrur Kandyan King had offended him Juan, the daughter who had Rajasinghe. The Portuguese, til to overrun the countryside, c Sack towns on the seacoast an Fr. S.G. Perera gives consideral tions and adds that Chilaw, Beruwela, Aiutgana, Welligama, C cked by naval expeditions. Ma tide by requesting the help of but these allies of his were de
Mayadunne was getting o Tikiri Bandara had, in spite right to the name "Rajasinghe skill as a soldier. Mayadunne earned the right to succeed Raigama. There would be but Kotte and Kandy, in assuming cc
Rajasinghe, however, i corre be taken before he moved agai
6

alese. The ensuing defence of adunne and he decided to alter
e engagements brought home to defending Don Juan's capital at nt in Colombo. It was accordiuld move to Colombo SO as to ry responsibility. There is a moral victory for Rajasinghe d with having been the cause of oncentrate on the defence of
lost the last vestige of regal out a capital of his own, withand without an army to defend rtuguese for their part, sought se, apart from Don Juanos own ght have opposed them, was enKandyan territory because the by giving in marriage to Don been promised to his son herefore, were given free rein apture forts, destroy temples, d seize vessels lying offshore. ble detail about these depredaNegombo, Kalutara, Maggona, alle and Matara were also attaayadunne attempted to stem the naval detachments from Malabar feated en route
n in years. His son, born as of his youth, now earned the " by reason of his outstanding e decided that Rajasinghe had him as King of Sita wake and one step, viz., the conquest of omplete overlordship in Ceylon.
ctly judged that Colombo had to -inst Kotte and Kandy. Colombo
7

Page 96
itself was ill-equipped. The fortifications were crumbling f vided with war materials. The led only three hundred Portugue Prima facie, therefore, an at Rajasinghe's reconnaissances di would prove an obstacle in ti attempted to overcome this by was marsh. This proved inadequ ever, now conceived the idea c high ground facing him and t movement less difficult and he series of attacks on the defe This only left Rajasinghe with the defence by siege. The si which the defenders were beginn cularly of the shortage of r Rajasinghe's tactics to deny to the attacking force was also f assaults on the defending posit an end by the intervention of India. They fanned out in se Rajasinghe's forces from variou withdraw.
At this stage, Mayadunne that he had been murdered by F accept the accuracy of this cl was already over eighty years o. lity have died of old age. F favourite of his and indeed, armies. It seems unlikely, Rajasinghe would have killed hi
Mayadunne had political achieved by military means. No the partition of his father's Sitawake, he overcame Raigama and fought Vidiya Bandara, hims the fight for the mastery of t the Portuguese but he bolstere assistance of the Raja of Calic did not achieve was mastery ove
6 :

walls were low and weak, the rom neglect and the city unprotroops defending Colombo totalse and six hundpred lascorins. :ack would be successful. But .sclosed that the Beira Lake ne is eastern sector. Rajasinghe draining the Beira where there ate. Rajasinghe resourceful as if cutting a ditch between the he outer marshes. This made exploited this by mounting a 2nces which, however, failed. the determination to wear down ege lasted two years, during ing to feel its effects, partiations, which it was part of the defenders. As it happens, eeling the strain of continued ions. The siege was brought to : Portuguese troops sent from veral directions and attacked S angles which induced him to
died and the story got around ajasinghe. It is difficult to aim. For One thing, Mayadunne age and would in all probabior another, Rajasinghe was a had been given command of his in these circumstances, that s father.
ambitions some of which he t satisfied with the fruits of s possessions which gave him which had gone to his brother, elf a most capable general. In che lowlands, he had to oppose d his weakness by seeking the ut for Malabar troops. What he r the highlands, even though he

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worked hard for that success.
success which eluded him wher death, however, saw the reincar the person of his brilliant so
It was not long before th the father, namely the subjugat by Karalliadde Bandara who had coversion to Christianity. On daughter Dona Catherina, in th Rajasinghe was, however, not sa his conquest of the Kandyan re Sions than his predecessors. Portuguese for the possession O in his ambitions.
For his assault in Coloml tions. His first priority pre the fighting troops, elephant would do battle for him. He pu might be hostile to him and int He took steps to isolate the gal nce from outside by sacking Portuguese, especially by the excesses alienated the people f them to work against him, eve Fate however favours the brav these vicissitudes and moved st the outer walls of the city i Maligakanda.
The defences of Colombo h assaults on the outer walls an The Portuguese commander, Rajasinghe, gave priority atte eastern sector of the city. The the Bastions of St. John, St. bastions were fortified by t Beyond, lay the lake which ser strategy of Rajasinghe was to sive base outside the lake air himself in case of sudden atta of stakes, rivetments, fortlets
6:

His was a life of strife for he yearned for it most. His nation of his martial spirit in , Rajasinghe.
e son achieved what had eluded tion of the Udarata, then ruled
taken the name of Don John, on
his death, he left his infant e protection of the Portuguese. tisfied with the fact that with gion, he now had more possesColombo and the defeat of the f Colombo was the central issue
po, he made extensive prepara'dictably enough was to create s and supporting weapons that it to the sword any persons who terfere with his military plans. Crison in Colombo from assistavillages that might help the supply of provisions. These rom rallying to him and induced h by an attempt to poison him. e and Rajasinghe overcame all eadily forward till he reached in the area of . Maligawatte and
ad suffered both from repeated d from the effect of monsoons.
realising the threat from 2ntion to the defences in the ese included the improvement of Stepher and St. Thomas. These he erection of gun platforms. red as a natural obstacle. The create for his troops a defenea behind which he entrenched ck by the Portuguese by the use and trenches. He also rever
2.

Page 98
ted to the recopening of the dili" the assault on Colombo mention created a second ditch so as t wise, would be an obstacle an Rajasinghe now ordered the city his artillery in the use of wh skill. Under cover of the artil were repeatedly undertaken. Hi demolishing the defences whils missiles on the defenders. leadership was used to the utm response from his troops. T Rajasinghe had now recourse to failed, with much loss to his the mercenaries whom he employ and malays. There was, however had on the city by the continua
The Portuguese, obviously pressure of the siege, now at their ships could reach, where t they could and destroyed temple: the worst forays resulted in Vishnu Devale in Dondra. It relief expedition from Goa tha lifted. The siege of Colombo resolution and fortitude on the face of a pitiless assault from and plague from within. It was of skill and courage on the pa forces led by his own outstan determination.
The failure to overcome t happened twice, now left Rajasi became tyrannical towards his : vitable consequence. The firs Bandara, the Prince of the tr. over which Rajasinghe had domi in the Kandyan region under th Francisco who delivered the kin Portugal. Don Philip's General adopted the name of Don John o
7 (

ich which he had opened during ed earlier in this study and o drain the lake which otherd so facilitated his assault. to be saturated with tire from nich hi s troops now had some lery barrage the main assaults s elephants were committed to zt his fighting troops . rained His own personal daring and ost in extracting the maximum he defences, however, held. a flanking attack by sea. This own Sinhalese soldiers and to 'ed including kaffirs, muslims , no lessening in the grip he nce of the siege.
7 in desperate straits by the tacked sea coast towns which they plundered provisions where s where they could not. One of the destruction of the famed was only the arrival of the t resulted in the siege being was a remarkable example of part of the Portuguese in the outside the city and of famine an equally remarkable example art of Rajasinghe's attacking ding leadership, resource and
he defences of Colombo, as it nghe an embittered man, and he subjects. Revolts were an inet was the revolt of Sotupala ibutary of the Seven Korales, nion. There followed a revolt he leadership of Mudaliyar Don jdom to Don Philip, now King of , Konappu Bandara who had now f Austria, set forth to meet a

Page 99
force sent by Rajasinghe to qu it. Don Philip died at this st still a boy, installed as King. revolt against Don Juan, seiz Portuguese troops sent against King and, when a force was se usurper, he succeeded in defe strategic importance which he In the retreat that followed, R be poisoned by a bamboo splinte a singularly inappropriate end
soldier. Rajasinghe himself wa fate that had befallen him b follows: "Since my eleventh y leader was able to stand agains against me in the hill country fortune. The power of my merit
In the assessment of Rajas I perceive two aspects. On th bute of the Mahawamsa which "brought this country under one help referring to him, as being rule with a strong arm," - the apostasy in giving up the B Hinduism and of his persecutic the other hand, there is Queroz therefore, hostile to Rajasing cribe him as "Rajasinghe, whom Jaffnapatam and the furthermost "as the greatest enemy that the the son of another of the same butes have compared him to Caes
One is inclined to accept and Rajasinghe. Both had paren: who instilled in their sons a 1 of enemy. Both served in the A the advantage of military learn with telling effect in battle achievement of a single objecti
71

ell the rebellion and defeated age leaving his son, Don Juan, Don John of Austria raised a ed the Government and routed him. He now proclaimed himself nt by Rajasinghe, to oust the ating it at Balana, a pass of continued to hold thereafter. ajasinghe had the misfortune to r entering his foot. This was to the career of an illustrious s philosophical about the cruel ecause he comments on it as ear, I have been fighting. No st me. But he who has appeared this time, is a favourite of has declined."
singhe's character and prowess, e one hand is the guarded trigives him credit for having canopy of dominion" but cannot , "verily the sinner (who) did consequence, I suspect, of his addhist faith and embracing in of the Buddhist clergy. On who, though a Portuguese and, he, finds it possible to desthe whole of Ceylon including : of the highlands, obeyed" and Portuguese had in the Island - kind." Other Portuguese triar and Hannibal.
the parallel between Hannibal ts - Hamilcar and Mayadunne - ove of fatherland and a hatred rmy from a tender age without ing. Both handled the elephant . Both were consumed by the
7e -

Page 100
"Rome must be destroyed" edict of the Roman Senate
"Colombo must be capture the dream of a lifetime.
In his "The People of Cey remember as one of Ceylon's mo as a historian, waxes lyr Rajasinghe's ability. Unquesti because he, unlike any of his g pitted against a European enem deadly use of cannon and gunpov effortless superiority over t. available to Rajasinghe. He unconquerable will to win whic despising" courage of his soldi it. It was a triumph of huma soulless engines of destruction
Phase 2. The Spread
The death of Rajasinghe le Sinhalese king to interfere wit an expedition against the King ridding his kingdom of the Port the assistance of the Raja Commander in Colombo, hearing the North, whilst a naval for off Mannar. The land forces mo the Tamil troops engaged the defeated. The Portuguese now nobles who acclaimed the King new King, Pararasa Sekaram was
The next objectives were opposed to the Portuguese we acclaimed King of Kotte. This of Sitawaka and Don Juan Was I Don Juan, however, being a p accession was nominal and th mastery over Jaffna, Kotte and
7.

for Hannibal, to balance the - delenda est Carthago.
l" for Rajasinghe, in pursuing
lon", N.E. Weerasooria, whom I st outstanding lawyers and not 'ical in his assessment of onably, Rajasinghe was unique reat military predecessors, was y whose power was based on the der which seemed to dictate an ne un sophisticated resources matched this, however, by an n led him to exploit the "death ers, as Geiger so pithily puts an skill and courage over the
ls
of Portuguese Power
ft the Portuguese with no great th their plans. These included of Jaffna who was desirous of tuguese and to that end, sought of Calicut. The Portuguese of these moves, set forth for ce destroyed the Calicut fleet ved to the capital Nallur where Portuguese in battle and were held a convention of the local of Portugal as their King. A installed as King of Jaffna.
e Kotte and Sitawaka. Forces re defeated and Don Juan was was followed by the subjugation ecognised as King of Sitawaka. uppet of the Portuguese, his e Portuguese could now claim Sitawaka.
2

Page 101
The Portuguese were now a Udarata. The heiress to the thil left in the protection of th Karalliadde, but the Portugue assume control over the Kingd battle with the forces of Wim Konappu Bandara and also as Don his new name at the time Raja Subjugate Udarata and was foile guese forces moved to Udarata b when they got as far as Gannon Wimaladharma's troops. In the : that they could not protect Do. was able to return to Kandy in the throne under his protection. and assumed kingship both as t and as the husband of the hei: father Karalliyadde.
The Portuguese, now smarti suffered, sent a new Governor t duties and lost no time in a bic regain lost prestige. He was ac to bolster his image with the p Sitawaka, the Seven Korales and ces of importance in the low. afield and set up stockades Negombo and Chilaw. There were guese, traceable to Wimaladharma out much difficulty.
It was at this stage that no legacy of greatness behind h and great charm of manner wh: people and to the Portuguese. of the Portuguese without any jects and without any army which his royal rights. It is, ther that history will remember him.
There is, however, an imp By virtue of a deed of gift August, 1580, renewed ans rati
73

nxious to gain ascendancy over rone, Dona Catherina, had been he Portuguese by her father se had to fight in order to om. The Portuguese moved to aladharma, (earlier known as John of Austria), who assumed singhe mounted a campaign to d by Wimaladharma. The Portuit were forced to retreat and, ruwa, they were surrounded by fighting, the Portuguese found na Catherina and Wimaladharma triumph, with the heiress to
In due course he married her he unconquered ruler of Kandy ress to the throne after her
ng under the reverses they had o Ceylon. Azevedo now assumed l to recover lost territory and companied by Don Juan in order beople. Initially, he mastered the Four Korales, both provinlands. He then went further in Matara, Galle, Kalutara, : rebellions against the Portul, but these were quelled with
Don Juan died. Don Juan left nim. He had a regal presence ich endeared him both to his He ended his days as a puppet possessions, without any subhe might have used to restore efore, as an ineffective king
ortance attached to his death. executed by him on the 12th fied in 1583, the kingdom of

Page 102
Kotte with all its appurten Portugal, Philip. Don Juan ha Kingdom of Kotte consisted of t Sitawaka, Raigama, Kandaudarata ces of the Seven and Four KOrale Kosgama, Palugama, Batticaloi Puttalam. In 580 and in 1583 met and solemnly agreed to recc their King and to renounce the
In terms of this donatior Ceylon, Azevedo, proclaimed th Portugal. The nobles attendin oath acknowledging Philip of E following terms - "for as much God has in Heaven, left him (1 there being no other who of righ crown and realm..." The intenti country according to Portuguese of nobles to assent to this pr preferred to be governed by loc the King of Portugal recognis privileges, they would serve Kin they would serve their own king,
Wimaladharma, the King of of local rulers opposed the ass the Portuguese. Whilst he reali Catherina, the lawful heiress to some legitimacy, Wimaladharma ) in open confrontation with th campaign of harassment and intr after felt that a military essay sful but the Portuguese counter action. Neither side being : Wimaladharma returned to his ca,
Wimaladharma was not disp tives to subdue and oust the F when a Dutch Admiral Spilberg behalf of the Prince of Orange, help to overcome the Portuguese capture of the trade of Ceylon
74

nces passed to the King of ld himself declared that the he Kingdom then known as Kotte, and Jaffna and of the provines, Matara, Denawaka, Velivera, Kottiyar, Trincomalee and the chieftains of Kotte had ognise the King of Portugal as tight to elect their own king.
l, the Portuguese Governor in e accession of King Philip of g the proclamation then took ortugal as their King in the as Don Juan Maha Bandara, whom Philip) as his universal heir, it may have and can inherit his on of Azevedo was to rule the laws and summoned a convention pcedure. . The nobles, however, all laws and declared that if ed their rights, customs and g Philip with the same loyalty
Udarata and the most powerful sumption of the Government by sed that his marriage to Dona the throne, gave his position realised his military weakness e Portuguese and organised a igues against them. He thereagainst them would be succesed this by their own military able to overcome the other, pital.
osed to terminate his initia'ortuguese. He got his chance en made overtures to him on
during which he offered Dutch . The Dutch interest was the . Spilbergen was followed by

Page 103
another Dutch Admiral de Weert Wimaladharma . suggested to hi blockade the Portuguese forts : would attack them on land. N notice of the Portuguese who lic to remove Wimaladharma. This i. desertion of Ceylonese lascorin The desertion was followed up b forces which might have resulte a skilful disengagement of Po conducted by Azevedo which ca Retreat". Other harassment O Wimaladharma attempted to exp Portuguese. He was enabled to inland forts set up by the Po: lost many troops, their garriso general himself powerless.
At this stage, Admiral de command of six ships. Taking i position of the Portuguese, Wim to blockade Galle, whilst he h de Weert was, however, more int off acting on the King's advice with the King, an inebriated family and was killed by the F to the Fleet Commander was as f no good and God has done justic be peace, if war, war." There after and the fleet sailed away
Wi maladharma himself di shrewdness rather than any mil him. He was shrewd enough to of an age difference. He was s running the court on Portuguese in adopting Sinhalese customs i ras as was the custom in Kott He compensated for his lack of ness with which he fomented S Portuguese. And finally, he c conspiring with the Dutch to own initiatives in this dire
7

who came on a similar errand. m to return to Ceylon and to in Ceylon while his own forces aws of this move came to the st no time in mounting a force litiative failed because of the s in the pay of the Portuguese. y an assault on the Portuguese d in disaster, were it not for rtuguese forces organised and me to be hailed as the "Great f the Portuguese followed as -oit his successes against the
secure the surrender of many rtuguese, while the Portuguese his rendered ineffective and the
Weert returned to Batticalloa in into consideration the weakened aladharma Suggested to de Weert imself attacked Galle by land. ent on promoting trade and put Thereafter during a meeting de Weert insulted the Royal cing's men. The King's comment ollows, "He who drinks comes to e. If you desire peace, let it was no reconciliation there
rY
ge
ed not long after. It is his itary prowess tinat lives after marry Dona Catherina, in spite hrewd to want to please her by lines. He was equally shrewd ncluding the staging of perahee and so pleased his subjects.
military skill by the shrewdedition and revolt against the lemonstrated his shrewdness in overthrow the Portuguese. His ction did not succeed but he

Page 104
showed to his successors how t terms of the capture of trad interests of the Ceylonese kin
Wimaladharma was succeede to as his cousin) Senarat, wh marrying Dona Catherina. Befo: in his kingdom, Azevedo, the cided to put into effect the coming Udarata. As a prelim: Portuguese sent expeditions to overcome the people. Senara intentions, sought Dutch assis but the assistance agreed upon now closed in on Kandy by way sent a force to contain the . dispersed at Getambe. Senarat capital, leaving the Portuguese the temples and devastate the to Colombo, with rearguard a thereafter, to which Azevedo his purpose of defeating the had not secured Control over th stage sent to Goa after eighte He will be remembered for his King of Portugal as King of Cey
Senarat took advantage of Ceylon to make a treaty with a to assist him in overcoming th in making the treaty was milita de Bochouver was, however, the in Ceylon and the setting up of facilitate the movement of trac involvement with the Portugue: assistance was slow in coming.
Azevedo's successor arrive structions about the spread Azevedo used the experience he years in Ceylon. This plan inv throughout the west - in the Se Four Korales (Luis Pinto), S.
7

he cupidity of the foreigner in e could be used to serve the
S.
d by his brother (also referred o consolidated his position by ze Senarat could settle himself Portuguese captain general, deLong cherished purpose of overinary to the main effort, the various parts of the country to t, now alerted to Portuguese stance and a Treaty was signed
was slow in arriving. Azevedo of Balliana and Gannoruwa. Senarat ortuguese which was, however,
had no option but to flee the free to sack the capital, raze
neighbourhood before returning at Balana. He sued for peace agreed because he had achieved Udarata forces, even though he le kingdom. Azevedo was at this en years of service in Ceylon. part in the proclamation of the lon on the death of Don Juan.
the departure of Azevedo from y Dutch emissary, de Bochouver, e Portuguese. Senaratos purpose ary assistance. The purpose of capture of the cinnamon trade a fort in Kottiyar which would le in the East without necessary se in the West. The promised
d in Ceylon with detailed inof Portuguese power in which had gained during his eighteen olved the appointment of agents ven Korales (Simon Correa), the abara.gamuwa (Luis Faria) and

Page 105
Matara (Domingo Cam). The pla Kandy which was undertaken but f defending forces.
Senarat now felt that Dutc of the determined nature of Port to press his case personally. Admiral die Weert were, however, return empty handed. Senarat inc of a rebel, Nikapitiya, who rai and amassed support throughout local lascorins. Senarat was i rebel pretender (probably in t against the Portuguese) but turn rose above himself in seeking th Catherina in marriage. Senara with the Portuguese and the com: Portuguese were used to subdue
Phase 3. Portuguese Inv«
The Portuguese Viceroy in G Ceylon, Constantin de Sa, a st found that the Portuguese in Cey soldiers unruly because they ha cials corrupt. Although ther discontended and there was a ri a supporter of Nikapitiya the set about dealing with these soldiers and corrupt citizens, course overpowering the rebel
de Sa's main concern was Dutch. He was systematic in c His first priority was again Pararasa Sekaram as King of Jaf: ce of involvement with the Dut Sa accordingly sent a force to with a force stationed in the forces defeated Sangili's for northern flank was secure. He the southern area where he el Galle, where the principal feat
77

n also involved an attack on ailed because of action by the
h aid was imperative, because uguese actions and went to Goa The memories of the murder of
too fresh and Senarat had to w had to deal with the actions ised the standard of rebellion the country including that of nitially in sympathy with the he hope of using his services ed against him when Nikapitiya he hand of the daughter of Dona t decided to mend his fences bined forces of Senarat and the the pretender.
blvement with the Dutch
oa now sent a new Governor for pldier of noble birth. de Sa lon were in disarray, with his ld not been paid and his offie was peace, the people were sk of some joining the ranks of pretender, named Bareto. de Sa irritations, disciplining his appeasing the populace and of forces of Bareto.
the growing threat from the lealing with this development. st Sangili who had replaced fna. Sangili had given evidench against the Portuguese. de deal with him, which teamed up fort at Mannar and the joint ces. de Sa now felt that his then turned his attention to rected the Santa Cruz fort at ure was the rampart facing the

Page 106
sea designed to protect the in ern flank was thus secured.
There arose a complication Dutch envoy, de Bochouver, Wh assistance for Senarat, had e Ceylon and a Danish fleet wa waters. Senarat, now on terms need of Danish help. But Dan. Bareto who had raised his head rebels, killing Bareto in the that they could not enter into would be favourable to them, sa
de Sa was recalled to Goa
fact that he had raised Portug exploits which helped to secu flanks in Ceylon. His successo administrator and things beg soldiers again became unruly b the people found him harsh in h recalled and de Sa sent back Ceylon, however, Albuquerque er would serve as a buffer again South against Colombo.
de Sa's first priority o strengthen his eastern flank, w Trincomalee. The site chosen renowned Hindu Temple, Tirukone dedicated to Shiva mentioned famous "Temple of a Thousand Co was venerated by pilgrims from to the ground in order to provi erect the fort and what was n
sea. The action of the Portu sacred place which matched t Devale at Dondra which I have m The vandalism was of course, ju tary necessity.
The defence of the Easter plete without a fort being erec
7 :

her fortifications. His south
| for de Sa at this stage. The o had failed to secure Dutch ngineered Danish interest in is sent to operate in Ceylon with the Portuguese, was not in ish help was forthcoming for
once again. de Sa pursued the
process. The Danes, finding D a treaty with Senarat which illed away.
at this stage, in spite of the Fuese prestige by his military ure the northern and southern r, Albuquerque, was not a good fan to drift under him. The ecause they were not paid and is dealings with them. He was : to Ceylon. Before he left ected a fort at Kalutara which st any force moving from the
n returning to Ceylon was to 7ith the creation of a fort at for this fort was that of the swaram, one of the five is warms by Dr. P.E. Pieris. This, the lumns" housed the shrine which Ceylon and India. It was razed ide the material with which to lot needed was thrown into the guese was a desecration of a he desecration of the Vishnu entioned earlier in this study. ustified on the ground of mili
n flank was not however comcted at Batticaloa. The signi
3

Page 107
ficance of Batticaloa was that port of entry into Ceylon. The it when they came to the aid
Dona Catherina. The Dutch had i port of entry. de Sa sent a f tion of the fort where he fe thousand Muslims who had been
had fled to the banner of Sena was built. de Sa placed Trinco jurisdiction of the Portuguese Jaffna, who, therefore, had ri and eastern filanks of the Portu
de Sa was now confronted w had not subdued Senarat. He taking a punitive expedition to flank. The force seven hundre the temple and burnt the city. Senarat's forces but managed to were pursued however and had forces of Senarat, even though Matara and the Seven Korales.
Colombo was besieged at garrison managed to hold out a Portuguese commander now decid attack Kandy. Senarat's force agreed to a peace, on condition, restore lands he had seized, Badulla and allow Portuguese co
Senarat died soon after b for his state to be divided amol
His eldest son Kumarasingh His second son Vijayapala His third son Rajasinghe
Rajasinghe the most capable of the position in which he found guese. He argued that earlier
lions causing di saffection ar turned out to be really satisfa
7ς

: it constituted the principal Portuguese had themselves used of Karaliyadde, the father of also been known to use it as a orce to cover the actual erecared attacks from some four expelled by the Portuguese and rat. In due course, the fort malee and Batticaloa under the Captain-Major stationed in esponsibility for the northern guese defences.
ith criticism in Lisbon that he was stung by this into underattack Kandy from its Badulla ed strong, took Badulla razed
It was thereafter set upon by cut their way through. They
to give way to the superior reinforced by lascorins from
this stage but the Portuguese ind see the siege lifted. The ed to move out of Colombo and es were overcome and Senarat however, that he pay tribute, release prisoners captured at introl of Batticaloa.
ut before he died, he arranged ng his three sons as follows:
e - to be King of Uva
to be King of Matale - to be King of Kandy
the three sons, took stock of
himself vis-a-vis the Portustrategies of fomenting rebelhd inducing desertion had not ctory. He further argued that,

Page 108
if the country was to be free power should be asked to assis with the inducement of being p a firm footing in the country. plans came from the Portugue considered to be his perfidy,
to Kandy in a bid to intimida however, defeated by Rajasinghe
At this stage, the Dutch forward in order to capture B also cruised towards Battical.c lated and the Dutch secured cor tive which soon spread elsewhe of the Dutch was Trincomalee w The Dutch were desirous of capt Rajasinghe to attack Colombo. towards Colombo but thought it route. They by-passed Colombo, getting no support from Rajas the garrison waiting to give b overpowering it. The Dutch now expected Colombo to be attacke Galle which was duly captured. the cinnamon growing area and harbour, the Dutch decided to Galle. There was desultory f Negombo was successively take: tured by the Dutch. A Portugu also repulsed.
At this stage a truce bet Holland and Portugal had been two countries were at war with ders accordingly decided on a part in the Portuguese-Dutch a
With the end of the truce Portuguese was also in sight. with Colombo as their objecti overcome en route. The Dutch on Colombo. Colombo itself elements of the defences being
8

of the Portuguese, a foreign t in defeating the Portuguese, armitted to trade and of having
The initial reaction to his se who, incensed by what they decided to field an expedition te the King. This force was
at Gannoruwa.
landed at Kalmunai and moved atticaloa. A naval detachment a. The local garrison capitutrol of the fort in an initiae in Ceylon. The next objective hich was stormed and captured. juring Galle but were advised by The Dutch accordingly moved prudent to reconnoitre Galle en when they found that they were inghe. At Negombo, they found attle but had no difficulty in moved South and the Portuguese d. Instead, the Dutch moved to Galle being in the centre of also being possessed of a good establish their headquarters in ighting thereafter, in which n by the Portuguese and recapase attempt to seize Galle was
ween the metropolitan forces of
declared in Europe, where the each other. The local commanlocal truce. Rajasinghe took no arrangements.
not long after, the end of the The Dutch moved out from Galle, ve, Kalutara and Panadura being were now ready for their assault was well defended, the main as follows:
O

Page 109
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Page 110


Page 111
to the North th
to the West th to the South th to the East th:
These bastions were connected r by ramparts to the South, West in all.
The defending force sho Soldiers but the garrison cou supplemented, however, by abl
The attack on the city to first was the bombardment of heights of Hults-dorf, Wolvel ensuing barrages served to dam not wholly. As the defences h the city by sea and to employ . was entrusted to four galleons forcing the Portuguese to man The ships were at this stage petered out. The attack by lau along the lake and entrusted to scaling ladders. The defences withdrew with General Hulft, forces, being wounded.
It was in the circumsta undertake the second phase, in The siege brought out the bes determination not to surrender, ships - disease, famine which refugees from Negombo, Kaluta: the reduction in military capa would have been alleviated if time to assist the garrison, b guese garrison, this did not ta tated by a furious assault on resulted in heavy casualties b and defender. The defenders W
8

bay of Colombo Open sea Beira Lake ee strong bastions- St. John's St. Stephen's St. Sebastian's
und the perimeter of the city and North, there being twelve
ld have been three thousand ld only muster five hundred, -bodied civilians.
ok place in two phases. The the city from the commanding ldhal and St. Sebastian. The age the ramparts partially but eld, it was decided to attack foot soldiers. The sea assault attacking from the North thus the bastions facing the bay. sunk and the naval assault hd was from the East and South three divisions equipped with still held and the attackers the Commander of the Dutch
nces decided by the Dutch to amely, the siege of the city. t in the defenders in a Stoic They faced innumerable hardTas accelerated by the influx of a and Panadura and of course, pility. The military situation reinforcements had arrived in ut unfortunately for the Portuke place. The end was precipithe bastion of St. John which ing sustained both by attacker 2re not, however, ignominiously

Page 112
defeated, because it was thoug surrender, to prevent further defenders. (Fr. S.G.Perera - Hi.
The Dutch, thereafter, exp by moving to Mannar and Jaffna ing forts of the Portuguese. the maritime region, till no Portuguese. An Assessment of the Portugu
The actions of the Portu Cruelty, reckless massacres a left behind a sinister reputat: vably be justified on the grc harassed, hard pressed by reb dictated retaliation. There is the despoiling of temples, par at Dondra and Hindu shrine a reputation is justified in the is, however, a moot point. friendship with the local peop of the "superiority" of a Euro ing influence of the Catholic one cannot say. But the intro alien though it was, is certair occupation.
The contribution that the development needs special menti to be noted that they arrived i the power of Parakrama Bahu h Ceylonese forces. Nor was the capable of firing thunderous people, conducive to the cre that self-confidence is precise numerous military engagements were undertaken by successive na melly, Vidi ya Bandara, Wimaladharma. These commander stly by organising the fighting lascorins or militia, secondly, among the lascorins, and lastly battle, which enabled them to
8,

ht prudent to raise the flag of casualties and hardships on the story of Ceulon)
loited their success in Colombo
where they subdued the remainThe Dutch were now masters of W under the domination of the
ese Occupation guese by indulging in wanton nd methods of repression have on. These actions may conceiund that they themselves were ellions and dissensions which , however, no justification for ticularly the Buddhist shrines t Trincomalee. Whether this totality of their occupation they were certainly capable of le to whom they exhibited none pean race. Whether the levellfaith helped in this process, duction of the Catholic faith, hly a feature of the Portuguese
e Portuguese made to military ..on. Seen in perspective, it is n Ceylon when the decline after ad unquestionably affected the impact of seeing a white race cannon. On an unsophisticated :ation of self-confidence. But ly what was created during the involving the Portuguese that Ceylonese military commanders, vaya dunne, Rajasing he and s served the country well, firelement of the public into the by developing esprit de corps ', by giving them leadership in display a fighting capability

Page 113
which, hitherto had remained d did not have a word of commenda in the pre-Portuguese period praise for the fighting spirit confrontation with the Portugue ry development, namely, in th needs to be mentioned. Tennent Portuguese, French and Dutch COI of them, Farian Y Sousa, is W of the Portuguese dominion, the locks for the East..." It stan used by the lascorins included and arrows, Swords and sprears
locally. According to Codrin supported by artillery in the portable pieces of ordnance, so enormous pistol supported in fil throwing a ball 4 to l2 ounces i in a sitting position. Eleph fastened to their trunks, were
army in besieging Colombo. Ti that the un sophisticated char initial encounter With the Po sophistication that is all tc people. In the process the Sin
The Portuguese must alsc introduction of the fortress i ment of the defended area which Bahu era. The fortress was, c the Dutch period, but the cre Ceylon goes to the Portuguese attacking a fortress and defer from techniques used in open ar
It is interesting to no entered Ceylon by accident, enc in Ceylon. Clearly, they, as á trade, were impressed by the routes its potential for de contribution to trade by the according to a Dutch Governo would rather lose India than i:
8

ormant. Professor Geiger who tion for the Sinhalese soldier has by contrast nothing but of the Sinhalese soldier in se. There is a further militaa manufacture of arms, which : gives many examples given by amentators of their skill. One orth quoting. "...at the close Sinhalese made the best fireis to reason that the weapons not only the traditional bows but also muskets made for them gton the lascorins were also form of "gingals" which were mewhat after the fashion of an ront by two legs and capable of in weight and fired by a gunman ants, with swords and knives used in the van of Rajasinghe's he unmistakable conclusion is acter of the people in their rtuguese had developed into a ) the credit of the Sinhalese halese soldier had matured.
be given the credit for the nto Ceylon. It was a develop) was featured in the Parakrama f course, developed further in dit for its introduction into and with it the techniques of ding it, which were different ld in close, wooded country.
te that the Portuguese, who led up with a desire to stay on seafaring nation in search of Location of Ceylon on the trade fending those routes and the
riches of the Island, which, r, their kings declared "they mperill."
3

Page 114
7
The Dutch (A
Phase . The Dutc
There is no question that possession of Ceylon. Trade particularly in the form of c gems. Again, given the devel which the Dutch themselves c. interests in the East Indies, such possession before other French having a comparable nav own interests in the East Indie posSession of Ceylon. The op successive kings of Ceylon, Rajasinghe, were quite obviousl securing such an advantage and without going through the proce
Rajasinghe, who had encour probably expected the relations prior to the capitulation of advantage in the period follow however, did not happen as s indeed differences between him surface. The King claimed tha of the Dutch forces, had undert for destruction. The Dutch because they did not want to . partly because Rajasinghe h bargain, namely, to pay the e with the Portuguese. Rajasing military resources were inadeq proclamations to his subjects with the Dutch. He also made
8.

D 1658-1798)
h and i Rajasinghe
the Dutch were anxious to take of course, was the magnet, innamon, elephants, spices and opment of naval power without ould not have projected their they would endeavour to secure powers like the British and all capability and having their is, made practical moves to take penings given to the Dutch by Wimaladharma, Senarat and y of assistance to the Dutch in enabled them to enter Ceylon sses of invasion. aged the Dutch to enter Ceylon, ships that had been fostered Colombo, to develop to his ing the capitulation. This, moothly as he had hoped, and and the Dutch surged to the t General Hulft, the Commander aken to deliver Colombo to him declined to do this, partly lose such a valuable prize and ad not kept his side of the xpenses of the Dutch campaign the, being frustrated that his late to fight the Dutch, issued forbidding them from trading overtures to the Portuguese to

Page 115
return to his territories c liberties, which were being di Dutch, being restored to them. as successful as Rajasinghe wol of religious liberty led to m Rajasinghe had a second cause
in the country, being contro handed over to him even though attitude fell into three compa Galle were claimed by them in 1. the expense of the Portugue: withheld by Rajasinghe. * This 1 their hold on the cinnamon pr category were Mannar and Jaffn hold by right of conquest f: assistance from him and indeed conquests had taken place when Dutch placed in the third cat Kottiyar and Batticaloa which prevent a foreign power from S truce followed, with Rajasingh possession of these territories to interfere in the King's affa.
The differences between Ra. Rajasinghe a disturbed monarch miscalculated when he sought D. Portuguese, after which he jud country with whatever compensa generosity might bestow on t clearly, indicated that they ha country to suit Rajasinghe's di was obviously the subject matte among Rajasinghe's subjects and ments made by them, that all he of one foreign power for anoth chilly for ginger - "Miris di being the pithy Sinhalese comme
Nor did the people remain chagrin. Plots and attempts or which were overcome with the / Rajasinghe reacted to those who
85

in the promise of religious nied to the Catholics by the The embargo on trade was not ld have liked but the promise any Catholics flocking to him. of grievance about territories Lled by the Dutch, not being he was "Emperor". The Dutch rtments. Colombo, Negombo and ieu of payment by Rajasinghe of se campaigns which had been neant that the Dutch continued oducing areas. In the second a, which the Dutch claimed to rom the Portuguese, without in spilte of him, because the he was hostile to them. The regory Kalpitiya, Trincomalee, they chose to hold in order to eizing them. A sort of armed e making no attempt to secure and the Dutch making no move
LTS
jasinghe and the Dutch found in . Quite demonstrably, he had utch assistance in ousting the lged that they would leave the Ltory benefit the King in his hem. The Dutch had, equally ld no intention of leaving the esigns. The ensuing situation ir of discussion and speculation accounts for the cynical comhad achieved was the exchange er — which was like exchanging La inguru gattha vagei" - that nt.
passive in giving vent to their his life have been mentioned customary tyranny with which plotted against him. Much of

Page 116
the plotting against Rajasinghe tains who were steadily gainir against the King but who were conflict with the King because 1 violent.
Rajasinghe's frustration Dutch led to rather cavalier example of this is the capture C "The Persia Merchant" which w causing the crew to come in a Ma they were incarcerated. There w ceration of Robert Knox, the sk Ann", his son and men of the ( the English may have been cause entered into in l66l between C Infanta of Portugal, Catherine of this treaty, it was agreed given to Charles II as dowry, i the Dutch, they would give Col. the Portuguese were to take Cey. be given to the English. Furth event, England and Portugal wou Ceylon between them. Given the kings wished to have over the Would be hostille to both Por happens, the older Knox died ir Knox escaped and wrote the Rajasinghe also vented his disli squadron under Admiral de la Hay its stay, a Treaty was enterec Rajasinghe under which the Fir Trincomallee, Kotti yar and Bat ships company being delayed, an to the King to arrange for th acted undiplomatically in the chains causing the fleet to sai.
There were three developme between Rajasinghe and the Dutc King who was ageing in any case, the effects of drugs (opium Thirdly, perhaps expecting some
86

was engineered by his chiefng ascendancy over the people reluctant to be seen in open retribution was both swift and
with the Portuguese and the attitudes to Europeans. An Df some men of the English ship 'as wrecked off the Maldives aldivian vessel to Ceylon where as also the case of the incaripper of the English ship "The crew. Rajasinghe's dislike of 2d by the marriage arrangement harles II of England and the de Braganza. Under the terms that, apart from Bombay being f the English took Ceylon from ombo to the Portuguese and if lon from the Dutch, Galle would er it was agreed that, in any ld share the cinnamon trade of monopoly which the Ceylonese cinnamon trade. Rajasinghe tuguese and English. As it captivity whilst the younger well known book on Ceylon. ke on the French, when a Royal re came to Trincomalee. During into between the French and ench were given the ports of ticaloa. Provisions for the envoy, de la Nerolle, was sent e provisions. The messenger process and was clapped into l away in protest.
ents at this stage. Relations sh deteriorated. Secondly, the
appeared to be suffering from even has been Inentioned). development in his health, the

Page 117
chiefs appeared to be strength the circumstances, the Dutch toc strengthening the fortificati Hanwella which of course, prov: of Colombo in the north, south
Rajasinghe's death was a contribution to history present: that endears. He was vain, as dress shows. He was petulant, probably the outcome of insecu dealings with his people whom his dealings with foreign power distrust them because he felt his country's wealth and to ol objectives. He certainly felt them, because he realised his could be exploited. In milita have been jealous of his grea exploits he tried to improve the earlier Rajasinghe was the Having said all this, one has it was in his reign that the I Dutch from this country. Whil was the outcome of their supe ultimate success could not Rajasinghe's own contribution told, however, it is likely tha and foreign, were glad to see t
Phase 2.- Rajasin
Wimaladharmasuriya II suc mild ruler who indulged in no The nearest to confrontation w petition to the Dutch authorit. professing faiths different fro Buddhists, Hindus and Catholics should be religious tolerance w
The reign of his successor characterised by tussles betwee
of trade. The initial cause o
8"

ening their position. In all ok the precautionary measure of ons in Negombo, Kalutara and ide the buffers in the defence and east, respectively.
nnounced not long after. His s no outstanding characteristic his specially designed personal and he had a suspicious nature, rity, which is evident in his he also tended to distrust. In s, there appeared a tendency to that they were out to exploit utwit him in achieving their insecure in his dealings with own military weakness which ry affairs, he is believed to t namesake, Rajasinghe, whose on. There is no question that more finished military figure. to conclude, by asserting that Portuguese were removed by the st it is true that the removal rior military capability, the have been achieved without to the overall strategy. All at all his associates, domestic he end of Rajasinghe II.
ghe's Successors
cceeded Rajasinghe. He was a confrontation with the Dutch. as when he supported a giant ies that harassment of persons m the practised by the Dutch - ; or should cease and that there 'ithin the country.
, Sri Vira Narendra Singh, was in him and the Dutch on matters f friction was the decision of

Page 118
the Dutch authorities to close, a trade passed. This measure acc Dutch through whom all foreign corresponding disadvantage of trade in his hands. Attempts ma when the Dutch authorities clai. ordered by their superiors in B closing the gravets, or watch meant a restriction of internal tated showed promise of leading mon peellers refused to peel foi new Dutch Governor seemed to pr the closure of both ports by Ceylon authorities was not li stage and was succeeded by hi Nayakkar stock in South India.
During the reign of the ne an attempt was made to persuade nate the closure of ports. He superiors to lift the closure The closure of the ports and gr
This reign marked the begi in Ceylon and the end of the dy. members of which were Senarat, and Narendra Singh. Narendra Nayakkars and when he married, moved to Kandy, setting a pre members of the Nayakkar familie married Nayakkars. When Naren his wife's brother Sri Vijaya, accordance with a new law of Nayakkars. When the new King took a Sinhalese name and calle but married a Nayakkar.
The etiquette in the Kan accordance with Nayakkar customs nce for kings was changed t Because of the language barrier communicate with their subjects le was consequently marginal an
88

ll ports through which foreign 3rued to the advantage of the trade had to pass, and to the
the King, who currently had ide to change the system failed med that the closure had been atavia. The King countered by posts, at the frontiers. This trade. The tussle so precipito confrontation, when cinnathe Dutch. The arrival of a esage an improvement, although the Dutch and gravets by the fted. The King died at this is wife's brother who was of
w King, Sri Vijaya Rajasinghe s the Dutch Governor to termiin turn attempted to get his of ports but with no success. avets accordingly continued.
inning of the Nayakkar dynasty. nasty founded by Wimaladharma, Rajasinghe II, Wimaladharma III Singh's mother and wife were
many of his wife's relatives cedent that was followed by s of later Kings of Kandy, who dra Singh died without issue,
took over the inheritance in i inheritance adopted by the assumed his royal duties, he d himself Sri Vijaya. Rajasinghe
iyan Courts was conducted in s and even the law of inheritao conform to Nayakkar laws. , the Nayakkar kings could not . Their influence on the peopd the Sinhalese Chiefs who had

Page 119
traditionally influenced the pe distinct classes of courtiers emerged. One in palace circles ing and Hindu by religion, and king, was Ceylon born, Sinhal religion. It was, therefore, an parties who sometimes conflicte Fr. S.G. Perera says, "were Sool existence of the kings in Ceylo
Sri Vijaya was succeeded
Sri Rajasinghe, then a boy of fc reign marked literary and religi rary side, the King ordered the (which had gone only to a sec Parakrama Bahu IV), into a third to Kirthi Sri. On the religio revival under the influence of t arrest the tendency to establis the Nata, Saman and Vishnu d Buddhist capital. The later par confrontation with the Dutch cause of friction was the refusa mon plantations, because their i cient to pay a paddy tax that followed an insurrection in whic against the Dutch.
It was in these circumsta the precedent set by his predec the British, for assistance a mission from Madras sent unde however, unable to produce sat. had the effect of angering the Kandy. The initial expedition determined resistance put up by the full their capability to fi the mountainous country round t accustomed. The second expedit traditional Balana pass but thr the King had the ignominy of h sacked for the first time in hur by a Dutch force. The Dutch con
89

pple continued to do so. Two close to the king therefore was Indian born, Tamil speakthe other, still close to the ese speaking and Buddhist by intriguing situation with two i with each other and who, as destined to destroy the very ".
oy his brother-in-law, Kirthi urteen. The early part of the ous development. On the litecontinuation of the Culuwamsa ond part from Vijayabalhu to part, from Parakrama Bahu IV as side, there was a Buddhist he Siamese monks, designed to sh Hindu temples dedicated to eities, in appropriate in a t of the reign was taken up in authorities. Initially, the ll of peelers to work on cinnaincome from paddy was insuffihad been introduced. There sh the King's forces intervened
nces that the King, following assors, made overtures now to gainst the Dutch. A British r an envoy called Pybus was isfactory results. Indeed, it
Dutch who decided to invade was a failure because of the the Kandyans who exploited to ght guerilla-type warefare in he capital to which they were ion, directed not through the ough Veuda, was successful and is capital being attacked and dred years and the first time mander was not, however, able

Page 120
to consolidate his position in among his troops and harassme forced, therefore, to withdrav occupation. The inevitable tre the Dutch were given paramount of Matara Galle Colombo a Kal pitiya, Mannar, Trincomal strip along the entire coast c masters of the coastal areas. the King's sovereignty over thi The trade embargo through the Dutch were to have a monopoly access being allowed to the Ki The king had to pay tribute.
which no effort on the King's Siri died in 1782. . . . . . .
Phase 3. Briti
Kirthi Sri's brother now
Rajadhi Rajasinghe. An interna into local affairs. With the A dence, war broke out between Bl risk of British attacks on D possibility, the Dutch decid capability, then resting on Europeans" of various Europe hired the services of a Swiss r Meuron, in addition to mercel Dukes of Wertenburg and Luxembu regiments of Malayan and Indi Muslims and lascorins.
The ensuing engagements we sea, with ships of the Britis The naval exchanges were for t Trincomalee - Fort Frederick, to Trincomalee and Fort Ostenbl In l792, they were captured by year, the French succeeded in which they held till the Peace restored to the British, who i Dutch. In 1794, the French dec
9

the capital, : owing to illness nt by Kandyan troops. He was after nine months of unsteady aty followed. Under its terms, sovereignty over the dissavanis nd Jaffna; the districts of ee and Batticaloa; and over a if Ceylon. This made them the In turn, the Dutch recognised entire inland area of Ceylon. ports was lifted, although the of trade, subject however to ng to the salterns on the coast. These were humiliating terms part could be varied. Kirthi
sh Involvement
became King, with the name of tional development now intruded merican Declaration of Indepenritain and Holland and there was utch colonies. To meet this 2d to increase their military the availability of "National lan nations. Accordingly, they egiment belonging to a Count de nary regiments supplied by the rg. These were supplemented by an sepoys and local levies of
ere not, however, on land but at h and French fleets involved. he control of the fortresses in which controlled the entrances urg, which commands the harbour. the British. Later in the same gaining control over the forts of Paris in 1793 when they were in turn handed them over to the lared war on Holland and set up

Page 121
a Batavian Republic in imitatic Dutch Statholder, William TTT o and fled to England for protec the Dutch garrison in Ceylon t British troops in Ceylon to pre ing the Forts. In the meantime, on a change in the Constitut Republic. The local commander t to the protection of the Briti overpowering the Forts of Tril Fort Ostenburg. The British, I moved to subdue Dutch holding: Jaffna were first taker, Mann when Negombo was taken, the oper Colombo.
Before the British attacke two initiative which are worth that the Dutch, considering strength, had hired the services to Count de Meuron, among oth approach made to him by a Brit had agreed to transfer his regi deration of the British agreeing to his officers and men which Some 850 men were involved in represented a severe blow to th enabled Colonel de Meuron, the in command of the Swiss troop, information to the British, reg hting capability of troops avai other information regarding the ding garrison. The second was a the co-operation of Rajasinghe into a treaty with him. Raj operation in return for a guaran would undertake never to allic themselves in Ceylon. The Brit: ling to agree to this arrangem A modified treaty was accordin however receive the King's c commenced.
9.

n of the French Republic. The f Orange, remained pro English ition. Frome there he ordered o agree to the stationing of vent the French from reoccupy
the people of Holland decided ion supporting the Batavian herefore decided not to submit sh. The British retaliated by comalee - Fort Frederick and low in control of Trincomalee, ; elsewhere. Point Pedro and ar and Kalpitiya followed and ling was made for the attack on
d Colombo, however, they took recording. It will be recalled their weakness in military of a Swiss Regiment belonging er mercenaries. Following an ish official, Count de Meuron ment to the British, in consito pay all the emoluments due the Dutch had failed to pay. this transfer and must have e Dutch. The change over also brother of the Count, who was s in Ceylon, to give valuable arding the discipline and figlable to the Dutch, along with battle readiness of the defenmove by the British to secure against the Dutch by entering asinghe offered his full cotee from the British that they ow the Dutch to re-establish ish were understandably unwilent, even if it were possible. gly agreed to, which did not onfirmation before hostilities

Page 122
The defensive layout of t presented the following features
The garrison at Negombo whi locality.
A defensive screen across t
· Hendala. W
Defensive posts on the Keli task of opposing the river
Troops deployed in depth f. perimeter, to deny the atta
Troops allocated to the cl Colombo both forward of fortress. ? ->
The layout clearly indicat the fortress and to prevent it
The actual engagement pre picture. Negombo had fallen, b fort there had been withdrawn
skirmishes north of the river virtually unopposed. Within th to be nonexistent and when a f attacking force, to demand surre rted with great ceremony. The desire to capitulate and when
been agreed to, the capitulation
The reasons for the capi international setting, the local assistance or even instructic There was no support from the South India who could have bee intervene. So far as the loca Dutch found that the consequer Meuron's Swiss troops were gra the capability of the garrisc
92

he Dutch garrison for Colombo
ich provided a forward defended
:he Kelani River at Wattala and
ani itself, entrusted with the crossing.
rom the river line to the city cker access to Colombo. .۷۰. است
ose defence of the Fortress of the fortress and within the
ted an intention to fight for oeing taken.
sented a completely different ecause troops allocated to the to Colombo. There were some but the river crossing was he city, the defences appeared lag of truce was sent by the 2nder, the flagbearer was escore was every indication of 'a the terms of capitulation had followed soon after. VM
tulation were many. In the L garrison found that it had no ons from Holland or Batavia. French or from Tipu Sultan of in influenced by the French to l setting was concerned, the ces of the change Over by de ve, by substantially reducing on to defend. There had been

Page 123
Assemb
· AYOUT OF BRIT :
ON COLOM BO
 

River Crossing ρoint
S F A TTA K
1796

Page 124


Page 125
desertions of Indian sepoys, soldiers. The total number a twelve hundred Europeans and e and Muslims. And even among ill-discipline, owing to non-pa local Civilian Staff were als not been paid either. Indeed empty and presented no hope ( supplies were also short and th garrison could hold out for mo this, the Dutch faced a rather sea, the British had available master ships and five smaller had at their disposal twentytv twelve hundred Indian troops, tion of two battalions from Be five thousand strong, was als left flank of the British.
Capitulation appeared in * to be desirable but imperative. were fair. Dutch soldiers Wol war. Dutch civilians could e effects or stay on, officials zens. The affairs of the Dutch examined and claims against it The British Government agree issued by the Dutch Government, The Dutch undertook to deliver only Colombo but also all othe and Matara which had not been c
After the capitulation Angelbeck, was the target of S that the British were allowed indeed, accusations were made surreptitiously introduced intC the assault more effective. Persival, suggested that the treaty" without the knowledge part, were incensed when they a capitulation. A French accus the extent of suggesting treaso
9.

apart from Malay and Muslim vailable has been put down at ighteen hundred Indians, Malays these, there was considerable yment of their emoluments. The o disgruntled because they had i, the coffers were virtually of payment. To crown it all, here was some doubt whether the re than three days. To balance daunting British strength. At three frigates, thirteen threevessels. On land, the British wo hundred European troops and with the prospect of the addingal. The army of Rajasinghe, o preparing to strengthen the
these circumstances not merely The terms of the capitulation uld be treated as prisoners of ither return home with their being treated as private citiEast India Company would be settled within stated periods. d to honour promissary notes up to a limit of Pound 50,000. to the British authorities not er places, like Kalutara, Galle captured by the British.
, the Dutch Governor, van severe criticism, on the basis into the city too easily and that British troops had been the Fort, in order to render An English accusation, by capitulation was a "private of his troops, who for their discovered that there was to be ation, by de la Thombe, went to n. What has been set out above

Page 126
is I think sufficient to estab lopments to justify the capitu that the terms of the capitul Governor's Council and that t before van Angelbeck finally ag
Having said this, one has Council have to bear responsibi capitulation. This include: soldiers which rendered the ha tive, the administrative ineffi of desertions and the loss of 1 general disorder within the ga
An Assessment of the Dutch P
So much for the matter capitulation. There is also t policy in Ceylon which requir been established that trade wa foreign involvement in these p naval and military capability h in order to deny such trade to naval capacity to secure tra Ceylon was the outcome of that responsiveness to the requests Rajasinghe to project themselve was deliberate and pre-determi which, certainly at the start,
Like the Portuguese, the erecting forts. Being more exp involvement in European wars, t initiatives. Thus their forts which was the cinnamon producir ing protection against naval att neously against attacks front Matara, Galle, Kalutara, Colomb ty. The Dutch went further, by system of inland waterways run the Western Seaboard which needs of the cinnamon trade and
94

ish that there were many deveation. There is also evidence tion had been referred to the he Council had approved them reed to the capitulation.
to add that Angelbeck and his lity for much that preceded the the ill-discipline of the "d core of the defence ineffecciency which was at the heart lorale of the civilians and the rison.
olicy in Ceylon
in the narrow perspective of he wider perspective of Dutch es attention. I think it has is the central issue governing arts and that consequently, a had to be utilised by the Dutch D their rivals, also having a de. The decision to control interest in trade and not of of Wimaladharma, Senarat and s in Ceylon. Dutch involvement ned unlike Portuguese interest was accidental. Ap
Dutch followed a policy of erienced in such work through hey improved on the Portuguese were concentrated in the West g area, with a view to providacks from the sea and simultadissident locals on land - ) and Negombo received prioriintroducing and maintaining a ning from North to South along Tould serve the transportation supplement the road system.

Page 127
A study of the Portugues the Dutch is instructive. Belo
Portuguese Forts Main - Dout
West Colombo Colomb Negombo Negomb Kalutara Kaluta
South Galle Galle
Mat二ara Matara
North Jaffna Jaffna Mannar Mannar
East Trincomalee Trinco Batticaloa Battic
Source: Ribeiro.
Source: "Dutch Forts of C
What emerges from the foregoir forts country-wide has been ) Portuguese. This has had a si kings which I discuss below.
In siting forts, the Dutc the Portuguese and the evidence Portuguese sites have been ret been instances where they ha certainly improved on the const as the Portuguese fort tended ture made of earthwork, the durable, rendering them with Dutch disclosed a square desi been used where the fort had defence need which could not ac outer perimeter was marked by
9

fort system as compared with is a comparative statement:
ch Forts Other Dutch Forts
o Hanwella Ariippu o Kalpitiya
a.
Hambantota Akuressa Tangalle Hakmana
Elephant Pass Pt. Pedro
Hamanhiel Pooneryn
Pass
BesChuter Pas Byl
malee alloa
eylon" by W. A. Nelson.
ng is that the spread of Dutch much greater than that of the gnificance in wars with local
n have been more thorough than ! is that, whilst generally the ained by the Dutch, there have ve been re-sited. The Dutch ruction of their forts. Where:o be a relatively weak strucDutch made theirs much more stonework. The layout of the Tn, although other shapes have to be sited for a particular commodate the square fort. The a ditch, the spoil from which

Page 128
was utilised to create, with the ramparts from which the mu four corners of the fort would emplacement of the guns. For ditch would be crossed by a would be secured by a draw-bric
I think that the Forts po it was from where the Portugue with the relative immunity enj by local Kings and Chieftains, Portuguese Occupation. This im the locals would find it more C which were better sited, bette wider spread than in the Portu reason which must not be over there were many Sinhalese com skill and courage to try conclu remembers Vidiya Bandara, . Wimaladharma I. By contrast th Semarat and Rajasinghe II who, side of the Dutch, but 1acked t predecessors.
Given the policy of the Dl system centred on the Fort, I a the final stage of their occ advancing forces of the Briti: have been proved so ineffectiv when one considers the defence strategy of both the Portuguese defensive forts north, south ar Kalutara and Hanwella which wo an attacker closed in on Colon Portuguese defended Kalutara a in on Colombo, whereas the I Negombo which should have of British force closing in on Co. actual defence of Colombo disc The Portuguese put up a spirite late. They went on fighting a final surrender. The Dutch on tion to the British attackers a
9

suitable foundation material, sketeers would operate. At the be created the bastions for the entry into the fort the outer bridge, the opening for which lge.
icy of the Dutch, developed as se had left it, had much to do oyed by the Dutch from attacks which had been a feature of the munity stems from the fact that difficult to attack Dutch Forts ir constructed and additionally guese time. There is another looked. In the Portuguese era manders who had both military sions with an alien enemy. One Aayadunne, Rajasinghe I and Le Dutch had to face rulers like admittedly were a thorn in the he military capability of their
itch in maintaining a defensive m puzzled by the fact that, in upation, when they faced the sh, the defences of the forts e. And this is most apparent
of Colombo the Capital. The and the Dutch was to maintain ld east of Colombo at Negombo, uld have to be overcome before bo. The evidence is that the gainst the Dutch force closing butch withdrew the troops at fered protection against the ombo from Mannar. Again, the :loses a remarkable difference. d fight and declined to capitund went down fighting till the the other hand gave no opposind capitulated under circumsta

Page 129
nces which have drawn consider who handled the capitulation.
The explanation given for obvious effort had been put intc ed to protect the capital and : capital which had been captured guese only after spirited fight prevented bloodshed and paved th the capitulation.
One is prepared to accept t cannot accept is the failure of a possession which they had cap European rival, developed again rivals and kept under subjuga years whilst they exploited the Dutch people might just as wel expense and trouble of the defe: dred and fifty years and the iç end of their occupation. Is i says, the Dutch had become inc Ceylon? And is there an indiffer attitudes described by Dr. Pa treated as a convenient spot whe bankrupts, who had influence in be dumped"?
The Dutch have to their di tolerance in the matter of reli Hindu or Catholic. There is, h tion they have made which must This lies in more than one direc they left behind a tradition of the techniques that go with th against, a fort. In the econom. credit a quite remarkable system helped to supplement the road sys rtation. In the cultural fiel Roman Dutch Law which forms th Ceylon. Regrettably, they have by their failure to ensure an h was surely intended to be an hor
97

ble criticism of the Governor
he capitulation after so much the erection of forts designnto the actual defence Of the by the Dutch from the Portuing, is that the capitulation way for favourable terms for
his explanation. But what one metropolitan Holland to defend bured by force of arms from a st attack from other European tion for hundred a and fifty wealth of the country. The l have spared themselves the nce of the territory for hunnominy of defeat at the tail ...t possible that, as Tennent lifferent to the retention of ence which is inherent in the aul Peiris that "Ceylon was re blackguards, libertines and the Directorate, could easily
scredit a noticeable lack of gion, whether it be Buddhist, owever, a balancing contribube recorded to their credit. tion. In the military sphere, erecting forts for defence and e defence of, and the attack c sphere, they have to their of inland waterways which had tem in the matter of transpoi, they have left behind the basis of the Common Law Of sullied their own escutcheon nourable termination of what ourable occupation.

Page 130
8
The British (A
It is an interesting feat although Britain had acquired the time the Portuguese acquire circumnavigated the globe not lc the Cape of Good Hope in 1498, not manifest itself till l698 Company was formed. Whilst Bri progessively in the sub-continel l876 that the Queen of Englan India. It is in the context c Empire that one must view the British forces.
At the time of the captur the British, the British Prime lared in the House of Commons t valuable colonial possession ir Indian Empire a security which first establishment." The Secu. from the capture of Trincomalee geous bay in the whole of India known and in which a whole f security".
The statement has both a p ficance. Politically, the re anxiety of the British when th undertaken an expedition to E campaign to capture India. It when Nelson virtually sank the reduced French capacity to at statement reflects the feeling c
98

D 1798-1948)
iure of British history that, an ocean-going capacity around d it, and that, although Drake png after Vasco da Gama rounded British interest in India did when the British East India Litish military power increased nt thereafter, it was not till d was proclaimed Empress of of the security of the Indian contemporaneous actions of the
e of the Dutch settlements by Minister, William Pitt, dechat Ceylon was "to us the most the globe, as giving to our it had not enjoyed from its rity he referred to stemmed "the finest and most advanta, the equal of which is hardly leet may hide and remain in
olitical and a military signiference to India revives the ley realised that Napoleon had gypt as the first stage in a
also revives the relief felt, rench fleet at Aboukir Bay and tack India. Militarily, the of security that the capture of

Page 131
Trincomalee projected in the Whitehall. Nelson regarded Trir in the world". And it is the geographical features of Trincon that statement. Its overall si bed within it enabled it to ac slargest fleet in existence at
also gave vessels anchored wi monsoon prevalent at any time. ring of hills gives it protect direction. And in the strateg. southern tip of the sub-cont counter any sea-borne threat t that the Prime Minister exulted
Phase l. The Kandyan Wa:
The events of the first occupation present a disturb study, the growing power and in tains was mentioned and cont decline in the power and infl Matters came to a head in l79. Adigar, Pilimatalawa, reached ranked next to the King in any nal power was such that he had ruler, Rajadhi Rajasinghe. The brother, Muttusamy, as interPilimatalawa took advantage Muttusamy from ascending the t l798, Pilimatalawa moved swift son of a sister of Rajadhi, w Wickrama Rajasinghe. The Adiga King in due course and instal King however gave every indicat the Adigar's tunes and indeed declining to marry the Adigar's the daughter of an enemy of Pil. chagrin. Muttusamy for his sought their protection.
Pilimatalawa, being vexed and anxious to supplant him. On
9S

minds of the politicians at comalee as the "finest harbour manifold topographical and halee as a harbour that induced -ze and the depth of the ocean commodate the entirety of the the time. The hills around it thin it protection from any In the tactical field, this ion from sea attack from any ic field, its location at the inent, gave it a capacity to zo India. It is small wonder
rs, Riots and Rebellions
half-century of the British ed picture. Earlier in this fluence of the Sinhalese chieftrasted with the corresponding luence of the Nayakkar kings. 8 when the power of the first its zenith. The first Adigar case but Pilimatalawa's persobeen able to depose the then King had appointed his Queen's rex but not as his successor. of this position to prevent throne. On the King's death in :ly to place on the throne the 7 ho assumed the title of Sri r's plan was to oust the puppet himself as King. The puppet cion that he would not dance to proceeded to prove this by daughter and instead marrying imatalawa, much to the latter's part fled to the British and
with the King's intransigence the throne, now sought British

Page 132
assistance to have the King rer throne. He offered in return S the British. As it happened, t felt that the dual control of ruled the interior whilst the E region, was unsatisfactory and Kingdom was the solution. What This was forthcoming not long a were molested and a parcel of was seized by the King's agent coming, even after the Court areca. The Governor thereupo against the kingdom.
The Kandyan war which fol. British assault groups convergi nded by Gen. Hay McDowell and c the 5lst and 19th Regiment and Bengal and Madras artillery set commanded by Colonel Barbut and men supported by artillery, s route, inter mediate forts we inter-communication with Color McDowell) for communication wi Kandy, they found that the King
The Governor made efforts success. He accordingly decide Kandy. Attempts made to induc the new King met with no suci success would depend on Pilima plans. Accordingly, he proposed between the British Govern) Muttu samy the illustrious L. Adigar and other nobles of the hold court at Jaffna, deliver country to Pilimatalawa as "Utul to take effect "as soon as the delivered to the British."
The success of the Agreen military capacity of the Briti the capture of the King. This,
(

noved and himself placed on the ubstantial trading benefits to he British Governor, North, had
the Island, whereby the King British controlled the maritime
that military control of the it he needed was a "casus belli". fter, when some British persons areca belonging to the British is. No restitution was forth
acknowledged the seizure of n decided on military action
lowed was set in motion by two ng on Kandy. The first, comma'omposed of two thousand men of a hundred Malays supported by out from Colombo. The second, qomposed also of two thousand set out from Trincomalee. En re set up at Dambadeniya for nbo and at Matale (later Fort th Trincomalee. On arrival at
had left the capital.
to reach the King but with no d to declare Muttusamy King of ce the chieftains to recognise cess. North now decided that atalawa's involvement in his i that an Agreement be drawn up ment and "His Majesty King ord Pili matalawa, the second Court" whereby Muttusamy would ing the administration of the m Kumaraya". The Agreement was Prince lately on the throne is
lent of course depended on the sh to hold the capital pending however, failed to materialise
) O

Page 133
because the garrison was gro jungle fever, from which both G became casualties, thus necess devolving on a Major Davis, an incapable of handling the job. garrison to lose at the rate ( troops deserted. Davis now fa dreds of Kandyans swooped dowr hours of fighting, Davis was allowed to leave Kandy with hi sick and the wounded behind. charge. On reaching the Mahave spate and impossible to cross. mercy and demanded the surre refused at first but eventual puts it, handed him over to t But the worst for Davis was stage, the King ordered him to : Kandy. This he did and a gen what is called "Davis" Tree" ju Davis himself was spared but h which he appealed to his frien but without avail. He died a b trous and in many ways, disgrac vement in Kandyan affairs.
The King, now elated by h: uprising in Colombo, Negomb Mulilaitivu, Trincomalee and Ba Bengal and the Cape had to be st British settlements. The Ki attack on Colombo and indeed S guns. At Hanwella, he was st reportedly held by sick person the King had to return to Kandy
In 1804, General Weymss, w planned a concerted attack on Island, with the object of ca and injury to the enemy's count accordingly designed to take Puttalam, Hambantota, Trincoma. difference of opinion, however
(

3sly weakened by the onset of en. McDowell and Colonel Barbut itating command of the troops officer who proved hopelessly The fever spread, causing the if six men a day whilst Malay ced further disaster when hunon his troops. After several forced to surrender. He was s able bodied meat-teaving the He took Muttu samy under his li Ganga, he found the river in The King now had Davis at his nder of Muttusamy. This was ly and "basely" as Codrington he King who had him executed. still to come because at this Lay down his arms and return to eral massacre took place under st outside Kandy. The life of e lived a miserable life during is to have him sent to England roken man. Thus ended a disasseful episode in British invol
is success, decided to engineer }o, Chi law, Mannar, Jaffna, tticaloa. British troops from ent to deal with the attacks on ng himself decided to lead an et out with a few six pounder :opped by the local garrison, s. His troops were routed and , a disappointed man.
ho had succeeded Gen. McDowell, andy from various parts of the using "the gravest devastation ry". Simultaneous attacks were place from Negombo, Chilaw, ee and Batticaloa. Owing to a
between North and Wemyas, the
l

Page 134
orders were countermanded but not reach the local commander M set out with a force of eighty sepoys. On arrival in Kandy, he out support from any British trc return to Trincomalee but lost the way and the effects of fe gallantly and extricated himsel Perera has compared to the "Gre: mention above. Johnson's feat ce reputation of British troops wh Davis' military misfortunes.
North was now at the end c is interesting to note his place Governors:
1803 Lt. Gen. Maitland l8ll Major Gen. Wilson (Lt. l8l2 Gen. Sir Rebert Brownr
This resumed a policy of having end of the l9th Century with
1796 Col. Stewart 1797 Major Gen. Doyle 1798 Brig. Gen. de Meuron
the last being the Commander o went over from the Dutch to the ment to General rank in the Bri' considers that he was Swiss and
the importance placed by the Bl the de Meuron Regiment to Britis
I now pass on to the rei Wickrama Rajasinghe. This perio struggle in which the King trie chiefs and they tried to destro still unable to secure the thre the zenith of his powers. He no for his son, by arranging a mar daughter of the natural son
O

thos meant for Batticaloa did |ajor Johnston. He, therefore, two Europeans and two hundred found himself isolated withpops. He, therefore decided to many men due to harassment on ver. He, however, fought on f in a retreat which Fr. S.G. at Retreat" of Azevedo which I ertainly helped to restore the ich had been lost during Major
of his tour as Governor and it was filled by three military
Governor) igg
military governors at the tail
E the de Meuron Regiment that
British. de Meuron's appointtish army is unusual, when one not British, thus accentuating citish on the crossing over of sh ranks.
mainder of the reign of Sri d was characterised by a power !d to destroy the power of his y him. Pilimatalawa, although one for himself, was still at w decided to secure the crown riage between his son and the
of the late King Rajadhi
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Page 135
Rajasinghe. The King was ince Pilimatalawa from the Adigarsh mistake of attempting the assas course failed. He and his son w mned to death. Pili matala wa spared through the intercession
The new first Adigar Sabaragamuwa, and a member of clan. The King disliked him but other chiefs, could not remove position as the chief Cof the appointed his chief opponent. Ehelapola now found himself l circles and retired to his Diss was accused of defrauding an Inc ordered him to appear in Kandy misdemeanours brought to the Ki do so, he was deprived of his Ad as hostage, pending his submiss.
Ehelapola now sought Briti King. For this purpose, he Official named d' Oyly (who i contact with Kandyan affairs, which he had created), with a vi influencing the Governor to British authorities, for their p on the advice of a rebel minist having knowledge of Ehelapola's vengeance on his family in one Ceylon history. John Davy, in h Ceylon" gives a vivid account also induced to act against all ciated either with the Adigar British were thus being forced.
The British for their part, Kandyan Kingdom, were not inte: might savour of military aggran some military control in the Isl exploit the natural resources o. administration intact. In thes
O

insed by this move and deposed ip. The Adigar now made the sination of the King, which of rere arrested, tried and condewas beheaded but his son was of some chiefs.
was Ehelapola, Dissawa of Pilimatalawa's own family and because of his influence over him. To counter Ehelapola's anti-Nayakkar group, the King Molligoda, as Second Adigar - osing his position in palace savani, Sabaragamuwa. Here he dian dealer in areca. The King to answer for this and other ng's notice. On his refusal to igarship and his family seized ion to the court.
sh assistance to overthrow the approached a senior British s believed to have had close largely through a spy network ew to securing his services in move against the King. The bart, found it difficult to act er. In the meantime, the King machinations against him, took of the most gruesome events in is "Account of the Interior of of the outrage. The King was l persons who had been assoor d'Oyly. The hands of the
though desirous of ending the rested in taking action which disement. All they wished was and which would enable them to f the land but leave, the civil e circumstances, they sought,
3

Page 136
as they did in 1803, a "casu; to intervene. The "casus be English traders in Kandyan te lated, leaving seven dead. ' was done by Ehelapola's agent posed to investigate this, anc as aggression and accordingly an expedition against the Kin
In the proclamation iss moves, the Governor took th acting in accordance with the Kingdom. Some headmen and th but still others fled before There was virtually no opposit from two directions, one thro through the Balana pass. Adic British forces but assisted t adherence. Before the forces : declined to believe that the Kandy after the massacre in l8 he realised that the defence p tive and decided to flee the troops belonging to the Ceylo) of Ehelapola and captured. Ti to send him to Vellore in one
On board the vessel that v Wickrama Rajasinghe said the about Ehelapola, "Take care abc who was a father to him" and a good man but not clever. He and you may depend on him beca would never have abandoned me has not much power and will inc enemies."
Fr. S.G. Perera, himself say of the King: "It must not Rajasinghe was a bad king. H. his people. His quarrels wer, the chief reasons why they wer evinced a determination to pro
l

belli" to develop, if they were li" was soon forthcoming. Ten Critory were attacked and mutihere was a suspicion that this ; but the Governor was not dispreferred to treat the incident prepared for war, by mounting
led to account for his warlike 2 stand that the British were unanimous voice of the Kandyan ir people joined the expedition the advancing British forces. ion and the forces reached Kandy agh the Veuda pass and the other rar Molligoda did not join the hem with Supplies and promised treached Kandy, the King at first 2 British would dare to attack O3 but when it did reach Kandy, ut up by his troops was ineffeccapital. He was followed by n regiment led by the followers he British authorities arranged of their ships.
was taking him to his exile, Sri following to his British escort but that man; he has betrayed me bout Molligoda, he said "He is a has sworn to serve the British use he is a man of his word. He if he could have helped it. He t be useful to you. He has many
a great historian, has this to
be supposed that Sri Wickrama was anxious to do his duty by with the Dissawas and one of e so hostile to him was that he tect his people from the vexa
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Page 137
tions of the Dissa was who were Dissa was who prevented him fro people; it was the Chiefs who
quoting his authority for their Davy, who was contemporaneousl says this in his book "An accou "He may justly be considered an wrapped up in selfishness - pos - destitute of religious feelin ples – and without check, human
d'Oyly now planned the futu Adigars Ehelapola and Molligoda les. An Act of Settlement was the 2nd March 1815 at a Conven attended by the Chiefs. The signed by the Governor, Ehela made the following provisions:
Sri Wickrama Rajasinghe wa His claims and those of h forfeited. The dominion o sovereign of England to Governors, saving to the Korales, Vidanes and ot headmen, the rights, pri respective offices.
The Buddhist religion was ministers, places of wo protected.
There were other consequel which left the control of and Sabaragamuwa in the ha
The Convention was followe - meant for international consum seizure by the British of a nei
"Led by the invitation o acclamation of the people
Majesty have entered the K.
C

the real tyrants. It was the a redressing the wrongs of the set the people against him by
tyrannies." By contrast, John r on the staff of the Governor, nt of the Interior of Ceylon": example of the perfect tyrant; sessed of ungovernable passion Js - destitute of moral princi
or divine."
Lre of the Kingdom with the two , the Dissa was and other nobdrafted which was presented on tion summoned by the Governor Act of Settlement, which was pola, Molligoda and Dissawas,
as declared fallen and deposed. his family to the throne were f the Kingdom was vested inthe o be exercised through his Adigars, Dissawas, Mohottalas, her Chiefs and subordinate .vileges and powers of their
declared inviolate; its rites, rship to be maintained and
tial provisions, the Chief of the three, four, seven Korales nds of the Chiefs.
d by a Proclamation which was otion, in justifying an act of shbouring kingdom. It read:
the Chiefs welcomed by the the forces of His Britanic andyan territory and penetrated
5

Page 138
to the capital. Divine efforts with uniform and the interior provinces h the Government remains at representatives. "
These events marked the termin ndence in this country which ha on the part of the initial colc the Dutch, to end that indepe Kandyan Kingdom, colonial rul The attitude of British comm following extract from Knightor in Vol.2, Chapter 3:
"From this day (lA Feb., l: Sinhales e independence material interruption for
The reactions among the Ehelapola, who, had helped to p King and to capture him, a investiture as king, was most d helped the British forces wit similar status, was also disapp
f
The Chiefs for their part the Act of Settlement which g brought into being officials ir carry that sovereignty through would inevitably redound to the whatsoever the phraseology in t and power. In many ways, the place of the old chiefs.
The people were disturbed in the three four and seven Ko found that their chiefs contin The people in other provinces : chiefs, found that their chie officials of the British.
lO 6

Providence has blessed their :omplete success. The ruler of is fallen into their hands and
the disposal of His Majesty's
ltion of the vestiges of indeped been ensured, despite efforts nial powers, the Portuguese and indence. After the end of the under the British continued. entators is summed up in the Chapter XVII quoted by Tennent
35), we date the extinction of which had continued without 2317 years."
Kandyans were considerable. ilan the expedition against the nd had not been chosen for isappointed. Molligoda who had h supplies could have claimed ointed.
found that the arrangement in ave sovereignty to the British whom was vested the right to The power of such officials detriment of their own power, he Act to safeguard such rights new officials had taken the
for independent reasons. Those rales and in Sabaragamuwa, now ued in control of those areas. tho had no quarrels with their is had been supplanted by the

Page 139

R OF
PERIOD
* *---

Page 140


Page 141
The outcome of the disapp the people was the rebellion wh history as the Uva Rebellion. been a prearranged plian to pri thinks that it was a sponta: deposition of the King and trappings of king ship and reg summary justice. To this, chagrin that their own trappin by British officials.
The rebellion itself was British official who had gone Badulla district. Ehelapola wa the crime. After a prelimina suggested that his brother-inkeep order in the region of th part took the side of the att and, given his influence in the which spread over Vellassa, Kotmale and Dumbara. In view uprising, the British were un plan of action. Martial Law military posts were establi rebellion was reported. Thirte in areas outside the lower par 4th Korales, Udunuwara and Yati
It was during the Uva exploited to the full their The following extract frc i 11ustrative. He said that t strategems of every kind and t the difficult nature of the knowledge of the ground. The fire on them from inaccessible an inpenetrable jungle; they which we had to march with sna spring guns, spikes etc. an opportunity occurred, they wol quarter." All along in this st the skill with which the Sinhal

ointment felt by the chiefs and lich broke out in l8l8 known in
There does not appear to have 2cipitate the rebellion. Davy neous outburst following the the removal of the outward sal authority which dispensed the chiefs contributed their gs of office were being eroded
sparked off by an attack on a to investigate a crime in the is sent by d'Oyly to investigate lry investigation, the Adigar -law, Keppitipola, be sent to le attack. Keppitipola for his ackers of the British official region, there was an uprising Bintenne, Ullapane, Hewaheta,
of the sporadic nature of the able to work out a coordinated r was of course declared but shed as and when evidence of een such posts were established t of Sabaragamuwa, the 3rd and
Waa.
Rebellion that the Kandyans capacity for guerilla warfare. om Dr. John Davy's book is he insurgents "had recourse to ook every possible advantage of country and of their minute y would waylay our parties and
heights or from the ambush of
would line the paths through res of different kinds, such as d in every instance that an uld show no mercy and gave no udy, I have drawn attention to ese soldiers adapted themselves
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Page 142
to guerilla warfare and explo country. Cordiner's comment on as it is pilthy, "There are fel the rude and undisciplined pea with the trained soldier." Cle Sinhalese soldier had come into
Given the harassment of t fighting and the fevers experie casualties were heavy. Out of there were one thousand casual have been put down as ten the Kandyans by the British troops the crops of the Kandyans wh: famine. This combined with th the incidence of fevers brought ce on the part of the Kandyan rebellion came to an end.
Keppiti pola and his henc Court Martial and sentenced beheaded. Pilimatalawa who h tried under the King was also c reprived and banished. The out Eheliapola a bitter blow. Admit his part in subduing Kandy by r was caught attempting to corru was banished to Mauritius. Mol join the rebels, came out of th unsullied. Keppitipola was pos by his people for having stood the rebellion.
The rebellion led the aut Chiefs had involved themselves Government and "recover for the properties and lives of the Reforms were accordingly intro established usages affecting t administered by British officia
1 (

ited the wooded nature of the
this capability is as shrewd
countries in the world where
sant is so nearly on a level
arly, in his own terrain, the
his own.
he Kandyans, the extent of the nced in the jungle, the British five thousand troops employed, Lties. The Kandyan casualties usand. The retaliation on the included the cutting down of ich brought about a degree of e effects of the fighting and about a dwindling of resistanS Leaders were caught and the
hman Madugalle were tried by
to death. They were both ad escaped death earlier when ourt martialled, but once again :come of the rebellion was for tedly, he was given credit for lot being punished but, when he pt and subvert his guards, he ligoda, whose disavanis did not e investigations with his name thumously acclaimed as a hero up to the British, by leading
:horities to conclude that the in it, in order to subvert the mselves absolute power over the
great mass of the people." duced whereby the ancient and he people would hereafter be Ls.
8

Page 143
From now on the control would
A Board of Commissioners
five of the Kandyan provi The remaining six Kandyan c control of Government Agen
Military agents were inst three and four Korales, M. Lower Uva and Vella SSa.
In the seven Korales, Sabar were to be civilian agents
In enforcing these reforms and
chiefs, the Governor used the i He therefore assumed a grea unfettered by His Majesty's Cou
There were other reforms
at large more directly. These
more leisurely pace. One excep in respect of roads, because the the reforms, was insistent tha roads; second - roads and third received precedence. Traditiona: the countryside to remain unde more difficult for an invader and fever were the allies of th of his enemies. No roads were
tracks, known only to a few an to use, were all that were pe changed all this and under th neer, Major Skinner and under Capt. Dawson, he saw to it that le for use by vehicles. Shc through the rock at Kadugannawa bridge over the river at Perade Sinhalese had a saying that no keeping Sinhale unless it had t and bored a road through the achieved by the British who pe fact that the hills round Kandy
1 (

pe as follows:-
would control the affairs of nces - the Kanda Uda Pas Rata. listricts were placed under the „tS.
alled in Uva and Bintenna, the atale, Harrispattuwa, Hewaheta
agamuwa and Tamankaduwa, there
o
in modifying the powers of the inherent powers of a sovereign. ter power over the country, İncill of the Chiefs.
which would benefit the people were also undertaken but at a }tion to the pace of reform was Governor who was spearheading it priorities would be "first - - roads". The road to Kandy ally, the Kandyan kings allowed r jungle in order to make it to enter the realm. The jungle e King and so were the enemies therefore developed and jungle i wide enough for only one man mitted. Barnes, the Governor, a direction of his Chief Engi
the immediate supervision of a road was constructed suitabIrtly after the road emerged , it passed over a single span niya on its way to Kandy. The foreign nation would succeed in he Dallada, bridged the Mahaveli hills. All this had now been rhaps felt the relief from the which had furnished a natural
) 9

Page 144
rampart had been breached and t rampart had been broken.
Other roads followed until
islandwide. Attention had all education, the postal services of land tenure whereby the King his subjects in kind, called "r tant year for two reasons. One reform whereby the administrat vested in the Board of Commiss Supreme Court of Ceylon with Island including the Kandyan p setting up of an Executive a former composed of officials an the Island. The latter compos by the Governor and six offici merchants and the landed prop ctions. These two changes cons cracy in Ceylon. The Governor's Ceylon without trial had hither but now the age of outspoken p the curtailment of the Governor
There is no evidence that effected brought the Government demonstrate public acceptance c dence on the other hand that elle eject the British. A series recorded. In 1820, a pretender Narendra Singha attempted a re easily crushed. Another in Anu leader being caught. In l834, abolished Rajakariya, there wa had been affected. Some leadi complicity in a plot to seiz soldiers and massacre the Briti brother of the Adigar Molligoda jury of Europeans and Ceylonese the case were acquitted. He w First Adigar bout was later reir four koraes. In 1843, there Chandragotte Unnanse.
l

he spell of security behind the
there was a network of roads so been paid to agriculture,
and the removal of the system could demand the services of ajakariya". l833 was an imporwas the Charter for judicial ion of justice which had been Sioners was now vested in the
jurisdiction over the whole Drovinces. The other was the nd Legislative Council. The ld constituted the Executive of ed of nine officials appointed als drawn from the principal rietors, had legislative funtituted the beginning of demopower to banish a person from bo inhibited free press opinion ress had been introduced, with 's powers.
the reforms which were being nearer to the people, so as to of foreign rule. There is eviments in the country wished to of rebellions have thus been calling himself Wimaladharma bellion in Bintenne which was radhapura resulted in the rebel following the reforms which s some reaction by chiefs who ng noblemen were suspected of e the Dalada, corrupt Malay sh. The chief accused was the a who was tried before a mixed 2. He and the other accused in as however deposed from being stated and made Dissawe of the was an abortive rising under

Page 145
The last of the rebellion rebellion in 1848. The immedia the imposition of a "gun tax" a in Kandy which necessitated th Secretary, Emerson Tennent. T in Colombo where the participan of the press who persuaded the uprisings all over the countr Matale, where the crowds not or but also went into the extent Puran Appu, King of Kandy. Ano was Gongalagoda Banda in Dambul
The authorities, mindful o l8l8, the series of attempted r matory nature of recent demo extent of proclaiming kings, t sent uprising. Troops were Dambulla and Kurunegala were g hundred persons denounced as r others publicly flogged and in India was also requisitioned.
As it happens, there was actions of the Government were excessive. And when thirty-fc Supreme Court with only sevent Justice, Sir Anthony Oliphant, recommendation to the Governor respect of the persons convi words: "When it is considered t by the rebels, that no Europe that no persons had appeared i) break at Matale and Kurunegal been spilt is sufficient for all tion of the law or for example the Chief Justice, reading as "I have served my sovereign fo the bread of the British natic the glory of the one was being the other for humanity was beil could not remain passive an appeals had any effect on the
l

was the now celebrated Matale lite cause of the rebellion was gainst which there was protest e intervention of the Colonial here was another demonstration ts were spoken to by Dr. Elliot m to disperse. There now were y. The worst of them was in lly indulged in riotous activity
of proclaiming one of them, ther to be similarly acclaimed .la.
f what had happened in 18O3 and ebellions since and the inflaminstrations which went to the ook serious notice of the pre
called out. Matale, Kandy, laced under martial law. two ebels were shot and hanged and prisoned. Military help from
a current of opinion that the repressive and the punishments ur men were tried before the een being convicted, the Chief found it necessary to make a for clemency to be exercised in cted. He used the following hat only one soldier is wounded ans had been put to death and n warlike array since the outa, the blood which has already l purposes, whether of vindica.." A private letter written by follows, is even more poignant: r twenty years and I have eaten in for that time. I felt that tarnished and the character of ng compromised, and therefore I y longer." Neither of these authorities.
ll

Page 146
In the meantime, Puran A been shot and a monk called K Court Martial for failing to giv resulted in the arrest of rebe tenced to be shot. The Queen the Governor for reprieve, on th ficient evidence for a convicti
This led to considerable Elliot and A.M. Ferguson of the Bar and Lawrence the Son and Justice, were participants. T included the Chief Justice and officers who conducted the Col. London for an inquiry. Priva Torrington the Governor were Emerson Tennent, the Colonial S In a post-script to the epis indemnifying the Governor and Court Martial.
Thus ended a regrettable history, and certainly in thei the background to the uprisings of Torrington's councillors tha was at stake may conceivably unforgivable was the ferocity lion was crushed. It certainl what is more serious is that i the doubt, if not opprobrium, c colony in an emergency.
Phase 2. Military and
During the fighting leadi garrison and in its immediate ties, predictably enough, reli included naval vessels, artill the fortress of Trincomalee an Their Headquarters was set up i
An exception to the empl however made by the inclusion
l

ppu and Gongalagoda Banda had udappola Unnanse was tried by re information which might have ls. He was arraigned and sens Advocate H.C. Selby, begged he ground that there was insufon. The monk was shot.
public agitation in which Dr. press, Richard Morgan of the Private Secretary of the Chief he principal complainants who
the Queen's Advocate and the lirt Martial, were summoned to te letters belonging to Lord produced and he resigned. Sir Secretary, was not reappointed. ode, an Ordinance was passed all persons concerned with the
: episode in British colonial r occupation of Ceylon. Given , the apprehension in the minds ut the security of the country
have been genuine. What was with which the socalled rebely cost Torrington his job. But t cost the British authorities ast on their capacity to rule a
Political Development
ng to the defeat of the Dutch aftermath, the British authoriad on their own troops. These ery troops for the defence of d infantry troops as necessary. in Trincomalee.
oyment of British troops was of the de Meuron Regiment of
l2

Page 147
Swiss troops in their establis came to be made by the inclusic to supplement the British In Army Historical Research, publi wing information on this Briti
In 1976, troops in the D' transferred to the British E initially as a Malay Corps a Ceylon Regiment under a Britis "Cinghalese" unit was raise Regiment - this was also calle 3rd Ceylon Regiment was raised Penang. Both these units were All three Ceylon Regiments fou In l805, more "Cinghalese" anc the 2nd and 3rd Regiments and seemed to have been some prefe 4th Regiment composed entirely but disbanded in l8l.5.
In 1815, the list Regiment in the Kandyan war and Lt. My troops, is credited with havi) of Sri Wickrama Rajasinghe. disbanded and in l820 the 2n name of the Regiment was chang In 1848, the list Regiment se] Rebellion. After the rebe "Cinghalese" was reduced. In the lst Regiment did duty in Ce as "having remained steady Ceylon Rifle Regiment was disk
The history of the Ceylor phase of the employment of non service in the British esta follows of events that happene century after the Matale Rebe of the Ceylon Light Infantry' by my own records.

ment. A further exemption now n of locally enlisted personnel antry Component. The British shed in London gives the folloh initiative: V−
Ltch service, who were Malays ast India Company and formed nd later in l802, as the list h Colonel. In the same year, a i and called the 2nd Ceylon i the "sepoy" corps. In 1803, a
with recruits from Molucca and
commanded by British Colonels. ght in the Kandyan war of l803. 'Madrasis' were recruited for more Malays for the list. There rence for African recruits and a
of Africans was raised in l8l4
is reported to have served well Lius, in command of some Malay ng been involved in the capture In 1817, the 3rd Regiment was i followed suit. In 1824, the ed to the Ceylon Rifle Regiment. ved with Credit in the Matale llion, the recruitment of l857, during the Indian Mutiny, ylon and the men were described and true to their salt". The anded in 1874.
Rifle Regiment marks the first -British personnel in Ceylon for olishment. The recital which in the second half of the 19th llion, is based on the "History Dy Oscar Abeyratne supplemented i

Page 148
The second phase in the en nel commenced in l86l with the l86l designed to "authorise the and to provide for the good O This followed a petition to t zens led by Mr. Brodie, Assist It is interesting to note that which gave the name to the 18 entertained so soon after the the fact that it was a petitio thing to do with its approval.
Not much activity has be l88l , when another group of pe Magistrate of Colombo, made an ment in a corps formed of thems to the provisions of the Ordin. then Lt. Governor gave his ass April, l88l. The Corps so for Light Infantry Volunteers and I Volunteer movement in Ceylon. of such a corps would compensa disbandment of the Ceylon Rifle
Some interesting developm aftermath of the creation of t and the preference petitioners wished to serve led to these de
ll. The authorities now rea be exclusively Europeans becaus were European and l56 Ceylonese
2. The petitioners came f Matale where detachments were i
3. Around fifteen persons and this led to the creati Volunteers.
4. The upcountry element li unit in due course to be de Rifles".

ployment of non-British person
enactment of Ordinance No.3 of
volunteeer Corps in the Colony rder and discipline thereof." e Governor by a group of citiant Government. Agent of Matale. the petition was made in Matale 48 rebellion and that it was uprising. It is possible that n of English persons had some
en recorded between l86l and rsons led by WJN Boake, Police other petition to permit enrolelves and submitting themselves ance earlier promulgated. The ent in a Proclamation dated l med was designated the Ceylon marked the commencement of the Quite obviously, the formation te for the void created by the
Regiment in 1874.
ents have been recorded in the he CLIV. The names, addresses gave to the arm in which they velopment.
alised that the unit would not te, of the 366 petitioners, 210
rom Colombo, Galle, Matara and n due course set up.
wished to join the Artillery on of the Ceylon Artillery
2d to the creation of a mounted signated the "Ceylon Mounted

Page 149
5. The stretcher bearers medical unit.
6. The professions well organisation.
Thus, there was a breakwa a public works company and the legal company modelled itself which attracted judges and lea
The legal company attrac Berwick, Hector VanLangenberg, other distinguished lawyers VanLangenberg (snr) who were all a tradition which attracted - Jayewardene, BW Bawa Jame Jayetillake, Gratiaen and other
Still in l881, the then P1 Edward VII, accepted the invita Honorary Colonel, thus commenci regiment in the persons of Edw Wales and the Duke of Gloucest the Prince of Wales and his mot ted to be incorporated in the e
In 1888, twentyseven membe members of the Ceylon Artille the Ceylon Garrison Artillery Artillery.
In l890, the stretcher bea ment since l881 formed the Ce course, the Ceylon Army Medical
In 1892, the Mounted Col Ceylon Mounted Infantry and in Rifles.
In 1897, Queen Victoria ce her reign, and a contingent fri
pate. Commenting on its perfo
l

converted themselves into a
re represented in the unit
cer company, a railway company, legal and medical company. The on the "Devil's Own" in England, ding practitioners at the bar.
ted legal luminaries like Tom HL. Wendt and HJC Pereira whilst like Dornhorst and James so members of the CLIV, created
men from Hultsdorp like EW es Van Langenberg (jnr), EGP
S.
cince of Wales, later to become tion of the Regiment to be its .ng a Royal association with the ard VIII when he was Prince of er, his brother. The plumes of
to Ich Dien, were also permit- . mblem of the regiment.
rs of the CL.IV were enrolled as ry Volunteers, later to become and in due course, the Ceylon
arrers who had been in the regiylon Medical Corps and in due Ll Corps.
mpany of the CL.IV became the due course, the Ceylon Mounted
lebrated the diamond jubilee of om Ceylon was sent to particibrmance, the Governor stated as
5

Page 150
follows: "For the first time Sovereign was escorted throug troops and among these, volunt ted infantry and infantry - to stand, a creditable position." contingents from Ceylon taking Victory celebrations in London
From the foregoing rec history of the Ceylon Light only the history of the Infan birth of many units of the Cey became the Ceylon Defence Forc
A word about other noncontemporaneous period. A majc agriculture, in the interests communications were developed Governor Barnes to cater for I meet the growing needs of the c started in l858 and the port ( was recognised that the port ( needs of the country since th inadequate to deal with the mu increased exports and imports v was also taken up and by l872 t been developed. The revenue fl development to be paid for ar providing primary education anc ty education by providing schol till our own universities were
The outcome of all these c were being encouraged to take their own affairs. Admittedly a colony which was steadily m the shackles of colonial rule national affairs.
Phase 3. World War
The first half of the 20t rish, by the selection of the
l

in the history of Ceylon, the the metropolis by colonial ers of Ceylon -artillery, mounok prominent part and, I underThis created a tradition of part in Coronation, Jubilee and
tal, one coneludes that the infantry Volunteers marked not try Arm in Ceylon but also the on Volunteer Force which later
military developments in the r factor was the development of of which external and internal
The road system, started by (lilitary needs, was expanded to ountry. The railway system was of Colombo soon after, when it of Galle, which had served the le days of the Portuguese, was Ich bigger vessels dealing with which used the port. Irrigation he entire irrigation system had som developments enabled social ld this included education, by l creating the lead to universiarships to universities abroad,
established.
levelopments was that Ceylonese an increasingly large part in Ceylon was still a colony but king progress towards shedding und assuming responsibility for
s and Independence
h century opened with a floumounted company of the CL.IV to
6

Page 151
form the bulk of a mounted unit War. The unit acquitted itself was accorded the honour of Carl
In 1910, a special appoin Ceylon, was created and Major ted for the office. His dutie system to give early warning landing places, collection of mand and the Creation of a sect mobilisation.
In l9l4 World War I cor mobilised. The CGA mounted gu the CLI took up positions cove northern entrances to Colombo, deployed in accordance with offer was made by the CLI to mu service overseas. This vas tur however prevent many members services to many units abroad. the CDF were enrolled for SerVi killed in action.
This is evidence of the sp. the CDF. Many performed wei individuals deserve mention. commendation given by his C Seneviratne (later Major Senevi "conspicuous gallantry devotio during an enemy counter atta recipient of the Military Medal tion was about another CILI m Guards during his service abro made in the Official History of and Flanders by Sir Arthur Co follows:
"It is typical of the tru that, when every man on killed or wounded, the Coldstreams, carried on th before he was blown to pie
l

which was to serve in the Boer with such distinction that it trying a Royal banner.
itment of Intelligence Officer, TG Jayewardene of the CLI selecs included the setting up of a of vessels approaching possible information useful to the comet service to be established on
mmenced and all CDF units were ns for the defence of Colombo, ring the eastern, southern and whilst all other units were mobilisation requirements. An Lster one hundred volunteers for ned down. This decision did not of the CDF from offering their In the event, ll8 all ranks of ce abroad, of whom twelve were
irit which obviously existed in l but the performance of two
The first of these was the ommanding Officer to Cpl DB ratne CLI) which recognises his n to duty and also leadership Sk" Cpl Seneviratne was the ... The second of these commendaan who joined the Coldstream ad, Private Jacotine, which is the British Campaign in France nam Doyle and which reads as
ly desperate spirit of the men an outpost save one had been survivor, Pte Jacotine of the e fighting alone for 20 minutes !ces by a grenade."
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Page 152
In l915, the CLI was c Infantry unit, the 28th Punjabi camp at Diyatalawa. The CLI re prisoners were moved to Austri in Ceylon, the CDF was call Colombo.
- In 1917, the CLI was Orde tics of the Indian Army which h in Colombo. These duties wer Detachment of the CLI, compo hundred men, not only for the comenced.
In l922, the CLI was awar the King's and Regimental Co performance in peace time since with that of its mounted compan the award of a Royal banner involving the relief of a Reg Army, must have been taken Colours. The Colours were pres the Regiment, HRH the Prince o command of Lt. Col. TG Jayeward
In 1939, World War II mobilised. An Indian Divisi operational duties. With the garrison was strengthened. In of South East Asia Command, und up in Kandy along with troop Theatre. In the meantime, expanded, so that its units cou till then carried out by Britis posted to other theatres of the deployed for the following oper
A regular artillery unit just before the war commenced, British service. The artillery add anti-aircraft units to coas were deployed to meet artillery and other vital areas throughol
l

rdered to relieve an Indian s, who were in charge of a POW mained on guard till the German lia. In 1915, during the riots 2d upon to perform duties in
red to relieve the 80th Carnaad been performing guard duties e undertaken by the Mobilised ;ed of three officers and two iuration but until World War II
ded the distinction of carrying lours. Quite obviously, its its formation in l881, coupled y in the Boer War which merited and its duties in World War I ular Batallion of the Indian into account in the award of ented by the Honoray Colonel of if Wales, to the unit under the ene
commenced and the CDF was on was posted to Ceylon for fall of Singapore, the British
due course, the Head Quarters ær Admiral Mountbatten, was set is meant for duty in the SEA the CDF was reorganised and ld take over some of the duties h and other troops as they were
war. The reorganised CDF was ational duties: -
of Ceylonese had been raised
to supplement regulars of the
of the CDF was reorganised to t artillery units. These units needs in Colombo, Trincomalee it the country.
8

Page 153
The Engineer Unit was r engineering and plant opera Training Depot and a Training
The CLI was expanded to f depot. The five battalions wi Trincomalee; one in Colombo; HQ in Kandy; one on training duties as required. The batta guard duty. But association involved with SEAC in the ope gave invaluable experience whi of the CDF. The Battalion ir guard duty, but was also resp Defence area" in which were Bay. The Battalion was also s the likelihood of suicide sq midget sub-marines for assi Special reconnaissance was acc intelligence covering possible routes to the installation a Special maps were prepared s reconnaissance. My unit had til Trincomalee on the special dut in Kandy and therefore gained
The Signals were expan reorganised CDF.
Similarly, medical and 1 meet the needs of the CDF.
There were two outstandil were the two Japanese air rai The attacking forces tested Force and anti-aircraft defenc performance of the defending f ber of Japanese aircraft broug
The reason for the tw Trincomalee by the Japanese ha ever since they were undertake major follow-up has led to the

eorganised to undertake field ting functions. An Engineer Ning were also created.
ive battalions and a regimental are deployed as follows: one in one on special duty at the SEAC and the last to provide special lion at Kandy was primarily on with personnel from Countries ration of a supra-level command ch does not readily come the way Trincomalee was primarily on onsible for defence of a "Local located the oil tanks at China pecially commissioned to assess lads being brought by Japanese ault on the oil installation. :ordingly organised to gather landing areas, assembly areas, ind possible points of attack. setting out the outcome of the he experience of serving both in lies just outlined and with SEAC invaluable experience.
ded to meet the needs of the
ogistic units were expanded to
ng events during the war. These .ds on Colombo and Trincomalee. the defences of the Royal Air es Organised against them. The orces was outstanding, the numht down being over 70.
to air raids on Colombo and
s been argued in service circles
n and the fact that there was no conclusion that the raids had a
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Page 154
reconnoitring role. Whatever t return either for further aerial sive on land. A chance of eng class enemy was therefore denie compensated for our not being service.
The CDF at large benefited the various units which were s war. Some such units were pos were posted for temporary duty, in the Ceylon jungles in prepar South East Asia. Many CDF unii and some were quartered in prox ties for association with regula to operational contact with a f: invaluable.
In due course, there was however took place after units duty. In 1946, representativ units and regular British units were selected to go to London, : the Victory Parade in London. ) to rub shoulders, in peace tim countries of the Commonwealth course, Canada, Australia, S before Pakistan came into exis As commander of the Ceylon Cont of five colonial contingents, and the Falkland Islands. The marched proudly through serrie hers, before they reached the reign and the Royal family ha victorious Commanders of the wa the experience of a lifetime.
In l947, the CDF was reca] the civil power in dealing wit union field. Having gone thro war, the brush with civilian ol The experience was however v disturbed areas, making judgeme
l2

he reason, the Japanese did not
bombing or to mount an offenagement on land with a first ed to the CDF which might have able to volunteer for overseas
greatly from association with stationed in Ceylon during the ited for duty in Ceylon. Others whilst they undertook training ation for operational duties in is trained with visiting units imity to them. The opportunir troops who were on their way irst class enemy were therefore
demobilisation. Two events had come away from mobilised "es of all CDF units, women's employing Ceylonese personnel, in order to represent Ceylon at It was a memorable opportunity e, with officers and men from and the Empire - Britain of outh Africa, India (this was tence) and a host of colonies. ingent I was placed in command Aden, Burmuda, Ceylon, Cyprus CLI colours were paraded and d groups of delirious Britissaluting dais where the Soved accommodated with them the ir and the War Cabinet. It was
led from leave in order to aid h a major crisis in the trade ligh the experience of a major ganisation was rather strange. aluable in taking control of ints as to the degree of force
O

Page 155
to be used and, in any case, as maintenance of law and order.
The experience gained by i war and the post-war events invaluable. There was, howeve tothe authorities, who would be tary organisation which would independence which all soldie The CDF was obviously a reservo the needs of such organisation
To turn now briefly to pc persistent agitation by the Cey Whitehall sent two Commissio reforms. The first in 1927 unt ded government by Executive C franchise to men and women ovel ttees were created with contre committee. The Chairman of the whose experience as such wou ultimate cabinet government. advice to the Governor would British Secretaries. Whatever the country was still far fr« sired.
Agitation therefore conti under Lord Soulbury was sent i. mended a bicameral Parliament for legislative functions ar Cabinet of Ministers (replaci would have executive functions would be subjects reserved f proposals being still unsatisf was invited to Whitehall to pr leader Mr. D.S. Senanayake, st ministers had gained not only by membership of the War Counc tion made by Ceylon to the war the setting up of SEAC HQ in electorate was both experie. examples of Ceylon's economic

sisting the civil police in the
individuals who went through the just described was of course r, a residual advantage namely, engaged in creating the milibe set up, with the advent of rs felt was round the corner. ir from which could be produced
litical matters. Consequent on lon authorities over the years, ls to report on constitutional der Lord Donoughmore recommen'ommittee and the grant of the : 2l years of age. Seven CommiDl over matters listed for suoh 2 Committee would be a minister ld stand him in good stead in Political, financial and legal
however be reserved for three
advances these measures meant, pm the political status it de
nued till a second Commission, In 1944. This commission recomwith a House of Representatives ld a Senate. There would be a ng the Board of Ministers) who . Defence and External Affairs or the Governor-General. These actory, the Leader of the House esent the case for Ceylon. The tessed the experience which his in peace time but also in war, il. He emphasised the contribueffort and the support given to Ceylon. He pointed out that the hced and enlightened. He gave contribution to the war effort.
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Page 156
Mr. Senanayake's presentation wa to be prepared for the conside ties, outlining fresh proposals had prevailed for India. Cey June 1947 the Governor annou Ceylon.
In February 1948, the Du present the King's Speech from referred to the surrender of C in 1796 to Britain, and to the in l802 making the maritime p The King also referred to the whereby the Kandyan province Sovereign. He then outlined th lead to the political emancipat ted in Ceylon being given the s of the Commonwealth of Nations He expressed satisfaction that constitutional and peaceful me British Government.
If it is true to say as I century of British occupation s equally true to say that it through the achievement of Inde
Phase 4 CDF aft
Demobilisation after World the history of the CDF namely, duties. War time establishme post-war requirements and unit ware time strengths, leaving onl to meet peace-time needs. In t senior commander on the effecti already had the responsibility wartime and the distinction Contingent at the Victory para peace-time command of the Reç commands from the inception o satisfying experience.

s sufficient for a White Paper ration of the Ceylon authoriwhich spelt Dominion Status as lon accepted and on the l8th ced the status of a Dominion
ke of Gloucester was sent to the Throne. In it, the King olombo and all Dutch territory terms of the Treaty of Amiens rovinces a British possession. 2 Kandyan Convention of 1815 s were vested in the British e steps that had been taken to ion of Ceyion which had resulstatus of a responsible member with the status of a Dominion. Ceylon had achieved freedom by ans in collaboration with the
have done that the last half tarted with a flourish, it is also ended with a flourish, pendence by Ceylon.
ser Demobilisation
War II marked a fresh phase in reorganisation for peace-time nts were clearly too big for s were required to trim their y sufficient officers and men he process, I found myself the ve strength of the CLI. I had of commanding a Battalion in of commanding the Ceylon de in 1946 in London but the siment, in line with pre-war the Regiment in l881, was a

Page 157
In the process of reorgan of the CDF which hitherto had cer, was now assigned to the Se CDF. The process of Ceylonisat to me of the post of Staff Of was expected to lead to the Sen was expected to follow. At th reverted to the Bar where I ha and had been offered a post in ney-General's Department. I prospects at the Bar which we prospects in the Army which we latter because I felt that I s help in the creation of the Arm
Although Independence had not stil 1948 that the inst handed over to the Prime Mini mentioned earlier by me, the r the King to his brother, the D pens, the Duke of Gloucester soldier who had a place in the two units, the CLI and the CPR connection between the Duke and CDF and the Commanding Officer rpart of the CDF, along with t and the CPRC were required to b Independence ceremony.
The CILI also took advantag its Honorary Colonel to comem the presentation of Colours tc the Prince of Wales in 1922. In reference to the fact that the officers to serve in the Cak namely, Lt. Col. J.L. Kotallawe pointed out that their elevatic history of the regiment which h officers who in later life had Court including a Chief Justice luminaries both at the offical
l

sation, the post of Commandant been filled by a British offinior Commanding Officer of the ion was continued by the offer ficer of the CDF, a post which Lor staff post in the Army that e time this was offered, I had i practised when war broke out the middle' order of the Attorhad now to decide between my re not inconsiderable and my re unpredictable. I chose the hould make myself available to y of Independent Ceylon.
been announced in l947, it was uments of Independence were ster, Mr. D.S. Senanayake. As esponsibility was delegated by uke of Gloucester. As it hapwas himself a distinguished
CDF as the Honorary Colonel of C. As though to emphasise the , the CDF, the Commandant of the of the CRNVR, the naval countethe Commanding Officers of CILI e part of his entourage at the
se of the presence in Ceylon of norate the 25th Anniversary of the Regiment by his brother, my address of welcome, I made CLI had now produced two of its inet of Mr. D.S. Senanayake, la and Major E.A. Nugawela. I in to cabinet rank enriched the ad in its past history produced become judges of the Supreme and other distinguished legal and the unoffical bar.
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Page 158
Later in the year, units c their way to Diyatalawa, to re conducting their Annual Trail which at the turn of the cent during the Boer War had been ac
Finally, the units of the taking part in the First Indep memorable occasion because the CDF as in pre-war years - a foc have to be shared with units to of Independent Ceylon. Approp) the officers and men represent. shouldered defence responsibili Wars and the inter war years. highlighted the officers and me form the nucleus of the units w
A chapter in the history to the opening of another chapt

if the now reorganised CDF made sume the pre-war tradition of ing Camps at the location in ury, prisoners of war captured commodated.
CDF had the satisfaction of bendence Day Parade. It was a focus was exclusively on the us which would in future years be raised as part of the Army riately enough, it highlighted ing their predecessors who had ties in the Boer War, two World Equally fittingly, the parade 2n who would be called upon to aiting to be raised.
of the CDF had closed, leading ær in our military history.

Page 159
9
The Colonial Peric
It would be rewarding t Colonial period which had invc for 450 years, by reference tc three Colonial powers concer. occupation.
The Politi
The Portuguese came to Ce by design. By the time, ho Mayadunne and his son Rajasing realise that they were in a Siti that which they had planned : agreement with Parakrama Bahu V arrival in Ceylon. The commel "The island of Ceilan amongst State what Carthage proved to consumed men and artillery to alone used up in her way, more East." Such was the assessmen Portuguese so far. This notwit withdraw from Ceylon and inc occupation should continue, par was not followed by anyone w proved to be. Certainly, the planned to supplant them, was i nue in occupation. And when t tude of Portuguese rulers was they would willingly have give precious a possession as Ceylo Dutch had not intervened, the P continued indefinitely.

od in Retrospect
o conclude the study of the olved the occupation of Ceylon the general attitudes of the ned to a policy of continued
cal Factor
ylon by accident but stayed on wever, they had en countered he I, the Portuguese began to lation which was different from for in the aftermath of the VIII whom they had met on their ht of deCouto is illuminating: our discoveries proved to the Rome. Little by little, she so great an account that she than all our conquests in the it of what Ceylon had cost the hstanding, there was no move to leed the evidence is that the ticularly because Rajasinghe ho was as difficult as he had fighting against the Dutch who indicative of a desire to contihe occupation ended the attisummed up in the comment that an up all India to preserve so n. One concludes that, if the ortuguese occupation would have
25

Page 160
The Dutch by contrast cam left because they lacked the occupation. It turned out in the entirety of Ceylon was not it the control of the maritime that the requirements of theil met although, as Dr. Paul Pier the speedy acquisition of we possession, compounded by the they had become involved, perha they could not maintain their Certainly, their capitulatio invading forces was a clear de give up possession with the min
The British captured Cey importance in safeguarding Bri' from Britain to the Far East an the defence of India. It is po continued control of the seab military control of the interic their maritime settlements by have moved towards total contr the persistent rivalry between chiefs made it imperative for rior and to be masters in Cey however, made their independent to continue in control of In American War of Independence ci of British history thereafter p tegration of the British Empire ment of important components c status. Successive world wars fact that India's performance in her claims to rule herself coul given her independence if only fact that India could fight for in Whitehall. Burma having con dence, it would have been invi Ceylon which had a significanee fight militarily for her ind significance.

e with the will to conquer but will to fight for continued ractice that the possession of what they wanted. Rather was provinces that they desired so international trade could be is states, their (sole) aim was alth. The cost of continued cost of European wars in which ps dictated the conclusion that hold on Ceylon indefinitely. n in the face of the British monstration of an intention to imum of casualties.
ʻlon because of her strategic tish interests which stretched d Australia and in assisting in }ssible that if the British had board completely, with only a r to prevent interference with
the Kandyans, they might not ol. As it turned out, however, the Nayakkar Kings and their the British to seize the intevlon. External developments,
impact. Whilst Britain wished dia, the significance of the ould not be denied. The course points inexorably to the disin, qua Empire, with the developf the Empire towards Dominion brought home to Britain the them had been so crucial that ld not be rejected. India was
for that reason, although the
her independence was not lost Durrently received her independious to reject the claims of
of its own. Her incapacity to spendence, had only marginal

Page 161
It is an important elemer gue was undertaken to oust the case of the Portuguese and the and Rajasinghe II intrigued t ouster of the Portuguese. The and Rajadhi in concert with th British support for the oust British occupation, the Kandyan the chiefs who might have int. in positions of no real authc such an undertaking. Nor had time ignored the lesson of hi foreign ruler is followed by invader. Additionally, the phi ner of the time of Rajasinghe ment of the Portuguese by th ginger for chilly), had not b Taking the matter a stage fl Ceylonese horizon to be beckon the defeat of the British force shown some interest by the si Danes who had appeared fleeti: will or the resources to ous credit of the Ceylonese leade) Senanayake in particular that in against the British.
Nor is the reason for t. British had come to Ceylon as period of occupation by a der as sist in Ceylon's affairs i Portuguese nor the Dutch att terms, the legacy of the Port the Roman Catholic faith. But average Ceylonese of the time with the tenets of Buddhism t tion. The Dutch made an at Reformed Church in lieu of Ca lacked the zeal of the Cathol adherence of those Ceylonese w of faith. The legacy of the Du ction of a canal system which rtation and, even more signii
l

t in our history that no intriBritish, as had happened in the Dutch. Wimaladharma, Senarat secure Dutch support for the Nayakkar brothers, Kirthi Sri eir chiefs, intrigued to secure er of the Dutch. During the kingdom had come to an end and rigued against the British were brity or influence to initiate the Ceylonese hierarchy at the story that the removal of one 7 the rule of another foreign losophy of the Ceylonese commoIII, (who compared the replacee Dutch with the exchange of een lost to Ceylonese thinking. lrther, who was there on the ed forward to share with Ceylon s? Neither the French who had eizure of Trincomalee nor the ngly in Ceylon waters had the t the British. It is to the rs of the time and of Mr. D.S. Lo steps were taken to intrigue
his far to seek. Even if the conquerors, they ended their monstration of their desire to in a manner which neither the empted. Looked at in liberal uguese was the introduction of
this was of no account to the who was more than satisfied o give him spiritual. satisfactempt to introduce the Dutch tholicism but their projection ic missionary in securing the ho were interested in a change toh therefore, was the construhelped in the matter of transpoiicantly, the introduction of
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Page 162
Roman Dutch Law which forms t Law.
Whilst the Portuguese anc in substantial and enabled the the contribution of the Briti value. On the one hand, they c ment by creating the infrastru development. This included production, the organisation imports of goods to support pro nication to facilitate movemen contributed to political devel ments of democracy, creating th tary process, preparing the el vote and guiding the leaders freedom through the democrati conduct national affairs witho guard the freedom achieved frc internal or external.
What flows from this rec Britain in achieving politic economic independence was not part of the British to continue lit is quite apparent from the that they did not subscribe to would not be a party to the Empire.
Accordingly, Colonial rule
without the trauma of engagin achieve that end.
Military Develop
I have now come to the e phases of the Military History to the Modern phase, I would li on the extent of military deve the earlier phases of history.
In what I have called thi History, the conclusion I came
l

le basis of the Ceylon's Common
the Dutch contribution is not authors to secure approbation, sh has been of greater overall ontributed to economic developcture serving the needs of such the creation of the means of of exports of produce and the duction and the means of commut. On the other hand, they also ppment, by introducing the ellehe instruments of the parliamenectorate in the exercise of the to progress towards political c process so as eventually to ut outside assistance and safem threats to security, whether
:ital is that the assistance of all emancipation and ultimate consistent with a desire on the 2 their occupation indefinitely. actions of the Attlee Government Churchill's declaration that he di smemberment of the British
: in this country came to an end g in a military initiative to
ment in Retrospect
ind of my study of the earlier of Ceylon and before I pass on
ke to pause to dwell inevitably lopment that had taken place in
Indian Period of our Military to was that, for reasons which
28

Page 163
I examined above, our rulers healthy military tradition. even though Duttagamani had no vision to recognise the need would enable him to defeat th deplored the fact that over til follow the precedent created force for security, purposes. to have been taken was in the personal security and in the organisations to deal with a th lised. No efforts seem to have instrument to deal with a futu had to arise in the form of crisis, before the effort was n contingency which had arisen.
Having said this, I shoulc our history is completely devo have said earlier, I can think of Ceylon who have enriched ot Indian period. I take this ol made them stand out to claim ac
Duttagamani blazed the wa an attacking force of llOOO mer about whose military prowess ht undertake a march of some l50 m ry involving jungle, mountai stages of which he had to over rious locations for protracted pioneering effort of the expedi but also the military effort forces, equipping them, providi ments and the final handling c an enemy who must obviously, h enable him to subdue the local forty years, that demand specia
Gajabahu whom I recognise time when Ceylon had been visi the invasions known up to th thousand Sinhalese had been ca.
l

lid not take steps to create a made the initial point that, precedent to go by, he had the o create the instrument which 2 intruder to his land. I have e years, there was no move to by Duttagamini to maintain a The only initiative that seems setting up of palace guards for creation of ad hoc Inilitary reat which had already materiabeen made to create a military e contingency. The contingency un invasion or other security ade to deal militarily with the
not be understood to say that it of character because, as I
of six of the royal commanders ur military history during the pportunity to set out what has clárnation.
y by his initiative in creating to subdue a foreign adversary e had no prior knowledge and to iles through difficult territon and river, during the last 'come an enemy deployed in vadefence. It is not only the tion that arrests our attention involved in the assembly of ng for their logistic requiref the operation itself against ave the military capability to forces and occupy the land for 1 mention.
next, ascended the throne at a ced by the most "predatory" of !n, during which some twelve tured and taken to India. It
9

Page 164
was left to Gajabahu to mount a the first of its kind in our m are varying accounts of the Ina confrontation with the Cholan K he was able to bring back his even a like number of Indians,
Dhatusena's claim to milit his involvement against an inv subjugated parts of South Inc Ceylon which was kept under years, during which the enemy of the hinterland. Dhatusena w the mountains for some time, attacking force before he emerg and engaged the enemy successfu sive however is the vision with on the coast to prevent futur force designed to take on an in screen. That is the sort of i the average Sinhalese king who
I have mentioned Vijayaba after the country had been ri Rajarajah and had continued in thirty eight years, during wi Viceroy in this country. It wa her independence and become Empire. This, however, did ascended the throne. He assem elements with such military abi control over the kingdom. Vija shrewdness to move his capital him to supervise the developmen land and to set up a military h controlled any invasion of the rebel movement from the south. ther evidenced by his creating tory which was only thwarted b mercenaries who were hostile to
Parakrama Bahu I has an un mention as an outstanding roy

punitive expedition to India - ilitary history. Whilst there nner in which he dominated the ing, there is little doubt that captured subjects and perhaps apparently in reparation.
ary fame lies in the context of rader whose forces had already lia and who now had turned on subjugation for twenty seven had taken the capital and parts as shrewd enough to lie low in during which he organised an ed from his self imposed exile ully. What I find more impreswhich he set up naval defences !e invasions and the military vader who had pierced the naval nitiative which was lacking in succeeded Dhatusena.
hu I, who came to the throne avaged by the Indian Emperor occupation of the country for hich he was represented by a as a time when Ceylon had lost a unit of the mighty Cholan not daunt Vijayabahu when he bled an army and deployed its lity that he was able to regain yabahu also had the acumen and to Polonnaruwa which enabled t of agriculture in the hintereadquarters from which would be country from the north and any Vijayabahu's ability is fura plan to invade Cholan terriby the rebellious action of his attack their own kith and kin.
challengeable claim for special ral commander of forces. His
3 O

Page 165
campaigns record actions in th which his ability as a strategi battlefield, he does not appea Duttagamani or Rajasinghe but from which he could better re influence it by deploying reser This is not to deny him acknowl ty which is recognised to the tactical situation by personal is the combination of his mast with that of the tactical batt control successfully of Maya Ra He was as masterful in open Cou he encountered opponents using altogether surprising that Parak induced in him the will to undel abroad. This meant the bui military forces, laying in the attacking force, on a scale not the uniform success which he e This does not detract from his p he did not lead the invading fo credit is the organising abilit the very forces which had over this country.
The sixth name which I h mention earlier in this study is ded the throne after the declin reign had set in. His milita subjugated the whole country inc illed by installing his Viceroy i concentrate on the South which capital in Kotte and the super cinnamon growing area which gav had been lost to the kings afte Bahu VI also found himself st campaign to proceed against a Vi fered with a cargo of cinnamor the circumstances, this act need
To the names who claimed Period, there must be added
3

ee parts of the country during st becomes established. On the r to have led his troops like :o occupy a rearward location, ad the tactical situation and ves as the situation demanded. 2dgement of his tactical abiliextent of taking charge of a intervention if necessary. It ry of the strategic Situation le that enabled him to secure ta, Raja Rata and Ruhunu Rata. ntry as in wooded country when guerrilla tactics. It is not rama Bahu's domestic successes take expeditions against kings .ding of ships, marshalling logistic requirements for his hitherto known. There was not xpected from the expeditions. personal military image because rces himself. What gives him y which enabled him to attack the years been a scourge in
have singled out for special Parakrama Bahu VI, who ascene following Parakrama Bahu II's ry prowess was such that he luding Jaffna which he controin Jaffna. This enabled him to involved consolidation of his vision of the affairs in the e the kingdom the wealth which Parakrama Bahu I. Parakrama rong enough to mount a navali jayanagar Chief who had interbelonging to Ceylon. In all led courage of a high order.
military fame in the Indian another name, now from the
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Page 166
Colonial period, whose exploit in the Valhalla of great Commar Rajasinghe I who commenced his and without great military know Rajasinghe is that, for the fir ry, his forces were opposed to his disposal European troops Rajasinghe was not daunted but because he showed at Mulleriy equal of the Portuguese forces experience that induced him to on Colombo, during which he exh capability but also his tactica operations against a well fort defended by men with uptodate v fame is assured.
The impact of those leader is worth mentioning. Early on statement by Sir Emerson Tenne "ineptitude" of the Sinhalese so to the reliance consequently mercenaries from India, to defe to other security requirements against Elara was against the ir also provided the mercenarie Duttagamani's force was inept and one can therefore conclude time proved the aptitude of the operation against what at that Parakramabahu's soldiers were ni enemy in his domestic engagemen against successive forces in wooded country where his enemy and persistence in exploiting til fighting a guerilla war. Adder performance of his soldiers aga his general Nagaragiri and th India under Lankapura. I perce aptitude for military service Bahu 's soldiers abroad. Under soldier was pitted against a open country where they were f
3

demand his independent niche ders of this country. This is military life at a tender age ledge. What is striking about st time in our military histoa European invader who had at and European war equipment.
perhaps stimulated by this, awa that his troops were the in open country. It was this undertake the historic attacks ibited not only his leadership l acumen in assault and siege fied fortress which was also Teapons. Rajasinghe's claim to
is on our military development in this study, I questioned a nt in which he refers to the ldier for military service and placed by the then kings on nd the frontiers and to attend . The action of Duttagamani nvading force from India which S. No one has claimed that in dealing with Elara's force that Duttagamani for the first Sinhalese soldier for a major time was a first class enemy. bt ranged against a foreign is. They were, however, pitted open country, and in close,
exhibited both tactical skill he terrain in which they were l to this, one recognises the inst the Burmese forces under eir account of themselves in ive a considerable degree of in the exploits of Parakrama
Rajasinghe I, the Sinhalese rist class European enemy in ced with first class weapons
2

Page 167
and in repeated assaults on
forts, to be followed by siege Geiger, described their perf This is high praise from a reli tently an admirer of the Sin period, the Kandyans displayed cribed as their "natural ins This they later developed again opposition of the British fo that, whatever ineptitude the
the earlier engagements with matured as time passed and had
the Colonial period had come to
Whilst recognising the n soldier has responded to the c. With a national crisis, I woulc have disclosed a tradition of have resulted in the reasoned p ce which would have not merel but would also have been of succeeded in office, in fashi( needed to deal with future cris
So much for our early mi what the Colonial rulers of Ces of military development. The Portuguese nor the Dutch thoug creation of local forces. The the defensive in meeting the p and Rajasinghe, to think of any and to defend those areas in C the interests which prompted t did the Dutch find it conveniel local forces because they were ces which would enable them t which gave security to their wealth which they were inter circumstances, neither the Por contribution to military develc vide the Military opposition ne the soldiers ranged against the
l

Colombo and other Portuguese
operations, in which Professor ormance as "death despising". able critic who was not consishalese soldier. In the Dutch
what Dr. Paul Pieris has destinct for guerilla fighting". nst the British in their savage orces. The foregoing discloses Sinhalese soldier displayed in an invading force, they had come into their own by the time
an end.
hanner in which the Sinhale se all of his sovereign when faced have preferred our history to
military service which would assing on of military experieny enriched military literature practical value to those who ɔning the military instruments
S6S
litary history. I ask myself lon have done in the direction
evidence is that neither the ht in prudent to assist in the
Portuguese were constantly on itiless campaigns of Mayadunne thing but a capacity to survive eylon where they could further heir continued occupation. Nor nt to help in the formation of busy creating the static defeno safeguard the maritime areas naval forces and to create the ested in amassing. In these tuguese nor the Dutch made any opment in Ceylon except to proeded to develop the capacity of
33

Page 168
What then of the British -half century of their occupati position of defenders of their fighters who resisted any of guerilla defence and thereafte ned to overthrow the British r have changed in the second ha1 tion which was less turbulent. were able to give considera "Cingalese" in a locally rais they prudently included some presumably to deal with any ar the "Cingalese". The experime anything more than an experime the CLI Volunteers were formed the Volunteer movement in Cey certainly recognised the "si towards the Creation of volunte
In the first half of the work of the 19th century seem was able to participate in the and also to take over duties units of the Indian Army dur evidence of a latent capacity t of soldiering. The change of from Ceylon Volunteer Force (CDF) in l9l0 was significan willingness of the Ceylonese t Their participation in World existence of a spirit underlying "volunteer" in Ceylon but also seas. Clearly, the involvement troops overseas would prove v the valour and courage of soldi be stimulating.
The outbreak of World War ment of the CDF. Regular tro Armies could not be spared in needs of Ceylon because of th duties elsewhere. The defenc therefore, largely met by pe:
l,

? Unquestionably, in the first n, they found themselves in the settlements against indigenous ensive operations by vigorous engineered rebellions desigegime. The position appears to century of the British occupaDuring this phase, the British ion to the inclusion of some ld regiment, in which however Malays, Indians and Africans, ti-British move on the part of it, and I doubt whether it was ht, paid off and in due course, and constituted the founding of ʼlOn. The British authorities pirit" underlying the thrust er units in Ceylon.
20th century, the pioneering s to have advanced and the CILI Boer War with regal recognition hitherto performed by regular ing World War I, thus giving o shoulder the responsibilities the nomenclature of the Force (CVF) to Ceylon Defence Force t, in that it recognised the o undertake their own defence. War I was indicative of the the willingness not merely to to fight in a major war overof our soldiers with fighting luable, whilst the example of ers like Private Jacotine would
II gave a boost to the developops of the British and Indian large numbers for the defence ir deployment for operational requirements of Ceylon were sonnel of the CDF and of the
4.

Page 169
Ceylon Royal Artillery. I have some outline of the expansion needs. Quite obviously, the op time regimental training (as opp given in peace time) and the exposed to requirements of defe war particularly in associatio. abroad, went far to improve th which is an ingredient in the c. sion towards professionalism w auspices.
There is an aspect of wart is relevant in a study of this examination of the historical p in Trincomalee could not fail to were now part of the historica. who entered Fort Frederick wh been located, were soon aware had taken place there. These l who destroyed the "Temple of th against a Dutch attack, the acti fort "Pagoda Hill", because pa with shrine, and the British cc by naming the fort after their Duke of York. Fort Ostenberg c vement. From the heights of th service at the time had a fleeti was a legend, (namely that Tril entirety of the largest fleet k harbour was called upon to acc convoy which included the Queen their escorts of battleships, looking for all the world like tank. At ground level at Osten. moremilitary exercise of settin ing arcs of fire, and camoufl perimeter of the ridge, as in done before them. The machi mouth, had the unforgettable Japanese fire when they were : during the Trincomalee raid in
l
3

elsewhere in this study given of the CDF for such defence portunities provided for fullosed to the part-time training experience gained in being nce in a recognised theatre of with seasoned regulars from a standards of professionalism bmplete soldier. This progresas now provided under British
ime deployment in Ceylon which nature which is devoted to an rocess. Those of us who served be struck by the fact that we Li process. Those, for instance ere Fortress Headquarters had of the historical changes that reached back to the Portuguese e Thousand Columns" in defence on of the Dutch who called the goda for them was synonymous ontribution to history in 1803 Commander in Chief, Frederick ompleted the historical involIe ridge of Ostenberg, those in ng manifestation of what to us comalee harbour could hold the nown then) - when Trincomalee :ommodate at one time a troop Mary, the Queen Elizabeth and aircraft carriers, destroyers toyships in a child's indoor oerg, we engaged in the much g up machine gun posts, checkaging the positions round the fantrymen through history had ne gunners posted at harbour experience of coming under subjected to lowlevel strafing 942. One remembers the tears
5

Page 170
of relief in their eyes when fellow soldiers after the raid
I have dwelt on the for Whilst peace time training wh: is of value, it is the ultima pletes the training schedule soldier. One recognis es that World War II did not involve field Dpérations but it was suí tion to guess what the real th: who saw the sun drenched bombs wards through the air with the: tion, learned to thank God tha distant destination and to be p our own position if God so w exhilarating as it was frighte
The military legacy which the end of their occupation mus having engineered the creation assimilated at least the rudim not only in peace time but a fleetingly, with a first class Waa.

they were reunited with their
going experiences advisedly. ch simulates battle experience e experience in war that coms and turns out the complete
the experience of the CDF in fighting with the Japanese in ficient for those with imaginang would be like. Those of us of the Japanese hurtling earthir message of hate and destruct the bombs were directed to a repared for the bomb to fall on illed. The experience was as ning.
the British left behind them at t have been the satisfaction of
of a military force which had ents of professional soldiering lso when confronted however anemy in the setting of a major

Page 171
Part
THE MODER

N PERIOD

Page 172


Page 173
1(
The Creation of th
The Politic
The constitution of Ceylon grant of Independence, provided the portfolio of Defence and Ex that of Prime Minister. This arrangement, whereby Defence an ed for British controll. The Pri charged with the responsibil foreign policies and of executi
An elementary fact of our military units as were located pendence were part of the mil meet the regional needs of the British element which withdre residue was inadequate to meet age, which could involve warfa. We had no air Force, whilst our were not only small but also la of the full time serviceman. Th to ensure that our defence forc to meet our overall defence in Prime Minister, in his briefil tives as Parliament was called ly that he could not accept the Defence, unless he was provid This of course meant the creati Navy and a Regular Air Force su
It is an equally element these military instruments wou interim period, we should have in turn dictated reliance on
3

)
e Army of Ceylon
all Setting
, which was introduced with the for the Prime Minister to hold (ternal Affairs, in addition to contrasted with the earlier d External Affairs were reservme Minister was now therefore, lity of creating defence and ng these policies.
military history is that such in Ceylon at the time of Indeitary organisation designed to British Empire. Shorn of the w following independence, the : defence requirements of that re on land, sea and in the air. military and naval components cked the professional character he Prime Minister had therefore es were professionally equipped seeds. Predictably enough, the ng of the House of Representaat i that time, said categoricala responsibility of Minister of ed with the means of defence. on of a Regular Army, a Regular itably trained and equipped. ary fact that the creation of ld take time and that, in the a viable defence shield. This a foreign ally who would be
9

Page 174
willing to provide that shield SO.
In the search for such ar. more than one option. One was own region and that clearly Given the hostility that had b the time of the grant of indepe bly have been impolitic to che other might conceivably resent further afield and this pointe whom we had been intimately co period of lS0 years and who had Independence. Britain for her in Ceylon in the form of comi would be keen on safeguarding. rests in the Indian Ocean stre which again she would wish to fore, be interested to continued such tenure would be on invitat. Imstances, in the mutual intere come to terms with each other. of the situation was the signi called "Defence Agreement". Th tive material and I accordingly
"Whereas Ceylon has reache development at which she is a fully responsible member
Nations, in no way subordi or external affairs, fre common allegiance to the cr
And whereas it is in the the United Kingdom of Grea that the necessary measu effectual protection and ( both and that the necessary for this purpose;
Therefore the Government ( Government of Ceylon have a
l 4

and would have capacity to do
ally, the Prime Minister had to search for an ally in our ointed to India or Pakistan. een generated between them at ndence to them, it would probaose one of them, because the such action. This meant going unerringly to Britain, with nnected in peace and war for a assisted us in the search for art had considerable interests lercial investments which she She also had regional intetohing from Aden to Singapore safeguard. She would, therel tenure in Ceylon, even though ion. It was, in all the circusts of Britain and Ceylon to The outcome of the assessment ng of an agreement which was is Agreement provides instruc
reproduce it in full:
ld the stage in constitutional ready to assume the status of of the British Commonwealth of late in any aspect of domestic aly associated and united by ΟWI) :
mutual interest of Ceylon and Britain and Northern Ireland res should be taken for the efence of the territories of
facilities should be afforded
f the United Kingdom and the greed as follows:

Page 175
SOLDIER MODERN
 

Page 176


Page 177
(l) The Government of the U nment of Ceylon will give assistance for the security c defence against external agg tion of essential Communica mutual interest to provide.
Kingdom may base such naval such land forces in Ceylon a purposes, and as may be mutu
(2) The Government of Ceylon of the United Kingdom all I objects mentioned in Article These facilities will inclu bases and ports and military of telecommunication facilit courts and authorities to exe sdiction over members of the at present.
(3) The Government of the Uni Government of Ceylon with suc from time to time be requir i development of Ceylonese arm
(4) The two Governments will tive machinery as they may a purpose of co-operation in re to coordinate and determine both Governments.
(5) This agreement will take constitutional measures ne Ceylon fully responsible
Commonwealth of Nations, sha.
Done in duplicate, at Colc November, l947. Signed on the United Kingdom of Great
ENRY
Signed on behalf of the Gc OS SE
l 4 l

nited Kingdom and the Goverto each other such military of their territories, for the ression and for the protections as it may be in their The Government of the United
and air forces and maintain is may be required for these ally agreed.
will grant to the Government necessary facilities for the l as may be mutually agreed. ide the use of naval and air 7 establishments and the use ies and the right of service arcise such control and juri
said forces as they exercise
ited Kingdom will furnish the sh military assistance as may red towards the training and ed forces.
l establish such administragree to be desirable for the agard to defence matters, and
the defence requirements of
effect on the day when the cessary for conferring on status within the British ill come into force.
ombo, this eleventh day of
behalf of the Government of
Britain and Northern Ireland.
MOORE
overnment of Ceylon. NANAYAKE"

Page 178
The Agreement came in for sition in the House of Represen argument that, even conceding ry, it constituted a gross redu and gave rise to the thinking dence. Mr. J.R. Jayewardena pi succinctly, when he said that t to become a free nation once agreement with them to defend our assistance when they need interest. The Prime Ministe invited to share our defence r that he could not think of a Ceylon than Britain.
What is material for the examining is the fact that Bri the measures that were neces external aggression and that Ce Britain to maintain such bases the installation of the naval, a vital element in the build-up
The Concept
The first indication of was the secondment of a British initially as Military Adviser the Army. The officer so sele Caithness DSO (he was the l9th served on the Western European during World War II, during wł the Distinguished Service Order nisation of the Burmese Army fo posted to Ceylon. I was astoni worked. He arrived on a Saturd ry manuals for study during t Secretary of the Ministry (of was briefed on the Ministry cor tion and its formation and, c offered me the appointment of (
l

heavy criticism from the Oppotatives. This was based on the that the agreement was necessaction in our independent status that ours was a "fake" indepen1t the case for the Government he British people had helped us again.... If we come to an us at our request and they seek it, it would be in our common r said that Britain was being esponsibilities as a friend and
"Safer or better friend" for
...tain was willing to undertake sary to safeguard Ceylon from ylon for her part, would enable in Ceylon as are necessary for air and land forces of Ceylon - p of the forces.
for the Aray
British assistance to the Army Officer for service in Ceylon, and thereafter as Commander of cted was Brigadier the Earl of Earl). Brigadier Caithness had Front and thereafter in Burma hich he had been decorated with . He had helped in the reorgaor post-war duties before he was shed at the speed with which he ay, took charge of some militahe weekend, Saw the Permanent Defence) on Monday, by whom he cept for the Army, its composion returning from the Ministry, Chief of Staff of the Army.
42

Page 179
I should like to pause bri
this offer, which was twofold. ( ring, even if it was not unex attractive vistas of military d it brought home the responsi would bring about. We were, for of the Commonwealth, about to S an independent member of that instinctively, on the armies o the time of independence, had all reaching back to the days when the Persians under Cyrus, the G enemies in the reigns of the Moghulls, before they were assim:
of Imperial Britain long before Ceylon, such military experienc the continuity of martial trad in India. Again, no comparab imperial environment, which ir Independence. It seemed that, Defence Agreement, there was other, we would lose the British have to fend for our Sel Ve S. which would not be undertaken l: whether I had the capability task. And yet, that responsibi struck me that, this responsibi a latent challenge which the si to ensure that Ceylon be provid commensurate with her new inde was accepted.
Brigadier Caithness then o what the Army should provide. ' retention of the Volunteer Un creation of the following regul
An artillery regiment to anti Aircraft defence;
An infantry battalion t
static guard and ceremonia
l

efly to dwell on the impact of On the one hand, it was flattepected and certainly opened up evelopment. On the other hand, bilities that the appointment the first time in the history et up from scratch an army for Commonwealth. One reflected f India and Pakistan which, at ready had a military tradition their predecessors had fought reeks under Alexander and state Mauryans, the Guptas and the ilated into the military system e independence. By contrast in ce as we had in history lacked ition such as had been enjoyed le army had been set up in an deed had ceased to exist with whatever the advantages of the a risk that, at some time or h shield and would consequently It would be a responsibility ightly and I certainly wondered to undertake such a daunting lity had to be taken. It also lity notwithstanding, there was tuation presented - a challenge ed with an Army which would be 2pendent status. The challenge
utlined the Ministry concept of The Army envisaged included the its then in existence and the air units:
undertake Coast artillery and
o undertake internal security, l duties;
43

Page 180
Operational support from a Logistic support from mode Ce, electrical and mechani rements ;
A works services Section buildings;
A small police section;
A Recruit Training Depot;
Army Headquarters superimp tives to set up the Army, administration of units as to provide the Command elle
I confess that I was tak Brigadier Caithness' recital, b essentially basic and fell shor the Army of independent Ceylon be an Army of all arms, inclu Field Engineers and an Infantry initially.
I did not, however, give it was obvious that the Minist two factors. Firstly, the need that the foundations of the Secondly, the need to conserve which the Government would not ty, given more urgent and imp It is relevant to say that def accounted for only 1% of Goverr spent 24%, Pakistan between 35 were fortunate that we did not tions experienced by India and and public disorders in Indone
The reasoning had much to along with the plans. In any only the beginning and that in
l4

modest signals unit; st elements for supply, ordnancal, apart from medical requi
to provide maintenance of Army
Xosed, to handle initial initiaand coordinate training and
they were created and finally, Iment.
ken aback when I listened to ecause what was visualised was t of the concept I had of what should be. Such an Army would uding Armour, Field Artillery,
component of Brigade strength
expression to my views because ry was basing its thinking on to start on a modest scale, so Aarmy could be soundly laid. 2 expenditure in a setting in consider defence a high prioriortant calls. On its resources. ence expenditure at this stage (ment expenditure, whilst India and 40% and Indonesia 25%. We face the internecine confrontaPakistan, rebellion in Burma
SLS,
commend it and I decided to go case, I argued that this was lue course, it would be possib
4

Page 181
حه
le to put my ideas forward. I guarantee that any other offic thinking: which meant that, i. should be there to see the mat the sort of Army that I had Ceylon.
Preparations for the S
The process of setting up ing experience. I was amazed Caithness not only to work out ry development but also to en the pattern. The process took
l. Drafting the Army Act.
2. Preparing the Pay and P
3. Ensuring British assist
Providing a training t the Recruit Training De
Providing advisers for cal and Mechanical En existed in the CDF;
Securing vacancies a selected officers of th
Securing vacancies a cadets.
4. Working out cadres f Training Depot from sel] sioned officers of the
5. Preparing selection pr boards for officers at Army Headquarters a recruiting centres thr
l

also argued that there was no er in the Army would adopt my i my ideas were to prevail, I ter through and help to create risualised for an Independent
etting up of the Army
che Army was for me a fascinatat the capacity of Brigadier the overall pattern for militasure the details in filling in the following outline
ensions Code
ance for the following:
eam to handle the training at pot;
the Ordnance Corps and Electrigineering Corps which had not
t British Training Schools for ne CDF, earmarked for the Army;
it Sandhurst for our officer
or units and for the Recruit ected officers and Non- Commis
CDF.
ocedures. This meant selection the Ministry, for soldiers at
oughout the country.
45

Page 182
6. Working out schedules fo ammunition, operational stores for transport and
7. Preparing to run the H
British Army.
8. Working out accommodatic
Naturally enough, I was ca Caithness in the work that he particular, advise him on local no prior knowledge. We were f who helped in a very complicate Melli handled operational and Jayatilleke administrative mati quartermaster matters. They f reliable team.
I found myself responsible was the drafting of the Army A. background, devolved on me. Th Legal Draftsman at the time was mount the Supreme Court Bench. of the requirements underlying a future Army. He was as quick as for the Act was, therefore, prod The work of the drafting of the . le experience which helped me in tions, in which I used the King
The second was the arrangen special plans for the construc The initial accommodation plan the buildings with which they Thus the infantry would move int site in the history of the CDF. in the interests of development went back to their traditiona adjacent to the guns which woul covering the mouth of the harbol already allocated the camp whic the century for prisoners of th
l 4

or the supply of rations, arms, equipment and other ordnance other requirements.
ospital taken over from the
in requirements for units.
illed upon to assist Brigadier
was putting in hand and, in matters on which he would have ortunate in the Staff Officers ld process. Majaor Maurice de training matters, Capt. Roy ters and Capt. Van Twest all ormed a willing, capable and
: for two special duties. One ct which, because of my legal e Army was fortunate that the Mr. AWH Abeysundera, later to He displayed a keen perception in Army Act in dealing with the 3 he was thorough and the draft luced with remarkable despatch. Army Act was for me a memorab| the draft of the Army Regulaf's Regulations as a guide.
ents for accommodation and the ction of the Army Cantonment. was to house units in some of were traditionally associated. to Echelon Barracks, a historic
(This has now been demolished i.) Similarly the Artillery l home at Rockhouse, Mutwal, d provide the ashorage service ur. At Diyatalawa, the CDF was h had been made at the turn of he Boer War from South Africa.
6

Page 183
We took over other camps from
earmarked for the Army Recruit the use of units which would b UK also released accommodation not stationed in Echelon Barrac
It was not the policy, h permit units to be located in b of the city like Echelon Barra cided that, except for units dictated their continued occ Colombo, units would be provide in a site acquired for the purp would be established. This sit dation to be provided for four n
An Army HQ area providing sonnel of Support units Barrack and Ordnance store spur from the local railwa
An Infantry area
An Artillery area
An Engineer area.
It was a massive undertak accommodation there was provis -fields, swimming pools, a gym rements for unit requirements. small township providing marri NCO's and others, a post offic erection of temples, mosques « ly enough, the scope of the wo the construction was entrusted who, in turn, thought it nec senior officers to function a: It was also considered necessa British Army Brigadier of til Moore, who was assigned to prov tion of the project. I was d the project as the Army Comm
l

the UK Army, one of which was Training Depot and others for stationed at Diyatalawa. The which would be used by units ks and Rock House.
) Wever, of the Government to lildings situated in the centre cks. Accordingly, it was dewhose operational commitments upation of accommodation in accommodation outside Colombo pse, where the Army Cantonment 2 was chosen to enable accommolain groups of the Army -
barrack accommodation for perand Store accommodation for s which were to be served by a y line.
ing because apart from barrack ion for parade grounds, playing nasium and all the basic requi
Actually the concept was for a ed quarters for Officers, WO's, e, a school and space for the hurches and kovils. Predictabrk envisaged was so great that to the Director of Public Works essary to appoint one of his Architect for the cantonment. ry to second the services of a Le Royal Engineers, Brigadier ide expert advice on the execuelighted to be associated with ander" s representative at all
47

Page 184
major project meetings. In the enriched. Working with the Ca Jones, was an experience in its gious thinking he puts into ti were the numerous questionnail conceivable user of the buildin
The Build up
On the loth October, l949, House of Representatives and w the build up of the Army in real tely following the enactment flurry of activity to put the f: up of Units and their physical to command units married up wit Warrant Officers their Non Col earmarked for the reception of would form the bulk of Units. put together in this period.
A major event in this per patch to the Royal Military Aca starry-eyed youngsters who woul a distinguished training inst return, peform regimental duty cases, to command their units a the Army of their country. I three of them placed in that p Perera, Weeratunga and Senevira
The selection of recruit Recruit Training Depot was conc ruiting staff was carefully Commander (then Capt. Udugal Caithness thought it desirable the recruiting staff during it tainly enabled me during the won ing staff, to learn something applied, their educational leve backgrounds and the environmer Recruiting centres were set up from which we had applicatic
l 4

process my own knowledge was ntonment Architect, Mr. Wynne elf, if one goes by the prodile project, evidence of which es he sent to us about every
to be constructed.
of the Army
the Army Act was passed in the e were empowered to attend to earnest. The period immedia
of the Army Act witnessed a inishing touches to the setting
build up. Officers appointed h their Junior Officers, their mmissioned Officers and others recruits from the Depot which A host of regimental detail was
iod was the selection and desdemy at Sandhurst, of a dozen d not only enter the portals of .itution but would on their before being selected in some and, in rare cases, to command have lived long enough to see osition, Majors General Denis tne.
:s for training in the Army turrently undertaken. The recchosen with a future Army na ) as its head. Brigadier for me to be associated with s initial sittings. This cerk that I did with the recruitof the standard of persons who ls, their family or community tal picture surrounding them. in all the provincial capitals ons, T , Colombo, Kandy Galle,
8

Page 185
Jaffna, Kurunegala, Ratnapura. progress made by the recruits Commissioned Officer and Warr Officer rank and I was delighte an Alpha + + as a recruit was before I gave up command of the
As I envisaged in an Brigadier Caithness had no dif for the Units that were being C the total in the CDF on demobil all members of the Regular For was, what he was looking for w cers, Non Commissioned Officer CDF to form the core of the R The bulk came from the output In this way, the youth of the A
And so, after months of a were able to create the units w initial briefing of Brigadie Secretary. The list makes inte
Army Headquarters
l Anti - Aircraft/Coast
l Works Services Unit C
Il Sqn Ceylon Army Signa
l Bn Ceylon Light Infan
The Ceylon Army Medical
1. Coy Ceylon Army Servi
l Coy Ceylon Army Elec ing Corps
The Ceylon Army Police
The Ceylon Army Recruit
ld

It was interesting to note the so selected not merely to Non ant Officer rank but also to d when a man I had marked with recommended for commissioning Army.
arlier part of this study, ficulty in finding the nucleus reated from the CDF. Actually, isation was sufficient to find ce, if he had so chosen. As it ere the Officers, Warrant Offis and certain key men from the egular units he was creating. of the Recruit Training Depot. rmy was to be maintained.
lmost feverish preparation, we thich had been envisaged in the
r Caithness by the Permanent resting reading:
Artillery Regiment
eylon Engineers
l Corps
try
Corps
ce Corps
trical and Mechanical Engineer
Training Depot.
9

Page 186
The units so raised would of the Army, committed to full trained to undertake "frontline
would be some time before th trained for such duty but from whatever responsibilities that
With the enactment of the Ceylon Defence Force underwent Defence Force Ordinance was r disbanded, but units of the C Volunteer Force which was the Regular Force. The name allotte "Ceylon Volunteer Force", so full cycle and resumed the name tence at the end of the 9th C Infantry Volunteers" and chang Volunteer Force" before it beca
In order to ensure cohesi both regular and volunteer unit: clature, dress and other concon this way, members of regular traditions of the Corps which t Units had enjoyed from the tin cades ago. Even the Infantry h posted to the "Ceylon Infantry formed had to accept the change Infantry". In the process of the members of the CDF who h nucleus of regular units played
Such was the reincarnation with their units being renamed
2 (V) Anti Aircraft/Coast
2 (V) Ceylon Army Signal C
2 (V) Ceylon Army Engineer
2 (V) Ceylon Army Light In

form part of the Regular Force -time soldiering, equipped and " duties in peace and war. It ley were fully organised and now on, they had to shoulder
arOS6.
Army Act, the affairs of the a metamorphosis. The Ceylon epealed and the HQ of the CDF DF continued. as units of the volunteer counterpart of the d to the Volunteer element was that it seemed to have turned with which it came into exis2entury namely, "Ceylon Light ed not long after to "Ceylon me the "Ceylon Defence Force".
ion within Corps of the Army, s were required to share nomenlitants of regimental life. In units were able to succeed to their counterparts in Volunteer le of their inception many dead to conform and the officers r Regiment" when the Army was of their unit to "Ceylon Light sharing traditional customs, ad been selected to form the | a vital part.
of the Ceylon Volunteer Force,
as follows:
Artillery Regiment
orps
Corps
fantry
5 O

Page 187
2 (V) Ceylon Army Service (
2 (V) Ceylon Army Medical (
The Ceylon Cadet Corps. I chapter of this study.
Having joined the CDF in l' to note that developments wit ensure continuity of service fo of the day for a long time and w continued services. They had th some of their number had been ( the Regular Force. Equally, the tion of knowing that their own country.
The Army of Independent Ce into existence.
Before I pass on from 194 was formed, I think it would b duce the personal message whic all of us on the day on which disclosed an unsuspected apprec: tive assessment of the future ar the emphasis he placed on the to set and to secure the founda which the Army would be built.
Personal
fr
Brigadier the Earl
Colanander,
On this day which sees t Army, I should like to take t message to all officers and men appointments or employments wh: tion.
I feel very honoured to Commander of the Army and whi
l

orps
orps
discuss this corps in the next
34, I was particularly pleased hin the army were such as to those who had borne the heat ho were keen on offering their Le satisfaction of finding that thosen for demanding duties in y themselves had the satisfacservices were of value to the
ylon had, in the process, come
9, the year in which the Army e appropriate for me to repro:h Brigadier Caithness sent to the Army Act was passed. It iation of the past and a sensild I was struck particularly by standards which he expected us tion which we would create on The message reads as follows:
Message
O
of Caithness DSO Ceylon Army
he inauguration of the Ceylon he opportunity of addressing a
who will be selected for those .ch are necessary for its forma
have been selected the first list I hold this , appointment II
Sl

Page 188
shall always endeavour to ma country can be proud; but in th sure that I always shall have y
Your country has had a pro and the material with which to btedly exists today. To those start this Army I offer my hea has been placed not only a gr should be proud, but also a gre loyalty, your courage and your duty the Army will be judged a will be those which will be fo
you.
I feel confident that the the very highest order and that secure foundation on which the
GOOD UCK TO YOU AI,

ke the Army one of which your is task II must have and I feel four constant support.
ud military history in the past form a fine Regular Army undouof you who will be selected to rtiest congratulations. On you eat distinction of which you at responsibility. For on your good conduct and devotion to nd the standards which you set llowed by those who come after
se standards will always be of t you will form a splendid and Army can be built.
Caithness Brigadier Commander, Ceulon Army.
52

Page 189
1.
The F Communal CC
If l949 was a crucial yea Commencement of its legal exist of its units, l950 was crucial the recruits designed to give b in for the first time for thei: ted to command the Recruit Tra had returned after specialise Instructors at the Depot had course of training under the E been set up for the purpose. Sinhalese, Tamil and English sp been selected had now been "sc through medical tests for physic ty were, therefore, ready for made to accustom therselves to the needs of personal and barra included parade ground drill skills, map reading, use of g significance of the Army Act a line. Additionally they became les esprit de corps and loyal superiors and colleagues, all C of the individual soldier.
Mr. D.S. Senanayake was i on the 6th February, l950. Th ciate indicates that he rec occasion. Predictably, in hi fact that the recruits had jet had adopted a new and hitherto dedicated to unquestioned obed
l

fties: nflict Erupts
for the Army as marking the 2nce and the skeletal formation
as marking the year in which ulk to such units were brought training. The Officer selecining Depot, Major Jayatilleke, d training in the UK and the
been put through a complete ritish Training Team that had The Depot instructors included eaking NCO's. Recruits who had creened" by the Police and put Cal fitness and mental stabilitraining. Initially, they were
the wearing of uniform and to ck cleanliness. Their training s, physical training, weapon round for tactical skill, the nd the whole range of discip
acqainted with the imponderabty to country, to unit and to f which are vital in the makeup
nvited to inaugurate the Depot e fact that he agreed to offignised the importance of the s address, he highlighted the isoned a known form of life and unknown form of life which was ence and which invovled, if it
53

Page 190
became necessary, the laying country. It was appropriate th the father of the nation, the the political head of the Brigadier Caithness and I toure tion of which, he turned to
satisfaction in his eye "Tony,
nation of hard, unrelenting wor
We now turned to the tas commanders in dealing with the the build up of their units wh mere matter of marrying up re Depot and Young Officers from Warrant Officers and NCO's Inad speaking, Brigadier Caithness and training matters whilst Brigadier Caithness left nothin himself with administrative mat
Two organisational matters One was the creation of the Fi representations of Brigadier Mot adviser on the Cantonment that without a Field Engineer elemen own heart because my concept of element. I naturally supportec made for the creation of the Capt. Ramanayake, later to comm.
The other was the reorgani; had carried the name "Cadet Bat" (CB-CLI) given to it when formed in l881. The unit was well e cadets from leading public sc Galle, justifying the formatic 1918. A second battalion was in lion" was inappropriate and j given, namely, Ceylon Cadet Cor to the Volunteers was well reco
Priority in the posting ( units - the list Bn of the CILI
15

down of one's life for one's ut Such words should come from architect of independence and rmy. After the ceremony, the training sites on compleme and said with a glint of it works". It was the culmi"
over many, many months.
k of being available to unit
many problems connected with ich sometimes went beyond the cruits as they came from the
Sandhurst With the cadres of e available to them. Broadly took charge of organisational
I did administration. But g to chance and often involved ters.
were taken up at this stage. eld Engineer Regiment, on the ore who had been functioning as
the Army would be incomplete t. This was a matter after my
the Army provided for such an il the proposal and plans were Field Engineer Regiment under and the Unit.
sation of the Cadet Unit which alion - Ceylon Light Infantry" ! as part of the CLI Volunteers stablished and had attracted hools in Colombo, Kandy and in of the "Cadet Battalion" in ow formed and the name "Batta1stified the new appellation s. Its value as a feeder unit mised.
f recruits was given to two under Lt. Col. Wijeyekoon, in
4

Page 191
view of their internal securit Artillery unit under Lt. Col.
Gunnery Staff Course in the UK, responsibilities covering coas Subject to these and other pric Army worked to a steady routine
An officer from the estab in Ceylon was posted to Army duties within the HQ. He was the training of three officers material to undergo training at This move created a predictab. gain staff experience. Among Major Bahar who later commande Capt. Attygalle who commanded t
Brigadier Caithness arrang at this stage. Although I had the war stationed at Trincomale by a Company Commanders Cours Senior Officers School, and b. British Units and Formations, ir
Before I went to Germany
Ceylon Contingent at the funera
rience which was interesting involved.
In Germany, I was attached an infantry brigade, a Corps, t with the HQ of Rhine Army. Wha was unlikely to prove of assis present stage of our developme Commander-in-Chief, General Sir interest and value to me. He h tions in World War III and I to him to mention my interest in r Army in Ceylon. He listened that all I wanted to create wa scout and armoured cars So tha' wireless operators could become for any sophisticated unit tha
5

y and guard duties and to the FC de Saram, (then doing Long in view of their operational and anti-aircraft defence. rities in technical units, the
in the fifties.
lishment of the British troops HQ in order to organise staff lso given the task of handling who were considereed suitable the Staff College at Camberly. e interest among officers to the first to be selected was il the Army Training Centre and he Army in due course.
ed for my own training abroad
commanded a Battalion during le, he thought I would benefit se, before I proceeded to the y a series of attachments to
West Germany.
, I was detailed to lead the l of King George VI, an expebecause of the ceremonial
to the HQ of an Infantry Unit, illi finally I spent some time it I saw at the highest levels tance to me in Ceylon at the nt. But my meeting with the John Harding, was of special ad a reputation in tank operak advantage of my being with ising an armoured unit for the patiently, whilst I explained s a modest unit equipped with Officers, NCO's, drivers and armour minded and form cadres might be formed later. He

Page 192
agreed with my views and stre terms of tanks because, apart f be recurrent costs, if one wis and development.
On completion of my attach London where I was conducted On British Army organisation head course interesting but unlikely a tiny Army such as ours in Ce much value from my call on the ( Slim. T was quite amazed at tl assistance to our Army and at t progress in Army development. tage of his obvious interest ir ness for armour and was delight enthusiasm. I returned home a 1 what I had achieved in my discu Field Marshal Slim.
My return to Ceylon in 19 Mr. D.S. Senanayake, our first did not have the time to spend for ceremonial occasions like t impact he had on the Army was for many of us a matter of alm of course provided the first c Army handled and the units tak drill and generally gave a good
Not long after the Prim witnessed another sad event - dier Caithness from Ceylon on I have set out above considerab of Brigadier Caithness first Government and later as the Co formative stages. I can thir work of Brigadier Caithness tha the CIGS for inclusion in the which II set up in 1952.

ssed the need not to think in rom initial costs, there would ned to keep pace with research
ments in Rhine Army, I went to a tour of the many branches of ed by the CIGS. This was of
to have any practical value in 2ylon. I did, however, derive IGS, Field Marshal Sir William he grasp he had of British Army he interest he displayed in our Not unnaturally, I took advanour Army to mention my keenled when he did not frown on my rather satisfied man because of ssions with General Harding and
52 coincided with the death of Prime Minister. Although he much time with the Army except he distribution of medals, the considerable and his death was ost personal loss. His funeral eremonial of its kind that the ing part were steady, in their
account of themselves.
e Minister's death, the Army namely, the departure of Brigatermination of his assignment. le evidence of the contribution ly as Military Adviser of the mmander of the Army during its k of no better tribute to the ur the following message sent by first issue of the Army Journal
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Page 193
MeSS
fr Field Marshal Sir William Sl Chief of the Imper
With the formation of her of Ceylon implements one of th the Independence Act. Now as Great Britain in defence again great responsibilities. It is ( that her Army should be of th cers, the men and its equipmer dards is already far beyond t watched the rapid progress that organisation and training. It background of sound administrat has been able to contribute a In this, I believe, we have a augurs well for a strong and years ahead.
It makes no direct refere: the reference to the "rapid organisation and training" of the work of the Army's first Ceylon has been the beneficiary him to this country at a cru Ceylon's military forces.
Brigadier Caithness was f Brigadier F.S. Reid, a Gunner was an Infantryman. Brigadie Officer commanding British trc after the Army was formed and ) with Brigadier Caithness during no stranger to the problems of different to that of Brig. Ca involved in what he wanted dor Imere detached role. For me, it to work with both.
E

age
Ofi in, G.C.B., G. B. E. , D.S.O., M.C. ial General Staff
own Army, the ancienc Kingdom se most important provisions of
a Dominion and partner with st aggression, she enters upon if vital importance, therefore, e highest calibre in its offiit. Realisation of these stanhe planning stage, and I have it has been made in recruiting, has been carried out against a ion to which the British Army
useful measure of experience. secret of a combination that a well defended Ceylon in the
Sd/W.J. Sliin Field Marshal
nce to Brigadier Caithness but progress made in recruiting, the Army points unerringly to Commander. Unquestionably, following the decision to post cial stage in the history of
ollowed as Army Commander by Officer where his predecessor er Reid had been in Ceylon as oops in Ceylon for some time nad established a close rapport
that time. He, therefore, was the Army. I found his approach ithness, who preferred to be le, whilst Brig. Reid played a
was an interesting experience

Page 194
In 1952, the Army was cal "operational" role - namely, th India who found the benefits of tive than life in the rigours entry of the small boats convey near Mannar, because of the sho sed. The lst Bn of the CLI und first unit detailed to undergo t seizing boats, capturing immig the police authorities. They : which succeeded one another. It Artillery searchlights scanning ting Force HQ with Army HQ an administrative and logistic sup was itself called "Ops Monty" a whose brain child it was, as Defence. In due course, the Fo for Anti Illicit Immigration watching duties.
In 1953, the Army was repl arms at the Coronation of HM th command of the Ceylon Continge the third time - twice in quic Whilst the march did not have Victory Parade, it had the glamo tion celebrations. Ceylon had Guard at Buckingham Palace in as nwealth countries, Canada, Aust Zealand. Our men got good cover their drill and smartness althc indifferently with the glamour however, did not prevent the Q the smartness of the drill of t a parade for the distribution Palace.
In 1953, the Army had its Unionists. Mr. Dudley Senanaya Senanayake as Prime Minister, controversy over the price of r raise the price, although ric staple food of the people. Th
l

led upon to perform its first e "capture" of emigrants from working in Ceylon more attracof South India. The area of ing the illegal immigrants was rtness of the distance traverer Lt. Col. Wijeyekoon was the ihe task of scanning the coast, rants and handing them over to set a cracking pace for units ... was an all arms affairs, with the horizon, signals connecd logistic personnel providing port. Initially, the operation fter Major Monty Jayaweikrema, Parliamentary Secretary for rce was called the Task Force
(or TAFII) in routine coast
resented by a Contingent of all e Queen, and I found myself in nt marching through London for k time and once in slow time. the glory of participation in our of participation in Coronathe distinction of providing a sociation with men from Commoralia, India, Pakistan and New age from the British media for ugh our khaki uniform compared of the Guards Uniforms. This, ueen from congratulating me on he men, when I escorted her at of Coronation medals at the
first confrontation with Trade ke, who had succeeded Mr. D.S. ound himself in the thick of a ice. The Government decided to :e was a major element in the ere was an angry reaction and
58

Page 195
the unions were so ferocious th to call an emergency. It was the Regular Army was for the f Trade Union action inducing the
The "Hartal" as the strike considerable experience. The Al UK attending a Conference of t The last time I had been in a co when the CDF was recalled frc against trade unionists. The took to their duties readily. granting that the men were regu experience. It is, however, O the results spoke volumes. T steadiness in all parts of the tore law and order with great ea of crisis when I found myself of recruits who had just comple had no regimental training. them because their lack of exper situation, with perhaps adverse I decided to take a risk and ir with the results because they This was also true of some You) returned from Sandhurst and ha training. Their performance wa the inexperienced regulars reac and fully appreciated the need r necessary but also for a greate with relatively recalcitrant op butes from the Prime Minister IGP, with whom we had been in C
One of the lessons I lear: intelligence in the Police and, was far from satisfactory. I sufficient cohesion between Arm the return of the Army Commande him a full report not only of t also the shortcomings which I h nce, a Joint Intelligence Burea Armed Services and Police Wa
l

hat the Government was obliged therefore, a setting in which irst time involved with major declaration of an emergency.
was called, provided me with rmy Commander was away in the he CIGS and I was in command. imparable situation was in 1947 om being mobilised for action troops then were seasoned and
The position now was that, lars, they had not had similar nly results that can speak and he troops behaved with great country and were able to resse. There was for me a moment short of troops except a batch ted their recruit training but Chere was a risk in employing ience might compromise a given e effects on their own morale. nvolved them. I was delighted behaved as to the manner born. ng Officer cadets who had just i been given little regimental is equally superb. Altogether, ited correctly to the situation not only for "minimum force" as er degree of force when dealing ponents. We had handsome triand Sir Richard Aluvihare, the lose association.
ned from the "Hartal" was that
for that matter, in the Army,
also felt that there was not ly and Police in operations. On er from the UK therefore, T gave he performance of the Army but lad experienced. As a consequeau composed of Officers of the is set up, along with a Joint
59

Page 196
Operations Bureau similarly Service Commanders in briefir intelligence situation and the quired to deal with any host intelligence. Such operation which overall direction woul
Mr. Dudley Senanayake resi Kotalawela assumed duties as CLI the distinction of having John was the first Prime Minis military experience because he CLI shortly after World War I) was also a Minister and, becau him for ministerial duties, he the time of the formation of been critical of the selection dered whether he would introdu Defence. There were none and he what had been done in the for however, one matter in which h his decision to order the men dation in the Cantonment. G experience, this dictated the involved and the men actually c buildings, but the progress wai
In l954, the Army Comma directive issued by Mr. Dudley considered for command of the and field experience at high l I was accordingly posted to t Commander of the 1st Batta Wijeyekoon, then Commander of Army HQ as Chief of Staff. I other troops in the Cantonment promoted Colonel.
Given the guiding hand of unit was well grounded in tacti duties and it was therefore, e advanced training. In order
l

staffed working closely with g the Security Council on the operations and deployment reile development disclosed by would determine the point at d pass from the Police to the
gned at this stage and Sir John 'rime Minister, thus giving the produced a Prime Minister. Sir ter of the country with previous was appointed Commander of the broke out. As it happened, he se of the more important call on had to relinquish command. At the Regular Force, Sir John had of some officers and one wonlice many changes as Minister of e was presumably satisfied with nation of the Army. There was, e introduced a change - namely, to build their barrack accommoiven their lack of skill and redesigning of the buildings sonstructed the more simplified s grossly reduced.
nder gave effect to a policy Senanayake that officers being Army should possess both staff level before a choice was made. he field and assumed duties as .ion of the CLI and Lt. Col. the Battalion, was posted to was also given command of the where the CLI were located and
Lt.Col. Wijeyekoon, I found the cal training and administrative asy for me to progress to more O equip my senior officers in
5 O

Page 197
such training, I directed them their colleagues would take par results obtained.
Two events of an unusual with the CILI. One was the pr Battalion by the Queen. It wa who had initiated the move to unit, would not be in command limitations of time, the ceremc was not done in public as part and the consecration was accordi ny within unit lines. Owing to cration should be exclusively ( Defender of her Christian fait Unit, I decided that there sh with Buddhist, Christian, Hindu ting. At the presentation cere the CLI which was the unit to w presented by the Prince of Wale colours from the Queen during a Galle Face on her birthday. She the Officers and men on parac you".
The second was the "Troop my unit conducted in Colombo : Colours from the Queen. It was regular Unit of the Army perf advised by many competent Wijeyekoon who should himself standards achieved were those e men. Not long after, I was appo
While I was in command of persuading the Army Commander Armoured unit of the Army to be battalion. Capt. Attygalle was in due course, to command the a unit was formally recognised a having helped to create a unit had consistently argued, the Ari
6

to conduct exercises in which t and I was satisfied with the
nature took place when I was esentation of colours to the ls sad that Lt.Col. Wijeyekoon, have colours presented to the at the ceremony. Owing to the ony of consecrating the Colours of the ceremony of presentation ingly done at a special ceremo
speculation whether the consechristian (the Queen being the h) in a predominantly Buddhist ould be an ecumencial SerVice
and Muslim chaplains officiamony, the second battalion of hich colours had initially been es in 1922 also received their a parade of armed forces on the had the unusual experience of le singing "Happy Birthday to
ing the Colour" ceremony which not long after the receipt of s the first occasion on which a ormed the trooping and I was critics, including Lt.Col. have been on parade, that the xpected of regular officers and inted Aide-de-Camp to the Queen.
the CILI, I had the pleasure of to enable the formation of the commenced as a sub-unit in the ; selected to handle this and, afnoured regiment. In 1955, the and I had the satisfaction of
of the Army without which, I my was incomplete.
Sl

Page 198
l954 was a memorable year as being the year in which coll for the first time. Hitherto, conduct the training of their geared to the rate of build up being limited in scope to regim thought that the time had come to be involved in collective than their own would be involve this direction, he decided to without troops to start with a cal exercise with troops in W exercised.
I think Brigadier Reid hi when undertaking the foregoing cise as the setting in which t the command of a Battalion gro me was that I had commanded an War II and that he had placec infantry battalion and of troo ment. He was, therefore, persor command even the Battalion Gro largest formation he could must Army's development.
The exercise was, appropr Tyro". : It was devoted to the from the Diyatalawa area to co in the Tissmaharama region and Operation from Tissamaharam Wellawaya. Several "incidents' kept the troops under my comm entire operation which also h. stration in the field.
I thought that the exerc: took troops away from routine r. unit build up and involved the Inight well have prevented them unquestionable benefit from Command military purpose apart pation in the exercise which

in the development of the Army ective training was undertaken unit commanders were free to sub-units, such training being of their units and inevitably ental training. Brigadier Reid for units to look outwards and training in which units other 2d. To give the Army a lead in conduct a tactical exercise ld follow this up with a tactihich Battalion Group would be
ad a secondary object in mind
and this was to use the exero assess my tactical ability in up. So far, all he knew about infantry battalion during World i me in command of a regular ps located in the Army Cantonhally unaware of my capacity to up which he was mustering, the zer at the present stage of the
iately enough, called "Exercise movement of a Battalion Group ontain a force which had landed to the conduct of a withdrawal a to Diyatalawa, by way of ' staged by a controlled enemy and fully exercised during the elped in the conduct of admini
ise was well timed because it egimental duties connected with m in a training exercise which
from getting stale. There was the assembling of units for a of course, from actual particiclearly widened their military
52

Page 199
outlook and experience. There to participants in that it enab nel from other units with Whom operational duties.
I was away in the UK in the cadre of the Volunteer Forc Volunteer Force were created, Matara, whose nucleus was prov tion companies of the CILI resic What was interesting apart fro se, was the names given to th the case of the Kandy unit and of the Southern unit. In both had fought with great courag names selected perpetuated the the past. There is evidence th sting the popularity of the uni nce of the Commanding Officers Lt.Col. Dharmapala in the sout
l955 also witnessed the
pursuance of a policy decided Trade Unionism had developed during the hartal to which I ha of Trade Union potential, w involve a move to topple the G the Army was still being bu reached maximum levels, the Gov ry units with personnel from tial services. Accordingly, m Railway Department, the Post Public Works Department and t were invited to join military Departments. Two such units v the Post and Telegraph Depart and Port Operating sector were clear to members of these un: was entirely voluntary, no cont should the occasion demand, t military duty, during which the connected with their departim
l

was residual benefit accruing Lled them to get to know personthey would have to associate in
1955 when important changes in e took place. Two units of the
one in Kandy and the other in ided by the men of two outstadent in Kandy Galle and Matara. n the military aspects of courese units, "Rajarata Rifles" in "Ruhunu Regiment" in the case these areas, Sinhalese soldiers e in military history and the
memory of military exploits of at recruiting was brisk, suggeits being raised and the influe, Lt.Col. Ratwatte in Kandy and
creation of two other units in on by the Ministry of Defence. in Ceylon and its performance lve referred above, was evidence nich might in a given setting overnment. Given the fact that ilt up, and certainly had not rernment decided to form militaDepartments carrying out essenembers of such services as the and Telegraph Departments, the he Port Operating Organisation units to be formed within the Tere created in the Railway and ents, whilst others in the PWD due to be started. It was made its that their military service pulsion being imposed and that, he unit would be mobilised for a members would carry out duties ental functions and that their
63

Page 200
loyalties at that stage would with their unions. There wa: enthusiasm for the services c returned to Ceylon, the CRER a formed, after some initial rel Commanding Officers were able t
Inevitably, there was mu policy, on the ground that it w lity of the Trade Union moveme ment argued that the formation ensure the even running of t community which might be int trade union action. The Gove service in the units being cre there being no compulsion to no doubt as to their loyaltie being called upon to function i
1955 was for me a crucial UK to undergo a course of tra College. Soon after the course ned from his assignment as Arm to take his place. I had no id plan to leave the Army before h the letters and telegrams of Co Commissioner in London indicate I began speculating whether the all. In due course, it all if that Colonel Wijeyekoon, as he act for me as Army Commander course at the IDC till its comp
The course itself was fasc quite different from any course necessarily for Officers in the ket Colonell/Major General an having comparable status. Off tries were also accommodated a cers from Australia, Canada, Ir South Africa. The United State

ave to be with the Army and not
obviously very considerable ontemplated and by the time I d the P & T Regiment had been Ictance to join which, however, o overcome.
h criticism of the Government ould work counter to the virint in the country. The Govern
of the units was designed to he services essential to the erfered with by irresponsible rnment also pointed out that ited was essentially voluntary, oin and those joining being in s in the event of their units in a crisis.
year. I was asked to go to the ining at the Imperial Defence started, Brigadier Reid resigy Commander and I was selected ea that Brigadier Reid had any is term came to an end and when ngratulation came and the High 2d ignorance of my appointment, e was something queer about it all into place and I was told now was had been selected to and that I was to continue my letion at the end of the year.
inating, having characteristics I had attended. It was meant British Services of the bracfor British civil servants cers from Commonwealth cound there were in my year, offidia, Pakistan, New Zealand and
also were given vacancies.
4.

Page 201
The course of study includ
The countries of the Com
The countries of the Wes
Communism
The Economic Problem
Nuclear Problems
The lecturers included Cab of the Services (Field Marsha year), writers and authors (Che year), University Professors a There were daily lectures foll Syndicate papers had to be prep short vacation periods, groups areas in the UK and in the lo tries of the Western Alliance. the course and recommended to send a representative from th services and the civili service.
l956 was an eventful year. and naturally enough looked for Kotalawela who had appointed me known from the days I had been it turned out, he was pre-occ because he had decided to call term had run out. In the even to Mr. SWIRD Bandaranalike who ha tion. Accordingly Mr. Bandara Minister to direct the affairs
My first call on him, whi call" turned out to be a work. announced his decision to disba which had been set up during being that such units would ser pment of trade union activity i predictable development, giver
6

sed
monwealth
bern Alliance
inet Ministers, Senior Officers al Montogomery was one in my ster Willmot addressed us in my nd other distinguished people. owed by long discussion period. ared from time to time. During of students visited industrial ng vacation they visited coun
I derived great benefit from the Government that we should is country each year from the
I assumed command of the Army
ward to working under Sir John e Army Commander and whom I had a young officer in the CLI. As cupied with political affairs,
a General Election before his ;t, his party lost the election ud led the MEP during the Elec– naike became the fourth Prime of the Army.
ch was to have been a "courtesy ing session. During this, he und the ESSential Service Units Sir John's time, the argument ve as a bar to the free develon the Departments. This was a the opposition to the units
55

Page 202
prior to formation. Mr. Bandar, to disband two units of the V recently created. These were "Ruhunu Regiment'. He had tw applied particulary to the Ruhu yalty during the Election. I s. brought to my notice whereupon had evidence on which he propos the se units had a regional ch precedent for the creation of instance the Jaffna region. formed on a national basis.
Whilst agreeing with him out that the disbandment he con reduction of men available for them with volunteers would take regular troops would be cost circumstances, he would agre Infantry Unit. This was the Regiment was formed - a develo because it gave me the seco) Brigade organisation which I Independent Ceylon.
Considering the fact that Prime Minister for four years, to meet him on important issu tion. I found the Prime Minis to take with. He was extremely views, he was courteous in lis arguments and positive in his done. I was particularly inte responsibilities as Army Comma as Minister and his own which certainly looked forward to my
One of Mr. Bandaranalike's to introduce the Sinhala Only the commencement of ethnic vi Tamil attitudes were centred o sentation in Parliament as evid split in Parliament - 50 per

anaike also said that he wished 'olunteer Force which had been
the 'Rajarata Rifles' and the O reasons. One was (and this nu Regiment) evidence of disloaid that I had no such evidence
he countered by saying that he (ed to act. The second was that haracter which could create a
other regional units, as for What he preferred were units
on the regional issue, I pointed templated, would result in the duty in a crisis. To replace time but to replace them with :ly. He replied that, in the e to the formation of another setting in which the Singha pment which I found satisfying, nd infantry battalion in the had envisaged in the Army of
I would have to work with the I was glad of the opportunity es so early on in our associaster a Surprisingly easy person clear in the exposition of his tening to me, quick in meeting statement of what he wanted rested in his contrast of my nder which he said were to him he said were to the nation. I tour of duty under him.
acts after assuming office was Bill, in Parliament which led to olence in Ceylon. Up to now, n the political issue of repreenced by the demand for a 50/50 cent of the seats going to the
5 6

Page 203
Sinhala majority and the remai ties. This was rejected by however, enacted the compensat the Constitution which guarant tive discrimination against r Up to l956, the use of Sinha language had been the declare parties. The Tamil party had the last General Election i Government coalition had obtai Sinhala areas. The Tamil lead of status for Sinhala and Tamil passed making Sinhala the onl brought an ethnic element in Violence between the two comm effectively be handled until due course, the rioting ended return to their barracks after and order in all parts of the ( out, particularly the Gall Oya assumed serious proportions. died down but Tamil resentment effort was made to deal with Tamils who had declared their : arrangement whereby the North led, leaving the remainder of ( Government, now gave every ind to achieve their ends. Mr. B enter into negotiation with M the Tamil Federal Party. In into between them (since calle councils would be set up, on powers designed to meet Tam language would be given which effect of the Sinhala Only Ac was called off.
In August of 1957, I was participate in the Conference organised by the CIGS. Befor of the Ministry to select Bri made available to help in th the Field Engineer Unit and th

ing 50 per cent to the minorihe Soulbury Commission which, pry provision in Section 29 of eed provision against legislaCial and religious minorities. -a and Tamil as the official l policy of the , all political obtained landslide victories at the Tamil areas just as the ned landslide victories in the }rs accordingly demanded parity , when the Sinhala Only Act was y official language. This now o the Sinhala Tamil conflict. unities broke out and could not an emergency was declared. In and the soldiers were able to they had helped to restore law country where rioting had broken Valley where the rioting had The violence which had erupted continued, because no political the demands of the Tamils. The intention to fight for a federal and East would be Tamil Controlceylon to be administered by the ication of performing satyagraha andaranaike felt that he should r. Chelvanayagam, the leader of July 1957, a pact was entered d the BC Pact), whereby regional whom would devolve political ill demands and concessions on however, would not reduce the ... On this basis the satyagraha
due to visit the UK in order to of Commonwealth military leaders 2 I did so, I had the authority ish army personnel who would be build up of the Armoured Unit, a Field Artillery Unit that were
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in the process of being organi up an Artillery School and Fi gly, I interviewed officers Artillery and Engineer Corps purpose. On my return to Ceyl resentment that foreign person Army, after the British per initial stages of Army format appreciated the Spirit that le my plans, I pointed out to my nsibility towards the build up have the resources to deal with chief among which was the sett British officers concerned rep were assigned the special duti Armoured Unit had been sent b they had ample scope for fie. Field training they returned to modation was found for the U. School was formed and set up il ing School was formed and set Hardy Institute which provided pers, leaving it open to the field engineering operations inc ship bridging in the training pleased with the progress bein matter, other units of the Army
1957 also witnessed a dev the Army, which centred on th bases which, under the Defence controlled at the time. Mr. Ba. the continued use of the bases impression that such user repre independence. He also argued t ted to a country in the Wester affect the credibility of c Bandaranaike had taken pains alignment in our diplomatic r been only with Western nations relations with the Soviet Unic arrangements with other social hoped to redress the diplomatic
6

ed. It was also keen on setting ld Engineer School. Accordinf the British Armoured Corps, whom I found suitable for my n I found that there was some el were being brought into the onnel brought to help in the on had left Ceylon. Whilst Ι to this apparent hostility to ritics that, given their respoof their units, they would not the matters I had in mind, the ing up of training schools. The orted to me in due course and es I had in mind for them. The me to Ridiyagama Camp where ld training. After completing Colombo where permanent accomnit in Mutwal. The Artillery Colombo. The Engineer Trainup in Amparai not far from the the basic instruction for sapSchool to conduct training in sluding mind laying & watermanareas around. All told, I was g made by these, and for that
elopment, not unconnected with e take over by Ceylon of the Agreement, the British Services ldarnaike was of the view that by the British would create the sented some diminution of our hat the bases had been permitAlliance and that this would ur non-aligned stance. Mr. to create the image of nonslations which up to then had
by entering into diplomatic 1 as a preliminary to similar st countries. In doing šo he balance to some degree. I saw
8

Page 205
the political implications of but I was concerned with the following on the withdrawal Britain's contribution to our d Mr. Bandaranalike countered by s contingency, our non-aligned s stead in the event of our being This constituted Mr. Bandaranai continued user of our bases in the British authorities.
" When Mr. Bandaranalike we discussions with the British S wealth Relations, Lord Home, h tion along with the Commanders talks proceeded smoothly and th hand over control of the bases Bandaranalike allowed' British pe to deal with any matters whic noted that there was no move ment. On our return to Ceylon, bring down the British flag fl up the national flag in it Bandaranaike felt that in this overtly demonstrated.
,་ ༈ །མ༥༣: ; ༧, ༤་གྲ: ; “ -
l958 saw matters between brought to a head. The BC Pact and perhaps we might have gone quo ante, had it not been for lese circles calling for its hands were as a consequence fo agitation was spearheaded by n The Pact was then abrogated an and Sinhalle se opinion. This which erupted and spread to emergency was declared, the vol Army was fully stretched to interesting i feature of the si Governor-General, who of cour Chief of the Services, ass Commander-in-Chief and issued

the Prime Minister's thinking military consequences that, of Britain from the bases, 2fence needs might be diluted. ying that, even conceding such tance would stand us in good threatened by a foreign power. e's policy on the issue of the Trincomalee and Katunayake by
I
nt to the UK in order to have scretary of State for Commonasked me to join his delega
of the Navy and Air Force. The
e British delegation agreed to
; to the Ceylon Services. Mr. rsonnel to remain in the bases h required their presence. I to abrogate the Defence Agreeceremonies were conducted to ying over their bases and sendi heir rightful place. Mr. way our independence was quite
the Tamils and the Government had still not been implemented on indefinitely with the status some agitation in some Sinhaabrogation. 7 Mr. Bandaranaike's rced, particularly because the embers of the Buddhist clergy. i led to the hardening of Tamil in due course led to violence all parts of the Island. An unteers were called out and the deal with the situation. An cuation was the fact that the se was de juré commander-inumed the de facto role of orders to Service Commanders at
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daily conferences. The situati because of the violence that th ing the use of much more than
"Aid to Civil Power" operation soldiers did not indulge in about law and order. There Was in the Uva Province brought ab respected citizens I knew, tc The situation was quickly hand situation in the country and w Army had helped to restore law
of the citizens of the country.
During the l958 emergency, strip in the Amparai region w resources of regular and voluu the general direction of Major setting up of the Army Enginee hbourhood. When the airstr Maithripala Senanayake (who il well as Sinhala), I had the pl present that the airstrip was part of the Army to the peopl were of course welcome to avai offered by the airstrip.
The riots in 1958 brought operational control from Colomb sation. I discussed with the P. regional commands, the merit: scheme was to divide Ceylon int
The Northern Region:
The Northern Eastern and North
In this region, the main ir rned the Tamils. Centrally plac lee, where I had an Artillery Wickramasuriya whom I prop Commander.

in was unquestionably difficult 2 soldiers experienced, involvthe "minimum force" adopted in s. The evidence was that the xcessive violence in bringing
one exception when a sub-unit ut a fervent appeal to me from
remove my "uniformed thugs". led, as indeed was the general e were able to claim that the and order, with the approbation
the construction of a landing as undertaken by the combined hteer engineer personnel under Hacker who was handling the r Training School in the neigip was commissioned by Mr. hcidentally spoke in Tamil as leasure of telling the public a gesture of good will on the e of the Eastern Province who themselves of the facilities
home to me the difficulty of o and the need for decentrali}rmanent Secretary my ideas for of which he recognised. My b three regions as follows -
Central Provinces
ternal security problem conceed in the region was TrincomaRegiment commanded by Lt.Col. psed to instal as Regional

Page 207
The Central Region:
The Central, Uva and Sabaragamut
In this region, the threa come from Indian Tamil labou Centrally situated in the regio an Infantry Battalion commanded proposed to instal as Regional (
The Southern Region:
North Western, Western and South
In this region, the threa In Colombo, centrally placed i one Lt. Col. , the senior of who whom I proposed to instal as Reç Regiment would, however, be un terS.
The Cantonment of Panagoda
Units located in the Ca Wijeyekoon, would form the Isla
The duties of Regional Co touch with the police and othe region and to take the initial s security problem that might aris ter any troops sent from outsi their own regimental troops in
In due course I sought the try for the formation of Regiona tment of Regional Commanders. the Ministry did not accept my that appointments had to be gaz administratively. I found t because I had made it known th ture, the Regional Commands wo that the regimental Commande Commander would not treat him:
7

a Provinces
t to internal security could r, based on the tea estates. n was Diyatalawa, where I had
by Lt. Col. Jayatilleke whom I ommander.
lern Provinces
t would be from Trade Unions. n the region, I had more than in was Lt. Col. Maurice de Mel, Jional Commander. The Armoured der command of Army Headquar
ntonment, commanded by Col. nd Reserve.
mmanders would be to keep in :r security personnell in their steps to deal with any internal se in their region and adminis.de their region to supplement the event of a Crisis.
formal approval of the Minisl Commands and for the appoinI was a little taken aback when recommendations, on the ground etted and could not be approved his difficult to understand lat, in order to save expendiuld be set up on the footing der given the job of Regional self as having been "selected"

Page 208
for the appointment and would ctions, in addition to his regi claim any special staff to ca enough, when I announced my int the Prime Minister asked me to order to implement what he des for regional command. I declin nue as Army Commander for thi thought the scheme was so simp. no difficulty in implementin which had been withheld, was
ment, regional commands have be are different from those I had
, 1958 also saw the formatic The Recruit Training Depot at function the turning out of rec courses for NCO's and sometimes expansion in the Army, there wa undertake the training of offi reorganised so that a Training to the Recruit Training Wing. an Academy for the training of my mind, but because I was sti to the Military Academy at San off. The ATC provided for th Commandant and Major Bahar was The Academy, has since been set "1959 witnessed development sation side. Regular units had strength, justifying my decisi officers of all such units to
The following statement makes interesting reading:
Recce Regiment Ceylon Armo lst Regiment Coast/Anti-A 3rd Regiment Field Artille

perform regional command funmental functions and would not
rry out his duties. Strangely. antion to retire from the Army,
continue, in Command, largely in
cribed as my "splendid" scheme ed the suggestion that I contiis specific purpose, because I Le that my successor would have g it, once Ministry approval, forthcoming. Since my retire en set up, although the regions visualised.
on of the Army Training Centre. Diyatalawa had as its primary ruits, but also conducted short i. for young officers. With the s a need for an; organisation to cers. The unit was accordingly wing would be set up, parallel The desirability of setting up.
cadet officers passed through llable to send cadet officers dhurst, I put that development. e appointment of a Lt. Col. as selected for this appointment.
in many fields, on the organibeen brought up to regimental lon, to promote the commanding . Čt. Col.
of units and their Commanders
ured Corps - Et. Col. Attygalle
ircraft Artillery
- - Lt. Col. Wickremasuriya κΥ, - Lt. Col. Abraham
72

Page 209
1st Field Engineer Regime 3rd Works Services Ceylon lst Battalion Ceylon Eigh ܙܐ . lst Battalion Ceylon Sing The Ceylon Army Medical c The Ceylon Army Service с
The Ceylon Army Ordnance The Ceylon Army Electrica The Ceylon Army General 's
The Army Training Centre -
The Ceylon Army Police Co.
On the Volunteer side, I dant CDF and installed Col. V Volunteer Force cadre remaine study, except that a new Volunt ment, had been Created. With already created, the formati produced the infantry componen visualised for the Army, altho battalion of the Gemunu Regime could claim that the full infa had been formed. This, however did, after my retirement.
A major development was construction of the cantonment. as required and some Rs.40, C Bandaranaike's time for this pi by the change of policy whereb modation was not undertaken Perera, the Commander of the WC ntal in ensuring progress at

-፡ زیر . . . . از را
ita - Lt. Col Ramanayake
، - : - - ( ) ;";": 8ން Lt. Col. Perera,
ܕܝܢ
la Regiment ४: ' १ । ?" : * : ' :'د ٠ .'
, Lt. Col.Jayạtillake Arps -- Col. Serasinghe .
... ؟ ::: " : : : ;........؟ ز, ؛ + "::: . : - :::: ... ت:
: : : : jf. f.
orps - Lt. Col. Perera
. . . .
Corps- Lt. Col. Abeysinghe .
& Mechanical Engineer Corps - Lt. Col. Mattysz ,
•rvice Corps - Lt. Sol Wijemane
- Lt. Col--Bahar. **> - 、リ : :。
ps – Major Zylva
recreated the office of CommanNijeyekoon as Commandant. The d as has been earlier in this zeer regiment, the Gemunu Regithe CILI, and the Singha Regiment on of this new infantry unit t of the Infantry Brigade I had agh the creation of the regular nt had to take place before one ntry complement of the Brigade was not long in coming, as it
the rapid progress made in the Money had been made available 00,000 had been voted in Mr. irpose. Progress had been made the building of barrack accomoy the Soldiers. Lt. Col. MLDA rks. Services Unit was instrumethe cantonment by acting as
73

Page 210
liaison officer with the PWD i new development was the Bill Stations", which I helped to d Minister of Defence to set up Stations" initially round the c be under the control of a spe personnel and local civiliar status in the station and the pc ry activities in the station, industries, removal of houses due course, the concept of "Dei ded to all service establishme and Diyatalawa.
l959 also witnessed the cu lling my successor. In decidi Commander" s tour of duty, Briga on the following priorities:
Year ll Taking stock after
Year2 Finalising own plau
them Year 3 Making changes as d
Year 4 Consolidation.
Training of Success
In my case, the selection Col. Wijeyekoon, who had acted was the obvious choice. In or familiarise himself with Army appointed him Inspector of Tra me posted on training matters development. I had also app Volunteer Force so that he co affairs. He was in this pro duties as Army Commander.
A word on the training of at this stage. Up to the time
l

in the construction process. A for the creation of "Defence aft. This Bill empowered the
areas to be called "Defence antonment. This station would Cial body, composed of Army s, which would have municipal wer to control all non-militaincluding buildings, obnoxious of ill-fame, gambling etc. In ence Stations" would be extennts in Trincomalee, Katunayake
limination of my plan for instang on four years as the Army ier Caithness and I had worked
take over of command
hs for the Army & implementing
ictated by experience
O
of successor was automatic and
for me when I was at the IDC, der, however, to enable him to affairs at close quarters, I had ining which enabled him to keep and also to keep pace with Army ointed him Commandant of the uld keep pace with Volunteer cess well-equipped to assume
the Army would be appropriate I assumed command of the Army,
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the emphasis in training had be country. In my early training units the need to familiarise the jungle so that they could ac to training in guerilla opera arising from unfamiliarity wi process, units would become f operations in open country and jungle country. In my training ced that there would be an Arn the year designed to ascertain the training I had outlined Wijeyekoon experience in the co jungle operations. The "enemy" Staff, Lt. Col. de Mel in carry ned to exercise the main forc Prime Minister was an interest from my standpoint a successful introduced to the problems of d handling of guerilla type oper and of course, administration i
I had planned that Col. W preparation to assume comman course at the Imperial Defence tion with personal problems, ho be deferred till l960. This C extension of my command which, by the Ministry. I accordingly of 1959 and Col. Wijeyekoon was le course of training at the II
Just before I retired, Mr. and I had the melancholy duty military funeral of a Prime M the Army. I found in Mr. Bal superior to deal with. His att was that I had the right to e. liked but that correspondingly where necessary and indeed to g. me to accept and to implement occasion when I attended a conf which were present Ministers, P

een on Conventional war in open directives, I pointed out to themselves with conditions in dress themselves in due course tions, without any constraint bh jungle conditions. In the amiliar both with conventional guerilla operations in close, directive for 1959, I announly Exercise towards the end of what progress units had made in but residually, to give Col. mmand of a force of all arms in was directed by the Chief of ing out guerilla tactics desigce under Col. Wijeyekoon. The ed spectator. The Exercise was one because the Army had been eployment in the jungle, to the ations of an elementary nature in the jungle.
ijeyekoon should round off his d of the Army by attending a College. Because of preoccupaowever he asked that his course of course would have meant an as I expected, was not approved arranged to retire at the end
denied the chance of a valuab
)C.
Bandaranalike was assassinated r of arranging for the second inister since the inception of ndaranaike a singularly easy titude to me as Army Commander xpose my views as freely as I ", he had the right ro disagree ive decisions which he expected loyally. There was a memorable erence presided over by him at ermanent Secretaries and Senior
75

Page 212
officials. During the discuss unacceptable to him. He lister and made a decision which of
conference, however, I apologis appeared as an "obstructive" at his reply was "My dear fellow,
not speak out as you did today, impressed by the fact that he aspects of a problem, even thol ment in his make up; but of c consequence, apart from the in the time he assumed the premi accepted my advice on the forma He also stood by the Army durin of the Army Cantonment, in spit the occasion of the Oth Anniv. Army in l959, I had asked him building at the Cantonment and
on the stone commemorating the ( other foundation stone bear: Senanayake, when he commissione ding some years before. I wa prevented him from keeping his perpetuated in stone at the Can
Mr. Bandaranaike WOuld hav Commander at the ene of my t declining his invitation, I poi centre of things in the Army whe Commander for so long that c promotion to the officers juni Army such as ours would be hi. made the flattering suggestion ment as High Commissioner in E continue in Government service refuse. Indeed, I saw merit i suggestion as signifying Gover that the Army was capable of Foreign Service at the highe enough to witness four Comman appointments as Ambassadors or glad of the precedent I )

ion, I expressed views quite led to me with great patience course I accepted. After the ed to him for what might have ttitude on my part, whereupon if the time comes when you do I shall be distressed." I was so readily saw the military ugh there was no military ele'ourse, he read widely. As a itial disbandment of units at ership, he generally speaking, ation and build up of the Army. g his time in the construction e of its considerable cost. On ersary of the founding of the to declare open the Army HQ indeed had his name inscribed occasion, which would match the ing the name of Mr. Dudley d the construction of the buills distressed when his death appointment and having his name tOnnent.
'e liked me to continue as Army our which ended in l959. In inted out that I had been at the ther as Chief of Staff or Army ontinued service would block or to me, which in a growing ighly prized. Mr Bandaranaike
that I should accept appointPakistan. I had not planned to on retirement but could not in accepting Mr. Bandaranaike's nment recognition of the view producing material for the st level. I have lived long ders of the Army follow me in High Commissioners and I am helped to establish. Mr.
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Page 213
Bandaranaike's death prevented conduct of foreign affairs - a But that is another story.
My service in the Army ca) Bandaranaike's death and I was of satisfaction that I had been changes in military affairs d service. I also felt a sense O the creation of the Army of In felt a sense of gratitude that with failure to carry out the w I had been enabled to bring abo for the Army, from the time initial concept. As I looked withal to form a Brigade Grol infantry regiments (although ad of one of them was still to be side the operational support of engineers and field signals an support of services, to mainta the field. All that remained t the HQ of the Brigade Group.
At the risk of appearing final message to the Army on rather inadequately the depth severed connection with an Army nce whether as a Volunteer or
peace.
MESS
fr Major General A.-M.- Mu Army Co
To All Officers Warrant Off
I write this on the occas Army after twentyfive years of
li

me from assisting him in the field in which he revelled.
me to an end not long after Mr. able to leave it with a sense able to participate in crucial uring my twentyfive years in f pride that I had assisted in dependent Ceylon. Above all I my tour had not been visited ishes of my superiors and that ut the changes I had mapped out Brig. Caithness outlined its back, the Army had the whereup, having at its core three mittedly the regular component raised) and having, on the one armour, field artillery, field d, on the other, the logistic in it both in barracks and in o be done was the creation of
presumptuous, I reproduce my retirement, which expresses of feeling I experienced, as I which had enriched my experiea Regular, in wartime and in
AGE
O ttukumaru. OBE ED ADC mmander
icers and NCO's
ion of my retirement from the service as a soldier.
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Page 214
Many thoughts pass through the most compelling is an aware and your subordinates have inva myself has any conception of wha and how much it has lightened I less compelling is my high asse ideals of service and the req have characterised your work dur In an age of changing values, some at least of the values pass sors are still being cherished ,
My retirement coincides wi inauguration of the Army of Ind was formed, we set out to ach professional efficiency in kee independent state. There is am standards have been achieved a and your subordinates have reas bution to the success achieved
What of the future? I nee must there be no deteriorati
eXCellence Of the Standards ach spur to improved standards in t a responsibility is cast on su It is the duty of the superiol level) to provide, by precept a subordinates have a right to e the duty of the subordinates because of precept nor merel. because he is disciplined enou Conscience must at least be as code of discipline.
My departure from the Arm me the unimportance and impern corresponding importance and pe: which they belong. I go now, bu unquestionably remain when in
7

my mind as I write this but eness of the loyalty which you riably given me. No one but I it your loyalty has meant to me my task as Army Commander. No essment of the devotion to the airements of efficiency which ing my tour as Army Commander. it is comforting to note that ed down to us by our predecesand fostered.
th the Tenth Anniversary of the ependent Ceylon. When the Army Lieve standards of conduct and ping with the prestige of an ple evidence that the required nd are being maintained. You on to be proud of your contrihitherto.
ld scarcely say that not only on in standards but that the hieved so far should act as a che future. In achieving this, uperior and subordinate alike. (particularly at the higher nd example, the lead which his xpect of him. Equally, it is to act correctly, not merely y for fear of punishment but gh to want to act correctly. s effective a deterrent as any
y has brought home forcibly to lanence of individuals and the
rmanence of the institutions to t the Army remains and it will the fullness of time you, like
8

Page 215
me, get ready to leave the Arm when that time comes, you will that my successors in office h of the Army and will see to it and efficiency are maintained remains vigorous.
GOOD LUCK
. Army Headquarters,
Colombo, 3l. 12.1959

y. It is my fervent wish that, be able to say as I can today, ave in mind the true interests that high traditions of conduct and the spirit of true service
O YOU AI,
Anton Muttukumaru Major General
79

Page 216
12
The Si An Abortive Coup d'
For the ten years followin I was abroad performing dutie Service in various part of the w ry development, therefore, la contact which had characterised Army as a Regular Officer. I with the Army completely becau had in the Army, I was informed
The first event brought to the Tamil problem. In the aft Bandaranalike made a move tow, Tamils by enacting the Tamil La but this did not go so far enol the Tamils. In the election ca after Mr. Bandaranaike's death, the UNP which came into power withdrew its support when it di signs of making any substanti problem. Mr. Senanayake resign which followed, Mrs. Bandarana party the SLFP, was voted into found that Mrs. Bandaranalike wa Sions in solving outstanding is: of the Government was that it w Bandaranaike.
Mr. Chelvanayagam now fou to demonstrate the dissatisfac Federal Party. This took the The Satyagraha was essentially
8

xties: »tat and its aftermath
g my retirement from the Army, is as a member of the Foreign forld. My knowledge of militacked the intimate, day-to-day the ten years I spent with the did not, however, lose contact se, given the known interest II
of major events.
my notice was connected with ermath of the l958 riots, Mr. ards reconciliation with the nguage (Special) Provisions Act ugh to assuage the feelings of mpaigning taking place in l960 , the Federal Party supported under Mr. Dudley Senanayake, but scovered that the UNP showed no all effort to solve the Tamil ed and in the general election ike, now leading her husband's power. The Federal Party soon s unlikely to grant any concessues, because the stated policy ould follow the policies of Mr.
nd it necessary to take action tion being experienced by the form of a satyagraha movement. in keeping with the outlook of
O

Page 217
Mr. Chelvanayagam who would es demands. He was fortified in example of Mahatma Gandhi, wh the instrument for ensuring sel
The possibility of non-vio. nment had been examined by us i ligence reports indicated that the Queen to Ceylon might demon on the streets. We had accord to clear the streets, with the 1
When the Government was co raha movement, the Army was pre with the satyagrahis who had be it happens, there were women deployed. The presence of wome Army which did not relish the women protesters. They had nev way, in order to give the Arm men, in case force had to be us much criticism but, this notwit situation under control without but not without violent protes zealous in carrying out the ord the "engagement" between the Ar be described cynically as the " of the Satyagrahis.
It was during the early through the experience that wa that matter, in the history attempt at a coup d'etat by ser whom were closely associated s the Police. Significantly, the
It is virtually axiomatic a matter of profound importan change a Government which, a legally constituted. It is, th and its implications are cer purely military side, military nists of the coup must be take
l

chew violence in securing his the stand he took up, by the
o chose non-violent protest as
f-government for India.
Lent protest against the Goverin the Army in l954 when intelprotesters against the visit of strate their hostility by lying ingly to devise counter-action minimum force.
nfronted with the Tamil satyagdictably enough ordered to deal :en deployed on the streets. As as well as men satyagrahis so n constituted a problem for the idea of having to deal with vertheless to be got out of the y full scope to deal with the ed. Their action brought about hstanding, the Army brought the
the violence that was expected it that the Army had been overers of the Government. Indeed, my and the satyagrahis came to Battle of Jaffna" by supporters
sixties that the Army went s new in its history and, for of the nation. This was an lior officers of the Army with senior officers of the Navy and
Air Force kept aloof.
to assert that a coup d'etat is ce, because it is designed to is in Ceylon at the time, was erefore, not lightly undertaken tainly multifaceted. On the opposition against the protagoan into account, the risk being
Bl

Page 218
the counteraction to the coup c non-military side, it would be people at large are in sympat After all it is the people that and if there is a move to subve be protest against the coup by life of the community throu services and by other means.
The possibility of the form of action was examined Nation" by Howard Wriggins and what he says:-
"The Army has remained alo ly served whatever Gov chosen... Ceylon's Army combat... This is not to sa was called out in the 195 mastered the disorders an But no recollection of p leadership to dominate a officer corps no doubt has of politics that is commo they nevertheless has bee ideas of the limited place life. If public disorders of politics appear chronic government, some leaders suaded that they were indis tical arena. But matters before this lurking tempta reality."
Howard Wriggins wrote this boo one is struck by the almost pro sments made by the author.
As far as one can make facing the protagonists in the deteriorated sufficiently to Whether the leaders of the cou read the i political setting mus
18

ould lead to civil war. On the imperative to ensure that the hy with the coup organisers. put the government into power ert the government, there could action to interfere with the jh strikes affecting essential
ceylon forces undertaking this in "Ceylon-Dilemmas of a new it would be rewarding to recall
of from politics and has loyalernment the electorate has
has no great tradition of ay it is ineffectual. When it 8 communal riots, it promptly d re-established public peace. ast grand missions tempt its ffairs. Moreover, while its that firm disdain for the men in to many army professionals, in deeply imbued with British
of the military man in public become frequent and if the men :ally incapable of effective in the Army might become perspensable in the domestic poli
would have to be dire indeed tion would become a political
k not long before the coup and phetic character of the asses
out, the political situation coup had in their judgement
justify their intervention. p were sufficiently shrewd to t remain obscure but they were
32

Page 219
unquestionably strong characters pective services - Lt. Col. de Sa de Mel in the Navy and DIG de course others. Lt. Col. de Sara unusual, almost unorthodox al both his subordinates and his earmarked him to succeed Col.
Army and I was saddened when h: resignation from the regular for found the time to join the vo personality infused spirit into soon after I took command of "mutiny" from a few men of hi vocational training at the enc service. They created history grievances to the Prime Ministe the l956 election campaign, he h their grievances to him. It nee tive to clarify the situation seeking similar redress. (I sho was criticised for not punishin ces under the Army Act. Il did there was no point in prolongil opted to leave the Army and whos their being treated as martyrs. rather than weakened the Unit,
what they left behind was disci
Lt. Col de Saram's forcefu his unquestioned leadership q influence several units in the and the volunteer force to join have loomed large in assessing t the coup arrangements, particula that the Air Force was not a pa
The coup failed and in as: into account the lack of public its impact on the success of element in a democracy where popularly constituted governmen is possible that the leaders ol
8

; with influence in their resaram in the Army, Rear Admiral e Zoy sa in the Police and of m was certainly an officer of bility, capable of influencing colleagues. Actually, I had Wijeyekoon in command of the is family problems led to his rce and I was delighted when he lunteer force. His forceful his men as I discovered when the Army, I was faced with a is unit who had been refused of their five year term of by insisting on taking their der on the ground that, during ad invited the people to bring ded a Prime Ministerial direcand to prevent others from uld add in parenthesis, that I g the men concerned for offennot do so advisedly, because ng the service of men who had e punishment might have led to Their discharge strengthened as had been predicted, because plined.)
illness as a Unit commander and ualities must have helped to Army both of the regular force
the coup - a factor which must he contribution of the Army in arly to compensate for the fact rticipant.
sessing the failure, one takes a support which must have had the coup. This is a potent a move is made to subvert a . t. And, as I comment above, it the coup failed to read the
3

Page 220
political situation adequately
plementation of their plans. It comment of a Prime Minister tha ciate popular success for a cou hierarchy handling the coup. Ad one possesses, it is possible t ders lacked the dedication whic demonstrated. Mrs. Bandaranaik with despatch and decision in i loyal to her and in ordering th safeguard the state. When the coup, bloodshed was unquestiona could not have been a firm COm the objects of the coup, if the it off, on what appears to have tance to their plans. This ap perhaps due to the fact that
structure. There was certainly which perhaps helped in plannin producing effective command, bei
Following the abortive c enough some military developmen the short term, with the disban units and the utilisation of loy creation of a new Artillery U Regiment was disbanded. The pl and the Volunteer squadron of t compensate for the loss of manpo wing units were raised:
One Volunteer Battalion of
Two Volunteer Battalions of
One Regiment (Developments
Engineers.
The second lay in the long that the coup had on the Army preparing a paper on "Armamen militarisation" which was meant mament. The Army Commander c
18

before they undertook the imis also as well to recall the it it was not possible to assoD that had no Buddhists in the ditionally, with the hindsight o conclude that the coup lea:h leaders of other coups have e, the Prime Minister, acted dentifying the Units that were em to take suitable action to coup leaders called off the bly avoided. But clearly there Initment to the achievement of leaders were prepared to call been the first show of resisparent lack of dedication is there was no proper command collectiveness in leadership g but would be insufficient in cause of its diffuse character.
oup, there were predictably ts. The first of these lay in dment of two regular artillery all personnel from them for the nit. The Volunteer. Artillery ant Regiment of the Engineers he Signals were disbanded. To Iwer in these units, the follo
the Gemunu regiment;
the National Guard;
Construction) of the
term and centred on the impact as a whole. In 1980, I was t Culture - the diffusion of for the UN Committee on Disar
f the time Major General JED
4

Page 221
Perera, briefing me on Army dev remarks on the aftermath of the
"...The overall effect of creation of a split in the Offic to suspicion and lack of esprit more recent times and the abort one of the most damaging events
I get the impression that years after the coup, there is sections of the Officers Corps.
A third and perhaps equall has been the example which it abortive coup was staged - this commissioned officers in the Ar; the time. Apart from the princ the then Army Commander, Major C ted for suspected complicity ir was acquitted as I anticipated him was essentially circumstant mind is that a coup could have the first one and that persons chy were involved. What is a coups, however unsuccessful, to of the Army, when it had not re. not in the happy position of t great coups in their history, w of disapprobation to one of ac reactions to them, the world h American Insurrection paved the develop; that the French Revolut emancipation and that the Russ the Communist ideology. It is matters whatever claim to divi lect that, when the validity canvassed in the Courts, the S. that it was the outcome of the law of necessity.
In 1965 also, there was a flict. Hitherto the Federal Pa
8

elopments, made the following
Coup:
the abortive coup was the er Corps in the Army, leading de corps which was evident in ive coup could be regarded as in the history of the Army."
even now, nearly twenty-five a residual lack of trust among
y damaging effect of the coup has created. In 1965, another time undertaken by senior nonmy to topple the Government of ipal participants in the plot, eneral Udugama was also arresthe plot. As it happens, he because the evidence against ial. What is disturbing to my been undertaken so soon after lower down in the Army hieraralso saddening is that these ok place so early in the life ached maturity. Sri Lanka was he countries which have staged hich have passed from a phase :ceptance. Whatever the early as come to recognise that the è way for the Commonwealth to ion blazed the way to national sion Revolution has introduced the will of the people that ne guidance is made. I recolof the Ayub Khan regime was upreme Court of Pakistan ruled vill of the people based on the
development in the Tamil conrty had to negotiate with the
5

Page 222
SLFP, whether under Mr. SWRD
Bandaranalike. In 1965, the UNP
Mr. Dudley Senanayake, the Prim a Federal politician, Mr. M.
The climate had clearly chang Chelvanayagam found it possib called the DC Pact. Its provi powers to District Councils c agreed upon, subject to Goverr national interest; Government
Tamil Language (Special Provisic rities to be adopted in the all Development Ordinance. By l968, White Paper on the implications opposition to it obliged the Gov
The resultant position was strably unhappy. The Federal I pacts with Government leaders of both of which had however prov therefore far from satisfactory end and they faced the commenc was perhaps the feeling in the m the time was approaching for the
8

Bandaranalike or Mrs. Sirimavo came into power once again and Minister, saw fit to include Iiruchelvam, in his cabinet. d and Mr. Senanayake and Mr. le to enter into a Pact, now sions included the vesting of ver subjects to be mutually ment control over matters of undertaking to implement the ns) Act and agreement on priootment of land under the Land the Government had prepared a of the DC Pact but strenuous ernment to withdraw the Paper.
for the Tamil people, demon'arty had admittedly concluded both of the SLFP and the UNP, 2d abortive. The outlook was, . As the sixties came to an ement of the seventies, there inds of the Tamil leaders that am to rethink their strategies.

Page 223
1.
The Sev Sri Lanka Fac
Sinhalese Terrorisa
The Seventies opened with SLFP was elected to power, with A feature of the election was t party, the Janatha Vimukthi Pe composed of youth, led by you and the courage of youth. Thi display of their political phi tionary purpose of changing in (Parliament was one) often sugg ssness. Significantly, plantat way to a massive food drive, bourgeois concept) being compe in food and full employment. in the display of their milita control many regions in the c armed forces in fierce gueril. cilated with the Ruhunu regio through our military history, dear to the kings for whom th appear to have inherited some activities which enabled them region in the South and the Rit
Their strategy was unus classes in the villages wher during which adherents to the c ly by reference to the ideals men and women involved (for t also prepared militarily throu
l

enties: es Terrorism
a general election in which the Mrs. Bandaranaike at its head. he emergence of a new political ramuna (JVP). This was a party th, having the ideals of youth s courage was evident in the losophy underlying the revolustitutions which offended them esting anihilism in its ruthleions would be ripped up to give the loss of foreign exchange (a nsated for by self-sufficiency Their courage was also evident ry skill which enabled them to sountry and give battle to the la fighting. The JVP is asson which produced the men who, displayed fighting qualities ey fought. The men of the JVP of that aptitude for guerilla to take and hold the Singharaja igala region in the North.
lal, for months, they conducted e possible and in the jungle, :ause were prepared ideologicalfor which the party stood. The here were women as well) were gh training in fire-arms, minor
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tactics in the jungle inclu action, administration in the nursing and in general, gettin tions against the security f foregoing, they indulged in th and explosives. Funds for th through subscriptions and dona thefts, robberies and holdups - all of which gave their "terrorist" character.
The political strategy
needed to be, for a fledgeling seasoned opponents as the UN defeat the UNP which was the p opportunity to support the S. although one is not clear whe arrangement for joint action probably disarmed by the ant perhaps did not fully appreciat alone and, as was proved in 19 been anti-UNP prior to l97l.
They came into military pi taneous attacks on a number of capturing the arms in the stati military effectiveness of such had been to attack many more : but some failure to read the C to a partial assault. Even so two police stations had been causing around fifty to be abai
The situation was seen a security and the Government wa emergency. The armed forces themselves heavily engaged. Co l958 emergency had been ap Batticaloa, the centres of Tami on an island-wide basis to deal gents, which were sufficiently
that the Government was deal tactics seemed to lie in giv
l

ling offensive and defensive jungle including first-aid and the fighters ready for operafrces. Concurrently with the efts and robberies of firearms eir activities were obtained tions, supplemented however by of banks and other institutions
activities a predominantly
of the JVP was shrewd, as it party to campaign against such P and the SLFP. In order to arty in power, they took every LFP in the election campaign, |ther there was any electoral
with the SLFP. The SLFP was i-UNP fervour of the JVP and e that the JVP stood for itself 7l, was as anti-SLFP as it had
rominence when they made simulpolice stations with a view to ons and residually reducing the
stations. The plan apparently stations in the initial assault ode invovled in the attack led , the evidence is that ninetyattacked, damaging fifty and doned.
s a major threat to national s obliged to declare a state of were deployed and soon found ordinating officers, who in the pointed only in Jaffna and li occupation, were now deployed with the actions of the insurviolent to justify the thinking .ng with "Terrorists". Their ing themselves a base in the
8

Page 225
jungle, from which they would neighbourhood and harass the t: into their jungle hideouts.
The army had been alerted the need for training in gueril follow up training by Gen. Wi them in good stead. He arrange cers, Lt. Col. Udugama and Li happens destined to command th Yugoslavia for training in g Yugoslavia under Marshall Tito Cial aptitude. Additionally, st for familiarisation with the ju conducted by General Templer ag Army at the time of the 197l I mand of Major-General Attygallé of having undergone guerilla t. and of raising the Armoured Uni I was personally delighted to he and performance during the cris fy my faith in its creation.
The insurgency was instru our non-aligned stance in inte I had with Heads of foreign mis some of them had been approache sion of military hardware to s Armed forces. Military aid po Britain, the USA, the USSR, C which had up to now supplied u obvious that, if the material s commander in the forward areas commanders of logistic units in variety of the material supplie
The Army benefited enormo the terrorists, in that its ov was widened. In the fifties trade union activities, and i opponents. In the sixties the non-violent satyagrahis whilst to deal with other parts com
8

sally forth and terrorise the roops sent out to follow them
in my time as Army Commanderto la operations in the jungle and jeyekoon, my successor, stood 2d for two of his senior offiit. Col. Attygalle (both as it e Army in their time) to go to uerilla operations for which had created for herself a speenior NCO's were sent to Malaya Lngle operations which had been gainst Malayan insurgents. The insurrection was under the come who had the unique experience raining under Yugoslav experts t from its infancy to maturity. ear of its extensive deployment is, because it seemed to justi
mental in proving the value of rnational affairs. Discussions sions in Colombo disclosed that d for assistance in the proviupplement the resources of the oured in from India, Pakistan, nina and of course Yugoslavia, s mountain guns. It is pretty supplied was the delight of the , it was the nightmare of the | the rear areas, because of the !d.
usly from the engagements with erall experience in operations they had been engaged in antiin activities against unarmed ay were required to deal with parts of the Army were deployed mitted to an abortive coup
39

Page 226
d'etat. In the seventies the Si new sort of "enemy"- young, ded: their actions, terrorist. It w to deal with armed terrorists guerilla tactics in the jungle furtherance of an objective to for which they were prepared to
It was also the equally det ment in maximising the use of strengthened by the raising of a reinforced by the considerable countries around the globe, ti gain ascendency over the ter because insurgent casualties wel price to be paid for national s
There is a residual expl success in the exchanges with fact that the people at large insurgents. At the time of th 60's, the will of the people Government which the people l intentions of a group which sou a government. And the will of even though the insurrectionis Muslim or other non-Sinhalese w ction but this had no impact support the aims of the insurg accordingly died down.
Tamil Terrorism
Peace however did not desc of the insurgency, because the C Tamils in the North still pe previous chapter of this study Tamil leaders were considering to secure their demands. Event that there was now a watershed leaders and the Government. Th fully with all governments whi Independence but found that nc

inhalese terrorists presented a cated, armed, ruthless and, in as the first time the Army had capable of exploiting skill in from which they operated, in which they were dedicated and
lay down their lives.
termined actions of the Governthe resources of the forces, a National Service Regiment and assistance provided by friendly nat enabled the Government to rorists. The cost was heavy re innumerable but this was the ecurity.
anation for the Government's
the terrorists - namely, the were not in sympathy with the ne abortive coup d'etat in the was implicit in support of a had put in power, against the ight to subvert and topple such the people was manifest now, ts were Sinhalese. No Tamil, Tas involved in the JVP insurreon the people who declined to ents. A new phase of violence
'end on the country with the end 'ommunal problems involving the rsisted. At the close of the , I suggested that perhaps the
a rethinking of their strategy s in the 70's certainly suggest
in relations between the Tamil Le Tamils had negotiated peacech had governed Sri Lanka since ) finality had been reached on
9 O

Page 227
the issues outstanding. In lS the Tamils found disturbing. for Tamil Research which was activity, had held internationa in Malaysia. The second and t in Madras in 1966 and l968 res in Jaffna, des pite the refus visas to some distinguished Tamil people, however, was acting in the belief that the c tones moved into the conferen aftermath of which seven Tami fire broke out and created a si
Perhaps this was the stri because in l976, at its Annual TULF adopted a resolution that of the "separate, free, secular Tamil Eelam". Mr. Chelvanayaga ted to have said that the Tam only God could help the Tamils
It was around this time t ce the activities of the Tami called themselves the Tigers. the royal emblem of the Cholas our military history against It has also been suggested tha the appellation of the Singha, of Sri Lanka. The Tamil tige) after l956 when communal con were, therefore, brought up . through two decades. They had tly, to be aware of the disabi ty. They were themselves pe discriminatory provisions of education because educational had been reduced, with the i employment opportunities.
It is significant that th on the scene closely followed coincidental but not perhap

74, an event took place which
The International Association levoted essentially to cultural l conferences beginning in l965 hird conferences had been held pectively. The fourth was held ll of the Government to issue articipants. What shook the ;he action of the Police who onference had subversive underce hall with tear gas, in the 1 persons were killed, when a
campede.
aw that broke the camel's back Convention in Vadukoddai, the its goal now was the setting up , sovereign, socialist state of im, the Tamil leader, is reporils had reached the stage when
hat Sri Lanka began to experien.l group of militant youth who The name is interesting because
of South India (often ranged in Sinhalese kings) was the tiger. t the name was chosen to match
(or Lion) Regiment in the Army is were generally speaking born flict erupted in Ceylon. They in the shadow of that Conflict
matured in the time sufficienlities affecting their communirsonally disadvantaged by the he policy of standardisation in opportunities at tertiary level nevitable impact on obtaining
2 appearance of the Tamil Tigers that of the JVP militants - a s wholly accidental occurrence.
9.

Page 228
The similarity between the two violence as the medium of the The dissimilarity between them JVP wished to topple the Gover its place, the Tigers only wan to provide for the state of Tam
The Tigers initially made attack directed against the Pol the police attack on the Intern nce. This was followed by Duraiappah, the Tamil Mayor ( collaborating with the SLFP Go dents were attributed to the Ti not only security personnel but of cooperating with the Governm
With the general election however, the UNP, now campaign perceptive manifesto in which solution of the problems facing Tamil speaking people support ev of a separate state. In the i integration, so necessary for country, the party feels such pi loss of time. The party, when all possible steps to remedy t as Education, Colonisation, the employment in the public and will summon an All Party Conf implement its decisions."
In the election that follo all the areas in which the TUL whilst the TULF swept the bo leader of the TULF was electec Parliament.
Very shortly after the el the country. Violence is, of CC have an element of chauvinism : it is believed that the Sinhales the conciliatory character of
19

groups is that they both chose projection of their objectives.
however, was that whereas the niment, and instal their own in ed a separation of the country il Eelam.
themselves felt with a bomb ice Superintendent who had led ational Tamil Research Conferethe killing of Mr. Alfred f Jaffna, who was accused of vernment. Other Violent incigers, in which the targets were also others who were accused ent.
fixed for 1977 approaching, ing for its election, issued a it said that "the lack of a the Tamil people has made the fen a movement for the creation interest of national unity and the development of the whole roblems could be solved without
it comes to power, will take heir grievances in such fields
use of the Tamil language and semi-public corporations. We erence as stated earlier and
ved, the UNP swept the board in had not fought the election, ard in the Tamil areas. The leader of the Opposition in
!ction, violence swept through arse started by extremists who n their makeup. In this case, 2 extremists were disturbed by :he UNP manifesto towards the

Page 229
Tamils which might lead to rec is the fact that the TULF ha election victory which disclos of the TULF now devoted to th Concurrently, the UNP had itse. the elections which probably l argue that any anti-Tamil mo period of that triumph.
Whatever the reasons, vio time during a UNP regime. Th Tamil persons and property in such a scale that the declar imperative. As it happens, thi gated. The decision could Minister, Mr. JR Jayewardene w long period of rule by the pre cy, had to be circumspect bef tion would be justified. In declared and enabled the servic not before damage had been don
The Army underwent a ch Lt. Gen. Attygalle who had co years handed over command, to Ministry of Defence. His term the history of the Army, durir the insurgency of Sinhalese te Army Commander to have had pr Defence Force and his retirer era. He was retired with the . any officer of the Army reache as Army Commander was taken The significance of his appoint Sandhurst-trained officer to appointment therefore, corres into the history of the Army, as its head.
In l978, Parliament pas Constitution in replacement of l972, which had converted Sri retained other elements in th

'onciliation. Coupled with this d been strengthened by their d public support for the policy 2 creation of a separate state. ..f secured a massive victory at ed the Sinhalese extremists to 7e should be undertaken in the
lence now erupted for the first e violence involved damage to various parts of the country on ation of an emergency seemed is was delayed in being promull
only be taken by the Prime ho, having been critical of the vious Government under emergenore he judged that the declarathe event, the Emergency was es to restore law and order but e to Sinhalese/Tamil relations.
ange in command at this stage. mmanded the Army for over ten
take up an appointment in the of command was the longest in ng which he had to contend with rrorists. He was also the last revious service with the Ceylon ent represented the end of an rank of General - the first time d that exalted rank. His place
by Major-General Denis Perera. ment was that he was the first take command of the Army. His pondingly introduced a new era with a full trained professional
sed an Act to introduce a new the one passed by the SLFP in Lanka into a Republic but had e Constitution in which execu
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Page 230
tive, legislative or judicial 1978 Constitution effected S which was the creation of ar vested with unprecedented powel what the country needed was a s Parliamentary control. Parlia but its position vis-a-vis th latter had in turn been "deva devaluation appears later in t
The UNP was taking serious the Tamil people in terms of removal of "standardisation" wa ment by a scheme whereby 30 Universities would be reserve vacancy; 55 per cent allocated cent reserved for persons in l the Tamil language was recogni language rights, promulgated effect to the Tamil Language ( but not implemented, were const
1978 also saw an intensifi Tiger militants who had been di and by failure of the Governmen nce referred to in the 1977 ele ties included attacks on secu and on others whose actions the nce. They also did damage to provide themselves with the fur vities. They also disclosed arms which they had been train indication of being "terroris control the activities of the T enacted the Prevention of Ter powers to security personnel in and detention of persons indul defined in the Act.
The President also took th Chief of Staff of the Army, Br nate the menace of terrorism il and more especially from Jaffn
l

powers had been vested. The
veeping changes, the chief of Executive President who was s. This was on the ground that trong executive which was above ent was accordingly "devalued" e judiciary disclosed that the Lued". Evidence of the latter nis study.
notice of the problems facing their election manifesto. The s considered, with its replaceper cent of the vacancies in d for those who merited such on a District basis and 15 per ess developed areas. In l978, ..sed as a national language and by regulations in 1966 to give Special Provisions) Act of 1958 titutionally recognised.
cation of the activities of the sturbed by the violence in l977 ut to call an all-Party Conferection manifesto. Their activirity personnel, on politicians
militants could not counterna
property and robbed banks to nds they needed for their actithat they possessed up-to-date ed to operate. They gave every st" in character. In order to amil terrorists, the Government orism Act which gave sweeping
respect particularly of arrest ging in "unilawful activity" as
e positive step of ordering the igadier Weeratunge to "elimiall its forms from the Island a", the mission having to end
) 4

Page 231
in six months. It was a manife President felt that violence sh his desire that the menace be e
The mandate meant, of CO Army should be effective and de reactions were retaliatory, an the conclusion that the Tiger challenge implicit in the Pres matic that violence begets viol in the next six months led Cr that the Army in Jaffna was no as an Army of occupation. Ur relations betwen the Army and no quarter being sought and nor
In 1979, the Army was ret being allocated to it in respec the context of the Government's lerate national development. To as follows:-
The defence of Sri Lanka a
threat;
Maintenance of law and ord
Maintenance of essential s
Participating in National
In order to create the executiv of these purposes, the Army w "task forces". Each task forc battalion and two volunteer b deployed in the North, North regions. The Western (or metrc by the specialist forces - arm
Two special units, not hi nisation, were created for sp Women's unit which was respons: tions, clerical and nur sing relasing manpower needed in th

Station of the concern that the owed no signs of abatement and radicated without delay.
urse, that the actions of the cisive. Predictably, the Tiger some of their actions led to s were prepared to accept the Lident's directive. It is axioence and events that took place itics of the Army to conclude : so much an Army in occupation questionably, a new phase in the terrorists had begun, with e being given.
organised to carry out the role t of the country as a whole, in s desire to intensify and accehe role of the Army was defined
gainst an external or internal
ler in aid of civil authorities;
ervices when ordered to do so;
Development projects.
re structure to achieve the last as reorganised so as to provide e was composed of One regular attalions and such forces were Central Central and Southern politan region) would be manned pur, artillery and engineers.
therto part of the Army's orgaecial duties. The first was a ble for carrying out communicaduties. It had the effect of e forward areas. The other was
95

Page 232
the creation of a commando u additional to the existing fi fighting capability of the Army
The role assigned to the the duties for which it had b additionally to assist in the n
The discharge of non-milit of the Army's responsibilities ) ed with national calamities droughts, cyclones, earthslips justified the assistance of expertise.
The new policy altered the non-military duties by making commitment and not merely as natural phenomena. Up to now til for the Army were the campaigns against smuggling, in collabor and the Police. The scope was construction of roads, levelli other projects, actual building of playing fields and indeed, ot character in which the involve the authorities.
Inevitably, the engineer re geared to carry out these resp creases in establishments and t ment, particularly for the plar Engineer units, the Works Servi ment and the Development and Co. vily engaged.
In the process the decisi Army Act to make soldiers liab justified, in spilte of the res was one of them), that the provi efficiency of non-technical uni the strong recommendation made Army establishment should inclu
19

lit. This unit was of courses hting units and added to the
rmy was to carry out not only een organised and trained but ational development effort.
alry duties was of course part but had hitherto been associatand their effects - floods, and similar abnormalities that the Army, its resources and
nature of Army involvement in such involvement a continuing temporary as the incidence of he only continuing Commitments against illicit immigrants and ation with the other services
now widened and included the ng of sites for building and y Construction, the setting up :her projects having a national ment of the Army would assist
sources of the Army had to be onsibilities. This meant inhe provision of special equipIt operators in the Army. All .ces, the Field Engineer Regi1struction Regiment, were hea
on to include provision in the le to non-military duties was ervations of its opponents (I sion would reduce the military bis. The policy also justified. by Brigadier Moore that the le Field Engineers.
6

Page 233
1.
The Eig Ethnic Cor
The Eighties commenced wit Development Councils Act, desi the deadlock created by the TI state. Under the terms of this to be set up in all districts Tamil districts) which would be pment in their respective area development plan of the Governi the grant of autonomy to the found that the provisions of t respect of autonomy, in that Ministers, who would be key reserved for the President whil not District Ministers, were a jects for development.
These disabilities notwit nominate candidates to contest Tamil areas during the electio campaign was expected to be v. involved and the local police accordingly strengthened by the various parts of the Island : police had been perturbed by prior to the election campa: security personnel, homicides, robberies, during one of which During the pre-election period policemen had been killed anc election rally. This led to pc Jaffna, during which, apart frc
l

4.
hties: frontation
th the enactment of the District gned by the Government to break JLF to campaign for a separate
Act, Development Councils were
of the Island (including the empowered to undertake develos. It was part of the overall ment but residually, constituted regions concerned. The Tamils he Act did not go far enough in , the appointment of District personnel in the regions, was st Ministers at the Centre, and lone empowered to initiate pro
:hstanding, the TULF decided to seats in the Councils for the in fixed for 1981. The election igorously fought by the parties force in the Jaffna District was 2 move of police personnel from into the Jaffna District. The the actions of the terrorists ign which included attacks on attacks on politicians and bank
two policemen had been killed. feelings had run high and two two others wounded during an lice retaliation in the city of om burning the market place, the
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Page 234
office of a Tamil newspaper anc cian, the entire Public Libra involving the loss of some 9500c statement to assert that this ou loss because some of the book It is certainly predictable that loss of these literary treasur remember being told in Baghdad
library centuries before by Hul Mongols, was still the cause of in Iraq, whilst later in Cairo,
on the minds of cultured people century of the books of the fa Patriarch Cyril's black army of that the outrage was committed
ted as the friends of the people their coming from other parts
cealed their identity during in
There followed a period of been described as a pogrom again the Eastern Uva Sabaragamuwa a tably, there was Tamil terrorist ty personnel conducting arrests rism Act and extracting confess: conditions which have been den rights. Consequently, one founc opened under favourable conditi violence took over as the year p and security forces being invol
982 - An Election Year
l982 was a year of relati had declared 1982 an "Election electorate were directed to the lly, the general election for l983 and the Presidential elec security situation and the expe nomic situation perhaps suggest advanced. The Presidential elle l982, resulting in a convin Jayewardene, which enabled him
9

the house - of a Tamil politiry in Jaffna was destroyed, books. It would be an undertrage represented incalculable s destroyed are irreplaceable. intellectuals will bemoan the es for centuries to come. I that the sacking of its great ahukhan, one of the marauding distress among intellectuals I was told of a similar impact by the destruction in the 4th mous library in Alexandria by monks. It is sad to reflect by the police, who are projec... The anonymity occasioned by of the island apparently convestigation.
violence during which what has st the Tamils was conducted in und Western provinces. Predicreaction, followed by securiunder the Prevention of TerroiOns from those arrested under ounced as violation of human i that, whereas the year l98l. ..ons of relative tranquillity, rogressed with both terrorists ved.
we calm because the President Year" and the energies of the forthcoming elections. Actua
Parliament had been fixed for tion for l984. The changing cted deterioration in the ecoed that the election should be ction was accordingly held in cing victory for President to continue in office for a
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Page 235
further six years. The gener held. Instead, an island wid issue whether the existing Parl for a further period of six yea favour of the Government. In th the UNP Parliament continued iI
If the position of the Gc by the effect of the foregoing no abatement, with terrorist reprisals by the security forc the situation tended to be ag. The first was the promotion o judgements had been entered in a demonstration by mobs agains given judgement against Police gation as to the authors of su promulgation of Emergency Reg security officers of given ra thrown up in security operati with the authority of the Se believed to have been occasion trate who had returned a ver security personnel who had beer could cause practical dislocat individuals involved in such op investigations and court proce is obvious that the regulation sons wishing to cover up a del: There is reason to believe t tended to create in the minds ing of immunity from inquiry of which was not long in bei. also some insecurity in judic diminution in judicial prestig
At this stage, in the fac against persons and against Go Army made plans to take more p an engagement which followed killed and the Army, elated secure the end of another terra Army movement along a known :
l

all election was not, however, referendum was held on the iament could continue in office rs. The referendum resulted in se result both the President and
office.
vernment had been strengthened the security situation showed activity on the one hand and es on the other. If anything, gravated by three developments. Police officers against whom the Law Courts. The second was t Supreme Court judges who had officers, without any investich outrage. The third was the ulation No.lib.A. which empowered nk to bury or cremate bodies ons, so long as this was done cretary of Defence. This is ed by the judgement of a magisdict of manslaughter against involved. Quite obviously, it ion of security operations, if berations were to be involved in edings. On the other hand, it is could lead to misuse by perberate offence against the law. nat the foregoing developments of potential wrongdoers a feeland from punishment, the effect ng felt. Inevitably there was ial circles on the ground of a
ع
se of repeated acts of violence vernment and bank property, the ositive action in the North. In l, a terrorist leader had been by this success, made plans to
rist leader. The plan involved route. This route was mined by
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the terrorists and in the bola diers were killed - the larges The local reaction was immedia sudden deaths of so many of t unit went on the rampage, dest) ting deaths on some thirty-fi distressed by the news becau belonged was the CLI, my own r of discipline in the unit, I c civilians was spontaneous and r tably, none the less reprehens:
So much for the instant ar. in distant Colombo was more bodies of the thirteen dead sol Colombo, where a full scale I Unfortunately, the bodies were . ry where a large body composed wishers of the deceased soldie gate. The delay led to specu some concern. This was exploi necks and other "interested" p. unrest took an anti-police turn gas the crowd which, now inflar police and on the persons and p in the vicinity of the cemetery spontaneous.
On the following day the 's lly. Colombo now witnessed the them lists of householders in Tamil homes were thus identif: destroy all the property so di ments and small private proper to property has been estimated the action against individuals displaced. An unsatisfactory f more than one unit of the secur the mobs and in other cases, t of the mobs. Having said this many Sinhalese persons have be being attacked, some of whom c from the frenzied mobs and othe
2 (

It that followed thirteen solin a single encounter so far. te and massive. Grieved by the eir comrades, the rest of the oying much property and inflicve innocent civilians. I was se the unit to which the men giment. Knowing the standards ecided that the action against ot deliberate although, regretble.
d local reaction. The reaction dramatic and traumatic. The liers were due to be brought to lilitary funeral was planned. late in arriving at the cemeteof relatives, friends and well rs had been invited to congrelation as to the cause and to ited by the inevitable rubberarties. As time went on, the ... This led the police to tear ned, vented its feelings on the roperty of Tamil people living . . So far, the actions had been
ituation had changed dramaticaactions of mobs who had with the areas where they operated. led and the mobs proceeded to closed. Both large establishties were destroyed. The loss as going into millions, whilst resulted in thousands being sature of the carnage was that ity forces were seen assisting urning a blind eye to the work
I Imust record the fact that en known to assist the Tamils oing so at risk to themselves is giving asylum to the distre
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s sed Tamilis. These acts ser human nature and human kindnes
There are two other incid One was a scare, which was pro that the "Tigers' had come t service targets. This led to people, to get away from pos return to their homes. During tably disorderly, much property injured or killed by opportunis The other was the massacre of prisoners who had been housed in Colombo. They are reported the custody of prison guards None of the persons responsi against the Tamils on the st brought to trial so far. The not sufficient identification applies equally to the prison c identification in that context difficult.
?
The Government has taken
bances were caused by foreign been identified. At the same label and the JVP were proscri complicity and their leader: leader of the communist par others remain in custody, alth been framed against them.
The President making a st rbances took upon himself som that he had not taken actio taking action to make it clea contenance moves to form a se by the sixth amendment to t action to set up a separate varied punishments set out il amendment.

ved to restore ones faith in
'O
2nts which are worth recording. oably engineered, by the report Colombo and were attacking an unholy scramble among the sible areas of involvement and the scramble which was predicwas destroyed and many persons ts being involved in the melee. some fifty-twe political Tamil in a "maximum security" prison to have been killed whilst in but not necessarily by them. ble for the systematic action :reets has been identified or explanation was that there was to justify prosecution. This outrages although the process of must have been infinitely less
up the position that the distur
agents, who however have not time a party bearing a communist bed, on the ground of suspected s arrested. Subsequently, the y concerned was released but ough no charges have reportedly
atement shortly after the distue of the blame, particularly in h against the TULF and in not that the Government would not oarate state. This was followed le Constitution, forbidding any tate in the Island, on pain of
the schedule accompanying the
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In l984, the President s Party Conference. Almost as it SLFP decided not to continue fu position of the SLFP in the co weaken the effectiveness of the ding, the Conference continued year, with no positive result h At the risk of over simplifica crucial issue of devolution, wit anything less than Provincial asserting that it would not District Development Councils.
In 1985, a new, unexpect development took place, in th Terrorists appearing in Anuradh Buddhists. There they killed s some in the precints of the sac 2000 years of its existence in S predominantly Sinhalese area wh: hitherto and seemed designed t that, the All Party Conference for a negotiated settlement had options were now open. The sig that, if violence had up to now ter, potential Violence, if the pointer, could be unacceptably i
The opening was thus crea help in the negotiating process. be held at a neutral venue was Government, the TULF and the n Thimpu in Bhutan. Apart from d the Government and the TULF, d. groups also emerged which are t perceptions and to military st fore, they did not form a uni Liberation Organisation of Tamil own. The Eelam National Libera composite of four groups - th Eelam (LTTE), the Tamil E1lam I the Elam People's Revolutionary the Eelam Revolutionary Orga
2O

immoned the long awaited All started its deliberations, the ther participation. Given the untry, this decision tended to Conference. This notwithstan
sitting till the end of the aving, however, been achieved. :ion, the Conference failed on h the TULF declining to accept Councils and the Government agree to anything more than
ed and politically dan gerous e form of an attack by Tamil apura, the sacred city of the ome 150 innocent civilians, >cred Bo Tree hal1owed over the Sri Lanka. The attack was in a ich the Tamils have not invaded o draw attention to the fact having failed, the prospects receded and that consequently, nificance of this attitude was had a relatively mild charac2 Anuradhapura massacre was a intensive and extensive.
ited for India to step in and A proposal that a conference accepted and talks between the lilitant groups took place at ifferences in attitude between ifferences between militant raceable to ideology, political rategies. Predictably thereced organisation. The People's Eelam (PLOTE) appeared on its tion Front (ENLF) appeared as a e Liberation Tigers of Tamil iberation Organisation (TELO), Liberation Front (EPRLF) and nisation of Students (EROS).
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Page 239
Their differences not-withstant were able to present the princi postures, whilst the Governmer during the All Party Confere exposition of attitudies, the sittings, during which no fina outstanding.
Efforts by India to resus venue have so far failed. At the Government has furnished I ing out views that can be the The TULF has reacted by statir negotiable, on the basis that represented by the joinder of t ces of the Island. The Govern suggesting provincial councils has asserted that the regional ptable. This is done to sa Muslims who can hold their O would be submerged under the o' the North and East. So far, th position clear on political is
To turn now to the militan to carry on fighting. The PI negotiation, if by such stratec leaders of the Tamils in the position of influence among th military solution, PLOTE woul with the security forces to ti by the other militant groups. in a link-up with extremist g) Government of their own proje event, Eelam would have lost i
Given the need for tranqu tions the Government and som agreed to a cease fire, or ce Government describes it. This rved, whether by the terrori Monitoring Committee composed in these Circumstances been se
2

iing, the TULF and the Militants -ples underlying their political it reiterated the views outlined nce. There being no detailed Conference adjourned after two lity was reached on the issues
citate talks at Thimpu, or other
the same time, one notes that ndia with a working paper settsubject matter of settlement. ng that the demand for Eelam is autonomy be granted to a region zhe northern and eastern provinment has modified its stand by as the unit of devolution but unit suggested would be unaccefeguard the interests of the wn in the Eastern Province but verall strength of the Tamils in e militants have not made their
SUS
y side. The ENLF seems to want OTE seems to be interested in gy they can be recognised as the event of the TULF losing their e Tamils. If there is to be a d prefer an all-out engagement he hit-and-run tactics employed
They would also be interested roups in the South and instal a cting a marxist image. In such ts appeal.
Lillity during possible negotiahe of the militant groups have es sation of hostilities as the
has not been consistantly obsests or the security forces. A of distinguished Sri Lankans has it up in order to monitor viola
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Page 240
tions of the cease fire. Its which appears to be evenhanded plete and it is therefore not of its work.
The position therefore a obscure. Looking at the two s taking the militants first, it been strengthened since the l9 manpower must have been one o they did an overall strength core of a few hundred. The l9 persons without homes, without hope for the future. With the made by the militants, hope in the idealism of youth, the ca been strong and the numbers jo according to some estimates, for the army being set up has ing camps permitted to be s Course, in our own jungles. Tamil sympathisers around the rces amassed by attacks on loc of cash. Above all, they have people with whom they operate claim that the will of the p conflict of this nature - alth attempts to dramatise their p of popular ex-Parliamentarians for them. How effective they Illa operations will depend on among themselves and their ab furtherance of objectives cen unity is created, they could counter to the security forces
The Army has correspond disturbances. At that time, I and in private that there was ligence techniques and in oper professionalism which is the soldier. I also advocated a po minds" of the local people wh
2

first report has been published but its work is far from compossible to make any assessments
ppears "fluid" and the outcome ides from a military angle and appears that their position has 83 disturbances. At that time, f their main worries, having as of around thousand with a hard 83 disturbances left many young i employment and indeed without promise of a land of their own low entered their lives. Given ill to fight for their land has ining the militants have grown, to several thousand. Training beeen possible in ad hoc trainet up in Tamil Nadu, apart of Funds are made available from world, supplementing the resou'al banks and other repositories the support and sympathy of the , again bringing to the fore my )eople is a potent factor in a ough one recognises that recent osition, like the assassination , have reduced public sympathy will be except perhaps in guerithe unity which they can forge bility to train collectively in trally worked out. Once such conceivably provide a credible
ingly improved since the 1983
thought and said both publicly a need for improvement in inteltrational skills, to display the
hall mark of the disciplined licy of winning the "hearts and o appeared often to resent what
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Page 241
they considered to be the host lian. Judging from reports, t derable improvement in the int tors which is attributed to the ligence personnel and SAS-tra whose stamp is evident from muc forces. I have been intereste training establishments, througl operations in the north and eas cal field, the services have bee the appointment of the Ministen give them the day-to-day su preoccupied as he was with oth could not give. And in the fi considerable budgetry provision l986 budget. These resources material, will help the serv increases in strength do not t careful selection and without
which are imperative in the bui in military development has
Operations Command which is ch tion of the operations under current crisis. I am particulal the first two Joint Operations
and Lt. Gen. Ranatunge, started Regular Force was created - a
and of the maturity reached by
A major element in the tl both sides is their perception fighting. On the side of the creation of the separate state security forces, the purpose is rity of the state. A residual tion of the state in the inte The Tamils have access to the be people of Tamil Nadu. The S: allies. Given the history of il which this study began, the p remains in the forefront of the They have certainly been dis
2C

lity of the Army to the civilhere seems to have been consielligence and operational secavailability of Israeli intelined personnel from Britain, h that is done by the security i in the setting up of special which all units earmarked for t have to pass. In the politin immeasurably strengthened by of National Security, who can pport which the President, er equally important problems, nancial field, one notes the that has been announced in the When Converted to men and rices enormously, so long as ake place too rapidly without the concurrent training inputs ld up of units. A logical step been the creation of a Joint arged with the military directaken by the Services in the Cly interested in the fact that Commanders, Lt. Gen. Weeratunga their military life after the measure of their own capacity the Army.
hinking of the protagonists on of the purpose underlying the militants, the purpose is--the of Eelam. On the side of the the preservation of the integpurpose would be the preservaests of the Sinhalese people. nefits of association with the
inhalese have no such ethnic
lvasions from South India with ssibility of their recurrence minds of numerous Sinhalese. :urbed by reports that Tamil
5

Page 242
militants seeking refuge in So where they can conduct militar against the security forces of this, the sympathy of the peo Tamils has been made evident strations, strikes and speech crowning move by an influential in Tamil Nadu who, in the after assembled a "force" of several
move across the Palk Strait i solidarity with the Ceylon Tami the crossing did not take place
le at the time. Given curren however, the possibility of th the point of extinction is remo
I have noted that the cu referred to as a "war". Prima i tion for such thinking because It is conceivable that the pre part of a "civil war" to come. in such an eventuality, the fic a state of war against a foreic conducted without restraint, o that "all is fair in war". T posed to that sort of fighting of the "violations" of human ri of the services are attributab that he is engaged in a war in ly when the adversary is out to in the achievement of his obje certainly lead to the actions a lighted by International bodies tional and to discussions by UN human rights. The soldier, pa operations, thinks in terms of see the "grey" areas which the indeed, must see. It follow rests on the officer, particul the soldier realise that all kind he is involved in whateve a foreign enemy.
2

uth India have access to camps y training for the operations Sri Lanka. Quite apart from ple of Tamil Nadu for Ceylon in the form of street demonles in Parliament and of the member of the Tamil community math of the l983 disturbances, hundreds which he intended to n a massive demonstration of ls in the north. In the event, but the impact was considerabt international conventions, e Sinhalese being isolated to te.
Lirrent conflict is sometimes facie, there is some justificathe "casus belli" is a state. sent fighting is treated as a I doubt, however, whether even shting could be comparable with gn enemy. Such a war would be in the basis of the philosophy he services have not been exand it is conceivable that many ghts that are laid at the door le to the individuals thinking which "all is fair" particularo kill with upto date weapons, ctive. Such an attitude could gainst innocent Civilians highlike the ICJ, Amnesty Internabodies devoted to the study of rticularly at the sharp end in black and white. He does not 2 perceptive officeF– does, and s that a heavy responsibility arly at junior level, to make is not fair in a "war" of the r may be fair in a war against
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Page 243
I should have liked to coi conflict which burst on the co Commander. My own personal a turn which militates against fl nected with that conflict. Th of military history which I ha Perhaps someone will emerge who I have left off and weave the c
As I lay down my pen, I aspects of ethnic confrontati round the issues enumerated in cover ethnic, political and eco disposed of as affecting the because they present overtones Sinhalese people as well. Ther raised by the TULF and echoed round the state of Eelam which disabilities now being experien is the equally profound mattel the integrity of the State of These matters have disclosed defied settlement.
I note that India has made search for such settlement. account primarily Sri Lankan a considerable preoccupations. would be interested in the re Tamil refugees who have flocke have to be done only when the permits them to return without flee to India. This is a facto - a potent factor in Indian po than ordinary interest, given Sri Lanka. In the external Se the possible destabilisation region which a worsening of th could precipitate. Such a wo resumption of hostilities, par a scale hitherto not experienc
4.

tinue this study of the ethnic ntry in 1956 when I was Army fairs, however, have taken a Cther recording of events cons also means that the Outline i undertaken has also to stop. will pick up the threads where ontinuation of this study.
| ee - in my mind's eye numerous on. These initially centred the UNP manifesto in 1977 which homic matters. These cannot be Tamil speaking people alone, which have significance for the e are the more profound issues by the militants which centre they believe will eliminate the ced by the Tamil people. There raised by the President that Sri Lanka is not negotiable. differences which so far have
her resources available in the In so doing, she takes into ttitudes. She also has her own In the domestic sector, she patriation of several thousand to India. This however would security situation in Sri Lanka , the fear that induced them to which the South Indian Tamils litics - would watch with more heir sympathy for the Tamils of :tor, India would be mindful of of the South India/Sri Lanka a ethnic situation in Sri Lanka sening could be initiated by a ticularly if they take place on ed.
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When I contemplate this co | my mind. There is my interes association with it which comm which ended with the period whe of Independent Sri Lanka. Ther militants who are part of the Overall, I am aware of the fact they be Sinhalese soldiers or Ta in which their fathers and thei participated and can share a f and their childrens' children cc Sri Lanka. But the predominant sion is the fervent hope that much elegance and beauty on th make it their divine purpose n continued shedding of precious our leaders with the wisdom to ble solution of the issues which this country.
2O

ntingency, many thoughts crowd it in the Army, because of my anced over fifty years ago and in I helped to Create the Army e is my interest in the Tamil community to which I belong. that the protagonists, whether mil "terrorists", share a past r fathers' fathers before them ature in which their children uld participate as citizens of thought that demands expresthe Gods, who have lavished so is lovely land of ours, will ot to sully that beauty by the plood and will instead endow arrive at a lasting and equitanow threaten the integrity of

Page 245
1.
Retrospect an
As I said at the conclusi this study, I have now come to has taken me back nearly twent period the country has been rul Kings or Queens and governed General, thirty-one Dutch Gover nors and two Governors General, and two Sri Lankan President presents a bewildering picture. certain features present themse the study progressed but nothing interesting.
Early on, I took the liber tion by Sir Emerson Tennent of lese soldier for fighting. As ! the conclusion that this was there have been times in his soldier for fighting was unques I found that such aptitude was the influence of the great cap This is not surprising becaus make up of the military commanc the best in his men, and to ex sometimes called charisma whi commanders in our history (I h to demonstrate. I am glad t himself a stern critic, has c when our soldiers, whatever "u had, were able to rise to performance.

d Prospect
on of the previous chapter to ihe end of an undertaking which y-five centuries. During that 2d by one hundred seventy-eight y twinety Portuguese Captains nors, thirty-one British Goverone Ceylonese Governor General s. Looked at cursorily, this On close examination however, lves which I have discussed as is lost in restating the most
ty of questioning the descripthe "ineptitude" of the Sinhathe study progressed, I came to not consistantly true and that tory when the aptitude of the tionable. On further analysis, manifested when they came under tains of our military history. e an essential element in the er is his capacity to bring out loit it in operations. This is sh is precisely what the great ave named seven) have been able find that Professor Geiger, oncluded that there were times hwarlike" properties the people great heights in military
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Page 246
I have in this study also Sinhalese kings made no effort is called a "standing army" eve to which the Country was subj such an institution. Conside available, a standing army wo occupation of the country and which occurred at least once ir advent of colonial rulers. I taken, there would have been a which would have helped to f assist in the creation of mili created an army and a navy agai exception that proves the rule. have examined some of the rea weakness, which do not have to
I have made the point tha Portuguese and the Dutch made l development except to provide with foreign forces. Britain the early stages of British occ pied with riots and rebellions a local forces. In due course, British saw fit to develop loca during the major wars in which War, the First Great War and brought war to our own territ Japanese.
What was nurtured in the Ceylon gained. Apart from for regular force being created, pe helped in creating traditional their juniors the attributes of and Non-Commissioned Officers, new soldiers all the time, incu of discipline which is an intec individual and esprit de corps the collective makeup of the belongs. It is axiomatic that, the unit can only appear as a corps can be self defeating.
2)

come to the conclusion that the to create what in modern times n though the repeated invasions ected pointed to the need for ring the talent that has been ld perhaps have prevented the the loss of our independence our early history, before the f such an initiative had been wealth of military knowledge ashion military thinking and tary tradition. Dhatusena, who inst contingencies, provides the In fairness to the rulers, I asons why there has been this be restated at this stage.
t, in the colonial period, the ittle contribution to military the opportunity of engagement was the exception, although in upation, they were too preoccuagainst them to want to develop
the pattern changed and the forces which made their mark h they were engaged - the Boer the Second Great War which Dry through the actions of the
process was what Independent ming the core of units of the rsonnel trained by the British values. Officers inculcated in leadership. Warrant Officers who would be in touch with the lcated in them the significance gral part in the makeup of the s which is an integral part of unit to which the soldiers without discipline the men of rabble. Similarly, esprit de "Going on the rampage" is of
... O

Page 247
course an example of "esprit de ted to a laudable cause is recei is directed to an unacceptable
innocent persons, it is reprehe the right word, has now been pa custodian of the military value
This study opened with a . with India followed however wi relations. It ends with refe helping to settle the ethnic pr discloses a friendliness of ap neighbourliness and prompts th turned full cycle and good rela
Prospect
In viewing the prospect a the Army has had a fair shar although not against a foreign to say that the Army has had c that its training is only for t ty is otherwise. The Army has operational duties with which also been fortunate that the duties has come gradually. In activity. There was then acti in the confrontation between Si satyagraha which by definition determined. The abortive coup the elements concerned to get rection involved the Army agair cised the Army extensively i jungle and of course the towns against an armed opponent that nised, well equipped and well tion of a separate state for bitterly. In the process, t achieve maturity in internal se strates the professionalism wł trate on its objectives becau distraction by unmilitary stimi
2.

corps". Such action if direcved with approbation but if it purpose like the harassment of insible. The torch, if that is ssed on by the old guard to the s which have been developed. .
eference to peaceful relations th a recital of unsatisfactory rences to India's interest in oblems facing Sri Lanka. This proach which goes beyond good a suggestion that history has tions become evident.
head, one must recognise that te of operational experience enemy. It is therefore wrong only ceremonial experience and . nat purpose, because the realibeen trained to deal with the it has been charged. It has exposure to such operational .itially there was trade union vity against unarmed opponents nhalese and Tamil. There was a is non-violent, but in practice involved no fighting but caused ready for fighting. The insurist an armed Opponent who exern guerilla operations in the ... And now the Army is engaged shows that he is well orgatrained, to establish the creawhich he is prepared to fight he Army will unquestionably curity operations, as it demonlich will enable it to Concense they are military, without ili such as ethnicity.
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Page 248
It has certainly received Governments which have seem fit component of the security stru its devotion to the duties whic
What the Army needs to a exposure to the rigours of enga in safeguarding the external s only when it emerges from suc the future historian can make h Army has served the country ef all conditions facing it. I ve short history, the Army has operational aspects of fighting gical aspects as would compleme many elements which have to be cipline, esprit de corps, loy duty. It is the aggregate of c to the psychological adjuncts creates the values which have m and which must, I suggest, be a emerge in history as a great Ar ries are good.
21

the approbation of successive
to retain the Army as a major cture. This is its reward for n have been assigned to it.
chieve complete maturity, is gement against a foreign enemy scurity of the country. It is engagement with credit, that is judgement as to whether the ficiently and faithfully under 2nture to suggest that, in its earned not only some of the but also such of its psycholont the picture. These involve assimilated - leadership, disalty, tradition, devotion to perational skill and adherence in the military makeup, that ade the great armies of history ttained, if our own Army is to my. In my judgement the augu

Page 249
Epil
I am conscious of the def concluded, which inevitably are sketch or outline of history. military history will readily tailed information which must b rched study. This includes the strategic considerations in the in battle, training, accoutre support and a host of other mat tion to some of these requirer great offensive of Duttagama Sigiriya of Kasyappa, the str Bahu" s campaigns, the tacti Rajasinghe I. There is howe' research. And there is much r India, Portugal, Holland, Brit There can additionally be som conducted in the cultural trian do not exclude myth and legend provide material for possible i
I have been critical of S taken steps to create a "standi under constant pressure from t moves would have enriched mi create military tradition. I h tion for this state of affairs the concept of the "standing Arn to absolve the kings for thei: which needs research.
I have made little mentio activities in a fuller history,
nisable place.
2

Ogue
ficiencies in the work I have characteristic of an attempted The perceptive student of notice that there is much dee included in a properly reseanature of campaigns conducted, conduct of war, tactical moves ment and equipment, logistic ters. I have given some attenments in my discussion of the ni, the defensive layout in ategic outlines of Parakrama cal skills demonstrated by ver a great deal that a waits research material available in zain and of course, Sri Lanka. e evidence thrown up by work gle that can enrich history. I which, if properly edited, can inclusion in a history.
Sinhalese Kings for not having ng army" even though they were he South Indian region. Such litary history and helped to ave examined possible explana
and have asked myself whether ny" is so essentially modern as r omission. This is a matter
n of the Tamil Kings and their, this matter will have a recog

Page 250
I have created in my mind great Captains of our military into that Palace of fame. T claims are worth examining. great commanders, there is meri cised my mind regarding Duttaga known in our history, underli which does scant justice to the verdict of history is to rememb ristic, one would have picked cribed him as "Gamani the magnar historic attitude towards a fall
I should like to have fe military heroes but have not bé of all of them during the perio reproduced pictures of soldie result of research done many Staff, by a team led by Col. conclusions arrived at in that group of experts whom I assen drawings which were thereafte: under the direction of the late are now reproduced in this bi recogni sing the contribution history, which I trust I have b study, as having been considera
I would conclude by making the book entitled "A Return to namely that a statue of the erected at Balane, the scene Sinhalese soldiers in the cam Colonial invaders. Such a monu some aspects of our military hi tuate incidents of valour hithe

a Valhalla and have named seven history as having earned entry here may be others and their Whilst on the subject of our it in mentioning what has exermani. The name by which he is nes a personal characteristic man and his exploits. If the Der him by a personal characteon a more noble one and deshimous" in commemoration of his len foe.
atured pictures of the great een able to find suitable Ones d of research. I have however 2rs in history which are the ears ago when I was Chief of (then Capt.) Ranatunge. The research were submitted to a bled, who approved the final r converted into statues made JDA Perera at Heywood. These ook and would go some way to of our soldiers to military een able to demonstrate in this
ble.
a reference to a suggestion in Kandy" by Wesak Nannayakara - "Unknown Sinhalese Soldier" be of many unsung exploits of paigns of their kings against ment would remind passersby of story and would certainy perperto unrecognised.
4

Page 251
Up
This is being written in of 20 months during which I h therefore lacking intimate conn
Earlier in this study, I the Tamil militants unite, they tion to the Sri Lankan forces This has not happened and, ind in bitter encounters with some strategy underlying this policy itself as the strongest element capture the leadership of the T
Efforts to resolve the ol place. In August l986, the TUL Lankan authorities which, howeve no agreement on the joinder of year, there were hopes of a set of Sri Lanka and India, which r
Concurrently, encounters
armed forces were reported, thu remote. In April 1987, there incident and in the heart of Central Bus Station, a bomb which was sufficient to cause ties. There was an immediate obliged to order aerial bombin militants. The bombing was ce to carpet bombing. Inevitably killed and damage done to sup that the Indian Government

late
August l987 after an interval ave been out of Sri Lanka and action with events.
ventured the opinion that, if could form a credible opposiin guerilla-type operations. 2ed, the LTTE has been engaged of its fellow militants. The suggests a design to present : in the dissident movement and amils.
utstanding problems have taken F had discussions with the Siri r broke down, because there was Provinces. At the end of the tlement between the Governments egrettably were not realised.
between the militants and the s making the peace process more was staged a most outrageous Colombo. In the area of the was exploded, the potency of hundreds of deaths and casualoutcry and the Government was g of areas believed to harbour aseless and caused its equation many innocent civilians were olies. Indian reaction was such elt itself bound to Iriount a
L5

Page 252
"mercy" mission by sea, which
the Sri Lankan authorities. Th Sri Lankan Navy patrols. The m: with the concurrence of the Sri
India's action, though ove per significance suggesting the if she judged that action of th criminate and therefore unac community.
Fresh negotiations were th Governments which resulted in Prime Minister Gandhi and P. elements of this agreement are
The Sri Lanka Governme the North and Easterr however, a referendum Province on the issue the joinder.
Each province would Council with a single superimposed.
The militants would la tainees would be relea
The Sri Lanka armed fo responsibilities to In them in the North and bility of Indian troops arms and to keep law a
The Agreement has had a m that it does not represent a f. that direction. The militants C tless under Indian persuasion, their arms. Just how much is i be the work of the Indian troop arms. Sri Lanka's response in related to the surrender of arm
2l

however was not cleared with
e Indian boats were halted by
.ssion was then repeated by air
Lankan authorities.
rtly compassionate, had a dee
will on her part to intervene, e Sri Lanka forces were indisceptable to India's own Tamil
en entered into between the two
an Agreement being signed by resident Jayewardene. The main as follows:-
int would agree to a joinder of Provinces. Within the year, would be held in the Eastern whether its people agreed to
pe administered by an elected Governor and Chief Minister
ay down their arms. Tamil desed.
orces would hand over security dian troops who would replace East. It would be the responsito supervise the surrender of ind order.
ixed reception. The TULF feels inal solution but is a step in ppose the agreement but, doub
they have agreed to lay down nvolved is obscure and it will s to locate and secure all the releasing detainees will be
de
6

Page 253
Singhalese reaction is, agreement. Within the cabinet opponents. The opposition is joinder is only a step to the separate state. Mrs Bandaranai on the ground that the terri of proportion to the Tamil com Lanka's population. The Mahana ded the withdrawal of the ag staged in more than one Singhal of disapproval took place at when a grenade was thrown an killed one. Whether this is O become apparent in the future.
These reactions were pre opposing participants in neg positions.
This has now changed wit declining to agree to a separat joinder of the two provinces c Given the racial composition o currently stands at 40% Tamil, the chances of the Tamilis bej happens, Singhalese opinion wi
Given all the circumstanc reached a momentous and Cour term he has ended violence wit exercising the military optic tempted to take. In the long t prospect of reconciliation bet forcibly separated, of the res of the commencement of rehabi.
What then of the Armed believe that there are no el preferred to end violence th their own. Such elements wil reflexion that the militants forces also have the satisfac preservation of security in

by and large, hostile to the
there are both supporters and based on the belief that the
resumption of a demand for a e has condemned the agreement ory involved is completely out unity which is only l28 of Sri yake of Asgiriya has recommenreement. Disapproval has been ese area but the worst evidence a meeting of Parliamentarians wounded several of them and ly the tip of the iceberg will
lictable in a setting in which ɔtiations took up inflexible
h President Jayewardene, while te Tamil state, has agreed to a :laimed, by the Tamil militants. f the Eastern province - which
33B Muslim and 278 Singhalese, .ng outvoted are strong. If that ll be assuaged.
es facing him, the President has ageous decision. In the short hout going through the trauma of n which he has sometimes been erm, the agreement opens up the teen communities which have been umption of tourist arrivals and itation.
orces? It would be futile to ements in them who would have rough some positive action of L derive satisfaction from the
have not won a victory. The ion of being entrusted with the the South of Sri Lanka in the
17

Page 254
event of Singhalese dissidents a It is a role that they can acc with customary efficiency.
28

itempting to subvert security. apt with dignity and execute

Page 255
Bibliog
The Mahawamse The Culuwanse The Rajavalia The Rajaratnavacari Dr. Paul Pieris
Fr. Gin anapragaser
M. D. Raghavan
Sir Emerson Tennent
H. W. Codrington
Dr. G.C. Mendis
Mudilaiyar Rasanayagam
Prof. Majumdar, Dr. H. C. Chaudri
& Dr. K. Datta
Dr. Basham
Dr. K. A. N. Sastri
Ceylon Historical Journal
Ribeiro
Querox

graphy
Nagadipa and Buddhist Remains
in Ceylon
Beginnings of Tamil Culture in Ceylon
Tamil Culture in Ceylon
Ceylon
Short History of Ceylon
Early History of Ceylon
Ancient Jaffna
Advanced History of India
The Wonder that was India
The Cholas History of the Pandyan Kingdom
The Polonnaruwa Period.
On Ceylon
On Ceylon
9

Page 256
Couto
Baldeus
For S.G. Perera
Dr. Paul Pieris
Dr. Paul Pieris
NE Weerasuriya
W. A. Nelson
Overseas Historical Archives, Lisbon
The Dutch Army and Arms Museum Leiden
Robert Knox
James Cordiner
Lennox Mills
Col. Powell
Dr. G.C. Mendis
L.B. Clarence
Major Tylden
Dr. John Davy
Wesak Nanakkara
22

On Ceylon
Discovery of Ceylon
History of Ceylon
Ceylon and the Portuguese
Ceylon and the Hollanders
The People of Ceylon
Dutch Forts in Sri Lanka
Documents, Iconography, Cartography on Ceylon
Archives of Dutch and foreign Military persons and matters
Historical Relation of the Island Ceylon . . . . ;-s, it -
Description of Ceylon
Ceylon under British Rule
British Army in Ceylon (18031818)
The Kandyan Wars
Ceylon under British Rule
100 Years of British Rule in Ceylon
Ceylon Regiments
Account of the Interior of Ceylon
Return to Kandy
O

Page 257
Sir John D'Oyly
R, L. Brohier
Howard Wriggins British Army Historical Research
National Army Museum, London
Colonial Office, London Royal Commonwealth
Society London
Royal United Services Institution London
Oscar Abeyratne Regimental Histories notably

Sketch of the Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom
Changing Face of Colombe
Ceeylon-Dilemmas of new Nation Ceylon Records
Ceylon Records
Ceylon Records
Ceylon Records
Ceylon Records
The History of the CLI

Page 258


Page 259
Inde
Abeysunđera, AWH 146 Aboukir Bay 98 Ajanta 24 Albuquerque 78 Alexander 37 Amban Oya 16 American Insurrection l85 Ananda 46 Anuradhapura 26 27 | 36 Aristotle 37 Artha Sastra 30, 35 Artillery School los Asoka, Emperor 5 Attlee l28 Attygalle, Capt. 55 Attygalle, Lt. Col. 189 Attygalle, Lt. Gen. 193 Attygalle, Major Gen. 189 Ayub Khan l85 Azevedo 73,76 Badulla 79 Bahar, Major 155, 172 Bailliana 71 i 76 i 89 Bandaranaike Mrs • 180,184,
186,187 Barbut, Col. 100 Bareto 77,78 Basham, A.L. 28,3l Batticalioa 79,8086 Batuta, Ibn 50 Bhuvaneke 62 63
2

X
Boake, WJN ll
Boer War lag
Brazen Palace 18
Brodie ll4
Brownrigg, Gen. Sir Rebert
O2
Buddha 5,46
Burima 43
Caesar 71
Caithness, Brigadier 49,151
56
Cambodia 43
Cape of Good Hope 6.
Caruwar 23
Ceylon Defence Force (CDF)
L34
Ceylon Light Infantry Volun
teers ll4
Ceylon Volunteer Force (CVF)
134
Ceylon regiment 104
chakravarti, Arya 50
Chatta l5
Chelvanayagam 167, 19l
chester Wilmot 165
Chola 8,46
Churchill l28
Cochin 8
Codrington 16,21,33, 37, 45,50
commonwealth l40,143
cordiner 3l , 108
223

Page 260
Culuwamsa 30, 32, 35 Dakkinadesa 32 Dalada 5l DaImbulla lll Damillos 7,3l Davis, Major lol Davy, John l05 Davy, John 107 Dawson, Capt. lo9 de Bochouver 76,78 de Mel, Lt. Col. Maurice l46,
l7ll 75 de Mel, Rear Admiral l83 de Meuron, Brig. Gen 102 de Saram, Lt. Col. F. C. 55
83 de Weert 75,77 Defence Agreement l40 Denis, Major Gen. Il48 Devanampiya Tissa 5 Devi 10 Dharmapala 63, 64 Dhatusena 53 l30 Dighajantu l7 Diyatalawa l46, l62 Domingo Cam 77 Don John of Austria 70, 73 Dona Catherina 69 73, 75 76 Dondra 64, 70 78 Donoughmore, Lord l2l Doyle, Major Gen. 102 Duraiappah, Alfred l92 Duttagarmani 13,53, 129 Echelon Barracks la6 Ehelapola 108 Elara 8, 9 Elliot, Dr. lllll2 Engineer Training School l68 Ferguson, A.M. ll2 Fort Frederick 90 Fort Ostenburg 90 French Revolution 85 . Gajabahu 2l , 53, 129

Galle 80 Gamani lO Gannoruwa 73, 76,80 Geiger 31,33, 45,83,133,209 Getambe 76 Giritale l6 , 4l Giriya l6 Gloucester, Duke of l23 Gnanapragaser, Fr. 4 Gongalagoda Banda lllll2 Gotha 16 Guttika 7 Hacker, Major l70 Hannibal 71 Hanwella 87 Harding, General Sir John l5 Hardy Institute l68 Himalayas 48 Home, Lord l69 Hulft. General 81,84 Hults-dorf 81 India 3,140,144,203 Indonesia la4 Izham 23 Jaffna 64, 72,91 Jagatvijaya 45 Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP) 187 Jayatilleke, Capt. Roy l46 Jayatilleke, Lt. Col. 17l Jayaweikrema, Major Monty
58 Jayewardene, J. R. l42, 193 Jayewardene, T. G. ll8 Jetavanarama 22 John Sir l65 Johnston, Major lo2 Kadugannawa 109 Kaduruwella 16 Kahagala l6 Kakawansa, king lo Kallawewa l6 , 23 Kalinga 49
224

Page 261
Kalmumai 80 Kalpitiya 9l Kalutara 78,87 Kandula 10, 16 Kankesanthurai 3 Karalliadde 69,73,79 Kautiliya 28,30,35,37 Kelani 92 Keppitipola 107,108 Kerala 8
Khosrow I 9 King George VI 155 King of Kotte 72 King of Portugal 70 King of Sitawaka 72 Kirthi 89 Konappu Bandara 70,73 Kopay 65 Kotalawela, J.L. 123,160 Kotte 63, 72, 74, l3l Kottiyar 3,86 Kullasekera 45 Kumarasinghe 79 Kuweni 4 Lankapura 44 45, 132 Lokapasada l8 Luis Faria 76 Luis Pinto 76 Luxemburg, Duke of 90 Madugalle 108 Madura 23,45 Magadha 5 Magantota l6 Mahabharata 3537 Mahatittha 3 Mahave1i Ganga 40 Mahawamsa 4,9, 22,3l , 48,71 Mahela 16
Mahinda 5 Mahiyangana 6, 27 Maitland, Lt. Gen. 102 Maiyangana 15 Majumdar, Professor 8

2
Malabars 7 Malaya l5, 40 Malaya Rata 37 Maligakanda 70 Maligawatte 69 Manabharana 27, 28, 37 40 Mannar 91,158 Mantota 3 Matale rebellion 1.11 Mayadunne 62,63,125,133 Mayarata 39 McDowell, Gen. Hay 100 Megha 49 Mendis, G.C 16, 26, 45 50 Minneriya 22 Mirissavatiya l8 Molligoda 108 Montogomery, Field Marshal
65 Moore, Brigadier 147,154 Morgan, Richard ll2 Morya 32 Mountbatten, Admiral ll8 Mulleriyawa 66 Muneeswaram 3 Muttusamy 99 Mylius, Lt. 113 Nagaragiri 44 l32 Naguleswaran 3 Nallur 65 72 Nandimitta l6 Napoleon 98 Narayana 41 Naushirvan 9 Negombo 80,87,92 Nelson 98 Nikapitiya 77 Nila 2l North O2 Nugawela, E. A. l.23 Oliphant, Sir Anthony lll Orissa 8 Pakistan lao, l44

Page 262
Panduvijaya 45 Pandya 8,46 Pandyan, King 4 Pandyans 8 Parakrama Bahu 30,53 Parakrama Bahu II 130 Parakrama Bahu II 50 Parakrama Bahu VI 53,3l Parakrama Bahu IX 62 Parakrama Samudra 47 Parakramapura 44 Pararasa Sekaram 72 77 Pathans 8 Pattini, Goddess 2l Peiris, Paul 3, 6l Perera, Fr. S.G. 104 Perera, Lt. Coll. MLDA 173 Perera, Major General Denis
93 Persival 93 Phussadeva l7 Pilimatalawa 99, l02 Polonnaruwa 26, 27, 36 Port Operating Organisation
63 Post and Telegraph Depart
ment:S 163 Private Jacotine ll7, l34 Public Works Department l63. Puran Appu lill ll2 Pybus 89 Queroz 7l Rahunu Rata 37 Raigam Bandara 62 Raigam Korale 62,63 Railway Department les3 Raja of Calicut 68 Rajadhi l27 Rajadhi Rajasinghe 90,99 Rajadirajah 45 Rajakariya ill:0 Rajarajah 130 Rajarajah II 26
2

Rajarata 26, 27, 32,37 Rajaratnavacari 28 Rajasinghe 79, 84,133 Rajasinghe I l 25, 132 Rajasinghe III l27 Rajasinghe, Sri Vijaya 88 Rajasinghe, Sri Wickrama 99,
102 Rajavaliya 9 Rajavalli 2l,48 Rajendra I. 26 Rajputs 8 Ramanayake, Capt. 154 Ramanna 34, 44 Ranatunge, Lt. Gen. 205 Rasanayagam, Mudaliyar 27, 50 Rattakara 32 Ratwatte, Lt. Col. l63 Reid, Brigadier F. S. lS7, lo2,
164 Rockhouse l46 Rome 72 Ruhunu 27, 4l Ruhunu Rata 14 Ruvanvelisaya l9 Sadhatissa l4 Salawatta 3 Saman 89 Sandemain 50 Sandhurst l48 Sanghamitta 5 Sangili 65,77 Santa Cruz 77 Sastri, Nilakanta 45 Selby, H. C. ll2 Senanayake, D. S. l.2ll27,153,
56 Senanayake, Dudley S8,160
176, 18O, 186 Senanayake, Maithripala l70 Senarat 76.8427 Seneviratne, Cpl D. B. ll.7 Seneviratne, Major Gen. 148
26

Page 263
Sengottavan 22 Sigiriya 36 Sikhg 8 Simon Correa 76 Singh, Sri Vira Caparendra 87 Sita Wake 6272 Siva 3 Skinner, Major 109 Slim, Field Marshal Sir
William 56 Sotupala Bandara 70 Soulbury, Lord l2l Sri Vallablp 27 4l 46 St. Sebastian 81 Stewart, Col. 02 Sujampati 25 Suranimala 16, 17 Suratissa 7 Tanjore 8 Tennent 359, 2l 28 Theraputta les Thimpu 203 Thuparama 6 Tinnevelly 8 Tiruchelvam M. 186 Tiruketeeswaram 3 Tirukoneswaram 378 Tissa, King lo Tissamaharama 14 162 Tittharaba l5 Tondeswaram 3 Torrington, Lord ll2 Trichnopoly 8 Trincomalee 86,91 Udarata 69 Udugama, Capt. 148 Udugama, Lt. Col. 189 Udugama, Major Gen. 185 Vadukoddai 191 Vakirigala 36 Van Angelbeck 93 Vasco da Gama 61,98 Veddahs 15,32 í Ve1akaram 27

Vellorè l04
Veuda ß9 Vickrama Bahu 37 Vickramabaħu ftit 5 Vidiya Bandara 63.642 Viharadevi l0 Vijay Bahu 3l Vijayabahu II 26, 53, il30 Wijayanagar 5l 131 Vijayangar Èkspre 49 Vijayapala 79 Vijayarajapura 27 Viljithapura 15 Vira Pandya 44 Vishnu 89 Vishnu Devala 70,78 Walagambahu 21
Wattala 92 Weerasorria, N.E. 72
Weeratunga, Lt. Gen. 205 Weeratunga, Major Gen. 148 Weeratunge Brigadier 194 Wellawaya 162 Wertenburg, Duke of 90 Weymss, General 101 Wickramasuriya, Lt. Col. 170 Wickreamabahu 62 Wijaya 3 * Wijayabahu VIII 62 Wijeyekoon, Col. 164,171,173,
l75, 183 Wijeyekoon, Gen. 189 Wijeyekoon, Lt. Col. 154, 158, 160
William III of Orange 91 William Pitt 98 Wilson, Major Gen. 102 Wimaladharma 73,74, 84, l27, Wimaladharma, Narendra Singha
lO Wimaladharmasuriya II 87 Wolvendhal 8 Wriggins, Howard 182 Yapahuwa 36 Yogandhara 62

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Page 265
Err
Page 4 Para l Line 5 for "this Page 20 Heading of Chapter 3-il Page 21 Last para line l For " Page22 In heading "Fourth II
433 Page 30 Para 3 Last line for " Page 32 Para comencing Vyaddas Page 34 Last para Line 8 1
"cowhorns" Page 45 Para 3 Line 8- delete Page 89 Para 2 Line 10 for "in
riate" Page 97 Para 3 Line 5-for "huu Pagell3 Para 2 Linel-for 1976 Pagel28 Para 2 Line 2- for "il
tilal' Page 132 Para 2 Line 2 from bot Page 158 Para l Line 15 for "Jay Para 2 Line l Delete "Ceylon" Page 166 Para 3 Line 5 - for "t Pagel68 Para l Line 24 for "
bridging" read "mini bridging." Page 176 Para 2 Line 2 - for "e Page 182 Para 3 Line 11 - for " Page 207 Para 2 Line 2 -for "ce Page2l3 Para 3 Line 2 -add fu
become "In"

ata
s" read "his" hsert "Fourth" after "Third" referce" read "reference" nvasion...-" for AD 43 read AD
Machiavilli" read "Machiavelli" S Line 2-for "waht" read "what"
Delete "a" between "in" and
"for"
appropriate" read "inapprop
hdred a " read "a hundred"
read 796 in substantial" read "insubstan
O for "friSt" read "Eir:St" eweikrema", v read. "Jayewickrema" 2 "the Army" and ... substitute
ake" read o "talk" • mind laying and watermanship, e laying, watermanship and
ne" read "end"
has" read "have" ntred" read "centre" illstop after "activities". "in"

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=